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**"One People, One Soul"**

**West Papuan Nationalism and the Organisasi  
Papua Merdeka (OPM)/Free Papua  
Movement**

Presented by Otto Ondawame  
PhD Candidate

This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, the late Wokailan Johana Niwilingamin/Onawame and Chief Hayanolan Jabocus Onawame, to my sisters Omotokailan Antonia Pinimat/Onawain, Nawet Josei Onawain/Pigai and Albertina Onawain/Timang, and finally to my wife Aldofina Zonggonau/Ondawame.



## Candidate's Statement

Except where otherwise indicated this thesis is my own work

Otto Ondawame

July 28, 2000  
Date





## **Abstract**

Indonesian colonisation of West Papua and the lack of a democratic tradition have been the main root causes of the current political problems in this area, triggering the emergence of an increasingly strong Papuan nationalism that finds its expression in a resistance movement, led by the OPM, seeking self-determination and independence. These problems have continued over many years, having serious social, political, economic, and environmental effects for West Papua but, despite the widespread local resistance, the OPM has so far been unable to end the colonial domination and practices.

This study analyses the impact of Indonesian colonisation on the people of West Papua and their reactions to it. It investigates how different views about the political status of West Papua are also reflected in views about the future of the Papuans. In doing so, it draws heavily on the often neglected perspectives of the West Papuan people. The main purpose is to affirm that, as the Indonesian colonisation policies have been the main root cause of the conflict, any approaches to ending the conflict must encompass a political solution and not merely temporary economic and social measures.

The West Papuan conflict is analysed in the light of current theories relating to colonialism and to a range of approaches to conflict resolution. After reflecting on the history of the national liberation struggle, focusing on the strengths and weaknesses of the conflicting parties, and on the balance of power and the role of international support, it is concluded that military victory by either side can only be a utopian dream. As the level of

conflict can only increase and intensify in the future, a new alternative approach is needed to start the peace process.

The empirical findings of this study show the extent to which colonisation has produced the bitter political conflict which threatens regional stability and security. The study also reaffirms that since national sentiments continue to strengthen, any end to the conflict is unlikely in the near future. Despite the relative strength of the Indonesian military forces and the lack of significant international support for the OPM, the struggle will continue in the future. By examining in detail the leadership, organisational structures and general programs of the OPM, it is concluded that the movement is seriously weakened by its factionalised organisation. The responses of the Indonesian government to the conflict by presenting social and military reform packages are also doomed to failure. The study concludes with a summary of the main findings in relation to the determined demands of West Papuans for independence and explores some possible strategies for achieving this in the future.

To gain a clearer picture of the relationship between the local effects of colonisation and ethnic nationalism in relation to wider Papuan nationalism and how those concepts have influenced the current situation in West Papua and the more local reactions, a detailed case study of the Amungme-Kamoro people in relation to Freeport and the colonial government in Mimika regency has been presented. Despite there is a clear relationship, yet the level of success has been more evident at the local level than nationally, for obvious reasons.

## Preface and Acknowledgements

Political conflict in West Papua has, in the last ten years, aroused much debate about the effects of the Indonesian colonisation on the future of Papuan culture, tradition and ways of life. The prolonged conflict, marked by the inability of the occupation forces to achieve a victory, emphasises the need to find new strategies on the part of both conflicting parties to establish an acceptable mechanism to resolve this essentially political situation. This underlying concern accounts for my interest in conducting this study, which seeks answers to the real reasons for the conflict from the Papuan perspective. Previous studies, mainly presented from foreign perspectives, have attempted to explain the reasons behind the conflict, but they fail to address the main colonial cause of the conflict and so do not construct their solutions within the framework of a political approach.

I found it a challenging task to carry out this study, particularly because of the social-political constraints under which it was carried out. Without the dedicated direction, support and unceasing inspiration of my supervisors, Dr Ron May, Dr Harold Crouch and Dr Chris Ballard, I would not have been able to complete this study, and to them I express my special thanks. Among all those who have assisted me, I am particularly grateful to Dr Chris Ballard, Jim Elmslie, Dr Anne Noonan and Joe Collins, members of the Australian West Papua Association (Sydney), colleagues at the Australian National University, and members of ACFOA in Australia; to the Marist Mission, ESKOPME, the Papuan community and Freeport employees; and to LEMASA in Timika. I wish to thank Senator Bob Brown, of the Green Party in Tasmania, for his moral and financial support, and most importantly for being so ready to provide valuable information in answering my questions in interviews, so that this study could be carried

out. I also express my special thanks to the staff and my fellow students in the Department of Political and Social Change and the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies at the ANU, for their moral and financial support that enabled me to carry out field work in PNG and complete this study within the time limit. My appreciation and thanks are also addressed to Brigid Ballard, for her assistance in editing this thesis. I also express similar appreciation to Claire Smith, Bev Fraser and Jill Wolf for retyping the edited versions of this thesis. I would like to express my gratitude to my sisters, Antonia Ondawamin, Josei Ondawain, and Albertina Onawain and to Mus Pigai in Timika for giving me valuable information. Finally, I express my special thanks to my wife Adolfina Zonggonau Ondawame who has supported my efforts at every critical stage of my work. However, I bear the sole responsibility for any shortcomings or errors in this thesis.

## ABBREVIATIONS

ACFOA	Australian Council for Overseas Aid
ABRI	Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Indonesian Armed Forces)
AWPA	Australian West Papua Association (Sydney)
BLK	Balai Latihan Kerja (Training Centre)
DOM	Daerah Operasi Militer (Military Operational Zone)
ESKOPME	Expedisi Komando Operasi Papua Merdeka (the Expedition of the Operational Command for Papuan Independence)
FFP	Föreningen För ett Fritt Väst Papua (Swedish West Papua Association)
FI	Freeport Indonesia
FPKPB	Front Persiapan Kemerdekaan Papua Barat (Independence Preparatory Front for West Papua)
FORERI	Forum Rekonsiliasi untuk Rakyat Irian Jaya (Forum for Reconciliation of the People of West Papua/Irian Jaya)
GPM	Gerakan Merah Putih (Red White Movement)
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
KPKPB	Komite Persiapan Kemerdekaan Papua Barat (Preparatory Committee for the Independence of West Papua)
KOPKAMTIB	Command for the Restoration of Security and Order. (Indonesian military intelligence body)
KOREM	Komando Resimen (Regional Military Command)
KODIM	Komando Distrik Militer (District Military Command)
LEMASA	Lembaga Musyawarah Adat Suku Amungme (Traditional Consultation Council of the Amungme)

MAKODAM	Markas Komando Daerah Militer (Headquarters of the Regional Command of the TEPENAL)
MAMTA	Mambramo Tanah Merah Command of the National Liberation Army
NAAP	National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
NLC	National Liberation Council of West Papua
OPM	Organisasi Papua Merdeka/Free Papua Movement
OPIC	Overseas Private Investment Corporation
PAPENAL	Pasukan Pembebasan Nasional (National Liberation Army), (The military wing of the PEMKA group, also called TEPENAL.)
PARNA	Partai Nasional (National Party)
PEPERA	Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat (Decision of Public Opinion)
PELITA	Pembangunan Lita Tahun (Five Years Development)
PEMKA	Pembela Keadilan (The Council for Restoration of Justice)
PNG	Papua New Guinea
PTFI	P T Freeport Indonesia
RPGWP	Revolutionary Provisional Government of West Papua
RMCOPM	Revolutionary Military Council of the OPM
SPOPPB	Staff Pelaksana Operasi Pembebasan Papua Barat (General Operational Staff for the liberation of West Papua)
TAPOL	Tahanan Politik di Indonesia (Political Prisoners in Indonesia)
TPN	Tentara Pembebasan Nasional (National Liberation Forces)
UNTEA	The United Nations Temporary Authority
WAHLI	Indonesian Environmental Group

WPNC

West Papua National Council

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## Chapter One : Introduction

### 1.1. The Nature of Colonialism in West Papua

“Every struggle against colonialism will end with victory for those who fight for freedom, because history has always shown that those who fight for freedom will win”.<sup>1</sup> This statement, made by Sukarno, the first president of Indonesia, reminds us that any struggle for self determination and independence by colonised peoples will finally achieve success no matter how long it takes or what odds have to be overcome. Colonised peoples believe strongly in this notion of final freedom, although they may express it in different ways. Such notions have also been clearly stated in both normative and international law. Such law sets out the obligations of the international community to fight against all forms of colonialism and imperialism, defending and protecting this fundamental right. These principles are already agreed upon by most of the international community which in one way or another has signed or ratified relevant international laws, conventions and protocols.

Despite this, the history of colonialism has shown that these rights have frequently been denied, violated and ignored by colonialist powers or by national governments even though they have agreed and ratified those international laws in the name of the security, stability and development of the state. The common characteristics of colonialism include oppression, exploitation of natural resources, and the genocide of indigenous and colonised peoples. These violations of human rights too easily become a socio-political disease. Like cancer, this deadly disease spreads to the nervous system—the ideologies, networks and supporters of the separatist movement. The colonised peoples become paralysed, if they do not slowly

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<sup>1</sup> Alan Smith (1991). *Crossing the Border: West Papuan Refugees and Self-Determination of Peoples*, Monash University, Melbourne, p.26.

die. The hostile relationship is made worse when the colonial power continues to deny political power, access to wealth, education, and social services, and the preservation of the environment. Such developments encourage the emergence of separatist sentiment among colonised peoples, that may be expressed in resistance movements.

But how is colonialism to be defined in ways relevant to such situations? There are many definitions and interpretations of the concept, reflecting different times and perspectives, but broadly colonialism is the subordination by a dominant culture or foreign power of other peoples for political, economic, social and strategic reasons. In academic debate, a distinction is often made between “neo-colonialism” and “conventional colonialism”; but in the experience of the oppressed and colonised peoples, the ultimate impact of the two systems is not much different. Neo-colonialism, which is also called “internal colonialism”, is defined as the direct and overall subordination of a group of people by dominant power elites within an existing nation-state for economic and political interests. It is a policy that allows one dominant cultural group to impose its cultural values on other groups in the name of national unity and assimilation. Forcible integration, oppression, exploitation of resources in the periphery, accumulation of power and wealth in the hands of a small elite or in the centre, and forcing all peoples within the state to use the same national symbols and slogans are general characteristics of internal colonialism. This type of colonialism still prevails in many recently independent countries. Authoritarian regimes such as Indonesia, the Philippines during the Marcos regime, Burma and Cambodia exhibit features of neo-colonialism. A more detailed discussion of this type of colonialism can be found in the next chapter.

Opposition to this type of colonial system has often been characterised by rising regional and ethnic sentiments that lead to serious engagement in civil wars. The primary objective of such conflicts is, apart from some exceptional cases, the demand for more social and political reforms, involving a meaningful participation in the political and development process. These are not secessionist movements that aim to bring fundamental political change in the society. Such resistance movements are often labelled “social movements” or “resource conflicts” because the nature of the conflict is such that a solution may be reached through a compromise on the basis of a consensus agreement such as power sharing, land and agricultural reform, and an egalitarian distribution of wealth and power in the country. It can lead to the granting of special autonomous status. If both sides can agree on these policies, then the solution of “internal self-determination” can be reached.<sup>2</sup>

In Indonesia this type of resistance against neo-colonialism has occurred since the 1950s. Civil war between the centre, in Jakarta, and the periphery, or outer islands, broke out in many parts of the archipelago. Except perhaps for the Republik Maluku Selatan (RMS) in the Moluccas, the major objectives were to demand social improvements, equal participation in and distribution of political powers, and social progress, not to seek secession. The Darul Islam in South Sulawesi in 1953, the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) in Sumatra and PERMESTA in North Sulawesi in 1963 are three examples of such movements. All these movements challenged the regime of the central

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<sup>2</sup> H. Halperin, David J. Scheffer and Patricia L Small (1992). *Self-Determination in the New World Order*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, p.17.

government in Jakarta at the regional level without attempting to secede from Indonesia.<sup>3</sup>

On the other hand, "conventional colonialism", which is also called "external colonialism",<sup>4</sup> is defined as the domination of a foreign power by imposing its own values, culture and traditions on colonised peoples. A colonised territory is most often located abroad, separated by "blue waters" from the colonising country; this is also called "territorial colonialism". Conventional colonialism most often refers to Western colonialism because it was historically associated with the territorial expansion of the Western imperial powers from the sixteenth century and with imperial domination as a consequence of the industrial revolution that occurred in many parts of Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Actually, this system is not markedly different from its successor, neo-colonialism, in behaviour, objectives and general characteristics such as oppression, exploitation and genocide; the one significant difference is that conventional colonialism was generally more coercive and inhumane in establishing territorial occupation.

Opposition to colonial systems has varied, but it commonly incites the further emergence of national sentiments. Resistance is shaped by distinctive features of geography, culture, race, historical experiences and existing levels of oppression, exploitation and genocide. It is characterised by the growth of "political movements" whose primary objective is to secede from the existing nation-state or gain freedom from external coercion or

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<sup>3</sup> Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin (1984). "Issues and politics of regionalism in Indonesia: Evaluating the Achenese experience" in Lim Joo-Jock and Vani S. (eds), *Armed Separatism in Southeast Asia*, Regional Strategic Studies Programme, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, pp.111-112.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*:16.

alien domination in order to establish a new sovereign independent state within which the people can decide their own future in accordance with normative international law. Such an outcome is often called "external self-determination",<sup>5</sup> a term which will appear as "territorial self-determination" in Chapter Two.

From these definitions it becomes clear that the opposition to neo-colonialism is normally a socially oriented movement, while opposition to conventional colonialism is a politically oriented movement. Yet despite this apparently clear distinction, the line between neo-colonial and conventional colonialism is difficult to draw in many non-Western occupied territories such as West Papua in 1962 and East Timor in 1975. A particular problem emerges when the international community chooses to maintain that conventional colonialism no longer exists as a consequence of the independence of most former Western colonial territories in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Pacific in the 1950s and 1960s. International law has also implicitly accepted that a decolonisation process can only proceed in those territories that were affected by Western colonisation. This means that the remaining colonial territories occupied by non-Western colonial powers are automatically not regarded as experiencing conventional colonialism but rather neo-colonialism.

The level of general public understanding about the real political status of West Papua and the way in which a solution must be found has suffered from this misperception over the last three decades. This creates difficulty in defining the current political status of the territory. As will be discussed in Chapter Six, there are now two clearly conflicting views on the status of

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<sup>5</sup> Halperin, *op.cit.*:16.

West Papua: those of the pro-integrationists and those of the hardline nationalists.<sup>6</sup> The pro-integrationists, most often represented by Indonesians and their allies, claim West Papua is a territory of Indonesia on historical grounds, as argued in Chapter Three, and they regard the continuing political problem in the territory as a reaction to Indonesian neo-colonialism. In contrast, the extreme nationalists, mostly Papuans, define the territory as a “colony” of a foreign power and, therefore, see the current political problems as a response to conventional colonialism. Whatever the perceptions, it is clear that the colonial system in some form has seriously affected the future of the people of West Papua.

In this thesis it will be argued that, despite the denials of Indonesia, West Papua is indeed a victim of conventional colonialism.<sup>7</sup> In the view of the people of West Papua, the current Indonesian political domination is nothing other than traditional colonialism. Geographically, West Papua is located “overseas”, separated by the “blue waters” of the Arafura Sea and the Indian Ocean; militarily, West Papua was forcibly annexed by a foreign power, during the brief war of 1962; and the level of oppression, exploitation and genocide that has been carried out in the territory over the last three decades is further justification for this conclusion. On these political grounds, West Papua is undoubtedly a colony in the traditional meaning.

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<sup>6</sup> “I know there are some who would prefer to call West Papua a ‘territory’ rather than a ‘colony.’ But, whatever the semantics, one thing is obvious: Indonesia’s annexation of West Papua in 1962 will increasingly be scrutinised by the international community in the near future”, Otto Ondawame “West Papua Demands Freedom”, *Canberra Times* (18 September 1999).

<sup>7</sup> Otto Ondawame (1997). “The Impact of Freeport Mining activities on the Amungme and Kamoro Peoples in West Papua” in S. Wareham (ed.), *Vision and Actions for Peace*, Australian Medical Association, Canberra, p. 227-228.

## 1.2 The Issues To Be Addressed

Traditional colonialism has caused problems in West Papua since direct colonisation began in the mid-nineteenth century. The relationship between the people of West Papua and the colonial powers has inevitably brought about inequalities. The inhuman treatment, racial prejudice, and, most importantly, the failure to address key human rights issues by the colonial powers, including the right to self-determination and independence, have dug a deep gap between them and the Papuans.

This political imbalance has increased during the one and a half centuries of foreign occupation, first by the Dutch, starting from 1848, and then by Indonesia after 1963. Superficially, the colonial powers and the ways in which they deployed colonial policies seem to be quite different, but in practice both colonialists carried out essentially the same policies for the same objectives. Their common weapons have been oppression, exploitation, and discrimination, even though they have more recently also developed the soothing rhetoric of development, rehabilitation, stability and security.<sup>8</sup> Such treatment has merely nurtured the growth of a Papuan nationalism which is expressed through resistance movements. Despite some variation in the styles of these movements in West Papua, their general objectives have always been consistent, namely to secede from foreign colonial domination and control, and to establish a free and independent state. Historically, Papuan resistance to the Dutch colonial rule can be traced back to the period before World War II, though in this period and also much later the anticolonial movements were often associated with millenarian tendencies.<sup>9</sup> However these movements were mostly very localised, and so they were easily and quickly crushed.

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<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*:228.

<sup>9</sup> Nonie Sharp (1994). *The Morning Star in Papua Barat*, Arena Publications, Melbourne.

More recently, opposition to Indonesian colonialism has been expressed primarily through the activities of the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM) or Free Papua Movement. The OPM was established by the Loedwik Mandatjan brothers on 26 June 1965 and later strengthened by Ferry Awom during the first military uprising which occurred in Manokwari. Their primary objective is to liberate the country from foreign colonial domination, as the history of their continuing and often heroic struggle (described in Chapter Four) will show. The OPM was born in response not only to the inequity of the socio-political system created by the colonial power of Indonesia but also to the policies of denial pursued by the international community in the 1960s, as discussed later in this thesis. The OPM continues to promote those aspirations and desires of the people of West Papua to destroy the colonial power and establish the democratic state of West Papua.<sup>10</sup>

The OPM has led one of the longest and “the most isolated struggles” in the world.<sup>11</sup> East Timor and Bougainville have attracted much greater international support than West Papua, over a shorter period of time. There are many reasons for this isolation but external misperceptions fostered by the colonial government and its allies have long undermined the reputation and credibility of the OPM. Indonesia and the international community continue to ignore the rights of the people of West Papua and describe the OPM as a terrorist group or “Gerakan Pengacau Liar” (GPK) or Wild Security Disturbers, denigrating the movement as “motionless and

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<sup>10</sup> Organisasi Papua Merdeka/OPM (1991). Ten Point Political Program of the OPM in *This is West Papua: A Presentation of the OPM*, OPM/FFP, Malmö.

<sup>11</sup> Stanley Simpson (March 1999). “Fighting on for a ‘forgotten’ struggle”, *Pacific News Bulletin*, Vol.14 No.3, p. 7.

their leadership does not exist",<sup>12</sup> and the people of West Papua as being a primitive people, a lazy and inferior race who are living in an unenlightened dark age.<sup>13</sup> They attempt to discredit the movement by describing it as highly factionalised, dominated by internal rivalries and mismanagement, lacking leadership, clear direction, political commitment and willpower. Indonesia claims that the opposition in West Papua exists only because of unequal development. It argues that dissatisfaction with "development", combined with the backwardness of the people, hinders the improvement of social and economic conditions in the province.

On the basis of these negative attitudes to the Papuans and the OPM, Jakarta sees the situation in West Papua as a social and economic problem rather than a political issue. It accepts the hypothesis that by improving the economic and social living conditions of the people of West Papua, the political conflict will end. The Papuan-born academic, John R.G. Djopari, in line with the view of the colonial government, also portrays the problem as a social and economic one, and argues that the resistance movement in West Papua will probably decline if the Indonesian authorities deploy a more social approach:

To destroy the OPM and its influences in Irian Jaya, first of all, the ideology of the OPM must be destroyed. This can only be done if there exists political will and good will on the part of the central government for recruiting the indigenous people of Irian Jaya selectively into leadership positions and appointing them as department officers both in the regional as well as in national offices as an implementation of integration.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> *Cenderawasih Post* 25 January 1993.

<sup>13</sup> Research Institute of Oppressed Peoples (RIOP)(1985). *The Tragedy of the Papuans and the International Political Order*, RIOP Report No.1. Makula, Boskoop, Amsterdam, pp.12-13.

<sup>14</sup> John R.G. Djopari (1993). *Pemberontakan Organisasi Papua Merdeka*, Grasindo, Jakarta, p.169.

Another source of criticism comes from some academics in Australia. Ian Bell *et al.*, for example, in their analysis of Papuan nationalism and of the strengths and weaknesses of the OPM, conclude that if Jakarta were to engage in serious reform programs, Papuan nationalism would certainly weaken.<sup>15</sup> They also criticise the OPM as being weak because of its lack of capacity to provide central direction for local actions; it is, they consider, more a movement than an organisation. Such criticisms, based on a neo-colonialist analysis of the West Papua situation, have further damaged the credibility and reputation of the OPM, raising questions about the strength of Papuan nationalism and the effectiveness of the movement.<sup>16</sup> This relates to a second hypothesis: that if the OPM can overcome its internal weaknesses, international support will flow. On the other hand the general public in Indonesia believes that even though the OPM may be weak and divided, "the movement could still be a time bomb for Jakarta that may threaten the regional stability and security."<sup>17</sup> The OPM remains a political cancer for Indonesia.

The status of West Papua cannot be ignored by accepting the colonial legacy and enforcing pro-integrationist solutions. This could lead to the extermination of the people of West Papua. The problem must be seen in a political context and addressed from a West Papuan perspective. It must be analysed in terms of traditional colonialism, not neo-colonialism. The important question then becomes how to resolve the differences between

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<sup>15</sup> Ian Bell, Herb Feith and Ron Hatley (1986). "The West Papuan Challenge to Indonesian Authority in Irian Jaya: Old Problem, New Possibilities", *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXVI, No.5, p.547.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*:547.

<sup>17</sup> *Jakarta Post* 18 January 1996.

traditional colonial perceptions and the principles of international law.

In attempting to address this question, the emphasis of the following analysis will be on the political nature of the clash between traditional colonialism and Papuan nationalism, and approaches that have been, and could be, deployed to resolve the conflict. It is not my intention here to attempt a comprehensive analysis of all the social and political relationships that can arise between colonisation and nationalist movements. Rather, this thesis will focus on specific factors, including the political weaknesses of Papuan nationalism, the major reasons for the failure of the OPM to obtain international support, and the future prospects for success, by examining the denial politics that have characterised the history of the OPM. Different views of the political status of West Papua and of the balance of power of the two major actors in the conflict will be examined in order to suggest possible solutions to the conflict. Through a detailed case study of Amungme relations with Freeport McMoRan, colonisation, national sentiment, and local responses will be examined at a micro level.

Starting, therefore, from the assumption that any constructive debate about the future of West Papua must be analysed in a political context with conventional colonialism as a central focus of attention, this study will be structured by the following questions:

1. How were the Papuans denied their right to self-determination in the 1960s?
2. Why have both the Indonesian armed forces and the OPM so far failed to achieve their military objectives?

3. What can be learned from the past experience of the OPM to promote new political initiatives for the future?
4. What is the perception of the political status of West Papua (Irian Jaya) and the OPM, and how has this affected international support?
5. What are the future prospects for West Papua and the OPM?

The primary objectives of this thesis are:

- to analyse the impact of colonisation on the future of the people of West Papua and demonstrate a clear relationship between Indonesian colonial domination and the emergence of the West Papuan nationalist movement;
- to argue that as a result of denial politics, although the Papuans are still clearly subject to colonial oppression, exploitation and genocide, any possibility of reopening the case in the international arena is still minimal;
- to examine the possible future role of the OPM in the light of past experience to promote new debate on the future of the OPM;
- to argue that the continued use of coercive approaches will never solve the current political conflict in West Papua;
- to analyse some future scenarios and assess the advantages and disadvantages of three alternative approaches to the resolution of conflict in the country, and to offer some recommendations relevant to future peace processes.

A case study of the impact of the Freeport mine on the Amungme/Kamoro peoples, as well as illustrating the impact of Indonesian colonial ruling on the Papuan people, shows how local ethnonationalism has contributed to the development of a broader West Papuan nationalism.

### 1.3 Methodology

This study provides a narrative picture of the political situation in West Papua as understood from a Papuan perspective. It focuses on the colonial policies which caused the emergence of Papuan nationalism, and in turn sparked the resistance movement. The ineffectiveness of the OPM, which weakened support for it and hence limited its progress, is also analysed.

To a large extent, the thesis is based on action research and participant observation. From 1969 to 1976 I was a member of the OPM fighting in the bush in West Papua. After 1976, having been detained during a visit to Papua New Guinea and ultimately granted refuge in Sweden, I became part of the OPM government-in-exile and an international spokesman for the West Papuan cause. In 2000 I became a member of the Papua Presidium. Much of the material in this thesis is thus based on my first hand knowledge and personal experience as a freedom fighter in West Papua and as an international activist. Inevitably this introduces an element of subjectivity, but my recollections have been supplemented by interviews with key actors (footnoted where appropriate and not subject to requests for anonymity), and have been checked against primary and secondary sources.

The case study has been employed as a research strategy, especially in Chapter 6. This method can address both "how" and "why" questions,<sup>18</sup> and the causes and effects of current political phenomena.<sup>19</sup> The actions of the Amungme/Kamoro peoples in relation to the policies and activities of the government of Indonesia and of the international mining company Freeport McMoRan were chosen as being particularly relevant to the wider

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<sup>18</sup> Gabriel Baffour Awuah (1994). *The Presence of Multinational Companies (MNCS) in Ghana*, Department of Business Administration, Uppsala University, Uppsala, p.6.

<sup>19</sup> Judith Bell (1993). *Doing Your Research Project, a Guidance for First Time Researchers in Education and Social Science*, Open University Press, Buckingham, p.6.

issues examined in the thesis. Since Freeport McMoRan, a New Orleans-based multinational company, was permitted by the Suharto government in 1967 to exploit mineral resources on the traditional land of the Amungme and Kamoro, the relationship between Indonesia and the company on one side and the landowners on the other has been worsening. The denial of the rights of landowners and lack of prior consultation, the degradation of people, land and environment, and an increase in human rights abuses in the region, have raised serious questions about the credibility and accountability of the company and the Indonesian government. The Papuan response has taken the form of increased ethnic sentiment, which is often transformed into violent reactions and a strengthened sense of Papuan nationalism.

A primary objective of this case study is to demonstrate how the relationship between the colonists and owners of capital has affected the local landowners, and to clarify the social, economic and political implications of resource exploitation for these landowners. This also demonstrates the failure of economic and social solutions to an essentially political conflict. Another important objective is to show the clear link between local nationalism and national identity, and to demonstrate that ethnic sentiments have become a driving force in the growth of Papuan nationalism. Finally, by analysing how the local issues are interpreted within the general political and theoretical contexts where the OPM plays a major political role, the enduring nature of Papuan nationalism can be revealed.

Primary data was collected from field work that took place at the end of 1996 in Papua New Guinea. Most of this data was collected by interviewing

Papuan refugees, leaders of the OPM, and PNG politicians in Maprik, Wewak, and Port Moresby. For political reasons it was not possible for the author to visit West Papua. During this visit, some secondary material was collected at the library of the Pacific Studies Centre at the University of PNG in Waigani. Members of the Australia West Papua Association and West Papuan colleagues in Sydney and Canberra were also interviewed. During a visit to New York in February 1999, the chairman of the Institute of Human Rights Advocacy Studies in Jayapura was interviewed, and the chairman of LEMASA, the local organisation in Timika, was interviewed during his visit to Canberra in September 1998. All these interviews were recorded. One of the many questions consistently asked of those interviewed concerned their perception of the future political status of West Papua. Detailed data was also collected from community leaders and friends in Jayapura, Timika, Tembagapura and Newcastle. Full responses were received from Timika, Tembagapura and Newcastle but, for unavoidable reasons, not from Port Numbay (Jayapura). Use was also made of internal OPM documents in the author's collection.

Much additional data was collected from secondary sources. This included, apart from literature available in the ANU and other libraries, daily email messages from Jayapura and Jakarta; internet and internal publications of the OPM; articles in periodical publications of the local governments and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in West Papua such as Lembaga Musyawarah Adat Suku Amungme (LEMASA/Amungme Council), Yayasan Pembangunan Masyarakat Desa (Rural Development Foundation); publications of NGOs in Australia, PNG and USA such as the Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA), the West Papua Relief Association, the Australia West Papua Association, and Tapol in London,

and of Freeport McMoRan. Daily newspapers such as *Tifa Irian*, *Kompas*, *The Australian*, the *Sydney Morning Herald*, bulletins such as *The Economic Review*, *Inside Indonesia*, *Pacific News Bulletin*, *Islands Business*, *Gatra*, and *Information Kit*, have provided useful materials. Periodic reports and internal material from the Freeport office in Tembagapura were also consulted. It is difficult to obtain current official statistics for the province of Irian Jaya and for the Freeport McMoRan enterprise, although older statistical data is of some use.

#### **1.4. Thesis Outline**

Chapter One introduces the study, focusing on the reasons for selecting the topic, the background to the problem, research aims and methodology, and identification of the key issues to be examined.

Chapter Two considers some concepts and theories that may be of relevance for this study, and presents a brief literature review of earlier studies on Papuan nationalism and the OPM.

Chapter Three looks at the denial politics of the 1960s in Indonesia during the Cold War period, and examines the failure of the international community to play its role in the promotion of justice, peace and democracy.

Chapter Four presents a detailed analysis of the formation and subsequent history of the OPM, focusing on the failure of the organisation to play its role as a true national liberation movement. It examines some major factors that have restricted the progress of the OPM, and attempts that have been made to improve its political image.

Chapter Five presents a range of views on the political status of West Papua and analyses the level of international support for the OPM. A clear

understanding of this situation is an important step in identifying the friends and enemies of the movement.

Chapter Six consists of a detailed case study based on the situation of the Amungme and the Kamoro in relation to the exploitation of mineral resources in their homelands by a foreign multinational company with the backing of the Indonesian government. There is analysis of the moves of the main actors, of the progress of social change, and of the militarisation of the Freeport, and local resistance. The main intention here is to demonstrate the close relationship between local sentiment and the emergence of Papuan nationalism.

Chapter Seven considers the future prospects of the West Papuan conflict, looking at some alternative peace solutions. The meaning and implications of autonomy, federalism and independence are discussed in relation to the future political status of West Papua.

Chapter Eight presents the findings of this study, summarising the key outcomes and considering their implications for West Papua.



## **Chapter Two: Concepts and Issues**

### **2.1. Introduction**

A brief review of the literature reveals the sensitive nature of the issue. Most commentators, with a few notable exceptions, recognise West Papua as an integral part of Indonesia, locking discussion of conflict resolution into the policy framework of the Indonesian state. In contrast, most Papuans believe that any solution to the problem must be found within an international legal framework; they argue that the presence of Indonesia in West Papua is that of an occupying power. In this situation an understanding of the concepts of integration, colonialism, and nationalism becomes particularly important. Ideological conflict between those for and those against self-determination and independence makes it hard to establish a common basis for discussion and negotiation.

### **2.2. Some Important Concepts.**

#### **2.2.1. The Concept of Integration**

The idea of whether people are part of or outside a dominant culture is controversial. The relationship between colonial masters or dominant groups and colonised or subordinated people, especially culturally distinct minorities, has always been unhealthy; in order to maintain colonial control, the rights of such peoples are often denied and they are forced to accept the culture of the dominant group. The practical meaning of integration is, therefore, a process of assimilating subordinated minorities into a dominant culture.

Two types of integration can be distinguished, based on motivation and structure: these are economic integration and political integration. Both

may be either horizontal or vertical. Economically motivated integration can be defined as a decision to integrate a subordinated group of people into a dominant culture or state for economic reasons. A group of people may freely bring themselves into association with a dominant group, culture, or nation-state on the basis of a consensual agreement; <sup>1</sup> this process, wherein each interest group desires to join the assimilation process, is called horizontal integration.<sup>2</sup> In such an arrangement normative consensus is sought to regulate political relationships among the population.

The reasons for such integration include lack of economic viability or small size of population of the integrating group, strategic interests, and having common social-historical experiences or identity. Stewart Firth has discussed this type of integration in relation to Niue and the Cook Islands. These two island groups, which have small populations and land mass, have a constitutionally free association with New Zealand in economic matters, but exercise self-government.<sup>3</sup> The economies of these small island countries are heavily dependent on New Zealand. The European Union (EU) is another example of this type of integration, aimed at building a powerful collective bargaining entity; even though the European member countries are advantaged and wealthy states, an individual country alone cannot compete as successfully in the global market. Federal systems such as the USA, Australia, Germany and Switzerland provide other examples of a consensus-based integration; the small Australian island state of Tasmania, for example, could not survive economically by itself.

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<sup>1</sup> Claude Ake (1967). *A Theory of Political Integration*. The Dorsey Press, Homewood, pp.12-13.

<sup>2</sup> John R.G. Djopari (1993). *Pemberontakan Organisasi Papua Merdeka*. Grasindo, Jakarta, p.10.

<sup>3</sup> Stewart Firth (1989). "Sovereignty and independence in the contemporary Pacific", *Contemporary Pacific* 1(2):77.

<sup>4</sup> Ake, *op.cit.*:12-13.

On the other hand, when a group of people is forcibly assimilated into a dominant culture or nation-state,<sup>4</sup> this is called coercive integration, and it generally involves a vertical power structure.<sup>5</sup> The primary motivation is to satisfy the political and territorial ambitions of the central power, such as its need for more land for resettlement or its strategic interests. But because there is no inherent logic behind such integration, the consequence has generally been negative. Instability, a clash of national sentiments, and political unrest emerge over time as responses to incorporation. The incorporation into Indonesia of West Papua in 1963 and East Timor in 1975 are classic examples of such coercive integration. The power relationships between the elite and the general population, and between the central government and the periphery, are vertically organised and aimed at ensuring that the population will obey the state's demands. The Indonesian political system under Suharto was an example of such vertical integration. The regional governments and their people were subjected to directives set by the central government. The governor of "Irian Jaya" for example, was appointed by the central government, and any decisions made at regional level had to be approved by the central authority in Jakarta.

These two variants of the concept of integration are helpful in analysing the case of West Papua, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter Five. Jakarta's position is clear: West Papua is an integral part of Indonesia. Implicitly, Jakarta uses only one justification, namely the common colonial heritage, to defend its stance. Even though the argument remains questionable, Jakarta has used it to justify its claims over many years. The policy for assimilating Papuan society into mainstream Indonesian culture

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<sup>5</sup> Djopari, *op.cit.*:10.

has taken many coercive forms, including the abolition of Papuan culture and the use of a single language (Bahasa Indonesia). Jakarta claims that since West Papua returned to the mother-land of Indonesia, the national goal of total integration has been achieved. The truth of such a statement, however, requires examination.

As I argue throughout this thesis, the general perception of the people of West Papua themselves is very different. The vast majority of Papuans feel they are one people and one separate nation within the Indonesian state (see Chapter 7). The question must be raised: if West Papua were truly an integral part of Indonesia, why have the Papuans been treated as foreigners in their own land, been discriminated against because of their colour and religion, and become the target for oppression, extermination and genocide, with landowners dispossessed and traditional land confiscated? The Papuans have become a major target of human rights abuses, and have suffered massive exploitation of their natural resources without receiving compensation. The Papuans have concluded that West Papua is nothing but a colony. To appreciate this conclusion, it is necessary to explore the nature of colonialism.

### **2.2.2. The Concepts of Colonialism and Imperialism**

A country is considered a colony if it is colonised by imperialistic expansion for political, strategic or economic reasons,<sup>6</sup> and governed by another state. Colonialism may be internal or external. Normally, a colony is located on the periphery and the colonists do not have any special obligation to improve the local conditions. According to the late President Sukarno of

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<sup>6</sup> Robert Petersen (1995). *Colonialism as seen from a Former Colonised Area*, Working Paper, Vol.32, No.2, presented at the 8th Inuit Studies Conference at Laval University, p.2.

Indonesia, an area is called a colony in a situation in which a people is governed by another people politically, economically, intellectually and physically.<sup>7</sup>

Today, colonialism is loosely taken to mean "overseas colonialism",<sup>8</sup> and the domination of one nation by another within a given nation-state is not recognised as colonialism. For Farely, internal domination does not qualify as colonialism because such a label would undermine the state's territorial integrity.<sup>9</sup> Such conservative views are contestable; in practice, colonialism is not limited by location but is an ideology that does not take account of geographical limitations.

Two types of colonialism, namely neo-colonialism and conventional colonialism, may be distinguished by their origins. Neo-colonialism, which is also called internal colonialism, is defined as oppression that is perpetuated by a government over its own people within a nation-state. Typically it involves exploitation of resources in the periphery and enrichment of the centre, accumulation of power and wealth in the hands of a small central power elite while the periphery remains poor, and direct and overall subordination of citizens for economic and political interests. On the other hand, external colonialism is domination by a foreign power, a concept I will explore further in this thesis.

Colonial ideology was developed in association with the industrial revolution in Europe from the beginning of the seventeenth century.

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<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*:2.

<sup>8</sup> Lawrence T. Farely (1986). *Plebiscites and Sovereignty: The Crisis of Political Illegitimacy*. Westview Press, Boulder, p.18.

<sup>9</sup> "The domination of a nation by another—especially if the two are located within the boundaries of one state is not labelled 'colonialism' " (*ibid.*:18).

European capitalists needed new territory for raw materials, cheap labour and markets. The dominant power of the imperial nations was achieved at the expense of slaves and the working class. The mercantilist symbols of wealth were gold and spices, and the colonial powers occupied territories in order to open markets and have access to gold, and supplies of raw materials in Asia, Africa, the Pacific and America.

Colonialism and imperialism are two sides of the same coin. Colonial power preserves the imperial interests and *vice versa*. Both are characterised by territorial expansion, exploitation and genocide. According to Jack Woddis, colonialism is “a direct and overall subordination of one country to another on the basis of state power being in the hands of the dominating foreign power”.<sup>10</sup> The concept implies the use of force to expand territory, to control cheap labour and resources, and to maintain market monopoly at the expense of local peoples. The Dutch imperial power that colonised the Malay archipelago between 1602 and 1949, and renamed it the Dutch East Indies, was one of the leading Western powers. Like Chilcote,<sup>11</sup> Woddis describes the relationship between colonialism and capitalism as an integrated system, saying: “colonialism enabled the imperialist power to rob the colonial peoples in various ways. They were able to secure cheap land, cheap labour, and cheap resources”.<sup>12</sup> The establishment of new trade centres and ports in Africa, America, Asia and the Pacific by the European colonists in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries demonstrates how colonists preserved the interests of their imperial masters in their host countries.

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<sup>10</sup> Jack Woddis (1967). *An Introduction to Neo-Colonialism*. International Publishers, New York, p.147.

<sup>11</sup> Ronald H. Chilcote (1984). *Theories of Development and Underdevelopment*. Westview Press, Boulder, p.16.

<sup>12</sup> Woddis, *op.cit.*:16.

Commonly, colonial practices have involved the exploitation of the indigenous peoples of the colonised territories and the extermination of their culture through the imposition of the colonial culture and language, through introduced laws and orders that preserved the interests of the colonialists, through the outnumbering of indigenous people by the planned resettlement of immigrants, through the establishment of local loyal or puppet regimes, through the exploitation of local natural resources in the colony on a large scale, through the imposition of a slave system involving social apartheid, through the dispossession of the people and the removal of their children, and through the systematic undermining of local traditions and cultures which were regarded as evidence of a primitive society. Along with this colonial control, over the past three hundred years or so millions of immigrant colonists from Europe, the Middle East and Asia have settled in the colonial territories of Australia, New Zealand, America, Asia and Africa. This demographic movement has brought about serious social-economic and political consequences for the indigenous peoples—in particular the Aborigines of Australia and the Indians of North Central and South America. The colonial ideology prevents any development of an autonomous economy within the controlled territories.<sup>13</sup> Thus colonialism empowers the colonialists but denies the rights of indigenous peoples for its own economic, political and strategic interests. Colonialism is, therefore, a necessary component of capitalism, channelling the accumulation of capital to the capitalists; colonialism and imperialism are intertwined.

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<sup>13</sup> Petersen, *op.cit.*:10-11.

As stated in the beginning of this chapter, a conventional colonial system still dominates political arrangements in West Papua, and has become a major cause of the political conflict there. As the relationship between the colonised and the colonists inevitably becomes unhealthy, mistrust and disobedience become new social diseases. The relationship between the core and the periphery becomes unbalanced, with unequal distribution of goods and services. For political purposes, a considerable number of transmigrants, (whom the Papuans call immigrants), from the overpopulated islands of Java and Bali have been moved to West Papua and used there as cheap labour to colonise the region. Most of these transmigrants are landless and poor. A rapid militarisation of West Papua has also brought serious political, economic, environmental and social consequences. Discrimination and social injustices are outcomes of this colonisation. The large-scale exploitation of the natural resources of West Papua brings little benefit to the Papuans, but provides an economic surplus for the government in Jakarta and for the capitalist owners, most often foreign multinational companies. Freeport McMoRan, a New Orleans registered mining company that today operates in West Papua (see Chapter Six), is one of many examples of such capitalist imperialism.

West Papua is indeed a colony of Indonesia. Unequal distribution of wealth and power, lack of respect for and recognition of the rights of the colonised people, widespread human rights abuses, environmental destruction, dispossession of population, and cultural domination, all encourage stronger national sentiments. In such circumstances, the emergence of West Papuan nationalism has been inevitable, and will

remain a major problem for the Indonesian government.<sup>14</sup> But in this context, how are we to understand the concept of Papuan nationalism?

### 2.2.3. The Concept of Nationalism: Ethnic vs People

The term nation refers to “a large community of people who usually share a common history and language and live in a particular territory”.<sup>15</sup> It is coterminous with a “people”. The suffix “ism” indicates an ideology; in the case of nationalism one that encourages both local and national sentiments in seeking improvement of social and economic conditions or, in an extreme case, secession. Nationalism generally involves devotion to one's own nation and patriotic feelings favouring political independence in a country that is controlled by another or is part of another.<sup>16</sup> Recently, it has often been used to indicate a sentiment that emerges or reemerges among colonised and oppressed peoples who are seeking self-determination or independence. “Ethnicity” is the term for the sense of common identity of a national, racial and tribal group that has common cultural traditions, language and ways of life. These two terms are interrelated, but politically differentiated. The feeling of group nationalism grows from a sense of ethnic and territorial identity—people who have in common with each other a culture, language, tradition and origin, distinct from the mainstream culture. Like Elmslie<sup>17</sup> and Bell *et al.*,<sup>18</sup> Michael van Langenberg defines nationalism as a sentiment that can be associated with ideology, class, geography, cultural identity, political movement, economy,

<sup>14</sup> R.J. May (1986). “East of the Border: Irian Jaya and the Border in Papua New Guinea's Domestic and Foreign Politics” in R.J. May (ed.), *Between Two Nations*, Robert Brown and Associates (Aust), Sydney, p. 159.

<sup>15</sup> A.P. Cowie (1989). *Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary*, Oxford University Press, 4th Edition, London, p.824 .

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*:824.

<sup>17</sup> Jim Elmslie (1995). *Irian Jaya in the 1990s: Economic Expansion and West Papuan Nationalism*. University of Sydney, pp.14-19 (unpublished).

<sup>18</sup> Ian Bell, H. Feith and R. Hatley (1986). “Papuan Challenge to Indonesian Authority in Irian Jaya: Old Problems New Possibilities”, *Asian Survey*, Vol.XXVI, No.5, p.544 .

bureaucracy and self-consciousness.<sup>19</sup> Nationalism can be both ethnic and communal.

In this thesis, I use the term "ethnic nationalism" when I discuss sentiments of a certain group of people within a given nation state, and I use "territorial nationalism" when I refer to the sentiments of multi-ethnic groups of peoples who all live in a given territory. As I will discuss in Chapter Six, the Papuans see themselves as a large multi-ethnic grouping of peoples who share a sense of common values primarily based on racial, geographical and cultural distinctiveness, marking a clear divide from the Indonesians. Territorial nationalism is thus the appropriate concept for understanding Papuan nationalism.

In contrast, ethnic nationalism may be defined as local sentiments that emerge among an individual ethnic group within wider state boundaries on the basis of a common sense of identity, colonial experiences, religion, ethnicity, class and race. This is sometimes termed 'sub-nationalism' in the literature of international politics. The reasons for the emergence of ethnic nationalism are many, but locally-based sentiment is always present. This ethnic sentiment can be sharpened if the relationship between the centre and the periphery becomes imbalanced. For example, if the centre becomes rich while the periphery is still poor, this disequilibrium will create a social gap which encourages sub-nationalist sentiment, and if the division of the economic order between centre and periphery is seriously imbalanced then a social gap between poor and rich is immediately created.<sup>20</sup> In the history of colonial occupation and its capitalist development, the periphery has

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<sup>19</sup> Michael van Langenberg (1993). "Importing Nationalism, the Case of Indonesia" in Garry Trompf (ed.), *Islands and Enclaves: Nationalism and Separatist Pressures in Islands and Littoral Context*, Sterling Publishers Private Limited, New Delhi, p.154.

<sup>20</sup> Chilcote, *op.cit.*:23.

generally suffered most.<sup>21</sup> When resources from the periphery are used to strengthen the centre, it is likely that the people from the resource-rich areas will engage in sub-nationalist movements. In such situations, a tendency for conflict between centre and periphery is inevitable. The Amungme sentiment against the government of Indonesia and Freeport McMoRan in relation to economic exploitation in Amungme land in West Papua over the past twenty-five years is an example of this (see Chapter Six).

One of the problems with ethnic nationalism is that it involves a very localised notion of being; an exaggerated ethnic nationalism can destroy national unity and stability. However, the emergence of any ethnic sentiment has value and can become a starting point for a wider nationalism. Self-identity and recognition at the local level provide a kickstart for West Papuan nationalism.

Many of the existing nation-states of the former European colonial territories in the "Third World" have been established on the basis of the sanctity of boundaries which were drawn by Western colonial powers in an earlier period. Western colonial boundaries define the geo-political map of the world that was created by the Western colonial powers, who ignored completely the existence of ethnic boundaries.

A study of 132 current countries found only 12 countries that had been established on a homogeneous ethnic basis.<sup>22</sup> Europe, which has only 20 per cent of the world's population, encompasses many ethnic communities. Outside Europe, the colonial order has been preserved with very little

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<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*:10.

<sup>22</sup> Said and Simmons (1976:10) cited in Wan Kadir bin Che Man, *Muslim Separatism, The Moros in Southern Philippines and the Malays in Southern Thailand*, PhD Thesis, Australian National University, p.1.

constructive rearrangement in the post-independence era, and, for whatever reasons, the legality of these artificial colonial boundaries has been generally accepted by the regimes in the Third World as a valid form of nation-state building. There is, however, a crucial need to recognise that these colonial boundaries in themselves create a problem because they ignore ethnic boundaries. Ethnic conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi, Zaire, the former Yugoslavia, and elsewhere in the world today suggest that the validity and legitimacy of colonial boundaries are inherently problematic. Although there may be many different causes for individual ethno-nationalist conflicts, a common primary reason is the ignoring of ethnic boundaries and imposition of coercive integration. In the case of the Kosovo crisis today, for example, ethnic sentiments are a major causal factor. Who is wrong and who is right is contestable, but any answer must be sought in a historical framework.

Ethnic sentiments have commonly encouraged territorial sentiments, as I argue later in relation to West Papua. It is possible that ethnic sentiments will soon dominate international debates about ethnic nationalism, redefinition of present boundaries of nation-states, and the role of the UN and international law regarding the growing calls for ethnic nationhood. The UN may, for example, be forced to redefine Article 73 of the UN Charter regarding the political status of colonised and non-self-governing territories, which currently takes a very narrow view of the obligation of the world community to decolonise a people from under a colonial power.

If people's nationalism or territorial nationalism were to be defined as the common sense of identity, culture and language within a multi-ethnic

society on the basis of common historical experiences, race, religion and geographical position, then political sentiments in West Papua could not be simply regarded as an ethnic issue alone but must also be recognised as people's nationalism as well. The people of West Papua consist of some two hundred and forty ethnic groups with divergent cultures, traditions and ways of life. Each of these ethnic groups has unique characteristics that differentiate it from the others. Different languages, myths of origin, and land boundaries are a few distinctions that mark each of them as a separate entity. Despite this, the common colonial experience, geographical position, and common language origins also give rise to a common sentiment that all Papuans are "One People, One Soul" (the motto of the OPM).<sup>23</sup> As a people, the Papuans' nationalism has emerged on the basis of common historical experiences over more than two centuries and during different colonial periods. Thus, Papuan nationalism is now much stronger than ethnic nationalism and when I use the term "nationalism" I am referring to West Papua nationalism in a national context rather than as expressing a purely local or ethnic sentiment.

The West Papuan nation-state will, on the other hand, be established on the basis of Papuan nationalism in the sense of both ethnic and territorial sentiments. West Papuan nationalism did not exist before Dutch colonisation began in the eighteenth century; it really only emerged in the 1950s-1960s, encouraged by the Dutch when the decolonisation process started. West Papuan nationalism has grown as a response to social-political injustice, and is rooted in a sense of common identity, race, religion, culture and historical experience. Previously there had only been a sense of ethnic nationalism; Papuan ethnic communities each had their own ethnic

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<sup>23</sup> The motto of national unity of the OPM is found on the head of the Papuan National Symbol.

sentiments and loyalties. Local resistance to the Dutch colonial power in different parts of West Papua during the Dutch colonial period was evidence of an ethnic nationalism that was associated with cult movements. The Koreroi movement in Biak is a clear example of this early type of ethnic nationalism. However, ethnic nationalism had and still does have, an important role as a starting point for Papuan nationalism. A sense of shared historical experience has also encouraged Papuan nationalism: West Papua was colonised by the Dutch under a separate administration from the rest of Indonesia and it was not included in the areas handed over by the Dutch to what is now the Republic of Indonesia during the decolonisation of the Dutch East Indies.

Instead, during the decolonisation process in the 1960s the Papuans were encouraged to establish their own independent state, by developing their own national symbols such as an anthem, a flag, a constitution, a provisional government and parliament, an army and police force, and their own currency. The Papuan national symbols and state apparatus were recognised by the Dutch colonial administration.

All these were factors in the rapidly growing national and political consciousness of the Papuans during recent years, which resulted, in October 1961, in the foundation of a Papuan National Committee, claiming to represent the entire indigenous population. In its Manifesto of October 19, 1961, specially emphasising Article 73 of the Charter of the United Nations as well as Resolution 1514(XV), the Papuan National Committee requested the government to give official recognition to its flag, as that of the territory, to be flown beside the Netherlands tricolour. It was also requested that the Papuan national hymn, "Hai Tanahku Papua" (Hail, My Country Papua), be designated the national hymn of the territory. The use of the name West Papua for Netherlands New Guinea was the third request. .... On December 1, 1961, all over the territory, the flag of West Papua was officially raised beside the flag of The Netherlands ....In a very

insecure world, the Papuan people showed great self-confidence and a growing faith in their own abilities and the future of their country. It was no longer a question of what the Papuans really wanted.<sup>24</sup>

This also inspired the other aspect of being different: the Papuans' common sense of being Papuan, racially different from the Mongoloid Malays, also strengthened Papuan nationalism. When these components of Papuan identity — such as different language, culture, ways of life, religion, and attitudes to land — were faced with serious threats, a Papuan resistance movement was created. In 1965, under the coordination of the OPM, the Papuans began striving for political and social recognition and respect as a nationalist movement.

The advantages of people's nationalism are its power and strength, its adaptability for economic development, its promise of security and stability, and the fact that it unifies divergent ethnic groups; but it also has weaknesses, such as power struggles, unequal distribution of resources, and other forms of potential domination. These may easily foster ethnic sentiments, which are a main cause of state instability even in a democratic country such as PNG, where political culture has not yet been well developed.

The relationship between ethnic and territorial nationalism in West Papua is very strong. Ethnic sentiment can shape a people's nationalism, as the Papuan case demonstrates, but the lack of a strong common sense of territorial nationalism may, on the other hand, also shape ethnic nationalism.

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<sup>24</sup> J.V. de Bruijn (1965). "Changing Leadership in Western New Guinea", in Roland W. Force (ed.), *Induced Political Change in the Pacific*, Bishop Museum Press, The Pacific Science Association, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, p.101.

Most often, small ethnic groups who live within a bigger nation state have not demanded secession but rather asked for recognition of their rights, such as the improvement of their education system, the maintenance of their culture, and their right to control their land and its resources. Minority groups in Indonesia often share values with other ethnic groups in the multi-ethnic state. The Papuans, however, do not see themselves as either an ethnic group or a minority group; rather they are a still colonised people who wish to be decolonised.

### 2.3. Review of Literature

The literature on West Papuan nationalism and the resistance movement, the OPM, is sparse. In contrast, there are many anthropological and religious studies in which scholars typically describe Papuan society as consisting of a people who still live in the stone age, a static society still entering the development process. It is implied, therefore, that the Papuans are backward. Indonesia has always claimed Irianese were “primitive and needed guidance from a superior culture”,<sup>25</sup> and the government of Indonesia has argued that the presence of foreign powers was and is still an important factor for “civilising” these savage people. Although such analyses fail to address the key problems that the Papuans face today, they do become an important tool for understanding the dimensions of their current social and political problems. Attempts to analyse the political situation in West Papua, usually by non-Papuans, generally present an inaccurate account of Papuan nationalism, predict a pessimistic future, and regard the political problems as an internal affair for Indonesia. As a West Papuan, I strongly reject such distorted views, but for the purpose of

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<sup>25</sup> Robin Osborne (1985). *Indonesia's Secret War: The Guerilla Struggle in Irian Jaya*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, p.xvi.

academic debate, such views must be taken into account in seeking any solution to West Papua's problems.

A small handful of scholars has tried to analyse the motives behind the emergence of nationalism and political resistance in the context of Australian and PNG relationships to Indonesia. Robin Osborne (1985) and Peter King (1993), for example, have examined the policies of the Australian government on security in relation to Papua New Guinea and Indonesia, and argued that Canberra must rethink its policy in order to prevent disintegration and militarisation in Indonesia and PNG.<sup>26</sup> King acknowledged the seriousness of the problem, arguing that "Timor is one conflict that will not go away; the 'forgotten war' in the former Dutch colony of West Papua (Irian Jaya) is another".<sup>27</sup> Bilateral and multilateral relations with Indonesia have been major concerns of scholarly writing regarding regional stability and security. Other scholars have identified a number of motives behind the political decisions on border agreements, military cooperation and the failure of international laws to guarantee the rights of self-determination of the people of West Papua in 1969, often suggesting new procedures for handling ethno-nationalism within the international legal framework; but their emphasis is on maintaining friendly relations between neighbouring countries, in accordance with Resolution of the General Assembly of the UN No: 2625. From such a viewpoint, the nationalist movement in West Papua is a destabilising factor, and discouragement of the OPM is seen as a strategy to avoid conflict with Indonesia.

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<sup>26</sup> Peter King (1993). "Breaking Deadlocks—Peace-making Opportunities for Australia in East Timor, West Papua and Papua New Guinea", in Kevin Clements (ed.), *Peace and Security in the Asia Pacific Region*, UNU. Press, 3, Tokyo, p. 93.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*:84 .

There has also been very little discussion of the motives and origins of Papuan nationalism. Analysing the implications of regional politics for the OPM, most scholars consider that social approaches provide the best strategy to reduce Papuan nationalism. Among the few experts who have attempted to analyse Papuan nationalism are Kees Lagerberg (1979), Peter Savage (1982), Robin Osborne (1985), Ian Bell *et al.* (1986), Carmel Budiardjo (1988), Alan Smith (1991), Ron May (1991), Peter King (1993), Beverley Blaskett (1993), Martin Tsamenyi *et al.* (1993), and Jim Elmslie (1995). All these scholars are reluctant to define West Papua as a colony in literal terms, but they are all deeply concerned about the continuing social and political repression, exploitation and genocide in the country. Ian Bell *et al.* and RIOP, for example, argue that the early slave trade, the invention of national symbols encouraged by the Dutch during the decolonisation process, the bitter experiences since the Indonesian takeover, and the marginalisation of Papuans are the main factors in the emergence of political nationalism. They conclude that Papuan nationalism will continue to be a problem in the future, and that any immediate solution is unlikely for reasons already mentioned in this thesis. Despite the general pessimism of these scholars, their views regarding the method of resolving the conflict differ. Many support an autonomy arrangement, and Lagerberg<sup>28</sup> goes even further to suggest that a federal arrangement with Papua New Guinea is the best solution. However these writers largely fail to recognise the political imperative that some ideological acknowledgement is needed that self-determination and independence are central to any debate about future political and legal frameworks. Savage makes a significant point when openly condemning Jakarta and the international community for their denial of the rights of the people of West Papua:

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<sup>28</sup> Lagerberg, *op.cit.*:153

The tragic history of West Irian (West Papua) has been one of constant betrayal in which the interests of a small Melanesian population have been sacrificed to those of its larger neighbours, proximately Indonesia and Australia and ultimately the United States and Japan <sup>29</sup>

The most disappointing analysis of the situation in West Papua has been made by John R. G. Djopari, a West Papuan born academic. In his book *Pemberontakan Organisasi Papua Merdeka*, he argues that the West Papuan nationalism that was encouraged by the Dutch has already died since West Papua "returned to Indonesia" in 1969 and he claims that it is social divisions that have caused the Papuan national sentiments that are now expressed in the resistance movement under the coordination of the OPM. In his deep concern for Papuan culture and tradition, Djopari argues that any solution to the problem must be seen in a social, rather than a political, context. This book raises many questions about the credibility of the OPM and paints a dark future for the people of West Papua. Given Djopari's own Papuan background, his argument cannot be as easily dismissed, and so it is important to review this book closely and critically.

Even though the subject of the rights to self-determination has been an important issue among political scientists for a long time, Djopari fails to address this issue in his book. Some attempt is made to examine the relationship between the policy of the Indonesian government in West Papua and the resistance movement, and he argues that since the military, or security, approach has failed to destroy the OPM, it should be replaced by a social approach. This conclusion is of particular significance because Djopari, as a Papuan, a scholar, and a senior bureaucrat in the Indonesian

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<sup>29</sup> Peter Savage (1982). "West Papua: Handed Over to Indonesian Colonialism," in *Politics in Melanesia*, Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, Suva.

civil service, could be expected to understand the problem and its implications clearly, and hence his support for a new social approach as the best way to solve the problem has been regarded as an important contribution to debate on West Papua in the circles of power. Yet despite all his qualifications, Djopari's views arouse some doubts because most of the "facts" presented in his book are actually speculation.

In his introduction, Djopari discusses the background to political integration, resistance, and political development. His main premise concerning the political status of West Papua is that West Papua is historically an integral part of the Indonesian state because the people of West Papua had been sacrificed to the policy of integration in the 1950s and 1960s. However, unequal treatment and discrimination have since brought about severe social and political consequences. He provides data to support his arguments for a relationship between the failure of integration and the rise of the resistance movement. He also compares the level of social achievement between different colonial periods, arguing that under the Dutch, the Papuans did better than during the Indonesian colonisation. The political theory of integration, developed by James J. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, is discussed at length, with a description of measures for reducing the social gap and addressing cultural development. The concept of development that was developed by Lucian W. Pye is also discussed, with reference to the four variables of similarity, capacity, division, and specialisation.

The author then raises questions about how far the Papuans feel they are truly Indonesian and how far the level of participation of the Papuans in development affects their views on being Indonesian. These two concepts

are intertwined because one function of vertical integration is to provide wider opportunities for Papuans to participate in development as an integral part of Indonesia. This would lead to political socialisation, a precondition for regional stability and security. But in reality, both the system of integration and the participation of the Papuans in the development process have failed to meet expectations.

The book also looks at the centralised state apparatus in Indonesia, and criticises the state as failing to address the key social and political issues that have triggered unrest in West Papua. According to Djopari, such political problems could be solved if governments at all levels focused more on contentious issues such as development, increasing Papuan participation in the development process, and adopting a social approach rather than a security approach to reducing Papuan nationalism. Yet like so many scholars, Djopari fails to recognise that West Papua is a colony, even though he discusses the general characteristics and implications of traditional colonial systems.

Although Djopari states that he has written the book as a general account to assist state officials and the wider public in analysing the strengths and weaknesses of the OPM, the extent of international support, and the impact of the resistance on the integration process, the account is unreliable and often confused. For example, in the discussion of the foundation and structure of the OPM, he claims, "the name OPM was for the first time introduced in Manokwari in 1964, ...under the leadership of Terianus Aronggear (SE) who in the beginning was involved in the underground movement organising forces against the government of

Indonesia for political and military confrontation".<sup>30</sup> This account contains errors about the timeframe; moreover, such a well organised structure as he describes never actually existed. He also ignores the OPM of Jacob Prai's groups in the border region. In presenting this inaccurate account of the OPM, Djopari hopes to convince his readers that the demands of Papuan nationalism will gradually disappear.<sup>31</sup>

Djopari makes a strong and pragmatic case for the social approach, while challenging the Papuan community to recognise that under a policy of assimilation they may in the long run lose their identity. In doing so, he argues that ideas such as unity, equality and democracy are mystical concepts. On the other hand Djopari failed to predict the political, economic, and social changes which have taken place in Indonesia, and the current move towards democratisation.

