chairman of Cabinet, and only his strength as a vote-getter prevented an open call for his removal from Sydney newspapers and businessmen. However, this fiasco was not typical of his chairmanship, and policies proposed by ministers less egocentric than Gullett received fuller Cabinet consideration and in most cases the support of all ministers.

Whatever his compromises over the details of policy or his failure to carry out his reformist social philosophy, Lyons had a vital influence on the climate of politics and the general direction of policy. Without his influence during and after the Depression, the course of Australian history would almost certainly have changed. Especially because of his friendly personality, he was able to moderate much of the bitterness and emotionalism aroused by the Depression in the community in general and in the Labour movement in particular in a way that neither Latham nor any other alternative leader could have done. His stand against Caucus had rallied the middle-of-the-road members of the community without alienating too greatly either the left or the right wings, and the fear that a centre party under his leadership would attract electoral support from the Nationalist Party forced the more conservative members of that party to accept him as their leader. But in making him leader to maintain and increase their electoral strength, the Nationalists were obliged also to accept his middle-of-the-road, 'national' stance, which as an

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1 Hugh McClure Smith, quoted in Moffat Diary, p.755 (7-8 February 1937).
integral part of his popular appeal had to be reflected in the new party's policies. To have adopted harsh and unrelieved deflation as its cure for the Depression would have cost the U.A.P. the loss of the new voting strength that had accompanied Lyons' acceptance of the leadership; it would also have lost Lyons. The party could not have such conservative policies as severe pension cuts or compulsory military training as well as Lyons' leadership; when obliged to make a choice, the party compromised on its policies, because his leadership was believed to be essential for electoral success.

Without his leadership and the altered 'image' the Opposition adopted in 1931 because of it, the party would have been far more likely to have accepted the recommendations of its most conservative wing. Lyons' principle of 'equal sacrifice' would probably have been ignored by the party's refusing to match the severe reductions in wages and pensions with reductions in interest rates and by harsher deflationary policies coupled with a refusal to compromise over 'the rights of capital'. The lack of sympathy felt by many party members for those on the bottom of the social scale would have been more open than under his unaggressive leadership, and would very probably have been expressed by such illiberal policies as the proposed reduction of old age pensions to twelve shillings and sixpence a week. In these circumstances, the divisions in society produced by the Depression would have continued and widened, for a polarization of the non-Labour parties to the right would have been matched by a polarization of the working classes to the left. The Labour movement would have
become bitterly alienated from the whole social system, to whose overthrow it would have been pledged. Although perhaps too pessimistic and melodramatic, Giblin had a valid point when he told Lyons in September 1930 that 'you are about our last hope of a peaceful solution'. ¹

While a revolution was most unlikely, riots had already broken out, and New South Wales was about to enter a period when extremism of both the left and the right flourished. Without Lyons and the strong support amongst the as yet unembittered general public for his policy of 'equal sacrifice' and the avoidance of conflict wherever possible, a much more militant and uncompromising Labour movement would almost certainly have emerged from the Depression. The Communist Party in particular would have been given a tremendous impetus, for harsh government policies would have appeared to prove its analysis of capitalism and the class struggle. As Lyons commented to his wife, after the Depression had lifted, they had 'saved Australia from ruin' by their actions throughout its duration,² for with her help he had led the country through the Depression without leaving a permanent division in the social structure.

¹ L.F. Giblin to J.A. Lyons, 1 September 1930, Lyons Papers, file 20.
² Quoted in Lyons, p.266.
Chapter 7
THE FINAL YEAR

In his last year as Prime Minister, all Lyons' problems reached a climax. With few of his most experienced ministers now in politics, disunity, earlier kept in check, for the first time endangered the government. Disagreements over policy deepened at a time when the overseas situation brought a crisis atmosphere unparalleled since the Depression. The unprecedented difficulties of leadership created increasing ill-health and over-strain that in turn seriously handicapped his efforts to overcome these difficulties. The troubles of this year created an emotional state described by his widow as 'disillusion':¹ not only had his colleagues frustrated his desire to carry out his reformist principles, but now, when his health was failing and his multiplying problems required unity and the fullest assistance from his followers, his deputy leader turned against him. Under this threat, he had to divert most of his attention to protecting his hold on the Prime Ministership at the very time that he desperately wished to retire. The bitterness of this irony was increased by the fact that the man to whom he had intended to hand over the leadership was the man whose attempts to depose him he was resisting.

By 1939, European developments had worsened to such an extent that Lyons, who had hoped that a way could be

¹ Lyons, p.265.
found to avoid war, had come to believe that a European war was probably unavoidable. Early in January, he reproved H.G. Wells for describing Hitler as a 'certifiable lunatic', for, as he privately explained, 'the nations of the world are so delicately poised on the brink of war at the moment that responsible men must be more than ordinarily careful that they do not provoke ill-feeling'. He felt that he must try 'to maintain the atmosphere of sweet reasonableness and tolerance which must prevail if world conflict is to be avoided'.

However, as he realized, 'sweet reasonableness' was not apparent in Hitler's demands, and on 31 January he declared, without first consulting any of his ministers about the contents of his statement, that 'unfortunately Germany has given many indications that she intends to rely on force, and not to accept peaceful methods of readjustment. Because of this, the British Empire has had to rearm. In its strength lies the hope of a peaceful settlement of international political and economic difficulties, and there must be no relaxing of our efforts' to rearm.

After Germany invaded the rump of Czechoslovakia on 15 March, he made his disillusionment with the policy of appeasement more explicit by stating that whereas earlier he had hoped that the Munich Agreement would

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1 S.M.H., 6 January 1939 and 10 January 1939; J.A. Lyons to Sir Norman Kater, 16 January 1939, Lyons Papers (C.A.), CP 167 (Series 1) Folder K; compare Lyons' action with that of Michael Savage, the Labour Prime Minister of New Zealand: S.M.H., 3 February 1939.

2 S.M.H., 1 February 1939.
avoid war, he now had 'grave misgivings' about the future. The democracies must 'make plain their determination that attempts on the part of one nation to achieve a wide domination by force or threat of force shall be resisted.' In a later broadcast, he said that as British attempts to collaborate with Hitler had failed, the time 'for making further concessions in the hope of preserving peace has passed', and added a warning that Australia's defence efforts must be further increased. He realized that not only was war with Germany almost certain, but also that Japan might attempt to attack Australia: in January, he had warned that Australia's one hundred and fifty years of peace might soon end.

He realistically supported Cabinet's drive to improve Australia's defences: £11,531,000 was allocated for defence spending in 1937-8, and in March 1938 he announced a new defence programme entailing the expenditure of £43,000,000 over three years. In December, the defence appropriation was increased by a further £20,000,000. But the possibility of war horrified him, and to be the leader of a nation at war

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1 S.M.H., 18 March 1939.
2 S.M.H., 24 March 1939.
3 S.M.H., 26 January 1939.
was a bitter prospect for such a man of peace. He despaired of human endeavours to prevent war, and when the Munich crisis broke called for a National Day of Prayer to petition for peace; in a speech at this time, he said that as 'no human agency could devise a solution' to the crisis, the only hope of 'achieving a lasting peace must emanate from the intervention of a Higher Power'.

