

BORDER TENSIONS
IN THE INDONESIA/PAPUA NEW GUINEA RELATIONSHIP

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This sub-thesis is my own work, and all sources used have been acknowledged.

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INTRODUCTION

The relationship between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea has been significantly affected by problems associated with the border between them. This has not been a dispute about the boundary itself. There is a line on the map which the two countries have agreed to accept. Rather, the border problem which has arisen between the two countries concerns an independence movement called the 'Organisasi Papua Merdeka' (Free Papua Movement - OPM) which since 1963 has been active against Indonesia and has repeatedly crossed the border to seek refuge in neighbouring Papua New Guinea; incursions in Papua New Guinea by the Indonesian military in pursuit of the OPM; and thousands of Irian Jayan refugees who have crossed the border to seek sanctuary in Papua New Guinea.

Since Papua New Guinea's independence in 1975 the border problem has intensified, especially in 1984 when an uprising in Jayapura resulted in an influx of 12,000 refugees into Papua New Guinea territory. This heightened security concerns in the two countries. For Jakarta, the refugees could become bases for the OPM to threaten Indonesia's security; for Papua New Guinea on the other hand, there were concerns about possible Indonesian border incursions in an attempt to destroy the OPM.

The border problems have given rise to considerable tensions between the two countries, because both have accused and have been suspicious of each other which could lead to further escalation to the point of open conflict. This, in turn, could invite Australia's involvement in view of her relationship with Papua New Guinea. Therefore the border problem is a very important in the Indonesia and Papua New Guinea relationship. The border situation could threaten not only security and stability between the two

countries, but also, the South West Pacific Region.

So far Indonesia and Papua New Guinea have maintained a good relationship and the escalation of the border tensions has been avoided. This is because there have been some efforts made by the two countries to reduce border tensions with regard to the OPM, the refugees, and the border incursions.

The main purpose of this subthesis is to evaluate the various approaches or measures that these two countries have attempted in fostering mutual understanding and trust, and to prevent further escalation of border tension. Most importantly, the thesis seeks to evaluate strategies in terms of how, and to what extent, they deal with the causes of the problem. Thus, much of the thesis is concerned with establishing the causes of the problem against which the tension-reducing measures can be judged.

The border problems between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea have attracted the attention of many scholars. There have been studies such as that of Paul W. Van der Veur which concentrate on the history of the New Guinea border.¹ Other studies, for example, that of Nyamekye and Premdas, analysed Indonesian and Papua New Guinean policies, interests, and views concerning the border problems.² Further, there have been many studies which dealt with particular aspects of the border problem. Loekman Soetrisno, for example, has observed the unintended effects of the 'Transmigrasi' Program on the local people in Irian Jaya. This program has given rise to hostility among the Melanesian people.³ Other studies have concentrated on Indonesian

¹Paul W. Van der Veur, Search for New Guinea's Boundaries, from Torres Straits to the Pacific (Canberra: Australian National University, 1966), especially Chapter 5.

²Kwasi Nyamekye and Ralph R. Premdas, "Papua New Guinea-Indonesia Relations over Irian Jaya", Pacific Perspective, Vol.8, No.2 (1979).

³Loekman Soetrisno, "The Problematic Role of Transmigration in Irian Jaya", Indonesian Reports, Culture and Society Supplement, trans. by Beverly Blaskett, No.19 (December, 1986).

development policy in Irian Jaya. For example, Ross Garnaut and Chris Manning have described the effect on Irian Jaya of immigrants, the lack of unskilled personnel, and the difficulties in developing the highland areas.¹ The rise of the OPM - its origins, its strengths and weaknesses - have been studied by many scholars.² Alan Smith and Kevin Hewison examined the particular uprising of the OPM in Jayapura in 1984 which caused the outpouring of refugees as mentioned above.³ There are only a few scholars, however, who have attempted to examine in detail some approaches to reduce the tensions associated with border problems. There are some scholars who have analysed some of these approaches as a part of a broader study and some have attempted to explore particular approaches, for example, Papua New Guinea's possible membership of ASEAN.⁴ There have also been bilateral scholarly seminars about the Indonesia and Papua New Guinea border problems.⁵

The subthesis is structured around four chapters. Chapter 1 explores the history and the nature of the border problem. Chapter 2 examines the causes of border tensions which can be said to emanate from Indonesian policies or from developments on the Indonesian side of the border. Chapter 3, on the other hand, focuses on, the causes of border tensions which result from developments on the Papua New Guinea side of the border. In the final chapter, Chapter 4, the various tension-reducing measures attempted by Papua New Guinea and Indonesia are evaluated.

¹Ross Garnaut and Chris Manning, Irian Jaya, the Transformation of a Melanesian Economy, (Canberra: A.N.U. Press, 1974).

²Premdas and Nyamekye, "Papua New Guinea 1978: Year of the OPM", Asian Survey, Vol.19, No.1 (January, 1979).

³Alan Smith and Kevin Hewison, "1984 - The Year OPM Pulled the Plug on Indonesia - Papua New Guinea Relations", Catalyst, Vol.15, No.2 (1985).

⁴Kevin Hewison, Alan Smith and N. Bardu, "The Papua New Guinea and Membership of ASEAN", Australian Outlook, Vol.39, No.3 (December, 1985).

⁵Edward P. Wolfers (ed.), Beyond the Border (Waigani: The University of Papua New Guinea and The Institute of Pacific Studies University of the South Pacific, Suva, 1986).

CHAPTER 1

THE BORDER PROBLEM

1.1 BOUNDARY DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Before examining the problems associated with the Indonesian/Papua New Guinea Border, it is useful to look briefly at the problem of borders in international relations in general. In order to prevent confusion of geographical terms, it is necessary to distinguish between 'boundary', 'frontier' or 'border' and border. According to Cukwurah: "*A 'boundary' denotes a line whereas a 'frontier' is more properly a region or zone having width as well as length and, therefore, merely indicates, without fixing the exact limit, where one state ends and another begins.*" Weigert and Percy described 'frontier' as the area adjacent to the boundary."¹ Holdich went a little further and observed that "*no limit is set to a frontier until an actual line or boundary is defined by treaty...*"² Further, Prescott defined a boundary as "*a line and a border is a zone in which a boundary is located.*"³

It is clear "*a boundary is a line*" whereas "*frontier*" and "*border*" denote a zone in which a boundary is defined. However, in many cases the words 'boundary', 'frontier'

¹J.R.V. Prescott, The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company 1965), p.34.

²T.H. Holdich, Political Frontiers and Boundaries Making (London, 1916) as cited by Cukwurah, The Settlement, p.12.

³Prescott, "Problems of International Boundaries, with Particular Reference to the Boundary Between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea", in Between Two Nations, ed. R.J. May (Bathurst: Robert Brown and Associates (Aust.) Pty. Ltd., 1986): p.1; see also idem, Boundaries and Frontiers (London: Crown Helm Ltd, 1978), p.90.

and 'border' are still used interchangeably as if they are synonymous.¹ Throughout this subthesis, the terms boundary, frontier or border are used in the following sense: 'frontier' or 'border' refers to a zone, and 'boundary' refers to a line.

There are several kinds of disputes over boundaries. Prescott described the four distinct kinds of boundary disputes as follows:

1. Territorial boundary disputes occur when one country wants to claim part of the territory of another country. For example, Somalia's claim to the Haud and Ogaden areas of Ethiopia.
2. Positional boundary disputes occur when one country does not agree with the boundary demarcation which has already been defined in a treaty. For example, the disagreement between China and Russia over the course of their boundary in the vicinity of the confluence of the Amur and Ussuri Rivers.
3. Functional boundary disputes occur when one country considers that its neighbour has affected its activities along the boundary. For example, Tanzania has prevented Kenyan lorries from operating between Kenya and Zambia along the roads through the west of Tanzania.
4. Resources boundary disputes occur when two countries have disagreed over "*the use of some trans-boundary resources*", such as a river or a Coalfield". For example India and Bangladesh have quarrelled over the diversion of the Ganges Waters at the Farraka Barrage.²

¹For greater detail see Cukwurah. The Settlement, p.11.

²Prescott, "Problem", p.2 and 11.

Indonesian and Papua New Guinean border problems do not fall under any of these categories. It is not a territorial boundary dispute, because the Agreement of 1973 has fixed the boundary in a clear manner which does not allow any territorial claims (see Appendix I). Prescott argues that "there does not appear to be any likely territorial claims from either side."¹ The border between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea is an agreed line on the map. The two countries have agreed to accept the boundary which was established by their colonial predecessors. The 141 st meridian east longitude was defined as the border dividing the Dutch possession in the West, and the German and British possession in the East in the Agreement of 1885."²

Further, the Indonesian and Papua New Guinean border problems do not fall under 'functional', 'resources', and 'positional' boundary disputes, because there is the Basic Agreement on Border Administration on 13 November 1973 that reduces and avoids these disputes, especially relevant is Articles 2, 3, 4, 6, 8 (see Appendix II). This Agreement was negotiated in 1979 and concluded in 1984 with minor but significant amendments (see Appendices III and IV).

These agreements have overcome the problem regarding Prescott's four different kinds of boundary dispute. For example, in the case of functional boundary disputes, the problem of traditional border crossers which is caused by the demarcation of the boundary between the two countries is covered by Article 3 of the Agreement 1973. The boundary has cut communities that have land rights and trade and marriage connections. For example, the people of Walomo Village on the north coast 50 kilometres east of the border in Papua New Guinea remember trading expeditions to Jayapura Bay and beyond to Cape Tanah Merah where they exchanged pots, sago and

¹ *ibid.*, p.3

² Paul W. Van der Veur, "New Guinea Annexations and the Origin of the Irian Boundary", Australian Outlook, Vol.18 (1964): p.325.

tapa cloth for the beads and rings of their currency.¹

It is obvious the Indonesian and Papua New Guinean border problem is not a boundary dispute between the two countries. The border problem commenced in the period of colonialism in West New Guinea. It arose from policies that the Dutch and the Australians pursued in their respective halves of the islands of New Guinea both together and separately.

1.2 INDONESIA/PAPUA NEW GUINEA BORDER PROBLEMS

In the mid 1950's Australia proposed the formulation of cooperation with the Dutch in New Guinea. It seemed that this idea was motivated by pressure from agriculture and defence interests in Canberra for the extension of administrative co-operation. The Australians believed that New Guinea was important for their agricultural industries which required the quantitative guarantees for co-operation between Australia and Papua New Guinea. In addition, 'defence' is an important consideration as Australia preferred the Dutch to be in West New Guinea as they considered that the Dutch were a more stable influence than the Indonesians.² Although this idea did not evolve it gave a feeling of a united New Guinea. As Verrier concluded "*... that the nature of both Dutch and Australian policies had the effect, if not always the intention of creating both a nationalist identity in West New Guinea and a feeling for a united New Guinea.*"³ Similarly Yusuf Wanandi argued that "*this idea has given rise among other things to an obsession among some Papua New Guinea leaders and Australian that the Melanesian*

¹Hank Nelson, "New Guinea Divided: The Papua New Guinea - Indonesia Border", Kabar Seberang, No.5/6 (February, 1979): p.236.

²June Verrier, "The Origin of the Border Problem and the Border Story to 1964", in Between Two Nations, ed. R.J. May, p.25.

³ibid.

culture throughout the whole of the island of Irian should be united."¹

Moreover the origin of the Indonesian and Papua New Guinean border problems was inherited from the policy the Dutch adopted when preparing to give independence to West New Guinea by forming the New Guinea Councils in 1961. This idea led to the emergence of the OPM which became a major cause of the border problems between the two countries. The hope for a united New Guinea and the rise of the OPM are at the base of the border problems which developed with the Indonesian policy in Irian Jaya from 1962 and continues to this day.

Nyamekye and Premdas rightly said that the Indonesian and Papua New Guinean border problems are not so much due to the nature of the border, but rather to a determined group which refuses to recognise Indonesia's sovereignty over Irian Jaya. Without the OPM activities, the geographic features and ethnic complications of the border would not cause so many difficulties for the two countries.²

Further Nelson observed that although there is agreement, border problems will arise: "*if problems of quarantine or migration occur, if valuable mineral resources are found, or the straits again acquires strategic importance, then that tangle of lines will result in confusion and resentment.*"³ However the border problems between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea do not come under this category. Most of these problems have been covered by the Basic Agreement on Border Administration. It is a fact that the activities of the OPM at the border have contributed to the border tensions.

¹Yusuf Wanandi, "Indonesia-Papua New Guinea Relations: Past, Present and Future: Indonesian views", in *Beyond the Border*, ed. Edward P. Wolfers (Waigani & Suva: The University of Papua New Guinea Press and The Institute of Pacific Studies, University of South Pacific, 1988): p.86.

²Nyamekye and Premdas, "Papua New Guinea-Indonesia Relations", p.42

³Nelson, "Divided", p.233.

Different from other movements that have caused problems for Indonesia in the past, the OPM has an ethnic relationship with a neighbouring country. Therefore it was no surprise when the Indonesia Government decided to use a "*military solution*" to suppress the OPM. This policy encouraged other problems, such as refugees and border incursions by the Indonesian military. The clash between Indonesian troops and the OPM has increased the number of refugees moving into Papua New Guinea territory trying to seek political asylum. The OPM has also put pressure on the local people to cross the border into Papua New Guinea. Besides this, Indonesian military operations have violated the border in the course of their chasing the OPM.

The movement of refugees and the number of border incursions sharply intensified when the "Act of Free Choice" took place. By the end of 1968 about 1200 refugees crossed the border.¹ Since the establishment of Indonesian rule in West Irian in 1963, there had been waves of refugees, but never before on such a scale. During 1964-1965, there were been 128 refugees who crossed the border and considerably fewer since then until 1984.² Further, border incursions also increased. On one occasion in 1969 the Indonesian troops crossed the border to search for Irianese and fired on an Australian patrol officer and Papua New Guinea police at Wutung. In the south, at Kwari, Indonesians shot and killed two Irianese.³ It seems that the growing resistance to Indonesia rule and the Indonesia patrols incites refugees and border violations.

Since 1965, the border problem became more 'political' due to the rise of the indigenous resistance to Indonesian Authority. More people crossed the border due to political reasons than for traditional or economical reasons. Before 1965 the numbers of

¹R.J. May, "East of the Border: Irian Jaya and the Border in Papua New Guinea's Domestic and Foreign Politics", in *Between Two Nations*, p.89.

²Verrier, "The Origin", in *idem.*, p.41-42.

³Nelson, "Divided", p.237.

border crossers was still small and most of them were traditional border crossers. They crossed the border from time to time in making sago, hunting, or visiting kin. At this time the border crossers were not really a problem because they did not threaten the security or stability for both sides.

After 1965 however, the border crossers were rebels or refugees who did not want to accept Indonesia's rule in West Irian. There have been some camps along the Papua New Guinea side of border at places, such as Wutung, Waris, Skotiau, and Korfor.¹

For Indonesia, the existence of refugee camps which become bases for the OPM activities on the Papua New Guinea side of the border are a threat to West Irian security. Therefore Indonesia has carried out a "*military solution*" to suppress the OPM movement which had sharply increased since 1965. This situation led to an increase in border incursions by Indonesia in an effort to pursue rebel refugees. Since 1962 border incidents have occurred in the Sepik District and elsewhere in the Western District.² For example, by December 1963, there were reports of armed Indonesian patrols crossing the border and sometimes being found many miles inside Papua New Guinea.³ However the incidents were not serious enough to affect the relationship between Indonesia and Australia, which at the time controlled Papua New Guinea. The lessening of numbers of border crossers and border incursions between 1969 and 1972 encouraged the countries to achieve the Border Agreement in 1973.

During the 1970s, the situation along the Indonesian and Papua New Guinean border has fluctuated. In the early 1970s, the border crossers continued, although on a much

¹Verrier, "The Origin", in Between Two Nations, ed. R.J. May, p.40-43.

²For details see idem., Australia, Papua New Guinea and the West New Guinea Question 1949-1969, Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Monash University, as cited by Verrier, ibid., p.35.

³ibid., p.38.

reduced scale. It seemed that during this period the Indonesian Government concentrated on the development of Irian Jaya. But in 1976-1978 the number of refugees increased especially in the period leading up to Indonesia's national election. There was at least one major border incursion when Indonesian troops raided a Papua New Guinea village and destroyed their gardens while searching for the OPM. It seemed that after Papua New Guinean Independence in 1975, the OPM activities increased which accelerated Indonesia's military operations. This was followed by the influx of refugees across the border into Papua New Guinea which was reduced in 1979 after the achievement of the Agreement of 1979.¹

In the early 1980s the border situation intensified. There were some border incidents instigated by Indonesia. In mid 1982, Indonesia military patrols on several occasions crossed the border into Papua New Guinea and a helicopter flying the regional military commander to Wamena, 240 kilometres southwest of Jayapura, landed at a mission station 10 kilometres southeast inside Papua New Guinea.² In April 1983, Indonesia built a highway called the "Trans Irian Jaya Highway" along the length of the border to facilitate effective penetration of the province as well as to seal off the border from Papua New Guinea. This highway is 850 kilometres of road designed to link the southern part of Merauke with the northern part of Jayapura, but it crosses into Papua New Guinea at two points near the head waters of the Bensbach River in Western Province. Papua New Guinea protested this violation and Indonesia apologized and corrected the mistake.³ In March 1984 two foreign military aircraft flew over Green River Station, 20 kilometres inside Papua New Guinea from the Irian Jaya border. The

¹May, "East of the Border", in Between Two Nations, p.92-95.

²May, "Mutual Respect, Friendship and Co-operation ? The Indonesia-Papua New Guinea Border and Its Effects on Relations between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia", Bulletin of Concerned Asia Scholars, Vol.19, No.4 (October-December, 1987): p.49.

³Papua New Guinea Foreign Affairs Review (PNGFAR), September, 1983, p.12.

Papua New Guinea Government believed the two military aircraft to be Indonesian.¹

The influx of 12.000 refugees in 1984 has become the "*most dramatic*" point in the history of Indonesia and Papua New Guinea border problems which attracted international attention. By late 1984, 4000 refugees, including educated Melanesians (teacher, academics, clerks, policemen, soldiers), were camped inside Papua New Guinea in the northern area, while 6000 refugees were camped inside of Papua New Guinea in the southern area (see Map I). The military operation which crushed the uprising of the OPM in Jayapura stimulated the refugees.

In the period since 1984 the border problem still exists, but it has not escalated as it did in 1984. Border crossers still exist, but in small numbers. In September, 1986, a group of 747 people crossed the border and arrived in the West Sepik border station of Yapsiei.² The OPM are still active and border incursions still occur. In April, 1988, the OPM raided a transmigration settlement, Arso, near Jayapura which was followed by some border incursions by Indonesian troops in pursuit of the OPM.³

1.3 THE IMPORTANCE OF THE INDONESIA/PAPUA NEW GUINEA BORDER PROBLEM

The border problem is very important to the Indonesian - Papua New Guinean relationship because it not only generates considerable tension between the two countries, but also it could invite Australian involvement if a conflict were to escalate.

¹Ibid., March, 1984, p.11.

²Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, West Papua: The Obliteration of a People, 3rd ed. (Thornton Heath, Surrey: Tapol, 1988), p.100.

³Post Courier, May 2 and October 27, 1988.

It seems that Indonesia and Papua New Guinea see the main cause of the border tension from different points of view. Indonesia sees the elimination of the OPM movement as a very important factor in overcoming the border problem. She considers that there would be no refugees and border incursions if the OPM were destroyed. In Indonesia's view, Papua New Guinea Government's policy towards the OPM is not tough enough to destroy this movement. For these reasons Indonesia is trying to suppress the OPM, and border incursions still occur in pursuit of this objective. On the other hand, Papua New Guinea sees border incursions by the Indonesian military as a threat to its security.

In these circumstances the '*misperception of the two states*'¹ could cause conflict between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. The border incursions by Indonesian troops on a large scale to eliminate rebel sanctuaries in Papua New Guinea territory may not be accepted by the Papua New Guinea Government. Papua New Guinea sees these incursions as a violation of their territorial integrity and a threat to her security and stability. Thus there could be clash between the two countries and border tensions would mount. On the other hand, Indonesia's perception that Papua New Guinea supports the OPM activities or lets external supporters use her territory to help the OPM, may stimulate Indonesia to interfere with military action, although on a small scale.

In this respect, how far the increase of border tensions can be managed by the two countries will depend on their relationship. The desire to maintain a good relationship will prevent the increase of border tensions. Thus, the attitude or policies of the two Governments will determine the situation at the border, as long as it can be tolerated. When the border problem cannot be tolerated by one of the two countries it will affect their relationship.

¹David Hegarty, South Pacific Security Issues An Australian Perspective. Working Paper No.147 (Canberra: The Research School of Pacific Studies, A.N.U., 1987): p.18.

A change of Government (which may employ a hostile policy) could make the border problems break into conflict. The rise of a possibly aggressive policy on the part of Indonesia towards Papua New Guinea and the emergence of a Papua New Guinean policy hostile towards Indonesia could incite the parties into conflict. Indonesia may at times cross the border to destroy the OPM bases without respect to Papua New Guinea authorities. On the other hand Papua New Guinea could let her territory be used by the OPM against Indonesia. If either country cannot tolerate this policy, the border tensions would intensify and conflict between the two countries could break out.

In all of these situations, in view of their relationship, Papua New Guinea is likely to seek Australian support. In December, 1987 Papua New Guinea and Australia signed the 'Joint Declaration of Principles' which strengthened the Papua New Guinean-Australian relationship.¹ For this reason, Australia would possibly give support to Papua New Guinea if there was possible conflict between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. It seems that Australia sees that a possible Indonesian attack on Papua New Guinea would threaten Papua New Guinean sovereignty and Australia needs to defend it in view of their relationship. According to Hegarty "... *in certain circumstances, all the members of the 'triangle' could be drawn into conflict.*"² Furthermore the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence noted:

"the implications of the continuing unsettled security and political situation in West Irian cannot be ignored within the context of examining potential sources of conflict in which Australia might become involved..."³

Australia would probably become involved in a possible conflict between Indonesia and

¹ibid.

²Ibid.

³The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Threats to Australia's Security Their Nature and Probability (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Services, 1981), p.37.