Djopari's views are extremely important to the discussion of West Papuan nationalism and have been one of the main inspirations for this study.

## 2.4. Theoretical Framework

Liberation is the ideology of resistance movements. According to Henry di Suvero,<sup>32</sup> liberation is defined as freedom from any form of foreign domination and is recognised in the principles of international law. Liberation from colonialism and imperialism implies a people's rights to self-determination and independence; it implies that aboriginal or

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<sup>30</sup> Djopari, *op.cit.*:102-103.

<sup>31</sup> "In order to destroy the OPM and its influences in Irian Jaya, first of all, the ideology of the OPM must be destroyed. This can only be done if there is a political and good will of the central government, recruiting the youths of Irianese selectively into leadership positions and administrative offices both in and outside Irian Jaya province and also at the national level; as a realisation of the integration". Djopari, *op.cit.*:169.

<sup>32</sup> Henry di Suvero (1986). *The Melanesian Response to Imperial Indonesia: West Papua/Irian Jaya Re-Examined*, Working Paper, Annual Conference of the Australian University of Law Schools Association (AULSA), Goroka, pp. 6-9.

indigenous people have a right to maintain the separateness and distinctiveness of their cultures and traditions from those of the colonial power.

In relation to rights to self-determination/autonomy and independence, there are two competing world views: liberation ideology and neo-imperial ideology. In this thesis I will refer to the neo-imperial ideology as colonialism, but the use of the term neo-colonialism is not to be taken to imply that I accept Indonesian sovereignty over West Papua. Like the majority of Papuans, I do not recognise the presence of Indonesia in West Papua as legitimate, but see it as a foreign occupation force.

The Indonesian-supervised Act of Free Choice was in fact an Act of No Choice; the result was a product of duress, and the UN Resolution accepting the result was legally void.<sup>33</sup> Papuans remain strongly of the view that Dutch colonialism was simply replaced by Indonesian colonialism. The people of West Papua are fully aware they share a common culture, a common geography and common racial characteristics with the other Melanesians who have qualified for nationhood, and perceive themselves as a nation separate from the Indonesians. Liberation ideology supports the view that the territory of West Papua is exploited economically by the imperial power centred in Jakarta and is governed by a classical colonial administration dominated by Javanese and the military, supplemented with co-opted local elites and owners of foreign capital. Indonesian immigration, both planned and spontaneous, may be seen as an imperial settlement strategy for genocidal purposes. This ideology views the OPM as a valid independence movement representing the people of West Papua. This view

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<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*:6.

is widely shared throughout Melanesia, among the other indigenous peoples, and among international ecological movements.

On the other hand, neo-imperialism, which I prefer to call colonial ideology, sees the "Indonesian nation" as a legitimate collective of peoples, cultures and ways of life and asserts that the incorporation of West Papua in 1969 was a final and irrevocable return to the "motherland".<sup>34</sup> The colonial ideology justifies such rule on grounds of equity, asserting that the same military rules should apply throughout the nation without exceptions. Indonesia claims that rather than exploiting West Papua as an internal colony, it has brought it development, creating an infrastructure of roads, establishing mines, breaking down isolation, and increasing educational possibilities. The immigrant resettlement program is justified in terms of equity within the Indonesian nation. It propounds the doctrine of assimilation and integration to create a new "Indonesian" identity throughout the Indonesian archipelago, replacing separate tribally-based ethnic identities. It justifies the predominance of Javanese in the local ruling elite as reflecting the "natural" Malay superiority and the inferiority of the indigenous peoples of West Papua. It first characterised the OPM as a remnant of Dutch colonialism; today it labels the OPM simply as terrorists or "wild gangs". The Papuans' desire for self-determination is viewed as subversive, and the use of the terms "Papuan" or Melanesian was banned until 1998, in favour of "Irianese". The Indonesian state seeks to co-opt Papuans through installing a local puppet elite. This ideology above all fears the crumbling of the empire, and internationally it invokes UN resolutions on incorporation as validating and legitimating Indonesian rule, using the language of nationalism in both describing and disguising Jakarta's imperial

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<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*:7.


hold over West Papua, and defining conflict in terms of border control and management.

In short, old colonialism is dressed up in the language of its opposite, nationalism. It is called neo-imperial because it is a new form of imperialism, one that seeks to be excused from the post World War II norms of international law because of its Third World characters. Neo-imperial ideology dominates most newly independent states throughout the world, including Indonesia. But it is clear, as I have argued, that Indonesian neo-imperialist ideology is actually part and parcel of conventional colonialism, disguised by a different language. Whether the colonial power theory or liberation ideology better explains the material reality of West Papua can be tested by examining recent events using the model of political system change that is presented below.

#### **2.4.1. Political System Change**

There is no general theory that explains political system change in relation to West Papua. Here we consider a hypothetical transition of one political system to another, involving the transformation of Papuan society from its current political status as a colony to that of a sovereign independent state, breaking down old boundaries and replacing them with new ones. This requires a total and fundamental political change, within the framework of both national and international laws which define the meaning and application of self-determination, establish who has rights to it, and indicate how such issues can be addressed.

Figure 1: Political System Change Model for West Papuan Liberation



#### 2.4.2. Legal Framework for Self-Determination and Independence

A number of basic principles can be applied in framing self-determination and independence. These are defined within normative, national and international legal frameworks.

First, according to normative law, all human beings are born free and have the right to live free and to exercise their fundamental rights without interference. This principle is strengthened by Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other relevant international laws and covenants. Secondly, the preamble to the 1945 Indonesian state

constitution clearly states that “whereas freedom is the inalienable right of all nations, colonialism must be abolished in this world as it is not in conformity with humanity and justice”.<sup>35</sup> As a people, the Papuans are treated under this norm as a social unit who have the right to exercise those rights and to enjoy the privileges that belong to them.

Thirdly, international laws have clearly defined the rights and obligations of colonial powers and colonised peoples. The main instruments of these international laws are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, two covenants on political, social, economic and cultural rights, international bills on Human Rights, General Assembly Resolutions, and UN Charters. According to the United Nations:

All peoples have the right of self-determination and independence. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.<sup>36</sup>

It is internationally acknowledged that all peoples have the right to self-determination and independence. This is acknowledged in the Charter of the UN, Article 1, paragraphs 2 and 55; under the Universal Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples, Articles 5, 6, and 11; and under the International Covenant on economic, social, and cultural rights and the International Covenant on civil and political rights. The provisions of these laws are crystal clear. The UN Charter, Chapter XI, Articles 73-74, the Declaration Regarding Non-Self Governing Territories, authorises “the UN

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<sup>35</sup> Preamble of the Indonesian Constitution 45, The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia Department of Information Republic of Indonesia 1989. <http://asnic.utexas.edu/asnic/countries/indonesia/ConstIndonesia.html>

<sup>36</sup> The United Nations (1988). *The International Bill of Human Rights, Universal Declaration of the Human Rights* and. Article 1(1) of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* and two relations covenants: covenants on civil and political rights and the international convention on economic, social and cultural rights provide a stronger basis for those rights, New York, p.10.

to be responsible for and control the administration of territories who have not yet attained a full measure of self government." Article 1 (3) of the same Declaration declares that "the parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realisation of the rights of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations".<sup>37</sup>

These laws also set conditions for the implementation of such rights. For example, Resolution 1541 of the UN General Assembly, 1960—Rights to Self Determination provides three main criteria for determining the beneficiaries of the rights: first, the territory must be geographically separate from the colonising state (this is referred to as "Blue Water" separation). Secondly, the people must be ethnically or culturally distinct from the colonising state. Finally, the people of the territory must be shown to be suffering from some form of discrimination and to be "arbitrarily placed in a situation of subordination"; that is, they are treated differently by the governing authorities to other parts of the territory and exist in a less developed and lower status situation (ie. they suffer from exploitation and discrimination). This Resolution further provides three options for such people of non-self-governing territories in their pursuit of self-determination. They can choose either to become a fully independent nation-state, or opt for some form of association with the colonial power, or opt for integration. In this way Resolution 1514 sets out the criteria for determining those entitled to the rights of self-determination. Additionally, the Resolution stipulates, among other things, that "the integrating territory should have attained an advanced stage of Self-Government with free political institutions, so that its people would have the capacity to make a

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<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*:10.

reasonable choice through informed and democratic process" (1514- IX), and that "the integration should be the result of freely expressed wishes of the territory's peoples acting with full knowledge of the change in their status, their wishes having been expressed through an informed and democratic process impartially conducted and based on universal suffrage. The United Nations could, when deemed necessary, supervise this process" (1514-V111). Finally, "all armed actions or repression measures of all kinds directed against dependent people shall cease in order to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence, and the integrity of their nation territory shall be respected" (1514-IV).

Resolution 1514 (XV) also recognises the "passionate desire for liberty of all dependent peoples" and proclaims "the necessity of rapidly and unconditionally putting an end to colonialism in all its forms;"<sup>38</sup> it sets out the elements of a definition of a colonial people and provides for the manner and conditions in which the beneficiaries are to exercise and protect their rights.<sup>39</sup> This is also strengthened by Article 1-9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which clearly recognises the inviolable rights of each individual, family, and community under law so that they are not subject to discrimination on the basis of race, sex, colour, social origin, property, birth or other status or held in slavery or subjected to other cruel treatment. When the Assembly created a Decolonisation Commission, this provision came into effect under Resolution No 2625 (XXV).

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<sup>38</sup> Alain Fenet (1988). "The Right of the Eritrean People to Self Determination" in Lionel Cliffe & Basil Davidson (eds), *The Long Struggle of Eritrea for Independence and Constructive Peace*, Sokesman Bertrand Russell House, Nottingham, p. 38.

<sup>39</sup> "The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Chapter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation" (Resolution 1514(XV)/1 of 14 December 1960, in *Human Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments*, (1988). The United Nations, New York, p.47).

Additionally, UN Resolution No 1514 (XV) states that “sovereignty in a colony or in a non self-governing territory does not lie in the hand of the colonial power, or in the hand of an administrative authority, but in the hand of the people of this colony” (UN Resolution No 1514 (XV)). The same Resolution continues: “sovereignty over a colonised territory is not transferable by the colonialist power to another power” but “all powers must be returned by the colonialist to the native people of each territory.”<sup>40</sup> In these terms, the peoples of West Papua have full rights to self-government and so the power over these peoples must be returned directly to them; control of West Papua should have been returned to Papuans not to Indonesia under the New York Agreement. Moreover, UN Resolution No 2625 XXV declares that “the duty of all states is to end colonialism and to stop anyone from using force against people struggling for their independence,” and that “each colonised territory has a separate legal status from other colonised territories and each has the right to independence”.<sup>41</sup> Additionally, UN General Assembly Resolution No 2621-XXV, adopted on 2 October has recognised any declaration of independence as a valid political exercise and rejected categorically all efforts to maintain a colonial domination over any people, which is regarded as “a crime”, and has further recognised the inalienable rights of all colonised peoples to struggle with all necessary means against the colonial power.<sup>42</sup> Resolution No 2621 XXV, therefore, legitimates the rights of Papuans to fight against their colonialist rulers.

The UN General Assembly Resolution No 2711 (XXV), adopted on 14 October 1970, recognises the legitimacy of liberation struggle, including

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<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*:13.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*:14.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*:14.

armed struggle, waged by the colonised peoples to gain self-determination; moreover, all UN member states were requested to aid such struggles. The legal status of freedom fighters who struggle against a colonial power for the right to self-determination was defined by the General Assembly in 1973. The principles agreed were as follows: "Such struggles are legitimate and in full accord with the principles of international law. Attempts to suppress struggles against colonial and racist regimes are incompatible with the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples as well as with the Principles of international law concerning Friendly Co-operation Among States. Such attempts constitute a threat to peace and security".<sup>43</sup> The same source has also stated: "the use of mercenaries against national liberation movements is a criminal act".<sup>44</sup>

Although the rights of indigenous peoples have been denied for years, in 1989 a new Working Group on Indigenous People, a sub-organ of the Human Rights groups, was formed. Since then the issue of indigenous people has become a major focus of international attention. In the Draft Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples, the UN recognises the rights and freedom of indigenous people, including the preservation and development of ethnic and cultural characteristics and distinct identities and protection against genocide and ethnocide; and the right to participation and self-determination. The Draft also outlines mutually acceptable and fair procedures for resolving conflicts between indigenous peoples and states, involving such means as negotiation, mediation, arbitration, national courts, international and regional human rights reviews, and complaints

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<sup>43</sup> The United Nations (July 1991). *Human Rights: International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights*, Fact Sheet No:13, New York, pp.10-11.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*:11.

mechanisms.<sup>45</sup> The Vienna Declaration adopted by the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights calls for an Indigenous Decade 1994-2003 and the establishment of a permanent forum for Indigenous People within the UN system.<sup>46</sup>

### 2.4.3. Referendum

According to Farley, "a referendum is a type of issues election the function of which is to approve or reject a specified proposal, while a plebiscite is a type of referendum wherein the proposal at issue concerns the matter of sovereignty".<sup>47</sup> A plebiscite is an important mode of political participation and it is a principle of popular rights that people have the right to participate in a political decision determining the future of their own sovereign state. A plebiscite is characterised by popular participation, a free, fair and secret ballot, one person one vote in electoral constituencies, and it may involve peacekeepers, independent monitoring groups, international observers, or the supervision of the UN. Thus, a plebiscite emerges out of the ongoing process of diplomatic bargaining in much the same fashion as ceasefires, alliances, arbitration panels, wars, economic sanctions and international organisations.<sup>48</sup> There are many plebiscite procedures and conditions that must be followed. For example, the process must include the initial creation of a small commission to undertake preliminary surveys on locale, secure records, make assessments of the local civilian administration, collect demographic data, ensure the withdrawal of troops, estimate the required number of observer forces, assess any new changes, determine the

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<sup>45</sup> The United Nations (1993). 'Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples', Forty-sixth Session, Item 15, Geneva.

<sup>46</sup> Joint Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade of the Federal Parliament of Australia, (May 1997). *Inquiry into the Regional Dialogue on Human Rights*, Information Booklet, Canberra, p.10.

<sup>47</sup> Farley, *op.cit.*:26.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*:51.

extent of participation, set out a time frame, and arrange finance, and civil administration.<sup>49</sup>

In a situation of uncompromising conflict, international law affirms that a public decision is crucial in settling disputed issues. Where the choice is between two or more options, such as independence and autonomy, voting is the generally accepted procedure for conflict resolution; the involvement of a third party can be crucial in setting out acceptable rules and regulations. The final decision usually requires something like a two-thirds majority vote from a fair, secret and democratic referendum. As will be discussed in the next chapter, this process was not followed in the case of West Papua.

#### 2.4.4. Autonomy

The word "autonomy" comes from the Greek words "autos" (self) and "nomos" (law), which together mean self-governing, or independent in government without outside control.<sup>50</sup> In common practice, it means the local people are given some powers in a regional government to arrange their own home affairs within certain limitations. According to Ramos B. Ocampo, the most important factor in establishing a genuine autonomous region is the decentralisation of power. This involves three processes: first, the devolution of power or transfer of national government power, functions and resources to the local government; second, deconcentration or delegation, also involving the transfer of central government powers, functions and resources to its line agency field units; and third, the privatisation of public services and purely commercial functions to non-

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<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*:52-89.

<sup>50</sup> June Pritt Brett (1989). *Indigenous Experience of Autonomy in the Cordillera*, in R.B. Salibad (ed.), ESC Working Paper 10 to Symposium, University of Philippines, Baguio.

governmental entities. According to Ocampo, autonomy is achieved primarily through devolution, but this should be backed up by deconcentration and other measures at the regional level.<sup>51</sup>

However, autonomy is not the same as decentralisation as it operates in Indonesia. According to the Indonesian Constitution:

The division of the area of Indonesia into large and small regional territories together with the structure of their administration, shall be prescribed by statute with regard for and in observance of the principles of deliberation in the governmental system of the State, and the traditional rights in the regional territories which have a special character.<sup>52</sup>

At present Indonesia is still a unitary state; all power is ultimately in the hands of the central government, and the regional legislature only has powers to propose regulations which must be approved by the central government. Indonesia also has its own system of guided democracy and a dualistic bottom-up and top-down approach in state planning. It is to some degree decentralised, but at the time of writing it does not encompass meaningful regional autonomy.

Autonomy can also be gained through an agreement negotiated and signed between the government and the opposition on a consensus basis. According to Game Theory, conflict resolution embodies "an assumption of perfect information, so that every party perfectly understands everyone's else's possible actions and the parties, in the end, coordinate their actions in

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<sup>51</sup> Ramos B.Ocampo (1989). *The Cordillera in Transition*, in R.B. Salibad (ed.), ESC Working Paper 10 to Symposium, University of Philippines, Baguio, p.36.

<sup>52</sup> Mike Freeman (1993). *The Indonesian Government System: An Introduction to Indonesian Government Agencies relevant to the Indonesia Australia Development Cooperation Program*, AIDAB, Canberra, p.37.

accordance with some agreed-upon plan".<sup>53</sup> Actually, where no perfect information and understanding exists, an initial understanding can be established, based on the information available concerning the root cause of the problem and different positions, cultures, and desires, and at the end the parties can then work together towards rational and mutually efficient goals.<sup>54</sup> Conflict resolution is, therefore, an outcome of a conflict situation that satisfies the inherent needs of all. A competitive process of conflict resolution is not true conflict resolution but merely dispute settlement.<sup>55</sup>

Agreement on autonomy may occur through negotiation, under the same preconditions as in a referendum. Success is often achieved by the tactic of emphasising the uncontentious factors in the first place, in order to establish a foundation for further discussion. If such a process were to take place in West Papua it could provide the basis for long-term political negotiation towards self-determination and independence.

#### 2.4.5. Self-Determination and Independence

"What we are experiencing ... is not the shaping of new coherences but the world breaking into its bits and pieces, bursting like big and little stars from exploding galaxies." <sup>56</sup>

The principles inherent in the provisions of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights concerning the rights to self-determination and independence enshrine these rights in international law. But the questions remain: who are entitled to self-determination, and

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<sup>53</sup> J.A. Scimecca (1993). "Theory and Alternative Dispute Resolution: Contradiction in Terms?" in J.D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe (eds), *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, p. 213.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*:4-5.

<sup>56</sup> Daniel Patrick Moynihan (1993). *Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics*, Oxford University Press, p.65.

what type of self-determination do those people demand? In the light of international law and liberation theory, this thesis attempts to answer these questions in relation to West Papua.

Self-determination means that a "people" determines its own future.<sup>57</sup> "The people" consists of a distinctive social unit within which the members share commonalities. Self-determination implies the right to independence of peoples in colonies and trust territories<sup>58</sup> in accordance with Article 73 of the UN Charter. Two important aspects should be clearly understood. First, self-determination is a dynamic and continuous process. A people exercises self-determination when it determines its own future continuously. As illustrated in Figure No 1, the achievement of self-determination is a step on the path to final independence. Secondly, self-determination has both internal and external dimensions. The internal dimension regulates the relationship between rulers and ruled within the community which inhabits a defined territory. The external dimension regulates the relationship between "a self-defined territory and the outside world. It makes the community a distinct political entity entitled to shape its ties, legal and otherwise, with other political entities, be they sovereign states, ethnic minority groups or international organisations".<sup>59</sup> Sovereignty is only one of the many forms these ties can take, as the examples of Niue and the Cook Islands have shown.

When ethnic groups claim the right to self-determination, most often they are primarily interested in the external aspect. According to Kamal there are two distinct approaches to self-determination based on different forms of nationalism, namely, territorial and ethnic self-determination.

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<sup>57</sup> Kamal S.Shehadi (1993). *Ethnic Self-determination and the Break-up of States*, Adelphi Paper 283, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, p.4.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*

Territorial self-determination seeks to achieve a particular political status for a defined territory and for all the people who reside in it. International law recognises only certain territorial claims as legitimate and it restricts the right to self-determination to people who live in territorial units within well defined boundaries. This criterion is established in UN General Assembly Resolution No 2625, which defines the criteria of legitimacy for colonised peoples who wish to be decolonised. Traditionally the UN has been concerned with maintaining friendly relationships between neighbouring countries and with non-interference in a state's internal affairs. "But Resolution No 688 (1991) of the Security Council of the UN broke new ground in international law, for the first time approving the right to interfere on humanitarian grounds."<sup>60</sup> This allows the UN to intervene in the internal affairs of a given state to arrange elections, referenda, negotiations, and plebiscites to determine the final political status of a disputed territory. This approach to achieving consensus on self-determination is based on the international authority of the UN and is a response to the inevitable disintegration of many existing nation states. It promotes external self-determination. Territorial self-determination may also promote internal self-determination, often known as autonomy. This is based on civic nationalism in which the right of self-determination is given to those communities of individuals freely associated on the basis of a social contract or for other reasons. This involves a democratic process in which the people define their own political community, its objectives and its scope.

"Ethnic self-determination presupposes identifiable ethnic nations or political communities of individuals who share genealogical origins."<sup>61</sup> The

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<sup>60</sup> Moynihan, *op.cit.*:67.

<sup>61</sup> Shehadi, *op.cit.*:5.

criteria for determining who is entitled to self-determination in this category are the same as those for identifying an ethnic nation; that is, a common ancestry, common language, common religion, common culture or any combination thereof. Moreover, the group should have its own political institutions and international recognition to give it a political identity as a nation-state embodying the nation's ethnically distinctive political entity. Self-determination entitles people to determine their own future, from preserving an ethnic identity to establishing relationships with states or other ethnic groups. Yet it poses problems. First, communal groups which have exercised self-government or enjoyed a degree of autonomy tend to aspire to independent statehood, even though such demands may lead to the destabilisation of the region or nation state. Secondly, it excludes other ethnic groups who live in the territory. This can lead to devastating civil wars. Thirdly, the ethnic approach reduces the importance of representative government as an integral part of self-determination.<sup>62</sup>

How is this concept of ethnic self-determination relevant to the case of West Papua? From both the territorial and the ethnic viewpoint the Papuans as a distinct Melanesian ethnic group, are well qualified for self-determination. The major objective of the OPM, as a resistance movement, is to achieve self-determination and independence for West Papua. According to Farley,<sup>63</sup> there are two major types of resistance movement: secessionist and irredentist. A secessionist movement is one that seeks to separate a population from the existing state in order to form a new state. The liberation movements in West Papua, East Timor, Eriteria and West Sahara are examples of such movements. An irredentist movement occurs when a population in one state seeks to break away in order to unite with

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<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*:5-6.

<sup>63</sup> Farley, *op.cit.*:10.

their fellow nationalists in neighbouring states, such as the Somalis in Ethiopia.

## **2.5. Conclusion**

The concepts of integration, colonialism, and nationalism and the theories relating to autonomy, self-determination and independence are useful instruments for understanding the complex nature of the issues addressed in this thesis. In particular, the concept of coercive integration is relevant to the case of West Papua; this will be discussed further in Chapter Five.

However, despite their relevance, these concepts have seldom been discussed in the literature covering West Papua, possibly because writers have been preoccupied with their own political and strategic interests in relation to Indonesia. The few studies which discuss West Papua generally paint a biased picture of the political problems and are pessimistic about the future of the territory and its people. Even those studies which present a neutral position suggest that a social approach offers the best solution to the problem, rather than contentious approaches such as self-determination and independence.

In this thesis, a simple model for political change, which I call the Political System Change Model, has been constructed. The people of West Papua are a distinctive people who live within clear territorial boundaries and are entitled to claim their right to self-determination and independence in the light of normative, national and international laws. In the next chapter we will examine how and why those rights have been denied all these years by the international community, who themselves have agreed with those principles, taking particular account of international tensions

during the cold war period between East and West and reflecting on the history of denial policies in the case of West Papua.

## Chapter Three: A History of the Colonial Politics of the Denial of Papuan Rights

### 3.1. Introduction

The United Nations has asserted that, "All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development".<sup>1</sup> Hassan di Tiro, in an analysis of the rights of the people of Aceh Sumatra, further claims that it is the duty of all states to end colonialism and to stop anyone from using force against their colonial subjects.<sup>2</sup> However, in the case of West Papua, the situation was completely reversed. Instead of applying these universal principles, international bodies such as the United Nations took an active role in denying these rights to the people of West Papua by transferring the territory from one colonial power to another, from the Dutch to Indonesia in the 1960s.

In this chapter, the history of West Papua will be briefly described, in order to provide a background for a more detailed focus on the colonial policy of denial and the reasons for the failure of the United Nations human rights principles that took place from 1962-1969.

### 3.2. Background to Indonesian Interest In West Papua

West Papua, which until recently was called Irian Jaya by Indonesia, is the western part of the island of New Guinea. It has an area of 421,981 square kilometres and shares borders with Papua New Guinea in the east, Australia in the south and the Moluccan islands in the west. West Papua is a land of

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<sup>1</sup> The United Nations (1988). "Human Rights: Article: 1(1), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights", in *A Compilation of International Instruments*, New York, pp.9, 19.

<sup>2</sup> Hassan di Tiro (1985). *The Case and the Cause*, The National Liberation Front of Aceh Sumatra, London, p.14.

high mountain ranges, mangrove swamps and tropical jungle. The 5,030 metre Nemang Kawi (in the local language of the Amungme) located in the Sudirman (previously Carstensz) mountain range is the highest mountain in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. West Papua has similar types of fauna and flora to Australia. Marsupials and gumtrees, for example, are found in the country, evidence that the island of New Guinea, including West Papua, was part of a common land mass with Australia a million years ago.

West Papua's one and a half million indigenous people are Melanesians, of the same racial origin as the people in Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Kanaky, Solomon Islands, Fiji and the Torres Strait Islands. The Papuans' culture has much in common with that of the other Melanesians rather than with the Indonesian Malays. More than 257 different languages are spoken in West Papua.<sup>3</sup> They are divided into two major groups. Languages of the Papuan Phylum are spoken mainly in the highlands and southern parts of the country; languages belonging to the New Guinea group are spoken in the coastal and islands areas, predominantly in the north and west of West Papua.

Seventy-five per cent of the population live in the Baliem and Paniai districts and other largely mountainous regions. Warfare in traditional society was endemic. Unlike the rice-eating Indonesians, these people domesticate pigs, which play an important social role in the society, and grow crops such as yam, sweet potato, tapioca, taro and banana. The irrigation systems for these crops date back to 10,000 BC.

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<sup>3</sup> Summer Institute of Linguistics/SIL (1995). University of Cenderawasih, Abepura.

Papuan culture is now under serious threat with the influx of tens of thousands of Indonesian migrants, particularly from the over-populated islands of Java and Bali, in the last thirty years. The population on the island has rapidly increased. According to the 1990 census, the population reached 1,648,708, with a growth rate of 3.46 per cent annually, the highest in Indonesia. Immigration has been an important component of this growth.

The country's infrastructure is underdeveloped. The land transport network is poorly developed. In the past few years, the central government, in cooperation with provincial governments and foreign contractors, has been building roads connecting the north to the south, and from the west into the east. A primary objective of this road construction has been to restrict the movement of the OPM. Along the Trans Irian Highway, which will connect Jayapura in the north to Merauke in the south, the government has resettled immigrants from Java and Bali. Independent observations have indicated that inhabitants of these camps are in various ways connected with ABRI's territorial strategy, because military materials could be found in those camps.

In 1960, before the occupation, 93 per cent of the population of West Papua were Christians. But this percentage has rapidly changed over the thirty-three years of Indonesian occupation. According to the 1981/82 census, 62.3 per cent were Protestants, who dominate in the north, and 23.6 per cent were Catholic, mostly in the south and highlands; 11.0 per cent were Muslim, 0.1 per cent were Hindu and 0.1 per cent were Buddhist.<sup>4</sup> Islam which dominates in the west and southwest of the island was originally introduced by Arab traders in the early 12th century,

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<sup>4</sup> John R.G. Djopari (1993). *Pemberontakan Organisasi Papua Merdeka*, Pt. Gramedia Widiasarana Indonesia, Jakarta, p.81.

predominantly in the Fakfak and Sorong districts. The number of Muslims, Hindus and Buddhists has increased significantly with the influx of immigrants from elsewhere in Indonesia. Papuans also have a strong link with the souls of their ancestors through the practice of traditional ritual and religions. "Cult" movements have been common. The Hai movement of the Amungme, for example, teaches that the souls of their ancestors will return and liberate them from oppression, social injustice and exploitation and that finally the Amungme will be a prosperous society.

To Indonesia, West Papua is "the 26th province". It is divided into twelve regions, 116 districts and 881 villages. The provincial government has limited power to make political decisions; all provincial policies are highly centralised. The provincial government's powers cover such matters as infrastructure, education, and water and electricity supplies. The governor of the province is appointed by the president. Autonomy was promised by Indonesia before and during occupation, but has never been implemented. In order to restrict the movement of the OPM, Jakarta has established new administrative centres in Mulia, Timika and Enarotali. For the same purposes, Jakarta in 1999 announced a plan to form three new provinces, with capitals in Jayapura, Timika and Sorong<sup>5</sup> (see political map below).


West Papua is rich in resources. An article in *Pacific Islands Business* in 1994 referred to it as "Treasure Island".<sup>6</sup> It has oil and mineral deposits such as gold, copper, silver and nickel, and agricultural production, fishing, and forestry contribute twenty per cent to the provincial economy. The Freeport gold, copper and silver mine contributes one quarter of the

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<sup>5</sup> *Tifa Irian*, (Minggu ke-II Juni 1996). "Membedah Irian Jaya, Membungkam GPK", p.1.

<sup>6</sup> *Pacific Islands Business* April 1994, p.31.

Map 1: West Papua







national income. Freeport Indonesia, one of the biggest gold mines in the world and a vital asset of the government, increased its gross revenue from \$74 million in 1975 to \$400 million in 1988.<sup>7</sup> West Papua has a pronounced trade imbalance: total exports in 1976/77, for example, were valued at US\$350 million, while the value of imports had sharply declined to US\$1 million in the same budget year. There is also mining exploration activity on Waigeo Island in the west and at the Cyclops mountains in Jayapura district. Oil found in Klamono, Sorong district, and other regions is exploited by multinational companies. Oil exploration started in 1934, with Dutch Shell, Standard and Texas Oil. In 1972, Petromer Trend, which is controlled by the South African Oil company, owned by Harry Oppenheimer, was licensed to resume drilling in Klamono oil field.<sup>8</sup> In 1997, natural gas was discovered in the west of West Papua in greater quantities than the Natuna gas reserves in Indonesia. More than 74 logging companies operate in West Papua. Yet, despite these riches, on the basis of social indicators West Papua has been classified as one of the poorest provinces in the Eastern Indonesia.<sup>9</sup>

West Papua has become a major target of Indonesianization, particularly through transmigration. According to the 1988 population census, immigrants accounted for 270,350 of West Papua's population, and 52 per cent of these immigrants came from Java and Bali.<sup>10</sup> The

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<sup>7</sup> George A. Mealey (1996). *Grasberg: Mining the Richest and Most Remote Deposit of Copper and Gold in the World in the Mountains of Irian Jaya, Indonesia*, Freeport McMoRan, Copper & Gold, Inc., New Orleans, p.129.

<sup>8</sup> Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong (1988). *West Papua: The Obliteration of a People*, Tapol, London, p.30.

<sup>9</sup> Susan Braun (1996). *Education in West Papua: A Comparative World Systems and Cultural Analysis*, Masters thesis, University of Sydney, p.2.

<sup>10</sup> Yulfita Raharjo and Bayu Setiawan (1994). "Indeks Perkembangan Manusia: Irian Jaya", in *Penduduk dan Pembangunan, Bulletin Pengkajian Masalah Kependudukan dan Pembangunan Irian Jaya*, Jilid V, No.1-2, Pulibang Kependudukan dan Ketengankerjaan Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, Jakarta, p.5.

transmigration program is an integral part of policies aimed at assimilating Papuans into Indonesian culture, tradition, and way of life. Most transmigrants are settled in the politically and economically strategic areas. This strategy of social warfare is an integral part of the Indonesian military's territorial strategy. It has devastating effects. By placing the transmigrants in the areas where the OPM has been most active, and along the Trans-Irian Highway, the OPM's movements have been restricted.

Like East Timor and Aceh Sumatra, West Papua has been declared a military zone and, with West Papua seen as a trouble spot, rapid militarisation is considered to be a crucial part of the Indonesian territorial strategy. Under state emergency law, Papuans are not permitted to undertake any political activity which can be perceived as a challenge to Indonesian rule; Papuans are not allowed to form their own independent political parties. From Jayapura, the Regional Military Command directs all military operations against the OPM. The Irian Jaya military command, which is known as the Cenderawasih Division of Kodam XVII, based in Jayapura, has 15,000 armed men. This Division is composed of three regional military units called Komando Resort Militer (KOREM), eight Komando Distrik Militer (KODIM), and three Battalions. These are Battalion 751 for Jayapura, Merauke and Wamena districts; Battalion 752 for Biak, Serui, and Paniai provinces; and Battalion 753 for Sorong, Manokwari and Fakfak districts.<sup>11</sup> A new military base for air, naval and land forces, with new KOREM and KODIM, was established in Timika in 1994-1996 in response to social and political unrest in that region. Under its dual-function role, the Indonesian armed forces (ABRI) have the right to intervene in civilian as well as military affairs, and under this arrangement

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<sup>11</sup> Martin O'Hare (1989). *The Indonesian Military in Irian Jaya*, Masters thesis, ANU, Canberra, p.29.

all levels of administration, from the centre down to sub-districts, are discharged by military personnel.

### 3.3. West Papuan Culture

Studies have shown that the first migration to this island from Africa to Asia and the Pacific islands occurred during the last ice age, about 50,000 years ago. The migrants arrived at different periods and lived in isolation from one another, separated by mountains, swamps, and forests. Each group of migrants was thus able to retain its cultural individuality. To a certain degree, this explains why over 257 languages are still spoken in West Papua. The irrigation ditches typical of the highlands, particularly the Dani people of the Baliem valley, were locally invented as early as 10,000 BC. Trading relations with neighbouring countries such as the Moluccas, Timor, and Melanesian island countries in the South Pacific Ocean, and also with mainland Asia, were well-developed 5,000 years ago.<sup>12</sup> The production and distribution of high quality pottery 'Lapita' pottery began here around 1,500 BC when the Lapita civilisation reached its zenith. The first Bronze Age came to northern New Guinea around 2000 BC, with evidence of the new metal culture in Sentani and Tobati.<sup>13</sup>

New methods of navigation and fishing were also developed by the people of the coastal regions. The coastal areas were well known to Chinese and Malayan seafarers long before the arrival of the first European explorers, and foreign cultural influences, particularly in language, music and the spread of Islam, were evident.

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<sup>12</sup> Pamela Swadling (1996). *Plumes from Paradise*, Papua New Guinea National Museum in association with Robert Brown & Associates, Hong Kong, p.205.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*:205-209.

### 3.4. Western Colonisation

The islands of the Moluccas and West Papua produced valuable trade items such as spices, plumes, nutmeg, massoy bark, trepang, pearl shell and *damar*. These attracted traders from China, India and Arabia in the tenth to twelfth centuries. They introduced such commodities to Europeans in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The Europeans, wanting to trade directly instead of buying from the middlemen, began what was described as the “*discovery*” of the new world. The Spaniard Ortiz de Retes was the first European explorer to land on the island of Papua, in 1545, and he gave it the name *Nueva Guinea*. Spain, however, did not colonise the island. Fifty-seven years later, in 1602, the Dutch East Indies Company established its headquarters in Batavia (now Jakarta) and conquered and colonised the sovereign nations in the Malay Archipelago, such as Aceh Sumatra and the Moluccas. But it did not initially colonise West Papua.

It was not until 24 August 1828 that the Dutch occupied West Papua and claimed it as Dutch territory, fixing the colonial boundary at 141° east longitude. After that, the Dutch administered West Papua separately under the name the Netherlands New Guinea. During the Dutch colonial period, exploitation of natural resources in the colonised territories was extensive but there was little development of the Papuans.<sup>14</sup> During the Second World War, West Papua saw heavy fighting between the allied forces and Japanese troops. More than 15,000 Australian soldiers alone lost their lives in West Papua.

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<sup>14</sup> Although West Papua generated export earnings in 1956/57 of £A3.6 million in non-mining exports alone, expenditure on education was very low; it had only two MULO (senior high schools), both run by missions. See G.T. Roscoe (1995). *Our Neighbours in Netherlands New Guinea*, Jacaranda Press, Brisbane, pp.8, 39.

The Papuan people launched resistance struggles against Dutch colonialism in many forms. One of the best known resistance movements was the Korero millenarian movement among the people of Biak and Jayapura from 1934-1945. It began as a social and religious movement, seeking improvement of local social and economic conditions, but in the later years became more political; it demanded independence in 1942. During the Second World War, many members of the movement cooperated with Japanese occupation forces (but also fought against them once they realised that the Japanese intended simply to replace their former colonial rulers).<sup>15</sup>

#### **3.4.1. 1960s Decolonisation: Failure of a "Golden Age"**

The early 1960s represented a prospective "golden age" for change in West Papua. However, because of the ineffectiveness of the political parties, the lack of strong leadership and international experience, and, most importantly, the lack of regional sentiment among the Papuans, and external pressure on Indonesia, early liberation movements failed to maximise their opportunities.

The Dutch colonial administration began the decolonisation process in 1961, promising that West Papua would be given self-determination and independence by 1970, in response to a request submitted by the Nieuw Guinea Raad.<sup>16</sup> Under a ten year program of Papuanization, both Legislative and Executive Councils were established. Administratively, Netherlands Nieuw Guinea was divided into six regencies (Hollandia, Geelvinkbaai, West Nieuw Guinea, Fakfak, South Nieuw Guinea and Central Bergland)

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<sup>15</sup> Nonie Sharp (1994). *The Morning Star in Papua Barat*, Arena Publications, Melbourne.

<sup>16</sup> Wim Zonggonau (January 1997), interviewed by the author, Port Moresby.

with 73 districts. The provisional government of West Papua was given power to make policies in the areas of finance, social justice, culture, economy, labour, energy and internal affairs. Under State Regulation Stb:454, dated 10 November 1960, a twenty-eight member Nieuw Guinea Raad (Parliament) was constituted; sixteen members were elected by the people, and twelve were appointed by the governor.<sup>17</sup>

In response to the Luns Plan (a proposal for undertaking the decolonisation process – see below), five members of the Nieuw Guinea Raad called a meeting in 1961. The meeting was attended by seventy educated Melanesians, who formed the National Independence Council of West Papua. The primary tasks of the council were to prepare a draft constitution, national symbols and an economic plan. At a meeting held in Hollandia (Jayapura), a draft of a national manifesto, a national flag (Morning Star), a national anthem (*Hai Tanahku Papua*) and a name for the country (Papua Barat) were adopted.<sup>18</sup> The proposals were accepted unanimously by the parliament.<sup>19</sup> From 1 December 1961, the West Papuan National flag, the Morning Star, was raised alongside the Dutch flag. Since then, 1 December each year has been celebrated as National Flag Day. The committee also submitted an economic development program, which was later endorsed by the parliament. It was suggested that West Papua should achieve its political independence by 1971, but before this the Papuans should be prepared economically over ten years. Major elements of the development program included oil and mineral exploration in Sorong, nickel and copper mining in the Cyclops Mountains (Jayapura), Waigeo, and Freeport, and uranium mining in Tawar and the Arfak area; the

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<sup>17</sup> Djopari, *op.cit.*:29.

<sup>18</sup> R.J. May, *op.cit.*:161.

<sup>19</sup> Wim Zonggonau (18 January 1998), interviewed by the author, Canberra.

development of hydro-electric power on the Mamberamo river; an international airport in Jayapura; the relocation of the capital from Jayapura to Nabire; and the development of logging.<sup>20</sup>

From the West Papuan point of view, the decolonisation of West Papua was not a serious plan but merely a manipulation of public opinion in response to increasing military and diplomatic pressure from Indonesia concerning the future of West Papua and so intended to forestall Indonesian demands.<sup>21</sup> This was also the view of Arian Brand, a former Dutch officer in Kaimana in 1961.<sup>22</sup> After the Round Table Agreement of 1949 signed in Den Haag, an agreement that provided that West Papua's future would be decided within one year from the date of the agreement, the relationship between Indonesia and the Dutch further deteriorated. Indonesian demands for incorporation of West Papua into the republic were opposed on the ground that the people of West Papua had little in common with the Indonesians in terms of ethnicity, culture, and tradition. This reaction was interpreted by Jakarta as a threat to its sovereignty. Jakarta increased diplomatic pressure on the Dutch, using the anti-Western colonial card to gain support from African, Middle Eastern and Asian countries. Jakarta's resentment was further expressed in the seizing of Dutch properties on the island of Java and the deportation of Dutch citizens from Indonesia. The announced commitment to decolonisation was also a face-saving response in particular to the anti-Western feeling that was manifested in declarations of the Non-Aligned Movement.

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<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>21</sup> Djopari, *op.cit.*:29

<sup>22</sup> In an interview with ABC Radio National in Sydney, Arian Brand gave Mark Worth his own eyewitness account of the decolonisation process and said that his government was not serious. It was only a manipulative exercise. If they had indeed been serious, West Papua would have already achieved independence a long time ago (Radio Australia, Sydney, 29 July 1999).

Finally, the change of policy was designed to maintain Dutch colonial control over West Papua by creating an image among the Papuans of the Dutch as liberators. As with France in Kanaky (New Caledonia) today, the Dutch considered Nieuw Guinea as part of Holland, but located abroad; in reality they did not foresee the territory becoming an independent state. The Dutch argued that the Papuans were not ready to govern themselves, and that time was needed to educate and train them. In fact, the Dutch had ignored education and training during their 134 years of colonial rule in West Papua.

The lack of commitment to their Papuan territory by the Dutch may be seen from the episode of the so-called the Luns Plan. Dr Joseph Luns, a former Dutch foreign minister, submitted a four-stage decolonisation plan to the 15th General Assembly of the UN in 1960,<sup>23</sup> as an alternative to a proposal that was submitted by Indonesia and India. The Luns Plan stipulated that, first, there must be regulations that guaranteed the rights of self-determination and independence of the people of West Papua; second, there must be definite wishes to constitute a government with agreement of the UN; third, in relation to the definite wishes, full political recognition would be given; and, finally, the Dutch would continue to finance social development programs to a high standard.

The Luns Plan envisaged the creation of a United Nations Trusteeship in West Papua, with the eventual goal of independence.<sup>24</sup> The General Assembly would not endorse the Plan, however, as it was generally

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<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*:35-36.

<sup>24</sup> Howard P. Jones (1971). *Indonesia: The Possible Dream - A Distinguished Statesman Describes the Dramatic Emergence of a Newly Independent and Significant Nation*, New York, p. 198.

seen as an attempt by Holland to perpetuate colonial rule in West Papua. The governments of Australia, USA and thirteen African French ex-colonies led by Cameroon rejected the Plan, suggesting that the principle of self-determination and independence should be upheld, as stipulated in the UN Charter and Convention on Human Rights.<sup>25</sup> Arian Brand, a former public servant in Netherlands Nieuw Guinea who witnessed the Act, argued that the Netherlands had a deep attachment to West Papua not only as its own territory but also on the social-cultural and racial arguments that the population was totally different from the rest of Indonesia.<sup>26</sup>

#### **3.4.2. Divided Views among West Papuans**

As well as the differences between the Dutch and Indonesians, the Papuan community was itself divided between pro-Indonesia, pro-Dutch and what Djopari has called pro-independence factions. The first supported the Sukarno regime and believed that integration into Indonesia would be the best political solution, in the expectation that Indonesia would grant independence in the future. This view was manifested in the political party known as *Suara Rakyat* (Voice of People), led by Lukas Rumkorem in Biak. The movement was inspired by the Koreri cult, whose supporters believed that supernatural powers (the spirit of ancestors) would bring glory and prosperity to the society. They assumed that, like the material goods given by their colonial masters, independence would be given to West Papuans by Indonesia. The primary initial objective of this materialist movement was not, as many people believed, the independence of Nieuw Guinea, but improvements in the local social conditions of the people on the island where the Rumkorem clan ruled. But later, notably during the era of

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<sup>25</sup> Peter Morris (1978). *Australia and the West New Guinea Dispute 1949-1962*. University of NSW, Sydney, pp.105-110.

<sup>26</sup> Arian Brand (April 1997), interviewed by the ABC, Sydney.

confrontation (*Konfrontasi*) the movement became more politically oriented and played a crucial role in the process of integrating West Papua into Indonesia.

Like the Suara Rakyat, two other political parties, Komite Indonesia Merdeka (KIM) and Partai Kemerdekaan Indonesia Irian (PKII), which were initiated by pro-Indonesian groups in Hollandia (Jayapura) and Serui, wanted West Papua incorporated into Indonesia. As a result of an effective propaganda campaign, one third of the West Papuan population, notably the people of Biak, Serui, coastal Sorong and Jayapura, became active supporters of these movements, and anti-Dutch and pro-independence sentiment was widespread. Subsequently, many leaders of the pro-Indonesian group were arrested and sentenced to long periods of imprisonment.

Human rights abuses and a feeling of Asian brotherhood encouraged members of the various movements to seek new alliances. The Sukarno regime, which was campaigning to take over West Papua, welcomed these internal divisions in the struggle to destroy Dutch colonialism in West Papua. Before the military occupation occurred, Jakarta sent its own military and political agents into the country. In the presence of these pro-Indonesian groups, the underground network was extended. As an expression of Jakarta's gratitude for the excellent work done by pro-Indonesian groups, Seth Rumkorem, the son of Lukas Rumkorem, for example, was given free education in the military academy in Bandung, West Java, even though he did not meet physical and academic requirements. During his period at the military academy, Rumkorem was elected vice chairman XVII of the Communist Party (XVII was the status of

Irian Jaya Province). Seth Rumkorem's father, Lukas Rumkorem, was promoted to Major Titular of Indonesian Marine Forces.<sup>27</sup>

In contrast, pro-Papua groups wanted West Papua to become an independent state. They were divided into two groups: those who sought cooperation with the Dutch and those who opposed cooperation with the Dutch.<sup>28</sup> The first group cooperated with the Dutch in the hope that the Dutch would uphold their promises and that by 1970 West Papua would be independent. Like the pro-Indonesian group, this group became dependent on external help. The pro-Dutch group established *Gerakan Persatuan Nieuw Guinea* (GPNG) under the leadership of educated Papuans such as Nicolaus Youwe, Markus Kaisiepo, John Eriks and Baldus Mofu. When the Dutch were defeated, most leaders of this group, including Nicolaus Youwe and Markus Kaisiepo, left the country and sought political asylum in the Netherlands, hoping that an international campaign could be intensified under sponsorship of the Dutch government. For this purpose, *Komite Persiapan Kemerdekaan Papua Barat* (KPKPB), chaired by Nin Youwe who was assisted by Markus Kaisiepo, the most prominent Papuan leaders at the time, established its new operational base in Holland. The relocation of the leaders was criticised by the new generation, who called themselves the *Generation of '69*, for leaving the country and abdicating responsibility. But a former member of Nieuw Guinea Raad dissented. According to Wim Zonggonau, it was important for the movement to maintain the security of its leaders. The logic behind the decision was explained in the following words:

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<sup>27</sup> Nicolaus Youwe (1 July 1981). *Sejarah Perjuangan Dua Generasi Rumkorem Supaya Memasukkan Papua Barat Tanpa Syarat Kedalam Republik Indonesia*, Pemka/Hollandia, pp.3-14.

<sup>28</sup> Djopari, *op.cit.*:39.

In a committee meeting in 1961, we discussed a few important points, regarding mobilisation of people and the urgent need of a declaration of Independence. But we faced deadlock. The majority agreed to accept the New York Agreement in order not to upset the Dutch. One reason was the promises that were made by the Queen of The Netherlands that her government would not leave West Papua and would have a strong commitment to defend the country at any cost. This political statement of the Queen created a strong impression among the Papuans. This was the basic reason why leaders such as Youwe and Kaisiepo trusted too much the Dutch. We also discussed the security of the leaders. The committee decided that prominent leaders—Youwe and Kaisiepo—should leave the country and establish a new diplomatic base in Holland, hoping that the government of the Dutch would uphold its promises, supporting their work. But in reality, the Dutch government has done nothing so far.<sup>29</sup>

In Holland, Youwe was elected chairman of the KPKPB, Markus Kaisiepo vice chairman, and Jufuay, Decky Kerewa, Manusway, Henk Inggamer, Zacky Zawor, David Hindom, Ben Tanggahma and Herman Womsiwor were members. Their hopes of intensifying the campaign, however, were never met; the government of Holland was reluctant to help them. In West Papua, the KPKPB was abolished when Indonesia took control of the country.

The non-cooperation groups believed in self-help and argued that any fundamental political change in West Papua required that the Papuans themselves make a strong commitment and have an effective political strategy. These groups were represented by two influential political parties: *Partai Nasional* (PARNA), headed by Herman Wayoi, and *Nasional Partai Papua* (NPP), headed by Nicolaas Tanggahma, a former member of the Nieuw Guinea Raad. The NPP represented Catholic political interests dominant in the southern and highlands parts of West Papua, while PARNA was based in Protestant-dominated areas in the north. These parties

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<sup>29</sup> Wim Zonggonau (18 January 1997), interviewed by the author, Port Moresby.

played an important role during the transition period, mobilising the people and organising an underground network to boycott the Act of Free Choice in 1969. In cooperation with churches and politicians, the organisations planned to have meetings with the central government of Indonesia and its special representative to West Papua, Sudjarwo, to discuss the proposed *Pemungutan Pendapat Rakyat* (PEPERA) (plebiscite). These organisations suggested that the Papuan leaders in exile, Jouwe and Kaisiepo, be brought in to discuss the issue of West Papua and how the plebiscite could be implemented. Concerning the crucial need for talks, members of the provincial parliament submitted a petition to Ortiz-Sanz, the special representative of the UN during the PEPERA. In response, the parliament was abolished and the people of West Papua were never given a chance to discuss the issue with the government of Indonesia.<sup>30</sup>

This division of people on the basis of their political convictions was the first sign of weakness of the Papuan community in the liberation struggle, and it was used by Indonesia to further its own political and strategic interests.

### **3.5. Military Confrontation 1961-1962**

As mentioned above, the internationalisation of the issue of West Papua posed a serious political threat for Indonesia's strategic interests in West Papua. Jakarta's attempts to gain political support at the UN's General Assembly were repeatedly defeated, challenging the logic behind the territorial claim. West Papuan claims were supported by most newly independent African states of the Brazzaville and Casablanca groups. The Sukarno regime attempted to persuade newly-elected American President

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<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, interview.

Kennedy and his counterpart in Canberra, but neither Washington nor Canberra wanted to embarrass their longstanding ally, the Dutch. On the other hand, Washington and Canberra had strategic interests in the South Pacific. Indonesia, with one of the biggest Communist parties in the world, could have posed a real danger to Western interests in the region. The Western interests were already under threat, following their loss of influence in North Korea and Vietnam and the emergence of the Communist movement in the Philippines. Washington's concern over these developments was exacerbated when the Sukarno regime sought military and financial support from the Soviet Union and China. In January 1961, General Nasution, who led the arms mission to Moscow as Armed Forces Commander, came back with \$400 million of arms; this represented a substantial increase in power for the Indonesian armed forces.<sup>31</sup>

Thus strengthened, Indonesia increased military pressure on the Dutch in early 1961. The Sukarno regime mobilised the masses and declared *Tri Komando Rakyat* (Trihora or Three People's Commands) on 19 December 1961 in Jogjakarta. The declaration abolished the state of West Papua created by the Dutch, authorised the raising of the Red and White flag of Indonesia in Irian Barat, and urged people to be ready to participate in a general mobilisation in order to defend national independence, unity and the people.<sup>32</sup> President Sukarno declared war against the Dutch over West Papua in 1962. More than 75,000 troops, who were stationed in Ambon, the capital city of the Moluccas, supported by warships bought on credit from Eastern Europe<sup>33</sup> launched attacks on Dutch military bases in West Papua, particularly on the southern coast. Considerable number of the Indonesian

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<sup>31</sup> Jones, *op.cit.*:189-190.

<sup>32</sup> Djopari, *op.cit.*:37.

<sup>33</sup> Brian May (1978). *The Indonesian Tragedy*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, p.165.

paratroops were dropped not only in the coastal and urban cities but also in the interior areas. The operation went quickly and smoothly, partly because an information and intelligence network had already been established ten years previously before the actual military annexation occurred. This was in part due to the work of pro-Indonesian Papuan groups, such as KIM and PKII (which are generally known as *Gerakan Merah Putih* (GMP)). The Dutch forces consisted of a West Papuan Battalion (Kasoari Battalion), prepared by the Dutch as an integral part of its Papuanization program, and Dutch air, marine and land forces equipped with modern arms. But the Dutch could not defend themselves from the attack once the Western allies had shifted their support to Indonesia. Like the Japanese and the USA, Australia refused to assist and its harbours were denied to Dutch cargo ships. The position of the Dutch deteriorated, leading to a deadlock. But the most humiliated people were the people of West Papua, because their rights were denied and their future became uncertain.

### **3.6. The Politics of Denial**

The rapid gain of communist influences in Indonesia, notably through the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), the second largest Communist party in the world after China, and the strong commitment of Jakarta to gain political control over West Papua at any cost, alarmed Washington and Canberra. Such developments were seen as a threat to regional stability and security, and, most importantly, as undermining the hegemonic power of the USA and its Western allies in the South Pacific. Washington did not want a repetition of the Vietnam and Korean wars in the South Pacific. Canberra and Washington therefore turned away from the Dutch and gave their support to the Sukarno regime. Washington argued:

At all events, the US did not want to immerse itself in a war with Indonesia over 700,000 Papuans and nothing else. The war would be unwinnable for both sides and would involve the Soviets. On every count, the costs were too high to contemplate backing the Dutch with troops.<sup>34</sup>

These international actors considered regional security more important than the right of the Papuans to form an independent state. The USA, one-time champion of democracy and opponent of colonialism, abandoned these values when its interests in Asia and Pacific regions were in danger. Washington handed over responsibility to its ambassador to the UN, Ellsworth Bunker, who acted as special ambassador for the Acting Secretary General in formulating a document, referred to as the Bunker Plan, which posed an alternative plan to the Dutch and Indian proposals. Unlike the Dutch proposal, which favoured the Papuans (with some reservations), the Bunker Plan attempted to create a balance of interests between Indonesia, the Dutch and the Papuans. But it failed. In fact, Washington had already chosen sides, favouring Indonesia.

In order to present the USA as a world champion of democracy, liberty and peace, Washington played a mediating role in the conflict. Based on the Bunker Plan, the New York Agreement (NYA) was signed on 15 August 1962 between the Dutch, Indonesia and the USA; the Papuans, the subject of the conflict, were excluded. The twenty-nine articles of the Agreement satisfied Indonesia, the USA and Australia; the Dutch suffered the pains of growing isolation. These political manipulations and the reluctance to take a humanistic approach, in the name of regional political stability and security, were the starting point of political alienation for the Papuans.

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<sup>34</sup> Morris, *op.cit.*: 110-111.

The future of West Papua was decided by the New York Agreement, not by the later Act of Free Choice (AFC) in 1969, as many people believe. The Agreement transferred political power from the colonial power, the Dutch, to a new colonial power, Indonesia, through direct pressure from the Kennedy government of the USA and contrary to UN Resolution 1514-X, which says:

Sovereignty in a colony or in a non self-governing territory does not lie in the hand of the colonial power, or in the hand of an administrative authority, but in the hand of the people of this colony.<sup>35</sup>

The same resolution states that sovereignty over a colonised territory is not transferable by the colonial power to another power. All power must be returned by the colonialist to the native people of each territory. Here the transfer of power from the Netherlands to Indonesia made a mockery of the UN Charter and General Assembly resolutions against colonialism.

Let us examine the provisions of the Agreement. In the first place, the Papuans were not allowed to express their views; their future was decided by three actors, the Dutch, Indonesia and the USA. The patronising attitudes of those actors reflected their views about the political culture of the Papuans, whom they saw as people still living in the "stone age". But under the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article: 6): "Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law".<sup>36</sup> Even if the Papuans were indeed so "primitive", this article gives the Papuans the right to participate in any agreement affecting their status. Articles 2, 7, 8, 9, 12 and 13

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<sup>35</sup> Hassan, *op.cit.*:8.

<sup>36</sup> The United Nations Department of Public Information (1986). *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, New York, p.8.

of the Agreement also denied those fundamental human rights by giving Indonesia control over West Papua<sup>37</sup> and making it impossible for the Papuans to protest against the injustice. Articles 2 and 12 provided that power would be transferred from the Dutch to the United Nations Temporary Authority (UNTEA) and in turn to Indonesia at "any time". This was clearly contrary to UN Resolution No:1514-XV. Furthermore, Article 7 denied Papuan rights to political power and replaced the Papuans in the military and police forces with Indonesians. Most importantly, Article 18 denied the international convention of a "one-person-one vote" plebiscite and allowed the use of *Musyawarah* (consultation)<sup>38</sup> in the Act of Free Choice of 1969, on the basis that the Papuans were not ready to adopt international practice. Finally, Article 16 limited the role of the UN to advice, participation and assistance, denying it responsibility for organising the plebiscite, which was entrusted instead to the new colonial power, Indonesia. Again, this was in contravention of the UN's Charter XI, where Articles 73-74 of the Declaration Regarding Non-Self Governing Territories give the UN responsibility for and control over the administration of territories which had not yet attained a full measure of self government.<sup>39</sup> Consequently, the Papuans refer to the *Musyawarah* as the Act of No Choice.

Thus, West Papua was sold out in the interests of regional stability, and in the eyes of the Papuans the UN lost its credibility. The UN was seen

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<sup>37</sup> William Henderson (1973). *West New Guinea, the Dispute and Its Settlement*, Seton Hall University Press, pp. 253-260.

<sup>38</sup> *Musyawarah* was normally used in traditional Javanese society to gather public opinion rather than to take decisions. The term "*Musyawarah*" (consultation) is also not the same as *Mufakat* (consensus), that is taking a decision on the basis of a consensus. Consultation does not necessarily produce a decision, but is part of the process of decision-making.

<sup>39</sup> Department of Public Information of the United Nations (1945). "Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice", San Francisco, pp.37-39.

simply as a servant of powerful states and transnational companies. The situation became worse even before the Act of Free Choice occurred, particularly following the introduction of the Anti-Subversion Law No 11, 1963.<sup>40</sup> This law denied all Papuans' rights. Presidential Decree No 8, 1963 banned the Papuan rights to freedom of expression, association, demonstration, publication and movement. This contravened Article XXII/1 of the Agreement which said:

The UNTEA and Indonesia will guarantee fully the rights, including the rights of free speech, freedom of movement and of assembly of inhabitants of the area. These rights will include the existing rights of the inhabitants of the territory at the time of the transfer of administration to the UNTEA.<sup>41</sup>

During the eight months of the UNTEA administration, the Papuans were haunted by fear, intimidation, torture, execution and uncertainty. When the Indonesian government took control over West Papua, the process of Indonesianization of all aspects of life immediately started. West Papua was immediately renamed "Irian Barat" and then "Irian Jaya"; the city of Hollandia, which Papuans called Port Numbay, was renamed Kota Baru (New Town), and then Sukarnopura, and finally Jayapura. The name of Papua was forbidden and only the use of the new name "Irian" was permitted. The mountain Nemang Kawi (the Papuan name), which previously was Carstensz Peak, was renamed Sukarno Peak. Human rights abuses were widespread in every corner of the country. Freedom of movement, freedom of association, and rights to demonstration were all restricted, and publications were censored. Freedom of movement was restricted by introducing the "*Kartu Penduduk*" (travel pass) system, like that used in South Africa during Apartheid. The Nieuw Guinea Raad was

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<sup>40</sup> Budiardjo and Liong, *op.cit.*:24-25.

<sup>41</sup> Henderson, *op.cit.*:258.

replaced by an appointed Regional Assembly. Student and military organisations were banned. The Papuans' national symbols, political parties, the Nieuw Guinea Raad, the Papuan Battalion and police forces, and the Dutch educational system, were all dissolved. The Papuan elite in the public service and the defence forces and also the UNTEA personnel were rapidly replaced by Indonesians. Properties left by the Dutch were appropriated and transferred to Indonesia. The functions of the "peace keeping force" (mostly from Pakistan) were systematically taken over by the Indonesian military and police.