Whatever the earlier enjoyment he had from being Prime Minister, the possibility of his becoming a war leader combined with multiplying internal difficulties replaced it with the desire to retire while his health was not too impaired. Although National Insurance rivalled compulsory military training as the main cause of dispute, on other and lesser issues also parliamentary debates were enlivened by criticism of the government by its followers, some of whom voted against government legislation. Criticism of Cabinet indecision was now led by Gullett, while the New South Wales 'left-wing' was increasingly exasperated by Cabinet's hesitancy over social welfare legislation. And for the first time, ill-feeling between the government parties endangered the stability of the coalition. In June, 


3 For example, H.S. Gullett's speech in C.P.D., vol.156, p.1869 (7 June 1938); Age, 3 November 1938; Herald, 9 November 1938.
four Country Party members voted in parliament against the National Insurance legislation, and later in the year were supported by most of their party when the legislation was seen to be probably detrimental for primary producers. While efforts were made to meet Country Party demands, the proclamation of the Act was twice delayed. In recognition of the growing Country Party influence in the government, in the November 1938 Cabinet reshuffle Lyons allotted it a fourth full minister, to the dissatisfaction of some of his own party. At the end of his Prime Ministership, the Country Party held four full ministerial posts, two of these ministers being in the Inner Cabinet, plus one Assistant Ministership, the post of Chairman of Committees, and that of the chief government whip.

Not only did Lyons' political strength weaken under the strain of political, personal, and policy differences, but his physical strength also deteriorated. By late 1938 he was 'tired, dispirited, and ill', and his ministers began to realize that his worsening health made him unable to enforce unity in the coalition or to overcome the government's problems; he had become far more over-strained than during any previous crisis. The strain of the Munich crisis forced him to recuperate at his Devonport home, but on returning to Canberra he said that, while feeling better, he had 'not succeeded in obtaining a real holiday, as his worries had pursued

1 Argus, 9 November 1938 and 23 December 1938.
2 Ellis, p.235; McLachlan, p.256.
Although Page and Casey tried to take much of the burden of policy-making from him, they could do little fundamentally to ease his problems, which exhausted him both mentally and physically, and in December an English newspaper reported that ill-health might force him to retire. The report was denied by Australian politicians, who said that he was merely over-strained and in need of rest; neither Lyons, his wife, nor his friends realized the extent by which his health was failing.

By 1938, 'no one recognized more clearly than Lyons that the task for which he had been chosen in 1931 had come to an end. New emergencies demanded new qualities of leadership which he frankly admitted he did not possess'. When in England early in 1937, he privately mentioned his wish to resign, and on his return decided with his wife, who was also in poor health, that he should step down as soon as a successor could be found who was acceptable both to the
coalition partners and to the party organizations. ¹
'I've really reached the point where I could cheerfully
leave it all aside', he told her, ² and after winning
the October election he consulted Willis about his
position. When he began to explain that he was
prepared either to continue as leader, or to stand
down for Menzies as earlier planned, whichever the
National Union desired, Willis interrupted to reveal
that "our people are unanimously of the opinion that
Menzies is not ready for the job and that you have
got to remain to lead us at the next election". ³

Rather reluctantly, he continued in office, and in
reply to rumours that he might retire retorted that he
had 'no intention of becoming a political corpse for a
long time yet', and would continue as Prime Minister
while his health permitted. ⁴ But in September 1938,
he and his wife began to prepare for his retirement,
sending their youngest children back to Devonport to be
looked after by the older girls until their parents
joined them after he left office. ⁵

¹ Ramsay MacDonald to J.A. Lyons, 7 June 1937, Lyons
Papers, miscellaneous file; Trevor Smith, writing in
_The Times_, 8 April 1939; see also Neville Chamberlain
to Dame Enid Lyons, 9 April 1939, Lyons Papers,
miscellaneous file; Lyons, p.269.

² J.A. Lyons to Dame Enid Lyons, n.d. [circa Christmas
1937], Lyons Papers, miscellaneous file.

³ J.A. Lyons to Dame Enid Lyons, n.d. [October-December
1937], Lyons Papers, miscellaneous file; see also Lyons,
p.269, and Irvine Douglas, writing in _S.M.H._, 8 April
1939.

⁴ _Argus_, 21 October 1938.

⁵ Lyons, p.267.
To retire, he had first to find a successor. Menzies, his chosen successor in 1934, had partly disappointed his friends and supporters by his performance in federal politics. His campaigning at the 1934 election first led the National Union to doubt his political ability, for Willis was convinced that he had lost two Tasmanian seats for the party through being clever at his audiences' expense.1 In both party and Cabinet, his inability or arrogant disinclination to be friendly with those he regarded as intellectual inferiors had limited his success and even in his own electorate his popularity had fallen drastically.2 Although Lyons had always admired his ability, and had helped to make him Deputy Leader of the party in 1935, as early as that date he was aware of the threat to his leadership that might be created by Menzies' impatience to succeed him.3 Page and other Country Party members were soon to warn him that they would not serve under Menzies, so that when Sydney Snow, with whom he was discussing his problems of leadership, supported the National Union's judgement that Menzies at this stage...
at least was not a suitable Prime Minister,\(^1\) he must have discounted him as a politically feasible successor for the immediate future. However, he made no attempt personally to block Menzies' hopes until after Menzies' first move against him.

If Menzies was not acceptable to the coalition, an alternative successor could not easily be found. As early as 1934, Charles Hawker's supporters were believed to be preparing to make him leader in place of Lyons; always independently-minded, by 1938 he had become a strong critic of the government's policies and performance.\(^2\) Many believed that his increasing criticism foreshadowed a move openly to contest the leadership by voting against the government on an important policy issue,\(^3\) but on 25 October he died in an air crash. There were suggestions that New South Wales U.A.P. parliamentarians wanted Stevens to become Prime Minister, and in October Stewart was reported to be willing to resign his seat for him.\(^4\) Members of the New South Wales party organization wanted Stevens to become at least a federal minister, but while Stevens

\(^1\) S. Snow to J.A. Lyons, 4 January 1939, Lyons Papers, miscellaneous file; J.A. Lyons to S. Snow, 14 January 1939, Lyons Papers (C.A.), CP 167 (Series 1) Folder S.


\(^3\) Information given by Dame Enid Lyons.

\(^4\) \textit{Age}, 19 October 1938; \textit{Sun News-Pictorial}, 20 February 1939.
was probably not averse to this idea, he privately assured Lyons of his support for his continued leadership, and made no attempt before Lyons' death to enter federal politics.1 Casey, although an able administrator who was generally liked and respected, had been too self-effacing to be a serious contender for the leadership in the eyes of government members. If Lyons had encouraged him to seek the succession, he might have attempted to gain support, but without impetus from others he lacked sufficient ambition at this stage to tackle Menzies single-handed. As he later admitted, he 'never had any overpowering lust to be Prime Minister ... I wasn't going to kick anyone to death to do the job'.2 With Parkhill out of parliament and Stevens in state politics, Hughes became the unofficial leader of many, probably most, of the New South Wales members, but in 1938 few if any could have expected him to be defeated by only four votes for the Prime Ministership in April 1939. There were some newspaper suggestions that Page wanted to become Prime Minister,3 but while he remained a member of the Country Party this was politically impossible; thwarted ambition may have increased his determination that Menzies, whom he loathed for many other reasons besides his disloyalty to Lyons, should not become Prime Minister. One possible successor, Bruce, was almost completely ignored, and had himself

1 S. Snow to J.A. Lyons, 4 January 1939; B.S.B. Stevens to J.A. Lyons, [?] 9 October 1938, Lyons Papers, miscellaneous file.


3 For example, Herald, 6 October 1938.
written in 1935 that he should not become Prime Minister again;¹ yet in March 1939 Lyons agreed, briefly, to step down for him.

