REVOLUTION IN SURAKARTA 1945-50: A CASE STUDY

OF CITY AND VILLAGE IN THE

INDONESIAN REVOLUTION

SOJATNO KARTODIRDJO

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Except where otherwise acknowledged, this thesis is based on my own original research.
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The five years of the Indonesian Revolution manifested not only the struggle to be free of Dutch colonialism; but also the attempt of Indonesian society to resolve its own tensions and contradictions, long held in suspension by colonial control. The intensity of internal revolutionary conflict in each locality served as an index of the social contradictions which had been latent beneath the superficial calm of Netherlands India.

For many years Surakarta had been the centre of Javanese monarchy and traditionalism. In addition, it had become a major centre of colonial penetration, particularly through sugar estates, which caused the local people to rise against colonial authority. Early in the Revolution, this region became the centre for the most important badan perjuangan organizations, with the result that the city of Surakarta (Solo) became the focus of opposition to the Republican Government at Jogjakarta during the Revolution. Another reason for its selection was the role of the two Surakarta monarchies, the Kasunanan and the Mangkunegaran, in preserving written sources at the local level. Surakarta appears to be richer than any other Republican-held region in terms of local documentation for the study of the Revolution.

This study was conceived while I was attending a colloquium on the Indonesian Revolution conducted by The Australian National University in Canberra in August 1973. Anthony Reid, who later became my supervisor, and other experts on Indonesian history such as John Smail, Lance Castles and Michael van Langenberg, encouraged me to enlarge my Surakarta case study to cover the period of the Indonesian Revolution as a whole.

A number of specific problems have animated this study. What were the responses to the Independence Proclamation of the Surakartans, who had been caught in a feudal pattern for so many years? What kinds of factors determined their participation in the political and social conflicts of the time? What were the reasons for the intensity of the Revolution in Surakarta, including the permanent eclipse of its ruling dynasties? Did the Revolution
really involve the rural people as well as the city-dwellers, or was it mostly an urban phenomenon? How far, in total, were the people involved in what had to be the key experience of their life time?

In an attempt to tackle these questions, I selected certain rural areas for careful study, to balance the urban bias of most written sources. Four rural subdistricts (kecamatan) were selected to provide a range of conditions. I selected two Kasunanan subdistricts with many plantations: Delanggu (Klaten regency) and Kedawung (Sragen regency) and two Mangkunegaran subdistricts with few plantations - Bendosari (Sukoharjo regency) and Jumapolo (Karanganyar regency). I hoped these examples would provide a broad enough range to examine the different degrees of rural involvement in the Revolution. I interviewed persons who had been involved, directly and indirectly, in many important activities during the Revolution. These interviews were conducted in either Javanese or Indonesian. In the villages they were more frequently in Javanese, because most of the older generation of villagers did not have an adequate knowledge of Indonesian.

The collection of data was also carried out by examining documents, local newspapers, other contemporary publications, and private memoirs and recollections. I located contemporary Surakarta newspapers and journals in the Reksopustoko Library (Mangkunegaran, Surakarta), the Sasono Wilopo collections (Kasunanan, Surakarta), Perpustakaan Negara (Jogjakarta) and Perpustakaan Islam (Jogjakarta). Archival sources were found mainly in the Arsip Mangkunegaran (AMN) in Surakarta and Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia (ANRI) in Jakarta. The Seksi Sejarah Militer Angkatan Darat (SEMAD), Surakarta, also contains documents and materials for the period, many of them relating to the badan perjuangan organizations.

Most other Republican archives in Java were damaged as a result of the scorched-earth policy followed by the Republican troops during the Dutch aggressions. This is the main reason for the relative scarcity of written sources in the period of the Indonesian Revolution. For this reason this study is at times obliged to rely on an unsupported oral history approach, although wherever possible oral sources are complemented by contemporary written sources.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis was made possible by the award of a Colombo Plan Scholarship covering the period December 1977 to February 1982. I wish to express my gratitude to the Colombo Plan Board for its generosity in making possible my study at The Australian National University and my field work in Indonesia.

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I want, in addition, to thank a number of Indonesian scholars who have helped me in many ways. Professor Sartono Kartodirdjo has long been my main source of inspiration as a professional historian; it was his guidance which enabled me to find my way through the twilight zone between history and the social sciences. Dr Taufik Abdullah's suggestions greatly facilitated my field work in Indonesia. Dr Ongkokham also took an interest in my work and through informal discussions helped give focus to my study.

My acknowledgments would not be complete without expressing my indebtedness to the head of the Department of Pacific and Southeast Asian History, ANU, Professor Gavan Daws, and to the staff and students of this Department, who helped me see familiar material from
new and different angles. Dr Anton Lucas and Dr Cheah Boon Keng, former fellow research students in this Department, helped me in a great variety of ways, both personal and professional.

Professor Wang Gung-wu, of the Department of Far Eastern History, ANU, through his one year course, helped to broaden my understanding of the study of revolutions elsewhere, and Dr Ann Kumar, in her course on Indonesian nationalism, forced me to deepen my thinking on that subject. Professor James Fox, of the Department of Anthropology, ANU, made valuable suggestions in a seminar on my research proposal, and I would like to express my indebtedness to him.

To Miss Soemartini and Mr Machfudi Mangkudilaga of the Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia also go my thanks for locating many sources. My thanks likewise go to the staffs of the libraries of The Australian National University, the Mangkunegaran Library, the Kasunanan Library and the Radyopustoko Library, Surakarta, and the State Library, the Islam Library and the Sonobudoyo Library, Jogjakarta; all kindly provided me with facilities and assistance during my research.

I am also deeply appreciative of the contributions of my informants. With unfailing kindness, they provided me with their invaluable knowledge, and that knowledge is the basis of much of this work.

My thanks also go to Pat Gilbert, Secretary of the Department, who typed earlier drafts of this manuscript. I would especially like to thank Anvidia Lamberts, who typed the final copy, good-humouredly, while under considerable pressure. She also assisted in a lot of work, including proof-reading, which was 'above and beyond the call of duty'.

My thanks also go to the Rector of Sebelas Maret University, who officially allowed me to study at ANU. My thanks likewise go to the staff of the Faculty of Art and Culture of Sebelas Maret University and its Department of History who helped me in a great variety of ways. They had the vision to see value in such a study as I proposed and gave me the privilege of a long leave of absence.

I am indebted to my parents, who gave me moral support
and encouraged me all the way through an unconscionably long period of schooling.

Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Nurdiana, for all that she has meant to me, and especially for her patience and tolerance in taking care of our children in Indonesia while I was studying at ANU.
A NOTE ON SPELLING

Indonesian words and place names are spelt in accordance with the present new system begun in 1972, except for titles of published works, newspapers and other contemporary written sources. Personal names have been spelt according to individual preference where it is commonly used. Javanese words with an 'o' commonly spelt 'a', e.g., jogoboyo, sentono. But in some cases an 'o' because of its previously accepted usage, is often replaced with an 'a', such as mancanegara. I have retained the older 'oe', instead of the modern 'u', in the names of persons, organizations, newspapers and other contemporary written sources. A number of commonly used Indonesian and Javanese words are italicised the first time and thereafter treated as English. A glossary of commonly used words and abbreviations can be found at the back of the thesis.
THE RESIDENCY OF SURAKARTA
CHAPTER ONE

COLONIAL SOCIETY IN SURAKARTA

Surakarta has played a central role in Javanese political and cultural life for the past two and a half centuries. For this reason, the upheavals which affected Java, from the Giyanti War to the revolution of the 1940s, frequently reached their climax in Surakarta. For this reason also, the attention of the Dutch was drawn towards exercising some indirect control over the region.

The intensive Dutch involvement in the Javanese royal heartland was greatly strengthened by events occurring in Central Java in the middle of the eighteenth century. A large-scale Chinese revolt (1741-43) was defeated only with great difficulty, and because of losses sustained in the revolt, Susuhunan Pakubowono II moved his capital ten kilometres east from Kartosuro to the new site, Surakarta. During the Chinese revolt, two Javanese leaders, R.M. Said and Martopuro, had also struck out against the Susuhunan and against the Dutch.

In 1746 Prince Mangkubumi rebelled against the Susuhunan who had defaulted on a promise to give land to him. Mangkubumi then joined R.M. Said and Martopuro and conducted campaigns against the Susuhunan and his Dutch allies. This rebellion was ended by the Giyanti Treaty of 13 February 1755 through which the kingdom of Mataram was formally divided. Surakarta continued to be ruled

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by the Susuhunan, but a new Sultanate of Jogjakarta was created under Prince Mangkubumi.

R.M. Said's own rebellious movement did not end until 1757. By the peace treaty of Salatiga on 17 March 1757, he was installed as Pangeran Midji, under the authority of the Susuhunan. His title, Pangeran Adipati Mangkunegoro, was recognized as legal and valid. His position was as a senior pangeran who governed his territory, about one-third of the region of Surakarta. Both the Susuhunan and the Mangkunegoro were supervised by the Dutch through the authority of a resident. In spite of the Mangkunegoro being under the suzerainty of the Susuhunan, however, there was little sign of cooperation between the two rulers. Indeed, the attitude of rivalry between the Mangkunegoro and the Susuhunan continued until the revolution broke out in August 1945.

CLASSICAL STRUCTURE

The concept of the Javanese state was centred on the authority of the king. The Susuhunan was the theoretical source of all power and authority. At the summit of the political structure, he had political, military and religious powers. There were three chief sections of the royal administration: the Kadipaten (internal palace administration); the Pengulon; and the Kepatihan.

The Kepatihan, or external administrative office, was under the Susuhunan's Patih (Grand Vizier). He headed a number of bupati jaba (outer regents). The whole of the Patih's administration was called the parentah jaba, the outer administration. Inside the kraton or the court, affairs were run by the parentah jero, the inner


administration, under the bupati jero (the inner regents). The duties of the bupati jero were connected with court ceremonies, court dancing, and other court affairs. The Pengulon, or religious office, managed all affairs relating to religion, including inheritance, marriage, etc. The Pengulu (religious officer) presided over the Pengulon, but the latter was also supervised by the Patih.

The administrative officials below the bupati were the wedono (district officers), while each wedono administered a number of panewu (sub-district officers). After 1928 sub-district officers in the Susuhunan's administration were called assistant wedono, while the Mangkunegaran administration still used the term panewu. Below the sub-districts were the villages, which were originally headed by the bekel. These acted in a similar manner to a village head, and organized a certain area of land on behalf of the appanage holders, who were called patuh. Originally, the relationship between the patuh and the bekel was based on the service of the bekel for the patuh in collecting taxes or other deliveries. Thus, the bekel obtained the right to exploit the patuh's land. The bekels had to deliver tax either in cash (bekel majegan) or in kind (bekel maron). In addition to these duties, the bekels had to provide the appanage holders with labour in the event of a marriage or any other important ceremony. The bekels also coordinated other burdens which the state levied on the people.

In Javanese terms, there were three main social classes in Surakarta society. First, there was the sentono dalem, the family of the king, which constituted the golongan ningrat or nobility. Traditionally, this group was placed at the top level of the social

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5 Rijksblad Surakarta, no.14, 1928.
6 Rijksblad Mangkunegaran, no.10, 1929.
7 For details of the agrarian system in Surakarta see Adatrechtbundels, vol.19, 1921, pp.361-70.
structure. They resided in particular places in the kraton (the court); the pangeran (princes) were in the Kadipaten, under the supervision of the Pangeran Adipati Anom; the Keputren was the residence of the wives and those children of the king who were not yet adult; the Kamisepuhan was for senior princes, or brothers of the Susuhunan, who did not have function in the government. The princes who actively functioned in the government and were not yet married, including the king’s adult children, were allowed to reside at the Kadipaten. The high and privileged status of the sentono dalem derived from their closeness to the centre of all power and authority, the Susuhunan.10 The pangerans had rights to special titles which referred only to them.11 The majority of members of the sentono dalem received as income a land allowance, the lungguh, the amount of which was dependant on their position, seniority, and blood relationship to the Susuhunan.

The second main social class was the abdi dalem or priyayi, officials who carried out state administration at the Susuhunan’s orders. They were frequently divided into two classes, the priyayi gede (the high priyayi) and the priyayi cilik (the lower priyayi),12 on the basis of administrative rank. Priyayis were given official names by the Susuhunan to replace their personal names. They also used certain official titles appropriate to their positions.13


11 In 1939, the sons of the Susuhunan had two different titles. Mangkubumi used the title KGPH (Kanjeng Gusti Pangeran Haryo); Adiwidjojo and Purbonegoro used BKPH (Bendoro Kanjeng Pangeran Haryo); see Pawarti Soerakarta, no.1, December 1939.

12 For this division, see T. Roorda (ed.), Javaanske Wetten: De Nawala-Pradata, De Angger-Sadasa, De Angger-Angen, De Angger-Goenoeng en De Angger-Aroebiroe (Amsterdam, Johannes Muller, 1844), pp.35-68.

13 For example, the bupati used the official titles: Raden Tumenggung (RT), Kanjeng Raden Tumenggung (KRT), Raden Mas Tumenggung (RMT); the wedono used Raden Ngabehi (RNg) and Mas Ngabehi (MNg). See also my research report, Soeyatno, ‘Sejarah Perubahan Sosial di Indonesia: Studi Kasus di Surakarta 1945-1950’, Laporan Penelitian untuk Yayasan Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial (Jakarta, 1979), p.13.
Culturally, the abdi dalem were defined by the refined priyayi life pattern in all respects, including language, dress and residential style.

Third were the kawula dalem (subjects). This group was originally referred to as commoners or wong cilik (small people). They had no privileges, few rights, and many state duties. The relationship between wong cilik and Susuhunan was commonly symbolized by the phrase manunggaling kawula lan Gusti (unity of the subject with the lord).\textsuperscript{14} As Selosoemardjan has pointed out,\textsuperscript{15} wong cilik culture is thoroughly Javanese: contemplative, non-aggressive, and extremely respectful, with a strong dislike of social tensions and conflicts and with fairly strong elements of traditionalism. The principal sources of wong cilik social norms and values are pre-Hindu animism, Islam, and the stories of the wayang (Javanese puppet) play. Kebatinan, the art of unifying man's spirit with the universe, is of basic significance in the culture and has withstood centuries of influence from the great world religions. In the eyes of the wong cilik, the Susuhunan was a monarch who had supernatural power never possessed by ordinary men. The Susuhunan, in the folklore of Surakarta society, had a mysterious relationship to the Kanjeng Ratu Lara Kidul (the Queen of the South Sea), which enhanced the power and authority of

\textsuperscript{14} The term kawula-gusti often referred to the religious element, and meant the unity of man and God; see Timboel, I, no.5, 1927, pp.66-69. In addition to this, Selosoemardjan explained that manunggaling kawula lan Gusti should be interpreted as follows: manunggaling means to unify or to become one (tunggal = one); kawula means subject; Gusti is an aristocratic title used by a kawula when addressing members of the upper nobility. See Selosoemardjan, 'The Kraton in the Javanese Social Structure', in Haryati Soebadio and Carine A. du Marchie Sarvas (eds), Dynamic of Indonesian History (Amsterdam, North-Holland Publishing Company, 1978), p.226; cf. Selosoemardjan, Social Changes, p.30. For further details on kawula-gusti, see Soemarsaid Moertono, State and Statecraft in Old Java: A Study of the Later Mataram Period, 16th to 19th Century, Modern Indonesia Project (Ithaca, Cornell University, 1963), pp.14-26.

\textsuperscript{15} Selosoemardjan, 'The Kraton', pp.223-34.
the Susuhunan and the safety of the state. Thus, the horizontal division of classes in Surakarta was based upon distance from the Susuhunan's court.

DUTCH EXPANSION

Change in Administration

By the end of the Kartosuro period, when the Susuhunan moved his capital to Surakarta, the appointments of the Susuhunan's officials had to be approved by the Dutch authority. The political contract of 1747 between the Susuhunan and the Dutch changed the administrative function of the Patih who thenceforth would be a part of the colonial administration.

In theory the Dutch residents at the courts of Surakarta and Jogjakarta were advisers, but in practice they were representatives of a stronger paramount power. In 1808, Governor-General Daendels issued a new regulation governing the role of residents in the courts of Surakarta and Jogjakarta. Under this new rule, the residents were to be honoured as the representatives of the highest authority and they were thus placed on an equal level with the Susuhunan or the Sultan. In short, the political contracts made by the Dutch with the Susuhunan were aimed at progressively limiting the military force and the political and economic power of the Susuhunan.

16 An example might help to clarify this relationship: if the kraton held the sacral dancing performance of Bedoyo Ketawang, the Kanjeng Ratu Lara Kidul was considered to appear as a dancer among the other dancers, but only the Susuhunan could see her. For details, see K G P H Hadiwidjojo, Bedoyo Ketawang (Surakarta, Radyopustoko, 1971).


19 Staatkundig Overzicht, pp.51-52.
The reorganization of the Surakarta region was closely connected with the expansion of Dutch power. In 1847, Van Nes, the adviser to the 'Vorstenlanden', gave instructions that new village administrations should be formed in the villages under Lurah Desa, especially in the outer regions of the 'Vorstenlanden'. The main purposes of his plan were:

1. to form kalurahan (village administrations) with communal land rights,
2. to introduce land rent,
3. to shift the land rental system in connection with the appanage system.

These changes, however, were not fully implemented until the 1890s. Then village administration was regularized, with larger village units, under the name of kalurahan, taking on a more bureaucratic structure than before. During 1912-13 the Patih of the Susuhunan had stopped appointing new bekels, since the kalurahan desa system was in the process of formation. By 1924, in the Surakarta region (Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran) there had been formed 1396 separate village administrations or kalurahan. Each kalurahan was under a Lurah Desa, supported by a staff comprising Carik Desa (secretary), Kebayan (head of hamlet or Dukuh), Modin (religious officer), Jogoboyo (village guard) and Jogotirto (the irrigation officer).

On 1 July 1928, the function of the resident of Surakarta was superseded by that of a governor, and thereafter the Surakarta region had an administrative system similar to that of a province in Java. The first governor of Surakarta was M.B. van der Jagt, an extremely

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20 See Staatsblad, no.37, 1847; no.9, 1848.
22 Rijksblad Surakarta, nos 33, 34, 43, 1917; Rijksblad Mangkunegaran, nos 10, 14, 15, 16, 1917.
24 L. Adam, De Autonomie van het Indonesisch Dorp (Amersfoort, S.W. Melchior, 1924), p.130.
26 Rijksblad Surakarta, no.12, 1928.
experienced official. The colonial administrative pattern, because the Surakarta region was a principality, was indirect rule.

Scheme of the Administration in Surakarta after 1928

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dutch</th>
<th>Javanese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>Susuhunan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resident/Assistant Resident</td>
<td>Patih</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controleur</td>
<td>Bupati</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wedono</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assistant Wedono</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lurah Desa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

= line of responsibility

= line of cooperation

Although the Dutch colonial administration in Surakarta was now under a Governor, most Dutch officials in the afdeling (regency) and in the onder-afdeling (district) continued precisely as they had before the changes occurred. As the scheme above hints, the Dutch officials actually sat in a supervisory capacity with regard to their Principality colleagues. Thus the Assistant oversaw the work of the regents, the controleurs inspected the efforts of the wedono and assistant wedono, and the Dutch effectively controlled the entire administration right down to the village level. This situation persisted until the Japanese invasion in 1942.

The Expansion of Estate Cultivation

Before the expansion of the Dutch plantation enterprises is

27 He had been resident of Kedu, Central Java, from 17 June 1922 to 30 May 1927. For details, see Memories van M.B. van der Jagt: Oud-Gouverneur van Soerakarta (Den Haag, 1955), pp.313-27.

28 For Dutch officials in the regencies and districts in Surakarta, see Regeeringsalmanak voor Nederlandsch Indie (Weltrevreden, Landsdrukkerij, 1925), pp.244-45.
discussed, something must be said about the agrarian situation in Surakarta.²⁹ Traditionally, there were mainly two kinds of land. First was appanage land or tanah lungguh. This land was an allowance for the sentono dalem and the abdi dalem who, as appanage holders, were known as patuh. The patuh, in turn, appointed bekel to supervise a certain area of land, including the population on it. As we have seen above, the bekels were agents for the appanage holders and were responsible for delivering taxes and other goods to them.

In Surakarta, each bekel was given the use of one-fifth of the arable land in his area by the appanage holder. The remaining four-fifths of the arable land was tilled by the peasants, with 50 per cent of its production to be delivered to the appanage holders. What was left was, of course, for the peasants.

The second kind of land was the royal domain of the Susuhunan, divided into two parts, the bumi pemajegan (bumi = land; pemajegan from pajeg = tax) and the bumi gladag (gladag = glidig = human force). This land came directly under the Susuhunan and the people who resided on it had to pay taxes and deliveries to the Susuhunan and to give their labour on demand for the kraton.

In reality, after 1755, appanage holders began to rent out their rights to land to Chinese. The Chinese had the capital necessary to use this land for production of cash crops on a plantation basis, in which they were supported by both the Susuhunan and the Dutch. According to a regulation of the Kasunanan issued in 1781, the duration of this type of land rental was three years. The increase in European plantation enterprises brought changes to the land rental system, however. In 1818 the Anggor Sedesa (the Tenth Rule) of the Kasunanan stated that land rental could be prolonged to a maximum of six years.³⁰ In 1857 the maximum term was extended to fifteen years, and subsequently to twenty.³¹


³⁰ For details see T. Roorda (ed.), op.cit., pp.35-68.

³¹ Staatsblad, no.11, 1857.
The Cultivation System (cultuurstelsel), which channelled forced deliveries of cash crops to the Dutch in lieu of tribute in the period 1830-70, could not operate directly in the principalities (Vorstenlanden) which were theoretically sovereign. Nevertheless it had an indirect effect in encouraging Dutch entrepreneurs to try to grow the same crops - indigo, sugar and coffee in particular - on royal or appanage land in Surakarta. Private entrepreneurs, forbidden to operate elsewhere in Java, tended to concentrate in the principalities, especially after 1842.

In Surakarta some of the new crops, such as coffee and indigo, gained an important place towards the middle of the nineteenth century. Between 1842 and 1849 total coffee production in the Mangkunegaran areas was 2,169 quintals while the Kasunanan areas produced 39,262 quintals.\(^{32}\) For the three-year period 1861-63, these figures increased to 12,127 quintals in the Mangkunegaran and 38,020 quintals in the Kasunanan.\(^{33}\) In 1863, indigo production in Surakarta was estimated at 32,597 kilograms.\(^{34}\)

In 1870, with the introduction of the Agrarian Law and its further elaboration in the Agrarian Decree, the Cultivation System was formally ended throughout Java.\(^{35}\) The new policy aimed at developing private estate enterprises in the colony, which had the effect of further increasing the number of private enterprises in Surakarta. In 1915, the following private enterprises were operating in the regencies of Surakarta (see Table 1).

Indigo, sugar and coffee remained the most important crops through the period of the liberal system. After 1915 a process of amalgamation began among the Dutch private estates, reducing their

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35 For the effect of the Cultivation System and its abolition, see B. Schrieke (ed.), *The Effect of Western Influence on Native Civilizations in the Malay Archipelago* (Batavia, G. Kolff & Co., 1929), pp.108-14.
**TABLE I**

**DUTCH PRIVATE PLANTATION ESTATES IN SURAKARTA IN 1915***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regency</th>
<th>Number of estates</th>
<th>Kind of crops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Surakarta</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>tobacco, indigo, sugar, coffee, agave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Klaten</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>tobacco, indigo, sugar, agave, kapok, rice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Boyolali</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>tobacco, coffee, indigo, pepper, rubber, kapok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Sragen</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>coffee, indigo, rubber, tea, sugar, agave, kapok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>98</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total number from ninety-eight to eighty by 1920. But the amount of capital and land involved in estates tended to increase nevertheless. By a 1906 ordinance, Dutch authority limited the right to rent land in Surakarta to two main categories:

1. the Dutch;
2. other Europeans who had businesses and trade associations established in the Netherlands Indies.

Dutch private enterprises rented the appanages from the appanage holders, the patuhs. In practice, they rented the rights of the patuhs, including the use of the bekels and the population for plantation purposes. This meant that the villagers, coordinated by bekels, experienced a heavy


36 See 'Overzicht van de Landbouwondernemingen in het Gewest Soerakarta', typescript, Soerakarta, 1927, pp.1-10, AMN.

burden of plantation work. Sugar cultivation in particular required very extensive labour.38

Relations between renters and appanage holders were controlled by the Patih or the Bupati Nayoko. The system of land rental for annual crops was the glebagan (glebag = reverse), a rotation system of land use. Land was divided into two plots, marked A and B. Estates were permitted to use land A during even years and B during odd years. When estates were using the land of A plot, the farmers worked the land of B plot and vice-versa.39

In short, Dutch entrepreneurs gained the rights of the appanage holders, while the bekels and farmers were compelled to serve on the plantation estates. A similar system operated in Jogjakarta, where its harmful results for the bekels and the population have been discussed by Selosoemardjan. 40

Impact on the Peasant

European influence on the agricultural system of Java was very great, especially in the periods of the Cultivation System and the liberal policy.41 This section will describe briefly the influence of Dutch enterprises on villages in Surakarta.

Within the appanage system outlined above, the bekels controlled a certain land area on behalf of the appanage holders, including the population of that area. The rights of the population to land, according to customary law in Surakarta, were only hak anggaduh or borrowing rights.42 Appanage holders had the right to the agricultural labour of the

40 Selosoemardjan, Social Changes, pp.33-34.
42 Soepomo, op.cit., pp.80-81.
population, through services called bau suku (bau = shoulder; suku = foot) and pasumbang (contribution),\textsuperscript{43} which were required at marriage or other ceremonies. In addition to these labour obligations, the villagers also worked on the bekels' land, a task called kuduran (from kudur = duty).\textsuperscript{44} In Surakarta the particular villagers who owed this service were called kuli pancên (kuli = labourer; pancên = allocated). Professor Sartono Kartodirdjo, in his study of Banten, observed that the pancên service was replaced there in 1882 by a poll tax of one guilder per head.\textsuperscript{45} In Surakarta, however, this feudal custom survived long afterward.

The division of the use of land can be summarized as follows: the bekels enjoyed the use of one-fifth of the arable land, the farmers two-fifths, and the appanage holders two-fifths. With the rise of the Dutch plantation estates, a further division of the use of land occurred during the liberal policy, 1870-1900. This division can be summarized as follows:\textsuperscript{46} one-seventh for the bekels; two-sevenths, called bumi glebag (rotation land), for the population; two-sevenths as land used by the estates (bumi gadangan) and two-sevenths as reserve land for the estates (bumi sediyan). Because the appanage holders now received land rent from the estates, they no longer received an agricultural product from the peasants, but they often continued to receive labour obligations, such as the bau suku and the pasumbang.

A regulation concerning compulsory labour took effect in Surakarta on 23 August 1909.\textsuperscript{47} Its main goal was to regularize the intensive work which the villagers performed on Dutch estates. This work was of various kinds. First, there was intiran (distribution


\textsuperscript{44} The kuduran was commonly performed with the bekel providing light food buc xo wages. See Adatrechtbundels, vol.19, pp.107-08.

\textsuperscript{45} Sartono Kartodirdjo, The Peasants' Revolt of Banten in 1888: Its Conditions, Course and Sequel, A Case Study of Social Movements in Indonesia ('s-Gravenhage, Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), p.44.

\textsuperscript{46} Adatrechtbundels, vol.19, p.370.

\textsuperscript{47} Some years later the regulation of kerja wajib was reinforced in the Rijksblad. For the Kasunanan see Rijksblad Surakarta, no.23, 1917, and for the Mangkunegaran see Rijksblad Mangkunegaran, no.23, 1920.
little by little) or compulsory agricultural work on the plantations. The rule for intiran duty was that villagers had to work on the estates for a maximum of ten hours each thirty-five days.\textsuperscript{48} Second, there was night guard duty on the estates. Villagers working as night watchmen had to guard the estates from 6 o'clock in the evening until 6 o'clock in the morning.\textsuperscript{49} Third, there was gugur gunung (gugur = fall; gunung = mountain), a collective unpaid obligation of the villagers, which served general purposes in the villages and on the estates. Most frequently, this consisted of work on the irrigation system. Bekels and the villagers were responsible for the physical condition of the irrigation system. The only villagers who were free from this compulsory labour were the bekels themselves and the wong panumpang (villagers having neither house nor land).

In Surakarta, farmers worked on plantation estates under what was known as the glidig or wage labour system. The glidig system demanded compulsory labour on the Dutch estates though with payment. Villagers had to work on estates under the supervision of bekels who were acting as pangarepe wong cilik (leaders of the little people). Bekels and villagers who neglected this duty were punished by having to work for three months with no payment except light food.\textsuperscript{50} In the glidig system the villagers had little time to work their own fields.\textsuperscript{51}

The regulation governing compulsory labour (kerja wajib) was put into effect on sixty-three estates\textsuperscript{52} in Surakarta on 1 September 1909, and on twenty-three more in the regencies of Klaten, Boyolali and Sragen on 1 January 1910.\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{48} Jonquière (ed.), \textit{op.cit.}, p.77.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., p.78.
\textsuperscript{50} For the regulation of glidig in Surakarta, see \textit{Rijksblad Surakarta}, no.24, 1917, and \textit{Rijksblad Mangkunegaran}, no.11, 1917.
\textsuperscript{51} A.K. Pringgodigdo, \textit{Geschiedenis}, p.36.
\textsuperscript{52} Fifteen of these estates were in Surakarta regency, three in Boyolali regency, twenty-nine in the regency of Klaten, and sixteen in Sragen regency.
\textsuperscript{53} Jonquière (ed.), \textit{op.cit.}, pp.83-84.
With these additional activities for the Dutch plantations, the villagers had three distinct burdens of compulsory labour - for the kingdom (pagaweyan nagara), for the estates, and for the irrigation system.

The appanage system was abolished in Surakarta in 1918, signalling a serious program of land reform. Each peasant was granted inheritable rights to the use of the land, which created strong ties between the peasant and his land. The role of the bekels was diminished by the abolition of the appanage system, which weakened the relationship between peasants and bekels.

During the Great Depression of the 1930s the Netherlands Indies experienced exceptionally severe economic difficulties. National and per capita incomes declined sharply. In particular the export-oriented economy, including the sugar estates of Surakarta, collapsed as a result of a steep decline in export prices. Although production of sugar continued to increase until 1930, the value of sugar exports from Java slumped from 1,049 million guilders in 1925 to 254 million in 1930. The Javanese population was thrown back upon the traditional sector for survival.

In Surakarta, too, the population was heavily affected, and many peasants could not pay the poll-tax. Many of them returned their individual rights to the land to the Susuhunan, a process known as kadedel (withdrawn). This resulted in many of the villagers becoming landless peasants. Others, in an endeavour to retain their land rights, pawned the land to rich peasants for several years. The money was then used for the payment of the poll-tax. In this way

54 Soepomo, op.cit., p.100.
55 Rijksblad Surakarta, no.34, 1917, and Rijksblad Mangkunegaran, no.16, 1917.
58 For Jogjakarta, see Selosoemardjan, Social Changes, pp.219-25.
60 Interview with Prawiroredjo, 11 March 1979; Pawiro Granggang, 27 August 1979.
the economic position of wealthier landowners was strengthened in relation to the poor.

POPULAR RESPONSES

As the various changes in labour obligation and in leadership style indicate, western enterprises penetrated deeply into the Javanese village, in Surakarta in particular. As a result of this penetration, there understandably arose a reaction among villagers along traditional lines. In an early exhibition of this phenomenon, villagers in Klaten regency agitated against the estates and murdered Dutch planters in 1847. There were other rural protest movements which had messianic features. Two important movements should be mentioned, the Mangkuwidjaja Affair in Klaten in 1865 and the Srikaton Affair in Karanganyar in 1888. Mangkuwidjaja, a villager of Merbaung village, Klaten regency, had prepared a detailed plan of revolt against the Dutch. He kept a document containing the Jayabaya prophecy stating that all foreigners in Surakarta and Jogjakarta would be eliminated. This movement failed when the Dutch captured most of its leaders on 8 July 1865. The Srikaton affair took place at the village of Girilayu. Imam Redjo, who had gone through an ascetic preparation at Ngawi, East Java, launched a movement to occupy the Srikaton bungalow of the Mangkunegoro, at Girilayu. Imam and his followers planned to establish a new Islamic kingdom. The Mangkunegoro troops successfully killed Imam and the other leaders. Sartono Kartodirdjo classifies these two movements as messianic, aiming to set up a golden age in society and to overthrow foreign dominance of any kind.

For details on the stages of western penetration and its result on the villages, see D.H. Burger, passim.

Ikhtisar Keadaan Politik Hindia Belanda Tahun 1839-1848, Penerbitan Sumber-Sumber Sejarah no.5 (Jakarta, Arsip National Republik Indonesia, 1973), pp.46-56.


In the twentieth century the latent dislike of foreign dominion rose above the threshold of national consciousness. The Budi Utomo (Glorious Endeavour) or BU, the earliest national organisation, which had Javanese nationalism as its basis, was formed by Javanese doctors and students in 1908. Its members were, in practice, limited to the educated priyayi elite. In Surakarta, Narpowandowo, a cultural organization consisting of nobles, was formed as part of the BU movement. By virtue of this elitist composition, the BU did not have much to offer the peasants in resisting the further exploitation of Dutch colonialism.

In 1912 the Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union) or SI was established, with its impetus coming mainly from batik traders in Surakarta. Initially, the SI was established to break the strong Chinese hold on the textile business. According to its statutes, this organization was limited to business enterprises, but it also aimed to encourage the development of the economic life of the Indonesian people and the Muslim religion. In the event, the SI was to provide the urban leadership for a widespread movement of rural protest.

During the first years of the development of SI, in 1912-18, the discontent of the peasants of Surakarta was manifested in a number of social upheavals. The continued expansion of the estates brought increasing burdens for the peasants. Despite the abolition of the appanage system, the granting of individual land rights and the introduction of the poll-tax, conditions in Surakarta were far from satisfactory. Although the poll-tax was intended to replace the

65 On the early years of the BU, see Nagazumi Akira, The Dawn of Indonesian Nationalism: The Early Years of the Budi Utomo, 1908-1918 (Tokyo, Institute of Developing Economies, 1972).


67 Sarekat Islam Lokal, Penerbitan Sumber-Sumber Sejarah, no.7 (Jakarta, Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, 1975), p.327.

68 For details on this point, see Sartono Kartodirdjo, Protest Movements, pp.142-85.
various feudal services, these were still widely imposed in this region. The peasants responded to these very real burdens by resisting taxes and all kinds of feudal services.

The dangers inherent in the plantation system of Surakarta became clear when Haji Misbach entered villages in Klaten regency in order to agitate politically. Haji Misbach, the son of a Surakarta batik dealer, had joined the SI in its early years. According to Dutch accounts, Misbach was extremely popular in the region of Surakarta. His teaching had elements of indigenous tradition, Islam, and Marxism. Pringgodigdo identified Misbach as 'seorang komunis-keagamaan', a religious communist. As a Muslim, Misbach relied on the teachings of the Quran. On the other hand, as a communist, he objected to the existence of varied classes in society.

According to two 1920 reports by the resident of Surakarta, Tjipto Mangunkusumo and Haji Misbach had successfully stirred up villagers in Klaten to refuse compulsory labour for both the villages and the estates. Apparently the peasants were angry about the increase of labour obligations on the estates and complained about the taxes imposed in the reorganization of the agrarian system in the principalities in 1918. The radicalism of Tjipto Mangunkusumo was also of long standing. In the early years of BU, Tjipto had represented the most radical view of the younger members, and he desired to lead BU down a more radical course. In 1909 he had resigned from the Board of BU and later became one of the prominent leaders of the Indies Party (Indische Partij).

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70 Ibid., pp.171-72.
72 R.C. Kwantes, De Ontwikkeling, vol.1, pp.266-69, 276-78.
73 Nagazumi Akira, op.cit., pp.56, 186: note 87, Tjipto was born in 1886, entered Stovia on 1 March 1899 and graduated on 28 October 1905.
74 Ibid., pp.54-55.
subversive activity in this party, was exiled to Banda and then to Holland before being allowed to return to Java in 1914. Tjipto rejected the world of the kraton and its feudal privileges. He once deliberately brought his buggy onto the alun-alun of Surakarta, in an attempt to break the Kraton regulation forbidding anybody but a noble to do so.

During 1919-20, Tjipto carried his revolutionary activity, in the name of the Sarekat Hindia, to the villages surrounding Delanggu (Klaten regency), including Polanharjo, Tempel, Ketandan and Ceper. Peasants were urged to refuse obligatory labour - herendienst, desadienst and cultuurdienst. Tjipto's propaganda had its effect. People in the area of Polanharjo alarmed the colonial authorities by their refusal of cultuurdienst, and their burning of plantation sheds. In April 1920 some 2,200 people attended a joint meeting of the Sarekat Hindia (the new name of the Indies Party) and SI in the district of Delanggu. They heard Misbach talk of initiating an economic action against the colonial government. Dutch spokesmen tended to consider Haji Misbach's followers as a terrorist and bandit group because of Misbach's radical propaganda when he joined the Sarekat Rakyat in Solo. Sarekat Rakyat was the new name of the Sarekat Islam Merah (the Red SI) a rural mass movement under the PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia - Indonesian Communist Party).

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75 A.K. Pringgodigdo, Sedjarah, p.23.
76 M. Balfas, Dr Tijpto Mangoenkoesoemo: Demokrat sedjati (Djakarta, Djambatan, 1952), pp.38-39.
77 R.C. Kwantes, De Ontwikkeling, I, p.277.
78 Ibid., p.267.
80 When Darsono replaced Semaun as the PKI leader in May 1923, he formed the Red SI branches and changed the name of the Red SI to Sarekat Rakyat. The Sarekat Rakyat was a place for selecting militant members for entrance into the PKI. For details see A.K. Pringgodigdo, Sedjarah, pp.36-37; Ruth T. McVey, op.cit., pp.155-57.
Darsono, who led the PKI from 1923, stressed the importance of influencing the SI from within. For such a policy a person like Misbach, who accepted communist ideas while being aware of Quranic teachings, was extremely important. Emphasizing the similarity of the social doctrines of Islam and Communism, Misbach began with the slogan sama rasa, sama rata, or 'same feeling, same level'. Misbach asserted that Islam, like communism, rejected a class division in society.81

Misbach and Tjipto Mangunkusumo both distrusted the authorities and the plantation owners, with whom they were constantly at odds.82 They successfully stirred up the villagers in Central Java, particularly Surakarta, against the government from 1919 to 1923. In 1924 their radical career was ended. Tjipto Mangunkusumo, after the Indies Party disintegrated as a result of internal conflict,83 could find no proper channel for his radicalism. In 1928 he was once again exiled from Java by the government. Haji Misbach was also exiled, to Manokwari, in June 1924. His wife, who joined him in exile, died in 1925, and he himself died in early 1926.84

The social unrest of villagers in the plantation areas is easy to understand. They were subject to pressure of a dual nature - from the rulers and from the planters who exploited the rights of the rulers. The sugar estates had always been the focus for this latent social unrest. As Jacoby asserted: 85


82 Misbach's attitude was influenced by the Red SI. See Ruth T. McVey, op.cit., pp.170-72.

83 A.K. Pringgodigdo, Sedjarah, p.78.

84 Ruth T. McVey, op.cit., p.424.

the area of sugar production has for decades been
the classical stage for social unrest. It is the
center of social pressure, latent resistance, and
open clashes. In the social pattern of Java, the
sugar plantation, though operating only on rented
lands, takes the place of large-scale land
concentrations in other countries of this area.

The peasants' opposition to taxes and other services found
a new channel after the Pakempalan Kawulo Surakarta (Association of
the People of Surakarta) or PKS was established in June 1932. Its
founder was Raden Pandji Singgih, who was born in 1894 in Malang,
East Java, and graduated in Law from the University of Leiden. From
1920 he was a member of Budi Utomo, and in 1930 he served as a
secretary of this organization. From 1920 to 1923 he also took
an active role in the Indonesische Studie Club. When the PBI
(Persatuan Bangsa Indonesia - Union of the Indonesian Nation) was
established in January 1931, Singgih was one of its prominent leaders.
Like other leaders of PBI, Singgih also joined actively in the Rukun
Tani (Peasant Association), established in 1932 under the auspices
of the PBI. He was also very active on the staff of the journal
Timboel, based in Surakarta.

From 1932 to 1942 Singgih led the PKS. He was assisted by
some important aristocrats, including RMTH Sumodiningrat (adviser),
Gusti Pangeran Haryo Djojokusumo and Mas Pringgowinoto. Sumodiningrat
was born on 7 May 1904 in Surakarta, the grandchild of Paku Buwono X.
He graduated from the Leiden Law Faculty in 1935 and thereafter
represented a crucial link between the nationalist intelligentsia
and the kraton. While he was in the PKS, Sumodiningrat apportioned

86 Orang Indonesia jang terkemoeka di Djawa (Djakarta, Gunseikanboe,
2604 [1944]), p.16. See also A.K. Pringgodigdo, Sedjarah, p.53.
87 A.K. Pringgodigdo, Sedjarah, pp.111-12.
88 Timboel, I, no.5, 1927.
89 GPU Djojokusumo was the son of Paku Buwono X. He was not
very active in the PKS. Mas Pringgowinoto was an official of
the Susuhunan and was very active in the PBI and Rukun Tani.
Interview with Sumodiningrat, 2 August 1979.
his activities among several political organizations. From 1936 to
1942 he was a deputy chairman of the Surakarta branch of Parindra
(Parai Indonesia Raya). He also chaired the cultural and educational
movement Narpowandowo during the period 1938-45.90

The initiative for the formation of the PKS came from leaders
of the PBI, and especially from R.P. Singgih himself. They argued
that an organization with members from all social levels ought to be
established in Surakarta.91 Apparently the PKS was also inspired by
the PKN (Pakempalan Kawulo Ngajogjakarta); it had been established
in June 1930 by nobles of Jogjakarta, though its members consisted
mostly of peasants. The goals of PKN were to strengthen the Sultanate
of Jogjakarta and to achieve better economic conditions for the
population.92

In 1933 the PKM (Pakempalan Kawulo Mangkunegaran) was also
established, apparently in imitation of the PKN and the PKS. The PKM
was of less interest to peasants, probably because its goal was the
unity of the population in the territory of the Mangkunegaran rather
than solving the various problems of the oppressed peasants.93 Three
years after its formation the PKM therefore declined rapidly. Most
peasants who had previously joined the PKM then entered the PKS.94
In fact the programmes of the PKS were more closely related to the
burdens of the peasants.

90 Interview with Sumodiningrat, 2 August 1979. For details see
'Sumodiningrat: Riwayat Hidup/Perjoangan', typescript, Surakarta,
1977. This may be found in Sumodiningrat's private collection.

91 A.K. Pringgodigdo, Sedjarah, p.126.

92 An excellent analysis of the PKN is W.J. O'Malley, 'Indonesian
In the Great Depression: A Study of East Sumatra and Jogjakarta
in the 1930s', Ph.D thesis, Cornell University, 1977 (University
Microfilm, Ann Arbor, 1979), pp.305-41.

93 Interview with Sunardjo Pontjorahardjo, 14 July 1979.

94 This was clearly seen in the subdistrict of Jumapolo, where in
1937 most members of PKM joined the PKS. Interview with Darmanto,
8 October 1979. For the decline of the PKM see also Pringgodigdo,
Sedjarah, p.126.
The programmes of the PKS were clearly apparent at its first congress in 1935, held on the alun-alun kidul (the south great square) of the kraton of the Susuhunan. Thirty thousand members were estimated to have attended. At this congress the leaders of the PKS announced the goals of their organization: first, to unite the people of the Kasunanan; second, to improve the living conditions of the people; third, to attempt to strengthen the principality.

The PKS had many branches in the villages, especially in the regencies of Klaten, Karanganyar and Sragen. Most members of the PKS were illiterate farmers, and there were few members from the city of Solo. Its organization was as follows: Puser (central PKS), Jogyantororo (branch), Parantororo (local branch), pembarep (chairman), penghulu (secretary), hartoko (treasury) and wargo (members). In 1939 a youth organization of the PKS, the so-called Bledug Menggala (bledug = young elephant; manggala = lucky, prominent) was formed. Most members of this organization were young villagers. They were trained in the skills of the scout movement by the members of the PBI. From 1939 to the end of 1941, the Bledug Manggala functioned to guard the security of rural meetings of the PKS.

According to Sumodiningrat, who followed the development of the PKS closely, after 1935 the PKS grew very aggressive. The peasants began to refuse to pay the poll-tax, and they attempted to replace those lurah desa (village headmen) who were identified as helpers of the Dutch. Mr Singgih's speeches during his tours of Surakarta rural areas in 1935-39 seemed to have an effect. Most of his speeches opposed the poll-tax and compulsory labour for the estates.

As a result of the increasing tempo of rural meetings of the PKS, the Dutch imprisoned many important local leaders of the PKS in 1937. Licences for PKS rural meetings became very difficult to obtain. The assistant wedono (sub-district officers) increasingly controlled all activities of the PKS.

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95 Interview with Sumodiningrat, 2 August 1979.
96 Interview with Darmanto, 8 October 1979.
97 Interview with Pawiro Granggang, a prominent PKS leader in Kedawung sub-district; he was once imprisoned for several weeks by the Dutch. Interview, 27 August 1979.
When the PBI merged into Parindra in 1935 most of the aristocratic leaders of PKS followed suit by also joining the new party. Although the PKS in this later period was influenced by Parindra, this was a less direct political influence than that of PBI had been in 1930-35. Parindra members were limited to the priyayi group, whereas the PBI, through the Rukun Tani channel, had been able to accept peasants as members of the PBI. Accordingly the influence of the Parindra was only limited to top leaders of the PKS.

In the period of the PKS there was also a protest movement with messianic features. It occurred in the regency of Wonogiri in 1935 and was popularly called the Tambakmerang Affair. The movement was led by Kyai Wirasandjaja, a villager who had received ngélmu (teaching), prophesying that the golden age would come and that people merely by staying at home would receive gold and diamonds. This teaching had drawn peasants to leave their villages and their work to become the students of Wirasandjaja. Supported by his followers, Wirasandjaja declared himself the Ratu Adil (Just King) and built a complex of buildings comprising eighteen houses in the style of the Susuhunan's kraton. Wirasandjaja's followers served in his houses every day and took part in the life of his kraton. The movement was ended when the regent of Wonogiri used police to stop Wirasandjaja's dangerous movement. 98

Wirasandjaja had no relations with the PKS movement. His prophecy was apparently in the same tradition as the Mangkuwidi jaja Affair and the Srikaton Affair, based on the Jayabaya prophecy and the coming of the Ratu Adil. 99

Although the PKS movement had the character of a modern peasant organization, its leaders also used the Jayabaya prophecy as a means of strengthening the goals of their organization. They believed that the colonial period was to be succeeded by a golden age

98 Sartono Kartodirdjo, Tjatatan, pp.20-21.

99 For details on an earlier study of Ratu Adil movements in Java, see G.W.J. Drewes, Drie Javaansche Goeroe's. Hun Leven, Onderricht en Messiasprediking (Leiden, Drukkerij A. Vros, 1925), pp.10-49; cf. Sartono Kartodirdjo, Protest Movements, passim.
in which the peasants would finally obtain prosperity.

Colonialism had given rise to latent rural unrest in Surakarta, which eventually took the form of peasant movements of various kinds. The Dutch authority had taken over the feudal rights of the Surakarta aristocrats, and had then maximised the obligations of the peasants for the needs of a Dutch-dominated modern capitalist economy.
CHAPTER TWO

THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION

On 15 February 1942, Singapore fell into the hands of Japanese military forces. As a result of this, Java lost its powerful shield.\(^1\) The main cities in Java, Batavia and Surabaya were occupied on 5 and 7 March respectively. On 8 March, General Imamura Hitoshi, Commander-in-Chief, demanded that his surrender terms be accepted unconditionally. On 9 March, the Governor-General of Netherlands India transferred his authority to the Japanese, and control of Java passed into the hands of the Japanese military forces.\(^2\)

Java was important to the Japanese in many respects, for it had considerable resources and a number of important oil refineries. The island, the most densely populated in Indonesia, was the administrative, industrial and vital working centre.

The Dutch in Surakarta burned the oil depot at Ngemplak, in the northern part of the city, on 2 March 1942 to prevent it falling into the hands of the Japanese.\(^3\) According to Mangkunegaran sources, the Japanese entered the city of Surakarta on 5 March 1942.\(^4\)

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4. See 'Aanteekeningen Omtrent de Mangkoenegaran in de Maart dagen 1942', typescript, Soerakarta, 1942, p.2. This date was the same as that in sources kept in the library of the Sedjarah Militer Angkatan Darat of Surakarta. See 'Sedjarah T.N.I. Didalam', p.3. On the other hand, Djajusman has given a different date, 7 March 1942. See Djajusman, *Hancurnya Angkatan Perang Hindia Belanda (KNIL)*, (Bandung, Penerbit Angkasa, 1978), pp.189-90.
Dutch forces in Surakarta were very weak and offered no resistance. 5 With the surrender, the Legion of Mangkunegaran, which had functioned to assist the Dutch troops and guard the security of the Mangkunegaran territories, was disbanded by the Japanese. 6

The commander of the Japanese Military Forces in Surakarta, H. Funabiki, announced to the people that they should be opposed to both the Dutch and the Chinese. 7 Dutch houses in the Bandjarsari complex and Chinese shops all over Surakarta were sacked by the people. Some days later, the Japanese announced that the booty from this plunder had to be handed over to the Japanese authorities. 8

CHANCES IN THE ADMINISTRATION

The first formal meeting between the Japanese and Susuhunan Pakubuwono XI and Prince Mangkunegoro VII was held on 14 March at the Sasanamulya, a place of ceremonial meetings for the Susuhunan family. 9 This meeting was intended to introduce the new Japanese authorities in Surakarta and to discuss the future government of the Kasunanan and the Mangkunegaran. It was continued four days later, on 18 March. Colonel Nakayama, head of the Public Affairs Department (Somobucho) in Batavia, and General Harada, Deputy Chief of Staff of the 16th Army,

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5 The Dutch military forces, the KNIL (the Koninklijk Nederlandsche Indisch Leger), consisted in Central Java of only one detachment, which was a combination of battalions from Jogjakarta, Surakarta and Salatiga; it was complemented by units of the Legion of Mangkunegaran. Djajusman, op.cit., p.178.

6 'Aanteekeningen', p.2. Initially, Daendels intended the Legion to strengthen Dutch troops in Central Java against the British invasion in 1811. From its earliest days, the Legion had been prepared as an auxiliary force to help the Dutch military forces. See H.F. Aukes, Het Legioen van Mangkoe Negoro (Bandung, A.C. Nix & Co., MCMXXXV [1935]), pp.30-31.

7 'Sedjarah T.N.I. Didalam', p.3.

8 Interview with Sudarjo, 3 September 1979.

9 'Aanteekeningen', p.3.
attended both meetings, and discussed the form of the princely
governments. Colonel Nakayama announced at the second meeting:

The status of the Surakarta principality is in
principle acknowledged as similar to that under
the Dutch regime. Jogjakarta and Surakarta
principalities are not included in the Central
Java region, but will be directly governed by the
Japanese Military Administration in Batavia. For
this purpose the Japanese government would like to
form a Central Committee for the Surakarta
principality.10

With the establishment of the Japanese Military Administration
in March 1942, the political contract between the Dutch regime and
the Susuhunan was naturally abrogated. In March and April 1942,
according to Zorab's analysis of the stages of Japanese authority,11
the Japanese in Surakarta were in the stage of the transfer of
authority. In April, they gave effect to the decisions of the meetings
of 14 and 18 March, setting up the BPK (Badan Pengawas Kerajaan)
for the principalities of Jogjakarta and Surakarta.12 The chairman
of the BPK was a high Indonesian official in Batavia named Kohri,13
and two other principal members were Japanese, S. Yoshigawa supervising
the Jogjakarta principality and H. Funabiki administering the
principality of Surakarta.14 On 6 April, Kohri and his staff met with
the Sultan and Prince Paku Alam; the next day, 7 April, the BPK
visited the Susuhunan and Prince Mangkunegoro.15

With the Japanese Military Administration controlling Surakarta,

10 'Aanteekeningen', pp.4-5.
11 Zorab saw three stages of Japanese authority in Java: the transfer
of authority, consolidation, and the period of political change;
op.cit., p.30.
12 Sedhiya Tama, no.94, 11 April 1942.
13 'Aanteekeningen', pp.4-5.
14 H. Funabiki was the commander of the Japanese military forces
which occupied the city of Surakarta on 5 March 1942. His name
has been popular thereafter. See 'Sedjarah T.N.I. Didalam',
p.3.
15 Sedhiya Tama, no.94, 11 April 1942.
the policy of heightening mass feeling against the Dutch was continued. In May 1942 the Japanese police announced that inhabitants of Surakarta were prohibited from keeping awards given them by the Dutch. These had to be handed in to the Japanese military office. This is particularly ironic in the face of all the Dutch (and other) medals and orders that used to wear. In the same period, people were prohibited from singing the Dutch national anthem, and even 'Indonesia Raya' was banned. Instead the Kimi Gayo, the Japanese national anthem, was required for formal occasions in Surakarta.

Further steps were taken regarding the prohibition of the Dutch language both in daily conversation and on the telephone. Other languages of the Allies were also prohibited. Shops with Dutch names had to change them into Indonesian or Japanese ones. The Japanese also forbade people to read books which described the western world.

With the Japanese prohibiting Indonesians from using the Dutch language, the importance of Dutch as a means of graceful conversation among the cultured group decreased rapidly. In assessing Japanese language policy, Takdir Alisjahbana concluded that the invaders wanted to make Japanese the main language in the archipelago. In the early stages of adjustment, however, they had to allow the use of the Indonesian language as the most practical step, if the energies

16 This prohibition was issued in a circular letter of the Surakarta Police Office, dated 12 May 1942.


18 This statement was found in the Pengoemoeman Kantor Besar Poelisi Bulutontura Dai Nippon di Soerakarta, 29 September 2602 [1942]. It was also found in the circulation letter of the Surakarta Kochi Jimu Kyoku Chokan on 10 December 2602, no.A/8130/29.


of the Indonesian people were to be involved in the Japanese war effort.21

On 30 July 1942, Hitoshi Imamura, commander of the 16th Army and supreme authority over Government affairs in Java, formally issued an important order to Paku Buwono XI concerning the status of the autonomous areas in Java. Its contents were as follows:

1. The Commander of the Japanese Army appoints Paku Buwono XI as the ruler (head of the autonomous area) of Surakarta.

2. The Susuhunan shall be subordinate to the Commander of the Japanese Army and shall conduct government affairs in the autonomous area on the basis of the Commander's orders.

3. The jurisdictional area of the autonomous area shall be the existing territory of the realm of the Susuhunan of Surakarta.

4. The customary privileges exercised by the Susuhunan shall be acknowledged in principle.

5. The Susuhunan shall be responsible to the Commander of the Japanese Army for conducting the government affairs of the autonomous area.

6. For the present, the political structure of the autonomous area shall follow the existing pattern except where specifically determined otherwise.

7. In order to guide and supervise the government affairs of the autonomous area, the Japanese Army Commander shall create an Administrative Office in the autonomous area and appoint a Director for that office.

8. The principles governing the government affairs of the autonomous area shall be separately outlined by the Superintendent of Military Administration.22

At Batavia, on the same date - 30 July 1942 - Imamura installed Susuhunan Paku Buwono XI as Solo Kös (head of principality


22 Hitoshi Imamura's orders can be found in H.J. Benda et al., Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia: Selected Documents, Translation Series, no.6, Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University, 1965, p.60. For a different translation of the orders by the JPRS, see Japanese Military Administration, p.145.
of Surakarta). At this ceremony the commander proclaimed:

On this day, Solo Ko and your family have united with Dai Nippon and we hope you and your family will live in peace. We also understand Solo Ko will do great works in the future.23

Within the system outlined for autonomous areas on 30 July, the Mangkunegaran principality was also declared an autonomous area. On 14 August 1942, Prince Mangkunegoro VII was installed as Mangkunegoro Kō by General Imamura.24 He too was declared subordinate to the Japanese Military Administration on the understanding that he possessed his previous privileges and administered the Mangkunegaran Köchi (Principality). After his installation, Prince Mangkunegoro VII instructed his people to obey Japanese military orders, and to work together with the Japanese nation to build a new society in Java.25

The three provinces of Dutch Java were abolished by the Japanese, and instead seventeen Shū, corresponding to old residencies, were set up as the highest regional administrative units.26 This division excluded the four principalities, the Kasultanan, Paku Alaman, Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran, which were specially designated as Köchi and were placed directly under the Japanese Military Administration in Batavia.27

Surakarta Köchi was headed by the Köchi Jimu Kyoku Chōkan (head of the permanent secretariat for the principality). Keiko Mayano was the first Chōkan of Surakarta and head of the Japanese Military

23 Kan Po, I, no.1, August 1942; see also Makloemat & Oendang-Oendang Balatentara Dai Nippon 1942, pp.13 A-14 A.

24 The installation ceremony was presided over by Colonel Nakayama, while Major-General Okazaki read the letter of appointment. On the same date, Prince Paku Alam VIII of Jogjakarta was installed as Paku Alam Kō. See Pandji Poestaka, no.20, 22 August 1942, p.686; Kan Po, I, no.1, August 1942, p.22.