The fifty Papuan members of parliament were reduced to sixteen members.<sup>42</sup> After dissolving the Nieuw Guinea Raad, Indonesia established nine "representative councils" whose members were appointed. The selection of consultative assembly representatives was regulated by government Decree number 31, 1969 which stated that

Members of the consultative assemblies were to be chosen through *musyawarah*. The same decree said that members of the representative councils who were appointed and not elected would automatically become members of the consultative assemblies.<sup>43</sup>

Three requests were submitted to the government of Indonesia. The first two were made by members of the Nieuw Guinea Council under the leadership of Nicolaus Tanggahma, member of Nieuw Guinea Raad, and Herman Wayoi of PARNA. Following a Congress decision of September 1962, they urged that the UNTEA should respect the national flag and anthem of West Papua and that the plebiscite should be held in 1963 during the UNTEA's period of authority. The third request came from Ortiz-Sanz

<sup>42</sup> Peter Savage (1984). *Irian Jaya Reluctant Colony in Politics in the Pacific Islands*, University of South Pacific, Suva, p.11.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*:12.

on 29 April 1969, urging a general amnesty for the opposition. All these proposals were rejected on the ground that an uprising in Paniai would influence a decision. Ortiz-Sanz also requested that the government allow the opposition to express its views; this too was ignored.<sup>44</sup>

The primary objective of these attempts was to allow for a fair outcome of the plebiscite. However, Jakarta had a different agenda. For Jakarta, the purpose of the plebiscite was to create a good image; the real transfer of power had already been decided by the New York Agreement on 15 August 1962. As Jakarta knew that a "yes" vote was assured, the plebiscite was not regarded seriously. The UN representative had no power over the consultative assembly, which was held from 10 July (in Merauke) to 2 August 1969 (in Sukarnapura [Jayapura]). As result of manipulation, intimidation, killing, and bribery, all of the 1,026 appointed "consultative representatives" confirmed the ties with Indonesia; all of them, without exception, publicly supported the decision made in the New York Agreement to bring West Papua into a new era of colonialism. When the decision was announced, many Papuans were disappointed and decided to leave the country. One of the victims was Otto Ondawame who witnessed the final stage of the Act on 2 August 1969. He spoke with freelance journalist Mark Worth in April 1997, expressing his painful experiences in the following words:

At the last day of the PEPERA that was held in Jayapura on 2 August 1969, I stood among a crowd in the front of the Governor's Palace in Jayapura. Like the others, I was not allowed to stand nearby where the vote took place. Despite this restriction, I could see from far away how the vote process was conducted. The "representatives" put their hands up, indicating "yes" or "no" to the questions concerning the future of West Papua. None of them said 'No' to integration to Indonesia. There was not any secret

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<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*:13.

ballot system that allowed voters to express their real feelings. Like the other witnesses, I became very sad and could not hold back my tears because it was the future of West Papua that has been decided in favour of Indonesia and the rights of Papuans denied.<sup>45</sup>

The passing of the Act was a great political setback for the Papuans. Many people attempted to persuade the UN representative that it was not legitimate. More than 179 petitions expressed discontent over the conduct of the Act and complained of ill treatment. The petitions and letters contained criticisms, complaints, and requests to release political prisoners, and demanded participation in the Act by all Papuans. For the UN, this was a major political and diplomatic failure. Even though the credibility of the UN was at stake, the UN representative could do little but act as an observer, as Article 16 of the Act stipulated.

In his report to the General Secretary of the UN, Dr U. Thant, Ortiz Sanz expressed his concern about the outcome of the Act in the following words:

I regret to have to express my reservation regarding the implementation of Article XXII of the Agreement, relating to 'the rights, including the rights of free speech, freedom of movement and of assembly of the inhabitants of the area'. In spite of my constant efforts, this important provision was not fully implemented and the (Indonesian) Administration exercised at all times a tight political control over the population.<sup>46</sup>

This manipulation of the Act of Free Choice to annex West Papua shocked the world community, particularly the newly independent countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, whose leaders such as President Kwame

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<sup>45</sup> Otto Ondawame (16 May 1997), interviewed by Mark Worth, freelance journalist, Sydney.

<sup>46</sup> Budiardjo and Liong, *op.cit.*:32. See also Brian May (1978) *The Indonesian Tragedy*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, Chapter 5.

Nkrumah of Ghana, President Nasser of Egypt and President Patrice Lumumba of the Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire) had agreed at the first Non-Aligned Movement Conference in Bandung not to use military interference against other countries. The thirteen French-speaking African countries of the Brazzaville Group, later joined by the Monrovia Group (Ghana, Togo, Benin, Guinea, Liberia, Burkina Faso and Zambia) and Egypt, adopted the Brazzaville Resolution, which condemned the Indonesian occupation and called for bilateral negotiations and international support for the cause of the people in West Papua. In a challenging speech to the UN General Assembly, Ghanaian Ambassador to the UN, Mr Akwei referred to the injustice of the Act of Free Choice:

We in Africa have suffered politically at the hands of the colonialist in the past who were determined to apply similar methods to our political evolution...These colonialist have used the same arguments that have been used about the people of West Irian...On the basis of such arguments, the Ian Smith regime in Southern Rhodesia has claimed to be able to ascertain the will of the African majority in Southern Rhodesia by consulting the chiefs....<sup>47</sup>

When general secretary of the UN, Dr U. Thant, presented the report of Dr Ortiz-Sanz, the UN special representative to the Act, a group led by Ghana and Togo expressed their dissatisfaction at the conduct, procedure and outcome of the Act and urged a new plebiscite under the international code of conduct and the direct responsibility of the UN. This had little effect on the Assembly; however, despite Indonesia's attempts to get the General Assembly to endorse the outcome of the Act, the General Assembly simply 'Took Note' of the report, as Appendix No: 01, including the complaints and reservations made by the UN special mission. The UN has never endorsed

<sup>47</sup> Gavan Breen (1979). "West Papua: A Call for Help—the History from 1945 to 1962", Social Justice Group of Our Lady of the Sacred Heart Catholic Parish, Alice Springs, p.9.

the outcome of the Act nor recognised West Papua as an integral part of Indonesia. A broader debate on the report was thus excluded. Czerapowicz, who made a comparative study of Leticia in Colombia and West Papua, concluded that the UN failed its obligation in the case of West Papua, from start to end.<sup>48</sup>

For West Papuans, the United Nations completely lost its reliability in 1969 and is no longer a trusted body in the eyes of the Papuans. Only by reopening the case can the trust of the people be restored. Reopening the case in the UN is still possible, because "taking note" of the report of the UN special representative does not amount to ratification by the General Assembly. The UN knew that the whole procedure and outcome of the Act was wrong in terms of its own principles. More important was the protest made by ambassadors of the 15 African countries. The issue of West Papua is still open, and needs to be reexamined.

### 3.7. Conclusion

Historically, the people of West Papua have inhabited the island of "New Guinea" for many thousands of years and have developed their own unique culture and tradition which have nothing culturally in common with the cultures of the Indonesian peoples. Since the first Asian and European explorers arrived in the country West Papua has systematically been subject to oppression, resource exploitation, and unwanted foreign cultural influences. One positive impact of Dutch colonial rule was the emergence of Papuan nationalism, which developed with the decolonisation and recolonisation processes that took place in the early 1960s. On the other

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<sup>48</sup> John Vincent Czerapowicz (1972). *International Territorial Authority: Leticia and West New Guinea*, Phd Thesis, Indiana University, Indiana, pp. 226-229.

hand, the forcible imposition of Western and Indonesian cultural forms, in such areas as language, dress, school system and way of thinking, have posed a serious threat to Papuan cultures.

The divide-and-rule policies deployed by both colonial powers impacted on the political convictions of the Papuans during the transition period of the 1950s and 1960s. Divisions between pro-Dutch and pro-Indonesian groups within Papuan society reflected the empty promises of the Dutch and the Indonesians. The ultimate lack of commitment by the Dutch was evident in their reluctance to continue to support the West Papuan leaders in the Netherlands in their campaign for self-determination.

The violation of the rights of the people of West Papua, including the rights to self-determination and independence, in the 1960s ran totally counter to international principles on human rights. The rights of the people were denied for the sake of maintaining regional and international stability. The case of West Papua demonstrates that democracy means little when the interests of the superpowers are endangered. The USA claims to be a champion of human rights and liberty, yet in the context of Cold War politics it forced the Dutch to transfer West Papua to Indonesia by the New York Agreement in 1962. Quite simply, the people of West Papua have, without their consent, paid a very high price for the interests of regional stability and security.

The USA and its Western allies empowered the UNTEA administration and left it to implement the so-called Act of Free Choice in 1969. As a result of this shameful Act, the rights of Papuans to self-determination were denied. The United Nations and its member states

failed to address the West Papuan issue in the terms of international laws and conventions, and the resolutions of the UN General Assembly regarding the rights of peoples. Although the main external actors achieved their aims, the outcome was a severe setback for the future of the people of West Papua. The failure of the Dutch and American governments and the United Nations to consult the people of West Papua regarding the proposed transfer of political power was a serious dereliction of responsibility and marked the beginning of a new era of colonisation.

While the chances of reopening an international debate about the future of West Papua may seem unlikely in the post-Cold War era, it might be possible, if the democratic process takes root in Indonesia, for Papuans to express their desire for independence. The use of international legal mechanisms, such as an appeal to the International Court of Justice in Den Haag, is an alternative, but West Papua is not internationally recognised as a nation-state with rights to sue other nation-states, and the sponsorship of another state would thus seem to be essential.

The rule of the Indonesian government has been no better than that of the previous Dutch government. It has continued the pattern of colonial practices with a difference face. Despite the continued denial of their rights, the people of West Papua, coordinated by the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM), have continued to pursue their claims to self-determination. However, the OPM has not yet been able to achieve its national goals. The reasons for this failure will be examined in the following chapter which analyses the strengths and weaknesses of the OPM from an historical perspective.



## Chapter Four: The History of the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM)

### 4.1. Introduction

Having considered the basis for the growth of national sentiment in West Papua, it is now necessary to examine the role of the OPM as the national organisation which transformed this national sentiment into action.

A successful organisation must have such characteristics as: managerial ability, skill and knowledge; coherence; clear aims and objectives; vision; programs, strategies and action plans; and most importantly a clear structure and good leadership with well defined areas of accountability.<sup>1</sup>

Good leadership, according to Andrew Leigh, is demonstrated when “people with certain motives and purposes mobilise resources so as to arouse, engage and satisfy the motives of followers”.<sup>2</sup> A leader should have a clear sense of direction; an ability to involve the whole organisation; a willingness to encourage, initiate, and take risks; tolerance; a management style, and should place emphasis on teamwork.<sup>3</sup> Personal ability is important in influencing others through a persuasive magic, but it needs to be supplemented by good communication, and personal influence.

Leaders gain their positions by various means, including birth, performance, influence and appointment; so, too, there are many types of leadership. According to Maxwell, four main types of leaders occur in the

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<sup>1</sup> John C. Maxwell (1993). *Developing the Leader Within You*, Tomas Nilson Inc., Nashville, Tennessee, p.9.

<sup>2</sup> Andrew Leigh (1988). *Effective Change: Twenty Ways to makes it Happen*, Institute of Personnel Management, Salisbury, p.19.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*:19.

modern organisation: the leading leader, the learned leader, the latent leader and the limited leader.<sup>4</sup> The first is characterised by natural leadership qualities from early in life; by becoming a leadership model throughout his or her life, by enhancing leadership skills through training, and by exercising self-discipline. The second type of leader displays the same characteristics as the first but, not being born with leadership qualities, he has to acquire them deliberately. In the third type of leadership, a person starts as a role model and then takes on leadership; the final type achieves leadership through personal ambition and drive. Modern leadership requires personal ability, self-discipline, good attitudes, a clear sense of direction, a charismatic and strong personality, and the ability to conceptualise goals and strategies.

A successful organisation must have a well structured working system, in which all tasks and lines of responsibility are well defined and organised. Most modern organisational structures have both vertical and horizontal dimensions. In a vertical structure, the role of each subordinate sector is organised on a top-down and bottom-up basis, providing a two-way communication system. All decisions are made at the top and passed down to the next level and so on to the local level; it is expected that feedback will be returned from the bottom, through the various levels, to the top. In the OPM, for example, the Political Bureau of the National Executive Council (NEC) acts as an executive committee, providing directives, plans and coordination to regional executive councils which, in turn, direct the district executive councils and so on down to the village councils. The vertical system is in principle straightforward and highly bureaucratic; it has the advantage that it protects the secrecy of the organisation. On the other hand,

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<sup>4</sup> Maxwell, *op.cit.*:ix.

this approach has potential disadvantages: it can become too bureaucratic, requiring excessive time to formulate and execute plans; it can also create gaps between one level and another; and it typically suffers from a lack of mass participation in the decision-making process. Additionally, the highly centralised authority means that regional units have very little influence in their own local affairs. Such weaknesses have been evident in the OPM structure.

In a horizontal structure, by contrast, decisions at the top are arrived at by reference to appropriate committees or sectors lineally. One of the advantages of this structure is that it provides wider opportunities to engage in mass political discussion at various levels and to provide feedback based on collective opinion. Decisions become a collective responsibility. On the other hand, the system also has disadvantages, including delays in the decision process because of the time taken in consultation and opinion gathering.

In the following, the OPM will be examined from an historical perspective and leadership and organisational factors will be assessed in relation to the changing political environment in which the OPM has operated. The primary objectives are to investigate the working relationship between the political and military councils and the regional commands; to show the link between the OPM's expansion in the past and the current guerrilla campaigns; to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the OPM organisation; to trace the growth of nationalist sentiment; and to indicate the difficulties of achieving national unity and reconciliation. Finally, I attempt to show how the OPM might, by reflecting on its past experiences

and mistakes, engage in a constructive redevelopment of its organisation in a rapidly changing political and socio-economic context.

For the purposes of this analysis, the history of the OPM can usefully be divided into four main periods:

1. 1965-1970: the origins of the OPM.
2. 1971-1975: declaration of independence and provisional government.
3. 1976-1990: leadership split and its political and military implications.
4. 1990-1999: the OPM in the "New Order".

#### **4.2. The Origins of the OPM (1965-1970)**

West Papuans have resisted foreign occupation as far back as the eleventh and twelfth centuries, when slave traders were already operating in the region.

During the Dutch colonial period, Papuan resistance against the colonial power can be traced back to the period before World War II, when anti-colonialism was often associated with millenarian tendencies<sup>5</sup> in many parts of West Papua. One example of this type of resistance was the "Koreri movement" on the island of Biak. This movement first arose to demand improvement of social conditions, but it became politically oriented. Proto-nationalist groups in Biak declared "independence" and raised a West New Guinea flag in 1942 during the Japanese occupation.<sup>6</sup> The movement was immediately crushed and the leaders were arrested and imprisoned, but inspired other movements to action in years to come.

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<sup>5</sup> Ron J. May (1991). "Sources of External Support for the West Papua Movement" in K.M. de Silva and Ron J. May (eds), *Internationalisation of Ethnic Conflict*, ICEC, London. p.150.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*:160.

Resistance against foreign occupation forces has intensified during the period of Indonesian colonisation since 1965, through the activities of the OPM. The recent widespread protests in urban centres such as Abepura, Jayapura, Timika and Jakarta, and the intensification of guerrilla campaigns in the 1990s, refute Jakarta's claim that the OPM has been crushed.

#### **4.2.1. The Birth of the OPM**

The exclusion of the Papuans from the New York Agreement in 1962, which led to the abandonment of the decolonisation process promised by the Dutch, severely upset the Papuan people. The consequent feelings of frustration, mounting discontent over ill-treatment, discrimination and political domination, and, most importantly, broader desires for self-determination and independence in West Papua, culminated in the Manokwari military uprising of 1965. Soldiers who deserted from the Papuan Battalion (known as Battalion Kasuari), hundreds of employees of the departments of forestry and agriculture, and 14,000 militia, led by two brothers, Lodwick and Barren Mandatjan, attacked the Kebar military and police posts on 26 July 1965 during a flag-raising ceremony, and declared an independent Papuan State.

This event became known as the Kebar Uprising. Two days later, on 28 July 1965, 400 armed men led by Ferry Awom attacked the ABRI outpost of Infantry Battalion 641 in Arfak, Manokwari. Applying hit and run tactics, the attackers vanished, having laid homemade mines, and waged psychological warfare. They seized 1,000 arms as well as destroying the military and police posts. These events are regarded as the first significant activities of the *Organisasi Papua Merdeka* (OPM), a name given by the occupation forces to any organisation in West Papua that had secessionist

ideas;<sup>7</sup> later they were referred to as 'terrorist organisations' or 'wild terrorist gangs', Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan (GPK).

Despite this, Djopari has claimed that the OPM was born of political perceptions created by Terianus Aronggear. Djopari presents a diagram of the organisational structure of the OPM, and an action plan.<sup>8</sup> But this analysis has been strongly criticised by many observers. Rex Rumakiek, for example, states firmly that such a name and organisational structure did not exist at that time (except, perhaps, as an abstract concept).<sup>9</sup> The truth is that the OPM was born out of the Papuans' national aspirations, not in the aftermath of Dutch colonial rule, as the Indonesian government claims. As discussed elsewhere, the Dutch had agreed to start the decolonisation process in the 1960s and had accepted new national symbols, such as an anthem, flag and parliamentary structure, as presented by the National Preparatory Council for Independence of West Papua. While the motivation for such initiatives is questionable, I would argue that they played a crucial role in encouraging the organisation of Papuan nationalism.

The emergence of West Papuan nationalism, and the guerrilla attacks in the Manokwari district, threatened the position of the Indonesian occupation forces. Jakarta did not want the history of RMS in the Moluccas, PERMESTA in north Sulawesi, and PRRI in Aceh-Sumatra in the 1950s to be repeated in West Papua. Deploying the Operasi Kesadaran (Consciousness Operation) program and using a "persuasive approach", the ABRI launched its first counter-insurgency operation against the OPM at Manokwari in

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<sup>7</sup> J. MacDougall (25 September 1995). "Sebuah Cita-cita dari Hutan Irian", *Apakabar Daily Newspapers*, Jakarta.

<sup>8</sup> Djopari, *op.cit.*:101-105.

<sup>9</sup> Rex Rumakiek (1998), interviewed by the author, Sydney.

August 1965. Under the command of Brigadier General Sarwo Edhie, the KODAM XVII Trikora of Irian Jaya (1965-69) attacked the area from air, land and sea. There were heavy civilian casualties and much damage to property. By the end of 1967, more than 3,000 village people had been killed. Quoting from Brian May, an AFP correspondent who covered the 1969 "Act of Free Choice", Carmel Budiardjo of Tapol says, "the Indonesians gradually wore them down, bombing them, cutting them into isolated groups and starving them from their hiding places".<sup>10</sup> The resistance leaders, including the Mandatjan brothers, were arrested; the Mandatjan brothers were given a Presidential amnesty, and were promoted to major and captain titulars respectively by the ABRI. Two weeks later, Ferry Awom with 800 of his followers surrendered. The fate of Awom is not clear to this day, but Papuans believe he was executed and his body thrown into the sea. One year later the corpses of the Mandatjan brothers were also found in mysterious circumstances in Jayapura.

The life of the early resistance movement was very short, and the reasons for its demise have been sharply contested. Independent observers argue that both internal and external factors were crucial in its collapse. Internally, the movement was largely a spontaneous expression of anti-Indonesian sentiment, and not well organised. The lack of an organisational structure, committed leadership and political program were serious weaknesses. Military leadership came mostly from the former Papuan Battalion, who had very little knowledge of politics or strategic issues. Equally, except for John Ariks, a former elementary school teacher and the only educated man in the Papuan leadership, the political leaders were limited in their capacity to play an influential role. Finally, the lack of a

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<sup>10</sup> Budiardjo and Liong, (1988). *West Papua: the Obliteration of a People*, TAPOL, London, p.20.

political program was a crucial factor in the defeat of the movement. Even though Terianus Aronggear claimed that there was an established political structure, organisation was more illusion than actual structure. Certainly, when leaders were arrested or surrendered to the colonial authority, their replacement was a major concern. Local movements also operated independently, with minimum coordination among regions: for example, Merauke and Sorong regions did not coordinate with Manokwari and vice versa, mainly because of inefficient communication networks. F. Awom's troops in Kebar could not communicate with the Mandatjan guerrilla units in rural areas. Difficulties in the dissemination and exchange of information remained an unsolved problem.

Although the resistance faced a serious setback in the early period, the spirit of the liberation struggle spread rapidly through the region, encouraging political propaganda work throughout the major urban cities and rural areas. The struggle enjoyed very broad mass support among students, peasants, public employees, villagers and workers. Resistance broke out in every corner of the country: in Ayamaru and Teminabuan in Sorong district, in Kokonao, Fakfak and Kaimana in Fakfak district, in Merauke and Biak and other places. In Merauke district, resistance against the occupation forces occurred along the border region. In 1969, Opni Yoku's guerrilla units attacked the ABRI post in Erambu and seized weapons including an AK 47, a Thompson machine gun and pistols; a week later the Jangganbu post was attacked and all the ABRI residents were killed. In retaliation, ABRI attacked villages and guerrilla posts in the region, forcing 1,500 refugees to cross into Papua New Guinea, then still under Australian administration; they were resettled in Morehead in the Western Province of

Papua New Guinea.<sup>11</sup> In Sorong in 1967, the OPM attacked and killed fourteen Indonesian soldiers. In February 1968, guerrilla units attacked two ABRI posts in Makbon and Sausapor of Sorong district; those districts were now fully controlled by the OPM.

The activity of the movement was not limited to the coastal regions but spread to the interior. The most serious resistance of all, outside Manokwari, occurred in the highlands in Enarotali, Paniai district, the home of the Ekagi (Me) people. Revolutionary forces consisting of army, police, workers, public servants and peasants in Wagete, Maunemani and Enarotali were mobilised in support of a boycott of the Act of Free Choice in 1969. The OPM used both traditional weapons (such as bows and arrows) and weapons left over from the Second World War against the sophisticated weapons of ABRI. In a secret plan, political and military leaders of the nine districts agreed to take part in a general strike during the Act proceedings. Seventy-five per cent of Ekagi, Moni and the other Papuans who worked as public officers and policemen participated in this strike. Military and police posts in Enarotali, Monemani, Epouto, Wagete and Mapia and also airstrips were attacked. Under the leadership of the indigenous Me people, Karel Gobai, the District Commissioner of the Paniai district, proclaimed a Free West Papua in February 1969. In Moanemani a large number of people took part in the resistance and attacked the Patrol Post of Komopa, resulting in 11 soldiers being killed and dozens of others seriously wounded. The surviving troops were forced to retreat. The guerrillas also seized more than 500 rifles and 100 boxes of ammunition. Another 800 people attacked Wagete on 1 May 1969, and Indonesian troops suffered heavy casualties. An

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<sup>11</sup> Gerard Tom Ninanti (1987). *Sejarah Perjuangan KODAM V*, Ambotweng, MAKODAM V, Merauke, pp.6-8. (See also Budiardjo and Liong, *op.cit.*:21.

Indonesian officer who led the forces described his own experiences in the following words:

Repeated attacks were launched against our troops every day from 14 July 1969, the numbers involved grew, reaching many thousands of people. It was not until 18th July, when their food had ran out and they had suffered numerous casualties that the spirit to resist began to flag. People who had taken the side of the enemy abandoned their areas of concentration in Aporo valley and returned to their villages.<sup>12</sup>

During the subsequent counter-insurgency measures, widespread and systematic human rights abuses were perpetuated by the ABRI. At the end of 1969, the resistance centres were strafed by aircraft and land attacks were mounted by military reinforcements from Divisions of Pattimura (Ambon), Hassanuddin (Ujung-Pandang) and Diponegoro (Central Java). A considerable number of civilians was killed and their properties destroyed. As in the Manokwari experience, the resistance was crushed and its leaders, including Karel Gobai, were captured and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment.

Alongside this conventional warfare approach, ABRI also used what I call a "social approach", which is any form of unconventional military-dominated approach aimed at genocide against the Papuans. This involves, among other things, poison, injections, intermarriage, immigration, and cultural domination. According to a UN definition, genocide means "any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethical, racial or religious group such as killing members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group,

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<sup>12</sup> Budiardjo and Liong, *op. cit.*:22.

deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part".<sup>13</sup>

In what some authors have described as a deliberate attempt to destroy the Me people, ABRI personnel from Bali introduced a number of pigs infected with tapeworm into the Paniai region. Culturally, as in other highlander communities, pigs have played a significant social role among the Me, not only for nutritional purposes but also in the economy, in trade and in marriage exchange. Fourteen years later it was reported that a considerable number of the Me people had died as a consequence of eating the infected pig flesh.<sup>14</sup> Following a consequent uprising, all local officers, in both public and private sectors, were replaced and a rapid militarisation of the region took place. Jakarta's political victory at the expense of the Papuans led many to question the people's commitment to the ideals of resistance and their capacity to mount a successful resistance campaign, and thus to question the credibility of the entire movement.

The capability of the Paniai movement declined significantly with the arrest of its leaders. The most serious weakness of the OPM was the lack of coordination and cooperation between the seven regions of the country. The OPM activities in Biak Island and in Jayapura, for example, were not coordinated with those in Paniai. While the Me people were waging a liberation war in accordance with the general plan to oppose the Act of Free Choice, the other regions kept silent. In short, resistance actions were merely local expressions of resentment over injustices and in protest against the

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<sup>13</sup> The United Nations (1988). "War Crime and War Crime Against Humanity, Including Genocide" in *A Compilation of International Instruments*, New York, p.143.

<sup>14</sup> See David Hyndman (1986) 'Transcultural tapeworm trafficking: the Indonesian introduction of biological warfare into West Papua', *Fourth World Journal* 1 (6). Also see Budiardjo and Liong, *op. cit.*:59.

transfer of political power from one colonial power (the Dutch) to another (Indonesia). Yet the resistance in the Paniai district was a significant starting point for a realisation of Papuan identity and the spread of Papuan nationalism among the highland peoples.

#### **4.2.2. Destroyed But Not Defeated**

Despite the crushing of these earliest liberation struggles, the OPM continued to grow, attracting support from students, army, police and politicians. During this period, Papuans established underground political networks and mobilised forces in each of the urban centres and in rural areas, and formulated a plan to take coordinated action in boycotting the Act of Free Choice in 1969. Police and military forces in Base G, Parliament House in Port Numbay (Jayapura) and the University of Cenderawasih in Abepura were the focus for underground activities, and the *Front Persiapan Kemerdekaan Papua Barat* (FPKPB) was established to coordinate these activities. There was no longer any hope or trust in the official system; the Papuans now decided to take responsibility into their own hands.

The Dutch government renounced its support for West Papua once its own program had been defeated by the New York Agreement in 1962. Papuan leaders in Holland such as N. Youwe and M. Kaisiepo were even discouraged from lobbying African countries such as the Brazzaville group, who were critical of the Indonesian occupation of West Papua in the 1960s. Unlike the support given by the government of Portugal to East Timor, at least from the late 1980s, the Dutch washed their hands of the situation and blamed the US government and the Papuan pro-Indonesian groups for selling out the country. Thereafter the Dutch were very reluctant to take further responsibility. The new policy commitment was supported

primarily by radical academic groups and Papuan politicians. Willem Zonggonau, a former member of the Nieuw Guinea Raad, who at the time was a member of the regional parliament, described the political change at the UN in the following words:

On 26 November 1968, the People's Assembly of Irian Barat submitted a petition to the government of Indonesia and requested Sudjarwo—the Special Representative of Indonesia in Irian Barat – to bring back Youwe and Kaisiepo from the Netherlands to West Papua to discuss how the implementation of the Act of Free Choice 1969 should be done. But the Parliament's proposal was rejected. This was, therefore, why the parliament submitted a petition to Ortis-Sanz. Consequently, the regional parliament was abolished. A lot of questions were raised as to how the voice of the Papuans could be heard. The West Papuan politicians, parliamentarians, community and church leaders decided to send a delegate to the UN, bringing a petition of the West Papuans challenging Indonesia at the UN Assembly when Indonesia presented West Papua's case. The leaders endorsed me and Clemens Runawery, members of the regional parliament, to carry out the task.<sup>15</sup>

This strategy was unlikely to achieve its ultimate goal primarily because the political status of West Papua had already been decided by the New York Agreement in 1962. Despite having this pessimistic view in the back of their minds, Willem Zonggonau and Clemens Runawery, members of the regional parliament, were sent to the UN with a petition from the people of West Papua direct to the UN, and to give first hand evidence about how the violations of the rights of people of West Papua were carried out during the Act of Free Choice in 1969. When, on its way to New York, the delegation arrived in Papua New Guinea, full of enthusiasm, they received a mixed reception. The indigenous people and the business community of Papua New Guinea encouraged them, but not so the Australian administration. Canberra was very much concerned with its bilateral relationship with Indonesia and did not want to upset its nearest

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<sup>15</sup> Wim Zonggonau (January 1997), interviewed by the author, Port Moresby.

Southeast Asian neighbour. Canberra also knew that the future of West Papua had already been decided by the New York Agreement, and that West Papua was to be an integral part of Indonesia. For this reason, Australia considered the delegation a waste of time and money.<sup>16</sup> From files that were made public on 26 August 1999, it is clear that the governments of Australia, the USA and the Netherlands, and the UN sold out the people of West Papua. Australian officials in Port Moresby prevented the transit of the Papuan leaders to New York because the presence of the Papuan mission there would embarrass the UN and those governments.

Indonesia quickly took advantage of the power vacuum in West Papua. As outlined in Chapter One, the Sukarno regime immediately introduced Subversion Law No 11, 1963, prohibiting the exercise of fundamental freedoms, including freedom of association. The law severely restricted the rights of Papuans: it stated, "it is prohibited for the time being to set up new political parties or party branches in West Papua"<sup>17</sup> and it empowered the Indonesian authorities to intervene, arrest, detain and imprison any suspected Papuan political activists. Despite protests, all important positions in the regional government which had been occupied by Papuans were now systematically filled by Indonesians, on the excuse that the Papuans needed to be re-educated to destroy their Dutch mentality and sent to Java or the other islands. The real reason was that the Indonesian government planned to take over their positions. The Papuans in Battalion

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<sup>16</sup> This international controversy was exposed by the Dateline program of SBS on 26 August 1999. The program made strong allegations against the governments of Australia, the USA, the Netherlands and the UN for violating the rights of the people of West Papua for the sake of defending their own strategic, economic and political interests in West Papua and the South Pacific during the Cold War. (See also *Sydney Morning Herald*, 'How Canberra helped crush freedom quest', 26 August 1999, and Press Release of the OPM, 26 August 1999).

<sup>17</sup> Budiardjo and Liong, *op.cit.*:24.

Kasuari and the police forces, for example, were forced to resign; if they were later recruited to join the Indonesian armed forces, Papuans were not allowed to carry guns except when on duty. All property that had been left in offices and public places by the Dutch was taken away to Jakarta.

In West Papua at this time there were more than twelve political parties, representative of various socio-political interest groups ranging from very conservative religious parties, to the extreme left.<sup>18</sup> However, all these were now disbanded. The socio-political situation was dramatically changed from that under the Dutch administration. The escalation of human rights abuses and forced social and political “de-localization” provoked deep Papuan resentment, arousing sentiments that were translated into the political and military struggle at the end of the 1960s.

#### **4.2.3. Military Activities in the Border Region**

The National Liberation Army was fully aware that its situation in the cities was unsafe and that the possibility of peaceful political dialogue was minimal. When the government of Indonesia and UNTEA rejected the Regional Council’s proposals for a one-person-one-vote system, the NLC decided to take radical action in the period leading up to the Act of Free Choice. For this purpose, the military organisation of the FPKPB, the National Liberation Army of West Papua, was established in the border region in 1968. All political and military campaigns and policies were coordinated from a new headquarters, Markas Victoria (Centre for Victorious Activities). The founders of the Markas Victoria were Leo S. Jamby (Jarisetouw), Henk Yoku, Marthen E. Tabu, Bob A. Kubia, Jacob H. Prai, Yuddy Yoku, Eddy Jarisetouw, John Pasik, Jan Meho and Obert

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<sup>18</sup> Djopari, *op.cit.*:33.

Tabuni.<sup>19</sup> Prai, who comes from the Keroom region, played a particularly important role in its establishment. Markas Victoria was not, therefore, established by Seth Rumkorem, as Robin Osborne and other writers have stated.<sup>20</sup> In fact, Seth Rumkorem at that time was serving in the Indonesian army in Java and only arrived in the Victoria headquarters two years later. The personal links made with the peoples of the border region in West and East Sepik provinces in Papua New Guinea, and the expertise of Prai and Kubia, both from the educated elite, made the organisation much more effective.

Organisational discipline was generally good, despite some continuing weaknesses. (See Appendix 1.) Unlike the previous resistance activities, the military structure and political vision were well defined. The first organisational structure of the FPKPB was as follows: Yarisetouw was elected as chairman and Prai as general secretary, with appropriate sections. The headquarters took the military campaign program seriously. Integral parts of the new campaign strategy included political education and training for the Papuan youth, a mass political awareness program, and the establishing of new communication networks in urban areas and in Papua New Guinea. The National Liberation Council (NLC), a political wing in Holland which was led by Nicolaus Youwe, was authorised to undertake an international diplomatic campaign aimed in part at seeking further support. The centre became a place to mobilise the masses, attracting considerable numbers of Papuans (old and young, men and women, coastals and highlanders, urban and rural dwellers) to join the struggle, and was the

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<sup>19</sup> Jacob H. Prai (29 April 1984). *Document: "Tanggapan dan Penjelasan Saya Tentang Redaksi Bulletin Pro-Patria"*, Malmö.

<sup>20</sup> Robin Osborne (1985). *Indonesia's Secret War: the Guerrilla Struggle in Irian Jaya*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, pp.52-53.

driving force in promoting a strong common sense of nationalism, national unity and cooperation. It engaged in both guerrilla activities, attacking important installations of the ABRI, and in psychological warfare, involving flag raising, distributing pamphlets, organising demonstrations, and, in extreme cases, attacking transmigration camps and logging companies. In this campaign the objectives were not only to boycott the Act of Free Choice in 1969, but also to protest to the world community that the New York Agreement in 1962 was unjust and to call for the UN to intervene directly in the plebiscite.

While the guerrilla units were engaged in campaigns in rural areas, student organisations in Jayapura, in cooperation with public servants, police and army, established underground networks in towns and mobilised the masses to take part in peaceful protest actions. A demonstration which took place in Jayapura on 13 April 1969, two days before the last plebiscite, was one of these actions. After handing over some petitions, which had been signed by thousands of people from all levels of society, to the Special Representative of the UN, Dr F. Ortiz Sanz, at his residence at Dok V, Jayapura, more than 5,000 demonstrators marched through the city shouting "*Merdeka*" ("Freedom"). The petitions generally expressed discontent over continuing ill-treatment and human rights abuses, and called for direct UN intervention in the Act of Free Choice in 1969, to guarantee the international practice of "One Man One Vote" in the plebiscite, and, finally, to oversee the demilitarisation of the region. Herman Wayoi and Moses Weror, both from the former pro-Indonesian group, delivered speeches that generally condemned Indonesian brutalities and urged the UN and the government of Indonesia to respect the UN charter and conventions on human rights and ensure their application.

ABRI responded with an iron fist, firing on the massed crowd indiscriminately. A considerable number of participants were arrested, detained and imprisoned without any fair trial. Fifty per cent of West Papuan students from high schools and universities were failed in their examinations; many consequently sought political asylum in Papua New Guinea or joined the OPM. This escalation of human rights abuses and the unjust implementation of the Act in 1969 sparked strong protests among the people of Papua New Guinea and the Melanesian region and the world community generally. Papua New Guineans expressed their sympathy by giving the OPM free movement along the border region and permitting the guerrillas to obtain medical treatment in Papua New Guinea. Important Papua New Guinea leaders such as Maori Kiki and Michael Somare (later foreign minister and prime minister, respectively, in Papua New Guinea) also voiced concern about the presence of Indonesia in West Papua and called for a reduction of Indonesian troops in the country and a fair plebiscite.

Yet the movement still had some fundamental problems. The OPM tended to become overly dependent on others, expecting too much from external support, particularly from the Western allies. A cult mentality was once again dominating their political orientation, blocking independent initiatives and placing too much reliance on the NLC's representatives abroad. According to one of the key players in 1969, the OPM believed that it would gain support from Western allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). In fact, the possibility of such support was very doubtful as the West did not want to risk creating a new Vietnam War in the middle of the South Pacific. The CIA had been involved in the liberation movements of the PRRI in Sumatra, PERMESTA in Sulawesi,

and the RMS in the Moluccas during the Cold War period of the early 1950s when the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was still small. But in 1955-65, when the PKI was the second largest communist party in the world after China, the USA did not want to make the mistakes it made in Korea and Vietnam;<sup>21</sup> it was unlikely that the expected support for Papuan rights would be forthcoming from the West.

The outcome of the Act of Free Choice and the failure of external support dismayed members of the guerrilla groups. A considerable number of OPM members either surrendered to the Indonesian authorities or sought political asylum abroad, particularly in neighbouring PNG and in the Netherlands. Some key leaders from the Merauke region as well as in Markas Victoria, including Zacky Sawor, Menase Suwae, Rex Rumakiek and Bon Sapia, sought political asylum in PNG or Holland, leaving Jacob H. Prai to carry on with a handful of guerrillas including Marthen Tabu, Jeret Wayoi, Saul Hubby, Simon Amisim, Karel Kelanangame, Philemon Yarisetouw, U. Youweni and Fisor Jerrisetuow. Lack of personal commitment, and some health problems, contributed to the dissolution of the guerrilla forces.

The departure of these guerrillas to other countries, however, strengthened the work of the NLC in the Netherlands and helped to develop further coordination work. Cooperation between the military and political bureaux intensified on the basis of an interdependent relationship. The Papuan leaders abroad, including members of the NLC such as Nicolaus Youwe, Marcus Kaisiepo, Philemon T.J. Jufuai and Herman Womsiwor,

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<sup>21</sup> The CIA had been active in Indonesian politics for some time. See Brian May (1978) *The Indonesian Tragedy*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, pp.125-40, and Peter Dale Scott (1985) "The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965-1967", *Pacific Affairs* 58 (Summer).

became a focal point for these activities. The NLC had authority to engage in international political campaigns and it strongly advised the FPKPB to continue the struggle, fearing that any loss of morale would discourage the movement as the whole.

Working under the shadow of this moral dilemma and uncertainty, the OPM slowly regained its strength. But the consequences of the change in the colonial system in 1969 affected the lives of many Papuans negatively. The level of unemployment increased rapidly and human rights abuses—intimidation, arrests, torture and disappearances—were widespread in the country. Like many others from the pro-Indonesian group, Seth Rumkorem, Eliser Bonay (the first governor of Irian Jaya province), Darius Maury and Amos F. Indey were no longer trusted by the colonial power. These senior public officers were suspected to be members of the OPM, and were arrested and imprisoned.

Seth Rumkorem, who is said by Jouwe<sup>22</sup> to have been the chairman of Committee XVII of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) before 1965 and attended the Military Academy student in Bandung, served with ABRI but was suspected of passing on military secrets to the OPM. He did not receive his expected promotion to captain and was subsequently arrested and imprisoned. At the end of 1970 he joined the guerillas at Markas Victoria and, because of his military expertise, was given a position in the leadership.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> *Sejarah Perjuangan Dua Generasi Rumkorem Supaya Memasukkan Papua Barat Tanpa Syarat Kedalam Republik Indonesia* PEMKA, Hollandia, 1981.

<sup>23</sup> Seth Rumkoren interviewed by the author, Port Vila, September 2000.

Escaping from state persecution and social chaos, and following their strong national sentiment, considerable numbers of students, public servants and soldiers left Port Numbay (Jayapura) and joined the guerrillas in the 1970s, reinforcing the national struggle. The NLC political bureau in Holland advised the FPKPB to establish a branch in Markas Victoria, which was formed with a new committee: Seth Rumkorem (Chairman), Philemon S. Jarisetouw (vice chairman), Jacob H. Prai (general secretary) and U.R. Youweny (vice general secretary). As the political wing, the NLC abroad sought political support from the governments of Japan, the Vatican, Senegal, Israel, Zambia, PNG and the USA. The responses varied: the Kaunda government of Zambia and the Golda Meir government of Israel (at least according to Jacob Prai), for example, promised that their governments would recognise the OPM as the legitimate representative of the people as soon as a declaration of Independence was announced.<sup>24</sup> While the genuineness of these promises was doubtful, they were taken at face value. When a CIA agent, using a false Nigerian passport, entered the Victoria headquarters and met the leaders, the OPM was further convinced that political recognition and support would arrive. In fact, once again, the OPM was being manipulated, repeating the story of the 1960s of unfulfilled promises.

### **4.3. Declaration of Independence and Provisional Government (1971-1975)**

#### **4.3.1. Declaration of Independence**

Following advice from the NLC political leadership abroad, the NLC leadership in Markas Victoria called an emergency meeting to discuss a plan for a Declaration of Independence of West Papua. At that meeting, held on

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<sup>24</sup> Jacob H. Prai, (1995), interviewed by the author, Malmö.

29 -30 June 1971 in Markas Victoria and chaired by Seth Rumkorem, it was decided to set the date and venue to declare the Independence of West Papua and the formation of a new provisional government of West Papua. The purposes of this action were, first, to coordinate activities between the NLC abroad and the Victoria headquarters concerning the promises of external political recognition; secondly, to demonstrate to the world community that the OPM was standing on its own feet and pressing for *de jure* recognition; and, thirdly, to formally reject the result of the Act of Free Choice in 1969.

In executing the plan, 82 guerrillas, under the leadership of Jacob H. Prai and Seth Rumkorem, attacked the Waris military post on 30 June 1971; the next day the independence of West Papua was declared. The text of the Proclamation was as follows:

To all the Papuan people, from Numbay to Merauke, from Sorong to Baliem (Star Mountains) and from Biak to the island of Adi: With God's help and blessing, we take this opportunity today to announce to you all that, today, July 1st, 1971, the land and people of Papua have been declared to be free and independent (*de facto* and *de jure*). May God be with us, and let it be known to the world, that the sincere wish of the Papuan people to be free and independent in their own country is hereby fulfilled.

Victoria, July 1st, 1971.

In the name of the people and government of West Papua

President

Seth J. Rumkorem (Brigadier General)<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Osborne, *op.cit.*:56.

Four days later, the announcement was officially ratified by the parliament of West Papua (established by the Provisional Constitution of West Papua [see Section 3]).

International responses were very few. The Zambian and Israeli governments have never recognised the OPM nor has any support come from them. Their promises, if given, were empty.

Notwithstanding their dependent behaviour, both organisations—the NLC and the FPKPB—became centres for expressing the profoundly held national desire for the independence of West Papua and played an important role in the national liberation struggle. Most importantly, the declaration symbolises the political desires of the Papuans and provides an important focus for building inner self-confidence. This symbolic declaration has become a powerful message to all Papuans who believe in themselves and their country and are prepared to struggle for it.

#### **4.3.2. Revolutionary Provisional Government of West Papua (RPGWP)**

Despite difficulties with the new governmental system, and pessimism on the diplomatic front, the board members of the NLC in the Netherlands advised the NLC branch in Papua to establish a new government and draft a new provincial constitution. Such moves for political reform had both positive and negative outcomes: on the one hand it they gave the impression that the OPM could administer itself; the diplomatic situation, on the other hand, remained a problem. On 3-5 February 1973, FPKPB and the NLC surrendered their organisational power to the new government which was called the Provisional Revolutionary Government of West Papua (RPG). Seth Rumkorem was elected Head of State (Chief Executive)

of the RPG and Jacob H. Prai was elected head of the Legislative Council (Senate of the West Papuan Parliament<sup>26</sup>). The provisional government was inaugurated by the vice president of the NLC and the FPKPB was recognised as the military wing of the OPM, now renamed Tentara Pembebasan Nasional (TPN); at the same time the 39 articles of the Provisional Constitution of West Papua were endorsed. The NLC no longer functioned as a legislative body in accordance with Articles 124-127 of the supplementary provisions of the Constitution, it became an advisory body of government.

This new organisation was much more effective than its predecessors. Political and military structures, programs, strategies, directives and leadership were well constructed. The overall policies, programs, duties and tasks of the appropriate councils, committees and sectors were elaborated in Chapter Two, sections 1-6 of the Provisional Constitution of West Papua. Another important development was the creation of an effective leadership. The government engaged also in education, military and health training programs. Most of the leaders were drawn from an elite background, having been senior public servants. The centre functioned as a means of unifying differences within the Papuan community.

The establishment of the government seemed to be a political success and the OPM entered into a new era of diplomatic activity. The government enjoyed some international support, mostly from African and Pacific island countries. During the Senghor administration, for example, the government of Senegal permitted the OPM to establish an information

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<sup>26</sup> The West Papuan Legislative Council was West Papua's authentic parliament, both upper and lower houses, in contrast to the provincial parliament of Irian Jaya, which has served the interests of the colonial government.

office in Dakar, and Ben Tanggahma, as foreign minister of the RPG, carried out international campaigns from the Dakar office for over fifteen years. However, after the death of President Senghor the office was closed because support had been based primarily on personal relationships and religious sentiment, and permission had not been officially enacted through Parliament. Senghor was a former Catholic priest and Tanggahma was also from a Catholic background; both men had good relations with the Vatican. The RPG enjoyed also some limited support from people and NGOs in Papua New Guinea, Australia, Japan, Holland, Sweden and the Pacific island countries, as well as from Black Americans in the USA. The National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP) sent a resolution to the General Secretary of the UN, Kurt Waldheim, on 4 January 1972 requesting "a full and free hearing on the status of the Papuans", but the general secretary replied thirteen days later that the UN was not in a position to raise the issue on its own as such formal consideration would be made "only if a member state can initiate such action."<sup>27</sup>

In the region, the OPM requested Papua New Guinea's politicians such as Maori Kiki, John Guise and Michael Somare in 1974 to play a mediatory role in a meeting at Madang. This request was welcomed by the governments of both Papua New Guinea and Indonesia but talks between Indonesia and the OPM have never come about.<sup>28</sup> Thus, while the RPG enjoyed some sympathy, political recognition and substantive support remained elusive. Political analysts have argued that the lack of an intensive political campaign, and sensitivity about the Papuan issue, have been reasons for the minimal external support the RPG attracted, but it is

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<sup>27</sup> Kurt Waldheim (17 January 1972). *Document No: Doc.CVN/eb.* of General Secretary of the UN, replying NAACP's letter, Washington DC

<sup>28</sup> Wim Zonggonau (January 1997), interviewed by the author, Port Moresby.

also true that countries with their own separatist movements were unlikely to support West Papuan independence.

Internally, the government concentrated on human development and the growth of an urbanised and centralised power structure. Military campaigns were restricted to the border region and towns in the north, so that broad, country-wide, mass participation was minimal, if it existed at all. Unfortunately, the RPG was a highly centralised and authoritarian regime, committing human rights abuses against its opponents, encouraging regional rivalries, and threatening national unity and cooperation.<sup>29</sup> In 1971-72 a personal clash occurred between Seth Rumkorem, on one side, and U. Youweni, P. Yarisetouw, Luis Nusi, and Yeret Wayoi on the other, in which J.H. Prai became the mediator.<sup>30</sup> Also, the people of the border areas complained about misconduct by OPM leaders, and some conflicts took place among guerrilla units. The chairman of the Senate once again played an important mediating role in those conflicts. But when a later episode threatened Prai's own life, conflict within the leadership deepened, leading to a leadership split in 1976.

#### **4.4. The Leadership Split and its Political and Military Implications (1976-1990)**

##### **4.4.1. The Leadership Split**

Like the conflict in East Timor between the UDT and Fretilin in 1975, the OPM leadership split between Jacob Prai and Seth Rumkorem, which occurred on 13 March 1976 in Markas Victoria, resulted in structural changes

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<sup>29</sup> Jacob H. Prai (29 April 1984). *Tanggapau dan Penjelason Saya Tentang Reala*

<sup>30</sup> Gerard Tom Ninanti (14 May 1999), interviewed by the author, Den Haag.

that have had both positive and negative effects on the progress of the movement.

The real reason for the split is still unclear, and there is much speculation about it. Robin Osborne has argued that the main reason was disagreement between Prai and Rumkorem over where to obtain arms.<sup>31</sup> But Jim Elmslie, who has studied the subject of West Papuan nationalism intensively, has argued that the different characters and backgrounds of the two men were the primary reason for what was essentially a personality clash.<sup>32</sup> Budiardjo argues that the fact that the two men came from different parts of West Papua played a role in the conflict, together with a contrast in personalities and sharp differences in their earlier political motivations.<sup>33</sup>

Identifying the problem as an ideological conflict has never been a satisfactory explanation. Both men are devout Christians and their political convictions are moderate; so there is no significant Western communist division between them. The political tradition in West Papua does not support ideological conflict: there has not been any conservative party representing the interests of a bourgeoisie or landlords, nor a communist party that ideologically represents the interests of a working class or peasantry. Both men accepted the Christian principle of "Brotherly Love" as one of the state principles contained in the preamble to the provisional constitution of 1971. Even though Seth Rumkorem had been a strong supporter of the Indonesian Communist Party in the 1950s and 1960s and played an important role in the "integration" of West Papua into Indonesia,

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<sup>31</sup> Osborne, *op.cit.*:64.

<sup>32</sup> Jim Elmslie (1995). *Irian Jaya in the 1990's: Economic Expansion and West Papuan Nationalism*, University of Sydney, p.29.

<sup>33</sup> Budiardjo and Liong, *op.cit.*:65-66.

this does not mean that, because he became president of West Papua, the OPM became a communist movement. The two men held common political views: they both supported the general policy objectives of the OPM, the destruction of Indonesian colonialism and the creation of a free and democratic state of West Papua. Moreover, both men recognised and respected the state and the national symbols—the national anthem and flag. Yet their different regional origins remained important: “People do not forget that Prai comes from Keroom region. If Rumkorem treated his people badly, Prai as local leader has to stand up and defend them.”<sup>34</sup>

The split can probably be best understood in terms of regionalism and personal factors. Blaskett argues that “personal differences seem to have played a far greater role in dividing the two men”<sup>35</sup> than anything else. Regional and tribal loyalties have always been major factors in the OPM; they have hindered cooperation, and ultimately undermined national unity and benefited the Indonesian government. The two leaders also made accusations against one another on the basis of their personal differences. In a statement, “13 points of accusation”, Jacob Prai criticised Rumkorem for being authoritarian and pro-Indonesian, oppressing civilians and colleagues, raping local women, and inspiring a divide-and-rule policy within the OPM. On his side, Rumkorem accused Prai of failing to provide an accountability report about FPKPB/A-'69 activities, being backward and of weak character, taking a Biak woman as his second wife, and similar accusations.<sup>36</sup> Rumkorem believed that Prai, as general secretary of the FPKPB/A-'69, had breached the military secrecy of the OPM by providing

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<sup>34</sup> Wim Zonggonau (January 1997), interviewed by the author, Port Moresby.

<sup>35</sup> Beverley Blaskett (1993). “Resistance Movement as a Nationalist Force: A Brief History of the OPM” in Garry Trompf (ed.), *Islands and Enclaves*, Sterling Publishers Private Limited, New Delhi, p.321.

<sup>36</sup> Osborne, *op.cit.*:64.

information to Australian and American intelligence in Papua New Guinea. In 1971 a CIA agent, under cover of a false Nigerian passport, allegedly had met with OPM leaders for secret talks about outside support (see p.23). However, no support ever arrived, and Rumkorem accused Prai of exposing the OPM's plans and working with unreliable agents in Papua New Guinea. According to Rex Rumakiek,<sup>37</sup> Rumkorem, as a military man, was anxious to find out from Prai why the secret plans had been exposed, and he therefore ordered a section of the Corps Para Militer (CPM) to arrest and imprison Prai and his entire family.<sup>38</sup> This was the start of the leadership split.

The arrest of Prai, who was chairman of the Senate, arguably contravened Article 92 of the *Provisional Constitution of the Republic of West Papua*, which explicitly guarantees the legal protection of members of the parliament of West Papua:

No member of the Senate can be arrested, taken into custody or proceeded against because of what he has said or done in discharging his responsibility in the Senate meetings.<sup>39</sup>

The president does not have constitutional power to dismiss or arrest a member of the Senate. In contrast, the Senate has the right to submit the president to an inquiry, a motion of no confidence, or dismissal. Djopari records that "Prai J.H. as President of the Senate in accordance with the Constitution dismissed Seth Rumkorem as President of the Republic of West Papua".<sup>40</sup> Article 35/1 of the Constitution provides that "The President and Vice President of West Papua are elected directly ... for a term

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<sup>37</sup> Rex Rumakiek (1997), interviewed by the author, Sydney.

<sup>38</sup> Jacob H. Prai (December 1992), interviewed by the author, Malmö.

<sup>39</sup> Organisasi Papua Merdeka/OPM (1 July 1971). Article 92 *Provisional Constitution of the Republic of West Papua*, Port Numbay, p.15.

<sup>40</sup> Djopari, *op. cit.*:117.

of office of 5 years”,<sup>41</sup> but empowers the Senate to call a new election, or to denounce the government leader and declare a *coup d’etat*. Instead, Prai chose to form a new organisation (see below). This action had considerable negative effects not only for national unity and reconciliation but for the struggle as a whole.

Despite their personal differences and weaknesses, the two men must be recognised as significant leaders on the basis of what they contributed to the liberation struggle through their personal commitment and influence, two important leadership qualities. On a positive note, the split created some productive competition between the two main factions, which encouraged West Papuans to participate in the struggle, expanding the areas of struggle and creating new approaches (which are discussed below). On the other hand, the split started a power struggle, fracturing national unity, creating a negative image of the OPM, and giving rise to a tendency to constant leadership shifts.

#### **4.4.2. The Implications of the Leadership Split**

##### **4.4.2.1. The Crushing of Student Organisations**

The student movement in West Papua has played a central role in the nationalist struggle. In the 1960s, the FPKPB had a strong base in the hearts and minds of the students. University students, who included Jacob H. Prai, Wim Zonggonau, Clemens Rumawery, Bob Kuvia, A. Atabu, Otto Wospakret and others, held positions of responsibility and built working relationships on the basis of national unity and trust. Students with radical views wanted to take part in new activities even if they involved danger.

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<sup>41</sup> OPM, *op.cit.*:5.

Given this spirit of unity and cooperation, the leadership split in the OPM initially had very little impact on the students. Equally, the people in the main towns were largely unaffected because the sense of national unity was stronger among urban Papuans than among those in the jungle and abroad. In a spirit of national unity university students established a new student underground movement, *Persatuan Mahasiswa dan Pelajar Papua Barat* (PMPPB), in 1975. This movement was initiated, in the Catholic Students Lodge in Abepura, by Felix Amokowame, Otto Ondawame, Frans Boga and Josep Gewab. Membership was not limited by religion and there were student representatives from all regions and all universities and colleges, including *Akademi Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri* (APDN) in Yoka, Universitas Negeri Cenderawasih (UNCEN) and both *Sekolah Tinggi Teologia Katolik* (STTK) and Kristen (STTK) in Abe. High schools and colleges also had representatives, among whom were Dan Kafiar, Dan Kurni, Bob Suela, Eddy Mofu, Arnold Ap, Gabriel Go, Charles Bless, David Huby and Philipus Kum.

The major objectives of this student movement were to establish underground networks and supply materials and information to the OPM in Markas Victoria; to mobilize the public for a total military uprising; and to increase the public's national awareness by engaging youth in cultural promotion through, among other things, songs, theatre, poems, and handicrafts. In the view of the students, the OPM should not be seen as a provocative movement but as a real political force, challenging the occupation forces continuously. They agreed that provocative actions such as flag raising on the hills and the distribution of pamphlets only created fear and uncertainty among civilians in the city. The committee decided to

send Felix Amokowame, a former student of the APDN in Yoka, to the OPM's headquarters, Victoria, to discuss these plans with the leaders of the OPM and coordinate activities.

When Amokowame arrived at the headquarters, he found the picture somewhat different to his expectations. The leaders had already decisively split into two groups, led respectively by Seth Rumkorem and Jacob H. Prai; an effort to overcome their differences had failed. Instead, Amokowame was persuaded by the Prai group to become one of the founding members of Prai's new organisation, which was called *Dewan Pembela Keadillan* (PEMKA) or the Council for Restoration of Justice (CRJ).

In the meantime, the urban students continued their operations, building effective information networks linking different levels of society, government officials and parliament, and supplying medicines, clothes and books to the OPM in the jungle. Otto Ondawame, who at that time was secretary II of *Golongan Karya* (Golkar) in Jayapura District, in 1975 became coordinator for agriculture and fisheries in the Abepura, Tobati, Engross and Yoka areas, under the chairmanship of Tontje Messet, district commissioner of Jayapura, and the first Secretary of Golkar, Taran Kalled, head of the district Agricultural Department. Together with Joel Kafiar and the other students, Ondawame coordinated supplies.

However, the student organisation proved to be open to manipulation. In an incident at Abe Hill in 1975, Moses Wenda, one of the frontline troops of the OPM's operational units, was killed by ABRI in a morning attack. The question arose as to who had informed ABRI that a platoon of guerrillas, including Wenda, Dan Kafiar, Karel Kelanangame and

Gerard Tom Ninanti, was in the area. Subsequently houses were ransacked, suspects were arrested, including Otto Ondawame and Joel Kafiar, and documents and materials were confiscated by ABRI. Ondawame and his colleagues were brought to the headquarters of *Komando Operasi Khusus* (KOPASSUS), the elite Red Berets, in Angkasa I, Jayapura. At this camp more than a hundred key political prisoners were held, including Bas Mekawa, who had been taken hostage in 1977, and T. Aronggear. The prisoners were tortured by burning their skin with cigarette butts and the use of electric shocks in order to force them to expose OPM secrets. In the camp, secret documents of the OPM confiscated by the ABRI could be seen, outlining the structure of the RPG and TPN with detailed maps and plans. How these documents had fallen into the hands of the enemy remains a mystery.

Deploying both intimidation and persuasive approaches, prisoners in the camp were forced to cooperate with ABRI and reveal OPM secrets. Personal relationships were exploited by the ABRI, who knew that relatives of the prisoners were members of the OPM. In particular, Joel Kafiar and Bob Suela were under strong pressure to cooperate. These two men were sent to Markas Victoria (Marvic) by the ABRI, where they met Seth Rumkorem and Joel's brother Dan Kafiar, operations commander of the TPN, and tried to persuade them to surrender. Their attempt was unsuccessful. Following their return, the ABRI increased military attacks on Marvic.

Ondawame, like the other political prisoners, refused to expose the secrets of the OPM. Because he resisted, the ABRI threatened to kill him on three occasions. In order to escape from these death threats, Ondawame

asked permission to visit his sick mother and organised a *surat jalan* (travel document) for his trip to Akimuga, Timika and Tembagapura. This travel pass is obligatory for all Papuans who want to travel to places outside their residential area, identifying them to each local military authority. It is similar to the travel pass used in South Africa during the Apartheid regime. When Ondawame arrived in his home subdistrict of Akimuga, his freedom of movement was still restricted; he was forced to report to the local authority on who, when and where he would visit:

When I arrived in Akimuga, my home district, I have to report to the local military about how long I have stay, who I want to see, and when I wanted to leave my village.<sup>42</sup>

During a short visit to Timika in 1975, Ondawame held a meeting with Victor Wamang, a guerrilla in Jayapura in 1969 who was now operations commander of the KODAM III *Nemang Kawi*, TEPENAL. The discussion focussed on two points: first, the decision to establish new guerrilla bases in East Mimika region; and secondly, the decision to attack Freeport Mine. Ondawame informed Wamang that Bonny Niwilingame and Kelly Kwalik were on their way to Akimuga and Tembagapura to pursue the second task.

After returning to Jayapura, Ondawame and Emanuel Nagapruol joined the OPM. The life of important political prisoners in West Papua is uncertain; in most cases, such prisoners are killed after only a short imprisonment. The cases of the national martyrs F. Awom and the Mandatjan brothers in 1969, Marthen Tabu and Arnold Ap in 1984, and Mecky Salosa in 1991 are a few examples of this practice. When Ondawame

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<sup>42</sup> Otto Ondawame (1975). Personal Experience: paid a visit to Akimuga and Tembagapura.

was once again threatened with death, he decided to escape execution and join the OPM:

I knew that my life was in danger. I did not want that the history of Mandatjan or F. Awon would repeat again to my destiny. I decided to join the OPM not only to escape from death but also to strengthen the OPM basis. It was therefore, I and Obert Nagapruol, the former unskilled worker in Tembagapura, joined the OPM in the end of 1976 while the other colleagues were still suffering behind the iron bars.<sup>43</sup>

The mass mobilisation organised by the student movement had great potential; but lack of accurate information and the low morale of the members, especially those taken prisoner, meant the plan failed to achieve its primary goals. The failure affected the lives of many students and public servants, and encouraged even deeper anti-colonial sentiment.

#### 4.4.2.2. Dewan Pembela Keadilan (The Council for Restoration of Justice)

Striving for social and political justice, democracy and peace, *Dewan Pembela Keadilan* (PEMKA) or the Council for Restoration of Justice (CRJ) was established on 26 December 1976 in Ubrud Sub-district, in opposition to Markas Victoria. Its formation was a consequence of the leadership split described above. The words “restoration of justice” reflected a criticism of the constitutional abuses and injustices perpetrated by the RPG. When PEMKA was established, Markas Victoria was abandoned.<sup>44</sup> Following the split with Rumkorem on 13 March 1976, Prai moved out with two thirds of the freedom fighters, and established a new organisational structure and propaganda machinery at Mamikli in the south. At the first meeting of PEMKA on 26 December 1976, two important actions were taken: the

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<sup>43</sup> Otto Ondawame (1976). Personal Experience during the liberation wars in the jungle, PEMKA.

