CHINESE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT IN MALAYA (1900-1911)

by

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This thesis is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Australian National University
This thesis is based on original research conducted by the author while he was a Research Scholar in the Department of Far Eastern History at the Australian National University from 1965 to 1968.

Yen Ching-hwang

[Signature]
### ABBREVIATIONS

(a) Abbreviations for periodical and archives

<table>
<thead>
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<tr>
<td>CKCTSLT</td>
<td>Chung-kuo chin-tai shih lün—ts'ung.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CKCTSTK</td>
<td>Chung-kuo chin-tai shih ts'ung-k'an.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKHTSTK</td>
<td>Chung-kuo hsien-tai shih ts'ung-k'an.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKYK</td>
<td>Chien-kuo yeh-k'an.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Colonial Office Records.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTSTL</td>
<td>Chin-tai shih tzǔ-liao.</td>
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<tr>
<td>HHKM</td>
<td>Hsin-hai ko-ming.</td>
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<tr>
<td>HHKMLWC</td>
<td>Hsin-hai ko-ming wu-shih chou-nien chi-nien lün-wên chi.</td>
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<td>HHKMHIL</td>
<td>Hsin-hai ko-ming hui-i lu.</td>
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<tr>
<td>KFCS</td>
<td>Kuo-fu ch'üan-shu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFNP</td>
<td>Kuo-fu nien-p'u</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMHLHCC</td>
<td>Ko-ming hsien-lieh hsien-chih chūan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>Kuo-min-tang.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMWH</td>
<td>Ko-ming wên-hsien.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSKKK</td>
<td>Kuo-shih-kuan kuan-k'an.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAS</td>
<td>Journal of Asian Studies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMBRAS</td>
<td>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Malayan Branch.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSEA</td>
<td>Journal of Southeast Asian History.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSSS</td>
<td>Journal of the South Seas Society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSBB</td>
<td>Straits Settlements Blue Book.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSNWH</td>
<td>Chung-hua min-kuo k'ai-kuo wu-shih nien wen-hsien.</td>
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<tr>
<td>WWPC</td>
<td>Wai Wu Pu Cables.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSGD</td>
<td>Straits Settlements Governor's Despatches.</td>
</tr>
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(b) Abbreviations for books

- i-shih: Ko-ming i-shih.
- ko-ming shih: Chung-hua min-kuo k'ai-kuo ch'ien ko-ming shih.
- K'ai-kuo shih: Hua-ch'iao ko-ming k'ai-kuo shih.
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PREFACE

This study has three main purposes. One is to describe and analyse the Chinese revolutionary activities in Singapore and Malaya between 1900 and 1911 to show how the movement grew and developed in these areas, and later became one of the main streams of the movement overseas, what difficulties it encountered, and what techniques were adopted to solve the problems.

The second purpose is to analyse and explain how overseas Chinese in Singapore and Malaya responded to the revolution and what difference were the responses amongst different classes of people.

The third is to estimate the importance of the activities in Singapore and Malaya to the revolutionary movement as a whole, and to assess the contribution in manpower and finance from the region towards the 1911 revolution.

Studies on the Chinese revolution and monographs on its personalities and organizations are not lacking. However, overseas Chinese involvement and contributions have been only barely touched and the present study is but a modest attempt to delve into this neglected field. Activities of Chinese revolutionaries in French Indo-
China, Burma, Thailand, the Dutch East-Indies, Canada, Japan and the United States and their contributions to the revolution deserve more attention than has hitherto been paid.

Overseas Chinese involvement in internal Chinese politics was started by the revolutionaries. Later, the Kuomintang's attempt to mobilize overseas Chinese against the Yüan Shih-k'ai regime (1913-1916) showed the tendency to use organizations and practices established during the anti-Manchu phase. Thus, newspapers, public speeches, mass rallies, reading clubs and drama troupes were used to popularize anti-Yüan feeling, and these practices are traceable to the period under study.

The choice of 1900 and 1911 as terminal dates is not a matter of convenience. The year 1900 marked the beginning of formal contact between the Chinese revolutionary movement and Malaya. The year 1911 was a turning point in the modern history of China and China's relations with her overseas subjects. This period also saw the growth of nationalistic and patriotic feelings in the Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya. It was a period of transition from indifference to active participation in China's politics, and from a divided and disorganized society to a more united and more national conscious one.
The title, 'Chinese Revolutionary Movement in Malaya, 1900-1911' needs explanation. Malaya at the time included the Malay Peninsula and Singapore. The existence of Malaysia and Singapore to-day makes the use of Malaya as a general term for the region under study objectionable or even misleading to present day readers if they do not bear in mind that Malaya from 1900 to 1911 did cover the region under study. The use of 'Chinese in Singapore and Malaya' instead of 'Malayan Chinese' in the text might help to avoid misunderstandings.

The research is based mainly on Chinese newspapers published in Singapore and Malaya during this period, the KMT archives (published and unpublished), memoirs, letters and pamphlets written by leaders actively engaged in the revolution. In collecting sources, the author came across many technical problems: the Chinese newspapers used are not indexed, and information had to be gathered laboriously page by page; microfilmed copies of the newspapers were not available until 1966, one year after this study had been started.

The newspaper used are party organs for revolutionaries and reformists: the Chung Hsing Jih Pao, the Sun Pao and Nan Ch'iao Jih Pao for the revolutionaries; the T'ien Nan Hsin Pao, Jih Hsin Pao, the Union Times and
the **Penang Hsin Pao** for the reformists. In using these newspapers, some mistakes made by published works and archives have been corrected. They are pointed out in the notes.

Additional difficulties were encountered in trying to locate the archives of the Ch'ing Consulate and of the Chinese Protectorate in Singapore. These two important archives no longer exist, possibly lost during the Japanese occupation. In interviewing descendants of revolutionary leaders, the author also had difficulty in obtaining information. Most of their private records were lost during the Japanese occupation, and their memory of their fathers or grandfathers was often vague and inaccurate. Some of the living revolutionaries were either too old to give accurate accounts or declined to give any information. An old T'ung Mêng Hui member in Ipoh, Lee Ah Weng (age 88) declined to say anything because he was afraid of revenge by Manchu descendants! A former manager of the **Kuang Hua Jih Pao** in Penang refused to be interviewed although the author had visited his residence four times. This fear of involvement is a common attitude among the overseas Chinese in Singapore and Malaya.
Romanizations in the text generally follow the Wade-Giles system. However, when the persons and institutions cited have their own transliterations in English, the original transliterations are retained. A glossary is provided for reference.
CHAPTER I

CHINESE COMMUNITIES IN SINGAPORE AND MALAYA
BEFORE THE COMING OF THE REVOLUTIONARIES

(1) The Formation of the Chinese Communities.

The Chinese had been trading with Malaya long before the founding of the Malacca Sultanate at the beginning of fifteenth century. Direct commercial and political ties between China and the Sultanate were firmly established at its inception. Some of the Chinese merchants who used Malacca as the entrepot of their trading activities in Southeast Asia might have settled there for commercial purposes. From the available Chinese, Malay and Portuguese sources, it seems certain that there was a Chinese trading community in the port-city of Malacca before the fall of the Sultanate in 1511. But as to whether these Chinese represented a permanent or a fluid society, that kept coming and going with the monsoons, is still uncertain. The size of the Chinese trading community was probably small and insignificant. However, it laid down the foundation for the development of a permanent Chinese community in the territory.

Under the Portuguese and Dutch rules from 1511 to 1795, a permanent Chinese settlement began to
develop in Malacca. Although no definite figure of Chinese inhabitants in the Portuguese Malacca is available, there can be no doubt that there were sufficient number of Chinese settlers there to form a 'Campon China' at the beginning of seventeenth century, 102 years after the Portuguese had occupied Malacca. Campon China, according to Emanuel Codinho de Erdia, a Portuguese cosmographer and explorer, formed part of the suburb of Upe which was one of the most important of the three suburbs lying outside the fortress of Malacca, and "In this quarter of Campon China live the Chincheos, descendants of the Tocharos of Pliny, and stranger merchants and native fishermen." It is notable that the word 'Chincheos' is probably another version of 'Ch'uan-chou' which was better known to the West as 'Chinchew' or 'Tsiuenchau', and which was one of the important ports for foreign trade before the opening of the five Treaty Ports in the middle of the 19th century. Furthermore, Ch'uan-chou is very close to Amoy, one of the five Treaty Ports in South China, which had been an important source of migration from Fukien Province to Southeast Asia since its opening. It thus seem that these early Ch'uan-chou people were partly responsible for the continuing settling of more
Southern Fukien Chinese in Malacca during the Dutch and British periods.

When Malacca was changed hands from the Portuguese to the Dutch in 1644, the Chinese settlers there was estimated at only 300 to 400. It is very likely that the number of Chinese prior to the Dutch occupation had been higher than this, for the Chinese settlers who depended on trade might have been heavily affected by the extortionate policy of the Portuguese and the continuing warfare between the two rivalling European Powers at the later stage of Portuguese rule.

The restoration of normal conditions in Malacca after the Dutch occupation witnessed a gradual increase of Chinese population. In 1678, Chinese inhabitants were estimated at 426 out of the total population of 4,884. But this figure steeply arose to 2,161 in 1750, a slightly more than five-fold increase over the 1678 estimates. This sharp rise has been explained as partly due to the Dutch policy of encouraging 'the industrious Chinese' to settle in Malacca for the cultivation of soil and other traffic, and partly to the result by natural increase of Sino-Malay mixed-bloods. It is also possible that the increase of
the Chinese inhabitants in Malacca was partly due to the coming of political refugees from China and Formosa (Taiwan). After the Manchu conquest of the South China at the end of the 17th century, large numbers of Ming loyalists who refused to give their allegiance to the new conquerers, fled overseas. Some of them might have come to Malacca, particularly those from Ch'uan-chou and Amoy areas who found it convenient to settle in Malacca because there was already a Ch'uan-chou settlement. The fall of the Cheng Ch'eng-kung (Koxinga) regime (the regime that attempted to restore the Ming dynasty) in Formosa in 1683, forced more Ming loyalists to take refuge overseas. According to one record, a group of Chinese patriots numbering more than three thousand fled to Southeast Asia with their families after the capture of Formosa by the Manchus. They escaped in nine warships, of which three went to Luzon in the Philippines, one to Thailand, three to Java and two to Malacca.

Other indirect evidence also points to the existence of such political refugees among the Chinese inhabitants in Malacca during this period. Kapitan Chan Lak Koan who died in 1718, was termed as 'Pi-Nan I-shih' (The Fugitive Hero) in his spiritual tablet deposited
in the oldest surviving Chinese temple in Malacca, the Cheng Hoon Temple. According to the record, Kapitan Chan was a native of Amoy, and was a refugee from China. He was credited with having renovated and expanded the Temple.

One may doubt the authenticity of some of the records cited above, but one cannot deny the fact that Malacca was one of the few foreign ports known earliest to the Chinese through political and commercial contacts, and because it was not a neighbouring state of China which might have been subjected to Chinese political pressure, it was an ideal place for political refugees particularly when it already had a Chinese community. Furthermore, before the United States, Canada, Hawaii and Australia were known to the Chinese, maritime ports in Southeast Asia, such as Malacca, Java, Luzon, Pontianak, and Patani became favourable places for taking refuge.

The coming of some political refugees to Malacca appeared to have helped to build up a permanent Chinese community, and helped it to retain much of the Chinese cultural heritage. For some of these Ming loyalists were men of letters, who, unlike ordinary merchants,
tended to preserve Chinese traditions at all cost, particularly when China had fallen into the hands of an alien race. They paid homage to the overthrown dynasty, and used the calendar and titles of the Ming dynasty.²⁰

The foundation of the British settlements in Penang in 1786 and that in Singapore in 1819 attracted large number of Chinese to trade and to settle. From then onwards, Chinese immigrants arriving in the Straits Settlements grew steadily in number. In 1840, the Chinese immigrants arriving in the Straits were 5,063, but two and half decades later (1865), the number had increased to 17,439, three times more than the previous figure.²¹ But the formation of large and more permanent Chinese communities in Malaya did not take place until the eighteen-eighties when large-scale Chinese immigration began. The influx of Chinese immigrants by the thousands was mainly the result of the establishment of British political control over the Malay states after 1874. Naturally, economic development and law and order in the Malay states brought about by the British served as a great stimulus to Chinese immigration. As a result, the figures of Chinese population in Singapore and Malaya increased substantially.²¹a
(1) (continued)

There were two patterns which existed side by side in the Chinese immigration to Singapore and Malaya in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. Namely, the Kheh-tau system, also known as the ticket-credit system, and the kinship-based system. Kheh-taus, the coolie-brokers who had a root in early Chinese immigration overseas, became very active between Singapore and Chinese treaty ports. When the demand for labour in Singapore, Malaya and the Dutch East-Indies was high, steamers were usually chartered by Chinese supercargoes to go to the treaty ports to get coolies (labourers). With the co-operation of supercargoes and coolie-depots in the ports, the Kheh-taus were able to supply most of the labour demanded. When some Chinese immigrants achieved modest success overseas, owing to the expansion of their commercial activities, they would send for (or return to China to bring back) their sons, nephews, cousins or other relatives. These people could be used as apprentices, shop assistants, clerks to help run the business. This was the second pattern, the kinship-based system, which partly accounted for the influx of the large-scale Chinese immigration to Singapore and Malaya at the end of the nineteenth century. This was mainly plied by the merchants and represented
the greater part of population growth in the big urban areas like Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Malacca and Penang.

These two patterns of immigration formed the basis of the large and more permanent Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya. Poor coolies who came through the Kheh-tau system, were mostly spread in the tin-mining centres and agricultural plantations. They formed the back-bone of the lower social group to whom the Chinese revolutionaries would strongly appeal. Those immigrants who came through the kinship-based system formed the core of the middle social group in the overseas Chinese communities. Indebted and economically dependent on their relatives who brought them over, the revolutionary proclivities of this middle social group members were later curbed to some degree by their merchant relatives.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, two distinctive trends developed in Chinese immigration to Singapore and Malaya. These were the rapid increase of free immigrants and the growth of female immigrants. The former can be seen clearly in the decrease of 'Unpaid Immigrants' to Singapore and Malaya. In 1877, the 'Unpaid Immigrants' still accounted for 27 per cent of the coolies arrived in Singapore, while the percentage from 1895 to 1900 ranged from 12.0 to 14.5.26 This rapid
increase of the Chinese free immigrants resulted from intervention of both the Chinese and Straits Settlements governments. The suppression of the Kheh-taus in Kwangtung province in 1887 reduced the supply of the 'Unpaid Immigrants' from China. The Ordinance passed to license and regulate the immigrant lodging-houses in Singapore in 1896 and the introduction of the Immigrants' Depot Bill in 1897 further weakened the Kheh-tau system. Thus the numbers of free immigrants grew tremendously and later came to form the bulk of the Chinese immigrants to Singapore and Malaya. These free immigrants gradually consolidated the formation of the large and more permanent Chinese communities. Unlike the ticket-credited coolies who fell victim to the Kheh-taus and the employers, the free immigrants had a better opportunity to save up money to start their own business and thus a better chance of success in commercial ventures. More and more of them settled in Singapore and Malaya.

The growth of female immigrants signified a change in the pattern of immigrant composition. Early Chinese immigration to Singapore and Malaya was predominantly male. C.B. Buckley said that up to 1837, no Chinese women had ever come to Singapore from China.
noticed in the mid-nineteenth century that there was a big gap in the sex ratio among the Chinese in the Straits Settlements. The ratio of Chinese males to females was 14.4 to 1 in Singapore in 1860. The shortage of women caused instability in the Chinese communities. Those married men were eager to go back to China to rejoin their families, whereas some of the unmarried men went back to find spouses, and some who could not afford to go back decided to marry local women.

The last decade of the nineteenth century saw the steady increase of Chinese female immigrants. From 1896 to 1900, the number grew from 7,717 to 11,982. The percentage of it to the male immigrants ranged from 5.7 to 8.1. Like the increase of Chinese free immigrants to the Dutch East-Indies, the improvement of communications between China and the Straits Settlements, and the gradual breakdown of restrictions on Chinese women immigration may partially be responsible for the steady growth of the Chinese female immigrants to Singapore and Malaya in this period.

The growth of the female immigrants is significant. It encouraged more male immigrants to settle permanently
(1) (continued)
overseas, and reversed the growing trend of intermarriage between Chinese males and local women. Thus, it helped to preserve Chinese identity and cultural heritage overseas.

(2) Social Structure of the Chinese Communities:

(a) Kinship, Dialect Groups and Social Divisions:
The Chinese have always been known to have elaborate family and clan systems. In traditional Chinese society, the family was a tight-linked unit. It was also the nucleus of all important social life. The clan was composed of families which traced their patrilineal descent to a common ancestor who had first settled in a given locality. These families either lived in the same community or among several nearby communities in the same region. The clan, though not as closely knit as the family, strengthened the ties of the entire group.

Nurtured in village communities where family and kinship ties were even stronger than those in the urban areas, the Chinese immigrants in Singapore and Malaya managed to maintain close ties with their families and clans in South China. Thousands of the immigrants remitted large amounts of money back to China.
Through the changing pattern of immigration, the elaborate family and clan systems were well transplanted into the Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya. The kinship ties which appeared to be quite strong in the villages in Kwangtung and Fukien from which the immigrants were mainly drawn, appeared to be even stronger overseas. Kin groups represent, as analysed by a modern sociologist, the individual's second line of defence. When a person is in danger or in trouble, when he needs help in the performance of an economic task or a ceremonial obligation, he requires a measure of assistance beyond what his own immediate family can provide, he can turn to the members of his larger kin group for aid or succour. The need of the second defence line was more pronounced for the immigrants who were living under a foreign government and among groups of people whose languages were unintelligible to them. Therefore, kinship ties became even stronger. Those migrating to Singapore and Malaya through the kinship-based system were initially dependent on their kinsmen for jobs and financial aid. Those who came as free immigrants also sought help from their kinsmen and relatives from time to time.

As we will see in the chapters which follow, family
and kinship ties played an important part in influencing overseas Chinese in their response to the revolution. Not surprisingly, those with families in China or with kinsmen who were actively against the revolutionaries were less responsive than those with pro-revolutionary kinsmen or relatives.

Besides the kinship ties, there existed another strong social ties based on dialects. Like present Singapore and Malaya, there were five main dialect groups in the Chinese communities before 1900. They were Fukien (Hokkien, speakers of Southern Fukien dialect), Cantonese (Puntai), Hakka (Kheh), Teochew (Techew) and Hainanese (Hailam). These groups were sub-divided into many smaller groups each with its own peculiarities. From a linguistic point of view, three of the five dialect groups, Fukien, Cantonese and Hakka are mutually incomprehensible. Only Fukien, Teochew and Hainanese are broadly intelligible.

The difference between these five dialect groups can probably be further understood in terms of custom and character. It is generally believed that Hakka and Hainanese women were more accustomed to do manual as well as domestic works, whereas Fukien, Teochew and Can-
(2a) (continued)

tonese women tended to confine themselves to household
activities. In terms of character, Cantonese and
Hainanese were popularly considered to be more flexible
and inclined to accept external influence, whereas
Fukien and Teochew tended to be more conservative. 40

Vocational differences should also be taken into
account. According to Siah U Chin, a leading Chinese
merchant in Singapore, there was a clear-cut difference
in occupations between dialect groups in mid-nineteenth
century Singapore. Fukien were mainly agriculturalists,
rice retailers, porters, petty traders, boatmen, masons
and sago manufacturers. Teochew were mainly gambir
and pepper planters, agriculturalists, shopkeepers in
the country side, rice and cloth retailers, fishermen,
seamen, boatmen and vendors in the public market. Macao
(Cantonese) were mainly cabinet makers, carpenters, wood
cutters, sawyers, brick makers, house servants, masons,
tailors and shoemakers. Hakka were mostly petty
traders, blacksmiths, house builders, tailors, shoe-
makers and makers of wooden boxes. Hainanese were almost
all shop servants and servants in the country. 41 These
differences among the Chinese dialect groups appeared
to have been perpetuated in Malaya. 42
All these various differences contributed to the creation of social divisions and conflict in the Chinese communities. Different dialect groups formed their own associations based on place of origin in China. For the five main dialect groups, there were Kong Chau Wui Kun, Wui Shiu Fui Kon, Hokkien Hoe Kuan and Kheng Chiu Hoe Kuan for Cantonese, Hakka, Fukien and Hainanese respectively. Apart from these, there were numerous associations for other small dialect groups. For instance, there were Hsin Ning, Hsiang Shan, Nan Hai, Shun Tê, Pan Yü, Hsin Hui, Hsin An and Ho Shan associations in the Cantonese community in mid-nineteenth century Penang.

Socially, the dialect associations offered opportunities for sharing news and reminiscences about the home districts as well as for recreation. But more important functions of the associations were to provide social welfare services and protection to new immigrants and those who needed material help. Usually rich merchants were elected as the leaders of their respective dialect groups. They contributed large sums of money to keep the associations going, and in return, they commanded respect in their own dialect groups. Through dialect associations, many leaders were able to influence the
attitudes of the members toward anything. Thus, we will see later, both revolutionaries and reformists were competing in winning the support of the leaders of dialect groups.

In social life, dialect groups maintained their own customs and heritage. Although they did not differ very much from one another in general outlook (in religious belief, marriage and funeral customs), linguistic difference still drew a very clear line between them. Each group had its own temple, its own burial ground, and its own school. In Singapore, the Fukien group had a temple named 'T'ien Fu Kung', Teochew maintained 'Yueh Hai Ch'ing Temple', and Cantonese 'Fu Tê Tz'ü' worshipping different deities. Although there was no written regulation limiting worshippers from other dialect groups, people used to worship the deities whom they revered. This naturally limited the scope of their religious activities. Furthermore, each main dialect group sponsored its own religious procession in honour of its deities, and the procession was usually confined to its own members. The Singapore Fukien group held a procession to honour its deities, Pao Shêng Ta Ti
(2a) (continued)

and T'ien Fei every three years; whereas the Cantonese group had its procession once a year for its own deities. In burial aspect, the Fukien group in Singapore had its burial ground 'Hêng Shan T'ing', the Cantonese had its 'P'i Shan T'ing'. The idea of having separate cemeteries was not only the natural result of the social grouping on the basis of dialect difference, but was probably designed to separate the spirits of the deaths from other dialect groups to whom the language was unintelligible. These cemeteries were exclusive to the respective dialect groups.

Divisions between the groups were also manifest in education. Before the rise of modern Chinese schools in Singapore and Malaya at the turn of the present century, leaders from different dialect groups had already founded schools for their own children. There were three Chinese schools in Singapore in 1829 (ten years after the founding of Singapore), two of them were Cantonese, the other was a Fukien. Apparently one school could not meet the needs of the growing Fukien population. Thus, Tan Kim-seng and twelve other Fukien leaders, founded the famous Chinese Free School (Ts'ui Ying Shu Yüan) in 1854. This school was restricted to children of the Fukien community in
Singapore.

The entrenched social divisions among the dialect groups tended naturally to lead to misunderstanding, suspicion, hostility and conflict. Clashes among the dialect groups frequently broke out throughout Singapore and Malaya before the turn of the present century. All these differences later proved to be the main obstacles in the way of revolutionary activities in Singapore and Malaya.

(b) Social Stratification and Mobility:

In comparison with the social structure in China, the overseas Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya were not clearly stratified. Roughly that society was divided into Shang (merchants, traders, planters and tin-miners) and Kung (artisans, craftsmen, shop assistants, clerks, school teachers, tin-mining workers, gardeners and employees in plantations). This special structure was a result of several factors. Firstly, the establishment and growth of the Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya were not spontaneous. For the communities were created by the British administrators to meet the demand of rapid economic development.
Secondly, the structure of the communities was largely determined by the nature of the Chinese immigration. From the immigration records mentioned earlier, we know that the early Chinese settlers were merchants and political refugees, and later poverty-striken peasants. It was clear that the members of the scholar-gentry in China did not come to Singapore and Malaya. Thirdly, there was lacking a hereditary group, such as the imperial and non-imperial nobility in China.

For the purpose of our study, we can roughly divide this rather mis-shapen social pyramid into three strata. The upper social group comprised mainly the wealthiest merchants, such as import and export merchants, bankers, shipping company proprietors, big agency house owners, tin-miners, gambir and pepper planters, opium and liquor farmers. The middle social group comprised shop-keepers, retailers, petty traders, clerks, shop-assistants, artisans, craftsmen, tailors and mechanics. The lower social group which formed the broad base of the pyramid, was composed of tin-mining workers, employees in gambir, pepper and rubber plantations, domestic servants, rickshaw pullers
and hawkers.

Owing to the absence of scholar-gentry and nobility classes, the overseas Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya had no very pronounced social distinction and prejudice, and the rate of vertical mobility was high. The main determinant of social mobility was wealth. Men who made money automatically moved up towards the apex of the pyramid, and those who lost it descended. This two-way movement appeared to have been confined to the individual and not to the group. There was no indication that a new social stratum would be formed by these ascending and descending individuals. Although towards the end of the nineteenth century, there was a small group of intellectuals who moved up the scale by means of their educational qualifications, it was not large enough to form a new social group to fill the vacuum of a scholar-gentry class in the Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya.

As wealth was the prime determinant of rank, and as diligence and thrift were the common virtues of most of the Chinese immigrants, it seems that theoretically all immigrants had an equal chance to improve
their social status. But in practice, there were three conditions which determined the potentiality for and speed of upward mobility: personal intelligence and adaptability to environment, kinship relations, capability of overcoming certain social disqualifications (see below). It is certain that the new commercial economy of Singapore and Malaya in the late nineteenth century provided ample opportunity for the immigrants to make money. Those with talent were able to observe and to exploit their opportunity, and those who could adapt to the new environment would tend to mix with other dialect groups freely, and become conversant in other dialects and languages to meet the demands of the new environment. By these means, they enhanced their prospects of making money. Those who had kinsmen and relatives overseas also stood a better chance of becoming wealthy, for they could rely on help rendered by their kinsmen and relatives. It was not unusual to find that with such financial aid, immigrants from China could become shop-owners traders after only a few years service as shop assistants and apprentices. The capability of overcoming social disqualifications or 'evils' was the decisive factor in determining the possibility and rate of progress.
(2b) (continued)
These 'evils' included gambling, drinking and opium-smoking.58 Those who could resist these temptations possessed the easier road to advancing their prospects. The height and speed of upward climbing depended on the combination of all these factors.

As will be shown later, the absence of a scholar-gentry class and nobility would enable the revolutionaries to appeal more freely in the Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya. The absence of a clear-cut social distinction provided those revolutionary activists (mostly from middle and upper social groups) with ample opportunity to mix with members of the lower social group.

(3) Secret Societies.

(a) Origins. Like the dialect and clannish organizations, the secret societies formed an important part of the social fabric of the Chinese communities in nineteenth and early twentieth century Singapore and Malaya. Before their suppression in 1890, the secret societies became a semi-legal form of self-government in the Chinese communities: protection of life and properties, allocations of jobs and settling of disputes among members. Because of the Straits Settlements
(3a) (continued)
government's lenient policy, they assumed a greater control over the Chinese in the communities through the forms of intimidation, blackmail and violence, such as recruiting newly arrived immigrants by force, and protection over opium and gambling houses and brothels. Personal feuds, factional quarrels over sphere of influence frequently led to armed clashes which had greatly affected life and properties of all Chinese, and threatened the public security as a whole.

There were many secret societies in nineteenth century Singapore and Malaya. Principal among them were the Ghee Hin, the Hai San, the Ho Seng, the Ghee Hok and the Toh Peh Kong.\(^\text{59}\) It is generally believed that all these societies were the offshoots of a parent society known as the Triad. The Triad, which was also known as the Hung League (Hung Mên) or the Society of Heaven and Earth (T'ien Ti Hui),\(^\text{60}\) was founded several centuries ago, and has prospered in the south of the Yangtze River. It appeared to be a quasi-religious sect and changed to a secret political organization against the Ch'ing dynasty at the end of the seventeenth century after the Chinese resistance to the Manchu conquerors was doomed to failure.\(^\text{61}\)
(b) The Triad's history in Singapore and Malaya.

As the majority of Chinese immigrants came from the southern maritime provinces of China (Fukien, Kwangtung and Kwangsi) where the Triad Society prospered, it is not surprising to find that many of them were Triad members, and had brought along the secret organization to Singapore and Malaya. From the available evidence, it is suggested that the Triad was firmly established in the Straits Settlements at the beginning of the nineteenth century. In 1799, the Triad was first recorded in Penang as a source of trouble to the local government. By 1825, there were at least four secret societies, Ghee Hin, Ho Seng, Hai San and Wah Sang, firmly entrenched themselves in the island. Almost at the same time, the Triad was reported to have widely spread in Singapore and Malacca. One account in 1826 said that the Triad in Malacca was able to muster 4,000 men from the different plantations and tin mines in the interior, added to those at Malacca itself. The society gradually gained its momentum after 1840. By that year, an estimated 7,000 Triad brethrens in the Straits was given. Added to this momentum was a new situation of Triad in Southeast Asia resulting from several factors at work. The political stability and economic opportunity in the
Straits Settlements and the government's lenient policy towards secret societies had naturally attracted Triad's attention; in the years between 1845 and 1846, both the Hong Kong and the Dutch East Indies governments outlawed the secret societies, a number of them moved to the Straits to seek shelter. It was said that about two to three thousand Triad members came over to Singapore from Rhio islands, and scattered through the jungle without means of subsistence. The coming of a large number of Triad members to the Straits in 1853 after their abortive uprising in Amoy in response to the Taiping Rebellion had further consolidated the Straits Settlements as the centre of Triad activities in Southeast Asia. By 1876, an official estimate of the members of 'Dangerous Societies' in Singapore and Penang alone was 34,776.

The rapid increase in number not only reflected the expansion of strength of various secret societies, but also meant an increase of lawlessness of their activities. Most of them engaged in extortion, shielding criminals and recruiting new immigrants by force. Their rivalry frequently led to murders, arsons, street fights and riots. In a period of about
forty years (1846-1889), a series of riots occurred in the Straits Settlements among which twelve were serious outbreaks. Most of these involved heavy loss of human lives and properties and constituted an enormous threat to public security. The Penang Riot of 1867, for example, involved some 30,000 Chinese and 4,000 Malay (about a quarter of the total population of Penang and Province Wellesley) in a bloody fight which lasted for about a month, and a sum of $60,000 (Spanish) was estimated to be lost as a result of the riot.74

In reacting to secret society's activities and unrest, the government of the Straits Settlements adopted a slow and cautious approach. In a period of slightly more than ninety years (1799-1890), the policy evolved gradually from complete toleration to attempt of suppression, and to final suppression. In the first period (1799-1878), a laissez faire policy was adopted, which allowed secret societies to thrive without curb.75 The transfer of the Straits Settlements from the Indian government to the Colonial Office in 1867 marked a change of the policy. A system of registration was put into effect after 1869. The new legislation required all societies to be registered with
detail information. This enabled the government to obtain a good deal of information about headmen, organization and strength of all the secret societies, and to exercise a wholesome control over the headmen.\textsuperscript{76} This system of control was only effective at the beginning, and was proved inadequate to cope with mounting criminal activities of secret society members towards the end of 1890's. The government's determination to completely suppress these societies was prompted by an attempt on Mr. Pickering's (the Protector of Chinese) life made by a member of secret society in July 1887.\textsuperscript{77} The new governor, Sir Cecil Smith who took the governorship of the Strait Settlements in October 1887, took the lead to introduce a new ordinance for suppression in 1889.\textsuperscript{78}

With the introduction of the new ordinance, all secret societies were outlawed, secret insignias and ancestral tablets were required to burn publicly,\textsuperscript{79} and heavy penalty were imposed on those who managed an unlawful society. This new policy only drove the secret societies underground. In order to meet the government's suppression, the societies had to strengthen the secret aspect of their organizations, and to make themselves more effective in action. This
(3b) (continued)
was the situation of secret societies in the Straits Settlements before the coming of the revolutionaries in 1900.

(c) Organization, Social Composition and Possible Relations with the Revolutionaries.

There can be no doubt that organization of most secret societies in Singapore and Malaya was modelled after their parental society—the Triad in China. Although there was some variation in different localities, most of them were organized in a simple two-strata structure: a small minority of ruling officials and a majority of rank and file. The ruling body generally composed of one Elder Brother (Tai Ko), one Second Brother (Yi Ko), one Third Brother (Sam Ko), one Master (Sin Shang, or Teacher), one Instructor (Pak Shin, or White Fan), two Introducers (Sin Fung, or Vanguard), one Executioner (Hung Kwan, or Red Staff), ten Councillors (Yi Sz), one Treasurer (Kwai Shi, or Key of the Safe), one Receiver (Sau Kwai, or Receiver of the Safe), one Assistant Receiver (Toi Sau Kwai), and then followed by a number of detectives (Ts'o Hai, or Grass Shoes), Messengers (T'iet Pan, or Iron Planks) and Recruiters (Toi Ma, or Hoarse Leader). Among these officials, the first three leaders were most powerful. With the help of few of their close subordinates such
as the Master, Executioner and Treasurer, they controlled the whole society. The main functions of these three top leaders were: the charge of the book of rules and records, the settling of disputes, the management of funds, the election, instruction and interpretation of rules, and the decision of waging war or peace. The Master and Executioner also wielded enormous influence in the society, both were entrusted to conduct the swearing in ceremony of new members and other festival ceremonies.

One of the main characteristics of the secret society organization was an absence of a marked difference between the ruling officials and the rank and file. The three top leaders were only addressed as the Elder Brother, Second Brother and Third Brother. The use of these terms may give ordinary member an impression that they were governed and guided by certain people who were older in age and senior in joining the society rather than different in status. Apart from this, all members were generally called Hiung Ti (brethren) to each other. This equalitarian spirit served as one of the important bases of solidarity of the organization, for it narrowed the gap between the ruling and the ruled, and enabled ordinary members to
feel that they had a stake in the destiny of the organization.

Perhaps the most important element in the solidarity of a secret society was brotherhood. All members were bound by an oath which was based on a ceremony of drinking one another's blood. The basic ingredients of brotherhood were mutual help and loyalty to each other which were codified in the famous 36 oaths and other rules. To guarantee the lasting of the brotherhood and to safeguard the society, severe punishments were given to those who violated the oaths and to betray the society. It is notable that this principle of brotherhood was not only used to cement the relationship among members, but also used as a means by the ruling body to demand unreserved loyalty and faithfulness from rank and file.

Another important principle of secret society organization was secrecy. Secrecy, analysed by a leading sociologist, is the basis of reciprocal confidence among members of a secret society. Secrecy was obviously essential to an organization like Triad which had such strong political objective of overthrowing the Ch'ing dynasty. Although the political
aspect of the Triad had lost when it spread to Singapore and Malaya, it still struggled to maintain an imperium in imperio in local Chinese communities. Secrecy was particularly necessary when the Triad was driven completely underground after the suppression in 1890. Thus a new member was required to swear that he would keep everything in secret not even to let his parents, wife and children to know. Besides he was taught the use of secret signs and watchwords to identify a brother and to seek help. Severe punishments were also imposed to those who revealed secrets of the society.

The question of social origins of the members of secret societies is a matter of general interest, but the nature of the secret society and scarcity of statistical evidence prevent us to make a definite statement of this subject. However the impression of European and Chinese observers was that the majority of secret society members were drawn from the lower social group in the overseas Chinese communities. They were poor, illiterate, and had close connections with gambling, opium-smoking, robbery, rioting and other criminal activities. This impression, however, should not lead us to conclude that the leadership of secret
societies was also drawn from that social group. On the contrary suggestions have been made that there was a close connection between secret society headmen and commercial group. Prominent Chinese commercial magnates such as Yap Ah Loy of Kuala Lumpur, Chang Keng Qwee of Perak and Chan Ah Yam of Penang were actually the leaders of the leading secret societies. This connection can be further illustrated by a statistical evidence derived from several lists of secret society leaders in Singapore and Penang for the period between 1881 to 1889. A close examination of the lists reveals that 9 out of 21 leaders in Singapore were merchants (gambir trader, rice-shop keeper, opium-shop keeper and spirit-shop keeper), and 24 out of 40 leaders whose occupations are traceable in Penang were also merchants (including shop-keeper, opium retailer, lime-dealer, planter, cigar-seller, rice-shop keeper, tin-miner, depot-keeper, sirl-planter and sugar-planter). These figures represent 43% and 60% of secret society leadership in Singapore and Penang respectively.

The reasons for this fact are not difficult to be found. Firstly, in a political setting like 19th century Singapore and Malaya, where the Chinese communities were left comparatively uninterfered with, secret societies
became an important means of social control. Whoever controlled them would wield enormous influence in the communities, and thus became de facto leaders. Secondly, most Chinese merchants had some difficulties in their commercial activities, such as enforcing fulfilment of business contracts,\(^9\) getting supply of materials and finding markets, and competing with business rivals. The use of secret society influence would partly solve these problems. It has been suggested that the use of secret societies in acquiring and ruling mining labourers was one of the two important factors for the supremacy of Chinese mining industry in Malaya before 1874.\(^9\)

It has been widely suggested that the Triad had degenerated from a political-oriented society to an evil-making organization after it was transplanted into overseas Chinese communities.\(^1\) The prime reason for this is probably due to the change of geographical environment. Living under the British colonial rule in Singapore and Malaya, it would be quite unrealistic for the Triad to work for the overthrow of the Manchu rule in China.\(^1\) However, the anti-Ch'ing tradition was still embodied in its rituals and ceremonies which could be revived by some external stimulants. It would be useful for us to know how the anti-Ch'ing spirit was instilled in
the minds of the new members. Before a new member was admitted, he was required to undergo an elaborate initiation ceremony. In the course of this performance, no matter how ignorant he was, he must have been constantly impressed by such a political tradition. In the preparatory stage for the ceremony, the candidate was required to have part of his queue (or lock of the hair) cut off and then arranged in the ancient Ming fashion (in the days of Ming the Chinese wore their hair long, but made up into a kind of bun at the back), and was clothed in white garments made in Ming style. Apart from these, he must have gradually instilled with anti-Ch'ing and pro-Ming feeling by repeating anti-Manchu slogans contained in verses recited to him by an Introducer (Sin Fung), such as 'we may serve the Prince of Ming', 'to overthrow Ch'ing and restore Ming is agreeable to Heaven', 'help our Lord to mount the throne and the days of Ming shall come', and 'you may sit in the temple of Ming'. He was further ingrained with anti-Ch'ing ideas when the Master (Sin Shang) who conducted the ceremony narrated the traditional history of the Triad which had its anti-Ch'ing roots in the 17th Century. The story of the Five Ancestors must have
been quite inspiring to him, for he had probably been familiar with this sort of story narrated by village elders in his home town before he joined the society.\textsuperscript{103} The slogan of 'Overthrow the Ch'ing and restore the Ming' which repeatedly appeared in the traditional history must have left a deep impression in his mind.\textsuperscript{104}

In the consecration and opening of the Lodge ceremony, the Master further urged the candidate to take 'Overthrowing the Ch'ing and restore the Ming' as his responsibility. The political aspect of the society which had lost in obscurity was again projected to the mind of the new recruit through some lofty ideas, such as 'with the downfall of the barbarians comes unity, and Ming shall reign again for thousand years' and 'the sons of Hung shall recover the Empire for Ming, to follow the ways of Heaven we must rise and put an end to Ch'ing.'\textsuperscript{105} When the Master was performing the opening ceremony at the Red Flower Pavilion, the last stage of the initiation ceremony, he made clear to the new recruits that the main object of the society was to expel the Ch'ing and restore the Ming, and declared solemnly that 'we will do our utmost to restore territories to Ming that its heirs may sit on the throne for ever and ever.'\textsuperscript{106} Perhaps the
performance which had impressed the new member most was the oath which he had to repeat after the Master. He had to swear solemnly the sentence that 'I will use my best endeavour to overthrow the Ch'ing and restore the Ming', the sentence which he had frequently heard during the ceremony.

It is of course difficult to judge how much psychological effect had those anti-Ch'ing symbols, slogans and oath exerted on those new members. It would seem reasonable to suggest that all these had instilled some anti-Manchu ideas in their minds, and these ideas would undoubtedly serve as a link between them and the Chinese revolutionaries.

Apart from this anti-Ch'ing tradition, secret societies had also provided certain advantages for the revolutionaries to associate with. Firstly, the widespread Triad branches in Southeast Asia and North America provided the revolutionaries a ready made organization to operate. Revolutionary activists who frequently escaped from apprehension of the Ch'ing authorities, could secure shelter and financial help through such connections. Secondly, the revolutionaries could more easily recruit new members through the
(3c) (continued)

influence of secret societies. Later events will show how Yu Lieh, a revolutionary and secret society leader, used such influence to establish the Chung Ho T'ang in Singapore and Malaya. Thirdly, the principles of loyalty and brotherhood which secret societies emphasized in the 36 oaths and other rules were also part of the new values the revolutionaries intended to introduce. The possession of such principles by the secret society members had certainly facilitated their acceptance of revolutionary ideas.

Fourthly, the oath taking practice, the secret signs and watchwords which were used to safeguard security of secret societies were also necessary for effective function of the revolutionary party which required secret operation to achieve its aims. It is claimed that the organization of the Hsing Chung Hui, the earliest revolutionary party founded by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1894, was patterned after secret societies, and its oath-taking practice (later also followed by the T'ung Mêng Hui) was also derived from the same source.

(4) Traditional Ideas in the Chinese Communities:

As the Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya were not formed by natural growth, but by
immigration, most of the Chinese traditional ideas were transplanted into the overseas communities. Many traditional ideas were well observed in nineteenth century China with regard to family, kinship, social and national relations, such as filial piety, chastity, reverence of the old, loyalty etc. We will confine ourselves to an examination of filial piety and loyalty, the two most important ideas associated with the response to the revolution.

The filial duty was a deep-rooted traditional conception which permeated all social classes in China. Some tangible evidence of its strict observance by the overseas Chinese can be seen in their annual remittance of large sums of money back to China to support their parents. The significance of this to our study may be found not so much in its narrow literal sense, but in the ideas derived from it. The idea of glorifying a family's name and ancestors (光宗耀祖) is particularly significant. According to Chinese Traditional practice, the ancestors and parents of those who attained prominence in government service were invested with appropriate titles, and the families were honoured.
Thus, the Chinese usually demanded that their children to study and work hard to achieve fame and honour for their families. In the overseas Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya, the idea of glorifying a family's name and ancestors also prevailed in all social groups, particularly in the commercial circle. The overseas Chinese merchants, who had difficulty finding places in the imperial bureaucracy in China, obtained official titles and honour from the Ch'ing government through purchase.\(^{110}\) Apparently the purchased titles did not bring them much real political authority or economic benefit, but they did give them prestige and honour with which they fulfilled the idea of glorifying family and ancestors. Examples of this are numerous, Wu I'ting, a leading merchant in Singapore and the holder of Kuan Ch'a title, celebrated the occasion of being given a tablet deed by the Ch'ing court in June 1888.\(^{111}\) Khoo Seok-wan, the famous reformist leader in Singapore who later put his support behind the Ch'ing government after 1900, celebrated magnificently his acquisition of the Chu Shih and the Fourth Rank (\(\text{ɪɪ}_2\text{ɪ}_1\)). More than five hundred guests (mostly kinsmen, relatives, and fellow villagers) attended
The quest for titles and rank from the Ch'ing government naturally deterred many overseas Chinese merchants from supporting the revolution, and on many occasions the holders (and questors) identified their interests with those of the Ch'ing government, and worked in opposition to revolutionary activities in Singapore and Malaya.

The second traditional idea prevailing in the overseas Chinese communities was loyalty. Again, this idea was deep-rooted in all social classes in China. 'Loyalty to emperor' was one of Confucius' basic teachings. In the peasant class in China, the idea of 'Loyalty to emperor and the nation' had been diligently cultivated by the Ch'ing government since the founding of the dynasty. This traditional idea appeared to be generally accepted among overseas Chinese before the coming of the revolutionaries. The founding of the Chinese Consulate in Singapore in 1877 undoubtedly helped to strengthen the idea. One of the Consul's main functions was to foster loyalty among the Emperor's overseas subjects.
On occasions such as the birthdays of the Emperor Kuang Hsu and the Empress Dowager Tzu Hsi, he gathered together the Chinese leaders to pay their homage. Solemn ceremonies were held at the Consulate in which rites of prostration were performed. The strong allegiance paid to the Manchu rulers by the overseas Chinese in Singapore and Malaya was also demonstrated on the occasion of the Emperor Kuang Hsu's marriage and his formal accession to the throne on 26 February and 4 March 1889. On these two days most Chinese in Singapore closed their shops in celebration of the occasion. Chinese leaders went to the Consulate to pay their allegiance. Shops and houses were decorated with flowers, lanterns, red cloths and illuminations, and special performances of dramas were given.

These traditional expressions of loyalty tended to hinder overseas Chinese response to revolutionary activities. The hard-line conservatives adopted this principle as a standard of everyday behaviour and regarded the anti-Ch'ing faction as traitors. This branding of the revolutionaries as traitors undoubtedly helped to retard the spread of revolutionary doctrines in a situation where there was no
clear distinction between the concepts of opposition to the regime and betrayal of the nation. 122
CHAPTER II

CHINESE REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES IN SINGAPORE AND MALAYA BEFORE 1906

(1) The Arrival of the Chinese Revolutionaries in the Straits Settlements:

The earliest contact between Chinese revolutionaries and overseas Chinese in Singapore and Malaya began in 1895. In that year, when China was forced to sign the humiliating Shimonoseki Treaty with Japan, Dr Sun Yat-sen and his Hsing Chung Hui members, with both overseas Chinese and secret society support, staged the first armed revolt in Canton. The failure of this revolt brought the Chinese revolutionaries closer to overseas Chinese, for the Ch'ing government offered handsome rewards for their apprehension,¹ and they had to take refuge abroad.

Yang Ch'u-yün, one of the leaders of the Hsing Chung Hui in Hong Kong, came to Singapore on his way to South Africa where he was seeking refuge.² Although it was the first time that Yang had visited Singapore, he must have known something of its predominantly Chinese population. His grandfather had stayed in Penang for some time, and his father was born and educated there to the age of sixteen.³ As an assistant manager of a foreign firm in
Hong Kong, Yang must have been quite familiar with Singapore with which city Hong Kong had much commercial contact. More important was his knowledge about the local Chinese secret societies. As the leader of the Hsing Chung Hui, which had strong sympathies with secret societies in Hong Kong, Yang must have known of the considerable influence of secret societies in the Chinese community in Singapore.

A few years earlier, Yang had been provided with the names and addresses of secret society leaders. During his short stay in Singapore, he approached some of these men. His intention was to enlist more members for the Hsing Chung Hui, and to expand revolutionary activities in Southeast Asia. Although no Hsing Chung Hui branch was set up there, he did enlist some members, and left some influence in the local Chinese community.

From 1895 to 1900 there was no further contact between the Chinese revolutionaries and overseas Chinese in Singapore and Malaya. In this period, the situation both in China and abroad were unfavourable to the revolutionary movement. Overseas Chinese, like their kith and kin in China, had a traditional reverence for the concept of absolute monarchy. They believed the emperor to be heaven's sole representative on earth to govern all
men, and regarded those acting against the ruling dynasty as rebels and traitors. When Sun organized the Hsing Chung Hui in Hawaii, his only followers were his elder brother and some ten others. After the failure of the first revolt in Canton, Sun became known throughout China and overseas as a gangster and a rebel. He was described by newspapers as a monster with red eyebrows and green eyes as had traditionally been described for a bandit chief. For this reason, Dr Sun and the Hsing Chung Hui leaders confined their activities to Hong Kong, Japan and Honolulu. This obviated any contact with the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya during the last five years of the century.

