

THE 'NEW EMERGING FORCES' IN
INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY

by

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VOLUME I

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DECLARATION

This thesis is entirely the result of my own original research conducted whilst a Research Scholar in the Department of International Relations, Australian National University.



(J. R. Angel)

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In making the following acknowledgements, I should like to stress that responsibility for the views expressed in the thesis rests solely with myself, except when another's opinion has been specifically cited. That an individual or institution is mentioned in this acknowledgement is not intended to imply endorsement of my views by those whose assistance is acknowledged. On the other hand, had it not been for this assistance, I should not have been in a position to form my own opinion and the thesis, if it had eventuated at all, would have been very different.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations are used in citations of material.

A-A Preparatory Meeting 1964: Meeting of Ministers in Preparation for the Second Afro-Asia Conference.

A-A Speaks: Asia-Africa Speaks from Bandung.

H.R. Abdulgani, A.A. Press: Asian-African Press, Mirror or Struggling A-A Civilizations.

H.R. Abdulgani, Pantjasila: Pantjasila, The Prime Mover of the Indonesian Revolution.

C. Adams, Sukarno: Sukarno, An Autobiography as told to Cindy Adams.

Background: The Territory of the Indonesian State: Discussions in the meeting of Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Investigating Committee for Preparation of Indonesia's Independence): Background to Indonesia's Policy Towards Malaysia.

Beograd: Indonesia and the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries: Beograd, September, 1961.

A.C. Brackman, Second Front: Southeast Asia's Second Front: The Power Struggle in the Malay Archipelago.

Constitution 1945: The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.

H. Feith, Decline: The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia.

W.H. Hanna, Sequel: Sequel to Colonialism: The 1957-1960 Foundations for Malaysia.

- D. Hindley, PKI: The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951-1963.
- Ind. Rev.: The Indonesian Revolution: Basic Documents and the Idea of Guided Democracy.
- G. McT. Kahin, A-A Conference: The Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April, 1955.
- G. McT. Kahin (ed.), Governments and Politics: Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia.
- G. McT. Kahin (ed.), Major Governments: Major Governments of Asia.
- G. McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution: Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia.
- D. S. Lev, Transition: The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959.
- J. S. Mintz, Mohammed etc.: Mohammed, Marx and Marhaen: The Roots of Indonesian Socialism.
- G. Modelski, Foreign Policy: A Theory of Foreign Policy.
- Orba: Orba: A Guide to the New Government Policy.
- Pantja Sila: Basis of State: Pantja Sila: The Basis of the State of the Republic of Indonesia.
- Proceedings: Second A-A Preparation: Proceedings of the Meeting of Ministers in preparation for the Second African-Asian Conference held in Djakarta, Indonesia, April 10-15, 1964.
- Reflections: Reflections upon the Indonesian Revolution.
- Resounding Voice: The Resounding Voice of the Indonesian Revolution: Independence Day Message by H.E. President Sukarno, Djakarta, August 17, 1963: Supplements: Manipol-USDEK & The Birth of Pantjasila.

Sel. Doc.: Selected Documents: Book One: Some Aspects Concerning Progress and Principles of the Indonesian Revolution.

Sukarno, Bendera I: Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, Vol. 1.

Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-'64: Indonesia's Political Manifesto 1959-1964.

Sukarno, Reach to the Stars: Reach to the Stars! A Year of Self-Reliance.

W.F. Wertheim, Society: Indonesian Society in Transition: A Study of Sociological Change.

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I

INTRODUCTION

1. THE SUBJECT OF THIS STUDY

'It is no longer revolutionary to suggest that we live in a revolutionary world.' This was the view expressed in 1966 by Manfred Halpern.¹ It has indeed become commonplace to hear that we live in a revolutionary age, that the world is rapidly being transformed, and this has especially been so since the end of the Second World War. As Spanier points out, 'the postwar era has been one of constant change, accompanied by ferment, turmoil and violence'.² One of the most striking of the changes that have occurred, and one with which much of the ferment, turmoil and violence has been associated, has been the emergence of the 'new', the 'underdeveloped' or the 'developing' nations. These new sovereign states, having obtained their independence from colonial rule, some peacefully, some by force, have been grappling with formidable domestic

1

Manfred Halpern, 'The Revolution of Modernization in National and International Society', in Carl J. Friedrich (ed.), Nomos VIII Revolution, Atherton Press, New York, 1966, p.178.

2

John W. Spanier, World Politics in an Age of Revolution, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1967, p.3.

problems and have been asserting themselves in regional and world affairs. This phenomenon has been described variously, for example, as the 'anti-colonial revolution', the 'revolution of modernization' and the 'revolution of rising expectations', to mention but a few of the terms that have come into common usage.

Associated with the emergence of these new nations has been the appearance on the national, regional and world stages of charismatic leaders from these countries, each leader propounding an ideology, predominantly to his own people, but also, to varying degrees, to the people of the developing nations in general and to the world at large. In C.J. Friedrich's words, 'The market place is filled with the clamor of voices proclaiming convictions which to be effective would require radical change in existing societies.'¹ Radical change is precisely what most of these ideologies call for, some more dogmatically than others. Reflected in these ideologies is a view of the nature of society, a view applicable particularly to the

1

Carl J. Friedrich, 'An Introductory Note on Revolution', in Carl J. Friedrich (ed.), op. cit., p.3.

new states and their problems. Also reflected is a view of the world and of world problems, leading to a vision of the contribution which the new nations can make towards building what is considered to be a better world.

To most Westerners, these ideologies appear to be unrealistic, especially when examined in the context of economic, political and social 'realities', viewed pragmatically. To many, they appear insincere or hypocritical, especially when compared to the performance of their propounders. To some, they are downright dangerous, threatening the stability not only of the new nations but of the whole world order. Whatever the validity of the criticisms that can be levelled against these ideologies and their propagators, the ideologies seem to have been widely accepted and the new nations have, for better or worse, begun to make their presence felt in international affairs. Whilst there is a risk that romantics can overestimate the importance of these new ideologies, there is much truth in the following view of C.B. Macpherson:

The revolutions and the ideologies likely to be most important in the second half of the twentieth century are those of the underdeveloped countries. This proposition does not denigrate the obviously

great continuing importance of the Communist revolutions of the first half of the century or of the Marxist ideology. They will go on working themselves out. But the new revolutions, having altered the terms on which the senior revolutionary ideologies can continue to be influential, may be regarded as the critical new factor in the problems of revolution and ideology of the next several decades. The revolutionary and ideological currents in the underdeveloped countries, currents which are not formed entirely from either Marxist or liberal-democratic ideologies,¹ are already having and will increasingly have an effect on the Communist and Western structures of power and ideas.²

It is therefore worthwhile, particularly for those who do not share the underdeveloped countries' experience, viewpoint, values and problems, to try to understand the new nations' perception of themselves and of the world.

Conspicuous amongst the new nations has been Indonesia, led by the flamboyant President Sukarno, whose voice, in the mid-nineteen-sixties, became to Western ears one of the most raucous of those clamouring in the market place. This thesis is basically an

1

An elaboration of this view may be found in C.B. Macpherson, 'Revolution and Ideology in the late Twentieth Century', *ibid.*, pp.143-150.

2

C.B. Macpherson, *ibid.*, pp.139-140. See also pp. 150-153 for an assessment of the possible effects of the new revolutions, particularly on Western ideology.

attempt to understand the Indonesian view of the world and of Indonesia's role in world affairs, as expressed in the Ideology of the New Emerging Forces (NEFO)¹, and as reflected in Indonesian foreign policy. The central concern of the thesis is thus the new emerging forces concepts, viewed in the context of Indonesian foreign policy. This has involved primarily the study of the development of the NEFO doctrines and their relationship to Indonesian foreign policy, particularly in the Era of Confrontation from 1962 to 1965², when the New Emerging Forces Ideology enjoyed its greatest popularity. The more general Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution and the broader field of Indonesian foreign policy since independence are also reviewed to provide a wider perspective for this study.

Subsumed in the basic question of the relationship between NEFO Ideology and Indonesian foreign policy are the following:

1

The term NEFO Ideology and related terms are defined on pp. 629-631 below.

2

An explanation for the choice of the term 'Era of Confrontation' and of the nature of Indonesian foreign policy of the Era of Confrontation is contained in pp. 514-579 below.

- (i) What was the nature of the NEFO Ideology?
- (ii) What was the nature of Indonesian foreign policy, particularly between 1962 and 1965?
- (iii) What gave rise to the development of the NEFO Ideology in Indonesia and to the type of foreign policy that Indonesia adopted in theory and practice?
- (iv) What was the significance of the NEFO Ideology for Indonesia and for world affairs?

A particular ideology does not develop in isolation. The Nefo Ideology is part of a complicated pattern of causal relationships involving ideas and doctrines on the one hand and, on the other, actions, which represent an application of doctrines or to which the doctrines represent a response. An understanding of part of this pattern is dependent upon an understanding of the whole and, more particularly, of the most relevant related parts. Expressed in terms of contexts, one could say that, to be understood fully, the NEFO Ideology needs to be viewed in both an ideological context and a policy context.

The most immediate and relevant ideological context of the NEFO Ideology is that of the Indonesian concepts which could broadly be grouped under the title

of 'Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution'¹, an ideology from which the NEFO Ideology developed and from which much of the meaning and appeal of the NEFO doctrines were derived. The most immediate policy context of the NEFO Ideology is that of Indonesian foreign policy of the Era of Confrontation for which the NEFO Ideology provided both an inspiration and a rationalisation or justification. To interpret Indonesian foreign policy of this period, however, one requires an overview of Indonesian foreign policy, of the objectives, principles and practice of Indonesian foreign policy from the proclamation of independence in 1945².

From these two immediate contexts of ideology and policy, one is drawn into increasingly marginal contexts, - e.g. developments in world affairs and in Indonesian domestic affairs, Indonesian experience prior to independence, foreign ideas and foreign policies of other nations, - all of which are interrelated and relevant to an understanding of Indonesian foreign policy and NEFO Ideology. This interrelatedness is

1

Discussed in Chapter II, pp.51ff. below.

2

Discussed in Chapter III, pp.229ff. below.

particularly apparent when one comes to examine the determinants of NEFO Ideology and of Indonesian foreign policy, i.e., those factors that caused the NEFO Ideology to emerge and that influenced the way in which the ideology and the foreign policy developed. The ideological developments, the foreign policy developments and their determinants are so closely linked that an appreciation of one is difficult without some attention to the others. In order, for example, to appreciate the relationship between the NEFO Ideology and Indonesian foreign policy of the Era of Confrontation, one must see this relationship in the context of other relationships between ideology and developments in Indonesian affairs. The major sources of influence on the development of NEFO Ideology and Indonesian foreign policy and the more relevant relationships between these sources may be illustrated as in Figure 1¹. The central consideration of this study is but a small part of a complete picture and requires excursions beyond what is strictly NEFO Ideology and beyond the foreign policy period which is of most direct relevance².

1

See p.10, below.

2

See the discussion of the problems of limiting the scope of the thesis, pp.16-19 below.




Fig. 1. Major Determinants of NEFO Ideology and of Indonesian Foreign Policy.

2. METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

(a) The Approach adopted

Given the complexity and interrelatedness of ideology and Indonesian foreign policy and their determinants, the selection of a basis for classifying and organising the material has been a formidable task.

The broadest division that has been made is that between ideas and actions, between words and deeds, between ideology and foreign policy and between declarations of aims and of principles and actual behaviour. As far as possible, these two aspects of the study have been separated, although it has not proved practicable to maintain an absolute separation in the course of exposition. This separation is reflected in the chapter headings and in the major sub-headings. This type of division assumes that the official statements on ideology and on the principles and objectives of Indonesian foreign policy are worthy of serious consideration and that they should not be lightly dismissed as nothing more than propaganda. I have regarded these statements as reflections of the leaders' values, aspirations and perceptions of the world and hence as

one of the determinants of Indonesian foreign policy¹. I have attempted to review Indonesia's behaviour in international affairs in the light of the declarations made by the chief actors. As Weatherbee points out, Indonesian ideology is self-validating² and, whilst one can deplore the retreat to abstractions and to what appear to be meaningless slogans and subjective, even mythical 'realities', one does not come to an appreciation of either Indonesian foreign policy or ideology by applying criteria which, to Indonesians of Sukarno's persuasion, are irrelevant and even misinformed because they are based on a totally different and equally subjective perception of reality.

Similarly, description, analysis and evaluation have, wherever possible, been separated, because of the need to see particular policies and concepts in their context before they can be adequately assessed. Little in the way of understanding is to be gained from criticism which, to the Indonesian ideologists, is based

1

See the discussion of principles and ideology in relation to foreign policy, pp.243-254 below.

2

See Donald E. Weatherbee, Ideology in Indonesia : Sukarno's Indonesian Revolution, Monograph Series No.8, Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University, 1966, pp.16-17.

on an incomplete picture and hence a misunderstanding of the policy or concept involved. This separation, however has not at all times been the most economical and clearest means of exposition since to be meaningful, some description has required analysis and/or evaluation before further description could be profitably attempted. Thus, the distinction between description, analysis and evaluation is not so strongly reflected in major headings as is the distinction between declared and operative aspects of policy.

One of the major difficulties arising from the complexity and interrelatedness of the material and from the need for explanation of both Indonesian terminology and my own, has been to avoid repetition and pedanticism on the one hand and loss of clarity or verisimilitude on the other. A simple chronological arrangement of the material has not been suitable, since this would obscure the themes and causal links that are central to the argument of the thesis and, in particular, would not bring out the evolutionary or dynamic nature of the

ideology¹. A purely theoretical basis for division of the material has also been unsuitable since this would involve an arrangement of Indonesian ideas and activities in an artificially imposed framework that in many instances would be foreign and inapplicable to the situation in which the ideologists and policy-makers saw themselves to be operating. To be complete and consistent, such a basis would also involve exposition of material irrelevant to an understanding of the attitudes and activities of the policy-makers. Nevertheless, a number of theoretical distinctions and concepts have been used as an aid to description and analysis. These concepts and distinctions and the consequent terminology are explained at the beginning of the relevant sections, in an attempt to make explicit the theoretical assumptions that I have made in this enquiry².

The basic approach that was eventually adopted in this account could best be described as thematic. This

1

See pp.67-68 below. Pp.145-221 below illustrate this point.

2

M.J. Toll puts forward a convincing case for this procedure in his 'Foreign Policy Analysis: Theory and the Traditionalist Approach', Work-in-Progress Seminar, Department of International Relations, Australian National University, Canberra, 4/7/67. See esp. p.2.

has involved tracing the development of the important concepts and policies, discussing separately a number of interpretations of the way in which ideological and foreign policy factors have operated and then attempting to correlate these diverse elements. Whenever possible, the line of argument in a particular theme has been pursued with the minimum of interruptions. For this reason, basic terminology, whether Indonesian or my own, has been defined in separate sections preceding the thematic discussion in which it is used. Some of the Indonesian terms, however, have been better defined in the course of exposition, since their full implications only become clear when viewed in the context of the appropriate theme.

The danger inherent in the thematic approach is that it can attribute to Indonesian foreign policy and to the ideology greater purpose, consistency and co-ordination than has in fact existed. Nevertheless, some basis involving generalisation and interpretation has been necessary in order to describe in a meaningful way the myriad of complex actions and beliefs that have constituted Indonesian foreign policy and ideology. A thematic approach has seemed the best way to attempt this with the minimum of repetition and interruption and

with the maximum of verisimilitude. The adoption of this approach has been compatible with the emphasis of this study, which has been on attempting to understand how the Indonesian leaders have perceived the role of their country in world affairs and not on attempting to test the ideology or the foreign policy against a preconceived theoretical model.

(b) Setting Limits to the Scope of the Thesis

The subject of this thesis, as outlined at the beginning of this chapter, has given rise to the problem of setting limits to the scope of the study. Limits had to be imposed in two respects: first, on the period to be studied; second, on the areas of study to be covered.

On the question of time limitations, there is a convenient and fairly obvious ending point for the study of both the New Emerging Forces Ideology and Indonesian foreign policy, -- the coup of October 1, 1965 --, although some comments on the post-coup situation would seem desirable. As I have argued elsewhere¹, I do not

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J.R. Angel, 'Indonesia since the Coup', Australian Outlook, vol. 22, no.1, April 1968, pp.86-88.

see post-coup Indonesian foreign policy as representing a fundamental change from the past policies. The change that has occurred can be better appreciated and understood if viewed as a change in emphasis, in tactics and in immediate priorities.

The question of where to start the study is more difficult. The NEFO Ideology may be regarded as having assumed a distinctive form by 1960 (Sukarno's speech to the United Nations General Assembly) or 1961 (Sukarno's speech to the Belgrade Non-Aligned Conference)¹, but, as this ideology incorporated so many concepts of the Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution, thus representing the final stages of a continuum of ideological developments, to examine NEFO Ideology only from 1960 or 1961 is to miss a great deal of its significance for Indonesians and to fail to understand its full meaning².

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See later discussion on the date by which NEFO Ideology may be regarded as having emerged, pp.670-672 below.

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This was the only criticism which NEFO enthusiasts in Indonesia expressed to me when discussing George Modelski (ed.) The New Emerging Forces : Documents on the Ideology of Indonesian Foreign Policy, Documents and Data Paper No.2, Department of International Relations, Australian National University, Canberra, 1963. In Indonesia IV : Looking Back Over 1964, Department of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia, 1964, There is a section (pp.13-24) titled 'New Forces Build a New World' which appears to have been written with this criticism in mind.

For this reason, whilst the ideological developments after 1960 are the main concern of this thesis, it has been necessary to examine at some length the ideological elements outside the time limit (1960 or 1961-1965) and outside the area of study limit (NEFO Ideology as strictly defined) of the central theme of this thesis.

Indonesian foreign policy presents a similar type of problem. Mid-1962 has been selected as the starting point for Indonesian foreign policy of the Era of Confrontation¹. To understand what was happening in Indonesian foreign policy between 1962 and 1965, and why, one needs to examine Indonesian foreign policy of that period in the context of Indonesian foreign policy of other periods. One could also profitably examine developments in Indonesia's domestic affairs, in world affairs and in the foreign policies of other countries, especially those aligned with Indonesia, the most notable being China.

As this thesis is concerned primarily with the

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See later discussion on the reasons for the choice of this date as the beginning of the confrontation phase of Indonesian foreign policy, pp.489-490 & 514-516 below.

relationship between the NEFO Ideology and Indonesian foreign policy, I have adopted an Indonesia-centred approach, which emphasises the foreign policy aspect of Indonesian affairs, the importance of ideology in the study of Indonesian foreign policy and in particular, the NEFO doctrines in Indonesian ideology. I have tried to cover the most significant elements in the other dimensions of enquiry by referring to these elements where I have considered them important and relevant, but cannot claim to have discussed the marginal areas fully or, as a result, to have necessarily given them the importance that they warrant as influences in Indonesian foreign policy. The restoration of balance, if such needs to be restored, must be left to others who wish to enquire into Indonesian foreign policy from a different viewpoint.

(c) Problems of Generalisation and Interpretation.

The attempt to take into account the most significant elements in areas of enquiry marginal to the central consideration of this thesis, -- e.g. developments in Indonesian domestic politics, in world affairs and in Chinese foreign policy --, has necessitated

generalisation and simplification, often based on the acceptance of interpretations by various authorities. In fields outside of Indonesian affairs such complications as those arising from rival interpretations cannot, however, be discussed at any length without distorting the Indonesian emphasis of this thesis.

Within the areas of enquiry that are directly concerned with Indonesia, there are also rival interpretations, the most important of which are summarised by Weatherbee¹. It seems to me that each of these, including Weatherbee's own interpretation, provides a partial explanation of and useful insight into Indonesian politics, ideology and foreign policy. The evidence to support each interpretation rests very largely on subsidiary interpretations. So many 'facts' need interpretation before they are of any use to an understanding of Indonesian affairs. It is not my aim to examine in detail evidence to support or reject each of the opinions that together constitute any of the major

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Weatherbee, op. cit., pp.3-9. See also J.D. Legge, Indonesia, Prentice-Hall, Inc., New Jersey, 1965, pp.161-169, for a more evaluative account,

interpretations to which I refer. There is not space to do this and, in many instances, the most meticulous and lengthy discussion of a particular issue is still unlikely to produce conclusive evidence for a definitive explanation. I have therefore contented myself with only a brief discussion of alternative explanations and interpretations where these exist, whilst concentrating on those that provide the greatest insight into the relationship between NEFO ideology and Indonesian foreign policy.

(d) Sources

In so far as I have gained an insight into Indonesian foreign policy and ideology, this has been derived largely from interviews in Indonesia and Australia. For the reason mentioned in the acknowledgements, material gained from interviews has not generally been presented as evidence. Instead, public sources such as books on Indonesian affairs, official publications, articles, newspaper reports and speeches have been used for this purpose. In the case of speeches and articles by Indonesian leaders, I have used those sources most readily available. In the pre-independence period, these have mostly been in

Indonesian, in the post-independence period, official translations. I have, in particular, made frequent use of collections of speeches and articles, for example, those of Sukarno, Subandrio and Roeslan Abdulgani¹.

3. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NEFO IDEOLOGY AND
INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY : A GENERAL STATEMENT

Modelski describes the New Emerging Forces Ideology as 'a carefully thought out body of ideas that serves as a guide, inspiration and also rationalisation of its (i.e., Indonesia's) international position'². This is a good starting point for an analysis of the ideology and of its relationship to Indonesian foreign policy, but it should not lead to the conclusion that

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As citation of particular speeches and articles by reference to their title would involve lengthy footnotes, especially when the source consulted is in Indonesian, I have usually merely cited the book and page number in which the material occurs. Exceptions have been made when the speech or article involved is particularly well known. On the other hand, the date on which the statement was originally made is often important to my argument and this would not be indicated simply by reference to a collection published some years later. For this reason, the date of the original publication or delivery is indicated in brackets at the beginning of the citation.

2

Modelski (ed.), op. cit., p. ii.

the relationship is a simple one. Other relationships, as summarised below, must also be taken into account.

(a) NEFO Ideology - Indonesian Foreign Policy of the Era of Confrontation.

The evolution of the NEFO Ideology and the development of Indonesia's conspicuously aggressive stance in foreign policy occurred during roughly the same period, the former preceding the latter. Both were features of Indonesian affairs in the first half of the nineteen-sixties. On the level of ideology, the NEFO doctrines projected the Indonesian Revolution beyond Indonesia, applied Indonesian revolutionary principles more forcefully to world affairs and stressed the importance of world revolution, not only for the improvement of the world, but also for the furtherance of the Indonesian Revolution at home. On the level of policy, there was a similar development. Foreign policy considerations were given increasing priority over domestic considerations and foreign policy became increasingly revolutionary, aggressive, doctrinaire,

extremist and irrational¹. The NEFO Ideology's function of guiding, inspiring and rationalising Indonesian foreign policy is thus most apparent when the ideology is considered in relation to the policies of the Era of Confrontation. This close interrelationship was, however, complicated by other relationships.

(b) Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution -
NEFO Ideology

The NEFO Ideology was not a totally new development in Indonesian ideology. It represented a culmination of the pre-NEFO Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution. NEFO doctrines were based on concepts and principles of long standing, dating back at least as far as the nineteen-twenties. The essentially new element in the NEFO Ideology was the emphasis on the application of these ideas and principles to the world situation, with a resulting change in revolutionary priorities and the introduction of some new terminology. The repercussions of Indonesian revolutionary ideology on Indonesia's view of world affairs and on foreign policy

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That is, 'irrational' by pragmatic Western standards, although not irrational in terms of revolutionary NEFO Principles.

were more explicitly stated and more thoroughly thought out than before. In this sense, the NEFO Ideology did represent a projection of the Indonesian Revolution into the international arena. It did not, however, create the international dimension of the Revolution, nor did it introduce the first demand for radicalism in Indonesian foreign policy. This dimension and this demand were already present in the earlier ideology, though they were less conspicuous. By restating, rearranging and, to some extent, reinterpreting the concepts of the previous ideology, the NEFO Ideology gave a new point and a new impetus to the old ideology, an impetus directed chiefly towards international objectives, but an impetus which was also expressed domestically in revitalised revolutionary fervour and stepped up radicalism.

The NEFO culmination was, however, incomplete, because the 1965 coup resulted in the downfall of the leading Indonesian propagators of NEFO doctrines before these doctrines had been completely worked out at the level of ideology and before they had been systematically transformed into programmes and policies.

(c) Indonesian Foreign Policy - Era of Confrontation.

As the Ideology of the New Emerging Forces represented a culmination of the Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution, so, in one sense, the policies of the Era of Confrontation represented a culmination of elements in Indonesian foreign policy since independence. The revolutionary foreign policy that became increasingly conspicuous after mid-1962 was a particular type of development from the earlier foreign policy: the more radical elements developed at the expense of the more moderate ones. The long established objectives, principles and practices were arranged in new priorities and with new emphases, which altered the dominant character and trend of Indonesian foreign policy, but the radical elements in the policies of the Era of Confrontation were not without precedent. The Era of Confrontation was thus as much a culmination of previous Indonesian foreign policy as it was a departure from it, depending on whether one regards the moderate or the radical elements of previous foreign policy as the more characteristic. Sukarno and his supporters tended to see the element of radicalism as the constant theme,

providing continuity between the Era of Confrontation and previous phases.

(d) Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution - Indonesian Foreign Policy.

The Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution was expounded by Indonesian leaders, most notably Sukarno, but was also manifested more generally in the nationalist movement's thought and action before independence and in the official ideology and policies of the independent Republic of Indonesia. This ideology conditioned the way in which Indonesia's leaders viewed and interpreted the world, their nation's interests and problems, Indonesia's role in world affairs and their own personal roles in national and international affairs. It served as the inspiration and guide to the country's struggles on both the domestic and international levels, outlining the ultimate goals and the means to their realisation and justifying both, idealistically, by reference to universal values, and 'realistically', by reference to history. The Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution provided the framework in which the Indonesian political dialogue was conducted and permeated the emotional and conceptual components of the policy-making process. In

this sense, the Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution was a determinant of policy, both foreign and domestic.

This was not, however, merely a one way process. As well as providing inspiration and guidance for policies, the ideology was also used to provide justification and rationalisation for policies. The Ideology of the Revolution and Indonesian foreign policy were thus involved in a two way relationship, each influencing the other.

(e) Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution - Domestic Developments - International Developments - Indonesian Foreign Policy.

The interrelatedness of ideology and policy as depicted above, does not exclude other factors as determinants of either ideology or policy. There are, in fact, considerable complications to the above relationship.

The Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution was in part based on Indonesian experience at home and abroad, as interpreted in the light of the ideologists' theories about society and history. The problems faced at home and abroad and the success or failure of policies designed to deal with these problems formed part of the

analysis on which the ideology was based. In its rationalising role, the ideology explained away the domestic and international situations over which the policy-makers had little or no control. The type of problems faced by the leaders influenced their selection of the ideological themes to be emphasised and the formulations and slogans to be used in particular expositions of ideology. For example, as colonialism became a vanishing phenomenon, 'neo-colonialism' replaced 'colonialism' in the ideologists' terminology. Cumulatively, these selections and formulations affected the trend in development of the ideology. Different individuals and the groups influencing or influenced by them also varied in their detailed interpretations of the ideology, in the weight given to ideological as against more pragmatic considerations and in the type of programmes into which ideological objectives and principles were translated. Shifts in the domestic and international alliances of groups and individuals, the interplay of group and personal motives and rivalries, and the changes in the composition of and power constellations surrounding the policy-makers influenced both ideological formulations and the type of policies pursued. For example, the rise of the PKI

(Indonesian Communist Party) as an influential force in Indonesian affairs during Guided Democracy was paralleled by the increasing resemblance of Indonesian ideology and policy to communist views.

On the other hand, the ideology, as a major means of legitimisation for post-independence regimes, provided the framework in which the Indonesian political dialogue was conducted. This means not only that ideology affected policy, as already mentioned, but also that it affected domestic and international developments. The radical nature of the ideology tended, as a general rule, to promote radicalism, at least nominally, on the part of those individuals and groups who aspired to power. It also tended to give the long-term advantage in the political competition to the more radical individuals and groups. The basically revolutionary nature of the ideology and the conspicuous place which ideological issues occupied in Indonesia's political life, especially when Sukarno dominated, were also factors operating against pragmatic solutions to economic and social problems, thereby contributing to the accumulation of unsolved problems and, ultimately, to the increasing instability of the country. Internationally, Indonesia, as an avowedly radical-socialist

country, tended to gain the sympathy of other radical and socialist nations, whilst the more conservative states regarded the revolutionary Republic with suspicion, alternating, from time to time, with attempts to win Indonesia over to less revolutionary ways. Despite Indonesia's commitment to non-alignment in relation to the cold war, increases in ideological radicalism, especially when accompanied by radical policies, tended to affect the balance of power between the 'conservative' western bloc and the 'progressive' communist bloc, in regional, if not in world affairs.

The Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution was thus interrelated with both domestic and international developments which were in turn interrelated. For example, prevailing relations with the communist or western blocs and the state of the cold war affected foreign aid and foreign investment patterns which in turn affected the domestic economic and political situations in Indonesia. World trade trends and fluctuations in international prices for Indonesian export commodities provide another obvious example of international influences on the domestic situation. Even in purely political terms, the domestic situation was subject to influence from international developments.

The rift between Peking and Moscow, for example, had an important effect on Indonesia's internal politics, once the PKI sided with Peking and thereby became a more difficult force to contain. Conversely, changes in the degree of domestic economic and political stability and changes in the alliance of key individuals and groups, resulting in increased or decreased power for radical elements, affected other nations' attitudes and policies towards Indonesia and hence the international situation with which Indonesian foreign policy had to cope. For example, the pursuit of domestic revolutionary objectives through such measures as Guided Democracy and Guided Economy, and the accompanying economic decline in Indonesia influenced the stance of both western and communist bloc countries towards Indonesia in international affairs.

Whilst acknowledging the interrelatedness of Indonesian foreign policy and the Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution, discussed in (d) above, one can also regard foreign policy as interrelated with both international developments and domestic developments.

The former relationship is the more obvious, since foreign policy is both a response to international developments and an attempt to influence these

developments. Indonesian foreign policy was no exception in this respect. In the field of foreign policy, for example, Indonesia's policy-makers had to cope with Dutch opposition to the Republic's creation, with the cold war, with the Peking-Moscow split and with such problems as colonialism, the threats to world and regional peace and the growing gap between the developed and developing nations. On these and other international issues, Indonesia was active with varying degrees of success. Whatever the setbacks suffered in these foreign policy ventures, there can be no doubt that Indonesian foreign policy influenced international developments, even if not to the extent that Sukarno hoped for. Indonesian foreign policy and international developments were thus interrelated.

So too were Indonesian foreign policy and domestic developments. Mention has already been made of the influence on policy of changes in the composition of the domestic ruling elite. The steady rise and the dramatic fall in 1965 of the PKI, with resulting changes in foreign policy trends, present the most dramatic example. Another obvious example of the influence of domestic developments on foreign policy has been the effect of continuing domestic economic

problems, leading to the pursuit of foreign aid and investment from both the communist and western world, alternating with the rejection of assistance from one or other of these sources, in response to domestic political and ideological pressures. Mention should also be made of Sukarno's use of foreign policy as a diversion from domestic economic and political problems and as a means of promoting national unity through directing hostility against a foreign enemy and scapegoat. Conversely, the type of foreign policies pursued affected domestic developments. The type of relations cultivated abroad influenced economic trends at home and also political developments, particularly when critics of the government could be depicted as friends of foreign enemies and hence as potential or actual subversives. Indonesia's drift into the Peking orbit, for example, tended to accelerate economic decline through the loss of assistance from the west, whilst encouraging the rise of the PKI and ultimately the dramatic swing against the communists. Sukarno's pursuit of ambitious foreign policies aimed at leadership of the underdeveloped world and at regional dominance also contributed to the accumulation of domestic problems through diverting resources and energies from domestic pursuits. The

internal effects of confrontation provide one of the best examples of the way in which Indonesian foreign policy adversely affected the domestic situation.

To summarise, the close relationship between the Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution and Indonesian foreign policy was complicated by a number of other relationships which could be represented diagrammatically as follows:




Fig. 2. Relationship between Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution, Indonesian Foreign Policy, Domestic Developments and International Developments.

(f) NEFO Ideology - Indonesian Foreign Policy of the Era of Confrontation - Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution - Indonesian Foreign Policy.

In the same, the close relationship between NEFO Ideology and Indonesian foreign policy of the Era of Confrontation, discussed in (a) above, was also complicated by other relationships. Indonesian foreign

policy of the Era of Confrontation was not solely dependent upon nor simply the result of the development of the NEFO Ideology. The NEFO Ideology was not solely dependent on nor simply the effect ideologically of Indonesia's declared and operative foreign policy of this period. Recognition of the above close relationship should be balanced by the realisation that each can also be regarded as one type of logical development from previous ideology and from previous foreign policy respectively, each consistent with and justifiable by reference to its respective precedents.

Further, NEFO Ideology, by incorporating the major concepts of the Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution, by reinterpreting these concepts and by providing new emphasis and a new direction and impetus to the older ideology, was able to draw on previously accepted principles for legitimisation purposes. The Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution was thus available as a source of supplementary justification and inspiration for the confrontation phase of Indonesian foreign policy. The NEFO Ideology also represented an assessment of Indonesian foreign policy experience, upon which the ideology drew to verify the NEFO theory and Principles. In this sense, the NEFO Ideology was influenced not

merely by the policies of the confrontation phase but also by Indonesian foreign policy as a whole. The ideology's influence on Indonesian foreign policy was to encourage a development towards the confrontation posture, thereby contributing to the evolution of the Era of Confrontation phase.

The Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution, the objectives, principles and practice of Indonesian foreign policy since independence, the NEFO Ideology and the confrontation phase of Indonesian foreign policy were thus all interrelated (Figure 3). As a result, NEFO doctrines provided an ideological foundation not only for foreign policy of the Era of Confrontation but also, in retrospect, for previous foreign policy and, hence, for general Indonesian foreign policy at least until 1965. Increased radicalism to an unprecedented degree was therefore accomplished without apparent loss of continuity.




Fig. 3. Relationship between NEFO Ideology, Indonesian Foreign Policy, Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution and the Policies of the Era of Confrontation.

(g) NEFO Ideology - Indonesian Foreign Policy of the Era of Confrontation - Domestic Developments - International Developments.

The evolution of the NEFO Ideology and the emergence of the Era of Confrontation phase of Indonesian foreign policy were roughly simultaneous. As well as reflecting the influences involved in the relationships illustrated in Figure 3 above, both developments were also manifestations of the same type of response at different levels, one of ideology, the other of policy, to the total situation prevailing in the nineteen sixties. Ideology and policy shared similar and, indeed, some common determinants¹. The policies that

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See the diagram of sources of determinants of NEFO Ideology and Indonesian foreign policy, Fig.1, p.10 above.

constituted Indonesia's aggressive and defiant confrontation stance represented a more inflexible application of the radical tendencies in Indonesia's traditional¹ foreign policy objectives, principles and practices, as seen in the light of the NEFO Ideology, to the situation existing from 1962, in an attempt to solve problems produced by a combination of domestic and international developments (Figure 4).




Fig. 4. Relationship between NEFO Ideology, Indonesian Foreign Policy of the Era of Confrontation, Domestic Developments and International Developments.

The NEFO Ideology's inspirational and rationalising function for Indonesia's confrontation phase of foreign policy is therefore not simply an indication of a close relationship between these two elements but is also an indication of the conjunction of these and other

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That is, 'traditional' since independence. I am not here attempting to find parallels for the Era of Confrontation in pre-independence history.

factors.

(h) The Total Pattern of Relationships

The interrelatedness of domestic and international developments with ideology and foreign policy in a more general context than that of NEFO Ideology and confrontation has already been mentioned. The combination of the above relationships could be depicted thus (Figure 5):




Fig. 5. The complex Pattern of Relationships of which the NEFO Ideology - Indonesian Foreign Policy of the Era of Confrontation Relationship was a Part.

(i) Implications of these Relationships

The question arises as to why the above pattern of relationships operated in such a way as to promote an increasingly revolutionary stance, manifested in the

parallel developments of NEFO Ideology and Indonesian foreign policy of the Era of Confrontation. It is tempting to adopt a circular argument that accounts for each development by reference to the effect of the other: NEFO Ideology caused Indonesian foreign policy to become more revolutionary and Indonesia's confrontation stance required, for legitimisation purposes, the NEFO Ideology's more rigorous application of Indonesian revolutionary principles to international relations. Although this snowballing effect was part of the process, the momentum of each development being fostered and sustained by the other, this explanation seems inadequate, firstly because it provides an incomplete picture and secondly because it overestimates the necessity to apply NEFO Ideology by pursuing policies such as those of the Era of Confrontation.

The second weakness rests on the assumption that the acceptance of the NEFO Ideology necessarily required the adoption of the type of foreign policy that developed after mid-1962. It is not certain that this was so. But, in support of the assumption, it can be argued that Indonesia's foreign policy of the Era of Confrontation was not incompatible with NEFO doctrines. Furthermore, the new international emphases and

priorities which the NEFO Ideology gave to the concepts of the older Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution provided a more suitable basis for aggressive external policies than did the earlier ideology. On the other hand, the policy implications of the NEFO Ideology were never definitively spelled out and the Indonesian NEFO adherents were removed from positions of influence before NEFO Ideology had been consolidated in an effective programme and policy. One can therefore only infer the policy implications of the Ideology.

The major doctrines of the NEFO Ideology were not new and the extremist policies were not entirely without precedents. These policies therefore did not need NEFO Ideology for legitimisation, useful as it was in this role. What was new in policy from 1962 was the degree of adventurism, extremism, aggressiveness and dogmatism manifested in Indonesia's international postures and actions and, for that matter, in domestic policy. It is the dominance of irrational features, not merely their existence, that distinguishes Indonesian foreign policy of the Era of Confrontation from previous foreign policy. The NEFO Ideology's projection of the Indonesian Revolution beyond the national boundaries into the international arena and the resulting change in ideological

preoccupations gives some plausibility to the view that this ideological development provided the stimulus for Indonesia's extremist foreign policy development. The NEFO Ideology, however, did not create but rather emphasised the international dimension of the Indonesian Revolution. The international aspect of the Revolution was recognised in pre-NEFO ideology but tended to be subordinated to the national dimension. The NEFO Ideology therefore drew out and restated more emphatically the concepts and principles in pre-NEFO ideology pertaining to foreign affairs. Whilst this restatement had important inspirational and rationalising functions, it does not provide a sufficient explanation for the post-1962 policy developments. The difference in degree of ideological radicalism in Indonesian political thought before and after NEFO, and the difference between the pre- and post-NEFO Indonesian views of the world is disproportionate to the difference in the degree of extremism evidenced in foreign policy before and after 1962.

The Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution and, even more suitably, the NEFO Ideology, contained doctrines that could be and were used to inspire, guide and justify the policies of the Era of Confrontation.

These ideologies, particularly the latter, fostered a political outlook and atmosphere suitable for the pursuit of adventurist and extremist external policies. These policies could also be justified as consistent - though intensified - developments of past policy by reference to the more radical threads in pre-1962 foreign policy. In these senses, ideology and previous foreign policy were contributory factors to the development of post-1962 extremism, but the explanation for the way in which Indonesia's ideology and foreign policy developed in the sixties must, in addition, be sought in factors other than these. The potential for the defiant confrontation stance and for doctrinaire extremism existed in pre-NEFO ideology and foreign policy, yet the potential was not conspicuously actualised until after mid-1962 and, after that, was actualised with accelerating aggressiveness and inflexibility. Why was the potential not realised earlier and why, once it was realised, did aggressiveness and inflexibility increase so dramatically? What caused the radical tendencies in pre-1962 foreign policy to reach a culmination whilst others were neglected? What provided the impetus for the ideology and for the lessons from past foreign policy to be interpreted and applied in such an

increasingly extreme, doctrinaire and aggressive way?

The explanation is to be found in the restraints, opportunities and provocations arising from the domestic and international situations, factors which, in addition to ideology, influenced policy-making. In particular, the impetus for the ideological emphasis on international aspects of the Revolution, and for the dramatic hardening of Indonesian foreign policy from 1962 to 1965 came from the conjuncture of domestic developments, including the interplay of personal and group motives and alliances, of the development of the NEFO Ideology and of developments in world and regional affairs. This combination of circumstances presented Sukarno and the Indonesian Government with formidable problems. Frustration was particularly evident on the part of the leaders, especially Sukarno, of Sukarno's rivals and of sections of public opinion. Sukarno and his supporters encountered continuing setbacks in domestic and foreign policy and increasing difficulty both in visibly furthering the Indonesian Revolution through domestic and foreign policy and in maintaining their control over the way in which the Revolution was to develop. In the final years of Guided Democracy, it was becoming increasingly clear to observers unfettered by ideological

blinkers that the 'Revolution' was not advancing and was indeed endangered. This posed a threat to the survival of Sukarno's regime. The frustration and desperation shown by Sukarno and his policy-makers is closely related to the extremism evidenced in Indonesian foreign policy after 1962, each reaching a culmination in 1965. Frustration and desperation required more urgent and more extreme policy action and greater stress on ideology to sustain morale in the face of policy setbacks. The immediate stimulus for a doctrinaire and aggressive interpretation and application of ideology thus seems to have come from frustration and desperation and hence from the circumstances producing these irrational reactions.

The essential point here is that the NEFO Ideology does not provide a necessary and sufficient explanation for the development of extremism in Indonesian foreign policy, nor vice versa. Both the NEFO Ideology and Indonesian foreign policy need to be examined in their wider contexts before a simple causal link between them is postulated. This is not to deny a causal relationship between NEFO Ideology and extremist foreign policy but to assert that this relationship is part of a much more complex set of interrelated factors.

The recognition of the importance of non-ideological factors as determinants of ideology and of Indonesian foreign policy should not lead to the conclusion that the NEFO Ideology was a mere cloak for more sinister motives and objectives. Whatever the influence of national (e.g., Indonesian and Chinese), group (e.g., PKI) and personal (e.g., Sukarno) ulterior motives, and these were involved in the policy-making process, Sukarno and his many NEFO supporters at home and abroad did believe in the ideology, even if it was not always consistently applied and even if other considerations were sometimes given priority over those of ideology.

The concepts incorporated in the NEFO Ideology were of too long a standing and were too much a part of leading Indonesians' values and perceptions of reality to be a mere cloak or diversion during the sixties. These concepts were intimately associated with the development of modern Indonesia. This does not mean that NEFO Ideology was 'pure' in the sense of unsullied by non-ideological calculations. Sukarno was not just a disinterested philosopher observing the world scene. He was very much involved in national and, particularly from 1962, international politics as a proud and

ambitious leader. The events and circumstances which he witnessed, and sometimes caused, at home and abroad affected his actions, his way of interpreting and applying the ideology in particular situations and, hence, ultimately, the ideology itself. On the other hand, Sukarno was also an idealist, a visionary and a revolutionary leader, attempting to build his nation and the world anew on the basis of his ideology. The fundamental doctrines of this ideology, once formulated, affected Sukarno's interpretation of national and international politics and the way in which he acted as leader of his country and as the self-appointed leader of the new emerging forces. NEFO Ideology and Indonesian foreign policy were thus parallel and interrelated products of forces at work in Indonesian society and in world affairs, being affected by and affecting each other and these factors.

The assumption that NEFO Ideology was either a rationalisation of Indonesian foreign policy of the Era of Confrontation or a cover for other ulterior motives, and that its necessary expression is in the form of this type of policy, now apparently abandoned, leads to the conclusion that the NEFO phenomenon is a thing of the past, swept away along with Sukarno. This is an

unnecessarily limited view of the NEFO Ideology and fails to take adequate account of the chord of sympathy which the ideology struck in Indonesia and in parts of the developing world. The NEFO Ideology was the most forceful and, as yet, the most significant formulation of the aspirations, resentments and frustrations of the internationally dispossessed. Indonesia happened to be the leader, Sukarno the chief exponent, roles for which both were eminently suited. The NEFO cause was abandoned primarily as a result of Indonesia's domestic upheaval and subsequent awakening to international and domestic realities. Its failure may also indicate its impracticability. On the other hand, the circumstances that fostered the NEFO view of the world in Indonesia and that rallied support for this view abroad remain. These, broadly, are the circumstances, internationally, of the contrast between the rich-powerful and the poor-impotent and, nationally, of the gap between aspirations and reality in most developing countries. A revolutionary approach to world affairs on the part of the dispossessed, however impractical, impotent and, by

Western criteria, irrational such an approach may be, therefore remains likely. The revolutionary phenomenon of the NEFO may yet be succeeded by a similar phenomenon if the leaders of the dispossessed see no acceptable way to bridge the gap between aspirations and reality, riches and poverty and power and impotence within the existing international order and if the hope, however slight, remains that national or international revolution offers a better prospect.

II

THE INDONESIAN REVOLUTION: BACKGROUND TO INDONESIAN
FOREIGN POLICY AND THE IDEOLOGICAL CONTEXT OF THE NEW
EMERGING FORCES IDEOLOGY

An account of the major concepts of the Ideology of the
Indonesian Revolution.

The 'Indonesian Revolution' has been a concept fundamental to modern Indonesian political thought, at least until the 1965 coup, if not until the present¹. 'The Revolution' and derivative concepts and terms have been part of Indonesian political thought and vocabulary for over twenty years and, indeed, it is virtually impossible to write about Indonesian affairs since the declaration of independence in 1945 without reference to this phenomenon.

The Indonesian leaders' and, in particular, Sukarno's revolutionary vocabulary was frequently used in an emotive way and produced an abundance of imagery and slogans some of which seem meaningless to Westerners. Nevertheless, behind the imagery and the slogans is a set of concepts, the 'reality' of which to Indonesians and to others in the underdeveloped world, provided one of the ingredients of the appeal of Sukarno's ideology. Whatever else Sukarno was, there can be no doubt that, in his own eyes and for many if not most Indonesians, he was a revolutionary leader, indeed, the 'Great Leader of the Revolution', to quote one of the many titles bestowed

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See pp. 226-227 below.

upon him. It is important to remember, when viewing Indonesian foreign policy, that Indonesia was a declared revolutionary society. The major concepts of the ideology need to be examined in some detail as a background to the discussion of Indonesian foreign policy. They also warrant examination on the grounds that they provide the theoretical foundation and much of the content of the NEFO Ideology.

A. THE INDONESIAN REVOLUTION: THE HISTORICAL PHENOMENON AND THE IDEOLOGICAL CONCEPT.

What is meant by the 'Indonesian Revolution'?

There appear to be two broad senses in which the term is used by Indonesians. One usage is synonymous with the term 'formal Revolution'¹, and implies that the reference is to an historical phenomenon. The other usage is more abstract and implies a reference to a vision, an ideal

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e.g., used by Sukarno in 'A Year of Triumph' (18/7/62), in Sukarno, Indonesia's Political Manifesto 1959-1964, Prapantja, Djakarta, undated, p.193. This book, which contains Sukarno's independence day speeches from 1959 to 1964, will hereafter be cited as Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64.

or a theoretical phenomenon. In this usage, the Revolution is an all-embracing concept that subsumes the major elements in Indonesian thought and action until the 1965 coup. The Indonesian Revolution in the former sense is a concrete phenomenon, the reality of which lies in the realm of actions and events; in the latter sense, it is an abstract, ideological, verbal phenomenon of the non-material world. These two senses are not sharply distinguished, as the two levels of reality which they reflect are seen as related aspects of a total reality¹.

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This is an example of the Indonesian ahistorical or cosmocentric way of thinking. For a general discussion of this approach and its effect on Indonesian historiography, see Soedjatmoko, 'The Indonesian Historian and His Time', in Soedjatmoko, Mohammed Ali, G.J. Resink and G. Mct. Kahin (eds.), An Introduction to Indonesian Historiography, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1965, pp.409-415. See also in the same book Mohammed Ali, 'Historical Problems', pp.19-23 and Berg's discussion of myths and verbal magic in C.C. Berg, 'The Javanese Picture of the Past', pp.87-901. See also Benda's comments on verbal magic in his preparatory note to Weatherbee, op. cit., pp.iv-v and Geertz's application of a particular aspect of the cosmological approach, 'the theory of the exemplary center' to the Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution, in C. Geertz, 'Ideology as a Cultural System', in D.E. Apter (ed.), Ideology and Discontent, The Free Press of Glencoe, Collier-Macmillan Ltd., London, 1964, pp.66-69. Robert Shaplen sums up the impact of Javanese beliefs and values on Indonesian affairs in R. Shaplen, Time Out of Hand : Revolution and Reaction in Southeast Asia, Harper & Row, New York, 1969, pp. 35-40.

Accounts of the Revolution therefore switch between the two levels of meaning.

As an historical phenomenon, the Revolution is also called on occasions the '1945 Revolution'¹, since it is seen as beginning in 1945² with the Indonesian leaders' Proclamation of Independence. The formal Revolution was thus a dramatic, sudden and violent break with the colonial past, beginning as a physical struggle against the Dutch to establish the Merdeka (independence) claimed in the Proclamation. The history of the Revolution may be divided into periods, stages or phases which, in the more abstract sense, are also called levels. The first two periods are clearly identified as the 'stage of physical Revolution' (1945-50) and the 'stage of survival' (1950-1955)³. Later stages, as historically identifiable phenomena are, however, less clearly

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e.g., Sukarno, 'The Rediscovery of our Revolution' (17/8/59), in Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64. This speech is also known as 'The Political Manifesto' or 'Manipol' and will hereafter be cited as 'Manipol'.

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'Manipol', *ibid.*, p.39.

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e.g., 'Manipol', *ibid.*, pp.33-34. These are also called the 'period of survival I' and the 'period of survival II', *ibid.*, p.241 (17/8/63). The stages of survival are contrasted to the 'phase of self-propelling growth' or the period of 'progress in a positive way', *ibid.*, p.245 (17/8/63).

specified.

After 1955, the desire was to move from 'a period of political Revolution' to a 'period of social-economic Revolution'¹. It was in preparation for the new stage that the Revolution entered a 'period of investment'², but, meantime, the Revolution had run into difficulties. Material compromises made with the Dutch in 1949³ and non-material compromises 'in the sense of sacrificing the Spirit of the Revolution' led to 'diseases and dualisms'⁴.

1 'Manipol', *ibid.*, p.34.

2 'Manipol', *ibid.*, p.38.

3 The most important of these compromises were: the acceptance of a federal instead of a unitary basis for the new state, the acceptance of a constitution incorporating elements of western parliamentary democracy, the suspension of the demand for the immediate inclusion of West Irian in the Republic's territory and concessions to capitalism and foreign commercial interests. See Sukarno, *ibid.*, pp.36-39 for his account of these compromises and G. McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1963, pp.433-445 for an account of the bargaining leading to Dutch recognition. This work will hereafter be cited as Kahin, Nationalism & Revolution. The compromises in fact began soon after the declaration of independence, with the introduction of a system of cabinet responsibility to parliament and a multi-party system. See the brief account of these developments in G. McT. Kahin (ed.), Major Governments of Asia, second ed., Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1963, pp.564-570, hereafter cited as Kahin (ed.), Major Governments.

4 'Manipol', *ibid.*, p.39

The basic cause of the setbacks encountered after the successful completion of the physical Revolution was attributed to the fact that the Indonesian people had 'deviated from the Spirit, from the Principles, and from the objective of the Revolution'¹. The Political Manifesto of 1959 provided a detailed diagnosis of the diseases and prescribed a cure. The programme proposed by the Political Manifesto, together with the decree of 5th July, 1959, restoring the 1945 Constitution, and the establishment of Guided Democracy, were a culmination of Sukarno's efforts to ensure a 'return to the rails of the Revolution'². 1959 was therefore hailed as the year of the 'return to the spirit of the Revolution', the year of the 'rediscovery of the Revolution'³. The period of investment ended in 1960⁴, yet the struggle for survival, characteristic of the earlier phases, continued after

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Loc. cit.

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Manipol-USDEK in Question and Answer, Department of Information, Indonesia, Special Release 84, January, 1961, p.9, item 10.

3

'Manipol', *ibid.*, p.33.

4

Ibid., p.241 (17/8/63).

1960¹. What is more, in 1962², 1963³ and 1965⁴, the Revolution was described as entering a new phase or rising to a new level. The new phase was explained in various terms, but essentially, it was what the Political Manifesto called the 'social-economic Revolution'⁵. This new phase does not appear to draw its reality from events but rather from Sukarno's revolutionary theory.

Despite the sacrifice of the Spirit of the Revolution, the Revolution remained for Sukarno, for his government and for the most vocal sections of his countrymen, a continuing phenomenon. How was it that the chronological phases were regarded as part of a larger whole from which deviations had occurred? What provided the continuity? What, in other words, were

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Loc. cit.

2

Ibid., p.225 (17/8/62)

3

Ibid., pp.241, 245 and 248 (17/8/63)

4

Sukarno, Self-Reliance (11/4/65) Department of Information, Indonesia, Special Issue 65002, 1965, p.8.

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'Manipol', in Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, p.34. This is in contrast to the preceding phase of 'Political Revolution'. In terms of Sukarno's fourth law of revolution, these two stages are 'the national democratic phase' and the 'socialist phase'. See Sukarno, *ibid.*, p.299 (17/8/64) and Weatherbee, *op.cit.*, p.55.

the constant elements that gave the Revolution its identity and, indeed, its reality? The answer is not to be found in events, least of all in the struggle against the Dutch for independence, since this became decreasingly relevant after 1949, but in the verbal, conceptual and symbolic aspects of the Revolution. Given the fascination that philosophy and abstract ideas held for Sukarno, his skill as an orator and the appeal that ideas and slogans seem to have had for Indonesians¹, it is hardly surprising that the Revolution was for Indonesians no less important as a mental, symbolic, almost spiritual phenomenon, than it was as an occurrence in the physical world. After the drama of the period of the physical Revolution, it was the conceptual-verbal aspects of the Revolution that were exciting and that provided hope for the future and it was on this level that the Revolution received most attention, absorbed most creative energy and, alas, provided only verbal

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Apparently another manifestation of Indonesia's cosmological approach. See footnote 1, p.54 above.

rewards¹.

The term 'Indonesian Revolution', then, also implies the more abstract sense of an all-embracing concept. In this sense, the Revolution gradually evolved: implications of basic principles were cumulatively elaborated; earlier ideas, predating the declaration of independence, were incorporated and expanded; and new terms were created. The conceptual elements were enunciated mostly, though not exclusively, in speeches by Sukarno. These expositions of the meaning of the Revolution gradually built up a complex framework of ideas which together may be regarded as constituting the Ideology of the Revolution². This ideology was not

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Since the 1965 coup, Sukarno has frequently been criticised publicly for having fostered these ideological preoccupations instead of promoting realistic policies. The New Order's pragmatism aims to rectify this error and to channel national energies into efforts to rehabilitate the economy, although the pragmatism is not always as conspicuous at the level of action as it is verbally. For a summary of the 'economic and administrative costs' of the preoccupation with symbols under Sukarno's leadership, see Herbert Feith, 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy' in Ruth McVey (ed.), Indonesia, Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University by arrangement with HRAF Press, New Haven, 1963, pp.388-389.

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The case for regarding these ideas as constituting an ideology is succinctly put in Weatherbee, op. cit., pp.86-87.

merely an adjunct to the Revolution, but an essential part of it. The ideology gave the Revolution its identity, defined its objectives and principles and provided the terms of reference for an assessment of the Revolution's progress. Without the ideology, the Indonesian Revolution means nothing more than a struggle for independence which ended in 1949. It is clear that, to Sukarno and his followers, the Revolution, even during the period of the physical Revolution, was much more than this.