25 Makloemat Mangkunegaran Koo, no.1, 20 August 1942.


27 Kan Po, I, no.2, August 1942, p.5.
Administration there. In practice, both Solo Kö and Mangkunegoro Kö lost all of their authority, becoming only symbols of local government. Their activities in administration, in military affairs, in law and in the economy were limited by Japanese Military Administration rules, and their policies were dictated by the Superintendent of Military Administration of the autonomous area.

At the lower administrative levels, the Köchi were governed in exactly the same way as the Shū in the remainder of Java. The Köchi or Shū were subdivided into Ken (the old regency), and Ken again subdivided into Gun (district). Below the Gun were the Son (subdistrict), and the Ku (village or desa). The heads of these districts, all Indonesians, were called Ken Cho, Gun Cho, Son Cho and Ku Cho, respectively. There were also Shi (municipality), subdivided into Shiku (wards). The heads of Shū were Shū Chōkan, most of whom were Japanese. Generally, these were experienced civil servants from Japan's provincial administration, without any knowledge of Java.

The administrative divisions in Surakarta Köchi, as elsewhere, reflected the traditional ones. There were merely changes of titles, and in fact Javanese traditional titles continued to be used in referring to the new Japanese ranks. The Javanese language continued as the means of social and formal communication within the inner administration of the kraton, but Indonesian was often used by Javanese officials to communicate with the Japanese.

29 For complete instructions from the Superintendent to the head of autonomous area, see H.J. Benda, et al., op.cit., pp.62-63.
31 For a list of the names of Shū Chōkan of seventeen Shū, see Kan Po, I, no.2, September 1942, pp.7-8.
32 G.S. Kanahele, op.cit., p.60.
33 For example, Ken Cho could use a title Kanjeng or Kanjeng Raden Mas Haryo. See Makloemat Mangkonegoro Köö, no.1, 9 December 1943.
34 Interview with KRT Darjonegoro, 5 December 1979.
In order to establish a direct chain of command in the bureaucratic system as well as to eliminate colonial practices, the Japanese abolished the Dutch official ranks of Governor, Assistant Resident and Controleur. Accordingly, the dualistic feature of Dutch rule disappeared.35

Because of a lack of Japanese personnel, the Japanese Military Administration continued to employ the local priyayis.36 But Japanese officials were constantly suspicious of the actions of Javanese officials, particularly the Ken Chō and the Ku Chō. After 1943, the suspicious Kempeitai (the Japanese Military Police) travelled to villages at least once every month. A description by one of these visits is given by Soekardi, who stressed the suspicion of the Kempeitai.

My father and my father-in-law, who were Ku Chō in the subdistrict of Kedawung, were always being asked by the Japanese police about meetings held by the villagers. The Japanese police were always coming with the Son Chō to interview my father and my father-in-law, about whether they had ever held political meetings.37

Although the Susuhunan was still on his throne, his authority


37 Soekardi was born on 2 May 1916, the son of the village head of Bendungan, subdistrict of Kedawung, Sragen regency. He graduated from primary school in 1929. In the Dutch period, he had been a teacher (1933-34). During the Japanese occupation, he was a deputy chairman of the Badan Oeroesan Makanan Rakyat (BOMR) and was the leader of Keibodan (Vigilance Guard). Interview with Soekardi, 31 July 1979.

38 Interview with Soekardi, 31 July 1979.
was seriously reduced by the Japanese Military Administration. After 1943, the financial affairs of Solo Kō were regulated and determined by the Kōchi Jimu Kyoku Chōkan. Various local taxes and other revenues collected by the Japanese Military Administration were not given to the Solo Kō. All local industries, whether of production or marketing, had to follow regulations set by the Japanese Military Administration. A regulation of June 1942 limited the batik industry and the textile industry to only 25 per cent and 50 per cent respectively of their 1941 production. The resultant decrease in government revenue from taxes on these industries contributed to the problem of pangreh praja salaries in the principality.

A new administrative institution introduced in the Japanese period was the Tonari Gumi (Neighbourhood Association). This was formed in 1943 as the basic unit of rural organization, and consisted of ten to twenty households. The head of a Tonari Gumi, elected by its members, was called Kumichō. The basic organization of the Tonari Gumi was modelled on a Japanese institution set up in cities and villages in Japan.

In the Surakarta Kōchi, the Japanese issued a special regulation on the Tonari Gumi, even though in practice its functions were exactly the same as in other places in Java. There were three main functions:

40 Ibid., p.2. In order to improve tax collections, the Mangkunegaran Kōchi reorganized the system under new guide lines, giving the Ku Chö 2 per cent commission on all taxes they gathered. See Pengemoeman Mangkoenegaran Koo, 31 December 1942 (1942), no.6447/24.
41 See Makloemat Dai Nippon Gun Sei Bu Soerakarta, 10 June 1942.
42 Himpoenan Oendang-Oendang dan Makloemat: Makloemat Pemerintah Dai Nippon 2604 [1944], for Tonari Gumi in the Kōchi area, pp.1A-4A. According to Kanahele, the Tonari Gumi was first instituted in March 1943 in Bandung and then in Jogjakarta; op.cit., p.305, note 34.
44 Before being formally established, the Tonari Gumi had to be approved by Kochi Jimu Kyoku Chokan and Solo Kō. Himpoenan Oendang-Oendang, 2604, pp.1A-4A, especially article 9.
1. to make propaganda for all Japanese Military objectives in the villages;
2. to form the base on which cooperative work would be conducted;
3. to help the Japanese in conducting the war.  

If these goals were to be achieved, the Japanese needed the Tonari Gumi to function at maximal efficiency and the Kumicho to have good leadership. For this purpose, in November 1944, special workshops were held throughout Java to train the Kumicho. In Surakarta Köchi, these workshops, called Kondan Kai Tonari Gumi (question-and-answer forum) were held in each Ken. Problems discussed included foodstuffs, clothes, and the training and recruitment of manpower for the defence of the motherland.

The Tonari Gumi organization struck deep roots in the society. On 30 September 1945 the Tonari Gumi in Surakarta changed its name to Rukun Tetangga (rukun = in harmony; tetangga = neighbour) but continued to exist in its old form. With the formation of Tonari Gumi, in fact, the Japanese were able to maximize the cooperation of the rural people in their war efforts. The mobilization of people was thus more easily achieved in the villages.

For some weeks after the proclamation of Indonesian independence on 17 August 1945, the Japanese-inspired administrative structure of the Surakarta Köchi continued. It was not until after the establishment of the KNID (the Komite Nasional Indonesia Daerah - the Regional Indonesian National Committee) of Surakarta in September 1945 that the administrative structure began to change.

Towards the end of the Japanese occupation, the political situation in the courts of Surakarta was dominated by the deaths of

45 'Hal Tonari Gumi', Bendel Djamin Djepang 1944-1945, no.29, AMN.
46 Kanahele, op.cit., p.145
47 'Hal Tonari Gumi', AMN.
48 'Laporan Rapat Tonari Gumi Pemerintah Mangkunegaran', typescript, Surakarta, 30 September 1945, AMN.
Mangkunegoro VII and Susuhunan Paku Buwono XI. Prince Mangkunegoro VII, the first KÖ of the Mangkunegaran principality, died on 19 July 1944. He had been crowned on 3 March 1916, and gained enormous experience in organization and administration. His young son BRM Sarosa replaced him as Mangkunegoro VIII and Mangkunegoro KÖ. Sarosa was born on 1 January 1920 and graduated from a Europese Lagere School in 1932, from Mulo in 1936 and from AMS in 1939. In 1941-42 he had attended a military course in Bandung (the Reserve Officers Corps). He also joined in the military training of Peta (Defender of the Motherland) in 1943.

Susuhunan Paku Buwono XI was a very weak figure in comparison to his long reigning predecessor, Paku Buwono X, or to Mangkunegoro VII. This weakness was caused by the opposing influence of certain senior princes during his reign and by the fact that Paku Buwono XI, before he was crowned, had had little experience outside of the court. As the eldest son of Susuhunan Paku Buwono X, he had been raised to his position on 26 April 1930, and his death some weeks before the proclamation of independence gave him little time to demonstrate any skills in office.

Raden Mas Surjoguritno, born on 14 April 1925, had been nominated as the Crown Prince to succeed his father and installed in this capacity, with the name KGPH Purubojo, on 16 December 1943. Crowned on 12 July 1945, he was still only twenty years old when he became Susuhunan Paku Buwono XII. Despite the revolutionary times in which he lived, Paku Buwono XII's lifestyle emulated more indulgent eras of the past. He kept both a legal wife (garwo padmi) and several concubines (selir) with him in the kraton. In addition some of his sexual adventures outside the kraton became widely known.

Because he was so young, some senior pangerans constituted a governing committee to help the new ruler. Its members were GPH Hadiwidjojo (chairman), GPH Surjohamidjojo, and GPH Djojokusumo. In practice, however, daily administration

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49 His original name had been R.M. Surjosuparto, and he was a son of Mangkunegoro V. In brief, his experiences were as follows: 1902-06, he worked in the Dutch administrative office at Demak, Central Java; in 1904 he received the title Bendoro Raden Mas Harjo; 1909-13, he studied in Holland; in 1915 he became junior controleur in the Department of Agrarian Affairs in Surakarta; 1915-16, he was chairman of Budi Utomo; 1918-21, he was a member of Volksraad; Darmokondo, no.128, 14 June 1939; Pewarta Oemoem, no.49, 3 March 1941.

50 Based on the archive 'SP Mangkunegoro VIII', AMN.
and policy were in the hands of the Papatih Dalem (grand vizier), Sosrodiningrat, and the Kanjeng Ratu (the Queen Mother).  

During their reigns, the young rulers were used by the Japanese to increase the mobilization of pemuda (youth) entering the Seinendan (Youth Corps). Both the Susuhunan and the Mangkunegoro addressed various pemuda meetings and also broadcast on the radio. In March 1945 when the Gerakan Hidup Baru (New Life Movement) was begun by the Japanese, the rulers were also involved as local leaders of this movement. The Japanese, it is clear, had no difficulty in dominating the young rulers.

Politically, the role of the Mangkunegoro Ko was still seen by the colonial power as a means of controlling the Susuhunan, as in Dutch days. The rivalry between the Sunanate and the Mangkunegoro, which had endured for almost 200 years, was continued by the two young rulers. This was a notable feature when crisis overtook the principalities late in 1945 and the young rulers faced bitter local opposition from mass movements refusing to acknowledge their legitimacy. This is discussed in detail in Chapter IV below.

ECONOMIC PRESSURE

Within a few months after the Japanese occupation began, Javanese society was already beginning to experience economic difficulty. Initially, this was caused by the chaos resulting from the Japanese—

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51 This point is from a personal interview with KRT Darjonegoro, December 1979.

52 For details on the mobilization of pemuda in Surakarta, see Bendel Djamin Djepang 1944-1945, no. 56, AMN.

53 The Surakarta radio was called Solo Hosokyoku. Most programmes contained Japanese propaganda to support the spirit of the war. Its programmes may be found in Berita Radio Solo Hosokyoku, no. 8, 21-27 February 1943.

54 For details on the discussion of the Gerakan Hidup Baru see the following pages.

inspired looting of factories, Chinese shops and Dutch houses. This campaign was intended to encourage anti-European sentiment, but shortly afterwards the Japanese took steps to collect the goods which had been stolen during that time of disruption.

The chaotic situation and uncertain atmosphere were added to by the fact that officials went unpaid for some time after the Japanese arrival, forcing many people to barter their goods for foodstuffs. In the months of March, April and May of 1942, a new phenomenon appeared, with the sides of the roads in such cities as Jakarta and Surakarta crowded with people trying to sell their secondhand goods.

In the cities of Java, the price of rice increased rapidly. In 1941, the Dutch government set the maximum price of paddy at f.3.25 per 100 kg for the low quality and f.3.60 per 100 kg for the high quality. This meant a rice price of f.6 to f.525 per 100 kg. In Surakarta, in June 1942, the Japanese Military Administration announced that the price of rice had risen to f.7.70 per 100 kg for best quality, and f.6.50 per 100 kg for low quality. Thus within the first months of occupation, the price of rice had already increased about 25 per cent.

In Surakarta, as elsewhere, the Japanese Military Administration policy was to regulate the prices of foodstuffs strictly. On 8 June 1942 a new regulation was announced stating that the prices of rice, wheat flour, salted fish, oil, tea, etc., were not to be raised any higher than the prices on 1 January 1942. For infractions of this regulation, a shopkeeper could be given a heavy fine - e.g., f.500 -

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56 Soedjito Sosrodidardjo, Perubahan Struktur Masjarakat di Djawa (Jogjakarta, Penerbit Karya, 1968), p.40. For the Surakarta region specifically see Sedjarah TNI Didalam, p.3.

57 Pandji Poestaka, no.3, 7 November 1942, p.1092.

58 Soedjito Sosrohidardjo, op.cit., p.42.

59 Each 100 kg of paddy, after milling, yields about 60 kg of rice.

60 See Pengoemoeman Harga Tertinggi Barang-Barang di Soerakarta, Gun Sei Bu Soerakarta, 8 June 1942, no.1/A.

61 Makloemat Pembesar Gun Sei Bu Soerakarta, 8 June 1942.
or have his goods confiscated. From June to December 1942, however, prices of foodstuffs in the region were not absolutely stable (see Table II).

### TABLE II

**THE PRICE OF FOODSTUFFS IN SURAKARTA FROM JUNE TO DECEMBER 1942***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>rice per 100 kg</th>
<th>salted fish per 100 kg</th>
<th>coconut oil per litre</th>
<th>wheat flour per sack</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>f.7.70</td>
<td>f.13</td>
<td>f.0.24</td>
<td>f.3.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>f.8.75</td>
<td>f.13</td>
<td>f.0.24</td>
<td>f.3.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>f.7.40</td>
<td>f.13</td>
<td>f.0.34</td>
<td>f.6.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>f.7.40</td>
<td>f.13</td>
<td>f.0.34</td>
<td>f.6.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>f.7.40</td>
<td>f.24</td>
<td>f.0.34</td>
<td>f.3.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>f.7.40</td>
<td>f.24</td>
<td>f.0.34</td>
<td>f.3.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>f.7.40</td>
<td>f.24</td>
<td>f.0.34</td>
<td>f.3.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Pengoemoeman Harga Tintinggi Gun Sei Bu Soerakarta: 8 June 1942, no.1/A; 1 July 1942, no.2/A; 1 August 1942, no.3/A; 1 September 1942, no.4/A; 1 October 1942, no.5/A; 1 November 1942, no.6/A; 1 December 1942, no.7/A.

Despite the efforts of Japanese authorities in Java to stop the increase, food prices continued to rise, for three chief reasons: first, food production was decreasing; second, with the inflow of troops there was an increase in the number of consumers; third, the amount of money in circulation was increasing. A Jogjakarta newspaper reported after the war that production of paddy in Java in 1941 had been 899,934,807 quintals, while in 1944 it was only 681,115,550 quintals. The production of secondary crops in 1941 amounted to 121,525,781 quintals, but in 1944 the yield was only 900,556,664 quintals. This was a

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62 See Makloemat Koochi Jimukyoku Soerakarta, 31 August 1942. See also Kan Po, I, no.3, September 1942, p.20.

63 Kedaulatan Rakjat, 11 February 1946. Cf. Soedjito Sosrodihardjo, op.cit., p.41; see also Pandji Poestaka, no.31, 7 November 1942.

64 Kedaulatan Rakjat, 11 February 1946.
serious decline in food production, especially in an island as food-deficient as Java, and the people suffered greatly from a shortage of foodstuffs. Even the Japanese rice exactions fell 100,000 tons short in 1944. Apparently, the chief causes of the decline in food (especially rice) production were: the mobilization of the villagers for para-military organizations; romusha (forced labour), which took a lot of men away from their farm lands; and the orders of the Japanese to enlarge the areas of cotton and castor oil planting, which means that some land was taken out of food production.

In Surakarta, the Japanese Military Administration implemented a variegated basic program to tackle the problem of rice shortages for the military forces. Initially, in August 1942, Surakarta Gunsei Shidobu (the Military Administration Office for Guidance) forbade essential goods, including rice, to be brought into or out of the Surakarta region. In addition, inhabitants of Surakarta who had more than 2,000 kg of rice were forced to register the amount which they held. These measures enabled the occupation government to control the movement of foodstuffs and to build up a local stock of rice.

The Japanese Chōkan in charge of Surakarta was eager to bring order to the local rice trade and to rice distribution in Surakarta. To this end, in 1943, he established the Kōchi Beikoku Kumiai (Special Region Rice Cooperation) or KBK, directly under the Chōkan, as the only cooperative which could buy rice and paddy. Big rice dealers, who were

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66 Based on the regulation of Gunsei Shidobu of Surakarta, 8 August 1942.

67 Kan Po, I, no.1, November 1942, p.20.

68 This policy paralleled the central policy of the Japanese Military Administration which prohibited the movement of rice out of any Residency in Java. See Miyamoto Shizuo, 'Jawa Shusen Shoriki', in Anthony Reid and Akira Ori (eds), op.cit., p.40.

69 See Atoevan Baroe Tentang Beras, Gabah dan Padi Boeat Tahoen 2603 stencilled (Soerakarta, 2603 [1943]), pp.1-2.
members of the *Kōchi Beikoku Oroshi Oeri Kumiai* (the Special Region Association of the Big Traders in Rice), could buy rice after being recommended by the Chōkan.

In each Ken there was a *Ken Beikoku Kooeri Kumiai* (Regency Rice Trader Association) or KBKK. This association sold rice to small rice merchants, called bakul, and distributed rice to the people. Most members of this association were Indonesian; in the Mangkunegaran Kōchi, of the 1,357 members of the KBKK, only 15 per cent were Chinese. This was different from the membership of the *Kōchi Beikoku Oroshi Oeri Kumiai*, of which Chinu merchants made up more than 40 per cent.

Through this rice cooperative system, the Japanese sought to control the movement and distribution of rice both at the local and at the regional level.

Japanese authorities also attempted to increase agricultural production. On 20 and 27 October 1943, the Chōkan of Surakarta Kōchi called a special meeting for leading Javanese on 'Increasing Agricultural Production'. Takahashi, who led this conference, explained its purpose and the need to achieve its aims. He indicated that the crops which were to be concentrated on were cotton, castor oil, and rice.

In November 1943, a committee called Peningkatan Hasil Boemi (Committee for Increasing Agricultural Production - or Surakarta Beikoku Zosan Kyoshinkai) was set up. This had branches in each Ken, the so-called Chio Iinkai (branch office), and its function was to advise peasants to work their land better. Methods urged on them included the introduction of new techniques of rice planting, new rice seeds, and

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70 Ibid., p.2.
71 See Bendel Djaman Djepang 1943-44: Sub Perdagangan Beras, AMN.
72 By way of comparison, in the Priangan region of West Java reorganization of rice cooperative had reduced Chinese members to less than 50 per cent. See I.J. Brugmans, et al., (eds), *op.cit.*, p.490.
new members of producing compost fertilizers.  

The **pangreh praja** hierarchy of Ken Chō, Gun Chō and Son Chō made propaganda for the programme of increased agricultural production among the people. Moreover, the Ku Chō and Kumichō, who were in direct contact with the peasants, were charged with seeing that they enlarged their plantings of certain crops. Japanese-inspired organizations, such as Seinendan (Youth Corps), Koiboden (Vigilance Corps), and Fujinkai (women's association), also assisted the Ku Chō in this programme. The Susuhunan and Mangkunegoro were themselves appointed members of the Zosan Kyoshinkai, and were compelled to propagate its aims actively. Early in 1944, the Japanese even managed to get the Susuhunan and Prince Mangkunegoro to travel around the villages to make propaganda for increasing food production. In the early months of the reign of the new young rulers Mangkunegoro VIII and Susuhunan XII, the Japanese authorities were still more direct in the way they manipulated them for propaganda purposes - in the same sort of way they manipulated other local leaders. The effect of this was to reduce the status of the rulers to a similar category as that of politicians and youth leaders.

In 1944, a crisis in food and textile supplies had begun seriously to affect the people. In October 1944, Wonogiri regency, a dry region of Surakarta, suffered greatly from a shortage of food. A report by the Ken Chō of Wonogiri listed some reasons for this. Chief among these was the delivery of agricultural produce to the Japanese. The Japanese made forced purchases at low prices, demanding that at least one-third of production be sold to them. Another third was kept in the Ku as a food reserve, and the remainder could be retained by the peasants who had grown it. A later Japanese demand for more rice resulted in the depletion of the Ku reserves, leaving the peasants with no local buffer stocks.

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74 For details on Chio Iinkai, see ibid., p.4.

75 Appointment letter of Chōkan of the Surakarta Kōchi, 3 January 1944, no.10/K/04, AMN.

76 See 'Rapot Rahasia', 16 October 1944, Djawatan Ekonomi Wonogiri, 1944.
Additional reasons cited for the Wonogiri crisis were insufficient rainfall and a lack of local transportation.

In Kedawung subdistrict, the peasants had also been forced to deliver one-third of their rice production at half the normal price. In some cases, the peasants, who had previously been members of the PKS, rejected the ordered target and delivered only one-fourth of their rice production. This helped to make the Kompeitaü suspicious of the disbanded PKS organization in rural Surakarta.

As a result of the food shortage, there was serious suffering from hunger in rural Surakarta, particularly the poorer areas such as Wonogiri, Karanganyar and Boyolali. In 1944 many peasants died of malnutrition. To obtain food, peasants sold their property, including cattle, land and even gold, to rich peasants. Chinese also played a role in buying the peasants' gold. Although many rich peasants became wealthier as a result of this process, some were themselves plunged into poverty as a result of a Japanese campaign to have them contribute their cattle and gold for the war effort.

An additional source of rural hardship was the recruitment of villagers as romusha, who were sent to labour on war projects, both locally and in other parts of Java - or even to Burma. Many of them died as a result of the heavy work with inadequate food and health facilities. In 1944 a local source reported that there were about 2,000 men from Surakarta who had never returned to their villages. It was not even known whether or where they had died.

As a result of food shortages, another new board was established, the Badan Oeroesan Makanan Rakjat (Board of People's Food Affairs) or BOMR. Its main goal was to sell food at a normal price. BOMR had branches at the Ken, Gun and Son levels, and its management was in the hands of Indonesians, mostly from the pangrreh praja, Kelbodan members and teachers. This board did not fully satisfy the

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77 Bendel Djaman Djepang 1944-1945: Sub romusha, AMN, this source explains that the above number included the haiho.
people's needs, in no small part because of the corruption carried out by certain members of the board, commonly called tukang catut (tukang = workman; catut = small pliers). As a result of this corruption, regional food stocks were depleted and artificial price levels affected everyday goods in the market places.

To cope with a shortage of textiles, village women were obliged to weave clothing at government looms set up by the Japanese in the houses of the Ku Chö. There were special Japanese officials who advised and taught the villagers how to use the looms. To supply the government looms, the villagers were forced to grow cotton. The gunny sack factory of Delanggu, in Klaten regency, was converted for the weaving of textiles. According to a member of the managerial staff of the factory during the occupation, production was planned to provide for the needs of romusha and other laborers, and the basic material used was not cotton but jute. These efforts were intended to replace imports, so that the village economy could be self-sufficient.

Another Japanese purpose for the village economy was to recruit villagers to plant castor-oil plants on the sides of roads and on uncultivated land. As the first step, the Japanese delivered the seeds to the villages and the Ku Chö divided them among the villagers. Each farmer who could produce 1 kg of new seeds from his plants was permitted to buy 0.3 litres of petroleum (1 litre of petroleum cost 12.50 cents). Through this system the Japanese could increase the number of castor-oil plants. Because castor-oil was important for the war, central coordination

78 According to Soekardi, secretary of the BOMR of Kedawung Son, Sragen Ken. Interview with him, 26 July 1979.
79 Soedjito Soerosodardjo, op.cit., p.47; he explains that the tukang catut carried out corruption without rational plans and that it was only incidental. In its broader meaning, tukang catut referred to trade activity in which profits were large; see I.J. Drugmanus, et al. (eds), op.cit., pp.491-92.
80 Interview with Gondowidjojo, 14 August 1979.
82 See 'Tjara Membagi Minjak Tanah Kepada Orang-Orang Jang Mënjerahkan Boeah Djarak', Bendel Roepa-Roepa Djaman Djepang 1943-1944, no.29, AMN.
was in the hands of the Chōkan of Surakarta Kōchi.

During the occupation the Japanese authorities in Surakarta concentrated on four main plantation crops - sugar, rubber, jute and coffee. Production was mainly for war needs, as the traditional export market was removed by the war. The Japanese experienced many difficulties in their efforts to enlarge estate production. Lack of capital was one of the major factors, many Surakarta banks having become bankrupt as a result of the war.

Sugar, needing more capital than other plantation crops, was particularly badly affected. In 1941 the area covered by sugar plantations in Surakarta was more than 4,220 ha and the production about 71,095 tons. During 1942 and 1943 the planted area decreased to 3,152 ha and the production to only 59,232 ton. A similar decline affected the sugar industry throughout Java. In 1942 there were 85 sugar factories operating in Java. This total decreased to 51 factories in 1943, 47 factories in 1944 and 12 factories in 1945.

Another reason for the decline in estate sugar production was a lack of the labour normally supplied by neighbouring farmers. These farmers were burdened heavily with obligatory work on war projects and semi-military training, especially for youth. In addition the farmers were forced by the Japanese authority to cultivate cotton on their own land. At least one-third of the farmers' own land had to be used for cotton. All this left farmers with little time to work on the sugar plantations.

With Surakarta society oppressed by the economic situation, the Japanese carried out a plan to collect the gold and diamonds owned by the population. On 29 December 1944, the Chōkan set up a committee for Gold and Diamond Collection, headed by Nishimia, a Japanese who proved very assiduous in his task. Both the Susuhunan and Prince

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82a Gula, I, no.5, January 1947.
82b Ibid.
83 'Kepoetoesan Soerakarta Koochi Jimu Kyoku Chokan', 1944, no.693, AMN.
Mangkunegoro were involved in the central committee, and they in turn became the leaders of gold and diamond collection committees in their areas. Not surprisingly it was the priyayi who could give more than the other social classes. In some villages, particularly in our sample areas of Bendosari and Kedawung, the collection of gold and diamonds was thwarted by villagers, who defied the Son Cho's orders despite the sanctions used against them.

The results of this collection more than satisfied the Japanese in Surakarta. In a letter to Prince Mangkunegoro, dated 1 February 1945, Hiroshi Watanabe, the Chōkan of Surakarta, who knew Indonesian well, expressed his gratitude. On 6 February Watanabe also sent a letter to the members of the committee, stating that the Surakarta region had achieved the largest diamond collection in Java. In such collections, many of the nobility lost their treasure, and this was one of the reasons they were to become poor when they lost their positions after the revolution.

In all of those programmes, as a part of its economic blueprint for the Netherlands East Indies, the Japanese government regarded the Surakarta region, as it did other regions in Indonesia, as a source for obtaining the materials demanded by the war.

84 Interview with S. Martodidardjo (village head of Toriyo, 1934-74), 20 August 1979; Sastrosuwarno (a village head of Gayam, 1943-74), 1 September 1979; interview with Soekardi, 26 July 1979.

85 This letter was written in both Indonesian and Japanese. It was kept in the Reksopustoko Library, and was filed in the Bendel Djaman Djepang 1944, no.29, AMN.

86 Ibid.
MOBILIZATION AND ORGANIZATION

During the Japanese occupation the nationalist movement gained considerable strength. One of the important factors behind this was the changing attitude of the younger generation, which was heavily under the influence of Japanese propaganda and took part in military and semi-military activities. Although the Japanese had banned political organizations in the early months of the occupation, ultimately the Japanese themselves sponsored political organizations on a large scale.

Within a year of the beginning of the occupation, the Japanese began to form organizations to support the war effort. In April 1943, the Japanese started to recruit heiho (auxiliary soldiers). The heiho were to be trained and deployed within the Seventh Army Area mainly in anti-aircraft, tank, field artillery, trench mortar, and transport units. Commonly, however, it was only the lower classes of society who were interested in becoming heiho.

The members of heiho were young men from eighteen to twenty-five years old. With minimal military training, they were sent off to Burma and elsewhere as auxiliary military units and as forced labour. Even with the end of the war, many heiho members never returned, becoming simply more victims of the war. Many who did return joined the ranks of unemployed. Only a small percentage of them could get jobs, for instance in the staff of village administrations.

90 Asia Raya, 24 April 2603 (1943).
92 Bendel Heiho 1945, AMN.
There is no complete data on the total number of the heiho in Surakarta. Based, however, on a report of the regent of Wonogiri, dated 4 October 1945, it can be estimated that the number was fairly high.\(^3\) From twenty-two subdistricts of Wonogiri regency, there were 678 persons who became members of heiho, whereas only 271 became members of the voluntary army, Peta. In Jumapolo district in Karanganyar regency there were thirty-three heiho, compared with only twelve Peta and three navy auxiliaries.\(^4\) In the capital city of Surakarta, those joining heiho from only seven of the many Ku are shown in Table III.

**TABLE III**

**TOTAL MEMBERS OF HEIHO IN SEVEN Ku IN SURAKARTA CITY AT THE END OF OCCUPATION 1945**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Name of Ku</th>
<th>Date of Ku Chô Report</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>59 Manahan</td>
<td>September 1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>23 Ketelan</td>
<td>September 1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>73 Mangkubumen</td>
<td>September 1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>49 Timuran</td>
<td>February 1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>22 Keprebon</td>
<td>February 1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>53 Punggawan</td>
<td>24 February 1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>76 Gilingan</td>
<td>21 February 1945</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Bendel Heiho 1945, AMN.*

If we project these figures to the whole of Surakarta Kochi, the numbers registering as heiho may have been in excess of 5,000, a much higher figure than the average for Java. The estimated strength of heiho at the end of the Japanese occupation was 42,000 (Java, 24,873; 93 See 'Djoemlah Ringkasan Adanja Bekas Pradjoerit Heiho dan Peta Dalam Daerah Kaboepaten Pangreh Pradja Wonogiri', typescript, Laporan Boepati Wonogiri, 4 October 1945, AMN.

94 'Daftar Adanja Heiho dan Peta Dalam Daerah Kawedanan Djoemapolo', typescript, Laporan Wedono Djoemapolo, 12 September 1945, AMN.
Timor, 2,504; other areas, 15,000). The reasons for this may have been hunger, especially in the dry Wonogiri area, but also the element of coercion exercised through the pangreh praja hierarchy.

Indonesians had been recruited as auxiliary soldiers in the Japanese army since the end of 1942. Besides heiho, the Japanese had trained Indonesian youth in various other para-military organizations. Two youth organizations, Seinendan (Youth Corps) and Keibodan (Vigilance Corps), had been created by the Japanese in early 1943. At the end of occupation, the Seinendan had approximately half a million members in Java, while the Keibodan had more than one million. The main goal of the Keibodan was to help the police and thus create a kepolisian rakyat (people's police). The Surakarta Kōchi Jimu Kyoku Chokan set the age of Keibodan members at twenty-three to thirty-five years of age, while Seinendan members ranged from fourteen to twenty-two years of age.

The leadership structure of the Keibodan of Surakarta Kōchi comprised: dancho (commander); fuku dancho (deputy commander); komon (advisers); keiho han (information service); keikai han (traffic service); kyuge han (first aid service); boeka han (preventive fire service). In the city, Keibodan members were recruited from among the pangreh praja, teachers, ordinary people and the Chinese. In the villages, most members were farmers, though a few were village teachers and

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98 The principles of Keibodan can be found in *Kan Po*, II, no.18, May 1943.
99 This regulation can be read in the letter of the Chōkan of Surakarta, Kōchi to the Patih of the Mangkunegaran, dated 27 September 1943, no.SKGC/248/H, AMN.
100 Bendel Keibodan dan Seinendan 2603 (1943), no.56, AMN.
village administration staff. It was coordinated from the Ken Chō down to the Ku Chō. Both Keibodan and Seinendan attracted large numbers of people. In Wonogiri Ken which, perhaps because of widespread poverty, had the largest membership totals in Surakarta, there were 22,000 members of Keibodan while Seinendan had 14,000 members.101

The general regulations of Seinenden were issued by the Soesoenan Djawa Seinendan.102 The Surakarta Köchi had a special unit of Seinendan, the Köchi Seinendan.103 It had branches, the so-called boendan, at Ken, Gun and Son levels. Some Seinendan were organized for sector work, such as the Seinendan pabrik (factory seinendan) and the Seinendan perusahaan (enterprise seinendan). The leadership structure of the Seinendan was: dancho (commander); huku dancho (deputy commander); komon (adviser); kanji (administration); sidooin (training leaders).

On 1 July 1943, the Chōkan of the Surakarta Köchi opened the PoesatLatihan Pemimpin Seinendan Soerakarta (Training Centre for Seinendan Leadership in Soerakarta).104 In the opening ceremony, he said that this training was aimed at producing leaders who would have experience of discipline, mental and physical training, and the spirit of unity. This training provided subjects such as Japanese and Indonesian languages, art, practical work, agricultural training, military training, sport and taisoo (physical exercises). The trainers were both Indonesian and Japanese. The Chōkan planned that each Son should have one Seinendan Rensei Sidooin (Seinendan Leadership Training Centre). The mobilization of Seinendan in Surakarta was based on a regulation of the Chōkan called the Doin Sakiki (regulation of mobilization). All Seinendan training centres in the Köchi and the Shū had to be approved by the Gunseikan.105

101 Laporan Hardjowiratmo: Wonogiri Ken Chō', November 1944, typescript, AMN.
102 See Soesoenan Djawa Seinendan (Djawa Gunseikanbu 2603 [1943]), pp.3-27.
103 Ibid.
104 Soeara Matahari, Tahoen II, no.152, 2-7 July 1943.
105 Soesoenan Djawa Seinendan, op.cit., p.16.
The Japanese also planned to mobilize influential Indonesian leaders to increase support for the war effort. In March 1943, as a first step to this goal, a Java-wide quasi-nationalist organization was set up headed by Ir. Sukarno and Mohammed Hatta, the best-known nationalist leaders. The name given to this new organization was Putera (Pusat Tenaga Rakyat - Centre of People's Power).\textsuperscript{106}

Putera's regulations provided for branches at Shū, Kōchi, Ken and Gun levels.\textsuperscript{107} The Putera of Surakarta was immediately set up in March 1943 and extended down to the Ken level. At Klaten Ken, the Ken Chō himself led the meeting which formed the Putera branch.\textsuperscript{108} The Putera of Surakarta Kōchi was under the leadership of Wurjaningrat, a member of the Kasunanan nobility and a former progressive member of BU, PBI and Parindra. Many of the pangreh praja of Surakarta took an important role in the Putera. In the eyes of the Japanese, the Putera of Surakarta gave good service, particularly in recruiting villagers as romusha. In addition, its leaders were involved in preparing for the formation of a volunteer army at the end of 1943.

When the Djawa Hökökai (Himpunan Kebaktian Rakyat or People's Service Association on Java) was established in 1 March 1944, most existing organizations, including Seinendan and Keibodan, became closely linked to it.\textsuperscript{109} In practice the Djawa Hökökai replaced the Putera, but Hökökai was much more of a mass organization than the Putera. In fact the Hökökai had branches reaching into all residencies, regencies, districts and villages.\textsuperscript{110} In Surakarta, the close connection between the

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\textsuperscript{106} The top leadership of the Putera was in the hands of the 'Empat Serangkai' (the Four-Leaf Clover): Sukarno, Hatta, Ki Hadjar Dewantara (chairman of Taman Siswa) and Kyai Haji Mas Mansur (former chairman of Muhammadiyah). See H.J. Benda, The Crescent, p.117.

\textsuperscript{107} Asia Raya, no.59, 11 March 1943.

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., no.73, 29 March 1943.

\textsuperscript{109} Kanahele, op.cit., p.143

Hōkōkai and other organizations (Tonari Gumi, Seinendan, Keibodan) was clearly seen at the conference organized by Surakarta Kōchi Hōkōkai on 24 March 1945. This conference discussed the Gerakan Hidup Baru (new life movement) and its programme of love of the fatherland, defence of the village, self-sufficiency in food and clothes, etc.

The activity of the Djawa Hōkōkai increasingly integrated the functions of the Seinendan and Keibodan, as well as the pangreh praja. In Surakarta in early 1945, both Seinendan and Keibodan were playing important roles in the implementation of Hōkōkai programmes.

While these organizations, the Seinendan, Keibodan and Hōkōkai, played some part in mobilizing segments of population in Java during the occupation, there were other organizations whose members played even more important roles in the final days of the Japanese period and in the time of revolution that followed. Chief among them was the Peta (Pombola Tanah Air - Defender of the Fatherland). Also significant were the youth organizations Barisan Pelopor (Pioneer Corps) and the Hizbullah (Allah's Army).

At the beginning of October 1943, Gatot Mangkupradja, one of the nationalist leaders of the 1930s, received a summons from Mr Nagashima and Abdulhamid Ono which said that a proposal Gatot had made for the formation of a volunteer defence army had been accepted. He was to present himself at the Beppan office (intelligence section) in order to meet and be congratulated by General Harada and the Gunseikan, General Yamamoto. The Japanese then issued the regulation Osamu Seirei, no.44 of 3 October 1943, as the operational basis for the establishment of the volunteer defence army of Java. It contained the following points:

111 See 'Laporan Ketoea Sidang Gaboengan Solo dan Mangkoenegaran Kooti Hookookai', 24 March 2605 (1945), typescript, AMN.

112 Raden Gatot Mangkupradja, 'The Peta and My Relations with the Japanese: A Correction of Sukarno's Autobiography', (translated by Haruni Wanasita Evans and Ruth McVey), Indonesia, no.5, April 1968, p.121.

113 For details, see Nugroho Notosusanto, The Peta Army, pp.69-101.
1. the members of the Peta army would be Indonesians;
2. within the Peta army, Japanese military personnel would be used mainly for training purposes;
3. the Peta army was under the Supreme Commander;
4. it would be a territorial army given the task of defending its region;
5. it would resist any attack by the enemy.\footnote{114}{Kan Po, II, no.28, 2603 (1943), pp.20-21.}

Gatot's request had been followed by dozens of similar letters from every corner of Java, some written in blood.\footnote{115}{Ibid., p.98.} After Osamu Seirei no.44 was issued, the whole of the Japanese propaganda apparatus was mobilized to support Gatot Mangkupradja's concept.\footnote{116}{Ibid., p.99.}

According to Gatot Mangkupradja, when the volunteer army was formed it was not called Peta, but rather Tentara Sukarela (volunteer army).\footnote{117}{Gatot Mangkupradja, op.cit., p.123.} It was only after the middle of 1944 that the change of name occurred, as the result of an initiative by Oto Iskandardinata and Jusuf Jahja to form a group to support the families of the volunteers. At that time, Oto began to popularize the name of Peta for the volunteer defence army.

In October 1943, the Beppan office commenced to train Indonesian officer candidates at Renseitai training school in Bogor.\footnote{118}{Nugroho Notosusanto, Pemberontakan Tentara Peta Blitar Melawan Djepang (14 Februari 1945), Seri Monografi, no.405-4-2, Lembaga Sodjurarai Hankam, 1968, p.9. Soo also Nugroho Notosusanto, 'Instansi Jang Melaksanakan Pembentukan Tentara Peta', Madjalah Ilmu-Sastra Indonesia, vol.II, no.2, June 1964, p.287.} From the way in which things were arranged, it is clear that it was Beppan which organized the Peta,\footnote{119}{This is the conclusion of Nugroho Notosusanto, 'Instansi', pp.285-90.} and Beppan which chose Bogor as the site for Peta officer training.\footnote{120}{Raden Gatot Mangkupradja, op.cit., p.121.}
In Java the first battalions of the Peta were formed in December 1943, and the organization reached a total of almost 40,000 men when the Japanese surrendered in 1945. The structure of the Peta organization was as follows: each daidan (battalion) had four chudan (company), each chudan consisted of three shodan (platoon) and each shodan had four bundan (squad). One bundan usually had ten members plus one commander. Hence each daidan had about 535 men including staff members. The commander of a daidan was a daidancho, of chudan a chudancho, of a shodan a shodancho, while a bundan was under a bundancho.121

There were sixty-six daidan in Java and three in Bali. The Surakarta Kóchi had two daidan, the Surakarta Daidan and the Wonogiri Daidan. The formation of the Peta army in Surakarta Kóchi was preceded by the establishment there of a preparation committee, the Panitya Penyiap Tentara Peta. This committee worked together with leaders of the Putera, such as Dr Kartono (general chairman), RMTH Sumodiningrat (head of organization section) and Muljadi Djojomartono (head of propaganda section).122 Beginning in October 1943, Putera leaders held meetings at the Ken, Gun, Son and Ku levels, propagandizing for the Peta army. Pemuda enthusiasm for Peta was great. From 11 October to 30 November, the committee held meetings with the pemuda in various places and some 9,400 persons attended.123

With a Surakarta Kóchi announcement on 25 November 1943, the registration of Peta candidates commenced. There were three classes of candidates: soldier, lower officer, and middle (or high) officer. Applications were addressed to the Surakarta Kóchi Chókan. Candidates were required to have semangat (spirit), not to be over twenty-five years of age and to be in top physical condition. Those intending to be higher officers should already be graduates of

122 'Hal Pradjoerit Tentara Soerkarela Pembela Tanah Air dan Heiho', Bendel Djaman Djepang 1943-1944, no.56, AMN. Interview with Sumodiningrat, 1 August 1979.
123 'Hal Pradjoerit'.
high school. Successful candidates numbered 225 persons for officer rank and 1,720 soldiers.124

The Surakarta daidan was under daidanchō Muljadi Djojomartono, who had experience in the Putera and was a prominent member of Muhammadiyah. When he joined the Peta army training at the Renseitai in Bogor, he had as a classmate GPH Purbonagoro, who was of the Kasunanan nobility and a graduate of Breda Military Academy in Holland.125 Soon afterwards, Prince Purbonagoro left Bogor and returned to Surakarta because he could not tolerate the Japanese military regulations.126 Apparently his main objection was to the Japanese policy which desired to place Islam in the forefront of Peta training. In fact the Prince was replaced by Mohammad Idris, one of the Muhammadiyah leaders in Solo, who later became the daidanchō of the Wonogiri daidan.

At the highest, most visible level of Peta, therefore, the Japanese sought to place Moslem leaders.127 However, the overall picture is very different, as we see from the following table relating to chudanchō.

From this table it is clear that most Peta officers on the level of chudanchō were nobility or priyayi. There were two nobles of the Kasunanan.128 The Mangkunegaran family sent three people to join Peta officer training at the Bogor Renseitai. Two were sons of Mangkunegoro VII, KPH Hamidjojo Sarosa and KPH Hamidjojo Santosa.

124 Ibid.


126 Interview with Sumodiningrat, 2 August 1979; see also Panitya Pembangunan Monumen Perdjoangan '45 Klaten (ed.), Sejarah Perjuangan Rakyat Kabupaten Klaten (Klaten, 1976), p.49.


128 Nugroho Notosusanto, The Peta, p.108, has incorrectly observed that there was only one chudanchō from the Kasunanan nobility.
TABLE IV

THE SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF CHUDANCHŌ OF THE
SURAKARTA DAIDAN AND THE WONOGIRI DAIDAN*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name of Chudanchō</th>
<th>Chudan</th>
<th>Daidan</th>
<th>Social Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>GPH Djatikusumo</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Ska</td>
<td>nobility of KS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>KPH Hamidjojo Sarosa</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>Ska</td>
<td>nobility, son of Mangkunegoro VII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>R. Sunarto Kusumodirdjo</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>Ska</td>
<td>middle priyayi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>RMTH Sumodiningrat</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Ska</td>
<td>nobility of KS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>KPH Hamidjojo Santosa replaced by</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Wg</td>
<td>nobility, son of Mangkunegoro VII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5A</td>
<td>Soekarto</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>a KNIL member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Suhardi</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>Wg</td>
<td>member of legion of MN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Mursito</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>Wg</td>
<td>middle priyayi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Soewarniman</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Wg</td>
<td>middle priyayi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: (1) Interview with Sumodiningrat, 2 August 1979; Sunarto Kusumodirdjo, 1 August 1979; (2) 'Hal Pradjoerit Tentara Soekarela Pembela Tanah Air dan Heiho', Bendel Djaman Djepang 1943-1944, no.46, AMN; (3) an oral source collected in the 'Sejarah Perjuangan Rakyat Klaten Kabupaten Klaten', p.49. Note: Ska = Surakarta; Wg = Wonogiri; KS = Kasunanan; MN - Mangkunegaran.

The other was Noto Hapsoro, a nephew of Prince Mangkunegoro who became a shodanchō.

Apparently, however, the social backgrounds of the shodanchō were more varied than those of chudanchō. Shodanchō officers were students from high school, policemen, members of KNIL or the Legion Mangkunegoro, middle priyayi, and members of other social classes. Generally speaking, they were more radical than the chudanchō, something that became obvious when shodanchō officers of the Wonogiri daidan established an illegal organization called IPTAS (Ikatan Putera
Tanah Air Sejati - the True Sons of the Fatherland Association). Its two most prominent leaders were Sutarto and Kusmanto. Sutarto's background is as follows: he was born in 1914, in the city of Solo (Surakarta), and only attended the Sekolah Rakyat (elementary 'People's School') until the third class. His father, Wirosunarto, was a commoner. When he was about fourteen years old, Sutarto joined an illegal national youth movement in Semarang. In the 1930s Sutarto was the leader of the Madiun branch of the SPI (the Suluh Pemuda Indonesia - Torch of Indonesia Youth), the radical youth affiliate of Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia.

Although they did not rebel against the Japanese as did a similar Peta group at Blitar, the members of IPTAS nevertheless became the core of local military power in the early revolutionary period in Surakarta. The AMT (Angkatan Muda Tentara - Army Youth Generation), established by Sutarto in August 1945, was a continuation of IPTAS. It is not surprising, given his personality and organizational skills, that Sutarto became the foremost leader among the shodanchō. His important role on the local military scene will be detailed at some length in the chapters that follow.

On 8 December 1943, the Surakarta Kōchi Chōkan established the BPP (Badan Pembantu Prajurit - the Board to Assist the Soldiers)

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130 'Riawajat Almarhum Kolonel Sutarto', typescript, Dinas Pemeliharaan Pemakaman Tentara, Divisi Diponegoro (compiled by Sutopo), Surakarta, 1 July 1955.

131 Ibid.

to support the Peta and heiho. Its members were drawn from the nobility, priyayi pangruh praja, teachers, and the western-educated intelligentsia. The total number of members was forty, plus twenty-two central committee members and fourteen advisors. The BPP had sections such as general section, finance section, propaganda and spirit section, assistance section and equipment section. The BPP ultimately became a useful channel for individual contacts between its civilian members and Peta officers. These contacts became particularly useful when Haji Mufti (head of the finance section), Dr Kartono (head of the propaganda and spirit section) and Sumodiningrat (chudanchō) headed the revolutionary regional government of Surakarta early in the revolution.133

The Peta and its legal and illegal offshoots gained much attention and following in the final years of the occupation, and they became a crucial focus early in the revolutionary period which followed. They were not, however, the only military groups brought into existence by the Japanese. Two additional organizations, the Barisan Pelopor and the Hizbullah, were created in 1944.

The Barisan Pelopor was established as the result of a decision of the Java Central Advisory Council in May 1944.134 Its principal aim was to act as the spearhead for Hökökai in its nationalist propaganda efforts. Although not officially established until September 1944, the principles of its formation were already fully developed by August.135 According to Gatot Mangkupradja, the Barisan Pelopor was based on the Suishintai (Promotion Corps), the activist auxiliary of the Hökökai's Keibodan, and initially its leaders were, like Peta leaders, trained at the Renseitai of Bogor.136

133 For the BPP of Surakarta, see 'Hal Pradjoerit Tentara Soekarela Peta dan Heiho', AMN.

134 H.J. Benda, The Crescent, pp.177-78; see also I.J. Brugmans et al. (eds), op.cit., p.63.

135 Sinar Matahari, 19 August 2604 (1944).

136 Raden Gatot Mangkupraja, op.cit., p.122
In Surakarta, the Barisan Pelopor began to spread out into the villages early in December of 1944. In general in the Surakarta area its leaders were teachers, pangreh praja and others who had at least passed through primary school. The bulk of its members, however, were illiterate farmers, most of them between twenty and forty-five years old.\(^{137}\) The structure of the organization followed a military model, with daitai (battalion) established at the Ken level, chutai (company) at the Gun level, and shotai (platoon) at the Son level.\(^{138}\)

Although the leaders of the Surakarta Barisan Pelopor had varied political backgrounds, the PNI and pro-Sukarno element was dominant. The leader in Solo was Soemokartiko (PNI), assisted by Surjokusumo (priyayi-Parindra), Hadisunarto (PNI, Gerindo), and Anwar Santosa (son of a Muhammadiyah leader).\(^{139}\) This pattern seemed to be similar to the central leaders.\(^{140}\) There were a few leaders in the Surakarta Barisan Pelopor who were actually in contact with central leaders like Dr Muwardi and Sudiro. Both Muwardi and Sudiro had a lot of opportunities to visit the Barisan Pelopor at the residency level, including Surakarta, in their campaign to mobilize the masses behind the Barisan Pelopor. One of the Surakarta Barisan Pelopor leaders, Hartono, was sent to join the Barisan Pelopor Istimewa in Jakarta and attended political courses given by Ir. Sukarno, Mohammad Hatta and Sjahrrir. At that time Hartono met D.N. Aidit, a young

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137 Soekiman Martowirono, 'Laporan Pemeriksaan Barisan Pelopor', typescript, 7 December 1944, p.l., AMN.

138 'Laporan Wonogiri ken Hookookai Kaityo', typescript, Wonogiri, 1944, AMN.

139 Detailed discussion of the leaders of the Surakarta Barisan Pelopor who subsequently played an important role in Barisan Banteng is in Chapter III.

140 For example, Ir. Sukarno (PNI), the commander of the corps; Oto Iskandardinata (the Pasundan); R.P. Suroso (Parindra), Gatot Mangkupradja (PNI); Muwardi (Kepanduan Bangsa Indonesia), Sudiro (Taman Siswa), while others were from Gerindo. For details on the central leaders of this corps, see Sudiro, Pengalaman Saya Sekitar 17 August '45 (Jakarta, Yayasan Idayu, 1972), pp. 1-6.
communist activist who was also attending the course.  

From early December 1944, the Barisan Pelopor of Surakarta based its activities on a special programme containing the following priorities:

1. to assist in recruiting romusha;  
2. to cooperate with the Peta army;  
3. To work closely with Keibodan, Seinendan, Tonari Gumi, the BPP and the pangreh praia;  
4. to establish Markas Barisan Pelopor (Barisan Pelopor Command Post) in each Gun; and  
5. to replace Japanese with Indonesian terms in drill practice.

Being under the Hökökai, the Barisan Pelopor was able to extend down into the villages and to attract other organizations to associate with it. Built upon people who were experiencing local conditions, and concerned with propagating nationalist ideology in the guise of pro-Japanese statements, the Barisan Pelopor had the makings of a strong revolutionary movement. The revolutionary impulse came to be the guiding factor in the Barisan after it became known as the Barisan Banteng in the early revolutionary period.

Another ideologically based corps founded in the war period was the Hizbullah, which was also to survive the Japanese occupation and to play a role during the Indonesian Revolution and War of Independence. The Hizbullah was envisaged as a reserve corps for the Peta, but it was under the control of the Muslim association, Masyumi, and was widely thought to be the army of Masyumi. Its members were given a short period of introductory military training at Cibarusa in Bogor Residency.

141 Interview with Hartono, 17 August 1979. He was born in 1919 and was a graduate of Mulo. He was an activist of the Barisan Pelopor and the Barisan Banteng.  
142 Soekiman Martowirono, op.cit., p.1.  
The Solo Hizbullah was organized by local kyai (Islamic teachers, or ulama) and was led by Bakri, a young man about twenty-two years old who had gone through the training at Cibarusa. The Hizbullah was mainly concentrated in the city of Solo and was financed by Moslem traders, in particular by batik merchants.\textsuperscript{145} In the rural areas it also had a strong base in the Delanggu region of Klaten regency where its efforts were coordinated by Kyai Buzairi, a Masyumi leader who later had strong connections to the Serikat Tani Islam Indonesia (the Indonesian Islam Peasant Union), or STII, in early 1947.\textsuperscript{146}

The Japanese occupation created in Surakarta large number of mass-based organizations with heavy overlapping of task and membership among them. Faced with the war effort as their first priority, the Japanese continued to employ the traditional priyayi in the administrative bureaucracy, and also to utilize them as leaders in the new mass-based organizations. The priyayi were more numerous among Peta officers than were the Moslem groups, but real initiative within Peta was exercised by pemuda who tended to be radical, rather than by those who were oriented to traditional priyayi or Muslim values. The combination of rapid ideological indoctrination within the various wartime organizations and the steadily declining economic situation of the common people was one which created a volatile atmosphere in Surakarta under the Japanese. When the Japanese were no longer a factor to be considered that atmosphere was ready to flare.

\textsuperscript{145} Interview with Bakri, 15 August 1979.

\textsuperscript{146} For details on Haji Buzairi's role in the Islamic movement, see below pp.85-86, 146, 179.
CHAPTER THREE

RESPONSES TO THE INDEPENDENCE PROCLAMATION:
AUGUST-DECEMBER 1945

THE FORMATION OF KNI AND BKR

In the days immediately after independence was proclaimed, the new Republic moved rapidly to establish a revolutionary government. The PPKI (Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia - Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence), set up earlier under Japanese auspices, now became the main instrument for forming the governmental institutions of the Indonesian Republic. Ir. Sukarno was the head of this PPKI, Mohammad Hatta was his deputy, and the membership consisted of twenty-one persons.\(^1\) Surakarta was represented by BPH Surjohamidjojo, a nobleman of the Kasunanan who was very active in the PPKI. Benedict Anderson, commenting on the PPKI, noted that it

...was not established within the context of occupation politics, in which it would have been important to give the pemuda a voice. The PPKI was rather a part of the new politics of independence, aimed at the problem of creating an Indonesian state....\(^2\)

The PPKI in its first meeting, on 18 August 1945, ratified the Indonesian Constitution and elected Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta as President and Vice-President of the Republic. During its second session, on 19 August, the PPKI approved the division of Indonesia into eight provinces: West Java, Central Java, East Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Sunda Kecil and Maluku (including New Guinea).\(^3\)

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1 According to Mohammad Hatta, nine members were from Java and twelve from the various regions outside Java. See Mohammad Hatta, Memoir (Jakarta, Tinta Mas, 1979), p.437.


3 For details on the sessions of the PPKI, see Moh. Yamin, Naskah-Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, vol.1 (Djakarta, Prapantja, 1959), pp.399-473.
This session of 19 August also discussed the Köchi, the Japanese-period name for the principalities of Surakarta and Jogjakarta. The PPKI agreed that for the time being the Köchi should continue to have the same status as under the former administration. They would be a part of the Indonesian Republic directly under the Central Government. Administratively, they thus lay outside the new Province of Central Java and were themselves on a similar level to a province. Moreover, President Sukarno, in a decree of 18 August 1945, recognized the territories of the Sunan of Surakarta and the Sultan of Jogjakarta, including the Mangkunegaran and the Paku Alaman, as special regions (Daerah Istimewa). Surakarta was thus excluded from the province of Central Java, the Governor of which was to be Raden Panji Suroso, a member of the PPKI and a person who later took an important role in the Directorate of Surakarta.

On 22 August President Sukarno announced a PPKI decision to set up a system of government advised by committees at both provincial and national levels. Members of the KNI (Komite Nasional Indonesia - Indonesian National Committee) were to come from all streams (aliran) and all groups (golongan), such as pangreh praja (officials), alim ulama (religious scholars), kaum pergerakan (nationalist movement), pemuda (youth) and kaum pedagang (merchants), and in this fashion representation was to be brought to Republican political institutions. On 29 August the Central KNI, the Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat (KNIP), was inaugurated by President Sukarno. Mr Kasman Singodimedjo, a former Peta daidanch in the Jakarta area, became its first chairman. The PPKI, after completing its initial duties, was absorbed into the expanded KNIP. The additional KNIP members were selected by Sukarno and Hatta, mainly from nationalist leaders thought to have a widespread following throughout Indonesia.

5 This decree may be found in the Bendel Swapradja 1945, AMN.
By October, leadership of the BP-KNIP (Working Committee of KNIP) had fallen to Sutan Sjahrir, the best known prewar politician who had not been involved in the Japanese administration.