The traditional attitude towards revolution only partially explains the general inactivity of the revolutionary movement and its lack of contact with overseas Chinese in Singapore and Malaya. The attention of the overseas Chinese, like their compatriots in China, was directed to the reform movement. The movement appeared on the political scene almost simultaneously with that of the revolutionaries. In May 1895 K'ang Yu-wei (1858-1927), the national leader of the reformists, led a group of more than 1200 provincial graduates (Chū-jên) to petition the throne. It advocated rejecting the peace treaty with
Japan, moving the capital inland for prolonged war, and undertaking a multitude of reforms. This memorial inaugurated the reform movement in China. The movement steadily grew in strength, and obtained the support of the scholar-gentry and some enlightened officers. But it failed to grasp power in 1898.

After the coup d'état in 1898, the reformists were driven from China, and brought closer to the overseas Chinese. Although they suffered defeat in China, their presence was still preferred by the overseas Chinese to that of the revolutionaries, for the reformist appeal was more moderate in tone, and it required less sacrifice and risk. For this reason, the contact between the revolutionaries and the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya was further obstructed between 1898 and 1900.

In 1900, while China was suddenly engulfed by a startling wave of anti-foreign frenzy, the revolutionaries were preparing to stage an uprising in South China to further their political aims. This preparation for an uprising had incidentally brought the revolutionary leaders into a second brief contact with the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya.

In planning an uprising in South China, Dr Sun's Japanese friend, Miyazaki Torazo proposed to join with the
reformists, and promised to approach K'ang Yu-wei in Singapore. Sun approved this scheme and Miyazaki with his two friends, Kiyofuji and Uchida, proceeded to Singapore. As soon as they arrived in Singapore in June 1900, Miyazaki sent a letter to K'ang asking for an interview. But K'ang had been led to believe that these few Japanese were sent by the Ch'ing government to assassinate him. For this reason, he refused to see them but instead approached the government of the Straits Settlements to have Miyazaki and Kiyofuji arrested.

The news of detention of Miyazaki and Kiyofuji frustrated Dr Sun. He had to rush to Singapore to save his friends from Saigon where he had an important task to raise funds for the uprising in South China. He arrived in Singapore on 9 July 1900. Although this was his first visit to this famous port, Singapore had been known to him for a long time. During his university days in Hong Kong, Sun had two schoolmates from Singapore and Malaya, Dr Wu Chieh-wu and Dr Wong I-ek. From them, he probably had learned a great deal of the local situation. Like Yang Ch'u-yün, Sun had also been provided with the names and addresses of the leaders of secret societies in Singapore and Malaya. In 1899 Sun was made the head of an alliance with the two big secret societies in South China.
he must have been well informed about secret societies overseas.

With the help of Dr Lim Boon-keng and Dr Wu Chieh-wu, Sun succeeded in rescuing his Japanese friends. With prejudice against the revolutionaries, the government of the Straits Settlements then deported Dr Sun and the two Japanese from Singapore for five years.

Apart from saving the Japanese, Sun contacted several leading intellectuals. Besides Dr Lim Boon-keng and Dr Wu Chieh-wu, Sun's meeting with Huang Nai-shang was significant. Huang was originally a reformist, who submitted eight petitions for reform when the movement was at its peak. After the coup d'etat in 1898, he fled from Peking to Singapore. He was becoming more radical as the conditions in China deteriorated. As Huang began to doubt the value of his reform ideology in saving China and was in quest of more radical ideology, the meeting with Sun had pulled him closer to revolution. He was impressed by Sun's demeanour, devotion and unfading belief in revolution. All these helped to dispel his prejudice against the revolutionaries. Although Huang did not join the Hsing Chung Hui immediately after the meetings with Sun, he began to read revolutionary publications and gradually changed his political belief from reform.
to revolution. The significance of the change of Huang's political belief lies not only in the fact that he became one of the important revolutionary activists in Singapore and Malaya after 1903, but also in his influence in the Chinese intellectual circle in Singapore in which he was a leading figure.16

Although this contact did not produce any constructive result,17 it did bring Singapore and Malaya closer to the revolutionary movement, and pave the way for future contacts between Dr Sun Yat-sen and the local Chinese revolutionary leaders.

Leaving Singapore in these unhappy circumstances, Dr Sun and his two Japanese friends proceeded to Japan to plan the revolt in South China. Taking advantage of the chaotic situation in North China caused by the Boxer Uprising, the revolutionaries staged the second revolt in Waichow in October 1900. Owing to the lack of supply of arms and ammunition, the revolt failed.18

This failure marked an important contact between the Chinese revolutionaries and overseas Chinese in Singapore and Malaya. For immediately after the defeat of the revolt at the end of 1900, several leaders who had been deeply involved in it had to seek refuge in Singapore.19 These leaders had strong associations with the secret
societies in south Kwangtung,\textsuperscript{20} which had some connections with the secret societies in Southeast Asia. For this reason, Singapore was chosen by them for taking refuge.

Apart from the fact that Singapore was the centre of secret societies in Southeast Asia which attracted these early revolutionary refugees, Singapore had other claims to be an ideal place for refuge. Although it is further away than Hong Kong to China, it is much nearer to China than from Honolulu and America. Like Hong Kong, Singapore had a predominantly Chinese population in which the influence of the secret societies was strong, and it also had a sizable Cantonese community.\textsuperscript{21} Any Cantonese-speaking revolutionary could easily fit in the social environment. More important, the British colonial governments in the Straits Settlements and the Federated Malay States were engaged in economic development programmes and encouraged more Chinese immigrants from China through Hong Kong and other Chinese treaty ports. Thus, revolutionary refugees could easily enter Singapore and Malaya by mixing with new immigrants, and earn a living there without difficulty. For these reasons, Singapore became one of the most important centres for revolutionary refugees in the period under study.
Soon after the arrival of this small group of revolutionary refugees, there came an important revolutionary leader, Yu Lieh, to Singapore at the beginning of 1901. The coming of Yu marked the turning point of early revolutionary contact with the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, for it was Yu who laid a solid foundation for revolutionary activities and encouraged the growth of local revolutionary movement in these areas. Yu, a native of Shun Tê district of Kwantung, had a long revolutionary career and close association with secret societies. Before the founding of the Hsing Chung Hui in 1894, Yu was already a revolutionary. Together with Dr Sun Yat-sen, Yang Ch'u-yûn and Ch'en Shao-pai, Yu was called by the inhabitants of Hong Kong as one of 'The Four Radicals' (四大寇) which resulted from their frequent discussion of rebelling against the Manchu government. Thus, when the Hsing Chung Hui Headquarters was founded in Hong Kong, he became one of the leaders of the party. In view of his close association with the secret society in his home district, Yu was appointed as the party's representative in making contact with secret societies in the Yangtze valley in preparation for the Waichow Revolt in 1900. The betrayal by the secret societies which was partially responsible for the defeat of the Waichow Revolt
convinced Yu that secret societies could not be used as the main force for revolutionary uprising unless their members had been indoctrinated. This belief led him to begin to organize and indoctrinate secret society and members of the lower social group for revolutionary purposes. Thus, after his flight to Yokohama, Japan, following the defeat of the revolt, Yu began to contact local Chinese workers and secret society members and founded a club named Chung Ho T'ang. Although it had no formal association with the Hsing Chung Hui, it immediately became a strong affiliated revolutionary organization.²⁵ Because the Chinese population in Yokohama was small, and the scope for Yu to expand his influence was limited, he decided to move to Singapore where overseas Chinese population was predominant. His decision might have been influenced by Dr. Sun who had been there before and had observed its potential to become an important revolutionary base.

Unlike the two previous contacts by Yang Ch'ü-yün and Dr. Sun Yat-sen, these early revolutionary refugees came to stay and earn a living in Singapore. They began to contact local Chinese, to preach revolutionary message, thus, revolutionary activities began to spread in this part of the world.
After arriving in Singapore, these early refugees faced many difficulties in spreading the revolutionary message. They discerned that the reformist influence had spread throughout the island and the local government's attitude was hostile towards them. Before the coming of K'ang Yu-wei, the reformist national leader, to Singapore in February 1900, there was a spontaneous reform movement. Two prominent leaders of the movement were Lim Boon-keng and Khoo Seok-wan. Lim, the most energetic and enthusiastic leader of the two, was born in 1869 in Singapore. He had most of his formal education in English, and was the first Straits Chinese who won a Queen's Scholarship to study medicine in Edinburgh University and in 1892 took his degrees of M.B., C.M.,. After returning to the Straits in 1893, he made a very successful medical career, and began to interest himself in public life. In 1895, he was appointed by the government of the Straits Settlements to succeed Seah Liang Seah as the Chinese member of the Legislative Council. Through the influence of his father-in-law, Huang Nai-shang, and the events occurred in China, his reformist outlook was gradually shaped.

From 1897 onwards, Lim became actively engaged in carrying out a dynamic reform movement in Singapore and
Malaya. Under his and Khoo Seok-wan's auspices, several institutions such as The Chinese Philomatic Society, The Diligent Study Society (Hao Hsueh Hui), the Straits Chinese Magazine and two Chinese newspapers (T'ien-Nan-Hsin Pao and Jih Hsin Pao) were founded between 1897 and 1899 to mobilize both English and Chinese educated intellectuals behind the movement.\textsuperscript{26e} Using these organizations as instruments, they preached doctrine of reformation; popularized the teachings of Confucius; discussed events taking place in China; advocated the cutting of T'ao-chang (queue); abolition of foot-binding, equal educational opportunity for women, and the rid of opium smoking, gambling and superstition.\textsuperscript{26f} To put theory into practice, they further sponsored and financed the establishment of Confucian temples and opening of new-style Chinese primary schools and a girl school in Singapore.\textsuperscript{26g}

This strenuous reform movement which had wide support among Chinese intellectuals and merchants, minimized the opportunity for the revolutionary appeals. Some of the rich merchants who were known by the local people as 'The Seven Big Commercial Magnates' were particularly hostile towards revolutionary doctrines. They even threatened to harm those who preached revol-
utionary ideology in the Chinese communities.\textsuperscript{27} Added to this difficulty was the hostile attitude of the local government. Strictly speaking, the British government did not have a definite and consistent policy dealing with the Chinese revolutionaries. During the period of our study, measures taken by the Straits Settlements and Hong Kong governments towards the Chinese political refugees (reformists and revolutionaries) differed from time to time. In the early period of the Chinese reformist and revolutionary activities in Singapore (1896-1906), the government of the Straits Settlements frequently showed its benevolence towards the reformist leaders,\textsuperscript{28} but hostility to the revolutionaries. Apart from the deportation of Dr. Sun Yat-sen from the Straits Settlements for five years, the government seemed to have taken measures to prevent revolutionary refugees to take shelter in the Straits.\textsuperscript{29}

In this unfavourable environment, most of these early revolutionary refugees went into underground activities. To avoid the attention of the local government and interference of the reformists, some of them had changed names to avoid suspicion. However, to spread the revolutionary message in such an environment, they had to find disguise which not only had to provide a living, but also to provide the best means for contact with other revolutionaries. Têng Tzü-yü,\textsuperscript{30} who changed his surname to Chu, opened a hotel in China Town named Yung Hsiang Hsing.\textsuperscript{31} Huang Yao-t'ing went into part-
nership with five other friends to run a restaurant in China Town named Wan Hua Lou. Song Shao-tung, who changed his name to Ch'en Ch'ing-po, ran a small clinic in the same locality to earn a living as well as to spread revolution. Yu Lieh, following the examples of other refugees, also settled in China Town where he opened a clinic named I Yeh Lou.

It is significant that these refugees ran clinics, hotel and restaurant in China Town frequented by prostitutes, members of secret societies, workers and beggars. Since clinics, hotels and restaurants enjoyed clientele of people from all walks of life, they provided a most appropriate disguise for keeping in touch with other revolutionaries on the one hand, and with the members of the lower social group of society on the other. It must also be noted that most of these revolutionary refugees, except T'eng Tzu-yü, were Cantonese. As the linguistic problem was so acute during that time, it was most advantageous for them to be able to preach their cause among the local Cantonese inhabitants. This explains why their shops and clinics were all located in China Town where Cantonese were predominant.

Yu Lieh, the man who had experience in organizing members of the secret societies and workers in Yokohama, was particularly fit for underground activity.
Having realized that it was hard to win over the Chinese intellectuals and rich merchants to support the revolution, he immediately started contacting members of secret societies and lower social group for the founding of a Chung Ho T'ang branch. In contacting members of secret societies, Yu was in a better position than Yang Ch'ü-yün and Dr. Sun Yat-sen, for he himself was a member of a secret society and had a long association with it since his youth.\(^{37}\)

Besides this, other factors also helped Yu in his work among the lower social group of the overseas Chinese. Although he was educated in a mathematical school in Canton and practised as an assistant in the Bureau of Survey of Kwangtung, he was also a Chinese physician. He had extraordinary ability in curing venereal and chronic diseases. Considering the volume of prostitution in Singapore, and the general lack of female companionship of members of the lower social group, venereal diseases must have found many victims. Thus, Yu's free treatment of venereal diseases ensured for him much goodwill. Moreover, Yu's sociable character enabled him to mix with them more freely in social life. He chatted, listened and drank with them, he even gambled and smoked opium with them in order to identify himself as one of them.\(^{38}\) This mixing had provided him with
better opportunities to know the lives, thinking and grievances of the Chinese among whom he worked. With these approaches, Yu was able to win over a number of secret society members and workers to join his Chung Ho T'ang; a branch of which was founded in Singapore.39

Yu Lieh had chosen to work among the lower social group of the overseas Chinese, not merely because of the force of circumstances in Singapore. To work among the lower social group and secret societies as he did was the general policy of the revolutionaries. The revolutionaries, whose main aim was to topple the Manchu rule in China by force, had to rely on the secret society heavily, for it was one of the two main sources of revolutionary strength—a potential source of manpower to be used as the spearhead for revolutionary uprisings. The heavy reliance of revolutionaries on the secret society was clearly demonstrated in the 1895 and 1900 revolts, and this policy was maintained till the New Army Revolt in Canton in 1910.

The appeals of the revolutionaries to the secret society in Singapore and Malaya had particular significance, for not only was it one of the most important social forces in the local Chinese communities, but it was in the leading position among the secret societies.
in Southeast Asia. Thus support from the secret society would facilitate the revolutionaries in gaining support from the overseas Chinese in Singapore and Malaya as well as in other parts of Southeast Asia. In this context, Yu's recruits of large numbers of secret society members into his Chung Ho T'ang can be considered as the first step towards the success of gaining support from overseas Chinese to the revolutionary movement in Singapore and Malaya.

After the formation of the Chung Ho T'ang branch in Singapore, Yu Lieh toured widely throughout the Malay Peninsula and this resulted in the establishment of a string of branches in Kuala Lumpur, Penang, Perak, Johore and Seremban. After the founding of these Chung Ho T'ang branches, the most important task lying ahead of Yu was obviously how to indoctrinate the members with the revolutionary cause. With much experience in associating with them, Yu knew perfectly well their anti-Manchu tradition. But how to revive this latent anti-Manchu feeling and how to instil in their minds new revolutionary ideas, was the problem to be solved. The unfriendly attitude of the Straits Settlements government towards anti-Manchu revolutionaries and the strong reformist influence in Singapore and Malaya made his task more difficult.
In overcoming these problems, Yu applied different techniques in indoctrinating the members of the Chung Ho T'ang and the general public. In places like Singapore, Ipoh where the reformist influence was more pervasive and the government's control was more strict, Yu preached revolution under the disguise of promoting Chinese education and Confucianism. He set up a lecture hall in Singapore in 1904 to give regular teaching of the Four Books, the core of Confucianism, and he also established a Chinese educational society in Ipoh for the same purpose. This disguise of promoting Confucius' teaching and Chinese education enabled Yu to work more smoothly without any interference from the reformists and the government, and also enabled him to inculcate revolutionary ideas gradually into the minds of his followers and the general public. In places like Kuala Lumpur where the environment was comparatively better, Yu and another revolutionary leader, Too Nam, carried out the indoctrination programme more publicly and freely. They set up a lecture hall to preach anti-Manchuism and republicanism regularly.

The anti-Manchuism was undoubtedly familiar to most secret society members, and it soon gained their support. It would appear that the republicanism which was new to most of overseas Chinese had also been gradually instilled
into the minds of audiences who packed the hall of the Chung Ho T'ang \(^{46}\) branch in Kuala Lumpur. The revolutionary flag of 'Blue sky, white sun and red earth' (青天白日满地红) which symbolizing the spirit of republicanism—liberty, equality and fraternity—was frequently flown over the Chung Ho T'ang's building in Kuala Lumpur.\(^{47}\)

The revolutionary ideas appeared not only to have infiltrated into the lower social group from which most of Chung Ho T'ang's members were derived, but also gradually found their ways into the intellectual circles, and won over some intellectuals to the revolutionary camp. Huang Shih-chung, Huang Po-yao and K'ang Yin-t'ien, the three reformist advocates who worked as the reporters in the reformist organ — T'ien Nan Hsin Pao\(^{48}\), were deeply influenced by their association with Yu Lieh and the new ideology. They deserted the reformist camp and joined the Chung Ho T'ang. Subsequently, Shih-chung was recommended by Yu to take up an appointment as a reporter of the Chung Kuo Jih Pao in Hong Kong.\(^{49}\) Po-yao and Yin-t'ien were recommended to join the revolutionary earliest organ in Singapore — the Thoe Lam Jit Poh in 1904, and later they became the important revolutionary activists in Singapore and Malaya.
The establishment of the Chung Ho T'ang branches and Yu's activities were of crucial importance in the early history of the Chinese revolutionary movement in Singapore and Malaya. Yu's successful appeal and indoctrination of the members of secret societies and lower class not only laid a solid foundation for the further development of the revolutionary activities, but more important, was to provide an insight of indoctrinating secret society members and a correct direction in using the lower class as the main basis for revolutionary movement. Although the revolutionary leadership in the period of our study was monopolized by merchants and intellectuals, the secret society and lower class were proved later to be the true basis of success of revolutionary movement in Singapore and Malaya.

(2) The Growth of the Local Revolutionaries:

While the expatriate Chinese revolutionaries were trying to find their ways in spreading the revolutionary message, there emerged other groups of local Chinese revolutionaries in Singapore and Malaya. As early as 1897, two years after the signing of the humiliating Shimonoseki Treaty, eighteen patriotic Chinese in Malacca, sensitive about China's decay and the growing foreign
encroachment, gathered in Tongkak (in Johore state but very near to Malacca) to form a small group known as 'The Eighteenth Saviours' (救國十八友). As the name of the group implies, these eighteen people were men of lofty ideals and aimed at saving China from destruction. This group comprised mostly young and energetic nationalists. Like other youth in China, they were idealistic, radical and sentimental, and easier to be stimulated into action. They were stunned and humiliated by the defeat of China in the Sino-Japanese war in 1895 and the ensuing treaty. Witnessing the increasing internal unrest and the mounting threat of foreign aggression, they felt the very existence of China under the Manchu was endangered. Burning with patriotism and nationalism, these young overseas Chinese, like their counterparts in China, regarded themselves as the saviours of the nation, and took upon themselves the task of working to overthrow the Manchu government which was to them the prerequisite if the nation was to be saved.

The leader of the group was Sim Hung-pek, a young and rich merchant from Malacca. Sim, a native of Fukien, came to Malaya in 1893, a year before the Sino-Japanese war, at the age of twenty-one. On the foundation of his father's successful enterprise, he had a good start in
business in Malacca, and as well successfully planted sago and rubber in Tongkak. It would appear from the limited evidence that he and his colleagues were successful in spreading nationalistic and revolutionary ideas among their relatives and friends in Malacca and Tongkak. This group was definitely linked with the local secret societies.

The emergence of this small group of revolutionaries was important because it marked the beginning of a movement amongst young Chinese in Southeast Asia advocating a radical revolution in China. It developed in response to events in China and not, apparently, to the activities of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Hsing Chung Hui. Indeed, only after the establishment of a T'ung Meng Hui branch in Malacca in 1908, was this group drawn into the main stream of Chinese revolutionary movement.
Soon after the turn of the present century, another group of local revolutionaries emerged in Singapore. Like its counterpart in Malacca, this group also comprised mainly young, energetic and rich merchants who were sensible of the decline of China. But unlike its counterpart, this group had a strong connection with the main stream of the Chinese revolutionary movement led by Dr Sun Yat-sen. Moreover, since its existence in 1901, this group had assumed the leading status in the revolutionary movement in Singapore and Malaya, and had been frequently under the limelight of the Chinese revolutionary movement as a whole. The main reason for the eminence achieved by the group in the movement was its location. Compared with Malacca or Tongkak, Singapore was a more cosmopolitan city where contact with the outside world was easier. Not only it had the advantage in contacting the early Chinese revolutionary refugees who came to Singapore to stay, but also could keep in touch with the main stream of revolution through visits and exchange of publications. Moreover, being an international entrepôt, Singapore easily obtained the supply of revolutionary literature published in Shanghai, Japan and Hong Kong.
With these advantages, the leaders of the Singapore group were more well informed with the revolutionary situation, and more familiar with revolutionary ideology. Thus, they were able to distinguish themselves to lead the revolutionary movement in Singapore and Malaya. The most prominent leaders of the group and those whose influence was lasting in the whole movement were Tan Chor-nam and Teo Eng-hock. Although the ancestors of Tan and Teo came from different provinces they had many things in common. Both were Straits-born Chinese, young and rich. They had very close relations with the famous reformist leader in Singapore, Khoo Seok-wan, by whom they were deeply influenced. The most striking similarity between them was the process of change of their political belief - from reform to revolution.

The significance of the change of their political belief lies in the fact that the change was not only the turning point of Tan's and Teo's personal history and its importance relating to the revolutionary movement in Singapore and Malaya, but the change could be taken as representative of a trend of overseas Chinese in relation to reform and revolution. Without such a trend of change of attitude, the large-scale revolutionary activities in this part of the world would have been impossible.
It is interesting to investigate the process and the factors of change of Tan's and Teo's thought in order to acquire a picture of metamorphosis of overseas Chinese during that period. Like many other young Chinese intellectuals, Tan and Teo were first drawn to reform rather than revolution. Coming from merchant families, they had a basic class interest which led them to become moderate rather than radical. Educated at home with Confucius' ethics, they were moulded in the traditional outlook. These family and educational backgrounds formed the basis of Tan's and Teo's conservative thought. On the basis of this, Tan and Teo were naturally exposed to the influence of the reformist ideology. The influence came mainly from two sources: reformist publications and Tan's and Teo's association with the reformist leader, Khoo Seok-wan.

Among the five Chinese newspapers published at the end of the nineteenth century in Singapore and Malaya, three of them (the Penang Hsin Pao, the T'ien Nan Hsin Pao and the Jih Hsin Pao)\(^5^4\) strongly advocated the reformist cause in China.\(^5^5\) These newspapers published editorials, special features and reproduced articles from other newspapers in China to propound reformist doctrine.\(^5^6\) Besides, they also served as agencies in
distributing reformist books, magazines and pamphlets. Under the pervasive influence of these publications, young men like Tan and Teo who were thirsty for knowledge, were naturally inspired and drawn to the reform cause which began to shape their political thought.

Tan's and Teo's reformist orientation was developed and consolidated by their close association with Khoo Seok-wan. Khoo, a native of Chang Chou, Fukien, came from a very rich family in Singapore. He was gifted in literature and obtained his Chü-jên degree (imperial provincial examination) at the age of twenty-one. Being young, rich, talented and the holder of an imperial degree, Khoo enjoyed respect and popularity in the Chinese community and became the acknowledged leader of the younger generation. Thus, Khoo's commitment to the reform movement in Singapore in 1898 provided a good example for the youth and greatly influenced Tan and Teo. According to Tan, they befriended Khoo from whom they received the main reformist propaganda, such as the Ch'ing I Pao, Hsin Min Tsung Pao and K'ai Chih Lu. This personal contact with Khoo had further developed their reformist belief and helped decisively to shape their reformist outlook.
Khoo Seok-wan, a well-known reformist leader in Singapore (by courtesy of Madam Khoo Ming-kuan, daughter of Khoo Seok-wan).
Between the years 1898 and 1900, both Tan and Teo were the advocates of the reform movement. Although they were not the activists, they were members of the Chinese Philomatic Society which was used by Khoo and Dr Lim Boon-keng to support the reformist movement. At the same time, Tan wrote several articles for the reformist organ, the T'ien Nan Hsin Pao, advocating the reform programme under a pen name 'Ssu-ming-chou shao nien' (a youngster from Ssu-ming-chou).

After 1901, the year after the Boxer Uprising, Tan and Teo gradually changed their stands from reform to revolution. With other youths like Lin Shou-chih and Lim Ngee-soon, they fervently discussed China's immediate problems such as the threat of foreign aggression, patriotism and racial revolution. The conversion of Tan and Teo and their friends to the revolution became clear in 1903. In July of that year, Tsou Jung and Chang Ping-lin, the two renowned revolutionary writers, were jailed in Shanghai under charges of agitation for revolution, and they were tried by a joint court of the foreign concessionaries in Shanghai. Attempting to influence the decision of the foreign court, Tan and Teo cabled the British Consul in Shanghai under the name of 'Hsiao T'ao Yuan
Club urging protection and justice for Zhou and Chang.  

It was the first time that the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia had taken such bold action against the will of the Ch'ing government. Although there was a precedent for overseas Chinese in Singapore and Malaya to petition the court for the restoration of the reigns of the Emperor Kuang Hsü in 1899, that was done in the name of loyalty to the Emperor. But Tan's and Teo's action went far beyond that, and directly countered the will of the government, for both Zhou and Chang were considered as the enemy of the nation. This risky action which could have resulted in their deportation by the government of the Straits Settlements not only reflects their devotion to the revolutionary gospel, but also indicates that they had moved a big step forward, from discussion to action.

The main factor for the change of Tan's and Teo's thought from reform to revolution was the general disappointment of the Chinese towards the Ch'ing government and the reformists. Before the Boxer Uprising in 1900, people hated foreigners but tended to sympathize with the dynasty, and most of the hope was directed to the reform movement which grew in strength.
from 1895 to 1898. Thus, the general attitude towards revolutionaries was hostile. But after the coup d'état and the imprisonment of the Emperor Kwang Hsü, people began to doubt whether the dynasty could withstand the foreign aggression, and began to entertain doubt about the value of giving loyalty to the dynasty. The role played by the Empress Dowager Tzü Hsi and her court favourites in the Boxer Uprising revealed further the incompetence of the Manchus as rulers and their inability to deal with the foreigners.

Dissatisfaction with the Empress Dowager's rule gave way after the Boxer Uprising to disillusionment with the reformists as well. The Hankow Uprising in 1900 revealed the failure of the reformists in arms and also their corruptibility. It was said that one of the most important factors for the defeat was the delay of remittance of overseas funds by K'ang Yu-wei who was rumoured to have embezzled part of the money. This meant that the reformists who repeatedly pledged for the salvation of China were inspired less by their lofty aim than by motive of personal gain.
Disillusionment with the Ch'ing government and the reformists forced many Chinese to turn to revolution. Ch'in Li-shan, a leading intellectual, a staunch advocate of the reformist movement, together with a group of his friends, deserted the reformist camp and joined the revolutionaries soon after the defeat of the Hankow Uprising in 1900. Ch'in who was later in 1905 recommended to meet Tan Chor-nam and Teo Eng-hock in Singapore on his way to Rangoon, expressed his utmost disappointment over the reformists, and strongly denounced K'ang Yu-wei and other reformist leaders for their embezzlement of overseas funds.

The discontent over the reformists and their armed revolt in Hankow had a particular significance for Tan Chor-nam and Teo Eng-hock. The defeat was a tremendous blow to Khoo Seok-wan, who had contributed S$250,000 to the uprising, and who was the friend and teacher of Tan and Teo. The relations between Khoo and K'ang Yu-wei after the defeat became cold, and they finally broke up in 1901 after a quarrel over the handling of a sum of $50,000 contributed by overseas Chinese in Australia to the uprising. After this, Khoo publicly announced in the T'ien Nan Hsin Pao that he dissociated from the reformists, and had put his support behind the Manchu government.
Considering the intimate relations with Tan and Teo, Khoo's desertion must have exerted a tremendous influence on the change of their thought. Like other youths in China, they had begun to lose faith in the reformists. But unlike Khoo, they proceeded a big step further towards the revolutionary cause.

Another important factor for the development of the thought of Tan and Teo was the influence of the revolutionary publications. The turn of the present century witnessed a steady growth of revolutionary publications both at home and abroad. In the first few years of revolutionary activities (1894-1900), only a few pamphlets were published. But between 1901 and 1903, revolutionary newspapers, magazines, books and pamphlets increased substantially. Two newspapers, Ta Tung Jih Pao and Su Pao were published in San Francisco and Shanghai; several periodicals, such as Kuo Min Pao, Ta Lu Pao, The Tide of Chekiang, Kiangsu Monthly and The Students of Hupei were published in Japan and Shanghai; a total of more than 36 books and pamphlets were printed. Some of them became very famous and widely read, especially The Revolutionary Army, A Refutation of K'ang Yu-wei's Political Statements.
All these revolutionary publications were preaching nationalism, anti-foreignism and anti-Manchuism. In view of the fact that the revolutionaries were aiming at launching military actions against the Manchu government, anti-Manchuism became the main theme of the publications. Although the revolutionary publications were strictly banned in China, they found wide circulations in overseas Chinese communities. Both Tan and Teo were influenced by the growing anti-Manchuism disseminated by the publications, and were most impressed by *The Ten Days of Yang Chou* (揚州十日記) and *The Revolutionary Army* (革命軍). For propaganda purposes, these two pamphlets were among the best written for the spread of revolutionary gospel. *The Ten Days of Yang Chou* was published in 1895 in Yokohama after the defeat of the first revolutionary uprising in Canton. The book is a vivid description of the cruelty and brutality of the Manchu who massacred the city of Yang Chou when they first conquered China in the seventeenth century. The author, Wang Hsiu-ch'u was one of the survivors of the massacre; the story was based on his personal experience in the event. Thus, it became more
appealing to its readers because it was based on historical facts. The book was banned for circulation by the Manchu government for a long time. The purpose for the revolutionaries to reprint it was obviously to stir up hatred and revengeful feeling against the Manchu. These hatred and revengeful feelings were consolidated and directly connected with revolutionary ideas by Tsou Jung, the promising young revolutionary who wrote the most famous pamphlet, *The revolutionary Army*. In this pamphlet, Tsou strongly appealed:

... If our nation wants to free from the yoke of the Manchu, we need revolution; if our nation wants to be independent, we need revolution; if our nation wants to compete with the foreign powers, we need revolution... When I was reading 'The Ten Days of Yang Chou' and 'The Massacre in Chia Ting' (嘉定三屠) I could not help shedding tears many times before I finished. I would like to appeal to our compatriots by saying that the massacres in Yang Chou and Chia Ting were only two examples. There were numerous other atrocities committed by the Manchu, tens and thousands of Chinese were slaughtered when the Manchu first trampled our land.

The significance of this pamphlet was its ardent advocacy and open appeal for a racial revolution and vengence. It openly attacked the ruling Manchu as barbarians who had cruelly massacred Chinese, destroyed Chinese customs and heritage, and who deserved extermination.
The anti-Manchu and revengeful appeal of *The Ten Days of Yang Chou* and *The Revolutionary Army* struck a responsive chord in Tan and Teo, for in both of them there ran a strong undercurrent of anti-Manchuism.

Going back to the seventeenth century, both Chang Chou and Teochew (Tan and Teo's home districts in China) suffered the worst atrocities of the Manchu conquest. Chang Chou, the stronghold of the Koxinga's anti-Manchu army in the seventeenth century and one of the last fortresses of the T'ai-ping army in Fukien in the mid-nineteenth century, had particularly experienced the brutality from the Manchu army. Thousands of Chang Chou people were forced to flee to Taiwan and Southeast Asia. The presence of these refugees had sown the seeds of anti-Manchuism in the overseas Chinese communities. The heroic deeds of resistance of Chinese patriots against the Manchu conquest and solemn instructions of vengence were handed down generation after generation. This latent anti-Manchu feeling had inspired a number of overseas Chinese to respond to the revolutionary appeals. According to Tan Chor-nam, he used to listen to heroic stories of Koxinga's resistance against the Manchu in Southern Fukien narrated by his fellow-countrymen in Singapore. These stories had
undoubtedly nurtured anti-Manchu feelings among the young overseas Chinese like Tan, Teo and others. Thus, when Tan and Teo read the inflammatory revolutionary publications like *The Ten Days of Yang Chou* and *The Revolutionary Army*, they were unconsciously drawn closer and closer to revolution.

(3) **The Growth of the Revolutionary Activities in the Straits Settlements:**

After 1903 the Chinese revolutionaries in Singapore became more active. In that year, Yu Lieh contacted Tan Chor-nam and Teo Eng-hock through the introduction of Huang Po-yao, the *T'ien Nan Hsin Pao*'s assistant editor. With this meeting the two streams of the Chinese revolutionaries, local and expatriate, had joined force. In the same year, under the influence of Yu Lieh, the first revolutionary organ in Southeast Asia known as the *Thoe Lam Jit Poh* was under way. The first issue of the newspaper came out at the beginning of the following year - 1904.

The appearance of the *Thoe Lam Jit Poh* marked the beginning of revolutionary propaganda in Southeast Asia. It signified that the Chinese revolutionary activities in Singapore had developed from underground to open. It was the first time in overseas Chinese history in
Singapore and Malaya that a newspaper was so daring in advocating the overthrow of the home government. Although the publishing of the newspaper was the natural product of the development of revolutionary activities, it was also the result of responding to the events in Singapore and Malaya. As we have seen earlier, Singapore was dominated by the reformist influence at the beginning of the present century and a newspaper was urgently needed for countering the reformist cause and spreading revolutionary ideas. The need for a revolutionary newspaper was accelerated by the banning of the Su Pao, the revolutionary organ in Shanghai in 1903. Teo Eng-hock stated in his memoir that the ban awakened them to the fact that a newspaper for propaganda was highly essential for carrying out the task of revolution, particularly in the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia where the revolutionary doctrines were comparatively unknown.

Unlike the first period of underground activity in which the appeal was emphasised on the members of secret societies and lower class, the newspaper was designed to appeal to all Chinese. As Yu Lieh had asserted in the preface of the newspaper -
The newspaper aims at approaching Chinese merchants, workers and Babas (the Straits-born Chinese) and those who sojourned in Southeast Asia. Therefore, it is named 'Thoe Lam' ....85

After its birth, the Thoe Lam Jit Poh began to spread revolutionary doctrines, and opened its attack on both reformist and Ch'ing government. Articles advocating racial revolution were written in the editorials, or reproduced from other newspapers. Maladministration and corruption in China were particularly singled out for fierce attack in order to stir up hatred against the ruling Manchu.86 To consolidate the revolutionary front of propaganda against the reformists, contacts were extended to the Chung Kuo Jih Pao in Hong Kong, T'an Shan Hsin Pao in Honolulu and Ta T'ung Jih Pao in San Francisco. They exchanged newspapers, information and techniques in fighting against their common enemies.87

The open activities of the revolutionaries posed a serious threat to the local reformists who had hitherto enjoyed the dominating influence in the communities. The strong advocacy of a racial revolution and attack on the Ch'ing government aroused hostility of the conservative merchants, who considered themselves as the guardians of Chinese traditions, and the Ch'ing Consul-General in Singapore. Thus, all these anti-revolutionary
elements formed into a united front against the Thoe Lam Jit Poh. The newspaper was accused as evil and malicious. Youngsters and shop employees were warned not to read it. The proprietors of the newspaper, Tan Chor-nam and Teo Eng-hock were frequently accused as being traitors and rebels who had no respect for the Emperor and their fathers. An attempt was made by the conservative merchants to hinder their economic activities in the hope that their financial resources could be drained off. It was claimed by Teo that the government of the Straits Settlements, at the urging of the Ch'ing Consul-General, threatened to take action against them. As a result, the newspaper decreased its circulation; it had to reduce from 2,000 to 1,000 copies with only about 20 regular subscribers.

The external pressure was followed by internal crisis. Some of the revolutionaries who, in charge of the newspaper, were disheartened by all the difficulties, gave up their posts. Ch'en Shih-chung, the chief editor, resigned from his post after one year's contract. Facing these difficulties, Teo Eng-hock, although unqualified, took over the chief editorship and worked hard for the newspaper. Attempts were made to attract readers: free copies of reprints of the
renowned revolutionary publications, such as *The Revolutionary Army* and *The Spirit of the Yellow Emperor* were distributed; literary competitions with prizes were started to attract readers.93

There was yet another new tactic to increase circulation and to spread revolutionary ideas. At the end of 1904, taking advantage of the Chinese New Year which fell on 4 February 1905, a colourful calendar was printed for free distribution. It was well-designed with a bell and a flag in the centre, which symbolized freedom and independence for China. Chinese couplets were printed at the top, recalling the destruction of the Ming Dynasty and advocating a racial revolution.94 The calendar soon found its way into the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia. Its circulation rapidly increased to about 2000 copies.95

Though small by modern standards, the circulation was considerable at the time. Considering the fact that unlike modern practice in the West, a copy of a newspaper was not read by one, but by many readers; its influence cannot therefore be gauged by the seeming small circulation figure. After nearly two years existence, the newspaper was forced to close down at the end of 1905 because of financial difficulties.96
The 1905 calendar printed by the T'u Nan Jih Pao for spreading revolutionary message in Southeast Asia (reproduced from Nanyang and the Founding of the Chinese Republic).
Together with the spread of revolutionary propaganda, other more intensive revolutionary tasks were being undertaken. Taking the opportunity of accompanying his father's coffin back to China in 1904, Lin Shou-chih, a revolutionary youth in Singapore, sought help from Tan Chor-nam and Teo Eng-hock to set up a clandestine organization in their home prefecture, Teochew (on the east coast of the province of Kwangtung). He was accompanied by two other comrades, Ch'en Yün-shêng and Huang Nai-shang. With the help of an intimate friend, Koh Soh-chew, who had close relations with local secret societies, Lin and his comrades were able to assemble local youths to found a revolutionary body, pledged solemnly to overthrow the Manchu and to restore Chinese rule. The centre of the organization was set up in the Hung An village of the Hai Yang district, branches were soon founded throughout the district. Feelers were then extended to local secret societies and met with zealous response. The organization engaged in underground activities, and worked out plans to launch military uprisings in East Kwangtung and South Fukien. These activities laid a solid foundation for revolts which occurred in Teochew in 1907.
In June 1905 an extensive campaign to boycott American goods spread throughout China as a protest against the American Exclusion Law. This movement soon found response among the Chinese in Singapore. On 20 June a meeting of several hundred Chinese merchants was held at the Thong Chai Medical Institution at Wayang Street with Dr Lim Boon-keng in the chair. A resolution calling for 'all Chinese merchants in Singapore to stop trading in American goods...' was unanimously passed, and the result was cabled to the Chinese government in Peking. The movement soon spread to Penang and the Federated Malay states.

In the August of that year, the anti-Americanism was highlighted by the suicide of a Philippine Chinese, Feng Hsia-wei, in front of the American Consulate in Shanghai, in protest against the Exclusion Law. With this episode the anti-American feeling reached its peak.

This unexpected development provided a good opportunity for the revolutionaries in Singapore to exploit the mounting nationalistic and patriotic feelings. To the revolutionaries, the anti-foreignism (anti-Americanism) could be directed against
Manchu who were considered by them as the alien rulers. Furthermore, they also wished to test their strength in the local community. At the end of that year, Tan Chor-nam and Teo Eng-hock held a protest meeting at the Jen Chi Hospital in commemoration of Fêng Hsia-wei's martyrdom. Permission was granted by the Protector of Chinese of the Straits Settlements on the condition of Yu Lieh's absence. Yu was much offended by this, and instead of ignoring the meeting, he arrived early and addressed the crowd with an inflammatory speech. Analysing the reasons for the boycott, he attacked vehemently those who usually gave way to foreigners. His speech was repeatedly punctuated by thunderous applause.

The extent of the influence or control Tan and Teo had among the Chinese workers in Singapore was illustrated in December 1905. The Chinese workers refused to repair an American full-rigged sailing ship which had been badly battered on the rocks in the Straits of Sunda. However, when the Protector of Chinese, W.D. Barnes, asked Tan and Teo to mediate, they were able to persuade the men to return to work.

One may wonder why Tan and Teo were open to pressure from the Colonial authorities on this matter? That they gave in to this issue appears to have encouraged the Protector of Chinese to argue that the boycott had no
support from local leaders.\textsuperscript{105} For the opposite was true and indeed the fact that the Protector tried to restrict the presence of Yu Lieh at the meeting held at the Jen Chi Hospital appears to\textsuperscript{7} as tacit confession that at least some local leaders were involved in the campaign. Moreover it is probable that the men realized that these were sensitive areas of the Singapore economy in which the Straits authorities would not tolerate disruptions. Therefore, rather than risk of provoking vigorous suppression of their movement they persuaded the workers to return to work. There is also evidence that the workers who refused to repair the American ship were members of the Chung Ho T'ang branch in Singapore which was under the control of Yu Lieh, Tan Chor-nam and Teo Eng-hock.\textsuperscript{106}
CHAPTER III

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES IN SINGAPORE AND MALAYA (1906-1909)

(1) The Founding of the T'ung Mêng Hui Branch in Singapore:

At the turn of the present century, in spite of setbacks in armed uprisings engineered by Dr Sun Yat-sen and his Hsing Chung Hui, the general prospect of the revolutionary cause both in China and abroad was promising. Revolutionary organizations and propaganda organs sprang up everywhere. In 1901, a group of Cantonese students and merchants in Yokohama began to form the 'Kwangtung Tu Li Hsieh Hui' which was to fight for the independence of Kwangtung province.\(^1\) It was followed by the establishment of 'Ch'ing Nien Hui' (1902)\(^2\) 'Ch'ün Kuo Min Chiao Yâ Hui' (1903)\(^3\) in Tokyo; 'Chung Kuo Chiao Yâ Hui' (1903)\(^4\) 'Ai Kuo Hsueh Shê' (1903)\(^5\) and Ssü Min Kung Hui (1904) in Shanghai; but the most important organizations were Jih Chih Hui (1904)\(^6\) at Wuchang, Hua Hsing Hui (1904)\(^7\) at Changsha and Kuang Fu Hui (1904)\(^8\) at Shanghai. Newspapers and periodicals, such as Kuo Min Pao Yüen K'an at Tokyo, Ta Lu Pao at Shanghai in 1901, the Tide of Chekieng, and
The Kiangsu Monthly at Tokyo, Shih Chieh Kung I Pao at Hong Kong, T'an Shan Hsin Pao at Honolulu, Su Pao, Kuo Min Jih Jih Pao and Chung Kuo Pai Hua Pao at Shanghai in 1903, Ta T'ung Jih Pao at San Francisco, Ching Chung Jih Pao at Shanghai and Kwangtung Jih Pao at Hong Kong in 1904, emerged one after another.

Not surprisingly, the tempo of revolutionary activities quickened during this period. On May 6, 1902 (March 29 of the lunar calendar, anniversary of the suicide of the last Ming Emperor) Chang Ping-lin, Ch'in Li-shan and other radicals in Japan took advantage of the occasion to call for a meeting in memory of 'The extinction of Chinese rule for two hundred and forty-two years'. The campaign was very successful at the beginning, it enlisted several hundred students as supporters. But the scheduled meeting was not allowed to take place by the Japanese authorities at the request of the Ch'ing Consul to Japan. Almost at the same time, a plan was made by Hung Ch'üan-fu for a military uprising. Hung was the nephew of the leader of the T'ai-ping Rebellion, Hung Hsiu-ch'üan. This plan was financed by Li Chi-t'ang and Hsieh Tsan-t'ai, two important leaders of the Hsing Chung Hui. When the uprising was about to take place, it was discovered by the Ch'ing authorities, and came to nothing.
In 1903, the 'Chung Kuo Chiao Yü Hui' and 'Ai Kuo Hsüeh Shê' at Shanghai were actively engaged in spreading revolutionary ideas: public talks on revolution were held regularly at Chang Yüan; and the Su Pao was used as the organ of the revolutionaries. In the meantime, rumours about Russian blackmail of the Ch'ing government for concessions in Manchuria were widespread throughout China, members of these two organizations reacted, together with the returned students from Japan, by forming an Anti-Russian Volunteer Corps. In 1904, another armed uprising was attempted by Hua Hsing Hui at Changsha under the leadership of Huang Hsing. Members of a local secret society known as the Ko Lao Hui joined the front. The target-date was set for 16 November (10 October in the lunar calendar) which would be the sixtieth birthday of the Empress Dowager Tz'ü Hsi. When the news of the impending revolt leaked out to the Ch'ing authorities at Changsha, stern measures were taken to suppress it. Many of the revolutionaries were caught and executed. Huang Hsing had a narrow escape.

The flourishing of these revolutionary organizations and propaganda organs together with the abortive uprisings, revealed that popular discontent was felt both at home and abroad. Although all these organizations had a
common hatred of the ruling Manchu, there was no agreement on the difference in their means to be employed. One of the most striking features was the trend to provincialism and regionalism.

As the revolutionary movement developed, all these provincial organizations came to realise through bitter experience that a larger organization was needed which could embrace these small bodies and which could undertake more intensive revolutionary tasks for a common purpose. It was in this atmosphere that the T'ung Mêng Hui came into being on 20 August 1905, in Tokyo.

The founding of the T'ung Mêng Hui marked the beginning of a new phase in the history of the Chinese revolutionary movement. Not only was it a confederation of many minor political organizations, which cut across the demarcation of provincialism and regionalism, but it was also a modern political organization with clearly defined principles and platforms.

Although the formation of the T'ung Mêng Hui was a clear indication of the popular participation by China's intelligentsia in the revolutionary movement, it is certain that the organization still had to rely heavily on the support of overseas Chinese and secret societies. The revolutionaries, who were sought by the Ch'ing
authorities and who believed in using force to overthrow the Manchu government, had good reasons to appeal to overseas Chinese for strong support. In the first place, overseas Chinese communities provided the best sanctuary for revolutionary exiles; secondly, financial support of the overseas Chinese was indispensable in any armed revolt; thirdly, overseas Chinese could become one of the main sources of manpower with which revolutionary uprisings could be carried out.

Dr Sun Yat-sen, who had a long connection with overseas Chinese in Honolulu and frequent contacts with others in America, Japan, and Hong Kong, fully realized the importance of gaining their support. He must have suggested to his colleagues that branches in key points of overseas Chinese communities should be established. As a result, immediately after the formation of the T'ung Mēng Hui Headquarters in Tokyo at the end of 1905, branches were founded in Hong Kong, Macao and Singapore along with other branches in Canton and Shanghai.16

The founding of the Singapore branch of the T'ung Mēng Hui experienced severe labour pains. When Sun first visited Singapore in 1900, there were no local revolutionaries in the island. Although Sun noticed the potential of Singapore as the centre of revolutionary activities
in Southeast Asia, he was forced to leave with the indignity of five years deportation. When Sun visited French Indo-China in 1903 and founded a branch of Hsing Chung Hui there, he was still unaware of the steady growth of local Chinese revolutionary activities in Singapore. It was not until the beginning of 1904 when the Thoe Lam Jit Poh was published and free copies were given to other revolutionary papers overseas that Dr Sun came to contact Tan Chor-nam and Teo Eng-hock. During that year, when Dr Sun was touring America in his campaign against the reformists, he probably read the Thoe Lam Jit Poh at the Ta Tung Jih Pao office in San Francisco. He was deeply impressed by it and surprised that he had so little knowledge of revolutionary activities in Singapore. A letter was sent to Yu Lieh to ask for information about the owners of the newspaper and through this he came to know Tan and Teo indirectly. In June 1905, after touring Europe and successfully gaining support from Chinese students there, Sun was on his way back to Japan to prepare for the founding of the T'ung Mêng Hui. When the ship stopped at Colombo, he cabled Yu Lieh asking him to arrange a meeting with local revolutionary leaders. On arrival at Singapore, Yu Lieh, Tan Chor-nam, Teo Eng-hock and Lim Ngee-soon greeted him on board, Dr Sun was
Tan Chor-nam (right), Dr. Sun Yat-sen (centre) and Teo Eng-hock (left). This photo was taken in 1905 at the Wan Ch'ing Yüan, Singapore (reproduced from WSNWH, Vol. 1, pt.10).
Wan Ch'ing Yüan, the office of the Singapore T'ung Meng Hui Branch, 1906-1911 (reproduced from WSNWH, Vol.1, pt.11).