B. THE NATURE, OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE
INDONESIAN REVOLUTION.

1. ELUSIVENESS.

The language in which the Indonesian Revolution was described is a curious, almost bewildering mixture of imagery and analytical terms, reflecting the blend in Indonesian ideology of traditional Indonesian concepts and modern social and political thought, chiefly from Modernist Islamic, European socialist and Marxist

sources¹. Official accounts of the Revolution constantly stressed that the foreign ideas had been adapted to Indonesian conditions. This emphasis was made partly to render the ideology acceptable to nationalist sentiments and partly because adaptation was indeed a major concern of the ideologists. They were after all, primarily concerned with understanding and solving the problems of their society². During the period of Indonesia's political awakening early in the Twentieth Century, intellectuals thus turned for inspiration and guidance to Indonesia's pre-colonial past and to progressive modern political ideas and methods of

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For a brief account of these sources, see J.D. Legge, op. cit., pp.120-127 and Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, For a fuller account, see Jeanne S. Mintz, Mohammed, Marx and Marhaen : the Roots of Indonesian Socialism, Pall Mall Press, London, 1965. Kahin regards Indonesian ideology, as expressed in Pantja Sila, as one of the best examples of a synthesis of such diverse elements. See Kahin, op. cit., p.123.

2

Most of the revolutionary generation whom I interviewed described their ventures into ideology in these terms. This is not to deny ulterior motives such as the pursuit of power, but rather to emphasise that they did not see themselves primarily as academic theorists. Soedjatmoko makes a similar point, though with a different emphasis. See Soedjatmoko, 'II. Indonesia and the World', Australian Outlook, Vol. 21, No.3, December 1967, p.288.

analysis. Although Sukarno and his supporters frequently spoke as if the diverse ideological elements had been integrated into one revolutionary theory, and although one frequently has the impression that there was, in Sukarno's mind at least, a total picture of which the varying expositions were merely partial reflections, the basis for the integration, the theoretical framework that incorporates and relates all the revolutionary concepts, and the total picture of the Revolution remain elusive.

Exasperating as this elusiveness can be for Westerners, it was not a fault but an asset as far as the ideologists were concerned. The causes of legitimacy for the revolutionary leaders, unity amongst their supporters and appeal to as wide an audience as possible, all major concerns of Sukarno and the ideologists, were best served by the expression of universal ideals and abstract principles, so formulated that all major groups could accept them.

The elusiveness of the Revolution arises in part from the lack of attention by the ideology-makers to systematic analysis. Concepts are not always distinguished or defined in a clear, complete and consistent way, either theoretically or substantively. Expositions

are frequently illustrative rather than comprehensive and there is rarely any serious attempt to explain the relationship between the varying accounts of different aspects of the Revolution. For example, one finds overlapping accounts of the spirit, principles, ideals, objectives, tasks, methods and characteristics of the Revolution. Even the 'classic laws of revolution', which Sukarno occasionally cites, are not systematically enunciated¹. Comprehension difficulties are increased by the fact that, as Sukarno has frequently claimed, the Revolution is 'multi-complex'², 'five-faceted'³, 'all-embracing'⁴, an 'overall revolution, embracing all parts and facets of our national life'⁵, 'a summing-up of many

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In his 'TAVIP' speech (17/8/64) Sukarno enunciated six laws. See Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, pp.298-299 and Weatherbee, *op. cit.*, pp.53-56. Other laws stressed elsewhere are not included in this formulation, except by implication in a passing reference to the romanticism, dynamism and dialecticalism of the Revolution. See, for example, Sukarno, *ibid.*, pp.84 (17/8/60) and 244 (17/8/63).

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e.g., 'Manipol', *ibid.*, p.72.

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e.g., 'Manipol', *ibid.*, p.85.

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e.g., Selected Documents : Book One : Some Aspects concerning Progress and Principles of the Indonesian Revolution, Series B & B No. 1002, Department of Information, Indonesia, undated, p.107 (2/4/61) (Hereafter cited as Sel. Docs.).

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e.g., *ibid.*, p.105 (2/4/61).

revolutions in one generation',¹ and, in addition to being a national revolution², is part of the 'Revolution of Mankind'³. These dimensions of the Revolution are not systematically differentiated with the result that it is not always clear to which aspect of the Revolution particular expositions are intended to apply.

The lack of systematisation in the Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution is accentuated because both the Revolution and Sukarno were 'dynamic'⁴, constantly

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e.g., 'Manipol', in Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, p.73.

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'Manipol', *ibid.*, p.16. See also Manipol-USDEK in Question and Answer, p.83, item 78, for an official summary of the senses in which the Indonesian Revolution is 'national'.

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e.g., Sukarno in Reflections upon the Indonesian Revolution, Department of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia, August 1964, p.11, hereafter cited as Reflections. This article was originally published in Le Monde and Le Monde Diplomatique, Paris, May, 1964.

4

In 1940, Sukarno defended his dynamic approach. See Sukarno, Dibawah Bendera Revolusi (Under the Banner of Revolution), Vol I, Panitia Penerbit (Publication Committee) Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, Djakarta, 1965, pp.447-455 (1940). This book, a collection of Sukarno's speeches and writings from 1926 to 1941, will hereafter be cited as Sukarno, Bendera I. Its companion, volume II, covers his speeches from 1945 to 1964. The need to be dynamic is mentioned in both the Elucidation of the 1945 Constitution and in the Political Manifesto. See The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, Department of Information, Indonesia, Special Issue

producing new ideas or new formulations of ideas. A concept was therefore expressed, usually in universal terms, and was illustrated, not always comprehensively. Before the concept had been fully elaborated and integrated into a total framework of ideas, a new formulation was adopted. The Revolution was not static long enough to be analysed and described fully. In dialectical terms, a thesis had no sooner been developed than an antithesis arose, leading to the creation of a new synthesis. Concepts were dropped or rephrased, not so much because they had been rejected, but because new formulations or new concepts subsuming the previous concepts, had acquired greater significance. The illusion was one of continuity combined with change, as the ideology evolved through expositions of new implications of established concepts and through newly perceived aspects of the Revolution. The emphases in the official expositions of the Revolution changed, reflecting both the developments in the ideologists' thought and the particular needs at the time of

No. 001/1966, p.20, hereafter cited as Constitution 1945, and the 'Specification' to 'Manipol', in Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, p.21. For a subsequent elaboration, see 'RE-SO-PIM' (17/8/61), *ibid.*, pp.147-148.

exposition, yet, essentially, the various formulations of the Revolution were not mutually exclusive but complementary.

The result is that there is no definitive exposition of the nature, principles, ideals, objectives and methods of the Revolution that takes account of every aspect of the Revolution and that explicitly defines and relates all the doctrines and terminology within an organised theoretical framework. There are, however, three relatively thorough official attempts at a formal statement incorporating the major doctrines of the Revolution. The first is the 1945 Constitution, especially the Preamble; the second is Pantja Sila; the third, Manipol-USDEK. These and some subsequent variations are discussed below¹. Mention should also be made of a constantly recurring image in accounts of the Revolution, expressing what Sukarno calls the

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See pp.129 ff. below.

'Romanticism of the Revolution'¹. This is the type of exposition that depicts the Revolution as a struggle. The early explanations of the struggle provided enunciations of fundamental concepts from which the more formal statements developed.

2. THE STRUGGLE AND BASIC REVOLUTIONARY CONCEPTS.

An official Foreign Affairs Department publication describes the Revolution and its significance in the following words:

The Indonesian Revolution is a struggle, a turbulence, a swift all-embracing movement of an entire society, changing not only political but economic, social and cultural forms. It is an upsurge of the social conscience of man, the

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This is a term closely linked with the dynamic, the dialectic, the dynamism and the logic of the Revolution, none of which has been fully explained by the revolutionaries. Amongst the clearest explanations of romanticism are: Sukarno, Sarinah: Kewadajiban Wanita dalam Perdjoangan Republik Indonesia (Sarinah: The Duty of Women in the Struggle of the Republic of Indonesia), Oesaha Pernibitan Goenter, Jogjakarta, 1947, pp.17-18, hereafter cited as Sukarno, Sarinah; 'Manipol' in Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, p.83; ibid., pp.288-289 (17/8/64). See also Weatherbee, op. cit., p.21.

outcome of which must affect man in Indonesian society and, to a greater or lesser extent, influence the world as it moves towards a new order.

No understanding of Indonesia is possible without some appreciation of the mainsprings of this Revolution, some knowledge of its ideals and objectives and of the political ideas which it is producing¹.

(a) Positive and Negative Goals.

This struggle had both positive and negative aspects, the former being aimed at achieving positive goals, the latter at overcoming the obstacles to the attainment of those goals. Herein lies the 'dialectic' of the Revolution, which, combined with 'romanticism', provided the 'dynamic' of the Revolution, forcing the Revolution inevitably onwards², in accordance with the

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Indonesia 1961, Department of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia, April, 1961, p.9.

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See Weatherbee, op. cit., pp.19-20; 'Manipol', in Sukarno, Political Manifesto, '59-64, pp.83-84; ibid., pp.147-148 (17/8/61), Cindy Adams, Sukarno : An Auto-biography as told to Cindy Adams, Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1965, p.271, hereafter cited as Adams, Sukarno.

'logic of revolution'¹. Destruction and construction were complementary essentials of the Revolution, since the obstacles had to be destroyed uncompromisingly before positive achievements could be made². In this struggle, there was no place for 'reformism'. Radicalism was essential³.

The negative aspect of the Revolution was dominated by the struggle to eradicate oppression and exploitation by destroying capitalism, colonialism and imperialism⁴.

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See H. Roeslan Abdulgani, 'Clarification concerning Manipol-USDEK' in The Resounding Voice of the Indonesian Revolution : Independence Day Message by H.E. President Sukarno, Djakarta, August 17, 1963 : Supplements: Manipol-USDEK & The Birth of Pantasila, Department of Information, Indonesia, Series B & B 1001, undated, pp.92-93. This book will hereafter be cited as Resounding Voice.

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See Sukarno's third law of revolution in Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, pp.298-299 (17/8/64) and Weatherbee's discussion of this law in Weatherbee, op. cit., pp.54-55.

3.

The justification for the rejection of reformism was summarised by Sukarno in an address of 16/7/58. See Pantja Sila : The Basis of the State of the Republic of Indonesia, National Committee for the Commemoration of the Birth of Pantja Sila 1/7/54-1/7/64, Djakarta, 1964, p.123. Hereafter, this book will be cited as Pantja Sila : Basis of State. For a fuller and earlier justification, see Sukarno, Bendera I, pp.223-226 (1933), & 297-314 (1933). The principle of radicalism is discussed below, pp.111-116.

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See, for example, Sukarno, Bendera I, pp.281 & 285 (1933). See also pp.219-221 below, for a fuller discussion of the importance of anti-imperialism.

These were seen as both concepts and systems¹, closely related in a trinity, colonialism and imperialism being the products of capitalism². References to the negative aspect of the Revolution sometimes emphasised one of these three elements, sometimes a combination of two of them and sometimes all three.

The positive objectives of the Revolution have been formulated in varying terms at different times: e.g., the creation of a 'Pantja Sila State'³; the realisation of the 'ideals contained in Pantja Sila'⁴;

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See, for example, Sukarno, Indonesia Menggugat (Indonesia Accuses), Penerbitan Khusus (Special edition) 168, Departemen Penerangan (Information Department), Indonesia, undated, pp.85, 98, 177-180, 190. This is Sukarno's defence speech at his 1930 trial before a colonial court.

2

For examples of Sukarno's account of the capitalist origins of colonialism and imperialism, see Sukarno Bendera I, p.1 (1962); pp.51-52 (1928); pp.123-127 (1932); pp.262-263 (1933); and Sukarno, Indonesia Menggugat, pp.15-32.

3

H. Roeslan Abdulgani, 'Clarification Concerning Manipol-USDEK', in Resounding Voice, p.106.

4

Sukarno, 'The Birth of Pantja Sila' (1/6/45) in Pantja Sila : Basis of State, p.37.

the establishment of a 'just and prosperous society'¹; 'the implementation of the Message of the Suffering of the People'²; the establishment of 'Indonesian Socialism'³. These expressions all involve the same interrelated ideas, which are discussed below in this chapter.

(b) Origins of the Struggle

The struggle was seen as beginning in the first decade of the twentieth century⁴ with the emergence of the nationalist movement, a term used to describe collectively the various cultural, religious and political organisations that were the expression of a 'new ideological force concerned not merely with resistance to Dutch domination but with forging a new national entity'⁵. According to Sukarno, the struggle was born

1 e.g., 'Manipol' (17/8/59), in Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, p.35.

2 e.g., *ibid.*, p.80 (17/8/60).

3 e.g., *ibid.*, p.248 (17/8/64).

4 Pantja Sila : Basis of State, p.9.

5 Legge, *op. cit.*, p.112. A detailed account of the rise and fall of these organisations is to be found in Chapter III of Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, pp.64-100.

out of the 'afflictions' of the Indonesian people and out of their aspirations for a better life¹. This view of the origins of the Revolution was later given more dynamic expression in the slogan 'AMPERA', i.e., the 'Message of the People's Suffering'², which provided the revolutionary leaders with a 'Mandate'³, essentially to realise the people's aspirations. In this sense, the Revolution was a people's struggle, which, in Indonesian ideological terms, meant more than a mere proletarian revolution, since it was seen as involving the whole of the Indonesian people or the Marhaen⁴. Through the

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e.g., 'Manipol', in Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, p.34. Here he is citing his 1933 account, in Sukarno, Bendera I, pp.280-281 (1933). See also Sukarno, Indonesia Menggugat, pp.69-79, 120-123, 157-159, 161-164 (1930), and H. Roeslan Abdulgani, 'Clarification concerning Manipol-USDEK', in Resounding Voice, pp.116-117.

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For a brief explanation of this concept, see Weatherbee, op. cit., p.19.

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See, for example, Pantja Sila : Basis of State, p.170 (3/9/58) and Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, pp.136 and 140-141 (17/8/61).

4

Marhaen was a term coined to incorporate all the common people of Indonesia, the mass of the Indonesian people, characterised as poor or small or oppressed. See The Indonesian Revolution : Basic Documents and the Idea of Guided Democracy, Special Issue 65, Department of Information, Indonesia, December 1960, p.23. This book will hereafter be cited as Indon. Rev. The concept of

nationalist movement, the dissatisfaction of the Indonesian people was expressed, the causes of their afflictions were analysed, and the means to the fulfilment of their aspirations were advocated¹. Sukarno saw the movement's task as that of mobilising the mass of the people, transforming the 'hidden forces' of society into a movement that was 'conscious and radical' and capable of 'mass action'². This process Sukarno called 'power-forming'³. To this end, he advocated the creation of a single, radical Marhaenist party, that would become the 'vanguard of the common people in marching towards their aims and ideals'⁴. This aim was not realised because

the Marhaen in Indonesia's revolutionary ideology was the equivalent of the Marxist concept of the preletariat. See the account of Marhaenism, pp.81-84 below.

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This in part involved making the people aware of their sufferings under colonialism in contrast to the glories of Indonesia's pre-colonial past and in contrast to the new society of the future. See, for example, Sukarno, Indonesia Menggugat, pp.119-123 (1930).

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e.g., Sukarno, Bendera I, p.281 (1933).

3

For an elaboration of the ideas of mass action and power-forming, see below, pp.93-98 & 68-93 respectively.

4

Sukarno, Bendera I, p.282 (1933). The concept of the vanguard party is discussed below, pp.89-91 below. See also 'Revolutionary Leadership and Victory' pp.116-128 below.

of the rivalries and divisions within the nationalist movement¹.

(c) The broad Unity of Purpose.

In a very broad sense, however, there was unity of purpose amongst the groups that constituted the nationalist movement. As Sukarno subsequently emerged as the dominant figure in the Revolution, it is his expositions of this broad unity of purpose and of the struggle that have come to dominate the official accounts of the Revolution. Basically, the aim of the struggle, as expressed by Sukarno in 1933², was to remove oppression and exploitation by seeking the 'total transformation of the character of society', destroying society's ills 'down to their very roots', changing the 'imperialist-capitalist character' of society into 'one

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These divisions and rivalries arose from a number of factors, including ideological, religious, ethnic and personal differences and clashes of interest. For a brief account of these rivalries and divisions and an attempt to explain the reasons for the schismatic nature of Indonesian nationalism, see Legge, op. cit., pp.127-131.

2

See Sukarno, Bendera I, pp.280-281 (1933).

of equity and equality, of sama-rasa-sama-rata'¹. In order to accomplish this transformation, the 'system of imperialism and capitalism' had to be 'exterminated completely'².

The necessary condition for initiating this transformation was independence for Indonesia, since, without freedom from colonial rule, no other objectives could be realised³. Independence was seen as the 'bridge' to the attainment of the 'just and perfect society, free from oppression and exploitation'⁴. So that

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'Sama-rasa-sama-rata' or 'sama rata, sama rasa' was a slogan adopted by the nationalist movement after the First World War to stress that, for Indonesians, European socialism and Marxism overlooked the importance of social equality and non-material well-being in their preoccupation with economic justice. Sukarno gives the meaning of this slogan as 'equality of standing, equality of satisfaction'. See Pantja Sila : Basis of State, p.71 (5/6/59). For a fuller explanation of the origin and meaning of this slogan, see Manipol-USDEK in Question and Answer, pp.37-38, items 37-39, and Indonesia 1961, pp.11-12.

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Sukarno, Bendera I, pp.281 & 285 (1933).

3

Ibid., pp.285-286.

4

Ibid., p.285. The bridge analogy is elaborated on pp.285-289 and 314-323. Sukarno reiterated the analogy in 'The Birth of Pantja Sila' (1/7/45), when he urged the seizure of independence, despite the country's difficulties. See Pantja Sila : Basis of State, pp.15-19. See also Sukarno's 1961 summary of the purposes which independence was intended to serve, a summary

independence would lead to the transformation of Indonesian society, it was necessary to ensure that the new state would be under the control of the Marhaen and not controlled by vested interests¹. The basis of the new state was therefore to be democracy, not mere political democracy as in Western democracies, but 'genuine democracy' that ensures sovereignty of the people. Such democracy involves political, economic and social democracy, in short, 'socio-democracy'². The society based on this principle was envisaged as one involving 'close harmony amongst the people, a co-operating by the people, a condition of sama-rasa-samarata, of equity and equality among the people'³. In this society⁴, capitalism would give way to socialism: imperialism, bourgeois-nationalism and aristocratic-nationalism to 'socio-nationalism'⁵; and individualism

based on the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution, in Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, pp.135-136.

1

See Sukarno, Bendera I, pp.286 & 315 (1933).

2

See the discussion of this concept, p.84-85 below.

3

Sukarno, Bendera I, p.321 (1933).

4

See Sukarno's full account of this transformation, *ibid.*, pp.321-323.

5

This concept is discussed below, pp.80-81.

to the 'social-mindedness' of 'the "new humanity" who feel themselves to be "social beings"'.¹

(d) Principles, Principles of Struggle and Tactics: early Expositions.

(i) Levels of the struggle

In 1933², Sukarno found it necessary to draw attention the distinction between what he called the 'levels' of the struggle³. This distinction he characterised as that between principles, principles of struggle and tactics. His explanation was as follows⁴:

Principles are foundations or something for us to hold on to, which, 'till the end of the world', will continue to determine our 'attitude', will continue to determine how we stand. We must never abandon principles, we must never throw them away, not even after we have reached Indonesia Merdeka; on the contrary, after Indonesia Merdeka has been achieved they must be the foundation for the way in which we organise our society ...⁵

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See Sukarno's explanation of 'social-mindedness', in Sukarno, Bendera I, p.323.

2

Ibid., pp.249-251 (1933).

3

Ibid., p.251.

4

See also ibid., p.212 (1933).

5

Ibid., p.249 (1933).

...These principles of struggle are needed so long as we struggle, so long as the struggle is still going on. When the struggle has been successful, when Indonesia Merdeka has been won, when the socio-political Republic has been established, then those principles of struggle have no further use. When Indonesia Merdeka and other things of the kind have already been won, there will no longer be an enemy whom we must confront with 'non', ...with 'power-forming', ...with 'mass action'...¹

...But how are we to sustain the struggle to which we have given these principles of struggle? How are we to guard, to organise, how are we to keep our struggle vital, to keep on making more mighty and stupendous that struggle whose major rules we have already decided? By tactics! Tactics are anything at all we do that is necessary to sustain the struggle. We apply tactics, we change them, we alter their direction, we turn them around, we adapt them to suit day-to-day needs... Principles are permanent 'to the end of the world', principles of struggle last till Indonesia Merdeka is reached, tactics change on any occasion. Principles are almost eternal - but tactics have no fixed duration. One kind of tactics may need to be conducted for ten years, but it can also need to be thrown away again in ten minutes!²

(ii) Principles

- Nationalism and Socio-Nationalism.

The principles which provided the foundation for the Indonesian struggle were described as: 'nationalism

1 Ibid., p.250.

2 Ibid., p.251.

and Marhaenism -- socio-nationalism and socio-democracy'¹. Nationalism in the Indonesian and Eastern context was sharply distinguished from the chauvinistic nationalism of the West². Indonesian nationalism was seen as essentially socio-nationalism or 'nationalism-of-society'³, i.e., 'nationalism in whose very essence genuine peoples' democracy is inherent, which is opposed to any kind of capitalism and imperialism even though from its own nationals, that is full of a sense of justice and humanitarian feelings...'⁴. In endorsing a statement attributed to Gandhi, 'My nationalism is humanity', Sukarno declared: 'Our nationalism must be a nationalism striving for the safety of humanity. Our nationalism must be born out of human-ness'⁵.

- Marhaenism

In 1958, Sukarno 'upset some people very much' by describing Marhaenism as 'Marxism as applied in, adapted

1 Ibid., p.249 (1933).

2 See, for example, *ibid.*, pp.5-6 (1926) & 75-76 (1928).

3 *Ibid.*, p.174 (1932).

4 *Ibid.*, pp.321-322 (1933) & 510 (1941).

5 e.g., *ibid.*, p.174 (1932).

to, carried out in Indonesia'¹. In applying Marxist principles and methods, particularly historical materialism², to the analysis of Indonesia's problems, Sukarno came to the conclusion that the doctrine of a proletarian revolution or class struggle, whilst having some relevance to Indonesia's struggle, required adaptation before it could be applied in Indonesia, where conditions were different from those in Europe of Marx's day and where, as a result, the Marxist concept of the proletariat was too narrow to provide the basis for a revolution of the people³. Whereas the Russian Revolution was a class struggle on the part of the proletariat against their capitalist exploiters, in Indonesia, the struggle was a national one, backed by the whole of the Indonesian people who were opposed to the foreign exploitation and oppression resulting from colonialism. A new and broader term was therefore

1

Pantja Sila : Basis of State, p.155 (3/9/58). This idea is elaborated ibid., pp.155-157.

2

Discussed below on pp.99-103.

3

For examples of Sukarno's analysis of the Indonesian conditions that required Marhaenism rather than proletarianism, see his account of Marhaenism in Sukarno, Indonesia Menggugat, pp.138-144 (1930); Sukarno, Bendera I, pp.183-185 (1932); and Pantja Sila : Basis of State, pp.75-76 (26/5/58).

necessary to symbolise the unity of the common people of Indonesia, the majority of whom, though not proletarian in the sense of being propertyless wage earners, were nevertheless poor, small, oppressed and exploited, being powerless to change their small status. The term 'Marhaen' was therefore adopted as the Indonesian equivalent of the proletariat in Europe¹. Through the use of the concept of the Marhaen, the logic and techniques of class struggle were thus adapted and applied to Indonesia's national struggle².

Marhaenism was defined³ as 'the principle which seeks that structure of society and that structure of the

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For two examples of Sukarno's many similar accounts of the origin of the term Marhaen, see Pantja Sila : Basis of State, pp.67-70 (5/6/58) and Adams, Sukarno, pp.61-63. For a brief account of the distinction between the concepts of the Marhaen and the proletariat, see Sukarno, Bendera I, pp.253-256 (1933), especially points 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the summary of the Partindo (Indonesian Party) decisions of 1933 on p.253.

2

For an account of the historical-philosophical basis for this transference of the doctrine of class struggle to a national struggle, see 'Antithesis', pp.103-111 below.

3

Except where otherwise indicated, these definitions were included in Sukarno's summary of the 1933 Partindo decisions. See Sukarno, Bendera I, p.253 (1933). These definitions are endorsed and elaborated on pp.253-256.

state which brings well-being to the Marhaen in all things', and, in addition, as 'the method of struggle to reach that structure of society and structure of state, which, therefore, must be a method of struggle which is revolutionary'. Combining these two ideas, the definition thus becomes: 'a method of struggle and a principle which seeks the disappearance of any capitalism and imperialism...' An alternative definition was that 'Marhaenism is socio-nationalism and socio-democracy', or, in post-independence terminology, 'Marhaenism is Indonesian Socialism in operation'¹.

- Socio-Democracy.

Socio-democracy, or 'democracy-of-society'², was a concept closely associated with that of socio-nationalism³. Socio-democracy was regarded as 'genuine' or 'true' democracy⁴, since it involved more than the mere political democracy of the Western parliamentary.

1

Adams, Sukarno, p.63.

2

An alternative term used by Sukarno. See Sukarno, Bendera I, p.174 (1932).

3

See Sukarno's explanation of this relationship, e.g., *ibid.*, pp.173-175 (1932), 321 (1933) and in Pantja Sila: Basis of the State, pp.157-170 (3/9/58).

4

See Sukarno, Bendera I, pp.175 (1932) & 320 (1933).

system. It also involved social and economic democracy, without which political democracy is ineffective as a formula for achieving sovereignty of the people¹.

Western parliamentary democracy was therefore rejected partly because of its inadequacy or incompleteness and partly because it was seen as an instrument of capitalism, and hence of imperialism, both of which were regarded as incompatible with the type of society which the revolutionaries envisaged².

(iii) Principles of Struggle.

The three most important principles of struggle put forward by Sukarno were 'non-cooperation', 'power-forming' and 'mass action'³. Their importance was

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See Sukarno's expositions of socio-democracy, *ibid.*, e.g., pp.171-176 (1932), 315-321 (1933), 364-366 (1940) & 579-588 (1941).

2

See *ibid.*, pp.249 (1933) & 319-321 (1933). The rejection of Western parliamentary democracy was reaffirmed many times during the Revolution. Of particular significance for the post-independence stage of the Revolution and for Pantja Sila was the rejection in 'The Birth of Pantja Sila' (1/6/45). See Pantja Sila : Basis of State, pp.32-32. For a succinct statement of the reasons for rejecting Western democracy, see Manipol-USDEK in Question and Answer, p.41, item 47. For a more general explanation of the rejection of Western democracy, considered in the context of the new states in general, see Spanier, *op. cit.*, pp.279-281.

3

e.g., Sukarno, Bendera I, pp.189 (1932) & 250 (1933).

explained as follows:

Non-cooperation, because Indonesia Merdeka will never be reached through working together with the opposing side; power-forming because the opposing side will never give us this and that unless they are forced to do so by our power; mass action because we can accomplish power-forming only through mass action¹.

- Non-Cooperation.

The principle of non-cooperation, also known as self-reliance or self-help, drew inspiration from the Indian nationalists' concept of swadesi² and from the Irish nationalists' slogan of Sinn Fein³. Non-cooperation involved, on the one hand, the total rejection of assistance from and of compromise with the opposing camp, the rejection of reformism, except as a subordinate tactic, and, on the other, the establishment of effective cooperation between the revolutionary elements, partly to obviate the necessity of assistance from the enemy and partly to increase the power of the revol-

1 Ibid., p.250 (1933).

2 e.g., *ibid.*, pp.121-156 (1932) especially pp.138-140.

3 e.g., *ibid.*, pp.190-191 (1932) & 209-213 (1933).

utionaries vis-à-vis the enemy¹.

Non-cooperation was seen as vital both to power-forming and to the creation of effective mass action in a colonial situation². In addition, this principle had an educative function, that of training the people to have confidence in their own ability and power³. Under Guided Democracy and Guided Economy, this principle was given a great deal of prominence with the launching of the slogan of 'Berdikari' (self-reliance)⁴.

Non-cooperation or self-reliance alone, however, was seen as insufficient as a principle of struggle for Indonesia. It had to be linked with power-forming: '...we must direct our labours towards machtsvorming, towards the building up of power. Through our own skill to strength, through our own effort to power!

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Of the many definitions of this principle, the most useful are *ibid.*, pp.189-191 (1932), & pp.291 & 295 (1933). For further elaborations, see Sukarno's expositions, *ibid.*, pp.198-202 (1932-33), 207-214 (1933) especially pp.213-214, 223-226 (1933) & 289-314 (1933), especially pp.291-297.

2

e.g., *ibid.*, pp.195 & 200-202 (1932-33).

3

e.g., *ibid.*, p.191 (1932).

4

See p.185 below, especially footnote 4.

-- that is the slogan we must adopt'¹.

- Power-Forming.

Power-forming was defined and justified as follows: 'Power-forming means the forming of might, the creation of force, the building up of power. Power-forming is the one and only way of forcing the other side to bow to our will. This compulsion is needed, since "they go that way, we go this"². More simply: 'power-forming is the building up of the power necessary to exert pressure on the coloniser'³. Power-forming was thus regarded as 'the first requisite'⁴, because of the conflict of interests between coloniser and colonised, because Indonesian society was composed primarily of

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Sukarno, Bendera I, p.85 (1928). See also Sukarno's argument stressing the need for mass action in conjunction with non-cooperation, *ibid.*, pp.153-157 (1932).

2

Ibid., p.297 (1933). For an elaboration, see *ibid.*, pp.289-314 (1933). The slogan with which the quotation ends is a reference to an earlier section of the same article, pp.289 ff., devoted chiefly to an exposition of the principle of non-cooperation.

3

Ibid., p.201 (1932-33).

4

Ibid., p.200 (1932-33).

Marhaen, oppressed by 'raw-materials' and 'capital-investment' imperialism and, more generally, because of the nature of colonialism, imperialism, capitalism and history¹.

The success of Indonesia's struggle required that:

...We must give priority to these strengths of our own, these forces of our own, this power-forming of ours, because it is only with a strong and secure power-forming in Indonesia, only with a power-forming in Indonesia in the shape of mental power-forming and physical power-forming, only with a power-forming amongst the Indonesian People themselves, that we will be able to make our voice reverberate and become a voice of thunder, to make our power tremendous until it becomes the power of the earthquake in order to fell all capitalism and imperialism...²

Power-forming required the formation of a 'brown front' comprised of 'a united, indivisible Indonesian people' and 'a united, indivisible Indonesian nation'³, to be achieved through uniting the various political parties in Indonesia⁴. This idea led to the call for

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For an elaboration of these reasons, see *ibid.*, pp. 121-157 (1932) especially pp.154-157, 200-201 (1932-33), 215-217 (1933) & 297-314 (1933).

2

Ibid., p.214 (1933).

3

Ibid., p.38 (1927).

4

Ibid., pp.38 ff. (1927).

the creation of a vanguard party¹ which would enlighten the masses and rouse their political consciousness, guiding them, through the propagation of radical theory and ideology. The party would also fight to the utmost along with the masses, leading them 'into the field of experience, into the field of struggle', focussing their spirit, will and energy upon the basic goal, 'the extermination of the system of capitalism-imperialism via the bridge of Indonesia Merdeka'². This task was seen to involve the transformation of 'an unconscious, and uncertain and groping movement, into a movement that is conscious and radical'³. The resulting movement had to embody the principles of the people in 'a mighty power-forming', since principles without power-forming accomplish little, and power-forming that is not upheld by principles 'is not a power that is out to subdue the opposing side, but a mere ball put into play by the

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For the major expositions of the nature and functions of the vanguard party see *ibid.*, pp.223-226 (1933), 280-285 & 297-323 (1933).

2

See *ibid.*, pp.223-224 (1933).

3

Ibid., p.282 (1933). See also pp.284-285 for an elaboration.

opposing side'¹. Marhaenism, socio-nationalism and socio-democracy were therefore seen to be basic to the vanguard party's struggle².

It may be seen from the above that power-forming involved more than simply direct political action. In Sukarno's words: 'Power-forming is not just the building up of material forces alone, power-forming is also the building up of the forces of fervour, the forces of will, the forces of the Spirit, the forces of the Soul'³. It involved in other words, the building up of physical and moral power⁴.

In order to promote this multi-faceted power-forming, the vanguard party needed to build its internal strength, perfecting its convictions, its discipline, its organisation, indeed, perfecting 'all its material and non-material aspects'⁵:- 'Therefore its primary

1 Ibid., p.299 (1933).

2 See *ibid.*, pp.314-323 (1933).

3 *Ibid.*, p.301 (1933).

4 For an elaboration of the concept of physical power, see Sukarno, Indonesia Menggugat, pp.109-112, 136 and 144-152 (1930). For an elaboration of the concept of moral power, see *ibid.*, pp.115-117.

5 See Sukarno, Bendera I, p.305 (1933).

task should be first to strengthen itself spiritually and physically, to make the whole of its basic character, the whole of its essence as secure and as strong as steel and to guard this strength'¹. The strengthening of the non-material aspects of the party required the propagation of radical theory². 'Talking' was therefore seen to be as important as 'working'³. In organisation, the vanguard party required: (1) discipline that covered all aspects, theoretical and practical, of the party's life and (2) discipline that rested on 'democratic centralism and centralist democracy'⁴. In its external relations, the party needed to conform to the will of the masses, whilst making the masses' instincts conscious⁵. This two-way relationship between the masses and the vanguard party was necessary in order that the party could carry out its primary

1

Loc. cit.

2

Loc. cit.

3

Ibid., pp.313-314 (1933). This argument was elaborated in an earlier article in 1933. See *ibid.*, pp. 215-217 (1933).

4

Ibid., p.307 (1933).

5

Ibid., p.308.

task: 'to transform the will of the masses which was earlier unconscious into a conscious mass-will'¹.

- Mass Action

Just as non-cooperation was regarded as vital to power-forming and to the creation of effective mass action, so was mass action, the third principle of struggle, seen as essential to power-forming and as the necessary complement to non-cooperation². The power-forming activities envisaged for the vanguard party were also described on occasions as activities aimed at creating mass action³. The distinction between mass action and power-forming is not always clear, since mass action would appear to be both the product of power-forming activities and the means to achieve power-forming. In his 1930 trial speech, Sukarno seemed to indicate that mass action, based on Marhaenism, was the physical form of power-forming⁴, yet his most important

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Loc. cit. An explanation of what is involved in this process follows on pp.308-310.

2

e.g., see *ibid.*, pp.154 (1932) & 250 & 300 (1933).

3

e.g., see *ibid.*, pp.154-156 (1932), 217 (1933) & 281 & 300 (1933).

4

See Sukarno, Indonesia Menggugat, pp.136 & 137.

expositions of mass action place considerable emphasis on theorising, which would seem to me to be better classified as an aspect of moral power-forming.

Sukarno provided a number of definitions of mass action, of which the following are amongst the most illuminating:

Mass action is action by the masses. The masses means: the Marhaen who number millions and millions. Mass action is therefore action by the Marhaen who number millions and millions. And since action means deeds, activities, struggle, mass action therefore means: the deeds, the activities, the struggle of the Marhaen who number millions and millions. And these deeds, these activities, this struggle are not things that will only occur later on; these deeds, activities, this struggle are things taking place today, now. What we are working at today, what we are doing today, whatever our activities are today in the way of building up organisations, writing articles for journals and newspapers, holding courses, holding public meetings, organising demonstrations -- all these things are part of the deeds, activities, struggle of the Marhaen who number millions and millions, all these things are included in mass action...

...Mass action is a movement of the common people which is radical and revolutionary¹.

Mass action is not an event of 'this day or that', mass action is not something to be 'ordered by telegram to begin at this time and end at this time' -- mass action is a radical and revolutionary awakening of the masses caused by forces

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Sukarno, Bendera I, pp.196-197 (1932-33).

within society itself. Mass action is revolutionary movement which in essence moves on its own...¹

...We, too, must activate the people in a radical movement which rolls on like the flood, must transform the mass movement that was formerly unconscious and groping in the dark into a mass movement which is conscious and radical, that is, a mass movement which comprehends fully its course and its objectives. For mass action is not just any movement of the people. Mass action is a mass movement that is radical...²

...This is what is called mass action: the actions of the common people who have been welded together into one new spirit, fighting against conditions they are not prepared to tolerate any longer...³

...Mass action is the actions of the common people who, because of their sufferings, have been welded into one new radical spirit, and who intend to 'midwife' the birth of a new society!⁴

Speaking of the priorities to be given to the various facets of mass action, Sukarno declared: 'Given such a society and such an imperialism⁵ the heaviest

1 Ibid., p.198 (1932-33).

2 Ibid., p.282 (1933).

3 Ibid., pp.301-302 (1933).

4 Ibid., p.308 (1933).

5. i.e., a society that is chiefly composed of Marhaen and a 'raw materials' and 'capital-investment' imperialism, ibid., p.154 (1932).

stress of our action must lie in the development of political consciousness and in political action, that is, in the awakening of the political comprehension of the people and in political struggle by the people'¹. In explaining this point, Sukarno criticised the tendency to regard only 'constructive' economic action as valuable, as such an attitude ignores the need 'to build enthusiasm, to build conviction, to build hope, to build an ideology or mental edifice or mental artillery, which, according to world history, is eventually the one and only artillery capable of overthrowing a system'². It was partly for this reason that Sukarno placed so much stress on the importance of theory, principles and principles of struggle and on the ideology formulation and propagation function of the vanguard party'³. Speaking specifically on the

1

Loc. cit., Sukarno's emphases. All emphases in subsequent quotations are in the sources from which the quotations are selected, unless otherwise stated.

2

Ibid., p.155 (1932). To support this contention, Sukarno cites works by Sun Yat Sen, Roland Holst, Kautsky, Vaswani, Rapport, Amman, Bebel, R. Rolland, V. Marcu, Trotsky and de Gruyter.

3

e.g., see *ibid.*, pp.280-285 and 297-314 (1933). Another major reason was the importance of theory for planning an effective strategy. See pp.125-126 below.

importance of theory to mass action, Sukarno stated: 'Mass action without theory on the part of those who conduct it, mass action without training courses, brochures and a press is a mass action that is not alive, that has no soul -- a mass action that, for this reason, possesses no will. Moreover, it is only this will that can become the real motor of energy of mass action!'¹

The particular enunciations of the principles that were seen to underly mass action and power-forming varied, chiefly because each of the principles subsumed or implied the others. At different times therefore Marhaenism, nationalism, radicalism, socio-nationalism and socio-democracy were put forward in varying combinations as the principles essential to mass action and power-forming.

In addition to these principles, idealism was seen as an important 'activating power' of mass action:

...Mass action indeed cannot be powerful if it just pursues 'to-day's small advantages' alone. Mass action can become genuine mass action only if the common people already intend to uproot old conditions and to replace them completely with new conditions. 'A new ideal of life must inspire

1

Sukarno, Indonesia Menggugat, p.146 (1930).

the masses', said a great leader about the prime requirement for mass action. It is for this reason that one day the time will come for us, the Marhaen, when our mass action too will come vitally alive and arise in all its power. Our ideals, our idealism, are not merely political idealism alone; our idealism is not confined to 'Indonesia Merdeka' alone, our idealism is the idealism of a new society, a glittering and brilliant social idealism. It is this social idealism which is the main activating power of our mass action¹.

(e) Marxist or Marxist-influenced Concepts.

The principles and the principles of struggle, were not seen as mere ideals founded on sentiment. They were regarded as firmly based on a knowledge of the 'factual conditions of society', on a 'knowledge of the structure of the world' and on a knowledge of history².

1

Sukarno, Bendera I, p.302 (1933).

2

See the following examples: Sukarno's explanation of the factual or realistic basis for 'genuine nationalism', socio-nationalism and socio-democracy, *ibid.*, pp.5 (1926), 75 (1928), 174-175 (1932) & 298 (1933); Sukarno's 1930 explanation of the reasons for the P.N.I.'s adoption of the policy of self-reliance, in Sukarno, Indonesia Menggugat, p.98, and his account of the P.N.I.'s reasons for emphasising theory in its courses, *ibid.*, pp.146-150, based largely on quotations from Kautsky; the reasons for classifying power-forming as 'the first requisite', referred to on pp.88-89 above; the explanation of the relationship between principles and power-forming, mentioned on pp.90-91 above; and the reference to socialism, p.125 below.

In this sense, they were seen as upheld by nature and to be in harmony with the times¹. Even the struggle of the Marhaen was seen in pragmatic terms: 'We struggle because of our misery, we struggle because we want a better and more fitting life...because we want a better lot in all the parts and branches of life'². The struggle had therefore to be based on a realistic view of the world and of politics³.

(i) Dialectics and Historical Materialism

What was the basis for Sukarno's and his supporters' realism? Sukarno and like-minded leaders of the nationalist movement, in searching for a method or a basis for analysing their nation's problem and for solving those problems, were attracted to Marxist

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See, for example, Sukarno's warning that the vanguard party must be 'upheld by nature', in Sukarno, Bendera I, pp.306-307 (1933) and his exhortations to keep in harmony with the times, *ibid.*, pp.254-255 (1933) & 315 (1933).

2

Ibid., pp.280-281, 285 & 315 (1933).

3

Ibid., pp.288-289 (1933).

methods of analysis¹. In particular, Sukarno and his supporters adopted a dialectical approach² with historical materialism, based on dialectical materialism, as its foundation³. The basic proposition of historical materialism was seen to be that it is 'not the thinking of man that determines conditions, but, on the contrary, it is conditions related to society that

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See Soedjatmoko, 'II. Indonesia and the World', in Australian Outlook, Vol. 21 No. 3, December 1967, pp. 288-289. This point was frequently made by older generation Indonesians whom I interviewed. One can see this view reflected in Sukarno's early writings. See, for example, Sukarno, Bendera I, pp.12 & 15-17 (1926), 121 (1932), 219-221 (1933), 228-230 (1933), 253-248 (1933), & 510-512 (1941). See also Soedjatmoko's comment on the appeal of Marxist analytical methods, Soedjatmoko 'The Indonesian Historian and His Time' in Soedjatmoko (ed.), Introduction to Indonesian Historiography, p.411.

2

e.g., ibid., pp.15 (1926), 121 (1932), 220 (1933) & 229 (1933).

3

Sukarno distinguished historical materialism from philosophical materialism and argued that it was the former and not the latter element of Marxism that the Indonesian revolutionaries as a whole, as opposed to the Indonesian communists, endorsed. See, for example, ibid., p.21 (1933). This is the reasoning behind the account of the background to Sukarno's thought explained briefly in Indonesia Volume IV: Looking Back Over 1964, p.19. See also Pantja Sila : Basis of State, pp.154-157 (3/9/58) for an elaboration of this distinction and for a fuller explanation of the meaning of historical materialism. For an example of Sukarno's interpretation, see ibid., pp.157-170. The rejection of the materialist element in Marxism was typical of the ideologies of most

determine thinking'¹. Expressed in other terms, this proposition became: 'that it is ways of finding a livelihood which determine all the ideas and thoughts and the behaviour and character of history and of human beings'². Given the revolutionaries' conviction that theories of dialectics were valid, they saw as one of the permanent elements in the conditions of society an unending dialectic or conflict³, a view reflected in references to such concepts as 'the dialectics of all conditions'⁴, 'the dialectics of nature'⁵, 'the

developing nations. See, for example, P.E. Sigmund (ed.), The Ideologies of the Developing Nations, Praeger, London, 1963, pp.17-18, 37-38.

1

Cited in Sukarno, Bendera I, p.15 (1926). See also *ibid.*, pp.89-90 (1928). For an example of Sukarno's application of this proposition, see his analysis of the difference between peasant and proletarian attitudes, *ibid.*, pp.254-256 (1933). See also his analysis of liberalism and fascism in terms of their origins in economic conditions, *ibid.*, pp.596-598 (1941).

2

Ibid., p.220 (1933).

3

See, for example, *ibid.*, pp.183 (1932), 290 (1933), 350 (1939), and Pantja Sila : Basis of State, p.184 (21/2/59). See also the discussion of 'Antithesis', pp.103-111 below.

4

Sukarno, Bendera I, p.183 (1932).

5

Ibid., p.290 (1933).

dialectics of history'¹, 'the dialectics of the situation'², 'the law of dialectics which is indeed the law of nature'³, and 'the dialectical process'⁴.

Thus, underlying their political thinking was an awareness of both evolutionary and revolutionary change⁵, of a historical process of action and reaction, akin to the Hegelian concept of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, to the Marxist concept of dialectics and to Toynbee's concept of challenge and response⁶. On this view, history contains its own dynamism in the form of self-propelling movement, the understanding of which requires a dynamic approach, since the ideas, that are the product

1 Ibid., p.396 (1940).

2 Ibid., p.557 (1941).

3 Loc. cit.

4 Ibid., p.603 (1941).

5 See Sukarno's discussion of his views, and those of socialist and Marxist writers, on evolutionary and revolutionary change in Sukarno, Indonesia Menggugat, pp.112-115 (1930). See also pp.121 & 123 below. For a more detailed discussion, and its application to Indonesia, see Pantja Sila : Basis of State, pp.90-102 (26/5/58) and 174-196 (21/5/59).

6 This was the picture given in an interview by one of Sukarno's former supporters and echoed, with minor variations by several others of the revolutionary generation whom I interviewed.

of changing social conditions, must themselves be subject to change¹.

On the above basis, the revolutionaries developed their view of the world, of history and of reality, their analysis of the nature of colonialism, imperialism, capitalism and Indonesian society, and their strategy for removing the barriers to the creation of a new society. This strategy was seen as realistic, since it took into account the nature of colonialism in Indonesia and in the world and also forces that could be brought to bear against the colonial and capitalist systems. These theoretical and philosophical analyses were seen as fundamental to all the revolutionaries' thought and action².

(ii) Antithesis

The above view of history led Sukarno to see the struggle of the Indonesian nationalist movement as a

1

See footnote 4, p.66 above.

2

For example, self-reliance was the result of 'an analysis of the fundamentals of colonial conditions, that is from an analysis the basis of colonialism itself'. See Sukarno, Indonesia Menggugat, p.98 (1930). For a more general explanation of the importance of the theoretical foundation for the revolutionaries' thought and action, see pp.125-126 below.

response to and expression of a fundamental antithesis in Indonesia which was in turn seen as part of a larger, continuing antithesis, opposition, struggle or conflict in the world. This fundamental antithesis in history was seen as taking different specific forms at different times and in different situations, although in essence it was the same¹.

Truly, the history of the world at all times shows conflict between two groups. Truly, the history of the world at all times shows the existence of an 'upper' group and the existence of a 'lower' group which are in conflict with each other, which ~~are~~ are the antithesis of each other; in the feudal age it was the aristocracy and the serfs, in the era of capitalism the capitalists and the proletariat, in colonial times the colonisers and the colonised. It is this latter antithesis or conflict which controls the basic character of the relations between them and us, the 'nature' of the relations between them and us, so that their side and our side are always clashing against each other. It is this antithesis which the Marxists call the dialectics of a situation, the dialectics of an historical phase, the dialectics of a period in the evolution of the world².

The antithesis was illustrated in various other

1

e.g., Sukarno, Bendera I, p.183 (1932).

2

Ibid., p.291 (1933). This account was taken up from time to time, e.g., in 1958, see Pantja Sila : Basis of State, p.184. For a further elaboration of the similarities and differences between the antithesis in its labour/capital form and in its colonial context, see Sukarno, Bendera I, pp.183-184 (1932) and Sukarno, Indonesia Menggugat, pp.79-83 & 117 (1930).

ways. In its most general form, for example, it was depicted as a conflict: 'between "those above" and "those below"'¹; 'between the "winners" and the "losers"'²; 'between those who suppress and those who are suppressed'³; 'between the old and the new, between orthodoxy and evolution, between the conservative and the modern'⁴. In terms of economic groupings and the class struggle, the conflict was seen as one: between 'the workers who are the "underdogs"' and 'the people "on top"'⁵; between capitalists and workers, e.g., in America and Europe⁶; 'between capital and labour'⁷; between the trade union movement and capitalism⁸; between

1 Sukarno, Bendera I, p.183 (1932).

2 Loc. cit.

3 Loc. cit.

4 Ibid., p.350 (1939). See *ibid.*, p.396 (1940) for an application of this formulation to the Reformation in Europe.

5 Ibid., p.20 (1926).

6 Ibid., p.183 (1932).

7 Ibid., pp.229 & 233 (1933).

8 Ibid., p.229 (1933).

'those who institute capitalism and those upon whom capitalism is instituted'¹. In terms of political philosophy and ideology, the antithesis was seen as that: between capitalism and socialism²; between the system of capitalism-imperialism on the one hand and, on the other, radicalism which 'seeks to construct a new society on the ruins of capitalism and imperialism'³. In the colonial context the conflict was depicted as that: 'between the overlords and the colonised people'⁴; between the brown front and the white front⁵; 'between the power-desiring brown and the power-clutching white'⁶. More specifically in Indonesia, the struggle was seen as one: between Marhaenism on the one hand and bourgeoisism and capitalism on the other⁷; or, more simply,

1 Ibid., p.184 (1932).

2 Ibid., pp.228-229 (1933).

3 Ibid., p.229 (1933).

4 Ibid., p.84 (1928).

5 Ibid., pp.38 (1927), 83 & 84 (1928).

6 Ibid., p.38 (1927).

7 Ibid., p.184 (1932).

between Marhaenism and capitalism-imperialism¹.

In abstract or theoretical terms, the antithesis was seen as arising because of the 'dialectics of nature'² or the 'dialectics of all conditions'³, from which it is impossible to escape⁴. For example, once the capitalist system was established, the very laws of capitalism itself rendered opposition from the oppressed inevitable⁵. This reasoning was backed up by more pragmatic reasons, basically variations on the theme of a clash of interest, for example, between capital and labour⁶. In the colonial context, there was a conflict of interests and needs between colonisers and colonised⁷, between the imperialists and the native people, in every field: Economic, social, political 'or any other at all'⁸. The

1

Ibid., p.229 (1933).

2

Ibid., p.290 (1933).

3

Ibid., p.183 (1932).

4

Ibid., p.557 (1941).

5

Ibid., pp.15-16 (1926).

6

Ibid., p.229 (1933).

7

Ibid., p.68 (1928).

8

Sukarno, Indonesia Menggugat, p.135 (1930).

essence of the position of those oppressed by imperialism and capitalism vis-à-vis their oppressors was therefore conflict:

...Conflict in all respects. Conflict of origin, conflict of objective, conflict of needs, conflict of nature and conflict of principle. There is no similarity, there is nothing in common between them and us. Between them and us there is conflict like that between fire and water, like that between wolf and deer, like that between the bad and the good¹.

This basic conflict was seen as amongst the most important of the determinants of the revolutionaries' principles of struggle². An awareness of the antithesis was seen as central to the struggle:

Blind, and once more blind indeed, is anyone who wants to deny the existence of this conflict, this clash, this antithesis, which in fact is there because of the dialectics of nature. But we, precisely those who have created the movement which bears nature forward and is borne forward by nature, which accords with nature and with which nature accords, we who do not want to be blind, must take precisely this antithesis as the nucleus of all our principles of struggle and of all our tactics. Precisely what we have to do is to base all that activity of ours upon this dialectic, base that attitude of ours on this dialectic. We should immediately comprehend that this dialectic calls upon us at all times to defy the other side, not to work together with them, but, on the contrary, to wage a never-ending struggle against the other side -- right up to the moment of

1

Sukarno, Bendera I, p.289-290 (1933).

2

Ibid., pp.189 (1932) & 289-290 (1933).

ascendency and victory. We should instantly understand that because there is this antithesis, we can achieve victory only by our own capacity, our own strength, our own effort, our own skill, our own toil and our own courage¹.

The recognition of the antithesis thus provided the basis for the principle of non-cooperation, a basis that distinguished the Indonesian version of that principle from other versions² and that added an active, radical aspect requiring the conduct of 'a relentless struggle against the colonisers'³. One of the important functions of non-cooperation was thus to promote the awareness of the antithesis and to sharpen and widen the conflict⁴, thereby rendering compromise with the opposing side impossible⁵. In this way the struggle would be strengthened:

...But every effort which makes the demarcation line more perfect between us and them is good for our struggle. The more obvious the line between our people and the overlords, the sharper the division appears between our side and theirs, that

1
Ibid., pp.290-291 (1933).

2
Ibid., p.194 (1932-33).

3
Ibid., pp.189-190 (1932).

4
Ibid., pp.198 & 202 (1932-33).

5
Ibid., p.290 (1933).

is, the clearer that antithesis can be seen and felt, then the clearer and sharper becomes the nature of our struggle, the purer and cleaner too becomes the manifestation of our struggle in consequence, thus imparting character to our struggle¹.

Non-cooperation of this active Indonesian type, based on the awareness of the fundamental conflict between colonisers and colonised, was seen as an essential part of the process of power-forming², and power-forming itself was seen as the necessary result of the antithesis:

...Power-forming is necessary because, in view of the conflict of interests between 'them' and 'us', all our wishes are in conflict with their wishes, collide with their interests, inflict losses upon them, with the result that the colonisers will never be prepared to concede to our wishes voluntarily, if we do not compel them to do so with a pressure that they cannot resist. And since we can only exert such pressure if we have force, that is to say, if we have strength, if we have POWER, we must therefore build up this power, we must work at this power-forming as vigorously and as industriously as possible.

Power-forming is therefore something based upon the antithesis between them and us, something that is full of the spirit of opposition and conviction in resistance, something that is full of élan and the conviction that there can be no peace between them

1
Ibid., p.84 (1928).

2
Loc. cit. & ~~ibid.~~, p.298 (1933).

and us -- something that is full of radical élan and conviction¹.

The antithesis, or the awareness of it, was given the status of a principle, indeed, the principle that was to uphold power-forming:

...Our power-forming...must be power-forming that is upheld by a principle: the principle of the antithesis between them and us, a principle of irreconcilable opposition between them and us, a principle of national independence, a principle of Marhaenism, a principle not of haggling but of aiming at the total extermination of the system of capitalism-imperialism, a principle that seeks to construct a new society on the ruins of capitalism and imperialism, that is upheld by the idea of equity and equality, of sama rasa sama rata².

(iii) Radicalism.

The description just quoted of the principle of antithesis upholding the Indonesian revolutionaries' power-forming also provided Sukarno's definition of radicalism. The quote continues:

It is this principle that can be expressed by one word, namely radicalism. Radicalism -- derived from the word radix, meaning root -- radicalism must be the principle of the Marhaen's power-forming: to fight without half-heartedly haggling, but to plunge to the very roots of the violent

1

Ibid., p.201 (1932-33). This argument is essentially the same as the Marxist argument, endorsed by Sukarno (e.g., *ibid.*, p.200), that no class will voluntarily give up its rights.