Papua New Guinea. However, how far would the Australian Government be involved in this conflict? In such a conflict Australia could be involved in discussions about the defence contingencies of Papua New Guinea against Indonesia.¹ Further, the Australian Government could provide strong diplomatic non combat support elements, logistic and financial support, and increase its training efforts for the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF).² It is unlikely the Australian Government would commit ground force elements to the defence of Papua New Guinea. According to estimates by Langtry and Ball, Australia would need to have six to nine deployable battalions "*in order to give effective assistance to Papua New Guinea in a contingency of low-level border incursions by Indonesia.*"³

Similarly, Ross Babbage estimated that the current Australian capability of two to three battalions plus support elements (about 2000-4000 personnel) to commit to the defence of Papua New Guinea "*could easily be swallowed up in the Papua New Guinea environment for little real return.*"⁴

In these circumstances, the commitment of Australia could cause protracted conflict. Besides, the participation of other countries in these circumstances could threaten the stability of the Southwest Pacific region. As Babbage observed: "*at least some American assistance would probably be forthcoming*" due to the ANZUS alliance, although Papua New Guinea is not a member of this alliance.⁵ In addition, the South

¹Hegarty, South Pacific, p.20 and 27.

²Ross Babbage, The Dilemmas of Papua New Guinea (PNG) Contingencies in Australia Defence Planning, Working Paper No.128 (Canberra: The Research School of Pacific Studies, A.N.U. 1987), p.14.

³J.L. Langtry and Desmond J. Ball, Controlling Australia's Threat Environment (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, RsPac, A.N.U., 1979): p.32, as quoted in Hegarty, South Pacific, p.27.

⁴Babbage, The Dilemmas, p.15.

⁵Ibid., p.5.

Pacific Forum members could provide diplomatic support to oppose Indonesia's attitude.

In conclusion, it is obvious that the Indonesian and Papua New Guinean border problem is not a boundary dispute as happens in international relations. The OPM activities, refugees, and border incursions have constituted border problems for Indonesia and Papua New Guinea since 1965. The border problems still continue and fluctuate. The inflow of 12.000 refugees in 1984 was the 'most dramatic one' in the history of the Indonesian and Papua New Guinean border problems.

However, it does not mean there is no room for the possibility of conflict. Misperception between the two countries and the change of government into one who employs a hostile policy could make the border problems burst into conflict. In these circumstances the 'special' relationship between Papua New Guinea and Australia could invite the latter to commit some non-combat and diplomatic supports, but not ground force support.

Accordingly, the border problems are very important in the Indonesian and Papua New Guinean relationship, not only for two countries, but also for the Southwest Pacific region.

CHAPTER 2

THE CAUSES OF THE PROBLEM ON THE INDONESIAN SIDE OF THE BORDER

To understand the underlying causes of the border tensions, we first need to examine the contributing factors from the Indonesian side which mainly focus on three factors: the Independence Movement (the OPM) in Irian Jaya; and the Indonesian Government's policies concerning Transmigration and Development in Irian Jaya. These should not be seen as separate factors. Rather, it will be shown that it is their interaction which produces their significant contribution to the border tensions.

2.1 THE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT

The OPM has become a problem for Indonesia due to its activities in Irian Jaya. The OPM is a Movement which does not want to accept Indonesia's rule over Irian Jaya but wants to claim independence for the West Papuan people¹. To maintain its sovereignty over Irian Jaya, Indonesia has tried to suppress this movement by military force since its emergence in 1963. Although the Indonesian Government has managed to overcome some separatist movements in the 1950's, for instance, PRRI (Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia) by military force² it has not succeeded in suppressing the OPM.

Actually, Indonesia should not find it difficult to crush this movement in view of the

¹Premdas and Nyamekye, "Papua New Guinea 1978: Year of the OPM", *Asian Survey*, Vol.19, No.1 (January 1979): p.67.

²Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, *Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy, 1945-1965* (The Hague: Morton, 1973), p.299.

small number of OPM hard core members; the lack of military capability, and of external support; as well as the weakness of the OPM's leadership¹. But the natural terrain, and the existence of a direct border with a neighbouring state which has ethnic relationships with this movement make Indonesia's efforts to eliminate the OPM more difficult. The OPM can cross the border to avoid the Indonesian Military Operation. This, in turn, leads to border tensions with Papua New Guinea.

The OPM, has so far not threatened Indonesian territorial integrity, but their activities, to some extent, have endangered Indonesian domestic security in Irian Jaya by attacking isolated patrol posts, mine sites, transmigration settlements, and air strips. For example the OPM guerrillas have sabotaged the pipeline of the Freeport Copper and Gold Mine at Timikia in 1977². For this reason, some people in Indonesia consider the OPM a "*disturbing security movement*"³.

However, other people believe the OPM has the potential of bearing political influence on the local people in Iran Jaya. One can argue that the rise of the outflow of refugees from Irian Jaya to Papua New Guinea in 1984, was not only because of "*Indonesian reprisals*", but also "*the influence and organisation of the OPM leadership was a prime factor*"⁴. This seems to be one of the reasons why some of the refugees cross the border. The OPM may have influenced villagers to flee across the border with false promises.⁵

¹Premdas, "The Organisasi Papua Merdeka in Irian Jaya: Continuing and Change in PNG's Relations with Indonesia", *Asian Survey*, Vol.25, No.10 (October 1985):p.106.

²Hegarty, *South Pacific*, p.20.

³*The Australian*, April 21, 1989.

⁴Hegarty, *South Pacific*, p.20.

⁵Alan Oaisa, "Indonesia - PNG Relations: Past, Present and Future: PNG Views" in *Beyond the Border*, ed. Edward P. Wolfers, p.103

So, it can be seen in the case of the uprising that the OPM is not just a "*disturbing security movement*" as some people in Indonesia think. The raising of the West Papuan Flag has represented a claim for West Papuan Independence. West Papuan Nationalism arose in the late 1950's, especially in the last five years before 1962 when the Dutch actively made preparations to grant independence to West New Guinea and mobilised local opinion against Indonesia¹. The OPM has held some "*disturbing security movement*" to attract Indonesian attention to their objective, independence for West Papua.

In order to understand the OPM's objective, it is important to look at the origin of the OPM in this territory. Furthermore, by examining its origin and its development it can be seen how far the OPM is prepared to go to achieve its objective.

The history of the West Papuan independence struggle goes back to the 19th Century when West New Guinea was occupied by the Dutch². But the origin of the OPM can be traced from the history of the struggle for West Papuan independence in the 20th Century when the Dutch colonialists came back to control West New Guinea in 1946 which was followed by the Indonesian's claim over this territory in the 1950s.

Motivated by their interest, the Dutch were prepared to give West New Guinea independence. The Dutch launched "a crash programme" (1952-1961), and established The New Guinea Council (1961) which introduced the West Papuan National flag and anthem. By doing this the Dutch attempted to "*discourage pro Indonesian sentiments*

¹Ian Bell, Herb Feith and Ron Hatley, "The West Papuan Challenge to Indonesian Authority in Irian Jaya; Old Problems, New Possibilities", Asian Survey, Vol.26, No.25, (May, 1986): p.544.

²Nonie Sharp, The Rule of the Sword, the Story of West Irian (Victoria: Kibble Books, 1977), p.11.

among the educated chain"¹ and "to guide the Papuan people toward self-government and the exercise of the right of self-determinations..."². However, the expectation of the educated elite to bring about independence did not eventuate, because on May 1, 1963, Indonesia commenced administering this territory subject to the New York Agreement, 1962.

When the Dutch left in 1962 there was some resistance against Indonesia which was suppressed by Indonesian military force. In April, 1963 the Front National Papua (FNP) was established in the Netherlands which largely consisted of former members of the New Guinea Council. The Chairman of the FNP was Marcus F. Kasiepo a former member of the New Guinea Council for the Biak-Numfort district³. The OPM which was established in West Irian in 1963 derived from the FNP. Savage (1978) observed that in trying to achieve the West Papuan independence in this period, the OPM attempted to link with "the Dutch colonialists, the Indonesian's 'middle strata' colonialisers and political exiles in Dutch New Guinea, the UNTEA"⁴.

But the West Papuan elite was disappointed when Indonesian sovereignty over West New Guinea was confirmed by the people through the 'Act of Free Choice' in 1969. The Papuan elite, as Savage discovered, realised that they "... have sought to make linkages with the peasant and proto peasant masses and have chosen the road of

¹Robin Osborne, "OPM and the Quest for West Papuan Unity" in Between Two Nations. ed. R.J. May: p.52.

²Gde Agung, Twenty, p.300.

³Justus M. Van der Kroef, "Indonesia and West New Guinea: the New Dimension of Conflict", Orbis, Vol.14, No.2 (Summer, 1970): p.390.

⁴Savage, "The National Struggle in West Irian: The Division within the Liberation Movement, Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology, Vol.14, No.2, (1978):p.142-148, quoted in Osborne, "OPM and the Quest" in Between Two Nations, ed. R.J. May, p.53.

organised armed struggle."¹ This was followed by the establishment of a Provisional Revolutionary Government led by Seth Rumkorem, as both the Head of Government and the Chairman of the OPM in July, 1971. After this the OPM started to attract sympathetic contact with the local villagers which instigated Indonesian military reprisals. These reprisals in turn encouraged villagers to support the OPM movement, especially in rural areas.

Premdas observed that there was some basis for the OPM, such as '*forced territorial incorporation into Indonesia*', '*cultural imperialism*', '*political repression*', '*loss of identity*', and '*alienation of land*'². It seems that the first two bases related to Indonesia's strategy which succeeded in the United States forcing the Dutch to abandon West New Guinea to Indonesia through the United Nations by the 'Act of Free Choice'.

Further, the base of '*political repression*' seemed to relate to Indonesian political policies in Irian Jaya. In 1963, the New Guinea Council was disbanded and replaced by Regional Assembly whose members were appointed by the Indonesian Government. None of the former Council members were included in this Assembly. In this period, for example, new political parties were prohibited as Indonesia needed to carry out tough political measures to maintain order during this period³.

So, it might be true that the first three bases are some of the reasons why the OPM to rejects Indonesia. However, the latter two bases, such as "loss of identity" and "alienation of land" brought about by the Indonesian "Transmigrasi" Programme probably happened in the late 1970s and early 1980s. It is unlikely that the "*loss of identity*" and

¹Ibid.

²Premdas, "Continuing and Change", p.1062.

³Budiardjo and Liem, West Papua, 3rd ed., p.15-16.

"*alienation of land*" occurred in the 1960s and the early 1970s as in this period only 267 families (1060 transmigrants) were moved to a few tiny settlements such as Merauke (Kumbe, Kurik & Kuprik) near Jayapura, Nabire and Manokwari on the north coast. Thus it was doubtful, that such a small number of transmigrants had stimulated a concern about the "loss identity" and the "alienation of land" that was one of the basis of the OPM in this period.

It could, however, be true that concern was shown when the Indonesian 'Transmigrasi' Programme in the period of the fourth Five Year Plan (Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun ke IV/Repelita IV) 1984-1989 planned to move large numbers of people to Irian Jaya.

In addition, as stated earlier, it should be taken into account that the Indonesian military policies may be one of the reasons the OPM used to gain support. There are several writings on the Indonesian military action to suppress the OPM activities. For example, in the years 1979-1982 there have been some operations called Operasi Sapu Bersih (Clean-Sweep Operation), Operasi Galang I and II (Reinforce Operation I and II)¹, which instead of destroying the OPM encouraged village sympathisers to the OPM Movement.

Up to now, the OPM has been trying to oppose the Indonesian Government by mobilising villager supporters. The OPM hard core members are small in numbers but their sympathisers can be underestimated. Indonesia estimates that there are only a few hundred which comprise the hard core of the OPM². Reliable observers put figures at 400-600 guerillas but with "*an extensive network of floating recruits available for quick mobilisation and potentially summing into several thousands*"³. Thus, the potential of the

¹Ibid., p.74-75.

²Peter Hastings, "Prospects: 'A State of Mind", in *Between Two Nations*, ed. R.J. May: p.221.

³Premdas "Continuing and Challenge", p.1061.

political influence of the OPM should be taken into account, because they have the capability to stimulate the revival of the West Papuan nationalism to claim the West Papuan independence due to the Indonesian policies concerning the Transmigrasi Programme and development in Irian Jaya.

2.2 TRANSMIGRASI

Transmigration in Irian Jaya has become a contentious aspect of the Irian Jaya development. It has given rise to concerns about the '*loss of identity*', and the '*alienation of land*' of the Melanesia people in Irian Jaya which resulted in the dissatisfaction of the local people. It arose, especially in the period of Repelita IV (1983/84 - 1988/89) when Irian Jaya was seriously considered as the transmigration target of 137,000 families (600,000 transmigrants) over the five years. The shortage of suitable areas in Sumatra, Sulawesi and Kalimantan encouraged this plan. Another view was that because "*Sumatra and Kalimantan are full*" in the latter years of Repelita III¹. Consequently, Irian Jaya was considered for this programme.

Compared with the estimated current population of 1.3 million people in Irian Jaya, of which one million are Melanesian, it can be understood that the target of 600,000 transmigrants has stimulated the concern of '*loss of identity*'. Further, by the end of 1984, 24 major transmigration sites had been built alienating a total of 700,000 hectares of land from the traditional owners. Therefore, the transmigration settlements also incited concern about '*alienation of land*'².

In the 1960s - 1970s, Irian Jaya did not become a priority area for the Indonesian

¹H. Arndt, "The Transmigration in Irian Jaya", in Between Two Nations, ed. R.J. May: p.166-168.

²Budiardjo and Liem, West Papua, p.51-52.

Transmigrasi Programme. As mentioned earlier in the 1960s there were only 267 families who moved to a few small settlements in Irian Jaya. In 1971-1973 another 260 families were brought to six villages. In 1975, 200 families also moved to Nabire. Clearly, Irian Jaya did not have a significant area of land taken over for the transmigrasi programme during 1969-1979. This was due to the geographical condition of the territory and its distance from Java. In addition, the political situation of Irian Jaya in the 1960s made the implementation of the transmigrasi programme in this territory impossible¹.

Nevertheless, in the 1980s Irian Jaya was once again considered as a priority area for the transmigrasi programme due to the growth of population in Java. Therefore in the period Repelita III (1979/80 - 1983/84), the significant number of 13,650 families were moved to this territory.

It is clear, that the Transmigrasi Programme in Irian Jaya is part of the National Transmigrasi Programme which is very important for Indonesian development. This programme was started during the Dutch colonial period in 1905, and Sumatra, Kalimantan, together with Sulawesi were areas for the Dutch Transmigrasi Programme at that time. The Indonesian Government continued the Transmigrasi Programme although in a broader sense than existed in the Dutch period.

The Indonesian Government promulgated Law No.3 of 1972, wherein seven goals of transmigration are set out as: improving living standards; regional development; more balanced population distribution; equal distribution of development across the country; utilisation of natural and human resources; national unity; and national defence and

¹Joan M. Hardjono. Transmigration in Indonesia (Kuala Lumpur : Oxford University Press, 1977), p.11.

security¹. To achieve the transmigration goals, the Transmigration Department gives an opportunity for 10 per cent of local residents to become local transmigrants. In Irian Jaya, the percentage of local residents for participation in the APPDT (Alokasi Pemukiman Penduduk Transmigrasi /The Allocation of Transmigrant Settlement) Programme is now 25 per cent. Loekman Soetrisno when he visited the Jayapura District sites (Arso, Koya Timur, Koya Barat, Nimborang I and II) discovered problems that the APPDT faced in regard to the local people in the transmigration settlements which are discussed below².

Generally, in achieving the transmigration goals the Indonesian Government faced problems such as land, farming systems, ethnic relations, migration selection and welfare services, administration and costs³. In the case of the Irian Jaya Transmigrasi Programme, the first three problems seemed to be the main problems for the local people in transmigration sites.

Firstly, the land problems have arisen not only because of the geographical condition, but is also associated with the local people. In context of the geographical conditions, unfamiliar soils, terrain, and climate were some of the reasons that a few of the settlements failed. For example, transmigration settlements in Merauke, Jayapura and Manokwari failed in 1971⁴. Further, the land problems stimulated hostility from the local people towards the transmigrasi programme. This was because the '*local land*

¹Colin MacAndrews, "Central Government and Local Development In Indonesia: An Overview", in Central Government and Local Development in Indonesia. Idem. (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1986): p.158-160.

²Soetrisno, "The Problematic": p.5.

³See further detail discussed in Arndt, "Transmigration: Achievements, Problems and Prospects", Bulletin of Indonesia Economic Studies, Vol.19, No.3 (December, 1983): p.59-65.

⁴Garnaut and Manning, Melanesian Economy, p.38-39; see also the explanation about the geographical condition of Irian Jaya in Hardjono, In Indonesia, p.90.

claims' were not settled and this should have been dealt with before the arrival of transmigration¹. In this respect, the local government and the local transmigration department seemed to see the land problem as "*an issue of local customary law*". They did not consider the land as an important issue for the local people who were concerned that their hunting areas would be reduced².

Hunting is one of the main sources of food for the local people and the transmigration settlements have made their hunting areas disappear. Therefore, the local people demand high compensation for their land, but the officials refused to offer compensation for '*uncleared land*'³. Furthermore, the local people who are Melanesian, believe that the land rights are "*an absolute command of mankind and of the God that the land of the aboriginal Melanesian must be protected*"⁴. But the officials strongly deny this Melanesian belief in the land being inalienable⁵.

But one may argue that the transmigrasi programme does not want to take the land of the local people, rather for the "*utilisation of unoccupied land for sedentary agriculture*"⁶. Certainly, the local people, who are very simple in their way of thinking, may not understand this term. They just feel that transmigration has taken their rights to the land⁷. The land problem has stimulated the hostility of the local people.

¹Hardjono, "Transmigration: A New Concept?", Bulletin of Indonesian of Economic Studies, Vol.14, No.1 (March, 1978): p.110.

²Soetrisno, "The Problematic", p.4.

³Osborne, Indonesia's Secret War: The Guerilla Struggle in Irian Jaya (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1985), p.130.

⁴Bernard Narokobi, "A View from PNG", Arena No.65 (1983): p.105.

⁵Osborne, Secret War, p.130.

⁶Hardjono, "Transmigration: Looking to the Future", Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol.22, No.2, (August, 1986): p.46.

⁷Soetrisno, "The Problematic", p.5.

Secondly, the farming system has become another problem for the transmigrasi programme in Irian Jaya. The Javanese transmigrants and the local people have different farming systems. Javanese transmigrants are accustomed to sedentary agriculture. This is very different from the agriculture of the indigenous people, except possibly the Mandrobe at the foot of Jayawijaya Mountain Range. Their farming system is a cross between shifting cultivation and hunting¹. Accordingly, it is difficult to synchronise these farming methods. Besides, the local people have found difficulty in absorbing the new technology from transmigrants, since they do not have as quite highly developed gardening cultures, except for the Muyu and the Mandrobe². The problem of different farming systems has contributed to the local people's opposition to this programme.

Thirdly, the ethnic relation problems have arisen due to the different ethnic relations between the Melanesian people in Irian Jaya and the Javanese transmigrants. Generally, the indigenous people do not welcome the Javanese transmigrants, especially when the transmigrants are a majority. Relations with the indigenous people proved easy if they gained benefit from employment or business opportunities which opened up when a transmigration settlement was established in a particular area³. In the case of Irian Jaya however, the local people do not enjoy the transmigration settlement facilities due to different customs and strong ties with their villages. They are not used to staying in the type of houses that the transmigrasi programme have planned. They do not feel secure in staying with other transmigrants in their settlements. This feeling has encouraged

¹ *Ibid.*, see also George J. Aditjondro, "Settler and Tribal Farmer", Unpublished paper (Cornell University, 1981), p.12, as cited by Soetrisno, "The Problematic", p.5.

² *Ibid.*

³ Arndt, "The Achievement", p.64.

them to return to their villages¹. The potential benefit of the transmigrasi programme such as new roads, in particular, has been enjoyed by immigrants who dominate economic activities in Irian Jaya².

The Indonesian Government therefore has faced all of these problems in reaching the transmigration goals. This programme, to some extent, has achieved cheaper agricultural produce for the towns and the improvement of the infrastructure³. It may help for the goal of regional development but for the local people, the living standards have not improved. Rather it has caused the rise of hostilities and led to opposition from the local people.

As a result, the objective of national unity, national defence and security has not been accomplished. This was because to bring about the goals, it requires a new society at the border which has economic and political necessity to become a 'cordon sanitair' in the border region. To create this new society it is important that the transmigrasi programme increase the living standards of the local people and above all, they must accept this programme⁴.

Up to now it is still questionable whether the transmigration target of the Repelita IV period has been met. Until October, 1986 the Ministry of Transmigration has put a figure on the number of transmigrants. It stated that 23,088 families (95,294 transmigrants) have settled in Irian Jaya and GOI (The Government of Indonesia)

¹Soetrisno, "The Problematic", p.5-6.

²Manning, "Irian Jaya", in Indonesian Assessment, 1988. ed. Hall Hill and Jamie Mackie (Canberra: Department Political and Social Change, ANU, 1989): p.74-75.

³Ibid. 74.

⁴Soetrisno, "The Problematic", p.3-4.

proposes to adjust the target at the rate of 2,000 families per year¹. Thus, it is doubtful whether the 98,500 families (490,000 transmigrants) which were due to move to Irian Jaya in the years 1986 to 1989 (as a newspaper in Irian Jaya stated) could be met². In 1986/87 there was a cut of over 40% in the manpower and the transmigration section of the development budget, compared with the previous fiscal year, and this showed that the transmigration target would not be achieved³.

It is clear that the transmigration target of the Indonesian Government in Irian Jaya has not been met. Meanwhile a land survey for many sites has been prepared. Studies are being made for a further 1,977,000 hectares of land to be found as suitable for transmigration sites⁴. Therefore, it is no surprise that the concern for the "loss of identity" and "the alienation of land" has spread in both Irian Jaya and Papua New Guinea. This feeling has led to the dissatisfaction of the local people towards the Indonesian Government.

2.3 DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN IRIAN JAYA

Indonesia's development policy in Irian Jaya also contributes to border tensions. The lack of opportunity for the local people in finding jobs in most sectors of the town; the feeling that only a small proportion of the wealth from the exploitation of Irian Jaya's mineral resources by foreign investors, and other parts of Indonesia, will flow back to Irian Jaya; and the lack of sensitivity in developing highland areas, has arguably led to

¹Government of Republic of Indonesia and United Nations Development Program. Regional Development Planning For Irian Jaya. (Lavalin International Inc. in association with P.T. Hasfarn Dian Konsultan, May, 1987), p.77.