Street address?  near Balasties Rd?
Still standing?
Lim Ngee-soon, Li Chu-ch'ih, Yu Lieh, Huang Yao-t'ing, Lin Ching-ch'iu, Hsü Tzü-lin, Hsiao Pai-ch'uan, Liu Hung-shih, Chiang Yü-t'ien, Wu Yeh-ch'en, Ho Hsin-t'ien and Lin Hang-wei. They were required to take an oath in front of Dr Sun and to sign it. The oath reads as follows:

I swear under Heaven that I will do my utmost to work for the expulsion of the Manchu, the restoration of Chinese sovereignty, the establishment of the Republic and equalization of land right. I solemnly undertake to be faithful to these principles. If I betray my trust, I am willing to submit to the severest penalties imposed by my comrades.

At the meeting, Tan Chor-nam was elected unanimously as chairman of the branch, Teo became his deputy, Hsü Tzü-lin and Lim Ngee-soon were elected to take charge of the party's finance and publicity respectively.

One may ask why Singapore was chosen as the location for establishing the head branch of T'ung Mêng Hui in Southeast Asia, whereas the Hsing Chung Hui's branch in Southeast Asia was not established in Singapore, but in Hanoi. This may be answered by considering three prerequisites for setting up a revolutionary branch overseas: firstly, geographical and social conditions; secondly, the attitude of colonial governments towards the revolutionaries; thirdly, the qualifications of the people handling the branch.
Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the founding members of the Singapore T'ung Meng Hui Branch, 1906 (reproduced from WSNWH, Vol.1, pt.11).
Lim Ngee-soon, Li Chu-ch'ih, Yu Lieh, Huang Yao-t'ing, Lin Ching-ch'iu, Hsü Tzü-lin, Hsiao Pai-ch'uan, Liu Hung-shih, Chiang Yü-t'ien, Wu Yeh-ch'en, Ho Hsin-t'ien and Lin Hang-wei. They were required to take an oath in front of Dr Sun and to sign it. The oath reads as follows:

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Singapore is situated at the centre of Southeast Asia, a convenient location for liaison with the Chinese in this part of the world. Demographically, Singapore had a preponderant Chinese community, eight-tenths of local property was in the hands of Chinese. In comparison with other possible locations, the British colonial government in the Straits Settlements was likely to be less repressive than the Dutch in the East Indies, the Americans in the Philippines, or the Thai government.

However, the most important reason for the establishment of the head branch of T'ung Meng Hui in Singapore was the vigorous activity of the local revolutionaries: the Thoe Lam Jit Poh was the earliest revolutionary propaganda organ in Southeast Asia; the anti-American movement in the Straits Settlements in 1905 was the most active and dynamic overseas. In view of these circumstances, Singapore was chosen as the location for establishing the head branch of the T'ung Meng Hui in Southeast Asia.

As to the reason why Hanoi instead of Singapore was chosen for establishing a head branch of the Hsing Chung Hui in Southeast Asia, it can be explained in terms of different conditions. From 1900 to 1903, although the geographical position of Singapore was the same, other
conditions were entirely different. During that period, the reformists had a dominating influence in Singapore; the government of the Straits Settlements tended to be hostile towards the revolutionaries. But more important is the fact that the local revolutionary movement in Singapore had not yet developed to an extent which would attract the attention of the leaders of the Hsing Chung Hui.

Apart from these factors, the ambition of Yu Lieh may help to explain this question. Yu was accused by some of his contemporaries of 'making use of the name of the Hsing Chung Hui to found the Chung Ho T'ang and to take advantage of it'. It may be true that from 1901 to 1903, Yu sought to build up his own image among the overseas Chinese as the head of the Chung Ho T'ang, rather than as one of the leaders of the Hsing Chung Hui. Judging from the historical conditions prevailing at that time, Yu could have taken the initiative to found a Hsing Chung Hui branch in Singapore, but it seems that he was more interested in recruiting the Chung Ho T'ang members. Furthermore, Yu was the only Hsing Chung Hui leader who could contact the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia during that period. Other leaders were otherwise occupied: Ch'en Shao-pai had to look after the Chung Kuo Jih Pao in Hong Kong, and Dr Sun Yat-sen had been deported from the Straits Settlements for five years.
(2) The Establishment of the T'ung Meng Hui Branches in Malaya:

Soon after the formation of the T'ung Meng Hui branch in Singapore, plans for setting up branches in key towns of the Malay Peninsula were carefully worked out. Dr Sun had to leave Singapore for Japan for a short while and when he returned in July 1906, he immediately set about the task of establishing branches. Accompanied by Tan Chor-nam, Lim Ngee-soon, Huang Nai-shang and Li Chu-ch'ih, Dr Sun's mission set out from Singapore for Seremban. Seremban, the capital city of Negri Sembilan and one of the famous mining centres of Malaya, had a predominantly Chinese population. Owing to its commercial connections with Singapore and Kuala Lumpur, the city appeared to have acquired some reformist influence. Thus, on his arrival on 17 July, Dr Sun found only a few people interested in the revolutionary cause. Further, the local British colonial government adopted a hostile attitude towards his mission. Although Sun's period of deportation from the Straits Settlements was over, the local authorities were still very suspicious of his activities. He was not permitted to hold any public meeting. 31

Under such conditions, Dr Sun managed only to assemble some sympathisers such as Chu Ch'ih-ni, Huang Hsin-ch'ih,
Li Meng-sheng and a few others at the Mining Association, (礦務會館) for an exchange of opinions. Most of these sympathisers were merchants who had received some private Chinese education at home, and knew well enough that China was declining. Like other overseas Chinese merchants, their primary concern was the salvation of China and its attainment of power and wealth. Naturally, they favoured a policy of trying reform ideas first and revolutionary ideas later. Although they gradually lost their faith in the reformists after 1900 and transferred their support to the revolution, the prevailing reformist propaganda like 'Revolution would invite partition' and 'Support the Ch'ing government's constitution' thwarted their conversion to revolution. Thus, Sun not only had to give confidence to these possible converts but also had to counter the vicious reformist and Manchu propaganda. At the gathering, Dr Sun informed them that the current situation both in China and abroad succoured revolutionary movement, and exposed the Ch'ing government's intention to introduce the false 'Constitutional Monarchy'. In answering their questions about the possible partition of China once an armed revolt broke out, Sun emphasized that the main cause of a possible partition was not because of any revolt, but of China's lack of independence.32
Dr Sun's exposure of the 'false constitution' and his views on the possible partition danger undoubtedly increased their confidence in revolution. The reformist propaganda which had hitherto obscured their minds had been cleared away. Although no branch was immediately set up, Sun's visit laid a solid foundation for the establishment of the T'ung Mêng Hui branches in Seremban and Kuala Pilah in the following year. Chu Ch'ih-ni and Huang Hsin-ch'ih, two of the participants of the gathering, later became Sun's staunch supporters and important leaders of the Seremban branch.

In August 1906, Dr Sun proceeded to Kuala Lumpur, the capital of the Federated Malay States, and a mining town with a preponderantly Chinese population. The revolutionaries had a good base among the lower class which had been established by Yu Lieh and Too Nam, two pillars of the Chung Ho T'ang in Kuala Lumpur. Through the influence of Too, Dr Sun obtained permission from the Protector of Chinese of the Federated Malay States to hold a public meeting at the Grand Theatre. In a speech to a packed audience, Dr Sun appealed strongly to his compatriots for support, and explained why the revolutionaries wanted to overthrow the despotic Manchu and to establish a democratic nation. He gave a simple
analogy that a democratic nation was like a company which was owned by all shareholders rather than a few individuals. Sun also warned his fellow-countrymen that disunity among them would bring disaster to the Chinese community as a whole. He illustrated his point by saying that ants and bees could survive because of their unity, yet fierce animals such as tigers and leopards can be trapped and caught because of a lack in collective action. For the same purpose, Dr Sun also gave a public talk at the Ch'ing Nien I Sai Hui (the Youth League), an affiliated revolutionary organization in Kuala Lumpur.

Although it was the first visit of Dr Sun to Kuala Lumpur, he was not unknown to the local Chinese. Since his failure in the Canton Uprising in 1895, and his narrow escape from the Chinese Legation in London in 1896, his name had frequently appeared in the local Chinese newspapers. His deportation by the government of the Straits Settlements in 1900 made his name more familiar to the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya. Perhaps a more important link with the local Chinese in Kuala Lumpur was his Cantonese origin. The large Cantonese population in Kuala Lumpur provided him with a better chance to enlist support among them.
Before the appearance of Dr Sun, the Chinese in Kuala Lumpur might have imagined that Sun typified the rough and cruel rebel. But they must have been impressed by his gentility and kindly appearance - a sharp contrast to what they had probably anticipated. His eloquence and cogency in argument must also have impressed his audience. This helped to dispel prejudice against him in the minds of the local Chinese, and partially explained why his mission was so successful in Kuala Lumpur.

On 7 August, 1906 (18 June in the lunar calendar) the T'ung Mãng Hui branch of Kuala Lumpur was founded. Members were sworn on the oath before Dr Sun. Sixteen founding members were named. Among them were Too Nam, Too Kwun-hung, Too Choo-sun, Yuen Ying-fong, Yuen Hing-wan, Yuen Tak-sam, Wang Ch'ing (alias Wang Ch'ing-chiang) and Loke Chow-thye. It is significant to note that all of them, except Wang Ch'ing, were Cantonese who came from neighbouring districts (mainly from Shun Tê, Nan Hai and Tung An), and six of them came from two families (Too Kwun-hung and Too Choo-sun were sons of Too Nam, Yuen Hing-wan and Yuen Tak-sam were sons of Yuen Ying-fong). These facts indicate that dialect difference and kinship tie played an important part in recruiting members for the T'ung Mãng Hui, and later for the whole revolutionary
movement in Singapore and Malaya. A few days later, fourteen more joined the branch, the well-known merchant, Ch'an Chan-mooi, was one of them. After a general meeting, Loke Chow-thye, a tin-miner, was elected chairman of the party and Wang Ch'ing his deputy.

After founding the Kuala Lumpur branch of the T'ung Meng Hui, Dr Sun and his mission proceeded to Ipoh to set up another branch. Ipoh, the capital of Perak, was another tin mining centre with a majority of Chinese. Although Yu Lieh had set up a Chung Ho T'ang branch here, its influence was overshadowed by the reformists and die-hard conservatives. When Dr Sun and his mission arrived in Ipoh, they were accommodated by local revolutionaries at a public institution, the Newly Reformed Commercial Bureau of Perak. But they were threatened with force by the local reformist leader, Foo Chee-choon. On hearing of this news, Dr Sun and his mission moved out immediately from the Bureau to a private hotel. Next morning they returned to Kuala Lumpur, having failed in their mission.

After the abortive journey to Ipoh, Dr Sun returned to Singapore, while Tan Chor-nam and Lim Ngee-soon proceeded to Penang to carry on their work. A letter from Dr Sun served as an introduction to the local revolutionary leader,
Ch'an Chan-mooi, a leader of the Kuala Lumpur T'ung Meng Hui Branch (by courtesy of Senator Chan Kwong Hon, the eldest son of Ch'an Chan-mooi).
Goh Say-eng, a rich merchant revered by the local community. Tan and Lim were well received and accommodated at the 'Hsiao Lan T'ing Club'. Contacts were extended to other local revolutionaries. Shortly afterwards, a meeting was held at which the participants were required to swear an oath of membership in front of Tan and Lim. Goh was unanimously elected as the chairman of the branch. Ng Kim-kong, another wealthy merchant, was elected as his deputy. The branch had twenty-two members.

It is noteworthy that the key towns that Dr Sun and his mission visited and attempted to set up branches were the tin mining centres where rich merchants abounded. His mission to Malaya, apart from setting up the T'ung Meng Hui branches, was apparently aimed at raising funds from these merchants. Although Dr Sun had some unsuccessful experiences in raising funds from Chinese merchants in Honolulu, Hong Kong and Japan, however, he still possessed a total charismatic appeal for Chinese merchants in Southeast Asia. The contribution of S$250,000 by Khoo Seok-wan for the reformist armed uprising in Hankow in 1900 must have impressed him to a great extent. With information provided by the Chinese students from Penang, Saigon and Java who were studying in Japan, Sun had further knowledge of the wealth of Chinese merchants in Southeast Asia.
Goh Say-eng, Chairman of the Penang T'ung Meng Hui Branch (by courtesy of Mr. Wu Tee-jen, an old friend of Goh Say-eng).
Optimistically, Sun planned to raise two million dollars from the Southeast Asian Chinese for the execution of the planned armed revolts in South China. The meeting with Tan Chor-nam, Teo Eng-hock in 1905 and the successful founding of the Singapore T'ung Mong Hui branch must have reinforced his confidence in the Chinese merchants in Southeast Asia. This led him to designate key mining centres in Malaya for priority in the establishment of T'ung Mong Hui branches. In his mind, all overseas Chinese, irrespective of their social status and provincial background, should support the revolutionary cause by which China could attain wealth and power. And support from those rich tin miners and business tycoons in Malaya would help to ensure the execution of his military plans, and would serve as a continuous source of financial support for revolutionary activities.

Although Dr Sun's mission had successfully established two branches in Kuala Lumpur and Penang, another aim of raising a large sum of money to meet his two million dollars target had failed. When he was in Kuala Lumpur, he went to see Loke Yaw, the leading tin miner and business tycoon in Malaya. His purpose was to gain Loke's support for his military programmes in South China. His persuasiveness did not carry the day and Sun felt
constrained to report to his colleagues that Loke was not patriotic. The threat on Sun's mission in Ipoh by Foo Chee-choon, another well-known Chinese tin-miner, had further disillusioned him. This disenchantment with rich Chinese merchants enabled him to realize that the main source of revolutionary strength in overseas Chinese communities was not in the commercial group, but in the middle and lower classes. But most members of these two social groups, owing to their financial status, were illiterate and had, at best, only an imperfect understanding of 'revolution'. Thus, the immediate task after the establishment of the T'ung Mêng Hui branches was, as Dr Sun had foreseen, to spread the revolutionary gospel and to carry out large-scale indoctrination of the members of the middle and lower classes. And this foresight served as guidance for revolutionary activities in Singapore and Malaya in the ensuing years.

In the following two years, branches of the T'ung Mêng Hui were established in Seremban, Ipoh, Kuala Pilah, Muar and Kuatan.

(3) Revolutionary Propaganda Activities:

After the establishment of T'ung Mêng Hui branches in Singapore and Malaya, the main work ahead was the raising
of more funds to support military uprisings in South and South-west China. This could not be accomplished unless more overseas Chinese were converted to the revolutionary cause. For this reason, campaigns of revolutionary propaganda and indoctrination had to be launched.

(a) Newspapers: In the period between 1907 and 1909, three revolutionary newspapers, the Chung Hsing Jih Pao, Yang Ming Pao and the Sun Pao were published in Singapore. All these newspapers shared a common purpose, namely to propagate the revolutionary message.

Among these newspapers, the Chung Hsing Jih Pao was most important. Not only was it the main revolutionary organ of the Singapore T'ung Mong Hui branch, but it also served as the mouthpiece of the revolutionary movement in Southeast Asia. It deserves our special attention.

Apart from the general need for spreading the message of revolution, the Chung Hsing Jih Pao was published with another purpose, that of combating the Union Times - the organ of the reformists in Singapore. Since the stoppage of the earliest revolutionary newspaper - the Thoe Lam Jit Poh, another attempt had been made by Tan Chor-nam and Teo Eng-hock to further their aims. In cooperation with some Chinese merchants in Singapore, a new revolutionary newspaper entitled The Union Times
The Chung Hsing Jih Pao, the Sun Pao, and the Kuang Hua Jih Pao, the revolutionary organs in Singapore and Malaya, 1907-1911 (reproduced from WSNWH, Vol.1, pt.12).
was so well received by the general public on its initial appearance, that the front door of the office was thronged with swarming crowds waiting for the newspaper.  

All these revolutionary newspapers mentioned previously had good reasons for extending their influence extensively throughout the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia. Not only because their appearance corresponded with the growth of revolutionary strength and the decline of reformist influence but also they were strongly backed up by a group of well-known revolutionary journalists and leaders. They were T'ien T'ung, Wang Fu, the two editors of the Chung Hsing Jih Pao, and some prominent revolutionaries such as Hu Han-min, Wang Ching-wei, T'ao Ch'eng-chang, Chü Cheng and Dr Sun Yat-sen. Most of these revolutionary intellectuals had editing and writing experience before they came to Singapore. T'ien T'ung was one of the founders and editors of the famous revolutionary magazine, Twentieth Century China (二十世紀支那), in 1904 and Fu Pao Monthly (復報月刊) in 1906. Wang Fu was the founder and the chief editor of Shao Nien Pao (The Youth Daily) and Jên Pao in Hong Kong. T'ao Ch'eng-chang was the editor of the main revolutionary organ in Tokyo, Min Pao, from April to October 1908. Furthermore, national
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leaders like Dr Sun Yat-sen, Wang Ching-wei and Hu Han-min were particularly popular among the overseas Chinese because of their writings in the Min Pao.

The strong backing of the national revolutionary leaders and well-known journalists indicates that these newspapers were considered as important links in a chain of revolutionary propaganda media. The particular interest and concern shown by Dr Sun Yat-sen for the Chung Hsing Jih Pao further suggests that the newspaper was of tremendous importance to the revolutionary movement in Southeast Asia.69

Because of the strong front of revolutionary intellectuals, the Chung Hsing Jih Pao and the Sun Pao were able to wage wars against the Ch'ing government and the reformists. The strategy was to spread the revolutionary message along these two lines: by attacking the Ch'ing government, contempt and hostility would be aroused among the overseas Chinese against the ruling Manchu, and sympathy would be acquired for the revolutionary activities; by refuting the false theory of the reformists, the ambiguous ideas of nation, race, loyalty and treason spread by them would be cleared in the minds of the overseas Chinese. Thus, the 'just cause' of the revolution would triumph.
The polemics with the reformists will be dealt with fully in Chapter V. With regard to the attacks on the Ch'ing government, the Chung Hsing Jih Pao and the Sun Pao maintained a constant barrage. At the beginning of its publication, the Chung Hsing Jih Pao fiercely attacked Ch'ing policy on protection of overseas Chinese. Several long editorials were published revealing the nature of the policy. The Ch'ing government was described as exploiting economic resources of the overseas Chinese instead of protecting them. And the Ch'ing emissary, Yang Shih-ch'i, who was by that time touring Southeast Asia to appeal for support from the overseas Chinese, was attacked and classified as a second-class traitor of the Chinese (漢奸). The newspaper warned the overseas Chinese that Yang was just like one of many Ch'ing officials who came to collect bribes in the form of presents, and he would, without exception, forget all the promises he made when he went back to China. Thus, the so-called 'protection for overseas Chinese' was no more than a ruse for fooling them and enriching the Ch'ing officials. The newspaper gave concrete examples purporting to prove that Ch'ing policy of protecting oversease Chinese interest in China would never be fulfilled. For example, overseas Chinese had invested
This cartoon shows a Ch'ing official trying to extort money from an overseas Chinese.

The cat represents the Ch'ing government trying to seize the rice of the overseas Chinese.

(reproduced from the original cartoons in the 'Fei Fei' column of the Chung Hsing Jih Pao, 11 September, 1907, p.5, 20 November 1907, p.5).
millions of dollars in the Canton-Hankow Railway, but control had fallen into the hands of foreign powers. 73

The newspaper had good reasons for its antagonism to the Yang Mission's and Ch'ing cordiality towards the overseas Chinese. For one of the main purposes of the mission was to spy on the revolutionaries, and to find out ways and means to suppress them. 74 Thus, its arrival had naturally aroused hostility among local revolutionaries who tried to obstruct Yang's visit. When Yang visited Ipoh in December 1907, he was embarrassed by a revolutionary, Ch'en Wên-pao, who boldly questioned and reprimanded him at a banquet given by local merchants in his honour. 75 He was further embarrassed by the revolutionaries in Ipoh who sent him a petition in which they questioned the ability and purpose of the government's protection. 76 This petition was apparently designed to antagonize Yang and to ruin his goodwill mission. The Chung Hsing Jih Pao took this opportunity to prop up these anti-government activities: the petition was fully published in the newspaper; and it was sent to be published in the Min Pao in Tokyo for wider circulation. 77

The attack on the government's policy towards the overseas Chinese continued after Yang was gone. The Sun
Pao, which succeeded the Chung Hsing Jih Pao as the main revolutionary organ in Southeast Asia between 1909 and 1910, also published two long editorials of this type. The authors recalled the traditional Ch'ing policy of neglecting overseas Chinese and attacked her current sinister aim of squeezing financial contribution from them.\textsuperscript{78} The persistence of this attack shows that the revolutionaries were not merely annoyed at being spied on by the government's emissary, but realized that the policy had directly jeopardized their interest. For the success of it would mean more overseas Chinese supporting the government, and this would retard the growth of the revolutionary cause.

Together with the attack on the Ch'ing policy towards the overseas Chinese, other current issues in China also came under strong fire in the editorials of the newspapers. In the year 9 September 1909 to 19 October 1910, twenty three leading articles were published in the editorial of the Sun Pao attacking the Ch'ing government. These articles commented on major current political developments in China, such as the government's false constitution,\textsuperscript{79} navy subscription,\textsuperscript{80} and its attitudes towards Japan.\textsuperscript{81} The death of the Emperor Kuang Hsü and Empress
Dowager Tz'u Hsi at the end of 1908, was the most interesting and controversial current issue in that period. The Chung Hsing Jih Pao clearly showed its hostile attitude. The Emperor was described as a puppet, the Empress Dowager was denounced as '... a stupid woman who trampled four hundred million Chinese ... the disasters she brought about, such as the loss of Taiwan to Japan, the cessions of Port Arthur and Dairen to powers, and the Boxer Catastrophe, were all unpardonable ...' and their death was considered as timely.

The revolutionary newspapers also tried to clarify some vague and deep-rooted traditional ideas about 'loyalty', 'treason' and 'Confucianism' which were prevailing in overseas Chinese communities. These traditional ideas had been frequently used by the reformists and the conservatives to counter revolutionaries and to deter the spread of their ideas. A concrete example was that when Dr Sun Yat-sen first visited Penang in 1906, he was considered by conservative merchants as a traitor and the revolutionary gospel he preached was regarded as snake and scorpion. In order to give a new connotation to these old terms, the revolutionaries tried to trace
the origin of the formation of the nation and the original relations between rulers and ruled upon which the old terms were based.

According to Chinese traditional ideas, a nation (dynasty) owed its existence to an emperor who received the mandate from heaven to rule it, the emperor was the only representative of heaven (he was usually addressed as T'ien Tzŭ, the son of heaven) on earth and was considered as equivalent to the nation. According to this idea, a patriot meant one who was first and foremost loyal to the emperor or his ruling family. No surprising overseas Chinese like those in China tended to combine or fuse the two concepts, nation and emperor. The revolutionaries tried to separate these two vague concepts by tracing the origin of a nation. As the Sun Pao argued in an editorial in 1909 that the formation of a nation was not for an emperor or a ruling family, but for the people. A nation is like a share-company, the emperor is like the manager who takes care of the company and works for the benefit of all shareholders. If the manager does not handle the company well, any of the shareholders can rise against him and work for his expulsion. The act of these shareholders against the manager is not against the company, but for the company
and the interests of all shareholders. Therefore, the revolutionaries concluded, those who worked for the overthrow of the Ch'ing Dynasty - a ruling family, should not be regarded as traitors.  

In this way the revolutionaries tried to give legitimacy to revolution, and to smash the mysterious divinity of autocracy. If this basic ideas on relations between rulers and ruled could be changed, other notions based upon it would naturally be altered. The analogy of a nation to a company had its origin in the writings of western political philosophers like John Locke (1632-1704) and Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778). Their basic ideas of liberty, equality and social contract had exerted tremendous influence on those revolutionary intellectuals who studied politics and law in Japan. Outstanding revolutionary writers like Hu Han-min, Wang Ching-wei and Ch'en T'ien-hua who were immersed deep in Western democratic ideas, tried to employ this theory as one of the effective weapons to propagate the revolutionary cause.  

Having thus pulled down the emperor from his
inviolable position, the revolutionaries went on to develop concepts of 'loyalty' and 'patriotism' and to establish their own legitimacy. They argued that loyalty to the emperor did not necessarily mean patriotism to the nation, because the emperor or the ruling family did not automatically represent the nation or the interests of the people. Thus, only those who really fought for the interests of the nation and the people were qualified to be termed as patriotic heroes. In history, according to the revolutionaries, there were numerous generals who fought and died for emperors. These people should not be considered as patriotic heroes, for they only fought for the interests of the ruling families and their personal glory. Only the historical figures like T'ang of the Shang Dynasty who mounted the first revolution in Chinese history to overthrow the tyrannical rule of the Hsia Emperor, and Yo Fei of the Sung Dynasty who fought against foreign invasion, should be regarded as patriotic
heroes, because they did so in the interests of the nation and the people.  

The revolutionary newspapers attempted further to revise Confucius' teachings which dominated the Chinese mind. As mentioned in the first chapter, Confucius' teachings had deep roots in overseas Chinese communities. Since the movement for the revival of Confucianism was staged in Singapore and Malaya in 1899, Confucius' teachings seemed to have enjoyed a more pervasive influence in the communities, particularly among the merchant class. The reformists, who were the moving spirit behind the movement, had skilfully utilized that to justify their actions. K'ang Yu-wei, for instance, declared that his ideas of reform were mainly derived from Confucius' tenets. The revolutionaries were aware of the fact that most of Confucius' teachings were unfavourable to or sometimes incompatible with, revolution. Like the reformists, they skilfully chose some elements in Confucianism to strengthen the ideas of racial revolution. They particularly singled out Confucius' racial concept of Chinese and barbarians ( 内 中 外 黃 祕 ) to justify the platform of nationalism which was the most important slogan against the Manchu rule in China.  

They also used one of the
key tenets, 'Anti-Egoism' (非利己主義) to defend their revolutionary activities. They emphasized that the risk they were taking in fighting against the Manchu was not in their own interests, but in the interests of the nation and the people. This spirit of self-sacrifice was derived from the Confucius' teachings, the revolutionaries asserted, and should be deemed praiseworthy.\(^9\)

(b) Books and periodicals: Books and periodicals were another principal propaganda medium used by the revolutionaries. In the period between 1906 and 1911, only two revolutionary booklets, Revolution and the Problems of Diplomacy (革命與外交問題) by Wang Ching-wei and On Constitutional Monarchy (立憲問題) by Hu Han-min, were published in Singapore in 1908.\(^9\)

In this aspect, Singapore had heavily relied on imported literature. Since 1903, revolutionary booklets, pamphlets and periodicals increased substantially. In that year, twenty seven books, pamphlets, and nine periodicals were published compared to seven and two in the previous year.\(^9\) The centres of revolutionary publications were Tokyo, Shanghai and Hong Kong.

In view of frequent commercial contacts with Hong Kong, Shanghai and Tokyo, Singapore could easily obtain
supplies of all these publications. The lack of censorship on Chinese publications in Singapore had further facilitated the spread of this imported material. The office of the Chung Hsing Jih Pao and Chen Yüan Chan, a shop owned by Teo Eng-hock, served as the main distribution agents. Almost all revolutionary booklets and periodicals published in Tokyo and Shanghai were immediately available in Singapore. In the distribution of these revolutionary publications in Southeast Asia, the Singapore T'ung Mêng Hui branch played a very important role. When new items of revolutionary booklets or periodicals were published in Tokyo and Shanghai, the Chung Hsing Jih Pao, the organ of the branch, soon advertised the titles, authors and prices of the publications and indicated where they could be obtained. With the increased circulation of the Chung Hsing Jih Pao in Southeast Asia, revolutionary booklets and periodicals became more popular.

Among the most popular and widely read revolutionary books and periodicals available in that period were those with a strong nationalistic appeal such as The Revolutionary Army, Sudden Awakening (猛回頭), To Awake our Compatriots (喚醒同胞), The Story of Hung Hsiu-ch'üan (洪秀全演義), A Biography of Hsü
The Revolutionary Army and Sudden Awakening had a particularly deep impact on the overseas Chinese. As shown in the previous chapter The Revolutionary Army partly contributed to the conversion of Tan Chor-nam and Teo Eng-hock. Sudden Awakening, written by Ch'en T'ien-hua in a style similar to The Revolutionary Army deserves our special attention.

Ch'en T'ien-hua, a well-known revolutionary leader, was born in Hsin Hua Hsien, Hunan, in 1875. He spent his youth in his native province studying in a technical middle school. In 1903, he proceeded to Japan at the age of twenty nine. Like other Chinese students in Japan, Ch'en eagerly read Western literature in Japanese translation, and was able to familiarize himself with Western doctrines on social and racial struggle. Like other Chinese students, Ch'en was by that time immersed in anti-foreign feeling caused by the threat of Russian occupation of Manchuria. Ch'en became a leading member of the openly revolutionary organization, Chün Kuo Min Chiao Yü Hui (Military popular education society). The object of the organization was to nurture a military spirit and to spread nationalism. In this environment Sudden Awakening was written at the end of 1903.
Unlike The Revolutionary Army whose theme was anti-Manchuiism, Sudden Awakening presented to its readers an obsession with racial destruction and anti-foreignism. Ch'en, who read Western literature extensively (in Japanese translation) was well acquainted with Social Darwinism. Darwin's universal principles of evolution and struggle for existence, which were later expounded in a social context by T.H. Huxley, had been indelibly printed on his thoughts. In the first paragraph of the Sudden Awakening, Ch'en clearly expressed his fear of destruction of the Han race (Chinese), and prayed to the Yellow Emperor, the legendary founder of the Han, for help and for the birth of a national saviour. He further expressed his anxiety over the decline of China which seemed powerless to resist encroachment of the Western powers. He used the term 'Racial Imperialism' (民族帝國主義) to describe a new pattern of destruction of an inferior race. He explained that a superior race - an imperialistic power - not only conquered and ruled a country when occupied, but also exported its people to the occupied country to eliminate the indigenous people. He gave a concrete example that the Australian aborigines were gradually and systematically eliminated by the British authorities after Australia was occupied.
To arouse his compatriots further, he listed the examples of the British conquest of India, the French annexation of Indo-China and the partitions of Poland and Africa. What Ch'en feared most was the loss of race and nation as in the case of the Australian aborigines. No less feared was division at the hands of foreign powers as in the case of Poland and Africa. But even the loss of just nationhood, as in the case of India and Indo-China, was by no means a welcomed prospect.

Together with the fear of destruction of China and the Chinese race, Ch'en introduced a strong feeling of anti-foreignism. He first traced the history of the coming of Europeans and the Western threat to China. He said:

...Since the opening of Chinese ports, English, French, Russian and German flocked to China to trade and drain away our resources. These powers not only impoverished our people, but also threatened our national security. The Japanese occupied Taiwan; Russia, Port Arthur; Britain, Wei Hai Wai; France, Kwangchow Wan and Germany, Kiaochow Wan: almost all the Chinese provinces were placed under their spheres of influence ...

After presenting this general picture, Ch'en sought to stir up the xenophobia of his readers by describing the ruthless oppression of the foreigners:

...Chinese in the foreign concessions in Shanghai are treated like animals. If a foreigner is killed by a Chinese, ten Chinese are executed to repay his life. But if a Chinese is killed by a foreigner,
the accused is merely sent back to his home country. A notice was put up at the gate of a foreigner's garden in Shanghai, stating that only Chinese and dogs were not admitted ...

Further Ch'en gave examples of foreigner's discrimination against and persecution of overseas Chinese to arouse the animosity of his expatriate readers. He wrote:

... There were two or three million overseas Chinese working in Southeast Asia, America and Australia as labourers. Because of their industry and thrift, the foreigners were jealous and levied heavy taxes against them. Every Chinese who disembarked had to pay fifty dollars tax. There is a place called Honolulu with more than ten thousand immigrant Chinese. When a Chinese woman died, her death was used as a pretext to burn off the whole of China Town to avoid an epidemic ...

The fear of the destruction of China and her people, and the anti-foreignism introduced in Ch'en's writing found strong echoes in the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia. Although unprotected by the home government, the overseas Chinese were deeply concerned about the decline of Chinese power. Unchecked it would result in the intensification of foreign oppression and exploitation of them also. Their concern for China was manifested in various ways. During the Sino-French war over Indo-China in 1884, a Chinese Kapitan of Perak, Chêng Ching-kuei, contributed S$100,000 to the Chinese government for the purchase of arms and ammunition. The visit of Chinese warships to Singapore in 1890 aroused tremendous interest
among the local Chinese communities. Loyalty was pledged and hope for the restoration of Chinese wealth and power was expressed by Chinese leaders to Admiral Ting Ju-chang, the Commander of the Chinese fleets. In the Chinese newspapers published in Singapore, hopes for the salvation of China were constantly expressed. These expressions became stronger after the defeat of China in the Sino-Japanese war in 1894. In an editorial in the Hsing Pao, a rather conservative Singapore newspaper, the author lamented the general decline of China and in particular her loss of territory, population and wealth. He stressed the fact that China had lost to the powers, land amounting to six provinces, two million people within fifty years and, due to that, gigantic wealth.

Such expressions of fears led many overseas Chinese to commit themselves to the revolutionary cause. Only through revolution, they gradually believed, could the nation regain its wealth and power.

Ch'en's anti-foreignism became even more appealing to the overseas Chinese communities. For most of their members had bitter experience of ill-treatment by foreigners. From the beginning of the history of overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, there were numerous records of their persecution by the Western powers. The famous
massacre of Chinese in the Philippines in the seventeenth century by Spanish authorities and similar cruelty displayed by Dutch authorities on Chinese residents in Batavia in the eighteenth century had left an ineradicable imprint. The ill-treatment of Chinese in Honolulu and in Thailand at the beginning of the twentieth century revived memories of the same brutality. Compared with their compatriots, the overseas Chinese in Singapore and Malaya were better off. However, they still had some grievances against the British authorities. For instance, the quarantine check on Chinese immigrants at Singapore had caused widespread discontent and protest from Chinese communities.

Anti-foreign feeling had found its expression in overseas Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya on many occasions. The chief manifestation of these feelings of xenophobia was boycott. Anti-American feeling caused by the passing of exclusion law against the Chinese was fomented throughout the year 1905 by the refusal to purchase American goods. Anti-Japanese feeling in 1908 and 1909 found its expression in boycotting Japanese goods and prostitutes.

Living under British colonial rule, the suppression by the colonial government of their expression on anti-
foreign feeling had probably diverted such expression towards the Manchu government. In their belief that the Manchu were responsible for all the sufferings they bore overseas and thus became the main target of their grievances.

Other books like *A Biography of Hsü Hsi-lin*, *A Biography of Ma Fu-i* and *The Revolutionary Martyr Fêng* also made an impression of the overseas Chinese. Men like Hsü Hsi-lin and Martyr Fêng were men of integrity and high social status. But they sacrificed their comfort and ultimately their lives for the revolutionary cause. These biographies of revolutionary martyrs were designed to inculcate in readers the values propagated by the revolutionaries. Perhaps the most important ideas they glorified was the eternal value of martyrdom. And this eventually came to exert a tremendous influence on the mentality of many overseas Chinese. Wên Shêng-ts'ai, the famous revolutionary martyr from Ipoh who assassinated a Manchu general at Canton, declared himself to be the successor of Hsü Hsi-lin and stated that he was deeply inspired by Hsü's heroic and fearless action.

(c) Reading Clubs: Although newspapers, books and magazines were effective propaganda media for spreading the revolutionary gospel, they could only exert influence
among those who could read, particularly those who could afford to buy. In view of the nature of the immigrant community and the lack of education, the number of literates in the Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya was comparatively small. The majority of the population who were either illiterate or could not afford to buy reading matter remained untouched by revolutionary publications. Thus, the question of how to spread the revolutionary gospel among the vast masses became the main task in the propaganda campaign. In the course of their activities, the revolutionaries discovered a successful means to carry out this task, namely, to use a semi-revolutionary institution to reach the masses - the reading club (書報社).

The origin of revolutionary reading clubs in the Malayan Peninsula can be traced to the Singapore Reading Club which was founded by a Chinese Christian missionary, Chêng P'ing-t'ing, in 1903. The main aim of Chêng in founding such an institution was neither to propagate revolution nor to create a battle-ground for the revolutionaries, but to provide reading facilities for poor young people in the hope of winning them over to Christianity.
The Singapore Reading Club (reproduced from WSNWH, Vol. 1, pt. 11).

Dr. Sun Yat-sen's residence in Penang, 1910 (reproduced from WSNWH, Vol. 1, pt. 11).
The association between reading clubs and the revolutionary movement was by no means accidental. It happened that Chêng was a friend of Tan Chor-nam who foresaw that the institution could be used as an affiliated organisation for spreading revolutionary gospel among the masses. Tan contributed money and became a patron of the institution. Efforts were made to spread revolutionary gospel. When public talks were sponsored by the Singapore Reading Club, Tan Chor-nam and Teo Eng-hock took the opportunity to address the audience with revolutionary doctrine and this aroused considerable public interest. 112

The infiltration of the Singapore Reading Club was reported to Dr Sun Yat-sen when he visited Singapore in 1905. Sun shared the view that the institution could and should be fully exploited for revolutionary purposes, and he asked them to keep an eye open for possible recruits from the club. This plan was later carried into effect after Chêng was persuaded to join the T'ung Mêng Hui. Through his influence, a number of Chinese Christian leaders became members. 113

The success of this infiltration of the Singapore Reading Club, from all points of view, was an event of great significance for the revolutionary movement in
Southeast Asia. Not only did it provide ground for revolutionary activities, but, more important, it provided a pattern for infiltration in the overseas Chinese communities. Moreover, it led to the successful infiltration by revolutionaries of the social institutions throughout Southeast Asia.

The success of the Singapore Reading Club gave an impetus to the revolutionary movement in the Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya. When the revolutionary leaders in Singapore witnessed the effectiveness of the reading club, they took steps to set up their own. Dr Sun Yat-sen, who diverted his attention from Japan to Southeast Asia after 1907, instructed the Singapore leaders to take the initiative. As a result, the K'ai Ming Public Speaking and Reading Club was founded by Ho Hsin-t'ien, Ho Tê-ju, Hu T'ing-ch'uan and Lin Hang-wei. The avowed aim as stated explicitly in the opening ceremony and in the declaration was to promote general knowledge among the common people. But the real purpose was to spread the revolutionary message and to organize members of middle and lower classes in support of the revolution.

The example was soon followed by other leaders in Singapore and Malaya. In 1908, Hsü Tzu-lin and P'an
Chao-p'eng founded the Kung I Reading Club and the T'ung Tê Reading Club respectively.¹¹⁵ In the same year, the Penang Philmatic Society (The Penang Reading Club) was founded by the leaders of the Penang T'ung Mêng Hui branch,¹¹⁶ and became the leading revolutionary organization in Northern Malaya.

Between 1908 and 1911, more than fifty reading clubs were established throughout Singapore and Malaya. (see Table 2 below). Following the examples of their counterparts in Singapore and Malaya, revolutionary leaders in the Dutch East-Indies, Burma, Thailand and French Indo-China took the same steps to establish reading clubs. Within the period under our study, more than a hundred revolutionary reading clubs sprang up throughout these regions.

The size of these clubs differed from place to place. In big urban centres like Singapore, Kuala Lumpur and Penang where members were more numerous, the reading clubs were usually bigger and elaborately organized; that is on a clear-cut two levels model. They comprised an executive committee and rank and file membership. The committee consisted of a chairman, a vice-chairman, a tsungli (總理) a deputy tsungli, an accountant, an auditor, several investigators of Chinese and English
Table 2. A List of Revolutionary Reading Clubs founded in Singapore and Malaya (1908-1911).

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Persons in Charge</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kung I</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Hu Po-hsiang, Ho Tê-ju</td>
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<tr>
<td>T'ung Tê</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Teo Eng-hock</td>
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<td>T'ung Wên</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Huang I-hua</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kung Min</td>
<td>Batu Pahat, Johore</td>
<td>Kuo Hsin</td>
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<tr>
<td>I Ch'ün</td>
<td>Muar, Johore</td>
<td>Wang Chi-shih</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ch'i Chih</td>
<td>Malacca</td>
<td>Liu Ching-shan</td>
</tr>
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<td>Chung Hua</td>
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<td>Teng Tse-ju, Li Yûeh-ch'ih</td>
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<tr>
<td>Batu Anam</td>
<td>N. Sembilan</td>
<td>Chu Ch'ih-ni</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ts'e Ch'ün</td>
<td>Broga, N. Sembilan</td>
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(Sources: Feng Tzǔ-yu, Ts'ū-chih shih, pp.180-84; Feng, k'ai-kuo shih, pp.89-91; The Sun Pao, 23/9/1909, p.3., 18/7/1910, p.7., 20/10/1910, p.7; Nan Ch'iao Jih Pao, 2/12/1911, p.9.)
books, magazines and newspapers, several receptionists and a number of commentators. In the small country towns where the members were few, the reading clubs were organized on a more simple basis. Although there were divisions between executive committee and ordinary members, the committee may only comprise a chairman, vice-chairman, a treasurer and some executive members.

In spite of differences in size, all revolutionary reading clubs were organized on the principle of unity and solidarity among Chinese. Those who were interested in reading were accepted as members irrespective of their dialect difference. The growth of some big-sized reading clubs gave rise to some functional problems and needed adjustments. Some of the reading clubs in Singapore, after a period of growth, had increased their membership by several hundreds. This increase had created difficulty in calling general meetings, members failed to get to know each other and there was a lack of the spirit of comradeship among them. To these defects, Dr Sun Yat-sen suggested reorganizing the reading clubs on the basis of dialect groups. They were divided into Fukien, Teochew, Cantonese and Hakka, and other small groups like Hainanese and Chao (潮) were incorporated into Teochew and Cantonese. Each group elected a
a representative as liaison officer between the club and the Singapore branch of the T'ung Mêng Hui. A messenger was elected for every ten members, and was responsible for keeping them informed and passing their opinions on to the organization. Meetings were called once a month to discuss problems and members from other dialect groups were required to attend the meetings in order to break down any barrier among them.

The reorganization of some reading clubs on the basis of dialect difference was not aimed at the revival of provincialism and regionalism. It was designed to facilitate the functions of the reading clubs, and to strengthen cooperation with the T'ung Mêng Hui.

The significance of reading clubs in propaganda activities was their important role in distributing revolutionary books, magazines and newspapers. In the lack of public libraries during that time, reading clubs emerged as the cultural centres for the general public, and performed the role in disseminating knowledge and promoting the educational standard of the masses. Instead of buying newspapers, books and magazines of other kinds, reading clubs provided most of the revolutionary publications. The members and the general public who went to reading clubs were both consciously and
unconsciously influenced by revolutionary ideas communicated to them through those publications. Some of the publications were not bought by the clubs, but contributed by the revolutionaries. For instance, The Singapore Reading Clubs received free copies of the Chung Hsing Jih Pao, the Sun Pao, Chung Kuo Jih Pao and others.119

Another important role of reading clubs in propaganda activities was their sponsoring of public talks. Public talks and rallies, which will be dealt with in the following section, were two other important media for revolutionary mass indoctrination. In most cases, reading clubs took the initiative to sponsor public talks and provide places for them. Prominent revolutionary leaders were invited to give talks, and advertisements of the names of speakers and topics were usually published in the local revolutionary newspapers.120 Most of the talks sponsored by reading clubs attracted large audiences. The significance of reading clubs in these propaganda activities was that they performed two important roles in indoctrination. Firstly, they provided reading matter which served to bring revolutionary ideas and knowledge of the progress of the revolutionary movement before their members and the general public.
Secondly, the public talks consolidated the impression made by the printed word. These two sides of the clubs' activities were designed to confirm their members' enthusiasm as well as to keep the revolutionary movement before the minds of the general public.

On a number of occasions, some leading reading clubs took steps to establish their image in the communities in order to increase the influence of their propaganda activities. In October 1907, the Chung Hua Public Speaking and Reading Club in Singapore called a mass rally to mourn Hsü Hsi-lin, the famous revolutionary martyr, who was executed in the abortive Anching Uprising. Pamphlets were widely distributed, and revolutionary leaders were invited to address the gathering. The mourning was designed to establish the image of revolutionary martyrs in the minds of the general public and spread the spirit of martyrdom. In 1908, the K'ai Ming Public Speaking and Reading Club in Singapore took the step in giving free medical service to the poor, an action aimed at expressing the spirit of philanthropic brotherhood among the revolutionary organizations. A small group of Chinese physicians, including one of the founders of the club, Ho Hsin-t'ien, was responsible for making prescriptions. In 1909, the Penang Philomatic
Society founded a revolutionary newspaper entitled Kuang Hua Jih Pao which eventually became the main revolutionary organ in Singapore and Malaya from 1910 to 1911.\textsuperscript{123}

The significance of reading clubs in the revolutionary movement in Southeast Asia lay not only in their dissemination of the revolutionary message among the masses. Of greater significance was that they came to form an integral part of the total revolutionary organization. Because of their legal status in society, they performed many functions for the T'ung M\êng Hui branches. They provided opportunities for party leaders to activate, and the venues for party meetings. Furthermore, some of the reading clubs acted as enrolment centres for the party.\textsuperscript{124} In country towns and outskirts of urban areas, reading clubs and the T'ung M\êng Hui branches were very closely identified. In fact, some of the branches of T'ung M\êng Hui came to be established under the name of reading clubs.

In view of all these important roles in the revolutionary movement, reading clubs became an essential part of the fabric of revolutionary organization, and a direct link was forged between the revolutionary elites and the minds of the ordinary people. Through the
functions of all the reading clubs, the intelligence and directions from the top level of the T'ung Mêng Hui could flow to the rank and file of the party and vice versa, and through this channel, the revolutionary leaders were able to exert more influence on the thinking and outlooks of the masses, and in return, to gain their support.

(d) Public Talks and Mass Rallies:

Public talks and mass rallies were two important links in the revolutionary propaganda chain in Singapore and Malaya. These forms of propaganda were long practised by the revolutionaries in Japan where overseas Chinese included a large proportion of Chinese students. After the centre of revolutionary activities was shifted to Southeast Asia in 1907, the national revolutionary leaders, such as Dr Sun Yat-sen, Wang Ching-wei and Hu Han-min were all amply experienced in public speaking, and introduced this obvious propaganda technique to the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia. As we have mentioned previously, the reading clubs had performed the functions of sponsoring public talks and of providing venues. Unlike the public talks, mass rallies were usually sponsored by the T'ung Mêng Hui branches or other important revolutionary organizations. This difference of sponsorship was probably due to the greater size of mass rallies and the
need for more elaborate organization. Thus, the T'ung Mêng Hui branches or the leading organizations like the Chung Hsing Jih Pao were suitable vehicles for sponsorship. Mass rallies were probably even more effective than public talks, for they were attended by a larger audience and the speeches could be made in more blatantly emotional terms. Two mass rallies organized by the Chung Hsing Jih Pao in 1908 were attended by several thousand people. The New Stage, where two mass rallies were held, was decorated with revolutionary flags, flowers, and before speeches were delivered, the speakers and the revolutionary supporters shouted 'Long Live the Revolution'. Prominent revolutionary orators, such as Wang Ching-wei and Lin Hang-wei, were invited to deliver speeches. They expounded the principles of nationalism and revolution. Other mass rallies on special occasions, such as those welcoming renowned revolutionary leaders, or commemorating the fall of the Ming Dynasty, were also aimed in this direction.