2

Ibid., pp.299-300 (1933).

antithesis, without half-heartedly just seeking the 'gains of to-day' alone, but out to destroy the system of capitalism-imperialism down to its very roots, without half-heartedly wanting to make just small reforms but out to set up a wholly new society upon new roots -- to fight with the last ounce of strength to uproot present ways of life and to construct a new way of life on new roots. It is this radicalism which must be the very soul of the Marhaen's power-forming. The Marhaen's power-forming. The Marhaen should reject with aversion all half-heartedness which does not fight but only haggles; the Marhaen should expel from the ranks of the Marhaen all opportunism, reformism and possibilism which is forever calculating losses and profits like a small vendor who fears to lose a single cent. The Marhaen should keep away from all politics seeking to cover up or soften the antithesis between them and us, -- instead the Marhaen should even sharpen the antithesis between them and us -- should not be willing to be conciliatory and strike a bargain with the opposing side, but should fight to the utmost against the opposing side even before the very gates of hell. The Marhaen should understand in the blink of an eye that their struggle aiming at the overthrow of capitalism-imperialism down to its very roots cannot be successful with the politics of reformism which favours 'trading' with the capitalists, whose system it wants to abolish. The Marhaen should take to heart the words of Kari Liebknecht that 'peace between the common people and the upper class means victimising the common people' -- destroying the common people. Thus the Marhaen, to repeat, must fight uncompromisingly down to the very roots of the violent antithesis, struggle irreconcilably to destroy the roots of the system capitalism-imperialism, fight without conciliation to sow the seeds of a new way of life -- fight uncompromisingly with the spirit of radicalism and with the actions of radicalism¹.

1

Ibid., p.300 (1933). The total and uncompromising nature of the struggle required by Sukarno's concept of

Radicalism was thus seen as an essential element in power-forming. It was also seen as an essential element in the Indonesian principle of non-cooperation or self-reliance and in mass action. Of non-cooperation, for example, Sukarno declared, after stressing that, in the Indonesian context, non-cooperation was an active as well as a passive principle:

...That is why non-cooperation contains radicalism, implies radicalism -- radicalism of heart, radicalism of thought and radicalism of behaviour, radicalism in all inward and outward attitudes. Non-cooperation demands activity, demands radical activity¹.

In the case of mass action, Sukarno declared that it is radicalism that distinguishes mass action, the potent force aimed at by the Indonesian revolutionaries, from what is mere 'mass-scale action'². The latter, without the former, does not succeed in converting a movement of the mass of the people into an effective political force, despite their numbers. Mass action

radicalism was not unique to Indonesia. For a general explanation of the reasons for uncompromising attitudes on the part of revolutionary nations, see Spanier, *op. cit.*, p.48.

1

Sukarno, Bendera I, pp.291-292 (1933). *Ibid.*, pp.197-198 (1932-33).

2

See, for example, *ibid.*, pp.197-198 (1932-33) & 302-303 (1933).

required mass radicalism, the product of 'the marriage between mass misery and mass education, the marriage between mass misery and mass struggle!'¹

The task of arranging this marriage and producing the desired off-spring was allotted to the vanguard party:

Only if that misery is accompanied by mass education, is accompanied by mass struggle, by mass opposition through mass action against that misery, only then can misery give rise to radicalism in the ranks of the masses and make it thrive. Consequently, with the misery of the present day alone...the vanguard party can already make the whole of the masses into a rolling ocean of radicalism, provided the party has the skill to open the eyes of the masses and is skilled at welding together the forces of the masses to fight that misery².

Viewed in terms of radicalism, the vanguard party's task was thus to promote radicalism through fostering political consciousness and understanding and through leading the masses into the field of experience or struggle, a process which would: 'make the spirit of the masses radical, make the will of the masses radical, make the courageous élan of the masses radical, make the

1 Ibid., p.311 (1933).

2 Ibid., p.312 (1933).

ideology and the activities of the masses radical'¹. In order to perform its task, the vanguard party therefore had to be 'radically consistent and disciplined'² and had to possess 'principles of struggle and a programme which are 100 per cent radical: antithesis, irreconcilable struggle, Marhaenism, wiping out the present social order, attaining a new social order, all these things should be inscribed in burning letters on the party flag and on the banners of the party'³

It was because of the central place accorded to radicalism, to an uncompromising dedication to the complete destruction of the old social order and the construction of the new, that Sukarno and his followers regarded their struggle as a revolution⁴ and themselves

1
Ibid., p.223 (1933). For an elaboration on this process, see *ibid.*, pp.223-226 (1933) and 280-285, 297-314 (1933).

2
Ibid., p.284 (1933).

3
Ibid., p.304 (1933).

4
e.g., *ibid.*, p.281 (1933). See also p.121 below for another aspect of the concept of revolution.

as revolutionaries¹. The terms 'revolutionary' and 'radical' were seen as synonymous². Indeed, 'revolutionary' was defined as 'radical', i.e., 'wanting to make changes quickly', 'the inverse of "patiently", the inverse of "moderate"', desiring 'to make a quick and radical transformation'³.

(iv) Revolutionary Leadership and Victory.

Sukarno's exposition of the role of the vanguard part in building power, in fostering mass radicalism and thereby transforming the unconscious will of the masses into a conscious mass-will, was also an illustration of the function of revolutionary leadership. One of the most important expositions of the more theoretical elements in Sukarno's concept of leadership is to be found in 'Sarinah'⁴. His exposition was put forward in

1

See, for example, Sukarno, Indonesia Menggugat, pp.112-115 (1930). In addition, Sukarno also endorses Liebknecht's definition of 'revolutionary', referred to *ibid.*, pp.113-114. See the discussion of this concept and its application to the Indonesian situation, pp.122-123 below.

2

See, for example, Sukarno, Bendera I, pp.197-198 & 201 (1932-33) & 303-304 (1933).

3

e.g., Sukarno, Indonesia Menggugat, pp.112-113 (1930).

4

See Chapter VI, pp.382-513 of Sukarno, Sarinah (1947). The following account, except where otherwise indicated, is based on this chapter.

an illustrative rather than analytical way, but the principles can be distilled from this account.

Generalising from the Indonesian experience in the 1945 Revolution, Sukarno argued that the gaining of genuine independence by a colony is a revolutionary act rather than the end of a process of constitutional development towards independence¹. Independence was achieved by Indonesia because of a revolutionary situation that had been produced by the turmoil of the Second World War, and, in particular, by the Pacific War. Sukarno predicted this development and saw its implications for Indonesia. In 1929 he proclaimed:

Imperialists, look! Look out! When shortly the thunder of the Pacific War strikes and splits the skies, when shortly the Pacific Ocean grows red and the earth about it shakes from the explosions of bombs and dynamite, then will the people of Indonesia cast off their shackles, then will the people of Indonesia be free!²

That utterance was not a prophecy, nor an exercise in wishful thinking. Sukarno described it as 'the product of an assessment of the coming of revolutionary

1

See *ibid.*, pp.393-401.

2

Quoted on p.397, *ibid.* See also Sukarno, Bendera I, p.77 (1928), and Sukarno, Indonesia Menggugat, pp.31 & 165-177 (1930).

situations, and of assessment of the utilisation of those revolutionary situations'¹. The circumstances that would be produced by the war were seen as 'an objective factor good for releasing Indonesia from the clutches of Dutch imperialism'². Sukarno therefore urged his people to build their revolutionary fervour to prepare for the opportunity that would be presented to them by historical developments. The general situation which Sukarno predicted did occur and the nationalist movement did prepare the people for seizing independence. The Revolution was therefore launched successfully. This was Sukarno's review in 1947 of the Revolution's progress and of the reasons for its success to that stage.

Central to Sukarno's analysis of the role of revolutionary leadership was the concept of a 'revolutionary situation', a situation propitious for the successful launching of a revolution. Revolutionary situations were seen to have two aspects: the 'objective situation', over which the revolutionaries

1 Sukarno, Sarinah, p.397.

2 Ibid., pp.399-400.

have little or no control, and the 'subjective situation', over which they do. Objective situations are the product of the evolution of history and are, in this sense, inevitable. Subjective revolutionary situations are the product of the efforts of revolutionaries, those factors which the revolutionaries can build up for themselves. The role of the revolutionary leader was thus seen firstly as assessing historical developments and trends accurately so that he can predict in general terms when an objective revolutionary situation is likely to occur, and so that he can recognise the indications that such a situation is developing. He can thus urge patience until the objective situation is propitious and then take advantage of the opportunity given by the objective situation, to launch the revolution, using the situation as an 'objective factor' for the success of the revolution. But, to be able to use that opportunity, the revolutionaries must be strong. The revolutionary leader must, therefore, build up 'subjective factors':

...We must build up subjective factors in order to be able to utilise that opportunity: we must build up our powers, strengthen our resolve, train our skills, forge our ranks, make our national will concrete. Beside the objective revolutionary situation..., there must be built...a subjective revolutionary situation in the form of enlarging

tremendously our revolutionary will and our revolutionary strength and of making them concrete¹.

The aim of the revolutionary leader should be to ensure that the creation of the subjective factors has been completed by the time that the objective and subjective situations co-incide, thereby setting in motion a revolution that cannot be resisted or suppressed².

The launching of the revolution at a propitious time, however, is not the end of the revolutionary leader's task. The revolution, once begun, must be safeguarded and guided through its successive stages, phases or levels³. The leadership skills involved in these tasks are basically the same as those involved in launching the revolution: correct assessment of objective factors and effective promotion of subjective factors. For example, in a national revolution such as Indonesia's, once independence is gained, it must be sustained and developed:

...We are already independent, we already possess the Republic, but if we do not heed the experiences

1 Ibid., p.400.

2 e.g., *ibid.*, pp.400-401.

3 These phases in the Indonesian context are elaborated *ibid.*, pp.410-421.

of history and do not give the correct form and policies to our struggle -- do not conduct our struggle with the right character and at the right place -- it is possible that this independence will fly off into the clouds. Most Great and Most Praised be God Almighty that the people of Indonesia are already independent, but, in order to possess that independence for all time and to give it substance with social well-being -- for that, there needs to be an accurate vision and endeavours that are also correct¹.

Since revolution is not a mere 'event', but a 'process', progressing through different phases, continuing over many years, blending destructive and constructive forces, destroying conditions in society that no longer accord with the new needs and building up new conditions that do², the revolutionary leader must assess correctly when the objective and subjective situations are right for and, indeed, demand, progression to a new stage of revolution. He must recognise the obligations and 'historical tasks' of each phase³.

The correct assessment of the objective situation and of the objective factors involved in it is of importance since, on Sukarno's view of history, events

1 Ibid., pp.391-392.

2 See *ibid.*, pp.408-409.

3 See *ibid.*, pp.413-421.

occur as part of an evolutionary and dialectical process determined by objective factors¹. Imperialists and their supporters, being ignorant of these objective factors and the trend of history, are thus fighting a losing battle: '...the evolutionary trends of society cannot be influenced by such people, whose endeavours are in conflict with the objective elements in society. Society continues to take its course in keeping with the laws of evolution themselves. Onward!'² By the same argument, however, a revolutionary leader can only lead his followers to victory, both ultimately and in specific revolutionary acts, while he himself continues to assess accurately the objective situations in which the revolution is occurring.

Successful revolutionaries, therefore, require more than dedication to rapid and total transformation of society³. They must also be those who are furthering the evolutionary course of society, removing reactionary obstacles to evolution:

1

See *ibid.*, pp.428-429.

2

Ibid., p.432.

3

See the definition of revolutionaries pp.115-116 above.

What is it that is called 'groups of the people who are revolutionary?' ...It is the groups who struggle in harmony with the advances in the evolutionary course of society, not opposing them, not holding them back ~~and~~ the groups who struggle might and main to shatter and destroy the old 'order' and to hasten the coming of the new 'order' in conformity with the tendencies in the evolution of society'¹.

Applying this criterion to the modern Indonesian and world situations, Sukarno diagnosed that the major obstacle to further evolution is imperialism. Therefore, every group which is opposed to imperialism is revolutionary. Indeed, opposition to imperialism was regarded as the essential criterion for admission to the ranks of the revolutionaries, a criterion taking precedence over those of class or poverty².

The correct assessment of the subjective situation

1

Ibid., p.493. This is essentially the same as Liebknecht's definition cited and endorsed in Sukarno, Indonesia Menggugat, pp.113-114 (1930).

2

See, for example, Sukarno's quotation and endorsement of Stalin's definition of 'revolution', pp.441-442 of Sukarno, Sarinah (1947). See also *ibid.*, pp.444-445, 453 & 476-477. In a lecture on 5/6/58, Sukarno blended this interpretation of 'revolutionary' with the other concepts referred to on pp.115-116 above. See Pantja Sila : Basis of State, pp.71-72.

and the adoption of the correct measures to sustain and strengthen the development of the subjective factors are no less important. The leader has a vital role to play in creating the subjective situation. He must motivate the people, by expressing the aspirations and ideals that the people feel subconsciously, by arousing the peoples' desire and will to pursue these ideals, by fostering their self-confidence in their ability to realise their aspirations, and by stirring the people to action¹. The leader cannot, however, create the subjective situation alone, nor can he carry out the revolution, since a revolution 'is a societal process that is set in motion by the forces of that society itself -- and not by the agitator, not by the demagogue, not by the inciter, not by the leader'². It is the people who have to carry out the revolution³, stimulated, aroused and led by the

1

This process is discussed below by reference to 'Sarinah'. In 1958, Sukarno provided a similar account of these leadership functions. See Pantja Sila: Basis of the State, pp.82-86 (26/5/58).

2

Sukarno, Sarinah, p.412. See also pp.433-434 for a description of these social forces in Indonesia.

3

See, for example, Sukarno's explanation of Sternberg's proposition that, 'Eventually it is men who are decisive', *ibid.*, pp.457-8 and his account of the significant role which must be played by the people in furthering the cause of socialism, *ibid.*, pp.468-469.

leader who acts as both a catalyst and a guide.

If the leader is to act as an effective guide, he must, of course, know the road ahead and how to take his people along that road:

...Can someone lead well -- point the path to the people, set the people's enthusiasm ablaze, mobilise the people's working powers and powers of struggle, achieve the greatest possible results at the cost of the least possible sacrifices -- if he does not know the path he must take, the methods he must use, which objectives he must aim at? Can someone lead well if he is not guided by knowledge and science? Can someone lead well if he himself does not know the road?¹

The necessary knowledge for this task of guide is to be found in socialism, for which Sukarno adopts a broad definition: 'Socialism is not merely a system of society, socialism is also a theory, a science, a guidance in struggle, a way of thinking, a method of thinking'². From the theory of socialism, the leader can acquire an understanding of the objective conditions in his own and in world society³. His socialist ideals will thus be based not upon utopian socialism, but upon 'the socialism which is the materialisation of the evolution of society

1 Ibid., p.468.

2 Ibid., p.464.

3 Loc. cit.

as it really is', i.e., 'upon concrete factors -- socialism that is "objective", or 'scientific'¹.

Socialism can thus equip the leader for his role as guide:

...Through understanding this kind of socialism (scientific socialism), we can study how far the level of evolution of our society has gone at present, we can determine what characteristics our Revolution should have at present, we can build the strategy of our struggle at present. With it, we can guide our Revolution to a higher level, we can determine the direction that should be taken, we can make sure of victory. For this reason, we should not merely hold ideals of socialism -- even though it be 'objective socialism' at that! -- but we have also to comprehend the theory of socialism, comprehend the way of thinking of socialism, know the science of socialism. Know the science of socialism so that we know the way in which to struggle to obtain socialism!²

Since the creation of the subjective situation depends on the support of the people, it is not sufficient for the leader to understand socialism fully. He must also promote this understanding on the part of the people³. Part of his role of guide thus involves his performing the role of a teacher, but his relationship with the masses must not be merely one directional. If the

1 Ibid., p.467.

2 Loc. cit.

3 Ibid., pp.468-469.

picture he paints is not attractive to the people, they will not be roused from their inertia. The leader can only attract and motivate the people if he understands them and describes what they want to hear, if he expresses their aspirations better than they can, if, in other words, he is a genuine spokesman for the people¹.

The success of a revolution, at any stage, is not inevitable. What is inevitable, is the development of objective revolutionary situations². If revolutionaries accurately assess the objective factors and are ready subjectively, they can turn the objective situations to their advantage and, as it were, push history along: '...I belong to that group of people who believe that social-political necessities in human societies always manifest themselves as "events" at times when objective elements obtain a burst of Mighty Inspiration from the most prodigious and greatest mass-scale subjective elements'³. But, on the other hand, the revolutionaries

1

See *ibid.*, pp.470-476 for further details of this interactive aspect of leadership.

2

See, for example, Sukarno's illustrations of this proposition, *ibid.*, pp.426-432 and 456-462.

3

Ibid., pp.425-426.

must also create their subjective factors through struggle. Only through the concurrence of subjective and objective factors can victory be assured:

'Objectively we are sure to win'. What does this mean -- that thus automatically we are sure to win? There is no victory when there is no struggle! There is no victory when there is no subjective will from human beings to achieve that victory! Every atom of our enthusiasm must be fanned to a blaze, every atom of our willingness to work to the bone and to bathe in our own sweat must be materialised, every atom of our perseverance to fight must be realised in practice, every atom of our willingness to sacrifice, sacrifice, sacrifice and once more sacrifice must be materialised -- on the basis of those objective principles -- in order to win that victory. Victory will not be won if men do not want to achieve victory, and victory is sure to be achieved if the objective factors make that victory possible and men want to win that victory¹.

(f) Summary

The struggle of the Marhaen was thus seen in part as a struggle to realise the aspirations of the Indonesian people, through transforming the nature of society, in part as a conflict with those factors which constituted obstacles to the realisation of the people's aspirations and in part as a struggle to remove the barriers to the natural evolution of society. With effective leadership

1

Ibid., pp.456-457.

through a vanguard party, the hope was to create a powerful mass action, which would serve as a 'midwife',¹ to the birth of a new society and which would enable the Marhaen to carry out their 'historic work' and their 'historic duty'¹. Since the struggle was to further the course of historical evolution and not to obstruct it, victory was seen as inevitable. Behind this view was the blending of both theories of historical evolution or historical inevitability and of direct action or intervention. The two combined produced what amounts to a theory of revolutionary leadership².

3. THE 1945 CONSTITUTION AND PANTJA SILA.

The struggle of the Indonesian Marhaen reached a culmination with the seizure of independence in 1945, but this was not seen as the end of the struggle³. The

¹ Ibid., p.288 (1933).

² For one of Sukarno's most thorough accounts of these theories and of their application to Indonesia, see Pantja Sila : Basis of State, pp.174-196 (21/2/59).

³ See, for example, Sukarno, 'The Birth of Pantja Sila' (1/6/45), in Pantja Sila : Basis of State, p.37.

birth of the independent Republic marked the beginning of a new stage in the struggle, a stage in which the state was to be used as the instrument for attaining the positive goals of the Revolution¹.

(a) The 1945 Constitution.

The above ideas were incorporated into the 1945 Constitution, which translated the dominant elements in the nationalist movement's aspirations and theories into the declared objectives and principles of the new Republic. The Constitution and, in particular, the Preamble², charted the course for the new stage of the struggle. The latter thus provides a formal statement of the objectives and principles of the Indonesian Revolution and ends by incorporating the five principles of Pantja Sila as the basis of the state³.

1

See for example, loc. cit. and ibid., pp.105 & 122-124 (16/7/58). See also Sukarno, Sarinah, pp.446-450 (1947).

2

Sometimes called the 'Opening'. See Appendix A, pp.A1-A2 below. For an annotated version of the Preamble, see Indon. Rev., pp.47-58.

3

Pantja Sila was also incorporated into the Preambles of the 1949 and the 1950 Constitutions. See p.15 of H. Roeslan Abdulgani, Pantjasila : The Prime Mover of the Indonesian Revolution, no publisher or date listed, but the format and printing are similar to Resapkan dan Amalkan Pantjasila, of which the former is a translation.

(b) Pantja Sila.¹

Pantja Sila was and still is officially accorded great importance in Indonesian ideology. In an introductory note to the collection of his speeches on Pantja Sila, Sukarno referred to 'the three basic meanings' of Pantja Sila²: 'the sublimation of Indonesia's unity of soul'; 'the manifestation of the unity of the Indonesian nation and territory'; and the Weltanschauung³ in

The latter was published by Prapantja, Djakarta, in 1964. It is a collection of Abdulgani's writings and speeches on Pantja Sila between 1955 and 1964 and was used in indoctrination courses. The English work will hereafter be cited as Abdulgani, Pantjasila.

1

The five principles of Pantja Sila were first enunciated distinctively by Sukarno on 1/6/45 in an address to the Body Investigating Efforts in Preparation for Independence. See Pantja Sila : Basis of State, pp.13-38 for the text of this speech. These principles were subsequently elaborated in a series of lectures by Sukarno between May 1958 and February 1959. See *ibid.*, pp.43 ff. for the texts of these speeches. For a general analysis of and commentary on Pantja Sila, see Abdulgani, Pantjasila.

2

Pantja Sila : Basis of State, p.5. Abdulgani, Pantjasila, p.374, lists six 'basic meanings'.

3

i.e., 'the outlook upon the world of the Indonesian people, an outlook typifying the Indonesian Nation, an outlook expressing the Indonesian Nation's Identity', Indonesia 1962, Department of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia, mid-1962, pp.17-18.

the Indonesian nation's way of life, nationally and internationally'. Pantja Sila provides the 'philosophical basis of the independent State, the Republic of Indonesia'¹; 'an ideal for the future' and a 'guide for present practice'²; and 'the basis for the implementation of the "Message of the People's Suffering"³. It is, in short, 'the basic and the state ideology of the Republic of Indonesia'⁴. Weatherbee describes the five principles as 'immediate normative values, the referent for any action or policy. They have the quality of natural law, taking their origin not from Sukarno but from the soil of Ibu Pratiwi (motherland)⁵. The

1

Pantja Sila : Basis of State, p.11.

2

Manipol-USDEK in Question and Answer, p.85, item 82. For a fuller exposition of the same point, see Indonesia 1962, pp.17-19.

3

Weatherbee, op. cit., p.25.

4

Abdulgani, Pantjasila, p.374. On p.14, he defines ideology as 'a world of ideas' or as 'a view of the world and society, which constitutes, for individuals as well as for groups, a guide and a pilot for their lives as individuals and as members of society'.

5

Weatherbee, op. cit., p.25.

official Indonesian view of Pantja Sila's origins is reflected in the following explanation:

Bung Karno stresses that he merely extracted these principles from Indonesia's cultural and political heritage, and acted as the mouthpiece of the people. Indeed, although they were largely unformulated, these ideas have existed for long past amongst the population, stemming from the ancient civilisation which still today marks the personality of the nation¹.

There are minor variations in the ordering and wording of the five principles², but these variations do not affect the basic meaning. The most common formulation is:

1. Belief in the One, Supreme God
2. Humanity (or 'just and civilised humanity', or

1

Pantja Sila : Basis of State, pp.10-11. Speaking to Cindy Adams, Sukarno put the same point in other terms when he described Pantja Sila as being rooted in Marhaenist traditions. See Adams, Sukarno, p.197. For a more lengthy account by Sukarno of the origins of Pantja Sila, see Pantja Sila : Basis of State, pp.87-90 & 99-100 (26/5/58).

2

Compare, for example, the wording in the Preambles of the 1945, 1949 and 1950 Constitutions, quoted in Abdulgani, Pantjasila, p.15 and H. Roeslan Abdulgani, Resapkan dan Amalkan Pantjasila, p.23; Sukarno's original exposition, 'The Birth of Pantja Sila', in Pantja Sila : Basis of the State, pp.22-33; and the annotated summary in Indon. Rev., p.84.

'internationalism')¹

3. Nationalism (or 'national consciousness' or 'the unity of Indonesia')²
4. Sovereignty of the people (or 'democracy')³
5. Social justice.

The above five principles are not regarded as separate, but as interwoven or interlocking, each conditioning or modifying the other four⁴. The

1

Alternative translations of the concept involved in the term 'Perikemanusiaan' or 'Kemanusiaan jang adil dan berabadab'. See Sukarno's explanation of this concept in Pantja Sila : Basis of State, p.129 (22/7/58) and the explanations given in Indon. Rev., p.84 and Indonesia 1962, p.14.

2

'Nationalism' and 'national consciousness' are alternative translations of the term 'kebangsaan'. See Indon. Rev., p.84 and Abdulgani, Pantjasila, p.15. The alternative formulation used in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution (see Appendix A) is a translation of the phrase 'Persatuan Indonesia', unity of Indonesia.

3

Sometimes called 'kedaulatan rakjat', sometimes 'kerakjatan' and sometimes 'demokrasi'. See explanations in Indon. Rev., p.84 and Indonesia 1962, p.14. 'Demokrasi' is mentioned as an alternative formulation in Pantja Sila : Basis of State, p.39.

4

Pantja Sila : Basis of State, p.39.

intention is that 'no one principle may be implemented or realised in ways mitigating against the fullest possible implementation or realisation of any of the other principles'¹. The second and third principles, if combined, become 'socio-nationalism'²; the third and fourth, 'socio-democracy'³. All five principles, compressed into one all-embracing principle, become gotong-rojong⁴, i.e., 'common effort for a common goal'⁵ or 'a system of mutual co-operation and mutual assistance'⁶ which operates on the basis of 'all for all'⁷. Gotong-rojong is regarded as a dynamic concept⁸,

1 Indonesia 1962, p.18.

2 Sukarno, 'The Birth of Pantja Sila' (1/6/45), in Pantja Sila : Basis of State, p.34.

3 Loc. cit.

4 Ibid., p.35. For general explanations of the connotations of this term, see Indonesia 1962, p.14 and Indon. Rev., p.23.

5 Sel. Docs., p.101 (21/4/61).

6 Manipol-USDEK in Question and Answer, p.35, item 34.

7 Sukarno, 'The Birth of Pantja Sila' (1/6/45), in Pantja Sila : Basis of State, p.35.

8 Loc. cit.

expressing traditional Indonesian attitudes about man in society. These attitudes see man as a social animal, seeking close human relationships and co-operating in accordance with the principle of the 'family system' under which there is a harmonious combination of the ideas of serving the group, whilst exercising authority as an equal member of that group¹.

Pantja Sila provides a basic theme in Indonesian ideology as developed during Sukarno's rule. It represents a summary not only of what were seen to be the most important of the nationalist movement's ideals and principles, but also of those traditional elements of Indonesia's culture that were seen to be appropriate to the modern Republic, together with progressive elements of thought culled from the world's great revolutions². The Political Manifesto of 1959 and Sukarno's subsequent major speeches which were regarded as constituting a supplement to the Political Manifesto,

1

See the explanation of the terms 'kerukunan' and 'kekeluargaan' in Indonesia 1962, p.13. See also Pantja Sila : Basis of State, p.152 (3/9/58).

2

See Indonesia Volume IV : Looking Back Over 1964, Department of Foreign Affairs, December, 1964, p.77.

were seen to reflect the Pantja Sila ideology¹. Pantja Sila thus serves as a focal point in Indonesian ideology.

4. MANIPOL-USDEK.

Following the restoration of the 1945 Constitution by the presidential decree of 5th July, 1959², an official restatement and clarification of the spirit, principles and objectives of the Indonesian Revolution was provided in 'Manipol-USDEK', as part of the attempt to return to the rails of the Revolution.

'Manipol' or 'The Political Manifesto' consists of Sukarno's 1959 Independence Day address³ and the

1

e.g., Abdulgarni Pantjasila, p.299 and Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, p.122 (17/8/60). These major speeches formed a cumulative guide to the implementation of Pantja Sila and the Political Manifesto. In February, 1961, for example, the following were specified as 'basic study material' for indoctrination courses: 1) 'The Birth of Pantja Sila'; 2) 1945 Constitution with its Elucidation; 3) The Political Manifesto with its Elucidation; 4) 'The March of our Revolution'; 5) 'To Build the World Anew'; 6) Course of Lectures on the Political Manifesto broadcast by H. Roeslan Abdulgarni; 7) Presidential Counsel on Development. Indonesia 1962, pp.143-4.

2

Reproduced in Indon. Rev., pp.121-122.

3

Also called 'The Political Manifesto' or, alternatively, 'The Rediscovery of our Revolution'. For the text, see Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, pp.31-76.

'Specification' (a formal summary and restatement of the contents of that address) attached as an appendix to the Supreme Advisory Council's Decision of 25th September, 1959¹. In addition to serving as an elucidation of the decree of 5th July and as an official statement explaining the major aspects of the Revolution, Manipol also provided a general programme for furthering the Revolution². The Supreme Advisory Council's Decision of 25th September adopted Manipol as the 'broad outlines of the State policy'³, a decision accepted by Sukarno on 10th November, 1959⁴, and subsequently endorsed by the Madjelis⁵ in November 1960. The Madjelis also adopted

1

For the text of that Decision and the Appendix, see *ibid.*, pp.9-23.

2

See the Preamble to the Specification, *ibid.*, p.11.

3

ibid., p.9.

4

For the text of this acceptance, *ibid.*, p.7.

5

Also known as the Madjelis Permusjawaratan Rakjat (M.P.R.), the representative body exercising sovereignty on behalf of the people under Chapter I Article 1 (2) of the 1945 Constitution and charged with responsibility to determine the broad lines of State policy under Chapter II Article 3. See Constitution 1945, p.7.

Sukarno's 1960 Independence Day address¹ and his 1960 address to the United Nations General Assembly² as guides for the implementation of that policy³.

The Specification of the Political Manifesto provides a vague description of the principles and objective of the Revolution, describing them as 'universal demands of the Conscience of Man' and illustrating these demands by referring to 'Social Justice, individual Freedom, national Freedom and so on'⁴. In Sukarno's speech, the objective of the Revolution is stated as the creation of a 'just and prosperous society'⁵. Two 'bases' are specified as necessary in order to realize the principles and objective of the Revolution:

1

'Djarek', or '"Like an Angel that strikes from the skies" The March of our Revolution', 17/8/60. See Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, pp.77-123.

2

'To Build the World Anew', 30/9/60. Sel. Docs., pp.33-84.

3

Indonesia 1961, p.27.

4

See Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, p.13.

5

See *ibid.*, p.35.

- a. an ideal basis, namely Pantja Sila, and
- b. a structural basis, namely a stable Government.¹

The 'principal tasks' of the Revolution are specified as:

to free Indonesia from all kinds of imperialism,² and to establish three aspects of the framework² as mentioned in the Political Manifesto, namely:

- First: The establishment of a State of the Republic of Indonesia with the structural form of a Unitary State and a National State, which is democratic, with a territory under its authority stretching from Sabang to Merauke³.
- Secondly: The establishment of a society which is just and prosperous, materially as well as spiritually within the bounds of that Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.
- Thirdly: The establishment of good friendship between the Republic of Indonesia and all the states of Asia-Africa, upon the basis of cooperation to create a New World free from imperialism, marching toward perfect World Peace⁴.

Later, when examining the future of the Indonesian

1

Ibid., p.13. For Sukarno's explanation of what is meant by 'stable government', see *ibid.*, p.60.

2

Sukarno describes these three tasks as 'the framework for the pioneer work' involved in 'the struggle of the People of Indonesia'. See *ibid.*, p.71.

3

i.e., 'from the tip of Sumatra to the eastern border of West Irian', Weatherbee, *op. cit.*, p.22.

4

The 'Specification' to 'Manipol' in Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, pp.13-14. Sukarno's wording is slightly different, especially for the third frame. See *ibid.*, p.71. For an analysis of the framework, see Weatherbee, *op. cit.*, pp.22-25.

Revolution, the Political Manifesto specifies short-term and long-term objectives as follows:

The short term objective...is the very simple programme of the Working Cabinet¹ -- the basic needs of the people, security and to continue the struggle against imperialism -- and in addition to maintain our personality amidst the pulls to the right and to the left which we are experiencing now in the turbulence of the world as it advances towards a new harmony.

And our long term objective is: a just and prosperous society, the elimination of imperialism everywhere, and to achieve the foundation for a durable and eternal world peace².

The 'general programme' put forward in Manipol consists of the measures considered necessary to achieve the above objectives. The programme calls for drastic 'retooling' or re-organisation of every aspect of Indonesian life³.

'USDEK' is an acronym of the Indonesian phrases⁴

1

Formed on 9 July 1959 with President Sukarno as Prime Minister. Indonesia 1961, p.202.

2

The 'Specifications' to 'Manipol' in Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, p.17.

3

For a summary of these measures, see section 'III. Basic Efforts (General Programme)' of the 'Specification' to 'Manipol', in *ibid.*, pp.19-23.

4

See Manipol-USDEK in Question and Answer, p.7, item 6, for the Indonesian terms.

that sum up the basic elements contained in Manipol. President Sukarno drew attention to these five elements in February, 1960, when opening a Youth Congress in Bandung¹. They were explained as follows:

If the youth throughout Indonesia are indeed going to implement Manipol truly, then they must first understand and be convinced about the Constitution of our Revolution, namely, the 1945 Constitution; and when we have already taken a firm stand on the 1945 Constitution, then the consequence is Indonesian Socialism, so that we must be pro Indonesian Socialism; the further consequence of that is Guided Democracy, therefore we must be pro Guided Democracy, and the consequence in turn of that is Guided Economy, so that we must be pro Guided Economy; and all of this is the Indonesian Identity².

5. SUBSEQUENT FORMULATIONS.

There were subsequent formulations of Indonesian Ideology, based on Manipol-USDEK. The most illuminating of these were the 'Re-so-pim' doctrine³ and 'Pantja

1

For an account of how the acronym came into use, see H. Roeslan Abdulgani, 'Clarification concerning Manipol-USDEK' in Resounding Voice, pp.78-79.

2

H. Roeslan Abdulgani, loc. cit., quoting from Sukarno's speech. For a brief official exposition of these five principles, see Indonesia 1961, pp.28-31. Emphasis added.

3

This doctrine was enunciated in Sukarno's speech titled 'Re-so-pim', 17/8/1961. See Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, pp.144-146.

Azimat Revolusi'¹. 'Re-so-pim' and its alternative formulation, 'R-I-L', were acronyms for the three vital elements of national revolution², also known as the 'Instruments of Struggle'³. The vital elements were:

R Re Revolution or National Independence⁴

I So A progressive National Concept, a Progressive National Ideology, Ideology, Socialism or Indonesian Socialism⁵

L Pim Leadership, a National Leadership or the Leadership of the Revolution⁶.

1

Enunciated by Sukarno on 25 June 1965 in a set of instructions to the National Front. See Reach to the Stars! A Year of Self-Reliance, 17/8/65, Department of Information, Indonesia, 1965, p.26. This book will hereafter be cited as Sukarno, Reach to the Stars!

2

Sukarno (21/4/61), in Sel. Docs., pp.107-108.

3

Sukarno, 'Re-so-pim' (17/8/61) in Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, p.144.

4

Alternative formulations. See ibid., p.144 and Sel. Docs., p.107 (21/4/61). Revolution and independence were seen as essential to each other. A revolution is not possible without independence and true independence requires the adoption of a revolutionary struggle.

5

Alternative formulations. See Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, pp.144, 145 & 177 (17/8/61). The 'Progressive National Concept' and the 'Progressive National Ideology' were defined as the 1945 Constitution plus Manipol-USDEK. See ibid., p.144.

6

Alternative formulations, ibid., pp.144, 145.

'Pantja Azimat Revolusi', the 'Five Talismans' of the Indonesian Revolution, were:¹

Nasakom (1926)

Pantja Sila (1945)

Manipol (1959)

Trisakti (the Three Potent Principles) (1964)

Berdikari (Self-Reliance) (1965)

Just as the 1945 Constitution and Pantja Sila drew together and systematised the major themes in pre-independence Indonesian political thought, so Manipol-USDEK subsumed the Constitution and Pantja Sila and provided a new structure to the previously enunciated concepts. The subsequent slogans such as 'Re-so-pim' and 'Pantja Azimat Revolusi' performed a similar function in terms of exposition of ideology. Manipol-USDEK and its successors introduced very little in the way of new elements of political thought, although, in the pattern of structuring of the old elements and in the examination of new implications, new emphases were given. Some of these developments need to be traced,

1

Dates given are those indicated by Sukarno as the dates of original enunciation. See Sukarno, Reach to the Stars! (17/8/66), p.26. The concepts not already discussed, are discussed below.

so that the more striking formulations after 1959 are seen in their ideological context¹.

6. DEVELOPMENT OF CONCEPTS DEPICTING DOMESTIC ASPECTS OF THE REVOLUTION.

(a) Nationalism-National Identity-Trisakti.

Sukarno's pre-independence concept of socio-nationalism was divided in Pantja Sila into the second and third principles². The formulation of the third principle used in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution, 'unity of Indonesia', echoed the aspiration expressed in the slogan, 'One Country, One Nation, One Language'³, adopted by the nationalist movement in the nineteen-twenties. The basis put forward for this unity was nationalism or national consciousness. This principle called for the creation of an 'Indonesian national

1

For an alternative analysis of the development of Indonesian ideology, particularly since independence, see Weatherbee, op. cit., Chapter III.

2

See pp.133-134 above.

3

Indonesia 1961, p.12. For a brief account of the circumstances surrounding the adoption of this slogan, see Kahin, Nationalism & Revolution, p.97, especially footnote 101.

state'¹, incorporating the geo-political entity of 'the entire archipelago of Indonesia from the northern tip of Sumatra to Irian'², and based upon 'Indonesian Nationalism in the fullest sense'³. This was a call for the submergence of regional and ethnic loyalties in order to create 'one independent nationality'⁴.

Implied in this principle and in Pantja Sila as a whole, was the concept of a collective way of life, character or personality⁵ -- in pre-independence terms, the 'Indonesian spirit'⁶ -- derived from Indonesia's

1

Sukarno, 'The Birth of Pantja Sila' (1/6/45), in Pantja Sila : Basis of State, p.22. For Sukarno's analysis of what constitutes a national state, see *ibid.*, pp.22-28. See also his earlier analysis of nationalism in Sukarno, Bendera I, pp.3-8 (1926).

2

Sukarno, 'The Birth of Pantja Sila' (1/6/45) in Pantja Sila : Basis of State, p.25.

3

Ibid., p.27.

4

See *ibid.*, pp.27 & 37.

5

This implication was reflected in the 1945 Constitution. See the Preamble in Appendix A, p.A1 below and the elucidations of the Preamble and of Chapter XII in Constitution 1945, pp.18 and 32-33 respectively. Sukarno's subsequent elaboration of the principles of nationalism and democracy referred to a nation's 'individuality', 'character' and 'identity'. See Pantja Sila : Basis of State, pp.112 (16/7/58) and 152 (3/9/58) respectively.

6

See Sukarno, Bendera I, pp.457-458 (1940).

cultural heritage. From this idea developed the more forceful concept of the 'national identity', USDEK's fifth element, of which the other four were the expression. Gotong-rojong was seen as the essence of Indonesia's national identity and Pantja Sila was regarded as its embodiment. The implications in Manipol of the assertion of the national identity against political, economic and cultural imperialism² were subsequently expressed more formally in Sukarno's 'TAVIP' speech³ when he referred to the three principles of 'political sovereignty, economic self-reliance and cultural self-assertion'⁴, endorsed by the Ministerial Preparatory Meeting for the Second Afro-Asian Conference, as providing the basis for the revival of the spiritual

1

Sukarno, 'Manipol' (17/8/59), in Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, p.67.

2

See *ibid.*, pp.17 & 60-63.

3

Ibid., p.315 (17/8/64). In fact, these three principles were earlier stated in Sukarno's definition of the 'fifth freedom'. See Sel. Docs., p.125 (1/9/61).

4

This is the formulation adopted in the 'Final Communique' of the Meeting of Ministers' (15/4/64). See Meeting of Ministers in Preparation for the Second Afro-Asian Conference, Djakarta, 10-15 April, 1964, Conference Secretariat, Djakarta, 1964, p.177. This book will hereafter be cited as A.-A. Preparatory Meeting 1964.

heritage and the development of the national identities of Afro-Asian nations. These three principles became known as 'TRISAKTI' or the 'Three Potent Principles' and were incorporated into the 'Pantja Azimat Revolusi'.

(b) Democracy-Guided Democracy.

Socio-nationalism was closely associated with the concept of socio-democracy¹ which, in Pantja Sila, was divided into the fourth and fifth principles. The fourth, 'Sovereignty of the People', or 'Democracy' were alternative expressions for the group of related and ancient concepts involved in 'Indonesian democracy'², which was seen as both a traditional creed or felling and a system of decision-making³, based on the 'Family system' and 'gotong-rojong'. The procedural aspects of Indonesian democracy were specified in both Pantja Sila

1

See Sukarno's explanation of this relationship in Sukarno, Bendera I, pp.173-175 (1932) & 321 (1933).

2

See Sukarno's explanation of the origins of Indonesian democracy in Sel. Docs., pp.100-101 (21/4/61).

3

See Pantja Sila : Basis of State, pp.152 & 170 (3/9/58). A similar point was made much earlier in Sukarno, Bendera I, pp.457-458 (1940).

and the 1945 Constitution¹.

The principle of sovereignty of the people became, in procedural terms, the principle of representation. The 1945 Constitution did not give any clear indication of how the representatives were to be chosen, although it did indicate that representation was not envisaged solely in terms of political parties². Subsequently, in President Sukarno's 'Konsepsi'³, put forward in

1

See Sukarno, 'The Birth of Pantja Sila' (1/6/45), in Pantja Sila : Basis of State, pp.28-30 and the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution in Appendix A, p.A2 below. For a brief explanation of the connotations of the Indonesian words expressing the principles involved, see Indon. Rev., pp.24-25, items 5, 6, 7 & 11.

2

See the provisions relating to the Madjelis, the representative body that was to exercise the sovereignty of the people, Chapter II, article 2(1) and its elucidation in Constitution 1945, pp.7 & 26.

3

The Konsepsi was a 'new concept of government structure' put forward in President Sukarno's speech, of 21/2/57, 'To Preserve the Republic We have Proclaimed'. For extracts, see pp.127-129 of Claude A. Buss (ed.), Southeast Asia and the World Today, an Anvil Original, D. Van Nostrand Co. Inc., Princeton, New Jersey, Toronto, London, New York, 1958. For a discussion of the Konsepsi, see J.D. Legge, Indonesia, pp.15, 145-146, Herbert Feith, 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy', in Ruth McVey (ed.), Indonesia, pp.319-320, and Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1962, pp.541-542, hereafter cited as Feith, Decline.

February 1957 as the formula for introducing Guided Democracy, more details for a system of representation were elaborated in the proposal for representation of 'functional groups'¹ in a National Council that would stand alongside the proposed gotong-rojong or mutual assistance Cabinet.

The procedures to be adopted by the representatives were more clearly indicated in the 1945 Constitution. Deliberations amongst representatives were not to depend on a system of majority voting, but rather were to be guided by Kebidjaksanaan (the 'inner wisdom') expressed in mufakat (the consensus or unanimous agreement) arrived at through a procedure of musjawarah (deliberation or consultation conducted in such a way as to stress common ground rather than differences). Democracy, then, in the contexts of Pantja Sila and the 1945 Constitution, was not modelled on Western democratic patterns².

1

i.e., golongan fungsional or golongan karya. See the explanation of these terms in Indon. Rev., p.26. For examples of the functional groups, see Legge, Indonesia, pp.15 & 146, Feith, Decline, p.542 and Buss, op. cit. p.129.

2

See p.85 above for a summary of the reasons for the rejection of Western democracy.

In 1949, speaking at his installation as President of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, Sukarno foreshadowed a new interpretation of Indonesian democracy¹, an interpretation which, between 1956 and 1959, was expounded under the name of 'Guided Democracy'². Sukarno put this concept forward as a replacement for the system of liberal or parliamentary democracy with which Indonesia had experimented under the 1950 Constitution and which had failed to promote unity and political stability. Guided Democracy was a formalisation of political procedures which Sukarno extracted from the model of the village³. Essentially, the concept of Guided Democracy was a restatement of the fourth principle of Pantja Sila, but with a new emphasis on the

1

See Feith, Decline, p.38.

2

For a brief account of the development of the Guided Democracy concept, see Herbert Feith, 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy', in McVey (ed.), Indonesia, pp.318-320 and Legge, Indonesia, pp.14-15 & 144-146. For an Information Department selection of the most important statements on Guided Democracy, see Indon. Rev., pp.85-119. Spanier regards Guided Democracy as one manifestation of new states' preference for authoritarian rule. See Spanier, op. cit., p.281. See also Sigmund, op. cit. pp.22-38.

3

Legge, Indonesia, pp.14 & 145. For a fuller elaboration of this point, based on explanations by Sukarno and Chaerul Salleh, see Weatherbee, op. cit., pp.38-39.

role of leadership in traditional Indonesian democracy. In the new formulation, the principles of the 'family system' and 'gotong-rojong', the concept of kebidjaksanaan and the procedures of musjawarah and mufakat amongst representatives were once again invoked, but so too was the image of the sesepeuh or elder, 'who did not dictate, but led, and protected'¹. Guided Democracy could thus be depicted in the following way:

Guided Democracy is the democracy of the family system, without the anarchy of liberalism, without the autocracy of dictatorship. It is a concept of life, the ideals of the 1945 Revolution, which animates our activities, and to this we must direct and subordinate all layers of our national life. Guided Democracy emphasises that every individual has the obligation to serve the public interest, to serve society, to serve the nation, to serve the state and also that every individual has the right to a proper living within that society, nation and state².

(c) Social Justice-Indonesian Socialism-Guided Economy-Berdikari.

The fifth principle of Pantja Sila, 'Social Justice', was seen as the essential complement to the

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Sukarno, 'Manipol' (17/8/59) in Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, p.59.

2

Manipol-USDEK in Question and Answer, pp.39-40, item 44. The rejection of both liberalism and dictatorship echoes Sukarno's pre-independence views. See, for example, Sukarno, Bendera I, pp.315-323 (1933) & 457-465 (1940).

fourth principle. It embraces the elements of economic and social democracy, or economic and social justice, which, along with political democracy, or sovereignty of the people, are subsumed in the concept of socio-democracy. In the 1945 exposition of 'Social Justice', the emphasis is placed on the element of economic democracy, but the non-material aspects, indicated by the title given to this principle, are implied¹. Social justice requires 'well-being', which involves the eradication of poverty, the establishment of equality in the economic field and the creation of a society in which 'the entire people prosper, where every man has enough to eat, enough to wear, lives in comfort and feels cherished by his Motherland which gives to him sufficient "sadang-pangan"², the basic necessities'. Of relevance here is the widely accepted doctrine of sama rata, sama rasa, stressing that the basic necessities and well-being

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See Sukarno, 'The Birth of Pantja Sila' (1/6/45) in Pantja Sila : Basis of State, pp.31-32.

2

See the explanation of this concept in Indon. Rev., p.26.

involve more than mere material prosperity¹. Although sama rata, sama rasa is not specifically mentioned in the 1945 exposition of social justice, the non-material aspects of well-being are clearly implied in the reference to the feeling of being cherished by the Motherland and in the reference to the Javanese concept of Ratu Adil, the Goddess of Justice². What is being invoked here are the traditional Indonesian concepts relating to man in society. The type of society which this principle envisages is, in the words of the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution, a 'just and prosperous society'³ which subsequently came to be defined as 'A technically advanced society which is enjoyed equally by the whole of the people; an orderly society of social justice with regard to non-material things as well as to the material'⁴.

1

See the official explanation of the relevance of 'sama rata, sama rasa' to the concept of the 'just and prosperous society', in Manipol-USDEK in Question and Answer, pp.37-38, items 37-38.

2

See the brief official explanation of the connotations of concept of Ratu Adil in Manipol-USDEK in Question and Answer, p.36, item 36.

3

See Appendix A, p.A1 below.

4

Manipol-USDEK in Question and Answer, pp.35-36, item 35. This humanist element in Indonesian Socialism was common to most new nations' concepts of socialism. See Sigmund, op. cit., pp.17-18.

In negative terms, the 'just and prosperous society' is one devoid of poverty and of 'the exploitation of man by man'; in positive terms, it evokes the Wayang Master's¹ picture of 'the Indonesian Golden Age of peace, prosperity, order and joyous labour'².

From Sukarno's pre-independence descriptions of the type of society that was desired in Indonesia³, and from the provisions of the 1945 Constitution⁴, it is clear that the 'just and prosperous society' was to be a socialist society⁵, but, like the democracy adopted by

1

i.e., the puppeteer. For a brief account of the various forms of the wayang, see Jeanne S. Mintz, Indonesia : A Profile, Van Nostrand, New York, London, Toronto, 1961, pp.223-226. For a more detailed account of the wayang and its significance, see Mantle Hood, 'Music and Theatre in Java and Bali' in McVey (ed.), Indonesia, especially pages listed under 'Puppeteers' in the index.

2

Manipol-USDEK in Question and Answer, p.36.

3

e.g., Sukarno, Bendera I, pp.320-321 (1933).

4

e.g., Article 33 and its Elucidation in Constitution 1945, pp.14-15 & 33-34.

5

The preference for a socialist society has been a common feature of most new states. See Spanier, op. cit., pp.279 & 281 and Sigmund, op. cit., pp.11-22.

Indonesia, the socialism was Indonesian socialism¹, based upon the 'family principle'. For this reason, the terms 'Indonesian Socialism' and 'just and prosperous society' were regarded as synonymous².

The concept of 'Guided Economy' was a subsequent development. Advocated as a corollary of Guided Democracy, it was a restatement of Pantja Sila's fifth principle and of article 33 of the 1945 Constitution³,

1

i.e., 'Socialism which is adjusted to conditions prevailing in Indonesia, adjusted to Indonesia's nature, to the people of Indonesia to the customs, the psychology and culture of the Indonesian people': 'Specification' to 'Manipol', in Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, p.17. For a brief official 'clarification' of the meaning of Indonesian Socialism, see the quotations from the National Planning Council's 1960 Blueprint for the First Stage of Construction, in Indonesia 1962, pp.26-27, as part of an article on 'Indonesian Socialism Principles and Practice'.

2

e.g., see Manipol-USDEK in Question and Answer, pp.35-36, item 35, and the 'Specification' to 'Manipol' in Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, p.17.

3

This, for example, is the argument in the 'Government Statement on the Implementation of Guided Democracy within the Frame of Returning to the 1945 Constitution', Prime Minister Djuanda, 2/5/59. See Indon. Rev., pp.30-31. See also Indonesia 1961, pp.30-31. Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution, and its elucidation are on pp.14-15 and 33-34 respectively of Constitution 1945.

but with the 'just and prosperous society' portrayed in terms that emphasised the need for a 'blue-print' that would be put into effect through the use of Guided Democracy¹. The idea of developing the economy according to a comprehensive plan was not a new one², but the overall development plans or blue-prints produced under Guided Economy were more comprehensive and more ambitious than previous plans³. These efforts at economic planning were also more consciously influenced by political considerations than were the previous efforts, since economic planning was seen as only a part of the overall effort to 'retool' and develop every aspect of Indonesian life under Guided Democracy⁴. Two blue-prints were

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e.g., see 'e. Explanation given by President Sukarno in a Sitting of the National Council in 1958', in Indon. Rev., pp.88-90. See also Sukarno, 'The Economic Declaration' (DEKON) (28/3/63), in Indonesia 1963 : Looking Back Over the Year, Department of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia, December, 1963, p.75. This book will hereafter be cited as Indonesia 1963.

2

For a brief summary of previous attempts at development plans, see C.K. Tan, 'Sukarnian Economics' in C.K. Tan (ed.), Sukarno's Guided Indonesia, Jacaranda Press, Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne, 1967, p.43, footnote 34.

3

For brief accounts of the development of Guided Economy after 1959, see *ibid.*, pp.34-40 and Weatherbee, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-45.

4

See, for example, Indonesia 1961, pp.23-26.

produced, the first in 1960 by the National Planning Council, to be superseded by Sukarno's 'Economic Declaration' (DEKON) of March 1963¹. The enunciation of 'DWIKORA'² in 1964, however, produced the need for a 'struggle economy' and, as a result, DEKON was succeeded by the concept of 'Banting Stir Untuk Berdiri diatas Kaki Sendiri' (slamming the steering wheel around in order to stand on one's own feet)³ or, abbreviated, 'Berdikari' (self-reliance)⁴. This concept initiated a nation-wide drive to free the economy from all foreign intervention, and represented an intensification of

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See the text of 'Dekon' and an official commentary in Indonesia 1963 : Looking Back Over The Year, pp.69 ff & 93 ff.

2

i.e., 'The Dual Command to build the stamina of the Indonesian Revolution, and to assist the people of the region in their struggle for liberation of the so-called "Malaysia"'. Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, p.301.

3

Announced in April 1964. C.K. Tan (ed.), op. cit., p.40.

4

Sukarno's 'TAVIP' speech of 17/8/64 refers to this principle as part of 'TRISAKTI' (See pp.147-148 above). The fullest exposition was given in Sukarno's 'Berdikari' speech of 11/4/65 to the Madjelis. See Sukarno Self-Reliance, Special Issue 6502, Department of Information, Indonesia, 1965. The concept was again given prominence in Sukarno's 1965 Independence Day Speech, 'Reach to the Stars! A Year of Self-Reliance'. See Sukarno, Reach to the Stars! For a discussion of the pre-independence concept of self-reliance or non-cooperation, see pp.86-88 above.

Sukarno's Manipol call to put into practice such slogans as: 'break up the colonial economy to turn it into a national economy'¹.

(d) Unity-Re-so-pim-NASAKOM.

Throughout the ideology of the Indonesian Revolution, the need for unity is a recurring theme. Three interrelated and overlapping types of unity seem to be envisaged. These could best be described as national unity, democratic unity and revolutionary unity.

National unity or Indonesian unity was seen as both a vital means to the success of the Indonesian struggle and as one of the objectives of the Revolution². The call for national unity as a means rested on the proposition that 'United we stand, divided we fall'³. Indonesian unity as an objective was proclaimed formally in the 1945 Constitution, as the third principle of Pantja Sila. The pursuit of national unity as an

1 Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, p.62.

2 For example, see Sukarno, Bendera I, pp.1-23 (1926) & 109-114 (1928), Sukarno, 'The Birth of Pantja Sila' (1/6/45) in Pantja Sila : Basis of State, p.37, and the 'Specification' to 'Manipol' in Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, pp.16-17.

3 See, for example, Sukarno, Bendera I, p.111 (1928).

objective rested essentially on the Indonesian people's aspirations for nationhood, reinforced by a number of concepts and values which, in USDEK, were brought together in the fifth, all-embracing principle of the national identity. Part of the ancient heritage which the term national identity symbolised was the spirit of unity, harmony, co-operation and pursuit of the community's well-being as opposed to the pursuit of selfish individual or sectional interests. These elements, incorporated into such concepts as Indonesian democracy, Guided Democracy, Indonesian socialism and gotong-rojong, added special significance to the idea of national unity, in that dissension and individualism could be depicted not merely as disruptive to the national effort but also as contrary to the Indonesian way of life. Unity had a positive value in itself.

The importance of national unity was reflected in the picture of the Indonesian Revolution as a 'National Revolution'¹, but this was only one facet. The Revolution was also a 'democratic revolution'², since it

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e.g., 'Specification' to 'Manipol', in Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, p.16.

2

Loc. cit.

was seen as a struggle by the people to alleviate their sufferings and to realise their aspirations for a better life. As Sukarno frequently emphasised, the Indonesian Revolution was not a struggle by one section of the people, but drew its authority and relied for its success on the support of the entire Indonesian people¹. This idea was reflected in the coining of the term Marhaen to symbolise the common people of Indonesia, in the proposal of a vanguard party that would mobilise the masses to form a power base of mass action, in the Pantja Sila principles of sovereignty of the people and social justice and in such concepts as sama rata, sama rasa, gotong-rojong, Indonesian socialism, Guided Democracy and national identity.

The Indonesian Revolution was, then, both a national and a democratic revolution, requiring national and democratic unity. But it was also a revolution, a radical struggle, dedicated to the total eradication of oppression and exploitation, of imperialism and capitalism, and to the complete transformation of Indonesian society. The full employment of 'all

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See, for example, Pantja Sila : Basis of State, pp.46-49 (5/6/58) and Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, pp.16 & 20.

national forces'¹, the 'welding together (of) the forces of the masses'², involved more than national and democratic unity.