²Tifa Irian, 31 May, 1987, as cited by Budiardjo and Liem. West Papua. p.52.

³B. Glassburner, "Survey of Recurrence Development", Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol.2, No.1 (April, 1986): p.1-23.

⁴Government of Republic of Indonesia and United Nations Development Programme, Regional. p.77.

dissatisfaction on the part of the local people.

The lack of job opportunities for the local people, which has become an important problem in the development of Irian Jaya, is a result of the education policy and the influx of immigrants with regard to education, it is necessary to look at the education policy of the Dutch period before 1962.

In 1961, under the Dutch, education was only 11 per cent of total expenditure. However, education was poorly adjusted to the manpower needs of the economy. Only about 1,000 pupils, including 400 Irianese attended advance primary or intermediate secondary schools in 1962. And the single secondary school had 157 students, including 22 Irianese, in the lowest three classes. A number of vocational and technical schools had a total of 975 students. There were no tertiary education institutions. In 1961 there were 95 Irianese who were studying abroad and only this small number could adjust to the manpower needs¹. Obviously education was developed under the Dutch which caused the lack of skilled personnel.

After Indonesia took over Irian Jaya, the education policy has included a priority aspect which was developed by the FUNDWI Programme and the First Five Year Planning (Repelita I) in 1969/70 - 1973/74. The FUNDWI Programme in particular, established projects aimed at developing human resources, especially vocational and teacher training. In addition, other levels of education have also been expanded by the Indonesian Government: enrolments at primary schools in 1972 (123,700) were more than double the 1961 level; secondary school enrolments also developed faster (from 3,232 in 1963 to 13,973 in 1970); enrolment in vocational training schools rapidly expanded (from 1,356 in 1963 to 3,346 in 1970); and for tertiary level, Cendrawasih University was

¹Garnaut and Manning, Melanesian Economy, p.17, 21, 49.

established in 1962¹.

The number of enrolments was impressive but it should be remembered, however, as Lagerberg argued, that the increase of high school and vocational training centre enrolments was a result of the influx of immigrants and not because of local people coming up from the junior grades. The immigrants, probably, had taken advantage of the opportunities open to them². This is borne out by Garnaut and Manning who observed that the unskilled wage and self-employment areas were taken by immigrants and most of the local primary school graduates remained in their villages³. In addition, the shortage of teaching personnel became a problem in filling the education needs. Similarly, vocational training centres with sophisticated equipment established at Jayapura in 1971 were not successful due to the lack of expatriate staff⁴.

In the early 1980s the highest proportion of the development budget in Irian Jaya (one third of the total budget) was allocated to the education sector, especially primary schooling under the National Inpres Programme, which almost doubled enrolments since 1970. The enrolment of both secondary and tertiary education have been fivefold between the years 1970-1985, but the tertiary graduates still remained small. However, again the immigrants seemed to take advantage of this opportunity. The enrolments of upper secondary and tertiary levels were filled by children born to immigrants⁵.

It is clear, then, that the small amount of attention that the Dutch gave to develop

¹Ibid., p.26.

²Kees Lagerberg, West Irian and Jakarta Imperialism (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1979), p.121.

³Garnaut and Manning, Melanesian Economy, p.27.

⁴Ibid., p.29.

⁵Manning, "Irian Jaya", in Indonesia Assessment 1988, ed. Hal Hill and Jamie Mackie, p.66-68.

education in the past was the cause of the lack of skilled personnel. Indonesia attempted to overcome this problem by expanding education rapidly and gave opportunities for immigrants to come to Irian Jaya by lifting the 'quarantine' of this area in 1969 to encourage development. Manning rightly said that "*the initial justification for employment of immigrant civil servants was primarily the shortage of educated and experienced Irianese administrators.*"¹.

The immigrants themselves became a problem in the development of Irian Jaya, not only in education opportunities as stated earlier, but also in job opportunities. There are three immigrant groups, the so called BBM (Bugis, Butonese and Makassarese) which gained benefits from development in Irian Jaya. In the mid 1980s, the number of immigrants increased to 40 per cent of the total urban population of approximately 350,000, and it is likely to increase by 1990 to 50 per cent². Immigrants are generally more successful in many sectors than the local people with regard to the competition for jobs, such as urban informal sectors, industry sectors and public service employment.

In the urban informal sectors, the local people find it more difficult to maintain an equitable share in an already highly competitive urban job market³. The mining sector, did appear to give the local people an opportunity to gain employment. For example, in the Freeport Case, they used several hundred local people for the unskilled jobs, but this number decreased to 40 by the end of the construction phase⁴. In fishing activities, Butonese and Torajanese were prominent in obtaining productive fishing areas. The

¹Ibid., p.67.

²Ibid.

³Further details see Government of Republic of Indonesia and United Nations Development Programme, Regional, October, 1987, Chapter 1, p.1.; see also Garnaut and Manning, Melanesia Economy, p.72.

⁴Osborn, Secret War, p.119.

local people only received little compensation for the licensing of foreign companies to fish their traditional waters. However, in terms of public service employment the competition from immigrants, even for lower level jobs, limited the job opportunities for the local people. Although opportunities for experienced Irianese to fill senior positions in the Government, the key officers in Central Government Departments and important lower level officials ('camat' or head of sub-district) are still employed from outside the province ¹.

Furthermore, Irianese are concerned about the outcome of the exploitation of Irian Jaya's mineral resources. Irianese feel that the wealth that comes from this industry is not used for Irian Jaya and for the needs of the local people. Smith argued that "*a significant proportion of the wealth flows directly to overseas investors and little of the State's share finds its way back to Irian Jaya.*"². This was confirmed by Manning's estimation that copper mining and oil exploitation has dominated the gross regional domestic product (GRDP) since the mid 1970s, but these developments have not had much impact on the regional economy³. This seemed to be true, because in the case of Freeport, this company did not have a specific obligation in the development of the areas⁴.

The next factor, which is very important, in the development of Irian Jaya, is the lack of sensitivity in developing the highland areas. Although there was not much development of West New Guinea under the Dutch the Indonesian Government has had

¹Manning, "Irian Jaya", in Indonesia Assessment, 1988, ed. Hal Hill and Jamie Mackie: p.68.

²Terence Wesley Smith, "Lost Melanesian Brothers: The Irian Jaya Problem and Its Implication for Papua New Guinea", Pacific Studies, Vol.10, No.3 (July, 1987): p.31.

³Garnaut & Manning, "Irian Jaya", in Indonesia Assessment, 1988, ed. Hal Hill and Jamie Makcie: p.65.

⁴Osborne, Secret War, p.119, see also Garnaut and Manning, Melanesian Economy, p.72.

no difficulty in developing urban areas or towns in Irian Jaya¹. Indonesia has made a lot of progress in developing towns in Irian Jaya, by improving the roads, sea and air transport, agriculture, public health, draining water, drainage, and housing². According to Isaac Hindom when he evaluated the three periods of Repelita, the Irian Jaya Economy has shown improvement in becoming integrated into the Indonesian national economy system, especially in sectors such as: agricultural; education; transmigration and government administration. But there still remains a problem regarding the local people's lack of capabilities to compete with other immigrants and the absence of any projects to integrate them into the new environment.³

In addition, the development of rural areas, especially the highland areas has not been successful. The effort to develop rural areas has been managed mainly by the Task Force, and Operation Koteka. This Operation was initiated on August 17, 1971, but from the end of February, 1972 it was placed under the control of the Task Force. The Task Force faced problems in developing rural areas, such as the lack of co-ordination between departments with a community development role (the education, social and health response), and overlapped into the activities of the Special Programmes (the Task Force and Operation Koteka) and routine activities of Government Departments⁴.

It might be true that Indonesia has many problems with regard to the operation of the Task Force, but it appears that there is a natural problem which Indonesia did not take

¹Ibid., p.18.

²Isaac Hindom, "Pengalaman tiga Pelita bagi Irian Jaya" (Experience of Three of the Five Year Plan for Irian Jaya), Paper presented in Seminar Pembangunan Masyarakat Irian Jaya (The Development of Irian Jaya Rural Community), Jakarta, April 30 - May 24, 1984, p.11.

³Ibid., p.20; see also Manning, "Iran Jaya", in Indonesia Assessment 1988, ed. Hal Hill and Jamie Mackie: p.72.

⁴Further detailed implementation of the Task Force. Garnaut and Manning, Melanesian Economy, pp.90-91.

into account when developing the highland areas. This is described by some people as a "lack of sensitivity" and "lack of knowledge" about indigenous people who live in this area. This can be seen from Operation Koteka in 1971.

Operation Koteka aimed at rapidly changing the village pattern of life. This objective may be a good idea to achieve acculturation of the indigenous people with other Indonesians but the time frame in which they hoped to achieve this object was too short. It took two years in each phase and military personnel would be involved in carrying out this policy. However, Manuel Kasiepo rightly said that such operations must be carried out gradually and could not be forced. Every development concept must have a meaning for community itself, so that community would accept it without force¹. Further, the changing of life patterns should be accompanied by economic activities. But the lack of transportation, such as roads, which link the major towns on the coast to the highland areas made efforts to develop this area difficult and economic activity and welfare has not progressed as much as would be desired².

Nevertheless, Indonesia realised that the development of the highland areas is very important in integrating Irian Jaya with the Indonesian National Development Plan. In order to develop this area, with regard to human factors, Indonesia has established a body called "Bimbingan Masyarakat Pedalaman" (The Guidance for Highland Community).

It would seem that, the immigrant domination of education and job opportunities, together with the lack of sensitivity in developing the highland areas has led to the rise

¹Manuel Kasiepo, "Menghindari Modernisasi yang Keliru" (To Avoid the Wrong Modernisation), in Pembangunan Masyarakat Pedalaman Irian Jaya (The Development of Irian Jaya Hinterland Community), Idem et al. (Jakarta: Penerbitan Sinar Harapan, 1985): p.92.

²Manning, "Irian Jaya", in Indonesia Assessment, 1988, ed. Hal Hill and Jamie Mackie: p.73.

of dissatisfaction among the local people towards Indonesian policies. This feeling not only makes it difficult to invite the local people to integrate with other Indonesians, but more importantly, they are reluctant to accept Indonesian rule and are looking for another place that would make them feel more secure and 'at home', that is the Papua New Guinea side of the border, which in turn leads them to cross the border.

2.4 THE CAUSES OF BORDER TENSIONS

The three factors mentioned above have arguably caused the border crossings and border incursions which have given rise to the tensions between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. For example, the OPM guerillas cross the border to avoid Indonesian military operations which occasionally cause border incursions. The dissatisfaction of the local people may encourage them to cross the border onto Papua New Guinea soil where they can find a place that they feel at 'at home', and have a better life. Before 1984 the number of border crossings was not a major problem. Between 1962 and 1982 there were only 2,000 - 3,000 border crossings into Papuan New Guinea which came about for differing reasons, such as: traditional border crossings; a small number of Irianese nationalist seeking political asylum; a number of Irianese villagers seeking temporary refuge as a result of Indonesian military activities, and the OPM guerillas crossing the border to evade Indonesian military operations¹.

However, the interaction of such factors have produced a significant contribution to border tensions. This seemed to be verified in the case of the influx of 12,000 refugees in a few months of 1984 when there were uprisings in Jayapura and Waropko.

In the case of these refugees, one may say that the clash between Indonesia and the

¹May, "Mutual Respect" in Between Two Nations: p.47.

OPM resulted in waves of border crossings into Papua New Guinea Territory¹. Another view is that "*major Indonesian military operations*" and a "*major campaign of fear by the OPM rebels*" have encouraged these refugees².

All of these possibilities appear to be the reasons for the waves of refugees crossing the border into Papua New Guinean territory (see Map II). First, the clash between the OPM and the Indonesian security forces was the cause these refugees, particularly the first wave in February, 1984. At the first wave, there were a large number of Melanesian soldiers police, civil servants, teachers and students who crossed the border. The reports of the existence of the fighting in Jayapura between the OPM and Indonesian security forces were all consistent. This seems to be true as city people did not usually cross the border. These people fled across the border because they most probably feared the fighting, and therefore it was safer for them to cross the border³.

Secondly, major military operations by the Indonesian soldiers and a major campaign of fear by the OPM following the above clash most probably incited the second wave of refugees in March, 1984. In this respect they have incited the villagers to cross the border because they feared the troops who destroyed their huts and gardens while searching for the OPM. But it is possible that they fled because of the OPM as well. The OPM may have influenced villagers to flee the border by telling them that Indonesian troops would shoot and kill them. The OPM may also have encouraged the people to leave their homes with false promises. More than 420 people who crossed the border came from the north-eastern corner of Irian Jaya, and they camped around the

¹Hegarty, South Pacific, p.20.

²Alan Oaisa, "Indonesia-PNG Relations: Past, Present and Future: PNG views" in Beyond the Border, ed. Edward P. Wolfers: p.103.

³Alan Smith and Kevin Hewison, "1984 - The Year OPM Pulled the Plug on Indonesia-PNG Relations, Part 1", Catalyst, Vol.15, No.2 (1985): p.96.

Kamburoto Catholic Mission and at the Green River Government Station, among their friends and relatives. They reported a 'clean up' operation¹. Nevertheless, it is possible that these refugees crossed the border because of the OPM as they were village people who may be easily intimidated by the OPM.

However, it seemed that the Indonesian threats instigated these refugees. This was proven by the incident at Waropko near the town of Mindiptanah on April 10, 1984 when there was a raising of the West Papuan Flag. This incident led the Indonesian soldiers to threaten people that the army would wipe them out if there was a third 'incident'. Consequently, an influx of refugees poured into Papua New Guinea territory. This was confirmed in a Jakarta press report of a tour by the Irian Jaya Governor Hindom, who found that 5,000 out of 8,500 people had gone from the Mindiptanah Sub-District while 4,400 out of 6,100 people had gone from Waropko Sub-District across the border onto Papua New Guinea soil².

The next month in May, 1984, there were about 2,500 refugees who came from the southern part of the border region which is a long distance from Jayapura to cross the border. These people crossed the border to join their relatives to have sago and hunting land on the Papuan side of the border. They are recognised as traditional border crossers³. In this case, their relatives or people of the same clan may have offered them land, which attracted them across the border.

Moreover, one may say that the transmigrasi programme accelerated such refugees to cross the border with Papua New Guinea Territory during the 1984 exodus. In the area

¹*Ibid.*, p.101-103.

²*Ibid.*, p.101.

³*Ibid.*

between Mindiptanah and Tanah Merah, some villages were completely deserted. These refugees reported to a foreign journalist that a land survey was carried out in 1984 in preparation for transmigration¹. However, some people argued that it remained unclear whether there was a connection between the intensification of the transmigrasi programme and the influx of refugees, as many of these refugees came from areas where there was no transmigrants².

This seems to be verified in the case of the first wave of refugees, as they came from the city of Jayapura. In the case of the second wave of refugees, some of them came from areas where there are transmigration settlements, such as Arso and Waris and when they heard reports that there was going to be a 'clean-up' operation this made them flee across the border.

In the case of deserted villages between Mindiptanah and Tanah Merah, it seems highly unlikely that any actual transmigration settlement has taken place here. There are some settlements in the hinterland of Merauke and there are more transmigration plans for that area, but it is questionable whether this caused the exodus of refugees in 1984. Smith and Hewison rightly said that "*transmigration may represent a threat to these people but not an immediate one*"³.

In the case of the inflow of 12,000 refugees, then, there were some extenuating circumstances which encouraged them to cross the border. This was confirmed by stories, such as: clashes; military operation and reprisals; fears and threats and traditional motivation. With regard to the people in the camps, the OPM is rarely mentioned. The

¹Hamis McDonald, "Still hoping against hope", Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), 27 March, 1986, p.28.

²Ian Bell, Herb Feith, and Ron Hatley, "The West Papuan Challenge", p.548.

³Smith and Hewison, "The Year OPM, Part I", p.103.

people are neutral, they are neither for or against it. But they do talk of their independence, and that they will not return until they gain their independence. They speak of the transmigrasi programme in the terms of a cultural threat¹.

It can be seen here, that the transmigrasi programme, to some extent, was not the main cause which encouraged refugees to flee. Rather it was the clashes, Indonesian operations and threats, and a fear of the OPM which incited the exodus of refugees.

However, they should not be seen as separate factors. The uprising in Jayapura has shown that there was interaction between the three factors which caused the exodus. In other words, the OPM took advantage of the dissatisfaction of the local people, both in towns and villages.

The increase of the political influence of the OPM in threatening Indonesian security seems not to be because of an increase in the hard core numbers of the OPM, but because of their capability to mobilise Irianese and to revive their Papuan nationalism which is indicated by their association in the uprising at Jayapura. But why does the OPM have this capability? This is related to the dissatisfaction of Irianese with Indonesian policies, such as military reprisals, the transmigrasi programme and the development policy in Irian Jaya. These policies have given rise not only to the insecurity of Irianese but also the feeling of being a 'second class' in their homeland. On the other hand, they realise that the people in Papua New Guinea, who have the same ethnicity have a more secure feeling and are 'hosts' in their land. This condition has revived their dream to have independence the same as their 'brothers'. Therefore they, in turn, show this feeling which was expressed in the uprising in Jayapura when the OPM gave them the opportunity. This was followed by the influx of refugees

¹Ibid.

which expressed their insecurity.

The OPM has benefited from the dissatisfaction of the local people. It seems that the OPM realised that the first uprising they initiated would be followed by other uprisings in other towns. It was proven by the 'Second Uprising' in Waropko. Further, the OPM was also aware of the advantage of the existence of the border and the influx of refugees. The OPM took advantage of the refugees to gain publicity. The OPM could expect that the incident at the Papua New Guinea border would bring the Irian Jaya issue to the notice of the United Nations¹. Further, it might be true that the OPM cannot survive if they do not have support from the indigenous people who are disappointed with the Indonesian Government's policy². Therefore it might also be true that the Indonesian Government has tended to blame the OPM for forcing villagers to leave³ for their own benefit.

In other words, if the Indonesian Government succeeds in creating the acculturation of the indigenous people with other Indonesian people by making them feel that they are a part of Indonesia, it is unlikely that the OPM could survive. The lack of weapons and external support, together with the absence of Irianese supporters, would most probably bring about the demise of the OPM. More importantly, the question of independence would disappear. The traditional border crossings may still occur, but these people would not cause border tension as they would not be refugees.

¹Oaisa, "PNG Views", in Beyond the Border, ed. Edward P. Wolfers: p.103.

²R. Slamet Roosman, "Pembangunan di Irian Jaya' (The Development in Irian Jaya), Analisa, Vol.8, No.4 (April, 1979):p.12.

³Edward P. Wolfers, "Indonesia and PNG, South East Asia and The South Pacific: Mutual Respect and Cooperation on and Beyond the Border", Beyond the Border: p.32.

However, the possibilities of the rise of a separatist movement in Irian Jaya due to the increase of the dissatisfaction of the local people could not be underestimated. It should be remembered that there is 'Melanesian Solidarity' with Papua New Guinea and other countries. The unwillingness of other Melanesian countries to see the fate of their 'brothers' could give them the moral support in their separatist movement. The possible clash between the indigenous people and the immigrants in the towns, together with the clash between the local people and the Javanese Transmigrants should be taken into account by the Indonesian Government. If a clash occurs and the Indonesian Government uses Military force to defuse the situation this could have an unintended effect. It could cause the revival of the West Papuan Nationalism against Indonesia and could lead to the influx of refugees who cross the border with Papua New Guinea territory. This situation, in turn, could stimulate border tensions.

In conclusion, it is obvious that the clashes between the Indonesian soldiers and the OPM; the Indonesian Military Operations and a major campaign of fear by the OPM and traditional motivation have caused the waves of refugees. The transmigrasi programme and development in Irian Jaya were not the main causes which directly encouraged a large number of refugees, but the impact of these policies have given rise to the disappointment of the local people. This disappointment in turn has been exploited by the OPM to gain support. More importantly, although the uprising of Jayapura was a failure, this incident has shown the political influence of the OPM to mobilise some Irianese against the Indonesian Government. Thus, it can be seen that the interaction of these factors has caused the exodus of refugees.

The number of refugees has given rise to border tensions and affects the Indonesian and Papuan New Guinea relationship. By examining the causes of border tensions it is hoped that approaches can be made to reduce tensions at the border. But before this happens it is important to look at the causes from the Papuan New Guinea side.

CHAPTER 3

THE CAUSES OF THE PROBLEM ON THE PAPUA NEW GUINEA SIDE OF THE BORDER.

In order to understand the significant causes behind the border tensions on the Papua New Guinea side, it is necessary to examine four factors: ethnic relationships; fears of an Indonesian 'invasion'; the existence of the OPM sanctuary on the Papua New Guinea side of the border; and the Papua New Guinea Government's actions.

All of these factors have created a misunderstanding and a mistrust between the two countries which contributed significantly to the border tensions. This chapter will examine each of these four factors.

3.1 THE ETHNIC RELATIONSHIP

The ethnic relationship between the Melanesian people in Irian Jaya and Papua New Guinea which has caused border tensions is a result of the to Papua New Guinean's concern about justice being done to their "*brothers*" in Irian Jaya in respect to the loss of identity and the alienation of land. According to Bernard Narokobi the indigenous people in Irian Jaya are Melanesians, because Melanesia includes several South West Pacific Islands, such as : East and West Papua New Guinea, Solomon, Fiji, Vanuatu, and New Caledonia¹. Therefore Papua New Guinea regards the Melanesian people in

¹Narokobi, "Bernard Narokobi and his Vision of Melanesian", in The Melanesian Way, ed. Henry Olela (Port Moresby: Institute of PNG Studies, 19812): p.12.

Irian Jaya as their "*blood brothers and will always do that until the end of time.*"¹

Motivated by their "*Melanesian Brotherhood*", some people from Papua New Guinea, such as university students, and some Parliament members oppose Indonesia's sovereignty over Irian Jaya. They regard Irian Jaya as a part of Papua New Guinea and the people as brothers of Papua New Guinea's Melanesian group of people should have the same rights to obtain independence. As Narokobi pointed out "*no race has the right to dominate another, through culture, religion, politics or economics.*"². Further he described "*from dawn to dusk, from east to west, the people of Melanesia are crying for freedom and justice.*"³

In addition, they are concerned about the land rights and the culture of Melanesian, because Melanesians believe that land rights are "*an absolute command, and absolute command of mankind and of God that the land of the aboriginal Melanesian must be protected.*"⁴ Therefore Melanesia must not lose their land due to the Javanese⁵. This view has been supported by Father John Momis, a Papuan New Guinea politician who said that "*the ordinary man or woman in Papuan New Guinea cannot support the destruction of Melanesian culture, on land separated from us only by an artificial colonial land border.*"⁶

¹Idem, "A View: p.103.