In Chinese communities like those of Singapore and Malaya where educational standards were low, public talks and mass rallies became important means of communication between the revolutionaries and the masses. Therefore, it is not surprising to find that prominent revolutionary
leaders frequently toured the main cities in Southeast Asia to propagate revolutionary doctrines. Not only did they realise that public talks and mass rallies were two most effective means of propaganda, but also by delivering public speeches they could easily build up their own image among the general public, which in turn would increase their influence among the overseas Chinese.

Although Dr Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles, namely, Nationalism, Democracy and Peoples' Livelihood, were frequently the subjects of public talks and mass rallies in Japan, it seems that the only principle preached in Singapore and Malaya was nationalism, the others receiving little ventilation. From twelve speeches delivered by Wang Ching-wei in Singapore and Malaya in 1908-09 (see Table 2) we find that the main theme of his speeches was nationalism. Six out of eight speeches whose contents are traceable, were on nationalism, and the other two dealt with current politics and commerce.

There were good reasons why the revolutionary leaders should preach only the principle of Nationalism to the overseas Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya. The majority of overseas Chinese were illiterate and even the middle class merchants who had had some private education experienced difficulty in understanding the
Table 2: Speeches Delivered by Wang Ching-wei in Singapore and Malaya (1908-1909).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Topic</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. 1/1/1908</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. 6/1/1908</td>
<td>S'pore Reading Club, S'pore</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. 11/1/1908</td>
<td>New Stage, S'pore</td>
<td>Nationalism &amp; Revolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. 15/3/1908</td>
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<td>Nationalism</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. 30/3/1908</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. 4/5/1908</td>
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<td>Constitutional Monarchy</td>
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<td>8. 18/6/1908</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. 5/8/1908</td>
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<td>10. 29/10/1908</td>
<td>Hsi Yuan, Seremban</td>
<td>Nationalism &amp; Patriotism</td>
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<td>San Shan Club, Penang</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. 1909</td>
<td>Hsiao Lan T'ing Club, Penang</td>
<td>Commerce &amp; Revolution</td>
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concepts of democracy and Peoples' Livelihood. Further, it was futile for the revolutionary leaders to preach these two principles purely on a theoretical basis without concrete examples and difficult for the masses to comprehend these newly imported Western ideas. Moreover, most overseas Chinese had inherited hatred for the Manchu from their ancestors, or had experienced themselves in China the harsh rule of an alien government. Under these conditions the Principle of Nationalism came to hold the strongest appeal for the audiences.

The skill of the speakers in delivering speeches should also be taken into account. We are not here concerned with the physical capacity of the speakers, but with their general skill in presenting the case for nationalism and revolution. Their general method was to employ striking historical facts as concrete examples and simple analogies. Wang Ching-wei used to talk about revolutionary history of the Fukien and Cantonese against the Manchu conquest in Southern China in the Seventeenth Century, and particularly singled out two renowned anti-Manchu figures, Chêng Ch'êng-kung and Hûng Hsiu-ch'üan who were well-known to the overseas Chinese. 129 Using these two national heroes of Fukien and Kwangtung origin, Wang appealed strongly to his audiences to perpetuate the
patriotic spirit and to rise against the Manchu rule.\textsuperscript{130} Further, Wang declared that most Fukien had emigrated to Southeast Asia as a result of the ruthless Manchu rule in China.\textsuperscript{131} Based on the premises of taking revenge for their ancestors and reviving the patriotic spirit of national heroes, Wang concluded that all Fukien and Kwangtung people should support the revolution.

Simple analogies were also given by the revolutionary leaders to illustrate their points. Wang Ching-wei and Hu Han-min used to set forth a premise acceptable to all, and then used analogy to support their arguments. For instance, when they justified their argument about inequality in China, they set forth a primary premise that equality was a basic right. The simple analogy was made that equality was not being given to Chinese by the Manchu government in China. A small minority of Manchu ruled the majority of Chinese and this was racial inequality. In view of the high rate of illiteracy in the overseas Chinese communities, simple analogies made the speeches more popular and impressive. When Wang Ching-wei and Hu Han-min delivered their speeches at the Singapore Reading Club on 5 August 1908, they were enthusiastically applauded by an audience of four hundred.\textsuperscript{132}
There can be no doubt that nationalism was a great inspiration to all overseas Chinese, and when it was linked with some significant historical events, the appeal for revolution became more meaningful and effective. Historical events like the birthday of the Yellow Emperor, the legendary progenitor of the Chinese, and the death of the Emperor Ch'ung Chên, the last monarch of the Ming Dynasty, were particularly meaningful to all Chinese people. The story of the Yellow Emperor was widely known among Chinese. The revolutionaries made use of this legendary common ancestor as the symbol of solidarity among all Chinese, and to distinguish them from the Manchu and other foreigners. It was not difficult for the revolutionaries to preach racial revolution on this basis. The story of the death of the Emperor Ch'ung Chên was more significant to all Chinese, for it marked the beginning of the destruction of the Chinese empire - the Ming Dynasty, and the ruthless rule of the Manchu. The story was banned by most of the Manchu rulers because of its subversive nature. But it was revived with the revolutionary movement at the end of the nineteenth century. The revolutionaries foresaw that it could be used as a reminder to their compatriots
of the destruction of Chinese rule, and used it as a basis of agitation for the restoration of Chinese political power. Like their counterparts in Japan who held a meeting on 19 March 1902 (the Lunar calendar) in memory of the death of the Emperor Ch'ung Chên, the revolutionaries in Singapore and Malaya also made use of it to further their propaganda activities. On 19 March 1910 (in the Lunar calendar) revolutionaries in Kuala Lumpur held a public meeting at the Ch'eng Chi Restaurant in memory of the death of the Emperor. Before the meeting took place, circulars of a strongly nationalistic flavour were widely distributed. The restaurant was decorated with green leaves and fresh flowers, and a portrait of the Emperor and two revolutionary flags were displayed. The meeting was chaired by K'ang Yuen-t'ien, one of the revolutionary leaders in Kuala Lumpur. The speakers at the meeting, such as Hu Han-min, Hsü Shao-sun, Yang Mu-jü, Chiang Chin-liang and Han Shih-kên, all attacked the Manchu rule, and stressed that one of the most vital prerequisites for saving China was an understanding of nationalism.

On 18 May 1910 (in the Lunar calendar) another group of revolutionaries in Muar gathered at the Ch'i Chih Reading Club to celebrate the birthday of the Yellow
Emperor. A local revolutionary leader, Ts'ui Ts'an-wên preached nationalism and revolution. He strongly urged his listeners to bear in mind that they were all the descendants of the Emperor who had founded the Chinese empire more than four thousand years ago, they should feel ashamed to see that the Manchu had been occupying China for more than two hundred and sixty years. He exhorted the audience to an appreciation that it was their responsibility to restore Chinese rule.

It is difficult to assess the influence of public talks and mass rallies on the Chinese communities. According to the revolutionary newspapers, all talks and rallies sponsored by them were very successful. Talks held at reading clubs or Chinese Christian Youth Associations always attracted several hundred people. Figures of attendance in mass rallies were frequently recorded as several thousands.

Although we cannot take these figures as indices of the real influence of public talks and mass rallies, we can still come to the tentative conclusion that these two forms of propaganda did exert great influence on the masses. It was claimed that Wang Ching-wei, the gifted
revolutionary orator, could control the sentiments of an audience with his inflammatory speeches, and he was so successful that the audience shared laughter and tears with him. Some of Wang's contemporaries even considered him as the man who should be given most of the credit for arousing the political consciousness of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya.

(2) Drama Troupes and Dramatic Activities:

Another important medium for the revolutionary propaganda activities was drama. The use of drama for revolutionary propaganda in Singapore and Malaya had particular significance, for it was the most effective medium for mass indoctrination of the great proportion of illiterates in the Chinese communities. It carried revolutionary ideas deep into the lower stratum of the society which other revolutionary media like books, magazines and newspapers were unable to penetrate. It also transmitted revolutionary values firmly on the minds of the masses, and influenced their outlook and attitudes towards life, society, nation, and revolution.

Drama was one of the oldest forms of social entertainment in China, and was also the most suggestive agency of mass education. Since the Sung Dynasty, drama had been popular and was particularly widespread in South
China. Its strong influence on world outlook and political behavior of masses was fully manifested in the Boxers' activities prior to their uprising against foreigners in 1900.¹⁴³

The origin of the revolutionary dramatic movement goes back to 1904. In that year, a graduate of a military school, Ch'êng Tzū-i, who was interested in social education, suggested that a drama school be founded in Hong Kong to modernize Chinese drama. His plan was well patronized and put into effect by two revolutionary leaders in Hong Kong, Ch'en Shao-pai and Li Chi-t'ang.¹⁴⁴ As a result, a drama troupe named 'Ts'ai Nan Ko' came into being. Young boys and girls were selected for training, and new plays with a strong revolutionary flavour were produced.¹⁴⁵

The troupe performed the new plays in Hong Kong and Macao, and was well received. However, after only two years of existence, the troupe had to dissolve because of financial difficulties.

The founding of the 'Ts'ai Nan Ko' drama troupe was of great significance for the revolutionary movement, for it proved that drama was the best medium for mass indoctrination in the revolutionary cause, and provided a valuable and convenient means for the revolutionaries
to gauge the support of the masses with whom they had hitherto made little measurable progress. After the demise of the 'Ts'ai Nan Ko', another two drama groups, 'Yü T'ien' and 'Chên T'ien Shêng' came into being. The founders of the groups were revolutionaries and their supporters.

Before the coming of the Hong Kong drama troupe, 'Chên T'ien Shêng', there were several drama groups in Singapore and Malaya performing new plays with a strong revolutionary appeal. In November 1907, a troupe in Kuala Lumpur performed a play entitled 'Hsü Hsi-lin' which portrayed that revolutionary martyr in the Anching Uprising. The same play was performed in 1908 in Singapore by another two troupes, 'Yung Shou Nien' and 'Tan Shan Fêng'. There is no evidence that the plays performed by these three drama troupes came from Hong Kong. But bearing in mind the close commercial and cultural contacts between Hong Kong and Singapore, these troupes could well have been inspired or influenced by the 'Ts'ai Nan Ko' or other Hong Kong groups.

The large-scale revolutionary dramatic movement in Singapore and Malaya began with the arrival of the 'Chên T'ien Shêng' from Hong Kong at the end of 1908. The aim of the 'Chên T'ien Shêng's' visit to Singapore,
Malaya and some other parts of Southeast Asia was to help to spread revolutionary ideas, although the visit was ostensibly to raise funds for flood relief in Southern China. As soon as the troupe arrived in Singapore, it was welcomed by local revolutionaries. The members of the troupe were encouraged in the revolutionary task by Dr Sun Yat-sen who was then in Singapore. Non-revolutionaries in the troupe were enlisted as members of the T'ung Mêng Hui in Singapore.

It was natural that the 'Chênn T'ien Shêng' should merge itself with the revolutionary movement in Singapore and Malaya. The troupe visited almost all the main towns in the Western Malay Peninsula, such as Seremban, Kuala Lumpur, Klang, Ipoh, Taiping and Penang. Wherever it went, it was warmly welcomed by local revolutionaries. Despite attacks and obstructions from the reformists, its visits went off smoothly, and its performances were highly successful. In most of the places visited, it was urged to extend its stay.

The visit of the 'Chênn T'ien Shêng' had a tremendous impact on the local revolutionary dramatic movement. Owing to the fact that the 'Chên T'ien Shêng's' performances were mainly aided by local revolutionaries, particularly in Singapore, its influence on the
revolutionary aids was unavoidable. These revolutionaries not only learned the technique of dramatic performances which later enabled them to start their own troupes, but also witnessed the remarkable success of dramatic performances in spreading revolutionary ideas among the masses. These undoubtedly served as an impetus towards organizing similar groups.

In October 1909, the revolutionaries in Singapore took advantage of a campaign to raise funds for the Foochow Typhoon Relief to form a drama troupe named the 'Fan Ai Pan'. It was led by Wang Pang-chieh, Chêng P'ing-t'ing, Lin Hang-wei and Wei Hsü-t'ung, famous revolutionary activists in Singapore. It is noteworthy that three of them had had experience of assisting the 'Chên T'ien Shêng' performances in Singapore. The birth of this drama troupe and its professed aim to raise funds for the typhoon relief received considerable encouragement from revolutionary newspapers. The Sun Pao published an editorial in praise of it and discussed ways and means of raising funds. The troupe sponsored two night shows (on 30 and 31 October 1909) at the New Stage, Beancurd Street, Singapore. The shows were so well patronized that S$5000 was raised for the relief funds.
The 'Fan Ai Pan' drama troupe was more or less a temporary charity organization and was dissolved after the fund-raising. It seemed clear that a more permanent dramatic organization was needed to push forward the revolutionary dramatic movement in Singapore and Malaya. Lin Hang-wei, the Chinese Secretary of the Singapore Anti-Opium Society, who played important roles in both the 'Chên T'ien Shêng' and 'Fan Ai Pan' performances, realized the need to set up such an organization. In December 1909, he founded a troupe named the 'Min To Shê' claiming that it would raise funds for the forthcoming Pan Singapore and Malaya Anti-Opium Conference due to take place in 1910.  

The birth of the 'Min To Shê' was hailed by all revolutionaries and their supporters in Singapore. In the inaugural ceremony which took place on 28 December 1909, eighteen of the thirty-one ornamental banners were presented by the revolutionaries and their supporters. Performances were given to full houses on 28 and 29 December 1909 at the 'Li Ch'un Yūan' in China Town. The troupe extended its activities to Malaya and some parts of the Dutch East Indies. In May 1910 it went to Malacca; in June it was invited to Johore Bahru by the Kwang Chao Association for charity shows;
in July the troupe went to Mersing, Johore, for five days; in August it was invited to Pontianak, Dutch East Indies, to raise funds for the T'u Ts'un School.

Together with the appearance of the 'Fan Ai Pan' and 'Min To Shê' drama troupes in Singapore, there emerged other revolutionary drama groups in Malaya, such as 'The Perak Welfare Troupe' (怡州慈善班). In Ipoh, 'The Anti-Opium Drama Troupe' (振武班) in Kuala Lumpur, and the 'Ching Shih Pan' in Penang. All the troupes were energetically engaged in performing new plays and spreading revolutionary ideas.

It is significant to note that all revolutionary drama troupes used charity as their pretext for the spread of revolutionary ideas. Like reading clubs, the main purpose of using charity as a cover was to avoid any interference from the local authorities, and to counter opposition from the conservative group in the communities. Realizing that drama performance was the best means for disseminating revolutionary message among the masses, the revolutionary leaders would not jeopardize this valuable vehicle by openly declaring its real objects. It was advertised as a charitable institution. They also knew that successful use of drama as a medium of revolutionary propaganda depended very much on the
goodwill of the British colonial government which still enjoyed diplomatic relations with the Ch'ing government, and any open revolutionary activities would provoke official interference. Furthermore, unlike books, magazines and newspapers which could be smuggled in and circulated among readers even while banned, any ban on a dramatic performance would reduce its effectiveness to nil. The conservative group, which had substantial influence in the Chinese communities, constantly proved to be an obstacle to the revolutionary movement. Considering themselves as the upholders of orthodox Confucianism and Chinese tradition, any open revolutionary activity would surely arouse their active opposition.  

Identifying the drama troupes as charity organizations, the revolutionaries could ward off active opposition of the conservative group, and to a certain extent, could even acquire its support to facilitate their activities.

The popular new plays performed by all the revolutionary drama troupes were 'Hsü Hsi-lin Shot General En Ming' (徐錫麟槍殺恩銘) 'General Hsiung Fei Fought to the Death at Liu Hua Pagoda' (熊飛將軍戰元樓花塔) 'The Execution of Madam Ch'iu Chin' (秋女士被害) 'The Storm over the Railways'
These plays can be divided into three groups, each of which represented a different aspect of revolution. The first group comprising the first five plays (above) was oriented towards nationalism. The story of General Hsiung who fought against the Mongols was apparently used to spread the idea of racial resistance to non-Chinese rulers (including the Manchu to whom indirect reference was made). The story of the descendants of the Han Kingdom who made a bold attempt to assassinate the Emperor Shih Huang (秦始皇) was used to spread the idea of revenge, for the Han Kingdom was annexed by the Ch'in and this story was used to encourage the Chinese to rise against the ruling Manchu who had been trampling them for more than two hundred and sixty years. The performance of stories of the assassinations of high ranking Manchu officials by the
two well-known revolutionary martyrs, Hsü Hsi-lin and Ch'iu Chin, was designed to incite anti-Manchu feeling. The martyrdom and dedication to the racial revolution of Hsü and Ch'iu which had received wide publicity and praise in revolutionary publications and speeches were transmitted to the minds of the masses through the stage performances. This would undoubtedly arouse hatred against the Manchu and build the image of the revolutionary martyrs in the minds of the masses.

The second group (which consisted of the following nine plays, 'The Bell after the Dream', 'Red Lotus in Hell', 'The Opium-smoking Devil', 'The Wife of an Opium-smoker', 'A Mirror of Civilization', 'New Year for an Opium-smoker', 'The Disaster of Superstition', 'The Prodigal Son' and 'The Most Poisonous Poison') was oriented towards the anti-opium and anti-superstition movement in Singapore and Malaya during that period. All these attacked, through actual dramatic scenes, the opium-smoking and superstition rife in the Chinese communities, and clearly warned that these social evils would bring disaster to addicts. This orientation was also indirectly connected with revolution, for the stamping out of these social evils would help the overseas Chinese to free themselves from this physical and
spiritual yoke, and furnish the revolutionaries with the opportunity to acquire support from the masses.

The third group consists only of one play 'Thief in Good Fortune' which attacked the bureaucracy of the Ch'ing government. The play exposed the evils of Manchu rule, its corruption, nepotism and bureaucracy.

The revolutionary message spread to the masses of the overseas Chinese in Singapore and Malaya through dramatic performances was probably more effective than through publications and public talks. Considering that the majority of the uneducated public were poor immigrants from Southern China where they had very rare opportunity to enjoy drama performances, the revolutionary dramatic performances held a very strong appeal for them. This social factor would partially explain why the revolutionary dramatic activity was so successful.

The contribution of the drama troupes to the revolution of 1911 was fully appreciated by revolutionary leaders in Singapore and Malaya. Teo Eng-hock, the chairman of the Singapore branch of the T'ung Mêng Hui (1906-1911) stated that the actors had contributed very greatly to the success of the overthrow of the Manchu. The editor of the Chung Hsing Jih Pao declared in 1909 that the influence wielded by the revolutionary drama troupes was even greater than that by the reading clubs.
In the course of their activities in Singapore and Malaya, the revolutionaries encountered many problems. These included the handling of the local British colonial authorities, winning the support of the majority of overseas Chinese, fund-raisings and overcoming of internal disputes. But the most thorny problem was how to win the battle against the reformists. The success or failure of this struggle would greatly influence the revolutionary movement in Singapore and Malaya.

(1) The Origin of the Conflict

Both revolutionary and reformist groups appeared on the political scene after China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894. They shared a common aim of saving China from worsening disaster. In the period between 1895 and 1899, several attempts had been made by the revolutionaries to cooperate with the reformists, but none bore fruit. Several factors contributed to the failure of the alliance. First and foremost, the members of the revolutionary and reformist movements came from different
social strata, differed in their outlooks and had prejudice against each other. Most of the revolutionary leaders came from middle and lower social groups and had modern education. They were the new elites of the society, progressive and radical, whereas the reformists leaders were mainly members of the scholar-gentry class, with a traditional Chinese education and Confucianist outlook.1 Being of the old elites of the society, they retained much of conservatism inherent in the dominating ideology—Confucianism. They were not prepared to bring about radical changes in society especially as their interests might be adversely affected.1a Moreover, as most of them had passed certain stages of the imperial examination, they generally regarded with contempt the revolutionary leaders who lacked such status.1b Secondly, there was a vast difference in political ideology. The revolutionary leaders had more direct contact with Western culture, and possessed a deeper understanding of Western political thoughts and institutions. They accepted or were quite prepared to accept stronger foreign influence in the moulding of their political thoughts and behaviour. In contrast, most of the reformist leaders who were conditioned by their classical education and social background, looked to Confucianism for the source of their inspiration and strength. Although some of them were prepared to learn from the West, they were limited by their intellectual
tradition, and lacked of direct contact with it. Thus, the Western influence made little impact on their thoughts and political behaviour. When one examines the political ideas of K'ang Yu-wei and Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the ideological difference between the reformists and revolutionaries appears to be clearer. K'ang was essentially an idealist, his utopian thinking was fully manifested in his most important work in political theory-Ta T'ung Shu (Universal Commonwealth) which was basically developed from the Ta T'ung section of the Book of Rites but influenced by Buddhist, Mohist and Western ideas. From his historical and evolutionary theory, he envisaged an equal, rational and happy society where there will be no national boundaries, no sexual and racial discrimination, no class oppression and no bonds of family system. He considered that all these social prejudice and systems are the main sources of sufferings of all human beings, and are the obstacles on the path leading towards universal unity and happiness, and they should be either abolished or destructed. In attacking these causes for human sufferings, K'ang seemed to have put his emphasis on family and clan systems. Using Chinese experience as his model, he considered family system as the grass-roots of all social evils. He claimed that family system, because of its self-
perpetuating outlook, nurtured selfishness, deceit, fraud and greed. These evils were further developed in the extended family system and clan. As a result, the Chinese only knew of the family and clan, but not of the nation. In this sense, K'ang had really found the roots of weaknesses of traditional Chinese society, and advocated for its destruction in the future world society. Although K'ang has been credited by some scholars as one of the few greatest geniuses in the world for such vision of a universal society and the first man to plan such a world government, his Ta T'ung Shu is far from complete. As pointed out by Liang Ch'i-ch'ao that '...K'ang set up these objectives as the ultimate aim of human evolution, but he did not state by what method these could be attained. He does not satisfactorily explain either whether his first objective—a time limit on the cohabitation of a man and woman—accords with human nature...'

These radical and utopian ideas were the products of K'ang's early intellectual and family life. As his life gradually moved from ideal to reality and his increasing commitment to political reformation, he felt the necessity to arm his reform movement with ideological weapons. In 1891, he published his first controversial work entitled Hsin- hsueh- wei-ching k'ao
(Study of the Classics Forged during the Hsin Period) in which he claimed all the Ancient Texts of the Classics had been forged by Liu Hsin who purposely did it to help Wang Mang to usurp the Han throne. This work was obviously aimed at shattering the foundation of the Ancient Text school and disarming the ideological weapons of those orthodox Ch'ing scholars who persistently resisted reform. But K'ang's more important work in which he attempted to provide ideological foundation for the movement was K'ung-tzü-k'ai-chih-k'ao (Confucius as a Reformer or A Study of Confucius on Institutional Reform), published in 1897. In this book, he claimed not only the Six Classics were all written by Confucius, but one of them, the Spring and Autumn Annals was a mere creation of Confucius for the purpose of institutional reforms. He believed that Confucius wanted to establish an independent criterion to appraise historical figures according to their achievement in institutional reforms. He further emphasized that not merely Confucius always justified his advocacy for reforms on the basis of antiquity, all other leading philosophers of the Chou dynasty such as Lao-tzü, Mo-tzü and Hsü Hsing also did the same thing.

Although K'ang repeatedly used his San-shih theory,
and other evidence to prove Confucius was a progressive reformer, and hence to convince his readers that political and social reforms were in line with the teaching of Confucius, his evidence is far from convincing. As pointed out by Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, who had made a thorough examination of K'ang's arguments and evidence, a number of K'ang's arguments are untenable. Liang successfully demonstrated that in order to achieve his aim, K'ang often went so far to suppress and distort evidence.\textsuperscript{10}

A glance on K'ang's career and social background would suffice to understand the forcefulness of his argument. K'ang was one of few Chinese intellectuals who saw the inadequacy of modernization programmes in the Self-Strengthening Movement which solely aimed at borrowing Western technology to defend traditional Chinese social order.\textsuperscript{1p} He saw the need of political and social reforms. But he also foresaw that any change of the existing social order would be resisted by the ultra conservatives who used orthodox Confucianism as their ideological weapons. It was therefore a shrewd move for him to attempt to popularize the idea that Confucius had himself been one who broke with the past. K'ang was trying to establish a precedent for violating precedent.\textsuperscript{1q}
Unlike K'ang, Sun Yat-sen appeared to be a pragmatist. Before accepting any political ideas from traditional China and the West, he had formulated an independent criterion on the basis of pragmatism to evaluate such ideas. Although he was diligently engaged in studying theories of Western democracy, socialism and Marxism, he made no attempt to contribute to the advancement of those theories, nor was he interested in their world-wide application. The main purpose of his studying was to find out their application to China's conditions and to make China strong. This bent of pragmatism was particularly true when he formulated his own political philosophy. As has been pointed out by a modern political scientist that there is nowhere in Sun's writings of any attempt to find value higher than necessities of perpetuating the Chinese race and nation. Indeed, Sun was more a revolutionary than a political thinker. Unlike K'ang, he seemed to have no ambition to become a sage, nor a philosopher. His chief aim was to make China strong and prosperous so as to place her on equal footing with other world powers. His Three People's Principles which served as the ideological guidance of the revolutionary movement actually grew out from the need and experience of his revolutionary career. To
preach his followers, Sun bluntly called his Three People's Principles as principles of national salvation.

Sun's political ideas were also more profoundly influenced by Western political thought than K'ang. It would be erroneous to claim that Sun's political philosophy was entirely derived from one or two particular Western traditions, and it would be equally false to say that Sun's thought was a mere extension of Confucianism, the orthodox Chinese thinking. It is clear that Sun had absorbed many Western political principles in the formation of his Three People's Principles, drawing especially in liberalizm, socialism, Marxism and Darwinism. It has been widely suggested that it was during his two-year sojourn in Europe (mainly in England 1896-1898) that the general outline of his later Three People's Principles was formed. This main body of Sun's political thinking was later constantly subjected to modifications by emergence of other new Western theories. This stronger and more direct Western influence made Sun more prepared to borrow Western political theories and institutions.

To probe a little deeper, there lay a basic difference between Sun and K'ang in their approaches to
the national problem. Although both were well aware the weaknesses of China's old social order and its danger of being partitioned by foreign powers and both also visualized a strong and prosperous new China, their answers to its salvation and attainment of a powerful status seemed to have differed considerably. K'ang's was a peaceful political and social reform programme which would enable China to succeed like the Meiji Japan; whereas Sun's was a combination of racial, political and social revolutions. In the eyes of Sun Yat-sen, China was more than a national state, it was a race-nation, it should be ruled by the Han Chinese who had been the only race made up of China since the Ch'in and Han dynasties. The Manchus were the usurpers, alien rulers, their rule in China should be terminated not only because they were illegitimate and oppressive, but also because they obstructed China from self-salvation and attaining a new status. For this reason, Sun formulated his first principle-nationalism which was both anti-Manchu and anti-imperialist, though the later aspect was not stressed in the early stage of his revolutionary career because he still had to seek foreign aid for the revolution.

Driving out of the Manchus would only solve one
aspect of China's national problem, Sun realized a more basic cause of China's weakness was its autocratic system. The despotic Empress Dowager Tzü-hsi and her court favourites, the repressive and corrupted officials, and the suffering of people had all contributed to Sun's opposition to such system under which all those evils were stemmed. Sun seemed to have learned a lesson from the Taiping Rebellion which fell, according to his disciple, partly because of unable to give better alternative to the people than the existing political system. He thus turned to the West to seek for inspiration and believed that a republican democracy, plus some modifications to adapt to China's conditions, should be adopted in China. He appeared to have believed quite firmly that people's right (Min-ch'uan) was the source of national strength, and was indispensable for national construction after the revolution. In his theory, the republican system was only the instrument of expressing the will and exercising the right of people. He seemed to have noticed the deficiencies of the republican system practiced by both the United States of America and France, and tried to offer the best one, as he saw it, to Chinese people. He proposed to separate 'right' (ch'uan) and 'function' (nêng), the former represents people's right, and the
latter represents political functions or sovereignty. He also suggested to increase the power of both the people's right and political functions which a real democratic system could be acquired, and a strong nation could be built.

He believed that his theories of Nationalism and Democracy could bring China to a status of strong and prosperous world power, but here he appears to have foreseen another national problem which might develop in the course of China's rapid industrialization, in other words a minority of capitalists and landlords would come to enjoy the fruits of this development while the majority of people would suffer. This appeared to him to be the lesson of the Industrial Revolution in Europe. Thus, Sun adopted basic concept of socialism (which he defined as the acceptance of a fairer system of distribution of wealth) to formulate his Principle of People's Livelihood. In the opening of his lecture on the Principle of People's Livelihood, he declared it could be equated to Western socialism and communism. Such a statement can hardly be accepted by some of his disciples who later became staunch anti-communist leaders. The controversy over interpretation of this principle is beyond the scope of this study.
However, there can be little doubt that Sun had accepted the ideas of socialism and communism, and would like to see the majority of Chinese people to enjoy the fruit of a rapid industrialization which was due to happen after the revolution, although he disagreed with their means of achieving such aims.\(^2n\)

None of these three principles were acceptable to K'ang Yu-wei. He singled out the anti-Manchuism, one of the three main components of Sun's Principle of Nationalism, for attack. He bluntly denied any racial problem in China, and strongly argued that Manchus were of same racial origins with Chinese, and there was no racial discrimination against Chinese by the Manchu rulers.\(^2o\) K'ang further warned his political opponents that flare-up of racial issue would bring disaster to China and would result in a partition by foreign powers.\(^2p\)

This difference in political ideology of Sun and K'ang had naturally led to a deeper conflict between the revolutionaries and reformists. The Nationalism (particularly the aspect of anti-Manchuism), the Democracy and the People's Livelihood became the central issues of debate between the Min Pao and Hsin Min Tsung Pao, the two main organs of the revolutionaries
and reformists, for many years.

Thirdly, there was another difference in practical means in bringing about change in China. The reformists, probably limited by their ability, believed that political change in China could be brought about by a peaceful means; on the other hand, the revolutionaries strongly advocated armed revolt as major means to change the existing political system.

Added to all these differences—social background, education and political ideology—there was a clash of personality between K'ang and Sun. This made an alliance impossible. K'ang, with such willful, subjective, arrogant and stubborn character, could hardly endure subordination to anyone, particularly to Sun Yat-sen whom he had such intellectual contempt. Although Sun was mild and agreeable in character, he was as ambitious as K'ang, any subordination in leadership to K'ang would definitely unacceptable to him.
These factors which were chiefly responsible for the failure of an alliance between the revolutionaries and reformists in the early period, became the basic causes of their conflict throughout the period under our study. After the reformists were driven out from China in 1898, the conflict between them became open. The presence of the reformists overseas brought them into direct conflict with the revolutionaries, for both of them considered overseas Chinese as the indispensable source of revenue and manpower. Before 1898, the reformists main strength was in China where they received staunch support from the scholar-gentry class and from some liberal high-ranking officers. Although the reformists also obtained support from the overseas Chinese in Japan and Singapore, it was comparatively insignificant. But after they had been
driven out from China in 1898, they lost their home base and had to turn to the overseas Chinese. The reformist dependence on overseas Chinese support was even greater than that of the revolutionaries, for, unlike the revolutionaries, they did not propose to rely on secret societies: thus, the overseas Chinese became their only alternative. Moreover, the growing economic importance of the overseas Chinese in relation to the Ch'ing government would enable the reformists to use it as an effective pressure group. Unlike the revolutionaries who advocated armed revolts, economic pressure was the reformists' most valuable political asset.

Open conflict between the revolutionaries and reformists began as early as 1897 when the first Chinese primary school was founded in Yokohama, Japan, by the revolutionaries. Hsü Ch'in, one of the most distinguished disciples of K'ang Yu-wei, was recommended by Ch'en Shao-pai to head the school.² When Hsü and other reformists took charge of the school, they deliberately changed its policy. The name of the school was changed from 'Chung Hsi School' to 'Ta T'ung School' and a curriculum with a strong reformist orientation was adopted. Anti Sun Yat-Sen slogans appeared in the school.³
The influence of the reformists in Yokohama was not confined to the Ta T'ung School. There were frequent contacts between their leaders and Chinese merchants. The immediate result, which was accelerated by the success of the reformists' movement in China in 1898, was a clear shift in the sympathies of the Chinese merchants in Yokohama from the revolutionary to the reformist cause.

A similar reformist capture of a revolutionary base occurred in Honolulu. In December 1899, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, the most prominent disciple of K'ang Yu-wei, left Japan for Honolulu with a letter of recommendation from Dr Sun Yat-sen to his brother and old friends. Liang was well received by the local Chinese merchants who were mainly Hsing Chung Hui supporters. During his few months stay in Honolulu, Liang succeeded in deceiving them by saying that the reformists were also aiming at revolution. A branch of the Emperor Protection Society (保皇會) was established immediately in Honolulu. Most Hsing Chung Hui members were misled by this and joined the society. Even old friends of Dr Sun Yat-sen, such as Chung Mu-hsien, Chung Yü and Chang Fu-ju became its staunch supporters.

The take over of revolutionary bases by the reformists greatly jeopardized the interests of the revolutionaries. In fact Dr Sun Yat-sen had at one time
regarded the reformists as more anti-revolution and anti-republican than was the Ch'ing government.  

Although the revolutionary leaders fully appreciated the threat from the reformist expansion, they were unable to launch any assault against their opponents because the revolutionary movement was at a low ebb during that time. It was not until 1903 that a general counter-attack was mounted. In September 1903, Dr Sun Yat-sen arrived in Honolulu from Japan. He was attacked by the local reformists' organ, Hsin Chung Kuo Pao. Dr Sun gathered his old supporters, and reorganized a local newspaper, Lung Chi Pao, into a revolutionary organ. With this newspaper at his disposal, he was able to attack the reformists. An open letter entitled 'A Letter to the Compatriots on the Difference Between Reform Movement and Revolution' (敬告同鄉論革命與保皇分野書) was published in the newspaper in which he clarified the differences between revolution and reform. He fiercely attacked the reformists for deceiving the people by adopting a revolutionary pose.

Dr Sun Yat-sen's effort in combating the reformists in Honolulu proved successful. After realizing what the reformists were really aiming at, most of his former comrades returned to the revolutionary camp. At the
beginning of 1904 Dr Sun was able to inform a friend that he had eliminated the reformists' influence from two of the four islands in Honolulu and he predicted that the success of the rest could be expected. 10

In March 1904, Dr Sun left Honolulu for San Francisco. The purpose of his visit was to appeal for support from the overseas Chinese in America. In other words, he intended to challenge the predominant influence of the reformists in America. On learning of his arrival, the local reformists in San Francisco conspired to thwart his entry into America. Fortunately, with the assistance from a local Chinese leader, Huang San-tê (a revolutionary sympathiser) he was able to disembark. 11

The attempt to prevent Dr Sun's entry into the United States created an atmosphere unfavourable to the reformists. Dr Sun capitalized on this to propagate his cause. With the help of Huang San-tê and others he reprinted 11,000 copies of Chou Yung's famous revolutionary booklet 'The Revolutionary Army' for free distribution in America and Southeast Asia. He also succeeded in obtaining support from a local secret society known as Chih Kung T'ang which had commanded great influence among the local Chinese community. 14 The organ of the Chih Kung T'ang, Ta T'ung Jih Pao which had hitherto been subject to reformist
influence, was reorganized and became a revolutionary newspaper. Its chief editor, Ou Ch'ü-chia (a reformist leader) was replaced by Liu Ch'en-yü who was recommended by Dr Sun Yat-sen. Soon afterwards, Dr Sun toured round the main cities of America with the leaders of the Chih Kung T'ang. The purpose of this tour was to combat reformist control of the local Chinese and to strengthen the relations between the Chih Kung T'ang's Headquarters in San Francisco and other branches throughout America. The outcome was very successful. On 10 June 1904, Dr Sun was able to report to his friend that he had succeeded in stamping out reformist influence in five or six of the cities he had visited. He predicted that further successes could be expected in three or four months.

The fight of Dr Sun Yat-sen against the reformists in Honolulu and America intensified the conflict between these two camps. After the founding of the T'ung Meng Hui in Tokyo in August 1903, large-scale conflict between the revolutionaries and reformists began. It originated in Japan, and soon spread to Singapore and Malaya as well as to other parts of the world where Chinese had settled.

(2) **Competition for the Control of Schools and Social Organizations:**

Up to 1904, the reformists held sway in Singapore and Malaya. Before the coming of K'ang Yu-wei to Singapore
in February 1900, the reform movement enjoyed strong support among intellectual and commercial circles in the local Chinese community. In 1899, reformist leaders in Singapore were able to collect more than six hundred signatures from Chinese commercial quarters in Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Rangoon, Rhio, Batavia and Makassa for a petition to the Ch'ing court urging restoration of the Emperor Kuang Hsü.

After the arrival of K'ang Yu-wei, the reform movement in Singapore, Malaya and other parts of Southeast Asia gained momentum. K'ang, the central figure of the famous Hundred Day Reform and the ensuing coup d'état in 1898, enjoyed a special place in the affections of the overseas Chinese. In their eyes, K'ang was the only savior of China, a man of considerable talent, and one of inexhaustible knowledge and energy. As the tutor of the Emperor and the master-mind of the Hundred Day Reform, he was particularly welcomed by those rich merchants who cherished the hope that their association with him would benefit them in the foreseeable future. Thus, K'ang's leadership was fully accepted by the Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya. His arrival in Singapore was accompanied by a surge of petitions from overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia against the conspiracy to dethrone
the Emperor Kuang Hsü, A circular issued by the Chinese merchants in Shanghai calling for a nationwide petition against the conspiracy was given wide publicity in the reformist newspapers in Singapore. Some local reformists had even proposed the establishment of an organization to work out ways and means to save the Emperor, and urged their compatriots to contribute funds to safeguard his life. The appeal from Shanghai also found its mark with the overseas Chinese in other parts of Southeast Asia. Petitions with 32,000 signatures from Thailand and 780 from French Indo-China were sent to the Ch'ing court for the same purpose.

K'ang was undoubtedly the master-mind of this surge of antagonism against the Ch'ing government. He also toured extensively throughout Singapore and Malaya seeking support from local Chinese merchants and making speeches in Chinese schools.

This success of propaganda of the reformists in Singapore and Malaya gave them a clear advantage over the revolutionaries. Although the latter had tried to attract support by other means, such as founding the Chung Ho T'ang and publishing the Thoe Lam Jit Poh, their efforts were frequently frustrated by the reformists. Warning by the government of the Straits Settlements against the Thoe Lam
Jit Poh in 1904 at the request of the reformists, clearly indicated that the reformists would not tolerate any challenge to the hegemony.

The establishment of the T'ung Mêng Hui branches throughout Singapore and Malaya after 1906 was such a challenge to the reformists. They became naturally hostile and conspired to ruin their opponents' effort. For instance, they attempted to sabotage the establishment of the T'ung Mêng Hui branch in Singapore in April 1906.\(^{21}\) The obstruction of Dr. Sun's mission to Ipoh in the same year by Foo Chee-choon is another example.\(^{22}\)

Despite the reformist obstructions, the revolutionary movement in Singapore and Malaya made headway after 1906. The publishing of the Chung-Hsing Jih Pao in August 1907, the rise of revolutionary reading clubs and drama troupes, public talks and mass rallies, all these signified that a strenuous and dynamic movement was taking place. But this movement was retarded by the reformists who were deeply entrenched in social and educational institutions, such as the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, other commercial organizations and schools. The reformists used the schools
to influence students and parents not to read revolutionary publications, to avoid reading clubs and ignore public talks and mass rallies. They further used the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and other leading social institutions to obstruct revolutionary dramatic performance and public talk activities. They were the biggest stumbling block in the way of development of revolutionary activities. The revolutionaries therefore set themselves to compete and challenge dominating reformist influence in social and educational institutions.

The first field for competition between the revolutionaries and reformists was schools. The significance of control over schools lies in the fact that it offered the key to influence in educated circles, and thence to other sections of the society. The competition for this influence commenced with the movement for setting up modern Chinese schools in Singapore and Malaya. Between 1904 and 1907, a number of modern Chinese schools were established throughout the peninsula as well as on the island. They were the Ying Hsin School, Yang Chêng School, Tuan Mêng School, Tao Nan School, in Singapore; Confucian School and K'un Ch'êng School in Kuala Lumpur; Chung Hua School and Khoo Family School in Penang. In view of the fact that leadership in
the overseas Chinese community was mainly drawn from the commercial group which had connections either with the Ch'ing government or the reformists, it is not surprising to find that the founders of these schools (mostly conservative merchants) favoured the reformists rather than the revolutionaries.

The favourable position held by the reformists in the Chinese schools was strengthened by the visit of Liu Shih-chi to Southeast Asia in 1905 and 1906. Liu, a reformist advocate in China, was commissioned by the Viceroy of Liang-Kwang, Ts'en Ch'un-hs'üan to promote Chinese education in Southeast Asia. Under his encouragement, the Tuan Meng School in Singapore and the Confucian School in Kuala Lumpur were founded in 1906 and 1907 respectively. Liu was also able to influence the founders of these schools in curricula, text books and recruitment of pro-reformist teachers.

In these favourable conditions, the reformists were able to control the managing boards and the majority of teaching staffs of Chinese schools. Two reformist leaders in Singapore, T'ang Hsiang-lin and Tan Hun-ch'iu were respectively the director and vice-chairman as well as the first headmasters of the Yin Hsin and the Tuan Meng Schools, and eight of eleven teachers of the Tuan Meng
School from 1906 to 1907 were either reformists or sympathisers. The reformists, who had the experience of gaining control of Chinese schools in Japan, Canada and Burma, applied the same methods of indoctrinating students in Singapore and Malaya. These were so successful that they were able to mobilize most of the Chinese primary schools in Singapore to cable a petition to the Ch'ing government to protest against the concessions given to Japan in Manchuria in 1909.

As the reformists held sway in most Chinese schools throughout Singapore and Malaya, there was little scope left for the revolutionaries to operate. The revolutionaries acknowledged this fact and turned their attention to night schools. The night school, as the name suggests, was a sort of evening class comparable to modern adult education. The primary aims of night schools were to provide educational opportunities for the biggest segment of the overseas Chinese communities - the lower social group, and to promote knowledge among the general public. One of the main features of night schools was that most of the students were adults; they were too old to attend day schools, and had jobs in the day time. The majority were workers and shop assistants. To the
revolutionaries, these adult students were one of the most valuable assets for revolutionary activities, for the workers and shop assistants formed the backbones of both the lower and middle classes in the overseas Chinese community in Singapore. After indoctrination, these students could be utilized as cadres to spread the revolutionary message among the masses. They could be trained as low-level leaders of the T'ung Mêng Hui, and could be engaged in revolutionary activities in reading clubs, drama troupes and mass rallies. In view of their social background and connections, their words could be expected to carry more weight than those of the top-level party leaders.

There were three night schools in Singapore before August 1908. Unlike the day schools which concentrated more on Chinese tradition, these night schools emphasized modern education. It is certain that these night schools were under strong revolutionary influence, for full publicity was given to the founding of the schools in the revolutionary newspapers, and the revolutionary leaders had assumed the role of the schools' patrons. In fact, nine of fifteen chief patrons of the Chên I Night School were T'ung Mêng Hui members in Singapore. In patronizing the schools, the
revolutionaries succeeded in influencing the managing boards and teaching staffs. Through these two channels, they encouraged students to read revolutionary publications, and to participate revolutionary activities.

The revolutionaries did not restrict their activities to the night schools. They also infiltrated schools in suburban areas of the main cities and in small towns where the reformist and conservative influence was not so strong. The revolutionaries had controlled some of these schools, such as Li Shêng School in the new town of Ipoh, the Chung Hua School in Raub, Pahang, and the Too Nam School in Kuala Lumpur. Exercise of revolutionary control in these schools was similar to that of the reformists, i.e. influence over the managing committees and teaching staff and the indoctrination of the students. The revolutionaries, with the help of reading clubs, public talks and drama troupes, were more successful than the reformists in indoctrinating the students. Twenty-one out of thirty-two students in the Chung Hua School in Raub adopted names connected with strong anti-Manchu and pro-Chinese ideas, such as Wang Han-hao (hero of the Chinese) Chêng Han-hsing (rise of the Chinese) Chêng Chi-ch'ing (to smash the Ch'ing Dynasty) Li Yü-man (to resist the Manchu) Huang Chu-hu (to drive out the barbarians) etc.
The adoption of such names spelt danger to students as well as parents, for it could irritate conservative elements in society and the Ch'ing Consul-General in Singapore and therefore bringing inconvenience upon themselves. This underlined the determination of the parents to support revolutionary slogans - anti-Ch'ing and restore-Han.

Further radical action was demonstrated by the students of the same school. At the end of 1909, a group of thirteen students had their queues cut as a symbolic act of shaking off the yoke of the Manchu rule. The chairman of the managing board of the school, Wang Ts'ün-tan took the lead in cutting off his queue, which was followed by the students. All students of the school also underwent a kind of military training in preparation for future revolutionary activities in China. Thirty wooden rifles were donated by a local revolutionary enthusiast, Ho Yün.

Similar actions took place in other revolutionary controlled schools. The Too Nam School students in Kuala Lumpur sang patriotic songs, such as Song of patriotism and Song of unity, in a public dramatic performance sponsored by the Kuala Lumpur Anti-Opium Society. The Li Sheng School in Ipoh
commemorated the death of the last Emperor of the Ming Dynasty which fell on 19 March in the lunar calendar each year. The day was made as the school holiday, and a meeting was called to commemorate the Emperor and fervent speeches were delivered by the teachers. Incidents of this kind, though trivial, were not without significance. They indicate the revolutionary fervour and tide of that time.

The revolutionaries, who succeeded in gaining control of the night and suburban schools, then attempted to infiltrate the day schools controlled by the reformists. Being better educated in the modern sense, they were better qualified for employment in these schools. This enabled them to infiltrate the stronghold of the reformists and to bid for control. On gaining employment in the schools under the control of their opponents, they used all the means at their disposal to indoctrinate the students. But their efforts were usually curbed by the school managing boards. Chua Hui-seng, an old boy of the Tuan Męng School which was under the control of the reformists, recalled a struggle between the revolutionaries and reformists in gaining influence in that school. Ho Tzü-yin, the revolutionary oriented headmaster, took the initiative in sponsoring night classes for the purpose
of indoctrination. He distributed revolutionary publications, preached revolutionary doctrine, and encouraged students to join reading clubs and engage in other revolutionary activities. There was a great difference of opinion between him and his reformist deputy, Yuan Shou-min. Eventually, Ho was relieved of his post by the managing board of the school when he escorted some students back to China for further studies.  

Another field for competition between the revolutionaries and reformists was that of the social organizations, particularly those important organizations like the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Anti-Opium Societies, whose functions cut through the barriers set between dialect groups. In view of the leading role that organizations played in all social activities in the overseas Chinese communities, and that most of these were patronized by merchants, the control over them would lead to considerable influence on the whole community. Thus, the reformists sought to gain control of all these organizations, and succeeded with regard to the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Selangor, Perak and, to a lesser extent, that in Singapore. Other amalgamated commercial organizations, such as the Bureau of Mining, Agriculture and Commerce of Perak (呲咄礦務農商總局) and the Newly
Reformed Commercial Bureau of Perak also came under their control. The strength of the reformists in these organizations was demonstrated in 1908 when they accelerated a campaign to petition for the introduction of a parliament in China. In August of that year, the reformist elements in the two bureaus led by Foo Chee-choon, convened a meeting to discuss ways and means for supporting the campaign. As a result, a petition was cabled to the government in Peking, and leaflets were widely distributed under the name of the bureaus. More forceful action was taken by the reformist elements in the Selangor Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Kuala Lumpur. As well as cabling the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce in Peking, the Chamber took the lead in organizing a large-scale campaign for the petition. Pamphlets and forms were widely distributed calling upon all Chinese in the Federated Malay States to fill in their names, professions and other identifications for that purpose. Also, representatives and letters were sent by the Chamber to other commercial organizations seeking their support.