In terms of Sukarno's pre-independence analysis, the Indonesian Revolution reflected a fundamental antithesis in Indonesia and in the world. The success of the Revolution required a clear delineation between the two contending camps³, disciplined co-operation in a united front by the revolutionary forces⁴, and an uncompromisingly radical stand by the revolutionaries against the enemies of the Revolution⁵. These requirements were formalised in the pre-independence principles of non-cooperation or self-help, power-forming and mass action, and in the concept of radicalism. They were subsequently amalgamated and universalised in Sukarno's

1 Sukarno, Bendera I, p.288 (1933).

2 Ibid., p.312 (1933).

3 e.g., *ibid.*, p.84 (1928).

4 e.g., *ibid.*, pp.39 (1927) & 288-289, 311-312 (1933).

5 e.g., *ibid.*, pp.289-297 (1933).

first law of revolution¹, but, in 1958, Sukarno explained the basis for unity in the following terms:

The Marhaen of all groups had to be solidly united, and therefore, ever since their beginning the 'generation of clarifiers' stated: we must stand on a revolutionary platform. What is it which is called revolutionary? Revolutionary in the sense of 'umgestaltung von grundauf', radical revolutionary change, in the sense of it is enough to desire an era of speedy revolutionary change, in the sense of opposition to imperialism. All groups following the swift changes of the era, all groups desiring to overthrow imperialism, all those groups are revolutionary, whether they are workers or farmers or any other².

The effective political expression of democratic and national unity thus also required revolutionary unity and its accompanying revolutionary spirit.

In 'The Rediscovery of our Revolution', Sukarno blamed the 'sacrifices of the Revolutionary spirit' for the setbacks encountered after 1949³. One of the reasons given for restoring the 1945 Constitution was to revive that revolutionary spirit⁴. Whilst Manipol

1

See Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, p.298 (17/8/64) and Weatherbee's discussion of this law, in Weatherbee, op. cit., p.54.

2

Pantja Sila : Basis of State, p.71

3

'Manipol' (17/8/59), in Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, p.38.

4

Ibid., p.46.

stressed the need for a 'Concentration of national strengths',¹ and for 'the support of the entire people',² in furthering the Revolution, it also described the Revolution as 'a common revolution of all classes and groups who oppose imperialism and colonialism',³. The 'spirit of the Political Manifesto' was therefore described as 'the spirit of opposing imperialism in all fields'⁴. The enemy of the Indonesian Revolution was thus seen as imperialism and, more specifically, the '"Dutchified groups", reformist groups, conservative groups, contra-revolutionary groups, chameleon and cockroach groups...the Dutch imperialists and their fellow-travellers who are hostile to the Republic'⁵. In his 'Djarek' speech, Sukarno made the importance of radicalism more explicit when he described Manipol-USDEK as the true reflection of 'the revolutionary will of the People' and as 'left-progressive'⁶. His exhortation

1 See the 'Specification' to 'Manipol', *ibid.*, p.14.

2 *Ibid.*, p.20. See also pp.14 & 16.

3 *Ibid.*, p.16.

4 *Ibid.*, p.18.

5 *Ibid.*, pp.18-19.

6 *Ibid.*, p.90 (17/8/60).

was as follows:

...solve our national problems in a revolutionary way, make the revolutionary spirit surge on, see to it that the Fire of our Revolution does not die or grow dim, not even for a single moment. Now, come on, keep on fanning the flames of the leaping Fire of the Revolution, let us become logs to feed the flames of Revolution!¹

The above three types of unity were not seen as competing but as complementary facets of the total unity of purpose of the Indonesian Revolution. In ideological terms, the Indonesian people were depicted as united in their sense of nationality, united as a common people and united as revolutionaries. These three senses of unity were regarded as inseparable aspects of the unity of the Marhaen. Nevertheless, national unity received the greatest emphasis until the rediscovery of the Revolution in 1959. Indeed, despite the firm commitment to an anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist stand², revolutionary unity was not emphasised specifically in the major post-independence formulations of the principles of the

1

Ibid., p.86.

2

See, for example, the opening words of the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution, in Appendix A, p.A1 below.

Revolution¹ until the slogans of 'Re-so-pim' and 'NASAKOM' elevated it to a place of prime importance in the ideological hierarchy.

This development was anticipated in 'Manipol' speech and more specifically in his 'Djarek' speech of 1960². The latter provided a more definite formula for unity in all three senses, a formula not dissimilar to that proposed in Sukarno's vanguard party proposals of the nineteen-thirties. In 'Djarek', Sukarno advocated:

One revolutionary leadership of the Revolution:
One National Ideology and Concept which is revolutionary, clear, firm, delineated³.

Further, taking up the Manipol analysis of the dualisms that endangered the Revolution, the 'Djarek' speech drew attention to the need to unify the leadership of the Revolution and the leadership of the Government, the separation of which had led to obstructions in the progress of the Revolution⁴.

In 'Re-so-pim' terms, the 'Instruments of Struggle

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See, for example, the summary of Pantja Sila, pp.133-134 above and of Manipol-USDEK, p.142 above.

2

See the quotations on pp.163-165 above.

3

Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, p.90 (17/8/60).

4

Ibid., pp.87-88 (17/8/60).

of the Indonesian Nation' were a 'trinity', which also amounted to a 'law for all nations...a universal law'.

This trinity consisted of the following propositions:

...a Great Struggle for a radical transformation must be made through Revolution, must have a Progressive National Ideology must have a resolute National Leadership. Once more: there is no Great Struggle without this trinity! It is not possible for that Great Struggle to run smoothly and successfully without this trinity. For the preservation of the Struggle, the smooth running of the Struggle, the successful outcome of the Struggle, these three things therefore constitute one whole; one unity, one single entity, each ¹ element of which is inseparable from the others¹.

The progressive national ideology or concept, in Indonesia's case, was socialism or, more specifically, Indonesian socialism which, in the 'Re-so-pim' context, becomes an all-embracing term subsuming the principles and concepts laid down in the 1945 Constitution and Preamble and elaborated in Manipol-USDEK².

The slogan 'NASAKOM' spelled out more specifically the basis for revolutionary unity. NASAKOM called for unity amongst the three major progressive or revolutionary

1

Ibid., pp.144-145 (17/8/61).

2

This substantive description of Indonesia's national ideology is set out on page 144, *ibid.* For an official exposition of Indonesian socialism interpreted in this all-embracing sense, see Indonesia 1962, pp.13-44.

groups in Indonesian politics: NAS (the nationalists), A ('Agama', i.e., religious groups, chiefly the progressive Islamic parties), KOM (the Indonesian Communist Party). Although the slogan dates from late in 1960 and was aimed chiefly at bringing the Communists into the government through representation in the cabinet¹, as Sukarno quite rightly claims², the concept dates from 1926³.

When the idea of unity amongst the nationalists, Marxists and Muslims was first mooted, its justification rested on the desirability of a united stand against Indonesia's oppressors⁴ and on the fact that, fundamentally, all three groups shared a unity of purpose. They were seen as three trends with the same objective, as comrades rather than opponents, since all three were opposed to the capitalism and imperialism of the West⁵.

1

See Feith, 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy', in McVey (ed.), Indonesia, p.339.

2

Sukarno, Reach to the Stars!, p.26 (17/8/65).

3

This is a reference to his article 'Nasionalisme, Islamisme dan Marxisme' (Nationalism, Islamism and Marxism). See Sukarno, Bendera I, pp.1-23 (1926).

4

Ibid., pp.2 & 22-23.

5

Ibid., pp.2, 6 & 20-21.

All these forces represented the dispossessed or, as Sukarno called them, the 'underdogs'¹. Apart from the advantages to be gained from utilising and combining the efforts and energies of all progressive forces in Indonesia, a theme constantly reiterated by Sukarno both before and after independence, the inclusion of the Communists in the leadership of the Revolution was also seen to be a necessary result of gotong-rojong, the family system and Indonesian democracy. These concepts required that all major political groups, except, of course, the counter-revolutionary groups, should participate in the process of musjawarah amongst the peoples' representatives². This argument was emphasised in President Sukarno's Konsepsi of February, 1957, in the call for the inclusion of the Communists in the proposed gotong-rojong cabinet³.

1 e.g., *ibid.*, pp.20-22.

2 For an elaboration of this argument as applied to NASAKOM, see Weatherbee, *op. cit.*, pp.40-41.

3 This proposal followed Sukarno's earlier and unsuccessful proposal, following the 1955 elections, that the PKI should be admitted to the coalition of the PNI, Masjumi and the N.U., to form a 'four legged' government, composed of the four most powerful parties as revealed by the elections. See Shaplen, *op. cit.*, p.60. For a summary of the 1955 election results, see *ibid.*, p.58.

From the rediscovery of the Revolution in 1959, the emphasis on revolutionary unity provided a more forceful justification for NASAKOM. Sukarno emphasised 'the necessity of unity and Gotong Royong between the Muslims, the Nationalists and the Communists'¹. He also warned against 'the left-phobia and the communist phobia'². Fear of Communism ran counter to the proposition that 'all revolutionary forces in the nation' had to be united, so that their combined strength could be used³. NASAKOM thus came to be depicted as 'a progressive-necessity of the Indonesian Revolution', requiring the support of all Indonesians:

...Whoever is opposed to NASAKOM is not progressive! Whoever is against NASAKOM, in reality, cripples the Revolution, disbalances the Revolution! Whoever is anti-NASAKOM is not fully revolutionary, nay, is historically even contra-revolutionary!⁴

Sukarno successfully claimed to be the mouthpiece

1

e.g., Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, p.99 (17/8/60).

2

e.g., *ibid.*, p.91.

3

See, for example, Sukarno's argument in 'Re-so-pim' (17/8/61), *ibid.*, pp.162-164.

4

Ibid., p.321. This in fact was not a new idea, but merely a restatement of one of Sukarno's earlier definitions of 'revolutionary'. See pp.122-123 above.

of the people, giving political expression to their aspirations¹. After the introduction of Guided Democracy and the enunciation of 'Re-so-pim' and NASAKOM, he became increasingly the symbol of the nation and of the Revolution². National unity, democratic unity and revolutionary unity came to be seen as synonymous with loyalty to Sukarno and acceptance of his policies³. These policies were depicted as the outcome of musjawarah and mufakat and hence, as expression of the will of the people. Opposition to Sukarno was therefore a rejection of Guided Democracy, of gotong-rojong, of sovereignty of the people, of the national identity and, indeed, of the Revolution itself. The seeds for this development were planted in Manipol⁴, when Sukarno argued that all

1

See Indonesia 1961, pp.39 & 41. For examples of Sukarno's view of this process, see Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, pp.79 (17/8/60), 190-191 (17/8/62), 233, 238 & 239 (17/8/63) & 283-284 (17/8/64).

2

Sukarno was not unique in this respect. See Spanier's comments on the charismatic leaders of the new nations and his explanation of this phenomenon, in Spanier, *op. cit.*, pp. 251-252.

3

See Weatherbee's explanation of this development in Weatherbee, *op. cit.*, pp.19-20 & 26.

4

The following quotations are taken from 'Manipol' (17/8/59) in Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, pp.56-57.

revolutions are an 'outburst of the collective will of a people'. In Indonesia's case, this outburst was in the form of a 're-ordering in the political, economic and social fields'. This re-ordering was seen as 'the main power -- the highest holder of power -- of our national life'. The highest¹ authority was therefore 'not a person, not the President, not the Government, not a council, but a concept of life which animates our Revolution'. This concept involved 'everything that is the ideal of the 1945 Revolution'. Loyalty to that 'concept' was seen as an absolute requirement:

...That [i.e., the concept] is what we must put into practice, that is what we must be loyal to, and that is what we must serve. We must direct and subordinate all the layers of our national life to the realization of the ideals of the Revolution. And whoever refuses to be directed there, or whoever does not want to be subordinated, is an obstructor of the Revolution.

In the words of the Supreme Advisory Council's 'Specification' of Manipol, this meant:

1.

In *ibid.*, p.57, the word 'rightest' is used. From the context and from an alternative source for this speech, it is clear that 'highest' is meant. See Political Manifesto Republic of Indonesia of 17th August 1959, Department of Information, Indonesia, 1960, Special Issue 53, p.59.

The Program of the Revolution¹ must become the program of the Government, the program of the national front, the program of all political parties, all mass organizations and all citizens of the Republic of Indonesia².

Sukarno, as the chief author and interpreter of this 'concept of life', as the mouthpiece of the people and as the Great Leader of the Revolution, became the operative locus of sovereignty, both national and revolutionary, even if he did not create a personal dictatorship³.

7. DEVELOPMENT OF CONCEPTS DEPICTING INTERNATIONAL OR UNIVERSAL ASPECTS OF THE REVOLUTION.

In the above account of the major concepts of the Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution, I have concentrated on their depiction of the domestic aspects of the Revolution. The emphasis has so far been on the Revolution as a national rather than a universal or international phenomenon, on the type of transformation

1 Contained in the 'Specification'. See Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, pp.19-23.

2 Ibid., p.11.

3 For a brief discussion of the issue as to whether Sukarno did create a personal dictatorship under the guise of Guided Democracy, see Legge, Indonesia, pp.148-153.

sought within Indonesia. Viewed in this way, the Ideology stresses the objective of building a new Indonesian society in which the ancient Indonesian heritage would be restored, purged of impurities resulting from centuries of foreign domination. In this new society, modern progressive ideals and principles would also be incorporated, thereby helping to eradicate not only the evils of the colonial period but also the undesirable feudalistic elements of Indonesia's past. The concepts are seen as valid for Indonesia and as intended for application within Indonesia.

Until 1960, the ideologists of the Indonesian Revolution and Sukarno in particular tended to emphasize this national character of the Revolution, but there was also an international or universal dimension which came into prominence with the development of the NEFO Ideology. Although the latter expressed more comprehensively and more forcefully the international application of Indonesia's revolutionary ideology, it did not create the international aspects of the Revolution. These aspects were already inherent in the doctrines outlined above, and it is to these international aspects of general Indonesian Ideology, as distinct from the New Emerging Forces Ideology as such, that I now wish to turn.

The Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution was based on the nationalist leaders' views of the world, of history and of the relationship between their struggle and world developments¹. Given these views, the domestic objectives and principles of the Revolution necessarily involved the pursuit of international objectives and the application of the revolutionaries' principles beyond Indonesia². The Indonesian struggle thus had both a domestic and an international or universal dimension. The adoption of the international level of struggle was partly a matter of expediency and tactics, partly a matter of principle, of ideals and of ultimate objectives. Since the revolutionaries' ideals and principles were founded on 'factual conditions in society' and not on mere sentiment³, expediency and principle

1

See 'Dialectics and Historical Materialism', 'Anti-thesis', 'Radicalism', and 'Revolutionary Leadership and Victory', pp.99-129 above.

2

This was not peculiar to the Indonesian revolutionaries. See Spanier, op. cit., pp.6-7, 48, 65-67 for an explanation of the process whereby revolutions are of necessity exported.

3

See pp.98-99 above for a general comment on the realistic basis of the ideology. See also Sukarno, Bendera I, pp.298-299 (1933) and Sukarno, Sarinah, pp.466-468 (1947), for examples of Sukarno's concern to balance ideals with an awareness of practicalities.

reinforced each other, indicating the same objectives and the same type of strategy to the achievement of those objectives. Arguments based on expediency and those based on principle were therefore frequently interwoven. One can, nevertheless, separate these two types of arguments for purposes of analysis.

Expediency, pragmatism or realism¹ involved the recognition of the need to adopt international as well as national means to the end of achieving the Revolution's domestic goals. The international aspects of the Revolution were, on this criterion, subordinate to and required by the national aspects. The Ideology of the Revolution was, however, seen to be based not merely on Indonesian principles, but also on principles of universal validity. This is one of the senses in which the Indonesian Revolution was seen to be part of the Revolution of Mankind². On this view, the international aspects of the Revolution were not subordinate to the national aspects, but were required by the universal principles themselves, and the achievement of the

1
i.e., realism in the eyes of the revolutionaries.

2
For further discussion of this point, see pp.191-207 below.

national objectives was but a step towards the ultimate realisation in the world of the identical universal goals of the Indonesian Revolution and the Revolution of Mankind. There were three levels of struggle -- (1) the national and (2) the international or universal levels of the Indonesian Revolution and (3) the Revolution of Mankind -- which were seen to be complementary and to be moving in the same 'progressive' direction, victories in the one field of endeavour contributing to victories in the others. The distinction between each of these aspects was therefore not always observed. Each appeared to be regarded as both a means and an end, and there was no permanently observed hierarchy in which each of these aspects was placed. Diagrammatically, the relationship between these three elements could be depicted thus:




Fig.6. Direction of Struggle of the Indonesian Revolution and the Revolution of Mankind.

(a) International Means to Domestic Ends.

Sukarno was well aware of and took an interest in the Stalin-Trotsky controversy as to whether the transformation sought by the Russian Revolution should first be attempted in Russia alone or whether it necessarily involved the simultaneous promotion of an international or world revolution¹. For guidance in the furthering of the Indonesian Revolution, Sukarno endorsed Trotsky's

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See, for example, Sukarno, Bendera I, pp.406 (1940), 521 & 523-525 (1941), and Pantja Sila : Basis of State, pp.137-140 (22/7/58).

reasoning¹.

(i) Offensive Means.

One of the formulations of the basic objective of the Indonesian Revolution was that expressing the commitment to eradicate exploitation and oppression. To this end, Indonesian society had to be transformed, and the 'bridge' to this transformation was independence, which would enable the Marhaen to use the new state as the instrument of their struggle². The major obstacles to the attainment of independence, to the transformation of Indonesian society and to the eradication of exploitation and oppression were colonialism and imperialism and the system of which they were the product, the capitalist system³. The Indonesian revolutionaries sought the destruction of the colonialist, the imperialist and the capitalist systems as such⁴, and

1

See, for example, Pantja Sila : Basis of State, pp.137 & 140-141 (22/7/58).

2

See Sukarno's explanation of the concept of the state as an instrument of struggle, in Pantja Sila : Basis of State, pp.37 (1/6/45), 105 & 122-124 (16/7/58) and Sukarno, Sarinah, pp.446-450 (1947).

3

See Chapter II, p.72 above, especially footnote 2.

4

e.g., Sukarno, Indonesian Menggugat (1930), pp.85, 98, 177-180 & 190, and Sukarno, Bendera I, pp.181-185 (1932), 281, 285 & 309-310 (1933).

these systems were seen as international phenomena¹ which therefore had to be combatted internationally. Indeed, Sukarno maintained, the international nature of imperialism and capitalism was even manifesting itself in an imperialist-capitalist alliance which could be seen to operate both on a world scale and, in particular, in Indonesia². His assessment of the strategy needed was thus as follows:

...Consequently, is it not an advantage, is it not beneficial, is it not a necessity, for us to confront that international imperialism with an alliance of nations, each of which is also opposing that international imperialism? Is it not therefore essentially a betrayal of our Great Cause if, in the face of that imperialist alliance, we want to conduct a policy like that of a frog under a nutshell?³

...It therefore follows that, if the imperialist giants work together, we, the victims of those imperialist giants should also work together. Let us too make a united front of the freedom fighters of Asia.⁴

1

e.g., Sukarno, Indonesia Menggugat (1930), pp.51, 98 & 179, Sukarno Bendera I, pp.75 (1928) & 294-297 (1933) and Pantja Sila : Basis of State, p.141 (22/7/58).

2

e.g., Sukarno, Indonesia Menggugat (1930), pp.50-51, Sukarno, Bendera I, pp.75 (1928), 296 (1933) and Sukarno, Sarinah (1947), pp.450-451 & 478-481.

3

Sukarno, Bendera I, p.296 (1933).

4

Loc. cit.

The call for unity on the part of all progressive forces in Indonesia¹ was therefore paralleled by a call for international co-operation: 'We can defeat the imperialism which holds sway in Indonesia speedily only if we join hands with the Asian nations outside our boundaries, establish a united front with the Asian nations outside'². Such international co-operation would act as 'an accelerator or a catalyst' in the Indonesian struggle³. This concept of co-operation with groups beyond Indonesia's boundaries was not seen to be incompatible with the Indonesian nationalists' principles of struggle, but was regarded as a natural and necessary extension of radicalism and of the principles of power-forming, mass action and, paradoxically as it may seem, of nonco-operation or self-reliance. The logical connection between revolutionary unity within Indonesia and revolutionary unity between Indonesia and other progressive elements abroad is perhaps best illustrated by the following extract from 'Sarinah'.

1 Discussed in Chapter II. See pp.162-170 above, especially pp.167 ff on NASAKOM.

2 Sukarno, Bendera I, pp.294-295 (1933).

3 Ibid., p.77 (1928).

...'Activate the masses!'

And in activating the masses -- through making them self-conscious -- we must amalgamate the forces of the masses with all, once again: all, the anti-imperialist forces within our boundaries, and with all the anti-imperialist forces outside our boundaries. Nationally, we tend unity, internationally we too tend unity. Nationally we join the forces of the masses together with the forces of the Indonesian merchants, the Indonesian aristocracy, the Indonesian intellectuals, the Indonesian religious leaders and so forth who are all anti-imperialist together, who all desire the independence of Indonesia together -- have class consciousness, but do not whip up the class struggle, I said a while ago -- internationally we make connections with the workers movements and the national movements in other countries.

And in that international field, we must not merely seek help from abroad, but if possible also give help to others abroad. Because, even though at bottom our revolution itself means help to the General Revolution (the World Revolution) of anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism -- because it is part of it -- any concrete help that we can give to some branch of that struggle in the outside world would be invaluable. The sense of unity of struggle throughout the world will become the stronger because of it, the feeling of a common destiny will become more real, the sense of facing up to the same enemy will become more manifest. And -- the sense of taking action -- of being active and positive -- will become the stronger. Negativism, that just hopes for help from abroad, will vanish, the weak spirit that always waits and asks for help will vanish. Gone too will be the whole of the spiritual disaster called inferiority complex that we have inherited from colonial slavery during hundreds of years. Our spirit will become one that is offensive in the struggle, the spirit of attack, the spirit of bravery, the

spirit of giving, a positive spirit that does not depend upon others for its lot¹.

The extension of revolutionary unity beyond Indonesia's boundaries was thus seen as a major step towards victory. This point was made even more forcefully. For example:

We the Indonesian people, we must realise that a defeat, a loss suffered by other imperialists means an advantage for us, a strengthening of our stand in our difficult struggle. A victory of the Egyptian people, of the Chinese people or of the Indian people over British imperialism is our victory; their defeat is our defeat too...

In our efforts to find the sunshine we should not oppose only Dutch imperialism, but this opposition should also be directed against the gathering clouds of other imperialisms which darken the skies of our motherland. In opposing British imperialism and others of the kinds, the Egyptian people, the Indian people, the Chinese people, the Indonesian people face a single enemy; they are comrades-of-one-fate, comrades-of-one-endeavour, comrades-of-one-front, whose ways must run very close to one another, so close as to become one Asian community having one spirit and one soul. If this Asian community undertake their offensive all together against the strong and sturdy bulwark of imperialism, if all the peoples of Asia together, each in their own country simultaneously, put up an opposition as tremendous as the waves of the typhoon against the strongholds of those imperialisms, then there is no² doubt those strongholds will crumble in consequence!

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Sukarno, Sarinah (1947), pp.475-477. See also *ibid.*, pp.452-453, and Sukarno, Bendera I, pp.74-75 (1928) & 294-297 (1933).

2

Sukarno, Bendera I, pp.74-75 (1928).

When the Indonesian Banteng¹ is working together with the Egyptian Sphinx, with the Nandi Cow of India, with the Chinese Dragon, with the Champions of Freedom from other countries -- when the Indonesian Banteng is able to work together with all the enemies of capitalism and international imperialism throughout the world -- ah, then the days of international imperialism will soon be numbered!²

(ii) Alliance of Nations.

What form of international co-operation did Sukarno envisage and with whom did he propose to co-operate? In the statements quoted above, he speaks of: an 'Asian community', composed of Egypt, India, China and Indonesia, a community united in their opposition to imperialism³; a 'united front with the Asian nations outside (Indonesia)', illustrated by reference to the four countries previously mentioned with the addition of the Philippines and Indo-China⁴; 'an alliance of nations each of which is ... opposing ... international imperialism'⁵; and 'a united front of the freedom fighters of

1. The Indonesian bull which became the symbol of the people's strength.

2. Sukarno, Bendera I, pp.296-297 (1933).

3. Ibid., p.75 (1928).

4. Ibid., p.295 (1933).

5. Ibid., p.296 (1933).

Asia', a front which he goes on to describe as one promoting co-operation with 'all the enemies of capitalism and international imperialism throughout the world'¹.

Whilst, at first glance, he appeared to be advocating an Asian alliance, it is clear that the essential basis for unity in the alliance was not seen to be Asian-ness, but the shared desire for freedom from foreign domination², the shared lot of oppression and misery³, the common enemy⁴. In short, the basis for the alliance was to be radicalism or opposition to capitalism and imperialism: 'It is imperialism and the lackeys of imperialism which we must reject, but the enemies of Imperialism are our comrades!'⁵. The criterion for admission to this proposed alliance was thus the same as

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Loc. cit. See Sukarno, Sarinah (1947), pp.420 & 451 for lists of freedom fighters. These lists extend to countries beyond Asia.

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e.g., Sukarno, Bendera I, pp.73-75 (1928) & 296-297 (1933).

3

e.g., ibid., pp.73 & 76 (1928).

4

e.g., ibid., pp.73 & 76 (1928) & 295 (1933).

5

Ibid., p.295 (1933).

that for admission to the ranks of the revolutionaries in Indonesia¹. The alliance of nations was the international equivalent of the 'brown front' advocated by Sukarno as one of the bases for power-forming in Indonesia. Asian-ness, like proletarian-ness, was subsumed in a more widely based criterion for the selection of friends and allies.

Sukarno saw a fusion of issues that required a broad base for unity on the part of those whose basic aims were the same and who therefore made natural allies:

...The issue of Egypt and India against Britain; the issue of the Philippines against the United States of America; the issue of Indonesia against the Netherlands; the issue of China against foreign imperialisms -- all of these have fused into one gigantic and tremendous issue, namely the issue of Asia against Europe; or wider still: it has fused into the world of the coloured people against the world of the whites.²

The Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution took this fusion into account and, indeed, was obliged to do so because of the nature of Indonesian nationalism which took an even broader view than that based on colour:

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Discussed in Chapter II, pp.162-170 & 123 above.

2

Sukarno, Bendera I, p.74 (1928).

...With such a nationalism as this, we realise to the depths of our hearts, that our country and our people are part of Asia and are part of the people of Asia, and that they are part of the world and part of the population of the world... We of the Indonesian nationalist movement, we not only feel that we are servants of this land of our birth, but we also feel we are servants of Asia, servants of all the suffering peoples, servants of the world.¹

(iii) Defensive Means.

An alliance of nations opposed to imperialism and capitalism and based upon the widest possible participation was thus envisaged as an advantageous and necessary instrument of struggle. In this sense, the international aspect of the Indonesian Revolution was an aggressive or offensive means to the attainment of both domestic and universal objectives, but it was also seen as a defensive weapon.

'The State of Indonesia is in danger', declared Sukarno in 1947. 'Precisely because our Proclamation of Independence was an event that was not constitutional, precisely because our act in freeing Indonesia was a revolutionary act, it could not be otherwise than that the Indonesian State must go through a phase of being "in

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Ibid., p.76 (1928).

danger"¹. The Indonesian Revolution was thus partly 'an effort of resistance to oppose dangers that come from without', dangers produced by the 'encirclement' of Asia by the 'giants of imperialism and capitalism'². Indonesia therefore had to build its own 'internal defence' in the form of armed forces and mass support, but 'external defence' also had to be mobilised through the pursuit of 'relations with the outside world'³. The international support which Indonesia had already received by 1947 was seen to come from the 'anti-imperialist forces of the world', or, expressed in another idiom, from the 'groups that are truly progressive throughout the world'. These included groups in Australia, in Russia, in Eastern Europe, in the whole of Asia, in parts of America and Western Europe and even 'socialist groups' in the Netherlands⁴. These 'progressives', through opposing colonialism throughout

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Sukarno, Sarinah (1947), pp.407-408. His reasons for this assertion are summarised following the passage quoted above. See *ibid.*, p.408.

2

Ibid., p.420.

3

Ibid., p.450.

4

Ibid., pp.454-455.

the world, were seen to have played an important part in creating the 'revolutionary situation' in which Indonesia was able to seize independence¹. Once independence had been seized, Sukarno saw the problem in the following way:

And, as I said before, our problem is not merely to proclaim independence but also to maintain that independence from now on. In maintaining that independence we need international sympathy and help much more than before. Our struggle that takes the form of concrete defence, our efforts in the field of diplomacy, our great difficulties in the field of development, all these must not be allowed to become shut off, must not be allowed to become isolated, all these things we must do in the international sphere...²

In 1947, at the time when the above was written, Indonesia and Viet-Nam were seen to be the chief victims of 'the general offensive of international imperialism'. In response to the imperialists' attacks 'with bombs and dynamite, with tanks and aeroplanes', Sukarno claimed: '...the people of Indonesia are defending themselves boldly and bravely. All their national forces are

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See the explanation of 'revolutionary situation', pp.118-120 above, and Sukarno's analysis of the circumstances surrounding the seizure of independence in Sukarno, Sarinah, pp.479-480.

2

Ibid., p.480.

mobilised, and they call to all the progressive forces in the world'¹.

(b) International Struggle as a Matter of Principle.

It may be seen from the above that, in Sukarno's eyes, there were strong practical arguments for the pursuance of Indonesia's struggle on the international as well as the national level, even if one considers only the domestic or national objectives of the Indonesian Revolution. These arguments were, however, reinforced by considerations of principle. Reference has already been made to the fact that the adoption of international means, in particular, the pursuance of international co-operation, was seen as a natural and necessary extension of radicalism and of the Marhaen's principles of struggle. In other words, these principles required such an extension of the struggle in the form of an attempt to form an international, anti-imperialist alliance. Even the basically practical argument for an international level of struggle in the Indonesian Revolution thus contained an element of appeal to

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Ibid., p.482.

principles. There were, however, more fundamental principles and ideals that required international struggle, irrespective of the practical advantages to be gained from this extension of the Indonesian Revolution beyond Indonesia. There was a deeper sense in which the Indonesian revolutionaries, led by Sukarno, were committed to international struggle as a matter of principle. To understand this commitment, one needs to see the Indonesian Revolution in its universal aspect.

(i) The Indonesian Revolution, the Fundamental Antithesis and the Revolution of Mankind.

One of the concepts underlying the perception of a universal aspect of the Indonesian Revolution was that of the fundamental antithesis in the world, an antithesis of which the Indonesian Revolution was one manifestation. This view was seen to be realistic, since it was based on a knowledge of history, which the revolutionaries saw to be a process of continual antithesis, of evolution and revolution.

The recognition of this fundamental antithesis was seen as central to the Indonesian struggle. From this recognition followed an awareness of the irreconcilable opposition between the two opposing camps and an appreciation of the need for unity with those forces which were

seen to be on the same side in the great conflict. The struggle of the Indonesian Marhaen was thus seen to be linked, as a matter of principle, as a historical necessity and not as a mere matter of expediency, with the struggles of all the oppressed, of all genuinely radical innovators, of all anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist forces, be they the workers of the developed world, the advocates of socialism, or the colonial peoples seeking independence and freedom from exploitation. The great antithesis was the concept on which was based the vision of an immense fusion of related issues. This fusion of all the conflicts into one was what constituted the 'World Revolution', the great 'Revolution of Mankind', or the 'Universal Revolution'¹, of which the Indonesian Revolution was a part.

This view of a universal revolution was undoubtedly influenced by other concepts of world revolution such as

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These were alternative terms for the same phenomenon. See, for example, Sukarno, Sarinah (1947), p.477 and Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, pp.225 (17/8/62) and 91 (17/8/60). Other titles included were: the 'General Revolution', the 'Revolution of Humanity', the 'Great Revolution', the 'Great International' and the 'Universal Revolution of Man'. See for example, Sukarno, Sarinah (1947), pp.477 & 392, and Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, pp.85 & 86 (17/8/60), 171 (17/8/61) & 284 (17/8/64).

those of the communists and social-democrats, whose ideas were incorporated into Sukarno's early thinking¹. The Indonesian version of the Revolution of Mankind was, however, no mere reiteration of those other concepts. Sukarno and his supporters saw the Indonesian picture of the Revolution of Mankind as a broader concept that subsumed those other revolutionary visions that had gone before².

One can see Sukarno's idea of the Revolution of Mankind taking shape throughout his writings and speeches, in his references to one or other of the manifestations of this world-wide and long term conflict and in his efforts to make his fellow revolutionaries aware of the connection between the struggle in Indonesia and the wider struggle in the world context³. As early as 1962,

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See, for example, Sukarno, Indonesia Menggugat (1930), pp.112-115.

2

See the discussion of the Indonesian Revolution and its ideology in relation to other revolutions, pp.200-206 below.

3

For an example of a particularly strong statement of this need, expressed in the form of a criticism of Sukarno's own Nationalist Party, see Sukarno, Sarinah (1947), pp.390-391 & 478. This is essentially a restatement of his argument that self-reliance cannot be chauvinistic.

for example, he proclaimed: 'A new era, a progressive era has arrived, like the dawn of a bright clear day'¹. This was in his article urging unity between the nationalist, the Muslim and the Communist forces in Indonesia. In that article, he went on to elaborate this idea of a new era in terms of the Asian awakening, an awakening on the part of colonial peoples who desire independence and release from poverty and oppression.

Despite the recurring references to a universal world conflict, Sukarno did not provide a thorough and comprehensive explanation of this phenomenon. The universal struggle remained an amorphous concept, illustrated rather than defined, invoked and implied rather than explained in its entirety, until the development of the New Emerging Forces (NEFO) Ideology, which provided a particular emphasis to the concept of a world revolution, an emphasis which will be discussed in Chapter IV. Co-inciding with the development of the distinctive NEFO formulation of Sukarno's ideology, his expositions of the Revolution of Mankind became clearer

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Sukarno, Bendera I, p.1 (1926).

and more comprehensive¹. These later expositions, viewed in the context of general Indonesian ideology, as distinct from that of the NEFO Ideology, provide the best overall picture of the Revolution of Mankind as seen by Sukarno.

In 1963, Sukarno summed up the Universal Revolution and Indonesia's place in it as follows:

Our national struggles are but part of another struggle -- the mighty Revolution of Mankind. The Revolution of Mankind! The Revolution that grows from Man's deepest conscience, the Revolution that feeds from the social consciousness of men and women everywhere under the bowl of the sky, the Revolution that expands with the extension of national independence and the contraction of colonialism and imperialism, the Revolution that struggles for abiding peace and social justice, the Revolution that sweeps the world!²

This Revolution he described on one occasion as having three chief elements: 'the struggle for abiding peace, the struggle for social justice and the struggle for national independence'³. He saw this phenomenon as linked with the great transformation taking place in the

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Compare, for example, Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, pp.44-46 & 72-73 (17/8/59), 84-86 (17/8/60); Sukarno, Let Us Transform the World (24/4/63), Department of Information, Indonesia, 1963, pp.9-14 & 19; and Sukarno in Reflections (1964), pp.5-25.

2

Sukarno, Let us Transform the World (24/4/63), p.9.

3

Ibid., p.11.

twentieth century world, the description of which had several variants¹. For example, in 1958 he listed four 'great events'²: 'the gaining of independence by nations in Asia'; 'the appearance of socialist states'; 'the atomic revolution'; and the development of a 'historical paradox' whereby man is divided by the boundaries of independent states whilst, as a result of 'the great advances in technology', mankind is becoming one. In 1959, he depicted 'two kinds of tremendous revolutions 'occurring in the world': Firstly, a political-social-economic revolution which involves three quarters of the whole of mankind, secondly a revolution of the technique of warfare in connection with thermo-nuclear armaments'³. In 1960, he spoke of 'three

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Compare these descriptions with Spanier's concept of 'the three forces - the revolution in military technology, the nationalist revolution throughout the underdeveloped areas, and the "permanent revolution" of Communism - that ... have profoundly transformed the nature of international politics since World War II', Spanier, op. cit., p.vii. See also *ibid.*, pp.3-12 and Chapters III, IV and V for his elaboration of these concepts.

2

See Pantja Sila : Basis of State, p.118 (16/7/58).

3

Sukarno, 'Manipol' (17/8/59) in Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, p.72.

great and permanent phenomena': 'the rise of the socialist countries', 'the great wave of national liberation and economic emancipation which has swept over Asia and Africa and over...Latin America', and 'the great scientific advance, which at first dealt in weapons and war, but which is turning now to the barriers and frontiers of space'¹. In 1964, his description was as follows:

These are the phenomena -- the awakening of social consciousness and the struggle against exploitation de l'homme par l'homme et de la nation par la nation, the physical ability to provide a modicum of comfort in the lives of the entire population of the earth, and the development of armaments of unbelievable frightfulness coupled to the conquest of outer space -- these are the phenomena which characterise this twentieth century of ours, ² phenomena which did not exist before our time².

The significance of these developments was put forcefully by Roeslan Abdulgani in a speech at the first plenary session of the Preliminary Conference of the Asian-African Journalists Conference in 1963:

...Man stands today on the threshold of realisation of his ancient dream -- the end of poverty and misery for all mankind. The technological

1 Sel. Docs., p.79 (30/9/60).

2 Sukarno in Reflections (1964), p.9.

revolution has made this a physical possibility. The awakened conscience of Man has made its achievement an obligation¹.

The awakened conscience or social consciousness² of man was thus seen as a prime motivator of the Revolution of Mankind, taking advantage of the opportunities provided by the technological revolution, to produce a twentieth century culmination of previous progressive struggles³ in the form of a 'Revolution of Rising

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H. Roeslan Abdulgani, Asian-African Press, Mirror of Struggling A-A Civilizations, Special Release 107, Department of Information, Indonesia, 1963, p.14, hereafter cited as Abdulgani, A-A Press. This is essentially echoing Sukarno's more lengthy statement of the same argument. See Let Us Transform the World! (24/4/63), pp.9-10.

2

These appear to be alternative terms for the same phenomenon, the former stressing the underlying sense of justice involved, the latter stressing the awakening to 'realities'. For an example of Sukarno's view of the development of the former, see Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, pp.44-46 (17/8/59) and of the latter, Sukarno in Reflections, pp.7-8 (1964). In its earlier formulations, this phenomenon was seen in a narrower and more specific context, for example, as an Asian awakening or as an anti-capitalist upsurge. See, for example, Sukarno, Bendera I, pp.67-71 (1928) & 275-285 (1933); Sukarno, Indonesia Menggugat (1930), p.69-75; Sukarno, Sarinah (1947), pp.453-454 & 481-482.

3

For a brief summary of the struggles leading to this culmination, see, for example, Sukarno in Reflections (1964), pp.7-8 and Sukarno, Indonesia Menggugat (1930), pp.69-77.

Demands':

It has been said that we live in the midst of a Revolution of Rising Expectations. It is not so! We live in the midst of a Revolution of Rising Demands! Those who were previously without freedom now demand freedom. Those who were previously without a voice now demand that their voice be heard. Those who were previously hungry now demand rice, plentifully and every day. Those who were previously unlettered now demand education.

This whole world is a vast powerhouse of Revolution, a vast revolutionary ammunition dump.

Not less than three quarters of humanity is involved in this Revolution of Rising Demands, and this is the Greatest Revolution since man first walked erect in a virgin and pleasant world¹.

The awakening of the social consciousness of man also provided a basis and a reason for the fusion of issues referred to above and hence for revolutionary unity of a broad kind. This can be best illustrated by the following argument. Although, as a result of the technological revolution, mankind was faced, for the first time, with a situation in which universal welfare was a physical possibility, the new wealth was controlled by small groups. What was the result?

...Poverty was still the lot of the masses -- poverty amidst plenty. And the cry for social justice was taken up by the labour movement, by the

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Sukarno (30/9/60), in Sel. Docs., p.81.

socialists, by the Marxists, by people who followed no 'ism', by sincere groups in many communities and by the entire mass of the colonised peoples.

Thus the struggle for social justice, for the realisation of Man's ancient dream for economic security, runs parallel to the struggle for the elimination of colonialism and imperialism. This struggle for social justice is one of the important elements in the Revolution of Mankind¹.

The parallel between the Indonesian Revolution and the Revolution of Mankind as perceived by Sukarno and his supporters is an obvious one. Both shared the same origins or sources: the discontent of the common people, of Indonesia in the former case, of the world in the latter case, and their aspirations for prosperity and freedom². The Message of the People's Suffering was

1 Sukarno, Let Us Transform the World! (24/4/63), p.10.

2 See, for example, Sukarno in Reflections (1964) pp.10-11. See also Abdulgani, Pantjasila, pp.279-280 (13/4/62), commenting on 'Manipol'. Compare these statements with Sukarno's much earlier statement of the common sources of Marhaenism and Pan-Asianism, in Sukarno, Bendera I, pp.67-71 (1928) and with his statement of the common sources of the Indonesian struggle and the struggles against oppression and imperialism, e.g., in Sukarno, Indonesia Menggugat (1930), pp.69-77 and Sukarno, Sarinah (1947), pp.450-454 & 476-482.

thus both an expression, through the Indonesian Revolution, of the Marhaen's demands, and a manifestation of the awakening of the conscience of man¹. The Message of the People's Sufferings was, in other words, an expression of the misery not only of the Indonesian people, but of the people of the whole world². Both revolutions had the same basic objectives: the eradication of exploitation and oppression and the achievement of social justice. Both were in essence anti-imperialist. For these reasons, the Indonesian Revolution was seen to be part of the Revolution of Mankind.

The parallels between the Indonesian struggle and the world conflict were seen to be of great importance. Since the transformation occurring in the modern world was seen to be rapid and irresistible, it was considered vital for the Indonesian Revolution to keep pace with these universal revolutionary changes. Although this

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See Sukarno in Reflections (1964), p.11. This states more succinctly the argument advanced in 'Manipol' (17/8/59), in Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, pp. 44-46. See also Abdulgani, Pantja Sila, pp.39-40 (1955).

2

e.g. Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, p.234 (17/8/63).

idea became more conspicuous in post-NEFO ideology, it was not unprecedented. For example, in 1933, Sukarno spoke of the need for the vanguard party, that would lead the Indonesian struggle, to keep pace with the rate of change in the world, otherwise 'the typhoon of this era will speedily sweep it off the face of the earth'¹. His advice to teachers in a revolutionary age was similar². In a generalised form, this argument, applicable to all nations in the twentieth century, is as follows:

...all endeavours to achieve progress must be kept in line with the current revolutionary transformation overtaking the whole of human society. All change and all development need to run counter to the old forces of domination and exploitation, and need to be directed towards building a new order in the world³. If this requirement is not met, it is certain that the change or development attempted will not eventuate, or will be only very short-lived. ...It is also necessary that the progress and development be effected through revolutionary, not merely reformist, means. Neither reforms nor the slow growth of evolution can keep pace with the speed of world transformation in this mid-twentieth century setting, and if the speed of external transformation is not paralleled by internal change,

1 Sukarno, Bendera I, p.306 (1933).

2 Ibid., p.624 (undated).

the former will surely overtake the latter, sweeping it aside¹.

One particular application of this principle was the view that a twentieth century revolution must involve the uncompromising application of radicalism in every aspect of life. In other words, a twentieth century revolution must be multi-complex, reaching the point where it becomes a 'revolution in the Man himself'².

The ideologists of the Indonesian Revolution and Sukarno in particular considered themselves to be well aware of the above necessary conditions for a successful modern revolution. With their knowledge of socialism and history, they were well able to base their ideals, principles and strategy upon the 'objective situation' in their own society and in the world, and, as the

1

Indonesia Volume IV: Looking Back over 1964, p.30. For alternative statements of his argument, see Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, pp.46 (17/8/59), 86 (17/8/60), 284 & 320 (17/8/64), Sukarno, Let Us Transform the World! (24/4/63), pp.13-14 & 19-20, and Sukarno in Reflections (1964), p.10. These are essentially updated versions of the earlier arguments cited in footnotes 1 & 2, p.202 above and of Sukarno's long standing views on the need for progressive radicalism and non-cooperation.

2

Sukarno, 'Manipol' (17/8/59) in Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, p.72. See also ibid., pp.72-73 (17/8/59), & 85-86 (17/8/60).

existence of the Revolution of Mankind was part of this 'objective situation', they saw to it that the principles and objectives of the Indonesian Revolution were 'congruent with the Social Conscience of Man'¹, partly as a matter of principle and partly as a matter of necessity. Sukarno therefore felt himself justified in claiming:

Yes, the Indonesian Revolution runs parallel to, and conforms with, and is congruent with that great Revolution of Mankind! Yes, the Indonesian Revolution is but part of that Revolution of Mankind!²

In other words, the Indonesian Revolution was seen to speak with a 'Universal Voice'³. The Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution and the Revolution's principles and objectives were seen to possess universal validity⁴.

1

See, for example, *ibid.*, pp.45 (17/8/59) & 122 (17/8/60) and Sukarno, Never Leave History (17/8/66), Department of Information, Indonesia, 1966, p.20.

2

Sukarno in Reflections, p.11 (1964).

3

e.g., Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, p.225 (17/8/62).

4

Spanier argues that revolutionary states by their very nature see themselves and their ideology as universal. His generalisations do seem to apply to Indonesia. See Spanier, *op. cit.*, pp.6-8 & 48.

The universal validity of the Revolution's objectives and principles and their contemporaneity, the fact that the Indonesian Revolution was congruent with the Revolution of Mankind and the complex nature of the Indonesian Revolution rendered it, in the eyes of the Indonesian ideologues, 'greater, broader and truer, than the revolutions of other nations'¹. This and the fact that the Indonesian Revolution was regarded as 'unique' and 'different from all others'², did not mean that it was seen to be in conflict with other revolutions, but rather, that it subsumed and synthesized them, bringing their concepts up to date, applying the lessons of the other revolutions to the mid-twentieth century.

1

Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, p.122 (17/8/60). See also ibid., p.85 comparing the Indonesian Revolution specifically with the French, the American and the Russian Revolutions. For a brief statement of some of the ways in which the Indonesian Revolution was greater, see Sukarno, Islam Must Fight Colonialism (6/3/65), Executive Command, Tenth Anniversary, First Asian-African Conference, Indonesia, 1965, pp.6-7.

2

e.g., Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, p.137 (17/8/61).

situation¹. Sukarno was undoubtedly sincere in his claim that: 'the INDONESIAN REVOLUTION is an "improved edition", and -- God willing -- the "last edition" of the revolutions in this present world!!'²

This assessment of the Indonesian Revolution in relation to other revolutions was paralleled by Sukarno's assessment of the place of the Indonesian Revolution in the Revolution of Mankind. Not only was it seen as a part of that greater Universal Revolution,

1

See, for example, *ibid.*, pp.44-46 (17/8/59) & 121-122 (17/8/60), Sel. Docs., pp.61-63 (30/9/60) & 129 (1/9/61), Sukarno in Reflections 1964) pp.9-10 and Sukarno, Never Leave History (17/8/66), pp.19-20. Sukarno's writings and speeches contain frequent references to and partial analyses of other revolutions, chiefly the French, Russian and American Revolutions, but also those of other countries in Europe, Asia and Latin America, as well as references to less specific phenomena such as workers' movements and nationalist movements. This attention to the radical movements outside Indonesia dates back at least to 1926 to Sukarno's account of Marxism in Sukarno, Bendera I, pp.14-23. For a lengthy but typical example of Sukarno's comparative analyses of the Indonesian Revolution and others, see Pantja Sila : Basis of State, pp.45-74 (5/6/58).

2

Sukarno, Never Leave History (17/8/66), p.19. My assertion that Sukarno was sincere in this claim does not deny that, in making it and the comparisons that follow in this speech, he was also 'showing off' and trying to 'impress his nation-wide audience with his familiarity with foreign cultures'. See Peter Hastings, 'The Guide in Profile', in T.K. Tan (ed.), *op. cit.*, p.9.

but it was seen to occupy 'one of the "leading positions"' in the latter¹, especially as its claim to pre-eminence became increasingly recognised and as its influence and support spread internationally². To Sukarno and his supporters, Indonesia and its ideology became 'a beacon for the struggles of the peoples of the whole world'³. Indonesia and its allies had no choice but to accept this pioneering role⁴.

(ii) Pantja Sila and the International Aspects of the Indonesian Revolution.

Of all the elements in Indonesian ideology providing a universal dimension to the Revolution's principles and

1

Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, p.91 (17/8/60).

2

This, at least, was Sukarno's assessment. See, for example, *ibid.*, pp.138 (17/8/61), 171 (17/8/61), 225 (17/8/62), 247 & 261-2 (17/8/63) & 294 (17/8/64).

3

Sukarno (19/4/65) in Ten Years After Bandung, Executive Command, Tenth Anniversary, First Asian African Conference, Djakarta, undated, p.104. See also Sukarno, Never Leave History (17/8/66), p.36.

4

See, for example, Sukarno, Let Us Transform the World (24/4/63), p.22. On that occasion, he regarded the underdeveloped countries, as represented in the Afro-Asian movement, as his allies.

objectives, the most abiding and one of the most basic was Pantja Sila¹. This has already been discussed in its domestic aspect, but now attention needs to be directed to its international or universal aspect.

The 'genius' of Pantja Sila was seen to lie in two 'factors':

One - It synchronizes and sublimates the common denominators of the traditional ways of life of the mosaic cultural legacy of Indonesia.

Two - It synchronizes and further sublimates the most progressive contents of other world revolutions and makes them an integral part of Indonesia's own revolution².

Because of the second of these two factors and because the Indonesian Revolution was seen to be part of, and, indeed, in the vanguard of the Revolution of Mankind, Pantja Sila was regarded as 'a sublimation of the American Declaration of Independence and the Communist Manifesto'³, to quote Roeslan Abdulgani. In Sukarno's

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Other important elements included the belief in the universal validity of the Message of the People's Suffering and the view that the principles of the Indonesian Revolution could be universalised in the form of classic laws of revolution derived from a study of history.

2

Indonesia Volume IV: Looking Back Over 1964, p.77. See also Sukarno's account, that combines these two factors, in Sel. Docs., p.63 (30/9/60).

3

Abdulgani, Pantjasila, p.374 (29-31/5/64).

rhetorical language, Pantja Sila was 'America's Declaration of Independence and the Communist Manifesto raised to a higher level'¹. Pantja Sila was also considered capable of synthesising the two great competing ideologies of Russia and America². For these reasons, it was believed that 'Pantja Sila better fulfills the needs of Man and saves Man more than does the American Declaration of Independence or the Communist Manifesto'³. Pantja Sila was thus seen to provide for the Indonesian Revolution 'a universal basis, a basis that can be used by all nations, and a basis that can guarantee the welfare, peace and brotherhood of the world'⁴. This was believed that the 'spirit of Pantja Sila' and the 'spirit of Nasasos'⁵ had to be the 'Guiding Star' leading the

1 Sukarno, Never Leave History (17/8/66), p.19. See also Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, p.122 (17/8/60).

2 See, for example, Sel. Docs., pp.62 & 69 (30/9/60).

3 Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, p.121 (17/8/60). For further details as to why this was considered so, see, for example, ibid., pp.121-122 and Abdulgani, Pantjasila, pp.302-309 (13/4/62).

4 Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, p.122 (17/8/60).

5 This was a post-coup reformulation of Sukarno's NASAKOM concept.

Revolution of Mankind¹, and why he proposed the Pantja Sila be written into the Charter of the United Nations². Since the Indonesian Revolution possessed such a 'universal basis', one can see why it was considered to be: 'greater, broader, and truer, than the revolutions of other nations -- a Revolution of Mankind, a genuine Revolution, that will bring a New World which is truly filled with physical, spiritual and divine happiness for Indonesians and even for all men throughout the world'³.

Although this international level of struggle received greater emphasis after the enunciation of the NEFO Ideology, it was an aspect of the Revolution long perceived by the Indonesian revolutionaries. Before Pantja Sila, the formal ideological basis for an international revolutionary commitment was provided in the concept of socio-nationalism, which was seen as the basis of both Indonesian nationalism and Asian

1

See Sukarno, Never Leave History (17/8/66), p.21.

2

See Sukarno, 'To Build the World Anew' (30/9/66) in Sel. Docs., p.76.

3

Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, p.122 (17/8/60).

nationalism¹. In Pantja Sila, this concept was divided into two principles which became Pantja Sila's second and third principles. The second, humanity or internationalism, recognises that nations must be involved in relations with other nations² and acknowledges that, in these relations, there is an obligation to work for the unity and brotherhood of the world³ and for the 'happiness of the whole of mankind'⁴. This principle balances the third principle, nationalism, forestalling the latter's development into chauvinism or isolationism⁵. The recognition of both principles enables a nation to live in brotherhood with other nations, whilst retaining its own identity and developing its own culture⁶. This implies the recognition of other nations' rights to their

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See, for example, Sukarno, Bendera I, pp.5-6 (1926) & 75-76 (1928).

2

Pantja Sila : Basis of State, pp.127-128 (22/7/58).

3

Ibid., p.28 (1/6/45).

4

Ibid., p.136 (22/7/58). A similar obligation, based on socio-nationalism, was acknowledged much earlier. See, for example, Sukarno, Bendera I, p.76 (1928).

5

Pantja Sila : Basis of State, p.28 (1/6/45).

6

Ibid., pp.111-112 (16/7/58).

own nationalism, provided their nationalism is similarly checked by internationalism.

The inclusion of internationalism in Pantja Sila thus provides a basis for the universalisation of Indonesia's struggle and for the universalisation of the other principles in Pantja Sila. The commitment to the realisation of the ideals of Pantja Sila within Indonesia is, by this second principle, extended to a commitment to the realisation of these ideals in the world. The Revolution therefore aimed not merely at building Indonesia anew but also at building the world anew. This aim was accepted by the formulators of the 1945 Constitution who included in their statement of the tasks of the new Republic the commitment 'to contribute in implementing an order in the world which is based upon independence, abiding peace and social justice'¹, a commitment reiterated in the Political Manifesto² and in subsequent elaborations of Indonesian ideology.

In the international aspects of its struggle,

1

Appendix A, pp.A1-A2 below.

2

See pp.140 & 141 above, quoting the 'Manipol' formulation of the 'principal tasks' of the Revolution and its 'long term objectives'. In 'Manipol', there is, however, an anti-imperialist emphasis.

Indonesia was thus committed to building a world society based on the principles of Pantja Sila. What did these principles involve when translated into terms applicable to international struggle?¹

The first, belief in God, a principle which received little attention in its international form, was essentially a principle of international religious tolerance². The second and third, internationalism and nationalism, required the recognition of complementary obligations and rights. What was envisaged was an international system 'based upon equality of regard, equality of esteem, upon the practical application of the truth that all men are brothers'³. The obligations involved respect for other nations' individuality, concern for the welfare of the world community and restraint upon the pursuit of chauvinistic national interests. The rights consisted basically of the right

1.

The most coherent of Sukarno's answers to this question may be found in Sukarno 'To Build the World Anew' (30/9/60) in Sel. Docs., pp.69-75.

2

See *ibid.*, pp.64 & 70. See also Weatherbee's discussion of this principle in Weatherbee, *op. cit.*, pp.28-29.

3

Sukarno, 'To Build the World Anew' (30/9/60), in Sel. Docs., p.71.

to independence¹ and the consequent right of each nation to develop its own national identity politically, economically and culturally. This right was ultimately formulated as the fifth freedom or the 'freedom to be free'² which anticipated the concepts later incorporated in 'TRISAKTI'. Both principles were therefore opposed to all forms of imperialism³.