At the beginning of October, a small group of prominent anti-Japanese members of the KNIP embarked upon a plan aimed at changing the form of government so that the presidential system would be replaced by a parliamentary system of government. Their aim was to put real legislative power into the hands of the KNIP, to which the cabinet would be directly responsible. This 'anti-fascist' group aimed at eliminating all Japanese influences from the revolutionary government. At the same time the KNIP requested that the President enlarge its memberships from 150 to 188 members, so that a number of influential leaders not yet included could be added.

During the transitional months prior to this power shift, however, the new Republican government had carried on employing many of the institutions and Indonesian office-holders from the wartime administration. Since the Japanese were still nominally in control of the government, this meant that Republican Ministers and officials often had dual roles, within both the Japanese-run and Republican administrations. This was because it was felt that these people could more easily obtain co-operation from the Japanese than could the 'anti-fascist' elements within the revolutionary government.

On 22 August the PPKI also established the BKR (Badan Keamanan Rakyat - People's Security Organization) as a section of the Badan Penolong Keluarga Korban Perang (Board of Aid to the Families of War Victims). The BKR was intended to involve former Peta and Heiho members who had been demobilized by the Japanese authorities

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7 This 'anti-fascist' pressure group chiefly consisted of Marxists - Wikana, Amir Sjarifuddin (afterwards known as Communists); Sjahrir and Subadio Sastrosatomo ('democratic' Marxists); Sukarni and Adam Malik (leaders of the Tan Malaka group). See Abu Hanifah, Tales of a Revolution (Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1972), pp.110-24.


9 Osman Raliby, op.cit., p.17.
shortly after the proclamation. The BKR was not intended to be a national army but rather a corps assisting in the maintenance of public security.\textsuperscript{10} The BKR was organized on a territorial basis and was to be a local security organization formed and supervised by the local KNIL.\textsuperscript{11}

The formation of the BKR had been the result of a compromise between two groups. The supports of Oto Iskandardinata (former adviser to the security department of the Japanese military administration) in the PPKI together with a number of high civilian officials, wanted the BKR to function only to maintain public security. On the other hand, many former officers of Peta and the KNIL (Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger - the Dutch Colonial Army) wanted to start a national army.\textsuperscript{12} What is important is that the local BKR units were able to function to disarm the Japanese military forces, and naturally evolved in the direction of a national army. In Java the transfer of arms from the Japanese to the local BKR units was often followed by small battles between the BKR, supported by other revolutionary youth groups such as Barisan Pelopor, and the Kempeitai (Japanese police corps). Fighting against the Japanese occurred in many cities of Central Java in October 1945, demonstrating and reinforcing the intense patriotism of the BKR members.\textsuperscript{13}

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION IN SURAKARTA

As in other parts of Java, the establishment of the Republican Government in Surakarta began in the city. At this time the city was still governed by the two rulers. The Susuhunan governed two-thirds of the city and the remainder was in the hands of the Mangkunegaran

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{10} A.H. Nasution, \textit{Sedjarah Perdjuangan Nasional Dibidang Angkatan Angkatan Bersendjata} (Djakarta, Mega Bookstore, 1966), p.58.
  \item \textsuperscript{11} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 59.
  \item \textsuperscript{12} Benedict Anderson, \textit{op.cit.}, pp.104-05.
  \item \textsuperscript{13} \textit{Republik Indonesia: Propinsi Djawa Tengah} (Djakarta, Kementerian Penerangan Republik Indonesia, 1953), pp.25-26.
\end{itemize}
government. The inhabitants still tended to identify themselves as wong Kasunanan (people of the Sunan) or wong Mangkunegaran. By 1945, however, this was coming to seem an anachronistic administrative legacy from the past, serving only to bolster the authority of the rulers.

In the economic life of the city, Chinese continued to play a crucial role. Their shop-houses lined the main streets of the city, especially in the areas of Cayudan, Pasar Gede, Pasar Pon and Singasaren. A few Chinese succeeded in penetrating the batik industry though this was mainly dominated by Muslim traders. A strongly Islamic orientation gave ideological coherence to the leading Indonesian entrepreneurs of the city, most of whom invested in batik production and had supported Sarekat Islam in its heyday. The traditional divisions of Surakarta city placed these Islamic entrepreneurs at such places as Kauman, Tegalsari, Mangkuyudan, Laweyan and Mutihan. Among the Muslim traders were a minority of Arabs, who mainly resided in the Pasarkliwon area.

The demographic features of this traditional city can be seen in the last colonial census, that of 1930. The total population of the city had then been 713,161, comprising: Javanese - 694,711 men; Europeans and Eurasians - 3707; Chinese - 13,332; and other "foreign Asiatics" (mainly Arabs) - 1411. The population of the whole region of Surakarta amounted to only 2,564,975, more than a quarter of whom therefore lived in the capital.\textsuperscript{13a}

During the early revolution sharp ethnic divisions became apparent in the city, between Javanese (wong Jawa), Chinese (wong Cina) and Arabs (wong Arab). These divisions originated in the economic plural society of the colonial period, but they became critical social and political problems when the revolution broke out. The Javanese, worked up by the revolutionary spirit of patriotism, anti-imperialism and nationalism, became more overtly antagonistic to both Chinese and Arab society.

Up to the early weeks of September, revolutionary action in Surakarta mainly took the form of raising red and white flags on public buildings and factories. In addition a lot of placards with the words 'milik Republik Indonesia' (property of the Indonesian Republic) were stuck on the walls of these buildings. The main activists

\textsuperscript{13a} Indisch Verslag 1931 (Batavia, Landsdrukkerij, 1931), p.12.
were former members of the Barisan Pelopor and Peta, with some local politicians.14

On 20 August, Sutarto, a former Peta officer, established the AMT (Angkatan Muda Tentara - Younger Generation of the Army).15 This replaced the earlier IPTAS organization, a pre-independence illegal movement of the Peta daidan in Wonogiri, of which Sutarto was the leader. The AMT aimed at disarming the Japanese military forces in Surakarta. Its core was made up of former IPTAS members, while its membership was drawn from former Peta members of the Wonogiri and Surakarta daidan, which had been disbanded by the Japanese on 19 August. A few members were also drawn from the Barisan Pelopor, Heiho and KNIL. The only AMT branch outside the city was in the regency of Klaten, where many of the Wonogiri daidan had returned after its disbandment. One former Peta chudanchö and AMT member estimated that its total membership was over 500.16 Sutarto, as the initiator of both IPTAS and AMT, was elected leader of the latter organization by the other ex-Peta officers.

In early September a chapter of the KNI of Surakarta was organized, with Wurjaningrat,17 the former chairman of the Surakarta branch of Jawa Hōkōkai, as chairman. But on 9 September two Ministers of State, Mr Sartono and Mr A.A. Maramis, arrived in Surakarta and met the former chudanchö, Sumodiningrat. They brought an official message from the central government that the Surakarta KNI had to be chaired by a former Peta officer. This was because the KNI would take over from the Japanese military forces. The ministers demanded that


15 Interview with Sunarto Kusumodirdjo, 1 August 1979.

16 Ibid.

17 Wurjaningrat was born on 18 February 1908 in Solo. He graduated from ELS, Mulo, and AMS, and from the University of Leiden in 1936. From 1937 to 1939 he worked in the Kasunanan; from 1939 to 1940 he worked in Malang and then in 1943 was in Jakarta. Orang Indonesia jang terkemoeka di Djawa (Djakarta, Gunseikanboe, 2604 [1944]), p.22.
Sumodiningrat become head of the Surakarta KNI, replacing Wurjaningrat who was not a Peta officer. Sumodiningrat's reply was brief: 'I have no objection to becoming head of the KNI if I am elected, but I will reject it if I am simply appointed by the government'.

On the night of 11 September, an election for the head of KNI was held, chaired by Wurjaningrat. Four former Peta officers were nominated: Muljadi Djojomartono (former daidanchö), G.P.H. Djatikusumo (former chudanchö), KPH Hamidjojo Santosa (former chudanchö) and RMTH Sumodiningrat (former chudanchö). With the exception of Muljadi Djojomartono, all the candidates were nobles, Djatikusumo and Sumodiningrat from the Kasunanan, and Hamidjojo Santosa from the Mangkunegaran. Attending the meeting were prominent Surakarta leaders from among the pangreh praja, politicians, Barisan Pelopor and Peta officers. Sumodiningrat estimated the number attending this meeting at about fifty. Invited by Wurjaningrat, they were all from the city of Surakarta, with no representatives from the rural areas. Sumodiningrat was elected as new chairman of the Surakarta

18 Interview with Sumodiningrat, 2 August 1979.

19 G.P.H. Djatikusumo was born in 1917 in Solo. He graduated from Senior High School (Solo) and Royal Military Academy, Breda, Holland. In 1944 he was an officer (chudanchö) in Peta. See Who's Who in the Indonesian Military (Jakarta, Sritua Arief Association [SAA], 1977), pp.195-06; KPH Hamidjojo Santosa was Mangkunegoro's son and was a younger brother of GPH Hamidjojo Sarosa (later Mangkunegoro VIII). Santosa graduated from Mulo (Solo). He went through Peta military training in Bogor and then became chudanchö. Interview with KRMT Sanjoto, 5 June 1979; RMTH Sumodiningrat was born on 7 May 1904 in Solo. He graduated from ELS and HBS in Bandung and from the Faculty of Law at Leiden University in 1935. From 1935 to 1940 he was a high official of the Kepatihan office. From 1936 to 1942 he was Vice-Chairman of the Surakarta Parindra. From 1937 to 1942 he was an adviser of the Pokoso. During the occupation he was involved in the Putera and Peta. See Sumodiningrat, 'Riawat Hidup/Perjoangan', typescript, Sumodiningrat's private collection, pp.1-2. Muljadi Djojomartono was born on 3 May 1898 in Solo. He was a member of various Moslem organizations before World War II. He received military training in Bogor during the Japanese occupation. In December 1943 he joined the Badan Pembantu Pradjurit. In 1947 he was a member of the staff of military government in Surakarta. After 1947 he was an activist in Masyumi and Muhammadiyah. See The Asia Who's Who 1958 (Hongkong, Pan-Asia Newspaper Alliance, 1958), p.208.
KNI, and at the same meeting the remaining members of this new KNI were chosen as follows:

- Suprapto (head of the court office)
- Dr Kartono (a representative doctors)
- R Ng Domono Pranoto (the police officer)
- Sutopo Adiseputro (a representative of teachers)
- Kyai Abdul Mufti (a representative of Moslem scholars and Moslem merchants)
- Hendrokusumo (from the pemuda group)
- Sujono (from the nationalist movement group)
- Mr Sukasno (a representative of intellectuals)
- Sumodihardjo (a representative of railway workers)

Most of these were from the Japanese-sponsored BPP, except for Sujono, a former communist who became increasingly influential with youth because of his anti-Japanese stance and radical rhetoric.

When the KNI membership was extended in October, however, the leftists who were under Sujono's leadership came to dominate the KNI, and the Working Committee of the Surakarta KNI fell into the hands of Sujono and Djuwardi, who had been PKI activists in 1926.

Soon after the new KNI was set up, the BKR was formed, in the second week of September, by senior Peta officers and AMT leaders - Muljadi Djojomartono (daidanchō), GPH Djatikusumo Sunarto Kusumodirdjo (both chudancho), Sutarto and Achmad Fadjar (both Shodanchō and AMT leaders), and GPH Purbonegoro (retired Peta candidate officer). The chairmanship of the BKR was in the hands of Muljadi Djojomartono, and Purbonegoro and Sunarto Kusumodirdjo

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20 Suprapto graduated from the Faculty of Law in Batavia and then joined the court office in Surakarta. During the occupation he was a committee member of BPP. See 'Hal Pradjurit Peta dan Heiho', Bendel Djaman Djepegang 1942-1945, AMN. Interview with Sumodiningrat, 2 August 1979. Suprapto was also closely associated with the Surakarta Barisan Pelopor leaders. Domono Pranoto was a Kasunanan official. During the occupation he was in the police office of the Surakarta Kochi, and also was involved in the BPP. Sutopo was a junior high school teacher and a member of the BPP. Hendrokusumo was from a priyayi family and joined the Barisan Pelopor. Sujono was a PKI activist in 1926 and was imprisoned in Digul for many years. Mr Sukasno graduated from Law School and worked in the Kasunanan government. During the occupation he was involved in the BPP. Sumodihardjo was a railway official and eventually became stationmaster. In December 1945 he joined the PBI. Interview with Sumodiningrat, 2 August 1979.
acted as his chief assistants. The main sections of the BKR were: operations; equipment and administration; armament; personnel; and transportation. The Surakarta BKR in its early stages was estimated by Sunarto Kusumodirdjo to have about 4,000 members, both in the city of Surakarta and in the regencies. In Surakarta, just as in other parts of Central Java, the BKR in its early stages had almost no weapons and inadequate organization. When the Japanese ordered that the weapons of Surakarta Peta members be surrendered at the headquarters, only a few of them resisted this instruction and fled with their weapons. When the local Peta was subsequently disbanded on 19 August 1945, therefore, few Peta members still had weapons which they could bring to the BKR. Substantial quantities of weapons were only obtained after the BKR disarmed the Japanese military forces.

The members of the Surakarta BKR were drawn from Seinendan, Keibodan, Peta and Heiho. The AMT, which had been founded earlier with IPTAS as its core, dissolved itself into the BKR, though remaining an influential group within it. In the BKR Sutarto was a very important figure because his leadership in the IPTAS and the AMT had gained him great influence among BKR members.

The main duties of the KNI were to disarm the Japanese military forces and take over authority from the Japanese in the Surakarta Kochi. Three weeks of preparation were needed before action began, since the Japanese forces were still very strong with about 1,000 men in the city of Surakarta. At each regency town in Surakarta the Japanese had about 200 men.

A series of meetings between the KNI, the BKR and the Barisan Pelopor discussed the rival methods of diplomacy and force and agreed that both were necessary. Finally, on 30 September, Sumodiningrat with other KNI members met H. Watanabe, the chōkan of Surakarta Kochi, and discussed the delegation of Japanese authority into the hands of the KNI. The meeting continued the following day, reaching eventual agreement on two points. Firstly, the Japanese would hand their military and civil authority, ...

21 Interview with Sunarto Kusumodirdjo, 1 August 1979. Both Muljadi Djojomartono and Purbonegoro died several years ago. Sunarto Kusumodirdjo himself died in December 1979, shortly after this interview.


including their military forces and all enterprises, to the KNI. Secondly, the KNI would guarantee the security of the Japanese in Surakarta. About 300 officials of Japanese-controlled officers were waiting outside for the results of this meeting, along with about 3,000 demonstrators. That afternoon there was a massive procession through the streets to celebrate the formal delegation of authority to the KNI by the chōkan of Surakarta.

In the days which followed, the Japanese forces were disarmed by the BKR. On 5 October, Muljadi Djojomartono and Sunarto Kusumodirdjo led a group of BKR and Barisan Pelopor pemuda in disarming the Japanese garrison troops under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Mase. The BKR took over all weapons in the headquarters of Mase's Battalion at Mangkubumen, more than 1,000 weapons in all. Some 350 soldiers from the Surakarta garrison were then moved to Tampir, in the Boyolali regency. The Japanese air force contingent at Panasan airport was disarmed without a fight, and about 200 of its men were also interned at Tampir. Many automatic weapons and much air force equipment were taken over by the BKR and the Barisan Pelopor.

The Kempeitai (military-police), based at Timuran and commanded by Major Shato, was the only unit which now refused to surrender its arms. On 11 October, an introductory meeting took place between Shato and the Surakarta KNI (Sumodiningrat, Mr Suprapto, Dr Kartono), but Shato refused to accept the KNI demand to hand over the Kempeitai's weapons to the BKR. On 12 October the BKR, Barisan Pelopor and many townspeople of Surakarta surrounded the Kempeitai headquarters. On the same date another meeting was held between Shato and the BKR (Muljadi Djojomartono and Suadi). Shato again refused to disarm. That night about nine o'clock the BKR and Barisan Pelopor moved against the

24 Kedaulatan Rakjat, 2 October 1945.

25 Interview with Sunarto Kusumodirdjo, 1 August 1979.

26 See Kodam VII Diponegoro (ed.), Sedjarah Tentara Nasional Indonesia: Komando Daerah Militer VII Diponegoro (Djawa Tengah) Sedjarah Militer-Kodam VII Diponegoro, n.d., p.31
Kempeitai post at Timuran. Action was still going on the following morning, but ultimately the Kempeitai gave in. About ninety military policemen were imprisoned at Tampir. Only one of the pemuda group was killed and another one injured. The BKR carried away five mortars and many other weapons, including sten guns, carbines and pistols.\(^{27}\)

During the disarming of the Japanese, the BKR and the Barisan Pelopor divided their members into groups, each of which was assigned to disarm a post of the Japanese military forces. At the most important concentrations of Japanese arms - the Kempeitai at Timuran, the Maso battalion at Mangkubumen and the Japanese air force at Panasan airport - both BKR and Barisan Pelopor insisted that their units be present. The Barisan Pelopor itself had nine groups involved in taking over the posts of the Japanese military forces.\(^{28}\)

By Central Government Decree of 5 October 1945, a regular army was established, the BKR being replaced by the Tentara Keamanan Rakyat (the People's Security Army) or TKR.\(^{29}\) Surakarta became the base of Division X of the TKR, under the command of GPH Purbonegoro, one of the founders of BKR. He was appointed by the central government, perhaps because of his education at the Breda Military Academy. Most former officers of Peta and the AMT element within the TKR preferred Sutarto's leadership. In order to prevent an internal conflict in the Surakarta TKR, an election was held at the end of the first week of November. Three candidates were nominated: GPH Purbonegoro, Sunarto Kusumodirdjo, and Sutarto. Of about 100 voters present, three-quarters wanted Sutarto, perhaps 20 per cent supported Sunarto, and Purbonegoro received only a handful of votes.\(^{30}\)

During the time the KNI began to function as the new Republican government of Surakarta, the administrations of the Susuhunan

\(^{27}\) Interview with Sunarto Kusumodirdjo, 1 August 1979.


\(^{29}\) Kedaulatan Rakjat, 13 November 1945.

\(^{30}\) Interview with Sunarto Kusumodirdjo, 1 August 1979.
and Mangkunegoro continued to function in their own areas. Neither ruler exercised any leadership during the disarming of the Japanese, and both remained passive while the KNI was being formed. Their nobles also were slow to respond to the new Republican government; only four Kasunanan nobles were involved in the new government institutions - Wurjaningrat and Sumodiningrat in the KNI and GPH Purbonegoro and GPH Djiatikusumo in the BKR - while no Mangkunegaran nobles openly embraced the Republican cause.

The two rulers remained rivals, as they had been under the Dutch colonial regime. This rivalry made it impossible for the Working Committee of the KNI to unify local government in Surakarta. Formally the city government of Surakarta should have been headed by the chairman of the regional KNI, but in actuality the city government was composed of three separate authorities: the KNI, the Kasunanan and the Mangkunegaran. Neither the Susuhunan nor the Mangkunegoro had representatives in the KNI and Sumodiningrat, though a Susuhunan noble, did not as KNI chairman represent the Kasunanan. He had been elected by the local leaders and politicians of Surakarta, but faced with the reality of three separate administrations in the city he was little more than a figurehead.  

On 13 October the central government appointed Raden Panji Suroso as High Commissioner (Komisaris Tinggi) in Jogjakarta and Surakarta. Suroso had been active in the PPKI and the KNIP, and in the PPKI session of 19 August he had been appointed governor of Central Java. As High Commissioner to the Central Java principalities, he was to function as representative of the central government, with

31 Interview with Sumodiningrat, 1 August 1979.
32 See Republik Indonesia: Daerah Istimewa Jogjakarta (Djakarta, Kementerian Penerangan Republik Indonesia, 1953), p.42.
33 Suroso was born in Sidorejo, in East Java, on 3 November 1894. In the prewar period, he had been chairman of the Central Civil Servants Union, a National Fraction leader in the Volksraad, and a member of Parindra. See The Asia Who's Who 1958, p.242.
34 Hatta, Memoir, p.466.
whom he had direct communication. Because the principalities had been given special status by the Presidential decree of 18 August 1945, the role of the High Commissioner was only as coordinator of the two regions, and Suroso was probably appointed not only because he had been active in discussing the köchi in the PPKI meetings but also because as the first governor of Central Java he had been charged by the central government with the coordination between his province and the special regions.

On 19 October Suroso, who had taken up temporary residence in the city of Surakarta, started to coordinate government activities in the Surakarta region. The first meeting between the High Commissioner and the Surakarta KNI was held on 22 October, with Suroso approving a KNI proposal to form a Directorate system for the Surakarta region, on the basis of collegiaal bestuur (collegial administration) between the Sunanate, the Mangkunegoro and the KNI. Sumodiningrat, who attended this session, described the main goal of the Directorate as follows:

Its goal was to achieve similar regulations for the government of the Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran. This was because the Surakarta people did not want the region of Surakarta to be governed by different regulations. The Directorate government planned to coordinate the divided authorities in Surakarta.

The Mangkunegoro was strongly opposed to a Directorate system based on equal representation of the two rulers and the KNI. He demanded that any Directorate be comprised only of representatives appointed by the Sunan and the Mangkunegoro, to the exclusion of the KNI. This proposal, however, was rejected by the High Commissioner and the KNI.

The first crisis for the Directorate began on 22 October, when Prince Mangkunegoro VIII, along with his high officials and

36 Interview with Sumodiningrat, 1 August 1979.
37 'Tentang Direktorioem', typescript, pp.1-2, AMN.
conservative nobles, issued a statement rejecting the formation of the Directorate system. The Mangkunegoro did not want his authority to be integrated with the Sunanate in the Directorate system. He retained his administration in his own hands and boycotted all meetings of the Directorate. Moreover, he issued political statements attacking the Directorate. This posed problems for the Directorate but it also represented the first step in the crisis faced by the traditional authorities in Surakarta. The crisis deepened toward the end of 1945 and in the early months of 1946, as will be discussed in Chapter IV.

THE FIRST PEMUDA ORGANIZATIONS

During the last months of the War, the Japanese had paid particular attention to the training and indoctrination of young Javanese, both educated and uneducated, through such organizations as Seinendan, Peta, Barisan Pelopor and Hizbullah. This resulted in the rapid rise of a new group of militant younger generation leaders and brought to the radical pemuda a keener understanding of state ideology.

Culturally, the term pemuda in traditional Javanese society denotes a young man who is entering maturity and is intensively learning the social and cultural norms of his society. Politically, however, the term in the context of the Indonesian Revolution came to mean a young activist, and it is with this connotation that we will be concerned here. Where in Dr Smail's study of the Bandung revolution, pemuda is defined only as revolutionary activist, thus including men of any age who had a revolutionary activist nature, Benedict Anderson in his work on the Indonesian Revolution has treated the pemuda in detail from the viewpoint of culture as well as politics. Anderson analyses the young revolutionary activist and distinguishes them from the elder politicians, and his usage is therefore more relevant to this study than Smail's.


The Pemuda in the Context of Javanese Culture

Youth in Javanese society can be designated as that stage in life at which one begins to enter maturity. One begins to learn more deeply the social and cultural norms which are the condition of maturity. One should practice tata krama (politeness) in daily communication, especially with one's parents. Most youths, except for those in strict Moslem families, are taught by their fathers the basic of elmu kejawen (the science of Javanism). The preliminary stage of elmu kejawen takes the form of physical training, several methods of which will be explained here in brief. First there is mutih (literally white, from the Javanese word putih) in which one does not eat salt for several days or weeks. Another is ngrowot (literally fruit and vegetables), when one does not eat rice for several days or weeks. A third is nguler (from uler meaning caterpillar), when one can only eat fruit. Still another is patigeni (literally pati = death; geni = fire), a severe training in which one cannot eat or drink anything and must sleep in a dark room for several days.

A youth who has mastered tata krama and has begun the preliminary stages of elmu kejawen is traditionally said to be wis Jawa, or to have become a Javanese. The opposite of this is durung Jawa, or not yet a Javanese. Benedict Anderson and Hildred Geertz have analysed the nature of this dichotomy. Hildred Geertz applies the term durung Jawa to a person who is not yet civilized, not yet able to control emotion in an adult manner, not yet able to speak with the proper respectful circumlocutions appropriate to different occasions. On the other hand, Benedict Anderson applies the term

40 RNg Sunardjo Pontjorahardjo, who led the Mangkunegaran priyayi group in the practice of elmu kejawen in the period 1947-1951, informs me that elmu kejawen is partly based on the contents of such Javanese literary classics as the Wedatama, Wulangreh and Hidayat Djati. Interview with Sunardjo, 16 July 1979.

41 Interview with Sunardjo, 14 July 1979.

durung Jawa to a person who is not yet able to understand the attitude of hormat (respect) in social communications. Both, however, have neglected the importance of performing elmu kejawen as an attitude of a person who is wis Jawa.

Javanese society therefore sees youth as a period of intense involvement in and practice with Javanese norms and elements of elmu kejawen. These were characteristics also of the pemuda involved in the lasykar organizations, and it is not surprising that when the lasykar began to fight against the Dutch, most of them put into use some practices of elmu kejawen, which Javanese society believes can bring slamet (safety and also invulnerability).

Lasykar members who were seriously concerned with the practice of elmu kejawen were commonly called jago (fighter; literally, fighting cock), a term widely used in Java to refer to a person with magical power. In the rural areas of Surakarta, the term jago is often applied to those leaders of robbers or brigands who were said to be invulnerable to weapons and expert in elmu kejawen. In rural

43 Interview with Soekardi, 23 August 1979.

44 For the term jago in the context of Indonesian rural cultures, see Anthony Reid, The Indonesian National Revolution 1945-1950 (Victoria, Longman, 1974), pp.56-57, 58 note 28; and in the context of urban society, see John R.W. Smail, op.cit., pp.88-89. In some detail, Rudolf Mrazek relates the jago spirit to traditional Indonesian military concepts, in The United States and the Indonesian Military 1945-1965 (vol.I (Prague, Publishing House of the Czechoslovak Academy of Science, 1978), pp.17-77. A nice description of jago in a modern Javanese setting may be found in the four heroes of Surabaya proletarian drama described by James L. Peacock, 'Anti-Dutch, Anti-Muslim Drama among Surabaja Proletarians: a Description of Performance and Responses', Indonesia, no.4, October 1967, pp.44-73.

45 In rural Surakarta, bands of unruly robbers were called gento or benggol. Such bands were traditionally widespread in Java, for treatment of such people in Pekalongan residency, see Anton E. Lucas, 'The Bambo Spear Pierces the Payung: The Revolution Against the Bureaucratic Elite in North Central Java in 1945', Ph.D thesis, The Australian National University, Canberra, 1980, p.37.
areas of Surakarta, a jago is considered to be a person with magical power who has had training at the hands of a kyai or guru (teacher) of ilmu kejawen. Many rural people regard the jago as their protector. Other features of the jago phenomenon were discussed earlier in a Dutch study. This jago pattern common to Javanese society everywhere, clearly influenced the social integration of the lasykar organizations, for each lasykar unit was likely to have one or even more jago in its ranks. The jago, however, was not always himself the leader of the lasykar organization.

Jago were also marked by their expertise in petungan Jawa (Javanese calendrical prediction). According to the petungan Jawa, each day in the weekly cycle can have two kinds of meaning, jaya dina (victory day) or naga dina (literally naga means snake; therefore a bad day). The position of naga dina can be plotted as it moves following the points of the compass. The jago's advice with regard to the petungan Jawa always strictly follows the Primbon (traditional guidebook on the subject), and thus there was likely to be agreement in the advice as to which days should be chosen to military action.

THE LASYKAR ORGANIZATIONS

Barisan Banteng

The Barisan Pelopor, established as the key mobilizing element in the Hökökai, continued to exist as an organization of activists, mainly urban youths, in the months after the Indonesian proclamation of independence. From 14 to 16 December 1945 representatives of Barisan Pelopor branches throughout Java and Madura attended a special congress in Surakarta. They decided there to change the name Barisan Pelopor to Barisan Banteng Republik Indonesia (Wild Buffalo Corps of the Indonesian Republic). They standardized the oath which


47 Interview with Soekardi, 23 August 1979. In the village of Wonokerso, Soekardi is noted for his knowledge of petungan Jawa. During the guerrilla war (in early 1949), he advised the pemuda on how to choose jaya dina for operations.

48 Kedaulatan Rakjat, 17 December 1945.
members of the organization were to take:

1. to be loyal to the discipline of the organization;
2. to be ready to sacrifice for the Indonesian Republic;
3. to unify the Indonesian people into one nation (satu bangsa) in one fatherland (satu tanah air) with one language;
4. to create social justice.

The congress elected Dr Muwardi, a prominent Barisan Pelopor leader and a close associate of Sukarno, as head of the organization and appointed Sudiro, head of Barisan Pelopor's daily secretariat, as his deputy. Because of its central location and good lines of communication, Surakarta was designed as the site of the Barisan Banteng Markas Besar (headquarters).

Organizationally, the Markas Besar was divided into seven sections. A fair number of the headquarters staff, Soemokartiko, Tjitromargoso, Suradji, Mangk-usudijono and Sonhadji, had previously


50 Dr Mas Muwardi was born in Pati, Central Java, on 30 January 1907. He graduated from ELS in 1921 and from STOVIA in 1933. He was prominent in Jong Java in the early 1920s and in the Boy Scout movement in the late 1920s. A prewar Parindra leader in Jakarta, he gained an important Putera post before associating with Barisan Pelopor during the Occupation. See Orang Indonesia, p.335; Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun, p.279 (f.19), p.289 (f.85). Sudiro was born in Jogjakarta on 24 April 1911 and also joined Jong Java. A school teacher and headmaster in the prewar period, he used his Taman Siswa background to become head of a special Barisan Pelopor group personally attached to Sukarno. See Sudiro, Pengalaman Saya Sekitar 17 Agustus '45 (Jakarta, Yayasan Idayu, 1972).

51 These sections were the general secretariat (under Moh. Yusuf); lasykar (under Soemokartiko): central commission (under Sidik Djojosukarto); intelligence (under Tjitromargoso and Suradji); propaganda and information (under Muljadi Djojomartono); press (under Imam Sutardjo); social and economic (under Mangkusudijono and Sonhadji). See 'Keterangan Susunan', p.2. This structure was confirmed by some informants: interview with Hagnjawigati, 30 July 1979; Suradji, 11 August 1979; Sudijo, 21 October 1979.
been in the Surakarta Barisan Pelopor. Newcomers from Surakarta included Muljadi Djojomartono (a Peta officer) and Surjokusumo (a high priyayi of the Kasunanan). In addition, there were four leaders from outside Surakarta, Dr Muwardi, Sudiro, Sidik Djojokartiko and Moh. Yusuf.

The regional leadership (pemimpin daerah) for Surakarta was distinct from the national headquarters. The three most important regional leaders were Hadisunarto (a member of PNI in the 1930s and a Barisan Pelopor activist in disarming the Japanese military forces in Surakarta), Hanjawigati (also of Barisan Pelopor), and Anwar Santosa (a Barisan Pelopor leader in the Kartosuro subdistrict; from Moslem family). One younger activist emerged to join these three in the Surakarta leadership - Sudijo, a former member of the Barisan Pelopor of Kartosuro and a man with a peasant background.

The fact that the leadership of Barisan Banteng headquarters was dominated by former members of the Surakarta Barisan Pelopor brought the local leaders of the Surakarta Barisan Banteng into closer association with headquarters than was the case with other branches in Java. This also meant that the Surakarta Barisan Banteng was less independent in its operations, and there could be no question of the branch ignoring orders from headquarters, a luxury in which other, more distant and independent-minded, branches sometimes indulged.

Smooth relations between the cabang (branches) at the regency level and the ranting (sub-branch) at district or sub-district level

52 'Sedjarah Perdjuangan Barisan Pelopor', pp.2-3. Soemokartiko had graduated from HIS though he was from an ordinary Javanese family. Tj tromargoso was a young official of the Kasunanan; he had graduated from HIS. Suradji was born on 15 January 1923 and graduated from HIS, Solo, (1937) and from Kweekschool (1942); he was from a Moslem family. Sonhadji was a HIS graduate, also from a Moslem family. Mangkusudijono was a HIS graduate, but from a pangreh praja family. Interview with Suradji, 11 August 1979; Hagnjawigati, 30 July 1979.

53 Sidik was born on 7 June 1908 in Blitar, East Java. He graduated from Mulo (Surabaya), and had been active in Jong Java, Indonesia Muda, Partindo, and Gerindo. He was chairman of Putera and the Hôkôkai of Kediri. Ensiklopedia Indonesia (Bandung, van Hoeve, 1954-56), p.1248.
in the Surakarta Barisan Banteng made for a sound organization. Most members at the ranting level were farmers, including pemuda desa (village youth) who were likely to be former members either of Barisan Pelopor or of such organizations as Seinendan and Keibodan, or, in a few cases, of Peta (in Kedawung sub-district, only one of the three Peta members joined the Barisan Banteng). Pemuda Pokoso was an important recruiting-ground in Jumapolo sub-district. At Jumapolo most members were peasants, while a few were from merchant backgrounds. Of the two local leaders, Mas Prijowinoto was the village teacher while Bahkran was a local merchant and pious Moslem. They had been the founders of the Barisan Pelopor in Jumapolo and now they became the builders of the Barisan Banteng. While Bahkran was collecting funds to finance the organization, Mas Prijowinoto maintained contact with the headquarters and regional leaders, namely Dr Muwardi, Sudiro and Hadisunarto.

In the ranting of Kedawung, a Sragen sub-district, the Barisan Banteng leaders were from the pangreh praja. Sastrobaja, a former member of the Sragen Barisan Pelopor and Hökbkai, formed the Kedawung sub-branch of Barisan Banteng. He was at the same time head of the information section of the sub-district government, and he recruited members for the Barisan Banteng through the authority of the lurah there. Although the lurah might not be a member of the Barisan Banteng himself, he enrolled members for it from former Seinendan, Keibodan and Barisan Pelopor members.

In rural areas, the Barisan Banteng acted to safeguard local security. At sub-district level it provided military training for village youth and helped village headmen to carry out their administration.

Compared with the other lawykar organizations the Barisan Banteng was quite well off financially. A special bank, the Bank

54 Interview with Bahkran, 11 October 1979.
55 On the role of Mas Prijowinoto our informant was Bahkran. Mas Prio died some years ago. At the time of Barisan Pelopor he often gathered pemuda together and gave them political courses.
Barisan Banteng, financed and supported the organization. It original funds had been allocated by the Japanese to the Barisan Pelopor, and those had later been supplemented by a donation from the Hokokai.

The Barisan Banteng, in addition to its normal organization, had a research section, the so-called Bagian P (P = Penyelidik, researcher). The primary aim of this section was to observe the political activities of perceived enemies of the Barisan Banteng, which by early 1946 meant the PKI and PESINDO (Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia-Indonesian Socialist Youth). This was because both the PKI and PESINDO were strongly opposed to Japanese 'collaborators', including the Barisan Banteng since this had arisen directly from the Japanese-sponsored Barisan Pelopor. Moreover, since the end of December the headquarters of Barisan Banteng in the city of Surakarta felt threatened by the PKI and the PESINDO, both of which were attempting to replace the influence of Barisan Banteng in this vital city.

The total membership of the Surakarta Barisan Banteng branch was estimated at 12,000. In two of the rural sub-districts I have researched in some depth, Kedawung ranting had over 200 members and Jumapolo more than 250. In the city of Surakarta there were about 4,000 members, and the rural membership would therefore have been around 8,000. The majority of the members of the Surakarta Barisan Banteng must then have been illiterate pemuda from rural areas, many of whom would have joined because they were attracted by the popularity gained by the Barisan Pelopor through its main leader, Ir. Sukarno.

**Barisan Buruh Indonesia**

In the middle of September 1945 the revolutionary pemuda group of Menteng 31 in Jakarta formed the Barisan Buruh Indonesia

56 Interview with Suradji, 11 August 1979.

57 Interview with Sardjono, 4 August 1979; Bahkran, 11 October 1979.

58 This figure is given by Sudijo and Hagnjawigati Interview, 21 October 1979; 30 July 1979.

59 This pemuda group was dominated by leftists such as Njono, Jahja Liman, Pandu Kartawinguna and Kusnaeni. See Sidik Kertapati, Sekitar Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945 (Djakarta, Jajasan Pembaruan, 1964), pp.133, 135, 138.
(Indonesian Labor Corps) or BBI, which was recognised on 5 October by Iwa Kusumasonbuntari, the veteran leftist Minister of Labor and Social Affairs, as the sole representative of organised labour. Regional pemuda groups, including one in Surakarta, quickly imitated the action of Menteng 31. In October the Surakarta BBI was already formed, chaired by Aliman, a young Marxist closely associated with such pre-war communist activists as Achmad Dasuki, Djauwardi and Sujono.

In its early stages the Surakarta BBI comprised three main labor organizations - the Serikat Sekerdja Kereta Api (Railway Workers' Union), chaired by Soemodihardjo, head of the Surakarta Railway office; the Serikat Buruh Negeri Surakarta (Surakarta State Workers' Union) or SBNS, led by Suto Sundoro, a radically-minded official in the Kepatihan of the Kasunanan; and the Serikat Pegawai Negeri Mangkunegaran (Mangkunegaran Civil Servants' Union) or SPNMN, founded by Moh. Daljono. Most members of the SBNS and the SPNMN were lower-level officials of the Kasunanan and the Mangkunegaran who, as a result of the financial problems of the Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran during the first months of revolution, had grievances which led them to align with the BBI. By the end of December the Surakarta BBI was estimated to have 3,000 members. These consisted primarily of railway workers, sugar factory labourers, lower-level officials and teachers.

An important step for the BBI was its national congress of workers and peasants held from 7 to 9 November 1945 in the city of Surakarta. This was attended by delegates of BBI branches throughout Java and Madura. The Surakarta BBI was represented by Soemodihardjo, Aliman and Moh. Daljono. On 8 November the congress established the Partai Buruh Indonesia (Indonesian Labor Party or PBI) and elected

60 Suto Sundoro was strongly opposed to the traditional authorities, he had been a member of prawar Gerindo, and he later joined the Barisan Pelopor. Interview with Wirodiningrat, 30 October 1979.

61 Daljono was born on 20 May 1912 in Surakarta and educated in HIS, Mulo, AMS, HBS (Jakarta). After 1936 he worked in the Mangkunegaran. See 'Hal Riwajat Mr Moh. Daljono Hardjosudiro', Surakarta, typescript, 1943.

62 Bendel Serikat Sekerdja 1945-1948, AMN. For further discussion of the financial problems of the kraton see below, pp.135-36.

63 'Laporan Rapat BBI Daerah Surakarta 14 January 1946', typescript. This report may be found in Bendel Serikat Sekerdja, ibid, AMN.

64 Suara Buruh, no.1, 8 December 1945.
Sjamsu Harja Udaja as its chairman. Moh. Daljono was elected head of a committee to draft the party statutes. Although at this conference the BBI was amalgamated into the BBI, the following January it was re-established as a separate organization.

It was also decided at the Congress that the BBI would establish its own armed force, to be called Lasykar Buruh Indonesia, or LBI. The Surakarta BBI formed a LBI unit in early December, under the direct leadership of Alimin. Its first activity was to attend the first national congress of LBI on 30 December in Malang.

Accordingly, the Surakarta LBI only began military activities in the early months of 1946. Its members were primarily pemuda interested in a Marxist ideology. Most were from the city, with only a few from rural areas, chiefly from sugar and rubber centres. The Kedawung LBI had less than 100 members (mainly rubber workers) and the Delanggu LBI more than 200 members (sugar, cotton and jute workers). In its early stages, the Surakarta LBI was called LBI Division VIII and consisted of five regiments.

With the emergency of the LBI as fighting organization, the BBI was free to concentrate on social and political questions affecting labor organizations. Both organizations were influenced by Marxist ideology and active in the struggle for labor rights. Moreover, the LBI supported a plan of the BBI and the PBI to nationalize the

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65 Singkatan Poetoesan-Poetoesan Kongres BBI pada tanggal, 7, 8, 9 Nopember 1945 di Soerakarta, stencilled. Sjamsu Harja Udaja was born on 23 March 1913 in Binangun, Banyumas (Central Java). He was educated in HIS (1929), Mulo and Taman Siswa (1930-35). In 1935 he became a teacher in Solo, from 1938 to 1941 a member of Parindra (Solo); in 1941-42 he was on the editorial staff of the journal Darmokondo and at the same time chairman of a Labour Union in Surabaya. See Orang Indonesia, p.290.

66 Sendjata Boeroeh, no.1, January 1946.

67 Interview with Sardjono, 4 August 1979; Bodronojo, 26 September 1979.

68 See 'Sedjarah Lasjkar Buruh Indonesia Didaerah Surakarta', typescript, n.d., p.2. In 1947 the name was changed to Battalion 13.
enterprises of the Susuhanan and the Mangkunegoro. Subsequently, as will be seen in Chapter V, the Surakarta LBI fell under the political influences of the PKI.

Barisan Pemberontakan Republik Indonesia

The other large lasykar organization in Surakarta with a national scope was the Barisan Pemberontakan Republik Indonesia (Insurgent Corps of the Republic of Indonesia) or BPRI. It was an organization dominated by the charismatic leadership of Sutomo ('Bung Tomo'), who played a key role in the fighting against the British in Surabaya in late October and early November 1945. BPRI was established on 29 October and replaced the former Pimpinan Pemberontakan Rakyat Surabaya (Insurgent Leadership of the People of Surabaya), which had been formed on 12 October.

The BPRI quickly spread throughout Java. In Surakarta the BPRI spread through two channels - Bung Tomo's radio speeches on 'Radio Pemberontakan' (radio of revolt), listened to by the pemuda of Surakarta every night, and those Surakarta pemuda who had been sent to Surabaya to fight against the British. Sutomo's radio speeches inflamed the pemuda spirit to fight against the British in cities in Java.

In November the BPRI of Surakarta had enough strength to establish a local organization. There were three levels in its organizational structure: a markas besar (headquarters) for all of Surakarta, markas cabang (branch post) at the regency level, and markas ranting (sub-branch post) in the districts or sub-districts. The Surakarta

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69 This plan was announced in the regional congress of the Surakarta labor union on 29 December 1945 by Aliman and Moh. Daljono. See 'Verslag Singkat Rapat wakil2 Serikat Boeroeh dan Serikat Sekerdja 29/30 1945', typescript, pp.1-2. This report was written by Anggoro et al., on 31 December 1945.

70 Republik Indonesia: Propinsi Djawa Timur (Kementerian Penerangan Republik Indonesia, 1952), p.916.

71 'Bendel BPRI 1945-1948', AMN.

72 'Sedjarah Singkat BPRI Daerah Surakarta', typescript, Surakarta, 20 April 1959.
BPRI was founded by Djajusman, a former Gerindo activist and member of Barisan Pelopor. After December he had maintained close relations with Sutomo, who often visited the Surakarta BPRI branch. In the early stages, the Surakarta BPRI consisted of 100 members. Although the BPRI drew some members from rural areas, it was less popular there than the other lasykar organizations discussed here. For instance, there was no BPRI organization in Kedawung, while in Delanggu its members numbered fewer than 100. This is because, unlike Barisan Banteng and Hizbullah, the BPRI had no roots from the Japanese occupation in rural areas. Most of its members were illiterate pemuda, although there were a few students who joined the BPRI and called themselves BPRI Pelajar (Student BPRI). This BPRI Pelajar, formed on 11 November, consisted of students of the Ardjuna Private High School of Surakarta. The spirit of the BPRI Pelajar was expressed in the slogan berdarah pemberontak (to have the blood of a rebel).

The BPRI funds came mainly from general contributions and amal BPRI (amal = works, or good deeds), which were attempts to raise money by performances of Javanese dancing and wayang. Sometimes these performances were followed by speeches aiming to draw the masses to join the BPRI.

The attitude of the Surakarta BPRI imitated that of their colleagues in Surabaya who had vowed to let their hair grow until full Indonesian independence was achieved. The Surakarta branch, following the policy of BPRI headquarters, was strongly opposed to any negotiations with the British or the Dutch.

Lasykar Hizbullah

The Lasykar Hizbullah of Surakarta was formed in September by Bakri, one of the Hizbullah leaders during the occupation and a

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73 'Sedjuruh Singkat BPRI', p.3.
74 Interview with Bodronojo, 26 September 1979.
75 Kedaulatan Rakjat, 1 December 1945.
76 Bendel BPRI 1945-1948, op.cit.
close associate of Kyai Haji Idris, former daidanchō of the Wonogiri Peta.  

The Surakarta Hizbullah was strongly supported financially by the Moslem batik merchants in Solo, concentrated in such areas of the city as Kauman, Laweyan and Pasar Kliwon. This was because the batik merchants shared the Hizbullah's commitment to an Islamic ideology as the basis for the national struggle. In the city the Hizbullah worked closely with the Markas Barisan Kyai Surakarta (Headquarters of Kyai Corps of Surakarta) at Singasaren, which was led by Kyai Haji Idris. Hizbullah members looked to the Kyai for Islamic teaching and general guidance. This link with a prominent kyai had in most cases already been established in the Hizbullah of the Japanese period. This link strengthened the militancy of Hizbullah by cultivating members' semangat bathin (inner spirit). Hizbullah ideology emphasized the unity of Moslems and the responsibility of Hizbullah as Tentara Allah (God's army) to carry out jihad (holy war) against the British or the Dutch.

In the rural areas, as in the city, the Hizbullah appears to have associated closely with the kyai. In Delanggu, for example, Haji Buzairi, a prominent kyai during the occupation, became an adviser of the local Hizbullah. Buzairi attempted to finance the Hizbullah by applying the Islamic concept of zakat (religious tax). Every Islamic farmer was exhorted to deliver 5 per cent of his agricultural production, which was to be used by Buzairi to finance the Hizbullah and to aid Moslems. The members of Hizbullah in

77 Bakri was born into a pious Moslem family in Solo in 1922 and was a graduate of HIS. During the occupation he was a Hizbullah leader and had attended military training in Bogor. His father was a Moslem batik trader in Kauman. Interview with Bakri, 15 August 1979.

78 See 'Bendel Markas Barisan Kyai Surakarta', 1947, AMN.

79 Buzairi was born in 1904 and graduated from the following peasantren: Jamsaren in 1918 (Solo), Termas in 1925 (East Java), Watutjengkal in 1931 (Central Java). In 1929 he made the pilgrimage to Mecca. Interview, 13 August 1979.
Delanggu and its surrounding areas were estimated at 300. In the city of Surakarta the Lasykar Hizbullah had 500 members. Apparently the local Hizbullah of Delanggu was not strictly subordinate to its headquarters, because of the influence of the local kyai on the Hizbullah branch.

We may then say that Islamic spirit (semangat Islam) was the source of Hizbullah militancy. Close ties between Hizbullah members and kyai were felt to be necessary during the first months of revolution, to build a feeling of unity in Islam and to carry out the holy war against the Allies.

*Lasykar Rakyat*

Officially, the BKR was replaced by the TKR on 5 October 1945, but in most regions of Java this change was only implemented a few weeks later. This appears to have been because the BKR was involved in disarming the Japanese. For instance, the Surakarta BKR was still busy disarming the Japanese until the middle of October. This would have postponed the disbandment of the Surakarta BKR, a process which was only completed on 1 November.

On 6 November, the Lasykar Rakyat of Surakarta was founded to embrace former members of the BKR who were not to become members of the TKR. It absorbed such small and local armed units as Lasykar Garuda, Lasykar Satriya, Lasykar Potehi and Lasykar Djanget. The Surakarta Lasykar was chaired by Iskandar, a Barisan Pelopor activist and former member of the BKR. The total strength of this lasykar, including its branches in the regencies, was six battalions.

80 Interview with Haji Buzairi, 13 August 1979.
81 Interview with Haji Bakri, 15 August 1979.
82 Kedaulatan Rakjat, 12 November 1945.
83 Iskandar was a younger brother of Sunarto Kusumodirdjo, and was thus from a pangreh praja family; he had graduated from HIS.
84 'Sedjarah Singkat Lasjkar Rakjat Surakarta', typescript (Surakarta, n.d.), p.2. This source may be found in the library of Sedjarah Militer Angkatan Darat, Surakarta.
The Lasykar Rakyat established deep roots among the people, particularly in the villages, partly, perhaps, because the word rakyat (people) attracted the pemuda. At the sub-district level it frequently organized asrama (dormitories) where military training was supervised by former Seinendan leaders. These asrama provided meals for their members through a system of dapur umum (public kitchens), which involved a wide circle of villagers in delivering meals to the asrama. Most members in the villages were illiterate pemuda. The rural Lasykar Rakyat functioned chiefly to assume general security for villages and to defend rural people against rampok (robbers). In November and December of 1945, however, many of its members joined the regular army in the front lines facing British troops in the city of Semarang.

Banditry Elements in the Lasykar

The traditional Javanese band was often headed by a leader who had magical-mystic powers. The leader and members possessed their own customs, ceremonies and code of honour, and they therefore formed a group with strong inner ties.

The rural people of Surakarta referred to the bandit groups in their area by the local term kècu (robber). Most kècu members were illiterate. The leaders could be literate, but they were distinguished primarily by possession of ngélmu kawedukan (ngélmu = mystical teaching, kawedukan = invulnerability).

The purpose of the modern lasykar organizations was quite different from the Surakarta kècu, but their members shared some of the attitudes of the traditional bandit. For instance, lasykar leaders were concerned with ngélmu kawedukan, much as bandit chiefs had been. To protect themselves Hizbullah members possessed a charm

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85 The defence perimeter for the Republican Army (TKR) in the Semarang area ran through such outlying towns as Ambarawa, Bawen, Ungaran and Mranggen see 'Sedjarah Singkat Lasjkar Rakjat', p.1.

86 For details, see P.M. van Wulfften Palthe, op.cit., pp.27-34.

87 Interview with Soekardi, 23 August 1979.
in the form of magical Arabic words written on a piece of paper. Other lasykar organizations held powerful objects which provided protection: Barisan Banteng and BPRI possessed a magical bamboo spear, the so-called bambu runcing Parakan. The Bendosari Lasykar Rakyat members went to Kyai Pentjil, a prominent local kyai, who led them in doing mutih and growot for several weeks, to induce invulnerability while they were fighting against the British or Dutch.

Growing out of the struggle against the Dutch and the Japanese, the lasykar organizations also turned against the minority groups, and in particular the Chinese and Arabs. Most of their victims were local traders. In December 1945 the BPRI and the Barisan Banteng entered Chinese textile shops and forcibly took away cloth for their uniforms and for making the red and white national flag. The Barisan Banteng even seized the house of a rich Chinese to be its headquarters. A few members of the BPRI, when they returned from the front line surrounding the city of Semarang, forcibly demanded the property of the people to make good their lack of provisions. Overall, in fact, the BPRI showed a more undisciplined record than the other lasykar organizations.

Another element of traditional banditry which found its way into the lasykar organizations was the anti-foreign obsession of the political bands. In December the BPRI and the Barisan Banteng popularized an action against Nica (Netherlands Indies Civil Administration) and its followers, the so-called kaki tangan Nica, in the local society of Surakarta. These two lasykar organizations warned the masses 'awas anjing Nica dan kaki tangannya' (beware of Nica dogs and their followers).

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88 This bambu runcing had magical power after Kyai Parakan (a prominent kyai of Parakan, near Temanqqunq, Central Java) had charmed it. Interview with Sudijo, 30 October 1979.

89 Kyai Pentjil was a poor farmer in Bendosari. During the occupation he studied in the pesantren in Ponorogo, East Java. During the revolution the villagers of Bendosari regarded him as a kyai who had mastered ngelmu kawedukan. Interview with Muljadi, 6 August 1979.

90 Wulfften Palthe also links the political bands with the regular army. See P.M. van Wulfften Palthe, op.cit., p.45.

91 Interview with Sudijo, 30 October 1979.
Eurasian youths were sometimes struck in the street as a result of these feelings, but there were no killings such as those which occurred in Semarang and in the Pekalongan area.

What conclusions can one then draw after discussing the local lasykar of Surakarta? The lasykar organizations were the home of the revolutionary pemuda who were the vanguard of the newly born Republic. Locally, the life of pemuda who were in the lasykar organizations was still heavily influenced by Javanese cultural tradition. In addition, there is no doubt that the military values which had been inculcated by the Japanese in the Peta, Heiho, Seinendan and Barisan Pelopor also contributed to the revolutionary attitudes of the pemuda which provided the strength of the Republic. The spirit of independence was a potent psychological force, spurring pemuda enthusiasm for joining lasykar organizations. With ideology and religion providing the motives for the decision as to which organization to join, it is not surprising to see a number of organizations, with different orientations, rising and flourishing. This very multiplicity of organizations, in an already chaotic period, made it almost inevitable that control by the central government would not be consistently exercised.

ADMINISTRATION AND SOCIAL RESPONSES IN THE RURAL AREAS

In most cases the news of the proclamation of independence was brought to the villagers of the Surakarta region by the local leaders of Barisan Pelopor and Peta or by local officials. The villagers of the sub-district of Bendosari learned about the proclamation at the end of August 1945. This news was brought by Kasimo, a former bundanchō of Peta, when he went back to Bendosari after the Peta organization was disbanded by the Japanese authorities on 20 August. In Kedawung and Jumapolo, the sub-district officials brought the news of the proclamation to the village headmen. In the sub-district of Delanggu, news of the proclamation reached the people from rumours

92 Interview with Kasimo, 28 July 1979. He was born in 1922 in Sukohardjo and had graduated from primary school.
passed on by Indonesian administrators at the Delanggu sugar factory.

Following closely the moves in the city, the local leaders at the level of sub-district began to be very busy preparing the formation of the local KNIs. In the middle of September, Kasimo received a telephone message from Sumodiningrat, the head of the Surakarta KNI, through the district official in Sukoharjo. The message conveyed the orders of the central government that former members of Peta were to form local KNIs as soon as possible.

At the end of September Kasimo held meetings with local leaders to prepare the local KNI. By early October the Bendosari KNI was established with Kasimo as its head. Kasimo then began to reform the village administration by introducing KNIs at that level also. But there was only one village, Toriyo, in which this attempt was immediately successful and here the village KNI was under the village head, Martodihardjo. This is because Martodihardjo was a member of the Bendosari KNI and closely associated with local revolutionary leaders such as Kasimo and Muljadi, the leader of the Bendosari Lasykar Rakyat. The Toriyo KNI members comprised former leaders of Seinendan and Keibodan, as well as village administration officials. The functions of this village KNI were to assist the village officials in their duties and to guard the security of the village.

The other sub-districts selected, Delanggu, Jumapolo and Kedawung, were only a little slower in responding. There the KNIs were led by the sub-district officials and included former Seinendan, Keibodan and Barisan Pelopor members and the village headmen. In these areas the sub-district KNIs often functioned as information centres where the village headmen could be informed about the situation of the new Republic.

Mostly the local KNIs functioned as local political institutions and as a means of communication between the regional government and rural society. Through the local KNIs the spirit of independence was conveyed to villagers in many ways. The KNIs ordered the villagers to wear a small emblem of the merah putih and to use the salutation 'merdeka' (fret) when meeting each other. These methods, of course, encouraged the villagers to feel a strong emotional involvement in the struggle for independence. Moreover, the villagers created folksongs
as a social expression of their spirit of independence. The traditional Javanese puppet, the wayang, was used to perform a story about an independent state in which the proklamasi (proclamation) was referred to as the wahyu kraton (divine inspiration of the state). A popular story was the Wahyu Makutoromo. According to this story, whoever received this wahyu would become the ruler. Therefore, the Pandawa group and the Kurawa group fought to gain possession of the wahyu. In this case, the Pandawa referred to the Republican people who had successfully defeated the Republican enemy, the Kurawa.

The rise of various laskyar organizations in general was a product of the spirit of independence among the pemuda groups. The degree of popularity of different laskyar organizations in the rural areas originally depended on the social and economic condition of each area. The laskyar organizations more interested in a Marxist ideology, such as BBI or LBI, were evidently quite popular in the plantation areas. For instance, the BBI and LBI were more influential than other organizations among rural pemuda in Delanggu and Kedawung. The rural pemuda who joined the LBI were mostly plantation labourers.

The Barisan Banteng, BPRI and Lasykar Rakyat were more influential in the rural areas outside the plantation areas. The Barisan Banteng, for instance, was stronger in Jumapolo than in the Kedawung plantation area. The Lasykar Rakyat was the strongest laskyar organization in Bendosari.

Another important point concerning the village administration reform was a plan promoted by the Surakarta KNI in December for re-electing village headmen. A person who was successfully elected as the new village headman was commonly called the lurah kemerdekaan (the independence village headman). From December 1945 to the early months of 1946, according to the results of my research, out of 100 village headmen who stood in Sragen regency, eighty were re-elected.