<sup>44</sup> Prai, *op.cit.*

formation of an organisational structure with a clear political program and action plan; and the renaming of the organisation, PEMKA. The structure of the CRJ was as follows:

Chairman: Jacob H. Prai

General Secretary: [the late] Felix Amokowame (deceased 1976)

Treasurer: Kentuy Paulus

Chief of Staff: Marthen Tabu

9 Administrative Sectors

5 Regional Commanders of the TEPENAL (see Figure 2)

Theoretically, nine regional commands were planned, but due to obstacles mentioned elsewhere in this thesis, five commands were established as in Figure 2. Organisation was structured both vertically and horizontally. Each regional command structure was (and still is) an independent entity.

#### **4.4.2.2.1. Political Program**


Six months later, a new council meeting endorsed a political program and action plan<sup>45</sup> as follows:

1. The objectives and aims of the OPM are to destroy the Indonesian colonialist imperialism and then to establish a free, democratic and independent state of West Papua.
2. The OPM will establish a people's government which will adopt a sovereign policy to protect the democratic rights and the interests of the people.

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<sup>45</sup> RIOP, *op.cit.*:21. See also Organisasi Papua Merdeka/OPM (1992). "This is West Papua: General Presentation of the OPM", Malmö, p.6.

**Figure 2: The Structure of Dewan Pembela Keadilan (PEMKA Council for Restoration of Justice)**



3. The OPM believes in popular democracy. In this respect, the OPM rejects any form of bureaucratic system and strives for the broadest mass participation in the politics. The OPM serves and protects the fundamental freedoms including freedom of political participation of the masses.
4. People's armed forces will be established to serve and protect the interests of the people. The masses must be armed and, together with the regular armed forces, fight the occupation forces and defend the country from all other external aggressions.
5. The OPM strives for the equal distribution of the national wealth and resources for the well being of the people. It is the only legitimate guarantee for economic and social progress and political stability.
6. The OPM rejects both the imperialistic and the centrally-planned economic systems, and strives for a mixed economic system, where every individual enjoys economic freedom but is collectively responsible for the well being of the citizens of the country.
7. The OPM believes that all mankind have equal value and rights before law, therefore the rights of the people such as to freedom of expression, religion, demonstration, strike, and work must be protected and there will be no discrimination on the basis of race, sex, social status and political conviction.
8. The OPM believes that every individual has the right to develop his or her talent. The OPM will, therefore, provide adequate services such as schools, education and cultural institutions for the people's need and enjoyment.
9. The OPM will provide adequate means of communication and protect resources and the ecology, and rehabilitate the land ravaged by the colonial and transnational companies. The OPM will also confiscate the land from imperialists and colonialists and give it to the people.
10. The OPM strives for world peace and security, for mutual respect for and equal recognition of the rights of indigenous people elsewhere, and works for international solidarity with oppressed and colonised peoples. To achieve these goals, the OPM will establish an independent foreign policy which upholds the principles of friendship to all, malice to none in their internal affairs. The OPM will also work actively with progressive and democratic peoples and governments who work for world peace and security.

The council emphasised three major principles of their action plan: decentralisation, mobilisation of the masses, and internationalisation. In the area of decentralisation, the following aspects would be targeted: localisation, flexibility, initiative, self-reliance, cooperation and human rights. In mobilisation, urban and rural areas, students, public servants, farmers, workers, army and churches were targeted. These points are briefly elaborated below.

#### **4.4.2.2. Decentralisation of Power**

Giving the masses an opportunity to take responsibility for their own local affairs has been a central tenet of the decentralisation policy. It was a direct reaction to the prior centralisation policy. The central command surrendered two thirds of its authority to regional commands of the TEPENAL, encouraging them to localise regional political and military affairs, though overall policy, in terms of strategic planning and foreign policy, was retained in the hands of the central organisation. The new command structure stressed that leadership of the regional command must be in the hands of the local people and demanded a high degree of flexibility in applying central policy according to the needs and conditions of the local people. The regional commanders' expertise and knowledge of local culture and traditions is valuable in convincing local people of the need for action, and involving them directly in the struggle.

For the purpose of decentralisation, five autonomous regions and commanders were decided upon. The new regional commands decided upon were:

KODAM I-MAMTA, Jayapura: Matheus Tabu, assisted by Philipus Kembu

KODAM II-Tabuni, Jayawijaya: Alex Derey, assisted by Marthen Wenda

KODAM III-Nemang Kawi, Fakfak: Bonifasius Niwilingame, assisted by Kletus (Kelly) Kwalik.

KODAM IV- Gobai, Paniai: Julius Go, assisted by Thadeus Jogi.

KODAM V-Rusa, Merauke: Gerard Tom Ninanti, assisted by Bernard Mawen.

The major objectives were to increase the political participation of the masses, and to encourage self-esteem and accountability for regional affairs. The council also emphasised the need for the regional leaders to take more initiative in their regional development programs, adapting the overall policy of the central organisation in accordance with regional needs and conditions, especially considering the general ineffectiveness of the communications network and the undeveloped geographical nature of West Papua. Solidarity with the other regions or guerrilla units was another crucial principle. The number of guerrillas was not equally distributed through the regions, as some regions had greater strategic importance than others. Cooperation between units was seen as crucial in maintaining national unity and exchanging experiences.

The decentralisation policy had many positive aspects, including expansion of the regions, greater mass participation, increased self-esteem and accountability. On the other hand, the policy ran the risk of breaking down the coherence of the struggle, which could lead to confusion, and there was a lack of central control, due to geographical distances, in any case.

#### 4.4.2.2.3. Mass Mobilisation

Political mobilisation and the creation of an effective underground network in towns was one of the important items on the political agenda of the PEMKA. Mobilising all revolutionary forces—trade unions, students, women, workers, intellectuals, police and army personnel, public servants, churches, political parties, and domestic bourgeoisie who supported the principles and programs of the OPM—was one of the key aims of the program. This was to be achieved through political education and training, and by establishing people's councils and committees in every district to monitor and implement a daily work routine and an effective propaganda network.

In order to implement the mass mobilisation program, the council sent Felix Amokowame, already mentioned, an Amungme and the general secretary of the CRJ, to Jayapura at the end of 1976 in order to establish contact, mobilise masses, monitor the situation, and coordinate activities. At this time, Otto Ondawame had just arrived in Markas PEMKA. While Ondawame was busy with new tasks given to him by the chairman of the council, Amokowame organised a secret meeting in Jayapura in late 1976 with the members of the PMPPB, politicians and public servants, including Bas Youwe, Otto Ovide, Josep Gewab and others in the house of Lambert Tsolme in Argapura, a Jayapura suburb. Important points of discussion were how to get clear information about the leadership split, how to reunify the leadership, and how to prevent the negative effects of the split in the cities. The meeting also discussed a plan for mass mobilisation and a military uprising in Jayapura. However, one of those present exposed this secret meeting to the ABRI; this resulted in the arrest of the participants, who were then sentenced to imprisonment in Jayapura and outside West Papua.

These events in Argapura seriously affected the structure of the council. Ondawame, who had just arrived in PEMKA headquarters, was elected to the post of general secretary of the council, replacing Amokowame, while the other posts did not change. During this process of political change and reorganisation, ABRI strafed Markas PEMKA on 6 May 1977, using two OV10-Broncos, and also bombed the new PEMKA headquarters 300 km south-west of Jayapura. "All properties, gardens and houses of the local people and the office of the OPM, including my own documents were destroyed".<sup>46</sup> Who actually revealed the location of the camp to the ABRI is still not known, but the disclosure was probably connected in some way with the earlier arrest of those in Argapura.

#### 4.4.2.2.4. An Attempt at National Unity

Papuan national unity involves a fight against any form of tribalism, factionalism or regionalism, and the formation of a national united front through the establishment of collective leadership, politicisation of the masses and the army, reorganisation of the army and the people's councils, and the use of appropriate tactics to expose the enemy's propaganda. Inspired by these ideas, Prai requested Papuan leaders such as Nicolaus Youwe and Suwai to form a new national government, a suggestion which aroused a positive response but with the reservation that the government should be called a *de facto* government. On another front, the chairman sent a call to Bernard Tanggahma, foreign minister of the RPG in Senegal, urging him to join the Youwe group. However this call was rejected and Tanggahma advised Prai to return to the RPG. Thereafter there was no real

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<sup>46</sup> Otto Ondawame (1977). My own eyewitness account of the first year of guerrilla experiences in the newly established Markas PEMKA.

attempt by either side to conciliate, and mutual suspicions continued into the 1980s.

The establishment of a social organisation in the headquarters was another way of encouraging national unity and cooperation, and of strengthening brotherhood and solidarity among the KODAMs. A social organisation, JAPAMEFAK (which stood for "Jayapura, Paniai, Merauke, and Fakfak"), was established in Markas PEMKA in March 1978, initiated by Ondawame. It was a Melanesian way to strengthen relationships when traditional organisational approaches had failed to achieve national unity. The organisation was extended into JAPAMEFAKSOM (including Sorong and Manokwari) at the end of 1978; later, during the OPM National Unity (see below), Biak and Jawa were also included. This social organisation has played a significant role in carrying forward the banner of the PEMKA and in efforts at national unity. The significance of this type of association is still recognised; after nineteen years, former guerrillas are again calling for a reorganisation of the association, once again stressing the importance of national unity.

#### **4.4.2.2.5. Internationalisation**

Internationalisation of the West Papua issue was another key objective. This was to be done through establishing support groups, improving internal organisational network systems, an international diplomatic offensive, solidarity with similar interest groups, publicising the facts about human rights violations in West Papua, and identifying the West Papua issue with the broader issues of refugees, minorities, indigenous peoples and hostages. Regionalisation of the issue, through lobbying Melanesian Spearhead groups and members of South Pacific Forum countries and by

increasing public awareness and working closely with progressive and liberation movements in Indonesia and the South Pacific region, has become an integral part of the international campaign.

#### **4.4.2.3. The Establishment of a National *De Facto* Government (NDFG)**

Despite the reformation that took place in PEMKA, the organisational system still followed the governmental model—even though PEMKA was aware of the negative implications of that model. Failing to learn from past experience during the RPG period, the new order regime continued to make mistakes.

To satisfy the demands of the NLC groups in Holland and to implement the action plans formulated by the RCJ, the National De Facto Government of West Papua (NDFG) was established on 10 April 1978 in Markas PEMKA. The full title not only reflected an intention to correct the constitutional abuses perpetrated by the RPG but also made clear the *de facto* grounds on which the government stood firm and sought *de jure* recognition. The name was intended to contradict external misperceptions even though, since there was no official political recognition of the Papuan struggle (as noted earlier), diplomatic lobbying would continue to encounter difficulties. External forces often saw the OPM as merely a terrorist group, without any power structure and territorial control, and accused the OPM of using Papua New Guinea territory for its operational base. Internally, this structural change was designed to denounce the RPG in accordance with Article 35 of the Provisional Constitution of West Papua, indicating that the RPG was no longer representative of the people. Further, the NDFG attempted to provide a national unified structure and to abolish any form of

leadership dualism within the OPM. The composition of the first cabinet of the National De Facto Government reflected such national unity:

President: Jacob H.Prai

Vice President/Foreign Minister: Nicolaus Youwe

Defence Minister: Otto Ondawame

Finance Minister: Henk Inggamer

Economy Minister: Zacky Sawor

Health Minister: Adolf Sawery

Social Minister: Wim Zonggonau

Communication Minister: Marthen Kambu

Chief Staff of TEPENAL: Colonel Marthen Tabu

Chief Staff of Papuan Intelligence Service (PIS): Colonel Yeret Wayoi

Chairman of the Senate: Fisor M. Yarisetouw

Vice Chairman of the Senate: Anton Numbun

Unlike in the RPG, representatives of all districts and social classes were given an opportunity through the NDGFG to exercise power in both legislative and executive areas. This was a primary reason for the popularity the government enjoyed soon after its establishment. The government represented a range of political and social backgrounds and controlled 60 per cent of the territory and people. The leadership roles of Prai and Youwe were also important. Most significantly, the new order regime had a humanistic approach, giving each group responsibility for its own home affairs.

Despite its initial success, the new structural changes were not free from problems. As with any nationalist struggle, the PEMKA group had

some weaknesses. First, the failure to denounce the RPG immediately by declaring a *coup d'état* meant that much time was wasted haggling over internal matters. Secondly, the guerrilla campaign was so widespread that there was a lack of control, caused primarily by ineffective communication networks. And, finally, a negative impression was given to the world of the OPM having two governments within one liberation movement, which was clearly irrational.

The political program of the National De Facto Government was not significantly different from that of the CRJ. The first cabinet meeting, which took place on September 1977 in PEMKA's headquarters, adopted the ten point program of the CRJ, as set out earlier in this chapter, with some minor modifications. The principles of self-reliance and respect for human rights were inserted, and additional regional commands were established, namely: KODAM VI-Kasuari, Sorong; KODAM VII-Mandatjan, Manokwari; KODAM VIII-Awom, Biak, and KODAM IX-Japen-Waropen.

A new commitment was that all political and military campaigns must take place on Papuan soil. The Supreme Commander of the OPM and president of the government had to be domiciled in West Papua, showing to the world community that the OPM had genuine control over its *de facto* territory. Self-reliance was seen as a crucial part of the OPM's new principles. Unlike the previous cult mentality, the new OPM took self-reliance seriously. Marthen Tabu, the chief of staff of TEPENAL, often summed up this principle in relation to material weaponry in a short sentence: "Enemy weapons are ours". The OPM believes that all material needs are available in the hands of the enemy, although the question still arises as to how the OPM can gain access to those materials. The lack of external support has

been a long-term concern, but it was now recognised that an isolated movement like the OPM is unlikely to attract significant external support. It must, therefore, rely on its own resources.

#### 4.4.2.3.1. New OPM tactics

Different tactics have been deployed in fulfilling the OPM's aims, including the taking of hostages and an intensification of aggressive political and military campaigns during the 1970s and 1980s in each region. Using a limited amount of external support in terms of money and communications equipment, and other items including weapons confiscated from the ABRI, a range of military campaigns took place in all five regions in 1976-1978.

The history of resistance in other regions will be described separately in this chapter but I will first describe in some detail the events that took place in the Mamberamo-Tanah Merah (MAMTA) region, as indicative of the new strategies. In the MAMTA region, the military campaign was intensified under the leadership of Marthen Tabu. One of the key campaigns involved taking hostages in Aurina, Kampung Tua on 16 May 1978. Nine Indonesian officers and officials were captured as war hostages, including Colonel Ismail (Commander of KOREM Abepura), Lieutenant-Colonel A.F. Admiral (Intelligence Assistant of the KODAM XVII Trikora Cenderawasih), Father Ombos, (Military Catholic Priest), Maloali (the Chairman of the regional Parliament), Otto Subruanggo, brother-in-law of Jacob Prai, and Bas Mekawa, a relative of Jacob Prai.<sup>47</sup> The objective was not only to gain material equipment but also to draw international attention to the issue of West Papua, to force the parties to the peace negotiation table, and, finally, to

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<sup>47</sup> Gatra (20 January 1996). "Pembebasan Tempo Dulu" in Teror-Teror OPM, p.25.

press for the withdrawal of the ABRI from the border region. Despite aggression and threats by the ABRI, the OPM maintained its commitment to the principles of a humanitarian approach. The hostages were treated well, in accordance with the Geneva convention regarding the fate of war hostages, and were provided with basic humanitarian needs. The way the OPM treated the hostages was later described by Father Ombos in the following words:

My former appendix operation was giving me pain, so I reported this to Otto Ondawame. He ordered me to stop carrying heavy stocks of wood. After a few minutes, I was threatened by one member of the OPM but he was brought into line by Otto Ondawame.<sup>48</sup>

Many humanitarian organisations argue that the taking of hostages is inhumane; however, in isolated situations like that of the OPM such an action has many advantages. It not only exposes the tactics of the enemy but can also gain positive publicity and attract international attention and intervention. The case of Aurina provided a clear indication of this. Through interrogation, the OPM were able to obtain the secret plans and locations of the ABRI. The reliability of this information was later confirmed when a document setting out five key points of a secret ABRI plan, dated 12 July 1981, was captured by the OPM. One of the points dealt with the Operation for Restoration of Security and Stability in Irian Jaya. The primary objective of this plan was to restrict the movement of the OPM and destroy its external support. Involving what ABRI calls a hearts and minds approach, it stated that the development of strategic regions along the border must be taken seriously. Resettling the landowners and immigrants from Indonesia into these strategic areas has always been an important

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<sup>48</sup> Samsuddin (1995). *Pergolakan di Perbatasan: Pembebasan Sandra Tanpa Pertumpahan Darah*, PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama, Jakarta, pp.318-319.

territorial approach of the ABRI and in this case it was planned as follows: “resettlement in the following areas: Arso in Yamas, Waris in Ampas, Senggi in Molov, Ubrub, Lereh and Unurum Guay in Guay in Jayapura district. Waropko, Mindiptanah, Muting, Tanah Merah and Agast in Merauke district, Akimuga and Kokonao in Fakfak district, Oksibil, Kiwirok, Tiom, Magi and Asologaima in Jayawijaya district; Biak Barat in Teluk Cenderawasih district and Warmare, Oramsbari in Manokwari districts were seen as vital”.<sup>49</sup> The realisation of such a plan become clear ten year later when new settlement camps had been built in Kerom region by the Indonesian government.

The taking of hostages was a tactic that continued to be used by the OPM. Eighteen years after the Aurina event, another hostage situation occurred in Mapenduma district in the southern highlands, this time involving international, Indonesian and Papuan civilians. In this event, 26 people, including nine scientists, were taken as war hostages on 8 January 1996, with the same objectives of attracting international attention to the plight of West Papua.<sup>50</sup> Here again, the OPM exercised good will in promising that the hostages would be released without harm and demonstrated their respect for international conventions in the initial Geselama release ceremony on 8 May 1996. However when the International Red Cross, which played a mediating role, became politically involved, the OPM leadership changed its release plans and the whole episode ended amid international controversy. The violation of ICRC's humanitarian symbols and the deployment of foreign mercenaries in the

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<sup>49</sup> Indonesian Armed Forces/ABRI (12 July 1981). “*Secret Document: Perencanaan Pengoperasian ABRI kepada Irian Jaya*”, Jayapura.

<sup>50</sup> The story of the kidnap incident has been told from the viewpoint of one of those kidnapped, in D. Start (1997) *The Open Cage: Murder and Survival in the Jungle of Irian Jaya*, Harper Collins, London.

release operation resulted in serious damage to the reputations of the ICRC and the government of the United Kingdom.<sup>51</sup>

In another incident later in the same year, Sony Giyono and Panidjanto (Ryanto), employees of PT Hexapilar Nusantara, were taken hostage on 8 November 1996 by Arnold Tumutu's troops of the KODAM V, Rusa in Upkin village, Waropko sub-district, Merauke, during a survey for the construction of the Trans-Irian Highway links in Waropko subdistrict. According to a spokesman for Trikora Military Command in Irian Jaya, Lt. Col. Maulud Hidayat, a fifteen-man special operation team, comprising military and police personnel led by soldiers from the Tribuana of Army Special Forces (KOPASSUS) was engaged in the rescue operation. The team confirmed that "despite being held captive since November 1996, Ryanto appeared healthy. But Ryanto, a father of two, said during his captivity he was treated well by the GPK".<sup>52</sup> Thus, in engaging in hostage-taking, the OPM was following humanitarian guidelines in their treatment of the hostages, while successfully attracting world attention to their cause.

During this period ABRI began to extend their activities along the border with Papua New Guinea. The OPM's camps along the border became the main targets of the Indonesian operation, not only to release the hostages but also to implement their plan of eliminating the OPM. ABRI used a divide-and-rule policy towards the local people and distributed pamphlets calling for surrender. Seeking hostages and military advantage, ABRI repeatedly violated Papua New Guinea's territorial sovereignty. US-

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<sup>51</sup> In the Four Corners program of the ABC in Sydney on 12 July 1999, a serious allegation was made against the ICRC and the Indonesian government for violation of ICRC 's humanitarian symbols and the deployment of mercenaries in the operation. (see also Press Release of the OPM on 12 July 1999).

<sup>52</sup> *Reuters* 14 May 1997.

supplied OV10-Bronco aircraft strafed the headquarters of the PEMKA and Victoria in 1978 and burned villages along both sides of the border, killing a considerable number of people and destroying houses and gardens. Many civilians retired into the jungle for protection, where many of them later died from hunger, disease and lack of medicines; others fled to sanctuary in West Sepik Province of Papua New Guinea. Belatedly, there were expressions of Australian and US concern at Indonesia's tactics here.<sup>53</sup> Land attacks were also intensified. On 12 April 1981, for example, the ABRI under the command of Major Gafar Arifuddin, Chief of Operational Section of the KOREM, violated the border in an attempt to release Ling Tay Hock, a Malaysian who had been taken hostage together with 21 others during a TEPENAL raid at a Malaysian timber camp at Holtekang, under the leadership of Alex Derey and Marthen Wenda.<sup>54</sup> On the diplomatic level, Jakarta pressured Port Moresby to engage in territorial military cooperation to disrupt the OPM's activities along the border; Papua New Guinea declined to take part in joint operations, but stepped up patrols along the border.

The OPM is not, and never has been, a terrorist organisation; it is a national liberation front. The movement has always taken its humanitarian approach seriously, in accordance with international principles. What the OPM has striven for consistently is to fight against the colonial system perpetuated by the government of Indonesia and its state institutions including the military, not against the Indonesian people. In the spirit of Brotherly Love and humanitarian values, all OPM hostages have been well treated in accordance with the Geneva Convention; they have been provided basic needs and protection from the more radical elements of the

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<sup>53</sup> Budiardjo and Liem, *op.cit.*:69.

<sup>54</sup> Samsuddin, *op.cit.*:543-547.

movement. The OPM has explored ways to release them through third party mediation. The goodwill of the OPM was witnessed by Father Ombos:

A day later, the Defence Minister of the OPM visited us. He brought blankets, t-shirts, shorts, and soap and gave these to each of us. Maloali got a blanket, Admiral got a shirt and I received a t-shirt, shorts and underpants.<sup>55</sup>

The OPM, however, continually failed to gain support for its activities from the Papua New Guinea government. In the process of handing over the Aurina hostages in 1978, Otto Ondawame had on a few occasions visited Papua New Guinea to deal with local churches and the PNG Defence Force about how the hostages would be released. The Somare government, however, maintained its hardline foreign policy towards the OPM, and Port Moresby used the situation to try to destroy the organisation. The target group was the OPM's leaders, Jacob H. Prai and Otto Ondawame of PEMKA and Seth Rumkorem and Yariseouw of Victoria, who were the prominent leaders in the 1970s.

The Somare government was not willing to use direct force against the OPM, and despite pressure from Jakarta, was reluctant to engage in direct military cooperation against the OPM. Instead, Port Moresby agreed to hold peace talks, and the leaders of the OPM were invited to Vanimo (the capital of Sandaun [West Sepik] Province) for talks on 26-27 September 1978 to negotiate the fate of the hostages and discuss the border crisis. However, when the OPM leaders arrived in Vanimo, instead of having a serious discussion, Jacob Prai and Otto Ondawame, together with two couriers, Nick Meset (a West Papuan pilot) and Fred Eiserman (a PNG-naturalised Australian), were arrested on 27 September by Papua New Guinea police.

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<sup>55</sup> Samsuddin, *op.cit.*:326-327.

They were charged with being illegal immigrants and transferred to Bomana Jail in Port Moresby. The so-called peace talks were simply a trap to capture the OPM leaders; the Melanesian brothers betrayed their own fellow Melanesians who were seeking justice, peace and democracy.

These arrests and the court procedure which followed were openly criticised as immoral and illegal by the Papua New Guinea general public. Expressing their solidarity with the peoples' struggle, Papua New Guinea students burned the Indonesian flag in front of the Indonesian Embassy in Port Moresby. A handful of politicians, including Iambakey Okuk, MP and the leader of the opposition, criticised the government. Okuk said: "the government should immediately end the prolonged detention of Jacob Prai and Otto Ondawame".<sup>56</sup> In cooperation with solidarity groups in Australia, Papua New Guinea and Holland, the cabinet ministers of the National De Facto government who lived in Papua New Guinea and the Netherlands appealed against the charges by hiring prestigious lawyers—Queen's Counsels from Australia—to defend Prai and Ondawame in the Papua New Guinea National Court.<sup>57</sup> Despite the lack of clear evidence against the two defendants, and the public outcry and criticism, the court rejected the appeal and the leaders were imprisoned for two months in Bomana Corrective Institution, Port Moresby. Six months later, the Papua New Guinea government decided to deport the two men to Indonesia, under an extradition treaty signed in 1978. However, this was prevented by the direct intervention of Prof. Saparkummar, the Special Representative for the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) for the Asia and Pacific region, based in Kuala Lumpur. This enabled the two men to escape

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<sup>56</sup> *Post Courier* 31 January 1979.

<sup>57</sup> Adolf Sawery, letter 11 November 1978 addressed to Chairman of Stichting Hulp Papuas in Nood in Ede-Wageningen.

execution. Responding to a formal request from the UNHCR, the Ola Ulstein government of Sweden welcomed the two men and three others – Amos F. Indey, Darius Maury and Nicolaus Messet—and granted them asylum as political refugees. This marked a new starting point in international concern about the armed conflict in West Papua.

The arrest of the OPM leaders and the border crisis created an emergency not only for Markas PEMKA but also for the border policy of Papua New Guinea. First, for the OPM the arrests meant a total loss of their leaders. TEPENAL claimed that their leaders should be returned, a claim which was unacceptable to Port Moresby for security reasons. TEPENAL consequently attacked outposts along the border with PNG, including Jako refugee camp on 2 April 1979, aiming to recruit new leaders. Their target preferences were Felix Amokowame and Otto Ofide, who had just arrived back after escaping from prison in Abepura, but both men rejected the request.<sup>58</sup>

The crisis also impacted on Port Moresby's border policy. The escalation of border incidents has always been a major concern in Port Moresby.<sup>59</sup> The hostage crisis on the border in 1978 provided an important motive for the government of Papua New Guinea to review its border policy in ways that disadvantaged the OPM in the years that followed. The governments of Indonesia and Papua New Guinea signed a Border Agreement on 17 December 1979 in Jakarta, which was reinforced in 1980. Article 8/1 concerning security <sup>60</sup> allowed both parties to use force in

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<sup>58</sup> Obert Nagapruol (January 1997), interviewed by the author, Port Moresby.

<sup>59</sup> Babani Maraga (1988). "Papua New Guinea Views" in Edward P. Wolfers (ed.), *Beyond the Border, Indonesia and Papua New Guinea South East Asia and the South Pacific*, The University of Papua New Guinea Press & The Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, Suva, p.113.

<sup>60</sup> Wolfers, *op.cit.*:156-157.

districts along the border in their respective territories in order to destroy the OPM and its sympathisers. Subsequently, the movement of the OPM in the border region was severely restricted.


#### **4.4.2.4. Ekspedisi Komando Kemerdekaan Papua (ESKOPME)**

Let me now move back to 1976 and describe the OPM's decentralised military campaign from 1976 to 1980 as an example of the positive effects of the new structure. The military campaign which took place in five regions, KODAM I, II, III, IV and V, (see Map 2) will be described briefly, focusing on the reasons for the campaign, the actual activities, the failure to maintain the campaign, and its general significance. \*

As we have seen, the leadership split opened a new chapter in the OPM's history. The change opened new fronts, increased mass participation and national consciousness, and broke the previous isolation. The notion of Papuans as a primitive people always embroiled in tribal wars slowly began to die. Now, Papuans in every region had a moral duty to make their own contribution to the struggle. The decentralisation of power brought about radical change in the minds and hearts of the Papuans in interior regions. Radicalisation of national sentiment became widespread in the interior in a relatively short period.

The term "war" has negative connotations for many people, but for the highlanders in West Papua, war is a part of their culture and way of life, educating boys into manhood. To this end, small children, especially boys, are encouraged to take part in physical activities.

Map 2: Divisions of Regional Commands of the TEPENAL



Guerrilla warfare against Jakarta has now become a natural part of highland traditions. The peoples of tribes such as the Dani, Amungme, Moni, Ekage, Yali, Ayamaru, Muyu, and Nduga have continued the struggle, defending their lives and communities. War against the foreign occupation forces is seen by Papuans as an obligation, for their very survival. The wars that erupted in the highlands in the 1970s were not accidental occurrences or "civil wars", as Jakarta claimed; they were deliberately organised by the OPM. This is illustrated by the ESKOPME long march, which lasted from 7 April 1976 to 1980, in KODAM II, III and V of the TEPENAL.

#### **4.4.2.4.1. Liberation Wars in KODAM II-Tabuni in Jayawijaya Region**

True public political awareness and localisation of power began when a group of Dani people, under the leadership of Hans Bomai, arrived in Markas PEMKA and made a formal request to the Council for Restoration of Justice for reinforcements. At that time, the Dani people had already opened a new guerrilla base in the Baliem valley. The Council decided to send reinforcements. In *Surat Perintah Jalan* No:004/P/p/76, dated 13 December 1976, the chairman ordered Bonny Niwilingame to lead fifteen guerrillas in a new expedition into the heart of West Papua and then to his own homeland, Amungsa in the southern highlands. These sixteen people were designated as follows: seven to the Baliem valley, three to the Mimika (Fakfak) region, two to Paniai and four to the Merauke region.<sup>61</sup> Mathius Tabu, a brother of Marthen Tabu, was among the seven sent to the Baliem valley and was appointed the regional commander. (He was replaced in 1977 by Major Alex Derey.) This guerrilla expedition was called *Expedisi Komando Kemerdekaan Papua Barat* (ESKOPME), a name given to it by

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<sup>61</sup> Bonifasius Niwilingame (June 1980). *Laporan Aktivitas TEPENAL thn 1977/80*. No:001/A- 1/Mil/KODAM III/1/1980, PEMKA.

members of the KODAM III, Nemang Kawi, Fakfak. The major tasks of the mission were to establish a base, to implement political and military training programs, to engage mass participation and mobilisation, and to carry out a mass political awareness program. In an operational order dated 29 August 1977, given by the chairman of the Council to the regional commander of the Tabuni Command, Major Alex Derey (who replaced Mathius Tabu) it was stated clearly:

Educate national awareness to our people in order to prevent any negative influences...This political education will not only be limited to Wamena region alone but it must expand into the whole region, for example, to Agimuga, Paniai, Enarotali, Tembagapura (Fakfak), Oksibil, Merauke, etc.<sup>62</sup>

This statement was strengthened by Bonifasius Niwilingame, who said: "the primary objective of the expedition into the regions was not to declare a war but to initiate an increasing political awareness program".<sup>63</sup> With this in mind, the team left PEMKA on 14 January 1976, arriving in the Baliem valley on 21 February; there, it launched a public awareness campaign at Ilaga, Pyramid, Sinak, Bokondini. Mulia, Mapenduma, Munak, Eraguiyam and Kelila; established a new base; took security measures; and made contact with officials in Wamena. For these purposes, on 7 February 1977 Niwilingame divided the Baliem Valley into two operational regions: Eastern and Western commands. The Eastern Command was headed by K. Komba, assisted by secretary A. Tabuni, and security was in the hands of Mathias Wenda, who is now Supreme Commander of the OPM. On 15 February 1977, Western Command was established with Elias Yikwa, a member of the West Papuan parliament, as chairman, assisted by Simon

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<sup>62</sup> Alex Derey (1977). *Document OPM, 29.8.1977: Operational Order from the Chairman of Council, PEMKA.*

<sup>63</sup> Bonifasius Niwilingame (January 1997), interviewed by the author, Maprik.

Tagawak, A. Yikwa, Weli Togoli and Simon Karoba. (Yikwa died at Markas PEMKA ten years later.) And on 21 March 1977, the headquarters of KODAM II Tabuni, Magambilis was inaugurated by Bonifasius Niwilingame; later, on 4 April 1977, a new base was also established in Tiom.

While Bonifasius Niwilingame and the others were engaged in the public awareness program, an operational order of the Chief of Staff, Marthen Tabu, arrived on 2 March 1977, carried by Anis Weyab. The major points of the order were that the guerrillas should be strengthened and should maintain readiness, waiting the commands of their superior. The message was very clear, but it was misunderstood by Major Mathius Tabu, the operational commander, who attacked a mission station, Kampung Pagai, near Mamberamo River on 7 April 1977 and continued the attack into the other sub-districts such as Pireme near Makki. Under the leadership of Boas Wanimbo, further attacks took place in Kobakma, Kelila, Makki, Tiom, Angguruk, Wamena, Pyramid, Wasilima, Kimbin, Wurik, Karubaga and Usilimo in Kurulu subdistrict, and in Bokondini, Abusa, Ampena, Lima, Simona, Wolo and Angguruk in Kurima subdistrict. All of these events occurred between 7 April 1977 and 17 April 1978 in Jayawijaya district. They destroyed many essential assets of the Indonesian Armed Forces, including airstrips, food stocks, and weapon stocks; some planes were also destroyed or shot down. A helicopter which carried five passengers (four Australians and one Indonesian), reportedly engaged in military map-making in West Papua, was shot down. The passengers, who were seriously injured, were sent to Australia for medical care. This encounter was denied by ABRI who claimed that the crash occurred because of bad weather.<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> Cenderawasih Badan Pelaksana Intelijen, "Daftar Kejadian tahun 1977 Khusus Daerah Kabupaten Jayawijaya". [See also Budiardjo and Liang (1984) *West Papua: the Obliteration of a People*, TAPOL. Revised Second Edition, London, pp. 115-120].

In response, the Indonesian Armed Forces intensified their counter-attacks against the OPM. American-made OV-10 Bronco bombers strafed and bombed regions suspected of guerrilla activity. There were varying reports of the number of war victims. The Jakarta daily newspaper *Kompas*, for example, reported that there had been a very large number of victims and that the Baliem River was full of corpses, affecting fish in the river. *The Times* of London reported that the Indonesian Armed Forces had “stepped up bombing raids along the border, using American-built aircraft”, and reported that these aircraft were being used to clean out a small nest of guerrillas.<sup>65</sup> At the end of August 1977, another air strike took place in Akimuga district, reportedly killing a considerable number of civilians and destroying their property.<sup>66</sup> During these operations a considerable number of people, mostly civilians, were killed and their properties (houses, gardens, pigs) were destroyed. On 29 July 1977 in Kurelu ABRI burned down houses and destroyed property indiscriminately, forcing a considerable number of civilians to surrender. On the other hand, ABRI also suffered heavy casualties. A detailed account of such casualties was reported by the local military commander.<sup>67</sup>

In order to clarify the situation, the Council sent Alex Derey, the head of diplomacy, to the Baliem valley to assist Mathius Tabu and the others. In an operational order dated 29 August 1977, the significance of public awareness programs and the need for expansion into the other regions were clearly stated. In a joint statement, Bonifasius Niwilingame and Alex Derey criticised Mathius Tabu for his emotional act. This positive criticism

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<sup>65</sup> Budiardjo and Liong, *op.cit.*:68.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*:35.

<sup>67</sup> See *Ibid.*: appendix.

developed into a deep personal clash between Derey and Mathius Tabu later in 1978, ultimately causing Mathius Tabu to cooperate with Indonesia.

#### **4.4.2.4.2. Campaigns in KODAM III-Nemang Kawi in Fakfak Region and KODAM IV-Gobai in Paniai Region**

In line with the major campaign objectives, the guerrilla campaigns also extended into KODAM III, IV and V. While KODAM I and II were engaging in their campaigns, the expansion of new fronts was carried out in the Fakfak region in the south, in Paniai in the west, and in Merauke in the southeast. Bonifasius Niwilingame and Kletus (Kelly) Kwalik were appointed as regional commander and assistant respectively of the KODAM III-Nemang Kawi, Fakfak.

In the spirit of localisation, the commander of the Nemang Kawi ordered Kwalik and Daniel Kogoya to prepare to establish a new base in Fakfak region. Consequently, on 22 January 1977 the assistant commander of KODAM III of the TEPENAL, Kwalik, with Daniel Kogoya, Anis Weyap and Karel Uropkul, left the headquarters in the south, in the direction of Akimuga district. Bonifasius Niwilingame and Kletus Kwalik, both Amungme and former students of the Catholic Teachers College of Taruna Bhakti, Waena, in Abepura, had also both attended a military officers training course conducted by the Rumkorem government after they arrived in the headquarters in 1974.

The team left the Baliem Valley on 22 February 1977. It started new awareness programs and mass-mobilisation; arranged secret meetings with a Papuan in the Indonesian army (Victus Wamang from Tembagapura) to distribute documents as part of the awareness program; and built up networks in Akimuga, Enarotali, Timika, Tembagapura, Wahgete, Nabire,

and Kokonao. The result of the operation was reported on 24 March 1977. From Kwiyawagi, Niwilingame then ordered Daniel Kogoya to Mapenduma. Kogoya was advised not to engage in any guerrilla activities, but this order was later undermined by Hermanus Kogoya, who attacked Mapenduma on 2 May 1977, and the leadership was forced to suspend all activities in the subdistrict. Because the situation in the Baliem valley was so tense, Niwilingame returned there and established a new base in Eragai on 5 April 1977. After evaluating the campaign, the crucial decision was taken that Niwilingame would be fully responsible for KODAM III-Nemang Kawi, leaving Tabu and Derey to take responsibility for the Baliem Valley affairs.

The presence of OPM commanders in the Fakfak and Paniai regions attracted the masses, leading to the establishment of a new training base of the MAKODAM III, Nemang Kawi where basic military training was conducted. More than 5,000 Amungme, Nduga, Damal, Moni, Ekagi, Sempan, Nakai and Asmat people participated in this program.<sup>68</sup> Propaganda offices were established in these two districts and the guerrilla campaign intensified. In 1976/77, police and military posts in Ilaga, Jila, Akimuga and Tembagapura were systematically attacked. The local people dug trenches, two metres deep, as a defence system. Three sections of guerrillas, under the leadership of Kletus Kwalik, Anis Weyap and Daniel Kogoya, attacked police and military posts as well as the government office in Akimuga on 18 June 1977. The OPM killed 44 Indonesian soldiers, took hostages including the head of the subdistrict, and seized many arms. In this campaign, women participated alongside men, providing food and intelligence networks.

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<sup>68</sup> Bonifasius Niwilingame, Simon Aim and Soter Pogolamun (January 1997), interviewed by the author, Wewak.

Akimuga soon became a ghost town. In a fourth counter-insurgency attack, two boats, supported by two Bronco OV-10s, attacked Akimuga<sup>69</sup> and regained control of it. Subsequently, a considerable number of civilians died not only from bullets and bombardment but also from hunger and illness. The mission station, health centres, schools, air strips, and communication networks were closed down. Father Frankenmolen OFM, the local priest of Aramsolki, was badly beaten by Indonesian soldiers. Women were raped systematically. Kwalik consequently ordered the civilians to flee into the jungle to escape from the indiscriminate slaughter and repression.

On 7 May 1977 Regional Commander Niwilingame called for reinforcements. At the same time, he sent an expedition to the Merauke region in an attempt to establish a new network in the southeast region. A section of guerrillas was first sent under the command of Karel Urapkulin, but the expedition experienced a lot of problems, including resistance from isolated local tribes in the south, and health and food supply problems. In a second attempt, a team led by David Kogoya and Anis Weyab left KODAM III on 12 May 1978 together with a few guerrillas of KODAM III, including Anton Tsungomol and Bernard Pogolamun (who died in East Awin in 1992). Simon Aim and Daniel Deikme were ordered to set up a new communications network between the Merauke region and the Central Headquarters of PEMKA. Despite much hardship on the way, caused by hunger, illness and the hostility of the isolated local people,<sup>70</sup> the ESKOPME team arrived in Merauke region on 23 August 1977 and then proceeded to the border region one week later.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> Osborne, *op.cit.*:69.

<sup>70</sup> Including such ethnic groups as the Momuna, Una, Iwur, Somahai, Citak, Ngalum, Yali, Kowai, Kombai, Yair and Ok.

<sup>71</sup> Ninanti, *op.cit.*:Appendix.

The presence of the OPM in the Mimika (Fakfak) region was heartily welcomed by the Amungme people. In accord with the view of the Amungme people, the CRJ believed that the presence of the Freeport mine in *Amungsa* (the land of Amungme) had not brought about any fundamental improvements in the wellbeing of the local people. On the contrary, the destruction of the socio-ecological system had brought serious threats to the very survival of (highland) Amungme and (lowland) Kamoro cultures, traditions, and ways of life. The January 1974 agreement between the Amungme, Freeport McMoRan and the government of Indonesia had little positive effect on the local people. The Amungme and Kamoro had long been concerned about the lack of respect for and recognition of their rights. The OPM also regarded Freeport as a puppet of the Suharto capitalist regime. Indonesia's economy was becoming heavily dependent on Freeport tax payments in the form of royalties, dividends and income tax (see Chapter 7). However the living conditions of the landowners are still no better now than they were fifty years earlier. The Council leadership sent an operational order to the Regional Command, received on 16 November 1977, to start negotiations with Freeport over compensation for loss of land, and the withdrawal of the military presence;<sup>72</sup> the OPM ordered that, if these demands were not met, it was to bring the mining operation to a stop. The attempt to negotiate with Freeport on the basis of this document failed.

While the expedition team moved northwards, a plan for attacking Freeport became one of the primary items on the military agenda of the KODAM III in early June 1978. After leaving Kwalik and Silas Wandik-Kogoya in Akimuga, Niwilingame led guerrillas to Tembagapura where

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<sup>72</sup> Document No:108/XVII-PR/SUP/1/1977.

preparation work took place over three weeks. During this period, Niwilingame sent four guerrilla teams to the Paniai region, led by Donatus Waine, Ignatius Mamukang, Mathias Gobay and Yarrus Kibak respectively, and ordered them to open new bases and pursue an increased public awareness program.

The Freeport mining area was attacked on 22 June 1977 as an expression of the discontent of the Amungme. Trucks, bridges, factories and the airport were destroyed and pipelines, which transferred tons of partly processed minerals 109 km from the Ertsberg mine to Amamapare on the coast, were dynamited. The Amungme, Moni, Ekagi, Nduga and Dani peoples who worked for Freeport joined the guerrillas and blockaded important installations. The primary reason for this attack was not just the provocation of the Amungme in Akimuga, as Doyle suggested<sup>73</sup>, but also the lack of recognition of and respect for Amungme rights, including the right to compensation for loss of land and resources. According to Soter Pogolamun, a former Freeport employee who disagreed with Doyle's analysis:

We believed that when Freeport entered our traditional land, our condition would be improved, our children would get good education, our health service would improve and we would get good house and food. But nothing happened. The Amungme have very little opportunity to get a position in the company. Many of our people were killed since Bechtel [the original construction contractors] came into the region. Amungme have never been paid any compensation for the loss of our traditional land and human rights abuses. We were very angry. When we heard that the OPM had arrived in our region, we were very happy. Many of us joined the OPM and took part actively in planning to attack Freeport.<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> Osborne, *op.cit.*:69.

<sup>74</sup> Soter Pogolamun (December 1997), interviewed by the author, Port Moresby.

This attack was the outcome of coordination between the OPM and landowners. The company was estimated to have lost at least \$US11 million per week during the attack.<sup>75</sup>

Indonesian military reinforcements were sent in to Freeport to regain control of the situation. Combining their military and persuasive approaches, the ABRI launched an intensive military action against the OPM. As usual, the guerrillas escaped from these massive attacks and the civilians became the main target of Indonesia's military repression. A considerable number of the landowners were intimidated or murdered. According to the report of the regional commander of the Nemang Kawi, 460 civilians were tortured, summarily executed, or disappeared. Military reprisals were widespread in the sub-districts of Akimuga, Ilaga, Jila, Tembagapura, Tiom, Mapenduma, Oksibil, Senggi, Abmisibil, Kiwirok, and Sawerma. Much livestock, including 158 pigs and chickens, 188 gardens and 176 houses in those sub-districts were destroyed by the Civil Defence (Hansip) and ABRI soldiers of the 753 Battalion of the *Kommando Resimen Militer* (KOREM) for the Paniai, Serui and Biak regions during the 1977-1979 period.<sup>76</sup> Two examples demonstrate the manner in which ABRI acted. First is the case of Constan Hanggaibak, the former District Commissioner of Timika in 1974. He was merely suspected of cooperating with the OPM because he is Amungme, and was arrested and imprisoned in 1977.<sup>77</sup> A more extreme case was the treatment of Kibak Nagalolan in Jila village in 1978. Nagalolan was hung up and his head cut off; his blood was collected in

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<sup>75</sup> Osborne, *op.cit.*:69.

<sup>76</sup> Niwilingame, *op.cit.*:Report.

<sup>77</sup> Machael Manufandu (12-18 September 1995). *Mutiara 777*, Jakarta, p.5

a bucket and the massed crowd were ordered to drink it. This incident has been reported by R. Osborne<sup>78</sup> and by eyewitnesses.<sup>79</sup>

In an extension of the counter-insurgency measures, 752 Battalion of the Indonesian army, based in Nabire, attacked the OPM bases in those areas, particularly in Jila sub-district. Houses, gardens and other property of the people were destroyed, and the Amungme people of Jila and surrounding areas were harassed when ABRI could not find members of the OPM. These human rights abuses increased when the OPM took Lieutenant Colonel Sodemo hostage and destroyed his aircraft at Jila airport.<sup>80</sup> A further report on human rights abuses was made by TEPENAL Kelly Kwalik, who claimed that 42,660 people had been killed by ABRI in Akimuga, Jila, Timika, Tembagapura, Tsinga, Ilaga, Dillam, Kwiyawagi, Benangga, Mapenduma and Sepan.<sup>81</sup> On the basis of a report by Sydney-based freelance journalist Ben Bohane, John Wright from the *Brisbane Courier Mail* also reported on 23 December 1995, that 43,000 civilians had been killed in the region.

A new OPM campaign program started immediately. Expansion into the other regions, particularly into KODAM IV and V, opened new posts and communications networks and new post commanders were appointed. A new basic training program was started, running from January to March 1978, and a second program was held from November 1978 to February 1979. The guerrillas engaged in campaigns in Fakfak, Paniai and Merauke regions;

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<sup>78</sup> Osborne, *op.cit.*:71.

<sup>79</sup> Bonifasius Niwilingame (24 Juli 1985). *Report: Bersama Ini Kami Laporkan Beberapa Peristiwa -Peristiwa Penting Antara Lain Pembunuhan Masal atas Rakyat Papua Barat Didaerah Pegunungan Tengah Dibagian Barat Dari Papua Barat Oleh Pemerintah Republik Indonesia*, Markas Besar Nasional OPM.

<sup>80</sup> Simon Dekme (9 January 1997), interviewed by the author, Port Moresby.

<sup>81</sup> Kelly Kwalik (May 1996). *Report: "Fakta 2 Pengorbanan jiwa bangsa Melanesia Barat Sejak Tahun 1962-1996 Dalam Wilayah KODAM III-Nemang Kawi, Fakfak, Puncak Abadi Jaya, MAKODAM III, TEPENAL.*

six groups were sent to bases at Jila, Mapenduma, Agandugume, Kwiyawagi, Hitadipa, and Mapia respectively. On 17 April 1979, the guerrillas destroyed a Boeing aircraft, owned by Bali Air Lines, and Lieutenant Colonel Sadewo Suwondo was captured. They also confiscated a radio in Jila (1978), and three Mausers, four grenades, and four automatic weapons in Ilaga and Akimuga (1979). As ransom for the hostages, the guerrillas made three demands: the return of Jacob H. Prai and Otto Ondawame from Port Moresby to PEMKA; the stopping of mineral exploitation in the whole of West Papua; and compensation of Rp 5 million rupiah and 5,000 military backpacks. This ransom demand was never paid. The hostages were released two months later.

#### **4.4.2.4.3. Expansion into KODAM V-Rusa in the Merauke Region**

Despite these guerrilla successes, the military campaign in general faced severe problems through lack of communication with central command, the inaccessible terrain, the self-isolation of the Nemang Kawi Command, and the non-arrival of reinforcements. Communications with central headquarters were cut off as a result of the events in the Baliem valley in 1977; this made it extremely difficult to report on the human rights abuses. The guerrilla forces in Jila demanded reinforcements, in order to avenge the death of Kibak Naogolan and the others. The OPM leadership consequently decided to send guerrillas to the Markas PEMKA in the north looking for further support both in manpower and material. The first stage of the expedition took a triangular route: Jayapura—Tembagapura—Paniai, Merauke—Jayapura (see again Map 2).

Members of the second expeditionary team continued their journey to the headquarters of PEMKA, to fulfil this mission and also to open new

military bases in Merauke region. On the way, having gone into the Ok Tedi mine area looking for food, they were arrested by the PNG army and sentenced to imprisonment in Wewak. However, the guerrillas were able to escape and return to their headquarters. The security of the Ok Tedi copper mining operation in Papua New Guinea, and the increase of OPM activities in the Baliem Valley and Merauke region engaged the PNGDF and the ABRI, so that movement of the OPM in those areas was severely restricted. On the other hand, Anton Tsungomol and his colleagues returned home in March 1979 to the headquarters of MAKODAM III Nemang Kawi, in the southern highlands of West Papua, and reported on the success of their expedition in opening communications between KODAMs in the north, east, south, central and west.

Acknowledging the people's demands for logistic support and material, and for contact with central command, a new, bigger expeditionary team was moved to the Central Headquarters, PEMKA, in the north. Under the leadership of Niwilingame, Commander of KODAM III, Nemang Kawi, 112 guerrillas started a long march from Jila, Fakfak region on 13 January 1980 to Jayapura via Merauke. Kwalik later replaced Niwilingame as the new regional commander. After spending three months on the way, in a journey of much hardship, the 109 remaining guerrillas arrived in the Merauke region on 22 March 1980.

The OPM needed to expand into new areas and the Merauke region, being highly militarised and a major destination for transmigration, was an important target. After having a discussion with East Timor Liberation Front leader, Ramos Horta, and Dr Hassan Tengku Di Tiro of the Aceh National Liberation Front in Stockholm in January 1980, the OPM political

bureau abroad ordered Marthen Tabu to raise the matter of establishing new military bases in the Merauke region in a cabinet meeting. On 2 January 1980, following a presidential decision, Gerard Tom Ninanti was ordered to establish a new base there, in order to expand the OPM's influence and oppose further transmigration and militarisation (see p.149 (fn)).

While Niwilingame's team was on their way north, another expedition to the south was planned when Anis Weyab and Daniel Kogoya arrived in PEMKA, after escaping from Wewak prison. The new expeditionary team, led by Gerardus Tomy, the Regional Commander for KODAM V- Rusa, Merauke, consisted of seven men, namely Thadeus Yogi, Karel Kelanangame, Emanuel Nagapruol, Anis Weyap, Nico Wenda, Jacob Hubi and Daniel Kogoya. The team arrived in MAKODAM V, Merauke on 8 March and two weeks later it met up with Niwilingame and his troops, who had arrived in the region on 22 March. A month later, an exchange of troops took place. Tadeus Yogi, Daniel Kogoya and the other troops left for the Paniai and East Mimika (Fakfak) regions respectively, while Niwilingame, with a number of guerrillas, decided to continue the journey to the Central Headquarters of the OPM in the north. On 19 April 1980, three days before their departure, news of the arrest of President Tabu came over the radio.<sup>82</sup> After climbing many hills and mountains, and crossing many deep valleys and rivers, they finally arrived at headquarters on 10 June 1980.

The journey of this ESKOPME expedition took almost five months, and the whole decentralisation process took almost four years, from 14 December 1976 to 10 June 1980. As a result of the expedition, five regional

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<sup>82</sup> Marthen Tabu was President of the National De Facto government 1978-1980. He was persuaded by the Indonesian military to surrender, arrested in Port Numbay and sentenced to Cipinang prison in Jakarta. He died in prison in 1984.

commands had been established, each with its own command structure. Together with the decentralisation of power, cooperation and new communication networks between KODAMs were also established. However, local resistance and lack of logistic support remained problems. More than 30 guerrillas were killed or died on the expedition. Ten of them were killed and eaten by cannibalistic groups in the Oksibil region; the rest died through hunger and illness.<sup>83</sup>

The New Order was established primarily to expand the OPM's regional political and military influence, to open new communication networks, to implement effective political and military education and training, and to expand the political awareness program. Besides decentralisation and increased local participation, the forces were mobilized in strategic areas such as Jayapura and industrial towns such as Tembagapura, Timika and Sorong. A very important contribution of the OPM in the highlands was introducing new influences in isolated areas. The OPM became a catalyst in forcing the Indonesian administration to review its rural development policies, leading to new administrative regencies in the highland regions, such as Timika, Mulia and Paniai.

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<sup>83</sup> Those who died during the expedition were: Wim Wandikbo and Karibat Kogoya (killed by isolated people in the head of Baliem river); Matius Wenda (died of hunger in the headwaters of the Brazza and Mapi rivers; Lukas Amokowame and Ben Murip (died in Pos Mangga of hunger); Keis Kasamol, Amos and Bernad (died in Bewani post from hunger and illness); Marius Magai, Joseph Magai, Jacky Magai, Kornelis Magai, Pasamal Alom, Philipus Kobogau, Alpius Kogoya, Legi Kogoya and a child (these ten were killed and eaten in Oksibil, being falsely suspected by the local OPM (and forces) of working with the enemy). David Dekme, a member of the ESKOPME team, interviewed by the author, Port Moresby, 1996.

#### 4.4.2.5. Frequent Leadership Shifts and their Consequences

Peter Savage noted in 1984 that "Since the arrest of J.H. Prai and O. Ondawame, guerrilla activity had declined along the border".<sup>84</sup> Repeating an earlier pattern in the RPG, the arrest of Prai and Ondawame produced a leadership shift. Recurring power struggles within the National De Facto group indicated that PEMKA lacked strong leadership. However, contrary to Osborne's claim,<sup>85</sup> the PEMKA group did not split into small factions, but maintained cohesion as a group despite power struggles.

In an official handover in 1978, Marthen Tabu, the former chief of staff of the TEPENAL, replaced Jacob H. Prai as the new president of the National De Facto Government. To fill the leadership vacuum while he was in Bomana Gaol (Port Moresby), on 30 September 1978 Prai authorised Marthen Tabu to take over power. On 23 December 1979, during an emergency congress held in Markas PEMKA, the parliament of West Papua inaugurated him officially as President of the National De Facto Government of West Papua. This leadership change was endorsed by senior cabinet members abroad at a ministerial meeting held in Malmö, Sweden, on 12 January 1980. The new governmental structure was as follows:

President: Marthen Tabu

Vice President/Foreign Minister: Nicolaus Youwe

State Minister/General Coordinator: Jacob H. Prai.

State Minister, Special Affairs: Otto Ondawame

State Minister, General Advice: [the late] Menase Suwae

Chairman of the Senate: M. Fisor Yarisetouw

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<sup>84</sup> Peter Savage (1984). *Irian Jaya Reluctant Colony in Politics in the Pacific Islands*, University of South Pacific, Suva, p.24.

<sup>85</sup> Osborne, *op.cit.*:79.

Chief of Staff of the TEPENAL: Paulus Kuntuy

Chief of Papuan Intelligence Service: Jos Wayoi

The other posts did not change, and the policy of this new government was to continue the old policies and principles with only minor modifications. The government continued to engage in small scale guerrilla campaigns along the border, during which Camat (District Head) Yamlean and his staff of Waris sub-district were taken hostage. However the term of this government was very short, from 30 September 1978 to 19 April 1980.

Kerom region is the heart and central nerve of the national liberation struggle. For a long time, the people of Kerom and Kerom-born leaders such as Jacob H. Prai and Marthen Tabu, played a leading role in maintaining order and security in the region. The arrest of Prai was a setback in morale for Tabu and his people, and particularly for the guerrillas. The president faced extreme pressures from different directions. Brigadier-General Santosa of KODAM Trikora VIII used a persuasive approach, enticing the Kerom people to surrender to Indonesia with promises of development in the region. As a result of this "smiling policy", two thirds of the Kerom people surrendered to Indonesia, and resettled in Koya Baru, near Yamas.

Secret negotiations between Mathius Tabu, the younger brother of Marthen Tabu, and Alex Derey with Colonel Samsuddin, Field Commander of KOREM, Abepura, then took place, and Mathius Tabu persuaded his brother to surrender to Indonesia. In the process of negotiation, Derey visited military officials in Jayapura. Marthen Tabu surrendered to

Indonesia on 19 April 1980 but when he arrived in Jayapura he was arrested and sent to prison in Kalisosok, Jakarta, where he died in 1986.

Low-level conflict within PEMKA (principally between the Alex Derey and Mathius Tabu factions over who should be commander in KODAM II Tabuni, Jayawijaya) was the major reason why the Tabu regime ended in such a relatively short time. When Indonesia increased its military attacks on the OPM in Wamena, Hans Bomai and Marthen Wenda, together with considerable numbers of guerrilla troops, moved to the north and joined with Tabu's forces. This reinforcement had mixed consequences. The loss of control over parts of the central highlands and Keroom due to increased Indonesian military activity, and constant personal conflict between the Tabu brothers and Derey and Wenda, created major problems. The Tabu brothers wanted to release their hostages in exchange for ransom, but Derey and Wenda resisted this move, contributing to the difficult relationship. The loss of Prai and Ondawame in 1978 and then also of Marthen Tabu three years later, upset many people, particularly the peoples of Keroom. It was this loss, and distrust of new leaders, together with the persuasive strategy of Indonesia, which led small groups to surrender to Indonesia or cross the border into Papua New Guinea.

In contrast, the surrender of Tabu and his people did not greatly demoralise the guerrilla units<sup>86</sup>; instead, PEMKA became even stronger. The group could readily recruit new leaders, because there was an ongoing cadre education program. Ecky Bemey, from the Genyem subdistrict of Jayapura, replaced Tabu as president of the National De Facto Government

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<sup>86</sup> Tabu was believed to have had contact with the Indonesian military during his leadership, and was regarded as being behind the surrender of many Keroom people in the 1980s.

and he held this office from May 1980 to 1982. The government of Bemei maintained the policies, programs and organisational structure of its predecessors, but it placed more emphasis on military offensive, national unity and rural participation as the key objectives of the guerrilla campaigns, as well as encouraging local mass participation. As part of the latter, six Ormu women, Florida Yakadewa, Persila Yakadewa, Regina Yakadewa, Barbalina Ikari, Dominggas Firsrewa and Maryones Yarona undertook a peaceful demonstration in front of the Governor's office on 6 August 1980, raising the Morning Star flag and singing the national anthem. They were arrested and imprisoned and then raped systematically, with the result that one of them became pregnant.<sup>87</sup>

Another action was initiated by students from the Fakfak region. In 1982, students of Cenderawasih University in Abepura, including Simon Tuturop, Herman Heremba, Abraham Hegemur, David Hegemur and Geradus Timang, raised the West Papuan flag in front of the provincial parliament and read out a statement calling for a Free West Papua. They also were immediately arrested and imprisoned.<sup>88</sup>

A more successful event was the attack on a Malaysian-registered logging company, PT Hanurata, in Holtekang on 9 October 1981. This attack took fifty-eight workers hostage, including Ling Tay Hock. The guerrillas demanded a ransom of US\$2 million and 100 machine guns,<sup>89</sup> demands which were never met. The destruction of forests by this company was later criticised by international environmental groups. A World Rainforest Conference, held in Penang, Malaysia on 12-15 February 1992, also

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<sup>87</sup> Budiardjo and Liong, *op.cit.*:81-83.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.* :81-83.

<sup>89</sup> Osborne, *op.cit.*:89.

condemned the exploitation of forests by PT Intimapura, which operated in the Moi land of Sorong district, and urged the company to recognise and respect the right to self-determination of all indigenous peoples in West Papua.<sup>90</sup>

This action also had international repercussions. While attempting to release the hostages in 1982, in cooperation with influential Kerom leaders (such as Bernard Wally, Bas Mekawa, Petrus Sewi and Titus Tikus), Captain Gafar Arifuddin, ABRI Commander of Operational Section of the KOREM, Arso, violated Papua New Guinea territory in the Imonda subdistrict.<sup>91</sup> Another Indonesian troop incursion into Papua New Guinea occurred in June the same year, in which houses were burnt, and one man was killed and one injured. But Port Moresby chose not to criticise the ABRI; instead, it prepared to attack the OPM in cooperation with Indonesia.<sup>92</sup>

Another important action during Bemey's government was the attack, in October 1982, on the gaol at Abepura manned by *Komando Operasi Keamanan dan Ketertiban* (KOPKAMTIB/Operational Command for Security and Stability) aimed at recruiting students into PEMKA. A large guerrilla force, under the command of Bonifasius Niwilingame and Marthen Wenda, attacked the gaol and burned a motor cycle, destroyed a truck, raised the Morning Star, and sang the West Papuan national anthem. Though the Abepura raid did not succeed in its immediate goals, it marked the awakening of Indonesian media interest in OPM claims.<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>90</sup> *West Papuan Courier* March 1992, p.8.

<sup>91</sup> Samsuddin, *op.cit.*:417-457.

<sup>92</sup> Carmel Budiardjo (1992), *Tapol Bulletin No:113*, October, London.

<sup>93</sup> Osborne, *op.cit.*:88.