The fourth principle, sovereignty of the people, or democracy, was in part a particular application of the principles of internationalism and nationalism, and of their corollaries, to the political sphere, in which each nation was seen to have the right to develop its own political procedures in accordance with its national identity rather than accept procedures imposed from without⁴. On the regional or Asian level, this

1

This was asserted unequivocally as a universal right in the opening words of the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution. See Appendix A, p.A1 below.

2

See Sel. Docs., p.125 (1/9/61).

3

See Sukarno, 'To Build the World Anew' (30/9/60) in Sel. Docs., pp.64-66 & 70-71.

4

This is what Sukarno claimed Indonesia had done in returning to the 1945 Constitution. See, for example, Sukarno, 'To Build the World Anew' (30/9/60), in Sel. Docs., pp.66-67 & 71-72.

principle was given expression in the form of the Sukarno-Macapagal doctrine that Asian problems should be solved by Asians in an Asian way¹. 'Sovereignty of the people' thus involved a rejection of Western interference in non-Western affairs and, in more general terms, an assertion that democracy was neither the monopoly nor the invention of the West². The closely associated concepts of Eastern Democracy, Indonesian Democracy and Guided Democracy³ were seen as valid alternatives. In particular, Indonesia's own forms of democratic government,

1

See the text of the joint statement signed by President Sukarno and President Macapagal (Philippines) on 11/1/64, reproduced in Indonesian Observer, Djakarta, 14/1/64, and Sukarno's subsequent elaboration, e.g., in Sukarno, Asian Problems Solved by Asians (4/3/65), Executive Command, Tenth Anniversary, First Asian-African Conference, Djakarta, 1965, especially p.7. For a brief statement reflecting the official Indonesian view of the essential elements of this doctrine, see Indonesia Volume IV: Looking Back Over 1964, p.58.

2

See Sukarno 'To Build the World Anew' (30/9/60), in Sel. Docs., pp.66-67.

3

There are indications that these terms were not clearly differentiated in Sukarno's mind. See, for example the quotation from a 1949 speech by Sukarno, in 'Manipol' (17/8/59) in Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, p.59.

involving the procedures of musjarawah and mufakat amongst representatives of the people, were put forward as a more suitable alternative to Western political procedures, not only for national deliberations, but also for international deliberations, including those in the United Nations¹. Just as Pantja Sila required in domestic affairs the establishment of sovereignty of the people or 'genuine' democracy, so, in world affairs, it required the creation of a new world order, which would not be dominated by one section of the world and in which the common people of the world would have their rightful say². The Western democratic system, with its long association with capitalism, colonialism and imperialism, was seen to be inadequate as the basis for

1

See Sukarno, 'To Build the World Anew' (30/9/60) in Sel. Docs., pp.72-74. Sukarno argued here that the adoption of these procedures would help solve many of the problems facing the United Nations Organisation and pointed out that they had already been successfully used in an international forum, citing the Bandung Conference as an example. See Weatherbee, *op. cit.*, p.28 for other examples of the use of these procedures in international meetings.

2

See Sukarno's explanation of this requirement in the context of the United Nations Organisation in 'To Build the World Anew' (30/9/60) in Sel. Docs., pp.77-82. For an explanation of this commitment in a less specific context, see Sukarno in Reflections (1964), pp.16 & 20-22.

either the new Indonesian society or the new world society¹.

The international application of Pantja Sila's fifth principle, social justice, was described by Sukarno as follows:

...To be applied in the international field, this should perhaps be international social justice. Once again, to accept this principle would be to reject colonialism and imperialism.

Furthermore, the acceptance of social justice as an aim by this United Nations would mean the acceptance of certain responsibilities and duties. It would mean a determined, united effort to end many of the social evils which trouble our world. It would mean that aid to the under-developed and the less fortunate nations would be removed from the atmosphere of Cold War. It would mean also the practical recognition that all men are brothers and that all men have a responsibility to their brothers².

The new world order or world society envisaged by the Indonesian revolutionaries was an enlarged version of the socialist or the just and prosperous society sought for Indonesia. The ultimate aim of the principle of social justice was two-fold: that of a just and

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See, for example, Sel. Docs., pp.72 (30/9/60) & 125-126 (1/9/61) and Reflections (1964), pp.20-22.

2

Sukarno, 'To Build the World Anew' (30/9/60), in Sel. Docs., p.75.

prosperous Indonesian society set in a just and prosperous world society¹. The latter was seen as both necessary for the full realisation of the former² and as an aim which the principle of internationalism obliged the revolutionaries to pursue whilst seeking to establish a Pantja socialist society within Indonesia³. This obligation was reinforced by the concepts of the awakening of the conscience of man and the Revolution of Rising Demands. Sukarno's description of mankind's demands amounted to a call for international social justice and democracy⁴. In a more specific form, the internationalised principle of social justice, expressed through the Revolution of Rising Demands, became a demand on the part of the 'emergent nations' for 'goods, equipment, the wherewithal to build their own industries', and a call to the developed nations to welcome the new

1

See, for example, *ibid.*, p.65 and Pantja Sila : Basis of State, pp.136-137 & 140-141 (22/7/58).

2

Pantja Sila : Basis of State, pp.137 & 141 (22/7/58). The reasons for this view, expressed in the course of a discussion of the Stalin-Trotsky controversy, are set out *ibid.*, pp.137-141.

3

Ibid., p.141.

4

See, for example, Sukarno, 'To Build the World Anew' (30/9/60), in Sel. Docs., p.81.

nations as 'emancipated partners' in a co-operation venture to build 'an affluent world with a boundless future before it'¹.

Internationalism, nationalism, sovereignty of the people and social justice, as well as Pantja Sila as a whole, standing for an internationalised form of gotong-rojong, were fundamentally opposed to colonialism, imperialism and capitalism on principle and therefore required a national and an international struggle to eliminate these evils. To quote Roeslan Abdulgani: 'Pantja Sila is a positive rendition of the negative formulation of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism'².

(iii) Anti-Imperialism and the International Aspects of the Indonesian Revolution.

One of the most abiding and basic themes in the Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution and one of the most important elements requiring an international level of struggle in the Revolution, was anti-imperialism. This

1

Ibid., p.135 (1/9/61). For a general statement of the argument of developing nations for aid as a right, see Sigmund, op. cit., p.14.

2

Abdulgani, Pantjasila, p.282 (13/4/62). Although he did not include 'anti-capitalism' in this description, capitalism was regarded as a third major concept opposed by Pantja Sila. See, for example, ibid., pp.334-335 (13/4/62).

was a fundamental sentiment or 'spirit', forming a trinity with anti-colonialism and anti-capitalism, and influencing the attitudes and approach of the Indonesian revolutionaries and their ideology.

Although, from a cursory perusal of the 'short-hand' formulations of Indonesian ideology¹, the importance of anti-imperialism is not immediately apparent, it most certainly permeates all important aspects of the ideology, as an examination of the official explanations of these 'short-hand' formulations quickly shows. Anti-imperialism was inherent in such early concepts as socio-nationalism, socio-democracy, Marhaenism, the fundamental antithesis, radicalism, non-cooperation, revolutionary unity and the alliance of nations. It also sustained and was sustained by the 1945 Constitution, Pantja Sila, Manipol-USDEK and the subsequent ideological developments, culminating in the NEFO Ideology.

Anti-imperialism was, indeed, fundamental to Sukarno's notion of what constitutes a revolution².

1

For example, the simple lists of principles under such headings as Pantja Sila, USDEK, Pantja Azimat or Trisakti.

2

See pp.115-116 & 123 above.

Imperialism and the associated evils of colonialism and capitalism were the prime targets of the Indonesian Revolution. They were the systems which the Revolution was dedicated to destroy as a matter of principle and as a means to the creation of the just and prosperous society. Given the apparent intensity of their anti-imperialist sentiments and given the international nature of imperialism, the Indonesian revolutionaries were compelled by their own logic to pursue their Revolution on an international as well as a national level. The discussion of how they attempted to do this leads us into the fields of Indonesian foreign policy and NEFO Ideology¹.

8. SUMMARY: THE INDONESIAN REVOLUTION.

From the above discussion, it may be seen that, to regard the Indonesian Revolution as merely a struggle for independence is woefully inadequate. From the very beginnings of the nationalist movement, the leaders were aware of the poverty and degradation of the majority of their people and of their own impotence to improve the

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Chapters III and IV.

situation. Armed with their largely Western education, they set about analysing the reasons for this unsatisfactory condition, defining what it was that had to be changed and how this was to be attempted. They came to the broad conclusion that the root of their problems was their colonial status, but this, in turn, was seen to be the product of their own and of world history. In particular, the Sukarnoist element became convinced that the solution to their country's problems required a radical transformation, not only in Indonesia, but in the world, so that the systems of colonialism, imperialism and capitalism, which held Indonesia and other colonial territories captive, could be destroyed. What was needed was a revolution, nationally and internationally.

In their search for methods to achieve this transformation, the leaders turned their attention to progressive movements elsewhere. They were struck by the paradox existing in Indonesia, in other countries, and in the world at large, of the powerless millions, exploited and suppressed, despite their numbers. These millions of dispossessed had to be aroused and organised to use the might of their numbers to wrest control of national and international affairs from their exploiters. The parallel between the Indonesian struggle, other

struggles for independence and the proletarian and labour movement struggles of the industrialised world was obvious.

Another important question that exercised the minds of the nationalist leaders was, what type of society should be created once they had broken free from their bonds? This was in many ways the most difficult question that they faced, since, whilst agreement on the intolerability of the existing situation was relatively easy to obtain, at least in general terms, there were many competing views, both in Indonesia and in the world, of what should replace the status quo. They sought inspiration and guidance in their traditional culture and in progressive thought abroad, chiefly of a socialist orientation, and attempted to synthesise these elements in a set of broad principles, ultimately formalised in Pantja Sila. The principles and theories which emerged from these intellectual labours were tested against Indonesian experience, initially experience at home, supplemented by second hand knowledge of comparable experience in other countries, and, after independence, against Indonesian experience as a participant in world affairs.

The result was the Ideology of the Indonesian

Revolution, defended as an ideology by Weatherbee, on the following grounds:

...The reasonably coherent body of related ideas making up the ideology of the Indonesian Revolution contained an analysis of the ills of society, an extensive criticism of the antecedent political order, an outline of a better future society, and an action-oriented program showing how to move to that better society -- all of these aspects of the ideology being rooted in what were considered to be immutable values. Furthermore, as ideology, it did pretend to universality in its NEFO aspect¹.

This ideology was revolutionary, a modernizing and a traditionalist ideology, a democratic and a totalitarian ideology, and an ideology that both emphasised 'Indonesian-ness' and universality². The ideology legitimised the revolutionary leadership³ and gave to the people of Indonesia a purpose, a pride, a motivation, as

1

Weatherbee, op. cit., pp.86-87. On Weatherbee's last point, I have argued above that, whilst the NEFO Ideology did represent a culmination of the international or universal aspects of the Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution, this aspect was inherent in the more general ideology. In particular, Pantja Sila was regarded as possessing universal validity, irrespective of NEFO Ideology.

2

See Weatherbee's discussion of these aspects in Weatherbee, op. cit., pp.87-92.

3

For further discussion of this aspect, see Weatherbee, op. cit., pp.9-16 and 29-45.

evidenced, under Sukarno's rule, by the prevalence of rallies and parades in the cities and towns throughout Indonesia, in the enthusiastic, almost obsessive attention to ideological matters and in Indonesia's adventurist postures as saviour of the world. The ideology provided excitement, ideals and hope in the face of depressing realities. Guided, sustained and justified by this ideology, the Indonesian Revolution was, from its birth, a 'multi-complex' struggle against the exploitation and oppression of the status quo, a struggle ultimately aimed at building anew both Indonesia and the world on the foundations of Pantja Sila.

Sukarno, the chief formulator and interpreter of the ideology, and the 'Great Leader of the Revolution', has been swept aside by the events of the 1965 coup and its aftermath. Whether the Indonesian Revolution has also been swept aside by the pragmatic spirit of the New Order remains to be seen. Suharto and his New Order supporters initially assumed the role of successors to Sukarno as leaders of the Revolution¹, saving the

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See, for example, the statements of New Order leaders quoted and cited in Weatherbee, op. cit., p.85.

Revolution from the excesses and deviations of the Old Order and of the Communists. Whilst attempting to retain the old ideology, though with the more conspicuously pro-Communist themes removed, the new leaders have replaced many of the Old Order personnel and have reversed a number of Sukarno's most important policies, particularly foreign policies, which were firmly linked with his ideology. It was not clear in the early stages of the New Order whether the new leaders would continue to pursue their pragmatic policies whilst retaining a nominally, though rather subdued, revolutionary ideology, or whether they would attempt to reconcile ideology and policy, and, if so, which would ultimately prevail.

Late in 1967, there was an indication that ideology was to give way to the new policy trends, as it was announced that, as from 8th December, 1967, the word 'revolusi' (revolution) was to be dropped from the public vocabulary of Indonesian politics, to be replaced by the term 'perdjoangan nasional' (national struggle)¹. The

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See 'The Straits Times', 2/1/68 and Suara Baru: Forum Bagi Karyawan Departemen Luar Negeri, No.8-9th.1., December 1967-January 1968, Department of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia, p.6.

reason given for this change was that the word 'revolution' is closely linked with the Communist group's use of this term to refer to the struggle for 'communisation' of the world. Whether the change from the term 'revolution' to the term 'struggle' is sufficiently great to indicate a move towards the total abandonment of the Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution is doubtful, since the concept of struggle was so central to the Revolution. Moreover, Pantja Sila remains the state ideology, and the 1945 Constitution, the Constitution which Sukarno restored when he 'rediscovered' the Revolution, remains the legal basis of the Republic. The ultimate fate of the Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution would seem to depend largely on the extent to which the New Order's pragmatism produces tangible and conspicuously better results than did the Old Order's radicalism.

Whether the Indonesian Revolution has now ended or not, the fact remains that, as a concept and as a phenomenon, the 'Revolution' or the 'National Struggle', whatever it be called, had a tremendous impact on Indonesian affairs while Sukarno was in charge.

Weatherbee aptly sums up its significance as follows:

Indonesian political life has been dominated by the idea and the activities of revolution. Since 1945, but after 1959 in an exaggerated manner, the nation

has marched forward in a continuing revolution that sought to transform society by a complete political, economic, and social reordering. Ideologically, the completion of the domestic revolution depends upon a dramatic reconstruction of the international order. Prodded by their Great Leader of the Revolution, Sukarno, the Indonesians have shouted bravely to the world their battle cry, 'Ever onward! Never retreat!'¹.

1

Weatherbee, op. cit., p.1.

III

INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY:
INDONESIA'S ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS

An account of Indonesian foreign policy
in theory and practice.

Since the Ideology of the New Emerging Forces was concerned predominantly with world affairs, as seen by Indonesia, an obvious setting in which to view the ideology is that of Indonesian foreign policy. The following description and analysis of Indonesian foreign policy involves the use of a number of terms and implies a number of distinctions which need to be clarified and explained before the description and analysis is attempted¹.

A. SOME IMPORTANT TERMS AND DISTINCTIONS.

1. FOREIGN POLICY.

Foreign policy, for purposes of this analysis, may be defined as actions of the Indonesian government,

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The purpose of Section A below is not to construct a theory of foreign policy but to render explicit the assumptions reflected in the approach and terms used in Section B below. In embarking on this attempt and for some of the ideas, I have been influenced by M.J. Toll, Foreign Policy Analysis: Theory and the Traditionalist Approach, Work-in-Progress Seminar, 4/7/1967, Department of International Relations, Australian National University, Canberra, 1967. I have also made use of the concepts set out in G. Modelski, A Theory of Foreign Policy, Center of International Studies, Princeton University/Praeger, New York, 1962, which was particularly suitable for my purposes. This book will hereafter be cited as Modelski, Foreign Policy. I have not, however, attempted to incorporate the whole of Modelski's theory, nor to test its validity by application to Indonesian foreign policy.

directed towards other governments and towards sub-groups in other states for purposes of changing the behaviour of other states or for purposes of adjusting Indonesia's own external activities to the international environment¹.

'Actions', 'acts' or 'activities' for purposes of this definition include the behaviour, plans, decisions and statements of Indonesian leaders and officials when they are acting on behalf of the Indonesian government² and when these activities are concerned with matters affecting Indonesia's external relations³.

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This combines the definitions of Modelski and Toll. See Modelski, Foreign Policy, p.6 and Toll, op. cit., p.9.

2

The application of this criterion requires a certain amount of arbitrariness, tempered by common sense, since individuals are prone to claim to speak for the Indonesian government when they are not authorised to do so or when their views are at variance with what appears to be the government's consensus. In Indonesia's case, the identification of this consensus is often extremely difficult and at times it may not even exist.

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The application of this criterion also involves an element of arbitrariness, since some actions may be of great relevance to domestic affairs whilst also affecting external affairs. The essential point here is, however, that these activities may occur at home or abroad and include such widely differing phenomena as official declarations of broad policy, official statements on specific international issues, diplomatic discussions, official visits, attendance at (or absence from) international conferences, joining (or leaving or refusing to join) international organizations, lobbying and voting at international gatherings, establishing or upgrading

(a) Declared/Operative: Theoretical/Actual Foreign Policy.

Modelski distinguishes between 'policy as planned' ('ex ante') and 'policy as executed' ('ex post')¹. In the case of Indonesia, policy as planned is particularly difficult to identify with any certainty, except by reference to public declarations as interpreted by observers and some participants². A more useful distinction for purposes of this analysis is that between declared and operative foreign policy. This is basically a distinction between Indonesian foreign policy at the verbal level and policy at the level of tangible action. The former is composed of official, general statements on the nature and aims of Indonesian foreign policy, whether accurate or not. The latter consists of

(or breaking or downgrading) formal diplomatic relations, signing (or refusing to sign or abrogating) treaties and joint communiqués, international propaganda activities, accepting or giving (or rejecting or refusing) foreign aid, external subversive activities, trading (where government control is exercised with a view to foreign policy objectives), participating (or refusing to participate) in international or regional co-operative ventures and instituting (or ending) defensive or aggressive military operations.

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See Modelski, Foreign Policy, p.7.

2

The chances of misinterpretation and deception are considerable.

policy actions which include statements indicating a position on a particular issue¹.

Declared foreign policy may be of two basic types. The declarations may provide a realistic or an unrealistic account of the policies in fact pursued. Unrealistic accounts may be of three basic types: desired foreign policy, i.e., foreign policy as the policy makers or declarers would like it to be or as they feel it should be; illusory foreign policy, i.e., foreign policy as it is mistakenly believed to be; and pseudo-foreign policy, i.e., foreign policy as the policy makers or declarers pretend it to be, knowing that their verbal description is inaccurate. Desired, illusory and pseudo-foreign policy may be combined with one another and with the accurate descriptions to constitute theoretical foreign policy (or foreign policy in theory) as distinct from actual foreign policy (or foreign policy in practice). This is basically the same distinction as that between declared and operative policy, the latter terminology emphasising the source of identification: word or deed.

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The latter is the same as Modelski's ex post policy but the former is not the same as his ex ante policy.

(b) General/Specific Foreign Policy.

One can also distinguish between general Indonesian foreign policy (or Indonesian foreign policy in general) and specific or particular foreign policy or policies. The use of the latter concept is most conveniently restricted to particular actions or declarations at specific times in relation to specific issues, the substantive description of specific policy depicting those particular actions and declarations without reference to the overall policy context. Such descriptions inevitably tend to be fragmentary, emphasising detail and giving little or no attention to generalizations. General foreign policy, on the other hand, is an abstraction which attempts to describe the totality of foreign policy during a particular period or the totality of policies on a particular issue over a period of time, by reference to the dominant general characteristics displayed. Inevitably, as a generalization, a description of general foreign policy may overlook particular activities that are inconsistent with those dominant characteristics. The above distinction is thus essentially based on the scope of actions and activities under consideration and the degree to which attention to detail is subordinated to a perception of logical order. The emphasis in the

description below of Indonesian foreign policy is on general foreign policy, although variations and inconsistencies are mentioned where these are particularly relevant and important.

(c) Long-Term/Short-Term: Permanent/Temporary Foreign Policy.

Another distinction that can be made is that between long-term and short-term foreign policy, depending on whether the phenomenon observed is operating for a relatively long or short period of time¹. This distinction is very similar to that between permanent and temporary policy. Temporary policy tends to be conditional, involving a compromise in the light of circumstances beyond the policy makers' control. Permanent policy, by contrast, tends to be unconditional, either because it is considered so important that compromise cannot be entertained or because success is considered to be inevitable, irrespective of prevailing circumstances. While no policy is based entirely on an

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The distinction between a long and short period of time is arbitrary. It is difficult to define these terms more specifically than as 'for many years' (long) and 'for up to a few years' (short).

application of ideology or a calculation of objectives and interests on the one hand or on prevailing circumstances on the other, permanent policy tends to be based primarily on the former and temporary policy, more opportunisticly, on the latter.

When circumstances render a policy impractical, despite its desirability, it may be modified or abandoned for a short or long period of time. Thus permanent policy may be replaced by a temporary policy until circumstances are once again favourable. Policies that are from time to time revived may therefore be classified as permanent if their revival is due primarily to the policy makers' objectives, principles or interests and as temporary if their revival is due to a recurring situation that renders compromise necessary or desirable.

Since no policy could be certain of permanent survival, and since temporary policy operates so long as the circumstances requiring it are thought to persist¹, the distinction is less useful than that between long-term and short-term policy. The latter distinction absorbs many of the qualities associated with that

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Thus, temporary policy may operate 'temporarily' for a very long time.

between permanent and temporary policy, long-term policy tending to correspond with permanent policy and short-term policy with temporary policy, although the correspondence is by no means total.

(d) Basic Foreign Policy and Deviations.

The distinction between permanent and temporary policy is very close to that between basic or fundamental policy and deviations. This is a distinction popular with Indonesians, but it is one that needs to be used with caution, since a substantive description of basic Indonesian foreign policy may be little more than a rationalization that ascribes a greater degree of consistency to Indonesian foreign policy than has in fact been exhibited, or, more crudely, may merely describe the policy approved by the observer, introducing a subjective and even a propaganda element into an apparently objective description¹.

(e) Relationships between the above Distinctions.

Each set of distinctions outlined above is the

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See the discussion of the basic/deviation interpretation of Indonesian foreign policy, pp.589-591 below.

result of observing and classifying the specifics of Indonesian foreign policy in different ways¹. The resulting classification of policy specifics is therefore not always identical, but there would be a remarkable degree of overlapping between the detailed descriptions of the aspects of Indonesian foreign policy classified under each of the first categories in the above distinctions (i.e., between descriptions of declared, theoretical, general, long-term and permanent Indonesian foreign policy) or under each of the second categories². One cannot, however, postulate an exclusive separation between the first and the second category throughout the sets of distinctions, since, as each set is based on a different approach to foreign policy analysis, the first terms in each set are not totally synonymous and neither

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For example, one may examine what was said, desired, thought or pretended as opposed to what was actually done, one can generalize or emphasise detail or one can concentrate on classifying policies according to the period during which they operated or according to the period during which they were intended to operate.

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The distinction between basic Indonesian foreign policy and deviations is a little more complicated and is therefore omitted from the above comparison.

are the second terms¹.

Because of the degree of overlapping between each of the first classifications² in the above distinctions, one distinction, that between declared and operative foreign policy, has been adopted as the basis for the account of Indonesian foreign policy below. Other terms set out in the above distinctions have occasionally been used in the course of the detailed exposition, but no attempt has been made at a systematic analysis on the basis of each distinction. This would be unnecessarily repetitive.

(f) The Pattern and the Trend.

From the generalizations that can be used to describe general or long-term Indonesian foreign policy, one can attempt to construct two further generalizations, one describing the pattern of Indonesian foreign policy,

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For example, some aspects of long-term foreign policy would be classified under declared policy, others under operative, thus cutting across the broad separation of the first group of terms and the second.

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The same is, of course, true of each of the second classifications.

the other describing the trend¹. The description of a pattern involves interpretation not only of detail but of the generalizations that I have called general foreign policy. Various possible interpretations of Indonesian foreign policy as a whole, resulting in the perception of different types of patterns, are discussed below². The pattern which has been adopted for the detailed analysis of operative Indonesian foreign policy is that depicting Indonesian foreign policy as a succession of phases or stages.

The concept of a trend can be applied either to the totality of foreign policy or to policy actions and declarations on specific issues during a specified period. The perception of a trend is the result of an assessment and comparison of the qualities and characteristics of foreign policy at the beginning and end of the period selected. A description of the trend provides a useful basis for summarising the most obvious

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Declared foreign policy in the account below is depicted as essentially unchanging. The concepts of the pattern and the trend are therefore of greater use when applied to operative policy, in which there are many conspicuous changes.

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See pp.581-591 below.

changes in the attitudes, approach, tone, style and methods of Indonesian foreign policy¹. Being a generalization from a generalization, the description of a policy trend must of necessity concentrate on dominant characteristics, virtually ignoring minor deviations from the trend.

2. FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS, OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES

If one adopts an ends/means approach to foreign policy analysis, one may regard foreign policy activities as being directed towards the achievement of certain ends, goals or aims. In theoretical terms, these may be described as the modification of the international environment or the production of desirable external conduct on the part of other states. This is the type of view adopted by Modelski, who distinguishes between two basic elements which are subsumed in the concepts of

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In this chapter, a description of the trend is used in this way, although no attempt is made to provide a detailed summary of attitudes, methods, etc., in the general description of the trend. Attention is given to the details of these aspects of Indonesian foreign policy in the course of the description of the phases. No summary of each of these aspects has been attempted, since, to have done so, would have been to labour the obvious.

aims:- interests and objectives¹.

(a) Interests and Objectives.

Interests may be defined as the demands, wishes and desires that pertain to the behaviour of states or to the nature of the international environment and that are conveyed to the policy-makers by the members of the community which the policy-makers represent. Included in interests are particular groups' interests, 'national interest'² and what Modelski calls 'minimum interests', that is, those interests that are given prime importance by the community, that are supported by the entire community and that represent 'the lowest common denominator' of the community's consensus. These are to be found in the case of Indonesia in the themes of declared Indonesian foreign policy³.

1

See, for example, Modelski, Foreign Policy, pp.9-10, 15-16, 65, 70 & 85-86, on which the following reasoning is based.

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This is a concept not easily defined in substantive terms, as Modelski points out. National consensus for a specific formulation of the national interest is difficult to sustain. For a discussion of 'national interest' in the Indonesian context, see pp.297-304 below.

3

See pp.268-304 below.

Objectives are the outcome of the policy-makers' efforts to formulate general policy by interpreting and co-ordinating the particular interests or claims with regard to foreign policy expressed by their community. In other words, objectives are the translation of community interests into aims that are suitable for foreign policy operations.

(b) Principles

An important part of declared foreign policy is the set of principles which a state claims to abide by in the pursuit of its foreign policy. These principles are of two basic types, one moral or idealistic, the other of a more practical nature. The former assert that certain foreign policy activities are desirable in themselves by virtue of their inherent justice or righteousness¹ and, conversely, that certain other activities are undesirable because of their inherent wickedness². Such principles represent for the policy-

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i.e., justice and righteousness as seen by the formulators of these principles.

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See, for example, Modelski, Foreign Policy, pp.10 & 94.

makers 'the accepted precepts of morality and law'¹. The other type of principles consists of statements or assumptions about acceptable or desirable means to reach desired objectives². The acceptability or desirability of the conduct advocated by such practical principles rests more on an assessment of what has been found to be effective or expedient and less on moral judgements. This type of principle represents for the policy-makers 'the distilled wisdom of experience'³.

Foreign policy principles are closely related to foreign policy interests and objectives. The link is most apparent in the case of minimum interests which are frequently expressed as principles 'that gain unquestionable and unreasoned acceptance' and which become 'part of the articles of faith that are upheld with great vigor'⁴. Similarly, objectives that are believed to

1 Ibid., p.95.

2 These principles may also affect the formulation of the objectives themselves by requiring the abandonment of those aims which are considered to be fundamentally impractical.

3 Modelski, Foreign Policy, p.95.

4 Ibid., p.86.

possess unconditional validity may also be expressed as principles¹.

The way in which Modelski distinguishes between aims (i.e., interests and objectives) and principles, and his description of the function of principles in the foreign policy making process reveals considerable insight:

Aims impel action by virtue of the beneficial consequences expected to follow from it. Principles are commands to act inspired by a strong sentiment that such action is worth doing for its own sake. Further, while aims are usually concrete and particular, principles are general and abstract, applicable to a variety of cases. Finally, the principles are characterized by the simplicity of their formulation. In these three respects, foreign-policy principles are distinguishable from foreign-policy aims².

Modelski goes on from this distinction to argue³ that the principles represent general statements of basic guide-lines for stable policies which the policy-makers and their community can support. The moral or ideal-

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See *ibid.*, p.94. The themes of declared Indonesian foreign policy provide a most appropriate example of the absorption of interests and objectives into foreign policy principles.

2

Ibid., p.95.

3

See *ibid.*, pp.95-99.

istic type of principles sets the limits to the range of morally acceptable policies, while the more practical principles take account of the limits imposed by reality. Principles endure, changing more slowly than aims, because they are held firmly with little reference to external events, transforming purely self-centred interests into perhaps more enlightened interests. They cannot, however, be completely independent from interests, since, once they are seen to run totally counter to interest, they are likely to be abandoned, or, at most, to be retained hypocritically.

There is a more sinister sense in which foreign policy principles may be regarded as related to foreign policy objectives and interests, a sense which questions the sincerity of declared principles and hence their validity as important influences in foreign policy making. As Modelski points out¹, some 'realist' writers dismiss foreign policy principles as a mere hypocritical cloak for ulterior motives². It is true

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Ibid., p.95.

2

Many western observers have been inclined to take this view of the principles of Indonesian foreign policy, particularly when these were invoked in defence of the confrontation of Malaysia.

that one of the functions of foreign policy principles is to state aims in terms sufficiently general and based sufficiently on universalised propositions that they are widely accepted at home and abroad¹. There can also be no doubt that principles can be stated hypocritically and that they can cloak interests or objectives which, if stated frankly, would arouse suspicion, resentment or opposition at home or abroad. It is also true that principles are usually proclaimed when they are seen to operate to the proclaimers' advantage².

Nevertheless, as Modelski points out, 'the prevalence and persistent resort to principles in the conduct of state affairs would suggest ... that they perform an important function in the efficient pursuit

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This has been a particularly important function of foreign policy principles in Indonesia where at least an illusion of domestic consensus on foreign policy has been necessary for the regime's legitimacy. Indeed, an emphasis on foreign policy principles has been one of the major legitimising devices of the Indonesian government, especially under Guided Democracy, when foreign policy assumed increasing importance as a diversion from domestic tensions and domestic policy failures.

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Thus, for example, the principle of self-determination was invoked by Indonesian leaders in relation to the people of North Borneo and Sarawak, yet they were reluctant to grant the same right to the people of West Irian.

of foreign policy'¹. They cannot be lightly dismissed as nothing more than policy aims in polite disguise. Whilst I would not want to maintain that one could adequately and comprehensively describe foreign policy as consisting of 'a society's attempts to realize on the international plane certain notions of what it conceives as good'², I would argue that this statement describes one of the important aspects of foreign policy, an aspect too easily dismissed as a verbal smokescreen. Given the importance which the Indonesian revolutionaries attached to principles³, the traditional tendency for Indonesians to adopt a cosmological approach when observing their relationship to the outside world⁴, and

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Modelski, Foreign Policy, p.95.

2
Charles O. Lerche, Jr., and Abdul A. Said, Concepts of International Politics, Prentice-Hall, New York, 1963, p.3, quoted in Weatherbee, op. cit., p.58.

3
See, for example, the discussion of principles and principles of struggle, pp.79-128 above.

4
See, for example, C. Geertz, 'Ideology as a Cultural System', in Apter (ed.), Ideology and Discontent, pp. 66-69.

the missionary zeal resulting from their embarking on a revolution¹, it seems unlikely that one can discount the influence of principles in their foreign policy thought and activities. Interests and objectives undoubtedly have an important influence on the formulation and implementation of foreign policy and, indeed, on the formulation of foreign policy principles themselves, but the statements of principles are revealing even when they are little more than statements of the policy-makers' or their community's values and aspirations. As such, they depict the type of world desired by the policy-makers and their community and the type of role desired in that world for their nation.

Indonesians tend to regard their foreign policy principles, as enunciated in declared Indonesian foreign policy, as setting the type of policy guide-lines described above, with the moral and practical elements in the principles closely interwoven. The ideals, objectives and principles of the Indonesian Revolution

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See Spanier's comments on the compulsion which the leaders of revolutionary states in general feel to export their revolutionary principles and values, in Spanier, *op. cit.*, pp.6-8 and Chapter II, especially p.48. In Indonesia's case, this commitment was especially intense. See, for example, pp.206-207 above.

and of Indonesian foreign policy are seen as the product of the application of historical materialism to an analysis of the actual conditions prevailing in their country and in the world. Their principles are therefore both moral and realistic¹. As a result, there is a great deal of overlapping between Indonesian leaders' statements of ends and means and of interests, objectives and principles², so much so that, to attempt to classify particular concepts as belonging to one or other of these categories would be to impose an arbitrary and artificial order on ideas enunciated by the Indonesian leaders. Being realistic, the principles of Indonesian foreign policy indicate how the nation's objectives are to be attained, but, being moral propositions, the principles also depict the values that Indonesia must seek to promote both at home and abroad. To an Indonesian revolutionary, the problem cannot arise of principles running counter to interests. Interests are defined

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See, for example, pp.98-126 above.

2

Thus, for example, the anti-imperialist sentiment depicts an end and an objective, the eradication of imperialism in Indonesia and throughout the world, but it is also a principle, that Indonesian foreign policy must be anti-imperialist, at least as long as imperialism continues to exist in any form in the world.

by reference to principles and vice versa¹. If the vigorous pursuit of a principle produces manifestly undesirable results, this is because the principle has been misinterpreted or misapplied. The solution is to reinterpret the principles in the light of prevailing circumstances².

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For this reason, Modelski's contrast between concrete aims and abstract principles, quoted on p.245 above, is not so apparent in the Indonesian context, since aims have rarely been defined in concrete terms, with the exception of such major preoccupations as acquiring independence and West Irian and crushing Malaysia. Even in these cases, the particular aims were very closely associated with more general principles. The tendency towards abstract and vague pronouncements on foreign policy reflects not so much an attempt to cloak ulterior aims as an apparent failure on the part of the policy-makers, especially those of 'solidarity making' predilections, to define interests and objectives in concrete terms. This is in many ways a much more serious short-coming than hypocrisy, at least in so far as the advancement of Indonesia's interests is concerned.

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The post-coup adjustments to Indonesian foreign policy present a good example of this process. The principles of Indonesian foreign policy have remained virtually unaltered but operative policy has been considerably changed. See pp.302-306 & 315-316 below.

3. IDEOLOGY.

Principles, particularly the more idealistic and moral ones, may become integrated into a total framework of related ideas, in which case, the totality may be conveniently termed an ideology and the principles may be regarded as elements or doctrines of the ideology. The ideology of foreign policy is thus the philosophical foundation, the inspiration, guide, justification and rationalisation for both theoretical and actual foreign policy. In Indonesia's case such an integration of principles did occur, initially in the Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution and subsequently in the Ideology of the New Emerging Forces.

The doubts that can be raised about the validity, importance and sincerity of foreign policy principles may also be raised in the case of ideology¹. Whilst far from wishing to argue that ideology is the only important element in foreign policy formulation or that it is the sole determinant, and whilst agreeing that

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See, for example, H.J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, Third Edition, p.71 and elaborated on pp.86-97.

ideology should not be accepted uncritically when one is assessing a state's foreign policy, I nevertheless agree with Modelski's assertion that, 'being important guides to action, ideologies should never be ignored'¹.

Ideologies provide valuable insight into the policy-makers' and their community's perception of the world and hence into the conceptual framework within which policy decisions are made. As Toll argues, men act not on the basis of reality but on their perception of it, and, between nations of different cultural backgrounds, the perception of reality may not always be the same. It is all too easy to assume that one's own perception of reality is the correct one and to dismiss as insincere, unrealistic or unimportant ideological depictions of a world which one finds totally unfamiliar². In the case of Indonesia, ideology was an obsession, especially during the Era of Confrontation. This is a

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Modelski (ed.), The New Emerging Forces, p.vii.

2

See Toll, op. cit., pp.3-6. See also Spanier, op. cit., pp.30-32 and Chapter X, 'The Ambiguity of Reality', pp.388 ff. Spanier's comments on the importance of ideology in the foreign-policy making process of the Soviet Union, *ibid.*, pp.74-77, are also applicable to the Indonesian situation.

further reason for taking Indonesian ideology seriously¹. It is with the relationship between ideology and Indonesian foreign policy that this thesis is primarily concerned.

4. DETERMINANTS.

If one adopts a cause/effect, means/ends approach to foreign policy, such policy may be regarded as a process resulting from the interaction of variable elements or factors, which may conveniently be called determinants². One can devise various means for classifying or arranging determinants³. My interest in this study is not in the theoretical classification of the determinants of Indonesian foreign policy, in the construction of a theory derived from the Indonesian example, in explaining how foreign policy in general operates or in testing others' theoretical suggestions

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The case for serious consideration of Indonesian ideology is succinctly put by H.J. Benda in the preparatory note to Weatherbee, op. cit., pp.iii-vi.

2

This is the sense in which Modelski uses the term. See Modelski, Foreign Policy, p.101.

3

See, for example, ibid., pp.11 & 101 and S. Hoffman, 'International Relations: The Long Road to Theory', in World Politics, Vol. 11, No.3, April, 1959, pp.371-373.

by applying them to Indonesian foreign policy. It is rather in attempting to understand and explain the developments that occurred in Indonesian foreign policy and ideology and the reasons for these developments.

Paralleling the distinctions outlined above between various types of foreign policy, one could attempt to distinguish between different types of determinants, but this would require lengthy treatment which would serve little to advance this particular enquiry. One distinction that is useful, however, is that between general and specific determinants.

When describing general foreign policy, one is emphasising dominant, general characteristics. Similarly, in describing general determinants, one is attempting to identify by generalization the most important broad forces that have tended to promote certain types of foreign policy actions and declarations. General determinants may be regarded as the factors producing general foreign policy and, ultimately, the trend in foreign policy¹. These general factors tend

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It is, however, possible to draw on general determinants as explanations for specific policy actions.

to be long-term determinants which, if not operating continually, are at least recurring or operating for a sufficiently long period to be regarded as more than mere random or brief influences. It is the general determinants that produce the general context in which the decision makers operate, for example, by producing the problems that have to be solved through foreign policy and by imposing limits to the range of acceptable policy options, either through influencing principles or through creating practical limits to what can be attempted.

Specific determinants, on the other hand, may be regarded as those influences which operate usually briefly and frequently in a random manner to cause the decision makers to adopt a particular policy action that either accords with or is in contrast to general foreign policy.

Foreign policy, both particular and general, is, of course, the product of many complex factors, some of which could be regarded as general determinants and some as specific determinants. The distinction between the two types of determinants is not always easy to apply, since some specific determinants could be regarded as particular manifestations of a general determinant, while

others would be too accidental or random to fit into a generalization. Whilst acknowledging the elements of arbitrariness in classifying influences as general or specific, I have nevertheless adopted the distinction for purposes of summarising the factors that caused Indonesian foreign policy to develop as it did. In that summary¹, specific determinants have been ignored except as illustrations of general determinants. Other specific determinants have been mentioned in passing during the course of description of operative Indonesian foreign policy where these have been important to the exposition, but no emphasis has been given to specific determinants since such an emphasis would inevitably produce a fragmentary picture of Indonesian foreign policy. However fragmentary, disjointed and inconsistent Indonesian foreign policy has been, one can also discern elements of continuity. While there is a danger that, in generalising either about Indonesian foreign policy or about its determinants, one can impose greater order and consistency than has in fact existed, an undue emphasis on specifics does not

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See pp.597-625 below.

contribute to an understanding of more than a very small part of Indonesian foreign policy and it is doubtful whether such a limited understanding is of much value since the broad context of the limited aspect is overlooked.

B. FEATURES OF INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY: AN
OVERVIEW.

Indonesia, rich in natural resources and having 84,000,000 inhabitants, comes automatically as an important factor onto the chessboard of world politics. It is not surprising, then, that the Western press has been asking questions recently about the direction of Indonesian foreign policy. Will she turn her back on the West and move closer to the Communist countries whose center of attraction is Moscow? None of the politicians, diplomats, journalists or businessmen who have occasion to visit Indonesia can keep from speculating on this subject¹.

This was how Mohammed Hatta described Western attitudes towards Indonesia in 1958. In the years that followed, these attitudes did not change appreciably and the basic question of where Indonesia was heading remained a matter for speculation. Indeed, uncertainty was increased by the emergence of China as an alternative centre for world communism and by increasing signs that Indonesian nationalism might express itself in the form of territorial expansion.

The difficulty for the speculators has been to perceive some pattern in the twists and turns of

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Mohammed Hatta, 'Indonesia Between the Power Blocs', in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 36, No. 3, April 1958, p.480.

Indonesian foreign policy, in order to form a basis for interpretation of particular policy developments. Without such a basis, the significance of particular Indonesian moves cannot be assessed and it is these assessments, not the moves themselves, that can provide the answer to the question of where Indonesia is heading.

The problem of discerning a pattern in Indonesian foreign policy has not arisen for want of explanations of policies and declarations of intent on the part of Indonesia's leaders, for of these there have been plenty, ranging from professions of friendship and peaceful intentions, to threats, moralising lectures and bombastic demands that Indonesia's 'rights' be recognised. Declared Indonesian foreign policy, however, has not generally been regarded as providing a reliable indication of Indonesian intentions. Westerners have tended to be sceptical about the sincerity of the statements by Indonesian leaders, partly because of apparent inconsistencies between the more specific declarations and between the word and the deed, and partly because declared Indonesian foreign policy seems to the Western observer to be composed of too many vague and sometimes ambiguous slogans with a marked ideological flavour that

suggests propaganda and rationalisation rather than honesty and objectivity. Indonesian leaders' more altruistic claims seem too good to be credible and the more blatantly nationalistic pronouncements, particularly those of Sukarno, seem to indicate delusions of grandeur. Neither, surely, can be taken seriously.

Faced with vagaries at the verbal level and apparently unpredictable inconsistencies at the level of action, one wonders whether there has been such a phenomenon as Indonesian foreign policy. It is tempting to conclude that there have been several Indonesian foreign policies, successively or simultaneously, or that Indonesian foreign policy has consisted of little more than a collection of poorly integrated, ad hoc, and, perhaps, opportunistic and unprincipled actions, mostly dictated by expediency and rationalised in a cloud of ideology.

Such a view is not, however, shared by Indonesians, even by those who acknowledge the role of expediency in Indonesian foreign policy-making. One of the striking features of interviews in Indonesia was that all of those interviewed tended to relate particular aspects of declared or operative Indonesian foreign policy to a total picture. The precise nature of the total picture

varied, as did the interpretations given to specific policy declarations and actions, but Indonesian foreign policy was seen to have elements of continuity as well as elements of change. The emphasis given in the total picture to continuity and consistency on the one hand and to change and inconsistency on the other varied, largely according to the tendency on the part of the person interviewed to adopt an ideology-dominated or a pragmatic approach. What was remarkable, however, was that even pragmatically oriented Indonesians did not totally reject the view that Indonesian foreign policy has been directed towards the attainment of certain basic objectives and that, in the pursuit of these objectives, certain broad principles have operated, thereby imparting to Indonesian foreign policy an identifiable character. There were differences in the specific formulation of the objectives and principles, differences in the description of the character and differences in the assessment of the degree to which Indonesian governments have ignored the principles, sacrificed the objectives and deviated from the character of Indonesian foreign policy. Nevertheless, references to objectives and principles and to an overall interpretation of Indonesian foreign policy kept

recurring in the explanations and assessments of particular aspects of policy.

Another striking feature of the interviews was the frequent reference to concepts, slogans or themes that recur in the official literature on Indonesian foreign policy¹. This is not to say that all of those interviewed presented a standard view of Indonesian foreign policy or that they had accepted the official explanations uncritically. There were variations in the choice of themes selected as important and, within the selections of important themes, variations in the emphasis and interpretation given to each theme. These variations were the more remarkable because they did not seem to be directly related to the extent to which those interviewed were Old or New Order² supporters.

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Discussed below, pp.268-304.

2

'Old Order' and 'New Order' are post-coup terms coined to refer respectively to the regime preceding the coup and the regime established in the wake of the coup. Basically, the former is seen as consisting of Sukarno, backed by the P.K.I., and the latter as consisting of Suharto, backed by the Army and the 'pragmatic' civilian advisers. The particular view of what constituted the Old Order leadership, of what constitutes the New Order leadership and of the characteristics of the two regimes varies from person to person, as the terms are often loosely and vaguely used, frequently with heavy emotional connotations reflecting

There were unexpected similarities and differences that cut across an Old/New Order classification of sympathies.

The variety of views encountered indicated that, despite 'indoctrination', there is no detailed, standard view of Indonesian foreign policy universally accepted by Indonesians. On the other hand, the recurrence of a number of themes, although arranged in different combinations and priorities and although interpreted differently, indicated that, beneath the variations, is an underlying, elusive and, as yet, imperfectly expressed area of broad consensus on what, in general, abstract terms, Indonesian foreign policy should be and has been. The equally elusive element of continuity in Indonesian foreign policy was depicted in terms of these themes. If one is to attempt to discern a pattern in Indonesian foreign policy, the themes of declared foreign policy are therefore worthy of some attention.

1. DECLARED INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY.

There is no lack of official and semi-official explanations of the nature and aims of Indonesian

the user's preference for the past or present leadership or policies.

foreign policy. Articles and speeches by Indonesian leaders and representatives, resolutions by such government bodies as the Supreme Advisory Council and the Madjelis, and publications by the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Information provide numerous expositions of the character of Indonesian foreign policy, primarily in terms of objectives and principles. These accounts provide a general picture of what the leaders, apparently with widespread support, have regarded as the general guide-lines for foreign policy. They have had the force of both moral propositions and factual descriptions, in that they purport to describe both what Indonesian foreign policy ought to be like and what it has been like.

Declared Indonesian foreign policy, like the Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution, has a nebulous and elusive quality¹. This is partly because there is no detailed and definitive statement that covers all aspects of foreign policy and that incorporates the various accounts of the objectives and principles into

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See the discussion of the elusive quality of the Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution in Chapter II, pp.62-69 above.

a total framework. Instead, declared Indonesian foreign policy consists of a number of similar but not identical statements that elaborate on the original declarations of intention set out in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution. This is the source that most Indonesians refer to as the authoritative statement on which their interpretations of Indonesian foreign policy are based, whether they be of the moderate, pragmatic stream or of the revolutionary, visionary stream in Indonesian politics¹.

(a) The Original Source for Declared Indonesian Foreign Policy.

The Preamble of the 1945 Constitution² opens with a clear denunciation of colonialism which, it declares, must be 'abolished in this world'. The obligation of the government of the new Republic to 'protect the whole of the Indonesian People and their entire native land

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This has been a striking feature both of the interviews and of the Indonesian literature on foreign policy. Both the Old and the New Order claim the 1945 Constitution as the basis for their foreign policies. See, for example, the 'specification' to Sukarno's speech, 'To Build the World anew' (30/9/66), quoted in Abdulgani, Pantjasila, p.310 and the M.P.R.S. Decree of 1966, Appendix B, pp.B2 & B3 below.

2

See Appendix A, pp.A1-A2 below.

of Indonesia' is also stated and Pantja Sila is specified as the basis of the new state, partly to ensure the achievement of the domestic objectives of the Revolution, -- 'in order to advance the general welfare, to develop the intellectual life of the nation', -- and partly to guide the Republic's activities in the international sphere, -- 'in order ... to contribute to implementing an order in the world which is based upon independence, abiding peace and social justice'.

Of the subsequent reiterations and elaborations of the above broad statements, the one most commonly referred to by those Indonesians whom I interviewed and the one of greatest relevance to the period of NEFO Ideology, was that contained in the Political Manifesto, enunciated in 1959 when the 1945 Constitution was restored. In fact, the Political Manifesto contains two formal statements of relevance to foreign policy, one describing the 'framework' of the Revolution, the other stating the Revolution's long and short-term objectives¹. Of the two, the three-point description of the framework

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These statements are quoted above on pp.140-141.

is the more commonly cited¹. Other statements may be regarded as further elaborations and interpretations of either the Manipol declaration or of that of the 1945 Constitution.

(b) Interpretations and Elaborations: Recurring Themes.

There are two broad structural variants in the statements derived from the 1945 Constitution and Manipol. One takes the form of an attempt to describe Indonesian foreign policy in terms of one broad slogan, depicting a concept that is all-embracing. The other takes the form of an attempt to specify a set of objectives and/or principles, usually, though not always, three in number².

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It is interesting to note that the 1966 M.P.R.S. Decree, which constitutes the basis of the New Order's foreign policy, incorporates the Manipol framework into the description of the aim of Indonesia's independent, active foreign policy, but, for the third frame, adopts the emphasis of Sukarno's 'Manipol' speech in preference to that of the 'Specification'. See Article 3, in Appendix B, p.B4 below and Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, p.71 (17/8/59). For a discussion of the Manipol framework, see Weatherbee, op. cit., pp.22-25.

2

Compare, for example, Mohammad Hatta, 'Indonesia's Foreign Policy', in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 3, April 1953, p.441, Pantja Sila: Basis of State, p.123 (6/7/58), Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, pp.71 (17/8/59), 13-14 & 17 (25/9/59), 111 & 112 (17/8/60), 142 & 173-174 (17/8/61), Abdulgani, Pantjasila, pp.310 &

Like the variations in the expositions of the Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution, the variations in declared Indonesian foreign policy are more in the nature of alternative expressions emphasising different aspects of foreign policy rather than mutually exclusive and definitive statements. They complement rather than refute one another. The variations introduce an element of change into declared Indonesian foreign policy, but this effect is counterbalanced by an overall general continuity, arising from the recurrence of a number of basic concepts, slogans or themes.

Since Indonesians themselves tended to discuss declared Indonesian foreign policy in terms of these recurring themes, I have adopted the same approach. This seems the most useful method to form an overall picture of what Indonesians see as Indonesian foreign policy, without being diverted into marginal disputes. Because of the nature of the variations in declared Indonesian foreign policy, there is little to be gained from pursuing an argument as to which of the particular

311 (13/4/62), Sukarno in Sel. Docs., pp.113-115 (21/4/61), & 141 (1/9/61), Sukarno (1964) in Reflections, p.19 and Subandrio (1964), ibid., pp.27-28.

formulations is the most definitive. The statements with the greatest authority are those that are the most general¹ and other, slightly more detailed statements are regarded as amplifications of those basic statements, in which they are therefore subsumed. Similarly, since principles and objectives are closely related², there is little point in attempting to establish which concepts are principles and which objectives. Substantive accounts of each would inevitably overlap, as they do in Indonesian expositions.

The six general themes outlined below represent an attempt to summarise those major concepts that recur in declared Indonesian foreign policy. This arrangement is not based on any one statement in the official literature or made in a particular interview. It is rather based on a composite picture derived from the interviews and the literature. The choice of six headings and the order in which they are arranged is purely arbitrary.

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e.g., the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution, the framework in Manipol and the Specification to Sukarno's U.N. speech of 30/9/60.

2

See the discussion of the relationship between objectives and principles, pp.244-247 & 249-251 above.

Some could be combined¹, others could be further divided².

(i) Indonesian Foreign Policy as an Instrument of the Indonesian Revolution.

In post-independence ideology, the independent state was seen as an instrument or weapon of the Revolution, and foreign policy was seen as one of the sources of power available to the state in protecting, safeguarding, preserving, sustaining and furthering the Revolution³. The basic objectives of Indonesian foreign policy were therefore those of the Revolution in its national and international dimensions. Negatively, foreign policy served as one of the means of protecting the Republic and the domestic achievements of the Revolution, positively, it served as a means to promote the development of a Pantja Sila society in Indonesia

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e.g., the first and the second below.

2

e.g., the second below.

3

See, for example, Sukarno, Sarinah (1947), pp.446-448, Pantja Sila : Basis of State, pp.105 & 122-124 (16/7/58), Sel. Docs., p.141 (1/9/61) and Subandrio in Reflections (1964), pp.27-28. In pre-independence ideology, this idea was implied in the concept of independence as a bridge to transformation.

and in the world.

It was the latter, positive function which made Indonesian foreign policy an instrument of the Revolution of Mankind and which required militancy in foreign policy¹. The recognition of this revolutionary function and of the need for militancy did not necessarily require the pursuit of foreign policy objectives at the expense of domestic objectives, but it did promote a particular type of application of the concept of revolutionary romanticism to foreign policy. Revolutionary romanticism rendered material sacrifice in the cause of the Revolution acceptable. Applied to foreign policy, revolutionary romanticism justified the subordination and hence the sacrifice of domestic progress to foreign policy objectives, when the international furtherance of the Indonesian Revolution and of the Revolution of Mankind seemed to require such priorities².

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See Sukarno in Reflections (1964), p.19.

2

See, for example, Sukarno's reasoning, loc. cit. See also the discussion of the theme that Indonesian foreign policy serves the national interest, pp.297-304 below.

(ii) Pantja Sila as the Basis of Indonesian Foreign Policy.

Since Pantja Sila held such a central position in the Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution, to describe Indonesian foreign policy as an instrument of the Revolution was to acknowledge Pantja Sila as the basis and guide for foreign policy¹. The implications of the principles of Pantja Sila for Indonesia's international activities have already been discussed². The official literature contains many accounts of the foreign policy requirements of Pantja Sila. One such account was provided by Sukarno in 1960:

...The objectives of our foreign policy are also aimed at friendship with all nations, in accord with the teachings of Pantja Sila. It has the objective of contributing towards the realisation of world peace, again in accord with the teaching of Pantja Sila. As everyone already knows, it is a form of foreign policy which people abroad call 'independent policy' or 'policy of non-alignment'.

Sometimes people abroad also label it 'policy of neutralism' - a policy that is neutral. This last label is incorrect. This last label is wrong and altogether beside the point. Because

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See Roeslan Abdulgani's account of 'Pantjasila and Indonesian Foreign Policy' in Abdulgani, Pantjasila pp.310-312 (13/4/62).

2

See Chapter II, pp.207-219 above.

we are not neutral; we are not passive spectators of the events happening in the world; we are not without principles, we are not without a standpoint. We do not conduct the independent policy just for the sake of 'washing our hands clean', not just in a defensive way, not in an apologetic way. We are active, we have our own principles; we do have a standpoint! Our principles are clearly Pantja Sila; our standpoint is actively aimed at world peace and prosperity, actively aimed at the friendship of all nations; actively aimed at abolishing 'exploitation de l'homme par l'homme; actively opposed to, and hitting hard at, all forms of imperialism and colonialism wherever they occur¹.

However much a Pantja Sila foreign policy aimed at world peace, international brotherhood and international social justice, it also constituted a challenge to the existing world order. Internationally, Indonesia was committed by Pantja Sila to a 'struggle for a New World' which would possess the virtues of Pantja Sila².

Whilst the element of international challenge contained in a Pantja Sila foreign policy received its greatest emphasis in the nineteen sixties, especially after 1962, the commitment to building a new world order and the

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Sukarno (17/8/1960), in Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, pp.111-112. Sukarno's emphases.

2

See for example, Sukarno's 1962 account of Indonesia's challenge and his quotations from his 17/8/58 address titled 'A Year of Challenge', in Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, p.142.

consequent commitment to change the existing order does not date from this period, since it was stated in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution¹.