94 Soeyatno, ibid., p.39.
The elected village headmen accepted instructions from the new independent administration, namely from the sub-district KNIs, in contrast to traditional village headmen, who had served the Susuhunan or Mangkunegoro for many years. Martodihardjo, one of the re-elected village headmen, described the lurah kemerdekaan as follows:

The lurah kemerdekaan took orders from the Republican Government and did not accept orders from the Susuhunan and the Mangkunegoro. The lurah kemerdekaan had to possess a revolutionary spirit. The lurah kemerdekaan did not serve the raja (the king) but served the Republic.95

In short, we can say that in the first months of Indonesian Independence, the Revolution had already produced changes in rural society. The spirit of independence had brought a new attitude to the villagers, who now saw the village governments as part of the new Republican Government.

95 Interview with Martodihardjo, 20 August 1979.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE FALL OF THE SURAKARTA DYNASTIES

THE PERSATUAN PERJUANGAN CHALLENGE

Surakarta as an oppositionist city became the national centre of Tan Malaka's Persatuan Perjuangan (Fighting Front) or PP. Why Surakarta should have so focussed oppositionist elements had something to do with the region's revolutionary tradition, but still more to do with its anachronistic administration. Most officials of the Kasunanan and the Mangkunegaran themselves opposed the rulers, and therefore gave support to Leftist leaders. The rulers sought the protection of the Republican central government, which in turn accentuated the opposition of local revolutionaries to that government.

As Benedict Anderson noted, 'almost from the start of the Sjahrir cabinet's life ... the elements of a formidable opposition were already in existence'. The cabinet had a narrow basis of support because it comprised only the Socialist Party leaders and largely apolitical professional men. Moreover the cabinet opened talks with the Dutch, a course strongly opposed by most of its rivals.

The Persatuan Perjuangan was formed on 6 January 1946 in Purwokerto by the groups supporting Tan Malaka. The PP rapidly attracted the support of 143 popular organizations. On Tan Malaka's suggestion, the PP in its session in Surakarta on 15 and 16 January declared itself a popular front, meant to build support for the PP program and to co-ordinate the badan perjuangan to attack the British and the Dutch. Moreover a planning sub-committee was formed, consisting of eleven members, including Sujono of the Surakarta KNI. Sukarno, Hatta, and all the ministers were invited but none of them came. It is clear that the conference was regarded as fundamentally oppositionist by the government. The PP adopted the Minimum Program proposed by Tan Malaka, consisting of seven points, as follows:

2 Osman Raliby, Documenta Historica: Sedjarah Dokumenter Dari Pertumbuhan dan Perjuangan Negara Republik Indonesia (Djakarta, Bulan Bintang, 1953), p.188.
3 Muhammad Yamin, Sapta Darma (Bukittinggi, N.V. Nusantara, 1957), p.113; Raliby, op.cit., p.194
4 Benedict Anderson, op.cit., p.293, gives a complete list of members. An incomplete list may be found in Osman Raliby, op.cit., p.194.
1. Negotiation on the recognition of 100 per cent 'Merdeka' (Independence)
2. A People's Government
3. A People's Army
4. Taking care of European internees
5. Disarming the Japanese
6. Confiscation of enemy rights and properties
7. Confiscation of enemy industry (factories, workshops, etc.) and agriculture (Plantations, mines, etc.).

The working Committee of KNIP endorsed the PP's stand and urged the whole population to join it. When the cabinet thereupon resigned on 28 February, Tan Malaka and the PP leaders had triumphed in over throwing and supplanting the Sjahrir group. Kahin asserts:

Many in the PP coalition, including General Sudirman and several other army leaders, while desirous for Sjahrir's overthrow, did not want a cabinet dominated by Tan Malaka and his group. They feared, with some justification, that once having reached that rung in the ladder of power, Tan Malaka would attempt to supplant Sukarno. The majority of the PP coalition wanted Sukarno to remain as president. ... They were willing to go along with Tan Malaka's group only as far as its first objective, the overthrow of Sjahrir.

When Sjahrir's second cabinet was announced on 12 March, it was apparent that none of the new cabinet members, ministers or vice-ministers were leaders of the PP. The new cabinet, in spite of the strong agitation of the PP, was still in the hands of Sjahrir's group. The PP leaders' opposition to Sjahrir's new cabinet was understandably strong.

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6 The resignation of Sjahrir's cabinet actually occurred on 26 February, but it was officially announced on 28 February in the KNIP session in Surakarta.
7 George McTurnan Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, p.176.
8 Raliby, op.cit., p.275; Kahin, op.cit., p.177.
Surakarta and Madiun then developed as the main centres for Persatuan Perjuangan opposition against the central government in Jogjakarta. In March, when the PP leaders held meetings in Madiun to oppose the new cabinet and its programs, the Government rose to the challenge. On 17 March, the Government arrested Tan Malaka and other important leaders of the PP - Sukarni, Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, Sajoeti Melik, Chaerul Saleh and Muhammad Yamin.9

Four leaders, Abikusno, Yamin, Tan Malaka and Sukarni, were brought to Surakarta on 18 March and jailed in a house at Baron Street, Kadipolo, for five days. On the night of 22 March they were moved into a house at Jatis, a village in the region of Pajang, Surakarta. Exactly a month later they were moved again, this time to Tawangmangu (Karanganyar Regency), a mountain resort on the slopes of Gunung Lawu.10 Initially they were confined to the house of Sastroiawu, commander of the local Battalion Lawu.11 There they were closely guarded by the special police corps, until Major Sastroiawu made himself personally responsible for the prisoners and allowed them to move freely around the resort of Tawangmangu. The continuing political concern of the prisoners is reflected by one of them:

"While we stayed at Tawangmangu, every day we thought about Indonesian politics and the Indonesian Revolution. We obtained material from newspapers, radio and verbal reports."

According to Sastroiawu, the Battalion Lawu, like the other battalions of the Panembahan Senopati Division, originally

9 Kedaulatan Rakjat, 20 March 1946; 1 April 1946.
11 The Battalion Lawu was originally Battalion 17, Regiment 27, the Panembahan Senopati Division. According to Sastroiawu, besides the four prisoners mentioned by Yamin, other leaders of the PP were also jailed there, including Mr Soebardjo, Samsi and Iwa Kusumasumantri. Interview with Sastroiawu, 13 October 1979. See also Sastroiawu, 'Catatan Peristiwa Yang Terjadi di Wetan Bengawan Daerah Karanganyar di Lereng Gunung Lawu (Tawangmangu): Sejak Kemerdekaan Negara Republik Indonesia', typescript, 1979.
12 Yamin, op.cit., p.66.
joined in the rise of the PP. Almost all the badan perjuangan of Surakarta, including three of the most important - Barisan Banteng, BBI and the BPRI - enthusiastically joined the PP. However the Barisan Banteng and the BPRI shifted to support Sukarno when it became clear the PP sought to overthrow Sjahrir's first cabinet. They feared that if the PP prevailed Tan Malaka would replace Sukarno as president. But most battalions of the Panembahan Senopati Division under Colonel Sutarto were still firm members of the PP even after the jailing of the PP leaders. Indeed the oppositionist character of the PP seemed to be strengthened by its location in Surakarta, where many of the most important political forces were strongly opposed to Sjahrir's policy of negotiation.

The most critical period in the bitter political struggle between Tan Malaka's supporters and Sjahrir's cabinet occurred at the end of June and the beginning of July 1946. On 27 June Sastrolawu allowed the prisoners of Tawangmangu to move more freely. Muhammad Yamin went to Surakarta and spent the night at the house of Dr Kartono (former Surakarta KNI member) with Iwa Kusumasumantri. The PP leaders paid special attention to Hatta's 27 June radio speech, which revealed that the Republican government was prepared to accept de facto Dutch recognition of the Republic in Java and Sumatra only. The same night, Sjahrir and some of his companions, who were spending the night at the former Javaasche Bank in Surakarta after their tour in East Java, were kidnapped by a small unit of the Third Division. This was led by Major A.K. Yusuf, a young commander of a battalion of the Third Division headed by Major General Sudarsono. The kidnapping had originally been planned by Yusuf, but its execution was authorized by General Sudarsono.15

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13 Interview with Sastrolawu, 13 October 1979. See also Yamin, loc.cit., p.66.

14 Abu Hanifah, Tales of a Revolution (Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1972), p.204.

15 For this account, see Yamin, op.cit., pp.66-67; Reid, op.cit., p.94; Anderson, op.cit., pp.383-84.
As commander of the Senopati (Surakarta) Division, Sutarto also authorized Yusuf's coup, and cooperated in it by giving orders to cut all telephone communications out of Surakarta. Sastrolawu, who guarded the prisoners at Tawangmangu, had been ordered by Sutarto to assist Yusuf's operation. The victims of the kidnapping were brought to the village of Paras (Boyolali regency), at the Susuhunan's bungalow on the slopes of Gunung Merbabu. There they were under the guard of Major Soekarto, the local battalion commander. This marked the successful completion of the manoeuvre, which has been described as 'more a pemuda-style daulat operation than a military coup.'

Having heard the news of Sjahrir's kidnapping, the Cabinet proposed that Sukarno, as President of the Republic, should take all power into his hands for the duration of the emergency. Sukarno accordingly proclaimed martial law in his radio speech of 30 June, and took government power into his own hands.

The kidnapping of Sjahrir was followed by a delegation to President Sukarno consisting of General Sudarsono, Muhammad Yamin and others on 3 July. They demanded that the Sjahrir cabinet be disbanded and replaced by a Supreme Political Council (Dewan Pimpinan Politik), with Tan Malaka as Chairman. After secret discussions between Sukarno and Hatta, Sukarno rejected these demands and ordered his bodyguards to arrest General Sudarsono, Muhammad Yamin and the other supporters.

Sukarno, who still trusted Sjahrir to lead the cabinet and

16 Interview with Sastrolawu, 13 October 1979; see also Anderson, op.cit., p.385.

17 Major Sukarto headed Battalion 18 of Regiment 27. Interview with Sunarto Kusumodirdjo (Regiment 27 Commander), 1 August 1979.

18 Reid, op.cit., p.94; see also Anderson, op.cit., p.385.

19 The full text of this speech may be found in Raliby, op.cit., pp.324-32.

20 A list of Ministers intended to replace the Sjahrir cabinet appears in Yamin, op.cit., pp.233-34.
to continue the policy of diplomacy, had successfully demonstrated his power against the challenge from the PP. Surakarta's role as a centre of radicalism and opposition to the Cabinet was not over, but it would subsequently assume an increasingly communist character. This will be discussed in the following chapters.

CRISIS OF THE TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES

The formation of the Directorate in October 1945, as mentioned in the previous chapter, was intended to reform and unify the government of Surakarta. The Directorate styled itself a collegiaal bestuur (collegial administration) involving the Susuhunan, the Mangkunegoro and the KNI. In essence, however, the Directorate never functioned according to the hopes of the High Commissioner. Both the Susuhunan and the Mangkunegoro attempted to retain their powers rather than pass them to the Directorate.

Politically, the first blow against the kratons of Surakarta had come in October 1945, when the High Commissioner started to coordinate the government of the Kasunanan and the Mangkunegaran. The political situation of the two kratons deteriorated further with the breakdown of cooperation within the Directorate government.

During the period of the Directorate the administrative offices of the Susuhunan and the Mangkunegoro continued to have their former functions. The majority of the priyayi who served in the offices of the two rulers continued to receive their salaries. Their traditional titles still lend social prestige to the priyayi. Politically, however, these officials were now subject to the orders of the Directorate and cut off from the Susuhunan's and the Mangkunegoro's direct control.

Officially, the Directorate government was intended to carry out the orders of the central government and of the Executive Board of the Surakarta KNI. In fact it did not function properly,

because of two vital weaknesses. Firstly, the patihs of the Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran resisted the formation of the Directorate from the beginning. Secondly, the daily administration of the Directorate was conducted only by the representatives of the KNI, who had no support from the rulers.

In the preliminary meeting on 22 October to plan the formation of the Directorate, the patihs of both rulers had proposed that the executive of the Directorate be the members representing the Kasunanan and the Mangkunegaran. This proposal was rejected by the High Commissioner. A further meeting between the High Commissioner, the KNI, the Kasunanan and the Mangkunegaran was held on 31 October. In this meeting Partono Handojonoto, the patih of the Mangkunegaran, demanded that representation in the Directorate should be approximately the same for the Kasunanan, the Mangkunegaran and the High Commissioner. This proposal was also rejected by the High Commissioner. On 1 November a special session of the Working Committee of the High Commissioner was held without involving the rulers' representatives. This meeting issued a decree in the name of the High Commissioner announcing the members of the Directorate. They were:

Chairman: R.P. Suroso

Members: Susuhunan Pakubuwono XII, Mangkunegoro VIII, RMTH Atmodiningrat (a high court official and representative of the Kasunanan), RT Sarwono Honggopati Tjitrohupojo (a high court official and representative of the Mangkunegaran), and five members who represented the Working Committee of KNI: Mohammad Daljono, Ronomarsono, Achmad Dasuki, R Ng Prodjosudodo and Djuwardi.

The first Directorate session on 7 November decided that the anggota dewan, or working committee, should consist of the five representatives of the Surakarta KNI. Each member was made responsible for one of five sections: general affairs (Daljono),

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22 See 'Tentang Direktorioem', typescript, 1945, AMN.

23 'Makloemat Komisaris Tinggi', no.1, 1 November 1945, Bendel Swapradja 1945, AMN.

24 See 'Verslag Rapat Direktorioem Repoebliek Indonesia Daerah Soerakarta 7 Nopember 1945', typescript, Bendel Swapradja 1945, AMN.
economic affairs (Ronomarsono), social affairs (Dasuki), pangeran praja affairs (Prodjosudodo) and security affairs (Djuwardi) respectively. No representatives of the Susuhunan nor Mangkunegoro were involved in the anggota dewan. Their political and administrative positions were therefore very weak. Local government policy was in the hands of these KNI appointees who were politically on the left. It should be noted that the KNI itself had been dominated by leftists unsympathetic to the rulers since the middle of October when its membership was enlarged.

These five men who conducted the daily administration of the Directorate were for the most part radical politicians. Daljono had assisted the formation of the Labor Party (PBI) on 8 November 1945 by drafting the statutes of the party, and he was a close associate of its chairman, Sjamsu Harjo Udaja.25 Achmad Dasuki and Djuwardi were active in the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in the 1920s and had been interned in Boven Digul for many years after the communist uprising in 1926.26 Ronomarsono was also sympathetic with the PKI, something borne out when he joined the Madiun rebellion in September 1948. In 1946 he joined the PBI and became a close associate of Daljono and Sjamsu Harjo Udaja.27 Prodjosudodo was a progressive wedono of Kartosura. He had been actively involved in the takeover of arms from the Japanese at Gembongan and was closely associated with the local leaders of Barisan Pelopor in Kartosura, such as Sudijo and Totosardjono.

The central government appeared to be dissatisfied with the Directorate system, in which the political role of the rulers in Surakarta's government had been effectively eliminated. Presumably the central government saw a more acceptable model in Jogjakarta,

25 Soeara Boeroeh, no.1, 8 December 1945. See also Singkatan Poetoesan-Poetoesan Konggres BBI tanggal 7, 8, 9, November 1945 di Soerakarta, stencilled.

26 Interview with Sumodiningrat, 1 August 1979. Benedict Anderson gives more details about them, Java, p.354, note 43.

27 Interview with Sastrolawu, 13 October 1979.
and wanted to reform Surakarta in a similar direction. In September 1945 the Sultan of Jogjakarta and the Paku Alam had jointly proclaimed that the two states were combined into one Daerah Istimewa Jogjakarta, with the Sultan as its head and Prince Paku Alam as his deputy.\textsuperscript{28} Personally they were aware of the revolutionary trend, as became clear when the Sultan decided to invite the Central Government to move to Jogjakarta in December 1945. Because Jakarta could not provide a proper basis for Government in the atmosphere of armed conflict between Indonesian and Dutch forces, the Central Government moved to Jogjakarta on 4 January 1946. Jogjakarta became the capital of the Republic and the seat of Government.\textsuperscript{29}

In Jogjakarta there was nothing like the Directorate of Surakarta, because the Sultan and the Paku Alam had already united their territories into a single regional government and invited the KNI to involve itself in the government. This was in contrast with the Susuhunan and the Mangkunegoro, who did not cooperate with the local KNI and insisted on retaining their separate territories and governments. Thus the rulers of Jogjakarta simply had a more shrewd attitude than those of Surakarta. They were rewarded when Suroso withdrew from his High Commissioner position in Jogjakarta, and concentrated solely on the region of Surakarta.

In the central government's view the Directorate had to be discussed. A Jogjakarta meeting was called on 10 November 1945, attended by the High Commissioner and representatives of the central government and the Surakarta KNI, to deal with the question of the Directorate. Sujono, the head of the Working Committee of the Surakarta KNI, informed the central government on the basis of his own experience in the region that the Directorate had been accepted by the people of Surakarta. Indeed the idea of the Directorate government had come from the Surakarta KNI and then been approved by the High Commissioner.


\textsuperscript{29} Anderson, \textit{op.cit.}, pp.356-57; Selosoemardjan, \textit{op.cit.}, p.78.
on 22 October. The Directorate thus had a legal local base, he argued. Because the central government had not authorized the Directorate, however, it declined in the Jogjakarta meeting to regard the Directorate as more than an unofficial government in Surakarta. 30

Apparently the Jogjakarta meeting, with the government's misgivings over the Directorate system, encouraged the Mangkunegoro to resist the Directorate. An anti-Directorate campaign was begun by high officials of the Mangkunegaran government, using two methods: meetings for Mangkunegaran officials and political statements to the public. The climax of this campaign was a conference of the Mangkunegaran high and middle officials on 21 November. It took three important decisions:

1. the Mangkunegaran government rejected the Directorate system;
2. the Mangkunegaran government urged the central government to form two special regions in Surakarta;
3. the Kasunanan and the Mangkunegaran would work together. 31

This Mangkunegaran officials' statement was enthusiastically received by one conservative regent, Sutojo Hardjoreksoko of Wonogiri, who was still very loyal to the Mangkunegaran. He invited the regency officials to a special meeting on 23 November, which produced the so-called mosi pegawai Mangkunegaran (Mangkunegaran officials' motion), a political statement rejecting the Directorate government. 32 Those who were anti-Directorate were a small group of regency officials directly influenced by the regent. Most of the regency officials

30 'Tentang Direktorioem', pp.1-3
31 See 'Laporan Panitya Rapat Pegawai Negeri Mangkoenegaran 21 Nopember 1945', typescript, Bendel Swapradja 1945, AMN. This conference arose from a special order of the patih. Those who attended it were officials of the kabupaten kota (city regency) of Mangkunegaran. Interview with Sunardjo Pontjorahardjo, 6 June 1979.
32 See 'Laporan Rapat Boepati Wonogiri 23 Nopember 1945', typescript. Bendel Swapradja 1945, AMN. According to KRMT Sanjoto, Sutojo Hardjoreksoko was one of senior officials in the Mangkunegaran and had been trusted by Mangkunegoro VII to govern Wonogiri Ken during the occupation. Interview with Sanjoto, 5 July 1979.
outside the city of Wonogiri supported the movement against the Mangkunegoro which was led by village teachers.33

In the Kasunanan government it was only the high officials of the Kepatihan and the kraton who took part in the movement against the Directorate. Their leader was Drs RMTH Sosrodiningrat, the experienced patih of the Susuhunan. Born on 1 December 1902 in Surakarta, he had received a diploma from the Indological Department of the University of Leiden in 1935. He was appointed patih in 1939 after having been a regent from 1927 to 1932.34 During the occupation, from 1943 to 1944, he had represented Surakarta in the Tyuo Sangi In (Central Advisory Council).35

The political authority of Susuhunan Paku Buwono XII was very weak. Born on 14 April 1925, he had succeeded his father, Paku Buwono XI, on 12 July 1945, as a young man of barely twenty.36 Inexperienced in handling government problems, he was surrounded by conservative high officials, advisers and experts of the kraton government. Some of them were senior pangerans, the sons of Paku Buwono X and close relatives of Paku Buwono XI. A few of them were former high officials of Paku Buwono X. In all matters of policy he depended upon them.37 His advisory committee was called the Paranpara Nata (paranpara - adviser; nata - king) and was led by GPH Hadiwidjojo.38 The advisers who surrounded the Susuhunan, including the Queen Mother (Kanjeng Ratu), strongly influenced the Susuhunan to cling to his

33 Interview with Sanjoto, 6 July 1979.
34 Orang Indonesia, p.102.
35 Almanak Soeara Asia (Soerabaja, 2604 [1944]), pp.36-37.
36 Interview with Darjonegoro, 5 December 1979.
38 Hadiwidjojo was born on 18 November 1888 in Surakarta. He graduated from ELS and HBS (1910-1915), and subsequently worked in the Kepatihan. In 1915-33 he headed the Narpowandowo organization, and in 1916-21 the Surakarta BU branch. Orang Indonesia, pp.419-20. The Paranpara Nata consisted of seven members; two pangerans (sons of Paku Buwono X), and five high officials; Kedaulatan Rakjat, 8 November 1945.
inherited power, so that the nobles would continue to benefit from the status of the ruler.

The political situation inside the kraton since October had been very chaotic. There were two political groups. The first group comprised the supporters of Sosrodiningrat and Kanjeng Ratu, who were in alliance for two historic reasons. Kanjeng Ratu was from the Kepatihan family; while Sosrodiningrat, who had served as a high official during the reign of Paku Buwono XI, was also a close relation of that king. A rival group consisted of nobles who wanted to replace the patih with a less conservative person who could respond positively to the new Republic. This group supported the candidature of KRMT Judonegoro, the regent of Klaten, as patih, and succeeded in having him installed for a short time in February 1946. There was also an attitude of rivalry between the Susuhunan and his younger brother Prince Mangkubumi, who sought to replace the Susuhunan himself in authority. He was dissatisfied with the way the Susuhunan was surrounded by conservative advisers who determined the kraton's very conservative response to the local Republican Government. But his plan was never realized. 39

Mangkunegoro VIII, who succeeded his father in 1944, was also young, having been born on 1 January 1920. He had, however, a wider experience of affairs than the Susuhunan. 40 He was also surrounded by conservative high officials as his advisers, most of them being relatives of Mangkunegoro VII.

The bitter rivalry between the Susuhunan and the Mangkunegoro, which had become institutionalized over the previous 200 years, was another reason that the Directorate government did not run according to plan. Because each ruler opposed it in his own way, the Directorate administered the region of Surakarta without either of them. The role of the rulers and their representatives in the Directorate was in fact only nominal.

39 Interview with Darjonegoro, 5 December 1979; Wirodiningrat, 30 October 1979.

40 Mangkunegoro VIII graduated from ELS (1932), Mulo (1936) and AMS (1939). In 1941 he joined the training programme for Corps Reserve Officers in Bandung. In 1942 he was an official of agrarian affairs. In 1944 he jointed the Peta. Interview with Sanjoto, 7 July 1979; see also Madjalah Merdeka, III, no.26, July 1950, p.9.
On 29 November the Working Committee of the Surakarta KNI sent a letter to the Mangkunegaran government ordering it to recognize the Directorate government. This was the only official answer given to the decisions of the Mangkunegaran meetings of 21 and 23 November.

The central government now intervened in the crisis of the Directorate by forming the Panitia Tatanegara Daerah Istimewa Surakarta (Committee for the State Structure of the Special Region of Surakarta). This committee was set up on 27 November under the chairmanship of Soeprapto, a member of the Surakarta KNI and the head of the local judiciary office. The committee consisted of eight members, four from the Mangkunegaran, three from the Kasunanan and one from the KNI. Its task was to draft a law for the government of Surakarta which was in harmony with democracy. In practice this committee also could not work effectively because the Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran representatives continued to insist that the region of Surakarta be a Special Region with two separate territories unlike the Jogjakarta model.

The formation of this committee nevertheless provided the pretext for the Mangkunegoro to ignore the Surakarta KNI's order of 29 November. This became clear when the patih presented a political statement to the committee on 22 March 1946 (see below), making clear that the Mangkunegoro continued to insist upon a special Region of the Mangkunegaran.

During the period the Panitia Tatanegara was officially charged with resolving the problems of Surakarta regional government the pemuda groups took matters into their own hands. Members of Barisan Banteng and the Hizbullah demonstrated around the kraton of the Kasunanan. At the end of December pemuda groups under the leadership of the Barisan Banteng stuck placards and posters on the walls of the kraton, containing unprecedented attacks on the Susuhunan. Slogans such as 'Guritno [the Susuhunan] and his mother must go and

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41 See 'Soerat Badan Pekerdja KNI Soerakarta 29 Nopember 1945', Bendel Swapradja 1945, AMN.

42 List of names of this committee may be found in 'Laporan Rapat KNID dan Wakil2 Kasoenanan dan Mangkoenegaran 27 Nopember 1945', Bendel Swapradja 1945, AMN.
leave the kraton', and 'they must be searched thoroughly', humiliated the court family. The nobles were terrified to see how the political situation had developed in the city.43

The crisis for the kraton reached a climax in early January 1946. Santoso and Sudijo, militant members of the Barisan Banteng fed up with the obstructionist and anti-Republic stance of the Susuhunan under the leadership of Anwar penetrated into the kraton. Hundreds of people from the pemuda groups surrounded the main gates of the kraton, so that the guards were easily overcome. According to Sudijo at least eleven men entered the kraton itself and seized the Susuhunan, the Kanjeng Ratu and KPH Surjobamidjojo. This action by the Barisan Banteng followed orders from its leader, Dr Muwardi. The kidnappers brought the three distinguished captives to the Susuhunan's villa at Grogolan, about ten km. west of Surakarta city in Kartosura subdistrict. Here the Barisan Banteng leaders pressured the Susuhunan not to continue his plan to form a Special Region of Surakarta.44 The Susuhunan accepted the demands of the Barisan Banteng leaders, although this proved to be purely verbal. Two days later the Barisan Banteng returned the Susuhunan and the other captives to the kraton. During the three days' power vacuum, state authority was in the hands of the patih with the approval of the Susuhunan's advisers.45

The Kanjeng Ratu and Surjohamidjojo (one of the Susuhunan's advisers) had been the strongest influences on the political policies of the Susuhunan, and it was they who had originally designed the kraton's opposition to the Directorate. This appears to be the political background for the Barisan Banteng acting to kidnap them.

Kidnapping continued to be used as an expression of the hostility of the revolutionary social forces towards the Susuhunan's rule. As a continuation of the kidnappings in the Kepatihan office at the end of November 1945 (see above), Suto Sundoro (the chairman of

43 See 'Soeatoe Oelasan Mengenai Perkembangan Swapradja Soerakarta', typescript, pp.1-3, Bendel Swapradja 1945, AMN.
44 Interview with Sudijo, 21 October 1979.
45 Interview with Darjonegoro, 5 December 1979.
Sarekat Pegawai Negeri Surakarta (SPNS) and Prodjosudodo (member of the Directorate) led the seizure of the patih himself, Sosrodiningrat, in February 1946. Suto was a former Kepatihan official and a close friend of Wirodiningrat in the Kepatihan office. However, as chairman of the officials' union, SPNS, he had worked closely with leftists such as Sujono, Dasuki, Djuwardi and Prodjosudodo. Accordingly Suto and Prodjosudodo had the support of most of Surakarta's left-wing leaders. This kidnapping aimed to force the Kepatihan office to accept the leadership of the Surakarta KNI and the Directorate. Beyond this, its ultimate goal was to destroy the Kasunanan government.

Because the Kepatihan office was the fulcrum of the Kasunanan administration, the Susuhunan naturally attempted to retain control of it. The rival group of nobles immediately urged the Susuhunan to instal KRMT Judonegoro, the former regent of Klaten, as new patih. However, the Suto Sundoro group acted again to kidnap this new patih after capturing a few of the Kepatihan guards. In March Purwodiningrat, one of the senior nobles inside the kraton, was installed by the Susuhunan as the successor of Judonegoro. Purwodiningrat too was only a short time in his position. In April Suto Sundoro's group and Barisan Banteng members kidnapped Purwodiningrat. Although the guards and security officials of the Kepatihan office protected the patih, they were not strong enough to withstand the revolutionary forces led by Suto Sundoro. For the last time the Susuhunan installed a new patih, in the form of RMTH Wurjaningrat, a former head of the Surakarta branch of Parindra. In May the central government in Jogjakarta used the local police to arrest Suto Sundoro, Prodjosudodo and the other leaders of the kidnapping actions to put an end to these actions. Thus Wurjaningrat was able to preside over the Kepatihan office without interference from kidnappers. Wurjaningrat was a popular figure in Surakarta, particularly because he had played a prominent role in Parindra and Putera.

46 Interview with Wirodiningrat, 30 October 1979; Darjonegoro, 6 December 1979.

47 Interview with Sumodiningrat, 2 August 1979.

48 This account is based on interviews with Wirodiningrat and Darjonegoro, for whose biographical details see bibliography.
This turbulence in the Kepatihan became known by the local term masa srobotan (the period of kidnapping). This reflected primarily the hostility of revolutionary social forces towards the traditional rulers. Also involved, however, were social conflicts between the rakyat (ordinary people), the priyayi (traditional officials) and the ningrat (the nobles), something manifested in the popular demand that the distinguishing titles of the nobility be dropped and the refusal of common women to continue to become concubines of the priyayi and the nobles. Politically, the chaos in the Kepatihan rapidly diminished the credibility and effectiveness of the Susuhunan's government. The office of the Kepatihan as the central government of the Kasunanan could no longer communicate effectively with the regencies. In practice it could only handle government affairs inside the kraton. Most middle and lower level officials retired from the Kepatihan and moved to the new offices under the authority of the Working Committee of the KNI. The governments of the regencies increasingly took their orders from the Surakarta KNI and ignored those from the Kepatihan office.

While the Kepatihan was still in chaos the situation inside the kraton deteriorated as a result of political pressure from the pemuda group. In the middle of April the Barisan Banteng leaders under Dr. Muwardi met the Susuhunan and forcibly demanded that he hand over his authority to the people. As a direct result of this pressure the Susuhunan issued a proclamation on 30 April:

We proclaim to Our people (the people of Surakarta) that if the abolition of the Special Region of Surakarta Hadiningrat is indeed clearly the wish of the people, and has been established as such by the government of the Indonesian Republic, then we do not object to the surrender of our authority to the central government.

49 Priyayi were traditional officials who typically had no blood relationship with the ruler, although a few of them were related to the Susuhunan (e.g., through marriage). The ningrat were actually descended from the Susuhunan. They possessed darah pangeran (blood of nobles) and had special titles: Bendoro Raden Mas, Gusti Pangeran Haryo, etc.

50 Kedaulatan Rakjat, 4 May 1946. This proclamation also in Merdeka, 3 May 1946, see Anderson, Java, p.359.
The patih, Wurjaningrat, attached an explanatory supplement pointing out that the Susuhunan was fully aware of the democratization process in the newly born Republic. Dr Muwardi, as leader of the Barisan Banteng, 'acknowledged' the Susuhunan's decree.\footnote{Kedaulatan Rakjat, 4 May 1946.}

Apparently the Mangkunegoro put up a longer resistance than the Susuhunan. On 22 March the patih announced the Mangkunegaran policy officially before the Panitia Tatanegara Daerah Istimewa Surakarta. He proposed three points for inclusion in the draft regional government law for Surakarta. Firstly, the Kasunanan and the Mangkunegaran would each have a \textit{Majelis Perwakilan Kerajaan} (Principality Representative Council) which should be elected by the people; secondly, both the \textit{Majelis Perwakilan Kerajaan} and the \textit{Dewan Pemerintah} (Government Board) should be chaired by a person appointed by the rulers; thirdly, the region of Surakarta should continue to consist of two special regions.\footnote{Statement of the patih of the Mangkunegaran to the Panitia Tatanegara dated 22 March 1946. This may be found in Bendel Swapradja 1946, AMN.} This proposal appeared to retain the essence of the old regime rather than to reform according to the Jogjakarta model. In consequence of it, the Surakarta KNI representatives, including Soeprapto, the chairman of the Panitia, refused to hold any further meetings of the Panita.

On 1 May the Mangkunegoro unilaterally announced a new constitutional reform proposal for his government, consisting of six points:

1. The Mangkunegaran was a Special Region within the Republic of Indonesia.
2. The Mangkunegoro as head of this Special Region was installed by the President.
3. The Mangkunegaran had a People's Representative Council which was directly elected by the territory's population.
4. This People's Representative Council had a Working Committee.
5. Court affairs were managed by the Mangkunegoro himself.
6. All regulations of the Mangkunegaran would be adapted to those of the Kasunanan, Paku Alaman and Kasultanan.\footnote{Berita Resoeblik Indonesia, vol.II, no.12-13, 15 May 1946, pp.124-25. The decree of 1 May 1946 and the draft of a new constitution also appears in the fortnightly journal of the Mangkunegaran, Poestoko Warti Pradja Mangkoenegaran, vol.I, no.10, 1 May 1946.}
Both rulers hoped for the protection of the central government against the anti-kraton movements. The Mangkunegoro's declaration was aimed primarily to obtain support from the central government in his efforts to form a Special Region of Mangkunegaran. The central government indeed appeared inclined to support the Susuhunan and the Mangkunegoro if only they could have combined to form a single Special Region of Surakarta on the same basis as the Special Region of Jogjakarta, which appeared to work effectively.

The Minister of the Interior, Dr Sudarsono (of the Socialist Party), now attempted to resolve the problem of the Special Region of Surakarta with a plan for a general election in the Surakarta area. On 17 May the Minister announced that he had formed an electoral committee for the Surakarta region. This committee would plan and carry out a general election in Surakarta. Dr Sudarsono hoped that this plan would provide a forum to settle the question of the special Region of Surakarta. The electoral committee was chaired by Subadio Sastrosatomo (PS) and its members were Sujono (representing the Surakarta KNI), Siswosudarmo (Masyumi), Mr Atmodiningrat, Mr Sumardi, Mr Suwidji and Suhadi (all Surakartans with wide experience of government elsewhere).

Sudarsono was born on 9 May 1911 in Salatiga, Central Java. He graduated from ELS, Mulo, AMS and the Medical Faculty (1938). In 1928-29 he was the chairman of the Indonesia Muda. Orang Indonesia, p.358; in November 1945 he became a member of KNIP and joined the Socialist Party. Ensiklopedia Indonesia, vol.III (Bandung, W. van Hoeve, 1954-56), p.1286.

Subadio Sastrosatomo was born on 26 May 1919 in Pangkalan Bradan, North Sumatra. From 1939 to 1942 he was a student of the Faculty of Medicine and then enrolled in the Faculty of Law, Jakarta. He was a member of the pre-war Indonesia Muda. After independence he became a member of the KNIP and of the Executive Committee of the Socialist Party. See Wilopo 70 Tahun (Jakarta, Gunung Agung, 1979), p.439. Sujono was chairman of the Working Committee of the Surakarta KNI. He had been imprisoned for six years for his connections with the communist uprising of 1926, and after his release had worked in the illegal PKI and Gerindo. See Anderson, Java, p.362. Atmodiningrat graduated from Law School and was the brother-in-law of the Susuhunan. Mr Sumardi was born in 1905 in Surakarta and graduated from Leiden Law Faculty in 1935. He worked in the tax office of the Kepatihan and then in the Surabaya residency. Since 1945 he had been general secretary of the Ministry of Defence; Ensiklopedi Umum (Jogyakarta, Yayasan Kanisius, 1977), p.1056. Mr Suwidji (cont. over page)
The Minister of Interior presumably felt confident that Subadio Sastrosatomo and his colleagues had enough political support to control the implementation of the general election in Surakarta. But Sudarsono's efforts came to naught. The electoral committee could not function effectively. Sujono, who was extremely anti-Swapraja and reflected accurately the attitude of the KNI, boycotted the committee. Sujono attempted to make contact with Dr Muwardi so that they might cooperate to intensify the movements against the rulers. Sujono and Muwardi took a decision to launch a political campaign against the central government for its determination to support the rulers in attaining Daerah Istimewa status. Muwardi, supported by the other leftist groups (PS, PBI, PKI), forwarded a resolution to the central government that the Surakarta electoral committee should consist purely of political representatives.

Although at a national level the PKI, PB and PS were the parties of the Government, expected to support the policies of their leaders in cabinet such as Sjahrir and Amir Sjarifuddin, the left wing in Surakarta was already taking a different line. There the PKI, supported by other leftist groups, seem to have opposed the central government ever since the Persatuan Perjuangan was formed. Among the reasons for this was that the Surakarta leftists, including the PKI, wanted to destroy the Sunan and the Mangkunegoro, and they realized that the central government wanted to save them.

This opposition produced a crisis for Sudarsono's plan, and led to a special meeting between the central government and the Susuhunan and Mangkunegoro on 22 May. The central government was represented by its central figures - Sutan Sjahrir (Prime Minister), Dr Sudarsono (Minister of Interior) and Amir Sjarifuddin (Minister of Defence).

56 was born on 24 June 1910, in Solo, and was educated in HIS, Mulo, AMS and Faculty of Law, Leiden University (graduated 1937). In 1938 he was an advocate in Surabaya and in 1942 was chairman of Perserikatan Kaum Pristen, Solo. See Orang Indonesia, p.297.

57 'Tjatatan Ketika Ingkang SP Sinoehoen dioendang rapat dengen Menteri Mimbitjarakan Keadaan Soerakarta', typescript, Soerakarta, 22 May 1946, Bendel Swapradja 1946, AMN.
The Susuhunan and the Mangkunegoro also attended this session, accompanied by their respective patih, Wurjaningrat (Kasunanan) and Partono Handojonoto (Mangkuregaran).

The meeting of 22 May discussed the political situation in Surakarta in the context of the anti-swapraja movement. There was a special proposal from Wurjaningrat, the so-called 'usul Wurjaningrat'. This consisted of two points: firstly, the civiele lijst (court allowance) from the central government should be given directly to the rulers and not through the Surakarta regional government; secondly, the Special Region of Surakarta should be directly administered by the central government, with the day-to-day government in the hands of a committee. This committee would consist of representatives from officials, the army, 'the people', the Kasunanan and the Mangkunegaran governments. Sjahrir accepted the first point but said he would discuss the second with the Cabinet and the President.

The central government deliberately excluded the anti-swapraja leaders from the meeting of 22 May. In addition, on the night of 23 May, on the order of the Minister of Interior conveyed to the Surakarta police office of Surakarta, Prodjosudodo, Djuwardi, and Ronomarsono were arrested for several days. These were all noted anti-swapraja figures from the Directorate. On the same date four leaders of the Barisan Banteng, Dr Muwardi, Muljadi Djojomartono, Mangkusudijono and Hadisunarto were also arrested. A local newspaper, Indra, attacked the affair of 23 May as 'political imprisonments', but the central government explained that the Minister of Interior's decision aimed to avoid further social conflicts among the people of Surakarta. In the national context the Sjahrir cabinet portrayed


60 Indra, 25 May 1946. Three of these leaders were from the national headquarters and one from the Surakarta branch.

61 Ibid.
the prisoners as a group who supported Tan Malaka's Persatuan Perjuangan against Sjahrir's policy in the negotiations with the Dutch.62

On 28 May a protest demonstration was held by the Barisan Banteng to urge the central government to release its leaders.63 Sudiro, the acting head of the Barisan Banteng, presented an ultimatum to the cabinet that the prisoners had to be released within forty-eight hours. Otherwise he would retire from the organization and would not be responsible for the chaotic situation in Surakarta.64 The army also sought to dissociate itself from the 'political imprisonments'. Sudirman issued a public statement:

In connection with the number of questions put to the Supreme Headquarters of the Indonesian Army concerning the arrests of several leaders which occurred in Solo on the night of 25 May 1946, it is necessary to explain that the army did not take part in any way with this affair. This is given for public clarification.65

Sudiro must have been confident about the effect of his ultimatum, for he issued it in Jogjakarta where he had gone to meet General Sudirman, the Army commander, for informal talks about the prisoners. All Sudiro's efforts finally forced the central government to release the prisoners. The Barisan Banteng leaders were released on 29 May with the special help of the police of Surakarta and Soerjo, the Governor of East Java, who had been given full authority by the government to resolve the crisis in Surakarta, replacing R.P. Suroso.66 Subsequently,


63 Kedaulatan Rakjat, 29 May 1946.


65 Ibid., p.113.

66 Soerjo was appointed acting High Commissioner by the Minister of Interior on 23 May 1946. He was charged as a representative of the central government in Surakarta. Soerjo, who was the governor of East Java and had been closely associated with Bung Tomo in fighting the British in Surabaya in November 1945, was supposed to help the central government to restore the situation in Surakarta. Kedaulatan Rakjat, 25 May 1946. Cf. Anderson, Java, p.363. For Soerjo's role in East Java, see Republik Indonesia: Propinsi Djawa Timur (Djakarta, Kementerian Penerangan Republik Indonesia, 1952), p.11.
on 31 May, the Directorate group (Ronomarsono, Prodjosudodo, Djuwardi) was also released. 67

During the first five months of 1946 Surakarta people distinguished in terms of personalities three urban social forces which made up the anti-swapraja movement. Firstly, the kelompok (group) Dr Muwardi, a group which was strongly supported by the Barisan Banteng. Secondly, the kelompok Sujono, comprising the 'men of the left' many of whom joined Tan Malaka's Persatuan Perjuangan. A few of them were former PKI activists of 1926. Thirdly, the kelompok Sutarto, based in the Panembahan Senopati Division of which Sutarto was the Division commander. Most of Sutarto's key supporters within this division were former members of the AMT. 68 The actions of these three revolutionary elements against the traditional authorities were known as daulat actions. The word daulat derives from the concept of kedaulatan (sovereignty). Surakarta people also refer to the period of the Indonesian Revolution as Jaman Kedaulatan (the period of sovereignty) in which sovereignty was in the hands of the people (rakyat). Benedict Anderson has referred to kedaulatan as the expression of the popular will in this period. He asserts: 'Mendaulat and didaulat came to depict the process of forcible removal from power by "popular" forces.' 69 The daulat operations in this study were forcible removals of traditional roles by revolutionary groups, through actions such as kidnapping, agitation and demonstrations. The daulat phenomenon in Surakarta rural areas expressed itself in such actions as replacing or re-electing the former lurah. The use of the term daulat operation in the study of the Indonesian Revolution may be regarded as a part of the process of social revolution.

Following the release of the Dr Muwardi group and the Directorate group, a new form of regional government was set up.

67 Interview with Hagnjawigati, 9 July 1979; Sudijo, 21 October 1979.
68 Interview with Sumodiningrat, 2 August 1979.
On 1 June Colonel Sutarto, as the Army commander in Surakarta, decreed on his own initiative that a new government was formed, the so-called Dewan Pemerintah Ra'jat dan Tentara Daerah Surakarta (Government Council of the People and Army of the Surakarta Region) or DPRT. This council consisted of representatives of the army, and of political, social, and economic groups.

The formation of the DPRT on purely local authority was a reaction against the inability of the central government to control the political chaos in this region. Sutarto, who had just been promoted from Colonel to Major General, took over the regional government of Surakarta under the authority of the DPRT. This DPRT represented a preliminary step towards Martial Law in the region. Its formation was intended to prevent further political conflicts and to restore security to Surakarta. On 6 June, President Sukarno officially declared a State of Emergency for the region of Surakarta which brought the law of the state once more into harmony with the DPRT. This will be discussed in the following pages.

Sutarto's first decree of 1 June abolished the three distinct kinds of government, Kasunanan, Mangkunegaran and Directorate, and placed their officials under the DPRT. In his second decree of the same day Sutarto appointed the members of the Working Committee of the DPRT, consisting of two military men and four civilians. The members and their responsibilities were: Sudiro mBbah (military) - chairman; Sudiro (Barisan Banteng) - general affairs; Soemodihardjo (PBI) - social affairs; Sujono (KNI) - economic affairs; Djuwardi (Directorate) - pangreh praja affairs; Sutarto Pejek (military

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70 Kedaulatan Rakjat, 3 June 1946. For details see 'Makloemat Kepala Tentara Repoeblik Indonesia Soerakarta', no.1, 1946, Bendel Ketentaraan 1946, AMN.

71 Kedaulatan Rakjat, 3 June 1946


73 Lasjkar, 3 June 1946.

74 Kedaulatan Rakjat, 7 June 1946.

75 This statement may be found in the 'Pendjelasan Makloemat', no.1, 3 June 1946. The same decree formed the Dewan Pemerintah Kabupaten to govern at the level of kabupaten.
The DPRT was dominated by anti-Swapraja men and included no representatives of the Susuhunan or Mangkunegoro. With the formation of DPRT, the anti-Swapraja movement succeeded in forcing the rulers to defer to the local authorities of Surakarta. Sujono's and Dr Muwardi's associates were entirely satisfied with the military role in the DPRT. This was because Major General Sutarto as chairman of the DPRT was inclined towards the leftists of Sujono's group. Moreover, Sutarto had taken no part in the arrests of 23 May, which also made the military role acceptable to the victims of those arrests. Nevertheless the region of Surakarta was still in a state of high political tension. The anti-Swapraja men were also, as a group, generally opposed to Sjahrir's cabinet and policies.

As mentioned above, the DPRT was a preliminary step towards martial law for the region of Surakarta. When the law for a State of Emergency was accepted by the Working Committee of the KNIP, sitting at Purwokerto on 5 June, then the DPRT was legalized by state law. However, the central government anxious to avoid further

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76 See 'Makloemat Kepala Tentara Repoblik Indonesia Soerakarta', no.2, 1 June 1946, Bendel Ketentaraan 1946, AMN. See also Kenang-Kenangan Kota Besar Surakarta 1945-1953 (Surakarta, Djawatan Penerangan Kota Besar Surakarta, 1953), pp.5-6; 'Riwajat Singkat Pemerintahan Kota Besar Surakarta, 1953), p.2. Cf. 'Sedjarah TNI Surakarta Periode II 1948-1950', typescript, Surakarta, 1961, p.1, in the archives collection of the Sedjarah Militer Angkatan Darat Library, Surakarta. According to this source Soemodihardjo was from the PS. The list of Working Committee members also appears in Kedaulatan Rakjat, 3 June 1946, which however wrote Sujono's name as Sujitno. 'Surakarta Hadiningrat dalam baranja api revolusi', compiled by Tukiman Notowardojo et al., (typescript, 10 November 1963, in private collection), as cited by Anderson, Java, p.365 note 79, gives a different list: Sudiro Mbah, in charge of general affairs; Dr Kartono, social affairs; Sujono, political affairs; Domopranoto, pangreh praja affairs; Sutarto Peyek, security. Benedict Anderson compares this with other sources including the newspapers, Merdeka, 3 June 1946 and Bulan Sabit, 8 June 1946. These newspapers however give the same list as Kedaulatan Rakjat. 3 June 1946, and the original source 'Makloemat'. Accordingly, we can conclude that the 'Surakarta Hadiningrat' list is incorrect.

77 Kedaulatan Rakjat, 7 June 1946.
conflict in Surakarta, and aware that the army favoured the state of emergency, had effectively no other choice than to accept the PDRT. On 6 June President Sukarno declared a State of Emergency for the region of Surakarta, which was extended to the whole of Java the following day. 78 Vice-President Muhammad Hatta met the members of the DPRT in Surakarta on the night of 6 June and explained:

A State of Emergency for the region of Surakarta is a preliminary to a State of Emergency which will be extended to the whole of Indonesia...the government of the Army and People in Solo will be adapted in harmony with the Law of the State. 79

As a result of Sukarno's declaration, the DPRT was changed on 10 June into the Dewan Pertahanan Daerah Surakarta (the Regional Defence Council of Surakarta) or DPD. It consisted of three military men, three civilian officials and three representatives of political organizations. 80 Most members of the DPD were former members of the DPRT, with the exception of Sudirman and Siswosudarmo. The authority of the DPD was regulated by the law on the State of Emergency. The civil government of Surakarta, including the Kasunanan and the Mangkunegaran, were placed under the control of the DPD. In practice Major General Sutarto was given full control of the region of Surakarta, as both commander of the Panembahan Senopati Division and chairman of the DPD. Within the DPD his leadership was accepted by the two key groups of Sujono and Dr Muwardi. The DPD was a face-saving formula for the central government, which had had no alternative in the end than to accept and legitimize Sutarto's coup.

The complete loss of power of the Susuhunan and Mungkunegoro was in turn legitimated by a Central Government decree of 15 July 1946.

78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 Major General Sutarto (military), as chairman; Sudiro Mbah (military), first deputy; Sutarto Pejek (military police), second deputy; Sujono (KNI); Sudirman (former resident of Surabaya); Djuwardi (KNI); Sudiro (Barisan Banteng and PNI); Soemodihardjo (PBI); Siswosudarmo (Masyumi); Kedaulatan Rakjat, 11 June 1946.
The territories of the Kasunanan and the Mangkunegaran were temporarily incorporated as one residency in the province of Central Java. Moreover a gemeente bestuur (municipality) was formed for the city of Surakarta.

We can now say that the social and political crisis in the period of the destruction of the Swapraja, from the end of 1945 to July 1946, formed part of a real social revolution in the area of Surakarta. The old system of traditional government was replaced by the new pattern of the Republic. The fall of the system of monarchy involved also the fall of the ningrat (nobles) in the traditional bureaucracy. Many of the conservative priyayi also lost their position as pangreh praja. They were replaced by new social classes such as nationalist politicians, army elites and badan perjuangan leaders.

The replacement of force of the traditional authorities occurred not only in Surakarta urban society but also in the rural areas. In early 1946 there was a process of reorganization of the village administration. This too formed part of the social revolutionary wave during the revolution.

THE DAULAT OPERATION IN THE RURAL AREAS

In the rural areas outside the city of Surakarta, the revolution began in the same way it had in the city, with the collapse of the Japanese authorities. This was followed by the formation of the subdistrict KNIs and the lasykar organizations. In a number of cases there were also village KNIs. In villages which successfully formed KNIs, the KNIs' authority was evidently more important than that of the village headmen. The traditional attitude of waiting for orders from the subdistrict officers and village headmen shifted its focus to the KNIs. Villages which had not yet formed KNIs continued to await orders from the government hierarchy.

The village KNIs, like the central and regional KNIs, acted as legislative bodies. In early 1946 when villagers began to form Dewan Desa (Village Councils), the village KNIs of Surakarta

81 See Penetapan Pemerintah, no.16/SD, 15 July 1946.
gradually changed their names to Dewan Desa. Between February and May 1946, Dewan Desa were formed both in villages which had formerly had KNIs, and those which had not. The Sjahrir government's plan to reorganize the village government administration in all of Java and Madura was set out in the decree of the Minister of Interior dated 4 December 1945. The High Commissioner of Surakarta, on the same date, received a telegram from the Minister of Interior containing two points: firstly, villages should hold elections for village headmen; and secondly, village administrative officials should be replaced. The Minister of Interior envisaged the new village administration as a local government which could carry out the orders of the Republic.

In January and February 1946 the subdistrict KNIs in Surakarta, including those of our sample subdistricts of Kedawung, Jumapoio, Bendosari and Delanggu, began to inform the villages about a plan for the reorganization of village government. In May six villages in the subdistricts of Kedawung and Bendosari held new elections for their village headmen. The candidates for election were former village headmen, other village administrative officials and prominent villagers (e.g., former leaders of Seinendan, Keibodan, and lasykar organizations). The electoral committees consisted of the subdistrict KNIs, the officials of the subdistrict and village administrative officials appointed by the subdistrict KNIs. The electoral system was of two forms. In one the electoral committee nominated the former lurah to be elected directly by the voters. This system was called jago jero (jago - fighting cock; jero - inside). If the former lurah were not elected as new village headmen by the voters, then the electoral committee nominated other candidates from among prominent villagers or officials of the village administration. This second system was called jago jaba (jaba - outside).

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82 Minister's telegram to High Commissioner of Surakarta, 4 December 1945, in the archives collection of the Reksopustoko Library.


In six villages of the subdistricts of Kedawung and Bendosari our informants note that there were only two villages (Pengkok and Kawis, in Kedawung) where the former lurah was rejected as the new headman by the voters. This is because these former lurahs had been very cruel to the villagers during the occupation. They had, for example, collected by force the villagers' property to fulfil Japanese demands. Former lurahs of two other villages of Kedawung subdistrict (Wonokerso and Kedawung) and two villages of the Bendosari subdistrict (Gayam and Toriyo) were re-elected, largely because they had acted to form village KNIs. They had been recognized as lurah perjuangan (struggle headmen) by the villagers.

The reorganization of the structure of village administration also involved the formation of Dewan Desa. The Dewan Desa consisted of five members directly elected by the villagers. The lurah became chairman of the Dewan Desa. This meant that the village headman functioned as both the executive and legislative head in the village government. The function of the Dewan Desa was mainly to assist the village government to manage village affairs. With the establishment of Dewan Desa the villagers could participate in village government.

In the early months of 1946 the formation of the Dewan Desa was limited to certain villages. There were two reasons for this. First not all villages had KNIs, which were able readily to change their names to Dewan Desa; secondly, there was a lack of formal communication between the subdistrict KNIs and the villages. As an illustration, some examples will be shown below. In the subdistrict of Kedawung only five out of ten villages established Dewan Desa. Only two out of eleven villages had Dewan Desa in the subdistrict of Bendosari, six out of sixteen in the subdistrict of Delanggu.

85 Interview with Madijo, 31 August 1979; Prawiroredjo, 11 March 1979; Pawiro Granggang, 27 August 1979.

86 Lurah perjuangan referred to village heads who adapted to the Indonesian Revolution and left the previous traditional pattern. Interview with Martodihardjo, 8 August 1979.

87 Interview with Soekardi, 26 July 1979.

88 Interview with Martodihardjo, 20 August 1979.

89 Interview with Slamet Muljono, 13 August 1979.
and two out of twelve in the subdistrict of Jumapolo. The members of the Dewan Desa in our four subdistricts were mostly local leaders of the lasykar organizations, village school teachers and village officials. There were two kinds of members, the anggota pilihan (elected members), elected by all villagers over eighteen years old and the anggota tunjukan (appointed members) appointed by the lurah. In a number of cases the Dewan Desa was closely associated with the lasykar organizations. For instance, the BBI of Kedawung had its representatives in the Dewan Desa, appointed by the lurah. The Dewan Desa of the Jumapolo subdistrict cooperated with the Barisan Banteng. This association was limited to jointly maintaining the security of the villages and collecting funds.

While the reorganization of village government was taking place, revolutionary villagers were following the anti-Swapraja movements led by urban revolutionaries. On 26 April the pamong praja of Klaten regency under instructions of the Klaten KNI broke off their relations with the Kasunanan government. This decision was apparently affected by the actions of the Surakarta KNI and the Directorate which had refused to work with the Susuhunan and Mangkunegoro governments since November. Moreover the KNI of Klaten, like those of other kabupatens in Surakarta, included the local leaders of badan perjuangan who were firmly against the rulers. The regency officials wanted to reform the structure of local government without reference to the Swapraja. On 29 April, the Working Committee of the Klaten KNI held a meeting of Klaten regency officials who were still confused about breaking off their relations with the Kasunanan. The KNI urged these officials to adapt the Klaten regency government to new conditions rather than continue to support the Susuhunan. The reasons given by the Klaten KNI were that the Swapraja government would resist reforms needed for local government in the new Republic.

90 Interview with Darmanto, 8 October 1979.
91 Interview with Sardjono, 4 August 1979.
92 Interview with Darmanto, 8 October 1979.
93 Kedaulatan Rakjat, 5 May 1946.
The KNI thought that reform could best be achieved by breaking off relations with the Kasunanan. The following day, on 30 April, the Klaten KNI sent a delegation to the Directorate of Surakarta to report the result of its special session. On 1 May, the Klaten KNI held a general meeting for the 'popular masses' (massa rakyat) of the Klaten region. Bodronojo, one of the Delanggu BBI leaders who attended this conference, estimated that there were more than 1,000 people present. The conference proclaimed that the ties of the regency government with the Kasunanan were broken.

Apparently the general meeting of 1 May had a strong impact in encouraging the revolutionary forces of the areas surrounding Klaten city to join the anti-Swapraja movements. The subdistrict of Delanggu, adjacent to the city, participated to the extent of forming a committee of the anti-Swapraja movement. After returning from the general meeting of 1 May, Bodronojo formed an anti-Swapraja committee. On behalf of the BBI he urged the central government to distribute the tanah konversi (conversion land, former land of the western enterprises) to the people, thus showing a difference within the anti-Swapraja movement, where the peasants were mainly concerned about land, and obtaining it from the estates, while the urban revolutionaries wanted to destroy the Swapraja. Bodronojo then met the leaders of the Klaten PKI and went to Jogjakarta to meet the Minister of Agrarian Affairs. The Minister, however, refused his request, saying that the problems of tanah konversi would be regulated by a special law.

A similar anti-Swapraja movement in the rural areas occurred in the subdistrict of Kartosura, one of the areas where the

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95 Ibid., p.94.
96 Interview with Bodronojo, 26 September 1979.
97 Sejarah Perjuangan, p.94; see also Kedaulatan Rakjat, 5 May 1946.
98 Interview with Bodronojo, 26 September 1979. The conversion rights referred particularly to the rights of long lease on land in the principalities. The conversion rights seemed to protect the interests of the plantations. See Encyclopsedie van Nederlandsch-Indie, vol.4, ('s Gravenhage, Martinus Nijhoff, 1921), pp.633-34.
Mangkunegoro had a sugar estate. In May and June 1946, the Kartosura BTI held a series of meetings among the peasants when they demanded the abolition of conversion rights in Surakarta. These meetings also rejected any expansion of the Mangkunegoro sugar estates on this area. Apparently this anti-Swapraja movement was affected by Sudijo and Anwar Santosa, prominent members of the Barisan Banteng who were originally from Kartosura.