The revolutionaries had a difficult task in ousting the reformists from their entrenched position in the social organizations. In the course of their activities, the
revolutionaries had experienced how their opponents used the leading social organizations to obstruct their activities, and realized the importance of controlling these organizations. So, having gained fair support from some sympathetic merchants, the revolutionaries attempted to put an end to the reformist hegemony by winning over the reformists or increasing revolutionary elements in the organizations. Sometimes, these two techniques were employed simultaneously to speed up the bid for control.

The best example of this revolutionary bid for control was the case of the Bureau of Mining, Agriculture and Commerce of Perak. The bureau was originally set up to promote mining, agriculture and commerce for the Chinese community in Perak. It had strong connections with the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce in China and other commercial organizations in Kwangtung. Thus, it served as the main channel of commercial activities between China and the Chinese merchants in Perak, and wielded tremendous influence in the local Chinese community. The bureau was at first dominated by the reformist group under the leadership of Foo Chee-choon and Au Shen-kang. The group had successfully convened a meeting on 2 August 1908 to support the campaign for a parliament in China, overcoming the opposition of the revolutionary elements in
the organization.\footnote{55} The revolutionary group led by Teh Lay-seng and Li Hau-cheong, attempted to increase their influence by encouraging more revolutionary oriented merchants to join the organization, and tried to win over Au Shen-kang from the reformist group. Au, a rich tin miner in Ipoh, had some propensity to revolution in his family background. His grandfather was a cook in the T' aiping army who was executed by the Manchu and his father sought refuge in Southeast Asia.\footnote{56} His support of the reformist cause was not intended as a show of loyalty to the alien ruler but was due to his interest in China's salvation and his desire for prestige and wealth. Thus Au was easily won over by the revolutionary group.

The defection of reformist leaders and the increase in revolutionary elements strengthened the revolutionary bid for control. Some reformist-dominated social organizations, such as the Newly Reformed Commercial Bureau of Perak, were either dissolved or replaced by those of the revolutionaries.\footnote{57}

In some other social organizations where the reformist position was too well-entrenched to be seriously challenged, the revolutionaries adopted another tactic. They set up similar social organizations to advance their purpose. An eminent example was the case of the two Chinese Chambers
Teh Lay-seng, Chairman of the Ipoh T'ung Meng Hui Branch (by courtesy of Mr. Teh Min-wei, eldest son of Teh Lay-seng).
of Commerce in Singapore. The original Chamber was founded by the Ch'ing Minister for Investigating Commercial Affairs in Southeast Asia, Chang Pi-shih, in 1906, and dominated by the reformist and conservative groups.⁵⁸ The revolutionary leaders in Singapore, such as Tan Chor-nam, Teo Eng-hock, Shên Lien-fang and Lim Ngee-soon, were excluded from the organization. Recognising that it was impossible for them to subvert the control of the reformists, they founded another Chinese Chamber of Commerce in 1910 to compete for influence in the local Chinese community. It was not until 1912 when the Republic was established in China that these two organizations were amalgamated.⁵⁹

(3) **Intensification of the Conflict:**

The competition for control of schools and social bodies was only the first phase of the conflict between the revolutionaries and reformists. The second phase was characterized by an intensification of conflict in the form of open struggle.

Two principal techniques adopted by both camps were to frustrate opponents' propaganda activities and to attack their leaders. In this stage, the idea of revolution and reform in the minds of the general public of the overseas Chinese communities was still vague.
Most of them might know what the revolutionaries and reformists aimed to do with the Manchu government, but they did not know what would happen to China after the overthrow of the dynasty. The general attitude towards revolutionaries and reformists was wavering. Under such circumstances, propaganda played the most important role in the indoctrination of the general populace. To the revolutionaries as well as to the reformists, the success of propaganda activities meant the acquiring of support from the masses and the hope of success in their ventures in China.

The common method for countering propaganda activities was sabotage. A group of members of one party would attend public talks and mass rallies sponsored by their opponents, to heckle and attempt to arouse the emotions of the audience, and sometimes even resorted to violence. The reformists who felt their predominant position was being jeopardized by the growing strength of the revolutionaries, often used these techniques. When Dr Sun Yat-sen and his mission first visited Kuala Lumpur to set up a T'ung Mêng Hui branch and held a public meeting in the Grand Theatre in 1906, the local reformists planned to sabotage the meeting. They failed to do so because the revolutionaries had been alerted and had appointed a number of supporters
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to guard the theatre and the well-known revolutionary advocate, P'eng Tsê-min was at the front entrance. In 1907, Dr Sun, Huang Hsing, Wang Ching-wei and Hu Han-min visited Penang where a public talk was held at the P'ing Chang Association. While Dr Sun and his colleagues were speaking, reformists interrupted with denunciations of the revolutionaries for making treasonable remarks against the government. Some of them went on to question the revolutionaries' right to make such speeches in a public institution like P'ing Chang.

Efforts to sabotage public talks and mass rallies were only one form of reformist attempts to frustrate revolutionary propaganda activities. Another form was vilification and rumour-mongering. The reformists, lacking the support from the emerging intelligentsia in the overseas Chinese communities, realized they could not compete with the revolutionaries in gaining support of the masses so they concentrated on spreading their influence in commercial circles in an effort to retard their opponents' propaganda activities. Chên T'ien Shêng, the revolutionary drama troupe from Hong Kong (mentioned in the previous chapter) underwent frequent reformist vilification and attack. When the troupe began its first performance in Singapore at the beginning of 1909, the
reformists were unaware of the troupe's political orientation. Some reformist leaders cherished a hope that it could be won over as a vehicle for their own propaganda. When the troupe visited Kuala Lumpur in February 1909, it was given a warm welcome by the representatives of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce of Selangor which was controlled by the reformists and conservatives.63

The reformists retained their illusion until they realised that most of the plays performed in Kuala Lumpur were imbued with revolutionary ideas, particularly the play 'General Hsiung Fei Fought to Death at Liu Hua Pagoda' which was related to the Chinese resistance of the Mongol conquest in South China.64 They became aware that the troupe had a very strong revolutionary orientation which was fully exploited by their opponents. It is not surprising, therefore, to see that the reformists' attitude changed radically from one of cordiality to hostility towards the players. When the troupe finished its performances in Kuala Lumpur and left for Seremban, it was ordered by the Chamber (which presumably intended to take some undisclosed action against it) to return but the order was ignored. This made the reformists more resentful. The immediate result was a special meeting
of the members of the Chamber held at Kuala Lumpur. There the reformists fiercely attacked the troupe, denouncing it as being a tool of revolutionary propaganda; some went even further by accusing it of making profit in cooperation with 'Pa I Kung So'. Although this vilification was refuted by the revolutionary members in the Chamber, word was spread by the reformists that the troupe was being used by the revolutionaries for evil purposes and credentials from 'Pa I Kung So' produced by the troupe was a counterfeit because it was not signed by the chairman of the organization. The reformist organ, the Union Times, published articles to help spread the rumours.

The years 1907 and 1908 were the years of dynamic developments in the activities of both revolutionaries and reformists overseas. In these two years, the revolutionaries launched six major uprisings in South and Southwest China, and the reformists had mobilized all their strength to press for a parliament in China. These developments brought about an increasing dependence of revolutionaries and reformists on the overseas Chinese, and this undoubtedly intensified the conflict between them. When the reformist leaders, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Hsü Chin campaigned for the establishment of
'Chêng Wên Shê' (Political Information Club) an affiliated organization of the reformists, in Tokyo at the end of 1907, the inaugural meeting was sabotaged by a group of revolutionaries who resorted to force to ruin the meeting. 68

In this climate of growing tension, the reformist sabotage and vilification of the revolutionary propaganda activities in Singapore and Malaya provoked fierce counter-attacks and violence. When Hsü Chin arrived in Kuala Lumpur in May 1908 to step up the campaign for the introduction of a parliament in China, a public gathering was held at the Association of Merchants (群商公會). Hsü urged that a petition should be sent to the Ch'ing government. The revolutionary leaders in Kuala Lumpur led by Ch'an Chan-mooi, Yuen Tak-sam, Li Ying-ts'ung, Too Kwun-hung and Têng Su voiced their opposition and heckled the reformists, and succeeded in ruining the meeting. 69

In July of the same year, Hsü Chin and another reformist leader, Wu Hsien-tzü were campaigning for the establishment of a 'Chêng Wên Shê' branch in Singapore. Hsü planned to make use of an anti-opium gathering to air his political views. However, when the news leaked out, a group of revolutionaries, led by the two chief
editors of the Chung Hsing Jih Pao (Chü Chêng and T'ien T'ung) attended the meeting with the object of obstructing the reformists.\textsuperscript{70} When Hsü turned his topic from anti-opium to pro-reform and appealed for the establishment of a 'Chêng Wên Shê' branch, the revolutionary hecklers began to spit and shout. This led to a hand-to-hand fight with the reformist supporters. The platform was overturned, Hsü was beaten and the meeting broke up in confusion.\textsuperscript{71}

Attack on individual leaders was another technique widely practised by both revolutionaries and reformists. In Chinese communities like those of Singapore and Malaya, where educational standards were low, people tended to respect distinguished leaders uncritically. The principles of revolution and reform were new to the majority of the overseas Chinese; the people tended not to choose a party for its principles, but rather for a leader whom they respected. Thus, the personal attack on individual leaders with the intent to destroy his public image could be an effective means of dealing a blow to the party he represented. This technique was frequently used by the reformists against the revolutionaries. Chêng Kuei-yin, a revolutionary leader in Taiping, Perak (who had enthusiastically promoted Chinese education and preached revolutionary doctrines) was charged by the local
reformists for trying to stir up Chinese ill-feeling against the colonial government. He was summoned by the Protector of Chinese to an enquiry. Although Cheng was cleared, the incident indicates that the reformists wanted to see him gaol ed and local revolutionary activities curtailed. The reformists also accused Dr Sun Yat-sen of piracy - an accusation which led to an action for libel by Dr Sun against the Union Times. The defamation of Dr Sun was intended not only to damage his image, but also to prompt the government of the Straits Settlements to order his deportation. The attack on the reformist national leader, K'ang Yu-wei, was almost as fierce, it being frequently alleged by the revolutionary newspapers that he was a fraud, a beggar and a political prostitute.

On 14 and 15 November 1908 (21 and 22 October of 34th year of Kuang Hsu) the Emperor Kuang Hsu and the Empress Dowager Tz'u Hsi died one after the other. This event gave rise to violent struggles between the revolutionaries and reformists in Singapore and Malaya. When the Ch'ing Consul-General at Singapore received this news from China, notices from the Consulate and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce were published in the local newspapers on the 17th calling all Chinese in Singapore to close their shops on the 19th of the month for national mourning. Chinese
schools were to be closed for three days and leaders of the different dialect groups were requested to be present at the Consulate for a traditional mourning ceremony. To widen publicity, handbills were distributed by the Chamber to all Chinese.

The reactions of the revolutionaries and reformists to this event were quite different. Elated by the news of the Empress Dowager's demise, the reformists were, nevertheless, shocked and saddened by the Emperor's death. The reformists and conservatives felt that national mourning should be observed in Singapore to express their loyalty to the late Emperor. In accordance with this, pamphlets were distributed calling all Chinese shopkeepers to close their shops for the period of mourning - the pamphlets were distributed not only to reformists and neutrals, but to the revolutionaries and their adherents. To the revolutionaries, the death of the Manchu rulers was a blessing to the cause and they were extremely excited about the implications of the event. During that time, Dr Sun Yat-sen and Hu Han-min were in Singapore. They may have felt that if the mourning was a success it would indicate popular support for the reformists whereas failure would ruin the reformist image among the overseas Chinese. Hence, the revolutionaries
planned to make use of the opportunity to ridicule the reformists and conservatives on the day of mourning by selling a 'tear-inducing ointment'. On the day prior to the mourning ceremony, this was widely publicised in the Chung Hsing Jih Pao. The satirical implication was obvious: the reformists and their followers were hypocrites, they needed 'tear-inducing ointment' to make them 'mourn'. This method was geared to reveal the weakness of the reformists and to impress the general public. In addition, revolutionaries also distributed leaflets attacking the reformists and conservatives for their call to mourning. A revolutionary leaflet, later produced in court, ran as follows:

The Manchurians had taken our Empire and wasted our people of Han. The old grudge is still very deep. These enemies ought to die; at present both Kuang Hsü and his mother are dead. It must be God that snatched away their souls, therefore it is but right for our brethren of Han to be happy. Tomorrow (the 19th instant) all the Chinese shopkeepers and inhabitants should do their business as usual. You must not hear what those traitors of Han say and not again put our ancestors to disgrace.

Other leaflets had the same tone, calling upon people not to close their shops for mourning otherwise they would be regarded as traitors to the Han race.

Although the majority of overseas Chinese remained neutral during this time, the notices of the Ch'ing
Consul-General and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, and the reformist leaflets had undoubtedly pressed them to conform, most of them were quite prepared to comply because they did not wish to antagonize the conservative merchant power group. But after the distribution of the revolutionary leaflets they were hesitant about what action to take - understandably they were reluctant to be branded 'traitors of the Han race'.

The leaflets produced some effect on the general public. Some might remain neutral as they did not heed either appeal.

The reformists, who were quite determined to make the day of mourning a success, were not unaware of the revolutionary opposition and preparations, and were determined to test their strength in the Chinese community. To them the success of this test meant future success and support from the general public. Thus, the reformists were quite prepared to use violence if necessary. Secret society members were employed to deal with revolutionaries who intended to sabotage the day of mourning.  

On 19 November 1908, the national day of mourning for the Chinese in Singapore, saw a violent struggle between the revolutionaries and reformists. On that morning most of the Chinese shops closed for business, yellow dragon
flags were flown at half-mast everywhere, particularly in China Town. The tranquility did not reflect the real situation; it was the lull before the coming storm. The revolutionaries, determined to carry out sabotage, sent a group of young followers (under the guidance of Ch'en Yü-i and Lin Hai-shêng) to sell the ointment. They carried white flags on which were written sarcastic words, 'Ts'ui Lei Wan Ying Ju I Yu' (ointment to cause tears at will). They plied to and fro between the Chinese Chamber of Commerce (302 Hill Street) and the Ch'ing Consulate (Bras Brasa Road) where the mourning ceremony was to take place. At about 10.00 a.m., a few hundred Chinese merchants (mostly reformists and royalists) and school children dressed in white, went to attend the mourning ceremony. The merchants, who wore official gowns and feathers, were frequently ridiculed and embarrassed by revolutionaries who offered to sell them the ointment. No violent incident was reported, but in other parts of Singapore violence broke out repeatedly. In the morning, two shops, Nos. 9 and 25, at Temple Street - owned by Ho Hsin-t'ien, a revolutionary leader - were stoned by a crowd of two to three hundred hooligans who were employed by the reformists. The wife and daughter of the owner were injured and considerable damage was done to the shops.
In Phillip Street, a mob of some three hundred people attacked the shops of Christian Cantonese because of their refusal to close shops for mourning.\textsuperscript{91} In the afternoon, a throng of two hundred Chinese engaged in a free fight in North Boat Quay and several people were injured.\textsuperscript{92} Apart from this large-scale violence, there were sporadic fights: in South Bridge Road hawkers were molested and robbed; a gang of coolies armed with poles attacked house No. 9 in Upper Macao Street (a building within a hundred yards of the Central Police Station);\textsuperscript{93} in Bukit Timah, three coolies pulling a cart loaded with rolls of cloth were attacked by a band of twenty or thirty men and the cloth was looted.\textsuperscript{94} Several arrests were made in these trouble spots. Normal situation was not restored until help was sought from Dr Sun Yat-sen and other revolutionary leaders in Singapore by the colonial authority of the Straits Settlements.\textsuperscript{95}

Incidents such as this (on the mourning issue) were not confined to Singapore; the main towns in Malaya, such as Kuala Lumpur, Ipoh and Penang were also involved.

When the Chinese Chamber of Commerce of Selangor (in Kuala Lumpur) received telegrams from its counterpart in Singapore,\textsuperscript{96} pamphlets were distributed calling all Chinese in Kuala Lumpur to close their shops for national
mourning on 19 November. To ensure the success of the occasion, the reformists visited a number of shops threatening to take action against the owners if they did not follow the instruction of the Chamber. This step was, undoubtedly, very provocative to the local revolutionaries who thereupon distributed several pamphlets opposing the reformists' propaganda. The revolutionary leaflets circulated in Kuala Lumpur were similar to those distributed in Singapore. One pamphlet entitled 'Do Not Falsely Identify Yourselves as Filial Sons' (莫假認孝子) read as follows:

Dear fellow-countrymen: the circular issued by the Chinese Chamber of Commerce stated that on receiving telegram from the Ch'ing Consul-General in Singapore that the Manchu Emperor and Empress Dowager had died, and asked us to close shops, lower flags to half-mast and put up lanterns for mourning.....

My dear fellow-countrymen, we all know China belongs to Chinese, but it was occupied by the Manchu for two hundred and sixty four years. They occupied our land, trampled and exploited our people and sold our lands to the foreigners. Those who are really patriotic would like to drive away the cursed Manchu and restore our own country. Despite the previous atrocities committed by the Manchu, in recent years, the two monsters, the Emperor Kuang Hsi and Empress Dowager Tz'ü Hsi had exploited people, slaughtered Chinese like grasses. Now, they deserved the penalty imposed by God, they are both dead of a sudden. At this moment, what are the reasons for us to mourn their death? Were they of Chinese blood? Is our country their homeland?...If we do go to mourn, we will be the persons who regard enemies as our fathers and
this act would be highly disgraceful. Those who refuse to mourn are the real patriots. Signed by Su Yao-t'ing, Ch' an Chan-mooi and twelve others.99

On the day of mourning, no violence occurred but hostility between reformists and revolutionaries was fully displayed.

The revolutionaries organized a small-scale parade which comprised carts, rickshaws and bicycles carrying two revolutionary flags (blue sky, white sun and red earth) six big lanterns, two of which were drawn with revolutionary flags, a tablet in the form of a lantern bearing the inscription in red characters 'Heaven Punishes the Manchu Chiefs (天討滿酋) several flags of other countries and a number of small colourful lanterns. The parade was led by a small band. The marchers passed through the streets exulting and celebrating the death of the Ch'ing rulers.100

The reformists, confronted with this challenge, had employed hooligans to interfere with the parade. They shouted at the marchers and threw stones at them but failed to disrupt it, and some of them were arrested by the police.101

In Ipoh and Penang, the revolutionaries also urged people not to close shops in mourning. Those shops owned by their supporters opened for business, as usual, on the
day of mourning. Although there was hostility between the two camps, no incident was reported.  

Judging by the success of the day of mourning, one may jump to the conclusion that the reformists had enjoyed considerable influence in the Chinese communities, for most of the Chinese shops in Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Ipoh and Penang were closed, yellow dragon flags (the Ch'ing flag) were hoisted and most of the Chinese primary schools were closed for three days. The Protector of Chinese of the Straits Settlements reported to the London Colonial Office that the mourning event was a defeat for the revolutionaries.

The success of the mourning did not necessarily reflect widespread support for the reformists. It is likely that the 'neutrals' would prefer to observe the mourning to avoid being labelled as revolutionaries.
CHAPTER V

THE REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGICAL WAR AGAINST
THE REFORMISTS IN SINGAPORE AND MALAYA
(1907-1910)

To win the support of the overseas Chinese in
Singapore and Malaya, the revolutionaries also waged
an ideological war against the reformists. Apart from
many other factors which favoured them, the reformists
had entrenched themselves by the time the revolutionaries
appeared on the scene. The publishing of the T'ien Nan
Hsin Pao in 1898 and Jih Hsin Pao in 1899, the sojourn
of K'ang Yu-wei in Singapore and Malaya since February
1900, and the control of modern Chinese schools, all
helped the spread of the reformist influence.

The reformists had another advantage, that was
to identify their ideology with Confucius' political
philosophy. Their main concept of innovating old
institutions to cope with new environment was shrewdly
related to the Confucius' teaching of change by K'ang
Yu-wei. This identification with Confucius' doctrine
gave the reformists authority to demand the acceptance
of their ideology by the overseas Chinese, who were
greatly influenced by traditional Chinese ideas.
Moreover, the reformists only preached for the reform of the political system, they did not pledge themselves to the abolition of the traditional monarchical system, nor the overthrow of the Manchu and the use of arms. This appeal for moderate change in China held promise of being more readily acceptable by the overseas Chinese. This was particularly true to those merchants who, in the absence of a gentry class in the overseas Chinese communities, acted as the upholders of Confucian ethics, and as the guardians of Chinese tradition.

The reformist ideology had made a substantial impression on the overseas Chinese communities. They claimed that adoption of a constitution would bring China wealth and power, and a constitution from the Manchu government could be obtained through peaceful means. These claims created hopes among overseas Chinese of an easier way to realize their dream of a wealthy and powerful China without demanding much sacrifice, for financial support and petition signatures demanded by the reformists would not bring them into direct conflict with the Manchu government.

The spread of reformist ideology obviously impeded dissemination of revolutionary doctrines. The revolutionaries, who believed in a racial and armed
revolution, the overthrow of the ruling Manchu, the replacement of the monarchy by a republic, and the enforcement of social equality, had difficulty in convincing the overseas Chinese to accept their new ideas. Thus, the prevalence and appeal of the reformist ideology set up a bar to their activities. However, these could only be overcome by combating the reformist ideology and checking its further spread in the overseas Chinese communities.

The conflict with reformist ideology increased with a rapid growth of revolutionary activities after the founding of the T'ung Mêng Hui branches in Singapore and Malaya in 1906. The Union Times, which succeeded the T'ien Nan Hsin Pao as the main reformist organ after 1905, constantly attacked the expanding revolutionary movement and its ideology. To combat the reformist challenge and to further the spread of their ideology, the revolutionaries established the Chung Hsing Jih Pao at the end of 1907. This newspaper soon engaged itself in an ideological war with the Union Times, and heated polemic between them thus started in December 1907. At first, it was confined to the editorial column, and as time went on, its tempo was accelerated by political developments in China. The skirmish gradually developed
into frontal attacks, and reached fever pitch in the middle of 1908, during which both parties had devoted two full columns to the argument. This ideological war lasted until February 1910 when the Chung Hsing Jih Pao was forced to close down due to financial difficulties.

In view of its important influence among the overseas Chinese, both the revolutionaries and reformists put tremendous effort into this verbal war. T'ien T'ung, one of the mainstays of the revolutionary magazine in Japan, 'Twentieth Century China', and the chief editor of the Chung Hsing Jih Pao, was put in charge of revolutionary operations. The reformists were directed by Hsü Ch'in, one of the well-known disciples of K'ang Yu-wei renowned for his writing. In the course of argument, the polemic not only showed its importance in influencing the revolutionary activities in Singapore and Malaya, but also demonstrated its crucial role in the ideological war between the revolutionaries and reformists throughout overseas Chinese communities in the world. For these reasons, the polemic was constantly reinforced by distinguished leaders of both camps. Wang Ching-wei, Hu Han-min, the two main figures of the Min Pao which engaged in a heated polemic with the reformists in Tokyo, came to the aid of the Chung Hsing Jih Pao as editors and
editorial writers. Ou Chu-chia, Wu Hsien-tzū and Yüan Shou-min, reformist leaders who had experience in editing newspapers in Canada, came to the aid of the Union Times. Dr Sun Yat-sen himself contributed articles to the Chung Hsing Jih Pao under the pen-name of 'A Primary School Student from Nanyang' (南洋小學生).

The ideological war in Singapore was not local, it was part of a world-wide revolutionary ideological war against the reformists. It also could be considered as the continuation of the heated polemic in Japan waged by the Min Pao against the reformist Hsin Min Tsung Pao; the Min Pao team actually moved to Singapore after 1907.

The details of revolutionary ideological war against the reformists in Japan is beyond the scope of this study, but it seems clear that the war waged in Singapore differed in many respects from the one in Japan. The main focus of the argument in Japan was on the basic questions of revolution and constitutional monarchy on which the platforms of both parties were based. In Singapore, however, greater stress was given to practical issues arising from developments in China, such as 'practicability of a Racial Revolution' and 'Parliament'. Furthermore, unlike the debate in Japan where the argument was confined to essays and editorials, the polemic in
Singapore appeared to be more colourful and spectacular. Apart from editorials and essays, a considerable number of articles took the forms of 'short notes', 'interesting notes', 'additional notes', 'jesting articles', 'jesting remarks', 'short stories', 'new dramas', 'Cantonese songs', 'folk songs', 'miscellany' and 'readers' forum'. One reason for adopting these less formal modes of arguments in Singapore was no doubt the relatively low educational level of overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. Unlike Japan, where the readers were mostly students and were able to appreciate more sophisticated essays, the overseas Chinese in Singapore and other parts of Southeast Asia could be approached only through these simple and popular forms.

A striking feature of the polemic in Singapore was its personal bitterness and vulgarity, whereas in Japan the argument was conducted in a formal and gentlemanly manner. In Singapore, revolutionaries were termed 'a rebellious faction', whereas the reformists were called 'an evil faction', and both parties had gone so far as to compare each other with fleas, mad dogs and prostitutes. Personal attack was frequently mounted against the editors, reporters and staff members of the
newspapers, and these gave rise to several claims and counterclaims for libel in court cases.7

(1) The Polemic on 'Racial Revolution or Constitutional Monarchy'  

Since the revolutionary ideological war against the reformists in Singapore was the continuation of that in Japan, it is not surprising that some of the basic points were repeated and developed. The basic question of a racial revolution or constitutional monarchy was argued at considerable length in the Min Pao and the Hsin Min Ts'ung Pao, but this was mainly concerned with theoretical aspects, such as 'racial origin of the Manchu' and 'consequences of a racial revolution'.8 In Singapore, the argument focussed on the feasibility of revolution and constitutional monarchy.

The reformists in Singapore claimed there was no racial problem in China, the so-called racial problem was merely revolutionary propaganda and the ruling Manchu had long been assimilated by Chinese, and accepted Chinese tradition and moral teachings. The most urgent and pressing problem foreseen by them was not a racial problem, but a need for political reform through which China would become strong and powerful. The revolutionaries, on the other hand, argued that Manchu
was an evil alien race, the Manchu conquest of China could never be regarded in the same light as the Sung Dynasty replacing the T'ang. They emphasized that China had been lost to the Manchu for more than two hundred and sixty years, and the Chinese were responsible for recovering the lost nation. Moreover, Chinese people had suffered large scale massacres, suppression and ill-treatment under the Manchu. The Chinese people would suffer further enslavement by foreign powers, for the Manchu was conspiring with foreigners and gave them Chinese territory. For these reasons, China could only be saved through an armed revolution through which the evil Manchu will be liquidated. Fourteen articles appearing in the Chung Hsing Jih Pao and the Union Times, between September 1907 and October 1908, were directly involved in the debate of these topics. The revolutionaries appeared to be more belligerent in that they contributed ten of them, and the rest were written by the reformists in defending their position. To give a clear picture of this argument, I have classified the detail of the articles into three sections.

(a) The Racial Revolution

In September 1902, K'ang Yu-wei published his famous article entitled 'Pien ko-ming shu' (Discussion
of Revolution) in the Hsin Min Tsung Pao. It was written in opposition to the mounting revolutionary sentiment among overseas Chinese and in China. His main principles were defence of the Manchu rule, anti-racial revolution and propaganda for constitutional monarchy. In defending the Manchu rule, he particularly emphasized that Chinese and Manchu were linked to the same destiny: the downfall of the Manchu would also mean disaster for all Chinese. In view of K'ang's frequent contacts with overseas Chinese intellectuals, merchants and middle-class since his arrival in Singapore in February 1900, his main theories prevailed in those circles; in particular the theory that Chinese and Manchu were inheritors of a single fate received a ready acceptance among these people. Some were dissuaded from conversion to revolution, and others based their charge of the 'irresponsibility' of revolutionaries on this theory.

The appeal of this theory to overseas Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya obviously retarded the spread of revolutionary ideology. It had to be discredited. In September 1907, one month after the first appearance of the Chung Hsing Jih Pao, the revolutionaries began to launch their attacks. In the
editorial entitled 'A Refutation of K'ang Yu-wei's False Theory that Chinese and Manchu Share the Same Fate', the author, under a pen-name 'Yünn', pointed out in the first place that the theory was false, because Chinese and Manchu had been long-standing foes since the Manchu conquest in the seventeenth century, so they could never share the same fate. The author argued that even if they did share the same fate in travelling in the same boat across a rough sea, the Manchu was an incompetent helmsman who would steer the boat into a whirlpool: why could not the passengers who were more competent in handling the situation forcibly take over the boat and ride the storm.

Apart from spelling out the animosity between the Chinese and Manchu, the author clearly implies that the fate of China under the Manchu would be like India, French Indo-China or other African countries, that is, colonization by foreign powers. The only way to save China was to ensure that all Chinese would rise against the Manchu, expel them, and establish a Chinese government. In the author's eyes, a Chinese government was the only solution to the threat of foreign encroachment.
If K'ang Yu-wei's 'false theory' was to be successfully refuted, then the declaration of the Cheng Wen She (Political Information Club), which was even more harmful to the spread of revolutionary ideology, must also be undermined. Cheng Wen She, a political club organized by the reformists to advance their aims in China, was founded in October 1907 in Tokyo. In the declaration, the reformists strongly called on people to support them to press for a constitutional government in China, and declared that to press toward such government was the responsibility of all Chinese. The declaration also put forth four platforms to work for the realization of a constitutional government.

The significance of this declaration was not its advocacy of constitutional monarchy, but its offer of a new hope for the realization of a constitutional government. The dissemination of this new hope in the overseas Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya would prove more harmful than K'ang's theory. Obviously it could not be left unchecked.

In December 1907, only about one and a half months after the appearance of the Cheng Wen She's declaration, a long article entitled 'The Rebuff of Cheng Wen She's Declaration' was published continuously in an editorial
in the Chung Hsing Jih Pao. The author, under the pen name of 'Lung-t'êng', launched a fierce attack on its appeal for a constitutional government, and he again emphasized anti-Manchuism. In the opening of the article, the author gave an interesting analogy of a family's revenge to that of taking revenge against the Manchu. He said:

There was a family sacked by a group of robbers who killed the masters, occupied the house and the property, and enslaved all members of the family. Although the members harboured grudges against the robbers, they could do nothing because they were weak. As time passed by, descendants of the family did not remember the tragedy which had occurred a long time before. They regarded the descendants of the robbers as their fathers and legal masters of the house...

After many years, the power of the robbers' descendants was in decline. The property of the family had aroused the desires of another group of robbers who were shrewd enough not to occupy the house, but make use of the usurpers to exploit the resources of the family...

Because of the greed of the new robbers, the descendants of the members of the family came to realize the danger the family was in, and also found out the secret that their masters were the descendants of usurpers who slaughtered their ancestors. Most of them felt animosity against the usurpers and prepared to take vengeance. But a handful of them who were a disgrace to the family, had been preaching a false theory that all the descendants should pay unquestioning loyalty to their enemies. These people deceived their compatriots and became claws of the tigers...
Obviously, the robbers were the Manchu who had conquered China in 1644, the descendants of the family were the Chinese under Manchu rule, the new robbers were foreign powers who had imposed their dominating influence on China's political and economic life, and the handful who deceived their compatriots were the reformists who preached loyalty to the Manchu. The clear purpose of the author in using this analogy was to strike the minds of overseas Chinese with simple facts based on family relations. It is noteworthy that the emphasis shown by the previous two articles on 'racial revolution' in the ideological war against the reformists in Singapore and Malaya was based on anti-Manchuiism and revengeful feeling. In the overseas Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya where the readers were more simple-minded, the use of the anti-Manchuiism and revengeful feeling was effective in counter-attacking the pro-Manchu reformist propaganda.

On the twin bases of anti-Manchuiism and revengeful feeling, the author rebutted the reformist theory that the Manchu rulers would make political concessions if the Chinese pressed hard. Unlike countries such as Germany, Italy and Japan, the author argued, China had an acute racial problem, that is a small minority of
Manchu ruling over a vast majority of Chinese. To maintain their rule, the Manchu was suspicious of any political demand made by Chinese, and would reject or ignore it. Because of this racial factor, China could never attain the status of constitutional monarchy like Japan and those countries of Europe. After using the racial argument to dispose of the Chêng Wên Shê's 'constitutional monarchy', the author went on to invoke the same argument to advance his theory for revolution. He declared that he agreed to a certain extent with the reformist view that the people were responsible in pressing for change in the political system, but he reiterated that any peaceful demand for political concessions would be null and void, the only feasible means for achieving political change in China was an armed revolution.

The reformists in Singapore ignored the arguments on the racial problem and revenge; instead, they attacked the revolutionaries by declaring that an armed revolution in China was impracticable.

(b) On Practicability of Revolution

From an historical point of view, the reformists declared that the opportunities for toppling the Manchu had been lost. They argued that since the Manchu
conquest in 1644, there had been good opportunities for racial revolution. One was in the 8th year of the Emperor Hsien Feng (1858) when the British and French troops occupied the capital, and the Emperor escaped to Jehol; the other was in the 26th year of the Kuang Hsu Emperor (1900) when the Boxer Uprising broke out. The capital was occupied by the troops of the foreign powers, and the Empress Dowager and the Emperor fled to Sian. During those times, the country was plunged into chaos, and the central government was without a leader. If there had been heroes who could have taken advantage of the situation to rise against the government, the Manchu might have been driven out from China forever. But these promising opportunities had gone begging.

In the eyes of reformists, the revolutionaries who had neither occupied vast land nor commanded support of numerous followers, could never succeed in their armed uprisings in China. The reformists argued that the revolutionaries were weak. Compared with the previous rebellions, such as 'The Rebellion of the Three Vassals' (三藩之乱), 'The Rebellion of the White Lotus Sect', and 'The Taiping Rebellion', the revolutionary strength at home and overseas was
insignificant. All these rebellions had occupied vast tracts of land and lasted for years, but the revolutionaries were roaming overseas without a solid base. If those previous rebellions with such great potential could not succeed in toppling the Manchu, what was the chance for the revolutionaries?

Strategically, the reformists completely ruled out any possibility of the success of revolutionary uprisings. They pointed out that locations chosen by the revolutionaries for staging revolts, such as Huang Kang and Waichow in Kwangtung, Ch'in-Lien and Chên Nan Kuan in Kwangsi and Hokou in Yunnan were strategic mistakes. Had the revolutionaries succeeded in all these uprisings, they could never have succeeded in controlling the whole of China, for all these locations were unimportant. The only hope for staging a successful revolt was in the capital. To back up their argument, the reformists gave much historical evidence.

The more important problem which the revolutionaries could not overcome, as the reformists had seen, was that of arms and ammunition. They posed a hypothesis that since modern weapons came into use, those who possessed superior arms would win in war. Thus, the old style of revolution - with the use of limited and
inferior arms - which had succeeded in Chinese history, would never be repeated. It was clear, the reformists argued, that the revolutionaries were unable to obtain financial support from overseas Chinese, without which arms and ammunition could not be acquired. Even if funds could have been collected as the revolutionaries fancied, their purchase and transportation were extremely difficult. Any transaction in arms in foreign countries would be noticed by the Ch'ing diplomats overseas, who would immediately inform the government to be on its guard, and any shipment of arms from overseas would be seized by cruisers which guarded the coastal lines. The government, on the other hand, had ample supplies of weapons and ammunition. Together with modern communications and inventions, such as telegraph, telegrams, etc., the government could easily put down any uprising as soon as it started. The failures of the P'ing Hsiang, Ch'in-Lien, Chên Nan Kuan and Hok'ou uprisings were concrete evidence of the impracticability of the revolution.

The reformist arguments on this topic were mostly well-founded. The revolutionaries did suffer a series of defeats in armed uprisings between 1906 and 1907.
They could not escape the fact that most of the defeats were caused by the inadequacy of funds and shortage of supply of arms and ammunition. Thus, the reformist arguments backed up by facts were quite convincing to a number of overseas Chinese, and had a detrimental effect on revolutionary activities. The revolutionaries who were embarking on large-scale indoctrination activities in Singapore and Malaya (such as founding reading clubs, sponsoring public talks and mass rallies), could not afford to watch the spread of such reformist arguments. They proceeded to defend their cause. Although they frankly admitted their defeats in a series of uprisings in South and Southwest China, they denied it was proof of the impracticability of revolution. They argued that setbacks were inevitable in any revolution in Chinese and Western history, and they had received valuable experience from these setbacks for the planning of future uprisings. In support of their arguments, the revolutionaries gave concrete examples that both American and French revolutions had succeeded after many years of setbacks and frustration. The revolutionaries also reminded their opponents that although they suffered a series of defeats, yet each uprising was followed by a more successful one - the Ch'in-Lien was an improvement
on the Teochew, the Chen Nan Kuan was more successful than the Ch'in-Lien, and the Chen Nan Kuan was surpassed by the Hok'ou. Each attempted revolt, the revolutionaries argued, not only had increased the volume of support, but also had helped to spread the revolutionary message.

The revolutionaries were apparently trying to convince their readers that the revolution was an enormous task, it needed time and patience. The American and French revolutions were concrete examples. They also tried to impress readers by the increasing success of uprisings, implying that eventually they would culminate in a victorious revolution. Although this argument might have given some confidence to the readers, it was not enough to persuade them to take an initiative in revolutionary activities. As will be seen in Chapter VII, these readers were revolutionary cadres, and formed the base of low-level leadership of the T'ung Meng Hui, their full commitment to revolution was most essential to the success of revolutionary activities during that critical time. Therefore, they must be prompted to action by some moral encouragement. In an article entitled 'The determination of staging a revolution', Wang Ching-wei, the renowned revolutionary
leader, exalted revolution as an honorable and glorious task, and praised as national heroes those revolutionaries who had sacrificed their welfare for the interests of race and nation. He emphasized that only those who disregarded difficulty, personal gain and death could become revolutionaries. 32

Apart from glorifying the moral aspect of revolution, the revolutionaries also tried to give it psychological encouragement. They asserted that the human being has various kinds of senses, namely: conscience, sense of justice, sense of chivalry, fraternal sense, filial sense, kind sense, brotherly sense and patriotic sense. These eight senses combined together to form a revolutionary sense. The revolutionary sense, according to their explanation, 'is quite different from the rest of the senses, it is not individual, but social. When it is defeated, it will not give up, but become harder and tougher'. 33

It is noteworthy that these various senses were usually considered by Chinese as virtues, particularly fraternal sense, filial sense, kind sense and patriotic sense which formed the basis of Confucian teachings. The relating of the revolutionary sense to all these
traditional virtues was an attempt in claiming legitimacy for revolution.

If the revolution was an honorable and glorious task, and was legitimate in the framework of traditional society, why could it not be carried out to its most successful extreme? Thus, the revolutionaries advanced their theory of radicalism. They emphasized that the principles of revolution were sacrifice and martyrdom, and revolutionary action should be carried out irrespective of existing conditions. They stressed that revolution was not just a matter of words, but had to be put into practice. The revolutionaries must take the initiative even though they knew it would mean personal sacrifice. For by dint of this sacrifice, they will be able to touch the hearts of the masses, and arouse their patriotism to achieve the final goal.34

The advancement of this radicalism was obviously designed to back up the declining morale caused by the defeat of revolutionary uprisings. It was essential during the time when most overseas Chinese were wavering in their allegiances. The appeal of this theory, as later events showed, was one of the main factors accounting for the success of revolutionary activities in Singapore and Malaya.
Turning from theory to reality, the revolutionaries made a comparison between the difficulties involved in revolution and in establishing a constitutional monarchy. They argued that lessons in past history had shown that it took less than 20 years to make a success of a revolution, whereas the Manchu only vaguely promised the fulfilment of a constitutional monarchy in not less than 30 years. In a case like the Chinese revolution, they further stressed, things were easier. For revolutions in olden time were waged for individual interests which had inevitably led to a power struggle, and thus were prolonged or undermined. But this revolution was, for the interests of the Chinese people, and altruistically aimed at the salvation of China. With the full support of the people and absence of a power struggle, it would succeed in a very short time.

(c) On Impracticability of Constitutional Monarchy

Together with defending the practicability of revolution, the revolutionaries launched a counter-attack against the reformists, and declared that a real constitutional monarchy was impracticable in China. They argued that all the constitutional monarchies in Europe and Japan were the compromises in the struggle
between monarchs and people. They were the results of numerous sacrifices and bloodshed. Thus, it was impossible to acquire a constitutional monarchy without struggle. Compromise between monarchy and people could be reached in countries comprising people of one race, but not in countries composed of two or more races, for the political issue became confused with the racial one. The ruling race tended to maintain and consolidate its position. Social justice was based on racial difference, and the conflict between them was inevitable. In a country like China, the Manchu were the conqueror and the Chinese were the conquered. They were placed on an unequal footing in the social scale. The Manchu had set up their own troops for preventing any Chinese revolt, and the Chinese, on the other hand, had harboured a deep grudge against the Manchu. On the basis of this mutual distrust and antagonism, it was impossible for the monarch to come to terms with the people. Thus, the so-called constitutional monarchy was unrealizable.

In making this claim, the revolutionaries still used racial grounds to justify their arguments. But this racial issue which they had emphasized time and again, seemed to be challenged by the fact that the Ch'ing government had announced its proposed
constitutional monarchy, and its plan for enforcing racial equality. The revolutionaries, who saw the proposed constitution as a false one, had to expose it in order to enforce their arguments that a real constitutional monarchy was impracticable in China.

In a long editorial entitled 'Hearty advice to those who long for a constitutional monarchy', the chief editor of the Chung Hsing Jih Pao, T'ien T'ung (under the pen name of 'Hên Hai'), proclaimed that the success of the proposed constitutional monarchy would be harmful to the Chinese. The Manchu, he said, merely wanted to disarm mounting opposition by giving a false constitution with which they would perpetuate their rule. He pointed out that the Manchu did not give a definite time for the completion of a constitutional government. The punishment of Hsiung Fan-yü for petitioning for early fulfilment of the proposed constitution, the ban on political petitions and gatherings, were all examples to show the falsity of the so-called constitutional government. The success of it, the author asserted, would mean consolidation of Manchu control, and eternal enslavement of the Chinese as a whole.
The attack on 'the false constitutional monarchy' was important for the revolutionary movement in Singapore and Malaya. It revealed the 'real' intention of the Manchu government as well as the 'false' allegations of the reformists, its defenders. The promulgation of the imperial edict on the proposed constitutional monarchy and the government's ostensible reforms between 1906 and 1907 had created some illusions among overseas Chinese. The Lat Pao, a neutral Chinese newspaper representing views of some Singaporean conservatives and intellectuals, hailed the pronouncement of the edict. The reformists used this as evidence to prove that a constitutional government, which they had long been fighting for, could arrive in China, and also as proof that revolution was impracticable. On the basis of these allegations, the reformists pressed for more support from overseas Chinese. Undoubtedly, the government's proposal for a constitutional monarchy had helped the reformists to win over a number of overseas Chinese, and formed a threat to the revolutionary development in Singapore and Malaya. It was to combat this threat that the revolutionaries mounted their onslaught against the so-called false constitutional monarchy.
But in spite of their fierce attacks, the revolutionaries were well aware that the political orientation of many overseas Chinese was determined by practical considerations, such as personal security and profit. They therefore stressed that a real constitutional monarchy would never succeed in China, and that those who supported it would have to face 'serious consequences'. In concluding his article, 'Hearty advice to those who long for the constitutional monarchy', T'ien T'ung inquired what would happen to reformist supporters when the revolutionaries succeeded in overthrowing the Manchu. Would they kill themselves or try to become citizens of foreign countries? Even if they were pardoned by their compatriots, they would be ashamed to face their kith and kin in China.  

These warnings were aimed at reformist supporters and those who were wavering. The questions asked were practical and steeped in self-interest. What would really happen to them if the revolutionaries succeeded in overthrowing the Manchu? Would their families and relatives in China not suffer persecution under the new government? Would not their profitable trade with China be stopped? Would not their relations with China
be cut off? These doubts were meant to deter them from supporting the reformists and the Ch'ing government.

(2) The Polemic on the Introduction of a Parliament

In the whole process of the ideological war against the reformists in Singapore and Malaya, the institution of parliament stood out to be an important issue. Its importance lies in the fact that the reformist campaigns for a parliament were quite successful both in China and abroad. This success constituted an immediate threat to the revolutionary activities. Like welcoming the imperial edict of 1906 and its ensuing reforms, the reformists asserted that introduction of a parliament would be a step further towards the realization of a constitutional monarchy. The reformist propaganda in Singapore which was partially responsible for the success of the campaign, and which had further misled the overseas Chinese, had to be refuted and attacked.

The debate started in July 1908, and reached its peak in August of the same year, which corresponded with high tide of the reformist campaigns for a parliament.

Since the proclamation of the imperial edict on the proposed constitutional monarchy, the reformist
leaders began to work for the introduction of a constitutional government. The main target was a parliament. At the end of the same year, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and other reformist leaders, worked enthusiastically for the formation of the Chêng Wên Shê. On 17 October 1907, the Chêng Wên Shê, which was to carry out necessary steps to press for a parliament, was founded in Tokyo. Soon afterwards, branches were established in China and abroad. In February 1908, its headquarters was moved to Shanghai. This shift signifies that the attention of the reformists was focussed on China, where conditions were favourable for a large-scale campaign. Members of the Chêng Wên Shê were very active in appealing to all social classes, and obtained substantial support from the merchants and scholar-gentry. As a result, petitions with thousands of signatures were frequently sent to court from Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Anhwei, Shantung, Hunan and Kiangsu. In July 1908, the Chêng Wên Shê sent an official cable to the Bureau for Compilation of Constitution, pressing the calling of a parliament within three years.

While the campaign was making headway in China, a similar campaign was started overseas. In Singapore
and Malaya, the campaign gathered momentum. From May to July 1908, Hsu Ch'in and Wu Hsien-tzü, two top reformist leaders, were active in Kuala Lumpur. They contacted local reformists, leaders of dialect groups and members of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce to enlist their support. Public meetings were held throughout Singapore and Malaya.

