THE PRACTICES OF KNOWLEDGE CLAIMS:
REFLECTIONS FROM THE DRIVE TOWARD CONSTRUCTING
‘EAST ASIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY’

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I declare that this thesis is the product of my original research.

Thuy T Do
Acknowledgements

The original idea for this thesis came from my encounter with IR Theory and East Asian international relations during my master’s studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore nine years ago. To turn it into a complete PhD project, I would like to extend my sincere thanks to those who helped, guided, and inspired me during the writing of this thesis.

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Abstract

The rise of East Asia has generated debate about how International Relations (IR) Theory should respond to ongoing structural change. Most significantly, a vibrant body of literature now exists that advances – or critiques – the imperative and feasibility for East Asian IR Theory (EAIRT). This thesis addresses an understudied but unique dimension of the EAIRT debate: how claims about EAIRT have altered the way academics approach their research, education and other professional activities. This question has been almost completely ignored by both those who study EAIRT directly (whatever their perspective on that debate) and by those who study the relationship between academia and practices more generally.

Driven by the question ‘how have academic practices changed in response to the call for EAIRT’, this study investigates the connection between the various claims about EAIRT and the actual practices of academics in bringing their claims to life. In addressing this issue, this research answers three sub-questions: why knowledge claims occur the way they do; how theorists validate and implement these claims in their daily life; and what actually drives those claims and shifting practices (if any). Addressing these questions provides vital and hitherto missing insight into the status, significance and depth of the contemporary EAIRT debate and enables a better appreciation of the theory-practice relationship.

To answer these questions, this thesis constructs a ‘sociology of science’ framework and then applies it to assess the Chinese, Japanese, and American IR communities in an EAIRT context. This study finds that whilst there have been some changes adopted by scholars involved in the EAIRT debate, the degree and form of changes vary across cases. In China, the biggest developments are the formulation of a vibrant theory-led debate and a resource mobilization process to pave the way for the construction of a ‘Chinese style’ IR Theory. In Japan, the EAIRT discourse initially presented itself in the form of re-examining the existence of ‘Japanese IR’ in the past. However, it has increasingly shifted toward a ‘post-Western IR’ agenda. Meanwhile shifting EAIRT practices in the US are most clearly found among a small number of American-based East Asia specialists who have attempted to bring the Eastern agency into IR Theory. Yet ‘mainstream American IR’, given its hegemonic status in the field and the adherence of most IR academics in the US to this approach, has proven resilient to EAIRT.
This thesis argues that these different responses to EAIRT can be attributable to the uneven impact of social factors on the practices of knowledge claims. These social factors can be classified into two main categories: structural consideration (power shift, socio-political concerns, and academic institutions) and agential choice (personal background, vision of science, and moral choice). These structural and agential factors often intersect and exert impact to varying extents on different national IR academies and individual academics, and therefore shape their respective responses to the call for EAIRT. That explains why claims for EAIRT take various forms in theoretical debates and are implemented in different ways in scholars’ daily practices.
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A note on name and translation

This thesis follows the Chinese and Japanese convention of placing the surname before the given name in refereeing to the names of mainland Chinese and ordinary Japanese scholars. As an exception, this convention is reversed when identifying those Chinese diaspora scholars and Japanese authors who have published extensively in English. The translations of Chinese sources are this author's unless otherwise specified.
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AJCP</td>
<td>Asian Journal of Comparative Politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>The Association of Southeast Asian nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASS</td>
<td>Chinese Academy of Social Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFAU</td>
<td>China Foreign Affairs University</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Consociational Security Order</td>
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<td>EAIRT</td>
<td>East Asian International Relations Theory</td>
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<tr>
<td>EJIR</td>
<td>European Journal of International Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCOE</td>
<td>Global Centers of Excellence in Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEACPS</td>
<td>Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICU</td>
<td>International Christian University (Japan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i.r.</td>
<td>international relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRAP</td>
<td>International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Journal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRT</td>
<td>International Relations Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISA</td>
<td>International Studies Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAIR</td>
<td>The Japan Association of International Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>JJPS</td>
<td>Japanese Journal of Political Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSIS</td>
<td>Japan Society for Intercultural Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSPS</td>
<td>Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEXT</td>
<td>Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>The North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPOPSS</td>
<td>National Planning Office of Philosophy and Social Science (China)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKU/Beida</td>
<td>Peking University</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIS</td>
<td>School of International Studies (Peking University)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRIP</td>
<td>Teaching, Research and International Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ULB</td>
<td>Université Libre de Bruxelles</td>
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<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>University of Southern California</td>
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<td>WWI</td>
<td>World War One</td>
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Introduction

Theoretical shifts and trends are seldom independent of real-world developments, such as changes to the distribution of power, the emergence of new patterns of conflict or cooperation, and the advent of new areas that pose urgent and serious challenges to states and societies... Assuming that a key underlying basis of Western-centrism in IRT had to do with the material and ideational dominance of the West, will the material rise of Asia have consequential ideational repercussions for IR, reshaping IRT not just in Asia, but also beyond? (Acharya 2014c, 120-1).

After centuries of Western dominance in world politics, we are now witnessing the shifting of economic and political power to the East. Serving as the key engine of the ‘Asian century’ (Kohli, Sharma, and Sood 2011; Commonwealth 2012), East Asia has become the limelight of attention given its growing geopolitical importance in the world political economy.\(^1\) East Asia is the world’s most dynamic and rapidly growing region with a total population of nearly 2.2 billion, accounting for approximately one-third of the world’s total (United Nations 2015, 13-7), and is home to economic and political powerhouses like China and Japan as well as emerging economies like South Korea, Taiwan, and ASEAN. This region’s growing strength has been accompanied by a call by both East Asian policy-makers and by its scholarly community for the thinking about international relations to be weighed more centrally by those involved in that pursuit. This groundswell was perhaps first evident in the early to mid-1990s when Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad and his Singaporean counterpart Lee Kuan Yew spearheaded the ‘Asian values’ movement as an alternative to Western formulas for modernization and political development (Zakaria 1994; Mohamad 1996; Teik 1999). More recently, this approach has been updated by Chinese President Xi Jinping’s ‘Chinese dream’ of building a stronger and more prosperous China coupled with Beijing’s ‘New Security Concept’ that envisions a new type of Asian-centric international relations devoid of traditional power balancing that so characterizes Western geopolitics. Other regional offshoots arguably embody a greater ‘Asianness’

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\(^1\) The term ‘East Asia’ in this research is not understood in its broader sense as ‘Asia-Pacific’ or ‘Asia’; nor is it confined in the older and narrower sense as ‘Northeast Asia.’ ‘East Asia’ in this research refers to the region that covers the Northeast and Southeast Asian sub-regions.
include Abenomics in Japan and the ‘ASEAN Way’ prevailing throughout much of Southeast Asia.\(^2\)

The reality of East Asia’s rise and the purported simultaneous decline of the West posit the key issue of how International Relations Theory (IRT) should respond to this structural development. The ongoing power shift to the East has created some discernible responses in the international relations (i.r.) of the West. These include most notably the announcement of US pivot to Asia in 2011 and Australia’s issuance of a White Paper on its place and strategy in the ‘Asian century’ in 2012 (Commonwealth 2012; White 2011). The geopolitical rise of the East, however, has not significantly changed the way our knowledge about i.r. is being produced: International Relations (IR) remains a Western-centric discipline.\(^3\) Increasingly, however, there have been various attempts by local as well as some Western-based scholars to construct some sort of indigenous theories based on the rich history, experience, and traditions of East Asia. This academic movement coincided with a critical self-reflection within Western scholarship on the current state and future development of IR theory. Together, these discussions have shaped one of the most heated debates in the existing IR literature regarding the so-called non-Western IRT in East Asia or East Asian International Relations Theory (EAIRT).

Among other things, the debate over EAIRT has raised an interesting and indeed important puzzle which this thesis aims to decode, and that is to what extent this theoretical debate can shape the practices of involved scholars. There have been many claims and counter-claims being put forward in the EAIRT debate but we may wonder how these claims have altered the way academics approach their work, research, education and other professional activities. In short, what have academics done to actualize their claims in daily life? It is this relationship between the theoretical debate about EAIRT on the one hand and the social practices of scholars across the range of their day-to-day operations on the other that is the focal point of this research.

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\(^2\) ASEAN is the abbreviation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. This organization comprises of ten Southeast Asian countries, namely Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia.

\(^3\) Throughout this research, ‘international relations’ (i.r.) is used to describe the practice of international politics while ‘International Relations’ (IR) refers to the academic discipline of IR.
Driven by the question ‘how have academic practices changed in response to the call for EAIRT’, this study investigates the connection between the various claims that surround EAIRT and the actual practices of scholars in bringing their claims into life. In addressing this issue, this research answers three sub-questions: why knowledge claims occur the way they do; how theorists validate and implement these claims in their daily life; and what actually drives those claims and shifting practices (if any). This question has been almost completely ignored by both those who study EAIRT directly, whatever their perspective on that debate, and by those who study the relationship between academia and practices more generally. Addressing this question thus provides vital and hitherto missing insight into the status, significance and depth of the contemporary EAIRT debate and enables a better appreciation of the linkages between theory and practice.

To address the research questions, this researcher constructs a sociology of science framework and then applies it to assess the Chinese, Japanese, and American IR communities in an EAIRT context. As a consequence of these innovations, this study finds that whilst there have been some changes adopted by scholars involved in the EAIRT debate, the degree and form of changes vary across cases. An argument is advanced here that these different responses to EAIRT can be attributable to the uneven impact of social factors on the practices of theoretical claims. These social factors can be classified into two main categories: structural consideration (power shift, socio-political concerns, and academic institutions) and agential choice (personal background, vision of science, and moral choice). These structural and agential factors often intersect and exert impact to varying extents on different national IR academies and individual academics, and therefore shape their respective responses to the call for EAIRT. That explains why claims for EAIRT take various forms in theoretical debates and are implemented in different ways in scholars’ daily practices.

With that in mind, this introductory chapter proceeds as follows. It starts with a discussion about the current state of IR Theory and the emerging debate about EAIRT. The researcher will then identify the gap in the existing literature and the relevance of this thesis, followed by a briefing about the thesis’s methodology, findings, and argumentation. The chapter concludes with a summary of the overall structure and the scholarly contribution of this thesis.
‘The end of IR Theory’ and the emerging debate over non-Western/East Asian IR Theory

In the summer of 1989, just before the end of the Cold War, Francis Fukuyama pressed the policy and the scholarly communities with his ‘end of history’ thesis. Among other things, Fukuyama argued that the demise of the Cold War would end the global ideological conflicts and eventually lead to an end of mankind’s ‘history’ of ideological contention with the ultimate triumph of liberal democracy and Western values (Fukuyama 1989).4 Shortly afterwards, a counter-thesis to Fukuyama’s theory in the form of the ‘clash of civilizations’ coined by a no-less renowned scholar Samuel Huntington emerged. Contrary to Fukuyama, Huntington foresaw a decline of liberal democracy and Western values and possible civilizational conflicts ‘between the West and the rest’ (Huntington 1993a; Huntington 1996b). Such a world, in Huntington’s view, was not a unitary one because ‘civilizations unite and divide humankind’ (Huntington 1993b, 194). Western culture, in such a diverse environment, is ‘unique’ but ‘not universal’ because ‘what is universalism to the West is imperialism to the rest’ (Huntington 1996a).

The aforementioned Asian values thesis was advanced almost simultaneously with Huntington’s clash of civilization theory. Asian values embodied the assertion that distinctly regional cultures and norms flowing from them contributed to the postwar economic success of many East Asian countries such as Japan, China, South Korea, Singapore, and Malaysia. It consequently shaped their worldview in different forms from those prominent in Western circles e.g. conception of democracy and human rights (Kausikan 1993; Jayasuriya 1996; Wu 1996; Inoguchi and Newman 1997). This assertion challenged the conventional wisdom about the West’s superiority of ‘civilized democracy/liberalism/individualism/science’ as opposed to the East’s

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4 There have been debates over the definition and distinction of the West/non-West terms as will be further elaborated in the Literature review chapter. Nonetheless, for the purpose of convenience, these two terms are referred to in this research with their most general understandings. Kishore Mahbubani defines ‘the West’ geographically as the United States, Canada, and Europe, joined by the ‘Anglo-Saxon states’ of Australia and New Zealand (Mahbubani 2008). Despite this relatively ‘homogenous’ concept of ‘the West’, there is a wide variation among the so-called ‘Western IR theories’ such as those differences between positivist and reflectivist positions or between the Anglo-Saxon and continental European approaches. The term ‘non-West’, meanwhile, is a more controversial concept and is currently vaguely defined as the region ‘beyond the West’. For the purpose of this research, the term ‘non-West’ is used interchangeably with those terms of ‘Third World’, the ‘Global South’, ‘Developing Countries’ or the ‘Subaltern.’ The term ‘non-Western IRT’ is also used interchangeably with ‘post-Western’, ‘past-Western’ or ‘postcolonial’ IRT although their discern distinction will be at times noticed in specific context.
inferiority of ‘barbaric Oriental despotism’, centering on ‘authoritarianism/collectivism/mysticism’ (Hobson 2014, 123). The ‘Asian values’ assertion was harshly criticized among Western scholarship; yet interestingly, Huntington was among the few Western scholars who identified with it. The success of East Asian societies, he acknowledged, was ‘not because they became like the West, but because they have remained different from the West’ (Huntington 1996a). Huntington, therefore, agreed with the assertion by the leading ‘Asian value’ proponent – Kishore Mahbubani – that ‘the rapidly increasing economic power of East Asian states will… lead to increasing military power, political influence and cultural assertiveness’ (Huntington 1993b, 193). The ‘Asian Values’ proposition, however, ran out of steam when most of Asian economies were undercut by the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis.

A decade after this civilizational debate, a similar debate materialized in the domain of IR Theory. In 2007, Christine Sylvester talked about ‘the end of IR’ implying the increasing silence of ‘theoretical debates’ in the field. IR, argues Sylvester (2007, 566) has been dominated by its ‘camp structure’ which ‘indicates that all major conflicts within IR have not been resolved and are not being resolved.’ Although borrowing the term ‘end of IR’ from Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ thesis, Sylvester (2007, 567) posited that the ‘end of IR’ is not a part of the ‘end of history.’ In fact, contrary to the end of history which hails the triumph of Western values, the end of IR ushers in a period of more ‘fragments’ or ‘camps’ and, by definition, ‘less overdetermining gatekeeping in the field’ (Sylvester 2007, 567).

The mitigation of ‘great debates’ and ‘conflicts’ in IR has increasingly become a clear trend in the field. In 2013 the European Journal of International Relations (EJIR) devoted a special issue to the theme ‘The end of International Relations Theory?’ Borrowing on their long-time observation of the IR field, EJIR’s editors (Tim Dunne, Lene Hansen, and Colin Wight) realized that since the third great debate between the rationalists and reflectivists in the late 1980s to early 1990s,⁵ there have been no new ‘great debates’ or ‘grand theorizing’ in IR scholarship. Instead of theoretical conflicts, what occurred was a ‘theoretical peace’ or ‘theoretical truce’ among contending theoretical paradigms and that scholars gravitated toward ‘theory testing’ rather than

⁵ This debate is at times referred to in the literature as the fourth great debate in IR. For consistency, it is referred to in this thesis as the third great debate in IR.
‘theory development’ (Dunne, Hansen, and Wight 2013, 406). The absence of ‘great debates’ or ‘paradigm wars’ in the field was also characterized by the surge of middle-range theorizing and mid-level theory at the expense of ‘grand theorizing’ or ‘meta-theory.’ Although IR scholars remained deeply divided as to whether the current situation constitutes the ‘end of IR theory’, they seemed to agree that the state of IRT was one of pluralism and/or fragmentation of theoretical approaches.

In an effort to repair this unfortunate situation, some leading scholars have since urged for the restoration of ‘big thinking’ and ‘grand debates’ in IR (Mearsheimer and Walt 2013). During the past two decades, some minor theoretical innovation has taken place, such as the introduction of critical realism, ‘practice theory’ (as part of constructivism), and empirically driven middle-range theories. However, no new ‘big theory’ has been developed and no new great debate currently appears to be in sight (Wæver 2007). In this context, analytical eclecticism developed by Peter Katzenstein and Rudra Sil (2008) emerges as ‘the only real alternative to the status quo’ (Lake 2011, 472). Eclectic scholars advocate ‘problem-driven rather than paradigm-driven research, and seek to foster dialogue across approaches so as to help solve substantive problems in international politics’ (Schmidt 2014). In light of this theoretical turn toward middle-range theories and eclectic theorizing, David Lake posits that ‘we should recognize there are multiple valid and perhaps even complementary paths to understanding’ (Lake 2011, 465). Diversity is needed, and we should depart from ‘great debates’ of isms toward more practical, issue-oriented knowledge (Lake 2011).

Occurring almost simultaneously with this critical self-reflection of the state of IR theory within Western IR scholarship is the call for constructing a more inclusive ‘global’ IR discipline by incorporating the voices of the non-West. While the drive toward building the so-called ‘non-Western IR Theory’ has been witnessed in various non-Western regions such as Latin America, South Asia, Russia, and Africa, the spotlight of attention and debate focuses on East Asia. This is because East Asia is a region of growing geopolitical importance where claims for cultural and philosophical ‘distinctiveness’ are also strongest. Yet, East Asian IR communities have long been regarded as a mere consumer rather than producer of knowledge. In particular, there is a heavy dependency on American IR theoretical findings and orientations in a Gramscian sense of hegemony. This concern is acknowledged by two East Asia specialists:
The leading American scholars are good at what they do, and East Asians recognize that. Thus, the implication is that IR social science in East Asia assumes the role of a follower and supporter of American IR standards, methodologies and ideas, rather than a leader and independent creator of ideas/norms. When combined with the strengths inherent in the US academy we can understand why the IR community in East Asia has been slow to develop (Inoguchi and Newman 2002, 19).

Nonetheless, the contemporary material and cultural rise of East Asia relative to the purported decline of Western power and intellectual hegemony has sparked off renewed interest among local scholars as well as some Western-based East Asia specialists in making an ‘East Asian’ contribution to the global heritage of IR knowledge. Starting from the 1980s when Chinese scholars first openly expressed their interest in studying ways to build ‘IR Theory with Chinese characteristics’ (Song 2010) and especially since the controversial debate over ‘Asian values’ during the 1990s, there have been more and more IR scholars viewing East Asia more than simply a playground for theory testing. In 2003, the distinguished East Asia specialist David Kang first pointed out the need for new analytical frameworks as the application of Western IRT to predict the future of Asian security, he concluded, often resulted in ‘getting Asia wrong’ (Kang 2003a). In 2007, the Japan-based *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Journal* (IRAP) devoted a special issue to the single theme ‘Why is there no Non-Western IR Theory in Asia?’ The issue, which was later turned into a book, was edited by the two renowned theorists – Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan – and contributed by other leading East Asia experts. It was the first time the question of the hindrances to the emergence of an ‘Asian’ IRT was discussed in a comprehensive and constructive manner. Following this pioneering work, there have been vigorous discussions among East Asia specialists regarding the deficiencies of IR Theory in its current form as it is applied to East Asia as well as the desirability, and even possibility, of building alternative approaches that have their origins in the region. More recently demands for not only a Chinese, but also a Japanese or Korean ‘School’, of IR are coming to the fore. Increasingly, this academic endeavor has attracted the attention of extra-regional scholars, thus spreading this debate beyond the geographical context of East Asia.

As will be discussed in Chapter one (Literature Review), the form that this demand for EAIRT takes varies and is presented by both East Asian scholars and Western scholars. Inevitably, there is academic backlash against the need for EAIRT. Some of
those who claim to be dissatisfied with the current state of IR Theory are based in Western universities and can be expected to have been schooled in existing approaches to IRT (e.g. Amitav Acharya, Barry Buzan, and David Kang). Others are based within East Asia, and may or may not have been schooled in ‘Western’ approaches (e.g. Muthiah Alagappa, Takashi Inoguchi, and Qin Yaqing). These scholars also approach this issue from different directions. Some are concerned with apparent shortcomings in Western-based IR thinking; others are preoccupied with the uniqueness of East Asia practices. All claim, however, that Western theoretical approaches are too narrow and too tied to their place and time of origin to ever truly capture the dynamics of East Asia. Other scholars seem to be troubled by that dissatisfaction, dismissing claims for EAIRT to be mere ‘theoretical egoism’ by certain theorists that risks ‘dividing’ the discipline (Callahan 2008; Chen 2011a; Hutchings 2011; Snyder 2008). Together these EAIRT proponents and critics fuel one of the most fervent debates within contemporary IR literature, including many leading IR thinkers and generating significant profile.

This debate about EAIRT is part of a broader trend of dissatisfaction with the perceived Western centricity of IRT as seen by attempts to understand IR from the perspective of various ‘non-Western’ regions (Cetina, Schatzki, and Von Savigny 2000; Neuman 1998; Tickner and Wæver 2009). Observers of this process have questioned whether this movement suggests ‘the emergence of the new sub-discipline of comparative IR theory’ or if it will eventually ‘provincialize’ the discipline (Tsygankov and Tsygankov 2010, 664; Hutchings 2011). Either way, the discussion over non-Western/East Asian IRT merits further academic attention. Recent interviews conducted by the Theory Talks – an interactive forum for discussing the underlying theoretical issues and debates in the IR discipline – indicate that many leading contemporary IR theorists posit that Eurocentricism and Western dominance in IR knowledge is one of the biggest challenges or principle debates in the field at the moment.6

For instance, John Hobson – a professor at the University of Sheffield and one of the most vocal critics of Eurocentricism in IR knowledge – posits that reducing Eurocentricism and bringing the ‘Eastern agency’ into IR theory ‘is (or should be) a

6 These theorists include, among others, Amitav Acharya, Barry Buzan, Ann Tickner, Pinar Pilgin, John Hobson, Siba Grovogui, Qin Yaqing, and Yan Xuetong.
key debate-in-the-making’ (Millerman 2015, 5). Since 2009, Routledge – a prestigious publisher in the IR field – has also published a number of qualified volumes for its series ‘Worlding beyond the West’ with the aim to explore ‘the role of geocultural factors, institutions, and academic practices in creating the concepts, epistemologies, and methodologies through which IR knowledge is produced’ within and beyond the West (Routledge).7 The common findings of these works often point to differences in the way IR is being practiced among the various IR communities in the world, including those in East Asia. Most recently, a leading IR Journal – *International Studies Review* – devoted a special issue to the 2015 International Studies Association (ISA) Conference theme ‘Global IR’ which, under the Presidency of Amitav Acharya, aims to advance a more inclusive discipline with possible contribution from non-Western knowledge. These publications often include specific case studies on the potential contribution of ‘East Asian IR scholarship’, reflecting the growing scholarly attention on the state of theory development in this particular region.

Empirically, the introduction of the Teaching, Research, and International Policy (TRIP) project has also offered valuable data and insights on the underlying trends in the discipline. It should be noted that the TRIP project has recently expanded their faculty surveys to some East Asian countries and territories such as Japan, Singapore, Hongkong, and Taiwan. Its latest survey report published in 2015 found that 77% of IR scholars worldwide thought that IR is a Western-dominated discipline and 61.8% thought it was important to counter such Western dominance in the field (TRIP 2015, 4). In particular, three claims have been put forward from the TRIP latest survey outcomes:

that IR is a Western/American dominated discipline, that geography is the core dividing line in IR, and that there is a division of labor within IR wherein scholars in the West are responsible for theory production while the ‘non-West’ supplies data and local expertise for theory testing (Wemheuer-Vogelaar et al. 2016, 16).

These facts and figures further underscore the importance and timeliness of a study on whether, and if yes, how a prospective non-Western IR such as EAIRT could contribute to making IR a more representative discipline.

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7 Arlene B. Tickner, David Blaney, Inanna Hamati-Ataya, and Ole Wæver are editors of this series. There have been ten volumes being published under this series thus far.
Research puzzle and focus

Research question

Given the rationales and contemplations mentioned above, this thesis will address the central question of ‘How have academic practices changed in response to the call for East Asian IR Theory?’ and, as a corollary, ‘what drives those changing practices (if any)?’ The aim of addressing these questions is to identify the extent to which the EAIRT debate actually shapes academic practices and where the avenues that may affect those practices are. More specifically, are there any substantive changes in terms of research, teaching, and outreach activities that are congruent to the claims academics made in the EAIRT debate? This question suggests it is important also to examine if changing practices have happened, why?; and from where does the pressure for change emanate? Importantly, it is also necessary to identify what changes implemented by scholars that are caused by EAIRT debate as opposed to changes that occur for other reasons (e.g. institutional, social or political pressure). Equally, if practices have not changed, why have scholars not felt the need to respond to the theoretical debate under review here? This research question, therefore, aims to address the broader relationship between IR theorizing (in particular discontent with the current status of theory) and practice, where ‘practice’ is understood as an academic issue rather than merely general ‘politics.’ It should be noted, however, that the question to be solved here is about how theory is shaping academic practices not the other way around and not directed toward any particular linear dynamics between the two.

Why is this a good question? First, the literature on non-Western IRT/EAIRT at present is all about what should happen, not what is happening. There are many claims for EAIRT, some pro-EAIRT, some anti-EAIRT, and some more nuanced. When the literature tries to decode these claims, it focuses mainly on the issue of why EAIRT is in demand at the moment. Accordingly, there might be ‘good’ as well as ‘bad’ reasons for an EAIRT. The pro-EAIRT groups emphasize more the objective factors (e.g. the rise of East Asia, disjuncture between IRT and East Asian context, and new dynamics in regional relations) (Acharya 2013a; Alagappa 2011a) while the anti-EAIRT group emphasizes more on the subjective ones (e.g. ‘theoretical nationalism’ by local scholars, or ‘straight jackets’ for government policy) (Snyder 2008; Callahan 2008). Little is known, however, as to what is actually happening on the ground – whether or
not this debate has its roots in the changing perceptions and practices of academics generating this EAIRT literature?

Moreover, in an attempt to ‘decode’ this academic movement, the existing IR literature often takes either a history of science or philosophy of science approach, viewing the drive toward building indigenous frameworks from the macro-lenses of power and counter-hegemony logics (Kristensen and Nielsen 2013, 20). Accordingly, the various calls for an East Asian paradigm have their roots in the material rise and growing importance of East Asia in world politics. Some other scholars have pointed to the ethnocentrism and anti-West sentiment embedded in such discourses as ‘Asian values.’ A fuller investigation into such claims, however, suggests that power shifts and anti-Western logic cannot fully explain the dynamics of this academic movement. Such top-down explanations can be applied, of course, in the case of China whose emerging great power status has, according to one estimate, precipitated 69% of its IR academia to agree on devising some sort of Chinese style theory in order to match its interests (Kristensen and Nielsen 2013, 24). Those explanations are less persuasive in other cases, however. A typical example is the South Korean IR community which has about 60% of its members having an American PhD and is often regarded as ‘an intellectual colony of the American international relations community’ (Moon and Kim 2002, 64). Yet, according to a recent survey of South Korean IR scholars,

62.5 percent of the respondents said that there is a need to develop Korean paradigms of international relations, while 28.1 percent strongly urged that this be done. Only 1.6 percent answered that there is no need for such paradigms, and 7.8 percent indicated they believed the intellectual climate was not yet ripe for their development (Moon and Kim 2002, 56).

Similarly, in Japan which has long identified itself as part of the Western liberal order, there are also assertions about the presence of Japanese IR theory in the past and growing scholarly interest in developing a home-grown theory (Inoguchi 2007a; Shimizu et al. 2008). More broadly speaking, many Western-based scholars have also enthusiastically contributed to this debate and present their own claims for a non-Western/East Asian contribution to IR Theory (Kang 2003b; Tickner and Wæver 2009; Acharya and Buzan 2010; Lizée 2011; Ling 2013b; Phillips 2014). How can we explain the way theorizing occurs and the many forms this demand for EAIRT takes across all these geographical contexts?
It is worth investigating why that is the case given that ‘Western’ IR theories claim to have universal applicability, albeit in different ways. Realists and liberals posit what they claim are all-encompassing and timeless truths about the global system while reflectivists assume that they can incorporate difference within their frameworks. For instance, there are ideas held by Asians and ideas held by Europeans but there is no fundamental difference in what an idea is and how it impacts actors. This holistic conception of theorizing is particularly popular in the US where positivism is the dominant epistemology. That IR theorizing is an independent activity detached from social context is reflected in this statement by three renowned American scholars – Gary King, Robert Keohane and Sydney Verba – in a leading training manual in IR: ‘no one cares what we think – the scholarly community only cares what we can demonstrate’ (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 15).

Given this, it is puzzling why there is demand for a distinctive East Asian perspective, most often expressed by leading Western-based and Western-trained East Asia specialists who would be expected to hold the claim to Western IRT universality. In an endeavour to resolve this puzzle, IR scholars increasingly turn to the sociology of science. Randall Collins, a prominent sociologist of science, challenges the traditional assumption that ‘thinking normally takes place independently, in a pristine realm driven by nothing but itself.’ Instead, he argues that ‘thinking would not be possible at all if we were not social; we would have no words, no abstract ideas, and no energy for anything outside of immediate sensuality’ (Collins 2000, 7). Similarly, L.H.M. Ling questions King, Keohane, and Verba’s above detachment of the individual from the scholarly environment in that ‘the evaluation of what we can demonstrate necessarily comes from what we think in terms of acceptable criteria, norms, and standard’ (Ling 2013b, 20). The fact that IR thinking is influenced by non-epistemic factors is perhaps most evident in theoretical debates where scholars put forward different knowledge claims and advance arguments against rival theories. As Karl Mannheim suggests, ‘one is never quite aware of how much one’s social location affects one’s perceptions and arguments until being brought into contact with a different way of thinking, an encounter that throws into sharp relief the way that social conditions shape thought’ (quoted in Jackson 2010, 171). And most recently, some scholars have called for more critical thinking about various ‘perspectives’ (understood as ‘contextualized systems of meanings’) in the process of knowledge
construction and for ‘conceiving the IR discipline as a fragmented, as opposed to a universal, body of knowledge’ (Pellerin 2012, 59). Taken together, these growing discourses are ‘indicative of a general “sociology of science turn” or “sociological reflexivity” in IR’ (Tickner and Wæver 2009, 17). Adopting a sociological reflexivity would then require us to pay more attention to practices of academics – ‘the actual doers of IR around the world’ (Tickner and Wæver 2009, 18).

Moreover, because of the very nature of theoretical debates in IR, discussions about the pros and cons of EAIRT are potentially endless. Many distinguished IR scholars have long acknowledged the ‘irreconcilability’ of contrasting theoretical approaches. ‘It is often contended that different international relations theories are fundamentally incompatible with one another’, observe Reus-Smit and Snidal (2008, 16) in their comprehensive Oxford Handbook of International Relations. Similarly, in his recent volume titled ‘Rethinking International Relations Theory’, Martin Griffiths posits that ‘neither conquest nor convergence between worldviews is likely in the foreseeable future. IR Theory in the twenty-first century is therefore inextricably pluralistic’ (Griffiths 2011, 14). Others have already warned about the danger of adhering to one’s position too rigidly. Friedrich Kratochwil, for example, observes that: ‘The desire to win, to stand one’s ground, perhaps not surprisingly, is most of the time stronger than the genuine search for an acceptable solution to a problem’ (Kratochwil 2003, 125; see also Katzenstein and Sil 2008, 117). These sentiments have led to the emergence and popularity of ‘analytical eclecticism’ which is believed to be ‘both focused in seeking out the best available answer for a given problem at any given time, and courageous, in pursuing intellectual engagements with diverse styles of thought and putting its wager unconditionally on the dialogical model of science’ (Katzenstein 2008a, 125).

There is a parallel between leading accounts of how a theory-driven discipline is structured and the current state of debate over EAIRT. Given the fact that ongoing debates about EAIRT might not be resolvable in any foreseeable future, this thesis represents a study on how theoretical claims impact on the practices of scholars involved in the EAIRT debate and to what extent there may be a shift underway within that debate from Western IRT foundations to more distinctly region-centric forms of theory. This suggests that we need to move beyond the theoretical debates per se to look deeper into the inner logics of theorizing – how and why the theorists
design, exercise, and validate in practice the theoretical claims they make in theoretical debate. To date, this remains an understudied aspect of IR as a scholar has noted:

This growing interest in different views about the world and the challenge to the pretension of universalism of the discipline are healthy developments. Yet, curiously enough, it did not change fundamentally the way the story of IR as a discipline is being framed. Perspectives, the sets of meanings that influence how scholars not only see but also interpret and validate their knowledge, are still marginal in the discipline (Pellerin 2012, 59-60).

For these reasons, this research is designed to examine the practices of claims about EAIRT. It aims to systematically investigate the presence of and variation in evidence of how academics have responded to the call for EAIRT as a key basis for theoretical discontent today. The choice of EAIRT is justified because it is the most prominent ongoing ‘grand debate’ within and, arguably, beyond Asia, and one that includes many leading thinkers and generating considerable profile. Given the scale and the vibrancy of this debate, it also provides the researcher the best opportunity to examine the link between theory and practice where practice is understood more broadly to include not only the behaviour of states and policy makers but also of academics themselves.

In particular, this thesis will empirically investigate whether scholars involved in the EAIRT debate are actually implementing, or not, a desire for change. It should be noted that despite all the significant work that has been done in envisioning various theoretical claims and counter-claims for EAIRT, few of them focus on the empirical dimension of the EAIRT debate – whether scholars are actually changing their education and research agendas in light of a perceived deficit in existing IR studies. Finding the answers to this issue is important and interesting in many ways. If there is evidence of a clear change in the nature of IR scholarship in East Asia, then such theoretical innovation may enrich existing IR theories. Questions over the ambiguous direction of China’s development, the intensifying territorial disputes in East Asia, and the loosely structured East Asian regionalism can all be explained through existing Western IR. However, might they not be better addressed through indigenous IR scholarship? If there is no evidence for any actual change in practice then the ongoing demand for an EAIRT by a number of Asian ‘big names’ also tells us something about the nature of their dissatisfaction with Western IRT and what that means for the future theoretical studies of East Asian i.r. Either way, finding evidence
on the practices of claims for EAIRT is a compelling subject of research that has been under assessed in the contemporary IR literature.

As importantly, studying how theoretical debate shapes academic practices can fill the gap in the literature that is not just concerned with debate over EAIRT. The link between theory and academic practices has been a reoccurring blind spot in the discipline. As I will discuss in the following Literature Review chapter, whilst many have been interested in how theory and practice relate, academics have usually understood ‘practice’ to refer to the practice of others, such as policy makers and politicians, rather than the disciplinary practices found within their own ranks. The gap that this thesis addresses is that despite what existing studies and investigations may address in this general context, there is perilously little work about what is actually happening on the ground – whether scholars are, or are not, changing their practices to match the claims they put forward in the EAIRT theoretical debate. The research in this study spans such changes, but is also interested in evidence for change as manifested in the daily work of academics in bringing their claims into life.

Such an investigation is necessary as it tells us how committed EAIRT scholars are in realizing their claims as well as the nature of such claims and practices. It is also a meaningful contribution to the theory-practice literature of the EAIRT debate in that scholars and analysts are linking this theoretical pursuit with the ‘practice’ understood as real world (the rise of East Asia) or politics (e.g. the Chinese authoritarian system and/or Chinese foreign policy) but are not really assessing very adequately the practices of scholars themselves (are they living what they preach?). Furthermore, addressing the gap in academic practice relative to the EAIRT debate is important because it gives us insights into the distinctiveness of the claims for EAIRT; and asks us to think about what inspires or shapes the things academics actually do. Whilst this author’s primary concern is to use the EAIRT debate as a basis in which to examine how theoretical discontent shapes academic practices, this examination will have broader relevance for those engaged in that current debate. It will, perhaps most centrally, shed light on whether the demand for EAIRT is simply something that fills academic publications but has no real world effect, or whether there are actual changes in teaching, research and outreach that are bringing this claim to life. Such a study will be of interest to scholars who are engaged in the EAIRT debate and those interested more generally in the theory-practice relationship.
Concerning the scope of study, this research will concentrate on the theoretical dimension of International Relations for the following reasons. First, theory is the main concern of regional scholars in advancing the state of IR in East Asia. There have been thought-provoking questions posed by East Asian scholars in investigating why East Asian IRT is so underdeveloped, such as ‘Can Asians think?’ (Mahbubani 2002) or ‘Why is there no non-Western IRT in Asia?’ (Acharya and Buzan 2010). It is, therefore, the area where most effort is put in by scholars in the region to develop East Asian perspectives. Second, it is the literature that reveals most clearly the nature of the EAIRT-led dissatisfaction with Western IRT. Whilst we witness convergence in other areas of study between Western and East Asian IR (e.g. strategic studies and foreign policy analysis) (Tow 2009; Khong 2014), we see continued and indeed developing space between East and West in the realm of IRT as can be seen from the various contrasting claims and counter-claims about EAIRT. It is thus interesting to examine why that is the case and how such a gap can be bridged through a study that explores how this debate has shaped the practices of involved scholars – be they on whatever side of the debate.

As this study mainly focuses on the IRT dimension, it is also necessary to clarify how ‘theory’ is understood in the East Asian context. There are basically two approaches to what constitutes IR Theory. The American conception of theory is dominated by its positivist orientation that any social theory needs to have causal relations and is universally applicable. The European conception of theory is more flexible and pluralist than the American one. European IR scholars, many of whom are from the reflectivist tradition of IR, believe in the Coxian ontology that ‘theory is always for someone and for some purpose’ and ‘the potential openness of various “taken for granted” aspects of world politics’ (Lake 2013, 579). These reflectivist approaches are generally believed to include constructivism, post-modernism, critical theory, and feminism.

As Acharya and many scholars have pointed out, the way theory is understood in Asia is closer to the European understanding than the American one (Acharya 2013b, 3). This is because despite the region’s widespread acceptance of the hegemony of American theories, theory in the Asian context is not strictly defined in positivist terms and in fact often has various meanings (Alagappa 2011b; Noesselt 2015, 436-7).
In their investigation of whether or not there is non-Western IR Theory in Asia, Acharya and Buzan (2010, 4) introduce a broad and pluralist view of theory that embraces ‘both the harder, positivist, rationalist, materialist and quantitative understandings on one end of the theory spectrum, and the more reflective, social, constructivist, and postmodern on the other.’ They also concede that ‘IR might include normative assumptions; even pretheoretical concepts are viewed as elements of an emerging IR theory framework in Asia’ (Acharya and Buzan 2010, 6). Muthiah Alagappa, meanwhile, observes that ‘theory’ in the Asian context has ‘a predominantly practical orientation with emphasis on understanding and interpreting the external world to develop suitable policy responses’ (Alagappa 2011b, 196). Theory, in this light, is embedded with the normative and ethical concerns of Asian countries rather than functions as a framework for analysis in positivist interpretation (Alagappa 2011b, 194; see also Noesselt 2015, 437).

This thesis adopts the most extensive conception of IR Theory, including those mentioned above. IR Theory in this light can refer to grand theory with universal applicability. It can also be a ‘middle-range’ or ‘typological’ theory. A ‘middle-range theory’ argues for the desirability of the integration of theory and empirical research (Merton 1968). Meanwhile, a ‘typological theory’ (George and Bennet 2005), in contrast to the ‘covering law’ conception of general theories, involves ‘contingent generalizations that explicitly outline the differing background conditions’ (Shin 2009, 3). In fact, some scholars have recently urged that IR Theory should be centred around middle-range theories for the practical purpose of resolving policy relevant problems (Bennett 2013, 462; Lake 2013).

Given this broad and relatively flexible understanding of IRT in East Asia, claim for East Asian IRT can also, to a lesser extent, be understood as the prospect of a distinctive East Asian IR perspective. A perspective is different to theory in that it does not exclude other perspectives and unlike ‘theory’ it ‘does not claim to be the sole repository of “truth”’ (Ayoob 2002, 28). Also, given that Western IRT is a diverse lot (Alagappa 2011b, 200-4), there is no expectation that East Asian IRT can be reduced to a single and unified approach. Therefore, discussions about EAIRT are sometimes narrowed down to national IR, such as the Chinese, Japanese, South Korean, Southeast Asian IR Schools/perspectives.
Moreover, although the EAIRT debate has spanned across and beyond the East Asian region, this study will focus on those IR communities where claims for EAIRT are strongest. Additionally, for the project to be manageable, the thesis will mainly investigate those IR institutions and scholars that have expressed and developed potential practices toward EAIRT. Put differently, this study adopts the ‘most likely cases’ approach in its empirical investigation. At the regional level, this EAIRT debate is most heatedly discussed in the Northeast Asian sub-region. The thesis, therefore, focuses more on the state of theory development in these Northeast Asian countries (e.g. China and Japan) with lesser reference to the Southeast Asian ones. At the extra-regional level, this EAIRT debate has attracted attention and contribution from many Western-based theorists. These scholars often discuss a pan-regional framework that covers the whole East Asia and even the broader Asian or non-Western context. As US IR academia is a hub of leading theorists and East Asia specialists and is often seen as a symbol of Western domination in IR, it has been selected for empirical studies to showcase how EAIRT is being developed and received beyond the East Asian region.

**Methodology**

Chapter two of the thesis will deal specifically with the problem of developing arguments and applying methods. In order to address the central research question, this thesis will employ three specific methods: the sociology of science as the overarching conceptual framework, empirical case studies under the guidance of structured focused comparison method, and qualitative analysis based on the primary data collected through fieldwork (semi-structured interviews and first-hand observation). The first necessary step toward that end is to break down the research question for a better appreciation of the components of data to be obtained as well as for a standardization of data collection under the guidance of the structured focused comparison method.

**Breaking down the research question**

In order to investigate in details how the EAIRT debate has shaped the practices of involved academics, this study breaks down the research question into three detailed questions:
1) What significant changes (if any) have been made in the areas of teaching, research, publishing, and theorizing to match the claims scholars put forward in the EAIRT debate?

To answer this initial question – which is designed to measure the extent of change by scholars involving in the EAIRT debate – the researcher will 1) compare changes made to the syllabi/curricula design at least in the two key subjects, IR Theory and methods (‘Introduction to International Relations’) and the other relating to the study of East Asian international relations; 2) examine main topics of these scholars’ research agenda by looking at major international, regional, and national journals for theory-oriented publications they have contributed to see whether there is distinct research agenda in comparison to that of Western scholars (i.e. different research questions, alternative terms of references); and 3) study their salient approach(es) to international relations and how these approaches have been impacted by or help shape their national worldviews.

2) What structural conditions have facilitated or restricted these scholars in making changes to their practices? What agential role do scholars play in the course of knowledge production?

The second question stems from an initial proposition that there might be some objective and subjective factors affecting the extent of changes scholars can personally make in order to bring their theoretical claims into life. These ‘intervening’ factors might include but are not limited to a scholar’s personal identity, the ‘disjuncture’ between Western IRT and local thinking and practices of international relations, restrictions within certain boundary of national ideology, the extent of autonomy of the IR scholarship in relation to the policy community, and/or the rapid rise of East Asia in terms of material power and consequently the desire to provide distinctive theoretical perspectives. These factors may also explain the variation in the scholarly claims and practices for EAIRT.

3) Is there evidence of ‘real changes’ toward EAIRT across the region or is it just a phenomenon of limited scope desired by a few number of scholars. If so, is this arranged geographically or along some other lines?

The last question is designed to check the parameters and consistency in the evidence of shifting practices toward EAIRT. This will require examining whether there are
exchanges and linkages between IR academia within different East Asian locales and whether they share a common approach with regard to EAIRT. These are the necessary conditions for a rigorous regional or national perspective on international relations. Lacking such concerted coordination, these scholars can hardly reject having a certain amount of ‘theoretical nationalism’ or even merely ‘egoism’ which could become a limiting factor in the quest to produce universal knowledge. That is what the critics of EAIRT have vehemently warned against as ‘provincializing’ or ‘nationalizing’ IRT (Callahan 2008; Callahan 2001; Snyder 2008).

**Conceptual framework and applied methods: the sociology of science, case studies, and qualitative analysis**

This thesis will employ the sociology of science as the backbone for both its methodology and argumentation. In particular, it draws on insights from the most recent academic attempts in bringing the sociology of science into IR. International Relations’ turn toward the sociology of science reflects an academic endeavour to move beyond the field’s traditional approaches to scientific development and knowledge production – the history of science and philosophy of science. The history of science analyses IR theory by assessing the field’s many ‘great debates’ as well as the institutional growth, and international political events that have shaped the development of the discipline (Schmidt 2002). A related and indeed inseparable framework from the history of science is the philosophy of science. Philosophers of science view IR as a discipline ‘that is structured around a set of deep contestations over the very idea of science itself and the extent to which IR can, and should, be a science’ (Wight 2002, 23). A common point of these two approaches is that knowledge production is generally seen as a ‘value free’ activity that is independent of social contexts. Intellectuals, therefore, are believed to be detached from and unaffected by social factors (Jackson 2010, 170). Consequently, ‘the intricacies of how the knowledge is actually produced, and how validity and certainty are constructed, are only of secondary relevance’ (Bueger 2015, 3).

The sociology of science, meanwhile, argues that theorizing is not a ‘value free’ activity because external factors such as the social, institutional and psychological contexts may intrude in the course of establishing knowledge (Salmon 1999, 162). Seen in this light, theorizing is a kind of social activity that is shaped by both the inner
motivations of the theorists themselves and the wider environment in which they are living. Studying how theory shapes practice(s) in the case of the EAIRT debate, therefore, needs to examine the practices of scholars as opposed to the claims they put forward in that debate.

How is the sociology of science relevant to this research? To date, the historiography of IR is often seen through the ‘great debates’ between proponents of various schools of thoughts. But most of the studies of theory and theoretical debates in IR so far view knowledge production as ‘given’ – an inherent scientific activity that is taken place in an independent sphere. Yet, if we view theorizing not from that external approach but from an internal angle by placing the concentration on academic practices, we would be able to see a different picture of the discipline that not merely comprises of theories and concepts per se but is intrinsically a set of practices that is closely interwoven to its wider environment. This presents an opportunity to grasp the nature of different processes of knowledge production, their social aspects, and the various pathways of knowledge transfer that the theorists use in order to bring their theoretical claims into life. Toward that end, the sociology of science provides a powerful analytical tool.

Drawing on Ole Weaver’s model of comparative sociology of IR, I have developed in chapter two a three-layered analytical framework for probing the linkages between the EAIRT debate and academic practices. These layers include the geopolitical context, the institutional/organizational context, and the practices of individual academics. Taking a bottom-up perspective, this study posits that the practices of scholars involved in the EAIRT debate (the third layer) are directly and indirectly influenced by the two afore layers (the geopolitical and institutional contexts). In the subsequent empirical chapters, I will identify how each approach in the EAIRT debate has been shaped by scholars’ background, their institutional environment, and the national context in which they are operating. Furthermore, if actual changes in academic practices are to be found, this study aims to investigate whether these changing practices are the result of scholars’ commitment to theory/scientific objectivity or whether other ‘external factors’ have intruded in this process of establishing knowledge. In this sense, the sociology of knowledge-in-the-making is examined through both the scholars’ internal motivations and the intruding factors, not merely the ‘external’ ones.
This sociology of science framework will be deployed in the three empirical studies. The method to be applied for case studies is Alexander George and Andrew Bennett’s guidance on structured focused comparison. According to this method, a number of cases are selected and a set of questions are repeatedly asked in each case to standardize data. As George and Bennett (2005, 83) have noted, the primary criterion for case selection is their relevance to the study’s research objectives and variation required by the research problem. With that in mind, three national IR communities – China, Japan and the US – have been selected as case studies for this research as they offer a meaningful cross-section of the variety that the EAIRT debate represents at the national level, particularly in terms of scale, level of development, national ideology, indigenous IR movements, and exposure to Western IR, etc. These are the most likely cases where claims for EAIRT are strongest and most vigorously debated. They are, therefore, useful empirical studies for checking the vibrancy and/or variation in evidence for a meaningful shift toward EAIRT in those countries (if at all). To ensure the consistency of the findings, the three aforementioned component questions will be asked repeatedly in each case under study to ‘guide and standardize the data collection, thereby making systematic comparison and accumulation of the findings of the cases possible’ (George and Bennet 2005, 67). The findings in these cases will allow for useful generalizations to be made and subsequently for conclusions to be derived as to whether or not there exists actual evidence for shifting nature of EAIRT studies across different national IR communities and what drives such changes (if any).

In term of qualitative analysis, this thesis will draw extensively on primary data in the form of semi-structured interviews with approximately 30 leading IR scholars who are involved or interested in the ongoing EAIRT debate. The questionnaire in the interview is designed in a structured way so as to gain information on the three layers identified in the analytical framework. The author of this study also relies on field research and first-hand observation through textual archival research, collection of teaching syllabi, and discussions with graduate students at the selected IR institutions under study. The researcher has also benefitted a great deal from secondary sources such as relevant existing literature and the most recently published theoretical work of involved scholars, including those published in the local languages (e.g. Chinese). The methodological approach for data and discourse analysis is qualitative interpretation.
Findings and arguments

Deploying the aforementioned analytical framework to study the impact of the EAIRT debate on the Chinese, Japanese, and American IR communities, the researcher has found that there have been some actual changes employed by scholars in response to the call for EAIRT but the degree and form of changes vary across cases. The first major conclusion offered in this vein is that the EAIRT debate does have a discernible impact on the practical activities of scholars involved in that debate. This finding is in line with the assertion made by sociologists of science that scholars perceive their surrounding environment corresponding to their knowledge claims, or put differently, they are generally ‘living what they preach.’ A second major finding is that the EAIRT debate takes a different form and consequently shapes the practices of scholars in different ways and to different extents in the various cases weighed by this study.

Accordingly, in China a general consensus has been made among its IR academia on the need to construct a Chinese style IR theory, be it a ‘Chinese School of IR’, a ‘Tsinghua approach to IR’, or a ‘Chinese theory of foreign affairs.’ The biggest area of changes in China, therefore, is in the vibrant theory-led debate and resource mobilization to pave the way for building some sort of Chinese IR knowledge. The EAIRT discourse in Japan, meanwhile, initially presented itself in the form of re-examining the existence of ‘Japanese IR’ in the past but has increasingly shifted toward ‘post-Western IR’ agenda recently. Even within the pro-EAIRT circle, the current trajectory in Japan points to the lack of interest in developing a narrowly focused ‘Japanese School of IR.’ In fact, the EAIRT literature constitutes only a part of Japanese IR scholarship which thus far continues to be characterized by the tendency toward historical and area studies. In the case of American IR academia, shifting practices are most clearly found among a small number of US-based East Asia specialists who have attempted to bring the Eastern agency into IR Theory. Yet ‘mainstream American IR’, given its hegemonic status in the field and the adherence of most IR academics in the US to this approach, has proven resilient to EAIRT. Moreover, unlike what has happened in East Asia, the EAIRT debate in the US presents itself in the form of enriching and bettering the existing body of knowledge with non-Western, including East Asian, ideas and experiences rather than a revolutionary one like the prospective Chinese IR or past Japanese IR.
Based on these empirical findings, this thesis argues that these different responses to EAIRT can be attributable to the uneven impact of social factors on the practices of claims. More specifically, these different responses to EAIRT can be explained by the dissimilarities in the three layers of analysis presented by Weaver’s sociology of IR framework that this thesis has applied to study the impact of the EAIRT across various geographical and socio-political contexts. The researcher then classifies the social factors that shape EAIRT claims and practices into two main categorizations: (1) structural causes (geopolitical concerns, academic structure etc.); and (2) the agential role played by the academics themselves (training background, moral choice, and vision of science). This thesis further argues that understanding the impact of EAIRT on academic practices require appreciating both structural consideration and agential choice. In their covariation, structure serves as the intervening factors and agency the determining ones. These structural and agential factors often intersect and exert impact to varying extents on different national IR communities and individual academics, and therefore shape their respective responses to the call for EAIRT.

For instance, in the cases of China and Japan, structural causes have exerted a large impact on the practices of claims adopted by Chinese and Japanese scholars. The rise of China and a greater awareness of Chinese cultural exceptionalism, in particular, have precipitated a large consensus among Chinese IR academia to construct some kind of Chinese IR knowledge to match its material rise and ultimately reshaped Chinese scholars’ identity into ‘knowledge producers.’ Meanwhile, the historical legacy terming from Japan’s failed pan-Asianism in the past, as well as its unresolved national identity as a country situating between East and West, have placed constraints on the possibility and credibility of a prospective ‘Japanese School of IR.’ This fact has driven the EAIRT discourse in Japan to shift gradually to a ‘post-Western IR’ agenda. The impact of structural causes, however, is less evident in the case of US-based scholars. Despite ongoing power shifts to the East and the changing dynamics in East Asian politics, the EAIRT debate only withholds an interest among a small number of US-based East Asia specialists working in the constructivist and reflectivist traditions whilst, for the majority of American mainstreamers, it is largely ‘business as usual.’

While structural causes can have some influence on shaping scholars’ response to the call for EAIRT, such an impact is often exerted in an indirect manner. As will be
shown in the subsequent empirical chapters, many scholars in the US, Japan, and even China have not changed their practices despite power shift and other socio-political pressure. That is because intellectual activities in general and theorizing in particular are most directly shaped by the agency – the practitioners of IR – and the academic scene. Across the empirical studies, the researcher has found that how academics choose to respond to EAIRT is largely subject to their theoretical identity, which has in turn been shaped by their personal background, training, vision of science, and moral choice, etc.

Taken together, it can be said that there is clearly a sociology of EAIRT claims and practices. Put differently, there is an inherent relationship between scholars’ identity and their perspectives concerning the EAIRT debate. Given the different structural contexts in which academics are living as well as scholars’ diverse training and institutional backgrounds, the EAIRT debate often exerts an unequal impact on the practices of scholars, and eventually, shapes their different responses toward EAIRT. That explains why claims for EAIRT take various forms in theoretical debates and are implemented in different ways in scholars’ daily practices.

Structure of study

This thesis comprises of seven sections. Apart from the Introduction and Conclusion, there are five component chapters which constitute the main body of the thesis. The first two chapters are designed for Literature Review and setting the theoretical framework for the thesis’ methodology and argumentation. The three following empirical chapters are case studies on how the EAIRT debate has shaped the practices of scholars based in China, Japan, and the US. Details of these sections are as follows.

Chapter one is the Literature Review chapter. It extensively and critically reviews the two main bodies of existing literature that are relevant to this research. One is the ongoing debate over East Asian IR Theory with many claims and counter-claims for/against EAIRT and the other deals with the theory-practice relationship. The main critique that this thesis presents is that the EAIRT debate seems to be intractable in the sense that it cannot be resolved in any foreseeable future. Instead of continuing this ‘endless’ debate, a more practical contribution should be to examine how these theoretical claims have been exercised in practice. The theory-practice literature, meanwhile, reveals a gap in that practice is understood to include only policy and
politics but not the practices of academics themselves. It then analyzes the value added dimensions of this study by investigating the linkages between theoretical debates and the actual practices of academics in bringing their claims into life.

Chapter two is devoted to presenting the methodology and argumentation of the thesis. It posits that the sociology of science approach, which has been recently imported into IR and which can be used as a springboard into a better appreciation of the dynamics of theoretical innovation in East Asia. Based on the insights from the sociology of science, the chapter builds up a three-layered analytical framework for studying the linkages between theory and academic practices in the case of the EAIRT debate. It argues that the extent to which theory can shape academic practices is the by-product of the interplay of agential and structural factors in which the former plays the decisive role and the later serves as the intervening factors. This analytical framework is then employed to structuring the three subsequent empirical chapters.

Chapter three is the first empirical chapter, focusing on decoding the EAIRT debate in China. By reviewing the historical and contemporary developments of Chinese IR and adopting the sociology of science framework, the chapter explains how the EAIRT debate has left an imprint to different extent on the Chinese IR academia, represented in the four approaches toward theoretical innovation in China. These include the ‘Chinese School of IR’ project, the ‘Tsinghua approach’, the Beida’s ambition toward developing a ‘theory of foreign affairs’, and the universalists’ orientation toward integrating with Western IR. Through the sociology of science framework, the chapter postulates that it is in China that we most clearly see the impact of structural factors on the practices of knowledge construction, manifested in the large consensus on the need to construct a Chinese style IR theory in support of the perceived peaceful rise of China.

Chapter four explores the impact of the EAIRT debate on Japanese IR. Like in China, there is a surging interest in indigenous theorizing in Japan yet unlike the case of China, claim for a ‘Japanese style IR theory’ is much weaker in Japan and indeed only constitutes a small portion of its IR academia. The majority of Japanese scholars remain heavily dependent on Western IR knowledge. In fact, the non-Western IR discourse in Japan recently has increasingly turned toward the ‘post-Western’ IR agenda. The chapter argues that this development is largely because the construction of a ‘Japanese School’ has been conditioned by the country’s failure during the
Second World War and the historical legacy of its anti-West pan-Asianism embedded in the Kyoto School of philosophy. Such lessons provide valuable insights into the theory-practice relationship, particularly the ramifications of theory on the world it studies. Combined with Japan’s unresolved ‘in-between’ identity as a country sitting between Western and Eastern civilizations as well as the ‘co-existence without synthesis’ tradition of Japan’s social sciences, we will most likely see Japanese IR, just like its foreign policy at the moment, continues to be ‘at the crossroads.’

Chapter five is devoted to examining how the EAIRT debate has been received in the core – American IR. By focusing on the work of leading US-based East Asia specialists (particularly David Kang, Amitav Acharya, and L.H.M. Ling), the chapter explains why the EAIRT debate in the US has taken the form of decentring American/Western dominance toward making IR a better body of knowledge rather than focusing on a particular regional or national approach. It argues that the growing interests in non-Western/East Asian IR discourse among US-based scholars have been a combined outcome of power shift, the growing academic maturity of Asian immigrant scholars, and the free scholarly environment in the US which allows dissenting voices. The chapter also investigates how mainstream American IR – the ‘gatekeepers of knowledge’ – has responded to such criticism of American domination in IR and the perceived academic challenges posed by the so-called ‘East Asian scholarship’ and what it may mean for the future development of American IR in particular and the discipline in general.

Finally, the concluding chapter will summarize the research findings, identify its contribution to the field, as well as suggest avenues for future research. The pieces of evidence gathered from the empirical chapters point to the presence of changes adopted by scholars involved in the EAIRT debate, yet the degree and form of change vary across cases due to the uneven impact of agential and structural factors. Based on these findings, the researcher has made generalizations about the necessary and sufficient conditions for changes regarding the existing and prospective EAIRT scholarship. The thesis also includes an Appendix combined of a list of scholars who have agreed to participate in this study as interviewees and a collection of course syllabi to showcase how IRT is being taught by scholars advocating for non-Western/East Asian IR Theory as compared to what it is normally taught in the West. Hopefully, this thesis can help the readers have a better understanding about the
motivations and dynamics of the drive toward constructing EAIRT and the room for further improvement. It will also serve as a springboard into a better appreciation of the practical implications of this academic movement on the socio-political development of the countries under study and the East Asia region more broadly, beyond being just another arcane IR theory debate.
Chapter 1: The debate over East Asian International Relations
Theory and its underexplored practical aspects

We do not typically conceive of knowledge itself as an inherently sociological phenomenon, as an ensemble of activities and practices... Yet in its discursive form, knowledge is a ‘social’, ‘sociological’, ‘structural’ and ‘material’ phenomenon, and manifestly so. Far better, then, for us to conceive of disciplinary knowledge – of theory, theorising and scholarship – as composed, quite literally, of active reasoning, inference, persuasion, criticism, exclusion, positioning and argumentation rather than just a mass of ‘information’ or a collection of theories and paradigms. We should examine what scholars do in making arguments, debating, advancing scientific theses and theorising (McMillan 2012, 135).

An emerging theoretical debate on the perceived deficiencies of existing IR theory as it applies to East Asia and the possibility of building new theories based on East Asian experience is taking shape. This body of literature focuses on three dimensions: how the perceived Western-centric discipline of IR should respond to the rise of China and the East; how ‘distinct’ aspects of East Asian history, culture, and traditions can be systematically incorporated into the existing body of IR knowledge; and whether or not a new IR paradigm at the national or regional level can and/or should be invented to match the power shift to the East. This academic movement has attracted the attention of a number of leading figures in the field and generates considerable profile. Inevitably, there is backlash against such academic attempts. As happened in the previous ‘debates’ in IR, there are various claims and moves against one another which, given their incompatibility, seem to be unresolvable.

Notwithstanding the intractable nature of the EAIRT debate, this chapter argues that it can be used as a springboard to investigate an underexplored dimension of the theory-practice linkage – the practices of theory making. A healthy and wide-ranging debate has emerged within IR and between IR scholars about the viability, desirability and even the possibility of a clear relationship between theory and practice. This body of literature, however, has been surprisingly quiet on a key aspect, and that is how these theoretical claims shape the practices of academics themselves. Put differently, there is little work investigating whether theorists and academics more broadly ‘practice’ what they ‘preach.’ This reluctance to examine how theoretical debate and dissatisfaction shapes the thinking and agendas of academics is all the more remarkable given that increasing attention is being paid to the ‘practical’ aspect of
theorizing. Books, articles, and speeches all suggest that theory can ‘guide’ practice. This is what Hans Morgenthau believed in his writings in the 1940s (Morgenthau 1947) and it is what Reus Smit and Snidal suggest in their *Oxford Handbook of International Relations* (Reus-Smit and Snidal 2008). In a recent article published in the *European Journal of International Relations*, Fred Chernoff has also written about how IRT is a key guide to policy and practitioners (Chernoff 2009). Some others have already mentioned the ‘practice turn’ in IR theory which takes practice(s) as the key level of analysis (Cetina, Schatzki, and Von Savigny 2000; Pouliot 2008, 2010; Brown 2012). Whilst this research does not approach the issue of practices from the perspective of ‘practice turn’ scholars, it has been inspired by their pioneering work to think more thoroughly about what theorists actually do to validate their claims in practice, as opposed to being satisfied with only what they write in books and journals. Such academic endeavor promises to significantly enrich the existing theory-practice literature: how major theoretical debates in IR impact not only world politics, policy-makers but also the individual theorists themselves.

Addressing this dimension in the theory-practice relationship is interesting and important. It seems strange that a discipline as concerned with theorizing as IR has not paid more attention to the relationship between academic debates over theory and the actual practices of academics. As one scholar puts it, what makes IR distinctive as a field of academic endeavour is that ‘while others of a lesser intellect do the facts and tell nice stories about something called the real world, IR does something called “theory”’ (Griffiths 2011, Foreword). IR Theory is, therefore, often held to be at the very heart of what it means to be an IR academic. It is also the core course in major teaching and training programs on IR. Despite the preoccupation the discipline has with theory and theorizing, we have little knowledge about how academic debates, particularly theoretical discontent, shape the daily work of academics.

With the aim to identify the gap and situate this research in the existing literature, this chapter proceeds as follows. First, I will review the two bodies of literature that are relevant to this study – the emerging debate over East Asian IR Theory and the discourses on the relationship between theory and practice. The main critique is that the EAIRT debate presents various theoretical claims and counter-claims with little knowledge as to how those claims are implemented in practice. The theory-practice literature, meanwhile, talks about the various impacts of theory on practice which is
understood as policy/politics and the consequences of theory on the real world but not the practices of academics themselves. The chapter then presents its argument that this debate over EAIRT can be used as a springboard into a better appreciation of the nature of EAIRT theorizing as well as the theory-practice relationship understood in its broader sense as to how theories and theoretical debates affect not only politics and policy-makers but also the practices of academics. Seen in this light, both the inner dynamics of the EAIRT debate and the impact of IR theorizing on the real world will be better identified and understood to, in turn, better appreciate the linkages between theory and practice.

The ongoing debate over East Asian IR Theory: advocacy and critique

For starters, the EAIRT debate did not emerge from nothing. It is part of ‘an emergent collective dialogue that aims to “provincialize” the Western European heritage of IR’ (Riffkin-Ronnigan 2013, 7). These discourses reveal the Eurocentric foundations of international/IPE theory and point to ‘the need to factor in the role of Eastern agency into our empirical accounts and theories of world politics/economics’ (Hobson 2014, 121). Although sharing this overarching objective, the degree and nature of their specific claims for EAIRT are different. Here, I categorize these claims into three key directions: the ‘democratizing’ IR, the ‘enriching’ IR, and the ‘East Asian School of IR’ approaches. Inevitably, these claims have precipitated critiques from both Western and Asian scholars, thus constituting a heated debate in contemporary IR literature.