Regional cooperation declined significantly as a consequence of the cutting off of communication networks, and this forced the regional commanders to develop their own plans. While the Jayapura and Merauke regions engaged in guerrilla activities, Paniai region underwent a structural change. When Julius Go, the Regional Commander of Gobai, was killed, Thadeus Yogi took over, arriving there in June 1980. New political awareness and basic military training programs were immediately started, involving thousands of men and women of the Me people. These activities attracted international attention and were reported by a TV team from the Dutch KRO network.<sup>94</sup>

However Bemey's administration did not last long. He was poisoned by Indonesian military agents in his village in December 1981. The death of Bemey upset many, particularly within the PEMKA group; his capacity to organise military campaigns and his strong commitment to the National De Facto Government were greatly missed. New hope, however, emerged with the new recruits to both OPM groups.

As a result of the Abepura raid, many Papuans deserted the Indonesian army and, together with public servants and university students, joined the PEMKA and Victoria groups. James Nyaro, Elieser Bonay, A. Atabu, Menase Lokombre, and Ignasius Mujijau joined Victoria, while Doga Lasarious, Paul Zonggonau, Leo Wakerkwa, Henk Tsenawatme, Willem Kiriyar, David Jebled and Jesaya Magai joined PEMKA. Unlike older members, these new arrivals called loudly for national unity and reconciliation. During this period, the Victoria headquarters came under pressure from the PEMKA group and in June 1982, James Nyaro and his

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<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*:87.

colleagues were coerced into joining the PEMKA-Markas Pusat OPM, in the interests of national unity. A year later, on 1st July 1983, James Nyaro was elected President of the National De Facto Government of West Papua by the Senate. The structure of the new government was as follows:

President : Nyaro James

Vice President/Foreign Minister: Nicolaus Youwe

State Minister/Coordinator : Jacob H. Prai

State Minister/Special: Otto Ondawame

Defence and Communication Minister: Alex Derey

Chief of Staff : Simon Amisim

Chairman of Senate: Fisor M. Yarisetouw.

The OPM leaders abroad released a statement supporting this initiative. Despite some small modifications, including a new name and structure, the general policies of the new government were consistent with those of the previous governments of the PEMKA group. But a special initiative of the new government was an attempt to reunify PEMKA and Victoria, and peace talks between the two factions culminated in the signing of a new peace accord by the chairman of the Senate, Fisor M. Yarisetouw, and Marthin Prawar of the Victoria group. In other policy areas, two major concerns were the social and ecological impacts of the transmigration program, and the need to regionalise the issue of West Papua in South Pacific politics. The government also continued to engage in small-scale guerrilla activities. In March 1984, for example, the TEPENAL, led by Nyaro and Alex Derey, ambushed a small Cessna 185 aircraft in Yuruf, a border village, taking hostage a 29 year old Swiss pilot, Werner Wyder.<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>95</sup> See Osborne, *Indonesia's Secret War*, pp.103-106.

On the home front, a power struggle between Lazarus Doga, originally from Wamena, and Alex Derey, from Paniai, continued to create an unhealthy atmosphere, despite attempts by Bonifasius Niwilingame to resolve the conflict. This counter-productive personal conflict led to the killing of Doga. The circumstances surrounding the death of Doga are still unclear, but his close colleagues believe that political and personal jealousies were motives for his killing. As a consequence of this power struggle, President Nyaro, his Defence Minister Derey and Fisor Yarisetouw sought political asylum in Papua New Guinea. Before Nyaro and Derey left the headquarters of the OPM, they persuaded the legislative and executive members to sign a document which empowered the two men to carry out a diplomatic mission abroad (similarly to Seth Rumkorem and John Wakum in 1982). It is not clear what their role as representatives abroad was expected to be, or whether they merely manipulated their colleagues with empty promises; in practice, their presence abroad brought no significant advantages to the movement.

Power struggles and regional loyalties have always been sources of destructive conflict within the OPM. Just as during the RPG period, a tendency to anarchy was created in PEMKA as military units did not trust their superiors and *vice versa*. It was becoming clear that the government had not succeeded in bringing about any significant progress, nor had it strengthened national unity. Instead, it had actually fostered disunity, by encouraging regional loyalties and power struggles, resulting in instability and a lack of socio-economic progress.

Responding to this unhealthy situation, the leaders of the OPM abroad, particularly Prai and Ondawame in Sweden, denounced the governmental system in 1982 and urged the OPM leadership in Markas PEMKA to reform its policy and return to a stronger organisational system, arguing that the leadership system required particularly high levels of self-discipline, since the OPM was not yet recognised by any international governments and a strong organisational base would create more flexibility for the OPM's international mission. Nicolaus Youwe, however, rejected the reform policy, arguing that the existing government system was the best precondition for international respect and recognition.

In 1988, in a document signed by the leaders of the OPM abroad—Jacob H. Prai, Otto Ondawame and Max Ireeuw in Malmö—it was suggested once again that the governmental system must be reformed and the OPM clearly recognised as the legitimate national liberation movement of West Papua, having its headquarters in *Markas Pusat OPM* (MPOPM). This time, the recommendation was accepted, and a new reform program was introduced in the PEMKA. Power within the National Executive was divided between political and military bureaux, with the political bureau operating abroad and the military bureau operating within the country. This meant there was no longer a PEMKA or a National De Facto Government. The major objective of this crucial policy change was to unify the different factions into one national front. A new organisational structure was established with David Jebled as chairman, Bonifasius Niwilingame as political and military adviser, and Marthen Wenda as commander in chief of the TEPENAL, assisted by Hans Bomai. In a document dated 23 September 1988, the council members were named as David Jebled, B. Niwilingame, S.K. Amisim and S. Povay; Jacob H. Prai, Otto Ondawame and Max Ireeuw

were authorised as their official representatives abroad, with responsibility for international diplomatic campaigns.

In retrospect, it can be seen that the leadership split in 1976 had many positive consequences, bringing about significant political and military progress. The immediate advantages included an expansion of areas of influence, the opening up new bases, increasing mass participation and political awareness, intensifying the diplomatic campaign abroad, and, in the later years, internationalising the West Papuan issue. The decentralisation and the mass participation policies of the PEMKA groups were a significant catalyst in forcing the colonial power, Indonesia, to review its policy on West Papua. In turn, Jakarta's policies of raising the political status of remote regions such as Mimika, Paniai and Puncak Jaya, with new district administrative centres in Timika, Enarotali and Mulia, constructing new communication networks, most notably the Trans-Irian Highway, and, finally, emphasising the significance of economic development under the 'Go East Policy', all had consequences for the OPM.

The split and the subsequent expansion policies of OPM were also significant developments. The De Facto groups mounted successful campaigns in the 1970s and the 1990s, though there was a sharp decline in the 1980s. On the other hand, the lack of strong leadership, leadership changes and power struggles, and the problems of national unity resulted in instability and decline, which in turn created a bad image nationally and internationally and prevented progress. The processes of militarisation and Indonesianization in rural areas, particularly in strategic areas such as along the border, were also intensified, restricting the movement of the OPM. It thus remained to be seen if the PEMKA and its De facto governments could

achieve the OPM's key political goals. Before discussing this issue, let me turn to the situation of the RPG after the split.

#### **4.4.2.6. The Revolutionary Provisional Government of West Papua (RPG)**

As discussed above, the RPG was the first provisional government of West Papua, and Seth Rumkorem was its elected president. The power structure and political program were clearly presented and it operated effectively at both national and international levels. But many observers described the political power structure as nothing more or less than Indonesian-style democratic centralism, that is, guided democracy.

Following the split, the future of the Rumkorem government was in doubt for many reasons. For one, the number of supporters declined sharply, primarily because they joined with the majority group—PEMKA—or sought political asylum abroad. Osborne estimated the strength of the Victoria group at only 500 guerillas while the PEMKA group claimed over 30,000.<sup>96</sup> Moreover, the RPG government was criticised for its unlawful actions against the Chairman of the Senate and for its human rights abuses against civilians, as indicated in Prai's report.

As in 1971-1976, the Victoria group continued its old policy with only minor modifications. In contrast to the De Facto Government and the OPM, the RPG emphasised centralisation, urbanisation and an aggressive international campaign. On 15 July 1977, the group presented its action plan.<sup>97</sup> In the short term, it emphasised national consciousness, mass mobilisation, international solidarity, a strengthened front line, and national unity. In the long term, the group aimed to destroy colonialism

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<sup>96</sup> Osborne, *op.cit.* p.94

<sup>97</sup> See Djopari, *op.cit.*:118-119.

and paternalism, to establish an independent state, and to create a greater Papua by establishing a federal state with Papua New Guinea. International solidarity with progressive and revolutionary movements was another important part of the program.

On the international front, the RPG maintained its information office in Dakar. How successful this office was in generating support and sympathy is questionable, but the presence of the office in Black Africa was psychologically important. The chances of gaining international support in Africa were much more promising than in Europe. Yet over all these years, the issue of West Papua remains little known on the African continent, as I discovered when I toured West Africa in 1988-89.

Regionalisation of the issue in the South Pacific was another foreign policy objective. Benard Tanggahma, the former foreign minister of the RPG, who sought political support in South Pacific island countries, told the Pacific governments in June 1983 that:

The Free Papua Movement was not communist. Neither was it concerned with democratic [sic]. Its aim was to fight to free the indigenous West Papuans from colonial power. And it did not receive arms from communist countries. The few arms it had were captured from Indonesian soldiers.<sup>98</sup>

As with the National De Facto Government, ideological debate was not a priority of the RPG. This sense of an ideological vacuum has been criticised by some who argue that without a strong ideology, international support is unlikely to be forthcoming. This may be partly true. But it must also be realised that, geo-politically, West Papua was located between two power

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<sup>98</sup> *West Papuan Observer* 7(3) (May-June 1983), p.10.

blocs during the cold war; a wrong choice of ideology might have meant political suicide, and no regime of the OPM wanted to be a political victim for the second time. Ideological debate was thus not a priority in the OPM; in the post cold war period ideological debate has become, arguably, irrelevant.

Some radical changes took place in the RPG power structure. In May 1982, Rumkorem was forced to seek political exile abroad, leaving behind 500 guerrillas.<sup>99</sup> New appointments were made of Marthin Prawar as leader, Uri Youweni as defence minister, Philemon Yarisetouw as chief of staff of *Tentara Pembebasan Nasional* (TPN), and Simon Imbiri as operational commander. The remaining guerrillas operated in the coastal areas in the north, from Wutung in Papua New Guinea in the east, to Sarmi in West Papua, and they engaged in an aggressive military campaign.

The different factions of the OPM did not always agree on the choice of military strategy and tactics. As described above, the PEMKA group used hostage-taking as a way of attracting public attention to the cause, but this strategy was generally not welcomed by the Victoria group. Instead of supporting the PEMKA, like the government of Indonesia the RPG condemned the hostage taking at Aurina in May 1978 as a terrorist act, even publicising a critical statement in the South Pacific News Service.<sup>100</sup> However, the RPG group later engaged in actions which included hostage-taking. They took hostages at the Phillips oil site in Sarmi, northwest of Jayapura, at the end of May 1983, killing a guard and seizing Australian-made automatic and semi-automatic rifles.<sup>101</sup> In another action in the Sarmi subdistrict, three Shell employees were taken hostage on 12 March

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<sup>99</sup> Osborne, *op.cit.*:95.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*:95.

<sup>101</sup> *West Papuan Observer* 7(3) (May-June 1983). "OPM attacks Phillips Oil in Sarmi", p.4.

1985 by a group under the command of Youweni and a ransom of US\$8,000 cash, plus food, medical supplies and blankets was demanded. The hostages were released one day later, after these demands were met.<sup>102</sup> The group also ambushed a platoon of the Indonesian Army in Koya Timor, near Jayapura, on 20 June the same year, and Captain Bambang Suedi and 1st Class Sergeant Syati Purnamo were killed. On the diplomatic front, however, the RPG maintained its old pattern.

The RPG also attempted to engage in guerilla campaigns in the northern region, with the aim of gaining political support among the Papuan community. It staged a military uprising on 13 February 1984 in Jayapura, in which Rumkorem played an important organising role from the beginning, although he has denied direct involvement. In fact, Rumkorem spent four days in Jayapura in 1982 to discuss secret plans, including the planned military uprising, before he left the country.<sup>103</sup> At a second meeting held at Kilometer 37 on 11 February 1983, it was agreed that 13 February 1984 would be the date to take military action. Rumkorem then left Pasir Enam Jayapura, together with Luis Nussy and Athen Atabu, after a meeting with Marthin Prawar, Hendrik Anari, Costan Ruhukail and Tom Ireeuw. Rumkorem gave these men a mandate to "make a move" and subsequently appointed Ireeuw and Ruhukail as ministers in his new cabinet, which comprised:<sup>104</sup>

Minister for Home Affairs: Arnold Ap

Minister for Education: Tom Ireeuw

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<sup>102</sup> *West Papuan Observer* 8(5) (Summer/Autumn 1985). "Shell Kidnapping", p.5.

<sup>103</sup> *West Papuan Observer* 7(1) (1983), p.31

<sup>104</sup> PNG Border Liaison Office (19 December 1982). *Report: to Papua New Guinea Intelligence Organisation in Port Moresby.*

Minister for Information: Costan Ruhukail

Chairman of the Senate: Jemmy Wawar

Most of these men were members of the *Mambesak Group*, a folk song and cultural group directed by Arnold Ap, who assisted the RPG by providing financial and material support. For the purpose of the military uprising, Rumkorem ordered the establishment of the *Staff Pelaksanaan Operasi Pembebasan Papua Barat* (General Operational Staff for the Liberation of West Papua (SPOPPB)) with the following composition:

General Coordinator: Marthin Prawar

Deputy Coordinator: John Jambuani

Secretary: Aulena Rumbewas and Eddy Mofu

Assistant Operation: A. Weyai

Assistant Intelligence: Hendrik Anari

Assistant Personnel: Fred Sibuny

Assistant Logistics: Arnold Wakum

This new structure, in which students, public servants and army were represented, constituted a strong working team. It worked closely with Border Liaison and the National Intelligence Organisation in Papua New Guinea, exposing the position of PEMKA<sup>105</sup> and reporting on Indonesian activities. Rumkorem also instructed his ministers to expand into the Biak, Nabire, Seru, Manokwari and Sorong regions and influence potential leaders from those areas in an attempt to gain their support.

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<sup>105</sup> "Ali Charli asked once more about the plan to bring Rumkorem to Port Moresby and Tufi interviewed him with the aid of the PEMKA Papers" in NIO-Rumkorem Relationship, Border Liaison Report (19 December 1978).

The plan for the military uprising in Jayapura was a coordinated action between Markas Pusat OPM and Victoria. Hendrik Anari, who played a significant role as mediator between Victoria and PEMKA groups, first visited PEMKA and met President Nyaro to discuss the plan. On 13 February 1984, President Nyaro instructed Gerard Tom Ninanti to encourage the people of the Baliem Valley and the Merauke region to take refuge in PNG, in anticipation of an uprising. These two events make it clear that the plan was coordinated between PEMKA and Victoria.

As the agreed deadline drew near, a Papuan corporal serving in ABRI was shot dead on 13 February 1984 in front of the provincial parliament house during a flag raising and the singing of the West Papuan national anthem. The plan for the uprising had been leaked. Major Joe Awom, together with 100 Papuan soldiers, immediately seized their arms and deserted. There was much speculation about the source of the leak, but independent observers concluded that it was clearly an inside job. According to Papua New Guinea Border Liaison, who interviewed the key players in Blackwater camp, the plan was leaked by Anari, but Anari has denied this and claimed that Burdam, a soldier in ABRI, was responsible for the leak. The experiences in 1969, 1978 and 1984 show clearly that members of the OPM were not well disciplined in maintaining the secrecy of the movement. This weakness was observed by one of the hostages of Auringa in 1977, Father Ombos, who stated that he talked with members of the OPM who frequently exposed their secret plans.<sup>106</sup>

The uprising of February 1984 had dramatic implications. As ABRI moved against suspected OPM supporters, more than 12,000 refugees from

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<sup>106</sup> Samsuddin, *op.cit.*:325.

Jayapura, Kerom, Baliem, and Merauke, including the initiators of the plan, sought political asylum in Papua New Guinea, leaving behind their jobs and relatives to face an uncertain future in refugee camps. Moreover, the loss of life was substantial. The director of *Mambesak*, Arnold Ap, and his colleague, Eddy Mofu, who had been arrested on 30 November 1983, were killed by Indonesian soldiers in February 1984. Many of the Serui fishing community, who had served as couriers for the OPM, and of students at the University of Cenderawasih, were also killed.

The committee of the SPOPPB subsequently decided to send a delegation overseas, consisting of Tom Ireeuw, Constant Ruhukail, Jemmy Wawar and John Wakum, in the hope that they could conduct a more successful campaign than Rex Rumakiek and Andy Ayamiseba had done. The mass movement of refugees attracted world interest in the root causes of this upheaval. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the governments in the region, notably Papua New Guinea and Australia, were asked to intervene. Australia became an important source of funds for the refugees; since 1984-85, Australia has been the major donor to the UNHCR program, providing a total of AU\$7.7 million dollars.<sup>107</sup> Yet international involvement did not result in political liberation but merely in the development of new concentration camps. The border crossers were denied travel documents and freedom of movement, and could not seek employment; PNG was not prepared to encourage a bigger problem of refugees.<sup>108</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> *West Papuan Courier* March 1993.

<sup>108</sup> Otto Ondawame (1992). *A New Perspective and Hope*, OPM-International, Malmö, pp.11-12. On the issue of terminology of "refugees" versus "border crossers" see Alan Smith (1991) *Crossing the Border: West Papuan Refugees and Self-Determination of People*, Phd thesis, Monash University, pp.241-309.

As in the case of the PEMKA, a leadership shift occurred also in the Victoria group. When Youweni Jarisetouew was killed in Sarmi by the Indonesian Army in 1989, Marthin Prawar, the army deserter, was elected the new leader of the Victoria group; but he too was killed four years later. With the death of Prawar, the influence of the RPG declined significantly, mainly because the Keroom people in the border area (who were loyal to J.H. Prai) did not welcome Rumkorem's leadership style. However, the banner of the RPG remained a significant symbol for a small number of Papuans, particularly among refugees in Papua New Guinea and abroad.

I now return to discussion of the RPG's secret mission. The real reasons why Rumkorem and his colleagues Athen Atabu and Luis Nussy left Markas Victoria are still unclear. According to the *West Papuan Observer*, Rumkorem was forced out by the PEMKA group when the two factions failed to reconcile their differences: "the withdrawal of Rumkorem should have to do with an endeavour of reconciliation between the pro-Prai and the pro-Rumkorem troops within the OPM".<sup>109</sup> But Rumkorem himself has denied this and claimed he merely went on the overseas mission to seek support, as had been planned in 1980, and intended to return. Rumkorem even claimed he was very pleased with this move because his departure meant the fulfilment of the first part of his mission.<sup>110</sup> On their way by boat to Vanuatu, Rumkorem and his colleagues stopped in Rabaul, Papua New Guinea, where they were arrested as illegal immigrants, and subsequently deported to Greece.

Why did Vanuatu become the first target of this mission? Recognition of the OPM by the Vanua-Aku Party might have opened new

<sup>109</sup> *West Papuan Observer* 7(3) May-June 1983, p.31.

<sup>110</sup> *Weekend News* (Port Moresby) 26 November 1983, p.24.

possibilities for the RPG that could have improved its image and enabled it to regain mass support. But, in reality, this was only a dream, as became clear when Rumkorem's application to visit Vanuatu was rejected. The group had failed to analyse adequately the position of the Vanuatu government which was heavily dependent on foreign aid, notably from France and Australia, and was therefore unwilling to offend either country. Like the other Melanesian governments, the Lini government wanted the conflicting parties in the OPM to unite before any further step for support was taken.

#### **4.4.2.7. Similarities and Differences of the Two Regimes**

The De Facto Government and RPG had many important aspects in common, but also some significant differences. Both factions strove, first, to destroy the colonial power, and then to establish the democratic, just and peaceful country of West Papua. Both accepted the same national symbols—flag, anthem and constitution—and the same general principles, such as collectivism, Christian Brotherhood and the idea of Pan Melanesia. The general manifestos in their two political programs also indicated a general uniformity of direction and action plans, with only small variations in areas such as immigration policy, rural advancement, self-reliance and internationalisation. The leadership split had the positive effect of opening up alternatives in approach, and increased areas of control and mass participation.

Gaining international recognition and support was a continuing problem for both factions. Although the events of 1977 in Tembagapura and 1984 in Jayapura qualified as successful campaigns in attracting international attention, neither faction was recognised by governments elsewhere in the

world, apart from limited support from Vanuatu and Senegal. Both factions enjoyed some small measure of support from solidarity groups and NGOs in Australia, Holland, Sweden, the USA and the United Kingdom, and Melanesian Solidarity Groups and the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific organisation. Among political parties, the Australian Labor Party, Green Party, Socialist Party, Social Democratic Party and People's Party, and individual politicians of the South Pacific Forum countries, have to a limited degree expressed their sympathy through parliamentary motions, resolutions and statements. The ALP Federal Conference in 1986 and 1995, for example, passed resolutions expressing concern about human rights, border problems, PNG-Indonesian accountability, and Australian assistance to the refugees. Similarly, the Swedish Social Democratic, Green and Centre parties submitted a number of resolutions in 1991 and 1992 which called, among other things, for recognition of the OPM as the legitimate representative of the people's struggle in West Papua and urged that it be given official support. A more detailed analysis of this growing international sympathy is contained in Chapter Six.

The groups were different, however, in their choice of strategies and tactics. The PEMKA group emphasised decentralisation, flexibility, localisation, ruralisation, participation and self-reliance; the RPG emphasised centralisation, urbanisation strategy and elite-oriented and centralised democracy. In comparison with the PEMKA, the RPG had more limited areas of control and manpower.

International support for both factions was always liable to decline primarily because of the problems of national unity, the ineffectiveness of both parties, and the rise and fall of leaders and factions, which continued to

confuse the world community. Small-scale military successes within West Papua had very little impact on the international community, while the split provided an opening for further Indonesian military aggression and more intensive pursuit of the Indonesianisation policy.

#### **4.4.2.8. The Emergence of Small Factions**

The most important negative effect of the split was the emergence of small factions within the OPM. From the jungle of West Papua to Papua New Guinea, Europe and the Pacific, new groupings have emerged, sometimes as major obstacles to national unity and reconciliation.

First was the creation of the Revolutionary Military Council of the OPM (RMCOPM), led by Moses Werror and based in Madang, Papua New Guinea. The size of its membership is uncertain; indeed, it seems to be a one-man party. Although RMCOPM supports the policy and program of Markas Pusat OPM, and recognises the Wenda leadership, it does not recognise the OPM representation abroad.

The Grass Root Movement is another grouping. It is led by Marthen Kambu, the former Communications minister of the De Facto Government. Its membership comes from members of both PEMKA and Victoria groups who deserted. This movement has similar objectives to the RMCOPM. Both have attempted to expand their influence into the western and northern parts of West Papua, and they support the policies and programs of OPM-National Unity based in Markas Pusat OPM. They both recognise 1 July 1971, the national flag, anthem, and other symbols of the OPM.

A third splinter movement is the National Liberation Front (NLFWP), led by John Koknak and Ignasius Mujijau. This group is a radical, socialist-oriented youth movement, inspired by leftist movements outside West Papua and emphasising the importance of Melanesian socialism. Ex-members of both the PEMKA and Victoria groups make up the Front. The movement calls for national unity on the basis of certain conditions, including abolition of the dual leadership and rejection of old styles of leadership. The group has drawn up a 15-point political program which is similar to the 10-point program of the OPM and FPM.<sup>111</sup> The NLFWP is more militant than the RMCOPM and Grass Root Movement. It shares its area of control with OPM-National Unity, which is an elaboration of the PEMKA and Victoria groups. Unlike the two other splinter groups, the NLFWP recognises the OPM international office in Sweden, with Jacob H. Prai and Otto Ondawame as official representatives abroad, and accepts the central power structure; a fundamental difference, however, is that the movement is very reluctant to recognise 1 July 1971 as official independence day and the Morning Star as the national flag, instead attempting to design its own new flag.

Another group which rejected the existing establishment was the Declaration of the Independence of the Western Melanesian State, led by Dr Tom Wanggai, who led a demonstration in the *Mandala* Sports Stadium, Jayapura, on 14 December 1988. Like the OPM, its major objective was to achieve an independent West Papua, which the group called Western Melanesia – an ambiguous term, because Western Melanesia could include all the western Melanesian islands of Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and Kanaky [New Caledonia]. This movement was not well

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<sup>111</sup> Elmslie, *op.cit.*:39-40.

planned and it was not coordinated with the OPM. Even though Dr Wanggai was a well respected academic and public servant with international experience, his movement had elements of a cult. The Declaration wished to start a totally new chapter of the history of resistance in West Papua, ignoring the existing struggle and its mechanisms. This was clear when the movement opted for a new name for the state, a new flag and a new anthem, arguing that all existing national symbols were relics of Dutch influence. Yet the fact is that these national symbols were not created genuinely or encouraged by the Dutch, as Jakarta believes, but were the independent product of the Papuan leaders. It was the members of the Nieuw Guinea Raad such as Nicolaus Youwe, Markus Kaisiepo, Wim Zonggonau and Elias Bonay who created those symbols. Wanggai's Declaration was criticised by many simply because such actions raise new confusion among the Papuans, Indonesia and the world community about the nature of the national liberation movement.

In 1988 Wanggai and 76 other followers were arrested and imprisoned at Kalisosok, Cipinang, and Tangerang in Java.<sup>112</sup> He died there early in 1996. However, evidence that the movement did inspire many Papuans was provided by the mass reaction when Wanggai's corpse was returned to Jayapura. Mass protests in Sentani, Abepura and Jayapura on 12 March 1996 indicated how important the Declaration was for many Papuans.

A Holland-based humanitarian organisation, the Folk Front, established among Papuan youth in 1983, was yet another faction. The primary objective of this association was involvement in humanitarian issues, particularly refugees, environmental issues and human rights, but in

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<sup>112</sup> Ondawame, *op.cit.*:30-32.

latter years the movement has also become involved in political issues. Like the Wanggai group, this organisation does not recognise 1 July 1971 as the National Declaration Day of West Papua. However, the Front has played a significant role in bringing the issues of West Papuan human rights, environment and refugees into such international forums as the Commission of Human Rights of the United Nations in Geneva.

The West Papuan Action Committee was established in 1995 in Port Moresby, led by the Papuan community and supported by NGOs in PNG, in an attempt to unify differences between factions within the OPM and to create a central administrative structure. In its political charter, the Committee called for national unity and reconciliation. However, with its lack of organisational experience, expertise, political program and mass support, the activity of this group declined.

Lastly, a new youth humanitarian foundation, PAVO (Papuan Volk), was established in Utrecht, Holland in the 1990s. The foundation works for meeting basic humanitarian needs, for women and for the environment. This organisation has been active in campaigning on socio-economic and political issues in West Papua in recent years. Most members are educated women born in Holland, and have little contact with the people in West Papua. However, they are a committed group and have attempted to build networks into the South Pacific region.

Most of the action-oriented groups have in common the weakness that they do not have any clear political program, leadership, military units, or areas of control. Each of the faction leaders claims to be the official representative of the OPM abroad. Unfortunately the existence of these

small factions contributes to confusion about the OPM, giving the world community the impression that the OPM is a fragmented organisation. Jakarta exploits this lack of internal unity in its counter-insurgency campaign; for example, in order to improve the image of the OPM and to make progress, national unity and reconciliation have now become the top priority on the political agenda of the OPM.

#### **4.5. The Problem of Achieving Unity and Attempts to Solve it**

One of the central questions in this account is why the West Papuan government and the OPM have failed to gain international support. According to Franz Fanon, "national unity is first the unity of a group"<sup>113</sup> and he defines unity as the liquidation of regionalism and tribalism. Yet in the case of West Papua, liquidation of these two factors is not easy. As discussed elsewhere, tribal loyalty is so strong that it cannot be liquidated in a short period. In a new society like West Papua, the problem of national unity will probably remain a contentious issue for a long time to come. Yet national unity is undoubtedly one of the crucial factors for progress and for gaining support. Much international opinion continues to regard West Papua as a dead issue and the OPM as a terrorist organisation which is destabilising regional peace and security and dividing Papuans on the basis of different political convictions, regional loyalties, religious beliefs, and social status. The position of the OPM has been often weakened because it has been preoccupied with criticisms and internal conflicts, even armed conflicts.

Political awakening to the central importance of national unity came only late in the 1980s. The newly exiled political leaders slowly recognised

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<sup>113</sup> Franz Fanon (1968). "The Classic of Third World politics" in P. Sartre (ed.), *The Wretched of the Earth*, Grove Press, New York p.105.

their past mistakes and began to call for national unity and reconciliation. Jacob H. Prai, for example, called for national unity in 1990, urging:

national unity and cooperation of the people of West Papua is a key issue. This is needed to achieve the primary objective of the national liberation struggle; however, it must be just, honest, and principled.<sup>114</sup>

The leaders of the PEMKA and Victoria groups were now fully aware that disunity within the OPM benefited only the occupation forces. The movements did not want to repeat African experiences in West Papua. This view was expressed by a member of the Victoria group:

Please, do not prolong this disunity which would bring a great disadvantage to our revolution, We must unite (PEMKA and Victoria) to challenge our enemy Indonesia and its allies. If we would not unite, the enemies will continuously divide and rule us. Please, see the example of civil war in Biafra, Africa. My self (Kakak) should not see West Papua as a second Biafra in the Pacific.<sup>115</sup>

Though the PEMKA group controlled two thirds of the territory of West Papua and a major proportion of its manpower, there are no dominant ethnic groups to play a leading role in the struggle; to achieve its objectives, the OPM needs national unity, cooperation and external intervention.

A number of attempts have been made to achieve national reconciliation and unity since 1976, inspired by both internal and external forces. Early in the struggle, the Dutch government made an attempt to reunite Nicolaus Youwe and Markus Kaisiepo, when these Papuan leaders, who had been loyal to Western liberal politics, split in 1967. The

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<sup>114</sup> Jacob H. Prai (15 August 1990). Letter addressed to Zacky Sawor in Wageningen.

<sup>115</sup> Anonymous letter addressed to Peter Rumbay (1981). Document: Markas Victoria.

government of the Netherlands called for reconciliation between the two in order to present one voice at the UN General Assembly when the issue of West Papua was to be discussed in 1969. However, personal differences led to the conflict deepening even further: Kaisiepo wanted to be president of what was called the Pan Melanesian Raya (Great Melanesia), while Youwe wanted to be the president of the National Liberation Council (NLC). Youwe is from the well-educated Papuan elite, and has a capacity for diplomatic work, while Kaisiepo, a former public servant with very little formal education, has special leadership qualities and a strong commitment to Papuan nationalism and Melanesianism. These different personal backgrounds have influenced the two men's views on politics and the role of the masses in West Papua. How far their different approaches have influenced different ethnic groups needs further investigation, but, clearly, the differences, compounded by regional loyalties, have had negative consequences for the OPM.

Another attempt at national reconciliation took place in refugee camps in Flen, Sweden on 11 May 1979. Benard Tanggahma and Tan Tse Tai from the Netherlands came to visit the OPM leaders and discussed national unity. Seven months later, on 24 December 1979, another meeting was held at the residence of Benard Tanggahma in Den Haag, where the representatives of both governments (RPG and De Facto) met to discuss their differences, and seek reconciliation. Otto Ondawame was the only representative of the National De Facto group who attended the meeting, while Benard Tanggahma, Tan Tse Tai, Indey Amos, Max Ireeuw and Darius Maury Victoria represented the RPG. One of three proposals under discussion was that "cooperation between Prai and Rumkorem must immediately be restored for the sake of continuation of the liberation

struggle for country and people of West Papua".<sup>116</sup> The RPG interpreted this statement as a call for the "return" of the National De Facto group to Victoria. This interpretation was sharply criticised by the National De Facto representative, who argued that genuine national unity and cooperation could occur only if there was a strong commitment on both sides to work towards consistent implementation. This view was later endorsed by Ignasius Muyijau, the former military adviser of Rumkorem, who said: "common understanding, honesty and national unity are primary factors that are needed to end the Indonesian colonisation".<sup>117</sup> Lack of further consultation between the two factions became a major hindrance to mutual understanding.

Three years later another attempt at reconciliation took place in Oegstgeest, the Netherlands, when a so-called National Congress was held on 29 April 1982. Except for Prai and Ondawame, the Papuan community in Holland and Sweden and a few representatives from Papua New Guinea participated. The meeting formed a presidium or standing committee with responsibility for preparing drafts of policies and programs for the next congress. However, the meeting failed to discuss the principal issues concerning strategy, policy and political programs. Because of the spontaneous nature of the arrangements, and some undemocratic procedures, the participants antagonised each other and the meeting ended without a successful outcome. One potentially positive recommendation, however, was the proposed abolition of the NLC and the Melanesian Federation, and also of the RPG-National De Facto governmental system, in

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<sup>116</sup> The Joint Statement Between PEMKA and RPG Groups (24 December 1979), Den Haag.

<sup>117</sup> Ignasius Mujiyau (January 1997), interviewed by the author, Port Moresby.

order to establish a new structure. However, the recommendation was not taken seriously and both parties continued in their old ways.

A new initiative then came from the National De Facto Government abroad. A ministerial meeting held in Malmö, Sweden on 10 May 1982 called for, amongst other things, national unity and cooperation between PEMKA and Victoria, emphasising understanding, justice and honesty as the crucial factors needed to establish genuine national unity. A statement on national unity was signed between Fisor Yarisetouw of PEMKA and Marthin Prawar on 8 November 1984. Subsequently, Bernard Mawen, Regional Commander of the KODAM V, Rusa, in a letter of 18 April 1991 addressed to Gerard Tom Ninanti in Holland, called for national unity and reconciliation among the OPM's leaders abroad, arguing that without national unity the OPM would not achieve its goal. Later, the secretary general of the OPM National Unity, Nicolaus Ipo Hau, called for national unity in July 1991.<sup>118</sup> Again on 1 August 1991 a memorandum of understanding and cooperation was signed between Marthen Wenda of PEMKA and Marthin Prawar of Victoria, developing a plan for national unity.<sup>119</sup>

In the southern command a new agreement was reached, ending one year of internal conflict, when, on 25 February 1995, Bernard Mawen and John Koknak signed a statement of cooperation which was witnessed by representatives of organisations from at home and abroad. More recently an initiative came from the West Papuan Students Organisation inside the country. In a statement of 9 February 1996, the students called for total

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<sup>118</sup> Statement No. 001-XV-0/P-Sek-Jen/TPN/POL/WPNG/4/7-91.

<sup>119</sup> See document No. 001/PWK-MV/PWK-PMK/TPN/91.

abolition of any form of ethnicity and regionalism, and for the establishment of a national united front. Finally, Kletus Kwalik, in a statement dated 16 June 1996, has called for national unity and reconciliation. All these initiatives indicate that national unity and cooperation are paramount concerns – but are also elusive.

#### **4.6. External Intervention in the National Reconciliation Process**

Despite all these efforts, the OPM factions have failed to achieve unity. This has led to a series of external interventions by the governments of Melanesian countries. First was the intervention of the Somare government in 1978. The representatives of the PEMKA and Victoria—Jacob H. Prai and Otto Ondawame and Seth Rumkorem and Dan Kafiar respectively—were brought to Papua New Guinea to participate in peace talks which were held on 14-15 April 1978 in Port Moresby. Papua New Guinea government officials requested the removal of the OPM headquarters, which they believed to be in PNG territory, and called for national unity and reconciliation; but these calls were never considered seriously by either side.

Another move was initiated by the Lini government of Vanuatu. This initiative came as a result of longstanding political contacts between the leaders of the National De Facto Government in Port Moresby and the government of Vanuatu. In 1983, when Rex Rumakiek was living in Port Moresby he was ordered to surrender his travel documents and there was an attempt to deport him to Indonesia.<sup>120</sup> The National De Facto Groups in Port Moresby (who were actually the opponents of the RPG), stepped in to help him, and requested the government of Vanuatu to grant Rumakiek

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<sup>120</sup> Osborne, *op.cit.*:81.

political asylum.<sup>121</sup> The Lini government agreed and gave him a new home in Port Vila, where he served in the new South Pacific Resources Centre and on behalf of the Victoria Group. This initiative in itself was a positive action towards national reconciliation. Following joint requests by a group comprising Rex Rumakiek, Max Ireeuw, Fred Korwa, and Zacky Sawor, there was also a positive response to proposals for the establishment of an OPM base in Vanuatu and for the sponsorship of the OPM as the legitimate representative of West Papuan interests, but only on the condition that national unity should first be achieved. This precondition seriously upset the RPG, which had thought that these initiatives would further its political and military ambitions. Like the other Melanesian governments, however, the government of Vanuatu would support only a United Front of the OPM, not the PEMKA or the Victoria group separately.

This reaction inspired Rumakiek to establish the United Front of the OPM in Vanuatu 1985. In order to convince the Vanuatu government and the world community of the seriousness of their intentions, the leaders of the two main factions—Prai for PEMKA and Rumkorem for Victoria—were pressured to sign the four point *Port Vila Declaration* of 11 July 1985, under the supervision of the Lini government. National unification, cooperation and specification of responsibility were emphasised in the Declaration. Even though their assent to the document was not wholehearted, the two men were each given specific responsibilities: Prai was to be responsible for political campaigns and Rumkorem for military campaigns. How far the Declaration was actually implemented is questionable, but it did have considerable positive political effect. It provided hope and it generated immediate public interest and support. The Lini government provided the

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<sup>121</sup> Wim Zonggonau (January 1997), interviewed by the author, Port Moresby.

United Front with a venue and diplomatic opportunity. The Vanua-Aku Party of Vanuatu recognised the legitimacy of the OPM and promised to take up the West Papuan cause at a forthcoming Commonwealth Heads of Governments Regional Meeting and at the South Pacific Forum;<sup>122</sup> it also brought the West Papuan cause before Committee 24 of the UN in 1984.

Despite these positive initiatives, however, the newly established base in Vanuatu was closed down after only a short period. There has been much speculation about the reasons for this failure. According to Prai, the initiative failed primarily because of a lack of honesty and an excess of manipulation; Prai argued that the Declaration was conceptualised secretly by Seth Rumkorem, Rex Rumakiek and Andy Ayamiseba, without consulting him or the other members of the respective factions – Prai even claimed that he was forced to sign the document.<sup>123</sup> The Declaration was, indeed, sharply criticised by members of both parties for the lack of consultation in its drafting. In a statement dated 31 July 1986, former ministers of the RPG in Holland and Sweden, including Amos Indey, Tan Seng Thai, Marcus Kaisiepo, Bernard Tanggahma and Daniel Wikom, sought to dismiss Rumkorem as president of the RPG, arguing that he had not first consulted them about the Vanuatu declaration. Like Bernard Tanggahma and his colleagues, Nicolaus Youwe and other members of the PEMKA factions (excepting Otto Ondawame and Nicolaus Messet), criticised Jacob Prai for the same reason. Mixed reactions were also evident among Papuan support groups. There was a general concern that the main actors did not take the position of the government seriously but instead became interventionist and manipulative. The support that had been promised by

<sup>122</sup> R.J. May (1991) "Sources of external support for the West Papua movement" in K.M. de Silva and Ron J. May (eds), *Internationalization of Ethnic Conflict*, Pinter Publishers, London, p.172.

<sup>123</sup> J.H. Prai (1995), interviewed by the author, Malmö.

the Vanuatu government was, accordingly, never given. The offer to resettle Prai and Ondawame in Vanuatu also lapsed. Lack of commitment and consultation, together with the personal ambition of the participants, were the major causes of the failure of this move for unity.

Internal conflict among local political leaders also affected the interests of the OPM in Vanuatu. Rivalry between Vanuatu's leaders Barak Sope and Walter Lini in 1990 impacted on OPM concerns. The Black Brothers, a Papuan folk song group, was accused of interference in Vanuatu's internal affairs by arousing national sentiment among local people and politicians. Independent observers believed that such disunity was promoted by foreign powers, thus undermining the support given by the government and people of Vanuatu to the OPM. Responding to these accusations, the OPM leaders, Prai, Ondawame and Ireeuw released a public statement criticising the Black Brothers and Rex Rumakiek for their intervention in the internal affairs of Vanuatu which had resulted in the closing of the OPM base.

On another front, the influence of Libya in the South Pacific continually alarmed Canberra, Washington and Jakarta. Formal diplomatic links between Vanuatu and Libya were established in 1986 and several youths from Vanuatu, together with Rumakiek and Kafiar, visited Libya for training in Tripoli. New questions of the future of the OPM were raised when Rumkorem confirmed the link and claimed that "Libya had offered the OPM financial assistance".<sup>124</sup> The fear of destabilisation in the South Pacific region was widespread among governments in the region. Because

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<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*:172.

Libya has supported 'terrorist' organisations, its presence in the Pacific was seen as provocative by the Western interests in the region.

The most influential factor, however, was the effect of Indonesian penetration into Pacific Islands politics and development, which also alarmed most Melanesian countries and Australia, because of its implications for regional stability and security. The involvement of the government of Vanuatu in West Papuan affairs transformed the foreign policy of Indonesia in the South Pacific. Fearing a spread of such actions, Indonesia established military and economic cooperation with countries in the region in order to undermine support for the OPM. Indonesia made attempts to gain international support by influencing politicians in Papua New Guinea, bribing them with money and women. In November 1987, for example, General Ted Diro was accused in the PNG Parliament of receiving almost US\$132,000 in election campaign funds from General Benny Murdany.<sup>125</sup> Indonesian military and economic cooperation with the Rabuka regime in Fiji and its penetration in Papua New Guinea alarmed the Vanuatu government and caused it to revise its policy.

Among the positive side effects of the Declaration were the impetus to establish new support groups, notably the Australia West Papua Association (AWPA), and the Föreningen För ett Fritt Väst Papua (FFP) (West Papua Association) in Sweden. A tour of Australia by the leaders of the OPM in Sweden—Jacob Prai, Otto Ondawame and Nicolaus Messet—was another outcome. Bev Hall, a member of state parliament from Adelaide, in cooperation with the AWPA and various other organisations, organised this tour which started on 3 November 1986 and

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<sup>125</sup> David Robie (1989). "The Forgotten Wars" in David Robie (ed.), *Blood on Their Banner Nationalist Struggles in the South Pacific*, Pluto Press Australia, Leichhardt, p.62.

continued to 18 January 1987; its aim was to increase government and community awareness in Australia of the situation in West Papua. The OPM leaders talked about the problems of refugees, military cooperation between Australia and Indonesia, humanitarian support, land problems and the need for a re-examination of the West Papuan issue in the UN Decolonisation Commission. They addressed meetings in Adelaide, Canberra, Sydney, Newcastle, Wollongong, Melbourne and Hobart, and met with politicians, political parties, NGOs, trade unions, support groups, solidarity groups, universities, and the mass media. They gained considerable moral support<sup>126</sup> and helped raise awareness of the West Papua issue throughout Australia.

The Port Vila Declaration had an important impact in the ending of factional armed clashes, in strengthening national unity, in highlighting the need for stronger leadership, and in encouraging the movement to be more respectful and tolerant.<sup>127</sup> But it could not be made legally binding, and given the coercive nature of the agreement and the lack of prior consultation among the conflicting parties, its credibility and legitimacy were weak.

The spirit of the Port Vila Declaration lived on, and several further national unification attempts took place abroad and at the headquarters of the OPM. In 1986, the leaders of the two factions met in Nijmegen and formed a preparation committee to plan a national congress. The meeting entrusted Fred Korwa (Chairman), Max Ireeuw (Secretary), Fred Atabu (Treasurer), and J.H. Prai and Seth Rumkorem as advisers, to plan another

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<sup>126</sup> For example, see *The Newcastle Herald* 25 November 1986, p.3.

<sup>127</sup> Wim Zonggonau (January 1997), interviewed by the author, Port Moresby.

congress. Three years later a meeting was held in Utrecht, which was attended by various groups, including the Volk Front; but again there was little progress.


These various initiatives indicate a serious concern about national unity and reconciliation among all parties. Unlike the situation in Africa and elsewhere, the internal conflict in the West Papuan movement is more personal and regional than ideological. A solution is possible, with personal commitment, and the choice of the right approach. The Port Vila Declaration has provided an important foundation.

#### **4.7. The OPM New Order**

The OPM New Order (OPMNO) was established as a response to the failure of the Vanuatu Declaration, seeking new bases for both political and military campaigns. The OPMNO is structurally divided into a political bureau and a military council, one of which operates abroad while the other is in-country. The primary objectives are not only to expand political and military campaigns but also to unite the different factions into one national united front. Membership is open to all Papuans who support the objectives and aims of the OPM National United Front, particularly the former members of the two major factions. The organisation structure is illustrated in Figure 3.

It is a loose organisational model. Theoretically, the OPMNO adopts a top-down approach, but in practice such arrangements are ineffective. Regional political and military commands, for example, still act independently and the OPM political bureau can only intervene in regional affairs on questions of general policy. Let me now examine both of the OPMNO councils.

Figure 3: Structure of the OPM New Order



Affiliated Organisations:  
 FORERI, TEAM 100, Students, Women, Churches, intellectuals, traditional council,  
 political parties, businesses, regional councils and support groups.

Numbers of PC and NEC will be determined in accordance with  
 the appropriate articles of the provisional constitution of the OPM.

\*Papuan Intelligence Service

→ Line of command

→ Line of coordination

#### 4.7.1. Political Bureau of the OPM

The International OPM Office was established on 1 February 1992 in Malmö, Sweden, by Jacob H. Prai, the political coordinator of the OPM, in order to promote the urgent needs of structural change, national reunification and reconciliation. Reflecting on the mistakes of the past, the new political agenda sought the abolition of the previous governmental system. The single name "OPM" is now widely used as a legitimate term to identify the Papuan national liberation struggle. The OPM Political Bureau was structured as follows:

President: J.H. Prai (formerly PEMKA)

Vice President/Treasurer: Indey Amos (formerly RPG)

International Spokesman: Otto Ondawame (formerly PEMKA)

Youth : Joseph Prai (formerly PEMKA)

Social Affairs: Marius Maury (formerly RPG)

Members: Waney and D. Kafiar (formerly RPG)

Supreme Commander: Marthen Wenda, with overall responsibility for nine Regional Commanders in West Papua.

Propaganda machinery has been set up as a vehicle for an international campaign. The centre also has a clearly defined political program and action plan. There is strong personal commitment to engaging in various forms of political campaign, and increasing political awareness among the governments and peoples in Scandinavia, Europe, the South Pacific, Australia and elsewhere, all actions which strengthen the position of the centre. OPM Central Command, under the leadership of David Jebled, in their decision No. 40/XI-K/SM/PP/MPOPM/1988, authorised Jacob Prai, Otto Ondawame and Mark Ireeuw as their official representatives abroad.

The centre has legal status, not only because it is a registered organisation in Sweden but also because it is recognised by most military units and the Papuan communities at home and abroad. John Koknak, the Operational Commander of the KODAM V, Merauke, who had titled himself "Supreme Command" in his decision No. 03/C/PITOPM/SKPM/MPOPM/V/1993, dated 6 May 1993, recognised the office as the centre for political activities abroad and authorised Prai as the official representative. Recognition also came from Marthen Wenda and, finally, from Kelly Kwalik, KODAM III, Nemang Kawi, who, in his decision No. 001/P.G.OPM/SM/1997, dated 25 July 1997, authorised Prai and Ondawame as official representatives abroad to approach the International Red Cross with a view to building mutual understanding and cooperation, and to lobby governments of Europe, Africa, Asia and the Pacific as well as NGOs, the UN Human Rights Commissions, the Secretary General of the UN and the European Parliament.<sup>128</sup> The latter were asked to seek the immediate withdrawal of Indonesian troops from West Papua; to send in a UN fact-finding mission to West Papua to monitor human rights abuses in Hoesa and Timika; and to make diplomatic approaches to the government of Indonesia to start peace talks.

The political program and action plan of the centre combine the former RCJ and RPG platforms, with some small modifications. However, the primary tasks of the centre are to work towards the creation of national unity and reconciliation, to engage in public awareness programs and international lobbying, and to reopen the issue of West Papua in the UN and also put it on the agenda of the South Pacific Forum countries.

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<sup>128</sup> Kelly Kwalik (25 July 1997). *Surat Mandat Resmi*, Doc. No:001/P.G.OPM/SM/1997.

#### 4.7.2. Diplomatic Offensive

Since its establishment the centre has achieved much success in its diplomatic efforts. Maintaining regular contact with military units at home, the centre has successfully lobbied the Swedish parliament and political parties. A number of motions in the Swedish parliament<sup>129</sup> provide evidence of this success: these motions have called for recognition of the OPM as a legitimate liberation movement; provision of financial aid to refugees; the banning of weapons exports to Indonesia; the reopening of debate in the UN about the future of West Papua; and action on human rights abuses. Pierre Schori, a Social Democrat Party MP, urged the Swedish government to recognise the OPM as the legitimate representative of West Papua and to reopen West Papuan questions in the UN.<sup>130</sup>

In Australia, in 1996 the ALP conference expressed its concern about the situation in West Papua and the plight of the refugees, and called on the Australian government to intervene on the basis of a 13-point resolution which had been submitted by Ondawame to the ALP Branch in Victoria through Jean McLean MP on 19 February 1992. The Irish Parliament also passed a resolution on West Papua, dated 31 January 1996, which condemned alleged abuses of human rights and called, amongst other things, for the issue of West Papua to be reopened with the UN Committee on Decolonisation. Finally, the European Parliament passed a resolution on March 14, 1996 echoing these calls but adding support for demilitarisation and the sending of an international fact-finding mission to the region.

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<sup>129</sup> Motion 1990/91:U602 of the Green Party; motion no. 3 of 1991/192:43 of the Center Party; motions no. 5 and 7 of 1991/92:U609 of the Social Democratic Party, dated 29 January 1992; motion no. 5 1991/92:624 of the People's Party and Center Party; and motion no, 3 of 1992/93:U604 of the People's Party. Foreningen foer Fritt Papua/FFP (1993). *Merdeka No:17/93*, Malmö, pp.18-25.

<sup>130</sup> FFP (December 1992). *Merdeka No:15/16*, Malmö, p.13.

Apart from this diplomatic approach, the centre uses other means to internationalise the Papuan issue, including guerrilla activities in West Papua. Events such as the human rights abuses in Hoesa and Tembagapura, the hostage dramas in Mapenduma, Arso and Waropko, and the attack on the Indonesian consulate in Vanimo in 1996, were acts which were used to attract international attention. The very existence of the centre, and the growth of support groups, provides indirect encouragement and strengthens morale.

The direct involvement of the UN Human Rights Commission, and a recent response of the Secretary General of the UN on the fate of hostages taken by Kelly Kwalik and his colleagues in 1996, indicate how the new process of internationalisation has begun to succeed. The Australian ambassador to Indonesia visited Timika in 1996 and confirmed the human rights allegations, and Gareth Evans, the former ALP foreign minister, raised the issue of human rights with his Indonesian counterpart, Ali Alatas.<sup>131</sup> During the hostage crisis in Mapenduma, the International Red Cross played a crucial role not only in negotiating the release of the hostages but also in bringing West Papua to international attention, forcing the UN Commission on Human Rights and permanent members of the UN and the European Parliament to invite representatives of the OPM to discuss the whole issue. Most importantly, the Secretary General of the UN at the time, Dr Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in calling for the release of the hostages on humanitarian grounds, made the first direct reference in the UN to the current West Papua issue and so engaged international attention. Finally, the visit of foreign diplomats from New Zealand and Canada in 1995, when

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<sup>131</sup> *Courier Mail* 23 December 1995 ("OPM-Figure Interviewed" by John Wright).

publicity was being given to human rights abuses in West Papua, and from Germany, the United Kingdom and Holland during the hostage crisis in Mapenduma in 1996, as well as a recent visit of the Dutch Foreign Minister, are all positive outcomes of the OPM's international campaign. The case of West Papua is no longer so obscure.

The centre has also promoted regional networks and public political awareness programs. By establishing support groups in different international centres, such as the Australia West Papua Association (AWPA) in Sydney, the West Papua Relief Association (WPRA) in Sydney, the West Papua Action in Ireland, and the Föreningen För ett Fritt Väst Papua (FFP) in Sweden, and by linking with other liberation and progressive movements (including environmental groups) in Indonesia, the Asia Pacific region, Europe, and the USA, the centre has successfully established international trust and confidence.

On the home front, the centre has attempted to reconcile all parties, particularly the two main factions; the new organisational structure is a reflection of this desire. A musical group in Holland, called "Sampari", was invited to open the office, and all faction leaders, including Rumkorem, were invited to start a new peace dialogue. This call has never received a positive response, but the centre has hopes to organise a national congress which will be a stepping stone to solving the organisational problem.

Despite such progress, lack of administrative experience, education, effective networks and finance suggest that hopes of substantial success are still remote. Recognising this, the centre emphasises the education of cadets and the improvement of networks. Realising the importance of improving

both the quality and the quantity of its activities, the centre sends students abroad to gain special skills and to participate in different activities and conferences.

In short, the centre now plays an important role in inspiring the guerrillas to take more initiatives and be more flexible in their actions. With genuine coordination between the political bureau and military units, total internationalisation of the West Papua issue is no longer a mirage. The presence of the centre has opened new opportunities for international involvement and has begun to break down the isolation of the West Papuan struggle.

#### **4.7.3. Military Council**

The military council is the highest organ of the TEPENAL structure. Its functions are to advise the regional military units, KODAMs, and to provide general directions and guidelines for military activities. As described elsewhere in this chapter, there are, theoretically, nine military regions which take independent responsibility for their own regional affairs. The strengths and the areas of control of these command structures vary from one military region to another, reflecting material and geographical constraints.

When David Jebled surrendered to Indonesian authorities in 1990 for tactical reasons, the OPM Political Bureau in Sweden appointed Marthen Wenda, the Commander of MAMTA I, to serve as acting supreme commander of the OPM. This move upset the self-styled Supreme Commander John Koknak of the KODAM V Merauke, who circulated a false account that he had been elected as the new supreme commander.

According to Koknak, his position as supreme commander was the result of an election, conducted after a meeting on 10 July 1992 at which eight commanders signed a "declaration of the unification and coordination body" and agreed to give him full mandate to organise the official committee of the OPM. He claimed that 52,000 ballot papers had been distributed between 25 August and 15 October 1992, and that he was elected over three other candidates: Marthen Wenda, Bernard Mawen, and Peter Tabuni.<sup>132</sup> According to Koknak the result was announced on 28 November 1992; he received 65 per cent of the vote, with Mawen as deputy commander-in-chief of TEPENAL receiving 20 per cent, Wenda as commander-in-chief of TEPENAL gaining 10 per cent and Tabuni, the deputy chairman receiving 5 per cent. In fact, no such election took place; Koknak used this story to promote his leadership claims. While an Australian journalist, James Matthew, who visited Koknak's camp, described him as a natural leader and as having unquestioned respect from everyone in the movement,<sup>133</sup> a group of people who visited the camp in 1994 discredited his leadership and accused him of abuse of power.<sup>134</sup> In a new command restructuring program of the KODAM V, Rusa of Southern region, Bernard Mawen was reappointed as commander in chief.

The relationship between the political and military sectors is governed by the terms of a general agreement on the policy and program of the OPM; TEPENAL carries out tasks under the general guidance of the political program and the military units are recognised by the OPM International Office in Sweden, as explained above. Clearly, the OPM abroad can campaign more effectively if the military units are actively engaged in

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<sup>132</sup> Elmslie, *op.cit.*:37.

<sup>133</sup> *Ibid.* p.38.

<sup>134</sup> Matthew Jamieson (1996), interviewed by the author, Sydney.

military campaigns, but the military units are largely independent and decisions about what actions they should take depend heavily on local situations and capacity. Actions such as the hostage-taking in Mapenduma and in the border regions (north and south) in 1996, and the attacks on transmigration camps in Arso in 1983 were instances of independent military actions.

By way of example, the policy and program of the KODAM V, Merauke reflects the blend of unity and differences. The 13-point action plan of the KODAM V is encompassed by the general policy and program of the OPM that was set out in the original 10-point program presented by the RCJ in 1976. The main points of the plan are economic and financial self-reliance, effectiveness of communication networks, solidarity work, and the organisation of a national congress. The key points of all such programs are the same, all urging the overthrow of Indonesian colonialism and imperialism, and the establishment of a democratic state of West Papua which will guarantee fundamental human rights, provide free education, health and social services, maintain solidarity with oppressed peoples, and work for world peace and regional stability.

#### **4.7.4. Intensive Guerrilla Campaigns 1995-1998 and the Political Responses**

Since 1995, guerrilla campaigns have been intensified. Each guerrilla unit has undertaken aggressive military campaigns against Indonesian repression, and these have attracted national and international public attention.

A peaceful demonstration organised by Kwalik on Christmas Day 1994, to which officials from both Freeport and the government were

invited, led to harsh reprisals and the subsequent death of over 100 civilians in Timika, Hoesa and Tsinga. According to reports by ACFOA and by Bishop Jan Munninghoff OFM, 37 people, including 11 children and women, were killed in the 1995 Hoesa massacre alone. Following this, on 8 January 1996, 26 people, including six Europeans, were taken hostage in Mapenduma by a group led by Danial Kogoya. Hostage taking also took place in 1996 in KODAM V, Merauke, KODAM II, Mamta, Jayapura and KODAM IV, Paniai. These incidents attracted much international attention.

Elsewhere, in Waropko, thirty people from a survey team of Conoco, a US-based oil company, were taken hostage on 22 November 1995 in Ikan Baru Village, and one hostage was killed. This operation was led by Arnold Dumutu of B-company, Battalion 2 of the TEPENAL. In reprisal, more than 200 civilians were forced to evacuate their homes and seek political asylum in PNG.<sup>135</sup> Another major guerrilla activity took place in KODAM I, MAMTA, where 40 guerrillas under Marthen Wenda marched into Vanimo on 26 October 1995, attacked the Indonesian consulate, held two Indonesians captive, raised the West Papuan flag, and destroyed consulate property.<sup>136</sup> The OPM accused the consulate of involvement in espionage activities, particularly against the OPM. The Wenda troops also captured two Indonesian students, Marwiyah Abubakar and Basyir Kadir, in Arso Kota, who were later released after a ransom was negotiated. In the same region, sporadic fighting also occurred in Base G, Jayapura, 30 km to the north. Finally, in KODAM IV, Thadeus Yogi, guerrilla units were also active. As in Mapenduma, Waropko and Arso, in KODAM IV Karel Gobai of Paniai took two hostages – Frenchman Frederick Benti and Gabriel Go (Ekagi), in

<sup>135</sup> Australia West Papua Association, Sydney (12 December 1995), "Report on Recent Incident at Waropko".

<sup>136</sup> John MacDougall, "Attack on Indonesian Consulate in Vanimo", *Kompas*, 28 October 1995.

Okaitadi on 20 February 1996.<sup>137</sup> In the same year, groups also attacked PT Kamund Raja of the Djajanti Group, a logging company in Timika owned by a son of President Suharto, and took seventeen hostages. Expressing their discontent over the injustice and corruption promoted by the local government, more than 6000 Ekagi, Moni, Dani and Nguda peoples marched on Nabire and destroyed government property; this was also in 1996.

All these events attracted considerable public attention and concern. The National Human Rights Commission in Indonesia, churches and NGOs in Indonesia and West Papua, and foreign diplomats in Jakarta, for the first time began to make public their concerns over human rights abuses and to call for international intervention. As detailed above, the call was taken up by the European parliament, the Irish government, the UK parliament, the Dutch government, the Australian Labor government, universities in USA, and various NGOs and solidarity groups. In West Papua, the events encouraged people in urban centres to engage in mass protest actions. The protests that erupted in Jayapura and Timika/Tembagapura in March 1996 and in Nabire a few days later indicated clearly that the Papuans' national awareness had significantly increased. Most importantly, the events also ignited a new debate about Indonesian claims of sovereignty over West Papua, in both national and international arenas.

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<sup>137</sup> *Kompas* 22 February 1996, "ABRI Free Two Hostages in Panai".

#### 4.8. Conclusion

Papuan nationalism has grown, inevitably, in response to high levels of oppression and exploitation. In terms of the concepts of nationalism and colonialism presented in Chapter Two, it is clear that the Papuan liberation movement has developed as a direct response to Indonesian colonisation.

Papuan resistance against foreign occupation of their land can be traced back at least to the early twelfth century. It continued into the Dutch colonial period. The Dutch began a process of decolonisation in the 1960s, but lacked serious commitment to political change. The Papuan community itself became divided between pro- and anti-Indonesian forces.

The resistance intensified significantly during Indonesian occupation. Yet although the restrictions on freedom of movement and increasing state terrorism, exploitation, repression and discrimination against the Papuans have served to encourage stronger nationalist sentiments, these factors alone do not explain the level of political unrest that is currently enveloping the country. The notion that all people have equal rights to be free and independent, as stipulated in international laws and conventions of the United Nations, has become the basis for Papuans claims. The independence of other Melanesian peoples has also inspired West Papuan nationalism.

The OPM has engaged in a military and political struggle to establish a free and democratic state of West Papua. However, it has generally been perceived as a weak and ineffective organisation. From 1965 to 1968 it suffered from a loose organisational structure, weak leadership and a vague political program. The OPM was, in this period, more an expression of

Papuan feelings and dissatisfaction than a real political force. Such an assessment was often used to discredit the movement. But while resistance activities in the 1960s were quickly crushed the movement succeeded in fuelling Papuan nationalism and arousing Papuan political consciousness.