Lyons admired Menzies' intelligence and ability, was grateful for his assistance and encouragement in 1931 when changing parties, and had always intended him to be his successor. But by 1938, Menzies, 'undoubtedly' feeling 'acute discomfort as the subordinate of a man whose political virtues he understood and valued only in retrospect and from the opposition benches',² was tired of waiting for him to retire. Disliking the unaggressive, 'homely' nature of his leadership, and perhaps not fully reciprocating his friendship, Menzies decided that Lyons was irretrievably incompetent when he announced in the House a policy different from that decided with Menzies earlier in the day.³ While in England in mid-1938, Menzies revelled in his relative freedom from the convention of ministers leaving Lyons to be the sole spokesman for Cabinet, and by frequent speeches publicized his own views on economic, foreign, and defence policy, questions far removed from his own area of responsibilities as Attorney-General and Minister for Industry. These speeches were widely reported in Australia, and the Sydney Morning Herald wrote that he returned from abroad with a 'considerably enhanced reputation', and should be given a more important portfolio.⁴

¹ Edwards, p.244.
² West, p.220.
³ Edwards, p.268; information given by Dame Enid Lyons.
⁴ Editorial in S.M.H., 16 August 1938.
After his return in September, he made almost daily speeches on the same topics, posing as an expert on foreign policy because of his visit to Britain and Germany. As well as displaying his apparent comprehension of all current problems and thereby implying his competence to lead the government, he avoided potential political embarrassment by resigning his seven directorships in the J.B. Were & Son group.¹ Press rumours, probably inspired by Menzies and his supporters, suggested that he might resign from Cabinet unless government leadership was more vigorous, a more responsible Cabinet position was found for himself, defence planning was improved, and compulsory military training was reintroduced.²

In March 1935, Murdoch, while he considered that Menzies had 'many fine capacities and with experience may do very well', hoped that he would not 'make his run too early. He should not be P.M. until he is 10 years older'.³ However, three years later, exasperated by the government's policies and by Lyons' performance, he changed his mind and backed Menzies' attempt to become leader. In 1938, his Herald continually accused the government of indecision and of choosing inadequate policies, and insisted that only immediate changes in the membership and policies of Cabinet would save it

¹ Century (Sydney), 28 October 1938, p.1.
² Herald, 26 October 1938; Age, 1 November 1938, 3 November 1938, and 4 November 1938.
³ K.A. Murdoch to W.M. Hughes, 22 March 1935, Hughes Papers.
from internal collapse and electoral defeat. In 1935, Murdoch had feared the outbreak of a European war involving Australia within 'a few years', and his Herald in 1938 strongly criticized Cabinet's defence plans as 'palpably ineffective and wasteful' in a situation where war might be imminent, 'converting the German-Japanese-Italian grouping into a military alliance bent upon ruthless territorial conquest. Australia would be in the first line in such a war'.

The Herald demanded compulsory military training, while on National Insurance, the most contentious internal issue, wanted Casey's legislation carried into effect as the first step towards a comprehensive scheme.

However, Lyons was not attacked directly until after Menzies began to move against him in October, probably in collusion with Murdoch; Murdoch told a meeting of Melbourne businessmen at this time that, having made Lyons Prime Minister, he would now pull him down. Under such headings as 'Call for Leadership in National Defence' or 'The Time for Leadership', the Herald's editorials suggested that Lyons was unable to

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1 K.A. Murdoch to W.M. Hughes, 22 March 1935, Hughes Papers; editorials in Herald, 7 December 1938 and 30 January 1939.

2 Editorials in Herald, 8 November 1938, 10 November 1938, 11 November 1938, 9 December 1938, 26 January 1939, and 28 February 1939.

3 Information given by Dame Enid Lyons; see oblique reference in Lyons, p.273.
control Cabinet or adequately to handle policy difficulties.¹ It warned that if defence preparations did not improve, he would 'answer in the possible reckoning', bringing his career to 'a near and inglorious end'.² Murdoch's solution to 'weak leadership' was revealed on 19 October, when the Herald called for the strengthening of Cabinet with men like B.S.B. Stevens, and proclaimed that Menzies' recent speeches indicated 'the development of a broader outlook, inspired thought, insight, knowledge, a capacity to interpret Australian opinion, the political courage and patriotic ambition associated always with the strong personality who commands his countrymen's allegiance'. After denying that it opposed Lyons' leadership, it noted that he was tired, and suggested that should he wish to retire, Menzies would be an acceptable successor.³

In late October, the struggle between Lyons and Menzies began in earnest. The strain of the Munich crisis forced Lyons to go to Devonport for a rest, and in his absence a rumour that ill-health might force his retirement prompted Menzies to make his first direct attack on his leader.⁴ His opportunity was provided on 21 October, when Lyons, immediately upon his return from

¹ Editorials in Herald, 10 October 1938, 18 October 1938, and 9 November 1938.
² Editorial in Herald, 7 November 1938; a Political Correspondent, writing in Herald, 8 November 1938.
³ Editorial in Herald, 19 October 1938.
⁴ Page, p.262.
Devonport, propounded Page's incomplete and inadequate proposals for defence and national development to an unenthusiastic Premiers' Conference; the conference's rejection of the proposals was another blow to the federal leadership's prestige. Menzies immediately seized his chance, and in a speech in Sydney on 24 October virtually declared, without naming Lyons, his intention to displace him. The speech called for leadership in Australia 'as inspiring as that of the dictator countries...in these times of emergency we must not hesitate to take the people fully into our confidence, and give them leadership along well-defined lines'. The implication clearly was that Menzies, but not Lyons, could provide such leadership. There was some press support for his charges of weak leadership, but few politicians doubted that self-interest prompted the speech: Curtin described it as 'a thin disguise of his own political aspiration toward the leadership of the government', and wondered if it was part of a bid for power. The Herald, after praising the speech, denied such allegations by writing that 'no one can accuse Mr Menzies of pushing his own claims in politics ...Rather has he been backward in this way, being satisfied with unspectacular portfolios and secondary positions'.

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1 Herald, 21 October 1938, 22 October 1938, and 24 October 1938.


3 S.M.H., 26 October 1938.

4 Herald, 1 November 1938.
At first, Lyons did not believe that Menzies was attacking him, but his wife and others soon convinced him of the true import of the speech. Greatly upset by the realization of his deputy's disloyalty, his distress was increased by the hypocrisy of Menzies' attacking him through innuendo behind a mask of false friendship and support; he would have preferred an open announcement that his tenure of the leadership would be contested. On his own volition, immediately after making his speech Menzies saw Lyons to assure him that he had not intended in any way to reflect upon him; however, Lyons no longer believed him, and asked Page to rebut his criticism in a broadcast previously planned for 31 October. In his broadcast, Page praised Lyons' achievements and said that he had all the necessary qualities of leadership.1

On 25 October, the Herald explained that Menzies had spoken on leadership to encourage Lyons to purge Cabinet.2 Although basically disingenuous, this explanation was probably partly correct, for while Menzies could not expect to displace Lyons immediately, in a Cabinet reshuffle he could hope to obtain a more prominent portfolio in which to display his qualifications for leadership and from which to make a later bid for power. Probably inspired by Menzies, after his speech the press reported that he would resign from Cabinet


if not given either External Affairs, Defence, or the Treasury. But he had overplayed his hand, for until his speech Lyons had been prepared to stand down for him whenever the coalition and the organization accepted Menzies as his replacement; after the speech, he was determined to thwart his ambitions. Although suffering from ill-health and over-strained by his difficulties, neither his political ability nor his influence within the coalition and with the extra-parliamentary organizations had been seriously weakened, whereas Menzies lacked sufficient political strength to defeat him in a direct contest. By November, the Herald admitted that an open struggle had developed between the two men, with Lyons unwilling to promote his challenger to a more prestigious portfolio.