Indeed early in 1946 political organizations of Surakarta and Jogjakarta, particularly BTI and PKI, had launched their resolution to abolish hak konversi (conversion rights) on the land of the former Dutch plantation estates in the principalities. Apparently the abolishing of conversion rights was included in the land reform program demanded by the Surakarta BTI congress in January 1946. In the context of land reform planning, the BTI not only gave attention to the problems of abolishing the conversion rights in the principalities but also demanded that all existing land leases outside the principalities between the enterprises and peasants be cancelled. The BTI in Madiun residency was successful in having the planting of estate crops in March cancelled.

A similar development occurred in the subdistrict of Kedawung, Sragen regency. Shortly after the Sragen KNI broke off relations with the Kasunanan on 1 May 1946, Sardjono, chairman of the Kedawung BBI, met Atmosudarmo, chairman of the anti-Swapraja movement of Sragen regency, a teacher, and a close associate of Panudi, a former Peta officer and one of the leaders of the Angkatan Muda Sukawati (Young Generation of Sukawati) or AMS in 1946.

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99 Interview with Sudijo, 31 October 1979; Totosardjono, 8 August 1979.

100 Kementerian Pertanian (ed), Agraria (Djakarta, Pusat Kantor Urusan Tani, n.d.), p.293.

101 Reid, op.cit., p.128.

102 Kedaulatan Rakjat, 5 May 1946.

103 Interview with Sardjono, 4 August 1979.

Atmosudarmo instructed Sardjono to form an anti-Swapraja committee in the subdistrict of Kedawung.

By the middle of May Sardjono had set up the anti-Swapraja committee, which consisted of members of the BBI, the Barisan Banteng and the Kedawung KNI. The committee issued a political statement that the subdistrict of Kedawung was under the Republican Government and not under that of the Kasunanan. The committee also demanded that the central government distribute former land of the western enterprises in Kedawung subdistrict, estimated at about 300 ha.\textsuperscript{105}

In the Mangkunegaran rural areas, the anti-Swapraja movement was also led by teachers. At the end of January 1946 seventeen primary school teachers in the subdistrict of Tawangmangu announced that they were breaking relations with the office of educational affairs of the Mangkunegaran. They gave as a reason that the Mangkunegaran had not increased the salary of primary school teachers and had not paid the salary of teachers during the first months of 1946. This was because in the months after the proclamation the Mangkunegaran government experienced severe budgetary difficulties, as some taxes, such as the market tax and land tax, were held at local government level (e.g., subdistrict or village) to finance the local offices and lasykar organizations.\textsuperscript{106}

The action of these primary school teachers was followed by other teachers in the subdistricts of Karangpandan and Jumapolo. The local Army battalion, under the command of Major Sastrolawu, supported the action of these teachers. The teachers and the local army both made propaganda among the officials of the regency and the subdistricts to reject the Mangkunegaran government. This propaganda had its effect. In early May the officials of Karanganyar regency announced that they had broken off relations with the Mangkunegaran. All subdistricts held mass meetings in which the subdistrict KNIs and

\textsuperscript{105} Interview with Sardjono, 4 August 1979.

\textsuperscript{106} Interview with Sanjoto, 26 June 1979.
badan perjuangan leaders urged the rural masses to refuse the authority of the Mangkunegoro. In Wonogiri regency the teachers and the officials of the health office took a leading role in the movement against the Mangkunegaran. These teachers, for the same reasons as the primary school teachers of Tawangmangu, rejected the authority of the Special Region of Mangkunegaran. On 22 May the officials of the health office announced that they too had broken their relations with the Mangkunegaran.

It is clear that the daulat operation against the traditional governments occurred not only in the urban bureaucracy but also in the rural areas. The urban daulat operation was mainly under the leadership of leftist groups and revolutionary badan perjuangan. In the rural areas the leftist groups (e.g., the BBI) were the most powerful social force opposing the traditional authorities. Both in urban and rural areas the KNI seemed to be a powerful political institution in carrying out the daulat operation to replace or reform the old institutions of the traditional government.

107 Lasjkar, 25 May 1946.
CHAPTER FIVE

RISING SOCIAL TENSIONS

NATIONAL POLITICS, JULY 1946-47

The failure of the Persatuan Perjuangan coup on 3 July 1946 did not end political tensions arising from party and ideological conflicts, group rivalries and the perjuangan versus diplomasi question. These conflicts became even more intense in the months leading up to the Madiun rebellion in September 1948, as will be seen in the following chapters.

As a result of the failure of the coup of 3 July, the Tan Malaka group lost the power which it had possessed during the first months of 1946. Most of the top leaders of the Persatuan Perjuangan, including Muhammad Yamin and Tan Malaka himself, were in detention at least until the end of 1947. Following the suppression of the coup, Sukarno decided that a more widely representative Government was necessary. On 2 October 1946 the third Sjahir cabinet was announced, after President Sukarno had invited the former Prime Minister to form a new parliamentary cabinet. According to Vice-President Hatta, the third Sjahir cabinet was prepared to continue negotiations with the Dutch, which were due to recommence in October 1946.

Sukarno's decree of 29 December called for increasing the membership of the KNI from 200 to 514, the government hoping that this expended KNIP would provide adequate support for the Linggajati Agreement. Of the 314 new members, ninety were to represent the political parties, forty the peasantry, forty Labour, seventy-eight the regions outside Java and Madura, and five ethnic minorities; the

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1 George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, p.192.
2 Muhammad Yamin, Sapta Darma, pp.74-76.
3 Muhammad Hatta, Memoir, p.492.
remaining 121 members were appointed on the basis of general social prominence or as representatives of minor parties and irregular armed organizations.\(^4\) In this new KNIP, the Sayap Kiri (left wing), a coalition of Marxist organizations including the Socialist Party, PESINDO, the Labour Party, and the PKI and its affiliated organizations, were much stronger than in the 1946 KNIP. The most important reason for this change was that Sukarno had to save diplomasi. For this purpose he increased the representation of the Sayap Kiri, which was then the main pro-government force and which could also claim to speak more clearly for the people. The extent of this increase is as follows: Socialist Party and PESINDO (Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia) from thirty-five to thirty-five; PKI, from two to thirty-five; Labour Party, from six to thirty-five; Workers, from nil to forty; Peasants, from nil to forty.\(^5\)

Sjahrir's own position in his third cabinet was much weaker. His party, the PS, occupied only four posts, including his own position as Prime Minister. Most of the Masyumi ministers, however, were from the progressive wing of the party, and they were openly supportive of Sjahrir.\(^6\) They could thus be depended upon to back Sjahrir's diplomasi policy. Among the thirty-one ministers was Wikana, who represented the PESINDO as Minister of State. Although he had not yet openly professed his support for communism, his position seemed to represent the PKI.\(^7\) The PKI was weak in Sjahrir's cabinet, but it was strong in the KNIP and the Communist-Socialist alliance,

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5 Kahin, op.cit., p.291; Reid, op.cit., p.97. PESINDO was under the auspices of the Socialist Party. PESINDO was formed at the national Pemuda congress in Jogjakarta on 10-11 November 1945 and consisted of seven Pemuda organizations with mainly educated Pemuda membership. The seven organizations were: API (Angkatan Pemuda Indonesia); PRI (Pemuda Republik Indonesia); AMRI (Angkatan Muda Republik Indonesia); Angkatan Muda Kereta Api; Angkatan Muda PTT; Angkatan Muda Gas Listrik; see Kedaulatan Rakjat, 16 November 1945.

6 Kahin, op.cit., p.195.

7 Ibid.
the Sayap Kiri, obtained seventeen of the forty-seven seats in the
new Working Committee of the KNIP. 8

The leadership of the Masyumi and PNI continued to oppose
the cabinet and its diplomasi policy, largely because neither party
could regard the eleven members they jointly had in the cabinet as
truly representative. 9 The Masyumi as a party was not represented
in the cabinet, and those Masyumi members who participated in it did
so only as individuals, not responsible to the party. Thus only
in a limited sense could the Cabinet be designated as a 'coalition
cabinet'.

The policy of the third Sjahrir cabinet, culminating in the
Linggajati Agreement of November 1946, 10 sharply divided society
between supporters and opponents of cabinet policies. The Linggajati
Agreement, which was initialled on 15 November 1946 and signed on
25 March 1947, recognized de facto Republican authority only over
Java, Madura and Sumatra. 11 The Republic and the Netherlands agreed
to establish by 1 January 1949 a federal United States of Indonesia,
which would consist of the Republic, Borneo and Eastern Indonesia.

The Linggajati Agreement naturally became the major political
issue for the political parties. Opinions both for and against were
intense. The group in favour consisted of the Socialist Party, PKI,
PBI, the Indonesian Christian Party, the Catholic Party, PESINDO,
BTI, Sobsi, and Lasykar Rakyat. 12 The Marxist parties in this group,

8 Donald Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951-1953
9 Reid, op.cit., p.96.
10 The Linggajati Agreement followed a series of serious meetings
between the Dutch and the Republic. Both the Dutch government
and the Sjahrir government had carefully considered the
meaning and repercussions of the agreement. For an account
of this see C. Smit, Het Akkoord van Linggadjati (Amsterdam,
11 An excellent analysis of this agreement is in Charles Wolf, Jr,
The Indonesian Story (New York, The John Day Company, 1948),
pp.43-44.
12 A.H. Nasution, Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia, vol.4
and other organizations such as the Lasykar Rakyat and GRI (Gerakan Rahasia Indonesia - the Indonesian Secret Movement), had coalesced into the Sayap Kiri in December 1946. This coalition argued that the Linggajati Agreement could prevent Dutch aggression and give Indonesia an opportunity to build new forces to continue the struggle. Moreover, the Republic still had many difficulties to overcome in leadership, defence, and economy.

On the other hand the groups opposing Linggajati, the PNI, Masyumi, Barisan Banteng, BPRI and the remaining Tan Malaka supporters and other small organizations such as Angkatan Muda Guru (Young Generation of Teachers) and Wanita Rakyat (Women of the People), formed the Benteng Republik (Republican Fortress) on 13 December 1946. They argued that this agreement did not guarantee a sovereign government of the Indonesian Republic either politically or economically. General Sudirman, the Army Commander, continued to emphasize the need for armed struggle and dissociated himself from diplomasi.

Because Sjahrir had become too compromised through diplomasi, the Sayap Kiri could not maintain its united support for his third cabinet. On 26 June 1947 several leaders of the Sayap Kiri who were ministers of the Sjahrir cabinet, such as Amir Sjarifuddin (Socialist Party), Setiadjit (Labour Party), Abdul Madjid (Socialist Party), and Wikana (PESINDO), withdrew their support from Sjahrir. Under strong pressure from the Dutch to produce counterproposals, Sjahrir had accepted on 8 June the principle of an interim government in which the Netherlands would exercise sovereignty. On 20 June he had even agreed to the de jure 'special position' of the Dutch Crown's representatives in such a government, something which

14 For details, see A.H. Nasution, Sekitar, vol.4, pp.231-32.
15 Ibid., pp.233-38.
16 Reid, op.cit., p.96.
17 For details on this discussion, see Reid, op.cit., pp.98-99; Kahin, op.cit., pp.207-08.
would give the Netherlands control over Indonesia's foreign relations. These concessions caused Sjahrrir's own Socialist Party to turn against him. Cabinet members from the Socialist Party, PNI, Masyumi and PKI withdrew their support from Sjahrrir. On 27 June Sjahrrir thus handed his resignation to President Sukarno.

On 30 June, a meeting was held between President Sukarno and the leaders of Masyumi, PNI, the Social Party and Labour Party to discuss the formation of a coalition cabinet. Masyumi demanded the Prime Ministership and the Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Internal Affairs, which caused the other parties to refuse to enter a coalition dominated by the Masyumi. Eventually, on 3 July, Amir Sjarifuddin, one of the leaders of the Sayap Kiri, was able to form a cabinet based on support by three other large parties and a small, newly emerged party which had split off from the Masyumi, the Partai Serikat Islam Indonesia (Islamic Union Party of Indonesia or PSSI). Amir Sjarifuddin himself was to hold the posts of Prime Minister and Minister of Defence.

In Amir Sjarifuddin's cabinet communists or crypto-communist allies controlled about thirteen of the thirty-four seats, including Ministries of State. Amir Sjarifuddin, as Minister of Defence both in Sjahrrir's third cabinet and in his own, had an important role in bringing elements of communist ideology into both the regular army and the Badan Perjuangan. The PEPOLIT (Pendidikan Politik Tentara - Political Education for the Army) took root in the majority of divisions during the last months of 1947. Major General Djokosujono, a pro-PKI former PESINDO activist, as head of PEPOLIT staff coordinated the implementation of PEPOLIT in the provinces. Djokosujono had the full trust of the Minister of Defence and was also head of the Central Lasykar Board (Dewan Kelasykaran Pusat). After the President's decree of 3 June 1947 implementing the government policy of integrating the Badan Perjuangan into the TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia - Indonesian National Army), Djokosujono had a further role as a member

18 Kahin, op.cit., p.207; Charles Wolf, Jr, op.cit., p.122.
of the central leadership of the TNI. 20

In Surakarta, PEPOLIT was under the control of Wikana, the Minister of State who was appointed Military Governor of Surakarta by the Minister of Defence (see below p.141) in August 1947. In practice the implementation of PEPOLIT in this region was in the hands of Lieutenant-Colonel Samsudin, one of the senior officers in the Senopati Division. Samsudin had been a member of the underground movement during the Japanese occupation, and was a PESINDO activist in early 1946. 21

The PEPOLIT contained the essence of Marxist ideology, including the nature of the Indonesian proletariat, the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle, military defence, military discipline, and mass organization. While the communists introduced Marxist ideology into the army and the Badan Perjuangan through PEPOLIT, 'Marx House', a political training centre established in Padokan, Jogjakarta, provided a training in Marxist ideology for the cadres of the left political parties and the labour organizations. By April 1947 this had produced 400 cadres. 22

Two lasykar organizations, the Hizbullah and the Barisan Banteng, were strongly opposed to the PEPOLIT. This was because PESINDO, the main support of PEPOLIT, was against Japanese-sponsored organizations such as Hizbullah and Barisan Banteng had originally been. Moreover, the Hizbullah, with its Islamic ideology, was fundamentally opposed to the Marxist content of PEPOLIT. Apparently the Barisan Banteng, which was inclined to the PNI, also accepted the PNI's criticism of FEPOLIT and the TNI Masyarakat (Social TNI). The PNI feared that the body of the army would become dominated by the left stream rather than comprising all popular forces so that fighting democracy would be achieved. 23 The personal conflict which developed between Dr Muwardi, the Barisan Banteng leader, and Wikana was partly

21 Interview with Sastrolawu, 13 October 1979.
23 Mangunsarkoro, one of the leaders of PNI, had presented this criticism in the session of KNIP in November 1947. A.H. Nasution, Sekitar, vol.6, pp.94-96.
based on the above factors. In a broader sense PEPOLIT gave rise to group rivalries, gang fights between battalions and political tensions among the leaders of political parties.

GOVERNMENT CHANGES AFTER THE FALL OF THE TRADITIONAL RULERS

The daulat operation against traditional rule in Surakarta was completed in July 1946. With the Government Decree (Penetapan Pemerintah) of 15 July 1946 the residency government of Surakarta formally commenced. As mentioned above, this determined that the territories of the Susuhunan and the Mangkunegoro would temporarily become a residency and part of the province of Central Java. The decree aimed to prevent further social and political tensions in the region of Surakarta.

On 18 July President Sukarno inaugurated Iskaq Tjokroadisuryo as the first Resident of Surakarta region on the strength of his revolutionary background. Iskaq, like Sukarno, had been a member of the Board of Leaders of the pre-war PNI (1927-31). He had been very active in the Bandung Study Club under the leadership of Sukarno and was thus an old friend of Sukarno and of leaders of the PNI such as Mr Sartono, Dr Budiarto, Dr Samsi and Mr Sunario. During the Japanese occupation Iskaq had been a high official in the Japanese administration of Banyumas and in the early revolution he had successfully taken the Japanese authority there into his hands. Iskaq had therefore been a leading figure in Banyumas since the beginning of the revolution. Sudiro, who had been a member of the DPRT and the DPD of Surakarta, was appointed Vice-Resident and inaugurated by Sukarno personally.

For details on this point see below.

This decree was popularly called the Penetapan Pemerintah 16/SD. It may be found in Bendel Swapradja 1946, AMN.

Bendel Swapradja 1946, AMN.

Abu Hanifah, Tales of a Revolution (Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1972), pp.77-78; see also Ahmad Subarjo Djjoyoadisuryo, Kesadaran Nasional: Otobiografi (Jakarta, Gunung Agung, 1978), pp.175-76.

on the same day as Iskaq. Iskaq and Sudiro were expected to support the policy of Sukarno's government rather than the oppositionist groups because both had been members of Sukarno's PNI. They could rely on the full political support of the local Barisan Banteng and PNI. The Barisan Banteng had previously been allied with Sutarto and the Surakarta leftists against the Republican Government's effort to form the swapraja. However, it was now firmly aligned with the central government, having supported the leftists only in their move to overthrow the traditional rulers. As far as the Barisan Banteng leaders were concerned, the decree of 15 July had ended the authority of the Susuhunan and the Mangkunegoro, thus closing that issue. The appointment of Sudiro as Vice-Resident cemented the relationship between the Barisan Banteng and the Government. In the eyes of Sukarno, this power base should have been sufficient to withstand the oppositionist element led by Sutarto, which was based chiefly on the local army unit and on the support of Dasuki's leftists. Dasuki, however, represented a force not to be underestimated, for it was the leftists who dominated the Surakarta KNI and had led the anti-swapraja movement since the end of 1945.

Colonel Sutarto, who had participated directly in the kidnapping of Sjahrir on 26 June, was becoming something of a local strong man in the Surakarta region. He still held his earlier posts both as commander of the Senopati Division and as chairman of the DPD Regional Defence Board. His intention was to accelerate the process of democratization in this formerly traditional region, using the DPD to realize his plan to form the Badan Perwakilan Rakyat (People's Representative Council) or BPR for the region. This was in apparent alignment with the Government policy of early 1946, which recommended the formation of BPR both at national and regional levels. In accordance with this policy, the Central Java Government, along with other provinces, decided to set up BPR at residency and regency levels. Shortly after the inauguration of Iskaq and Sudiro,

29 Bendel Swapradja 1946, AMN.

a series of meetings was held between Sutarto, the DPD members and the political party leaders in order to prepare for the formation of the Surakarta BPR. With the establishment of the Surakarta residency, they argued, political parties and Badan Perjuangan had to be involved in local government through both executive and legislative bodies. The DPD, as the body of regional defence, saw itself as being responsible for the local BPR. By 24 July it had already set up the Surakarta residency BPR with seventy-five members. Most members were chosen by the political parties, and the remainder were appointed by the chairman of the DPD. Masyumi was represented by twelve members, PBI by nine members, PNI by seven, PKI four, the Christian Party two, the Cartholic Party two and Partai Rakyat (People's Party), one. The lasykar organizations had nine members. There were fourteen members representing the six kabupatens and the Surakarta municipality. These fourteen were appointed by the DPD. There were also ten other members who were appointed by the DPD, to represent minority groups and the army.

This BPR acted as a legislative body—replacing the former Surakarta KNI. With the rise of the BPR, the authority of the resident was restricted by the power of political parties. The resident would now have to carry out the regional civil government in conjunction with the BPR. In civil defence the DPD itself was more powerful than either the resident or the BPR. It appeared, therefore, that Sutarto could control both the resident and the BPR. At the same time, following the example of the residency BPR, the regencies also formed regency BPR. The members of the regency BPR came ordinarily from three groups—the political parties, the Badan Perjuangan and local leading figures.

For six months, from July to December 1946, the Surakarta BPR held a series of sessions to discuss the local political situation, especially the movement against the traditional rulers, the position

31 Kedaulatan Rakjat, 30 July 1946.
32 Ibid. Interview with Sunarto Kusumodirdjo, 1 August 1979.
33 Kedaulatan Rakjat, 30 July 1946.
of Susuhunan and Mangkunegoro officials in the Republican Government, and various local Surakarta taxes such as the market, industrial and land taxes. The residency of Surakarta had enormous problems. Former officials of the Susuhunan and the Mangkunegoro were still at their posts. Only a few of them had started to move into the residency offices. Until the end of 1946 there were about 1,800 officials of the Kasunanan and 900 of the Mangkunegaran still functioning in their former offices. The main cause for this situation was that the residency government was not prepared to take over the former offices of the Kasunanan and the Mangkunegaran. Moreover, the residency government still faced the complex problem of how to deal with traditional Javanese ranks in adapting to the regulations of the Republican Government. These factors impeded the integration of these officials into the new bureaucracy of the Republic. All of the officials were paid by the Republican Government. For instance the Republic subsidized the Mangkunegaran to the extent of 300,000 rupiahs in 1947, still considerably less than the Mangkunegaran's request for 840,000 rupiahs.

At the same time, both rulers found their independent incomes shrinking. Since May 1946 their sugar plantation enterprises had been nationalized by the Republic, along with former Dutch enterprises and placed under the control of the Badan Penyelenggara Perusahaan Gula Negara (Board of Management of State Sugar Enterprises) or BPPGN, the new owner of all sugar plantations. Moreover the land tax and most other taxes became the government income of the residency. In 1947 the remaining enterprises of the Susuhunan and

34 Interview with KRMT Sanjoto, 6 July 1979; KRT Darjonegoro 29, 31 December 1979.

35 See Mangkunegoro VIII's letter to the Minister of Internal Affairs, 17 March 1947, Bendel Swapradja 1947, AMN.

36 The BPPGN was formed on 25 May 1946, in accordance with directives set down in Government Regulation No.3, 21 May 1946. For details see Gula, I, no.1, 17 November 1946.

37 Interview with KRMT Sanjoto, 6 July 1979.
Mangkunegoro were nationalized by the Republic and coordinated by Perusahaan Nasional Surakarta (Surakarta National Enterprise) or PNS.\textsuperscript{38}

Therefore the rulers lost not only their political authority but also most of their incomes. For several months neither ruler could pay the salaries of those officials who still served in their former offices. This created discontent on the part of these officials. These financial difficulties were one of the important reasons why in 1947 most of the remaining officials of the Susuhunan and the Mangkunegoro left their former posts and joined the residency government. The few who remained loyal to the rulers were those officials who continued to believe in the rebirth of the Swapraja in Surakarta.

The residency of Surakarta consisted of six kabupatens, including a new one called Sukoharjo,\textsuperscript{39} and the municipality of Surakarta. The BPR was the residency-wide legislative body, assisting the executive body headed by the resident. Through its five sections the BPR shared in facing the various problems of the Surakarta government. The five sections were concerned with government and political affairs, security and defence, education and health, agriculture and 'conversion land', and economic affairs.\textsuperscript{40}

Even after the Surakarta BPR was set up, however, real power still lay in the hands of the DPD chief and Division commander.

\textsuperscript{38} Gula, I, no.13, 17 August 1947, pp.199-201. Established by Peraturan Pemerintah No.9, 1947, the PNS supervised the plantations that had been the Susuhunan's (Manisharjo - sugar; Ampel - tea, coffee, rubber; Karanggeneng - jute; Tegalgondo - tobacco) and the Mangkunagoro's (Tasikmadu - sugar; Tjolomadu - sugar; Mojogedang - jute; Kerjogadungan - coffee) and also managed all former Dutch plantation enterprises in Surakarta.

\textsuperscript{39} Sukoharjo was formerly one of the districts of the kabupaten kota Mangkunegaran. In early 1946 it became a regency. See DPRD,\textit{Pantja Warsa Daerah Swatantra Sukohardjo 1950-1955} (Sukohardjo, DPRD Kabupaten Sukohardjo, 1955), p.66.

\textsuperscript{40} Penerangan Rakjat, no.67, 4 November 1947; no.69, 6 November 1947; no.75, 15 November 1947.
Because of local and national tensions, and the state of relations between the Dutch and the Republic, the role of both the Resident and the BPR continued to be regarded as less important than those of the DPD and the military government.

The municipality of Surakarta replaced the two former kabupaten kota (city regencies), the kabupaten kota Kasunanan and the kabupaten kota Mangkunegaran. The administrative integration of these two regencies marked the end of the governmental authority of the Susuhunan and Mangkunegoro within the city. The municipality was headed by a mayor (walikota), with the same status as a regent. The first mayor was R. Sjamsuridjal, the mayor of Bandung early in the revolution. The central government hoped that Sjamsuridjal's reputation as the fiery mayor of Bandung would enable him to cope with the social and political conflicts of Surakarta. He was inaugurated on 1 November 1946 by the resident of Surakarta. Sjamsuridjal had been a youth movement activist during colonial times, and after August of 1945, as revolutionary leader in Bandung, he was closely associated with Colonel Nasution, first commander of the Siliwangi Division. Sjamsuridjal began his term of office determined to create a changed society in Surakarta. In his inaugural speech, he stated:

The society of Surakarta, which has been for many years under the influence and the authority of the colonial system, has to be transformed into a democratic society.

41 Bendel Swapradja 1946, AMN.
42 Sjamsuridjal was born on 11 October 1903 in Karanganyar, Central Java. In 1925 he graduated from Law School. In 1924 he was the Chairman of the Jong Java, and in 1925 of the Jong Islamieten Bond. In 1942 he worked in the office of the Bandung law court. See 45 Tahun Sumpah Pemuda (Jakarta, Yayasan Gedung-Gedung Bersejarah Jakarta, 1974), p.354.
Trouble surfaced in Surakarta when local PKI leaders became dissatisfied with having Iskaq and Sudiro as the top officials of Surakarta, seeing them as too inclined to back Sukarno's government in Jogjakarta. The three key PKI leaders were Ahmad Dasuki (former member of the Directorate and a pre-war communist prisoner at Digul), Djuwardi (member of the former Directorate and Surakarta KNI and of the DPD), and Sujono (member of the former Surakarta KNI and of the DPD). Sujono and Djuwardi planned to replace Iskaq and Sudiro with PKI men, and thereby gain control of the executive. This had to be done by military means, since as shown above the Surakarta PKI had more representatives in the DPD than other organizations, whereas in the BPR, the PKI was given only four seats against twelve, seven and nine respectively held by the Masyumi, PNI and PBI. Nevertheless, the leftist coalition consisting mainly of the PKI and PBI still held a strong position in the BPR.

On 9 November 1946 the PKI leaders in Surakarta used their supporters in an army unit of the Senopati Division to kidnap both Iskaq and Sudiro. According to the Barisan Banteng's sources, the two men were held in a building in the city, guarded by a few soldiers. On the same day, Ahmad Dasuki took over as Vice-Resident and Sodjas, a PKI man who was a close friend of Amir Sjariffudin, began to act as Resident.

Popular reaction to the kidnapping came mainly from the Barisan Banteng leaders. A few days after the kidnapping they demanded that the commander of the Senopati Division help to release Iskaq and Sudiro. When they were finally released in the middle of November, however, they had lost their positions as Resident and Vice-Resident respectively. On 6 December the central government reacted by appointing Sutardjo Kartohadikusumo, governor of the province of Central Java, to act also as Resident of Surakarta, replacing both Sodjas and Ahmad Dasuki. Sodjas was moved to the office of the Ministry of State by Amir Sjarifuddin, and Ahmad Dasuki returned to his former role as member of the BPR.

45 Interviews with Sunarto Kusumodirdjo, 2 August 1979; Sastrolawu, 13 October 1979.

46 Kenang-Kenangan Kota Besar Surakarta, p.7.
During the short term in office enjoyed by Sodjas and Ahmad Dasuki, the residency government was in the hands of those two men and of the Executive Board of the Surakarta BPR, consisting of five members, representing PNI, Socialist Party, PBI, Masyumi and the pemuda group respectively. One of the major programs of Ahmad Dasuki's period in office was to accelerate the transfer of Susuhunan and Mangkunegoro officials, to bring them under the auspices of the residency government. However, his period of office was too short to achieve all that he had hoped for here.

For six months, the Sutardjo government seemed relatively successful in normalizing the residency government. The Surakarta PKI group, as well as leftists like Amir Sjarifuddin at the national level, were reluctant to oppose the Sutardjo government, apparently because of Sutardjo's leading role in the nationalist movement. However, local PKI men remained determined to hold Surakarta in their hands. Because Sutardjo was required to devote all his time to governing the province of Central Java, however, he was withdrawn from his position as acting Resident of Surakarta in the middle of July 1947. Sudiro, who was still backed by the Barisan Banteng and was the most influential figure in the DPD, was then again entrusted by the Central Government with the administration of Surakarta as Resident.

Different Dutch and Republican interpretations of the Linggajati Agreement of 25 March 1947 caused relations between them to deteriorate rapidly, and this finally resulted in the Dutch beginning their

47 Ibid., pp.6-7.

48 Sutardjo was born in 1892 in Blora, Central Java. He graduated from ELS (1907) and OSVIA (1911). From 1912-13 he was an official of Blora regency. From 1936 to 1938 he tried to push his famous petition for greater Indies autonomy through the Volksraad. See Orang Indonesia jang terkemoeka di Djawa, p.48.

49 For discussions of the Dutch-Republican crisis from March to July 1947, see C. Smit, De Indonesische Quaestie (Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1952), pp.124-38.
first aggression against the Republic on 21 July. Dutch targets included many of the major cities of the Republic in Java and Sumatra. From their base in Semarang, the Dutch launched attacks against the cities of Central Java, including Surakarta, whose airport of Panasan was attacked by the Dutch air force on 21 July. The Senopati Division and other Republican troops concentrated their defence around Salatiga and Tengaran and successfully resisted the southward Dutch movement. The Dutch troops had still not occupied the city of Surakarta when a cease-fire was achieved on 4 August 1947. 

The regional government of Surakarta responded to the Dutch attack by attempting to strengthen both civil and military defence. Sutarto's chairmanship of the DPD was terminated so that he could concentrate his efforts on his Division, and he and the BPR agreed to place the chairmanship of the DPD in the hands of Sudiro, regarded as a strong man when it came to organizing civil defence, because he was fully supported by the Barisan Banteng. Moreover, he was backed by President Sukarno, who had been closely associated with Sudiro in the Barisan Pelopor.

The function of Surakarta in regional defence strategy was to screen the Republican Government in Jogjakarta from Dutch attacks. This became the justification for the Minister of Defence's decision to include the region of Surakarta as a special military administrative authority - the so-called Daerah Militer Istimewa (Special Military Region) or DMI. Politically, however, the formation of the Surakarta DMI provided an opportunity for Amir Sjarifuddin as Minister of Defence to get his own man into power in Surakarta. The DMI of


52 There were three DMIs in Java: The DMI of Jogjakarta, consisting of Jogjakarta, Kedu, Banyumas and Pekalongan; the DMI of Surakarta consisting of Surakarta, Madiun, Bojonegoro, Semarang and Pati; the DMI of East Java consisting of Surabaya, Kediri and Malang. Interview with Sunarto Kusumodirdjo, 1 August 1979.
Surakarta was inaugurated by Amir Sjarifuddin on 22 August. He personally appointed Wikana, a non-military PESINDO leader and the Minister of State for Youth in Amir's cabinet, as the first Military Governor of the Surakarta DMI. Wikana had been a member of the underground PKI, at least since his days in the left-wing pemuda group associated with the Asrama Indonesia Merdeka (Dormitory for Free Indonesia) of 1944-45 in Jakarta.

In terms of the power struggle, Amir's policy seems to have been to seek supporters in the army and the badan perjuangan, who could stand up to such opponents of his as PNI and Masyumi. As will appear below, the conflicts between Dr Muwardi and Wikana were based on the political opposition between Amir's leftist group and their antagonists.

Wikana as military governor was assisted by a fifteen-man staf pembantu gubernur militer (staff assisting the military governor). Eight of the staff members were officers of the Senopati Division, including Major General Sutarto, the Division commander. Three were members of the PNI, including Sudiro, the resident of Surakarta and head of the DPD. Two nobles from the Kasunanan and two from the Kangkunegaran were appointed by Wikana. In addition, Wikana had an advisory board which consisted of four members, including Dr Muwardi and Sjamsuridjal, the walikota of Surakarta city.

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54 Penetapan Pemerintah, No.559/A/I, 20 August 1947.

55 Wikana had in fact headed the Asrama Indonesia Merdeka, intended to 'prepare students for the task of national leadership, in line with the Japanese promise of Indonesian independence in the future.' J.M. van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia: Its History, Program and Tactics (Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press, 1965), pp.308-09.

56 Kusumojadi and Mangkubumi were from the Kasunanan, but neither was among the conservative senior pangerans who had resisted the abolishing of Swapraja. Similarly, Surjosulardjo and Surjosumarno were from the Mangkunegaran, but not from the Mangkunegoro's clique. Interview with KRT Darjonegoro, 7 October 1979.
The appointment of Wikana as military governor raised protests from the PNI and the Masyumi on the grounds that Wikana was not a military man and was a militant PESINDO leftist. The rise of Wikana to prominence in Surakarta particularly angered the leaders of the Barisan Banteng, and Dr Muwardi was far from satisfied with his position as Wikana's adviser. This conflict became more intense when Wikana became the coordinator of PEPOLIT in Surakarta. As mentioned above, PEPOLIT was a political cause designed by the leaders of the Sayap Kiri and was largely based on Marxist ideology. The conflict between Dr Muwardi and Wikana climaxed with the resignation of Muwardi as a member of the advisory board in September 1947.

On 1 October, Wikana sent a letter to the Prime Minister explaining Muwardi's resignation:

When the staff and advisory board of the military governor made a tour, Dr Muwardi was also invited to join it, but he gave no answer. When one of the staff assisting the governor asked him about this matter in a friendly way, we only got the impression that he was not satisfied with his position as adviser. From the resident himself (Sudiro) the military governor received a report that the action of the leaders of the Barisan Banteng was less than satisfactory.58

When Sudiro received a copy of Wikana's letter he was very angry with Wikana, because he had given no such report as described in the letter. He wrote to Wikana on 8 October 1947 protesting:

It never occurred to me to give a report about Dr Muwardi and still less did I report to you that the actions of the leaders of the Barisan Banteng were less than satisfactory.59

We can trace the political tensions between the leaders of the Barisan Banteng and Wikana back to PESINDO's hostility to all

57 The PNI's protest was presented in the meetings of the Working Committee of KNI in November 1947. A.H. Nasution, Sekitar, vol.6, pp.94-96.

58 Wikana to the Prime Minister, 1 October 1947, no.122/10/U. This may be found in the Bendel Ketentaraan 1947, AMN.

59 Resident of Surakarta to Military governor of Surakarta, 8 October 1947, no.529 Rahasia, Bendel Ketentaraan 1947, AMN.
Japanese-sponsored organizations, including Barisan Banteng. When earlier the local-level Marxists had been able to cooperate with Barisan Banteng in the anti-Swapraja movement of 1946, the attempts of national-level Marxists to obtain control of Surakarta through Wikana greatly increased the tension.

The Surakarta region under the military administration of the DMI was organized as part of a strategic defence to protect the Republican capital of Jogjakarta from Dutch attack. Since this defence was to involve all pro-Republican forces, Wikana shared his authority with other leaders in the DMI, Sutarto heading the Battle Strategy section, Sudiro the Civil Defence section, Sudibjo the Equipment section, and Sumarto the Security section.60

Wikana had in mind mobilizing the people as a whole for defence. He established a section of the military government called Penerangan Pertahanan Total (Total Defence Information) or PPT. In November 1947 the PPT began to tour the region, conducting meetings for 'the officials and the people' of the regencies and subdistricts. These meetings were intended to raise the popular spirit of struggle against the Dutch, through performing sandiwara and adaptations of Javanese traditional drama.61 For instance, one play presented was called Jaman Merdika (The era of freedom), in which actors portrayed Indonesians with enough spirit to defeat the Dutch. Jaman Merdika represented a period of struggle when everybody had to participate to achieve independence.62 In addition to this the people had to be made more 'aware' of defence (penginsyapan pertahanan).63 Thus the DMI

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61 Penerangan Rakjat, no.79, 20 November 1947; no.86, 28 November 1947; no.88, 6 December 1947.

62 In the case of the subdistrict of Kedawung the actors consisted of five men. Their dialogue referred to both Indonesian and Javanese. They dressed in kain sarung, one of the Javanese dress fashions. Interview with Soekardi, 8 July 1979.

63 Apakah jang disebut Perang Total (Surakarta, 1947).
military government, in its efforts to resist Dutch aggression, sought to develop a concept of people's war (perang rakyat) in which the people assisted the army.

After the fall of the traditional rulers the people could participate, at least through political party representatives in the BPR, in controlling the executive branch of government. Representation was based on consultation among the leaders of each party rather than a general election. As a residency Surakarta was under a resident but militarily this region was able to be regarded as a unit of military administrative government under the auspices of a Division commander and a Military governor. As a unit of civil defence this region was headed by the head of the Regional Defence Council. The majority of the new civil and military leaders of Surakarta previously belonged to the badan perjuangan. Till the end of 1947 local authority in Surakarta was in the hands of three leaders, Sudiro (Resident and leader of the Barisan Banteng), Wikana (military governor, PESINDO) and Sutarto (former head of the AMT and commander of the local division). All three had a strong anti-Swapraja leaning.

THE GERAKAN POKOSO

Before discussing the Gerakan Pokoso (the Pokoso movement), this section will first treat other peasant organizations which appeared during the revolution. For while the Pokoso was part of a peasant organization formed in 1935, which was reborn during the revolution, there were a number of other peasant organizations of various political persuasions also active in rural Surakarta after 1945, and it is useful to know of their aims and activities if the Pokoso is to be understood in the proper context. Among those other organizations were the Barisan Tani Indonesia (the Indonesian Peasant Front) or BTI, closely linked to the PKI, and the Sarekat Tani Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islam Peasant Union) or STII, tied to Masyumi.

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64 The word Pokoso is derived from PKS, the abbreviation of Pakempalan Kawulo Surakarta. In Javanese, the abbreviation PKS is pronounced Pokoso.

65 For the re-establishment of the PKI, see Kedaulatan Rakjat, 8 November 1945. For instance, the Klaten BTI was formed in October and started as a branch of the Surakarta BTI. Kedaulatan Rakjat, 30 October 1945.
Established in October 1945, about the same time as the PKI and PS, the BTI was at first led mainly by Sjahrir's followers. It grew rapidly in various regions of Java in the last months of 1945, after representatives from the conference of Workers and Peasants held in October in Solo returned home and formed BTI branches in their own regions. The Surakarta BTI was also formed in October, with its members concentrated in four regency branches at Wonogiri, Sragen, Boyolali and Klaten.

The Sragen BTI held its first congress on 29 December 1945. Present were 223 representatives from villages, including villages in our sample subdistrict of Kedawung. The congress took several decisions, the key one being to demand that the Directorate of Surakarta carry out land reform in the region so that landless peasants could gain proprietary rights to land. At almost the same time, on 6 January 1946, the Surakarta BTI held its first congress in Solo. This congress discussed the special question of land reform in the Surakarta region. The BTI argued that the former land regulations of Surakarta did not give proprietary rights to the people. Therefore the BTI congress requested the Directorate to form a committee for land reform which would investigate the former land regulations of Surakarta.

Most BTI members were landless peasants. They were mainly abangan peasantry, who followed a Javanese life-style comprising animist, Hindu-Buddhist and Islamic elements. Many of the non-abangan peasants eventually joined the STII. In the Surakarta region

67 *Kedaulatan Rakjat*, 8 November 1945.
69 *Kedaulatan Rakjat*, 1 January 1946.
70 *Kedaulatan Rakjat*, 8 January 1946.
the STII was formed in early 1947 by the Masyumi. Haji Buzairi, one of the leaders of the Masyumi in Klaten and a prominent adviser of the Hizbullah of Delanggu, began the formation of the STII. He followed the example of the STII which had been formed by Masyumi in late 1946 in Kediri, East Java. STII members consisted of landowners and landless peasants who followed the life pattern of the santri, pious Moslems concerned with Islamic teachings.

Where BTI members were mainly landless peasants, the STII consisted of landowners as well as landless peasants. The Masyumi leaders encouraged the STII to collect zakat (religious tax) from every landowner. Under the guidance of Masyumi leaders, the STII utilized its zakat funds to help landless peasants. This was an obvious reason why the STII attracted landless peasants as well as landowners. The BTI held to a Marxist ideology while the STII sought to improve the lot of the peasants on the basis of Islamic teachings. Culturally the BTI was inclined to an abangan orientation while the STII held firmly to a santri one.

As was discussed in a previous chapter, Pokoso was a late-1930s organization of the people of Surakarta whose members, including many peasants, were generally opposed to Dutch colonialism. During the occupation Pokoso, like other political organizations, was disbanded by the Japanese authorities. Many of its members then joined Japanese-sponsored organizations such as Barisan Pelopor, Seinendan and Keibodan. A few of them became members of Heiho. In the early months of revolution, former Pokoso people, in the spirit of the struggle for independence, had readily participated in various lasykar organizations such as Barisan Banteng and Lasykar Rakyat. The former members of Pokoso, who for the great part were inclined to the abangan orientation, were naturally not interested in the Hizbullah's Islamic elements.

In early 1946 many former leaders of the Pokoso in rural areas of Surakarta began to be interested in the BTI organization.

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72 Interview with Haji Buzairi, 19 August 1979. In early 1947 he was ordered by the Central Masyumi to form the STII.

73 Kahin, op.cit., pp.307-08.
Apparently the BTI program inspired them to reorganize Pokoso as an affiliate of the BTI, for there were indeed similarities between the BTI programs and the main goals of Pokoso in the colonial period. In early 1946 the Surakarta BTI launched its programs for land reform, such as the demand for individual property rights to land. The Pokoso movement from 1935 to 1942 had also launched demands to achieve individual land rights to land, though without success.

Some of the early Pokoso leaders, including Mr. Singgih and Pringgowinoto, had already joined the PNI, apparently feeling that their former party, the Persatuan Bangsa Indonesia (PBI), had a similar platform to the PNI's. Pringgowinoto was very active in making contacts with former local leaders of Pokoso. In early 1946 Pringgowinoto suggested in various local meetings at Sukoharjo and Jumapolo that Pokoso join the PNI. Sunardi, former leader of the BPRI of the Sukoharjo regency, drew about 200 former members of the Sukoharjo Pokoso into the PNI.74

The central Pokoso Executive of Surakarta was not reorganized by its former leaders.75 The re-establishment of the Pokoso only took place at local levels in accordance with the steps of its former local leaders. Two former leaders, Pawiro Granggang and Sastrodijono, rebuilt the Kedawung subdistrict Pokoso. Both men were literate farmers, landholders in Kawis village, and graduates from the sekolah desa (village school).76 In the middle of 1946 the two men met Kusen, one of the leaders of the Surakarta PKI, who had been very active in the colonial period. Kusen urged Pawiro and Sastro to rebuild their former Pokoso. They were assisted in this by two other former leaders of Pokoso, Sāikrōmo and Soeroredjo, and had successfully

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74 Interview with Sunardi, 6 August 1979.
75 Similarly the PKM was not brought back to life, evidently because the leaders were intimidated by the strength of the anti-swapraja movements. Interview with KRMT Sanjoto, 30 June 1979.
76 In 1936 Pawiro was the head of Pokoso in the village of Kawis. He is now eighty years old. He had been arrested twice by the Dutch. Interview with him, 27 August 1979.
set up the new Pokoso organization by the end of 1946. On the one hand its former organizational structure and symbol were still used, while on the other its programs now followed the BTI programs.

The revitalization of the Kedawung Pokoso coincided with the re-establishment of other Pokoso branches, such as those in Jumapolo and Bendosari. In February 1946 the BTI decision which tried to re-establish the Surakarta Pokoso had an effect in rural areas of all three subdistricts of Kedawung, Jumapolo and Bendosari. The BTI leaders had believed that the Pokoso as a former peasant organization would simply fall into line and support the BTI. In fact, however, the allegiance of former Pokoso members was often determined by individual circumstances. Bei Bowopranoto, a former Pokoso leader of Bendosari subdistrict, successfully reformed Pokoso there at the end of 1946, but he had since early in that year been active in Tan Malaka's Persatuan Perjuangan and his members, following him, embraced the cause of that organization. Likewise in Jumapolo the BTI did not gain automatic support from the Pokoso. There Pokoso was re-established by Donoredjo, its former leader and an associate of Mas Pringgowinoto; under his guidance the Jumapolo Pokoso was closely connected with the PNI.

By 1947, however, the leadership of the Pokoso movement was generally inclined toward the BTI. The Bendosari Pokoso, more deeply influenced by BTI, changed its name from Pakempalan Kawulo Surakarta to Persatuan Kekuatan Sebangsa (Union of the Power of Common Nationality) or PKS. The Kedawung Pokoso replaced its name with

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77 Interview with Sastrodijono, 27 August 1979. Soikromo was a former Pokoso leader of Pengkok, an illiterate, and a landholder farmer. Soeroredjo was illiterate; he was a landholder farmer of the Wonokerso village. Interview with Madijo, 31 August 1979; Atmosukimin, 23 August 1979.

78 Interview with Sastrodijono, 27 August 1979.

79 Bei Bowopranoto was an official of Bendosari, pensioned in 1943 as vice wedono. Interview with Martodihardjo, 20 August 1979.

80 Interview with Muljadi, 6 August 1979; Martodihardjo, 20 August 1979.
Sarekat Rakyat Indonesia (People's Association of Indonesia) or SRI. This linked the Kedawung SRI with the SRI elsewhere, though it still firmly followed local BTI programs. These changes of name signified the way Pokoso was being brought into contact with national politics.

In Bendosari, the local BTI leader, Sabarno, launched the BTI programs in a series of meetings from February to April 1946. The Bendosari BTI programs consisted simply of two points. Firstly, to distribute tanah kas desa (land owned by the village as an entity, income from which went into the village treasury) to landless peasants. Secondly, to strengthen the peasant union through working together with the PKI. The Sragen BTI shortly after its first congress in December 1945 also launched its programs in the first months of 1946. This was then followed by local BTI branches, including the Kedawung BTI.

Sabarno hoped for full support from the Pokoso members, and worked closely with a prominent Pokoso leader of Sugihan village to distribute the tanah kas desa of Sugihan and neighbouring villages. In Kedawung it was a Surakarta City PKI activist named Kusen who introduced the radical ideas of BTI. Villagers still remember his persuasive address to the SRI in the village of Pengkok. He gave his address the special title, Wahyu Cemlorot (wahyu - divine revelation; cemlorot - very bright). He identified the Wahyu Cemlorot with communist ideology, which could transform the condition of society for the better. Javanese, particularly the abangan people of Surakarta, believe that to receive the wahyu during a period of meditation (tapa brata) means one will become an extraordinary person. Apparently Kusen aimed to convey BTI ideas through

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81 Interview with Madijo, 31 August 1979.

82 Kusen was a fine orator, who always spoke in Javanese so that the peasants could follow all his speeches. Interview with Madijo, 31 August 1979.

83 For instance, wahyu kraton marks a person who will become king; wahyu pangkat marks a person who will have high rank in government; wahyu kadonyan marks a person who will be rich.
indigenous Javanese thought which could appeal to the mass of the peasantry.

Kusen particularly identified the Wahyu Cemlorot with two programs of the BTI - to replace lurahs who did not support the BTI; and to distribute the tanah kas desa to poor and landless peasants. The SRI, as the new form of the Pokoso, moved to realize these two programs at the end of 1947. The SRI successfully distributed the tanah kas desa of Pengkok village, and twenty-three members of SRI occupied this land for their house buildings. The SRI called this action the aksi perumahan (housing action). The movement also temporarily succeeded in replacing the lurah of Pengkok village with the local Pokoso leader, but a few weeks later the subdistrict officer reappointed the former lurah. The distribution of land was then followed in other villages such as Jenggrik, Kawis and Wonokerso. In the village of Kawis, Pawiro Granggang, after reaching agreement with other leaders at Jenggrik and Pengkok, successfully distributed a few hectares of former estate land. There was less opposition to these moves in the Kedawung area than some other areas, partly because the STII, which increasingly became the instrument of wealthier villages to oppose such redistribution, was there very small.

Politically, the Surakarta peasantry was coming to see itself as divided into three socio-political groups: wong ijo (literally, green people), wong abang (red people) and wong ireng (black people). This division became marked during 1947, when Pokoso activities were more intense in the Surakarta rural areas. The wong ijo were oriented to Islamic ideology. Members of the Masyumi and the STII, and of other Islamic organizations, were regarded as wong ijo. The term ijo originally referred to the Islamic symbol, a green banner with a crescent moon and star (Bulan Bintang). Wong abang

In the 1960s the leaders of the PKI also adopted this style, identifying themselves with the wayang hero figures, the Pendawa; Rex Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965 (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1974), pp.13-14.

Interview with Soekardi, 26 July 1979; Pawiro Granggang, 27 August 1979; Sastrodijono, 27 August 1979; Madijo, 31 August 1979.
referred to the followers of the communist ideology such as PKI, BTI and the BTI supporters among Pokoso members. The term abang originally referred to the red hammer and sickle (Palu Arit) on the banner of the PKI. The wong ireng were the followers of the ideology of the PNI and held to the PNI's philosophy, Marhaenism. As defined at the congress of Partindo in 1933, the concept of Marhaenism was as follows:

Marhaenism, that is socio-nationalism and socio-democracy. Marhaenism is the principle which seeks a social structure of society that protects the marhaon (small independent peasant) in everything. Marhaenism is the method of struggle in order to achieve this social structure, therefore it must be revolutionary.

Culturally, the three socio-political groups could be grouped into two: santri and abangan. Both wong abang and wong ireng were counted as abangan peasantry. Politically, the implications of santri-abangan are, of course, not enough to understand the conflicting groups of Javanese peasantry. Use of the terms wong abang and wong ireng clearly indicated that the abangan had two political streams (aliran politik): a communist and a nationalist ideology.

ARMY CONFLICTS, JUNE-DECEMBER 1947

In addition to the conflicts in rural society, conflicts were also deepening within the army, both reflecting and exacerbating wider social polarization. The formation of the TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia - Indonesian National Army) and the integration of Badan Perjuangan under its organizational structure, the rise of Brigade XXIV of Surakarta, the rise of the left-sponsored TNI Masyarakat and the growth of the TP (Tentara Pelajar - Student Army), all became political components which caused army conflicts in Surakarta.

The Presidential Decree of 3 June 1947 originally had two principal bases of reorganization of the regular and irregular army: the formation of the TNI, and the integration into it of all former

85a The term ireng (black) originally referred to the PNI symbol, the black colour of the wild buffalo head.

army and badan perjuangan units. At the end of June 1947 the implementation of the Presidential Decree in Surakarta was sponsored by Iskandar, chairman of the Surakarta Lasykar Rakyat and younger brother of Sunarto Kusumodirdjo, the commander of Regiment 27 of the Senopati Division and former chairman of the Surakarta BKR. In the middle of June Iskandar held a meeting to discuss his plan with Sutarto, the commander of the Senopati Division, and with his own brother Sunarto Kusumodirdjo. At this meeting it was decided to coordinate the Surakarta badan perjuangan into a new brigade called Brigade XXIV. Sunarto Kusumodirdjo proposed to Sutarto, on the basis of personal friendship, that he appoint Iskandar as commander of this new brigade, which he duly did.

Brigade XXIV had six regiments containing twenty-three battalions. Regiment One was the former Lasykar Rakyat; Regiment Two was the former Barisan Banteng; Regiment Three was the former Surakarta BPRI; Regiment Four comprised the former LBI, Lasykar Merah and PESINDO; Regiment Five was the former Salatiga BPRI; Regiment Six was the former Lasykar Hizbullah.

Outside Brigade XXIV there was also a student organization, the so-called Tentara Pelajar (Student Army) or TP. This TP was rooted in a former student organization, the IPI (Ikatan Pelajar Indonesia - Indonesian Student Association), set up in September 1945. The Surakarta IPI branch consisted mainly of students from sixteen schools continued from the Japanese period, both Junior High School (SMP) and Senior High School (SMT). The SMP students were from thirteen to fifteen years old, and those of SMT from sixteen to eighteen. The IPI at both national and regional levels, including the Surakarta

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88 Interview with Sunarto Kusumodirdjo, 1 August 1979.

IPI branch, had a defence section, the so-called IPI Pertahanan (IPI Defence). 90

The IPI Pertahanan changed its name into Markas Pertahanan Pelajar (Headquarters of the Student Defence) or MPP in February 1946. Thus, the MPP coordinated the student battalions of various student organizations. As a result of the Presidential Decree of 3 June 1947, the MPP was changed into the so-called MTP (Markas Tentara Pelajar - Headquarters of the Student Army). This decree indicated that student army battalions would be integrated into one brigade, the so-called Brigade XVII. However, the student battalions in Central Java and East Java were organized under their names TP and TKIP (Tentara Republik Indonesia Pelajar - Student of the Indonesia Republican Army) respectively. 91 In West Java, battalions such as these were under several names, Banten Battalion, Ceribon Battalion and Priangan Battalion.

The Surakarta TP consisted mostly of former students of Lasykar Kere and two small revolutionary student groups, Lasykar Alap-Alap and Lasykar Garuda. 92 By 1947 the members of the Surakarta TP numbered some 500, and its leadership was in the hands of Achmadi and Prakosa. Achmadi was a Central Javanese, born in 1927 at Ngrambe, and a HBS graduate. During the occupation he joined the underground 'anti-Fascist' movement. His close friend, Prakosa, describes Achmadi as follows:

Achmadi's personality is tough (keras) and he was very disciplined in organization. He was at the same time very friendly both in school and in the organization. Like other Javanese young men at that time, Achmadi enjoyed watching the wayang. 93

90 Interview with members of TP: Sujahma, 3 May 1979; Sunaruo, October 1979; Errol Sudibjo, June 1979.

91 For details about TP in Central Java, see Marsudi, 'Tentara Peladjar di Djawa Tengah Dalam Sedjarah Revolusi Indonesia, 1945-1951', MA thesis Gadjah Mada University, Jogjakarta, 1970.

92 For details about Lasykar Kere see Kedaulatan Rakjat, 12 December 1945. They were mostly SMT students who had fought against the British in Semarang, Central Java. Interview with Prakosa, 20 February 1979; Farodhal, 24 July 1979. Kere means beggar, reflecting the student attitude to an austere life. Alap-alap means hawk and garuda means eagle, both seen by Japanese as powerful, wild, and free.

93 Interview with Prakosa, 20 February 1979.
In the last months of the occupation, Achmadi and Prakosa had spread the idea of a student union through their underground movement. As leaders of the TP both men were constantly inspired by the wayang teachings and the so-called watak satriyo (knightly manner). These two leaders jointly represented a symbol of leadership for the TP members until the post-revolutionary demobilization.

Politically, the TP as a student organization had not affiliated with any political organization. The TP members were rather impelled by a sense of duty as expressed by their motto, belajar dan berjuang (to learn and to struggle). Their solidarity as students, as an army corps and as Solonese, all helped to strengthen the unity of the TP organization. This TP organization succeeded in creating an esprit de corps among its members. Apparently the TP's neutrality between the political streams made it possible for the Hizbullah to work together with it. In fact the Hizbullah often shared its funds with the TP when they were fighting in the front line. This partnership means that the TP in 1947 and 1948 was indirectly aligned with Hizbullah against the oppositionist element increasingly composed of the Left. The TP was inclined to support the Government rather than the opposition, and the role of Achmadi as the security commander for Surakarta city further inclined the TP to the side of the Government. Despite the intention of the TP not to follow any political stream, its political role became clear after the implementation of Hatta's rationalization program in early 1948. In fact, the Siliwangi Division in Surakarta put the TP directly under its own auspices. The TP was included in the Brigade 'W' and functioned as Kesatuan Reserve Umum (General Reserve Unit) or KRU. Thus, the TP became openly on the side of the Government.

Brigade XXIV was under the leadership of the Senopati Division. This Brigade was intended to contain various social forces, and therefore could not escape political tensions. One political phenomenon which sharpened the political tensions within the Surakarta

94 Interview with Prakosa, 20 February 1979; Haji Bakri, 15 and 17 August 1979.
Brigade XXIV was the rise of the TNI Masyarakat. In early August 1947, after the Dutch aggression had begun, Amir Sjarifuddin established an auxiliary organization, the TNI Masyarakat. The rationale for this was to 'organize popular defence on a local basis to supplement the regular army'. Sakirman, one of the top leftist leaders, was appointed by Amir Sjarifuddin to lead the TNI Masyarakat. Since Sakirman was the head of Lasykar Rukyat for the whole of Java and Madura, he was expected to be able to mobilize the members of the Lasykar Rakyat to support the TNI Masyarakat.