To back up the campaign, the Union Times, the reformist organ in Singapore, began to appeal to its readers. From 8 July to 21 October 1908, five long editorials entitled 'An appeal to the people to demand with all their effort for a parliament' (敬告國民宜以全力要求國會), 'All people should join the Preparatory Association for a parliament' (論國民皆宜加入國會期成會), 'An appeal to advocates for a parliament' (敬告主張國會者), 'The trend towards parliament' (論國會的趨勢) and 'Fixing a time for the establishment of a parliament is the foundation of China's self-strengthening' (論定期開國會為自強的基礎) appeared one after another in the newspaper. In these articles, the reformists emphasized the vital importance and sovereignty of parliament. They declared that parliament was the only means to make China strong and prosperous, to prevent foreign encroachment and to
ensure the independence of China.\textsuperscript{58} They argued that China had the potential to become powerful with its vast territory and dense population. Under autocratic rule, the Chinese people were disunited and did not support the government whole-heartedly, so the nation was weak. But, if China had installed a parliament which represented the interests of the people, the nation would become strong because all people would throw their weight behind the government.\textsuperscript{59}

The absence of parliament, the reformists argued, was not only the root of decay of imperial China, but also the source of poverty. Without the supervision of parliament, the nation did not give enough protection and encouragement to commerce, nor to agriculture, industry or mining. As a result, the nation became poor. The establishment of a parliament, they stressed, would provide the nation with a budget, in which all kinds of expenditures would be appropriately estimated.\textsuperscript{60} With the supervision of parliament, the government would be able to allocate an enormous amount of money to step up economic development, and appropriate a portion for defence of the nation. With economic expansion and modernization of troops, China would become wealthy and powerful.\textsuperscript{61}
Wealth and power had been the two things sought by the Manchu government, the reformists and the revolutionaries, and they were also the dream of most Chinese people. Whoever could provide the best means for the attainment of a wealthy and powerful China would undoubtedly obtain tremendous support from overseas Chinese. The emphasis on the relations between power and wealth with parliament was a shrewd tactic adopted by the reformists to increase their support to back up the campaign. The revolutionaries, who saw the danger of the dissemination of the theory, embarked on a fierce assault. After the appearance of 'The trend towards parliament' (the main article expounding the reformist theory) in the Union Times, Hu Han-min, now the chief editor of the revolutionary Chung Hsing Jih Pao, began the attack by publishing a long article entitled 'Refutation of the Union Times on the trend towards parliament'. He was reinforced by an article 'Correcting the Union Times on fixing a time for the establishment of a parliament is the foundation of China's self-strengthening'. In these articles, the revolutionaries focussed their attacks on the main theme of the reformist propaganda, that is the theory of omnipotence of parliament.
The revolutionaries charged that the reformists were only clamouring the vital importance and omnipotence of parliament, but failed to understand its essence. They also failed to distinguish between parliament and constitution. Parliament, the revolutionaries argued, was not so omnipotent as reformists claimed. It was only a component part of the constitution, but was not equivalent to it. Parliament derived its power from a constitution which derived its authority from the people's rights. Thus, the foundation of a wealthy and powerful nation was not based on the formality of parliament, but on the people's rights. It was only when the people's rights defeated the power of a monarch, and obtained a real constitution, that parliament could truly exercise its power in the interests of the people. The people's rights, the revolutionaries emphasized, could be obtained not through begging and petitioning, as advocated by the reformists, but by armed revolution. The people of Britain, France and the United States of America acquired their rights and real constitution through bloodshed; thus, their parliaments could exercise real power in the interests of the people. On the other hand, in countries like Russia and Turkey where
constitutions were acquired through peaceful means, their parliaments possessed no real power, but were used as tools by the monarchs to control the people. This was because the rights acquired through these means were piecemeal, and the constitution thus acquired was false. 65

After laying down the premise that the people's rights were the real basis of constitution and parliament, the revolutionaries went further to declare that a parliament which could exercise real power in the interests of the Chinese people could never be obtained from the Manchu through peaceful means. Like refuting the reformists on the topic of false constitutional monarchy, they once again used racial incompatibility between the Manchu and Chinese and current political trends to prove their points. They emphasized that the Manchu had never loved the Chinese land nor the Chinese people. The Manchu gave away Chinese territories to foreign powers time and again and placed China on the verge of partition. The Chinese people were treated like slaves. One concrete example was that the government only gave 100,000 taels to relieve a serious flood affecting several hundred thousand people in South Kwangtung in 1908, whereas a
sum of 400,000 taels were allocated to entertain the American Fleet visiting China. The fear of revenge further led the Manchu to declare that 'When the Chinese are strong, the Manchu will perish. When the Chinese are tired, the Manchu will become fat.' (漢人強，滿人亡；漢人疲，滿人肥.) Because of this clash of interests between the two races, the Manchu would never willingly give up their political power, and give the Chinese people a real parliament.

Since the announcement of the imperial edict on the proposed constitutional monarchy, the revolutionaries further argued, the government ostentatiously embarked on some reforms to show the people that there were no political discriminations against the Chinese, but the Manchu still firmly controlled the military, financial and educational aspects. The revolutionaries emphasized that the government made a show of giving political equality to the Chinese for the purpose of improving the tense racial relations, but in reality, the Manchu used this as a camouflage for consolidating their rule.

The revolutionaries thus concluded that the reformists' campaign for the introduction of a parliament
would fail, their efforts of cabling, petitioning and begging would be null and void.\textsuperscript{70}

(3) \textbf{Probable Results of the Ideological War}

Since the centre of Chinese revolutionary activities was gradually shifted from Japan to Southeast Asia after 1907, the ideological war against the reformists in Singapore and Malaya had wide implications. It succeeded the \textit{Min Pao} as the main spokesman in defending revolutionary ideology and in attacking the reformists. Through heated arguments, the war helped the revolutionary doctrines to spread and to take root in the minds of overseas Chinese, and thus helped to advance revolutionary activities. On the other hand, it also exposed the weakness of the Manchu government and the false allegations of the reformists, and thus inflicted a heavy blow on the reformist movement as a whole - and to the reformist activities in Southeast Asia in particular.

(a) \textbf{Spread of the Revolutionary Doctrines}

Before the ideological war in Singapore, circulation of those revolutionary newspapers engaged in polemics against the reformists (such as the \textit{Min Pao} and \textit{Chung Kuo Jih Pao}) was very limited in Southeast Asia.
The majority of overseas Chinese in this part of the world were confused by the presence of both reformist and revolutionary platforms, and failed to distinguish which was to their and China's better interests. But after the waging of the war, both the Chung Hsing Jih Pao and the Sun Pao (the two newspapers waging war against the Union Times in Singapore) had a good circulation throughout Southeast Asia. They provided more opportunities for the general public to read and to understand the views presented by them. With the help of reading clubs, public talks and mass rallies, the war had aroused considerable interest among the revolutionary supporters. Some of them directly participated in the polemics. They wrote to the Reader's Column of the Chung Hsing Jih Pao under various pen names to refute the reformists. This direct participation provided ample opportunity for a number of revolutionary followers to make clear the implication of revolutionary doctrines in their minds and this consolidated their belief and devotion to revolution.

(b) To Inflict a Serious Blow on the Reformists

In the polemics waged in Singapore, both the revolutionaries and reformists tried to mobilize their
supporters to attack each other, in order to obtain victory in the ideological struggle. Despite the great efforts made by both sides to convince the overseas Chinese of the rightness of their causes, their arguments were always subject to the test of events in China itself. Here, the reformists were placed in the awkward position of having to defend the steps taken by the Ch'ing government. The reformists generally regarded the proclamation of the imperial edict on constitutional monarchy as the culmination of their struggle against the Manchu, and they gradually moved closer to their former enemy. On some occasions, they served merely as the Manchu mouthpiece. This change of stand meant that they had to give a reasonable explanation of all the Manchu measures over which they had no control. This increasing dependence on the Ch'ing government constantly exposed their weaknesses in theory and practice. The stern measures taken by the Manchu in banning the Chêng Wên Shê and against those who championed the establishment of a parliament, had put them in a dilemma in Singapore. They had to keep on arguing for the vital importance and omnipotence of parliament and for the possibility of obtaining constitutional monarchy by peaceful means. In some
cases, they had even to conceal the facts and the events which occurred in China to cheat the readers. But all these unrealistic and contradictory arguments were subject to constant exposure and attack by the revolutionaries.

The proclamation of outlines of a proposed constitution in September 1908 was a further proof to the revolutionaries' charge that the Manchu had no intention of making any political concession to the Chinese. The proposed constitution provided the Emperor with the right to sanction or proclaim a law and to transfer it to the parliament, to open, close, prolong, or disband the parliament. Furthermore, all judicial authority should be exercised by the Emperor's appointed officers in accordance with the code sanctioned by him. Such a constitution was obviously to protect the Emperor's authority and rights, and offered very little to the people. Thus, its promulgation had further exposed the falsity of reformist claims and their campaigns for the introduction of a parliament. The revolutionaries had taken full advantage of this and pressed home to the overseas Chinese the hopelessness of the reformist movement. The more the overseas
Chinese understood the limits of the reformist capacities, the more they shifted their support to revolution. Some of the revolutionary leaders felt able to claim that revolutionary ideas had obtained overall support in the Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya after the ideological war.76
CHAPTER VI

CHINESE REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES IN SINGAPORE AND MALAYA, 1909-1911

While the Chinese revolutionary movement was making headway in Singapore and Malaya, it was constantly disrupted by internal feuds, factional dissensions within the T'ung Mêng Hui. These dissensions were both destructive and constructive and undoubtedly had momentous effects on the revolutionary activities. This period also saw increasing involvement of the Chinese of Singapore and Malaya, in major revolutionary uprisings in China. It brought Malayan and Singaporean Chinese into the main stream of Chinese revolutionary movement.

(1) The Anti-Sun Movement in Singapore, Malaya and other parts of Southeast Asia:

Source of Internal Feud. The T'ung Mêng Hui was a product of exigency. It was a loose confederation of three main revolutionary groups: Hsing Chung Hui, Kuang Fu Hui and Hua Hsing Hui which all had their origin in Japan. The common aim that bound them together was the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty and the restoration of Chinese rule. But the tie was often weak because of personality clashes and policy difference.
The Cantonese group, the Hsing Chung Hui, led by Dr Sun Yat-sen, Hu Han-min, Wang Ching-wei, Ch'en Shao-pai and Fêng Tzŭ-yu, came from the coastal districts of Kwangtung, a province with a long history of Western contact and a comparative cosmopolitan outlook. A number of them had had direct contact with Western civilization, and admired the materialistic and technological achievements of the West. They were quite prepared to borrow Western institutions and to transplant them into China's soil. Sun Yat-sen, the man who had the strongest Western educational background, was even prepared to use foreign aid to bring about revolution in China.¹ The Chekiang-Anhwei group of the Kuang Fu Hui led by Chang Ping-lin and T'ao Ch'eng-chang, and the Hunanese group of the Hua Hsing Hui led by H'uang Hsing and Sung Chiao-jên, came from inland provinces which had fewer contact with foreigners. Most leaders of the last two groups were immersed in Chinese classical learning, and moulded in a traditional outlook towards the West. In their eyes, Western parliamentary system was unsuited to China,² and accomplishing a revolution in China with foreign aid was undesirable.

Apart from the differences in education, outlook, and attitudes towards the West, amongst the
revolutionaries, another main source of internal discord was provincialism. Right from the formation of the T'ung Mêng Hui, the seed of provincialism was already sown in the party structure. Leaders of the three groups maintained a tenuous balance of power in the executive committee of the T'ung Mêng Hui. Recruitment tended to have a strong provincial bias which further sharpened the lines of division within the party, elevated the influence of group leaders, and strengthened the centrifugal tendencies to the detriment of central authority. It was this difference that fed the internal dissensions which spread throughout branches in Southeast Asia.

In 1907 there were several attempts in Tokyo by the Chekiang-Anhwei and the Hunanese groups to topple Dr Sun Yat-sen's leadership in the party. Although unsuccessful, these attempts did discredit the authority of top leadership, and undermined the harmony within the party. After 1908, the process of internal dissensions was accelerated when the Chekiang-Anhwei and the Hunanese groups were dissatisfied with a series of unsuccessful uprisings in South and Southwest China, and they disagreed with the Cantonese group over the choice of location for uprising. This internal struggle within
the T'ung Mêng Hui in Tokyo gradually spread to Southeast Asia, where overseas Chinese support formed an indispensable financial base of the movement.

One of the main critics of Sun was T'ao Ch'eng-chang. T'ao, a native of Chekiang province, was a leader of the Kuang Fu Hui which was founded in 1904. In the following year, T'ao joined revolutionaries from Fukien, Kiangsu and Anhwei to carry out underground activities and assumed leadership, being addressed as the Commander of the five provinces. In 1906, his close association with Hsü Hsi-lin and Ch'iu Chin, the martyrs of abortive uprisings in Anhwei and Chekiang, 7 forced him to flee to Japan. He soon joined the T'ung Mêng Hui, and assumed the leadership of the Chekiang-Anhwei group within the party and was instrumental in organizing the anti-Sun leadership campaign in Tokyo in 1907. 8 One of the main differences between the Chekiang-Anhwei and the Cantonese groups was the choice of locale for uprisings. The leaders of the latter, who placed much emphasis on foreign aid and overseas Chinese support, preferred the provinces in South and Southwest China (Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Yunnan) where foreign bases such as Hong Kong, Singapore and Hanoi could easily be reached. These were the main provinces from which the Cantonese group
came, and this aroused suspicion from both the Chekiang-Anhwei and Hunanese groups that Sun and his followers were being partial to Cantonese interests. The Chekiang-Anhwei group favoured neither foreign aid nor enjoyed overseas Chinese support. They had good connections with secret societies along the Yangtze river, and naturally preferred to attack from within. They set priority for revolution in such provinces as Chekiang, Anhwei and those along the Yangtze Valley.

The Anti-Sun Movement in Process. Tao Ch'eng-chang was one of the leaders who strongly favoured starting revolutionary uprisings in Chekiang and other inland provinces. He went to Singapore at the end of 1907 with two objectives: to get $3,000 from Dr Sun for expenditure on the Min Pao, and to get a letter from Sun recommending him to raise funds in Southeast Asia for uprisings in Chekiang. Dr Sun, who was against provincialism and was infuriated by the attempts to challenge his leadership in Tokyo, rejected his appeals for aid. As a result, T'ao failed in both aims, and harboured a deep grudge against Sun. He toured widely throughout Southeast Asia to embark on an extensive anti-Sun movement. He was able to obtain support from some local revolutionary leaders who were disillusioned with Sun and the T'ung Meng Hui.
All these leaders were non-Cantonese, and ingrained with provincialism and regionalism. Two of them, Koh Soh-chew and Ch'en Yün-shêng, were the main figures of the first and second Ch'iao Chou Uprisings in 1907, and had quarrelled with Dr Sun Yat-sen and his Cantonese followers over the failure in completing delivery of a shipment of arms and ammunition from Japan. From then on, Koh and Ch'en had harboured a grudge against Sun, and supported the anti-Sun movement staged by T'ao Ch'êng-chang. On the basis of the support of these leaders, T'ao set up Kuang Fu Hui branches in Banka and Surahbaya in 1908. Although there was no formal organization of the Kuang Fu Hui branches in Singapore and Malaya, both Koh and Ch'en worked clandestinely in the interests of the organization, and obtained substantial support of the Teochew community in Singapore to which they belonged.

As soon as T'ao and other dissentients established their bases in Southeast Asia, they embarked on anti-Sun and anti T'ung Mêng Hui activities. In order to obtain financial source, they began to compete with Sun and his dominated T'ung Mêng Hui branches in gaining support from the overseas Chinese. In 1908, T'ao and his colleagues launched a large-scale fund-raising programme throughout Southeast Asia for an uprising in Chekiang and the
neighbouring provinces. Regulations were drawn up to control fund-raising activities and these were widely distributed.\textsuperscript{15} Military bonds were also extensively sold.\textsuperscript{16} It is noteworthy that these regulations for fund-raising were circulated in the name of the Kuang Fu Hui, a sub-organization of the T'ung Mêng Hui. But details of future repayments to donors were listed according to the T'ung Mêng Hui's statute. It was stipulated that the money thus collected was to go either to the T'ung Mêng Hui Headquarters in Tokyo or the T'ung Mêng Hui Southeast Asia Headquarters in Singapore.\textsuperscript{17} The main reason T'ao and his colleagues maintained a formal relation with the T'ung Mêng Hui was because it had a longer history in Southeast Asia, and was better known to the general public. The appeal to the overseas Chinese under the name of the T'ung Mêng Hui would be much more effective than would be the case if it came from the Kuang Fu Hui for which T'ao and his colleagues had really been working.

After 1909, the anti-Sun movement in Southeast Asia intensified. This new development was believed to be stimulated by Sun's hasty reaction to T'ao. It was said that Sun vilified T'ao as a reformist, and sent an assassin to make an attempt on his life.\textsuperscript{18} By way of
revenge, T'ao and his colleagues sent an open letter to the T'ung Mêng Hui Headquarters at Tokyo fiercely attacking Sun and his followers. In this letter, Sun was accused of ill-treating comrades, practising favouritism and corruption. The letter called upon the executive committee to expel Sun and to save the party from ruin.

In the same year, another development emerged in Tokyo. Chang Ping-lin, the anti-Sun leader in Japan, issued a statement attacking the resumed publication of the Min Pao edited by Wang Ching-wei, a faithful follower of Dr Sun Yat-sen. In the statement, Chang challenged the legality of the new edition and vehemently attacked Sun for his refusal to support the Min Pao. He declared that the false edition no longer represented the view of the majority of the revolutionaries, but worked in the personal interests of Sun. He strongly urged the overseas Chinese not to contribute money to Sun and his followers.

The timing of T'ao's open letter and Chang's statement was not a coincidence. They were designed to achieve Sun's expulsion from the party, and to destroy the image of Sun and his Cantonese group among the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. Both T'ao and Chang
knew that being natives from Chekiang they could hardly compete with Sun and his Cantonese group in gaining support from the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, the majority of whom came from Kwangtung and Fukien. For this reason, they still kept the association with the T'ung Meng Hui although they were dissatisfied with Sun's leadership and the dominating influence of the Cantonese group in the party. This would explain why T'ao and Chang did not campaign for the secession of the Kuang Fu Hui from the party, but for the expulsion of Sun.

Both T'ao's letter and Chang's statement were widely distributed throughout overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia and America, and had direct bearing on the revolutionary movement. When Wang Ching-wei and Têng Tzŭ-yü went to the Dutch East Indies to raise funds for the Hok'ou Uprising in Yunnan in May 1908, the anti-Sun group successfully put a halt to their campaign. The
failure of fund-raising and obstruction of shipments of arms and ammunition from Tokyo by the anti-Sun group were the main factors in the failure of the Hok'ou Uprising. 26 Owing to the influence of Tao's open letter and Chang's statement, a large number of overseas Chinese in America began to lose faith in Dr Sun Yat-sen and the revolutionary movement, and were unwilling to contribute money to uprisings planned by the T'ung Meng Hui. 27

Neither in Singapore nor in Malaya did the anti-Sun movement gain much ground. Although Koh Soh-chew and Ch'en Yün-shêng were the leaders of the anti-Sun group, they did not attempt to set up any formal organization to compete with the Tung Meng Hui for influence, not to engage in any open activities against it. In April 1909 T'ao Ch'eng-chang and Ch'en I-t'ao toured widely in Malaya to spread the anti-Sun message, but their campaign was unsuccessful. 28 On the contrary, these attempts provoked in Malaya the opposite reaction. After receiving these copies of the open letter and the statement sent from the Dutch East Indies and Tokyo, a group of revolutionaries from Seramban, Kuala Pilah, Malacca and Muar issued a public statement on 22 November 1909 attacking Chang Ping-lin and other dissentients. Chang was described as selfish, partial, narrow-minded, immoral
and a disgrace to the revolutionary intellectuals. 29

Another statement signed by the Reading Club of the Chinese Merchants of Kuala Pilah and published on 8 December 1909 in the Chung Hsing Jih Pao, strongly refuted the charges made by T'ao and Chang. It challenged the legitimacy of the title 'Comrades of the Seven Provinces' used in T'ao's open letter, and charged T'ao and his associates with fabricating stories. The statement warned that sheer fabrications were not the best means of fraudulently eliciting money from the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, for most of them were no longer naive and were capable of distinguishing between true and false revolutionaries. 30

In the meantime, the revolutionary organ, the Chung Hsing Jih Pao, made known its stand in this conflict and closely sided with Dr Sun Yat-sen. Several editorials were published defending Sun and counter-attacking his opponents. 31 In these editorials, the paper vehemently attacked Chang Ping-lin for treating the Min Pao as his own property, and T'ao Ch'eng-chang and Ch'en I-t'ao for their 'vicious slanders' of Dr Sun. Ch'en was singled out for attack. He was accused of embezzlement from the Chung Hsing Jih Pao, and this had led him to harbour a grudge against the newspaper and the party, and then to
spread rumours in Malaya. In conclusion, the writer warned Chang Ping-lin and those who sent anonymous letters that the Chinese revolution was first started by Dr Sun, whose talent, knowledge, capacity, leadership and devotion to the revolution were beyond question, and he should be and would be firmly supported.

Apart from these statements and editorials, the Chung Hsing Jih Pao reproduced several articles counter-attacking T'ao and Chang from the Chung Kuo Jih Pao and the Kung I Pao in Hong Kong, and Jih Hua Hsin Pao in Japan. These articles accused the anti-Sun elements even more violently. Chang Ping-lin was accused of betraying the revolutionary party, the T'ung Mêng Hui.

There was no doubt that a considerable number of the overseas Chinese in Singapore and Malaya supported Dr Sun against his opponents. But we have to bear in mind that the statements condemning T'ao and Chang came from a few small branches of the T'ung Mêng Hui in Malaya in which one of Dr Sun's faithful followers, Têng Tsê-ju, had strong influence. The main branches, such as Kuala Lumpur, Ipoh and Penang did not follow suit. It is very significant that the T'ung Mêng Hui's Southeast Asia Headquarters in Singapore did not issue any statement either. Most leaders in Singapore, apart from Ho Tê-ju
Têng Tsê-ju, Chairman of the Kuala Pilah T'ung Mêng Hui Branch (by courtesy of Mr. Têng An-yung, nephew of Têng Tsê-ju).
other revolutionary leaders to help maintain the newspaper which was the main organ of the T'ung Mêng Hui. On the contrary, Sun paid much attention to the Chung Hsing Jih Pao over which he and his Cantonese group had a better control. At least four letters were sent to the leaders concerned between 1908 and 1909 instructing them to raise funds for the newspaper. 39

One may argue over the propriety of Dr Sun's practice of a certain degree of favouritism and his apparent inclination to provincialism. In view of the unhealthy power structure of the T'ung Mêng Hui which gave rise to provincialism and regionalism, Sun had found it necessary to associate more with Cantonese comrades than with non-Cantonese, and in the bid for power in the party, he had to rely on an inner-core composed mainly of the Cantonese leaders.

The anti-Sun movement had serious effects on the revolutionary movement in Singapore and Malaya. Although the movement did not cause a complete breakup of the revolutionary camp, it crippled the Singapore T'ung Mêng Hui branch which was mainly responsible for operating the T'ung Mêng Hui's Southeast Asia Headquarters. A number of Singapore leaders who had fervently supported the revolutionary movement became inactive, and unwilling
other revolutionary leaders to help maintain the newspaper which was the main organ of the T'ung Mêng Hui. On the contrary, Sun paid much attention to the Chung Hsing Jih Pao over which he and his Cantonese group had a better control. At least four letters were sent to the leaders concerned between 1908 and 1909 instructing them to raise funds for the newspaper. 39

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to continue their financial support. As a result, revolutionary activities were constantly disrupted, and some of the programmes came to a halt. The K'ai Ming Public Speaking and Reading Club, one of the biggest revolutionary reading clubs in Singapore, had to close at the end of 1909 and the Chung Hsing Jih Pao, the main revolutionary organ in Southeast Asia ceased publication at the beginning of 1910. The reformists, who had been engaged in bitter struggles against the revolutionaries in Singapore, took advantage of the situation. The Union Times gave full publicity to T'ao and Chang's statements which were used to attack Dr Sun and his followers, and used them as evidence to show the unpopularity of the revolutionaries among the overseas Chinese. The inactiveness of the Singapore T'ung Meng Hui leaders and the reformists' attack had an evident psychological effect on overseas Chinese. To supporters and sympathisers of the revolutionary cause, the movement had caused bewilderment and confusion; in the eyes of the general public, the internal struggle of the revolutionary camp had limited the chance of its success, and thus affected their confidence in the revolutionaries.

Perhaps the most important effect was the shift of the T'ung Meng Hui's Southeast Asia Headquarters from
Singapore to Penang. This shift was apparently the consequence of the crippling of the Singapore T'ung Mêng Hui branch resulting from the emergence of the anti-Sun movement.

(2) The Shift of the T'ung Mêng Hui Southeast Asia Headquarters from Singapore to Penang and Its Activities:

In May 1909, Dr Sun Yat-sen left Singapore for Europe for his fourth world tour, preoccupied with two primary objectives: to seek foreign financial aid and diplomatic support from the Western powers for the cause of revolution. The idea of reorganizing the T'ung Mêng Hui had not yet entered his mind, for the large-scale anti-Sun movement was not yet launched. When Sun left Europe for America five months later, his primary concern was to gain financial help from the overseas Chinese in America and attempt to reorganize the T'ung Mêng Hui. This was because after T'ao and Chang's attack, he realized that a united party and faithful followers were the most important assets for the revolutionary movement. Taking advantage of the decline of the reformist influence in America, Sun began to mobilize supporters to establish and reorganize branches under a new name, 'The Chinese Revolutionary Party' (中華革命黨) for which new members were sworn before Sun on a new oath.
use of a new name was intended to signify the rebirth of a new, revolutionary and united party of which Sun was the only leader. The adoption of a new oath and the oath-taking ceremony had further consolidated the unchallenged position of Sun in the party. The oath, which was slightly different from the former one, clearly spelt out acceptance of Dr Sun's Three People's Principles. This means that the members accepted Sun's ideological guidance without reserve. Moreover, the swearing-in of members in Sun's presence implies that members paid allegiance to the party as well as to Dr Sun personally, a fact which gave him more authority over the members than he had hitherto enjoyed.

After founding and reorganizing the branches in New York, Chicago, San Francisco and Honolulu at the beginning of 1910, Sun left America for Japan in June of the same year with the hope of reorganizing the T'ung Mêng Hui Headquarters. Owing to the unfriendly attitude of the Japanese government, Sun was forced to give up his plan and proceeded to Singapore and Malaya, the only places he could take shelter throughout the whole of Southeast Asia.

On 11 July 1910 Dr Sun Yat-sen arrived in Singapore from Japan. The impressions he gained after a year's
absence caused Sun to conclude that Singapore had changed tremendously. The T'ung Mêng Hui Southeast Asia Headquarters appeared to be inactive, disorganized, and the leaders appeared to have become unenthusiastic and indifferent. The disruptive influence of the dissident group on the revolutionary movement in Singapore and Malaya was not unknown to Sun who had enjoyed an intimate correspondence with Têng Tsê-ju, the leader of the Seremban and Kuala Pilah T'ung Mêng Hui branches. It was likely that, before his arrival in Singapore, Sun has formulated a plan to reorganize the T'ung Mêng Hui branches in this area.

To Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Singapore and Malaya were the most important for his reorganization movement. The proximity of Malaya to China (compared with places like Australia, the United States and Canada), the sizable Chinese population and the strong financial position of the Chinese there, together with the comparatively enlightened British policy towards the revolutionaries in this area, made Singapore and Malaya important to the revolutionary movement. But Sun Yat-sen was confronted with many difficulties in his effort to reorganize the Southeast Asia Headquarters whose leaders were influenced by the dis-
sident group. They were against the proposals of changing the name of the party, the oath and its procedures. Sun realized that even if these opponents were removed from the positions they held in the Southeast Asia Headquarters, they could continue to use their influence to retard revolutionary activities. He therefore chose to move his headquarters. A letter was sent on 14 July 1910 to the leaders of the Ipoh branch of the T'ung Mêng Hui inviting their opinions on the proposed transfer and reorganization programme. Five days later Dr. Sun left Singapore for Penang for the same purpose. Having obtained the support of the leaders there, he decided to shift the headquarters to Penang. An instruction was sent to the secretary, Chou Hua, to move all documents to the island. Thus, the Singapore branch of the T'ung Mêng Hui which had hitherto enjoyed supremacy among the branches in Southeast Asia, was reduced to a relatively unimportant position, and the Penang branch emerged as the guiding spirit in the period between 1910 and 1912 of the Chinese revolutionary movement in Southeast Asia.

Sun's choice of Penang rather than Kuala Lumpur, Malacca, Ipoh or Seremban as the new site was probably affected by the following considerations. Firstly,
the main function of Southeast Asia headquarters was to serve as communication centre linking the T'ung Mêng Hui branches in this region on the one hand, and the T'ung Mêng Hui headquarters in Tokyo and other important branches in Hong Kong and Shanghai on the other. It was to transmit messages and instructions from above, and money and opinions from below (see pp. 306-307), any location to replace Singapore's position must possess good postal and banking facilities. Penang, at the turn of the present century, seemed to have surpassed other cities in the Peninsula in these aspects. Since 1882, it became a station of the international telegraphic service. It had direct telegraphic communication with Burma and India on the one hand, and Malacca and Singapore on the other, and through them with Europe, Indochina and East Asia. With better postal and banking facilities, Penang, like Singapore, could effectively transmit and distribute messages from any war front in China and instructions from Sun Yat-sen and other leaders overseas. On the other hand, it could also efficiently remit money by telegraph to Hong Kong, Shanghai or other treaty ports to finance any progressing uprising. Secondly, Penang, as a part of the Straits
Settlements, was under the same administration with Singapore. Revolutionary activities needed not require any readjustment to a new political environment. Thirdly, the Penang branch of the T'ung Mêng Hui, like other branches in Northern Malay Peninsula, was less affected by the anti-Sun movement. In a period of low ebb of revolutionary movement in Malaya soon after the defeat of the Ho'kou Uprising in May 1908, the Penang leaders had shown their continued confidence in the movement. They organized the famous Penang Philomatic Society which became one of the leading Reading Clubs in Malaya (see this volume pp.118-119 and volume 2, p.73); they also took initiative to found the Kuang Hua Jih Pao to succeed the demising Chung-Hsing Jih Pao to be the main revolutionary organ in the Peninsula. This untiring interest and faith in the movement would certainly impress Sun Yat-sen who made such important decision after the consultation with the Penang's leaders. Fourthly, the existence of a revolutionary newspaper had undoubtedly helped to qualify Penang as the location for the Southeast Asia Headquarters. For a newspaper not merely served as a main centre for spreading revolutionary message, but also provided jobs for professional revolutionaries who moved around overseas. Moreover, the
office of the newspaper could conveniently be used as meeting place for revolutionaries, or in case of need, for accommodating some revolutionary refugees.\footnote{52c}

Having freed the party from the influence of the dissident group, Dr. Sun set about reorganizing the Southeast Asia Headquarters on a more solid foundation, Goh Say-eng and Ng kim-keng two faithful followers of
Dr Sun,\textsuperscript{53} were appointed by Sun to head the organization. A new statute was provided.\textsuperscript{54} In this the standing committee of the organization was composed of seven sections: Executive, Finance, Secretariat, External Affairs, Education, Investigation and Social Function. Each section comprised five to thirteen persons.\textsuperscript{55} Apart from this standing committee, the statute provided a twenty-point scheme clearly defining the jurisdiction of each section. Five of these regulations deserve our special attention. The seventh and eighth articles stipulated that the heads of the seven sections should meet once a month to discuss all matters with which they were concerned, and that, before any order was given to the branches in Southeast Asia, it should have been agreed on unanimously by the heads of the sections. The ninth stipulated that each section head was entitled to nominate more members responsible for the affairs of that particular section. Articles fifteen and eighteen stipulated that the Investigation Section and the Education Section were mainly responsible for keeping an eye on the behaviour of the members of the party and studying new methods for propaganda.\textsuperscript{56} The regular monthly meeting of the section heads was to ensure that the machinery was working properly. Considering that the
lack of co-ordination and collective action were traditional defects of Chinese organization, these meetings brought some degree of administrative efficiency to the T'ung Mảng Hui. The requirement of unanimous instructions to the branches had further strengthened the co-ordination among the sections. The right for each section head to expand his section broadened the base of leadership of the party, and enabled the machine to operate more smoothly and flexibly. The ensurance of good behaviour of the members would establish a favourable party image and gain the confidence of the general public, and the studying of new methods for propaganda would give the party new energy to seek support from the masses and spread wider the message of revolution.

The second step taken by Dr Sun was to reorganize the rank and file of the party. Realizing that disorganization and laxity were the main weaknesses, Dr Sun tried to reorganize the members on military lines. He divided the members of the Penang branch of the T'ung Mảng Hui into P'ai and Le. Each P'ai was composed of eight members, including a head. Each Le consisted of four P'ai, plus a head, making thirty three members. There were close contacts between heads of P'ai and Le, and between heads of the standing committee of the party. Thus, these
organizational cells served as direct links between the
top-level leaders of the party and the ordinary people.
Instructions from the top were quickly carried to the
rank and file of the party. Conversely, opinions from
below could reach section heads of the standing
committee, which could thus more thoroughly handle
affairs of the party.

The measure to organize the members of the party on
a more effective basis had already been taken in the
T'ung Mêng Hui branch in Kuala Pilah at the beginning of
1908. When Wang Ching-wei and Têng Tzŭ-yü went to Kuala
Pilah to help organize the branch, they carried out Dr
Sun's instruction that the members of the branch should be
divided into P'ai, Le, Tui and Ying - the military model.
Each P'ai consisted of eight members including one head,
four P'ai formed a Le which consisted of twenty five
members, four Le formed a Tui which comprised one hundred
and one members including a head; four Tui formed a Ying
which consisted of four hundred and five members and a
head. 59

This more elaborate system had the weakness in that
the chairman of the branch was in touch with only a small
handful of leaders consisting of heads of Ying and Tui.
When some of them became inactive, the whole organization
was reduced to impotence. In view of this weakness, Sun purposely abandoned Tui and Ying and preserved the P'ai and Le only. This was to enable the heads of the branches to keep closer contact with the rank and file of the party, and broaden the basis of low-level leadership.

The third step taken by Dr Sun Yat-sen was to re-register the membership of the party. This was what he did in America when he reorganized the new branches there, and it was particularly essential in Southeast Asia where Sun's opponents had gained some ground. Some of the dissentients still held key positions in the branches, some of the rebels' sympathisers and those who wavered in between became inactive and apathetic about revolution. A large number of members were disillusioned by this internal struggle, and became ill-disposed to the revolutionaries. Thus, rules for re-registry of membership were very strict, only those who held a firm faith in the revolutionary cause were registered. They were required to swear and sign a new oath before Dr Sun to become members of the Chinese Revolutionary Party. Although all sorts of reasons were given by Sun in justifying his re-registry of membership, his intention of gaining unity and absolute control of the party was clear. He wanted to launch revolution without internal dissentions to hinder him.
The shift of the T'ung Mêng Hui's Southeast Asian Headquarters from Singapore to Penang and the reorganization of the party gave the Chinese revolutionary movement new impetus, particularly when Sun stayed in Penang to guide the new movement between 1910 and 1911. Branches throughout Malaya frequently sent delegates to Penang to consult Sun on organization and to seek his advice and guidance on their activities. The success of the reorganization and the new unity of the party gave Sun hope and confidence. In a letter to Têng Tsê-ju, he declared optimistically that he had decided to rely entirely on the newly reorganized party for any undertaking in China. These confidences paved the way for the preparation in Penang of a large-scale uprising known as 'Canton March 29 Uprising'

(3) The Preparation in Penang of the 'Canton March 29 Uprising'

The 'Canton March 29 Uprising' was by far the most important revolt ever launched by the revolutionaries. Its influence surpassed that of all previous revolts, and indirectly led to the overthrow of the Manchu government in 1912. The preparation in Penang of such an important uprising placed Malaya in the limelight of the Chinese revolutionary movement.
Dr Sun's idea of undertaking a large-scale revolt such as the 'Canton March 29 Uprising' germinated before he came to Singapore and Malaya in June 1910. It went back to February of the same year when the 'New Army Uprising in Canton' failed. During that time Sun was touring America reorganizing new branches and seeking financial support\(^{64}\) and, despite that setback, his success in reorganizing the branches gave him confidence. The failure of the 'New Army Uprising in Canton' owing to the lack of funds convinced him that large-scale revolt could be undertaken only when the drive for financial support overseas was successful. He confidently declared, as he wrote to a revolutionary leader in America, that '... although the first regiment of the new army has failed, the second and third are untouched. We still have enough strength to try again. I intend to stay in America a little longer for the purpose of contacting comrades and raising funds. A new attempt will be undertaken sooner or later....'\(^{65}\)

The success in reorganizing the T'ung Mêng Hui's Southeast Asia Headquarters and its branches, as we have seen, gave added impetus to Dr Sun, and consolidated his belief in having a large-scale revolt in China. Realizing the time was ripe for such action, Sun set
about planning for the famous revolt in Penang. In October 1910 letters were sent by Sun to his important followers inviting them to Penang for a meeting. On 13 November 1910 (12 October in the lunar calendar), the crucial meeting known as 'The Penang Conference' was held at Sun's residence (Number 400 of Dato Kramat). The participants were Huang Hsing, Hu Han-min, Chao Shêng, Sun Mei (elder brother of Dr Sun); the representatives of the T'ung Mêng Hui's Southeast Asia Headquarters in Penang, Goh Say-eng, Ng Kim-keng, Hsiung Yü-shan, Lin Shih-an; the representatives of the Ipoh branch, Li Hau-cheong; the representative of the Seremban branch, Têng Tsê-ju; the representative of the Pontianak branch in Borneo, Li I-hsia.

It is notable that most of the participants were the representatives of the T'ung Mêng Hui's branches in Malaya, and they were to decide the fate of the Chinese revolution at the meeting presided over by Dr Sun Yat-sen. Moreover, such an important meeting like the Penang Conference was held without the knowledge of the T'ung Mêng Hui Headquarters in Tokyo, all the participants were Sun's faithful followers, and those important branches in Southeast Asia controlled or influenced by Sun's opponents such as Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Batavia,
Semarang, and Bunka were not invited to send representatives to the meeting. All this indicates that Sun was determined to carry out a large-scale revolt in China with the support of his faithful followers only, and demonstrated to his opponents that a task of great magnitude could be undertaken without their cooperation.

At the meeting, Dr Sun made clear to the participants his intention to undertake a large-scale uprising. Most of those present were pessimistic about the future of the revolution, for they were all depressed by the continued setbacks: the imprisonment of Wang Ching-wei, the failure of the New Army Uprising in Canton, and the financial difficulties in the party.

Realizing his followers' lack of appreciation of the situation and their small confidence in the revolution, Dr Sun gave them encouragement by analysing the current situation in China and abroad. He said: 'After the defeat of the New Army Uprising, most Ch'ing officials think that we will simply never try again, so their defences must be lax. Therefore, the situation is favourable for a new attack on Canton which can be taken easily.' Dr Sun emphasized 'This time our new uprising differs very much from the previous revolts, for most of them were without sufficient preparation. But now we have been planning
carefully, we will hold the winning card. He went on, 'I know that what makes our comrades hesitate is the problem of funds and arms. We must not forget that owing to the several uprising staged by our party and the propaganda spread by our comrades, the revolutionary spirit has been pervasive among the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia. If we have the courage and the right methods, we will succeed ...'71

This speech made a considerable impact on most of the audience and did much to restore their confidence in revolution. They agreed with him that another large-scale uprising was needed. The meeting arrived at some concrete measures. It was decided that Canton should be the target of the next uprising; at least a sum of S$100,000 should be raised (but the amount aimed was S$130,000: British and Dutch colonies in Southeast Asia S$50,000 each, Thailand and French Indo-China together S$30,000); the new army of Kwangtung should become the backbone of the uprising, and five hundred revolutionary cadres were to be selected to guide them;72 after the capture of Canton, Huang Hsing was to be responsible for attacking Hunan and Hupeh, and Chao Shêng was to attack Kiangsi and Nanking.73

The resolution of the Penang Conference was the personal victory of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. His strategy of
attacking coastal provinces instead of inland provinces as advocated by his opponents, was once more put to trial.

The conference also agreed to the proposal put forward by Chao Shêng that money should be sent back to China to keep the remnants of the new army from being dispersed for lack of funds. A meeting of members of the Penang branch of the T'ung Mêng Hui was held at the Penang Philomatic Society two days immediately after the conference to deliberate this issue. At this meeting, Sun appealed strongly for financial support. He pledged emotionally that he would stake his future on the success of the planned uprising, he would retire to the jungle and would never trouble his supporters if it failed. Most participants were deeply touched by his statement and generously contributed more than eight thousand dollars (Straits) on the spot.

With the collection, Chao Shêng was immediately sent to Hong Kong with funds to assist the new army and to reorganize the T'ung Mêng Hui branch in Hong Kong. In the meantime, a large-scale fund-raising campaign was launched. Fund-raising books under the name of Charity for Chinese Education were widely distributed throughout Malaya, Singapore and other parts of Southeast Asia.
While the fund-raising campaign was proceeding well under the guidance of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, it received a blow from the local government. Sun was ordered by the Resident Councillor of Penang to leave the island. The reason for his deportation was that he had made a public speech at the Ch'ing Fan Ko Club in Penang in which he not only called upon the audience to support a revolution against the Ch'ing government with which the British government had diplomatic relations, but also indirectly attacked British colonial rule in Malaya. In the speech, Sun warned his audience that they will be kicked out from Singapore and Malaya when the colonies grew with enough white population and their service was no longer needed by the British colonial government. This speech was recorded and published in the reformist newspaper, the Penang Hsin Pao, by Ch'iu Chê-ch'ing, a reformist leader. It was reproduced and criticized by the Straits Echo, a pro-government English newspaper in Penang, on 2 November 1910. Another local reformist leader, Lim, urged the government to take stern measures against Dr. Sun on the ground that local security would be jeopardized by his speech and by the fund-raising campaign. These moves by the reformists contributed largely to the deportation of Sun from Penang,
One would wonder why should Dr. Sun snarl at his host when he was fighting China, particularly when he was using Penang as the centre for preparing a large scale uprising in Canton? One would suspect that he purposely did it to express his loathing towards Western colonial powers. It seems to me that the indirect attack was not intentionally done to denounce British colonial rule, but was used as an example to strengthen his appeal to his audience who were predominantly rich merchants, and who were wavering their attitudes towards the revolutionary movement. This assumption is consistent with Sun's political attitude towards British in this period. Sun, who was well informed about the international situation of his time, realized very well that his fighting against the Manchus had to depend heavily on help and cooperation from Western powers, particularly the British whose colonies in the Far East and Southeast Asia (Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaya and Burma) were crucial for Chinese revolutionary activities. Thus, a policy of cultivating cordial relationship with the governments of the British colonies was adopted. This policy, however, does not suggest that he liked them, but was only a matter of expediency. Although Sun had some bitter experience with both the governments of Hong Kong in 1896 and the Straits Settlements in 1900.
he refrained from launching any attack on the local
governments. None of his speeches delivered in Singa­
pore and Malaya prior to 1910 had touched anything on
British colonial rule.\textsuperscript{82c} To Sun, this speech was
mainly to impress his audience rather to embarrass
the host government. Thus, he did not anticipate any
action to be taken by the local government.\textsuperscript{82d} This
explanation seems inadequate to justify his using of
such sensitive topic (sensitive at least to the local
government and some of Straits Chinese who paid loyalty
to the British crown) as an example to impress his
audience. Some suggest that this might be due to a slip
of tongue after his drinking of wine.\textsuperscript{82e} Probably, wine
was one of the factors of his carelessness in his speech.
But it is also possible that his carelessness was
partly a result of his hidden anti-British feeling
stirred up by the deportation of his elder brother, Sun
Mei, from Hong Kong not long before.\textsuperscript{82f}

The deportation order came as a shock to Sun,\textsuperscript{83} who
planned to go to Singapore to step up the fund-raising
campaign,\textsuperscript{84} and it placed him in a very difficult position.
Having been rejected by the governments of French Indo-
China, Thailand, Japan and the Dutch East Indies, he seemed to have no opportunity to stay in any part of Asia. He had to abandon his plan to guide the fund-raising campaign in Singapore and Malaya, and had to rely on his few faithful followers, Hu Han-min, Huang Hsing and Têng Tsê-ju, to take charge of the whole operation of preparation for the uprising.

The most important aspect of the preparation was how to raise the target amount of money (S$100,000) without which other measures could not be set in motion. Têng-Tsê-ju and Hu Han-min were assigned to direct the fund-raising campaign in Singapore and Malaya, and Huang Hsing was sent to guide the campaign in French Indo-China and Thailand. To Dr Sun, as well as to other revolutionary leaders, the success or failure of the fund-raising in Singapore and Malaya was of tremendous importance to the campaign, for the T'ung Mêng Hui's Southeast Asia Headquarters was located in Penang, and regarded by other branches in Southeast Asia as the guiding machine of the party. Failure in Singapore and Malaya would discourage other branches and jeopardize the whole campaign. It was because of this, that Sun asked two of the party top leaders, Huang Hsing and Têng Tsê-ju to take charge of it.
After all these arrangements had been made, Sun left Penang for Europe and America on 6 December 1910, and the fund-raising campaign in Singapore and Malaya was duly started. Copies of the fund-raising books were already distributed to the T'ung Mêng Hui branches in Taiping, Ipoh, Sungei Siput, Prai, Lahat, Kampar, Menglembu, Ampang, Kuala Lumpur, Seremban and Malacca before Sun's departure. To speed up the campaign, Mêng Shêng was sent to Kuantan and Lembing on the east coast of the Malay Peninsula; Têng Tsê-ju, the man who wielded considerable influence in Southern Malaya, went to Seremban and Kuala Pilah; Hu Han-min, with the help of Li Guan-sui and Loke Chow-lo went to Singapore.

The money-raising activity in Singapore and Malaya was expected to meet some difficulties, for the target amount, S$50,000, was a very large one. In the main urban centres like Singapore and Kuala Lumpur where the T'ung Mêng Hui branches had been influenced by Dr Sun's opponents, fund-raising became even more difficult. When Hu Han-min began to raise funds in Singapore he encountered many difficulties. Some leaders evaded contact, others, though enthusiastic, were unable to contribute large sums of money. A meeting was called on 25 December 1910 at the T'ung Mêng Hui office (Wan Ch'ing Yüan) attended by
A preparatory meeting in Ipoh for fund raising for the Canton March 29th Uprising. (front row, left to right) Têng Tsa̍g-ju, Tam Yong, Teh Lay-seng, Huang Hsing, Wong I-ek, Loke Chow-lo. (back row, left to right) Ch'en Tsêng-po, Chu Ch'ih-ni, Li Guan-sui, Li Hau-cheong, Koh Ying-cheong. (reproduced from Nan-yang p'ili hua-ch'iao ko-ming shih-chi, p.26).
Photostat of an original letter from Dr. Sun Yat-sen to Li Guan-sui dated 20th November, 1910 (by courtesy of Mr. Teh Min-wei, Ipoh).
about a hundred members in the absence of Teo Eng-hock, the chairman of the branch. Apparently, Teo and some of the leading figures were influenced not only by the anti-Sun movement, but were also disturbed by the shift of the T'ung Meng Hui's Southeast Asia Headquarters from Singapore to Penang. Furthermore, they might have been greatly annoyed at not being invited to attend the Penang Conference. They were apathetic to the fund-raising campaign. Although Hu Han-min and other leaders strongly appealed to those who attended the meeting for the support of the new attempt, in the absence of influential figures like Teo and others, the result was far from satisfactory, and only about three thousand (Straits) dollars were raised. Teng Tsê-ju with some other leaders went to Malacca to seek support and a meeting held at the Yang Chên-hai Farm was attended by some fifty members of the T'ung MengHui. The response was equally poor.

So the first round of the fund-raising campaign in Singapore and Malaya was something of a fiasco. The money raised was only about S$12,000, apart from the small amount collected in Penang. This amount was far short of the target sum of S$50,000. Huang Hsing, who returned to Singapore from his fund-raising tour in
Burma, was so disheartened that he hinted that if they failed to achieve the target sum in Singapore and Malaya for the new attempt, he would follow the step taken by Wang Ching-wei and risk his life in another attempt at assassination.

However, the second round of the financial campaign soon followed. The leaders of the campaign, Têng Tsê-ju Hu Han-min and Huang Hsing fully realized that it would be futile to appeal to those who were indifferent, such as the leaders in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur, so they decided to concentrate on enthusiasts elsewhere. On 1 January 1911 Têng Tsê-ju, Huang Hsing and other leaders went to Seremban, the town where Têng had wielded great influence. A meeting was held at the An T'ai shop with more than thirty attenders. Huang Hsing gave a very impressive speech in which he pledged emotionally to sacrifice his life for the success of the new attempt. This achieved great results. One of the local leaders, T'am Yong (alias T'an Tê-tung) increased his original donation from $S1,000 to $S6,000 and promised to sell off some of his shares.