Democratizing IR: In search of IR Theory beyond the West

The first direction of advocacy for an EAIRT comes from scholars who are dissatisfied with the current Western if not American domination in IR and, therefore, are interested in developing a non/post-Western, post-Westphalian understanding of International Relations/World Politics. This approach includes such scholars as Amitav Acharya and L.H.M. Ling (US), Barry Buzan and John Hobson (UK), Arlene Tickner (Colombia), Pierre P. Lizée (Canada), Ole Weaver (Denmark). Their works focus more on the broader non-Western context with occasional reference to East Asian IR as an example (Buzan and Little 2010; Ling 2002; Lizée 2011; Neuman 1998; Tickner 2003; Tickner and Wæver 2009). The majority of these scholars often come from non-mainstream approaches with the most radical claims being put forwarded by postcolonial scholars who have been ‘debunking europeocentrism and
challenging the universalist posture of American and/or European knowledge’ (Pellerin 2012, 62).

The common agenda of these scholars is to ‘democratize’ the discipline of IR by exploring the possibility of non-Western IRT (hereafter referred to as the ‘non-Western IRT’ approach) or by problematizing ‘the basic formulation and idiom of our query’ so as to ‘redefine IR’ itself (hereafter referred to as the ‘post-Western IR’ approach) (Behera 2007, 342; see also Shimizu 2015). This is because, in their view, the discipline of International Relations is overwhelmingly dominated by the West, resulting in the fact that it always privileges certain perspectives, pedagogies, and practices (Crawford and Darryl 2001; Lizée 2011). While this Western-centrism is true for the entire discipline, it is even more so in the field of IR theorizing. Specifically, two criticisms have been directed at Western IR Theory: ahistoricism and Eurocentrism (Zhang 2002; Hobson 2012; Wallerstein 1997). Acharya has summarized the implications of Western dominance in IRT by advancing four major points: 1) ‘auto-centrism’ in theorizing international order based on Western ideas, culture, politics, historical experiences and contemporary practice; 2) ‘false universalism’ in viewing Western theories and practices as ‘universally valid’ whilst non-Western ideas are deemed as ‘particularistic and inferior’; 3) disjuncture in the application of Western IR theory in explaining non-Western experience; and 4) agency denial of non-Western states, regional institutions, civil society actors in contributing to world order. Consequently the non-West is seen as ‘consumers or passive recipients’ rather than ‘producers or active borrowers of knowledge’ (Acharya 2000a, 2007a; see also Clifford 2011).

It is important to note that despite their dissatisfaction with Western dominance in IRT, these scholars do not reject the contribution of IRT in spreading the discipline in the non-West. They do acknowledge that there are theories, despite their Western origins, that are ‘more relevant to the non-Western world with the help of extensions and “advances”’ (Acharya 2011b, 623). For example, constructivism, post-colonialism, feminism and strands of critical IR that have helped considerably in broadening the relevance and appeal of IR theory around the world (Acharya 2011b, 623; Hobson 2007, 116). These scholars, however, are united in the belief that bridging the North-South gap in IRT by simply testing, extending and revising existing theories would not address the need and demand for change given that their
Eurocentric nature remains intact (Acharya 2011b, 623). A more representative discipline, therefore, can be constructed with theoretical input based on the tradition and practice of international relations in other regions beyond the West because they at times do not fit in the explanations of Eurocentric theories. In this light, Acharya argues that

While one cannot and should not seek to displace existing (or future) theories of IR that may substantially originate from Western ideas and experiences, it is possible, through dialogue and discovery, to build alternative theories about the functioning of international relations that have their origin in the South (Acharya 2011b, 620).

In light of this development, many IR scholars began to call for ‘catching up’ with the West, ‘decentralizing, ‘democratizing IR’, ‘decolonizing IR’, ‘reinventing international studies’, and promoting ‘dialogue’ between West and non-West in order to have a more ‘inclusive’ and ‘international’ discipline (Acharya 2011b; Lizée 2011; Nayak and Selbin 2010; Jones 2006; Ling 2014a). This is necessary given that the world has become more pluralistic and ‘globalized’ in the postcolonial and post-Westphalia era. Barry Buzan and Richard Little, for instance, argue that ‘Westphalia-based IR theory is not only incapable of understanding pre-modern international systems, but also… its lack of historical perspective makes it unable to answer, in many instances address, the most important questions about the modern international system’ (Buzan and Little 2000, 3). To expand the explanatory power of IR theory, much more needs to be known about the development and practice of international relations in the different regions of the non-Western world. It is important, they suggest, that ‘non-Western IR theorists follow the route charted by non-Western world history theorists and take up this challenge, which will not only transform our understanding of international relations in the non-Western world but also require us to re-construe developments in the Western world’ (Buzan and Little 2010, 214). While sharing the view with Buzan and Little that IR needs to take greater cognizance of world history and the varieties of pathways and experiences from outside the Western world, Acharya even goes further in envisioning an ideal scenario for a ‘truly international discipline’ whereby one could derive IR theory from all parts of the world, not only the great powers (Clifford 2011).

The study of regions in particular, argues Acharya, brings greater richness and diversity to the discipline. It also offers a useful pathway for integrating area studies and IR to the benefit of both (Acharya 2006). In this context, East Asia stands out as a
prominent example because it is an interesting case to evaluate IR in a region that is moving from periphery to the center of the international political economy. Pierre Lizée, for instance, explains that his selection of Asia as the source of non-Western examples is because Asia remains ‘the key points of reference when one speak of the “rise of the rest” and the way it would entail a reorientation of basic understandings of global politics: the growing influence of China, India or Japan, as the case in point is, most definitely, always part of this sort of debate…’ (Lizée 2011, 7). In this light, including voices long disregarded by mainstream Western IRT literature will ‘enrich’ the epistemology of the discipline and/or diversify the inter-subjective IR space, thus leading us to ‘a more democratic theorization of world affairs’ (Shimizu 2015, 6). However, some of these scholars simply point out that there are different interpretations of international relations in the non-West. They ‘do not make explicit arguments regarding the political and intellectual meaning behind offering these different perspectives, even though they may implicitly aim to connect this issue to a political re-evaluation of the discipline’ (Shimizu 2015, 5). Furthermore, apart from Acharya and Ling, most of these non/post-Western discourses focus more on the wider Third World context and thus, do not provide in-depth envisions about East Asian IR Theory. These shortcomings are covered by the other approaches discussed hereafter.

*Systematically ‘bringing East Asia in’ IRT*

The second direction of EAIRT advocacy consists of the most vocal proponents for EAIRT, most prominently David Kang, Gerald Chan, Yongjin Zhang, and given his overlapping interests, Amitav Acharya. These are Western-based East Asia specialists who, despite their Western citizenship and working experience, are more inclined to take an East Asian ‘inside’ perspective. These scholars do not seek to displace mainstream IRT or advocate an Asian school of international relations because ‘this would link us to constructs (and debates surrounding them) such as Asian values, Asian democracy, Asian way etc.’ (Acharya and Buzan 2010, 229). As Acharya puts it, mainstream IR theories and critical IR theories ‘are relevant and useful in analyzing Asian IR provided they do not encourage a selection bias in favor of those phenomena (ideas, events, trends, and relationships) that fit with them and against that which does not’ (Acharya 2007a). In fact, most of these scholars (Acharya, Kang, and Chan) are constructivists and their works have contributed to importing constructivism into the
region which has advanced the understanding of Asian international relations in important ways. Nonetheless, ‘there is a need to incorporate more to IRT the distinctive aspects of Asian history, ideas and approaches’ by not stopping at ‘testing Western concepts and theories in the Asian context, but generalize from the latter in order to enrich an hitherto Western centric IRT’ (Acharya 2008, 76). This approach has been categorized by Iain Johnston (2012) as claims for systematically ‘bringing East Asia in’ to IRT by developing a ‘new analytical framework’ that reflects more East Asian particularities (Kang 2003a; Kang 2010b) or by ‘using Asia as the basis for generalization’ (Acharya and Buzan 2010, 14; Acharya 2010b, 167).

The first rationale for these specialists’ call for ‘bringing East Asia in’ stems from their observation that Western IRT, when it is applied to the study of East Asian international relations, often result in ‘getting Asia wrong’ (Kang 2003a). Given that IRT in the West was constructed based on a history which mainly reflects anarchy and power politics, many doubt the contemporary utility of Western IR theory when applied to subsystems like East Asia (Acharya 2008; Choi 2008; Kang 2007, 2010b). Stephan Haggard, for example, observes that big theories regarding power, economic integration, and political regimes often stumble on their way to application in understanding international politics in Northeast Asia (Haggard 2004, 30). In the case of Southeast Asian states, Evelyn Goh points to the weakness of realist theory in explaining the ‘hedging’ and ‘enmeshment’ practices of these smaller regional countries in dealing with China’s rise and the growing Sino-US strategic competition (Goh 2008). In analyzing Asian regionalism, Peter Katzenstein comments that ‘theories based on Western, and especially West European experience, have been of little use in making sense of Asian regionalism’ (Katzenstein 1997, 5). Although Katzenstein’s remarks primarily refer to the study of Asian regionalism, Acharya argues that they can be applied to Asian IR in general (Acharya 2008, 58). To make sense of what is happening in Asia today, he suggests, we have to understand ‘the local context, the local culture, the local history – and although comparative insights are helpful, the primary point of reference has to be local’ (Acharya in Clifford 2011, 8). Given that existing IR theory ‘deeply reflect(s) the historical experience of the European states system in the past, and the cold war more recently’, Kal Holsti (1985, viii) posits that it ‘would be perfectly legitimate… for an Indian or African scholar to claim that other historical experiences should help form the basis of theories about the contemporary international politics.’
Sharing this view, Yongjin Zhang, who belongs to the English School, argues that ‘no credible IR theory can be built only upon the narrow confines of the European historical experience… China’s rich and deep history is an important avenue for exploring other world orders’ (Zhang 2001b, 63). Similarly, in his study of East Asian international relations in the pre-modern and modern time, David Kang suggests that the region has exercised a different pattern of international relations from that of the West – the hierarchical order and pacifism of the tribute system in the ancient Chinese world order that explains why East Asian countries are not balancing against a rising China (Kang 2007, 2010b). Nonetheless, both Kang and Acharya warn against focusing exclusively on Asia’s differences, because it ‘runs the risk of essentializing the region, resulting in the sort of orientalist analysis that most scholars have correctly avoided’ (Kang 2003a, 59).

The second rationale for the need to ‘bring East Asia in’ to IRT is the fact that despite its rise in world politics, East Asian cases are often excluded from much of the analysis in the US and European IR. As noted by Acharya, much of the growth in the discipline, viewed in terms of the number of degree conferment, comes from non-Western countries, especially China, India and even Indonesia. Yet, IR theory ‘remains stubbornly Western, incorporating relatively few insights and voices from the non-West’ (Acharya 2007a). In his article titled ‘What (if anything) does East Asia tells us about International Relations Theory?’ Alastair Iain Johnston (2012, 54) points out that only 9% of US IR scholars mainly worked on East Asia in their own research although the majority of them believe that East Asia is/will be the area of greatest strategic importance to the US at the moment and in the next 20 years. This relative neglect of the region has come in different forms: ‘excluding East Asian cases from analysis, including East Asian cases but miscoding or misunderstanding them, or including them but missing the fact that they do not confirm the main findings of the study’ (Johnston 2012, 53).

Reviewing East Asia–related literature on three important clusters of theorizing – structural theories of conflict, institutional design and efficacy, and historical memory – Johnston (2012) acknowledges that there are distinctive aspects of East Asian international relations that have not been adequately incorporated into transatlantic IR theorizing. These are also the key issues whereby East Asia IR specialists have different views with their Western counterparts. For instance, they point to the
deficiencies of structural theories e.g. power transition theory as it is applied to the Asian context given that there have been few evidences of a balance of power against either China or the US in East Asia (Kang 2007; Goh 2008). David Kang further argues that such anomalies can be better explained by looking at the historical order of East Asia which was based on China’s pacifist tribute system and the cultural commonalities of Confucian norms and values (Kang 2005; Kang 2010b). In explaining regional conflicts, many East Asia specialists believe that ‘historical memory (and its expression in nationalism and ethnocentrism) is a key source of interstate conflict, persistent security dilemmas, and ongoing disputes over territory’ (Johnston 2012, 169). As for explaining the cooperative dimension in international relations, these specialists note the under-institutionalized reality of East Asian multilateral institution building characterized by the ‘ASEAN Way’ (sometimes termed the ‘Asian Way’), and the lack of a NATO-like multilateral security alliance in East Asia (Acharya 2000b, 2010b; Acharya and Stubbs 2009).

Johnston (2012) suggests that this neglect of the Asian region may not be beneficial to transatlantic IR, not only in terms of data problems but also in terms of omitted or downplayed explanatory variables and theoretical arguments. Nonetheless, unlike Acharya and Kang, Johnston is more skeptical as to whether systematically ‘bringing East Asia in’ will make any major difference for IR theorizing. Rather he suggests that ‘bringing East Asia in’ is necessary for the own sake of the discipline’s development but this is a responsibility of the IR field as a whole, not just of East Asia IR specialists. A more in-depth study of East Asia IR, he concludes, ‘can be a platform for greater theoretical innovation in transatlantic IR’ (Johnston 2012, 70).

**Toward East Asian School(s) of International Relations**

The third direction of advocacy for EAIRT comes from local IR scholars. These include, among others, Muthiah Alagappa of Malaysia, Kishore Mahbubani of Singapore, Qin Yaqing of China, Takashi Inoguchi of Japan, and Chaesung Chun of Korea. They do demand for some form of a distinctive East Asian IRT either at the regional or national level based on the unique aspects of the history, ideas, and relationships that drive international relations in East Asia. Muthiah Alagappa – a prominent scholar from the region – observes that ‘there is growing interest among

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8 It should be noted that these claims were put forwarded before the U.S. announcement of its pivot/re-balancing to Asia in 2011. It will, therefore, be interesting to see how scholars may respond to such changes in world politics in their theorizing. This will be analyzed in the subsequent empirical chapters.
Asian scholars in developing indigenous ideas, concepts, and perspectives. As it flourishes, Asian scholarship has the potential to enrich, pluralize, and make IR a more international discipline’ (Alagappa 2011b, 195).

Explaining why this is the case, Alagappa (2011a) posits that previously Asia mattered on the margins primarily as an extension of Western interests in a subordinate region, but the current rise of Asia into a core world region have altered this situation. The worldviews and practices of international relations of Asian countries are commanding increased attention. Moreover, Alagappa (2011a, 156-64) points out four new developments that will alter the state of IR in East Asia: 1) Asia has transformed from a subordinate to a dominant region; 2) Asia has evolved from a war-prone to a more peaceful and stable region, 3) Asia has changed from an impoverished to a prosperous region, and 4) Asia’s strategic environment has become more complex. These changing patterns of Asian international relations are not fully explained by structural theories, particularly in terms of anarchy or distribution of power. As anarchy is a constant in a system of sovereign states, it cannot explain change, including the transition to peace in Asia. Anarchy also cannot account for the termination of some types of war and the persistence of others. Likewise, distribution of power (unipolar, bipolar and multipolar) explanations cannot explain war and peace in Asia. Instead, ‘contestations, advances, and setbacks in making states and nations along with changes in state capacity have been the primary drivers of war, peace, cooperation, and order in post-1945 Asia’ (Alagappa 2011a, 155).

Meanwhile, a number of other local scholars believe that there are key concepts and practices of East Asian international relations that have not been adequately captured by theoretical paradigms developed from Western experience. These include, amongst others, Chinese pacifist views of world order (*Tianxia* and *Datong*) (Zhao 2005, 2006, 2009), Japan’s pan-Asianism through its vision of ‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’, the soft-institutionalism and open regionalism embedded in regional institutions such as ASEAN, or the strict adherence of East Asian states to the non-intervention norms and its skepticism to multilateralism. In their comprehensive volume that investigates the question of ‘why there is no non-Western IRT in Asia’, Acharya and Buzan and their local colleagues conclude that there is a prospect for building IRT beyond the West in Asia. It can be done by theorizing East Asian history and various of pathways and experiences, including but not limited to classical
traditions and thinking of religious, military, political and military figures (e.g. Sun Tzu, Kautilya), thinking and foreign policy approach of local leaders, the work of Asian scholars who have taken up Western IRT, and policies and praxis of Asian countries (Acharya and Buzan 2010, 10-6).

In practice, there have been efforts by local scholars to construct indigenous frameworks, most noticeably in Northeast Asia (China, Korea, and Japan). IR scholars in these countries have begun to study the English School model of ‘international society’ and ‘modified sovereignty’ for theory making based on their distinct culture, philosophy, and history. Others have already called for ‘democratizing’ IR study with culture as a method, ‘indigenization’ e.g. Eastphalian order, East Asianism, East Asianization etc (Shimizu et al. 2008; Shin 2009; Qin 2006). Some of the most radical accounts among these attempts strive to criticize Western modernity and emphasize the ‘Asian values’ in IR knowledge. They do so by inverting ‘power relations, represented in resisting hegemonic narratives and discourses, in order to create “our” version of “Self” and “Others”’ (Shimizu 2015, 6).

**Critics’ responses: the pros and cons of EAIRT**

Unsurprisingly, there has been backlash on the need/desirability of an EAIRT. The most vehement critique of EAIRT, unsurprisingly, comes from Western IR scholars, including Jack Snyder, William A. Callahan, and Kimberly Hutchings. They are joined by a number of other local (Asian) scholars – many of whom were trained in the United States or Europe – who are skeptical or against the ideas of building regional/national school(s) of IR in East Asia. These include Ching-Chang Chen, Chih-Yu Shih, See Seng Tan, etc.

The primary critique of the non/post-Western IR writings is that they are too intent on drawing a distinction between the Western and non-Western worlds. The West/non-West distinction seems to be understood as constructing the non-West as the ‘Self’, and the West as ‘Other’ or vice versa. As Hutchings argues, neither the term ‘West’ nor ‘non-West’ is homogenous and whatever the differences between them, ‘non-Western’ experiences and perspectives remain defined in a negative relation to ‘West’. The terminology of ‘West’/‘non-West’ is over determined by the ways in which it has been used to mark distinctions, for instance, between different ways of life, different histories, different political institutions or regimes, and different territories or
regions. Any attempt to pin any of these meanings down empirically collapses very quickly (Hutchings 2011, 645).

Moreover, the fact that not only non-Western scholars are taking up the issue of Western dominance in IR knowledge but increasingly many Western scholars are also uncomfortable with the status quo led some to object that this distinction between West and non-West has become increasingly unsustainable and should be subsumed under a single global conversation about the nature and purpose of IR theory. Importantly, although Acharya says that he and his colleagues do not aim to set up a new debate and that they seek for ‘dialogue and discovery’, many believe that current efforts to construct IR beyond the West will possibly divide rather than unite the discipline (Chen 2011a; Frost 2009; Hutchings 2011).

Concerning the relevance of Western IRT in the East Asian context, some Western-based East Asia specialists defend the universalism of Western IRT and reject claim of East Asian exceptionalism (Friedberg 1993; Berger 2002; Mearsheimer 2006; Wang 2011c). After reviewing 4000 years of East Asian history, Warren Cohen concludes that there are no major differences in the international relations of East Asia. As he argues,

regardless of the teachings of Confucius and other great Chinese thinkers or strategists, China has behaved in the past, as it does in the present, as do all great powers throughout recorded history: it has been aggressive when it was strong and defensive when it was weak. Despite the German words that have become part of our vocabulary, the Chinese invented the practices we call Realpolitik and Machtpolitik. Nothing in Chinese culture or tradition either demands or precludes aggressive action (Cohen 2000, 478).

Other scholars (e.g. Johnston 1995; Wang 2011c) similarly question the claims about the pacifism of Chinese tribute system Tianxia promoted by David Kang or Zhao Tingyang. While acknowledging the parallel existence of Confucian pacifism, which is said to be ‘symbolic and inoperative’, Johnston contends that China’s strategic culture has been largely ‘realpolitik’ or ‘parabellum’ (Johnston 1995). Meanwhile, some East Asia specialists do acknowledge the region’s distinctiveness and diversity in terms of history and culture but argue that there is a nexus toward convergence as East Asia is socialized into the international system (Ikenberry and Mastanduno 2003). Jack Snyder, for example, concedes China’s claim to a distinctive strategic culture but rejects the need for a ‘distinctive theory’ to analyze it. He argues instead for using Chinese distinctiveness to test and broaden existing IR theories because
‘mainstream theories are universally applicable paradigms, whereas Confucianism is formulated specifically to Chinese or East Asian civilization’ (Snyder 2008, 10). More thought-provokingly, Snyder postulates that current efforts to build a monolithic Chinese IRT may be healthy provided that it is not harnessed to legitimizing Chinese policies in domestic and international politics and thus used as a social ideology. William Callahan seems to share this viewpoint as he questions Chinese scholars’ theorizing of world order through the hierarchical ‘all under heaven’ (*Tianxia*) concept:

*Tianxia*’s most important impact will not be on the world stage, but in China’s domestic politics, where it blurs the conceptual boundaries between empire and globalism, nationalism, and cosmopolitanism. Hence rather than guide us toward a post-hegemonic world order, *Tianxia* presents a new hegemony where imperial China’s hierarchical governance is updated for the twenty-first century (Callahan 2008, 749).

For local IR scholars, some also warn against the building of local school(s) of IR given the region’s complexity and a wide range of divergent interests among its proponents (Choi 2008; Yan 2011a). As a South Korean scholar notes, theorizing endeavors are most dynamic in Northeast Asia, nonetheless ‘conversations among academia in Northeast Asian countries are rather lacking. IR scholars in Korea, China and Japan have different approaches. Without systemic conversations among scholars in the same region, it would be very hard to have regionally coherent IR theories’ (Chun 2010, 85). Taiwanese scholar Chih-yu Shih also suggests three methods for the formation of Asian Schools of IR but simultaneously explains how it would backfire in each case (Shih 2010a, 3). Moreover, as a scholar has recently warned:

simply calling for greater incorporation of ideas from the non-West and contributions by non-Western scholars from local ‘vantage points’ does not make IR more global or democratic, for that would do little to transform the discipline’s Eurocentric epistemological foundations. Re-envisioning IR in Asia is not about discovering or producing as many ‘indigenous’ national schools of IR as possible, but about reorienting IR itself toward a post-Western era that does not reinforce the hegemony of the West within (and without) the discipline. Otherwise, even if local scholars could succeed in crafting a ‘Chinese (or Indian, Japanese, Korean, etc.) School’, it would be no more than constructing a ‘derivative discourse’ of Western modernist social science (Chen 2011a, 1).

Other scholars have similarly dismissed recent non-Western efforts to build alternative perspectives and indigenous theories of IR as ‘copying’ or ‘mimicry.’ As See Seng
Tan puts it, that is the tendency of ‘auto-Orientalism’ whereby ‘for no matter their ideological and intellectual preferences, they remain for the most part wedded to Western methodological categories and terms of reference’ (Tan 2009, 128). Therefore, in the immediate future the most feasible way to advance East Asian IR, according to EAIRT critics, is to incorporate more East Asian contexts and experiences to enrich IR theories (see, for example, Choi 2008; Tang 2010c; Yan 2011a; Zhang 2012c). Mohammed Ayoob, for instance, has done pioneering work in developing ‘subaltern realism’ where he thinks ‘IRT meets the Third World’ (Ayoob 1995). Chinese scholar Tang Shiping also contributes solid theoretical development of defensive realism to analyze Chinese foreign policy behavior. As Acharya also acknowledges, ‘instead of drawing a sharp distinction between what is Western and what is Asian, theoretical perspectives on East Asian international relations should explore commonalities that are quite substantial and would constitute the core of a universal corpus of knowledge about world politics’ (Acharya 2008, 76).

Another ‘debate’, so what? On the need to ‘open the black-box’ of IR theorizing

As we can see from the above, there is a lively debate in the existing literature about the possibility and desirability of an East Asian IR. However, we may wonder whether this emerging EAIRT discourse will eventually become one of the many unresolved debates in IR. All the claims and counter-claims for EAIRT presented in the debate have their own rationales and certainly appear ‘heartfelt’ but there are endemic reasons to the nature of theorizing that suggest this theoretical discussion will remain intractable. This debate over EAIRT, however, raises many interesting and important questions: Are all these claims and counter-claims justified? What is the relationship between real world events and theories about them? Can we, or should we, aim to achieve a consensus or compromise between these sides? As one scholar has noted, the end of ‘great debates’ and the diversification of theoretical approaches indicate that ‘all major conflicts within IR have not been resolved and are not being resolved’ (Sylvester 2007, 566). David Lake, therefore, has urged the IR community to stop claiming the superiority of one approach over another and instead ‘seek progress in understanding real problems of world politics’ to fulfil our responsibilities toward the society (Lake 2011, 478).

Against that background, this thesis posits that we need to look into the inner dynamics of theory making. Amidst all the debates over EAIRT, one aspect has
remained surprisingly understudied; that is how this debate has actually shaped the
practices of academics who are engaged in that debate, on whatever side that might
be. There are many big claims but what have academics actually done to bring their
preferred theoretical claims and approaches into life? In the current form, all these
claims and counter-claims about EAIRT seem to be impressionistic or normative at
best. If anything, they recall the previous bold assertions of ‘Asian values’ and the call
for constructing ‘IR Theory with Chinese characteristics’ in the 1990s which, as will
be analyzed in Chapter 3, is considered no more than a political project. We, therefore,
should exercise caution on the quality of all these claims and counter-claims about
EAIRT because almost no systematic research has been done to document empirical
patterns or verify causal hypotheses.

In light of such development, this study postulates that theoretical claims are only
valid when the practices of the theoretician align with them. By validity I mean that is
for a theoretical assertion to be counted as knowledge claim and by alignment I mean
the match between the claims scholars put forward in the theoretical debate and the
practices they adopted in daily life. Lacking actual practices, these various calls for
EAIRT are considered merely ‘hollow claims’ with no significant impact on both the
study and practice of i.r. This view about the validity of knowledge claims particularly
applies for mainstream IR scholars – the current ‘gate-keepers’ of knowledge. Note,
for example, the below critique of a leading US-based East Asia specialist about the
various claims for a Chinese worldview:

American scholars care about capabilities. They care about what China and
other countries’ capabilities are. They don’t pay attention to words. Chinese
have slogans after slogans, theories after theories (peaceful rise, new
international political order, new security concept, harmonious world, Chinese
dream, etc.). To them, they are not slogans, they are real values and ideas
about how the international system and order should work. But frankly to
Westerners, they are just slogans – they are propaganda that does not provide
blueprints for an alternative world order. Westerners, in my view, do not take
Chinese assertions about world order seriously. They dismiss it as propaganda,
myself included… Latin America, Africa, maybe the Middle East and Central
Asia, in these four regions there may be some interest in the Chinese vision of
world order… but it does not resonate in the West (David Shambaugh,
Interview, November 2013).

Given this fact, a more useful contribution to the evaluation of the quality and impact
of the EAIRT debate would be to examine its practical aspects to uncover why
knowledge claims occur the way they do, what factors have shaped those claims, and
how they influence scholars in their daily practices. In other words, there should be an attempt to ‘open the black-box’ (Fuchs 1992, 3) of IR theorizing to see how theorists actualize their claims in practice. As a scholar has noted, we should not consider theorizing as ‘given’ but need to ‘examine what scholars do in making arguments, debating, advancing scientific theses and theorising’ (McMillan 2012, 135). For example, some claims about the distinctiveness of East Asian international relations such as the absence of a balance of power against China may be outdated with the US recent pivot to Asia. How have scholars responded to such evolving changes in world politics as well as to the critiques placed on their claims so as to advance their theoretical approaches? And how have they implemented those claims not only in their theoretical research but also in teaching, networking, and other outreach activities? Toward that end, the EAIRT debate can serve as an excellent springboard for investigating the practices of knowledge-in-the-making as it is arguably an example of ongoing ‘big debates’ in contemporary IR literature.

**Toward a better appreciation of the theory-practice relationship**

To explore how and in what ways the EAIRT debate has influenced, or shaped, academic practices, it is necessary to initially discuss the theory-practice relationship more broadly. There is a well-developed literature that is probing different aspects of the theory-practice linkages: the (ir)relevance of IR knowledge to policy and politics, the responsibility of individual academics for the implications of their theories on the real world, and the desirability to bridge the policy-scholarly gap (to name but a few, Hill and Beshoff 1994; Wallace 1996; Smith 1997; Ninic and Lepgold 2000; Smith 2004; Walt 2005; Ish-Shalom 2009). While some are worried that academics are getting too distant from the world they are studying and that IR knowledge risks becoming irrelevant to policy-makers, others are deeply concerned that IR theories are getting too close to politics and, in some instances, such as the democratic peace theory, even help to justify political actions of practitioners (Wallace 1996; Hobson et al. 2011). Despite such divergence regarding the perceived theory-practice gap or nexus, it has been well noted by various scholars that ‘theory and practice are intrinsically combined rather than opposed’ (Grenier 2013a, 16; see also Walt 2005; Nye 2009).

In what way, then, can theory be linked to or ‘guide’ practice? The existing literature emphasizes at least three dimensions: theory can be made policy-relevant to help
guide policy-makers; theory can have real and sometimes negative impact on world politics and society; and theory is embedded in the scientific practices involved in the process of knowledge production. Although this thesis discusses all these dimensions because they are somewhat interrelated, it is the third kind of potential linkages between theory and disciplinary practices that will be intensively examined to unveil how theorists bring their claims into life. In what follows, I will briefly discuss this body of theory-practice literature with the particular emphasis on the third dimension — the practices of knowledge claims.

First, the current theory-practice literature predominantly focuses on the desired policy relevance of IR knowledge, particularly in answering the question of what kind of IR theory may be useful to foreign policy and politics. Bruce Jentleson argues that ‘middle-range theory’ is best suited to the daily needs of policy makers as ‘the policy relevance of IR theory inversely correlates to the level of abstraction’ (Jentleson 2002, 145). Fred Chernoff believes that for the discipline to enhance its policy relevance, it should produce theories with predictive power as it guides policy-makers on what to do (Chernoff 2009). The ‘practice turn’ scholars meanwhile have tried to develop a practice theory that focuses on the everyday, highlighting embodied capacities such as know-how, skills and tacit understandings and apply it to world politics.9

The paradox here is that theory and policy need to be congruent, but in order to inform policy ‘theory needs to be autonomous and ahead of the practical game, rather than chasing behind it’ (Hill and Beshoff 1994, 214). In this light, the more autonomous and independent science is from policy and politics, the stronger its scholarship and the greater its potential influence (Haas 2004, 576). Furthermore, ‘policy-relevant’ theories may also risk turning into ideologies which can only be avoided if they strictly refer to reality. As some scholars have noted, ‘Reality is not a given, but an intellectual construct and thus a precondition for theory-building and action. A relevant dimension, it should be stressed, is the normative aspect. Normative factors determine what is relevant and what is not’ (Girard, Eberwein, and Eber 1994, 154).

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9 These practice scholars have used Bourdieu’s analytical framework for studying concrete practices in world politics such as multilateral diplomacy, nuclear deterrence, global banking or migration. In one of the first attempts to apply practice theory to the study of International Relations, Vincent Pouliot builds on Pierre Bourdieu's sociology to devise a theory of practice of security communities and applies it to post-Cold War security relations between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Russia (Pouliot 2010, 2008). Practice theory has also been employed to study the operation of East Asian institutions, such as ASEAN (Davies 2016).
This normative aspect relates to the core question: should theory inform practice? There has been much debate on this critical issue, mainly in two dimensions – the impact of theory on the world and the responsibility of the theorist to that world. The predominant objectivist conception of science in IR, influenced by philosophers of science Karl Popper and Imre Lakatos, holds the view that science aims to produce theories that truthfully represent how the world is. Theory is, therefore, independent of social values and human interventions and the scientist is said to be observing the world without affecting it (Büger and Villumsen 2007, 417). This positivist approach hence rejects the notion that theories have any influence and power outside of academia and no substantial real-world ramifications (Keohane 1986). Moreover, as theory is not real, we cannot use the reality to test its validity. Theories, therefore, can only be falsified by another theory (Popper 1959; Lakatos 1976). This philosophy of science has dominated in IR together with the rise of structuralist theories of neo-realism and neo-liberalism.

Post-structuralists (particularly critical theorists) reject this objectivist position on two counts: the world is socially constructed and that theorists have responsibility for the impact of their theories on the society. Critical theorists argued that theories not only grew out of reflections on real world politics but may also affect and even constitute the world they purport to explain and eventually reinforce the common sense of everyday political discourse (Ish-Shalom 2009, 305). The ‘end of history’ and ‘democratic peace’ theories are among those powerful examples of how theoretical work can directly contribute to the world they are observing (Ish-Shalom 2009, 170; Hobson et al. 2011; Nossal 2001). Most emphatically, Steve Smith declared in his 2003 International Studies Association (ISA) Presidential Address that the whole IR discipline has been ‘one voice singing into existence the world that made September 11 possible’ (Smith 2004, 515).

But if we assume that theory has real world implications, it should also be legitimate to raise a concern about ‘responsible scholarship’ and the responsibility of theorists upon theorizing. Steve Smith first questioned the ‘ethic of responsibility’ of IR theorists in the wake of the disastrous events of 11 September 2001. He feels that ‘all of us in the discipline need to reflect on the possibility that both the ways in which we have constructed theories about world politics, and the content of those theories, have supported specific social forces and have essentially, if quietly, unquestioningly, and
innocently, taken sides on major ethical and political questions’ (Smith 2004, 500). Instead of portraying themselves as ‘merely’ reporting on the world of politics, Smith urges academics to take a normative stance on it. From this perspective, IR theorists have a social task and agency role in designing what they theorize and preach (Smith 2004).

Advancing this point, Pikki Ish-Shalom (2009, 303) posits that while social science theorists do not bear moral responsibility or blame for the ramifications of their theories (which is known as ‘blame responsibility’), they do ‘bear social responsibility for the actions or effects that derive from their theories’ (which is known as ‘task responsibility’). In this sense, while theorists cannot reasonably expect the political abuse of theory to disappear totally, they must do their best to reduce such abuses. To discharge the task responsibility and work against theories’ vulnerability, ‘theorists need to renounce the principle of objectivity, and to adopt instead a normative ethic, making it harder for politicians to abuse their theories, and theorists would be able – and morally obliged – to use theories for the benefit of society’ (Ish-Shalom 2009, 304). Moreover, all causal claims in social science may have phenomenal, or ‘real-world’, implications but real-world implications are not necessarily policy implications; there would be social implications as well (Hobson et al. 2011). The theorists, therefore, should take both political and social responsibilities to ensure that their theories not only being misused by policymakers but more importantly to ‘achieve their maximum potential for the public good.’ In so doing, Ish-Shalom believes that theorists should put themselves forward as public intellectuals – or, in his preferred terminology, ‘theoretician citizens’ (Ish-Shalom 2011, 182).

Smith and Ish-Shalom’s work is the tip of an iceberg in the theory-practice literature that advances the notion of practice beyond the ‘doings’ of politicians and states. It refocuses our attention on the behavior and normative stance of theorists themselves when they do the theorizing. Nonetheless, to call for the relevance of theory to practice or academics’ responsibility when theorizing is not only about asking theorists to either engage with policymakers to improve policies or to act as ‘theoretician citizens’ in educating and enlightening the public about the ‘uses’ of theories. It is a fuller commitment to examining how theorizing is conducted and stabilized, e.g. how theories and theoretical debates shape understanding and agreement with certain propositions, and particularly what scholars themselves do in
their day to day practices to perpetuate or change how their theories and theoretical claims are shared and supported.

Moreover, if we assume that the environment that shapes IR theorizing is not limited to policy and politics then these linkages become more complicated. As a scholar has noted, the theory-practice debate ‘does not only concern the potential relation between academic IR and policy-practice. It is also related to the identity of academic IR itself’ (Grenier 2013a, 16). In this light, the notion of practice should be broadened in order to enable a better appreciation of the encounters between theory and practice. Accordingly, it should be more satisfactory to speak about practice as multiple ‘doings’ than to think of it merely as the ‘doings’ of politicians or states. Practice, in Knud Erik Jørgensen’s categorization, includes three kinds: 1) practice of states (policy-making); 2) practices in society concerning international affairs (e.g. political action and international thought); and 3) the practice of academics, no matter whether they theorise, analyse empirical issues or engage in critical self-reflection (Jørgensen 2004, 335-6). In this light, a study of how theory can shape academic practices in IR, e.g. teaching, research, and other knowledge diffusion activities, can offer a significantly different outlook on the theory-practice debate (Grenier 2013a, 16).

It should be noted that this broadened conception of practice(s) is inspired by the practice turn in IR theory. The practice turn take practices as the core unit of analysis, seeing ‘practices’ as the stuff that drives the world and makes it ‘hang together’; thereby it entails a distinctive way of studying the world (Bueger and Gadinger 2015, 449). The symmetrical perspective of practice theory implies not only considering the world studied as a practical configuration, but also conceiving of (academic) knowledge generation as practice. Practice theory, then, provides a tool for studying scientific disciplines (such as IR), for understanding the multiple relations between scientific and other social and political practices, and for examining the practical activities involved in generating knowledge (Bueger and Gadinger 2007). Such an encompassing conception of practice promises to place ‘scholars in a better position to contribute to real-world problems and to produce statements of relevance beyond a community of peers’ (Bueger and Gadinger 2015, 9-10). Disciplinary practices scholars, hence, call for more ‘self-reflexive accounts of the discipline’ by focusing on the links between space and knowledge production and the practices inside the discipline. In particular, they place emphasis on ‘the everyday practices of IR scholars
who navigate between various cultural and linguistic settings’ (D'Aoust 2012a, 124; see also Büger and Gadinger 2007; Berling and Bueger 2013).10

Among these ‘everyday practices’ scholars, Christian Büger and Frank Gadinger are most proactive in introducing concepts and insights from the sociology of science in order to explore and to illustrate in what way these can advance IR’s disciplinary sociology. In arguing for moving from epistemology to sociology of science in IR, Büger argues that ‘academic disciplines are communities organised by a distinct set of shared practices, vocabularies, and institutions. They give meaning and legitimacy to academic practices such as writing and presenting research, reading or teaching; they are a means to evaluate one’s status, and give intelligibility to distinct claims to knowledge’ (Büger 2012, 101). Drawing on this logic, these two scholars claim that we can address one of the key issues of disciplinary sociology – the character of the relations of IR to other actors and their institutions and discourses – by treating IR as a scientific practice that is closely tied to its social environment. In this light, the discipline of IR is not only constituted by theory and concepts but ‘doing IR’ is a technique, a set of practices in which IR scholars are closely linked with the wider IR environment (e.g. policy, practitioners, funding agencies, media, public etc) (Büger and Gadinger 2007, 91). Hence, ‘understanding IR scholars in ‘doing IR’ requires taking into account their daily and sometimes trivial practices’ (Büger and Gadinger 2007, 90).

How, then, is theory linked to academic practices? McMillan (2012, 135) posits that we should see disciplinary knowledge as a product/output/outcome of other processes and practices (research, learning, data collection, observation, inference, teaching), which are in their turn the result of wider social and structural conditions that drive and shape them. From this perspective, IR is pivotally a culture constituted by different domains of practice, or put differently, different pathways of knowledge transfer. Therefore, knowledge production in IR can only be understood by taking into account the rich IR network of actors, discourses, and their practices that allows for the stabilization of knowledge. Those different domains of practice are systemized into key categories, namely ‘mobilizing the world’ (such as translating the actions of a

10 Most of the ‘disciplinary practices’ scholars I mentioned here collectively argued for bringing the sociology of science deeper into IR in a 2012 issue of the Journal of International Relations and Development. For details, see (Büger 2012; D'Aoust 2012b, 2012a; McMillan 2012; Kessler and Guillaume 2012).
foreign policymaker into a scientific article), ‘autonomy’ (self-organization and maintaining the imaginary boundary to ‘non-science’), ‘alliance’ (seeking allies and influence through the enrolment of funding agencies, clients and publics), and ‘public representation’ (engagement with the public) (Büger and Gadinger 2007, 101-5). ‘Being an IR scholar’ and ‘producing IR knowledge’ depends inevitably on these sets of practices and IR is intrinsically interwoven with its environment through these pathways (or, in their words, ‘links and knots’). In and through these practices, knowledge circulates and ‘content’ is made and re-made (Büger 2012, 106).

**On the value added of studying the practical aspects of the debate over EAIRT**

Why is the EAIRT debate a good lens through which to analyse practice(s), including academic practices? Linking the theory-practice literature with the ongoing EAIRT debate, we can see an echo of what has been much debated above. Like their colleagues in the debate on the theory-practice linkages, academics engaged in the EAIRT debate also argue over the (ir)relevance of an emerging EAIRT to policy and politics as well as the roles and functions of involved academics vis-à-vis the policy circle. As these scholars sharpen their arguments on the claims and counter-claims for EAIRT, some of the practical aspects of this debate become increasingly apparent. Accordingly, some scholars link the desirability of an emerging EAIRT with the nature of theorizing (to explain and predict reality) and the need to build new frameworks to reflect new developments in practice (new dynamics in East Asian international relations) (Alagappa 2011a; Qin 2006). Conversely, others have raised concerns that such a theory is too close to policy (e.g. serving as ‘government straight-jackets’ or ‘political ideology’ in Acharya and Snyder’s respective terminology) (Acharya 2011b; Snyder 2008). Academics, hence, may indeed inadvertently exercise a certain amount of ‘theoretical nationalism’ and thus risk losing their intellectual integrity or end up producing ‘unscientific’ knowledge (Snyder 2008).

Yet, most of the above assertions about the connection between theory and practice in the case of EAIRT thus far have adopted a top down approach, linking the claims for EAIRT with the practice understood as ‘politics’ or the policy practice of scholars. Little has been known as to how claims about EAIRT have altered the way academics approach their work, research, education and other professional activities. This issue has been almost completely ignored by both those who study EAIRT directly, whatever their perspective on that debate, and by those who study the relationship
between theory and practices more generally, whose focus tends to be external (practices beyond academia) rather than internal (practices within academia).

In this context, a study on how academic practices have changed in response to the call for EAIRT provides vital and hitherto missing insight into the status, significance and depth of the contemporary EAIRT debate. First, it is interesting and understudied – there is an empirical gap on what is actually happening on the ground and this gap is both regional and country specific. Second, filling that gap may bring about ‘new knowledge’ – findings of vital clues relating to the ‘genuineness’ of the claims for EAIRT. Third, the research may be able to develop more precise traction about where changes may or may not be happening in a broader regional and extra-regional context. For instance, is there evidence of disinterest in Western IR theory? Is there evidence of multiple new approaches being called for not only by ‘the big names’ working on IR in Asia, but also by numerous other scholars? What form does this demand manifest itself and is that demand pan-regional or vary between countries?

Furthermore, the investigation on how theory shapes academic practices enables not only a better understanding of the factors contributing to the construction of knowledge but also the identification of the ‘practical (performative) effects that academia has’ (Bueger and Gadinger 2015, 457). As Christian Büger convincingly argues, ‘a study of the [IR] discipline allows for a better understanding of the knowledge produced, which might influence political decision making’ (D’Aoust 2012b, 91). Utilizing the debate over EAIRT which is the key site of knowledge-in-the-making in the IR discipline today to explore academic practices, therefore, should unveil valuable insights into the theory-practice linkages. To conceive of disciplinary knowledge from the scientific practices angle in this light ‘would begin to undermine the implicit assumption of significant ontological difference between knowledge, the activities of knowledge-production and the social conditions of knowledge-production’ (McMillan 2012, 135). This approach promises to provide a better appreciation of the theory-practice relationship more broadly which is enabled through the sociology of science framework to be discussed in the next chapter.
Chapter 2: Exploring the EAIRT claims and practices - a sociology of science perspective

The sociology of science suggests that disciplines are not necessarily universal in their methodologies, results and outlooks, and that a number of factors that often go unrecognized serve to structure the ways in which particular national academies view the world. These include the role and concerns of a particular state in the international arena, the educational culture of a society, the size and structure of its internal academic market, and the relationship of this national social scientific academy with other national social scientific academies (Bacon and Newman 2002, 23).

Back in 1985, K.J. Holsti made an interesting observation about the state of the IR discipline: that IR is not a unified body of knowledge; and that in understanding how IR has developed in and beyond the U.S. academia, it is necessary to take into account the geographical and social context of those who produce knowledge (Holsti 1985, viii). In fact, his work can be counted as one of the first attempts to analyse IR from the ‘sociology of science’ perspective. This is an innovative approach to science that has recently been infused into IR in a relatively comprehensive and systematic manner. It started with Ole Wæver’s 1998 article on comparative sociology of IR and later coming to the fore with ‘disciplinary practices’ discourses.¹¹ It is also the key conceptual framework upon which this study draws to construct its method and argument with regard to the linkages between theoretical claims over EAIRT and academic practices. The reason why these two parts of method and argument are mixed together is that the method designed to study the links between the EAIRT debate and academic practices facilitates an assessment of the central claims and arguments put forth in this thesis.

Methodologically, this chapter develops an analytical framework for probing the linkages between the EAIRT claims and academic practices. This framework is a combination of the history, philosophy, and sociology of science with the sociology of science serving as the backbone. The history of science helps explain how IR has been developed into a distinct field of study in a particular national context as well as how EAIRT-related discussions emerged in such disciplinary evolution. Understanding the development and characteristics of IR studies in each country will serve as a springboard for evaluating the extent of changes and impacts that the current EAIRT

¹¹ I use the term ‘disciplinary practices’ to distinguish with the ‘practice turn’ which, as discussed in the previous chapter, understands ‘practice’ in a related but somewhat different meaning.
debate may have incurred in those countries and on the practices of individual academics. The philosophy of science, meanwhile, informs this study in the sense that it serves as a basis to analyse the nature of different knowledge claims presented by scholars involved in the EAIRT debate and their respective epistemological and ontological positions. It will also help evaluate the extent of innovativeness and distinctiveness (if any) of those claims and practices for EAIRT as compared to the existing theories.

Both the history of science and philosophy of science have already expressed their strength in uncovering some of the logics of the EAIRT debate such as through the lenses of power transition and what constitutes legitimate knowledge (Snyder 2008; Lu 2012; Cunningham-Cross 2012; Callahan 2001; Acharya 2013a). These ‘top-down’ approaches, however, tell us little about the practices of theoretical innovation. In particular, they have difficulties explaining the way theorizing occurs and the fact that, in the case of EAIRT, it takes various forms. As Peter Kristensen and Ras Nielsen (2013, 19) have pointed out, what is missing in the literature is an attempt to view theorizing from a bottom-up perspective – to open the black-box of IR theorizing. Given the diversity of value-laden knowledge claims presented by scholars involving in the EAIRT debate, it is necessary to explore the importance of social context in theory making. Toward that end, the sociology of science offers a powerful analytical tool. The sociology of science claims that science (knowledge construction in particular) is a social construct, and therefore it is shaped by the social-political concerns and social relations of scientists. Taking this into IR, there have been claims that social factors such as culture, ideologies, languages or geography do play a role in the process of IR theorizing (Agnew 2007; Rathbun 2012; Pellerin 2012; Grenier 2013b).

Drawing on the insights from the sociology of science, I construct a three-layered model to investigate how academic practices change in response to the call for EAIRT and what drives such changes (if any). These layers include the geopolitical context, the institutional/organizational context, and the individual practices of scholars. Taking a bottom up approach, this thesis posits that analysing academic practices needs to take into account not only the activities of scholars in bringing their claims into life but also the broader environment in which the scholars are living – the geopolitical and institutional context that indirectly shaped their knowledge claims.
and practices. In addition, comparative case studies on the Chinese, Japanese, and American IR communities and qualitative analysis based on primary data in the form of interviews with scholars involving in the EAIRT debate are employed as supplementary tools to the sociology of science framework. Together, these blended methods enable a systematic investigation into and generalization about the link between EAIRT and academic practices.

I argue in response to the research question that there have been actual changes adopted by scholars involved in the EAIRT debate but the degree and form of change vary across cases. These different responses to EAIRT can be attributable to the uneven impact of intervening social factors. The central argument is advanced here that understanding the impact of the EAIRT debate on the practices of academics requires appreciating two factors – structural considerations (power shift, policy/politics, and academic institutions) and agential choice (personal background, vision of science, and moral concerns). These structural and agential factors often intersect and impact on various national IR communities and individual academics to varying extents, and therefore shape their respective responses to the call for an EAIRT.

To demonstrate why such is the case, this chapter is divided in three parts. First, an analytical framework is constructed to explore the dynamics of the EAIRT debate and practices based on the insights from the sociology of science. Second, the central arguments about the linkages between the EAIRT claims and practices are presented. The chapter concludes by arguing that the EAIRT claims and practices are socially constructed by various structural and agential factors relevant to scholars’ personal background, institutional, and national settings. The interplay of structure and agency shapes scholars’ respective responses to the call for EAIRT.

**Exploring the EAIRT claims and practices from the sociology of science perspective**

* Sociology of science as the overarching analytical framework*

This thesis draws on the insights from the sociology of science to build up its own model for probing the linkages between theoretical debates and the practices of academics. In particular, a three-layered analytical framework is applied here to probe
the possible linkages between EAIRT debate and the actual practices of academics engaged in that debate (see Table 2.1). This framework primarily draws on Ole Wæver’s explanatory model for comparative sociology of IR (Waever 1998, 696) and the notion of disciplinary practices developed by other sociologists of science in the field (Büger and Gadinger 2007).

Layer 1: The social and political context
- a. Geopolitical concerns
- b. Cultural, intellectual styles
- c. “Ideologies” or traditions of political thought
- d. Form of state; state-society relations
- e. Foreign policy

Layer 2: The institutional/organizational context
- a. The IR discipline (Theoretical traditions, structure, and historiography)
- b. Universities (Policy-scholarly relations, Autonomy, Grants and Resources)
- c. IR Departments (Mission Statement, Funding, Hiring patterns)

Layer 3: Individual academic practices
- a. Research (theorizing, publishing, conference attendance)
- b. Teaching (curriculum, syllabus, supervision)
- c. Outreach activities (policy consultancy, networking, media speech, public services etc.)

Table 2.1. Analytical framework for studying the EAIRT claims and practices

What is the sociology of science and why is it employed here for constructing the above analytical framework? At the first approximation, sociology of science is the study of science as a social activity, especially dealing with ‘the social conditions and effects of science, and with the social structures and processes of scientific activity’ (Ben-David and Sullivan 1975, 203). By examining the various epistemic and non-epistemic factors that influence science, the sociology of science ‘opens the black-box of scientific rationality and inspects the actual internal dynamics of science-in-the-making’ (Fuchs 1992, 3). In this light, sociology of science argues:

Science is a set of practices shaped by their historical, organizational, and social context. Scientific knowledge is produced in a set of practical contingencies. In its practice, science produces its realities as well as describing them. Scientists participate in the social world, being shaped by it

12 Contemporary sociology of science can be traced back to the sociology of knowledge developed by European sociologists such as Émile Durkheim and Karl Manheim in the early 20th century. It emerged in the 1970s as an alternative approach to the dominant history of science and philosophy of science and thus far has incorporated a number of variants including ‘the sociology of scientific knowledge’ and ‘science studies.’ For the purpose of convenience, all these variants are collectively referred in this study as sociology of science or sociological approaches unless otherwise noted.
and simultaneously shaping it. Consequently, scientific knowledge is something that is constructed within those practices (Law 2004, 8; quoted in Büger and Gadinger 2007, 96-7).

Understood from this sociological perspective, it does not make sense to treat the process of knowledge production as an internal exercise separated from its context as the philosophy of science argues. Rather, ‘theorizing’ is an activity that will inherently absorb values in the course of establishing knowledge. ‘New’ knowledge, then, is understood as ‘being produced not through disembodied reason but through the situated context of the “knower” producing it’ (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006, 10). Science is seen as a cultural formation and research as a social process constituted by practice (understood as ‘a set of practices’). In this sense, academia is also a set of practices centring on the activities of the scientists. Therefore, the scholarly practices relating to knowledge claims (such as researching) are linked to those types of practices by which scholars connect with their environment (e.g. seeking for allies and funding and public representation). In short, ‘scientists assemble their environment with the claims they make… The practices by which scholars engage with their environment form a unified whole with “internal” knowledge production practices, or in other words, there is a “constant traffic” between the two’ (Büger and Gadinger 2007, 105).

The sociology of science started to be infused into IR in the 1990s, first and foremost as a response to the scholarly inquiry of whether or not IR is or remains an ‘American social science.’ Ole Wæver pioneered this dimension of research. In his International Organization article, Wæver (1998, 692) first observed that ‘the relationship between IR and sociology of science is virtually non-existent.’ This is perhaps true given that almost anything that relates to the conception of science in IR so far has been under the framework of philosophy of science (including Karl Popper’s criteria of ‘verification’, Thomas Kuhn’s concept of ‘paradigm’, and Imre Lakatos’s notion of ‘research programs’). Although acknowledging ‘the merits philosophy of science approaches might have as schemes for measuring progress in the discipline’, Wæver (1998, 693) believes that ‘they have not proven useful for generating sociologically informed studies of the development of IR.’

In his pioneering attempt to bring sociology of science into IR, Wæver developed a model for comparative sociology between American and European IR. He posits that
academic disciplines are social and intellectual structures and vary in their structure over time. In this light, IR is ‘an American structure’ in that the US houses the leading journals for IR research and produces most of the funding for that research. However, he also reminds readers that there are other regional and national centres ‘doing IR.’

Drawing on the sociology of science, Wæver outlines a three-layered model to explain comparative developments of IR in America and Europe. He argues that the development of IR studies in different societies is the outcome of the interplay among three layers – the nature of their society and polity, the state of social sciences, and the intellectual activities within an IR academia (Wæver 1998, 696). Wæver applies this model in four case studies (Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the United States) to explain why the discipline has developed the way it has in these four countries and more importantly, how IR communities in those countries, given their dissimilarities in these three layers, have adopted different development trajectories than their American counterpart.

Following Weaver, sociology-oriented scholars started arguing strongly for applying sociology of science in IR on at least two counts. First, if we see IR scholarship as a constitutive element of world politics and its aim is to investigate the particulars of how IR makes the world it studies then there is a logical reason for IR to engage with sociology of science (Büger 2012, 100-1). Second, the sociology of science offers promising insights into the praxis and function of the discipline, or in other words, it moves the discipline ‘inside-out’ (Büger 2012; Büger and Gadinger 2007; Buzan and Albert 2010; D’Aoust 2012b). In particular, the sociology of science, its advocates maintain, promises to give ‘a better and different look at IR’ as it points us to a different focus – the everyday practices of IR scholars and the associated epistemic and non-epistemic factors that shape those practices. The sociology of science, therefore, provides a useful platform to probe the relationship between knowledge claims and academic practices that this study will build on to assess the practical dimension of the ongoing debate over EAIRT. There is a direct contribution of the sociology of science approach in providing tools by which we can systematically explore the conversation (or links) between context (or IR environment), knowledge production (or EAIRT claims) and practice (or the practices of academic involved).

Given the relevance of the sociology of science to this study, it can serve as a springboard for probing the theory-academic practices relationship which is at the
heart of this study. Like many of the aforementioned sociologists of IR, I employ the sociology of science (particularly the actor-network and/or agency-structure discourses) as a broad conceptual framework for analysis. However, unlike them, whose work aims to capture a general ‘big picture’ of the sociology of IR, I focus on a more specific and indeed narrower aspect of disciplinary sociology – how theoretical claims impact on academic practices in the context of the EAIRT debate. Weaver’s model of comparative sociology of IR hence has been adjusted as identified in Table 2.1.

Taking a bottom-up sociological approach, the actual practices of academics, comprised mainly of their research, teaching, and outreach activities, is the key and last level of analysis (layer 3). Yet, as argued by sociologists of science, those practices are inseparable from the social contexts that have shaped them – the socio-political and institutional/organizational layers. In this light, scholars do have an agency in carrying out their daily activities but the practices they choose to be implemented should be placed and/or understood within certain contexts. These are the socio-political and institutional/organizational contexts which constitute the first two layers of the above framework.

The socio-political context (layer 1) shapes the wider IR environment in which academics operate. As manifested in the previous section, there are specific national traditions, determined by the social and political development patterns such as culture, ideology, form of state, and foreign policy that directly or indirectly influence the development of social sciences (IR included) as well as the nature and quality of knowledge produced. That is because political and economic forces constitute the largest structure which feeds the science-related organizations in layer 2 (Collins 2000, 51). An investigation on the linkages between EAIRT claims and practices hence needs to take into account this overarching socio-political context. As one recent study has revealed, the development of political science in three East Asian states (China, Japan, and Korea) has been associated with the key theoretical trends in the US; yet at the same time they also developed some distinct features. This is because ‘their development has been inexorably grounded on the nature and dynamics of their society and politics, especially the nature and dynamics of their democracies’ (Inoguchi 2012, 12). The aim here, therefore, is to identify what, if anything, is happening at the national level (culture, ideologies, form of state, foreign policy) that
might serve as the broader context for any social and political changes within an institutional framework that are found.

The institutional context (layer 2) is comprised of the IR discipline, universities, and IR departments – the organizational base in which academics are working. The importance of these intellectual and social organizations in shaping the development of science in general and theoretical orientation in particular cannot be ignored because they provide material resources and social structures that shape how scientists perform their work (Whitley 2000; Fuchs 1992). Moreover, it is through these institutions that academics exercise their ‘alliance’ practices (e.g. how they mobilize funding resources and support from peers for their theoretical claims). Therefore, in order to investigate the link between EAIRT claims and practices, it is necessary to look into the academic institutions and the scholarly linkages with policy circles of the national IR communities under study. This step, in turn, facilitates an evaluation of the impact of policy and institutional factors that have shaped the development of the IR discipline in a particular national context and the quality of ‘knowledge’ produced in such an environment. Pertaining to this ‘institutional layer’, university/research institute and departmental statement missions as well as their funding, their hiring policies, and their broader policies and activities will be carefully examined. It is also necessary to examine the link between IR departments and universities in the countries under study with their governmental or private grants and funding agencies. For this project to be manageable, I have focused on some of the top IR departments and universities in designated sites (namely China, Japan and the United States) where there is clearest sense of (dis)satisfaction and the possible presence of changing practices by their academics.

The third and most important layer for this study is to examine the various practices of individual academics that might reflect any moves toward actualizing the theoretical claims they put forward in the EAIRT debate. To investigate these academic practices properly, it is necessary to be aware of the linkages between academic practices and the social, political, and institutional contexts outlined in the two previous layers. That said these three layers are interrelated and one is generally instrumental in producing

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13 The proposition that material factors have influence on knowledge production has its roots in Marxism which argues that ‘how people think is related to how the material means of mental production are distributed. Those who control these means are in a good position to control how ideas are produced as well, and even these ideas themselves’ (Fuchs 1993, 935).
the others. Nonetheless, academics do have an agential role in restraining or stimulating the impact of external factors in shaping their choices. For example, not merely being driven by structural and institutional factors alone, academics can shape their surrounding environment by exercising their ‘theoretician citizens’ role or, in Buger and Gadinger’s words, ‘mobilizing the world’ and adopting ‘public representation’ practices.

This analytical framework helps uncover the inner logic of theorizing – how and why theoretical claims and practices occur the way they do and what actually drives those changes. This model will be deployed in three empirical case studies – China, Japan, and the US – with the rationale as follows.

**Case Study Justifications**

As an additional method to the sociology of science, this study employs the comparative case study method as a mean to test the aforementioned analytical framework. The specific guidance for conducting case studies is the structured focused comparison approach that Alexander George and Andrew Bennett have developed. According to this approach, a set of variables is identified and then their variation is analysed across several detailed qualitative cases studies to derive systematic conclusions (George and Bennet 2005, 67; Bailes et al. 2011, 1). The case studies selected may contribute to theory development through ‘building block’ analysis whereby the research asks the same questions in each case under study to standardize data (George 1993). These studies can be component parts of larger contingent generalizations and typological theories (George and Bennet 2005, 75-6).

Given the need to appreciate the geographical and social-political context in the process of knowledge construction as claimed by the sociology of science, three empirical cases – Chinese, Japanese, and American IR academies – are chosen to provide a cross section where theoretical claims regarding the EAIRT debate may take particular forms in particular contexts (layers 1 and 2). Given that many of the scholars who are involved in the EAIRT debate work outside of East Asia, it would be restrictive to focus only on what is happening within the region. Furthermore, some of the most vociferous critiques on IRT as it currently stands are about the Western-centrism/domination in the field. It would, therefore, be helpful to investigate the impact of this EAIRT discourse on a Western academia. The researcher, therefore,
selects two regional cases (China and Japan) and one extra-regional case (U.S.-based academics) for empirical investigations. These are places where there is a high concentration of scholars involving in the EAIRT debate. They also represent different types of geographical conditions, socio-political practices, and academic institutions. This variation is meaningful because assessing the impact of the EAIRT debate from the sociology of science perspective requires an appreciation of the context in which that debate is generated – national, regional, and extra-regional contexts. Furthermore, these three cases also offer insights into the influence of power shift and geopolitical concerns on the practices of knowledge claims: the US as the hegemonic country/discipline facing relative decline; China as the most likely ‘challenger’ to Western/US dominance in the field thanks to the rapid rise of its material power; and lastly, Japan as the once dominant then resurgent and now declining power in East Asia. Together, these case studies promise to unveil an inner look into the sociology of knowledge production.

To ensure the standardization of data and uniformity of findings, the case studies included in this research address three sets of questions: How have academic practices changed in response to the claims for EAIRT in the country under study? Why is this so? And what does it tell us about the theory-practice relationship more generally? The focus on the individual, institutional and policy contexts will be asked repeatedly in each case to standardize the data. The key variable as identified in this study is the practical moves by academics to follow through with their (dis)satisfaction about the current state of IRT. The variations of that dissatisfaction will be analysed across the selected case studies. Such methodological approach allows systematic conclusions to be made here on whether there are uniform or homogenous claims and academic practices toward EAIRT.

The national and regional contexts: China and Japan

China and Japan are the two regional powers that have influenced East Asian international relations in many important ways. These are also places where academic dissatisfaction with the state of IRT and desirability for an indigenous framework are strongest in East Asia. For China, its IR academia has long yearned for building a ‘Chinese School of IR theory’ and such a desire is being emboldened with the current geopolitical rise of China. Similarly, there is also renewed interests among Japanese scholars in developing an indigenous framework, most clearly manifested in recent
attempts by a number of Japanese scholars to prove that ‘there were Japanese IR theories criticizing the western IR theories and endorsing the new East Asian order’ (Kamino 2008, 31). While sharing the desirability for indigenous frameworks, China and Japan represents two different types of IR academia. China has a newly emerging and fastest growing IR community with close linkages to the policy circle, thus its theorizing efforts are often accused as ‘government straightjackets’ whereas Japan possesses the largest, most developed and most democratic scholarship in East Asia. These two countries hence reveal two different institutional settings to explore how dissatisfaction might shape academic practices.

Moreover, with regard to the policy context, both China and Japan are facing critical policy issues that may drive the practices of their IR communities. For China, that is the implications of its current rise and subsequently growing interests in its worldview; for Japan, its relative decline and deepening historical animosity amid heightening territorial disputes with neighboring countries. Given that IR in general and IR scholars in particular aim to study the functioning of world politics and states’ foreign policy, the desirability for building indigenous frameworks in these two countries may usher in significant policy implications. China and Japan, therefore, provide important evidence for both the variation in claims for EAIRT and the relationship between theory and practice where practice is understood in its broadest sense.

The extra-regional context: US-based academics

A study on how theoretical claims shape the actual practices of extra-regional academics is necessary given that this EAIRT debate has spanned beyond the region. In particular, the US, with its free and vibrant academic environment and a high concentration of leading IR theorists and East Asia specialists in the field, has become a venue for EAIRT discussion. I, therefore, include an empirical study on US-based academics to showcase a situation concerning EAIRT outside the region. Such an extra-regional case study also facilitates a better appreciation as to whether indigenous scholarship developed in the ‘East’ can travel beyond their place of origin, and thus measure the potential and enduring impact of EAIRT on overall IRT.