The image of the OPM slowly improved from the end of 1968 into the 1970s. Increasing repression forced the Papuans to follow new paths. A new political vision and military structure gradually emerged, involving the people in public awareness programs, education and training, and mass mobilisation in capital cities and along the border. New bases were formed and thousands of Papuans joined the resistance.

Despite some serious organisational problems, and the denial politics described in the previous chapter, the OPM has managed to stand alone and fight against one of the largest and most powerful states in Southeast Asia. It has been able to expand its areas of control and spread nationalist sentiment throughout the entire region. A leadership split in the 1970s resulted in a factionalised movement, divided by regional loyalties and personal differences. The expansion of new areas of influence and the creation of a competitive environment, however, were positive effects of the split, partly compensating for the disunity and consequent lack of international support. Though the two factions have taken different approaches, it is hard to see fundamental differences in objectives and ideology, which suggests that reconciliation of internal differences may be easier in the OPM than in more ideological conflicts elsewhere in the world. External intervention to promote reconciliation has not been pursued seriously. National unity agreements have regularly inspired the Papuans since the Port Vila Declaration, but real achievement still seems far away.

The OPM has repeatedly called for peace talks with the Indonesian government over the last ten years, but such calls have fallen on deaf ears. The guerrilla campaigns of the last two years reflect frustration at Jakarta's lack of political will. However, the OPM is aware that a military approach can only be complementary to a diplomatic approach.

The OPM New Order has brought about some positive change by internationalising the West Papuan issue and strengthening the military council. The growing self-confidence of Papuans has been important in forcing the OPM to unite to work in positive directions.

However, returning to the criteria for successful leadership and organisation discussed at the start of this chapter, it is clear that most leadership styles within the OPM fall within Maxwell's fourth type, the limited leader. The issue of leadership remains a major problem for the OPM. Moreover, the OPM is still loosely structured, and lacks a clear line of accountability, a clear direction, effective coordination, and effective networking. Although, on paper, the political and military wings are unified in their major political objectives, in practice lack of coordination between the two bureaux remains a serious weakness. The military wing, for example, has taken political decisions without reference to the political wing abroad, and *vice versa*. The resulting confusion has often had devastating effects. The highly fragmented organisation of the OPM makes it difficult to establish accountability. While the OPM tends to adopt a vertical structure, a drift towards a horizontal structure – although sometimes successful at the local level—leaves dangerous gaps in the working mechanism.



## **Chapter Five: International Support for the OPM**

### **5.1. Introduction**

In the previous chapter it has been argued that West Papua cannot achieve its independence through military actions alone; it also requires international recognition and support in this struggle. Gaining such support is difficult because of the divergent attitudes towards West Papua within the international community. The main debate concerns the question whether West Papua is to be considered as an integral part, or a colony, of Indonesia. The opposing arguments have created widening social and political gaps both within West Papua and between it and Indonesia.

The first part of this chapter will examine the perspectives of the three major groups involved: the Indonesian view, the West Papuan view, and international opinion. The second part will analyse international support for the OPM, the national liberation movement, describing connections with Black Africa, Europe, Pacific/Australia, and the USA. The chapter will conclude with an analysis of an internationalisation strategy for the OPM.

### **5.2. Differing Viewpoints on the Status of West Papua**

The absence of a constructive debate about the political status of West Papua in the period of the third wave of colonisation has become obvious. Both Jakarta and its close allies, and those opposing Jakarta rule have been reluctant to arouse public opinion through open debate. Indonesia's general stance has always been defensive and one of avoidance. In contrast, the OPM believes that constructive debate would be beneficial for both sides. The international reaction reflects not only these different viewpoints but also the quite different interests of the countries and international organisations interested in the West Papuan situation.

### 5.2.1. The Indonesian View and Its Consequences

Within Indonesia the general view of the political status of West Papua is unchanging: West Papua is an integral part of Indonesia as a consequence of the political decision taken through the Act of Free Choice in 1969. However, there is also an alternative view, which holds that the annexation of West Papua was an illegitimate act and violated fundamental human rights. Among Indonesians, the group supporting West Papuan independence forms a very small proportion of the population, but one which is politically important for the West Papuans. This group believes that the Papuans have the right to be a free and independent state on the basis that the Papuans are Melanesian by race and have a different ethnicity, culture and tradition, and colonial historical experience from the rest of Indonesia. Mohammad Hatta, the first vice president of Indonesia, was one who recognised Papuan rights when the West Papuan issue became an issue after the Second World War. Disagreeing with the plan of his colleagues Sukarno and Mohammad Yamin for the occupation of West Papua, Hatta warned them that such a plan could be regarded as “expansionist” and “imperialistic”, arguing that “If we take West Papua, we must also include the Solomon Islands in the middle of the South Pacific. The West Papuans are Melanesian. I recognise that the Papuans have the right to be an independent nation”.<sup>1</sup>

After the death of Mohammad Hatta, self-determination for West Papua was for many years regarded as a non-issue, but more recently, in the post Suharto era, debate about its political status has resurfaced. A few of the newly emerging radical and democratic groups in Indonesia have acknowledged the past mistakes of Indonesian politics in the 1960s and the

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<sup>1</sup> Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soie Liong (1984). *West Papua: The Obliteration of a People*, TAPOL, London, p.16.

rights of the indigenous people of West Papua. Some alternative approaches to a resolution of the Papuan conflict have begun to attract discussion, including the options of autonomy and of a federal system (see Chapter Seven). A handful of Indonesian intellectuals, including George Aditjondro (who lectures at the University of Newcastle in Australia), Arif Budiman (who now lectures in Melbourne University in Australia), and Amien Rais (the chairman of Partai Nasional (PAN) and a former academic at Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta), and some other democratic forces believe that a federal system is the best solution for preventing further escalation of social and political unrest that could lead to the disintegration of the Indonesian state. This view is based on recognition of past mistakes and of the need to correct them. A different call has been made by Marine Brigadier General Freddy Numberi, the governor of Irian Jaya province until 2000; like others he recognises the need for a resolution of past injustice, but unlike other Indonesian intellectuals, he does not support the creation of an independent West Papua, but advocates autonomy.<sup>2</sup>

Social-economic and political disparities also influence ways of thinking among peoples from the outer islands of Indonesia. Many of these peoples feel that they "are colonised by our own countrymen because we cannot express our desires and opinions".<sup>3</sup> These people are also resisting central domination because their natural resources are being exploited on a huge scale, making a few Javanese and Chinese rich while the local inhabitants of resource rich regions like Sumatra, Kalimantan, Riau and Irian Jaya remain poor. People ask: if tiny resource-poor Singapore can

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<sup>2</sup> *Post Courier* (Port Moresby) 17 December 1998.

<sup>3</sup> *Indonesian Daily News*, 18 August 1997. "Siapa Bilang Kita Sudah Merdeka".

become a wealthy country, why cannot similar progress take place in Sulawesi, Kalimantan and Aceh?

In contrast, the general view in Indonesia has always been in favour of unifying West Papua as an integral part of Indonesia. Any demand for the independence of West Papua is dismissed as a utopian dream. It is argued that West Papua has always been historically a part of Indonesia: in the eleventh century West Papua was a part of the Modjopahit Empire, a Buddhist Kingdom that ruled out of Central Java and extended its power as far as Ternate and Tidore in the Moluccas. This claim is historically dubious; but even it were true, it is not relevant to the status of West Papua at the end of the twentieth century, any more than an argument that the Vikings of Sweden could legitimately claim sovereignty over Russia, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Spain, Greenland, America, Germany and Poland because they invaded those countries eleven centuries or more ago. Jakarta has also used the 'sanctity' of the Dutch colonial boundaries to justify its claims.

The Indonesian ambition to incorporate West Papua into Indonesia led to a diplomatic approach in the 1940s. At the Round Table Conference between the Dutch and Indonesian governments in Den Haag in 1949, the two parties reached an agreement that within one year West Papua would be resolved as an issue; but in practice Amsterdam delayed negotiation, as discussed elsewhere in this thesis. Jakarta regarded this delay as a humiliation. Yet in reality Den Haag had already surrendered West Papua to Indonesia by accepting Indonesian demands instead of defending the *status quo*. Sukarno therefore increased diplomatic pressure on the Dutch and later developed military campaigns to annex West Papua. Jakarta preferred the term "return to the Motherland [*Ibu Pertiwi*]". During the

military campaigns a considerable number of Indonesians were said to have sacrificed their lives (Naval Captain Jos Sudarso and all his crew members were killed in the Arafura Sea, southwest of West Papua in 1962).

The catchcry “return to the motherland” is a loaded term, politically motivated and of questionable validity. The occupation of East Timor, a former Portuguese colony, in 1975 and the confrontation with Malaysia in 1963-1965 clearly indicate that Jakarta could engage in territorial expansion for its own social, economic, political and strategic interests. The evidence of such motivation is clear, even in the use of new names to replace the old Dutch names. To honour those who made the supreme sacrifice fighting the Dutch, the name of West Papua was changed by the Indonesian government to “Irian Jaya”, and the use of the phrase “the gate of Victory” indicates that the take-over of Irian Jaya symbolised the ascendancy of the Republic over the colonial masters.<sup>4</sup> The creation of “Irian Jaya” was thus important for the dream of creating a greater Indonesia. Before, during and after what was called the Act of Free Choice in 1969, Jakarta expounded this historical myth to convince the world community of the justification of its claim.

Since the international community readily recognised the annexation, Indonesian views soon shifted. The Papuans were now to be regarded as Indonesian citizens with rights and duties that such citizenship entails. The Papuans were to comply with state rules and regulations like other ethnic groups; any complaints, criticisms and ideas of secession were seen as counter-productive. But there were inherent contradictions in this view. The Papuans were supposed to be the same as other Indonesians, yet

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<sup>4</sup> Jim Elmslie (1995). *Irian Jaya in the 1990s: Economic Expansion and West Papuan Nationalism*, University of Sydney, p.14.

they were in fact considered a special group, both “underdeveloped and backward” and racially different with a black skin.<sup>5</sup> As citizens the Papuans have a duty to defend the state and the state ideology, Pancasila and the Constitution of 1945. Any opposition to this state ideology is seen as a threat to the state's stability and security, and must be destroyed. The Irianese cannot be permitted to challenge the interests of the state either by trying to claim for themselves resources that belong to all Indonesians, or by creating political instability by calling for the independence of West Papua.<sup>6</sup>

Further, Jakarta argues that because Indonesia is composed of many divergent cultures, traditions, ways of life, and races, spread across a vast area, any claim for independence or special treatment of West Papua encourages similar claims elsewhere, and poses a serious threat to the stability and unity of the state. Thus anyone who promotes the idea of West Papuan nationalism, and hence threatens national stability, must be crushed.<sup>7</sup>

As far back as the seventh century, and particularly during the Hindu, Buddhist and later Muslim empires that ruled Indonesia in the eight to twelfth centuries, West Papua was a place for capturing slaves, hunting birds of paradise, and collecting other valuable trade items.<sup>8</sup> Most Indonesians still stereotype Papuans as a primitive, backward and inferior race living in the stone age, that must be educated even though it will take them generations to reach the level of the Javanese.<sup>9</sup> It is believed that the

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<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*:14.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*:15.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*:16.

<sup>8</sup> Wim Zonggonau (1998). *Statement* at meeting of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Melbourne, 7 December, pp.3-4 .

<sup>9</sup> Research Institute of Oppressed Peoples/RIOP (1985). *The Tragedy of the Papuans and the International Political Order*, RIOP Report No:1. Makula, Boskoop, Amsterdam, pp. 12-17.

Papuans cannot develop themselves because they are lazy, undisciplined, and fractious. If they were allowed to leave Indonesia, they would not have the knowledge and skills to develop the country and become economically viable. Jakarta thus repeats the derogatory remarks that were often made by its former colonial master about Indonesian freedom fighters during the Indonesian independence campaign in the 1930s and 1940s.

More recently, the Papuan nationalists have been regarded as traitors, terrorists or wild gangsters who must be destroyed. Jakarta believes that the problems that exist in West Papua will disappear over time as the Papuans accept the political reality and become assimilated as Indonesians. Working within Indonesian society, Papuans will then be able to take their part in the national development program and improve their living standards.<sup>10</sup> However, there are many hidden motives underlying these arguments. In order to develop and resettle its population, Jakarta needs more land and resources, both of which are available in West Papua.

One of the possible consequences of coercive political integration can be disintegration. Marthin van den Heuvel and Jan G. Siccoma (1992), in their study of the political, economic and social crisis in the former Yugoslavia, concluded that disintegration was inevitable mainly because the nation-state of Yugoslavia was created by force, perpetuated by the Tito communist regime. The federal government of Yugoslavia believed that by unifying the divergent ethnic groups, differences of religion and culture, regionalism and ethnic sentiments would be eradicated. Tito saw this as fundamental to the achievement of national and regional stability. However, the Balkan conflict following the death of Tito provides clear evidence that a majority of people of "Yugoslavia" rejected this artificial and enforced unity. The Catholic

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<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*:16.

communities in Croatia and Slovenia, the Muslim community in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Albanians in Kosovo all felt that they had become the subject of colonisation by the Serbs who dominated the central power structure. The Serbs imposed their own culture and traditions on the other ethnic groups and regarded these ethnic groups as inferior races. Consequently, the emergence of new political opposition within the establishment inspired further ethnic nationalism. After the death of Tito, the federal state of Yugoslavia fell apart and demands for broader political participation and separation dominated the conflicts in the 1990s. Ethnic nationalism emerged once again. Most recently, the Kosovo liberation movement mobilised the ethnic Albanians to struggle for freedom. For them, the question is not one of social improvement but of the independence of Kosovo. Improvement in economic conditions will not end ethnic nationalism. The disintegration of Yugoslavia will continue, regardless of economic change and the assistance of foreign powers.<sup>11</sup> The emergence of newly independent states such as Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia provide clear evidence of inevitable political transformation in the Balkans.

Balkanisation of Indonesia could well be a political outcome. Yugoslavia and Indonesia share many common characteristics. Like Yugoslavia, Indonesia constitutes many ethnic groups, religions, races and cultures. More than 3,000 distinct ethnic communities inhabit Indonesia. The state is also based on artificial colonial boundaries created by the Dutch, ignoring ethnic boundaries. In the case of West Papua, the Papuans are ethnically Melanesians and, logically, should be part of Papua New Guinea, not forcibly integrated with the Malay Indonesians. Like Tito, Sukarno

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<sup>11</sup> Marthin van den Heuvel and John G. Siccoma (1992). "The Disintegration of Yugoslavia", *Yearbook of European Studies*, Rodopi, Amsterdam, p.206.

abolished a federal system and united divergent ethnic groups into an artificial mega-state.

### 5.2.2. The Papuan Perspectives

Papuan views are also divided for and against independence. The contra-independence movement argues that an independent West Papua is unlawful and historically unjustifiable. The supporters of this view comprise only a small proportion of Papuans, in terms of numbers, but have a strong influence in the central power structure. Most of them are of the elite, who fear the loss of their current positions in such organisations as Gerakan Merah Putih of '45, Pemuda Pancasila (the Pancasila Youth), and Battalion Kasuari. As military agents, members of Battalion Kasuari have the task of spying on OPM supporters in the villages; they often live in the villages as ordinary citizens and may not be suspected as agents working for the Indonesian military.<sup>12</sup> They are not only contra-revolutionaries but also opportunists, and do harm to the movement. In line with Jakarta, these people accept the present political *status quo*. Most often they are self-interested operators rather than loyal supporters of Indonesia. Their lives are constantly in danger because both sides suspect them of disloyalty. During the social and political unrest in major cities in 1996 and 1998, such groups actively participated in counter insurgency activities against pro-independence activists, with the Indonesian military using them in their espionage activities. They are often more dangerous than the real enemy because they can infiltrate local society and orchestrate protests and rallies. In the highlands of West Papua, for example, well trained agents wore

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<sup>12</sup> KODAM VIII/TRIKORA (December 1990). *Sejarah KODAM VIII/TRIKORA Period 1982-1990*, Jayapura, p.118.

traditional clothes and lived among the local people while searching for sympathisers and members of the OPM.<sup>13</sup>

The second group is the nationalist or pro-independence movement. It is not only large in number, comprising comprising the vast majority of the population, but it controls access to the future of the nation. In its view, West Papua is not an integral part of Indonesia, but a colony in disguise. This group argues that the common characteristics of the early conventional colonial systems (territorial occupation, exploitation of natural resources, genocide of indigenous peoples, and militarisation), prevail in West Papua and, in some instances, are even worsening,<sup>14</sup> and that what happened in the Act of Free Choice in 1969 was merely a transfer of power from one colonial master to another, without the consent of the Papuans. Although some observers believe that the current political tensions in West Papua are caused primarily by social dissatisfaction, to the Papuans it is absurd to see such an interpretation as a basis for deciding whether or not West Papua should be part of Indonesia.

Racism and social barriers have also played an important role in determining the Papuans' views. The Papuans strongly believe that the colour of their skin marks a line of racial separation. The Papuans are black with fuzzy hair, while the Indonesians are Malays with brown skin and straight hair. The Papuans regards Indonesians as "*orang seberang*" or foreigners.<sup>15</sup> These differences are compounded by religious divisions. A

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<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*:118. Also confirmed by Aldolfina Zonggonau Ondawame, September 1998, interviewed by the author, Canberra.

<sup>14</sup> Otto Ondawame (1997). "The Impacts of Freeport Mining's Activities on the Amungme and Kamoro Peoples in West Papua" in S. Wareham (ed.), *Visions and Actions For Peace*, Conference Proceedings of International Physicians For the Prevention of Nuclear War and Prevention of War (Australia), Canberra, p.227.

<sup>15</sup> This term is used to describe Indonesians (see Otto Ondawame, 25 July 1999, ABR-Hindsight: West Papua, interviewed by Mark Worth, Sydney).

majority of Indonesians are Muslim, whereas the Papuans are predominantly Christian. Their ways of life, tradition and culture are also quite distinctive. The Papuan food culture, for example, is typical of the food cultures of the people of South Pacific with taro, yam, sago, sweet potato and pig as their staple foods; the Indonesians are a rice-eating culture. The social structure of the Papuans is a communal one, in which the big-man plays a significant leadership role, while Indonesian society, notably in Java, is semi-feudalistic. These differences have created deep social and political divisions between the Indonesians and the Papuans. According to the Papuans, secession is the only practical way to diminish the cultural conflict between the two societies.

Reference to legal argument raises other factors. The Papuans have rights to self-determination and independence like other peoples in the world. As noted above, these have been clearly stipulated in the UN's Declaration on Human Rights and its related conventions and resolutions. However, in West Papua these rights were denied in the transfer of land and people from the old colonial power, the Dutch, to the new colonial power, without the Papuans' prior consent. The Papuans argue that a just, democratic and lawful plebiscite was not implemented in West Papua during the so-called Act of Free Choice in 1969, and they criticise the United Nations for its failure to honour its responsibility in this matter.

The bitter experiences of the current colonial occupation have impacted on the hearts and minds of Papuans.<sup>16</sup> The state administration is concentrated in Java, and the relationship of the centre to the periphery has been harsh. Militarisation has intensified and West Papua, which is

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<sup>16</sup> John R.Djopari (1993). *Pemberontakan Oraginasia Papua Merdeka*, Grasindo, Jakarta, p.160.

regarded as a “trouble zone”, has been declared a Military Operational Zone (DOM). Widespread human rights abuses have occurred and there has been a massive influx of immigrants. In 1994 political observers regarded the 173,430 immigrants with increasing alarm;<sup>17</sup> by 1999 the number had risen to around one million. The Papuans lost control of their land and economy and became a target for cultural genocide. More than 163,000 hectares of forest were destroyed between 1982-1990 as a result of large-scale logging.<sup>18</sup> Economic inequality, unlawful selling and purchasing systems, outside exploitation of local economic resources, land conflicts, business-motivated marriages, criminal activity, and competition for jobs are just a few of the consequences of the tidal wave of immigration. There is a real fear that the Papuans will become a marginalised society in their own land in the years to come.

The independence of most Melanesians and of many small island countries in the South Pacific, which in terms of geographical and population size and capacity are much smaller than West Papua, have encouraged the aspirations of Papuan nationalism. The Papuans ask, if their Melanesian brothers in the east can enjoy freedom and independence, why cannot the Papuans in the West of Melanesia enjoy the same freedom? The feeling of Melanesian Brotherhood is expressed in the OPM's national motto for the state of West Papua: “One People One Soul”.

Although public opinion in West Papua is somewhat divided, the general view is clear: as West Papuan students in Jakarta have argued, independence is the only realistic solution to the current conflict.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> *Pacific Islands Business* April 1994, p.34.

<sup>18</sup> This destruction compared with 368,000 ha in Sumatra, and 611,000 ha in Kalimantan, *ibid.*:37.

<sup>19</sup> *The Age* (Melbourne) 10 July 1998.

Arrangements based on force will not survive long, and will often end unhappily; the experiences of the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union demonstrate this. Papuans refuse to accept the assumption that merely by improving the economic conditions of the West Papuans, ethnic nationalism will die out. Indeed improvement of internal conditions is seen as a way of strengthening the Papuan national sentiment. The experiences of newly independent states in Eastern Europe, and ongoing political resistance within democratic countries, such as the Scots and Northern Ireland in the UK and the Basques in Spain, show that economic improvements do not necessarily reduce separatist national sentiments.

### **5.2.3. International Attitudes towards West Papua**

From the viewpoint of international opinion, West Papuan nationalism is often dismissed as unrealistic, but more generally it is regarded as a non-issue. There are three main international perspectives. First, there are groupings associated with Jakarta. They include multinational companies and individual countries such as Papua New Guinea, Australia and USA, which have both bilateral and multilateral ties with Indonesia. Like the colonial power, this group readily accepts that West Papua is an integral part of Indonesia since the international community recognised the outcome of the Act of Free Choice in 1969. For this group, the issue of an independent West Papua is already dead; they consider the OPM to be a gangster or terrorist organisation, probably associated with communist movements, and consisting of only a handful of men equipped with outdated weapons. According to this view, West Papua would be better off within the current system than seeking separation. Its exponents argue that West Papua has a small population which is still "backward and primitive", that continual fighting between its many ethnic groups could lead to civil war in the future, and that it lacks qualified manpower, while in contrast Indonesia is

already a major power in the region.<sup>20</sup> The Papuans themselves cannot defeat Indonesia and any move to the independence of West Papua will merely destabilise the region. Supporters of the view prefer to strengthen their bilateral and multilateral relationships with Indonesia. Papua New Guinea and Australia, for example, as part of their preventive diplomacy, pursue a friendly policy with Jakarta and have signed mutually beneficial military and border agreements. The military approach to overcoming West Papuan resistance is accepted. According to Peter King, in the interests of *realpolitik*, commercial advantages, and short-run tranquillity, Australia has turned a blind eye to problems in West Papua and East Timor,<sup>21</sup> and has actively discouraged its own ex-colony PNG from showing Melanesian solidarity with the West Papuans.

The more moderate international groups believe that the desire for separation exists because of unequal distribution of wealth, power and resources. These views come mostly from human rights groups, parliamentarians, environmentalists, academics, government sponsored non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and investors in West Papua and Indonesia. Like the first group, they defend the *status quo* of the unitary state of Indonesia. On the other hand, they are concerned about the survival of Papuan culture, tradition and ways of life, human rights abuses, and land destruction. They believe that by sharing of powers and a more equitable distribution of the national resources, political unrest will gradually disappear. According to them, autonomy, self-determination or a federal system offer the best prospect for resolving conflict, as such solutions would avoid an escalation of disintegration and would safeguard Papuan culture,

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<sup>20</sup> Ian P. Siagian (21 November 1999) interviewed by the author, Sydney.

<sup>21</sup> Peter King (1993). "Breaking Deadlocks—Peace-making Opportunities for Australia in East Timor, West Papua and Papua New Guinea" in Kevin Clements (ed.), *Peace and Security in the Asia Pacific Region*, UNU Press, Tokyo, p.84 .

dignity, land and ethnicity. These groups suggest that the OPM shift the focus of attention from contentious to non-contentious issues,<sup>22</sup> that is from the issue of independence to matters such as human rights, immigration and land issues and so engineer a new break in the current deadlock. While this view is unlikely to be acceptable among the nationalists, it makes sense in tactical terms, in that it envisages a basis for developing consensus in any subsequent peace talks.

The third international perspective is that of groups of the far left, who argue that neither a unitary state, nor autonomy, nor federation will improve the basic condition of the people in West Papua. This group is relatively small in number, consisting of grassroot movements, radical NGOs, left organisations, progressive churches, academics and politicians, the peoples of Melanesia, and Black people elsewhere in the world. It includes the PNG Council of Churches, the Melanesian Solidarity movement and many solidarity groups in other parts of the world. The group supports the major objectives of the OPM,<sup>23</sup> and distrusts Jakarta.

The contra-independence view is driven by political realism, while the pro-independence view derives from an idealist viewpoint. In part this reflects a division between state interests and people's interests. However, the general consensus on the likely success of any attempt to gain independence is pessimistic.

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<sup>22</sup> P.Wallenstein and G.Lindgren (1998). *Towards Conflict Resolution in the Third World*, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, p.129.

<sup>23</sup> *Post-Courier* 27 November 1997.

### 5.3. Potential Sources of International Support

By comparison with the case of East Timor, international support for the OPM has been insignificant, for the reasons outlined above. The world community accepts the *realpolitik* of the supremacy of the state of Indonesia as legitimating the current *status quo*. It is important, however, to understand the shifting concerns of the international community, over time and space. The potential sources of support are four-fold: European, African, South Pacific, and American.

May<sup>24</sup> and Djopari<sup>25</sup>, who have both made studies of external sources of support, conclude there is no real international support for the OPM, but that there is some low level of sympathy emerging, mainly on the basis of racial solidarity from the South Pacific and from Black countries, which to a considerable extent has encouraged West Papuan nationalism; any fundamental political change in the near future is unlikely. Let me examine this conclusion more closely.

#### 5.3.1. European Connections

The public in West Papua, essentially the oldest generation, believe that support will come from Europe, particularly from the former colonial master, the Dutch; but that expectation is unlikely to be fulfilled even though the Dutch have a moral obligation to the Papuan people and have a tradition of democratic and international solidarity.

The Dutch have in the past felt some moral duty to defend the rights of the Papuans. Their decolonisation process was started in 1960, first, to

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<sup>24</sup> Ron J. May (1991). "Sources of External Support for the West Papua Movement" in K.M. de Silva and Ron J. May (eds.), *Internationalization of Ethnic Conflict*, International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Pinter Publishers Limited, London, pp.158-180.

<sup>25</sup> Djopari, *op. cit.*:134-146.

improve the poor international image created by their role as colonial masters, and secondly, because the granting of self-determination to the Papuans would open up a new opportunity for the Dutch to restore its colonial ties through the provision of conditional aid. In other words, the Dutch wanted to continue their domination. However, the support given by the Dutch was never serious and, as argued in Chapter Three, no real political support was given even to the West Papuan exiles in the Netherlands. The presence of West Papuan leaders such as Nicholas Youwe, Philemon T.J. Jufuway, Herman Womsiwor and Markus Kaisiepo in the Netherlands was virtually ignored in 1962. In the multilateral talks which preceded the New York Agreement in August 1962 the Dutch undermined the Papuan leaders, who were excluded from the negotiations. Since the transfer of power to Indonesia, the Dutch government has been very reluctant to support the OPM, arguing that it will only embarrass the home government, and it has never offered moral or financial support similar to that given by Portugal to East Timorese leaders. Some small local support has been given by Dutch grassroot organisations, NGOs and churches but their policy also goes hand in hand with that of the government. In the 1980s and 1990s, Stichting Werkgroep Nieuw Guinea (HAPIN), based in Nijmegen, for example, provided small-scale financial support for social and educational projects inside West Papua.

A significant development, more recently, has been the political support given by the European Union parliament. It passed Resolution No.B4-0332/96, of 15 March 1996, which called for demilitarisation and the presence of an international monitoring group in West Papua.

Similar sympathy has come from Ireland. On 31 January 1996, the Irish Parliament passed a resolution stating its deep concerns over "the

allegation of human rights abuses and the inadequacy of the Act of Free Choice in 1969", and then called on the government "to request the United Nations to investigate and act on the allegations of human rights abuses and on the question of the validity of the 1969 'Act of "Free" Choice'".<sup>26</sup> West Papuan Action, a local solidarity group based in Dublin, has kept the Irish government and people informed about political developments in West Papua on a regular basis.

Unlike the Netherlands, Sweden has been an important source of support. The government of Sweden provided a new home for leaders of the OPM such as J.H. Prai and Otto Ondawame, Amos Indey and Darius Maury, and a small but significant measure of sympathy has emerged in the country. During the RPG period, leftist intellectuals, in collaboration with members of the OPM, were allowed to open an information office in Stockholm, but the venture failed. Fourteen years later, Nicolaus Messet, a West Papuan exiled in Sweden, confirmed that the increase of public awareness in Sweden was a result of energetic lobbying efforts by Prai and Ondawame.<sup>27</sup> Six motions were submitted to the Swedish parliament during the 1990/91 and 1991/92 parliamentary sittings, drawing attention to allegations of human rights abuses and weapons exports to Indonesia and calling for recognition of the OPM, and the reopening of the case of West Papua in the UN. In the early 1990s the Swedish parliament called for a change in the position of the government on the issue of West Papua: it called on the government to take the issue to the United Nations and reopen the case; to play an active role in working for the implementation of a plebiscite to determine the future of the people of West Papua; and to submit a resolution on West Papua in the UN as it had done on East Timor

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<sup>26</sup> Irish Parliament (31 January 1996). "Resolution on West Papua".

<sup>27</sup> Nick Messet 6 February 1992, *Document*: "A letter addressed to Andy Ayamseba in Canberra".

in the European Parliament.<sup>28</sup> In Motion 1991/92:U609, of 27 January 1992, Pierre Schori and other members of the Social Democratic Party urged Prime Minister Karl Bill and the Liberal government to recognise the OPM as the legitimate representative of the people of West Papua, to provide humanitarian aid to the West Papuan refugees in Papua New Guinea, to take up the issue of West Papua at the UN, and to urge that the UN pass a resolution concerning West Papua similar to paragraphs 8 and 9 of the European Parliament's resolution on East Timor. This continuing activity reflected the work of the Swedish-based support group, Foeningen foer Fritt Väst Papua (FFP), established in January 1988 in Malmö, and of the International Office of the OPM, set up by the head of Political Bureau of the OPM, J.H.Prai, in Malmö on 1 February 1992. Expressing concrete sympathy, the youth wing of the Social Democratic Party (SSU), Skaone branch, and the local government provided a venue for OPM operations. More recently in 1998 a new support group, known as West Papuan Information, was established in Copenhagen.

In Germany, a church-based organisation has been one of the largest support groups in Europe to have played a role in keeping the West Papuan issue alive. The London-based TAPOL (which is the oldest human rights organisation in Europe focusing on Indonesia), Amnesty International, Survival International, and other NGOs have also monitored the situation in West Papua closely and raised the issue on a regular basis in different forums. In Greece, a group of West Papuans including Seth Rumkorem was

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<sup>28</sup> See motions of Swedish Parliament No: 1991/92:U624, point 5 of Folk Party (People's Party) and Centre Party and 1992/93:U604, point 3 of Folk Party submitted motion. In motion 1991/92:U609, Pierre Schori, points 5 and 7 of the Social Democrat Party, clearly stated the need for human rights and a political solution. Also, see motion 1992/93:UU3 in the Parliament archive or in the *Merdeka Nyhetsbulletin* of Foeningen Ett Fritt Papua, Nr17/93, Malmö, pp.15-25. See also earlier motions: 1990/91:U602 Eva Goes et al. (Green Party) and motion 1990/91:U647, Ingela Maortoson (Folk Party) on the colonisation of West Papua.

given political asylum. The Vatican has offered relatively little support, but some moral support was given when the late Bernard Tanggahma was running the information office in Dakar. The position of the Vatican is broadly similar to that of other governments in the world. My own impression from a visit in 1989 to hold discussions with officials in the Vatican, was that if the population of West Papua had been predominantly Catholic, political support would have been likely, in the same way that the Vatican voiced concern over East Timor, where 95 per cent of East Timorese are Catholics.

### 5.3.2. African Connections

Support given by the Black African continent was significant in the 1970s;<sup>29</sup> even today Black African countries are actively concerned about the future of the West Papuans and of other colonised black peoples around the world, unlike the official positions of the governments in the South Pacific. The governments of both Black Africa and the Caribbean demonstrate high levels of support and sympathy. The effects of racism, the painfulness of colonial experiences, and strong feelings of the unity of black people are important motivating factors. As mentioned in Chapter One, in 1969, responding to the result of the Act of Free Choice, the Brazzaville group expressed their sympathy and called for a new and just plebiscite. The late President Senghor of Senegal, who was Chairman of the Brazzaville group, recognised the right of the Papuans to independence and provided a venue, with diplomatic immunity and office facilities, in his capital city from which to pursue an international campaign throughout Africa. During the Provisional Revolutionary Government of West Papua, the late Bernard Tanggahma, a Catholic, was appointed as the head of this bureau. Senghor's own background as a former Catholic priest enabled him to play an

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<sup>29</sup> Djopari, *op. cit.*:136-137 (see also May, *op. cit.*:163).

important role in creating links for Tanggahma with the Vatican. However, the office in Dakar was later closed down, primarily because of political change in Senegal (where a leadership shift replaced Senghor by a Muslim president) but also because of leadership clashes within the OPM in 1976, as outlined earlier. The closure of the bureau has not brought a decline in the Black people's interest in West Papua, however; much general sympathy still exists in Africa,<sup>30</sup> but geographical distances and Africa's own serious social and political crises mean that this important potential source of support cannot be mobilised at this stage to become West Papuan sponsors.

An embarrassing question raised by government officials from mainly West African countries (including Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria and Liberia) during my own discussions with their diplomatic representatives in Ghana in September 1989 was, what has your own region (referring to South Pacific Forum countries) done to help in your struggle? I had to admit, sadly, the OPM had not received any consistent support from its neighbours.

### **5.3.3. Pacific and Australian Connections**

It is a matter for regret and shame that members of the South Pacific Forum have done nothing at all collectively to help to bring the West Papuan conflict to an end. In diplomatic rhetoric one often hears of "the Melanesian Way" and "Melanesian Brotherhood", but in reality such terms are empty as far as the people of West Papua are concerned. The governments of the South Pacific Forum (SPF) should play a more active role in seeking to resolve this conflict; however, the OPM enjoys only a very low level of sympathy in the region.

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<sup>30</sup> Otto Ondawame (1998). *The Joys and Challenges of a Freedom Fighter*, Canberra, (unpublished), pp.128- 130.

As a close neighbour and also the first point of refuge, Papua New Guinea has frequently been affected by the West Papuan conflict, and any future political development in West Papua will also have an immediate effect on PNG. Repeated incursions by Indonesian troops along the border, and the flight of West Papuan refugees into PNG, have already created confusion for PNG, and PNG's attempts to take preventive diplomatic actions have failed. The official position of Port Moresby is clear: West Papua is an integral part of Indonesia and any support for the OPM risks encouragement of regional conflict and the influx of more refugees. There is some sympathy among politicians, government officials and people,<sup>31</sup> but, like the Somare government in 1984, the Skate government in 1998 continued to deny the rights of the people of West Papua.

Despite this disappointing official stance, Port Moresby has made some positive contributions, as for example in providing a new home for more than 20,000 West Papuan refugees, despite pressures coming from Jakarta and Canberra. Port Moresby also ratified the international convention on refugees in 1986, during the Paias Wingti administration.<sup>31</sup> In 1998, 1,000 of the refugees were permitted to stay in PNG. Over the years a few politicians have individually expressed their sympathy. In 1962, for example, members of the Papua New Guinea legislative council voiced concern about the future of West Papua New Guinea (referring to West Papua), and supported an immediate referendum on self-determination.<sup>32</sup> John Guise wrote to the United Nations expressing Papua New Guinean dissatisfaction with the UN's actions in 1969. In 1974, a year before PNG's independence, Foreign Minister Albert Maori Kiki, called a secret meeting with the leaders of the OPM in Madang, and said that PNG was ready to

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<sup>31</sup> Otto Ondawame (1992). *West Papua: A New Perspective and Hope, Report: OPM-International Affairs*, Uppsala, p.11.

<sup>32</sup> May, *op. cit.*:165.

mediate in peace talks with Indonesia.<sup>33</sup> However, these talks never took place, due to the fragmentation within the OPM in 1976. Individual politicians such the later opposition leaders Iambakey Okuk, John Momis and Bernard Narokobi are among those who have raised the West Papuan issue in the PNG parliament from time to time. In the final communique of a NGO parallel conference before the Forum meeting in Madang in September 1995, the conference called on the Forum to put the issue of West Papua onto the agenda of its next meeting, and then collectively bring the issue to the UN Decolonisation Commission. One year later, former Prime Minister Julius Chan made an important point to Jakarta, when Indonesians criticized him for allowing West Papuan political activities in PNG; West Papuans, he said, had full rights under PNG's laws to exercise their democratic rights.<sup>34</sup> In the same year, John Tekwie, an MP from Sandaun province and chairman of the Indigenous People's Party, together with highlands MPs Robert Lak, and Peti Lafamana, both members of Melanesian Solidarity (MELSOL), East Sepik MP Bernard Narokobi (then opposition leader), and Western Province MP Micah Wes, criticised the Skate government's policy towards West Papua and said:

The request is for the PNG government to take up the issue of West Papua self-determination and independence with Indonesian as well as take the matter to the United Nations.<sup>35</sup>

In 1998, leaders of the Melanesian Solidarity Group, the Secretary General of the PNG Council of Churches Pat Kila, and other community leaders led a protest march to the Indonesian Embassy to call on the new Indonesian government to recognise West Papua as an independent

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<sup>33</sup> Wim Zonggonau, interviewed by the author (January 1997), Port Moresby.

<sup>34</sup> *Post-Courier* 26 April 1998.

<sup>35</sup> *Post Courier* 22 June 1998, "Papua New Guinea Parliamentarian Pushing West Papua Independence".

country.<sup>36</sup> The Papua New Guinea churches, Melanesian Solidarity groups, PNG Legal Aid, the Individual and Community Rights Advocacy Forum (ICRAF), and the Rural Training Centre are among the organisations that have supported independence for West Papua. In November 1998 the PNG Council of Churches allowed the OPM to open an information office in Port Moresby, but the government refused to accept such an arrangement and ordered it to close down, an action which was sharply criticised by the PNG Ombudsman, ICRAF, Melanesian Solidarity and the PNG Council of Churches.

Unlike PNG, the Walter Lini government of Vanuatu recognised the OPM in 1985 as a legitimate organisation and provided a base for the OPM's activities in the region.<sup>37</sup> The government also raised the issue in the United Nations and played an important role in bringing together the leaders of the Pemka and RPG factions to sign the Vanuatu Declaration in September 1985 (see Chapter Four). The Vanuatu government later agreed to support the exiled leaders of the Free Papua Movement (OPM) in seeking independence for Indonesian's Irian Jaya province.<sup>38</sup> [Since this was written, Prime Minister Barak Sope of Vanuatu supported calls for West

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<sup>36</sup> "West Irianese are Melanesians; they are not Asians. They cannot remain internally repressed under the tyranny of an Asian leadership. They are half of Papua New Guinea—literally in flesh and blood. They are Papua New Guineans who unfortunately were cut off from the rest of us by the borders of the colonial powers. They share our cultural values, societal norms and virtues; the aboriginal patterns of their lives do not resemble their Asian counterparts in any way. They are culturally different from the rest of Indonesia", Samson Komati, (June 1998) "Indonesia must Free West Irian", California Lutheran University, Thousand Oaks, California USA.

<sup>37</sup> "The Republic of Vanuatu, through its development co-operation program, will assist diplomatically and the Vanua-aku Party in particular will take an active part in the negotiations which may lead to the international recognition of the West Papuan People's Rights for Self-Determination and Independence. The Government and the People of Vanuatu are determined to support it in the future", in "The Vanuatu Proposal to the West Papuan National Liberation Front", The Lini government of Vanuatu (1985), Port Vila.

<sup>38</sup> *The Times of Papua New Guinea* (28 November—4 December 1986). Port Moresby.

Papuan independence at the Pacific Islands Forum meeting in Kiribati in October 2000, as did the government of Nauru.]

The Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific movement (NFIP), based in Suva, has also given concrete support and kept alive the issue of independence of West Papua throughout the years. The foreign policy of the Fiji Labour Party government under the late Dr Timoci Bavandra made clear its support for the OPM. The Pacific Islands Association of NGOs (PIANGO) at a conference held in Suva in June 1998 also called for the end of colonialism in the region and classified West Papua as one of the Non-Self Governing Territories in the South Pacific, together with Te Ao Maohi (French Polynesia) and Ka Pae'Aina (Hawai'i).

Since the incorporation of West Papua into Indonesia, the official position of Australia has remained unchanged: Canberra does not want to destabilise the region and endanger its own relations with Indonesia. In the *Guidelines* of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), the OPM was listed under South Pacific region, and DFAT officials were reminded that the Australian government neither recognises nor condones the activities of the OPM.<sup>39</sup> Bill Hayden, Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1986 refused to meet the leaders of the OPM during an official tour in Australia. He justified this action as follows:

I would not agree to a formal meeting because of tension between Australia and Indonesia and the likelihood that Indonesia would be disturbed by official recognition of the OPM.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1995). "Guidelines on Official Australian Contacts with Representatives of Foreign States, Political Entities or Organisations where Special Considerations are Involved", Canberra, p.10-11.

<sup>40</sup> *The Canberra Times* 21 November 1986.

However, following a series of significant events, including the mass influx of refugees into PNG in 1984, human rights abuses in 1995/96, the Mapenduma hostage crisis in 1996, the release of human rights reports by ACFOA and Bishop Herman Jan Munninghoff OFM in Jayapura, the hostage crisis and drought in 1996, and political protests in 1998, the official position in Canberra has slowly shifted. Australia was a major donor of humanitarian aid to refugees in 1985 and in the relief operation in West Papua in 1997/98, and has also provided financial support to the Indonesian Human Rights Commission in Jakarta to carry out its monitoring work. In 1995, the then foreign minister, Gareth Evans, raised for the first time concern about human rights abuses in West Papua and requested the Australian diplomatic mission in Jakarta, headed by Allan Taylor, to visit the Timika region to monitor the situation.<sup>41</sup> Two years later, under the new Coalition government, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer warned the Indonesian military not to use security forces in dealing with separatist movements or popular protests, as this would damage Indonesian's international reputation and economic recovery.<sup>42</sup> The Australian government also released over AUS\$4 million for relief operations in West Papua in 1997/98.

In the corridors of Federal Parliament, concern is mostly focused on human rights and environmental issues. The Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade made clear its position on human rights in a recommendation calling on the Australian government to actively support a new UN initiative for consultations with all the parties to the conflicts in East Timor, Irian Jaya and Aceh with a view to negotiating a settlement, and to draw to the attention of the Indonesian Government the gross injustice

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<sup>41</sup> *The Australian Financial Review* 7 April 1995, p.12.

<sup>42</sup> *The Weekend Australian* 11-12 July 1998, "Downer Warns Rogue Troops" p. 12. (See also *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 17 November 1998, p.11).

of the application of the Anti-Subversion Law to those involved in peaceful protests.<sup>43</sup> Minority parties, in particular the Democrats and the Green Party, raised questions on West Papua in parliament. For example, in July 1998, Senator Bob Brown, MP for the Green Party of Tasmania, gave notice of a motion in the Senate which called on the government to “reinvigorate Australia's approach to the West Papuan freedom movement by moving to ensure a fully enfranchised vote on self-determination in West Papua”<sup>44</sup> and called for a reopening of the case of the Act of Free Choice of 1969, arguing that this was the only way to solve the political conflict in West Papua. At the party level, the Australian Labor Party has on different occasions discussed the issue of West Papua. The Victorian Branch of the ALP in November 1978 called among other things for: “the recognition of the OPM as a political voice of the people of Irian Jaya, granting refugee status to West Papuans, and sending a fact-finding mission to West Papua to monitor human rights abuses, and urging Canberra to take up the issue with its counter-partners in Jakarta”.<sup>45</sup> Similar resolutions were passed by the Victorian Branch in 1986 and in February 1992, and at the national ALP Conference held in Hobart in 1994.

While the Australian government has officially adopted a hands-off stance, a growing level of sympathy is emerging among the Australian people. In November/December 1986, grassroot organisations in Australia organised an official OPM tour around the country. During the tour (from 11 November to 10 December 1986), public meetings and talks were held

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<sup>43</sup> The Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (Australian Parliament) (1992). *A Review of Australia's Efforts to Promote and Protect Human Rights*, Canberra, pp.78-79.

<sup>44</sup> Mark Ludlow, 12 July 1998. “Activist Pushes for 'Positive Dialogue on Irian Jaya'”, *Sunday Times*, Canberra. (See also Senator Brown Motion on West Papua, 1 July 1998, Motion No:11912 of the Australian Parliament).

<sup>45</sup> Victoria Branch ALP Conference, 11th-12th November 1978; Recommendation to National Conference in 1992. (See also ALP National Conference held in Hobart, September 1994).

with aid groups, churches, universities, foreign affairs officials, parliamentarians, and solidarity groups. Three key concerns were submitted in the form of a resolution to the Federal Parliament, concerning human rights abuses, refugees, and the need for a re-examination of the Act of Free Choice of 1969 through the Decolonisation Commission of the UN. On the final day of the tour, the leader of the delegation, Otto Ondawame, answered journalists' questions in the following words:

the tour found a lot of positive moral support among the politicians and the other people we have met in Australia... in the long term, the West Papuan leaders would like to see a federated Melanesia incorporating West Papua, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, New Caledonia and Fiji.<sup>46</sup>

In 1985 the Australia West Papua Association (AWPA) was established in Melbourne, and twelve years later additional branches were opened in Sydney and Hobart. In 1996 the West Papua Relief Association (WPRA) was set up by Ondawame. The Australia Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA) has also played a key role in the area of human development and human rights. These organisations have been important in fund-raising, publicity, and information campaigns which have had very positive effects. The AWPA has produced newsletters and information kits for worldwide distribution. The associations have organised meetings, seminars, exhibitions, and fund-raising events, and have paid travel expenses for OPM representatives. As a result, they have succeeded in breaking down the isolation of the West Papuans by increasing public awareness of their struggle. By organising visits of media personnel to remote areas in West Papua, it has been possible to expose the brutality and manipulation of the Indonesian regime. The mass media, including radio and TV programs, in

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<sup>46</sup> P. Heyward, "Exiles Push West Papuan Cause: Independence from Indonesia Revived As Prime Objective", *The Mercury*, 4 December 1986.

Australia have been instrumental in transmitting the message throughout the country. The personal involvement of OPM leaders, and the commitment of members of the OPM and support groups, have been key factors in the success of this campaign.

#### 5.3.4. USA Connections

The official position of the Washington government is the same as that of the Australian and most European governments, that bilateral and multilateral relations with Indonesia must be preserved at all costs. This general position has remained unchanged despite a growing concern about human rights issues. Over the last three years, human rights abuses in West Papua have been sharply criticised by Washington. In 1998 State Department Spokesman James Rubin urged the government of Indonesia to exercise maximum restraint, to permit peaceful demonstrations to proceed, to foster a climate of dialogue, and to order the immediate release of political prisoners in West Papua.<sup>47</sup> In the same year the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the US Department of State released a 1996 report on human rights abuses in West Papua which recommended that the Clinton government review its aid policy to Indonesia. However the prospect of direct pressure by Washington on Jakarta to prevent escalation of human rights abuses—as the USA has done in the cases of Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina—is still remote. At best, the State Department promised in 1995: “we will continue to actively pursue the advancement of human rights in Indonesia”.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> *The Australian* 9 July 1998.

<sup>48</sup> Marshall Carter, Director—African, Asian, and American Affairs Bureau of Democracy, letter to S. Udall, Executive Director of International River Networks in New York, 1 May 1995.

The US Congress has recently shown its concern not only about human rights issues but also about the issue of self-determination and independence of West Papua. On 22 May 1998, fifteen congressmen from across the parties called on President Habibie to "initiate direct, good faith dialogue with the peoples of East Timor and Irian Jaya on human rights protection and a just solution to their political status".<sup>49</sup> This call inspired the people of West Papua to demonstrate on the streets of the main urban centres such as Jayapura, Wamena, Biak, Manokwari and Sorong on 1 July 1998 to celebrate the 27th anniversary of the struggle; but these actions only brought about severe reprisals. On 11 September 1998, Congressman Eni Faleomavaega, from American Samoa, expressed his own concern and then called the attention of his colleagues to the on-going liberation struggle in West Papua.<sup>50</sup>

Among the American public, support for West Papua crosses social class, race and religious divisions. The emerging support is mainly coming from churches, grassroot organisations, environmentalists, intellectuals and students. In 1962, the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP), an important interest group of Blacks in the US, endorsed the Papuan independence struggle.<sup>51</sup> Since Freeport McMoRan started its mineral operations in West Papua in 1967, the issue of human rights abuses and environmental destruction has become more apparent internationally and the attention of the USA has increased, particularly among environmentalists and academics of the University of Texas in Austin and other universities, and among human rights organisations.

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<sup>49</sup> The Congress of the United States, letter addressed to President Habibie, Washington D.C, 22 May 1998.

<sup>50</sup> *Pacific Islands Report* 11 September 1998. See also "Congressional Testimony: Indonesia's Human Rights Violations Against the People of West Papua", US House of Representatives, Washington. DC

<sup>51</sup> J.M. van der Kroef (1977). *Conflict Studies; Patterns of Conflict in Eastern Indonesia*, No.79, London, p.14.

They claim that Freeport is one of the most irresponsible international mining companies, and has shown little respect for human rights, the environment or indigenous people. Expressing their sympathy, students have demonstrated in front of Freeport main offices in New Orleans and established huge data bases on West Papua and Freeport activities. Prof. Steven Feld, from the Anthropology Department at the University of Texas, Austin, resigned his academic position as a protest against the involvement of the university chancellor on the Freeport Board. A Kennedy Foundation Award for human rights activities was given to Bambang Wiyanto, who is now leader of the Legal Aid Institute (LBH) in Jakarta, for his concern over land issues in West Papua. Tom Beanal, the leader of the LEMASA, also received the Jane Bagley Lehman Award by the Tides Foundation in September 1997 for his public advocacy.

There is still little significant support from the USA, but sympathy has increased slowly over the past decade. More information about West Papua, together with the recent move towards democratisation in Indonesia, may encourage a greater public awareness.

#### **5.4. Strategies for Further Internationalisation of OPM Support**

Potential international support for the OPM is still very limited. Unlike the struggle for independence in Kanaky and East Timor, the OPM has not yet gained any significant political support from governments in the Asian and South Pacific regions.

Since regional support is so important, the OPM needs to increase its efforts in this area. On the home front, the OPM must unify its forces; present a new vision, program, strategy and leadership structure; make more effective use of mass media outlets; and improve its information

network. At the regional/international level, the OPM must engage in more active diplomatic campaigns, using diplomatic channels in Australia, New Zealand and the Melanesian countries, and the existing networks of the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific movement. It must lobby the South Pacific Forum to put the issue of West Papua on the agenda of the UN's Non-Self Governing Territories committee, as was done in the case of the overseas territory of French Polynesia, and to reopen the West Papuan case with the UN. Cooperation with the Hawaiian liberation movement is an important avenue of entry to US political circles. The OPM must lobby NGOs, parliamentarians and government bodies, environmentalists, churches in the region, and member countries of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, particularly donor countries to Indonesia, to stop all further financial, military and economic aid to Indonesia. It should specify international target groups, which may include the USA, Japan, Australia, the European Union, ASEAN, the IMF, the UN, the Unrepresented People's Organisation (UNPO), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), and the Black Caribbean countries, in order to have the plight of the people of West Papua put back on the international agenda. It should again lobby those African countries which rejected the result of the Act of Free Choice 1969 in the United Nations, particularly the government of Senegal, urging them to sponsor the West Papuan cause in different international forums.

Finally, as regionalisation is so important in international relations, West Papuan representatives should be allowed to attend the South Pacific Forum as observers and be admitted as members of the Melanesian Spearhead Group.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> Liem Soei Liong (1992). "Indonesian Colonialism in the Pacific" in David Robie (ed.), *Tu Galala; Social Change in the Pacific*, Bridget Williams Book Limited/Pluto Press, Sydney, p.113.

## 5.5. Conclusion

The issue of whether West Papua is to be or not to be a part of Indonesia has always been controversial and there is still debate about its future political status. One view derives from *realpolitik*, while the other comes from a sense of idealism. It is clear that public opinion within Indonesia itself has slowly changed; even if it is still has a long way to go, a positive shift is now occurring.

Potential national and international support for the OPM is still far from realisation. However, there is evidence that sympathy is spreading geographically and slowly increasing. The specific issues of refugees, human rights abuses, and hostage crises, and, most importantly, the democratisation of Indonesia, have influenced this shift in public opinion.

The level of support is still minimal. Three major factors help account for this. First, the Pacific countries lack experience of national liberation struggles, their current political status being largely a product of the negotiated withdrawal of colonial powers rather than a bitter liberation struggle. Secondly, the small size of most small island countries in the region means they are relatively powerless; the political interests of Australia and New Zealand still largely determine the domestic policies of these island countries, which remain heavily dependent, both economically and militarily, on the two larger countries. Finally, there is the deep political sensitivity which shapes Australia and PNG relationships with Indonesia. These two governments, as close neighbours of Indonesia, do not want to invite new conflict in the region. But regionalisation of the West Papua issue is vitally important and must be the primary focus of the OPM's efforts.

## 5.6 Postscript

With the raised profile of the OPM and the Papuan National Council inside West Papua from June 2000, regional concern and support have steadily increased. The governments of Vanuatu and Nauru have openly declared their support for an independent West Papua. In their addresses to the UN's Global Summit in September 2000, they declared their support and called on the UN to revisit the so-called Act of Free Choice of 1969. Other members of the Pacific Islands Forum have expressed their concern over human rights abuses in the country. The government of New Zealand has openly stated that it would like to play a mediatory role if the government of Indonesia and the OPM request it, a condition which seems unlikely to be met.

International public opinion on West Papua has also shifted in the last two years, with expressions of support from US Congressman, with the establishment of parliamentary groups on West Papua in both Australia and New Zealand, and growing support within Europe.

In Indonesia, a small number of radical groups are also calling for an independent West Papua. But the most important support has come from President Wahid himself. In a new policy, President Wahid approved a change of name of the province from Irian Jaya to Papua, allowed the raising of the Papuan national flag, and provided \$A350,000 for the Papuan National Congress in May 2000.

All these demonstrate that West Papua is no longer an isolated issue. After East Timor, it will become an international issue. Australia and Papua New Guinea may not be able to continue to ignore the political reality in West Papua. But there are still many obstacles to overcome. One question is

how the OPM can attract more international attention and support? The answer to this depends on the formulation of a new OPM strategy.



## Chapter Six: Ethnic nationalism and Local Resistance: a case study

### 6.1. Introduction

To illustrate how Papuan nationalism has taken root among Papuan communities, a study of Amungme ethnic nationalism and its responses to the mining company Freeport McMoRan and the government of Indonesia is presented here as a case study.

Despite the claims of the government and Freeport that there has been some improvement in local conditions, social and political unrest at the Freeport mine, which is located in the southern part of West Papua, has been so bad in the last 32 years that the region is regarded as a serious trouble spot. The relationship between the main actors—Amungme and Kamoro landowners on one side, and on the other side the government and its military forces and Freeport McMoRan, a New Orleans-based company—has actually deteriorated seriously over time.

Political analysts such as Djopari<sup>1</sup> argue that public turmoil has occurred mainly because of dissatisfaction over the consequences of development, and suggest that the use of a “social prosperity approach”, with a more equal distribution of social services and job opportunities and participation in the decision making process, will restore stability and security. While such improvements may bring some advantages in the short term, in the long term the issue of nationalism remains unsolved not only because of its complexity but also because it is so deeply rooted in the hearts and minds of all Papuans.<sup>2</sup> The social prosperity ‘solution’ has been

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<sup>1</sup> John R. Djopari (1993). *Pemberontakan Organisasi Papua Merdeka*, Grasindo, Jakarta, pp.161-165.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*:150. See also M. Kaisiepo (1994) “Ke-Irian-an dan Ke-Indonesia-an Mengkaji Nasionalisme dalam Kontext Lokal”, in K.H. Timotious et al. (eds), *Irian Jaya di Persimpangan Jalan*, No.45 Tahun 12, Bina Darma, Salatiga, pp.50-51.


opposed by the OPM and its supporters on the basis that such change will not address their fundamental demands.

This case study will look at the relationships among the main actors and analyse the reasons for the continuing social and political unrest. It will argue that, even at the local level, the bases of the conflict are much deeper than a mere misallocation of benefits. Finally, it will suggest some possible avenues for conflict resolution.

## **6.2. The Main Actors and Their Conflicting Interests**

There are six major political actors in the Freeport mine area, all of whom are in conflict with each other over their roles in the mining operation, and their share of any benefits. These are: the landowners (the Amungme/Damal and Kamoro) and the Amungme Consultation Council (LEMASA); Freeport McMoRan, the multinational mining company; the central, regional and local governments and the armed forces of Indonesia; the other highlanders in the region (Moni, Dani, Ekagi and Nduga); the Indonesian and Papuan workers; and the OPM. Each of these groups claims that it has rights to benefit from the mining operation; but on what basis can each group justify such claims, and which claims should be given precedence? I will examine each group of actors in turn, but will focus on the main three—the landowners, Freeport Indonesia (FI), and the Indonesian government.

Map 3: Amungsa (the Land of Amungme)



### 6.2.1. The Amungme and Kamoro: Landowners

The Amungme and Kamoro are the local landowners. They have been severely affected by the Freeport mining operation for more than 32 years<sup>3</sup>.

The Amungme, who belong to the Papuan language phylum, total 14,000 people who speak Amungkal<sup>4</sup>. The Amungme have been described as peace-loving<sup>5</sup>. According to Junus Pribadi, the chairman of the regional government in Fakfak in the 1970s, the Amungme are intelligent and capable.<sup>6</sup> A more recent account by Flannery notes that the Amungme are a physically small but tough people who have able to manage their lives in an extremely difficult environment.<sup>7</sup> Generally, the Amungme value kindness, honesty, calmness, and integrity, and strongly believe in collective, consultative approaches to social and political conflicts.

The Amungme live in Amungsa (the land of the Amungme) which is located between the Jigi-Mugi valley in the east and Delamagama in the West, sharing borders with the Nduga-Dani in the east, the Moni/Ekagi in the west, and the Kamoro in the south. Timika city is located on the current border between the Amungme and the Kamoro.<sup>8</sup> The Amungme live in

<sup>3</sup> A general description of the Amungme people is contained in Otto Ondawame (1998) 'The Joys and Challenges of A Freedom Fighter: A Personal Reflection of My Past Experiences —A Short Autobiography', Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian National University, Canberra, pp3-4 (unpublished).

<sup>4</sup> *Warta Freeport* Vol.No.XXV (3rd Quarter 1997). The Community and Community Report: Working Together Towards Sustainable Development, Jakarta, p.20.

<sup>5</sup> A Dumatuban (1993). *Pembangunan Masyarakat Pedesaan: Studi Tentang Peranserta Orang Amungme Dalam Pembangunan di Desa Kwamki Lama, Kecamatan Mimika Timur, Kabupaten Fakfak, Irian Jaya*, Universitas Indonesia, Jakarta, p49.

<sup>6</sup> Junus Pribadi (1996). "Orang Amungme Memang Cerdik and Piawai", *Tifa Irian*, Minggu Ketiga, Jayapura, p. 10.

<sup>7</sup> Tim Flannery (1998). *Throwim Way Leg: An Adventure*, Griffin Press, Melbourne, p.101.

<sup>8</sup> "These workers and their families had established themselves just north of the airport. This area represents the southernmost edge of Amungme territory", in George A. Mealey (1996) *Grasberg: Mining in the Richest and Most Remote Deposit of Copper*

seventeen regions: Duma, Wa, Araowoanop, Tsinga, Hoesa, Belakmakama, Umpiliga, Malimepsingama, Dola, Noema, Bela, Ilaga, Alama, Beoga, Aronowa, Akimuga and Timika; and from 1962 and 1967, the lowland areas of Akimuga, Jita and Timika were also inhabited by Amungme (see Map 3 below). The Amungme and Kamoro people have settled on the most cultivatable land in the southern part of the mountainous range where both the Lorentz Conservation Area and the Freeport mining operations are located. The Lorentz national park, managed by The World Wide Fund for Nature, is one the biggest of its kind in the world, covering 1.5 million ha. Many unique species of flora and fauna have been protected within the park. The area is not only home to many types of flora and fauna, but also to more than 80,000 indigenous Amungme, Kamoro and Nduga peoples.<sup>9</sup> In the same region, Freeport McMoRan has been granted a concession area of almost 2.6 million ha, covering the area from the current operation site to the Star Mountains near the border with PNG.

Amungme settlement can be presumed to have begun by approximately 7,000 BC, when new agricultural techniques were developed in the highlands of New Guinea. The Amungme practice a shifting agricultural system supplemented by domestication of animals, and hunting and gathering. They also barter with their neighbours, particularly with the Kamoro in the south, and in this way developed alliances, and established land boundaries.