The team then went to Ipoh, and their appeal was likewise very successful. Teh lay-seng, Li Guan-sui, the two faithful followers of Dr Sun and the leading figures
Li Guan-sui, a leader of the Ipoh T'ung Mêng Hui Branch (reproduced from Nan-yang p'ili hua-ch'iao ko-ming Shih-chi, p. 20).
of the local T'ung Mêng Hui branch, with Li Kuei-tzü and Wong I-ek donated S$1,000 each. Madam Ko, the wife of Wong I-ek, contributed S$500. Large sums of money were subscribed by many people, while others volunteered to sell various shares to support the planned uprising. In Taiping and Kampar the team also met with great success.

Within a week (from 1 to 7 January 1911) the money raised (plus the amount from the first attempt) almost reached the target sum of S$50,000. The main reason for the success of the second round was the spirit of devotion and determination demonstrated by the top revolutionary leaders. The spirit of self-sacrifice shown by Wang Ching-wei in 1910 in his attempt to assassinate the Ch'ing Regent undoubtedly left a very deep impression on most of the revolutionary supporters, and Dr Sun Yat-sen's appeal that 'Comrades overseas sacrifice their money, comrades in China sacrifice their lives' had consolidated the belief in 'self-sacrifice for revolution' among his followers. Huang Hsing's pledge to martyr himself for revolution had further stirred up the spirit of self-sacrifice and stirred their supporters to action. The increased contributions and sales of properties by local leaders like T'am Yong,
Teh Lay-seng and Li Guan-sui were the result of their direct response to the untiring spirit of devotion and determination shown by the top leaders.

The significance of the success of the fund-raising campaign in Malaya lies in the fact that it served as the precedent for fund-raising campaigns in other parts of Southeast Asia and America, and it was used to press for increased support from overseas Chinese elsewhere. The success added greatly to the confidence of the top leaders in planning the uprising. It may therefore be said that the money raised in Singapore and Malaya had set military preparation for the planned uprising in motion. 101

After the successful fund-raising in Malaya, Huang Hsing left Singapore for Hong Kong on 13 January 1911 to make military preparations. 102 Soon after his arrival, a General Staff was established under his leadership with Chao Shêng as his assistant. All the revolutionary leaders who gathered in Hong Kong to take part in the military preparation were highly excited at the success of the fund-raising campaign in Malaya and they became more determined to carry out the planned revolt in Canton. 103 The success of fund-raising in Malaya was also made known to Dr Sun Yat-sen who was touring
America seeking financial support. The news was used by Dr Sun to urge Chinese there to donate. As a result, the Chinese in North America contributed some S$77,000 (Canada $63,000, United States $14,000) which far exceeded the contribution from Singapore and Malaya ($47,660).

(4) The Response of the Local Revolutionaries to the Wuchang Uprising in October 1911:

With such great zeal shown in the fund-raising, the failure of the 'Canton March 29 Uprising' came as a great shock to all revolutionaries in Singapore and Malaya, particularly to those who had contributed generously and cherished the greatest hope for success. Many of them wept at the news of defeat. A mourning gathering was held at the T'ung Mông Hui's Southeast Asia Headquarters in Penang commemorating the martyrs of the abortive uprising. In the meeting, the revolutionary refugees who had taken part in the uprising reported the details of the failure. The pledge made by them and some local leaders, gave little comfort to those present and did little to dispel the atmosphere of depression. The sorrow of failure was increased by the death of Chao Shêng, one of the main figures of the uprising and the best military brain in the party. Thus the period between the
defeat at the 'Canton March 29 Uprising' in April and the Wuchang Uprising in October 1911 was the low ebb of the revolutionary activities in the Malayan Peninsula.

The news of the outbreak of the Wuchang Uprising came as a great surprise to the revolutionaries in Singapore and Malaya. Most of them did not anticipate another large-scale uprising within so short a span of time after the defeat of the Canton Uprising. This at once stirred up more revolutionary activity. As soon as the T'ung Mêng Hui's Southeast Asia Headquarters in Penang received telegrams from Wuchang and Shanghai on 11 October 1911, $20,000 was immediately cabled to Shanghai for urgent needs. Stimulated by the revolutionary developments in China, all sections of the Southeast Asia Headquarters in Penang were at work at full swing. All cables and telegrams received were immediately transmitted to branches throughout Southeast Asia; news of victories of the revolutionary armies were made publicly known through circulars and newspapers, and programmes for raising revolutionary funds were carried out by the Headquarters as well as other branches. This response in Singapore and Malaya towards the success of the Chinese revolution was remarkable. It was said that most important leaders of the Southeast Asia
Headquarters in Penang gave up their business and devoted themselves wholeheartedly to the cause from morning to night. 111

To the revolutionary leaders in Singapore and Malaya, the most urgent task was how to raise a large sum of money to finance the revolution in China. To achieve this aim, large-scale public meetings were held under the auspices of the T'ung Mêng Hui branches. The first public meeting was held in Ipoh on 2 November 1911 under the sponsorship of Teh Lay-seng, the chairman of the local T'ung Mêng Hui branch. The meeting was attended by more than four hundred people. 112 With the inflammatory speeches delivered by Teh and other leaders, more than fifty people joined with Foo Chee-choon in cutting off their queues symbolizing the end of the Manchu yoke, 113 and more than eight thousand dollars was collected on the spot. 114

Sustained victories by revolutionary forces in China greatly stimulated and strengthened the revolutionary movement in Singapore and Malaya. It united the revolutionary camp and won over some reformists, conservatives as well as the neutralists. Dr Sun's opponents and their sympathisers who had been indifferent towards the campaign for the 'Canton 29 March Uprising'
changed their attitude to support the Wuchang Uprising, for it was not engineered by Sun and his followers, and held out greater hope of success. To those neutrals, conservatives and reformists, the victories gradually brought conviction that it was in their interests to support the revolutionaries who were on the way towards gaining political power in China, with the result that the revolutionary camp in Singapore and Malaya was greatly enlarged.

With unity in the revolutionary camp, and support from some neutralists, reformists and conservatives, the fund-raising campaign for the Wuchang Revolution gathered momentum. At the beginning of November there was a widespread rumour that Peking was in the hands of the revolutionaries and the Emperor made prisoner. This rumour was accompanied by the news of a great victory of the revolutionary armies in South China and in Shanghai, the biggest port in China and one of the strategic points in the south, and that it was occupied by the revolutionaries. Similar reports followed about Kuichow province (4 November), Hangchow and Soochow (5 November), Kwangsi province (7 November), Chiangchiang (8 November), Canton (9 November) and Foochow (10 November) etc. All these rumours stimulated more overseas
Chinese to take action. Thousands of them cut their queues and burnt the Manchu dragon flags. The news of victory also brought contributions flowing in to the revolutionary funds. In Singapore, the T'ung Mêng Hui leaders who, months before, were unenthusiastic towards the Canton Uprising, became very active, and tried to mobilize more overseas Chinese to back the new revolution. The second large-scale public meeting for the purpose of raising revolutionary funds was held on 10 November and was attended by more than one thousand people. In the meeting, addresses were made by representatives of the Cantonese, Fukien, Teochew and Hailam communities. While these were being delivered, donations ranging from fifty to five hundred dollars (Straits) were freely given by the audiences. A portrait of Dr Sun Yat-sen was sold for four hundred and fifty dollars. Apart from a few thousand dollars collected on the spot, the meeting resolved to set up a fund-raising committee. The committee was responsible for carrying out a more intensive fund-raising campaign. In order to avoid any interference from the local government, all funds were collected under the name of 'Funds for the Chinese Martyrs'.
In Penang, a similar meeting was sponsored by the leaders of the T'ung Mêng Hui's Southeast Asia Headquarters at the P'ing Chang Association on 11 November. It was attended by more than one thousand people from all walks of life. The revolutionary leaders strongly appealed for financial support, and in order to carry out a more effective fund-raising campaign, a committee comprising representatives of every street in Penang was set up to organize house-to-house canvassing.

All these public meetings held in Ipoh, Singapore and Penang were only the beginning of the large-scale fund-raising campaign in Singapore and Malaya. Encouraged by the revolutionary occupation of Canton and Foochow, the two capital cities of Kwangtung and Fukien provinces, large-scale mobilization of the Kwangtung and Fukien communities in support of the revolution in their home towns was begun. As soon as a telegram from the revolutionary government of Fukien asking for financial help was received (12 November 1911), the Singapore Fukien community, under the auspices of their leaders Tan Chornam, Tan Kah-kee, Tan Boo-liat and Ch'en Hsien-chin (who were also the revolutionary leaders of the Singapore T'ung Mêng Hui branch), convened a public meeting at the T'ien Fu Kung Temple on the following day. The
meeting unanimously passed resolutions to set up a fund-raising committee under the name of 'Fund-raising for Fukien Security' (福建保安捐), to which twenty members were elected. More than S$20,000 was collected and promptly cabled to China.

The same action was immediately taken by the Kwangtung community in Singapore. On 20 November a meeting of the representatives from the Cantonese, Hakka Teochew and Hailam dialect groups, was held at the Thong Chai Medical Institution in Wayang Street. A committee under the name of 'Fund-raising for the Security and Relief of Kwangtung Province' (廣東全省救濟保安捐) was formed and eighty-two persons and shops were appointed to conduct the large-scale fund-raising movement.

The mobilization of overseas Chinese on dialect lines for revolutionary support had tremendous influence in the communities in Singapore and Malaya, for the dialect organization was the biggest and most powerful social group with which the greatest number of people was associated. Women's organizations also became active. The women's section of the Kwangtung community in Singapore organized a house-to-house collection and succeeded in raising more than S$20,000.
Singapore mechanical workers, students and drama groups raised funds by all kinds of means. This dynamic campaign soon spread throughout Malaya, and the Chinese communities in Penang, Ipoh, Kampar, Kuala Lumpur, Kuantan and other urban centres were plunged into unprecedented activity and excitement.

The popular support for the fund-raising campaign indicated the general desire to see the revolution succeed in China - a desire which was fully exploited by the revolutionaries in advancing their cause in Singapore and Malaya. On the eve of the outbreak of the Wuchang Uprising, a small number of revolutionaries in Singapore formed a public speaking group to promulgate revolutionary doctrine. This group comprised seventeen full members and twenty-five associate members under the leadership of Chou Hsien-jui. It made public speeches five nights every week. The speeches were mainly devoted to attacks on the Manchu government, and support for revolution. Revolutionary pamphlets, such as 'The Revolutionary Army', 'The Spirit of the Yellow Emperor' and 'The Revolutionary Martyr - Ma Fu-i' were sold on the spot. This move was aimed at reviving the dynamic revolutionary propaganda movement which had been disrupted by the anti-Sun movement in Singapore. After
the outbreak of the Wuchang Uprising, this activity was intensified. Apart from the regular speeches delivered at street corners and public meeting places, the group divided its members into small units to serve as operation cells for all public speech activities. They joined the masses to organize them, and to encourage them to attend public meetings. This activity was successful in indoctrinating the ordinary people and, according to an eye-witness, '...It is done in the People's Park and in coolie bangsals (workers' huts) by itinerant and eloquent native orators, who demonstrate the tyranny of the Manchu to the sons of Han (Chinese). Any observant person cannot fail to have seen, evening after evening, hundreds of stolid coolies swarming round a fiery preacher jerking explosive eloquence at them in the People's Park. The seeds are sown there and the outcome is nurtured at secret little meetings held in kongsis (secret society meeting places) everywhere...'.

Propaganda activity was also carried out by other means such as newspapers, dramas and leaflets. Since the stoppage of the Chung Hsing Jih Pao and the Sun Pao in 1910, there was no revolutionary newspaper in Singapore for nearly a year between 1910 and 1911. The revival of revolutionary movement required a new paper
serving as the mouthpiece of revolution. To meet this demand, Lu Yao-t'ang, Huang Chi-ch'en and Lu Wei-hang published the Nan Ch'iao Jih Pao (The Times of the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia) in October 1911. The newspaper had devoted most of its pages to revolutionary development in China, revolutionary activities in Singapore and Malaya, as well as other parts of the world where Chinese communities existed. In such a situation, the Nan Ch'iao Jih Pao had played an important role in spreading revolutionary news, supporting fund-raising campaigns and indoctrinating the general public. The newspaper was so widely read throughout Southeast Asia that its circulation increased to about two thousand copies after two weeks of its appearance, and this figure was the highest ever attained by Chinese newspapers in Malaya and Singapore during the period under study.

In the meantime, drama troupes in Singapore, Kuala Lumpur and Penang, like the P'u Ch'ang Ch'ün, the Anti-opium Drama Troupe and the Hua T'ien Lo, performed dramas to spread the revolutionary message as well as to raise funds for the Fukien and Kwangtung Security Committee. The plays they performed were all revolutionary, with titles like 'Dr Sun Yat-sen began to preach revolution.'
Unlike the previous period (1909-1910), the revolutionary dramatic activities could adopt a clearer stance in support of the revolution. The dramatization of living revolutionary leaders like Dr Sun Yat-sen and Huang Yao-t'ing was aimed at establishing their images with the masses.

Through their contribution to the revolution, the overseas Chinese in Singapore and Malaya became increasingly aware and began to take a lively interest in their country's future.
CHAPTER VII
THE RESPONSE AND IMPACT

(1) The Response of Different Groups to the Revolution:

In the course of Chinese revolutionary activities in Singapore and Malaya, the overseas Chinese reacted in different ways towards the revolution. Some fervently supported it, some whole-heartedly rejected it, some were indifferent, and some changed their attitude from time to time. The support, opposition and change of attitude seemed not only concerned with individuals, but also closely connected with group interests. Thus, further investigation into the response of different social groups towards the revolution is essential.

The response of the upper social group:

In the relations between the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya and the Chinese revolution, commercial magnates, wealthy shop-keepers, tin-miners and plantation owners played an important role. These people are classified here as the upper social group. The importance of this group was neither its manpower nor its ideological contribution, but its financial resources. Overseas Chinese financial powers appeared to be particularly important when the Chinese revolutionaries
were organizing a series of armed uprising in South and Southwest China from 1906 to 1911. In the eyes of the revolutionary leaders, securing the support of this group would come close to solving the financial problems of the party. Because of this the revolutionary leaders were anxious to win the support of this group.

We have seen that when Dr. Sun Yat-sen came to Singapore and Malaya in 1906 to found T'ung Mêng Hui branches, unlike Yu Lieh who appealed to the middle and lower social groups, he associated himself mainly with the local wealthy merchants. His initiate success in gaining support from a few rich merchants in Singapore encouraged him to appeal strongly to some mining magnates whose financial contribution he considered vital to the success of the revolution. A good example of this is his appeal to Loke Yaw, a tin-mining magnate in Kuala Lumpur. When Dr. Sun came to found the Kuala Lumpur T'ung Mêng Hui branch in 1906, he approached Loke and tried to persuade him to contribute funds to the revolution. He failed in his attempt. In later years, when the revolutionary uprisings were short of funds, Sun tried again several times to persuade Loke, either by correspondence or through Têng Tsê-ju a
close friend of Loke, and he even promised to give Loke a ten years monopoly of the mining in Yunnan in exchange for a donation of S$100,000. But again he failed. Other revolutionary leaders, such as Hu Hsun-min and Ch'en Hsin-cheng, had similar experience as Dr. Sun. Hu had an unhappy experience with a rich miner, Yao Tung-shêng. Yao had been a revolutionary supporter before he had made his fortune, but when Hu approached him for a donation at the beginning of 1911 for the Canton March 29 Uprising, Yao flatly refused, saying: 'I am now a man of property and am different from what I was. I can't go along with you as I did before ...' This attitude must have been very common among the wealthy merchants and led some revolutionary leaders to conclude that wealthy merchants were 'unpatriotic', 'afraid of revolution' and that 'those with nationalistic views and generous in contributions are rare'.

It is significant that it was through this disillusionment with the wealthy merchants that the revolutionary leaders came to realize they could find real support, not in the upper social group, but only in the middle and lower social groups. This shift of attention partly explains why, from 1907 onwards, the revolutionary leaders concentrated very much on organizing reading clubs, night classes and dramatic activities
for seeking support among the middle and lower social groups.

There were several reasons why the wealthy merchants were reluctant to support the revolutionaries. First of all, they were men with great fortunes and had to take the safety of their property into serious consideration. For this reason they were unwilling to become involved in anything that was against the existing authorities. Yao Tung-shêng is a good example of someone who changed his attitude completely after he had made a great fortune. Secondly, a number of these rich merchants had been in Singapore and Malaya for a long time and had made their fortunes mainly under British protection. Their interests were thus closely linked with British rule, and they had naturally less inclined to pay loyalty to China. Thirdly, these merchants, irrespective of their different family backgrounds, tended to associate with the existing authorities in Singapore and Malaya and China. This inclination, together with the title-selling policy of the Ch'ing government, led them to look to China as the main source of honours which would enable them to claim legitimate leadership in the local Chinese communities. Some rich merchants, who were considered to be more
nationalistic, had gone even further by developing close economic and political relations with the Ch'ing government through capital investment and by obtaining official posts in China. Their economic and political interests in China seemed to have ruled out possibility of their involvements in any activity against the Manchu regime as long as its rule was still tenable. It was this interest that partially explains why some of these rich merchants immediately changed their support from the Ch'ing government to the revolutionary party after the outbreak of the Wuchang Uprising. A typical example of this kind is the case of Foo Chee-choon, the tin-mining magnate in Perak. As we have mentioned in previous chapters, Foo was a reformist leader in Perak and had very close relations with the Ch'ing government who threatened to use force to deal with Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1906. From 1907 to 1908, Foo with other partners raised a sum of S$8,430,000 to invest in mining and railway construction in Fukien, Kwangtung and Hainan island. Apart from the several official titles he held, he was recommended in 1908 by all the gentry in Fukien for the post of Superintendent of Mining of Fukien province. It was these economic and political interests in China that led Foo to support the Manchu
strongly. But after the outbreak of the Wuchang Uprising, his attitude suddenly changed. On 3 November 1911 (less than one month after the outbreak of the Wuchang Uprising), in a mass rally for collecting revolutionary funds of which he was the chairman, Foo strongly denounced the Manchu enslavement and oppression of the Chinese and praised the revolutionaries as the vanguards of the Chinese. He donated S$5,000 and called upon all participants to contribute to the revolutionary funds.\(^{15}\) In order to set an example in shaking off the yoke of the Manchu rule, Foo, with great emotion, took the lead in cutting off his queue, the symbol of the Manchu enslavement of the Chinese.\(^{16}\) On 20 November 1911 Foo proposed to set up a Security Council of overseas Chinese from Chia Ying Chou, Teochew and Ting Chou, in order to help the establishment of the revolutionary government in these three territories in Kwangtung.\(^{17}\) In December of the same year, Foo was further appointed by Hu Han-min, the revolutionary governor of Kwangtung, as the head for fund raising programme in Southeast Asia in support of the northern expedition.\(^{18}\) Although Foo strongly supported the revolution after the Wuchang Uprising, his quick shift of loyalty from the Manchu to the revolutionaries naturally leads one to suspect
his faith in the revolution. His shift of support was probably more due to his economic and political interests in China rather than his conviction to the revolutionary cause. When he saw the Manchu rule becoming untenable, and his economic interests in China jeopardized, he transferred his support to the revolutionaries.

The combination of these factors constituted the basic consideration for the wealthy merchants in their response to the revolution. Thus, we can postulate that the wealthiest merchants who were more dependent on the local government, and had closer political and economic relations with the Ch'ing government, tended to be less responsive and more opportunistic to the revolution. The less wealthy, who were less dependent on the local government, and had few political or economical links with the Ch'ing government, tended to respond more enthusiastically and were less opportunistic to the appeal of the revolutionaries.

Although these considerations were important intervening variables in the response of the upper social group to the revolution, other secondary factors must also be taken into account, so as to explain
some paradoxical phenomena. These secondary factors also played important roles in deciding the degree of response.

Table 3. Origins of Ten Rich Merchants who were Revolutionary Leaders in Singapore and Malaya (1903-1912).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Origins</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Tan Chor-nam</td>
<td>southern Fukien (Ssu Ming district, Fukien), was born in Singapore in 1884, and was first generation Straits-born Chinese. He had some private Chinese education at home. His father had a shop named Hup Chun engaged in grocer's trade and timber, and it had some business with Shanghai and other Treaty ports in South China. Tan had no economic and political interests in China, nor had he held any official titles from the Ch'ing government. He was only 20 sui when he was actively engaged in publishing the Thoe Lam Jit Poh to propagate revolutionary ideas (1903), and was the deputy chairman of the T'ung Mêng Hui branch in Singapore after 1906.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Teo Eng-hock</td>
<td>Teochew (Jao P'ing district, Kwangtung), was born in Singapore in 1871, and was the second generation Straits-born Chinese. He had some private Chinese education at home. His father Teo Lee had a shop in Beach Road named Tiang Bee dealing in mercer and piece goods and as a general commission agent. It also had an extensive trading connections with other ports in Southeast Asia. Eng-hock had no economic and political interests in China, nor had he held any official titles from the Ch'ing government. He was 33 sui when he joined with Tan Chor-nam to publish the Thoe Lam Jit Poh, and was the chairman of the T'ung Mêng Hui branch in Singapore after 1906.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Lin Shou-chih</td>
<td>Teochew (Teo An district, Kwangtung), was born in China in 1876, and came to Singapore in 1895. He had some private Chinese education in China. His father, Lin Chi-chih succeeded in business venture and had two shops in Singa-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
pore dealing in rubber. He had personal contact with some revolutionary leaders in Hong Kong before he came to Singapore. He was at 27 sui when he actively engaged himself in revolutionary activities with Huang Nai-shang, another revolutionary leader in Singapore in 1902. He had no economic and political interests in China. He was an important leader of the Singapore T'ung Mêng Hui branch, and had contributed large amount of money to finance the two Teochew Revolts in 1906 and 1907.

4 Têng Tsê-ju

Cantonese (Hsin Hui district, Kwangtung), was born in China in 1870, and came with his elder brother to Singapore at 19 sui. He had three years private Chinese education in China. He at first opened a grocery shop in Ipoh, and switched to tin mining in Kampar areas. He had two grocery shops in Kuala Pilah when he settled there. He did not hold any official titles from the Ch'ing government, nor had any economic interests in China. He was at 37 sui when he joined the T'ung Mêng Hui in 1906, and became the chairman of the Kuala Pilah branch since 1908. He was one of the most important leaders of the Chinese revolutionary movement in Malaya, and actively participated in Chinese politics after the 1911 Revolution.

5 T'am Yong

Cantonese (K'ai P'ing district, Kwangtung), was born in China in 1858, and was brought along by his relative to Malaya at 18 sui. He became a tin-mining labourer in Negri Sembilan at first, and opened a grocery shop after having saved up some capital. He also succeeded in ventures in tin-mining and rubber plantation. He had no economic and political connections with China, but he was appointed as a member of the State Council of Negri Sembilan since 1899. He joined the T'ung Mêng Hui at 49 sui, and became the chairman of its branch in Seremban.

6 Sim Hung-pek

Southern Fukien (Chin Chaing district, Fukien), was born in 1873 in China, and came to Malacca in 1893. His father and elder brother who came to Malacca earlier had paved way for his success in business. He successfully ventured
in cash-crop plantation. He had some Chinese education. He had no economic and political interests in China, and held no titles from the Ch'ing government. He was at 25 sui when he began to propagate revolutionary ideas in 1897. He was the leader of the T'ung Mêng Hui branch in Malacca since 1907.

7 Loke Chow-thye Cantonese (Shun Tê district, Kwangtung), was born in Penang in 1874, and was second generation of Straits-born Chinese. He had some English education and knew some Chinese. He worked as a supervisor to some mining companies in Selangor. He had no economic and political interests in China, nor had he any official titles from the Ch'ing government. He joined the revolutionary movement at 33, and was elected as the first chairman of the T'ung Mêng Hui branch in Kuala Lumpur in 1906.

8 Ch'an Chan-mooi Cantonese (Shun Tê district, Kwangtung), was born in China in 1875, and came to Malaya at 5 sui. He was sent back to China to have his Chinese education, and came back to Malaya at 17 sui. He was successful in tin-mining which a foundation was laid by his father. He had no economic and political interests in China, nor had he held any official titles from the Ch'ing government. He joined the T'ung Mêng Hui in 1906 at 32 sui and became an important leader of its branch in Kuala Lumpur. His grandfather had connections with the Taiping Rebellion.

9 Teh Lay-seng Southern Fukien (T'ung An district, Fukien), was born in China in 1870, and came to Malaya when he was young. He had some private Chinese education in China. He opened a grocery shop named Kiat Seng Liung in Ipoh dealing in oil and rice from Rangoon and Bangkok. The shop had several branches in Penang, Batu Gajah, Sitiawan and Bruas. He had no political and economic interests in China, and had no official titles from the Ch'ing government. He held a title of Justice of Peace from the local government. He was at 38 sui when he joined the T'ung Mêng Hui in 1907, and became the chairman of the Ipoh branch for several years.

10 Goh Say-eng Southern Fukien (Hai Ch'êng district, Fukien), was born in Penang in 1875, and was second generation of Straits-born Chinese.
He had some private Chinese and English educations. His father Goh Yu-chai laid the business foundation in Penang. He had a shop named Swee Hock manufacturing Chinese rice sticks and matches. He had no political and economic interests in China, nor had he held any titles from the Ch'ing government. He joined the T'ung Meng Hui and became chairman of its branch in Penang at 32 sui in 1906. He was the mainstay of the Chinese revolutionary movement in Malaya at its later stage (1910-1912), and was elected as the representative of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia to the national convention of the T'ung Meng Hui held on 22nd January 1912.

Table 4. Origins of Ten Rich Merchants Who Were Either Reformist Leaders or Pro-Ch'ing Conservatives in Singapore and Malaya (1898-1911).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Origins</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Khoo Seok-wan</td>
<td>Southern Fukien (Hai Ch'eng district, Fukien), was born in China in 1874. His father, Khoo Cheng Tiong, first came to Singapore and established himself in business circles. Cheng Tiong soon became a leading rice merchant and a leader of the local Fukien community. He was a holder of an official title, Yung-lu ta-fu from the Ch'ing government. Seok-wan came to Singapore in 1880 at 7 sui, but returned to China again for receiving traditional Chinese education. He passed the provincial examination and obtained his Chü-jên degree in 1894 at 21 sui. He inherited a large fortune from his father in 1896 and began his reform activities in Singapore in 1898 at 25 sui. He thus became the foremost reformist leader in Southeast Asia until 1903. Later, he shifted his support to the Ch'ing government, and obtained Kuan-cha title and four rank in return.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Foo Chee-choon</td>
<td>Hakka (Yung Ting district, Fukien. The Yung Ting Hakka is known in Singapore and Malaya as Fukien Hakka because the district belongs to the Fukien province), was born in China in 1859, and came to Malaya with his father in 1871 at 13 sui. He had some traditional Chinese education in Penang. He succeeded in tin-mining venture in Perak and became one of few wealthiest Chinese in his time. He had immense political and economic interests in China, and was the holder of several official titles from the Ch'ing government. He was both a reformist and pro-Ch'ing leader. He was at 47 sui in 1906 when he first showed his strong objection to revolutionary activities. But he shifted his support to the revolutionaries in 1911 after the outbreak of the Wuchang Revolt.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3 Tan Hunch'iu

Teochew (Teo Ann district, Kwangtung). His birthplace and age are unknown. His father founded a shop named Joo Hong dealing in pepper and gambir. He inherited his father's business and became a leading merchant in Singapore. He was one of the important leaders of the local Teochew community. He was one of the founders of the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and was elected as its vice president of the first batch in 1906. Tan was an important leader of the reformists in Singapore, and was a proprietor and managing director of the most important reformist newspaper in Southeast Asia, the Union Times since 1906.

4 Chang Pishih

Hakka (Ta P'u district, Kwantung), was born in China in 1840. He first went to Batavia in 1856 at 17 sui. After several years struggle, he cut his figure in business circles. He became rich at 26 sui, and was the leading planter in Dutch East Indies. After 1886, he extended his business in the Malay Peninsula. He founded a shipping line in Penang, and had plantation and mines throughout Malaya. He further extended business operation to China. He founded a winery in Shantung numerous factories in Canton and Shanghai. He was one of few most wealthiest Chinese in Southeast Asia. In January 1895, Chang was appointed as the first Chinese Consul of Penang, and was at the same time the Acting Consul General for the Straits Settlements at 46 sui. In 1896, he was entrusted by Li Hung-chang to sponsor the founding of the Imperial Ch'ing Bank (大清銀行) and the Fo Shan Railway. In 1898, he was again entrusted by the Ch'ing government to sponsor the construction of the Hankow-Canton Railway, the most important railway in South China. He was given several audiences by the Empress Dowager in 1903 consulting him about China's development of mining and railway. He was then made as the Imperial Commissioner for Commerce and Superintendent of Agriculture, Mining and Public Works for
the Fukien and Kwangtung provinces. He was the first overseas Chinese who gained such imperial favour. In 1905 and 1906, he toured Southeast Asia in the capacity of the Imperial Commissioner of Commerce, and sponsored the founding of many Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Southeast Asia. The founding of the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce was mainly of his effort. He held numerous official titles from the Ch'ing government and was given Second Rank. In 1910, he was elected as the President of the Kwangtung Chinese Chamber of Commerce. He died in 1916 in Batavia.

5 Hsieh Yung-kuang

Hakka (Chia Ying Chou, Kwangtung), was born in Pontianak, Borneo, in 1848. He was actively engaged in business in Acheh, and acted as agent between the Dutch and the natives. He was appointed as Chinese Kapitan in Acheh by the Dutch authorities. Later, he shifted his business operation centre to Penang, and ventured himself in plantation of commercial agriculture and tin-mining in Perak. He was appointed to the position of Acting-Chinese Vice-Consul in Penang in 1895 at 48 sui, and then the Vice-Consul in 1897. He purchased several official titles such as T'ung-chih, Kuan-ea and Yen-yün-shih from the Ch'ing government through the form of donation to several Flood Relief Funds. He died in 1916.

6 Liang Pi-ju

Hakka (Mei district, Kwangtung), was born in China in 1859, and came to Malaya when he was young. He succeeded in coffee planting and tin-mining ventures in Perak. As a leading miner and planter in the local Chinese community, he began to purchase an official title, Ssu-ma from the Ch'ing government in 1900 to upgrade his social status. He was appointed as the Chinese Vice-Consul in Penang in 1901 at 43 sui. He was the fourth merchant (after Chang Pi-shih, Chang Yu-nan and Hsieh Yung-kuang) to be appointed to such official capacity. In 1906, he submitted an important suggestion to the Ch'ing authorities for developing China's mining enterprise. He died in 1912 at 54 sui.
7 Tye Kee Yoon

Hakka (Ta P'u district, Kwangtung), was born in China in 1848, and came to Penang at 24 sui. He first became a hawker, a clerk and then a shop-keeper. He made his fortune out of selling Chinese drugs and herbs, and had several branches in Penang and Ipoh. Like other rich merchants, he purchased his official titles from the Ch'ing government through donating large sum of money to several Flood Relief Funds. He held Kuän-chê, yen-yün-shih with Second Rank. In 1907, he was appointed by the Chinese Minister for England, Li Ching-fang, to the office of the Chinese Vice-Consul in Penang at 60 sui. He was also made the Acting Chinese Consul-General for the Straits Settlements in 1911. He died in 1919 in Penang.

8 Goh Siew-tin

Southern Fukien (Chao An district, Fukien), was born in 1856 (?). His father Goh Siew Swee came from China and engaged in business activities. Siew Swee was a general merchant opening a shop Ban Ann. The firmed owned seven small steamers plying between Singapore and the neighbouring Dutch and British possessions, besides working tin mines and running a saw-mill at Kallang. Goh Siew-tin succeeded the business and a large fortune after his father's death in 1892. With his wealth, he became a leader of the local Fukien community. He was on the Committee of Po Leung Kuk and was an important member of the committee for reviving Confucianism and establishing modern Chinese schools. In 1906, he was elected as the first president of the newly founded Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce. He was a holder of several official titles such as T'ai-shih and Kuan-chê, and was made Acting Chinese Consul-General for the Straits Settlements in 1902 for four months (Jan.-May) at 46 sui. He died in 1909.

9 Lee Cheng Yan

Southern Fukien (Ying Choon district, Fukien), was born in Malacca in 1841. Rich merchant and was a leader of Singapore Fukien community. He was a commission agent
and general trader, and had a firm Lee Cheng Yan & Co, Chop Chin Joo which was one of the principal houses dealing with Europeans. He was a member of the Chinese Advisory Board and the Po Leung Kuk, and was made Justice of Peace by the Straits Settlement government. He also purchased official titles from the Ch'ing government. He obtained Ssu-ma in 1890 at 50 sui, and was given Second Rank with feather in 1906 at 66 sui.

10 Wong Ah Fook

Cantonese (T'ai Shan district, Kwangtung) was born in China in 1837 (?), and came to Singapore at 16 sui. He worked as a carpenter and gradually shifted his interest to business activities. After years' Struggle, he became one of the most successful contractors and planters in Johore, and became a leader of the Cantonese communities in Johore and Singapore. He was made S.M.J. by the Johore government (1910) and Justice of Peace by the government of the Straits Settlements. He was a founder of the Kwong Wai Siu Free Hospital (1910) and the Kwong Yik Bank in Singapore. Apart from his immense commercial interests in Johore and Singapore, he also bought big sum of shares of the Teochew-Swatow Railway and the Chinese Commercial Bank, and also invested considerable amount of money in land property in Canton. Through the form of contribution to the establishment of modern Chinese schools in Singapore, he obtained official titles such as Chün-hsiu and T'ung-chih with feather in 1908 at 72 sui. He died in 1918.

(Sources: Khoo Ming-kuan (daughter of Khoo Seok-wan), interviews on 4 and 9 September 1966 at her residence in Singapore; Tsêng Tsung-yen, 'Epitaph of the Right Honorable Yung-lu ta-fu, Mr. Khoo Cheng Teong' in Hsing Pao, 25 November 1896, pp.5,8; Ta-ch'ing tê-tsung ching-huang-ti shih-lu, vol.486, pp.6-7; T'ien Nan Hsin Pao, 26 October, 1901, p.2; Song Ong Siang, One Hundred Years' History of the Chinese in Singapore, pp.100-01. Anonymous, 'A Short Biography of Foo Chee-choon' in Kê Chia, p.570; K'uang Kuo-hsiang, 'King of the Tin-mining' in Ping-ch'êng san-chi, pp.114-17; Foo Ying-fong (grandnephew of

In the tables above, we are examining twenty rich Chinese merchants in Singapore and Malaya, ten of them (in the table 3) were deeply involved in revolutionary activities, and the other ten (table 4) were either reformists or pro-Ch'ing conservatives. It is clear that the absence of
economic and political interests in China together with the non-holding of Ch'ing titles were the characteristics of the first group. Without such interests in China, members of this group could respond more freely to the revolutionary appeals. Whereas most members of the second group who held Ch'ing titles, offices or had capital investment in China tended to support the regime or reform, evidently because they had a definite stake in preservation of the existing regime.

Apart from these factors, age and the type of Chinese education appear to be quite important as well. The average age of the first group was about 32 sui, while the average age of the second group was about 48 sui. The actual age difference between these two groups was 18 sui or nearly a generation. To some extent this generation gap may account for the difference of political attitude towards the revolution. Naturally, older generation tended to be less capable to accept change and more conservative in their outlooks. The younger generation, on the other hand, absorbed new ideas more quickly and subjected more to
emotional appeals. All of the revolutionary leaders listed in the table 3 had Chinese education (private or formal). This factor appears to have been quite important because it largely conditioned the response of overseas Chinese to the revolution. As most revolutionary propaganda was published in Chinese, Chinese education became a pre-requisite for accepting revolutionary ideas. In contrast with English educated Straits-born Chinese, those with Chinese education appeared to be more China-oriented, and tended to be involved either to support or against the revolution. Other factors, such as personal contact with revolutionary leaders in early days (like Lin Shou-chih) and an anti-Manchu tradition (like Ch'an Chan-mooy) may also draw some rich merchants into the revolutionary movement. However, these ten rich merchants who were revolutionary leaders, plus other rich merchants less involved in revolutionary activities, only account for a small percentage of the whole upper social group. Their attitude and involvement in the revolution should not be taken as the representative but as an exception of the group they belonged. As the evidence shown, we may conclude that the majority of the members of the upper social group were either apathetic, reactionary or opportunistic towards the revolution.
Those who had no Chinese education tended to be apathetic; those who had Chinese education, older in age and had political and economical interests in China were against the revolution: only a small handful of those who had no direct interests in China, younger in age tended to be involved in the revolutionary movement. Their active involvement were probably inspired more of concern of China's attainment of wealth and power rather than pure anti-Manchu feeling. It is also possible that some of them were inspired by personal gains which might be fulfilled after the overthrow of the Ch'ing government.\textsuperscript{19}

The Responses of the Middle and Lower Social Groups:

The terms middle and lower social groups could be said to include shop-keepers, petty traders, school teachers, clerks, shop assistants, tin-mining and plantation workers, gardeners, hawkers and rickshaw pullers. We have mentioned in the previous chapters that the early expatriate revolutionaries had appealed strongly to the lower social group particularly after the establishment of the Chung Ho T'ang throughout Singapore and Malaya. We have also seen how the revolutionary leaders, like Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Hu Han-min and others, had been disillusioned with
the rich merchants and had turned to seek support among the middle and lower social groups. The early appeal to and the later emphasis on these two groups was fundamental to the success of the revolutionary activities in the overseas Chinese community in Singapore and Malaya.

Unlike the upper social group, members of these social groups did not have any economic and political interests in China, nor had they possessed immense wealth in Singapore and Malaya. This were the basic reasons why they could freely respond to the revolution.

The members of the middle social group, who had relative advantage of having some formal or informal Chinese education than their counterparts of the lower social group, were more exposed to the influence of revolutionary publications. They realized that China had been continuously humiliated by foreign powers, even by the 'tiny island kingdom, Japan, which had been one of China's tributary states'. Through newspapers and revolutionary publications, they came to know that overseas Chinese, as well as their countrymen in the treaty ports, had been ill-treated by the foreigners. Although they themselves may not have
suffered such ill-treatment, the suffering of Chinese in Dutch Indies, America and Thailand had undoubtedly served as reminders to their awareness of disadvantageous position of being a Chinese. Many realized it was important to have a strong China which would give them not only prestige but also protection. This vague ideas of nationalism, plus the conditions of having no economic and political interests in China, and of having no immense wealth to worry, constitute the most important latent impulse in the way the members of the middle social group responded to the revolution. Thus, when they read revolutionary newspapers, magazines and pamphlets, they were highly susceptible to the influence transmitted through these media. They could not be held to respond emotionally towards some seditious revolutionary publications, such as 'The Revolutionary Army', 'The Bell of Awakening', 'Sudden Awakening', 'The Spirit of a Perished Nation' and 'Tragic Account of a Perished Nation'. The appeal of revolutionary publications like 'Chinese are Sneered at by foreigners as barbarians and of low origin. Chinese are ill-treated by foreigners overseas, they are treated worse than cows and horses ...' and' The foreigners in Shanghai forbad Chinese and dogs to
enter a garden, therefore, Chinese are regarded by
foreigners as dogs and cattle ..'\textsuperscript{22} must have found
strong echo among them. Other appeals such as '...The
Manchu massacred tens of thousands of Chinese. In
Yang Chou city along, more than eight hundred thou-
sand Chinese were slaughtered ..'\textsuperscript{23} and '... The
Manchu had massacred tens of thousands of Chinese
without much resistance, but were strongly resisted
only by a junior government official, Yen Yin-yüan
at Chiang Yin district, Yen organized a few Hundred
partriots to fight against two hundred and fifty
thousand Manchu troops. After eight days of resist­
ance, the district fell. But none of the inhabitants
surrendered to the Manchu, all of them fought to the
last breath ..'\textsuperscript{24} must have greatly aroused hatred
against the Manchu regime, and would have impelled
them to take some symbolic actions.

In July 1909 a shop-keeper of a small town in
Perak, Tai Ch'iu-pin, having heard the story of the
revolutionary martyr, Hsü Hsi-lin,\textsuperscript{25} emotionally cut
off his queue and pledged himself to get rid of the
Manchu. The story of Hsü's heroism was told at the
second anniversary of his death on 13 July 1909.\textsuperscript{26}
In October of the same year, another shop-keeper in Taiping, Perak, Li I-san did the same thing and cut off his queue when he read '... Either you preserve your head or your hair...'

27 in the revolutionary pamphlet 'Tragic Account of a Perished Nation', he learned that all Chinese were forced to have a queue over their heads, a symbol of enslavement by the Manchu. From this pamphlet, he also learned that his ancestors had been ruthlessly persecuted by the Manchu, and tens of thousands of Chinese had been massacred. 28

These symbolic acts in cutting off queues and pledging themselves to fight the Manchu not only displayed their hatred of the Manchu regime, but also expressed their devotion to the revolution. It was this devotion that drew many of the members of the middle social group into the T'ung Mêng Hui and its affiliated organizations. They formed the lower echelon of leadership of the T'ung Mêng Hui, they took charge of reading clubs, became voluntary teachers at night schools and organizers and performers of the local revolutionary drama troupes. Thus, they constituted a middle stratum of leadership linking the top leaders of merchants and the masses.
The role assumed by these members of the middle social group proved to be indispensable to the success of the revolutionary movement. In the revolutionary activities in Singapore and Malaya, particularly in the spreading of propaganda, they were fervent activists. Some organized themselves into small groups to give talks for propaganda purposes. In 1908, small groups of these revolutionary activists engaged in propaganda activities in the towns of Perak, such as Lahat, Papan and Tronah. They addressed the general public at street corners, roadsides and gardens, they attacked the Ch'ing government and the reformists, and preached revolutionary doctrine. They toured towns to give talks. Similar groups were organized by members of the middle social group in Singapore on the eve of the Wuchang Uprising. In July 1911, a group consisting mainly of low-level leaders of the T'ung Mêng Hui branch of Singapore made public speeches five times a week to propagate revolutionary doctrine and held more than 29 public meetings between 27 July and 19 September 1911.

While some actively engaged in public talks, public speech making, and dramatic activities, some even used
modern movies to propagate revolution. Lin Hang-wei, the secretary of the Anti-Opium Society of Singapore, actively engaged in public speech-making and other activities. He became one of the chief aides to the 'Cheng Tien Sheng' drama troupe when it visited Singapore at the beginning of 1909. With other junior leaders of the T'ung Mêng Hui branch of Singapore, such as Chêng P'ing-t'ing, Wei Hsi-t'ung, Chou Hua, T'an Shao-chûn and others, he founded the Fan Ai Pan and Min To Shê, the two revolutionary drama troupes in Singapore. Lin, Chou and T'an even took part in the performance of revolutionary plays. Under Lin's guidance, the Min To Shê made several tours to Southern parts of the Malay Peninsula and certain parts of the Dutch East Indies. All these activities indicate Lin's firm belief in nationalism, and his untiring devotion to the cause of revolution. When he died in October 1910 he left his family without means of support, and his colleagues and friends had to raise funds for his funerals for the support of his family. He was highly praised as 'The promoter of nationalism and an enthusiastic for public welfare'.

Lin was born in Five Phoenix village of P'an Yü district in Kwangtung. A few years before his death,
he came to Singapore to take up an appointment as a clerk in the Anti-Opium Society of Singapore. Apart from this full-time job, Lin was busily occupied with the revolutionary activities mentioned above. The strain and overwork by these activities were probably one of the causes of his death.

Lin is only one of numerous examples of members of the middle social group which gave organization support to the revolutionary movement. Some of them were even more radical. In 1908, Ch'en Wên-pao, a small trader in Perak, bravely reprimanded the Ch'ing Imperial Commissioner, Yang Shih-ch'i, in 1908. He broke into a banquet that was held in Ipoh in honour of Yang and openly denounced the Commissioner saying:

′... You running dog of the Manchu, why do you come overseas? Are you coming to squeeze the poor overseas Chinese who have long been separated from their homeland, after you have exploited our four hundred million compatriots in China? How can you talk about the protection of overseas Chinese when most of the Chinese in China are ill-treated, and most overseas Chinese are victimized whenever they go back? Your purpose in coming here is obviously to squeeze our money. Hurry up and go back, don't let your blood dirty my knife.′"
Not only was he prepared to challenge the authority of a high officer from the Ch'ing court without fearing deportation or execution, but later took part in the famous Canton March 29 Uprising in 1911. It was this hatred of the Manchu and devotion to the revolutionary cause that inspired other members of the middle social group to sacrifice their lives for the success of the revolution. 40

Apart from the role they played as junior leaders and their devotion to the revolution, the members of the middle social group also enthusiastically responded to appeals for financial contribution. Although their financial position was weak in comparison with that of the rich merchants, they contributed all they could. School teachers, clerks and shop-assistants sometimes contributed one or two months wages to the revolutionary funds. Some of the clerks even used the names of their employers to canvass for donation. 41
The members of the lower class, being less educated, were placed in a passive position vis a vis the revolution. The depth of their response to the revolution corresponded with the amount of revolutionary activity in Singapore and Malaya. Prior to 1906, there was comparatively little response from them. The failure of Yang Ch'u-yün's and Dr Sun Yat-sen's attempts to enlist secret society members in Singapore in 1895 and 1900 proves this. The success of Yu Lieh in recruiting secret society members into the revolutionary affiliated organization, Chung Ho T'ang, marked the beginning of a response from the lower class towards the revolution.

After the establishment of the T'ung Mêng Hui branches in Singapore and Malaya in 1906, the spread of mass education - night schools and reading clubs - and the dynamic revolutionary propaganda activities - public talks, mass rallies and drama activities - greatly changed the response of the lower class. By attending night schools, their educational standard was gradually improved, and their ability to respond gradually increased. Almost all the night schools in Singapore were run by revolutionaries. The curricula were fully in line with the revolutionary propaganda policy of indoctrination, and the staff was drawn mainly from revolutionary
volunteers. Thus, revolutionary ideas filtered through these channels to the students. By attending reading clubs where newspapers, magazines and pamphlets with strong revolutionary orientation were provided, the members of the lower class were strengthened in the revolutionary ideas they had learned in the class room. Further, reading clubs provided appropriate meeting places for members of the lower and middle social groups. They read the same newspapers, magazines and pamphlets and listened to the same lectures. Gradually, they got acquainted with each other, and developed a new kind of comradeship. The result of this kind of intimate association, psychologically, is a fusion of individualities in a common whole, so that one's very self, for many purposes at least enters into the common life and purpose of the group. By attending the revolutionary public talks, mass rallies and dramatic performances, they were further inspired by the inflammatory speeches and the vivid stories in the shows.

The dynamic response of the members of the lower social group can be better understood if the underlying factors of their responses are thoroughly examined. Apart from the basic factors - of having no economic and political interests in China and not being the holders of official
titles of the Ch'ing government as mentioned before, other secondary factors must also be taken into account. Firstly, the majority of the members of the lower social group came from the most recent and poorest immigrants. Most of them came to Singapore and Malaya for economic reasons. They would be likely to return to China to rejoin their family after they had saved some money overseas. Unlike the members of the commercial group, who had established business connections overseas, they could easily pack up their belongings and return to China without any hesitation. For this reason they had closer relations with China, and naturally were concerned with the future of China with which their own destiny was so closely connected. Secondly, most of them had had bitter experience of the corrupted and oppressive Ch'ing officials when they were peasants in villages. The oppressive hand of Ch'ing officials was felt again when they migrated overseas. Thirdly, the tyranny of the Ch'ing officials, together with Kheh-taus, secret society members, imperceptibly fostered a spirit of resistance since it created anti-authority attitudes. Fourthly, the lack of female companionship and other entertainments was a major source of frustration and, by participating in revolutionary activities they
would occupy their leisure time as well as relieve their depression.