(iii) Anti-Imperialism.

Mention has already been made of the importance of anti-imperialism and the associated elements of anti-colonialism and anti-capitalism in the Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution². Anti-imperialism was fundamental to Pantja Sila as a whole and to each of the five principles, more especially to the principles of nationalism and internationalism. Anti-imperialism was also essential to the Revolution and to Indonesian foreign policy in at least two basic senses.

Firstly, as a national phenomenon, the Indonesian Revolution required independence for Indonesia as a bridge to the attainment of all other revolutionary objectives. The illegal seizure of independence was justified primarily by appeal to the principle of anti-

1 See Appendix A, p.A2 below.

2 See Chapter II, pp.123 & 219-221 above.

imperialism¹. On more practical grounds, the immediate threat to the Republic's survival until 1949 was the attempt by the former colonial power to reimpose its control over the territory of the Republic. Even after 1949, although the Dutch recognition of Indonesia's independence removed the threat of direct foreign political interference, especially after the Republic succeeded in disbanding the federal constitution and the union with Holland, the retention of colonial rule in West Irian perpetuated the problem of formal colonialism in part of what was considered to be Indonesian territory. There also remained the threat of indirect influence and possible subversion by Holland and other imperialist powers. Foreign powers hostile to the Revolution were seen to possess the opportunity to thwart the Revolution's progress in Indonesia, both through exerting direct political and economic pressure on the Indonesian government and through supporting dissident groups

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See the opening words of the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution, Appendix A, p.A1 below. This sentiment was actually couched in terms of anti-colonialism and was seen as endorsed by the Atlantic Charter. See Hatta's summary of Indonesian aims and ideals (23/8/45) in Mohammad Hatta, Verspreide Geschriften, Van der Peet, Djakarta, Amsterdam, Surabaya, 1952, pp.311-313.

within Indonesia¹. Indonesian foreign policy was therefore anti-imperialist both in its role of protecting the state and in its role of safeguarding and furthering the domestic Revolution. A subsidiary foreign policy role was that of weakening the influence of imperialist powers in what was regarded as Indonesia's regional sphere of influence, partly in order to remove restraints on Indonesia's free exercise of its sovereignty in regional affairs, and partly to remove threats of subversion from foreign bases.

Secondly, in its international dimension, the Indonesian Revolution sought the creation of a new world

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For an example of this view, see Sukarno in Reflections (1964), p.14 and Subandrio, ibid., pp.27-28. Sukarno's reasoning that Indonesia's commitment to radicalism renders a threat from foreign powers, more particularly western countries, inevitable was not a new idea. See, for example, Sukarno, Sarinah, pp.407-408 (1947). The Indonesian experience with foreign assisted insurrections tends to verify this view. See, for example, Soedjatmoko's comments on the rebellions after 1949 in Soedjatmoko, 'II. Indonesia and the World' in Australian Outlook, Vol. 21, No. 3, December, 1967, pp.290-291. For a more extensive example of the official Indonesian view of western subversion, see Subversive Activities : The Jungschlager and Schmidt Affair, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia, undated, but probably published in the late nineteen-fifties. This booklet will hereafter be cited as Subversive Activities.

order devoid of exploitation and based upon universal social justice, partly as a matter of principle and partly because, only in such an international context, could the full transformation of Indonesian society be accomplished and hence the domestic goals of the Revolution be fully realised¹. A prerequisite for the creation of such a world was independence for all nations or, in negative terms, the eradication of imperialism, colonialism and capitalism, which were seen as the major obstacles both to the acquisition of genuine independence by the weaker nations and to the creation of a just and prosperous world society. Indonesian foreign policy was thus anti-imperialist in its role of furthering the international course of the Indonesian Revolution and hence in its role of furthering the Revolution of Mankind.

In the early years of the Republic's existence, when colonialism was a real threat to Indonesia and, for a longer period, while formal colonialism was a

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See the discussion of 'International Means to Domestic Ends' and 'International Struggle as a Matter of Principle', in Chapter II, pp.178-221 above.

surviving phenomenon both in West Irian and in the world, Indonesia's anti-imperialism was primarily directed against formal colonial control¹. As colonies gained independence in increasing numbers and, as a result, colonialism became a largely dead issue, the emphasis was transferred to opposition to more indirect forms of colonialism and imperialism. From 1964, anti-imperialism was largely expressed in terms of anti-'Nekolim'², but the concept of opposition to indirect as well as direct imperialism and colonialism was not an invention of the Era of Confrontation. In 1961, for example, Sukarno warned against neo-

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The Preamble of the 1945 Constitution, for example, rejects 'colonialism'. See Appendix A, p.A1 below. Colonialism and imperialism are not, however, consistently distinguished in Indonesian ideology. See, for example, Indonesia 1961, pp.63-64, where some translated quotations from Sukarno's 1930 defence speech, Indonesia Menggugat, are introduced as definitions of imperialism and then are described as definitions of colonialism and imperialism.

colonialism¹. In the Political Manifesto, he spoke of economic, political and cultural imperialism². In 1955, he referred to the 'modern dress' of colonialism³, echoing his lengthy 1930 exposition of the different forms that imperialism takes⁴.

The anti-imperialist theme in Indonesian foreign policy was closely associated with the element of radicalism in the Ideology of the Indonesian Revolution⁵. Upon the platform of anti-imperialism, Indonesia strove through foreign policy to unite the progressive, anti-imperialist forces in the world in a stand against the reactionary forces of imperialism, colonialism and capitalism. Whilst this particular expression of anti-imperialism reached its climax in NEFO Ideology and in the foreign policy of the Era of Confrontation, the concept of an international united front by all anti-imperialist forces was by no means a new element in

1 See Sel. Docs., pp.106 (21/4/61) and 136-8 (1/9/61).

2 Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, p.63 (17/8/59).

3 Sel. Docs., p.17 (18/4/55).

4 Sukarno, Indonesia Menggugat, pp.16-32, especially pp.16 & 17.

5 Discussed in Chapter II, pp.111-116 See also p.123 above.

Sukarno's declarations of Indonesian intention¹. By the early sixties, however, the emphasis had changed from international co-operation for the purpose of obtaining political independence for colonial territories to co-operation for the purpose of changing the world order so that nominal independence already gained could be more effectively exercised to promote a just and prosperous international society.

(iv) Independent, Active Foreign Policy.

An expression commonly used by Indonesians to sum up the character of their foreign policy is 'independent and active'². This idea evolved gradually and has enjoyed more or less constant and almost universal support in Indonesia, so much so that it is sometimes specifically stated as a principle of Indonesian foreign policy³.

1

See the discussion in Chapter II of his pre-independence concept of an alliance of nations, pp.184-187 above.

2

For example, see the Indonesian Supreme Advisory Council's 'specification' concerning Sukarno's speech of 30/9/60 to the U.N. General Assembly, quoted in Abdulgani, Pantjasila, p.310, and the decisions of the Fourth Plenary Session of the M.P.R.S., 20/6-5/7/66, Article 2, in Appendix B, p.B3 below.

3
e.g., Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, p.173 (17/8/61).

Because the slogan represents something of a lowest common denominator, acceptable as a basis for consensus, its meaning is somewhat vague, permitting a wide variety of different interpretations and hence policies¹. This lack of a precise meaning in terms of detailed policy commitments perhaps explains why the slogan has both survived and been a useful source of justification for foreign policies with different emphases and orientations. Despite its vagueness and the differing interpretations, there are, however, some basic meanings that have come to be associated with the slogan and that are therefore worthy of attention.

As the phrase implies, the concept of an independent and active foreign policy subsumes two closely related concepts. The first, that Indonesian foreign policy should be and is independent, appealed to Indonesian nationalist sentiments² and reflected such

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The variety of interpretations given to this slogan is well illustrated in the disputes over the signing of the Japanese peace treaty and the Mutual Security aid agreement. See Feith, Decline, pp.195 & 201-202.

2

Herbert Feith in 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy', in McVey (ed.), Indonesia, p.350, regards 'the symbol of an independent foreign policy' as having become 'an integral part of Indonesian nationalism' by 1950.

influences as anti-imperialism, Pantja Sila, especially the principle of nationalism, and the leaders' desire to maintain and exercise fully their national independence so dearly bought, free from the pressure of foreign powers¹.

In more practical terms, the idea of independence in foreign policy was in part a response to the cold war situation existing at the time of Indonesia's entry into the international system as a sovereign state². The Indonesian leaders had no desire for their country to lose its independence by becoming a puppet of either of the super powers. Besides, in the early years of independence, the Republic desired peace, not only as a

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See, for example, Mohammad Hatta, 'Indonesia Between the Power Blocs' in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 36, No.3, April, 1958, p.485 and Sukarno's account of Indonesia's independent and active foreign policy in Sel. Docs., pp.98 & 115-116 (21/4/61). For a brief official explanation reflecting the values outlined above, see 'The historical and philosophical background of Our Independent Foreign Policy' in Indonesian Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 7, July 1951, Information Office, Djakarta, Indonesia.

2

See, for example, Hatta's statement of 2/9/48 quoted in Abdulgani, Pantjasila, p.323 and the government statements of 2/9/48 and 22/5/52 quoted in Mohammed Hatta, 'Indonesia's Foreign Policy', in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 3, April 1953, pp.446-447. See ibid., pp.443-450 for an elaboration of this line of reasoning.

matter of principle, but also as a practical matter of survival. It was in no fit condition to become involved in a major war. Peace was the prerequisite both for recovery from the second world war and the struggle against the Dutch and for the development of the foundations for a just and prosperous society in Indonesia. The cultivation of friendly relations with as many nations as possible was also seen to be desirable both for trading purposes and for the purpose of attracting foreign aid in large quantities. Indonesia's interests were not seen as being furthered by an exclusive association with either side in the cold war or by a victory for either side. Despite occasional pressure to take sides, the leaders did not feel compelled to do so. On both ideological and practical grounds, the best role that Indonesia could play was seen to be that of non-involvement in a dispute which, after all, was not of Indonesia's making. Alliances, particularly of a military kind, were seen not as a guarantee for but as a threat to security, partly because Indonesia's entry into an alliance could provoke the opposing camp or its supporters in Indonesia, and partly because the growth of alliances around the two contending super powers was seen to be a source of increased rather than

diminished tension¹. Indonesian security was sought by working for world peace. To this end, Indonesia sought to reduce the intensity of the cold war by fostering good relations with countries in both camps and by encouraging other new nations to do likewise, thereby creating a third force in world affairs that could act as a restraining influence on the two super powers². Indonesia therefore adopted a non-aligned stand on the cold war.

This non-aligned stand was not, however, seen as a commitment to a neutral, passive or isolationist role, even on cold war issues. Such a commitment would have been totally unacceptable to nationalist sentiment and would have been incompatible with the spirit of the Revolution, the 1945 Constitution and Pantja Sila, especially the principle of nationalism. Indonesia's position was rather that, on a cold war issue, it would take a stand or not, supporting one side or the other or neither, depending on its own leaders' assessment of

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e.g., Sel. Docs., p.116 (21/4/61).

2

See Sukarno's statement at the Bandung Conference, 1955, in Sel. Docs., pp.19-20, and his statements at the 1961 Belgrade Conference, *ibid.*, pp.122 & 123.

Indonesia's interests and those of the world¹. An independent foreign policy in this sense implied a freedom to manoeuvre, without a firm commitment to follow the lead of other countries.

The concept of an independent Indonesian foreign policy, however, implied more than this. There was a sense in which the cold war was irrelevant to the main concerns of Indonesian foreign policy. To Indonesia's leaders, the essential cold war proposition that small nations must choose to follow either the way of the Communist Manifesto or of the American Declaration of Independence was an affront². Indonesia, like many other new nations, had its own principles, as Sukarno pointed out: '... We are active, we have our own principles; we do have a standpoint! Our principles are clearly Pantja Sila...'³.

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See, for example, the 1952 government definition of Indonesia's independent foreign policy, quoted by Hatta in 'Indonesia's Foreign Policy', in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 3, April 1953, pp.446-7.

2

See, for example, Sukarno's reply to Bertrand Russell's depiction of the post-war bi-polar world, in Sel. Docs., p.61 (30/9/60). See also Hatta's warning of Indonesian sensitivity on this point in Hatta, 'Indonesia Between the Power Blocs' in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 36, No.3, April 1958, p.485.

3

Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, p.112 (17/8/60).

The Indonesian concept of an 'independent' foreign policy implied the rejection of passivity or neutrality. If Indonesia was to exercise its independence fully and if it was to be true to its revolutionary cause and principles, it followed that Indonesia was committed to take a positive role in world affairs. This aspect was emphasised by linking the term 'independent' with the term 'active' in descriptions of Indonesian foreign policy¹.

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W.A. Hanna regards the addition in 1951 of the term 'active' to the official description of Indonesian foreign policy as representing a redefinition of the original concept of an independent foreign policy and as signifying the beginning of a second phase in the development of this policy. Thus, he distinguishes between the 'neutral' 1950 foreign policy of the Hatta and Natsir cabinets and the more positive 1951-1953 foreign policy of the Sukiman and Wilopo cabinets. See W.A. Hanna, Bung Karno's Indonesia, American Universities Field Staff, Inc., New York, 1960, part XIX, pp.2-6, especially p.4. This distinction is, however, very much one of degree rather than quality and, although one may, with some justification, be suspicious of Indonesian leaders' tendencies to emphasise continuity whilst ignoring changes, the two Indonesian concepts of independence and positiveness in foreign policy are so closely related that I have chosen to regard each as manifestations of the same basic concept. Similarly, in the account below of the phases of Indonesian foreign policy, Hanna's first and second phases have been merged.

The claim that Indonesian foreign policy was independent and active thus amounted to a reaffirmation of the other themes already discussed. Indonesian foreign policy was directed towards the revolutionary purposes of building a new world, replacing the conflict born of the clash between the Communist Manifesto and the American Declaration of Independence, but, more important, replacing the conflict born of the antithesis between exploiters and exploited, by a just and prosperous world society, devoid of colonialism and imperialism and based on Pantja Sila.

This, then, was the widely accepted meaning of the concept of an independent and active foreign policy as it developed under Sukarno. Vague as the slogan may be, even when the above meanings are accepted, and capable as it is of interpretation in differing ways when applied to specific policy problems, it is nevertheless, in Soedjatmoko's words, 'the reflection of a basic attitude'¹. Because of its vagueness, the

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Soedjatmoko, 'II. Indonesia and the World', in Australian Outlook, Vol. 21, No. 3, December 1967, p.288. His full statement is: 'Non-alignment - or in the Indonesian phrase, her independent active foreign policy - is therefore not so much the result of national calculation of the national interest, but rather the

doctrine that Indonesian foreign policy should be independent and active provided only a general guide to positive policy formulation. It appears, however, to have operated as a principle setting the limits to the manoeuvring ability of an Indonesian government that aims at long-term survival and a semblance of support and consensus at home. In this negative role, the independent active principle has been more specific and decisive in its operation on at least one occasion and possibly two.

According to Roeslan Abdulgani, the right-wing boundary line of what is acceptable as an independent active foreign policy was reached in 1951-52, culminating in the downfall of the Sukiman Government over the M.S.A. agreement¹. This was an agreement to accept

reflection of a basic attitude'. This question of national interest in Indonesian foreign policy is discussed below, pp297-304.

1

See H. Roeslan Abdulgani, Perkembangan Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia Dalam Tahun 1956, (The Development of Indonesia's Foreign Policy in 1956), no publisher listed, but printed in 1957 by the Government Printer, Djakarta, No. 113/B.57, p.14. This view is endorsed by Herbert Feith. See Feith, 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy', in McVey (ed.), Indonesia, p.350. For an account of the arguments over the M.S.A. agreement, see Feith, Decline, pp.198-207. See ibid., pp.193-196 for discussion of a similar dispute in 1951 over the signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty.

U.S. aid under the conditions laid down in the American Mutual Security Act of 1951, conditions which, especially in the case of military aid, tied the recipients to the 'free world'¹. The left-wing boundary, again according to Roeslan Abdulgani, was reached in 1956 with the signing of a joint statement with the Soviet Union². Although this statement³ was very general and did not represent the acceptance of any contractual obligations on the part of Indonesia, coming as it did as a culmination to the establishment of diplomatic relations with Russia in 1954 and President Sukarno's visit to the Soviet Union in 1956, it provoked a hostile reaction in Indonesia on the part of those who feared a drift towards the Communist bloc. Although the government did not fall on that occasion, Abdulgani interpreted this reaction as 'an alarm signal ... indicating the

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The acceptance of military aid required, amongst other things, that the recipient should 'make a full contribution ... to the defensive strength of the free world'. The conditions that applied in the case of non-military aid involved a less specific commitment to the 'free world'. The relevant sections of the Mutual Security Act are quoted in Feith, Decline, p.199.

2

H. Roeslan Abdulgani, Perkembangan Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia Dalam Tahun 1956, p.13.

3

See *ibid.*, pp.89-90.

beginning of a danger zone on the left edge of our independent and active foreign policy especially if it is desired that that policy should receive complete support at home'¹. The fact that Indonesia subsequently moved much further left than this, culminating in the creation of the Axis with Peking, does not necessarily refute Abdulgani's general point, since Sukarno and Subandrio, the chief architects of this leftwards-moving policy, were ultimately swept from office².

1

Ibid., p.13.

2

Sukarno's and Subandrio's alleged abandonment of the independent active foreign policy has provided the grounds for some New Order criticism of the Old Order, although this alleged deviation in foreign policy could not be regarded as the prime cause of the downfall of Sukarno, Subandrio and the Old Order. Sukarno and the Old Order leaders were swept from power by the post-coup reaction to alleged PKI initiation of the 1965 coup. Whether this allegation against the PKI is justified or not, there is little doubt that the post-coup developments represented a rejection of communist bids, in whatever form they took up to the coup, for leadership in Indonesia. Sukarno and his supporters, having become increasingly associated with the PKI, were unable to survive this anti-communist swing. Thus, although the move in foreign policy beyond the acceptable left-wing limit to Indonesia's independent foreign policy was not in itself decisive in causing the Old Order's downfall: it was one manifestation of the general development that was a major cause of that downfall; the pre-coup trend towards an apparently unacceptable degree of communist influence in Indonesia's domestic and foreign affairs.

Expressed in more general terms as below, Abdulgani's point appears to be valid: no Indonesian government can hope to retain substantial support and hence, in the long run, to survive, if it clearly commits the country to the acceptance of the status of a satellite of a foreign power. The problem for Indonesian governments in attempting to steer a course within the limits set by this principle is the difficulty of establishing how far good relations can be cultivated with particular powers without acquiring the status of a satellite.

(v) Good Neighbour Policy

From its inception as an independent state, Indonesia has been concerned to win friends internationally. For this reason, Indonesians sometimes refer to their 'Good Neighbour Policy'. This concept even appears in some formulations of the principles of Indonesian foreign policy¹. The pursuit of friendship and international good will, of which the good neighbour policy is one manifestation, has been in part a matter of principle, derived from Pantja Sila, particularly the principle of internationalism. The ultimate aims of

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e.g., Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, p.173 (17/8/61).

world peace, harmony and social justice, objectives of both Indonesian foreign policy and of the Indonesian Revolution in its international aspect, have required the pursuit of a good neighbour policy both as a means and as an end. The good neighbour policy has also been seen as an important means to Indonesian security, since it represents a more concrete manifestation of seeking security through promoting world peace, or of averting threats through converting potential enemies into friends. The good neighbour policy thus involved the promotion of friendly relations not only with actual neighbours, but with every nation, regardless of its ideology or form of government, provided that the friendship was based upon mutual respect¹.

Sukarno's pre-independence thought made much of

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See, for example, Mohammad Hatta, 'Indonesia Between the Power Blocs' in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 36, No.3, April 1958, p.480, Sukarno, 'Manipol' (17/8/59) in Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, p.71. Sukarno's formulation, however, adds a further proviso that the 'friends' should be united with Indonesia in the cause of building a new world free from imperialism. On the other hand, Sukarno has frequently asserted the right of every nation to the 'fifth freedom', an assertion which, together with his explanations of peaceful co-existence, implies tolerance of alternative systems and ideologies.

the value of building co-operative relationships with foreign countries and groups in order to gain international support for the cause of Indonesian independence and, subsequently, for the cause of removing imperialist domination in world affairs¹. Sukarno was not alone in this view, although his version of it contained rather more emphasis on radical alliances than did the versions of more moderate leaders. In 1945, for example, Hatta addressed an appeal to those who had attended the 1926 International Democratic Congress at Bierville and the 1927 Anti-Colonial League Congress at Brussels, urging them to support Indonesia's bid for independence². Indonesia's experience in the struggle between 1945 and 1949 to gain recognition of the 1945 declaration of independence verified the value of friendly and sympathetic neighbours and hence the value of pursuing a good neighbour policy, since international support for the Indonesian cause is acknowledged as one of the factors

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See the discussion of 'International Means to Domestic Ends', pp.178-190 above.

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Mohammed Hatta, 'A personal message to my old comrades wherever they may be' (30/8/45) in Mohammed Hatta, Verspreide Geschriften, pp.314-315.

contributing to the ultimate victory¹. United Nations intervention, trends in international opinion, pressure from Asian nations and the role of the United States and Australia in the negotiations leading up to Dutch recognition are amongst the most important of the international factors contributing to an Indonesian victory².

After 1949, and particularly from 1954, the emphasis in the good neighbour policy was placed increasingly on building friendly relations with Asian and African nations, not in an exclusivist manner, but

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See, for example, Sukarno's acknowledgement of India's initiative in calling the 1949 Delhi Conference of Asian Nations, in Sel. Docs., pp.21-22 (18/4/55); Hatta's acknowledgement of Australian support in 'Indonesia Between the Power Blocs', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 36, No.3, April, 1958, p.488 and Nasution's more general acknowledgement in A.H. Nasution, Fundamentals of Guerilla Warfare and The Indonesian Defence System Past and Future, Information Service (sic) of the Indonesian Armed Forces, Djakarta, 1953, p.15.

2

For detailed accounts of the events leading up to Dutch recognition of Indonesian independence, see Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, especially Chapter XIII, and A.M. Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Stevens & Sons, London, 1960.

as a starting point¹. Put more forcefully, the pursuit of friendship and co-operation with Afro-Asian nations, later with the addition of Latin American nations, became the pursuit of Afro-Asian solidarity, which also figures specifically in some statements of foreign policy principles². In this form, the good neighbour policy acquired a more exclusivist character, since Afro-Asian solidarity implies a united front against outside nations, in particular against western imperialist powers. From this concept developed that of NEFO solidarity which, whilst requiring a good neighbour policy in relation to other NEFO countries, made unmistakably explicit the abandonment of a good neighbour policy in relation to those considered to be in the hands of the OLDEFO.

Combined with the concept that Indonesian foreign

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The wording of this objective in the Specification to 'Manipol' limits the scope of the good neighbour policy to Africa and Asia, but Sukarno's own wording in his 'Manipol' speech, a wording more commonly quoted in his subsequent speeches, provides an Afro-Asian emphasis, without limiting the policy to that area. Compare Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, pp.14 & 71.

2

e.g., Sukarno, Political Manifesto '59-64, p.173 (17/8/61)

policy should be independent and active, the good neighbour policy reinforced Indonesia's non-aligned stand on the cold war until the emergence of the NEFO Ideology. The positive pursuit of friendly relations with both camps and the acceptance of badly needed aid from both sides was justifiable both in terms of an independent active foreign policy and in terms of the good neighbour policy. In a sense, the good neighbour policy was subordinate to the independent active principle in that it was one of the means to ensure that Indonesia could retain its independent active stand.

(vi) National Interest.

A number of Indonesians when interviewed described the basic function of Indonesian foreign policy as that of furthering or protecting the Indonesian nation's interests. This is a description of foreign policy that has received more emphasis since Sukarno's decline, reflecting the more pragmatic and less ideology-dominated approach of the post-Sukarno leadership¹. This type of

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See, for example: Foreign Policy Statement made by the Foreign Minister, Mr. Adam Malik, to Parliament on 5th April, 1966, Department of Information, Indonesia, duplicated, p.1; Decree No. XII/MPRS/1966, Articles 2 & 4, in Appendix B, pp.B3 & B4-B5 below; Orba: A Guide to the New Order Government Policy, Department of

view was not unknown under Sukarno's rule, but it was overshadowed by more idealistic statements of objectives and principles. For example, a 1961 Department of Foreign Affairs account of Indonesian foreign policy ends with the following observations:

It is a truism to say that the foreign policy of a state serves the interests of that state. The interests of the revolutionary state of the Republic of Indonesia, however, have never been conceived of as ending with the interests within her own boundaries. From the time of the pre-war Nationalist Movement, it has been realised that 'Indonesia is only just a small part of the world', a world in which Indonesia has a part, but also a world in which Indonesia has duties.

Indonesia's foreign policy, therefore, is designed to serve not only the interests of the Indonesian State, it is also designed as an instrument through which the Indonesian people can fulfil their obligations to their fellow men throughout the world¹.

Such a statement appears to be excessively altruistic, so much so that one is tempted to write it off as an example of naive and rather unconvincing

Information, Indonesia, 1967, pp.10 & 25-27, hereafter cited as Orba; Address of State Delivered by Acting President General Soeharto to the Dewan Perwakilan Ralnjat Gotong-Royong on the Eve of Independence Day 1967, Department of Information, Indonesia, Special Issue 030/1967, pp.41-57.

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Indonesia 1961, p.73.

propaganda, yet there is a sense in which this type of statement can be regarded as sincere and, at the same time, as not altruism at the expense of national interest.

Before they became policy-makers controlling the state machine of Indonesia, Sukarno and his fellow revolutionaries had spent many years analysing their country's and the world's problems, and forging an ideology to help them understand the complexities of the modern world and to guide them in their struggle to realise their aspirations¹. They were well aware of the futility of pursuing ideals and objectives that are unrealistic or impractical. Drawing on historical materialism and 'scientific' socialism, they developed a set of aims and principles that they believed accorded with the 'objective' conditions in Indonesia and in the world. Their perception of the national interest was thus at the same time realistic and ideology-dominated².

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This ideology and its principles and objectives are discussed in Chapter II above.

2

See Weatherbee, *op. cit.*, pp.7-8 on the importance of realising the extent to which ideology dominated and conditioned the revolutionaries' perception of the world and hence their perception of the national interest. See also *ibid.*, pp.57-59 & 92-95.

This, to an Indonesian revolutionary, is not a self-contradictory proposition, since the ideology reflects reality. It is others, without the advantage of an understanding of the evolutionary and revolutionary process of history, who, at least in the long run, will be proved to have been unrealistic. The pursuit of what appears to be the national interest, defined without an understanding of the social conditions prevailing in the nation and in the world, is ultimately doomed to failure, since one cannot hold back the inexorable process of history. The short-term national interest, narrowly perceived, may be sacrificed by the revolutionary, but, in certain circumstances, the long-term national interest requires such a sacrifice¹, just as achievement in the domestic revolution requires sacrifices. The romanticism of revolution is not a call for sacrifice for the sake of sacrifice, but for the sake of ultimate achievements. So, too, altruism in foreign policy, though justifiable by reference to universal principles, is also in the national interest, when this national interest is 'realistically' assessed.

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e.g., See Subandrio, Indonesia's Foreign Policy (1964), pp.21-22 & 25-26.

Thus, Pantja Sila's principle of internationalism or humanity is justifiable not only because chauvinistic nationalism is harmful or unjust to others, but also because, in the modern world, the disregard of the principle of internationalism must produce conflict, thereby jeopardising both narrowly and broadly conceived national interests. Similarly, the attempt to build a just and prosperous society in Indonesia is furthered by the simultaneous pursuit of the altruistic objective of building a just and prosperous world society; and Indonesian security is promoted by working for world peace. Indeed, the pursuit of international objectives that are similar to domestic objectives, is the only way of providing a secure foundation for domestic achievements, otherwise the latter, if progressive, will be delayed or undermined by international reactionary forces. Alternatively, if national achievements are based on chauvinistic considerations, these achievements will ultimately be swept away by international progressive forces, when the World Revolution reaches the point at which conservative and reactionary forces are defeated in the international arena by the successful deposition of the 'haves'. Even the substantial costs to the domestic economy of pursuing such policies as self-

reliance and confrontation are justified in the long run because, according to the revolutionaries' analysis, until imperialist domination in the world is removed, the full realisation of the domestic objectives of the Indonesian Revolution is unattainable¹.

Many Indonesians possessed of less revolutionary fervour than Sukarno would not and did not agree with his assessment of the degree of domestic sacrifice needed for the sake of international objectives, nor did they agree with the priority which he increasingly gave international objectives over domestic progress. Few Indonesians, however, would regard the above general themes in declared Indonesian foreign policy as incompatible with the national interest. Indeed, these themes represented different statements of the ways in which Indonesia's

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For general statements of this scale of priorities, see, for example, Sukarno in Reflections, pp.16-20 (1964). These are essentially the same arguments as those advanced in 'Sarinah', explaining why the economic or social phase of the Revolution had to be delayed until after the political or national phase had been completed. See, for example, Sukarno, Sarinah, pp.405-412, 418-421, 435, 450-455, 476-482 (1947).

national interests could best be served¹. Sukarno's opponents question his interpretation of these themes and the policies into which he translated them, but the themes and slogans as such are not generally rejected. They are used as grounds for criticising Sukarno's policies. The possible exception is the theme depicting Indonesian foreign policy as an instrument of the Revolution. To some New Order supporters, the concept of the Revolution is no longer acceptable, although the concept of a national struggle to realise the ideals of Pantja Sila generally is². Since the above themes have been incorporated into the New Order's declarations of policy, even though the national interest has emerged as the paramount consideration in foreign policy³, they

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For an example of a pragmatic type of justification of these themes, see Hatta, 'Indonesia's Foreign Policy', in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 36, No.3, April 1958, pp.480-490. Whilst Hatta draws on ideals and principles to explain Indonesia's foreign policy, he also justifies these ideals and principles in practical terms that amount to statements of enlightened self-interest.

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See pp.226-227 above.

3

See Appendix B, p.B5 below. In accordance with the rejection of the concept of the Revolution, subsequently reflected in Suharto's proposal that the term 'Revolution' be dropped from official terminology, (see footnote 2 above), the depiction of Indonesian foreign policy as an instrument of the Revolution, still implied in the MPRS Decree of 1966, has also been dropped.

would appear to be regarded as interrelated with the national interest even by those who reject Sukarno's revolutionary approach.

(c) Characteristics of Declared Indonesian Foreign Policy

(i) Generalities.

One of the most noticeable characteristics of the themes of declared Indonesian foreign policy is that, although they may be regarded as elaborations of the broad declarations of intent set forth in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution, they remain at the level of generalities, essentially filling out the Indonesian picture of Utopia, rather than providing a specific indication of how Utopia is to be reached. They therefore commit Indonesian governments to no specific policies, merely to a point of view which is broadly acceptable to all major groups in Indonesia¹.

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In this characteristic, the themes of declared Indonesian foreign policy resemble the major concepts of the political philosophy of the nationalist movement. See Legge's comments on the latter in J.D. Legge, Indonesia, pp.123-125.

(ii) Permanence and Unchangeability.

A number of consequences follow from their non-specific nature. The first is that, despite minor variations in the combinations of the themes in explanations of policy, declared Indonesian foreign policy has a permanent, unchanging quality produced by the recurrence of the themes. For this reason, the themes are regarded by many Indonesians as akin to principles or principles of struggle as defined by Sukarno in the early formulations of his ideology¹. If principles, they are intended to operate permanently. If principles of struggle, they are intended to operate until the objectives of Indonesian foreign policy have been reached. Since the realisation of Indonesia's international objectives is recognised as involving a long period of struggle and, in the case of the more radical thinkers, since the Indonesian Revolution is regarded as a permanent revolution, it makes little difference whether the themes are the equivalent of principles or principles of struggle. Either way, they are sharply distinguished from tactics and are seen to provide

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See p.79 above.

general and long-term guide-lines for Indonesian foreign policy.

If one regards the themes as permanent or semi-permanent guiding principles, one can understand why they must remain as generalities. They cannot be given specific policy-oriented formulations, since this would relate them too closely to particular circumstances which change, thereby rendering the themes liable to obsolescence or inapplicability. Indonesian foreign policy would then be without guide-lines, a situation which, if not intolerable, would at least be undesirable to most Indonesians and more especially to those of a more visionary disposition. As generalities, however, the themes are capable of transcending changes in the conditions under which foreign policy decisions are made. The decision-makers can interpret them in the light of the existing situation and translate them into appropriate policies that take account both of the values of declared Indonesian foreign policy and of the particular circumstances prevailing at the time, if necessary, with the adoption of suitable and temporary tactics. This in part accounts for the survival value of the themes and hence for their recurrence.

(iii) Consensus.

A second consequence is that, because they are general, they are capable of interpretation in a variety of ways and are therefore acceptable as slogans to the most important segments of Indonesian public opinion. Overt opposition to the slogans is not necessary, since interpretation renders them acceptable. There therefore appears to be consensus on the general propositions of declared Indonesian foreign policy. They express general Indonesian aspirations of what world affairs should be like and of what Indonesia's role should be in world affairs. Together they provide an imprecise but nonetheless acceptable world outlook and a national self-image founded on general Indonesian values. They are thus useful not only as general, long-term guides, but also as rallying symbols, capable of sustaining support and consensus, which function also provides an explanation for their survival and recurrence.

(iv) Harmonious and complementary Relationship.

A third consequence is that, while the themes lack specific policy content, they depict a reasonably logical and consistent point of view. One could, for example, integrate them into a summary of declared Indonesian foreign policy in much the same way as Sukarno linked

the themes of Manipol to form what later became USDEK¹. Thus, Indonesian foreign policy, as an instrument of the Revolution², is guided by Pantja Sila, since the Revolution is so guided. Indonesia's revolutionary struggle and the principles of Pantja Sila are fundamentally opposed to imperialism, therefore Indonesia's foreign policy is anti-imperialist. In order to pursue both the domestic and the international objectives of the Revolution, and, in order to retain the national independence that is vital to the success of the Revolution, Indonesia must maintain a policy that is both independent and active, - and so on.

Viewed in this way, the themes of declared Indonesian foreign policy form a harmonious and complementary set of concepts in much the same way as do the principles of Pantja Sila. Like the principles of Pantja Sila, each theme needs to be interpreted with due regard

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See pp.134-135 above.

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To be acceptable to the New Order, 'Revolution' would have to read 'Struggle' throughout this summary and the term 'revolutionary' would have to be dropped.

to the others¹. Given such a balanced interpretation, there is no friction between the themes².

(v) Flexibility.

A fourth consequence of the generalities of the themes is that declared Indonesian foreign policy permits flexibility in operative policy, whilst providing a general framework for integration of diverse policies. The only check that declared policy exercises on the choice of operative policy alternatives is that actions must be capable of justification in terms of the values expressed in the slogans. The slogans, however, need to be interpreted before they can be translated into specific policies designed to meet particular situations, and declared Indonesian foreign policy provides no concrete guidance for this interpretation. The most obvious omission of this type is the failure to stipulate formally the priorities to be given to each objective

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See the comments on the need for a balanced interpretation of Pantja Sila, pp.134-135 above.

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This was the reasoning by which apparent contradictions between the themes were explained away by those who, in the interviews, were committed to the view that the themes constitute a harmonious whole.

and principle¹, an understandable omission if one sees the themes and the values which they express as complementary and harmonious.

Even at the verbal level, there is a source of flexibility, derived from the general nature of declared Indonesian foreign policy. The themes include such diverse elements as anti-imperialism and Pantja Sila's Principle of nationalism on the one hand and the good neighbour policy and internationalism on the other. The declared policy therefore contains the potentials for a radical, aggressive and uncompromising character or for a moderate and co-operative character and may be seen to require very different types of international conduct. Either tendency may be brought to the fore, whilst

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Priorities have been acknowledged in declared Indonesian foreign policy. For example, during the Era of Confrontation, anti-imperialism was given prime place and domestic sacrifices were justified largely because of this priority. Under the New Order, the national interest, especially economic recovery, is emphasised as the major concern. These acknowledged priorities, however, do not constitute formal ideological stipulations. They are rather statements of the way in which particular governments intend to interpret declared Indonesian foreign policy. These statements, therefore, have not remained constant or consistent over long periods. They are more in the nature of temporary priorities than permanent ones.

retaining all of the themes suitably interpreted. Since declared Indonesian foreign policy contains no formal stipulation of priorities, interpretations both of declared policy as a whole and of particular themes may be given either emphasis through allowing some elements in the themes to dominate at the expense of others.

(d) Problems arising at the Level of subsidiary Interpretation and Application.

(i) Disharmony and Competition.

It is at the point of subsidiary interpretation and of translation of declarations into policies that the complementary and harmonious relationship between the themes becomes more difficult to sustain and that the omission of clearly stated priorities in declared policy presents problems.

Whilst, in a Utopian sense, the themes may be regarded as harmonious and whilst, as general propositions, they appear to be complementary, when they have to be applied in practice, they are at least as likely to be competing if not incompatible as they are likely to be complementary. For example, in a desirable world, one could work to eradicate exploitation and oppression whilst simultaneously pursuing a good neighbour policy.

Given the existence of imperialism and capitalism, however, to the extent that one adopts a forceful stand against them, one jeopardises good relations not only with imperialists but also with those smaller nations which, for a variety of reasons, do not share one's dedication to the eradication of imperialism and capitalism. Anti-imperialism, nationalism, a good neighbour policy and internationalism may complement one another in ideal terms, but, in practical terms, one has to choose between them. Similarly, whilst in ideal terms, the national interest may be served by promoting the Revolution of Mankind, in practice, the attempts to upset the international status quo can result in more than temporary setbacks to national development. It can result in a breakdown of the national economy for the sake of an ultimately worthwhile but rather vague cause. Granted that all of the values expressed in the themes of declared Indonesian foreign policy are seen as worthwhile, and that none can therefore be totally sacrificed, there is, nevertheless, a need for at least some interim priorities to be observed until the Utopian situation is achieved. Declared Indonesian foreign policy appears to be an attempt, consciously or unconsciously, to ignore this need. The themes

represent an attempt to have things both ways. In this sense, declared policy is unrealistic. The element of realism in foreign policy, in so far as it exists, must be provided in the interpretations and in the choice of tactics.

(ii) Loss of Consensus.

It is also at the level of subsidiary interpretation and application that the apparent consensus on foreign policy disintegrates because of different interpretations of the meaning of the objectives and principles as expressed in the themes, because of disagreements over the way in which the principles should be applied and the objectives pursued and because of disagreements over policy priorities. Thus, while the general propositions of declared Indonesian foreign policy are acceptable to most Indonesians, different groups find some specific interpretations and the resulting policies totally unacceptable.

This is perhaps best illustrated by reference to the concept that Indonesian foreign policy should be independent and active. This seems to be a proposition that is virtually universally accepted in Indonesia. It is not a meaningless slogan, but its precise meaning and its specific policy implications are not matters on which

there is consensus. To some, the independent active principle requires a rigorously non-aligned policy. Therefore, the attempt to get the new states of Asia and Africa to work together with the communist countries in an anti-imperialist stand is not acceptable, although the broad principle of anti-imperialism is. To others, for whom anti-imperialism is the dominant concern of Indonesian foreign policy, NEFO solidarity or the Axis with Peking is consistent with an independent active foreign policy, provided that Indonesia leads the way. Even those who maintain that an independent active policy requires non-alignment do not agree on the extent to which this precludes collaboration with either side in the cold war, although there does appear to be agreement that formal military alliances are precluded. Short of such alliances, however, the accusation that the independent active principle is being infringed is usually levelled against policies which are seen to bring Indonesia into closer relations with a country to which the accuser is opposed. Thus, nationalist elements who are also devout socialists with communist leanings and who are anti-imperialist and suspicious of the west, regard with disapproval any policy that appears to bring Indonesia into the western sphere of

influence, whilst right-wing Moslems with pro-Western leanings and strong anti-communist sentiments watch for moves that could increase communist influence in Indonesian affairs.

(iii) The Anomaly of unchanging declared Policy and changing operative Policy.

In practice, Indonesian governments, whilst retaining the same general policy guide-lines provided by the themes of declared Indonesian foreign policy, have pursued very different policies. These have ranged from the doomed acceptance of the American Mutual Security Aid Agreement to the equally doomed Axis with Peking, from the use of diplomacy and negotiation to the use or threat of force to obtain objectives, from participation in the United Nations Organisation and other international bodies to the defiant withdrawal and the attempt to found rival organisations. As has been mentioned above, the declared themes sanction any of these types of policy, enabling them to appear consistent both with one another and with the professed Indonesian aims and values. Whether one accepts the sanction and the illusion of consistency and continuity thus provided, depends on whether one regards the governments' varying interpretations of declared policy as valid applications

of the values which the broad declarations express. This in turn depends on one's own interpretation of the themes which also determines which particular actions, if any, are to be regarded as deviations.

Small wonder then, that, in the interviews, although the same slogans or themes recurred as those in official and semi-official explanations of policy, the detailed meanings given to those themes, the views of Indonesian foreign policy as a whole, the assessments of the degree of consistency evidenced in Indonesian foreign policy and the assessments of particular policies varied immensely. Whilst the themes of declared policy appear to reflect an Indonesian viewpoint, the subsidiary interpretations reflect the multitude of divisions behind the united Indonesian facade.

(e) The Significance of Declared Indonesian Foreign Policy.

Is one, then, to conclude that the themes of declared Indonesian foreign policy are meaningless? Surely not, since they appear to strike a chord of sympathy among Indonesians, as is evidenced by their recurring use as rallying and justificatory symbols and by the often heated debate on whether particular actions

have infringed one or more of the principles of foreign policy as enunciated in the themes. If the themes did not convey some meaning to Indonesians, they would have little or no use as rallying symbols and would long ago have been discarded. As expressions of an abstract, lowest common denominator of what is acceptable to the important segments of Indonesian public opinion, the themes do have meaning, even though they are meaningless in the sense of specifying particular policies.

The anomaly of the retention of virtually unchanged themes in declared Indonesian foreign policy, combined with very different policy actions, has caused westerners to doubt the sincerity of the declarations, especially those that emphasise international good will and altruistic intentions. It is true that their vagueness, combined with their suitability for interpretation collectively or individually with either an aggressive or a moderate emphasis, renders them peculiarly suitable for use as mere rationalisations and as hypocritical justifications for policy. It is also true that they can promote self-deception on the part of the policy-makers and their supporters. Some Indonesians will admit that the themes of declared policy have been used in these ways. The tendency for arguments about foreign

policy to be preoccupied with establishing whether such has been the case with particular policies indicates an element of skepticism about government justifications for policies. Nevertheless, that the themes of declared policy can be and probably have been misused, does not invalidate the themes as such for most Indonesians. What is discredited is the particular use of the themes by particular regimes.

To dismiss the themes as mere hypocritical utterances is to misunderstand Indonesian values and to oversimplify the causes of the apparent anomaly between unchanged declared policy and changing operative policy. The problem of this anomaly arises because, in attempting to formulate permanent or semi-permanent guide-lines, based on values on which there is consensus, the formulators of declared Indonesian foreign policy have used slogans that are too general to provide a clear indication of the type of detailed policies that are considered desirable. Apart from the theoretical reason, mentioned above, that permanent or semi-permanent guide-lines must be abstract, and apart from the appeal that abstract ideas seem to have for Indonesians, particularly for those of a visionary temperament, there has been a very practical reason for refraining from providing a specific policy

content to declarations of foreign policy principles and objectives. Had the formulators enunciated more specific principles and objectives, or initiated debate on alternative and more detailed foreign policy programmes, they would almost certainly have had difficulty in retaining wide support, since the illusion of consensus would have been shattered. The themes of declared policy have to accommodate different and conflicting segments of public opinion. Consensus on specific policies is therefore difficult if not impossible to obtain.

There is also a further problem inherent in the values expressed in the themes. The slogans have to accommodate competing if not conflicting values. The emphasis on harmony between the themes has tended to obscure the elements of competition and, to some degree, of incompatibility between them, evidenced in the potentials within declared policy for either tolerant and co-operative or aggressive and domineering conduct. Not only can appropriate interpretation bring either tendency to the fore, thereby permitting rationalisation, but both tendencies seem to be demanded by the themes. The Indonesian obsession with pursuing harmony manifests itself in this context in something approaching a

determination to make the values, the principles and the objectives harmonise. The need to choose between the themes is thereby ignored, although, in practical policy decisions, priorities must be given. What appears to be desired is that all of the principles should be applied and all of the objectives pursued simultaneously when, in practice, this cannot always be done. Thus, the situation is not that either the aggressive and radical or the moderate, co-operative and altruistic declarations are hypocritical but that both are genuinely supported and, whatever practical policies are adopted, the general values expressed in either type of declaration are never fundamentally rejected.

This problem is compounded by the acquisition by the themes of the authority of articles of faith that must not be infringed. It is virtually impossible for Indonesians to admit that some of the values have been abandoned, except, perhaps, as a temporary tactic¹. The themes therefore dominate the discussion of foreign

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The possible exception is the New Order's abandonment and rejection of the concept of the Indonesian Revolution See p.304 & pp.226-227.

policy in Indonesia. Debates tend to concentrate not on the relative advantages of alternative policy programmes but on the 'real' meaning of the themes and on the question of whether particular policies represent deviations from the principles and values expressed in the themes. The result is that all of the themes and the values and aspirations they express are retained verbally and emotionally whilst policy actions exhibit varying trends. An idealistic and unrealistic consensus is thus perpetuated whilst consensus on priorities and on desirable policy actions remains unattainable. Public discussion avoids the necessity of establishing consistent priorities and avoids consideration of the practical difficulties of translating the ideals of declared Indonesian foreign policy into practice. Whilst apparently agreeing on the fundamentals of Indonesian foreign policy, the competing groups in Indonesia remain as far as ever from achieving agreement on specifics. As there is no indication of a possible basis for lasting consensus on the question of priorities and hence on whether the aggressive or the co-operative tendency is to dominate, declared Indonesian foreign policy, in so far as it aims at expressing the area of consensus, can only indicate what Utopia should be like, without indicating

the priorities to be observed or the specific measures to be adopted to reach Utopia. Priorities are therefore changed de facto and operative policy changes acquire the character of temporary adjustments rather than decisive long-term trends. What are at one time low priority objectives and principles may subsequently be given a high priority. The very slogans which provide the justification for current policy may become the inspiration and justification for a subsequent change in policy. Indonesian foreign policy therefore contains a built-in and more or less permanent source of unpredictability.

As articles of faith and as expressions of ultimate and general Indonesian aspirations and values, the themes of declared Indonesian foreign policy indicate the possible extreme positions between which operative foreign policy may fluctuate. Their weakness as indicators of policy trends arises not so much because they are meaningless or because they may be used hypocritically, but because they do not and, given the nature of Indonesian values and the factions in Indonesian society and politics, cannot indicate which specific policy position between the extremes will be adopted. They explain Indonesian values that influence the general Indonesian view of the world and of Indonesia's role in

world affairs, but they do not indicate which values are likely to dominate. As general indicators of foreign policy aims, the themes are of some value and should not be lightly dismissed. On the other hand, in recognising the importance of particular themes at particular times, one needs to bear in mind that there are other themes that may tend to take Indonesian foreign policy in a different direction. Whilst the 'balanced' interpretation of the themes does not remove the elements of incompatibility in their relationship, it is as well to recognise that each theme is potentially restrained by the influence of the others and that an excessive development of some at the expense of others is likely in the long run to promote a reaction while all of the values remain verbally, conceptually and emotionally part of the Indonesian vision of Utopia.

2. OPERATIVE INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY.

Although the guide-lines for Indonesian foreign policy, as enunciated in declared Indonesian foreign policy, have remained virtually unchanged, Indonesia's actual behaviour in the foreign policy field has varied enormously. Apart from the question of whether operative Indonesian foreign policy has been consistent

with declared policy, the most obvious immediate question that arises as a result of these changes is whether one can discern any pattern in the varied actions of Indonesia as a participant in international affairs.

(a) The Pattern of Operative Indonesian Foreign Policy: Some Interpretations.

When the latter question was raised in interviews in Indonesia, the answer was invariably that operative Indonesian foreign policy does have a discernible pattern. The particular accounts of that pattern were many and varied, but, basically, they were of two main types, both of which are worthy of consideration. One is a phase interpretation, depicting operative Indonesian foreign policy as a pattern of successive and, in important respects, different phases, stages or periods. The other could best be described as a thematic interpretation, depicting operative policy in terms of a number of basic pursuits or preoccupations which are reflected in declared policy and the pattern of which, in terms of combinations and emphases, changes from time to time, transforming the characteristics of operative Indonesian

foreign policy. Both interpretations are of necessity generalisations based on an identification of dominant characteristics.

(b) The Phase Interpretation.

The essence of this interpretation is that, if one examines and compares Indonesian foreign policy during different periods, one notices certain similarities in the policies of one period and differences from the policies of other periods. Each phase has its own character or tone. The transition from phase to phase is rarely abrupt, with the result that it is not always easy, nor particularly important for an overall view of Indonesian foreign policy, to identify the precise point at which one phase ends and another begins. In some cases, there is, however, a climax which typifies the phase. By the time the climax has been reached, a change from the policy of the preceding phase may be seen as having clearly occurred.

Depending on the degree of generalisation that one wishes to adopt, one can characterise Indonesian foreign policy as consisting of as few as two or three phases. For example, some Indonesians regard the 1965 coup as the most important turning point in foreign policy. Thus,

Indonesian foreign policy is seen as having two phases: 1945-1965, the period of Sukarno's leadership, and 1966 to the present, the period of Suharto's leadership with the backing of the army and the pragmatic civilian advisers. The eventual acquisition of West Irian is also regarded by some as a major turning point in Indonesian foreign policy, warranting a division of the Sukarno period into two phases. Until West Irian was 'liberated', the defeat of Dutch colonialism there had been a dominant foreign policy concern, absorbing a great deal of the leaders' attention and of the country's resources and adversely affecting Indonesia's relations with the Netherlands and, to some extent, with the West. With the 'liberation' of West Irian, Indonesia's leaders were free for the first time to set about pursuing a foreign policy without the complications of the West Irian problem. The acquisition of West Irian was a three stage development extending from the signing of the West Irian Agreement in August, 1962, through the transitional control by the UNTEA¹ from October 1962, to the transfer of the territory to the Indonesian administration

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United Nations Temporary Executive Authority.

in May, 1963.

These and similarly broad periodisations of Indonesian foreign policy, though of some validity and value to an understanding of the overall pattern, are based on rather sweeping generalisations of operative foreign policy, thus ignoring other important changes that have occurred. For example, one could add as important turning points in foreign policy the eventual Dutch recognition of Indonesian sovereignty in 1949 and the roughly simultaneous events of 1959: the restoration of the 1945 Constitution, the enunciation of Manipol and the establishment of Guided Democracy.

In attempting to provide a meaningful and reasonably accurate account of the phases, one needs to strike a compromise between over-generalisation and over particularisation. The periodisation adopted below is an attempt at such a compromise.

A convenient starting point as a basis for dividing the phases of Indonesian foreign policy is provided by the corresponding stages in domestic development. On this criterion, one can distinguish four major periods, some of which, for foreign policy purposes, need to be subdivided. The four main phases may be identified as:

1945 - 1949: the period of the physical struggle for independence.

1950 - 1959: the period of liberal democracy

1959 - 1965: the period of Guided Democracy

1966 - present: the period of the New Order.

(i) 1945 - 1949: The Physical Struggle for Independence
- Domestic Background to Foreign Policy.

The 1945 to 1949 phase of Indonesian foreign policy corresponds to the period of the physical Revolution.

Having proclaimed independence on 17th August, 1945, the prime concern of Indonesia's leaders was to implement and uphold their proclamation in the face of Dutch and, initially Allied resistance. This involved more than four years of negotiation and armed struggle in an effort to establish an independent, unitary state as the successor to the Netherlands East Indies¹. The infant

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For a detailed account of the national and international aspects of this phase of the Revolution, see Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, chapters V to XIII. For a discussion of the international aspects and, in particular, the role of the United Nations Organisation, see Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations. For a rather pro-Indonesian account, drawing heavily on newspaper sources, see J.K. Ray, Transfer of Power in Indonesia 1942-1949, Manaktalas, Bombay, 1967. For a pro-Dutch account see P.S. Gerbrandy, Indonesia, Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., London, 1951. The chronology in Indonesia 1961, pp.173-186 provides a useful summary of what Indonesians regard as the most important events.

Republic had to fight for possession of those areas in which the Dutch successfully reestablished their control and even had to fight for its survival in its stronghold, Java. Whilst facing this external threat, the Republic's successive governments were hampered by disagreements within the Republic over the extent to which negotiation and compromise should be used as the means to obtain Dutch recognition of independence. In addition, the revolutionaries were divided by rifts and rivalries which not only helped to unseat governments, but which also manifested themselves in occasional open rebellion¹.

A major domestic preoccupation of the new nation's leaders was to create political institutions for the government of the Republic. Rapid progress was made in this direction. The Independence Preparatory Committee² elected Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta as President and Vice-President respectively, the 1945 Constitution was promulgated and the above committee was replaced by the

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See pp.334-335 below.

2

This committee was established under Japanese auspices on August 7, 1945.

KNIP¹. The 1945 Constitution provided for a strong executive and the initial trend was towards a one-party system of government with cabinet responsibility to the President. Because of powerful internal opposition to this development from members of the elite favouring liberal democratic system and as a result of widespread fears that, if the initial trend were continued, the new state would be regarded abroad as fascist and Japanese influenced, the system was modified in November, 1945, in favour of cabinet responsibility to parliament and a multi-party system². The hope was that, by making these concessions to western democratic procedures the Republic would allay western suspicions and fears and would thereby more easily obtain sympathy and support in the struggle

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Under the transitional provisions of the 1945 Constitution, the KNIP (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat, i.e., the Central Indonesian National Committee) was to function as an advisory Council to assist the President until elections could be held for a Consultative Assembly and a Chamber of Representatives.

2

For a brief account of the 1945 Constitution and the changes introduced, see Kahin on Indonesia in Kahin (ed.), Major Governments, pp.564-570. For a more detailed account, see Kahin, Nationalism & Revolution, Chapter VI. The exception to the system of parliamentary cabinets was during times of crisis. See Kahin (ed.), Major Governments, pp.570 & 571.

against the Dutch, as well as the foreign investment needed for economic recovery¹.

Although the 1945 Constitution remained in force until the creation of the federal Republic in 1949, these modifications amounted to a de facto abandonment of this Constitution and paved the way for the formal adoption of liberal democracy in the 1949 and 1950 Constitutions.

Under the multi-party system, political parties and semi-political organizations proliferated, the most important to emerge being the PNI², the Masjumi³ and the

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The latter need was acknowledged in the 'Manifest Politik', issued by the government on 1st November, 1945. See the brief summary of this Manifest's main points in Indonesia 1961, p.174. For the full text, see Republic of Indonesia, Central Committee of Indonesian Independence, Brisbane, 1946, pp.9-12.

2

This was the Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Party, also known as the Nationalist Party) representing the secular nationalist elements in Indonesian politics. Initially it tended to be dominated by moderates but gradually the more radical nationalist sections gained control.

3

This was the major Muslim party, uniting conservative and progressive Muslim elements until the Nahadatul Ulama (NU) broke away in 1952, taking with it the conservative, traditionalist, orthodox Muslim elements. The division between the Masjumi and the NU was, however, more complex than that based on progressiveness and conservatism since, as Wertheim points out, the NU's orthodoxy frequently led it to anti-western and more radical policies than the Masjumi. See W.F. Wertheim, Indonesian Society in Transition: A Study of Sociological Change, second revised edition, van Hoeve, The Hague, 1964, p.343. This work

Socialist Party¹. In addition, there were the PKI² and Partai Murba³ and a number of small nationalist, radical and religious parties⁴. This multi-party system, instead of fostering national unity and political stability, tended to reflect and encourage the perpetuation of the existing divisions in Indonesian society. Thus,

will hereafter be cited as Wertheim, Society.

