This study deals with the rise of a Malay kingdom, the modern state of Johore, out of an old Malay empire which covered the southern part of the Malay Peninsula and the islands to the south at the beginning of the nineteenth century; with the efforts of the new dynasty to establish itself in the Malay world; and with the relations of the emerging state with the colonial power whose territory bordered upon it.

The emergence of the new dynasty is discussed in terms of both the intimate connection which it established with the local authorities of the colonial power (the Government of the Straits Settlements) and the vitality of traditional Malay institutions.

The political settlement which freed the new dynasty from the interference of the old imperial house is discussed in relation to the policies of the British Government and the ambitions of the princes and chiefs of the old empire.

In the latter half of the century attention is focussed on the relationship between the new kingdom and the British power. The modus vivendi arrived at between the ruler of Johore and the Straits Government in the 1860s, which laid the foundations of administrative cooperation between the
NINETEENTH CENTURY JOHORE

RULER AND REALM IN TRANSITION

C.H.H. Wake

Dissertation submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in the
Australian National University

February 1966
The dissertation is my own work. Where I have used the findings of others to supplement my own, the notes carry an acknowledgment.

[Signature]
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GBPP</td>
<td>Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIA</td>
<td>Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMBRAS</td>
<td>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (Malayan Branch)</td>
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<td>JSBRAS</td>
<td>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (Straits Branch)</td>
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<td>NEI</td>
<td>Netherlands East Indies</td>
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<td>R.C. Singapore</td>
<td>Resident Councillor, Singapore</td>
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<td>R.C. Malacca</td>
<td>Resident Councillor, Malacca</td>
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<td>Straits Settlements</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Straits Settlements Records</td>
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<td>VBGKW</td>
<td>Verhandelingen van het Bataviasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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In the latter half of the century attention is focussed on the relationship between the new kingdom and the British power. The *nexus vivendi* arrived at between the ruler of Johore and the Straits Government in the 1860s, which laid the foundations of administrative cooperation between the
two territories in matters of common concern, and the ruler's political ambitions on the Malay Peninsula are discussed. Finally, the continued independence of Johore throughout the period in which all the other Malay states not under Siamese suzerainty were brought under British administration is considered in relation to the nature of economic enterprise in Johore, the nature of the Johore administration, and the personal relationship of the ruler to the colonial power.
THE MALAY STATES
1895

MILES

Straits Settlements
State of Johore
Other F.M.S.
## CONTENTS

Acknowledgments ................................. 1
Abbreviations ................................. ii
Precis ........................................ iii
Maps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The Old Sultanate of Johore</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The Division of Empire</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The Emergence of the Temenggong</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Johore, Pahang, and the Old Royal House</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The State and Territory of Johore</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Johore and the Straits Settlements</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>The Foundations of Bureaucracy</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Political Relations</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix 'A'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The Royal House of Johore in the Eighteenth Century</td>
<td>348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The Singapore Branch of the Old Royal House</td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The Lingga Branch of the Old Royal House</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The Bendahars of Pahang</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The Temenggongs of Johore</td>
<td>353</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix 'B' ................................... 354

Appendix 'C' ................................... 356

Bibliography .................................. 358
CHAPTER 1

THE OLD SULTANATE OF JOHORE

ETHNICALLY and linguistically the Malay belongs to a great family of related peoples, a branch of the mongoloid race, whose southward movement over the past four or five millennia has carried them from a dispersal area in south-west China down the great river valleys to the plains and coastal regions of mainland Southeast Asia and into the islands of the Pacific Ocean and the Eastern Archipelago. By the end of the first millennium of the Christian era the Malays\(^1\) had emerged as a distinct people inhabiting the riverine marshlands of the east coast of Sumatra, whence they gradually spread through all the coastal areas bordering the Straits of Malacca and the southern waters of the South China Sea, absorbing or pushing before them the negrito and proto-Malay inhabitants with whom they came in contact and establishing themselves as the dominant people of the region. By the fifteenth century, and probably at a much earlier date, they had made themselves masters of the area which they now occupy: the lowlands of east coast Sumatra between Peureulak and Palembang, the south- and north-west littoral of

\(^1\) 'Malay' is here used to mean 'Coastal Malay' or 'Malay proper' and does not include other Malay groups, such as the Menangkabau Malays, whose social organisation and customs are different. For a classification of the different peoples of the Malayo-Indonesian world according to law and custom see B. Ter Haar, Adat Law in Indonesia, pp. 6-10.
Borneo at intervals from Bandjarmasin to Marudu Bay, the Malay Peninsula below Songkhla (the historic Singgora) and the island groups of the intervening seas - the Natunas, the Anambas and the myriad islands and islets of the Riau-Lingga archipelago. These were the limits of the region in which the Malays settled in numbers and established their own political organisations. Malay penetration and influence extended over a much wider area, however. In the days before western and Chinese enterprise transformed his environment the Malay was a bold and skilful seafarer, whose pursuit of trade carried the use of his language as a lingua franca through the islands of the Eastern Archipelago to the shores of New Guinea, and brought into existence Malay communities up the great rivers of Siam and Cambodia and across the Indian Ocean in the distant island of Madagascar.

The Malay world was a sparsely inhabited world of waterways and small settlements on the edge of the primaeval forest, separated by great tracts of pathless jungle and joined in communication only by the sea and the inland water-systems. But, although great distances separated communities in different parts of the Malay world, a remarkable degree of cultural and linguistic uniformity prevailed and common patterns of economic life and political organisation recurred throughout the region.

The east-west sea trade in luxury goods between China, India and the countries of the west contributed to the rise of a multitude of petty states throughout the Malay world and provided the economic basis of the great Malay empires of Sri Vijaya and Malacca. The lands bordering the Straits of Malacca were a
terminal area for shipping engaged in the east-west trade. The rhythm of the monsoon winds, blowing alternately south-west and north-east across the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, compelled the junks of the Far East and the dhows of western seas to shelter in the vicinity of the Straits of Malacca until the wind changed, and then, if they intended setting out on the long homeward journey, to leave before the arrival of the ships from the opposite direction.² As the sea trade between the Far East and the west increased, thriving emporium towns sprang up at convenient anchorages in the Peninsula and along the east coast of Sumatra. Here goods in transit were stored and marketed, and the ships which brought them awaited the fair winds which would bear them home.

The Peninsula and the Archipelago contributed their share to the trade of the emporium towns. Gold, silver, tin, spices, and forest produce such as camphor, aloes, ivory, skins, and rare woods were items in a network of trade which covered the Malayo-Indonesian world and provided employment and profit for a great host of producers, collectors, traders, and mariners throughout the region. The larger rivers of the Peninsula, Borneo, and Sumatra were generally important for the volume of trade which flowed down their waters to the emporium towns; for this reason they attracted population and became the foci of political structures of some stability and elaborateness.

The characteristic political form throughout the Malay world was the 'river-state' or 'toll-state', in which the imposition of tolls and monopolies and direct participation in the trade of the waterways under his control formed the basis of the ruler's wealth and power, while gradations of rank and influence among major and minor chiefs were determined by the success of similar operations in the higher reaches of the river-system. In some places the social surplus necessary for political development was provided by large-scale rice cultivation, but the 'padi-state', based on a populous agrarian community, which in Java became the dominant political form and provided the framework for the efflorescence of Javanese civilisation, never achieved real importance in the Malay world. The great Malay polities of Sri Vijaya and Malacca had their basis in the emporium towns; it was only here, in the few large centres of trade and commerce, that conditions favoured the development of a highly evolved court life, an urban nobility, and a class of religious and official literati. Sri Vijaya and Malacca brought Malay culture to the height of its development and stamped political institutions throughout the Malay world with forms which survived the decay of empire and provided the norm of princely rule in the centuries that followed.

The first mention of the kingdom of Sri Vijaya occurs in the Chinese records of the seventh century A.D. When the Buddhist monk I Ching visited the country towards the end of the century, Sri Vijaya was one of the main entrepots through which the triangular trade between east, west and the Archipelago passed.
Her hegemony rested on naval power. Great fleets were maintained by the ruler and his chiefs to cruise constantly in the neighbouring seas, combining trade and perhaps piracy with the enforcement of the staple which had been decreed at the capital.  

In the political organisation of the kingdom royal power was developed to a high degree and acquired the awful sanctions which the theories of kingship and godhead imported into Southeast Asia from India conferred on the wielder of princely authority. It was probably also in Sri Vijaya that the aristocratic element in Malay society became prominent and the mild prescriptions of the adat perpateh, a corpus of customary usages appropriate to the condition of simple village communities, gave place to the severe penalties and autocratic concepts of the adat katumenggong, the system of customary law which eventually became associated with princely rule throughout the Malay world.  

The kingdom of Malacca was founded at the end of the fourteenth century by a refugee prince from Palembang. By the middle of the following century Islam had become the religion of the royal family and the ruling class. The adoption of Islam introduced new elements into Malay culture and modified the institutions of the Malay kingdom; among other things it involved changes in the

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manner of conceiving the magico-religious sanctions which supported the royal power. It did not, however, represent a complete break with the past; the new religion was rather an addition to the cultural legacy of Hindu-Buddhist Sri Vijaya: while Islam became the official religion of the state and Arabic replaced Sanskrit as the sacred language, the Hindu-Buddhist tradition maintained its strength in the realm of popular religion and superstition and in the ceremonies and sanctions which surrounded the exercise of royal power. In the view of religious orthodoxy the incarnation of Hindu deities had become the Shadow of God; among his subjects, however, he continued to be regarded as a manifestation of supernatural powers which had no place in Moslem theology.5

Like Sri Vijaya, Malacca was an empire of trade based on naval power. The government of the kingdom was in the hands of an aristocracy under the rule of a sacred king, and control was centred in the capital, where most of the revenues were collected by the king and his nobles in the form of port dues, presents, and taxes on the import, sale and export of merchandise. The principal officials of the city-state were the Bendahara, the Laksamana, the Penghulu Bendahari, the Temenggong and the Shahbandars. The Shahbandars were the heads of the foreign communities. It was their function to receive ship-masters of the nationalities under their charge, present them to the

Bendahara, allot them warehouse space and expedite the despatch of their merchandise. They were traditionally four in number and were usually or often foreigners; probably they were more closely connected with the business cliques of the city than with the Malay ruling class. The Temenggong was the chief magistrate of the city and head of the police force. He was also responsible for assessing and receiving dues on merchandise. The Penghulu Bendahari was the senior official of the palace and the king's treasurer. He had authority over the king's clerks, the Shahbandars and all other officials connected with the collection of the king's revenues. The Laksamana had charge of the king's bodyguard and the fleet; as 'admiral' he had jurisdiction over all shipping and all persons at sea. The Bendahara was the chief minister and the highest judicial authority under the king. His was the leading family in the kingdom, second in rank and importance only to the royal line, and traditionally provided consorts for the ruler.\(^6\)

The Bendahara, Laksamana, Temenggong and Penghulu Bendahari were great officers of state, courtiers, administrative officials and territorial chiefs. Their offices were as a rule hereditary in the great aristocratic lineages. As great officers and courtiers they resided in the capital, near the king's palace on the hill of Malacca, attended the king and performed ceremonial functions at court. As lords of men and lands they possessed

\(^6\) For a contemporary description by a European observer see A. Cortesao (ed.), *The Suma Oriental of Tome Pires* and *The Book of Francisco Rodrigues*, pp. 229-89.
the revenues of fiefs in the provinces and stood at the head of
great patrimonial followings of personal servants, retainers and
kinsmen whose prime allegiance was to their chief rather than to
the 'state' or to the king. It was these patrimonial followings
upon which the great officers largely relied for carrying out
the administrative functions for which they were responsible.

At the beginning of the sixteenth century the kingdom of
Malacca extended for nearly 500 miles along the west coast of
the Peninsula, from the Straits of Singapore in the south to the
Kedah border, at some point beyond the river Bruas. The
districts outside the capital and its immediate environs were
under the rule of officials appointed by the Sultan, who had
their headquarters on the main rivers after which the districts
were named. These officials held sway over the local inhabitants
as representatives of the Sultan; their principal duties were to
dispense justice, collect taxes and organise the military levy
when called upon to do so. Beyond the limits of the kingdom
other rulers exercised authority as tributaries of Malacca: the
kings of Rokan, Siak, Kampar and Indragiri, important states on
the main rivers of east coast Sumatra opposite Malacca, the
kings of Pahang, Trengganu and Lingga, and the rulers of a
number of lesser polities along the Sumatran coast. The
Malacca sultanate came to an end in 1511, when the capital fell
to the Portuguese and was incorporated into their eastern empire.
The royal house, the court, and the great nobles and their

7 Ibid. pp. 259-64.
followers fled south to the Muar river, crossed to Pahang and again moved south to the island of Bentan (Riau), where they remained for some years before finally seeking refuge in the Johore river. It was here that Sultan Ala’u’d-din Ria’yat Shah, son of the last Sultan of Malacca, fixed his capital about the year 1530. The Johore river gave its name to the new kingdom and remained its centre during two centuries of warring with the Portuguese and the Achehnese for supremacy in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.\(^8\)

The expulsion from Malacca involved the immediate loss of comparatively little territory - no more than the town and the neighbouring districts. The west coast of the Peninsula below the Bruas river (in Perak) and the islands of the Riau-Lingga archipelago remained under the rule of the sultan, while the vassal states of Pahang, Trengganu, Siak, Indragiri, Kampar and Aru (Deli) continued to pay homage to the heir of the Sultans of Malacca.\(^9\) But the loss of the great emporium town struck at the economic base of the kingdom and altered the nature of its political system. In the face of competition from the Portuguese, the Achehnese, and later the Dutch, the rulers of Johore were compelled to fight to secure and hold a share of the trade of the region. Their capital was not a great commercial centre like Malacca, the natural resort of merchant vessels attracted


by the entrepot facilities of a convenient harbour, but a fortified stronghold, the headquarters of aristocratically organised fleets which combined the search for trade with piracy, extortion and commercial warfare against their enemies. The great nobles continued to bear the titles of the officers of the Malacca sultanate but they no longer performed the functions of officials in a mercantile city-state. Instead they commanded great fleets of ships which they maintained and manned out of the resources of their patrimonial followings.

Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Johore remained the great Malay power in the Straits of Malacca, but her rulers were unable to maintain their grip on the distant dependencies and the empire steadily diminished in size and ultimately in strength. The rulers of Perak early acquired virtual independence and extended their sway south towards the river Bernam, which marks the modern boundary between Perak and Selangor. In 1641, according to the Dagh-Register, the Johore empire comprised the Peninsular districts below the Klang river, together with Singapore, Riau, Bulan, Lingga, Pulau Tinggi and other islands off the east coast, and the Sumatran states of Bengkalis, Kampar, Siak and Indragiri. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the Sumatran dependencies were lost and the Peninsular states of Selangor and the Negri Sembilan

achieved independence under rajas who acknowledged little more than the special sanctity of the Sultan of Johore.¹²

IN 1699 Sultan Mahmud Shah, the last of the old Malacca line, was murdered and his place was taken by the Bendahara, who ruled as Sultan Abdul Jalil Shah. The new dynasty remained in undisputed possession of the kingdom until 1717, when a pretender from Sumatra, who claimed to be the murdered sultan's son, attacked the capital and put the ruling family to flight. The usurper held the capital until 1722, when he was in turn expelled and replaced by Abdul Jalil's son, who ascended the throne as Sultan Sulaiman Badr al-Ålam Shah.

The expulsion of the pretender was achieved with the help of a force of Bugis adventurers who afterwards demanded a place of honour and power in the kingdom. Accordingly, a treaty was concluded between the Malay Sultan and the Bugis war-leaders which recognised the rule of Bugis princes in the richest parts of the empire, the tin producing areas on the west coast of the Peninsula, where they had already been established for some time,¹³ and the island of Riau, the commercial centre of the Riau-Lingga archipelago and the capital of the empire. Riau now became the seat of a Bugis prince and the Sultan removed to the island of


¹³ For the Bugis settlement of the West Coast see Winsted, 'A History of Selangor', pp. 3-10.
Lingga, where his descendants continued to rule until the abolition of the sultanate in 1911. The Bugis ruler at Riau was head of all the Bugis in the empire and was accorded royal rank. His title was Yang di-Pertuan Muda, or Yamtuau Muda ('The Junior King') and he also bore the style Sultan Ala'u'd-din Shah. 14 Although subordinate, in the formal constitution of the empire, to the Malay Sultan at Lingga, who was henceforth called Yamtuau Besar ('The Great King') to distinguish him from his royal vassal, the Yamtuau Muda was nevertheless the more powerful ruler. At Riau he exercised most of the powers which had formerly belonged to the Yamtuau Besar, whose direct rule now became largely confined to the relatively poor island of Lingga and its neighbours.

With the decline of the Sultan's power great princely and chiefly lines established themselves in the outer provinces and territories of the empire. In Selanger and Trengganu, and at a later date in the Negri Sembilan, local dynasties arose which owed only shadowy allegiance to the Sultan of Johore. 15 Similarly, the offices of Bendahara and Temenggong, which were held during the first half of the eighteenth century by sons and

14 Sultan Ala'u'd-din Shah was the style of successive Yamtuau Mudas, although it does not appear to have been much used. In the Tuhfat al-Nafis the Yamtuau Muda is referred to either as Yang di-Pertuan Muda or by his personal name prefixed with the title da'log or raja. This is in marked contrast to the manner of referring to the Malay king, who is usually called by his regnal name, and never without the prefix Sultan.

brothers of the reigning Sultan, eventually became hereditary in separate lineages descended from the royal house. The Bendahara ruled as the Sultan's representative at Pahang, the capital of a large and populous province which had once possessed a royal line of its own. The Temenggong exercised rights over islands in the Riau-Lingga archipelago, including, perhaps, those bordering the Straits of Malacca which were under his control at the beginning of the nineteenth century.

The political system of the Johore empire in the eighteenth century was highly personal, decentralised, and unstable. The sultanate was a conception of order and relationship rather than an organisation of administrative functions. It existed less to govern the ra' yat (the common people) than to contain the chiefs within a system of status and legitimate their exercise of power. Legitimate authority was conceived as a delegation from the ruler (yang di-pertuan) who, as king (raja) and secular head of the Moslem community (sultan), was the possessor and embodiment of mystical powers which derived partly from native tradition and partly from Hindu and Moslem ideas of kingship. It was

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16 For the genealogy of the Bendaharas and the Temenggongs see App. 'A', Tables 1, 4, 5.
18 Yang di-Pertuan, Yamtuan (Malay) = 'he who is made lord'; Raja (Sanskrit) = 'king'; Sultan (Arabic) = 'king'. In traditional Malay usage Sultan was a personal title which preceded the king's regnal name, the Persian title Shah ('king') being taken as a suffix; e.g., Sultan Mahmud Shah. As ruler of a territory the king was referred to as Raja or Yang di-Pertuan (or Yamtuan); e.g. Raja Johor, Yang di-Pertuan Johor. In the course of time
only allegiance to the symbolic figure of the sultan, and respect for the ancient customs of which he was the paramount custodian, that placed bounds to the turbulent behaviour of a proud and unruly nobility.

The basis of political action and organisation was the chiefs personal following of kinsmen, servants, and dependents. This patrimonial following was the immediate and ultimate source of his power, whether he was a great magnate or a minor chief with limited influence beyond the neighbourhood of his own village; they were his men, bound to their lord by the reciprocal duties of loyalty and protection, and assured of shelter, sustenance, and entertainment so long as they kept faith with him. 'Politics', in the aristocratic military tradition, was a product of shifting alliances among chiefs whose power was measured in terms of the number of men, arms, and vessels at their disposal. Localised warfare, in which there was often little more at stake than the personal fame and honour of the leaders, was common. Hostilities were generally conducted in a desultory fashion, and great importance was attached to the possession of stockaded strongholds, which it was the object of the enemy to invest while maintaining a blockade designed to bring trade to a standstill and prevent supplies from reaching the defenders.

Raja became a personal honorific borne by descendants of royalty, and a title of rulers who did not claim royal rank. Yang di-Pertuan then became the usual word for 'king'. The modern habit of referring to a ruler as Sultan of a territory (e.g., Sultan Johor, 'Sultan of Johore'), is due to European influence and has no basis in traditional Malay usage.
Faithful servants were at times rewarded with the grant of a benefice - a special tax or monopoly, an estate, or general rights of taxation or commercial exploitation within a specified locality - which, if not resumed, might become hereditary in the family of the holder and permanently subtracted from the royal 'domain'.

Although the government of the sultan was generally restricted to the districts under his immediate control, his jurisdiction extended throughout the entire kingdom. All chiefs were in theory representatives of the sultan and held commissions which showed their authority to govern. Similarly, all land was in theory the property of the sultan and cultivation conferred only rights of use which ceased when cultivation ceased. In practice, however, the ruler had little control over the outer parts of the kingdom and in distant provinces his rights were often usurped by greater and lesser chiefs.

THROUGHOUT the eighteenth century the politics of the Johore empire turned largely on the rivalry between Malay and Bugis. During the first half of the reign of Sultan Sulaiman Badr al-Alam Shah the Bugis Yamtuan Muda was able to maintain his

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19 For examples of such commissions see Linehan, 'A History of Pahang', pp. 213-14, 216-17, 222-24.
Sporadic disorders and chronic insecurity were accepted throughout the greater part of the Malay world as simple facts of life. Men walked to their ricefields fully armed, as though to battle; chiefs quarrelled; kings went to war; villages were sacked and their inhabitants killed or led into slavery; exiles, fugitives, and free-booting war-leaders ranged the waterways in search of plunder, or issued from conveniently situated strongholds to tax and pillage all who came within their power. For the Malay ra'yat mass exodus, which cut at the economic base of the nobility's power, was the only practical form of protest in the face of intolerable oppression, and when anarchy and the demands of the powerful became unbearable whole villages abandoned their cultivations and migrated to less troubled regions.

Apart from the largely sacral role which his kingship involved, the position of the sultan was not very different from that of the chiefs under him. His government consisted largely of administering the revenues of the districts over which he ruled directly. Within this area he raised taxes, levied tolls and exploited the resources of the land to provide for his establishment and dependents. As with the great chiefs, it was the patrimonial following of kinsmen, servants, and officials upon whom the sultan relied for the administration of his affairs. In addition to the oath of allegiance which they swore to the sultan, the loyalty of the followers was secured by their dependence on the royal household for the necessities of life and the perquisites attaching to personal service to the ruler.
position at Riau with comparative ease, since the Malays depended on Bugis assistance to ward off the attacks of the pretender, who continued to threaten the kingdom from his base in Siak. With the death of the Yamtuan Muda in 1745 and of the pretender in 1746, however, the Bugis power at Riau weakened, the chief external danger to the kingdom was removed, and the Malays were in consequence able to take a stronger line against their allies and rivals. The new Yamtuan Muda found that he was unable to maintain the Bugis position at Riau and withdrew to one of the Bugis settlements on the Peninsula, where he remained until 1760. In that year the Sultan, having apparently come to the conclusion that the presence of the Bugis was necessary to the prosperity of the island, invited him to return to Riau. Shortly afterwards the deaths of Sultan Sulaiman and his two immediate successors, Sultan Abdul Jalil and Sultan Ahmad, gave the Bugis their chance to deprive the Malays of strong leadership and consolidate their own position at Riau. After the death of Sultan Ahmad the Bendahara and the Temenggong attempted to elect an adult member of the royal house as his successor, but a show of force on the part of the Yamtuan Muda and his supporters secured the elevation of an infant son of Abdul Jalil. The new Sultan was Mahmud Ria'yat Shah, who reigned from 1761 until 1812.

Having settled the succession to their own advantage, the Bugis remained in untroubled possession of Riau until 1784 when, after an unsuccessful attack on Malacca, they were driven out by the Dutch, who then built a fort on the island and made a treaty with the Sultan which extended parts of the Dutch commercial
monopoly to Johore, brought the kingdom under Dutch suzerainty, and placed a ban on Bugis officers of state. Three years later the Malays rose against the Dutch and swept them out of Riau. After this feat, however, the Sultan prudently withdrew to Pahang, where he lived on the plunder of Dutch shipping until the Dutch deemed it convenient to make peace and allow him to return to his island dominions.  

The decision to allow the Sultan to return to Lingga was made in 1794, just before the administration of Malacca passed into the hands of the British, by whom it was confirmed. The British also lifted the ban on Bugis officers of state, and as a result the then Yamtuan Muda, Raja Ali, returned to press for the restoration of his position at Riau. By this time the simple division between Malay and Bugis was becoming blurred. While the Sultan and the Yamtuan Muda were in exile Riau had come under the rule of a chief who was descended from both the Malay royal house and the Yamtuan Muda's dynasty. This was Raja Mohamed, the Temenggong's son by a daughter of one of the founders of Bugis power in Johore. Raja Mohamed associated his mother with him in his rule at Riau, thereby emphasising the Bugis descent upon which he relied to maintain his authority over the Bugis inhabitants and traders, and in imitation of the Yamtuan Muda's titles he styled himself Ungku Muda and even,

apparently, Sultan.\textsuperscript{23} This half-Bugis son of the Temenggong was clearly the Malay party's candidate for the position of Yamtuan Muda. For some years after Raja Ali's return the Malays successfully resisted his claim to be re-instated at Riau.\textsuperscript{24} Towards the end of 1800, however, fighting broke out and the Sultan, who was under pressure from all sides, instructed Raja Mohamed and his supporters to set up Raja Ali as head of the Bugis at Riau. When they failed to carry out this order Raja Ali forced his way in and drove them off the island. Raja Mohamed then withdrew to the neighbouring island of Bulan and in May 1801 returned to blockade Riau with a fleet of eighty vessels. Finally, in September 1803, after two years of desultory hostilities, the Sultan sailed to Bulan and effected a settlement on the basis of the status quo: Raja Ali was to have Riau and Raja Mohamed was to rule at Bulan. In December 1804 Raja Ali was established as Yamtuan Muda at Riau, while Raja Mohamed, disdaining his late father's title of Temena-gong, continued to rule at Bulan under the style of Ungku Muda.\textsuperscript{25}

Raja Ali and Raja Mohamed did not long survive the settlement of their differences. Raja Ali died in 1805 and was

\textsuperscript{23} Winstedt, 'A History of Johore', p. 71. For the genealogy of the Temenggongs see App. 'A', Table 5.

\textsuperscript{24} Raja Ali had been elected Yamtuan Muda by the Bugis chiefs in 1784 but was forced to flee before his installation.

succeeded by Raja Ja'afar. Raja Mohamed died in 1806 and was succeeded by his nephew, Tun Abdul Rahman, who had been installed as Temenggong earlier in the same year. With these deaths the more turbulent leaders of faction were removed and some years of peace ensued.

The restoration of peaceful relations between the families of the Yamtuan Muda and the Temenggong was symbolised by marriages which linked the factions through the mediacy of the royal house. Sultan Mahmud married Raja Ali's daughter, Tengku Putri Hamidah, and his eldest son, Tengku Husain, was handed over to the care of Raja Mohamed, who promptly married him to his daughter. This marriage touched on the succession.

Sultan Mahmud had no male issue by either Tengku Puan, the consort of his youth, or Tengku Putri Hamidah. The succession therefore lay between the two sons of secondary (though fully legal) wives, Tengku Husain and Tengku Abdul Rahman. Under these circumstances the principle that the eldest son was the proper heir ruled, but the matter was less certain than usual, since neither mother came from one of the great families that customarily provided consorts and mothers-royal, and neither clearly outranked the other. Tengku Abdul Rahman's mother was the daughter of an important Bugis family and her marriage to

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the Sultan in 1780 was arranged by the Yamtuan Muda, presumably with a view to strengthening his own position. It was therefore natural that the Bugis should regard Abdul Rahman as their candidate for the succession. Tengku Husain's mother was also a Bugis of noble birth, but being the eldest son he was probably always considered by the Malays to be the proper heir to the throne. It was only to be expected, therefore, that an attempt would be made, when he came of age, to identify him in a formal way with the Malay chiefs who hoped for his succession. His marriage to Raja Mohamed's daughter was an obvious move in this direction, and there is a strong presumption that Bugis acquiescence in the union was the quid pro quo in the agreement which ended Raja Mohamed's attempts to regain possession of Riau.

It is possible also that the Sultan made some attempt to recognise Husain as his successor at this time. Many years later, in 1827, Husain claimed that he had been permitted to fly the royal standard when he sailed with his father to Bulan in 1803; that the Sultan had there declared that he was to inherit all the Johore empire except Lingga; that he had been adopted by


29 Tengku Husain's birth date is not known. According to a Johore MS quoted by Winstedt ('A History of Johore', p. 72), he came of age shortly before his marriage to Ungku Muda's daughter, in 1803. This suggests a birth date of around 1789-91. Munshi Abdullah states, however, that he was 59 (according to the Moslem reckoning, presumably) when he died in 1835, which suggests a birth date of around 1779. See A.H. Hill (ed.), 'The Hikayat Abdullah. An annotated translation', JMBRAS vol. 28 pt 3 (1955), (hereafter cited as Hikayat Abdullah), p. 242.
both Ungku Puan and Tengku Putri Hamidah; and that the latter had been made custodian of the regalia on his behalf.\textsuperscript{30} Whether or not Sultan Mahmud publicly designated his successor at Bulan in 1803 must remain a matter of speculation. It is fairly certain, however, that he meant his eldest son to succeed him, and it is also of some significance that Tengku Putri Hamidah, herself a daughter of the Yamtuan Muda’s house, refused to allow the regalia to be used to install the Bugis nominee.\textsuperscript{31}

When Sultan Mahmud died, in January 1812,\textsuperscript{32} Tengku Husain was away in Pahang (where he had gone to marry the Bendahara’s daughter), and as custom prescribed that the new Sultan had to be proclaimed before the burial of his predecessor could take place, the Yamtuan Muda was able to take advantage of his absence to proclaim Abdul Rahman. When Husain returned he was accompanied by the Bendahara, who had already acknowledged his succession,\textsuperscript{33} and preparations were begun for an attempt to place him on the throne by force. This was prevented, however, by the intervention of the British authorities at Malacca, and no further action was taken against Tengku Abdul Rahman’s

\textsuperscript{30} SSR N-3, letter of Sultan Husain Mohamed Shah, n.d. [ca 7 Nov. 1827].
\textsuperscript{31} See ch. 2, pp. 27, 32.
\textsuperscript{32} The Tuhfat al-Nafis (p. 209), gives the date of Mahmud’s death as 18 Zulhijjah 1226 [3 Jan. 1812]. Netscher (‘De Nederlanders’, p. 246) gives 12 Jan. 1812.
\textsuperscript{33} SSR N-3, letter of Sultan Husain Mohamed Shah, n.d. [ca 7 Nov. 1827]. According to this account the Bendahara and the chiefs under him made obeisance on the occasion of a Moslem festival, presumably 1 Moharam 1227 [16 Jan. 1212].
Nevertheless, the succession issue had not been settled: Tengku Putri still held the regalia and as long as she refused to allow it to be used to install Tengku Abdul Rahman it could very properly be held that the throne was still vacant.35


35 This view was maintained by the Bendahara and the Temenggong as late as 1819, when they were still using seals which described them as ruling under the late Sultan Mahmud. See 'Notes and Queries', no. 4, JSBRAS vol 17 (June 1886), pp. 104-14. For a reproduction of the Temenggong's seal see C.B. Buckley, An Anecdotal History of Old Times in Singapore, vol. 1, frontispiece.
CHAPTER 2

THE DIVISION OF EMPIRE

WHEN the armies of Revolutionary France over-ran Holland, at the
beginning of 1795, the British moved quickly to prevent the
Dutch colonial possessions from falling into the hands of their
enemies. In the Eastern Seas Malacca, Padang (on the West Coast
of Sumatra), and the Moluccas were immediately occupied by
British forces. The Moluccas were returned to the Dutch after
the Peace of Amiens (27 March 1802), but were re-possessed in
1810, when the French annexed the Netherlands. In the following
year Java was also taken. These possessions remained under
British rule until the end of the wars with France, when they
were returned to Holland under the terms of the London Convention
of 13 August 1814.

The occupation of Holland’s Eastern empire, which lasted in
places for more than twenty years, enabled the East India
Company to expand into the heart of the Dutch sphere of trade
and influence. By the time the wars in Europe were ended the
Company and its licencees, the country traders, had developed
extensive trading interests in the Archipelago. The prospect of
all these gains returning to the Dutch was regarded with dismay
and disappointment by local British officials and traders, who
resented the frustration of their visions of empire and feared
that severe trade restrictions would be imposed once the Dutch
were firmly re-established. The British officials administering
the Dutch possessions actively opposed the return of the Dutch and at the same time did all in their power to salvage what they could for British trade in the area. Foremost among the Company's imperialist servants in the Eastern seas were Thomas Stamford Raffles, at this time Lieutenant-Governor of Fort Marlborough (Bencoolen),¹ and Major William Farquhar, the officer in charge of the Government of Malacca.² In 1818, shortly before Malacca was due to be handed back to the Dutch, Farquhar visited a number of Malay states in Sumatra and Borneo in the hope of concluding commercial treaties with their rulers before the Dutch returned. Forestalled in other places, he arrived at Riau before the Dutch and negotiated a treaty with the Yamtuan Muda (acting on behalf of Tengku Abdul Rahman as Sultan). This agreement secured to vessels and merchandise of British subjects and persons under the protection of the East India Company the privileges of most favoured nation and granted similar privileges to Johore subjects trading with ports under the Government of Prince of Wales Island (Penang). In addition, the Sultan was bound not to grant monopolies on articles of trade and not to renew 'obsolete and interrupted.'

¹ For Raffles' career see D.C. Boulger, The Life of Sir Stamford Raffles, and C.E. Wurtzburg, Raffles of the Eastern Isles.
² For a summary of Farquhar's career see Buckley, An Anecdotal History, p. 50.
treaties, the provisions of which might exclude or obstruct the trade of British subjects.³

At this time Britain's possessions provided no more than a toe-hold in the Eastern Seas. The East India Company's stations, Bencoolen, off the west coast of Sumatra, and Penang, at the northern end of the Malacca Strait, were on the periphery of the Dutch sphere and afforded little protection to British shipping and commerce in the area. With a view to strengthening the British position, Stamford Raffles was despatched from India in December 1818, to found a station at the southern entrance to the Strait of Malacca before the Dutch could re-establish their treaty position in the area. By this time the Dutch had occupied Riau and abrogated Farquhar's treaty with the Yamtuan Muda. Raffles therefore went with Farquhar to Kerimun Besar, Farquhar's choice for a settlement, and then to Singapore, where they landed on 29 January 1819 and met the Temenggong, Tun Abdul Rahman, at a small village a few hundred yards up the Singapore river. On the following day a preliminary agreement was entered into for the establishment of a British factory on the island.

This meeting at Singapore, seemingly fortuitous, was almost certainly the outcome of an understanding arrived at in November or December of the previous year, when Farquhar returned to Riau to upbraid the Yamtuan Muda for making a treaty with the

Dutch. According to the *Tuhfat al-Nafis*, Farquhar communicated with both Tengku Husain and the Temenggong at this time, and when he returned to Malacca the Temenggong sailed *in accordance with ancient custom* to Singapore.

The Temenggong's motives in scheming with the British had to do with the old feud between his family and the Yamtuan Muda over the possession of Riau. After his expulsion from Riau in 1800 the head of the Temenggong's family retired to Bulan, where he died in 1806, and was succeeded by his nephew, Temenggong Tun Abdul Rahman. Tun Abdul Rahman appears to have remained on Bulan until after the death of Sultan Mahmud, in 1812. Bulan was then used as the base for an attempt to place Tengku Husain on the throne. When this failed the Temenggong and Tengku Husain came to terms with the Yamtuan Muda. Husain was given a share of the port and market dues at Riau and went to live with Tengku Putri, the late Sultan's consort, in whose palace on Pulau Penyengat (a small island opposite the port of Riau) the regalia was kept. The Temenggong married a niece of the Yamtuan Muda.

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4 *Tuhfat al-Nafis*, pp. 217-18. Farquhar later denied that he had been in communication with Tengku Husain at this time, though he admitted that Husain had appealed to him for help several times between 1812 and 1818. See SSR L-10, Farquhar to Sec. Govt, Fort William, 8 Feb., 12 Feb. 1820.


6 Tengku Husain to Yamtuan Muda, n.d., in 'Notes and Queries' no. 4, JSBRAS vol. 17 (June 1886), pp. 109-10.

7 *Tuhfat al-Nafis*, p. 211; SSR N-3, letter of Sultan Husain Mohamed Shah, n.d. [ca 7 Nov. 1827].
Muda\(^8\) and also settled on Pulau Penyengat. Possibly he too received a share of the local revenues, though his main source of income appears to have been the organisation of expeditions of fishing and piracy, the traditional resort of indigent chiefs with a large following to provide for.\(^9\)

The accommodation arrived at between the contending parties after 1812 represented a stalemate and satisfied no one. Tengku Husain still aspired to be Sultan, the Temenggong still hoped to recover something of his family's former position, and the Yamtuan Muda regarded the presence of the two chiefs at Riau with disfavour. This was the situation in November 1818, when the Dutch returned to re-establish their position on the island. Dutch recognition of Tengku Abdul Rahman as Sultan had the effect of strengthening the Yamtuan Muda's position vis-a-vis Tengku Husain and the Temenggong. Under these circumstances there was much to be said, from the point of view of Tengku Husain and the Temenggong, for Farquhar's proposal that they should remove from Riau to one of the Temenggong's islands bordering the Singapore Strait and there authorise the establishment of a British factory. A new commercial centre would promote their rise to wealth and power. Moreover, if Husain were proclaimed Sultan under British patronage his formal position would not be inferior to Tengku Abdul Rahman's and it

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\(^8\) Tuhfat al-Nafis, pp. 235, 259. This marriage may have taken place before 1812.

\(^9\) See ch. 3, p. 56ff.
might then become possible to install him with the sacred regalia. The prospect before the Temenggong was also an enchanting one. As the local ruler of the island, and as the Sultan's closest kinsman among the great chiefs, he could look forward to a position of dominance in the new centre of the ancient empire.

The British had their own reasons for proclaiming Tengku Husain as Sultan of Johore. The Temenggong was not the sovereign ruler of Singapore and could not, in European international law, dispose of the rights which the East India Company sought. For this it was necessary to obtain the consent of the Sultan. It was obviously useless to approach Tengku Abdul Rahman, since he was in the tutelage of the Yamtuan Muda, the ally of the Dutch, and did nothing of importance without consulting him. Raffles therefore decided to ignore Abdul Rahman and recognise Husain as Sultan. Accordingly, the Preliminary Agreement of 30 January 1819 was entered into by Temenggong Tun Abdul Rahman in the name of and on behalf of himself and 'Sultan Husain Mohamed Shah', 'Raja of Johore'. Under its terms permission was granted for the establishment of a British factory and the Temenggong bound himself not to enter into relations with other nations or allow other nations to set up factories anywhere in his dominions. In return the East India Company engaged to pay him

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10 See App. 'A', Tables 2, 5.
11 See in Maxwell and Gibson, Treaties and Engagements, pp. 116-17.
an annual ground-rent of 3000 Spanish dollars and protect him from his enemies. Shortly after the conclusion of the Preliminary Agreement Tengku Husain arrived from Riau. Raffles immediately had him proclaimed as Sultan of Johore and presented him with a commission or seal of office and rolls of cloth of black and yellow, the royal colours. Then, on 6 February 1819, Husain and the Temenggong entered into a treaty which confirmed the terms of the Preliminary Agreement, added a few clauses concerning their relations with the Company, and allotted the Sultan a ground-rent of 5000 Spanish dollars per annum.

About a week after the conclusion of the Treaty of 6 February 1819, the Temenggong and the newly-proclaimed Sultan set about the delicate task of winding up their affairs at Riau. At the same time they attempted to insure themselves against the possibility of a British withdrawal from Singapore. In letters to the Yamtuan Muda, Tengku Abdul Rahman, and the Dutch authorities at Malacca, the Temenggong explained that Tengku Husain, having heard that a number of British ships were at Singapore, came to fetch his son and was seized by Raffles and

12 Hikayat Abdullah, p. 140; Tengku Husain to Yamtuan Muda, n.d., in 'Notes and Queries' no. 4, JSBRAS no. 17 (June 1886), pp. 109-10.

13 See in Maxwell and Gibson, Treaties and Engagements, pp. 117-19. On the same day the British establishment was proclaimed a Residency under the Government of Fort Marlborough. See Boulger, Life of Sir Stamford Raffles, p. 313. On the following day Raffles departed, leaving Farquhar as Resident. Singapore remained a dependency of Fort Marlborough until June 1823, when it came directly under the Supreme Government of India.
proclaimed Sultan against his will. This story was repeated by
Tengku Husain in letters to the Yamtuan Muda, Tengku Abdul
Rahman, and other chiefs. At the same time he informed the
Yamtuan Muda that envoys were coming to take charge of his
finances and make arrangements for the removal of his family to
Singapore.14

In his letters to Tengku Abdul Rahman and the Yamtuan Muda
Husain's claim to royal authority is explicit. In both he
styles himself 'Yang di-Pertuan Singapura', and in the letter to
the Yamtuan Muda he refers directly to the fact of his having
been elevated to kingship with the title Sultan. Nevertheless
the tone of these communications is conciliatory. To the Yamtuan
Muda he is apologetic: 'your son now asks for pardon and
forgiveness, hoping that it will be granted. Your son is his
father's son in this world and the world to come; he will never
do anything against his father nor abandon him.' To Tengku
Abdul Rahman, whom he addresses as 'Yang di-Pertuan Besar', he
is re-assuring: 'although your brother may comply with the
British, never fear, nor entertain the least suspicion that he
intends to do anything that will cause future ill will or
animosity.' Taken at their face value these letters seem to
offer an accommodation on the basis of the status quo, that is,
that Tengku Abdul Rahman should rule as Yamtuan Besar at
Lingga and Tengku Husain as Yamtuan at Singapore, the extent of

14 See 'Notes and Queries' no. 4, JSBRAS no. 17 (June 1886), pp.
104-10, and Netscher, 'De Nederlanders', pp. 269-73.
the latter's authority being left in a diplomatic state of uncertainty. In fact, however, Husain was still determined to obtain his formal installation with the sacred regalia.

The first attempt to bring the regalia to Singapore was made by Farquhar, who went to Riau immediately after the conclusion of the Preliminary Agreement of 30 January 1819. For whatever reason, possibly because Tengku Putri was under pressure from the Yamtuan Muda and the Dutch, this mission failed. Another attempt was made at the end of the year, while the Yamtuan Muda was absent from Riau and the Dutch were involved in hostilities with the leader of the foreign Bugis community on the island. On this occasion Tengku Husain's son was sent to bring Tengku Putri over to Singapore with the regalia. At the last moment, however, the Yamtuan Muda's men arrived and prevented her departure. After this the Yamtuan Muda made efforts to induce the Dutch to install Tengku Abdul Rahman. The Dutch did nothing, however, until rumours began to reach them that Tengku Husain and the British were making renewed efforts to obtain the regalia. The Dutch Governor of Malacca then went to Pulau Penyengat and seized the regalia by force. Another year elapsed before Tengku Abdul Rahman was brought back from Trengganu, where he had been living for the

15 Hikayat Abdullah, p. 303, editor's note.
16 Tuhfat al-Nafis, pp. 222-23.
17 Ibid. p. 228.
past two or three years. Finally, on 27 November 1823, almost twelve years after the death of his predecessor, the ceremony of Tengku Abdul Rahman's installation took place at Riau in the presence of the Yamtuan Muda and some Dutch officers. Immediately afterwards a party was sent to plant the Sultan's flag in Johore and claim the country as a dependency of Lingga.

In a formal sense the installation of Tengku Abdul Rahman with the sacred regalia brought the succession issue to a close. The Bendahara, who had supported Tengku Husain's candidature in 1812, now gave his allegiance to Tengku Abdul Rahman, and a few years later the Temenggong also changed sides. But although the theoretical unity of the sultanate had been re-established, the Sultan of Lingga was in fact little more than the titular head of a polity which was rapidly falling into dissolution. In this process the policies of the European nations whose rivalry had led to the proclamation of Husain in 1819 and the installation of Abdul Rahman in 1823 played an important part.

The rival claims of the Dutch and the British in the Eastern Seas were eventually settled on political rather than legalistic grounds, as part of the general colonial settlement embodied in

18 Tengku Abdul Rahman went to Trengganu in A.H. 1236 [1820-21] for his son's marriage to the Sultan of Trengganu's daughter. According to Netscher ('De Nederlanders', p. 277), he was resolved not to return to Lingga until the regalia was handed over.
19 Tuhfat al-Nafis, pp. 232-34.
20 See ch. 4, pp. 118ff.
the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 17 March 1824. Under the terms of this Treaty, national spheres of influence were delimited along a line drawn through the Straits of Singapore and Malacca. Britain relinquished her interests in the Archipelago in return for a free hand in the Peninsula, Bencoolen was handed over to the Dutch in exchange for Malacca, and the British possession of Singapore was confirmed. Although the form of the ancient sultanate continued for another three decades to have political consequences for the European powers and the Malay rulers in the area, the effect of this Treaty was to clear the way for the rise of independent states in Peninsular Johore and Pahang. For the Temenggong and the Sultan at Singapore it offered the implicit assurance of non-intervention in the Peninsula by the Sultan of Lingga and his allies. At the same time, however, it cut them off from the Riau-Lingga archipelago and confined them to the area in which British influence was becoming increasingly powerful.

THE East India Company's original establishment on Singapore was far from being a British possession. Under the terms of the Treaty of 6 February 1819 the Company acquired a variety of rights in a small area which constituted a special jurisdiction

\[\text{See in Maxwell and Gibson, } \text{Treaties and Engagements, pp. 8-12.}\]

\[\text{At this time only the Temenggong exercised authority south of the Singapore Strait. After Tun Abdul Rahman's death the Kerimuns, which had been under his rule, were occupied by Sultan Husain, whom the Dutch expelled in 1827. See ch. 3, p. 83.}\]
within the dominions of the Sultan and the Temenggong. Within this area the powers of government were vested in a triumvirate consisting of the Sultan, the Temenggong, and the Company's Resident. The treaty also stipulated that the port of Singapore was to be under British control and that 'all persons belonging to the English Factory or Factories or who shall desire to place themselves under the protection of its flag, shall be duly registered, and considered as subject to British authority.' In return for these concessions the Sultan was to receive 5000 Spanish dollars per annum and the Temenggong 3000 Spanish dollars per annum and half of all the duties levied on native shipping. In June 1819 a further agreement, entitled 'arrangements for the Government of Singapore', was drawn up. This defined the limits of the Settlement as extending along the sea front from Tanjong Malang to Tanjong Katang, a distance of some six miles, and inland 'as far as the range of cannon shot, all round from the factory', and provided that the administration of justice, the imposition of customs and duties, and the establishment of revenue farms were to be under the joint control of the Sultan, the Temenggong, and the Resident. The 'Arrangement' also stipulated that the disposal of land for agricultural purposes in the Settlement was to remain in the hands of the Temenggong, and that direct control of the inhabitants of the

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23 See in Maxwell and Gibson, Treaties and Engagements, pp. 120-21.
24 The Temenggong was considered to be the original proprietor of the soil. As such he permitted Chinese and Malays to cultivate the land in return for an annual rental or tax, which was paid
Settlement was to be exercised by the Sultan and the Temenggong in the case of their own followers, and by the Resident in all other cases.

During the first few years after the foundation of the Settlement the Sultan and the Temenggong derived incomes from monopolies, taxes, and other levies on the commerce of the port. In the main these were imposed by the Temenggong, who had been, and still was, the local Malay ruler of the island. The Temenggong is known to have obtained an income from the operation of a ferry across the Singapore river, from the taxation of native vehicles in the Settlement, and from the monopolistic control of the manufacture of lime and the collection of valuable woods on the island. Both the Temenggong and the Sultan appear to have levied a poll tax on Chinese passing through Singapore with property acquired in their dominions; the Sultan also exacted tribute from the captains of trading vessels, and it is almost certain that the

in kind. In some cases he advanced capital to the cultivators. When some of these tried to sell their holdings to Europeans the Temenggong's title was upheld by the British authorities, who took the view that the occupants possessed no rights 'beyond what may belong to the followers of a native Chief'. See SSR L-17, Sec. Lieut-Gov. to Farquhar, 4 Feb. 1823.

25 H.E. Miller, 'Extracts from the Letters of Colonel Nahuijs', JMBRAS vol. 19 pt 2 (1941), p. 195; Crawfurd to Sec. Govt India, 10 Jan. 1824, in [Braddell], 'Notices of Singapore', JIA vol. 9 (1855), p. 467. According to Crawfurd the lime monopoly had Farquhar's sanction.

26 The poll tax was sanctioned by Farquhar in 1820. It was fixed at $6.50 and was not to be levied on Singapore residents. See SSR L-10, Farquhar to Raffles, 27 June 1820.
Temenggong levied port or customs dues of one kind or another.27 In addition to these 'private' revenues, the chiefs received half the proceeds of the revenue farms which the Resident established in 1820.28

The chiefs' arrangements for raising revenues in the Settlement were made after the arrival of their followers from Riau, early in 1819. The Temenggong's people, who numbered some sixty or seventy households in 1823,29 settled around his establishment on the Singapore river, an advantageous position from which the commerce of the port could be kept under close surveillance. The Sultan's followers went to live at Kampong Glam, some distance to the east of the Singapore river, where the royal palace was situated. With these forces at their disposal, the chiefs were a power to be reckoned with during the

27 Under the terms of the 1819 Treaty the Temenggong was entitled to half the port dues and customs duties, but as port dues were light and customs duties were never introduced his income from this source was small. See App. 'B', pp. 354-55. There is some suggestion, however, that both the Temenggong and the Sultan were allowed to levy their own customs duties until early in 1820, and that their share in the revenue farms was partly in compensation for the discontinuance of this practice. See [Braddell], 'Notices of Singapore', JIA vol. 9 (1855), p. 455.

28 Opium, spirits and gambling monopolies were let in May 1820, despite Raffles' disapproval, in order to prevent the growth of illicit monopolies. Half the proceeds was applied to the cost of the Company's police establishment and the rest was paid to the Sultan and the Temenggong in consideration of police duties performed by their followers. See SSR L-10, Farquhar to Raffles, 2 Nov. 1819, 5 May 1820; [Braddell], 'Notices of Singapore', JIA vol. 9 (1855), p. 448.

29 Hikayat Abdullah, p. 156.
first few years of the Settlement's existence. It was perhaps for this reason, and also because the position of the British vis-à-vis the Dutch was still insecure, that their impositions on the trade and commerce of the Settlement were generally acquiesced in or sanctioned as being in accordance with the provisions of the agreements of 1819.\(^{30}\)

The condominium of Company officials and Malay rulers continued until after the return of Raffles in October 1822,\(^{31}\) when steps were taken to suppress the chiefs' commercial monopolies and exclude them from direct participation in the revenues and government of the Settlement. In November 1822 a proclamation was issued to the effect that private monopolies were illegal and that trade in all articles was 'in every respect open and free to all persons without imposition of any kind whatever'.\(^{32}\) In December the chiefs' share in the revenue farms was commuted for a fixed allowance of 500 Current dollars (about 30

The principal exception was the surreptitious levy of tribute on overseas trade, which continued for a number of years despite official prohibition and public protest. In April 1820 a committee of enquiry reported that the practice had ceased. In the following February, however, a case came to light of a Chinese trader being placed in stocks for failing to wait on the Sultan with presents. See [Braddell], 'Notices of Singapore', JIA vol. 9 (1855), pp. 446-49.

This was Raffles' second and last visit to the Settlement after its foundation. He arrived on 9 October 1822 and left on 9 June 1823. The previous visit was in June 1819.

The occasion was a complaint against a monopoly of the retail of atap (thatch) maintained by a certain Wan Ali, presumably an aristocratic follower of the Sultan or the Temenggong. See [Braddell], 'Notices of Singapore', JIA vol. 7 (1853), p. 335.
425 Spanish dollars\(^\text{33}\) per month each\(^\text{34}\) — about one third of what they were then receiving as their share of the farms.\(^\text{35}\) In the following year Raffles began to attack their position under the terms of the agreements which he himself had negotiated in 1819. The Treaty of 6 February 1819, he now claimed, 'expressly stipulated that the Company shall be entitled to whatever extent of ground they may require for any Factory or Factories now or hereafter to be established and this stipulation could of course have had no other object in view than to vest in the British Government the possession of whatever lands might become necessary for the population resorting under its flag'.

Furthermore, 'the boundaries alluded to in the provisional [sic] arrangement of 26 June 1819 merely defined the limits within which the British Government undertook at the time to afford immediate protection and had not the least reference to the Establishment or control generally'.\(^\text{36}\) This interpretation was

\(^{33}\) Here and elsewhere in this chapter the conversion of Spanish and Current dollars is at the rate ruling in June 1823, i.e., Sp $85 = Ct $100.

\(^{34}\) [Braddell], 'Notices of Singapore', \textit{JIA} vol. 9 (1855), p. 455. That the sum specified was in Current dollars is clear from SSR L-18, Sec. Lieut-Gov. to Farquhar, Jan. 1823, which gives instructions for paying the Sultan a total allowance of $1000 per month (i.e., Ct $1000, or Sp $850, made up of Sp $416, allowance fixed by the 1819 Treaty, and Sp $425, in lieu of his share of the revenue farms).

\(^{35}\) The chiefs' share at this time was about Sp $1300 per month each. See R.C. Singapore to Sec. Govt Prince of Wales Island, Malacca, and Singapore, 27 April 1827, in [Braddell], 'Notices of Singapore', \textit{JIA} vol. 8 (1854), pp. 416-17.

\(^{36}\) SSR L-17, Sec. Lieut-Gov. to Farquhar, 27 Feb. 1823; SSR L-18, Sec. Lieut-Gov. to Farquhar, 4 Feb. 1823.
entirely contrary to the obvious spirit and meaning of the agreements of 1819. Nevertheless it now became the official British view, and pressure was brought to bear on the chiefs to accept land reserves for the accommodation of themselves and their followers. In March 1823 these were settled. The Temenggong received 200 acres between Tanjong Pagar and Tanjong Telok Belanga, some distance to the west of the town, and the Sultan a smaller but more valuable block of 50 acres around his palace at Kampong Glam.

Implied in this delimitation of reserves was the Company's control over the land not specifically assigned to the chiefs. It was also Raffles' object to free the commerce of the Singapore river from the constant interference of the Temenggong's followers, who were to be moved to a new location on the far side of the Telok Belanga reserve. Though the Temenggong demurred at this, Raffles was insistent and after some months

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37 It is noteworthy that Crawfurd - who adopted Raffles' view (see the summary of his 'General Report on Singapore', 9 Jan. 1824, in [Braddell], 'Notices of Singapore', JIA vol. 9 (1855), p. 468, which states that although the Convention of June 1823 was not clear, property and sovereignty over the soil must be considered as vested in the Company) - later admitted that the 1819 Treaty conferred little more than the right to form a British factory, that there was 'in reality no territorial cession giving a legal right of legislation', and that 'the native chief was considered to be the proprietor of the land, even within the bounds of the British factory'. See Buckley, An Anecdotal History, p. 40.

38 SSR L-18, Government Notification, 4 March 1823.

39 The turbulence of the Temenggong's followers is referred to in Hikayat Abdullah, pp. 141-42, 154-55.
the removal was accomplished. At the same time Dato' Penglima Perang, a minor chieftain who had attached himself to the Temenggong, shifted his establishment from a position higher up on the Singapore river to Pantai Chermin, on the plain between the hill of Telok Belanga, where the Temenggong's new village was located, and the waterfront at New Harbour. In the 1850s, when New Harbour was chosen as the site for the main European shipping terminals, the Temenggong made a fortune from the sale of waterfront sections. In the meantime, however, the principal advantage of the new location was that it removed his establishment from the immediate purview of the British authorities and, by placing them at a distance from the rest of the population of the Settlement, helped to preserve the identity of his followers.

Raffles' last important act before leaving Singapore was to negotiate a new agreement with the Sultan and the Temenggong.

40 The Company cleared the site of the new village and paid removal expenses. According to the Hikayat Abdullah (p. 156), the 60 or 70 heads of households who made the move to Telok Belanga each received $50, $60, and in some cases $100. The Temenggong may also have received as much as $6000 in addition (see SSR L-13, Farquhar to Sec. Lieut-Gov., March 1823; Raffles to Crawfurd, 7 June 1823, in [Braddell], 'Notices of Singapore', JIA vol. 7 (1853), p. 338; Crawfurd to Sec. Govt India, 10 Jan. 1824, in [Braddell], 'Notices of Singapore', JIA vol. 9 (1855), pp. 463-64. Nevertheless, the compensation paid to the Temenggong was considerably less than the value of the land vacated.

41 Mohamed bin Haji Alias, Tawarikh Dato' Bentara Luar, p. 56.

42 See ch. 6, pp. 208-10.
This was the 'Convention' of 7 June 1823, which placed the whole of Singapore, with the exception of the land reserves at Telok Belanga and Kampong Glam, at the Company's disposal, provided for the universal enforcement of English law, 'with due consideration of the usages and habits of the people', 'relieved' the chiefs of their judicial functions, and stipulated that henceforth they were to have no claim to port dues, customs or monopolies on the island. Raffles also wished to fix their allowances at $500 per month each - less than what they were then receiving under the terms of the Treaty of 1819 and the revenue farms agreement of December 1822 - but neither the Sultan nor the Temenggong would agree to this. Eventually it was settled that they should receive 1500 and 800 Current dollars per month respectively.

43 See in Maxwell and Gibson, Treaties and Engagements, pp. 121-22.

44 In this connection it was further provided that 'in all cases regarding the ceremonies of religion, and marriages, and the rules of inheritance, the laws and customs of the Malays will be respected, where they shall not be contrary to reason, justice, or humanity!'

45 The chiefs were associated with the Resident as judges under the terms of the Arrangement of June 1819. Difficulties probably arose at the beginning of 1823, when the jury system was introduced and magistrates were appointed to sit with the Resident.

46 Raffles to Sec. Govt India, 7 June 1823, in [Braddell], 'Notices of Singapore', JIA vol. 7 (1853), pp. 344-45.

47 Equivalent at this time to about Sp $1275 and $680 respectively. Previously the Sultan had received about Sp $850 (see p. 39, n. 34 above), and the Temenggong about Sp $675 ($250 under the terms of the 1819 Treaty and $425 in accordance with the revenue agreement of 1822). In effect, therefore, the Sultan received an increase of ca Sp $400 per month and the Temenggong practically none at all.
Although the Convention of 1823 eliminated them from the government of the Settlement, the Sultan and the Temenggong still maintained princely establishments on the island and continued to rule over their followers in the traditional manner. Inevitably disputes arose with the new Resident, John Crawfurd, who was determined to assert the power of the Company. During the latter half of 1823 clashes occurred over slavery and debt-bondage, traditional institutions which played a vital role in the chiefs' relations with their followers, particularly in the organisation of the household, but which the Resident, who regarded Singapore as virtually a British possession, was disinclined to countenance. The question arose as a result of the chiefs' requests for the return of defectors who fled to the protection of the British authorities. Crawfurd's view was that a condition of slavery could be recognised only in the case of a few dependents of the Temenggong who were on the island before 1819. Crawfurd was also reluctant to hand over fugitives who were claimed as debt-bondsmen. For their part

48 Crawfurd succeeded Farquhar in June 1823.
49 Crawfurd to Sec. Govt India, 10 Jan. 1824, in [Braddell], 'Notices of Singapore', JIA vol. 9 (1955), pp. 460-61.
50 In March 1823 Raffles had proposed that written contracts of debt-bondage be instituted and that the period of servitude should not exceed 5 years. The substance of these proposals was embodied in Regulation No. V of 1823, which also provided for the abolition of slavery except in the case of persons attached to the domestic establishments of the Sultan and the Temenggong, visiting princes, and the crews of foreign ships. In the latter half of the year Crawfurd made unsuccessful attempts to get the Sultan and the Temenggong to agree to a procedure of registration
the Sultan and the Temenggong maintained that slavery and
debt-bondage were Malay customs whose continuance was guaranteed
under the terms of the Convention of 1823. They also took issue
with the Resident for failing to assist them to expel the Sultan
of Lingga's men from Johore.51 Disagreement over these matters
eventually led the chiefs to compose a memorial of grievances
for presentation to the Governor-General of India. At the same
time Crawfurd took the opportunity to lay before the Supreme
Government the desirability of treating with the Sultan and the
Temenggong for the entire cession of sovereignty over Singapore.52

The chiefs' appeal to higher authority completely misfired;
their memorial was rejected and the Resident was instructed to

which would enable the magistrates to decide cases of defectors
claimed as bondsmen. Meanwhile, in the absence of satisfactory
proof of their status, the magistrates often refused to hand
over fugitives. See SSR L-18, Raffles to Johnson, Napier and
Maxwell, 10 March 1823; Regulation No. V of 1823, in Asiatic
Journal no. 16 (1823), pp. 545-47; Crawfurd to Sec. Govt India,
10 Jan. 1824, in [Braddell], 'Notices of Singapore', JIA vol. 9
(1855), p. 462.