The Surakarta TNI Masyarakat consisted mainly of the LBI, the Lasykar Merah and the Lasykar Rakyat. In practice, they broke away from Brigade XXIV, appearing to have more political freedom of action than Brigade XXIV which was split by rivals such as the Hizbullah, the BPRI and the Barisan Banteng. The LBI and the Lasykar Merah joined the TNI Masyarakat because it was set up by the leftists. The Lasykar Rakyat, on the other hand, was ordered by Sakirman to join. The other leftist organization, PESINDO, was also among the strongest supporters of the TNI Masyarakat, because Wikana was leader of PESINDO and also one of the builders of the TNI Masyarakat.

The Surakarta TNI Masyarakat in particular was strongly supported by Wikana. His position as Military Governor and PESINDO leader enabled him to mobilize the lasykar organizations which were pro-Amir Sjarifuddin to support the TNI Masyarakat. At least seven battalions, from Regiment 1 and Regiment 4 of Brigade XXIV, strongly supported the formation of TNI Masyarakat. In theory, these battalions still formed part of the Brigade, but most members of the seven battalions withdrew from Brigade XXIV and entered the

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95 Kahin, op. cit., p.261.

96 Ir. Sakirman was born on 11 November 1911. He graduated from HIS (1926), Mulo (1930), AMS (1933) and Technological University (1940). In 1940 he joined Gerindo. See Orang Indonesia jang terkemoeka di Djawa, p.206.

97 According to Sunarto Kusumodirdjo, his younger brother Iskandar who was the head of the Surakarta Lasykar Rakyat, received Sakirman's orders at the end of August 1947. Iskandar died at the end of 1948, shortly after the Madiun uprising. The Hatta Government identified him as a leftist who joined this uprising. Interview with Sunarto Kusumodirdjo, 1 August 1979.
TNI Masyarakat. The leadership of the Surakarta TNI Masyarakat was in the hands of Lieutenant-Colonel Suhurinan, leader of the Surakarta PESINDO, who was very close to Wikana during Wikana's term of office as Military Governor. These battalions tended to support the left.98

In many Surakarta rural areas the TNI Masyarakat was also successfully established. In the Sukoharjo region, Major Gunadi, the local regular army commander and a former PESINDO activist, built the TNI Masyarakat from members of Lasykar Rakyat and PESINDO from the subdistricts of Gatak, Baki, Tawangsari, Weru and Bendosari. Its total membership was about 200 men.99 In Delanggu subdistrict, the TNI Masyarakat was restricted to PESINDO, and its membership was not over 200 men.100 In the other subdistricts, Kedawung and Jumapolo, the TNI Masyarakat was not set up, largely because none of the local regular army officers supported the TNI Masyarakat. Major Panudi, commander in Sragen regency, and Sastrolawu, commander in the regency of Karanganyar, both resisted the rise of TNI Masyarakat. They believed that the TNI Masyarakat was not yet an official program of the government, and in fact the TNI Masyarakat was still the subject of serious debate between the Minister of Defence and the PNI and Masyumi representatives in the KNIP.101

Once the TNI Masyarakat was established, Wikana intensified the PEPOLIT program. In practice the implementation of PEPOLIT had deviated from its original syllabus, which had been intended to include politics, religion, psychology, and social and general knowledge. By late 1947, PEPOLIT was effectively limited to Marxist ideology and the PKI's doctrine. During the last months of 1947, Wikana had coordinated PEPOLIT training for the officers of the Panembahan Senopati Division, the leftist groups of the Brigade XXIV, and the TNI

98 Interview with Sastrolawu, 13 October 1979.
99 Interview with Sunardi, 6 August 1979.
100 Interview with Bodronojo, 26 September 1979.
101 Interview with Panudi, 27 July 1979. Panudi graduated from Kweekschool (Teacher School). In 1944 he joined Peta training in Bogor and became a member of Peta. He was also a student of Sekolah Guru Laki-Laki (Male Teachers School). In the early revolution he joined the BKR and the AMS (Angkatan Muda Sukawati).
Masyarakat. Alimin Prawirodirdjo, an old PKI veteran of the 1926 uprising, became Wikana's adviser and took part in the political training of the Surakarta PEPOLIT. This had trained more than 1,000 men, mainly members of Panembahan Senopati Division and the supporters of Amir in the Brigade XXIV.

PEPOLIT and TNI Masyarakat created a political schism in the local regular army of Surakarta. The Twenty-seventh Regiment of the Senopati Division, which consisted of four battalions (battalions 17, 18, 19 and 20) refused absolutely to have PEPOLIT in its Division. Sunarto Kusumodirdjo, as commander of the Twenty-seventh Regiment, had objected on the grounds that both the PEPOLIT and the TNI Masyarakat were sponsored by leftists in the armed forces aiming to spread communist ideology.

Three former lasykar organizations of Brigade XXIV - Barisan Banteng, Hizbullah, and BPRI - for their own reasons also did not follow the PEPOLIT training. Barisan Banteng and Hizbullah felt a deep rivalry with PESINDO arising from PESINDO's opposition to all Japanese-sponsored organizations such as themselves. The BPRI had from the beginning been inclined to the ideology of Tan Malaka's Murbaism, so this organization was not interested in the communist ideology of Amir's group. The TP insisted on its neutrality from competing political ideologies and for this was not interested in the communist ideology of Amir's group. The TP insisted on its neutrality from competing political ideologies and for this was not interested in the political training of PEPOLIT. Politically the TP only entered the political arena in 1947, when conflicts arose within the army and the badan perjuangan along the lines of national politics.

Thus PEPOLIT and the TNI Masyarakat marked the polarization of political forces in the army and the badan perjuangan. Through

102 Interview with Sastrolawu, 13 October 1979.
103 Interview with Sunarto Kusumodirdjo, 1 August 1979.
104 Interview with Sunarto Kusumodirdjo, 2 August 1979.
PEPOLIT the influence of communist ideology deepened in the Senopati Division. The polarization of Surakarta society was tending towards political schism both in the city and the countryside, with society dividing into aliran (streams).
Throughout 1948 the political atmosphere of the Republic was one of tension, as the crisis which had begun in the first months of 1946 approached its climax. In the early months of the year, a series of events took place which put the Republic in a dangerous situation owing to tensions between the Sayap Kiri (Left Wing) and the Sayap Kanan (Right Wing), the core of which was Masyumi and its affiliated organizations such as the Hizbullah and the STII. In a broad sense, Masyumi also enjoyed the support of the PNI and other minority parties, such as Catholic and Protestant parties, against the leftists.

On 17 January 1948 the Renville Agreement was signed by the government of Amir Sjarifuddin, although without the full support of many cabinet members, notably the representatives of Masyumi and PNI. A few days later an anti-Amir demonstration, under the leadership of Masyumi and PNI, took place in the Republican capital, Jogjakarta. Amir's followers responded in turn with a show of force in the form of a big parade.1 When Masyumi and PNI then withdrew their members from his cabinet, Amir resigned on 23 January. President Sukarno immediately appointed Hatta to form a coalition cabinet. During negotiations for its formation, Amir insisted that Hatta provide ten seats in the new cabinet for Amir's men. Hatta rejected this demand, allotting only one seat for Amir's socialists; Amir felt he could not accept this offer.2

When the Hatta cabinet was formed on 29 January, therefore, Amir's men had no ministerial seats, so that the left was unrepresented in Hatta's cabinet. In fact the Hatta cabinet consisted mostly of

1 Mohammad Hatta, Memoir, pp.523-24.
2 Ibid., p.525.
prominent leaders from Masyumi and the PNI, along with a few influential Catholic and Protestant leaders. On the same day Amir's Sayap Kiri launched a protest against Hatta's government in various residencies and regencies, including Madiun and its surrounding areas. A few days later the Surakarta Sayap Kiri followed the example of the Madiun Sayap Kiri and staged a demonstration. The demonstration consisted mostly of PESTINDO, Amir's supporters in Brigade XXIV, and Sarbupri (Sarekat Buruh Perkebunan Republik Indonesia - Union of Plantation Workers of the Indonesian Republic).

The resignation of Amir was of course one of the major turning points of the revolution, as the leadership passed from the left to the right for the first time. It appears to have led Amir to concentrate on his own political forces in the Sayap Kiri. On 11 February the Socialist Party, which had previously consisted of Communists and Socialists, split, with Sjahrir's followers setting up a new party, the Partai Sosialis Indonesia or PSI, and Amir retaining the leadership of the old Socialist Party. On 26 February Amir's group set up a new organization, the so-called Front Demokrasi Rakyat (People's Democratic Front) or FDR, which gained strong support from Amir's Socialist Party, the Labour Party and the PKI. Two other organizations, PESINDO and Sobsi (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia - All-Indonesia Secretariat of Labour Organization) also joined it. Thus all the Sayap Kiri groups, except Sjahrir's PSI and Tan Malaka's former Persatuan Perjuangan, joined together in the FDR which constituted a major political force in opposition to the Hatta cabinet.

3 Hatta's cabinet is listed in ibid., p.524.
4 Bekerdjaj, 30 January 1948.
5 Interview with Sardjono, 4 August 1979; Bodronojo, 26 September 1979.
6 Justus van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia, p.32. See also Anthony Reid, The Indonesian National Revolution 1945-1950, p.130.
In early March, shortly after the formation of the FDR, Amir launched his campaign for national unity and new democracy, touring East Java in an attempt to arouse mass support for opposition to the Hatta cabinet. Meanwhile the FDR held a series of meetings throughout East and Central Java. In June the FDR campaign reached a peak in Surakarta with various meetings in the regencies and in the city. The FDR launched programs which concentrated on the abolition of bengkok (village land allocated in lieu of salary to village officials) and of various taxes, and on reformation of the agrarian system. On a different tack, the FDR and Hatta's cabinet had come into serious disagreement on a key policy. Hatta, feeling that the army was not functioning properly, initiated a program called Rera (reorganization and rationalization) which would reduce the size of the armed forces and make them more sensitive to Republican government control. The FDR, seeing that the implementation of Rera would demobilize many soldiers, particularly in the badan perjuangan where support for the Sayap Kiri was strong, opposed Hatta's plan and attempted to resist Rera.

The return of Musso in August 1948 acted to intensify the political tensions between the left and the Sukarno-Hatta government. Musso on his return passed himself off as one Suparto, the secretary of Suripno, a PKI member who had represented the Republic in eastern Europe, and began to correct what he saw as the fault of Amir's policy, compromise with the Dutch through agreements. Musso introduced instead

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7 Bekerda, 3 March 1948.
8 Suara Ibu Kota, 22 June 1948.
his 'Jalan Baru' (New Road) for the Republic. Ideologically, Musso's policy was one of total confrontation of imperialists. Tactically, it involved an uncompromising fight against the Dutch and against those Indonesian politicians who were inclined to the diplomacy policy. The PKI accepted Musso's policy and when a new PKI Politburo was announced on 1 September, Musso became one of the principal members of the General Secretariat. Musso's 'Jalan Baru' seemed to create a new political role for the PKI, and in response the Partai Sosialis, PBI and PKI merged in August into one enlarged PKI, with Amir Sjarifuddin declaring himself to be a communist.

The Musso leadership sparked an increase in the mass support for the new PKI and its policy. PKI leaders, including Musso, made speeches concerning the 'Jalan Baru' at mass meetings in many cities of East and Central Java, such as Madiun, Kediri, Bojonegoro, Jogjakarta and Surakarta. After the arrival of Musso, political tension in society increased dramatically, with both sides indulging in kidnappings, killings and gang rivalries. The climax of this was the Madiun rebellion on 18 September 1948, when Musso's challenge was militarily crushed by forces loyal to the Sukarno-Hatta government. The collapse of the PKI meant that the revolutionary leadership of the Republic had fallen securely into the hands of the rightist group.

10 For details of Musso's 'Jalan Baru' see van der Kroef, op.cit., p.33; Reid, op.cit., p.137. Musso was born in 1897 in Pegu, a village in the residency of Kediri, East Java. He was a close friend of Alimin since their high school days in Batavia and in Tjokroaminoto's boarding house in Surabaya he met Sukarno. He had been involved in political activities with Insulinde, Sarekat Rakyat and ISDV, and he attended the Lenin School for several years after he went to Russia following his key role in the planning of the 1926-27 PKI uprisings. See Ruth T. McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism, pp.169, 202; Harry A. Poeze, Tan Malaka: Levensloop van 1897 tot 1945 ('s-Gravenhage, Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), p.254.

11 For the members of the new PKI Politburo, see Pinardi, Peristiwa Coup Berdarah PKI September 1948 di Madiun, p.44.
MILITARY CONFLICT IN SURAKARTA

Two points of the Hatta cabinet programs created military conflict in the Republic - the implementation of the Renville Agreement, and the rationalization of the army. Almost the first step Hatta's cabinet took was the withdrawal of most of the Republic's crack troops from West Java. This was a result of the government's recognition of the so-called van Mook line, between the Dutch and Republican territories, which required most of the Siliwangi Division to withdraw in February 1948 from pockets (kantong) in West Java to Republican territory in Central Java. This retreat, popularly known as the hijrah was a very bitter experience for the Siliwangi Division, whose members were assembled in the city of Cirebon and transferred to Central Java by cargo ships and trains, guarded by the Dutch military. Their arms had to be surrendered until their arrival at their destination in the towns of Central Java.

On 22 February 1948 about 29,000 men of the Siliwangi Division left West Java for Central Java. One of the daily newspapers in Surakarta reported in early February that 13,000 men of the Siliwangi Division had already entered Central Java. The total figure for

12 The van Mook line arose from the Linggajati Agreement of 1947 as a policy of the Governor-General of the Netherlands East-Indies, H.J. van Mook. This line separated the Dutch-occupied territories and the Republican territories. As a result the Republic was driven back to the most densely populated and poorest areas of Sumatra and Java. This action coincided with an economic blockade. See Kahin, op.cit., pp.220-21; T.B. Simatupang, Report from Banaran: Experiences During the People's War (Ithaca, Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project, 1972), pp.115-17.

13 The term hijrah here refers to the imitation of the Prophet Mohammad's flight to Medina before his return to Mecca. The Siliwangi Division, in using this term for its evacuation from West Java to Central Java, thus prophesied its own triumphant return to West Java. See Simatupang, Report, p.35, n.18.

14 For details see Siliwangi dari masa ke masa, pp.129-44.

15 Siliwangi dari masa, p.129. Anthony Reid, op.cit., p.134, has given the different figure of some 22,000 men.

16 Merdeka, 3 February 1948.
the hijrah was about 35,000 men, not including army families who followed the hijrah to Central Java. Thereafter the army of the Siliwangi Division was popularly called the Tentara Hijrah or the Tentara Kantong (the Hijrah Army or the Pocket Army) by the people of Central Java.

In Surakarta there were, by March 1948, four battalions of the Siliwangi Division which had been withdrawn from the 'pockets' in West Java. These were the Rukman Battalion, the Sentot Iskandardinata Battalion, the Umar Battalion and the Sambas Battalion. Like other Siliwangi battalions, they had been relatively well disciplined during the first Dutch aggression. Other Siliwangi units were stationed in areas near Surakarta, such as Madiun (4,000 men), Bojonegoro (3,000 men), Pati (4,000 men), and Jogjakarta (four battalions).

The Siliwangi division in Surakarta, as in other parts of Central Java, faced many difficulties. These were classified by the hijrah committee of Surakarta into five main categories: security, transportation, funds, health and housing. Funds from the local community were collected to support their daily needs. Apparently, though, the committee could not provide adequate transportation and health facilities. The chief reason for this was that Surakarta, like other parts of Java, had been suffering from the Dutch economic blockade.


18 The Siliwangi did not like the term Tentara Kantong, because it was associated with a setback for the Republican army, caused by the Renville Agreement. Interview with Sastrolawu, 13 October 1979.

19 Siliwangi dari masa, pp.125, 140, 141. Interview with Sastrolawu, 13 October 1979.

20 Merdeka, 3 February 1948.

21 Siliwangi dari masa, p.125.

22 Merdeka, no.416, 9 March 1948. For the hijrah committee of Surakarta see also Wasito, no.7, 6 February 1948; no.13, 20 March 1948.
Various imported goods, including medicines and motor vehicles, were very difficult to find.

The arrival of the Siliwangi Division in Central Java became a major political issue for the FDR. Within the PKI, the Siliwangi Division was viewed as loyal to the Hatta government, since it had obeyed Hatta's orders to evacuate West Java and to move into Republican territory. The FDR accordingly feared that the Siliwangi Division, which was well disciplined and sympathetic to Islam, might outweigh the TNI Masyarakat and the Sayap Kiri's other supporters in the Senopati Division. A consequence of the arrival of the Siliwangi Division in Central Java was, therefore, that the schism in the army leadership became more obvious.

Another factor which sharpened the hostility within the military in Surakarta was the implementation of the rationalization program of the Hatta cabinet. This reorganization, or Rera, would demobilize some of the regular TNI as well as the lasykar units which had nominally been included within TNI since June 1947. Nasution reckoned there were 350,000 men in the regular army and 470,000 men in lasykar units in Java alone.23

One reason for the rationalization was that the Republic was incapable of financing a large standing army, since the Linggajati Agreement, the first Dutch aggression, and the Renville Agreement had placed it in a very difficult economic position. In addition, the rationalization was aimed at developing a well-armed and well-trained regular army, which would be prepared to operate at battalion strength in a mobile, hard-hitting guerrilla war against the Dutch. The rationalization, which was implemented in February and March 1948, was partially successful. There were, however, only four divisions (Divisions II, III, V, and VII) which completed the rationalization. In March General Sudirman himself, in view of the danger of Dutch attacks, ordered the commanders of divisions to delay temporarily the implementation of the reorganization.24

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The rationalization program was a blow against FDR strategy, which was largely premised on a strong power base within the army. Moreover, the TNI Masyarakat, which was dominated by FDR supporters and had strong roots in rural areas, would also be disbanded. For these reasons, the FDR resisted the Hatta rationalization strongly and made a series of protests against the government.

On 20 May, the occasion of the commemoration of the foundation of Budi Utomo (the event in 1908 which was regarded as the birth of the Nationalist movement), the commander of the Senopati Division led his army in a big parade through the main streets of Surakarta. His aim was to improve the morale of the local armed forces and to indicate their repudiation of rationalization within the army. This open defiance intensified the political unrest which had been simmering since the arrival of the Siliwangi Division in February.

The effect of the Rera program in Surakarta was to raise political tensions within the Senopati Division. Sutarto, under the influence of his leftist officers and the FDR, pursued his own rationalization policy by demobilizing only those battalions which had not yet accepted the PEPOLIT or which did not support the Sayap Kiri and the FDR. For instance, the demobilizing of Sastrolawu's Regiment 27 was based on these considerations. Another possible reason, in the eyes of Sastrolawu himself, was a plan by the leftist officers to replace Sastrolawu with a pro-FDR officer.

The Barisan Banteng, the Hizbullah, and the BPRI, three lasykar units which had rejected the PEPOLIT and opposed the FDR, were also officially demobilized. In reality, however, these organizations continued to exist, though with only the few weapons they were able to hide. One of them, the Barisan Banteng, had a fair number of weapons which were secretly kept in its headquarters, so that it could still be regarded as a strong lasykar organization in Surakarta. In addition the Barisan Banteng associated itself with


25 For the PEPOLIT political indoctrination course, see Chapter Five.

26 Interview with Sastrolawu, 12-13 October 1979.
with GRR (Gerakan Revolusi Rakyat - the Movement of People's Revolution), formed in February 1948 under Dr Muwardi's leadership. Part of the purpose of the GRR was to balance the seemingly growing strength of the FDR (and especially PESINDO, the perpetual rival of the Barisan Banteng).

The TP was also reorganized under Rera, becoming a new brigade, Brigade 17, under the auspices of the Siliwangi Division. Prakosa, one of the TP leaders, later observed that the main reason why the TP was placed under the control of the Siliwangi Division was to avoid the political conflict which had continually afflicted the Senopati Division throughout 1947. This step made it clear that the TP had become the partner of the government against the opposition.

On 15 June Lieutenant-Colonel Sudiarto and Major Kusmanto, the commanders of Regiments 24 and 25, following orders from Sutarto, disarmed the two strongest battalions of the Sastrolawu Regiment, Battalion 17 based in Karanganyar and headed by Major Sugijarto, and Battalion 20, based in Sragen and headed by Major Panudi. Battalion 20 was disarmed by forces from Regiment 25 at 5 o'clock that morning. Panudi was confused by this action because Major Kusmanto did not bring written orders from Sutarto. Kusmanto informed Panudi that he brought only Sutarto's oral orders. Nevertheless Panudi believed him and therefore agreed to sign a letter transferring the battalion weapons and ammunition. All weapons were then collected in the Division headquarters. Only a part of Battalion 17 was disarmed, because most of its members, including the battalion commander were not at their barracks at the time.

Among the battalion commanders of the Sastrolawu Regiment

27 Merdeka, 15 February 1948. For the GRR, see also below, pp.190-91.

28 Interview with Prakosa, 20 February 1979.

29 Interview with Panudi, 6 July 1979; Sastrolawu, 13 October 1979. See also 'Pelapuran Pendek Kedjadian Penting dalam Karesidenan Surakarta', typescript, pp.2-3, Bundle B, 4/13, ANRI.

30 Interview with Panudi, 6 July 1979.
only Major Panudi protested formally against the events of 15 June. On 22 June he wrote to General Sudirman, the commander-in-chief of the TNI, protesting:

> It is impossible that Lieutenant-Colonel Sudiarto would have disarmed it (the Sastrolawu Regiment) if he had not received orders from above (the Division Commander). Indeed, Sutarto was unfair in dealing with the units of his Division. He gave priority to his own clique.  

According to Panudi his protest had no effect on General Sudirman's attitude toward resolving tensions in the Senopati Division. However, Panudi argued, Sudirman must have known about Sutarto's demobilization policy and how it had arisen from the demands of the leftist officers.

In contrast with the presumed intentions of the government, the demobilization carried out in the Sutarto Division strengthened the elements of the PKI. In fact the leftist officers demobilized the battalions which had not supported the Sayap Kiri or the FDR. The Hatta government thus failed to reduce the influence of the Sayap Kiri in Sutarto's Division.

The Hatta government bitterly denounced the Sutarto Division for resisting its rationalization program and identified it as a Division of the left. The climax of the political crisis in the Division was the killing of Sutarto on 2 July 1948. He was shot by unknown men at about 7.30 p.m. as he left his car in front of his house in Timuran, in the centre of the city.  

There were at least two explanations of the killing of Sutarto. The first pointed to the kidnapping of Sjahrir in June 1946 in which Sutarto had directly supported the kidnappers. Local sources reported as follows:

31 Surat Komandan Batalyon 20 Res.27. Div.IV kepada Penglima Besar Tentara Nasional Indonesia 22 June 1948, no.21/B/49/BC/20, Rahasia, typescript, Bundle B. 31/35, ANRI.

32 Interview with Panudi, 6 July 1979.

33 'Kemungkinan lain tentang peristiwa Solo', typescript, Surakarta, 9 July 1948, Bundle B.18/19, ANRI.
The killing of Sutarto must clearly be related to the kidnapping of Sjahir, when Karto and Sastrolawu hid Sjahir, perhaps on Sutarto's orders. When the commander-in-chief asked Sutarto to go to headquarters, he did not do so.  

In addition, Sutarto was known to be against Hatta's rationalization program and to lean toward the left wing. In the eyes of the communists, at least, the killing of Sutarto had been implicit from the beginning in plans for the implementation of the rationalization policy of the Hatta-Sukiman-Natsir government.  

Aidit, a young communist leader in 1948, subsequently wrote:

The commander of Division IV, Sutarto, was killed by a shot in the back. The people generally suggested that the attack on Sutarto was because he was a senior officer who did not agree with the rationalization of the army which was being carried out by the Hatta-Sukiman-Natsir government at the time. Many people concluded that the killing of Sutarto was included in the implementation of the rationalization policy of the Hatta-Sukiman-Natsir government in a special way.

The second explanation was that the killing of Sutarto was the work of the Sayap Kiri itself. An anonymous report, written on 20 July 1948, explained that the killing of Sutarto was carried out by the leftists. Wikana, the military governor, seemed to give his moral support to this killing. The leftists had doubted Sutarto's loyalty and feared he would leak the secret plans of the communists.

34 Ibid. 

35 D.N. Aidit, who was a member of the PKI Politburo from 1 September 1948, blamed the Hatta government for being involved in the kidnappings and killings in Surakarta. See D.N. Aidit, Konfrontasi Peristiwa Madiun 1948 - Peristiwa Sumatera 1956 (Djakarta, Jajasan Pembaruan, 1964), pp.9-10; D.N. Aidit, Aidit Menggugat Peristiwa Madiun (Djakarta, Jajasan Pembaruan, 1964), pp.17-18. 


37 'Pembunuhan Sutarto. Laporan-Tindjauan: Rahasia', Surakarta, 20 July 1948, typescript, Bundle B.18/9, ANRI.
This second version, however, is patently impossible. We can argue as follows: in May the Division's show of force was planned by its left wing, which appeared to be at its peak of influence in Sutarto's Division at that time. On 15 June Sutarto disarmed the battalions considered anti-Sayap Kiri, such as Sastrolawu's Regiment, some units of the BPRI, the Barisan Banteng and the Hizbullah, thus making it clear that he continued to oppose the government's rationalization policy. Given this, it is understandable that the first explanation was the one generally believed in Surakarta.

Apparently, however, the killing of Sutarto was not based on a decision of the Hatta government at Jogjakarta, but was a result of rivalry between local army units. Well-informed Barisan Banteng sources insist that the main perpetrators of the attack on Sutarto were members of the Siliwangi Division, who, as a pro-Hatta force, were moving against the leader of the anti-Rera Senopati Division. Sutarto's assassination therefore acted to sharpen political tensions between the Siliwangi Division and the Senopati Division during the months before the Madiun uprising.

A feature of army conflict in Surakarta was the rivalry over control of supplies, which often took the form of simple gang fighting. At the end of March 1948, a two-day battle had already taken place between the badan perjuangan units (Barisan Banteng and BPRI) and the Senopati Division, assisted by the TP, after the Barisan Banteng and the BPRI were accused of corruptly managing a cloth store in Surakarta. They had seized the store in 1947 in response to a plan of the communists to use it to supply PESINDO. The communists argued that this store had been legally set up for the purpose by Amir Sjarifuddin at the time he was Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. Amir also stored other important trade

38 Interview with Hagnjawigati, 30 July 1979; Hartono, 17 August 1979.

39 Interview with Hagnjawigati, 30 July 1979; Sudijo, 29, 30 October 1979.
goods in Solo, particularly quinine and rubber, and apparently
the proceeds from the sale of these items were to be used to supply
funds for the political parties of Amir's Sayap Kiri.

Thus this action by the Barisan Banteng and BPRI appeared
to be motivated by political animosity towards the PESINDO. On the
other hand, the TP regarded the action of the Barisan Banteng and
BPRI as a question of the morality of the badan perjuangan. Surakarta
BPRI members were known to have committed robberies in the countryside
in 1947 in order to supply the requirements of the organization. The
TP argued that this could undermine the values of the struggle
(nilai-nilai perjuangan) of the pemuda in the eyes of society. The
question of morality therefore became the main reason for the TP
to carry out an on-the-spot execution of Lieutenant-Colonel Mardjuki,
the commander of BPRI, in March 1948. About three months later, a
battle also took place in Tasikmadu, in the regency of Karanganyar,
between the Rukman Battalion (Siliwangi Division) on one side and
the Singowareng Battalion (Senopati Division) and the TP on the other.
The reason for this was quite simply that the members of the Rukman
Battalion had expropriated the regional government's stores a few
days before Hari Raya Idulfitri to provide for their families.

Although the TP was under the supervision of the Siliwangi Division,
the TP became involved in the battle against the Rukman Battalion
because of the moral involved. On questions such as these, the
TP held firmly to its neutral political orientation.

National political rivalry was adding tension to local gang
rivalries, which in turn embittered the political schism, so that
kidnapping and killing became commonplace during the revolution.

40 'Laporan Djawatan Kepolisian Negara Jogjakarta', 2 March 1948,
typescript, Bundle B.35/35, ANRI.

41 See my 'Revolution and Social Tensions in Surakarta 1945-1950',
translated by Benedict Anderson, Indonesia, no.17, April 1974,
p.107.

42 Idulfitri is the feast at the end of the fasting month of Ramadhan,
on the first day of Syawal. In Java, both observant Muslims
and abangan people celebrate it as a major festival, demanding
their best clothes.
DELANGGU AFFAIR, MAY-JULY 1948

The condition of the estates in 1948 had significantly improved over that of the late Japanese period. For the planting period 1947-1948, the Surakarta government projected the extent of sugar, tobacco and cotton estates as 9,105 ha, 2,925 ha and 4,000 ha respectively.\(^{42a}\) The importance of this estate production in time presented political problems for the political parties, as evidenced by the Delanggu Affair of May 1948.

Since the early months of the revolution, the local revolutionary leadership in the rural areas of Delanggu had been inclined to the left. The workers of the cotton plantation and the sack factory established during the Japanese period continued at their tasks in the early months of the revolution. The BBI, as explained in the previous chapter, was the first workers' organization in Delanggu and also functioned as a badan perjuangan organization. Since 1946 the political activities of these workers were under the leadership of the Delanggu branch of Sarbupri (Sarekat Buruh Perkebunan Republik Indonesia - Plantation Workers Union of the Republic of Indonesia) and Sobsi. According to J.M. van der Kroef, Sarbupri was affiliated with Sobsi while retaining autonomy in its operations.\(^{43}\)

Two weeks after the Hatta cabinet was formed, Maruto Darusman, the chairman of Sarbupri, opened the national conference of that organization in Delanggu on 17 February 1948.\(^{44}\) The conference was attended by representatives of Sobsi and the BTI, as well as by many branches of Sarbupri (including the Delanggu branch), and was designed to strengthen the unity of the peasants and the workers. Alimin, a close friend of Musso, was one of the speakers. Bodronojo, a prominent PKI leader and former BBI leader in Delanggu, who also attended the Sarbupri conference, summarized Alimin's speech as follows:

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\(^{42a}\) Penerangan Rakjat, no. 93, 6 December 1947.

\(^{43}\) Van der Kroef, op.cit., p.311, n.14.

\(^{44}\) Merdeka, 19 February 1948. Maruto was already Marxist-oriented when he was one of the members of the Perhimpunan Indonesia in Holland in 1932. Since 1946 Maruto was a member of the PKI; Kahin, op.cit., pp.88, 161. In July 1947 he was a Minister of State in Amir's Cabinet and was also a member of the PKI's executive; Van der Kroef, op.cit., p.31
The pillars of the Indonesian Revolution were the proletarian class and the peasants. The revolutionary group had to work for the national revolution.\textsuperscript{45} This conference also decided that Sarbupri would support the BTI programs, namely its struggle to abolish the rights of estates to land (tanah konversi).\textsuperscript{46} In fact the conversion rights on land were an important element in the agrarian law of the new Republic, for the Republic was pledged to protect the interests of plantations with regard to conversion rights. Since this meant that the government ignored the landless peasants, it is not surprising that peasant bitterness should have been aroused by the tanah konversi question, bitterness directed especially against the plantation owners, including the Susuhunan and the Mangkunegoro, whose administration aided and benefitted from the maintenance of the plantations.

By Law Number 13 of 26 April 1948, however, the conversion rights were completely abolished,\textsuperscript{47} and the term 'tanah konversi' came to refer to land which had earlier been placed under conversion rights. There were two kinds of tanah konversi, tanah konversi glebagan (rotation land, e.g., for sugar and tobacco plantations) and tanah konversi terus-menerus (permanent land, for perennial plantation crops such as rubber and tea). The tanah konversi glebagan under the new law of 1948 was to be distributed to farmers, and particularly to occupiers of the land whose names were registered with the village administration. The implementation of this law, however, did not fully satisfy the BTI, for most landless peasants did not get rights to the distributed land. This situation pushed the BTI to launch

\textsuperscript{45} Interview with Bodronojo, 13 September 1979; cf. Merdeka, 19 February 1948. Alimin was born in 1899. He was active in the Sarekat Islam, Insulinde, and ISDV. Between 1913 and 1921 he stayed in Tjokroaminoto's boarding house in Surabaya where he met Sukarno and Musso. See Ruth T. McVey, \textit{op.cit.}, pp.43-46, 363, no.36; Poeze, \textit{op.cit.}, p.254. During the revolution he became a close friend of Sutarto, the commander of the Senopati Division. Merdeka, 4 July 1948.

\textsuperscript{46} Merdeka, 22 February 1948.

\textsuperscript{47} Kementerian Pertanian (ed.), \textit{Agraria} (Djakarta, Pusat Kantor Urusan Tani, n.d.), pp.293-95.
another propaganda campaign demanding that the bengkok (land allowance for the village officials) and the kas-desa land (village-owned land, the proceeds from which went into the village treasury) be distributed to landless peasants. Tanah konversi terus-menerus was declared to be tanah negara (state land) by the Republic.

Apparently this February congress inspired the Delanggu branch of Sarbupri in its struggle on behalf of the workers. The Delanggu Sarbupri consisted mostly of the workers in the cotton plantation and the sack factory. Most of them were originally landless peasants, though a few were well-to-do and rich peasants who had rights to land (sanggan). The total number of workers in the sack factory and the seven adjacent plantations areas was more than 15,000 men and women.

The central activity of the Delanggu Sarbupri after the conference of 17 February was its campaign for the Badan Tekstil Negara (State Textile Agency) or BTN to increase the workers' wages and to distribute rice and clothes for workers and their families. In fact the wage of daily workers was only two rupiahs per day, considerably below the wage paid to daily workers elsewhere, which had been estimated to average more than five rupiahs per day. Moreover the BTN had not yet distributed clothing material for the second term of 1947. From 26 February Sarbupri's campaign obtained the full support of Sobsi. Sobsi directly discussed the workers' demands in meetings with the BTN, which acted as representative of the government. The Delanggu Sarbupri was led by Dibjosardjono and Suhari. Dibjosardjono was also head of the PBI of Delanggu and a former

48 The workers on the cotton plantation were called buruh jaba (lit. buruh = worker; jaba = outside) and the workers in the sack factory were called buruh jero (lit. jero = inside). The buruh jaba comprised monthly workers, daily workers, permanent contract workers, and pemaro (peasants who shared half the yield of the crops they cultivated for the plantation).

49 Interview with Gondowidjojo, 18 August 1979.

50 Interview with Slamet Muljono, 13 August 1979; Gondowidjojo, 14 August 1979; Bodronojo, 13 September 1979.
member of the local KNID. Suhari was an administrator of the sack factory and a good organizer. Both men were Mulo graduates. Like Dibjosardjono, Suhari divided his political activities between Sarbupri, the PKI and Sobsi.

The FDR, as the only party with systematic programs in the economic field, naturally attracted Sarbupri to support its program of opposition to the Hatta government. Moreover Sobsi, which had already joined the FDR and was affiliated with Sarbupri, could also influence Sarbupri to support the FDR programs. The FDR's economic programs consisted of abolishing the estates' right to land (konversi), distributing the bengkok and demanding a maximum of eight working hours a day for the workers. These programs were close to Sarbupri's own programs. The economic programs of the FDR became the main theme of various meetings in the villages to gain mass support for opposition to the Hatta government. In April the propaganda section of the Surakarta FDR began to hold rural mass meetings to explain its programs to the peasants.

In May the Surakarta FDR encouraged the Delanggu Sarbupri to strike in the hope that this would enable the FDR to achieve its political goals in national politics. Preliminary strikes, directly ordered by the head of Delanggu Sarbupri, took place in the last week of May. About 9,000 workers from the cotton plantation and the sack factory stopped work for several hours a day.

The Delanggu strike immediately became an important national problem. In June the central government formed a commission to investigate it. Sartono, a PNI representative in the KNIP, led this commission, which was to visit Delanggu and Surakarta city to investigate the whole background to the strike. In early June, while Sartono's commission was collecting information, a series of meetings were held between BTN and Sarbupri to try to solve the problem of strikes. These meetings were held in three places, the BTN office in Surakarta, the Sarbupri

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51 Dibjosardjono was killed by the Tentara Hijrah in the district of Walikukun, East Java, a few days after the Madiun rebellion on 18 September 1948. He was a close friend of Soemodihardjo, head of the Surakarta PBI. Dibjo had also been a member of Gerindo. Interview with Slamet Muljono, 13 August 1979; Bodronojo, 26 September 1979.

52 Djamal Marsudi, Menjingkax^ Pomberontakan PKI dalam Peristiwa Madiun (Djakarta, Merdeka Press, 1966), pp.4-5.

53 Interview with Gondowidjojo, 14 August 1979.
office at Delanggu and the office of the Republican Government in Jogjakarta. Most of the meetings were also attended by representatives of Sobsi and Perbutsi (Persatuan Buruh Tenun Seluruh Indonesia - Textile Workers Union of Indonesia). The meetings discussed the demands of Sarbupri on behalf of the workers, but with no success. The BTN agreed to only one of Sarbupri's demands, namely that BTN would distribute, to permanent workers only, the three metres of clothing material which had not yet been distributed in the second half of 1947. In addition, the BTN would provide a rice allowance for workers, but not for their families. The BTN decision was rejected by Sarbupri and Sobsi.

This stalemate produced a simmering hostility between the BTN and the Sarbupri. The Lembaga Buruh dan Tani (the Board of Workers and Peasants) or LBT, which functioned to handle various problems of the workers and peasants, became more deeply involved in attempting to solve the crisis. The LBT was formed by the leaders of BTI and Sarbupri, and ultimately came to be controlled by Sobsi. On 14 June the LBT sent a letter to the BTN in Surakarta with three main demands: a new scale of wages for the workers; cloth distribution for all workers; and rice distribution for both the workers and their families. 54 Meanwhile the Komite Kesatuan Aksi Delanggu (Action Front Committee of Delanggu), which had already been set up by the leaders of BTI and Sarbupri in February and was under the influence of Sobsi, held a general meeting of representatives of its branch on 15 June. 55 This meeting was attended by representatives of seven branches who attempted to get definite decisions from the BTN, which had still not replied to the previous discussions. The leaders of LBT at this meeting agreed to present to the BTN a motion which could be summarized as follows:

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54 This letter may be found in 'Berkas-Berkas Sekitar Peristiwa Solo dan Delanggu', Bundle B. 83/7, ANRI.

55 A report of this meeting is in no.B.83/7, ANRI.
The negotiations have already taken a long time, causing concern to the Komite Kesatuan Aksi. Therefore, further negotiations must be carried out during the three days from 17 to 19 June 1948. Komite Kesatuan Aksi may have to carry out further actions.\textsuperscript{56}

This ultimatum had some effect. On 17 June the meeting between the BTN and LBT recommenced in Delanggu. The chairman of the LBT, Suparno, addressed the meeting to explain why the workers' demands should be fulfilled by the BTN:

The workers were an important factor in production. The fulfilment of the workers' demands would mean that the total defence of the state could be achieved against the Dutch. Corruption had taken place in the BTN while the workers had been suffering. If the government refused to fulfill the workers' demands, as appeared likely, then the government itself would soon collapse.\textsuperscript{57}

This meeting did not succeed in reaching a compromise between the demands of the BLT and the plans of the BTN. The BTN reaffirmed its position of distributing textiles for permanent workers only and rice for the workers but not their families. In this deadlock the representatives of the Ministry of Welfare and the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, who always attended the meetings, proposed that discussions be handled by the Minister of Welfare, on the grounds that the BTN administration was under the control of the Ministry of Welfare. Both BTN and LBT agreed to this proposal, hoping that the Minister, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, could solve the crisis. On 19 June Sjafruddin wrote to the LBT of Delanggu to answer its demands. The Minister agreed to provide textiles for only, 8,823 workers, thereby excluding seasonal workers.\textsuperscript{58}

The LBT continued to demand that BTN provide textiles for 13,872

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{57} See 'Uraian djalannja perundingan antara delegasi2 Lembaga Buruh dan Tani (L.B.T.) dan Badan Tekstil Negara (B.T.N.) di Delanggu pada harai Kamis tanggal 17 Juni 1948', Bundle B. 83/7, ANRI.

\textsuperscript{58} Letter of the Minister of Welfare, 19 June 1948, no.3833/C.3, Bundle B. 83/7, ANRI.
workers from seven plantation areas. The Minister gave as his reason the impossibility of providing textiles for all categories of workers, because the government simply did not have sufficient textiles. The Minister also argued that the action of LBT was motivated by political rather than social considerations. The LBT, alleging corruption in the BTN, regretted the Minister's proposals. A further confrontation could not therefore be avoided between the BTN and the LBT.

The following day, 20 June, a general meeting of the workers was called by the LBT in Delanggu. It was attended by 8,000 workers. They decided to entrust the LBT campaign to Sobsi, which as a national workers union could discuss the crisis between the BTN and the LBT with the government at national level. Moreover Sobsi could mobilize the support of workers beyond the cotton plantation areas and the sack factory. On 23 June a strike of more than 15,000 workers took place. They put red flags in the cotton plantation areas and at the sack factory, to indicate that no-one was allowed to continue work.

On 26 June two STII members in the village of Sribit, Martosudjud and Sumardjo, who were working on the cotton plantation, were attacked by thirty strikers armed with three carbines and three revolvers. The strikers threw stones at the two men and prevented them from working in the cotton plantation. Martosudjud and Sumardjo were held for a couple of hours in the office of Delanggu Sarbupri where they were warned that they had to join the strike action of Sarbupri. The strikers recaptured the two men on 29 June in order to make a public example of them. They took pictures of Martosudjud and Sumardjo and displayed them in public, shouting that they would

59 'Uraian djalannja', Bundle B.83/7, ANRI.
60 Nasution, Sekitar Perang, vol.8, p.33.
61 'Pelaporan Pendek Tentang Kedjadian Penting Dalam Karesidenan Surakarta', Laporan Djawatan Polisi Negara Surakarta, July 1948, typescript, Bundle B.4/13, ANRI.
kill them if they continued to work on the cotton plantation. 62
This incident appeared to have political rather than economic causes. Apparently the STII was trying to break the strike by using its own members in the fields. In nine villages in Juwiring subdistrict, which borders Delanggu, members of STII succeeded in replacing the strikers on the cotton plantation. 63 In Juwiring the STII organization was stronger than elsewhere, perhaps because many farmers there were also small traders and were active in Masyumi. 64

The conflict between the STII and Sarbupri became more intense when the STII obtained the backing of Hizbullah and the Tentara Hijrah. This caused the Komite Kesatuan Aksi and the LBT to put placards which read:

The strikers are not rebels.
The LBT will maintain security.
Don’t disturb us when we are on strike.
May the police and the army unite with us. 65

These placards angered units of the Tentara Hijrah. They fired their rifles in the air and began to haul down the red flags at the sack factory and other places. The strikers did not react, probably because they feared the Siliwangi Division, which was known to be well-trained.

On 10 July a small battle took place between the STII and the strikers. Some members of the STII who had been working on a cotton plantation, guarded by the Hizbullah, were suddenly attacked by the strikers. More than 500 strikers staged a show of strength to break up the working STII group. Two prominent leaders of the STII, Haji Buzairi and Abing Sjarbini, were injured. Buzairi was hit by more than twenty strikers, and the villagers of Sabrang thought he had died. However Buzairi and Sjarbini were brought to

62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Interview with Haji Buzairi, 19 August 1979.
65 'Pelaporan Pendek Tentang Kedjadian', Bundle B. 4/13, ANRI.
hospital at Delanggu, where they recovered.  

The Delanggu strike had become a major political problem for the Hatta government. While the incident of 10 July was taking place, the Working Committee of KNIP held a series of meetings specifically to discuss the Delanggu strike. Three days of meetings, from 9 to 11 July, failed to resolve the issue. The representatives of FDR, Sobsi and the LBT proposed that the government fulfill the principal demands of the LBT without further discussions with the BTN. On the other hand the representatives of PNI, Masyumi and the Christian Party suggested that Sobsi and the BTI hold further meetings in Jogjakarta. On 12 July the FDR issued a two-point political statement endorsing all actions of the strikers in Delanggu, and regretting the STII involvement in these strikes. For its part, the STII defended its action on a number of grounds. The STII believed that the strike inflicted an economic loss upon the government, and feared that many hundreds of hectares of cotton would be damaged. Politically, since the FDR had backed the strikes and armed the strikers with various kinds of weapons, the Hizbullah had responded by guarding the security of the STII members from this politically-motivated threat. By the time the FDR political statement was issued, the Delanggu affair had become a major political question. One of the newspapers in Surakarta, Pacific, described the affair as follows:

The strike is a dispute which has developed into a mass political conflict, though it arose from tension between the Sobsi and the BTN.

The Suara Ibu Kota, one of the popular newspapers of Jogjakarta, was more strident in its comment.

66 Interview with Haji Buzairi, 19 August 1979.
68 This statement was signed by Amir Sjarifuddin (Socialist Party), Aidit (PKI), Asmu (PBI), and Sudisman (PESINDO), ibid., p.45.
69 Interview with Haji Buzairi, 19 August 1979.
70 Pacific, 14 July 1948.
From the events of Delanggu, it is obvious that the rights of the people, which are guaranteed by the Constitution, have once again not been protected. The people demand food and clothes, and are oppressed by the gun.\footnote{Suara Ibu Kota, 14 July 1948.}

As these newspaper reports indicate, the Delanggu affair was essentially a political dispute along the line which increasingly divided society between left and right, between oppositionists and the Hatta government. It was by no means simply an economic matter, and the Hatta government was obliged to give the strike at Delanggu its serious attention.

On 16 July Hatta held a special meeting with the members of the KNIP, the BTN and the Delanggu LBT. At this meeting the BTN accepted the principal demands of the LBT, agreeing to distribute two metres of cloth per person to all workers and to distribute rice for workers' families. The LBT on its part agreed that the new regulation on workers' wages could be postponed.\footnote{This was reported by Jogjakarta radio on 16 July 1948. See file Bundle B.83/7, ANRI. Cf. Nasution, Sekitar, vol.8, pp.46-47.} The same evening, the government announced over Radio Jogjakarta that the LBT's demands had been accepted by the government, and that the workers would start work on 18 July.\footnote{See 'Surat Perintah Pusat Pimpinan Lembaga Buruh dan Tani', 16 July 1948, Bundle B. 83/7, ANRI.}

The Delanggu strikes had inflicted a heavy loss on the government. \textit{Pacific} reported that the government had lost 13,901,050 rupiahs because of damage done to the cotton plantation.\footnote{Pacific, 23 August 1948.} Politically, the Delanggu strikes were a tactic of the FDR to further its campaign against the Hatta government. There was some truth in the allegation of \textit{Indonesia Raya}, a Muslim-oriented Jogjakarta newspaper, that the striking peasants of Delanggu were only being used by the FDR.\footnote{Indonesia Raya, no.39, 26 July 1948.}
The Delanggu strikes could be regarded as a form of opposition to the
government and in fact as the last weapon of the opposition against
the Hatta government. In the eyes of the Communists, the Delanggu
strike was regarded as a corrective action to force the government
to continue the national revolution. In addition, however, the FDR
aimed to create a political situation in which it would be able to
topple the Hatta government.

Hatta himself had no doubt that the Delanggu strike was
a political action of the leftists to oppose his cabinet. This was
also recognized by the leftists themselves. Buruh, one of the leftist
newspapers, asked rhetorically:

Why did this strike not occur in the period of
Amir's and Sjahrir's cabinet? It is clear that
one of its aspects was a reaction to the Hatta
cabinet.76

In revising their options with regard to the Delanggu
strike, Hatta's supporters appear to have included consideration of
army units, particularly Siliwangi units, when it came to estimating
their own strength. This was in response to the fact that the strikers
were already supported by PESINDO armed units. The head of the
Surakarta police office reported that political confusions at Delanggu
were obviously tied up with the existing military tensions and the
widening gap between Hatta's supporters and the leftists.77

The Delanggu affair was the first instance of what was to
become a deeply rooted conflict between Muslims and leftists in rural
areas. It demonstrated that the leftists were able to mobilize their
rural supporters against the attacks of their political opponents.
The left, soon to be politically united under the PKI umbrella, had
improved the power base from which it could continue its opposition.

76 Buruh, 20 July 1948.

77 'Laporan Pendjagaan Disekitar Delanggu', Bundle B.18/19, ANRI.
See also Berita Delanggu, no.1, 1 July 1948.
ALIRAN CONFLICT IN RURAL AREAS

The use of the term 'aliran conflict' in this section is confined to the conflict between leftists and Muslims. The term leftist in this case refers specifically to the organisations which became affiliated to the enlarged PKI in August 1948, and their supporters. The concept of aliran may help to explain the nature of the rural conflicts which culminated in the Madiun rebellion, in which communists and Muslims seemed ready to fight to the last drop of blood.

The conflict was not just between political parties, but between a whole set of affiliated organizations, such as youth and peasant groups. The communists had the support of the peasant organization, BTI, while Muslims had the STII, oriented to Islamic ideology. The communist youth organization was the PESINDO, which had previously been under the auspices of the Socialist Party. The PESINDO had a large popular following in both urban and rural areas of Surakarta, as it did throughout Java. Hizbullah, a youth organization of strict Muslims, represented an old enemy of the PESINDO.

Conflicts between leftists and Muslims in the rural areas of Surakarta had roots in the polarization of Surakarta society in 1947. Further instances of rural conflicts took place in 1948.

78 Aliran (stream) conflict in Javanese society has also been described in terms of the distinction among santri, abangan and priyayi, notably by Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java (London, University of Chicago Press, 1976). In the political context we may also apply the term aliran conflict to the three major political groups: nationalist, communist and Muslim, including modernist Muslims and conservative Muslims, together in this last group. The literature on aliran conflict is extensive. See, for example: Robert R. Jay, Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java (New Haven, Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies, 1963); W.F. Wortheim, 'From Aliran Towards Class Struggle in the Countryside of Java', Pacific Viewpoint, vol.10, no.2, 1969, pp.1-17; Donald Hindley, 'Aliran and the Fall of the Old Order', Indonesia, no.9, April 1970, pp.23-66; R. William Liddle, Cultural and Class Politics in New Order Indonesia (Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1977), esp. pp.2-14.
reflecting the bitter contests between leftists and Muslims at the central government level when the two elements struggled to obtain cabinet seats and argued vociferously over the policy of diplomasi. A major reason was that the communists, through their affiliated organizations, endeavoured by every means possible to obtain mass support to oppose the Hatta government. By all accounts, it was the actions of the communists which were the most inflammatory mass-oriented, and dynamic.

In the early months of 1948, the BTI launched its propaganda campaign to replace those village headmen who were identified as Masyumi members. This occurred, for example, in the villages of Pengkok, Kawis (Kedawung subdistrict) and Toriyo (Bendosari subdistrict). According to Martodihardjo, village head of Toriyo, BTI leaders addressed rural mass meetings and severely criticized Muslim village headmen, saying they were antek (followers) of the Hatta government which had compromised with the Dutch. In the two subdistricts the BTI could draw political support through the Pokoso, and in Kedawung, the Pokoso endeavoured to replace Muslim village headmen with a system known as pasuel (anonymous letter). This involved circulating negative rumours about the village headmen, alleging such things as corruption and manipulation of official village land.

In villages in Gemolong subdistrict, Sragen regency, communists also incited villagers to replace village headmen who were not communists. This political campaign, however, failed to achieve any concrete results and some reasons may be indicated here. Many villagers refused to turn against the village headmen they had originally elected. The village headmen who were under attack also

79 The term antek was widely used for the follower of a political stream; for example, antek Masyumi, antek PKI. Interview with Martodihardjo, 20 August 1979.

80 Interview with Soekardi, 31 July 1979.

81 See 'Laporan Mengenai Siasat Letkol Soejoto', Surakarta 1948, Bundle B.18/19, ANRI. Lieutenant-Colonel Soejoto led a new Brigade in the Senopati Division consisting mostly of former members of the Navy who had joined the PKI. See 'Keadaan Kota Solo Panas', Bundle B.2/5, ANRI.
obtained backing from anti-communist political parties and their affiliated organizations. For instance, the Muslim village headmen of Kawis, Pengkok and Toriyo, along with those of several villages in Delanggu and such adjacent areas as Juwiring, were firmly backed by Masyumi, the STII and the Hizbullah. It was therefore not easy to replace village headmen in accordance with the communist plan. Apparently, a political system based on aliran was becoming an important determinant of the role of village headmen in Surakarta in the first months of 1948.

The political cleavages between leftists and Muslims were clearly seen in the case of the Delanggu strike, from May to July 1948. Viewed in the context of the aliran conflict, the strike obviously reflected a political contest between the leftists and Muslims. The communist-affiliated organizations, FDR, BTI, Sarbupri, Sobsi, PESINDO and other affiliated groups such as LBT and Komite Kesatuan Aksi, confronted the STII and the Hizbullah and the Masyumi. Small battles took battles during the strikes. The Tentara Hijrah, which was known to have strong Islamic elements, also stood behind the STII and the Hizbullah and armed those two organizations.

That there was also a class element in the conflict between the leftists and Muslims in the Surakarta rural areas, including Delanggu, is suggested by the following cases. Haji Buzairi, a prominent Muslim of Delanggu and a leader of the STII and Masyumi, had taught Muslim peasants that the richer had to help the poorer. He implemented the program of the STII to collect zakat (religious tax), which he then distributed to landless peasants. Ideologically, the STII followed the Masyumi, whose modernist Islamic ideas included a rational approach to economics. Haji Buzairi himself was not only a prominent Muslim but also a rich peasant, landowner and local business man. We may also take another example for comparison. Haji Dullah, a leader of the Bekonang STII and Masyumi and an influential figure in the Bendosari STII, was also a rich peasant, a landowner and a local merchant. In 1948 rich members

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82 Haji Dullah was an important leader of the Bekonang Masyumi who successfully built the Bendosari STII. Bendosari was close to Bekonang, so the Bekonang STII could easily influence Muslims of Bendosari to form a branch there. Interview with Martodihardjo, 20 August 1979.
of the Bekonang STII were also involved in the local batik industry, which was closely connected with the centre of the batik industry in Surakarta. In Juwiring the richest members of the STII were also local business men.

Members of the STII themselves appeared to recognize that the programs of the BTI had been more successful than those of the STII in attracting landless peasants. The actions of the BTI seemed to be more agitative and mass-oriented. Its political slogans such as distributing official lands, opposing the rich peasants, and abolishing taxes, easily won the support of the landless peasants. Bodronojo, a prominent communist who actively joined the Madiun rebellion, said that the Indonesian communist ideology was actively opposed to the rich peasants. When the PKI used the term 'peasant' as one of the basic forces behind the Indonesian Revolution, it meant landless and middle peasants. According to D.N. Aidit, a young communist in 1948 who came to lead the party from 1950 to 1965, the landless and middle peasants were a part of the Indonesian proletariat and could accept socialist ideology. They were opposed to imperialism.

In July and August communist propaganda in the rural areas, as presented by the FDR and PESINDO, supported the BTI programs at the local level and opposed the Hatta government and the Tentara Hijrah at the national level. All of this was clearly observable in Delanggu and Sukoharjo. In Sukoharjo various placards concerning the distribution of land for the landless peasants and opposing Hatta's government had been put in public places. Hizbullah placards supporting the Hatta government also appeared.

83 In 1948 the Batik merchants of Surakarta formed a cooperative known as Batari (Batik Asli Republik Indonesia). Most of its members were Muslim merchants.

84 Bodronojo was active in the BBI and Sarbupri and was familiar with the communist literature of the time; see bibliography for biographical details.

During August and September 1948 actions for agrarian reform by the FDR and the BTI seemed to grow more intense. The chief reason was Musso's 'Jalan Baru' policy, accepted by the PKI, which emphasized agrarian reform. It included a plan to abolish the system of bengkok and kas desa land, and turn this village land over to be worked by the peasants. This policy was of course supported by the FDR and the BTI leaders, who had already seen the popularity of land reform proposals during their action for abolition of tanah konversi in the principalities.

As a result of Musso's 'Jalan Baru' policy, peasants began almost immediately to attempt to take over bengkok, official village land and tanah konversi. Anthony Reid cites various cases of peasant action both in East and Central Java, for example in Blitar, Pacitan, Jogjakarta and Surakarta.  

In Surakarta the action of the peasants appears to have been coordinated by the FDR. Lieutenant-Colonel Soejoto, a prominent leftist officer of the Senopati Division who also led the Surakarta FDR, outlined the policy of agrarian reform.

During August and September a series of peasant actions took place:

1. In Pajang about 22 ha. of village land began to be worked by the Sarekat Rakyat (SR).
2. In Boyalali 95 ha. of kas desa was distributed to landless peasants.
3. In Kedawung subdistrict, one-fifth of 300 ha. of tanah konversi was worked by landless peasants and labourers of the rubber factory. A few hectares of kas desa in the village of Pengkok were also taken over by the Sarekat Rakyat.