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The Socialist Party or Partai Sosialis combined moderate and radical socialists led by Soetan Sjahrir and Amir Sjarifuddin until 1948 when Sjahrir and his moderate supporters formed the PSI, Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist Party).

2

This was the Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party) which initially tended to follow a Moscow or Stalinist line.

3

The Partai Murba (Proletarian Party) was a radical, nationalist-communist party formed in 1948 as a merger of the major groups that were composed of the followers of Tan Malaka.

4

For a brief summary of the early political parties, see Feith, 'Indonesia' in G.McT. Kahin (ed.), Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia, second ed., Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1964, p.200. This book will hereafter be cited as Kahin (ed.), Governments & Politics. See also R. Van Niel, 'The Course of Indonesian History' in McVey (ed.), Indonesia, pp.302-303. For a more detailed account of the parties and semi-political organisations prior to 1950, see Kahin, Nationalism & Revolution, pp.155-164 and Kahin, 'Indonesian Politics and Nationalism' in W.L. Holland (ed.), Asian Nationalism and the West: A Symposium based on Documents and Reports of the Eleventh Conference Institute of Pacific Relations, MacMillan, New York, 1953, pp.73-110. For accounts of the post-1950 political parties see Feith, Decline, pp.122-145, Kahin, 'Indonesia', in Kahin (ed.), Major Governments, pp.609-618, Legge,

Indonesian politics, until the establishment of Guided Democracy in 1959, were characterised by mergers, alliances and rifts between leaders, parties, factions, semi-political organizations and sections in the armed forces. The result was a succession of short-lived cabinets¹.

The adoption of a multi-party system and cabinet responsibility to parliament represented a victory for the more moderate, democratic elements in the nationalist movement at the expense of the more radical and militant revolutionaries. Whilst there were variations in the composition of the cabinets and whilst the distinction between moderates and radicals was not always clear cut, the general pattern during the physical Revolution was for the moderate elements in the nationalist, socialist and modernist Islamic groups to dominate the governmental system to the disadvantage of the radicals of the communist groups (both nationalist and Stalinist varieties)

Indonesia, pp.139-141 and H. Kosut (ed.), Indonesia: The Sukarno Years, Interim History Series, Facts on File, New York, 1967, p.44.

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See Appendix C, pp.C1-C3 below.

and of the conservative, orthodox Muslim elements¹. This tendency was reinforced by leftist and Muslim rebellious activities that threatened to undermine the Republic's strength in the face of Dutch aggression. Of these rebellions, the most serious were those initiated by the nationalists and Stalinist communists. The activities of the former reached a culmination in Tan Malaka's attempted coup of July, 1946, after his unsuccessful bids for power². Opposition from the latter culminated in the communist-led Madiun rebellion of 1948³. Orthodox Muslim dissidents also sustained a guerilla warfare campaign from 1948 until 1962 in support of their demands

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See J.S. Mintz, Mohammed, Marx and Marhaen: The Roots of Indonesian Socialism, Pall Mall Press, London, 1965, p.81. Hereafter, this book will be cited as Mintz, Mohammed, etc. The major differences and similarities between the competing elements are discussed ibid., pp.81ff.

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For a brief account of Tan Malaka's activities leading up to the 'July 3' affair of 1946, see R. Van Niel, 'The Course of Indonesian History', in McVey (ed.), Indonesia, p.304. For a more detailed account, see Kahin, Nationalism & Revolution, pp.147-193.

3

For a brief account of the Madiun affair see R. Van Niel, 'The Course of Indonesian History' in McVey (ed.), Indonesia, p.306. For a detailed account, see Kahin, Nationalism & Revolution, pp.256-303.

for the creation of a theocratic Islamic state¹.

In terms of Herbert Feith's distinction between the 'administrators', typified by Hatta and Sjahrir, and the 'solidarity makers', typified by Sukarno², the modifications to the 1945 Constitution established the former as an effective counter-balance to the latter and gave to the administrators the advantage in the political competition. The 'administrators' tended to be rather pro-western and moderate socialists and nationalists, concerned with establishing order and democratic procedures and were notable for their pragmatic and rather prosaic problem-solving approach to politics. The 'solidarity makers' tended to be more radical, anti-western and visionary and were inclined to emphasise national unity and the manipulation of inspiring slogans rather than to approach problems in a western, pragmatic way. Sukarno, despite his pre-war radicalism, adjusted

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For a brief account of the activities of Darul Islam, see Kahin, 'Indonesia' in Kahin (ed.), Major Governments, pp.599-600. For further details of the early stages of these activities, see Kahin, Nationalism & Revolution, pp.326-331 and Kahin, 'Indonesian Politics and Nationalism' in W.L. Holland (ed.), op. cit., pp.104-110.

2

See pp.604-607 below.

to the important role of the 'administrators', as is evidenced by the harmonious relationship that existed between him and his Vice-President, Hatta¹. Given a predominantly moderate, though socialist and nationalist leadership, the idea of launching a radical foreign policy aimed at world revolution received no serious consideration or support amongst the dominant leaders.

- Foreign Policy

Apart from the above domestic factors, the Republic's leaders during these years were too preoccupied internally to give serious attention to playing an important role in world affairs. The country was weak and struggling for survival. Nationalism was channelled into the cause of winning independence. Indonesian foreign policy was therefore primarily defensive in the sense that it was directed towards gaining international recognition, sympathy and support, wherever it could be found, for the struggle against the Dutch². The hope was that, through

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This harmonious relationship contrasts sharply with the later divergence between the two leaders as Sukarno once again adopted a more radical stand from late in 1950 and more conspicuously from 1956.

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For a general review of the Republic's attitudes and tactics see Taylor, op. cit., pp.306-326. The chronology in Indonesia 1961, pp.173-186 also provides a useful summary of the Republic's activities.

gaining recognition of the Republic's existence and of the justice of its cause, the leaders would foster international pressure on the Dutch to desist from their efforts to thwart Indonesia's legitimate aims. In support of the legitimacy of the Indonesian cause, the Atlantic Charter was cited. Appeals were made by Indonesian leaders to world leaders of both Communist and western states, leaders of Afro-Asian nations and to the United Nations. Various delegations were despatched to win support for Indonesia¹ and the Republic participated in such international gatherings as the 1947 Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi, the 1947 United Nations-sponsored Trade Conference in Havana, the 1948 Southeast Asian Conference for World Peace and International Fellowship held in Ceylon, the 1948 ECAFE conference, and the 1949 Inter-Asian Conference in New Delhi.

Whilst Indonesian leaders were determined to obtain independence, throughout their struggle they gave ample evidence of a willingness to adopt a conciliatory posture

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For example, the missions to the Arab States and to Eastern Europe. Discussions were also held with the Prime Ministers of Australia and India. See the chronology in Indonesia 1961, pp.178 & 182, Taylor op. cit., pp.33 & 306 and Kahin, Nationalism & Revolution, p.268.

and to accept compromises. In October, 1945, for example, the Republican Government announced its willingness to negotiate and to accept mediation. Soon afterwards, in the Government's 'Manifest Politik' of 1st November, 1945¹, provision was made to guarantee Dutch commercial interests in Indonesia. The Sjahrir Government that succeeded the Presidential Cabinet reiterated the Republic's willingness to cooperate with Holland, to make concessions to Dutch interests and to accept mediation. These declarations were matched by deeds. In early negotiations with the Dutch, for example, the Republic made a major concession in reducing the demand for recognition of its sovereignty over the entire archipelago to the demand for recognition of the Republic's de facto authority in Java and Sumatra². Each of the major agreements, the Linggadjati and Renville Agreements and the Round Table Conference Agreement, the latter

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This was also known as the 'Political Manifesto', but it has been overshadowed by its 1959 namesake. For a summary of the main points of the 1945 Manifest, see Indonesia 1961, p.174.

2.

See Taylor, *op. cit.*, p.21.

establishing the terms for Dutch recognition of Indonesian independence, involved major concessions by the Republic¹. The outcome of the struggle was far short of the original Indonesian aspirations. The Republic accepted a federal constitution based on parliamentary democracy, a Union with Holland, economic concessions to Dutch interests and an internal and external debt totalling nearly \$1,130,000,000. On the question of West Irian, the Republic accepted the continuation of Dutch rule, on condition that, within a year of the date of transfer of sovereignty to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, the political status of West Irian would be determined through negotiation between Indonesia and the Netherlands.

In making these concessions and, indeed, in the concessions made throughout the struggle for independence, the Indonesian Government showed both an ability to make realistic assessments of their bargaining position and a lack of belligerency. These qualities were factors contributing to international acceptance of the Indonesian cause. As the conflict dragged on and as the Dutch

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For details, see Kahin, Nationalism & Revolution, pp.196-199, 224-229 & 433-445.

victories in the military field and at the conference table mounted, the Indonesian case gained increasing international support. At the same time, Dutch actions, such as the launching of the two 'police actions', the second culminating in the internment of the Republic's leaders, the defiance of Security Council resolutions, the institution of a blockade against trade and communications with the Republic and, in the final stages, the unilateral attempts to shape the future of the projected United States of Indonesia in such a way as to exclude Republican participation in the preparations, did much to damage the Netherlands' case in world opinion and in the United Nations.

Indonesia's policy of seeking international support whilst resisting as strongly as possible the Dutch military advances, must be judged as having been successful. After the call by the Arab League for recognition of the sovereignty of the State of the Republic of Indonesia, a number of Arab and Asian states accorded recognition¹. Following the acceptance of the

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See the chronology in Indonesia 1961, pp.174-183 which lists those states that accorded recognition. See also Taylor, op. cit., p.349, footnote 48 and L.H. Palmier, Indonesia and the Dutch, Oxford University Press, London, 1962, p.55.

Linggadjati Agreement, Britain, America and Australia also accorded de facto recognition to the Republic. There were a number of expressions of sympathy and support for the Indonesian cause and, following the more blatantly aggressive Dutch acts, India, Burma, Ceylon, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia imposed sanctions against Holland¹. Having rejected offers of British, American and Australian good offices, Indonesia succeeded in obtaining United Nations intervention, although, despite communist, western and Asian-originated moves in the United Nations Security Council, this intervention did not prove effective until towards the end of the struggle². The turning point seems to have been reached with the resolution of the 1949 Inter-Asian Conference, expressing support for Indonesia and urging Security

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See the chronology in Indonesia 1961, pp.174-183 and Kahin, Nationalism & Revolution, p.400.

2

For a summary of the attitudes and actions of the chief participants in the United Nations moves on the Indonesian question, see Taylor, op. cit., pp.374-400. See also his discussion of the problems limiting the effectiveness of U.N. action, *ibid.*, pp.400-436. Kahin refers frequently to instances of U.N. ineffectiveness and Indonesian disappointment, in Kahin, Nationalism & Revolution, chapters VII-XII.

Council action¹, and with the decision of the United States to exert definite pressure on Holland to accept Indonesian independence². Despite the Indonesian compromises at the Round Table Conference, the greatest measure of the Republic's success was that it did achieve independence against heavy odds.

It was during the period of the struggle for independence that the foundations were laid for two important features of Indonesian foreign policy. Whilst the need for great power support was realised, the experience of Russian and American assistance left the Indonesians with no illusions as to the importance of self-interest in great power calculations. Despite verbal declarations of opposition to aggressive Dutch actions, the great powers and the United Nations largely

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For a summary of the most important items in the resolution, see Ray, op. cit., p.166 and Taylor, op. cit., p.188. See Taylor's tentative assessment of the impact of this resolution in *ibid.*, p.399 and Kahin's assessment in Kahin, Nationalism & Revolution, p.400.

2

See the discussion of this change in United States policy in Ray, op. cit., pp.175-176, Taylor, op. cit., pp.171 & 399-400 and Kahin, Nationalism & Revolution, pp.403-405, 415-421 & 432.

left the Republic to fend for itself¹. The alleged Russian involvement in the Madiun affair, American and British attempts to exert diplomatic pressure on the Republic at crucial points in negotiations and America's policy, until the final stages of the struggle, of indirectly assisting the Dutch cause through continuing aid to Holland without exerting any serious diplomatic pressure, left the Indonesians reluctant to rely on any one foreign power for support in safeguarding Indonesian independence and interests. The best course for Indonesia was therefore to adopt an independent active foreign policy that was non-aligned in the cold war and that sought assistance from both blocs, without relying entirely on either side, and giving no opportunity for foreign interference in Indonesian affairs.

Indonesia's success in gaining international support, particularly from Afro-Asian nations, verified the value of a good neighbour policy and, in particular,

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See Kahin's summary of the Indonesian assessment in Kahin (ed.), Major Governments, p.680. A similar but more detailed account may be found in Kahin, 'Indonesian Politics and Nationalism' in W.L. Holland (ed.), op. cit., pp.169-178. For further amplification, see Kahin, Nationalism & Revolution, Chapters VII-XIII and pp.477-478. Ray's account of the situation after the Renville Agreement is also interesting in this context. See Ray, op. cit., pp.151-155 & 158-160.

the value of seeking closer relations with Afro-Asian nations, with whom Indonesia was seen to have much in common. The independent active foreign policy and the good neighbour policy in both its general and Afro-Asian contexts thus became influential concepts in subsequent foreign policy phases, although both were ultimately overshadowed by other, more dynamic concepts.

This first phase of Indonesian foreign policy is fairly clearly identifiable, beginning and ending with dramatic events: the declaration of independence on 17 August 1945 and the Dutch recognition of Indonesian independence on 27 December 1949. Whilst there were arguments between different groups over the extent to which negotiation or force should be used to obtain Dutch recognition of independence and over the extent to which compromises should be made in negotiations, and whilst different governments adopted differing emphases in their methods of conducting the struggle for independence, the foreign policy of the period may, in general, be characterised as a judicious blending of negotiation and force, as firm on the principle that independence should be recognised but as conciliatory on the question of the terms of recognition.

The succeeding phases are not so clearly

differentiated and there is less agreement amongst Indonesians on what constitute the dividing points both in terms of time and characteristics.

(ii) 1950 -1959: The Liberal Democratic Period.

- Domestic Background to Foreign Policy.

With the transfer of Dutch sovereignty over the Netherlands East Indies to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (R.U.S.I.) on 27th December, 1949, the physical struggle for independence came to an end. International de jure recognition and admission to the United Nations¹ followed, establishing Indonesia as a full member of the international system. Independence had been acquired and the new Republic's leaders faced the tasks of promoting recovery from the protracted struggle against the Dutch and of using the newly acquired independence to build a modern, strong and

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There were some complications surrounding Indonesia's joining of the U.N. For details, see L.S. Finkelstein, 'Indonesia's record in the United Nations', in International Conciliation, No.475, November 1951, pp.519-524.

prosperous Indonesia¹.

In many ways, however, the phase beginning in 1950 represented a continuation of the preceding period. The struggle for independence was not entirely completed, since West Irian remained under Dutch control and this, together with the other compromises made in the Round Table Conference agreement, had resulted in less than the desired independence. This situation required a continuation of the struggle for independence, although the struggle was initially less intense, less desperate and less dramatic. Attempts at negotiation entirely replaced force and, for a time, relations with Holland improved. The first major success in the attempts to reverse the Round Table Conference compromises was the

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A detailed account of the way in which the leaders attempted to carry out these tasks and of the problems they encountered from 1949 to 1957 is provided in Feith, Decline. The period from 1957 to 1959 is covered more generally in that book. A useful supplement to the general coverage of the transition to Guided Democracy occurs in Herbert Feith, 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy' in McVey (ed.), Indonesia, pp.309 ff. See also Daniel S. Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959, Monograph Series, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, 1966, hereafter cited as Lev, Transition.

the dissolution in 1950 of the federal republic and the inauguration of a unitary state¹, although still without West Irian. The other compromises took longer to reverse.

The domestic political structure also resembled that of the preceding phase, since the adjustments made in November 1945 in the operation of the 1945 Constitution, adjustments which created a liberal democratic and multi-party system of government, were formalised in both the 1949 federal Constitution and the 1950 Provisional Constitution². In theory, this system was retained until the restoration of the 1945 Constitution in July, 1959, although from early 1957, the parliamentary system was in practice replaced in a series of moves that established Guided Democracy³.

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For details of the negotiations and problems encountered in achieving this change, see Kahin, Nationalism & Revolution, Chapter XIV, pp.446 ff. and Feith, Decline, Chapter II, pp.46 ff.

2

For a summary of the reasons for the adoption of western-type democracy after the acquisition of independence, see Feith, Decline, pp.43-45 & 328-335. See also Legge, Indonesia, pp.14 & 135-136.

3

This raises the question as to whether 1957-1959 should be classified as part of the liberal democratic phase or part of the phase of Guided Democracy. See footnote 2, p.379 below.

The problem of political instability was intensified following the acquisition of independence, partly reflecting the failure of the leaders to build a sense of national unity sufficiently strong to overcome the many social, political, ideological, religious, racial and regional divisions in Indonesian society¹. Such unity as had been forged in the ranks of the nationalist movement by the common desire for independence and the common opposition to Dutch rule tended to decline once the immediate threat of the reimposition of colonialism had been removed. The vague ideals of revolutionary nationalism were not able to provide a basis for consensus on the type of new society that was to be created. There were important differences amongst the elite and amongst the general political public on the detailed objectives to be pursued and on the methods and priorities to be adopted. The multi-party system and that of cabinet responsibility to parliament continued to reflect and perpetuate the divisions in Indonesia and party and factional bickering continued to produce short-

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For an account of these divisions, see, for example, Legge, Indonesia, Chapter I, Chapter V pp.102-111, Chapter VI pp.120-131 & Chapter VII pp.157-169.

lived, basically coalition governments¹. The effectiveness of government was further undermined by periodic differences between the cabinet and the President² and by disunity in the armed forces, with some elements in the military leadership openly defying and, in some instances, causing or contributing to the downfall of the government³. Instability might have been overcome or at

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See Appendix C, pp.C3-C5 below.

2

Except during the periods of the Sukiman, the first Ali Sastroamidjojo, the Djuanda and, to some extent, the 1949-50 Hatta cabinets, the cabinet could not rely on support from the President. In the case of the pre-1956 cabinets with which relations were strained, Sukarno's bids for independent status as a leader were resisted by the cabinets, the leaders of which saw the power of the President as limited by the 1950 Constitution. In addition, Sukarno's tendency to adopt a 'solidarity maker' stance in his speeches was incompatible with the cabinets' 'administrator' type approach. There were also disagreements over the type of strategy to be adopted on the West Irian problem. Under the second Ali cabinet, the main source of disagreement was the Prime Minister's refusal to include PKI representatives in the cabinet in accordance with Sukarno's suggestion. Relations were further strained from 1956 onwards by Sukarno's increasingly vocal criticism of the political parties and of the parliamentary system.

3

Apart from the defiance of the central government by regional commanders in the Outer Islands, beginning with army-supported smuggling, developing in 1956-1957 into regional military coups and culminating ultimately in 1957-1958 in the PRRI-Permista, there were also instances of defiance and attempts at direct political intervention by military leaders in and around Djakarta. Of these, the 'October 17' (1952) affair, the 'June 27th'

least reduced had the Masjumi and the PNI, a coalition of which was the most likely to produce a strong government, been able to co-operate more effectively. Such co-operation, however, became increasingly difficult to create and sustain as the moderate elements in the Masjumi and the more radical elements in the PNI grew in influence in their respective parties and adopted increasingly incompatible and hostile positions. Polarization of the political system around these two parties became more pronounced at the time of the campaign for the 1955 elections and the animosities engendered by the elections proved impossible to overcome¹.

(1955) affair, the attempted arrest of the Foreign Minister in August, 1956, and the moves in October and November, 1956, to organise a military coup to oust the Ali government and Nasution (the army's Chief of Staff) were the most important.

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The PKI's remarkable success in the 1955 elections revived attempts at a PNI-Masjumi coalition in an effort to exclude the PKI from the government. Whilst a government based primarily on a PNI-Masjumi coalition was successfully created (Ali's second cabinet) and whilst the PKI was excluded from this new cabinet, co-operation between the Masjumi and the PNI proved difficult to sustain, especially after Sukarno's enunciation of his Konsepsi increased both the ideological and the geographical polarization of Indonesian politics.

Not surprisingly, the wider political public and elements in the army grew increasingly dissatisfied with the political parties and with the parliamentary system¹, but dissatisfaction was largely held in check by the hope that national elections would end the factional bickering and would bring in a new era of political stability and effective government. The hopes were proved to be unfounded. When the elections were eventually held in September (for Parliament) and December (for the Constituent Assembly), 1955, the results, whilst simplifying the political party scene to some extent by establishing four parties² as the major

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For examples of the pre-election expressions of dissatisfaction with the parliamentary system, see Feith, Decline, pp.221-224, 255-256, 325-328, 401, 406-409 & 464. For a summary of the post-election development of anti-parliamentary sentiment, see *ibid.*, pp.509-514.

2

These were the PNI, the Masjumi, the NU and the PKI. The number of seats that each gained in the elections was as follows. These figures are taken from Indonesia 1961, pp.194 & 195.

<u>September Elections for Parliament (D.P.R.)</u>	<u>December Elections for the Constituent Assembly</u>
Total number of seats 257	Total number of seats 514
Seats won by PNI 57	Seats won by PNI 119
" " " Masjumi 57	" " " Masjumi 112
" " " NU 45	" " " NU 91
" " " PKI 39	" " " PKI 80
Remaining seats won by 24 minor parties.	Remaining seats won by minor parties.

contenders for parliamentary power, did not produce a basis for stable government. No one party emerged as possessing overwhelming support and the two most powerful parties turned out to be the Masjumi and the PNI which were becoming increasingly hostile to each other. The elections also revealed the growth in importance of the PKI.

The problem of stability was compounded by unrealistic social, political and economic aspirations and expectations which had been engendered during the struggle for independence and which were difficult if not impossible to bring to fruition in the infant Republic, inadequately prepared for independence and impoverished as a result of the Second World War and the struggle against the Dutch¹. The rewards expected

For a brief analysis of the significance of the September election results, see B. Grant, Indonesia, Melbourne University Press, 1964, p.30, and, on both elections, Wertheim, Society, pp.344-348. See also Feith, Decline, pp.434-437 & 449-450, and, for a more detailed analysis, H. Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, Ithaca, 1957.

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For an excellent summary of the contrast between aspirations and reality after the acquisition of independence, and of the political and administrative barriers to effective progress, see G. MCT. Kahin, 'Indonesia', in G. MCT. Kahin (ed.), Major Governments, pp.575-590.

after the successful completion of the struggle for independence proved more difficult to obtain than had been anticipated. Increasingly the blame for the failure to achieve the anticipated progress was placed on the parties and the parliamentary system, although optimism was sustained as the elections approached only to lead to further disillusionment when they failed to promote progress towards political stability and economic development.

One particular manifestation of dissatisfaction and unrest was the rise in anti-foreign, particularly anti-Dutch sentiment and radical nationalism in the wider political public. This development was especially fostered by frustration at the failure to reach a satisfactory solution to the West Irian problem, which assumed increasing importance in Indonesian politics, along with the associated problems of modifying the terms of the Round Table Conference agreements. Although until 1953 the government dissociated itself from this developing militant nationalism and tried to restrain it, it was in part encouraged by President Sukarno who, from late in 1950, advocated more extreme measures against the Dutch rather than a continuation of attempts at negotiation. Negotiation was clearly failing to

achieve the 'return' of West Irian.

Another serious manifestation of dissatisfaction, in this case reflecting important divisions in Indonesian society, was the continued and intensified phenomenon of insurrections¹, which gained varying degrees of foreign sympathy and support². These insurrections seriously weakened the government's authority, adding a new

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These insurrections primarily involved extremist Moslem elements, remnants of the various guerilla bands that had fought during the physical Revolution, regional dissidents and, in the later rebellions, pragmatists of pro-western, democratic sympathies, profoundly disturbed at the move towards centralism and to the left in the Republic's policies and leadership. The most important of the insurrections were the Westerling affair of 1950, the rebellions and guerilla activities from 1948 to 1962 backed by Darul Islam, a group of Muslim extremists demanding the creation of a Muslim state, and the PRRI-Permesta anti-Djakarta and anti-leftist rebellions in Sumatra and Sulawesi, which grew out of the regional unrest and coups of 1956-1957, reaching a climax in 1957-1958. Although the PRRI-Permesta was virtually suppressed within a few months, scattered resistance to the Djakarta regime was maintained until 1961.

2

Palmier is sceptical about this allegation, at least, when applied to the early insurrections. See L.H. Palmier, Indonesia and the Dutch, pp.85-89 & 93. On the other hand, the allegation seems to be accepted even by such relatively pro-western pragmatists as Soedjatmoko. See, for example, Soedjatmoko, 'II - Indonesia and the World', in Australian Outlook, Vol. 21, No.3, December, 1967, pp.290-291.

dimension to the already formidable problems of promoting stability and development. The problem of regional discontent was made the more serious because the mounting conflict between Djakarta and the Outer Islands became associated with the simultaneous polarization of the political system between the Sukarno-PNI-PKI elements on the one hand and the Hatta-Masjumi-PSI elements on the other. The tendency for the political-ideological polarization to assume a geographic character was already apparent in the results of the 1955 elections¹, but from 1956 onwards, as the political-ideological conflict at the centre heightened, as the Sukarno-PNI-PKI elements gained ascendancy in Djakarta and Java and as regional defiance of the Djakarta regime strengthened, the identification of the Masjumi-PSI elements with regional dissidents and rebels became more complete, contributing ultimately to the rejection of the Masjumi-PSI in national politics after the defeat of the regional rebels.

From 1950 to mid-1953, the moderate 'administrators' particularly of the Masjumi and the PSI

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See, for example, Feith, Decline, pp.436-437.

generally dominated the cabinets and, as a result, there was an emphasis on dealing pragmatically with domestic economic and administrative problems and on pursuing a moderate and gradualist course towards socialism. The hope was that national elections would be held at the earliest possible opportunity, resulting in the establishment of stable and democratic government and that, with foreign aid and investment, particularly from the west, economic recovery, development and industrialization would begin. Socialism and Indonesian control of the economy were amongst the declared ultimate objectives of the pragmatic 'administrators', but these aims were to be pursued through fostering the development of public, co-operative and private Indonesian enterprise, without hastily eradicating Indonesian or foreign capitalism, thereby avoiding economic dislocation.¹

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For a summary of the basic attitudes of the pragmatists on this matter, and of their opponents, see D.S. Paauw, 'From Colonial to Guided Economy' in R.T. McVey (ed.), Indonesia, pp.206-207. See also Kahin, 'Indonesian Politics and Nationalism', in Holland (ed.), op. cit., p.179 and Kahin, Nationalism & Revolution, pp.476-477. Kahin describes this broad consensus on immediate and intermediate objectives amongst non-communist members of the political elite as one favouring 'a mixed economy-co-operative, socialist and capitalist - with primary emphasis on the co-operative sector', *ibid.*, p.476.

As in the preceding phase Sukarno, as President, initially adjusted to the prevailing political situation and continued to co-operate with his Vice-President, Hatta, although this co-operation became more difficult to sustain and finally ended in 1956 with the latter's resignation from the Vice-Presidency.

During 1950, however, and increasingly thereafter, Sukarno began to play a more positive, independent, radical and, for the early, moderate cabinets, embarrassing role, particularly on the West Irian issue¹. In contrast to the predominantly 'administrator'-type posture of the early cabinets, Sukarno's speeches began to revert more conspicuously to his pre-war 'solidarity maker'-type approach as he identified more closely with the militant nationalism which the moderate elements in the government were trying to restrain². This development tended to undermine the authority of the 'administrators', whose position was further weakened

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Sukarno's position on West Irian is discussed on pp.387-390 below.

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The major exception was during the period of the Sukiman cabinet, when, apparently as part of his policy of supporting the cabinet, he also made a number of 'administrator'-type statements. See, for example, Feith, Decline, pp.215-216.

by three developments which occurred in 1952.

One development was the separation of the NU (Nahadatul Ulama) from the Masjumi, a move which served to split the major Muslim groups in the political arena and which ultimately weakened the position of the Masjumi vis-à-vis the PNI¹. Another was the PKI's remarkable recovery from their 1948 Madiun defeat and from their suppression under the Sukiman government in 1951. This recovery coincided with the adoption of a change in PKI tactics, involving a shift from the previous position of open opposition to the government to a strategy of qualified support for the government headed by Prime Minister Wilopo and, in particular, of support for the PNI and Sukarno². By the adoption of this new tactic, the PKI made what was to be a successful bid for respectability by associating itself more closely with the nationalist revolutionary symbolism supported by 'solidarity maker' elements in the PNI and expounded

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For an analysis of this development, see *ibid.*, pp.233-237.

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See Feith's analysis of this change in tactics, *ibid.*, pp.237-246.

by Sukarno. Thus began a Sukarno-PNI-PKI partnership¹, with occasional support from the NU. The third development was the 'October 17' affair of 1952². This affair, with undertones of a military coup, indicated dramatically that elements in the army leadership were dissatisfied with political parties and parliament and desired to interfere directly in politics. During an allegedly army organised anti-parliament demonstration, a predominantly 'administrator' element amongst the senior military officers³ demanded that the President should dissolve parliament, a demand which Sukarno refused to meet. This unsuccessful move by elements in the army leadership brought into the open internal military divisions and a growing rift between army groups and groups in parliament and in the cabinet. It was

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This was later to culminate in Sukarno's unsuccessful attempts in 1956 to create a 'four legged' government, i.e., a cabinet composed of the four main parties as revealed by the 1955 election results; the Masjumi, the NU, the PNI and the PKI. The other three parties were not, however, agreeable to the inclusion of the PKI.

2

For a brief explanation of this affair, see Wetheim, Society, P.349, and Grant, Indonesia, pp.71-73. For a fuller account, see Feith, Decline, pp.246-273.

3

Nasution, then Colonel Nasution, was prominent amongst this group.

followed by a series of regional clashes between military leaders supporting and opposing the instigators of the 'October 17' affair, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the army as an instrument for maintaining civil order at a time of mounting tension. The 'October 17' affair also led to the suspension of several top military leaders, including Nasution, and resulted in increased power within the army for 'solidarity maker' elements, reduced influence over cabinet policies on the part of the military leadership and a corresponding increase in Sukarno's influence.

The combined effect of the increased social unrest and radicalism amongst the general public, of the increasing estrangement between the PNI and the Masjumi and between the President and the more moderate cabinets, of the growing alliance between Sukarno, the PNI and the PKI and of the schisms in the army was to create a situation more favourable to the visionary, radical, nationalistic 'solidarity maker' approach advocated by Sukarno. The result was a shift in the distribution of power between the 'administrator' and 'solidarity maker' elements both in the army and in the political arena, a shift favouring the latter. This in turn favoured the PNI, the PKI and Sukarno in politics at the national

level. As the 'solidarity makers' rose in influence, the 'administrators', particularly as represented by the Masjumi and the PSI, were forced into opposition and ultimately into open defiance in the 1958 PRRI rebellion¹.

The change in political direction began with the appointment of the first Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet in mid-1953², although there was a brief reversal under the Burhanuddin Harahap government from August 1955 to March 1956. The change was reflected in the move away from pragmatism, in the government's increased use of nationalist symbols and identification with radical nationalist sentiment and in the new emphasis on Indonesianisation of the economy³, the latter being attempted at the cost of increased inflation,

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For brief accounts of the major events of the PRRI rebellion, see Feith, Decline, pp.585-588, Wertheim, Society, pp.360-362 and Kosut (ed.), op. cit., pp.65-71. For references to more detailed accounts of this rebellion, see Feith, Decline, p.588, footnote 51.

2

The Ali cabinet was not lacking in men with 'administrator'-type skills and attitudes, but it did contain more 'solidarity makers' than the cabinets of the previous phase. See Feith's comments on this aspect of the cabinet in Feith, Decline, pp.342-343.

3

For a review of the problems and effectiveness of Indonesianisation between 1953 and 1957, see *ibid.*, pp.564-566.

racketeering and artificial foreign exchange rates detrimental to export producers. Politicisation of the civil service and increased use of patronage also increased during this period, initially in favour of the PNI under the first Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet, then in favour of the Masjumi and its allies under the Burhanuddin Harahap cabinet. The long term effect was to establish more firmly the spoils system and government corruption as features of Indonesian parliamentary democracy, to the ultimate detriment of administrative efficiency and of the reputation of parliamentary government.

During the period of the second Ali cabinet from March, 1956, criticism from the army and from the general public became increasingly directed not only at the Ali cabinet but also at political parties, parliament and the parliamentary system as such¹. The general dissatisfaction with the existing system and the desire for stronger leadership was not new, but the intensity of these feelings increased rapidly under the second Ali cabinet. This development was encouraged and

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For details, see *ibid.*, pp.509-514 and Lev, Transition, p.11.

ultimately brought to a head by the President, who, from March, 1956, began to call with increased insistence for a more genuinely Indonesian system of government¹. In October and November, he urged more specifically that the political parties should be 'buried' in the interests of national unity and that a system of democracy with leadership, or Guided Democracy should be established. These suggestions served to widen the growing gap between Sukarno and Hatta, leading to the latter's resignation from the Vice-Presidency in December, 1956. This in turn aggravated the regional problem since it increased the dissatisfaction and apprehension of the regional leaders who were disturbed by the political trends in Djakarta. In February, 1957, Sukarno put forward his Konsepsi, which elaborated on his proposal for the introduction of Guided

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There was nothing new in Sukarno's rejection of western type parliamentary democracy. See pp.85-85 above. For an account of Sukarno's campaign against parliamentary democracy, see Legge, Indonesia, pp.144-146 and Feith, Decline, pp.515-520 & 538-544. See also Kahin, 'Indonesia', in Kahin (ed.), Major Governments, pp.623-626. Lev in Transition, pp.46-59 and Mintz, Mohammed, etc., pp.165-174 provide summaries of the major themes employed by Sukarno in his campaign for the introduction of Guided Democracy.

Democracy¹. Basically, this Konsepsi called for the creation of a gotong-rojong cabinet, representing all the major parties in parliament, including the PKI², and, in addition, called for the establishment of a National Council, chaired by Sukarno and based on representation of functional groups -- occupation, social, religious and regional. The Konsepsi received a mixed reception³. It was accepted by the PNI and the PKI and, in a modified form, by the NU, but was firmly opposed by Hatta, the Masjumi and the dissident groups outside Java⁴. As

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For a summary of the proposals in the Konsepsi, see Kahin, 'Indonesia', in Kahin (ed.), Major Governments, pp.624-625 & Feith, Decline, pp.541-542. Extracts from the Konsepsi are included in C.A. Buss (ed.), Southeast Asia and the World Today, pp.127-129.

2

This was essentially a variation on the rejected call for the creation of a 'four legged' cabinet to be composed of representatives of the four major parties (Masjumi, PNI, NU and PKI). See Legge, Indonesia, pp.15 & 145-146.

3

For details, see Feith, Decline, pp.543-546.

4

Regionally, one of the most important statements rejecting the President's Konsepsi was contained in the Charter of Common Struggle, announced in March, 1957, by the East Indonesian rebels, whose movement, as a result of their declaration, became known as the 'Permesta'. For details of their demands see Feith, Decline, pp.545-546. This development was followed in February 1958 by the proclamation of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) after a number of Masjumi and PSI leaders joined the rebels. So began the PRRI

frustration, unrest and political tension mounted, the Ali cabinet resigned in March, 1957. This resignation marked the beginnings of the transition from parliamentary democracy to Guided Democracy¹.

During the second Ali cabinet's period in office, what had occurred was what Feith diagnoses as a collapse of the system of legitimacy combined with the development of a power vacuum, manifested in the growing 'discrepancy between claimed authority and actual power'². Those who claimed authority lacked the power to exercise it effectively and lacked the legitimacy or moral authority to command the support of those into whose hands power was increasingly passing. Parliamentary democracy as practised in Indonesia had failed to create the necessary political framework for national unity,

rebellion. For an overall account of the development of regional dissidence culminating in the PRRI rebellion, see Palmier, Indonesia and the Dutch, pp.160-166.

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See p. 379 below, footnote 2.

2

Feith, Decline, p.549. For details of his analysis of developments during the period of the Ali cabinet, see *ibid.*, pp.549-555. For a more general review of the crisis in legitimacy from 1953 to 1957, see *ibid.*, pp. 572-578.

political stability and economic and social progress¹. It had also become increasingly associated with corruption and manipulation on behalf of vested interests. The liberal democratic system, parliament and the parties that had been closely associated with parliamentary government were therefore largely discredited. The earlier desire for a new system of government with stronger leadership, a desire which had waned at the time of the approaching elections, was rekindled with greater strength than ever. In place of parliament and the political parties, grouped chiefly around the poles of the PNI and the Masjumi, three new centres of power emerged in national politics: the President, the army and the PKI. In addition, there were the regional military-civilian dissidents who, until mid-1958, were important

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For a brief discussion of some of the major causes of this failure and of the consequent reasons for the abandonment of parliamentary democracy, see Kahin, 'Indonesia', in Kahin (ed.), Major Governments, pp.626-635. See also Feith 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy' in McVey (ed.), Indonesia, pp.322-324, Wertheim, Society, pp.340-342 and J.M. Pluvier, Confrontations: A Study in Indonesian Politics, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1965, pp.31-37. For a more detailed analysis, see Feith, Decline, Chapters VII and XI, especially pp.597-608. Benda's comments in reviewing Decline are pertinent. See H.J. Benda, 'Democracy in Indonesia', in The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. XXIII, No.3, May 1964, especially pp.452-455.

competitors in the struggle for power and legitimacy¹. All possessed an increasing amount of power², all claimed legitimacy and moral authority in contrast to those who had become associated with corruption and ineffective government and all had been held back from pursuing what they considered to be their legitimate aims by the restraints imposed by the parliamentary system of government and its manipulators.

Under the second Ali cabinet, Sukarno had successfully adopted an increasingly independent 'solidarity maker' role, enhancing his stature as a revolutionary leader and building up a new basis for political support

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Prior to the defeat of the regional rebels, the pattern of rivalry and conflict was complicated. Lev describes the general situation, in Transition, p.44 as one of conflicts 'between Java and the outer islands, between the PNI-PKI and Masjumi, between Soekarno and Hatta, and between Nasution and the dissident colonels'. Before the PRRI rebellion, the alliances were Sukarno, the PNI, the PKI and the NU (taking a middle position) versus the Masjumi, the PSI, the Christian parties and allied groups, with the army divided between the two camps. After the rebels were virtually defeated in 1958, the dominant alliance had become Sukarno-army leaders versus the political parties (loc. cit.). The PKI, however, complicated this pattern because of its co-operation with Sukarno.

2

The power of the regional dissidents was different from that of the other competitors, since it was in the form of local power, sufficient to resist the central government's ability to impose its will within the areas controlled by the dissidents.

independent of parliament and of the dominant parties in the cabinet¹. As a long-standing critic of western parliamentary democracy², and, of greater immediate relevance, as an increasingly vocal critic from 1956, Sukarno was able to dissociate himself from the failures of the liberal democratic system, the more so since, in its final stages, he had emerged as a political figure in his own right. His new power base was founded on 'the youth' or 'the 1945 generation', as represented by a group of basically non-party revolutionaries whose associations were not with the dominant parties of the parliamentary and cabinet system but with radical nationalism, and, in so far as they had affiliations, with the Partai Murba, the PKI, youth groups and veteran groups. These were basically 'solidarity makers', whose skills lay in their effectiveness 'as political organizers and communicators of political symbols'³.

Elements in the army had long shown an interest in

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For details, see Feith, Decline, pp.514-517.

2

See pp.84-85 above.

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Feith, Decline, p.157.

interfering in politics¹, an interest manifested in periodic antagonisms between the army leadership and the cabinets and, more dramatically, in such defiant acts as the 'October 17' affair (1952), the 'June 27' affair (1955)², the attempt to arrest the foreign minister in August, 1956³, attempts at a coup in Djakarta in October-November, 1956⁴ and the regional coups of 1956-1957⁵. This interest sprang partly from a sense of

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At times of good relations between the army leadership and the cabinet, direct interference was not necessary, but, after the 'October 17' affair of 1952, the basis for military-cabinet co-operation was undermined. See Feith's summary of army-cabinet relations, *ibid.*, pp.571-572 and Wertheim's summary of the attempts at increased political influence by military cliques from 1952 to 1957 in Wertheim, Society, pp.349-351. Lev regards the conflict between civilian and military leaders as one of the major factors paving the way for Guided Democracy. See Lev, Transition, pp.4-10.

2

For details of this 'affair', see Grant, Indonesia, p.73 (there called the 'July 27th affair') and Feith, Decline, pp.394-409.

3

See Feith, Decline, p.503.

4

For the background to these moves, see *ibid.*, pp.500-507.

5

For an account of developments leading up to these coups, see *ibid.*, pp.487-500 and for an account of the coups themselves, *ibid.*, pp.520-538. See also Palmier, Indonesia and the Dutch, pp.160-164.

guardianship¹ which in turn was derived from the important role of military groups in the physical Revolution, and in part from army dissatisfaction with the general record of parliamentary governments and with specific political interference in army affairs in such matters as the appointment of senior officers. Under the second Ali cabinet, army criticism of the existing system mounted² at the same time as did criticism from other sources, but there was no consensus on the type of solution to be reached to the growing political crisis.

Whilst faced with hostility from some army elements, Major General Nasution, once again Army Chief of Staff, attempted, with the backing of his supporters amongst the General Staff officers in Djakarta, to mediate between the regional dissidents and the central government³. When his efforts to bring Sukarno and Hatta together to discuss the situation failed, he negotiated a basis for co-operation with the President. The result was that, when the Ali cabinet resigned, a state of martial law

1 e.g., see *ibid.*, pp.208-9, 406.

2 For examples of army attitudes at this time, see *ibid.*, pp.512-514 & 522-523.

3 See *ibid.*, pp.546-548.

('War and Siege') was declared throughout the country, thereby providing a legal basis for increased military participation in political affairs at both the regional and national levels. This helped for a time to relieve the tension between the military-led regional dissidents and the civilian central government and also increased the status and power of the central army leadership, providing a framework conducive to army initiative in attempting to solve the problem of regional defiance of the central government. Nevertheless, the regional problem came to a head in February, 1958 with the outbreak of the PRRI rebellion, but the army leadership's effective suppression of the rebels added to its already increased status. As a result of the imposition of martial law and the subsequent victory against the PRRI, the army was effectively reunited and was established as a force to be reckoned with in Indonesian politics¹.

During the period 1953 to 1957, the PKI had grown

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For examples of the way in which the army and its central leadership increased its power during 1957-1958, see *ibid.*, p.589 and Wertheim, Society, p.364. For a more elaborate analysis of this development, see Lev, Transition, pp.59-74 & 182-201.

rapidly in strength¹, overcoming the stigma resulting from the Madiun rebellion, increasing membership of the party and of its front organizations² and effectively developing its association with the symbolism of revolutionary nationalism. The extent of its gains in popularity was indicated in the 1955 election results and, so far as Java was concerned, even more dramatically in the 1957 provincial elections³. Despite its electoral success under liberal democracy, however, unlike the other major parties, the PKI was neither committed ideologically to parliamentary democracy, nor was it associated with the failures of the existing system. Although it had adopted the strategy of supporting the PNI, it had also supported the President

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For a brief account of the PKI's recovery and rise in influence, see Kahin, 'Indonesia' in Kahin (ed.), Major Governments, pp.617-618 and Mintz, Mohammed etc., pp.143-156. For a fuller discussion of this phenomenon in the context of the inter-party conflict of 1957, see Lev, Transition, Chapter III, especially pp.75-105.

2

See, for example, Feith, Decline, pp.407-408 and Grant, Indonesia, p.62.

3

See Feith, Decline, p.582. For an analysis of the election results as a measure of the PKI's increasing strength, see D.Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951-1963, University of California Press, Berkeley & Los Angeles, 1966, pp.222-229. This book will hereafter be cited as Hindley, PKI.

and, more important, it had been excluded from participation in the cabinet. Its reputation was therefore unaffected by the wave of anti-party sentiment. Of the major parties, the PKI was thus the one best placed to benefit from the growing chaos in the final stages of the Ali cabinet's period of office¹. Its strength was increased by its activities in support of the central government against the regional dissidents and by its strong backing given to Sukarno and his Konsepsi. Although the PNI and, with some hesitation, the NU joined the pro-Sukarno bandwagon, the PKI had established itself as a valuable and virtually indispensable ally for Sukarno.

The above three major political forces, the President and his '1945 generation' supporters, the army central leadership, and the PKI were united at least in a negative sense. They were critical of the political parties and the existing political system, they desired a change away from the weak, corrupt, divided and ineffective leadership provided by these parties and

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See Feith's assessment of the PKI's situation at this time and his account of PKI tactics, Feith, Decline, pp.540-541, 543 & 548.

they were opposed to the demands of the regional rebels¹. On the other hand, they all shared a desire for greater power which brought them into a competitive relationship. There was also a considerable degree of suspicion and even animosity between the army and the PKI. In a sense, the subsequent political developments in Indonesia represent the working out of this triangular competition, leading ultimately to victory for the army.

The government of Ali Sastroamidjojo was succeeded in April, 1957, by an 'emergency, extra-parliamentary cabinet', chosen by Sukarno, following two unsuccessful attempts by the new chairman of the PNI to form a new cabinet. Djuanda, a non-party leader, was the new Prime Minister, heading a basically business cabinet².

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The opposition to the demands of the regional dissidents was more complete in the case of the PKI and Sukarno, but the central army leadership was also opposed to the regionalists in the sense that, although, until the outbreak of the PRRI rebellion, a compromise was regarded as acceptable, the demands of the rebels as they stood were not. Once the PRRI rebellion had begun, however, compromise with the rebels became unacceptable even to the central army leadership.

2

i.e., a cabinet composed of leaders chosen primarily for their ability rather than as party representatives.

rather than a coalition cabinet, although most ministers were members of parties¹ and the PNI and NU formed the basis of the cabinet². This cabinet in theory presided over the transition to Guided Democracy, remaining in office until July, 1959³, when the 1945 Constitution was reinstated and a new cabinet with Sukarno as Prime Minister was formed. In practice, cabinet and parliament declined in importance in decision-making and in legitimising. Conferences of army commanders, influential as a result of the imposition of martial law, and the National Council⁴, created between May and July

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For an account of the negotiations leading to the formation of this cabinet and an analysis of its composition, see Feith, Decline, pp.578-580 and Lev, Transition, pp.18-23.

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See Feith, 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy', in McVey (ed.), Indonesia, p.320.

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It was, however, reshuffled in May, 1958, bringing in the first regular army officer in the role of a minister. See Feith, Decline, p.589. For the background to the reshuffle and further details, see Lev, Transition, pp.146-160.

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For an account of its composition and an assessment of its importance, see ibid., pp.580-581. See also Roeslan Abdulgani's account of its operation in 'Indonesia's National Council: The First Year', in Far Eastern Survey XXVII, July 1958, pp.97-104. This article also appears in Abdulgani, Pantjasila, pp.181-206. Lev, in Transition, pp.23-28 also provides an analysis of its composition and functions.

1957, largely usurped the functions of cabinet and parliament. The creation of the latter was a major step towards the implementation of Sukarno's Konsepsi. The other important element in the President's 1957 proposals, that of creating a gotong-rojong cabinet which would include representatives of the PKI, was not, however, implemented, although the communists did have some influence through two ministers who were allegedly PKI sympathisers¹.

The virtual defeat of the PRRI in June, 1958, after which its threat was reduced to sporadic guerilla warfare proportions, left effective competition for power and legitimacy to Sukarno, the army and the PKI². Parliamentary political parties were by this time peripheral to the centres of power. Of the three dominant political forces, Sukarno and the army were initially the most

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Feith in Decline, p.580, points out that two non-party ministers were PKI sympathisers and two others were Murba sympathisers. Lev, in Transition, pp.21-22 is, however, sceptical of this view.

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The defeat of the PRRI not only removed the regional dissidents from the political scene, but also resulted in the discrediting of those individuals and groups which had sympathised with the regionalist cause, e.g., Hatta, the Masjumi, the PSI and anti-Sukarno officer groups in the army. See Feith, Decline, pp.588-589. For a more detailed analysis, see Lev, Transition, Chapter IV.

important, at least in terms of power, if not legitimacy¹. They formed a co-operative but, at the same time competitive partnership, controlling an increasingly authoritarian system of government². The defeat of the PRRI rebels also removed effective opposition to the implementation of Sukarno's Guided Democracy proposals. The three dominant political groups, together with the PNI and, with some reservations, the NU, were agreed on

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After mid-1958, when the PRRI rebellion ceased to be important, the PKI lost much of its influence, partly because domestic and international communist support against the rebels was no longer necessary and partly because the U.S. successfully attempted a rapprochement with Indonesia. The PKI had also been rather too conspicuously successful and had aroused fears and animosities particularly on the part of the PNI and, more important, among elements in the army. Sukarno, however, restrained the anti-communist efforts of elements in the army, lest the reaction should go too far, thereby jeopardising Sukarno's power vis-à-vis the army. For details, see Feith, Decline, pp.589-591 and Lev, Transition, pp.142-144.

2

The nature of this partnership will be discussed in the context of Guided Democracy, pp.458-474 below. For present purposes, the most important aspect of the partnership was that Sukarno was left the virtual monopoly over the formulation of ideology and was the dominant force in foreign policy making. See Feith, 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy' in McVey (ed.), Indonesia, pp.327-328.

principle to the introduction of Guided Democracy and the trend towards stronger leadership appeared to be supported by the broader political public. The important debate from mid-1958 was no longer on whether Guided Democracy should be adopted but on the methods for and details of its implementation. The government eventually accepted the proposal, from a conference of military commanders, that Guided Democracy should be implemented by returning to the 1945 Constitution. The Constituent Assembly, which had failed to reach agreement after almost four years of argument over the basis for a new constitution¹, was unable to produce the necessary majority to endorse the government's suggestion that the 1945 Constitution be reinstated. The issue was resolved on 5th July, 1959, by Presidential Decree. The 1945 Constitution was restored and the Constituent

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The 1950 Constitution had been regarded as provisional, but work on the production of a permanent constitution had been thwarted, primarily because of the fundamental conflict between the Muslims and the secularists, i.e., between those who demanded the creation of an Islamic state and those who advocated a secular state based on Pantja Sila. For details, see Lev, Transition, pp.257-277.

Assembly was dissolved¹. Parliamentary democracy was thus formally abolished and in its place Guided Democracy was instituted.

From the above account of the domestic background to foreign policy, three phases of the liberal democratic period emerge: the first, from 1950 to mid-1953, during which the 'administrators' and moderates largely dominated, the second, from mid-1953 to 1957, during which the more radical 'solidarity makers' tended to dominate, and the third, from 1957 to 1959, during which the system of parliamentary democracy was replaced by that of Guided Democracy², dominated by Sukarno, the

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For a brief account of these developments, see Feith, 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy' in McVey (ed.), Indonesia, pp.358-361. For a fuller account, see Lev, Transition, Chapters V and VI. The text of the presidential decree is contained in Indon. Rev., pp.121-122.

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For this reason, this period could be regarded as the beginning of Guided Democracy as well as the end of parliamentary democracy and would therefore be as well classified under the next major phase as under this one. Lev in Transition, Kahin in his section on Indonesia in Kahin (ed.), Major Governments and Feith in Decline make such a classification. Feith writing on Indonesia in Kahin (ed.), Governments and Politics treats 1958 as a major turning point, marking the beginning of an 'authoritarian social order'. I have chosen the formal restoration of the 1945 Constitution and the enunciation of the Political Manifesto in 1959 as the major dividing point and have therefore classified the period 1957 to 1959 under the phase of liberal democracy.

army and the PKI. During the first two phases, those of parliamentary democracy proper, the political parties, initially the more moderate ones, later the more radical nationalist ones, were dominant in the decision-making process. During the third phase, the political parties, with the exception of the PKI, were no longer of significance.

- Foreign Policy : 1950-1959.

In general terms, Indonesian foreign policy of the period of liberal democracy may be regarded both as a continuation of and as a gradual development away from the policies of the preceding phase. Independence remained an important concern but, once the unitary Republic had been created and recognised and had formally entered the international system, the preoccupation with gaining independence was replaced by an attempt to exercise, maintain and safeguard independence, without initially resorting to extremist policies. The only outstanding and immediately Indonesian colonial problem was that of West Irian and it was hoped in government circles that this area would soon be 'returned' to Indonesia as a result of the negotiations for which provision was made in the Round Table Conference agreements. As part of the attempt to exercise Indonesian

independence, diplomatic representation was expanded and Indonesia's representatives began to play an active, though not an obsessively leading part in world affairs.

Indonesia's foreign policy of the liberal democratic phase may best be described as predominantly an independent foreign policy and a good neighbour policy, aimed at relieving world tensions, promoting world peace and cultivating friendly relations with as many countries as possible, in order to create an international and regional situation conducive to Indonesian recovery and development and in order to attract the aid and trade necessary for the promotion of domestic prosperity. There were, however, some important changes, at least in emphasis, as the foreign policy developed during this period. For this reason, the period of liberal democracy is best sub-divided into three phases, corresponding to the phases suggested above for domestic political developments:

1950-1953: independent foreign policy, low posture, pro-western.

1953-1957: independent foreign policy, assertive, Afro-Asian emphasis.

1957-1959: independent foreign policy, defiant, anti-western.

1950-1953

Given the dominance of the 'administrator' group amongst the decision makers from 1950 to 1953, it is not surprising that Indonesian foreign policy during this period tended to be pro-western in the application of the independent active principle and the good neighbour policy. This 'administrator' group largely admired western, pragmatic, problem-solving values and saw western aid as the most effective means to solve Indonesia's problems, particularly those of economic recovery and development which were generally given a high policy priority. Besides, the cultivation of good relations with the west and with Holland in particular, was thought likely to facilitate a peaceful and satisfactory solution to the West Irian problem, the major undesirable legacy from the Round Table Conference. Western economic aid was eagerly sought¹ and the return

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e.g., under the Hatta cabinet, a \$100 million Export-Import Bank loan and a \$37.7 million loan from the Netherlands were negotiated as well as an agreement to receive approximately \$5 million of military aid from America for police equipment. See Feith, Decline, p.85, footnote 63, citing Raymond E. Stannard, The Role of American Aid in Indonesia-American Relations, M.A. thesis, Cornell University, 1957, pp.1-5 and 25.ff. W.A. Hanna, however, stresses a cautious approach to foreign aid on the part of the early post-independence

of pre-war foreign enterprises, as well as the attraction of new foreign investment, were welcomed and encouraged. The expansion of Indonesia's diplomatic representation reflected the pro-western emphasis, the prime exception being the early establishment of diplomatic relations with Communist China in 1950-51.