Menzies was not alone in urging the reconstruction of Cabinet. Many ministers and other government members were dissatisfied with Thorby's administration of the defence portfolio, a task which by 1938 was almost beyond the capacity of one man: some ministers reportedly wanted some of his responsibilities given to other ministers, or the portfolio to be administered by two ministers. And besides parliamentarians seeking a more efficient Cabinet and, in some cases, personal advancement, it was reported that 'influential semi-

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1 *Age*, 26 October 1938; *Argus*, 2 November 1938; *Age*, 3 November 1938; *Sun News-Pictorial*, 3 November 1938.


3 H.S. Gullett's speech in *C.P.D.*, vol.155, pp.669-670 (29 April 1938); *Argus*, 31 October 1938.
public organizations' desired Cabinet's reconstruction. However, neither parliamentarians nor finance committees sought to topple Lyons from the leadership, for he remained the least objectionable of the possible Prime Ministers, and still possessed considerable personal popularity within and outside parliament. Menzies was unpopular with most parliamentarians, and no alternative successor had come forward.

On 25 October, the day after Menzies' speech, the parliamentary U.A.P. carried a motion of confidence in Lyons, and on the following day separate meetings of both government parties revealed strong support for his continued leadership. On 2 November, at another meeting of the parliamentary U.A.P., Gullett, his most vocal critic, was the only member to vote against another motion of confidence in his leadership. At this meeting, several members charged Menzies with being disloyal in his 24 October speech, while Lyons insisted that he alone would decide the membership of Cabinet and would not tolerate dictation. The Herald noted on 3 November that his position was 'unchallengeable', for he had the full support of the New South Wales parliamentarians, who would not allow an unpopular Victorian to seize the leadership. In the vote in the House on 2 November on a Labour Party motion of no-confidence in the government

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1 S.M.H., 19 October 1938.
2 Age, 26 November 1938 and 27 November 1938.
3 Herald, 2 November 1938; S.M.H., 3 November 1938.
4 Herald, 3 November 1938.
because of its 'lamentable lack of leadership in regard to urgent national problems', no government member voted with Labour. After several private discussions with Lyons, Menzies on 3 November denied that he had given him any ultimatum about the reconstruction of Cabinet, adding that they were 'not only colleagues, but also friends'. Realizing that Lyons could not be deposed immediately, he presumably wanted to patch over the breach caused by his 24 October speech in the hope of gaining a more important portfolio.

On 7 November, a new Cabinet was sworn in. The main change was that Street replaced Thorby as Minister for Defence, Thorby taking a new portfolio created by the combination of Works and Civil Aviation; the latter was portion of his earlier responsibilities. A.G. Cameron succeeded McLachlan as Postmaster-General, McLachlan having resigned on 3 November when accused of financial impropriety; as the Country Party's fourth full minister, Cameron's appointment displeased some U.A.P. members. Both the press and some parliamentarians complained that the changes were insufficiently drastic, the Herald heading its editorial: 'A "New" Cabinet: Disappointment and Dissatisfaction'. However, as the Argus conceded, considering the poor quality of his followers Lyons had probably made the best possible

3 Editorial in Herald, 8 November 1938.
readjustment. To Menzies' reported dissatisfaction and the surprise of the newspapers, Menzies had not been promoted: the Herald noted the complete failure of his first attempt to replace Lyons. Although he made no public complaint, the set-back plus the likelihood that he would be unable to overcome the obstacles between himself and the leadership so discouraged him that he told Page that he might retire from politics. Only after much thought and the dissuasion of his colleagues did he decide to remain in Cabinet.

Lyons, who on 19 October had described as 'sheer imagination on somebody's part' the suggestion that he might establish an Inner Cabinet, formed seven senior ministers into such a body on 7 November. The new body was to develop major policy unfettered by routine problems, and its formation may have been in part a minor concession to Menzies, its main advocate for some years. However, the omission from its membership of T.W. White, the Minister for Trade and Customs, caused an unexpected complication for Lyons. At the swearing-in ceremony on 7 November, White was surprised to find that Casey had been promoted above him in the order of

1 Editorial in Argus, 8 November 1938.
2 S.M.H., 8 November 1938; Age, 8 November 1938; Herald, 8 November 1938 and 9 December 1938.
3 Page, pp.265-6.
4 Sun News-Pictorial, 20 October 1938.
5 For example, R.G. Menzies, quoted in S.M.H., 1 October 1935.
precedence, because of the latter's inclusion in the Inner Cabinet, the existence of which White only then discovered. When his request to be included in the new body was rejected by Cabinet on 8 November, he immediately resigned, and bitterly squabbled with Lyons in the House that afternoon.\footnote{C.P.D., vol.157, pp.1324-6; Argus, 9 November 1938; Herald, 9 November 1938.} This resignation weakened Lyons' position in Cabinet, for the strong mutual dislike between White and Menzies made White an active opponent of the latter's ambitions. After his resignation, White persistently criticized his former colleagues' policies, and cryptically warned of Menzies' desire to be Prime Minister.\footnote{T.W. White, quoted in Herald, 9 November 1938 and Age, 10 November 1938.} His portfolio was offered by Lyons to Stewart, who had walked out of the House rather than support his attacks on White.\footnote{Argus, 9 November 1938.} The offer was rejected, although Stewart still supported his leadership; one week later, he apologized for any difficulties caused by his 'impatience' on social questions, and offered his assistance to publicize National Insurance and other legislation.\footnote{F.H. Stewart to J.A. Lyons, 17 November 1938, Lyons Papers, file 17.}

Out of the confusion and crisis of October and November, Lyons emerged with the support of the majority of both government parties and the temporary defeat of the machinations of his sole challenger. However, a
minority had privately repudiated his leadership, saying that he was leading only 'on sufferance'. The Victorian and New South Wales organizations continued to support him, Sydney Snow assuring him in January 1939 that he was 'entirely satisfied that you personally are still the one and only P.M. possible'. The Country Party solidly supported him against Menzies, under whom it refused to serve when he became Prime Minister. There was a tacit understanding between all ministers except Menzies that no move should be made against him until after 22 April 1939, when he would pass Hughes' record term as Prime Minister, but the Murdoch newspapers warned that after this date the leadership question would be raised in 'acute form'.

For the moment, therefore, there was a pause in attacks on his position, for even Menzies made no overt moves against him until March. Indeed, when visiting Tasmania early in February 1939 he praised Lyons' leadership which, he told the press, he hoped would continue. However, he reverted to his earlier indirect denigration in a speech to the Young Nationalists later in February, when he called for a virile Australian government instead of one that just wanted to stay in office, and, in an implied reference to National

1 Herald, 9 November 1938.
2 S. Snow to J.A. Lyons, 4 January 1939, Lyons Papers, miscellaneous file.
3 Herald, 4 February 1939; Ellis, p.236; Herald, 8 February 1939; Sun News-Pictorial, 20 February 1939.
4 Examiner, 11 February 1939.
Insurance, which he supported, said that the government should risk defeat in a good cause.¹

The attacks on his leadership deeply distressed Lyons, who was particularly upset that Menzies used 'the method of the hidden dagger', with its implied criticisms and underhand attacks, which included the 'leaking' of private Cabinet and party information to receptive newspapers in the hope of embarrassing him.² At first he had accepted the protestations of loyalty made by Menzies and other critics, but gradually he began to fear betrayal by practically all his associates, especially as he discovered more about the plotting against him. But because he could never unearth the full details, he, 'who trusted everyone, came in the end in politics almost to trust no one'.³ Because he worried excessively about the campaign of Menzies and Murdoch and the likelihood of war, his health failed completely.