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87 'Laporan Mengenai Siasat Letkol Soejoto', Bundle B.18/19, ANRI.
88 Reid, 'Marxist Attitudes', p. 54.
89 Ibid.
90 Interview with Sardjono, 4 August 1979.
4. In the villages in which the Muslims seem to have been very strong, such as those of Bekonang subdistrict in Sukoharjo, the BTI failed to take the kas desa in their hands. The Muslim peasants through their political organizations, Masyumi and STI, strongly opposed the action of the leftist peasants.  

5. In other villages of Sukoharjo regency, including those of Bendosari subdistrict, the communists fully controlled the area during the Madiun rebellion in September, and took by force various official lands.

THE SURAKARTA AFFAIR, 13 SEPTEMBER 1948

By early September gang rivalries had grown more intense and were more obviously affected by political tensions. On 1 September Slamet Widjaja and Pardijo, two prominent leaders of the Surakarta FDR, were kidnapped by a small army group led by Alip Hartojo which happened to be opposed to the FDR. The reason may have been that Alip Hartojo, who was very loyal to Bung Tomo's BPRI, sought revenge against the FDR leaders who had demanded that Colonel Sutarto disarm the Surakarta BPRI in June 1948.  

Thus the Surakarta PKI lost Slamet Widjaja, who headed its propaganda section, and Pardijo, who was an important man in the secretariat of the FDR. On 7 September five officers of the Navy Brigades which had been included in the Senopati Division were kidnapped by members of the Siliwangi Division. These Brigades were

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91 Interview with Martodihardjo, 20 August 1979.

92 Alip was an activist pemuda who had supported the Barisan Pelopor in its move to disarm the Kempeitai at Timuran in Surakarta city in October 1945. He subsequently became an activist of BPRI. In November 1945 Alip fought with other BPRI members against the British in Surabaya. This is based on an interview with Sudijo, 30 October 1979.

very loyal to Amir Sjarifuddin, and they have moved from the van Mook line to strengthen the PKI and the FDR in Surakarta. They were the Seventh Brigade and the Ninth Brigade, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Yadao and Lieutenant-Colonel Soejoto respectively. Once again Alip masterminded the kidnapping. The five were known to be among the principal officers resisting Hatta's rationalization program. They were subsequently killed by members of the Siliwangi Division.

On 10 September Lieutenant-Colonel Suadi, the commander of the PPS (Pertempuran Panembahan Senopati - Senopati Battle Command), sent an ultimatum to those who had kidnapped his officers on 7 September. It contained only one point, that the kidnapped officers had to be returned by 4 p.m. on 13 September at the latest. The ultimatum had the prior approval of General Sudirman to whom Suadi had reported in Jogjakarta about the kidnapping of his officers. Just before the ultimatum expired, a meeting was held in Surakarta in the afternoon of 13 September between General Sudirman, Suadi and Lieutenant-Colonel Sadikin, the commander of the Siliwangi Division in Surakarta. It failed because Sadikin claimed that he knew

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94 'Sekitar Pentjulikan dan Tembak-Menembak di Surakarta', typescript, reported by Djawatan Kepolisian Negara Jogjakarta, 16 September 1948, Bundle B.34/35, ANRI. The names of those kidnapped may be found in 'Keadaan Kota Solo Panas', typescript, Bundle B.2/5, ANRI.

95 The Siliwangi Division continued to claim that its members were not involved in the kidnapping of 7 September 1948. See Siliwangi dari masa, p.143. Aidit strongly maintained that the Siliwangi was directly involved in this event. See Aidit Menggugat, p.21. My informants, especially former Barisan Banteng leaders and TP members, have stated that the Siliwangi was directly involved in the kidnapping of the leftist Senopati officers. Sastrolawu also stated that members of the Siliwangi Division were directly involved in this kidnapping; interview, 12 October 1979.

96 Interview with Sastrolawu, 13 October 1979.

97 Sadikin was born in Purwokerto, Central Java, in 1916. He was a member of KNIL and during the occupation was a heicho. During the revolution he joined the Siliwangi Brigade and later commanded its units which had retreated to Surakarta in 1948. See T.B. Simatupang, op.cit., p.35, n.15.
nothing about the kidnapping of Suadi's officers. Suadi, on the basis of a report of the state police, was sure that members of the Siliwangi Division were involved. Communist sources allege that members of the Siliwangi Division were involved in a plan of the Hatta government to clean out the prominent communists of Surakarta.

The same afternoon, before his meeting had finished, a small battle took place between the members of the Siliwangi Division and Suadi's troops from the Yadao and Soejoto Brigades. The Siliwangi troops at the Srambatan post were from the Second Company of the Fourth Battalion of the Siliwangi Brigade. This Company was headed by Oking and it had originally been a special unit of Brigade Thirteen. The Komir Company of the Second Battalion of the Siliwangi, based at Kleco (about ten km west of Srambatan), quickly came to the aid of the Oking Company. At Pasar Slompretan (in the city) the Komir Company met the members of the Yadao Brigade, who were all wearing red armbands. A battle was inevitable. The fighting ceased at 6.30 p.m., after General Sudirman ordered a cease fire between the two army units. During the incident fourteen of Suadi's troops and two of the Siliwangi were killed.

There was no doubt that the Srambatan affair really had broader political causes, and the ideological conflict behind it burst at the same time into open fighting between laskar units. PESINDO had long been opposed to Barisan Banteng because of the latter's original sponsorship by the Japanese. The conflict between these two

100 Aidit, Aidit Menggugat, pp.18-19.
101 Interview with Sastrolawu, 13 October 1979.
102 Siliwangi dari masa, pp.141, 143.
103 The red band was worn by members of the laskar units and the army who were pro-PKI. Interview with Sastrolawu.
105 'Sekitar Pentjulikan', op.cit.
organizations became more intense with the establishment by Dr Muwardi of GRR (Gerakan Revolusi Rakyat) in February. The primary concern of the GRR was to discredit the FDR leaders on the grounds of their responsibility for signing the Linggajati and Renville Agreements. It brought together several organizations opposed to the FDR, including the Barisan Banteng, and its formation sharpened the rivalry between PESINDO and the Barisan Banteng. The GRR was also supported by Tan Malaka's followers, who were old enemies of the PKI, which in turn denounced them as ideologically unsound 'Trotskyists'.

The climax to this intense rivalry was reached with the kidnapping of the leaders of the Barisan Banteng, Dr Muwardi, Darmosalimin and Tjitromargoso, on the afternoon of 13 September. Muwardi was kidnapped by members of PESINDO while he was operating on a patient in the Jebres hospital. One of the leaders of the kidnappers was Sutaryo, an activist of the Surakarta PESINDO who had been close to Wikana. The three kidnapped men were subsequently killed, with two bodies later being found at Wijipinilihan, in the southern part of Solo city. Muwardi's body was never found. (He may have been buried in Kaliyoso, about fifteen km north of the city.)

On 15 September the Barisan Banteng retaliated by attacking the headquarters of PESINDO at Singosaren, but PESINDO had already evacuated the place. The combined forces of a Siliwangi Division unit, the Barisan Banteng and the Hizbullah were, however, able to defeat some units of the Surakarta PESINDO on 16 September. This combined force still continued to pursue the Surakarta PESINDO. From 18 to 19 September the Siliwangi unit, headed by Sadikin, moved against Surakarta PESINDO and against the Naval units, which, headed by Yadam and Soejoto, supported Amir Sjarifuddin. Meanwhile on

106 Merdeka, 15 February 1948.
107 Interview with the Barisan Banteng leaders: Hagnjawigati, 30 July 1979; Hartono, 17 August 1979.
108 'Keadaan Kota Solo Panas', Bundle B.2/5, ANRI.
109 'Surakarta: Kronologis September-Oktober 1948', typescript, Bundle B.26/48, ANRI.
The GRR placards contained attacks to the groups who had kidnapped Dr. Muwardi. (Lukisan Revolusi Rakjat Indonesia 1945-1949, p.233).
13 September, the government carried out an operation against PESINDO forces at Blitar and Nganjuk in East Java. The defeat of the Surakarta PESINDO gave rise to worries about the security of the Twenty-ninth Brigade TNI Masyarakat in Madiun led by Lieutenant-Colonel Dahlan, who strongly supported the Communists. It also shocked the communist armed forces in Madiun.

General Sudirman had paid special attention to the events of September in Surakarta. In the middle of September a series of meetings had been held in Jogjakarta between General Sudirman, A.H. Nasution, (Commander of the Java Headquarters of the Armed Forces) and Colonel Gatot Subroto (Commander of Military Police Corps or CPM). These meetings dealt mainly with a plan for restoring order in Surakarta and for stopping conflicts among the military units and badan perjuangan organizations. For this purpose Sudirman and Nasution asked the government that Gatot Subroto be appointed as Military Governor of Surakarta and its surrounding areas. Both President Sukarno and the cabinet accepted Sudirman's and Nasution's proposal.

On 17 September President Sukarno declared a state of martial law for the region of Surakarta, aiming to avoid further conflicts there and to control the oppositionist groups which had been most intense in their criticism of the Hatta government. On 18 September Gatot took up his new position in Surakarta and his CPM duties were transferred to Lieutenant-Colonel A.J. Mokoginto, a senior officer of the Siliwangi Division, who was close to Nasution in Armed Forces headquarters in Jogjakarta. On the same day Gatot issued his first orders, meant to bring about a cease-fire among all

110 Kahin, op.cit., p.290; Pinardi, op.cit., p.72.

111 Dahlan was ex-chairman of DKDS (Dewan Kelasykaran Daerah Surabaya - Surabaya Area Lasykar Council), which had been set up at the end of 1946. Most members of the Twenty-ninth Brigade were former members of DKDS. See David Charles Anderson, 'The Military Aspects of the Madiun Affair', Indonesia, no.21 (April 1976), p.23.

The Surakarta city was suddenly quiet when the Srambatan affair broke out on 13 September 1948. (Lukisan Revolusi Rakjat Indonesia 1945-1949, p.233).
fighting groups. The cease-fire had to be carried out at the latest by midnight on 20 September. In addition, all commanders of fighting groups, both in and outside the city, had to call on the Military Governor by 21 September at the latest. Those who did not obey these orders would assume the status of traitors to the Republic, and the government would take severe action against them. In fact, Gatot's orders had no effect: shortly after they were issued the Madiun uprising broke out.

New political developments took place in Madiun when Sumarsono, a prominent PESINDO leader, held a secret meeting on 17 September at his house at Rejoagung, north of Madiun. This meeting was attended by only a few of the communist leaders. It was decided there to take over the Republican Government of Madiun. The first steps to be taken would be to disarm the Military Police Corps (CFM), the Siliwangi units and the Mobile Brigade. Djokosujono and Supardi, who both attended this meeting, played a leading role in taking over the Government of Madiun.


114 'Madiun, Laporan Pembantu Dinas Kopolisian Negara', typescript, 18 September 1948, Bundle B.26/48, ANRI. Sumarsono was born in 1921, became a Protestant Christian, and was close to Amir Sjarifuddin since the days when both were in Gerindo (1939-41). Based on Anthony Reid's interview with Sumarsono, August 1981.

115 See 'Madiun', Bundle B.26/48, ANRI.

116 Djokosujono was one of the members of the Leadership Committee of the TNI which was formed in June 1947. See Nasution, Tentara Nasional Indonesia, vol.2, p.86. Djokosujono was Amir Sjarifuddin's close colleague and was appointed as head of the Central Biro Berjuangan by Amir. Djokosujono also took charge of the TNI Masyarakat. He was a former Peta member. Mohammad Hatta, Memoir, p.527. Supardi was a civilian, Deputy Mayor of Madiun city, who sympathized with the PKI. See Nasution, Sekitar, vol.8, p.238; cf. J.M. van der Kroef, op.cit., p.40.
communist leaders such as Musso, Amir Sjarifuddin, Setiadjit and Wikana were still campaigning in several places in Central Java to get mass support for their opposition to the Hatta government. The Surakarta affair, which resulted in the defeat of part of the leftist forces, seemed to have hastened the decision of the PKI leaders in Madiun to take the revolutionary leadership into their own hands. The Madiun uprising broke out on 18 September at 3 a.m., and the Dahlan Brigade successfully disarmed the three key government forces - the Siliwangi unit, the Military Police and the Mobile Brigade. Most of the local Republican leaders and army officers were arrested, and some of them were killed by the communist forces. The key officers and other vital buildings of the Republic were occupied by the communist armed forces without resistance. The National Front Government was set up under the leadership of Sumarsono as Military Governor, Djokosujono as Military Commander of Madiun city and Supardi as resident. The communist rebellion had begun, and the top communist leaders had come out in open resistance to the government's armed forces.

Shortly after the uprising took place, political tensions between the leftists and their opponents in areas surrounding Madiun, such as Ponorogo, Magetan, Pacitan, Ngawi and Surakarta, surfaced in local communities and reciprocal kidnappings and killings took place in all these areas.

Since March 1948 the communists had planned for Surakarta to be the principal stronghold for their operation, and even though

117 Setiadjit had been one of the members of the Perhimpunan Indonesia (Indonesian Union) in Holland, where he met Hatta. Setiadjit was attracted by Marxism and in 1934 he studied at the Lenin Institute in Moscow. From 1936, he studied at the Lenin Institute in Moscow. From 1936, he appeared to follow the communist line. Kahin, op.cit., pp.88-89, 161, 273. In Amir's cabinet of 1947-48 Setiadjit was Deputy Prime Minister. He was also chairman of the Labour Party.

events had not transpired that way, the Surakarta region continued to play an important role in the political strategy of the communists immediately after the uprising. A few days after the uprising the Surakarta communists selected the Sukoharjo area, including rural Bendosari, as their local stronghold. Geographically, this region was in easy communication with communist territories in East Java, particularly Pacitan, Magetan and Ponorogo. The region of Sukoharjo was about twenty-five km to the north of Wonogiri, and both were accessible from the communist strongholds around Madiun.

AliRan tensions in the Surakarta rural areas reached a climax with kidnappings and killings between PESINDO and the Hisbullah, which were symptomatic of the wider ideological conflict between the communists and Muslims. Moreover the communists took the village official lands by force and distributed them to landless peasants. The communists, under the protection of the Tentara Merah (Red Army), distributed the kas desa land to landless peasants who had been BTI members.

The Red Army had established a stronghold at Grogoi, a village about ten km to the north of Sukoharjo, on 18 September. Here the communist armed forces consisted mainly of PESINDO and the navy units of Soejoto's Brigade and Yadao's Brigade. These forces were joined by units of the Red Army from Ponorogo which had established themselves at Bendosari in the region of Sukoharjo on 22 September. At Bendosari the Red Army kidnapped the leaders of Masyumi, PNI and some village headmen, including Martodihardjo, the village headman of Toriyo and the local leader of STII.

119 'Laporan Djawatan Kepolisian Negara Jogjakarta', typescript, 2 March 1948, Bundle B.35/35, ANRI.

120 The term Tentara Merah was applied to armed units under the PKI at the time, at least by non-PKI people, mainly because their members wore red bands on the head and arm. They were also referred to as the Tentara Musso.

121 'Surakarta', Bundle B.26/48, ANRI.

122 Interview with Martodihardjo, 20 August 1979.
From 22 to 26 September, the Red Army continued to kidnap prominent pamong praja, from regents down to subdistrict officers, as well as political leaders who were not leftists.

A detailed plan had been made by Sadikin's Siliwangi Brigade in Surakarta to occupy the strongholds of the PKI in the areas of Sukoharjo and Wonogiri, and then to move down to the coastal region of Pacitan in East Java. Sadikin ordered two Siliwangi battalions to attack the PKI strongholds in these areas, and these were strengthened by Battalion 14 from the Fifth Brigade of Senopati Battle Command (PPS), which was based in the Pacitan area and headed by Major Slamet Rijadi, who was not among the communist-influenced Senopati officers.123

As the Siliwangi battalions began to attack the PKI strongholds at Grogol and Bendosari, the Red Army withdrew to the south into Wonogiri regency. At the village of Tirtomoyo, one of the PKI strongholds in Wonogiri, about seventy km south of Surakarta city, the Red Army killed their prisoners.124 The new Military Governor of Surakarta, Colonel Gatot Subroto, publicly announced the mass killing at Tirtomoyo. Most of the victims were policemen and pamong praja, and a few were prominent Muslims.125 According to the report of the Nasuhi Battalion, at least fifty-six policemen and pamong praja had been killed by the Red Army.126 There were about 200 prisoners at Tirtomoyo. A captured PKI document stated that

123 Interview with the members of Barisan Banteng in July/August 1979; Sastrolawu, 12, 13 October 1979. The lasykar units of the Barisan Banteng, the Hizbullah and a portion of the Sastrolawu Battalion were ordered to assist Umar Wirahadikusumah in taking the PKI stronghold at Ngawi, about sixty-five km to the east of Surakarta city.

124 The Sukoharjo prisoners who were killed were Tjitrohupojo Honggopati (regent), Hardjodiningrat (deputy regent), Prodjosonto (district officer), and Tantopranoto (subdistrict officer). Interview with Martodihardjo, 20 August 1979.

125 Nasution, Sekitar, vol.8, p.312.

126 Siliwangi dari masa, p.159.
Yadao Brigade intended to kill these prisoners also, but owing to the sudden attack of the Siliwangi troops many of them were released.\(^{127}\)

In the early weeks of October the Communists withdrew their forces from rural areas of Wonogiri and concentrated on defending their stronghold in Pacitan, which was taken by Siliwangi troops on 15 October.\(^{128}\) The mopping-up operation by the Nasuhi Battalion in Wonogiri was completed by the last week of October. The majority of the communist armed forces at Wonogiri had consisted of members of the Yadao Brigade, the Soejoto Brigade and a portion of the Red Army from Madiun. The Nasuhi and Slamet Rijadi Battalions went on to capture the leading pro-PKI officers of the Senopati Battle Command at the PKI stronghold of Baturetno, Wonogiri. Among those taken were Lieutenant-Colonel Yadao, Lieutenant-Colonel Samsudin, an active promoter of the Surakarta PEPOLIT training, and Major Suwitojo, the PESINDO commander of the Ninth Brigade of the Senopati Battle Command.\(^{129}\) By early November Sukohardjo and Wonogiri were completely free of armed communists.

According to official sources in Surakarta, about 2,500 members of the Surakarta PKI had been captured by the Republican government troops.\(^{130}\) For the most part, captives were taken in the last week of September and early weeks of October, so that by mid-October there were hardly any more prisoners coming in.\(^{131}\) Some PESINDO members had in fact already been captured a few days after the uprising broke out. The captures were mainly carried out by Siliwangi troops and by Senopati soldiers who remained loyal to the

\(^{127}\) Nasution, Sekitar, vol.8, p.312.
\(^{128}\) Siliwangi dari masa, p.160.
\(^{129}\) Interview with Sastrolawu, 12, 13 October 1979.
\(^{130}\) Kenang-Kenangan Kota Besar Surakarta 1945-1953, Surakarta.
\(^{131}\) Interview with former prisoners of the Manahan camp, Sardjono, August 1979; Bodronojo, September 1979; Pawiro Granggang, September 1979.
government, particularly members of the Slamet Rijadi Battalion. In their duties, these were helped by the TP, the Hizbullah and the Barisan Banteng. The captured PKI supporters were collected in an emergency camp at Manahan, a wide square in the city of Surakarta, where they were closely guarded by Siliwangi troops. Prisoners' families could visit them only by standing on the street surrounding the camp and could provide meals for them only through the camp office. This was necessary because the government could not give proper meals as the local budget was concentrated on the expenses of the army units and the badan perjuangan which still continued to suppress PKI supporters hiding on the slopes of Mount Lawu and Mount Wilis.

The Surakarta PKI prisoners consisted mostly of members of PESINDO and the FDR, pro-PKI elements of the Senopati Division, activists of Sarbupri and Sobsi, prominent members of the BTI and pro-PKI Pokoso activists. In less than three months most of the PKI prisoners were released by the government, for on 19 December the Dutch initiated their second military action, attacking the territories of the Republic. All, however, were not freed; according to two of the prisoners, Sardjono and Bodronojo, tens of captives were killed, particularly prominent members of FDR and PESINDO.

The operations of the Republican armed forces had completely defeated the PKI uprising. The most senior communist leaders were captured by the Republican armed forces, or in some cases killed during the battles. Amir Sjarifuddin, Maruto Darusman, Suripno, Djokosujono and seven other leaders who had been in prison were simply shot at the village of Ngalian, Karanganyar regency, at midnight on 19 December 1948. Musso himself was killed in a

132 Originally, Manahan was a horse-racing track and a football field. In the Manahan camp there were more than 3,000 prisoners. Interview with Sardjono, 4 August 1979.

133 The seven other leaders were Oey Gie Hwat, Katamhadi, Ronomarsono, D. Mangku, Sardjono, Harjono and Sukarno. See Sedjarah Tentara Nasional Indonesia Komando Daerah Militer VII Diponegoro (Djawa Tengah) (Semarang, Sedjarah Militer Kodam VII, Diponegoro, n.d.), p.190.
skirmish at the village of Semanang, Ponorogo, on 31 October. His corpse, at the request of the Madiun people, was burned in Madiun.¹³⁴

Although the climax of the internal revolutionary conflict is associated with Madiun, Surakarta was in reality the main centre in which the building-up of tensions occurred. Because the conflict was resolved through military not political means, it resulted in the creation of a much higher degree of unity in the army, on the basis of a nationalist and anti-communist ideology. At the same time, however, a deep-seated division within society at large continued. In Surakarta, as elsewhere, revolutionary leadership moved to the right.

¹³⁴ A detailed contemporary report about the capture of Musso was made by Soemarno. See Djamal Marsudi, *op.cit.*, pp.102-06.
CHAPTER SEVEN

THE GUERRILLA PERIOD AND ITS AFTERMATH

THE DUTCH ATTACK: DECEMBER 1948

By early December 1948, relations between the Republic and the Dutch had reached a critical stage. Both informal discussions and more formal negotiations between Hatta's cabinet and the Dutch were deadlocked. A series of meetings held at Kaliurang near Jogjakarta in early December between Hatta, Stikker, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Sassen, Dutch Minister of Overseas Territories, did not produce anything. Sassen demanded that the Republic disband the TNI and exercise only police duties within the projected Federal Indonesian Government. Hatta and other Republican leaders refused this demand, stating that it would be impossible to disband the TNI because it had struggled for independence since the Republic of Indonesia was born.¹

On 11 December the Dutch announced officially that there would be no more negotiations with the Republic, for neither formal negotiations nor informal ones through the mediation of the Three Nations Commission would be of any further use.² This decision was designed to accelerate Dutch plans for the formation of the federal United States of Indonesia. On 18 December at 6 a.m. the Dutch radio in Jakarta announced that the Dutch would proceed with their plans to form a federal Indonesia without the Republic.³ On the same date Merle Cochran, the US representative on the Three Nations Committee, brought before that body a letter from the Dutch stating that Holland was terminating the Renville Agreement.⁴

¹ For details about the negotiations of Hatta with Stikker and Sassen see Mohammad Hatta, Memoir, pp.536-38.
² Republik Indonesia: Daerah Istimewa Jogjakarta (Kementerian Penerangan Republik Indonesia, 1952), p.294.
³ Mohammad Hatta, Memoir, p.539.
⁴ Abu Hanifah, Tales of a Revolution, p.296.
The crisis in relations between the Republic and the Dutch was quickly followed by a Dutch attack. The Dutch air force began to attack the Jogjakarta airport, Maguwo, on 19 December at 6 a.m. The Dutch dropped paratroops on the airport, and special troops then began to move on the city of Jogjakarta.\(^5\)

While the Dutch attack was going on, President Sukarno held an emergency cabinet meeting which could be attended by only a few Ministers: Dr Leimena (Minister of Health), Djuanda (Communications), Laoh (Public Works), Sultan Hamengkubuwono (Minister of State), H.A. Salim (Foreign Affairs).\(^6\) Other Ministers were unavailable, with Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, the Minister of Welfare, on tour in Bukittinggi, Sumatra, and Maramis, the Minister of Finance, with other Republican leaders in India.\(^7\) The cabinet made a number of important decisions. Firstly, President Sukarno and Vice-President Hatta would stay in Jogjakarta so that they could retain contact with the Three Nations Committee. Secondly, the Vice-President was authorized, as Minister of Defence, to announce that the army and the people must continue to carry out guerrilla warfare against the Dutch army. Thirdly, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, since he was in Sumatra, was authorized to form an Emergency Government and to take over the authority of the central government at Jogjakarta.\(^8\) On the same date the radio of the Republic at Jogjakarta announced these government decrees.\(^9\)

There was little resistance to the Dutch occupation of the

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\(^5\) For details on the Dutch attack and the situation of the Republican Government at Jogjakarta, see Mohammad Hatta, Memoir, pp.540-42; also, A.H. Nasution, Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia, vol.9, pp.186-90.


\(^7\) Republik Indonesia: Daerah Istimewa Jogjakarta, p.295.

\(^8\) Mohammad Hatta, Memoir, pp.541-42.

\(^9\) The full text of these decrees may be found in Daerah Istimewa Jogjakarta, pp.295-97.
capital, except for a small battle around the Presidential palace. Most of the Republican troops, in accordance with the previously planned guerrilla policy, had been leaving the city to establish their strongholds in rural areas. The Dutch captured Sukarno, Hatta, Sutan Sjahrir and other Republican leaders who still remained in the city. On 22 December all of them were imprisoned either on the island of Bangka or in the town of Prapat, Sumatra. Fortunately, General Sudirman had left the city on the afternoon of 19 December and was able to take direct charge of the guerrilla troops. Sultan Hamengkubuwono remained in his kraton, but refused an invitation to cooperate with the Dutch, and later he even actively financed guerrilla troops and Republican officials who still operated in the city.

The fall of Jogjakarta left other Republican territory open to attack by Dutch troops. On 19 December the Dutch air force also bombed the radio station at Delanggu, and made aerial drops of pamphlets urging the people to see that the TNI would be much better off handing over their weapons to the Dutch. On the morning of 20 December the Dutch air force attacked the radio transmitter building at Tawangmangu, in Karanganyar regency. Most of its equipment was damaged, but some was successfully evacuated to Balong, a village

11 For details, see Mohammad Hatta, Memoir, pp.542-50.
12 During the next five days, General Sudirman and his army guard contacted guerrillas in areas in Surakarta and East Java in the course of an extended march; Nasution, Sekitar, vol.9, pp.187-90.
13 Ibid., p.192.
14 Interview with Gondowidjojo, 14 August 1979.
16 Interview with Sastrolawu, 13 October 1979.
on the slopes of Mount Lawu. Under the control of the 'radio struggle group', Balong became the radio station of the Republic during the second Dutch aggression.17

On 20 December Lieutenant-Colonel Slamet Rijadi, the commander of the Fifth Brigade at Surakarta, under the broader authority of Gatot Subroto, ordered the army, the pemuda and the people to carry out a scorched-earth (bumi hangus) policy in the region of Surakarta. At six p.m. the army and the student army (TP) began to burn all important buildings, such as the post office, the army headquarters, government offices and the markets.18 In the regency of Klaten most tobacco factories, sugar factories, textile factories, and other important buildings were completed gutted by the local people.19 In Sragen the regency office and other government buildings were also burned down. Because of a lack of dynamite, the army and the pemuda did not succeed in blowing up the whole of the Sragen sugar factory.20 The scorched-earth policy was carried out in all regencies of Surakarta before the Dutch entered the regency towns.

On 21 December Dutch troops occupied a damaged city of Surakarta. The Republican army, led by Colonel Gatot Subroto, the Military Governor of the Surakarta region, had left the city, accompanied by most Republican officials, and formed a guerrilla government in the rural areas. Neither the Susuhunan nor the Mangkunegoro, however, left the city, and in fact both rulers seemed to welcome the Dutch return. Pakubuwono XII, under the strong influence of his mother and of KRT Sosrodiningrat, the experienced patih under Pakubuwono XI who had returned to that position in late 1946, decided to help the Dutch

17 Republik Indonesia: Propinsi Djawa Tengah (Djakarta, Kementerian Penerangan Republik Indonesia, 1953), pp.160-61.

18 Interview with Sudijo, 31 October 1979. According to this informant, TP, Barisan Banteng and Hizbullah all took an important part in the scorched-earth policy.


20 Interview with Panudi, 27 July 1979. In Sragen the AMS (Young Generation of Sukowati) took the leading role in the scorched-earth tactics.
The army and the pemuda burned the Surakarta municipality building shortly before the Dutch entered the Surakarta city.

*Republik Indonesia: Propinsi Djawa Tengah, p.221.*
government in the city rather than the Republic Government. Although
the Susuhunan himself had considered joining the Surakarta guerrilla
government, he was too weak to defy the opposition of his mother
and the patih. The patih set up a so-called Ontvangst Comite
(Reception Committee) in order to welcome the Dutch, and the patih
of the Mangkunegaran appeared to take his cues from Sosrodiningrat.
A few weeks after the Dutch occupation the rulers secretly allowed
the Dutch to visit their kratons. This contrasted sharply with the
attitude of the Jogjakarta rulers, who steadfastly refused to allow
any Dutch visits to the kratons.

Within a week the Dutch occupied the regency towns in
Surakarta. Most of their forces were based in Klaten regency, so
as to control the largest plantation areas in Surakarta, and most
of the place where Dutch troops were garrisoned, such as Ketandan,
Ceper, Gondangwinangun, Tegalrejo, Karanganom, Cokrotulung and
Delanggu, were centres of plantations and factories.

While the Republican troops and the pemuda carried out
guerrilla war against the Dutch, the Republican leaders endeavoured
to continue their diplomacy. Indeed, from a diplomatic point of
view, the second Dutch military action did not much help Dutch plans
to defeat the Republic. Most of the federal states, although they had
been set up under Dr H.J. van Mook, did not support the Dutch action.
After February 1949 the Dutch allowed Republican politicians who were not
imprisoned, to visit Sukarno, Hatta and the other leaders in Bangka.
Apparently this resulted from urgings of the Three Nations Committee
and the United Nations that the Dutch continue their diplomacy with
the Republic rather than their aggression. The republican politicians
discussed a transfer of sovereignty as planned by the Dutch. The
Republican Government would agree to discuss such a transfer if the

21 Interview with KRT Darjonegoro, 30 December 1979.
22 Panitya Monumen Perjoangan '45 Klaten, op.cit., p.154.
   According to this source, the Dutch troops in the region of
   Klaten constituted some two battalions.
Republic regained its authority at Jogjakarta. However, the Republic continued her struggle against the Dutch through diplomasi and perjuangan until a unitary state was achieved in August 1950.

NATURE OF THE DUTCH OCCUPATION, DECEMBER 1948-MARCH 1949

The second Dutch aggression could be regarded as an effort to destroy the Republic by force and to implement the Dutch strategy and tactics of building a federal system. Military aggression was complemented, however, by the old Dutch policy of attracting local aristocrats to commit themselves to an anti-Republican stance. Although the Dutch had failed to win the cooperation of the rulers in Jogjakarta, they succeeded with the rulers of the Surakarta principalities.

The first Dutch plan in Surakarta was to restore the former authority of the rulers through the formation of a local federal state under the title Negara Mataram, aiming to evoke the glory of that state in the seventeenth century. Its government was to be chaired by the Susuhunan, and its territory would embrace the former territories of both the Kasunanan and the Mangkunegaran. This plan failed because the Mangkunegoro demanded that the Dutch set up two separate local governments in Surakarta. The Dutch themselves, as a result of the increasing pressure from the guerrilla troops, abandoned this plan in favour of more immediate goals. The Dutch also failed in their efforts to establish a Dewan Islam (Islamic Committee) for Surakarta. The Dewan Islam was intended to enrol the political support of Moslem leaders, and it was first applied in Surakarta. After its failure there, however, it was not attempted elsewhere in Java. Two prominent Moslem leaders of Surakarta, Idris and Muljadi Djojomartono, both former Peta officers, rejected the Dutch offer to lead this organization, prompting the Dutch to imprison both men briefly.

24 Hatta, Memoir, p.549.
26 Interview with Haji Bakri, 15 August 1979.
The Dutch were more successful in forming the TBS (Territoriale Bataljon Surakarta). The TBS was an auxiliary military force of the Dutch, and its existence strengthened the alliance between the Dutch and the Mangkunegaran in Surakarta. The TBS consisted mostly of former members of the Mangkunegaran Legion, the traditional armed force loyal to the Mangkunegoro. As part of the Dutch armed forces it was under the control of the Dutch Resident of Surakarta, and its members made up two battalions.

The Dutch also strengthened the Semut Ireng ('Black Ants') force which had been recruited by the Mangkunegaran prior to the Dutch occupation to guard the security of the palace. Most of the members of this force, which was expanded to almost 500 men under the Dutch, had also been members of the Mangkunegaran legion. They were conspicuous by the black uniforms they wore.

The Dutch also armed these Semut Ireng troops specifically to enable the Mangkunegoro to guard his sugar plantations and factories. Although the rulers' estates had been taken over by the Republic since May 1946, the Dutch occupation enabled the rulers, particularly the Mangkunegoro, to regain control of these estates. Some workers, who wished to continue to labor on the plantation estates and the factories, accepted positions under Dutch control. Most of them, however, such as those at the Mangkunegoro's Colomadu and Tasikmadu sugar factories, left their jobs, with some of them returning to their former peasant status and a few joining the guerrilla troops in their villages. The assistance given by the Semut Ireng force to the Dutch armed forces intensified the resentment of the people of Surakarta toward the Mangkunegoro. API, a Surakarta newspaper asserted:

27 Berita Solo, no.23, April 1949. According to Mangkunegaran sources, the TBS was outside the Mangkunegaran's responsibility. Surakarta revolutionaries, however, believed the TBS was planned, jointly by the Dutch and the Mangkunegoro.

28 See above, pp.135-36.

29 This data is taken from interview with former Mangkunegaran officials: KRMT Sanjoto, 6 July 1979; Soedjono, 9 July 1979; Marjono, 9 July 1979; Sudarjo, 14 July 1979.
Do you know that Semut Ireng which is fully armed, intends to confront your own nation and to help protect the security of the Dutch. We (the people of Surakarta) warn you that the people may attack, burn and rob the palace.

The Dutch were successful in attracting the support of the Susuhunan, who provided facilities for Dutch administrative offices in the Gladag area of the kraton. In April the Dutch convened a meeting among the nobles of the Kasunanan and the Mangkunegaran at Sidikoro, a special meeting room inside the kraton of the Susuhunan. About 100 men attended. The Dutch were represented by Colonel J.H. de Vries, the military commander in Surakarta, Resident Linck and Major Bajetto. The meeting discussed a plan for the development of the region of Surakarta, as a way of obtaining popular support to strengthen the Dutch government.

Administratively, some of the functions of the rulers, under the categories of general affairs, economic affairs, social affairs, and government affairs, were restored by the Dutch. Only security affairs remained in the hands of the Dutch armed forces, so that they could respond directly to the changing situation in the Surakarta region. New kepala kampung (hamlet heads) were appointed in each area of the city by the two rulers, in the hope of strengthening their authority. This caused some confusion, for it meant that certain areas, such as the Banjarsari neighbourhood, now had two types of kepala kampung, those appointed by the Republic and those by the Susuhunan.

The Dutch, seeing the situation in constitutional terms, planned to establish the principalities of Surakarta as an autonomous area which would join the projected Indonesian Federation. The rulers, seeing in this the reincarnation of their swapraja hopes, responded positively to the Dutch plan. Within a few months, in August 1949, this issue once again created intense conflicts between pro- and anti-swapraja forces.

30 API, no.3, 3 March 1949.

31 Berita Solo, no.23, 12 April 1949.
As was the case generally in Republican Java, the region of Surakarta had suffered seriously from life's hardships since the first Dutch action on 21 July 1947. This was caused by the Dutch blockade, preventing the Republic from importing vital goods, such as cloth, rice and oil. The Surakarta official source, Penerangan Rakjat, reported that the people of Surakarta were experiencing difficulties in obtaining clothing and foodstuffs.  

Most markets in the regency towns had no more stocks of clothing or food. In November 1947 the Surakarta government had launched a great movement to induce peasants to plant cotton, aiming to boost stocks of cloth. In early 1948 the food shortage became so acute that foodstuffs were effectively controlled by the Panitya Pembagian Bahan Makanan (Foodstuffs Distribution Committee) of Surakarta. This was chaired by Sudiro, the head of the DPD, who imposed a policy prohibiting merchants from accumulating food supplies.

Several weeks before the second Dutch aggression, the rice merchants in the city markets had been ordered by the walikota of Surakarta to sell their rice to the local Republican government. Compensation for the rice was given in the form of petroleum and refined sugar. The main goal of this move was to retain rice stocks in the hands of the Republican Government so that Chinese merchants could not control the rice trade.

In the first months of 1949 the price of rice was very high in most regions of Java. This was chiefly because of the war, which made it difficult for agricultural produce to enter the cities. The Surakarta evidence shows that after the occupation trade relationships between villages and regency towns did not run smoothly. Only a few shops remained open, most of them owned by Chinese. Many city people left the towns for the villages to be secure from the Dutch attacks, and this influx added to the fear village merchants had about entering the towns. All of this interrupted normal commercial transactions between town and country.

34 Wasita, no.13, 20 March 1948.
35 Pengumuman Walikota Surakarta, no.15, 2 November 1948.
The price of goods was unstable. Already several months before the Dutch occupation of December 1948 the price of rice in many cities of Java was between f. 160 and f. 185 per quintal, rising to f. 185 in January 1949. As a result of Dutch controls the price then began to decrease till it reached f. 60 per quintal in May.36

The Dutch also suffered from the high prices for rice, particularly in supplying food for their soldiers. Therefore the Dutch commander in Surakarta, Coloneel de Vries, issued a decree in January attempting to regulate the price of foodstuffs in the city. For instance, the price of rice was fixed at 50 guilder cents per kg, refined sugar at 20 cents per kg and corn at 25 cents per kg.37

As a result of the Dutch occupation the people of Surakarta used both the federal (Dutch-recognized) currency and the Republican currency, the so-called ORI (Oeang Repoeblik Indonesia - Indonesian Republic Currency). This situation created difficulties for both sellers and buyers in their commercial transactions. In some cases the urban pemuda of Surakarta prohibited merchants from using the federal currency. Apparently the Dutch in Surakarta tried to decrease the rate of exchange for the ORI, or even to replace it altogether by the federal currency. The Dutch collected the ORI, aiming to reduce the amount in circulation so that the federal currency could gradually replace the ORI.38 In retaliation the Surakarta guerrilla troops issued a decree fixing the rate of exchange between ORI and federal currency in the ratio of 10 to 1.39

The Surakarta rural case studies show that villagers had difficulty getting the Ori. They fulfilled their daily needs with a barter system in the local markets.40 The federal currency had been prohibited from circulating in rural areas by the village guerrillas.

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36 Economische Weekblad voor Indonesie, no.15, 9 April 1949.
38 Interview with Haji Bakri, 15 August 1979.
39 Pengumuman Pasukan Gerilya Surakarta, no.1, 12 March 1949.
40 Interview with Sardjono, 4 August 1979; Darmanto, 8 October 1979; Bahkran, 11 October 1979.
In addition, the Republican subdistrict government prohibited the sale of rice production in large amounts in the city markets. This policy was intended to build local stocks of rice so that no area was excessively dependent upon other areas to fulfil its needs, but it was also one of the reasons why the price of rice in the towns was unstable. The Republican military government of Surakarta prohibited Chinese traders from living in the subdistrict centres. In many cases Chinese traders had been compelled by the Dutch to support their economic policy, particularly Dutch efforts to accumulate a food supply. For instance, the family of Babah Kidjang, a rich Chinese in Sragen, had to sell their large stock of food to the Dutch at prices lower than the normal rate.

Such Chinese actions, even though they were insisted on by the Dutch, gave rise to a negative feeling against the Chinese in Surakarta, when the people of Surakarta thought that the Chinese were supporting the Dutch. As a result, an anti-Chinese movement appeared. In the early months of 1949 a few Chinese merchants were killed in Gondang and Kedawung, two subdistricts of Sragen regency. Many Chinese houses in the subdistrict of Baturetno (Wonogiri regency) were burned by Republican forces. In early February 1949 the Eng Bo shop, the biggest Chinese shop in Surakarta, was burned by pemuda and guerrilla troops.

Apparently the unstable economic conditions, compounded by the war, caused social unrest in both urban and rural areas of Surakarta. Some villagers suffered from malnutrition, for example in Jumapolo, one of the dry areas in Surakarta. The same problem occurred in the city of Surakarta, particularly in Pasar Kliwon, Tipes, Joyotakan, Joyosuran, Semanggi and Sangkrah. Robbery also increased during the Dutch occupation, as a response to the war

41 'Laporan Pemerintahan Distrik Baturetno', 1948, AMN.
42 API, no.1, 17 February 1949.
43 Interview with Darmanto, 8 October 1979.
44 Berita Solo, no.59, 27 May 1949.
and the economic hardship. Cattle theft occurred in many rural areas of Surakarta. The Surakarta weekly, API, classified the robbers into three categories: professional robbers; supporters of the Republic, consisting mostly of guerrilla troops who robbed richer pro-Dutch city people, for instance Chinese traders; and kaki tangan (supporters) of the Dutch, who stole the property of the people to create a chaotic situation in the territories of the Republic. This was planned by the Dutch, according to API.  

In short, the Dutch aggression succeeded in occupying the cities and towns, forcing the Republican Government out into the countryside. In the economic field, this had the effect of disrupting trade relationships between urban and rural areas.

GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION AND ITS OPERATION

The basic idea behind the system of guerrilla warfare pursued by the Republic was derived from Colonel A.H. Nasution's experiences of fighting against the Dutch in West Java during the first Dutch action in 1947. With the outbreak of the second Dutch action on 19 December 1948, Nasution as Commander of the Army and the Java Territorium issued, on 22 December, a decree establishing a Military Administration for the whole of the island of Java. This was amplified by a working instruction dated 25 December dealing with the formation of new military government authorities. There were also civil authorities in Java, such as resident, regent, camat (subdistrict officer) and village headman.

45 API, no.3, 3 March 1949.
48 The new military government authorities were as follows: Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces; Commander of the Army and Java Territorium; Military Governor; Military Regional Commands or Sub-territorial Commands (STC); Military District Commands (KDM); Military Subdistrict Commands (KODM); Village Cadre (Kader Desa); and Hamlet Cadre (Kader Dukuh). Nasution, Pokok2, p.120; Nasution, Fundamentals, p.121.
The military government of Central Java, following Nasution's working instruction, was divided into two authorities. The Second Military Governorship or the Second Division, headed by Colonel Gatot Subroto, consisted of STC Semarang, STC Pati, STC Surakarta and STC Madiun. The Third Military Governorship or the Third Division, headed by Colonel Bambang Sugeng, consisted of STC Banyumas, STC Pekalongan, STC Kedu and STC Jogjakarta. Each STC delineated an area of the guerrilla operation and was called a *wehrkreise*. Each *wehrkreise* was divided into sub-*wehrkreise*. The *wehrkreise* Surakarta consisted of seven sub-*wehrkreise*, each operating in a different regency, including one in the city of Surakarta itself.

On the other hand, military control of government was exercised through the PMKB (Pemerintahan Militer Kabupaten - Regency Military Government) and PMKT (Pemerintahan Militer Kecamatan - Subdistrict Military Government). In addition, there was also a civil administration which followed the lines of the former divisions - regency, district, subdistrict and village.

Thus the region of Surakarta, under the system of guerrilla government, had three different authorities: the operational authority, the military territorial authority and the civil administrative authority. The last two functioned as the agent of the Republic, carrying out the tasks of government in the fields of general affairs, economic affairs, community affairs and defence. In practice the two authorities united in the PMKB at regency and PMKT at subdistrict level, both of which therefore contained both military men and civilians.

Apparently the PMKT groups in Surakarta played a leading role in organizing the guerrilla troops in rural areas. For instance, Lieutenant Kasimo, a former Peta officer and the head of the Bendosari KNID, who was the head of the Bendosari PMKT from 1948 to 1950, explained that the Bendosari PMKT set up Pager Desa (Pasukan Gerilya Desa - Village Guerrilla Troops) in February 1949. This was based


50 Interview with Kasimo, 28 July 1979.
on Nasution's instruction to the Military Governors on 25 January 1949 that Pager Desa had to be formed for the whole of Java. The Bendosari Pager Desa was comprised mostly of rural pemudas who had experienced military training at the Lasykar Rakyat's dormitory at Bendosari. Some of them had received military training in the Seinendan during the Japanese occupation. The leader of the Bendosari Pager Desa was the commander of the sub-wehrkreise of Sukaharjo.

The Pager Desa of other subdistricts, such as Kedawung and Jumapolo, were made up of rural pemuda who had joined the Barisan Banteng. A few of them were former members of Lasykar Rakyat. Most were illiterate pemuda. The Pager Desa of Kedawung was under the auspices of the sub-wehrkreise of Sragen, and that of Jumapolo Pager Desa under the sub-wehrkreise of Karanganyar. Apparently the Pager Desa at Delanggu had a more varied membership, consisting of Hizbullah, Lasykar Rakyat, leftist pemuda such as PESINDO members, and students of the High School. It was under the auspices of the sub-wehrkreise of Klaten.

The distribution of army units in each subdistrict was based on the demands of military strategy, not on the importance of the subdistrict. To see this, we can compare four of our selected subdistricts in the context of military strategy. In Jumapolo, because its location was far from the Dutch headquarters, there was only a small army unit consisting mainly of soldiers of the PMKT and other mobile troops from other subdistricts. The subdistrict of Delanggu, on the other hand, needed a force of more than one company. The main reason for this was to face the Dutch troops who made their headquarters in the factory of Delanggu. The Bendosari subdistrict, with its surrounding area, was considered the ideal place to resist the advance of Dutch troops to areas south of the city of Surakarta.

52 Interview with Darmanto, 8 October 1979.
53 Interview with Slamet Muljono, 13 August 1979.
Several companies were therefore located there.\textsuperscript{54} There was only one platoon for the subdistrict of Kedawung, apart from mobile army units from other PMKT.\textsuperscript{55}

The Surakarta \textit{wehrkreise} consisted in all of over 6,000 men, including TP members, who were distributed in more than 100 subdistricts.\textsuperscript{56} The Surakarta \textit{wehrkreise} concentrated its defence in Klaten regency. The Dutch had placed two battalions there in order to control the biggest concentration of estates in Surakarta, and the Republic countered by stationing more than one battalion in the Klaten region.\textsuperscript{57}

These army units in their guerrilla operations were closely integrated with the Pager Desa. The Surakarta evidence shows that Pager Desa were coordinated by lurahs assisted by kebayan (heads of hamlet). There were small units of Pager Desa located at the dukuh (hamlet) level. The Pager Desa's main function was to guard village security. Pemuda members of the Pager Desa were usually veterans of various \textit{badan perjuangan} organizations. During the guerrilla period, however, they became very close to army units, assisting them actively in various tasks. A characteristic Pager Desa role was to barricade roads, either with crossbars or by digging ditches across them. Special targets were the roads connecting Surakarta city with regency towns or the regency towns with the subdistrict centres. For instance, the roads between Sragen and the subdistrict centres of that regency - Kedawung, Masaran, Gondang, Tangen and Sambirejo - were completely destroyed by the guerrilla troops. Pager Desa also participated alongside army units in small night attacks on the Dutch garrisons. The preparations for night attacks were summarized by one Kedawung guerrilla as follows:

\textsuperscript{54} Interview with Kasimo, 28 July 1979.

\textsuperscript{55} Interview with Soekardi, 23 July 1979.

\textsuperscript{56} For details see Mengenang Palagan Empat Hari di Surakarta tanggal 7 s/d 10 Agustus 1949 (Surakarta, Panitva Seksi Penggali Sedjarah Monumen dan Sedjarah Militer Dam Diponegoro, 1965), pp.24-30.

\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Perjoangan Rakyat Klaten}, p.154.
The members of the village guerrilla troops came in secret to a pre-determined place around dusk. The members of the army had already arrived. They dressed in black and green uniforms and tied red and white flags on their heads. After getting all the necessary information about the plan of attack, they shouted 'merdeka'. Then they simply left their base and went to the city in which the Dutch headquarters were.58

Certain members of the Pager Desa, selected on the basis of education and experience, had responsibilities as couriers to link one post to the others. It is important to note that the members of the Pager Desa did not live in barracks but at their own houses, and regular soldiers as well were lodged at the villagers' houses.59 Through the public kitchen system, coordinated by the lurahs and the PMKT, the villagers provided meals for the army.

In a broader context, the guerrillas also guarded the security of village markets, and attempted to control the fluctuations in prices of goods. As a result of speculation by the sellers, the price of goods nevertheless rose dramatically, particularly goods normally distributed from the city, such as dried salted fish, salt, petroleum, coconut oil and sugar. The sellers of these items were usually city traders who sold in the villages, and the price increases were simply caused by the danger of moving in and out of the cities. The Dutch sometimes seized people on the roads whether they were really merchants or guerrillas. Indeed it sometimes happened that guerrillas disguised themselves as merchants to try to investigate the strength and disposition of Dutch forces in the cities.

The relationship between the villages and the guerrillas was also influenced by the role of the village jago or the guru ngèlmu who advised the army leaders on th petitungan Jawa. In addition the jago's house, in the case of Soekardi, was also a place of secret

58 Interview with Soekardi, 23 July 1979. Soekardi's house became a place of night meetings of the guerrilla troops. Soekardi joined the PMKT in the section of food supply and headed the dapur umum at his village. See fuller notes in Bibliography.

59 The Kedawung case suggests that each family could look after only one or two soldiers. Interview with Soekardi, 8 July 1979.
night meetings of the guerrillas before the launching of an attack on a Dutch base. The jago or the guru nyelau advised the whole guerrilla organization on moral questions, especially the so-called waler (prohibition). The waler prohibited fighting men from having illicit sexual relations or damaging people's property. Anyone who broke the waler would die a useless death (mati konyol).

One of the other problems in organizing guerrilla warfare was finance. In the Surakarta case this was partly solved by the dana perjuangan (struggle funds) system, which consisted of several sources of income. Firstly, there might be a village market tax, directly collected by the PMKT, as occurred at Tawangmangu, Kedawung, and Delanggu. Another source was a tax collected from the production of agriculture, representing about 5 per cent of production. This aimed to replace a land tax which had previously been collected by the lurah. This contribution, however, was apparently more than the normal land tax, for the peasants in these three subdistricts had in fact paid land tax in cash yearly to the amount of only 1 or 2 per cent of production. A third source of revenue was general contributions, such as the donation by the batik making cooperative of Surakarta, Batari, of clothing and money for the city sub-wehrkreise.

All kinds of revenue sources had to be authorized by the Military Regional Government or by the PMKT. Moreover, there was a claim bureau which solved various problems of collecting funds, particularly if persons were not satisfied with the amount levied. The struggle funds were often embezzled by the army members of PMKT. In the use of the struggle funds, moreover, conflicts often took place between soldiers and civil administrators. Civil administrators were very critical of army men who misused the struggle funds.

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60 For Soekardi's role with regard to the petungan Jawa, see above, p.76.
63 Berita Solo, 21 November 1949.
64 Interview with Kasimo, 28 July 1979.
These army men were commonly called tukang catut, a term popularly used during the Japanese occupation to refer to corrupt people. One of the Surakarta newspapers, Wasita, referred to corrupt elements of the revolutionary period as golongan sampah masyarakat (scum of society group). This group had neglected the poor (si miskin) and forgotten religion and the national struggle (perjuangan negara).

The spirit of guerrilla warfare was strengthened by radio broadcasts, directed by Maladi, a pemuda who had been active in the Surakarta AMRI. During the Dutch occupation the transmitter was at Balong, a village on the slopes of Mount Lawu. It broadcast news of the guerrilla situation in Indonesian, English and Dutch, about four times a day. The balong transmitter could be picked up throughout Java and Sumatra. Because its location was surrounded by hilly areas, Dutch attacks on the transmitter were unsuccessful until just before the cease-fire in August 1949, when the Dutch air force bombed the Balong area, damaging part of the radio equipment.

The gerilya government, which secretly mobilized in the villages, greatly increased the participation of the rural community in the independence struggle. The rural community grew closer to the Republican leaders. Ministers, governors, residents and regents led their mobile government. An outstanding example was the experience of Susanto Tirtoprodjo, the Minister of Justice. In his book, Najaka Lalana, Susanto has described his experience of joining the guerrilla government which moved from one village to another in East Java. The lurahs and other villagers looked after Susanto's and his friends' meals, in the spirit of the guerrilla struggle.

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65 Wasita, no.1, 15 February 1948; no.6, 8 March 1948.

66 In 1934 Maladi had been a member of Solosche Radio Vereeniging (SRV). During the occupation he headed the Surakarta radio station. See Republik Indonesia: Propinsi Djawa Tengah, pp.155-63. Maladi was born on 31 August 1912 in Surakarta and was a graduate of AMS. See The Asia Who's Who (Hongkong, 1960), p.259.

67 For details about the Dutch attack at Balong see Republik Indonesia: Propinsi Djawa Tengah, pp.161-62.

Susanto recalls military leaders, civilian administrators, village heads and villagers discussing important points with him. Such discussions would include consideration of how best to keep the guerrilla government's civil administrators safe while moving them about in areas threatened by Dutch attacks and Dutch spies. Participation in such talks obviously would help to strengthen villagers' feelings that this government was their government. At the local level throughout the Surakarta region, the bupatis and their staffs also secretly led their mobile government. Sometimes they met camats who were also mobilizing their local government. They slept and ate in the houses of the lurahs and the villagers. They always ate in village style - with sayur (vegetables), tempe (soya bean cake), gereh (dry, salted fish) and sambal (chili sauce). Like the villagers, the bupatis and their staffs had a simple breakfast of cassava (ketela pohon) and sweet potato (ubi). At each house they stayed no more than five days. This served both to elude Dutch spies and to avoid placing too heavy a burden for meals on certain villages.

In practice the relations between civilian administrators and military leaders were conducted within the military government system, in such institutions as the PMKB and the PMKT. This meant that civilian administrators had less power than those who were military leaders. Most statutes regulating local security, identity cards for local travel, local market taxes and others were produced and legalized by the PMKT and signed by the military men who headed this PMKT.

The role of military men in the villages, however, seems to have been a more popular one than that of civilian leaders during the guerrilla period. Apparently this was because the military government system, through the PMKB and the PMKT, made military men seem more than civilian administrators to be wielding the actual power of government. Moreover the military men could be seen protecting the villagers from Dutch attacks and from other disturbances, such as

69 Ibid, pp.39-49.
Situation of the Surakarta city during the Dutch occupation December 1948-1949.
Republik Indonesia: Propinsi Djawa Tengah, p.171.

One of city markets in Surakarta damaged as the result of battles between the Dutch and the guerrillas.
Republik Indonesia: Propinsi Djawa Tengah, p.171.
robberies and theft. And the PMKB and PMKT, through military government which was implemented, in fact designated the pamong praja as assistants in carrying out the guerrilla government. The dominance of the military in the government ended only in August 1950, when the Minister of Interior announced a decision that the government should be transferred to the hands of civilians.

During the guerrilla period, then, the military both controlled and appeared to control the civilian administration. In these circumstances, relations between civilians and the military elite worsened as the status of the pamong praja dropped rapidly in comparison with the military. This had a serious effect in later periods, when the 'dwifungsi' of the army became an obvious fact in the Indonesian government bureaucracy, and laid the basis for political conflicts between civil administrators, particularly those who joined political parties, and the military elite in contemporary Indonesian society.

RETURN OF THE GUERRILLAS TO THE CITY


Six meetings of the United Nations in March 1949 prompted the Dutch to advance a drastic new scheme. This featured two points:

1. sovereignty would be transferred earlier than the United Nations Resolution had demanded;
2. during the transitional period all difficulties would be reduced. 71

To this end discussions began in April in Jakarta between J.H. van Royen, the chief of the Netherlands Delegation, and Vice-President Hatta.


71 Ibid., pp.201-02.
Van Royen agreed to Hatta's demand that authority be returned to the Republican Government at Jogjakarta. 72

Meanwhile guerrilla actions stepped up throughout Java and Sumatra. The Dutch were increasingly obliged to use their troops defensively to guard the security of the towns against the guerrilla attacks. In turn, they periodically launched surprise attacks on villages surrounding the cities in the hope of capturing guerrillas. From January to May, day and night battles were frequent in Java and Sumatra between the Dutch army and the guerrillas. In Surakarta, too, the months between January and May were marked by frequent Dutch sorties against villages which were assumed to be guerrilla centres. Dutch spies, both Chinese and Javanese, entered villages trying to obtain information about the guerrillas' headquarters. On the other hand, the guerrilla troops expanded their activities, destroying roads and carrying out sudden attacks on Dutch patrols around the regency towns.

Hatta's meetings with representatives of the Three Nations Committee subsequently led to the Roem-Royen Agreement of 13 May 1949. This stipulated a cease-fire between the two opposing forces, the release of all Republican prisoners, and the return of the Republican Government to Jogjakarta. Further negotiations between the Republic and the Dutch reached the compromise that a cease-fire would be achieved before the Round Table Conference, designed to finalize plans for a sovereign, federal Indonesia, opened in Holland on 23 August 1949. This cease-fire was to come into effect on 11 August 1949.