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*and Gold in the World in the Mountains of Irian Jaya, Indonesia*, Freeport McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc., New Orleans, p.322.

<sup>9</sup> Ronald G. Petocz (1987). *Konservasi Alam dan Pembangunan di Irian Jaya: Strategi Pemanfaatan Sumber Daya Alam Secara Rasional*, The World Wildlife Fund, Grafitipers, Jakarta, pp. 42-74.

Amungme society is divided into two major moieties, *Mom* and *Magai*, which determine eligibility for marriage; each moiety consists of nine subgroups or clans.<sup>10</sup>

Amungme society is egalitarian. Like the Dani, the Amungme traditionally accord all people equal rights.<sup>11</sup> Men and women have equal opportunity to gain social status. Usually, the eldest women can gain respect and position in Amungme society. According to many authorities,<sup>12</sup> a leader (*me nagawan*), either male or female but usually male, is elected on the basis of wealth, high social status, good attitude, oratorical skills, charisma, ability in making war and peace, and generosity in dispensing resources. Tom Beanal, the leader of LEMASA, particularly emphasises the following criteria for a leader: he should be a well respected figure, wise, firm, trustworthy and honest, while cowardliness and dishonesty are strongly condemned.<sup>13</sup> The primary advantage of this social system is that it provides the opportunity for everyone to express their views and to participate in collective decision-making; consequently opportunities for dominant leadership are minimised in Amungme society. Within the system of delegation of power, *me nagawan* are divided into three categories: village *me nagawan*, regional *me nagawan*, and tribal *me nagawan*, with each responsible for their own internal affairs.<sup>14</sup> These

<sup>10</sup> Tom Beanal (1997). *Amungme: Magaboarat Negal Jombe Peibei*, Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia (WALHI), Jakarta. pp.94-96. [See also N. Manembu (1991). *The Sempan, Nduga, Nakai and Amungme Peoples of the Lorentz Area*. WWF Project 4521, Jayapura, p.77.]


<sup>11</sup> Dumatubun, *op.cit.*:40.

<sup>12</sup> D.K.Carlsson (1987). *Fraon Koen till Genus: Kvinnligt och Manligt i Ett Kulturellt Perspektiv*, Minervaboeckerna, Boraos, p.83. See also Manembu, *op.cit.*:79; Dumatubun, *op.cit.*:42; John D.Ellenberger (1994) *On Economic Development Amongst the Damals (Uhunduni) North of the Carstensz Mountain Range*, Bureau of Native Affairs, Hollandia, pp.7-8; and C.D.T. Cook (1995) *Amungme Way: the Subsistence Strategies, the Knowledge and the Dilemma of the Tsinga Valley People in Irian Jaya, Indonesia*, UMI, Ann Arbor, pp.91-94.

<sup>13</sup> Beanal, *op.cit.*:116.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*:114-119.

Map 4: Freeport Project Area



Source: Redrawn Freeport Project Area (1997); McMoRan Copper and Gold, New Orleans.

Amungme traditions of leadership and organisation embody many of the criteria for successful management discussed in Chapter Four .

The Kamoro people live in the coastal areas between the Asmat in the east and Etna Bay. Like the Amungme, they belong to the Papuan linguistic phylum. Physically, they are tall and well built. They are nomadic people, whose daily economic activities are dominated by hunting, gathering and small-scale gardening. They are classified as a semi-nomadic society. Unlike the Amungme, their main staple food is sago, derived from the palm which grows in swamp areas and along river banks. Rivers and the sea are very important to the Kamoro both as an economic resource and as a communication network. The current Freeport concession areas to the south of the mine are designated as supporting areas, which means that no actual mining takes place there; but a large area of Kamoro land has been seriously affected by toxic tailings and wastes, and land has also been taken over for roads, airfields and a harbour, and for dumping mine waste.

#### **6.2.1.1. The Amungme Land Tenure System**

In Amungme traditional law an individual is not allowed to own land. As in many parts of Melanesia, land is not owned by individuals but belongs to the community. An individual has rights to use land according to accepted community arrangements. For these purposes, the traditional land tenure system of the Amungme and Kamoro is classified both by natural qualities and use.<sup>15</sup> Like the Ekagi people, the Amungme classify terrain into fourteen categories "according to its economic and physical attributes (garden, fallow, virgin forest, fallow bush, fallow grass, paths, swamps, rivers) which [are] based on seven contrasting components: nature of the

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<sup>15</sup> R. Crocombe and R. Hide (1987). "New Guinea: Unity in Diversity" in Crocombe R. (ed.), *Land Tenure in the Pacific*, University of the South Pacific, Third Edition, Suva, p.325.

surface, cultivation, significance, degree of vegetation disturbances, type of vegetation, size, and, in the case of water, whether moving or still".<sup>16</sup>

At the level of the clan, parish, or community, the Amungme have common rights to hunting territories and common defence obligations, but not necessarily rights to commonly held land. Group land rights, for example, are focused at the level of sub-clans and lineages or of hamlets and villages, where decisions on the allocation of land other than through inheritance are most frequently made.<sup>17</sup> The Amungme classification of land recognises intermediate (nuclear) family land, sub-clan land, community land, regional land, and the Amungme land.

Within this system, the Amungme classify the areas around the mine operation into two main categories, according to functions. There is the classification by topography, from savanna through deep forest to hillsides and high mountains; and by the social and religious significance of each of these land forms. On the hillsides of Ridge Camp or Mile 74 at the mine, for example, the Amungme traditionally plant pandanus trees, which are the only trees suitable for this environment. All this land is held in collective ownership and an individual has only use rights.

Land is basic to much of the conflict of values between the Amungme and Freeport; for the Amungme, land has two key functions: the mythological aspects of origin and survival, and the spiritual values of the land tenure system.

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<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*:325.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*:330. See also Erari (1997) in "Tanah Kita, Hidup Kita: Pendekatan Budaya Melanesia dalam Rangka Krisis Ekologi Global", *Prisma*, 6 June.

### 6.2.1.2. The Meaning of Land

Traditionally the Amungme regard land as their “Mother”, their source of life, inspiration and survival. The system of land tenure is rooted in mythology and history of origin, genealogy, and warfare, a heritage passed down for generations. Generally, the division of land is made in accordance with the religious ecology of the people, emphasising harmony as the primary feature of their interaction with their natural and social environment. In this respect, mountains, rivers and valleys are regarded as the “Body of our Mother” by the Amungme.<sup>18</sup> The mountains are called *ningok* (“the head of our Mother”). This is the secret place where the spirits of the ancestors live, often in the mountains of *Nemang Kawi* or *Yelsegel* (Puncak Jaya) or *Ongopsegel* (Ertsberg) or *Awulkeweng* in the Noema valley. The lower mountain slopes and foothills are the places where the Amungme live. All social activities such as war and peace, hunting, gardening and governing, take place on the land. Land is also a source of origin, as A. Kelanangame, an Amungme academic, has explained:

Land signifies their identity. It shows where a person comes from, for example Tsingame means a man from the Tsinga area. Land is the place where the Amungme live, where the Amungme can get food, where their bodies are buried and where their ancestral spirits live. Land is their mother; a mother gives birth, gives food, takes care of them, and educates them. Land is their mother's womb. Mountains are their mother's breasts which give the Amungme milk to drink. Rivers are their mother's urine. The flow of the water in the big rivers means that mother is healthy and can give the Amungme fertility. Valleys are their mother's chest where the Amungme live. Land, mountain: “body of our Mother” for the Amungme.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> N. Manembu, *op.cit.*:83. See also K.P. Erari, *op.cit.*: 73. “They [Amungme] believe that the land represents their mother in three distinct sections: the head, where the Amungme think, the body, where the Amungme live (planting food and raising children), and the legs, which is a taboo area,” said Peter Yan Magal, ACFOA (24 April 1996) *Freeport Indonesia: Reconciling Development and Indigenous Rights, Report*, Canberra, p9.

<sup>19</sup> Manembu, *op.cit.*:83.

In this way the Amungme explain the meaning of land and set social norms to protect the land from mass destruction. The Sempan-Kamoro people also, for example, believe that they come from the Big Swamp around Jita and Pece, in the south of Akimuga sub-district.<sup>20</sup> Sempan people call themselves *Manesari*, which can be translated as 'Centre of People'. Like the Amungme claims to the Mulkia region, the Sempan-Kamoro also claim land ownership on the basis of river systems. They divide land according to individual, family, village/group and *se* (clan) ownership. Both river and land areas are divided between a village's *se* and families. Inawka river, for example, is claimed by Inawkans;<sup>21</sup> the Inafita people claim Inafita river as their land, and the Waonoripi people claim the Minajerwi river as their land boundary. Similarly, the Amungme regard Bela Mepingama as the Amungme place of birth. The Amungme and Kamoro revere the land both as their source of origin and as their own mother who bore them.

Land also represents religious values. The Amungme, for example, differentiate between *aba dingkop*, which is a garden place, and *seboanayi*, which is a sacred forest or mountain. In the *seboanayi* forest of Ulalokbugin in the eastern part of Aramsolki, Akimuga subdistrict in Mulkia (Grasberg) and in Awulkeweng, Noemba, for example, people are not allowed to cut trees, not even a leaf.<sup>22</sup> Ertsberg and Grasberg and Awulkeweng-ningok are among the secret places where ritual ceremonies are held asking for success, protection, strength and health. According to Hai, the Amungme religion which has overtones of reincarnation, these are places of the first passing of the dead spirit on its journey to heaven (*Haijogon*) to meet *Jomun nerek-temun nerek* (God). Each year, the Amungme traditionally celebrated a Holy

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<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*:14.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*:23.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*:81.

Day when all members of the community were obligated to participate in the *Nord Nomun* ceremony. Similar rituals to the holy communion that is practised in Catholic churches today were also performed in the Hai religion. When Christianisation spread to Amungsa in the middle of the 1950s, this religious practice was prohibited.

The people's religious relationship with the land may be expressed through many different ceremonies. Like other religions of indigenous peoples in the world, the Amungme often offer goods and sacrifices to the supernatural powers. In Javanese culture, such beliefs are still practised: on the island of Java alone there are more than a hundred holy places where spiritual forces are believed to be concentrated like magnetic poles. There is, for example, Sendang Semanggi, a spring near Yogya; Gua Serandil, a sea cave near Cilacap, and the misty uplands of the Dieng Plateau, all sacred sites which the former president Suharto often visited to seek spiritual strength.<sup>23</sup> If the government of Indonesia denies the validity of the Amungme belief system and the secret places in the Mukia area, this is the same as denying the right of their former president and many Javanese to visit the Dieng Plateau to meditate and practise self-denial in order to gain new strength and insight.

However, Amungme values have been systematically destroyed since the first geological expedition to Ertsberg in the Mulia valley (Tembagapura) in 1936, led by Colijn and Jean Jacques Dozy, and later by Freeport McMoRan, whose contract of work was signed in 1967. The mother of the Amungme has been systematically killed: the head has been cut off and destroyed, and the remains have been thrown into the rivers. Other parts have been taken away to Japan, USA, South Korea and other faraway countries. Today, the

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<sup>23</sup> H. McDonald (1980). *Suharto's Indonesia*, Fontana/Collins, Blackburn, p.3.

Amungme are living in a destroyed environment. They want freedom to preserve their cultural identity, which is under serious threat.<sup>24</sup>

Recent changes in the land tenure system in Papua are the result of increasing economic pressures. Land that was traditionally valued in spiritual terms is now valued in purely monetary terms.<sup>25</sup> The selling of land for transmigration camps in Timika is a clear example of this trend. Additionally, traditional subsistence groups have turned to the market economy, with demands for faster transport and higher quality of produce.

In order to obtain effective control, increase production, and make way for colonists (immigrants), the Indonesian government has introduced new laws to overturn the traditional land tenure system. Such injustice reinforces the hatred of the colonial powers and encourages separatist sentiments among the Papuans.

#### **6.2.1.3. Lembaga Musyawarah Adat Suku Amungme (LEMASA)**

Comparable to the OPM nationally, at the local level the Lembaga Musyawarah Adat Suku Amungme (LEMASA) or Traditional Consultation Council of the Amungme was established in 1991 to represent the interests of the Amungme and Kamoro. Even though it has some fundamental weaknesses in terms of administrative management, organisational structure, policy, program, and financial viability, the organisation feels strong because it is supported by the local people, the churches, the landowners, NGOs and Papuans at regional, national and international levels.

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<sup>24</sup> Mealey, George A. (1996). *Grasberg: Mining in the Richest and Most Remote Deposit of Copper and Gold in the World, in the Mountains of Irian Jaya, Indonesia*, Freeport McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc, New Orleans. p.76-77.

<sup>25</sup> Crocombe, *op.cit.*:4.

A major priority of the organisation is recognition of and respect for Amungme rights to land. It has set out a list of 33 demands (see below). Freeport McMoRan and the government of Indonesia both regard the organisation as a disruptive element working against their interests in the region and creating bad relations. In order to undermine LEMASA, a new alternative organisation, AMUNGKAL, was established in 1996 with financial assistance from the government. Even though Amungkal is not supported by the majority of the people, its existence has created confusion and division within the Amungme community.

As a representative of the local people, LEMASA fights against such injustices as compulsory land acquisition, dispossession of the local people, environmental destruction, and the continuing lack of employment, social services, compensation and participation for the Amungme. LEMASA has organised meetings, demonstrations, and talks with the company and the government, and has even taken Freeport McMoRan to district and federal courts in the USA. In this way the organisation has become the mouthpiece of the people in gaining public sympathy and support.

As LEMASA is officially regarded as a political movement, it is subject to the restrictions on fundamental freedoms imposed by the Indonesian government. Suspected of having links with the OPM, LEMASA has become a target of suppression and intimidation; Tom Beanal, the leader of the organisation, has personally been accused of having a connection with the OPM.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> The Head of Police for Eastern Timika Sector (14 January 1998) accused Tom Beanal of having a connection with the OPM, Document No:Pol.SP/02/1998/SERSE, Timika.

While LEMASA's relationship with Freeport and the government is generally poor, due to public pressures over the 1990s a more sensitive relationship is developing. Policy change could give LEMASA a new role as a full player in the decision-making process.

### **6.2.2. Freeport McMoRan and Rio-Tinto/CRA**

There are many economic and practical reasons why multinational companies such as Freeport McMoRan, Rio-Tinto and CRA invest abroad. They include the availability of raw materials and cheap manpower, tax holidays and market dominance. Often they ignore social and environmental responsibilities in the Third World country.

When political change took place in Indonesia in 1965, the shift from a guided economy to a free market economy opened up new possibilities for foreign investment. The economic policy of the Suharto regime emphasised rapid economic development, aiming to catch up with the new economic tigers in Southeast and East Asia. One priority area was direct foreign investment in Indonesia, mainly in the mining, oil, forestry and fishery sectors.

In line with this objective, a thirty-year Contract of Work (COW) to undertake mining exploration and operations in the Mulkia area was signed between representatives of Freeport McMoRan and the government of Indonesia, through Saleh Bratanta as Minister for Mines, in Jakarta on 7 April 1967. There was no consultation of any kind with the Amungme and Kamoro landowners, or with the provincial and regional governments of Irian Jaya. This contract allowed the company to exploit mineral resources on approximately 100,000 ha of the traditional Amungme land in the Ertzberg and Mulkia valleys (see Map 4 below).

The initial discovery of mineral deposits in this area was made by geologist Jean Jacques Dozy during the first Coljin expedition in Ertsberg in 1936, and a second reconnaissance expedition was sent by Freeport in 1960 to determine whether the Ertsberg was an economically viable prospect. Rock samples indicated that the region was rich in mineral resources.<sup>27</sup> The Amungme people became angry because the team had entered the region without first asking permission, and they felt humiliated at being treated like slaves; they expressed their discontent through low-level disturbances. The mining operation was delayed for some years by the unfriendly attitude of the Amungme and also the political changes that took place when the Dutch were finally forced to leave.

With capital of US\$100 million, a gigantic mining operation began in 1967 with a large number of national and expatriate workers. In 1973 the 1,031-strong workforce consisted of 68 expatriates and 963 nationals, both Indonesians and Papuans. Fourteen years later, the workforce had increased to 17,000.

Freeport Indonesia (FI) is the biggest producer of gold in the world and the third largest producer of copper. It has forty associated and contracting companies engaged in some way in the mining operation. UK and Australian based multinationals Rio Tinto and CRA signed a joint venture agreement with Freeport McMoRan in 1995, under which Rio Tinto acquired a 12 per cent interest in Freeport and a 40 per cent participation in any incremental production. The new partners will finance up to US\$750 million for mine development, together with US\$100 million for

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<sup>27</sup> Chris Ballard (1996). "A Freeport Timeline: 1910-April 1996" in Chris Ballard (ed.), *Freeport in Indonesia; Reconciling Development and Indigenous Rights, Report*, ACFOA. p.26.

exploration around the mine and in areas covered by Freeport's exploration licences elsewhere in West Papua.<sup>28</sup>

Production capacity has increased significantly in recent years following the discovery of more concentrated ore in the Grasberg region. A US\$81 million project is located three kilometres east from Ertsberg, and production has risen from 7,500 tons per day in 1978 to 32,000 tons per day in 1992.<sup>29</sup> Gross revenues increased from \$74 million in 1975 to \$400 million in 1988,<sup>30</sup> with total output of 15 billion pounds of copper, 22 million ounces of gold, and 37.4 million ounces of silver. Freeport has the largest known gold reserve of any operating mine in the world.<sup>31</sup> In December 1991, FI signed a new contract with the central government, following the discovery of more concentrated ore in Grasberg, three kilometres from Ertsberg. The new concession covers an additional 2.6 million hectares.

Freeport pays the Indonesian state very significant royalties, dividends and taxes, in US dollars. In 1990 Freeport paid US\$271 million in taxes, much the biggest corporate tax received by the government<sup>32</sup>.

To protect its mining operation, the company has supported the deployment of military, police and security forces in the region, supplying them with accommodation, finance, job opportunities, social privileges, and permission to use Freeport's infrastructure of airfields, helicopters and barracks. This creates a strong triangular interdependency between the company, the government, and the military: the government and the

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<sup>28</sup> Rio-Tinto (1998). "Tainted Titan or Responsible Company", *The Facts*, Melbourne, p.12.

<sup>29</sup> Mealey, *op.cit.*:121.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*:129.

<sup>31</sup> Jim Elmslie (1995). *Irian Jaya in the 1990s: Economic Expansion and West Papuan Nationalism*, University of Sydney, p.78.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*:78.

military provide security protection, and FI contributes royalties, dividends and taxes, and improves infrastructure and rural development programs.

Yet despite its influence over the mass media, and good international communication networks, Freeport Indonesia has for a long time been under media scrutiny for its poor human rights record, its destruction of the environment, and, most importantly, for its lack of respect for the rights of the landowners in the region. The behaviour of the company towards the landowners and the dependence of landowners on the company have become sources of social and political conflict, resulting in a steadily deteriorating relationship between these two parties over recent years.

### **6.2.3. The Government of Indonesia**

The term “government” here covers all three levels of government—central, provincial and regional—which influence the decision-making process in relation to Freeport Indonesia and the region of West Papua. As indicated above, Indonesia faced a serious economic crisis in the 1960s, partly as a result of the political crisis during this period. One contributing problem was the proportion of the state budget spent on purchasing weapons from Western and communist countries in order to occupy West Papua in 1962 and in preparation for the later annexation of East Timor in 1975. Demands for political and economic change resulted in the military *coup d'etat* in 1965 which brought General Suharto to power.

In order to restore confidence in the government, promote economic development, and repay its soaring foreign debts of almost US\$1.8 billion, the New Order regime introduced a new economic policy which emphasised free capital movement and encouraged foreign investment. In accordance with this new economic policy, the government allowed Freeport to invest

in mineral exploitation in West Papua. Subsequently Indonesia entered a new era of economic success, with one of the fastest rates of economic growth in the region. The general living standard of the Indonesian people improved significantly, with Freeport being a major contributor through its royalties, dividends and taxes.

In 1998-1999, however, Indonesia faced another serious economic crisis: the financial and banking systems collapsed; the value of the rupiah fluctuated wildly and dropped severely; the basic needs of the people could not be met; and the Indonesian people lost confidence in the government. These problems were either created or compounded by the corruption, collusion and nepotism practiced by the Suharto government and its cronies, including military officers and business allies.

The fall of the Suharto regime in 1998 has created a new political reality. Popular demand for economic and political reforms had led to widespread social and political unrest, and to internal conflict within the ruling elite. The successor Habibie regime, however, retained control of most of the state's institutions, including the military, business, mass media and communications, financial institutions, and international networks.

Under Article 33 of the Pancasila Constitution of 1945, the land, sea and air and its abundant resources all belong to the Indonesian state. Also, under a new agrarian law, land ownership can only apply to cultivated land, which means the Amungme rights to hunting and secret grounds around the Mulkia region have been totally ignored. Its centralised power system allows the national government to continue to exercise control over mining operations and to enjoy privileges given by the company. Even though the national government promised to give autonomy to the province of Irian

Jaya in 1963, it has only paid lip service to this agreement; in practice, the powers of the regional and local governments are limited and they function only as guard dogs for the interests of the central government, and enjoy few privileges. The regional and local governments have expressed their strong resentment of this discriminatory arrangement. In 1995 they argued that "Freeport has contributed US\$1001.90 million in the form of US\$19.31 million in royalties and US\$81.59 million in taxes, but these funds have never been heard of even at the office of the regency".<sup>33</sup> They have very limited influence in dealing with joint or individual rural development programs. During the negotiations of new agreements in 1974, the Amungme representatives were allowed to participate in the primary talks that occurred between the Amungme and FI, but not on the issue of the rural development program.

#### **6.2.4. The Interests of Other Groups**

The category of "other groups" refers here to those peoples and organisations that believe they are, or should be, eligible to benefit from the mining operations, in terms of influencing the decision-making process, controlling job opportunities, or sharing in the profits. These groups include the military, four other neighbouring groups of highlanders some of whom now live within Amungsa (Dani, Moni, Ekagi and Nudga), and other West Papuan and Indonesian workers.

##### **6.2.4.1. The Indonesian Armed Forces**

To protect the interests of the company, a considerable number of Indonesian military, consisting of land, air and sea troops, together with Freeport security personnel, are now stationed in the region.

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<sup>33</sup> *Kompas* 11 September 1995.

From the start, the company has been responsible for the actual deployment of these forces and provides necessary support, creating a mutual dependency in which Freeport Indonesia allows the use of its property and the ABRI and security forces provide security protection. Yet despite this apparently mutually satisfactory relationship, troops can face a moral dilemma because they are required to adopt a coercive approach towards the opponents of the company.

#### **6.2.4.2. Central Highlanders**

The Dani, Moni, Ekagi and Nduga peoples share borders with the Amungme in the east, north and west of Amungsa. The five groups have much in common in terms of culture, traditions and ways of life. However, the mining operations are located in areas that by tradition and by established boundaries are recognised as belonging to the Amungme. It is argued by the Amungme, therefore, that the other highlanders are not entitled to compensation for loss of land or to equal treatment with the Amungme in any compensation package. Despite this these highlander groups feel they have a right to benefit from the mining operation. First, they consider that they have a right to pass through the mountain ranges which they used traditionally in barter trade stretching back several thousand years. Secondly, there are strong blood relationships between the Amungme and the other highlanders through intermarriage, particularly between the Amungme and the Nduga and Moni.

Even though these claims do not provide sufficient evidence for equal compensation, the government and Freeport Indonesia put the other highlander groups into the same category as the Amungme and Kamoro, thus entitling them to share in royalties amounting to US\$17 million annually (paid into a trust fund). Such manipulation of royalties has been

orchestrated by the company and the government to undermine national unity and cooperation among the highlanders and among Papuans as whole. However, this arrangement was stopped after tribal wars erupted in 1996 and 1997 in Timika, Banti and Utekini between the Amungme and Dani/Nduga. The divide-and-rule policy of the government and Freeport was ultimately unproductive. These highland peoples come seeking job opportunities; but as traditional people they are not able to compete with outsiders. Most of them become "spectators". Freeport Indonesia and the government view them as parasites, and the government has taken strong measures to either return them to their home areas or resettle them in the coastal area at Timika. To the Amungme, these people destroy traditional land and create environmental damage when they cut down trees for firewood and for making gardens. Hence their relationship both with Freeport Indonesia and with the Amungme is generally very poor.

#### **6.2.4.3. Freeport Workers (Indonesian Nationals)**

This category includes both the Indonesians and the West Papuans who work as employees of the company. Today, there are 17,000 workers employed by Freeport or by companies contracted to Freeport, of whom only 2 per cent are local people. Of the 5,838 workers employed directly by direct contract to Freeport, 81 per cent are Indonesians and expatriates (see Table 1). Unlike the Amungme and the other highlanders, these outsider groups are semi- and highly-skilled workers and have strong loyalty to Freeport Indonesia. Many of them work in executive positions both in administration and in operations in the field. Most of these outsiders feel they have a comfortable and secure future in the company and therefore regard any opposition to the company as an attack on their own interests. Consequently, along with Freeport Indonesia and the government, they support tough measures against any disturbances by the Amungme.

#### 6.2.4.4. The OPM /Free Papua Movement

The final interest group is the OPM. Like the other groups, the OPM wants a share of the action and benefits, but for political reasons. The regional command of the OPM, Nemang Kawi Command, sees the Freeport mining company as an agent of the colonial government of Indonesia, benefitting at the expense of low-paid local workers, enjoying a tax holiday, and causing serious social and environmental damage through its lack of social responsibility.

The establishment of the OPM in the region dates back to 1977 when the new ESKOPME expedition began (see Chapter Four). This was followed by low-level guerrilla raids on the main rural centres, from the central mountain ranges in the northeast to Akimuga in the south, and ended with the attacks on Freeport facilities in Timika and Tembagapura on 23 June 1977.

The military capability of the OPM in the area has been limited by the lack of logistical and political support and any clear vision and program; however, the OPM has been sustained by personal commitment and strong local leadership. The current regional commander, Kelly Kwalik, has appeared in many media interviews in relation to guerrilla activities in 1994, 1995 and 1996, assisted by Daniel Kogoya and Titus Murip. Local support has also been vital, even though there have been allegations of crimes against the local community. The local OPM, moreover, are waging a war on their home ground; they feel they have nothing to lose and will be regarded as national heroes if they die in battle. The inaccessible terrain and the support of the local people gives the guerrilla units great mobility, and the inability of the army to defeat them boosts their influence.

### 6.3. Colonisation and the Implications of Mining Activities

The term “colonisation” here is justified, first, by the nature and scope of the exploitation of local resources and, secondly, by the way the major actors deal with the landowners and the environment.

Jakarta's colonial policy in Amungsa has had both positive and negative consequences. On the positive side, the Papuans, notably the Amungme and Kamoro peoples, have benefited in some small degree through the breaking down of social isolation, the improvement of infrastructure, the promotion of the region's political status, the creation of employment opportunities, and the increase in regional productive capacity. At the state level, FI is the highest tax payer in Indonesia, and a vital asset for the central government.

In contrast, to the Amungme and other local communities, the presence of the Freeport mine is a colonial imposition and its presence has brought about discrimination, Indonesianisation, militarisation, an escalation of human rights abuses, and the destruction of traditional social structures and the environment.

#### 6.3.1. Immigration Policy

Rapid population growth in the region through government-sponsored immigration (*transmigrasi*) is an integral part of the colonial process of territorial control, with the ultimate objective of Papuan genocide and ethnic uniformity in the entire Malay archipelago. What has happened in West Papua since the 1960s is analogous with European colonisation over the last four hundred years, when European peoples resettled in America, Australia and Africa, wiping out the indigenous peoples and taking over their land and resources.

In 1976, new construction was started in Kwamki Lama where five houses were built by the Amungme together with an airstrip and petrol station. Two more houses were built on the riverside belonging to Paulus Beanal, the village head, and one by a family from Kei. Nine years later, the population increase in this area has broken all records in the province. Timika and Tembagapura are now two of the most densely populated towns in West Papua: "Today, not even 25 years later, these urban cities have already reached a total population of 50,000-60,000 people, making the area one of the most populous parts of the province".<sup>34</sup>

There have been official immigrants from Java and Bali, 'spontaneous' immigrants from Maluku and Sulawesi, and local job seekers (referred to as internal immigrants) from within West Papua. West Papua has become the major target of the government's transmigration program, with numbers 88.4 per cent higher than in any other province. During the PELITA IV (1984/85-1988/89), for example, West Papua was used to solve the overpopulation problem of Sumatra, which was the major destination of transmigrants in this period. By 1988/89, 137,800 families, or 685,000 people, were resettled in West Papua,<sup>35</sup> of whom 9,000 families, or 7 per cent of the total immigrants, were settled in Timika<sup>36</sup> in seven Unit Resettlements (SP). These developed into established villages including Kamoro Jaya, Timika Jaya and Karang Senang. Seven years later, during PELITA VI, the number of immigrants, mostly from the overpopulated islands of Java and Bali, increased to 11,000 (2,300 families).<sup>37</sup> Apart from these official immigrants, "spontaneous" migrants from outside Amungsa have resettled in Kwamki

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<sup>34</sup> Mealey, *op.cit.*:290.

<sup>35</sup> Prayan Purba, Anna M. Massie *et al.* (1987). *Irian Jaya: The Land of Challenges and Promises*, PT Alpha Zenith, p.39.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*:37.

<sup>37</sup> Mealey, *op.cit.*:326.

Lama, Kwamki Baru, and SP II, III, VIII, looking for better lives and job opportunities.<sup>38</sup>

Many fear that the population of the area will double by the year 2000, threatening the future of the Amungme and Kamoro, who number only 22,000 people. The Amungme and Kamoro have already become marginalised societies in their own land.

### 6.3.2. The Confiscation of Land and Dispossession of Landowners

In order to extract the mineral wealth and to build roads, airfields, bridges and military posts, the lands of Amungme and Kamoro have been confiscated without any payment of compensation. A considerable number of the landowners have been and are being forcibly dispossessed and relocated into resettlement camps in Timika and surrounding areas. In 1998, for example, the local government made public a plan to relocate considerable numbers of Amungme and other groups from Wa, Banti and Utekini villages in the highlands<sup>39</sup> and dozens of villagers from Koperapoka in the south, thus creating a buffer zone for mining expansion and the dumping of the mine wastes. The regime uses various justifications to dispossess the landowners, including the claim that a village is the centre of the OPM. The most common practice is to claim the land on the basis that it is no-man's-land and therefore the government and FI have the right to claim it as state land.

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<sup>38</sup> Mus Pigai (1996), interviewed by the author, Timika.

<sup>39</sup> "Thousands, probably up to 40,000, of indigenous folk including Amungme tribespeople, were dislocated when Freeport McMoRan built the mining town of Tembagapura for its workers. Since the company started operation in 1967, unrest and riots have been reported in protest of mining operations. Amungme leader Tuwarek Karkime [Natkime] once said: 'I am always angry at God and why He had to place these beautiful mountains here, because the Amungme people have received nothing from Freeport except problems' ", Andreas Burdani, in article: "Environment-Indonesia: As Big Mines Settle in, Indigenous Folk Crowded Out", *Inter Press Service World News*, December 11, 1998, Jakarta.

The growth of new cities and towns provides new employment opportunities and improvements in infrastructure. However, there have been severe social consequences too: the destruction of social structures and belief systems; the loss of traditional land; significant changes in traditional life styles; and the spread of coastal diseases such as malaria, cholera and dysentery.

### 6.3.3. Social Injustices

Social discrimination on the basis of race, colour, religion and sex is an integral part of colonial policies. In the mining area, discrimination in access to health services and in wages are examples of this. In order to understand the overall situation, let us examine in more detail the health situation, discrimination in job opportunities, wages and education opportunities, and environmental destruction.

#### 6.3.3.1. Health Problems

The massive changes in the Amungme area have also brought about severe health problems for many local people. In 1980, it is claimed that 216 Amungme in Kwamki Lama died of an epidemic.<sup>40</sup> In the highlands, the people commonly suffer from poor nutrition, yaws or treponemal infection and also from respiratory ailments, skin infections and eye infections.<sup>41</sup> Many people die from diseases spreading inland from the coast, such as malaria, cholera, TB, tape-worm, diarrhoea, dysentery and tetanus. Malaria is now endemic in the area. According to Freeport Indonesia, malaria positive rates in Kwamki Lama in 1992 were as high as 68 per cent.<sup>42</sup> Despite the well-documented existence of these health problems, and

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<sup>40</sup> Ballard, *op.cit.*:8.

<sup>41</sup> Cook, *op.cit.*:345-348.

<sup>42</sup> *Warta Freeport* Vol.XIV (1st quarter of 1995) Indonesian Government, The Community and Freeport: Working Together Towards Sustainable Development in Irian Jaya, Jakarta, p.12.

notwithstanding local demands for medical assistance, the state and Freeport Indonesia initially did very little to improve the health conditions of the local people.

Eventually, in response to local demands and protests (particularly the social unrest that erupted in 1996), FI built health centres in Banti, Aroanop, Kwamki Lama and Mapuruajaya, and provided substantial assistance and consultation. However these centres can only provide primary medical services, and seeking treatment at the general hospital in Tembagapura is generally discouraged; only wealthy patients can afford the high medical fees there. In Banti, 130 patients visit the health centre every day but there are only three nurses on staff, plus some volunteers from the Tembagapura Hospital. In Kwamki Lama, Aroanop and Pomako, medical centres built by FI were transferred to the local government which does not supply adequate service. Okoseray, a Papuan medical doctor who is head of the Community Health Centre in Timika, reported in 1995: "Mimika-Akimuga Districts still lack medical personnel, particularly doctors and nurses".<sup>43</sup> The rural village medical centres, such as those at Kwamki Lama, Banti and Wa, have an average of six beds and a staff of three nurses assisted by visiting doctors. In contrast, Tembagapura has a modern hospital which has 67 beds, 12 doctors and 60 nurses to serve the more than 200-300 people who visit it each day.

There have been some recent attempts to improve the health of local people. Some years ago, efforts to control malaria were undertaken jointly by Freeport, the Department of Health, the University of Indonesia, Medical Research units of the US Navy, and regional and community services.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> *Tifa Irian* (Minggu Ke IV January 1992).

<sup>44</sup> Freeport Indonesia (1995). *Warta Freeport*, Vol XIV, 4th Quarter of 1995, p.11.

These included spraying, drainage of stagnant water, and distribution of mosquito nets, as well as the provision of medication and consultation.

The current spread of deadly diseases such as HIV/AIDS in Timika has also alarmed the authorities.<sup>45</sup> When I visited Timika in 1975 there were no brothels, but the economic boom has since attracted many sex workers, with centres of prostitution located in Kilo 10, Pisa and a few bars in the city. Mostly, the prostitutes are Javanese and Menadonese (from North Sulawesi), from broken families, orphans, or driven by poverty. The sex industry is one of the faster growing developments in the area. In 1995, it was reported that there were six suspected HIV cases in the Timika area, but this number had jumped to 40 in 1997. In Kwamki Lama alone, four people were reportedly affected by AIDS. In a society where the use of condoms is tabu, a rapid spread of the virus is likely.

### 6.3.3.2. Discrimination in Job Opportunities and Wages

Looking for new lives, traditional dwellers have moved into the cities and towns expecting to make their fortunes. However, few achieve their goals. Wage and job discrimination is a problem faced by many. Most small- and medium-sized business activities are in the hands of newcomers, primarily the Buginese, Makassans and Javanese. As the former governor of Irian Jaya, Mr Pattipi, said: "Both Javanese settlers and 'spontaneous' migrants coming from Sulawesi have taken many jobs and secured a stranglehold on the urban economy."<sup>46</sup> For example, FI brought in Javanese and Buginese taxi drivers, ignoring the many Irianese with the skills to drive cars and trucks.<sup>47</sup> Today, there are 17,308 workers employed directly or indirectly by Freeport,

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<sup>45</sup> "Sex workers in Timika and Nabire are those in a high risk group," *Cenderawasih Post* 5 June 1993, p.3.

<sup>46</sup> *Pacific Islands Business* April 1994, p.34. See also *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 10 March 1994, p.50.

<sup>47</sup> *Forum Keadilan* No.11, Thn IV, 11 September 1995.

of which only a small number are local unskilled workers, as shown in Table 1 below.


**Table 1: Distribution of Employment at Freeport Indonesia, by origin, 1997**

Nationalities	Staff	Non-Staff	Total
Expatriates	173	77	250
Indonesians	923	3,684	4,607
West Papuans	71	910	981
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,161</b>	<b>4,671</b>	<b>5,838</b>

Source: Community Affairs Department, FI, June 30, 1997

These figures show an increase of 46 per cent from the previous total of 670 West Papuan workers in 31 March, 1997, caused mainly by the FI's commitment to increase the West Papuan workforce in response to riots that occurred on 10-12 March 1996 and also to LEMASA demands.

**Table 1a: Distribution of Job Opportunities Among Different Nationalities**



However there is still a problem as two thirds of the Amungme and Kamoro employees are unskilled workers.

**Table 2: Total West Papuan Employees in 23 Direct and Non-Direct Contract companies within FI on June 30, 1997.**

Origin	Numbers of Employees	%
Amungme/Damal	580	20
Biak	557	19
Ekagi/Me	307	11
Dani/Lani	215	8
Japen/Waropen	206	7
Jayapura	178	6
Kamoro	165	6
Ayamaru/Sorong	81	3
Others	583	20
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,872</b>	<b>100</b>

*Source:* Community Affairs Department, FI, June 30, 1997.

According to Table 2, which includes FI employees and employees of companies contracted by FI, the Amungme workers do seem to enjoy higher employment rates than other West Papuan groups. This is largely because the Amungme, as the group in the immediate area and thus most affected by FI, have been forced to adapt more rapidly. Even so, most of them are employed as unskilled workers with low wages while immigrants dominate the semi-skilled and skilled jobs. This bias in the allocation of jobs has become one of the main factors fuelling the widespread social resentment in the region.

Marked differences in wages are a further problem. An unskilled Papuan worker in Tembagapura, for example, can earn Rp 464 per hour, while an Indonesian manager earns 220 times this. This situation is illustrated in Table 3.

**Table 3: Wage Relationships in Thousands Rupiahs per month 1997**

Type	Quality	Grade	Basic Wage	Total
Non -Staff	Unskilled	G1	150	150
	Elem.School	G3	180	207
	Sen.High School	E2	215	224
	Sen.High School	D1	246	256
	University	C1	303	330
Staff	New Empl.		4,000	4,000
	Superexp.		12,000	14,000
	Superintendent		16,000	18,000
	Manager		32,000	34,000
	Executive		40,000	50,000
Expatriates (White)	Supervisor		32,000	48,000
	Superintendent		36,000	52,000
	Manager		48,000	56,000
	VIP Executive		60,000	76,000

*Source:* Community Affairs Department, FI, 30 June 1997.

(Exchange rate: Rp.4000= US\$1 ).

Most Papuans, particularly the highlanders who are often unskilled workers, earn a very low wage. Unskilled Indonesians and expatriates are paid very much higher wages than Papuans at the same level; however, coastal Papuans still enjoy much higher levels of earnings than the locals (see Table 4).

**Table 4: FI: Wage Relationship Between Different Indonesian Nationals in Thousands Rupiah per month, 1997**

<b>Employees</b>	<b>Average Wage</b>	<b>% of total wages paid</b>
Highlander (Papuan)	750	24
Coastal (Papuan)	950	31
Indonesians	1,400	45
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,100</b>	<b>100</b>

*Source:* Community Affairs Department. FI, 30 June 1997.

FI and the government argue that this imbalance exists because of the lack of appropriate skills among the locals and the Papuans. But this defence merely raises the question of how many Amungme and Kamoro are given the educational opportunities that would reduce this disadvantage.

#### **6.3.3.3. Unequal Access to Education**

Discrimination against the Amungme has created deep social divisions. Stereotypes of the West Papuans, notably the highlanders, as backward and primitive, OPM supporters, alcoholic, and resistant to progress make it very difficult for the Amungme to participate in the development process and gain access to education.

This attitude is clearly reflected in the way education and social services are distributed. Even though FI has been in the area for more than three decades, equal access to education and training for the local people has been ignored. Following the signing of the January 1974 Agreement, only one elementary school was established, with classes UPT I-IV. By contrast, an Elementary School INPRES was built for 300 students, with eight teachers

employed, to serve children of Freeport employees. Training and education centres established in Tembagapura in the 1970s served only children of expatriates and Indonesians; the children of the Amungme were excluded. More recently, again in response to LEMASA demands and local protests, Freeport has begun to realise the need to provide education and training for the Amungme and Kamoro. New elementary schools were established in Wa, Banti and Timika in the 1990s and a dormitory for Amungme students was built in Kwamki Lama. New senior high schools were built in Timika and an international secondary high school was established in Tembagapura. FI has also opened vocational training centres in both Tembagapura and Jayapura, and is now engaging in preschool education, literacy campaigns, and other educational and skills-based activities. A human resources program and a training centre (*Balai Latihan Kerja* or BLK) is now located in Jayapura, and a primary school and dormitory have been established in Timika.<sup>48</sup>

In 1996, FI introduced an Integrated Development Program in Timika, targeting seventeen villages, of which eleven are in the coastal areas, three in the central area, and three in the highland region. The program aims to improve the quality of human resources, address basic needs in education, training, social services, health care, religious services and economic activities, and improve the environment. FI argues that the local low level of human resources has been caused by the limited infrastructure, poor quality of settlements, inadequate nutrition, and extremely limited levels of education; and that strong social-cultural bonds make adaptation to different ways of thinking difficult.

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<sup>48</sup> Freeport Indonesia Incorporated (1992). *Program Yayasan Freeport Cenderawasih*, Jakarta, pp. 27-32. [See also Mealey, *op.cit.*:312-345.]

If this ambitious plan had been realised, it would have served the interests of a population of 22,405, or 3,937 families, of those villages—representing 50 per cent of the total Papuan population in the region. The program has, however, been criticised as a failure. Social disparities and crime remain major problems in the emerging towns and villages. Considerable numbers of students drop out of schools, and there has been an increase in social crimes and alcoholic problems among the local youth. This unhealthy situation has been exploited by local compradors who are very ready to import cheap alcohol, pornography, prostitution and engage in other forms of criminal activity. In Timika, for example, boats from Java and Makassar bring in cheap whisky, locally made *sagoer* (a fermented palm juice), and pornography and sell these products to their willing customers at high prices.<sup>49</sup>

#### 6.3.4. Destruction of the Environment

Lack of environmental accountability on the part of FI has been a contentious issue for some time. Environmental destruction has intensified over the last twenty years, with serious social, religious and economic implications. When I visited Timika and Tembagapura in 1976, the environmental destruction was largely limited to the actual areas of mining operations. The Aijkwa river was already becoming polluted; even then I could not drink from the river or swim in it. At that stage only a small handful of hamlets had been built in Kwamki Lama and a very rough airstrip and a police patrol post had been established in Timika.

Over the last seventeen years, the environmental impact of mining has been catastrophic. Following the discovery of concentrated ore in Gunung Bijih Timur (GBT) in 1975, a mega construction program was introduced,

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<sup>49</sup>. *Far Eastern Economic Review* 26 December 1996—2 January 1997, p.105.

and more than 20 private companies were invited to join Freeport McMoRan. In the process, 350 Amungme houses in Wa, Banti and Utekini villages were destroyed, and both landowners and transmigrants were forcibly resettled in Kwamki Lama under the BANPRES program.<sup>50</sup> More recently, another 300 families have been forced to resettle in Timika.<sup>51</sup> During the years 1982 to 1985, Amungme and Kamoro people were forced to sign a Statement of Land Release covering more than 1,000 sq km of land, from Pomako in the coastal area to Mile 50 in the highlands. The Amungme and Kamoro people have lost not only their land but also their houses, animals and other property.

For the purpose of the mining operation, initially (1973) more than 100,000 hectares of land in the Ertsberg and Grasberg areas was destroyed, with irreparable damage to its ecosystem; estimates now place the area of degraded land at 2.6 million hectares. A total of 1,000 ha has been cleared for harbours, bridges, roads, tunnels, towns, camps, airfields, and military barracks, as well as for mineral exploration. In the Mulkia Valley (Mile 74), FI cut down 240 ha of trees and excavated a great hole in the heart of the mountain.

The rural Amungme now have to travel long distances to make gardens, to go hunting, and even to find clear drinking water. Peaceful places have been turned into industrial cities where the noise of tractors, buses, helicopters, and all the machinery of heavy industry have driven away valuable fauna, and plant species which traditionally had social and economic value for the local people, such as pandanus and various rainforest plants used traditionally as medicines, have disappeared.

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<sup>50</sup> Chris Ballard (1997), *op.cit.*:7.

<sup>51</sup> *Jakarta Post*, 13 May 1998.

The destruction of rainforest has also brought serious erosion and much reduced fertility of land used for producing basic food crops such as taro, yam and tapioca.<sup>52</sup> Erosion has caused major flooding, which has destroyed the gardens and houses of the lowland Kamoro people. Organisms in rivers and the sea, and in the forests along the river banks, are causing contamination. Currently 120,000 metric tons of tailings (including toxic chemicals) are discharged into the Aijkwa river system every day, killing fish, plankton, sago palms and mangrove trees.<sup>53</sup> Jakarta has recently approved an increase in production to 300,000 tons of ore per day; this means that another 88 square miles of land will be smothered under the grey, sand-like tailings.

Clean drinking water is a continuing problem: "The main concern of the Amungme and Kamoro is their water supply".<sup>54</sup> The people who live along the Aijkwa, Minajerwi and Kopi rivers cannot now drink the water because the water, originating in the Ertzberg and Grasberg mining areas, is heavily polluted by toxic wastes. Despite the very obvious problems, Freeport Indonesia and the government of Indonesia have denied the facts and accuse environmental and human rights organisations of publicising OPM propaganda. However, a Jayapura-based official has recently broken the silence.<sup>55</sup> Recently Freeport and the local government have built a few water

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<sup>52</sup> Podzolic and latozolic soil structures are found in southern mountain ranges and lowlands respectively. Both are characterised by softness and lack of keasaman and are particularly vulnerable to erosion (Petocz, *op.cit.*:28).

<sup>53</sup> An independent environmental audit concluded that Freeport mining operations have significant impacts upon the environment, and called for an immediate improvement (Ros Kelly, Paul Whincup & Soeharto Wongsosentono 1996), PTFI *Environmental Audit Report*, Dames and Moore, p.2.

<sup>54</sup> Cook, *op.cit.*:424.

<sup>55</sup> "Residents along the Aijkwa River which flows from the outskirts of Tembagapura city to Timika the capital of East Mimika regency, have been warned against drinking the polluted water" (*Jakarta Post* 27 March 1997).

tanks in Banti, Koperapoka, Kwamki Lama and Aroanop, but the water supply is still far from adequate.

Problems during pregnancy have been related to environmental degradation and, according to a Catholic Mission report, the rate of natural increase in 1936 was 1.9 but had dropped to 0.9 in 1989.<sup>56</sup>

Large areas of land have been used as a dumping ground for mining wastes, and Kamoro landowners have been forcibly removed from their traditional land. Recently, the Regency of Mimika told dozens of villages in the Koperapoka to move to Timika from their traditional land to enable FI to take care of its massive mine waste disposal problem. Bertha Urumami, a mother from Nawaripi village, protested against the move, saying:

If the military come they will have to kill me here. It is my land. We are only different by the skin and hair but Freeport can not treat us like animals.<sup>57</sup>

### 6.3.5. Militarisation and Human Rights Abuses

#### 6.3.5.1. Increased Militarisation

Along with the provincial city of Jayapura in the north, the relatively small urban centres of Timika and Tembagapura in the district of the East Mimika Regency are among the most highly militarised zones in the southern hemisphere. The region has been seen as a "red zone", where conflict between the Papuans, notably the OPM and the Indonesian Armed Forces

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<sup>56</sup> Forum Studi dan Pengembangan Mimika-Akimuga di Jayapura, (22 Mei 1993). "Laporan Keadaan Lingkungan dan Social Penduduk Koperapoka, Tipuka dan Iwaka Dalam Kaitannya dengan Aktivitas Freeport Indonesia Inc", *Report*, Jayapura, p.17.

<sup>57</sup> Shanna Langdon (1997). "Kamoro Landowner may be forcibly ejected for Freeport's mining wastes" *Project Underground Newsletter, Drillbits & Tailing*, Vol 2, No. 5, p.1.

(ABRI) has occurred frequently over the last twenty-two years.<sup>58</sup> Jakarta argues that it has a duty to “protect the state's vital asset”, the Freeport mine.

In 1976 there were no military posts in either the coastal or the interior mining areas, and only a couple of police posts to be found in Tembagapura and at Timika airport. However in reaction to the long running local protests that have occurred over the last twenty-two years, military capacity has been substantially increased and the military has become increasingly interventionist in civil as well as military affairs. A number of events have contributed to this increased militarisation. In November 1976, two years after the January Agreement was signed, riots and roadblocks occurred between Tembagapura and Ertsberg. Subsequently, a huge military deployment took place in June 1977 after the OPM attacked the Freeport installation, severely affecting Freeport's operations. Peaceful demonstrations were later organised by the OPM in 1994/95, hostage crises occurred in Mapenduma and Timika in January 1996, and mass protests occurred in March 1996 in Kuala Kencana, Timika and Tembagapura. All these events provoked further militarisation.

From the port of Amamapare on the coast to the inland mining region at Grasberg, the deployment of police, military and security forces is now seen as essential. In each village, each transmigration site, mining operational centres, and even in remote villages such as Banti, military and police now play a security role. In main centres at Koperapoka in Timika (Mile 26), Kuala Kencana (Mile 34), Tembagapura (Mile 68), and Banti (Mile 66), there is tight security control and intimidation of opponents; these

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<sup>58</sup> “In a year when Irian Jaya proved to be even more a problem than Indonesia's perennial trouble spot of East Timor, security forces also had their hands full on the northern side of the Central Highland” in *Asia 1997 Year Book 1996, Far Eastern Economic Review*, Hong Kong, p.136.

centres have also been used as places for detention, torture and execution (see Map 5 for locations).

In Timika the number of ABRI personnel increased significantly after the riots of April 1996 when many suspects were taken away at checkpoints at Mile 38 by Battalion 733 and Brimob. The Amungme were suspected of being members of the OPM and were forced to surrender their traditional weapons such as bows and arrows on the basis that they created a security breach under the Emergency Law No12/DRT/1995 regarding sharp weapons. LEMASA later claimed (22 August 1997), that this state law was in violation of traditional customary law. Special troops (KOPASSUS) have been attached to all security posts and at other secret locations. Since OPM activities escalated in the 1990s, considerable numbers of the Indonesian troops (including members of the elite KOPASSUS) have been located in Mimika regency. Many observers have concluded that the army's objective is to wipe out the OPM and its sympathisers.

There are very close links between FI and the ABRI. FI has actively supported the militarisation process, and ABRI provides essential protection for the mining operation. All visitors intending to visit Tembagapura and Timika first have to be checked at Mile 37, which is a checkpoint run by the security forces. Moreover, both parties cooperate in the Integrated Rural Development Program for East Mimika District. Most importantly, FI allows ABRI to use its communication infrastructure networks, accommodation, port facilities, and helicopters, and also provides subsidies, direct funds and medicines. During the peace demonstration in 1994/95, the hostage drama in 1996, and the recent civil war in Banti and Timika, for example, FI allowed ABRI to use their trucks, containers, helicopters and air fields and

even funded salaries. This close relationship has been described in the following words:

Any one visiting the area can see the close links between FIC security guards and local ABRI units. The main road to the mining site can only be entered with permission, through military check points...It is well known that company bosses in Indonesia pay the local military to protect them from hazards, like strikes.<sup>59</sup>

Josepha Alomang, a former detainee, has confirmed this relationship, describing ABRI as flies seeking honey but at times acting like a hungry tiger ready to crush the other flies.<sup>60</sup>

Increased militarisation has also impacted negatively on the local people, restricting their movement and creating fear among the people. There have been psychological effects too, on the ABRI troops, affecting their discipline and capacity to control rural areas. This was evident at Timika airport on 15 April 1996 when an Indonesian soldier shot 28 people and killed 19, many of them fellow soldiers.<sup>61</sup>

ABRI has used the classical policy of divide-and-rule, practised earlier by the former colonial master, the Dutch. It has sought to create divisions among the people on the basis of ethnicity, religion and region, in order to undermine national unity. When fighting erupted in Banti and Timika between the Amungme and Dani and Nduga migrants at the end of 1998, ABRI did not intervene on the grounds that they had not come to protect the local people. But independent observers confirmed that ABRI and

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<sup>59</sup> Carmel Budiardjo (1995). "The Great is the Name of the Game", *TAPOL Bulletin*, No.31, April 1995, London.

<sup>60</sup> Josepha Alomang (1998), interviewed by Mark Enger, German TV journalist, Timika.

<sup>61</sup> Ballard, *op.cit.*:14.

Freeport Indonesia actively encouraged the migrants so as to aggravate ethnic tension.

FI and ABRI also succeeded in creating divisions within Amungme society over the issue of a Trust Fund, which Freeport offered the local people in response to their mass protests in 1996. When the Traditional Amungme Council (LEMASA) in Kwamki Lama, Timika, rejected this offer, FI formed an alternative council, which it called AMUNGKAL. It also accused LEMASA of having connections with the OPM, thereby restricting the freedom of movement of LEMASA members, and leaving the chairman, Tom Beanal, under constant threat.

Internationally, the use of the military to protect a private company such as FI is unusual. But in Indonesia, the direct involvement of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) is considered appropriate, even though this practice has resulted in an intensification of human rights abuses.

#### **6.3.5.2. Human Rights Abuses**

For a long time in West Papua democratic freedom has been regularly violated and the people have been subjected to oppression and exploitation. In reaction to the growing public pressures for political change, violations of fundamental human rights have steadily increased. The occupation forces maintain their tight grip on the opposition partly through the new Criminal Code. Amnesty International, which has been observing the situation closely, has concluded:

Opposition to Indonesian rule of West Papua, both armed and unarmed, has continued since authority over the province was transferred to the Indonesian Government in 1963. Protests, flag-raising and peaceful demonstrations have been responded to by the occupation forces with severe widespread human rights violations including arbitrary arrests, "disappearances",

extrajudicial executions, torture and the imprisonment of prisoners of conscience.<sup>62</sup>

Similarly, John Wing comments:

West Papua is a place where freedom of expression and assembly have been violated, and the rights of self determination and independence of the Papuans completely denied. The indigenous Papuans are in effect a colonised people who have no control over the course of even determining the country's development.<sup>63</sup>

These human rights abuses have intensified since the Presidential Decree No 8, 1963 concerning prohibition of the exercise of political rights, which was later reinforced by Presidential Decree No 11, 1963 formulating the Anti-Subversion Law that legitimated the role of the Indonesian armed forces in eliminating political opposition.<sup>64</sup>

The government has continued to impose severe limitations on freedom of assembly, association, demonstration and criticism, in combination with a wave of arrests, torture, intimidation and expanded surveillance aimed at reining in the activities of the OPM. Prison conditions are extremely harsh, and security forces regularly violate citizens' right to privacy. The following examines two aspects of human rights abuses: violations of political freedom and of civil liberties in the Timika and Tembagapura areas.

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<sup>62</sup> Amnesty International (1997). "Urgent Action Request about Recent Events near the Freeport Mine". *All Index*: ASA.21/61/97, p. 2. [See also: <http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/boyer/fp/amnesty-970829.html>].

<sup>63</sup> John Wing (1995). "An Overview of the Impact of Indonesian Development and the Critical Social-Environmental Situation in West Papua (Irian Jaya)", Masters Thesis, University of Sydney, p. 2.

<sup>64</sup> C. Budiardjo and Soe Liong Liem (1984). *West Papua: The Obliteration of a People*, TAPOL, London. pp.24-52.

### 6.3.5.2.1. Lack of Political Freedom

Respect for political freedom is essential in a democracy; however, since the introduction of the Anti-Subversion Law in 1963, those rights have routinely been violated in West Papua.<sup>65</sup> Political killings have been intensified in many parts of the region—particularly in the areas where OPM is most active, notably in the highlands towns and villages along the border region.

The occupation forces place restrictions on public meetings of five or more persons, including academic or other seminars, and all marches and demonstrations require permits from the police and several government agencies. Lectures and class discussion materials in schools, colleges and universities that might provoke government displeasure can lead to academic sanctions, if not expulsion or arrest. Any publications that contain the word “Papuan” were banned until late 1999. Old scholarly publications that deal with Papuan songs, literature, poetry, politics and culture are similarly barred from circulation on the basis that such items are relics of Dutch colonial rule and could encourage Papuan nationalism. The military is allowed to intervene on campuses and in schools to arrest and detain students who may have taken part in any form of “subversive” activity. The arrest and detention of members of the Papuan Youth Organisation in 1968, 1975, 1996 and 1998, both in Timika and Jayapura, are classic examples of such military intervention. Such undemocratic actions inhibit academic institutions and scholars in their roles of promoting freedom of expression and providing informed public criticism.

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<sup>65</sup> The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the US Department of State (1997). *Indonesia: Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996*, p.1.

The Timika and Tembagapura areas have become particular targets of human rights abuses over recent years; this has contributed significantly to the poor relationship between the military and the local people in the area. Accusing the Amungme of supporting the OPM, the military argues that “the OPM itself depends on the people, and as bullets have no eyes the death of ordinary people is unavoidable”.<sup>66</sup> Papuan human rights, environmental and social organisations, churches and unions have all been subjected to systematic government crackdown and have become regular targets of intimidation. NGOs have faced government harassment through police raids on their offices, surveillance by police or military intelligence, and cancellation of private meetings; in some cases high-level government officials have been threatened with legal action because they are considered to be trouble-makers. Amungme Consultation Council (LEMASA) chairman, Tom Beanal, for example, was accused of involvement in a demonstration in 1994/95 and in the hostage crisis and riot in 1996, and was threatened with death.<sup>67</sup> In 1994-1995 more than one hundred innocent Amungme, including 37 people in one village (among whom were two children and a priest), were killed, disappeared, or detained.<sup>68</sup> Other human rights violations occurred in Bela, Alama, Jila, and Mapenduma in 1996-1997,<sup>69</sup> where more than 138 civilians died as a consequence of military reprisals; 166 buildings were burned down, including 29 men's houses, one traditional men's house, 13 church buildings, and two medical care centres. While some of these events have been widely reported, there are many

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<sup>66</sup> *Inside Indonesia* December 1995, p.20.

<sup>67</sup> Head of Police, East Mimika Sector (14 January 1998). *Document* No.Pol.SP/02/1998/SERSE, Timika.

<sup>68</sup> Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA), April, 1995. *Trouble at Freeport: Eyewitness Accounts of West Papuan Resistance to the Freeport-McMoRan Mine in Irian Jaya, Indonesia and Indonesian military repression: June 1994—February 1995*, Melbourne.

<sup>69</sup> Isak Onawame, Nato Gobay and A.B.M. Hutapea (1998). *Human Rights Violations & Disaster in Bela, Alama, Jila & Mapnduma, Irian Jaya*, Indonesian Evangelical Church, Mimika, Catholic Church, Three Kings Parish, Timika, Christian Evangelical Church of Mimika, ACFOA Human Rights Office, Melbourne, pp.2-34.

more systematic human rights abuses that are never reported in the world's mass media.

The government considers all outside investigations or foreign-based criticisms of alleged human rights violations to be interference in its internal affairs. It consistently obstructed NGO and church efforts to investigate human rights abuses committed by the military in the Mapenduma area after the hostage drama. According to critics of the government, this event resulted in the subsequent deaths of considerable numbers of Nduga and Amungme civilians. Even the International Red Cross (ICRC), a non-political organisation with UN observer status, has periodically encountered difficulty in implementing its humanitarian programs in the famine-affected areas in the West Papuan highlands. ABRI claims that it can only permit limited access to the area by non residents, for security reasons; it argues that such areas are very remote and there is a lack of materials and transport. But in 1997 the OPM International office in Sweden strongly criticised the relief policy of the government and stated that the relief program was intentionally protracted, leaving the Papuans to die slowly; the delay in the relief program was, it argued, an integral part of its policy of genocide.<sup>70</sup>

The Indonesian Constitution of 1945 sets out the principle of equal rights and obligations for all citizens, both native and naturalised. Chapter 4 of the 1993 Guidelines of State Policy also states that all Indonesians have the same rights, obligations, and opportunities. Notwithstanding this, the Papuans have consistently been discriminated against on the basis of their race and religion and excluded from high official posts because they are seen as an inferior race of lazy and unreliable people. The Papuan public officials

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<sup>70</sup> J.H. Prai *Press Release* (14 October 1997) OPM-International Office, Malmö.

who held government offices in the 1960s were replaced by Indonesians because Jakarta considered the locals to be incapable of positions of responsibility over the occupation forces. In Timika, for example, the Indonesians consistently look down on Papuans in general, and the local peoples in particular, as an inferior and "primitive" race; local people are not allowed to shop at the supermarket in Tembagapura and the company has built a wire fence around the city area to prevent local people from entering.

The disappearances of many Papuans have also been reported. According to Zonggonau *et al.*,<sup>71</sup> K. Kwalik,<sup>72</sup> and B. Niwilingame,<sup>73</sup> a considerable number of Papuans have disappeared without trace. Following the Tembagapura incident, both the Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA) and Bishop Jan Herman Munninghoff OFM of Jayapura<sup>74</sup> reported five relatives of Kelly Kwalik missing. Josepha Alomang, who was one of the detainees, confirmed that "Kwalik's relatives were taken away that night but never returned again".<sup>75</sup> A report made available by Amnesty International<sup>76</sup> records that people are missing; independent observers believe that most of those missing are dead, including the five relatives of Kwalik.