The Herald intensified its campaign against him in 1939, in January suggesting that the time had come for him to retire.⁴ In attacking his stand on compulsory military training, it criticized 'timid politicians who measure defence policy by the hypothetical swing of balancing votes', and in discussing National Insurance it referred to 'the weakness of the Prime Minister in

¹ Argus, 22 February 1939; Age, 22 February 1939.
² Lyons, p.272.
³ Lyons, p.273
⁴ Herald, 2 January 1939.
the face of any issue affecting votes'. In early March, it warned that the U.A.P. would disintegrate if he did not retire, for with the 'strange collapse' of his now 'discredited' leadership many party members would stand as Independents at the next election. While it would prefer him to stand down rather than be thrown out, and was willing to see him continue as a minister, there had to be an end to the 'humiliating, intolerable mess into which exhausted leadership' had landed the government. Until April, it still wanted Menzies to be Prime Minister, but after Lyons' death it briefly supported Page's efforts to make Bruce the new leader, retaining Menzies as its second choice.

When Cabinet on 14 March once more decided to postpone the introduction of National Insurance until Country Party demands had been comprehensively considered, Menzies immediately resigned from Cabinet and the deputy Leadership of the U.A.P. In a statement to the newspapers, he revealed that since September 1938 he had disagreed with the majority of ministers over many policies, especially defence, and explained that the National Insurance decision was the last straw.

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1 Editorial in Herald, 30 January 1939; see also editorial in Herald, 26 January 1939, and also Herald, 27 February 1939.
2 Herald, 3 March 1939 and 7 March 1939.
3 Editorials in Herald, 10 April 1939 and 12 April 1939.
4 Age, 15 March 1939.
Although some of his colleagues doubted the sincerity of his support for National Insurance, he had written a circular to his constituents in December the previous year explaining his complete support for the scheme, and when Prime Minister his Cabinet worked out a more advanced plan than that of 1938.  

1 He may therefore have been partly making a stand on principle by resigning over the then apparently unpopular scheme. And of his other disagreements with his colleagues, he may have genuinely believed that such policies as compulsory military training were feasible and necessary, and only after becoming Prime Minister realized his mistake.  

However, whatever the sincerity of his differences with his colleagues, the main motive for his resignation appeared to be self-advancement. By resigning apparently on a matter of principle, he no doubt hoped to gain the support of dissident U.A.P. members, while by being free of the restrictions imposed by Cabinet solidarity and the Deputy Leadership of the party he would be able to make a more vigorous drive for the leadership. What angered Page and probably other ministers was that he resigned just after news had arrived that Hitler had marched into the rump of Czechoslovakia. Page 'remonstrated with him, reminding him that we might be at war by the evening. I urged that it was unthinkable

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2 For compulsory military training, see Hasluck, p.162.
for the third-ranking man in the Ministry to resign at such a time'.

If Menzies had hoped that his resignation would prompt a newspaper demand that he be made Prime Minister, he was disappointed, for while newspapers generally supported his action, only the Herald wanted him to replace Lyons. Surprised that no other ministers had resigned with him, the Herald forecast that his action 'has within it the hopeful possibility that at last an end is in sight to the drifting career of a Government which is sacrificing the urgent need of the nation to political opportunism'. The resignation gave 'new and welcome proof of his fitness for leadership in national affairs'. But outside parliament, he had yet to overcome his electoral unpopularity and the opposition of the party organizations; and while prominent businessmen such as Ricketson might want him eventually to become Prime Minister, they did not want him to depose Lyons to achieve his goal. In parliament, he needed to have the support of only seven members of the Representatives to defeat the government with Labour

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1 Page, p.266.
3 For example, editorial in S.M.H., 15 March 1939.
4 Editorial in Herald, 15 March 1939.
5 Information given by Staniforth Ricketson, and also his evidence quoted in S.M.H., 16 October 1941.
Party help, and the nucleus for a Menzies group within the U.A.P. existed with Gullett, Harold Holt,\(^3\) and J.V. Fairbairn, all Victorians, and J.N. Lawson, who resigned as Parliamentary Secretary to support him.\(^1\) Stewart announced after Cabinet's decision on National Insurance that he could no longer support the 'discredited' government, and he might have been able to rally his New South Wales supporters behind Menzies if Menzies guaranteed to put into effect the National Insurance legislation.\(^2\)

In public, Menzies and Lyons remained friends despite the former's resignation, and before leaving for Melbourne after submitting his resignation Menzies had what was described as a friendly drink for the road in Lyons' office.\(^3\) Free from his disruptive tactics, Cabinet after Menzies' resignation was more united and confident.\(^4\) Indeed, if his health had improved, Lyons might have been able with a more peaceful and effective Cabinet to find a solution to some of his policy problems, and to choose an alternative successor. However, he would have faced difficulties in parliament and the party room, for although Menzies made no further moves against him immediately after his resignation, he

\(^1\) H.S. Gullett, quoted in *Argus*, 2 March 1939; *Herald*, 15 March 1939 and 17 March 1939.

\(^2\) F.H. Stewart, quoted in *S.M.H.*, 4 March 1939 and 15 March 1939; see *Herald*, 28 February 1939.

\(^3\) *S.M.H.*, 16 March 1939.

\(^4\) See Canberra Correspondent, writing in *S.M.H.*, 20 March 1939 and 3 April 1939.
would almost certainly have launched a direct attack when parliament met in April. Also in April, the party had to elect a new Deputy Leader, and a victory for Menzies or his nominee would have been regarded as a vote of no-confidence in Lyons.

After resting at Devonport over Christmas, Lyons appeared to be in better health, but by March, with Menzies' resignation and the probability of war created by Hitler's further aggression, the rapid decline in his health alarmed his friends. When Menzies resigned, he must have known that their final conflict was imminent; to avoid this, he desperately sought to resign. Nobody 'concerned only with himself' would wish to remain Prime Minister, he told the press when referring to all his problems. Yet a successor had still not been found. With Menzies an enemy, Page a political impossibility, and Casey lacking sufficient drive to be readily acceptable to the government parties, the only other possible choice was Bruce, whom he had long admired, and who had returned to Australia for a visit late in January 1939.

Fearing Bruce as a possible rival, Menzies and his supporters had opposed moves in January and February to induce him to re-enter Australian politics, and his knowledge that Bruce was being considered as Lyons' successor.

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1 Lyons, p.272; Herald, 8 February 1939; S.M.H., 6 April 1939.
3 Edwards, p.266; editorial in Argus, 29 March 1939.
successor may have been a significant factor prompting his resignation from Cabinet. Sydney Snow and probably the rest of the Sydney organization wanted Bruce to rejoin Cabinet, but Snow emphasized to Lyons that Bruce would not be acceptable to the public as Prime Minister. The National Union also wanted him to rejoin Cabinet, and in January or February joined Lyons in appealing to him to become a minister, explaining that for the moment they were not asking him to be Lyons' successor. Bruce refused the request, also that in January from Page and others to re-enter parliament to succeed Lyons.