51 The chiefs claimed that the failure of the British to come to
their aid was a breach of trust. In fact, however, the 1819
Treaty specifically stated that the British were not bound to
uphold the Sultan's authority beyond Singapore. In February
1823 the local authorities did give permission for the Union
Jack to be flown in Johore to keep the Dutch out, but this
decision was reversed by the Indian authorities and in August
the order was given to strike the flag. Thereafter it was flown
only on special days, apparently without the consent of the
Singapore authorities. See Crawfurd to Sec. Govt India, 10 Jan.
1824, in [Braddell], 'Notices of Singapore', JIA vol. 9 (1855),
pp. 459-60.

52 Crawfurd to Sec. Govt India, 10 Jan. 1824, in [Braddell],
reprove them for ill-conduct.⁵³ Crawfurd's recommendations for a treaty of cession, on the other hand, were immediately accepted. Armed with the Indian Government's mandate he opened negotiations in May 1824, and on 2 August the assent of the Sultan and the Temenggong was obtained to a 'Treaty of Friendship and Alliance'⁵⁴ which provided for the cession of the whole of Singapore and the adjacent islands and waters within a distance of ten geographical miles.⁵⁵ The Treaty also stipulated that in the event of their wishing to withdraw from Singapore to reside in their own dominions, the Sultan and the Temenggong were to receive Sp $20,000 and Sp $15,000, respectively, in compensation for the relinquishment of all their 'lands, houses, gardens, orchards, or timber trees' on the island or its dependencies.⁵⁶ While they continued to reside on the island or draw pensions from the East India Company they were to enter into no foreign alliances and maintain no correspondence with

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⁵³ Crawfurd to Sec. Govt India, 3 Aug. 1824, in [Braddell], 'Notices of Singapore', JIA vol. 7 (1853), p. 352.
⁵⁵ The Treaty stipulated cession 'in full sovereignty and property', i.e. possession of the soil passed to the Company. For the purposes of the Treaty the Sultan was considered as 'possessing the right of paramount dominion' and the Temenggong as 'virtually exercising the powers of government' and 'de facto the real proprietor of the soil'. See Crawfurd to Sec. Govt India, 3 Aug. 1824, in [Braddell], 'Notices of Singapore', JIA vol. 7 (1853), p. 351.
⁵⁶ The effect of this provision was to make all the chiefs' property on the island liable to reversion on their removing from the Settlement. In practice it was never held to refer to property outside their reserves.
foreign powers without the Company's consent. It was also stipulated that neither of the contracting parties, that is, the Sultan and the Temenggong on the one hand and the East India Company on the other, was bound to interfere in the affairs of the other's government, 'or in any political dissensions or wars which may arise within their respective territories, nor to support each other by force of arms against any third party whatever! In addition the chiefs engaged to maintain 'free and unshackled' trade in their dominions, to admit British commerce on the terms of most favoured nation, and to use every means within their power to suppress piracy in the neighbourhood of their dominions. As some concession to their position as great chiefs, it was provided that retainers or followers who deserted from their service would not be permitted to remain in the Settlement. Such persons would only be expelled, however, if they were natural-born subjects of territories in which the authority of the Sultan and Temenggong was substantially established, and if their names had been 'duly and voluntarily' entered in a register kept by the Singapore authorities for this purpose.57

The assent of the Sultan and the Temenggong to these highly unfavourable terms was obtained by the application of extreme pressure. For the purpose of the negotiations Crawfurd declared

57 This appears to have been an indirect way of allowing for the continuance of debt-bondage under regulated conditions, as recommended by the Resident. See Crawfurd to Sec. Govt India, 10 Jan. 1824, in [Braddell], 'Notices of Singapore', JIA vol. 9 (1855), p. 462.
that the Convention of June 1823 had never been ratified by the Supreme Government and that the higher allowances paid under its provisions were in consequence unauthorised.\footnote{58} He therefore proposed to discontinue these allowances and recover the sums unlawfully paid to the chiefs in the preceding year. This threat was carried into effect on 1 June 1823.\footnote{59} All payments were stopped and the pensions provided for by the Treaty of 1819, which were not in dispute, were applied to the liquidation of the chiefs' 'debt' to the Company.\footnote{60} At the same time they were given to understand that if they agreed to the terms of the proposed treaty of cession their 'debt' would be cancelled, the full allowances fixed by the Convention would be restored for the

\footnote{58}{Both morally and legally this view was indefensible. Since May 1820 the chiefs had been receiving large payments in addition to their Treaty pensions. The Convention of June 1823 was one of several agreements whereby they accepted payments in respect, or in lieu of, rights which were guaranteed by the 1819 Treaty.\footnote{59}{According to the Hikayat Abdullah (pp. 192-94), payment of the chiefs' allowances was withheld on three successive occasions immediately before the conclusion of the Treaty. That their allowances were in fact stopped is clear from the figures examined in n. 60 following.\footnote{60}{When the Treaty was drawn up the 'debts' of the Sultan and the Temenggong were placed at Sp $13,200 and $6,800 respectively. These figures were arrived at by subtracting the 1819 Treaty pensions for the period 1 June 1823 to 1 May 1824 (12 months) from computed figures for the total allowances for the period 1 June 1823 to 1 July 1824 (14 months), thus:

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<th>Sultan</th>
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<td>Sp $18,200</td>
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From this it appears that the sums withheld during the period of the negotiations were later paid, although this was not taken into account in calculating the sums to be subtracted from the total allowances (which should have been $5832 and $3500 instead of $5000 and $3000).}
term of their natural lives - an important qualification - and they would receive in addition lump sums of $20,000 each. These terms, and in particular the provision that the allowances were to cease at death, were bitterly opposed by the Sultan and the Temenggong, but to no avail. Crawfurd stood firm, and after they had been refused their allowances on three successive occasions the chiefs capitulated and agreed to sign the Treaty.

Immediately after the conclusion of the Treaty criers were sent through the Settlement to proclaim the news that the Sultan and the Temenggong had surrendered their powers of government to the Company and no longer had authority on Singapore. For the Sultan there were additional humiliations. About a month after the cession more than two dozen palace women fled to the protection of the British authorities, and when he went in person to the court-house to ask for their return he was publicly refused. Later in the same year the Company's convicts were sent to breach the wall of the royal compound and build a road through the Sultan's reserve. In these and other ways

61 The 'debts' were cancelled by adding them to the lump sums, which are specified in the Treaty as $33,200 and $26,800, although the chiefs received only $20,000 each.

62 Crawfurd maintained that the chiefs' contention that their allowances were hereditary and perpetual had 'no foundation in any former treaty or promise' (see Crawfurd to Sec. Govt India, 3 Aug. 1824, in [Braddell], 'Notices of Singapore', JIA vol. 7 (1853), p. 352). This was quite untrue. The 1819 Treaty provided that they were to be paid 'for and during the time' that the Company maintained a factory in their dominions. In subsequent financial agreements, including the Convention of June 1823, the same conditions were implicit.

63 Hikayat Abdullah, pp. 195-97.
the British demonstrated that it was they who now held power in Singapore.

The cession of Singapore was the culmination of a process which threatened to undermine the authority of the Sultan and the Temenggong over their followers and destroy their position as great chiefs. Traditionally the cohesion of the chiefly following depended on two factors: the chief's control of violence and his ability to provide opportunities for honourable and lucrative employment. With the progressive commutation of their rights as rulers it became increasingly difficult for the Sultan and the Temenggong to provide for their followers on Singapore. At the same time the British authorities were becoming reluctant to hand over defectors who were attracted by the personal freedom enjoyed by other Malays in the Settlement and fled to their protection. This, together with the decision to suppress slavery and allow debt-bondage to continue only in a modified form, dealt a serious blow to their power and prestige; in particular, their ability to maintain large numbers of women in and around their establishments, a vital necessity for men of high chiefly rank, was seriously impaired.

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64 See p. 46, n. 57 above.

65 At this time the ratio of females to males at Kampong Glam and Telok Belanga was said to be 2:1, whereas among the rest of the Malay population it was less than 1:2, and among the Chinese about 1:8. See Crawfurd to Sec. Govt India, 10 Jan. 1824, in [Braddell], 'Notices of Singapore', JIA vol. 9 (1855), pp. 461-62. For the role of bondswomen in the chiefly household see J.M. Gullick, Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya, pp. 102-03.
main problem facing the chiefs after 1824 was not, however, the curtailment of their coercive powers or the abolition of slavery, for it is clear that violence and servitude continued - at least in the Temenggong's case - to play an important part in the relationship between the chief and his followers long after the cession. Of more importance was the question of providing for their followers. After 1824 this could be done only through illicit racketeering and the organisation of expeditions of overseas trade and piracy. It was on the success of ventures of this kind that the future of the Sultan and the Temenggong as great chiefs, and ultimately as territorial rulers in the Peninsular provinces of the old Johore empire, depended.

See ch. 3, p. 63, n. 22, and ch. 6, pp. 196-97.
DURING the latter half of the eighteenth century the power of
the great chiefs of the Johore empire steadily increased
vis-a-vis the Sultan; by the time of Sultan Mahmud's death in
1812 the Sultan was no longer able to exercise effective control
over the actions of his mighty subordinates. There was no
question, however, of abolishing the unity of the ancient sultanate. Neither the great commoner chiefs, the Bendahara and
the Temenggong, nor the Yamtuan Muda, who was of royal rank,
wished at this time to assume the status of independent rulers.
Although his physical power had diminished, the Sultan was still
the embodiment of royal - and hence sovereign - power, and the
part which he played in the political system as the symbol and
supreme source of legitimate authority was still a vital one.
The Sultan's sovereign authority, which derived from his election
and installation with the sacred regalia, found its most general
expression in the ceremonies of the royal court, in the
veneration in which he was held by all his subjects, including
those under the authority of the great chiefs, and in the form of
his relationship with the chiefs. The great commoner chiefs were
the Sultan's 'vassals'. They were installed by the Sultan, they
used seals which described them as the Sultan's representatives
(al-wakil Sultan), they swore fealty (bersumpah setia) and made
obeisance (menyembah) to the Sultan, and on occasion they may also have rendered tribute.

Harmonious relations were preserved between the Sultan and the great chiefs largely because of the infrequency of their meetings and because the Sultan usually refrained from interfering in the affairs of the districts under the rule of the chiefs. In theory the Sultan was the possessor of supreme authority over the whole state and might intervene in the government of the chiefs' dominions at any time; in practice he generally avoided such action and confined his direct exercise of authority to the districts which made up the royal domain. Thus, although they exercised authority as representatives of the Sultan, the great chiefs in fact enjoyed considerable independence in their own districts, taxing, administering justice, appointing headmen, and generally disposing of the resources of the land and its inhabitants without reference to the Sultan.

The Temenggong's dominions in the first quarter of the nineteenth century consisted of the Peninsular province of Johore - the region south of the Muar and Sedili Besar rivers¹ - and the islands of Bulan, Battam, Singapore, the Kerimuns, Sugi, and Galang. In 1824 he was obliged to surrender his rights over Singapore in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of August

¹ The Johore province appears to have extended from a point between the Sedili and Endau rivers (which marked the boundary with Pahang) to Tanjong Piai, on the south-west corner of the present State of Johore. The Muar district extended from the vicinity of Tanjong Tohor to the Kesang river, which marks the northern boundary of the present State. See ch. 5, pp. 161-63.
1824. In the same year the Treaty of London (the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824) was concluded, which divided the area of the old Johore empire into British and Dutch spheres of action and influence. As a result of these treaties the Temenggong lost his most valuable possession, Singapore, and became cut off from his dominions to the south. At the same time Sultan Husain also became confined to the Peninsular parts of the Johore empire.

Sultan Husain's position after 1823, when Tengku Abdul Rahman was installed with the sacred regalia and received the allegiance of the Bendahara and the Yamtuan Muda, was somewhat anomalous. His claim to kingly status was apparently accepted by the courts of Riau and Lingga and he seems to have remained on good terms with Sultan Abdul Rahman during the 1820s. Husain in fact appears to have been fitted into the grand imperial scheme as a junior ruler within the bounds of the ancient empire. In this respect his position could be said to resemble that of the Yamtuan Muda, who was also a ruler of royal rank and sovereign power. But although Husain's kingly status was recognised in Riau and Lingga, other aspects of his

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2 The Temenggong continued to rule the Kerimuns until his death, when they were occupied by Sultan Husain. Husain's men were expelled by the Dutch in 1827. See p. 83 and n. 73 below


4 See ch. 1, p. 12.
pretensions were rejected both there and in the Peninsular parts of the empire. The main cause of contention was the claim put forward by Husain and his successor to authority over the Bendahara and the Temenggong. The Bendahara never recognised Husain's assumption of the royal title or any claim to authority over himself or the territory under his rule. After 1823 he gave his allegiance to the Sultan at Lingga. A few years later the Temenggong, who had been a party to Husain's elevation in 1819, also refused to recognise the Sultan at Singapore and gave his allegiance to Lingga.

The Bendahara and the Temenggong chose to ignore the pretensions of the Singapore Sultan for two main reasons. In the first place, the Sultan at Lingga was the properly constituted successor to Sultan Mahmud; he possessed the sacred regalia, he reigned at the ancient capital, and he was generally recognised - even by the Singapore branch of the royal house - as the ruler of highest rank and paramount authority in the area of the old empire. Moreover, whereas the Sultan at Lingga was distant and unassertive, the Singapore Sultan was close by and, since he possessed no worthwhile domain of his own, a potential competitor for the revenues of the districts under their own rule. This latter consideration weighed less with the Bendahara than with the Temenggong, whose dominions were in the immediate vicinity of Singapore and therefore more open to interference on the part of the Sultan.

The paramount authority of the Singapore Sultan was generally recognised by the Malays of Muar and the Johore
province in the second quarter of the nineteenth century, but it was only in Muar, where there was no really powerful local chief, that he was able to exploit the prerogatives of sovereignty and raise a revenue. In Johore, an 'ill-peopled and sterile domain' which was under the immediate rule of the Temenggong, Husain and his successor were recognised as Sultan by the village headmen but made no attempt, so far as is known, to raise a revenue before the 1840s, when the country began to achieve economic importance as a result of colonisation by Chinese gambier and pepper planters. By this time Husain had been succeeded by his son, Tengku Ali, whose assumption of the royal title was recognised by neither the Temenggong nor the British. After 1845 Ali made a number of attempts to assert the royal authority in Johore, but the Temenggong was now strong enough to counter all attempts to interfere in the government of the country. There was, however, one other course open to Tengku Ali. This was to appeal to the British to place him in the position to which they had elevated his father in 1819.

The attitude of the British authorities to the dispute over Johore was determined by their concern to see the government of

5 J.H. Moor, Notices of the Indian Archipelago, and adjacent countries, p. 244.

6 The paramount authority of the Sultan over the Temenggong's subjects is referred to by a local headman in the following terms: 'I am not under the rule of Sultan Ali [Husain's successor]. I am under the rule of the raja Temenggong. But although I am not under the rule of Sultan Ali, if Sultan Ali issues a command I must carry it out without fail.' See 'Panghulu Kisang's Statement', in 'Miscellaneous Notices', JIA vol. 3 (1849), p. xx.
Singapore's hinterland in the hands of a strong, capable, and amenable ruler. By 1845 it was clear that it was in the British interest to support the Temenggong against the royal house, the only question being how far this support could be carried in view of the fact that the Sultan and the Temenggong had been recognised as joint rulers by the Treaty of August 1824. The decision to back the Temenggong was dictated by the circumstances of his greater power and influence. By 1850 the Temenggong's power was firmly established in Johore. The origins of this power, however, lay in developments which took place in Singapore rather than Johore during the preceding quarter century.

In the early part of the century, before the foundation of Singapore, the Temenggong's principal source of income was large-scale and systematic piracy, an occupation for which his island possessions bordering the entrance to the Straits of Malacca offered unusual advantages. Most of the larger islands were inhabited by small communities of Orang Laut, primitive nomadic tribesmen of proto-Malay stock who from time immemorial had provided the man-power for Malay pirate fleets, while the countless small islands and creeks covered with dense mangrove offered perfect cover for pirate craft lying in wait for passing junks and praus. Singapore island, which the Temenggong often visited in the first two decades of the century, was itself a convenient base for pirate enterprises. "...at this time", says Munshi Abdullah in his autobiography, "the seas round Singapore so far from being navigated freely by men, were feared
even by jinns and devils, for along the shores were the sleeping-huts of the pirates. Whenever they plundered a ship or a ketch or a cargo-boat, they brought it in to Singapore where they shared the spoils and slaughtered the crew, or fought to the death among themselves to secure their gains.\footnote{Hikayat Abdullah, p. 129.}

The Temenggong's pirate interests extended far beyond the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Before the foundation of the British Settlement on Singapore Tun Abdul Rahman controlled a force of some 1200 men in 48 boats which gathered at seven points of rendezvous in the Riau-Lingga archipelago.\footnote{These were the Singapore Strait and the islands of Sugi, Pakako, Bulan, Galang, Timian, Bokaya [?Buaya], all apparently under the Temenggong's rule.} In company with the other main pirate fleet in the archipelago, a force of 18 vessels under the control of two Lingga chiefs, Tun Abdul Rahman's great fleet made a regular annual voyage along a route which was well-known and carefully calculated to take advantage of fair winds and currents:

They set out towards the close of the western monsoon, or even during the months of December or January, and directing their course by the Straits of Sunda, towards the southern coast of Java, bore up at the commencement of the east monsoon. They then passed through one of the Straits to the east of Java, and ran along the eastern and northern coast of Java, which they infested till the commencement of May, when regaining the offing of their first route, they took the road to their coverts pillaging in passing the shores of Banca and Palembang. If they made an important prize they returned at once, but if as often happened, their voyage was unfruitful, they continued...
to infest these coasts until the close of the east monsoon, when they invariably regained their lairs, with or without booty.\(^9\)

It was not usual for the great chiefs who controlled these forces to accompany their cruises. Their role was to provide for the fitting out of the expeditions in return for a share of the spoils. The terms upon which this was done varied. According to one account Tun Abdul Rahman usually supplied the artillery and ammunition and in return certain parts of the plunder, such as the hull of the praus, all guns taken above a certain size, krises and other weapons of various kinds and 'a portion of the female captives', were reserved for him. He also made advances to the pirate leaders for fitting out and provisioning their vessels, and these loans had to be repaid at a high rate of interest. In addition, the commanders of vessels were expected to offer presents at the end of a successful expedition.\(^10\)

The importance of piracy as a source of income for the Temenggong, and of lucrative and congenial employment for his followers, declined during the first few years after the foundation of the British Settlement. The great fleet broke up, the various squadrons began to go their different ways, and effective control over the pirate communities in the Temenggong's insular dominions began to pass to local chiefs.


whose relationship with the Temenggong is uncertain. By 1825
the pirates of Galang, Bulan, and several of the neighbouring
islands had come under the control of a Bulan chief who
apparently supplied them with boats, arms, and provisions.\textsuperscript{11}
Between 1819 and 1824, while the Temenggong still exercised the
prerogatives of a ruler on Singapore, the greater part of his
income probably came from monopolies, taxes, and other charges on
the commerce of the Settlement, the administration of which no
doubt also provided employment for his followers.\textsuperscript{12} But although
this was so, the Temenggong still maintained a profitable
interest in the activities of the pirates in the neighbourhood
of Singapore. According to a Dutch visitor to the Settlement in
1824, it was common knowledge that he was in constant
communication with the pirates, 'giving them regular news of the
comings and goings in Singapore harbour and the destination,
cargo and strength of the different ships.'\textsuperscript{13} The exact nature
of the Temenggong's relationship with the pirates is not known,
but it is likely that he supplied them with powder and shot and
acted as a broker or receiver in the disposal of their plunder.
At the same time his own followers on Singapore were engaged in
piracy, often, no doubt, on advances and in boats which the

\textsuperscript{11} [Logan?], 'The Piracy and Slave Trade', \textit{JIA} vol. 3 (1849),
pp. 634-35.
\textsuperscript{12}
See App. 'B', pp. 354-55.
\textsuperscript{13}
Miller, 'Extracts from the Letters of Colonel Nahuijs',
Temenggong provided, and with crews recruited from among the Orang Laut ferrymen of the Singapore river.\textsuperscript{14}

After the cession of Singapore, in August 1824, and the death of Temenggong Abdul Rahman in December of the following year, piracy began to assume once more the economic importance which it had held for the Temenggong and his followers before the foundation of the British Settlement. Tun Abdul Rahman's death dealt a double blow to the fortunes of his family and followers. In the first place the pension of $700 per month from the East India Company ceased, being replaced after some time by an eleemosynary grant of $350 per month.\textsuperscript{15} Secondly, the Telok Belanga Malays were left for almost a decade without effective leadership, since the heir, Daing Abdullah, was only eighteen at the time of his father's death and suffered from intermittent insanity. Daing Abdullah succeeded as head of the family and chief of the Telok Belanga Malays but was not installed as Temenggong. About 1833 or 1834 he was superseded by his younger brother, Daing Ibrahim, who was eventually installed as Temenggong in 1841.\textsuperscript{16} Meanwhile, in the period before Ibrahim was old enough to assume effective leadership, the fortunes of the chiefly family and their followers reached a low ebb. Rival chiefs closed in on the Temenggong's overseas

\textsuperscript{14} For the Temenggong's relationship with the Orang Laut see p. 63 and n. 22 below.

\textsuperscript{15} See App. 'B', pp. 354-55

\textsuperscript{16} See pp. 93-95 below.
interests, there was presumably little capital for financing large-scale expeditions of trade and piracy, and the majority of the Telok Belanga Malays were reduced to earning a poor living through fishing, eked out with petty trade and pirate windfalls. That the Temenggong's position did not suffer a complete collapse as a result of these misfortunes is to be attributed to the character and capabilities of Tun Abdul Rahman's eventual successor.

Temenggong Abdul Rahman, a prince of great tact and charm, managed to keep on fairly good personal terms with the British during the last years of his life despite his pirate associations and despite the disputes which arose over the respective rights and powers of the Malay chiefs and the British authorities on Singapore. His death was the subject of a sympathetic obituary in the local newspaper, whose editor observed, 'His Highness possessed mild and amiable manners, which rendered him much respected and highly esteemed, and to his friends and dependents, who are very numerous, his loss will be irreparable'. Blandness of manner was also an outstanding characteristic of Tun Abdul Rahman's second son, Daing Ibrahim, a prince of intelligence and resolve, and the founder of his

17 After the death of Tun Abdul Rahman all the Temenggong's dominions south of the Singapore Strait passed to other chiefs, although relations with the pirates in those places were maintained (or revived) in the 1830s. For the Sultan Husain's seizure of the Kerimuns see p. 83 below.
family's fortunes as the ruling dynasty of Peninsular Johore. Born in 1811, probably at Bulan or Riau, Ibrahim was brought to Singapore when he was eight years old. The rest of his life was passed in the British Settlement, at his village of Telok Belanga, on the outskirts of the greatest centre of trade and commerce in the Eastern Seas. Through residence in Singapore, Ibrahim came to form friendly associations with Europeans, notably with the family of W.W. Ker, who built a house at Bukit Chermin, near Telok Belanga, in the early 1840s, and acquired a knowledge of European ways and a taste for European styles, in such matters as dress, adornment and architecture, which, however superficial, set him apart from the Peninsular rulers whose contact with Europeans and European society was casual and limited. As his wealth and power increased, Ibrahim began to feel his way towards a recognised position in Singapore society. These developments were taken as evidence of the Temenggong's 'enlightenment' and attachment to the British interest, and had an important bearing on his relations with the imperial power during the 1840s and 1850s. In fact, however, although residence in the British Settlement modified Ibrahim's tastes and even, to some extent, his outlook, the dominant influences on

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19 For the Ker family see ch. 7, p. 248, n. 18.
20 It is noteworthy that one of Ibrahim's wives (the mother of his second son, Abdul Rahman) was a European or, more probably, a Eurasian. See App. 'A', Table 5.
21 That the Temenggong had a recognised social position was demonstrated in November 1848, when he gave his first large public entertainment. See Singapore Free Press, quoted in Buckley, An Anecdotal History, pp. 494-95, and Straits Times 2 Dec. 1848.
the development of his personality emanated from the Malay, or rather Bugis-Malay environment into which he was born and in which his life was passed. In the exercise of authority over his dependents and followers at Telok Belanga and in the government of his dominions beyond Singapore, Temenggong Ibrahim conformed, so far as this was possible in British territory, to the traditional pattern of chiefly rule.\footnote{22}

For twenty years after Tun Abdul Rahman's death the Telok Belanga Malays continued to engage in piracy. Their system was simple but extremely effective. Acting on shipping intelligence supplied by the Orang Laut ferrymen of the Singapore river, they would slip quietly out of the Settlement, fall upon their quarry, and return with their plunder in vessels fitted out to resemble traders.\footnote{23} Although these facts were well-known in Singapore, they were able to commit their depredations with almost complete impunity because of the difficulty of proving that merchandise brought into Singapore was pirate plunder, and the inability of the local authorities either to expel suspects domiciled in the Settlement or bring them to trial for piracy on the high

\footnote{22} Ibrahim's authority over his followers was maintained through a combination of moral sanctions and physical force. In the case of the Orang Laut ferrymen of the Singapore river, many of whom lived in the town rather than at Telok Belanga, the belief was instilled in them that if they forsook the dynasty to which their forefathers had sworn allegiance they and all their kin would suffer perdition. Care was also taken to ensure that members of their families were always living at Telok Belanga, where they were under the Temenggong's immediate control. See Straits Times, 5 Sept. 1846.

Nevertheless, as attacks on shipping in the vicinity of Singapore increased in frequency and daring the activities of the Telok Belanga Malays became a matter of public comment and eventually of official concern. In 1832 a piracy off Pulau Tinggi was reported in the press as being the work of marauders from Galang, Timian, Pahang and Telok Belanga. In 1835 the Singapore Chronicle accused Ibrahim of incessant piracy and described his method of obtaining accurate shipping intelligence. In the following year the same newspaper alleged that Telok Belanga was 'a great mart for the reception of and sale of goods taken by pirates' and 'the great channel through which the wants of the pirates have been and are amply supplied', and demanded that it be placed under strict police surveillance.

G.W. Earl, whose views typify the general attitude of the European business community at this time, observed: 'The Tumung-gung is a young man, and like most of the nobles, remarkable, even among the Malays, for his depravity....he is strongly suspected of encouraging the pirates, who, for years have been murdering and plundering the native traders almost

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24 Domicil in the Settlement was considered to confer rights under English law which prevented expulsion on mere suspicion. Trial for piracy was not possible while the local courts lacked Admiralty jurisdiction. See Tarling, Piracy and Politics, p. 36.
27 Quoted in Tarling, Piracy and Politics, pp. 80-81.
within sight of the harbour; and, if not personally engaged in piratical pursuits, it is well known that many of those in his confidence are absent for considerable periods under very suspicious circumstances. Fortunately for Ibrahim and his followers, the policy pursued by the Straits Government when it eventually came to grips with the problem of piracy was a two-fold one which combined the use of force to destroy the most notorious pirate strongholds with diplomacy to encourage respectable Malay regimes in areas where piracy was endemic. This policy was formulated as early as 1828, by the then Governor of the Straits Settlements, Robert Fullerton, and was put into practice after 1835 by Governors Bonham and Butterworth, both of whom came to rely on the Telok Belanga chief's cooperation.

29 Tarling, Piracy and Politics, pp. 35-37.
30 Sir Samuel George Bonham, K.C.B. (1850), Bt (1852), was born in 1803 and educated at the East India Company's College at Haileybury. He joined the Government of Fort Marlborough (Bencoolen) in 1818 and was transferred to Singapore in 1823. He was an Assistant to the Resident Councillor at Singapore from 1823 to 1834, Resident Councillor from 1834 to 1836, and Acting Governor from January to April 1834, and from October 1834 to June 1835. In 1836 he served as Commissioner for the Suppression of Piracy. He was Governor of the Straits Settlements from December 1836 until January 1843 when he retired from the Company's service. From 1847 until 1853 he was Governor and Commander-in-chief of Hong Kong and H.M. Plenipotentiary and Chief Superintendent of British Trade in China. He died in 1863.
31 Colonel (later Major-General) William John Butterworth, C.B., of the Madras Army, was appointed Governor of the Straits Settlements in June 1843, after a distinguished military career in India. His term as Governor began in July or August 1853 and ended in March 1855. He died in 1856.
In Bonham's view the problem of piracy in the neighbourhood of Singapore arose largely from the lack of strong chiefly authority in the islands to the south of the Singapore Strait which had formerly been under the Temenggong's rule and would persist until these islands came under the authority of powerful chiefs who could be held responsible for the behaviour of their inhabitants. There could be no question, Bonham was careful to acknowledge, of assisting Ibrahim to recover his father's authority over the islands south of the Strait; the appointment of responsible chiefs was a matter for the Dutch authorities. Nevertheless, Bonham saw no reason why the British should not enlist Ibrahim's aid in the prosecution of their own anti-piracy campaign. In his view it was worthwhile overlooking the Telok Belanga chief's dubious past and even, to some extent, the continuing lapses of his followers, in order to obtain the benefit of his influence with other Malay chiefs and his knowledge of the haunts and habits of the Riau-Lingga pirates. Bonham accordingly used his influence as Resident Councillor and Commissioner for the Suppression of Piracy to prevent drastic action being taken against Ibrahim for his complicity in acts of piracy and called upon him to assist the British in their

32 SSR AA-7, R.C. Singapore to Gov., 11 June 1836.
33 Bonham was one of two Commissioners appointed to report on the suppression of piracy in 1836. The other was Captain Chads of H.M.S. Andromache, which cruised against the pirates in the neighbourhood of the Straits Settlements between May and October 1836. See Tarling, *Piracy and Politics*, pp. 76-99.
34 When rumours reached the Governor that Ibrahim had stocks of arms and ammunition at Telok Belanga, Bonham was instructed to
effort to stamp out piracy in the neighbouring seas. This was, up to a point, a sensible policy, since it was clearly useful to have the cooperation of a Malay chief, and it was also realistic to acknowledge that Ibrahim could not make his followers change their ways overnight; but in the absence of any serious attempt to coerce him with threats of reprisals if he acted in bad faith no worthwhile result was achieved. Throughout Bonham’s governorship Ibrahim’s cooperation remained minimal and his followers continued to engage in piracy.

The intensive anti-piracy campaign conducted by vessels of the Royal Navy in 1836, and the introduction of more effective local measures for the suppression of piracy in the following year, led to a temporary drop in the number of attacks on shipping in the vicinity of Singapore. By the end of Bonham’s term as Governor, however, piracy had again become a serious menace. In February 1843 the Resident Councillor at Singapore, Thomas Church, drew attention to the large number of Cochinese junks which were being cut off and plundered each season by pirates residing under British rule, the most notorious being an

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stop his allowance and prevent his use of New Harbour if there was 'any strong presumptive evidence' against him. Bonham replied that there was no truth in the allegations. (SSR U-4, Gov. to R.C. Singapore, 5 May 1836; SSR AA-7, R.C. Singapore to Gov., 11 June 1836). Bonham also appears to have prevented action being taken against Ibrahim on the basis of evidence gathered by Chads. See Tarling, Politics and Piracy, pp. 82-83.

35 In 1837 Admiralty jurisdiction was conferred on the local courts and an armed paddle steamer, the H.C.S. Diana, was placed at the Governor’s disposal for cruising against the pirates. See Tarling, Piracy and Politics, pp. 96-99.
Orang Laut community which Ibrahim had settled on the island in 1837. To counter the activities of pirates in and around Singapore, Church pressed for a substantial increase in naval power, the construction of roads to the pirate villages on the north-east coast of the island, and an enlarged police force. These recommendations were approved by the Indian authorities and implemented by the new Governor, Colonel Butterworth, with the result that there was an immediate sharp decline in the number of attacks on Cochinese traders.

Shortly before Butterworth's appointment the Singapore Free Press launched a strong attack on the Temenggong. It was 'well-known' the Free Press maintained, that all the pirates in the neighbourhood of the Settlement were subjects of the Sultan of Johore, or rather, of the Temenggong, who was the real ruler of the country. There was no doubt that Ibrahim could put an end to piracy if he wished, and the Government should call upon him to do so; if he proved unwilling his allowance should be stopped and applied to the cost of the Government's gunboats.

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36 About March 1837 Ibrahim requested permission for about 270 families of Orang Laut who had hitherto 'more or less depended on piracy for a livelihood' to settle on Singapore under his control. This accorded with Bonham's view that the pirate communities should be placed under responsible chiefs and was agreed to, although it was at first thought that it would be preferable to locate them in the Temenggong's own dominions, where they could be dealt with without reference to English law. See SSR R-4, Gov. to Sec. Govt., Fort William, 45A, 5 April 1837.

37 Tarling, Piracy and Politics, pp. 206-09.

38 SSR R-10, Gov. to Under-Sec. Govt Bengal, 86, 24 June 1844.
and armed steamers. These views found some favour with the new Governor, who commenced his term of office with a low opinion of the Temenggong's value as an instrument of British policy and was disinclined to overlook his dubious associations. Accordingly, when a Cochinese vessel was pillaged off Tanjong Ramunia, a notorious pirate haunt on the south-east coast of Johore, Ibrahim was apprised of the Governor's attitude and informed that the 'smallest countenance' of piracy in the future would lead to the withdrawal of his allowance. Ibrahim protested his innocence and assured the Governor of his cooperation in the suppression of piracy, but to no avail. Butterworth remained unimpressed, and in reporting the matter to the Indian authorities he expressed his distrust of the Malay chief: 'his natural indolence of habit is such that it would be useless to expect assistance from him - indeed I should be disposed to regret any interference on his part, and I feel persuaded it would tend rather to mischief than to good'.

In view of the Governor's obvious hostility, Ibrahim thought it advisable to sacrifice a few victims. In July 1844, less than three weeks after the piracy off Tanjong Ramunia, he presented Penglima Tujoh, 'the notorious freebooter', to the Singapore authorities. The Penglima, it transpired, had been residing at Tanjong Surat, a settlement in Johore which owed allegiance to the Temenggong, during the whole of his pirate

40 SSR R-10, Gov. to Under Sec. Govt Bengal, 86, 24 June 1844.
career and was apprehended with remarkable ease by the commander of one of the Temenggong's armed praus. Butterworth instructed the Resident Councillor to compliment the Temenggong on the proof he had so speedily produced of his sincerity in promising to assist in the suppression of piracy; at the same time, however, he made it clear that he was not to be placated with occasional victims, however 'notorious' their careers may have been. Butterworth was also opposed to the Temenggong's maintaining armed vessels for the capture of pirates. This, he informed the Resident Councillor, should be discontinued at once, 'or we shall shortly find the remedy worse than the disease.' The best service the Temenggong could render was to persuade his people to give information concerning the pirates in the vicinity of his village at New Harbour.  

The Governor's immediate reaction to the capture of Penglima Tujoh was certainly discouraging. Nevertheless it is clear that a turning point in the Temenggong's relations with the British - and with the pirates - was reached then or shortly afterwards, possibly as a result of further captures. The decline of piracy in the neighbourhood of Singapore had begun in the first half of 1844, before the capture of Penglima Tujoh, and was due to the anti-piracy measures introduced on the recommendation of the Resident Councillor at Singapore. After the Penglima's capture, however, the process was accelerated and

41 SSR U-10, Gov. to R.C. Singapore, 10 July 1844; SSR R-10, Gov. to Under-Sec. Govt Bengal, 93, 10 July 1844.
this could be attributed, in part at least, to the Temenggong's grim demonstration of collaboration. By the beginning of 1845 the Temenggong's relations with the Governor had improved greatly, and as a mark of appreciation of his willingness to 'assist the views and wishes of the Government', the rule against hiring out convicts was relaxed to allow the Temenggong to obtain the services of experienced syces. Ibrahim's position was now sufficiently well established to enable him to withstand the compromising disclosures of Penglima Tujoh's last confession. On the strength of this confession the headman at Tanjong Surat, a subordinate of the Temenggong's, was taken into custody on a charge of complicity in acts of piracy, but the Penglima's accusation that the inhabitants of Tanjong Surat and a neighbouring village rendered annual tribute to the Temenggong for the privilege of engaging in piracy was dismissed as being without substance. It was most likely, Butterworth concluded, that a small annual tribute or duty was paid for the right to fell timber and collect forest produce, and this was altogether unobjectionable. 'I feel perfectly persuaded', he informed the Indian authorities, 'whatever His Highness may have been in days gone by that he is not at present either directly or indirectly connected in Piracy, as his recent acts have sufficiently proved'.

42 SSR G-5, Gov. to Temenggong, 25 Jan. 1845.
43 SSR R-12, Gov. to Under-Sec. Govt Bengal, 91, 22 May 1845.
Meanwhile the Temenggong had gone with the Government steamer to Pahang to intercede with the Bendahara for the release of a number of Cochinese slaves. Eventually, as a result of the Temenggong's persuasions and the Governor's threats, the release of some 60 Cochinese (out of a known total of 150 or so) and 50 Balinese was obtained and the Bendahara promised not to allow his capital to be used as a slave market. With this achievement the Governor expressed himself well pleased, and in reporting his success to the Government of India he paid a tribute to the 'ready and able assistance' of the Temenggong. At the same time he praised his 'earnest cooperation' in the suppression of piracy. Ibrahim was now well on the way to rehabilitation. In the eyes of the Governor he was 'this greatly belied or so much changed native prince.'

Butterworth was anxious to encourage the Temenggong to further efforts and also to demonstrate to other Malay chiefs that the British Government honoured faithful allies. It was accordingly decided that Ibrahim's services against the pirates should be recognised by the presentation of a state sword. A sword was procured from England, and in September 1846 the presentation was made. The ceremony was an impressive one. Two

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44 SSR G-5, Gov. to Bendahara, 5 April, 17 April, 24 May, 9 Aug. 1845; SSR G-5, Gov. to Temenggong, 24 May 1845; SSR R-13, Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 102A, 4 June 1845; SSR R-13, Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 180, 20 Oct. 1845.

45 SSR R-13, Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 102A, 4 June 1845.
companies of Indian troops in full dress uniform lined the road up Government Hill, and as the Temenggong, accompanied by the Sultan of Lingga, the sons of the late Sultan Husain and 'some European gentlemen', passed between their ranks a salute of fifteen guns was fired. At the steps of Government House he was greeted by the Governor and escorted onto the verandah, where the Resident Councillor, senior military officers and other government officials stood beneath a portrait of the Queen. There, before a large crowd of all nationalities (including 500 of the Temenggong's armed followers) the Governor delivered a speech in praise of Ibrahim's services and presented him with the sword of honour. The Temenggong, in reply, expressed the hope that the Governor might remain as ruler of the Straits 'for ever'.

During the next two years Ibrahim assisted the Straits Government in an intensive campaign against the pirates in the Riau-Lingga archipelago. In this the Temenggong's armed praus complemented the Government steamers which, though highly successful on the high seas, could not follow the pirates into the mazes of creeks and channels in which they sought shelter. Here, in waters too shallow or too narrow for the Government's vessels, the Malay praus proved their worth in hunting the

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46 Who these were is not known. Probably they included W.W. Ker, for whom see p. 62 above.

47 Singapore Free Press, 3 Sept. 1846; Straits Times, 5 Sept. 1846; Hikayat Abdullah, pp. 261-64; SSR V-11, Gov. to Officer Commanding the Troops, 3 S., 26 Aug. 1846.
pirates down and destroying their lairs. Ibrahim also accompanied H.C.S. Hooghly on cruises against the pirates from time to time. In addition, his followers cruised around independently of the British and occasionally made important captures; in March 1847 they caught Penglima Mat, a notorious marauder who lurked in the waters round Bangka, and a few months later Penglima Passang, a veteran who had evaded capture for more than a decade.

The capture of Penglima Mat in March 1847 brought forth fresh laudatory effusions from Butterworth, who took the opportunity to declare: 'I have not hesitated, from the period of receiving the Temenggong's assurance of assistance in the suppression of Piracy to place the greatest reliance on that chieftain, as frequently expressed in my several communications on the subject, and I gladly add that on the present occasion he has more than realised my utmost expectation'. The Indian authorities were impressed with the Governor's assessment of this feat and suggested that some 'suitable mark of appreciation' should be conferred on the Temenggong. After making discreet enquiries from his leading followers Butterworth reported that a diamond studded star would be 'most gratifying'. While the

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48 See Straits Times, 30 Sept. 1846; SSR R-14, Gov. to Under-Sec. Govt Bengal, 98, 26 June 1847.
49 SSR R-16, Gov. to Under Sec. Govt, Bengal, 150, 6 Nov. 1847.
50 SSR R-14, Gov. to Under-Sec. Govt Bengal, 36, 6 March 1847.
51 SSR S-14, Under-Sec. Govt Bengal to Gov., 734, 28 April 1847.
52 SSR R-16, Gov. to Under-Sec. Govt Bengal, 119, 2 Aug. 1847.
Indian Government was considering this, Ibrahim seized the opportunity to apply for an increase in his allowance, apparently representing himself as being in financial difficulties as a result of his anti-piracy activities. This request was turned down by the local authorities, but a few weeks later, after the capture of Penglima Passang, Butterworth recommended a grant of $5000.\textsuperscript{53} In a subsequent despatch he informed the Indian Government that he had ascertained 'beyond doubt' that the Temenggong had incurred debts in consequence of his activities for the suppression of piracy.\textsuperscript{54} In the end, however, the Indian authorities sent a sword instead of a star and sanctioned a donation of $2500 instead of $5000; moreover, the sword was not presented since Ibrahim had already been given one, and he had to be content with the money.\textsuperscript{55}

There can be little doubt that the Temenggong's anti-piracy coups were coldly calculated to advance his own interest and that, so far from indicating a change of heart, they did not even mean that his own pirate associations had ceased completely. It is noteworthy that the capture of Penglima Passang came at a most convenient time to support his request for financial assistance. There is no reason to suppose that the local authorities were unaware of this. For them, however, the important

\textsuperscript{53} SSR R-16, Gov. to Under-Sec. Govt Bengal, 150, 6 Nov. 1847.
\textsuperscript{54} SSR R-17, Gov. to Under-Sec. Govt. Bengal, 37, 15 March 1848.
\textsuperscript{55} SSR R-17, Gov. to Under-Sec. Govt Bengal, 37, 15 March 1848; SSR R-15, Gov. to Under-Sec. Govt Bengal, 5, 23 Feb. 1850; SSR S-15, Sec. Govt Bengal to Gov., 620, 25 May 1848.
consideration was that the Temenggong actively and publicly supported the policy of the British Government in the neighbourhood of Singapore. So long as this support was forthcoming Ibrahim's motives were not questioned, and when evidence of his followers' malpractices came to light he was personally exonerated on the assumption that he was unaware of their doings.\textsuperscript{56} Butterworth, indeed, was prepared to go to considerable lengths on the Temenggong's behalf; for instance, when he pressed the Indian Government to give the Temenggong a large sum of money to help him out of his financial difficulties, he must have been aware that Ibrahim was in receipt of a very

\textsuperscript{56} In 1851 complaints reached the Straits Government that boats with passes bearing the Temenggong's seal had been committing piracies in the neighbourhood of Deli, Batu Bara and Assahan, on the East Coast of Sumatra. After making enquiry of the Temenggong, who expressed himself 'mortified and grieved' by the suggestion that he was implicated, Church reported that some of the Temenggong's boats had been in the area but that it was now 'almost certain' that the pirates were a Galang fleet sailing to Junk Ceylon ostensibly for trepang. Butterworth thereupon declared his 'unbounded confidence' in the Temenggong and took the view that the passes 'supposed to bear His Highness's chop' had been surreptitiously obtained or that some of his followers had engaged in piracy without his knowledge. See SSR U-22, Gov. to R.C. Singapore, 26 June, 14 July, 19 July 1851; SSR AA-22, R.C. Singapore to Gov., 12 July 1851.

In 1859 further evidence of the pirate activities of the Temenggong's followers came to light. British enquiries into the incidence of piracy in the vicinity of the Sembilan and Pangkor islands elicited the information that 'the piracies had for the last year been committed by the Penglima Inche' Mahmud of Telok Saggah, belonging to the Temenggong of Telok Belanga (the Temenggong of Johore) who had a large boat like those further eastward with a crew of twenty men, all armed with muskets, which was always accompanied by two other boats, all having passes from Singapore, and that they moved from place to place'. See CO 273/4, p. 249, 'Narrative of the Proceedings of the Government of the Strait during the Second Quarter of 1859'.
large personal income. Moreover, so far from being a burdensome expense, the outfit of the anti-piracy expeditions was probably a good investment, since it is to be presumed that his followers kept whatever plunder they captured from the pirates. But of all this not a word was said to the Indian authorities.

It was fortunate for the Temenggong's relations with the British, and for the future of his family as the ruling house of Johore, that the period of Butterworth's anti-piracy campaigns coincided with the rise of new sources of income for himself and his followers. After 1854 Ibrahim began to receive a very large income from the lease of revenue farms in Johore. In the late 1840s, however, the greater part of his and his followers' incomes came from the organisation of expeditions of overseas trade.

For many, if not most of the Telok Belanga Malays, piracy probably continued to provide employment until the 1840s. At the same time fishing and overseas trade were also important. Fishing, notably for trepang, occupied the Temenggong's followers from before the foundation of Singapore until at least the beginning of the 1850s. Clients and followers of the Temenggong also engaged in overseas trade on advances and often

57 Butterworth certainly knew of Ibrahim's interest in the gutta trade (for which see pp. 78-81 below) when he informed the Bengal Government of his financial difficulties.

perhaps in ships which he provided. Malays from Telok Belanga dominated the petty trade between Singapore and the small Malay communities on the rivers of Peninsular Johore, and, in addition, the Temenggong sent parties of followers into the forests of Johore to organise the collection of rattan, gaharu wood, and other jungle products. These trading operations were, however, on a comparatively small scale until the sudden rise to importance of a common, hitherto neglected product of the forests. This was getah taban, the 'gutta percha' of Western industry, a rubber-like gum which began to attract the attention of European technologists after 1842, when a Singapore Malay started to export riding whips with handles made of the substance. The possibilities for the industrial application of gutta were quickly appreciated and within a few years a strong demand had developed for the raw material. Between 1845 and 1848 the price of gutta rose from $8 to $24 per pikul at Singapore. After 1851, when gutta came into general use as a waterproof insulation for submarine cables, the price began to soar. In 1853 it was $60 per pikul; by 1901 it had risen through a series of fluctuations to $700 per pikul.

In the early 1850s the Temenggong maintained trade relations with Aceh, Siak and other places on the East Coast of Sumatra. See SSR AA-22, R.C. Singapore to Gov., 12 July 1851; SSR U-28, Sec. Govt to R.C. Singapore, 8 Feb. 1855.


As soon as the commercial value of gutta became known the Temenggong moved to engross the profits of the new trade. Gutta was declared a monopoly of the Temenggong in Johore, and while anyone might collect the gum or procure it from the aborigines, all were obliged to sell to the Temenggong at a fixed price. In the rivers of south Johore the aborigines were set to work to collect gutta under the direction of the Temenggong's agents, one tribe even being transported from the forests of Battam for this purpose. Parties of up to 100 of the Temenggong's followers were sent out to procure gutta in other parts of the Malay world, to the west coast of the Peninsula, to Pahang (by arrangement with the Bendahara), and to Borneo, Sumatra, Bangka, Billitung, and the Riau-Lingga archipelago. The Singapore searchers were the first to bring a knowledge of the commercial value of the gum to these places, and it is probable that in the early stages the greater part of the trade was in the hands of the followers and clients of the Temenggong, operating on capital which he advanced to them. But as the value of the product became known, local rulers took steps to secure the profits of the trade to themselves through the imposition of monopolies similar to the Temenggong's in Johore. By 1847 the Sultan at Lingga had declared getah taban to be a royal monopoly and had laid the islands of the Riau-Lingga archipelago under contribution; trade with the Temenggong's men was forbidden and gutta which they collected was confiscated.  

63 J.R. Logan, 'Range of the Gutta Taban Collectors, and Present Amount of Imports into Singapore', JIA vol. 2 (1848), pp. 529-30;
Although the Temenggong was to a large extent squeezed out of the overseas collection of gutta, he continued for some time to engross the buying up of the product at Singapore, where most of the produce of the region was brought for sale. The details of this monopoly are obscure, but it is apparent that it was run in conjunction with a group of baba (Straits-born) Hokkien who presumably handled the gutta once it reached the Settlement. The Temenggong's role was to maintain a fixed price in dealings with the Malays and others who brought the product to Singapore. It was his practice to station armed boats at different points of approach to the port in order to intercept the praus bringing the gutta into market. In this way the collectors were induced to dispose of their cargoes to the Temenggong's agents, who paid them with money which he advanced for the purpose. The gutta was then stored and prepared for export, probably in the godowns of the Temenggong's Chinese associates, and its sale on the European market was arranged by the Temenggong's business agents, the Singapore firm of Ker, Rawson & Co.

Ibrahim's lucrative system of intimidation was eventually brought to the notice of the Singapore Chamber of Commerce, which

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64 Logan, 'The Orang Sabimba of the Extremity of the Malay Peninsula' and 'The Orang Bidauna Kallang of the River Pulai in Johore', *JIA* vol. 1 (1847), pp. 295, 298, 300.


66 W. Makepace, G.E. Brooke, R. St J. Braddell (eds), *One Hundred Years of Singapore*, vol. 1, p. 590.
took action in March 1848, when it became known that vessels from Sumatra were taking gutta to Malacca in order to avoid his exactions. In bringing the matter to the attention of the Straits Government the Chamber of Commerce claimed that 90% of the total gutta imports, estimated at 10,000 to 12,000 pikuls p.a., worth $150,000 to $200,000, was bought up by the Temenggong at less than the market price.\(^6^7\) After investigations which convinced him that practices in restraint of trade were in fact going on (though not necessarily, he thought, with the knowledge of the Temenggong), the Governor announced that steps had been taken to prevent the Temenggong from assuming a monopoly of gutta, 'if that was ever his intention'.\(^6^8\) What these steps were, and whether they were successful, is not known, but although there is no evidence of further complaints it seems unlikely that the Temenggong and his followers completely gave up their interest in gutta after 1848. Meanwhile, in the three and a half years up to July 1848 it is probable that Ibrahim had made upwards of $50,000 out of gutta and that a further $50,000 went to his followers.\(^6^9\)

\(^6^7\) Singapore Free Press, 16 March 1848.
\(^6^8\) SSR U-14, Gov. to R.C. Singapore, 15 March 1848.
\(^6^9\) These estimates are based on Logan, 'Range of the Gutta Taban Collectors and Present Amount of Imports into Singapore', JIA vol. 2 (1848), pp. 29-33; Logan, 'The Orang Binua of Johore', JIA vol. 1 (1847), p. 291; Singapore Free Press, 16 March 1848; SSR U-14, Gov. to R.C. Singapore, 15 March 1848. These give figures (for imports, exports, prices and total value of the trade in the period 1845-48) which suggest that the Temenggong and his followers made a profit of ca 200% (of which the Temenggong took 1/4) on gutta from Johore and other places where they dealt directly with the collectors, and ca 20% to 30% on their dealings with traders bringing the product to Singapore.
By 1849 the profits of the gutta trade had wrought a considerable transformation in the way of life of the Temenggong and his followers. In the early 1840s the poverty of the Telok Belanga Malays was reflected in the appearance of their village, the chief's house being distinguished from its neighbours, according to the Singapore Free Press, 'by being of brick, and if possible dingier and dirtier than the rest.' By the end of the decade their wealth was evident. The old palace had been renovated for the use of the Temenggong's mother, and a number of bungalows, 'gay with green and white paint', had been built for the accommodation of the Temenggong's immediate family and his numerous female relatives. Several balai (reception halls), also in the European style, had been built for use on ceremonial occasions, an elegant new mosque had replaced the old one, and a number of the leading men of the village had followed the Temenggong's example in building in the European style, 'their smart, green-venetianed, tile-roofed houses, being an extreme contrast to the rude huts in which they formerly were content to live.' A granite aqueduct brought in a supply of pure water from a nearby stream, the bathing places along the roadside had been fenced in, and the heights above the village, formerly a tiger-infested wilderness, had been cleared and planted with fruit and spice trees. In noticing these changes the Singapore Tawarikh Dato' Bentara Luar, pp. 59-60.

Free Press voiced a suspicion that they owed a great deal to the promptings of the Temenggong's European friends, though it was graciously conceded, 'enough still remains to show that there must be a real desire to adopt the comforts and conveniences, and the more settled and industrious habits of civilized life, instead of adhering to the rude habitations and idle and equivocal habits which formerly were the marks and distinguishing characteristics of the Teluk Blangah Malays.'

WHILE the Temenggong was rising to a position of wealth and power the fortunes of the royal house were steadily declining. After 1827, by which time Husain had been eliminated from all share in the revenues of Singapore and expelled from the Kerimuns, the royal house became confined in the exercise of its authority to Muar and the Johore province, a sparsely populated and economically undeveloped territory which produced very little revenue. The Sultan's dominions were in fact practically

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*Singapore Free Press, 1 Feb. 1849.*

*The Kerimuns were seized by the Sultan shortly after Tun Abdul Rahman's death and remained in his possession until November 1827, when the Dutch and the Yamtuan Muda expelled his followers. See N. Tarling, 'British Policy in the Malay Peninsula and Archipelago, 1824-1871', *JMBRAS* vol. 30 pt 3 (1957), hereafter cited as Tarling, 'British Policy', p. 24ff.*

*The only revenue which the royal house is known to have received came from Muar, where the local ruler sent annual tribute of 200 bags (kamnit) of rice and $1 per house from the village of Padang (population ca 200), worth in all perhaps $200 p.a. See T.J. Newbold, Political and Statistical account of the British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca...with a History of the Malay States on the Peninsula of Malacca, vol. 2, p. 160.*
useless, not only as a source of personal income but also as a means of providing for his following. Faced with a similar situation, the Temenggong's family turned to the organisation of expeditions of trade and piracy. The royal house, however, does not appear to have participated in ventures of this kind to any significant extent. 75 As a result, Husain's patrimonial following dispersed, leaving his successor without the means of challenging the Temenggong's power in the 1840s, when Johore began to assume economic importance.

In the final analysis, the failure of the royal house to overcome its difficulties is to be attributed to the personal incapacity of successive Sultans and to the circumstances of their royal position, which imposed obligations of largesse, hospitality, and the maintenance of state far beyond those of a mere chief, while at the same time inhibiting, through the force of traditional values, their ability to adapt to changing circumstances. Both Husain and his successor, Sultan Ali, were powerfully affected by traditional attitudes to kingship; in particular, by the paralysing belief that the world owed royalty a living. It is this view, as much as the special circumstances of his position on Singapore, which finds expression in Husain's own characterisation of his kingly role. 'Formerly and when the

75 This is not to say that the Sultan's followers were not involved in piracy - clearly they were (see Tarling, Piracy and Politics, pp. 32, 35-36, 40) - or that the Sultan did not receive tribute from his pirate followers. The suggestion is that Husain did not play a significant part in financing their activities in the 1830s.
Company elevated me to my present rank and made a treaty', he declared, 'it was stated in the engagement that the Sultan should remain quiet and amuse himself and that the Sultan should not trouble himself about any affairs whatever and that all business would be carried on by the Company and Tamangong Abdul Rahman.'76 This same view, that, while others may have charge of the government, the Sultan possessed supreme authority and was entitled to a share of the revenues, appears again in proposals put forward by Sultan Ali in the 1850s.

After 1827 the royal house was faced with a choice between political power and personal comfort. On $1300 per month, the Sultan's pension from the Company, it was possible to maintain a lavish establishment and a large retinue.77 To preserve his political position, however, the Sultan had to provide for his followers - not merely the attendants and servants of the royal household, but the generality of his followers residing at Kampong Glam. After the loss of Singapore and the Kerimuns these could not be provided for in the usual way out of the resources of the royal domain. The only alternative before the Sultan was to follow the Temenggong's example and use his income to finance expeditions of trade and piracy. Husain, however,

76 SSR N-3, Sultan Husain to Gov., 29 Rabeal awal 1243 (21 Oct. 1827).
77 It is noteworthy that the Resident at Singapore received a salary of Sp $750 and a table allowance of $500 per month in 1823, and the Assistant Resident a salary of $300 per month. (See [Braddell], 'Notices of Singapore', JIA vol. 3 (1853), p. 346). For the finances of chiefly households in the latter half of the nineteenth century see Gullick, Indigenous Political Systems, ch. 7.
lacked the energy and initiative which characterised the Temenggong's family. Instead, he withdrew into the palace and squandered his resources on luxury and extravagance.

Husain disappointed those who looked to him for financial assistance, and in consequence his relations with his followers deteriorated during the last years of his life. This development was associated with the rise of a favourite, Abdul Kadir bin Ahmad Sahib, a Malacca-born Tamil who was taken into the royal household, to the great scandal of the Sultan's followers, and given charge of his patron's finances. When Abdul Kadir displaced the Sultan's mentri (minister) and his other advisers in their master's confidence, rumours sprang up of an adulterous connection between him and Tengku Purbu, the Sultan's wife. The leading followers took the unusual step of complaining to the Resident Councillor, who advised Husain to get rid of the favourite. This he refused to do, however, and relations with his followers steadily worsened. Finally, when it appeared that a party of Malays was about to storm the palace and kill him, Abdul Kadir fled to Malacca. A few months later, in June 1834,

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78 In his later years a grossly corpulent figure, Husain would fall into a doze and snore whenever he sat down. For a graphic description of his manner and appearance see Hikayat Abdullah, pp. 192-93.

79 In December 1828 Husain asked for a loan of $1000 to meet the expense of a religious festival. 'Without this assistance', he was obliged to confess, 'we are fearful of incurring disgrace.' (see SSR N-5, Sultan Husain to Presgrave [Malay translator], n.d. [ca 30 December 1828]). When he died the royal family was left destitute (see SSR R-3, Gov. to Sec. Govt, Fort William, 2, 5 Jan. 1836).
the Sultan followed him, accompanied by Tengku Purbu, his children by her, and about ten men and ten or twenty women. At Malacca another attempt was made on Abdul Kadir's life by one of the Sultan's retainers. After this, all the Malays were turned out of the royal household and Abdul Kadir, now entitled Tengku Muda, was given the hand of the Sultan's daughter in marriage. The royal household was now served exclusively by Indian Moslems, and Malay chiefs who came to see the Sultan were turned away without an interview.