The selection of these empirical studies is meaningful in two ways. First, it ensures a good variation in checking the validity of claims for EAIRT and evidence of changes in academic practices across different geographical and socio-political contexts.
Second, it offers a chance to explore the similarities and differences in the academic structures and theorizing practices among various IR communities in the East and West. For example, academic scholars in America ‘are protected by tenure and not directly dependent on government support for their livelihoods, so they are uniquely positioned to challenge prevailing narratives and conventional wisdoms’ (Walt 2012a, 40). It might not be the case for most East Asian scholars who are less autonomous and ‘dare to know’ only in their retirement. It will then facilitate the generalization of the impact of theoretical debates on academic practices in different contexts and ultimately answer whether there is a uniform impact, or if the impact of EAIRT on academic practices changes from case to case.

**Semi-structured interviews and interpretive analysis**

As this study applies the sociology of science framework and comparative case studies, it employs interpretive methods throughout. Field-based observation and interviews, therefore, are important research techniques for collecting and analysing key data. The main source of data that this researcher relies on is semi-structured interviews with approximately 30 scholars involved in the EAIRT debate, textual-archival research of their relevant research and publications, and collection of pedagogy and course content at leading IR institutions under study. The selected interviewees hold different positions in the debate, ranging from vocal proponents to vehement opponents of EAIRT. The scope of their claims and counter-claims for EAIRT also varies with some focusing only on national frameworks while others are more interested in pan-regional perspectives. In fact, they represent different types of (dis)satisfaction with the state of IRT and desirability for EAIRT in different contexts – a variation inherent to this kind of study. The interviews were structured in line with the three-layered analytical framework. Accordingly, interview questions were geared toward attaining information on how the EAIRT debate has shaped a scholar’s research, teaching, and outreach activities and how these practices are linked to their training background as well as the wider institutional and socio-political context where he/she is working.

Although these interviews constitute valuable input for this study, the author of this study does not solely rely on them; rather the information provided is cross-checked

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14 Japanese scholars may be an exception to this observation. Japanese IR academia, therefore, makes an interesting case in this regard.
vis-à-vis other sources of data e.g. analysis of published work and investigation of scholars’ teaching pedagogy. The triangulation of research methods (sociology of science framework, case studies, and interpretive analysis of interviews and other data) helps overcome the disconnection between the author’s own suppositions and those of the academics under review in this study. In particular, this methodological approach might provide a parallel inasmuch as it queries less what people say than the contexts in which them saying it makes sense to them. It also helps untangle the ‘truth’ of the matter from the perspective of the other. Most importantly, the blended method adopted here is in itself innovative because to explain academic practices requires bringing together all these things – semi-structured interviews, examination of the objects of academic practices, and qualitative interpretation.

With a three-layer analytical framework, comparative case studies, and interpretive analysis, the researcher can systematically grasp the theory-academic linkages, and thus ultimately manage to answer this study’s research question of how theory and academic practices relate in the context of the ongoing debate over EAIRT.

**On the structural and agential factors shaping EAIRT claims and practices**

Based on the afore-mentioned insights and methods drawn from the sociology of science and interpretive analysis of data collection through fieldwork, a set of claims and arguments will be presented about the two central questions of this research: 1) how academic practices change in response to EAIRT; and 2) what drives such changing practices (if any). On the first question, I argue in line with the sociology of science accounts that theorists assemble their environment with the claims they make in theoretical debate. Put differently, scholars are expected to adopt changes in practice corresponding to the claims they made in the EAIRT debate. In this light, there are inherent linkages between theoretical claims and academic practices in which the practices involved in academics’ engagement with their surrounding environment are linked to the ‘internal’ practices of knowledge production. Second, on the issue of what drives changes in theoretical innovation, the research here points to the view that those EAIRT claims and practices did not evolve from nothing but were a product of social construct. From this perspective, theory building is not a value-free activity but other socio-political, institutional, and personal factors may intervene and affect scholars’ commitment to theory and scientific objectiveness. As one distinguished scholar has noted:
It goes almost without saying that all theories of International Relations have a perspective, sometimes explicit but often implicit. Given the nature of the phenomena that scholars have to deal with in this field this is inevitable... In other words, theories of International Relations, no matter how refined and complex they may be, derive their perspectives from their historical and geographic contexts. Most theorists tend to make claims of universal validity for their theories. However, almost all paradigms in International Relations are, in the final analysis, the products of theorists’ perception of what they see around them. These perceptions are in turn shaped by the theorists’ experiences, and theories, therefore, become prisoners of time and space (Ayoob 1998, 31-2).

Theorizing, in this light, is a type of social activity, and therefore it inevitably, sometimes unconsciously, absorbs the values and norms of society (Doppelt 2007, 189). Therefore, three specific propositions to assert that the EAIRT claims and practices are socially constructed are presented here. First and foremost, academic practices are driven by a scholar’s theoretical identity (personal training and working background). Second, academic practices are directly influenced by organizational and material factors (e.g. funding, hiring, and career incentives). Third, academic practices are indirectly shaped by the broader social and political developments at the national, regional, and international level at present. That scholars’ theoretical perspectives and academic practices have been shaped to different extent by those different social factors explains why EAIRT claims occurred and are practiced in different ways. This characteristic is not unique just to the EAIRT debate. It has been part of the wider sociology of the IR field. Sociologists of IR have pointed out that IR scholarship in different places has been unevenly influenced by structural factors such as ‘higher education policies, financial resources, publication opportunities, citation patterns, research infrastructures, hiring rationales, and career advancement rules’ as well as agential causes e.g. ‘nationality, personal loyalty, or paradigmatic fidelity’ (Hagmann and Biersteker 2014, 295; see also Tickner and Wæver 2009; Waever 1998).

Taken together, these propositions form the central argument of this thesis that understanding the impact of the EAIRT debate on the practices of academics requires appreciating two things – structural considerations and agential choice. Rationalist paradigms (realism and liberalism) often overemphasize the importance of structural causes whilst overlooking the role of agency. Constructivism, meanwhile, argues that what matters in shaping human behaviour is not only structure and process but also agents. Importantly, structures and agents are not separate from each other but
intersect. In this inter-subjective relationship between agents and structures, ‘structures exert influence on the formation of agents’ collective identity as well as their interest and state’s policy, while on the other, identity thus formed in turn constructs or reproduces structures’ (Moon and Kim 2002, 63-4).

Therefore, an argument is advanced here that the interplay of structural and agential causes shapes the responses to EAIRT. In this course, structure serves as a source of ‘intervening factors’ and agency as ‘determining factors.’ By this I mean that there are structural causes that create preponderances toward shaping academic practices concerning the EAIRT debate but ultimately it is the agency that decides whether and, if yes, how to respond to such call for EAIRT in practice. The interplay of structure and agency in shaping academic practices explains why within and across individual states we witness various kinds of responses to EAIRT.

In clarifying the question of what drives those different academic practices in various geographical and social contexts, this thesis will identify the structural causes that develop a set of pressures on theoretical debate as it stands within a specific country under review and the agential factors that come together within that structure to promote a particular response to EAIRT and academic practices. Drawing on the sociology of science, I argue here that the practice of deriving theoretical claims is directly shaped by the agential factors embedded in a scholar’s background, vision of science and moral choice. It is further impacted – at least indirectly – by the structural factors, including power shifts, the socio-political practices of the countries in which a particular academic is residing and working, and the academic institution in which he/she operates (see Table 2.2). In short, to understand academic practices requires an awareness of both structural and agential factors across scholars’ identity, academic institutions, and socio-political development components.

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*Table 2.2. The factors shaping EAIRT claims and practices*
In what follows, I will identify why these factors matter in the establishing of theoretical claims and practices and reconstruct the conditions under which such an impact is more likely in the case of those scholars involved in the EAIRT debate. Furthermore, I will identify the importance that one factor may have in relation to the other as well as the relationship between the various factors in play that determine outcomes.

**Structural causes: Power shifts, Socio-political Practices, and Academic Institutions**

The first structural cause shaping academic practices is the ‘geopolitics of knowledge’ (D'Aoust 2012b, 94) or, in other words, the significance of geopolitical concerns in the shaping of IR theorising. The key question here is whether this factor delegitimises the theoretical work or that it is an inherent part of theorising anywhere in the world at any time. Here, controversies remain. If viewed from the American positivist conception, there should be a separation between power and knowledge for the sake of scientific objectivity and neutrality. Yet, as some sociologists of IR argue,

regardless of whether one subscribes to, for instance, the Kuhnian notion of paradigm shifts, Wittgenstein’s idea of therapy, or Foucault’s arche’, as soon as the well-trodden paths of positivist philosophy of science are re-situated within a series of relations, practices, institutions, and persons, questions regarding scientific endeavour stop being solely confined to objectively instituted rules of evaluation (Kessler and Guillaume 2012, 110).

This study, adopting the sociology of science perspective, argues that power does play a role in knowledge construction as Michael Foucault famously claimed decades ago.¹⁵ The current drive toward EAIRT is no exception. While traditional theories of science view knowledge production as a neutral, value-free, and universal process, Foucault sees it as an integral component of power and domination. In his view, ‘power is everywhere’, diffused and embodied in discourse, knowledge and ‘regimes of truth’. According to Foucault, power can be said to create knowledge through ‘the institutions of power’ which establish the circumstances under which scientific claims can be counted as true or false (Foucault 1991). On the other hand, Foucault also believes that ‘every production of knowledge serves the interest of power. Thus knowledge produced in economics, medicine, psychiatry and other human sciences is

¹⁵ Foucault uses the term ‘power/knowledge’ to signify that power is constituted through accepted forms of knowledge, scientific understanding and ‘truth’ (Foucault 1980, 1982).
nothing but a part of the power of the social institutions that have grown around these disciplines’ (Panneerselvam 2000, 21). While discussing the power-knowledge interrelationship, Foucault affirms that it is power that is a pre-condition of knowledge rather than vice versa (Panneerselvam 2000, 24).

Is IR an exception to this claim? Such is hardly the case. Kenneth Waltz – the founder of structural realism – states succinctly that a general theory of international politics should be based on and/or written in terms of the great powers of the time (Waltz 1979, 73). As Western powers have dominated world politics for the past centuries, IR theories, particularly mainstream paradigms, have also mostly evolved from European/Western history. These theories, therefore, reflect the logic of power politics and imperialism. The inception of the English School, for instance, is largely believed to be an intellectual response to the decline of Britain in the international order. Perhaps it was not a mere coincidence that IR emerged as an academic discipline in the wake of two devastating World Wars, with the geopolitical rise of the US. In fact, Stanley Hoffmann was one of the first American scholars acknowledging that power is important in constructing the field by confirming in his 1977 article that IR is an ‘American social science’, born and raised in the US and reflected American interests in the global politics (Hoffmann 1977; see also Smith 2002).

Both Hoffman (1977) and Walt (2011) have attempted to provide explanations to this Anglo-Saxon/American dominance in IR. First, there is a clear linkage between power and knowledge production: great powers tend to produce ‘big thinkers’ who help conceptualize their visions about world politics. Given British and American dominance in world politics since the nineteenth century to this moment, it is understandable that they also dominate in the field of knowledge production. As Acharya points out, there is a ‘close nexus’ between power and knowledge production as has been the case with the US, Britain, and Europe in the past and arguably China at the moment (Acharya 2011b, 625; 2013a). This raises concerns as to whether theories are meant to be constructed to justify the rise or decline of powers. That power-knowledge linkage becomes more obvious under the lens of postcolonial scholarship. Accordingly, the current hierarchy of the perceived Western-centric discipline is structured around the core-periphery distinction that resembles the contemporary international political economy order (Wallerstein 1984; Tickner 2013). Within the joint Anglo-American ‘intellectual condominium’ (Holsti 1985), the U.S.
serves as the ‘core’ and the declining Britain is considered ‘semi-periphery’ whilst ‘the rest of the world represented various dependent “peripheries” importing and consuming knowledge generated by the few in the center’ (McMillan 2012, 132).16

Although IR is one of the least American-dominated social sciences and is ‘not as “American” as it was 45 years ago’ (Kristensen 2015b, 259), that US hegemony still prevails in the field is beyond question. Given its material affluence and the sheer size of its academia, the US ‘accounts for 33% of the world’s research funding (55 countries surveyed), employs 24% of the world’s researchers in terms of fulltime equivalent (53 countries surveyed), produces around 26% of the world’s PhDs in social sciences (48 countries surveyed), and 30-40% of all social science research articles’ (UNESCO survey data, cited in Kristensen 2015b, 247). The hierarchical structure in IR is organised around the leading journals which are still in the control of Anglo-Saxon IR. These journals serve as the ‘gatekeepers of knowledge’ and every scholar wishing to be published in these journals needs to convince those at the centre about relevance and quality of her or his research (Kristensen 2015b). The same logic can also be applied in the dimension of IR teaching. Among the ten best PhD programs in IR as ranked by IR scholars worldwide in 2014, the US has seven and the UK has three.17 As Peter Katzenstein observes, IR is ‘a handmaiden of great power’ and ‘a consolidated field related to power’ (Katzenstein in Schouten 2008, 6).

If it is true that power and power shifts do play a role in theorizing, then we can assume that the three case studies selected for this study will offer valuable empirical insights. If the rise of the US in the post-WWII era stimulated the formation of the IR discipline, what will happen when America’s material power is in relative decline? Conversely, is the current drive toward constructing a ‘Chinese School’ a by-product of the rise of China? Somewhere in between, how have the past failure and contemporary resurgence of Japan shape the development of IR thinking in that country? These issues will be intensively explored in each empirical chapter. Yet, the basic assumption here is that power is a factor integral in the course of knowledge production.

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16 Alerne Tickner broadens the status of ‘semi-periphery’ to include Western Europe, Canada, and, perhaps, Australia (Tickner 2013, 640). Despite the surging interest in Chinese IR perspectives recently, China has not been granted the ‘semi-periphery’ status (Hellmann 2010, 11).

17 These 10 best PhD programs are (in order): Harvard University, Princeton University, Stanford University, Columbia University, University of Oxford, Yale University, LSE, University of Chicago, University of Cambridge, and University of California – Berkeley (TRIP 2015).
In what ways, then, can power influence knowledge? From the sociology of science perspective, the development of the IR discipline in a country and the practices of academics are influenced by material factors. In that light, 'the geopolitical and economic rise or fall of states shifts the location of resources, expanding the material bases for some intellectual networks at the expense of others. Networks realign; new philosophical positions appear’ (Collins 2000, 623). The role of the Rockefeller Foundation in the promotion of theoretical innovation that met US foreign policy interests in the wake of WWII (particularly its sponsored conference in 1954) and its financial support for the construction of the ‘English School’ (via the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics) perhaps offers the most relevant guidance in this regard (Wæver 2011, 116; Guilhot 2011). Similarly, a rising power like China presumably has more material resources to invest on science from which its IR academia may benefit. Growing interest in Chinese perspectives on international relations may also attract collaboration and/or funding from foreign institutions. For instance, Chih-yu Shih – a Taiwanese professor who develops the ‘balance of relationship’ theory based on the model of Chinese foreign relations with neighbouring countries (Huang and Shih 2014; Shih and Yin 2013a) which somewhat resembles the Chinese School’s key thesis of guanxi (relationality) – reveals to this author that he has greatly benefited both intellectually and financially from ‘the rise of China’:

I have practically benefited from the rise of China but not necessarily worked for China. [This is] because a few Chinese scholars are interested and even enthusiastic about what I have been doing with my research on intellectual history of Sinology. They are willing to provide platforms and to sponsor my research. They are able to use their money and resources to organize international conferences with me being the coordinator behind the scene so they would invite scholars to come to the conference to interact with me. So I take advantage of the rise of China because they have resources and people are going to China. If I am doing the same thing in Taiwan they will not come. So because they are willing to do this for me, I enormously appreciated the generosity. I have had four conferences held in China in the past three years, two in Beijing via Chinese Academy of Social Sciences the other two in Nanning’s Guangxi Academy of Social Sciences. The theme of these conferences is not about the rise of China but I think they may find it comparable. I don’t know how they conceptualize my work. I suspect some or

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18 The head of the Rockefeller Foundation at that time was Dean Rusk who was subsequently a U.S. Secretary of State. Other participants attending the 1954 conference include policy makers. As Robert Jervis observes, the theorists and practitioners at the conference spoke the same language (Jervis 2011, 38).
most of them don’t even know what I am doing. They just feel that this is a good thing for China to have (Chih-yu Shih, Interview, February 2015).

While a shift in geopolitical power and policy concerns necessarily changes something in theorising, it may not exert an equivalent impact across various national IR communities as the empirical chapters of this study will show. It is argued here that these different responses to power shifts can be attributed to the two factors: first, changes in knowledge production are often slower to responses than are power shifts and secondly, scholars do have an agential choice in modifying the impact of structural factors. Historically, the transfer from material power to intellectual power often takes time. Furthermore, theorizing is mainly an intellectual endeavour of an innovative mind by itself. The role of agency played by the theorists, then, is of critical significance. Power, in this light, should only be seen as a stimulating rather than determining factor. As Ole Wæver puts it, ‘the rise and fall of power centers influence the discipline but do not directly translate into theory’ (Wæver 2011, 101).

Indeed, a recent study on the number of articles produced by scholars coming from emerging powers like China, India, and Brazil which have managed to be published in mainstream IR journals shows that ‘emerging powers still cannot speak in mainstream IR.’ While growing attention to emerging powers opens up the discursive space of IR for scholars located in those countries to become published in leading mainstream journals, these scholars merely serve as ‘theorisers within established Western theoretical traditions such as realism, constructivism or English School’, ‘native informants presenting empirical material’, or as ‘quasi-officials representing a perspective from their country’ (Kristensen 2015a, 648). Consequently, the non-Western/EAIRT discourse has mainly been discussed in native language journals and/or the newly established English publishing platforms such as the China-based Chinese Journal of International Politics and the Japan-based International Relations of the Asia-Pacific.

While power shift can exert a large impact on IR theorizing, other structural factors also play a part in shaping the type of responses to EAIRT in different national contexts. Most notable among these are socio-political structure and the characteristics of academic institutions that each country under this study represents. The impact of these external social factors upon theorizing is revealed in a remark by a ‘Chinese School’ proponent:
Those who produce any particular theory have different background (nationality/concerns/experience etc.) in shaping their own research question. When they try to answer it, they incorporate their own experience into theory building. People who produce theories are social animals in a social world in the sense that their interests and concerns impact on their theorizing and theoretical efforts (Ren Xiao, Interview, August 2013).

Among these factors, the international position and foreign policy environment of the country in which the theorists are living and/or attached to have a particular impact on the knowledge they produce. This is because no matter how objective a scholar thinks his/her description of the real world is, ‘scholars’ [policy] preferences may play a role even in their most abstract theories’ (Jervis 2011, 42). As a scholar has noted, ‘theorists respond to the challenges facing their country because these issues present themselves as the most pressing to the research community, or because research in policy issues is more easily funded, or a combination of the two’ (Breitenbauch 2013, 30).

Nonetheless, the extent to which policy and politics can influence theory depends on the degree of their direct exposure to the policy-making process e.g. to temporarily leave the academia to work for governments or international organizations and/or to undertake substantial policy consultancy assignments (Parks and Stern 2013, 1). This revolving door mechanism has long existed in the West, particularly the US, and has recently gained a foothold in China with distinguished scholars being appointed as members of Chinese Foreign Ministry’s consultancy board or ambassadors and diplomats at Chinese embassies overseas (Wang 2015).

That said similar arguments on the implicit influence of policy and politics on academic claims and practices can be applied for the EAIRT claims and practices. Once more, the most relevant case in this instance is the Chinese IR community given its government’s tight intellectual and ideological control and the large extent of overlapping themes between Chinese foreign policy and the hard-core of the perceived emerging ‘Chinese IR theories.’ Nonetheless, it is not argued here that policy relevance is always bad for IR theorizing as long as scholars can retain their autonomy. In this light, Ole Wæver (2011, 102) has noted that ‘a question about the theory that ought to be put forward is shaped in relation to the academic world. Policy relevance is ultimately causally relevant to the extent that it translates into power within academe.’ As will be further discussed in Chapter 4, the lessons of the Kyoto School of philosophy in pre-war Japan may offer useful insights in this regard.
While overarching structural factors such as power shifts do matter, theories are shaped to a greater extent by their immediate social setting – the academic scene (Wæver 2011, 101). What, then, is the characteristic of the academia? Randall Collins argues that intellectual life and disciplinary development are most shaped by ‘conflict and disagreement’ (Collins 2000, 1). The key practice of scholars, therefore, is always related to making moves against a rival position. That constitutes the core idea of his ‘law of small numbers’ thesis. Among other things, Collins argues that intellectual life is featured with ‘structural rivalry’ and that theoretical innovation is motivated by competition for prominence among ‘a small number of warring camps.’ Competition in academia concentrates on two dimensions: 1) material resources such as grants, jobs, and access to research facilities; 2) symbolic resources, such as reputation, journal space, or innovations. These two kinds of resources are closely linked because ‘without material resources, one cannot contribute to science; without such contributions, researchers would have difficulties getting funded’ (Fuchs 1993, 937).

Incorporating the above factors into the IR field, Wæver argues that ‘this specific structure explains the most-often noticed peculiarity of IR: its fondness of “great debates.” Debates ensure that theorists remain central but empirical studies important (in contrast to economics)’ (Wæver 2013, 315). Therefore, in order to be a ‘star’ in the field, scholars have to do theory. Given the aforementioned competition for material and symbolic resources, theoretical debates in the field are often limited by a focus on certain topics and by the search for allies via scholarly and social interaction/networks (Collins 2000, 1). As Collins (2000, 7) further explains this process: ‘thinking consists in making “coalitions in the mind,” internalized from social networks, motivated by the emotional energies of social interactions.’ Potential allies are often peers who share similar approach but can also be formed by training excellent students. And this kind of ‘law of small numbers’ often repeats after a certain generational span, approximately 35 years (Collins 2000, 5-6). Changes to the intellectual fields or knowledge construction may occur if there are generational change and/or changes in the control/allocation of these material resources. The importance of career incentives, generational change, and mobilization of material resources, hence, will be critically analysed in the case of EAIRT debate to uncover the nature and dynamics of such claims and practices.
Agential factors: Personal identity, moral choice, and vision of legitimate knowledge

The sociology of science posits that the practice of knowledge production is inevitably affected by external factors; nonetheless, it is more directly driven by the internal factors closer to the academic scene. Most importantly, it emphasizes the agency role played by academics in the production and practice of knowledge claims. Although being driven to a different extent by structural factors, theorists do have an agency in choosing their theoretical approach and decide what to practice. In the case of EAIRT, this agential role of academics is threefold: personal identity, moral choice, and vision of legitimate knowledge. Personal identity refers to a scholar’s background including his/her prior education, political beliefs, and personal inclinations which, in turn, shape his or her moral choice, vision of science, and ultimately one’s preferred theoretical framework.

Through the literature review chapter, we can see that most of the scholars who advocate for or who sympathize with the calls for non-Western IRT/EAIRT have been trained in and/or adopted a reflectivist approach to IR whilst the EAIRT opponents are often theoretical mainstreamers. Empirically, the TRIP project also provides very helpful data to further verify the linkage between scholars’ preferred theoretical approach and their political beliefs. Based on TRIP surveys, a recent study on the ‘implicit ideology’ of IR scholar comes up with a fascinating finding that there is a ‘resonance between the content of ideology and the key propositions of different schools of thought in IR.’ Accordingly,

Realists are the most conservative and right-leaning of international relations scholars, while Liberals are more liberal and left-leaning. Although neither approach has any intrinsic ontological content, rationalism and constructivism also have a distinct ideological profile, the former being more conservative than the latter. Post-positivist epistemological commitments are associated with the political left (Rathbun 2012, 607).

In this light, Brian Rathbun argues that scholars’ choice of a conceptual approach might be ‘at least partially and implicitly, most likely unconsciously’ a function of their ‘political beliefs toward certain understandings of international politics’ (Rathbun 2012, 608). The link between paradigms and ideology is stronger in the case of non-/post-positivists and is much weaker for positivists. Applying this into a specific issue – American scholars’ attitude toward the US-led war in Iraq – the TRIP
researchers find that ‘ideologically conservative scholars were far more likely than liberals or moderates to support the US invasion of Iraq’ (Long et al. 2015, 33).

If scholars do have their ‘implicit ideology,’ it is also legitimate to ask a question: what is the role of moral/ethical reasoning in the choices of scholars as they shape their research agendas? And, more central to this study, is EAIRT driven by these concerns? The answers to those questions depend on which ontological and epistemological background a scholar accrues. Accordingly, positivist scholars believe that ‘science’ is bipartisan and scientists are not influenced by their ethical and political values when they do science. They, therefore, contend that ‘their work has no implications for society and that there are no potential non-epistemic consequences of error’ (Douglas 2007, 136). On that ground, leading structural realist Kenneth Waltz used to coin a theoretically rational and politically-wise but morally controversial thesis that Iran (and with similar logic, perhaps North Korea as well) should pursue a nuclear bomb in order to preserve regional balance and stability (Waltz 2012). Post-positivists, meanwhile, insist that science is indispensably value-laden and IR theorizing should always have its normative aspects (Sober 2007). In fact, post-positivist scholars are also the most fervent advocates of bringing the sociology of science to IR. As two among these sociologists of IR observe:

the sociology of the discipline is in various ways linked to questions of the post-positivist turn in social theory, which has entered IR via the so-called third debate (Lapid 1989). That said, this debate has not only a philosophy of science dimension (i.e., the difference between explaining and understanding), but also a sociological one (Kessler and Guillaume 2012, 112; in-text quote in original).

Where the third debate between positivists and post-positivists meets the sociology of science is the call for more critical reflexivity in IR. Reflexivity, in this case, is ‘a call for the producers of social knowledge to locate their knowledge-claims in relation to the everyday understandings of particular social groups’ whose vision they seek to advance (Jackson 2010, 176). Reflexivity also means critical self-reflection by the theorists on the non-epistemic implications and potential consequences of their work on the real world (Douglas 2007, 135-6; Smith 2004; Ish-Shalom 2009). Given its normative ideals – to transform the existing social order – reflectivist IR scholarship is, more often than not, associated with ‘subordinate segments of society’ (Jackson 2010, 176). Reflectivist scholars, therefore, have focused on unveiling the social, political, and moral responsibilities toward such marginalized or dissident social
groups as women, aboriginal tribes, and refugees. Since many of the pro-EAIRT scholars also come from the reflectivist tradition of IR, EAIRT discourses may also imbue with normative concerns: representing the voices and concerns of the non-West, non-English speaking IR communities who for long suffered an inferiority complex as knowledge consumers and backward societies. This will, in their view, transform IR into a truly representative discipline. As one observer has aptly noted, ‘understanding who is marginalised, where, and through which mechanisms allows us to identify sites for potential change and transformation. This potential for transformation affects social hierarchies inside the discipline as much as it produces knowledge about the world’ (D'Aoust 2012b, 91).

Given the diversity of ontological and epistemological positions of scholars involved in the EAIRT debate, the role of moral claims in shaping theorizing need not be uniform across the different facets of EAIRT practices (Kincaid 2007, 229). As pro-EAIRT scholars are mostly non-/post-positivist scholars, there are more opportunities for ideology/political values to have a larger impact on them than those EAIRT opponents who often side with the mainstream IR camp. This explains their different interpretation of theory and the ethical concerns embedded in knowledge construction with pro-EAIRT scholars focusing more on social factors, including the morality of theory and theorists, whilst EAIRT critics are less interested in this particular dimension of IR theorizing.

Interestingly, recent research has also proved that historically there have often been moral contradictions in the transitional period of power shift and/or paradigm shift. In term of power shift, E.H. Carr points out that many people in Great Britain in the 1920s and 1930s believed that the status quo power projected moral superiority. The general point, as inferred by Robert Jervis, is extremely important: ‘states that have gained a favourable position in the international system tend to conclude that their country is uniquely wise and just and that those who are seeking to displace them are morally inferior’ (Jervis 2011, 36). Similarly, during IR paradigm shifts that occurred in the 1950s, realists believed that ‘liberals and idealists were prone to make the world

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19 It should be noted that not all EAIR-related discourses focus on these reflectivist dimensions. Much of the Chinese IR scholarship, for example, on the one hand reflects the counter-hegemonic dimensions; yet, on the other hand, presents its own hegemonic power politics. The role of marginalized or dissident social groups such as women, the Wigurs and/or the Tibetans is seldom mentioned in Chinese IR scholarship (Blanchard and Lin 2016). This will be further explained in the following empirical chapter concerning Chinese IR academia.
worse because of their mistaken belief that there were no conflicts between what was
good for the country and what was best for the world’ (Jervis 2011, 36).

It can, therefore, be argued that the current discourse on EAIRT are also shaped by
such moral concerns with American mainstream scholars dismissing de-centring
American scholarship as ‘inferior’ and ‘unscientific’ whilst claims for EAIRT, as has
been the case with the Kyoto School of philosophy in the past and some discourses
presented in the Chinese School of IR currently, often reveal both counter-hegemonic
and new hegemonic orientations i.e. to promote their own moral values (Callahan
2008). For example, Wang Fan – a professor from China Foreign Affairs University –
urged Chinese scholars in the 2013 Annual Meeting of Chinese IR community to
introduce new concepts to the world because ‘Western values are of monopolistic,
exclusive and lacking of integrity whereas Chinese values are holistic and inclusive’
(Wang, quoted in Mao 2013).

Another question is how scholarly practices have been shaped by and/or insulated
from theoretical innovation as compared to other intervening factors. An important
 corresponding argument here is that theoretical claims shape the epistemic practices of
scholars more clearly than their non-epistemic practices. As the empirical chapters of
this study will show, the EAIRT debate shapes the research practices (e.g. theoretical
discussion, publishing, organize and attend conferences, and seeking for funds and
allies) of scholars more clearly than their teaching and other social practices
(networking, policy consultancy, public presentation, etc.). This is because research
constitutes the most important and frequent practice of the intellectual life. In this
way, strengthening one’s own theoretical work and making further discussion with a
rival position should be seen as the core practical response to the claim for EAIRT.

Teaching is another important epistemic practice but the impact of EAIRT debate on
scholars’ teaching practices may be less evident than in the field of research because
in many cases it is governed by academic institutions and in the case of China,
ideology. Presumably, however, scholars may adopt changes in teaching to match
their preferred theoretical approaches wherever possible, as a scholar has noted:

These are some very real and powerful obstacles to the enactment of a more
self-reflexive pedagogy of international studies, from public stakes in ranking
and evaluative rating schemes to individual concerns with career development
and institutional concerns with departmental positions. These constraints
notwithstanding, instructors do have agency to revise reading lists, and hence
an individual ability, dare we say a social responsibility, to develop a more pluralistic IR curricula today (Hagmann and Biersteker 2014, 21).

Similarly, the degree theoretical debate can exert its impact on scholar’s outreach activities depends on how far academics are willing to move from their Ivory Tower. Often, junior scholars are not much involved in policy consultancies and/or public presentations. Distinguished scholars, meanwhile, have more chances to be invited to engage in policy advocacy and/or participate in social events (media interviews, public presentation etc). Thus, it can be argued that although scholars generally practice what they preach, the extent to which EAIRT claims shape scholars’ other practices beyond research largely depend on the level of exposure to the wider social environment in which they are working. However, it cannot be presumed that scholars only undertake EAIRT in their own research but do not pursue it in other activities.

Last but not least, the agential factor involves the vision of legitimate knowledge adopted by individual academic. Here in the EAIRT debate, we see a series of discussions about the multiple meanings of science – how science as a symbol to be aspired to (and thus as a powerful motivating goal) can be reconstructed in different social/institutional/political contexts to mean different things (indigenous modes of thought in China being valid versus the rejection of non-Western theories in the US and elsewhere). There have been heated debates about not only science versus non-science but also debates about the legitimate parameters of science. Basically, Western social sciences in recent decades have been structured around the two schools which have their roots in 19th century debates between the economists and the sociologists. The economist school of thought looks for universal laws – mostly ontologically materialist and rationalist. The historical sociology school, by contrast, asserts the appropriate unit of analysis is not the individual but the relationships between different individuals. It does not search for universal laws because individuals are self-reflexive: you cannot just think that they are atoms or monocles because they are aware of what they are doing and they will correct – and thus distort – the prediction one attempts to make. Those are the two big traditions which, Max Weber, among others, tried to bring together. As Peter Katzenstein observes, the basic contours of contemporary social science have been defined and articulated in the 19th and early 20th century by the likes of Marx, Durkheim, Freud, and Weber (Interview, October 2013).
From that understanding of social science, there has been skepticism that EAIRT scholarship is neither theoretically innovative nor methodologically different from Western IR theorizing. As a colleague of Amitav Acharya at American University argues, ‘to be genuinely non-Western, we need ways of generating theory that are not prone to King, Keohane, and Verba type of generating theory’ (quoted in Acharya 2011b, 633). Acharya goes on to suggest that ‘what is, then, important is not just the content of IR, but the ways of doing IR. Part of the answer lies in broadening our conception of what the philosophy of science behind IR actually means’ (Acharya 2011b, 633). Understandably, if viewed from a typical American philosophy of science vantage point, value-laden EAIRT, particularly the proposed ‘Chinese School’, is at best ‘pseudo-science’ given its ideological orientation and unverifiable claims (similar to Karl Popper’s critique toward Marxism). Objectivity remains the key principle of science but the presence of values in knowledge construction would mean rejection of objectivity and universalism of knowledge for the sake of someone’s individual interests (Betz 2013). Therefore, apart from cognitive value (worth, merit), to ensure the neutrality of science, non-cognitive value (personal, moral, social, aesthetic, etc.) should play no role in developing theories (Lacey 2005, 16).

Much of the current EAIRT scholarship, however, actually embodies non-/post-positivist conception of IR theorizing. Patrick Thaddeus Jackson (2010) and other sociologists of IR have made a powerful case for pluralism of what constitutes legitimate ‘science’ and ‘knowledge construction.’ As they argue, theorizing is a social activity that certainly incorporates values in the course of establishing knowledge. Theories should also be less strictly defined in term of positivism, particularly claims for objectivity and universalism of knowledge. In this light, acknowledging value-laden science/knowledge in the case of EAIRT or elsewhere does not mean to ‘dismiss non-Western experiences and voices as the “stuff of area studies” or as “unscientific”’ (Acharya 2011b, 633). Similarly, as a notable Japanese scholar has noted:

It seems to be already a biased view to see scientific approach as non-biased. It may be true when we are looking at natural science, but human world is full of irregularity which often refuses the straightforward application of natural scientific methods. In such situation we cannot ultimately prove the very neutrality of the approach itself, and to me, it may be a better option to locate the science as a part of what makes human intellectual. Closer to IR, if the rise of national schools from non-Western world could be criticized because of the lack of science, I think this criticism would become self-defeating. Thus as the
calls for Chinese or Japanese School are not scientific, neither claims of American Social Science or the English School are (Josuke Ikeda, Interview, February 2014).

In short, as this section has attempted to demonstrate, knowledge construction, be it in the East or West, is not a ‘value-free’ but socially constructed activity. Yet, the inevitable presence and acceptance of values in IR theorizing does not mean that knowledge inevitably loses objectivity. This is because even value-laden scholarship is subject to evaluation and criticism during which it can be further improved or rejected. Therefore, to paraphrase Heather Douglas’ observation on the merits of value-laden knowledge: by understanding EAIRT as value-laden, we can better understand the nature of theoretical controversy in many cases and even help speed resolution of those controversies (Douglas 2007, 120).

**The interplay of structural and agential causes in shaping the responses to EAIRT**

The above section has identified the key structural and agential factors that shape the claims and practices about EAIRT. This final part will further discuss the covariation of structure and agency in determining outcomes. As will be shown in the subsequent case studies, there are some noticeable changes in the practices of scholars in China, Japan, and even the US, in response to the call for EAIRT. Shifting practices are most clearly found among those EAIRT proponents while there are few changes being witnessed from EAIRT critics and observers. This is understandable because the burden of theoretical innovation is often shouldered on those who want to make the change whilst, for those who enjoys the status quo, it is largely business as usual. Another finding is that the degree and type of changes vary across the three national IR communities under study. In the case of Chinese IR academia, the biggest area of changes is in their vibrant theory-led debate and resource mobilization for the construction of a Chinese style IR theory to match its material rise. The EAIRT discourse in Japan, given the country’s historical legacy and structural constraints, is geared toward the ‘post-Western IR’ direction rather than a challenging agenda like the ‘Chinese School.’ Meanwhile in the US, the call for EAIRT debate only garners an interest among a small portion of East Asia specialists while the majority of mainstream American scholars are largely indifferent to such call for EAIRT.

This thesis argues that such diverse response to EAIRT is attributable to the uneven impact of structural and agential factors on the practices of claims. Accordingly,
structure and agency often intersect, and their interplay shapes the degree and form of response to EAIRT. Structurally, the three national IR communities under this study are undergoing a similar context that is power shift to the East; yet they are dissimilar in many other socio-political aspects including ideology, the form of state, political concerns, the historical development of IR discipline, and academic institution. As will be analysed in Chapter 3, it is in China that the influence of power shift and structural causes on the practices of claims is most evident as seen through their effort to construct a Chinese style IR theory to match the country’s material rise and its government’s policy practices. The impact of power shift on the Japanese and the US IR communities, however, is less evident. In agential terms, scholars involved in the EAIRT debate also have different background regarding their training, vision of science, and moral choice. Therefore, while all scholars are presumably affected by structural factors, it is a scholar’s own interpretation of the geo-political, social, and institutional environment in which they are living that shapes one’s choice of reaction to structural pressure. In other words, the various types of claims and practices adopted by scholars involved in the EAIRT debate are the outcome of the interplay between those structural and agential causes.

In this light, it is argued here that in their covariation, structure plays the intervening role and agency the determining role. That is to say, agency is the most direct factor shaping academic practices. Although structural factors do exert their influence on academic practices, and in some case an unyielding impact such as in the case of Chinese IR academia, ultimately it is the agency that decides whether, and if yes, how to respond to EAIRT. As will be shown in the empirical chapters, many scholars in the US, less in Japan, and even some in China have not changed their practices to match with structural changes. The interplay of structural consideration and agential choice, therefore, explains why there are diverse responses to EAIRT among individual scholars as well as across national IR communities.

**Conclusion**

Recently, the sociology of science has garnered growing interest from scholars studying the development of national IR beyond the US or the West. According to this approach, ‘any academic discipline by its very nature consists of a complex of social relationships, relationships not ancillary to or separable from the knowledge which it contains and produces, but rather constitutively intertwined with – and embedded in –
that knowledge’ (McMillan 2012, 134). Applying this to IR, scholars have attempted to investigate the social conditions of IR theorizing – how IR knowledge is produced and explained by the organisation of its (internal/external) social setting and infrastructure across different geographical contexts. At the micro level – the everyday practices of academics, the sociology of science argues that knowledge construction is a social activity in which the theorists inevitably absorb social, ethical, and political values. At the macro level – disciplinary sociology, the sociology of science suggests that IR has been practiced differently in different national contexts because of the dissimilarities in their socio-political concerns, form of state, ideology, and academic institutions, etc. In other words, the sociology of science ‘examines the social mechanisms at play in the social universe of researchers – internally in each community as coordination, control, and contestation, between fields in processes of delineating disciplines and superseding them interdisciplinarily, and vis-a`-vis the external world of economic and political interests’ (Wæver and Tickner 2009, 11; emphasis in original).

Drawing on the sociology of science model developed by Ole Wæver and other ‘disciplinary practices’ scholars, a multi-layered analytical framework has been constructed here to analyse the causal relationship between the claims and practices that surround EAIRT. Based on these innovations, this study argues that EAIRT claims and practices are socially constructed by both structural and agential causes. While this chapter has identified the different roles played by these structural and agential factors in the shaping of knowledge production, EAIRT included, it argues that structure and agency often intersect and the interplay between them is crucial in determining outcome. This analytical model will be hereafter applied in the three national contexts – China, Japan, and the US – where the EAIRT claims and practices have taken different shapes due to the unequal impact of and indeed the interplay of structural and agential factors.
Chapter 3: China’s Rise and the ‘Chinese Dream’ in International Relations Theory

The most obvious candidate for an independent IR tradition based on a unique philosophical tradition is China, though very little independent theorizing has taken place (Waever 1998, 696).

Many years after Marx’s picture was moved from Tiananmen Square, the statue of Confucius was set up there (Yan 2011b).

Although the debate over East Asian IR Theory has intensified across the region, it is in China that the discourse exposes its most vibrant dynamics. This is most evident in but not restricted to the controversial ‘IR Theory with Chinese characteristics’ or more recently the ‘Chinese School of IR’ project. In the latest development, some staunch ‘Chinese School’ proponents have gone as far as promulgating a ‘Chinese dream’ in IR Theory whereby the emerging Chinese IR paradigm would overcome the existing pitfalls of Western IRT and eventually replace it as the dominant School of IR Theory (Wang and Han 2013). Efforts to theorize from the Chinese perspective, however, also create a backlash among not only Western but also East Asian and even other Chinese scholars who are concerned about the nationalistic if not hegemonic nature of the Chinese IR scholarship. These two contending visions have formed one of the most heated debates within and beyond the Chinese IR community about the necessity, possibility, and substance of a Chinese style IRT.

While the existing literature has shed much light on the various dimensions of the Chinese IRT debate per se (Chan 1999; Ren 2008; Song 2001; Qin 2009a; Wang 2009; Zhang 2012b); there has been little discussion about how this debate actually shapes the practices of involved academics. Specifically, are there actual changes in research agendas to match various theoretical claims or are they merely ‘hollow slogans’ to fill up Chinese academic journals? This chapter explores the activities of Chinese scholars in bringing their theoretical claims to life. It finds that Chinese scholars have made some noticeable changes in practice to match the claims they put forward in the debate. In particular, the research shows that the biggest area of change in China is in the vibrant theory-led debate and resource mobilization to make way for the construction of a Chinese style IRT. Another finding is that the EAIRT debate has

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20 Part of this chapter has been published in Global Change, Peace & Security Journal (Do 2015).
21 I thank Professor Wang Yiwei for providing me the English version of this article for reference.
been exerting an impact on Chinese scholars in different ways and to different extents as manifested in the four key movements toward theoretical innovation. These include the ‘Chinese School of IR’ movement, the ‘Tsinghua approach to IR’, the Beida-led ambition to build a theory of foreign affairs, and the Universalists’ orientation toward integration with Western IR. Many of these theoretical endeavors are narrowly focused, working mainly on developing a Chinese perspective on IR while there are also some scholars aiming to develop universal knowledge.

This leads to another thought-provoking question: what actually drives those who adhere to a ‘Chinese School’ outlook on IR? Is this because of a genuine commitment to theory by Chinese scholars or is it due to other causes? Much of the literature on Chinese IRT debate takes either a history or philosophy of science framework, explaining the drive toward theoretical innovation in China through the lens of China’s geopolitical rise and/or the nature of its authoritarian politics (Snyder 2008; Lu 2012; Cunningham-Cross 2012; Callahan 2001; Acharya 2013a). This top-down approach, however, has difficulty explaining why theorizing takes various forms in China. Recently, Peter Kristensen and Ras Nielsen have attempted to decode the Chinese IRT debate from a bottom-up perspective – to ‘open the black box’ of IR theorizing. Drawing on Randall Collins’ sociological theory of intellectual change (particularly his ‘law of small numbers’ thesis), these scholars argue that it is opposition and debate rather than agreement and consensus that drives Chinese IR theorizing. In this light, the Chinese IRT debate should be seen as moves by small numbers of Chinese scholars seeking attention and prominence rather than looking at the issues in terms of power transition and counter-hegemony (Kristensen and Nielsen 2013, 19-20). While this approach is helpful in uncovering some of the inner logic that has shaped the Chinese IRT debate, it still leaves an analytical puzzle: ‘69% [of Chinese IR academics] agree or agree very much that building a Chinese IR theory or IR school is an important task – only 18% disagree or disagree very much’ (Kristensen and Nielsen 2013, 24). How can we explain this large consensus and more importantly, are there real changes adopted by Chinese scholars in practice to match such determination?

The aforementioned ‘how’ and ‘what’ questions of the Chinese IRT debate, I argue, would be better explained under the sociology of science framework discussed in the previous chapter. Accordingly, EAIRT claims and practices are the outcome of the
interplay of both structural and agential causes. Applying this to Chinese IR, the Chinese IRT debates and practices can be interpreted as being shaped not only by the theoretical identity of scholars but also by their engagement with the broader intellectual, political, and social environment unfolding in China. This chapter finds that it is in China that the impact of structural factors on academic practices is most evident. The rise of China, in particular, has precipitated a redefinition of its national identity which in turn reshapes Chinese scholars’ personal identity into ‘knowledge producers.’ In this light, the turn toward Chinese IRT is a result of an endeavour by Chinese scholars to redefine their national as well as their own identity.

To ascertain why this is the case, my analysis proceeds in four steps. First, I briefly reconstruct the historical development of IR studies in China to reveal the background in which the current ‘Chinese IR Theory’ movement is placed. Second, I discuss the various theoretical claims put forward in the Chinese IRT debate and how they shape the changing practices of Chinese IR scholarship. Third, I investigate the underlying factors that actually drive those changes under the sociology of knowledge framework. Lastly, I conclude by arguing that while there are certain internal motivations for establishing Chinese IR knowledge, social factors, ranging from China’s rise, national interests, ethnic nationalism, and cultural exceptionalism, have intruded in and undermined Chinese scholars’ commitment to universally applicable theory. The primary response to EAIRT in China, therefore, is the vibrant theory-led debate among various camps within Chinese IR academia and their respective resource mobilization to make way for the construction of a Chinese style IR Theory.

The development of IR as an academic discipline in China

Although there was research in and teaching of IR in China prior to the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, most relevant and ongoing accounts are in general agreement that IR became a distinct ‘field of study’ in that country during the 1960s. This was when the first IR-related departments were established at Peking (Beida), Renmin (Renda) and Fudan Universities. IR, however, was not

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22 Lu Peng argues that IR studies existed in China during the late 1920s and early 1930s. But the period under Kuomintang rule has been ignored for political purpose, primarily due to the political intervention of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since the early 1950s (Lu 2013).

23 These three IR departments were established initially to serve the government’s need to study the world and to conduct independent research against the political background of its deteriorating ties with the Soviet Union. They were intended to specialize in different areas of teaching and research with the Beijing University department focusing on Third World movements; Renmin on the international
recognized as an independent academic discipline in China before the 1980s given the PRC’s commitment to Marxist assertions that segregated the Chinese discourse from non-Marxist theories (Geeraerts and Jing 2001, 254; Shambaugh 2011, 341). As a result of this problem, together with the fact that China on the whole was isolated from the world (a reality particularly in evidence during the disastrous Cultural Revolution that interrupted the whole Chinese social sciences from 1966 to 1976), Chinese scholars missed the opportunity to participate in the first and the second ‘great debates’ of Western IR (Interview with Ni Shixiong, Shanghai, August 2013).

The comprehensive domestic reform and opening up to the outside world initiated by a politically resurgent Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s breathed a new life into China’s IR studies. After his return to power, Deng urged Chinese academia to ‘buke’ (make up the missed lessons) and ‘catch-up as soon as possible’ in the fields that had suffered from the loss during the Cultural Revolution such as political science, law, sociology, and world politics (Geeraerts and Jing 2001, 254; Wang 2002a, 72). In May 1977, a separate Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) was established as part of the government’s effort to modernize science and technology (social sciences included). IR studies resumed at leading universities (Peking, Renmin, and Fudan Universities, and then the Foreign Affairs College) and later at IR research institutes initially to serve the purpose of assisting the government’s formulation of foreign policy (Shambaugh 2011, 342). To meet the rapidly increasingly demand for developing IR as a separate discipline, particularly China’s opening to the outside world and establishment of diplomatic relations with foreign countries, the National Association of History of International Relations was set up in 1980 as the first nationwide academic body in the field.24 Western thought started to be imported initially to assist the government’s foreign relations with Western counterparts in the period of Sino-West rapprochement.25

The Tiananmen Incident in June 1989, however, precipitated another setback to most social science disciplines in China. Restraints on sensitive research topics in the fields

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24 The Institution later changed its name to China National Association for International Studies in 1990 (Qin 2009a, 186).
25 A review of China’s IR studies by Wang Jisi states that classical realism and neo-realism were first imported to China, followed by other American and non-American theories such as the English school, dependency theory, constructivism, and neo-liberal institutionalism (Wang 2001, 11).
of political science, sociology, and journalism were applied because of the government’s fear of ‘ideological liberalism’ within the Chinese intellectual circles as the result of the so-called ‘peaceful evolution’ (heping yanbian) campaign initiated by the West to erode the communist rule (Song 2001, 62). However, the IR discipline was less affected because Chinese leaders were more concerned about the risk of China being isolated from the outside world than being ‘peacefully undermined’ from within (Song and Chan 2000, 16). As a result, Western IR theoretical work continued to be translated and exchange programs between Chinese IR institutions and their Western partners were expanded under the co-sponsorship of Chinese Government and American grants such as the Ford Foundation (Song and Chan 2000, 16). With China’s political reform geared toward liberalisation and market economy back on track in 1992, some conceptual restrictions on ideological and political topics imposed since Tiananmen began to be lifted. The following period witnessed the diversification of research agendas and especially the waning influence of Marxist thought (Shambaugh 2011, 344-51).

In this opening-up period, Chinese scholars began to get involved and contribute more to the global field of IR. According to Professor Ni Shixiong – one of the pioneers in introducing Western IR theories in China, Western IR had a big impact on Chinese academic community starting from the ‘third debate’ in the 1980s (Interview, Shanghai, 12 August 2013).26 Chinese scholars actively participated in these discussions and there were many exchange programs in teaching and research between Chinese and Western scholars during this period. Notably, American funding sources (e.g. the Ford, Rockefeller, Asia, and MacArthur foundations) played an important role in the promotion of IR studies in China and this ensured the domination of American knowledge in Chinese IR discourse during this period. American foundations supported activities such as translating Western IR textbooks, sending Chinese scholars overseas for higher education training, bringing Western scholars to China, and organizing conferences on IR research. Within a decade (1990s-2000s), the Ford Foundation invited three distinguished Chinese and American scholars to conduct in-depth research about the development of IR studies in China and make suggestions for its further engagement with Chinese IR (Wang 2001; Johnston 2003;

26 One of the examples of the impact of the third debate on Chinese IR is that Alexander Wendt’s ‘Social Theory of International Politics’ volume was immediately translated by Qin Yaqing. It was published in 2000 - only one year after the English version.
Shambaugh 2011). As a result of intensive exposure to Western IR, by early 2000s almost all major Western IR theories were imported to China. Leading Chinese scholars started to self-designate their work or were schooled in IR theory; for example, Qin Yaqing as a ‘Wendtian constructivist’, Yan Xuetong as a ‘Waltzian realist’, Wang Yizhou as a ‘globalist’, and Shi Yinhong as an ‘English School proponent’ (Zhang 2002, 104-5; Kristensen and Nielsen 2013, 22).

To date, IR has become an increasingly established field of study in China. In fact, the country is witnessing some of the fastest developments in the global field of IR. As of 2010 there was 46 degree-conferring institutions nationwide, and Chinese IR research and institutions equalled those of the US in size (Shambaugh 2011, 352). The quality of Chinese IR scholarship, however, remains questionable as many scholars do not have solid IR backgrounds and rarely publish in the field’s recognized peer-reviewed disciplinary journals. Nevertheless, the professionalization of the discipline in China has produced some outstanding scholars whose voices are well-respected domestically and internationally. As China’s IR community matures, it is increasingly concerned about the risk of over-dependence on Western knowledge. As a result, some Chinese scholars began to define their own research agenda and to call for developing a distinctive Chinese IR theory. Since the early 2000s, many Chinese scholars have continued to learn from Western IR, yet at the same time they started looking at China’s own history and practice of international relations for inspiration – in the words of Prof. Ni Shixiong, a so-called ‘walking on two legs’ phenomenon (Interview, Shanghai, August 2013).

Regarding the current state of the discipline in China, leading IR scholar Wang Yizhou has advanced an interesting observation. Wang believes that the IR discipline in China at present is ‘booming’ in quantitative terms (e.g. number of students, degree conferring institutions, and individual and collaborative research projects with foreign colleagues). Yet ‘there is a really deep sense of crisis in that we are losing direction for further development, and that scholars [are] seemingly lost [in establishing]

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27 A comprehensive study of contemporary IR studies in China lists the following Western theories that have been imported and intensively studied in China over time: Marxism, Realism, Liberalism (International Regime), Constructivism, English school, Feminism, Globalism, Regionalism etc (Wang 2006a).

28 These following Chinese IR scholars are listed as intellectuals who have affected the development of contemporary China: Yan Xuetong, Wang Yizhou, Shi Yinhong, and Wang Jisi (Hao 2003, 288). In 2008, the American journal Foreign Policy named Yan Xuetong as one of world’s top 100 public intellectuals.
common language for communication and the inner energy and emotion for debate’ (Interview, Beijing, 6 September 2013). The fundamental problem lies in the risk of getting lost in a period of growing plurality and diversity in Chinese IR. Wang has observed:

> The situation is like we are going from a poor land to a deep forest. In the poor land you see nothing but if you go deeper and deeper into the forest you see many trees, but there is no light and no right way (North or South, East or West) to go. People just talk about themselves with little interest in what others are thinking and talking about. Many people just want to pursue areas or issue-specific studies rather than doing theoretical research (Interview, Beijing, September 2013).

Notwithstanding this situation, Wang observes that there are some ‘deep-minded scholars’ who do serious theoretical work. They have generated a number of theoretical attempts that may drive the future development of IR studies in China. These characteristics of disciplinary evolution in China and the ongoing generational change in Chinese IR academia form the background for a vibrant debate about the future trajectory of Chinese IR to be discussed in the subsequent section. Understanding these underlying trends is important given that theory development is seldom separated from the socio-political and institutional context in which academics operate.

**Debating ‘Chinese’ IR Theory: theoretical claims and actual practices**

Although serious IR theoretical research in China only began in the late 1970s, it was as early as in 1982 that Chinese scholars started mentioning the need for China to have an IR theory of its own. This perceived desire was formally embraced by several scholars in a Chinese journal article in 1986 (Wang, Lin, and Zhao 1986). Since then, there have been a number of movements to map out a desirable Chinese contribution to IR Theory. These include the ‘IR theory with Chinese characteristics’ (juyou Zhongguo tese de guoji guanxi lilun), the ‘indigenization’ (bentuhua) and ‘Sinicization’ (Zhongguo hua) of IRT approaches in the 1980s and 1990s. More recently, they incorporate the ‘Chinese perspective’ (Zhongguo shijiao), the ‘Chinese

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29 Li Huichuan – the then Director of China Institute of International Studies – first talked about a Chinese IR theory in a welcome speech given to the visiting graduates of Peking University in 1982 (quoted in Lu 2012, 164).
School of IR theory’ (Zhongguo xuepai), the ‘Chinese IR theory’ (Zhongguo guoji guanxi lilun), and the ‘Tsinghua approach’ to IR.  

The various drives toward theoretical innovation in China are manifested in Table 3.1. A number of prominent Chinese scholars are involved in the Chinese IRT debate and represent contrasting positions. Qin Yaqing and Yan Xuetong are known as the key proponent and critic, respectively, of the ‘Chinese School’ project. Qin has won the support of many scholars while Yan’s ‘Tsinghua approach’ is followed mostly by his colleagues and former PhD students at Tsinghua University. Wang Yizhou, Wang Jisi, and Ni Shixiong, are proponents of a Chinese perspective on IR – albeit in different ways. Shi Yinhong and Zhang Xiaoming are among proponents of the English School in China, calling for greater awareness of history in Chinese IR research. The ‘universalist’ camp, represented by Tang Shiping and Zhang Ruizhuang, strives toward integrating further with Western IR and its theoretical orientations.

This study finds that four conceptual schools of thought among these various positions have shaped into noticeable theoretical movements with actual practices. These include: the ‘Chinese School of IR’ project; the ‘Tsinghua approach’ to IR; the Beida-led ambition to shape a foreign affairs theory; and the Western camp’s movement toward deeper integration with Western IR. Each of these approaches focuses on a particular aspect of IR theorizing: some are more preoccupied with introducing a ‘Chinese brand name’ in IRT, others are concerned about producing policy-relevant knowledge to guide Chinese foreign policy, and only a few scholars are interested in developing universal knowledge. Before the emergence of these movements, there was a precursor approach called ‘IR theory with Chinese characteristics’ which, despite its lack of actual practices and loss of popularity recently, still has some lingering influence in Chinese IR academia, arguably through the revision of ‘Tianxia’ philosophy by Zhao Tingyang. It is necessary to discuss this old approach as Chinese scholars have somewhat learned from its flaws and weaknesses to develop more credible theoretical perspectives.

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30 For the purpose of convenience, these academic movements are hereafter referred to collectively as the ‘Chinese IR Theory’ debate.

31 Some scholars have identified Shi Yinhong as an ‘English school’ proponent (Zhang 2002, 104-5; Kristensen and Nielsen 2013, 22). I found this observation largely true during my interview with him in Beijing in September 2013. Throughout the interview, Shi explained how his educational background in history shapes his perspective on IR. He also criticized the current Chinese IR theoretical debates for neglecting historical dimensions as well as Yan Xuetong’s realism as ‘being too simple and reductionist.’
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Movement</th>
<th>Scholar</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Position in the debate</th>
<th>Key claims</th>
<th>Changes in practice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **The ‘Chinese School of IR’ project**       | Qin Yaqing | China Foreign Affairs University (CFAU) | University of Missouri (PhD) | Representative of the ‘Chinese School’ project             | - A ‘Chinese School of IR’ is not only necessary but also possible and even inevitable.  
- Chinese IR theory can be built upon the richness of Chinese philosophy and tradition.  
- The perceived Chinese IR theory can be universally applicable (Qin Yaqing) and/or integrate other approaches within it (Wang Yiwei). | - Qin Yaqing’s development of a relationality theory.  
- Wang Yiwei’s research on the ‘Chinese Dream’ of IR Theory.  
- Translation of selected texts (Qin).  
- Resource mobilization and collaboration with foreign scholars (e.g. English School scholars) for developing Chinese School.  
- Some changes in teaching practices.  
- Policy consultancy for the Chinese government and involvement in East Asian Track Two Diplomacy (Qin Yaqing and Wang Fan). |
|                                              | Ren Xiao | Fudan University                  | Fudan U (PhD)       | Proponents of the ‘Chinese School’                         | - Qin Yaqing’s development of a relationality theory.  
- Wang Yiwei’s research on the ‘Chinese Dream’ of IR Theory.  
- Translation of selected texts (Qin).  
- Resource mobilization and collaboration with foreign scholars (e.g. English School scholars) for developing Chinese School.  
- Some changes in teaching practices.  
- Policy consultancy for the Chinese government and involvement in East Asian Track Two Diplomacy (Qin Yaqing and Wang Fan). | |
|                                              | Wang Yiwei | Renmin University                | Fudan U (PhD)       |                                                             | - Qin Yaqing’s development of a relationality theory.  
- Wang Yiwei’s research on the ‘Chinese Dream’ of IR Theory.  
- Translation of selected texts (Qin).  
- Resource mobilization and collaboration with foreign scholars (e.g. English School scholars) for developing Chinese School.  
- Some changes in teaching practices.  
- Policy consultancy for the Chinese government and involvement in East Asian Track Two Diplomacy (Qin Yaqing and Wang Fan). | |
|                                              | Wang Fan | CFAU                             | CFAU (PhD)          |                                                             | - Qin Yaqing’s development of a relationality theory.  
- Wang Yiwei’s research on the ‘Chinese Dream’ of IR Theory.  
- Translation of selected texts (Qin).  
- Resource mobilization and collaboration with foreign scholars (e.g. English School scholars) for developing Chinese School.  
- Some changes in teaching practices.  
- Policy consultancy for the Chinese government and involvement in East Asian Track Two Diplomacy (Qin Yaqing and Wang Fan). | |
|                                              | Su Changhe | Fudan University                | Fudan U (PhD)       |                                                             | - Qin Yaqing’s development of a relationality theory.  
- Wang Yiwei’s research on the ‘Chinese Dream’ of IR Theory.  
- Translation of selected texts (Qin).  
- Resource mobilization and collaboration with foreign scholars (e.g. English School scholars) for developing Chinese School.  
- Some changes in teaching practices.  
- Policy consultancy for the Chinese government and involvement in East Asian Track Two Diplomacy (Qin Yaqing and Wang Fan). | |
|                                              | Pang Zhongying | Renmin University                | PKU (PhD)          |                                                             | - Qin Yaqing’s development of a relationality theory.  
- Wang Yiwei’s research on the ‘Chinese Dream’ of IR Theory.  
- Translation of selected texts (Qin).  
- Resource mobilization and collaboration with foreign scholars (e.g. English School scholars) for developing Chinese School.  
- Some changes in teaching practices.  
- Policy consultancy for the Chinese government and involvement in East Asian Track Two Diplomacy (Qin Yaqing and Wang Fan). | |
| **The ‘Tsinghua approach’ to IR**            | Yan Xuetong | Tsinghua University             | UC Berkeley (PhD)   | Representative of ‘Tsinghua approach’                      | - The ‘Chinese School’ is not possible and desirable given its narrow focus and the diversity of Chinese thought.  
- IR Theory should be universally applicable.  
- Chinese traditions can be used to enrich IR theory and provide a blueprint for Chinese foreign policy. | - Yan Xuetong’s research team on ancient Chinese thought and ‘moral realism.’  
- Policy relevant and quantitative research.  
- Research on East Asian ancient tributary system and current order.  
- Teaching quantitative research methods.  
- Employing quantitative methods in research (e.g. measuring Chinese soft power).  
- Fundraising, CJJP Journal’s editorship, networking. |
|                                              | Sun Xuefeng | Tsinghua U                       | Tsinghua U (PhD)    |                                                             | - The ‘Chinese School’ is not possible and desirable given its narrow focus and the diversity of Chinese thought.  
- IR Theory should be universally applicable.  
- Chinese traditions can be used to enrich IR theory and provide a blueprint for Chinese foreign policy. | |
|                                              | Zhou Fangyin | CASS                             | Tsinghua U (PhD)    | Former PhD students of Prof. Yan; followers of the ‘Tsinghua approach’ | - The ‘Chinese School’ is not possible and desirable given its narrow focus and the diversity of Chinese thought.  
- IR Theory should be universally applicable.  
- Chinese traditions can be used to enrich IR theory and provide a blueprint for Chinese foreign policy. | |
|                                              | Xu Jin     | CASS                             | Tsinghua U (PhD)    |                                                             | - The ‘Chinese School’ is not possible and desirable given its narrow focus and the diversity of Chinese thought.  
- IR Theory should be universally applicable.  
- Chinese traditions can be used to enrich IR theory and provide a blueprint for Chinese foreign policy. | |
| **The Beida-led movement toward shaping a theory of** | Zhang Chuanjie | Tsinghua Univeristy             | Yale University     | Advocate for a Chinese theory of foreign affairs           | - Not much interest in ‘Chinese School’ because time is not ripe enough.  
- Diversity in theoretical perspectives of scholars.  
- Wang Yizhou’s work on ‘creative involvement.’ |
|                                              | Wang Yizhou | PKU                             | CASS (PhD)          | Advocate for theorizing a China’s ‘grand                    | - Not much interest in ‘Chinese School’ because time is not ripe enough.  
- Diversity in theoretical perspectives of scholars.  
- Wang Yizhou’s work on ‘creative involvement.’ |
|                                              | Wang Jisi  | PKU                             | PKU (MA)            |                                                             | - Not much interest in ‘Chinese School’ because time is not ripe enough.  
- Diversity in theoretical perspectives of scholars.  
- Wang Yizhou’s work on ‘creative involvement.’ |
The Universalist orientation & critics of Chinese IRT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>University/Institution</th>
<th>Education/Qualification</th>
<th>Position and Contributions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Xiaoming</td>
<td>PKU</td>
<td>PKU (PhD)</td>
<td>Proponent of a Chinese theory of foreign affairs is necessary e.g. to guide Chinese foreign policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jia Qingguo</td>
<td>PKU</td>
<td>Cornell University (PhD)</td>
<td>- Research on the South China Sea disputes (Zhu Feng heads an entire institute at Nanjing University dedicated to this question).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhu Feng</td>
<td>PKU &amp; Nanjing U</td>
<td>PKU (PhD)</td>
<td>- Policy consultancy for the government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Dong</td>
<td>PKU</td>
<td>UC Los Angeles (PhD)</td>
<td>- Blended teaching of both Chinese and Western IRT approaches.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Zhizhou</td>
<td>Beijing Foreign Studies University</td>
<td>PKU (PhD)</td>
<td>- Summer school course on China’s rise and its impact on i.r and IR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tang Shiping</td>
<td>Fudan University</td>
<td>UC Berkeley (MA); Wayne State Uni. (PhD - Biology)</td>
<td>Representative of universalist camp, critic of a Chinese-style IR theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Ruizhuang</td>
<td>Nankai University</td>
<td>UC Berkeley (PhD)</td>
<td>- A 'Chinese IR theory' is undesirable given its ideological orientation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Song Xinning</td>
<td>Renmin University</td>
<td>Renmin University (PhD)</td>
<td>- Universalism should be the end point of IR Theory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shi Yinhong</td>
<td>Renmin University</td>
<td>Nanjing University (PhD)</td>
<td>- Chinese cases can be used to enrich IRT.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>- Integration with Western IRT, produce qualified knowledge in Western standard.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>- There should be a greater awareness of history in Chinese IR theorizing.</td>
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Table 3.1: The key movements toward theoretical innovation in China

32 There have been some academic movements in the Beida camp recently. Accordingly, Zhu Feng moved to Nanjing University to head the China Center for Collaborative Studies of the South China Sea in 2014 and Jia Qingguo became the Dean of the School of International Studies (SIS) in replace for Wang Jisi who is now the President of Beida’s Institute of International and Strategic Studies.