On 20 March, Lyons announced that Bruce would remain in Australia instead of leaving for Britain on the following day as earlier planned. They met in Melbourne on 21 and 22 March, Lyons stressed that he could no longer stand the strain of leadership, and asked Bruce to replace him. Lyons had not fully considered his future, but was willing to retire to the backbenches immediately; the possibility was mooted by senior ministers of his becoming the first Australian Minister to Washington. Although reluctant to become Prime Minister again, Bruce on the urging of Casey and

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1 S. Snow to J.A. Lyons, 4 January 1939, Lyons Papers, miscellaneous file.
2 Edwards, pp.261-2; Ellis, p.238.
3 S.M.H., 21 March 1939.
4 Edwards, p.262.
5 Esthus, p.68; New York Times, quoted in Herald, 14 April 1939; F.C. Green, writing in Sun-Herald, 24 May 1959; information given by Dame Enid Lyons.
Page began to suggest conditions under which he might accept the post. One was that a 'national' government in some form should be established, but when Lyons on 23 March tested the political reaction by suggesting that such a development might be desirable, Curtin rejected the idea out of hand.¹

On Saturday 25 March, the newspapers reported that although Lyons said that Bruce had no intention of returning to Australian politics, he had asked him to remain in Australia 'indefinitely'.² The initial negotiations having been fruitless, he clearly planned to keep Bruce in Australia until he was persuaded to accept the offer. Discussing his future at Devonport on the previous night, Lyons and his wife had agreed that he must retire at once; however, Dame Enid had warned him that Bruce's conditions were not politically practical.³ On Sunday, while his wife remained at Devonport, he returned to Melbourne, where no doubt he consulted Knox and Willis. On Monday, 27 March, when he met Bruce in Canberra, Bruce made his final offer, but one so politically unreal that he probably hoped it would be rejected. He stipulated that on the following day, Lyons must inform the Governor-General that he could not continue as Prime Minister, and suggest that he send for Bruce. On being appointed, Bruce would broadcast to the nation as Prime Minister, having three

² S.M.H., 25 March 1939.
³ Lyons, pp.273-4; information given by Dame Enid Lyons.
months in which to be elected to parliament. He insisted that Lyons should be a minister. Lyons accepted the conditions, but after reconsidering them overnight and probably consulting Page and Casey, told him on the following day, 28 March, that despite his anxiousness to retire, they were not politically feasible in peacetime and could not be accepted. On the same day, he announced that Bruce would return to Britain immediately.

On the weekend of 1 and 2 April, he met his wife in Melbourne, and they spent Sunday afternoon with Knox and Willis discussing what was to be their future now that there was no successor immediately available. On being told that the National Union wanted him to continue as leader until the 1940 election was won, they reluctantly agreed that he should not retire. Page believed that the National Union now wanted Casey to be his successor and that the Consultative Council supported Hughes; Lyons' preference is unknown, for on 4 April doctors sent him to hospital, where he suffered a series of heart attacks and went into a coma. He died on 7 April, aged only fifty nine.

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1 Edwards, pp.262-3; Ellis, p.238.
2 Edwards, p.263; Ellis, p.238.
3 S.M.H., 29 March 1931.
4 Lyons, p.274.
5 E.C.G. Page, Quoted in Herald, 24 April 1939.
Party leader in state and federal politics for nearly twenty-one years, Premier for five, Prime Minister for seven until his death in office only two weeks short of Hughes' record term, Lyons' political record had been marked by the Labour Party's first electoral victory in Tasmania's history and the winning of three successive federal elections. Such sustained success was unique in Australian history to that date.

In both state and federal politics his leadership of his party was notable for his genial, pragmatic, and conciliatory manner. When policy was being considered, he sought to find a consensus of opinion, even if such a consensus should offend his personal beliefs. His personality won him friends amongst his parliamentary followers, within the party organization, and with influential extra-parliamentary supporters and advisers, thereby greatly strengthening his leadership; it also significantly assisted his efforts to moderate the passions aroused in parliamentary and public debate. His willingness to seek advice, to be content as chairman of Cabinet to subordinate his personal wishes to the will of the majority, and to campaign unceasingly to retain popular support for his government and its policies created admiration amongst his colleagues. They acknowledged his political skill, especially as spokesman for the government and as mediator between factions within government and coalition, and knew that he had no rival at that time as an election-winner. Any dissatisfaction with his leadership that appeared within the party was overcome because, apart from his political skills, he was, to place the very lowest estimation on his worth,
the least objectionable leader available. All factions liked him as a person and were prepared to accept his leadership, and they could not have agreed on a candidate to replace him.

His personality appealed to the voters, who identified themselves with him because of his very ordinariness, ordinariness that so exasperated Menzies. He had the largest personal following of any parliamentarian of his day: in Tasmania, many Nationalists had voted for him because of his personal qualities and constructive Premiership, while in the early thirties he was supported by many customarily Labour voters because he provided 'saner' leadership than that of Scullin or Lang, yet leadership that they could still regard as at least partly 'Labour'. Even in the late thirties, despite his failing capacity he retained popular sympathy and affection. In his ordinariness, his representativeness of the ideals and outlook of the common man, lay much of the secret of his success. More than anything else, the Australian electors of the thirties wanted a leader who would bring quiet and confidence while the wounds of the Depression healed. As in the twenties, when after a great upheaval Britain had turned to Baldwin and the United States to Calvin Coolidge, so Australia in the thirties turned to Lyons.
## APPENDIX¹

### Scullin Ministry – From 22 October, 1929 to 6 January, 1932

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>James Henry Scullin, P.C.</td>
<td>Prime Minister, Minister for External Affairs, and Minister for Industry</td>
<td>22 October, 1929 to 6 January, 1932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward Granville Theodore</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
<td>22 October, 1929 to 9 July, 1930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Succeeded by</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Henry Scullin, P.C.</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
<td>9 July, 1930 to 29 January, 1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Succeeded by</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward Granville Theodore</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
<td>29 January, 1931 to 6 January, 1932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Joseph Daly</td>
<td>Vice-President of the Executive Council</td>
<td>22 October, 1929 to 3 March, 1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Succeeded by</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Barnes</td>
<td>Vice-President of the Executive Council</td>
<td>3 March, 1931 to 6 January, 1932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank Brennan</td>
<td>Attorney-General</td>
<td>22 October, 1929 to 6 January, 1932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Aloysius Lyons</td>
<td>Postmaster-General and Minister for Works and Railways</td>
<td>22 October, 1929 to 4 February, 1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Succeeded by</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albert Ernest Green</td>
<td>Postmaster-General and Minister for Works and Railways</td>
<td>4 February, 1931 to 6 January, 1932</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Date Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>James Edward Fenton</td>
<td>Minister for Trade and Customs</td>
<td>22 October, 1929 to 4 February, 1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>succeeded by Francis Michael Forde</td>
<td>Minister for Trade and Customs</td>
<td>4 February, 1931, to 6 January, 1932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arthur Blakeley</td>
<td>Minister for Home Affairs</td>
<td>22 October, 1929 to 6 January, 1932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank Anstey</td>
<td>Minister for Health and</td>
<td>22 October, 1929 to 3 March, 1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>succeeded by John McNeill</td>
<td>Minister for Health and</td>
<td>3 March, 1931 to 6 January, 1932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albert Ernest Green</td>
<td>Minister for Defence</td>
<td>22 October, 1929 to 4 February, 1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>succeeded by John Joseph Daly</td>
<td>Minister for Defence</td>
<td>4 February, 1931 to 3 March, 1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>succeeded by Joseph Benedict Chifley</td>
<td>Minister for Defence</td>
<td>3 March, 1931 to 6 January, 1932</td>
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<tr>
<td>Parker John Moloney</td>
<td>Minister for Markets and Transport*</td>
<td>22 October, 1929 to 6 January, 1932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Barnes</td>
<td>Honorary Minister</td>
<td>22 October, 1929 to 4 February, 1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francis Michael Forde</td>
<td>Honorary Minister</td>
<td>22 October, 1929 to 4 February, 1931</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Created two separate Departments, the Department of Markets and the Department of Transport, 21 April, 1930, Mr Moloney holding both Portfolios.
Scullin Ministry - continued