Sultan Husain's extraordinary behaviour during the last years of his life is explicable in terms of a rejection of the traditional role of the great chief which, in the circumstances in which he found himself in Singapore, he was personally unable to fulfil. Abdul Kadir was more than simply a personal favourite. By turning over the management of his affairs to a foreigner, who stood outside the nexus of traditional relationships in which he was involved, the Sultan sought to escape from his traditional obligations towards his followers. Similarly, the violence of his followers' reactions was directed not only at the personal position of the favourite, but also at the prince's denial of these obligations. In the end Husain's determination to throw

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80 Hikayat Abdullah, pp. 230-33.
81 Ibid. pp. 233-34, 240-41.
82 When the Resident Councillor advised him to get rid of Abdul Kadir the Sultan is said to have replied, 'It is Abdul Kadir who helps me in everything I do and who lightens the tasks of my office. All my followers are trying to ruin me and bring about my downfall. None of them has any regard for the privacy of my palace or my powers as ruler.' See Hikayat Abdullah, p. 231.
off the traditional role led him to withdraw from the Malay community and seek solace in the society of Indian Moslems.\(^{83}\)

When he died, in September 1835, his body was interred in an Indian Moslem burial ground at Malacca, and the princes, led by his eldest surviving son and Daing Ibrahim, who came to bear the remains back to Riau for burial beside the grave of Sultan Mahmud, were prevented by the bitter opposition of Tengku Purbu from carrying out their pious mission.\(^{84}\)

Husain's son and heir, Tengku Ali, was only ten years old at the time of his succession and continued to live at Malacca for nearly six years after his father's death. When he finally returned to Singapore the authority of the royal house over the Kampong Glam Malays had been weakened by years of absence and neglect.\(^{85}\) Moreover Ali, whose allowance from the Government was only a fraction of what his father's had been, lacked the means of attracting a large retinue and reviving the loyalty of the followers whom Husain had spurned. In his attempts to make good his claim to Muar and Johore he was obliged to rely on Bugis

\(^{83}\) The Sultan's sons often dressed in Tamil fashion at Malacca, to the amazement of the Malacca Malays. The Sultan never went to the Malay Mosque or consulted the Malay khatib (religious official) at Malacca; whenever there was a religious ceremony to be performed the khatib of the Indian Moslems was summoned. See Hikayat Abdullah, pp. 240, 243.

\(^{84}\) Hikayat Abdullah, pp. 243-44.

\(^{85}\) In the latter half of the 1830s some of the Sultan's former followers took to piracy in the environs of Singapore (see SSR AA-7, R.C. Singapore to Acting Gov., 21 April 1835); others may have followed the fortunes of the elder son, Tengku Abdul Jalil, who quitted Singapore and established himself on the East Coast about 1838 (see App. 'B', pp. 352-55.)
mercenaries, whose payment contributed to the eventual bankruptcy of the royal house.

For the officials of the Straits Government and their superiors in Calcutta and London, the death of Sultan Husain raised questions of policy which were not finally settled until the 1880s. The British involvement in the affairs of Johore arose in the first place from the fact that it was they who had elevated Tengku Husain to the sultanate in 1819. Husain's position was subsequently recognised in the Treaty of August 1824, which was concluded on the same basis as previous agreements with the Sultan and the Temenggong, that is, that the Sultan occupied the position of sovereign and the Temenggong that of local ruler. On the other hand the Treaty gave no indication of what the respective rights and powers of the two rulers were considered to be, or of the bounds of their dominions. Under these circumstances, and in view of the fact that the Treaty specifically exempted them from any obligation to interfere in the internal affairs of the country, the British considered that they were not bound to recognise Husain's successor or take any steps towards his installation. At the same time, however, they were reluctant to take positive action to suppress the royal line, even though this was clearly in the British interest once Johore began to assume economic importance. Partly this was a question of moral scruple, for there could be no getting round the fact that the British had recognised Husain as Sultan of Johore. There were also considerations of a practical nature. The Straits Government was reluctant to give
offence by appearing to deal harshly with a family whose rank still commanded respect among the Malays of Singapore and the neighbouring territories. It was also considered desirable that there should be under British influence a titular sovereign whose existence might be opposed to any design on the part of the Sultan of Lingga to exercise authority in the Peninsular parts of the old empire. During Bonham's governorship all these considerations were taken into account, with the result that no really firm line of policy was followed in relation to the Johore chiefs. A positive policy did not emerge until the latter half of the 1840s when it became imperative, for reasons of expediency, to settle the government of the neighbouring territory. Nevertheless, moral considerations, which were taken very seriously by Edmund Blundell, the Acting Governor who initiated negotiations in 1852, played an important part in determining the final form of the settlement which the Straits Government effected between the Temenggong and the royal house.

When Sultan Husain died, in September 1835, the Resident Councillor at Malacca recommended that Tengku Ali should be recognised as his successor and granted a large allowance. A different view was taken by the Resident Councillor at Singapore, George Bonham, who believed that no official action should be taken to encourage the pretensions of a successor. In his

86 CO 273/94, excerpt from [Gov.] to Bendahara, 10 July 1840, in Paper by F.A. Swettenham, encl. in Gov. to Sec. State, 194, 5 July 1878.
87 SSR U-4, Gov. to R.C. Malacca, 17 Sept. 1835.
opinion the question of a successor concerned the Government only in so far as the royal family's property at Kampong Glam was concerned. Bonham was also opposed to the suggestion that special provision should be made for the heir. The late Sultan, he informed the Governor, 'was never recognised as Raja of Johore by the Malay states and decidedly derived no revenue whatever from the territories originally forming the empire, or inherited any of its dignities, and I feel assured that no more consideration will be paid to Tengku Ali than to Tengku ja'afar [his younger brother] unless a larger pension is allowed him to enable him to retain a number of idle followers.'

Bonham's recommendation was that the royal house should receive the same allowance as the Temenggong's family ($350 per month), that this should be paid to the individual members of the royal house and not, as in the case of the Temenggong's family, to the head of the house. These recommendations were adopted by the Governor and passed on to the Indian authorities, who accepted the view that there was no reason to recognise a merely titular prince and that Tengku Ali should receive no more than his brother. Instead of $350 per month, however, the allowance of the royal house was fixed at $250 per month, out of which Tengku Ali and his brother were each allotted $70 per month.

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89 SSR AA-7, R.C. Singapore to Gov., 2 Jan. 1836.
90 The balance was divided between a sister and a half-brother, who each received $55. Two years later another sister was granted $55 per month, bringing the royal family's total allowance to $305 per month. See App. 'B',
Shortly after Husain's death envoys were sent to Pahang to try to persuade the Bendahara to install Tengku Ali as his successor. The Bendahara, however, acknowledged the authority of the Sultan of Lingga and, as Newbold remarks, 'appeared to wait for some more active demonstration of its views on the part of our government.'⁹¹ Another mission was despatched to Pahang in 1840, when Tengku Ali was about 15 years old, but the Bendahara's attitude had not changed, although on this occasion he cautiously sounded out the Governor before committing himself in the matter.⁹² The Governor at this time was George Bonham, who as Resident Councillor had opposed Tengku Ali's recognition in 1835. Bonham's policy as Governor is by no means clear. He appears to have taken the view that Ali’s installation might be useful in preventing the Sultan of Lingga from extending his influence into the Peninsular states; it is possible, however, that he merely wished to reserve the Government's position. In any case the Bendahara was informed that the British could not recognise as Sultan or Temenggong any but the sons of the princes who ceded Singapore, and that they would approve of Tengku Ali's installation if this was the wish of the Malays.⁹³ The Bendahara evidently took from this (what may well have been intended) that the Governor would not press the matter; he accordingly declined

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⁹² CO 273/94, excerpt from [Gov.] to Bendahara, 10 July 1840, in Paper by F.A. Swettenham, encl. in Gov. to Sec. State, 194, 5 July 1878.
⁹³ Loc. cit.
to take any part in a ceremony of installation. Under these circumstances the Straits Government was also unwilling to recognise Ali, but as some sort of acknowledgement of his succession was necessary to enable him to enter into possession of the Kampung Glam estate, a proclamation was issued which stated that the British Government looked upon him 'in every respect as the successor of his late father'. On the strength of this implicit recognition Tengku Ali was proclaimed by members of the royal family as Sultan Ali Iskandar Shah of Johore. Immediately after this, in October 1840, Ali applied for an increase in his personal allowance, which on the Governor's recommendation was granted. Ali's personal allowance was raised from $70 to $115 per month, bringing the total allowance of the royal house up from $305 to $350 per month, the same as for the Temenggong's family. Care was taken, however, to avoid explicit and public recognition of Tengku Ali's assumption of the royal title.

Ali's assumption of the royal title posed something of a threat to Dring Ibrahim's position as a ruler, the more so since

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94 The text of the proclamation, dated 16 Sept. 1840, is printed in Maxwell and Gibson, Treaties and Engagements, p. 126. It was issued as a result of an application by Husain's agent for the settlement of the Kampung Glam estate.

95 SSR R-6, Gov. to Sec. Govt, Fort William, 131, 24 Nov. 1840.

96 See n. 90 above, and App. 'D', pp. 354-55.

97 Although he was generally known as 'Sultan of Johore', Ali was usually referred to by name as 'the eldest son of the late Sultan' in official Government correspondence.
he had been neither proclaimed as Temenggong by his own followers nor installed by higher authority. Technically the Temenggong's office was vacant, and although the British authorities and the European community knew him by that title, Ibrahim was in fact no more than Daing Kechil, 'the little prince', son of Temenggong Abdul Rahman. When Tengku Ali assumed the title of Sultan, Ibrahim broached the matter of his own installation to the Bendahara. As local rulers under the head of the Johore empire the Bendahara and the Temenggong had the same general interests as against both branches of the royal house. Eventually they would support each other against the encroachments of the Sultan of Lingga. In the 1840s, however, they had a common interest in ignoring the pretensions of the Singapore house and giving their allegiance to the distant Sultan at Lingga, who as yet showed no disposition to interfere in the affairs of the Peninsular states. The Bendahara accordingly agreed to assist Ibrahim to assume his father's title.

In August 1841 the Bendahara came to Singapore and intimated to the Governor that since Tengku Ali had succeeded to his father's style and title it would be a good thing if Daing Ibrahim were also to succeed to the office of Temenggong. Bonham in reply affirmed his readiness to recognise the sons of

98 Daing Kechil (or Tengku Kechil as he was also called) was a personal honorific indicating fraternal order, the elder brother, Daing Abdullah, being known as Daing Besar, 'the great prince'.
99 See ch. 4, p. 118ff.
both the princes from whom Singapore had been acquired, 'provided always that they succeed agreeably to the Law and Customs of the Johore Empire.' Accordingly, on 18 August, a ceremony of installation was held on the heights above Telok Belanga in the presence of the Bendahara, the Governor, the Resident Councillor, and other senior officials of the local administration. Daing Ibrahim, 'richly attired', was escorted up the hill by some hundreds of Malays, the crowd squatting as he passed, until he reached the place where the Bendahara and the Governor's party were seated. An Imam (religious official) then advanced and addressed the assembly: 'The Dato' Bendahara and Mr Governor Bonham have agreed to raise Daing Kechil to be Temenggong Sri Maharaja....Do you wish it or not?' Three times the question was put and three times the traditional response came sounding back, suka, 'we wish it!' After the performance of this, the vital part of the ceremony, a banquet was held.

The ceremony of Daing Ibrahim's installation provided an impressive demonstration of the favour in which he was held by the officials of the local government. But although he was glad to associate the Governor with the assumption of his father's title, he was also concerned to obtain the sanction of the other principal chiefs of the Johore empire. It was particularly important to obtain the consent of the Sultan of Lingga who, as
the acknowledged head of the empire, was the proper authority to confer the Temenggong's title. Soon after the conclusion of the ceremony at Telok Belanga, therefore, Ibrahim set out for Lingga to pay his respects to the new Sultan, an eighteen-year-old youth who ascended the throne in August 1841 as Sultan Mahmud Mudzaffar Shah,¹⁰² and to meet the Yamtuan Muda's agent at Lingga.¹⁰³

Less than a month after Ibrahim's installation Tengku Ali quitted Malacca and returned to Singapore to reside in the royal palace at Kampong Glam. Shortly after his arrival he applied to the Governor to procure his installation 'in the place of his father'. Bonham wrote to the Bendahara and asked him to do 'what is proper on this occasion.'¹⁰⁴ There was no response to this appeal, however, and the British made no effort to press the matter.

Tengku Ali again raised the question of his installation in August 1846. By this time the policy of the Straits Government

¹⁰² See ch. 4, p. 123, n. 13.
¹⁰³ Ibrahim's action in going to Lingga immediately after the ceremony at Telok Belanga implied allegiance, though there is no evidence of a formal act of homage. By the same token Mahmud's reception of him amounted to recognition of his assumption of the Temenggong's title. The implication of suzerainty may have been distinctly pleasing to the young Sultan, who had visions of reviving the influence of his line on the Peninsula. It is also noteworthy that the Yamtuan Muda's agent at Lingga (the Yamtuan's brother and eventual successor) was Ibrahim's brother-in-law, and that the young Sultan (who had probably not yet been installed) may have had little choice in the matter of Ibrahim's reception.¹⁰⁴

towards Johore had crystallised. It was now clearly appreciated that British policy should be directed towards the establishment of a strong and capable regime in the neighbouring territory, and to this overriding consideration other questions, such as the rights of the royal house and the desirability of maintaining a titular Sultan as a bar to the interference of the ruler at Lingga, were subordinated. This decision arose from the spread of the Singapore gambier and pepper planting industry to the southern districts of Johore in the latter half of the 1840s. The British had a general interest in the development of Singapore's hinterland, since this was bound to contribute to the prosperity of the Settlement, and for this reason they were anxious to see the country under the rule of a prince with the capacity to provide the stability and good government which was necessary for economic progress. The colonisation of Johore by Chinese from Singapore also created a variety of administrative problems for the Straits Government, the most important being the protection of the Singapore excise farms (which were vulnerable to smuggling from Johore), the treatment of British subjects in Johore, and the extradition of fugitives from the Settlements. These problems could be dealt with adequately only if the neighbouring territory were under the undivided rule of a strong and capable prince. Since the Temenggong was already in actual possession of the country and had proved himself both capable and amenable, the Straits Government saw its interest in

105 For the rise of the Johore plantation industry see ch. 5, p. 181ff.
supporting his regime and opposing the claims of the royal house. But because of the Treaty of August 1824, which recognised the Sultan and the Temenggong as joint rulers of Johore, the local authorities felt obliged to proceed slowly and carefully for fear of accusations of bad faith. This was all the more necessary in view of the undercurrents of feeling, in some cases associated with business interests, which the Johore question aroused in the European community of Singapore. The views of the supporters of the royal house found expression in the local newspapers, the Singapore Free Press and the Straits Times, both of which supported Tengku Ali’s claim to the sultanate and were at times highly critical of the Temenggong. ¹⁰⁶ Under these circumstances the officials of the Straits Government were reluctant to assist the Temenggong in a direct and open manner; in general the line which they took with the Indian Government stressed Tengku Ali’s incapacity and the likelihood of his becoming a charge on the Government if he were recognised as Sultan, and pointed to the fact that the Temenggong had always been considered the actual ruler of the neighbouring territory. This was the policy of Thomas Church, Resident Councillor at Singapore from 1837 to 1856,¹⁰⁷ and Colonel Butterworth, who was

¹⁰⁶ For the attitude of the press and the part played by European business interests and advisers in the affairs of the Sultan and the Temenggong see ch. 6, pp. 199-202.

¹⁰⁷ Thomas Church was transferred to the Government of Prince of Wales Island (Penang) from the Government of Fort Marlborough (Bencoolen) when the latter was abolished. He retired about 1833, but returned to India from England in 1834 and was appointed Acting Governor of the Straits Settlements. He was superseded by
Governor of the Straits Settlements from 1843 to 1855. 108

In forwarding Tengku Ali's application for recognition to the Governor in August 1846, Church observed that he was heavily in debt, that he had no means of supporting the dignity of the position he wished to occupy, and that his installation was bound to saddle the Government with the responsibility of preventing a collision with the Temenggong, who was the wielder of 'exclusive and supreme' control in Johore. 109 These views were passed on by Butterworth to the Indian authorities, together with his own statement of the case. While avoiding an explicit recommendation against recognising Ali as Sultan, Butterworth pointed out that if he were installed the British would be expected to increase his allowance to enable him to keep up the dignity of his position, since his own abilities were unequal to the task of raising a revenue in Johore in the face of the Temenggong's 'powerful influence'. The Temenggong, he observed, had always been the real ruler of the country, the late Sultan having been no more than a titular sovereign. Nevertheless, Butterworth believed that something should be done to provide

Bonham in October 1834 and was appointed Resident Councillor at Singapore in March 1837. He remained in this position until his retirement in August 1856. When he finally left the Straits Settlements the Temenggong thanked him for his help and advice, which, he said, had converted Johore into 'a populous country again' (see Buckley, An Anecdotal History, p. 327). Church died in England in 1860.

108 See n. 31 above.

for the royal family out of the revenues of the territory under the Temenggong's rule, and he accordingly suggested that the Temenggong might be induced to share the proceeds of a recently established revenue farm with Tengku Ali. The Indian authorities, however, were disinclined to interfere in the affairs of Johore, and refused to sanction either Tengku Ali's installation or the proposal for dividing the revenues of the country.

Tengku Ali's position at this time was an unenviable one. Burdened with a title which no one was prepared to recognize, and lacking a large patrimonial following, he was unable either to reduce his household establishment, and so live within his income, or exploit the prerogatives of sovereignty, and thus obtain the means to support his assumed dignity. All his applications for an increased allowance were refused, and almost all his efforts to raise a revenue in the Peninsular provinces of the old empire were defeated by the local rulers, generally with the approval of the Straits Government.

At this time there were only two territories in which the Singapore house might hope to exercise any authority: the Johore province and the district of Muar. In Johore the Temenggong


111 SSR S-14, Sec. Govt Bengal to Gov., 64, 23 Feb. 1847.

112 A partial exception was when his sister died and her allowance was added to his. See App. 'B', pp. 354-55.
possessed the physical power to impose his authority on the
gambier and pepper planters and exclude Tengku Ali from any share
of the revenues arising from their activities. At various times
Tengku Ali granted licences to Chinese to open plantations, fell
timber, and collect forest produce, and on one occasion at least
he gave a mining concession to a Singapore agency house. But,
in the words of Temenggong Ibrahim's successor, 'none of these
attempts [to exercise sovereign authority] was for an instant
allowed to succeed. All the men who went over under the
protection of assumed authority on the part of the Sultan were
driven away or captured or imprisoned'. In Muar the political
situation was more favourable to royal interference. The local
ruler, the Temenggong Paduka Tuan of Muar, was a chief of no
great power who had acknowledged the authority of Sultan Husain,
to whom he sent annual tribute in the 1830s, and who had
enemies in the neighbouring states of the Negri Sembilan. These
circumstances encouraged the royal house to press their claims in
Muar. In 1844 Tengku Ali's brother, Tengku Ja'afar, joined the
ruler of Tampin (a district of the Negri Sembilan) in an attempt
to drive out the local headmen of Gunong Ledang (Mount Ophir)
and assume control of the gold mines. This venture failed,
but a few years later Tengku Ali's mother, Tengku Purbu,

113 CO 273/93, Maharaja of Johore to Gov., 7 May 1878, encl. in
Gov. to Sec. State, 147, 18 May 1878.
114 See n. 74 above.
succeeded in establishing herself at the mouth of the Muar river,\textsuperscript{116} where she presumably obtained an income from river tolls.

In 1849, following the death of the Temenggong Paduka Tuan, Tengku Ali seized the opportunity to offer Muar to the British.\textsuperscript{117} Both the local authorities and the Bengal Government were attracted by the idea of adding this fertile region to the Settlement of Malacca but the offer was nevertheless declined, the Indian authorities taking the cautious view that the agricultural potential of Malacca should be developed before the expense of administering additional territory was undertaken.\textsuperscript{118} Tengku Ali's request for a loan of $12,000, which accompanied the offer of Muar, was also turned down.\textsuperscript{119} Ali next applied for an increase in his allowance - which on Butterworth's recommendation was refused\textsuperscript{120} - and began to advertise land for sale in Muar.\textsuperscript{121}

This latter move drew a remonstrance from the Governor, who was now firmly opposed to any attempt on Tengku Ali's part to exercise the powers of a ruler on the Peninsula.\textsuperscript{122} Nevertheless,

\textsuperscript{116} See SSR EE-16, R.C. Malacca to Gov., 2 May 1849; SSR EE-17, R.C. Malacca to Gov., 12 April 1850
\textsuperscript{117} SSR U-17, Gov. to R.C. Malacca, 26 Feb. 1849.
\textsuperscript{118} SSR R-18, Gov. to Under Sec. Govt Bengal, 52, 25 April 1849; SSR S-16, Sec. Govt Bengal to Gov., 147, 14 June 1849.
\textsuperscript{119} SSR U-17, Gov. to R.C. Malacca, 26 Feb. 1849.
\textsuperscript{120} SSR R-15, Gov. to Under-Sec. Govt Bengal, 4, 23 Feb. 1850; SSR S-17, Under-Sec. Govt Bengal to Gov., 1132, 13 April 1850.
\textsuperscript{121} \textit{Singapore Free Press}, 1 March 1850.
\textsuperscript{122} SSR U-21, Gov. to R.C. Singapore, 25 March 1851.
Despite the obvious hostility of the Straits Government, Ali persisted in his efforts to derive some advantage from his claim to sovereignty. About the beginning of 1851 he granted the Singapore agency house of Jose d'Almeida & Sons a mining and agricultural concession in respect of land in the Johore river. When the existence of this concession became known the Resident Councillor at Singapore was provoked to comment:

The conduct of Tengku Ali in this matter is inexplicable; without consulting the Government, Hereditary Chief, or other members of his family, he has alienated for 999 years a part of the Johore territory...a measure calculated to occasion broils and serious disturbances in our immediate neighbourhood....His Highness the Temenggong is at present the only one who exercises paramount authority over the Johore territory, and he is not likely to view with indifference the extraordinary and unprecedented proceedings of Tengku Ali....It is the policy and interest of Government to prevent open collision between Tengku Ali and the Temenggong. The former it is true is a weak minded Prince, and totally destitute of power and resources; he may however become an instrument in the hands of others, causing thereby trouble and annoyance to the well disposed and industrious Planters...at Johore.\textsuperscript{123}

These views were fully shared by the Governor, who regarded Tengku Ali ('that idle, and I fear, evil disposed young man') as a roi faineant, incapable of forceful action or orderly administration. It was his firm belief, Butterworth avowed, 'that nothing would rouse this Chieftain from his slothful habits and unbecoming intercourse with the least respectable portion of the Community'.\textsuperscript{124} It was true, he recalled, that the Treaty of 1824,

\textsuperscript{123} SSR AA-22, R.C. Singapore to Gov., 25 March 1851.
\textsuperscript{124} SSR R-15, Gov. to Under-Sec. Govt Bengal, 4, 23 Feb. 1850.
recognises the late Sultan, and the late Temenggong conjointly, as the hereditary chieftains of Johore but there can be no doubt that the latter was the principal, if not the sole authority at this end of the Malayan Peninsula at the period the island of Singapore was ceded to the Honourable East India Company, and that he, and also his successor the present Temenggong, have at all times exercised exclusive control in the Territory and Rivers adjacent to the Old Straits of Singapore. 125

While he acknowledged the advantage of capital investment in Johore, Butterworth maintained that Tengku Ali, as Sultan, was not competent to alienate parts of the country or grant exclusive mining rights without the consent of the hereditary chiefs; concessions such as the d'Almeidas' were clearly objectionable since they were bound to lead to collision with the Temenggong. To solve the problem of providing for the royal family, and thereby bring to an end their interference in Johore and Muar, Butterworth returned to his suggestion of 1846 that the Temenggong should be induced to divide his revenues with the head of the royal house. 126 Perhaps this proposal met with an unfavourable response from the Resident Councillor at Singapore; in any case it was not passed on to the Indian authorities for their consideration.

Tengku Ali's position was now desperate. Unable to maintain his pretensions on his allowance and his income from the Kampong Glam estate, and prevented at every turn from raising a revenue in Muar and Johore, he accumulated debts and raised loans which merely added to his difficulties; in 1851 he narrowly escaped

125 SSR U-21, Gov. to R.C. Singapore, 25 March 1851.
126 Loc. cit.
being sent to prison for defaulting on his creditors.\(^{127}\)

Finally, in despair, he appears to have sought release from the
*damnosa hereditas* of his royal pretensions. About the beginning
of December 1851 he went with his brother to Lingga, and announced
his intention of transferring his Peninsular inheritance to Sultan
Mahmud and accepting a position under his authority. 'I will
swear allegiance and place myself under the Sultan of Lingga',
he declared, 'and obey his orders.'\(^{128}\) When the Dutch heard of
this they informed the Straits Government,\(^{129}\) and after a few
months the errant princes were got back to Singapore.\(^{130}\) Ali now
made another attempt to have his claim to Johore recognised by
the British. In May 1852, shortly after his return from Lingga,
he formally protested against the Temenggong's violation of his
sovereign rights and called upon the British to recognise his
succession as Sultan and put him in possession of his rightful
inheritance.\(^{131}\)

At this time Butterworth was on leave and the administration
of the Government was in the hands of the Resident Councillor at
Penang, Edmund Blundell, whose own term as Governor of the

\(^{127}\) SSR R-15, Gov. to Under-Sec. Govt Bengal, 4, 23 Feb. 1850;
SSR U-21, Gov. to R.C. Singapore, 25 March 1851.

\(^{128}\) SSR W-18, Tengku Ali to Yamtuan Muda, 12 Safar 1268 [7 Dec.
1851], encl. in Gov.-Gen. N.E.I. to Gov. S.S., 27 March 1852.


\(^{130}\) Tarling, 'British Policy', p. 59.

\(^{131}\) SSR R-24, Acting Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 79A, 20 July 1852;
SSR CC-28, R.C. Singapore to Temenggong, 16 June 1852.
Straits Settlements subsequently ended in disaster. take the view that Tengku Ali had been the victim of a grave injustice which, by his own account, he proposed to rectify at the expense of British policy. Accordingly, in July 1852, he applied to the Indian Government for authority to proceed to a final settlement of the conflicting claims of the royal house and the Temenggong. These claims, he warned, were causing 'violent family quarrels' and seemed likely to lead to 'disruption and bloodshed in the state.' He hastened to add, however, that no political advantage could be expected to follow from Tengku Ali's installation; all that he was prepared to say was that he considered it impolitic to allow 'such an apparently clear and

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Edmund Augustus Blundell, joined the Government of Prince of Wales Island (Penang) in 1821. Shortly afterwards he was transferred to Burma, where he became Assistant Commissioner for Tavoy and Mergui. In January 1843 he was appointed to act as Governor of the Straits Settlements. In July, on hearing that he had been superseded by Colonel Butterworth, he left for England to press his claim to the governorship on the grounds of seniority. As a result the Court of Directors of the East India Company directed the Indian Government to give due consideration to the principle of seniority in future. In 1848 Blundell returned to the Straits Settlements and was appointed Resident Councillor at Penang. He acted as Governor while Butterworth was on leave (November 1851 to November 1853) and succeeded him as Governor in March 1855. This appointment as Governor was in accordance with the directive of the Court of Directors; Blundell never enjoyed the confidence of the Indian authorities and his resignation before the end of his term was readily accepted. His successor, Colonel Orfeur Cavenagh, took over in August 1859. Aspects of Blundell's governorship are examined in Constance Turnbull, 'Governor Blundell and Sir Benson Maxwell: a conflict of personalities', JMBRAS vol. 30 pt 1 (1957), pp. 134-63, and 'Communal Disturbances in the Straits Settlements in 1857', JMBRAS vol. 31 pt 1 (1958), pp. 94-144.
undisputed claim to remain any longer in abeyance:

It would appear that the Governorship of Johore, under the Sultan, is or was an hereditary appanage of the Tamongong and in virtue of this the present man, while residing wholly at Singapore, has administered the Government of Johore and possessed himself of the entire Revenues of the Country preventing (and in some instances forcibly) the young Sultan from exercising any of the rights of Sovereign.

Blundell conceded that it suited the interest of the British to leave the country wholly in the possession of the Temenggong who, he observed, 'Owing to the notice extended towards him by the Government of the Straits and by the Mercantile community of Singapore...has become comparatively civilized, and is undoubtedly superior to the Young Sultan in the capacity to govern the country of Johore in subservience to British interests.' He was also obliged to agree with the Resident Councillor at Singapore that Tengku Ali's recognition might lead to much trouble and confusion, 'but still', he insisted, 'I am impressed with the injustice of disregarding the claims of the Son of the Prince from whom we obtained the Island of Singapore, simply because it is less troublesome and perhaps more advantageous to us, that the rule should continue in the hands of a subordinate officer.' In Blundell's opinion Tengku Ali ought to be installed as Sultan of Johore and he accordingly requested permission to take steps to bring this about.\textsuperscript{133}

The Acting Governor's fine sentiments - there was no question of compelling arguments - were wasted on the Indian

\textsuperscript{133} SSR R-24, Acting Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 79A, 20 July 1852.
authorities, who saw no reason why the government of the Temenggong, a ruler of 'energy and decision', should be upset to make room for a prince remarkable only for 'supineness and sloth.' Blundell was informed that any attempt on the part of the Government to install Tengku Ali would be a violation of the Treaty of 1824. This reply did not, however, completely deter the Acting Governor. He now proposed that the Temenggong should recognise Tengku Ali as Sultan and divide the revenues of the country with him, and that Tengku Ali should relinquish all claim to interfere in the government of Johore. These terms were put to the Temenggong and fiercely resisted by him in a series of stormy interviews which took place towards the end of 1852. Ibrahim maintained that since it was the Governor who wanted to make Tengku Ali Sultan, he should provide an allowance out of government funds, or alternatively he should invite all the chiefs of Johore, Pahang, and the Negri Sembilan to contribute to the support of the royal family. Eventually he agreed to divide the revenues but declined to commit himself on the question of Tengku Ali's installation, which he pointed out was a matter for the Bendahara. Tengku Ali for his part agreed to accept

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134 SSR S-19, Under-Sec. Govt India to Gov., 2721, 5 Aug. 1852.
136 CO 273/93, Maharaja of Johore to Gov., 7 May 1878, encl. in Gov. to Sec. State, 147, 18 May 1878.
137 Tarling, 'British Policy', p. 59. Traditionally the Bendahara, as the senior officer of state, installed the Sultan.
a share of the revenues but declined to give a categorical assent
to the proposal that he should give up all claim to authority in
Johore. 138 Incomplete though this agreement was, it was
sufficient for Blundell's immediate purpose. On 14 January 1853
he reported the terms of his proposed settlement as having been
agreed to by both parties and asked for the confirmation of the
Supreme Government. 139

The Indian authorities were annoyed by Blundell's
persistence. He was informed that the Supreme Government had no
concern with the relationship between the Temenggong and the
Sultan and had never since 1824, when it recognised them as
'joint rulers of Johore', sought to define what share of
authority belonged to either or what proportion of revenue should
be enjoyed by either. Nevertheless, it was felt that the
purchase of entire sovereignty by the Temenggong would be 'most
beneficial', and the Supreme Government was therefore prepared
to concur in such an arrangement. Blundell was warned, however,
that he must confine his action to mediation between the two
parties. 140

139 CO 273/94, excerpt from Acting Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 14
Jan. 1853, in Paper by F.A. Swettenham, encl. in Gov. to Sec.
State, 194, 5 July 1878. The negotiations appear to have been
conducted entirely by the Acting Governor. The Resident
Councillor, Church, who was sympathetic to the Temenggong, was
not officially informed of their outcome until a week after
Blundell had reported to India. See SSR U-24, Acting Gov. to
140 SSR S-20, Sec. Govt India to Gov., 1042, 4 March 1853.
Blundell now found himself in something of a quandary, for agreement had never been reached with either the Temenggong or Tengku Ali and neither was prepared to compromise. By this time Ali was accepting advice from W.H.M. Read, a prominent Singapore merchant whose reckless support of the royal house was eventually to lead to his own disgrace. In August 1853, under the influence of this mentor, Tengku Ali made known his own terms for a treaty of settlement. These took the form of an ultimatum to the Temenggong and made it clear that Ali had no intention of giving up his claim to authority over the territory under the Temenggong's rule. Ibrahim was to attend at Tengku Ali's installation, he was not to enter into political relations with other rulers without the Sultan's consent, and he was to pay compensation to the Sultan for excluding him from the revenues of the country in the past; furthermore, the execution of criminals and the disposal of the revenue farms were to be in the hands of the Sultan, and the Sultan was to receive a larger share of the revenues than the Temenggong. Finally, after a period of three years, the whole question of the relationship between the Sultan and the Temenggong was to be reviewed and a new treaty was to be made if this was deemed necessary. If all these conditions were agreed to, the Sultan was prepared to install Ibrahim as Temenggong.

141 For W.H.M. Read's career see ch. 6, p. 202, n.9.
Perhaps these extreme demands were meant as a basis for negotiation. If this was so, they failed to achieve their purpose. The Temenggong took offence at the tone and substance of the ultimatum and refused to consider Tengku Ali's proposals, and since Blundell, who had already misled the Supreme Government as to the agreement reached with the chiefs, was in no position to force his mediation on either party, the matter was allowed to stand over until Butterworth's return.

Butterworth returned to the Straits Settlements in November 1853, but made no move towards a settlement until the following February, when Tengku Ali accused the Temenggong of levying duties in British territory and announced his intention of going to Johore to establish his own government.\(^{143}\) In April, presumably in response to pressure from Butterworth, Daing Ibrahim offered terms of settlement: Tengku Ali should recognise him as rightful ruler of Johore and its dependencies and engage not to interfere in the government of the country; in return he would be recognised as Sultan and would receive in perpetuity a fixed amount out of the Temenggong's revenues.\(^{144}\) Tengku Ali countered with proposals which, like those of the previous year, explicitly affirmed the supremacy of the Sultan and confined the Temenggong to the area in which he actually exercised power:


\(^{144}\) CO 273/94, excerpt from Temenggong's letter, 3 April 1854, in Paper by F.A. Swettehm, encl. in Gov. to Sec. State, 194, 5 July 1878.
was to govern part of Johore as 'Minister under the authority of the Sultan'; he was to adopt a seal of the size and form appropriate to a ruler of his rank, his revenues were to be divided with the Sultan in a manner which was 'equitable and proper', and he was to pay the Sultan $10,000 in lieu of his share of past revenues.\[145\] These terms were rejected by the Temenggong, and as the Governor was also dissatisfied with them the matter was allowed to rest for several months. In August, however, the Governor returned to the problem with a proposal that Tengku Ali should cede complete sovereignty over the country for $5000 cash and $500 per month in perpetuity.\[146\] Ali held out for Muar (which he had previously indicated he wished to retain) and for periodic increases in his share of the Temenggong's revenues until October, when he gave in on the question of the allowance.\[147\] Pressure was then brought to bear on the Temenggong to agree to the financial settlement and the retention of Muar. After some time he agreed to the terms,\[148\] and in December a draft treaty was drawn up. This provided that Tengku Ali was to cede Johore 'in full sovereignty and property'.


\[146\] SSR R-27, Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 122, 22 Dec. 1854.


for $5000 cash and $500 per month in perpetuity and that he was to retain the territory between the Muar and Kesang rivers. The Temenggong was to withdraw all claim to Muar-Kesang, but was to hold a second option (after the East India Company) on the territory in the event of Tengku Ali wishing to dispose of it. It was further provided that the two rulers were to allow free movement of goods and persons between their dominions and refrain from acts 'calculated or having a tendency to promote or foment disturbances within the territory of the other'. Differences arising out of these last provisions were to be adjudicated by the Government of India.\textsuperscript{149}

A significant omission from the terms of the treaty was any reference to the question of Tengku Ali's recognition as Sultan. This was the subject of a brief ceremony which preceded the signing of the treaty, the formalities of which took place in a large reception room at the Government Offices on 10 March 1855. At noon the Governor arrived and took his seat on a scarlet covered platform at the head of the room, beneath the Union Jack and the Company's flag. The body of the hall was filled with officers of the Government and the Military, the consuls, who sat beneath their national flags, other prominent residents, and the wives of officials and residents. Behind the Governor on the platform was a pedestal supporting a marble bust of Raffles, and beside him were chairs for the Sultan and the Temenggong. On either side of the platform were tables, on one of which

\textsuperscript{149} SSR AA-31, R.C. Singapore to Sec. Gov., 18 Dec. 1854.
there was a silver inkstand, three copies of the treaty and the
state seals of the signatories, and on the other a sword of
state - an old ceremonial sword for which the local authorities
had no use - which was intended for presentation to the
Sultan. Beside the tables were chairs for the sons of the
Sultan and the Temenggong. When the Governor was seated, the
Resident Councillor and the Senior Military Officer escorted
Tengku Ali to the door of the reception room, where he was
received by a guard of honour. He was then presented to the
Governor who, 'addressing the guests assembled, in a firm voice,
said he took advantage of the occasion publicly to recognise
his friend Tuanku Allie as Sultan of Johore, in succession to
his father'. The Sultan was then seated on the Governor's
right, under a salute of eleven guns. 'After a short pause,
His Highness the Tumonggong arrived, and the guard of honour in
the portico again presented arms. The Governor received His
Highness with a cordial shake of the hand, and introduced him
to the Sultan under a salute of nine guns, whereupon the
Tumonggong made obeisance to the Sultan, and was then handed
by the Governor to a seat on his left hand.' After this the
Treaty was read out in English and Malay and signed and sealed
by the contracting parties. Another eleven gun salute was
fired, the guard again presented arms, and the ceremony ended.

150 This was the sword sent for presentation to the Temenggong
in 1847. See p. 75 above.

151 Newspaper account quoted in Buckley, An Anecdotal History,
pp. 614-15. It is not clear what form the Temenggong's
IMMEDIATELY after the conclusion of the 1855 Treaty the Temenggong took steps to display his sovereign authority over Johore. A small administrative station was established at Tanjong Putri, on the curve of the Johore coastline between the Skudai and Tebrau rivers, and placed in the charge of a wakil raja ('Representative of the Ruler') sent over from Telok Belanga. The choice of Tanjong Putri as the site of the capital was of some significance. In the first place it marked the establishment of a new polity which, in contrast to almost all the other Peninsular states, was not based on the control of an inland water system. The strategic importance of the new capital consisted in its location in the middle of the gambier and pepper planting region of the southern coast. The choice of Tanjong Putri also underlined the discontinuity of the Temenggong's dynasty with the ancient line of Sultans who ruled in the Johore river in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The old royal house, the heirs of the Malacca Sultans, had been pushed aside in 1699 by the Bendahara's family, from whom the later royal house of Johore (and also the Bendaharas and Temenggongs of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries) were descended. Now the Temenggong sought to usurp the place of the usurpers. For him the historic centre of the old sultanate had associations of legitimacy to which he could not lay claim, and "obeisance" took - the traditional ceremony of prostration is highly unlikely - but whatever motions he went through will have implied, for Malays, recognition of the Sultan's superior authority.
of sacrilege in which his own forbears were involved. In the manner of interlopers he sought to legitimate his rule by appropriating the name of the traditional progenitor of all Malay dynasties, Iskandar dzul-Karnain, the hero of Moslem romances which preserve the memory of Alexander's expedition to the Indus. The new capital was accordingly named **Iskandar Putri** ('Royal Alexander's Daughter'), a name which nevertheless survived only until 1866, when the present name, **Johore Bahru** ('New Johore'), came into official use.

When Iskandar Putri was founded the Temenggong began to style himself Raja of Johore, adopted a seal which described him as a sovereign and independent ruler, and raised a black flag - the symbol of sovereign authority over the land - in his dominions. But although he claimed sovereign authority, he did not claim royal rank. This was an anomalous situation in Malay constitutional theory, which viewed sovereign authority and royal rank as inseparably linked and virtually synonymous. As a result the royal house was able to dispute the authority of the Temenggong and his successor in Johore in spite of the terms of the Treaty of 1855.

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152 Local tradition has it that descendants of Sultan Mahmud's murderer sicken on approaching the scene of the crime. The curse affects Malays from the North Sumatra district in which the regicide is said to have settled. The persistence of this tradition alone would have sufficed to rule out a site in the Johore river for the new capital.

153 Buku Peringatan Keraja'an ['State Diary', in JA], 14 Sha'aban 1282 (1 Jan. 1866).

154 Johore Flags (anon.).
CHAPTER 4

JOHORE, PAHANG AND THE OLD ROYAL HOUSE

The Johore Treaty of 1855 was regarded by the British as the definitive instrument in the Temenggong's acquisition of sovereignty over the 'State and Territory of Johore'. From the point of view of Malay constitutional theory, however, the position was not so certain. Though he was forced to sign the territory south of the Muar river, Tengku Ali nevertheless obtained recognition from both the British and the Temenggong as Sultan. Under these circumstances Ali's claim that he was Sultan over all Johore and the Temenggong's rightful suzerain did not strike Malays as either odd or unfounded. The idea that the Temenggong, whose title was that of a subordinate ruler, could govern in complete independence of the prince whom he had acknowledged as Sultan simply did not make sense. The ruler's position remained open to question, in terms of Malay constitutional theory, until the 1880s, when, the Singapore house having been eliminated from the scene, Abu Bakar took the final step of proclaiming himself Sultan. In practice, however, a Malay political settlement which rid the Temenggong of royal interference was achieved within a few years of the conclusion of the Treaty of 1855. This was not an isolated development. It was closely associated with a similar process going on in Pahang during
the same period, and was in fact part of a wider Malay settlement which disposed of the claims of both branches of the old royal house to exercise paramount authority over the Peninsular provinces of the former empire.

Despite the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824, which marked the division of the old Johore empire so far as the European powers were concerned, the form of the ancient sultanate continued to have political importance for another forty years, for although it suited the Dutch and the British to carve up the region into spheres of influence, the Malay rulers were not prepared to accept this as a bar to the pursuit of their own political objectives. After 1824 both the Bendahara and the Temonggong ignored the pretensions of the Singapore Sultan and gave their allegiance instead to the Sultan of Lingga, who was clearly the legitimate embodiment of royal authority in virtue of his installation with the sacred regalia, and who, moreover, showed no disposition to interfere in the internal affairs of the Peninsular territories.

But although the Bendahara and the Temenggong continued to recognise the Sultan of Lingga as their suzerain throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, the vital ceremonies which demonstrated their allegiance and preserved the formal unity of the kingdom were gradually discontinued. These ceremonies were the Sultan's installation by the Bendahara in the presence of the great chiefs, the installation of the Bendahara and the Temenggong by the Sultan, and the ceremony in which the Bendahara and the Temenggong did homage to the Sultan.
The last definitely known case of the installation of a Bendahara or a Temenggong by the Sultan occurred in 1806, when Bendahara Ali and Temenggong Abdul Rahman were both installed at Lingga by Sultan Mahmud.\(^1\) Abdul Rahman's successor, Temenggong Ibrahim, was installed by the Bendahara and the Governor of the Straits Settlements, and although he went to Lingga immediately afterwards it is fairly clear that the Sultan's role was simply to confirm what had already taken place.\(^2\) The successor to Bendahara Ali, who abdicated, was installed by Ali himself with, according to one account, the assistance of the Temenggong.\(^3\) Similarly, the Bendahara and the Temenggong ceased to take part in the ceremony of installing the Sultan. Neither was present at the installation of Sultan Abdul Rahman in 1823 or, so far as is known, at the installation of his successors, Sultan Mohamed (1832-41) and Sultan Mahmud (1841-57).\(^4\) In all three cases the Bendahara and the Temenggong simply recognised the Sultan's succession after he had been installed by the Yamtuan Muda and the chiefs of Riau and Lingga, in the same way that the Sultan now merely assented to the succession of the Peninsular rulers after the ceremony of their elevation had been performed in their own territories.

\(^1\) Winstedt, 'A History of Johore', p.72.
\(^2\) See ch. 3, pp. 95-96, and n. 103.
\(^3\) SSR W-26, Adam Wilson to Gov., 29 Jan. 1858.
\(^4\) The Tuhfat al-Nafis does not even mention the installation of Sultans Mohamed and Mahmud, though it does refer to the proclamation of Mohamed and the installation of Mahmud as Tengku Besar some years before his succession. See Tuhfat al-Nafis, pp.253, 258, 266.
This, at least, seems to have been the position. The exact nature of the relationship between the Peninsular rulers and the Sultan of Lingga is by no means clear, probably it was confused and subject to varying interpretations even at the time. What is certain, however, is that the Bendahara and the Temenggong were not considered to be royal personages and hence could not, in theory, exercise an independent authority of their own. This they acknowledged in the inscription on their seals, which described them as the representatives of the Sultan (*al-wakil Sultan*). When they had audience with the Sultan they no doubt made obeisance (*menyembah*). But did they continue to perform the traditional ceremony of doing homage (*menjunjong duli*) to the Sultan? It seems unlikely. In all probability this aspect of their subordination was allowed to fall quietly into abeyance lest insistence on its performance provoke the Peninsular rulers to a formal renunciation of allegiance.

On this basis friendly relations, marked by mutual visits

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5 The *menyembah* consists in raising the hands with palms together to a height appropriate to the rank of the person to whom obeisance is made - in the Sultan's case to the forehead. The position in which the obeisance is made - standing, squatting, or kneeling - depends on the relative status of the persons performing and receiving the obeisance. It is quite likely that the Bendahara and the Temenggong made obeisance to the Sultan in the standing position only.

6 In the *menjunjong duli* the chief approaches the Sultan in a kneeling position, drawing himself forward on his hands and making obeisance (*menyembah*) after each forward movement. On reaching the Sultan he touches hands and then retires backwards.
and marriage alliances,\textsuperscript{7} were maintained between the Peninsular rulers and the court of Lingga in the 1830s and 1840s. At times these had a definite political significance. In 1834 or 1835 the Bendahara joined with Sultan Mohamed in installing Mohamed's son as Tengku Besar (i.e., heir to the throne) in the presence of the Temenggong, the Yamtuan Muda, and other chiefs,\textsuperscript{8} at the same time the Sultan recognised the Bendahara's son as his heir.\textsuperscript{9} In 1844 the Temenggong took part in choosing a successor to the Yamtuan Muda,\textsuperscript{10} and in 1857 he was again summoned to Lingga for this purpose.\textsuperscript{11}

At this time the Sultan raised no revenue and took no part in the administration of justice or the appointment of local chiefs and headmen in the Peninsular territories. All these powers of government were exercised in delegation by the Bendahara and the Temenggong, who, although they ruled in the Sultan's name, were in fact beyond his effective control. Nevertheless, the Sultan remained a figure of considerable political importance, for he was still an anointed king, God's vicegerent

\textsuperscript{7} For marriages linking the Bendahara and the Temenggong with the royal house. See App. 'A', Table 3.

\textsuperscript{8} Tuhfat al-Nafis, p.258; Linehan, 'A History of Pahang', pp.59-60.

\textsuperscript{9} This is inferred from the fact that the Bendahara's son received the title Ungku Muda and married a daughter of the Sultan at this time. See Linehan, 'A History of Pahang', p. 60.

\textsuperscript{10} Tuhfat al-Nafis, pp. 272-73.

\textsuperscript{11} On this occasion the Temenggong preferred to be represented by his son. See Temenggong to Gov., 29 Aug. 1857, in Letter Book of His Highness the Maharajah, commencing 1855, ending 11 July 1868 [J.A.]
on earth, and as such he possessed an authority to which no Bendahara or Temenggong could lay claim. This God-given authority reached down through the levels of greater and lesser chiefs and laid its grip on the lowliest of the Sultan's subjects. Opposition to the will of the Sultan was treason (durhaka), the most heinous of crimes, punishable by extirpation in this world and eternal damnation in the next, whereas refusal to comply with the commands of a chief was merely an offence (salah) of more or less gravity. The concept of treason played a vital part in the preservation of political order and civil obedience. Under normal circumstances it sustained the rule not only of the Sultan personally, but of all who held power as his accredited representatives: to oppose the Sultan's representative was to oppose the authority of the Sultan himself. It was for this reason that the Bendahara and the Temenggong continued to recognise the Sultan's authority. In Pahang, where there was a strongly entrenched hierarchy of district chiefs, the Bendahara frequently invoked the royal authority in letters and proclamations to support his own exercise of power. In Johore, which was without powerful chiefs, the Temenggong was in a strong enough position not to have to do this. Nevertheless, he still found it convenient to recognise the suzerainty of the distant Sultan of Lingga

For examples of the manner in which the Bendahara invoked the Sultan's authority and the concept of treason, see Linehan, 'A History of Pahang', pp. 65, 213-14.
as a counter to the pretensions of the head of the Singapore
branch of the royal house.

But although the royal authority sustained the rule of the
Bendahara and the Temenggong, it could also be employed to
destroy their position, since the Sultan could always, in
theory, withdraw his commission and confer it on another. In
the mid-nineteenth century there was little likelihood of such
action succeeding so long as the Bendahara and the Temenggong
kept their own subordinates under control and checked the
ambitions of their close kinsmen. Should they fail in this,
however, and a move arise among their own subjects to oust
them, the Sultan would then have an opportunity to intervene
decisively. Moreover, the very existence of the royal
authority was in itself an encouragement to would-be usurpers,
for, under conditions of rebellion, a pretender might claim
and be widely credited with possession of the Sultan's
commission. This, in fact, was the real threat which the
continuance of the royal authority posed to the Peninsular
rulers in the middle of the nineteenth century.

THE modus vivendi which preserved the formal unity of the empire
during the reigns of Sultans Abdul Rahman and Mohamed ended
after the accession of Sultan Mahmud,¹³ a prince of restless

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Sultan Mahmud Muazzam Shah was born in 1823 and ascended the
throne of Lingga on 18 August 1841. He was deposed by the Dutch
in September 1857 and died at Pahang in July 1864. He was
closely related to the Temenggong (see App. 'A', table 3),
with whom he maintained outwardly friendly relations until
about 1860.
energy and lofty ambition whose dream it was to revive the influence of the royal house in the Peninsular territories. As a result of Mahmud's activities, the Bendahara and the Temenggong renounced their allegiance and assumed the status of independent rulers rather sooner than might otherwise have been the case. The Temenggong's assumption of sovereign authority in 1855[^14] gave great offence to Mahmud,[^15] but he remained on outwardly good terms with both the Temenggong[^16] and the Bendahara until 1860, when the Bendahara declared his independence. After this open enmity existed between the Sultan and his former subordinates.

Mahmud's efforts to revive the substance of royal power on the Peninsula had the support of his maternal uncle, Sultan Omar of Trengganu, and his cousin, Tengku Ali, the

[^15]: See CO 273/94, extract from Bendahara to Sultan of Lingga, 4 Zulhijjah 1271 [15 August 1855], in Paper by P.A. Swettenham, encl. in Gov. to Sec. State, 194, 5 July 1878.
[^16]: Butterworth noted in 1853, 'there is certainly but hollow friendship subsisting between him [Mahmud] and the Temenggong although they visit each other, and such like.' (See SSR R-25, Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 122, 31 Dec. 1853). In November 1857, after the Dutch had deposed Mahmud, the Temenggong sent his son and his legal adviser in a chartered steamer to Lingga to fetch the Sultan's family and property in defiance of the British. (See Netscher, De Nederlanders, p. 307, and SSR R-32, Gov. to Sec., Govt India, 190, 18 Nov. 1857). Later, when Mahmud went to the East Coast, the Temenggong looked after his schooner for him. In 1859, when Mahmud's debtors tried to gain possession of the schooner, the Temenggong once more went out of his way to assist him at the expense of his own relations with the British. (See CO 273/4, 'Narrative of the Proceedings of the Government of the Straits during the Second Quarter of 1859', par. 12).
head of the Singapore branch of the royal house. Ali aligned himself with Mahmud in the early 1850s, when his own position seemed hopeless, in the belief that any increase of royal power on the Peninsula would be to his advantage. Omar's support may have owed something to fear of the apparent expansion of British influence on the East Coast, a development with which the Temenggong, the chief collaborator in the anti-piracy campaigns of the colonial powers, was associated. For Mahmud himself the dream of reviving the old empire may have become increasingly attractive as the Dutch authority became more firmly established in the Riau-Lingga archipelago and the campaigns against the pirates restricted the opportunities of the royal house in the neighbourhood of Lingga. The most important consideration in the minds of the two Sultans, however, was probably the maintenance of their superior rank and authority in the face of the upstart pretensions of the Bendahara and the Temenggong, who, being of royal descent, appeared now to aspire to royal status.

The attempt to re-assert the authority of the royal house in Johore and Pahang met with the united opposition not only of the local rulers but also of the colonial powers, who were anxious to maintain a complete division between their

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18 Though they ranked as commoners, the Bendahara and the Temenggong were, like the Sultans of Trengganu and Lingga, descended in the male line from the old (eighteenth century) royal house of Johore (see App. 'A', Table 1.)
respective spheres of influence. In 1850, when Sultan Omar tried to establish relations with Batavia, the Dutch refused to see his envoys and reported their mission to the British.  

In the same year the Tengku Muda of Lingga and Tengku Abdul Jalil of Singapore settled in Pahang and began to raise taxes, to the great annoyance of the Bendahara. After some time the Bendahara complained to the British, who then requested the Dutch to recall Tengku Muda and also to forbid Sultan Mahmud from visiting the East Coast states. As a result, Tengku Muda was obliged to leave Pahang and return to Lingga. About the same time, towards the end of 1851, Abdul Jalil also left the country.

The expulsion of these princes gave great offence to their royal kinsmen, the Sultans of Trengganu and Lingga, and the self-styled Sultan of Johore, Tengku Ali. According to the Temenggong, who was in bad odour with the Sultans for using his influence on the Bendahara's behalf, Sultan Omar threatened to attack Pahang and vented his displeasure on Telok Belanga traders at Trengganu. At the same time the Singapore and Lingga branches of the royal house began to draw together. In 1851 Tengku Ali went to Lingga and announced his intention of transferring his Peninsular heritage to Sultan Mahmud. Though

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19 Tarling, 'British Policy', p. 58.
20 For Tengku Abdul Jalil's career see App. 'A' p. 350.
23 See ch. 3. p. 105.
he was forced to return to Singapore after a few months, he again slipped off for a brief visit to the Riau-Lingga islands in the following year.\textsuperscript{24} At the same time his nephew, Tengku Sulaiman, left Singapore for the Natunas, an island group under the authority of the Sultan of Lingga, where he began to raise taxes and govern the local population.\textsuperscript{25}

In December 1852 Sultan Mahmud paid a visit to Singapore, ostensibly to arrange for the development of coal deposits in his dominions, but in reality to use his influence to prevent Tengku Ali from transferring his rights over Johore to the Temenggong, since this would make it harder for the royal house as a whole to maintain its position on the Peninsula.\textsuperscript{26} In the following year, perhaps with an eye to developments in Singapore, where the British authorities were still attempting to obtain a final settlement of the Johore question, the alliance between Lingga and Trengganu was strengthened by the marriage of Mahmud’s sister to Omar’s son.\textsuperscript{27} By the end of 1853 the development of a royal combination against the Bendahara and the Temenggong was evident and seemed likely, in the view of the Straits authorities, to lead to hostilities which would

\textsuperscript{24} SSR CC-28, R.C. Singapore to Resident Riau, 20 Sept. 1852.
\textsuperscript{25} SSR CC-28, R.C. Singapore to Resident Riau, 22 Oct. 1852.
\textsuperscript{26} SSR CC-28, R.C. Singapore to Resident Riau, 14 Dec. 1852; Straits Times, 11 Dec. 1852. Mahmud was still, or again, in Singapore in March 1853 and was in communication with W.H. Read, Tengku Ali’s adviser. See SSR R-25, Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 122, 31 Dec. 1853.
\textsuperscript{27} SSR BB-91, Resident Riau to R.C. Singapore, 16 April 1853; Singapore Free Press, 26 Aug. 1853.
jeopardise British trade on the East Coast. The Governor now became concerned to get Sultan Mahmud out of Trengganu, where he had been staying for some months, and back to his own country. In trenchant terms he informed the Dutch authorities that the Sultan's visits to Singapore and the Peninsular states had an 'injurious tendency', that he exercised an influence over Tengku Ali in opposition to the views of the Government of India, that he was fostering 'misunderstandings' between the Sultan of Trengganu and the rulers of Pahang and Kelantan, and that he ought to be recalled to his own dominions and required not to interfere in the affairs of Tengku Ali and the rulers of the Peninsular states. The Dutch then ordered Mahmud back to his own dominions, where he remained quietly until August 1856, when he again visited Trengganu in defiance of both the Dutch authorities at Riau and the British at Singapore. After this he was solemnly warned never to leave his dominions without the prior consent of the Netherlands East Indies Government. A year later, in September 1857, after another unauthorised visit to the British sphere, he was deposed and a new Sultan was elevated to the throne of Lingga.

28 SSR R-25, Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 122, 31 Dec. 1853.
30 Netscher, De Nederlanders, p. 301.
32 Tuhfat al-Nafis, pp. 284-87; Netscher, De Nederlanders, pp. 303-07.
DEPOSING Mahmud relieved the Dutch of a troublesome vassal, but at the expense of the rulers of Johore and Pahang. After an eleventh-hour dash to Lingga in the vain hope of saving his throne, Mahmud returned to Singapore and took up residence with the Temenggong. 33 Here he remained, a great charge on the Temenggong’s household, no doubt, for some six months or so before moving on to Pahang, where the political situation appeared favourable for an attempt to establish a position for himself.

The ruler of Pahang at this time was Tun Mutahir, who had been Bendahara since the abdication of his father, Tun Ali, in 1841. Mutahir had a long-standing quarrel with his youngest half-brother, Wan Ahmad, the favourite of his father’s old age. When the old Bendahara died, in October 1856, Ahmad fled for his life to Singapore, where he attempted to gain British support for a claim that part of the country had been bequeathed to him as a hereditary fief. 34 His real aim, however, was to become Bendahara, and to this end he sought the support of Sultan Ali, whom he agreed to recognise as Sultan over Pahang when he came to power. 35 This development posed a threat not only to the Bendahara, but also to the Temenggong.

It was apparent to the Temenggong that political instability

33 Netscher, De Nederlanders, p. 307.
34 SSR R-32, Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 13, 25 Jan. 1858.
35 When he invaded Pahang Ahmad used a seal which described him as Bendahara under the Sultan of Johore. See n. 87 below.
in the neighbourhood of his own dominions was bound to encourage Sultan Ali to renew his claim to paramount authority. The strength of Ali's position, such as it was, lay in the fact that he represented the principle of legitimate royal authority. So long as Ibrahim remained on good terms with the British and Ali lacked powerful support, there was little danger of a direct assault on the Temenggong's position in Johore. In 1857, however, Ibrahim had reason to be uneasy. His relations with the Governor were bad, the Sultan was employing Bugis mercenaries to subjugate a Muar chief whose district extended into Johore, Wan Ahmad was preparing for a venture which promised to throw all the southern Malay states into turmoil and - by no means the least of the Temenggong's worries - the ex-Sultan of Lingga had arrived to add his disturbing influence to the politics of the region. Under these circumstances there was much to be said for a strong defensive alliance with the Bendahara.

Such an alliance was in fact entered into by the Bendahara and the Temenggong about the middle of 1857, before Sultan Mahmud was deposed. To seal the pact the Bendahara's heir, Tun Koris, was sent to Singapore to wed the Temenggong's daughter. At the same time Ibrahim began a series of attempts to put an

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36 The British were at this time particularly annoyed with Ibrahim for meddling in the affairs of the deposed Sultan of Lingga. See n. 16 above.

37 See ch. 8, p. 323

38 In the following year the Temenggong's heir married the Bendahara's daughter. See App. 'A', Table 4, 5.
end to Wan Ahmad's war preparations, which were going on within
the bounds of the Settlement. In July he informed the Straits
Government of these and expressed the hope that Ahmad would
not be permitted to set out against Pahang from British
territory. As this produced no effect, he resorted to legal
manoeuvres. A number of local traders were induced to bring
actions for injuries allegedly sustained in Pahang; a warrant
was made out for Ahmad's arrest, and the Temenggong obligingly
sent a force to seize him on behalf of the Singapore police.
He was soon released, however, and shortly afterwards set out
with 40 or 50 Bugis fighters for Kemaman, in Trengganu, which
became the principal base for his attacks on Pahang. The
Temenggong then sent a message to Sultan Omar asking him not
to allow Ahmad to attack Pahang from his territory. Omar,
however, seems to have been pleased enough to see his neighbour
in trouble, and although he sent the Bendahara a letter
denouncing Ahmad's intentions, he made no attempt to prevent
him from using Kemaman as a base or recruiting in Trengganu
for his expedition.