The pro-western emphasis in Indonesian foreign policy from 1950 to 1953 was not unchecked and there were ample precedents for the subsequent policies that were to develop during the next foreign policy phase. The above emphasis essentially occurred within the framework of an independent foreign policy, rather than as part of a policy of alliance with the west. Thus, the pro-western emphasis in the pattern of Indonesia's diplomatic representation was balanced by the establishment of diplomatic relations with the major non-committed countries and, in international collaboration, Indonesia's

governments of Hatta and Natsir and points out that the Indonesian Government did not draw heavily on the above loan, nor did it 'exhibit any particular eagerness to implement the assistance programme [for U.S., economic and technical aid, concluded in October 1950]'. See W.A. Hanna, Bung Karno's Indonesia, Part XIX, p.3.

closest ally was India¹. Indonesia's independent and non-western stance in world affairs was particularly apparent on cold war issues and on issues involving colonialism. In 1950, for example, at the Baguio Conference, Indonesia firmly rejected the proposal to form an anti-communist bloc of Southeast Asian nations², a rejection which was revived during the subsequent foreign policy phase in Indonesia's refusal to join SEATO and in Indonesian criticism of the SEATO concept. On colonialism, Indonesian statements expressing sympathy for anti-colonialist movements, for example, those in Indo-China, Malaya and North Africa, ran counter to the pro-western emphasis in foreign policy, as did Indonesia's activities in the United Nations in support of colonial

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For a summary of the extent and origins of Indonesia's early good relations with India, see J.M. van der Kroef, Indonesia in the Modern World, Part II, Masa Baru, Bandung, 1956, pp.367-368.

2

The final resolution of this conference placed it more in the context of emerging Pan-Asianism, later to become Afro-Asianism, than anti-communism. See the 'Final Act of the Baguio Conference of 1950, Resolution', Appendix IV, pp.198-201 of S.L. Poplai (ed.), Asia and Africa in the Modern World: Basic Information Concerning Independent Countries, Asian Relations Organization/Asia Publishing House, Bombay & Calcutta, 1955.

peoples¹.

In the United Nations, the Indonesian delegation appeared to be directing its activities primarily towards three basic purposes: promoting the peaceful settlement of international disputes, encouraging negotiation between the great powers on cold war issues and supporting colonial peoples². In these endeavours, Indonesia did not follow the lead of the west or, for that matter, of the communist bloc, when to do so was seen to run counter to the above basic objectives. On the Korean war issue, for example, Indonesia took an active part in collaboration with other Afro-Asian nations in attempting to promote the use of United Nations machinery to bring

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Indonesia's attitude on the Indo-China issue in particular brought it into sharp conflict with American policy. See Kahin, 'Indonesian Politics and Nationalism' in Holland (ed.), op. cit., pp.174-175. For further details of Indonesia's early attitudes and actions on colonial issues, see Mintz, Mohammed, etc., pp.103-107, van der Kroef, Indonesia in the Modern World, Part II, pp.364-367 and Finkelstein, op. cit., pp.535 & 536-539.

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This is Finkelstein's assessment of Indonesia's basic purposes in the U.N. See Finkelstein, op. cit., p.541.

about a speedy cease-fire and peace settlement¹.

Indonesia did not, however, support the move to place an embargo on the shipment of strategic materials to Communist China², the attempt to brand Communist China as the aggressor in Korea³ or the western moves countering attempts to accord a measure of recognition to Communist China in the United Nations⁴.

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Indonesia's activities on the Korean war issue are summarised in van der Kroef, Indonesia in the Modern World, Part II, pp.360-361. See also Feith, Decline, p.176 and Kahin's account of Indonesian attitudes on U.S. policy in the Korean war in Kahin, 'Indonesian Politics and Nationalism in Holland (ed.)', op. cit., pp.175-177. Finkelstein, op. cit., pp.527-532, provides a more detailed account of Indonesia's early activities in the U.N. on the Korean issue. See also his summary of Indonesia's voting pattern, *ibid.*, pp.542-546. For a summary of the Indonesian governments attitude before joining the U.N., see *ibid.*, p.518.

2

Indonesia abstained on this resolution but subsequently agreed in principle to observe the embargo. See Finkelstein, op. cit., p.530.

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Indonesia again abstained. See *ibid.*, pp.529 & 544. It is interesting to note that Indonesia also failed to support the Russian complaint concerning U.S. aggression against China. See *ibid.*, pp.532 & 543.

4

Indonesia abstained on the resolutions seeking to delay consideration of the question of Communist China's admission to the U.N., but supported the moves to have Communist China represented on the proposed committee to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the Korean war and also supported the attempt to have the Mao government represented at the discussion of Soviet complaints of U.S. aggression against China. See *ibid.*, pp.530-532.

By and large, the Hatta cabinet set the tone for foreign policy of the first phase of liberal democracy: a policy of independent but moderate participation in world affairs, one devoid of aggressive, revolutionary postures or bids for world leadership, a tendency to court the favour of the western world and, in relations with Holland, a preference for negotiation rather than agitation or threats as the means to obtain a satisfactory solution to the problems arising from the Round Table Conference agreements.

By mid-1950, the West Irian problem had become an important public issue in Indonesia and various committees and organizations were formed to mount an increasingly active verbal campaign directed against the Dutch and demanding the 'return' of West Irian to the Republic. President Sukarno was also active in this

and van der Kroef, Indonesia in the Modern World, Part II, p.361. For a summary of Indonesian notes in the U.N. on the China question, reflecting the trend towards increasingly conspicuous support of Communist China from 1951 to 1963, see A.C. Brackman, 'The Malay World and China: Partner or Barrier?' in A.M. Halpern (ed.), Policies Toward China: Views from Six Continents, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1965, p.505.

campaign¹. As December, 1950² approached, without any signs that negotiations with the Dutch authorities would prove successful, Indonesian animosity towards the Dutch increased rapidly. The signs indicated, quite correctly, that growing inflexibility on the part of the Dutch government would render the strategy of negotiation ineffective as a means to a quick solution. Whilst the West Irian problem acted as a rallying cause for Indonesian unity, the growing mass solidarity behind the campaign for the return of West Irian hampered the government in its attempts to reach a solution by moderate diplomatic methods. More seriously, it accentuated splits amongst the political elite which was divided in the intensity of commitment accorded to acquiring West Irian, on the priority allocated to this objective and on the question of the extent to which negotiation or force should be used as a strategy.

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See, for example, the lengthy quotation from Sukarno's speech of 17/8/1950, in G.McT. Kahin, 'Indonesian Politics and Nationalism' in W.L. Holland (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp.165-166.

2

This was the time by which, under the terms of the Round Table Conference agreements, a negotiated solution was to be achieved.

The Natsir cabinet, like the Hatta cabinet, having an 'administrator' approach, attempted to use diplomatic negotiation, whilst restraining domestic agitation against the Dutch. The hope was that this issue could be resolved without creating a serious breach in Indonesian-Netherlands relations. The Natsir cabinet was hampered in this endeavour by the President's championing of the opposing strategy of mass action and threats of force. Natsir's task was made more difficult because of Dutch inflexibility and because mounting public anti-Dutch sentiment and heated arguments in parliament between the parties and the factions limited the extent to which the Indonesian Government could compromise in the negotiations. As the deadline for a solution drew near, the President became more estranged from the cabinet by his suggestion that the Round Table Conference agreements should be unilaterally abrogated and that pressure should be brought to bear on Dutch business interests in Indonesia. The cabinet successfully defeated these proposals, but faced increasing agreement in parliament that the Netherlands-Indonesian Union should be liquidated and that the Round Table agreements should be modified, although the critics of government policy were by no means united on the extent to which changes should

be made or on the methods to be used.

Despite these problems and pressures, largely arising from the West Irian dispute, the Natsir cabinet succeeded in continuing the moderate, low posture, relatively pro-western foreign policy initiated by the Hatta cabinet. Internationally, there were also occasional pressures to move more closely into the U.S.-led cold war camp, but these pressures were resisted because of the well established principle that Indonesian foreign policy should be independent. Feith sums up the position under the Natsir cabinet as follows: 'Thus the cabinet's characteristic foreign policy position was one of warding off U.S. pressures and cautiously selecting from a range of U.S. offers of aid'¹.

Under the Sukiman cabinet, the pro-western tendency in Indonesia's independent foreign policy became more conspicuous, ultimately becoming so pronounced that the apparent abandonment of the independent foreign policy played an important part in toppling the government. This development paralleled the Sukiman cabinet's vigorous anti-communist drive domestically. The most

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Feith, Decline, p.175. For examples of this approach, see ibid., pp.175-6.

obvious parallel was in the Indonesian Government's attitude to the Communist Chinese Embassy which was suspected of fomenting and assisting communist subversive activity in Indonesia. A number of crises occurred in Djakarta-Peking relations as a result of Chinese provocation and Indonesian sensitivities and suspicions¹.

The more important pro-western developments in Indonesian foreign policy were those that appeared positively to bring Indonesia into the American sphere of influence. The first was the decision to be represented at the San Francisco Japanese Peace Treaty Conference, despite India's and Burma's announcements that they did not intend to send delegates². This decision and the subsequent signature of the treaty sparked off a heated debate as to whether the government was betraying the principle of an independent foreign policy, since the San Francisco conference and the treaty were seen as

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See Feith's summary of these crises, *ibid.*, pp.192-193. See also Kahin, 'Indonesian Politics and Nationalism' in Holland (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp.172-173 for a summary of Indonesian attitudes towards China.

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See Feith's account of the arguments over this decision in Feith, *Decline*, pp.193-197. See also Kahin, 'Indonesian Politics and Nationalism' in Holland (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp.191-192.

dictated by U.S. strategic interests. This argument split the two largest political parties, the Masjumi and the PNI, although the government survived, largely because the PNI was reluctant to precipitate a cabinet collapse on this issue. This pro-western development was climaxed, during the Foreign Minister's visit to America for the conference, by his apparently successful discussion aimed at obtaining American agreement to provide economic and technical aid even though Indonesia was trading with communist countries. He also paid a highly successful visit to Australia on his return journey to Indonesia.

Whilst under the Sukiman cabinet good relations with the west reached an unusually high level, relations with Holland deteriorated as a result of the impasse on the West Irian problem¹. Protests and demands for

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Provocations by each side also played a part in increasing animosity. In November 1951, as part of a revision of the Netherlands Constitution, it was proposed that the words 'Netherlands New Guinea' be inserted in the clause defining the territory of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. In December, as a result of a raid by Indonesian authorities on two Dutch ships in Djakarta harbour, arms destined for West Irian were seized. See R.C. Bone, Jr., The Dynamics of the Western New Guinea (Irian Barat) Problem, Interim Reports Series, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, 1958, pp.113-114.

action against Dutch interests in Indonesia once again increased, creating a situation similar to that prevailing towards the end of the Natsir cabinet, but, in many ways, Sukiman's problem was more serious, since his cabinet was itself divided between the different opinions held by the PNI and Masjumi elements represented in the cabinet.

The crucial issue that eventually brought about the downfall of the Sukiman cabinet was the secret agreement between the Foreign Minister, Subardjo, and the U.S. Ambassador, Cochran, for Indonesia to accept aid under the terms of the United States' Mutual Security Act¹. This move, when it was made public a month later, caused uproar, since the acceptance of aid on these conditions was seen to compromise Indonesia's independence in foreign policy. It is not clear that the acceptance of Mutual Security aid, especially on its economic and technical as opposed to its military forms, would have necessarily committed Indonesia to support

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The relevant sections of this act are quoted in Feith, Decline, p.199. The detailed account of the storm which the Subardjo-Cochran agreement provoked may be found ibid., pp.198-207. See also Kahin 'Indonesian Politics and Nationalism in Holland (ed.)', op. cit., pp.192-195.

American policies, but the agreement was, nevertheless, seen as involving too great a sacrifice of the principle of independence in foreign policy. The pro-western trend had gone too far to maintain an adequate appearance of consensus and support¹. Ratification of this agreement and of the Japanese Peace Treaty proved impossible to obtain.

The pro-western trend in the Sukiman cabinet's foreign policy did not lead to a drastic reaction when the Wilopo cabinet assumed office. The latter gave foreign policy a low priority in its programme, subordinating foreign policy considerations to those of the domestic situation, particularly to matters relating to economic development. The new government, like its predecessors, favoured the attraction of foreign aid and investment and announced that it would attempt to negotiate a new agreement with America for economic and technical aid, although military aid would not be sought or accepted. Balancing this indication of a continued pro-western interpretation of the independent foreign policy, was the consideration given to opening diplomatic

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See footnote 1, p. 289 above.

relations with the U.S.S.R., for which inconclusive preliminary negotiations had been conducted in April, 1950, while the Hatta government was still in office. The parliamentary decision in April, 1952, supporting, for ideological and practical reasons, the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with Russia, widened the split between the PNI and the Masjumi, the latter threatening to withdraw its ministers if and when the cabinet decided to establish a Moscow embassy. On relations with Holland, the government resisted the pressures for the unilateral abrogation of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union and favoured a resumption of negotiations on this matter and on the issues of the acquisition of West Irian and the modification of the Round Table Conference agreements. Despite the growth in anti-Dutch and anti-foreign feeling in Indonesia and despite the increasing strength in Indonesian politics of the 'solidarity makers' as opposed to the 'administrators', the Wilopo cabinet continued with basically the same type of foreign policies as its predecessors. 1953-1957.

Of the domestic political developments beginning during the preceding phase and accelerating after the appointment of the first Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet, one

of the most significant for the future trend in Indonesian politics and in Indonesian foreign policy was the increase in radical nationalism, reflecting the growing influence of the 'solidarity makers'. Nationalist sentiment was not, of course, new, but, whereas previous post-independence governments, in contrast to the President acting independently, had tended to restrain militant nationalism, especially in its anti-foreign and anti-western forms, the first Ali cabinet encouraged it and attempted successfully to channel and direct it. Paralleling the increased emphasis on Indonesianisation of the economy, greater sums were spent than previously on such symbolic and prestigious ventures as monuments and celebrations of important national occasions, providing a foretaste of the style of government that was to develop under Guided Democracy. In the election campaign, the government parties replied to criticism of their economic policies by arguing that they were aimed at destroying the hold which foreigners still had over the Indonesian economy. The PKI took this type of argument one stage further, anticipating what was later to become a major scapegoat theme in Indonesian politics, by claiming that the failure to achieve prosperity for the people was due to continued imperialist control over

the Indonesian economy. In more general terms, the government parties emphasised their anti-colonialist stand on both domestic policies and on West Irian, and, in foreign policy, their firm commitment to an independent policy, as contrasted to the westward-leaning tendency of the Masjumi and the pro-Moscow tendency of the PKI. Opposition and criticism were depicted as disloyal to the nation and as associated with foreign interests or Muslim fanatics opposed to Pantja Sila.

These claims, especially those stressing the government's anti-colonial and independent stand, had considerable validity in the foreign policy field. Whereas previous governments had tended to be pre-occupied with domestic problems, to subordinate foreign policy objectives to domestic concerns and, with few exceptions, to adopt a largely passive and pro-western stance, the Ali government, whilst stressing the continuity of its foreign policy with that of its predecessors¹, became increasingly assertive in its bids to organise and lead an international anti-colonialist movement, based on the newly independent nations.

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Ali's foreign policy, like that of previous governments, was still 'independent and active'.

Indonesian nationalism's confidence, radicalism, militancy and sense of unity with Pan-Asianism seemed to have been rekindled and expressed for the first time in concerted foreign policy actions. The Ali cabinet, more than any of its predecessors, could claim to have put the 'active' element into Indonesian foreign policy.

The pro-western tendency in the foreign policy of the preceding phase was balanced by more serious efforts at strengthening relations with the communist bloc. This element in the Ali government's foreign policy was seen as a continuation and more consistent application of the traditional independent foreign policy that stressed the pursuit of friendly relations with both blocs in the cold war and commitment to neither. There was, however, a new element introduced. This was the more positive and assertive form of non-alignment that emphasised close relations and co-operation with uncommitted and newly independent nations to such an extent that this relationship took priority over the wooing of both the western and communist blocs.

Of the former type of adjustments, the improved relations with Communist China and the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union were the most significant developments. Following Peking's adoption

in 1953 of a more conciliatory attitude towards non-communist nations in Asia, suspicion of China declined. The Indonesian representation in Peking was upgraded from that of charge d'affaire to ambassador in May, 1953 and in December of 1953 and August, 1954, trade agreements were signed with Peking¹. Relations with Peking reached a high point in 1955 with the Indonesian government's pro-Peking statements on the Formosa issue, with the successful outcome of the Bandung conference and with the signing of the Dual Nationality Agreement². The

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For a summary of these agreements see Feith, Decline, p.389. In October, 1954, when the latter agreement was given cabinet approval, trade agreements with Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania and France were also approved. (Indonesia, 1961, p.190).

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This agreement aimed at removing the anomaly of Indonesian Chinese who claimed both Indonesian and Chinese nationality. Under this agreement, such people would have to opt positively for Indonesian nationality and reject Chinese nationality or forfeit the former. China would surrender any claim to the loyalty of those who became Indonesian nationals under this agreement. The agreement was not in fact ratified by Indonesia until 1957 and by China until 1960. For the text of the agreement, see Appendix VI in D.E. Willmott, The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia 1900-1958, Monograph Series, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, 1961, pp.130-134. This treaty is discussed *ibid.*, pp.44-66.

exchange of good will visits by the Chinese and Indonesian Prime Ministers in April and May-June of 1955 provided the symbolic expression of friendship between the two countries. Meanwhile, an Indonesian embassy had been established in Moscow in March, 1954, with Dr. Subandrio as ambassador. Whilst these developments were seen by the government as a logical application of the long established independent foreign policy and not as specifically anti-western or pro-communist, they were viewed with concern and disapproval in the west, particularly in the United States. In practice, they served to bring Indonesia closer to the communist bloc and further from the western bloc, but this, in the eyes of the Ali government, merely restored a balance that had been lost in the earlier applications of Indonesia's independent foreign policy.

The new element introduced into Indonesian foreign policy, that of seeking to strengthen links with the non-aligned and new nations, was the more dramatic development and brought great prestige to the Ali government. This type of policy was not entirely unprecedented, since Indonesia had sought the support of Afro-Asian nations during the physical Revolution and had collaborated with these nations, particularly with India,

from the beginnings of the country's formal diplomatic activities. The new element was provided by the more frequent and stronger initiatives taken by the Indonesian government to render the existing collaboration more formal and more forceful. One initiative, which proved unsuccessful, was the proposal in May, 1954, for a non-aggression pact between Indonesia, China, India and Burma. The other venture, also begun in 1954, was successful. This occurred at a time when the international situation, particularly in Asia, was causing the new nations of Asia to draw closer together. In April-May, the Prime Ministers of India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia, the 'Colombo Powers' as they came to be known, met in Colombo while the Geneva conference on Indo-China was in session. These leaders, concerned that the Indo-China situation could develop into a second Korea, and anxious to reduce the tensions of the cold war generally and particularly in Asia, were determined to be heard since these problems, if mishandled by the great powers, were seen to present a threat to their survival and development as independent nations.

At the Colombo conference, Ali Sastroamidjojo proposed that these five countries should jointly sponsor a conference of leaders of the African and Asian nations

represented in the United Nations to discuss such world problems as the cold war and colonialism. Only Pakistan was enthusiastic and India and Burma were politely sceptical about the usefulness of such a conference, but the Colombo conference agreed that the Indonesian Prime Minister should 'explore the possibility of such a conference'¹. Following the mid-1954 rapprochement between Delhi and Peking, culminating in their adoption of the Five Principles of Peaceful co-existence, the Indonesian Prime Minister visited India and Burma in September and obtained Nehru's and U Nu's support for his proposed conference². A meeting of the Colombo Power prime ministers followed in December at Bogor, Indonesia, and, at that meeting, plans were made for the first Afro-Asian conference to be held in April, 1955, at Bandung in Indonesia. Provision was made for the creation of a conference secretariat with representatives

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See paragraph 14 of the final communique of the Colombo conference, included as Appendix I in Asia-Africa Speaks from Bandung, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Djakarta, p.223 (hereafter cited as A-A Speaks). This book has no date of publication, but the foreword is dated July, 1955.

2

See the quotations from the joint statements made at the conclusion of Ali's visit, *ibid.*, p.12.

of all of the sponsors and under Indonesian chairmanship.

The Bogor meeting was highly successful both in reaching agreement on such potentially divisive matters as the invitation list¹ and the statement of the Bandung conference's objectives² and in devising procedures and safeguards which would not discourage participation in the conference and which would contribute to its

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This comprised the Afro-Asian group in the United Nations, with the addition of 11 other independent or nearly independent Afro-Asian countries, including Communist China, whose participation was particularly sought by Nehru. See the list of those to be invited, contained in the joint communique issued from the Bogor conference. This is included as Appendix II, *ibid.*, p.225. The most significant omissions were the Soviet Union's Asian republics and Outer Mongolia, North and South Korea, the Union of South Africa and Israel. For the reasons for these omissions, see G. McT. Kahin, The Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1956, p.3. This work will hereafter be cited as Kahin, A-A Conference.

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See the Bogor communique in A-A Speaks, p.224, paragraph 14. This statement represented the area of consensus amongst the Colombo Powers on what the aims of the Bandung conference should be. Behind the stated objectives were the foreign policy aims of the sponsors, aims which collectively contained areas of potential agreement and potential disagreement. For a summary and analysis of the particular aims of the sponsors, see Kahin, A-A Conference, pp.4-8.

harmonious operation¹. In addition, the final communique expressed the collective views of the Colombo Powers on a number of issues, including their anti-colonialist position on West Irian, Tunisia and Morocco and their opposition to nuclear testing².

Of the 30 countries invited, only one, the Central African Federation, refused. Twenty-nine nations thus attended the conference in Bandung from 18 to 24 April, 1955, the assemblage including an impressive array of the leading figures in the Afro-Asian world³. Although there was a wide area of agreement between the delegations⁴, there were also important clashes⁵, but these

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See Kahin, A-A Conference, p.3 and for subsequent procedural decisions taken in Bandung, pp.9-11. See also paragraphs 7-10 of the Bogor communique in A-A Speaks, p.225.

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See paragraphs 11-17, *ibid.*, pp.225-226.

3

The star-studded cast included Mohd. Ali (Pakistan), Col. Nasser (Egypt), Ali Sastroamidjojo (the conference chairman), Roeslan Abdulgani (the conference secretary-general) and President Sukarno (Indonesia), Sir John Kotelawala (Ceylon), U Nu (Burma), General Romulo (Philippines), Prince Sihanouk (Cambodia) and Chou-En-lai (Communist China). For details of the composition of the delegations, see Appendix III of A-A Speaks, pp.227ff.

4

See Kahin's summary in Kahin, A-A Conference, pp.32-35.

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See *ibid.*, pp.11-32.

were overcome partly by skilful diplomacy¹ and partly by the use of musjarawah procedures that fostered compromise formulae on controversial issues and that reflected the area of common agreement rather than the differences of opinion. What was surprising was not that disagreements occurred but that so many nations of differing backgrounds and traditions were able to achieve a general consensus on a wide variety of issues. The area of agreement was reflected in the final communique of the conference² which was a vague document dealing largely in generalities, but attempting with considerable success to present a balanced statement of Afro-Asian attitudes to major world problems. The critical political issues were generally covered in ambiguous terms and, although the decisions on economic and cultural matters contained a sensible statement of problems, they involved little commitment to concerted action. Nevertheless, as an expression of the Afro-Asian demand for a say in world affairs and as a

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It is interesting to note that Chou En-lai emerged during the conference as a skilled mediator which did much to enhance China's reputation amongst delegates.

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See the Appendix, *ibid.*, pp.76-85.

reflection of broad Afro-Asian unity on such issues as western colonialism, world peace and the cold war, the conference and its communique was an impressive first step¹.

For Indonesia and for the Ali cabinet, Bandung represented a triumph². Indonesia had gained international prestige as the host country and prime initiator of the conference, many of the basic principles of Indonesian foreign policy had found support in the views expressed by representatives of other nations and, in particular, the Indonesian position on West Irian was endorsed³.

The period of the first Ali cabinet also saw an intensification of the campaign for West Irian. The policy of negotiation with Holland on Dutch-Indonesian relations was continued but a new tactic was added to Indonesian diplomacy and non-diplomatic means were also adopted, since the Netherlands refused to negotiate on

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See Kahin's assessment of the conference's achievements in terms of the sponsors' stated objectives, *ibid.*, pp.36-38.

2

See Feith's assessment in Feith, Decline, pp.393-4.

3

See the final communique's comments on West Irian, in Kahin, A-A Conference, p.82.

West Irian. Direct negotiation with Holland culminated in an agreement, the Sunario-Luns Protocol¹, to abrogate the Netherlands-Indonesian Union and to make certain minor adjustments, favouring Indonesia, to the Round Table Conference agreements of 1949. Since this protocol was far short of what was desired by Indonesian nationalist sentiment, it produced a critical reaction, even from the PNI, and ratification by the Indonesian parliament was postponed indefinitely. This round of negotiations was thus little more successful than the previous attempts at bilateral negotiation.

The new element in Indonesian diplomacy on the West Irian issue was similar to the diplomatic strategy used during the physical Revolution. Indonesia began actively to organise international support for its case. In August, 1954, simultaneously with Sukarno's call in his Independence Day address for international support¹, Indonesia's U.N. representative successfully requested that the West Irian issue should be placed on the agenda of the U.N. General Assembly. Despite the strong

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For a brief summary of the terms of this agreement and of the Indonesian and Dutch reactions, see J.M. van der Kroef, The West New Guinea Dispute, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1958, p.19.

Indonesian statement of its case¹, and despite both manoeuvres for support and a relatively mildly worded resolution, the necessary support was not forthcoming when the vote was taken in December, 1954². Similar diplomatic efforts in the developing Afro-Asian forum were, however, more successful³.

These more positive international moves were matched by a change of strategy at home. Having established in December, 1953 the first of a series of organizations to coordinate the campaign for West Irian⁴,

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For a summary of the Indonesian case and the Dutch position, see L.H. Palmier, Indonesia and the Dutch, pp.97-98.

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See Bone, op. cit., p.130. The failure to obtain the required two-thirds majority in the General Assembly does not indicate that this diplomatic venture was a total failure. Indonesia had achieved a moral victory despite its technical defeat. See Bone's comments, *ibid.*, p.121. To obtain the necessary voting support was a formidable task. See *ibid.*, pp.125-126.

3

Indonesia succeeded in obtaining expressions of support from the Bogor Colombo Powers' meeting and from the Bandung conference. See pp.404 and 406 above.

4

See Bone, op. cit., pp.121-122. Other organizations had been formed previously, e.g., the Irian Struggle Body, established in 1950, (see Feith, Decline, p.157), but these were non-governmental organizations.

the Ali government and the parties supporting it adopted the tactics which Sukarno had unsuccessfully¹ advocated from 1950 to 1953, namely, that of promoting the development and expression of radical nationalist sentiment on the West Irian question by encouraging mass meetings. The government no longer dissociated itself from these 'mass action'-type activities. At the same time there were signs of the intention to back negotiation by force, as had been done during the physical struggle for independence. The first major series of infiltrations into West Irian began in 1954² and, whilst the government denied responsibility, it did not seem to be particularly anxious to discourage such activities. Whilst these new tactics did not replace attempts at negotiation with Holland and whilst, compared with later developments, the Ali government's strategy was relatively mild, an important departure had been made from the moderate, low-posture policies of preceding post-independence governments.

The Burhanuddin Harahap government attempted in

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i.e., unsuccessfully so far as official government policy was concerned.

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See Feith, Decline, p.391.

foreign policy as in domestic policy to undo the damage which it considered had been done by the Ali cabinet.

Herbert Feith sums up the new leaders' attitude thus:

'In their view, Indonesia had lost the confidence of the outside world, its governments and its business leaders, and would have to regain this quickly'¹. Indonesian foreign policy during this government's term of office, except at the final stages of the dispute with Holland, thus resembled that of the 1950-1953 period in its reasonableness and its pro-western emphasis. There was a renewed round of diplomatic activity to improve relations with Australia, Britain, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaya, Pakistan and the United States².

The efforts to find an acceptable solution to the West Irian dispute and to reach an agreement on a new basis for Dutch-Indonesian relations were continued, but

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Ibid., p.421.

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For examples, see ibid., p.450 and Indonesia 1961, p.194. This pro-western tendency was not totally unchecked, however. For example, the Foreign Minister in August, 1955 declared that Indonesia supported all people's movements for national independence and stated that Indonesia was closely watching the situation in Morocco and Algiers. In addition, a trade agreement was signed with Poland in September. See Indonesia 1961, p.193.

in a style reminiscent of pre-Ali policy¹. The emphasis was placed on bilateral negotiation and patient diplomacy and, although the West Irian question was raised in the U.N. General Assembly in December, 1955, this time on the initiative of 15 Afro-Asian states, it was not debated and the Indonesian government, much to the disgust of the opposition parties, was content with an innocuous, unanimous resolution². The government's hope was that the unratified Sunario-Luns Protocol of 1954 could be replaced by agreements involving further Dutch concessions and that, in a more conciliatory atmosphere, Holland would be persuaded to resume negotiation on West Irian. As in previous Dutch-Indonesian discussions, however, the Indonesian government was hampered by militant nationalism and opposition at home to the new round of talks, including opposition from the President and PNI and from the NU and PSII, both government parties. Nevertheless, at the new round of talks, held at The Hague and then in Geneva in December, 1955, conciliatory

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For accounts of these endeavours during the Burhanuddin Harahap government's term of office, see Feith, Decline, pp.450-456 & 458-459, Bone, op. cit., pp.134-144 and Kosut (ed.), op. cit., pp.46-48.

2

See Feith, Decline, p.451 and Bone, op. cit., pp.141-142.

gestures were made by both sides and by January 7, 1956, an interim agreement had been reached on a number of issues, mostly involving greater concessions to Indonesia than previously¹. Subject to acceptance by both governments, this interim agreement was to become the basis for a further round of talks.

Opposition in Indonesia, however, provoked a cabinet crisis resulting firstly in the recall of the Indonesian delegation, then, following the withdrawal of NU and PSII ministers from the cabinet, the Indonesian delegation was instructed to remain in Europe and to initial the agreement as soon as the Dutch agreed to do so. The Dutch government similarly encountered opposition at home and, in an attempt to take advantage of the Indonesian government's obvious difficulties, refused to initial the agreement. Opposition to the agreement and to the talks mounted in Indonesia and in Holland and, after an unsuccessful effort to resume negotiations in February, the talks broke down. The Indonesian cabinet reacted swiftly, announcing on February 13 the unilateral abrogation of the Union and

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See Feith, Decline, p.453. Deadlock remained, however, on the question of West Irian.

declaring that similar action on the other Round Table Conference agreements was under consideration. Parliamentary approval of the abrogation was obtained on February 28, but it was not until after the Burhanuddin Harahap cabinet had succumbed to pressure to make way for a new cabinet that an amended abrogation bill was promulgated¹.

The decision to take unilateral action was a dramatic change in diplomatic style for the Burhanuddin Harahap government, and, indeed, a decisive change in Indonesian foreign policy, reminiscent of the declaration of independence. It was ironical that a basically 'administrator'-type, pro-western, Masjumi-based cabinet should have set the precedent for defiant repudiation of an international agreement. Feith assesses the significance of the abrogation thus:

... Now, for the first time since the days of the Revolution, Indonesia had broken through legality to act in defiance of the Dutch. A complicated

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This was partly because Sukarno and other leaders were dissatisfied with the provisions of this first abrogation bill. Van der Kroef in Indonesia in the Modern World, Part II, p.370 provides a summary of the main reasons for this dissatisfaction.

and humiliating series of negotiations and compromises had ended in a clear and intelligible solution of which an Indonesian nationalist could be proud. Indonesia had stopped playing the game on the Dutch home ground of agreements and formal regulations. It had seized the initiative in a symbolic assertion of national self-reliance¹.

After the impressive Bandung venture of the first Ali cabinet and the last minute defiance of the Dutch and of international conventions under the Burhanuddin Harahap cabinet, Indonesian foreign policy under the second Ali cabinet was something of an anti-climax, reflecting the general tendency towards delays and indecision on the part of this government. Apart from the mounting disunity in the country at the time, the second Ali cabinet was hampered by continued differences between its two major components, the PNI and the Masjumi, whose divergence was not overcome by the perception of the threat posed by rising PKI influence. The President also undermined the authority of the cabinet, partly because he disagreed with the Prime Minister over such issues as the exclusion of the PKI from the cabinet and the continuation of foreign investment, and partly because he was, in any case, becoming

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Feith, Decline, p.456.

increasingly critical of the parliamentary system. In both domestic affairs and in foreign affairs, President Sukarno was effectively adopting an independent role which subsequently enabled him both to survive and to benefit from the ultimate collapse of the Ali Government¹. It was the President's personal and flamboyant diplomacy, particularly his two visits with a sizeable entourage in May-June² and August-October, 1956³ that provided the impressive and prestigious features of Indonesian foreign policy during the second Ali government's term of office⁴.

On the problem of relations with the Netherlands,

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One of the most important and controversial of his independent foreign policy actions was to persuade the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Roeslan Abdulgani, to sign the Indonesian-Soviet Joint Statement of 1956 without consulting the Prime Minister. See pp.290-291 above and Feith, Decline, pp.514-515.

2

to America and Western Europe.

3

to the Soviet Union and Communist China.

4

Hanna's assessment is that the Ali cabinet 'became so engrossed in a nearly catastrophic series of troubles at home that it began of necessity to de-emphasize foreign policy. Even before the protracted period of its collapse on issues of domestic policy, it had passed foreign policy over into the hands which still retain it [in 1959] - the ready hands of President Sukarno. Hanna, Bung Karno's Indonesia, Part XIX, p.8.

Burhanuddin Harahap government largely stole the second Ali cabinet's thunder by its abrogation bill of February, 1956. As the President had delayed approval of this bill, however, the Ali government was provided with an opportunity to produce a similar but more radical bill that abrogated the Round Table Conference agreements of 1949 as a whole¹. The amended abrogation legislation, passed by parliament in April, 1956, was signed by the President and promulgated in May, but it was some time before the cabinet could agree on the details for the implementation of the abrogation. One problem was that arising from the economic privileges given to the Dutch under the Round Table Conference agreements. Important elements in the cabinet were anxious not to lose the economic advantages to be gained from Dutch investment and were opposed to rapid nationalisation. On the other hand, there was difficulty in reaching agreement in the cabinet on the conditions that should be laid down to govern foreign investment. Agreement on a new foreign

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For further details of the way in which the Ali government handled the abrogation, see Feith, Decline, pp.474 & 475-476, H. Kosut, (ed.), op. cit., pp.47-48 and A.M. Taylor, op. cit., pp.437-439. For a summary of the provisions of the abrogation bill, see L.H. Palmier, Indonesia and the Dutch, p.96.

investment bill, similar to that prepared while the Wilopo cabinet was in office, was not reached until late June, 1956 and the Ali cabinet fell from office before parliamentary approval could be obtained. Another problem was that of the debt to Holland incurred under the 1949 agreements. The cabinet was divided on the question of whether this debt should continue to be honoured. A decision was eventually taken in August, 1956, when the Indonesian government repudiated the debt, then amounting to 3.661 billion guilders (\$1.098 billion)¹, although it also declared that debts to other countries would be honoured. The repudiation was justified on the grounds that the acceptance of this debt, forced upon the Republic during the negotiations for Dutch recognition of Indonesian independence, meant that Indonesia had been required to pay for the Dutch military campaign against the Republic.

On the West Irian dispute, the government adopted the type of approach taken by the first Ali cabinet².

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For the Indonesian justification of this decision, see Taylor, op. cit., pp.438-439.

2

For further details of the second Ali cabinet's tactics see Bone, op. cit., pp.144-151.

Following the passage of a bill through parliament in August, 1956, providing for the establishment of an autonomous provincial government for West Irian, the Sultan of Tidore was installed as governor of this province in September. The 'mass action' tactic was given expression in August at an 'All-Indonesia People's Congress',¹ at which the Prime Minister called for the harnessing of domestic and international anti-colonialist forces in an intensified joint effort with the people of West Irian to throw off Dutch colonial rule. Sukarno's personal diplomacy was also used to promote international support during his overseas visits. In October, 1956, again at the request of 15 Afro-Asian nations, the West Irian question was placed on the U.N. General Assembly's agenda and was discussed in February, 1957. Although an Afro-Asian and Latin American sponsored resolution, calling on the United Nations to establish a Good Offices Committee to assist in negotiations between Indonesia and Holland, was adopted in the First Committee discussions, the necessary two-thirds majority was not

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Sukarno originally called for such a body in December 1954, in order to overcome internal divisions and thus create the power for the West Irian struggle. See Feith, Decline, p.392.

obtained in the full General Assembly session¹.

The drift away from the west, checked during the Burhanuddin Harahap cabinet's term of office, continued under the second Ali government with such developments as² the upgrading of the Yugoslavian and Czechoslovakian legations to the rank of embassies, the granting of de facto and de jure recognition to Morocco and Tunisia and of de jure recognition to the People's Republic of Mongolia, the signing of trade treaties with the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Rumania and North Vietnam and of a cultural agreement with Czechoslovakia, the announcement that Indonesia would no longer observe the U.N. embargo affecting trade with Communist China and the visit of a trade delegation from East Germany. Of particular significance was the successful negotiation of a loan of \$100 million from the Soviet Union, the commencement of loan negotiations with Communist China and, of symbolic importance, Sukarno's acceptance of an 'Ilyushin' type

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The majority of votes were, however, favourable to Indonesia, as there were 40 votes for, 25 against and 13 abstentions on the resolution. See Bone, op. cit., p.150.

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See Hanna, Bung Karno's Indonesia, Part XIX, pp.7-8 and Indonesia 1961, pp.195-197.

plane from Russia. The shift in the interpretation of Indonesia's independent foreign policy was well illustrated in the denunciation of British and French action in Suez as contrasted to the reluctance to criticise the Russian action in Hungary. There were also two violent manifestations in Djakarta of anti-western feeling, providing a foretaste of the mob diplomacy of the Era of Confrontation. In September, 1956, there were the communist organised anti-Dutch demonstrations during the Schmidt trial on charges of subversion and in November, the anti-British and anti-French demonstrations following the British and French invasion of Suez¹.

These developments were not entirely unbalanced. The pursuit of friendly relations with the west and western-influenced countries continued. For example, grants for economic assistance totalling A £1,300,000, were accepted from Australia under the Colombo Plan, Sukarno's visit to communist bloc countries was balanced

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See Feith, Decline, pp.508-509. Earlier in the Ali cabinet's period of office there had been an upsurge of popular anti-Chinese feeling, but this was concerned with the role of Indonesian Chinese in the Indonesian economy rather than with Djakarta-Peking relations. For details, see *ibid.*, pp.481-487.

by his visit to America and western Europe, an immigration agreement was concluded with the Philippines, and the King of Perlis (in the Federation of Malaya) was entertained on a state visit. The promotion of Afro-Asian (and Latin American) co-operation, though subdued by comparison with the Bandung climax, was continued by such activities as the Afro-Asian Students Conference in Bandung, the invitation to the U.N. representatives of Costa Rica and the Argentine to visit Indonesia, the visit of a U.A.R. cultural mission and the visit of the Indian Vice-President. Signs of Indonesia's desire to play a responsible role in international affairs were also provided by the dispatch of the 'Garuda' battalion to the Middle East as part of the U.N. force and by the payment of over Rp.277,000 by the Indonesian Red Cross as a contribution towards the purchase of medical supplies for the Egyptian people.

By the end of the 1953-1957 phase, Indonesian foreign policy, though still justifiable as independent, was unmistakably assertive, defiant and even aggressive, if only on the West Irian issue, and was becoming increasingly anti-western in both the West Irian crusade and in the Afro-Asian emphasis that was developing in the good neighbour policy. Compared to the policies of

later phases, however, Indonesian foreign policy of this period was less consciously anti-western and was not yet militantly so. Animosity towards the west was still largely an extension of anti-Dutch sentiment, aroused primarily over the West Irian deadlock.

1957-1959.

Indonesian foreign policy of this period saw a continuation of the drift away from the west and towards the communist, non-aligned and Afro-Asian countries. This was reflected in the pattern of visits paid and received and agreements signed¹. Thus, for example, Indonesia entertained the President of the U.S.S.R. (May, 1957), the Vice-President of Yugoslavia (August, 1957), the Japanese Prime Minister (October, 1957)², the Premier of Czechoslovakia (January, 1958), the President of Yugoslavia (December, 1958) and the President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Viet Nam) (February, 1959). Sukarno visited India, Egypt, Yugoslavia, Syria, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, Thailand and Japan (January,

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See Indonesia 1961, pp.198-201.

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This was, however, more in the nature of a business visit, since its purpose was to discuss the war reparations agreement, subsequently signed in January, 1958.

1958) and Turkey, Europe, Latin America, Japan and North Viet Nam (April, 1959). Following discussions between the Indonesian and Communist Chinese Premiers in February, 1958, a committee on Dual Nationality was installed by Foreign Minister Subandrio in April, 1958, to work out proposals for the implementation of the 1955 Sino-Indonesian agreement¹. Agreements signed between 1957 and early 1959 included one with Czechoslovakia for scientific, educational and cultural co-operation (May, 1958), a trade agreement with Bulgaria (January, 1959), an agreement for co-operation between the Indian and Indonesian navies (December, 1958) and a cultural agreement with the Philippines (April, 1959). Western and prowestern nations were not entirely neglected. For example, Subandrio visited Australia and New Zealand in February, 1959², and the Prime Minister visited Malaya in

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The instruments of ratification were not, however, exchanged until 1960.

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The purpose of this visit was to seek a softening in the Australian attitude on the West Irian issue. See Grant, Indonesia, p.139. For a brief account of the effect of this visit, see ibid., pp.158-159.

April, during which visit a treaty of friendship was signed¹.

Whilst the above developments were occurring, two considerations came to dominate Indonesian foreign policy: the struggle for West Irian and the threat of foreign support for the regional rebels. Both these considerations tended to promote the development of a more consciously anti-western stance.

The trend towards an intensification of the West Irian campaign continued and accelerated from 1957 to 1959² along the lines established by the first and second Ali Sastroamidjojo governments. Soon after the Djuanda cabinet came to power, the West Irian Liberation Committee was created, headed by the Information Minister.

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Although the treaty of friendship was signed, the visit was not highly successful and the treaty led to little effective co-operation. See W.A. Hanna, Sequel to Colonialism: The 1957-1960 Foundations for Malaysia, American Universities Field Staff, Inc., New York, 1965, pp.190-191. This work will hereafter be cited as Hanna, Sequel.

2

For brief accounts of this intensified campaign, see Feith, Decline, pp.583-585, Wertheim, Society, pp.357-359, Lev, Transition, pp.33-35 and Feith, 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy' in McVey (ed.), Indonesia, pp.320-321. For further details, see Palmier, Indonesia and the Dutch, pp.99-104 and Bone, op. cit., pp.151-161.

Even Hatta supported the campaign initially. In October and November, 1957, the campaign moved into high gear. This was in preparation for the November debate in the U.N. General Assembly on yet another pro-Indonesian resolution, backed by the Afro-Asians and the Soviet bloc and calling for negotiations between Indonesia and Holland for the settlement of the dispute. As nationalist fervour and intimidation of Dutch citizens in Indonesia mounted, Indonesian government leaders sounded warnings of the probable consequences of another defeat in the U.N. On November 8, 1957, for example, Sukarno threatened that, if the resolution in the United Nations was defeated, Indonesia would adopt a new tactic, one that would 'surprise the nations of the world'¹. When the vote was taken in the General Assembly on November 29, the necessary two-thirds majority was not obtained².

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Quoted in Feith, Decline, p.583. For examples of other threats, including Subandrio's, see van der Kroef, The West New Guinea Dispute, pp.24 & 26-27 and Bone, op. cit., p.153.

2

For the voting figures, see van der Kroef, The West New Guinea Dispute, p.27. See also Bone, op. cit., pp.157-158 for Subandrio's reaction.

The reaction in Indonesia was swift and dramatic¹. On December 2, on orders from the cabinet, there was a 24 hour strike to demonstrate opposition to the Dutch stand on West Irian and, the following day, a group of workers, many of whom were communists or communist sympathisers, set in motion a series of take-overs of Dutch enterprises by seizing the offices of two major Dutch firms. At first the government did not support these moves, but on December 5, the cabinet announced that those enterprises that had been taken over would be controlled by the government. On December 13, by which time most Dutch enterprises had been seized, Nasution, the Army Chief of Staff, called for an end to the seizures but also decreed military control over all ventures taken over to that date². Although the Prime Minister announced that these enterprises would be returned as soon as West Irian was returned to Indonesia,

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The sense of crisis was aggravated by an attempted assassination of Sukarno on the following day. See Feith, Decline, p.583 and Feith, 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy' in McVey (ed.), Indonesia, p.321 for brief accounts of what became known as the 'Tjikini affair'.

2

In practice, the Indonesian government continued the process of economic reprisal against the few remaining Dutch interests throughout 1958, 1959 and 1960. For details, see Palmier, Indonesia and the Dutch, pp.107-109.

they were nationalised in February, 1959. In the wake of the take-overs, an exodus of Dutch citizens still in Indonesia began, encouraged by both the Dutch and Indonesian governments¹. By the end of 1957, the rift with Holland was virtually complete. It only remained to formalise the complete break by the severance of diplomatic relations in August, 1960².

The effect of the take-overs was to produce chaotic economic conditions³ and to set Indonesia on its path of rapid decline. They also served to worsen relations between Djakarta and the regional dissidents

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On the December 5, the Indonesian Minister of Justice announced that 50,000 Dutch nationals would be expelled or repatriated, although on December 10, the Minister of Information tried to reverse this announcement. See Palmier, Indonesia and the Dutch, pp.103 & 104. Meantime, the Dutch government offered immediate repatriation to all Dutch citizens in Indonesia. See Feith, Decline, p.584.

2

The Indonesian Foreign Ministry had already ordered the closure of all Dutch Consulates and Vice-Consulates throughout Indonesia, except for the diplomatic mission in Djakarta, in December, 1957. See Palmier, Indonesia and the Dutch, p.103.

3

For a brief description of the economic effects, see Feith, 'Indonesia' in Kahin (ed.), Governments & Politics, p.212. For further details, see D.S. Paauw, 'The High Cost of Political Instability in Indonesia 1957-1958', in B.H.M. Vlekke (ed.), Indonesia's Struggle 1957-1958, Netherlands Institute of International Affairs, The Hague, 1959, pp.23-55. See also Wertheim, Society, pp.362-363.

but, at the same time, they strengthened Sukarno's position and popularity as a revolutionary leader and also strengthened the power of the central government and the army leadership vis-à-vis the regionalists¹. There were also international repercussions². The anti-Dutch measures caused some Afro-Asian states, particularly India, to be disturbed by the Indonesian actions³, even though they mostly supported the Indonesian claim to West Irian. Similarly, there were unfavourable reactions in the west, especially in the United States, the latter tending to worsen U.S.-Indonesian relations considerably. Indonesians were particularly upset by U.S. Information Agency reports that the campaign against Dutch enterprises was part of a communist plot outlined in a publication by D.N. Aidit⁴, by stories that Sukarno was

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See Feith's assessment in Feith, Decline, pp.584-585 and in Feith, 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy' in McVey (ed.) Indonesia, p.321.

2

For a general and brief summary, see Wertheim, Society, pp.363-364 and Palmier, Indonesia and the Dutch, pp.104-105.

3

See van der Kroef, The West New Guinea Dispute, pp.28-29.

4

More convincing is the type of explanation given by Wertheim in Wertheim, Society, pp.356-357, explaining the economic and political motivations of Sukarno and his government.

being influenced by a Russian blonde and by the U.S. withdrawal and denial of offers to mediate in the West Irian dispute¹. Expressions of concern by the United States and its NATO allies over the anti-Dutch measures in Indonesia, coming after U.S. and western opposition to or, at best, abstention on the pro-Indonesian U.N. Resolution, served to discredit the west in Indonesian eyes². Perhaps most significant of all, however, a successful³ precedent had been created for the new confrontation-type tactics which Indonesia was to adopt increasingly and to develop under Guided Democracy. The creation early in 1958 of the army-led National Front

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See van der Kroef, The West New Guinea Dispute, p.30. For a summary of the western press reaction, see Bone, op. cit., p.160.

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See van der Kroef, The West New Guinea Dispute, pp.30-31, especially the reference to Subandrio's statement of December 21, 1957. See also Bone, op. cit., pp.160-163.

3

This new tactic was not successful in the sense of producing an immediate solution to the West Irian problem, but it was successful in that Indonesia had defied western opinion and had suffered no immediately disastrous consequences in the form of effective reprisals. Post-coup Indonesian analysis, however, acknowledges that this militant action did exact a high cost in the form of rapid economic decline.

For the Liberation of West Irian, Sukarno's speeches in August, 1958 and the Foreign Ministry announcement on August 19, 1958, that Indonesia would not seek to place the West Irian question on the agenda of the thirteenth U.N. General Assembly¹, indicated that the new tactics were to become more firmly adopted.

At the same time as the West Irian campaign was serving to aggravate relations with Holland and with the west generally, the regionalist problem was approaching a climax. During 1957, as Djakarta and the regionalists adopted increasingly opposing ideological positions, there were indications that the rebels intended to seek overseas support for their cause of opposing the alleged drift towards communism in the central government². To the Indonesian government, there appeared to be two sources of assistance to the rebels, one, already existing, the neighbouring countries of Southeast Asia,

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See Bone, op. cit., pp.164-165. The reason given for the decision not to raise the issue in the U.N. was that the Dutch attitude and the U.N. administrative procedures rendered the U.N. unable to solve colonial issues, loc. cit., citing The New York Times, August 20, 1958.

2

See Feith, Decline, p.582.

particularly Malaya and Singapore, both of which were in the British sphere of influence and therefore anti-communist, the other, at first more potential than actual, the western states themselves, particularly the United States. In an attempt to remove the first source of outside interference, the Indonesian government directed efforts towards persuading the neighbouring countries that they should expel the rebel agents, prevent the shipment of supplies to rebel held areas and close trading facilities to rebel 'smugglers' who were depriving Djakarta of foreign exchange earnings¹.

The threat of possible western assistance to the rebels was in many ways the more serious danger, since this could so strengthen the rebels that the Djakarta regime would be defeated by what would amount to a western, imperialist, anti-communist, anti-Sukarno conspiracy. Alternatively, if the central government obtained the support of communist bloc countries in order to withstand a western-backed onslaught, Indonesia could

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These efforts continued until the rebellion was crushed in 1961. See Feith, 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy' in McVey (ed.), Indonesia, p.351. For further details, reviewed in the context of the problems in Indonesia's relations with Singapore and Malaya, see Hanna, Sequel, pp.170-176 & 183-185.

become a cold war battle ground. An ominous sign was provided by the American government's delaying tactics on Indonesia's unsuccessful attempts, from July, 1957, to obtain Washington's approval for the purchase of approximately \$420 million worth of arms from U.S. suppliers¹. Late in 1957, Djakarta turned successfully to Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Poland as alternative sources of arms². Agreements with these three countries were announced in April, 1958³, occasioning U.S. displeasure⁴.

Rumours of negotiations between the rebels and western powers mounted in January, 1958⁵ and, as the PRRI rebellion was beginning, U.S. government statements indicated sympathy for rebel views and disapproval of Guided Democracy and the Djakarta regime⁶. Although no foreign state recognised the rebel government proclaimed

1 See Feith, Decline, p.585.

2 Loc. cit.

3 Ibid., p.589.

4 See Kosut (ed.), Indonesia: The Sukarno Years, p.73.

5 See Feith, Decline, p.585 and Lev, Transition, p.35.

6 See Feith, Decline, p.586.

in February, 1958 (the PRRI), and although the PRRI's attempts to have the Djakarta government's funds frozen by overseas banks met with no response¹, some degree of U.S. and western sympathy and unofficial support was indicated². The Djakarta regime was particularly critical of the rebels' ability to obtain modern U.S. arms, for which the American government's approval was believed to be necessary.

The allegations of western support given to the rebels, the communist countries' willingness to supply arms to the central government and America's reluctance to do so whilst apparently doing nothing to stop the supply of arms to the rebels, resulted in a pronounced anti-western and pro-communist development in Djakarta, so much so that Djakarta hinted that it might accept

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Loc. cit., and Lev, Transition, p.41. It is interesting that even Caltex, whose oil wells were in Sumatra, continued to pay the Djakarta regime.

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For example, see Feith, Decline, p.586 and Lev, Transition, pp.35 & 41-42. G.C. Linebarger in 'Indonesia (1958-1961), in Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict, Vol.1: 'The Experience in Asia', Center for Research in Social Systems, The American University, Washington, February 1968, pp.418-419, is sceptical of the evidence of western support and suggests other explanations for the acquisition of U.S. equipment, but the allegation of western support is not totally refuted.

offers of 'volunteers' and other help from Moscow and Peking¹.

By March, 1958, Djakarta feared that direct U.S. intervention in Sumatra might be imminent². In April, however, the U.S. Secretary of State, Dulles, officially declared U.S. neutrality³ and by May, it was clear that America was attempting a rapprochement with Djakarta. The U.S. government acceded to the Indonesian request to condemn outside intervention in the PRRI rebellion and approved the supply of military equipment to Djakarta, as well as large supplies of rice⁴. These moves met with an immediate response in Djakarta from the government groups, including Sukarno, and produced an anti-PKI swing in domestic affairs and an apparent pro-western

1. See Feith, Decline, pp.589-590.

2. For the circumstances that gave rise to these fears, see *ibid.*, p.587.

3. See Kosut (ed.), Indonesia: The Sukarno Years, p.72. The declared neutrality was given as the reason for Washington's refusal to the Indonesian request of April, 1958 for approval to purchase \$120 million worth of U.S. arms, planes and ships, *loc. cit.*

4. Feith, Decline, p.590. The \$146,600 worth of small arms for which export licenses were issued were for the police force. Licenses were also issued for nearly \$1 million worth of aircraft and radio parts, Kosut (ed.), Indonesia: The Sukarno Years, p.73.

swing in foreign policy¹.

Associated with the anti-western swing in early 1958 was the growth of anti-Taiwan sentiment provoked by alleged Kuomintang involvement in the PRRI rebellion². The army introduced a number of anti-Nationalist Chinese measures in April, 1958, but, whereas the anti-western sentiment declined in May, measures against the K.M.T. Chinese continued, culminating in September-October in the banning of a number of Chinese organizations and in the military's seizure of businesses partially or wholly owned by Chinese declared to be sympathisers of the K.M.T.

By the end of the period of liberal democracy, Indonesia's independent and active foreign policy had changed considerably from what it had been at the

1

See Feith, Decline, p.590 for examples of this swing. The culmination was the U.S. agreement in August, 1958, to sell to Indonesia large quantities of arms to be paid for in rupiahs.

2

For details of the allegations and the measures taken against alleged K.M.T. Chinese in Indonesia, see V. Hanssens, 'The Campaign against Nationalist Chinese in Indonesia', in Vlekke (ed.), Indonesia's Struggle 1957-1958, pp.56-59. This development is discussed in the context of general anti-Nationalist Chinese sentiment and act-on, ibid., pp.56 ff. See also Palmier, Indonesia and the Dutch, pp.174-176.

beginning of this period in 1950. Although the policy was still non-aligned and, although, with the exception of Holland, Indonesia's relations with western countries had withstood the strains produced by the PRRI rebellion and the West Irian campaign reasonably well, Indonesia had moved a long way from its original pro-western position. It was perhaps significant that relations with the west, particularly with the United States, were improved towards the end of this period as a result of friendly, pro-Indonesian gestures and that Holland's refusal even to compromise with Indonesian demands led to the virtually complete break in the Netherlands-Indonesian relationship. The simultaneous change from Indonesia's low posture to assertiveness and finally to a defiant posture in world affairs indicated that the Indonesian leaders were determined to go their own way, regardless of international repercussions, the good neighbour policy notwithstanding. The West Irian problem remained unsolved and Indonesia was becoming more obviously committed to radical tactics to acquire the territory. These developments did not augur well for Indonesia's future 'respectable' conduct in the international community, or for future friendly relations with the west.