²Idem. "Vision of Melanesian", p. p.IX.

³Idem, "A View", p.105.

⁴Idem, "Vision of Melanesian", p.12.

⁵Idem, "A View", p.105.

⁶John Momis, "Prospect for Stability in PNG after Ten Years of Independence", speech to Canberra National Press Club, 15th May, 1986, p.2.

In contrast, the Papua New Guinean Government accepts Indonesia's sovereignty over Irian Jaya. As Foreign Minister, Rabbie Namaliu said in July, 1984 "*Papua New Guinea recognises that Irian Jaya is an integral part of Indonesia. Thus Papua New Guinea Government does not want to interfere in Indonesia's internal affairs.*"¹ This does not mean, however, that they do not have sympathy with the Melanesian people in Irian Jaya. Prime Minister Somare, after condemning the OPM activities in Papuan New Guinea admitted "*I have a feeling for Irian Jayans of Indonesia. We were divided by history. We know that we have brothers on the other side, we sympathise with them.*"²

It can be seen, there is an ambivalence even in Government circles. Some groups, mainly some Parliament Members, regard the Melanesian people in Irian Jaya as having the same rights to gain their independence as other Melanesians. But the official view of the Papua New Guinea Government is more concerned with the 'fate' of the Melanesian People in Irian Jaya. Thus, there is legitimate concern about what has been called "*the alienation of land*" and "*the disappearance of Melanesian identity*".

It seems the emergence of the unintended effect of Indonesian policies particularly the transmigrasi programme, to some extent has created this Papuan New Guinea concern. Some people see the transmigrasi programme as "*an invasion programme*" in order to decrease their influence and to kill the Melanesian culture³. Further, one may see that this programme will increase the influence of non Melanesian and the Melanesian people will eventually be "*outnumbered*", their culture and tradition will become assimilated and

¹Rabbie L. Namaliu, "Independent and Constructive Neighbour", in Beyond the Border, ed. Edward P. Wolfers: p.47.

²J. Richardson, "Tough Talking on the Border", Island Business. (May, 1984): p.13.

³Victor Kasiepo, "The Free Papuan Movement Fights Back", AMPO Japan - Asia Quarterly Review, Vol.19, No.3 (1987): p.48.

finally their identity will be lost¹.

However, one can argue that the Indonesian Transmigrasi Programme needs to be understood with regard to the overall concept of the transmigrasi programme generally². This is considered to be the true situation as the transmigrasi programme is part of the Indonesian National Development Policy. Indonesia has carried out this programme in other islands, such as Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi which has different ethnic relations with the transmigrants since the Dutch period. The programme has been successful in other areas.

Furthermore, the goals of the transmigrasi programme are clear. Indonesia does not want to eliminate any tribal cultures. It should be remembered that Indonesia has various ethnic cultures, including Melanesian in the Moluccas, and East Nusa Tenggara, and each ethnic culture respects their own cultures and each others. As Indonesians, they realise that Indonesia as a nation strives towards "Binheka Tunggal Ika" or "*a diversity in unity*". So, as Yusuf Wanandi said "*although Papua New Guinea has a Melanesian culture, it does not follow that only Papua New Guinea can understand Irian Jaya*". For Indonesia, he further argued that "*Melanesian culture is not a problem*", and "*it should not be made a political issue*."³

However, it appears that some groups have used 'Melanesia' as a political issue by talking about the rights of the Melanesian to gain independence. They oppose the Papua New Guinea Government's recognition of Indonesian's sovereignty over Irian Jaya by asserting internal and ethnic links between Melanesian residents on both sides of the

¹Oaisa, "PNG View", in Beyond the Border, ed. Edward P. Wolfers: p.107.

²Ian Bell, Herb Feith, and Ron Hatley, "The West Papuan Challenge", p.550.

³Wanandi, "Indonesian View", in Beyond the Border, ed. Edward P. Wolfers: p.93.

border¹.

The Papua New Guinea Governments's sympathy towards the Melanesians in Irian Jaya may cause border tensions and affect the relationship between the two countries. This sympathy for various reasons could stimulate them into crossing the border and live on the Papua New Guinean side of the border, as they believe that they would be allowed to stay in Papua New Guinea due to the 'permissive residence' that Papua New Guinea gives them. Moreover, the sympathy of some groups, mainly members of opposition within the Papua New Guinea Government because of the ethnic relationship have encouraged the OPM to establish its sanctuary on the Papua New Guinean side of the border which makes it difficult for Indonesia to destroy them.

Obviously, the ethnic relationship between Papua New Guinea and the Melanesian people in Irian Jaya has contributed significantly towards the tension between the two countries. The awareness by both the refugees and the OPM that they would not be treated badly by the Papua New Guinea as they ethnic relations with them is a main factor for the border tension. However, there is another factor which caused border tensions between the two sides, that is the fears of an Indonesian 'invasion'.

3.2 THE FEARS OF AN INDONESIAN 'INVASION'.

The fears that Indonesia could have "*expansionist designs on Papua New Guinea*" seems to have derived from the lack of understanding of Indonesian history. There are some people who regard Indonesia as having territorial ambitions. Premdas who spoke to Papua New Guinea elites, both radicals and pragmatists, has discovered "*a strikingly*

¹Nyamekye and Premdas, "Papua New Guinea - Indonesia Relations", p.47.

widespread underlying fear of Indonesia."¹ There is some basis to Papuan New Guinean fears of an Indonesian 'Invasion', such as: Indonesia's population and military capability; Indonesia's claim over Irian Jaya (was called West Irian); the confrontation of Malaysia; and Indonesia's acquisition of East Timor².

In relation to Indonesia's population, it seems that Papua New Guinea feels vulnerable because its neighbours has such a large population. As one Papuan New Guinean said "*Indonesia is a nation of 150 million people, and we are only three million people.*"³ However, Wanandi argued that "*while it is true that Indonesia is a medium or regional power, Indonesian need not be regarded as a threat to other countries. On the contrary, Indonesia may be a stability factor in the South East Asian region.*"⁴

This seems to be verified by the implementation of Indonesian Foreign Policy in the South East Asia region under the Soeharto Government. Indonesia has brought an immediate end to its confrontation with Malaysia and Singapore, and has formed the ASEAN Regional Co-operation in 1967 as a vehicle to promote regional stability in South East Asia. She also has signed border agreements with her neighbours, such as Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Philippines, and Australia.

In the case of Indonesia's confrontation with Malaysia, Indonesia never made claim to the northern Borneo States. At that time Sukarno opposed Malaysia because he

¹Premdas, "Toward a PNG Foreign Policy: Constraint and Choice", Australian Outlook, Vol.30, No.2 (August, 1976): p.273.

²Ibid., see also J.A.C. Mackie, "Does Indonesia Have Expansionist Designs on PNG?", in Between Two Nations, ed. R.J. May: p.65.

³A Papua New Guinean participant in the Indonesian - PNG Seminar in July, 1984 is quoted by Sabam Siagian in, "Indonesia-PNG Relations: Past, Present and Future: Indonesian View", in Beyond the Border, ed. Edward P. Wolfers: p.98.

⁴Wanandi, "Indonesian View", in idem, p.91.

regarded Malaysia as an imperialist scheme of the British who wanted to maintain its interest in Singapore, Borneo and Malaysia. Therefore Indonesia opposed Malaysia as the natural outcome of the sympathy for the popular uprising of North Borneo against British colonial rule. This does not mean, however, that Indonesia wanted North Borneo for herself¹. Thus Indonesia's confrontation with Malaysia should not be regarded as demonstrating territorial ambitions on the part of Indonesia.

In connection with Indonesia's claim to Irian Jaya, the main principle of its claim is that Irian Jaya (previously West Irian) was a part of the Netherlands East Indies. However, the Dutch always stressed that the right of self determination must be utilised by the population of New Guinea. The Dutch arguments to substantiate this were: the ethnic difference between Papuans of West Irian and the rest of the Indonesian people, the incapability of the Indonesian Government to rehabilitate West Irian after the war².

This argument was irrelevant as Indonesia consisted of a number of different ethnic groups, including Melanesian, that the Dutch called the Papuans. Indonesia does not regard racial affinity as the determining criteria for its nationhood.

Similarly, the arguments of the Indonesian incapability to develop West Irian is not valid. It is fact that in the Dutch period West Irian was poorly developed, especially in the highland areas and lagged well behind other Indonesian islands. It should be remembered that it was considered that the Dutch kept this territory for their own interests and had prepared this territory to obtain independence as discussed in the previous chapter.

¹Gde Agung, Twenty Years, p.465, Mackie "Over Indonesia", in Between Two Nations, ed. R.J. May: p.80; see also Bernard Gordon, "The Potential for Indonesian Expansionist", Pacific Affairs, Vol.36, No.4 (1963-64): p.385.

²Gde Agung, Twenty Years, p.86.

Thus, Indonesia's claim over Irian Jaya derived from "*the central principal of nationalism and anti colonialism*"¹ to oppose the Dutch who colonised Indonesian territories which they called the Netherland East Indies which included West Irian. It cannot be accepted that 'expansionism' is a factor in the Indonesian campaign for West Irian.

In the case of East Timor, there was no claim that this territory had been part of the former Netherlands East Indies as there is in Irian Jaya. When the Portuguese left East Timor they had not prepared the local people to obtain their independence and Indonesia was concerned about their security because of the infighting amongst the three factions trying to control power, which resulted in a breakout of fighting between the UDT (Uniao Democratica Timoreuse) and the Fretilin in July, 1975. Indonesia tried to coordinate with the Portuguese to facilitate the smooth changeover of power but the consultation broke down when the fighting broke out in July, 1975.

Indonesia was concerned that the military victory of the Fretilin would give an opportunity for communist regimes to control East Timor and could make this area, at least, "*a beacon light to flickering sessionist*", a launching pad for communist subversion against Indonesia². Thus Indonesia would not have interfered in the national affairs of East Timor if the Portuguese Government had conducted a plebiscite properly when it was still a Portuguese colony³.

The Papua New Guinea fears of Indonesian expansionism grew due to the lack of understanding regarding Indonesian history. It should be remembered that Papua New

¹Mackie, "Does Indonesia" in Between Two Nations, ed. Edward P. Wolfers: p.91.

²Peter Hastings, "The Papuan New Guinea - Irian Jaya Border Problem", Australian Overlook, Vol.31, No.1, (April, 1977): p.58.

³Wanandi, "Indonesia's View", in Beyond the Border, ed. Edward P. Wolfers: p.91.

Guinea is very different from other cases in which Indonesia has carried out her 'tough' policy. Indonesia does not have a claim over PNG which is different from the case with Irian Jaya. With Irian Jaya, the Dutch did not want to return this territory to Indonesia. It is true that Indonesia does not have a claim over East Timor, but the decolonisation of the Portuguese Government in East Timor did not proceed smoothly properly, which led to a threat to Indonesian security.

Papua New Guinea is a sovereign state. Indonesia has never made claim to Papua New Guinea, Sabah or Sarawak and has no intention of incorporating them into Indonesia. Actually, Papua New Guinea should not consider the possibility of Indonesia invading them as Indonesia considers Papua New Guinea as a sovereign state, who is a member of the South Pacific Forum, the Commonwealth, and has close relationships with Australia. As Hastings rightly said that "*...Jakarta has enough problems without adding to them...*"¹. The economic development and maintenance of peace is a priority for Indonesia.

Obviously Indonesia does not have territorial ambitions towards Papua New Guinea. In the meeting between President Soeharto and Prime Minister Michael Somare in January, 1977, Soeharto stressed that "*Indonesia has never had any territorial ambitions.*"² Nevertheless, the continuing Papua New Guinea fears of an Indonesian 'invasion' may cause border tensions.

Such fears may stimulate Papua New Guinea's suspicions towards Indonesia's policies and actions regarding the border. For example, the transmigrasi programme has invited Papuan New Guinea suspicions about Indonesia expansion. As Oaisa pointed out in

¹Hastings, "Irian Jaya Border Problems", p.670.

²See Joint Communiqués by President Soeharto and Prime Minister Michael Somare. Johnson, 13th January, 1977 as in Beyond the Border, ed. Edward P. Wolfers.

1984 the transmigrasi programme is "*a step towards expansion of present territorial boundaries. The placing of non Melanesians among or close to the border would provide conditions conducive to such a policy.*"¹

However, Wanandi argued that the transmigrasi programme which is located near the border is not based on any military strategy, but because the area is suitable for agriculture². This is the situation in Kurik and Erom which are located close to the border of the Merauke Province. The transmigrasi programme is generally successful here which is due to the land having a relatively high agricultural potential.³

Furthermore, Mackie discovered that there were general border incidents in 1978 which were regarded by many in Papua New Guinea as indications that "*Indonesia aspired to dominate and perhaps ultimately to annex the eastern half of the island.*"⁴ It seems that these people did not consider the reasons underlying the border incidents as stated earlier. The lack of border markers on the ground has caused Indonesia to violate the border in seeking the OPM who fled into Papua New Guinea. It means that over the 10 years that border incidents have taken place there are still not enough markers to define the border properly. This is nothing to do with 'invasion' as some people fear.

Therefore, Papua New Guinea's fear of 'invasion' could be an over reaction to Indonesia's action. For example, in relation to the border incidents in 1984 when the military aircraft of Indonesia flew over 20 kms. inside Papua New Guinea, the Papuan

¹Oaisa, "PNG View", in *Beyond the Border*, ed. Edward P. Wolfers: p.107.

²Wanandi, "Indonesian View", in *idem*: p.91.

³Hilman Najib, "Transmigration Project in Irian Jaya", *Indonesian Reports*, Culture and Society Supplement (December, 1986), trans. Beverly Blaskett: p.79.

⁴Mackie, "Does Indonesia", in *Between Two Nations*, ed. R.J. May: p.65.

New Guinea Government decided to review the continued presence of the Indonesian Defence Attache due to the delayed response of the Indonesian Government regarding this matter. Moreover, it might be possible that Papua New Guinea would send their troops to the border due to the fear that Indonesia would invade their territory if these border incidents accelerate. It is unlikely that Indonesian border incursions would occur if the OPM did not flee across the border to their sanctuaries in Papua New Guinea.

So, the fear of an Indonesian 'invasion' to some groups within Papua New Guinea would lead to border tension due to over-reaction to Indonesia's action. If Papua New Guinea does not have such fears, they would not see a 'threat' from Indonesia to their territory. They would have more understanding of Indonesia's action which is not a 'threat' to them. Furthermore, they do not need to rely on another country to face "such threat". This, in turn, would decrease tensions between the two countries.

3.3 BASES FOR THE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT

The existence of OPM sanctuaries in Papua New Guinea territory may cause border tensions due to Indonesia suspicions that the OPM could use Papua New Guinea soil as a base to fight against Indonesia. Hastings noted in 1985, that there are 14 refugee camps which are bases for the OPM on the Papuan side of the border. It means that the OPM has become "*an increasingly effective political organisation*"¹ which easily stimulates Indonesian action.

In this respect, the Indonesian soldiers crossed the border to search for the OPM. Further, the Indonesian military may have attacked several of these camps by helicopter

¹Hastings, *Indonesian Report*, No.29 (1985), as cited by J.W. Smith, "Lost Melanesian Brothers: The Irian Jaya Problem and its Implications for Papua New Guinea", *Pacific Studies*, Vol.10, No.3 (1987): p.35.

transport¹, which is likely especially if the OPM increases their attack on Indonesian outposts or other targets in Irian Jaya which would threaten the stability and security. After attacking the OPM would flee across the border to prevent Indonesian pursuit and this, in turn, encourages Indonesia to violate the border which in turn invites Papua New Guinea's protests. It was proved for example, in June, 1978 when six Indonesia patrols raided a Papuan New Guinea village and destroyed their gardens in pursuit of the OPM, inviting Papua New Guinea's protestations². To date, the clash with Papua New Guinea forces has been avoided.

Regarding this clash, Smith analysed that a clash with Papua New Guinea's forces seemed inevitable if border incursions continued³. However, it depends on how often and how fierce the border incursions occur. As long as border incursions do not threaten Papua New Guinea security, or do not stimulate their fears of 'invasion', it is likely that a clash between Indonesian and Papua New Guinean forces will be avoided. It is possible for the two countries to prevent future strains as long as they have a the mechanism to communicate, such as the Joint Border Committee. It has been 10 years (since the late 1970s) that border incursions have led to a clash between the two countries. This situation could change however and a breakdown the relationship could occur if the Papua New Guinea Government changes its policy as discussed in Chapter 1.

Moreover, Smith stated that other tensions could occur if the Papua New Guinea Government allowed the OPM to gain external support while they were camped on Papua New Guinea soil. This possibility is based on Osborn's observation that "*the*

¹Ibid.

²May, "East of the Border", in Between Two Nations, p.97.

³Smith, "Lost Melanesians", p.35.

*linkages between OPM sympathisers in Papua New Guinea and the Soviet Union, Cuba and North Korea have been alledged at various times*¹. In Smith's view if significant external support to the OPM is given it will lead to the potential of an armed conflict on Papua New Guinea soil due to Indonesia's clash with OPM guerillas.

However, this possibility is unlikely as the OPM's ideologies are not clear. This problem has become an obstacle for the OPM in gaining external support either from east or west². In addition, the Papua New Guinea Government will not let those countries use Papua New Guinea soil to supply their aids to the OPM. If the Papua New Guinea Government allows external support to the OPM it would be within the realms of possibility that Indonesia would launch 'a small lesson attack' to warn Papua New Guinea. But it is highly unlikely that Indonesia would invade Papua New Guinea.

It is true that the OPM operation at the camps in Papua New Guinea have caused border tensions and a possible military clash between the two countries, but there are other factors that influence the Papua New Guinea Government's action towards Indonesian policies which are discussed below.

3.4 PAPUA NEW GUINEA ACTION

The Papua New Guinea Government's policy or action with regard to border problems may cause tensions, because Indonesia will not tolerate the Papua New Guinea Government doing anything which would prevent Indonesia from carrying out its policies in the border region.

¹Osborne, *Secret War*, p.168-171.

²Premdas, "Continuity and Change", p.1061.

To maintain its relationship with Indonesia, Papua New Guinea is attempting to carry out a 'tough line' policy both to the OPM and the refugees. It seems that the Papua New Guinea Government realises that if it is contemplating confrontation with Indonesia it must take into account Indonesia's armed forces which number over 200,000 troops, compared with the Papua New Guinea Defence Forces (PNGDF) of 3,500. This condition may influence the Papua New Guinea Government not to aid the OPM. As Somare said "*we have a population of only 2.5 million people. When we see such a big population in the country bordering ours we must not create any disputes with Indonesia.*"¹

The tough line policy of the Papua New Guinea Government can be seen, especially in June/July, 1978 when Papua New Guinea had a joint military operation with Indonesia along the border to destroy the OPM. One month later, in September, 1978, the Papua New Guinea Government arrested and jailed the leader of the OPM, Seth Rumkorem and his deputy, Jacob Prai². In 1985, the Papua New Guinea Government, as Premdas observed, had employed what he called "*aggressive posture against the OPM*" which covered returning refugees, searching the OPM house to house and military patrols along the border³. In the same year, the Government had arrested the OPM leaders, monitored the activities of known sympathisers, and conducted its own military operation against the OPM⁴.

However, this has not brought about the destruction of the OPM. Although Papua New

¹May, "East of the Border", in Between Two Nations: p.92.

²Nyamekye and Premdas, "P.N.G. Indonesia Relations", p.37 and 43.

³Premdas, "Continuity and Change", p.72.

⁴Indonesian Reports, 11th May - 3rd June, 1985.

Guinea conducted regular border patrols, the number of PNGDF troops deployed have not been large. In the early 1980s when there were some reports of OPM activities there were only two border patrols each year¹. Therefore the OPM still survives and attacks Indonesia from Papua New Guinea side of the border, and Indonesian violates the border to pursue the OPM. For example, in April, 1988, the OPM attacked a transmigrasi settlement at Arso, and Indonesian troops crossed the border to pursue the OPM guerillas into Papua New Guinea territory. Indonesian troops stayed there for three weeks and withdrew after they made contact with the PNGDF patrol.²

This situation created tension at the border and affected the relationship between the two countries. Either side accused each other. Indonesia accused Papua New Guinea of not respecting the Border Agreement because they let the OPM find sanctuary in its territory. On the other hand, Papua New Guinea accused Indonesia of violating this agreement because of the Indonesian border incursions. It is obvious that the border situations was influenced by the Papua New Guinea Government's action or policy towards the OPM. So far, the Papua New Guinea Government's policy not to support the OPM has succeeded to maintain its relationship with Indonesia, but the border problem still exists.

In addition, Papua New Guinea's action to refugees may give rise to border tensions. According to the Papua New Guinea Government, a 'refugee' is *"person who has left his or her country of origin, and is unwilling to return because of what our Government judges to be a justifiable fear of persecution for reasons of political opinion."*³ The Government allows these refugees to remain as permissive residents if they show that

¹Peter Hastings, "Defence Under Attack", FEER, 23rd June, 1984, p.45.

²Niugini Nuis, November 4, 1988, as cited by Hegarty, "PNG in 1988. Political Crossroads?", Asian Survey, Vol. XXIX, No.2 (February, 1989):p.185.

³PNGFAR. December, 1985, p.34.

they are likely to suffer persecution by returning to Irian Jaya. They may not engage in any political activity. But amongst these refugees are some leaders of the OPM who are using Papua New Guinea as a base for operations against the Indonesian Government. This would lead to a confrontation as Papua New Guinea will not return these people to Indonesia. The Government allows them to remain in Papua New Guinea until acceptable arrangements can be made for them to be resettled in a third country. But refugees who fled across the border without any political reason will be returned to Indonesia. And for the people who want to return to Indonesia, the Papua New Guinea Government has asked Indonesia's insistence to guarantee their safety on their return¹.

However, such a policy is not strong enough to appease Indonesian concern. Indonesia is worried that the Papua New Guinea policy on refugees would promote future problems for Indonesia. Firstly, it is possible that refugees who had been given permissive residence by Papua New Guinea may continue to support the OPM's idea for independence, although they have given a guarantee not to engage in political activity. Most of the Irianese in Port Moresby who have already become Papuan New Guinea citizens have sympathy for the OPM².