39 Temenggong to Gov., 23 July 1857, in Letter Book of His
Highness the Maharajah.
40 The Temenggong's 'prompt assistance' was highly appreciated.
41 SSR R-32, Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 13, 25 Jan. 1858; Temenggong
to Gov., 20 Feb. 1858, in Letter Book of His Highness the
Maharajah.
42 SSR R-32, Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 190, 18 Nov. 1858.
43 Temenggong to Gov., 7 Dec. 1857, in Letter Book of His Highness
the Maharajah.
Wan Ahmad launched his first attack at the beginning of November 1857. The Bendahara was taken by surprise and fled into the interior, leaving Ahmad, who now styled himself Bendahara, in control of the entire sea-board. Ahmad's assumption of the ruler's title proved premature, however. Lacking support within the country and being almost entirely dependent on the foreign adventurers who accompanied him, he was unable to stand against the force which the Bendahara led against him. At the end of March 1858 he abandoned his stockades on the Pahang river and after briefly occupying Endau retired to his base at Kemaman.

By this time the Temenggong had become involved in a bitter and tendentious wrangle with the Straits Government over his support for the Bendahara. In accordance with their traditional policy of preventing the rulers of the Peninsular states from interfering in one another's affairs, the Straits authorities sought to prohibit all outside intervention in the dispute between the Bendahara and his brother. In this way, it was thought, the disturbances could be localised and their effect on trade minimised. In the Temenggong's case there was an additional reason for the prohibition: the fact that he resided on Singapore and drew an allowance from the East India Company. After 1855, however, the attitude of the Government changed.

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44 SSR W-37, Bendahara Koris to Gov., 1 July 1861.
The new Governor, Edmund Blundell, regarded the Temenggong's residence in British territory as being completely incompatible with the exercise of sovereign power in Johore and made several attempts to get him out of Singapore and into his own dominions. Ibrahim was reluctant to go, however, and as the Indian Government was not prepared to sanction measures to eject him, the local authorities were obliged to suffer the periodic embarrassments which his presence entailed. When the Pahang war broke out the Government was already highly annoyed with him for meddling in the affairs of the deposed Sultan of Lingga and was suspicious of his aims on the Peninsula. Blundell believed that he aspired to a position of dominance over all the southern Malay states and was determined to prevent him from using Singapore as a privileged base from which to wage war to this end. Blundell also feared that if he were allowed to take part in the Pahang war his Singapore business associates and their rivals would quickly become involved, the business community as a whole would divide into opposing factions, and attempts would then be made to drag the Government into the struggle.

Accordingly, when Ibrahim informed him of Ahmad's invasion and expressed the hope that there would be no objection to his

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46 Blundell succeeded Butterworth in March 1855. For his official career see ch. 3, p. 106, n. 132.
47 See n. 16 above.
aiding 'the rightful Sovereign of Pahang', Blundell replied that the dispute between the Bendahara and his younger brother was a purely internal affair in which neither the Temenggong nor the Straits Government had any right to interfere.\textsuperscript{50} Ibrahim then declared that he was bound by the most solemn pledges to assist the Bendahara, who was his ally, and that as there was no treaty provision to prevent him he intended to do so.\textsuperscript{51} Blundell in reply pointed out - what Ibrahim must have been very well aware of - that the 1824 Treaty specifically prohibited him from forming foreign alliances while he resided on Singapore. Blundell then went on to assert that the Temenggong's position on Singapore was that of a British subject by domicile and that he was liable as such to the jurisdiction of the Straits Courts. If he persisted in his intention of interfering in the affairs of Pahang, Blundell declared, he would face prosecution under Act X of 1839, an Act of the Indian Government which made it an offence for persons subject to British jurisdiction to aid or abet the waging of war against a government at peace with the East India Company.\textsuperscript{52}

\textsuperscript{49} Temenggong to Gov., 7 Dec. 1857, in Letter Book of His Highness the Maharajah.
\textsuperscript{50} SSR V-24, Gov. to Temenggong, 8 Dec. 1857. The Temenggong forwarded letters from the Bendahara which referred to the Sultan of Trengganu's involvement, but Blundell doubted their authenticity. See SSR R-32, Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 13, 25 Jan. 1858.
\textsuperscript{51} Temenggong to Gov., 3 Feb. 1858, in Letter Book of His Highness the Maharajah.
\textsuperscript{52} SSR V-24, Gov. to Temenggong, 5 Feb. 1858.
Blundell was now on shaky ground. To seek to apply Act X to the Temenggong's interference in Pahang involved two doubtful propositions: that Wan Ahmad had replaced the Bendahara as ruler of Pahang, and that the Temenggong in his capacity as sovereign of Johore was amenable to the courts of the Straits Settlements. After consulting his legal advisers on these points Ibrahim delivered a stiff rejoinder. Act X of 1839 did not apply to the case in question and proceedings under it would not be justified. 'Such a menace is wholly uncalled for', he declared. Furthermore, the Governor's opinion of his status on Singapore was erroneous and did not represent the views of the Supreme Government:

I believe that I have been made fully aware of the extent to which, as a resident within this Settlement, I am amenable to the laws of your country, and the jurisdiction of the courts; but in matters of State, in matters which appertain to the exercise of my power and authority as the Sovereign of Johore, I deny any liability but that which is imposed by the force of treaties, and the obligations of international law.53

What Ibrahim and his legal advisers chose to overlook, however, was that the Treaty of 1824 clearly prohibited his maintaining independent foreign relations so long as he continued to reside on the island of Singapore.

The Temenggong made two attempts at this time to interfere in Pahang in defiance of the Governor's prohibition. In January 1858 arrangements were made to send a mixed force of Bugis fighters and European seamen to the Bendahara's aid. The

53 Temenggong to Gov., 20 Feb. 1858, in Letter Book of His Highness the Maharajah.
plan fell through, however, when the local authorities found out about it and threatened the leaders with prosecution under Act X of 1839.\textsuperscript{54} A few weeks later, when Ahmad was forced out of the Pahang river and took refuge at Endau, the Temenggong sent his son, Abu Bakar, and the Bendahara’s mentri, Ungku Syed Omar, to the East Coast with a schooner and a gunboat to cut off his escape.\textsuperscript{55} When it became known in Singapore that they were stopping and searching vessels on the high seas the Hooghly was sent to apprehend them. The gunboat was disarmed, and the schooner was towed back to Singapore under threat of sinking. Abu Bakar and Ungku Syed were arrested and charged with piracy but the charge was dismissed by the examining Magistrate, the whole purpose of the prosecution having been, apparently, to humiliate the Temenggong and deter him from further interference in Pahang.\textsuperscript{56}

Abu Bakar’s arrest caused a minor sensation in Singapore. While the Temenggong’s enemies were no doubt jubilant, the general feeling in the European community seems to have been one of revulsion against the high-handed action of the officials. The Singapore Free Press, which had not shown itself particularly well-disposed towards the Temenggong in the past, called upon

\textsuperscript{54} SSR R-32, Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 13, 25 Jan. 1858; SSR W-26, Adam Wilson to Gov., 29 Jan. 1858.

\textsuperscript{55} The schooner belonged to Sultan Mahmud. For the Temenggong’s naval force see ch. 7, p. 261, n. 40.

\textsuperscript{56} See Temenggong to Gov., 6 May and 22 May 1858, in Letter Book of His Highness the Maharajah; SSR R-33, Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 50, 10 May 1858.
the Government to apologise.\textsuperscript{57} Even Blundell - who had been absent during the height of the crisis - thought matters had gone too far and he administered an official reproof to the Resident Councillor for 'unnecessarily subjecting men of rank and position to an act of indignity'.\textsuperscript{58} Nevertheless, there was no relaxation of the ban on the Temenggong's interference in the internal affairs of neighbouring states. Blundell had already applied to Calcutta for endorsement of his policy and when this was received the Temenggong was informed of its tenor and admonished to accept the Government's decision as final.\textsuperscript{59}

Ahmad withdrew from Endau and returned to Kemaman in April 1858. Though peace was restored, the political situation on the East Coast remained uncertain. It was now becoming apparent to the authorities in Singapore that Ahmad did have the support of the Sultan of Trengganu, as the Temenggong had claimed, and that it was not, as the Government had supposed,\textsuperscript{60} the support of the Pahang chiefs which had enabled him to challenge the Bendahara's position. It was also realised that the war might very well go on for years unless action was taken to prevent the Sultan of Trengganu from aiding Wan Ahmed.

\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Singapore Free Press}, 1 April 1858. For the attitude of the press to the Temenggong see ch. 6.

\textsuperscript{58} SSR R-33, Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 50, 10 May 1858, SSR U-35, Gov. to R.C. Singapore, 12 April 1858.

\textsuperscript{59} See Temenggong to Gov., 22 May 1858, in Letter Book of His Highness the Maharajah.

\textsuperscript{60} SSR R-32, Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 13, 25 Jan. 1858.
Accordingly, in May 1858, the Governor visited Trengganu to warn Sultan Omar that the Indian Government would not tolerate outside interference in Pahang. At the Governor's insistence, Wan Ahmad summoned to reside in the capital, where, it was hoped, he might settle down and live quietly. Ahmad, however, had no intention of giving up his designs on Pahang, and by August he was back at Kemaman and busy with preparations which seemed to presage another attack. The Bendahara then appealed to the British for protection and the Singapore Chamber of Commerce, primed, no doubt, by the Temenggong's supporters, called upon the Government to avert the possibility of further hostilities. In the interests of British trade on the East Coast, Blundell now completely abandoned his original policy of neutrality and despatched the Hooghly to warn Ahmad that the British would expel him by force if he invaded Pahang again. Deterred by this threat, Ahmad remained quiet for more than two years.

61 SSR R-33, Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 56, 26 May 1858.
62 SSR R-33, Bendahara to Gov., 6 Aug. 1858, encl. in Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 116, 13 Sept. 1858.
63 The Temenggong's business agent, William Paterson, of Ker, Rawson & Co., was Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce in 1854 and 1862. In 1857 and 1858 he was Deputy Chairman. The Secretary, Abraham Logan, who held office from 1849 until 1869, became one of the Temenggong's legal advisers in 1861.
64 SSR R-33, Singapore Chamber of Commerce to Gov., 30 Aug. 1858, encl. in Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 116, 13 Sept. 1858.
65 SSR V-25, Sec. Gov. to Commander H.C.S. Hooghly, 2 Sept. 1858; SSR R-33, Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 116, 13 Sept. 1858.
WAN Ahmad's first attempt to conquer Pahang failed because he lacked support within the country. His only allies were Sultan Omar of Trengganu, who gave him covert assistance while remaining publicly uncommitted to his cause, and Tengku Ali, who took virtually no part in this first campaign. Between 1858 and 1861, however, the political situation changed considerably. The most important development during this period was the direct involvement of the ex-Sultan of Lingga in the affairs of the East Coast states.

Sultan Mahmud remained in Singapore until April 1858. He then moved on to Pahang, and after staying some time with the Bendahara, journeyed into the interior to meet the Maharaja Perba of Jelai, the greatest of the Pahang chiefs. Soon rumours of a plot to proclaim the Sultan's direct rule in Pahang began to reach the Bendahara, and also the British, who advised the Bendahara to get rid of Mahmud as soon as possible. When Mahmud returned to the capital, bringing the Maharaja Perba with him, he was coldly received, and soon afterwards left for Trengganu, again in the company of the Maharaja Perba.

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66 Ali seems to have looked after Ahmad's interests in Singapore. His mentri, Bujal, appears to have been involved in laying the information which led to the arrest of Abu Bakar on a charge of piracy. (See Temenggong to Gov., 6 May 1858, in Letter Book of His Highness the Maharajah). It is also possible that the Bugis Suliwatang (war-leader) who informed the Government of the Temenggong's plan to send a force of Bugis and Europeans to Pahang was induced to do so by Ali, with whom he had close relations at various times.

67 SSR R-33, Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 80, 21 June, and 116, 13. Sept. 1858.

At this stage Mahmud had not yet declared his support for Wan Ahmad. He was still on outwardly good terms with both the Temenggong, who was looking after his affairs in Singapore, and the Bendahara, who continued to acknowledge his authority over Pahang. In 1859 he returned to Pahang and appears to have been given the revenues of a district for his personal maintenance. Nevertheless, Mahmud's presence was a grave embarrassment to the Bendahara, the more so since his own position remained insecure while Wan Ahmad and the Maharajah Perba remained at large. In is not surprising, therefore, that Mahmud's relations with the Bendahara should have broken down completely after some time. The crisis was reached about August 1860, when the Bendahara abdicated in favour of his eldest son, Tun Koris. Koris declined to acknowledge Mahmud's authority and assumed instead the status of an independent and sovereign ruler. After this Mahmud threw in his lot with Wan Ahmad.

Having finally broken with Sultan Mahmud, the new Bendahara went to Singapore to obtain the support of the Temenggong and

69 See n. 16 above.
his European associates. Financial backing was obtained from Paterson, Simons & Co. (formerly Ker, Rawson & Co.), the Temenggong's business agents, in exchange for a grant of extensive mining interests in the Kuantan district. The Temenggong's price was even higher. In return for a pledge of military and political support he obtained tin mines in Kuantan and the cession of all the Pahang territory south of the Endau river, including Pulau Tioman and the other offshore islands. These great acquisitions gave the Temenggong a very large interest in the continuance of Tun Koris' regime, an interest which was reinforced by ties of kin, for Tun Koris and Wan Abu Bakar, the Temenggong's heir, were each married to the other's sister. But the Temenggong's gains were also a measure of the Bendahara's dependence on foreign support, and in the end this alienated the Pahang chiefs and thereby contributed to the Bendahara's own downfall.


74 The Temenggong was mining at Kuantan and Sungai Blat in 1862 (see Buku Peringatan Keraja'an [State Diary, JA], 14 Zulkaedah 1278 (12 May 1862) and 23 Moharam 1279 (20 July 1862)), possibly in association with Paterson, Simons & Co.

75 That this cession was part of the agreement is clear from Temenggong to Gov., 17 May 1861, in Letter Book of His Highness the Maharajah; SSR W-39, Wan Ahmad to Gov., 24 July 1861; SSR R-40, Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 213, 16 Dec. 1861. The Temenggong's possession of this territory was later recognised in the treaty which was drawn up between Johore and Pahang in consultation with the British in December 1861 and concluded in June 1862. See pp. 150-51 below.

76 See App. 'A', Table s 4, 5.
By the end of 1860 it was becoming apparent that Ahmad's next attack was likely to coincide with disturbances in Muar and the neighbouring borderlands between Johore and Pahang, where Sultan Ali was planning a major bid for political power. Ali had aligned himself with Ahmad at the outset of the Pahang war. Now he was busy with preparations for the collection of men and arms at Tanjong Gading, his Muar 'capital', and the formation of a confederacy of Negri Sembilan chiefs under his leadership. In February 1861 a number of these chiefs, including the Dato' Klana of Sungai Ujong and the nephews of the Yamtuan Besar of Sri Monanti and the ruler of Tampin, gathered at Tanjong Gading to confer with Sultan Ali and Wan Ahmad, who journeyed overland from Trengganu in the hope of obtaining the assistance or at least the friendly neutrality of the West Coast chiefs.77

While the chiefs met in Muar, Ali's supporters in Singapore sought to present his case to the European community. In January 1861 the Straits Times denounced the 1855 Treaty as a fraud and called upon the Government to regard the Temenggong's rule in Johore as a regency during the Sultan's 'imbecility' - Ali, fortunately, was not able to read what his friends had to say about him in public - which should be terminated now that his eldest son was of age.78 A few weeks later the same paper

78 Straits Times, 19 Jan. 1861.
informed its readers that an army of 30,000 was gathering in
Negri Sembilan, Muar, Pahang and Trengganu to 'make amends
for the injustice done by a civilized Government to a semi-
barbarous ruler' by ousting the parvenu and restoring 'the
ancient kingly line'. The leaders had met at Tanjong Gading
and unanimously agreed to invite Sultan Ali to hold sway over
them. A genuine national movement, comparable to that of the
Italians, was developing in the states not subject to Siam,
the Straits Times declared, and it deserved the sympathetic
consideration of the British Government.79

Despite the rhetoric of the Straits Times and the
Temenggong's claim that his dominions were about to be invaded
from Muar,80 there is no good reason to believe that Ali
contemplated a direct assault on Ibrahim's position at this
time. The Sultan's object seems to have been to take advantage
of the general uncertainty of the political situation in
Pahang and Negri Sembilan (where the chiefs were at loggerheads)
to consolidate his rather precarious position in Muar and
extend his influence into Negri Sembilan and the vaguely defined
borderlands between Pahang and Johore, where neither the
Bendahara nor the Temenggong had so far established his authority.
In these regions, it was hoped, the petty rulers whose ancestors
had sworn fealty to the Sultans of Johore might be persuaded

79 Straits Times, 9 Feb. 1861.
80 Temenggong to R.C. Singapore, 14 Feb. 1861, in Letter Book
of His Highness the Maharajah.
to renew their allegiance and accept once more the paramount authority of the royal house. After this the authority of the Temenggong in Johore might be challenged. But in the meantime Ali's military preparations were directed not against the Temenggong but against the district chief of Muar, from whom he was anxious to wrest control of the Mt Ophir gold mines. 81

Wan Ahmad's second invasion of Pahang was launched in April 1861. His forces descended on Kuantan by sea, burnt the town, and after an unsuccessful attempt to take the capital, briefly occupied Endau before retiring once more to Kemaman. Shortly afterwards, in June, he again took Kuantan and held the town for about five or six weeks before being forced to retreat. Though these military operations were on a small scale their political consequences were of great importance. In the first place they gave encouragement to dissident elements within Pahang. Secondly, they demonstrated that the British, despite their threats, were not prepared to intervene with force to expel the invader.

As soon as news of the invasion reached Singapore the Temenggong sought the Government's permission to send aid to the Bendahara. As in 1858, he maintained that he had an alliance with the Bendahara which obliged him to send assistance and on this occasion he also claimed the right to expel Ahmad from Endau on the ground that it was part of Johore. 82 These arguments

81 For Ali's rule in Muar see ch. 8, p. 323.
82 Temenggong to Gov., 23 April and 17 May 1861, in Letter Book of His Highness the Maharajah.
made no impression on the Governor, who replied that the Treaty of 1824 prohibited the Temenggong from forming foreign alliances while he resided on Singapore as a British pensionary, and that so far as the Straits Government was aware Endau belonged to Pahang. 83

The Governor at this time was Colonel Orfeur Cavenagh, 84 an Indian Army officer of forthright views and, on occasion, forceful action, who eventually became a good friend of the ruler of Johore. Like his predecessor, however, Cavenagh was opposed to the Temenggong's interfering in the affairs of other states while he resided in British territory and was anxious to prevent any widening of the Pahang war as a result of outside intervention. At first he had hopes of a mediated settlement. Accordingly, after browbeating the Bendahara into agreement, he offered Ahmad a pension from the Bendahara if he would cease his attacks on Pahang, at the same time warning him that the British would expel him by force if he invaded the country again. 85 However, shortly afterwards, when Ahmad re-occupied Kuantan and the Bendahara called upon him to carry out his threat, Cavenagh declined to do so, presumably because he still had hopes of effecting a compromise. It was soon to become apparent, however, not only

83 SSR V-33, Gov. to Temenggong, 21 May 1861.
84 Colonel (later Major-General Sir) William Orfeur Cavenagh, was Governor of the Straits from August 1859 until April 1867. 85 SSR R-39, Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 86, 3 June 1861; SSR V-33, Gov. to Wan Ahmad, 3 June 1861; W.O. Cavenagh, Reminiscences of an Indian Official, pp. 303-05.
that Wan Ahmad could not be bought off, but that the policy of trying to localise the war had completely failed.

Towards the end of July Wan Ahmad sent a reply to the Governor's offer of mediation. This was a lengthy and rambling account of his career and grievances, much of which was taken up with fulminations against the Temenggong, 'my mortal enemy', as he bitterly characterised him, 'who can invent a thousand devices to injure me'. The Temenggong he declared, wished to become Sultan over all the Malay countries and make his son Raja of Pahang, and was supplying arms and ammunition to the Bendahara to drive him out of the country and deprive him of his inheritance. He added:

I wish this case to be brought to the notice of the great Governor of Bengal, to see whether he will agree to this, that one who lives upon Government pension, such as the Temenggong, has any right to interfere, so as to cause an open war in a foreign country, between two brothers who are quarrelling for their father's property.86

'I have no desire to become Bendahara', Ahmad avowed, 'only I wish to keep what my father has given me in his life-time'. But despite this disingenuous disclaimer it was now quite apparent that his object was in fact to make himself ruler of all Pahang. It was also apparent that he was making use of the authority of the royal house to this end. Ahmad in fact posed as the restorer of legitimate authority in Pahang. In his letter to the Governor he charged the Bendahara and the Temenggong with renouncing their allegiance to the Sultan and arrogating to themselves the position of independent rulers. But who was

86 SSR W-39, Wan Ahmad to Gov., 24 July 1861.
the Sultan to whom the Bendahara and the Temenggong owed allegiance? On this question Wan Ahmad was disinclined to commit himself. His seal, on which he styled himself Bendahara, described him as the representative of the Sultan of Johore, a studiedly ambiguous formula which left him free to choose between Sultan Ali and Sultan Mahmud.\(^8\) To the Straits Government, as to the Temenggong, all this was most ominous. Neither wished to see the southern states convulsed by disturbances which might lead to a revival of the claim of the two branches of the royal house. The indications were, however, that this was exactly what was about to happen.

Ahmad withdrew from Kuantan about the beginning of August 1861. At the same time a revolt broke out in the interior of Pahang, where the people had become exasperated with the harsh rule of the Bendahara's brothers. The movement commenced in Raub and quickly spread to Jelai, the district of the Maharaja Perba. Early in 1862 this chief returned to Pahang with a commission from Sultan Mahmud giving his royal sanction to the uprising. After this another leading chief threw in his lot with the rebels and several more began to waver in their

\(^8\) The inscription on his seal reads *al-wakil al-Sultan Johor dato* Bendahara Sewa Raja ibne Bendahara Sewa Raja, *the representative of the Sultan of Johore, Dato' Bendahara Sewa Raja, son of Bendahara Sewa Raja*. (See document IV in Linehan, 'A History of Pahang', p. 210, where the Seal is wrongly attributed to Bendahara Ali and a wrong date is given). This was an unusual and improper manner of referring to the Sultan, the correct method being to refer to him by name.
loyalty to the Bendahara. Then, with a large part of the interior in their hands, the rebels invited Ahmad to return and take possession of the country. 88

THE support of the rebels was of crucial importance to Wan Ahmad's eventual success. The royal sanction which Sultan Mahmud's support conferred was also of importance in legitimising the action of the rebels. In other ways, however, Mahmud's involvement hindered Ahmad's cause. It is most probable that the British would have acquiesced in Ahmad's seizure of power, once it became clear that he had the support of important chiefs, if it had not been for the fact that he was also backed by Mahmud and, through him, by the Siamese. The Siamese at this time exercised suzerainty over Trengganu and wished to bring the country under closer control. The opportunity to do so, and at the same time to extend their influence into Pahang, arose in 1861 as a result of a quarrel between the Sultan of Trengganu and the ex-Sultan of Lingga.

The support which Sultan Omar of Trengganu gave to Wan Ahmad in 1857 and 1858 had the effect of embroiling him with the British, the only power capable of saving his state from absorption by the Siamese, at a time when his relations with the Siamese were deteriorating. From Omar's point of view, there was much to be said for a détente with the Bendahara and the cultivation of closer relations with the British. This

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Linehan, 'A History of Pahang', pp. 79-82.
in fact appears to have been the policy which he adopted, for in the latter half of 1860, when Tun Koris repudiated the authority of Sultan Mahmud and assumed the status of a sovereign ruler it was to Omar that he turned for royal recognition.\(^{89}\) Again, in 1861, when Ahmad was forced to retire from Kuantan, Omar made it clear he was no longer welcome in Trengganu. As a result, Ahmad was obliged to shift his headquarters to Kelantan.\(^{90}\)

Omar's change of front was a blow to the ambitions of Sultan Mahmud, who was determined to win a position of power on the East Coast. Mahmud now turned to the Siamese, who, perceiving in him a useful instrument for the advancement of their own influence, summoned him to the capital. Shortly afterwards, in July 1861, rumours began to reach the Straits Government that the Siamese were about to depose Omar and place Mahmud on his throne.\(^{91}\) Though this was denied in Bangkok,\(^{92}\) three Siamese naval vessels appeared off Kuala Trengganu at the end of July and would probably have landed troops but for the presence

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\(^{89}\) According to his own account, Sultan Omar 'conferred' the title of Bendahara on Tun Koris at Trengganu. See SSR W-36, Sultan of Trengganu to Gov., 13 Oct. 1860. It is clear, however, that Koris simply sought recognition as Bendahara and that there was no question of the Sultan of Trengganu acquiring authority in Pahang.

\(^{90}\) SSR W-39, Sultan of Trengganu to Gov., 9 Moharam 1278 (17 July 1861) and 10 Sept. 1861.

\(^{91}\) SSR W-39, Resident Riau to Gov., 16 July 1861.

\(^{92}\) GBPP 1863/541, p. 6, H.B.M. Consul, Bangkok, to Gov. S.S., 30 July 1861.
of the Hooghly, which had been sent to watch out for some such move. 93

The involvement of the Siamese had the effect of forcing the British to take steps to safeguard their own position on the East Coast. The prospect before them was a disturbing one. If Sultan Mahmud, the senior claimant to royal authority over the southern Malay states, acquired the throne of Trengganu as a Siamese vassal and then gained power in Pahang by backing Wan Ahmad, the probability was that almost the whole of the East Coast would become a Siamese sphere of influence. To counter this threat Cavenagh decided to sanction the alliance between the rulers of Johore and Pahang and bring the foreign relations of both states under the control of the British Government. These objects were achieved in a treaty which was drawn up at the end of 1861 and concluded on 17 June 1862. 94

In addition to providing for mutual defence and confirming the Temenggong's possession of the territory south of the Endau river, the Treaty stipulated that neither party was to enter into any alliance or maintain any correspondence with foreign powers without the knowledge and consent of the British Government, which was also to be the final arbiter in all

93 Ibid. p. 6, Commander H.M.S.S. Hooghly to R.C. Singapore, 29 July 1861.
94 For the text of the Treaty see Maxwell and Gibson, Treaties and Engagements, pp. 209-11. For the original draft see Temenggong to Gov., 7 Dec. 1861, in Letter Book of His Highness the Maharajah.
future matters of dispute between the parties. The effect of these provisions was to bring Pahang under British paramountcy for the first time, and to perpetuate the Johore ruler's subordination to the British where foreign relations were concerned. This was the price which the Bendahara paid for protection and the Temenggong for British recognition of the Endau cession. It was to have enduring consequences for both rulers.

Almost immediately after the conclusion of the Johore-Pahang Treaty it became known that the Siamese had appointed Sultan Mahmud to be governor over Kelantan and Trengganu. In July a Siamese naval vessel returned Mahmud and about 30 or 40 of his personal followers to Trengganu, where he was joined by Wan Ahmad and a large force from Kelantan. Omar now had no choice but to fall in with the plans of his unwelcome guests. Accordingly, when Ahmad set out against Pahang, Omar supplied him with arms and ammunition and placed an embargo on the

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95 The Treaty also stipulated that British subjects and the subjects of Johore and Pahang were to enjoy equal trading rights and privileges in the two countries. The provision concerning British trading rights was added to the original draft by the Straits Government.

96 Under the terms of 1824 Treaty, the Temenggong could terminate British control of his foreign relations by giving up his allowance from the Government and withdrawing from Singapore.


export of rice to Pahang. Later, when the British requested him to hand Mahmud over to them, he refused, preferring, apparently, to submit to the bombardment of his capital rather than incur the displeasure of the Siamese.

Wan Ahmad's third and final invasion was launched early in August 1862. With a force of some 300 or 400 Trengganu men he entered the interior of Pahang, joined up with the rebels and moved unopposed down the Tembeling and Pahang rivers to Chenor. At Chenor and places further downstream the Bendahara threw up defensive works and attempted to make a stand, but without success. By November the insurgents were at Temai, less than twenty miles from the capital. During the next six months they continued, slowly but surely, to push the Bendahara's forces towards the sea.

During this final phase of the Pahang war Temenggong Abu Bakar (who had succeeded his father in February 1862) threw all his resources into the struggle. In July, when it became clear that another attack was imminent, he called upon the British to take action, at the same time sending messages to the Sultan of Trengganu urging him not to allow Wan Ahmad to invade Pahang from his territory. At the end of the

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99 SSR V-36, Gov. to Sultan of Trengganu, 2 Sept. 1862; Singapore Free Press, 30 Oct. 1862.
100 The bombardment of Trengganu was debated in the House of Commons, which called for the printing of GBPP 1863/541, 'Papers connected with the Attack upon Tringanu, November 1862'.
102 SSR W-43, Temenggong to Gov., 26 July 1862 and encl.; Buku Peringatan Keraja'an, 8 Moharam 1279 (5 July 1862) and 26 Moharam 1279 (23 July 1862).
month he sent a gunboat to Pahang to guard against an invasion from the sea. In August envoys were sent to Perak to beg the Sultan not to supply arms and ammunition to the invader, and the Temenggong's cousin, Raja Kechil Ahmad, was despatched to Pahang with 60 men in the armed schooner Khatijah. Within a few weeks some 400 followers and mercenaries had been sent to the Bendahara's aid. There followed thousands of dollars' worth of food, arms, and equipment, and a stream of instructions and exhortations to the Temenggong's captains, to the Bendahara and his advisers, and to the chiefs and people of the country. The chiefs were informed that Pahang had been 'entrusted' to the Temenggong, a reward of $500 was offered for Wan Ahmad's head, and the Bendahara was privately advised to have him put to death before the British should arrive and arrange a settlement. In September Abu Bakar went in person to view the situation and to spur the Bendahara on to greater efforts, and in the following month a force of some 600 fighting men was sent through Muar to descend the Pahang river and take Wan Ahmad's forces in the rear.

103 Buku Peringatan Keraja'an, 3 Safar 1279 (30 July 1862).
105 Buku Peringatan Keraja'an, 26 Safar 1279 (22 Aug. 1862). For the Temenggong's naval force see ch. 7, p. 261. n. 40.
106 See entries in Buku Peringatan Keraja'an for the period September 1862 to February 1863.
But despite all this energy and activity, and all the men, money and arms which the Temenggong poured into the defence of his brother-in-law's position, the rebel advance continued. Wan Ahmad now had the support of most of the important chiefs as well as a large section of the population, which had grown tired of Tun Koris' harsh regime and the hardships which invasion and blockade inflicted on the country. Above all, the chiefs had become alienated by the Bendahara's obvious dependence on the ruler of Johore. When Ahmad won the support of the rebels in the interior and the Temenggong's forces began to appear in the country the struggle quickly took on the aspect of a war to expel foreign forces and with them a discredited ruler who no longer commanded the loyalty of his subjects.

The Pahang war ended in June 1863, with the death of the Bendahara, Tun Koris, and of his father, Tun Mutahir, and the flight of their family and followers to the safety of the Temenggong's dominions.\textsuperscript{108} Wan Ahmad quickly consolidated his victory with a series of shrewd measures which averted famine, stimulated trade, and assured him of the continued support of an important section of the nobility.\textsuperscript{109} Soon he was more firmly in power than Mutahir or Koris had ever been. Nevertheless, he still

\textsuperscript{108} Tun Mutahir left Pahang on 24 May and died at Sedili five days later. Tun Koris, who remained in Pahang, died on 2 June. See Singapore Free Press, 11 June 1863.

\textsuperscript{109} Linehan, 'A History of Pahang', p. 90.
had to contend with the Sultans whose royal authority he had invoked in driving out his predecessor. Ahmad had adopted a seal which described him as Bendahara under the Sultan as early as 1857, and this fiction, that he ruled as the Sultan's representative, was kept up for some time after he came to power. Care was taken, however, to avoid the use of any formula which named the Sultan. The inscription on his seal suggested that it was Ali who possessed authority over Pahang. In other ways it was Mahmud's authority which seemed to be referred to, but again in such a manner as to leave the matter in doubt. In this way the usurper was able to make use of the royal authority to sanction his own exercise of power while at the same time he exploited the uncertainty surrounding the positions of the two Sultans to weaken the authority of both.

Ahmad had to deal first with Mahmud, who arrived in Pahang at the end of 1863. Mahmud had been in Muar, where he had conferred with Sultan Ali. According to the Temenggong, whose spies kept him informed of events in Muar, he had tried to

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110 See n. 87 above.
112 Mahmud remained in Trengganu for four months after the bombardment of Sultan Omar's capital. Then, in April 1863, the Siamese fetched him back to Bangkok at the insistence of the British. About November he left Bangkok, perhaps with the connivance of the Siamese, and went to Muar. See GBPP 1863/541, p. 78, H.B.M. Consul, Bangkok, to Sec. State for Foreign Affairs, 15 April 1863; Singapore Free Press, 3 Dec. 1863.
persuade Ali to accompany him to Pahang, where preparations could then be made for an attack on Johore by way of the Muar river. Ali remained in Muar however, though he sent his nephew and some followers to Pahang with Mahmud. Probably he had no wish to appear in Pahang in the train of the ex-ruler of Lingga. A decade earlier, when Mahmud occupied the throne of Lingga, Ali had been prepared to accept a position under him. Now, however, he appears to have considered himself to be the ruler of highest authority in the southern Peninsular states. According to the Tuhfat al-Nafis, he promised to make Mahmud his minister (mentri) when he gained possession of Johore.

In the eyes of the Malays of Johore and Pahang Sultans Mahmud and Ali were still endowed with the magic qualities of kingship; their persons were sacred, their wishes were, in theory, commands, and it was no doubt generally thought that they should be comfortably provided for. It was also probably held that the Sultans - or at least one or other of them - were the superiors of the Bendahara and the Temenggong and were, in a general way, in authority over them. But it was also recognised that the Bendahara and the Temenggong had long ruled their territories without interference from the Sultan and there was, so far as one can judge, no strong feeling that the existing arrangement

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113 Temenggong to Gov., 14 Dec. 1863, in Letter Book of His Highness the Maharajah.
114 Loc. cit.
115 Tuhfat al-Nafis, p. 298
should be upset to allow the Sultans to exercise direct power either in Johore or Pahang. In other words, a constitutional convention had come into being that the royal house did not exercise direct authority in the dominions of the Bendahara and the Temenggong. The Sultan's dreams of power were therefore vain. The Bendahara and the Temenggong were now firmly in control of their own territories and the activities of the royal house, while they were embarrassing, posed no serious threat to their authority. In Johore the Temenggong's power had never dependend on the allegiance of the Malay population, which was small, scattered, and without a hierarchy of chiefs, but on the loyalty of his personal followers. In Pahang, after Ahmad came to power, there were no discontented chiefs to challenge the Bendahara's authority, or at least none who felt strong enough to do so. There was thus no solid base in either country upon which the royal house could found a party.

Mahmud arrived in Pahang in December 1863, sick and worn out by the disappointments of his years of exile, but still anxious for a place of honour in the territories which made up the ancient kingdom of Johore. 116 The Bendahara was equally anxious to be rid of the royal authority and declined to set him up

116 Mahmud also had plans of going to Rembau, and even, at one time, of getting up an expedition to win back the throne of Lingga. See Linehan, 'A History of Pahang', pp. 91-92; SSR W-49, Bendahara to Gov., 5 Ramadhan 1280 (8 Feb. 1864).
as Sultan in Pahang. Instead, he tried to send him off to Singapore. But although they quarrelled, Mahmud managed to hang on in Pahang until July 1864, when he died. With his death the attempts of the Lingga branch of the old royal house to exercise authority on the Peninsula came to an end.

In the meantime Sultan Ali was preparing to assert his authority in Pahang. In June, while Mahmud was still living, he addressed the Governor in exalted terms on the subject of the threat to the peace of his dominions posed by the activities of 'Wan Abu Bakar, the son of the Temenggong, now residing in British territory', who was getting up a combination against the Bendahara. He was now about to enter his dominions, he declared, in order to preserve the peace. In this letter Ali claimed jurisdiction over both the Temenggong and the Bendahara and represented himself in the Sultan's characteristic role, as the symbol of unity, the restorer of harmony and the guardian of Malay custom and religion. In August, a few weeks after Mahmud's death, he made his appearance in Pahang. How he was received, what his real objects were, and what part he played

117 SSR W-49, Bendahara to Gov., 5 Ramadhan 1280 (8 Feb. 1864) and 10 Shawal (20 March 1864); Singapore Free Press, 28 July 1864.

118 The Tuhfat al-Nafis (p. 298) gives the date of his death as 15 Safar 1281 [20 July 1864].

119 Ali claimed the right to appoint the Temenggong (see SSR W-42, Sultan Ali to R.C. Singapore, 29 April 1862) and therefore refused to recognise Abu Bakar's assumption of the title.

in local politics during his sojourn in the country are matters of conjecture. It may be surmised, however, that he tried to obtain some sort of acknowledgement of his paramount authority, though not necessarily any specific power of government in the country. Whatever his objectives, it is clear that he had no more success than Sultan Mahmud, and when he left Pahang to return to Muar in May 1865 Ahmad was as firmly in control as ever. After this Ali continued to claim authority over the Bendahara and the Temenggong but he was never in a position to enforce his pretensions. The main result of his participation in the Pahang war, peripheral though it was, was his own reduction virtually to a state of bankruptcy.\footnote{121}

The strength and stability of Ahmad's rule in Pahang was quickly appreciated by the British authorities in Singapore. After briefly considering the Temenggong's suggestion that Ahmad should be recognised as regent during the minority of Keris' son, the Straits Government wisely decided to accept the change of government and treat Ahmad as \textit{de facto} Bendahara. After this, the Temenggong was also obliged to drop his opposition to the new regime.

For the Temenggong, the Pahang war resulted in political defeat and financial loss. He lost his tin mines in Kuantan, he was left with debts amounting to tens of thousands of dollars.\footnote{122}

\footnote{121} See ch. 8, p. 323 for Sultan Ali's financial position. \footnote{122} These included a debt of $60,000 to Paterson, Simon & Co., which Temenggong Ibrahim had contracted and which was made a charge on the Telok Belanga estate after his death. See ch. 7, 248, n. 88.
and he now had to contend with hostile northern neighbour. In the long run, however, the Temenggong's losses were outweighed by important gains. Despite the new Bendahara's strenuous opposition, managed to hold on to most of the territory ceded to Pahang under the terms of the Johore-Pahang Treaty of 1862. Moreover, Ahmad's victory in Pahang was in itself to the Temenggong's advantage ultimately. The Johore ruler had given his support to Mutahir and Koris partly because the continuance of his own political influence (and financial interests) in Pahang depended on the maintenance of their position, and partly because of his concern to prevent disturbances which might create opportunities for the two branches of the royal house to revive their influence in the southern Peninsular states. There was, however, a strong element of contradiction in this policy, for the very conditions of political instability which enabled the Temenggong to gain a footing in Pahang also made it possible for the Sultans to pursue their objectives. In the end the Johore ruler had to accept the collapse of his own influence as a corollary to the exclusion of the royal house. Moreover, in the final analysis, the Temenggong's failure in Pahang was in his own best interests. Pahang was too large and populous to be absorbed by Johore, and the Temenggong's continued involvement in the affairs of the country could only have exhausted his resources and brought him into collision with the Pahang chiefs, and ultimately with the British Government.

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123 See ch. 8, p. 309. n. 24.
CHAPTER 5

'THE STATE AND TERRITORY OF JOHORE'

THE limits of the old province of Johore cannot be determined with any degree of precision; probably they were never exactly known or delimited. The border with Pahang lay between the Endau, which was under the Bendahara's rule, and the Sedili Besar, which was subject to the Temenggong. According to J.T. Thomson, who made a careful study of the region between the Endau and the Sedili in 1849, there were no settled inhabitants between the two rivers and the few Malays who ventured into the forest in search of dammar and rattans sought the protection of either ruler. Thomson also found that the inhabitants of all the offshore islands were subjects of the Bendahara, and that the most generally accepted boundary between the two territories was Tanjong Leman, a small cape at lat. 2°09' N., about three miles south of Pulau Sibu.¹ According to Newbold, the Temenggong's dominions did not extend beyond Pulai on the southern coast,² but in fact the headmen on the west coast rivers south of Muar

¹ J.T. Thomson, 'Description of the Eastern Coast of Johore and Pahang, and Adjacent Islands', JIA vol. 5 (1851), p. 84. Thomson nevertheless reports a claim that Mersing, some 25 miles down the coast from Endau, was the border. Newbold, Political and Statistical Account, vol. 2, pp. 41, 55, and Moor, Notices of the Indian Archipelago, p. 244, both give Sedili Besar as the boundary. Newbold also notes a report that Rompin, 15 miles north of Endau, marked the border.

early came under his authority\(^3\) and by the time the Johore Treaty of 1855 was concluded this stretch of coast was considered to be an integral part of the Johore province.

The 'State and Territory of Johore' which was recognised as the possession of the Temenggong in the Johore Treaty (though it was not therein defined) was bounded by a line which followed the course of the Muar and Segamat rivers from Kuala Muar to the vicinity of Gunong Besar before turning south to Gunong Blumut, and thence east to strike the South China Sea at some indeterminate point north of Sedili Besar. This placed the Muar-Kesang region and most of the territory between the Endau and the Sedili Besar outside the Temenggong's dominion. Neither of these regions had in fact ever been considered to form part of the Johore province. Endau had always been under the authority of the Bendahara, while the Muar district was historically orientated towards the Negri Sembilan and had its own territorial chief. Under the terms of the 1855 Treaty the territory between the Muar and the Kesang rivers was specifically awarded to Tengku Ali, who was recognised as 'Sultan of Johore', and this region did not become part of Johore until the Sultan's death in 1877. The territory between Sedili and Endau was ceded to the Temenggong by the Bendahara in 1862, and despite the fact that his successor for some time refused to recognise the

\(^3\) Rev. P. Favre, 'A Journey in Johore', JIA vol. 3 (1849), pp. 60, xviii-xxv; Daud bin Sulaiman, Rengkasan Tawarikh Orang Kaya\(^2\) dan Penghulu\(^2\) Batu Pahat.
validity of the transfer, remained under the control of the Temenggong after that date. 4 Except for some minor alterations to the boundary, 5 these acquisitions filled out the state to its present dimensions, the inland boundary being a line which follows the rivers Kesang, Chohong and Gemas to the conjunction of the Gemas and the Muar, and thence runs in a straight line to Kuala Chelau before turning south and east to follow the watershed down to the conjunction of the Sembrong and the Endau. From this point to the sea the boundary with Pahang is made by the course of the Endau.

The countless creeks, streams and rivers of present-day Johore are organised in five major river systems. Two drain the uplands and marshes of the east coast and flow down to the South China Sea; two take an opposite course to the west of the watershed and flow through narrow coastal lowlands to empty into the Strait of Malacca; one flows south to the Strait of Singapore. The west coast rivers are the Muar, fed by the Labis and Segamat, and the Batu Pahat, with its affluents, the Lenek, the Bekok and the Sembrong. Several minor streams, the Benut, the Pontian, the Pulai and the Skudai, intervene between the Batu Pahat and the Johore, the historic river of the southern coast which has given its name to the ancient sultanate and the modern state. The east coast rivers are the Sedili Besar and the Endau, which

4 For the history of the Johore-Pahang boundary dispute see ch. 3, p. 309, n. 24.
5 For the settlement of the boundary with Pahang, Malacca and Negri Sembilan see ch. 3, p. 309, n. 24, and p. 341, n. 102.
drains through its affluents, the Lenggor, the eastern Sembrong, the Sekai and the Kahang, almost one-third of the surface of the country.

Twisting through a wild terrain of low forested hills and inland marshes, these waterways provided the only practical means of communication in the days before roads and railways and hence exerted on the pattern of human settlement and the evolution of political units an influence which was decisive. The fact that the country was divided into a number of quite separate and autonomous drainage areas tended to isolate the communities on the different waterways and prevented the development of large-scale political units. Of the five major river systems only one, the Muar, was of any importance as a trade route and a means of access to a rich and settled hinterland, and it was only in this region that a hierarchical system of territorial authority developed.

IN the early nineteenth century a primary division in the population of the country lay between the aborigines of the interior and the Malays of the coastal plains and the lower reaches of the larger rivers. The aborigines, variously termed Orang Hutan ('men of the forest'), Orang Binua ('men of the country'), and Jakun (an aboriginal word meaning 'man'), were primitive communities of proto-Malay stock whose migration into the Peninsula preceded the arrival of the coastal Malay. Pushed into the interior by the newcomers, they inhabited the upper reaches of most rivers, shifting their villages according to the
exigencies of slash and burn cultivation, and generally shunning the coastal regions which had once been their home.  

Logan, who travelled extensively through their territory in 1847, uses the term Orang Binua to describe all the aborigines of Johore with the exception of the Orang Laut ('river nomads') and Orang Sabimba of the southern rivers, and two small inland tribes inhabiting parts of Muar.  

Logan found no Binua on the Muar, the Pulai, the upper reaches of the Sedili Besar, or the Johore river below the conjunction of the Linggui, the Sayong, and the Sekol. With these and possibly other minor exceptions, small bands of aborigines inhabited all the main streams of the interior.

The minor affluents of the great rivers form an extensive network of inland waterways which, with a few forest trails, enabled constant communication to be maintained among the inhabitants on both sides of the watershed. The aboriginal tribes thus belonged to an inner system of settlement and political relationship which looked out on the coastal world of the Malay at the infrequent points where the great rivers met and drained the streams of the interior. The authority of the Temenggong and the Bendahara, at this time the ruler of the

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7 These latter belonged to a settlement pattern extending from Muar through Negri Sembilan to Ulu Pahang rather than to the main settlement pattern of interior Johore. Probably their numbers did not exceed 200 in the 1840s. See Logan, 'The Orang Binua of Johore', *JIA* vol. 1 (1847), pp. 246-49; Rev. P. Favre, 'An account of the wild Tribes inhabiting the Malayan Peninsula, Sumatra and a few neighbouring Islands', *JIA* vol. 2 (1848), pp. 253-54.
Endau district, was little more than nominal in these inland regions, the affairs of the Binua being entirely administered by their own chiefs. The chiefs, at least those of the Endau-Sembrong waterway, were associated in a loose confederacy under the nominal authority of the Batin Onastia, a chief of high rank supposedly descended from the folk-hero Raja Binua. According to Logan, each chief (Batin) had absolute authority within his own jurisdiction, although there was also a council composed of all the Batins except the Batin Onastia, which deliberated on difficult or unusual questions and on matters affecting all the Binua.  

Logan gives no figures for the size of the aboriginal population. Another traveller, Favre, who made a journey through much of the interior in 1846, put their numbers at no more than 1000. This estimate leaves out of account the population of the Muar-Segamat and Endau regions, which together came to perhaps 1000 or 1500. In all, the aboriginal population of interior Johore can hardly have been more than about 2000 or 2500 in 1846.

The lower reaches of the rivers of southern Johore were inhabited in the first half of the nineteenth century by small bands of 'river nomads' and Orang Laut (known locally as Orang

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9 Favre, 'An account of the wild Tribes', *JIA* vol. 2 (1848), pp. 253-54, estimates the aboriginal population of the region between the Muar and Sedili Besar rivers at about 1000 and that of the Muar region and part of Malacca at 300. On the basis of what Logan and Hervey have to say, the population of the Endau-Sembrong waterway may be estimated at no more than about 1000. See Logan, 'The Orang Binua of Johore', *JIA* vol. 1 (1847), p. 273; D.F.A. Hervey, 'The Endau and its Tributaries', *JSBRAS* no. 8 (December 1881), pp. 93-124.
Tambusa), primitive tribal communities of the same proto-Malay stock as the Binua of interior Johore and the Orang Laut of the Riau-Lingga archipelago and the adjacent coast of Sumatra. The Orang Laut were sea-farers, and probably also pirates, who lurked in the estuaries of the Johore, the Lebam, and other rivers of the south coast. The river nomads, a timid, sea-fearing people, spent their lives in small boats in the estuaries and lower reaches of the southern rivers and obtained a living from fishing and collecting forest produce. Logan in 1846 found them divided into two tribes whose names indicated that they had come in the recent past from rivers on Singapore island. Small groups of the Orang Selatar tribe, numbering in all upwards of 200 persons, inhabited most of the southern creeks and estuaries. The Orang Biduanda Kallang were confined to the Pulai, where they had fishing stakes near the mouth of the river and collected forest produce for one of the Temenggong's Malay officers who had charge of them. This tribe had formerly inhabited the Kallang river on Singapore, and had been removed by the Temenggong to the Pulai after the cession of Singapore. According to Logan the Biduanda Kallang at one time numbered about 100 families in as many boats, but by 1846 the ravages of smallpox had reduced them to eight families. There were also about seventy Orang Sabimba in the Tebrau and Skudai rivers, who had been taken there from Battam by the Temenggong to collect forest produce; according to Logan, they were entirely a forest
people, having neither boats nor cultivations. On the basis of what Logan has to say, the total number of Orang Laut, river nomads, and Orang Sabimba in the southern rivers may be put at perhaps 500 or 600 in the 1840s.

The Malays inhabited the larger river valleys and coastal plains. Unlike the aborigines of the interior they practised settled agriculture and were not always shifting their villages. Nonetheless, the Malay population fluctuated with the fortunes of districts and migration over long distances was not uncommon. When chieftains fell to quarrelling and trade and agriculture became difficult the Malay ra'yat forsook their cultivations and removed to less troubled parts of the Malay world. But certain areas, on account of natural advantages, endured as centres of population and maintained a degree of continuity in local life and tradition.

Before the middle of the nineteenth century the Endau-Sembrong and the Batu Pahat were joined to form a trans-Peninsular water-route which in the remote past had provided an alternative to the often hazardous passage through the Strait of Singapore. In the first half of the nineteenth century both rivers provided outlets for the forest produce of a large section of the interior. The settlement at the mouth of the Endau was also of some

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importance as a pirate resort. When the British began to take action against the pirates and their bases in the neighbourhood of the Settlements, in the 1830s, the Bendahara cautiously transferred the centre of his dealings with the pirates from the Pahang river to Endau. Until 1838, when the British destroyed a pirate fleet there, Endau remained the principal slave market for the Ilanun pirates and the slave dealers of the East Coast. Thereafter the Malays of Endau relied principally on padi-planting, poultry-rearing, and the trade in forest produce for their livelihood. In the 1840s Endau exported considerable quantities of rattans, wood oil, camphor, gutta, and aloes. This trade was under the control of an upriver chief with the title To Jenang, an Ilanun ex-pirate who rented the river revenues from the Bendahara.\textsuperscript{12} Newbold in the 1830s put the size of the settlement at the river mouth at about 300 houses.\textsuperscript{13} In 1850 Thomson estimated the population at about 2000.\textsuperscript{14} After the cession of the territory south of Endau to the Temenggong the population divided into two communities, one at Padang, where the agent of the Temenggong resided, the other at Pianggui, on the north side of the river, which in 1879 was under the rule of Che Ungku Da, a nephew of the Bendahara.\textsuperscript{15} Padang in 1892 had a population

\textsuperscript{12} Thomson, 'Eastern Coast of Johore and Pahang', \textit{JIA} vol. 5 (1851), pp. 136-37, 145-46.
\textsuperscript{14} Thomson, 'Eastern Coast of Johore and Pahang', \textit{JIA} vol. 5 (1851), p. 136.
\textsuperscript{15} Hervey, 'The Endau and its Tributaries', \textit{JSBRAS} no. 8 (December 1881), p. 121.
of about 500 Malays and a few Chinese merchants and shopkeepers.\textsuperscript{16}

The east coast islands, Pulau Aur, Pulau Tinggi (Pulau Babi) and the small islands nearby, were under the rule of the Bendahara until this region was ceded to the Temenggong in 1862. In 1846 the local ruler on Pulau Aur had the title To\textsuperscript{1} Kaya Perang; under him were twelve penghulus who headed the local communities into which the population of approximately 1400 was then divided. The islanders sold water and wood to passing junks from China and Cochin China and carried on a thriving trade with Singapore in oil, coconuts, mats, guats, durian and other commodities. At one time Pulau Aur had been an important market for the sale of Cochinese slaves, but by 1846 this trade had ended.\textsuperscript{17} In the 1830s and early 1840s Pulau Tinggi and the neighbouring islands were notorious as pirate bases; by 1850, however, piracy was on the wane and the local population, then numbering about 300, obtained a living by collecting edible birds' nests, turtles' eggs and trepang.\textsuperscript{18}

In the 1830s there was a settlement - probably also with pirate associations - of about seventy houses on the Sedili Besar.\textsuperscript{19} By 1850 it had a population of about 300 and the main

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Singapore Free Press}, 16 July 1846.
\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Singapore Free Press}, 25 May 1843; Thomson, 'Eastern Coast of Johore and Pahang', J\textsc{IA} vol. 5 (1851), p. 136.
\textsuperscript{19} Newbold, Political and Statistical Account, vol. 2, p. 44.
local occupation was collecting rattans and gutta for the Singapore market.\textsuperscript{20} The main centres of Malay population on the south coast of Johore at this time were at Johor Lama and Pulai. Johor Lama, for a brief period in the sixteenth century the capital of the empire, had degenerated into a small fishing village with about twenty-five or thirty houses by the middle of the nineteenth.\textsuperscript{21} At Pulai there was a village with about 100 houses in the 1830s.\textsuperscript{22}

Between Tanjong Piai and the Muar river, the west coast was divided into a number of petty districts under penghulus and Orang Kaya who resided on the main rivers, Pontian, Benut, Batu Pahat, and at Padang. Newbold remarks that Benut was 'a small place'. In 1847 there was a Malay village of about forty or fifty inhabitants about three miles from the mouth of the river.\textsuperscript{23} According to Newbold the jurisdiction of the penghulu at Batu Pahat extended along the coast from Batu Pahat to Pinang Saribu and upriver as far as Pantang Batu on the eastern Sembrong, although after the waterway became blocked, at some time before 1847, he no longer exercised control on the eastern side of the watershed, and the trade of the Johore section of the eastern

\textsuperscript{20} Thomson, 'Eastern Coast of Johore and Pahang', \textit{JIA} vol. 5 (1851), p. 137.

\textsuperscript{21} Moor, \textit{Notices of the Indian Archipelago}, p. 244; Favre, 'A Journey in Johore', \textit{JIA} vol. 3 (1849), p. 52. In the early 1830s the population of Johor Lama appears to have been about 1000. See Winstedt, 'A History of Johore', p. 89; Newbold, \textit{op. cit.} vol. 2, p. 43.

\textsuperscript{22} Newbold, \textit{loc. cit.}

\textsuperscript{23} Favre, 'A Journey in Johore', \textit{JIA} vol. 3 (1849), pp. 60-62.
Sembrong was tapped by the To Jenang of the upper Endau-Sembrong. In the 1830s Batu Pahat exported annually some 400 pikuls of ebony, about 1000 bundles of rattan, 15 pikuls of aloe wood, and some ivory, dammar, wax and sandal wood. The stretch of coast from Pinang Saribu to the mouth of the Muar was under the authority of an Orang Kaya who resided at Padang, a small fruit-growing district on the south side of the river. Newbold put the population of this area at about 200, but gives no indication of the size of the Malay communities on the Batu Pahat and the Pontian.\(^{24}\) It may fairly be surmised that the population of these rivers was small, and probably did not exceed 400.

The Muar, largest of the West Coast rivers south of the Perak, was of considerable importance at one time as a waterway to the Menangkabau settlements of interior Negri Sembilan and as the western outlet of two trans-Peninsular trade routes which ran, by water and portage, to Kelantans and Pahang.\(^{25}\) Muar is mentioned in the Malay Annals and the Portuguese narratives as the refuge of Parameswara, the first king of Malacca, after his expulsion from Singapore, and it was again the temporary resting place of Sultan Mahmud, the last king of Malacca, in his flight from Malacca to Pahang after the Portuguese captured his city. In the early nineteenth century the Muar and its affluents formed a petty state under the authority of a chief with the


title Temenggong Paduka Tuan. Under him were a number of headmen, of whom the most important, in theory, were the eight penghulu known as the Empat di-Ulu and the Empat di-Hilir ('the Four Upriver' and 'the Four Downriver'). The first Temenggong of Muar was appointed to rule the district by Sultan Abdul Jalil Shah in the first decade of the eighteenth century. The Empat di-Ulu and the Empat di-Hilir represented an older local configuration, which originated, according to tradition, at the time of Sultan Mahmud Shah's brief sojourn.26

In the 1830s a small state with a population of about 2000 existed on the Jempol, an affluent of the Muar on the trade route between Pahang and Malacca, which was open by water for about four months of the year. Opium, tobacco, cloth, salt, iron and other goods passed up to Pahang in exchange for the gold-dust and silks of the East Coast states. Some of this traffic passed along the Muar, which was also an outlet for the produce of Jempol and other small states in the Negri Sembilan. Muar itself produced small quantities of rice, sago, ivory, ebony, gold-dust, tin, wax, aloe wood, camphor, dammar, lakka wood and other rare products, such as stones 'extracted generally from the heads of porcupines'. Despite the comparatively large volume of the trade which passed up and down the river, the Muar district was but sparsely populated. Newbold, who ascended as far as Grisek, some 15 miles from the coast, in 1833, formed an

impression of decline from former prosperity: 'the land appears almost one uninterrupted mass of jungle and swamp, exhibiting only a few straggling villages and clearings. Thriving rice-grounds have degenerated into barren marshes; an enormous forest, peopled with wild elephants, overshadows a soil naturally rich and prolific; while the gaunt rhinoceros and uncouth tapir, stalk unmolested over spots, once, if tradition belies them not, the sites of large and populous towns'.

Newbold estimated the population of the district at 2400 and put the total population of the region between the Kesang and Sedili Besar rivers at a computed figure of approximately 25,000.

On the basis of his own estimates for the population of the main areas of settlement, and those of other observers in the 1830s and 1840s, it would appear that the population was in fact considerably less.

When the contemporary estimates of the size of the main communities are added together, and some allowance is made for small villages which escaped the notice of observers, it seems probable that the Malay population was of the order of 6000 to 8000. If the estimates for the aboriginal population are added

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27 Newbold, op. cit. vol. 2, pp. 139-40.
28 Ibid. vol. 2, p. 54.
29 This was also the opinion of J.R. Logan, editor of JIA. See editor's note to S. St John, 'The Population of the Indian Archipelago', JIA vol. 3 (1849), p. 380.
30 Where the number of houses in a settlement is given the population is calculated on the basis of 5 to 10 persons per house. 10% has been added to the total figures as a rough estimate of the small communities which escaped the attention of observers.
the total population comes to about 8000 to 10,000. This range agrees fairly well with the estimate made by Favre in 1849. Similarly, the Malay population of the Endau region, including the islands, may be estimated at about 3000 to 5000, and the aboriginal population at round 1000. In all, the total population of the whole of present-day Johore can hardly have exceeded 12,000 to 16,000.

In the first half of the nineteenth century the Johore Malays obtained a living by fishing and growing rice (in small quantities), sago, nuts, fruit and vegetables, partly for local consumption and partly for export to Singapore and Malacca. In addition, they traded in the products of the forest: rattan, valuable woods, oils, resins, camphor, bees' wax, ivory, horn, bezoar, and extraordinary stones. As a rule these products were collected by the aborigines of the interior, who bartered them against weapons and utensils of metal, salt, tobacco, cloth, and other consumer goods which the Malays brought up from the coast. This trade was jealously guarded by the local Malays and outsiders.