John Albert Beasley  Honorary Minister  22 October, 1929 to 3 March, 1931
Edward James Holloway  Honorary Minister  3 March, 1931 to 12 June, 1931
Charles Ernest Culley  Honorary Minister  3 March, 1931 to 24 June, 1931
John Braidwood Dooley  Honorary Minister  3 March, 1931 to 6 January, 1932
John Joseph Daly  Honorary Minister  26 June, 1931 to 6 January, 1932
Lucien Lawrence Cunningham  Honorary Minister  26 June, 1931 to 6 January, 1932

Lyons Ministry - From 6 January, 1932 to 7 November, 1938

Joseph Aloysius Lyons, P.C., Prime Minister and  6 January, 1932 to 7 November, 1938
  C.H.  6 January, 1932 to 3 October, 1935

succeeded by
Richard Gardiner Casey,  as Treasurer  3 October, 1935 to 7 November, 1938
  D.S.O., M.C.
John Greig Latham, P.C.,  Attorney-General, Minister  6 January, 1932 to 12 October, 1934
  C.M.G., K.C.  for External Affairs and
succeeded by
Minister for Industry
Robert Gordon Menzies, P.C.,  as Attorney-General and  12 October, 1934 to 7 November, 1938
  K.C.  and
Lyons Ministry—continued

Sir George Foster Pearce, P.C., K.C.V.O.  
Minister for External Affairs 12 October, 1934 to 29 November, 1937

Minister in Charge of Territories 12 October, 1934 to 29 November, 1937

succeeded by

William Morris Hughes, P.C., Minister for External Affairs and Minister in charge of Territories 29 November, 1937 to 7 November, 1938

Stanley Melbourne Bruce, P.C., C.H., M.C.  
Assistant Treasurer 6 January, 1932 to 23 June, 1932

Minister without portfolio 23 June, 1932 to 26 September, 1932

Minister without portfolio, London 26 September, 1932 to 6 October, 1933

succeeded by

Sir Walter Massy-Greene, K.C.M.G.  
Assistant Treasurer 23 June, 1932 to 11 October, 1933

Sir George Foster Pearce, P.C., K.C.V.O.  
Minister for Defence 6 January, 1932 to 12 October, 1934

succeeded by

Sir Robert Archdale Parkhill, Minister for Defence K.C.M.G.  
12 October, 1934 to 20 November, 1937

succeeded by

Joseph Aloysius Lyons, P.C., Minister for Defence C.H.  
20 to 22 November, 1937

succeeded by

Harold Victor Campbell Torby  
Minister for Defence 29 November, 1937 to 7 November, 1938
Lyons Ministry - continued

James Edward Fenton
Postmaster-General
6 January, 1932 to 13 October, 1932

succeeded by
Sir Robert Archdale
Postmaster-General
13 October, 1932 to 12 October, 1934
Parkhill, K.C.M.G.

succeeded by
Alexander John McLachlan
Postmaster-General
12 October, 1934 to 7 November, 1938

and Minister in charge of
Development and Scientific
and Industrial Research
6 January, 1932 to 29 November, 1937

succeeded by
Richard Gardiner Casey,
as Minister in charge of
D.S.O., M.C.
Development and Scientific
and Industrial Research
29 November, 1937 to 7 November, 1938

Sir Henry Somer Gullett,
Minister for Trade and
K.C.M.G.
6 January, 1932 to 14 January, 1933

succeeded by
Thomas Walter White, D.F.C., Minister for Trade and
V.D.
Customs
14 January, 1933 to 7 November, 1938

Sir Robert Archdale
Minister for Home Affairs
Parkhill, K.C.M.G.
and Minister for Transport
6 January, 1932 to 12 April, 1932

Sir Robert Archdale
Minister for the Interior*
Parkhill, K.C.M.G.
12 April, 1932 to 13 October, 1932

succeeded by
John Arthur Perkins
Minister for the Interior
13 October, 1932 to 12 October, 1934

* On 12 April, 1932, the Departments of Home Affairs, Transport and Works
and Railways were amalgamated into one Department, called the Department of
the Interior.
Lyons Ministry - continued

succeeded by
Eric John Harrison
Minister for the Interior
12 October, 1934 to
9 November, 1934

succeeded by
Thomas Paterson
Minister for the Interior
9 November, 1934 to
29 November, 1937

succeeded by
John McEwen
Minister for the Interior
29 November, 1937 to
7 November, 1938

Charles Allan Seymour Hawker
Minister for Markets
6 January, 1932 to
13 April, 1932

and Minister for Repatriation
6 January, 1932 to
12 April, 1932

Charles Allan Seymour Hawker
Minister for Commerce*
13 April, 1932 to
23 September, 1932

succeeded by
Joseph Aloysius Lyons, P.C., Minister for Commerce C.H.
3 to 13 October, 1932

succeeded by
Frederick Harold Stewart
Minister for Commerce
13 October, 1932 to
9 November, 1934

succeeded by
Sir Earle Christmas Grafton Minister for Commerce
Page, P.C., G.C.M.G.
9 November, 1934 to
7 November, 1938

Charles William Clanan Marr, D.S.O., M.C., V.D.
Minister for Health and
Minister for Works and
Railways
6 January, 1932 to
12 April, 1932

* On 13 April, 1932, the name of the Department of Markets was altered to the Department of Commerce.
Lyons Ministry - continued

Charles William Clalan Marr, D.S.O., M.C., V.D.  *Minister for Health and Minister for Repatriation
Minister in charge of Territories

succeeded by
William Morris Hughes, P.C., Minister for Health and K.C. Minister for Repatriation

succeeded by
Joseph Aloysius Lyons, P.C. Minister for Health
C.H. Minister for Repatriation

succeeded by
William Morris Hughes, P.C., Minister for Health K.C.
and Minister for Repatriation

succeeded by
Sir Earle Christmas Grafton Page, P.C., G.C.M.G. as Minister for Health
Minister for Repatriation and Minister in charge of War and Minister for Repatriation and
Service Homes Service Homes

Hattil Spencer Foll

Alexander John McLachlan Vice-President of the Executive Council

12 April, 1932 to 12 October, 1934
6 January, 1932 to 24 May, 1934
12 October, 1934 to 6 November, 1935
8 November, 1935 to 26 February, 1936
8 November, 1935 to 6 February, 1936
26 February, 1936 to 29 November, 1937
6 February, 1936 to 29 November, 1937
29 November, 1937 to 7 November, 1938
29 November, 1937 to 7 November, 1938
6 January, 1932 to 12 October, 1934