33 There are, of course, many other Chinese scholars who are involved in this debate. Given the limited scope of a case study chapter, however, I have focused on the most influential ones in each movement. Their position in the debate is identified based on existing literature as well as personal interviews conducted during my fieldwork in China during August and September 2013.
Setting the scene: from ‘IR Theory with Chinese characteristics’ to ‘world philosophy with Chinese characteristics’ (Tianxia tixi)

The Chinese IRT debate began with the ‘IR theory with Chinese characteristics’ movement. The term was initially introduced at the first national conference on IR theory in Shanghai in 1987. From the very beginning, this idea was largely seen as a transplant of the ‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics’ political slogan coined by Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping. The initiative was strongly promoted by Liang Shoude (the then Dean of the International Politics Department at Peking University) and was followed by other senior scholars. Some proponents of the idea argued that ‘IR Theory with Chinese characteristics’ should focus on developing Marxist theory while others instead argued for assimilating Chinese culture and traditional diplomatic theory and practice (Wang 2009, 109; Song 2001, 67-8; Ren 2008, 294). The question of what constitutes ‘Chinese characteristics’ and how such a theory should be constructed, however, was poorly addressed. This resulted in scepticism if not opposition to the idea by younger scholars who believed that theories should be scientific, universal, and generally acknowledged. Critics of this ‘Chinese characteristics’ project posit that it is highly questionable whether Chinese scholars, so obsessed with ‘Chinese characteristics’, can build a theory that has ‘transnational appeal’ (Shambaugh 2011, 366). In fact, there were no remarkable theorizing efforts to match these claims. Professor Song Xinning (2001) from Renmin University hence dismissed this movement as highly ideology-driven and concluded that such a pursuit constituted nothing more than a political project.

Given such strong scepticism on the academic value of ‘IR Theory with Chinese characteristics’, it has not been in the spotlight of Chinese academia since the early 2000s. It has been replaced by the current dominant narrative of a ‘Chinese School of IR theory’. Nevertheless, ‘Chinese characteristics’ remains a popular term in Chinese IR discourse, particularly from institutions close to the CCP line. There are continuing efforts by Chinese scholars to conceptualize terms like ‘power’, ‘soft power’, ‘geopolitics’, ‘grand strategy’ (and so on) with ‘Chinese characteristics’. The common ground of these writings is to introduce China’s unique way of understanding

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34 A search in Chinese Online Academic Journal system (http://cnki.net/) with the keywords ‘Chinese School’ and ‘IR theory’ shows 70 articles discussing the various aspects of a possible ‘Chinese School of IR theory’ during the time between 2000 to 2013.
international politics. Arguably, the most notable work in this respect is Zhao Tingyang’s recent attempts to provide a ‘world philosophy with Chinese characteristics’ by revising the concept of ‘Tianxia’ (all-under-heaven).

Zhao Tingyang is a political philosopher at the Institute of Philosophy of Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS). As China’s largest think-tank, CASS is believed to be a ‘heavily politicized and doctrinal Marxist institution’ (Shambaugh 2011, 359) which represents the classical and conservative component of Chinese IR (jingdian pai). In 2005, Zhao published his first book on the ‘Tianxia system’ and it quickly became popular in China and abroad. In the introduction, titled ‘Why is it necessary to discuss China's worldview?’, Zhao posits that the problem facing the rise to great power status of the modern Chinese nation is not merely that China has not yet truly become an ‘economic power’ but also that it is not a ‘knowledge producing power.’ If it cannot become a ‘knowledge producer’ then no matter how great its economic and material power is, China remains a ‘small state’ (Zhao 2005, 1-2).

Zhao (2005, 2) argues that the most important background for the emergence of Chinese thought is that China’s problems today have become the world’s problems. China's problems, however, cannot be explained by Western theories because they paint a wrong picture of China, such as the ‘China threat’ or ‘China's rise’ theses. Western thought, Zhao (2005, 10) notes, ‘can explain conflicts but only Chinese thought can fully explain harmony’ because hidden in Chinese traditional thought is a completely different system of worldview, values, and methodology. Therefore, China can act as a ‘responsible power’ and contribute to international scholarship by providing alternative and indeed better theoretical solutions to China and the world’s problems. In so doing, Zhao suggests Chinese scholars should ‘rethink China’ in order to eventually ‘reconstruct China.’ Therefore, China can act as a ‘responsible power’ and contribute to international scholarship by providing alternative and indeed better theoretical solutions to the world's problems. ‘Rethinking China’ has three components. These are, to make Chinese knowledge an important foundation of international scholarship; to renew Chinese thought by developing China-related thought into world-related thought; and to ultimately ‘rethink the world’ (Zhao 2005, 11). Zhao finds such a material for Chinese theory building in the ancient Chinese concept of ‘all-under-heaven’ system which dates back 3000 years ago under the Zhou Dynasty (1046-256 BC).
Basically, the *Tianxia* thesis posits that although we are living in the era of rapidly expanding globalization, the world today is still a ‘non-world’, a ‘failed’, or ‘bad’ world. This is because there is no ‘truly coherent world society governed by a universally-accepted political institution’; it remains a ‘Hobbesian chaos.’ Although there are international organizations such as the UN or EU, these institutions remain state-centric and are unable to prevent many international conflicts. In other words, there is no real ‘worldism’ or ‘worldness’ but only ‘internationality’ (Zhao 2009, 6). In this context, Zhao argues that the Chinese philosophy of ‘*Tianxia*’ offers a different vision of a world institution that is more effective in solving world issues. In ancient Chinese thinking, the meaning of ‘*Tianxia*’ was threefold, consisting of the physical world (all the land under heaven), the psychological world (the hearts and minds of the people), and the political world (a world institution or a ‘world-as-one-family’ system). The *Tianxia* system is featured with long-lasting peace and order because, as Zhao argues, in the minds of the kings of the all-under-heaven system, creating harmony is the ultimate goal (Zhao 2012, 46). In addition, during the Zhou dynasty which was the first and only one thus far to put the all-under-heaven system into practice, the world is seen as a starting point for political thinking. Zhao, therefore, suggests that *Tianxia* is a philosophy of ‘true world-ness’ because it takes the world as a whole as the key philosophical issue (Zhao 2009, 11).

At the core of Zhao’s holistic view of the world is Confucian ‘family ties’. In his view, if nation-states and Tianxia are built upon the spirit of family-ship, the world can evolve into a place of great harmony (that minimizes economic and cultural conflicts) and inclusivity (in which nobody is excluded or pushed aside). In other words, it is a commonly agreed institution ‘of all and for all’ (Zhao 2012, 60). Therefore, he concludes, ‘today’s chaotic world is in need of a new “all-under-heaven” to establish perpetual peace’ (Zhao 2012, 52) In intellectual circles, the world needs to divert away from ‘wrong-minded philosophy’ to employ a new philosophy of true world-ness (Zhao 2012, 54-5).

Zhao’s *Tianxia* philosophy generates heated debates domestically and internationally. Apart from admiration for the sophistication of his work, there was also a wave of criticism against his ‘over-beautiful’ if not utopian worldview (Callahan 2008). For example, how can Tianxia explain the increasing assertiveness of China in territorial disputes with neighboring countries e.g. Beijing’s posturing in the South China Sea?
This led to several IR scholars writing to explain how his philosophy has been misunderstood (Xu 2014; Zhang 2010a). Noting the shortcomings of his work including the theory-practice gap and the unidentified pathways to such an ideal world institution, Zhao has been working on a new book entitled ‘Making the World into All-under-heaven (Tianxia)’ (Qin 2012a, 72). Although being a philosophy rather than IR theory, Zhao’s work is an important starting point for the Chinese IR community as it opens a way for indigenous IR theorizing – to go back to Chinese traditions and ancient thought.35

The ‘Chinese School of IR’ movement

Since 2000, the Chinese IR debate has been increasingly dominated by the narrative of the ‘Chinese School of IR’ (Zhongguo Xuepai). Compared to its ‘IR Theory with Chinese characteristics’ predecessor, the ‘Chinese School’ project has won more support and increasingly received international attention, particularly when leading Chinese theorists (such as Qin Yaqing, Ren Xiao, Wang Yiwei) joined the camp and played an instrumental role in developing the approach. The pursuit of China’s distinctive brand of IR theory reflects the generational change in Chinese social sciences, particularly the return of high qualified Western-trained scholars and their subsequent socialization into the socio-political context of China. The movement from think-tanks to universities by leading IR scholars has also pulled Chinese IR into the direction of more in-depth theoretical research.36 Calling for the ‘China School of IR’ reflects the professionalization of Chinese IR academia and their desire to ‘catch up’ with the global intellectual community.

Given their high hopes and expectations for indigenous theorizing, how have Chinese scholars made the case for the ‘Chinese School’ and what has been done so far to match their desire? Over time, three fundamental issues have become the heart of the ‘Chinese School’ discussions. First, why is there no distinct Chinese IR theory at present? Second, is a ‘Chinese School’ desirable and possible? And third, if yes, how can it be constructed? A number of leading scholars had attempted to address the first

35 Most of the Chinese IR scholars whom I interviewed in 2013 did not perceive Zhao’s Tianxia theory as part of the Chinese IR Theory movement, largely because his work is about philosophy rather than about the real world (see also, Yan Xuetong in Creutzfeldt 2012).

36 For example, Wang Yizhou, Wang Jisi and Tang Shiping moved from different institutes of Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS), Yan Xuetong and Chu Shulong from China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), and Shi Yinhong from the Center for International Strategic Studies at International Relations Academy, Nanjing.
question (Qin 2010b, 36-41; Yan 2011a, 256; Wang and Han 2013, 38). Qin Yaqing summed up these discussions, arguing that ‘uncritical critiques, insufficient empirical studies, and unsophisticated research designs impede theory breakthroughs in China’ (Qin 2008, 467-8).

Since 2005, Chinese scholars have started to discuss the possibility of a Chinese School. Qin Yaqing argues that a Chinese School is not only justified but also possible and even inevitable because every social theory has ‘geographic and cultural birthmarks based on the experience and practice of people living there’ (Qin 2009b, 18). Qin agrees with Zhao Tingyang that Chinese ancient philosophy is a major source for building new theory but disagrees that it should be the sole one. Even in establishing the ‘Chinese School’, Qin argues, Chinese scholars need to combine Western approaches, ideas, and concepts with a modern, contemporary reinterpretation of traditional Chinese discourses (Creutzfeldt 2011, 9). Qin’s approach received the support of many Chinese scholars who are united by a Coxian ontology that ‘theory is always for someone and for some purpose’ (Cox 1981, 128). For example, Zhang Xiaoming – an English School proponent – believes that in the English School, along with other major Western IR theories, it is hard to escape ethnocentrism or cultural bias in their perceptions of and dealings with the non-Western countries. They are all culture-laden and value-laden. In fact, there is not a true value-free and universal IR theory in the world. Every IR theory is provincial in cultural terms (Zhang 2011, 785).

If all theories are cultural and provincial then claims to universality on the part of Western theory are unnecessarily exclusive. Chinese theory, in this sense, is just as provincial and thus just as valid. Another vocal advocate of the ‘Chinese School’ Wang Yiwei argues that IR theory is both science and art in the sense that even if some features appear to be universal, it is in essence still a kind of art with nationality (Wang 2002b, 2007). In an article in 2007, Wang placed lengthy and harsh criticism of Western IRT which, he believes, has increasingly lost its appeal. The main flaw of Western IRT, he points out, is ‘seeking the common grounds when it cannot reverse differences and cannot solve the original inequality (identity, interests) problem.’ For this reason, he dismissed Western theories as ‘vulgar’ IRT that contradicts with Marxist IRT and even declared ‘the end of international relations theories’ (Wang 2007, 204).
In this context, Wang Yiwei and his student Han Xueqing suggest that the world needs a ‘Chinese dream’ in IR theory. If anything, this slogan recalls Xi Jinping’s ‘Chinese dream’ policy posture which was coined in November 2012. While most other proponents of Chinese School claim that a future Chinese theory can sit alongside as equally valid and partial approaches to IR, Wang and Han actually pursue a more ambitious claim – that Chinese approaches can be the integrative framework in which Western theory exists. In their ‘Chinese dream’,

grand theories might be replaced by meso and micro theories. Encouraged by Chinese inclusiveness of Indian Buddhism into Chinese Zen, China can also include Western universalism into Chinese theoretical framework. As a consequence, the Chinese dream in IR will turn into reality with the full shaping of global China’ (Wang and Han 2013, 38).

What China has beyond Western IRT, in their view, is threefold: Chinese style cosmopolitanism (Tianxia zhuyi), ethical idealism (daode lixiang), and harmonious mentality (hexie linian) (Wang and Han 2013, 32-7). The ‘Chinese dream’ in IRT then can be realized in three ways – that is, by reviving Chinese cultural traditions; by de-Westernizing, especially de-Americanizing, IRT while remaining ‘open and inclusive’ regarding Western civilization; and by constructing IR theory that ‘originates in China and belongs to the world’ to ‘innovate’ the IR theory system (Wang and Han 2013, 38-9). As William Callahan has noted, the Chinese dream is similar to the American Dream in that both of them are a debate about values which ‘knits together culture and politics’ (Callahan 2014, 151). Put differently, the Chinese and American dream serve as some sort of ideology e.g. to promote and export their sets of values abroad. However, the difference between a ‘Chinese dream’ and ‘American dream’ of IR theory, as claimed by Chinese scholars, is that while Western IR theory subscribes to a universal dream, Chinese IR theory harbours a ‘harmonious but different’ (he er bu tong) dream. There is a belief that with the pacifist tradition and tolerance of diversity embedded in the Chinese culture, the future Chinese IR theory will contribute to making both the real world and the discipline of IR ‘a better place’ than the ones that Western IRT offers (Wang and Han 2013, 39; see also Wang 2007).

Interestingly, in making a case for the ‘Chinese School’, Chinese scholars increasingly refer to Western philosophy of science on how a theory comes into being. At one extreme, Wang Yiwei foresees that ‘the real revolution will take place through the deconstruction of the Western international system by the Eastern one’ in Kuhnian
sense of scientific revolution or paradigm shift (Wang 2007, 207). Qin Yaqing meanwhile borrows Cox’s ‘core problematic’ and Lakatos’ ‘research program’ thesis as a methodology for constructing a Chinese School. Accordingly, a Chinese School can be constructed if Chinese scholars find a new and different ‘theoretical problematic’ in their research program. Comparing the theoretical problematic of American IR (hegemonic maintenance) and British IR (international society), Qin argues that the successful construction of the English School is attributable to the different problematic it holds from American mainstream theories. In this light, China’s peaceful integration into international society, Qin argues, is most likely to become the theoretical problematic of a ‘Chinese School’ (Qin 2005, 65-9).

To date, the ‘Chinese School’ proponents have produced only some distinct research outcomes. Most notable is Qin Yaqing’s development of a systematic theory on relationality (guanxi) and process (guocheng) by employing processual constructivism as the analytical framework and taking the Chinese concept of ‘relationality’ as the theoretical hard-core. His aim of developing ‘Chinese relationalism’ is ‘to universalize Chinese concepts’ (Qin 2009a, 197). In his recent publications, Qin has sketched the key elements of his ‘relational theory of world politics.’ It focuses on process rather than structure; it takes Chinese yin-yang dialectics as the meta-relationship; and it develops a model for ‘relational power’ and ‘relational governance’ (Qin 2012a, 2012b, 2016). Such a theory, Qin argues, has three distinctive dimensions as compared to Western mainstream theories.

First, while most existing Western theories (including constructivism) place emphasis on structure, Qin’s theory focuses on process, defined as ‘dynamic relations’. Process is significant in that in that ‘it shapes national interests, develops norms, nurtures collective emotion and builds shared identity through inter-subjective practice. Mainstream constructivism has done considerable studies on norms and shared identity, but missed collective emotion’ (Qin 2009b, 12). A theory focusing on process can thus explain change. Second, the Chinese yin and yang dialectics, unlike the Hegelian dialectics, see relations between the two opposite poles as generally non-conflictual. Yin and yang indeed can be developed into a harmonious synthesis by means of Zhongyong, or ‘the mutually inclusive way.’ The relevance of this meta-relationship to the current international politics, Qin argues, is that it provides an alternative explanation for cooperation and conflict between the actors of different
cultural and civilizational backgrounds in global society (Qin 2012a, 81). Third, a theory on relationality can explain ‘relational governance’ – a feature in East Asian Confucian societies as opposed to ‘rule-based governance’ in Western society. The former model is based not only on cost–benefit calculations but also relationships (such as the management models in East Asian companies).

Relational governance is defined as ‘a process of negotiating socio-political arrangements that manage complex relationships in a community to produce order so that members behave in a reciprocal and cooperative fashion with mutual trust that evolves through a shared understanding of social norms and human morality’ (Qin 2012a, 83). This model of relational governance, Qin argues, can be applied to explain regional politics such as East Asian regionalism and ASEAN Way (Qin 2016, 43). He even believes that relationality theory may also be universal because ‘society must be defined in terms of relations of some kind’ (Liu Xin, quoted in Qin 2009b, 18). It should be noted that unlike Zhao Tingyang, Qin does not see Chinese and Western theories, such as relational and rule-based governance, as mutually exclusive but rather mutually complementary to ‘create a more effective and humane approach to global governance’ (Qin 2012a, 85). Qin’s nuanced approach of blending Western methodology with Chinese concepts is thus supported by many other Chinese scholars.

At present, the ‘China IR Theory’ research led by Qin has become one of the three research focuses of at the Institute of International Relations of the China Foreign Affairs University (CFAU). As the only higher learning institution directly under China’s Foreign Ministry and responsible for the country’s ‘Track-two Diplomacy’, CFAU sponsors training and research that are policy-oriented. The perceived purpose of Qin’s theorizing on relations and process is to apply it in explaining China’s peaceful integration into the international society and East Asian peace and cooperation. In an article co-authored with his CFAU colleague in 2007, Qin first discussed ‘process-oriented regional integration’ (Qin and Wei 2007; see also Qin and Wei 2008). He argued that the enduring of peace and economic development in East Asia in the past three decades is largely attributable to ‘the regional processes that

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37 Qin is the long-time Vice President of CFAU. The other research specializations of CFAU’s Institute of International Relations comprise ‘China and the International System’ led by Professor Zhu Liqun and ‘East Asian Regional Cooperation and International Security’ led by Professor Wang Fan (CFAU’s website, accessed 17 June 2014).
produce dynamics socializing powers and spreading norms’ (Creutzfeldt 2011, 3). To investigate this aspect further, Qin has formed a small group of his CFAU colleagues to work on innovating constructivism to explain Chinese foreign policy with a focus on the East Asia region. Their aim is to revise and develop key constructivist concepts such as the role of languages (the Chinese language), special social linkages such as China’s informal relations with ASEAN (Track 2 and Track 3 dialogues), and how to develop new social forces (Interview with Wang Yizhou, Beijing, 6 September 2013).

With regard to training at CFAU, Qin has been teaching the ‘IR Theory’ and ‘Research Methodology’ courses. The content of these courses, according to an American professor, looks very similar to a typical syllabus of a US undergraduate IR course.38 As Qin himself acknowledges, despite the recent shift in CFAU’s research focus, there has been no course on Chinese IR at that institution, and there are no changes in the teaching curriculum yet. Nevertheless, Qin also notes that he does teach a diversity of Western IR theories and methods; at the same time, however, he encourages students to study Chinese narratives to seek inspiration from them (Qin in Creutzfeldt 2011). In his courses for post-graduate students (where the professor has more freedom to design the syllabus), Qin has included articles and books related to the Chinese and non-Western IR written by both indigenous and foreign scholars to manifest that different cultural and historical settings lead to distinct practices that Western theories sometimes fail to explain adequately. For example, he includes his own writings as well as Zhao Tingyang’s ‘Tianxia system’, Victoria Hui’s ‘War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe’, David Kang’s ‘China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia’, and Erik Ringmar’s ‘Performing International Systems: Two East-Asian Alternatives to the Westphalian Order’ (Qin 2013, 168-9).

Qin also utilizes his membership in national and international editorial boards of journal and book series (particularly in his capacity as the Deputy Editor-in-chief of the Journal of China Foreign Affairs University,) to promote research about Chinese IR and the translations of relevant Western theoretical books. He has been assisting major Chinese presses to select books for translation with a focus on liberalism (with

38 This remark is from Alastair Iain Johnston (2003, 32-3), who has reviewed Qin’s course syllabus. Students in Qin’s class study major Western paradigms and methods including realism, liberalism, constructivism, as well as other sociological and marginalized approaches. The key reading assignment for his IR theory course is Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr’s World Politics: Menu of Choice.
Peking University Press), the English School (with the World Affairs Press), and constructivism (with Shanghai People’s Publishing House). Qin himself has translated a dozen IRT books with different theoretical orientations, including Carr’s ‘The Twenty Years’ Crisis’; Robert Jervis’s ‘Perception and Misperception in International Politics’; Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner’s ‘Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics’; Katzenstein’s ‘A World of Regions’ and ‘Civilizations in World Politics’, and most recently Sil and Katzenstein’s ‘Beyond Paradigms’ (Qin 2013, 170).

Other pro-Chinese School scholars are also contributing new research topics to the Chinese School discourse. These include Ren Xiao’s re-examination of the history of the tributary system and the practices of East Asian ‘symbiotic’ order (e.g. rules, norms) for modern-day application (Ren 2013) and Wang Yiwei's work on a ‘Chinese Theory of New Great Power Relations’ that claims to go beyond the path dependence of Western theories (Wang 2013b). Nevertheless, these agendas have not been developed into sophisticated propositions in the same manner as Qin’s relationality thesis. As Ren Xiao admits, theorizing is a difficult and time-consuming task that requires both independent thinking and peer collaboration. However, thus far much of the ‘Chinese School’ scholarship is individual efforts or institutional-based.39 There has been little, or no, cross-institutional collaboration or joint research among pro-Chinese School scholars, reflecting a certain amount of ‘theoretical egoism’ even among scholars who share the same goal.

**The ‘Tsinghua approach’ to IR**

Yan Xuetong, the Dean of the IR Department at Tsinghua University, is known as the most vocal opponent of both Qin Yaqing-led ‘Chinese School’ project and Zhao Tingyang’s Tianxia philosophy. As a realist, Yan does not believe in the possibility of harmony like Zhao or Qin. As a proponent of Western quantitative methods, he believes that any theory worthy of that name should be constructed in a scientific way and be universally applicable regardless of time and space. Yan, therefore, criticizes Zhao’s Tianxia theory as unrealistic and Qin-led ‘Chinese School’ project as narrowly

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39 In my interview with him in August 2013, Professor Ren Xiao said that he had suggested with Professor Qin Yaqing to form a hard-core group of scholars to work on the construction of the Chinese School but so far this has not been realized. Ren, meanwhile, has been the leading advocate for a ‘Shanghai approach’ (Shanghai Xuepai) in the current debate about the ‘Chinese School of IR’ (Ren 2015).
based. Apart from his accusation that Qin is making a case for a national IR theory, Yan further criticizes the ‘Chinese School’ proponents for giving name to the theory before giving birth to it. Moreover, he argues that it is impossible to have a single Chinese IR theory given the diversity of its traditions. Even Confucianism, he believes, cannot represent all of Chinese thought. Therefore, it is not feasible that a single school of thought or theory could represent the entirety of Chinese thinking (Creutzfeldt 2012, 2; Yan 2011a, 252-9). This view is largely shared by Yan’s collaborator Xu Jin: ‘China is too big and diverse. No one can represent the whole China and no theory can capture China’s diversity. Hence, there can only be a ‘Han Chinese approach’ or a ‘Tsinghua approach’ but not [an all-encompassing] ‘Chinese School’’ (Interview, Beijing, 5 September 2013).

Although criticizing the ‘Chinese School’ initiative and calling for universal knowledge, Yan Xuetong and his colleagues at Tsinghua University are actually proposing another Chinese style IR theory – the so-called ‘Tsinghua approach to IR’ (Zhang 2012c). The ‘Tsinghua approach’ is characterized by its self-acclaimed commitment to the universalism of ideas, its quantitative methodology, and policy-relevant orientation. This approach attempts to, in Yan’s words, ‘create something universal, applicable not only to China, but the world’ (Creutzfeldt 2012, 2). This has driven Yan and his followers to look into the diverse literature of ancient Chinese thought as an alternative source for Chinese IR theorizing. In fact, despite his opposition to the ‘Chinese School’ idea, Yan shares many common points with the non-Western IR theory movement. As he argues,

> if we want IR theories to become truly rich and develop more universal values, we should encourage these scholars and students to take a deeper look into their own culture, knowledge, philosophy, and political theory, to enrich this field (Yan in Creutzfeldt 2012, 4).

In order to build new theory, Yan suggests that Chinese scholars rely on both Lakatos’s methodology of scientific research programs and Laudan’s problem-solving criterion to guide their research. Chinese scholars, he believes, should ultimately aim for developing a new research program with a distinct hard-core as Lakatos suggests. The first step toward this end is to follow Laudan’s suggestion that ‘they focus on solving existing theoretical and empirical puzzles by wisely using traditional Chinese thought and literature’ (Yan 2011a, 258).
Starting in 2005, Yan and his Tsinghua colleagues have deeply studied the thought of seven pre-Qin (before 221 BC) masters, namely Laozi, Mozi, Kongzi (Confucius), Mengzi (Mencius), Guanzi, Xunzi, and Hanfeizi. The outcome was a number of articles and books in Chinese which were eventually translated and gathered into an English volume titled *Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power*, published by Princeton University Press in 2011. In this important work, Yan first places ancient Chinese thinkers within the analytical framework of Western IR theories. He classifies pre-Qin thinkers by their epistemological ideas (conceptual determinism, dualism, and materialist determinism) and the analytical level of their thought (system, state, and individual) (Yan 2011a, 26). He then tries to study how ancient Chinese thinkers understand international order and political power.

Yan outlines three types of order/power envisaged by ancient Chinese masters: ‘kingship’ or ‘humane authority’ (*Wangquan*), hegemony (*Baquan*), and tyranny (*Qiangquan*). He rules out the relevance of tyranny, which is entirely based on military force and stratagems, to today’s world. Rather he focuses on comparing the two other forms of rule: hegemony which seeks domination by means of maintaining strong force and strategic reliability (e.g. assurance through alliance) and ‘Humane authority’ or ruling by morality and justice (Yan 2011a, 84-91). It is humane authority that Yan thinks is a superior model because it wins the hearts and minds of the people. Yan further claims that pre-Qin understanding on morality and power may enrich existing IR theory, particularly realism, in at least two dimensions. First, hard power cannot be disregarded in realist understandings of power but morality can provide legitimacy for states to use force. Second, although classical realist writings (such as Morgenthau’s *Politics Among Nations*) presume that morality is an important component of power, Yan suggests that ‘realism should take morality as a constant and specific, not simply an abstract concept’ (Yan in Creutzfeldt 2012, 5).

Given his emphasis on the role of morality, Yan has been labelled as a ‘moral realist’ or ‘Confucian realist’ (Zhang 2012c, 95). The core principles suggested by Yan’s moral realism are fairness, justice, and civility, followed by equality, democracy and freedom (Huang 2016). When being questioned in an interview with the *New York Times* as to whether China should exercise such ‘human authority’ or ‘moral realism’ by sanctioning North Korea for its recent nuclear tests, Yan gives a frank answer:
That would be a Western hegemonic idea. A humane authority sees everyone on equal terms. If North Korea is not entitled to nuclear weapons, then China and the United States should guarantee North Korea its security in return for denuclearization. That’s what we call leading by example and fairness. It's only Western countries that are calling for sanctions without considering a fair solution, and they make up only about 20 percent of the world’s 195 countries (Yan in Huang 2016).

It can be said that the aim of Yan’s revision of ancient Chinese thought into ‘moral realism’ does not merely stop at ‘enriching IR theories’ for its own sake but more importantly provides a guide for China’s rise to global leadership. Yan sees the power competition between the US and China as a zero-sum game – in order for China to prevail, it needs to provide higher-quality leadership than the US. ‘Humane authority’, as suggested by pre-Qin thinkers, is an important pathway to that end. In this course, he suggests China to build an inspiring model at home first and then to seek alliances abroad as a way to prove the credibility of Chinese model and leadership in attracting more high-qualified friends than the US. Policy relevance, hence, is the ultimate aim of Yan's theorizing. In fact, for Tsinghua University, which has a reputation of ‘king-maker’, this has become an open goal of many faculties. An associate professor explains the mission of the Tsinghua IR Department and the foundation of their research as follows:

We do not have the ambition to establish a grand theory. We think we are more realistic in producing some sort of middle-range theory, for example, those focusing on regional order, policy transformation as well as conducting empirical test. We always keep the balance between theoretical innovation and policy relevance. Many faculties in the department have a strong background in policy analysis and empirical research. We, therefore, do not want to separate theory from the practice of foreign policy (Interview, Beijing, September 2013).

Apart from the aforementioned pre-Qin thought project, the ‘Tsinghua approach’ scholars are also studying the ancient and modern practice of East Asian international relations as a source for theory building. The Deputy Dean of the Department, Sun Xuefeng, has been working on probing ‘a quasi-anarchical regional order’ (the anarchy system associated with a sub-hierarchical system) in East Asia and its impact on China’s rise (Sun 2013; see also Sun 2010). Zhou Fangyin, meanwhile, has done preliminary research on ancient China’s tributary system (Zhou 2011). The Chinese Journal of International Politics of which Professor Yan is the Editor-in-chief and Sun Xuefeng, Zhou Fangyin, and Xu Jin are among the editors, has served as the key
outlet for distributing the Tsinghua approach’s research outcomes and generating debates.

The Tsinghua’s IR department has also been taking the lead in heightening the scientific and methodology awareness among the younger generations of Chinese IR community. They are particularly interested in using quantitative methods to make scientific predictions for a number of dimensions in China’s foreign relations (e.g. Yan and Zhou 2004; Yan 2009). They have also been educating students and junior faculties all over China about quantitative methods (game theory, statistical analysis, systems analysis, psychology, etc). Professor Yan himself has been involved in convening a number of annual workshops and summer schools on quantitative methods. The book on methodology for IR research that he co-authored with his colleague, Sun Xuefeng, has been selected as a national textbook on methodology for IR curriculum (Yan and Sun 2007). The Tsinghua IR Department’s graduate course syllabus titled “Contemporary Theories of International Relations” convened by Zhang Chuanjie looks very similar to a typical IRT program at Western universities. The major theories and issues discussed in the course are realism, liberalism, constructivism, foreign policy making, perceptions in IR, and new asymmetric threats. Zhang has students read the work of leading Western theorists such as Thucydides, Machiavelli, Waltz, Mearsheimer, Keohane, and Alexander George. The only reading from a non-Western scholar assigned for the course is Zhang’s own piece titled ‘Affective US Image Predicts Chinese citizens’ Attitudes toward the United States.’

Tsinghua’s IR Department also includes separate courses on ‘Classical Chinese Thought on Foreign Relations’ and ‘Theory and Practice of Chinese Foreign Policy’ in its contemporary graduate curriculum (Tsinghua). Blending Western theories and scientific methodology with Chinese ancient thought and practice of international relations, therefore, is a ‘trademark’ of the Tsinghua approach to IR.

The Beida’s ambition to shape a theory of foreign affairs

Much of the attention to China’s theoretical innovation focuses on the three aforementioned approaches. Yet the movement toward conceptualizing new dimensions of Chinese foreign policy by Beida’s School of International Studies (SIS)
scholars should not be disregarded because it includes leading scholars such as Wang Jisi (a self-described ‘cautiously optimistic realist’ (Wang 2012b), Wang Yizhou (a globalist), Zhang Xiaoming (an English School proponent), and Jia Qingguo. Given the diversity of perspectives adopted by the faculty and their prudent approach in the ongoing Chinese IRT debate, there has been no Beida equivalent to the ‘Tsinghua approach’ despite sharing an ambition for developing ‘middle-range’ theories to explain and inform China’s foreign policy. In the past, SIS focused more on area studies but its current priority has shifted to the study of comparative politics and China’s foreign policy (Shambaugh 2011, 355). In fact, Beida scholars do aim for developing ‘middle-range’ theories to explain and inform Chinese foreign affairs. Two ongoing projects at Beida are worth mentioning: Wang Jisi’s designing of China’s grand strategy and Wang Yizhou’s conceptualization of ‘creative involvement.’ Both these academic endeavors aim to provide a blueprint for Chinese foreign affairs in the future. This movement reflects the Chinese traditional understanding of theory which is meant to serve practical purposes rather than to explain the causality of social phenomena. The policy relevance/impact of Beida’s approaches should not be disregarded as many Beida SIS scholars are members of the government’s Consultancy Committee on Foreign Affairs. Professor Wang Jisi, for example, is widely known as former President Hu Jintao’s ‘chief brains truster’ for foreign policy (Leonard 2012, 118). Other SIS scholars such as SIS’s current Dean Jia Qingguo and Vice Dean Wang Yizhou are also members of the Consultancy Committee on Foreign Affairs.

As the scholar most exposed to policy, Wang Jisi – former SIS’s Dean and current President of Beida’s Institute of International and Strategic Studies – has been the leading force in designing a ‘grand strategy’ for China over the years. Unlike Yan Xuetong who coins a controversial vision of ‘humane authority’ strategy for China’s global leadership, Wang advocates for a more modest, prudent, and practical Chinese strategic design (Wang 2011a, 2005, 2012a). In the context of China’s rapid rise, Wang believes that the low-profile tradition of Chinese foreign policy needs to be revised. Yet he is also cautious about the idea of making China a competitor for global leadership (Kato 2012).

Most recently, Wang Jisi has been working on developing a new grand strategy for China (Xin zhanlue or Da zhanlue in Chinese) – the first of its kind in Chinese IR
since the PRC’s founding. This ambitious project aims to conceptualize and provide a blueprint for China’s future foreign policy development. It tries to entail many important areas of China’s policy development including foreign policy, economics, ecological environment, social and cultural development, and demographic approaches (Interviews with SIS scholars, Beijing, September 2013). Apart from this important work, Professor Wang also serves as the chief editor of a comprehensive theoretical book series entitled ‘World Politics - Views From China.’ Published by Beijing-based New World Press since 2007, this eight-volume series has brought together 184 treatises that present the views of almost 200 leading academic experts in the various fields of IR including international order, national interests, strategies of the great powers, China’s foreign affairs, international security, non-traditional security, the world economy and global governance, to name but a few (Zan 2007). As Wang states in Robinson and Shambaugh’s seminal volume ‘Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice’, he does believe that ‘there are distinctive Chinese approaches to observing international politics’ (Wang 1994, 481). Providing Chinese perspectives in this regard is both natural and necessary given that IRT whether originating from China or the West is always ‘value-oriented.’ He nevertheless urges Chinese scholars to refrain from building a distinctive Chinese IR theory when conditions are not ripe:

When learning from Western International Relations Theory, we can only copy some features; if we copy the entire value system, it will become completely Westernized. This is impossible and also unacceptable. At the moment, there is a phenomenon of distancing our theoretical research from Western theoretical studies at some level. That is we employ Western methodology but stay away from its core values; while we have yet managed to build up our own, it is difficult to succeed. Only after our mainstream value system were completely constructed could we talk about establishing a universally acceptable Chinese International Relations Theory (Wang 2004a).

Another prominent scholar – SIS’s Associate Dean Wang Yizhou – has been leading a research team at Beida in conceptualizing new concepts and terms for Chinese diplomacy. Before moving from CASS to Beida in 2008, Wang Yizhou has been known as a key figure in introducing Western IR theory in China and a long-time Editor-in-chief of the leading Chinese IR journal, World Economics and Politics. He is a critic of the former ‘IR Theory with Chinese characteristics’ project given its ideological and doctrinal orientation and a prudent observer of the current ‘Chinese School’ narratives. Yet, since China is now emerging as a great nation that will help in constructing the world, Wang sees the need for Chinese scholars to provide ‘abstract
theoretical ideas and guidance about how to integrate China’s own interests with world peace, sustainability, development, and an orientation for great-nation relations’ (quoted in Wang 2013a, 22-3). He, therefore, is taking the lead in designing a Chinese theory of foreign affairs to reflect China’s diplomatic behaviour and systematic world outlook.

To date, Wang Yizhou has published two key volumes introducing the concept of ‘creative involvement’ (chuangzaoxing jieru) which advocates China playing a more active role in international affairs to match its rapid rise. His work deals with big questions such as how China can provide public goods, how it can learn from other global powers, and how China can build up its own identity (Wang 2011b, 2013c). In fact, Wang Yizhou is one of the leading Chinese scholars involved in the ongoing intense debate between the ‘internationalists’ and ‘realists’ in China as to whether Deng Xiaoping’s dictum of ‘taoguang yanghui’ (keeping a low profile) is still relevant. Both sides agree that Deng’s policy has become somewhat obsolete and support China’s active involvement in international affairs. The two groups, however, have fundamental differences over specific diplomatic approaches and strategies. The internationalists (e.g. Wang Yizhou, Qin Yaqing) oppose assertive policies, urge self-restraint, advocate compliance with international norms, and utilize the international system to participate in global governance. The realists e.g. Yan Xuetong, meanwhile, argue for China to quit its age-old non-alignment policy and seek alliances to serve its own national interests. However, the mainstream Chinese academic community still maintains that the benefits of further adherence to non-interference outweigh the potential costs of a major policy change (Duchâtel, Bräuner, and Hang 2014, 5; Roy 2012; Zhang 2012a; Yan 2014; Qin 2014).

In this light, Wang Yizhou recommends cautiously modifying Deng Xiaoping’s dictum of ‘Taoguang Yanghui’ (keeping a low profile) and the long-standing ‘non-intervention’ principle for the country to actively play a bigger role and voluntarily get involved in international affairs, or in his terminology, ‘creative involvement’. In his view, China’s ‘creative involvement’ has three core elements. First, it should operate under the international legitimacy framework; second, it must be carried out with great caution, e.g. only in cases concerning China’s vital national interests; and third, it places more stress on soft power (diplomacy and economic assistance) rather than military force (Ding 2012). As Wang describes the nature of his work:
‘Creative involvement’ is a new kind of thinking in China’s foreign policy. It is neither a systematic ideological doctrine nor a logical assumption nor a traditional theory of international relations or diplomacy. Instead, it is a guiding thread somewhere between a metaphysical theory and an exemplified interpretation of policy (Wang 2012c, 109).

Recently, Wang has been working on the last volume of his ‘Creative Involvement’ trilogy series. It focuses on further covering diplomatic innovation and related domestic political and social points in the belief that ‘China can influence the world by changing itself’ (Wang 2012c, 109). His work has been praised by many scholars. Wang Fan (CFAU) and Zhang Zhizhou (Beijing Foreign Studies University), for example, see it as an attempt to contribute to de-Westernize international scholarship. Zhang comments that ‘Western political and diplomatic theories, pertaining to economic management and financial governance, have been found wanting. As a major power, China should take responsibility and provide public goods such as policies and theories to the world’ (Ding 2013).

The moderate approach of SIS’s scholars is also reflected in their teaching activities. The IR Theory course for graduate students at Beida, co-taught by several lecturers, includes both Western writings (in English and Chinese translations) as well as China’s own sources. For example, the general required reading list includes Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff’s ‘Contending Theories of World Politics’ (translated by Yan Xuetong), Wang Yizhou’s ‘International Politics in the West: History and Theory’, Zhu Feng’s ‘Theory of International Relations’, and Ni Shixiong’s ‘Contemporary Western International Relations Theories.’ Other recommended readings include the translations of key Western theorists’ writings such as Carr, Morgenthau, Waltz, Keohane, Wendt, Mearsheimer etc. After a thorough assessment of Western IR theory and methods, the final session discusses the topic ‘China’s diplomacy, East Asian security, and International Relations Theory’ where the relevance of Western IRT in explaining China’s and East Asian international relations is examined from a Chinese perspective.42 Another course titled ‘The Rise of China and Change in World Politics’ offered by PKU for its annual summer school discusses more directly about the implications of China’s rise in both the academic world and the international system. Convened by Xu Xin – a former academic at PKU and current associate professor at Cornell University, this is one of the most intensive

42 I thank the graduate students at Beida’s SIS for providing me the course syllabus for reference.
courses in China that directly link the material rise of China with ‘paradigm change’ and the changing dynamics of East Asian international relations (for detailed course syllabus, see Appendix).

The Universalists’ movement toward integrating with global scholarship

As can be seen, there are many faces of an emerging ‘Chinese Dream’ in IR Theory. Despite such ‘different dreams’, these scholars do share the ‘same bed’ – they all attempt to bring the Chinese perspectives into global knowledge. Yet, there is also another dream which is less vocal and provocative in manner and more sophisticated in substance – to produce qualified knowledge in Western style theorizing. Professors Zhang Ruizhuang from Nankai University and Tang Shiping from Fudan University are representatives of this approach. These scholars are not actively involved in the current Chinese IRT debate, believing it is of little value (and, indeed, a waste of time) if there is no real progress made. Instead, they seek further integration with Western IR in both its methodological and theoretical trends using Chinese cases and beyond.

Zhang Ruizhuang, as the only Chinese (PhD) student of Kenneth Waltz, has pursued his main academic interests in applying Waltz’s theory to empirical studies (e.g. Zhang 2013c, 2009; Liu and Zhang 2006). He does not regard the English School highly and thinks it does not qualify as IRT.\(^{43}\) He is, therefore, not interested in the Chinese IRT project although he has not openly written against it. In the 2013 meeting of China’s Association of International Studies regarding China’s IR studies and theoretical development, Zhang emphasizes that first and foremost Chinese scholars should not try to ‘propose new theories simply from a place of impetuousness or impatience to see progress in the field’ (Mao 2013; see also Zhang 2003b). Zhang has also built his reputation as an independent thinker and constructive critic of the official guidelines of China’s foreign policy (Zhang 2003a, 2001a). His recent book titled The Unharmonious World applied structural realism in explaining and predicting China’s foreign policy amid the growing power competition between China and the US. It actually challenged both the party line and the core thesis shared by many other Chinese theorists on a ‘new type of great power relationship’ between China and the US or the dominant discourse of ‘harmonious world’ (Zhang 2010b). Given his

\(^{43}\) I thank Lu Peng for this observation.
unconventional thinking, Zhang’s work often has difficulties in getting through China’s publishing censorship.

Tang Shiping meanwhile is one of the few Chinese theorists that have published intensively theoretical work that transcends existing mainstream theories. He is among the few Chinese theorists who have managed to get recognition from their Western colleagues for the rigor and quality of his work. After a number of publications focusing on defensive realism, the theory of institutional change, a new theory of attribution in IR (Tang 2004, 2010c, 2010a, 2012), Tang (2013) recently published a very sophisticated volume on ‘The Social Evolution of International Politics.’ Largely influenced by his prior educational background in biology (PhD), Tang borrows Darwin’s theory of biological evolution into IR to explain the evolutionary system of world politics from Mearsheimer’s offensive realist world (before 1648 or 1945) to the Jervis’s defensive realist world in contemporary terms (post 1945). He also suggests the course toward a more rule-based international system while ruling out the possibility and desirability of a ‘world state’ or ‘world society’ utopia (Tang 2013, 6, 141-7; see also Tang 2010b). By examining the social evolution of international politics, Tang argues that mainstream IR theories are ‘time sensitive’ because they emerged and best explained world politics in different historical epochs. In this light, the many great debates in IR that compared different theories at the same phase of history, particularly that between offensive and defensive realism, are questionable. Tang’s work, despite its remaining shortcomings, has been praised by Barry Buzan who notes that ‘quality big thinking like this does not come along often’ (Buzan 2013, 1304).

This social evolutionary approach also affected Tang’s teaching of the ‘International Relations Theory: a Critical Introduction’ course (in English) at Fudan University. He has students read general texts such as Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff’s ‘Contending Theories of International Relations’, Robert Jervis’s ‘Perception and Misperception in International Politics’, and Sokal and Bricmont’s ‘Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science.’ After reviewing the development of Western IRT from classical realism to post-modernism in the first 10 sessions, the remaining sessions are dedicated to the themes ‘Social Psychology of International

44 Tang’s aforementioned volume won the ISA Annual Best Book Award at the 56th Annual Convention of ISA in 2015.
Politics’, ‘Social Evolution of International Politics: Emerging Paradigm’, ‘Theory of Foreign Policy’, ‘Theory of Region and Regionalism’, and finally ‘Game Theory, and Systemic Complexity: Some Challenges in Theorizing IR.’ Tang does include a number of his work in the syllabus but no writings of other Chinese scholars are listed.45

In short, it can be seen that the Chinese IRT debate has shaped the research practices of Chinese scholars quite clearly, with a number of endeavors to realize their theoretical claims. Chinese scholars have also developed greater awareness in blending the Western and Chinese approach in IR syllabus. The teaching practices of scholars are also manifested in their supervision of graduate students during which the supervisor generally have an intellectual influence on their students. There are many examples of the supervisor – PhD student relationship later resulted in collaboration for joint research such as the case of Prof. Ni Shixiong and Prof. Wang Yiwei and Yan Xuetong and his many followers such as Xu Jin, Sun Xuefeng, and Zhou Fangyun. There is also evidence of actual changes in outreach activities by Chinese scholars in realizing their claims such as alliance building, the establishment of new publishing platforms, and fund-raising for theoretical research, etc. This reflects the logic of resource mobilization to make way for theoretical innovation as has been identified in the previous chapter. It can, therefore, be said that the EAIRT debate in China has taken the form of discussion about the construction of a Chinese style IR theory, be it the Chinese School, the Tsinghua approach, or a Chinese theory of foreign affairs. In other words, the EAIRT discourse in China is predominantly a debate about different pathways to construct Chinese IR knowledge. Why that is the case and what are the underlying factors that are actually driving Chinese scholars in their course toward theoretical innovation?

What drives changes? An interpretation from the sociology of science approach

Iain Johnston (2003, 34-5) once argued that the turn toward Western IRT in China in the 1990s was largely thanks to three factors – the return of Western-trained scholars; the growth in translations of Western IR works; and the rise to journal and book series editorship of a key group of younger IR scholars in Beijing and Shanghai. Arguably, the current turn toward Chinese IR theory has also been facilitated by very similar

45 Course syllabus was retrieved from the official website of Fudan University (see Tang).
factors. While Western theories remain dominant in Chinese IR discourse, three major causes have contributed to indigenous theorizing of Chinese IR academia. These are, first, the socialization of returning Western-trained scholars in the intellectual and political environment in China; second, the growing reliance on China’s own sources as the result of the heightened awareness among Chinese academics about their identity as ‘knowledge producers’; and third, the role of the ‘gate-keepers’ who control institutional resources and access to funding and publications in shaping the research agenda. China’s continued rise and the overarching political atmosphere in China further drives the majority of Chinese scholars into the direction of building Chinese IR theory. In a sense, structural and agential factors do intrude in the establishment of Chinese IR knowledge. The interplay of structure and agency determines the degree and shape of response by Chinese scholars toward EAIRT; that is debate surrounding and resource mobilization for the construction of Chinese IR knowledge. The following sections will discuss the specific roles played by these factors in shaping the practices of Chinese scholars.

The changing theoretical identity of Chinese scholars

First off, it can be said that Chinese scholars have now promoted a desire to become ‘knowledge producers.’ I argue in line with the sociology of science accounts that this theoretical identity of Chinese scholars has been directly or indirectly shaped by their educational background as well as the broader institutional and social context of China. Given the socio-political atmosphere and academic structure in China, unsurprisingly the majority of locally trained Chinese scholars would have some nationalist sentiment in their call for constructing a distinct Chinese perspective on IR. It is striking, however, that many returning Western-trained Chinese scholars have also proactively participated in this movement. It, therefore, makes sense to assess the impact of the possible ‘intervening variables’ on two main targets: returning Western-trained scholars, and the remainder of Chinese IR community. Although nearly all leading Chinese scholars today have undertaken short-term visiting fellowships at a Western IR institution, those who received intensive higher education in the West should logically have a greater awareness of research methodology and theoretical rigor. It is, therefore, interesting and indeed important to know why some of these scholars, exposed to Western thinking and practices, are nevertheless calling for the building a ‘Chinese style’ IR theory.
Commitment to theory versus socialization of theoretical identity

Leading Western-trained scholars such as Qin Yaqing, Yan Xuetong, Chu Shulong, Tang Shiping, and Zhang Ruizhuang have been playing an important role in importing Western IRT and raising the awareness of scientific rigor in Chinese IR. In fact, they were all trained in American universities during the 1980s-1990s period and at the time of their graduate training, all adopted a highly positivist (and, in most cases, realist) approach. After returning to China, however, only Tang Shiping and Zhang Ruizhuang continue to strictly adhere to realist accounts and thus see no need for a Chinese IR theory to explain China’s behavior. For Tang Shiping, China serves ‘merely as a data point’ in his theorizing (Interview, Shanghai, August 2013). In a recent interview, Tang noted that ‘a decent mastery of research methodologies’ and ‘a noble concern for reality’ are the two biggest factors that have shaped his work. When asked about the relationship between theory and practice in China, Tang suggests that Chinese scholars should not be limited to simply explaining policies but also offering theoretical knowledge and developing instruments to inform policies (Zhang 2013b).46 He has specifically warned about the overt Sino-centrism and U.S.-centrism in China’s academic discussions of its foreign policy (Tang and Qi 2008). For Zhang Ruizhuang (2009), China’s rise does not necessarily differ from other cases in history and China’s foreign relations can be explained by existing realist frameworks. A blind pursuit of idealism, he believes, is not only unhelpful but also dangerous and disastrous. The answer to the puzzle of ‘Which diplomatic theory should China choose?’ in his view is thus simple – to safeguard China’s national interests (Zhang 1999, 2007). Therefore, it can be concluded that commitment to universally applicable theory and scientific objectivity is the main driver of Tang and Zhang’s theorizing. The Chinese IRT debate and other China-related social factors have little impact on their work.

Yet, reading the Chinese IRT literature one may wonder why other scholars like Qin Yaqing and Yan Xuetong – those who were also trained in the West, well aware of what social science is, and already schooled into IR theory end up calling for ‘bringing China in’ to IRT, albeit in different ways. It is argued here that these scholars’ theoretical identity has been socialized with their engagement in the

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46 Nonetheless, for IR to be more relevant for the real world, Tang agrees with Acharya that ‘we need an IR enriched by a diversity of theoretical perspectives, a diversity of geographical focus, and a diversity of scholars from different ethnic, national, geographical backgrounds’ (Tang 2016, 162).
intellectual and social environment in China. As leading Chinese theorists and public intellectuals, they have become ‘speakers’ of China in the international intellectual community where solid knowledge of Western IR is deemed necessary but no longer sufficient to speak on equal terms with Western counterparts. This sentiment is revealed in a remark by Yan Xuetong:

> For Chinese scholars, if you are doing research with American style theory you cannot surpass those American scholars. [This is] because all these theories are rooted in Western culture. So you can only follow up, you cannot surpass that. So if you want to do a real achievement, you need to do something that the Westerners cannot understand (quoted in Kristensen and Nielsen 2013, 27).

Nonetheless, ‘doing something that the Westerners cannot understand’ is not necessarily or automatically synonymous with an achievement, per se. Despite his strong wording above, Yan’s work on ‘ancient Chinese thought, modern Chinese power’ actually employs Western IR frameworks in categorizing ancient Chinese thought. That is to say, he still uses the languages understood by Western scholars. Blending Western methodology and Chinese knowledge, rather than proposing an entirely different worldview like Zhao Tingyang’s Tianxia philosophy, is the foundation of Yan’s work and the Tsinghua approach more generally.

Qin Yaqing, meanwhile, is not satisfied with the indigenization of existing Western IR theory (e.g. a Chinese-style Realism, Liberalism, or Constructivism) because ‘the result would be a localized explanation that verifies Western theories’ (Qin 2011, 50). A distinct Chinese IRT, in this sense, is needed for the Chinese IR community to overcome an inferiority complex of a backward society ‘learning and borrowing from existing theories of advanced societies to explain native phenomena’ (Qin 2011, 50). Arguably, a certain extent of theoretical egoism and nationalism has been forged during this socialization process. This is seen in the course of Yan Xuetong’s movement from a ‘Waltzian realist’ to a pre-Qin ‘moral realist’ and Qin Yaqing’s transformation from an American style realist to a Chinese style ‘prosessual constructivist.’

For Yan Xuetong, despite his opposition to the ‘Chinese School’ idea and his claim for universally applicable theory, the Chinese nationality factor is ironically an intruding factor in his scholarship. This is seen in Yan’s simple and straightforward explanation for his theorizing of ‘ancient Chinese thought’:
Because I’m Chinese, my Western cultural background is lacking. It is difficult for me to understand that culture, because I did not grow up with it. But I’m familiar with the Chinese culture: I know international politics today are very different than two thousand years ago, but I also find some similarities between now and then. Perhaps we can get some important resources from ancient Chinese thought, to help us to develop theory – to help us to surpass Alexander Wendt (Creutzfeldt 2012, 4).

Yan also admits that national identity has influenced both his choice of research questions, and the direction of his research in that he only chooses questions that are ‘highly relevant to China’ and ‘central to China’s core interests’ (quoted in Wang 2013a, 6). In fact, Yan is often described using a dual image – a political realist and a ‘nationalist.’ The purpose of his ‘moral realism’ is to provide a strategy for China to defeat America in the competition for global leadership by not only reducing the power gap between them but also providing ‘a better model for society than that given by the United States’ (Yan 2011a, 99; see also Yan 2011c; 2013). To manifest that this is not merely rhetoric, Yan actually applies this theory to interpret China’s increasingly ‘assertive’ foreign policy under Xi Jinping which, he argues, has shifted from ‘keeping a low profile’ to ‘striving for achievement’ approach (Yan 2014). His seemingly ‘zero-sum’ outlook on international order and IR theorizing actually reconfirms Western scholars’ assumptions about China’s hegemonic ambitions and the nationalist nature of his moral scholarship.

This self-fulfilling conflictual worldview (proposed both by Yan and Western scholars) has precipitated a strong criticism from Qin Yaqing (2014). While Yan Xuetong’s motivation for theorizing is somewhat driven by his ‘theoretical nationalism’, Qin Yaqing’s theoretical orientation is largely impacted by his involvement with policy and politics. Qin has served as the Vice President of China Foreign Affairs University which is under the Foreign Ministry, a member of the Foreign Ministry’s Policy Advisory Committee, and the China national coordinator of the Network of East Asian Think-tanks. In fact, as Qin himself acknowledges, it was his experience as a track two practitioner, not a scholar, that distanced him away from his former ‘highly positivist, highly quantitative, and highly Waltzian’ approach (Qin in Creutzfeldt 2011, 3). Upon his return to China in late 1990s, Qin started to doubt

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47 Qin’s PhD dissertation at the University of Missouri titled ‘Staying on top: Hegemonic Maintenance and US choice of sides in International Armed Conflicts Behavior, 1945-89’ heavily depended on structural realism and quantitative methods, using a regresional model combined with hegemonic stability theory. Qin uses the same model in his first book published in China in 1999, titled ‘Baquan tixi yu guoji chongtu’ (Hegemonic structure and international conflict) (Qin 2013, 161).
realist arguments as he matched it with the conduct of China’s foreign policy. In his observation, China’s foreign behavior has become less and less ‘hawkish’ since 1978. That rendered Qin to shift to constructivism in the late 1990s as he believes the latter better captures China’s foreign behaviour (Qin 2013, 162). His intensive involvement in East Asian track-two diplomacy further convinced him of the disconnects between the major Western IR paradigms and the practice of East Asian regional integration. Even constructivism, he argues, is not dynamic because like realism, it still focuses on structure while missing process without which nothing happens. This is a turning point in his theorizing on relations and process based on Western constructivist theory and Chinese philosophical traditions. As he explains how the process of his theorizing evolved:

In my thinking, I also draw a lot on Western theories but including Chinese and Oriental considerations. I try to find key dynamics underpinning the Chinese way, integrating Oriental ideas and concepts, reinterpreting them in the light of established IR theories and problems. The reinterpretation is based upon a Chinese understanding, a Chinese way of thinking, or a Chinese worldview (Qin in Creutzfeldt 2011, 4).

Therefore, it can be concluded that the turn toward indigenous theorizing by some returning Western-trained scholars has been affected by external factors such as national identity and/or involvement with policy and politics. Nevertheless, commitment to theory and scientific rigor still matter given their prior serious training and solid knowledge of Western IR. The result of this socialization process is a mobilization for de-Westernification (at least in terms of hegemony) of the discipline via the inclusion of conceptually Western but Chinese-oriented work. While opposing the domination of Western learning and proposing a ‘Chinese School’, Qin Yaqing has also warned about the danger of ‘cultural revisionism’ that lies in the ‘restoration’ of Chinese culture that excludes other cultures including the West (Qin 2013, 173-4).48 This integrative approach differentiates these scholars from the most radical accounts of Chinese IR – those who are more obsessed with Chinese uniqueness and exceptionalism (see Figure 3.1). That is not to say that there is no intrinsic value in the latter’s theoretical work but it does say that other factors may overshadow their scientific objectivity.

48 Qin Yaqing notes that the only reason he uses the ‘Chinese School’ label although he thinks it is not entirely correct is to catch international attention and to open a way for changing the status of Chinese marginalized IR in the intellectual status quo (Creutzfeldt 2011, 9).
Figure 3.1: The underlying factors driving the Chinese IRT debates and practices

China’s Rise, the national socio-political context, and academic institutions

One scholar has noted that if China were not a rising power, the Chinese IR discourse would not draw much attention (Wang 2013a, 126). It is true that there are some inherent causal relationships between material power and knowledge production, as seen in the dominance of American IR in global scholarship. Yet apart from the power-knowledge linkages, the question of how China’s geopolitical rise actually shapes academic debates and practices is not adequately examined. My interpretation is that the rise of China has precipitated a redefinition of its national identity which in turn reshapes Chinese scholars’ personal identity into ‘knowledge producers.’ In this light, the turn toward Chinese IRT is a result of an endeavour by Chinese scholars to redefine their national as well as their own identity.

Chinese cultural exceptionalism and national interests

Wang Yiwei once argued that IRT should be understood under the ‘personal identity-national identity-features of the time’ paradigm (Wang 2003; 2009, 115). Under his lens, the current identity of IRT has been strongly affiliated with ‘Americanization’ because these theories are produced by American scholars and imbued with American values and interests e.g. (Hoffmann 1977; Wohlforth 1999; Mearsheimer 2001). They are then transmitted worldwide thanks to the American domination in world affairs. As a result, ‘IRT with American characteristics thinks of what America thinks, worries what America worries’ (Wang 2004b, 3). The current movement toward ‘Sinicization’ of IRT, Wang similarly argues, is shaped by the personal identity of Chinese scholars, the emerging national identity of China as a new great power, and the most salient feature of the contemporary era – China’s geopolitical rise in the international system. As his view represents the most radical and popular account of the Chinese IRT debate, I will apply his framework for interpreting the underlying factors that have forged such a large consensus among Chinese scholars toward building indigenous theory, be it the Chinese School, the Tsinghua approach, or a Chinese theory of foreign affairs.
First, the personal identity of Chinese scholars at the moment is shaped by their dissatisfaction with the status quo and determination to become ‘knowledge producers’. Constructing a ‘Chinese School’, as Ren Xiao has noted, is such a boring, time-consuming and painstaking task that only with long, sustained effort could it be possible to produce real results. Yet this academic pursuit ‘indicates the self-confidence of Chinese scholars and the aspirations to become producers of knowledge’ (Ren 2009, 15). The personal identity of Chinese scholars, however, not merely refers to their mindsets but also connections with policy and politics (Wang 2009, 116). So in order to understand the evolving identity of Chinese scholars, we need to examine the broader context in which they are living – the political environment, cultural values, and historical traditions of China. As Wang Hungjen (2013a, 31) puts it, the attitudes, intentions, and emotions of Chinese scholars are inseparable from ‘their China’ – or their national identity and interests. In the search for their new national identity, a discernible and growing consensus has been formed among the Chinese people that their country has been transforming from a revolutionary power to an increasingly responsible stakeholder in the international society. It is one that has discarded its inferiority complex of century-long humiliation and isolation to become an increasingly confident power with positive contributions to the world (for example, Qin 2003, 2010a). This growing confidence and benign self-view are rooted in the Chinese people’s pride of their country’s natural greatness (Tianfu weida), rich traditions, and pacifist history.

In light of this perception, Chinese theorists commonly assert that the rise of China will take a different course than what existing IRT and their Western counterparts generally project. Hence, there have been numerous academic debates between Western and Chinese scholars about the prospect of China’s rise such as those between Barry Buzan, Zhang Xiaoming, and Qin Yaqing (Zhang and Buzan 2010, see also Qin 2010a), and between John Mearsheimer and Yan Xuetong, even though they are in the same schools of IR theory (Mearsheimer and Yan 2013). There has been a surge of Chinese counter-discourses on the issues of national concerns including China’s peaceful development, great power responsibility, strategic culture, soft power, public diplomacy, new type of great power relationship etc. In effect, a number of scholars claim that China should take independent research because some of the questions related to China’s rise and Chinese foreign policy are best answered via Chinese scholarship (Ren 2008, 306; Men 2005; Su 2014).
Unfortunately, in the course of constructing their country’s ‘self’, Chinese scholars have increasingly Occidentalized the ‘other’ or, for most of the cases, Western scholarship as ‘evil’ and ‘conflictual.’ Conversely, China’s future IRT is self-viewed as ‘peaceful’, ‘moral’, and ‘harmonious’ (Zhang 2013a, 13; see also Callahan 2012, 641; Callahan 2013, 157-8). This sentiment is evident in the most radical accounts of Chinese IR – those who are portraying China not only as a unique but also superior kind of great power. Obviously, there is a certain amount of ethnic nationalism and cultural exceptionalism at play here. Moreover, theorizing on Chinese pacifist Confucian culture and benign practice of diplomacy, whether intentionally or not, has been seen by some scholars as serving the national interests of the PRC, both for strengthening its soft power and one party system as well as for lessening the repercussions of the ‘China threat’ theory (Schneider 2011, 9; Zhang 2012b, 81-2; Noesselt 2015). As one recent work has observed, ‘in the 21st century, Confucianism and socialism are officially intertwined’ (Shih and Yin 2013a, 68). It was hardly a mere coincidence that the cultural and ideological rise of China has begun around 2005 – simultaneously, as Feng Zhang (2013a, 3) has noted, with the introduction of Hu Jintao’s ‘harmonious world’ rhetoric, Zhao Tingyang’s ‘Tianxia system’ thesis, and the commencement of Tsinghua project on pre-Qin thoughts. All these discourses are characterized by the bias selection of Confucian pacifism as the foundation for Chinese IR theorizing without mentioning other rich Chinese traditions such as Legalism or Buddhism as well as its silences on the contributions of marginalized voices such as feminism and ethnic minorities in Chinese IR (Blanchard and Lin 2016, 54-9). Thus efforts to theorize IR from a Chinese perspective often encounter skepticism that it presents a new hegemonic logic rather than emancipation toward a universally inclusive discipline (Callahan 2008; Blanchard and Lin 2016).