31 See n. 9 above.
32 Favre, 'A Journey in Johore', JIA vol. 3 (1849), p. 63, estimates the total population of the region between the Kesang and Sedili Besar rivers at no more than one-sixth or one-seventh the population of Singapore, i.e., one-sixth or one-seventh of 52,891 (the population of Singapore in 1849), or ca 7500 to 8800.
33 These figures are derived from the estimates of Newbold and Thomson, discussed above.
34 See n. 10 above.
were generally not permitted to ascend into the interior. Logan thus describes the manner of its conduct:

The Malayan Panghulu, Jinnang, or other Head in each river is also the head of the monopoly of trade with the Binuas. Strangers who enter the river for trading purposes visit him. He either supplies them from his own store, purchases what they require from the Malays of the river, or allows the traders to do so directly. This system is enforced with more or less strictness according to the character of the Panghulu, but traffic is always to a certain extent carried on without his intervention. Strangers are absolutely prohibited from trading with the Binuas.... The prices at which articles bought and sold are to be valued is from time to time regulated by the Panghulu, who in this, as in all other matters, consults the principal men of the river. The Batins of the Binuas on the subject, and so manages the discussion as to carry his point.35

The importance of the trade in forest products declined in the latter half of the century with the expansion of the market for agricultural products in the Straits Settlements and the influx of settlers from Sumatra, Borneo, and Java, who were attracted by the security of the Temenggong’s regime and the richness of the alluvial flatlands of west coast Johore. By the late 1860s immigrants from the Dutch East Indies were settling in numbers along the plain south of the Muar river. After 1877, when the Muar-Kesang district became part of Johore, they began to spread into the fertile regions north of the Muar river. By 1885 the Malaysian population may have been about 40,000, of whom perhaps 10,000 were immigrant

Malays or Javanese. By 1895 the number of Malaysians in the country was probably around 50,000, and by 1900 around 90,000.36

Almost all the immigrants were cultivators who sought in their new surroundings to continue their old life as peasant smallholders. Instead of rice, however, they planted coconuts, arecanuts, fruit, vegetables, and sago. By the early 1880s the region around Padang and the Muar river was exporting large quantities of coconuts, arecanuts and copra, as well as bananas, plantain, pumpkins, yams, keladi (sweet potato) and other vegetables.37 After 1885 sago also became important. Except for the fruit and vegetables, a large part of which was consumed within the country, the produce of the Malaysian agriculturalists was exported to Singapore and Malacca. In the period 1885 to 1896 exports of coconuts, arecanuts and copra increased almost two and half times and their value rose from $217,265 to $565,673. In the same period the value of sago exports rose from $10,692 to $80,038.38 In 1896 fruit and fish to the value of $37,824 and $27,348 was also exported.

36 For the basis of these estimates see App. 'C', pp. 356-57.
37 Singapore Free Press, 29 Nov. 1884.
38 Straits Settlements. Returns of Imports and Exports, 1885, 1896. Sago was grown principally in the freshwater marshlands around the Muar and Batu Pahat rivers and at Kukub, where Syed Mohamed bin Ahmad al-Sagof had nearly 4000 acres under sago in 1896. See Singapore and Straits Directory (hereafter cited as Straits Directory), 1897 (it is to be noted that information in Straits Directory refers to the year preceding that of publication), J.R. L[ogan], 'Sago', JIA vol. 3 (1849), p. 288.
The total value of coconuts, arecanuts, copra, sago, fruit and fish exported to the Straits Settlements in 1896 came to $710,883. By and large this represented the output of the Malay sector of the economy. It was still small by comparison with that of the Chinese, whose principal exports, gambier and pepper, were worth $7,474,705 in 1896, but the ratio was changing. By 1896 the cultivation of gambier and pepper had reached its zenith; thereafter the output of the plantations began to decline while that of the Malay smallholdings continued to increase.

The rise of gambier as a plantation crop occurred after the process of boiling the leaves to precipitate the astringent became known and a demand developed for the product in the Chinese tanning industry. In the first half of the nineteenth century gambier planting was widespread in Sumatra, Borneo.

39 'Malay' is here and hereafter used to refer to all Malaysians in Johore.

40 The Malays also exported small quantities of coffee and pepper, as well as mats, matting, indigo, mace, nutmegs, ginger and forest produce to the value of about $25,000. In addition to gambier and pepper, the Chinese grew tapioca, the exports of which rose in value from $170 to $160,791 between 1885 and 1896. See S.S. Returns of Imports and Exports, 1885, 1896; J.C. Jackson, 'Chinese and European Agricultural Enterprise in Malaya, 1786-1921: A Geographical Study of Expansion and Change', (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Malaya 1965), p. 102.

41 Gambier was grown in various parts of the Malayo-Indonesian world for consumption with betel before its application to the tanning industry. See Burkill, A Dictionary of the Economic Products of the Malay Peninsula, pp. 2198-2204.
the Riau-Lingga archipelago, the Malay Peninsula and other parts of the Malayo-Indonesian world. In these areas it was almost exclusively a Chinese enterprise and was almost always carried on in conjunction with the cultivation of pepper, the two crops being economically and ecologically complementary. In 1819 there were about twenty plantations in the vicinity of the Temenggong's village on the Singapore river. Probably more were established during the 1820s, but it was not until the beginning of the following decade that the industry achieved real importance on Singapore. The interest of Chinese businessmen seems to have turned to gambier and pepper after other crops failed to do well on the island, and in the early 1830s considerable planting took place, despite the fact that gambier and pepper prices were low. By 1834 the gambier output was 10,549 pikuls per annum; two years later this had increased to 22,000 pikuls and the pepper crop amounted to 10,000 pikuls.

Joint cultivation enabled the work force to be employed with great efficiency. In addition, the boiled gambier leaves were used either as a fertilizer for the pepper plants or to prevent the growth of weeds around them.

In 1827 Singapore exported 800 pikls of gambier; probably more was exported before the imposition of duties at Batavia. See Low Siow Chek, 'Gambier and Pepper Planting in Singapore, 1819-1860'), (unpublished Academic Exercise, University of Singapore 1955). For the rise of gambier and pepper planting on Singapore and its spread to Johore, see also J.C. Jackson, 'Chinese Agricultural Pioneering in Singapore and Johore', JMBRAS vol. 38 pt 1 (1965), pp. 77-105.

In 1836 the price of gambier rose from $1.20 to $3.00 in response to the demand of the developing European market and more land was brought into cultivation. By the end of the decade about 350 plantations, 47 covering perhaps 15,400 acres, were producing 48,000 pikuls of gambier and 15,000 pikuls of pepper. During the 1840s the industry reached a peak and began to decline. In 1848 the gambier and pepper crops were

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46 Ibid. p. 307.

47 See Singapore Free Press, 28 March 1839, for a detailed account of the Singapore plantations. This gives figures for the size of the cultivations which suggest an average of 65 acres or more. Other newspaper accounts give figures which suggest an average of about 10 acres. See P. Wheatley, 'Land Use in the Vicinity of Singapore in the Eighteen-Thirties', Malayan Journal of Tropical Geography vol. 2 (March 1954), p. 65. For an estimate of the probable size of the plantations see n. 48 following.

48 This figure is calculated on the basis that the average size of the plantations was 44 acres, of which 40 acres was planted in gambier and 4 in pepper, and that the average yield of gambier per acre was 3½ pikls p.a. These estimates are obtained from J.T. Thomson, 'General Report on the Residency of Singapore, drawn up principally with the view of illustrating its agricultural statistics', JIA vol. 4 (1850), pp. 136-37, 206-09, and Statements 'B' and 'C', between pp. 219 and 220; A.E. Coope, 'The Kangchu System of Johore', JMBRAS vol. 14 pt 3 (1936), p. 248.

Thomson states that the average size of the Singapore plantations was 33 acres (10 in gambier and 3 in pepper), but this figure seems too low; it may have been obtained by dividing the figure for the total area under gambier and pepper (26,834 acres) by 800, the total number of plantations, including those which had been abandoned, instead of by 600, the number of plantations actually in cultivation. Dividing 26,834 by 600 gives 44 (actually 44½) as the average size of plantations. This figure is supported by Coope, who gives the average size of the Johore plantations as 30 to 50 acres. Coope's figures seem to refer to the area under gambier alone; adding the area under pepper brings his estimate to 33 to 55 acres for the average plantation.

49 Singapore Free Press, 28 March 1839.
estimated at 80,000 and 30,923 pikuls respectively. At this time the area under plantations was about 600.\(^5\) In 1850 there were only about 400 plantations\(^5\) and by 1866 only a handful.\(^5\)

Contemporary observers usually attributed the decline of the plantation industry on Singapore to deforestation and exhaustion of the soil. As early as 1841 disputes were arising among the planters over the right to reserve adjacent stands of timber for firewood,\(^5\) and during the next few years the plantations which had been established in the early 1830s began to cease production on account of exhaustion of the soil,\(^5\) but there was in fact still plenty of virgin land on the island. Planters whose cultivations were going out of production preferred, however, to migrate to Johore rather than occupy fresh land on Singapore under the disadvantageous terms of the Land Regulation which came into force in 1844.\(^5\)

\(^{50}\) Thomson, 'General Report on the Singapore Residency', JIA vol. 4 (1850), p. 208 and Statements 'B' and 'C'.

\(^{51}\) Singapore Free Press, 31 Jan. 1850.

\(^{52}\) Makepeace, Brooke and Braddell (eds), One Hundred Years of Singapore, vol. 2 p. 80.

\(^{53}\) Singapore Free Press, 4 Nov. 1841.

\(^{54}\) Gambier exhausted the soil after about 15 years, pepper after about 30. See J. Low, A dissertation on the soil and agriculture of the British Settlement of Penang . . . , p. 43; Thomson 'General Report on the Residency of Singapore', JIA vol. 4 (1850), p. 137.

\(^{55}\) See Low Siow Chek, 'Gambier and Pepper Planting in Singapore, 1819-1860'. When the price of gambier rose, in the late 1860s, planting revived on the island and continued through the latter half of the century. See Jackson, 'Chinese Agricultural Pioneering in Singapore and Johore', JMBRAS vol. 38 pt 1 (1965), pp. 94-96.
The first applications for permission to open plantations in Johore were made towards the end of 1844. By the middle of 1845 fifty-two plantations had been established in four neighbouring rivers on the southern coast, close to the site of the future capital of the state. The Chinese population of these plantations was estimated at 500 persons. By 1850 at least eight more rivers had been opened up, and it was estimated that there were then 200 plantations in the country. On most of the plantations the pepper vines had not yet come into production but the gambier crop was already large; in 1850 the annual output was estimated in advance at 30,000 pikuls. At this time the area of the Johore plantations may have amounted to about 9000 acres. During the 1850s the exodus of Singapore planters continued as their land became exhausted. A further impetus was given to the movement by the commencement in 1855 of a government survey of the gambier and pepper lands with a view to enforcing the Land Regulation of 1844. By 1860 at least 24 rivers in southern Johore had been opened up for

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56 Singapore Free Press, 5 June 1845.
57 [Register of River Concessions, 1844-1902, in JA]
58 Singapore Free Press, 31 Jan. 1850.
59 Loc. cit.
60 Low Siow Chek, "Gambier and Pepper Planting in Singapore, 1819-1860". Johore also had other attractions. The water supply was better than Singapore's and the holders of river concessions enjoyed various financial perquisites, including a monopoly on gambling - which was banned in the Settlement.
planting; by 1870 the number was around 70, about 3,000 plantations were in production, and the area under cultivation amounted to upwards of 132,000 acres. 61

In origin the Johore plantation industry was simply an extension of the industry on Singapore. Many, if not most, of the planters had cultivated the same crops on Singapore, and they were financed on the same general terms, and very often by the same merchants, as before. Nearly all the Singapore plantations were started by squatters on government land, operating on advances from financiers who were usually in business as dealers in gambier, pepper and general merchandise. According to Seah Eu Chin, one of the earliest and most successful of the Singapore dealers, whose family also played an important part in financing the plantation industry in Johore, 62 the Singapore plantation workers were almost all Teo-chiu, the rest being Macao Chinese, while the dealers were all either Hokkien or Teo-chiu, the greater number (slightly more than 80%) being Hokkien. 63 Advances of food, clothing, equipment and working capital were made during the unproductive period during which the land was being cleared and the vines established. No interest was taken on the value of these

61 [Register of River Concessions, 1844-1902]; Tawarikh Dato' Bentara Luar, p. 84. The area under cultivation is calculated from the number of plantations in production.

62 See ch. 7, p. 297, n. 2.

advances; instead the financier received the exclusive right to act as the planter's business agent, in which capacity he took a commission on the value of everything bought and sold on the planter's behalf. Since he was usually himself a dealer in gambier, pepper and general supplies, the financier's profit as commission agent was in addition to his normal business profit.

In 1839 it was estimated that two-thirds of the Singapore plantations were financed on the advances system, and, while it was claimed that the thrifty and hard-working planter could work off his debt and nett as much as $400 p.a., few seem to have been so fortunate; plantations often changed hands, and it was not uncommon for owners to abscond leaving considerable debts behind. Nevertheless, a number of planters did manage to disencumber their property and accumulate capital. It was these successful planters, presumably, who pioneered the plantation industry in Johore.

The first step towards the opening of plantations in Johore was the acquisition of 'river concessions' (surat sungai). These documents were simply acknowledgements of permission (keterangan kebenaran) to open plantations within the limits of the concession. In practice, however, the concessionaires quickly established a general monopoly of commerce in their

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65 Singapore Free Press, 28 March 1839.
territories which developed into a complex of customary rights and privileges and eventually achieved recognition in the law of the land as the hak perniaga'an sungai ('the right of commerce in the river'). The most important of these were the five monopolies (pajak) - opium (chandu), spirits (arak), gambling (judi), pork (babi), and pawn shops (gadai) - and the exclusive right to permit plantations to be opened in the area of the concession.66

Cultivation was carried out by planters who received food and other supplies from the concessionaires on credit during the 18 months or so before the first crop was ready. At the end of this time the planter was obliged to enter into a 'produce agreement' (surat pajak kebun) with his creditor, who, as 'produce farmer' (taukeh pajak kebun), acquired an exclusive right to supply provisions and dispose of the produce of the plantation on commission until the debt was liquidated.67 As produce farmer the concessionaire carried on the business of a dealer in gambier, pepper, and general merchandise.

66 The first known surat sungai was issued on 26 Ramadhan 1260 [10 Sept, 1844] and was a grant of the Skudai river. See [Register of River Concessions, 1844-1902].

67 It is not clear how much the commission was. Par. 41 of the Kanun Kangchu, a code of regulations issued in 1873, gives the rate as 30 cents per pk1 on rice and 5 kati per pk1, i.e., 5%, on gambier and pepper. Par. 66 states that the produce farmer is entitled to 20% on the value of all goods supplied to the planter. (See Coope, 'The Kangchu System in Johore', JMBRAS vol. 14 pt 3 (1936), pp. 256, 258). According to the Straits Times, 3 March 1877, the rates were 20 cents per pk1 on rice - i.e., probably between 5% and 10%-and 33% on the value of gambier and pepper. The rates were probably varied according to market conditions.
It was almost always the case, however, that he had considerable
debts of his own, and his creditors were the old-established
gambier and pepper dealers of Singapore. What usually happened,
therefore, was that when the plantations came into production
the concessionaire assigned the debts of a number of planters
to his own creditors, who thus became produce farmers. 68

In 1864 half the Johore plantations were said to be indebted to
Singapore merchants in this manner. 69 Of the remainder, some,
presumably, were clear of debt and the rest were financed by the
concessionaires themselves.

As a rule, the holders of river concessions were not single
individuals but partnerships or firms (kongsi) whose members,
numbering from perhaps two or three to upwards of a dozen, were
united by ties of kin or clan. It was usual for one of the
partners to take charge of the affairs of the kongsi in the
area of the concession. So far as the Chinese inhabitants were
concerned, this person was the local ruler of the river; he
was called kangchu ('master of the river') and resided in a
'Big House' (rumah besar) at the firm's 'river-settlement'
(kangka, literally 'foot of the river'), where the produce of
the plantations was brought for removal to Singapore and a

68  Tan Tek Soon, 'Chinese Local Trade', The Straits Chinese
Magazine vol. 6 no. 23 (September 1902), p. 91, quoted in
Jackson, 'Chinese Agricultural Pioneering in Singapore and

69  SSR W-52, 'Petition of 34 Planters Resident in Johore
(Heads of Rivers)', 15 Zulhijjah 1280 [22 May 1864], encl.
in Temmengong to Gov., 20 Oct. 1864.
few shops and other buildings were maintained for the storage of supplies and the provision of amenities for gambling, pawnning, drinking, and smoking opium. The kangchu supervised the bringing in of supplies and the export of produce, maintained the monopolies and collected all the other dues owing to the concessionaires, assigned land for planting, settled disputes, punished malefactors, and generally maintained law and order among the Chinese of his district.70

Before 1845 the Chinese population of Johore and Muar consisted of several hundred gold miners in the neighbourhood of Mt Ophir (Gunong Ledang) and a few traders and woodcutters in other parts of the country.71 With the rise of the plantation industry the Chinese population increased in a series of leaps and bounds. By 1856 it may have been as much as 10,000. Eight years later, in 1864, it was probably around 15,000. Thereafter the rate of inflow increased. The Chinese population was probably around 40,000 in 1870, 80,000 in 1885, and 130,000 in 1895. At this time there were twice as many Chinese in the country as Malays. After 1895, however, the Chinese population declined. In 1900 it was only about 100,000 and by 1903 no more than 75,000 to 80,000.72

70 For a description of a Johore kangka see Lake, 'Johore', Geographical Journal vol. 3 no. 4 (1894), p. 290.
71 The Mt Ophir goldfields were worked sporadically by Chinese in the first half of the century. See Newbold, Political and Statistical Account, vol. 2, pp. 169-70; Singapore Free Press, 6 Feb. 1840 and 21 Jan. 1853.
72 For the basis of these estimates see App. 'C', pp. 356-57
The great majority of Chinese in Johore were male labourers employed on the gambier and pepper plantations, and the rise and fall in their numbers reflects the changing fortunes of the plantation industry. Up to the mid-1860s the growth of the planting industry in Johore was very largely a matter of the Singapore planters crossing the Johore Strait in search of fresh land. In the late 1860s and early 1870s the development of the industry was stimulated by rising prices. Towards the end of the 1870s there was a drop in production, due to falling prices, but in the following decade the price of pepper began to rise steeply and as a result the industry entered a period of great expansion. From the original areas of cultivation along the rivers flowing into the Johore Strait the plantations spread up the east and west coasts to Sedili Besar, Batu Pahat and Muar, regions hitherto settled almost exclusively by Malays. The area under cultivation continued to increase until

73 The gambier and pepper output of the Johore plantations appears to have been about 338,000 and 134,000 pkls respectively in 1877, 316,000 and 56,000 in 1880, and 268,000 and 89,000 in 1883. (See S.S. Returns of Imports and Exports, 1877, 1880, 1883, where imports from Johore appear to have been entered under the headings 'Malay Peninsula' and 'East Malay Peninsula'). Between 1885 and 1896 gambier exports rose from 340,576 pkls to 625,766 pkls. In the same period exports of black and white pepper rose from 95,273 and 569 pkls to 127,755 and 9,628 pkls respectively.

74 For the pattern of settlement in the last quarter of the century see Jackson, 'Chinese Agricultural Pioneering in Singapore and Johore', JMBRAS vol. 38 pt 1 (1965), pp. 96-101.
In the early 1890s, when pepper prices plummetted.\textsuperscript{75} In the latter half of the decade prices recovered, but much of the increase was off-set by rising production costs.\textsuperscript{76} As a result the industry began to decline, and with it the number of Chinese in the country.\textsuperscript{77}

That gambier and pepper planting was essentially an extractive industry which deforested the land and exhausted the soil\textsuperscript{78} had always been appreciated by the ruler and his advisers. As early as 1862 attempts were made to find an

\textsuperscript{75} Between 1889 and 1892 the price of black pepper and white pepper fell from $19.60 and $36.10 per pkl to $9.40 and $15.80 per pkl respectively. See S.S. Returns of Imports and Exports, 1889, 1892.

\textsuperscript{76} The main increases were in the price of foodstuffs. Between 1885 and 1900 the price of rice, pork and poultry rose 35%, 40% and 80% respectively. These price increases were the result of a general inflation of the Straits currency which had been going on since the 1880s. Between 1885 and 1900 the price of rice doubled, the price of poultry tripled, and the price of pork rose 75%. See Johore import figures in S.S. Returns of Imports and Exports, for the years 1885-1900.

\textsuperscript{77} The output of gambier and pepper declined from 625,766 and 267,276 pkls in 1896 to 455,414 and 101,128 pkls respectively in 1901. Nevertheless, gambier and pepper were still the leading exports, although the value of other crops was rising fast. The value of gambier and pepper exports stood at $7,474,705 in 1896 and - as a result of higher prices - $7,952,544 in 1901. In the same period the value of coconuts, arecanuts, copra, tapioca and sago rose from $806,572 to $1,516,151. See S.S. Returns of Imports and Exports, 1896, 1901.

\textsuperscript{78} The number of plantations formed between 1845 and 1895 can hardly have been less than 8000. The land thus exhausted must have amounted to 300,000 or 400,000 acres, while another 300,000 acres will have been deforested to provide fuel for the gambier boiling pans.
economic alternative which would not devastate the country. It was not until the late 1870s, however, when the coffee and tea planters of Ceylon began to turn their attention to the Malay Peninsula, that a really serious effort was made to establish new plantation crops. In 1878 the ruler engaged two Ceylon planters, T.H. Hill and E.A. Watson, to report on the suitability of the country for growing coffee, tea, and cocoa. Their findings, which were favourable, were published, and within a short time a rush had developed among Ceylon planters and Straits Settlements speculators to take up land in Johore. By 1882 about half the plantations which came into production in the 1880s and 1890s were already under cultivation. Almost all the plantations were situated in the undulating hill country of southern Johore or at Batu Pahat, on the slopes of Mt Formosa. Most were within about twenty miles of the capital, at Sungai Tebrau, Sungai Skudai, Gunong Pulai, Bukit Lunchu, Kukub or Pengarang. At first coffee arabica, Liberian coffee, and cocoa were generally grown together. After 1884 the cultivation of

79 At this time the Temenggong was attempting to establish cotton in Johore. In 1864 efforts were made to establish tobacco planting on a large scale and a public company (European) was formed to grow sugar in the plain south of the Muar river. See Singapore Free Press, 11 Sept. 1862, 8 June 1864, 3 Nov. 1864.

80 CO 273/100, C.A.G. to Sec. State, conf., 23 Sept. 1879 and enclosure. Hill later took up planting in the Protected States. Another man, W.M. Buchan, was engaged by the ruler in 1878 to conduct experimental cultivations at Johore Bahru but was discharged in the following year for incompetence.

cocoa and coffee arabica practically ceased, and in the next
twelve years about half the estates grew Liberian coffee alone
and the remainder diversified with pepper and spices. The
industry reached its peak in 1896; at that time Johore was
the second largest coffee producer on the Peninsula and the
value of the year's exports to the Straits Settlements amounted
to $129,470. After 1896 the industry declined rapidly as
a result of the depressed state of the world market. By 1901
half the plantations had gone out of production and the annual
exports had fallen in value to $43,771.

The demographic pattern and the forms of industry which became
established in Johore during the nineteenth century had a
profound influence on the system of governing the country and
on the ruler's relations with the British Power. The
comparatively small size of the Malay population in the first
half of the century, and the fact that there was strongly
organised hierarchy of territorial chiefs, enabled the ruler
to extend his authority over the country and establish organs

82 Straits Directory, 1883, 1886, 1897. In 1896 the total
acreage under cultivation was about 8,300 acres. Of this 4,400
acres belonged to Syed Mohamed bin Ahmad al-Sagof, who owned
61,120 of the approximately 75,000 acres then held under
plantation lease.

83 In 1896 Johore exported 3,664 pkls of coffee (worth $129,470)
to the Straits Settlements. Selangor, the largest Peninsular
producer, exported 6,796 pkls. See S.S. Returns of Imports and
Exports, 1896. The area under coffee in Johore at this time
amounted to about 2,000 or 2,200 acres. See Straits Directory,
1897.

84 Straits Directory, 1901; S.S. Returns of Imports and Exports,
1901.
of centralised administration with little or no local opposition. Similarly, the fact that the Malay population was small and concentrated in only a few of the country's many rivers enabled the Chinese plantation industry to spread over a wide area with, initially, comparatively little contact with or disruption of the life of the Malay communities. In the latter half of the century, with the influx of large numbers of Malaysians and the spread of gambier and pepper planting into the predominantly Malaysian region north of Batu Pahat, contact between the races increased and friction began to develop. Nevertheless, the corporate life of the two communities continued virtually in isolation into the twentieth century. Malays and Chinese were seldom in economic competition with one another; and, in contrast to the situation in the mining states, the Chinese population was engaged in an agricultural enterprise which could be carried on almost anywhere where there was land, wood, and water; as a result, the population became dispersed over a wide area, competition for the control of natural resources did not develop and the growth of secret society rivalries was easily checked. For these reasons the problem of preventing or putting down inter-communal violence did not arise in Johore, and the presence of a large Chinese population, never presented a serious challenge to the ruler's authority.

The ruler's close relationship with the British in the latter half of the century arose in the first place from the intimate economic connection between Johore and Singapore. In a very real sense Johore was an economic dependency of Singapore.
The gambier and pepper plantations were largely financed by Chinese merchants in Singapore, most of the produce of the country was marketed in Singapore and a great deal of food and almost all other consumer goods were imported from Singapore. The value of this trade was considerable and contributed significantly to the prosperity of leading Chinese and European merchant houses in the latter half of the century. For this reason the Straits Government took a keen interest in its protection and in the general development of the neighbouring territory.

With the development of gambier and pepper planting the proprietary rights of concessionaires, produce farmers and planters became the subject of a maze of transactions of daunting intricacy. The whole of the concessionaire's rights (the hak perniaga'lan) or shares in them could be leased out, mortgaged, or sold. Similarly the rights over the plantations of both owners and produce farmers could be leased, mortgaged, or sold. The possibilities for dispute arising out of these transactions posed problems of an administrative nature for which the ruler was eventually obliged to seek a solution. This involved the institution of agencies for the record, regulation and adjudication of the activities of all those engaged in the plantation industry. As a result bureaucratic government became established in Johore. The first moves in this direction were made in the second half of the 1850s, when an administrative centre, comprising a police organisation, a court and a secretariat, was set up at Iskandar Putri (Johore Bahru).
In the following decade this organisation was enlarged in size and scope, and technical arms - notably Survey and Public Works Departments - were added. By the mid-1870s the administrative system had been developed to the point where the needs of the gambier and pepper planting interests were largely satisfied, and the requirements of the Straits authorities, who were concerned to protect the life, liberty and property of British subjects in the country, were met.

A new phase in the development of the system of government commenced with the establishment of the coffee planting industry in the 1880s. The planting of coffee and associated crops never achieved real economic importance in Johore. Nevertheless it did have considerable political importance and led to changes in the administrative system. Although comparatively few plantations were actually formed, over 120 leases were issued during the 1880s - almost all to Europeans. This had two important consequences. In the first place it increased the desire of local British officials to extend the Residential system, which was already operating in Perak, Selangor and parts of Negri Sembilan, to Johore. Secondly, it obliged the ruler to introduce public amenities, particularly in the field of communications, which were necessary to attract European planters and also to prevent the rise of a demand amongst them for British administration.
CHAPTER 6

JOHORE AND THE STRAITs SETTLEMENTS

DURING the first half of the nineteenth century, when Johore was still an undeveloped and sparsely populated territory of little or no importance, the proximity of the country to the British Settlement of Singapore, and the fact that its rulers resided on Singapore, presented few problems for the British authorities. But with the extension of the Singapore gambier and pepper planting industry to the southern districts of Johore after 1845, a process which involved large-scale colonisation by Chinese from Singapore and the creation of close economic ties between planting interests in Johore and Chinese merchants in the Settlement, a variety of administrative and political problems arose. Arrangements had to be made for the protection of the Singapore excise farms, which were vulnerable to smuggling from Johore, for the protection of the persons and property of British subjects in Johore, for the extradition of fugitives, and for the delimitation and policing of a convenient border between the two territories. In addition, there were problems arising out of the fact that the ruler of Johore resided on Singapore.

The way was cleared for a general administrative and political settlement between the Straits Government and the ruler of Johore by the Johore Treaty of 1855, which annulled the 1824
Treaty provision whereby the Sultan and the Temenggong were recognised as joint rulers and enabled the British to deal with the Temenggong as sole and sovereign ruler of the country. A satisfactory modus vivendi was eventually arrived at in the 1860s, during the governorship of Colonel Orfeur Cavenagh. In the meantime, during the governorship of Edmund Blundell (1855-59), the Government's relations with the Temenggong were marred by a series of sterile disputes which achieved nothing.

WHEN Blundell took over the administration of the Government the Temenggong's position on Singapore was a most unusual one. Although permanently domiciled in the Settlement Ibrahim enjoyed a foreign potentate's exemption from the jurisdiction of the local courts. This was a most extraordinary privilege, the legal basis of which was Article V of the 1824 Treaty, which provided that the Sultan and Temenggong were to be treated with 'all honours, respect, and courtesy belonging to their rank and station whenever they may reside at, or visit, the Island of Singapore'. In practice, however, Ibrahim's privileges extended far beyond personal exemption from the

1 In 1829 the Resident Councillor at Singapore asked for a ruling as to whether Temenggong Abdul Rahman's successor should be considered exempt from the jurisdiction of the local courts in virtue of the provisions of the 1824 Treaty. The question at issue was whether the successor inherited the 'full honour and dignity' of the late Temenggong, since he did not receive the full pension granted under the terms of the Treaty. The Resident Councillor's opinion was that since immunity had already been conceded to the Sultan it should also be allowed to the Temenggong even if the courts were in fact entitled to exercise jurisdiction. See SSR AA-1, R.C. Singapore to Sec. Govt, 28 Oct. 1829.
Law of the land. With the tacit consent of the British authorities, he exercised virtual extra-territorial jurisdiction over his followers on the island despite the fact that they were almost all British subjects by birth or domicil. In many ways life went on for the Telok Belanga Malays as though Singapore had never been ceded to the British and the Temenggong was still the ruler of the land; Ibrahim's followers were still bound by the traditional bond of fealty; slavery, and most probably also debt-bondage, still existed, runaways were pursued through the Settlement, and the chief held court at Telok Belanga to try offences against his own authority.

2 Such a case occurred in 1855, when the Temenggong sent 30 armed men to seize a runaway slave girl who had been a servant in his household for three years. Apparently her relatives made no attempt to get her back during this time. When the matter did come to the notice of the authorities no formal action was taken. Instead, the Resident Councillor, Church, called in the Temenggong's son and settled the matter with him. There were still slaves in and about the Temenggong's establishment at Telok Belanga in 1864, and probably at a much later date. See Buku Peringatan Keraja'an, 19 Rabeal Akhir 1281 (20 Sept. 1864) and 21 Rabeal Akhir 1281 (22 Sept. 1864).

3 Followers of the Temenggong accused of serious crimes involving the person and property of British subjects were handed over to the local authorities on demand. In other cases the Temenggong exercised extensive judicial and executive powers with the tacit consent of the British. According to Tawarikh Dato' Bentara Luar (p. 73), he was permitted to try followers at Telok Belanga for offences concerning Johore other than those carrying the death penalty, which were supposed to be tried in his own dominions. So far as is known, no formal process of extradition was involved in their removal from Singapore. Malay followers of the Temenggong might be seized in any part of the Settlement and transported to Johore for execution without reference to the British. There is also evidence that offenders were kept in confinement at Telok Belanga, at least for short periods.
In the 1830s and early 1840s, before the development of the gambier and pepper planting industry in Johore, Ibrahim's regime at Telok Belanga was comparatively unobtrusive and caused no real embarrassment to the Government. But with the rise of the plantation industry, and the Temenggong's own rise to wealth and power, Telok Belanga became conspicuously the capital and administrative centre of a ruler's dominions, the source from which orders went out to subjects and servants within and without the Settlement, and the scene of a variety of activities which involved the exercise of sovereign power. Throughout Butterworth's governorship the existence of this princely establishment on British soil continued to be tolerated; in fact, the Government was glad to make use of the Temenggong's power and influence, not only to put down piracy on the high seas—which involved the sanction of war preparations at Telok Belanga—but also as an unofficial extension of its own institutions for maintaining law and order within the Settlement. Butterworth placed such a high value on Ibrahim's cooperation that he sanctioned the maintenance of a military force at Telok Belanga and even provided an N.C.O. from the Singapore garrison to teach the British drill.  

Ibrahim was also regarded as a useful agent for the recovery of escaped convicts and other fugitives who fled to Johore

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4 Temenggong to Gov., 11 Dec. 1858, in Letter Book of His Highness the Maharajah. About the same time, and for the same reason, the Singapore Volunteer Force was formed. See Buckley, An Anecdotal History, p. 606.
or the neighbouring states with whose rulers the Temenggong was on friendly terms. This use of the Temenggong's power and influence was generally regarded by the European business community as contrary to due process of law. In 1846, for instance, when an absconding debtor who had been seized by the Yamtuan Muda at Riau and kept in confinement at Telok Belanga, was handed over to the Sheriff's bailiff, the *Singapore Free Press* condemned the arrest as 'illegal and improper', adding,

> It is only another instance to be added to the many which exist, of the undue power and control exercised by this native chieftain in Singapore and the adjacent islands belonging to the British Crown, where we find not only the Penghulus and other functionaries holding their appointments from the Telok Belanga Court, but the inhabitants impressed with a vivid and lively idea of their allegiance to the Temenggong, while their knowledge of the Supremacy of the English Government is of the faintest and most evanescent description.5

Hostility towards the Temenggong's regime at Telok Belanga grew with the rise of a strong movement of opposition to the authoritarianism and arbitrariness of the Straits Government. In the eyes of the European merchants who led this movement the Temenggong's extraordinary position on the island, and the use made of his power and influence by the local authorities, epitomized the Government's disregard for due process of law and the rights of the subject. Hostility to the Temenggong, the Governor's protege was very largely an expression of opposition to the Government. Just at the time when criticism of the Government reached a peak, however, the Temenggong fell out with the local authorities and as a result the

5 *Singapore Free Press*, 26 Nov. 1846.
attitude of the mercantile community softened towards him. The change is reflected in the editorial opinion of the local press. Up to the late 1850s the *Singapore Free Press* and the *Straits Times* were generally critical of the Temenggong's pirate associations, his position on Singapore, and the irregular use made of his influence by the local authorities. Both papers thought that Tengku Ali should be recognised as Sultan and both opposed the Government's efforts to effect a settlement which would eliminate the royal house from the government of Johore. In 1855 the *Singapore Free Press* described the Johore Treaty as an act of great injustice. Three years later, however, it supported the Temenggong wholeheartedly in his dispute with the Straits Government over the Pahang war. Thereafter it often took the Johore ruler's part against the British authorities. The *Straits Times* was virulent in谴责 the Johore Treaty and the Temenggong's participation in the intervention in Pahang up to 1861, when, having

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6 The *Singapore Free Press* was published as a weekly from 1835 until 1868. During this period it was edited by William Napier (1835-46) and Abraham Logan (1946-68), who were also proprietors. Logan was sole proprietor from 1848 until 1868. The paper was revived as a weekly in 1884 and became a daily in 1887. From 1860 or 1861, when Logan became a legal adviser to the Temenggong, and again from 1884 until 1895, the paper was closely connected with associates of the ruler of Johore. In this latter period two of the five joint proprietors were Thomas Shelford, a partner in Paterson, Simons & Co., the ruler's business agents, and C.B. Buckley, a member of the firm of Rodyk & Davidson, the ruler's legal advisers. Buckley was also editor for some time after 1884 (probably until it became a daily), and was later (from 1898 until 1909) financial adviser to the Government of Johore.
apparently come to the conclusion that the Temenggong's regime was in the interests of stability in the southern states, it too went over to supporting him.\(^7\) By this time the Temenggong was receiving legal advice from former critics who were now only too pleased to accept fat fees for the opportunity to tilt at the Government on his behalf.\(^8\) Not all the Temenggong's

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\(^7\) This change may have been related to a change of editorship. In 1861 the original editor (and founder), R.C. Woods, was succeeded by John Cameron, who shortly afterwards bought the paper and remained as editor until 1867. Cameron was a man of more moderate opinions than Woods, who is best remembered for his persecution of Raja Brooke. Under the editorship of Cameron and his successors the *Times* was generally well disposed towards the ruler of Johore though it never became, like the *Free Press*, a mouthpiece for the Johore lobby in Singapore.

\(^8\) This was certainly true of Abraham Logan and William Napier, who had both, as editors of the *Singapore Free Press*, been critical of the Temenggong. So far as is known, Napier was the Temenggong's first legal adviser, and acted in this capacity from the latter half of 1855 until his retirement from the East in 1859. As editor of the *Free Press* he had, on one occasion at least, inveighed against the Temenggong for his pirate associations (see *Singapore Free Press*, 25 May 1843). As the Temenggong's lawyer he composed letters whose tone gave great offence to Governor Blundell (see SSR V-24, Gov. to Temenggong, 5 Feb. 1858). Logan, who advised the Temenggong from 1860 or 1861 until 1867, frequently attacked him in the *Free Press* before 1858. His change of attitude in that year was probably related to the campaign which he and his brother, the editor of the *Penang Gazette*, were carrying on against Blundell (see Constance Turnbull, 'Governor Blundell and Sir Benson Maxwell: a conflict of personalities', *JMBRAS* vol. 30 pt 1 (1957), pp. 134-63, and 'Communal Disturbances in the Straits Settlements in 1857', *JMBRAS* vol. 31 pt 1 (1958), pp. 94-144). Logan in fact seems to have become a supporter of the Temenggong very largely out of opposition to the Governor.
opponents changed sides, however. Some, like W.H. Read, had connections with the royal house, which continued to find support in the European mercantile community for another quarter-century. Others, who viewed the Temenggong's rise to wealth, power, and position with a jaundiced eye, were probably motivated by nothing more than jealousy and spite.

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9 William Henry McLeod Read, CMG (1886), was born in 1819 and arrived in Singapore in 1841. He joined the firm of A.L. Johnston & Co., of which he became a partner. Throughout his time in Singapore Read took a leading part in public life. He was Deputy Chairman of the Singapore Chamber of Commerce in 1847-48, 1868, 1869, and 1870, and Chairman in 1860, 1866, and 1867. He was an honorary Police Magistrate from 1862 to 1867, a J.P. from 1867 to 1885, a member of the Municipal Council from about 1865 to 1875, and President of the Council from 1875 to 1880. From 1867 until 1880 he was senior unofficial member of the Legislative Council of the Straits Settlements. Read also developed extensive commercial interests and political connections in the Malay states. In 1866 he headed, with Tan Kim Ching, one of the leading Chinese merchants of Singapore, a syndicate which leased the revenues of the Klang district from the Sultan of Selangor. Later, to preserve and extend his business interests in Selangor, he backed Tengku Zia'u'd-din, the 'viceroy' of Selangor, against Raja Mahdi and his associates. Probably Read's connection with the Singapore branch of the old royal house of Johore, which began about 1853, also originated as a business speculation. After the conclusion of the Johore Treaty, or at least by the early 1860s, it must have become clear that Ali would never be able to reward him with concessions in Johore. Read enjoyed his role of confidant and adviser to Malay chiefs, however, and continued to interest himself in the affairs of the royal house despite the hopelessness of its position. In 1862 he was nominated, with the lawyer J.G. Davidson, to wind up the Kampong Glam estate on the Sultan's behalf. After Ali's death he took a leading part in the move to prevent Muar from falling into the hands of the ruler of Johore. Disclosures concerning his conduct over this led to his resignation from the Legislative Council in 1880. In 1887 he retired from the East.

10 See ch. 8, p. 326

11 Butterworth attributed much of the hostility towards the Temenggong to feelings of this kind. See SSR R-25, Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 122, 31 Dec. 1853.
The views of those who felt that Ibrahim had been made too much of by Butterworth found expression in the administration of his successor, Edmund Blundell. Blundell had clashed with the Temenggong in 1852 when, as Acting Governor, he attempted to settle the Johore dispute. At that time he had stated his belief that whoever was recognised as sovereign of Johore should be obliged to quit Singapore, surrender his land reserve in accordance with the terms of the 1824 Treaty, and give up his allowance from the East India Company.\textsuperscript{12} Now that the Temenggong, with whom he was completely out of sympathy, had been so recognised Blundell was determined to destroy his position on Singapore and pack him off to his own dominions. One of his first acts as Governor was to put an end to the drilling of the Temenggong's bodyguard at Telok Belanga.\textsuperscript{13} During the next four years he took issue with Ibrahim over a number of matters, including his military operations and political activities on the Peninsula, his use of force against his dependents on Singapore, and his leasing of parts of the Telok Belanga reserve without the consent of the Government.

In view of Blundell's determination to drive him out of the Settlement, it was most fortunate for the Temenggong, firstly that he was supported by the shrewd advice of prominent members of the European business community, and secondly, that his

\textsuperscript{12} SSR R-24, Ag Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 79A, 20 July 1852.
\textsuperscript{13} Temenggong to Gov., 11 Dec. 1858, in Letter Book of His Highness the Maharajah.
adversary did not have the confidence of the Supreme Government. Blundell's appointment as Governor followed a directive from the Directors of the East India Company in London and did not represent the choice of the Calcutta authorities, who accorded little weight to his opinions and often ignored his most urgent representations. Some of Blundell's proposals concerning Johore and its ruler could have served no useful purpose, and his action in bringing them forward merely confirmed the Indian authorities in their low opinion of his judgment and put them on their guard against measures which appeared to be directed against the Temenggong out of malice. From the point of view of the Straits Government, however, much of Blundell's policy made sense. It was clear, for instance, that the time had passed when the Temenggong could be allowed to rule at Telok Belanga as though he were in his own dominions. But the manner in which Blundell pursued his objectives, and the fact that reasonable objectives were often coupled with unreasonable demands, alienated the Temenggong and lost Blundell whatever support the Indian authorities might otherwise have been prepared to give him.

A contributing factor to the bad relations between the Temenggong and the Governor was the Temenggong's arrogance, particularly as this showed in his letters to the Governor. For example, in March 1856 Blundell requested him to investigate the murder and robbery of a Chinese by Malays in the vicinity
Ibrahim's reply, which was delayed for two months, was couched in terms which were bound to offend the Governor. After referring grandly to 'my settlement on this island' and 'persons owing obedience to me', he dismissed the implication that the murderers were to be found among his own followers. 'The Malay inhabitants of Teluk Blangah', he blandly observed, 'are so well aware...of the means I possess of obtaining information of their proceedings and the inevitable consequence of their being handed over to be dealt with by English law, if discovered to be engaged in any such nefarious enterprise as the one in question, that I see no cause to believe that this attack was made by any among them'. Perhaps, he suggested, the marauders came from the Riau islands.

This was simply one in a series of incidents which convinced Blundell that the Temenggong was not prepared to cooperate with the Straits Government. In September 1855 a clash occurred over Ibrahim's preparations to send a force to Muar to subjugate a district chief. Eventually the expedition set out in defiance of the Governor's prohibition. Blundell then applied to Calcutta for authority to convey to the Temenggong the Supreme Government's displeasure that 'the peace of the Malayan Peninsula should have been threatened by a Prince living at Singapore, where he enjoys safety and perfect immunity from all

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14 SSR V-20, Gov. to Temenggong, 26 March 1856.
15 Temenggong to Gov., 30 May 1856, in Letter Book of His Highness the Maharajah.
hostile attacks. On this occasion the Indian authorities acceded to his request. Subsequently, however, they ignored his appeals for authority to discipline the Temenggong. In June 1856 Blundell reported that British subjects were being molested in the Old Strait (the Johore Strait) and maltreated by the Temenggong's officials in Johore. He now stated that Ibrahim's residence on Singapore was inconsistent with the exercise of absolute authority in Johore, that he could, if he chose, put an end to lawlessness in the Old Strait, and that if he retired to his own dominions he might be able to govern them more effectively. A copy of this despatch was sent to the Temenggong, presumably with a view to intimidating him. Far from being put down, however, Ibrahim returned a vigorous rebuttal in which he denied that his residence on Singapore was inconsistent with the exercise of sovereign power in Johore and repudiated the suggestion that he was unwilling to cooperate with the Straits Government. By this time Blundell had fresh evidence of his malpractices. Four men and a woman (fugitives, presumably, from the Temenggong's household) had been seized by the Bendahara at Ibrahim's request and sent down in irons to

16 SSR R-28, Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 124, 8 Oct. 1855.
17 SSR S-22, Sec. Govt India to Gov., 4179, 28 Nov. 1855.
18 SSR R-30, Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 133, 22 Oct. 1856.
Telok Belanga, where they were kept in confinement until their release was procured by the Singapore authorities. In reporting this case to the Supreme Government, Blundell advanced the claim that the Temenggong was to all intents and purposes a British subject and liable to the jurisdiction of the Straits courts while he resided on the island. A few months later, in December 1856, he reiterated his view that the Temenggong's continued residence on Singapore was an embarrassment to the local authorities and a bar to the establishment of good government in Johore:

Almost daily experience strengthens my conviction that the residence as a simple citizen within the jurisdiction of the Courts of a Foreign Prince ruling the neighbouring country with unlimited power and enjoying a revenue now near a hundred thousand dollars p.a. is prejudicial to the interest of both countries. This comparatively enormous revenue is considered as a family perquisite and is enjoyed here in safety while but little of it is expended in Governmental purposes or in improving the resources of the country.\footnote{SSR R-30, Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 133, 22 Oct. 1856.}

The possession of the great income, Blundell added, gave the Temenggong an extensive influence on Singapore itself, 'for the judicious exercise of which there is unfortunately no security.' A year later, after the Temenggong's involvement in the Pahang war had further embroiled him with the Straits authorities, these same points were again put to the Indian Government in even more explicit and forceful terms:

\footnote{SSR R-30, Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 173, 21 Dec. 1856.}
The Tumongong of Johore, a chieftain receiving a large personal revenue, and enjoying an independent Autocratic Rule over a large Country, ought not to reside in Singapore as an ordinary British subject. His presence is embarrassing, his proceedings involve incessant complaints and recriminations, and his Revenue is not spent as it ought to be in the proper Government and improvement of his Country.22

To all these earnest representations, however, the Supreme Government returned no reply.

Closely associated with the Indian Government's refusal to give Blundell a definite ruling on the question of the Temenggong's continued residence on Singapore was their reluctance to support his attempts to check the alienation of the Telok Belanga land reserve. This had been assigned to Temenggong Abdul Rahman in 1823 for the accommodation of his family and dependents, and although Ibrahim exercised virtually complete control over its use, it was nevertheless considered by the Straits Government as a trust which he administered for the benefit of the whole family. Under the terms of the 1824 Treaty the whole reserve was liable to reversion to the East India Company in the event of the Temenggong removing permanently from Singapore. The Government accordingly held that no part of the reserve could be alienated without its consent. This condition led to difficulties in the 1850s, when, with the development of New Harbour as a dock area, Ibrahim began to dispose of waterfront sections to European commercial interests.

The first alienation of any importance was a lease in

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SSR R-32, Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 190, 18 Nov. 1857.
perpetuity to the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company. It was made in 1850 with the approval of Governor Butterworth, who appears to have waived the liability of the land to reversion under the terms of the 1824 Treaty; the only condition imposed by the Government, so far as is known, was that the premium paid by the P. & O. should be funded and invested for the benefit of the Temenggong's whole family. A much tougher policy was followed by Butterworth's successor. Blundell criticised the manner in which Butterworth had sanctioned the Temenggong's leases and opposed further alienations. As Acting Governor in 1852 he insisted on replacing the P. & O.'s informal lease with a Government grant and balancing this diminution of the reserve by making some of the Temenggong's personal property on the island liable to reversion. As Governor he tried to force the Temenggong out of Singapore and resume the Telok Belanga estate under the terms of the Treaty. In this way the Straits Government would have acquired for $15,000, the sum specified as compensation in the Treaty, property worth perhaps ten times that amount. The scheme failed because Blundell was unable to get permission to expel the Temenggong and because the Temenggong, who was well aware of

23 See AA-22, R.C. Singapore to Ag Gov., 11 May 1852. Butterworth appears to have left the Indian Govt in ignorance of this transaction. See SSR S-19, U-Sec. Govt India to Ag Gov. 272, 5 Aug. 1852.
24 SSR R-24, Ag Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 79A, 20 July 1852.
the Governor's intentions, pressed ahead with informal leases in defiance of the official prohibition. By the end of 1857 almost the whole of the Telok Belanga waterfront had been disposed of to business interests which counted on establishing some sort of prescriptive right before a serious move was made to dispossess them. Blundell made repeated representations to the Supreme Government in protest against this, but although the Indian authorities took the view that the Temenggong had no right to alienate parts of the reserve in perpetuity, they nevertheless declined to support Blundell's attempts to prevent further leases.

Blundell also clashed with the Temenggong over the letting of the Johore excise farms. Since 1846, when opium and spirits farms were first established in Johore, they had always been

26 SSR R-32, Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 190, 18 Nov. 1857.

27 SSR S-19, Sec. Govt India, 4721, 14 Dec. 1852; SSR R-32, Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 190, 18 Nov. 1857.

28 The Supreme Government was disinclined to take any firm decision on the Temenggong's reserve during Blundell's governorship. In 1856 Ibrahim made two requests for an absolute title to the Telok Belanga estate which were ignored. Permission to negotiate for the abrogation, on certain conditions, of the Treaty provisions concerning the reversion of the estate was eventually given in 1859, but the local authorities appear to have taken no action. See Temenggong to Gov., 2 Feb. 1856, 30 May 1856, 7 Oct. 1856, and 20 May 1859, in Letter Book of His Highness the Maharajah; CO 273/4, p. 265, Gov. to Temenggong, 16 May 1859; SSR R-30, Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 173, 21 Dec. 1856; SSR R-32, Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 190, 18 Nov. 1857; SSR R-33, Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 101, 28 July 1858; SSR R-39, Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 154, 4 Sept. 1861. For the eventual settlement of the Telok Belanga land question see p. 230 below.
leased to the holder of the same farms in Singapore. This arrangement was made at the insistence of the Straits authorities, who feared that the existence of separate monopolies would give rise to smuggling, to the detriment of the Singapore farms. However, neither the Straits Government nor the Temenggong was satisfied with the arrangement as it stood. Immediately after the conclusion of the Johore Treaty both sides began to press for a change. The Temenggong wanted to extricate himself from the existing arrangement, which virtually obliged him to accept any 'reasonable' offer which the successful bidder for the Singapore farms cared to make, and to obtain the true value of the Johore farms by putting them up for public auction. The Straits Government, on the other hand, feared that its own farms would suffer if the Temenggong's were let separately and sought a formal agreement to prevent this.

The Temenggong tried to dispose of the Johore farms by public auction in April 1855. This was prevented by the Governor, who took the opportunity to press for a treaty for the future disposal of the opium and spirit farms in conjunction with those of Singapore. Blundell's proposal was that the farms of the two territories should be permanently amalgamated, or

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29 Singapore Free Press, 7 Jan. 1847; Buckley, An Anecdotal History, p. 430; SSR R-28, Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 109, 1 Sept. 1855.
31 SSR BB-98, H.M. Simons to R.C. Singapore, 16 April 1855.
rather, that the Singapore farms should be extended to Johore and the Temenggong paid a proportion of the total proceeds.\(^3^2\)

This would have taken the letting of the Johore farms entirely out of the Temenggong's hands and would have obliged him to deal not with the farmers, upon whom, if they proved too unreasonable, it had always been possible to bring some sort of pressure to bear with the cooperation of the Straits Government, but with the Straits Government itself, whose financial interest would henceforth be in direct conflict with his own. However, Blundell was unable to get any real support from the Indian Government for this scheme,\(^3^3\) and with the assistance of his advisers, William Paterson of Ker, Rawson & Co. and the lawyer William Napier, the Temenggong was able to defeat the attempt to bind him for the future. Blundell's only success was in preventing the auction of the Johore farms at the end of the current twelve month term. In December 1856 an agreement was reached for the combined farms to be let for a period of three years, during which the Temenggong was to get only a slightly higher share than before.\(^3^4\) This, however, was

\(^3^2\) SSR U-29, Sec. Gov. to R.C. Singapore, 2 May 1855. Blundell also proposed to ban gambling in Johore and prevent the establishment of a gambling farm, which the Temenggong was known to be considering. All this was to be written into the excise treaty. See SSR R-28, Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 109, 1 Sept. 1855.

\(^3^3\) The Indian Gov. authorities no doubt regarded Blundell's plan as a step towards the absorption of Johore. His first request for permission to negotiate a treaty, in September 1855, was ignored. When permission was finally given in July of the following year, it was given most reluctantly. See SSR R-28, Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 109, 1 Sept. 1855, and SSR S-23, Sec. Govt India to Gov., 4030, 29 July 1856.

a minor success in comparison with the Temenggong's. If Blundell had managed to obtain an excise treaty the Straits Government would have acquired a permanent and direct interest in the finance of Johore, and a compelling precedent would have been created for the extension of British control to encompass other aspects of the Temenggong's administration.35

BLUNDELL'S relations with the Temenggong were characterised by a mixture of intransigence and weakness, and for this reason, very largely, he failed to make any real progress towards the settlement of the problems arising out of the government of Johore and the ruler's position on Singapore. The settlement of these problems to the satisfaction of the Straits authorities was the achievement of his successor, Orfeur Cavenagh, who, while he lacked Blundell's animus, acted towards the Temenggong with authority and decision. Cavenagh took a keen interest in the Temenggong's administration of Johore throughout his term as Governor; in particular, he was concerned to ensure that British subjects received fair treatment at the hands of the Temenggong and his officials in Johore. This question was gone into a great length in relation to a number of incidents which came to Cavenagh's notice during the early part of his governorship. As a result, important conditions were imposed on the trial of cases involving British subjects. In the

35 For the later history of the excise farms see ch. 8 p. 337 n. 91.
exchanges which led up to the imposition of these conditions there was never any suggestion that the Temenggong might be required to surrender jurisdiction over British subjects in his own territory. This was not the object of the British authorities. Their concern was to induce the Temenggong to establish forms and procedures for the administration of justice which conformed, in certain minimal respects at least, to those of the Straits Settlements.

Cavenagh's first clash with the Temenggong occurred within a few weeks of his arrival in the Straits Settlements. On 18 September 1859 about 1000 Chinese, including some 300 from Singapore, gathered at Sungai Palentong, a gambier and pepper growing district on the south coast of Johore, to celebrate the inauguration of a new joss house. On the following day the assembly was dispersed by an armed force under the command of the Temenggong's officials. During the melee a local Chinese was killed, several others were wounded, and two leaders of the Singapore Chinese were seized and carried off to prison. Other leaders escaped, however, and on reaching Singapore they complained to the British authorities. According to their story, the affray arose from the refusal of one of the Temenggong's officials to pay his gambling debts and it was this man's creditors who were now languishing in gaol at Iskandar Putri.36 Cavenagh immediately called upon the Temenggong to enquire into

the matter and, if the prisoners were found to have been wrongfully detained, to release them, compensate them for their injuries, and punish their aggressors. Ibrahim in reply declared that the men were leaders of the Ghi Ho secret society, which had lately been organising in Johore in defiance of official prohibition, that the purpose of their visit to Sungai Palentong had been to install local headmen, and that they had in fact been seized, along with several kegs of gunpowder, in the house of one of the newly-installed heads. To this Cavenagh replied that they should certainly be punished if the charges against them were substantiated, but that it was not right to gaol men for an indefinite period on a charge for which there was no direct evidence. To determine their guilt or innocence a formal investigation should be made and a careful record kept of all the evidence. A few weeks later Ibrahim reported that the prisoners had confessed and had been released on giving sureties that they would refrain from further secret society activity in Johore. After this nothing more was heard of the matter.

These exchanges were no more than a preliminary skirmish.

37 SSR V-27, Gov. to Temenggong, 23 Sept. 1859.
38 Temenggong to Gov., 4 Oct. 1859, in Letter Book of His Highness the Maharajah.
39 SSR V-27, Gov. to Temenggong, 8 Oct. 1859.
40 Temenggong to Gov., 15 Nov. 1859, in Letter Book of His Highness the Maharajah.
The real challenge to the Temenggong's methods of government came in 1861, when a whole series of incidents involving British subjects was brought to the attention of the Straits authorities. In one of these cases, which concerned the confinement of five Singapore Chinese at Iskandar Putri on a charge of fraudulent gambling, the nature of judicial proceedings in Johore was explored at some length. As the Governor understood the matter, the gamblers had been sentenced to remain in stocks until fines totalling $5000 had been paid. Cavenagh considered this a favourable opportunity to require, as a condition of his continued residence on Singapore, that the Temenggong accept regulations for the trial of British subjects which would provide for the attendance of a Straits officer, the maintenance of court records (which might be inspected by the Straits authorities) and the prohibition of punishments which were excessive or repugnant to British law. With this in mind, he informed the Temenggong that the penalties imposed on the gamblers were out of all proportion to their offence and were not in accordance with English or Islamic law, and that the Straits Government therefore required full particulars of their trial, including a transcript of proceedings and a copy of the law upon which judgment was based.

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41 SSR V-33, Gov. to Temenggong, 24 April 1861.
42 SSR R-39, Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 94, 12 June 1861.
43 SSR V-33, Gov. to Temenggong, 24 April 1861.
These demands produced an immediate defensive response, and there followed, in letters and interviews, a protracted duel in which the Temenggong (assisted by his legal adviser) sought to justify the proceedings at Iskandar Putri and the Governor tried to expose their defects. Cavenagh seized upon the elements of uncertainty and arbitrariness in the judicial process as these were revealed in successive statements by the Temenggong and his adviser. There was confusion over the amount of the fines. At first Cavenagh believed that each of the five prisoners had been fined $1000, a sum which he considered excessive and far beyond their ability to pay. The Temenggong denied this, stating that the fines had been only $200 each, but he omitted to mention that an order for the restitution of $1500, the sum claimed by the plaintiffs as their losses, had also been made. Later when this became known, the Governor naturally felt that he had been deceived. Again, the prison sentences were at first stated to be, in default of payment of the fines, two, three or more years, but when Cavenagh intimated that the British Government could hardly approve of indeterminate sentences it was then claimed that one-year sentences had been imposed in the first place.\textsuperscript{44} Cavenagh was also not satisfied from the transcript of evidence that the dice-box produced in court was in fact the one used by the defendants.\textsuperscript{45} To this

\textsuperscript{44} SSR R-39, Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 105, 28 June 1861.

\textsuperscript{45} SSR V-33, Gov. to Temenggong, 18 June 1861.
the Temenggong replied that it had been taken into custody by one of his officers who was present at the disturbance which led to the prisoners' arrest, and that their defence consisted of individual disclaimers of knowledge that the box was a false one.\(^46\) This was a good lawyer-like reply — no doubt it owed much to the legal adviser who composed Ibrahim's letters — but Cavenagh had now come to doubt the Temenggong's good faith. There were, he believed, discrepancies in the evidence which suggested the unlikelihood, if not the impossibility, of the plaintiffs having lost the sum claimed by them.\(^47\) Cavenagh's conclusion was that no formal investigation had ever been held and that the transcript of evidence was a 'mere fabrication',\(^48\) and in reporting on the case to the Indian Government he declared that there was no approach to any system of law in force in the Temenggong's dominions, the government of the country being completely despotic. This impression was confirmed in a personal meeting with the Temenggong's son, Abu Bakar, which took place in October 1861. After discussing other issues, Cavenagh notes,

\(^{46}\) Temenggong to Gov., 26 June 1861, in Letter Book of His Highness the Maharajah.

\(^{47}\) The main discrepancy involved dates in the Moslem calendar, according to which the day begins at nightfall. Cavenagh appears not to have realised this and hence misunderstood the whole of the evidence before him.