Secondly, OPM leaders who stay in a third country might to give moral support to the OPM movement to fight Indonesia and to make propaganda for their struggle abroad. Indonesia wants them to repatriate to Irian Jaya and face the consequences of their actions against Indonesia. Thirdly, the refugees, who cross the border, because of a campaign of fear by the OPM and Indonesia military operations, may become bases for the OPM. Therefore, Indonesia wants the Papuan New Guinea Government to repatriate

¹Ibid., see also J.D.B. Miller, "PNG in World Politics", Australian Overlook, Vol.27, No.2 (August, 1973): p.193; see also Tempo, 9th June, 1984, p.16.

²Ibid., p.13.

all refugees to Irian Jaya, not only because of the above concerns, but also because the consider these refugees to be Indonesian citizens. Further, in Indonesia's view the repatriation of all refugees to Irian Jaya will decrease the border crossings.

Unfortunately, the Papua New Guinea Government faces obstacles in fulfilling Indonesia's claim. There is opposition within the Government which, probably due to their interest and popularity, will oppose the Papua New Guinea policy to destroy the OPM and repatriate all of the refugees. This restrains the Government from going further as the Opposition may shake the Government's credibility. For example, the deportation of October 1985 generated a revolt within the Somare Cabinet¹. Obviously the opposition in the Papua New Guinea Government may not cause border tensions directly, but it is this opposition which may influence Papua New Guinea Policy which causes border tensions. While Indonesia would like the Papua New Guinea Government to take a stronger stand with problems regarding the border it understand the difficulties facing the Papua New Guinea Government.

In conclusion, it can be seen that one of the main factors which caused border tensions on the Papua New Guinea side is the ethnic relationship between Melanesian people in Irian Jaya and Papua New Guinea. This ethnic relationship has stimulated Papua New Guinea's concern about the fate of their 'brothers' in Irian Jaya. This feeling, together with the fears of Indonesia policies and action, for example, the transmigrasi programme and border incursions create a misunderstanding between the two countries.

The ethnic relationship is a main reason for some groups within Papua New Guinea (mainly the Opposition) to oppose or criticise Papua New Guinea's policy towards the OPM and the refugees. Therefore, Papua New Guinea policy or action towards border

¹Mc Donald, "A long, slow process", *FEER*, 27 March 1986, p.26; see also Ian Andrews, "Rumpus Over Refugees", *ibid.*, p.36-37.

issues are not strong enough to help overcome border tensions. Consequently, border tensions between the two countries still continue.

Thus, both Indonesia and Papua New Guinea have causes which contribute to border tensions. So far, the escalation of the border tensions has been avoided due to steps taken by both countries to reduce tensions.

CHAPTER 4

APPROACHES TO TENSION REDUCTION

The previous chapter examined the border problem and the issues which caused border tensions both from Indonesia's and Papua New Guinea's viewpoint. Both countries have tried approaches to overcome these tensions such as legal instruments, diplomacy, and the use of a third party. However, all of these approaches need to be evaluated to assess how effective they are in overcoming, or at least reducing, these border tensions.

Before examining each approach, it is useful to recognise which are 'physical' and 'psychological' problems associated with the overall border problems.

The refugees; the border incursions; and the OPM are physical problems which need to be handled immediately by both countries as they directly affect border tensions. Both countries have tried various approaches to overcome these problems such as the Border Agreement; the Role of a Third Party (Australia and the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR)); and a Joint Border Patrol.

The ethnic relationship and the fear of an Indonesian 'invasion' are psychological problems which need time and patience to overcome. If the physical problem is overcome then the psychological problem can be handled more easily as they are inter-related. The flow of refugees make their 'Melanesian solidarity' stronger, and the border incursions by Indonesian troops or helicopters have stimulated fears in Papua New Guinea of an Indonesian 'invasion'.

4.1 THE BORDER AGREEMENT

In international relations, a border agreement is generally an attempt to overcome a border problem. It is usually concerned with the delineation of the border. Indonesia and Papua New Guinea have solved border delineation and administration problems. In 1973 Indonesia and Australia, on behalf of Papua New Guinea, signed the Border Agreement and the Border Administration. In the first Agreement, 14 border markers were established and in the latter, administrative border arrangements have been managed (see Appendices I and II). According to Article 13 of this Agreement, the Agreement will be reviewed five years from the date of ratification.

After Papua New Guinea's Independence in 1975 the two countries reviewed the Agreement and signed the Basic Agreement on Border Administration in 1979 and 1984. Indonesia and Papua New Guinea formulated new important articles in these Agreements in order to establish more communication between the two countries with regard to the border problem, such as: the Joint Border Committee (Article 2 of the Basic Agreement 1979 and 1984); and the Exchange Information on Major Construction (Article 14 of the Basic Agreement 1984). According to Article 2, the Joint Border Committee (JBC) should consist of senior officials of both Governments. This Committee "*shall formulate guidelines and procedures for the effective implementation of this Agreement*" and "*shall, as appropriate, advise and make recommendations to their respective Government on all matters...*" Further, this Committee shall meet at least once a year as well as when necessary, upon request of either Government (see Appendix II).

Furthermore, as with the Border Agreement of 1973, in the Basic Agreement of 1979, the Article concerning the Liaison Arrangement still existed which stressed assistance to the JBC. This article stated that two liaison meetings should be established: first, a level of primary liaison, between officials from Jakarta and Irian Jaya and officials from

Port Moresby and the Western and West Sepik Provinces: and second, a level of secondary liaison between officials of the Kabupaten or Kecamatan in Irian Jaya and their counterparts in the districts in Papua New Guinea. The aim of these liaison meetings are as follows: to exchange information, to facilitate the practical operation, to ensure that both governments through the JBC are kept informed of significant developments relating to the border areas: and to consider local technical or development matters affecting border communities. Meeting are held at intervals not exceeding two months (see Appendix II).

Another new article is the Exchange of Information or Major Construction related to Border Development on both sides. According to Article 14, the two Governments shall keep each other informed of any major constructions (roads, dams, bridges, aerodromes) within a five kilometre zone on either side of the border. The imbalance of the development along the border will attract border crossers from one side to the other.

So far, Indonesia and Papua New Guinea have succeeded in achieving the Basic Agreement on Border Administration. In addition, the countries have signed four Memoranda of Understanding in Port Moresby on August 4, 1982, as follows:

1. Memorandum of Understanding on the establishment of the JBC;
2. Memorandum of Understanding on the establishment of a radio circuit;
3. Memorandum of Understanding on the survey and demarcation of the international border;
4. Special management on traditional and customary border crossings¹.

Since 1982 there has been an Annual Joint Border Committee Meeting together with

¹Ronald Nangoi, "Indonesia-PNG Relations", The Indonesian Quarterly, Vol.X, No.4, (October 1982): p.8.

irregular meetings of the Border Liaison Committee. The two Governments have established a 'hot line' between Jayapura and Vanimo. In the context of border survey and demarcation since 1983, the two countries have agreed to a joint survey of the entire border including placement of new markers for clearer definition of the border. By 1985, the placement of border markers had been completed between Bensbach and the Fly River Bridge and this would continue up to the northern side¹.

However, the extent to which these mechanisms are effective in handling the border problem need to be evaluated. In order to know the effectiveness of the various legal instruments, it is important to estimate the situation at the border. It seems that Reviews were required in 1973, 1979 and 1984 due to border problems.

In 1977 and 1978 refugees crossed the border and border violations occurred. For example, hundreds of Irianese crossed the border into Papua New Guinea territory due to the intensification of conflict between the OPM and Indonesian military forces in the period leading up to Indonesia's national elections². There were also reports that Papua New Guinean villagers were shot by an Indonesian patrol on the Papua New Guinean side of the border³. In 1978, there were major incursions by Indonesia in the border area while searching for the OPM who crossed the border into Papua New Guinea to avoid Indonesian military operations⁴. In this period the Indonesian and Papua New Guinean relationship deteriorated because of these incidents. In order to prevent further deterioration of relations, Indonesia and Papua New Guinea changed their policy. Indonesia scaled down military operations and Papua New Guinea carried out a 'tougher

¹PNGFAR, December, 1985, p.38.

²Canberra Times, 20th October, 1981, quoted in May, "East Border", in Between Two Nations: p.95.

³Post Courier, 30 May, 1977, quoted in May, idem, p.95.

⁴Ibid., 22, 23 June, 1978, quoted in May, idem, p.95.

line' policy towards the OPM as stated earlier. These developments resulted in the signing of the Basic Agreement of 1979.

Similarly, the situation in the border area between 1979 and 1984 warranted Indonesia and Papua New Guinea reviewing the Basic Agreement in 1979. In this period, there was an upsurge of OPM activities within Irian Jaya during 1981 and their activities escalated¹. There was also an increase in the number of border crossings. Further, as mentioned in Chapter 1 there were several border violations by Indonesia in 1981, 1982 and 1983. The most important development which caused border tensions was the influx of refugees who crossed the border into Papua New Guinea in February, 1984. After this development, Indonesia made some efforts to ensure that her relationship with Papua New Guinea did not deteriorate. For example, Vice President Umar Wirahadikusumah and his entourage visited the far eastern province to view the situation for themselves. These efforts to maintain a good relationship has led to the achievement of the Basic Agreement in October, 1984².

It is clear that the Border Agreement is not a guarantee that the border problem can be overcome totally. The existence of the OPM sanctuaries and the border violations by Indonesia in the periods before and after 1979 have shown that the Border Agreement could not prevent situations from occurring, although there is an article for security which states that either side should not allow their respective border areas to be used for hostile activities (see Appendix II).

However, there are some mechanisms which maintain communications between the two countries to discuss border problems and this prevents further deterioration of their

¹Canberra Times, 20 October, 1981, quoted in May, *idem*, p.105.

²Ian Bell, Herb Feith, and Ron Hatley, "The West Papuan Challenge", p.551.

relationship. There are the JBC, and the Border Liaison. In his speech on the occasion of the signing of the Revised Basic Agreement, Namaliu said that the JBC and the Border Liaison have greatly contributed to the effective administration of the border.

On the other hand, May argued that the machinery of the border liaison was generally ineffective. He gave an example of the flow of refugees in February, 1984 and observed that Indonesian officials did not know anything about the problem in Jayapura regarding the situation there as 'normal'. This was in spite of the fact that residents on the Papua New Guinea side of the border confirmed that Jayapura was in darkness and its government radio station silent. At that time there had not been a border liaison meeting for over a year, and the 'hot line' of Jayapura and Vanimo "*had been out of service*" for several months¹.

It may be that what May observed was because there had not been a border liaison meeting for one year, and the 'hot line' of Jayapura and Vanimo had been out of service for several months. So when the flow of refugees occurred in February, 1984, Papua New Guinea initiated a special border liaison meeting between officials of both countries to discuss the problem. In the meeting, they discussed the improvement of communication links between Vanimo (Papua New Guinea) and Jayapura. Although the two delegations failed to reach an agreement on the future of the border crossings, this meeting showed that they can communicate with each other, which is an important factor in maintaining their relationship².

An evaluation of the effectiveness of the JBC and the Border Liaison depends on what people expect from this committee. If people expect that the Committee can overcome

¹May, "Mutual Respect", p.52.

²PNGFAR, March, 1984, p.8.

the border problem quickly and decisively, the JBC and the Border Liaison functions can be regarded as not too effective. For example, the JBC meeting in Bandung broke up after 4 days, because of the failure to achieve an agreement on the proposals for joint search and rescue operation in the border area¹. But, if people expect that the committee and the Border Liaison is a mechanism for the two countries to communicate and to avoid further escalation of border situation, then the committee is effective. It is worth noting that it is better to have a mechanism to communicate which may prevent an increase of tension than to have nothing.

It should be remembered that the JBC is not only a useful means for communication, but also for Survey and Demarcation and Procedure together with a procedure for the implementation of subsidiary arrangements, such as a technical sub committee, and detailed arrangements for traditional border crossers. These have been negotiated and agreed upon at the JBC meetings².

Moreover, the Article on the Exchange Information of Major Constructions as stated earlier may be useful to control border development for as Yusuf Wanandi stated "*The aim was to prevent large scale migration, which will otherwise certainly create severe problems for both sides*"³. With regard to the exchange of information on border development, Papua New Guinea informed Indonesia that approximately K1 million was spent in 1983 on this project and the same amount is expected to be spent this year (1984). Similarly, Indonesia informed Papua New Guinea that they had spent an equivalent amount on Border Development⁴. Further, although border development on

¹May, "Mutual Respect", p.52

²PNGFAR, March, 1984, p.9.

³Wanandi, "Indonesian's View", p.92.

⁴PNGFAR, March, 1984, p.10.

both sides has not had much progress¹ in preventing border crossings the exchange of information seems to be respected by both countries.

So, it can be seen that Indonesia and Papua New Guinea have tried to overcome the 'physical' problem, such as border violations, border crossers, border development, and the OPM, by various legal instruments. These instruments are effective in reducing border tensions but do not overcome the border problems completely. The influx of 12,000 refugees in 1984 gave rise to another problem for the two countries, which needs a totally new approach. A third party may be of value in reducing tensions; that is Australia and the UNHCR.

4.2 THIRD PARTY : AUSTRALIA AND THE UNHCR

4.2.1 Australia

Besides the Indonesian and Papua New Guinean efforts, Australia could be expected to play a role in reducing border tensions. Ziegler discovered that there were several functions for a third party, e.g., provide good offices and a neutral place for disputants to meet, and to delay any action until tempers have cooled².

In the case of the Indonesian and Papua New Guinean border problem, Australia would be a useful third party. In the context of refugees, Australia could suggest that Papua New Guinea employ a hard line towards the refugees. It can be seen from what Bill Hayden has advised in Port Moresby that Papua New Guinea was "*to adopt proper screening procedures, identify the real refugees, separate the OPM activities from the*

¹May, "Mutual Respect", p.51.

²David Ziegler, War Peace and International Politics.(Toronto: Little Brown and Company, 1987), p.298-301.

*other border crossers and create the condition for these people to go back to Indonesia*¹.

Further, according to Babbage, in terms of a possible escalation of border tensions, Australia may counsel Papua New Guinea to carry out stronger measures to prevent illegal border crossers to avoid conflict with Indonesia. On the other hand Australia could approach Jakarta to have patience with Port Moresby².

But instead of reducing tensions, if Papua New Guinea's relies on Australia's defence to deter Indonesia's policy on border issues, it would escalate the problem. Further, a possible establishment of a Defence and Security Co-operation Treaty between Papua New Guinea and Australia would also escalate the tensions.

4.2.2 The Involvement of the UNHCR.

According to David W. Ziegler, *"the UN's contributions to peace are similar to those of third parties in disputes... One thing a third party can do is provide good offices ..."*³. Thus, in the case of refugees, one of the areas in which the United Nations can contribute is with supervision and observation.

Before 1984, both Indonesia and Papua New Guinea had similar views on a solution to overcome the border crossings without the involvement of the UNHCR. Indonesia wanted to keep the UNHCR out of the border crossers problem. Indonesia regarded that border crossers are an internal affair and opposed internationalisation of this problem. In Indonesia's view, the involvement of the UNHCR is an admittance to the fact that

¹Budiardjo and Liem, West Papua, p.103.

²Babbage, The Dilemma, p.10.

³Ziegler, War and Peace, p.323.

these were refugees rather than border crossers.

Similarly, Papua New Guinea was reluctant to refer to border crossers as refugees, because they regarded them as Indonesian citizens who should be returned to their original abodes. Prime Minister Somare stated that Papua New Guinea did not want the UNHCR to be involved in the refugee problem because Papua New Guinea was not a party to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the status of refugees, and therefore, Papua New Guinea was not subject to the provisions of this international agreement¹.

However, the inflow of refugees in 1984 caused a change of policy. It is fact that before 1984 both Indonesia and Papua New Guinea were able to overcome the border crossing problem, as the numbers were small. So, the UNHCR was not needed to solve the problem. But the problem became too big for the two countries to solve when the number of refugees increased alarmingly. For Indonesia, the camps housing the border crossers became potential bases for the OPM to act against Indonesia. For Papua New Guinea, besides the cost problem, the criticism of The Opposition together with public opinion put Papua New Guinea in a difficult situation when making decisions on the refugee problem.

It was not surprising that when Paias Wingti came to power in late 1985, he implemented a new policy concerning the border crossers. He insisted on the involvement of the UNHCR in screening the refugees, supervising repatriation and administering and caring for the refugees in the camps on the Papua New Guinea side of the border. And therefore, in January, 1986, the Papua New Guinean Government signed the United Nations Convention of Refugees and the Protocol Relating to the

¹PNGFAR, December, 1984, p.24.

Status of Refugees¹.

Meanwhile, Wingti tried to persuade Indonesia to agree that the UNHCR should have a role in determining the status of the border crossers. In February, 1986, in a joint communique, the Indonesian Government declared that it "*respected Papua New Guinea's decision to assign a greater role to the UNHCR on its territory*"². It seemed that Indonesia secured "a quid pro quo" for the involvement of the UNHCR with a Treaty of Mutual Respect, Friendship and Co-operation which was signed on 27th October, 1986 (see Appendix V)³.

The official view of both the Papua New Guinea and the Indonesian Governments is that the involvement of the UNHCR in looking after the border crossers is a positive move. The Papua New Guinea Foreign Minister Namaliu stated that the new policy "*would contribute positively towards stabilising the border situation, and provide a better climate for cross border arrangements.*"⁴ Similarly, the Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja noted the constructive effort being taken by the Papua New Guinean Government under the new policy "*to improve border security, border camp management, and more cost effective delivery of humanitarian assistance to border camps*".⁵

¹Wolfers, "Mutual Respect", in Beyond the Border: p.34.

²Budiardjo and Liem, West Papua, p.104.

³Colin Brown, "Indonesia, the Southwest Pacific and Australia", World Review, Vol.27, No.2, June, 1988:p.46.

⁴PNGFAR, March, 1986, p.17.

⁵ibid.

It might be true that the involvement of the UNHCR is a positive approach in handling the refugee problem. To look after the refugees a substantial amount of money is required which the Papua New Guinea Government does not have. The involvement of the UNHCR can handle this finance problem. In fact, the UNHCR has provided almost K2 million (in 1985), K2 million (in 1986), K3 million (in 1987)¹ to the Papua New Guinea Government to assist refugees. Without the financial support of the UNHCR, it is difficult for Papua New Guinea to maintain the large number of refugees. The lack of a budget for Papua New Guinea to look after and repatriate the refugees may cause the unhealthy conditions for these refugees, such as death, sickness etc. This situation may stimulate criticism from The Opposition and the public within Papua New Guinea which could lead to the loss of office, as happened to the Somare Government. This, in turn, may cause the Papua New Guinea Government to adopt a 'less tough policy' which would stimulate border crossers.

Moreover, the involvement of the UNHCR may stabilise the border situation because they have resources to build refugee camps long distances from the border. For example, the East Awin Camp in Western Province². This situation would create and improve the security and administration of the border. In the case of security, the placing of refugee camps far away from the border might prevent the OPM from exploiting the refugees. In the context of administration, the reduction of refugee camps would make these camps easier to manage and more efficient for the delivery of humanitarian assistance³. However, Foreign Minister Vagi rightly said that "*relocation should be a temporary measure until screening had determined who should return to go*

¹PNGFAR, December, 1985, p.37; Sinar Pembaruan, 10 Maret 1987.

²ibid., March, 1986, p.17; see also Budiardjo and Liem, West Papua, p.105.

³ibid., March, 1986, p.12.

home"¹.

With the UNHCR implementing the repatriation, it is most probable that the repatriation would be accepted more readily than if either Indonesia or Papua New Guinea implemented it. For example, when Indonesia and Papua New Guinea's team visited the West Sepik Province as a first step in the implementation of the proposed repatriation programme, there was a violent and unprovoked demonstration by some of the border crossers in the Blackwater Camp near Vanimo². By mid January, 1986 the UNHCR announced that *"it believed up to one third of the Irianese then in PNG - probably around 10,000 in number - were ready to return home, and another one third would return if their safety could be guaranteed"*³.

However, the UNHCR faced obstacles in repatriation of the refugees. Although the programme should have commenced in 1986, by March, 1988, only 2,000 refugees had actually been moved⁴. By 1987 there were still 10,029 refugees in Papua New Guinea refugees camps; only 1,295 refugees had returned to Irian Jaya⁵. The reluctance of Indonesia to allow the UNHCR to monitor homecomings as an essential prerequisite for a voluntary repatriation programme has become an obstacle to the repatriation of refugees. In addition, new arrivals of border crossers on the Papua New Guinea side of the border have continued. For example, in September, 1986, a group of 747 Irianese arrived in West Sepik and they told Papua New Guinean officials that six or seven

¹Budiardjo and Liem, West Papua, p.105.

²PNGFAR, December, 1984, p.22; see also Tempo, 17 November, 1984.

³Brown, "The Southwest Pacific", p.46.

⁴Budiardjo and Liem, West Papua, p.105.

⁵Sinar Pembaruan, 10 Maret, 1987, the numbers of refugees was given by PNG Ambassador, Brian Amin in Jakarta.

hundred more people were waiting to cross. They complained about maltreatment by Indonesian troops¹.

Furthermore, although the UNHCR did not make any progress in finding third country asylum for Irianese refugees, in August 1986, at least five guerilla leaders who gave up the struggle - James Nyaro, Alex Derry, Gerardus Thomy, Ries Wyder and David Titiemka - were resettled in Ghana in August, 1986². Although the resettlement of the OPM leaders in a third country may give rise to problems in the future for the time being it will influence the OPM activities which should lead to reduced border tensions.

Obviously, to some extent the involvement of the UNHCR is effective in reducing border tensions in terms of security and administration which prevents further possible tensions. Actually the UNHCR would be effective in repatriating the refugees if there were no obstacles in implementing it. Thus, the most effective way to handle the refugees would be to deal with the root problem which caused the rise of refugees.

Meanwhile Indonesia is trying to overcome the cause of the border problems, that is the OPM. To eliminate the OPM, Indonesia needs Papua New Guinea's co-operation. Indonesia is anxious to invite Papua New Guinea to have a Joint Border Patrol. In Indonesia's view, a joint border patrol is the most effective way to flush out the OPM.

¹Budiardjo and Liem, West Papua, p.101.

²Ibid., p.105.