Academic institutions and the role of ‘gate-keepers’ in shaping research agenda and distributing research outcomes

The changing practices toward constructing Chinese IR knowledge has also been shaped to a large extent by the academic structure of Chinese academia, particularly the tight government’s intellectual control, the professionalization of Chinese IR academia, and the role of the ‘gate-keepers of knowledge.’ At the global level, ‘the gate-keepers of knowledge, which include specialised journals, academic associations, foundations and academic experts in the core’ have arguably been a key obstructing factor for the penetration of periphery IR in the global scholarship (Tickner 2003,
301). Interestingly, that observation may also be true in the case of Chinese IR. Given China’s authoritarian politics, the biggest ‘gate-keeper’ for Chinese IR is perhaps the CCP. Although there is no separate instruction on and funding allocation for the Chinese IRT project, the Chinese government ‘plays an important role in knowledge generation, and can therefore shape Chinese IR theory to meet its needs and interests’ (Wang 2013a, 115). The key pathways for the CCP’s impact on the Chinese IRT discourse are its funding system for social sciences, general guidance and statement, and the recruitment of IR scholars for the government’s consultancy and policy analysis.

First, a rising power like China generally has sufficient material sources to support education in general and research of its own interests. Until 2011, less than 3.5% of China’s gross domestic product (GDP) was reserved for education but in 2012 this number was raised to 4%, reflecting the higher awareness of the role of education in China. Particularly in its quest for world-class universities, since 1993 the Chinese government has provided extra funding for a group of elite universities through the ‘Project 211’ and ‘Project 985’ and the ‘Quality Project.’ Being the top four ranked universities in China, Peking, Tsinghua, Fudan, and Renmin Universities are among the largest beneficiaries. As the result conditions for research (e.g. access to research materials, library holdings, exchange and collaboration with foreign scholars) and academic well-being (salaries, healthcare, weekly working hours, etc.) have been significantly improved (Kristensen and Nielsen 2013, 33-5). For example, per capita income at Peking University more than tripled from RMB 22,612 in 2000 to RMB 75,738 in 2008 (Kristensen and Nielsen 2013, 33). Better working condition and greater academic freedom have explained why leading IR scholars e.g. Wang Yizhou, Wang Jisi, Yan Xuetong, Shi Yinhong, Chu Shulong, and Tang Shiping moved from think-tanks to universities. This movement helps promote the theoretical research in China as IR theorizing is largely seen as ‘a preserve of university-based scholars.’

Most universities in China are public universities, so a considerable amount of funding (approximately one-third or one-fourth of their annual budgets) comes from the government (Kristensen and Nielsen 2013, 53). In the ‘opening up’ stage of Chinese IR (1980s-1990s), various American and European funding agencies (e.g. the

49 Some institutions within CASS such as IWEP also produce theoretical research but the majority of Chinese think-tanks are strongly policy-oriented (Shambaugh 2011, 359; Kristensen and Nielsen 2013, 35).
Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation, and various European grants) provided generous support for IR research as well as for sending Chinese scholars overseas for higher education. This contributed to the domination of Western knowledge in Chinese IR studies during this period. Yet China now has its own funds to support academic research so that universities and scholars do not need to rely as much on foreign grants anymore. The Chinese research funding system for social sciences includes the National Social Science Foundation, the Humanities and Social Science Foundation of China which is under the Ministry of Education, and the research projects system of CASS. These foundations primarily support policy relevant and applied research but also encourage some theoretical projects focusing on ‘pre-defined topics’ such as ‘Peaceful Rise’, ‘Harmonious World’, ‘IR Theory with Chinese characteristics’ and most recently the ‘Chinese dream’. Access to these government funds is not easy as these are ‘grants that come with conditionalities’ (Kristensen and Nielsen 2013, 34).

Second, as Wang Jianwei (2002a, 86) has noted, ‘although to a much lesser degree than before, IR teaching and research are still subject to government control and supervision. One of the main functions of scholars and researchers in the field continues to be the interpretation and advocacy of party and government policies.’ Wang Yizhou further points out that ‘Chinese political structure and institutions determine the basic features of almost all kinds of research. Completely going against the mainstream ideology risks the loss of opportunities and resources’ (quoted in Blanchard and Lin 2016, 58). In this light, those research and discourses that do not fit with the government’s interests are hard to procure through the ‘gate-keepers.’ In his 2010 ‘Unharmonious World’ volume, Zhang Ruizhuang complained that many of his previous writings were rejected by Chinese journal editors or publishers for contradicting Party doctrine (quoted in Wang 2013a, 18). Thus, pro-Chinese IR theorists ‘can be viewed as operating in a space of strategic necessity and in what amounts to a tacit alliance with the CCP’ (Blanchard and Lin 2016, 58).

The turn toward Chinese IRT, therefore, is a by-product of government’s effort ‘to rejuvenate its values and political system’ (Zhao 2015, 167). As a senior scholar at Fudan University notes, since the early 2000s, the Chinese IRT debate has quietened and the previous critics no longer raise their voices (although it does not mean that they were convinced) because ‘Beijing has decided that it is time for China to build up
its own social science’ (Interview, Shanghai, August 2013). In fact, many scholars based their calls for building a ‘Chinese school’ on Hu Jintao’s 2003 speech titled ‘Creating outcomes for Chinese characteristics, Chinese style, Chinese vigor culture’ and his subsequent 2004 speech on how to make advancements in the study of philosophy and social sciences (Ren 2009; Zhao 2007). Following this, in March 2011 the Planning Office of the National Social Science Foundation formulated the National 12th Five-Year Plan for Research in Philosophy and Social Science, which is oriented toward constructing a system for innovation in philosophy and social sciences in China (Ren 2012). When Xi Jinping came to power, he largely promoted the ‘Chinese dream’ idea, which is thus far vaguely defined as ‘the great rejuvenation of the China nation’ and this has already become a popular topic for Chinese academics. In 2013 the Central Propaganda Department Theory Bureau issued a notice to nationwide research institutions to register research topics on deepening research on Marxist theory and the Chinese dream. The 15 suggested topics, as posted on the website of China’s National Planning Office of Philosophy and Social Science (NPOPSS), cover almost every aspect of the ‘Chinese dream’, including its origin and contemporary background, opportunities and challenges, basic content and main characteristics, and how it is related to the current development of China (see NPOPSS). As has been seen, these themes have generated a number of publications in IR including the ‘Chinese dream in IR theory’ thesis.

While the government’s intellectual control has somewhat directed the orientation of Chinese IRT discourse, what seems to be encouraging is an emerging new base and a new flow in the Chinese IR system including diversified funding sources, theoretical inputs, greater academic freedom, and other social forces that may hopefully help Chinese IR to gradually move beyond the Party line. While central government funding continues to account for one-third to one-quarter of universities’ annual budgets, universities can mobilize other sources generated from tuition, profit-making enterprises, and applied projects for the business sector. If scholars do not want to or cannot apply for ‘conditional’ grants from the government, they can now find extra funding to support the theoretical work of their own interests. Although to a lesser extent than before, Western grants (e.g. the Ford, Asia, and MacArthur Foundations) continue to be an important source for theoretical research in China, particularly in promoting the collaborative research/forums and deepening the integration between
Western and Chinese scholars and scholarships. Tang Shiping, for instance, has been publishing mainly in English and in the West.

Funding from Chinese private foundations is another important source for research. For example, scholars can now find extra funding to support the theoretical work of their own interests, particularly as publication remains costly. A scholar at Renmin University informed this author that scholars are expected to contribute approximately RMB 30,000-50,000 (AUD 6,000-10,000) for purely theoretical work which do not produce profits for the publishing house, so they have to mobilize funds from other sources (Interview, Beijing, September 2014). Another example is the generous support of a private foundation – the Wang Xuelian Education Fund – for the Tsinghua IR Department in numerous activities. These include the running of its World Peace Forum, Yan’s pre-Qin thought research project, and the Chinese Journal of International Politics (of which Yan is the chief editor) as well as the organization of national conferences and international forums that Tsinghua hosts or co-hosts with foreign partners (e.g. the Brookings–Tsinghua Center for Public Policy and the Carnegie–Tsinghua Center for Global Policy).50 One distinguished professor shared his insightful observations with this author about the growth of such scholarly–policy linkages and the diversification of scholars’ academic choices that have helped expand the agendas of Chinese academics:

As people who have had the chance to join government’s committees, we can on the one hand clearly see the Government’s intentional efforts to include some ideological traditional thinking to encourage, for example, Marxist ideological school or [other] ideological traditional agendas. However... the new development means that more and more sources, more and more initiatives come up from other directions such as from large companies, from localities, from the society, from rich millionaires, and other foundations etc. If you observe the development of Chinese IR in 1990s, you [would conclude that] the choices and the alternatives were narrower then. But now it becomes more diverse. There are so many agencies and jobs that you can choose. If you really have some talents or you have a deep mind, you can find your own way (Interview, Beijing, September 2013).

In addition to these diversified resources, Chinese universities now have greater freedom on recruitment and remuneration policy. As a result, prominent scholars who often hold administrative positions and editorial memberships of leading journals and

50 Ms Wang Xuelian is a member of the China Democratic League and Chairman of the Jia Lian Group. In 2009, she donated 21 million Yuan to Tsinghua University in the form of the ‘Wang Xuelian Education Fund.’ Much of this Fund has been allocated to Tsinghua’s Institute for International Studies, including its research, teaching, administration and students in need (Tsinghua 2010).
book series are taking advantage of institutional resources and personal influence to promote their research and seek followers. This is in line with the logic of ‘law of small numbers’ as the sociology of science has rightly noted. One of the examples is Yan Xuetong’s successful formation of a hard-core group of Tsinghua scholars to work on pre-Qin thought and scientific methodology. As one scholar has observed, the ‘Tsinghua’s approach’ to IR is possible largely because ‘Yan is using the resources of Tsinghua’s Institute for International Studies to train PhD students, hire new staff, and edit national and international journals to produce and distribute the results of this research project in both Chinese and English’ (Callahan 2011, 168).

Furthermore, the pursuit of a distinct brand of Chinese IRT has also attracted international attention and have, therefore, created opportunities for joint research collaboration between Chinese and foreign scholars. There have been calls for the current ‘Chinese School’ (Zhongguo xuepai) label to be replaced by a more broad-based brand like a ‘Greater China School’ (Zhonghua xuepai) for in-depth collective ‘brainstorming’ (Wang Yiwei, Interview, Beijing, September 2013). The theoretical development of a ‘Chinese School’ has also received the contribution from Western scholars and other diasporas Chinese scholars (Wang and Buzan 2014, 44-5; Zhang 2015a, 2015b; He 2012). Yuen-fong Khong, for example, argues that the Chinese concept of ‘tributary system’ can be applied in other cases, such as the American alliance and partnership system (Khong 2013). Prof. Chih-yu Shih and his associates at National Taiwan University are also working on a theory of ‘balance of relationship’ which is partially related to Qin Yaqing’s theory of relationality (Huang and Shih 2014). With a grant from Taiwan’s Chang Ching-kuo Foundation, Professors Yongjin Zhang, Chang Teng-Chi, and Barry Buzan have held several conferences in China and Europe on comparing the ‘Chinese School’ and ‘English School.’ The proceedings of these conferences were later turned into a volume titled ‘Constructing a Chinese School of International Relations: Ongoing Debates and Sociological Realities’ (Zhang and Chang 2016). The pluralization of these material and organizational resources together with scholars’ growing self-confidence, mobility, and quest for independent inquiry with the contribution of diaspora Chinese and Western scholars may be the centrifugal forces that give Chinese IR scholarship the impetus for further development.
Conclusion

This chapter has examined the actual practices of the Chinese IRT debate, manifested in the four major movements toward theoretical innovation. An interesting finding is that the Chinese IRT debate has exerted an unequal impact on the practices of scholars given their diverse training and institutional background. In fact, different approaches toward theoretical innovation in China have been shaped by very different causes. At one end of the spectrum, the ‘universalist’ scholars are genuinely committed to theoretical universalism and are largely unaffected by China-related factors. At the other end, the most radical accounts of Chinese IRT are largely driven by their ethnic identity, cultural exceptionalism, and national interests. Somewhere in between, the pro-Chinese IRT Western-trained scholars project a hybridization of Western and Chinese learning as the result of their socialization into the Chinese contexts. Intertwined with the overarching ideological and political environment in China and the impetus of China’s rise, these structural and agential factors have pulled the Chinese IRT debate in the direction of attaining a general consensus on the need to construct indigenous IR theory. Yet they differ on what pathways must be followed to achieve that end. This explains why theorizing in China has taken various and, at times, seemingly contradictory forms.

Given China’s authoritarian political system, however, the attempt to construct Chinese IRT inevitably raises questions of credibility. This is because, although to a lesser extent than before, there remain discernible intertwinements between the CCP’s rhetoric and Chinese scholars’ research agendas. How to balance theoretical integrity and policy relevance, therefore, will be a major challenge for Chinese academics in the future. Even a staunch pro-Chinese School professor is well-aware of this theory-policy dilemma: ‘you cannot keep a distance to the government because in that case you cannot find the information to build theory. However, if you get too close to the government, your theory will only explain but cannot predict or inform foreign policy’ (Interview, Beijing, August 2013). Moreover, the fact that the Chinese IRT discourses are concentrating mainly on China’s own sources but with little or no interest in a pan-regional theory or other national paradigms (e.g. Japanese or Korean approaches) suggests that this academic pursuit is quite ‘nationalistic.’ More worryingly, is there indeed a sense of ‘Sino-centricism’ in that even an emerging pan-regional/East Asian paradigm must start with a Chinese theory or must be drawn on China’s resources? As
Wang Yizhou (Interview, Beijing, September 2013) has rightly noted, ‘during this booming period, how to find your own thinking identity, how to find China’s own unique contribution at the same time to learn from each other and learn from the other countries will be a challenge for Chinese IR.’

As has been the case with Western knowledge production, critical debate is vital for China’s IR theorizing. China’s IR community is currently on this trajectory, struggling between dependence on Western knowledge and endeavour to develop its own distinct frameworks. The dynamics of the Chinese IR theory debate therefore not only lies in the diverse visions for building a Chinese IR theory but also how to harmonize the ‘Chinese essence’ (ti) and the ‘Western function’ (yong) in constructing new knowledge. As the Chinese national identity as a great power continues to deepen with China’s continuing rise and the growing confidence among Chinese IR community, it is likely that this theoretical debate will continue to dominate the Chinese IR literature. The pursuit of a distinct Chinese brand in IRT has hitherto produced some initial outcomes such as Qin Yaqing’s theory of relationality and Yan Xuetong’s re-examination of ancient Chinese thought for contemporary relevance. These intellectual endeavors by Chinese scholars have also attracted the increasing contribution of many other Sinophone and Western scholars. Therefore, notwithstanding its remaining flaws, the Chinese IRT movement should be seen as an academic movement that reflects the growing self-reflexivity of a non-Western IR academia that to some extent would enrich the sociology of a perceived Western-centric discipline.
Chapter 4: Between East and West: Japanese IR at a crossroads

As an in-between state, Japan’s international identity combines both Western and Eastern influences enabling Japan to develop a world culture that other states can adopt... At the same time..., Japan is neither in the East or the West, instead Japan is removed from either camp and thereby has its own distinct identity (Black and Hwang 2010, 102).

That East Asian IR communities are increasingly interested in knowledge construction has become self-evident. While the form that this interest is taken in Chinese IR academia is quite narrowly focused on the developing of a Chinese style IR Theory, the situation regarding theoretical development in Japan is much more diverse and complicated. Japan’s ‘in-between’ identity – its position as a country situated between the Western and Asian civilizations – and the legacy of its defeat during World War II (WWII) have been the two primary factors shaping the trajectory and characteristics of post-war Japanese IR studies. With the aim to provide an academic inquiry into why Japan failed in WWII and how the country fits into the evolving regional order, IR studies in Japan has been developing predominantly in the direction of historical and area studies. Theoretical research, which constitutes a small portion of Japanese IR studies, is mainly an importation and adaptation from American and European theoretical approaches. Since 2007, however, the ‘non-Western’ IRT debate has intensified within the country and has created renewed interest in indigenous theorizing among the younger generation of the Japanese IR community.

Against this background, Chapter 4 examines the impact of the non-Western/East Asian IR debate on the Japanese IR community. Among East Asian IR communities, Japan has the earliest and most advanced IR studies both in quantitative and qualitative terms. As a ‘bridge of civilizations’ (Shih 2010), Japan also serves as a good case to evaluate both the influence of Western/American IR knowledge and the trans-national appeal of an emerging ‘East Asian’ paradigm such as the ‘Chinese School.’ The chapter finds that the call for non-Western/East Asian IR theory has been quite heatedly debated among the younger generation of Japanese IR academia in recent years. The inner motivations for these Japanese scholars are their sense of ‘inferiority’ to and desire to catch up with Western IR as well as their presumption about the existence of original and innovative IR theories in modern Japan’s history.

The external forces that drive this emerging indigenous discourse are Japan’s relative economic decline and its increased ‘non-Western’/Asian identity, the robust diffusion
of the English School as the result of the collaboration between the English School scholars and returning Britain-educated Japanese scholars, and the financial support from Japanese government and funding agencies to promote world-class universities and researchers. Younger Japanese IR scholars initially tried to confirm the existence of ‘Japanese Schools’ of IR theories in the past e.g. the ‘Kyoto School’ of philosophy and the theory of East Asian Community. They, however, gradually realized the pitfalls and dangers embedded in such IR discourses. This leads to the emerging shift toward post-Western IR direction. An interesting and important finding is that despite growing interests in knowledge production in Japan, there have been few claims for and actual theorizing on a ‘Japanese brand-name’ in IR Theory like the ‘Chinese School.’ Such development has its roots in the structural restraints embedded in Japan’s unresolved identity as a de facto polity situated between ‘East and West’ and the heritage of its war-time history. What would occur, at best, is either historical explorations of Japanese IR or theoretical engagement with the broader non/post-Western IR in general.

To evaluate these points, this chapter is structured as follows. It begins with an introduction of the historical development and characteristics of IR studies in Japan. It then discusses the non-Western/EAIRT discourses and practices manifested in the two academic movements that have been taking shape in Japanese IR – the English-School inspired Japanese IR and the post-Western IR approaches. The underlying factors actually driving these approaches at the national, institutional, and individual levels will also be analysed. Given the relatively large size of the Japanese IR academic community, I focus mainly on those Japanese scholars who are interested in non-Western/East Asian IR and have published in English. The chapter concludes by arguing that given the aforementioned historical constraints of Japan and its unresolved ‘in-between identity’, the country’s IR academic components will most likely follow their own trajectory without integration and synthesis. This will position Japanese IR, just like its foreign policy at the moment, at a crossroads.

**Historiography and characteristics of IR studies in Japan**

Despite budding interests and ‘practical needs’ (Inoguchi 1989, 251) in understanding world affairs since the 1868 ‘Meiji Restoration’, IR came into existence in Japan, as in the West, during the early 20th century, especially as a result of World War I (WWI) (Kawata and Ninomiya 1964, 190; Huang 2007, 179-93). In the pre-WWII period, IR
studies in Japan were strongly influenced by European intellectual traditions, particularly *Staatslehre* – the German teaching about the state. This tradition tends to supply ‘ample historical-institutional backgrounds and describing events and personalities in contexts and their consequences in minute detail’ and therefore ‘was valued for analysing international change that might affect Japan’s foreign relations’ (Inoguchi 2010, 52). However, the field was only recognized as a professional discipline in Japan after WWII. This situation was unlike that in the West where IR was established as a free-standing discipline (e.g. in the UK) or a subfield of political science (in the US). IR in Japan was developed firstly as ‘a complex of different subjects or a patchwork’ of five disciplines: International Law, Diplomatic/International History, Modern Politics, Sociology, and Philosophy (Ikeda 2011b, 17; Inoguchi 2007a). This diversity has hindered the emergence of IR as ‘a discrete and centralized discipline in Japan’ in the sense that there are/were no separate autonomous IR or political science departments within Japanese universities (Inoguchi and Pacon 2001, 15-6; Inoguchi 2002, 121). Instead, Japanese IR scholars have been working in area studies institutions or diplomatic history and law departments. Students undertaking an IR major are often awarded Bachelor of Laws (LLB) degrees instead (Kazuya Yamamoto, Interview 2014). As a result, Japanese scholars tend to produce interdisciplinary work that transcends the traditional boundary of IR and thus appears to be ‘inappropriate to be called IR literature’ by English-speaking readers (Shimizu 2008, 69).

The development of the IR discipline in Japan was also strongly affected by both international and domestic politics. Foreign studies in modern Japan tended to serve the purposes of justifying government’s national and international policies (e.g. pan-Asianism). For example, area studies in pre-war period were focused overwhelmingly on East Asia (Hosoya 1988, 5) partly as a result of Japanese government’s ambition to establish the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (GEACPS). Japan’s unconditional surrender in the wake of WWII set the stage for political science which in turn led to growing interest in IR studies. The 1945–60 timeframe was the embryonic period for the IR scholarship in Japan. The Japan Association of International Relations (JAIR) was established in 1956, and the Japan Institute for International Affairs was created by former Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru in 1959. A number of research institutes focusing on area studies were also established during this period. During this incipient stage, Japanese scholars were interested in studying
war and conflicts, particularly the reasons why Japan failed in the war, the emerging US-Japan alliance and the dynamics of ongoing Cold War. In particular, scholarly inquiry into questions such as what went wrong with the country during the first part of the 20th century and why it failed relative to the West was the key factor shaping early post-war IR studies and explains why Japanese IR has gone in the direction of historical studies, including diplomatic history and other aspects of modern Japanese history (Inoguchi 2007a, 375; Shimizu 2008, 70).

As Japanese scholars were trying to understand war and peace under the context of their country’s defeat in WWII and the ongoing Cold War, they became increasingly interested in theoretical explanations of international politics. They turned to Western, particularly American, theories in order to ‘fill in their intellectual vacuum as quickly as possible’ (Hosoya 1988, 7). Many of them were heavily influenced by realist works (e.g. those of Hans Morgenthau, E.H. Carr, George Kennan) while others opted for idealist/pacifist approaches, arguing that Japan should be a peaceful and neutral state in the emergent postwar ideological confrontation (Huang 2007, 180). This resulted in a debate between the two camps that somewhat resembles the first ‘great debate’ between the realists and idealists in American IR (Inoguchi 2007, Sato 2008). 51 Another prominent feature of theoretical studies in Japan during this time was the American analytical frameworks, concepts, methodologies, and theories were introduced into Japan. These included Morton Kaplan’s theory of international systems, Ernst Haas’s theory of international integration, and Thomas Schelling’s theory of negotiating strategy. Japanese IR studies during the 1980s and 1990s were considerably interested in the theories of world systems and hegemonic stability.

As a seemingly natural counter-reaction to the Americanization of Japanese scholarship, many scholars paid more attention to European approaches (Murata 2010, 359). The interest in theories that stress historical perspectives such as the theories of world systems in the 1980s was shifted to the English School in the 1990s. Some researchers have assimilated the argument of this School and developed their own arguments regarding the international order (Yamamoto 2011, 272-3). In the late 1990s, constructivism was imported to Japan. Due to its tendency of avoiding overgeneralization, constructivism quickly became a popular approach in Japanese

51 Inoguchi argues that the first ‘great debate’ in Japanese IR was relatively different than the one in American IR in that ‘realism’s victory over idealism was somewhat incomplete’ (Inoguchi 2007a, 376; see also Sato 2008).
In fact, the lack of a clear hierarchy and tangible reward structure in Japan has encouraged a diversity of approaches, contrary to those who argue that constructivism dominates the IR paradigm in the country (Bacon and Newman 2002, 40). IR studies in Japan are characterized by the ‘self-sustaining in a mutually segmented fashion’ influence of the four distinctive major intellectual currents – Staatslehre, historicism, Marxism, and positivism (Inoguchi 2002, 115; 2007a). The most important ‘characteristics’ of theoretical studies in Japan, according to Takashi Inoguchi, is the co-existence without integration of these four traditions. The tendency of accepting diversity in IR scholarship can be attributed to the absence of a centralized and competitive structure given the interdisciplinary nature of the discipline in Japan (Inoguchi and Pacon 2001, 15). As a result, there were no ‘great debates’ among different paradigms and approaches as what occurred in Western IR (except for the first ‘incomplete’ great debate between realists and idealists in Japan cited above) (Inoguchi 2007a). This characteristic could be viewed as one of the reasons why Japanese IR has maintained a focus on historical and cultural traditions. This, in turn, leads Japanese IR scholars to be more concerned with pragmatic issues rather than theoretical issues (Shimizu 2008, 71). In addition, the influence of American IR on Japanese IR studies is not as strong as in other Asian countries (e.g. South Korea or Taiwan) both in terms of the number of American PhDs (3-4% of its academy) and their positivist orientation (Inoguchi 2012, 17-8). Instead, Japanese scholars are selectively absorbing American approaches and then endogenizing them to fit the Japanese context. This tradition of ‘permeable insulation’ has something to do with the large domestic market for academic publications in Japan, the country’s long-time model of self-reliance and the limited English proficiency of Japanese scholars (Inoguchi 2012, 22).

52 Despite the dominance of constructivism in Japanese IR, Yamamoto observes that many Japanese researchers do not regard these constructivist approaches as ‘new’ and ‘innovative’ given Japan’s long-term emphasis on the cultural and historical dimensions of IR (Yamamoto 2011, 270).

53 Among the variants of constructivism, Inoguchi and Bacon observe that Japanese scholars are more interested in ‘non-postmodern constructivism, and other assorted pursuits that could not be defined as rationalist’ (Inoguchi and Pacon 2001, 11).
It must be noted, however, that such diversity and lesser American-centrism in research agenda is not replicated in the teaching of IR Theory. The standard IR Theory syllabus in Japan does not seem to be much different than those taught in Western universities. Specifically, theoretical, or philosophical, perspectives on IR are introduced. Specific issue areas such as military security, international political economy, and environmental problems follow. For example, the IR Theory syllabus posted on the official websites of Waseda University and The International University of Japan include the teaching of major IR theories including realism, liberalism, constructivism, and critical approaches (post-structuralism, Neo-Gramscianism, and Feminism). The key required reading for both of these courses is John Baylis, Steven Smith, and Patricia Owens’s *Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. The theoretical triad among neo-realism/neo-liberal institutionalism/social constructivism seems to be the very core of IR teaching at these esteemed Japanese universities, which means there may be less opportunity to study other theories in depth, such as post-structuralism, post-colonialism or critical realism. According to Josuke Ikeda (Interview, February 2014), this trend already appears through the contents of IR textbook in Japan – many of them do devote space for explaining Anglo-American positivist approaches, but not for others. For instance, some years ago when the JAIR launched a four-volume work on ‘International Relations in Japan’ that theoretical triad was covered but nothing more than that. In addition to introducing Western IR theories, some course conveners may include contemporary Japan’s diplomatic policy in order to attract greater student interest. Another different feature is that more lectures tend to be assigned to the history of international politics than those in other countries (Kazuya Yamamoto, Interview February 2014).

With regard to the organizational settings, the Japanese IR community to date is the third largest of its kind in the world (more than 2,000 members). However, as Inoguchi and Pacon (2001, 2) have argued, ‘Japanese international relations has been held back by decentralization, and the lack of a secure and discrete institutional foothold in Japanese universities. These factors, compounded by a substantial language barrier, have constituted a serious bar to extended dialogue between Japanese scholars and scholars from other national academies.’ Nonetheless, there have been significant efforts in improving the situation in recent years. With the growing interest in IR studies, some separate IR Departments have been established
within Japanese Universities (e.g. the School of International Relations at the
International University of Japan, the College of International Relations at
Ritsumeikan University, and the School of International Studies at Kanazawa
University). There have also been various efforts to liberate Japanese academics from
their slight isolation from the global IR community by the publications of influential
Japanese and English journals. *Kokusai Seiji (International Relations)*, one of the key
journals of JAIR, has been publishing articles primarily in three areas: Japanese
diplomacy and international relations; area and international studies of the rest of the
world; and international relations theories. Another key journal is *Japanese Journal of
Political Science (JJPS)*, published by Cambridge University Press since 2000. The
most vigorous of these efforts was the launching of an influential English-language
journal, *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific (IRAP)*, published by Oxford
University Press in 2001. This journal aims to be a first-rate IR journal with a focus on
important developments in the Asia-Pacific and strives to become a meeting place
where various issues and all methodological approaches and schools of thought are
debated, including non-Western theories of international relations (Oxford Journals).54

In comparison with *Kokusai Seiji*, which tends to publish a larger number of articles
that employ historical approaches, or with JJPS which focuses more on broader
political science issues, IRAP more actively publishes theoretical oriented articles.
Most recently, the launching of the new English journal *Asian Journal of Comparative
Politics (AJCP)* in 2015 targets the publication of theoretically or methodologically
original articles that articulate conceptual and theoretical perspectives in Comparative
Politics. Although this journal is mainly comparative politics oriented, it also touches
other subfields of political science, particularly International Relations.55 Such
publications indicate that ‘an increasing number of Japanese IR researchers are more
eager than before to use a common lens to engage in dialogue with researchers around
the world’ (Yamamoto 2011b, 273). This growing confidence and maturation of the
Japanese epistemic community together with the aforesaid development and
characteristics of Japanese IR studies set the background for the non-Western/East
Asian IR debate that will be discussed below.

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54 IRAP has gained A-ranking journal status in Australia (as ranked by Australian Political Science
Association).

55 Edited by the leading Japanese IR scholar Takashi Inoguchi, sponsored by Japan Society for the
Promotion of Science, and published by Sage, AJCP aims to become a new meeting place for political
scientists and IR scholars with an interest in Asian politics (Sage Journals).
The non-Western IR Theory debate and its imprints on Japanese IR

At the outset, it should be noted that the current non-Western/EAIRT debate does have an impact, albeit a modest one, on Japanese IR community. In particular, the Japanese IR community does not share a strong vision or endeavours in practice to develop a national School of IR like a substantial faction within its Chinese counterpart. This is because the development of ‘Japanese’ IR is conditioned by the historical burden of Japan’s ‘failed’ pan-Asianism in the past, the country’s relative decline at present as well as its ambiguous identity as the country situating between the Western and Asian civilizations. As a result, the knowledge construction movement in Japan has taken the form of broader discussions on the non-/post-Western IR agenda. At present, this theoretical approach has garnered interest among a portion of Japanese IR academia, particularly those younger Western-trained scholars. Other theoretical oriented scholars are still working within the framework of existing theories. Their response toward the non-/post-Western theoretical narratives will be discussed in the last section of this chapter. In what follows, I will analyse the national and institutional settings that have stimulated discussions on non-Western IR from Japanese perspective and how it shapes the practices of involved individual academics.

Power shift, national identity, and generational change

For starters, why have non-Western IR narratives emerged in Japan now? It is argued here that the growing interest in non-Western IR in Japan is the result of three factors: 1) power shift (the relative decline of America and consequently the lesser appeal of American theories to at least a portion of Japanese IR academia); 2) interests (the need for Japan to build a new identity in the coming ‘Asian century’ amid China’s rapid rise); and 3) generational change (the emergence of younger generation of well-educated scholars who are trying to eradicate the long-time inferiority complex of being a knowledge consumer of Western knowledge). Cross-cutting among these three factors is the financial support by the Japanese government in order to build ‘global centers of excellence’ in science (GCOE) which have been utilized to invest in research projects on non-Western IR as well as to disseminate research outcomes.

First, the surge of interest in non-Western IR discourses in Japan occurs at the time where there is a big transition in the international political economy, particularly the relative decline of US. Most of the Japanese scholars interested in non-Western IRT
whom this author had the chance to interview attribute the emergence of non-Western IR discourse to the decline of the US and the lesser appeal of Western IR theories to them. After its WWII defeat, Japan tended to subscribe to the dominant post-war and U.S.-led liberal international order. This order is premised on American dominance and the importance of other industrialized advanced democracies such as Europe and Japan. Naturally, Japanese IR scholars have followed US-centered theoretical development (Yoshihide Soeya, Interview, December 2013). Nevertheless, the changing dynamics in the international relations of Asia and Japan, particularly the unprecedented power transition have posed some important puzzles for American IR theories. Leading Japanese IR scholar Takashi Inoguchi (Interview, December 2013), for example, questions along such line: ‘what theories explain when the US is declining? Will the second and third [great power] assume that role? Why is there no balance of power against a rising China? Realism, balance of power, offensive realist theory, and ‘tributary system’ theory – all these theories are interesting but none of them fits and are not persuasive sufficiently.’ In his view, ‘the West has gone bankrupt’ in the sense that ‘it has not introduced new appealing knowledge (end of IR theory).’

This observation of Inoguchi is largely shared by other proponents of non-Western/Japanese IR such as Kosuke Shimizu, Shiro Shato, and Josuke Ikeda who, as will be discussed later in the chapter, are also dissatisfied with the Western domination in IRT. In the view of these scholars, the decline of American power and knowledge leaves an intellectual vacuum for scholars beyond the West to fill. In the case of Japanese IR scholars, this desire is manifested in their ambition to construct middle-range theories rather than grand theorizing to explain this unprecedented power transition in the region. This is because, as Inoguchi (Interview, December 2013) observes, ‘we are not particularly interested in doing theorizing for theorizing’s sake, rather we try to make sense out of important empirical phenomena like the rise of China or the decline of the US.’

Second and partly flowing from the above trend is the sharpening of Japan’s identity as a non-Western state. While Japan has largely identified itself as part of the Western liberal order since 1945, its Asian identity has been recently revived. In fact, as a

56 As noted earlier, I will first discuss the rationales and motivations of those Japanese scholars who are interested in non-Western/Japanese IR. The impact of the EAIRT debate on ‘mainstreamers’ and other factions of the Japanese IR communities will be analyzed in the later sections of the chapter.
country sitting between Western and Eastern civilizations, Japan has been struggling to locate itself between the two worlds. Its first detachment from the West to Asia (1894-1945) culminated in ‘Asia for Asians’ vision. Yet, pan-Asianism ended up in calamity for Japan and the entire region. Meanwhile, the post-war alignment to Western circles, from a Japanese perspective, has not been so easy. Recently, concerns have been raised regarding the ‘declining morality’ of the West. As one professor observes, ‘some people started wondering if the Western/American IR is something we can keep relying on. Thinking about 9/11, invasions of Afghanistan or Iraq, people may ask is it a right way? Something might be wrong here’ (Kosuke Shimizu, Interview, February 2014). According to Takashi Inoguchi, a ‘Japan in Asia’ school of thought has been regaining strength in Japan, especially after Japanese strengthened perceptions over the West’s (and mainly the United States’) ‘seemingly exploitive or opportunistic behavior’ during the 1997 Asian financial crisis (Inoguchi 2001, 205).

This ‘Asian identity’ has also been translated into the field of IR. In 2007, on the 50th anniversary of JAIR, IRAP – the JAIR’s English journal – published its special issue titled ‘Why is there no non-Western IR theory?’ This was the first time when non-Western IR specialists seriously attempted to provide an answer by devoting a single volume of an academic journal to this question. Inoguchi, as IRAP’s founding editor, contributed a piece to this issue exploring the situation in Japan. In particular, he propounded two questions emphasising Japan as a member of the non-West: (1) To what extent has Japan contributed original theories to the discipline of IR? (2) In what manner has Japanese IR been developed thus far? (Inoguchi 2007b, 157; 2007a; Sato 2008, 50). Inoguchi argues that if IR theories are not understood in the American positivist way, there were Japanese IR theories in the past under the form of middle-range theories. These theoretical contributions can be found in the work of three prominent modern Japanese scholars – Nishida Kitaro, Tabata Shigejiro, and Hirano Yoshitaro – which were categorized by Inoguchi respectively as an innate constructivist, a popular sovereignty theorist of international law and a Marxist theorist of regional integration (Inoguchi 2007a, 370-83). These ‘theories’ were not recognized in the West because of the differences in the academic areas and concerns between Japanese (philosophical, regional, and history studies) and American IR (positivism) (Inoguchi 2007a, 70-1; Shimizu 2008). Also in 2007, there was another publication by Sakai Tetsuya that further explained history and genealogy of IR in Japan (Sakai 2007). As can be seen, there have been new narratives and discourses
coming to the frontline of IR in Japan, creating renewed interest in indigenous theorizing.

Third and most importantly is the chain effect among non-Western IR academia in general and generational change within Japanese IR community in particular. Prior to the 2007 IRAP special issue of on ‘non-Western IR Theory in Asia’, there were a considerable number of papers and books which had already suggested possible ‘paradigm change’ in the discipline of IR (e.g. Chan 2001; Ling 2002). These pioneering works open up the possibility of alternatives, apart from Western mainstream theory. What makes these contemporary offerings on non-post/Western IR different from previous works may be ascribed to the collective endeavours: there has been a chain effect among different scholars, both inside and outside the West or Asia, touching on and arguing about the same questions – why haven’t we looked at non-Western traditions and enriched the discipline? These underlying currents have generated an intention of some Japanese scholars to ‘catch up with Western counterparts’ (Josuke Ikeda, Interview, February 2014).

This ‘chain effect’ is rooted in the inferiority complex to the West shared among non-Western IR communities. In Japan, this sentiment can be traced back to the 1960s. In 1966, Hikomatsu Kamikawa, the first president of JAIR, raised the question ‘Are we monkeys?’ The question came from Adolf Hitler’s controversial book Mein Kampf. Among other things, Hitler argued that the Japanese race was a typical race of ‘the bearers of European and American culture’ but not ‘the creators of the culture.’ Applying this to IR, Kamikawa then posed the question, ‘Are Japanese IR scholars only monkeys to import European and American IR theories?’ (quoted in Kamino 2008, 29). There was, however, no distinct research program in response to Kamikawa’s question apart from a small number of research investigations on the development of Japanese IR studies and the possible contributions of Japanese experience to a more ‘international’ discipline of IR (e.g. Inoguchi and Pacon 2001; Murata 2010). In 1996, the American scholar Samuel Huntington advanced a no less controversial ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis in which he listed Japan as one of the eight civilizations in the world – an acknowledgment of Japanese cultural uniqueness. In this context, a distinct type of Japanese exceptionalism came into play. This was reminiscent of those works relating to Nihonjinron (theory of Japanese uniqueness) in the 1980s and 1990s which argued that ‘Japanese culture is unique, exceptional, and
thus parochial’ (Hagström 2015, 129). The chain effect from the non-Western IRT movement thus gave Japanese scholars a chance to eschew their traditional inferiority complex. Note the following remarks of a Japanese professor who identifies himself with the non-Western IRT camp:

Scholars in this country (and many other countries as well) continue to have a feeling of inferiority to the West. It is more like (what presents in) post-colonialism. In postcolonial countries, they have got the same feelings. If they have the chance to say something which actually asserts that they have advanced IR theory beyond those of the West, I am sure they will go for it (Kosuke Shimizu, Interview, February 2014).

This ‘chain effect’ also occurred at the time of generational change within Japanese IR academia, particularly the return and/or recruitment of qualified Western-trained scholars. Among the scholars who are interested in a Japanese contribution to IR theory, a group of young scholars (Josuke Ikeda, Shiro Sato, Kosuke Shimizu, Tomoya Kamino, among others) based at universities across the Kansai region (Kyoto, Osaka, and Kobe) have been very active in exploring the ‘non-Western’ IR agenda in the Japanese context. Rooted in their prior training in the reflectivist traditions of IR Theory (critical theories, post-modernism/post-structuralism, and English School approaches), these scholars are inspired by Acharya and Buzan’s call for non-Western IRT in general and Inoguchi’s inquiry about Japanese IR theories in particular. Yet they have even gone further than what senior scholars e.g. Takashi Inoguchi and Sakai Tetsuya have claimed about the existence of IR theories in Japan. These younger scholars have taken actual steps in re-examining Japan’s modern IR discipline to give a positive answer to the question of whether there were Japanese IR theories in the past. Josuke Ikeda and Shiro Sato – the two pioneers of this project – actively invited would-be interested colleagues from within and beyond Japan (e.g. Kosuke Shimizu, Yongchul Cho, Tomoya Kamino, and Ching-chang Chen) to join the camp of ‘non-Western IR Theory’ in Japan, believing it to become ‘the next generation of IR Theory’ (Shimizu, Interview, February 2014). As Josuke Ikeda further explains the inner motivations for his own engagement with ‘non-Western’/Japanese IR:

Originally I was not much interested in such greater questions of non-Western IR. My beginning was an independent study regarding the disciplinary development of Japanese IR. The background was my consideration that the newest academics in Japan were eager to import and expand the latest approaches, namely social constructivism or post-positivism, but why not
focus more on past literature of my own country, creating something ‘new’ through exploring ‘old’ (Interview, February 2014).

These scholars formed a panel at the 2008 ISA Convention in San Francisco which was dedicated to the single theme ‘Is there a Japanese IR?’ As this was the first time Japanese scholars comprehensively examined the presence of IR theories in Japan, the presentations attracted many comments and critiques (Giorgio Shani, Interview, February 2014). The papers were later amended and edited into a volume with the same title, published by Ryukoku University in Kyoto. This book drew noticeable attention from abroad, presumably because it was written in English and was publicly available on the Ryukyu University’s website (Kosuke Shimizu, Interview, February 2014). In this volume, chapter contributors supported Inoguchi’s argument that there were operative IR theories in Japan even before WWII. These ‘theories’ were mainly introduced by former disciples of the ‘Kyoto School’ of philosophy. They criticized Western IR and proposed a new emerging order in East Asia. The rationale for the re-examination of ‘past Japanese IR,’ despite the fact that these ‘theories’ were discredited by the ‘failed’ Japanese experience in WWII, was to learn from its intellectual contributions and flaws to construct ‘new Japanese IR.’

Since then, non-Western/Japanese IR has become a research subject of growing interests at several Kyoto-based institutions, including Ritsumeikan, Kyoto, and Ryukoku Universities. The reason Kyoto becomes the center of research on non-Western/Japanese IR is largely threefold. Culturally, Kyoto is the former capital of Japan which represents the traditional culture, values, and history of Japan while Tokyo – the current capital – is believed to adopt a more modern lifestyle which is closer to Western values and scholarship. Intellectually, it is the place of origin of the ‘Kyoto School’ of philosophy – a ‘brand-name’ for intellectuals in the country and a rich resource for constructing ‘Japanese IR’. Institutionally, the Kyoto-based universities have benefitted from viable funding sources (see Table 4.1) and a remarkably high concentration of theory-oriented scholars who are well-trained in both the mainstream and reflectivist traditions of IR Theory (including post-structuralism and the English School) discussed above.

It is also important to acknowledge the role of government funding in promoting this research. In 2006, the Japanese Cabinet approved the Global Centers of Excellent (GCOE) Program. This is an initiative by the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture,
Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) to provide financial support for the development of internationally outstanding centers of education and research and internationally competitive universities (Website of Kyoto University). Another Program for enhancing the profile of Japanese universities funded by MEXT is the Project for Advancement of Academic Research at Private Universities. At least three education and research centers based in the Kyoto surrounding region have received funding from these Programs to promote their research on non/post-Western IR: the Center for Southeast Asian Studies at Kyoto University, the Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies at the Ryukoku University, and the Institute for International Relations and Area Studies at Ritsumeikan University. Other funding agencies include the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Research (JSPS) and Japan Society for Intercultural Studies (JSIS). JSPS is an incorporated administrative agency which was established by MEXT to provide academic research funding. JSPS and MEXT generate funding for research training, promotion of international exchanges and other academic activities. JSIS meanwhile supports young scholars in academic ‘dispatch’ programs i.e. sending Japanese scholars to foreign institutions as visiting or postdoctoral fellows. These institutions have made use of these funding sources to organize a number of high-profile international conferences and seminars on the theme of non/post-Western IR Theory (see Table 4.1). Moreover, these centres have good collaboration with other national and regional institutions in Europe (Leiden and Aberystwyth Universities), Taiwan, Korea, and India etc., thus spreading such research and the discussions that accompany it beyond Japan.

In addition, the surge of interest in non-/post-Western IRT in Japan is partly linked to the ‘globalization’ of the English School. Unlike Chinese scholars who are inspired mostly by the reputation rather than the substance of the English School in their attempt to construct the ‘Chinese School’ (see Chapter 3), Japanese scholars seem to be genuinely interested in developing a Japanese vision of international society. This is because the diffusion of the English School in Japan has been a genuine and robust process of two-way travel: through returning Britain-educated scholars (although this number remains less than US-educated scholars) and via frequent visits by and cooperation with leading English School scholars. For example, Josuke Ikeda, one of the most pro-active scholars in importing the English School approaches to Japan acknowledges that his attitude and ideas about theory was rooted in his education at Aberystwyth University during 2003-2004. At that time, Aberystwyth had a number
of theorists in English School, Critical Theory and post-positivism in general. Thus his orientation both in teaching and research is very much influenced by his British educational background (Interview, February 2014).

In April 2009, the Institute for International Relations and Area Studies at Ritsumeikan University conducted a three-year project entitled ‘Critical Analysis of the English School and Post-Western IR Theory.’ The participants of this project are mostly well-trained English School scholars in Japan (e.g. Hiroaki Ataka (PhD – University of Warwick), Josuke Ikeda (MA - Aberystwyth University), Makoto Onaka (2004-2005 Nitobe Fellow, St Antony’s College, University of Oxford), Ching-chang Chen (PhD-University of Wales, Aberystwyth). Moreover, Ritsumeikan University has organized five annual international conferences/seminars that frequently bring in renowned English School experts such as Andrew Linklater, Hidemi Suganami, and Ian Hall to teach students and discuss the work of their Japanese counterparts. As the result of this robust engagement, the first comprehensive volume/textbook on the English School and its relevance to Japanese IR was published in Japanese in October 2013 (Sato, Onaka, and Ikeda 2013). Many other articles written in English linking the English School with the Japanese IR movement have also been published in these universities’ websites and journals as well as abroad (e.g. Ikeda 2010; Chen 2011b; Kamino 2008; Ikeda 2008). As a scholar who has contributed a chapter in that English School volume explains the interest in the English School among Japanese scholars:

The English School has some kind of attraction simply because it is not American. There has been a common understanding that IR in the post-war period has been dominated by the US for ages. So the English School is one of the best counter-arguments. That’s the reason it is popular. If that is a real issue, then there are some connections between the English School and non-Western IRT (Shimizu, Interview, February 2014).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>International Conferences/Seminars</th>
<th>Organizing institutions</th>
<th>Associated research projects and grants</th>
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<tr>
<td>27/11/10</td>
<td>The Hegemony of Western/Non-Western International Theory</td>
<td>RITSUMEIKAN UNIVERSITY Institute for International Relations and</td>
<td>These conferences/seminars were organized as parts of the two Research projects at Ritsumeikan University on the themes: ‘Critical Analysis of the English School and Post-Western IR Theory’ and ‘Deconstructing Western Paradigms in International Relations’. Grants: Ministry of Education,</td>
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<td>23-25/03/10</td>
<td>International Theory at the Crossroads: Critical Scrutiny from Western/non-Western Views</td>
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<td>26/03/12</td>
<td>English School in International Relations Theory and Post-Hegemony in International Order</td>
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<td>09/03/13</td>
<td>The English School of IR: its Impacts on East Asian and Global</td>
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<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Institution/Location</td>
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<tr>
<td>24/02/14</td>
<td>English School, Post-Western IR, and Beyond</td>
<td>Area Studies &amp; Asia-Pacific Peace Research Association</td>
<td>Culture, Sports, Science and the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Research Project, Grant Category: ‘International Theory in the Age of Conviviality and Post-Hegemony.’</td>
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<tr>
<td>15/10/11</td>
<td>Rethinking the Discourse of ‘Non-Western’ IR Theories</td>
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<td>18/05/14</td>
<td>Future of International Relations Study (Speakers: Amitav Acharya and Hiroshi Nakanishi (Kyoto University).</td>
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<td>24/11/11</td>
<td>Asian International Relations and Peace in Korea</td>
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<td>08/03/12</td>
<td>Critical Review of Prospects for East Asian International Relations</td>
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<td>11/2013</td>
<td>In Search of Non-Western International Relations Theory: The Kyoto School Revisited</td>
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<td>21/01/11</td>
<td>Toward Multi-lineal International Order of East Asia</td>
<td>OSAKA UNIVERSITY School of International Public Policy</td>
<td>The Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Research Project’s Young Researchers Overseas Dispatch Program.</td>
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<tr>
<td>25/03/11</td>
<td>Toward East Asian International Relations Theory: More May Be Better or More Will Be Worse?</td>
<td>Kyung Hee University, Seoul (Korea)</td>
<td>Co-organized with Kyoto University’s Global COE Program.</td>
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<tr>
<td>23/02/11</td>
<td>Politics of East Asian International Relations Theory: Toward ‘Non-Western’ International Relations Theory</td>
<td>Institute for Area Studies, Leiden University (Netherlands)</td>
<td>Organized by Josuke Ikeda, who by then was a visiting researcher at Leiden University.</td>
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<tr>
<td>24/02/12</td>
<td>Theorizing Asia – The Development of Post-Western IR Theory</td>
<td>O.P. Jindai Global University (India)</td>
<td>Co-organized with Ryukoku University’s Afrasian Center for Peace &amp; Development Studies.</td>
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<tr>
<td>15/11/14</td>
<td>Dialogue between Different IR Traditions for One World: Western IR and the Challenge of non-Western/post-Western IR.</td>
<td>Japan Association of Int’l Relations (JAIR) Annual Convention 2014</td>
<td>The Research Caucus for Junior Researchers and Graduates Students – JAIR.</td>
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**Table 4.1. Major International conferences and research projects on non/post-Western IR organized and/or participated by Japanese scholars**

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57 Information was retrieved from the official websites of relevant Universities as well as via this author’s personal interviews with Japanese scholars in late 2013 and early 2014.
The above discussion about growing Japanese interest in non-/post-Western IR serves as a springboard for the following section where I will further analyse how these structural and agential factors have shaped the two major currents about theory development in Japan: the Japanese IR project and the emerging turn toward ‘post-Western IR’ agenda. One significant implication the EAIRT debate has had on the practices of Japanese scholars is that they have gradually shifted from the claim for some sort of distinctive ‘Japanese IR’ toward the more broadly focused post-Western IR agenda. The dynamics and constraints of each of these academic movements will be investigated hereunder.

‘Japanese IR’ as a by-product of modern Japanese philosophy and the expanded ‘international society’

When non-Western IR discourse reached the Japanese IR community in 2007, it initially presented itself in the claim for a ‘Japanese School of IR.’ The two major intellectual inputs for developing ‘Japanese IR’ are modern Japanese philosophy and the extended English School concept of ‘international society.’ First, if Chinese scholars go back to their ancient thinkers and concepts in the attempt to construct a ‘Chinese School’, Japanese scholars similarly nurture their history and traditions – Buddhist, Shinto and Confucian thinking which were collectively embodied in modern Japanese philosophy, particularly within the ‘Kyoto School.’ Second, with the recent import of the English School into Japan, some Japanese scholars have tried to develop a Japanese vision of international society by categorizing modern Japanese philosophical thought into the English School language. The by-product of these dual attempts is a confirmation of the existence of Japanese style IR theory during the prewar period. This is a particularly significant historical epoch for Japan when the country encountered the expansion of European ‘international society’ after the successful Meiji Restoration. According to Josuke Ikeda, Japan, during the 1920s-1940s period, was faced with an identity dichotomy due to its unique geographic location between the Western colonizers, as an emerging major power, and the colonized, and yet as a country outside the Western world. The structure of Japanese vision of international society is based on ‘in-between-ness’ – a bridge between the Western and Eastern (Asian) civilizations. In other words, ‘Japaneseness is in-between-ness’ (Ikeda 2008, 22). This distinct identity has its root in modern Japanese
philosophy, particularly the pioneering work of Kyoto School’s founder Nishida Kitaro.

After the Meiji Restoration era (1868-1889), Western cultural and intellectual traditions were intensively imported into Japan. Japanese intellectuals then were eager to learn and absorb them and combined these ideas and thoughts with Japanese traditional philosophy. This led to the formation of the two prominent schools of thought in modern Japan: the ‘Tokyo School’ and the ‘Kyoto School’ of philosophy. Among these two factions, the Kyoto School has been more widely known thanks to its development of original systems of thought by creatively drawing on the intellectual and spiritual traditions of East Asia as well as the methods and content of Western philosophy. The School was associated with academics from the Department of Modern Philosophy at the University of Kyoto. Nishida Kitaro, the Department’s first Chair (from 1913 to 1928) is regarded as the founder of and most prominent figure within the School. From the outset, the Kyoto School tried to bridge the gap between Western and Eastern philosophy. It was influenced by both European philosophers (Kant, Hegel and Nietzsche) and Asian philosophic tradition (Buddhism and Confucianism) (Williams 2014, 19). Although the Kyoto School’s contribution to the global field of philosophy has long been a subject of intensive study for scholars (e.g. Waldenfels 1966; Heisig 1990; Goto-Jones 2007, 2009; Williams 2014), its relevance to the field of IR was explored only recently when the non-Western IRT movement reached the Japanese IR community. Accordingly, contemporary Japanese IR scholars have learned from both the innovation and failure of the Kyoto School, particularly how the theory was abused by the wartime Japanese government to justify their imperialism in Asia, to guide their course of theory development.

Nishida Kitaro (1870–1945) characterizes the Kyoto School as an effort to reply to the Hegelian challenge that Asia is ‘the land of Oriental despotism’ (Shih 2010a). Throughout his years of contemplation and publication, Nishida has always endeavored to provide a truly universal philosophy by combining the Western philosophy of self and the Eastern philosophy of Zen Buddhism. The Kyoto School evolved based on Nishida’s conceptualization of pure experience, self-awakening and place of nothingness which together constitute a theory of identity formation.58 Often

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58 Nishida defines ‘pure experience’ as direct experience without deliberative discrimination and identified ‘self-awakening’ with the state of the ‘absolute free will.’ In 1926, when Nishida combined
called a Japanese style constructivist (Goto-Jones 2009; Inoguchi 2010), Nishida developed the consciousness of Japanese identity when the country is allocating between the East and West by employing Asian philosophies systematically in his thinking and methods.

Ontologically, Nishida’s theory of identity formation relies on East Asian religious concept of ‘nothingness’ as opposed to Western philosophical concept of ‘being.’ In Nishida’s conceptualization, ‘being’ is understood as ‘the objectivity of determinate things’ while ‘nothingness’ is associated with a kind of ‘transcendental subjectivity of consciousness or the heart-mind’. In other words, they represent the ‘subjective (noetic) and objective (noematic) dimensions of reality’ (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy – Kyoto School). The notion of nothingness recalls Chinese Daoism, particularly Laozi and Zhuangzi’s concept of wu or ‘non-existence’ and Buddhist expression of suntaya or ‘emptiness.’ In Zen Buddhist thought, when one enters the state of absolute nothingness, there is no distinction between subject and object while such distinction is essential to Western philosophers (e.g. Aristotle and Kant). Attempting to apply this to reality, Nishida provided an explanation of the agency-structure relations that supposedly transcend the boundaries of cultures or history (Shimizu 2011, 164). Reality is thus understood as a dynamic ‘identity of the absolute contradiction’ between subjective nothingness and objective being (Shimizu 2011). Nishida ultimately developed the notion of place of absolute nothingness (basho) as a non-dualistic ‘concrete’ logic through the affirmation of what he calls the ‘absolutely contradictory self-identity’ (Shimizu 2011). Like the Hegelian dialectics, basho is a contradiction between opposites but unlike the Hegelian dialectics, the tension of thesis and anti-thesis in the place of nothingness needs not be resolved with a synthesis but rather they can co-exist. For example, in 1934 Nishida wrote:

> Reality is being and at the same time nothingness; it is being-and-nothingness [u-soku-mu], nothingness-and-being; it is both subjective and objective, noetic and noematic. Reality is the unity of subjectivity and objectivity, and thus the self-identity of what is absolutely contradictory. Or rather, it is not that [the separate spheres of] subjectivity and objectivity come to unite, and then we first have reality. [The opposition of] subjectivity and objectivity must instead be thought from out of a dynamically dialectical reality that is self-determining’ (Nishida 1970, 29; quoted in Standfürd Encyclopedia).

the concepts of ‘pure experience’ and ‘absolute free will,’ he offered the important concept of ‘place’ of nothingness (Standforder Encyclopedia).
Nishida’s conceptualization of place of nothingness has been employed by contemporary IR scholars to analyze Japan’s identity in the period of the ‘expansion of European international society’ (Watson and Bull 1984). During this time, Japan faced the identity puzzle of whether or not it should be a Western or Eastern nation. For Nishida, Japan apart from being a normal state can also be a ‘culture that could provide a place of nothingness, thus absorbing the elements of other cultures and integrating them into one cultural piece’ (Shimizu 2011, 177). The idea of Japan being a ‘place of nothingness’ can resolve Japan’s difficult in-between position in a number of ways. First, Japan can avoid choosing sides between the seemingly contradictory East and West, thus alternating comfortably ‘among different moral principles without any sense of its identity being threatened’ (Shih 2010b, 549). Second, it enables Japan’s free reentry anywhere into the world, therefore ‘overcoming the arbitrary modernist historiography or stagnant Confucian harmony’ (Shih 2010a, 17).

Despite his initial aim to bridge between Western and Eastern philosophy, Nishida’s theory of place of nothingness was later radicalized by his disciples into the confrontation and class of sovereign states. After the successful Meiji Restoration, Japan emerged as a modern state and the first non-white country which managed to defeat the Asian long-time great power (China in 1895) and a powerful European power (Russia in 1905). Such military strength allowed Japan to declare its autonomy and proclaim a distinctly Japanese set of values (Heisig and Maraldo 1995, 293). As the Japanese government was determined to expand its country’s influence across Asia after the Manchuria Incident in 1931 and Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933, they asked Kyoto School philosophers to provide intellectual justification for its policy objectives. In 1942, the Kyoto School scholars organized the Chuo Koron (Overcoming Modernity) symposia titled ‘The Standpoint of World History and Japan’ (Williams 2014, 15). The idea of ‘overcoming modernity’ implies an overcoming that ‘moves through and beyond’ the limits and problems of Western modernity by replacing ‘modern materialistic civilization, based on individualism and avarice,’ with ‘a spiritual culture based on the moral values of the East and the scientific achievements of the West’ (Shillony 2006, 429; see also Williams 2004).

In 1943 Yatsugi Kazuo, a member of the Center for National Strategy, approached Nishida and asked him to provide a scholarly rationale for the so-called ‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’ (GEACS) which was initially announced by the Japanese
government in July 1940. Nishida later wrote an essay entitled ‘Principles for a New World Order’ in which he helped justify Japan’s central role in East Asia – the key foundation of GEACS (Standford-Encyclopedia). Some ‘Kyoto School’ disciples then developed a ‘Theory of East Asian Community’ to proclaim the superiority of Japanese vision for GEACS and Japan’s central role in East Asia as the Japanese was the only people in the world that succeeded in converging the West with the East. This was an attempt to displace the West from Asia to create a new, pluralistic world order based on East Asian traditional values (Heisig and Maraldo 1995, 292). Japan was able to lead in the formation of a universal GEACS allegedly because ‘Japanese people were the only children of Goddess Amaterasu in the world that, unbounded by the limitation of one’s place, could know both sides. Manchukuo was the quintessential site of such imagined infinity because it was the origin of the two major civilizations – Christianity and Confucianism’ (Shih 2013, 17; Shih and Huang 2011). Undoubtedly, this logic has helped to justify Japanese imperialism across Asia during the 1930s and 1940s in the guise of pan-Asianism, starting with the invasion of Manchuria – the ideal ‘place of nothingness’ in the Kyoto School’s imagination. In other words, the Kyoto School of philosophy or pan-Asianism had been abused by the Japanese government and turned into an ‘ideology’ (Hotta 2007, 3).

Although predominantly regarded as pre-war Japanese philosophy, the Kyoto School still has a lingering impact on contemporary Japanese IR in a number of aspects. The fact that the ‘Kyoto School’ has been recently rediscovered by contemporary Japanese IR scholars tells us something about how non-Western IRT is constructed and how it is calculated in Japan. On the one hand, it is believed by Japanese scholars that the Kyoto School philosophers were among the first academic communities outside the West who managed to develop original and creative theories based on ‘non-Western’ traditions. This confirms that there have long been ‘non-Western’ IR theories in Japan (Inoguchi 2007a; Shimizu et al. 2008). The Japanese-ness in IR can be found in the understanding of the relationship between Japan and the world – its location between the two civilizations (East and West) and the two orders (the colonizer and the colonized worlds) (Ikeda 2008, 10). This unique and exceptional position of Japan as a quasi-power beyond the West, put in the terms of contemporary Japanese scholars, provides a distinct Japanese vision of international society (Ikeda 2008, 7) and international order (Sakai 2008; Shimizu 2008, 72-3) or in the words of Shogo Suzuki, ‘an alternative international society’ through the ideal of pan-Asianism (Suzuki 2014;
see also Suzuki 2005). More specifically, the ‘Japanese-ness’ presents itself in the form of the question of autonomy, based on the self-identity of being ‘in-between.’ The “‘in-between-ness” posed a question to what extent Japan should have been autonomous in international politics (or to what extent Japan should have been free from European rules).’ And it is ‘this question about autonomy that differentiates a Japanese vision of international society from others, and thus gives a positive answer to the inquiry of “Japanese IR”’ (Ikeda 2008, 21).

Beyond the English School, the claim for Japanese ‘in-between’ identity is also found in the work of contemporary Japanese constructivist scholars. Takashi Inoguchi observes that there is no strong national identity in Japan because, given the domination of pacifism in the post-war period, ‘Japanese are intrinsically hesitate [sic] to identify themselves with the state/nation.’ Similarly, Japanese have ‘ambiguous feelings about Asia’ (Inoguchi 2009, 174); however, Asia ‘was essential to the Japanese identity because it reminded Japan that it was not Europe. To be Asian is to be not European, but neither to be anything specific’ (Shih 2010b, 150). This dual identity is a key to understanding some of the puzzles surrounding Japan’s inconsistent foreign policy. One example is Japan’s adherence to international environmental norms on the one hand and its rejection of anti-whaling norm on the other (Sato and Hirata 2008). Other examples include Japan’s de-valuation of the ‘human rights’ norms in relations with ASEAN members (Katsumata 2006) or its kakehashi Official Development Aid (ODA) policy (Black 2013).59 As can be seen through the country’s difficulties with regard to the Yasukuni shrine, to the East Asian summit, and to the United States military bases in Japan, ‘Japan’s identity between the West and the East (Asia) has not been well sorted out’ (Inoguchi 2007, 383).