\(^{48}\) SSR R-39, Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 100, 18 June 1861, and 116, 17 July 1861.
I then referred to the case of some Chinamen who had been confined on a charge of gambling, remarking that although I did not wish to interfere with his authority, or to prevent criminals from being punished, I could not permit British subjects to be at the mercy of the caprice of any native chief, and, therefore, required them to be sentenced according to some known law. He asserted that the law in force was the Hukum-i-Sharrat (ecclesiastical law), according to which the Chinese might have had their hands cut off, and he had inflicted a more lenient punishment. I pointed out that the Hukum-i-Sharrat applied to all gamblers, and consequently that their accusers should have been punished also. Upon this he observed that Mahommedans who violated the Hukum-i-Sharrat would be punished by the Almighty, and consequently human punishment was unnecessary. To this I replied that, if so, the Chinese should not have been punished at all, as the Hukum-i-Sharrat was not applicable to unbelievers. He then changed his ground, and stated that they had been punished according to the Hukum-i-Aadut (common law), for cheating. I inquired whether he could furnish me with a copy of the rules prescribed by the Hukum-i-Aadut that I might become aware whether our subjects had broken any law, and if so, to what extent of punishment they had rendered themselves liable. He then confessed that there were no rules, and that the sentences were passed according to his own judgment. I told him that this was the very circumstance of which I complained; that there was no regularity or certainty about judicial proceedings in Johore, and that I could not allow persons under my charge to be punished according to his will.

Cavenagh's view of the nature of judicial proceedings in Johore had an important bearing on his attitude to other incidents which occurred in 1861, in which the principal point at issue was the extent of British and Johore jurisdiction in the waters between Singapore and the mainland. These incidents concerned the treatment of Singapore Chinese who fished in the off-shore shallows of south coast Johore and the neighbouring

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small islands. In the early 1860s more than a thousand Singapore Chinese were fishing in this area and clashes with the local Malays, who regarded them as interlopers, were fairly common. The Malays set fishing stakes in places which the fish were known to frequent; the Chinese, who used nets, then came along and tried to fish around them, to the great annoyance of the Malays. To preserve the peace, and also to safeguard the interests of his own subjects, the Temenggong introduced regulations in the 1850s to control the activities of the Chinese. Net fishermen were obliged to obtain passes to fish in Johore waters, they were forbidden to approach within 50 fathoms of any fishing stakes on pain of seizure, and the Temenggong's officials at Pengarang and elsewhere were empowered to impose fines and impound the property of transgressors.50

These regulations appear to have been enforced without protest until 1861, when some Johore Malays were tried in Singapore for the murder of eight Singapore Chinese at Pulau Tinggi, an East Coast island under the Temenggong's rule.51 This trial demonstrated what the Chinese had never really believed before— that the Straits Government was prepared to take forceful action on their behalf against the ruler of

50 Temenggong to Gov., 8 Aug. 1861, in Letter Book of His Highness the Maharajah.
51 According to the Straits authorities the offences had been 'condoned' by an official of the Temenggong, who had imposed a fine of $15 on the murderers. See Temenggong to Gov., 23 April 1861, in Letter Book of His Highness the Maharajah; SSR V-33, Gov. to Temenggong, 25 April 1861; CO 273/5, p. 401, Gov. to Sec. Govt 'India, 125, 22 July 1861.
Johore and his subjects. As a result, the Singapore fishermen were encouraged to carry their grievances to the local authorities. When these were investigated it soon became apparent that the Temenggong was exercising an extensive authority over islands and waters which were British under the terms of the Treaty of 1824.

The Treaty of 1824 provided for the cession of Singapore island and the 'adjacent seas, straits, and islets' within a distance of 10 geographical miles from the line of the Singapore coast in all directions. The purpose of this stipulation was to give the British command of the main channel south of Singapore, and to enable them to take action to prevent the neighbouring islands from being used as pirate bases. It had the curious effect, however, of bringing the border with Johore right up to the low-water mark on the Johore side throughout the entire length of the Old Strait and in the entrance to the Johore river. That these waters were in fact British under the terms of the Treaty seems to have been almost completely forgotten between 1824 and 1861. During this time official maps showed the boundary as a line running down the middle of the channel and responsibility for policing the Old Strait was shared between the Temenggong and the Singapore authorities.52

52 In 1856 the Temenggong agreed to contribute half the cost of maintaining two large armed cutters in the Old Strait. In 1860 or 1861, on the Temenggong's suggestion, these were replaced by armed sampans, which were cheaper and more efficient. The cutters were then bought by the Temenggong for his own use. See Tarling, Piracy and Politics, p. 214, and Temenggong to R.C. Singapore, 12 Dec. 1861, in Letter Book of His Highness the Maharajah.
Nor was this all. In practice the Temenggong exercised authority not only over the waters of the Old Strait but also over Singapore's off-shore islands, where he regularly appointed penghulus and made grants of land in complete independence of the Straits authorities. When this came to Cavenagh's notice steps were immediately taken to assert the authority of the Government over all the islands and all the water within ten miles of the Singapore coast.

The Temenggong made no effort to oppose the establishment of the Government's authority in the off-shore islands, which were clearly British under the terms of the 1824 Treaty. What he did dispute was the claim to jurisdiction over all the waters between Johore and Singapore. Cavenagh had several reasons for pressing this awkward claim. In the first place he wished to re-establish all the rights of the Government which had been encroached upon by the Temenggong since the cession of Singapore. More specifically, he wanted jurisdiction over the waters around Singapore in order to facilitate the suppression of piracy and to prevent the Temenggong from imposing taxes on British subjects fishing in the waters between Singapore and Johore. Nevertheless, Cavenagh had no intention of assuming complete responsibility for the maintenance of law and order on the Johore side.

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53 CO 273/5, extract from R.C. Singapore to Gov., 15 Sept. 1856, R.C. Singapore to Sec. Gov., 11 July 1861, and Memorandum of Surveyor General [1861], encl. in Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 125, 22 July 1861.

54 CO 273/5, Sec. Gov. to R.C. Singapore, 13 July 1861; SSR U-33, Sec. Gov. to R.C. Singapore, 1 Sept. 1861.
While claiming exclusive jurisdiction, and thereby denying the Temenggong the right to deal with incidents involving British subjects without reference to the Straits Government, he was content to exercise ultimate authority. Cavenagh was in fact quite prepared to allow incidents involving British subjects in the Old Strait to be investigated at Iskandar Putri, provided that the proceedings were conducted in a manner which met with his approval. In this way, it was hoped, judicial procedures might be introduced into Johore in which the Straits Government could have some faith.

The British claim to jurisdiction over the Johore side of the Old Strait was argued at some length in relation to complaints against the Temenggong's official at Pengarang, who was responsible for enforcing the fishing regulations in the neighbouring waters. One of the Chinese fishermen claimed that this official had detained him overnight and confiscated his nets for refusing to pay $10 for the privilege of fishing in Johore waters. Cavenagh demanded that this complaint should be fully investigated, at the same time reiterating his view that the waters between Singapore and Johore were British.55 To this the Temenggong replied that he saw no reason for formal proceedings against his servant, whom he believed to be quite innocent of oppression, that the Chinese had been taken in the act of transgressing the fishing regulations after repeated

55 CO 273/5, p. 405, Gov. to Temenggong, 13 July 1861, encl. in Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 125, 22 July 1861.
warnings, and that he might, if he wished, bring his case before the court at Iskandar Putri. Ibrahim then entered into a detailed rebuttal of the British claim to jurisdiction over the Johore side of the Old Strait. The general terms of the 1824 Treaty, he maintained, had never been intended 'to deprive the independent Territory of Johore of nearly fifty miles of its own Seaboard', and no previous Governor had so construed them. Moreover, the signatories had no power to cede possession of the sea, which was the common property of all nations, and it therefore followed that the provision for the cession of adjacent islands and waters operated as a cession of the islands, together with such rights over the surrounding waters as were conferred by the law and custom of nations:

We understand this law and custom to be that when a narrow sea lies between two independent States, the jurisdiction and rights of each extend to the centre or middle line of such narrow sea, and such according to our understanding is the case with the Strait between our Territory of Johore and the Island of Singapore.

Ibrahim also referred to the difficulties and anomalies which would arise from the adoption of the Governor's interpretation. Opium and spirits could not be moved from the capital to the gambier and pepper districts of the south coast without passing through British jurisdiction and thereby infringing the excise laws of the Straits Settlements; furthermore, the ruler of Johore would be deprived of jurisdiction over all anchorages and harbours on the south coast and ships loading or discharging
cargo at Iskandar Putri, where the jetty extended beyond the low-water mark, would be beyond his control.56

These arguments eventually caused the Indian Government to modify slightly the position adopted by the Governor. In the meantime, however, they upheld his interpretation of the Treaty in its entirety and instructed him to defend the rights of the British Government, 'especially in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, and where the injured parties were British Subjects who are not likely to get justice at the hands of the Tumongong'.57 Cavenagh then informed the Temenggong that he would not be permitted to demand payment for fishing licences and that due reparation would be required for injuries to British subjects.58 Argument continued, however, on the question whether the exactions complained of had occurred above or below the low-water mark. Eventually, and reluctantly—for they suspected trickery—the British agreed to a mixed delegation to decide this question on the spot.

By this time the Governor’s relations with the Temenggong were thoroughly bedevilled by mutual suspicion and misunderstanding. On both sides there was a tendency to consider incidents involving the subjects of each as tests of their own authority. The Governor regarded judicial proceedings in Johore as a farce and was determined to uphold the rights of British subjects who fell

56 Temenggong to Gov., 8 Aug. 1861, in Letter Book of His Highness the Maharajah.
57 CO 273/5, p. 400, U-Sec. Govt India to Gov., 4580, 16 Aug. 1861.
58 SSR V-33, Gov. to Temenggong, 1 Sept. 1861.
into the hands of the Temenggong's officials. The Temenggong, on the other hand, regarded the demands of the British as an assault upon his sovereignty. There was also, on the Governor's side, a tendency to jump to conclusions which were unfair to the Temenggong,59 and on the Temenggong's a wiliness in parrying enquiries which angered the Governor. What annoyed Cavenagh more than anything, perhaps, was the knowledge that but for the 'clever legal practitioner by whom His Highness' letters are penned', most of the questions at issue could be swiftly settled to the satisfaction of the Straits authorities. Cavenagh believed, with some reason perhaps, that the Temenggong had fallen into the hands of European advisers whose sole object was to benefit themselves:

Were His Highness free to act in accordance with his own inclinations, I really believe that he would be perfectly willing to be guided by the advice of the Local Authorities, but it is of course to the interest of those about him to prevent his seeking such advice, and to induce him to leave the management of his affairs entirely in their hands...60

Cavenagh therefore decided to side-step the lawyers and deal directly with the Temenggong and his son.

Cavenagh's first personal meeting with the Temenggong's son took place towards the end of September 1861, on board the steamer which bore the delegation to Pengarang to decide the case of the fishermen who complained of ill-treatment at the hands of the Temenggong's official. Cavenagh describes the meeting in his memoirs:

59 See n. 47 above.
60 SSR R-39, Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 167, 21 Sept. 1861.
I took the opportunity of pointing out to him the injudiciousness of the course his father had been pursuing, as, although I was anxious to show him every kindness, I could not allow our subjects to be ill-treated. He acknowledged this, and stated that he and his father were much grieved at having incurred the displeasure of the British Government, and were desirous of meeting my wishes. I asked, if this was the case, why instead of writing improper letters, he or his father did not come to the resident councillor or myself to offer a verbal explanation on any point on which there might be disagreement? He said that he would be very glad to adopt this course, which he was not previously aware that I would sanction; that his father was often ignorant of the contents of the letters to which he attached his seal, and for the preparation of which he sometimes paid 2,000 or 3,000 dollars.61

This meeting was a turning point in Cavenagh's relations with the ruler of Johore. Abu Bakar deferred gracefully to the Governor's opinions, Cavenagh was favourably impressed by the demeanour of the young prince ('A few earnest but kindly words of counsel convinced him that he would always find a good friend and adviser in the Governor...'), and a friendly personal relationship was established between them. The first result of this detente was the settlement of the various disputes then going on over the ill-treatment of British subjects in Johore.62

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61 Cavenagh, Reminiscences of an Indian Official, p. 312.
62 The fishing dispute was soon settled. On viewing the spot where the Chinese had been seized Abu Bakar immediately admitted that the Johore authorities were in the wrong and made arrangements for the return of the nets which had been detained. (See SSR R-40, Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 183, 16 Oct. 1861). Two months later the Chinese imprisoned at Iskandar Putri for fraudulent gambling were released. (See SSR R-40, Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 211, 12 Dec. 1861).

Another dispute which was settled at this time concerned the plunder of a Straits Chinese vessel and the murder of several crew members by Malays at Padang, on the Johore side of the Muar river. After some hedging the Temenggong put several suspects...
This was followed, after some time, by a general settlement of problems relating to the government of Johore and the ruler's position on Singapore. Cavenagh's object in settling these matters was to provide for the future protection of British subjects in Johore and to bring about the Temenggong's withdrawal from Singapore without losing control over his foreign relations.

British control over the Temenggong's foreign relations arose out of the terms of the Treaty of 1824, which provided that he was to enter into no foreign alliance and maintain no correspondence with foreign rulers without the consent of the East India Company so long as he resided on Singapore or drew a pension from the Company. This restriction became extremely irksome to the Temenggong when differences arose with the Straits Government over his participation in the Pahang war. In January 1861, therefore he announced his intention of relinquishing
his allowance from the Government.\(^{63}\) A few months later he re-opened negotiations for the abrogation of the articles of the 1824 Treaty which provided for the reversion of the Telok Belanga estate.\(^{64}\) The British authorities now found themselves in something of a dilemma. Ibrahim's purpose was clear enough. He wished to prepare against the day when he or his successor might find it convenient to escape British control by formally withdrawing from the British Settlement. The Straits authorities were naturally anxious to retain their control over the Temenggong's foreign relations. On the other hand they also wanted to see the ruler of Johore settled in his own dominions, the more so since a recent judgment in the Recorder's Court had established, for the time being, the principle that as a resident of the Straits Settlements he was amenable to the jurisdiction of the local courts for acts committed in Johore in his capacity as sovereign ruler of the country.\(^{65}\)

The continuance of British control over the Temenggong's foreign relations was provided for by the Johore-Pahang Treaty of June 1862, the terms of which were agreed to in draft by the Governor in December of the preceding year.\(^{66}\) Cavenagh's

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\(^{63}\) Ibrahim merely renounced a personal share in the family allowance, which continued to be paid to other members of the family during their lifetime. See Temenggong to R.C. Singapore, 22 Jan. and 16 March 1861, in Letter Book of His Highness the Maharajah; SSR R-38, Gov. to U-Sec. Govt India, 46, 25 March 1861; SSR S-30, Sec. Govt India, 331, 5 April 1862.

\(^{64}\) Aitken to R.C. Singapore, 15 July 1861, in Letter Book of Highness the Maharajah.

\(^{65}\) SSR R-38, Gov. to U-Sec. Govt India, 2, 3 Jan. 1861.

\(^{66}\) See ch. 4, pp. 150-51.
first concern, however, was to ease the Temenggong's departure by agreeing to a generous settlement of the Telok Belanga land question. Negotiations for a settlement of this question had in fact been opened by the Temenggong in June 1861, and in December of the following year an agreement was signed which gave him an absolute title to the Telok Belanga estate on certain conditions.  

The settlement of these matters was not, however, followed by the complete withdrawal from Singapore which the British authorities had originally envisaged. Abu Bakar maintained a personal establishment at Iskandar Putri and often resided there, but Telok Belanga remained the family seat and the ruler himself moved between Telok Belanga, Iskandar Putri and other residences in Singapore. By now, however, the main objections to the Temenggong's presence in the Settlement had disappeared. He was no longer permanently domiciled as a British pensionary in British territory, it had been clearly established, by a ruling of the Government of India, that as a sovereign ruler he was beyond the jurisdiction of the Straits.

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67 The main condition was that parts of the estate were to be made over to the Government for the construction of roads, military installations, and a jetty. For the negotiations see Aitken to R.C. Singapore, 15 July and 23 July 1861, in Letter Book of His Highness the Maharajah; SSR U-43, Sec. Gov. to R.C. Singapore, 25 June, 17 July, and 26 July 1861; SSR R-39, Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 154, 4 Sept. 1861; SSR R-41, Gov. to Sec. Govt India, 91, 18 July 1862; SSR S-30, Sec. Govt India to Gov., 291, 25 March 1862, and 814, 30 Aug. 1862. For the text of the agreement of December 1862 see Maxwell and Gibson, Treaties and Engagements, pp 129-30.

68 SSR S-30, Sec. Govt India to Gov., 5 April 1862.
courts, and a serious start had now been made to shift the centre of his government to Johore.

The protection of British subjects in the Temenggong's dominions was provided for by judicial reforms which were introduced in 1862 and 1863 at the Governor's request. In May 1862 Abu Bakar accepted conditions for the trial of British subjects on charges of a serious nature which provided for British surveillance of the judicial process from the time of arrest until sentence was passed. The most important conditions were that a British officer should be in attendance at the trial of British subjects, that sentences should not be excessive or repugnant to English law, and that a transcript of the proceedings be furnished for the information of the Straits Government. In the following year a penal code was drawn up with the Governor's advice which specified maximum penalties for a variety of offences. Once these arrangements came into operation the Straits authorities dropped all opposition to the trial of British subjects in the Temenggong's court;

69 The term 'British subject' was used in the Straits Settlements to denote natural-born subjects, persons naturalised under the Indian Government's Act XXX of 1852, and persons who had acquired and retained the right of domicil in British territory. The latter was by far the largest class with which the Straits authorities were concerned. It was also the most difficult to determine.

70 See SSR W-47, Temenggong to Sec. Govt, 20 Aug. 1863, and encl.; SSR W-48, Temenggong to Sec. Govt, 28 Sept. 1863, and encl. entitled 'Criminal Laws of Johore'; SSR V-37, Sec. Govt to Temenggong, 26 Aug. 1863; SSR V-38, Sec. Govt to Temenggong, 9 Nov. 1863.
Cavenagh, in fact, was sufficiently well satisfied to allow the extradition of fugitive offenders—including British subjects—to Johore.\(^7\)

There still remained two unresolved questions which had a vital bearing on relations between Johore and the Straits Settlements. These were the meaning and interpretation of article XII of the Treaty of 1824, which bound the Temenggong to maintain 'free and unshackled' trade throughout his dominions, and the validity of article II, which ceded sovereignty over all the waters within ten miles of the Singapore coastline to the East India Company. The latter, a complex question, was first raised in 1861 in relation to the Temenggong's interference with British subjects fishing off the Johore coast. At that time the Supreme Government ruled that the cession of Johore's coastal waters under the terms of the Treaty was valid. There was, however, an important qualification to this. The Indian authorities specifically disclaimed jurisdiction over any port of Johore 'properly so called', including jetties extending beyond the low-water mark.\(^7\) This decision was received by the

\(^{71}\) The first extraditions in fact took place before the introduction of the penal code. See SSR U-46, Sec. Gov. to R.C. Singapore, 4 July 1863.

\(^{72}\) CO 273/15. Sec. Govt India to Gov., 140, 29 Nov. 1861, and encl., Opinion of Advocate-General to the Government of India, October 1861. The Advocate-General's opinion, which formed the basis of the Government's ruling, divided the waters within ten miles of the Singapore coast into three categories: (1) the territorial waters of Singapore and the off-shore islands, which extended for a distance of three miles from the coast of each of the islands; (2) the coastal waters of Johore, which also extended for a distance of three miles; (3) and other waters
Temenggong without comment and argument was suspended until 1864, when the question was again raised in relation to measures adopted by the Temenggong for the regulations of the gambier and pepper industry. During this controversy the Straits authorities also raised, for the first time so far as is known, the question of the Temenggong's obligation to maintain free and unshackled trade within his dominions.

In October 1864 101 Chinese merchants of Singapore petitioned the Governor in protest against an order of the Temenggong to remove their gambier and pepper businesses to Iskandar Putri, where they claimed, it had been decreed all gambier and pepper was to be handed over to the dealers in future. In taking this matter up with the Temenggong, Cavenagh pointed out that any such regulations would be a violation of article XII of the 1824 Treaty. To this the Temenggong replied that he had done no more than require the gambier and pepper boats to call at Iskandar Putri to obtain a pass or port clearance, that this measure was introduced to protect the interests of planters and dealers, that few plantations were so far from the capital that the requirement was burdensome, and that for their

within ten miles of the Singapore coastline. There was no question but that the waters in the first category were British as against all other nations. The Advocate-General's opinion was that those in the second category were also British as against the State of Johore and, less certainly, as against other nations, and that those in the third category were high seas.

73 SSR W-52, Petition of 101 Chinese Merchants, encl. in Sec. Chamber of Commerce to Sec. Govt. 3 Oct. 1864.
74 SSR V-41, Sec. Govt to Temenggong, 4 Oct. 1864.
convenience he was prepared to set up posts where passes could be obtained on payment of a fee. Cavenagh then stated that there would be no objection to the regulations so long as they were not compulsory; at the same time he pointed out that Johore officials who attempted to interfere with gambier and pepper boats in the Old Strait would lay themselves open to charges of piracy. In reply the Temenggong declared that no penalty would be imposed on vessels which did not call at Iskandar Putri. Cavenagh was at first inclined to accept this assurance, but the Chamber of Commerce, which was in close touch with the Government over the matter, was not satisfied and continued to press its views on the Government. Although no formal penalty might be imposed for failing to call at Iskandar Putri, coercive measures were bound to be taken to induce them to do so, the Chamber declared; furthermore, the Temenggong's real purpose was to shift the centre of the gambier and pepper trade to Johore and establish Iskandar Putri as the port of

75 Temenggong to Sec. Govt, 20 Oct. 1864, in Letter Book of His Highness the Maharajah.
76 SSR V-41, Sec. Govt to Temenggong, 22 Nov. 1864.
77 SSR W-52, Temenggong to Sec. Govt, 3 Dec. 1864.
78 The committee of the Chamber saw and commented on the Temenggong's letters and its rebuttals of arguments adduced by the Temenggong were usually passed on to the Temenggong. The real debate was in fact between the Temenggong and the Chamber. A curious aspect of this contest was that the correspondence of both parties was carried on by one man, Abraham Logan, who was legal adviser to the Temenggong and Secretary to the Chamber.
despatch for all the country's exports, to the great detriment of the trade of Singapore.79 Abu Bakar was now given to understand that if this was his intention, the Government would take steps to protect its own interests. Since British jurisdiction extended over all the waters between Johore and Singapore, Cavenagh declared, it was within the power of the Straits Government to impose heavy dues on ships resorting to Iskandar Putri or prohibit entirely their anchoring for any length of time in the Old Strait.80

The whole question of the validity of the British claim to jurisdiction on the Johore side of the Old Strait was now carried on appeal to the Supreme Government, the Temenggong maintaining that the British claim to exclusive jurisdiction was untenable according to international law, the provisions of the 1824 Treaty notwithstanding, since the Strait had been used by ships of all nations from time immemorial. The Temenggong also protested against the Governor's refusal to recognise Iskandar Putri as being a port of Johore in terms of the Supreme Government's ruling of November 1861 and therefore excluded from the British claim to jurisdiction over the Old Strait.81

The Indian authorities were reluctant to take up these larger

80 CO 273/15, Sec. Govt to Temenggong, 12 Jan. 1865, encl. in Sec. Govt to Sec. Govt India, 13-615, 27 May 1865.
81 Temenggong to Sec. Govt, 26 April and 8 May 1865, in Letter Book of His Highness the Maharajah.
issues. Instead the Governor was informed that the Government of India agreed that to require all vessels to call and register at Iskandar Putri amounted to interference with the trade of Singapore and concurred generally in the view which he had taken on the subject. 82 This decision was conveyed to the Temenggong and no more was heard of the matter until the beginning of 1866, when a deputation of Chinese merchants complained to the Chamber of Commerce that force was being used to compel the gambier and pepper boats to call at Iskandar Putri. The Temenggong denied that this was so but when the Government, prodded on by the Chamber of Commerce, pressed him further he announced that six stations had been set up along the Johore coast for the issue of passes to the gambier and pepper boats. With this the British declared themselves satisfied, and as there were no more complaints the matter ended there. 83

THE dispute over the attempt to divert the gambier and pepper trade to Iskandar Putri was the last occasion on which the Straits authorities used the threat of sanctions against the Temenggong. In this, as in previous cases, they were in the end successful. Nevertheless, the history of these disputes

82 CO 273/15, Sec. Govt India to Gov., 612, 13 July 1865.
83 SSR V-41, Sec. Govt to Temenggong, 3 Jan., 24 Jan., and 26 Jan. 1866; Temenggong to Sec. Govt, 7 Jan. and 26 Jan. 1866, in Letter Book of His Highness the Maharajah. For the circumstances and policy of the Temenggong's attempt to shift the gambier and pepper trade to Johore see ch. 7, pp. 252-54.
illustrates the comparatively large area for manoeuvre which the Temenggong possessed in relations with the British. With legal argument and appeals to the Indian Government, which in some cases were referred to London for a final decision, disputes could drag on for months, and during this time the Straits Government was virtually powerless to enforce its will. In the case of the fraudulent gamblers, for instance, the prisoners were kept in confinement for nine months despite the protests of the Straits authorities. Again, it took over a year to force Abu Bakar to give up the attempt to divert the gambier and pepper trade through Iskandar Putri, although the policy of the local Government had the full support of the Indian authorities. These verbal duels were time-consuming and exhausting; since the Temenggong was receiving competent legal advice, and since all correspondence dealing with matters in dispute might eventually go on appeal to higher authority, care had to be taken in considering and replying to the arguments which the Temenggong put forward. Moreover, there was no guarantee of substantial victory at the end, even though the Temenggong might bend in compliance with the wishes of the Government; there was no way of telling, for instance, whether British subjects arrested in Johore were tried in accordance with the procedures which had been introduced for their protection.\(^4\)

\(^4\) This was because the Straits Government was dependent on the Johore authorities for notification that a British subject was to stand trial. The reformed procedures operated with certainty only in the case of offenders extradited from the Straits Settlements.
There is no reason to suppose that the Straits authorities were unaware of the deficiencies in the Temenggong's reforms. On the contrary, it was appreciated that the adoption of administrative institutions and procedures on the British model was bound to be a slow process. To Britons of the mid-nineteenth century, with their tendency to regard Asians (as indeed foreigners generally) almost as being innately incapable of good government, any sign of modernity was encouraging. The British authorities were therefore pleased to see the outer forms of their own administrative institutions introduced into Johore. Moreover, in Abu Bakar they seemed to discern something of that spirit of progress which might eventually give life to these institutions.
CHAPTER 7

THE FOUNDATIONS OF BUREAUCRACY

TEMENGGONG Ibrahim was the traditional Malay chieftain, exacting unquestioning obedience from the followers who were the basis of his power as a territorial ruler, and providing them in return with protection and opportunities for profit, plunder, and the exercise of authority through the exploitation of the resources of his dominions, and the organisation of ventures of trade and piracy in the neighbouring seas. The administration of the chief's affairs was carried out in the traditional manner of patrimonial rulers by personal servants and officers of the household who were recruited, in the main, from among the families of his hereditary followers; those who were most closely associated with the ruler, and whose duties required them to be in attendance upon him during his waking hours, were usually lodged within the outer walls of the palace compound and were probably supported out of the resources of the ruler's household.

In a political and social system of this kind the bureaucratic distinction between the private affairs of the prince and his household and the public business of the state naturally had no significance. In particular, no distinction was made between public revenue and private income; all funds accruing from the ruler's prerogatives and his interests as landowner, capitalist and entrepreneur were entirely at his personal disposal and
were applied without discrimination to the maintenance of his retinue, investment in realty and commerce, the provision of hospitality to visiting chiefs, and the reward of faithful servants and followers.

In the last years of Daing Ibrahim's rule the affairs of the household were under the superintendence of 'Long Abdullah bin Tahir, a member of one of the leading families at Telok Belanga. Long Abdullah was the traditional Malay mentri, the secretary-treasurer, steward and confidant to whom the Malay raja or great chief entrusted the administration of his possessions and affairs. Under his superintendence two or three writers carried out the clerical work involved in administering the Temenggong's affairs; inditing letters to rajas and chieftains in the Peninsula and the Riau-Lingga archipelago with whom Ibrahim maintained courteous relations; issuing instructions to political and business agents, letters of appointment to village headmen, and permits to cut wood, seek gutta, or open gambier and pepper plantations; recording details of household supplies ordered and received, capital advances to traders and ship-owners, revenue farms, commercial ventures, concessions, monopolies, leases of land and buildings, loans to kinsmen and followers, and a host of other matters of greater or less importance. Besides the mentri there was also

1 'Long Abdullah was in the Temenggong's service, and was probably already his mentri, in 1844. He died in January 1863.
2 Tawarikh Dato' Bentara Luar, p. 13.
probably a cashier or treasurer charged with responsibility for the receipt, safekeeping and disbursement of the sums of money which accrued from the ruler's various rights, properties, and interests.

As a secretarial establishment, the household organisation under 'Long Abdullah was no more elaborate than that of other prosperous chieftains with a large and diverse income. It was sufficient for the purposes of Temenggong Ibrahim, but with the great increase in gambier and pepper planting in the latter half of the century, and the growth of British interest in the development of Johore, his successor was obliged to make considerable changes in the traditional mode of government. The trend of these changes, which were largely inspired by the Straits Government, was in the direction of bureaucratic institutions on the British model, and involved the establishment of administrative agencies separate from the household to deal with the 'public' business of government and the creation of a distinction between the revenues of the state and the ruler's private fortune.

ABU BAKAR, who succeeded Temenggong Ibrahim in 1862, was undoubtedly the ablest and most successful of nineteenth century Malay rulers. During his thirty-three year reign he laid the foundations of bureaucratic government in Johore, preserved the

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3 Temenggong Abu Bakar had a 'treasurer' (tukang wang) who died in an explosion aboard the S.S. Johor in 1865. See Buku Peringatan Keraja'an 18 Zulkaedah 1281 (15 April 1865).
independence of his administration in the face of the British advance into the Malay states, and attained for himself a unique position among the royal vassals of the Queen-Empress. Much of Abu Bakar's success is to be attributed to his education. His Malay instructor was the famous Munshi Abdullah, the most progressive and distinguished Malay pedagogue of his day; the most remarkable feature of Abu Bakar's education, however, was his attendance at the Rev. B.P. Keasberry's boarding school for Malays, a vernacular institution with a Western curriculum which included English and Bible studies. This liberal, and for the

4 Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir was born in Malacca in 1797, the son of a professional letter-writer, Malay teacher and Government clerk of mixed Arab, Tamil and Malay descent. Abdullah's early education was at a Koran school. In 1815 he began to learn English, teach Malay to Europeans, and translate texts for Christian missionaries in Malacca. In 1819 he moved to Singapore and set up as a translator of commercial agreements and official documents. In the 1830s, when Christian missions were established in Singapore, he was employed to translate religious texts and compile educational booklets on applied science, inventions and industries. He also translated Tamil works into Malay and edited traditional Malay stories. His own principal works were the Hikayat Abdullah—an autobiography with personal reflections, observations on the condition of Malay society, and vivid descriptions of Singapore and its leading personalities during the first twenty-five years after its foundation—and Kesah Pelayaran Abdullah, an account of a journey up the East Coast. He died at Jeddah in 1854.

It was probably at Keasberry's school, with which he was associated during the last 18 years of his life, that Abdullah taught the future ruler of Johore. For the career of his son in the service of Johore see n. 12 below.

5 No wonder that, as Munshi Abdullah notes, 'the news of this very important event spread from west to east'. Abu Bakar spent three or four years at Keasberry's school, probably ca 1848-51. His eldest brother, Abdul Rahman, also attended this school. See Hikayat Abdullah, p. 264; Tawarikh Dato' Bentara Luar, p. 76; SSR R-17, Gov. to U-Sec. Govt Bengal, 37, 15 March 1848. Keasberry's work in Singapore is described in Buckley, An Anecdotal History, pp. 320-22.
son of a Moslem ruler, highly unorthodox education, enlarged the young prince's outlook and enabled him to view the Western world with a confidence and a tolerance—unparalleled among Malay rulers of the nineteenth century—which goes far to explain the success with which he conducted his relations with the British power.

Abu Bakar’s active participation in the administration of the Temenggong’s affairs commenced in 1852, when he took part in discussions with Blundell concerning the dispute over Johore. He again represented Ibrahim in the negotiations which preceded the drawing up of the 1855 Treaty, and in the following year he was officially recognised by his father as Bakal Raja Johor ('Prospective Ruler of Johore'). After this he took an increasingly greater share in the administration of the Temenggong's affairs. Abu Bakar saw clearly that a ruler whose capital lay within twenty miles of the seat of a British colonial governor had no alternative but to arrange for the government of his dominions along lines which recommended themselves to Europeans if he wished to remain in possession of them. Abu Bakar's own education and abilities fitted him for the task of reform but this alone was insufficient. He was also fortunate in commending the loyalty of men who were capable of making the new institutions work.

Within a few years of Abu Bakar's succession the old

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generation of followers who had served Ibrahim in the days of
dubious maritime adventures had passed away and their place had
been taken by a new generation of Singapore Malays, born, bred,
and above all educated, in the British Settlement, for whom the
days of pirate forays were remote and irrelevant.

Most of the higher officials of Abu Bakar's reign were
recruited from among the leading families of Telok Belanga.
Foremost among these were Ja'afar bin Haji Mohamed, who was a
clerk under the mentri in 1862, and Mohamed Saleh bin Perang.

Ja'afar bin Haji Mohamed was born at Telok Belanga in 1838.
About 1854 he joined the Temenggong's service as a clerk under
his uncle, the mentri. When the mentri died, in 1863, Ja'afar
appears to have taken over his duties. In 1865 or early 1866
he received the court title Dato' Bentara. In 1866 he accompanied
Abu Bakar on his first visit to Europe. After the appointment
of William Hole as the Maharajah's Private Secretary (about 1873)
Ja'afar came to be regarded as 'Secretary to the Government'
and his title was changed to Dato' Mentri. He remained at the
head of the Johore Government Service until his death in 1919.
Three of his sons, Abdullah, Mustaffar and Onn, later became
Mentri Besars of Johore.

Mohamed Saleh bin Perang was born at Telok Belanga in 1841.
He attended Kearsberry's school for two years, studied the Koran
for two years, and taught in the Malay school at Kampong Glam
for a short time in 1854 or 1855. In 1855 he stayed for several
months in the house of the Straits Commissioner for Lands, and
in the following year joined the Temenggong's service as a clerk.
He was chief Clerk at Iskandar Putri from 1858 to 1868 and
Commissioner of Police from 1868 to 1882. Mohamed Saleh was the
only Malay official in the Johore Government with any knowledge
of Chinese languages; in the early 1860s he learned to read and
to speak Teochiu. In 1868 he also studied surveying and map-
making in Singapore, and in the early 1870s he carried out the
first surveys and public works in Johore. In 1882 he was relieved
of his responsibility for the Police Department and devoted all
his time to surveys and public works. In 1881 or 1882 he received
the court title Dato' Bentara Luar. He was State Commissioner
(Pesuruhjayva Kerajaan) for Muar and Kesang from 1886 to 1894 and
for Batu Pahat from 1895 until his retirement in 1912. He died
in 1915. After his death a number of his papers were published
by his grandson under the title Tawarikh Dato' Bentara Luar,
'The History of Dato' Bentara Luar'. 
who was chief clerk at Iskandar Putri. Ja'afar was the son of a prominent follower and nephew of the mentri 'Long Abdul Rahman's Abdullah. Mohamed Saleh was the grandson of the Temenggong leading follower, a chieftain with a following of his own, and nephew of the first Wakil Raja ('Ruler's Representative') at Iskandar Putri. Other Telok Belanga Malays who were already in the Temenggong's service in the 1860s were Abdul Samad bin Ibrahim, who had charge of one of the ruler's tin mines in Pahang, Nong Yahaya, the ruler's representative at Pengarang, Andak bin Moyang, the Telok Belanga Malay of Bugis descent. In 1871 he was head of a Police Station at Tanjong Kupang, at the west end of the Old Strait. He remained in charge of this part of the southern coast until 1898. In 1884 he was given the title Dato' Penggawa Kanan, which was changed to Dato' Penggawa Barat two years later. One of his brothers was Mohamed bin Ibrahim, who, as Dato' Penchulu Ista'adat, presided over court ceremonies from 1886 until about 1902; a sister married the Dato' Mentri, Ja'afar bin Haji Mohamed.

Nong Yahaya, styled Nong Besar and Tuan Sharif, appears to have been of Arab Syed and (on the distaff side) Malay princely descent. He married a wife of Temenggong Ibrahim. In 1861 he was the Ruler's Representative at Pengarang, at the east end of the Old Strait, and may have been there or nearby, at Tanjong Surat, as early as 1845. He was still in charge of this area in 1875 and was succeeded by his son, Ja'afar, who was the Maharajah's half-brother and brother-in-law. In 1884 Ja'afar received the title Dato' Penggawa Kiri, which was changed to Dato' Penggawa Timur two years later.

Andak bin Moyang was a Pahang Malay of Bugis descent who settled at Telok Belanga in the 1850s (or before). He was one of Abu Bakar's most trusted advisers and was given charge of the Muar-Segamat district, a charge which involved much diplomatic activity in the neighbouring borderlands of Pahang, the Negri Sembilan and (before its accession to Johore) Muar. Andak was the father of Abdul Rahman bin Andak, Dato' Sri Amar diRaja, for whom see n. 78 below. Another son, Mohamed, was Chief Clerk in the Mentri's Office and Clerk of Council in the 1880s.
representative in Ulu Muar, and possibly also Haji Osman bin Tahir, the representative at Padang, Haji Mohamed Saleh, the hakim (judge) at Iskandar Putri, and Haji Abdul Rahman, a religious official at Telok Belanga.

Other leading officials were recruited on account of their erudition, connections, or special abilities, from the wider Malayo-Moslem community of Singapore. Three of the famous Munshi Abdullah's sons were at various times in the Temenggong's service and one of them, Mohamed Ibrahim,\textsuperscript{12} rose to high office. The Arab community was represented by Syed Salim bin Ahmad al-Attas and Syed Mohamed bin Husain al-Habshi, descendants of the Prophet who were, respectively kadhi and mufti to the Temenggong in the 1860s. The Arabs or Arab-Malays Yahaya bin Awal-ud-din and Yahaya bin Sha'aban al-Datar and the Siak Malay Abdullah bin Tahir may also have been chosen for reasons of this nature.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{12} Mohamed Ibrahim bin Haji Abdullah Munshi, entered the Temenggong's service in 1860. For some years he was in charge of the Malay school at Telok Belanga. In the 1870s he was employed on confidential missions for the Maharaja and as an assistant and interpreter for British officials visiting the Malay states. In the 1880s and 1890s he was in charge of the Johore Education Department and was responsible for much of the work of the Treasury. In 1881 or 1882 he received the court title Dato' Bentara Dalam. He died in 1904.

Mohamed Ibrahim was the most scholarly of Abu Bakar's officials. He published two works, Kesah Pelayaran Mohamed Ibrahim Munshi, an account of his journeys to the West Coast states in the 1870s, and Perhintunan Hukum-Hukum Shara' al-Islam, a digest of Moslem law.

\textsuperscript{13} Syed Salim bin Ahmad al-Attas was the Temenggong's kadhi in 1864. Shortly afterwards he went to Arabia, where he spent most of the next twenty years. He returned to be Kadhi of Johore in 1885 and in the following year he became Mufti. He died in 1899.

Syed Mohamed bin Husain al-Habshi was the Temenggong's mufti in 1862. He died in 1886, being succeeded as Mufti by Syed Salim.
The success of Abu Bakar's government depended primarily on the abilities of his Malay officials and the strength and stability of the Chinese institutions for the regulation of the gambier and pepper industry. Also of importance, however, was the skilful use which he made of European advisers and officials. Abu Bakar's advisers were men of standing and influence in Singapore. In addition to the highly valuable services which they rendered in a professional capacity, these men and their associates were in a position to influence the Straits Government in matters which concerned the ruler and to pass on to him information which would not otherwise have reached him.

Foremost among Abu Bakar's European connections was the enduring association with Paterson, Simons & Co. (formerly Ker, Rawson & Co.), the agency house which acted for the ruler of Johore from the 1840s until after the appointment of a British Adviser in 1909. The ruler also retained the services of legal advisers and law agents who were men of ability and influence in the Settlement. Abraham Logan, who acted for the Temenggong from 1860 or 1861 until 1867, was the editor of the Singapore Free Press and secretary of the Chamber of Commerce. During

Yahaya bin Awal-ud-din was in charge of municipal public works from the early 1870s until after 1900.

Yahaya bin Shal'aban al-Datar appears to have been attached to the Balai Polis at Iskandar Putri in the later 1850s as an official of the gaol or police force. He was in charge of the Johore prison from at least the early 1870s until after 1900 and was Superintendent of Public Works from the 1880s.

Abdullah bin Tahir was in the Temenggong's service in 1867, and was Commissioner of Police from 1882 until his death in 1906. In 1886 he received the court title Dato' Sri Setia diRaja.
most of this time his partner, Thomas Braddell, who also acted for the Temenggong, held the position of Crown Counsel. Braddell became Attorney-General in 1867 and continued to advise Abu Bakar (who paid him a retainer) until 1875. After 1879 the ruler's legal advisers were Rodyk & Davidson, one of the partners being J.G. Davidson, the former British Resident in Selangor and Perak.

Apart from these agents and advisers, there were also Europeans who entered the ruler's service as officers of his Government. In almost all cases these men were employed in a purely technical capacity, as engineers, telegraph operators, medical and military officers. The principal exceptions were William Hole and James Campbell Ker, who were at different times the ruler's private secretary from before 1874 until 1886. He accompanied Abu Bakar to India in 1875 and to China and Japan in 1883. In the 1890s he returned to Johore and was made State Commissioner for Endau.

James Campbell Ker was one of three sons of William Wemyss Ker of Ker, Rawson & Co. (later Paterson, Simons & Co.) who entered the ruler's service. In the 1840s the Ker household was at Bukit Chermin, close to the Temenggong's establishment at Telok Belanga, and the sons were friendly with Abu Bakar and his brothers from childhood. Thomas Rawson Ker was Superintendent of the Johore Marine Department in the 1880s and 1890s, and had charge of the Post-Master General's Department for some time in the 1890s. In 1896 H.C.G. Ker became Post-Master General and J.C. Ker, who had joined the postal service in 1894, became Private Secretary to Sultan Ibrahim.
times private secretary to the ruler, and Herman Yzelman, an Eurasian who worked in the state secretariat. These officials provided technical services (in the case of Hole and Ker intimate acquaintance with the conventions of European society) which were administratively or politically necessary without, however, gaining any personal ascendancy over the ruler. With the partial exception of Hole, who was employed on diplomatic missions in the Malay states in the 1870s and 1880s, the European officials were simply paid functionaries who stood outside the nexus of traditional obligations and relationships which gave cohesion to the Malay officials and bound them in service to the ruler.

The first step towards the establishment of a bureaucratic administration separate from the household was taken in 1855, with the founding of the Iskandar Putri, the future Johore Bahru. Iskandar Putri was at first little more than a place of inquisition and incarceration, and perhaps also a base for operations against opium and spirit smugglers. In 1858, however, the Temenggong was persuaded by his son to establish a police organisation modelled on that of the Straits Settlements. Abu Bakar, who foresaw that this would go a long way towards promoting confidence in the Temenggong's government among Singapore businessmen and officials, drew up a set of police procedures on the pattern of those in force in Singapore and personally supervised the construction of a 'Police Hall' (Balai Polis) to house the new administrative organisation.19 The British

19 Tawarikh Dato' Bentara Luar, pp. 78-79. The Balai Polis
system of issuing court summonses and arrest warrants was introduced, and it was probably also at this time that Haji Mohammed Saleh was appointed as 'police magistrate' to try cases in the Temenggong's name. The first policemen were probably the band of a hundred retainers who had formerly drilled with rifles at Telok Belanga.

When these arrangements came into force a new Wakil Raja, Raja Kechil Ahmad, a cousin of the Temenggong, was put in charge of Iskandar Putri and Mohamed Saleh bin Perang, one of the clerks at Telok Belanga, became chief clerk in the Balai Polis. Mohamed Saleh and the four clerks under him dealt with all the clerical work of the station, which at this time included the correspondence with Telok Belanga, the issue of fishing permits, police summonses and warrants, and the maintenance of court records and records concerning the opium and spirits farms. In remained the principal centre of administrative activity outside the palace until 1875, when a 'Council Chamber' (Dewan) was opened. A number of Government offices were then moved into the new building. In 1888 several other offices were moved out of the Istana Besar, the principal palace in Johore Bahru, into the Dewan. See Buku Peringatan Keraja'an, 20 Sha'baban 1292 (20 September 1875) and 9 Zulkaedah 1305 (17 July 1888).

Tawarikh Dato' Bentara Luar, pp. 14, 77-78.

Haji Mohamed Saleh was definitely acting as judge in 1865 (See SSR W-53, Temenggong to Sec. Govt, 2 March 1865, and enclave entitled 'deposition taken before Tuan Haji Mohamed Saleh, Police Magistrate Johore, Iskandar Putri'). However, the ruler still heard cases of importance in person or delegated this function to members of his family. See Temenggong to Gov., 12 July 1861, in Letter Book of His Highness the Maharajah.

See ch. 6, p. 198 above.
addition, the station received revenue, mainly in the form of fees and fines, and paid out the salaries and wages of officials in Johore. The purpose of these innovations was to establish the Temenggong's authority in Johore in an institutional form, and to show the British that the government of the country was not being neglected. They had, however, very little relevance to the administrative problems posed by the growth of the gambier and pepper industry. The police force was useful for maintaining the authority of the ruler in particular cases, but it had no continuing influence outside the immediate neighbourhood of Iskandar Putri. Law and order among the Chinese of the plantations was maintained by Chinese headmen acting as the agents of private commercial enterprises and, so far as is known, appointed without reference to the Malay ruler. A court of justice existed at Iskandar Putri, and the Chinese were exhorted to resort to it, but civil litigation arising out of the transactions of planters and merchants interested in the gambier and pepper industry was at this time a difficult and uncertain venture since there were no official documents, apart from the surat sungai of the river concessionaires, which might be considered in deciding ownership and contractual obligations in cases which came before the court. The most serious defects were the lack of title deeds to

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23 Tawarikh Dato' Bentara Luar, pp. 14, 78.
plantation land and the absence of any official record of agreements entered into between the producers and farmers of gambier and pepper.

The tenure of the gambier and pepper planters in Johore was at this time based entirely on Malay customary tenure, the leading principles of which were that all land belonged to the ruler, and that the individual landholder possessed rights of usufruct which were created through the act of cultivation and lapsed when cultivation ceased. Malay cultivators occasionally went to the trouble of obtaining written 'acknowledgments' (surat akuan) of their occupancy, but these documents conveyed no proprietary rights per se; they merely acknowledged the existing right of usufruct.

Further problems arose from the diametrically opposed interests of the planters and concessionaires, on the one hand, and the gambier and pepper dealers who financed their operations. The dissatisfaction of all parties with the existing state of the industry was brought to the ruler's notice in two petitions which were presented to him in May 1864. The first of these, dated 8 May 1864, was signed by twenty-two gambier and pepper dealers of Singapore who owned and financed plantations in Johore. The petitioners complained that it was useless to take proceedings against planters who violated their produce agreements, since their debts usually amounted to more than the value of their produce. To rectify the position they requested the ruler to introduce written land grants which might be held by the produce farmer until the planter had paid off his debts,
and to decree that henceforth all consignments of gambier and pepper should be sent to Iskandar Putri for delivery to the produce farmers.24

The second petition, dated 22 May 1864, was presented by thirty-four 'heads of rivers' who stated that they had been residing in Johore and planting gambier and pepper since the days of the late Temenggong. After referring to the bad feeling which existed between the planters in Johore and the dealers in Singapore who, it was claimed, invariably used false scales in weighing the planters' consignments of gambier and pepper in order to cheat them and keep them perpetually in their debt, these petitioners also asked that all produce be brought to Iskandar Putri, where the dealers could be forced to use the ruler's standard weight and the planters would be assured of redress for 'insults'.25

24 SSR W-52, 'Petition of 22 Gambier and Pepper Dealers', 1 Zulhijjah 1280 [8 May 1864], encl. in Temenggong to Sec. Govt, 20 Oct. 1864.

25 Ibid, 'Petition of 34 Planters resident in Johore (Heads of Rivers)', 15 Zulhijjah 1280 [22 May 1864], encl. in Temenggong to Sec. Govt, 20 Oct. 1864.

Apart from the deep division of economic interest, relations between the planters and dealers were affected by another factor: the traditional antipathies of the different dialect groups. The concessionaires and planters were predominantly Teo-chiu while most of the dealers were Hokkien (see Siah U Chin, 'The Chinese in Singapore', JIA vol. 2 (1848), pp. 283-89). There was also, however, a small group of Teo-chiu dealers, and it is almost certain that these were the merchants who petitioned the ruler on 8 May, and that it was their object to shift the gambier and pepper market to Iskandar Putri in order to establish the plantation industry in Johore as a Teo-chiu preserve. About the time the petition of 8 May was presented a group of dealers—presumably these same Teo-chiu merchants—came to an understanding with Tan Hick Nee, the Chinese headman at Iskandar Putri and leading Teo-chiu concessionaire in Johore, concerning the establishment of their
Shortly after the presentation of these petitions the ruler introduced a system for the voluntary taking out of 'grants' (surat geran) in respect of gambier and pepper land at the same time he decreed that henceforth all boats carrying gambier and pepper to Singapore must call at Iskandar Putri to obtain a pass or port clearance. The ostensible purpose of this latter measure—as represented to the Straits Government—was to protect the interests of both planters and produce farmers by providing an official check on the size of consignments from the plantations. Abu Bakar's real purpose, however, was to shift the centre of the gambier and pepper trade from Singapore to Iskandar Putri, where it would be under his immediate control. When this became known in Singapore the Straits Government intervened to prevent any interference with the free flow of trade and the scheme had to be abandoned.

The failure of the plan to divert trade through Iskandar Putri was of considerable significance for the development of government in Johore. It meant that the ruler could not increase his revenues simply by adding to the burden of taxation borne by trade and industry, since this would affect interests in businesses at Iskandar Putri (see SSR W-52, Temenggong to Sec. Govt, 20 Oct. 1864).

SSR W-52, Temenggong to Sec. Govt, 20 Oct. 1864. The first known land grant is number 157 of 1280 A.H. [June 1863 - June 1864]. See Tambahan Pemberi Tahu [Supplementary Notifications, 1860-98], entry no. 132.


See ch. 6, pp. 233-36 above.
Singapore and provoke a hostile reaction from the Straits Government. It also meant that he was obliged to rely very largely on Chinese business interests in Singapore for the regulation of the gambier and pepper industry and the collection of taxes. The result of this was that the machinery for administration in Johore developed in two distinct sections, one Malay and centred in Johore Bahru (Iskandar Putri), and the other Chinese and centred in Singapore.

In the late 1860s and early 1870s a far-reaching series of measures was introduced for the regulation of the gambier and pepper industry. The first of these laid down simple rules for acquiring plantation land and providing proprietary and contractual rights arising out of agreements concerning the plantations and their produce. In April 1866 the taking out of grants for gambier and pepper land became compulsory and the possession of a duly registered title became the legal criterion of ownership. At the same time regulations were introduced for the registration of all contracts relating to plantation land held under grant. These provided for the execution and registration of produce agreements (*surat pajak*), bills of sale (*surat jualbeli*), transfers (*surat tukar nama*), and mortgages (*surat gadai*), introduced a scale of fees for their authentication, and gave public notice that in future unregistered agreements would not be received in court as evidence. A person wishing to open a plantation was now obliged to obtain a permit (*surat keterangan kebeneran*) and at the same time give the name of whoever was advancing him money or supplies on the security
of the produce or a mortgage of the plantation. Within twelve months of commencing the plantation he had to take out a land grant and enter into a produce agreement with the farmer according to the prescribed form.29

The object of the regulations which came into force in 1866 was to provide proper documentary evidence for the court to consider in determining cases of civil litigation, and the work of registering the legal instruments created for this purpose was carried out by the administrative organisation in the Balai Polis. This aspect of the government of the Chinese was therefore under the direct control of the ruler's Malay officials. Between 1868 and 1873 the ruler issued a number of decrees dealing with the general regulation of the gambier and pepper industry which conferred administrative functions on the kangchus, the Chinese river heads, and the officials of the Kongkek, the 'Gambier and Pepper Society' which was founded in Singapore in 1867.30

29 Undang-Undang Gambir Lada ['The Gambier and Pepper Law'] Pt 1, dated 16 Zulkaedah 1282 [2 April 1866].
30 Song Ong Siang, One Hundred Years' History of the Chinese in Singapore, p. 38. After the failure of the scheme to centralise control of the gambier and pepper trade under Tan Hock Nee at Iskandar Putri, the Kongkek seems to have been founded to achieve the same object in Singapore. Throughout the 1870s and 1880s it appears to have been dominated by Teo-chius, and in particular by members of the Tan and Seah clans. Tan Seng Poh, the head of the Singapore Teo-chius in the 1870s, was President of the Kongkek in 1877. In the early 1880s the President was Seah Leang Seah, who was also a member of the Straits Legislative Council. Seah Leang Seah's father was Seah Eu Chin, one of the earliest and most successful financiers of gambier and pepper planting on Singapore. The manager of the Johore branch of the Kongkek in the early 1880s was Seah Leang Chye, the son of Seah Tee Heng, the holder of valuable river concessions in Johore. Seah Tee Heng
The decrees of 1868-73 had two main objects: to protect the planters from gross exploitation, which retarded the development of the industry, and to prevent smuggling, which deprived the ruler of revenue. The regulations which were introduced in 1868 recognised the right of the planter to mortgage (menggadai) his crops to the kangchu in order to obtain working capital, fixed the commission or profit (keuntongan) and the discount or interest (basi) which the produce farmer might take on the supply of rice and the disposal of the planter's produce, and admonished the farmers to use correct scales in weighing the produce, to enter details of all transactions in the planter's account book without delay, and to keep up the supply of plantation labour.31 A further decree, promulgated in July 1871, put an end to the produce farmers' attempts to keep the planters continually in debt.32 The same decree also provided that the farmer could not transfer his interest in a plantation without the consent of the planter and that he could not discontinue the supply of

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31 was a member of the Ruler's Council in 1873 and 1874, and his son was on the Committee of the Johore Education Department in the late 1880s.

32 Undang-Undang Gambir Lada, Pt 4, dated 10 Ramadhan 1284 [5 January 1868].
provisions without forfeiting his rights under the terms of the produce agreement. 33

In 1868 regulations were also introduced to combat the smuggling of gambier and pepper. These required the kangchus to maintain registers of the owners and *chons* (brand names) of the plantations in their district and to furnish certified lists of these to the Balai Polis in Jchore Bahru and to the masters of the gambier and pepper boats. These boats were now required to be licensed and to display number plates, and their masters were obliged to keep records of the quantity of gambier and pepper received from each plantation. After this heavy fines were imposed on any one caught carrying produce which did not bear the registered *chop* of the plantation of origin. 34

These anti-smuggling regulations appear to have been introduced for the benefit of the produce farmers, to ensure that they received all the produce of the plantations to which they were entitled. In 1873 more stringent measures were introduced to safeguard the gambier and pepper revenue farms. 35 These required the kangchus to weigh all shipments of produce and forward certificates showing the amount consigned by each plantation to the holder of the gambier and pepper farm and to

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33 *Undang-Undang Gambir Lada*, Pt 7, 12 Rabeal Akhir 1288 [1 July 1871].

34 *Undang-Undang Gambir Lada*, Pt 4, 10 Ramadhan 1284 [5 January 1868].

35 Gambier and pepper duties were introduced at some time between 1866 and 1871. See Cavenagh, *Reminiscences of an Indian Official*, p. 361, and *Undang-Undang Gambir Lada*, Pt 8, 12 Zulkaedah 1288 [2 January 1872].
the Kongkek, which now became responsible for supervising the landing of all plantation produce at Johore Bahru and Singapore; on arrival, all produce was inspected and weighed by the officials of the Kongkek in the presence of the agents of the produce farmers and the revenue farmer. This operation was the ultimate check against smuggling—for no gambier or pepper could be landed without the permission of the Kongkek—and also determined the price received by the planter and the duty collected by the revenue farmer.36

It is clear from the ordinances of 1868-73 that the ruler was not concerned to bring the conduct of the gambier and pepper industry under the direct control of his own Malay officials. His object was simply to provide for the maintenance of order in the gambier and pepper districts and the self-regulation of the plantation industry through the action of the Kangchus and the officials of the Kongkek, men who drew their power from the Chinese community and who were not primarily agents of the ruler. By and large the plantation industry, its economic infrastructure and the Chinese population which was associated with it, remained what it had always been in the past: a great imperium in imperio with its own life, leaders and purposes,

36 These regulations, and the main provisions of the previous decrees were brought together in the Kanun Kangchu ('the Law of the Kangchus'), a comprehensive ordinance of 78 paragraphs which was promulgated in 1873. For an English translation see A.E. Coope, 'The Kangchu System in Johore', JMBRAS vol. 14 pt.3 (1936), pp. 2 247-63. For the duties of the Kangchus and the Kongkek see also Straits Times, 3 March 1877.
alien to its Malay surroundings, and having few points of contact with the government of the Malay ruler. Nevertheless the introduction of measures to regulate the gambier and pepper industry did have important consequences for the development of the Malay administrative system. One of the main functions of the clerical officials in the Balai Polis was to issue land titles and register agreements concerning the plantations, their produce, and the rights of concessionaires. As the volume of this work increased the administrative organisation in the Balai Polis grew in size and status. In 1868 Mohamed Saleh bin Perang, the head clerk in the Balai Polis, was appointed 'Commissioner of Police' (Pesurohjaya Polis) and the organisation under his control became known as the 'Police Department' (Jawatan Polis). By this time it was becoming apparent that unsurveyed titles provided an inadequate basis for the settlement of boundary disputes among the planters. In 1868, therefore, Mohamed Saleh and another official, Yahaya bin Awal-ud-din, were sent to Singapore to learn surveying. By the end of the decade the work of surveying the plantations had begun and by 1873 a department had been set up under Yahaya Awal to take charge of public works and surveys.

37 Tawarikh Dato' Bentara Luar, pp. 15-16.
38 Ibid. p.16.
39 Straits Calendar and Directory, 1874. The discussion of administrative developments which follows is based on Straits Calendar and Directory, 1873, 1874, Colonial Directory of the
The establishment of Yahaya Awal's public works and survey department (its official designation was 'Public Works and Land Department') as a government agency separate from the organisation under the 'Police Commissioner' marked the beginning of a new stage in the development of the administration. However, the various departments which were created in the 1870s were at first little more than nominal entities. The 'Marine Department', as listed in the Straits Calendar and Directory for 1874, simply comprised the steamships Pulai and Pantai, two steam launches and their crews; there was no departmental head, and the work of supplying and servicing the vessels was carried out by the Johore Arsenal, a separate organisation according to the Straits Calendar, with a 'Director', superintendent, engineer,

Straits Settlements, 1875, and Straits Directory, 1880-96. Where other sources have been used these are indicated.

In the 1850s and 1860s the ruler's naval force consisted of half a dozen small sailing vessels fitted out as 'gunboats' (gambot) and a 150 ton armed schooner, Khatijah, which was launched at New Harbour in 1859. The ruler's first steamer was the ill-fated Johor, which blew her boilers in April 1865, shortly after delivery. A number of people were killed in the explosion and the vessel was then disposed of to the Tanjong Pagar Dock Company. The ruler's next steamer was the 80 ton Pulai, which was in service by 1872. In January 1875 the 400 ton steam yacht Pantai, one of the largest vessels built in Singapore up to that time, was launched at Telok Ayer. In the 1880s another gunboat and several more steam launches were added to the Marine Department. (See Temenggong to Gov., 6 May 1858, and Temenggong to R.C. Singapore, 16 March 1860, in Letter Book of His Highness the Maharajah; Buku Peringatan Keraja'an, 12 Zulkaedah 1278 (10 May 1862), 3 Safar 1279 (30 July 1862), 6 Rabeal Akhir 1279 (30 Sept. 1862), 20 Sha'aban 1279 (20 May 1863), 18 Shawal 1279 (17 April 1863), 18 Zulkaedah 1281 (15 April 1865), 23 Jamadal Awal 1289 (28 July 1872); Straits Times, 30 July 1859, 27 Feb. 1875; Straits Calendar and Directory, 1874; Straits Directory, 1880-96.
accountant, and half a dozen clerks. Moreover, the Director of the Arsenal, James Meldrum, was also the manager (and part-owner) of the Johore Steam Sawmills, which, though listed as such, were not really a government department at all, and the establishment attributed to the Arsenal in fact belonged to the Sawmills.41

The appearance of these government departments in the Singapore directories of the 1870s represented little more than a genuflection towards the administrative ideals of the Straits Government. The ruler's object at this time was simply to provide the minimum of government institutions consistent with moderate efficiency in regulating the gambier and pepper industry. Nevertheless, the fact that these institutions were given an overtly bureaucratic form was important, for as the volume of administrative activity increased the isolation and departmentalisation of functions, which is the essence of bureaucratic government, took place within the framework thus provided.