* Consequent upon the amalgamation of the Department of Home Affairs, Transport and Works and Railways, the Hon. C.W.C. Marr was appointed to be Minister for Repatriation, vice the Hon. C.A.S. Hawker.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minister/Assistant</th>
<th>Position/Role</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sir Walter Massy-Greene, K.C.M.G.</td>
<td>Minister assisting the Leader of the Government in the Senate</td>
<td>6 January, 1932</td>
<td>23 June, 1932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Josiah Francis</td>
<td>Assistant Treasurer</td>
<td>23 June, 1932</td>
<td>11 October, 1933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Arthur Perkins</td>
<td>Assistant Minister for Defence and Minister in Charge of War Service Homes</td>
<td>6 January, 1932</td>
<td>12 October, 1934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Allan Guy</td>
<td>Assistant Minister for Trade and Customs</td>
<td>13 October, 1932</td>
<td>7 November, 1935</td>
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<tr>
<td>Richard Gardiner Casey, D.S.O., M.C.</td>
<td>Assistant Minister (Treasury)/Assistant Treasurer</td>
<td>25 September, 1933, to 3 October, 1935</td>
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<td>Position</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assistant Minister (Treasury)</td>
<td>Minister in charge of Territories</td>
<td>17 October, 1933 to 12 October, 1934</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minister without portfolio, directing negotiations for trade treaties</td>
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<td>24 May, 1934 to 12 October, 1934</td>
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<td>Minister without portfolio</td>
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<td>12 October, 1934 to 11 March, 1937</td>
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<tr>
<td>Honorary Minister in charge of the Royal Visit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minister without portfolio, assisting the Minister for Commerce</td>
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<td>12 October, 1934 to 9 November, 1934</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minister without portfolio, assisting the Minister for Commerce and the Minister for Industry</td>
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<td>9 November, 1934 to 29 November, 1937</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minister without portfolio, in charge of War Service Homes and assisting the Minister for Repatriation</td>
<td></td>
<td>12 October, 1934 to 9 November, 1934</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minister without portfolio, in charge of War Service Homes and assisting the Minister for Commerce</td>
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<td>9 November, 1934 to 1 September, 1935</td>
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<td>1 September, 1935 to 11 September, 1936</td>
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<td>1 September, 1935 to 29 November, 1937</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Period</td>
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<tr>
<td>James Aitchison Johnston</td>
<td>Minister without portfolio, representing the Postmaster-General in the House of Representatives</td>
<td>9 November, 1934 to 1 September, 1935</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hunter</td>
<td>Minister without portfolio, assisting the Minister for Repatriation</td>
<td>1 September, 1935 to 29 November, 1937</td>
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<tr>
<td>John Arthur Perkins</td>
<td>Minister without portfolio, assisting the Minister for Repatriation</td>
<td>23 September, 1935 to 29 November, 1937</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allan Nicoll MacDonald</td>
<td>Minister without portfolio, in charge of War Service Homes</td>
<td>11 September, 1936 to 29 November, 1937</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Minister without portfolio, assisting the Minister for Commerce</td>
<td>18 March, 1937 to 25 July, 1937</td>
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<tr>
<td>Victor Charles Thompson</td>
<td>Minister without portfolio, assisting the Treasurer</td>
<td>29 November, 1937 to 7 November, 1938</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Minister without portfolio, assisting the Minister for the Interior</td>
<td>1 February, 1938 to 7 November, 1938</td>
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<tr>
<td>Archie Galbraith Cameron</td>
<td>Minister without portfolio, assisting the Minister for Commerce</td>
<td>29 November, 1937 to 7 November, 1938</td>
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**Lyons Ministry - 7 November, 1938 to 7 April, 1939**

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<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>start_date</th>
<th>end_date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Joseph Aloysius Lyons, P.C., C.H.</td>
<td>7 November, 1938</td>
<td>7 April, 1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister for Commerce</td>
<td>Sir Earle Christmas Grafton Minister for Commerce Page, P.C., G.C.M.G.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>succeeded by</td>
<td>William Morris Hughes, P.C., Attorney-General and K.C.</td>
<td>20 March, 1939</td>
<td>7 April, 1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister for External Affairs</td>
<td>William Morris Hughes, P.C., Minister for External Affairs K.C.</td>
<td>7 November, 1938</td>
<td>7 April, 1939</td>
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<tr>
<td>Treasurer</td>
<td>Richard Gardiner Casey, D.S.O., M.C.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Minister for Trade and Customs</td>
<td>Thomas Walter White, D.F.C.</td>
<td>7 November, 1938</td>
<td>8 November, 1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>succeeded by</td>
<td>John Arthur Perkins</td>
<td>8 November, 1938</td>
<td>7 April, 1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister for Works and Aviation</td>
<td>Harold Victor Campbell Thorby</td>
<td>24 November, 1938</td>
<td>7 April, 1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister for Defence</td>
<td>Geoffrey Austin Street, M.C.</td>
<td>7 November, 1938</td>
<td>7 April, 1939</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minister for the Interior</td>
<td>John McEwen</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

1. The Department of Works and the Department of Civil Aviation were created on 24 November, 1938.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>George McLeay</td>
<td>Vice-President of the Executive Council</td>
<td>7 November, 1938 to 7 April, 1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hattil Spencer Foll</td>
<td>Minister for Repatriation and Minister for Health</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Archie Galbraith Cameron</td>
<td>Postmaster-General</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Arthur Perkins</td>
<td>Minister without portfolio, assisting the Prime Minister</td>
<td>8 November, 1938 to 7 April, 1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and administering External Territories</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>succeeded by</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eric John Harrison</td>
<td>Minister without portfolio, assisting the Prime Minister</td>
<td>8 November, 1938 to 7 April, 1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and administering External Territories</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victor Charles Thompson</td>
<td>Minister without portfolio, assisting the Minister for</td>
<td>7 November, 1938 to 7 April, 1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allan Nicoll MacDonald</td>
<td>Minister without portfolio, assisting the Treasurer</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Pensions: 32/3745, 35/689.
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Royal Commission into banking: 35/517, 35/1479.
Grants to the States: 33/3056 (part 1), 34/3401, 34/4450.
Lyons and A.G. Ogilvie: 32/2249.
Unemployment: 34/4611, 36/1241.
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>Title</th>
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<td>1915-6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Education Department: Report for 1914.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1923-4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Financial Proposals submitted by the Prime Minister of Australia to the State Government, in so far as they relate to Tasmania. Report of Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament, with Minutes of Proceedings and Appendix.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1924-5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Memorandum in Support of Tasmania's Claim to Special Consideration from the Parliament of the Commonwealth.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Assent to Appropriation Bill, 1924-25 (No.67): Copies of Cables between His Excellency the Administrator of the Government and the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for the Colonies, &amp;c.</td>
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<td>Appropriation Bill, 1924-25 (No.67): Report of Select Committee, with Statement relative to Bill.</td>
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</tbody>
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Year    No.
1925-6  8  Report of Committee appointed to inquire into Tasmanian Disabilities under Federation.
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1925-6  52 'The Case for Tasmania'. Presented to Sir Nicholas Lockyer ... by The Hon. A.G. Ogilvie, K.C., M.H.A., and The Hon. Tasman Shields, M.L.C., for and on the behalf of The Government of Tasmania ...
1926-7  5 Financial Statement of the Treasurer of Tasmania, 1926-27.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<tr>
<td>1928-9</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Public Trust Office: Report of Royal Commission appointed to inquire into the Administration of the Public Trust Office by The Hon. A.G. Ogilvie, K.C., and by the Public Trustee.</td>
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<td>1934-5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>The Case for Tasmania, 1934. Statement presented to the Commonwealth Grants Commission on behalf of the Government of Tasmania by the Hon. Claude James, M.H.A., Chief Secretary.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Year

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