Yet the confirmation of Japanese distinctiveness in IR has two important caveats. Although there may be some grounds for claiming that the ‘Japanese School’ was one of the earliest attempts for developing non-Western IR theories, it should be noted that such a ‘revolt’ ended with failure (Kamino 2008, 40-1). In particular, the Kyoto School has a clear tendency to prioritize Japanese culture over others and ultimately

59 The rationale behind Japan’s kakehashi approach (or bridging policy) ‘lies in the construction of Japan’s self-identity as a state able to reenter international society after World War II through focusing on economic development rather than military and coercive action. Proponents of the kakehashi approach construct Japan both as a model of successful democratization through development which other states can learn from, as well as the means through ODA to ‘bridge’ the divide between repressive regimes and liberal democratic capitalism’ (Black 2013, 337).
provided rationales for Japanese invasions in Asia. ‘Japanese IR’, in that sense, has had quite negative implications (Ikeda 2008, 26). Nonetheless, the case of Kyoto School provides an important lesson that may contribute to the growing body of literature that deals with the relationship between theory and practice as well as between scholars and policy makers. The ‘Kyoto School’ philosophers from the beginning were seen as nationalists/patriots who wanted to defend/expand the interests of their country (Williams 2004) but their close connection with the wartime regime eventually rendered them to produce harmful knowledge to the society. As a pro-Japanese IR scholar offers his critical self-reflection on the Kyoto School that parallels Steve Smith and Pikki Ish-Shalom’s concerns about the ramifications of theories:

I believe that the theory of East Asian Community was one of the creative Japanese IR theories but was one of the morally questionable theories. How should we judge a researcher’s morality and responsibility if his/her theory does harm to a real society? And how should we consider researchers who maintain a close relationship with governments in order to actualize their own theory in real politics? Or how should we consider researchers who keep their distance from governments and as a result consign their theory to the world within the library walls? Social scientists should make a conscious effort to deal with the crisis in the relationship between theory and practice (Kamino 2008, 41).

This negative legacy of ‘past Japanese IR’ inhibits the construction of ‘new Japanese IR’. Although contemporary ‘Japanese School’ has not come into being yet, its would-be influence and impact may be seen from reactions to Japan’s regional policy initiatives. Since Japan’s re-engagement with Asia in the late 1970s, there have been a number of initiatives for new Asian Regionalism such as a call for a ‘new concept of Asia’, ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’, or ‘East Asian Community’. These ideas, however, have never really taken hold due to skepticism relating to Japan’s ‘unforgettable past’ (Shimizu 2007). Note this insightful remark about the ‘Japanese School’ of a Japan expert in the US:

Japanese after 1945 do not have an indigenous voice (they lost the war so badly). But there was a Japanese school of IR during the 1930s because they provide the ideology for Japanese aggression (fighting for Asian national liberalization). While the ‘Japanese school’ has ended, the legacy of that thinking remains powerful and it is still relevant. So if you say there is a Japanese social science and IR independent from the government, I say ‘Yes’ but on the issue of memory politics I would say ‘No’, because although it happened two generations ago, that legacy still has an enormous liability for the Japanese. It is now the only one who believes it; the US does not believe it, neither do China and Korea (Interview, October 2013).
Given these historical legacy and structural constraints, claims for distinct ‘Japanese IR’ has quieted down in recent years and the current trend in Japan’s non-Western IR debate has gradually turned toward the ‘post-Western IR’ agenda. This means that Japanese scholars no longer focus intensively on the ‘Japanese distinctiveness’ in theory development but rather to learn from the pitfalls of past Japanese IR to repair the existing problems in both Western and non-Western IR.

**The emerging turn toward ‘post-Western’ IR in Japan**

‘Post-Western IR’ has become more salient in the latest discussion of non-Western IR in Japan. To date, there is no consensus as to what constitutes post-Western IR. In what follows, I will discuss a number of understandings of post-Western IR developed by Japanese scholars and how they have shaped the respective practices of scholars involved in the EAIRT debate. So far, there are two major projects that focus on exploring post-Western IR in Japan: first, using the Kyoto School as a basis for repairing the inherent shortcomings of emerging non-Western IR, and second, reformulating IR beyond its ‘Western/European centric’ ontology and epistemology. Both these attempts ultimately aim at creating ‘a decolonized IR.’ This academic attempt works on two levels. On the one hand, it puts forward proposals for non-Western IRT; on the other hand it criticizes the new hegemonic or parochial pattern embedded in some non-Western IR discourses (e.g. the establishment of national Schools of IR) in order to construct a truly representative and indeed better body of knowledge (Kwon et al. 2011, 109).

**Learning from the Kyoto School: back to the future**

Among Japanese scholars interested in the non-/post-Western agenda, Kosuke Shimizu – Professor and Director of the Afrasian Research Centre at Ryukoku University – is particularly interested in studying and drawing lessons from the pitfalls of the Kyoto School to guide the current ‘non-Western IR Theory’ discourse. His sympathy to the current non-/post-Western IR can be traced back to his training in post-structuralism at the Victoria University of Wellington which has shaped his post-modernist understanding of IR Theory.60 As he explains:

> The American understanding that IR is universal I think is actually provincializing the understanding of IRT. Theories can be different and

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particular to some places and time. History is the contingency. It really depends on how you see the world. If you think that you have to develop, you have to grow up, you have to become adult, you need to get mature, etc.; that’s modernist understanding of time. But if you read some other stuff in other areas other than the West/US, accumulation of knowledge is based on a different perception of time. If you don’t have to grow up to develop, you don’t have to become bigger then theories can be seen in a completely different way (Interview, February 2014).

This approach also influences his teaching of the IR Theory course at Ryukoku University. The teaching of IRT in Japan, as discussed earlier, is much like in the West with a tendency to place a strong emphasis on mainstream theories and lesser attention directed toward reflectivist theories. Shimizu actually reverses this order in his class. He decides to teach critical and poststructural approaches first before introducing mainstream IRT (realism and liberalism) because he thinks the latter are ‘boring.’ As the result, his students tend to be influenced by critical approaches and become critical as well (Shimizu’s remarks at the ISA Annual Convention – ‘Post-Western IR’ panel, 21 February 2015). Shimizu also teaches a course entitled ‘Culture and Politics in Japan: From Kyoto School to Miyazaki Anime.’ The aim of the course is to understand the historical relationship between politics and culture in Japan, and its meanings to Japan studies as well as contemporary world affairs. The core questions to be explored include 1) what were the preconditions of the two World Wars in Japan?; 2) why did many Japanese, intellectuals in particular, enthusiastically support the imperial government in the WWII?; 3) how could a few intellectuals maintain their anti-war attitude under the oppressive government before and during the WWII, while the vast majority of intellectuals and political activists converted their beliefs to the totalitarian politics?; and 4) are there any similarities and/or differences between cultural politics in the pre-war time and the present? In addressing these questions, Shimizu briefly discusses IR theories of Essentialism and Constructivism before introducing Kyoto School philosophy (Nishida Kitaro and Tosaka Jun) and how these thoughts are relevant to Japan’s contemporary politics including its recent effort to construct its soft power by the means of pop culture.61

Similarly in research, Shimizu is particularly driven by the contradiction between the world-class level philosophical understanding by Kyoto School philosophers and their involvement in the war and justifications for foreign invasions by the Japanese

61 I thank Professor Kosuke Shimizu for providing me the syllabus of this course. For more details about this course syllabus, see Appendix.
government. His theoretical work, therefore, is directed toward investigating why they were involved in the war regime during that time relative to contemporary IR Theory. As he further explains the ultimate aims of his theorizing to this author:

My intention is not to provide grand theory but to give or to present some historical epochs which actually relate to the question of how these theories can be abused. So in that sense, I am just a historian. I am more concerned about empirical issues. So describing what happening in the past in this country is an effort to develop a grand theory of philosophy and what happened after that, how it was abused, and how actually it shattered people living in Japan as well in Asia (Interview, February 2014).

This research project has profound implications on the two important issues in the existing IR theory-practice literature: how theory shapes the world it studies and what is the ideal relationship between the policy and scholarly worlds. In his recent publications, Shimizu tries to identify the connection between the political and social atmosphere in pre-1945 Japan and contemporary Japanese politics and non-Western IR discourses. He has found some worrying similarities in these two periods: 1) the international political economic background (relative decline of the West and rise of East); 2) the method of setting the West as the only reference point; and 3) an emphasis on the cultural aspects that leads to an attempt to essentialize Eastern culture while displacing the West. That drives him toward developing critical readings about the Kyoto School and creating some cautionary tales about contemporary Japanese politics as well as the non-Western IRT movement. Like the current non-Western IR movement, the Kyoto School started with an objective to enrich Western philosophy and bridging the East/West distinction. However, Kyoto School philosophers ‘never attempted to problematize the philosophical tradition itself’ (Shimizu 2015, 7). Shimizu argues that the main reason why Kyoto School philosophers were involved in the war regime was their ‘abstract theorization of politics and culture, which trapped them in the timeless and spaceless thinking practice and weakened their connection with the everyday world’ (Shimizu 2015, 4). Similarly, non-Western IR scholars are placing too much emphasis on the dichotomy ‘between the West and the rest’ in configuring new IR theories, thus ignoring the everyday lives led by people in non-Western regions. This may result in a simple affirmation of the prevailing hegemony and thus perpetuate power relations within non-Western countries. As a result, some discussion of non-Western IRT runs the risk of being co-opted into the Western positivist mainstream IR that it intends to criticize.
Shimizu then turns to the work of Tosaka Jun. Tosaka was initially a member of the Kyoto School (a student of Nishida) but later became a Marxist and was jailed for his opposition to Japan’s imperialist wars in Asia. Examining his work helps shed light on how non-Western theoretical work can both be truly inclusive and not to be abused. Tosaka’s writings are often understood as the antithesis of the mainstream Kyoto School philosophers and unlike the latter, he never offered justification for the war. In Tosaka’s writings, he often criticized the Kyoto School as ‘promulgating a bourgeois idealism that ignores material historical conditions and issues of social praxis’ (Standford-Encyclopedia). According to Shimizu, what characterizes Tosaka’s political philosophy was his unchanging focus on ordinary citizens’ everyday experiences such as culture and literature and critical reflection on morality (Shimizu 2015, 15). Yet Tosaka did not hold an essentialist and parochial understanding about culture and morality like other Kyoto School philosophers. Tosaka argued that culture has an important function for moral reflection beyond that of a mere means to identify one’s distinctiveness from the West. Put differently, it should be a mirror for critical reflection of morality (Shimizu 2014, 691). Shimizu make use of the Kyoto School and Tosaka’s story as a benchmark for criticizing the current non-Western IR discourse as well as the current soft power foreign policy of Japan for their tendency of adopting an essentialized understanding of culture (e.g. using culture to distinguish their values from alleged Western values), thus losing the opportunity for self-reflection (Shimizu 2014, 696).

Given the lessons drawn from the case of the Kyoto School and their relevance to the contemporary non-Western IR narratives, Shimizu (2014a) posits that a more promising and useful agenda for the non-Western IR movement is an approach to overcome the dichotomy of the Western and non-Western IRT. This can be done by problematizing ‘the basic formulation and idiom of our query’ (Behera 2007, 341). Accordingly, post-Western IR is not merely an attempt to establish a new School of IR in non-Western regions, but an attempt to ‘redefine IR itself’ (Behera 2007, 342). The post-Western IR approach clearly involves critical engagement with IR as an academic discipline by re-envisioning the epistemology and ontology of IR (Shimizu 2013). This has been the key theoretical approach adopted by Shimizu’s Afrasian Research center at Ryukoku University (Kyoto campus). This center has focused on researching multiculturalism and post-Western discourses such as languages, culture, and conflict resolution based on the empirical cases of African and Asian people. This
kind of research promises to enrich the existing Western IRT as well as the emerging non-Western IRT literature as such discourse focuses on providing the perspectives of the ‘marginalized people’ in the non-West rather than attempting to replace Western IRT with a new kind of hegemony and parochialism under the form of national Schools of IR in Asia.

Along with Kosuke Shimizu, Josuke Ikeda is also aware of the dual ‘triumph’ and ‘trauma’ legacy of the Kyoto School and thus calls for Japanese IR to turn to the post-Western approach (Ikeda 2014b). The Kyoto School, in his view, was a project that faced squarely the question of Western centricity for the first time, at least in Japan, from a non-Western standpoint. Yet, it increasingly lost the balance between Western and Eastern Philosophies, which it aimed to bridge, in the direction of essentializing East over West. It thus eventually became supportive of government policy. Ikeda sees similar risks in the construction of IR ‘Schools’ in Asia that ‘differentiate from the mainstream IR, retreating to their own cultural and logical standpoints to show their superiority in the name of uniqueness, as has been the case of the former Kyoto School’ (Ikeda 2010, 32). The problem with ‘non-Western’ movements, in his view, is that the West-centricity question cannot always solved by extending its theoretical reach toward the non-Western world, or by just emphasizing the uniqueness of particular areas or states. It can only be done by de-essentializing the Western way of thinking about international/world politics (Ikeda 2010, 32). In this sense, post-Western IR avoids the fallacy of claiming uniqueness by de-essentialising the Western way of theorizing, not the West itself (Ikeda 2011b). Ikeda then suggests reformulating IR theory in more imaginative and creative way. This would not be mere criticism toward ‘Western’ mainstream but indeed would be the process of ‘intaking, criticising, picking up and tailoring wider range of knowledge among cultures.’ In this light, his exploration of modern Japanese ‘will only be one possible ingredient for cooking IR in more tasteful manner’ (Interview, February 2014).

Yet, unlike Shimizu and others, Ikeda’s call for ‘post-Western’ IR is rooted in his British education and scholarly linkages. His proposed agenda for ‘post-Western IR’ is based on the inter-civilizational dialogues rooted in a collaborated project between Japanese and British English School scholars entitled ‘The English School, post-Western IR, and beyond.’ As part of the said project, English School professors Andrew Linkater and Hidemi Suganami traveled to Japan almost every year between
2010 and 2014, teaching students and publishing articles on the expansion of international society through the ‘civilizing process’ (see, for example, Linkater 2011). Another source for Ikeda’s turn toward ‘cross-civilization’ dialogues is found in the thought of Tokyo School scholar Nakamura Hajime whose work aims to introduce a cross-civilizational method for comparing ideas (both religious and secular) that connect with the notion of world community and peace (Ikeda 2011b). That said the current drive toward indigenous theorizing in East Asia has been inspired by and is closely linked to the global expansion of the English School.

Most recently, Ikeda has been engaging in a project with scholars in Taiwan, Turkey, US and others, in which he would project the re-theorisation of the world along with the notion of ‘road’ or ‘road networks.’ He suggests a means for a paradigm shift in IR Theory by shifting the current focus on politics and the political of Westphalian/Western IR to the ‘non-political.’ In doing so, Ikeda suggests that this requires a turn toward history from theory, together with an insertion of comparative analysis to ultimately develop International Relations as ‘cosmopolitan of ideas’ (Ikeda 2011a). While it has been the idea of space and territory that has dominated to theorise our world, Ikeda introduces his idea of possible re-theorisation by focusing on what penetrates territories, in which communication and exchange of ideas about the world itself would be a major pillar of understanding. This latest approach has just emerged in somewhat coherent manner, with the help of the conception of ‘civilization’ (Interview, February 2014; see also Ikeda 2014a).

Post-Western IR as ‘decolonized IR’

Giorgio Shani, one of the first scholars to coin the term ‘post-Western IR’ back in 2008, however, disagrees with the interpretation of ‘post-Western’ IR through the lens of the English School. As he critiques:

Post-Western IR [in that light] would be to say ‘Look we live in a world which was colonized and which still has Western values and assumptions, we can’t really escape from that. So we can’t really talk about a Japanese IR and there can’t be a Japanese school of IR as such.’ That’s very different and I don’t think we can start with the English School approach and expand the international society. That’s not post-Western because if we look at the expansion of international society, we just say that the values of international society were synonymous with European values and then they become internationalized. That’s not post-Western (Interview, February 2014).
In contrast, Shani’s understanding of post-Western IR has its roots in post-colonialism and South Asia studies. In fact, Shani was not aware that post-Western IR existed and that other people are also working on this issue when he first used the term in his 2008 article. His main area of specialization at that time was South Asia which explains why he became interested in the idea of post-Western IR (Shani 2001, 2008, 2006). Then having moved from India to Japan, he became more exposed to East Asian ideas of the structuring of society and more specifically what shape their values. And this stimulated his search on understanding or trying to conceptualize what post-Western IR would be. As he further explained his vision of post-Western IR to this author:

For me, ‘post Western IR’ comes out of certain traditions. On the one hand, we have British critical political theory which looks at the idea of universality and cultural differences. Then we have another tradition which I would say draws on postcolonial theory. The biggest distinction between post-Western IR Theory and post-colonialism would be that post-Western IR firstly believes that those societies which have not been colonized have still internalized Western assumptions and secondly it is certainly a possibility of engaging with differences, with something other than the West. So this is different from postcolonial theory which will say that everything is contaminated by colonialism. They would not look at the possibility of reaching universality in the sense that comes out of critical theory and postcolonial theory traditions (Interview, February 2014).

Similarly, Shani differentiates his ‘post-Western’ IR project from Acharya and Buzan’s non-Western IRT initiative. According to Shani, Acharya and Buzan presume that there is no international theory and they look at the national Schools of IR. So they pose the question of why there is no IRT in the non-West that resembles the English School of IR. Such an approach, in his view, is neither ‘non-Western’ nor ‘post-Western.’ As he further explains:

My argument is if you look at national Schools, it is not ‘non-Western.’ Look at Japan! Japanese School of IR is basically a Western School of IR. You have to identify core values. If you look at Chinese scholarship, it is different because I think they have developed certain core values – Confucian values specific to China – upon which you construct a school of thought. You cannot construct national schools; you can only construct schools of values. So, the English School is not about being ‘English’ but the central concept is international society. So then what other concepts can we use to build other forms of international relations? (Interview, February 2014).

The task of enriching IR theory and modifying its Western-centric nature, Shani argues, cannot be realized simply by the addition of new voices from the Global South as Acharya and Buzan suggest. A genuinely ‘post-Western’ critical IR, in his view,
would seek ‘to go beyond mere mimicry of the “derivative discourses” of the modern West by identifying critical discourses on the political from within non-western traditions’ (Shani 2008, 722). Post-Western IR in this light is trying to de-essentialise the hegemony of Western IR theorizing, yet at the same time avoiding to end up ‘reproducing the very hegemony they set out to critique’ (Shani 2008, 723).

In recent years, Shani has worked mainly in the area of human security. This agenda is partly related to the Departmental setting where he is working – the International Christian University (ICU). Unlike other Japanese universities where IR is associated with the Department of Law, ICU concentrates on a very different scope of peace studies. Shani is the associate director of the Peace Research Center within ICU so he was hired, in his words, to look at conflicts, human security, and peace studies (Interview, February 2014). Combining his personal interest with this institutional setting, Shani is trying to work on the linkages between religion, identity and human security from a post-Western perspective (Shani 2014). In his latest work, Shani criticizes Western IR with reference to conventional theories of human security. He advocates that a ‘post-Western’ and ‘post-secular’ conception of human security should be sought instead that recognizes multiple religious and cultural contexts in which human dignity is firmly embedded (Shani 2014, 2015). He plans to edit a volume on a pan-Asian perspective with the hope to create more venues to interact with other Asian scholars (Interview, February 2014).

Shani’s understanding of post-Western IR is largely shared by Ching-chang Chen – a Taiwanese scholar working at Ritsumeikan University. Despite having been trained in Britain (as a student of Hidemi Suganami) at the same IR Department with Josuke Ikeda (Aberystwyth University), Chen, unlike Ikeda, has not been predominantly influenced by the English School. Rather, his ‘intellectual identity’ is rather ‘eclectic’:

If I really need to categorize myself, I would say that I am using some constructivism and some post-colonial studies as well. And I am familiar with the mainstream IR language because I think in order to understand how power relations actually work, it is important to figure out the language that is often employed by mainstream IR theories. My orientation is somehow in between critical approaches and mainstream theories. But I am not using mainstream theories per se. I am trying to understand why certain policy discourses are more powerful than others because they involve the language of mainstream theories (Interview, February 2015).

Chen is one of the most vocal critics of the efforts by East Asian IR communities in constructing national Schools of IR modeled after the English School. He criticizes
that the discourse of non-Western IRT represented through national Schools of thought would also be hegemonic if they just aim to be another English School or to show superiority over Western IRT (Chen 2011b, 59). Chen particularly criticizes what he views as the uncritical adoption of the English School’s concept ‘international society’ among Japanese scholars. The English School, he believes, is essentially a Eurocentric theory with its own selection bias (Interview, February 2015). Chen argues that those non-Westphalian societies ‘must lack some crucial qualities of international society’ in their regional system. Hence they are ‘unable to produce any English School-comparable theory that can meet the Western standard’ but serves merely as a ‘derivative discourse’ of Western IR (Chen 2011b, 45). In other words, ‘the non-Western tortoise will never catch the European hare’ if the former continues to use Western IR as a sole reference point (Kayaoglu 2010, 196; quoted in Chen 2011b, 45). Rather, he suggests that for scholars who are involved in theory building, one of the first important tasks is to unpack the problematic embedded in existing mainstream theories, and that is Eurocentricism. Nonetheless, it seems to him that

in experiencing the recent joys to develop a national school of IR in China and to some extent in Japan several years ago, these scholars [non-Western IRT theorists] did not really challenge the structure embedded in mainstream theories. Rather they reproduced the structural and power relations in their indigenous theory building. To me, it is a problem that should be addressed by scholars who are interested in alternative theory development (Interview, February 2015).

This ‘post-Western’ method has been employed in Chen’s recent systematic studies on the diplomatic disputes between China and Japan over the Ryukyu islands (Okinawa) in the 19th century – an understudied inquiry which will help to illuminate how historical roots might affect contemporary Sino-Japanese relations. In this project, Chen (2014) criticizes the narrow European-centric conception of international society presented by the English School. He believes that if the concept of international society can be used more critically and broadly, it can help us explain why China responded to Japan’s incorporation of the Ryukyu in a rather passive way. Accordingly, China could have more coercive measures to prevent Japan from annexing Ryukyu or it could have accepted a US proposal to divide the Ryukyus in two parts with China controlling the Southern part. As it happened, China chose not to do anything and Japan eventually took over all the Ryukyus. This puzzle has not been adequately addressed by materialist perspectives (China’s lack of hard power to
forestall Japan) or other mainstream scholarly work (e.g. Chinese strategic culture). Nor were domestic politics perspectives (corruption and incompetence of late Qing leaders) sufficient to understand what happened. Instead, Chen argues that China reacted the way it did because it was deeply socialized into the old norms and rules of East Asian society and institutions embedded in the tribute system.

The alternative explanation proposed by Chen is based on the premise that the norms and institutions originating from European international society (e.g. equality among members demonstrating their sovereignty, balance-of-power politics, etc.) should not be treated as a universally valid starting point when analyzing the strategic behavior of political entities outside the West. In the case of pre-modern East Asia, he argues, the institution is the hierarchical tribute system with China at the top. The shared norms are Confucian norms, values and practices rather than those focusing on material power (including control of territorial possessions) (Chen 2014, 90). In this context, Japan was no longer considered a member of the East Asian international society but a ‘treacherous’ outsider (Chen 2014, 100). Employing compellence against Japan over the Ryukyus or dividing up the islands with Japan, however, would violate this key aspect of status hierarchy and call into question China’s position as the genuine center within Confucian cosmology, along with the assumed moral superiority of its leadership. To preserve the hierarchical order and its moral authority and legitimacy as the ‘father’ of Asian family, China decided to settle the Ryukyu issue like a family affair because the use of force would expose its failure to keep the family in harmony (Chen 2014, 98-9).

This finding shows that European-centric concepts and theories of international society need not be applied in the case of East Asia. It also has significant policy relevance for today’s Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute between China and Japan. While the current IR literature on Sino-Japanese relations tends to focus on either ‘power’ or ‘interest’, Chen’s study has illustrated how the Ryukyu debacle paved the way for transforming Chinese perceptions of Japan, or, to put it another way, the borders of a once-shared civilization. A sustainable resolution of the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue, then, should move from calls for putting aside sovereignty differences toward a more inclusive, post-Westphalian bordering practice in East Asia where it is not always power or interests that matter (Chen 2014, 87). Chen’s thesis, thus, seems similar to David Kang’s (and arguably John Fairbank’s) earlier argument about the
China’s hierarchical world order in pre-modern East Asia – a perspective which has already precipitated critique from several Japanese scholars for its Sino-centric tendency and selection bias of historical cases (e.g. Kohno 2013; Inoguchi 2006).

As can be seen, while Japanese scholars are increasingly interested in a post-Western IR agenda, they have not yet reached a consensus on what constitutes its substance. To further this agenda, Giorgio Shani organized a panel titled ‘Post-Western IR: What is it and how does it work?’ at the 2015 ISA convention in New Orleans, USA. The panel included scholars from within and beyond Japan who have intensively talked about post-Western IR recently (Chair: Giorgio Shani, Panelists: Kosuke Shimizu, Navnita C. Behera, Chih-yu Shih, and Robbie G. Shilliam). The three questions heatedly discussed at the panel included 1) what is ‘post-Western’ IR and how does it differ both from ‘Western’ and ‘Non-Western’ IR; 2) how does post-Western IR ‘work’ in practice, and what should be the focus of post-Western research agendas in IR; and 3) what is the saliency of post-Western IR in a rapidly globalizing world? Should it be subsumed under the category of ‘Global IR’ and, if so, whose histories are occluded? The panelists held widely diverse views about these questions and in the end no agreement was reached. Nonetheless, this ‘post-Western IR’ agenda seems to be the most likely orientation for Japanese scholars in the years to come. As Ching-chang Chen observes:

Some may think that ‘post Western’ itself is still Western in the sense that the West is always there as a reference point. Still, I think that it is kind of positive and productive strategy because post Western can mitigate the possibility of producing IR discourse which committed the mistakes of building non-Western national school. I think it is still one step further. That is a positive move (Interview, February 2015).

At a crossroads: Whithering Japanese IR?

Given all the scholarly initiatives and developments mentioned above, will the non-/post-Western IR movement critically change the course of IR studies in Japan similar to what has occurred within Chinese IR academia? This final section will evaluate the impact of this academic movement on Japanese IR academia as a whole as well as project what future developments of IR theorizing in Japan might be.

Initially, this study finds that researchers who are interested in the Western/non-Western IR debate constitute only a modest portion of the Japanese IR community. The movement toward indigenous theory building in Japan, therefore, has only a
limited impact on the whole Japanese IR academia. Another influential theoretical
direction in Japan consists of researchers employing mainstream and constructivist
theory although they are also a part of the Japanese IR academia. This is because, as
analysed above, Japanese IR studies are predominantly occupied by diplomatic history
and regional studies. The encounter between these two major intellectual streams and
the mainstream Western/non-Western theoretical approaches creates a crossroads for
Japanese IR as seen in Figure 4.1.

![Figure 4.1. Major theoretical directions in Japan concerning the EAIRT debate](image)

As could be expected, scholars working in mainstream (rationalist) IR tradition are
mostly unimpressed and thus largely unaffected by the non-Western IR theory in
general and ‘Japanese’ IR in particular. Like their Western counterparts, they believe
that theory, in a strict sense, should be universally applicable and that social sciences
should use the term ‘theory’ to indicate a logical explanation in which causal
relationships are articulated in an objective way. Kazuya Yamamoto – an associate
professor at Waseda University who was trained in positivism and quantitative
methods – argues that ‘there is neither Western theory nor non-Western theory’ if
theory is understood in this sense. While not disregarding the value of diversity of
ideas in IR studies, Yamamoto believes that the non-Western IRT movement initiated
by Acharya and Buzan and followed up by Japanese scholars should be seen as
‘normative and ideological’ rather than a fully-fledged theoretical debate because
what they are advocating for is not theory but philosophy. Yamamoto’s critique is that
proponents for non-Western IRT do not distinguish the two notions clearly (Interview, February 2014). In his article reviewing the development of IR in Japan, Yamamoto (2010) argues that while Japanese IR studies continue to be dominated by the historical tradition, there has been growing interest in theoretical studies and diversification of approaches. His implied message is that theory should be understood rigorously and that IR studies in Japan will follow this theoretical direction.

Another professor who identifies himself as a ‘hard realist’ – Yoichiro Sato (PhD - University of Hawaii, USA) – is even more sceptical about moves toward building national schools of thought or non-Western IR orientations. The reason is not so much that he does not think they have different new perspectives to contribute to the discussions about IR but more that too much diversification of approaches in the form of national IRs will become ‘closed circles’ and valuable dialogues will thus be lost. In the process of constructing indigenous perspectives, the lack of engagement with mainstream approaches, according to Sato, will lead these scholars to ‘encircling themselves.’ As he further observes:

My scepticism (toward the non-Western/Japanese IR movement) is related to my scepticism of critical studies and constructivist approaches. They end up creating their own jargon and creating new jargon becoming a game within a closed circle and that disrupts communication across different approaches. Some people in the constructivist camp are very much going in that direction although others try to keep engaging with mainstream approaches and traditional utilitarian theories. In Japan, I think both types have already presented themselves among the so-called Japanese IR people and also some foreign scholars who work with those ‘Japanese School’ scholars (Interview, February 2015).

Although these scholars acknowledge that existing theories at times do not adequately explain all the dimensions of Japanese/East Asian international relations (as seen in Kang 2003a; Hughes 2007), they disagree that those misfits disqualify Western IR. Rather, alternative method would be employing eclectic framework as Katzenstein and Okawara has set an example (Katzenstein and Okawara 2006; Akimoto 2013; Sato and Hirata 2008). Rationalist approaches have recently regained their influence in explaining Japan’s security issues as the Shinzo Abe’s administration adopts policy changes reflecting a ‘normal country’ vision amid Japan’s heightened tensions with China.

Another dimension of Japanese IR theory is its constructivist orientation. As discussed earlier, constructivism is a popular approach among Japanese IR academia, not least
because of its affinity with the historical and cultural studies tradition of IR studies in Japan. The popularity of constructivism in Japan may also have significant practical implications. According to Koji Murata, Japan’s relative decline, as opposed to China’s rapid rise, means that Japan needs a new national identity that subsumes its former status as the world’s second largest economy. Constructivism, in this light, may be of great help (Murata 2010, 364). In fact, constructivism has been employed extensively in research about Japan’s identity and soft power. Hiro Katsumata (associate professor at Kanazawa University) is the Japanese scholar who employs constructivism extensively in explaining Japanese politics and East Asian integration. He particularly focuses on the cultural aspects e.g. the role of norms and cultural exchanges (e.g. Japanese pop culture) in promoting regional integration and forming an East Asian regional identity (Katsumata and Iida 2011; Katsumata 2012). Japan and ASEAN regionalism, in Katsumata’s view, represents an appropriate case study for enriching existing theories in both senses of analytical eclecticism and broadened constructivist research agenda today e.g. the issues of multiple ideational factors or the agency role of local actors (Katsumata 2006, 262; 2009; 2011, 559). Katsumata argues that Japanese norms, particularly those focus on Japan’s in-between identity (as an advanced industrialized democracy and an Asian country) effectively explain the country’s visions and behaviours within an East Asian context (e.g. the initiative for creating an East Asian Community, its response to the ‘Asian values’ debate, and a non-intrusive approach in ASEAN human rights issues) (Katsumata 2006, 261-2). In a comparison of Japan’s new Asianism today (to ‘keep the West engaged in Asia’) with the former pre-war pan-Asianism (to ‘push the West out of Asia’), Katsumata argues that these differences may be understood by advancing the premise that Japan is in the process of transformation of its identity (Katsumata 2004, 3).

Other scholars who are working intensively on Japan’s new identity and its culture and vision of Asian regionalism under the lens of constructivism include Takashi Inoguchi (Inoguchi 2000, 2011; Collet and Inoguchi 2012; Inoguchi and Newman 1997) and Akitoshi Miyashita (Miyashita 2007; Miyashita and Sato 2001). As noted earlier, given some overlapping interests in the research agendas between constructivism and the current non-Western IRT (e.g. the issue of Japanese identity), there has been sympathy generated for the non-Western IRT movement from the beginning, as seen in the case of Professor Inoguchi. It is important to note, however, that despite being one of the pioneers in exploring the question of whether there are
non-Western IR theories in Japan back in 2007, Inoguchi has not proactively participated in the development of ‘Japanese IR theories’ ever since. His research agenda thus far has not moved well beyond the existing IR theories, particularly constructivism (see, for example Inoguchi 1999, 2014; Inoguchi and Bacon 2005; Inoguchi and Ikenberry 2013). In fact, Inoguchi has become more cautious with the non-Western IRT movement recently. As he shared in an interview with this author in December 2013, the biggest question for those who like to regard themselves as theoreticians elsewhere as well as in Japan is that they should articulate concepts and theories more carefully, especially when distinguishing themselves from mainstream Western IR theories. He further observes: ‘all the Indian, Chinese, Korean scholars are confirming that the products of their research are coming soon… Yet, just saying “I do believe this or that” may not be able to persuade many others, especially the Western counterparts’ (Interview, December 2013). I have, therefore, identified him with the constructivist faction in Japanese IR academia rather than the non-Western IRT movement.

In short, the impact of this non-Western/EAIRT debate on the rest of Japanese IR academia is not large. One of the reasons is the modest interest in theory generally and the dominance of empirical and historical studies that have characterized IR studies in post-war Japan. As Keio University’s Professor Yoshihide Soeya observes, ‘theories, in Japanese tradition, are not necessarily mainstream theories. There is not much interest nor necessarily respect for theory for theory’s sake. Empirical studies are what scholars primarily do’ (Interview, December 2015). Given this, Japanese scholars tend to produce empirical work relating to Japan’s diplomatic history and regional studies. Although this kind of work may be policy relevant, it is important to note, however, that unlike the controversial involvement of modern Japanese intellectuals in Japan’s imperialist policy during the interwar period, there is no strong linkage between the policy and scholarly circles in Japan nowadays. This characteristic has its root in the political inclination of Japanese scholars as Kosuke Shimizu observes:

I found it quite interesting in this country that IR as a discipline has been quite critical about Japan’s foreign policy. In that sense, scholars in this country are pretty much left-wing if you applied some understanding of politics. They are working more on history and regional studies and I don’t think this trend will be altered by the development of non-Western IRT (Interview, February 2014).
Therefore, unlike what we have seen in the case of Chinese School, empirical work by Japanese scholars tends to explain and guide rather than justify Japan’s foreign policy. One such example is Yoshihide Soeya’s conceptualization of a ‘realistic and appropriate’ grand strategy for Japan which in his word, is ‘not necessary theory but practical for policy discussion’ (Interview, December 2013). Since 2005, he has published a number of writings arguing for Japan to pursue ‘middle power diplomacy.’ His main argument is that in the age when Sino-American relations are critical to the shaping of Asia’s regional order, there is not much room left for other countries to compete with these two great powers or to influence the future evolution of China-US relations. In this context, Japan should stop pursuing great power politics and instead regard itself an equal player to other East Asian states which aims to promoting regional cooperation whenever possible.

Regional cooperation is essential for Japan as well as other regional states because no country can deal with the ramifications of Sino-American relations or rivalry alone (Soeya 2005, 2011). Nonetheless, according to Soeya, regional states do have an agency and legitimacy in creating a sort of infrastructure of regional order out of cooperation among themselves for peaceful survival purpose. ‘It is a survival strategy in the era of East Asian G2, and the survival will be much more effective if we can cooperate among ourselves’ (Interview, December 2013). In the concluding chapter of his 2005 book, Soeya analysed a middle power network including Japan, Korea, ASEAN (Soeya 2005). He argues that Japan did pursue ‘de-factor middle power diplomacy’ in the past; examples of which include its explicit commitment to international peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations, its continued reliance on the alliance with the US, and particularly the rise of human security as a central pillar of Japan’s diplomatic agenda in recent years (Soeya 2011, 89).

When being questioned by this author about the relevance of his ‘middle power diplomacy’ framework to the current policies of Shinzo Abe’s government, Professor Soeya indicated that he has been working on the second volume to review Japanese foreign policy changes during the past ten years. He argues that despite Abe’s recent policy innovations, Japan’s post-war foreign policy framework which consists of Japan’s Peace Constitution, the US-Japan security alliance, and historical burden of Japan’s past military aggression remains the same even for Abe’s administration. As long as this unique framework stays intact, it does not allow Japan to behave like a
great power (Interview, December 2013). Although Soeya is modest about the theoretical contribution of his work, this conceptualization of Japan’s past behaviour and strategic choices will help expand and enrich realist arguments about balance of power and hegemonic stability.

All these above discussions seem to suggest that the non-Western/EAIRT debate will most likely continue to command interest among a portion of the Japanese scholarly community discussed in the previous section. It is interesting to note that even among this group of scholars, there is not much enthusiasm and even much less optimism or indeed a desire for the construction of a distinct ‘Japanese school’ of IR theory. Most of the scholars interested in non-/post-Western IR that the author has interviewed for this study share a belief that the non-Western IR debate will not greatly influence Japanese IR thinking. One major reason for this is the burden of Japan’s past history. As Josuke Ikeda posits, ‘Japanizing IR is still having an impact closer to the sophisticated modification of ‘Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere’ even we might change its name to ‘East Asian Community’ or whatever. So simply stated, Japanese scholars have been hesitant and still do hesitate’ (Interview, February 2014). In fact, leading scholars in the global non-Western IRT camp similarly warn about the pitfalls of pre-war ‘Japanese School’ embedded in the ideas of Kyoto School of philosophy and pan-Asianism (Acharya 2010a, 1003-4; 2011a, 855; Ling 2000, 283-4; Shih 2010b, 545-6).

Another reason that works against the prospect of a distinct Japanese School of IR is power shift. Yoshihide Soeya argues that as the result of China’s rapid rise and the Chinese aspiration for a China-centered world, the tendency for Japan to side with the established liberal international order has become stronger. In the competition of big thinking and ideas on IR between China and the West, ‘there is no room for countries like Japan to come up with its independent attempt to build some theory’ (Interview, December 2013). Interestingly, despite their differences on a desirable Japanese contribution to the field of IR, Japanese scholars from all approaches almost unanimously disregard the value of a ‘Chinese School’, be it its motive, content, or applicability. This is because the attempt to construct Chinese IR knowledge has been seen by many Japanese scholars not as providing an alternative analytical framework for existing Western theories but as serving the Chinese national interests and promoting cultural exceptionalism. Kosuke Shimizu – a pro-EAIRT scholar –
indicates that his effort to study Japanese pre-war philosophy is to give the Chinese counterparts caution regarding how theories can actually shape the world it studies and how they can be abused by the governments to justify aggressive behavior toward other countries (Interview, February 2014). Such thinking is seen in the below remarks of Yoshihide Soeya:

So-called ‘Chinese IR theories’ are mostly justification of their foreign policy or the reality that China is getting strong. That reflects the strong Sino-centric mentality. The flipside of that is that not many non-Chinese scholars are ready to buy into Chinese arguments. So to what extent you can call that theory building I think that is dubious to be frank (Interview, December 2013).

Given all the pros and cons of developing a Japanese style theory, it can be concluded here that post-Western IR agenda seems to be the most promising candidate for a Japanese contribution to IR theory. This approach aims at developing a better body of knowledge by reformulating rather than displacing Western IRT. The Japanese theory development in this context may constitute a part of the broader regional body of knowledge fuelled by post-Western IR discourse. Considering the development of IR in Japan so far, together with Japan’s position as a ‘bridge between civilizations’, there is an expectation that Japan might be ‘the center of “Asian IR dialogue” in the future’ as Professor Hiroshi Nakanishi – Vice President of Japan Association of International Relations – has explicitly stated (Ritsumeikan-News 2014). In fact, there have been ongoing pan-regional dialogues in the form of collaborative projects as well as international seminars convened not only in Japan but also in Taiwan, South Korea, and India with the participation of many Japanese scholars.

Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed the impact of the non-Western/EAIRT debate in Japan. It maintains that this theoretical debate has held an interest among a cohort of younger Japanese IR scholars, mostly based in the greater Kyoto area. These scholars were initially trying to confirm the existence of ‘Japanese IR’ theories in the past through re-examining the work of pre-war Japanese intellectuals for contemporary IR relevance. Nonetheless, they have increasingly realized and acknowledged the problems of this kind of parochial knowledge and gradually shifted to a post-Western IR agenda. Beyond this hard-core group, however, this particular theoretical dimension has had modest impact on the other intellectual traditions in Japanese IR.
studies, including the mainstream IRT camp, the increasingly popular constructivist faction, and the dominant streams of diplomatic history and regional studies. As noted earlier, the Japanese IR discipline is characterised by its acceptance of diverse perspectives and approaches without competition and efforts for integration and synthesis. In this light, it is likely that these major currents will continue to go down their own conceptual and separate path, thus leading theoretical development in the country to a crossroads.

As this chapter has asserted, there is a clear linkage between the theoretical identity of Japanese scholars and their preferred approach to IR. This theoretical identity is largely shaped by their prior education, scholarly networking, as well as the unresolved national identity of Japan as a country situated between East and West. Accordingly, scholars interested in indigenous theory building often come from the critical traditions of IR and are more prone to identify themselves to the ‘non-West’ (Asia) whilst other theory-oriented scholars largely categorize themselves as part of the Western liberal order and theoretical orientation. As a scholar has observed about these divergent perspectives:

In some sense, it can be understood as a problem of generational outlooks. While senior scholars are more interested in producing sophisticated frameworks and analysing actual international relations, younger scholars are more intent on building a disciplinary identity (Josuke Ikeda, Interview, February 2014).

The reality that the number of Japanese IR academics interested in theory building is not large has something to do with the overall ‘characteristics’ or nature of IR studies in Japan. Japanese IR has retained its interdisciplinary tradition, serving as a patchwork of several disciplines. Accordingly, history, IR, and area studies are the three key elements constituting the whole body of knowledge of Japanese IR studies. That the majority of Japanese scholars are doing area and empirical studies explains the comparatively low interests in theory and theorizing in Japan. This is further complicated by the legacy of Japan’s pan-Asianism and the past involvement of modern Japanese intellectuals in the country’s imperialist wars. Such a historical legacy renders any effort or even discussion on developing a new Japanese paradigm for East Asia less credible to regional scholars. In practice, therefore, not much interest exists even among the non-Western IR theory oriented scholars in developing a Japanese equivalent to the ‘Chinese School’ of IR. As one scholar has noted,
Japanese IR studies, in comparison with other East Asian counterparts such as China and Korea, ‘are neither policy relevant/engaged nor theoretically intensive/original. IR academics were ill-equipped to pursue policy relevance and theoretical innovation’ (Huang 2007, 180).

Given the aforementioned constraints and characteristics of IR studies in Japan, it is hardly surprising that the latest publication on Japanese IR and non-Western IR in Japan emanated from historical inquiry rather than theoretical endeavour and the study of political history rather than IR per se. As Takashi Inoguchi has observed, the question is not so much about ‘Japanese IR theories’ but to historicize and contextualize selected American IR theories ‘to generate insights and positions much more sensitive to [Japan’s] historical and cultural complexities’ (Inoguchi 2002, 115). Against this background, more general theoretical discussions such as the post-Western IR research agenda, which attempts to reformulate IR theory into a stronger body of knowledge, may be the only feasible direction for the non-Western/EAIRT discourse in Japan to pursue. In fact, Japanese IR, with its ‘large market, long tradition, political freedom and economic affluence’ (Inoguchi and Newman 2002, 11-2) and the emerging reorientation toward post-Western IR, is most likely destined to prevail in future dialogues relating to defining and shaping a pan-regional paradigm for scholars coming from both East and West.
Chapter 5: Trailblazing, eclecticism, and business as usual: US academia responds to EAIRT

On the basis of institutional development and research infrastructure, international relations no longer is an American social science. On the important dimension of theoretical hegemony, however, reports of American decline has been overstated. Unfortunately, a growing field composed of national parochialisms may not be best equipped for making sense of the new world politics that will merge in the next century (Kahler 1993, 412).

International Relations as an academic discipline has not much changed since Stanley Hoffman’s famous statement in 1977 that it is an ‘American social science.’ Increasingly, however, regrets about the American domination in IR have intensified within and beyond American IR academia. This is because from the postcolonial turn in the 1980s to the more recent discourses on non-/post-Western IR Theory, there have been various attempts directed toward ‘de-Americanizing’ IR knowledge. While this academic movement has aroused significant interest in studying various non-Western IR traditions in East Asia, there has been little analysis on how this debate is received in the US. In particular, how has American IR academia actually responded to the challenges from the ‘East Asian’ scholarship?

To fill the gap, this chapter examines the presence and impact of the current East Asian IR theory (EAIRT) debate on the US IR academic community. It finds that this debate does hold an interest within a small number of US-based (in most of the cases, foreign-born) East Asia specialists and for American scholars working in the constructivist and reflectivist traditions. Among the various positions, three have morphed into actual claims accompanied by distinct the ‘bringing East Asian in’ movement led by David Kang; the ‘Global IR’ approach spearheaded by Amitav Acharya; and the postcolonial agenda of re-envisioning IR with Daoist worldism advocated by feminist theorist L.H.M. Ling. These conceptual developments have shaped the practices of these scholars quite clearly as seen through their trailblazing endeavours in terms of research, teaching, and networking activities. Collectively, these efforts are intended to re-orient global IR scholarship toward a less Western/American-centric nature and with theoretical inputs from Asian traditions.

62 As one recent work has noted, it is difficult to define ‘what is an “American IR scholar” (e.g. should she/he be based, employed, born, or educated in the United States?)’ (Kristensen 2015b, 6). In this chapter, I use the term ‘American IR scholar’ interchangeably with ‘US-based scholar.’ ‘American IR’ or ‘US IR academia’, in this sense, is comprised of scholars who are currently working in American universities, regardless of their nationality and educational background.
Although the form that this EAIRT debate is taken in the US is much more broadly focused in scope and by no means ‘nationalistic’, there exist certain linkages and interactions between the movements in the US and those in East Asia.

Overall, however, there is little evidence that this debate has any particular impact on mainstream American IR.\(^{63}\) With few exceptions, mainstream American scholars are largely indifferent to the calls for building alternative theories, whether they originate from within (US) or outside of it (East Asia). The research underlying this chapter nonetheless reveals that American IR itself is facing an identity problem by increasingly shifting away from theoretical parsimony to non-paradigmatic approaches and/or analytical eclecticism when dealing with the empirical puzzles associated with area and regional studies. Therefore, while mainstream American scholars are generally unimpressed with the various claims for East Asian IR theory, their shift toward relatively greater eclecticism nonetheless reflects their desire to develop theoretical flexibility that best allows them to study global issues and other regions (in this case, East Asia) in the context of growing critique of the disjuncture between disciplinary and area studies.

To explore these points, this chapter is organised as follows. It begins with a brief review of the conventional wisdom that IR is ‘an American social science.’ This serves as a springboard for better appreciating the motivations for change that the current EAIRT movement has developed and projected toward the American IR community. It will then identify the various critiques of the Western/American-centric theories and the alternative visions presented by the ‘dissidents’ in US academia. Those claims will be analysed in the context of how they actually shape these scholars’ practices. Lastly, this chapter examines the response of American mainstream scholars toward these various claims for non-Western/East Asian IR theory and to what extent such claims shape or may shape the nature and characteristics of American IR. The chapter concludes by arguing that the growing interest in studying East Asian politics due to global power shifting to the East and the surge of Asian students and immigrant scholars studying in American universities will

\(^{63}\) ‘Mainstream American IR’ is commonly characterized by its positivist ontology and overwhelmingly privileges rational choice approaches (Waever 1998, 689). Most scholars believe that neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism are representatives of American mainstream IR. Nonetheless, constructivism (particularly its American branch) is increasingly categorized as part of the mainstream American IR (Hobson and Lawson 2008, 417). This thesis understands American mainstream IR in this broader sense.
gradually sharpen the academic discussions on East Asian international relations in the US. This is true despite the insistence of the most conservative mainstream accounts within American academia at the moment that such a debate does not exist.

IR as ‘an American social science’: a matter of growing concern?

Although the first IR department was established at Aberystwyth University in the United Kingdom in 1919, Stanley Hoffman (1977) argued that it was the United States that provided the most receptive ground in which the seeds of IR were planted and grown into a new field of study. According to Hoffman, the development of international relations as a discipline in the United States emerged from the convergence of three factors: 1) intellectual predispositions (the explosion of social sciences in general in the US after World War II); 2) political circumstances (the prominence of American political role in world affairs since 1945); and 3) institutional opportunities (the link between the scholarly and policy circles, the role of American foundations or ‘kitchen of power’ as well as the free and stimulating social science scholarship in the US) (Hoffmann 1977, 43-50). Hoffman further identified the three factors that have largely shaped the ‘characteristics’ of American intellectual predispositions from the outset: 1) a faith in scientific method; 2) a belief that science would be useful to society; and 3) the influence of immigrant scholars (Hoffmann 1977; see also Cochran 2001, 55). Although the field has proliferated globally since 1945, IR was dominated by the United States ‘both in terms of its policy agenda and, more importantly, its theoretical orientation’ (Smith 2000, 375). In short, the US has dominated the field of knowledge production with the pervasiveness of American power and the sheer size, rigor, and diversity of its IR community (Smith 2002, 81; Bacon and Newman 2002, 41). That is why Stanley Hoffman called it an ‘American social science’ or, alternatively, as Knud Jørgensen observed, ‘IR was launched in the image of social science as understood in the US’ (Jørgensen 2004, 331).

64 On the role of American Foundations (e.g. the Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations) on the establishment of the IR discipline in the US, see (Parmar 2012; Palmer 1980, 349).

65 The free ‘politics and sociology of the scholarly community’ in the US provides a stimulating environment for the diversity in intellectual thought. The sizable US IR academia (more than 4,000 scholars spanning across more than 2,000 colleges and universities) ‘makes it largely impossible to impose a single intellectual orthodoxy on any field of study’ (Walt 2011). As a ‘melting pot’ for foreign immigrants, the US has also attracted ‘the best and brightest’ foreign-born scholars (mostly from Europe) who later became prominent thinkers and public intellectuals after their immigration to the US (Hoffmann 1977, 47; Palmer 1980, 347-8). These include Hans Morgenthau, Karl Deutsch, Ernst Haas, Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Peter Katzenstein, and Stanley Hoffman himself, to name only a few.
This view of American dominance in IR was further backed up by Kal Holsti (1985) in his survey of the state of the ‘dividing discipline’ in eight countries (America, Britain, Korea, India, France, Canada and Australia, and Japan). Holsti expands the hegemonic structure of IR to a ‘British-American intellectual condominium’ but acknowledges that there is ‘a greater reliance solely on Americans to produce the new insights, theoretical formulations, paradigms, and data sets of our field’ (Holsti 1985, 128). More than a decade later, Ole Weaver (1998) also argued that IR is a ‘not so much an international discipline’ but rather ‘an American structure’ in that the US houses the leading journals and produces most of the field’s research funding (see also Smith 2002, 79-80). More recent critical reviews as to whether IR remains an American social science (Kahler 1993, 395; Smith 2000; Crawford and Darryl 2001) or more thought-provokingly ‘Was it ever an American Social Science?’ (Kahler 1993, 396; Crawford and Darryl 2001, 17) point to the conclusion that the state of the discipline has not much changed more than three decades since Hoffman’s famous assertions. Empirically, the latest TRIP Survey Report also finds that 63.67% of US-based scholars agree or strongly agree that IR is an American-dominated discipline while 53.16% think that it is important to counter American dominance in the IR discipline (TRIP 2015).

Although an assertion of American domination in the entire IR discipline may be debatable particularly in the contemporary context (see, for example, Turton 2015), it is largely acknowledged that the global IR community is dependent on American scholars along Gramscian lines in the sub-field of IR theory. As Crawford and Darryl (2001, 20) observe, ‘while there is no clear and absolute consensus on the issue of whether IR continues to be (or ever was) an American social science’, scholars generally acknowledge ‘an overwhelming preponderance of American theoretical influences.’ Although there are excellent scholars overseas, Stephen Walt (2011) observes that there is a shortage of ‘big thinking’ on global affairs from scholars outside the trans-Atlantic axis, including continental Europe. He points to the lack of non-Anglo-Saxon scholars and public intellectuals whose writings have managed to become the object of global attention and debate. In other words, as Walt vividly puts it, ‘there’s no German, Japanese, Russian, Chinese, or Indian equivalent of Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations, Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man, or Joseph Nye’s various writings on “soft power”.’ His claims are empirically supported by the TRIP survey result on the top ten scholars whose work
has had the greatest influence on the field of IR in the past twenty years: except for Barry Buzan, all the remaining nine most influential scholars in the field are Americans.66

Why, then, is American hegemony in IR scholarship a matter of growing concern for not only non-Western but also some Western scholars? Ideally, there would be no problem if a theory or an idea is American or Western. Universalism is the ultimate end for which all sciences and theories pursue. Yet, as Hoffman (1977, 57) concluded, ‘because of the American predominance, the discipline has also taken on some additional traits which are essentially American, and less in evidence in those other countries where the field is now becoming an object of serious study.’ Despite its acceptance of diversity of approaches, American IR is predominantly characterized by its rationalist ontology, empiricist epistemology, and positivist methodology which together ‘define “proper” social science and thereby serve as the gatekeepers for what counts as legitimate scholarship’ (Smith 2002, 72; see also Bacon and Newman 2002, 39; Tickner and Wæver 2009, 311). A typical example is the dominance of US positivist approaches in IR publications (Maliniak et al. 2011, 461). As Steve Smith has perceptively observed:

 IR remains an American social science both in terms of the policy agenda that U.S. IR exports to the world in the name of relevant theory, and in terms of the dominant (and often implicit) epistemological and methodological assumptions contained in that theory. This latter dominance is far more insidious than the former, especially because it is presented in the seemingly neutral language of being ‘the social science enterprise’ (Smith 2002, 81).

The Americanocentric nature of American IR is also reflected in its teaching activities where few non-American and virtually no non-Western scholarship whatsoever was taught (Waever 1998, 699; Hagmann and Biersteker 2014, 306). IR textbooks, written by American scholars, have bibliographies only in English and in American IR syllabi ‘overwhelmingly the references, the suggestions for further reading, and the selected bibliographies are the works of American scholars, writing in American journals, or for American publishing houses’ (Nossal 2001, 171). For example, a survey on the teaching curricula of the ten leading American universities found that US IR programs assign an average of 94% of their reading assignments for works developed within the intellectual and socio-political context of the US. Among these top IR institutions,

Michigan University is labelled ‘the most US-centric and nationalist IR school overall’ by assigning 99% of the readings merely from US-based scholars (Hagmann and Biersteker 2014, 303). In a standard ‘Introduction to International Relations’ course in the US, reflectivist theories such as ‘dependency, modern-world systems, and other Marxian or neo-Marxian perspectives are either ignored or treated superficially’ (Robles 1993, 527). In none of the leading American IR programs surveyed by Hagmann and Biersteker (2014, 305) ‘were students introduced to non-Western perspectives on, or conceptualizations of, international politics.’ For example, with the changing dynamics in world politics, many students now choose Asia (particularly China) as a focus of study. However, as Professor Stephanie Neuman from Columbia University puts it, it is difficult to expose students to an alternative, non-Western view of the world – to see it, for example, from China’s perspective – because, with few exceptions, what we read in the US about the Third World in general and about China in particular is written from the perspective of the US, e.g. the ‘China Threat Theory’ (Interview, October 2013). This has driven her to teach a course that introduces Third World’s perspectives on security issues and subsequently to edit one of the first volumes that questions the relevance of IRT to explaining Third World security (Neuman 1998). As she further explains to this author:

I have been teaching a graduate course, *Third World Security Issues*, at Columbia University for many years. An issue of confusion that continually arises is related to the term ‘sovereignty’. My students find the concept of sovereignty we teach in the West confusing since it has so little relevance when applied to weak and poor states. There is a misfit between the term as we define it here in the West and its application in the Third World. And this is true for many of the central concepts in international relations theory. That’s how I came to organize the book, *International Relations and the Third World*. It came directly out of my teaching experience and my frustration with the Eurocentric, normative character of most IR theory (Interview, October 2013).

The problem with this evident parochialism of American IR is that it ‘tends to represent world politics in an essentially Americocentric way’ (Nossal 2001, 170). This creates ‘barriers to understanding and engaging alternative views on international politics’ (Hagmann and Biersteker 2014, 307). As a leading US-based theorist has recalled to this author: two-thirds of the American Political Science Association (and perhaps two-thirds of American IR field) study just American foreign policy and international relations perspectives. Mainstream American IR, particularly rational theorists, views world politics in an uncomplicated and reductionist way through a
decidedly American lens. ‘They think American power is there forever and it is good and America will shape the world… The norms are uncontested, we are right. The explanation is unproblematic, we have power and we will win. That is what the liberals have thought for the past 150 years’ (Interview, October 2013).

Urging the development of a more ‘critical pedagogy’ in IR, Hagmann and Biersteker (2014, 307) warns that if this kind of parochialism and ethnocentrism in the field continues, it may entail risks that ‘students will project paradigmatically restricted, culturally closed, gender-biased, and historically situated perspectives onto international events, regions, and actors, and simply assume that these perspectives are universally applicable and trans-historically valid.’ Calls have thus been raised for lessening the American dominance in IR and ultimately striving toward international intellectual diversity. This is not an attempt to disregard or displace American theories but an endeavour to search for intellectual contributions in other parts of the world for the sake of a more representative discipline. As Crawford and Darryl (2001, 18) have noted, ‘the point is not that American scholarship has failed to make a positive and lasting contribution to IR. The question, rather, is whether room can be found for other constructions of the discipline…’ This is because despite the perceived path dependence on American theories and concepts in the global IR community, IR ‘is quite different in different places’ (Waever 1998, 723). Even in Britain where IR is closest to the US, we find the strongest criticism of American domination. Leading British theorist Steve Smith (2002, 68), for example, is uncompromising that the US study of IR has failed on normative grounds and that by ‘adopting an essentially rational-choice account of the relationship between interests and identity’, it ‘runs the risk of failing to understand other cultures and identities and thereby become more and more a U.S. discipline far removed from the agendas and concerns of other parts of the world.’

This wider discussion on American hegemony in IR serves as the point of departure for exploring the impact of the ongoing EAIRT debate on American IR. If American power and European immigrant scholars have been contributing to the dominance of the US in the discipline, will the relative decline of American power vis-a-vis ‘the rise of the East’, together with the growing number of Asian migrant scholars and students in American universities and IR programs, have any impact on the intellectual predispositions of American IR?
The ‘dissidents’ and their rationales for theoretical reform

Although American IR is overwhelmingly characterized by its positivist orientation, there are ‘dissenting voices’ increasingly being heard (Robles 1993, 527). According to a recent survey on contemporary ‘dissidence’ in American IR, 11.5% American scholars identified themselves as Dissidents, 27.9% declared to belong to the Minority while 46.2% considered themselves Mainstreamers (Hamati-Ataya 2011, 366). The main criterion for this categorization is their different views on the degree of diversity needed in IR. Accordingly, mainstreamers are ‘systematically satisfied with the degree of diversity achieved’ which, in their view, reflects ‘a plurality of approaches, methodologies, and inquiries that remain in accordance with the central tenets of positivism, materialism, and statism.’ Dissidents and Minority scholars, meanwhile, are not satisfied with the current degree of diversity in IR and perceive that such diversity should entail ‘a stretching of the discipline’s scholarship beyond the limits set by mainstream IR scholars’ (Hamati-Ataya 2011, 388).

In light of the above definition, the EAIRT-related ‘dissidents’ in US academia are those who call for greater diversity of theoretical approaches with nutrition from East Asian cases and intellectual sources. They can be categorized into the three following positions, led by David Kang, Amitav Acharya, and L.H.M. Ling respectively. The first group comprises of East Asia specialists claiming for ‘bringing East Asia in’ to existing IR theory. The second group desires to construct a truly representative discipline by bridging mainstream IRT and area studies. The third group consists of scholars working in the reflectivist tradition of IR theory, mainly undertaking anti-mainstream scholarship. The common ground is their dissatisfaction with the current state of the Western centric nature and American domination of IR and their desire to introduce alternative approaches based on non-Western, and for the purpose of this study, East Asian understandings of world politics. The extent and nature of their dissatisfaction and claims, however, are different. Although there are connections and at least some collaboration among and beyond these scholars, their works are generally distinct. Given the East Asia focus of this study, the three leading theorists and East Asia specialists cited above are selected as the key representatives of these approaches, respectively. The reason for them being the exemplars of this study is the extent of innovation their works are as compared to their peers. Nonetheless, other
scholars who share the perspectives of these conceptual leaders will be referenced where necessary.

Figure 5.1. The EAIRT debate in the US

It is important to note at the outset, however, that although sharing the general predispositions, these ‘dissenting voices and factions’ are diverse in size and, even if put together, they remain a tiny portion relative to the number of mainstream IR scholars in the United States. The closer their positions to the mainstream (such as in the case of Kang and Acharya whose work have been categorized as ‘constructivist’ approaches), the more likely that their views will at least be afforded a hearing by mainstreamers. Mainstreamers are, however, less interested in the work of postcolonial scholars like Ling and her associates given their different ontological and epistemological positions. The emphasis of these approaches is also different: Kang and Acharya are trying to enrich and extend Western IRT to the point that it eventually incorporates East Asian patterns of international relations. Ling, meanwhile, is attempting to build a more distinct theory based on East Asian traditions and concepts. Each of these approaches will be discussed in turn.

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67 This figure is made by the researcher based on input data gathered from (Hamati-Ataya 2011, 366).
Bringing East Asia in’ to IR Theory

Historically, the study of regions (or area studies) in American political science is closely linked to the geopolitical concerns and policy interests of the US. East Asia is no exception. Japan’s rise in the international political economy in the 1970s and 1980s, for example, intensified the impact of ‘revisionist’ theory and interest in the US about Northeast Asian regionalism. Japan’s subsequent economic stagnation undercut such ‘revisionist’ theories and consequently caused a decline in Japanese studies (Rozman 2002, 152-3). East Asia as a whole has nevertheless become a region of growing interest since the end of the Cold War. The rapid rise of China and the dynamics of East Asian regionalism, in particular, have provided American scholars with a playground for theory testing (e.g. Friedberg 1993; Johnston 1995; Berger 2002; Ikenberry and Mastanduno 2003). Through this interaction of IR Theory and area studies, East Asia is posing a number of theoretical and empirical puzzles for IR scholars, exemplified by the trajectory of China’s rise, the lack of hard balancing blocs against China and/or the US, and an ASEAN-led loose and soft regionalism (Alagappa 1998; Alagappa 2003; Goh 2008; Johnston 2012). Increasingly, there have been visible laments about the disjuncture between existing theories and East Asian politics. During the 1990s and early 2000s, the pessimistic predictions of American realists about a violent transformation of Asian security order as the result of China’s rise sparked counter-arguments from East Asia specialists (Kang 2003a; Acharya 2003). More recently, some US-based scholars have brought into IR discourses some distinctiveness of historical East Asian order, thus expanding the EAIRT debate in the US.

Among US-based East Asia specialists, David Kang, currently at the University of Southern California (USC), presents the strongest claims for ‘bringing East Asia in’ to IRT. Starting with his disagreements with the pessimistic prediction of East Asian Security by American realists, Kang has been a fervent advocate for a new analytical framework to explain East Asian politics. His main argument is that theories inductively derived from European history often end up ‘getting Asia wrong’ because ‘Asia has different historical traditions, different geographic and political realities, and different cultural traditions’ (Kang 2003a, 84). Asia’s rising importance in today’s world system, in his view, ‘gives scholars a wonderful opportunity in the fields of
international relations generally and Asian security specifically to produce increasingly rigorous and theoretically sophisticated work’ (Kang 2003a, 58).

What, then, is so ‘East Asian’ that Kang, and many others, would like to bring into IRT? There are at least two dimensions: the peace-prone hierarchical East Asian historical system and the lack of religious war in that region’s history. Kang challenges the traditional ‘US-centric’ approach that views the United States as the key ‘stabilizing factor’ in maintaining East Asian order (e.g. Ikenberry 2008; Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth 2012). Rather, he makes China the centre point of his analysis. To understand the absence of hard-balancing bloc against China, Kang argues, we need to go back to the historical East Asian order (1300-1900 AD). During that time, the region was not characterized by balancing and conflict but hierarchy, peace, and stability (Kang 2005, 74; Kang 2010b). Although Western scholars have theorized about hierarchy before, such analysis focuses more on the security, economic, and social factors (much like hegemonic stability theory) from the vantage points of the U.S. authority and legitimacy (Lake 1996, 2009; Dunne 2003). Kang, by contrast, offers what is perhaps the most systematic account to date about the hierarchical system in pre-modern East Asia. In his view, that system was generated by the interplay of ideas and interests. In this hierarchical order, China had both cultural and political superiority over its tributary states. East Asian states accepted Chinese hegemony and voluntarily subordinated themselves to China which in turn fostered regional stability. Put differently, it was ‘an international society based on culture’ (Kang 2010a, 593) centring around China’s ‘legitimate authority’ (Kang 2012).