In the late 1870s and early 1880s the ruler was impelled, by reasons which were partly political and partly economic, to consider plans for a wider range of public facilities.

41 The Johore Steam Sawmill Co. was floated in 1859. The original shareholders were James Meldrum, William Napier, Paterson, Simons & Co., Joachim and Jose d'Almeida, Abu Bakar and his brother Abdul Rahman. In 1872 Meldrum and Abu Bakar became sole owners. At this time the mills were among the largest in the world and regularly sawed about 30 tons of wood a day, mostly teak and cedar, which was exported all over the world. (See Meldrum's obituary in Straits Chinese Magazine, vol 3 no. 2 (1904), p. 54; Lord Stanmore, Fiji. Records of Private Life, 1875-1880, vol. 1, p. 103).
After Perak, Selangor and Sungai Ujong came under British administration, Johore ceased to be the show-piece of the Malay states; where formerly the Straits authorities had pointed to Abu Baker's administration as the supreme example of what British 'influence' could effect in the government of the Peninsular states, they now expressed dissatisfaction with the low level of government activity in Johore, and in particular with the small proportion of the state revenues which was spent on capital works of a useful nature. At the same time Abu Baker was anxious to foster the growth of a European-owned coffee and tea planting industry employing indentured labour from British India. For these reasons it became imperative that Johore should not fall too far behind the British-administered states in the development of public facilities and in the general quality of government. Abu Baker at first hoped to shift the financial burden of development to a chartered company (which he proposed to endow with vast land concessions and commercial privileges); when this failed he was obliged to turn to the task of enlarging the size and scope of his own administrative service.

In the early 1880s existing departments, notably the Medical Department, the Treasury and Yahaya Avdi's Public Works and Land Department, were expanded, the Judiciary and Mohamed Saleh's

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42 See, for example, CO 273/113, Gov. to Sec. State, COWF., 23 Feb. 1882.
43 See p. 267, n. 50 below, and ch. 8, p. 335.
44 See ch. 8, p. 333.
survey group, which had hitherto been under the Police Department, were given a separate existence, and new Departments of Education, Posts and Telegraph, Indian Immigration, and Audit were created. By the end of the decade an imposing arrangement of departments and secretarial offices had come into being. In fact, however, the process of multiplying the outer forms of bureaucracy generally outpaced the actual isolation and departmentalisation of the functions of government. Competent officials were few and many of the posts created in the 1880s, though necessary, did not require the attention of a full-time official. In the early 1880s, when administrative pluralism was common, the business of the government was carried out by a few key officials whose administrative establishments were personal rather than departmental. What is significant, however, is that as the volume of government business expanded and the number of capable administrators increased, the personal ‘empires’ of the senior officials were broken up and the logic of bureaucratic organisation

45 The expansion of the government service in the 1880s and 1890s was made possible by the development of educational facilities. The main source of clerical officers in the 1860s and 1870s were the two Malay schools, one at Telok Belanga (founded in 1855 and supported jointly by the Temenggong and the Straits Government), and the other at Johore Bahru, which was founded by the Temenggong in 1864. In 1882 English became the medium of instruction in the school at Johore Bahru, a new Malay language school was established in the capital and village schools were opened at Tanjong Surat, Pangarang and Padang. During the next ten years about a dozen new schools were established, including a religious school, two new English schools (one at Johore Bahru and the other at Bandar Maharani), a Chinese school for Malay girls and a technical school.
asserted itself. The working out of this process is well illustrated in the development of the Departments of Lands, Surveys, and Public Works.

The 'Public Works and Land Department', which was functioning under the control of Yahaya Awal in 1873, was in reality a department of public works and surveys, the main function of a 'land' department – the issue of titles – being carried out, as in the past, by the clerks of the Police Department. Even in the field of public works and surveys Yahaya Awal's Department did not possess complete control; throughout the 1870s the Police Commissioner, Mohamed Saleh, who was senior to Yahaya Awal in the state hierarchy, continued to bear the main responsibility for the survey of gambier and pepper plantations and the execution of public works in rural areas. Yahaya Awal's department appears to have been mainly concerned with town land surveys and public works in the immediate vicinity of the capital.

Mohamed Saleh continued to combine the functions of police chief and surveyor until 1882, when a new Commissioner of Police was appointed and Moahmed Saleh, now known as Dato' Bentara Luar (Dato' Luar), became the head of a new 'Land Department' which was created to accommodate his team.

46 See n. 8 above.
of surveyors and draftsmen. At the same time Yahaya Awal's 'Public Works and Land Department' was renamed the 'Survey Department' and a new 'Public Works Department' was created and placed under the immediate supervision of Yahaya bin Sha'aban al-Datar, an official who, as Superintendent of the Gaol, had charge of the department's work force. Yahaya Sha'aban's chief in the Public Works Department was Ungku Haji Mohamed, a cousin of the ruler, who was soon replaced by Walter Garland, a qualified engineer and surveyor from Ceylon. Garland was appointed Commissioner for Public Works in 1883 and Governor of the Gaol in the following year. He continued to hold both these positions, together with that of 'Surveyor of Coffee Districts', until his retirement in 1894.

In 1884 the division of responsibility for survey work which had developed during the 1870s was completed. The Surveyor of Coffee Lands was detached from Yahaya Awal's department and placed under Dato' Luar, who thus acquired sole responsibility for the survey of agricultural land. At the same time Dato' Luar's department was renamed 'Survey Department',

47 Ungku Haji Mohamed's qualification for this position was experience in financial administration - he had been Treasurer in the early 1870s - of which there was more need in this department than in most of the others.

48 Walter F. Garland, A.M.I.C.E., came to Johore in 1878 or 1879. In 1879 he and one of his partners from Ceylon were 'Civil Engineers and Surveyors to the Johore Government'; they had a staff of seven and were probably fully employed in surveying plantation leases for tea and coffee growers. In 1880 the partner left and Garland became 'Surveyor to the Johore Government'. In 1882 he was designated 'Surveyor of Coffee Lands'. 
Yahaya Awal's department (which was in reality an urban land and public works survey department) became the 'Land Department', and Yahaya Awal himself received the title 'Chief Engineer and Surveyor' and was made subordinate to the Commissioner for Public Works. Until 1887, when Yahaya Awal again became independent, the Public Works and Land Departments virtually functioned as one.

These changes were related to the ruler's plans for the development of the country. In the early 1880s Abu Bakar was anxious to provide facilities which would attract tea and coffee planters to Johore; in particular, he wished to provide the capital (which in 1884 had a population of about 15,000) with facilities comparable with those of towns in the Straits Settlements. During the 1880s considerable progress was made towards the achievement of this goal. In Johore Bahru a postal service was established, metal was laid on all the town roads,

49 Straits Directory, 1885.
50 The Johore Post Office was opened in 1882. At first it provided mail and telegraph communication with Singapore. Within 3 years mail connections had been established with a dozen outstations, and by 1889 branch offices had been opened at Bandar Maharani and Batu Pahat and facilities existed for the transmission of money orders to the Straits Settlements, the Malay states under British administration, India and Ceylon. These facilities were introduced very largely as a service for the European planters and their Indian labourers. The rise of the tea and coffee industry also led to the establishment of an Indian Immigration Department to supervise the introduction of Indian labour and to inspect conditions on the plantations which employed Indians. The first Immigration Agent was Howard Bentley, who was also Post-Master General and 'Magistrate', in which latter capacity he dealt with cases involving Indians. The Immigration Department shared responsibility for inspecting conditions on the coffee estates with the Medical Department,
electric lighting was introduced, a fire station, reservoir, waterworks, and new goal were built, several new buildings were put up to house the government offices, and a 500 foot wharf, complete with arsenal, stores, and workshops, was built to service the ruler's fleet of gunboats and steam yachts.\textsuperscript{51} Responsibility for all these undertakings was borne by the Public Works-cum-Land Department, which drew up plans, supervised the execution of government contracts, and itself carried out some of the work of construction.

Abu Bakar was also anxious to open up the northern part of the state for increased settlement by Malaysians and Chinese, and to establish there a commercial centre to counter-balance the concentration of population in the south.\textsuperscript{52} In the early 1880s Batu Pahat marked the northern limit of the gambier and pepper growing region and the transition to an area of predominantly Malaysian settlement, the rich alluvial flatlands which consisted of one small hospital in Johore Bahru run by the State Medical Officer (a qualified medical practitioner) and an apothecary in the early 1880s. In 1887 a second hospital and a dressing station were set up under apothecaries at Bandar Maharani and Batu Pahat respectively. Apart from the treatment of Indian labourers (the Chinese generally went to the Tan Tock Seng hospital in Singapore. See CO 273/143, Gov. to Sec. State, 65, 21 Feb. 1887; CO 273/151, Gov. to Sec. State, 16, 17 Jan. 1888), and the inspection of conditions on the coffee estates, the Medical Department's main functions were to advise the Government on matters of public health, combat epidemic diseases and treat convicts and government employees.

\textsuperscript{51} \textit{Singapore Free Press}, 1 Nov. 1884, 15 Nov. 1884, 6 Dec. 1884, 10 Jan. 1885, 3 Oct. 1885, 8 May 1886.

\textsuperscript{52} In 1884 it was estimated that more than half the population of Johore resided within 15 miles of the capital. See \textit{Straits Directory}, 1885.
which extend some ten miles inland and thirty miles up the coast from Batu Pahat to Kesang. Throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century this region underwent extensive settlement by Malay and Javanese agriculturalists who were attracted by the opportunities for growing fruit and vegetables for export to Singapore and Malacca. The main centres of population in the early 1880s were at Padang, Batu Pahat, and the confluence of the Muar and the Segamat, where there was an old-established and populous community of Malay padi-planters. Malays and Javanese were also settled on other parts of the Muar river, principally at Pengkalan Bukit, Bukit Kepong and Lenga, where they had established pepper plantations and where there were also a few Chinese gambier and pepper planters.53

In 1884 Dato' Luar received orders to lay out a town on the left bank of the Muar, between the river mouth and Padang, and in the following year he began the work of surveying the whole left bank of the Muar and its affluents.54 By the end of the decade Muar was a populous and prosperous province; the town, officially named Bandar Maharani in honour of the ruler's consort, had a population of about 3000, including a large number of Chinese merchants and shopkeepers, a number of government buildings and public amenities had been constructed under Dato' Luar's supervision, Padang had a population of around

53  Straits Times, 1 Sept. 1877;  Straits Directory, 1885.
54  Singapore Free Press, 1 Nov. 1884, 11 April 1885.
10,000, the interior was being settled by large numbers of Malays, Javanese, and Chinese, and regular communication by Steamer had been established between the upriver stations, Malacca, and Singapore.55

As Dato' Luar's responsibilities in connection with the development of Muar and Batu Pahat increased the administrative 'empire' over which he presided underwent a change: some of the functions of his organisation passed out of his hands entirely, others became the responsibility of new departments headed by former subordinates (who in all probability continued to regard Dato' Luar as their chief), and the Dato' himself came to occupy a supra-ordinate position as 'State Commissioner' (Pesurohjaya Keraja'an) for the area whose development was in his charge.

The first change took place in 1887, when Dato' Luar was relieved of responsibility for the records of land administration. Although these records had been under his nominal control since 1882, the actual work of maintaining the registers was carried out in a number of different offices. The 'Forest Produce Branch' (of the Land Department), which licensed and inspected the activities of woodcutters and other forest workers, was located in the office of an official of the 'State Secretariat', who was also responsible for the registration of river concessions. The registration of plantation titles was carried

55 Straits Directory, 1889.
out by two separate organizations: applications and title deeds for coffee land, an almost exclusively European concern, were handled in Singapore by the ruler's law agents, and the registration of titles to gambier and pepper plantation land was carried out in Johore Bahru by the Police Department. The reform of 1887 brought all these functions together in a single 'Department of Registration'. 56 A further re-organization two years later relieved Dato' Luar of responsibility for public works at Bandar Maharani, which now became the concern of a local branch of the Public Works Department. The survey of public works and town lands at Bandar Maharani continued to be carried out by Dato' Luar's subordinates until 1894, when this section of the Survey Department was united with the Public Works Department. In the same year the officials who carried out surveys of the gambier and pepper plantations were formed into a new 'Inspection of Gambier and Pepper Plantations Department'. These changes reduced Dato' Luar's Survey Department to a small group of surveyors, draftsmen and overseers who were at this time engaged in laying out a town and constructing government buildings at Batu Pahat.

The re-organisation of 1894 produced a four-fold division of responsibility for public works and surveys. Dato' Luar's

56 The following discussion of changes in the departments concerned with public works, lands, surveys and registrations is based on Straits Directory, 1885-95.
Survey Department carried out public works and surveys at Batu Pahat; the new Inspection of Gambier and Pepper Plantations Department assumed responsibility for the survey of gambier and pepper lands; Yahaya Awal's Land Department carried out urban land and public works surveys at Johore Bahru; and the Public Works Department (whose Commissioner was also Surveyor of Coffee Lands) carried out public works at Johore Bahru and public works and surveys at Bandar Maharani. In addition, a fifth department, the Department of Registration, was responsible for issuing land titles and permits to collect forest produce.57

WHILE the administration was being elaborated in the capital, steps were also being taken to carry the ruler's government into the countryside. This was a dual process, involving the subordination of the local headmen, both Malay and Chinese, and the introduction of a system of official authority which was independent of the local population and their leaders.

57 Registers of the classes of documents with which the Registration Department was concerned survive in the Johore Archives. See [Register of River Concessions, 1844-1902], Register Surat Jualbeli Bagian Sungai [Register of Deeds of Sale relating to Shares in River Concessions, 1896-1910], Register Surat Perjanjian Utang kerana Sungai [Register of Agreements concerning Debts relating to River Concessions, 1898-1910], Register Surat² Kongsi Bahagian Sungai [Register of Deeds of Partnership relating to Shares in River Concessions, 1896-1910], Register Surat Wakil Bahagian Sungai [Register of Letters of Attorney relating to Shares in River Concessions], Surat² Wakil bagi Sungai Daerah Johor [Letters of Attorney in respect of rivers in the Johore District, 1905-14], Register Surat² Serahan Bagian Sungai [Register of Deeds of Transfer relating to Shares in River Concessions, 1896-1910].
In this the ruler had two purposes: to establish his authority over the land and the people, and to provide for the discharge of the administrative functions upon which the regime depended.

The Temenggong's authority was already firmly established over the headmen (penghulu) of the Malay villages by the 1850s. In general, however, this simply meant that the penghulus, who were chosen by the village elders, presented themselves at Telok Belanga and received from the Temenggong's 'letter of appointment' (tauliah) which showed their authority to govern; although they exercised authority in theory as the agents of the ruler their interests and loyalties remained firmly centred in their own village community. For this reason they were not employed as instruments of the central government: instead, the ruler sent personal followers and officials from the capital to maintain his presence in the countryside and accomplish the objects of his administration. These officials were principally concerned with enforcing the ruler's regulations relating to the gambier and pepper trade, fishing, and forest produce. The purely local affairs of the Malay villagers remained largely beyond the purview of the bureaucratic administration, and although they carried out some local functions on behalf of the bureaucracy, the penghulus continued to be under the personal authority of the ruler, to whom they had at all times the right of direct access.

58 The journeys of penghulus to Telok Belanga to obtain letters of appointment are described in Daud bin Sulaiman, Rengkasan Tawarikh Orang Kaya dan Penghulu Batu Pahat (hereafter cited as Rengkasan Tawarikh), passim.
In contrast to the 'village democracy' of the Malay communities, the government of the Chinese population of the gambier and pepper regions was in the hands of 'river-lords' (kangchu) whose authority in no way emanated from the population beneath them, but was imposed from above, by the concessionaires who developed the gambier and pepper industry under licence from the ruler, and was exercised over communities in which the dominant relationships were those of master and servant, debtor and creditor. The position of the kangchus was without doubt the most extraordinary feature of the system of government which arose in Johore in the middle of the nineteenth century. Originating as agents of business enterprises, a character they never entirely lost, they became transformed into territorial rulers and eventually acquired official duties which they performed as agents of the bureaucratic administration. The kangchus' duties and privileges were laid down in the decrees of 1868-73, which also made it clear that their appointment was subject to the ruler's approval and was held during good behaviour. There was, however, no intention to subordinate the kangchus to the state bureaucracy in more than a formal sense. As Chinese headmen they stood in much the same relation to the bureaucratic administration as the Malay penghulus, while as administrators of the gambier and pepper regulations they were involved in a chain of command which led up through

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59 See ch. 5, pp. 184-87 and pp. 257-58 above.
Chinese organisations of a semi-official nature, the Kongkek, the assembly of kangchus, and the Ghi Hin society. It was with these bodies that the ruler and his officials dealt in matters concerning the Chinese and the gambier and pepper planting industry.

The process of extending the ruler's authority into the countryside independently of the penghulus and kangchus commenced in the last years of Temenggong Ibrahim's rule. In the early 1860s wakil raja ('representatives of the ruler') were stationed at strategic points throughout the country with commissions to 'watch over the good and the bad'. There was nothing systematic about these appointments, however and the differences of rank and power which existed among the wakils was considerable.

Nong Yahaya, the wakil at Pengarang, was an orang besar ('great man') who, though he policed the ruler's regulations, generally exercised power in the manner of a chief rather than a mere official; Andak bin Moyang, the wakil in the Muar-Segamat district, on the other hand, was primarily a political

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60 The Ghi Hin was the ruling secret society in Johore throughout the latter half of the century. It had the sanction of the ruler and attempts to establish other societies were rigorously suppressed (see Temenggong to Gov., 10 Sept. 1859, in Letter Book of His Highness the Maharajah, and par. 13 of the Kanun Kangchu, in Coope, 'The Kangchu System in Johore', JMBRAS vol. 14 no. 3 (1936), p. 253). The kangchus were probably local secret society heads and were subordinate to the head of the Chinese community in Johore, Tan Hick Nee, who was kapitan China at Johore Bahru in the 1860s and Major China Johor after 1872 (see n. 25 above).

61 See n. 10 above.

62 See n. 11 above.
agent, and was concerned with maintaining the ruler's influence along the ill-defined marches between Johore and the interior states of the Negri Sembilan. Yet others, notably the wakils at Batu Pahat and Pasir Godown, were little more than police functionaries and were eventually absorbed into the Police Department.63

The practice of appointing wakils who exercised general powers of government under the direct authority of the ruler persisted into the 1870s. In 1874 there were sixteen wakils or 'residents', as they were now styled in the Establishment Lists, and nine 'assistant residents'.64 By this time, however, the task of extending the arms of the central government into the countryside had been taken up. In 1874 there were thirteen district police stations, each with a resident police officer and one or two sampans manned by police peons; in addition there was a Malay policeman at each kangka (kangchu's headquarters). In most cases, however, the police stations were located in the same place as the district resident, to whom the police officials seem to have been subordinate, while the policemen in the kangkas received not only their orders but also their wages from the kangchu.65

64 Colonial Directory of the Straits Settlements, 1875.
65 Kanun Kangchu, par. 56 and 57, in Coope, 'The kangchu System in Johore', JBRAS vol. 12 no. 3 (1936), p. 258. After 1884 the police in the kangkas received their wages at Police headquarters in Johore Bahru, though the money still came ultimately from the kangchus. See notice dated 1 Rabeal Awal 1302 [19 Dec. 1884] in Tambahan Pemberi Tahu [Supplementary Notifications, 1860-98].
This muddled situation lasted until the early 1880s, when steps were taken to rationalise the arrangements for local administration and strengthen the control of the central government.

By 1885 the 'residents' and 'assistant residents' of the previous decade had disappeared and the police organisation was firmly established as the principal instrument of central government in the countryside. At the same time a new system of provincial administration came into being. In place of the dozen or so wakils there were now four provincial officials, the 'Residents' or Naib Raia ('Deputies of the Ruler') at Endau and Muar, the 'Commissioner for the East Coast and Islands', styled Dato' Penggawa Timor (Dato' Timor), who was stationed at Tanjong Surat, and the 'Commissioner for the West Coast and Islands', styled Dato' Penggawa Barat (Dato' Barat), who was stationed at Kupang. 66 These four officials were all instruments of the central administration and were under the direct authority of the Dato' Mentri. Among themselves, however, they differed widely in character and function. The Resident at Muar, Ungku Sulaiman bin Daud, was a senior administrative officer of rank and experience, 67 and under his superintendence a whole range of government departments was

66 Straits Directory, 1885, 1887.

67 Ungku Sulaiman bin Daud was assistant to the 'Secretary to the Government' (Jaafar bin Haji Mohamed) in 1873. From 1874 to 1883 he was Assistant Commissioner of Police. He was appointed to Muar in 1883. (See Tawarikh Dato' Bentara Luar, p. 84; Straits Calendar and Directory, 1875; Straits Directory, 1884).
established to provide for the administration of a populous and thriving agricultural region. At Endau, however, the situation was altogether different. There was practically no Chinese settlement, the Malay population was comparatively small, and the place derived its importance from the fact that the river marked the boundary with Pahang and gave access to the forests of the interior. The main duties of the Resident, Mohamed Ali bin Haji Khamis, a former war-leader, were to maintain peace on the border and regulate the trade in forest produce, and for this he had a personal assistant and one clerk. The connection of the two 'Commissioners' with bureaucratic administration was even more tenuous; neither had any official establishment before 1895 and their main function seems to have been, like the wakils of thirty years before, to 'watch over the good and the bad'. Though they counted as administrative officials, their positions were essentially personal.

Nevertheless, although a strong element of personal rule persisted in the arrangements for provincial government throughout Abu Bakar's reign, the innovations of the early 1880s did provide a basis for the development of a rational

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69 Straits Directory, 1883-95.

70 Dato' Timor (Ja'afar bin Nong Yahaya) was the ruler's half-brother and brother-in-law. His father was the former wakil at Tanjong Surat (see n. 10 above). Dato' Barat (Abdul Samad bin Ibrahim) was also a member of a prominent family and had been in the ruler's service since the early 1860s (see n. 9 above).
system of local administration. In particular, by disentangling the police from local wakils and kangobus, they cleared the way for the Police Department to establish itself in the countryside as an autonomous and bureaucratically organised institution.

In the 1880s a process of rationalisation was going on in the more strictly secretarial and administrative arms of the central government as well as in the technical departments and the local administration. Here, however, the attainment of the bureaucratic ideal was very much more difficult because of the involvement of the higher administrative officials in the affairs of the ruler's household.

For the greater part of Abu Bakar's reign the senior administrative officials occupied an ambivalent position between the government service and the household. Variously thought of as secretaries or ministers of state and great officers of court, they were primarily the servants of an absolute ruler whose will they carried out with little reflection as to the 'public' or 'private' nature of their duties. Ja'afar bin Haji Mohamed, who succeeded to the mentri's position (though not to his title) in 1863, continued to combine his predecessor's functions of secretary, minister, and steward until the mid-1870s. During this time his responsibilities in connection with the administration of the government increased at the expense of his

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71 See n. 65 above.
household duties. The shift in emphasis is reflected in changes in official terminology and titles. For almost a decade Ja'afar bore the court title Datot Bentara, which was conferred on him in 1865.72 In 1873 he was described in the official Establishment List as 'Secretary to the Government',73 and in the following year the title Datot Bentara was replaced by that of Dato Mentri bagi Pegawai ('Minister for Officials').74 By this time there was also a 'Private Secretary', the Englishman William Hole, who seems to have entered the ruler's service about 1873.75 Ja'afar was probably relieved of most of the more routine work of household administration at this time. Nevertheless, the innovations of the early 1870s did not signify the emergence in practice of a clear distinction between the private affairs of the ruler and the public business of the state. Ja'afar certainly did not confine himself to matters of state after 1874 and Hole, although he was styled 'Private

72 The title appears to have been conferred between April 1865 and March 1866, see Buku Peringatan Keraja'an, 18 Zulkaedah 1281 (15 April 1865), 6 Zulkaedah 1282 (22 March 1866).
73 Straits Calendar and Directory, 1874.
74 The appointment may be dated fairly certainly from entries in Buku Peringatan Keraja'an, where the title is progressively abbreviated between September 1874 and November 1875 from Dato Mentri bagi Pegawai to Dato Mentri Pegawai, Dato Mentri Johor, and finally Dato Mentri. See entries dated 6 Sha'aban 1291 (17 Sept. 1874), 21 Sha'aban 1292 (21 Sept. 1875), 8 Shawal 1292 (6 Nov. 1875), 25 Shawal 1292 (21 Nov. 1875).
75 The first mention of him is in Straits Calendar and Directory, 1874. For his career see n. 17 above.
Secretary', in fact acted as a sort of 'secretary for European affairs'. In addition, he probably supervised the household arrangements for entertaining Singapore society and was at various times entrusted with political missions in the Malay states.  

These simple secretarial arrangements were sufficient to handle the volume of government business in the 1870s; with the expansion of the administrative service in the following decade, however, it became necessary to establish a regular state secretariat. The first moves in this direction were made in 1882. In that year the court title Dato' Bentara Dalam (Dato' Dalam) was conferred on Mohamed Ibrahim bin Abdullah Munshi, who emerged from the obscurity of the household to take a place in the official administrative hierarchy of the state. In the Establishment List compiled in 1882 Dato' Dalam and the Dato' Mentri appear, each with his own establishment of three or four clerks, as heads of the State Secretariat, and another official, Abdul Rahman bin Andak, is listed as 'Secretary and English Translator to the Government' under the Dato' Mentri.  

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76 See ch. 8,  
77 The title was probably conferred in 1882, at the same time as Mohamed Saleh bin Perang became Dato' Bentara Luar and ceased to be Commissioner of Police. See Straits Directory, 1882, 1883.  
78 Abdul Rahman bin Andak was the son of the ruler's representative in Ulu Muar (see n. 11 above). He was sent to England to be educated in 1871 and returned in 1878. See Buku Peringatan Keraja'an, 3 Zulhijjah 1287 (23 Feb. 1871), 24 Shawal 1295 (20 Oct. 1878).  
79 Straits Directory, 1883.
At this stage no clear distinction was maintained in practice between the officials of the secretariat and the various departments. For several years the Dato' Mentri, Dato' Dalam, and their clerks took an active part in the administration of a number of departments. The Dato' Mentri was personally responsible for the Marine Department and probably also for the Arsenal, and in addition the work of the English Translator and some of the work of the Treasury was carried out under his immediate supervision. At the same time Dato' Dalam held the positions of Treasurer, Registrar of River Concessions, and head of the Education Department, the Government Printing Office, and the Forest Produce Branch of the Land Department (which licenced and inspected the activities of wood-cutters and others). This administrative pluralism was, however, only a passing phase; in the main it was eliminated by reforms carried through in 1885 and 1886 which established a clearer line of demarcation between the State Secretariat and, on the one hand, the government departments, on the other, the ruler's household.

In 1885 the connection between the clerical establishments in the State Secretariat and the departments which had been under the control of the Dato' Mentri and Dato' Dalam was ended

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80 The Marine Department and the Arsenal had been closely connected in the 1870s. In 1886 they came under the authority of T.R. Ker (see Straits Directory, 1887; Dato' Mentri to T.R. Ker, 10 Nov. 1886, in [Dato' Mentri's Letter Book, Johore Archives].

81 Straits Directory, 1883-85.
and most of these now acquired permanent heads of their own.²²

In the following year Abdul Rahman bin Andak, the 'English Translator and Secretary' under the Dato' Mentri, received the title Dato' Sri Amar diRaja (Dato' Amar) and was appointed Private Secretary (in succession to Hole) and head of a new office which was created to handle European affairs.³³ At the same time new positions were created for the officials who were now responsible for the administration of the household. In 1886 a Penghulu Istana ('Mayor of the Palace') was appointed to supervise the domestic administration of the household and a Penghulu Ista'adat ('Master of Ceremonies') was placed in charge of matters of court ceremony.³⁴ There was also now an aide-de-camp, who was well-versed in the conventions of European society³⁵ and who probably took over from the Private Secretary many duties of a social and semi-private nature which Hole had formerly discharged.

²² Straits Directory, 1885-87. The exceptions were the Treasury, which remained under Dato' Dalam until 1889, and the Education Department and the Government Printing Office, which remained under Dato' Dalam's general control throughout Abu Bakar's reign.

³³ This office was established at 15, Stamford Road, Singapore, which became known as Johore House (see entry no. 34 in Peringatan Dato' Mentri Johor: Segala Pekerja'an [General Memorandum Book of the Dato' Mentri of Johore, 1885-88, in Johore Archives]; Straits Directory, 1887-96.

³⁴ Straits Directory, 1888, 1887.

³⁵ This was Tengku Osman, known as 'Tengku Osman London', who was educated in England at the same time as Dato' Amar (see n. 78 above). He was the son of the ruler's eldest brother, Ungku Abdul Rahman, and was for some years heir-apparent to the throne of Johore.
The emergence of the State Secretariat as a supra-ordinate administrative body, separate from the household, and charged with the supervision of the state bureaucracy, was associated with other changes which had as their object the rationalisation of financial administration. This, the most important aspect of the ruler's government, was the last to yield to bureaucratic organisation.

Though the arrangements for financial administration in the 1860s and 1870s are by no means clear, it would seem that throughout most of this period the proceeds of the major revenue farms were received by the ruler's brothers, Ungku Abdul Rahman and Ungku Abdul Mejid at Telok Belanga.

Ungku Abdul Rahman was the second son of Temenggong Ibrahim, by a wife who was European or Eurasian. He was the executor of Ibrahim's will (see n. 88 below) and regent for Abu Bakar during his absence overseas in 1866 and 1875. At other times he administered important affairs of state as the ruler's 'Fully-empowered Representative' (vakil mutlak). In 1869 he was made a J.P. of Singapore. He died in 1876 at the age of 41.

Ungku Abdul Mejid, who was ten years younger than Abdul Rahman, was Temenggong Ibrahim's son by a Chinese wife. In 1867 he accompanied a British expedition to the Nicobars. In the late 1860s and the first half of the 1870s he assisted Ungku Abdul Rahman. After Abdul Rahman's death he became chief financial administrator at Telok Belanga. He acted as regent (perangku raja) during the Abu Bakar's absence overseas in 1878 and thereafter. In the early 1880s he moved to Johore Bahru and was for a short time official Treasurer. In 1884 he visited Europe and the Middle East. He died in 1889, at the age of 44.

Abdul Rahman and Abdul Mejid were also responsible for the management of the landed property belonging to the ruler and the ruling family in Singapore, most of which was mortgaged or in other ways charged with the ruler's debts. This included property held in trust for the ruling family, which was charged with state debts arising out of the Pahang war, amounting to
It appears to have been the practice, at least in the early 1870s, to send a fixed proportion of these proceeds to Johore to pay the wages of officials and other expenses and to retain the balance in Singapore and apply it to such objects as the payment of bills for government supplies and the servicing of the ruler's debts. Though a Treasury Department was established in Johore about 1873, Telok Belanga remained the main centre of financial administration until the early 1880s, when Ungku around $60,000, which were not paid off until 1873 (see item 100 in [Miscellaneous Bundles of Documents in the Johore Archives], which contains accounts relating to the trust between 1862 and 1878, when it was distributed). The land at Telok Belanga, which belonged to the ruler, was also usually mortgaged to cover his debts. See Indenture dated 22 March 1866 relating to mortgage of land at Telok Belanga for $13,000, in [Miscellaneous Bundles]; CO 273/66, Maharaja to Gov., 31 March 1873, encl. in Gov. to Sec. State, 119, 24 April 1873.

89
See item 29 in [Miscellaneous Bundles], instructions from the ruler to Ungku Abdul Rahman, dated 17 Moharam 1287 [20 April 1870].

90
The proceeds of the revenue farms were probably paid into bank accounts operated in the ruler's name in Singapore. Between 30 June 1870 and 30 June 1873 $45,173 was paid into an account with the Oriental Bank Corporation. Of this $44,838 was withdrawn in the same period, mainly by Ungku Abdul Mejid. See Oriental Bank Corporation bank-book in [Miscellaneous Bundles].

91
Straits Calendar and Directory, 1874; Colonial Directory of the Straits Directory Settlements, 1875. The Treasurer was Ungku Haji Mohamed, a cousin of the ruler, and he had two clerks under him. The department was probably established to deal with minor revenue farms and to supervise government expenditure in Johore Bahru. Its functions were probably taken over by the Dato' Mentri in 1878 (if not before), when Ungku Haji accompanied the ruler on a visit to Europe. (See item 102 in [Miscellaneous Bundles], entitled Surat Perentah dari kabawah duli Yang Maha Mulia Tuanku sapeninggalannya belayar ka-Eropah ('Instructions of His Highness on leaving for Europe'), dated 12 Jamadal Awal 1295 [12 May 1878].
Abdul Mejid moved to Johore and was officially recognised as Treasurer. At first this move simply meant that the official who had charge of the major revenues was more often than not resident in Johore Bahru, where he devoted much of his time to the supervision of public works expenditure. Other financial administration was carried out under his over-all control by two 'Assistant Treasurers', Dato' Dalam and Ungku Mohamed Khalid, and by clerks under Dato' Dalam and the Dato' Mentri. In 1883, in a move towards the consolidation of financial administration, Dato' Dalam became Treasurer and the positions of Assistant were abolished. These changes were largely formal, however, and did not signify the end of either Ungku Abdul Mejid's or Ungku Mohamed Khalid's association with the administration of the finances. The first changes
of real importance came in 1885, when the Treasury establishment became almost entirely separate from the clerical establishments in the State Secretariat and was strengthened by the addition of two cashiers. At the same time a new Audit Office was set up. By 1887 both the Treasury and the Audit office functioned as distinct arms of the government. 98

The establishment of the Treasury and the Audit Office as real departments with their own full-time officials was followed by attempts to bring the financial administration of the government service under effective control. For several years, however, financial administration remained dispersed, for although Dato' Dalam was officially Treasurer both Ungku Abdul Mejid and the Dato' Mentri took a hand in administering the finances. 99 The movement towards stricter control did not really get going until after the death of Ungku Abdul Mejid, in 1889. The Dato' Mentri then took over complete control of the government finances, Dato' Dalam was promoted from Treasurer to the new position of Timbalan Dato' Mentri ('Deputy to the Dato' Mentri'), and the position of Treasurer

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98 Straits Directory, 1886, 1888.
99 In 1888 Ungku Abdul Mejid signed an agreement to let the gambier and pepper farm on behalf of the government. (See item 127 in 'Miscellaneous Bundles', entitled Surat Perjanjian Prijak Gambir Lada Johor ('Agreement concerning the Gambier and Pepper Farm of Johore'), dated 19 Nov. 1888. It may well be that Ungku Abdul Mejid was still receiving the proceeds of the principal revenue farms at this time. The impression in Singapore was that he still directed the State finances at the time of his death. See Singapore Free Press, 2 April 1889.
was left vacant. Under the Dato' Mentri's direction the fixed procedures of bureaucratic administration were now applied to the financial transactions of the government departments. Shortly after Ungku Abdul Mejid's death the cashier in the Treasury was instructed to make no loans out of government funds and to pay no wages or salaries without authority; in the following month the Police Department, the Court, and the Registration Department were informed that in future all income from fees, fines, etc, should be paid into the Treasury and not, as had often been the case in the past, retained in the department.

These and subsequent reforms went a long way towards bringing the government departments under effective financial control. At the higher level of administration, however, many of the informal and unbusiness-like practices which had characterised Ungku Abdul Mejid's administration of the finances persisted, for although the Dato' Mentri bore the

100 *Straits Directory, 1890*

101 Dato' Mentri to cashier, 18 April 1889, in [Dato' Mentri's Letter Book, 1886-91]. In the previous month two of the ruler's brothers had been given larger salaries (for which they were obliged to sign receipts) and were forbidden to appropriate government funds for their own use. See letters of Dato' Mentri to Ungku Abdullah and Ungku Mohamed Khalid, 19 March 1889, in [Dato' Mentri's Letter Book].

102 Letters of Dato' Mentri to Commissioner of Police, Hakim (Judge), and head of the Registration Department, 10 May 1889, in [Dato' Mentri's Letter Book].

103 It had been the custom in the past to make loans to officials and members of the ruling family out of government funds, despite the fact that the ruler was himself obliged to raise loans at high rates of interest. A striking instance of this occurred in 1886. At that time, when the ruler was
principal responsibility for financial administration the state revenues continued to be at the personal disposal of the ruler, whose requirements took precedence over those of the government. The result was that large loans carrying high rates of interest were raised for non-productive purposes which were made a charge on the state revenues, and as these debts accumulated various financial expedients were resorted to which vastly complicated the work of financial administration and tended to nullify the reforms of the 1880s. By 1898 the state finances were in a chaotic state: Government salaries were many months in arrears, contractor's bills were outstanding, and official payments were being made by the Dato' Mentri out of his private funds. A solution to these difficulties was then sought in a completely new system of control whereby the new ruler (Sultan Ibrahim) became his own Treasurer. The effect of this was to introduce a sense of economy into the ruler's household while at the same time preserving his personal control over

paying 8% p.a. on a large overdraft with the Chartered Bank, cash in hand totalling $53,000 was loaned to the Dato' Mentri and Seah Leang Chee for three years at 6% to enable them to buy shares in the Johore-Singapore opium and spirits farms. See item 40 in [Miscellaneous Bundles].

In September 1887 the ruler's debts to the Chartered Bank amounted to $440,089, of which $79,194 represented interest at 8% p.a. (see item 191 in [Miscellaneous Bundles], which contains a statement of these debts). In 1889 a third of the state revenues ($384,000 out of a total of $1,003,000) was being applied to the liquidation of the ruler's debts. See entry no. 46 in Peringatan Dato' Mentri Johor: Segala Pekerja'an [General Memorandum Book of the Dato' Mentri of Johore, 1885-89].

Dato' Mentri to Sultan, 29 Sept. 1898, in [State Secretariat: Outward Letters, 1891-99].
the disposal of the state revenues. After this the government finances were reduced to order under the ruler's personal direction.

As the process of isolating and departmentalising the functions of government proceeded, the resemblance of the Johore administration to the Government of the Straits Settlements, upon which it was explicitly modelled, became less a matter of mere form and more one of substance. There were limits on how far this process could go, however. The essential difference between the Straits Government and the Government of Johore lay in the relationship of the bureaucracy to the ruler and the governing class. In the British colony the governor and all the officials under him were public functionaries whose administrative actions were carried out under the rule of law. In Johore this was not the case. The ruler was completely exempt from any requirements of bureaucratic or legal procedure, the government was in a very real sense his own, and the distinction between the ruler's 'private' affairs and the 'public' business of the state was by no means clear. The consequence of this was that while a considerable degree of bureaucratisation took place in the technical departments, which were beyond the immediate purview of the ruler, the areas of government in which he was personally involved (notably that in which the Treasury operated) failed to achieve a substantial degree of rational organisation despite the fact that the forms of bureaucracy were applied to them.
CHAPTER 8

POLITICAL RELATIONS

THROUGHOUT the nineteenth century the external relations of the rulers of Johore were conducted within limits which were imposed by the aims and interests of British policy in the Straits of Malacca. In a sense Johore was the first British protectorate in the Malay Peninsula, in as much as the ruler was prohibited by the Treaty of August 1824 (and later by the Johore-Pahang Treaty of 1862) from maintaining independent foreign relations. Johore was also the first Peninsular state to receive a large influx of Chinese from the Straits Settlements and the first to attract the investment of Straits (Chinese) capital on a large scale. Nevertheless, despite the early development of British interest in the country, Johore managed to retain a greater degree of substantial independence, at least in internal affairs, for a longer period of time than any other Peninsular state. The explanation of this is to be sought in the political and economic conditions within Johore, and in the conditions under which the Straits Government pursued its 'forward policy' during the latter half of the nineteenth century.

The 'forward policy' of direct intervention in the government of the Peninsular states was the policy of the local officials of the Straits Settlements. Its acceptance
by the Home Government, which had traditionally sought to restrict the growth of imperial responsibilities, was the major British political decision affecting the Malay states in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The change was signalled in 1873, when the Colonial Office was driven to admit that action of some sort was necessary to restore peace and security in the tin mining states of the West Coast. Within a year the principal mining states, Perak, Selangor, and Sungai Ujong, accepted British Residents whose advice had to be followed on all matters not directly related to Malay custom and religion. After this, however, the Colonial Office drew back and refused to sanction any further extension of British responsibility until the Residential system had proved itself in these states. The effect of this veto was to halt the British advance for almost a decade. During this time the local authorities found it convenient to exercise an indirect influence over the states beyond their formal control through the ruler of Johore, whose prestige and influence on the Peninsula accordingly rose to a great height.

The introduction of the Residential system into Perak, Selangor, and Sungai Ujong was in response to conditions of anarchy and civil war which appeared, in Perak at least, to be moving towards the complete collapse of the political system. In all three states the development of large-scale tin mining operations had upset the traditional balance of power between the ruler and his chiefs and introduced large numbers of Chinese whose secret society rivalries found
expression in violent conflict for control of the mines. In Perak and Selangor a further element of instability was introduced by internal dissensions within the royal house.

In Johore the position of the ruler was much stronger. In the first place, the Malay population was comparatively small and there were no powerful local chiefs. For this reason the Temenggong was able to impose his authority on the country with little difficulty. The only challenge to his power came from the royal house, and by 1855 this had, for all practical purposes, been defeated. Another factor of considerable importance was the strength of the Temenggong's position vis-a-vis his kinsmen, which was also largely a product of the absence of a hierarchy of district chieftainships: not being provided for territorially, the ruler's brothers and cousins remained dependent upon the ruler's grace and obedient to his wishes.

The nature of Chinese enterprise in Johore also favoured the emergence of a stable structure of authority. In Perak, Selangor and Sungai Ujong the Chinese were engaged in tin mining, a speculative extractive industry which concentrated population in a few small areas and gave rise to intense competition for control of the mines. In Johore on the other hand, the Chinese cultivated gambier and pepper, a sober unspectacular enterprise involving patient toil for a relatively small return, the population was dispersed over a wide area, and the element of competition, which in the mining states found
expression in fierce secret society rivalries, was lacking.\footnote{In Johore only one secret society, the Ghi Hin, was permitted, and attempts by rival societies to gain a footing were rigorously suppressed. See ch. 7, p. 275, n. 60.}

Under these circumstances the Chinese settlement of Johore proceeded in a peaceful and orderly manner and no serious strain was placed on the arrangements made by the Chinese themselves for the management of their own affairs. The strength and stability of the Chinese system of authority was quickly appreciated by the Malay ruler. It was accordingly subordinated and institutionalised to provide internal self-government of a kind which relieved the ruler of the necessity to interfere directly in the affairs of the alien community.

Johore's internal stability, which was largely the product of historical accident, must be accounted the principal reason why no attempt was made to bring the state under the Residential system in 1874. There were, however, other reasons which owed more to the constructive ability of the ruler than to fortuitous circumstances. Under pressure from the British, bureaucratic institutions were established on the model of the Straits Government to safeguard the interests of Singapore Chinese with investments in the country and to provide for the administration of justice in accordance with certain minimum standards of procedure demanded by the Straits Government in cases involving the rights of British subjects. Between 1855 and 1867 a police force and court were established, a schedule of maximum penalties for various offences was introduced, and provision was made for the issue of land titles and the registration of

\footnote{In Johore only one secret society, the Ghi Hin, was permitted, and attempts by rival societies to gain a footing were rigorously suppressed. See ch. 7, p. 275, n. 60.}
agreements relating to the gambier and pepper industry. During the governorship of Sir Harry Ord (1867-73) the bureaucratic organisation was extended and a start was made on public works and surveys. By the end of Ord's term the Government of Johore was beginning to resemble that of the Straits Settlements, and although the resemblance was more formal than substantial, the administration nevertheless functioned well enough for the needs of the gambier and pepper industry. Most important of all, appeals to the Singapore authorities by British Subjects in Johore were rare.

In the early 1870s, when the Straits officials were anxious to justify a policy of limited intervention, Johore was held up as a shining example of what good government could achieve in the Malay States and great play was made with the fact that the establishment of a progressive administration was the result of British advice. By 1883, however, the situation had changed. Johore was no longer in the vanguard of progress on the Peninsula; Perak, Selangor and Sungai Ujong had been under the rule of British officers for almost a decade and an administrative system which conformed more closely to British standards of efficiency than anything in Johore was functioning in all these states. Moreover, the local authorities were eager to bring more territory under their rule and the Colonial Office was now ready to permit this. By 1890 all the Peninsular states not under Siamese domination had been brought under the control of British Residents except Johore. The most important acquisition of the 1880s was Pahang, which was already a mining
state of some importance and which was believed to contain almost limitless natural resources. The Straits Government was anxious to move in and control the exploitation of these resources before the whole country became parcelled out among a few big concessionaires. In 1887 a treaty was forced on the ruler which obliged him to accept a British agent and at the first opportunity (in 1888) the full Residential system was introduced. The Negri Sembilan states, an untidy patchwork of petty and in some cases conflicting jurisdictions between Malacca and Selangor, were brought under British administration in 1883-89 in order to round out British control in the central region of the West Coast and facilitate the development of communications.

The considerations which led to the extension of the Residential system into Pahang and the Negri Sembilan also applied to some extent to Johore. No one believed that Johore was an Eldorado of untapped mineral wealth, but it was thought that the country had a bright future as a grower of tea, cocoa and coffee, crops in which Europeans were interested. The prospect of large-scale European investment in the country intensified the Straits Government's desire to gain control of the state. This was also considered desirable in view of long range plans for running a railway through the West Coast states to link the Settlements. Moreover, by the early 1880s the ruler's influence in the Peninsular states, which the British had made use of in the preceding decade, was coming to be regarded with disfavour by the Straits Government.
That Johore did not come under British administration in the 1880s was due to a number of factors. In the first place there was no local pressure for intervention in Johore outside official circles. The Singapore Chinese and Europeans with interests in Johore were totally opposed to any move in this direction and their views found expression in both the local press and the Legislative Council. Furthermore, although the Johore Government was undoubtedly less efficient than the governments of the states under British administration, there were signs of continuing progress. While the Residential system was being extended to Negri Sembilan and Pahang the ruler of Johore was enlarging and extending his own government in order to provide the facilities of the states under British administration. These did not reach the same standard as in the British-administered states but it was difficult to point to specific failings of a serious nature which might justify the appointment of a Resident against the ruler's wishes. The

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2 The Teo-chiu who controlled the Johore gambier and pepper trade had a strong interest in preserving Johore as a Teo-chiu preserve under Malay rule; British control would have meant the end of their monopoly. Similarly, the ruler's business agents (Paterson, Simons & Co.) bankers (the Chartered Bank) and legal advisers (Rodyk & Davidson) drew a great profit from Johore which was bound to end if the state came under British administration. These interests were well represented on the Legislative Council. In the 1880s Seah Leang Seah, the President of the Kongkek, W.G. Gulland ('the honorable member for Johore') and Thomas Shelford, both partners in Paterson, Simons & Co., were members of the Council. Shelford also had an interest in the Singapore Free Press, which was edited for some time in the 1880s by O.B. Buckley of Rodyk & Davidson, who was also for many years a personal friend and adviser of the ruler of Johore.
case for such an appointment was further weakened by the
proximity of the Johore capital to Singapore, which enabled the
Governor to maintain a personal influence over the ruler in
matters concerning the internal as well as the external affairs
of the country.

Also of importance in the preservation of Johore's
independence was the fact that by the 188Os Abu Bakar was well
known in England and had influential connections in English
Society and in the City. Abu Bakar was the first, and for
many years the only Malay ruler to visit the Western world. His
first visit was undertaken at the suggestion of Governor Cavenagh
in 1866, on the eve of the transfer of the Straits Settlements
from the Government of India to the Colonial Office. On this
classification he met the officials of the Colonial Office, toured
the main industrial cities of the British Isles, and was
presented to the Queen (who made him a Knight Commander of the
Order of the Star of India) and the Prince of Wales. These
contacts with the Royal Family were highly valued and sedulously
cultivated. In 1869, when the Queen's second son, the sailor
Duke of Edinburgh (later reigning Duke of Saxe Coburg and Gotha)

3 Chief among Abu Bakar's City connections was William Paterson
of Paterson, Simons & Co. Paterson retired from the East in
1864 but his connection with the firm continued until 1895.
He was also for many years chairman of the board of directors
of the Chartered Bank (Abu Bakar's bankers). See obituary
in Straits Budget, 18 Jan. 1898.

4 CO 273/7, F.O. to C.O., 14 Sept. 1866, and following
correspondence; London Times, 15 May, 6 June, 1 Sept. 1866.
visited Singapore, Abu Bakar (who had met him at a banquet in London) triumphantly carried him off to Johore to be entertained and stay overnight in the new palace, which was hastily completed for the occasion. In December 1875, at the height of the Perak crisis, he dashed off to India (against the Governor's wishes) to meet the Prince of Wales. He again visited England in 1878, 1885-86, 1889-91, 1893, and 1895, and on each occasion he was well-received by the Royal Family and lionised by London society. This aspect of Abu Bakar's relationship with the British power became increasingly important during the last twelve years of his reign. Though the Colonial Office had come to the conclusion that Johore should be brought under the Residential system it was reluctant to try to force this change on the ruler. In this they were no doubt influenced by the fear of political trouble in England. It was one thing to bully chiefs around on the fringes of the empire, and quite another to deal harshly with a ruler whose name was almost a household word in the metropolitan country and who might be seen, in company of the Prince of Wales, at Cowes Regatta or the Derby.

5 Straits Times, 11 Dec. 1869; Singapore Free Press, 2 Oct. 1886. The Straits Times, in reporting the visit, noted that it would be 'long remembered in the annals of this part of the world, from the display of Oriental magnificence and the profuse liberality that marked the occasion'.

6 This visit was arranged by the previous Governor, Sir Andrew Clarke, who was now on the Viceroy's Council. See R.H. Vetch, Life of Lieut.-General the Hon. Sir Andrew Clarke, p. 194.
THE preservation of the independence of his Government in matters of internal administration was the principal object of Abu Bakar's foreign policy. In addition to this, however, he had ambitions of personal aggrandisement and territorial expansion; he wished to be recognised as a ruler of royal rank, to extend his influence through the Peninsular states, and to absorb as much as possible of the neighbouring territories which had once formed part of the Johore empire. After the failure of his first foreign adventure, the attempt to gain a footing in Pahang, Abu Bakar turned his attention to the West Coast states, where the opportunities for extending his power and influence were greater. Immediately to his north were Muar, then under the nominal rule of Sultan Ali, and the tiny inland states of the Negri Sembilan which had formed part of the Johore empire in the eighteenth century. Their politics were now in a state of confusion and as their principal water outlet was via the Muar river, of which Johore commanded the left bank, there was some chance that they might be brought under the control of Johore. Beyond Muar and the inland states were the mining states, Perak, Selangor and Sungai Ujong (the most important of the Negri Sembilan states), where political upheavals offered further opportunities for Abu Bakar to extend his influence beyond his own borders.

It was not only Abu Bakar who was interested in the troubled politics of the West Coast states. The Straits Settlements had always been concerned to prevent disorders in the neighbouring
states, and as these increased, with the intensification of competition among the Malay chiefs and the Chinese secret societies for control of the tin mines, its concern deepened. At the same time European commercial interests were beginning to look increasingly to the Peninsula as a field of investment. In the early 1870s the Straits Government and the local business community were agreed on the need for action to restore order in the mining states and the desirability of bringing them under closer control. The Colonial Office, however, was firmly opposed to any extension of British responsibilities in the Peninsula and Sir Harry Ord, the first Governor appointed by the Colonial Office, was prohibited from embarking on any course of action having this tendency. Under these circumstances the local authorities were obliged to rely on the old policy of encouraging 'progressive' and 'amenable' elements in the Malay ruling class in the hope that through them it might be possible to establish the conditions of stability necessary for exploiting the resources of the Peninsular states. In this connection the case of Johore assumed considerable importance during Sir Harry Ord's term as Governor.

Tactless and overbearing in manner, Ord was generally...

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7 Major-Gen. Sir Harry St George Ord, R.E., C.B., G.C.M.G., served in the Royal Engineers for 20 years before joining the Colonial Service. In the 10 years before his appointment to the Straits Settlements he was successively Governor of Dominica, and Bermuda, and Special Commissioner to West Africa. His term as Governor of the Straits Settlements lasted from April 1867 until November 1873. Subsequently he served as Governor of Western Australia (1877-79). He died in 1885.
unpopular in the Straits Settlements throughout his term as Governor. His relations with the ruler of Johore, on the other hand, were always most cordial. Ord was charmed by Abu Bakar's courtly manner and delighted with his professions of subservience to the British interest. His eulogies of the Malay prince were fulsome:

In his habits and tastes he is an English gentleman, as a Ruler, he is anxious to promote in every way the advancement of and civilization of his people, and [he] is the only Rajah in the whole peninsula, or in the adjoining states, who rules in accordance with the practice of civilized nations.

He is deeply attached to the British Government and nation, and feeling that with their support and encouragement he is most likely to benefit his country he takes no steps of importance in administration without the advice of the local government, whilst he is ready at all times to place the whole resources of his country at our disposal. Ord's vanity was no doubt flattered by the deference with which Abu Bakar treated him, but there were also serious considerations of policy which influenced his attitude to Abu Bakar. Ord was highly impressed with the beneficent results of British advice in Johore and regarded Johore as a model for the extension of British influence on the Peninsula. For this reason he was anxious to show favour to its ruler:

I deem it of very great importance that the Government should manifest openly and in as marked a manner as possible its appreciation of and sympathy with a Sovereign who has not hesitated to ally himself so intimately with us, and to attempt to govern his

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8 After Ord's death Abu Bakar, who was in England at the time, had a village institute built in his memory. See C.N. Parkinson, *British Intervention in Malaya*, p. 105.

9 CO 273/17, Gov. to Sec. State, 22, 10 Feb. 1868.
country in accordance with the custom of civilized nations. It is in this way that we have the best chance of influencing other rulers and of inducing them to adopt more liberal and sensible views in the Government of their countries and the treatment of their people.  

In conformity with this policy Ord supported Abu Bakar's bid for recognition as a ruler of royal rank. During his visit to England the outlandish title Temenggong had been dropped in favour of Maharaja and the unofficial use of this title was continued after his return.  

Ord approved of the change and gave instructions that Abu Bakar should receive a royal salute of 21 guns on official visits to the Settlement or British warships. This led to a dispute with the officers of the Naval Station, who questioned that the 'so-called Maharaja' was a ruler of royal rank and maintained that he was entitled to no more than 15 guns under Naval Regulations.

10 Loc. cit.

11 At first Abu Bakar was referred to in England by his full title as 'H.H. Datu Tumongong Abubakar Sri Maharajah, of Johore'. This soon became 'H.H. Datu Tumungung Abubakar Sri, Maharajah of Johore' and it was under this style (with the spelling 'Datu Tommongong Abu Bakar Sri, Maharajah of Johore') that he was gazetted for the Order of the Star of India. After this change was made he was styled 'H.H. the Maharajah of Johore' in press notices and in letters from the Colonial Office. (See London Times, 15 May, 6 June, 7 July, 1 Sept, 5 Sept. 1866; CO 273/7, F.O. to C.O., 14 Sept. 1866; CO 273/17, minute on Gov. to Sec. State, 22, 10 Feb. 1868). Back in Singapore Ord was already referring to Abu Bakar as 'Maharajah' in official correspondence several months before the formal request to drop the title Temenggong was made (see CO 273/12, Gov. to Sec. State, 90, 5 Sept. 1867).

12 CO 273/17, Gov. to Sec. State, 22, 10 Feb. 1868, and enclosures.

13 CO 273/17, Heneage to Senior Naval Officer, 30 Nov. 1867, Senior Naval Officer to Gov. 12 Dec. 1867, Gov. to Senior
Abu Bakar then made a formal request that the title Temenggong should be discontinued as being 'altogether inapplicable to the sovereign ruler of the country', and the whole question of his status was referred to the Colonial Office. Ord declared that he was a ruler of the highest rank with which the Straits Government was likely to have relations and strongly recommended that he should receive 21 guns. The Colonial Office was at first inclined to agree to this but eventually, out of deference to the Indian Office, Abu Bakar's salute was fixed at 17 guns, which thus became the royal salute for Malay rulers of the highest rank. At the same time the Colonial Office sanctioned the adoption of the title Maharaja as the future designation of the ruler of Johore.

As Maharaja of Johore, K.C.S.I., Abu Bakar now took his place at the head of the hierarchy into which the Straits Government was beginning to sort the Peninsular rulers. Only three other rulers, Sultan Ali of Muar and the Sultans of

Naval Officer, 10 Feb. 1868, encl. in Gov. to Sec. State, 22, 10 Feb. 1868.

14 CO 273/17, Temenggong to Gov., 8 Feb. 1868, encl. in Gov. to Sec. State, 10 Feb. 1868. About the same time Abu Bakar sent off a box of manila cheroots to the Prince of Wales, with a hint that the hunting in Johore might offer attractions 'to a sportsman like the Prince of Wales'. See Temenggong to Prince of Wales, 28 Jan. 1868, in Letter Book of His Highness the Maharajah.

15 CO 273/17, Gov. to Sec. State, 22, 10 Feb. 1868.

16 CO 273/24, I.O. to C.O., 7 May 1868, and minutes, and Sec. State to Gov., 79, 20 May 1868, and 80, 20 May 1868. See also CO 273/17, minute on Gov. to Sec. State, 10 Feb. 1868.
Selangor and Trengganu, were recognised by the British as bearing a higher title than Abu Bakar's, and of these only the first two were accorded a royal salute equal to his own.¹⁷ No other Malay prince had been admitted to a British order of knighthood.

Having done so much for Abu Bakar, Ord might reasonably have expected some return in the way of support for the objects of British policy on the Peninsula. To a certain extent this was forthcoming, but from this time on, as the British began to take an increasingly active interest in the politics of the Malay states, Abu Bakar played a double game. Abu Bakar was opposed to the extension of British control over the Peninsular states for two reasons. In the first place any move in this direction posed a threat ultimately to his own independence. In addition, it had the immediate effect of reducing his influence in the neighbouring states.

Traditionally this depended very largely on his association with the British. Abu Bakar, like his father before him, was considered to be an adept in dealing with the European and was believed to have the Governor's ear. Chiefs therefore sought his advice, and if unsure of their reception often made their approach to the Governor through his mediation.

¹⁷ The salutes to be accorded Malay rulers were laid down in Straits Government Gazette, Notice of 15 Sept. 1869 (see in CO 273/105, Gov. to Sec. State, 263, 7 Dec. 1880). The Sultan of Trengganu received a lesser salute (15 guns) presumably because he was considered to be a vassal of Siam. An anomaly was that the ruler of Perak was acknowledged merely as a 'chief' and was allowed 13 guns.
Conversely, the British had long been in the habit of making use of his services in their dealings with various of the Peninsular rulers. The general effect of this was to give the ruler of Johore an influence on the Peninsula which was out of all proportion to his rank among the Malay princes and which his wealth alone would not have brought him. Abu Bakar was understandably anxious that this situation should not be upset by moves to bring the Malay states under more direct British control. It was impossible for him to obstruct the British advance openly, however. On the contrary, since his own position depended on the connection with the British, he was obliged to associate himself with the British advance to a certain extent. Abu Bakar's opposition to the British advance in the 1870s in fact amounted to no more than covert support for anti-British elements in the West Coast states. Moreover, in some cases (notably Selangor) his policy was determined primarily by considerations other than opposition to the British. 18

In the early 1870s Selangor became the scene of a bitter struggle between Tengku Zia'u'd-din (Tengku Kudin), the so-called Viceroy of Selangor, a Kedah prince who was married to a daughter of the Sultan of Selangor, and Raja Mahdi, the

18 In Perak Abu Bakar's support (which was only moral, so far as is known) for the anti-British Sultan Ismail may have owed something to a desire to see the sultanate pass to a new line which would be less haughty in its attitude to Abu Bakar's own dynasty.
grandson of a former Sultan. What commenced as a competition between Kudin and Mahdi for possession of Klang, which controlled the main route to the mines in the interior, eventually turned into a general war involving all the important factions in Selangor, Chinese as well as Malay, and also the chiefs of Sungai Ujong and Rembau and the rulers of Johore and Pahang. After July 1871 the British were also involved, their support being given to Tengku Kudin.  