4.3 A JOINT BORDER PATROL

For Indonesia, a joint border patrol would be as effective in destroying the OPM as the Jakarta-Kuala Lumpur Joint Border Patrol was in eliminating the Communist insurgency in North Kalimantan. Indonesia and Malaysia have carried out 'search and destroy' operation, and 'hot pursuit' rights in respect of each other's territory. Besides, Indonesia regarded a Joint Border Patrol as coming under the provisions of Article 9 of the 1979 Agreement that emphasises the importance of close co-operation with one another.

However, Papua New Guinea has refused repeated requests for a Joint Border Patrol. In his statement released in October, 1985, Father John Momis of the Melanesian Alliance Party emphasised that "*there will be no pursuit by either the Indonesian military or security forces into our territory*"¹. Therefore, it was no surprise that the JBC meeting held in Bandung in October, 1986 broke up due to the failure to reach agreement on proposals for a joint search and rescue operation in the border area. Papua New Guinea refused these proposals.

Obviously Papua New Guinea did not accept a Joint Border Patrol as a solution to eliminate the OPM. May observed that there were two reasons why Papua New Guinea resisted the Indonesian request. First, it is politically impossible to have a Joint Border Patrol because any government that agreed to it would lose office. Secondly, the Jakarta/Kuala Lumpur Joint Border Patrol was not a model that could be applied in the Papua New Guinea/Indonesia case because of the difficulty in distinguishing between Indonesia Melanesians and Papua New Guinea Melanesians². In the case of the

¹PNGFAR, December, 1985, p.35.

²May, "East Border", in Between Two Nations: p.225-226.

Jakarta/Kuala Lumpur - Joint Patrol it was easy to recognise Chinese Communist terrorists among the Malays.

May might be right when he commented on the possibility of losing office because when in June - July, 1978 Papua New Guinea and Indonesia held the Joint Military Operation along the border to eliminate the OPM, it caused so much debate and anxiety that Papua New Guinea would be reluctant to repeat it again. It seems then that the ethnic relationships between Papua New Guineans and the Melanesians in Irian Jaya prevented the Papua New Guinean Government from accepting the Indonesian request.

Another obstacle in having a Joint Border Patrol is that Papua New Guinea does not see the OPM as a proscribed organisation and consequently is rarely prepared to deploy troops against it. Papua New Guinea does not see the OPM as a significant threat to their security. Therefore they do not want to deploy their Defence Force to the border¹. Thus, the absence of a common perception of threat has become an obstacle in establishing a Joint Border Patrol. It is different with the Jakarta - Kuala Lumpur Joint Border Patrol. They could co-operate with each other, because they perceived a common enemy².

So, a solution of a Joint Border Patrol between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea is not a viable proposition, although this approach may be effective. Up to now, Indonesia and Papua New Guinea have not found an approach that would effectively eliminate the OPM at the border area. It seems, in relation to the OPM, that the Treaty of Mutual Respect, Friendship and Co-operation is not too meaningful when handling this problem. The OPM still resides in Papua New Guinea and the border incursions by Indonesian

¹Interview with David Hegarty in March, 1989.

²Hastings, "Irian Jaya Border Problem", p.51.

troops still occur up until 1988.

It is clear that the approaches such as the Border Agreement and the involvement of a third party is effective in reducing border tensions and in preventing further escalations of border situations. It is true that these approaches cannot totally overcome the physical problem, because border incursions, border crossers or refugees still continue, and the OPM still exists.

On the other hand, there are the psychological problems, mainly on the Papua New Guinean side which need to be overcome, because it will influence the Papua New Guinea policy and action and in turn, lead to border tensions. To overcome the psychological problem, both sides need to understand each other which can be obtained not by legal instruments, but other instruments dealing with diplomacy, such as personal contact, bilateral forums and regional co-operation.

4.4 PERSONAL CONTACTS

In order to understand the importance of personal contacts in approaches to reducing border tensions, it is useful to know the value of diplomacy in preventing conflict between the two countries. According to David W. Ziegler, diplomacy is "*the process of talking over differences, clarifying aims, and exploring adjustments short of fighting*", and "*the emphasis in diplomacy is on communication*"¹.

Accordingly, diplomacy is an important instrument for Indonesia and Papua New Guinea to communicate their differences and their aims. It is a fact that there are differences in their history, culture and political system, which each other needs to understand,

¹David W. Ziegler, *War and Peace*, p.277.

especially with regard to the border problem. The lack of understanding about these differences gives rise to misunderstandings on both sides. On the one hand, the lack of sensitivity and knowledge of Indonesia about the local people in Irian Jaya has caused misunderstanding with some groups within Papua New Guinea. These groups are concerned that the Melanesian culture will disappear. On the other hand the lack of understanding about the Indonesian history, culture and their perception of security have given rise to the fear of Indonesian 'expansion' on the part of some Papua New Guineans. Clearly, it is important for the two countries to communicate with each other in order to handle this misunderstanding.

In relation to diplomacy as a communication instrument, Indonesia and Papua New Guinea have had numerous exchange visits by political leaders to consolidate the Indonesian and Papua New Guinean relationship. There were meetings of the two Heads of Government in January, 1987, June, 1979, and December, 1980. There were also meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the two Governments in May and December, 1978, in April and October, 1984, in February 1986, and in March, 1987. In addition, there have been frequent contacts at an official level. For example, between March and June, 1984, a large number of government figures visited the far eastern province to see the situation for themselves, such as: Vice President Umar Wirahadikusumah, Internal Minister Supardjo Rustam, Leaders of the Legal Aid Institute¹. In March, 1987 the head of the Papua New Guinean Parliament, Brown Sinamoi visited Indonesia².

All of these personal contacts have created communication between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea and given them a chance to explain their position. In the meetings between the two heads of Parliament and the two Foreign Ministers many issues were

¹Ian Bell, Herb Feith and Ron Hatley, "The West Papuan Challenge", p.551.

²Sinar Pembaruan, 23 Maret, 1987.

raised including bilateral issues with regard to the border problem. These meetings led to the achievement of the Basic Agreement on Border Arrangement as mentioned earlier. Further, in these meetings, Indonesia reiterated her position regarding the question of East Timor and stressed that Indonesia had never had any territorial ambitions¹.

However, how far are these personal contacts useful in creating understanding and reducing border tensions? It seems, these meetings and exchange of visits have not been very effective in creating understanding with some groups within Papua New Guinea especially The Opposition. It was shown by their opinion towards the Treaty of Mutual Respect, Friendship, Co-operation. Some Opposition members described the treaty as '*naive and misconstrued*', '*sinister*' and an '*exercise in hypocrisy*'². Obviously this group is still suspicious about Indonesia's intention towards Papua New Guinea.

However, one may argue that the frequent personal contacts are effective in fostering the understanding of the Papua New Guinea Government which was shown when Prime Minister Paias Wingti stated that the treaty "*would give direction for the future and inspire confidence in Papua New Guinea and its regional neighbour*"³. Further, the Papua New Guinea Government has appreciated Indonesia's position on East Timor as a domestic affair of Indonesia in a speech by Prime Minister Somare in 1977⁴.

But the need to create understanding became important when another approach had to be found when the influx of refugees occurred in 1984. Indonesia and Papua New Guinea need another forum to communicate which involves other groups from different

¹See appendices of Joint Communiques/Statements of Indonesia and PNG in Beyond the Border.

²Post Courier, 29 October 1986, quoted in May, "Mutual Respect", p.44.

³Ningini Nuis, 28 October, 1986, quoted in *idem*.

⁴The Joint Communique Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, in Beyond the Border, p.187.

disciplines, that is a bilateral forum.

4.5 BILATERAL FORUM

The decision to hold a bilateral seminar as a forum to communicate arose from the meeting of the two Foreign Ministers of Governments (Mochtar Kusumaatmadja and Rabbie T. Namaliu) in April, 1984. It appears that the flow of refugees in February, 1984 which attracted international attention gave rise to this idea. The first seminar held in Port Moresby on 20th and 21st July, 1984, was attended by academics, government officials, journalists, and other experts and leaders from the two countries.

The involvement of various kinds of experts showed that Indonesia and Papua New Guinea realised that to overcome the border problem, especially the psychological problem, a forum with broader participation was required. The effectiveness of personal contacts has only achieved contact between the officials at a high level in the Papua New Guinea Government. This approach did not reach other groups that actually play an important role in creating tensions between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. For example, some groups who opposed the government's border policy came from local and foreign university students, lecturers and journalists in Port Moresby¹. In the case of journalists, the news that they wrote about the border crossers, or about the deaths in refugee camps, may attract public sentiment towards the Papua New Guinean policy on refugees.

Therefore, it was important to have a forum that involved some people who came from different disciplines to create mutual understanding amongst them. In this forum, Indonesia and Papua New Guinea were discussing issues frankly and openly. For

¹Premdas, "Over Irian Jaya Border", p.47.

example, on the one hand Indonesia explained that the Indonesian 'Transmigrasi' Policy does not mean to make the Melanesian culture disappear and Indonesia does not have any territorial ambitions. As Mochtar Kusumaatmadja assured his listeners, "*It will be sheer madness if we had territorial ambitions on Papua New Guinea. You should have no concern for this.*"¹. On the other hand Papua New Guineans were talking about the ethnic relationship between the Melanesian people in Irian Jaya and the Papua New Guineans, explaining the Melanesian culture, and asking that Indonesia protect their culture and their interest. They felt strongly that Indonesia was not doing enough to understand the Melanesian culture of Irian Jaya.

There have now been three seminars between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. They not only discussed their bilateral interest, but also regional developments. In relation to the regional issues, the two countries were discussing South East Asia and ASEAN, Papua New Guinea and the South Pacific, Papua New Guinea and Australia. It seems that Indonesia and Papua New Guinea are trying to improve their relationship by finding a common interest to maintain regional stability either in South East Asia or in the South Pacific region.

However, the effectiveness of a bilateral forum to create mutual understanding and trust needs to be assessed. Alfred Sasako observed that the Papuan New Guinea - Indonesian dialogue in 1984 achieved 'very little' because of some misunderstanding about what the meeting was all about. The Papua New Guinean side thought that they were there to discuss the border issues which caused tension in the Indonesia and Papua New Guinean relationship².

¹PNGFAR, December, 1985, p.36.

²*Ibid.*, p.35.

It could to be true that the dialogue of the two countries gave 'very little' if the Papuan New Guinean side expected too much for a solution to the border problem at this forum. The aim of the establishment of this forum was *"to foster the kind of understanding and mutual trust that appears to have been absent for many years"*¹.

However, it is too early to estimate how far the Indonesia - Papuan New Guinea dialogue can foster mutual understanding and trust. Indeed, the Indonesia - Papua New Guinea dialogue is not effective in reducing tension in a short time. The border tensions still occur. For example, during 1987, there were seven occasions on which Indonesia's troops crossed the border onto Papua New Guinea soil to search for OPM guerillas, without first consulting with Papua New Guinea authorities as required under the Treaty of Friendship. David Hegarty rightly observed that *"Despite the enormous turnaround in trust and confidence between Jakarta and Port Moresby that had occurred under Wingti, the rise of border security remains a sticking point."*².

In the long term, however, the Indonesian - Papua New Guinea dialogue may be effective in reducing border tension when the two countries become more and more understanding of each other and what they should do to tackle border problems with regard to the physical problems. This may follow with the elimination of the psychological problems. For example, on Indonesia's side, there is an understanding that Indonesia should take into account an anthropological approach in the development of Irian Jaya. But it would take a long time to see the implementation of this policy. In this respect, Papua New Guinea should understand this problem and not be concerned about the disappearance of the Melanesian culture.

¹Ibid.

²Hegarty, "Papua New Guinea in 1988, Political Crossroads?", Asian Survey, Vol. XXIX, No.2, (February, 1989): p.185.

In addition, the two countries need to implement some efforts to foster mutual understanding and to improve their relationship. For example: exchange of visits by social and national leaders; exchange of information through the mass media; conferences; as well as the exchange of students and scholars in various disciplines¹. The Technical Co-operation Agreement which was signed by the two countries in 1979 needs to be developed. So far Papua New Guinea has sent more than 100 people to Indonesia for training in the fields of agriculture, education, health, housing, small industry, statistics and social affairs².

Obviously the effectiveness of the Indonesian - Papua New Guinean dialogue can be seen in the long term and will depend on how far physical problem can be tackled.

4.6 PAPUA NEW GUINEA'S MEMBERSHIP OF ASEAN

In order to know the value of ASEAN for Papua New Guinea it is necessary to understand the importance of regional co-operation. According to David W. Ziegler, a regional organisation will have more success in maintaining peace among the members, if they have a common interest. They may have similarities or similar problems which make them understand regional disputes better, and help to find an appropriate solution³. So, in this context Papua New Guinea may have benefit as an ASEAN member.

The idea of Papua New Guinea's membership of ASEAN was motivated by their hope that smoother relations at the border would occur. This idea arose in 1984 when border tensions with Indonesia increased. The possibility of Papua New Guinea becoming a

¹Wanandi, "Indonesian Views", p.92.

²Brian K. Amin, "Papua New Guinea Indonesian Bilateral Relations: Problem and Prospects", paper presented in Second Indonesian - Papua New Guinean Conference, Jogjakarta, November 9-10, 1985, p.34.

³Ziegler, War Peace, p.198.

member of ASEAN was raised by the Somare Government. As Somare stated in an interview given in Honolulu, in February, 1984: "*if and when we are invited to join ASEAN of course Papua New Guinea will join*"¹.

However, it took two years before Papua New Guinea formally stated her intention to become a member of ASEAN in the 19th Meeting of ASEAN's Foreign Minister on 23 and 24th June, 1986 in Manila. In early 1986, Papua New Guinea stated that she wanted to sign the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in South East Asia. This statement indicated that Papua New Guinea had become closer to ASEAN. Papua New Guinea has attended all ASEAN Conferences since 1976 and in 1981 acquired observer status. Further, in 1985 Papua New Guinea was invited to join three ASEAN Committees : food, agriculture and forestry, social development and social technology, thereby upgrading its status from an observer².

The idea of Papua New Guinea's membership of ASEAN as an approach to decrease border tensions have been debatable, because it relates to the question of how far Papua New Guinea may take advantage of the economic, politic and security interests available as a member of ASEAN. In terms of economic interest, Hewison observed with relation to trade, access to expertise and investment, Papua New Guinea can be satisfactorily organised on a bilateral basis. To increase co-operation Papua New Guinea does not have to become an official member of ASEAN³. The similar view was pointed out by Robert Igara that "*Papuan New Guinea seems unlikely to gain substantial benefit from*

¹Hewison et al, "PNG and Membership of ASEAN", Australian Outlook, Vol.39, No.3, (December, 1985): p.171.

²Pacific Islands Monthly, July, 1985, p.7.

³Hewison et al, "Membership of ASEAN", p.174.

intra ASEAN co-operation in trade and industry"¹.

While it is probably true that in terms of trade, industry and investment Papua New Guinea will not benefit greatly from being a member of ASEAN, it should however be considered that there are still some benefits for Papua New Guinea. There would be advantages in attempting to co-operate with ASEAN in commodity negotiations aimed at improving access to overseas markets and at stabilising prices². Further, as Peter King noted Papua New Guinea can learn from ASEAN expertise and experience in such fields as small scale rice production and light manufacture, which would be an excellent way to promote long term economic independence³. Papua New Guinea will not gain this benefit from its trade relationships with Australia, because Australia adopts export oriented industrialisation manufactures. Moreover, it should be remembered that there are other non member countries which participate in ASEAN -through the 'dialogue' process, e.g. the US, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, EEC (European Economic Community) and the United Nations Secretary and Papuan New Guinea may benefit from this.

Furthermore, in terms of politic and security factors, Papua New Guinea's benefit in becoming an ASEAN members is debatable as well. As Hewison put it "*it is questionable whether Papua New Guinea, inside ASEAN, could maintain much independence on the issue of Irian Jaya ...*"⁴. He further argued that "*even if Papua New Guinea was to join ASEAN, it seems most unlikely that it would be able to muster*

¹Robert Igara, "PNG's REgional Environment", *Beyond the Border*, ed. Edward P. Wolfers: p.72.

²*Ibid.*

³Peter King, "The ASEAN Connection - For and Against", *PNGFAR*, July, 1981, p.31.

⁴Hewison et al., "Membership of ASEAN", p.173.

*sufficient support from other member states to bring pressure to bear on the Indonesian regime to soften its hard line approach to the OPM ..."*¹.

However Paulius Matane, then Secretary for Foreign Affairs and Trade, may be right when he said that Papua New Guinea can expect that ASEAN will be used as a means to promote its foreign policy and explain its position on issues which are common to ASEAN countries, including the administration of land boundaries and refugees². For example when a border violation by Indonesia occurred in June, 1984, Namaliu raised this matter at the 17th Annual Meeting of ASEAN's Foreign Ministers and hoped that every Foreign Minister present understood the matter clearly³. At that time, Papua New Guinea still an observer, not a member of ASEAN, was able to raise the question.

The raising of this matter at the ASEAN forum has not overcome the border problem but it is possible that as a member of ASEAN, Papua New Guinea may expect that other ASEAN members can persuade Indonesia to soften its hard line approach regarding the OPM, but not to bring pressure on Indonesia about her policy as Hewison stated. This is possible as ASEAN has the basis to solve problems amongst its members, as symbolised in the ASEAN Concord and the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in South East Asia. In fact, there are sources of conflicts among ASEAN members, such as: Sabah's claim between the Philippines and Malaysia, Communist insurgency and Muslim separatism at the border of southern Thailand and Malaysia, where conflict has been avoided. Thus, in this case, Papua New Guinea may hope that the rise of the possible conflict between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea will be avoided. Moreover, Papua New Guinean membership of ASEAN could make Papua

¹Ibid., p.174.

²Ibid., March, 1984, p.8.

³Ibid., December, 1984, p.20.

New Guinea feel more secure with regard to the fear of Indonesia's 'expansion'. ASEAN is a realisation of Indonesia's good neighbourly policy, so it is unlikely that Indonesia will threaten one of its members¹.

In addition, Papua New Guinea may play a significant role in creating stability in the Southwest Pacific region which is consistent with Papua New Guinea's objective to create stability in the region². In this respect, the Papua New Guinea's Membership of ASEAN can be used as a bridge between ASEAN and the South Pacific Forum³. A close co-operation between ASEAN and South Pacific Forum will lead to stability in this region.

It also means close co-operation between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea to promote their respective interests. To become a member of ASEAN, Papua New Guinea must be accepted by all of the members. In this case Indonesia will be trying to persuade other ASEAN members to accept Papua New Guinea as a member. On the other hand, Indonesia would like to use Papua New Guinea as a "good office" to dilute South Pacific support for anti Indonesian rebels. As Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja said "*ties with Papua New Guinea are needed in order to save Indonesia's image in the South Pacific.*"⁴

It is clear that Papua New Guinea's membership of ASEAN may reduce border tensions, as Papua New Guinea will feel more secure in regarding its fear of an Indonesian

¹J. Kusnanto Anggoro, "Masalah Keanggotaan PNG Dalam ASEAN" (The Problem of the PNG's Membership of ASEAN). *Suara Karya*, 15 July, 1986.

²Government of PNG, *Foreign Policy*, p.43, 59, 114, quoted in Hewison et al. "The Membership of ASEAN", p.173.

³Wanandi, "Australia, Indonesia, PNG and the South Pacific", *Beyond the Border*, ed. Edward P. Wolfers: p.122.

⁴*Jakarta Post*, 7 February, 1987.

'invasion'. This feeling may influence the Papua New Guinea Government to employ a 'tougher line' policy or take action towards border issues which would lead to reduced border tensions. Further the success of Papua New Guinea in diluting the South Pacific support for 'West Papuan self-determination' will reduce border tensions as well. This, in turn, may contribute to regional stability in the South West Pacific region.

On the whole, it can be seen that there are still obstacles to implementing the Joint Border Patrol and Papua New Guinea's membership of ASEAN, although these approaches may be effective in reducing border tensions. But other approaches that Indonesia and Papua New Guinea have been trying seem to be effective in reducing border tensions. It was proved that the two countries can maintain a good relationship - although the border problem still exists.

CONCLUSION

All of the approaches to tension reduction examined in chapter 4 just deal with symptoms of the border problems, not the underlying causes. All of these diplomatic and legal mechanisms are meaningless to overcome the border problem totally if the parties involved do not deal with the real problem, that is the development policy in Irian Jaya. It means Indonesia needs to rethink her policy.

As mentioned in Chapter 2, Indonesia has carried out policies to develop Irian Jaya and to integrate the province into the Indonesian National Development Policy. But it seems the Indonesian Government has carried out the national standard development policy in this territory which has given an unintended effect which led to the border problem. Moreover, this policy has instigated negative feelings in Papua New Guinea due to the ethnic relationship that they have with the people in that part of Irian Jaya.

The Transmigrasi Programme which has been successfully implemented in most other areas, has stimulated hostility among the local people in Irian Jaya. Moreover, it has incited negative feeling by Papua New Guinea about "*the disappearance of Melanesian culture*" due to Javanese transmigrants.

In addition, regarding the spontaneous immigrants, every Indonesian citizen has the right to go anywhere in any other part of Indonesia. It seems in most parts of Indonesia the immigrants have to compete in obtaining jobs and other opportunities. In the case of Irian Jaya, the immigrants have dominated the opportunities for jobs and education which leads to the rise of the local peoples' dissatisfaction. Indonesia should realise that they erred in the development of Irian Jaya but whatever the mistakes it is important

that Indonesia now corrects the mistake.

As Sabam Siagian said:

"whatever policy mistakes or cases of mismanagement we Indonesians have done during the past years in the province, it is not merely rhetorics if I say now, a determination to develop the Irian Jaya province in a responsible manner, to correct past mistakes, to be more sensitive to local anthropological factors is now visible."¹

It is obvious, Indonesia has realised its mistakes by the fact that it is now making an enormous effort to correct its mistakes. With regard to the transmigrasi programme, there was a team of a social scientists from Gadjah Mada University headed by Mubyarto (who visited the province in January, 1985) to survey the effects of the transmigrasi programme. Another survey was headed by Kahpie Suriadiredja to do the same. Each of these reports suggested that the Indonesian Government had made serious mistakes in Irian Jaya and that existing policies needed to be rethought².

In relation to the development in Irian Jaya there were some efforts to estimate what the result of development policy has been. There was the Indonesian Journalist Association in 1984 which organised a working seminar on development of Irian Jaya. Indonesian anthropologists and social scientists were invited to deliver their thoughtful papers. This seminar found that the development of Irian Jaya must be carried out more effectively, more responsibly and with an anthropological approach.