The guerrilla leaders argued that general attacks ought to be made on Dutch bases during the days immediately before the cease-fire, in order to show that the Republican armed forces were still strong. In addition, victory in those attacks would enable the guerrillas to capture Dutch arms, which might well be of use in the future. The plan of general attack also arose from the strategic situation of the guerrillas, who had already surrounded many cities

72 Hatta, Memoir, p.549.
of Java during the first days of August 1949. In the city of Surakarta, as in many other cities in Java, therefore, heavy fighting took place just before the date the cease-fire would become effective. From 7 to 10 August a series of battles took place in the city between the Dutch army and the Surakarta guerrillas. Lieutenant-Colonel Slamet Rijadi, the commander of the Fifth Brigade of Surakarta, Second Division, issued an oral order to the troops of sub-wehrkreise 106 on 7 August 1949. This contained a plan for general attacks on Dutch headquarters in the city, to begin on 7 August and end on 10 August at midnight. Slamet Rijadi argued that this would be the ideal moment to show the Dutch the strength of the guerrillas. The offensive should also be regarded as an attempt to destroy the Dutch before the cease-fire, and to win the moral support of the people for the Indonesian army.

Two thousand guerrillas, consisting mainly of the sub-wehrkreise 106 troops and the Student Army (TP), entered the city of Surakarta from all directions on 7 August at 4 a.m. Apparently the Dutch were prepared, since their spy agency had already learned of Slamet Rijadi's plan. The guerrillas, their anti-Dutch spirit now at high pitch, could no longer delay and began to attack the Dutch headquarters at 9 a.m. The battle spread rapidly during four days. The daily Kedaulatan Rakjat, reported that three-quarters of the city were under the guerrilla troops on 8 August. The guerrillas occupied most of the neighbourhoods in the south, east and north of the city. In practice, the Dutch controlled only the Surakarta city highway and their own strongholds of Beteng, Gladag, Penumping and Mangkubumen.

73 See Mangenang Palagan Empat Hari, p.52.
74 Ibid, pp.50-52. This oral command of 7 August was supplemented by a written order the following day.
75 Republik Indonesia: Propinsi Djawa Tengah, p.54; see also, Perjoangan Rakyat Klaten, p.178.
76 Republik Indonesia: Propinsi Djawa Tengah, p.54.
77 Mengenang Palagan, p.52.
78 Kedaulatan Rakjat, 12 August 1949.
All the fighting ended at midnight on 10 August when the cease-fire agreement was reached between the Republic and the Dutch.

During these battles the Dutch enjoyed the advantage of modern military equipment. Their tanks rolled up and down the streets. Their air force bombed areas of the city occupied by the guerrillas. The Dutch also used cannons, mortars, and automatic rifles, causing heavy civilian casualties in the neighbourhoods of Pasar Kembang, Pasar Nongko, Kadipolo, Gajahan and other places. During the fighting more than 1,800 Surakarta civilians died.

Immediately after the cease-fire, on 11 August, a preliminary discussion was held between Slamet Rijadi and Colonel Ohl, the Dutch commander in Surakarta. They agreed that the TNI should be withdrawn from the city and relocated around its periphery. The Dutch would end their reprisals, return their troops to their former posts, and plan to transfer the city of Surakarta quickly to the control of the TNI.

These Dutch undertakings were immediately violated. On 11 August, the Dutch 'Green Berets', consisting mostly of Ambonese, carried out mass killings at Gading, a centre for the Indonesian Red Cross. Skirmishes continued between the Green Berets and

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79 Their military equipment, based on an estimate of May 1949, comprised 24 cannons, 24 mortars, 40 machine guns, 496 carbines, 97 pistols, 496 other guns, 34 tanks, 119 trucks and 58 jeeps. The Dutch troops consisted of 1,050 men, 352 of them Dutch and the remainder Indonesian (including many former Heiho); see Mengenang Palagan, p.23. This number excluded the TBS and Semut Ireng, most of whom had defected from their positions alongside the Dutch armed forces a few weeks before the cease-fire. Some Dutch reinforcements also came from Semarang during the fighting.

80 Mengenang Palagan, pp.53-54; Kedaulatan Rakjat, 12 August 1949; Perjoangan Rakyat Klaten, p.179.

81 Mengenang, pp.56-57.

82 These Green Beret troops came from Semarang to assist the Dutch forces in Surakarta during the battles. See 'Pelapuran Minggon Kawontenan2 tuwin Kadodosan2 ing wewengkon Mangkunegaran', typescript, 31 July-20 August 1949, AMN. These reports are subsequently cited as 'Pelapuran Minggon', followed by the dates covered in the report.
guerrillas until early September in many places within the city.  

On 12 November 1949 the Dutch authorities transferred the city of Surakarta to the control of the TNI. On the same date the Republican army, police corps, and military police corps entered the city. The Dutch began to withdraw their troops to Semarang, their principal headquarters in Central Java. On 29 November Resident Linck transferred all administrative offices of the civil government to Sudiro in his capacity as Republican Resident of Surakarta.

The transfer of civil administration gave rise to many problems. The so-called golongan ko-operator (co-operator group) had worked in Dutch government offices during the occupation, although they had previously been Republican officials. Those officials who had joined the gerilya government now refused to allow these co-operators to participate in the new Republican civil administration. In many cases the co-operators could not be appointed as Republican officials.

Action against co-operators took place chiefly in rural areas of the Mangkunegaran. In line with earlier revolutionary experience, kidnappings again became a popular way to attack the traditional authorities. On 11 August the village administrative staff of Selogiri (Wonogiri regency) were kidnapped by military men hoping to force the breaking off of relations with the Mangkunegaran government. The military commander of Colomadu subdistrict (Karanganyar regency) ordered all village headmen there to stop work. Apparently the village headmen had cooperated in defending Mangkunegoro's sugar plantation and factory at Colomadu, which the Dutch had jointly managed. In September 1949 the kidnapping actions expanded to rural areas of Wonogiri regency, such as Jatisrono, Baturetno and

83 'Pelapuran Minggon', 2-9 September 1949.
84 Sari Radio-Pers, no.23, 30 November 1949.
85 'Pelapuran Minggon', 31 July-20 August 1949, AMN.
86 Ibid.
87 Interview with Totosardjono, 8 August 1979.
Surakarta guerrilla troops entered the city shortly after a cease-fire of August 1949.

Republik Indonesia: Propinsi Djawa Tengah, p.223.

(X) Lieutenant Colonel Slamet Rijadi in the reception of transfer of authority from the Dutch hands.

Republik Indonesia: Propinsi Djawa Tengah, p.172.
Pracimantoro. Village headmen and their assistants there were kidnapped by former guerrillas. 88

In the regency of Karanganyar the kidnapping actions were followed by the destruction of the sugar plantation. 89 On 18 and 19 September the villagers, led by military officers, burned the sugar plantation of the Mangkunegoro enterprise. 90 In the subdistrict of Kartosuro the military and the pemudas replaced those village government officials who had openly cooperated with the Susuhunan in distributing clothing rations to the people during the Dutch occupation. 91 This distribution had actually been planned by the Dutch in an attempt to restore the people's sympathy for the Susuhunan. By contrast, in the subdistrict of Delanggu the Dutch had not been able to distribute clothing to the people, because most of the village headmen actively supported the village guerrillas and refused to act as an arm of the Dutch. 92 The same pattern occurred in two other subdistricts, Kedawung and Bendosari. 93 A few of the Jumapolo villagers received clothing distributed from the Dutch agency at Tasikmadu. 94

In Surakarta the guerrillas did not confine their role to military defence but also took some initiatives to solve the social problems of the peasants. There was unrest among landless peasants who resided on the slopes of Mount Merapi and Mount Merbabu, in the regency of Boyolali, and complained about their shortage of food. 95

88 'Pelapuran Minggon', 2-9 September 1949, AMN.
89 'Pelapuran Minggon', 17-23 September 1949, AMN.
90 'Verslag Wedono Karanganjar', typescript, 4 October 1949, AMN.
91 Interview with Totosardjono, 8 August 1979.
92 Interview with Slamet Muljono, 13 September 1979.
93 Interview with Soekardi, 31 July 1979; Kasimo, 28 July 1979.
94 Interview with Darmanto, 8 October 1979.
95 Republik Indonesia: Propinsi Djawa Tengah, pp.211-12.
On 7 April 1949 the Regional Military Government (PMKB) of Boyolali held a special meeting to discuss the critical condition of the landless peasants and decided that the land formerly worked by European plantations would be distributed to them. An Emergency Regulation of the Boyolali sub-wehrkreise, dated 13 April, distributed the rights to work such land. The peasants who were given such rights, however, had to deliver part of the production to the government, to be used for village defence and the budget of the Regional Military Government.

When the transfer of sovereignty by the Dutch to the independent federal Indonesian government (RIS) was carried out on 27 December 1949, the RIS in turn had to implement the terms of the Round Table Conference. These included restoring the rights of former Dutch estates, at Boyolali as elsewhere. It was not surprising that the landless peasants who had obtained the right to work the land of former plantations were bitter about losing it.

In fact the discontent of the landless peasants of Boyolali rapidly led them to join the Gerakan MMC (Merbabu-Merapi Complex Movement) which arose in early 1950. The MMC movement consisted mainly of the victims of Hatta's rationalization, the irregular armed forces who could not become members of the APRIS (Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia Serikat - the Armed Forces of RIS). A few of them were communists who had joined the Madiun uprising. The MMC had its stronghold in the forest areas of Mount Merbabu and Mount Merapi, and its main activities were to plunder the property of people living on the slopes of Mount Merbabu and Mount Merapi, in such areas as Boyolali, Kopeng, Ungaran, Bawen and Salatiga. The Republican armed forces completed the suppression of the MMC movement only in 1955.


97 Ibid., pp.328-33.

98 Ibid., pp.337-39.
To a certain degree relations between military and civilian leaders were strained, although this never broke out into open conflict. Apparently problems arose from the civil administration continuing to be under the authority of the military government. Many military men had been functioning in the civil administration. A regulation of the military governor of Surakarta dated 1 December 1949 stated that the Resident, as head of the civil administration staff, was under the control of the military governor. Accordingly the military governor authorized all sections of the civil administration.

On 10 February 1950 the military governor issued an instruction aimed at the reconstruction of the civil administration of Surakarta. This contained four basic articles:

1. simple government;
2. appointment of persons appropriate for their task;
3. selection from among multiple candidates for each post;
4. representation of the younger generation who had supported the Republic among those appointed as officials.

The major source of conflict was removed in April 1950. The military governor's decree of 19 April 1950 stated that civilians could take over all sections of the civil government from the military. In addition all military officers who had functioned in the civil administration were withdrawn from their civil functions and removed to their former military functions. Moreover, the subdistrict level military governments (PMKT) in Surakarta were abolished on 25 April 1950.

PRO- AND ANTI-SWAPRAJA MOVEMENT

The Dutch occupation encouraged the pro-swapraja movement to pursue its former plans for the formation of special regions for

99 'Surat Keputusan Gubernur Militer Daerah Militer Istimewa II', typescript, 1 December 1949, no.019/Pmt/GM II/49, Bendel Kemiliteran 1949, AMN.
100 'Instruksi Gubernur Militer DMI II Surakarta', typescript, no. 2/GM II/St.Civ./50, 10 February 1950, Bendel Kemiliteran 1950, AMN.
101 'Surat Keputusan Gubernur Militer', typescript, no.283/Ph. 50, 19 April 1950, Bendel Kemiliteran 1950, AMN.
Surakarta. The formation of TBS and the Semut Ireng troops, and the cooperative attitude of the rulers towards the Dutch, encouraged certain priyayis who were pro-swapraja to revive their former plans. Their hopes increased further as the draft Constitutional Law for an independent federal Indonesia were negotiated at the Round Table Conference in Holland, concluded on 2 November 1949. After their second military action the Dutch had attempted to extend their policy of federalism into the former Republican heartland of Java, placing their major hopes on the traditional rulers there, just as they had in South Sulawesi, East Sumatra, and Maluku. As we have seen, the rulers of Jogjakarta refused to cooperate with the Dutch plans, whereas the rulers of Surakarta, who had lost their authority since July 1946, hoped to regain it through the 'special regions' with Dutch support. Since the rulers cooperated with the Dutch during the occupation, the Dutch in return attempted to protect their position during the final negotiations.

Apparently the Susuhunan and the Mangkunegoro, who both attended the Round Table Conference, were optimistic about realizing their plans for the formation of the Surakarta swapraja (the new Republican term for a special region governed by a traditional ruler). The draft of the RIS Constitutional Law recognized the continued existence of the swapraja through four of its articles. Article 64 stated that the former swapraja regions were still recognized. Article 65 forbade the abolition or reduction of the swapraja except in the interests of general welfare (kepentingan umum). Article 66 specified that former regulations for the swapraja would continue while new ones were being prepared. Article 67 stated that conflicts between other federal states and the swapraja would be decided by the Indonesian Supreme Court.102

This constitutional situation formed the backdrop to the renewed movement to re-establish special regions in Surakarta. Two organizations intimately connected with this movement were Paguyuban

Pasemeden Mangkunegaran (Mangkunegaran Meditation Association) or PPM, and the Gerombolan Sarasehan Mangkunegaran (Mangkunegaran Meeting Group) or GCM. Both organizations were set up in 1949 by people who had been prominent in a movement established in 1947 by a certain Sunardjo Pontjorahardjo. Sunardjo had earlier been chairman of the Mangkunegaran youth organization Yoga Pinardi Utama and had graduated from Mulo in 1933. In November 1947, now a middle-level priyayi, Sunardjo began to lead a small group of priyayi in the practice of traditional Javanese meditation. Sunardjo himself had been extensively trained in the refined manners of the Javanese by his father, also a Mangkunegaran official. He also, like many Javanese, steeped himself in the lore of the wayang, and from wayang stories he drew certain moral lessons. Chief among those lessons was that if officials were to carry out their tasks properly, they had to act with watak satriyo (knightly bearing), which required that they be jujur (honest) and that they practise tapa brata (asceticism). The main goal of Sunardjo's movement was to put into practice among officials the ideals that all of them, as educated Javanese adults from the priyayi tradition, should have embraced.

The central point of the Sunardjo movement rested on the teachings of kejawen. Sunardjo explains that the teachings of kejawen derive from the stories of the wayang and from such traditional Javanese writings as Serat Centini and Serat Wirid Hidayat Jati. Sjech Amongrogo, a figure in the Serat Centini, had given examples of how to communicate with God through meditation. Serat Wirid Hidayat Jati also contained the secrets of inward-directedness, the practice of which is so important in Javanese society. Sunardjo and his colleagues practised semedi (meditation) and tapa (asceticism). Through these means, as loyal officials, they tried to seek supernatural aid so that the ruler would not lose the divine inspiration (wahyu) of the kraton.


104 Interview with Sunardjo, 2 July 1979.
By performing *semedi* and *tapa* they sometimes obtained *sasmita*, spirit guidance which could pass information to them. According to Sunardjo's experiences the *sasmita* could be in the form of miraculous voices, dreams, or visible events. All such experiences were discussed and their meaning interpreted by the members.

The members of the Sunardjo movement, like many Javanese who are still close to *kejawen*, believed that the ancestors had magical spirits which still maintained connections with the human world. Their meditations were therefore carried out on the graves of the ruler's ancestors in order to get the ancestral spirits to strengthen the power of the rulers. The most important grave at which Sunardjo meditated was that of Mangkunegoro I, on the hill of Mangadeg, Karanganyar regency.

Most members of the PPM and GSM were middle and lower priyayis who had been members of the Sunardjo movement. Sunardjo estimated that the members of the two organizations numbered less than 200 persons. PPM and GSM did not limit themselves to meditation activity like the Sunardjo movement but appear to have moved into political activity to realize their demands for the formation of special regions, encouraged by the RIS Constitutional Law's recognition of *swapraja*. Both PPM and GSM were politically under the direct control of the Mangkunegoro himself. On 8 April 1950 the PPM sent a resolution to President Sukarno requesting that the Mangkunegaran *swapraja* be restored with a democratic nature in harmony with the Constitution. On 14 April the same resolution came from the members of GSM, signed by seventy-four members. They demanded that the Republican Government restore the *swapraja* of the Mangkuneragan separately from the Kasunanan.

105 Sunardjo also used the term *wisik* and *tayuh* to replace the term *sasmita*.

106 'Resolusi Pagujuban Pasemeden Mangkunegaran', 8 April 1950, typescript, Bendel Swapradja 1950, AMN.

107 'Resolusi Gerombolan Sarasehan Mangkunegaran', 14 April 1950, typescript, Bendel Swapradja 1950, AMN.
The pro-swapraja movement in rural areas was particularly supported by villages in which the Sunardjo movement had become rooted since the end of 1947. Ronggo Panambangan, for example, who resided at Panambangan, Karanganyar regency, and was an active member of the Sunardjo movement, managed to influence the peasants there to support a plan for the formation of a Mangkunegaran swapraja. The Panambangan area, however, has a long tradition of support for the Mangkunegaran, (Panambangan villagers had helped Raden Mas Said, who later became Mangkunegoro I, to rebel against the Susuhunan in the eighteenth century, and Raden Mas Said had even stayed there for many years during his rebellion) so it is not surprising that the Panambangan people were still very loyal to the Mangkunegaran during the revolution.

In March 1950 three social and political organizations of the Kasunanan had already demanded that the RIS government guarantee the existence of swapraja in accordance with RIS Constitution. These organizations were as follows: Narpowandowo, a nobles' organization which had formerly had close ties to Budi Utomo; the Perhimpunan Pradjurit Kraton (Court Army Association), consisting mostly of former Kasunanan soldiers (many of them ex-TBS members) who guarded security inside the kraton; and the Sarekat Sekerja Kraton (Court Workers' Union), consisting of officials who still actively worked in the kraton. All of them received their salaries from the Susuhunan, whose source of income was his court allowance from the Republican Government. These organizations were not involved in meditation like PPM and GSM, and were politically in the hands of the conservative pangerans who had surrounded the Susuhunan since the early years of his reign. During the occupation most members of these organizations appear to have cooperated with the Dutch.

There were also social and cultural organizations connected with the Kasunanan which joined the pro-swapraja movement in the interests of their own survival. These organizations, particularly the cultural ones, were originally financed by the Kasunanan government. Without the swapraja they could not survive. In early 1950 at least

ten organizations sent letters to the RIS government with demands for the formation of swapraja in Surakarta.\textsuperscript{109}

Meanwhile most political organizations in Surakarta, notably the Socialist Party, Murba, PNI, Sobsi and BTI, firmly supported Residency government for Surakarta and rejected the swapraja concept.\textsuperscript{110} These organizations even set up Panitya Anti Swapraja (Anti-Swapraja Committee) or PAS in January 1950.\textsuperscript{111} Soon after the establishment of PAS, the Working Committee of the Republican Parliament sent a team, led by Hutomo Supardan of the PKI, to investigate the political situation in Surakarta, particularly in relation to opinions about the swapraja. His duties started in January and his preliminary observations were that:

1. the rulers insisted on two separate swapraja in Surakarta;
2. the military was opposed to the traditional authorities;
3. pro- and anti-swapraja movements had emerged rapidly in this region, apparently caused by the relevant articles (64, 65, 66 and 67) of the RIS Constitution.\textsuperscript{112}

The political organizations began to be active in opposing the restoration of the swapraja, evidently as a reaction to the rapid emergence of pro-swapraja movements after the establishment of RIS in December 1949. In February 1950 the leftist organizations which had joined PAS sent a telegram to Parliament demanding that the RIS government abolish swapraja government in Surakarta, on the basis of 'general welfare' as specified in Article 65 of RIS Constitution. This ensured that the government did nothing to promote the swapraja.

\textsuperscript{109} There are four cultural organizations: Rombongan Kridonggo (Sragen regency), Rukun Reksa Sentosa, Perkumpulan Kesenian Tari Merdi Budaya and Rombongan Santi Suara. The others were social organizations. See Ichtisar Parlemen, no.50, 20 April 1950.

\textsuperscript{110} Djarum Masa, 21 February 1950.

\textsuperscript{111} Kedaulatan Rakjat, 6 January 1950.

\textsuperscript{112} 'Laporan Pertemuan Fihak Mangkunegaran dan BP KNP 21 Januari 1950', typescript, Bendel Swapraja 1950, AMN. See also Nasional, 9 February 1950.
in Surakarta. In April, moreover, a conference of the Sarbupri of Delanggu took a decision to oppose the formation of swapraja in Surakarta.

Indeed the representatives of the leftist political parties in Parliament were all opposed to the traditional rulers. For instance in a meeting of 25 May 1950 between the Working Committee of the RIS Parliament and the Minister of Interior, the leftist representatives led by Hutomo Supardan demanded that the region of Surakarta be a normal residency within the province of Central Java. A similar decision was made on 24 July 1950 by the Working Committee of the KNIP (assembly) of the Republic, which was dominated by leftists (i.e., PKI, Sobsi, PESINDO and nationalists) and included no swapraja representatives. This meeting accepted a motion by Tjoegito to be forwarded to the RIS government, calling for the rejection of all efforts for the formation of the Surakarta swapraja. Tjoegito and his supporters argued that the formation of swapraja deviated from the goal of the Indonesian Revolution, which was against imperialism and feudalism.

Tjoegito's motion had the effect of stopping the plans of the Republican Government for a plebiscite to decide the form of the Surakarta local government. Tjoegito argued that the plebiscite would have created a serious conflict among the people. Moreover Surakarta had already been legally constituted as a Residency by 1948.

113 Djarum Masa, 21 February 1950.
114 Kedaulatan Rakjat, 13 April 1950.
116 The list of men who signed the Tjoegito motion are as follows: Tjoegito (PKI), Sidik Djojosukarto (PNI), Djokosudjono (Sobsi), S. Sardjono (BTI), Raka (Partai Rakyat), S. Hadikusumo (PNI), Soedijono (Murba), W. Wondoamiseno (PNI), Suhardjo (PSII), Krissubanu (Persatuan Progresif), Tedjosukmono (Labor Party), S. Utojo (PKI) and S. Rasjad (PNI). See 'Usul Mosi Tjoegito cs Tentang Pengembalian Swapradja Didaerah Surakarta', typescript, Jogjakarta, 24 July 1950, Bendel Swapradja 1950, AMN.
The rulers responded to Tjoegito's motion by demanding that this motion be re-discussed by the government of the unitary Republic of Indonesia which would be set up in August 1950. However, the government never acted on the rulers' demand. The rulers and prominent pro-swapraja figures were left to lament in vain.  

The Tjoegito motion appeared to end all efforts to form a swapraja in the Surakarta region. The leftists at national level were finally successful in abolishing the system of monarchy in local government. Surakarta became simply one of the residencies in Central Java. The rulers continued to receive monthly court allowances from the government to support their court expenses and building maintenance, but they had no authority when the unitary Republic of Indonesia was established in August 1950.

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117 Their chronic complaints may be found in Notosoeroto, Pro Swapradja (Solo, Penerbit Mataram, 1950); Notosoeroto, Wedaran Sawatewis Bab Swapradja (Solo, Penerbit Mataram, 1950).
Susuhunan Paku Buwono XII (left) and Mangkunegoro VIII (right) in 1950.
CONCLUSION

Why was the revolution in Surakarta so fundamentally radical, particularly in comparison to that in Jogjakarta? The rebellious nature of society in this region dates back to the colonial era. Before the war there was already a strong tradition of political protest in Surakarta, represented in the city by such figures as Tjipto Mangunkusumo and Haji Misbach and in the countryside by the PKS as well as by messianic movements. Both Tjipto and Misbach also successfully provided leadership for peasant protest movements on the Klaten sugar estates, particularly the Delanggu estates, against the colonial authority. These movements were increasingly alienated from the kratons, tending to see the Susuhunan and the Mangkunegoro less as traditional rulers than as agents of colonial exploitation, partly because (unlike Jogjakarta's rulers) they also acted as owners of sugar estates.

The relationship between Misbach's leadership in Surakarta rural politics and the beginnings of the communist movement is more obvious. George D. Larson, in his thesis, asserts:

The communist movement in Surakarta began shortly after the release of Haji Misbach from the Pekalongan jail in August 1922 and petered out after the well-known abortive uprising in November 1926.¹

The strong influence of the Misbach agitation in plantation areas generated a political awareness amongst the peasants which made them receptive to the ideas of affiliated communist organizations during the Indonesian Revolution. In fact, during the Dutch colonial period there was always latent unrest on the sugar estates.

During the occupation (1942-45), the Japanese used the rulers to extract labour and produce from Java, and in doing so they reaccentuated the rulers' authoritarian character and distanced them still further from the Javanese people over whom they ruled.

The Japanese occupation also created a polarization between two forces: on the one hand, the kraton and the priyayi who had become instruments of Japanese administration and levies of labour; on the other, the Japanese-sponsored youth groups, such as Barisan Pelopor, Peta, Seinendan, Hizbullah, etc., which were imbued with intense patriotic spirit but had no part in administration. Accordingly there were two antithetic social groups, and this became one of predominant aspects in the social conflicts in Surakarta during the revolution.

The Surakarta revolution was not started from the bottom, at village level, but was initiated by leaders in Surakarta city. The pemuda and pre-war politicians, taking cues from the revolutionary leadership in Jakarta, set up, enthusiastically and simultaneously, the principal elements of the revolutionary government: the KNID, the BKR and the badan perjuangan organizations. The elements which first established Republican power in the city of Surakarta deliberately excluded members of the kraton establishment from their ranks, because of the polarization mentioned above.

In comparison with Jogjakarta, the kratons in Surakarta were unfortunate, in that both the Susuhunan and the Mangkunegoro were new and youthful rulers, with no experience, little personal prestige, and little capacity to stand up to their conservative ministers. Moreover, between the two rulers there was never the unity of action demonstrated in Jogjakarta under the Sultan's direction. These personal factors, however, should not overshadow the elements of social conflict which had for some time been more evident in Surakarta than in Jogjakarta. The Sultan of Jogjakarta, in playing host to the Republican Government from January 1946, ensured that the revolution in Jogjakarta would continue to have a vertical and orderly character from the top down. Surakarta, meanwhile, partly because of its rival claims to national leadership and partly because of the populist forces which were already strong there - especially the Barisan Banteng - became the focus for national movements of opposition to the government. In particular, the establishment of the Persatuan Perjuangan headquarters in Surakarta accentuated the city's oppositionist character.
These factors, the limited authority of the Republican government in Surakarta and the strength of radical, populist, anti-establishment forces in the city, account for the removal of the traditional rulers from power in March 1946. After the humiliation they suffered at this time, it would be very difficult for them to recover authority in the years that followed, especially as the conservative elements on which they had to rely became too closely identified with the Dutch counter-revolution in 1948-49.

The formation of various lasykar organizations both in the city and in the villages was a response to the independence proclamation indicative of the splits within society. These organizations invariably claimed allegiance to the general values of revolution, such as independence, democracy, anti-imperialism, and anti-feudalism. In particular, however, each organization had its own political stance and ideology, its own goals and programs. The attitudes of members of the lasykar organizations in Surakarta were obviously defined by the cultural values of Javanese society, and within each organization there were close relations between members and leaders, expressed in the bapakism (patron-client) terms so familiar in Java. This commonality of cultural background and of internal adhesion could not, however, cover the fact that there were serious divisions and rivalries among the organizations. Each lasykar was made up of youths who shared a common background, a common orientation, and common goals, and different organizations sprang from different groups within society and the existence of those organizations helped to make the differences between the groups more noticeable. The conducting of bandit-like activity by some groups made the divisions still clearer, and in the period 1947-48 the polarization was intensified by developments within national politics.

Rural responses to the independence proclamation imitated what had taken place in the city. Local revolutionary leaders set up KNIs at the subdistrict level, and in some cases KNIs were formed at the village level. Various badan perjuangan organizations were likewise formed by rural pemuda who had gained experience in Japanese-sponsored organizations. The gulf between urban and rural areas could not be maintained, however, for the formation of rural KNIs
and of rural badan perjuangan began to involve rural society directly in national politics. The rural KNIs acted as the rural revolutionary government, carrying out the orders of the new Republican Government. This disrupted the flow of orders from the rulers, through their own administrations, a pattern that had held for many years. The villagers who aligned themselves with the new Republican Government commenced to measure former village heads with new values which were ushered in by the Indonesian Revolution.

Although it began in the city, the revolution found sympathetic ground in the rural areas, where it was carried out by the Barisan Banteng and BTI in particular from late 1945 onwards. Many villages spontaneously overthrew their village heads in 1945-46, and subsequently villagers supported programs by left-wing parties and organizations for the redistribution of land and the abolition of the rights of sugar estates.

In the course of 1947 and 1948, the rural areas were caught up in the polarization which was taking place in Surakarta city along political lines. The sharpening division between badan perjuangan organizations increasingly resulted in political conflicts in rural Surakarta. The peasant organizations BTI and STII affiliated with the PKI and Masyumi respectively, existed in a state of mutual hostility, and the Delanggu affair of July 1948 brought that hostility into open conflict.

A large section of the abangan peasantry was effectively mobilized by left-wing organizations and succeeded, to a greater extent than elsewhere in Indonesia, in reducing the rights of the rulers and of estates over land. The BTI in particular, because of its radical program on agrarian reform, succeeded in reaching landless peasants, the majority of whom were abangan. As a result of the BTI's national campaign, the government, by the law of 26 April 1948, abolished conversion rights on land. This meant that rulers and estates no longer had claims to conversion land, though the law still left something to be desired in that it granted rights to land only to peasants whose names had already been registered as landholders with the village administration. The discontentment of the BTI with the implementation of this law and the support which the FDR gave to BTI
programs gave renamed impetus to the BTI campaign for agrarian reform in the period between April and September 1948. The program now, however, concentrated more on bengkok land and kas desa land, planning to distribute these lands to landless peasants.

These BTI efforts made the organization's position very strong in rural Surakarta during this period. Reflecting the breakdown of traditional society, the BTI's success also furthered the deterioration of the surface unity that had characterized rural Surakarta for some time.

Unlike the situation in other parts of Java which underwent a 'social revolution' (Banten, the Tiga Daerah, Central Java, etc.), events in Surakarta's rural areas showed a widening split between abangan and santri villagers. The majority abangan peasants were attracted by the radical agrarian reforms advocated by the leftists, and they remained members and sympathizers of the leftist groups, particularly the BTI, right up to the Madiun uprising. The santri, however, took an opposite course, with the STII advocating delay in approaching the subject of agrarian reform and with most rural santri leaders taking a pro-government stance opposed to radical change.

As the rift widened at the national level between the government and the Marxist in 1948, Surakarta city once again attracted the main opposition forces, with PESINDO establishing its headquarters in the city from 1947 on. Wikana, the top PESINDO leader and the military governor of the Surakarta region, specifically set out to make both the leftists and PESINDO very strong in Surakarta. In the early months of 1948 Surakarta became the main battle ground between groups on the left and right, culminating in virtual civil war in August and September 1948. Although the political and military aspects of Surakarta obviously indicated an oppositionist city and the oppositionist groups were very strong there, they had never dominated Surakarta society. Partly this was because the pro-government groups, including the Siliwangi forces brought in from West Java, were strong too, and partly because the influence of the rulers within certain groups of Surakarta society also continued. No single force, therefore, was able to dominate Surakarta society up until the Dutch attack on the city in December 1948.
During the Dutch occupation of Surakarta city, the kratons and the conservative priyayis were given much encouragement, even though the rulers were not restored to autonomous power by the Dutch. The personal ambition of the rulers, and particularly that of the Mangkunegoro, who wanted a special region of his own, and the threat of danger from the guerrilla troops made the Dutch unsuccessful in forming a Dutch-sponsored special region of Surakarta. Most conservative priyayis, however, firmly cooperated with the Dutch, voluntarily joining Dutch offices, and the Dutch occupation prompted the conservative elements to try to restore the swapraja through the federal system which emerged from the Round Table Conference. Once again this gave rise to radical actions by political organizations, particularly the PKI, BTI, Sobsi, PNI and others, opposing all efforts to establish the swapraja, at both national and local levels.

The rapid destruction of the federal system and the establishment of the Unitary State of Indonesia in August 1950 lowered the role of the kratons drastically and brought about the permanent demise of the royal houses of Surakarta as political entities. The guerrilla opposition to the Dutch and the close relations between the guerrillas and the rural community had shown that the Surakarta peasantry was more devoted to the new ideals of independence and democracy than to the old ideal of loyalty to the ruler. The Surakarta peasantry began to abandon the pattern of kawulo-gusti that had marked the classical relationship between people and ruler.

During the guerrilla period the role of the army had become a dominant element in Surakarta society. The military elite gained firm control over the civil administration in 1949 and had presided over a drastic decrease in pamong praja functions. The 'dwifungsi' of the army thus occurred for the first time during the Indonesian Revolution and through it included a negative element, in that the military in some cases was responsible for corruption. It also created a strong sense of the identity between people and army on the part of both these forces.

The Surakarta revolution, in the general context of the Indonesian Revolution, was both anti-imperial and anti-feudal, with an unusually radical and complex character of its own. It brought profound and irreversible change to the area once considered the heartland of Javanese traditional aristocratic values.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abangan</td>
<td>Nominal(ly) Moslem influenced by Hinduism, Buddhism and animist elements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdi dalam</td>
<td>The king's servant; state official</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMGL</td>
<td>Angkatan Muda Gas dan Listrik; Younger Generation of Gas and Electricity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMI</td>
<td>Angkatan Muda Indonesia; the Indonesian Younger Generation</td>
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<td>AMPTT</td>
<td>Angkatan Muda Post, Telegrap dan Telepon; Younger Generation of the Post, Telegraph and Telephone</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMRI</td>
<td>Angkatan Muda Republik Indonesia; Younger Generation of the Republic of Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMS</td>
<td>Algemene Middelbare School; Dutch Senior High School</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMS</td>
<td>Angkatan Muda Sukawati; Sukawati Younger Generation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anték</td>
<td>Follower, e.g., antek PKI, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>API</td>
<td>Angkatan Pemuda Indonesia; Younger Generation of Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arit</td>
<td>Grass knife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asrama</td>
<td>Dormitory, training place</td>
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<tr>
<td>Badan Perjuangan</td>
<td>Struggle Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bambu Runcing</td>
<td>Bamboo Spear</td>
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<tr>
<td>Barisan Banteng</td>
<td>Buffalo Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>Barisan Pelopor</td>
<td>Pioneer Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bau Suku</td>
<td>Villagers' labour force</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBI</td>
<td>Barisan Buruh Indonesia; Indonesian Labour Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bengkok</td>
<td>Village headman's allowance, official land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BKR</td>
<td>Badan Keamanan Rakyat; People's Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPH</td>
<td>Bendoro Pangeran Hario, high pangeran's title in Javanese society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPFKKP</td>
<td>Badan Penolong Keluarga Korban Perang; the Board of Assistance for the Families of War Victims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>BPR</td>
<td>Badan Perwakilan Rakyat; People's Representative Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>BPRI</td>
<td>Barisan Pemberontakan Republik Indonesia; Insurgent Corps of the Republic of Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTI</td>
<td>Barisan Tani Indonesia; Indonesian Peasants' Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bumi Hangus</td>
<td>Scorched-Earth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bundan</td>
<td>Squad in the Peta</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bupati</td>
<td>Regent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabang</td>
<td>Branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cacah</td>
<td>Amount of Land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camat</td>
<td>Subdistrict head</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chō</td>
<td>Head; chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chōkan</td>
<td>Governor, the head of residency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chudan</td>
<td>Company in the Peta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chudanchō</td>
<td>Head of Chudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daerah Istimewa</td>
<td>Special Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daidan</td>
<td>Battalion in the Peta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dana Perjuangan</td>
<td>Struggle Funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dapur Umum</td>
<td>Public Kitchen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daulat, Mendaualat</td>
<td>Forcibly remove from office during the Revolution; kidnapping, small coup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dewan Desa</td>
<td>Village Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djawa Hōkōkai</td>
<td>People's Service Association on Java</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMI</td>
<td>Daerah Militer Istimewa; Special Military Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPD</td>
<td>Dewan Pertahanan Daerah; Regional Defence Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRT</td>
<td>Dewan Pemerintahan Rakyat dan Tentara; People and Military Government Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dwifungsi</td>
<td>Dual function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELS</td>
<td>Europeesche Lagere School; European Primary School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elmu kejawèn</td>
<td>Science of Javanism</td>
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<td>-------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDR</td>
<td>Front Demokrasi Rakyat; People's Democratic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fujinkei</td>
<td>Women's Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerindo</td>
<td>Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia; Indonesian People's Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glebagan</td>
<td>Rotation system of using land between the peasants and the Dutch estates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPH</td>
<td>Gusti Pangeran Haryo; title of high pangeran (prince)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gugur Gunung</td>
<td>Labour duty owed by peasants (villagers) to government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haji</td>
<td>A title for person who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HBS</td>
<td>Hoogere Burger School; Dutch Senior High School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heiho</td>
<td>Auxiliary soldiers of the Japanese armed forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIS</td>
<td>Hollandsch-Inlandsche School; Dutch Native School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hizbullah</td>
<td>Allah's Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intiran</td>
<td>Compulsory agricultural work on the plantations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jago</td>
<td>Literally, fighting cock; a person who knows well the `elmu kejawèn or is expert in Javanese self-defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAD</td>
<td>Kesatuan Aksi Delanggu; Action Front of Delanggu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kadipatèn</td>
<td>Internal palace administration headed by the prince</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasunanan</td>
<td>The polity ruled by the Susuhunan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kauman</td>
<td>The quarter for pious Moslems in Javanese cities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kecamatan</td>
<td>Subdistrict headed by camat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keibodan</td>
<td>Vigilance Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kelompok</td>
<td>Group</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Kempeitai | Military Police Corps
Ken | Regency (kabupaten)
Kenchō | Regent
Kepala Kampung | The head of hamlet
Kepatihan | External administrative office headed by the patih (grand vizier)
Keris | Creese
KNI | Komite Nasional Indonesia; Indonesian National Committee
Kō | Head of principality
Kōchi | Principality
Kraton | Palace of Javanese kings
KRT | Kanjeng Raden Tumenggung; high priyayi title
Kuchō | Village head
Kuduran | Compulsory labour by the peasants for the village headman
Kuli Pancèn | Villagers who provided occasional labour to native officials
Kumiai | An association or cooperative
Kumichō | Head of Tonari Gumi
Kweekschool | Teachers' training school
Kyai | A title for holy persons or sacred objects
Lasykar | Irregular troops
LBI | Lasykar Buruh Indonesia; Indonesian Labour Militia
LBT | Lembaga Buruh dan Tani; Board of Workers and Peasants
Lurah | Village head
Mancanegara | Dependencies outside the core area of the Mataram kingdom
Mangkunegaran | The polity ruled by the Mangkunegoro
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Markas Besar</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masyumi</td>
<td>Majelis Syuro Muslimin; the Consultative Council of Indonesian Moslem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merah putih</td>
<td>Red and white</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merdeka</td>
<td>Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMC</td>
<td>Merbabu-Merapi Compleks, a political movement of early 1950 in the regency of Boyolali, Surakarta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mulo</td>
<td>Meer Uitgebreid Lager Onderwijs; Dutch Junior High School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutih</td>
<td>Literally, white; a form of physical training in the <em>elmu kejawen</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narapraja</td>
<td>Officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngelmu Kawedukan</td>
<td>Science of invulnerability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngrowot</td>
<td>A form of ascetic training, fasting from rice and meat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nguler</td>
<td>Literally, caterpillar; a form of ascetic training in the <em>elmu kejawen</em> in which one can only eat fruit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NICA</td>
<td>Netherlands Indies Civil Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ningrat</td>
<td>Nobles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pager Desa</td>
<td>Pasukan Gerilya Desa; Village Guerrilla Troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pamong Praja</td>
<td>The term for the Republican officials used after 1946. This comes from the term <em>pangreh praja</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panewu</td>
<td>Subdistrict officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pangeran</td>
<td>Prince, son of the King</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parang</td>
<td>Sword</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pasumbang</td>
<td>Gifts, including labour force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pati Geni</td>
<td>Literally, death fire; a form of physical training in the <em>elmu kejawen</em> in which one cannot eat or drink anything and must sleep in a dark room</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patuh</td>
<td>Appanage holders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBI</td>
<td>Partai Buruh Indonesia; Indonesian Labour Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pejuang</td>
<td>Revolutionary activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pemuda</td>
<td>Youth, especially activist youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pengajian</td>
<td>Recital of the Koran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pengulon</td>
<td>Religious office headed by pengulu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEPOLIT</td>
<td>Pendidikan Politik Tentara; Political Education for the Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perjuangan</td>
<td>Struggle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pesantren</td>
<td>Religious school in Islam; pondok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PESINDO</td>
<td>Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia; Indonesian Socialist Youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peta</td>
<td>Pembela Tanah Air: Defenders of the fatherland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKI</td>
<td>Partai Komunis Indonesia; Indonesian Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>Pakempalan Kawulo Surakarta; Surakarta People's Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMKB</td>
<td>Pemerintahan Militer Kabupaten; Regency Military Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMKT</td>
<td>Pemerintahan Militer Kecamatan; Sub-district Military Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNI</td>
<td>Partai Nasional Indonesia; Indonesian National Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPKI</td>
<td>Panitya Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia; Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPT</td>
<td>Penerangan Pertahanan Total; Total Defence Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priyayi</td>
<td>Javanese official class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>Partai Sosialis; Socialist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSI</td>
<td>Partai Sosialis Indonesia; Indonesian Socialist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSII</td>
<td>Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia; Indonesian Islamic Union Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Explanation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUTERA</td>
<td>Pusat Tenaga Rakyat; Centre of People's Strength</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rakyat</td>
<td>People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ranting</td>
<td>Sub-branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renseitai</td>
<td>Training unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMTH</td>
<td>Raden Mas Tumenggung Haryo; title of high <em>priyayi</em> (or prince)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R Ng.</td>
<td>Raden Ngabehi; middle <em>priyayi</em> title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romusha</td>
<td>Labourer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT</td>
<td>Raden Tumenggung; high <em>priyayi</em> title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sandiworo</td>
<td>Javanese traditional drama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanggan</td>
<td>Right to land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sayap Kanan</td>
<td>Right Wing, refers to Islamic and non-Marxist groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sayap Kiri</td>
<td>Left Wing, refers to socialist and communist groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBNS</td>
<td>Serikat Buruh Negeri Surakarta; Surakarta State Labour Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seinendan</td>
<td>Youth Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sekolah Desa</td>
<td>Village School, equivalent to primary school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sentono Dalem</td>
<td>King's family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMP</td>
<td>Sekolah Menengah Pertama; Junior High School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMT</td>
<td>Sekolah Menengah Tinggi; Senior High School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPNS</td>
<td>Serikat Pegawai Negeri Surakarta; Surakarta State Official Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STII</td>
<td>Sarekat Tani Islam Indonesia; Indonesian Islamic Peasant Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swapraja</td>
<td>New Republican term for a region governed by a traditional ruler</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanah Kas Desa</td>
<td>Village official land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanah Konversi</td>
<td>Conversion land, referring to the former land of the Dutch plantation estates in the principalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatakrama</td>
<td>Politeness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tentara Hijrah</td>
<td>The Siliwangi Division which withdrew from pockets in West Java and transferred to Republican territories in Central Java</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tentara Merah</td>
<td>Red Army or Musso's Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TKR</td>
<td>Tentara Keamanan Rakyat; People's Security Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNI</td>
<td>Tentara Nasional Indonesia; Indonesian National Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNI Masyarakat</td>
<td>TNI of Society (under Left-wing control)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tombak</td>
<td>Spear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonari Gumi</td>
<td>Neighbourhood association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TP</td>
<td>Tentara Pelajar; Student Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRI</td>
<td>Tentara Republik Indonesia; Indonesian Republican Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tukang Catut</td>
<td>Corruptor, a term used during the occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulama</td>
<td>Religious Scholar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wahyu</td>
<td>Divine revelation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walikota</td>
<td>Mayor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wayang</td>
<td>Javanese puppet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wong abang</td>
<td>Red people, i.e., followers of PKI and BTI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wong Cilik</td>
<td>Little man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wong Ijo</td>
<td>Green people, i.e., the followers of Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wong Ireng</td>
<td>Black people, i.e., the followers of PNI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zakat</td>
<td>Religious tax in Islam</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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A. DIARIES

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Sastrolawu - former commander of Regiment 27, Senopati Division

Sastrosuwarno - village head of Gayam, Sukoharjo, during revolution

Soekardi - former secretary of the Badan Urusan Makanan in the Kedawung subdistrict during the Japanese occupation

Sumodiningrat - former chairman of the Surakarta KNI

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III. PERSONAL INTERVIEWS WITH 75 INFORMANTS

Personal interviews as a method of oral history will produce oral historical sources of contemporary Indonesia. The following are the list of chief informants, who had taken various important roles in Surakarta society, particularly during the time of the Indonesian Revolution.

BACHRAN was born in 1917 in Jatipuro. His father was a farmer. Bachran was educated at the Primary School of Jumapolo subdistrict.
During the occupation he set up the Barisan Pelopor of Jumapolo. During the revolution he led the Jumapolo branch of Barisan Banteng.

BAKRI was born in 1922 in Solo, of a pious Moslem family from Kauman. During the occupation he joined the Hizbullah training at Bogor. When he returned to Solo, he began to form the Surakarta branch of Hizbullah. When the revolution broke out he reformed the Hizbullah and became one of its important leaders from 1945 to 1948. From 1946 to 1948 he was a member of the Surakarta KNID. Since 1948 he was involved in the cooperative of the Surakarta batik industries, Batari.

BUZAIRI was born in 1904 in Delanggu. His education was in various pesantrens in Jamsaren, Solo (1918), Termas, Pacitan, East Java (1925), Watuceskal, Central Java (1925-31). In 1929 he made a pilgrimage to Mecca. His father, Kyai Haji Mansur, led Tarekat Naksibandiyah at Jatinom, Klaten. Buzairi also joined this Tarekat. During the occupation he led the Delanggu Hizbullah. During the Revolution he led the STII and Masyumi in the Delanggu area.

BODRONOJO was born in 1919 in Delanggu. He graduated from HIS at Delanggu. At the end of 1945 he was one of the leaders of Delanggu BBI. He also shared his activity in the BPRI. Since 1946 he was very active in Sarbupri. Since 1948 he was known as a PKI leader at the Delanggu area, and was indicated as an activist of the Madiun uprising in September 1948. As a result of the Gerakan 30 September 1965 Bodronojo was in prison for many years.

DARJONEGORO, KRMT. He was born on 12 February 1912 in Surakarta. His father, RMTF Hadisurjo, was a Bupati during the reign of Paku Buwono X and Paku Buwono XI. In 1945 Darjonegoro began to serve in the Susuhunan's kraton. In 1936 he was a junior official of the kraton secretariat office. In 1946 he became secretary of the advisory board for the Susuhunan. In 1947 he became a senior official in the Sasono Wilopo office.

DARMANTO was born in Jumapolo. His father was an illiterate farmer. Darmanto graduated from the Sekolah Desa. In 1939 Darmanto, as a young man, joined the FKS. During the occupation he joined the Barisan Belopor. During the revolution he became one of the Jumapolo Barisan Banteng leaders.

FARODHAL, Lieutenant-Colonel. He was born in 1922 in Delanggu, Klaten and graduated from Mulo and Sekolah Menengah Tinggi (SMT) Surakarta. At the end of 1945 he joined Kasykar Kere. Until early 1946 he was active in the front line against the British in Semarang. In 1947 he joined the TP till its demobilization in 1950. He then became a member of the TNI.

GONDOWIDJOJO was born in 1894 in Delanggu. He graduated from HIS and took private management courses. During the Japanese occupation he was a junior manager of the gunny factory of Delanggu, and
became its manager from 1945 to 1949. He was also active in Sarbupri during the revolutionary period.

HAGNJAWIGATI was born in 1913 in Surakarta. He graduated from HIS. His father was a lower priyayi who worked inside the kraton of the Susuhunan. During the Japanese occupation, Hagnjawigati joined the Barisan Pelopor, and subsequently was a prominent activist of the Surakarta Barisan Banteng branch. In 1947 he joined the PNI.

JUDOSASTRO was born in 1910 in Sukoharjo. During the occupation he was the head of the Committee for Food Supply in the Sukoharjo region. In 1946 he established the Sukoharjo PNI branch. In 1949 he joined the guerrilla troops in the food supply section.

KASIMO was born in 1922. He was educated at HIS. On 26 December 1943 he joined the Peta and became budanchö. During the revolution he chaired the Bendosari KNID. He also joined the TNI and became the head of the PMKT of Bendosari in 1949. During the second Dutch aggression he led the guerrilla troops in the Sukoharjo regency.

MARTODIHardjo was born in 1903. In 1924 he became carik desa (secretary of village government) of Toriyo, Bendosari subdistrict. In 1930 he was elected village headman. During the occupation he was very active in the Keibodan in his village. During the revolution he was a member of the Bendosari KNID. In 1946 he led the Bendosari STII branch. During the Madiun uprising he was arrested by the Communists.

Muljadi was born in 1923. He was educated at Vervolgschool in 1935. During the occupation he led the Bendosari Seinendan. During the revolutionary period he led the Lasykar Rakyat and was the head of the information section of the Bendosari subdistrict government. At the same time he was active in PESINDO till 1948.

Panudi was born in 1926. He was educated at Kweekschool (teachers' college) in Sragen. In 1944 he joined the Peta training at Bogor and became shodanchö. In the early revolution Panudi joined other Sragen pemuda leaders to set up AMS (Angkatan Muda Sukowati). Since 1946 he joined the Senopati Division and later became the battalion commander based in Sragen.

Pawiro Granggang was born in 1899 in Kedawung and educated at the Sekolah Desa. He was one of the leaders of the FKS Kedawung branch since its foundation in 1932. Because he refused the desadienst, he was often arrested by the Dutch. When the Madiun uprising broke out he was regarded as a supporter of the PKI.

Prakosa, Brigadier-General. He was born on 22 June 1927 in Ciamis, West Java, where his father, Diran, was a Javanese doctor. Prakosa was educated at SMP and SMT in Surakarta. In 1960 he graduated from the Faculty of Medical Sciences, Gajah Mada University. In the early revolution he joined the Surakarta branch of IPI. When Lasykar Kere was formed on 11 December 1945
Prakosa was one of its leaders. Together with Achmadi, he led the TP from 1947 until its demobilization in 1950. He then joined the TNI.

RAMELAN was born at Bendosari. During the occupation he joined the Seinendan. Since the early revolution he had been an activist of the Lasykar Rakyat. In 1949 he began to work in the Bendosari subdistrict government.

SARDJONO was educated at HIS in Sragen. In 1940 he became an administrator of the rubber factory of Kedawung. During the occupation he joined the Barisan Pelopor and was also treasurer of the Badan Urusan Makanan for the subdistrict of Kedawung. In the early revolution he set up the Kedawung branch of the BBI. He also chaired the Kedawung Sarbupri. In 1947 he attended political courses in Sragen held by the Communist leaders. When the Madiun uprising broke out he was regarded as a supporter of the PKI and imprisoned for three months (October-December 1948) in Solo.

SANJOTO SOETOPO KOESOEMOHATMODJO, KRMT. He was born on 26 December 1921 in Jogjakarta. His maternal grandfather was KPH Soerjokoesoemo, the Mangkunegaran pangeran. Sanjoto was educated at ELS, Surakarta (1937), Mulo, Surakarta (1940). From 1945 he worked in the Mangkunegaran government.

SASTRODIJONO was born in 1919 in the village of Jenggrik, subdistrict of Kedawung, and educated at a Sekolah Desa. He was the vice-chairman of the Kedawung PKS branch. During the Revolution he led the re-formed PKS at Kedawung.

SASTROLAWU was born in 1912. He was educated at HIS, Surakarta. During the occupation he joined the navy-sponsored Gyugun in Surabaya. When the revolution broke out he set up the BKR of the Karanganyar regency. He joined the Senopati Division as commander of the Seventeenth Battalion and later became commander of Regiment 27. In June 1946, on the orders of Colonel Sutarto (of the Senopati Division), he was involved in kidnapping Sjahrir. During the Madiun uprising Sastro actively joined in defeating the communists.

SASTROSUWARNO was born in 1907, in Sukoharjo. He was educated at a village school. From 1926 to 1943 he worked in the sugar plantation enterprise of Sukaharjo. In 1943 he was elected as the village headman of Gayam, Bendosari. In 1949 he joined the village guerrilla troops in the supply section.

SLAMET MULJONO was born in 1929, in Delanggu, where he also attended the HIS (until 1943). During the Revolution he was a prominent member of the Lasykar Rakyat and an organiser of the village guerrilla troops. In 1949 he began to work in the Delanggu PMKT.

SOEDARMO was born on 11 November 1928 in Solo. He was educated at HIS, SMP and SMT in Solo. During the Revolution he joined
the Surakarta BKR in 1945 and the TP in 1947. He also took an important role in disarming the Japanese armed forces at Timuran and went to the front line against the British in the last months of 1945.

SOEDJONO was born in 1908 in Surakarta. He was a member of the pre-war Mangkunegaran Legion. In 1947 he joined the TRI. During the Madiun uprising he was involved in the TNI operation to capture Amir Sjarifuddin and his followers at Purwodadi, Central Java.

SOEKARDI was born on 2 May 1916 in the village of Bendungan, in the subdistrict of Kedawung. His father, who was the lurah in the 1930s, was a re-elected lurah in 1946. Soekardi was educated at the Sekolah Goebernemen, and then became a teacher at Sekolah Desa (1933-34). In 1937 he worked in the Dutch irrigation office. During the occupation he chaired the Badan Urusan Makanan in the subdistrict of Kedawung (1944-45). On 21 July 1945 he attended a short course on cooperatives in Sragen. When the Revolution broke out he joined the Barisan Banteng. For a while he also shared his energies with PESINDO. During the second Dutch aggression he joined the guerrilla troops. On 6 February 1949 he became the carik desa (secretary) of the Wonokero village government.

SOEPENO was born on 3 February 1930, and educated at SMP and SMT in Surakarta. In the early revolution he joined the Surakarta IPI branch, and in 1947 the TP.

SUHARSO was born on 3 June 1927 in Sragen. He was educated at a HIS and Technical School in Surakarta. In the early revolution he joined the Surakarta IPI branch and the AMS in Sragen. He also joined the pemudas fighting against the British in Surabaya. Subsequently he joined the TP and became a close friend of Prakosa and Achmadi. Since childhood Suharso had enjoyed the wayang.

SUMODININGRAT, BPH. He was born on 7 May 1904 in Surakarta. His father, KGPH Kusumojudo, was the son of Susuhunan Paku Buwono X. Sumodiningrat was educated at the Europese Lagere School (ELS) in Bandung; the HBS in Bandung; and the Faculty of Law, Leiden University (1935). From August 1935 to September 1940 he worked in the Kepatihan office. From 1936 to 1942 he was vice-chairman of the Surakarta branch of Parindra. From 1937 to 1942 he was a prominent member of Narpowandowo. During the occupation he joined the PETA training at Bogor. On 17 January 1944 he became a chudanchõ of Peta. In September 1945 he became chairman of the Surakarta KNID. In October 1945 Sumodiningrat, with other politicians, led the Surakarta pemuda to disarm the Japanese armed forces in Surakarta.

SUNARDI was born in 1915 in Solo. He was educated at the HIS Wonogiri, Central Java. During the occupation he worked in the Kabupaten Kota of the Mangkunegaran. In 1946 he moved to Sukoharjo and became the chief leader of BPRI. He was also active in the FNI.
SUNARTO KUSUMODIRDJO was born on 11 February 1908 in Surakarta. He graduated from HIS, Surakarta. In 1926 he became an official of the Boyolali regency. During the Japanese occupation he joined the Peta and was trained at Bogor together with Sumodiningrat. When the revolution broke out he became vice-chairman of the Surakarta BKR and in October 1945 commander of the Second Regiment of the Surakarta TKR. He was also a member of the KNID as representative of the army. In 1947 he became the commander of Regiment 27, Senopati Division. Later he was replaced in this position by Sastrolawu, when he moved to join the TNI at Blora, Central Java.

SURADJI was born on 15 January 1923 in Surakarta, of a pious Muslim family. He was educated at HIS (Muhammadiyah) in 1937 and Teachers' Training School in 1942. In 1944 he joined the Barisan Pelopor. During the Revolution he joined the Barisan Banteng and became one of its leaders, particularly in the spy section.

TOTOSARDJONO was born in 1919 in the village of Makamhaji, Kartosuro. He graduated from HIS in 1934. From 1939 to 1949 he was carik desa of Singopuran village, Kartosuro. Together with his younger brother, Sudijo, and Anwar Santosa, he led the Barisan Pelopor in the Kartosuro subdistrict. During the revolution these three all became leaders of the Barisan Banteng in Surakarta.

WIRODININGRAT, RMT. For many years he worked in the Kepatihan where he was a close friend of Sutosundoro, an official who became very anti-monarchical after 1945, when he headed the Sarekat Pegawai Negeri Surakarta (SPNS). Wirodiningrat was a Kepatihan official who remained loyal to the Susuhunan.

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