Kang further argues that East Asian states prefer a strong China even now because whenever China is strong, it would bring regional stability. If China is weak e.g. during its ‘century of humiliation’, the region tends to encounter instability. These historical patterns help explain why, to Kang, East Asian states are currently accommodating rather than balancing China and why the East Asian order is more stable and peaceful than realists expected (Kang 2003a; 2003b, 169). Kang attributes the paucity of balancing actions by East Asian states against China to two factors: 1) interests (East Asian states see the rise of China as bringing more opportunities than

68 In his work, Kang (2010a) defines East Asia in its narrow concept which includes the Confucians states only e.g. contemporary Northeast Asia states (China, Japan, Korea, and Mongolia) and Vietnam. The cases of Southeast Asian states, therefore, are less relevant to his analysis.
threats), and 2) identities (the acceptance of China’s benign hierarchical world order based on a shared Confucian worldview) (Kang 2007, 4; see also Kelly 2012, 16). The policy relevance of this analysis is clear: if East Asian states are not inclined toward balancing China, then the US pivot to Asia by mobilizing regional countries to ‘contain China’, is ‘highly problematic’ (Kang 2005, 76).

Kang’s more recent work points to the absence of religious wars in pre-modern East Asia. During that time, East Asian states like Korea, Japan, Vietnam, and China ‘rarely experienced anything like the type of religious violence that existed for centuries in historical Europe, despite having vibrant religious traditions such as Confucianism, Buddhism, Daoism, and numerous folk religions.’ Addressing this anomaly, to Kang, ‘is theoretically important because it challenges a large body of scholarly literature that finds a universal causal relationship between religion and war that is empirically derived mainly from the experience of only Christianity and Islam’ (Kang 2014, 665). This distinct historical pattern of East Asia has become even more salient especially after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 when ‘religion is widely believed to be one of the root causes of war, rebellion, and terrorism’ (Kang 2014, 667). Bringing this particular aspect of East Asia into IR, therefore, will help address the ‘selection bias’ in current literature and promises to enrich ‘theorizing about the relationship between religion and war’ (Kang 2014, 665).

While making a case for avoiding ‘an implicitly Euro-centric approach to Asia’, Kang is also aware of the essentialist ‘Orientalism’ that focuses merely on Asian differences. Rather, he strongly calls for applying the same Western mode of empiricism that based on evidence rather than selection bias in any study on Asian international relations (Kang 2003a, 59). What the empirical evidence reveals thus far, in Kang’s view, ‘still getting Asia wrong’ a decade after his famous 2003 article first appeared (Interview, September 2013). Despite the growing concern about China’s ‘new assertiveness,’ Kang observes that there is no evidence of either a sharp increase in military expenditure or a military alliance against China by East Asian states (Kang 2013a). Maritime disputes in Asia, albeit intensifying, are still primarily involving frigates and vessels posturing rather than directly confronting one another. Nonetheless, Kang indicates that he will change his argument if the relevant evidence changes its key premises (e.g. if there is a substantial increase in Asian defence budgets) (Interview, September 2013).
Despite his systematic conceptualization of East Asian international relations, Kang does not aim to build new ‘non-Western’ IR theories. Rather, his goal is ‘to expand international relations theory so that scholars can better identify factors that help to explain regional and temporal differences in how states think about and achieve security and how they conduct their international relations’ (Kang 2003b, 165; on the case of North Korea, see Kang 2011). Kang acknowledges current efforts toward constructing national school(s) of IR in East Asia as well as Acharya’s and Buzan’s argument for non-Western IR Theory in Asia. However, he positions himself within this debate in more neutral and agnostic terms:

I go back and forth about whether there is a need for non-Western theory or whether we simply need to realize that the current theories are actually European theories. I started out with ‘Getting Asia wrong’ – they all derived from European experience and we think it is universal. In fact, the world is very old, but most of us believe that the Westphalia world is inevitable, obvious, and universal… My basic point was I don’t think that it is universal and I say the same thing over and over again. Whether there need to be other theories or whether we can widen the current ones is really what I am interested in and I don’t know yet… My position in the debate is that there clearly is a sociology of the field – things existing independently of the theories that make us view the world the way we do… It really helps if you are a Korean American or like Amitav Acharya from India, then you really know the world does not [from their perspective] look the way Americans think it does (Interview, September 2013).

These views about the particular aspects of East Asian history are also reflected in Kang’s teaching of several courses at USC, including Introduction to International Relations, Business and Politics of the Korean Peninsula, International Security of East Asia, and Introduction to East Asian Studies as well as in his guest lectures delivered at other institutions.69 As the Director of USC’s East Asian Studies Center and Korean Studies Institute, Kang has also chaired a number of seminars and conferences that brought together leading East Asia specialists in the US. His argument has attracted both support and criticism from other East Asia specialists, creating a ‘mini-debate’ on East Asian IR within American academia. The most heated discussion to date was reflected through a conference entitled ‘Was there an historical East Asian International System?’ hosted by Kang’s Korean Studies Institute at USC in 2013. The conference essays were later organized into a special

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69 See, for example, Kang’s lecture at Cornell University on the theme ‘The Rise of China and the East Asian Regional Order’ (Cornell-University 2012).
issue of the *Journal of East Asian Studies* edited by Kang with a key overarching observation:

Long understudied by mainstream international relations (IR) scholars, the East Asian historical experience provides an enormous wealth of patterns and findings, which promise to enrich our IR theoretical literature largely derived from and knowledgeable about the Western experience. The intellectual contributions of this emerging scholarship have the potential to influence some of the most central questions in international relations: the nature of the state, the formation of state preferences, and the interplay between material and ideational factors (Kang 2013b, 181).

Kang is not alone in his claim for ‘bringing East Asia in’ to IR Theory. A number of other US-based scholars (many of whom are young immigrant scholars from East Asia) are also using East Asian empirical applications for building new analytical frameworks, albeit in different ways. Somewhat like Kang’s argument, Kai He has posited that all the three major IR theories (realism, liberalism, and constructivism) that deal with the questions of ‘Does ASEAN matter?’ end up ‘getting ASEAN wrong.’ He insists that they fail to specify ASEAN’s actual impact on regional security (He 2006, 194). Accordingly, he introduces a new theoretical framework called ‘institutional realism’ to explain ASEAN successes and failures. Under this framework,

ASEAN is a realist tool for its member states to realize two levels of balance of power. At the intramural level, ASEAN helps its members keep state-to-state relations balanced and in order, although it does not provide any problem-solving mechanism. At the extra-regional level, ASEAN is seen as an important institutional balancing tool for ASEAN states to deal with external pressures and threats (He 2006, 207; see also He 2008a).

Kai He’s colleague and partner, Huiyun Feng, meanwhile, argues against Iain Johnston’s claim that Chinese strategic culture is generally ‘parabellum realist’ (Johnston 1995). Employing an operational code construct model, her analysis concludes that Chinese strategic culture is generally defensive in nature and that Chinese leaders are much more cooperative and accommodationist than what is normally perceived to be the case (Feng 2007). As co-authors, He and Feng have adopted the innovative step of integrating the neoclassical realist framework in

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70 Both Kai He and Huiyun Feng obtained their doctoral degrees from the University of Arizona. They came back to China to work for Chinese think-tanks for a few years before returning to America to assume faculty positions at the University of Utah. They left the US for Denmark in 2014 and have recently moved to Griffith University in Australia. They are mentioned here because these theoretical works were developed while they were working in the US.
political science and prospect theory in psychology to investigate why and how leaders make risky and seemingly irrational decisions in international politics, using empirical cases from Asian security (He and Feng 2013). Like Kang, they also question the lack of hard balancing of East Asian states against China’s rise. Instead, they view East Asian security under the alternative lenses of ‘soft-balancing’ and ‘institutional balancing’ (He and Feng 2008; He 2008b). Nevertheless, as in the case of Kang, these US-based specialists only plea for ‘bringing East Asia in’ be it to test, falsify, affirm, or broaden existing IRT. They have not, at least not yet, developed alternatives that challenge the hegemony of existing IR theory. This makes a distinction with the two other approaches to be discussed below.

**Deprovincializing both Western and ‘Asian’ IRT: toward ‘Global IR’**

Iain Johnston (2012, 54) once categorized David Kang and Amitav Acharya as sharing the same agenda of systematically ‘bringing East Asia in’ to IRT. An objective analysis of Kang and Acharya’s work, however, reveals that they have developed relatively different perspectives in the EAIRT debate. While there are certain overlapping interests between these two scholars, Acharya’s approach, in this author’s view, is broader in scope and more sophisticated in substance. While Kang and other East Asia specialists focus merely on China and East Asia, Acharya often embraces Asia as a whole. He has also been the leading advocate of the ‘non-Western IR Theory’ project. Understanding his claims and practices, therefore, warrants a separate discussion.

The need for recasting the IR discipline has motivated and underscored Acharya’s own scholarship since his entry into the field in the 1980s. Although having been educated and working extensively in the West, Acharya’s perspective in IR – his inclination toward liberal internationalism at first, then constructivism, and now the non-Western IRT approach – has been largely shaped by his upbringing in India. Immersing himself in a society embedded with Hinduism, Buddhism, and a ‘Nehruvian worldview’, Acharya has always been sceptical of the realist argument that states always identify their interests in terms of power (Acharya 2013b, 6). He

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71 Acharya is an Indian-born scholar. He completed his undergraduate and master degrees in India before obtaining his PhD degree from Murdoch University in Australia in 1987. He has prior working experience in Canada (York University), US (Harvard University), Singapore (Nanyang Technological University), and Britain (Bristol University) before assuming his current position at the American University (US) in 2009.
quickly became an advocate of social constructivism when that theory was introduced in the 1990s because he saw in it ‘a clear potential to secure greater recognition for the agency of non-Western actors’ such as the culture, norms and identity that resonate well with Asian thinkers and writers (Acharya 2013b, 11; 2014g, 80). Yet, he increasingly felt uncomfortable with mainstream constructivism because of ‘the theory’s tendency to privilege the moral cosmopolitanism of Western transnational actors in explaining norm diffusion in world politics’ (Acharya 2013b, 12). Although acknowledging that some frameworks developed in Western scholarship have been more relevant to non-Western contexts such as the balance of threat theory (Stephen Walt), subaltern realism (Mohamed Ayoob), neoclassical realism (Victor Cha), and other constructivist and post-structural theories; none of them, he laments, ‘give much space to the agency of Asian actors: they simply confirm the American-centrism of IRT’ (Acharya 2014c, 127-8). This eventually turned him toward the current ‘non-Western IR Theory’ approach.

Acharya’s claim for non-Western IRT has four main elements, each of which has largely shaped his research and teaching practices over the years. First, he largely concurs with other East Asia specialists discussed in the previous section that existing Western IR theories, derived mainly from Western history, traditions, and experience, fail to fully capture and explain the key trends and puzzles of international relations in the non-Western world such as Asia (Acharya 2013b, 251). The claim of universally applicable Western theory is, in his view, a ‘false universalism’ (Clifford 2011; Acharya 2014c, 129) that is embedded with a dangerous parochialism and ethnocentrism (Acharya 2013b, 2). In contrast, he aims to develop an emancipatory IRT which should have ‘the recognition of the margin, the representation of the object, and the empowerment of the weak’ and ‘to render the discipline truly universal by recognizing and incorporating the ideas and the experiences of the non-West’ (Acharya 2000a, 17-8).

This claim has motivated Acharya to study the marginal, local actors in Asia e.g. ASEAN. In fact, he has been taking the lead in not only explaining ASEAN intra-regional cooperation but more importantly how the weaker states of ASEAN have shaped the regional order in Asia (Acharya 2000b, 2001; Acharya and Stubbs 2009; Acharya 2014f). While Kang and others view Asian order through the lenses of power – e.g. either a Sino-centric or US-centric worldview – Acharya focuses on the history
and evolution of Asian regionalism. This is because, as he argues, ‘without regionalism, …there might not even be any idea of Asia for us to talk about’ (Acharya 2010a, 1013). Acharya’s earlier work attempted to introduce an Asian version of constructivism – how ideas and norms in world politics are diffused and localized in the Asian context with the focus on the agency of local actors in Asian regionalism (Acharya 2001, 2010b; Acharya and Stubbs 2009; Acharya 2013b). In his recent book, Acharya (2010b) argues that in understanding Asian style regionalism, it is necessary to understand the diffusion of ideas and norms in the international system from the perspective of local actors. In this light, the reason Asia is not ‘ripe for rivalry’ is because ‘Asian multilateral conferences and institutions helped to embed the Westphalian norms of independence, reciprocity, equality, and non-interference within regional diplomatic and security practice’ (Acharya 2003, 159). His explanation of a major historical puzzle of Asian international relations – why regional powers failed to create and shape a lasting regional organization to their liking and why Asia’s regional institutions have continued to be led by weak states – is that ‘in each phase, the region’s principal powers suffered from a legitimacy deficit that prevented them from organizing regional cooperation in a sustainable manner, despite having the material capabilities to do so’ (Acharya 2014b, 21).

Second, while his call for ‘non-Western IR Theory’ has aroused growing interest in building indigenous theoretical frameworks in Asia, Acharya discounts the prospect of an ‘Asian school of IR’. The reason is twofold: 1) Asian diversity creates problems for generalizations; and 2) the claim for Asian uniqueness/exceptionalism is quite controversial, and thus restricts the global appeal of an emerging ‘Asian school’ (Acharya 2014g, 124; 2014c). Regarding the first premise, he asks, ‘how can one speak of a coherent set of values that can be uniquely ‘Asian,’ and ignore the differences between Confucian, Muslim, and Hindu cultural norms?’ (Acharya 2010a, 1011). Even within the core East Asian region, there are two distinct systems of the Confucian system in North East Asia and the Mandala system in Southeast Asia (Acharya 2014c, 124). Building national schools of IR, in his view, is more feasible but undesirable because of the alternatively ethnocentric, hegemonic, and parochial nature of such academic movements. The construction of a ‘China School’, for example, is seen ‘to a large extent an attempt to legitimize the rise of China as a fundamentally positive force in international relations’ (Acharya 2011a, 857). Chinese exceptionalism, with no difference than its American counterpart, thus ‘carries the risk
of introducing a new and dangerous parochialism to Asian IR discourse and practice’ (Acharya 2014c, 130). It is his scepticism of ‘Asian uniqueness’ that Acharya differentiates himself with Kang and the current drive toward constructing indigenous theories in Asian IR communities. As he notes, ‘while Western IRT has a tendency to universalize, Asian contributions often tend to ride on exceptionalism: how Asia differs from other regions’ (Acharya 2014c, 129). The challenge for an Asian contribution to IRT, therefore, is how to modify Western-centrism ‘without falling into the trap of exceptionalism’ (Acharya 2003, 163). A more useful approach, Acharya suggests, ‘would be to generalize from the Asian experience on its own terms’ (Acharya 2003, 162).

Third, instead of supporting ‘Asian exceptionalism’, Acharya argues for ‘Asian universalism’ (Acharya 2014g, 81). As he notes, Asia ‘also abounds in historical forms of local knowledge with a universal reach. Examples include the ideas of Asian thinkers such as Tagore’s critique of nationalism, Nehru’s neutralism and non-alignment, and Gandhi’s satyagraha’ as well as other local ‘writings that were developed either in association with, or in reaction against, Western concepts of nationalism, internationalism, and international order’ (Acharya 2014g, 82). Among these traditions, Acharya pays great attention to the potential of Buddhism, an age-old religion that has pan-Asian appeal, as a rich source for theory building. Drawing on Dalai Lama’s comparison on the similarities and compatibilities between Buddhism and science, Acharya also makes his own comparison between Buddhism and IR theories such as constructivism and post-modernism. The notion of ‘Emptiness’ in Buddhist philosophy, in particular, offers a ground of synthesis between Buddhism and science, including IR. In the theory of emptiness, nothing is absolute and permanent, and everything is interconnected, dynamic, and constantly changing just as what the relativity theory generally says. For the Dalai Lama, both quantum physics and the idea of emptiness tell us ‘that reality is not what appears to be’. For Acharya, Buddhism can be a nutrition to broaden the epistemology of IR as it ‘is not a purely ideational doctrine – it rejects the idea of an ‘essential core to . . . our individuality and identity that is independent of the physical and mental elements that constitute our existence’ (Acharya 2011b, 74).

Last but not least is Acharya’s argument on the ultimate aim of the non-Western IRT and a vision for future theoretical work on Asian IR. On more than one occasion,
Acharya has stated that his goal is not to generate a new grand debate. Rather, his intent is ‘to underscore the long-term and ethnocentric neglect of the non-Western world in IR theory, the limitations and distortions that this inflicts on our understanding of world politics as a whole’. The ultimate objective is to help construct ‘a more inclusive, truly global IR’ (Acharya 2013b, 1; see also Acharya 2000a, 2; 2011b). The third pathway which is more possible and desirable as compared to either simply using Asia as a testing ground for Western theories or claiming for Asian uniqueness/exceptionalism is, in Acharya’s words, the “deprovincialization” of both the established Western and a presumptive “Asian” IRT (Acharya 2014c, 123). This is a process in which ‘existing Western-centric theories are localized to fit Asian history and praxis, while local historical and cultural constructs and contemporary practices of foreign policy and intraregional relations are universalized and projected to a world stage’ (Acharya 2014c, 134). The aim is not to displace, but challenge, enrich, and engage with existing theory as well as to offer greater interaction and integration between discipline and area studies. The gap between IRT and area studies, Acharya suggests, can be bridged by a hybrid such as ‘transnational area studies’ and ‘disciplinary regional studies’ which offer ‘much common ground for productive interaction and mutual learning’ (Acharya 2014f, 472-83).

As a demonstration for how such a hybrid might evolve, Acharya has recently proposed a new theoretical approach, termed ‘consociational security order’ (CSO), to analyse the emerging Asian security order in the context of China’s rise. Drawing from different theoretical lenses of defensive realism, institutionalism, and especially consociational theory in comparative politics, this model presents an eclectic alternative conceptualization on the implications of China’s rise on Asian security order beyond the usual explanations offered by theories such as anarchy, hierarchy, hegemony, concert, and community. Those theoretical frameworks have identified contributing factors to Asian stability/instability but so far have failed to capture the complexity of Asian security. The CSO framework, meanwhile, holds that ‘no single factor is by itself sufficient to ensure stability’ and that all four conditions – interdependence, equilibrium, institutions, and elite restraint – must be present to some degree in order to produce Asian order (Acharya 2014e, 162). A key theoretical implication of this analysis concerns the relationship between rising powers and regional orders. While Western theorists like Mearsheimer presume that rising powers (e.g. China) tend to seek regional hegemony and coerce regions, Acharya points to the
opposite possibility: regions, with the conditions of a CSO, can constrain rising
hegemons.

Beyond this eclectic work, Acharya’s more ambitious research project is to construct a
‘theory of multiplex world order.’ His main thesis is that regardless of the fact that the
US is declining or not, the liberal American-led world order that we have since the
end of WWII is over. The rising powers, meanwhile, are not united and lack of
material power (legitimacy, public goods) for global leadership. In this light, what we
may see instead is the emergence of a ‘multiplex’ world order which is neither
multilateral nor unipolar. Unlike the 19th century multilateralism where great powers
formed alliances and play the game of balance of power, the ‘multiplex’ world order
comprises of multipolar worlds with more than two or three major powers but their
interrelationship is complex interdependence. It is like a multiplex cinema in which a
variety of shows featuring different plots (ideas), actors, producers and directors (e.g.
Hollywood thrillers and westerns, Bollywood song and dance, Chinese kungfu,
European realism, and many other entities) running parallel with each other in
different theatres. No single movie nor any single director is dominating the attention
of the audience, and the audience has a choice of what they want to see (Acharya
2014a). In other words, it is the world characterized by multiple actors (not merely
great powers or states), complex interdependence, multi-layers of global governance
today, or a ‘de-centered world.’

These theoretical claims of Acharya are also translated into his teaching and outreach
practices. Over the years, Acharya, with his lectures and speeches, has contributed to
the spreading of theoretical awareness in various non-Western regions (Asia, Africa,
Latin America), particularly in lesser developing countries in Asia e.g. in India, China,
Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Vietnam, etc.72 This is also partly reflected
in his present teaching at American University. Acharya’s syllabus for courses like
‘Introduction to World Politics’, ‘Law and Diplomacy in Regional Organizations
(ASEAN, Africa, and the Americas)’; and ‘Global Governance’ have assigned

72 Acharya served as the founding co-President of the Asian Political and International Studies
Association (APISA) which was established in 2001. As it happens, this author had the opportunity to
study with Professor Acharya in a course titled ‘Asian Security Order’ in Singapore where many of the
points discussed in this section were rehearsed. In another occasion, this author was in a master class
that Acharya delivered to the Vietnamese IR community on the theme ‘IR Theory and Methodology’ in
August 2011, sponsored by the Ford Foundation. Many of this author’s Vietnamese colleagues have
been influenced by his non-Western IR approach.
readings on many of his writings as well as some other non-Western approaches. He also supervised PhD students on his preferred ‘Global IR’ theme such as Jiajie He from China working on comparing the divergent normative power between EU and ASEAN (He 2016). Acharya has also presented the relevance of his ‘theory of multiplex world’ to the study of IR in his lecture titled ‘Political Science and International Relations in a Multiplex World’ at the Institute for European Studies of the Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) on the occasion of the opening of its Doctoral Academic Year 2014/15. As he noted in that address, ‘one way to make international studies more relevant is to encourage universities to broaden the curriculum so that it reflects the history, culture, politics, and ideas of the whole world, and not just the West…. Whether America is declining or not, the study of international relations needs to adapt to the accelerating global diffusion of power’ (Acharya 2014d).

Another impact of this debate on Acharya’s own practices is his graduate shift from the relatively controversial term ‘non-Western IRT’ toward a more neutral term ‘Global IR.’ As the first Asia-born scholar elected to the Presidency of the International Studies Association (ISA), Acharya has put forward a theme of his interest, titled ‘Global IR and Regional Worlds: a New Agenda for International Studies’ for the 2015 ISA Annual Convention. The theme calls for a universal, inclusive discipline that takes us beyond its hitherto American and Western dominance. At this conference, over 300 panels/roundtables, or nearly a quarter of the convention total (1,250 panels/roundtables) were arranged to discuss various aspects of ‘Global IR.’ Indeed, as expressed in his six principles or wish-lists for ‘Global IR’, Acharya does not aim to rename the discipline but rather to relaunch the field as ‘IR 2.0’ (Acharya 2013b, 251). The key message to be delivered is:

> International relations has a multiple and global heritage that must be acknowledged and promoted. The Global IR must be inclusive in every sense and across the traditionally understood but increasingly blurred East-West and North-South lines. It needs to be more authentically grounded in world history, rather than Western history, and embrace the ideas, institutions, intellectual perspectives and practices of non-Western states and societies’ (Acharya 2013b, 254).

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73 Course syllabi were retrieved from the Website of American University.
74 The recording of this lecture is available on ULB’s youtube channel (IEE-ULB 2014).
If being taken seriously, this would be a turning point for future development of the discipline. One important step in that direction is the publication of a special issue of the *International Studies Review* journal (published on behalf of ISA) that reflects the theme of the 2015 ISA Convention – ‘Global IR.’ In fact, in his post as ISA President in the year 2014, Acharya had also instructed ISA-sponsored journals to accept contributions with good idea from (and if necessary, to provide language assistance for) non-Western scholars. He also attended a number of regional and national IR conferences in Asia that linked to the ‘Global IR’ theme. For example, in December 2014, Acharya delivered a keynote speech on ‘Global International Relations’ at a seminar on ‘Global IR & Chinese School of IR’ organized by China Foreign Affairs University in Beijing. During this trip to China in his capacity as ISA President, Acharya also spoke on the compatibility of Global IR & Chinese School of IR at Shanghai’s Fudan University. His two main challenges for Chinese IR scholars were: (1) how to avoid automatically justifying Chinese government policy as a precondition for engaging in IR debate at all; and (2), how to generate global appeal for Chinese IR i.e. to offer universal concepts and explanations that apply beyond China to world at large. At another conference in Shanghai, Acharya presented his consociational security order idea to develop approaches for enhanced security policy interaction in Asia (Acharya’s Twitter, 4-8 December 2014). Earlier (in May 2014), Acharya attended an international symposium on the future of the IR discipline held in the Kinugasa Campus – Ritsumeikan University, Japan. His presentation, entitled ‘Global IR and Regional Worlds Beyond Sahibs and Munshis: A New Agenda for International Studies’ proposed an agenda for a prospective Global IR, which transcends the debate between so-called Western and non-Western IR. In his speech, Acharya suggested that Global IR is either a mutual learning process between non-Western and Western IR or an inclusive, an equal, and a constructive dialog between them as symbolized by the relations between Sahibs and Munshis in the past (Ritsumeikan-News 2014).

It is important to note that despite his criticism of Western IR theory, Acharya, like Kang, remains closely connected to mainstream IR. Kang is not discussing reflectivist scholarship at all. Acharya, while noting the many overlapping concerns between his perspectives and critical theories and approaches (especially the ‘emancipatory claims’ of postcolonialism), admits that he is mostly unfamiliar with reflectivist theories and does not discuss their stance in details (Acharya 2013b, 15-6). As he
notes, ‘I don’t call myself a postcolonial scholar but a constructivist because of the problem of agency (postcolonial scholars don’t think subaltern can speak), my whole life is talking about agency’ (School of International Service 2014). So the next movement to be discussed is a separate but related agenda of US-based reflectivist scholars, aiming to re-envisioning IR toward a post-Westphalia dynamics.

**Re-envisioning IR with ‘Daoist’ theory of world politics**

As intimated above, reflectivist theories make up a minor component of American IR. As Smith points out, they ‘receive little attention in U.S. journals, textbooks or syllabi’ (Smith 2002, 81). Leading postcolonial theorists Anna Agathangelou and Lily Ling have used a vivid metaphor of a colonial ‘House of IR’ to describe the current domination of Westphalian IR at the expense of non-Westphalian IR. In this ‘house’, realism and liberalism assume the parental role and other ‘recognized’ family members are mostly American theories (no place for non-Western IR theory for sure but even the English School is excluded). In that ‘house’, reflectivist theories at best serve as the ‘rebel sons’ and ‘fallen daughters’ while postcolonialism is considered merely a ‘love child’ that is not even accepted into the household (Agathangelou and Ling 2004, 28-34). This is, perhaps, because post-colonialism has been at the forefront in calling for decolonizing Westphalian IR (e.g. Nayak and Selbin 2010; Ling 2002; Agathangelou and Ling 2009; Ling 2014a). Inspired by Edward Said’s foundational text ‘Orientalism’, postcolonial theory has attempted to introduce the ‘non-Western Other’ into the IR field by looking at the ‘subalterns’ and ‘marginals’ like women, indigenes, etc. (Chowdhry 2007; Ling 2007). They are, therefore, directly and indirectly involved in the current debate over non-Western/East Asian IR Theory.

Among the various postcolonial approaches, that of L.H.M. Ling – a feminist theorist at the Milano School of International Affairs, The New School, New York – is particularly relevant to the EAIRT debate. Her research agenda focuses on developing a post-Western, post-Westphalian understanding of International Relations/World Politics. Being a diaspora Chinese (Taiwanese American), her exposure to the Asian/Chinese culture, language, and philosophy has facilitated her awareness of Asian traditions and submission to Western dominance. This ultimately drives her to theorize East Asian international relations from a postcolonial IR perspective (Ling 1996; Ling, Hwang, and Chen 2009; Ling and Shih 1998). Either by herself or collectively with other feminist and postcolonial scholars, Ling has levelled some of
the strongest criticism of mainstream IRT (particularly neorealism). As she argues, ‘coming from five centuries of Western colonialism and imperialism, abetted by three centuries of Eurocentric IR…, neorealist logic produces a series of interlocking asymmetries under a single, normative rubric: that is, one culture (‘West’), race (‘white’), and gender (‘hypermasculinity’) should supersede all others’ (Ling and Pinheiro 2013, 13). From a postcolonial IR perspective, this reveals ‘a predominant pattern in IR research and teaching syllabi in terms of methodology (rationalist/formal), language (English), geographical location of authors (US), and gender (male)’ (Ling 2014b, xxii).

The product of this combination, in Ling’s view, is that apprehension, fear, and distrust overwhelmingly dominate world politics. One example is the ‘China’s Threat Theory.’ Western theorists coming from various theoretical traditions such as John Mearsheimer and Aaron Friedberg often view China’s rise with suspicion and a cause of instability and disorder in Asia. As she further elaborates on this parochial thinking:

To Westphalian IR, China’s ideology, politics, and culture are so alien the country cannot integrate into, not to mention play a leading role in, world politics. Instead, China must assimilate: that is, comply with, and preferably internalise, the norms, institutions, and practices of the Western, liberal order. Only in this way could China become a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in the Westphalian world order (Ling 2013a, 553).

Yet, Ling asks: does China qualify as a threat as understood in Western terms? What if China just entertains a different worldview from Western powers? (Ling 2013a, 558). Neorealism’s structural logic, in this sense, fails to capture the multiple logics in world politics. Postcolonial IR, meanwhile, ‘builds on these explorations of Self and Other’ (Ling 2002, 236) and aims for ‘interstitially transforming’ Westphalian outlooks in general and (neo)realism in particular (Ling 2002, 231). With that goal in mind, Ling has worked with a core group of like-minded scholars (including, among others, Carolina M. Pinheiro, Anna M. Agathangelou, and Arlene Tickner) to theorize on ‘worldism’ as a supplementary approach to Westphalian IR. Worldism recasts IR/world politics into a complex of entwined and entwining social relations with multiple, interactive logics (Agathangelou and Ling 2009; Ling 2002), constituting a ‘world of worlds’ (Ling 2014). Worldism in this light employs ‘hybridities’ (Ling 2013b, 23). It draws on social constructivism (norms, ideas, agents and structures), postcolonial IR (the other subaltern), and dialectical IR (Hegelian dialectics). The most important inspiration for worldism is Chinese Daoist dialectics, which Ling
claims to be so far the first non-Western philosophy to be theorized as an alternative epistemology of IR and possibly an alternative ontology for IR as well (Interview, October 2013). As she has explained the motivations for her pursuit of worldism and Daoist theory to this author:

I draw on Daoist theory as a basis for formulating IR theory. The point is not to replace IR theory but to engage with it because the problem with the current IR theory is it all focused on the perspectives of the West – the theorizing, concepts, experiences, history and it is also from a Western masculinist perspective. So my effort is to introduce not just different voices [from outside the West] because postmodern scholars have introduced different voices. My effort is to theorize another kind of IR to engage with Westphalian IR. I think we need to call IR as it is currently understood as ‘Westphalia’ rather than to allow Westphalian IR to presume that it represents everything [in IR] (Interview, October 2013).

How much different, then, are worldism and Daoist dialectics from conventional IR theory predicated on Westphalian roots and reasoning? First, Worldism begins with five commitments to agency, identity, critical syncretic engagement, and accountability as opposed to Wesphalian IR’s five main principles of sovereignty, hierarchy, normality, legitimacy, and power (Ling and Pinheiro 2013, 42). Second, Worldism has three characteristics: 1) it ‘does not treat states as “units,”’ but ‘values the agency of multiple subalterns at multiple sites trying to improve life for the majority, not just the minority’; 2) worldism does not define power as ‘a single capability’ but as ‘the creative act that emanates from collaboration across differences and the trans-subjectivity that arises as a consequence’; and 3) worldism ‘does not see politics as a mere balancing of state interest but the building of communities with rich legacies of social exchange across imposed borders’ (Ling and Pinheiro 2013, 31). Together these shape a ‘relational ontology’ for worldism (Agathangelou and Ling 2009, 8).

Third, in terms of epistemology, Worldism mainly draws on traditional Chinese Daoist philosophy (the yin-yang dialectics, the concept of water, and wuwei (non-action)) which was developed by ancient Chinese masters Laozi and Zhuangzi (Ling 2013b, 40). Through yin and yang, Daoist dialectics give us ‘gender as an analytic’ with the yin signifying the female principle and the yang the male (Ling 2013b, 15).

75 This citation is based on a conference paper presented by Prof. Ling at the International conference titled ‘International Relations Theory: Views from Beyond the West’ held at the New School, New York on 14 October 2013. This conference paper has been turned into a chapter in the new textbook edited by Nizar Messari, Arlene Tickner, and L.H.M. Ling (2016).
The world, in this sense, is full of *yang*, but lacks *yin*. Unlike conflictual Hegelian dialectics, *Yin-yang theory* enables us to develop a method of dialectical discourse – worldist dialogics – that builds on the complementarities (*yin*-within-*yang*, *yang*-within-*yin*) and results in the acceptance of the opposites or enemies. It allows for complexity (‘you are in me and I in you’) without reductions to simplistic dualisms (‘you’ vs ‘me,’ ‘us’ vs ‘them’). Equally important, worldist dialogics provides a means of creatively and intuitively ‘stepping into the mystery of the unknown’ without fear or anxiety, given our mutual embeddedness (Ling and Pinheiro 2013, 28).

Such dialectics are relevant to IR in the sense that it can repaint the picture of world politics in which Westphalian IR and non-Westphalian approaches or ‘multiple worlds’ can co-exist peacefully. In this reconstruction, Westphalia World serves as *yang* to Multiple Worlds’ *yin* (Ling 2013b, 18). There is no clear-cut distinction between the two as, like *yin* and *yang*, the East is within the West, and vice versa. For example, a research by a Western scholar argues that the Western civilization has its root in the East (Hobson 2004). There is also a ‘zone of engagement’ that ‘builds on the complementarities that persist, from within and without, despite the contradictions that repel the two polarities’ (Ling 2013b, 20). Nonetheless, Daoism does not necessarily exclude conflicts. In case there is an imbalance e.g. ‘yin and yang fail to match, or each polarity is paired with itself rather than its opposite, then disaster necessarily results’ (Ling 2013a, 562).

Ling applies Daoist theory to analyse US-China relations as it shows ‘how two supposedly distinct polarities could bind through complicities and complementarities despite their conflicts and contradictions. This process springs from the pockets of co-implication within each polarity (that is, US-within-China, China-within-US)’ (Ling 2013a, 549-50). Daoist dialectics, therefore, helps reframe the ‘China threat’ thesis into a politics of engagement (Ling 2013a, 563; Ling 2013b, 95). In Ling’s view, Daoist dialectics help us see the world differently and help us deal with contradictions efficiently. Its emancipatory mission is obvious: to rescue world politics from unnecessary conflicts and tragedies (Ling 2013a, 568).

As can be seen, Ling’s theorizing on Daoist dialectics is also based on the *yin-yang* dialectics like Chinese theorist Qin Yaqing. This is understandable given their common exposure to Chinese culture and traditions. Nonetheless, the point of Ling’s Wordism or Daoist theory is not to reject or replace Western IRT but to engage with
and supplement to it in order to construct a better body of knowledge. In fact, Ling does not support the ideas held by many mainland Chinese scholars who see the ‘Chinese School of IR’ as a kind of declaration of their ethnic and culture pride. Indeed she questions the nature of that project:

To [assert there is] a ‘Chinese School of IR’ is an oxymoron. It does not make sense because what is ‘Chinese’ about IR that it represents?? If it is the same old IR but with the Chinese flavour to it then it is the same of Westphalian IR – power politics. If it is Chinese then it is not IR. The Daoist theory that I presents has inspirations from the Chinese traditions but it is not ‘ethnically Chinese’ because there are similar philosophical roots in India and Japan and the Daoist theory applies to everybody not just Chinese. And if you use Daoist theory for world politics, you will not end up with IR, you end up with something else quite differently (Interview, October 2013).

Similarly, Ling supports the movement to develop indigenous frameworks in East Asia if it is implemented in a de-Westphalian manner but warns about a possible negative impact if it is conducted otherwise:

If people are drawing on non-Westphalian concepts and still put it into a Westphalian framework in order to demonstrate that ‘we too have theories, and so we are just as good as you’, that kind of competitiveness is, in my view, stupid. It defeats the purposes [of innovating IR] because you are still centralizing the Westphalian order and those who propose the Westphalian order. You are not really introducing anything new, it is like saying ‘I have my native clothing and isn’t my native clothing just as good as yours? So you can wear your shoes and I will wear my native clothing.’ But what’s the point of that? That is just another kind of hyper-masculine competitiveness and we have had enough of that. The world is weary, I am weary of that kind of competition between masculinist identities…76 We don’t need any more of that; we need to break from the conventional way of looking at the world, relating to the world and being in the world. We need to have a celebration of complexities (Interview, October 2013).

Apart from her theoretical innovations, Ling has also been taking the lead in writing alternative textbooks for undergraduate and postgraduate students in the US. The first textbook, titled ‘Learning World Politics: People, Power, Perspective, Volume I: Confucianism, Hinduism, Islam’ aims to introduce ‘Other worlds’ in IR/world politics. She has also authored a book of plays, as an experimental pedagogy for IR, titled ‘Play on Worlds: A Performative Pedagogy for International Relations.’77 In the past few years, Ling has been teaching a course that totally focuses on ‘Non-Western

76 Masculinist identities, in Ling’s interpretation, ‘can include women as well, it is not a biological definition. It is a social construction. There are plenty of women who compete just like men, who think like men, act like men and in fact they put down other women just like men’ (Interview, October 2013).

77 Information is retrieved from the New School’s website.
approaches to the World.’ Her class begins with a critical review of the contemporary
debate over the Western-centric nature of IR and the emerging claims for non-Western
IR Theory. She then discusses the three alternative non-Western approaches of Islam,
Hinduism, and Confucianism. Ling assigns readings from both Western and Asian
scholars (e.g. Amitav Acharya, Mohamed Ayoob, Rajiv Malhotra, Yan Xuetong
etc).78 Most recently, she has worked with Nizar Messari and Arlene Tickner to edit
another textbook, entitled ‘International Relations Theory: Views Beyond the West’
that ‘speaks to the key concepts, categories and issues of world politics from the
perspectives of those who are based in or originate from the Global South’ (Messari,
Tickner, and Ling 2016). The ultimate aim, as Ling notes, is ‘to teach IR differently
and the textbook is just the beginning’ (Interview, November 2013). This could be
seen as a ‘sea change’, given how parochial IR teaching has been in most US
universities.

**Living what they preach: what drives changes?**

As designated above, there are at least three types of claims as far as the EAIRT
debate is concerned in the US and these positions have shaped the practices of
‘dissident scholars’ or the ‘gatecrashers’ of IR knowledge in the US. As Acharya
observes, ‘the “gatecrashers” are a diverse lot, but share one thing in common:
resistance to exclusion and a commitment to emancipation’ (Acharya 2000a, 11). One
common point of these three approaches is a determination to help construct a better
body of knowledge rather than a revolutionary agenda such as in the case of the
‘Chinese IR Theory’ project. The evidence, therefore, points to the conclusion that it
is a commitment to theory that drives the practices of those scholars working on the
EAIRT project in the US. Unlike the case of Chinese IR, it is hard to see the impact of
external ‘intruding’ factors (e.g. funding, nationalism, policy linkages, etc.) on these
US-based scholars other than that, given their Asian background, they are more
exposed to the thinking and practices of East Asian countries. In their interviews with
this author in 2013, these scholars all rejected the role of funding and/or policy
entrapment in shaping their ‘dissident’ theoretical research agenda, saying it is of little
interest to the US government and/or funding agencies. In fact, Acharya has written a
piece warning about the impact of the scholarly engagement and entrapment with the

78 I thank Professor Lily Ling for providing me this course syllabus for reference. For more details on
the course’s content, see Appendix.
policy world in the Asian context (Acharya 2011c). In Ling’s case, she has never been involved in any consultancy work. Kang, meanwhile, has received a number of research grants from the Korean Foundation but that is to support his policy-relevant analysis, not theoretical work. Rather, these changing practices reflect the evolution of their own thinking over time and their shared commitment toward intellectual diversity in IR. As Ling explained her own process of academic evolution to this author:

Postcolonial theory leads me to where I am now because postcolonial theory is about critiquing the imperialism that still exists. So it is great as a critique but it does not offer an alternative as a theory. I had to go through the passage from feminist IR to postcolonial IR to postcolonial feminist IR to my present Daoist approach to IR. It is necessary to go through these critiques to pave the way because if you don’t understand the critique, then you don’t know what should be done (Interview, October 2013).

Nonetheless, the overarching context that stimulates their work is the geopolitical context of theorizing. Arguably, the emergence of East Asian scholarship in the US can be attributable to the rise of Asia and the growing academic interests in the region. For example, the China debate in the US has clearly exerted implications on IR theory and U.S. foreign policy (Hsiung 2008; Christensen 2015; Shambaugh 2012, 2013). As discussed in Chapter 2, power shift is the underlying factor driving paradigm change in predominant International Relations thinking. In this context, it can be argued that the decline of American/Western power and theories versus the rising power and cultural assertiveness of China and the East serves as the important background for the surge of non-Western/East Asian IR discussions in the US/West.

Another element that stimulates the debate over EAIRT is the vibrant academic freedom in the US which largely tolerates dissenting views. In fact, as a recent study on dissidence in American IR has noted, ‘the degree of academic freedom is the most influential factor perceived to affect research across the population and should therefore be viewed as characteristic of American academia rather than of IR itself’ (Hamati-Ataya 2011, 386). Career incentives based on self-motivation is another issue. Interestingly, Acharya’s decision to move from Singapore to the UK and later to the US was largely because of the greater intellectual freedom and academic opportunities he would enjoy in the latter two venues.79 These structural factors,
together with the growing confidence of the younger generation of immigrant scholars in American academia, have culminated in their introduction of bold claims and alternative approaches to American IR. Ling further elucidated on this point to this author:

We are now three generations after World War II. I feel that my generation of peers to me is different from the former generations of scholars who because of world political conditions did not have the kind of structural conditions to support their ideas. So I think it is a kind of maturation of a scholarly generation which is very well trained in Western IR thinking but also has enough cultural self-confidence to draw on their own traditions. And this cultural self-confidence, of course, reflects the rise of Asia in the world political economy. There is no way you can say that the rise of East Asia and now South Asia has nothing to do with the intellectual development. But at the same time, it is a reflection of generational change in intellectual development (Interview, October 2013).

This ‘generational change’ and growing academic maturity do not merely imply the growing diasporas of Asian scholars who are trained and currently working in American universities. It also reflects the growing demand for intellectual diversity from within the American/Western IR community. As Hamati-Ataya (2011, 366) has pointed out, all of the scholars who identified themselves as dissidents (accounting for 11.5% of American IR) are Americans. Leading feminist theorist Ann Tickner, for example, acknowledges the fact that IR remains the continuation of US hegemony. She nonetheless believes that feminism, less bound by the scientific and disciplinary constraints of US social science, has been ‘more international and more methodologically pluralistic.’ In this light, Tickner has offered some insightful thoughts on how Western critical scholarship might contribute to deconstructing the existing body of knowledge with self-reflexibility and incorporation of non-Western experiences (Tickner 2011, 617-8). While sympathy for the calls for greater intellectual diversity is often found among those American scholars working in non-mainstream traditions and/or immigrant scholars, one may ask ‘How does mainstream American IR – the gatekeepers of established knowledge – respond to such challenge?’

**What impact, if any, does the EAIRT debate have on American IR?**

The TRIP surveys, thus far the most extensive study of American scholars’ viewpoints on the impact of East Asia on their research and teaching practices, have indicated that ‘academics recognize the strategic significance of East Asia, but comparatively few
scholars teach about or do research on the region’ (Hundley, Kenzer, and Peterson 2013, 1). In other words, there is a gap between theory and practice as it applies to East Asia. While there has been a recent ‘pivot’ in US policy toward East Asia, there is no equivalent within the American IR academic community (Hundley, Kenzer, and Peterson 2013).

This author’s own interviews with leading US theorists also point to the same conclusion. Most American scholars – with a notable exception of John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt, Jack Snyder, Ian Johnston, and Thomas Christensen, among others – care less about theory than empirical studies. As a result, despite the growing importance of East Asia to the US, there has been virtually little debate about the movements toward building indigenous approaches within the region as well as those theoretical endeavours by US-based scholars. Even the work of Kang and Acharya has not been universally well-received in the US (Interviews with various American scholars, October and November 2013). Indeed, some mainstream scholars simply dismiss the presence of such a debate in the US. Therefore, while the EAIRT debate has clearly shaped the practices of the dissident scholars, it cannot be said that it has any particular impact on American mainstream scholars or that it has compelled them to change their strong propensity toward theoretical universalism and/or their overall disinterest in alternative theory. This response toward EAIRT, however, should be placed in the context of the general tendency of American IR: the shift away from grand theorizing and theoretical purity toward problem-solving and analytical eclecticism.

The decline of ‘grand theorizing’ and the rise of analytical eclecticism in American IR

To understand mainstream American IR’s response to EAIRT, it is necessary to discuss the growing concern about the decline of ‘grand theory’ and the rise of ‘hypothesis testing’ in US IR that leading theorists John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt and others have noted (Mearsheimer and Walt 2013; Levine and Barder 2014). There are increasing laments about the ‘closing of American minds’ in that scholars are less and less concerned about developing new grand theory (asking big questions) or rigorously employing theory in their research. This is reflected in the growing number
of non-paradigmatic approaches that the TRIP surveys have disclosed.\textsuperscript{80} Rather, American IR research has been dominated by ‘simply hypothesis testing which emphasizes discovering well-verified empirical regularities’ using statistical methods (Mearsheimer and Walt 2013, 427). This ‘triumph of methods over theory’ is unhealthy for the development of the IR discipline (Mearsheimer and Walt 2013, 429). Ideally, Mearsheimer and Walt suggest, IR should strike a balance between theory construction and hypothesis testing, if not giving greater importance to the former.

How is this relevant to the EAIRT debate? In this author’s view, its relevance is manifested in at least two dimensions. First, lesser interest in IRT in general subsequently results in disinterest in or even ignorance to alternative theory development by non-Western scholars. As a result, mainstream scholars are largely indifferent to claims for EAIRT. The implied message is clear: ‘We don’t even care about our own theory, why should we care about EAIRT?’ This sentiment is exposed in the remark of a noted specialist on Asian i.r.:

> The majority of American scholars, I would argue, including myself, are not driven by theory. We don’t really care about theory, we care about empirics and about puzzles, and researching and exploring empirical problems. If you look at the work of most American experts on Asian international relations, that is what they do, they explore problems and theory is tangential at best. It is very peripheral to most of the research that is done in the US about international relations in Asia… And for US government, theory is 100% irrelevant to policy makers… This debate doesn’t have any influence on my own thinking and research, frankly (David Shambaugh, Interview, November 2013).

Second, the problem not only reflects scholars’ decreasing interest in theory but also the narrow focus of existing mainstream theories on a number of topics relevant only to American foreign policy. Interestingly, this has served as an excuse for local scholars in developing ‘new’ theory. Professor Jack Snyder observes that in the US, IR theorizing of the last five to ten years has been going in the direction of being theoretically eclectic and problem driven. Scholars have been studying terrorism, civil war, foreign-imposed regime change and international intervention, peacekeeping, etc. So the research agenda has become more current policy problem-driven and less

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\textsuperscript{80} The latest TRIP survey result in the US shows that 31.6\% of American IR scholars say they do not use paradigmatic approach. The two key reasons for their selections are that their approach is not based on any paradigm or school of thought (50\%) and that their approach is based on more than one paradigm or school of thought (40.24\%) (TRIP 2015).
oriented toward big macro theoretical debates about the nature of the international system. Many of the topics that IR scholarship has been focusing on over the last ten years are not so much of interest to China. That might explain Chinese scholars’ motivations for developing a ‘Chinese School’ (Interview, October 2013).

In this context, analytical eclecticism has become an increasingly popular approach in the US to study other regions, notably East Asia. For scholars who do care about theory when studying East Asia, there is a tendency to employ a hybrid of mainstream theories – the so-called ‘analytical eclecticism.’ Peter Katzenstein, for example, has been praised by Acharya as ‘the exception among US and Western gurus of international relations (IR) in having recognized the importance of Asian regionalism (and Asia more generally) as a subject worthy of serious theoretical investigation’ (Acharya 2007b, 370). In fact, Katzenstein is among the pioneers in promoting this analytical eclecticism in studying East Asian international relations. This is seen as a scholarly attempt to bridge the gap between discipline and area studies. According to Katzenstein (1997, 6), ‘IR scholars and area specialists both fail to capture regional dynamics properly. The former tends to downplay the local or national contexts specific to regionalism. In sharp contrast, area specialists pay insufficient attention to the broader structural and comparative conditions under which regional developments take place.’

Working at the intersection of IR, comparative politics, and area studies, Katzenstein and his collaborators have drawn on a variety of theoretical perspectives from these fields to eclectically theorize about Asian economic and security regionalism. Such eclectic frameworks ‘serve many good purposes, including avoiding never-ending debates about metatheory, providing a common theoretical vocabulary and common knowledge, offering common standards for evaluation and a recognizable professional identity to scholars, and encouraging progress in one research tradition that finds itself in competition with others’ (Katzenstein 2007, 397). In fact, this is a natural reaction to the perceived waning American scholarly hegemony as opposed to ‘the rise of national and regional centers of academic excellence and the rearticulation of indigenous scholarly traditions around the world.’ Accordingly, ‘exploring

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81 In an interview with this author in October 2013, Katzenstein insisted that he was not a constructivist and that designating him as a constructivist would be a misreading of his work. Constructivism can explain some aspects that realism and liberalism cannot explain but constructivism, to Katzenstein, is not theory but merely ‘language.’ He prefers to be linked directly to analytical eclecticism.
intersections between area, regional, and international studies can give students a glimpse of theoretical debates at the cutting edge of knowledge, while also teaching them languages, facts-in-context, and systematic thinking’ (Katzenstein 2002, 134-6).

In Katzenstein’s view, moreover, the growing nexus between area studies and IR ‘must be seen within the context of a change in the demographic composition of graduate studies in the U.S’, particularly from an ‘infusion of intellectual energy from foreign graduate students and post-docs’ (Katzenstein 2001, 789). In fact, much of his thinking about the East have been shaped by his teaching experience e.g. through the engagement and interactions with Asian postgraduate students. Interestingly enough, Katzenstein has shared with this author that he wrote his book on analytical eclecticism for the sake of his undergraduate students (Interview, October 2013).

Following Katzenstein, other theorists studying East Asia increasingly accept that no single theory explains all the dimensions of that region’s IR. For example, a recent study on the impact of China’s Rise on IR Theory concludes that ‘a full solution to the question of China’s rise will require an “analytic [sic] eclecticism” characterized by theoretical pragmatism, broadly formulated questions and complex answers’ (Gilley 2011, 795-6). More broadly speaking,

A robust bilateralism and incipient multilateralism in Japanese and Asian-Pacific security affairs are typically not well explained by the exclusive reliance on any single analytical perspective – be it realist, liberal, or constructivist. Japan’s and Asia-Pacific’s security policies are not shaped solely by power, interest, or identity but by their combination. Adequate understanding requires analytical eclecticism, not parsimony… Strict formulations of realism, liberalism, and constructivism sacrifice explanatory power in the interest of analytical purity. Yet in understanding political problems, we typically need to weigh the causal importance of different types of factors, for example, material and ideal, international and domestic. Eclectic theorizing, not the insistence on received paradigms, helps us understand inherently complex social and political processes (Katzenstein and Okawara 2006, 167).

Analytical eclecticism as a pathway to bridge the gap between theoretical universalism and contextual knowledge, therefore, has become a popular framework to be employed in most recent publications on East Asian international relations (e.g. Katzenstein 2005; Goldstein 2007; Fravel 2010; Shambaugh 2014; Pekkanen, Ravenhill, and Foot 2014). The engagement between American theorists (including the dissidents) and East Asian anomalies have resulted in the introduction of a number of ‘eclectic frameworks’ such as Victor Cha’s ‘neoclassical realism’, T. J. Pempel’s

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‘institutional Darwinism’, Kai He’s ‘institutional realism’, and Acharya’s theory of ‘consociational security orders’ (Cha 2000; Pempel 2010; He 2008b; Acharya 2013a).

While eclecticism represents the potential flexibility of IR Theory and the desirability to study other regions more extensively, it is often seen as no more than a synthesis and an extension of existing (and in most of the case mainstream) theories. As one recent work has argued, ‘while China’s rise will certainly contribute to a deepening of that theory, it does not support the contention that existing theory is unable to handle China’s rise’ (Gilley 2011, 810-1; for similar remark on East Asia more broadly, see Johnston 2012, 69). Therefore, a discussion on the response of American mainstream IR to the various claims for EAIRT is offered below, analysing the impact of EAIRT discourse on the future development of American IR.

At best agnosticism, at worst indifference: mainstream American IR’s responses to EAIRT

Research conducted for this study has led this author to conclude here that the response of American mainstream IR scholars to the various claims for EAIRT is mainly threefold: 1) scepticism if not rejection of the possibility and desirability of national School(s) of IR in Asia; 2) partial sympathy, within the framework of analytical eclecticism, with claims for ‘bringing East Asia in’ to IR theory (Kang) or ‘Global IR’ (Acharya); and 3) indifference to post-colonial IR agenda such as Ling’s Daoist approach. Each of these reactions may tell us something about the impact of the EAIRT discourses on American IR.

First, American mainstream scholars do acknowledge that there are some distinctive concepts and traditional values that may affect the way Asian nations think about IR just as how Western philosophy (e.g. Locke and Hobbes) have shaped the thinking and practices of Western countries. Katzeinstein, for example, believes that Confucianism is an important feature in the Sinicization of the Asian civilization (Katzenstein 2012b) and that Tianxia is a very rich world order concept which will really add to what Kant and Morgenthau and other people who deal with world order concept (Interview, October 2013; see also Katzenstein 2008b, 2). David Shambaugh concurs that the way the Chinese and Indians are thinking about IR today is very much rooted in their cultural and traditions, language, historical path, and values. For instance, he notes that a number of traditional values associated with Confucianism and Legalism such as the role of De (ethics), Mianzi (keeping face), Ba (hegemony),
Datong (Great Harmony) date back hundreds of years ago and that they still play an important role in Chinese thinking and writings. As he self-reflects, ‘I told my students that there is a Buddhist or Daoist theory. Chinese yin and yang dialectics, for example, view things in cyclical change while in the West it is linear change (evolutionary change)’ (Interview, November 2013).

While these remarks may signal at least some recognition by American mainstream scholars of the sociology in the IR field as it pertains to East Asia, they nevertheless seem to collectively dismiss the idea of a ‘regional’ or ‘national’ school of thought. Katzeinstein posits that every region has its distinctive conceptual developments that all can learn from, work with, and expand to but to say that drawing on such distinctiveness to come up with something dramatically new is, he asserts, highly implausible (Interview, October 2013). Another mainstream scholar, meanwhile, observes that from an American positivist perspective, the attempt to develop a regional School of IR for Asia, ‘is a very foolish project’ and ‘a project which is bound to fail because it has inherent limitations, the built-in limitations of international relations and social theory in general’ (Interview, October 2013). These inherent limitations are most evidently exposed in the case of the ‘Chinese School’, dismissed by leading American theorists as merely ‘political slogans’ or ‘propaganda’ which may fit very nicely during the earlier period of the ‘China’s peaceful rise’ but which have become increasingly harder to sell at the moment (Interviews with American scholars, October and November 2013). Note this observation by one American constructivist who says he takes culture seriously:

I am worried when I hear about the Chinese IR theory. I am reminded of arguments by Carl Schmitt back in the 1930s whose writings about the German international relations have become an excuse to reject everybody else’s. It may become an excuse for Chinese professors. They may take this cultural element which is supposed to be unique – one that says something positive about themselves e.g. ‘peaceful rise’ (Interview, October 2013).

In fact, as Chris Brown has pointed out, the universalist intellectual predispositions of American IR is ‘committed to denying the privileging of any particular national viewpoint – indeed to denying the very idea that a national viewpoint could have any intellectual validity’ (Brown 2001, 216). Such rejection is also applied to the possibility and desirability of a pan-regional framework. Katzenstein, for example, holds that he needs theory, not ‘Asian’ theory (Interview, October 2013). Similarly, Victoria Hui posits that ‘it is a good idea to develop genuinely universal theories by
incorporating non-Western experiences. But this is not to say that we need a separate regional theory’ (Interview, October 2013). Jack Snyder meanwhile strongly dismisses the ideas of ‘Asian School(s) of IR’ or ‘Asian values’ discourses:

Singaporean diplomats wrote about ‘Asian values’; Aryeh Neier, the founder of Human Rights Watch, replied that they were ‘unacceptable values.’ You can call them ‘Asian’ but they are not any more acceptable for Asians than for anyone else. So from the universalists’ point of view, if an idea doesn’t meet a universalist standard, it is not good enough (Interview, October 2013)

Yet, the strongest critique in this regard is presented by David Shambaugh, perhaps one of the greatest skeptics of EAIRT:

Asians seem to take Asian IR more seriously than non-Asians take Asian IR. Frankly, I don’t think there is a big debate. In the West, there is no debate, it is a non-issue. Most Westerners dismiss Asian attempts to create an alternative school of IR because they aren’t very theoretically sophisticated and they are not achieved universally. They are all very *sui generis*, or unique. Despite the strong desire for Chinese School of IR, so far Chinese scholars have not produced any kind of theory that is appealing and attractive to people outside China. That is a litmus test for any school of IR. It has to have universalistic appeal…. There is not a distinctive American school of IR. We have developed several schools of thought but we don’t call it an ‘American School.’ So I am quite sceptical at best and I dismiss the idea that there is such thing as an Asian School of IR, much less a Chinese School, Japanese School, Korean School, or anything else so far… Asian IR has not gained appeal. It hasn’t defined itself (Interview, November 2013).

Second, there seems to be more sympathy with Kang and Acharya’s constructivist arguments, partly because that approach is still regarded as fitting within the framework of mainstream theories. David Shambaugh, who has earlier rejected the desirability of a specific Asian School(s) of IR thought, nevertheless notes that ‘constructivism definitely has a basis original in Southeast Asia, to the extent that any kind of Asian School of IR is constructivism. Although constructivism also originated in the West, South East Asian scholars and governments have given it many substances’ (Interview, November 2013). In fact, constructivism is attractive to East Asian scholars because it rejects the sort of universalizing projects that associated with more traditional forms of rationalist IR Theory. Acharya’s theorizing on norm localization, in particular, has been quite well received by mainstream scholars as a rich and interesting research agenda because it taps into a larger debate in IR about the vernacularisation or localization of general international norms of democracy, sovereignty, human rights etc. Similarly, works that compare both the commonalities
and differences between European and Asian history and practices of international relations have been generally welcomed. In fact, scholars in the mainstream seem to increasingly acknowledge the potential of using East Asian cases to enrich existing IR theory (see, for example Wohlforth et al. 2007; Katzenstein 2008b, 17-8; Johnston 2012; Womack 2014; Kim 2014, 50).

Mainstream American theorists are less enthusiastic about Kang and others’ argument for ‘getting Asia wrong.’ To those mainstream American scholars whom this author has a chance to interview, Kang’s theorizing on a Sino-centric hierarchical order reveals both the promise and pitfalls of ‘East Asian’ scholarship. On the one hand, Kang tries to take the region seriously which, in their view, is good. On the other hand, he endeavours to provide a new analytical framework on Chinese terms that does not distinguish the relationship between the Chinese reading of history and current Chinese policy interests which, according to mainstream American scholars, lead to ‘a flawed analysis’ (Interviews, October and November 2013). Chinese leaders, in David Shambaugh’s opinion, are no different. ‘They are hard-headed practitioners of realpolitik and realism’ (Shambaugh 1997, 18). Similarly, Jack Snyder argues from the US vantage point:

> It seems pretty clear that they [East Asian states] are ready to balance with the US against China in order to maintain their sovereignty. So I think that Kang has an argument that was sort of plausible when he first wrote it and it starts to look less and less plausible with every year that goes by (Interview, October 2013).

The ‘getting Asia wrong’ thesis is also opposed by other immigrant East Asia specialists who use East Asian cases as a means for proving the universality of Western IRT. Victoria Hui and Yuankang Wang, former students of leading American IR theorists Jack Snyder and John Mearsheimer respectively, disagree with David Kang and Huiyun Feng that China’s behaviour/strategic culture is pacifist and ‘Confucianism-based.’

Another example of American supervisor-Chinese student team working on Asian power balancing issues is Randall L. Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu. They co-author an article titled ‘After Unipolarity - China’s Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline’ (Schweller and Pu 2011).
universal empire’ – the Qin dynasty – in ancient China but a ‘checks and balances’

system in early modern Europe (Hui 2005, 7). In both cases – which are more than
two thousand years apart – Hui finds the existence and operation of an Asian balance
of power system intact, although the logic of balancing is Western-centric in its
origins (Hui 2005, 226). Her explanations to the question of why the Napoleonic wars
ultimately failed but Qin Shihuang successfully unified China may be striking to the
advocates of a benign and different China (like Kang). The Qin dynasty could achieve
universal domination by pursuing ‘the most comprehensive self-strengthening reforms
and the most ruthless strategies and tactics’ i.e. divide-and-conquest strategies toward
neighbouring countries and harsh suppression of its own people (Hui 2005, 35). In
comparison, European leaders, although practicing balancing and counterbalancing,
‘rarely pursued ancient-Chinese-style stratagems and brutality against fellow
Europeans’ (Hui 2004, 201). This outstanding work won the 2006 Jervis-Schroeder
Award from the American Political Science Association for the best book on
international history and politics. It has also been praised by Acharya as an exemplar
of ‘East Asian’ IR scholarship that travels beyond China or East Asia (Acharya 2014g,
82).

Apart from publishing in English, Hui has also extensively published in leading
Chinese venues. As Hui has shared with this author, ‘scholars with truly bi-/multi-
cultural backgrounds are better equipped to integrate East Asian experiences’
(Interview, October 2013). Hui nonetheless warns against both Eurocentricism and
Sino-centrism in theorizing, calling for Chinese scholars to exhibit a greater awareness
of history. She has also raised concerns about Yan Xuetong’s ‘Ancient Chinese
thought, modern Chinese power’ volume as employing an ‘unhistorical and even anti-
historical’ view of ancient Chinese history, and thus risks ‘building castle on the sand’
(Hui 2012b, 2012a). More broadly speaking, Hui holds that the various attempts to
construct national Schools of IR in East Asia ‘would indeed be like building regional
trading blocs.’ Nevertheless, she notes that ‘they do help to enrich the debates’
(Interview, October 2013).

Yuan-kang Wang, meanwhile, is even bolder in defending the relevance of realist
theory in explaining Chinese behaviour and the ancient East Asian order during the
medieval era of the tenth–twelfth centuries as well as the rise of China in the modern
day international system (Wang 2011c, 2013d). Wang completely disagrees with the
‘benign China’ thesis. He instead agrees with Iain Johnston (1995) that Chinese behaviour has been generally realist-oriented but disagrees that such realist strategic thinking is embedded in China’s culture. Rather, his explanation is simple – it is power and power asymmetry that matter. Analysing historical East Asian system during Chinese Song dynasty (960 – 1279) and Ming dynasty (1368 – 1644), Wang concludes that ‘like their European counterparts, great powers in East Asia have historically attempted to dominate the region and maximize their share of power over potential rivals.’ In such an anarchical system, ‘Imperial China placed a high premium on the utility of force and looked for opportunities to maximize China’s relative power. China adopted a more offensive posture as its power grew and shifted to a more defensive one as its power declined’ (Wang 2004c, 174-5). Viewed in this longitudinal historical context, Wang, like his mentor John Measheimer, predicts an ‘unpeaceful’ re-emergence of China (Wang 2006b; see also Mearsheimer 2006).