The Indonesia military solution, instead of suppressing the OPM, has created fear in the Irianese towards Indonesia and stimulated their sympathy to the OPM movement. It is true that in the past, Indonesia succeeded by using military force in suppressing separatist movements, but in the case of the OPM, it has caused an unintended effect

¹Sabam Siagian, "On Indonesian - Papua New Guinean Bilateral Relations : Some Priorities for a joint discussion", paper presented in Second Indonesian - Papua New Guinean Conference, Yogyakarta, November 9-10, 1985, p. 5-6.

²Ian Bell, Herb Feith and Ron Hatley, "The West Papuan Challenge", p.551.

which has given rise to the border problem. This is because there is a direct border and the ethnic relationship with Papua New Guinea. The OPM takes advantage of this condition and crosses the border to avoid Indonesian pursuit and uses scare tactics on the village people regarding the Indonesian military and encourages them to cross the border as well.

The Indonesian Government did not realise the result of its development policy in Irian Jaya until the uprising in Jayapura and the movement of 12,000 refugees who fled across the border. Indonesia and Papua New Guinea then made an effort to reduce border tension as mentioned earlier. However, the border problem cannot be overcome with the approach adopted by the two countries.

It is clear, that Indonesia has realised her mistakes and needs to rethink its approach in order to correct these mistakes. The Indonesia Transmigrasi Programme needs to be implemented with great sensitivity and respect for local culture and interest. The target of the Transmigrasi Programme needs to be re-evaluated to consider the condition of the areas and the local people as well as the Indonesian Government's capability to move such a large number of people. If the Programme has still not reached its objectives, the increase of transmigrants may give rise to the hostility of the local people.

Further, with regard to the development of Irian Jaya it should be considered that a large role should be given to the Irianese in the administration of the province. Accordingly, the Melanesian should have a role in the decision-making for Irian Jaya.

However, it is too early to see how all of these efforts will be implemented. It takes a long time to see the result of a new understanding as mentioned above. Yusuf Wanandi rightly said that *"to expect that they should immediately change their way of life seem to*

*be asking too much ... Irian Jaya cannot be developed overnight*¹.

In relation to the OPM, Indonesia has tried to carry out a 'non-military' policy, but it did not work. On the Indonesian side, she tried to carry out a 'smiling policy' in May, 1978 when a group of senior Indonesian officials flew by helicopter to a village southeast of Jayapura to consult with and to bring medical supplies to people who agreed to stop resisting Indonesia. But this mission was responded to by attacks from armed villagers who killed two pilots and seven officials were imprisoned by the OPM. After this Indonesia increased troop numbers at the border². It seems armed villagers who were OPM sympathisers or members of the OPM prevented "*the smiling policy of Indonesia*". But on the other hand, as stated earlier, the Indonesian military reprisals instead of suppressing the OPM have caused fear among the local people.

So, Indonesia needs to rethink her military solution. Less military patrolling and less threatening of people at the border may be an appropriate policy to prevent the fears of the local people towards Indonesian soldiers. This policy may also avoid "*a major campaign of fears by the OPM*" to the local people. The military policy is needed to protect and defend the security of the local people and the transmigration settlements from the OPM.

Clearly Indonesia needs to change her development policy in Irian Jaya to overcome the border problem by dealing with the real problem. However, it needs time to see how far the changes of policy will take to be carried out.

If Indonesia changes her policy, and the local people accept it, then the border crossings

¹Wanandi, "The Indonesian View", in *Beyond the Border*, ed. Edward P. Wolfers, p.89.

²May, "East of the Border", in *Between Two Nations*: p.100.

will become less and less, and the OPM will not have basis to move against Indonesia. In this case, Indonesia might offer an amnesty policy¹ as a possible strategy to invite the OPM guerillas to surrender. It is likely that the resolve of the guerillas could weaken in view of their lack of material resources, food, medicine, weapons and external support.

However, Hastings rightly said that "*the solution lies not only in changed Government attitudes but in the Irianese themselves*"². It means that when the Indonesian Government changes the development policy in Irian Jaya so that the Irianese would have a larger role in administering Irian Jaya, then the Irianese should take this opportunity and show that they are capable of administering it.

¹Interview with David Hegarty in March, 1989.

²The Sydney Morning Herald, July 6, 1989.

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APPENDIX I.

**Agreement between Australia and Indonesia concerning
certain boundaries between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia,
Jakarta, 12 February 1973**

AUSTRALIA AND INDONESIA

Recognising the desirability of having boundaries of political and physical permanence between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia,

Considering the desirability of demarcating more precisely in certain respects the land boundaries on the island of New Guinea (Irian) as described in Articles I, II, III and IV of the Convention between Great Britain and the Netherlands dated the sixteenth day of May One thousand eight hundred and ninety-five

Noting the steps taken since then in relation to the demarcation of the land boundaries on the island of New Guinea (Irian),

Noting in particular, with appreciation, the work of the Joint Survey by the Australian and Indonesian Survey Authorities (in this Agreement called "the Joint Survey") in surveying boundaries on the island of New Guinea (Irian) as described in their final report dated the twelfth day of February One thousand nine hundred and seventy,

Recalling that in the Agreement between the Australian and Indonesian Governments dated the eighteenth day of May One thousand nine hundred and seventy-one (in this Agreement called "the 1971 Seabed Agreement") the two Governments left for further discussion the question of the seabed boundary line between the point of Latitude 9 degrees 24' 30" South, Longitude 140 degrees 49' 30" East (Point B1 shown on the chart annexed to this Agreement and on chart "A" annexed to the 1971 Seabed Agreement) and the point at which the land boundary between the Territory of Papua and West Irian meets the southern coast of the island of New Guinea (Irian),

As good neighbours and in a spirit of friendship and co-operation

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The boundary between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia on the island of New Guinea (Irian) shall be more precisely demarcated as follows:

- (a) In the north the boundary is the meridian of Longitude 141 degrees East extending southwards from the point of the intersection of the meridian with the mean low water line on the northern coast, located at Latitude 2 degrees 35' 37" South, to the point of its most northerly intersection with the waterway ('thalweg') of the Fly River and that meridian shall be deemed to lie along the geodesic lines successively linking the markers MM1, MM2, MM3, MM4, MM5, MM6, MM7, MM8, MM9 and MM10 established by the Joint Survey and indicated on the chart annexed to this Agreement.
- (b) From the point of the most northerly intersection of the meridian of Longitude 141 degrees East with the waterway ('thalweg') of the Fly River (at present located at Latitude 6 degrees 19' 24" South) the boundary lies along that waterway to the point of its most southerly intersection with the meridian of Longitude 141 degrees 01' 10" East (at present located at Latitude 6 degrees 53' 33" South).
- (c) From the last-mentioned point the boundary is the meridian of Longitude 141 degrees 01' 10" East extending southwards to the point of Latitude 9 degrees 08' 08" South (Point B3 shown on the chart annexed to this Agreement) and that meridian shall be deemed to lie along the geodesic lines successively linking the markers MM11, MM12, MM13 and MM14 established by the Joint Survey and indicated on the chart annexed to this Agreement.

ARTICLE 2

The Governments of Australia and Indonesia, as soon as practicable after the entry into force of this Agreement and at a time to be agreed upon by them, shall arrange for aerial or satellite photography of that part of the Fly River referred to in Article 1(b) of

this Agreement. Thereafter, such photography of that part of the Fly River shall be arranged periodically at intervals to be agreed upon.

ARTICLE 3

Immediately off the southern coast of the island of New Guinea (Irian), the boundary between the area of seabed that is adjacent to and appertains to Papua New Guinea and the area that is adjacent to and appertains to Indonesia shall be the straight lines shown on the chart annexed to this Agreement commencing at the point of Latitude 9 degrees 24' 30" South, Longitude 140 degrees 49' 30" East (Point B1) and thence connecting the points specified hereunder in the sequence so specified:

B2 The point of Latitude 9 degrees 23' South, Longitude 140 degrees 52' East

B3 The point of Latitude 9 degrees 08' 08" South, Longitude 141 degrees 01' 10" East referred to in Article 1(c) of this Agreement.

ARTICLE 4

The point B3 referred to in Articles 1(c) and 3 of this Agreement is the present location of the point of intersection of the meridian of Longitude 141 degrees 01' 10" East with the mean low water line on the southern coast of the island of New Guinea (Irian). If the point B3 ceases to be the point of such intersection the land boundary referred to in Article 1(c) and the seabed boundary referred to in Article 3 shall meet and terminate at the point at which the straight lines connecting the points MM14, B3 and B2 shown on the chart annexed to this Agreement intersect the mean low water line on the southern coast.

ARTICLE 5

For the purpose of this Agreement 'seabed' includes the subsoil thereof, except where the context otherwise requires.

ARTICLE 6

If any single accumulation of liquid hydrocarbons or natural gas, or if any other mineral deposit beneath the seabed, extends across any

lines that are referred to in this Agreement, and the part of such accumulation or deposit that is situated on one side of the line is recoverable in fluid form wholly or in part from the other side of the line, the Governments of Australia and Indonesia will seek to reach agreement on the manner in which the accumulation or deposit shall be most effectively exploited and on the equitable sharing of the benefits derived from such exploitation.

ARTICLE 7

Off the northern and southern coast of the island of New Guinea (Irian) the lateral boundaries of the respective territorial seas and exclusive fishing zones shall so far as they extend coincide with the seabed boundary lines referred to in Article 3 of this Agreement and in Article 4 of the 1971 Seabed Agreement.

ARTICLE 8

1. Vessels or other craft permitted by the laws of Papua New Guinea to navigate on that part of the Bensbach River flowing within Papua New Guinea shall for the purpose of entering or leaving the river have a right of passage through the adjacent Indonesian waters.
2. For the purpose of access to the mouth of the Bensbach River, the authorities of Papua New Guinea and Indonesia shall keep open and mark any channel that may be necessary for safe navigation.

ARTICLE 9

1. The co-ordinates of the points specified in this Agreement are geographical co-ordinates. The actual location of any points or lines referred to in this Agreement which have not yet been determined shall be determined by a method to be agreed upon by the competent authorities of the Government of Australia and the Government of Indonesia.
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1 of this Article the competent authorities shall be the Director of National Mapping of Australia and any person acting with his authority and the Chief of the Co-ordinating Body for National Survey and Mapping (Ketua Badan Koordinasi Survey Dan Pemetaan

Nasional) of Indonesia and any person acting with his authority.

ARTICLE 10

Any dispute between the Governments of Australia and Indonesia arising out of the interpretation or implementation of this Agreement shall be settled peacefully in accordance with the procedures mentioned in Article 33 of the charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 11

1. This Agreement is subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional requirements of each country, and shall enter into force on the day on which the Instruments of Ratification are exchanged.
2. It is understood that the approval of the House of Assembly of Papua New Guinea to this Agreement shall be obtained before Australian ratification of the Agreement.

Text in English and Indonesian.

Entry into force: 26 November 1974.

Notification of succession by Papua New Guinea: 12 September 1980

Source: ATS 174: No. 26, pp. 1-4.

APPENDIX II.

BORDER ADMINISTRATION

Agreement between the Government of Australia (acting on its own behalf and on behalf of the Government of Papua New Guinea) and the Government of Indonesia concerning Administrative Border Arrangements as to the Border between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia, Port Moresby, 13 November 1973

The Government of Australia (on its own behalf and on behalf of the Government of Papua New Guinea) and the Government of Indonesia

Recalling the Agreement between the Australian and Indonesian Governments dated the twelfth day of February 1973 which, among other things, demarcates more precisely in certain respects the land boundaries on the island of New Guinea (Irian) and delimits territorial sea boundaries off the northern and southern coasts of that island

Recognising the need to protect the traditional rights and customs of people living in promiximity to the border constituted by those boundaries

Recognising also the spirit of co-operation, understanding and goodwill that already prevails with regard to the administration of the border and border areas and the existing arrangements between Governments for liaison and other purposes in relation thereto

Recognising also the desirability of further fostering co-operation, goodwill and understanding and further strengthening and improving existing arrangements and to this end of formulating a broad framework within which the border and border areas shall be administered in the future

Having in mind Papua New Guinea becoming an independent nation

Recognising also that until independence the border arrangements in relation to the Papua New Guinea side of the border will be carried into effect by the Government of Papua New Guinea with the understanding that after independence Australia shall cease to be responsible in respect of such arrangements

As good neighbours and in a spirit of friendship and co-operation.

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

For the purposes of this Agreement the border area on each side of the border shall be those areas notified by letters and shown approximately on maps to be exchanged on or before the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification of this Agreement. The border areas may be varied from time to time by an exchange of letters and maps after mutual consultations.

ARTICLE 2

Liaison Arrangements

1. The establishment of liaison on matters relating to the border is fully accepted. Arrangements should be made for regulating the functions and working procedures for each level of liaison.
2. Until otherwise mutually arranged, existing liaison arrangements shall continue and liaison meetings shall be held:
 - (a) by senior officials of the Government of Papua New Guinea and of the Provincial Government of Irian Jaya when requested by either Government on reasonable notice, and at least once a year, to review and develop border co-operation;
 - (b) by officials of West Sepik and Western Districts and the Jayapura, Jayawijaya and Merauke Kabupatens at regular intervals but at least every two months; and
 - (c) by officials of the sub-districts and kecamatans concerned at regular intervals but at least every two months, the location to be locally decided.
3. The main purposes of the liaison arrangements shall be:
 - (a) to exchange information on all developments in the border areas which are of mutual interest to the Governments;
 - (b) to devise, amend or establish arrangements to facilitate the practical operation, particularly at local and district levels, of the provisions of this Agreement; and

- (c) to ensure that Governments are kept informed of developments of significance relating to the border areas and that their attention is drawn to any matters which may require consultation in accordance with this Agreement.

ARTICLE 3

Border Crossing for Traditional and Customary Purposes

1. The traditional and customary practices of the peoples, who reside in a border area and are citizens of the country concerned, of crossing the border for traditional activities such as social contacts and ceremonies including marriage, gardening and other land usage, collecting, hunting, fishing and other usage of waters, and traditional barter trade are recognised and shall continue to be respected.
2. Such border crossings based on tradition and custom shall be subject to special arrangements, and normal immigration and other requirements shall not apply.
3. The special arrangements shall be formulated on the principle that such crossings shall be only temporary in character and not for the purpose of settlement.

ARTICLE 4

Cross Border Rights to Land and Water

The traditional rights enjoyed by the citizens of one country, who reside in its border area, in relation to land in the border area of the other country and for purposes such as fishing and other usage of the seas or waters in or in the vicinity of the border area of the other country, shall be respected and the other country shall permit them to exercise those rights on the same conditions as apply to its own citizens. These rights shall be exercised by the persons concerned without settling permanently on that side of the border unless such persons obtain permission to enter the other country for residence in accordance with the immigration laws and procedures of that country.

ARTICLE 5

Settlement

It shall be an agreed objective to discourage the constructions of villages or other permanent housing within a two kilometer zone on each side of the border.

ARTICLE 6

Border Crossing Other Than For Traditional and Customary Purposes

1. The crossing of the border by persons not coming within Article 3 above is to take place through designated points of entry and in accordance with the normal laws and regulations relating to entry.
2. Information shall be exchanged with respect to the migration laws and policies operating on each side of the border to maintain more effective control of the border areas.
3. Persons who cross the border other than in accordance with the practices recognised by Article 3 above or the normal laws and regulations relating to entry shall be treated as illegal immigrants.
4. In administering its laws and policies relating to the entry of persons into its territory across the border, each Government shall act in a spirit of friendship and good neighbourliness bearing in mind relevant principles of international law and established international practices and the importance of discouraging the use of border crossing for the purpose of evading justice and the use of its territory in a manner inconsistent with the preamble or any provision of this Agreement. Each Government shall also take into account, where appropriate, the desirability of exchanging information and holding consultations with the other.

ARTICLE 7

Security

1. In a spirit of goodwill and mutual understanding and so as to maintain and strengthen the good neighbourly and friendly relations already existing, the Governments on either side of the border agree to continue to co-operate with one another in order to prevent the use of their respective territories in or in the vicinity of their respective border areas for hostile activities against the other. To this end, each Government shall maintain its own procedures of notification and control.
2. The Governments shall keep each other informed and where appropriate consult as to developments in or in the vicinity of their respective border areas, which are relevant to their security.

ARTICLE 8

Border Trade

The Governments agree to exchange information concerning cross-border trade and when appropriate to consult in relation thereto.

ARTICLE 9

Citizenship

The desirability is recognised of having a regular exchange of relevant information regarding laws and regulations on nationality and citizenship and each Government agrees, if so requested, to have consultations on any problem being encountered in relation thereto.

ARTICLE 10

Quarantine

1. The co-operation already existing in the field of health and quarantine, including mutual visits of officials and exchange of

information and periodical reports, shall be continued and developed.

2. In the case of an outbreak or spread of an epidemic in a border area, quarantine and health restrictions on movement across the border may be imposed, notwithstanding Article 3 above.

ARTICLE 11

Navigational Facilities in Boundary Waters

Arrangements shall be made as appropriate in order to facilitate navigation of traffic in main waterways in boundary waters, especially the "Fly River Bulge".

ARTICLE 12

Pollution

The Governments agree that when mining, industrial, forestry, agricultural or other projects are being carried out in the respective border areas the necessary precautionary measures shall be taken to prevent serious pollution of rivers flowing across the border. There shall be consultations, if so requested, on measures to prevent pollution, arising from such activities, of rivers on the other side of the border.

ARTICLE 13

Consultations and Review

1. The Governments shall, if so requested, consult on the implementation, operation and scope of this Agreement.
2. This Agreement shall be reviewed upon the expiration of five years from the date of exchange of the instruments of ratification.

ARTICLE 14

Signature and Ratification

1. This Agreement is subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional requirements of each country, and shall enter into force on the day on which the instruments of ratification are exchanged.
2. It is understood that the concurrence of the Government of Papua New Guinea in this Agreement is a condition thereof and such concurrence is evidenced by the signing of this Agreement on its behalf by Maori Kiki, Minister for Defence and Foreign Relations of Papua New Guinea.

Text in English and Indonesian.

Entry into force: 26 November 1974.

Source: ATS 1974: No. 27, pp. 1-4.

APPENDIX III.

**Basic Agreement between the Government of Papua New
Guinea and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia on
Border Arrangements, Jakarta, 17 December 1979**

THE GOVERNMENT OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA

and

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA,

NOTING the provisions of the Agreement dated the 13th day of November one thousand nine hundred and seventy-three and in particular Article 13 which called for a review of the Agreement upon the expiration of five years from the date of ratification;

DETERMINED to further foster co-operation, goodwill and understanding between the two countries and to co-operate in the administration and development of the Border Area for the mutual benefit of their peoples.

RECOGNISING the need to replace the said Agreement dated the 13th day of November one thousand nine hundred and seventy- three with a new Agreement;

As good neighbours and in a spirit of friendship and co- operation;

Have agreed as follows:-

ARTICLE 1

The Border Area

1. The Border Area shall consist of the Kecamatan- kecamatan Perbatasan within the Republic of Indonesia and the Census Divisions within Papua New Guinea, in respect of which the border forms part of their boundaries.
2. The Border Area may be varied from time to time by an exchange of letters and maps after mutual consultations.

3. For the purpose of implementation of paragraph 1 of this Article, the two Governments shall consult and each make the necessary arrangements for the mapping, by a mutually agreed method, of that part of the Border Area on their respective sides of the border.

ARTICLE 2

Joint Border Committee and Consultation

1. There shall be established a Joint Border Committee consisting of senior officials of both Governments.
2. The Committee shall formulate guidelines and procedures for the effective implementation of this Agreement.
3. Members of the Committee shall, as appropriate, advise and make recommendations to their respective Governments on all matters, procedures and arrangements relating to the implementation of this Agreement and to the development and review of border co-operation. The Committee shall meet at least once a year, and additionally as and when necessary, upon request by either Government. The venue for such meetings shall be by rotation in each country.
4. The two Governments may, if required, consult each other concerning the implementation and operation of this Article.

ARTICLE 3

Liaison Arrangements

1. To assist the Joint Border Committee, liaison at appropriate levels on matters of mutual concern relating to the administration of the border shall be established. Arrangements shall be made for regulating the functions and working procedures for each level of liaison.
2. Unless otherwise agreed, there shall be established:-
 - (a) a level of primary liaison, as is appropriate in each case, between officials from Jakarta and Irian Jaya and officials from Port Moresby and the Western and West

Sepik Provinces, meeting at intervals not exceeding two months; and

- (b) a level of secondary liaison between officials of the Kabupaten or Kecamatan in Irian Jaya and their counterparts of the Districts in Papua New Guinea.
3. The main purposes of primary level liaison meetings and secondary level liaison meetings shall be as follows:-
- (a) for primary level liaison meetings:-
 - (i) to exchange information on all developments in the Border Area which are of mutual interest to both Governments;
 - (ii) to devise, amend or establish arrangements to facilitate the practical operation, particularly at local and district levels, of the provisions of this Agreement; and
 - (iii) to ensure that both Governments, through the Joint Border Committee, are kept informed of developments of significance relating to the Border Area and that their attention is drawn to any matters which may require consultation in accordance with this Agreement;
 - (b) for secondary level liaison meetings, to consider local technical or development matters affecting border communities, and to implement at the local level, when and where necessary, arrangements approved at the primary level of liaison.

ARTICLE 4

Border Crossings for Traditional and Customary Purposes

1. The traditional and customary practices of the peoples, who reside in the Border Area and are citizens of the country concerned, of crossing the border for traditional activities within the Border Area, such as social contacts and ceremonies including marriage, gardening and other land usage, collecting, hunting, fishing and other usage of waters, and customary border trade are recognised and shall continue to be respected.

2. Such border crossings based on tradition and custom shall be subject to special arrangements, and normal immigration and other requirements shall not apply.
3. The special arrangements shall be formulated on the principle that such crossings shall be only temporary in character and not for the purpose of resettlement.

ARTICLE 5

Cross Border Rights to Land and Water

1. The traditional rights enjoyed by the citizens of one country who reside in the Border Area within that country:-
 - (a) in relation to land in the Border Area within the other country; or
 - (b) for the purposes of farming, hunting, fishing or other usages of land, seas or waters in the Border Area within the other country,
 - (c) shall be respected, and the other country shall permit the exercise of those rights, subject to its laws and regulations, on the same conditions as apply to its own citizens.
2. The rights referred to in Paragraph 1 shall be exercised by the persons concerned without settling permanently on that side of the border unless such persons obtain permission to enter the other country for residence in accordance with the immigration laws and procedures of that country.