The combination of all these factors caused the members of the lower class to respond as freely and enthusiastically as members of the middle class to the Chinese revolution. When the revolutionary affiliated organization in Kuala Lumpur, the Chinese Christian Association, was first established in 1905, a member, Ch'en Liang donated twelve wooden chairs. Ch'en was a carpenter who struggled to earn a livelihood for a family of several people, but still managed to make these twelve chairs for the association. Another member of the same association, Huang Yang, who was also a worker, attempted to mortgage his house for a sum of money which he wanted to contribute to the Canton March 29 Uprising. These actions clearly show the devotion of the members of the lower class towards the revolution. Like the members of the middle class, they felt strongly about some political issues. At the end of 1909, when the Ch'ing government was forced to give a number of concessions in Manchuria to Japan, anti-Manchu feeling was stirred up by revolutionary activists among the masses. In response to this issue, more than sixty mining workers in Tambun, Perak, cut off their queues.
It was followed by a number of workers in Ipoh and Kampar. 48 In January 1910, a group of tin-mining workers of the 'Kuang Hua Hsing Co.' in Muar, were greatly worried by the news that China would be partitioned by the powers. They cut off their queues as a token of protest against the Manchu and organized themselves into a small unit as 'The Vanguards for Saving China' to prepare for action. 49

These symbolic actions are further proof of the devotion of the members of the lower class towards the revolution. Their readiness to save China as shown by the tin-mining workers in Muar, pushed them a step further towards revolutionary action and actual participation in uprisings in China.

In comparing with members of the middle social group, members of the lower class appeared to be more responsive to calls to revolutionary action. The reasons for this may be because they did not have families in Singapore and Malaya to consider. Also, most of them did not have any property, except perhaps for a small sum of savings, so that they were not held back on this account. Furthermore, most of them still had a strong peasant nature although they had taken up different occupations overseas. They were plain, simple-minded
and straightforward, and this, plus the lack of education, made them more easily incited to action. A typical example of this was the case of Wên Shêng-ts'ai, a revolutionary assassin who made a successful attempt on the life of a Manchu general in Canton in 1911. Wên, a native of Chia Ying Chou, of Kwangtung province, was born in 1869. He became an orphan at the age of six. He served as a body-guard to several Ch'ing officers and as a soldier before he went overseas. In the year 1900, he went to Malaya to be an apprentice in a factory in Ipoh, and three years later (at the age of 34), he moved to Tambun, a tin-mining area a few miles from Ipoh, to be a tin-mining worker. When the T'ung Mêng Hui branches and the revolutionary reading clubs sprang up in Perak from 1907 to 1908, Wên joined them and began to be influenced by revolutionary ideas. He read revolutionary newspapers, magazines and pamphlets, and was particularly impressed by 'Ten Days of Yang Chou' and other pamphlets. His hatred against the Manchu was not only moulded by all these revolutionary publications, but also by inflammatory speeches delivered by revolutionary activists. The heroic deeds of the revolutionary assassins, such as Hsû Hsi-lin in 1907, and Wang Ching-wei in 1910 must have given him such tremendous inspiration
that he resolved to follow their examples. This latent hatred against the Manchu and the fervour of martyrdom were roused to a pitch when his own prestige was hurt. At the beginning of 1911, Wen was insulted and expelled by an English manager in a tin-mining company in Tambun. He probably had felt the misery and bitterness of being a subject of a weak nation like China. He might have thought that, by resorting to assassination, he could arouse the patriotism of all Chinese to rise against the Manchu rule for the sake of building a strong China. It was possibly this thought that prompted him to take action. In February 1911, Wen went back to Canton to wait for an opportunity and in March of the same year succeeded in assassinating the Manchu general of Canton, Fu Ch'i who was on his way home after inspecting a display of aeroplanes. When Wen was tried, he alleged that he did not have any personal feud against the general, but that he had taken revenge for his four hundred million compatriots in China who were oppressed by the Manchu. When he was escorted through the streets to the place of execution, he appeared as a heroic martyr. He talked and laughed, and loudly declared 'I have taken revenge for my compatriots, I hope they will stand up to be men'.
It is significant that Wen came from a peasant family and was a tin-mining worker. His family and occupational backgrounds provide basic reasons for his fervent response to the revolution. He had no family burden, nor had he any property to consider. These factors may explain why he was so determined in revolutionary action.

Wen was only one of the numerous examples of the response of the lower social group to the revolution. There were five other workers who sacrificed their lives in the Canton March 29 Uprising. Apart from these five martyrs, it was said that there were no fewer than five hundred supposed members of secret societies from the Straits Settlements who went to Hong Kong to prepare to take action on the eve of the Canton March 29 Uprising in 1911. These secret society members were most probably from the lower social group. After the outbreak of the Wuchang Uprising in October 1911, the chance of overthrowing the Manchu rule was more promising than ever before. Therefore, manpower as well as money were crucial to the success of the revolution. The members of the lower social group in Singapore and Malaya realized that they could play a part in the revolution. A large number of them gave up their jobs to go back to China to take
part in revolutionary action. As far as we know, there were about two thousand tin-mining workers from Perak who left for China in a fortnight in November 1911. Those who remained behind did all they could to raise funds. It was said that tin-mining workers in Perak has contributed S$10,000 after the outbreak of the Wuchang Uprising. Compared with S$1,000,000 which the merchants and miners of Perak had raised, S$10,000 is a small amount. But when we consider the wages they earned, and the daily necessities they had to buy, they were equally as responsive as the members of the middle and commercial classes in financial aspect. On the average a worker could earn S$8 to $9 per month, deducting his daily necessities and entertainment, he could at most save $4, and he had to remit some of his savings to China to support his family. Probably all he could have saved would be about $1 or $2 per month. Despite the smallness of their income and savings, they donated to the utmost of their capacity. The prominent revolutionary leader, Hu Han-min, greatly praised the enthusiasm of the workers, saying '.... Workers are even more enthusiastic in donating funds, they often generously donated $20 to $30, or donated one or two months wages for the revolution. Some of them even wrote down their names first and tried to pay up later...'
Not only did the workers respond fervently to the revolution, other members of the lower class, such as members of secret societies, hawkers, rickshaw pullers, prostitutes and beggars, also enthusiastically contributed to revolutionary funds. It was said that between 1909 and 1911, a Triad Society in Malacca carried out a large number of gang robberies, the money was sent to China to aid the revolutionary cause. After the outbreak of the Wuchang Uprising, prostitutes in the China Town, Singapore, donated quite a large sum of money to the revolutionary funds, two of them donated $300 each. Two old Cantonese women in Penang, who depended entirely on their son and son-in-law for support, donated $20 respectively. These $40 were their savings gained over years by making embroideries. Another old woman beggar in Singapore donated 30c to the revolutionary funds, and expressed her regret that she could not contribute more because she was so poor. (2) The Impact on the Overseas Chinese communities: The Chinese revolutionary activities in Singapore and Malaya during this period were unprecedented in the history of overseas Chinese in this part of the world. Although the revolutionary activities were mainly aimed at the saving of China rather than the welfare of the
Overseas Chinese communities, its incidental impact was far-reaching and lasting. This impact can be better understood in the following aspects: the rise of overseas Chinese nationalism; growing unity in the overseas Chinese communities and the emergence of new ideas.

The rise of the overseas Chinese nationalism:

As we have seen in Chapter III, the main theme of the revolutionary propaganda in Singapore and Malaya was 'Nationalism', and through the spread of it, the ideas of race and revolution were imperceptibly absorbed into the minds of the overseas Chinese. Popularization of nationalism led to the fervent response of the overseas Chinese towards the revolution: thousands of youths went back to take part in the revolutionary uprisings. Some of them sacrificed their lives; and tens of thousands of dollars were raised to aid the revolution. Through the interaction of appeals and responses, the idea of nationalism continued to develop in the overseas Chinese communities, and from 1911 onwards became the main guiding force in the relations between the Malayan and Singaporean Chinese and China.
In the course of spreading the idea of nationalism, seeds of anti-foreign sentiment were sown. For since the middle of the nineteenth century, China had been living under the shadow of foreign encroachment and partition, so in order to foster nationalistic and patriotic feelings, the revolutionaries had to agitate against any foreigner who jeopardised China's interests. The revolutionary involvement in the Boycott Movement against American Goods in 1905, and in the same Movement against Japanese Goods in 1909 had proved this case. The seeds of anti-foreign sentiment sown in this period continued to sprout and grow until it constituted the basic ideology of the overseas Chinese in reaction to foreign aggression on China. This latent anti-foreign sentiment partially explains the Chinese riots against the British in Singapore in 1927, and the fervent anti-Japanese movement in Singapore and Malaya from the Manchurian Incident in 1931 to the Japanese surrender in 1945.

Growing unity in the overseas Chinese communities:

Prior to the rise of Chinese revolutionary activity, the Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya were disunited, and was to a certain extent torn by factional struggles (see Chapter I). This disunity was apparently
harmful to the spread of revolutionary ideas, for the factional struggles had affected the economy of the Chinese communities, and deterred the co-operation between dialect groups; county and provincial allegiance (such as Teochew concerned only with several Teochew districts, and Fukien only concerned with Fukien province) had prevented the growth of Chinese national consciousness, whereas the idea of revolution was not aimed at certain districts or certain provinces, but aimed at China as a whole.

The revolutionaries had realized the danger of this disunity to the local Chinese community itself as well as to the spread of revolutionary ideas. Thus, the revolutionary leaders had made some efforts to eliminate the differences between dialect groups and tried to bring them more closely together under the flag of the revolution. When Dr. Sun Yat-sen went to Kuala Lumpur to found the T'ung Mêng Hui branch in 1906, he explicitly warned the local Chinese that disunity would eventually ruin the
Chinese community as a whole. Through the T'ung Mêng Hui branches, Chung Ho T'ang, reading clubs, night schools, drama troupes and other revolutionary infiltrated organizations, people from different dialect groups were gathered together to work for the revolution. They learned how to understand each other, and how to cooperate in solving common problems. Through repeated contacts, the spirit of unity and Chinese national consciousness was fostered and developed.

These revolutionary organizations had not only provided the best common ground for moulding unity among their members, but also encouraged the spirit of unity in the community as a whole through their propaganda activities. For instance, students in the Too Nam School, a revolutionary controlled institution in Kuala Lumpur, were taught the concept of unity. Examples were given such as '.... Ants and bees are small and weak, but they can survive because they are united... Tigers are strong and fierce, but they are trapped because they are disunited... Therefore, we must love our compatriots and unite together...'. This simple analogy of the benefits of unity was written in songs and sung by students, and on some occasions, the song was sung in order to spread the idea of unity in the whole community.
In some cases the revolutionaries even founded institutions expressly to promote the ideas of unity. These institutions were open for all Chinese irrespective of their difference in dialect and social status. Common problems, such as anti-superstition, anti-opium smoking, abolition of foot-binding and others were discussed. The 'Chi Ch'in Shê' of Tapah in Perak founded in 1909 was one of these institutions to serve that purpose. 83

The idea of unity spread by the revolutionary organizations helped to strengthen the unity in the Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya. In 1906, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the most important social institution which cut across the demarcation of dialect groups, was established in Singapore under the encouragement of the Ch'ing government. 84 Of course it was not by the revolutionaries, but partly in reaction to the revolutionary activities. The Ch'ing government encouraged to establish such an institution through which it could compete with the revolutionaries and the reformists to gain support among the overseas Chinese. 85 The growing consciousness of unity can further be seen in the breakdown of barriers in the Chinese schools. Before 1909, all Chinese
schools in Singapore were run along dialect line, children belonging to different dialect groups were excluded. But this barrier began to break down after the middle of 1909. It would of course be erroneous to claim all credit for the revolutionaries, for the break-down of educational barrier among dialect groups was, to some extent, result of the efforts of Dr. Lim Boon-keng and some of the reformist leaders. Believing that language was an important elements for preserving Chinese identity and a means for Chinese unity, Lim started a campaign for the study of Mandarin, the official language of China. The first Mandarin class started in his house in 1898 for the Straits-born Chinese, and later was extended to wider circle. In 1906, he convened a meeting of the clan leaders and exhorted them to introduce Mandarin as a subject in the 'temple school'. This campaign for learning Mandarin had directly contributed to the break-down of the educational barrier. The use of Mandarin as medium of instruction in the schools made the enrollment of children of other dialect groups possible. The reformist leaders such as K'ang Yu-wei and Hsü Ch'in also made indirect contribution to the break-down of the linguistic barrier, they promoted sense of unity by making speeches to arouse national consciousness. In this respect, the
revolutionaries also had played a part to bring about the break-down and helped to consolidate inter-dialect-group relations.

The significance of the removal of this restriction was not merely in letting children from other dialect groups to have same educational opportunity, more important was the gradual break-down of the deep-rooted prejudice against each other. With the use of a common language and through a more intimate contact in class room and school campus, children of different dialect groups learned to live together and promoted mutual understanding. Thus, a new sense of Chinese nationhood gradually developed. Although this new concept was still vague in their minds, they would certainly feel that it was much bigger than districtal and provincial identities which their parents usually would like to adhere to.
It was the growth of a sense of unity and a new concept of Chinese nationhood that enabled different dialect groups to become concerned with other groups' welfare, and even to extend their connections to other groups who lived in China. In particular, when certain parts of China where certain groups of overseas Chinese originally came from, suffered natural disaster and needed help, the brotherly concern based upon the sense of unity and the new concept of Chinese nationhood would show. The best example of this is the case of the flood in Southern Kwangtung in 1908, which affected more than eight districts seriously. The Cantonese in Singapore and Malaya immediately took steps to raise funds to help their kith and kin in China. Apart from the Cantonese, Fukien, Teochew and Hakka also generously contributed to the relief funds, and some of Fukien leaders in Taiping, Perak, even followed the example of the local Kwangtung Association in persuading Fukien residents house by house to contribute to the funds.

Although the social structure of the Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya after 1911 still followed the pattern of dialect lines, and although there was seldom inter-marriage among the dialect groups in this period, the growing unity of the Chinese
communities partly resulting from revolutionary
activities was the first step towards the solidarity
and unity of the Chinese communities in Singapore and
Malaya. It was an important first step, without which
the fruits of today could never have been reaped.

Emergence of new ideas:

The effects of Chinese revolutionary activities on
social ideas in the Chinese communities of Singapore and
Malaya were great. We see the gradual replacement of
the traditional ideas of loyalty, filial piety and
inequality by the new ideas of altruism, martyrdom,
equality and freedom. The process of replacement was
slow, sometimes even imperceptible. The main cause
of the break-down of the old ideas and the emergence of
the new was the incompatibility of the old with the
ideas of revolution. The old ideas were the products of
the traditional society and to a great extent served the
interests of the ruling class and preserved the old order.
The idea of revolution, on the contrary, sought to over-
throw the old regime and to transform the old social order.
In seeking to spread revolutionary ideas, the revolutionaries had to attack old ideas. In order to make the new ideas more acceptable, they sometimes used traditional concepts with new connotations. Through the operation of the revolutionary newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, public talks, mass rallies and dramatic performances, we see the gradual breakdown of the old ideas, and the growth of the new ones. As a result of altruism and martyrdom, millions of dollars were contributed to the revolution and a number of the Malayan and Singaporean Chinese sacrificed their lives. As a result of the spread of equality and freedom, women were given better treatment, schools for girls were opened one after another, and women began to take part in social activities. After the outbreak of the Wuchang Uprising, for example, Cantonese women in Singapore gathered together to discuss ways and means of supporting the revolution. They set up a committee for fund raising, and divided into groups to raise funds. Like their male counterparts, they painstakingly visited house after house to solicit donations. Some of them even went back to China to take part in revolutionary uprisings.
The spread of these new ideas should not be entirely accredited to the revolutionaries, the experience under a relatively enlightened colonial rule and the activities of the reformists had their roles to play in bringing about these new ideas (see page 297). Nevertheless, the revolutionaries, through the operation of their organizations, had translated these new ideas into action. Thus, equality - equality in sex and age - and patriotism - altruism and martyrdom - became two important social forces in a long process of transformation of the overseas Chinese communities.
CHAPTER VIII
RETROSPECT AND EVALUATION

(1) The Centre of the Chinese Revolutionary Activities in Southeast Asia

Prior to the establishment of the T'ung Mêng Hui branches in 1906, Singapore and Malaya were just like French Indo-China, Burma, Thailand, Dutch East-Indies and Philippines, with wealthy Chinese and a potential source of revenue for the revolutionary movement. But after 1906, Singapore and Malaya surpassed their counterparts, and emerged as (one of) the centre(s) of the revolutionary activities in Southeast Asia. In April 1906, the first T'ung Mêng Hui branch in Southeast Asia was established in Singapore by Dr Sun Yat-sen; this step was soon followed in Kuala Lumpur and Penang, and more than ten T'ung Mêng Hui branches sprang up throughout Malaya within two years. Five revolutionary newspapers, the Chung Hsing Jih Pao, the Yang Ming Pao, the Sun Pao, the Kuang Hua Jih Pao and the Nan Ch'iao Jih Pao, were published in Singapore and Penang between 1907 and 1911. In the same period, more than fifty revolutionary reading clubs and a number of other
affiliated organizations spread throughout Singapore and Malaya.

The flourishing of the T'ung Mõng Hui branches, revolutionary newspapers, reading clubs, and affiliated organizations indicates that there was an unprecedented and dynamic movement taking place in Singapore and Malaya, and this movement was closely connected with the main stream of the Chinese revolution at home and abroad.

The position of Singapore and Malaya, however, was strengthened by the frequent visits of the prominent revolutionary leaders, such as Dr Sun Yat-sen, Wang Ching-wei and Hu Han-min, who came to help to organize the T'ung Mõng Hui branches, to start the revolutionary newspapers, and to preach the revolutionary cause. Among these tasks, their reinforcement to the Chung Hsing Jih Pao against the reformist organ, the Union Times, in the heated polemics, deserves our special attention. Wang and Hu were the two mainstays of the revolutionary front in the polemics, and Dr Sun Yat-sen also contributed several articles. Further, when the Chung Hsing Jih Pao had been facing financial difficulties since 1908, Dr Sun, Wang and Hu had been making several attempts to save the newspaper. These
reinforcements and the effort to save the Chung Hsing Jih Pao not merely show their deep concern for the newspaper itself, more important was their concern about the effect of success or failure of the newspaper on the whole revolutionary movement overseas, for it was the main organ in Southeast Asia, and Singapore and Malaya were in the leading positions in the revolutionary movement in these areas.

The leading status of Singapore and Malaya can be seen further in the comparison with their counterparts in Southeast Asia. When the T'ung Mêng Hui branches were established in Singapore, Kuala Lumpur and Penang in 1906, no branches were established in other parts of Southeast Asia except one in Cholon in French Indo-China, and most branches in Burma, Thailand and Dutch East-Indies were not established until 1908. Although there existed revolutionary newspapers in these areas, such as Hua Hsüan Jih Pao in Thailand (1905), Yang Kuang Hsin Pao (1906), Kuang Hua Pao (1907) and Chin Hua Pao (1910) in Burma, Ssû Ping Jih Pao (1908), Min To Pao (1908) in Dutch East-Indies, all of them were more regional in character and hence their influence was far less than that of the Chung Hsing Jih Pao in Singapore. Further, these newspapers were not receiving special
attention and reinforcement by those revolutionary leaders like Dr Sun Yat-sen, Wang Ching-wei and Hu Han-min.

The leading role of the T'ung Mêng Hui branches in Singapore and Malaya in promoting revolutionary activities in other parts of Southeast Asia was even more eminent. Soon after the establishment of the T'ung Mêng Hui in Singapore, Shên Lien-fêng, one of the leaders of the branch, established a branch of his firm in Bangkok, partly to enlist support among local Chinese. In 1907, the Singapore T'ung Mêng Hui decided to send a few aides to Batavia, Banka and Semarang in the Dutch East-Indies to keep in touch with the local revolutionaries, in order to pave the way for the establishment of new branches. As a result, T'ung Mêng Hui branches in these areas came into being in 1908. In the same year, when Lim Ngee-soon and Hsü Tzü-lin, two leaders of the Singapore T'ung Mêng Hui, were sent to Rangoon to raise funds for the Chung Hsing Jih Pao, they contacted the local revolutionaries, distributed revolutionary pamphlets, and laid down a solid foundation for the establishment of the Rangoon T'ung Mêng Hui in the same year.
With the establishment of the T'ung Mêng Hui Southeast Asia Headquarters in Singapore, in Autumn 1908, the leading status of Singapore and Malaya was further consolidated. Although the Headquarters was a kind of secretariat without exercising highly centralized power, it did serve as the centre of communication among branches in Southeast Asia. Branches were required to send the list of their executive members and all the written oaths of the members to Headquarters for preservation. They were also required to give addresses for correspondence, and to inform the Headquarters immediately after any change of the addresses. Further, they had to congratulate and to encourage the starting of other new branches once they were informed by the Chairman of the Headquarters.

These steps were apparently designed to promote cooperation among the T'ung Mêng Hui branches in Southeast Asia, to foster comradeship among the revolutionaries in this vast area, and to strengthen the leading status of Singapore and Malaya. By keeping lists of executive members and their changing addresses, the Headquarters in Singapore could keep in close touch with all the branches, and transmit all military news from battle fields, secret instructions from Dr Sun
Yat-sen or from the Tokyo Headquarters. In return, the Singapore Headquarters could also transmit opinions, demands and financial contributions from the branches to the top. This function as the main channel of communication remained as one of its most important tasks throughout the period under study.

The choice of Singapore as the location for the establishment of the T'ung Mêng Hui Southeast Asia Headquarters was by no means incidental. Apart from the unique geographical position and the comparatively lenient policy of the British colonial government towards the revolutionaries, which we have mentioned in Chapter III, the timing of the choice of Singapore deserves our special attention. Since the departure of Dr Sun Yat-sen and his Cantonese group from Japan for Southeast Asia in March 1907, which resulted from the increasing hostility of the Japanese government, the centre of the whole revolutionary movement shifted from Japan to Hong Kong and Southeast Asia. This shift marked an important change in the history of the Chinese revolution prior to 1911. Singapore and Malaya as well as Hong Kong stood out not only as the reservoirs of revolutionary revenue, but also as centres of the revolutionary operation. From March 1907 to the autumn
of 1908 (the establishment of the T'ung Mêng Hui
Southeast Asia Headquarters in Singapore), there were
five major uprisings staged by the revolutionaries in
Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Yunnan provinces (Huang Kang
Uprising in May 1907, Waichow Uprising in June 1907,
Ch'in-Lien Uprising in September 1907, Chên Nan Kuan
Uprising in December 1907 and Hok'ou Uprising in April
1908). The centres of operation were distributed in
Hanoi, Singapore and Hong Kong, and there was no
headquarters in Southeast Asia on which the
revolutionaries could depend for collecting funds.
This lack of a centre for revolutionary operations and
collecting funds was, perhaps, one of the important
factors in the repeated failure of the uprisings. Thus,
the timing of the founding of the Southeast Asia
Headquarters in Singapore soon after the defeat of the
Hok'ou Uprising in June 1908, was a logical result of
previous experiences.

Another reason for this timing may have been to
prevent expansion of the influence of the anti-Sun group
in Southeast Asia. As we have noted before, the anti-
Sun movement led by T'ao Ch'eng-chang in Southeast Asia
emerged in the beginning of 1908. It acquired its base
in Banka and Surabaya in Dutch East-Indies, and its influence had extended to Singapore and Malaya.\footnote{18} This movement had first shown its strength in May 1908 in retarding the revolutionary fund-raising activities.\footnote{19} If it was left unchecked, the future of the revolutionary activities in Southeast Asia would be ruined. Dr Sun Yat-sen clearly realized this danger; a headquarters in Singapore would be ideal in controlling other branches and checking the spread of influence of the dissident group in Southeast Asia in terms of geographical distance.

Although the shift of the T'ung Meng Hui Southeast Asia Headquarters from Singapore to Penang in July 1910 signifies the decline of importance of Singapore in the movement, the spotlight of the revolutionary activities was still focussed on Malaya (Penang was a part of it). Since then, Malaya emerged as the nerve centre for the whole revolutionary movement. The preparation of the Canton March 29 Uprising in Penang and its guiding position in Southeast Asia after the outbreak of the Wuchang Uprising had clearly indicated its importance.

(2) The Rendezvous for Revolutionary Refugees

Prior to the middle of 1908, Singapore and Malaya were only one of the three centres overseas (Hong Kong
and French Indo-China) for revolutionary refugees. Since the failure of the Waichow Uprising in 1900, revolutionaries began to seek refuge in Singapore. In this early period (1900 to 1906), the revolutionary refugees who arrived in Singapore and Malaya were very few: only those revolutionary leaders, such as Yu Lieh, Têng Tzū-yü and others. These early refugees came to Singapore not merely to seek refuge, but also to help to start the revolutionary activities in Singapore and Malaya.

The year 1907 saw a substantial increase of revolutionary refugees to Singapore and Malaya. After the two unsuccessful attempts in Huang Kang and Waichow in the middle of the year, more than one hundred refugees (about half of the aggregate exiles) sought their sanctuary in Singapore and Malaya. They were well accommodated by the local T'ung Mêng Hui leaders, and most of them were helped to find jobs in farms and rubber estates.

After the middle of 1908, the importance of Singapore and Malaya as a centre for revolutionary refugees greatly increased and surpassed its counterparts, Hong Kong and French Indo-China, to become the only rendezvous overseas. This situation was brought
about by a new development in French Indo-China. After the failure of the Chên Nan Kuan Uprising in December 1907, most of the defeated revolutionaries sought sanctuary in French Indo-China, particularly in Hanoi and Haiphong, which were geographically closer to the Chinese border and had T'ung Mêng Hui branches. These revolutionaries were highly frustrated and became unstable in mind. Being revolutionarily orientated, they naturally inclined to any revolt against the ruling authority. For these reasons, some of them became involved in a local Vietnamese plot to poison French troops. Their involvement greatly infuriated the French colonial government. Although the French colonial government had shown a friendly attitude towards Dr Sun Yat-sen and the revolutionaries before 1908, this friendly attitude was not because it was really sympathetic towards the Chinese revolution, but because it wished to use them as a bargaining asset with the Ch'ing government for more concessions. After achieving its goal, it began to change attitude towards the revolutionaries. At the beginning of 1908, Dr Sun was deported from Hanoi for his involvement in the Chên Nan Kuan Uprising. This unfriendly attitude culminated at the beginning of 1909 in an agreement between the French and Ch'ing governments
on a joint suppression program against the activities of revolutionaries in French Indo-China.\textsuperscript{25}

This new development of the revolutionary involvement in the 'Poison Case' completely ruined the future of French Indo-China as one of the three overseas centres of refuge for revolutionaries in flight. When the French colonial authority threatened to extradite the refugees involved to the Ch'ing government, Dr Sun, who by that time was in Singapore, decided to transfer them to Singapore and Malaya if it was possible. Through repeated entreaties, the Governor of French Indo-China promised to deport them to Singapore instead.\textsuperscript{26} The first batch of about sixty revolutionary exiles arrived in Singapore in May 1908,\textsuperscript{27} and were well accommodated by the local revolutionary leaders.\textsuperscript{28} Later, they were joined by other batches which brought numbers to more than four hundred people.\textsuperscript{29}

The influx of these political exiles to Singapore presented a number of problems to Dr Sun Yat-sen and the local revolutionary leaders. Apart from accommodation and clothing, the main problems were how to feed them and make them observe local laws. All these four hundred refugees were soldiers, and after their detention in
French Indo-China for some time, most of them had good appetites. Apart from their need for vegetables, pork, tea, medicines and other daily necessities, they consumed one thousand kati of rice per day.\(^{30}\) This heavy burden was placed on the shoulders of local leaders, and obviously this state of affairs could not be tolerated for too long. Dr Sun and other leaders had clearly realized the seriousness of the problem. They tried to find jobs for these refugees, and local revolutionary supporters were urged to recruit them as shop assistants, apprentices and workers. Letters were also widely sent to the T'ung Mêng Hui branches in Malaya and the Dutch East-Indies seeking jobs.\(^{31}\) Despite all these efforts, only about one hundred were settled with jobs and the remainder still had to rely on relief.\(^{32}\)

Frustrated by defeat, detention and unemployment, these exiles tended to be hot-tempered and troublesome. Some of them clamoured to go to Hong Kong, some demanded work, some raided the Chung Hsing Jih Pao to ask for provisions,\(^{33}\) and some even became involved in armed robberies.\(^ {34}\) All these actions obviously jeopardized revolutionary activities in Singapore and Malaya. The involvement in armed robbery was used by the reformists as evidence proving that all revolutionaries aimed at
plundering, and their presence in Singapore was responsible for mounting unrest in society. Not only had the misconduct of some of the refugees affected the image of revolutionary soldiers among the overseas Chinese, it might also have led to the deportation of them all, and ruined the future of Singapore and Malaya as the overseas rendezvous for revolutionary refugees. In view of these dangers, Dr Sun Yat-sen felt that the only solution was to start a quarry which could absorb the majority of them. It was planned that S $3000 should be raised as starting capital, and Hu Han-min was sent to tour Malaya to collect funds for that purpose. After repeated efforts exerted by Dr Sun and his colleagues, the quarry, under the name of 'Chung Hsing' was opened at the beginning of 1909, and about two hundred refugees were employed.

The reason for all these efforts of Dr Sun and his colleagues in settling these refugees was not merely a sense of moral obligation, but also that these people would be of great use in future revolts. Most of them had fighting experience, and could be trained as the best vanguards with sufficient indoctrination during their stay overseas. In short, they were the best reservists, particularly when the revolutionaries had
no troops of their own, and had to rely entirely on secret society members and the new armies in the Ch'ing troops in China. The value of these assets was shown that among five hundred revolutionary vanguards chosen for starting the uprising at Canton on March 29, a large number of them were probably the refugees from Singapore and Malaya.

After about two years lull (from April 1908 until February 1910), the revolutionaries staged two more major uprisings in Canton between 1910 and 1911 (the New Army Uprising in February 1910 and the Canton March 29 Uprising in April 1911); most of the defeated revolutionaries sought refuge in Hong Kong and Singapore. In view of the tightening of the Hong Kong government's policy towards revolutionaries, and the active espionage of the Ch'ing spies, most of the refugees in Hong Kong had to leave for Southeast Asia. A large number of them found sanctuary in Singapore, and were well looked after.

(3) Financial Contribution

In estimating the financial contribution of the overseas Chinese in Singapore and Malaya towards the revolution, several difficulties have to be noted.
Firstly, the revolutionary activities were illegal, so any formal financial contribution to the revolution would be generally regarded as undesirable. Thus, a number of donors declined to put down their names. Secondly, financial contribution to the revolution assumed many forms: some contributed to the revolutionary uprisings, some to the running of newspapers, some to the maintenance of revolutionary refugees, and some to the rescue of comrades and other forms. And the remittances of money were sent through several channels, some to the T'ung Mêng Hui branches, some to Dr Sun Yat-sen, and some direct to the leaders of uprisings. This variety of forms and channels of remittance made it difficult to keep accurate records. The problem was reinforced by the fact that there was no organization primarily responsible for keeping records of all these donations. Thirdly, owing to the fact that the T'ung Mêng Hui was an illegal organization, some records were purposely destroyed, and some were lost because of the fluctuations of staff and the shifting of the T'ung Mêng Hui branches. Thus, the records available are only partial and fragmentary. Fourthly, a number of memoirs were written long after the revolution of 1911, and the figures given by faded memories may not be accurate. Moreover, some
records were written by friends and descendants of the donors who tended to exaggerate contributions to the revolution.

In view of all these difficulties, our estimate based on the available sources is by no means final, but is only a tentative conclusion which could be greatly affected by other new sources coming to light at any time.

Financial contribution to the revolutionary uprisings. In the one year period between May 1907 and April 1908, the T'ung Mêng Hui staged five major uprisings in Southwest China (Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Yunnan provinces) According to Dr Sun, the expenditure on activities and arms and ammunition amounted to about HK$200,000. About half of it was raised in the overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia. Of this HK$100,000, overseas Chinese in British Malaya only contributed some HK$10,000 (one-tenth of the total amount). The rest came mainly from the Dutch East-Indies (HK$30,000), French Indo-China and Thailand (HK$60,000). On this figure, the financial contribution of the overseas Chinese in Singapore and Malaya to the five uprisings appears to be insignificant. But when we go into details, evidence shows that the figure of expenditure given by Dr Sun seems to be
incomplete: probably the figure was only based on the money remitted through him and his close colleagues like Wang Ching-wei and Hu Han-min, and the donations through other channels were not included.

In fact, the financial contribution of the overseas Chinese in Singapore and Malaya to the five major revolutionary uprisings was much more than Dr Sun had indicated. As we mentioned previously (in Chapter II), the Huang Kang Uprising in Teochew (also known as the First Teochew Uprising) had long been fermenting before the formation of the T'ung Mãng Hui. The uprising broke out in May 1907 after almost three years preparation (1904-1907). Immediately after that, a second Teochew Uprising was planned by the same group under the leadership of Koh Soh-chew. It was scheduled to take place in September 1907, but it turned out to be abortive. 50

No records have shown how much money was really spent on these two Teochew Uprisings. The available sources indicate that about S$50,000 was spent on them (S$30,000 through the Singapore T'ung Mãng Hui branch, and S$20,000 through private channels). 51 Most of this money was donated by the Chinese in Singapore, particularly the Teochew community. It was recorded
that about S$20,000 to S$30,000 was collected from the T'ung Mêng Hui members in Singapore for the First Teochew Uprising, and about S$5,000 for the Second. Lin Shou-chih, a Teochew revolutionary leader in Singapore, had privately given Koh Soh-chew (S$14,000) and Ch'en Yûn-shêng (S$6000) S$20,000 for the two uprisings. Thus, we can claim that at least one of the five major uprisings (the First Teochew Uprising) and a minor uprising (the Second Teochew Uprising) were entirely supported by the Chinese in Singapore.

In other major revolutionary uprisings between 1907 and 1908, the overseas Chinese in Singapore and Malaya also made some minor efforts in financial contributions. In the Waichow Uprising in 1907, we do not know how much they contributed, but we do know that during that year revolutionary military bonds were widely sold in Kuala Lumpur and Perak, and the money raised through these bonds could have been used for the Waichow Uprising. In Ch'in-Lien (September 1907), Chên Nan Kuan (December 1907) and Hok'ou (April 1908) Uprisings, only about S$5700 was raised from Singapore and Malaya, and most of it came from the T'ung Mêng Hui branches in Kuala Pilah and Seremban. The lack of enthusiasm on
the part of the Chinese in Singapore for these revolutionary uprising may be mainly because most of the T'ung Mêng Hui leaders in Singapore had exhausted their financial capacity after the Two Teochew Uprisings. Further, some of the Teochew revolutionary leaders may have been depressed by the repeated failure of the uprisings in their home districts, with which their fate and interests were closely related. 58

The financial contribution of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya to the revolutionary uprisings resumed its importance in the last major revolt—the Canton March 29 Uprising (27 April 1911) and the period after the outbreak of the Wuchang Uprising (10 October 1911). In the preparation for the former, Singapore and Malaya were considered to be the most important, and a target sum of S$50,000.00 out of total amount of S$130,000.00 was allocated to be raised. The money raised in these two places served as precedent for pressing contribution from other overseas Chinese communities. 59 The actual total amount raised for the uprising was estimated at S$187,636.00, of which Singapore and Malaya contributed S$47,663.00, and stood only second to Canada (S$63,000.00). The following table shows the amounts contributed by various overseas
Chinese communities. (see Table 5).

Table 5. Money Raised in Various Overseas Chinese Communities for the Canton March 29 Uprising (27 April 1911).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Sum of Money (S$ or HK$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Canada</td>
<td>63,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. British Malaya (Singapore and Malaya)</td>
<td>47,663.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Dutch East Indies</td>
<td>32,550.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. French Indo-China and Thailand</td>
<td>30,423.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. United States of America</td>
<td>14,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>187,636.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Most of the money raised in Singapore and Malaya came from Negri Semblian, Perak and Penang, whereas Singapore, Selangor and Malacca played a rather insignificant part (see Table 6). The reasons for such indifference in these few areas were given in the Chapter VI.

In the Wuchang Uprising on 10 October 1911, although the main role was played by the T'ung Mêng Hui Central China Headquarters in Hupeh, the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya also played a part in financial assistance to the uprising.
Table 6. Money Raised in Singapore and Malaya for the Canton March 29 Uprising (27 April 1911)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Sum of Money (S$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Negri Sembilan</td>
<td>18,600.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Penang</td>
<td>11,500.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Perak</td>
<td>11,420.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Singapore</td>
<td>3,530.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Selangor</td>
<td>1,551.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Johore</td>
<td>729.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Malacca</td>
<td>333.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>47,663.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In August 1911, when the planning of the Wuchang Uprising was on the way, the T'ung Mêng Hui Southeast Asia Headquarters in Penang received a cable from Huang Hsing in Shanghai asking for financial assistance. A sum of few thousand Straits dollars was immediately sent to the Min Li Pao at Shanghai (the revolutionary office for the Lower Yangtze area) which enabled Huang to contact the T'ung Mêng Hui members in Szechwan and Hupeh, and helped to bring out the outbreak of the Wuchang Revolt.

The importance of the financial contribution of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya can be seen further in the post Wuchang Uprising period (11 Oct, 1911-12 Feb, 1912). In the months following the outbreak, large amount of money from Singapore and Malaya, as well as from
other overseas Chinese, poured to the assistance of the progressing revolution. Some of the money were remitted to Hong Kong, where Li Hai-yün remained as the official treasurer of the defunct Operational Centre. Some were remitted to Shanghai to be forwarded to Wuchang, where the revolutionaries had established a government. A part of money was sent to Dr. Sun and his provisional government at Nanking after his return to China in late December 1911. In addition, large sum of money was sent directly to the revolutionary governments in Kwangtung and Fukien provinces.

Because of different channels of remittance and records of all these channels are not entirely available, a tentative assessment is attempted here to throw some light on this aspect. This figure, however, can be readjusted by the availability of new sources. Approximately, an amount of S$(or HK$) 870,000 was raised and donated by Chinese in Singapore and Malaya to finance the progressing revolution in the post Wuchang Uprising period. Most of it came from Singapore, Selangor, Perak and Penang.
In pure monetary terms the amount represents more than one-third of the estimated total amount contributed by all overseas Chinese in this period (HK$2,380,000.00)\textsuperscript{63a} which accounted for the bulk of financial source for the success of the revolution of 1911.

Table 7. Money Raised and Donated by Chinese in Singapore and Malaya for the Post Wuchang Uprising Period (11 October 1911-12 February 1912)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place Where Money Remitted to</th>
<th>Sum of Money (S$ or HK$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Hong Kong</td>
<td>234,334.00\textsuperscript{64}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Fukien Revolutionary Government in Foochow</td>
<td>270,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Kwangtung Revolutionary Government in Canton</td>
<td>250,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Shanghai</td>
<td>66,562.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Dr. Sun Yat-sen</td>
<td>50,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>870,896.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Sources: Töng Tsê-ju, Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang ˇêrh-shi nien shih-chi, pp.83, 103; Souvenir of the 30th Anniversary of the Penang Philomatic Society, p.29; Tan Kah-kee, Autobiography, vol.1, p.3; Fêng Tzü-yu, Chung-kuo ko-ming yün-tung ˇêrh-shi liu-nien tsu-chih shih, p.270; Ch'en Ch'ü-n-shêng, 'Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia and the Chinese Revolution' (manuscript), pp.46-47; Penang Hsin Pao, 9 December 1911,p.2.)

The importance of the financial contribution of the overseas Chinese in Singapore and Malaya to the post Wuchang Uprising period can further be understood in terms of how the money was needed and used in the revolution. After the outbreak of the Wuchang Uprising,
the revolt became widespread throughout South China. The revolutionaries successfully captured several capital cities along the Yangtze river and the coastal areas and set up revolutionary governments. However, the new order encountered a number of problems, among which the financial problem was most acute. For during this transitional period, old treasuries were empty, revenue was uncollected and inflation rife. All the provincial revolutionary governments were in dire need of money for establishing new treasuries, maintaining law and order, and stabilizing their position among the populace.
Financial help from overseas Chinese was most significant and indispensable to the stabilization of some revolutionary governments and the recovery of Kwangtung and Fukien provinces. On 4 November 1911, Shanghai was captured by the revolutionaries, and a government was established under the leadership of Ch'en Ch'i-mei. It soon encountered serious financial problems: the old treasury was empty; revenue and various public funds could not be collected; and financial stringency was strongly felt. It could have fallen without overseas financial help. At this crucial moment, S$35,390 from the Chinese of Southeast Asia, and S$20,000 from revolutionaries in Penang helped significantly to stabilize its position. The capture of Shanghai and the stabilization of the revolutionary government there had changed the whole situation of the revolution: it enabled the revolutionaries to encourage the Ch'ing navy to defect; to control the centre of tele-communications of the whole of China, which enabled them to spread revolutionary message; to combine the revolutionary troops in Kiangsu and Chekiang provinces to pave the way for the capture of Nanking.

In the recovery of Kwangtung province, financial aid from Singapore and Malaya also played an important
part in stabilization of the revolutionary government. On 9 November 1911, Kwangtung was controlled by the revolutionaries, and Hu Han-min was elected as the Governor. The revolutionary government in Canton had the same financial problem as in Shanghai; overseas money was badly needed. On 12 November 1911, a cable asking for money was sent to the revolutionary leaders in Singapore and Malaya by the Fund Raising Bureau in Hong Kong. In response to this call, a campaign of fund raising for the Kwangtung revolutionary government was carried out in Singapore. On the 20 November, a committee under the name of 'Fund-raising for the Security and Relief of Kwangtung Province' was set up to meet the purpose. In the meantime, the revolutionary movement in China appeared to be very promising. On 2 December 1911, Nanking, the most important strategic city south of the Yangtze, was captured by the revolutionaries; a provisional revolutionary government consisting of most of the provinces south of the Yangtze, was on the way; and all the revolutionary governments south of the Yangtze were prepared to support a northern expedition to topple the Ch'ing government. The revolutionary government in Canton, as the leader of all these
revolutionary governments, had particularly felt the financial burden of this new commitment. On 8 December 1911, only six days after the capture of Nanking, the Governor of Kwangtung, Hu Han-min, who had cordial relations with most revolutionary leaders in Singapore and Malaya, cabled for more financial assistance. In his cable, Hu called upon overseas Chinese to donate to their utmost capacity, and spelled out that without their help, revolutionary troops could not be fed, and the Manchu could not be toppled. In order to ensure success of fund raising, two representatives, Ch'en Hsin, and Jao Chao, were dispatched to Singapore and Malaya. Foo Chee-choon, the tin-mining magnate, who put his support behind the revolutionaries after the outbreak of the Wuchang Uprising, was also appointed by Hu as the chief fund raising officer in Southeast Asia for the Kwangtung revolutionary government. In this dearth and need of overseas money, the remittance of S$234,000.00 to Canton must have been a great help to the Kwangtung revolutionary government.

The financial contribution of the overseas Chinese in Singapore and Malaya to the recovery of Fukien province was even more significant. On 10 November 1911, one month after the outbreak of the Wuchang
Uprising, the capital city of Fukien, Foochow, was captured by the revolutionaries. One of their main reasons for the delay of staging a revolt here was lack of money. At this crucial moment, a remittance of S$5000.00 from the revolutionaries in Perak became the commencement fee for a revolt. Three days after the capture of Foochow (13 November 1911) a fund raising committee under the name of 'Fund-raising for Fukien Security' was set up in Singapore, and S$20,000.00 was immediately remitted to stabilize the finance of the revolutionary government.

The new government in Foochow had to rely mainly on financial support from Singapore, Penang and Burma, where the Fukien were predominant. It could get only very little money from the Fund Raising Bureau in Hong Kong, which was supposed to mete out overseas money to all revolutionary governments in China. In the meantime, it had to prepare to help to recover Amoy, Ch'üanchow and other parts of the province; to reestablish a new treasury; to maintain law and order; and, like Kwangtung and other revolutionary governments, to prepare troops for the northern expedition. All these tasks could not be carried out unless overseas money poured in. It was in this sense that a financial contribution from
Singapore and Malaya became so important. The Governor of the Fukien revolutionary government, Sun Tao-jên, was the person who particularly felt the need of the overseas money. Apart from cables, he sent a long public letter to all overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia urging financial help. He strongly emphasized the indispensability of the overseas assistance, with which the precarious position of the revolutionary government in Fukien would be stabilized. He sincerely urged them to donate and to buy military bonds issued by the Fukien revolutionary government. To ensure the success of the fund raising, he also sent three representatives to tour Singapore and Malaya and other parts of Southeast Asia.

It was in this critical period that the remittance of more than S$270,000.00 by Chinese in Singapore and Malaya played a key role in reestablishing the new treasury, and in stabilizing the revolutionary control of the whole of Fukien province.

In short, in the eight major uprisings from 1907 to 1911, at least one (the Huang Kang uprising in April 1907) was entirely financed and two (the Canton March 29th Uprising and the Wuchang revolution) were significantly supported by the overseas Chinese in Singapore and Malaya.
Financial contribution to other revolutionary activities. As the centre of revolutionary activities and for the revolutionary refugees, Singapore and Malaya had to spend more money in contacting branches and looking after the refugees. Transmission of instructions, news and opinions, and dispatching of special missions to branches in Southeast Asia, required large sums of money for maintenance. Receiving refugees, feeding, clothing and finding jobs for them, involved another large amount of money. All these were to be maintained by the revolutionaries in Singapore and Malaya. Lin Shou-chih, a revolutionary leader in Singapore, spent S$3000.00 in accommodating revolutionary refugees defeated in the First and the Second Teochew Uprisings. Thousands of dollars must have been spent in accommodating and feeding the large number of refugees (more than four hundred) who sought sanctuary in Singapore in 1908.

Apart from these expenditure, Chinese in Singapore and Malaya had to contribute large sums of money for maintaining the most important revolutionary organ in Southeast Asia, the Chung Hsing Jih Pao, and the other five less important revolutionary newspapers (the Thoe Lam Jit Poh, the Yang Ming Pao, the Sun Pao, the Kuang
Hua Jih Pao and the Nan Ch'iao Jih Pao). Large sums of money were also raised for saving revolutionary leaders from imprisonment; for financing assassination and for helping to recover other revolutionary newspapers. In 1907, S$1800.00 was raised in Singapore to save Yü Chi-ch'eng from Hong Kong gaol.\(^89\) In 1910, two women revolutionary sympathisers in Penang sold their jewellery for more than eight thousand dollars to finance Wang Ching-wei's assassination of the Ch'ing Regent.\(^90\) After the failure of this attempt, several thousand dollars were raised in Penang and Singapore to save Wang from imprisonment.\(^91\) In 1911, revolutionary leaders in Penang took the initiative to campaign for the revival of the Min Pao, the main revolutionary organ in Tokyo. More than ten thousand Straits dollars were raised for the purpose. Later, because of the outbreak of the Wuchang Uprising, the plan for revival was given up, and the money was incorporated into the funds of the Kuang Hua Jih Pao in Penang.\(^92\)

In summing up, the financial contribution of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya played a significant part which was not less important than that of any other overseas Chinese in the world, for at least one
out of the eight major uprisings was entirely financed and two were significantly supported. Apart from direct financial contribution, Singapore and Malaya provided a major base for the planning and launching of the uprisings, and they were the most important refuge for political exiles. Within the scope of such contributions, more Singapore and Malaya were comparatively important to the revolutionary cause than other Chinese communities overseas (Canada, the United States, Australia, Thailand, Burma, Dutch East Indies, South America and South Africa) with the possible exception of the Chinese communities in Hong Kong and French Indo-China.