Overall, Kang and Acharya’s discourses about the promise of using East Asia (or Asia more broadly) as a foundation either to enrich IR theory or to construct new theory have been somewhat accepted by Western IR mainstreamers but with serious qualifications. As Katzenstein has noted, in a world of American theorizing, the kind of ‘value-laden’ claims that Kang and Acharya are making is very hard for [American] people to understand (Interview, October 2013). Furthermore, these ‘dissident’ scholars’ theoretical approaches may not be seen as distinctive to mainstream American IR as what has been claimed. In fact, Kang and Acharya’s work are not perceived as so significant with the mainstreamers given that US IR is actually more interested in asking empirical questions, and especially if Kang and Acharya are not perceived by them as engaging in original theory building at all. Kang’s work can be categorized into the constructivist account but only adds the ‘East Asian flavour’ into it. Acharya’s research agenda on norm localization and Global IR, from the standpoint of mainstream American scholars, is interesting and more challenging but not so much theoretically distinct (saying local actors need agency does not a theory make). While noting that the negligence of East Asia region in IR theory may come at the expense for trans-Atlantic IR, Iain Johnston (2012) strictly requires that ‘for theoretical contributions to IR focusing on East Asian to succeed, they would need to resolve major controversies, lead to breakthroughs, and drive theory development.’ Acharya has responded to this point, saying that Johnston ‘sets a bar too high’ (Acharya 2014g, 83).
Lastly, mainstream scholars are largely unimpressed with alternative research agendas presented by post-colonial theory. Analytical eclecticism, thus far mainstream American IR’s most comprehensive response to non-Western scholarship, mostly focuses on how a synthesis and dialogues can be attained and sustained between mainstream theories, including the various branches of realism, neorealism, and constructivism. There have been rare cases where an eclectic framework is drawn between mainstream and reflectivist theories. The delegitimation of post-colonial IR is exposed in a remark by one leading American scholar who claims that the generalization of world politics that postcolonialism offers is very weak. In his words, ‘when you tell me you are doing post-colonialism, I think I understand what you are saying but you need to tell me a whole lot more’ (Interview, October 2013). Ling herself admits that she has had a hard time trying to get recognition from the ‘big names’ in American IRT.

In the West, there are many stereotypes about Asian women, both good and bad. They [mainstream men in mainstream IR] seem to generally not like what I have to say. They treat me as a kind of ‘oddity’. When I was younger, I wanted to be accepted by the big guys but now I get to the point when I don’t care anymore. Instead, I get fulfilment from the work itself as well as from a network of friends, colleagues, and students. So I have my own community (Interview, October 2013).

Albeit such remark is not much of a rationale for failure to engage and refute critics, here, we clearly see the divergence between the growing self-reflexivity in ‘East Asian’ scholarship and American mainstream IR’s lack of self-criticism given the latter’s hegemonic status. John Mearsheimer, for example, disagrees with the critique placed by Acharya and many others that IR is ‘too American-centric and needs to broaden its horizons’ because there are ‘legitimate and defensible reasons’ for the American dominance in IR which is, in his view, a ‘benign hegemony’ (Mearsheimer 2016, 147). In fact, this gap in perception is due to the fact that for scholars advocating EAIRT, it is necessary to ‘catch up’ and establish a disciplinary profile whilst American mainstream scholars, given their current dominance within the discipline, do not need to do. This view is reflected in the below remarks by one of the most moderate voices in the US mainstream IR community concerning East Asian IR:

At the conceptual level, we can learn [from East Asian distinctive ideas and concepts] but from the generic approach and theory level, I haven’t seen it. So I say I never say ‘no’, but I say the burden to prove that there is an East Asian
IR is on those who say it exists. I am not the one who will be looking. If you come up with something, I would love to read it but I think the burden to prove it is on you, not on me. That makes me sound more conservative intellectually than many of my East Asian colleagues would like me to be but it is not. I am agnostic, I think it is possible but you got to show me. I don’t have to show it or the West doesn’t have to show it (Interview, October 2013).

While there is a wide gap in the actual practices of the EAIRT proponents and its greatest sceptics – which include most of those working in mainstream American IR – it would be premature and indeed misleading to conclude that such divergence is permanent or cannot be bridged. Rather, the difference between the shift to eclecticism in the US and the drive toward theoretical purity and innovation in East Asia reaffirms the sociology of the field – there exists a relationship between identity and approach to the discipline. Equally, analytical eclecticism does reflect promising evidence of the US academy’s desire to study global issues and develop theoretical flexibility that best allows it to study other regions amid the ongoing power shift. In this light, the increasing popularity of analytical eclecticism should be seen as a reaction, in a passive form, of American IR toward the critique about the disjuncture between American/Western IR theories and the practices of international relations in ‘non-Western’ regions, including East Asia. Furthermore, as one recent work observes, the rise of China/East Asia and foreign policy practices in the region ‘contributes to the creation of IR theory and the conduct of foreign policy analysis in a peculiar way – not necessarily by writing IR theory but by refocusing IR theorisation on the civilizational process’ (Shih and Yin 2013b, 61). The trilogy on civilizations and processes edited by Peter Katzenstein is very relevant in this context (Katzenstein 2009, 2012a, 2012b). The central arguments that Katzenstein puts forward in these books is that civilizations (be it an ‘American imperium’ or ‘Sinicization’) are plural and pluralist. By refocusing IR Theory to the civilizational unit, he helps shape an overarching theme in IR scholarship that there is indeed no difference between East and West.

Similarly, there have been signs that some mainstream American scholars are willing to update their assigned reading list for East Asia-related courses. In his teaching of the ‘China’s Foreign Policy’ course at Cornell University, Allen Carlson has increasingly included a sampling of writings by PRC-based scholars on the syllabus to provide alternative perspectives beyond the US-centric approaches. The feedback he has received from his students is encouraging: ‘students, many of whom are quite
interested in learning more about the ‘Chinese’ perspective on various issues, inevitably find such assignments to be very engaging and thought provoking’ (Carlson 2012, 430). Similarly, Stephanie Neuman’s syllabus for her Third World Security Issues course at Columbia University does not merely rely on the work of American scholars. As more scholars from non-Western countries begin to write in English and contribute to the international relations literature, she includes their work in her class syllabus. In that way, Neuman hopes her students will gain a more balanced view of security issues in the Third World (Interview, October 2013). Others have also suggested IR scholars in the West to draw more abundantly from area studies expertise in general and East Asian experience of international relations in particular for theory building and theory testing (Moore 2004, 393; Johnston 2012; Pekkanen, Ravenhill, and Foot 2014, 4). In a rare case that may reflect concern about American parochialism becoming obsolete, an American constructivist scholar offers some thought-provoking remarks about the possibility of the new ‘East Asian’ theory and its linkages with Western scholarship:

I am all for an East Asian IR Theory and I think it is good. I am looking for learning about it and taking part in that debate. I think it is wonderful to have scholars from many different places in the world who try to address this kind of question. But I also want to warn against the danger about how this kind of theory can become very disruptive and misleading. With the West, it is the same thing. For example, Edward Said talks in his famous book ‘Orientalism’ how ideas about modernization – ideas about what modernity and civilizations meant - became an excuse for Western imperialism. This is to some extent unavoidable but I hope that scholars including scholars in East Asia need to think about it through and learn from the mistakes in the West and avoid them (Interview, October 2013).

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the dynamics of the EAIRT debate in US academia. What it finds is that there are relative richness and diversity of claims and reactions to EAIRT. While evidence shows that this debate has shaped the practices of ‘dissident scholars’ quite clearly, it can hardly be said that the same degree is exerted on American mainstream IR scholars. Significantly enough, the findings here point to the presence of the sociology of knowledge as far as the EAIRT debate is concerned. In other words, there seems to be an inherent linkage between identity and perspective in

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83 Her course syllabus assigns readings from scholars such as Mohamed Ayoob, Amitav Acharya, and other non-Western writings on the Third World. I thank Professor Neuman for providing me her course syllabus for reference.
IR. For the dissident scholars, their practices are mainly inherited from their previous accumulations. In the US, the diversity of thought, the strong mainstream agendas, and the independent thinking of foreign-born scholars explains why most of the ‘dissident’ agendas are ‘personal.’ Given this particular characteristic of American IR, the drive toward theoretical innovation based on East Asian cases in the US has adopted a different understanding of ‘new-ness’ than the form it takes in East Asia. In fact, it is a struggle between new theories and old theories on new issues, or put differently, between empirical differences only versus emerging theoretical differences rather than a ‘revolutionary’ approach such as that represented by the Chinese School.

For mainstream American scholars, a general disinterest in EAIRT is actually in itself an identity concern embedded in their wilful rejection of a critique that would undercut their intellectual hegemony. Mainstream American IR’s reactions to EAIRT are largely conditioned by the intellectual hegemony of the US in the field and the traits of American IR – their dominant positivist tradition. Against this background, the most nuanced reaction toward EAIRT among American IR is found among critical and constructivist scholars while rational theorists simply reject such academic movements. Yet, contrary to the most conservative accounts among American IR which insists that such a debate does not exist and that it is a non-issue for the West, the rising popularity of analytical eclecticism nevertheless reflects the desirability of American academia to develop synthesis and flexibility in studying the complexities of world politics in general and the East Asian region in particular. In this sense, analytical eclecticism is actually an initiative by which mainstream IR adherents seek to diffuse critique of ‘Western theories’ and to narrow the gap between the universalism of American theories and regional empirical anomalies. In short, it is just a defensive move or, put differently, it just marks the beginning of a shift away from their ‘business as usual’ logic.

Given the continued domination of American scholarship and the incipient stage of the alternative approaches, it would be naïve to think that the global discipline or American IR will change its nature overnight. The growth in quantity and the maturation in quality of foreign students and scholars currently studying and thriving in American IR, however, suggest that this debate will be more likely to permeate in American IR in the time to come. The rise of two dissident scholars, Amitav Acharya
and Lily Ling, to Presidency and Program Chair, respectively, of ISA 2015 Convention and their ability to set the agenda for the world’s largest association on international studies on such controversial theme as ‘Global IR and Regional Worlds’ signal a looming generational change worldwide that may, in turn, introduce a new stage for the IR discipline to accept more diversity and for American IR itself to become more eclectic.
Conclusion

*If IR is to overcome Western dominance, then it must offer concepts and theories that are derived from other societies and cultures...* Global IR, after all, does not seek to displace but subsume existing IR and enrich it with the infusion of ideas and practices from the non-Western world... *(Acharya 2016, 6).*

The geopolitical and cultural rise of East Asia has triggered a debate on how IR theory should respond to this structural change. On the one hand, we see a critical self-reflection within Western scholarship about the ‘end of IR theory’ – the decline of grand theorizing and great debates, a call for acceptance of theoretical diversity, and the emergence of analytical eclecticism to answer key empirical questions in international relations. On the other hand, a growing array of IR scholars is calling for bringing an ‘Eastern’ agency into IR Theory. There are many claims for and counter-claims against the so-called ‘non-Western IR Theory’ emanating from East Asia. While it remains to be seen whether this academic movement will have a decisive impact on the development of the IR field, the growing intensity of this debate has yielded an important opportunity to explore an understudied practical aspect of theory building in IR – the practices of knowledge-in-the-making.

To what extent do theoretical controversies in IR shape the practices of academics involved in those debates? That is the key puzzle that has driven the research underlying this study. Although there exists a well-developed literature that lays out a variety of arguments about the theory-practice relationship, particularly the linkages between the discipline, theory, and the political reality, the existing body of literature has not extensively examined how theory impacts on the practices of theorists themselves. It is strange that a discipline as concerned with theory as it is and one dominated by theoretical debates has not paid adequate attention to the possible linkages between theory and the practices of those who produce it. The central enquiry of this thesis, therefore, has been to develop an account of whether the various theoretical claims presented in the debate over East Asian IR Theory have ‘roots’ in the actual academic conduct or instead they are being conducted above and beyond the quotidian practices of academic life. Either of these outcomes provides a platform to interrogate the integrity of the claims for/against East Asian IRT, rather than merely privileging the pyrotechnics that it may have generated. It is posted here that the
EAIRT debate can serve as a springboard into a better appreciation of the theory-practice relationship; indeed, that is how theory and theoretical debates in IR actually shape the practices of academics.

One way to understand the complexity of theory-practice interaction is to foster reflexive deliberations on academics’ own practices as the analytical focus. Decoding the connection between the various claims about EAIRT and the scholarly practices of academics involved in that debate has been undertaken here. Three dimensions along such lines are at the heart of this study: why knowledge claims occur the way they do; how theorists validate and implement these claims in their daily life; and what actually drives those claims and practices. It has been argued in this study that these three issues are interrelated and that a full investigation into these questions requires us to turn to the sociology of science framework. Among other things, the sociology of science claims that theorizing is itself a practical activity that is directly and indirectly shaped by the interactions between the individual academic and his/her wider socio-political and institutional environment. In the course of establishing knowledge claims and practices, various structural and agential factors (including power shifts, socio-political concerns, academic structure, and scholars’ theoretical identities) often intrude in and shape relevant theorists’ responses to an academic issue such as the EAIRT debate. In other words, there is clearly a sociology of knowledge construction – things that exist beyond the theory that shape the way theorists view the world, and consequently, their knowledge claims and daily practices.

**Empirical findings**

The empirical findings of this study vindicate the key claim postulated by the sociology of science: theorists assemble their environment with the claims they make in theoretical debate. That is to say, there have been some actual changes in the research, teaching, and other outreach activities adopted by scholars involved in the EAIRT to match the claims they make in that debate. Nonetheless, the degree and form of changes vary across cases due to the uneven impact of social factors on the practices of claims. In the case of the EAIRT debate, those social factors can be classified into two main categories: structural consideration and agential choice. Understanding the various responses toward EAIRT requires appreciating the role of both structure and agency in shaping scholars’ behaviours vis-à-vis the EAIRT debate. In their covariation, structure creates preponderance toward shaping outcome but
ultimately it is the agency that decides whether and if yes, how, to respond to the call for EAIRT.

In chapter 3 this study has found that it is in China where the impact of structural factors (e.g. power shift, geopolitical concerns, social practices, and institutional settings) on academic practices is most evident. Accordingly, more than two-thirds of the Chinese IR community have agreed on the need to construct a ‘Chinese style’ theory. At least three directions toward establishing Chinese IR knowledge were identified, namely 1) the Chinese School of IR, 2) the Tsinghua approach to IR, and 3) the Chinese theory of foreign affairs led by the Beida camp. The ‘universalist’ scholars, constituting a minority within the Chinese IR community, meanwhile seek further integration with Western scholarship and thus see no need to construct a Chinese IR theory. A common trend can thus be discerned insofar that in establishing the various kinds of knowledge claims in China, external factors do intrude in and undermine Chinese scholars’ commitment toward universally applicable theories. Accordingly, the key approaches toward theoretical innovation in China have been shaped by very different causes. The most radical accounts of Chinese IRT are largely driven by their ethnic identity, cultural exceptionalism, and national interests. The ‘universalist’ scholars, meanwhile, have retained their agency role in strictly observing universalism of knowledge amid the strong impact of China-related factors. Serving as a bridge between the nationalist Chinese scholarship and the scientific camp are those pro-Chinese IRT Western-trained scholars who, as the result of their socialization into the Chinese contexts, advocate a hybridization of Western and Chinese learning. Intertwined with the overarching ideological and political environment in China, these structural and agential factors have pulled the Chinese IRT debate in the direction of attaining a general consensus on the need to construct indigenous IR theory. Yet they differ on what pathways must be followed to achieve that end. This explains why theorizing in China has taken various and, at times, seemingly contradictory forms.

Japan presents a different picture of indigenous theory development in East Asia. That East Asian IR communities are increasingly interested in knowledge construction has become evident. While the form that this interest is taken in China is quite homogeneous and nationalistic, the situation in Japan is much more diverse and complicated. In Chapter 4, the researcher finds that despite growing interests in
knowledge production in Japan, there have been few claims for and actual theorizing on a ‘Japanese brand-name’ in IR Theory like the ‘Chinese School.’ The EAIRT debate does hold an interest among a small portion of theoretically oriented Japanese IR scholars whilst the majority of Japan’s IR academia remains focused on areas studies and diplomatic history. Such development has its roots in the structural restraints embedded in that country’s unresolved identity as a de-facto polity situated between ‘East and West’ and the heritage of its war-time history. As a result of these legacies and the long-time path dependence on Western knowledge, what would occur for a Japanese contribution to IR theory, at best, is either historical explorations of past Japanese IR or theoretical engagement with the broader non/post-Western IR agenda. Furthermore, given the tradition of peaceful coexistence among diverse IR traditions in Japan, there various theoretical movements will most likely follow their own trajectory without integration and synthesis. This will position Japanese IR (just like Japan’s overall foreign policy at the moment) at a crossroads. Theoretical development in Japan, therefore, should be treated as a case of ‘eclecticism’ in the sense that it is neither a ‘neo-colonial entity’ of Western IR nor an alternative challenger like Chinese IR.

A study on the impact of the EAIRT debate in the US, meanwhile, finds that this debate holds an interest within a small number of US-based (in most of the cases, foreign-born) East Asia specialists and American scholars working in the constructivist and reflectivist traditions of IR Theory. This debate has shaped the practices of these scholars quite clearly as seen through their trailblazing endeavours in terms of research, teaching, and networking activities which aims to introduce more in-depth non-Western perspectives (such as those of Asia) to their American/Western audience. Collectively, these efforts are intended to re-orient global scholarship toward a less Western/American-centric nature and with theoretical inputs from the Asian traditions. Although the form that this EAIRT debate is taken in the US is much more broadly focused in scope and by no means ‘nationalistic’, there exist certain linkages and interactions between the movements in the US and those in East Asia.

Yet there is little evidence that this debate has any particular impact on the mainstreamers and American IR overall. With few exceptions, mainstream American scholars, given their lingering hegemony in the field, are largely indifferent to the calls for building alternative theories be they from within (US) or without (East Asia).
This study nonetheless concludes that American IR itself is facing an identity problem by increasingly shifting away from theoretical parsimony to non-paradigmatic approaches and/or analytical eclecticism when dealing with the empirical puzzles associated with area and regional studies. Equally, the growing popularity of analytical eclecticism reflects the US academy’s desire to study global issues and develop theoretical flexibility that best allows it to study non-Western/East Asian issues. In this light, while mainstream American scholars are generally unimpressed with the various claims for East Asian IR theory and analytical eclecticism should be seen as a reaction, in a passive form, by predominant American IR factions toward the growing critique of the disjunction between disciplinary and area studies and the challenge posed by the emerging ‘East Asian’ scholarship.

Taken together, these empirical findings show that the EAIRT debate has exerted different impacts on the practices of scholars involved in that debate. For EAIRT proponents or the ‘gatecrashers’, the EAIRT debate has shaped their practices quite clearly as seen in various academic endeavours toward theorizing on non-Western/East Asian perspectives. For EAIRT critics or the ‘gatekeepers’, however, the EAIRT debate may not have any significant impact on their practices. Here, we clearly see the divergence between the growing self-reflexivity in ‘East Asian’ scholarship and American mainstream IR’s lack of self-criticism given their hegemonic status. This is quite understandable because the pressure of theoretical innovation is often shouldered on those who want to make the change whilst, for those who already enjoy the status quo, it is largely ‘business as usual.’ In fact, this gap in perception is due to the degree to which for East Asian states/scholars, IR Theory offers a way to ‘catch up’ and establish a disciplinary profile which the US – given its current dominance of the discipline – does not need to do.

The difference between the rise of analytical eclecticism in the US and the drive toward theoretical purity and innovation in East Asia also reaffirms the sociology of the field – there exists a relationship between identity and approach to the discipline. The various extents to which this debate has exerted its influence on scholars’ practices confirm the sociology of science logic: while theorizing is presumably driven by scholars’ scientific objectivity, ‘external’ factors such as the social, institutional, and psychological contexts (which are different in different places) may intrude in the process of establishing knowledge and undermine scholars’ commitment
to universally applicable theory. In this light, the EAIRT claims and practices take different shapes in different places because they have been socially constructed to various extents by diverse structural and agential factors. The extent to which the EAIRT debate can shape academic practices depends on two things: scholars’ agency and the level of exposure they have to the wider institutional and socio-political settings in which they operate. In this interplay of structure and agency in determining an outcome, the former serves as the intervening variable while the latter plays the decisive role in shaping an actual outcome. The uneven influence of these structural and agential factors on EAIRT scholarship explains why in China we see the dominant narratives of the Chinese style IR theory; why Japanese IR adopts diversity of approaches without debate and synthesis; and why in the US it occurs in the form of decentralising but also enriching American mainstream scholarship in order to build a better body of IR knowledge.

On the interplay of structural and agential factors in determining outcomes

The central argument of this thesis is that the interaction of structural and agential factors shapes the changing practices scholars have adopted in response to their claims in the EAIRT debate. This is in line with a key constructivist observation which highlights the importance of both the agents and the structure in shaping actors’ behaviour (Adler 1997). Existing literature regarding the EAIRT tends to overemphasize the importance of the structure (e.g. power shifts) over the agents and thus only focuses on one specific level of analysis. Such a narrowly focused approach ‘limits the need and ability to contemplate the various factors that concurrently shape actors’ behavior’ (Lupovici 2013, 239). This study, derived from its three-layered analytical framework and empirical findings, insists that understanding how EAIRT debate shapes the practices of scholars requires appreciating both the importance of structural and agential factors. In agential terms, the drive toward EAIRT can be explained first and foremost by personal motivations of individual academics themselves (training background, psychological aspects, ideological and political beliefs, fame, career incentives, etc.). Structurally, EAIRT claims and practices are directly and indirectly shaped by the wider national, institutional, and socio-political setting such as funding, traditions of academic discipline, geopolitical concerns, and national interests of the country with which they are associated. Cross-cutting among these layers are the generational change and academic maturation of those EAIRT
scholars and an evolving nascent power shift to the East. In what follows, these factors are categorized into the ‘necessary’ versus ‘sufficient’ conditions to better explain the interactions among various factors in play relative to determining the degree and form of changes we have witnessed concerning the EAIRT debate.

The necessary conditions for changes: a new batch of scholars plus a geopolitical context

First and perhaps most importantly, it can be seen that the current drive toward constructing non-Western IR Theory in Asia or East Asian IR Theory can only be made possible with the rise of distinguished scholars who are, on the one hand, well-trained in Western knowledge and, on the other hand, have developed a greater sense of confidence in developing their own thinking based on their profound local knowledge. Clearly, generational change is the first necessary pre-condition for a new wave of theoretical innovation, as has happened in the past and is happening now with the non-Western/East Asian IRT. In the US/West, this generational change is found in the surge and maturation of immigrant scholars (and Asian graduate students) in American/Western universities who have helped to introduce more theoretical and empirical insights into the existing Western paradigms. In East Asia, returning Western-trained scholars have contributed to enhancing theoretical rigor in various East Asian IR communities. As a result of the encounter between these scholars’ previous training and the local knowledge, there have been growing endeavors aiming at not only introducing and critically engaging with Western IRT but also constructing new analytical framework based on the local experience and traditions. In fact, the EAIRT debate can be said to be a ‘maturity mechanism’ that scholars in East Asia are currently going through, and scholars in other places e.g. the US have experienced. In the US, however, universalism is the end point; it is not the particularly Western output of that maturity mechanism. In East Asia or Asia more broadly, ongoing generational change will be conducive to making IR ‘a more level playing field.’ If the current trend continues, we can expect greater innovation and progress in research in, and the teaching of, IR in Asia (Moon and Kim 2002, 65).

It should be noted, however, that as happened with the emergence of new theories in the past, it is not simply new people coming into the discipline that drives the changes that we have witnessed concerning the EAIRT debate. It is something more
complicated: new people plus a context that is particularly welcoming of innovation. Realism and constructivism, for example, only really came into being because of the emergence of a new batch of scholars and the political context – the end of WWII and the end of Cold War respectively. Similarly, the context for the ongoing surge of literature on Asian IR is partly a result of a distinct material and ideational power shift to the East – the decline of American/Western power and the geopolitical and cultural rise of East Asia or Asia more broadly. With such logic, we can imagine that an unambiguously dominant US would not display the same level of stasis or a clearly declining China would not be so keen on new approaches.

While a shift in geopolitical fortune necessarily changes something in theorising, what has been affirmed in this study is that this has not exerted the same impact on individual theorists and more broadly on the three national IR academies under this study. Rather, it points to differences in response. China, as discussed in Chapter 3, provides the clearest evidence where power shift has created such a large consensus among its IR academia to construct a Chinese style IR theory to support the ‘peaceful rise’ of China. Japanese counterparts, meanwhile, usually draw a line between geopolitics and knowledge production. As has been noted in Chapter 4, the development of ‘Japanese’ IR is conditioned by the historical burden of Japan’s failed pan-Asianism in the past, the country’s relative decline at present as well as its ambiguous identity as the country situating between the Western and Asian civilizations. Moreover, Japan also offers an interesting case of the impact of power politics. Yoshihide Soeya (Interview, December 2013), for example, argues that as the result of China’s rapid rise and Chinese aspiration for a China-centered world, the tendency for Japan to side with the established liberal international order has become stronger. Finally, as Chapter 5 that discusses the case of the US has shown, power shift only has an impact on the practices of a small number of US-based ‘dissident scholars’ whilst the majority of American IR, who still enjoys the hegemony in both the real world and the IR discipline, is largely indifferent to the EAIRT claims and practices.

Interestingly, however, not only many scholars in the US but also some in Japan and even China have not changed their practices despite the intensification of power shifts. Instead, it seems to be something that creates a propensity or a tendency. The reason for these different responses to power shift across various national contexts, as have
been argued in this study, is largely threefold: first, changes in knowledge production power is often slower to be realized than changes in material power; second, power shift to the East is by itself a tendency rather than a given fact; and third, even if power shift is evident enough such as in the case of China, scholars do have an agency in deciding what to practice corresponding to their own identities and beliefs. The US dominance in the real world, for example, started as early as in the late 19th century but IR only became an ‘American social science’ in the wake of WWII. Furthermore, it is important to note that China now has only shown sign of a rising great power. It has not become the dominant power yet nor is its great power status guaranteed. Broadly speaking, the same logic can be applied to East Asia – the ‘Asian century’ is a future prospect rather than current reality. That explains why some scholars are responding to power shift in the case of EAIRT but some do not.

Moreover, this process of knowledge transfer is not inevitable. It would be naïve to believe that the rise of China and East Asia will automatically bring about new and increasingly predominant IR theory. Regional scholars are well aware of this fact. The first ISA Asia-Pacific Conference (held in Hong Kong in late June 2016), for example, states in its call for proposals that the political and economic rise of ‘Asian superpowers’, such as China, Japan and the East Asian ‘Tiger’ economies has not been able to re-shape IR theory and practice. Although attributing the proliferation of national Schools of IR in Asia to the rise of China and the East, local scholars acknowledges that these academic endeavours have done a little in challenging Western dominance in the field and ‘have left the traditional ontology of IR intact’ (ISA 2016).

In short, as has been well argued by the sociology of science, power shift does have an impact on knowledge production; nonetheless, such an impact is an indirect one as theorizing is first and foremost an outcome of a scholar’s arduous thinking process. Therefore, generational change and power shift are the necessary conditions for theoretical innovation such as in the case of EAIRT whilst, as will be elaborated below, institutional support and agential choice are the sufficient conditions for such changes.

**The sufficient conditions for changes: institutional support and scholar’s agency**

While external factors such as generational change and power shift do matter in stimulating EAIRT discourses, theorizing is more directly shaped by the factors closer
to the academic scene, namely the institutional settings and agency role played by scholars. As theorizing is a scholarly activity that involves independent thinking and self-motivation, academics do have an agency role in deciding what they want to do. What the author has found in this study is that the EAIRT proponents do in fact display their resolve in theoretical innovation and have produced some initial outcomes such as Qin Yaqing’s theory on relationalism, Ling’s Daoist theory of world politics, or the emerging ‘post-Western IR’ agenda developed by some Japan-based scholars. Nonetheless, these academic movements remain at their early stage and will thus require much more effort and time in order to produce notable research outcomes. This trend is not unique to the case of EAIRT scholars but has become a general practice in the field of IR theorizing. Reportedly, it took Kenneth Waltz 15 years to write his *Theory of International Politics* volume (Jervis 2011, 40) and even much longer to develop the thinking that found its way into that seminal work. Arguably, therefore, EAIRT will take time to develop in credible ways. The drive toward EAIRT with its earliest serious scholarly development dates back to only less than a decade ago. Therefore expectations about remarkable research outcomes or the novelty of EAIRT should not be overstated at this stage. Even Chinese scholars whose desire for a Chinese style theory is strongest are well-aware of this fact. ‘Theoretical innovation does not happen overnight’, they reflect (Mao 2013). It is like ‘building a mansion which needs a solid basis and cannot be built on sand’ (Ren Xiao, Interview, August 2013).

Moreover, theorizing is difficult and time-consuming work that requires not only the personal creativity of scholars but also a stimulating working environment. Across the three empirical chapters, we can see evidences of how the material and spiritual support as well as career incentives presented by those institutions in which the theorists are working have contributed to shaping the changing practices of scholars. Particularly in East Asia, universities in those countries and territories like China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hongkong, and Singapore have poured large investments into the construction of new research platforms and personnel recruitment with the aim to build IR institutions with global standards. As a result, there have been stricter requirements developed for scholars in their academic performance and publication. Such competitive environments are encouraging young scholars to engage in more serious original research. In China and Japan, for example, this has fostered some
institutionally based IR perspectives such as the Tsinghua approach and Beida camp in China or the new ‘Kyoto School’ in Japan.

Another important finding regarding the agential role of scholars in shaping the theory-academic practices relationship is that theoretical claims shape the epistemic practices of scholars more clearly than their non-epistemic practices. As the empirical chapters of this study have shown, the EAIRT debate shapes the research practices (e.g. theoretical discussion, publishing, organization of and attendance at conferences, and the searches for funds and allies) of scholars more clearly than their teaching and other social practices (networking, policy consultancy, public presentation, etc.). This is because research constitutes the most important and frequent practice of the intellectual life. In this context, strengthening one’s own theoretical work and engaging in debates with those entertaining rival perspectives and positions should be seen as a core practical response to the claim for EAIRT. Teaching is another important epistemic practice. This study has found that there have been a few, albeit important changes in the teaching agenda of pro-EAIRT scholars to match the claims they put forward in theoretical debate. Whilst IR theory syllabi in East Asian universities look not much different from those taught in the West, courses or sections of course that discuss the Chinese IR School, post-Western IR, and non-Western IR have been increasingly taught in Chinese, Japanese, and even American universities (see Appendix). These new pedagogies may be used as a tool for ‘thought experiment’ – projecting new approaches and seeing the reactions from students and other scholars. This kind of mutual learning process seems to be lacking in Asian textbooks but has been pioneered elsewhere (e.g. Messari, Tickner, and Ling 2016).

Nonetheless, the impact of theoretical claims on the teaching practice of EAIRT scholars is not as strong as that on their research practice partly because not all scholars are teaching the same EAIRT-related courses. Some of the academics assessed in this study have retired and no longer teach (e.g. Takashi Inoguchi, Ni Shixiong). For others who do the teaching, it is not always that they teach the courses of IR Theory or East Asian international relations where they can teach what they preach in the EAIRT debate. At some institutions such as Peking University, the IR Theory course is co-taught by four or five lecturers. Given these diverse institutional and personal backgrounds, it is difficult to generalize the impact of EAIRT on individual academic teaching practices.
Last but not least, there is also evidence that scholars adopt changes in their social activities beyond the academic domain. The extent to which theory can shape theorists’ outreach activities depends on how far they are willing to move from their natural ‘Ivory Tower’ e.g. engagement in policy consultancy, media/public presentation, seeking funding, and networking. Along these lines, it is important to note the networking practices among scholars who yearn for change. Proponents of non-/post Western IR have played an important role in helping to expand the existing structure of IR which is currently centred on the leading Western-based academic journals – the so-called ‘gatekeepers of knowledge’ in the field. Either through international bodies such as the ISA, regional platforms, or connections with leading publishing houses, these scholars have actually attempted to play the gatekeeping role themselves. There have been efforts to construct regional publishing platforms such as the Japan-based *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, the *Chinese Journal of International Politics*, and South Korea-based *Asian Perspective*, etc. to provide an outlet for theoretical-oriented research by Western and local scholars with an interest in Asian international relations. Additional evidence is the organization of the first ISA Asia-Pacific Conference in Hong Kong in 2016 which aims to ‘investigate the ways in which IR (as both practice and theory) is being transformed in the Asia-Pacific’ beyond Western IR theory (ISA 2016). Yet perhaps the clearest examples in this sense is the introduction of a new book series titled ‘Global Dialogues: Developing Non-Eurocentric IR and IPE’ (series editor: John Hobson and L.H.M. Ling). Published by Rowman & Littlefield, this series ‘adopts a *dialogical* perspective on global politics which focuses on the interactions and reciprocities between West and non-West, across Global North and Global South’ (Littlefield). This series also seeks to register how ‘Eastern’ agency, in tandem with counterparts in the West, has made world politics and the world political economy into what it is. According to the Rowman & Littlefield’s website, the Editorial Review Board of this series includes some of the most vocal participants in the non-Western IRT/EAI RRT debate, namely Amitav Acharya (US), Pinar Bilgin (Turkey), Ching-Chang Chen and Josuke Ikeda (Japan), Alan Chong (Singapore), Shogo Suzuki and Yongjin Zhang (UK).

Taken together, these findings indicate that there are indeed serious efforts to encourage intellectual creativity and to mobilize institutional and social resources to make way for theoretical innovation e.g. criticizing existing frameworks, seeking
allies and funding, establishing ‘social organizations’ such as new IR journals, conference panels, and book series that talk about EAIRT. What are the constraints and/or implications of this movement on the development of East Asian IR studies and the IR field more broadly?

From periphery to semi-periphery? East Asian IR between power shift and paradigm shift

Given all the aforementioned necessary and sufficient conditions for change, what can we expect about the evolution of East Asian IR? This thesis has found that although there are discernible changes at the national level, scholarly dialogues about a pan-regional approach remain modest. Even the possibility and desirability of a ‘national’ IR theory, such as the Chinese School of IR, is debatable. The constraint for the emergence of a regional level theory is largely threefold.

First and foremost is the ‘preoccupation with national agendas’ and the wide range of diverse interests among East Asian IR communities which makes it ‘much less cohesive and monolithic academically than Western Europe and North America’ as Takashi Inoguchi has pointed out:

One of the unifying forces of IR scholarship in East Asia is the medium of the English language, yet of course this is a primary vehicle for the inculcation of ideas that have originated elsewhere in the world, especially North America and Europe. In other respects – religion, ideology, culture – and of course a recent troubled history there has largely obstructed the development of an East Asian consciousness, and this has pervaded into the academic realm. Where alternative Asian visions have been suggested – such as Confucianism or ‘Asian values’ – they have not formed into coherent or persuasive IR concepts and certainly not contending paradigms (Inoguchi 2012, 15).84

Second and more importantly, although there is a proliferation of various national schools of IR in the region, East Asian IR communities remain largely dependent on Western knowledge in both their methods for constructing new theories as well as in their teaching about IR. It can be seen that there are two ways for building ‘East Asian’ IRT. The first is distinctly indigenous theorizing about the world – such as ‘Asian values’ or Confucianism and the second is using Western IR theoretical frameworks as a springboard for incorporating the Eastern agency and/or ideas. In both senses, ‘East Asia remains underdeveloped’ (Bacon and Newman 2002, 22) for

84 As analyzed in Chapter 5, this is a view to which the IR mainstream scholars such as Peter Katzenstein and David Shambaugh readily concur.
two reasons: the continuous lack of very original approaches, concepts and ideas with wider applicability and the path dependence on Western knowledge (including the translation and consumption of leading Western IR textbooks). As one Japanese scholar has observed, a major reason for this comes from people’s attitude to knowledge: ‘to see it as something pre-packaged and simply consumed’ (Josuke Ikeda, Interview 2014). Therefore, ‘even if a “Chinese School of IR” drawing heavily on distinctly Chinese traditions eventually emerges it will have been mediated via theory as practiced in the English-speaking, mostly US-dominated Western world of IR’ (Hellmann 2010, 8-9). Looking at more encompassing theoretical approaches that may have transnational appeal, few of them are really all that innovative e.g. Lily Ling’s Daoist theory of world politics or the emerging post-Western turn in Japan. Much of EAIRT scholarship, however, remains a structured re-discovery of past theoretical and conceptual innovations. That is actually precisely how theorising in the West is meant to work – theoretical innovations in IR over the last decades have been attributable to exactly this process. As two local Asian scholars have noted, ‘needless to say, the appeal to something Western in order to begin the construction of one’s self-knowledge produces a sense of inferiority’ (Shih and Huang 2011, 15).

In this light, despite the surging interests in becoming knowledge producers, few East Asian IR communities can be counted to the semi-periphery of the second tier in the existing hierarchy of the discipline. Even Japan and China with their sizable IR communities and conscious institutional efforts at increasing their visibility globally – recently by establishing the peer-reviewed English language journals such as IRAP, AJCP, CJIP – are not having much of an impact globally nor have scholars in either China or Japan succeeded in establishing a distinct national profile (Inoguchi 2007, 2009). In the more distant future, only China, with its continued geopolitical rise and a very distinct and old tradition of its own, has the promise to rise to a semi-periphery theoretical status or, put differently, to compete with Western IR academia in constructing new knowledge about the world (Hellmann 2010, 11).

Last but not least, there is a lack of dialogue among East Asian IR communities and beyond. Most of the EAIRT discourses to date are narrowly focused and the transnational appeal of such ‘scholarship’ remains in question. For non-Western/East Asian IR to have more regional and even global appeal, it needs to eschew exceptionalism and broaden the scope of its applicability beyond the country or region
from which it is derived. In other words, such attempts to develop alternative approaches to understanding the world need to ‘travel beyond their nations and regions’ (Acharya 2016, 14). In so doing, the most important task for East Asian IR community is to have more frequent and productive dialogues with each other so that they can learn from each other’s mistakes and to foster a more common approach toward IR theorizing. At the moment, there have been some positive developments along this line such as the engagement between mainland Chinese scholars and diaspora in Taiwan, Hongkong, Singapore, and Western-based scholars (such as L.H.M. Ling, Yongjin Zhang, Feng Zhang, etc.) in providing theoretical input for the presumed ‘Chinese School of IR’ or the various regional conferences organized by Japan and India-based scholars on the development of post-Western IR agenda. This may give some hope for the future development of East Asian IR.

Moreover, the development of non-Western IRT in East Asia could serve as a major precedent, spilling over to a degree to which similar theoretical innovation might occur in other regions. In fact, such a development process may usher in an initial stage of reformulation of IR itself. Yet a cautionary note here is that such reformulation does not mean the dismissal or displacement of Western IR theories. Existing Western expertise will be certainly an essential element on which different people residing and working in different regions may rely to build their knowledge. However, any such process should not stop merely at regionalisation of IR because our world is, in fact, becoming both more ‘localised’ and ‘globalised’ (Josuke Ikeda, Interview, February 2014). Accordingly, any regionally particularistic view will need to accompany the holistic view of the world. In this light, the construction of the perceived ‘Global IR’ with an East Asian component in it may indeed help IR build a better and more flexible body of knowledge and lead to a more truly representative discipline.

Implications and avenues for future studies

This thesis represents an inaugural study for investigating the effect of the EAIRT debate on the practices of scholars involved in that debate. Its key contribution is twofold: to extend our knowledge on an understudied aspect of the theory-practice relationship – the practices of theoretical claims and to enrich the sociology of the discipline by investigating the applied or professional practices of scholars in bringing their claims into life. This study has shown that scholars are generally living what they
preach in theoretical debates as manifested in numerous evidences of change adopted by scholars under study. In the process of actualizing their theoretical claims, scholars do have an agency in deciding what they want to practice but there are various pathways in which structural factors such as the geopolitical, social, and institutional ones may intrude or influence in the course of establishing practices and even knowledge itself. This conclusion indicates that, despite such laments about the theory-practice gap and the perceived irrelevance of IR knowledge, theory and practice are intrinsically inter-related.

A limitation of this study, however, is that it only examines the one-way relationship between theory and practice – how theory shapes the practices of scholars but not the other way around or what particular linear relationship may exist between the two. Therefore, future research should be undertaken to explore whether and if so, how, academic practices can shape theory in turn. This kind of research would unveil a more complete dynamic explaining the linkages between theoretical claims and academic practices and the theory-practice interrelationship.

Given that this thesis has adopted the ‘most likely case’ approach, it has mainly focused on those IR communities where claims for EAIRT are strongest and where there are clearest signs of changing practices toward EAIRT – in this case the Northeast Asian IR academia and US-based scholars. Further research, therefore, should be conducted to determine the impact of the EAIRT debate on the lesser developed national IR academia in East Asia, such as those in Southeast Asia. Although this study does contemplate the picture of theory development in East Asia as a whole, its scope has been restricted by time and resources in examining the situation in Southeast Asian IR academia more rigorously. Yet there are also budding interests in indigenous theorizing in that part of the world, with the cases of Singapore, the Philippines, and Indonesia all being potential cases-in-point. Such an investigation would certainly be useful in determining the effectiveness of power shift and social factors on the practice of IR in small and medium states in Asia. Heightened reflexivity on how IR knowledge is produced and practiced in different parts of the world can be helpful for making IR a better and truly representative body of knowledge.

The aforementioned limitations, however, do not devalue the contribution of this thesis. An investigation on how theory shapes academic practices in the EAIRT
context is the foundational step on which future studies can draw to produce new knowledge about the linkages between theory and disciplinary practices as well as the sociology of IR more broadly. Importantly, this study establishes validity for the assertion that, contrary to the growing concern about the ‘end of IR theory’, there are reasons to be cautiously optimistic about the state of the field: IR remains a theory-driven and theory-oriented discipline. As far as the EAIRT debate is concerned, we continue to witness rivalry among different perspectives and approaches. This is healthy for theory development in particular and for the IR field as a whole because ‘rivalry implies debate and debate implies progress’ (Schouten 2008, 6). Although it is still too early to conclude whether or not this non-Western/East Asian IRT or the broader ‘Global IR’ agenda will form another ‘grand debate’ in IR, it has clearly revealed the logic of ‘law of small numbers’ and ‘structural competition’ among rival theorists and theories which has characterized the cause of theoretical innovation since the very first days when science came into being. As many scholars have rightly noted, what makes IR a distinctive discipline is the vibrancy of its theories and theoretical debates. Put differently, ‘International Relations may find resilience because it has become theory-led, theory-literate and theory-concerned’ (Dunne, Hansen, and Wight 2013, 405). Ultimately, theoretical innovation at all level, be it grand theory, middle range theories or even embryonic if untested perspectives, will help ensure that IR remains a relevant and distinctively exciting discipline. For that reason, the EAIRT debate and its various practices should be welcomed as a positive development.
### Appendix 1:

#### List of interviewees

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<td>Wang Yiwei</td>
<td>Renmin University</td>
<td>Oral</td>
<td>27 August 2013</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Zhu Feng</td>
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<td>Song Xinning</td>
<td>Renmin University</td>
<td>Oral</td>
<td>3 September 2013</td>
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<td>Anonymous scholar</td>
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<td>Zhang Xiaoming</td>
<td>Peking University</td>
<td>Oral</td>
<td>4 September 2013</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Xu Jin</td>
<td>CASS</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Wang Yizhou</td>
<td>Peking University</td>
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<td><strong>Japan</strong></td>
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<td>University of Niigata Prefecture</td>
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<td>Yoshihide Soeya</td>
<td>Faculty of Law Keio University</td>
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<td>Kazuya Yamamoto</td>
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<td>Kosuke Shimizu</td>
<td>Ryukoku University</td>
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85 Interviewees were given the choice of indicating their preference for identification: full disclosure or confidentiality (anonymous). In the case where an oral interview could not be arranged, a written questionnaire was sent to the interviewees via email for them to answer and return to this author.
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<td>David Kang</td>
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<td>Stephanie Neumann</td>
<td>Columbia University</td>
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<td>Jack Snyder</td>
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<td>Victoria Tinbor Hui</td>
<td>University of Notre Dame</td>
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<td>Thomas Berger</td>
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<td>David Shambaugh</td>
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<td>Amitav Acharya</td>
<td>American University</td>
<td>Oral</td>
<td>13 November 2013</td>
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Appendix 2:

Collection of course syllabi on non-Western/East Asian IRT

1. The Rise of China and Change in World Politics
   - Course convenor: Xu Xin
   - Institution: Peking University.

   (Course syllabus was retrieved from the official website of Peking University).

2. Culture and Politics in Japan: From Kyoto School to Miyazaki Anime
   - Course convenor: Kosuke Shimizu
   - Institution: Ryukoku University.

   (Course syllabus was provided by Prof. Kosuke Shimizu and included here with his approval).

3. Non-Western Approaches to the World
   - Course convenor: L.H.M. Ling

   (Course syllabus was provided by Prof. L.H.M. Ling and included here with her approval).
Course syllabus 1:
THE RISE OF CHINA AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS

PEKING UNIVERSITY

2016 年国际暑期学校项目
PKU Summer School International 2016

Delivery Method & Learning Outcomes

The course is organized as a seminar. The proceeding of the course will be based on instructor’s overview of specific issues for each session and students’ presentation of the required texts related to the general themes and specific topics, followed by class/group discussion. Using an inquiry framework, students practice reading and analyzing articles, research studies, and other relevant texts, viewing selective videos, and visiting museums. Students learn to synthesize information from multiple sources, develop their own perspectives in written essays, and design and deliver oral and visual presentations, individually and/or as part of a team. The successful students will have demonstrated the ability to analyze the nuances and implications of China’s ascent on the world stage from a broad historical and theoretical perspective.

Assessment

Five parts of the evaluation will be calculated as follows:
Attendance 20%; Participation 15%; Presentation 15%; Quizzes 20%; Essays 30%

Academic Integrity

Participation in this class commits the students and instructor to abide by a general norm of equal opportunity and academic integrity. It implies permission from students to submit their written work to services that check for plagiarism (such as Turnitin.com). It is your responsibility to familiarize yourself with the definition of plagiarism. Violations of the norm of academic integrity will be firmly dealt with in this class.

CLASS SCHEDULE
(Subject to adjustment)

Session 1
Introduction: The Rise of China and Its Implications for World Politics

The purpose and scope of the course
Course requirements
Class and presentations scheduling

Questions:
• According to Gilpin, what is the difference between international systemic change and international systems change?
• What kind of change does the rise of China bring about to international relations?
Readings:


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I. CHINA’S RISE AND THE “PARADIGM CHANGE” IN WORLD POLITICS

*What we are witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such; that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.*

Francis Fukuyama, 1989

*The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.*

Samuel Huntington, 1993

*It is not possible to pretend that China is another player. This is the biggest player in the history of man.*

Lee Kuan Yew, 1993
Contending Paradigms in World Politics
Memo and Presentation I

Questions:
- Is the world embracing the "end of history" or the "clash of civilizations"? As of 2013, which of these two contending paradigms, or none of them, makes sense to you? Why?
- According to Katzenstein, what is Huntington right about post-Cold War world politics? What is wrong with his "clash of civilizations" thesis?
- What policy implications do you draw from Katzenstein’s thesis differently than from Huntington’s and Fukuyama’s?

Readings:
PEKING UNIVERSITY

Session 3
China's Reemergence as a World Power: East Asia as a Distinct International System?
Memo and Presentation II

Questions:

- Does China's rise pose a threat? To what and whom?
- According to Kang and Acharya, why did Western IR scholars get Asia wrong? Are their critiques convincing? Why or why not?
- Kang and Acharya make different arguments about how and why China is rising peacefully. Where do they differ? Whose argument is more persuasive? And why?
- Will Asia's future return to its own past of the Sino-centric world, or replicate Europe's past of conflicts and war, or remain under the American hegemonic domain, or unfold as something else?

Readings:

Questions:

- According to Zhao, what are the fundamental flaws of the modern international system? Does his Tarutina theory offer any better alternative? Why or why not?
- On what counts does Callahan criticize Zhao's Tiansia theory as hegemonic? Is his critique convincing? Why or why not?
- What may Wang's external Chinese perspective imply for Zhao's Tiansia theory?

Readings:

II. CHINA’S QUEST FOR IDENTITY AND ORDER

China is not just another nation-state in the family of nations. China is a civilization pretending to be a state. The story of modern China could be described as the effort by both Chinese and foreigners to squeeze a civilization into the arbitrary, constraining framework of the modern state, an institutional invention that came out of the fragmentation of the West’s own civilization.

Lucian Pye, 1990

Beijing, you are host to the present and gateway to the future.

Jacques Rogge, 2008

Session 5
China’s Quest for Modern Identity
Memo and Presentation IV

Questions:

• Does Lucian Pye’s characterization of China as “civilization-pretending-to-be-a-state” make sense to you?
• Why is the notion of strong state so central to Chinese national identity?
• Does Hunt’s preference for the concept of patriotism make sense to you?
• What implications does China’s identity problem have for its international strategy?

Readings:

Session 6
The Revival of Confucianism: Identity and Modernity
Memo and Presentation V

Questions:
- What does Tu Wei-ming mean by the "modern predicament"? Why and how may Confucianism help address such a problem according to Tu?
- How distinctive is Confucianist conception of human rights from liberal conceptions of human rights according to Joseph Chan?
- Does Kang Xiaoguang's interpretation of "Confucian orthodox" in terms of legitimation make any sense to you?
- Chan, Tu, and Kang all seem to advocate reviving Confucianism, but where do you see their views/arguments are compatible with each other and where they diverge?
- What is your take on the revival and contention of Confucianism in today's China?

Readings:
Required


Session 7
Is Culture Destiny? The “Asian Values” Debate
Memo and Presentation VI

Questions:
- Is culture destiny? Is there such a thing called the “Asian values”?
- What is the nature of the relationship between culture and politics?
- Where does Asia fit in the “end of history” vs. the “clash of civilizations” debate?

Readings:

中国 北京市 海淀区颐和园路 5 号 100871
Session 8
Chinese Soft Power: The Case of the Beijing Olympics
Memo and Presentation VII

Questions:
• Why does the concept of soft power receive more attention in China than in the United States?
• What image(s) does China try to project through mega-events such as Olympic Games and World Expo or by means of the Confucius Institute?
• Through hosting mega-events such as Olympic Games and World Expo, has the world changed China or China changed the world?
• How has China been perceived by the outside world through organizing these mega-events and promoting Confucian culture?
• What do you think are major problems with China’s image? How can China overcome its image problems?

Readings:

Beijing Olympics

中国 北京市 海淀区颐和园路 5 号 100871
PEKING UNIVERSITY

2016 年国际暑期学校项目
PKU Summer School International 2016


Websites:
- World Expo 2010 Shanghai: http://www.expo2010china.hu/

Videos (clips):
- 大国崛起 (CCTV)
- 北京 2008 奥运会开幕式 (CCTV)
- 2008 Beijing Olympic Opening Ceremony (NBC)
- Olympic Nightmare (South Park): http://www.southparkstudios.com/clips/187263
- China Problem (South Park)

III. THE CHINA CHALLENGE IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Our relationship with China will be the most important bilateral relationship in the world in this century.

Hillary Clinton, 2007

I will also encourage China to play a responsible role as a growing power — to help lead in addressing the common problems of the twenty-first century. We will compete with China in some areas and cooperate in others. Our essential challenge is to build a relationship that broadens cooperation while strengthening our ability to compete.

Barack Obama, 2007

Lecturing a country with a history of millennia about its need to “grow up” and behave “responsibly” can be needlessly grating.

Henry Kissinger, 2012

Session 9
China’s Frontier Problems: The Case of Taiwan
Memo and Presentation VIII

Questions:
- What impacts has the modern concept of sovereignty had on China’s traditional “center-periphery” relations?
To what extent do China’s traditional statecrafts of dealing with peripheries remain valid and viable?

Why Taiwan matters? Why did the Taiwan issue become increasingly salient and volatile after the Cold War?

What implications does the generational change in Taiwan have for cross-strait relations?

What is at stake in Taiwan for the United States?

Readings:


 twenty-sixth Summer School International 2016


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**Session 10**

The “History Issue” in China’s Relations with East Asia

Memo and Presentation IX

**Questions:**

- In what sense is history alive in China-Japan relations?
- Is history always subject to political manipulation? Is history a “mirror for the future” or “playing card” for politics?
- What is at stake in history education?
- What is the role of the media and public opinions in foreign relations?

**Readings:**


Session II
China's Rise as a Maritime Power: the South China Sea Challenge
Memo and Presentation X

Questions:

中国 北京市 海淀区颐和园路 5 号 100871

253
Will China’s rising as a maritime power challenge the U.S. hegemony? Can the geopolitical interests of the United States and China be reconciled or managed by peaceful means?

What are American interests in the South China Sea? How do you interpret the Obama Administration’s “return to Asia” posture?

What is at stake in the South China Sea for China? What is China’s strategy in the South China Sea? To what extent is China’s approach to the South China Sea dispute part of its expanding maritime power and influence?

Readings:

Session 12
China's "Peaceful Rise" and American "Hegemonic Stability"
Memo and Presentation XI

Questions:
- Are China and the United States becoming "responsible stakeholders"? If so, in what sense? If not, why not?
- Can China's rise and U.S. hegemony reconcile within the existing international system?
- What do you think are the most important challenges and opportunities a rising China has brought to the United States?
- What is a sensible, effective, and sustainable approach to managing U.S.-China relations?
- What do you think of President Hu's recent state visit to the United States?
- What do you expect U.S.-China relations will unfold in the next five years?

Readings:


Course syllabus 2:
CULTURE AND POLITICS IN JAPAN: FROM KYOTO SCHOOL TO MIYAZAKI ANIME

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It is said that Japanese politics has got nothing to do with its culture. Contemporary intellectuals working on traditional culture as well as pop-culture of Japan have indeed tended to regard Japanese politics as something completely separated from cultural interactions. However, I will explain that there has been a close relationship between culture and politics in Japan and that there are some interesting reasons why scholars of Japanese studies misunderstood this. This course introduces the Kyoto School's theory of world history, Yanagida Kenzo's folkloristic, and Miyazaki Hayao's Anime films by focusing particularly on inbedded political meanings and interpretations of contemporary world affairs in their works. This class is specifically designed to answer the following questions: 1) What are the preconditions of the two World Wars in Japan?; 2) Why did many Japanese intellectuals in particular, enthusiastically supported the imperial government in the WWII; 3) How could a few intellectuals maintained their anti-war attitude under the oppressive government before and during the WWII, while the vast majority of intellectuals and political activists converted their beliefs to the totalitarian politics?; 4) Are there any similarities and/or differences between cultural politics in the pre-war time and the present?

To understand the historical relationship between politics and culture in Japan, and its meanings to Japan studies as well as contemporary world affairs.

In the first half of each class, the lecturer will provide a general introduction to the topic concerned. After a short break, discussions by class participants will follow.

Students taking this course will be expected to read thoroughly all the materials handed out in the classes.

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Materials will be notified in each class.
Although it depends on the size of the course, your active participation is expected.

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<td>2 回目</td>
<td>清水耕介</td>
<td>Introduction to IR theories</td>
<td>Essentialism / Constructivism</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3 回目</td>
<td>清水耕介</td>
<td>World Affairs before the World Wars</td>
<td>E.H. Carr, Carl Schmidt, Hannah Arendt</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>Nishida Kitaro and World History</td>
<td>Western Philosophy and Eastern Thought?</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>5 回目</td>
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<td>Overcoming Modernity Roundtable</td>
<td>The disciplines and their involvement in the War-time Regime</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>6 回目</td>
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<td>Yanagida Kenzo and Folkloristic</td>
<td>Janon and Yagei Cultures and Contemporary Politics</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>7 回目</td>
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<td>War Involvement of Yanagida and Following Folkloristics</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>8 回目</td>
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<td>Tosa Gyu and Politics of Resistance</td>
<td>Japan's Gramsci?</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>Soft Power Diplomacy</td>
<td>Politicalising the Pop-Culture</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>Miyazaki Hayao's Political Engagement</td>
<td>From Left Wing Activist to an Animator</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>11 回目</td>
<td>清水耕介</td>
<td>Miyazaki Hayao's Ideal World</td>
<td>Mononoke Prince's Worry</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>清水耕介</td>
<td>Possibility of Apolitical Politics</td>
<td>Totoro and Foraying the Politics of Non-Speaking</td>
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<td>13</td>
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<td>Presentation 1</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>14 回目</td>
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<td>15 回目</td>
<td>清水耕介</td>
<td>Presentation 3</td>
<td>Politics and Culture in Japan</td>
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Course syllabus 3:

NON-WESTERN APPROACHES TO THE WORLD

NINT 6379-A/7612

Fall 2015
Wednesdays, 4-5:50pm
Rm 259, 65 W. 11th St., Lang College

L.H.M. Ling

Office: Rm 604, 72 Fifth Ave.
Office Hours: Thursdays 2:00-4:00pm or by appointment
Email: LingL@newschool.edu
Phone: 212.229.5800 ext 2422

COURSE DESCRIPTION

This course stems from a lack. That is, scholars and practitioners of International Relations (IR) increasingly recognize the need to take into account world politics as a whole, rather than presume it fits neatly into the Westphalian inter-state system that Europe invented. But they often lack the knowledge on how to do so. And this lack involves all in IR, regardless of where one may come from geo-culturally. The discipline of IR, in other words, limits our ability to know of, by, and about our world-of-worlds. It reflects and sustains the hegemony of “the West,” now led by the US national security state.

This course aims to amend this lack. We do so with modesty since we can only cover a portion of the world in bits and pieces, fits and starts. But I hope these small beginnings will lead to larger insights, giving the student a sense of what’s out there in terms of people, power, and perspectives.

Here, we will examine three world traditions: Islam, Hinduism, and Confucianism. Please note: this course will not approximate a comparative religion/philosophy course. We will not study these world traditions in isolation from one another or our contemporary lives. Rather, we will look at how these pre-Westphalian traditions interface not only with one another but also our daily lives and the politics that arise from them.

We will cover each tradition from three angles: (1) the philosophy, (2) how it is lived, and (3) how it reflects and/or influences contemporary politics. Given the vastness and richness of the subjects available, our focus is necessarily limited. Students may want to pursue other lines of inquiry in their term papers.

We conclude this course with a query: is there a post-Westphalian IR in the making? And if so, what does it imply for world politics?

REQUIREMENTS

Class Participation (5%). Students are expected to participate in class discussions. Full attendance is presumed. The instructor is obliged to report to the Dean’s office any student missing more than 3 classes.
In-Class Summary (10%). Each student must summarize in class within 15 minutes one assigned reading. Visual aids or a copy of the summary distributed to cohorts, either in hardcopy or by email, is required. The summary should answer the following questions:

1. what problem/issue is the author addressing?
2. what evidence does the author present to substantiate his or her argument?
3. is the author persuasive?

Four Response Papers (15% each, 60% total). Students must write four response papers on a reading of their choice. The response paper cannot be on the same reading as the student’s in-class presentation. Please spread these response papers over the course of the semester rather than hand them in all at once at the end of the semester. The purpose of the response paper is for the instructor to check and improve the student’s writing skills. It is in the student’s interest to receive feedback on this as soon as possible. These response papers must be typed, double-spaced, in size 12 font, and no longer than 2 pages. The response paper is due on the day we discuss the assigned reading and can be submitted electronically.

Term Paper or Artistic Project (25%). The term paper gives the student a chance to examine a topic in greater depth. The student will focus on a particular question/issue and conduct research to answer it. Consultation with the instructor, either in person or by email, is required. Outside sources should be used but drawing on the Internet alone is not permitted. Students must consult journal articles and books, as well. The term paper should be 15-20 pages, no more no less. It should be double-spaced, with proper citation format, and in size 12 font. The term paper/artistic project is due on Friday 11 December 2015.

NOTE ON PLAGIARISM

Plagiarism refers to any appropriation of words or ideas without due attribution. Any words copied directly from another source must be placed within quotation marks. After a direct quote, this form of acknowledgement is required: (author’s last name, year of publication: page number of quote) in the text followed by a full citation in the Bibliography. Referencing an idea requires citing only the (author’s last name, year of publication) in the text followed by a full citation in the Bibliography. A student failing to take these precautions could be found guilty of plagiarism and expelled from the program.

READINGS

I will email all readings – unless otherwise indicated with an URL. Please print your name and email address on the sign-up sheet. If you missed the sign-up sheet, please email me.

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1 I suggest you use the Reference Citations listed for the International Studies Quarterly. See (http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1468-2478/homepage/ForAuthors.html).

2 I suggest you use the Reference Citations listed for the International Studies Quarterly. See (http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1468-2478/homepage/ForAuthors.html)
You will need to purchase the following book (available on amazon.com):


The University Learning Center

The University Learning Center provides individual tutoring sessions in writing, ESL, math and economics. Sessions are interactive, with tutor and student participating equally. Appointments can be scheduled via Starfish or stop by for a walk-in session, available every hour from 10:00am to 7:00pm. The ULC is located on the 6th floor of 66 West 12th Street. For more information, please visit the Center’s website: http://www.newschool.edu/learning-center/.

COURSE OUTLINE

Session 1 (9/2): Introduction: International Relations (IR) – Neither International Nor Relational

Introduction of the course and the state of IR as a discipline of study for world politics. L.H.M. Ling, “The Red Dust of World Politics: Paradigms of Self and Other Compared between The Quiet American and Dream of the Red Chamber” (powerpoint presentation).

Session 2 (9/9): How to De-Colonize IR?


- John Mearsheimer, “Benign Hegemony.”
- Andrew Hurrell, “Beyond Critique: How to Study Global IR?”
- Peter J. Katzenstein, “Diversity and Empathy.”
- Navnita Chadha Behera, “Knowledge Production.”
- Barry Buzan, “Could IR Be Different?”
- J. Ann Tickner, “Knowledge is Power: Challenging IR’s Eurocentric Narrative.”
- Peter Vale, “Inclusion and Exclusion.”
- Shiping Tang, “Practical Concerns and Power Considerations.”
- Shirin M. Rai, “One Everyday Step at a Time.”
- Farid Mirbagheri, “Human Agency, Reason and Justice.”
I. ISLAM

Session 3 (9/16): Islam & IR


[9/23: NO CLASS, YOM KIPPUR]

Session 4 (9/30): Political Islam [Guest Lecturer: Massimo Ramaioli, PhD Candidate, Department of Political Science, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University]


Session 5 (10/7): War & Peace in Islam


- “Postscript: A Few Words on the Sweeping Changes in the Middle East,” pp. 177-179.

II. HINDUISM

Session 6 (Saturday 10/10 from 2-4pm, Klein Conference Room (A 510) at 66 W 12th Street): What is Hinduism?

• “The Central Story of the Mahabharata,” p. xvi
• “Arjuna’s Despair,” pp. 88-116
• “Krishna’s Guile,” pp. 183-212
• “Mahabharata’s Dharma,” pp. 256-275.


[10/14: NO CLASS, INSTRUCTOR WILL BE IN BUENOS AIRES! MEANWHILE, INSTRUCTOR WILL PROVIDE SEVERAL BOLLYWOOD FILMS FOR YOU TO VIEW DURING THIS WEEK.]

Session 7 (10/21): Bollywood’s India


Patrick Colm Hogan, “So What’s the Deal with All the Singing?” Understanding Indian Movies: Culture, Cognition and Cinematic Imagination (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2008).

Session 8 (10/28): Theorizing Politics in the Subcontinent


Session 9 (11/4): A Pause


P. Nguitragool, “God-Kings and Indonesia: Renegotiating the Boundaries Between Western and Non-Western Perspectives On Foreign Policy,” Pacific Affairs 85 (4) 2012: 723-743.
III. CONFUCIANISM

Session 10 (11/11): Social Relations & Social Order


- “Another Kind of Nation,” pp. 29-54.
- “Modernity, the State and Civilization,” pp. 103-130.

[SPECIAL SESSION 11 (11/17): TEA CEREMONY, TBA]

Session 12 (11/18): Confucianism as a Living Tradition


Session 13 (Tuesday 11/24 but on Wednesday schedule): Confucianism in Politics, Past & Present


(http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1360082032000069082#.VV85gmRViko)

Peter Mandaville, “Toward a Different Cosmopolitanism – Or, the ‘I’ Dislocated,” Global Society 17 (2) 2003: 209-221
(http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1360082032000069091#.VV85GmRViko)

TERM PAPER/ARTISTIC PROJECT DUE ON FRIDAY 11 DECEMBER 2015.
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