ARTICLE 6

Settlement

It shall be an agreed objective of both Governments to discourage the future construction of villages or other permanent dwellings, except as approved by either Government, within a five kilometer zone on either side of the border.

ARTICLE 7

Border Crossing For Non-Traditional and Non-Customary Purposes

1. The crossing of the border by persons not falling under the provisions of Article 4 of this Agreement is to take place through designated points of entry and in accordance with the normal laws and regulations relating to entry. Designated points of entry shall be as agreed from time to time by an Exchange of Letters after consultations.
2. Information shall be exchanged with respect to the migration laws and policies operating on each side of the border to maintain more effective control of the Border Area.
3. Persons who cross the border other than in accordance with the practices recognised by Article 4 of this Agreement or the normal laws and regulations relating to entry shall be treated as illegal immigrants.
4. In administering its laws and policies relating to the entry of persons into its territory across the border, each Government shall act in a spirit of friendship and good neighbourliness bearing in mind relevant principles of international law and established international practices and the importance of discouraging the use of border crossing for the purpose of evading justice and the use of its territory in a manner inconsistent with any provision of this Agreement. Each Government shall also take into account, where appropriate, the desirability of exchanging information and holding consultations with the other.

ARTICLE 8

Security

1. In a spirit of goodwill and mutual understanding and in order to maintain and strengthen the existing good neighbourly and friendly relations, the two Governments shall continue to actively co-operate with one another in order to prevent the use of their respective territories in or in the vicinity of the Border Area as sanctuary, staging areas, bases or routes for any kind of

hostile or illegal activities against the other. To this end, each Government shall maintain its own procedures of notification and control.

2. The two Governments shall keep each other informed and where appropriate consult as to developments in or in the vicinity of their respective Border Areas, which are relevant to their security.

ARTICLE 9

Border Co-operation

In the event of natural disasters or major accidents in the Border Area, the two Governments shall establish close contacts with one another and shall render all possible assistance, particularly in search and rescue operations.

ARTICLE 10

Customary Border Trade

1. The two Governments shall make arrangements to facilitate the continuation of customary cross-border trade by the inhabitants of the Border Area.
2. In making such arrangements the two Governments shall be mindful of the following limitations:-
 - (a) that such arrangements shall only apply to Papua New Guinea and Indonesian citizens who traditionally live in the Border Area; and
 - (b) that the cross-border trade be of a traditional nature and conducted in order to satisfy the needs of the people in the Border Area; and
 - (c) that the goods traded are not prohibited by either Government.

ARTICLE 11

Transport and Communication

The two Governments shall consider, in accordance with the normal procedures and practices:-

- (a) The continuation of the operation of the existing direct trans-border telecommunication link for border-liaison purposes;
- (b) Aeronautical communication between the Air Traffic Service Units of the two countries relating to international flights;
- (c) Radio frequency co-ordination crossing trans- border areas; and
- (d) Matters relating to the improvement of communication system and direct trans-border transport.

ARTICLE 12

Citizenship

The desirability is recognised of having a regular exchange of relevant information regarding laws and regulations on nationality and citizenship and the two Governments shall, if either so requests, consult each other on any problem being encountered in relation thereto.

ARTICLE 13

Quarantine

1. The co-operation already existing in the field of health and quarantine, including mutual visits of officials and exchange of information and periodical reports, shall be continued and developed.
2. In the case of an outbreak or spread of an epidemic in the Border Area, quarantine and health restrictions on movement

across the border may be imposed, notwithstanding Article 4 of this Agreement.

ARTICLE 14

Navigation and the Provision of Navigational Facilities

1. Nationals of either country or vessels registered in either country may navigate freely throughout the boundary waters of the Fly River Bulge and the two Governments shall make arrangements for the provision of navigational facilities in the said waters.
2. Where, for the purposes of a national development project, either Government requires a right of transit navigation between two points in its territory, through a river in the territory of the other country, then the two Governments recognise that such a right may be exercised in accordance with terms and conditions to be determined by them, according to the individual requirements of that project.

ARTICLE 15

Major Development of Natural Resources

1. The two Governments, recognising the need which either Government may have to develop, for the benefit of its people generally, any naturally occurring resources in an area adjacent to, or in close proximity to, the border agree to keep each other informed, either by consultation or through their respective representatives on the Joint Border Committee, as to particulars of such developments or proposed developments.
2. The two Governments further recognise the need which may arise from time to time for them to co-operate in order to formalise mutually satisfactory arrangements which will assist in facilitating the establishment and continued operation of such developments in either country, in a manner consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.
3. Having regard to the provisions of this Article, the two Governments recognise in particular the Ok Tedi Mining Project as being such a major development and agree to consult

as appropriate, at the request of either Government, on any matter of concern relating to that development.

4. If any single accumulation of liquid hydrocarbons or natural gas, or if any other mineral deposit on land or subsoil thereof, extends across the border, and the parts of such accumulation or deposit that is situated on one side of the border is recoverable wholly or in part from the other side of the border, the two Governments will seek to reach agreement on the manner in which the accumulation or deposit shall be most effectively exploited and on the equitable sharing of the benefits derived from such exploitation.

ARTICLE 16

Protection of the Environment

When mining, industrial, forestry, agricultural or other projects are carried out in areas adjacent to, or in close proximity to, the border, the Government responsible for such development shall ensure that all necessary precautionary measures are taken to prevent or control pollution of the environment across the border.

ARTICLE 17

Utilisation and Conservation of Natural Resources

The two Governments shall, as appropriate and at the request of either Government, consult each other on matters regarding the utilisation and conservation of such natural resources as fresh water and forest resources (including wildlife) in areas adjacent to, or in close proximity to, the border, with a view to preventing the adverse effects which might arise from the exploitation of such resources.

ARTICLE 18

Promotion of the Agreement

The two Governments shall promote amongst their people, particularly those in the Border Area, an understanding of the

Agreement in order to develop a stable and harmonious border regime, reflecting the good-neighbourly relations between the two countries.

ARTICLE 19

Consultation and Review

1. The two Governments shall, if so required, consult each other on the implementation, operation, and scope of this Agreement.
2. This Agreement may be reviewed upon the expiration of each five year period beginning from the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification.
3. The members of the Joint Border Committee may make recommendations to their respective Governments on any matters concerning border arrangements not specifically regulated by this Agreement.

ARTICLE 20

Signature and Ratification

1. This Agreement is subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional requirements of each country, and shall enter into force on the day on which the instruments of ratification are exchanged.
2. On the day this Agreement enters into force, it replaces the Agreement between the Government of Indonesia and the Government of Australia (acting on its own behalf and on behalf of the Government of Papua New Guinea), concerning Administrative Border Arrangements as to the border between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia, dated the 13th day of November one thousand nine hundred and seventy-three.

Text in English and Indonesian: "Both texts being equally authentic. In case of different interpretation, the English text shall prevail."

Entry into force: 6 February 1980.

APPENDIX IV.

Basic Agreement between the Government of Papua New Guinea and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia on Border Arrangements, Port Moresby, 29 October 1984

The Government of Papua New Guinea and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia

NOTING the provisions of the Agreement dated the 17th day of December one thousand nine hundred and seventy-nine and in particular Article 19 which called for a review of the Agreement upon the expiration of five years from the date of ratification;

DETERMINED to further foster co-operation, goodwill and understanding between the two countries;

DETERMINED to further co-operate in the administration and development of the Border Area for the mutual benefit of their peoples giving due consideration to the traditional rights and customs of the people living in the Border Area as already done by both Governments (in the past);

RECOGNISING the need to replace the said Agreement dated the 17th day of December one thousand nine hundred and seventy-nine with a new agreement;

As good neighbours and in a spirit of friendship and co-operation
HAVE AGREED as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The Border Area

1. The Border Area shall consist of the Census Divisions within Papua New Guinea and Kecamatan-Kecamatan Perbatasan within the Republic of Indonesia in respect of which the Border forms part of their boundaries.
2. The Border Area may be varied from time to time by an Exchange of Letters and maps after mutual consultations.
3. For the purposes of implementation of paragraph 1 of this Article, the two Governments shall consult and each make the

necessary arrangements for the survey and demarcation of the Boundary and mapping of that part of the Border Area on their respective sides of the Border, by a mutually agreed method.

ARTICLE 2

Joint Border Committee and Consultation

1. There shall be established a Joint Border Committee consisting of senior officials of both Governments.
2. The Committee shall formulate guidelines and procedures for the effective implementation of this Agreement.
3. Members of the Committee shall, as appropriate, advise and make recommendations to their respective Governments on all matters, procedures and arrangements relating to the implementation of this Agreement and to the development and review of border co-operation. The Committee shall meet at least once a year, and additionally as and when necessary, upon request by either Government. The venue for such meetings shall be by rotation in each country.
4. The two Governments may, if required, consult each other concerning the implementation and operation of this Article.

ARTICLE 3

Liaison Arrangements

1. To assist the Joint Border Committee there shall be established liaison meetings to discuss matters of mutual concern relating to the administration of the Border. Arrangements shall be made for regulating functions and working procedures for such meetings.
2. The liaison shall comprise officials from Port Moresby, Western and West Sepik Provinces and officials from the Province of Irian Jaya.
3. The main purpose of the liaison meetings shall be as follows:

- (i) to exchange information on all developments in the Border Area which are of mutual interest to both Governments;
 - (ii) to devise, amend or establish arrangements to facilitate the practical operations, particularly at local and district levels, of the provisions of this Agreement; and
 - (iii) to ensure that both Governments, through the Joint Border Committee, are kept informed of developments of significance relating to the Border Area and that their attention is drawn to any matters which may require consultation in accordance with this Agreement.
4. The liaison meetings shall take place as and when required but not later than three months intervals.

ARTICLE 4

Border Crossings for Traditional and Customary Purposes

1. Each country shall continue to recognize and permit movement across the Border by the traditional inhabitants of the other country who reside in the Border Area and are citizens of the country concerned for traditional activities within the Border Area such as social contacts and ceremonies including marriage, gardening, hunting, collecting and other land usage, fishing and other usage of waters, and customary border trade.
2. Such movement shall be the subject of special arrangements between the two Governments and normal immigration, customs, quarantine and health requirements shall not apply.
3. The Special arrangements shall be formulated on the principle that such movement across the Border shall only be temporary in character and not for the purpose of resettlement.

ARTICLE 5

Exercise of Traditional Rights to Land and Waters in the Border Area

1. Where the traditional inhabitants of one country who reside in the Border Area and are citizens of the country concerned but enjoy traditional rights of access to and usage of areas of land or waters in the Border Area of the other country that country, shall permit the continued exercise of those rights subject to its existing laws and regulations on the same conditions as those applying to its own citizens.
2. The traditional rights to use land and waters referred to in paragraph 1 shall not constitute proprietary rights over the same.
3. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 shall be exercised by the persons concerned without settling permanently on that side of the Border unless such persons obtain permission to enter the other country for residence in accordance with the immigration and other laws and or procedures of that country.

ARTICLE 6

Border Crossings by Non-Traditional Inhabitants

1. Crossing of the border by persons not falling under the provisions of Article 4 of this Agreement is to take place through designated points of entry and in accordance with the relevant existing laws and regulations relating to entry. Designated points of entry shall be as agreed from time to time by an Exchange of Letters after consultations.
2. Information shall be exchanged with respect to the migration laws and policies existing on each side of the Border in order to maintain more effective control of the Border Area.
3. Persons who cross the Border other than in accordance with Article 4 of this Agreement or the relevant laws and regulations relating to entry shall be treated as illegal immigrants. The preceding sentence does not apply to crossings for purposes as agreed upon by both Governments.

4. In administering its laws and policies relating to entry of persons into its territory across the Border, each Government shall act in a spirit of friendship and good neighbourliness, bearing in mind relevant principles of international law and established international practices and the importance of discouraging the use of border crossing for the purposes of evading justice and the use of its territory in a manner inconsistent with any provision of this Agreement. Each Government shall also take into account, where appropriate, the desirability of exchanging information and holding consultations with the other.

ARTICLE 7

Security

1. In the spirit of goodwill and mutual understanding and in order to maintain and strengthen the existing good neighbourly and friendly relations, the two Governments shall continue to actively co-operate with one another in order to prevent the use of their respective territories in or in the vicinity of the Border Area as sanctuary, staging areas, bases or routes for any kind of hostile or illegal activities against the other. To this end, each Government shall maintain its own procedures of notification and control.
2. The two Governments shall keep each other informed and where appropriate consult as to developments in or in the vicinity of the Border Area, which are relevant to their security.

ARTICLE 8

Border Co-operation

In the event of natural disasters or major accidents in the Border Area, the two Governments shall establish close contacts with one another and shall render all possible assistance, particularly in search and rescue operations.

ARTICLE 9

Customary Border Trade

1. The two Governments shall make arrangements to facilitate the continuation of customary cross-border trade by the inhabitants of the Border Area.
2. In making such arrangements the two Governments shall be mindful of the following limitations:
 - (a) that such arrangements shall only apply to Papua New Guinea and Indonesian citizens who traditionally live in the Border Area;
 - (b) that the cross-border trade be of a traditional nature and conducted in order to satisfy the needs of the people in the Border Area; and
 - (c) that the goods traded are not prohibited by either Government.

ARTICLE 10

Transport and Communication

The two Governments shall consider, in accordance with the normal procedures and practices:

- (a) The continuation of the operation of the existing direct trans-border telecommunication links for border-liaison purposes;
- (b) Aeronautical communication between the Air Traffic Service Units of the two countries relating to international flights;
- (c) Radio frequency co-ordination crossing trans-border areas; and
- (d) Matters relating to the improvement of communication systems and direct trans-border transport.

ARTICLE 11

Citizenship

The desirability is recognised of having a regular exchange of relevant information regarding laws and regulations on nationality and citizenship and the two Governments shall, if either so requests, consult each other on any problem being encountered in relation thereto.

ARTICLE 12

Quarantine

1. The co-operation already existing in the field of health and quarantine, including mutual visits of officials and exchange of information and periodical reports, shall be continued and developed.
2. In the case of an outbreak or spread of an epidemic in the Border Area, quarantine and health restrictions on movement across the Border may be imposed, notwithstanding Article 4 of this Agreement.

ARTICLE 13

Navigation and the Provision of Navigational Facilities

1. Nationals of either country or vessels registered in either country may navigate freely throughout the boundary waters of the Fly River Bulge and the two Governments shall make arrangements for the provision of navigational facilities in the said waters.
2. Where, for the purposes of a national development project, either Government requires a right of transit navigation between two points in its territory, through a river in the territory of the other country, then the two Governments recognise that such a right may be exercised in accordance with terms and conditions to be determined by them, according to the individual requirements of that project.

ARTICLE 14

Exchange of Information on Major Construction

The two Governments shall keep each other informed of any proposed major construction such as roads, dams, bridges and aerodromes within a 5 kilometer zone on either side of the Border, provided such construction could affect the movement of the people from one side of the Border to the other.

ARTICLE 15

Major Development of Natural Resources

1. The two Governments, recognising the need which either Government may have to develop, for the benefit of its people generally, any naturally occurring resources in an area adjacent to or in close proximity to the Border agree to keep each other informed, either by consultation or through their respective representatives on the Joint Border Committee, as to particulars of such developments or proposed developments.
2. The two Governments further recognise the need which may arise from time to time for them to co-operate in order to formalise mutually satisfactory arrangements which will assist in facilitating the establishment and continued operation of such developments in either country, in a manner consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.
3. Having regard to the provisions of this Article, the two Governments recognise in particular the Ok Tedi Mining Project as being such a major development and agree to consult as appropriate, at the request of either Government, on any matter of concern relating to that development.
4. If any single accumulation of liquid hydrocarbons or natural gas, or if any other mineral deposit on land or subsoil thereof, extends across the Border, and the parts of such accumulation or deposit that is situated on one side of the Border, is recoverable wholly or in part from the other side of the Border, the two Governments will seek to reach agreement on the manner in which the accumulation or deposit shall be most

effectively exploited and on the equitable sharing of the benefits derived from such exploitation.

ARTICLE 16

Protection of the Environment

When mining, industrial, forestry, agricultural or other projects are carried out in areas adjacent to or in close proximity to the Border, the Government responsible for such development shall ensure that all necessary precautionary measures are taken to prevent or control pollution of the environment across the Border.

ARTICLE 17

Utilisation and Conservation of Natural Resources

The two Governments shall, as appropriate and at the request of either Government, consult each other on matters regarding the utilisation and conservation of such natural resources as fresh water and forest resources (including wildlife) in areas adjacent to, or in close proximity to the Border, with a view to preventing the adverse effects which might arise from the exploitation of such resources.

ARTICLE 18

Fauna and Flora

Each Government shall use its best endeavour, and shall enhance mutual co-operation to protect species of indigenous fauna and flora that are or may become threatened with extinction, in and in the vicinity of the Border Area.

ARTICLE 19

Compensation

1. Each Government shall pay due compensation for damages caused intentionally or otherwise to the other Government for

acts and related activities within its responsibility in the Border Area.

2. Damages in the Border Area caused by acts of each other's citizens, except by elements hostile to each other's country may be compensated in accordance with traditional and customary practices, under the supervision of both Governments, without limiting the right of each Government to consult directly.

ARTICLE 20

Promotion of the Agreement

The two Governments shall promote amongst their people, particularly those in the Border Area, an understanding of the Agreement in order to develop a stable and harmonious border regime, reflecting the good-neighbourly relations between the two countries.

ARTICLE 21

Consultation and Review

1. The two Governments shall, if so required, consult each other on the implementation, operation and scope of this Agreement.
2. This Agreement shall be reviewed upon the expiration of a five year period, or earlier with the approval of both Governments beginning from the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification.
3. The members of the Joint Border Committee may make recommendations to their respective Governments on any matters concerning border arrangements not specifically regulated by this Agreement.
4. Upon receiving of information that an influx of border crossings or other border crossings have taken place other than border crossings under Articles 4, 5 and 7, the two Governments shall consult immediately at liaison level. The two Governments shall agree to meet at higher levels if the need arises.

APPENDIX V.

MUTUAL RESPECT, FRIENDSHIP AND CO-OPERATION

Treaty of Mutual Respect, Friendship and Cooperation between the Independent State of Papua New Guinea and the Republic of Indonesia, Port Moresby, 27 October 1986

The Government of the Independent State of Papua New
Guinea and

the Government of the Republic of Indonesia

Mindful of the interests which their countries share as immediate
neighbours;

Responding to their people's common desire for peace, progress,
and prosperity, in accordance with the spirit and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations;

Fully committed to maintaining, renewing, and further
strengthening the mutual respect, friendship and cooperation which
have been developing between their two countries in accordance with
existing agreements, as well as their policies of promoting national
and regional resilience and independent and constructive neighbourly
cooperation; and

Conscious of the contributions being made to national
development, regional cooperation, and international order, by the
United Nations, the Association of South East Asian Nations, and the
South Pacific Forum;

Solemnly agree to enter into a Treaty of Mutual Respect,
Friendship and Cooperation which provides as follows:

CHAPTER 1

Guiding Principles

ARTICLE 1

The Government of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea
and the Republic of Indonesia (referred to hereinafter as the
"Contracting Parties") shall display and promote respect, friendship,

and cooperation between their two nations, both as means towards securing common and national objectives, including regional stability, and as valued ends in themselves.

ARTICLE 2

Each Contracting Party shall display and promote respect for the other country's:

national independence, sovereign equality, and territorial integrity; and

national identity, traditions, and values, including the Papua New Guinea Constitution, in which Papua New Guinea's National Goals and Directive Principles are contained, the Indonesian State Philosophy (PANCASILA) and the Indonesian Constitution.

ARTICLE 3

The Contracting Parties shall endeavour to avoid, reduce, and contain disputes or conflicts between their nations and settle any differences that may arise only by peaceful means.

ARTICLE 4

- (1) Should a dispute arise between the Contracting Parties, they shall endeavour to reach a mutually acceptable settlement through direct consultation and negotiation.
- (2) If consultation and negotiation do not produce a mutually acceptable settlement to a dispute, the Contracting Parties shall endeavour to settle the dispute through conciliation, arbitration, adjudication, or such other peaceful means as may be agreed.

ARTICLE 5

Nothing in this treaty shall prevent either of the Contracting Parties from seeking to settle any dispute in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

ARTICLE 6

The Contracting Parties shall consult without delay and at an agreed level of representation if either of them believes that a dispute which threatens peace or the stability of either country has arisen or is likely to arise between them.

ARTICLE 7

The Contracting Parties shall not threaten or use force against each other.

CHAPTER 2

Mutual Respect

ARTICLE 8

- (1) Each Contracting Party shall display and promote respect for the other country's national interests and policies.
- (2) The Contracting Parties shall each respect the other nation's right to be free from coercion, external interference in internal affairs, and subversion.

ARTICLE 9

- (1) The Contracting Parties shall not cooperate with others in hostile or unlawful acts against the other nation, or allow their territory to be used for such acts.
- (2) The Contracting Parties shall endeavour to conduct their respective nation's affairs in the border region bearing in mind the other nation's interests.

CHAPTER 4

Cooperation

ARTICLE 14

The Contracting Parties shall endeavour to maintain and further develop existing programmes of cooperation, and facilitate and promote other areas of cooperation.

ARTICLE 15

- (1) The Contracting Parties shall facilitate understanding of each other's country through exchanges of experience and information, including cultural, social, educational, and sports.
- (2) The Contracting Parties shall engage in technical cooperation through exchanges of experts and information, and other agreed forms of mutual assistance.

ARTICLE 16

The Contracting Parties shall endeavour to facilitate and promote trade and economic relations.


ARTICLE 17

- (1) The Contracting Parties shall maintain and endeavour to strengthen consultation, liaison, and other arrangements which provide for orderly administration of the common border between their two countries.
- (2) The Contracting Parties shall take practical steps to cooperate in implementing development on and near the common border in their mutual interest.

ARTICLE 18

The Contracting Parties shall endeavour to consult with a view to promoting regional cooperation, orderly change towards equity in

MAP 1 - Refugee Camps



Source: R.J. May (ed.), Between Two Nations : The Indonesia-Papua New Guinea Border and West Papuan Nationalism.