The British decision to back Kudin against Mahdi followed logically from the policy of supporting progressive and amenable chiefs against the forces of anarchy and disorder. Tengku Kudin was a prince with Western tastes and inclinations; he was used to dealing with Europeans, had an interest in regular administration, and professed a desire to follow the example of the Maharaja of Johore in matters of government. Until it became possible to put in a British Resident, Tengku Kudin offered the best chance for good government in Selangor; he employed Europeans in his government -mainly in military capacities, it was true- he sought the assistance of advisers in the Straits Settlements, and above all, he was 'amenable'. Raja Mahdi, on the other hand, was a Malay warrior of the old school, 'the best representative of all that was piratical.

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19 For a full discussion of the Selangor war in relation to British policy see C.D. Cowan, Nineteenth Century Malaya: The Origins of British Political Control. To this work and to Emma Sadka, 'The Residential System in the Protected Malay States, 1874-1895' (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Australian National University, 1960) the following account is indebted.
and reactionary in Selangor.\textsuperscript{20} He was, in the opinion of C.J. Irving, the Straits Auditor-General, 'little better than a treacherous lying savage'.\textsuperscript{21} Ord described him as 'one of the most crafty, energetic and mischievous chiefs in the Peninsula'.\textsuperscript{22} Unfortunately for the plans of the British, he was also (as Wilkinson observes) 'at the head of all that the Malays considered the chivalry of Selangor'.\textsuperscript{23} Furthermore, when the foreigner Tengku Kudin, who had never been popular in Selangor, gained control of the Klang and Selangor rivers, the Selangor chiefs generally began to favour Raja Mahdi. Nor was this all. In time it became clear that Britain's cherished ally, the Maharaja of Johore, also supported the 'treacherous lying savage' and cared nothing for Tengku Kudin's 'intelligence and honesty of purpose'.

The ramifications of the contest between Tengku Kudin and Raja Mahdi began to emerge in 1872. Kudin had an alliance with Yap Ah Loy, the head of the Kuala Lumpur tin mines, and was powerfully supported by financial interests in the Straits Settlements. His principal European backers were W.H. Read, of the firm of A.L. Johnstone & Co., and the lawyer J.G. Davidson. Read was at this time a member of the Legislative Council and he and Davidson were, respectively, chairman and

\begin{footnotes}
\item[21] Quoted in Wilkinson, \textit{The Peninsular Malays}, p. 166.
\item[22] CO 273/60, Gov. to Sec. State, 174, 24 Oct. 1872.
\end{footnotes}
secretary of the Chamber of Commerce. Early in 1872 an alliance between Tengku Kudin and Bendahara Ahmad was also in the air. Ahmad's prime interest was in suppressing the Rawas and Mendelings, foreign Malay communities settled in Ulu Pahang who were using Selangor as a base for rebellion. He also wished to strike at Raja Mahdi, who had supported an invasion of Pahang in 1870 and whose party was now holding a Pahang prince in captivity. Raja Mahdi's backing came initially from Chinese merchants in Malacca and later—at least by 1872—from the ruler of Johore.

Abu Bakar was drawn into the conflict primarily out of opposition to Tengku Kudin, whose brother, the Sultan of Kedah, was married to the daughter of Sultan Ali. Moreover, W.H. Read, Tengku Kudin's supporter, was also the confidant and adviser of Sultan Ali's family and was Abu Bakar's inveterate enemy. Abu Bakar had no desire to see Selangor come under the rule of a prince who might then support the ambitions of the old royal house in Johore. The prospect of an alliance between Tengku Kudin and Bendahara Ahmad added to the Maharaja's fears. Ahmad was known to be dissatisfied with the award of Endau to Johore in 1872 there was a series of border incidents which presaged further trouble and jealous of Abu Bakar's power.

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24 Straits Times, 10 August 1872. On becoming Bendahara Wan Ahmad had refused to recognise his predecessor's cession of Endau and the off-shore islands to Johore. For some years he occupied Endau and made attacks on the islands. In 1868 Ord went to Pahang and made an award which returned the islands north of the mouth of the Endau to Pahang and confirmed the Johore ruler's possession of the rest. The agreement was never ratified by Pahang, however, and the border was not
and position. The Maharaja was generally regarded as an upstart, and by none more so, perhaps, than the Bendahara. It was also believed that after Sultan Ali's death his heir, Tengku Alam, was likely to disclaim the 1855 Treaty and try to assert his claim to authority over Johore as well as Muar. Abu Bakar feared an alliance between the royal house and the Bendahara and a concerted drive against him on both sides on the Peninsula. It was in this connection that the alliance between the Bendahara and Tengku Kudin had significance. It seems clear enough that Ahmad's main objective was to secure his western border as a defensive measure. Nevertheless, the implications for Johore were plain. With his flank protected and a safe line of communication overland to the Malacca Strait the Bendahara would obviously be in a much better position for a contest with the ruler of Johore.

Abu Bakar made no secret of the fact that his sympathies were with Raja Mahdi, though he strenuously denied that he was actively assisting him. In dealings with the Straits Government his stance was that of mediator and advocate. In 1872 Ord learned that Mahdi was organising an expedition against Tengku Kudin at Bengkalis (whither he had fled in the preceding

Finally settled until 1898. See Report of the Johore Boundary Commission, 18 February 1898.

Abu Bakar's Malay status as Temenggong had been inferior to the Bendahara's. Under his new title he claimed royal rank and this claim was recognised by the British, by whom he was accorded a royal salute of 17 guns. The Bendahara on the other hand got a salute of only 9 guns.

This aspect of the struggle in Selangor was the subject of a memorandum by C.J. Irving (Auditor-General), encl. in Gov. to Sec. State, 2A Feb. 1874, in GBRF 1874/1111.
year) and requested the Dutch authorities to apprehend him. Mahdi eluded capture, however, and made his way to Padang, in Johore. Abu Bakar dutifully reported this to the Governor, who then took the Attorney-General's opinion as to whether it would be worthwhile putting Mahdi on trial for piracy. The Attorney-General was Thomas Braddell, who was also Abu Bakar's legal adviser. His opinion was that there was no case against Mahdi. At the same time Abu Bakar assured the Governor that Mahdi had no plans for invading Selangor. Ord then decided to leave Mahdi in Johore for the time being and try to bring about a settlement which would leave Tengku Kudin in control of Selangor. Kudin was summoned to Singapore and persuaded to offer Mahdi $350 a month if he would remain in Johore. According to Ord's account to the Colonial Office Abu Bakar made repeated efforts to induce Mahdi to accept these terms but without success. In fact Abu Bakar was doing exactly the opposite, at the same time putting the argument that it was not Mahdi but the foreigner, Kudin, who was responsible for the disturbed state of Selangor politics. To restore order, he suggested, Tengku Kudin should be

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27 See pp. 247-48 above.
28 This opinion was in decided contrast to a later opinion by Braddell in which he recommended proceedings against Tengku Kudin for piracy. See Wilkinson The Peninsular Malays, p. 170.
29 Ibid. p. 166.
superseded as 'Viceroy' by the Sultan's eldest son. 31

Abu Bakar's attitude to the Selangor war greatly increased the difficulties facing Tengku Kudin. The rumours that he was assisting Raja Mahdi in themselves hindered the Viceroy and heartened his enemies. Moreover, it is difficult to believe that Mahdi was not also obtaining material aid from Jchore, despite Abu Bakar's indignant denials. Whatever suspicions Ord had were rigorously suppressed, however, for to admit that Britain's closest ally on the Peninsula, the paradigm of progressive Malay rule, was acting in opposition to the British Government would have been to call in question the whole policy of giving countenance to 'progressive' and 'amenable' rulers in the Malay states. This was a risk Ord was not prepared to take. 32

Since Mahdi refused to be bought off and the Maharaja declined to support the British candidate, Ord decided to sanction an alliance between Kudin and the Bendahara. Ord left Singapore to arrange this and other matters with the Bendahara at the

32 Ord kept the Colonial Office very much in the dark about both his own and the Maharaja's involvement in Selangor affairs (see Cowan, The Origins of British Control, p. 108, n. 16). Rumours of Abu Bakar's association with the 'piratical chief' got back to Downing-street, however, and Ord was asked for an explanation. There followed an unpleasant correspondence in which Ord defended the Maharaja (and himself) and the Colonial Office took offence at the tone of his reply. See CO 273/58, Sec. State to Gov., 174, 28 Aug. 1872; CO 273/60 Gov. to Sec. State, 174, 24 Oct. 1872, and Sec. State to Gov., 240, 12 Dec. 1872, and 137, 24 June 1873.
end of July. At the same time Raja Mahdi, who had been quietly making his preparations throughout the negotiations of the preceding three months, slipped out of Johore and returned to Selangor to throw his weight into a major offensive against the Vicerecr. In the next few weeks Kuala Lumpur was captured and Tengku Kudin's forces were cleared out of the interior. However, with the Governor's assistance a successful blockade was mounted and with the arrival of a large force from Pahang Mahdi's party began to lose ground. In March 1873 Kuala Lumpur was recaptured and Mahdi and his allies were forced to retreat to the Selangor river, where they managed to hold out until November. Then, having been dislodged from their forts at the river mouth, they fled the country and the war came to an end.

The defeat of Abu Bakar's allies checked the growth of his influence in Selangor—which had in fact never amounted to much—and weakened his position generally in the southern states. But the grand alliance which he had feared did not materialise. Tengku Kudin's regime lasted only a short while in Selangor and the British, who were now about to embark on a bolder policy of intervention in the mining states, were determined to prevent further trouble in the southern part of the Peninsula.

33 The date is known from Buku Peringatan Keraja'an, 23 Jamadal Awal 1289 (28 July 1872).
34 Mahdi left Johore on 29 July 1872, a day before Ord set out for the East Coast. See Buku Peringatan Keraja'an, 23 Jamadal Awal 1289 (28 July 1872).
In November 1873 Sir Harry Ord was succeeded as Governor of the Straits Settlements by Sir Andrew Clarke. Clarke arrived with instructions to report on the advisability of appointing resident British officers in the Malay states. Instead of reporting, however, he acted. Since there was now peace in Selangor, Clarke’s attention became focused on Perak, where the succession was disputed and Chinese secret societies were fighting for control of the Larut mines. In January 1874 Clarke met the Lower Perak chiefs at Pulau Pangkor and concluded a treaty whereby Raja Abdullah, the Lower Perak candidate, was recognized as Sultan and agreed to accept the advice of a British Resident on all matters not directly connected with Malay custom and religion. An officer was immediately appointed to reside with the local ruler of Larut and during the next twelve months others were sent to Sultan Abdullah, Sultan Abdul Samad of Selangor, Tengku Kudin and the Dato’ Klena of Sungai Ujong.

The introduction of Residents into the West Coast mining states marked the abandonment of the policy pursued by Ord of giving countenance to progressive and amenable elements in the Malay ruling class. To justify his limited intervention in the face of Colonial Office disapproval, Ord

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*Lieut-Gen. Sir Andrew Clarke, G.C.M.G., C.B., C.I.E., was Governor of the Straits Settlements from November 1873 until May 1875. Before coming to the Straits Settlements he had served with distinction as Director of Public Works at the Admiralty. After his term as Governor he went to India to take a seat on the Viceroy’s council as Public Works member.*
had been obliged to show that British intervention directed
to this end need not lead to direct British rule. While this
policy was being followed serious criticism of the ruler of
Johore was not possible. But once the decision had been taken
to put in British officers to supervise the administration of
the mining states, the local authorities gained a wider margin
for criticism of Malay rule, including the Maharaja's. In
reporting the arrangements for sending a Resident into Perak,
Clarke spoke of Malay rule in terms which Ord had never used.
'The Malays', he observed, 'like every other rude Eastern
nation, require to be treated much more like children, and
to be taught; and this especially in all matters of
improvement, whether in the question of good government
and organization, or of material improvement'. Such teaching
could only be given by resident European officers. This
was true even in Johore, where an enlightened ruler was in
almost daily intercourse with the members of the Straits
Government:

I have already seen enough of the state of His
Highness' financial arrangements to make me feel
how important it is with a Native Chief, however
enlightened and anxious to improve, to place near
him a responsible adviser—an officer of experience
responsible to his own Government—who will give
to the chief sound and disinterested advice as to
the expenditure of his revenues. A native Ruler,
anxious to develop the resources of his country,
and surrounded by European Agents and employes,
becomes an instrument in their hands, as to the
schemes and projects he undertakes, and is
liable, even in Johore, to receive and adopt
anything but sound advice, and to embark in
undertakings involving anything but profitable
expenditure.36

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GBPP 1874/1111, Gov. to Sec. State, 43, 24 Feb. 1874.
A few months later, in addressing the Legislative Council, Clarke again alluded to Johore in a slightly ominous fashion:

You know the prosperity that there is now in that state, -that there is protection for life and property to all who dwell there, and who go there for agriculture, mining, or trade. I cannot conceal from myself the fact, however, that even there it is quite possible that for the great future we have hardly yet received sufficient guarantees to secure the continuance of prosperity, or the further continuance of what has been already commenced by that able and enlightened ruler who now governs that state.37

Although he sounded a warning, Clarke's policy was to go slow in the mining states and not to trouble the ruler of Johore. His personal relations with Abu Bakar were most cordial throughout his term as Governor and a personal friendship was kept up for many years afterwards. Nevertheless there was now a real possibility that an attempt might be made at some future time to bring Johore under the Residential system. Abu Bakar's response to this threat was to draw yet closer to the imperial power, by associating himself with the Government's policy on the Peninsula, by cultivating close personal relations with successive Governors, and by working up high connections in London; in this way he succeeded in involving the British in a special relationship with him which hindered their later attempts to bring his Government under British administration.

37 CO 273/76, press report of Governor's speech to Legislative Council, incl. in Gov. to Sec. State, CONF, 15 Sept. 1874.
An important aspect of this relationship was the princely hospitality which the Maharaja extended to successive Governors. When Clarke paid an official visit to Johore in March 1874 the occasion was turned into a demonstration of loyalty to the British Government and the British Crown. Much was made of the Maharaja's connection with British royalty. At the banquet in the Governor's honour Abu Bakar proposed toasts to the Queen, 'whose friendship he had made and prized so sincerely', the Prince of Wales - 'the gracious manner in which the Prince and other members of the Royal family had received him when in England he could never forget' - and the Duke of Edinburgh, 'with whom he maintained a warm friendship, and in whose fortunes he felt a deep interest'.

The Dato' Mentri, Ja'afar bin Haji Mohamed, then dilated on the virtues of his sovereign and his wisdom in cultivating good relations with the British:

...my heart and my conscience say surely prosperity will continue because of the good intentions of His Highness, for ever since he has governed Johore, which he has done with diligence, we have been blessed with peace and prosperity. Learning and wisdom tends to good government, and His Highness has always been ready to take the good advice of whosoever was appointed to be Governor of the Straits Settlements. By doing so he has done good for himself and his people. We have to thank the Almighty for appointing such a king over us, whereby we have tasted of the sweets of justice and enjoyed his sympathy, everyone of us.

The friendship which His Highness has promoted will surely be of use to us - begetting good relations between His Highness and the British Government. The English people are worthy to be imitated in many ways - I feel that the Almighty has given them a mission to fulfil, and we ought to love and learn of them all their good ways, and they know how to treat us.
as friends. With the help of the Rulers of the Straits Settlements we shall go on prospering in commerce, and I hope that health, happiness and prosperity will attend you all...38

Abu Bakar's loyalty to the British Government was tested, and triumphantly vindicated, in the brief period after the murder of the British Resident in Perak, J.W.W. Birch, when it seemed that the British position on the Malay Peninsula might be about to collapse completely. It was at first thought that Birch's murder was part of a concerted effort by the Perak chiefs to drive the British out of their country and that similar moves were likely in Selanger and the Negri Sembilan. The Maharaja's support at this time was invaluable. While the Governor, having cabled for troops, rushed off to the scene of the murder in Lower Perak, Abu Bakar placed Raja Mahdi under surveillance (lest he slip off to Selanger and raise his supporters against Tengku Kudin) and sent the Dato' Mentri with a party of Johore officials via Larut to discover the state of affairs in upper Perak.39 In March 1876, after the situation in Lower Perak had been brought under control, the Maharaja's officials succeeded in persuading Sultan Ismail to leave Upper Perak and go to Singapore, whither he was then taken to

38 Straits Times, 14 March 1874. The Dato' Mentri's speech was given in Malay and read in translation.

39 Buku Peringatan Keraja'an, 8 Shawal 1292 (6 Nov. 1875), 23 Shawal 1292 (21 Nov. 1875); Straits Times, 13 Nov. and 20 Nov. 1875.
Two months later Abu Bakar sent his brother, Ungku Abdul Mejid, and his Private Secretary, William Hole, to Upper Perak to seek out the Maharaja Lela, the chief most directly implicated in Birch's murder, and persuade him to surrender. This mission was also successful. The Maharaja Lela and several associates apparently decided to give themselves up on condition that they received a safe-conduct to Johore and a fair trial by the British. In July they were brought down in Abu Bakar's steam yacht to Johore Bahru, where they were then handed over to the British. A few months later they were taken back to Perak, tried, and condemned to death.

In Perak after Birch's murder there could be no question of Abu Bakar's opposing the British although he no doubt would have liked to. He therefore set about extracting whatever credit was to be got from assisting the British to restore order. In this his success was striking: the Governor, Sir William Jervois, praised his efforts in despatches, the

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Buku Peringatan Keraja'an, Safar 1292 (March 1876); Straits Times, 1 April 1876; extract of letter Abu Bakar to Sir Andrew Clarke, in Vetch, Life of Sir Andrew Clarke, p. 191.

GBPP 1876/1709, Gov. to Sec. State, 30 July 1876, and enclosures; Straits Times, 29 July 1876.

Abu Bakar's sympathies were with the anti-British Sultan Ismail against Abdullah, who had agreed to accept a British Resident.

Lieut.-Gen. Sir William Francis Drummond Jervois, R.E., G.C.M.G., C.B., F.R.S. was Governor of the Straits Settlements from July 1875 until March 1877. Before this he had been principally
Queen conferred on him the G.C.M.G., and the Colonial Office put his name forward as a possible Sultan of Perak. In Negri Sembilan, on the other hand, Abu Bakar had direct political interests which he was determined to preserve at some risk to his relations with the British.

Since 1869, when the last Yamtuan Besar of Sri Menanti died, this royal title, which carried with it the headship of the Negri Sembilan confederacy, had been in dispute between two candidates, Tengku Ahmad Tunggal and Tengku Antar. Tengku Antar, who had the support of the chiefs of Johol and the minor districts of Terachi, Gunong Pasir, Jempol and Ulu Muar, was in control of Sri Menanti and called himself Yamtuan Besar. He also appears to have had the support of the Maharaja of Johore, who hoped to bring the minor inland chiefs of the Negri Sembilan under his own dominant influence. Tengku Ahmad, on the other hand had the support of the Dato' Klana of Sungai Ujong, while other important chiefs favoured neither candidate and wished to see the position of Yamtuan Besar abolished.

This was a higher honour than either Jervois or Clarke had while they were Governor. The award was announced in Singapore on 6 May 1876. (See Straits Times, 6 May 1876).

The Colonial Office also suggested Tengku Kudin. Jervois replied that neither would be acceptable to the Perak chiefs and the idea was dropped. See GPFP 1876/1709, Gov. to Sec. State, 19 Aug. 1876.
In November 1875, shortly after the murder of Birch, Tengku Antar made the mistake of attacking the Dato' Klana, who had allied himself with the British. Within a few weeks British troops had occupied Sri Menanti, Ulu Muar and Jempol and Tengku Antar had fled through the borderlands into northern Johore. Jervois considered this a good opportunity to introduce a Resident into Sri Menanti, Ulu Muar and Jempol, which he proposed to place under Tengku Ahmad as 'Malay Captain'. In September 1876, however, he learned that the Colonial Office refused to sanction any extension of the Residential system. By this time also it was becoming apparent that Tengku Ahmad Tunggal had no local support in Sri Menanti and the neighbouring districts. The Governor was therefore obliged to deal with Tengku Antar, who had made his submission to the British in June and was now living quietly in Johore Bahru. After Jervois intimated that he was prepared to drop Tengku Ahmad Tunggal, Tengku Antar's supporters arrived in the Maharaja's steamer for a meeting with the Governor. On 23 November, at Government House, they signed an agreement whereby Tengku Antar was recognised as Yamtuan of Sri Menanti with authority over Johol, Inas, Guneng Pasir, Terachi, Ulu Muar, and Jempol and the Maharaja of Johore was

46 GBPP 1876/1709, Gov. to Sec. State, 13 May 1876.
47 Loc. cit.; Straits Times, 10 June 1876.
accepted as arbiter in any dispute which might arise among the
chiefs of these districts. 48

Early in the following year similar agreements were entered
by the chiefs of Rembau and Jelebu. 49

The purpose of these agreements was to allow the Straits
Government to exercise through the Maharaja an indirect
influence over the little states, since a direct extension of
British responsibility had, for the time being, been ruled cut.
Essentially this was a temporary expedient. Jervois had no
intention of abdicating on the part of the Straits Government
all right to interfere directly in the affairs of the Sri
Menanti confederation and this was made clear to the Maharaja
in correspondence. 50 Nevertheless, the immediate effect of
the agreements was to give the ruler of Johore an enormous
influence in the inland states. This was increased still
further when, on the death of Sultan Ali, a few months later,
Abu Bakar assumed direct control of Muar with British approval.
To the chiefs of the inland states (whose principal water
outlet was now under Abu Bakar's complete control) it must have
seemed that their region had been permanently assigned to the

48 GBPP 1876/1709, Gov. to Sec. State, 13 Dec. 1876.
49 For the text of these agreements with Sri Menanti
(23 November 1876) Rembau (31 March 1877) and Jelebu
(26 April 1877), see Maxwell and Gibson, Treaties and
Engagements, pp. 60, 48, and 52 respectively.
50 GBPP 1876/1709, Gov. to Maharaja, 29 Nov. 1876, encl. in
Gov. to Sec. State, 13 Dec. 1876.
Maharaja of Johore as his sphere of influence. There were, however, special reasons for letting Abu Bakar have Muar and these did not apply to the Negri Sembilan.

Sultan Ali had been recognised as ruler of the Muar-Kesang region by the Johore Treaty of 1855. In fact he had never been in effective control of more than a few small areas on the coast and near the Malacca border and had never been able to develop the country or raise much of a revenue from existing resources. By 1877 he had debts amounting to $155,000 and almost all his assets, his property at Kampung Glam, his allowance from the Straits Government, his pension under the terms of the 1855 Treaty, and the state of Muar itself had been mortgaged to raise money. In mortgaging Muar Ali had broken the conditions of the 1855 Treaty, which provided that in the event of his wishing to dispose of the country it should be offered first to the British and then to the ruler of Johore. The affairs of the royal family were further complicated by the fact that the late Sultan had on his deathbed made a will disinheriting his eldest son, Tengku Alan, in favour of Tengku Mahmud, a child of eleven.

The British had a strong interest in seeing Muar under capable government since it bordered on Malacca and since any

51 CO 273/91, O.A.G. to Sec. State, 212, 6 July 1877, and enclosures; CO 273/93, Maharaja to Gov., 7 May 1878, encl. in Gov. to Sec. State, 147, 18 May 1878.
52 See in CO 273/91, O.A.G. to Sec. State, 212, 6 July 1877.
railway to link the Settlements would have to pass through it. In the view of Colonel Anson, the Officer Administering the Government at the time of Ali's death there was every reason to believe that the misgovernment of the country would continue and grow worse so long as it remained in the possession of the royal family. Annexation to the British Settlements was out of the question. Anson therefore decided that the best course would be to allow the Maharaja of Johore to gain possession of the country. Accordingly, he requested the Maharaja to take over the 'guardianship' of Muar and sent the Colonial Secretary to prevent the proclamation of a successor at Ali's funeral. Arrangements were then made for Tengku Mahmud to be educated in Singapore and Tengku Alam was informed that the late Sultan's allowance would not be continued and that his heir would not be recognised as Sultan. Support for Tengku Alam continued in Muar, however, where a branch of the royal house (the descendants of Ali's brother, Abdul Jalil) and the family of the Temenggong Paduka Tuan, the principal local chief, were opposed to absorption into Johore. This group held a meeting which elected Tengku Alam as Sultan. Anson then allowed the Maharaja to send his steamer to Muar to collect as

54 CO 273/92, Ccl. Sec. to Tengku Alam, 5 July 1877, encl. in Gov. to Sec. State, 365, 5 Dec. 1877.
many headmen as he could and bring them down for a meeting at Government House. Seven or eight came and, not surprisingly, opted for the Maharaja. Meanwhile Abu Bakar had summoned the Temenggong to Johore Bahru and was subjecting him to pressure of various kinds. Shortly after this Anson and Abu Bakar went together to Segamat (in Muar) ostensibly for a meeting with the chiefs of the inland states, but with the real purpose, apparently, of over-awing the Muar headmen. Finally, in October 1877, Anson received a letter from the Temenggong and fourteen headmen asking for the Maharaja as their ruler. All that now remained was the formality of an election. This was held at Kuala Kesang on 8 November, under the guns of the Maharaja's steamer and in the presence of a government official chosen (by the new Governor, Sir William Robinson) for his partisanship of the Maharaja.

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56 Loc. cit.
57 According to Tengku Alam, the Temenggong was arrested by a force of 200 men and held in 'durance' at Johore Bahru. The Temenggong's own complaint was that he was bribed and treated 'in various manners of deceit' and that he would have been 'ruined' if he had not agreed to accept the Maharaja's rule. See CO 273/92, Tengku Alam to O.A.G., 3 Aug. 1877, encl. in Gov. to Sec. State, 365, 5 Dec. 1877; CO 273/98, Temenggong of Muar and others to Gov., 28 Ramadhan 1295 (25 Nov. 1877), encl. in Gov. to Sec. State, conf. 7 Jan. 1879.
60 Sir William Robinson, G.C.M.G. was Governor of the Straits Settlements from August 1877 until February 1879. He had previously been Governor of the Leeward Islands and of
The local authorities continued to support the Maharaja and as he was in a position to enforce his rule, Muar was eventually brought under control. All resistance to his authority collapsed at the end of 1879, when a Johore force moved through the country dispersing the rebels and pulling down their stockades.\textsuperscript{66}

As ruler of Johore and Muar, arbiter and adviser of the inland states, and the honoured ally of the Queen-Empress, Abu Bakar was at the height of his power and influence in the late 1870s. His position depended very much of the indulgence of the British, however, and when this began to dry up, during the governorship of Sir Frederick Weld,\textsuperscript{67} his influence on the Peninsula suffered. Weld, who became Governor in May 1880, was a recognised 'expert' on native affairs with a romantic conception of empire and a highly developed sense of his fitness for the imperial mission.\textsuperscript{68} He was immediately difficult. See CO 273/97, W. Napier to Sec. State, 30 July 1878, and minutes; CO 273/95, paraphrase of telegram Gov. to Sec. State, 9 Aug. 1878, Gov. to Sec. State, conf., 14 Aug. 1878, and minutes on these.

\textsuperscript{66} CO 273/103, O.A.G. to Sec. State, 129, 29 April 1880.

In March 1880 Tengku Alan's mentri was arrested by the Singapore police and charged with inciting the rebellion in Muar. Documents in his possession compromised W.H. Read, who resigned from the Legislative Council. See CC 273/102, O.A.G. to Sec. State, 87, 27 March 1880.

\textsuperscript{67} Sir Frederick Aloysius Weld, G.C.M.G. was Governor of the Straits Settlements from May 1880 until November 1887. He had previously been Minister for Native Affairs (1860-61) and Premier (1864-65) of New Zealand, Governor of Western Australia (1869-74) and Governor of Tasmania (1875-79).

\textsuperscript{68} Emma Sadka, 'The Residential System in the Protected Malay States, 1874-1895', pp. 211-15.
The election at Kuala Kesang was by no means the end of the succession question. In Muar hostility to the Maharaja continued and in Singapore the supporters of the royal house, notably W. H. Read, kept the question alive in the press and encouraged Tengku Alam to refuse a pension and insist on his claim to the succession. In November 1878 the Temenggong of Muar and several others informed the Governor that they had chosen Tengku Alam as their ruler.62 Two months later he was proclaimed as Sultan Ala'ud-din Alam Shah at Kampong Glam.63 After this he petitioned the Queen for his rights64 and his supporters in Muar began to prepare to resist the Maharaja. All this was to no avail, however. The Colonial Office, while it was troubled by scruples concerning the treatment of the royal family and by fears of questions in Parliament, nevertheless approved of the accession of Muar to Johore.65

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Western Australia. After the Straits Settlements he again served as Governor of Western Australia and later of Victoria.61

61 CO 273/91, Gov. to Sec. State, 339, 14 Nov. 1877.
63 CO 273/98, Gov. to Sec. State, conf., 1 Feb. 1879, and enclosures.
65 The Colonial Office was prepared to allow Abu Bakar the title Sultan when, in August 1878, he raised the matter in London. The Colonial Office was only dissuaded from taking this step by the strong opposition of the Governor, who represented that it would rouse the whole Malay Peninsula and taken in connection with the late question of the Muar succession would render the position of the Straits Government extremely
attracted by the possibilities for the exercise of personal power in Pahang and the Negri Sembilan states which were not yet under British administration. Inevitably this brought him into conflict with the ruler of Johore, who regarded the inland states as being under his special charge and who was also beginning to acquire a strong influence over the Bendahara of Pahang. Weld’s attitude to the Maharaja fluctuated wildly throughout his term as Governor; he was effusively friendly when Abu Bakar was 'behaving' and chillingly formal when he was not.

Weld’s efforts to establish his influence in the inland states were hampered by the treaties of 1877-78, which gave the Maharaja a voice in the affairs of Rembau, Jelebu, and the Sri Menanti confederacy. To avoid the accusation of initiating a change of policy he was obliged to associate the Maharaja with him in his dealings with these states. Abu Bakar resented the Governor’s interference, however, particularly as it was often directed against his own proteges. 'Misunderstandings' occurred and on the Governor’s side there developed the suspicion that the Maharaja and his agents were working against the British.

Finally, in January 1882, after it became clear that Abu Bakar was also 'intriguing' in Pahang, Weld could contain his feelings no longer. In a long despatch to the Secretary of State he

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posed the Maharaja's machinations and denounced the policy which had led to his obtaining a treaty position in the Negri Sembilan.\textsuperscript{70}

Though the Colonial Office accepted Weld's outburst coolly and refused to sanction any change of policy,\textsuperscript{71} the opportunity soon arose for an attempt to squeeze the Maharaja out of the Negri Sembilan. In both Rembau and Jelebu quarrels between Abu Bakar's proteges and other chiefs, who appealed to the Governor, enabled Weld to step in and arrange a settlement. In March 1883 the Rembau chief who had signed the 1877 Treaty was deposed at a meeting presided over by Weld and a new agreement was signed by his successor which substituted the Governor for the Maharaja as arbiter and adviser. In August, after a number of Jelebu headmen had asked for British intervention, Weld negotiated a new agreement which eliminated the Maharaja's protege from the government of the country.\textsuperscript{72}

Though the new Jelebu agreement did not formally abrogate Abu Bakar's treaty relationship, the general effect of the new arrangement was to exclude him from Jelebu affairs.

Although the Maharaja's influence in the Negri Sembilan had been largely dissipated by the end of 1883, his influence in Pahang, which the Straits Government was becoming anxious to bring under British control, continued to give rise

\textsuperscript{70} CO 273/113, Gov. to Sec. State, CONF., 23 Jan. 1882.
\textsuperscript{71} CO 273/113, Sec. State to Gov., CONF., 8 April 1882.
\textsuperscript{72} For the text of these two agreements see Maxwell and Gibson, \textit{Treaties and Engagements}, pp. 50-53.
to concern. Abu Bakar and his old enemy, Bendahara Ahmad, were drawn together by a strong community of interest: both were anxious about British intentions towards their states and both sought recognition as Sultan. Ahmad, in addition, was troubled by fears of a war over the succession, which he wished to pass to his young son instead of to his brother, Ungku Muda Mansur, and he was anxious to prevent Ungku Muda from obtaining external support for an invasion of Pahang. After an extended visit to Singapore and Johore in 1880-81 to sound out the Maharaja and become acquainted with the Governor, Ahmad had himself proclaimed Sultan and made a request (initially through Abu Bakar) for British recognition of the change of title. Weld immediately saw in this the hand of the Maharaja, who, he informed the Secretary of State, imagined that if the Bendahara were recognised as Sultan he could not long be refused the title:

*I have no doubt in my own mind that the Maharajah's ambition is to be Sultan of Johor, and gradually to extend his influence over other states - it is a natural aspiration and one especially in accordance with Malay nature, which cannot be happy without an undercurrent, I will not say of intrigue, but a secret object to pursue.*

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73 Mansur was given the title Ungku Muda about 1879-80. Shortly afterwards he quarrelled with Ahmad and fled to Singapore, where he remained for most of the next four years. During this time he also stayed in Johore with one of the Maharaja's brothers, and this probably aroused in Ahmad a fear that he might obtain the Maharaja's support.

Weld’s policy was to withhold the title of Sultan from both the Maharaja and the Bendahara until they were prepared to enter into closer relations with the British Government. In the Bendahara’s case he suggested as a first step a treaty of friendship to settle the succession and bring Pahang’s foreign affairs under British control. However, although the Colonial Office approved of this, Weld found that he was unable to bring the matter to issue. When a treaty was suggested to him in Singapore Ahmad demurred, saying that he would have to consult his chiefs. It was then arranged that the Governor should visit Pahang after a few months, but when the time came Ahmad put him off with excuses.

When it became apparent that Ahmad was in concert with Abu Bakar and was determined to maintain his independence the Straits Government began to consider the claim of Ungku Muda, who made it clear that he was prepared to accept a Resident to succeed Ahmad as ruler of Pahang. In June 1884 the Officer Administering the Government, C.C. Smith, appeared to have been unaware of the provisions of the Johore-Pahang Treaty of 1862 which gave the Straits Government control over Pahang’s foreign relations—or perhaps he chose to ignore the existence of this Treaty and negotiate a new one which gave the British Government larger powers.

Sir Cecil Clementi Smith G.C.M.G. (1892), K.C.M.G. (1886), was Colonial Secretary in the Straits Settlements from 1878 until 1885. He administered the Government during Weld’s absence (March 1884 to November 1885) and after a period as Lieut-Governor of Ceylon (1885-87) succeeded Weld as Governor in 1887. He retired in 1893.
raised the question of recognising Ungku Muda if he should manage to supplant Ahmad and of then seizing the opportunity to put in a Resident. Five months later he arranged a settlement whereby Ungku Muda was re-instated in his former position and allotted an allowance out of the Pahang revenues. In conducting these negotiations Smith pointedly excluded the Maharaja.

The drift of British policy towards Pahang in the latter half of 1884 was disturbing to Abu Bakar. In the following February he was further shaken by the appearance in the Straits Government Gazette of a Notification that British subjects entering the independent Malay states would not be entitled to British protection and that the British Government would not necessarily recognise at that time or in the future any concessions granted by the rulers of these states. The main purpose of the Notification was to check the situation in Pahang, which was being rapidly divided up among a few large mining concessionaires, but it also applied to Johore. Abu Bakar was concerned partly because of its effect on European investment but mainly because it seemed to give point to rumours that Weld was about to return with instructions to annex Johore. Coming together, the rumours and the

79 CO 273/130, O.A.G. to Sec. State, MOST CONF., 17 Nov. 1884.
Notification thoroughly frightened him. Smith tried to allay his fears but refused to alter the Notification to exempt Johore from its operation. Abu Bakar then decided to go to England to confer with the Colonial Office.81

ABU BAKAR'S fears that his state might soon be brought under British control were by no means groundless. During 1884 the Colonial Office had been considering the matter in relation to two matters of importance: the growth of European investment in Johore and the administration of justice where this concerned British subjects. In 1878, when Abu Bakar had sought to solve his financial difficulties by granting an enormous commercial monopoly to British financial interests who were to build a railway through Johore, the Colonial Office had managed to scare off the London financiers and bring the scheme to nought. On being taxed about this concession, Abu Bakar confessed that he had been ill-advised to grant it and promised to make no more agreements of this nature without consulting the British Government. Four years later, however, he signed another concession which, while it did not confer the enormous monopoly rights of the first, nevertheless granted banking privileges of a kind which were considered objectionable by the Colonial Office and the

81 CO 273/133, C.M.G. to Sec. State, 84, 5 March 1885, and enclosures.
Straits Government. 82 Weld, who was in England when the existence of this concession became known to the Colonial Office (in August 1884), opposed the whole scheme on the ground that it would vastly increase the influence of the Maharaja's legal advisers (the Singapore promoters of the scheme) - which influence, he advised, was already too great and was exercised in opposition to the Straits Government. 83

The Maharaja's lack of wisdom in granting these concessions caused the Colonial Office to consider the question of providing him with sound and disinterested advice. In 1878 one of the officials minuted:

He would be well advised to pay a liberal salary (say £300 a year) to an English gentleman of ability and experience to act as his Grand Vizier and protect him against plunderers. 84

By 1884 'Grand Viziers' were cut. Among themselves the Colonial Office officials now spoke in terms of a British Resident in Johore. 85

At the same time that this latest concession was before it, the Colonial Office was also considering new arrangements for extradition between the Straits Settlements and the

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82 See CO 273/97, W. Napier to Sec. State, 5 Oct. 1878, and enclosure; Sec. State to Gov. 188, 23 Oct. 1878, and Under-Sec. to W. Napier, 23 Oct. 1878; CO 273/132, Malay Peninsular Agency to Under-Sec., 6 Aug. 1884 and associated papers.

83 CO 273/132, minutes on Malay Peninsular Agency to Under-Sec., 6 Aug. 1884.

84 CO 273/97, minute by Herbert (cf 14 Oct. 1878) on W. Napier to Sec. State, 5 Oct. 1878.

85 See CO 273/130, minute on O.A.G. to Sec. State, CONF., 16 Oct. 1884.
Protected Malay States. The question arose whether Johore should be included in the new arrangements and under what conditions. The Attorney-General, Braddell, whose opinion was passed on to the Colonial Office by Weld (they were both in England at the time), advised that it would be 'hazardous' to allow the Johore court to try persons extradited from the Straits Settlements unless some form of supervision was introduced. For this and other reasons of a general nature, Braddell recommended that a Resident should be appointed in Johore as soon as possible. 86 Weld, however, thought that the immediate difficulty could be got over, as in the past, by sending a European officer to be present at the trial of persons extradited. In his opinion the time was not ripe for the appointment of a Resident. 87

Abu Bakar's main purpose in visiting England in 1885 was to obtain an assurance from the British Government that his state would not be annexed and that the rights of his successor would be respected. He also wished to obtain the exemption of Johore from the operation of the Notification of February 1885, to come to an agreement for the joint disposal of the Johore and Singapore opium farms on terms more favourable to Johore, and to arrange for the importation of Indian labour into Johore. In addition, he hoped to obtain permission

86 CO 273/132, Braddell to Weld, 27 Aug. 1884.
87 CO 273/132, Weld to Herbert, 29 Aug. 1884.
to assume the title Sultan. Though the Colonial Office was prepared to assure Abu Bakar that there was no plan to annex his state, it was unwilling to enter into direct negotiations with him about other matters unless, of course, he decided to accept a Resident.\footnote{CC 273/138, minute by Meade (dated 22 May) on Weld to Lucas, 14 May 1885.} However, Weld, who remained in England for some months after Abu Bakar's arrival, was in favour of any agreement which would increase British control over Johore in exchange for reasonable concessions. Weld went to some pains to conciliate Abu Bakar and win his confidence and in the early stages of the negotiations which followed he acted as a sort of intermediary with the Colonial Office.

In May 1884 Weld raised with the Colonial Office several of the questions which Abu Bakar wished to have settled in England; in doing so he suggested that it might be desirable to make a treaty with him, 'asking on our side that he should not enter into alliance or treaties with other powers without our consent'.\footnote{CC 273/138, Weld to Lucas, 14 May 1885.} About the same time the Maharaja sent in a printed memorandum on the joint opium farms in which he requested that the mode of letting these should be decided by the Colonial Office in conference with himself and the Governor.\footnote{CO 273/138, p. 338, Memorandum on the Triennial Letting of the respective Opium Farms of the Singapore and Johore Governments, dated London, May 1885.}
The Colonial Office pointed out to Weld that the Johore-Pahang Treaty of 1862 bound the Maharaja not to enter into independent foreign relations and that there was therefore no need for a treaty to secure this point. But since Weld was anxious to obtain some sort of agreement, and since it was also considered desirable to settle the question of the opium farms before the next triennial letting (in September) drafts were prepared of a Convention dealing with the opium farms and a Treaty which provided for the appointment of a British consular official in Johore. 91 The main purpose of the Treaty at this stage was to allow satisfactory arrangements to be made for supervising the trial of British subjects and the importation of Indian labour.

While the draft of this Treaty was being considered despatches arrived which suggested that the Maharaja was deeply involved in the affairs of Pahang and that his influence was being exerted to prevent the appointment of a Resident there. 92

91 CO 273/138, pp. 278, 281, draft 'Convention' and draft 'Treaty'. Subsequent drafts of the Treaty were in the form of a 'Memorandum' of an agreement between the Maharaja and the Straits Government, though it was as a Treaty that it was finally signed in London by Abu Bakar and the Secretary of State. The Opium Farms Convention, which provided for the division of the proceeds of the joint farms between Johore and Singapore according to the population ratio, was dropped because of the strong opposition of C.C. Smith, the Officer Administering the Straits Government during Weld's absence. See CO 273/135, Telegram O.A.G. to Sec. State, 27 July 1885, O.A.G. to Sec. State, 301, 1 Aug. 1885, and Sec. State to O.A.G., 165, 10 Oct. 1885.

92 CO 273/134, O.A.G. to Sec. State, CONF., 20 May 1885, and CONF., 23 May 1885, with enclosure.
On learning of this the Colonial Office decided to tie the Maharaja down more firmly and a new clause (which became the basis of Article VI of the final Treaty) was added which read:

The Maharaja of Johore undertakes on his part not to negotiate any Treaty or enter into any engagements with any foreign State or to interfere in the politics or administration of any Native State without the knowledge and consent of Her Majesty's Government of the Straits Settlements. 93

Weld strengthened this by inserting 'or advise as to' after 'interfere' and added a prohibition on the granting of concessions to 'Foreign persons and companies'. 94

At this stage the Colonial Office appears to have had it in mind to acquiesce in Abu Bakar's assumption of the title Sultan if he signed the Treaty. It was Weld, however, who pressed the point.

It must come as we cannot deal with Pahang without ultimately calling the Bendahara Sultan which he is now called by his people and as soon as he comes to terms we shall have to acknowledge him as such and if so we cannot refuse the Maharajah. 95

Weld thought that the best course would be to confer the title rather than simply acquiesce in its assumption. '...we should give it to get the credit of it with him', he urged, 'and to let the other Malays know that unless we confirm a title

93 CO 273/138, p. 286, draft 'Memorandum'.
it is not of the same value'. On Weld’s recommendation, therefore, an article was added to the Treaty whereby Abu Bakar was recognised as 'Sultan of the Territory of Johore'.

Abu Bakar was delighted with the article recognising him as Sultan but objected to the ban on his giving advice to other rulers; the effect of this prohibition, he claimed, was to make it virtually impossible for him to maintain ordinary social relations with his 'near relative' the ruler of Pahang without running the risk of being accused of a breach of the agreement. On Weld's recommendation the phrase 'or advise as to' was dropped but the Colonial Office refused to give up the main point, which was that the ruler was not to interfere in the affairs of other states. Abu Bakar also objected to the clause dealing with concessions to foreigners which, as it stood, excluded all foreigners; presumably, Abu Bakar suggested, what was meant was 'persons of an European or American nationality other than English'. The Colonial Office recognised that this needed redrafting but could not at first see how to provide for foreign Orientals to acquire interests in Johore without running the risk that some foreign power might attempt to intervene on behalf

96 Loc. cit.
97 The word 'Territory' was inserted at Weld's instance to detract from any claim that Abu Bakar might later make to the authority of the old Johore sultans in the neighbouring states. In the final version the wording was changed to 'State and Territory of Johore'.
98 CO 273/138, Maharaja to Meade, 21 Aug. 1885, and following papers.
of its aggrieved nationals. The difficulty was eventually got round by a provision to the effect that the ruler's correspondence with foreign states should be conducted through the British Government. When this had been agreed to a clause was inserted in the article relating to Abu Bakar's recognition as Sultan which extended this recognition to his 'heirs and successors, lawfully succeeding according to Malay custom'.

When Weld left England to return to the Straits, in October 1885, a final draft of the agreement had been completed. At this stage it was cast in the form of a 'Memorandum on certain points' and was to be signed in Singapore. But since Abu Bakar was most anxious to conclude it in London and since the

100 In its final form Article VI read:

The Maharajah of Johore, in the spirit of former treaties, undertakes on his part that he will not without the knowledge and consent of Her Majesty's Government negotiate any Treaty, or enter into any engagement with any foreign State, or interfere in the politics or administration of any native State, or make any grant or concession to other than British subjects or British companies or persons of the Chinese, Malay, or other Oriental Race, or enter into any political correspondence with any foreign State.

It is further agreed that if occasion should arise for political correspondence between His Highness the Maharajah and any foreign State, such correspondence shall be conducted through Her Majesty's Government, to whom His Highness makes over the guidance and control of his foreign relations.
The signing of the Johore Treaty by the Secretary of State in London took Weld completely by surprise. Weld wanted the Governor to get the credit in the eyes of the Malay chiefs for making the agreement and conferring the title of Sultan. The conclusion of the Treaty in London not only wrecked this plan but also enabled Abu Bakar's emissaries and agents in the Malay states to represent their master as having an influence with the British Government in England which exceeded the Governor's. Weld was extremely sensitive about this undercurrent of comparison and was anxious to dispel any impression that the ruler of Johore was a man of influence in London. 102

Weld's main concern during his last two years as Governor

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101 For the text of the Treaty see Maxwell and Gibson, Treaties and Engagements, p. 132.

102 Early in 1886 Weld became upset over the stoppage of a survey of the Johore boundary with Malacca and Johol on orders from England. In a despatch to the Colonial Office, from whom the Sultan was trying to get a decision on the border question, Weld declared that the stoppage would prejudice his chances of dealing successfully with the Bendahara. 'To the native mind', he wrote, 'this is a trial as to whether the Governor or the new Sultan will meet with the support of Her Majesty's Government'. See CO 273/139, Gov. to Sec. State, CONF., 6 Feb. 1886.
was to bring Pahang under British control and it is in the light of this that his relations with Johore must be viewed. In June 1886 Weld paid a personal visit to Pahang in the hope of persuading Ahmad to enter into closer relations with the British. He discovered, however, that the Johore ruler's agents had a great influence over Ahmad and that this was exercised against the British. By the time Abu Bakar returned from Europe, in July, Weld had come to regard him once more as the principal obstacle to the advance of British influence in the independent states and was bitterly attacking him in despatches to the Colonial Office.

Abu Bakar's policy, as Weld discovered, was still to oppose the British advance wherever possible. By now, however, it was becoming increasingly difficult, and since he had just signed a Treaty debarring him from interference in the affairs of other states, increasingly dangerous to do so. By early 1887 it must have become clear that the British were bound to get control of Pahang before very long. In any case Abu Bakar now began to associate himself with the Governor's attempts to negotiate with the Ahmad. His object in this appears to have been to improve his own relations with the Governor and at the same time to assist Ahmad to get the best terms possible in his dealings with the British. Weld had already come to the conclusion that it would be inadvisable to try to introduce the Residential system; for the present he was content to obtain Ahmad's assent to the same terms as in Treaty concluded
with Johore. While ostensibly assisting the British, Abu Dakar seems to have advised Ahmad to agree to a modified version of the Johore Treaty which would preserve his control over the granting of commercial concessions. Weld would accept no change, however, and Abu Dakar found that he could do no more than extract what credit was to be gained from assisting the British to secure their object. With his help, therefore, a Treaty in similar terms to the Johore Treaty was signed by Ahmad in October 1887 and in the following year, again with his support, the full Residential system was introduced into Pahang. In both these cases Abu Dakar was finally obliged to side with the British because Ahmad's political builders had rendered his position untenable. In a similar situation in 1892, when Ahmad's position was compromised by his association with the Pahang rebels, Abu Bakar again acted as the Straits Government's envoy and assisted in the settlement which followed the cessation of hostilities.

Immediately after the conclusion of the Pahang Treaty of 1887 a British Agent was accredited to Pahang. At this time,

103 CO 273/140, Gov. to Sec. State, CONF., 15 June 1886.
105 For the Sultan's part in these negotiations see CO 273/144, Gov. to Sec. State, CONF., 16 April 1887, and CONF., 28 April 1887; CO 273/148, Gov. to Sec. State, CONF., 11 Oct. 1887; CO 273/154, Gov. to Sec. State, 396, 30 Aug. 1888.
106 See CC 273/180, Gov. to Sec. State, 169, 19 April 1892; CO 273/182, Gov. to Sec. State, 305, 13 July 1892, and 305, 22 Aug. 1892.
However, there was still no Agent in Johore. Weld had discussed the question with Abu Bakar in 1886 and at the same time had recommended to the Colonial Office that an appointment should be made.\textsuperscript{107} The Colonial Office, influenced by the fact that both the Sultan himself and all the unofficial members of the Straits Legislative Council were opposed to the appointment, instructed him to defer the matter for the present.\textsuperscript{108} When Weld raised the matter again in 1887 Abu Bakar was polite but firm; he would sooner, he declared, deal personally with the Governor than with 'a thousand agents'.\textsuperscript{109} After this the question was raised only once more, in 1888, when the then Governor, Sir Cecil Clementi Smith, was considering the extension of extradition arrangements to Kedah, Johore, and the Negri Sembilan states not yet under British administration. Abu Bakar again made it clear that he was totally opposed to the appointment of an Agent. Smith then recommended that the question be deferred during Abu Bakar's lifetime and this course was approved by the Colonial Office.\textsuperscript{110}

ALTHOUGH the question of appointing a British Agent was dropped after 1888, Abu Bakar's anxiety about the independence of his

\textsuperscript{107} CO 273/141, Gov. to Sec. State, CONF., 26 Nov. 1886.
\textsuperscript{108} See CO 273/141, minutes on Gov. to Sec. State, CONF., 26 Nov. 1886.
\textsuperscript{109} CO 273/144, Gov. to Sec. State, CONF., 27 April 1887.
\textsuperscript{110} CO 273/154, Gov. to Sec. State, CONF., 15 Sept. 1888, and minutes.
country continued and threw a cloud over his last years. It must have been clear to him that the British were simply waiting for his death to make their next attempt to gain control of Johore. There were also other issues which affected his relations with successive Governors. The running battle over the northern border and the difficulties which arose over the desire of both Governments to run a railway line through Johore dragged on for years without any real progress being made towards their solution. During this period the Sultan became noticeably more suspicious of Europeans, fearful of the menace which they represented to his independence, and resentful of the occasional interference of the Straits Government in the affairs of his state. In 1892, after a lengthy correspondence concerning the case of some Chinese women allegedly detained in Johore against their will, Abu Bakar was provoked to complain:

"It is with feelings of real regret and sore disappointment that I notice how very seldom the efforts of my Government...have succeeded in commanding the sympathy of Your Excellency's Government, and how often we have been placed in the awkward position of not knowing exactly whether our motives would be understood or misunderstood."

As his health deteriorated, Abu Bakar became more concerned

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111 See correspondence regarding the dismissal of Howard Bentley, in CO 273/190, C.I.G. to Sec. State, CONF., 28 Nov. 1893, CONF., 13 December 1893, and enclosures.

112 CO 273/179, Sultan to Gov., 24 Feb. 1892, encl. in Gov. to Sec. State, 100, 2 March 1892.

113 Abu Bakar suffered from tuberculosis. See obituary in Strait Budget, 11 June 1895.
about the question of the succession. In May 1891 his son was officially recognised as his successor in a ceremony witnessed by the Governor and consular representatives of foreign nations. In 1895 he made his final preparations against the crisis which he feared would follow on his death. After promulgating a constitution designed to throw a cloak of constitutionalism over the arrangements for the government of the country and check the absolute power of his successor, he set out on his last journey to England to settle the affairs of his kingdom. There, in a London hotel, he died on 4 June 1895.

ABU BAKAR's epitaph was pronounced by the Straits Free Press in terms which aptly sum up the achievement of his reign:

Astute, far-seeing, and sagacious, for thirty years he reigned, within fifteen miles of a seat of English Government—and held that Government at bay. No Asiatic had ever been able to do such a thing; yet the Sultan Abu Bakar did it with brilliant success. Usually, he was in friendly relations with English Governors, and afterwards with persons far more powerful than Governors. At the same time he had ever with him the sympathies of the European element of Singapore, partly because he was astutely liberal to Europeans with whom he dealt or who invested in his territory, but chiefly because he was by nature, hospitable, generous, courteous, and dignified. Withal he never failed to keep English officials at arm's length. The temptation to borrow from England a competent civil service or military instructors of position must, sometimes, have been great; but the Sultan feared what might follow, and the Englishmen whom from time to time he employed

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114 Singapore Free Press, 26 May 1891, 2 June 1891.
were always persons selected from his own peculiar point of view. Nor, did even they, in later days, know anything of the policy, the finances and the resources of the Sultan whom they served. Abu Bakar ruled his own country by his own people and after the Asiatic fashion. He was the Caliph of the Arabian Nights, the source of all justice, the remedy for all grievance, the personal cause of everything, accessible to every man's surmise - the earthly Regent of Allah. 116

116

Strait's Standard, 11 June 1895.
Tengku Abdul Jalil ibne Sultan Husain (born 1817/18, died 1868), was the eldest son of Sultan Husain by a non-royal wife and was hence passed over for the succession. About 1838 he went to Trengganu, married well and ranked high at Kemaman or some neighbouring place. His wife appears to have been a relative of the Trengganu Sultan who was expelled in 1839.

In 1841 Tengku Abdul Jalil was in Singapore and was warned by the Governor not to set out to attack Sultan Omar of Trengganu. In 1852 he was expelled from Pahang and settled in Muar, where his eldest son married the daughter of the Temenggong Paduka Tuan, the Muar district chief. In 1877 his family played a leading role in resisting the accession of Muar to Johore.
SULTAN ABDUL RAMAN

1822-1832

SULTAN SULAIMAN

(see Table 2)

daughter = Tengku Noor Mohameda

1841-1847

SULTAN MAHKUD

(see Table 4)

daughter = Bendahara Musa

SULTAN TEH

sister of Sultan Omar

SULTAN MOHAMED

(see Table 2)

Tengku Besar Mohameda

daughter of

MAHKUD
Note on the Temenggong's income in Singapore in the 1820s.

It is not possible to do more than indicate the lower limits of the Temenggong's income during the 1820s. Leaving out of account land leases, and investments in expeditions of overseas trade and piracy, his income was derived from four main sources;

1. Commercial monopolies on the island. Nothing is known of the Temenggong's income from this source. It is quite probable that the monopolies were generally granted to faithful followers in return for a comparatively small rental.

2. The pension under the 1819 Treaty. This was fixed at $3,000 p.a. until August 1824.

3. One quarter share of the revenue farms from May 1820 until December 1822, amounting to $2,600 in 1820, $4,500 in 1821, and $7,000 in 1822. From January 1823 this was commuted to a fixed allowance of $5,100 p.a.

4. Levies on maritime trade. This, the Temenggong's largest source of revenue, is the most difficult to assess. According to Raffles, the value of "native imports" into Singapore in 1819-1821 was $5,000,000 (see Raffles to Marsden, 21 January 1823, in Lady Raffles, Memoir, pp. 255-59). The Temenggong's levies might easily have amounted to 2% or 3% of this, or more. If we take the still lower figure of 1% his income from customs duties in the period 1819-21 will have been of the order of $50,000.

On the basis of these figures the Temenggong's income during the first three years after the foundation of the settlement may be estimated, quite conservatively, at upwards of $66,000, or more than $2,000 per month.
This was a considerable sum. For comparison it may be noted that the cost of the Company's entire Civil Establishment on Singapore in 1823 was $3,923 per month, (Crawfurd to Sec. Govt., Fort William, 15 July 1823, in JIA vol. 8 (1854), p.334). The Temenggong's income probably reached a peak around 1822, before the Singapore authorities began to exclude him from direct participation in the revenues of the Settlement. The biggest blow was undoubtedly the refusal of the Singapore authorities to allow him to levy duties on shipping, though it is quite possible that it was some years before they were able to enforce this prohibition effectively.

Note on Allowance to the Royal House of Singapore by the British Government

In 1836 the Supreme Government decided to grant the family of the late Sultan Husain a monthly allowance of $250. Of this $70 was to be paid to the new head of the house, Tengku Ali, $70 to his full brother Tengku Ja'afar and $55 each to an unmarried sister Tengku Maimunah, and a half-brother, Tengku Abdul Jalil. In 1838 a widowed sister, Tengku Andak was allowed $55. Two years later Tengku Ali's personal allowance was raised to $115 per month, bringing the total allowance of the royal house to $350 per month. After the death of Tengku Maimunah in 1848 her allowance was added to Ali's. Ali also tried to get Tengku Ja'afar's allowance after his death, but the Government decided that it should be paid to his children. Tengku Jalil's children also received their father's allowance after his death, but on Ali's death (in 1877) his pension ceased.*

Note on the population of Johore, 1885–1900.


Very little rice was grown in Johore in the latter half of the nineteenth century, almost the only areas of cultivation being in Segemat and Endau, where small Malay populations (500 at Endau in 1892) grew rice and traded in forest produce. (See Lake, 'Johore', Geographical Journal vol. 3 no. 4 (1894), pp. 293–94, and 'A Journey to the Source of the Indau', JSERAS no. 25 (Jan. 1894), p. 2.) Local production has therefore been ignored and the population has been calculated from the rice import figures on the basis of an annual consumption of 2½ pikuls a head, or just under 1 lb per day.

Meldrum puts the Malaysian population at 50,000 and the Chinese at 100,000 in 1885. The figure for rice imports in 1885, 302,041 pikuls, suggests that the total population was only about 120,000, and Meldrum's figures have been scaled down accordingly. Lake puts the population in the early 1890s at 80,000 Malaysians, 210,000 Chinese, and 10,000 Arabs,
Indians, Europeans and Eurasians, a total of 300,000, and gives the size of the annual rice imports as about 50,000 tons (i.e. ca 840,000 pikuls). This figure of 50,000 tons suggests a total population of ca 335,000, but as it is likely that any underestimate refers to the Chinese population rather than the Malaysian, Lake's figure for the latter has been taken. In the latter half of the 1890s the Chinese population rapidly decreased with the decline of gambier and pepper planting. The rice import figure for 1901, 439,896 pikuls, suggests a total population of ca 175,000. G.T. Hare, Secretary for Chinese Affairs, F.M.S., estimated the Chinese population at 75,000 to 80,000 in 1903. The Malaysian population may therefore be roughly estimated at between 80,000 and 100,000 in 1901.
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