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<sup>71</sup> Wim Zonggonau *et al.* (1997). *Accuses: The Case of West Papua*, Port Moresby, (unpublished), p.88.

<sup>72</sup> Kelly Kwalik (3 May 1996). *Fakta-fakta Pengorbanan jiwa bangsa Melanesia Barat sejak tahun 1962-1996 Dalam Wilayah KODAM III, Fakfak, Puncak Abadi Jaya, Laporan*, MAKODAM III, FakFak.

<sup>73</sup> Bonifasius Niwilingame (1984). Niwilingame, Bonifasius (24 Juli 1985). *Bersama ini Kami Laporkan Beberapa Peristiwa Penting Antara Lain Pembunuhan Masal Atas Rakyat Papua Barat Diderah Pegunungan Tengah Dibagian Barat Dari Papua Barat Oleh Pemerintah Republic Indonesia*, Laporan, Markas Besar Nasional- OPM.

<sup>74</sup> Jan Herman Munninghoff, OFM (1995). *Violations of human rights in the Timika area of Irian Jaya, Indonesia, A Report by the Catholic Church of Jayapura*.

<sup>75</sup> Josepha Alomang and Juliana Magal (1997), interviewed by Mark Enger, German TV Journalist, Timika.

<sup>76</sup> Amnesty International (1995). "Irian Jaya: National Commission on Human Rights Confirms Violations", *Document No: AI Index: ASA 21/47/95*, London, pp.1-13.

Torture and degrading treatment have been common practices in the detention centres and prisons. The Indonesian Criminal Code makes such practices a crime punishable by up to four years in prison and gives suspects or their families the right to challenge the legality of an arrest or detention. However, such legal protection is in practice both inadequate and widely ignored. Security forces continue to use torture and other forms of mistreatment on suspects, forcing them to make confessions. For example, Josepha Alomang and four men were detained and held in containers owned by Freeport Indonesia on suspicion of being collaborators with the OPM.

We were arrested by Indonesian soldiers and Freeport security in the night and then brought to the police station for interrogation. Despite we had not had any link with Kelly Kwalik, the leader of the OPM, they accused us and detained us in the containers which are owned by Freeport Indonesia for almost two weeks. Then they removed us to police cells, which was actually a toilet. The condition in the cells was so very bad, affecting our health seriously. We were treated as animals.<sup>77</sup>

It is also known that considerable numbers of the participants at the protest of 10-12 March 1996 in Timika and Tembagapura were arrested and detained without warrant.

#### **6.3.5.2.2. Lack of Civil Liberties**

The second category of human rights abuses perpetrated by the Indonesian government is the lack of respect for civil liberties, including freedom of speech, of the press, of peaceful assembly and association, and of movement within the country and overseas.

Although the 1945 Constitution and the 1982 Press Law provide for freedom of the press, the government has consistently restricted public

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<sup>77</sup> J. Alomang (April 1999), interviewed by the author, New Orleans.

discussion. Critics of the president, senior officials and influential local interest groups, for example, are at risk of harassment, arrest or torture. In West Papua, news magazines and daily newspapers have been banned, and the authorities provide guidance to local journalists and editors on what they should write and print. The Catholic daily newspaper, *Tifa Irian*, in Jayapura, for example, has been frequently warned for publishing critical articles concerning social injustice and rural development. *Suara dari Kampung (Voice of the Village)*, a university-based quarterly bulletin, was banned in the 1980s because it criticised the government for the failure of its rural development policy including problems arising from the FI enterprise.

Foreign television and radio broadcasts are rarely accessible; little is available other than Javanese programs on Indonesian TV. Special permission is required for foreign journalists to travel to West Papua. For example, the environmentalist, Danny Kennedy, who attempted to monitor environmental degradation on the Aijkwa river in Timika, was deported at the beginning of 1997 for fear he would expose the full extent of the environmental damage. A permit for the importation of foreign publications and video tapes, which must be reviewed by government censors, is also required.

Freedom of movement is restricted and special permits are required to visit certain parts of West Papua, particularly sensitive areas such as Tembagapura/Timika and surrounding areas. Even to visit their own relatives, Papuans are required to have an identity card, *Kartu Penduduk*, and a travel document, *Surat Keterangan Jalan*, a system little different to that under the apartheid regime in South Africa. As mentioned earlier, in 1975 my own freedom of movement was restricted even in my home area and I was required daily to declare my movements in detail, including my

objectives, the places and people I would visit, and the times of my meetings; I had to report to the local police and military afterwards. I was treated virtually as a foreigner in my own village.

West Papua is, therefore, a place where freedom of expression and assembly have been violated, and legal access to prisoners, to information sources, to public criticism, and to democratic freedom denied. A major objective of these abuses in the Timika area is to create confusion and fear among the landowners, particularly in the concession region, so that the company and the state can exploit the mineral resources without opposition.

### **6.3.6. The Political Administrative Approach**

Responding to the failure of the purely military approach, the Indonesian government has introduced a new political approach in its attempt to destroy the influence of the OPM; this may be termed an "administrative approach". The government plans to focus on particular strategic regions, creating new provinces or regencies in order to counteract the influence of the OPM and facilitate Indonesianisation. The first step in this plan is to divide the province of "Irian Jaya" into three provinces:<sup>78</sup> a northern province, with Jayapura as its capital; a western province, with Sorong as the capital; and a southern province, with Timika as capital. Each of these provinces will be under the authority of an assistant governor. Jakarta argues that such reorganisation is crucial to the provision of development and services, and to improve infrastructure and create more job opportunities. But Papuans see the plan as a strategy for increasing political and military control. According to state law, a region can only be upgraded to a "province" if it fulfils certain criteria; one of these is that there must be a

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<sup>78</sup> Yusril Ihza Mahendra, "Irian Jaya Agar Dijadikan Tiga Provinsi", *Republika*, 25 June 1998, Jombang.

population of at least one million. The Papuans fear that if the plan were to be implemented, an even greater influx of migrants from Indonesia would be needed to increase the population in each of the newly created provinces and so the 1.5 million Papuans would very quickly become marginalised.

Following the social unrest that occurred in the central and southern parts of the country in 1996, another administrative reform was put in place: three new regencies were created in East Mimika (with Timika as capital), Puncak Jaya (with Mulia as capital), and Paniai (with Enarotali as capital). Again, the Papuans believe that such administrative rearrangements were part of a politically and militarily motivated strategic plan. In order to restrict the movement of the OPM in the border areas, the military has built new outposts even in the most remote locations. In Akimuga district, for example, three times a week military aircraft drop troops to Jila, Ilaga, Beoga, Hoesa, Alama, and Bela from the military's new base in Aramsolki. Each small village now has its own military post, with the main KODIM in the region supplying manpower, food, and medicines.

During the drought of 1998, the military also used the social catastrophe as a means to hasten the extermination of the Papuans. Apart from delays in supplying food to victims in remote areas such as Sinak, Mulia and Geselama, the military set fire to the terrain; landowners in Hoesa were unable to save their crops, animals, houses and land from the bushfire. According to an ICRC report (1998), the district of East Mimika was one of the areas worst hit by drought, with more than 250 people dying of hunger and drought-related diseases such as diarrhoea, malaria, and cholera.

Jakarta is now attempting to reduce the boundaries of the Lorentz National Park in order to allow a contractor (Nabire Bhakti) to explore the

viability of a gold mine in Jila valley, approximately 50 kilometres north-east of Tembagapura. This means new environmental destruction will take place in the eastern area of Amungsa, affecting Dologong and Noemogong, the headwaters of the Cemara river system, and the adjacent lowlands.

Jakarta is proud of its current administrative policy; but Papuans remain extremely critical, believing that the real objectives are to restrict the movement of the OPM and cut off its information network and local support. The military has used the administrative reorganisation to legitimate further forcible removal of landowners and increased militarisation in the regions. Moreover, if the government continues to claim land in accordance with Article 33 of the Indonesian Constitution 1945, concerning the state's right to ownership of all "no-man's-land", the Amungme will not have any right to claim compensation. In such circumstances, conflict between the Amungme and FI (and Nabire Bhakti) will drag on well into the future.

#### **6.4. Local Resistance**

Despite the claims of FI and the government of Indonesia that the presence of the company in the region has significantly improved social and economic conditions and local infrastructure, and has broken down the isolation of the people, the Amungme and Kamoro people are still highly critical of it. As Professor Steven Feld argues:

Like all indigenous West Papuans in Irian Jaya, Amungme have suffered from the brutal oppression of their Indonesian colonizers. They had no say in the takeover of their homelands for mining nor in the resettlement programs that removed them for the benefit of Freeport Indonesia. Their lands have been annexed, their wealth has been absorbed. They receive no land rent and no royalties, and have virtually no legal, political, or economic recourse to this forced dispossession. When some Amungme rebelled in frustration in 1977 and blew up part of a pipeline, Indonesian military retaliations

resulted. Gardens and houses were destroyed, people murdered and tortured. Indonesia claimed that “only 900” were killed. Others put the estimate at twice that number.<sup>79</sup>

But even more important than these abuses is the lack of respect for the fundamental human rights of the local people, including land rights, and the destruction of their environment. The specific abuses of the 1960s and early 1970s are briefly summarised below:

- The lack of consultation and agreement with landowners; confiscation of their land, and exploitation of their natural resources, the destruction of their secret places; and environmental degradation.
- The treatment of the Amungme as slaves in their own land. The Amungme have complained that their secret places were destroyed and that the Forbes Wilson’s Freeport minerals exploration expedition in 1960 refused to pay the Amungme porters any bonus for their role in this expedition.
- The disregard of local landowners by first contractor Bechtel Pomeroy (BP) in 1967. Without asking permission or making any attempt at consultation, BP started to build its camps in Peyukate where the villages of Jelsegel and Onogopsegel are located. In response, the people of Wa, under the leadership of Tuarek Natkime, organised a protest and planted stakes to mark their land, saying “Natkime is determined to resist change at all costs”.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> Steven Feld (1995). “Let’s Call It Amungme Hall”, University of Austin, Texas.

<sup>80</sup> “For much of his life, Tuarek Natkime, chief of the Amungme tribe, dressed in an orange penis gourd, feathers and a layer of pig fat. These days, he adopts Western-style clothing. But when it comes to a consortium mining his clan lands in Indonesia’s remote Irian Jaya province, Natkime is determined to resist change at all costs. The leathery wrinkles in his dark skin clench in a dramatic frieze as he vows: ‘As sure as if

- The treatment of the Amungme as inferior workers. In 1971, a fight broke out in Mile 74 between the Amungme and FI workers, which led to four workers being killed. Two years later, an FI geological team once again entered the secret places of the Amungme in Nosalonogoma in the Tsinga valley without asking permission. The Amungme, under the leadership of Pitarogome Beanal, protested, and the camp was burned down. In 1973, a protest broke out in Tembapapura against further deforestation and confiscation of land without compensation. The Amungme planted many crosses around the Mulkidini as a sign of prohibition of entry.

The government, responding to Amungme demands, required the company to provide basic social facilities in remote villages such as Banti, Kwamki Lama and Aroanop, but, in practice, FI has ignored its obligations, continuing its expansion into prohibited areas outside the Tembapapura region not covered by the agreement.<sup>81</sup> An Amungme delegation, consisting of Tom Beanal, Constan Hanggaibak and selected Amungme chiefs, was excluded from the final decision-making process or in the formulation of the document, their views being represented by the government of Indonesia.<sup>82</sup> The January 1974 Agreement was thus not the product of a democratic and just negotiation.

This pattern was repeated when FI and the government signed a new Contract of Work on 31 December 1991, to approve another 30 years of

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I were holding a rock in my hand, I'll never let go' ", in Michael Shari (1996) "My Land is Your Mine", p.7.

<sup>81</sup> Lembaga Masyarakat Amungme/LEMASA (1995). *Tuntutan and Tanggapan Amungnesorei Atas Masalah Pelanggaran Hak-hak Asasi Manusia Terhadap Penduduk Asli di Wilayah Pt. Freeport Indonesia dan Hasil Temuan KOMNASHAM, Timika*, (unpublished), p.7.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*:7.

mining. Once again, the Amungme were not consulted. Moreover, in order to build towns for workers and immigrants, there has been further land acquisition. Sixteen chiefs of the Amungme and Kamoro were forced to release their land on 16 March 1985, covering an area between Timika, Mile 50 in the north, West Sempan in the south, Kauga river in the West and Aijkwa river in the east.<sup>83</sup>

In expressing their discontent over these injustices, the landowners have taken both non-violent and violent approaches.

### **Non-Violent Approaches**

Non-violent actions have included the following:

- The use of blockades and silent strikes (when FI failed to consult the Amungme and undermined the sale of local products, the Amungme planted prohibited entry marks in Mulkidini (Tembagapura), and women held a silent strike in Timika market);
- The channelling of the aspirations of the Amungme through the Amungme Consultation Council (LEMASA); as the only legitimate body of the Amungme and Kamoro peoples LEMASA addresses issues of land rights, human right abuses, environmental destruction, and improvement of education, health and social services;
- cooperation with national and international solidarity groups, NGOs and environmental groups (campaigns have influenced decision making in some host countries; on 13 October 1995, for example, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) cancelled export insurance cover to Freeport McMoRan). International solidarity is also expressed through

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<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*:8.

protests, press releases, seminars and conferences. In one instance, a highly respected academic, Professor Steven Feld of the University of Texas in Austin, resigned from his professorship arguing that the University of Texas and Freeport, which have links, failed to address human rights and environmental issues. In a letter to the University chancellor he wrote:

The attempts I made to follow them [my previous letters] up and speak with you about Freeport's human rights record was met with silence. I even offered to provide you with an executive summary and copies of hundreds of pages of accounts of Freeport's role in Indonesian military detentions and murders of Melanesian civilians. But you have been unwilling to even acknowledge these overtures, much less acknowledge or participate in any campus forum on Freeport. Your lack of accountability presents the entire University community with a clear picture of arrogant disregard for democratic discussion. I can no longer be proud of my association with the University, and certainly no longer wish to bring prestige to it. This feeling was surely intensified when I read last month's report (copy enclosed) by the Catholic Church of Jayapura on violations of human rights around Freeport's West Irian mine site. Among other things, the report provides eyewitness accounts of Indonesian military use of Freeport containers as detention and torture cells.<sup>84</sup>

The Indonesian Environmental Group (WALHI), the Catholic Church, and national and regional groups such as the Foundation for Rural Development Program in Jayapura, Student Solidarity with the Amungme People, Christian-based organisations, and indigenous advocacy forums have been instrumental in defending human rights and environmental values in the area.

- Legal challenge is another form of non-violent campaigning; LEMASA brought actions against FI before both district and federal courts in the

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<sup>84</sup> Steven Feld, letter to the Chancellor of the University of Austin, Texas, 11 September 1995, announcing his decision to resign from his professorship.

USA for its crimes against humanity and environmental destruction. Charges of human rights abuses against FI were provisionally upheld in the Louisiana Supreme Court in July 1998, but LEMASA's case was eventually lost.

### **Violent Approaches**

In general, the Amungme are not an aggressive people. However, some individuals, frustrated when their peaceful demands have not been heeded, have resorted to occasional violence. In November 1976, the Amungme blocked roads between Tembagapura and Ertsberg to express their discontent at the destruction of their forests and land in Mulkindi. On 23 July 1977 a joint operation between the OPM, Freeport workers and the Amungme burned down oil tanks at Mile 50 and cut off the pipeline that transferred copper ore to the port in Ammapare, involving losses to Freeport of between US\$6 and US\$11 million.<sup>85</sup> Many protests and demonstrations have been organised over the years; the biggest erupted on 10-12 March 1996 when 6,000 Papuans in Tembagapura and Timika went onto the streets and destroyed company offices, airport facilities, cars, and laboratories, valued at US\$1 million.

In the view of the OPM, the support given by FI to the state of Indonesia prolongs the colonisation of West Papua. This perception has strengthened Amungme sentiment against FI over the years.

The leader of the Nemang Kawi Command of the OPM, Kelly Kwalik, himself an Amungme, has taken a number of actions in an attempt to force

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<sup>85</sup> Ballard, *op.cit.*:32. See also Robin Osborne (1985). *Indonesia's Secret War: The Guerrilla Struggle in Irian Jaya*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney. p.69.

FI and the government to the negotiating table. The demands of the LEMASA and Kelly Kwalik are set out in Appendix , 2.<sup>86</sup>

The 23 points of this declaration have been demanded for many years without any result. However it is possible that the currently increasing internal and external pressures may change the social and development policies of Freeport McMoRan and of the post-Habibie government. Let me consider this future possibility in the light of conflict resolution strategies.

## **6.5. Prospects for Ending the Conflict**

### **6.5.1. General Overview**

The painful experiences of the past, which I have described above, are unlikely to be reversed in the future because all the actors feel that they are in the right. In the view of the government, the mineral resources belong to the state and must be exploited for the benefit of all Indonesian citizens, in accordance with Article 33 of the State Constitution of 1945. FI is seen as a vital asset of the state because Jakarta benefits from the mining operations in the form of dividends, royalties and taxes. Demands for social justice and democracy are regarded as criminal acts against the interests of the state. The government also has major strengths. The powerful military protects the interests of the state and of FI. The government also controls the apparatus of the state such as finance, international relations, and the powers of local, regional and national administrative bodies, and it exercises substantial control over the media. The government is, therefore, willing and able to suppress opposition.

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<sup>86</sup> LEMASA (1995). *op.cit.*:12-14.

Parallel to the state's interests, Freeport McMoRan and its associated companies will continue to support government policy because the company does not want to lose the opportunity to make profits in West Papua. A change of regime in Indonesia is unlikely to affect the company's presence or operations significantly. In the short term, there may be minor difficulties but in the long run the government of Indonesia, no matter how it is constituted, needs FI to operate in the region. Freeport McMoRan's strengths lie in its capacity to contribute to the state's finances, and in the knowledge that it enjoys the protection of the state and military; it also has effective international networks and influence over the local mass media.

In contrast, from the perspective of the Amungme and Kamoro, the presence of this transnational company has brought very few advantages. As landowners whose fundamental rights have been ignored, they feel that they have nothing to lose, and they will therefore continue to fight for their land and their rights. Their major strengths are the popular support they enjoy, the fact that they are defending their own land, the important role the leadership of the LEMASA has played in their struggle, and the increasing regional, national and international support for their cause. However, the landowners lack financial support, managerial skills, control over the mass media, and access to national and international networks, and the government's divide-and-rule policy has seriously affected the unity of the Amungme and the other peoples.

### **6.5.2. Possible Scenarios for a Resolution**

Each set of actors has placed itself in a defensive position, distancing itself from dialogue. From this apparent stalemate, there are several ways of breaking the deadlock.

The current move towards the democratisation of Indonesian politics will impact on the region. A soundly based civil society is still far away; however, political democratisation and the abolition of ABRI's dual function (*dwifungsi*) may open up new possibilities for dialogue. Restoring a constitutional regime and empowering civil society are primary tasks in the reform program, but the government must also redefine the meaning of landownership, recognise indigenous peoples, human rights, and political rights and obligations, and introduce an accountable regional rural development program.

Democratisation in Indonesia will also affect the political situation in West Papua. Alternative forces will emerge within the political system. Freeport Indonesia may be forced to redefine its policy concerning the indigenous people if it is to continue its operations in the region (or it could decide to sell out to another company). A total withdrawal of the military would be one way to create a neutral zone in which to start dialogue between the conflicting parties, but this is still a remote possibility.

Increasing internal and external public pressures will also impact on the attitudes of the main actors; however, it seems unlikely that either the government or FI will be willing to fully recognise the rights of the Amungme and Kamoro in the near future. In the longer term, with the creation of a civil society, the deadlock may be broken, primarily because all the actors would like to share in the profits. Ongoing talks between the conflicting parties indicate some positive steps towards this eventuality.

But there is also the likelihood that the Amungme will get nothing except further destruction and misfortune. If FI decides to sell out its operation any compensation for loss of land or environmental destruction

is unlikely. Maintaining unity among the Amungme and Kamoro will be crucial. If FI and the government were to recognise LEMASA as the legitimate representative of the Amungme, and party to the negotiations, this would be a great step forward, though at present it seems unlikely.

Another possibility is a replication of the Bougainville conflict. This is generally seen as unlikely "because the government of Indonesia, a stakeholder, sees Grasberg as one of the country's most important resources projects and will use its army to protect it"<sup>87</sup>; however if the current negotiations fail, then local organisations may consider they have no alternatives to violence. The situation has been analysed by Elmslie, who concludes that the national consciousness of the Papuans shows "no sign of dying out"; rather, local sentiment will grow and will promote social unrest.<sup>88</sup> I share his view.

## 6.6. Conclusion

The problem of West Papua is not only social; it is also political. Any solution to the problem must, therefore, be sought not only within social and economic contexts, as suggested by Djopari and other social and economic experts, but within cultural and political contexts as well. Addressing the basic issues of human rights, land rights, indigenous rights and environmental issues is vital. However, minor improvements in these key areas will not guarantee security and stability in the region. First, the coercive approach that is currently employed by the Indonesian government and the military will not break local sentiment; instead, it will encourage more violence. A more effective option for achieving a productive dialogue would be to withdraw troops from the region and replace them with police security forces. Secondly, the application of a purely social approach will not

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<sup>87</sup> *Sydney Morning Herald* 14 March 1996.

<sup>88</sup> Elmslie, *op.cit.*:103.

reduce the strength of local sentiment either, primarily because the local demands are for something much more fundamental: namely respect for basic human rights, including land rights and political rights.

Land means everything to the Amungme and Kamoro. It has social, economic, religious and cultural values; spiritual connections to land cannot be ignored. Therefore, any peaceful solution must be culturally grounded and involve popular participation.<sup>89</sup>

The demand for recognition of, and respect for human rights has been a continuing issue. Freeport Indonesia and the government of Indonesia must recognise the importance of land and resources to the Amungme and Kamoro as the indigenous people of the area. The suggestions made by LEMASA (set out above) should be seriously studied in order to create a foundation for trust and stability in the region.

Local ethnonationalism has contributed to the development of a broader West Papuan national sentiment. LEMASA has played an important role, especially in initiating the Forum for Reconciliation of the People of West Papua (FORERI) and taking part in a peace dialogue with the government of Indonesia under the coordination of Team 100. LEMASA, and its leader, Tom Beanal, who has consistently fought for human rights and environmental issues in the Amungsa and Kamoro land, are now major actors at the national, as well as the local, level. Beanal's commitment and experience at the local level gave him the credibility to play a national role. Further, LEMASA's fight against the USA-based Freeport McMoRan had a serious impact nationally. Environmentalists and human rights

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<sup>89</sup> LEMASA (1995). Amungme people's response to National Commission of Human Rights findings, 22 September 1995, *TAPOL*, London.

organisations who support the struggle of the Amungme, also support the West Papuan national struggle. A resolution passed by the LEMASA in Timika in 1998 called for an independent West Papua, arguing that only in an independent West Papua could the problems of human rights, environmental degradation, and social education be solved. The raising of the Morning Star flag in Timika on 10 November 1999 indicated the continuing serious local commitment to West Papua's national cause.



## **Chapter Seven: Future Prospects for West Papua**

### **7.1. Introduction**

The future of West Papua remains controversial even after 35 years of struggle, for the issues at stake are extremely complex and sensitive. Furthermore, there is still a lack of political commitment from the two conflicting parties, the government of Indonesia and the OPM, to engage in a healthy and constructive dialogue. For these reasons, and because of the divergent views that were discussed in Chapter Five, negotiation on the future of West Papua was impossible in the New Order period. However, since the collapse of the Suharto regime, new possibilities may at last emerge as the spirit of democracy strengthens.

This chapter is divided into three parts. The first will provide a general review of the collapse of the Suharto regime and its effects on the social and political problems in West Papua. The second will focus on future scenarios, in particular the issue of the survival of the nation-state of Indonesia. The final part will discuss three alternative political approaches to resolving the conflict—autonomy, federation, and independence. Papuans are currently debating the advantages and disadvantages of these potential solutions.

### **7.2. The Failure of the New Order Regime**

The Suharto government was one of the most highly centralised and authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia. Because the country was ruled through a militarised power structure, the position of the Suharto regime was for long unchallengeable. The state built a system of centralised control over economic resources in which Suharto's family and close friends played a predominant role. Major strategic industries such as oil, gas,

communications and plantations were run by state companies controlled by Suharto loyalists and selected private companies.

As in South Korea, the authoritarian regime brought rapid economic growth to the country, and living standards and infrastructure improved significantly. According to Huntington, economic growth tends either to democratise or to destabilise authoritarian regimes.<sup>1</sup> In the case of Indonesia, behind the success there was extensive corruption, collusion and nepotism. In West Papua, for example, the corruption of the family of former President Suharto was evident in the logging industry. According to Sitorus, chairman of the Provincial Parliament of Irian Jaya (DPR D-I), Suharto's grandson Arisigit was closely involved in logging contracts that jeopardised the local economy and environment, and the parliament has called for further investigation into logging in West Papua.<sup>2</sup> Suharto and Bob Hassan were also involved in a scandal relating to Freeport Indonesia (FI); Hassan purchased shares from Bakrie Indocopper Invertama Cooperation, one of the contractors at the Freeport mine, and then sold them at a 9.3 per cent profit to Freeport Indonesia.<sup>3</sup>

To protect this situation of privilege, the Suharto regime gave no mercy to its political opponents. There was no respect for human rights. Considerable numbers of Indonesian citizens and colonised peoples were brutally murdered, imprisoned, detained, or executed, and many disappeared without trace. Land confiscation and resource exploitation became endemic. In the absence of the rule of law, corruption, collusion and

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<sup>1</sup> "In a few countries extremely rapid economic growth destabilised authoritarian regimes, forcing them either to liberate or intensify repression. Economic development, in short, provided the basis for democracy; crises produced by either rapid growth or economic recession weakened authoritarianism", Samuel P. Huntington (1991) *The Third Wave, Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century*, University of Oklahoma Press, London, p.59.

<sup>2</sup> *Cenderawasih Post* 31 May 1998.

<sup>3</sup> *Suara Independence* No.10, 3 August 1997.

nepotism became a way of life. Consequently even a country as rich as Indonesia was brought to the point of economic collapse. After 1997 the financial and banking systems no longer functioned and Indonesia was unable to pay its soaring foreign debt, which even by late 1996 was recorded as US\$55.5 billion, or 25 per cent of GDP.<sup>4</sup> Economic infrastructure was run down and the level of unemployment rose to a record high. The value of the Indonesian rupiah fluctuated further and a high rate of inflation forced changes in the consumption index in the middle of May 1998. As the rupiah lost its purchasing power, hunger, frustration, and high unemployment became prevalent.

In reaction to social dissatisfaction and economic crisis, the demand for change of the Suharto regime quickly became widespread in early 1998. The unequal distribution of economic growth among the regions created increased resentment, leading to social unrest in many parts of the Indonesian archipelago.<sup>5</sup> The Suharto family and its associates were sharply criticised for their role in conglomerate business, and faced a new test of credibility as the people demanded an end to one of the longest-lasting authoritarian regimes in the world. Student organisations, intellectuals, workers, human rights activists and environmentalists in the main cities on Java and the other islands demanded Suharto's resignation and called for immediate economic and political reforms. As the reformist movement steadily gained momentum, President Suharto was forced to stand aside and the combination of economic deterioration and political protest triggered the downfall of his regime. Rousseau's observation that "stronger is never strong enough to be always the master"<sup>6</sup> was confirmed by the

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<sup>4</sup> M. Purcell (1998). "Sinking Asia: Capital Flows and the Collapse of the Asian Miracle", *ACFOA Development Issues* 4, Canberra, pp.14-18.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*:69.

<sup>6</sup> Huntington, *op.cit.*:46.

collapse of the Suharto regime; the government was forced to resign and on 21 May 1998 President Suharto himself was removed from power.<sup>7</sup>

This change of regime, and the associated process of political democratisation in Indonesia, has seriously affected social and political conditions in West Papua.

### **7.3. The Effects of Democratisation in Indonesia**

The demand for greater democratisation and political participation in Indonesia received wide national and international publicity when student organisations in the main cities demonstrated in the streets and demanded change. Even though these mass movements were loosely organised and lacked coordination and leadership, they had considerable impact on the country's political future.

This political action led to an increase of national sentiment and political turmoil in many parts of West Papua. On 1 July 1998, raisings of the West Papuan flag, the Morning Star, took place in Jayapura, Biak, Sorong, Wamena and Manokwari and were accompanied by demands for the independence of West Papua. Similar actions by West Papuan students took place in Jakarta and Yogyakarta; they also went to the UN representative's office, demanding independence for West Papua and expressing their deep anger and frustration over the injustices, repression and exploitation suffered by West Papuans under the Indonesian colonial system. July 1st was chosen for these demonstrations as this is the date on which, each year, the OPM celebrates its National Independence Declaration Day, commemorating the day in 1971 that Seth Rumkorem, the president of the RPG, first publicly declared the independence of West Papua. The

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<sup>7</sup> G. Forrester (1998). "Introduction" in Geoff Forrester and R.J. May (eds), *The Fall of Suharto*, Crawford House Publishing, Bathurst, pp.16-17.

occupation forces reacted harshly to these peaceful demonstrations, and many of the participants were arrested, detained, killed or disappeared. Serious incidents occurred in Biak, where it was reported that a considerable number of civilians were killed or wounded, or disappeared.<sup>8</sup>

Unlike in previous years, West Papuan national sentiment in 1998 was channelled through more effective organisational systems. Democratisation opened up new opportunities to publicly express political desires and to organise mass protests and rallies. The Forum Untuk Rekonsiliasi Bagi Rakyat Irian Jaya (Forum for Reconciliation of the People of Irian Jaya FORERI), the Komite untuk Papua Barat (KIPB), and other organisations inside and outside West Papua were established. The general aims of these organisations were the same—the independence of West Papua—but the organisational models and means of achieving the ultimate goal were often different. For example, FORERI, which was established on 24 July 1998, has been consistent in its demand for discussion of three possible options for West Papua: autonomy, federation and independence.<sup>9</sup> At a seminar on 1 August 1998, the forum suggested that national dialogue should be followed up by an international dialogue involving the United Nations. In a communique released in Jayapura on 29 July 1998, FORERI called for the independence of West Papua, arguing that the integration of West Papua within Indonesia was historically unacceptable even to many Indonesians (referring to Mohammad Hatta and others), and that West Papuans were never given an opportunity to express their desires either in the New York

<sup>8</sup> Team Investigation of Human Rights Institute and Advocacy, July 1998, "Laporan Pelanggaran HAM di Biak", Jayapura, pp.26-31.

<sup>9</sup> "FORERI is a broad based organisation which consists of churches, students, youth, women and traditional leaders and affiliated members organisation established on 24 July 1998. One of the tasks of the forum is to inspire the national aspiration of the people of West Papua and find an appropriate mechanism to end the political conflict. As a new political agenda, the forum stresses the necessity of developing an open, just and peaceful national dialogue with the government of Indonesia." *Forum Untuk Rekonsiliasi Bagi Rakyat Irian Jaya/FORERI* (30 July 1998). "Resume Hasil Pertemuan FORERI Dengan TPF-DPR-RI", Jayapura. pp.1-2.

Agreement or the Act of Free Choice in 1969. The Forum rejected the unrepresentative decision-making of 1969, and the orchestration and manipulation of opinion by the state. It called for national dialogue, withdrawal of the military, release of all political prisoners, the court-martialling of soldiers guilty of human rights abuses in Wamena (1977), Timika (1995), Bela, Alama, Jila and Mapenduma (1996), and Biak, Manokwari, Sorong and Jayapura (1998), and the opening up of the region to international fact-finding missions.

This call received a positive response from the Habibie government which "agreed to open a national dialogue. Habibie's willingness indicates openness of the government to hear the aspirations of the people".<sup>10</sup> However, no agreed agenda has yet been set up for discussion. In contrast to the broader Papuan demands, the government wishes to restrict the agenda of national dialogue to the issues of development and autonomy only. Yet even though there are still obstacles, the new commitment and understanding on both sides has been a positive step towards engaging in future discussions.

Another positive sign has been the call, from the government side, for the demilitarisation of West Papua. President Habibie made initial efforts to recognise and apologise for the human rights abuses in West Papua and, as a token of his willingness to acknowledge past mistakes, he promised to initiate a limited withdrawal of Indonesian troops. In acknowledgment of the mounting evidence of past army atrocities and the recent ceasefire agreement, the Indonesian armed forces are reported to have now halted their special operations or Daerah Operasi Militer (DOM) in West Papua. There are many reasons behind this change in strategy, but the most

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<sup>10</sup> Suajay Izack, the Vice President of the Traditional Consultation Council of Irian Jaya (LMMA), *Indonesian Daily News*, 5 October 1998.

important has been the need to improve the image of the ABRI, which has met with worldwide criticism over its record of human rights abuses in East Timor, Aceh and West Papua. In October 1998, General Sembiring Amir announced a withdrawal from most military operational areas and a limited withdrawal of the Indonesian armed forces from certain sensitive regions, such as Timika regency.<sup>11</sup> Two months later, Indonesia cancelled the military operations zones set up to safeguard vulnerable areas in Timika regency in 1995/96 and in other regions. The military has already lost public trust and there are continuing demands for the withdrawal of its troops and for soldiers who have been involved in atrocities to be courtmartialled. In Timika, for example, two companies of Satuan Tugas (SATGAS) Infantry of Garuda I/98, namely Yonif Linud 330 of Ujung Pandang I KOSTRAD and Brid.Inf 9 KOSTRAD, have been pulled out.<sup>12</sup> The military is now shifting from a security approach to a territorial approach.<sup>13</sup>

According to General Sembiring, any withdrawal of troops from West Papua will need time because the conditions are difficult and the territory is so vast.<sup>14</sup> In practice, however, these changes do not mean anything, because the DOM is merely transferred to territorial units and a joint operation is always possible between different units. For example, during the hostages crisis in Timika, Mapenduma and Waropko, Yonif. 32 Ujung Pandang and Yonif. 412 Purworejo in Central Java were transferred to West Papua and stationed in those towns from October 1995. When critics argued against their presence, Jakarta replied that these reinforcement troops came under the territorial arrangement. Thus the current change in policy will only affect the elite troops, while other troops will remain to "guarantee

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<sup>11</sup> *Suara Pembaharuan* 17 October 1998.

<sup>12</sup> *Tifa Irian* August Minggu III, 1998, p.13.

<sup>13</sup> *Antara News* 9 October 1998. "KODAM VIII TRIKORA Changed Operational Function To Territorial Development".

<sup>14</sup> *Reuters* 3 October 1998.

security “, in Jakarta's words. The whole process is window-dressing, intended to repair the damaged reputation of the military in the eyes of the world. In practice, human rights abuses continue in West Papua. Occurrences of arrest, interrogation, imprisonment and killing of suspected OPM and participants in the independence activities in July 1998, indicate that “withdrawal” is a façade. There is growing fear that, as in East Timor, the military will come back in a different, and less easily identifiable, uniform.

Democratisation has also affected the policy of the OPM, with renewed debate about the overall policy and structure of the organisation being a primary item on the political agenda. The Political Bureau of the OPM and the Papuan community abroad have both welcomed the current national political initiatives and are ready to work towards a realisation of the national dialogue. The fragmented factions of the OPM are now being forced to unite and to forget their differences. The establishment of the OPM-PNG Chapter in September 1998 is a clear example of this shift. The call for a ceasefire made by the OPM faction in the north of the country, under the leadership of Marthin Wenda, on 29 September 1998 is another example. The OPM commander requested that a peace dialogue be set up and asked for a guarantee of the safety of every member of the OPM visiting the country.<sup>15</sup>

But the changes which have taken place in Indonesia have also had negative effects. First, the region has faced a serious economic crisis. As a result of corruption, collusion and nepotism, the economic recession, and the collapse of the financial and banking systems, the socio-political situation has been seriously affected. Industrial production has virtually

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<sup>15</sup> Reuters 30 September 1998. “Irian Rebels, Indonesian Army Agree Ceasefire”.

stopped, and exports of primary products have declined sharply. In the Freeport mining operation in the south of West Papua, 5,000 workers went on strike demanding increased wages and improvement of working conditions;<sup>16</sup> subsequently, a considerable number of Papuan employees lost their jobs. Secondly, the price of basic commodities has increased more sharply in West Papua than in the other provinces. In Jayapura, for example, the price of low quality rice in DOLOG (Rice Distribution Company) increased from Rp2,400 per kg in 1996 to Rp2,500 per kg in 1998; sugar increased from Rp3,000 per kg to Rp4,000 per kg, and cooking oil from Rp5,000 to Rp7,000 per kg. over the same period.<sup>17</sup> Thirdly, the economic crisis has brought growing social problems, such as prostitution and the mass influx of immigrants seeking a new life and economic success in West Papua. According to Tom Beanal, the situation is out of control:

I cannot believe that the number of prostitutes, both local and immigrants, in main urban cities such as Timika, Jayapura, Biak and even in Wamena has increased so much in a relatively short period. One of the reasons is there are no jobs available for their husbands, so that they are forced into these activities. Another alarming issue is that the influx of immigrants into West Papua is increasing since the collapse of the Indonesian economy because many Indonesian believe that West Papua is still paradise for them. In Jayapura, Nabire and Manokwari where alluvial gold was discovered, many Indonesians moved in seeking for fortune and competing with the Papuans which often led to social tensions, and resulted in an unhealthy outcome. In the Nabire case, for example, five people were killed in a social clash in 1998. In the coastal areas of the island of Biak and in Timika considerable numbers of Indonesian immigrants have occupied the traditional land of the local people and forced landowners into the jungle. As coastal dwellers, there is no easy way for them to adapt to a new life. This also creates serious social tension. These are a few effects of the Indonesian economic crisis affecting our people.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Australian Broadcasting Cooperation/ABC News, 12 August 1998. "Five Thousand Workers Strike at the Giant Freeport Mine".

<sup>17</sup> *Antara News* 9 November 1998.

<sup>18</sup> Tom Beanal (September 1998), interviewed by the author, Canberra.

There has also been a decline of the regional government's acceptance of social responsibility. During the El Niño disasters leading to widespread drought in the highlands in 1997, it was very difficult to deliver basic humanitarian needs to the affected people there. Consequently, about 180 out of a total of 900 civilians in Nongme and Wosak villages in the Jayawijaya regency died as a result of drought and related diseases such as staphylococcus bacteria caused by dead pigs. According to Slamaet Harjosuwarno in Jayapura, apart from an isolated case reported by Hyndman sixteen years earlier in the Paniai region, this Jayawijaya epidemic is unique. Despite the thousands of tons of humanitarian food aid stocked in Wamena, and the teams of medical doctors available, officials could not deliver an immediate relief operation. The government claimed that poor communications and the isolated nature of the region meant the goods and emergency services could not be delivered. However there are strong suspicions that extensive corruption was involved and that many officials regarded the emergency as an opportunity to increase their own fortunes.

It is also known that the military actually encouraged many of the recent widespread and well-orchestrated mass protests, rallies and demonstrations. According to Tom Beanal and John Rumbiak, the mass demonstrations and flag-raising ceremonies that occurred in centres such as Jayapura, Biak, Wamena, Sorong and Manokwari on 1 July 1998, as mentioned above, were not a true expression of the Papuan desire for independence but were actually masterminded by the Indonesian military, aiming at destroying national unity and infiltrating the underground networks of OPM supporters inside West Papua.<sup>19</sup> There were similar concerns in the case of the Timika and Tembagapura riots in 1996, when the

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<sup>19</sup> Tom Beanal (September 1998) and John Rumbiak (February 1999), interviewed by the author, Canberra and New York respectively.

Papuans accused the Indonesian military of orchestrating the riots on 10-12 March. Military "dirty tricks" campaigns create suspicion between the pro and contra independence movements which leads in turn to further social tensions.

The change in Indonesia has also impacted on the bilateral relationship between the government of Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. In November 1998, both governments signed new Standing Operations Procedures in Surabaya, and agreed on the return of West Papuan refugees now in Papua New Guinea.<sup>20</sup> However, the PNG government declined to agree to joint operations between the two countries; instead it reviewed its own refugee policy, allowing 1,000 refugees to remain and integrate into PNG society. This initiative of the PNG government has mixed implications for the OPM: while the refugees get a new opportunity to exercise democratic freedoms, it is something of a setback for the OPM, as it means the organisation has lost one means of gaining international attention; it also diminishes national sentiment.

In short, the democratisation of Indonesia has significant social, political, economic and military consequences for West Papua. Along with opportunities for an intensification of political agitation, for increased self-reliance and the opening of new possibilities for independence, an increase of unemployment, the difficulty of making an economic recovery, and military and governmental provocation have clear implications for the need for political change in Indonesia. In order to consider whether this change may bring a better future for the people of West Papua, let me now analyse some possible socio-economic and political scenarios.

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<sup>20</sup> See *Antara News* 31 October 1998: "West Papuans staying in PNG urged to return home," and "PNG rejects more Irian Jaya refugees".

When political analyst observers the relationship between the OPM and the National Papuan Council (NPC) they conclude that the OPM has already defeated since the NPC was established on 5 June 2000 in Port Numbay. It is, therefore, the OPM will not play a vanguard role in the future. The role of the OPM has been overtaken by the Papuan National Council. This misleading assumption is not only very weak in argument, but also wrong judgements for obvious reasons. Let me mention briefly some similarities and differences.

History has proved that Forum for Reconciliation of the people of West Papua (FORERI) and The National Papuan Council were born as a result of the OPM campaigns. The OPM as the longest and an umbrella organisation, it has played an important role inspiring and encouraging national sentiments of the people. The OPM believes there is crucial need to cooperate between three major components of the liberation movement: political bureau who responsible for diplomacy, the National Liberation Army (TEPENAL) who responsible for military campaigns, and popular movement inside West Papua who responsible for political education and mass mobilisation aiming at destroying the colonial power. The history of the struggle shows that the last component was not active in the last 33 years, because the political circumstances inside West Papua was not allowed Papuan community to mobilise themselves.

It was therefore, the OPM increased guerrilla campaigns in 1990s in West Papua. Flag raising ceremonies in many parts of West Papua, hostages taken were part and parcel of the military campaigns aiming at attracting public attention. Consequently, widespread of human rights abuses spread out in the country. Many actors played their crucial role to expose those crimes against humanity. Social and human rights organisation such

LEMASA in Timika, with Tom Beanal, Father Nato Gobai, Isak Onawame, Mama Josepha Alomang, John Rumbiak, from Institute for Human Rights Studies and Advocacy in Port Numbay, Brother Theo van Broek from Catholic Commission for Peace and Justice of Jayapura Bishop Diocese, Willy Mandowen, and Deny Yomaki of environmental group -YALI in Port Numbay, and most importantly, students of University of Cenderawasih, both Theologies in Abepura and few Freeport employees were those forces and actors that played crucial role to change political situation in West Papua. They exposed human rights abuses and environmental destruction, by documenting, reporting and giving eyes witness account. The OPM in its cooperation, supported their works by providing networks and organised foreign journalists into West Papua.

Democratisation of Indonesian politics provided new avenue where the OPM utilised effectively. Mass mobilisation and continue demand for independence was major political agenda. The development of effective mass movements and networks inside the country become major focus attention. In order to encourage such establishment, the primary task of the OPM was to be able to problematise the situation, aimed to attract attention and responses. For this purpose, the OPM used both political and military approaches. Political education and the increased political campaigns and established clandestine movements both in West Papua and Indonesia and increased military campaigns were few examples of such approaches. These method have had positive impacts on the emerge of national sentiments which self awareness expressed in many political and social manifestations.

Popular demands for independence inside West Papua and establishment of popular movements such as FORERI and the Papuan National Council were few examples of such achievements. The situation

was orchestrated by the OPM for the political purpose. The OPM used the momentum to gain political pressures the Papuan masses. This took in form of increasing of military campaigns both in interiors areas and urban cities. Hostages drama in Mapnduma event in January 8, border region and Biak event in July 1998 were classical examples how the OPM was able to force the masses in West Papua to change their mind and act.

As a direct response, the masses matched on the street demanding for respecting human rights abuses, withdraw troops and organised mass demonstrations and protests. They established new organisations. FORERI which consists of traditional council, student, women, academic and churches to facilitated the aspiration of the people inside West Papua and play a facilitator role in mediation between the people of West Papua and the government of Indonesia. In order to facilitate this people's aspiration in the political context, Papuan National Council was formed in June 5, 2000. where member of the OPM also part of it both in Presidium and Panels. It is therefore, the OPM and the PNC is not separated in general political perception, but divided in methodical questions. Both parties are united by spirit of struggle, and support major goals of the movement-an independent West Papua, but divided in strategy- the PNC strives for peaceful solution, while the OPM would like to use force to achieve a peace settlement. Another differences is the PNC was established two years ago while the OPM was established 35 years ago, so it has broader experience, clear strategy, political program, diplomatic contact networks and military strengths which are missing in the PNC. It is therefore, the OPM has been backbone for the continuation of the aspiration of the independent movement.

Despite this clear relationship, some power elites in the Indonesian administration who are now in the new popular movement, undermine

the OPM and believed that the movement was just started in July 1998 which historically is very doubtful.

#### 7.4. The Root Causes of the Problem

The basic cause of the disaffection in West Papua has been discussed earlier in this thesis; here I will merely describe the situation in the last few years insofar as it is relevant to any future resolution.

There are several reasons why political movements in West Papua have revived in the last two years. There is general consensus that increasing national resentment and unequal distribution of wealth and development are among the major factors. Further, the OPM is now far better organised and more unified; though there are still problems to be addressed, the movement has become more outward looking and has clarified its objectives. It now places more emphasis on a reconstruction program, calling for a national dialogue, the withdrawal of the military, and an end to human rights abuses and immigration, and stresses the need to review those policies that have led to underdevelopment. As one observer commented in 1996: "the OPM is weak but will be a time bomb for Indonesia in the future".<sup>21</sup> Even though the OPM has gained very little international support, some low level of political resistance will certainly continue.<sup>22</sup> The Indonesian military may be strong, but the OPM is unlikely to be defeated. Moreover, the collapse of the Indonesian state is likely if the new government continues the old pattern of policies and lacks the capacity to bring about an economic recovery, and fails to address the root causes of social and political unrest.

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<sup>21</sup> *Jakarta Post* 18 January 1996.

<sup>22</sup> R.J. May (1991). "Sources of External Support for the West Papuan Movement" in R. J. May and K.M. de Silva (eds), *Internalisation of Ethnic Conflict*, International Centre for Ethnic Conflict, London, p. 178.

Given the complex and conflicting views about the political status of West Papua (outlined in Chapter Five), finding a solution to this problem has always been difficult. The two conflicting parties have, over the years, built up social and political barriers, making it impossible to engage in any meaningful peace dialogue. However, the collapse of the New Order regime in May 1998 has created new avenues for political discussion.

### **7.5. The Selective Process of Conflict Resolution**

The possible approaches to conflict resolution are many, depending on the type and level of the conflict to be resolved. In relation to West Papua, I suggest there are five key steps in any process of resolution: ceasefire, third party intervention, national dialogue, military withdrawal, and an end to immigration. The last two have already been covered in previous sections of this thesis; here I will discuss only the first three.

#### **Step I: Ceasefire**

By definition, a ceasefire is an agreement between two conflicting parties to lay down their weapons on a limited or permanent basis. Such an agreement often incorporates mutual promises to stop all fighting within a specific area and within a specific time. The driving force behind reaching such agreements is usually that at least one of the opposing parties is in a difficult position.

In September 1998 the OPM factions in the north, led by Marthin Wenda, called for a ceasefire, and Brigadier General Sembiring, commander of KODAM VIII/Trikora, agreed. The exact motives behind this decision are not clear; it may have been seen by the military as the only tactic to avoid international criticism, but military experts believe that the political change in Indonesia and the call for national dialogue significantly influenced the

move and that "it indicates a good will on both sides and a recognition by the military of the presence of the OPM".<sup>23</sup> Even if nothing else results from this initial move, first it shows that both sides want to engage in constructive talks, and, secondly, it signals a recognition of the OPM by the Indonesian armed forces, supporting the view that "the OPM is not a 'spent force' but is, rather surprisingly large and well organised".<sup>24</sup> The OPM and their families are already allowed to enter Indonesian-held areas, to get access to medical facilities and food. There is now a crucial need for a pragmatic approach to finding new middle ground between Indonesia and West Papua. This would be "the first time the Indonesian armed forces have given the OPM such a degree of recognition by deigning to enter into the talks".<sup>25</sup> In the past the Indonesian military has always rejected any ceasefire proposal by the OPM, claiming "the military will continue to crush down mass protests".

This ceasefire agreement was, however, between only one section of the OPM and the Indonesian armed forces. Given that (according to Jim Elmslie) "there is no point in negotiating with the OPM because the main area of disagreement—the political status of west New Guinea—is not a matter open for debate",<sup>26</sup> such an agreement may have little effect on the OPM as a whole, which has little trust in the good faith of the military. The examples of East Timor in 1983 and Bougainville in July 1997 demonstrate that occupation forces often break ceasefire agreements after using the ceasefire period to reinforce their troops. The OPM fears that this pattern could be repeated in West Papua.

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<sup>23</sup> Reuters September 1998.

<sup>24</sup> Jim Elmslie (1995). *Irian Jaya in the 1990s: Economic Expansion and West Papuan Nationalism*, Masters thesis, University of Sydney, p.22.

<sup>25</sup> Carmel Budiardjo, "ABRI Common Strategy in West Papua and East Timor", TAPOL, London, 15 October 1998.

<sup>26</sup> Elmslie, *op.cit.*:22.

On the other hand, Indonesia could take the opportunity offered by the ceasefire to discuss with the OPM a series of measures leading to limited autonomy for West Papua. Such proposals could include the Papuanisation of the administration, with powers devolved to the Jayapura regional assembly to manage certain areas of the economy, to oversee the implementation of the regional plan, to suggest policies for maintaining Papuan culture, and so on. They could entail a substantial increase in educational provisions for West Papua in order to build up a corps of trained workers for both the local economy and the local bureaucracy. Also, members of the OPM could be offered an amnesty, with the opportunity for participation in regional government. The introduction of these policies could be accompanied by a limited military withdrawal, the ending of the transmigration program, a campaign to deter human rights abuses, and the adoption of a general "winning of hearts and minds" or persuasive approach by the armed forces.

Under the present circumstances, such developments seem rather remote; on the Indonesian side there is little sign of what Elmslie has described as evidence of a "serious intention to involve West Papua in the running of the political system".<sup>27</sup>

### **Step II: The Role of Third Parties**

Third party intervention in negotiating a peace settlement has in many cases ended in success. Such mediation is commonly undertaken by regional organisations, the UN, foreign governments, and sometimes NGOs, churches and academics. The role of a mediator is to facilitate a peace accord by taking on an active role in bringing the conflicting parties to the negotiating table.

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<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*:22.

West Papua has gone through a painful experience with international mediators. As argued earlier, the intervention of the United Nations and the United States of America as mediators in the conflict between Indonesia and the Dutch did not achieve a better outcome for the Papuans.<sup>28</sup> Instead of playing a mediating role, both parties collaborated with the government of Indonesia, effectively denying the rights of the people of West Papua, and forcibly transferring power from the Dutch to Indonesia.

The USA and the UK have recently suggested that the Decolonisation Commission of the UN (Committee 24), should be abandoned, arguing that such a body is no longer necessary because the decolonisation process in the world has been completed. These world powers see Committee 24 from a Euro-centric viewpoint, assuming that conventional colonialism ended with the departure of Western colonial powers. However I would disagree: "colonialism and imperialism are not only European diseases, but are a global human problem, relating to a capitalist mentality, regardless of race, social status and religion".<sup>29</sup> Special attention must be directed to the apparent sanctity of inherited Western colonial boundaries and the emergence of neo-colonialism. A large number of peoples around the world are still suffering from both Western and indigenous colonialism, and international intervention to end colonialism is still important.

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<sup>28</sup> C. McMullen (1981). *Mediation of the West Guinea Dispute in 1962, A Case Study*, Georgetown University, Washington DC, p.79. [See also RIOP (1984:50); M.C. Terrence (1996). *The West Irian Dispute, How the Kennedey Administration Resolves the 'other' Southeast Asian Countries*, The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, p.63].

<sup>29</sup> Otto Ondawame (1997). "Impact of Freeport Mining's Activities On The Amungme and Kamoro Peoples in West Papua" in Susan Wareham (ed.), *Vision and Actions for Peace*, Conference Paper, International Physicians and Actions on Nuclear War and the Medical Association for Prevention of War (Australasia), Panther Publishing & Printing, Canberra, pp.227-228.

Some international intervention on behalf of West Papua has already taken place. As mentioned in Chapter Four, the government of PNG, with Maori Kiki as Foreign Minister, offered to act as mediator in 1974. A similar offer was also made by the government of Vanuatu in 1985. However, both initiatives failed. The involvement of international peacekeeping forces is currently unlikely, but as West Papuan demands for independence escalate, the presence of such troops may be crucial. A Pacific peacekeeping force, led by New Zealand, would be welcomed by West Papuans; members of the South Pacific Forum countries, particularly the Melanesian Spearhead Group, might be expected to take some initiative, though such an expectation has been unrealised so far. Intervention by the USA, the European Union or the UN is currently unlikely. With the process of democratisation of Indonesia, however, the acceptance of peacekeeping forces, international monitoring groups, and foreign mass media in Indonesia, and in West Papua, is more likely in the future.

### **Step III: National Dialogue**

National dialogue is another step in the peace process. Unlike a ceasefire, which is a military approach, national dialogue is a political approach. It seeks a middle ground where the aspirations of the people and the intentions of government can be heard, and alternative development approaches can be discussed, with a view to narrowing the social and political differences until some form of consensus is possible.

In an attempt to express their aspirations openly, FORERI recently undertook a new initiative. The Papuans have called for national dialogue to discuss key issues, including military withdrawal, regional development, human rights, land issues, and, most importantly, satisfying the people's aspirations concerning the future political status of West Papua whether

through autonomy, federation, or independence. Three points of the position statement of the people of West Papua were contained in a final official communiqué of 26 February 1999, following a meeting with President Habibie:

Firstly; We the people of West Papua want to separate ourselves from the Unitary Republic of Indonesia to be fully sovereign and independent among other nations in the world.

Secondly; to establish as soon as possible a Transition Government in West Papua under the auspices of the United Nations, democratically, peacefully and accountably at the latest on March 1999.

Thirdly; if there will be no solution to respond to this Political Statement, specifically for the First and Second statements, then we demand: (i) to arrange an International Dialogue between the government of the Republic of Indonesia, the West Papuan People and the United Nations; (ii) We the people of West Papua hereby declare to abstain from the General Election of the Republic of Indonesia in 1999 (see Appendix 3 for the full text).

The political statement was signed by one hundred delegates representing various communities and social classes in West Papua.<sup>30</sup>

This communiqué is significant for four reasons: first, it represented the true expression of the desires of the people without political orchestration or manipulation; secondly, it marked a new preparedness by the Indonesian government to listen to the voices of opposition; thirdly,

<sup>30</sup> Forum Untuk Rekonsiliasi Bagi Rakyat Irian Jaya. "*Pernyataan Politik Bangsa Papua Barat Kepada Pemerintah Republik Indonesia*", Document, 26 February 1999, Jakarta.

the Papuans clearly affirmed their political commitment, self-respect and confidence in proposing to take over political power, if Jakarta agrees; finally, it informed the world community that independence is the last chance for West Papuans in order to save their people and their culture, traditions and ways of life from extinction.

President Habibie welcomed the statement, saying that he honoured the demands because he saw them as being very honest and true, arrived at without any pressure, and reflecting a civilised and ethical approach to the principles and issues in dispute.<sup>31</sup> Even though the response of the Indonesian government remained unclear, the president's statement was significant for future debate.

A majority of the people of West Papua, including those overseas or in Jakarta, and the OPM have welcomed the initiative and support the aims and objectives of the national dialogue. Such initiative has a number of advantages. It creates and contributes to any type of consensus concerning the future of West Papua. Inside West Papua the growing wave of Papuan nationalism cannot be underestimated; however, the OPM has generally distanced itself from the calls of FORERI for political reasons. The two forces are agreed on broad objectives, but divided on the choice of approach. There is a fear that Jakarta will use the outcome of the dialogue as confirmation of the people's opinion, and that the mistakes of the consultation process during the Act of Free Choice in 1969 will be repeated. Another concern is that the lack of involvement of all layers of Papuan society will fuel popular opposition.

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<sup>31</sup> Pius Urbanus Adii (1999). "Rangkuman Dialog Bapak Presiden Republik Indonesia dengan Masyarakat Irian Jaya", *Report of the Representative of Nabire Regency to the National Dialogue*, Nabire, p.2.

The organisation of a Musyawarah Besar Papua 2000 was seen as a further step toward national dialogue, but in fact little progress has been made towards this goal (see Epilogue).

To discuss the three options for resolution of the conflict in a cordial manner, the conditions suggested by FORERI and the other organisations must first be met. Among these, the most important are the presence of international peace monitoring groups, the participation of all layers of the West Papuan community, including leaders of the OPM abroad, and the withdrawal of the military from West Papua. These three conditions are vital in order to establish a basis from which to achieve a genuine consensus .

#### **7.6. Three Types of Conflict Resolution**

As has been discussed above, West Papua suffers from a lack of respect for the fundamental human rights of its people, from militarisation, immigration, and cultural domination. Its demand for independence is also based on incompatibility: it has a different history and no common culture with Indonesia. A 1991 study of Irian Jaya, in terms of conflict resolution, stated:

... integration is a result of colonialism, religions are different, geographical structure is different from Java. The compatibility factors on the other hand, are that both parties have recognised their diverged cultural composition, both agree that a new political arrangement such as autonomy and federation will be to their best interests. Incompatibility is clearly expressed by the OPM rejecting incorporation in the republic, opposing

Indonesianisation and the immigration program which is generally considered to be part of military strategy.<sup>32</sup>

Any solution to the problem of West Papua must recognise that the cultural and religious identity of West Papua is distinctive, and that cultural differences have been used to create socio-economic and political imbalance in the society between centre and periphery (Indonesians and “spiritual” non-Indonesians). So far, there is no clear acknowledgement of these differences by either side.

Over the past two years, a new approach has been widely discussed, involving three possible governmental forms capable of conflict resolution: autonomy, federation and independence.

#### 7.6.1. Autonomy

Debate about autonomous status for West Papua took place even before annexation began, back in the 1950s when the government of Indonesia first declared its objectives. A report prepared by the Research Institute for Oppressed People (RIOP) in Amsterdam<sup>33</sup> and a study by Djopari<sup>34</sup> have both reviewed this early discussion.

Article 6 of the decree of MPRS No.XXI/MPRS/1966 placed West Irian (West Papua) in the position of an autonomous region and stated, “as soon as the ACF is over, we will immediately start the realisation of the autonomous province of West Irian”. The later report of the New Guinea Parity Commission in 1950 also affirmed: “when Indonesia has control of

<sup>32</sup> L. Lundstöm (1991). *Irian Jaya; A Conflict Analysis*, University of Uppsala, pp.2-3.

<sup>33</sup> Research Institute of Oppressed Peoples (1985). *The Tragedy of the People and the International Political Order*, RIOP Report No.1. Makula, Boskoop, Amsterdam, pp.23-29.

<sup>34</sup> John R.G. Djopari (1993). *Pemberontakan Organisasi Papua Merdeka*, Grasindo, Jakarta, pp. 65-70.

the sovereignty of the area, an autonomous provincial administration will be quickly set up, according to the principles of decentralisation within the Indonesian state".<sup>35</sup> Thus, four years before the West Irian campaign, the government of Indonesia had already promised that if West Papua became an integral part of Indonesia, the West Irianese would have the right to arrange their own affairs based on the regional administration law No. UU 1948/22. However this assurance was nothing but propaganda to win the hearts and minds of the West Papuans.

To be seen to fulfil these promises, when West Papua was being forced to become a part of Indonesia, President Sukarno immediately announced Presidential decree 1962/1, which declared West Papua an autonomous region in accordance with the spirit of Article 18 of the State Constitution 1945. The people of West Papua were to be "fully autonomous" with the appointment of Papuans to official posts such as governor and the establishment of a regional parliament.<sup>36</sup> This meant that all powers, except foreign policy, defence and financial powers, would be in the hands of the regional government. In August 1962, Sukarno made his intention clear that "only self-determination within Indonesia would be recognised",<sup>37</sup> in other words, autonomy. What was called "fullest autonomy" was then spelt out in three presidential decrees during the UNTEA period: Pen Pres 1963/1 (which regulated the powers, responsibilities and functions of the governor, vice governor, parliament and executive council), In Pres 1963/2 (secret) and Kep. Pres 1963/57.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*:28.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*:23-29 (see also pp.60-71).

<sup>37</sup> Chris Ballard (1996). *Chronologies of West Papuan History*, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, p.1.

<sup>38</sup> RIOP, *op.cit.*:24.

The presidential decrees addressed not only decentralisation of power but also deconcentration. The distinction between political decentralisation, which refers to devolution, and administrative decentralisation, which refers to deconcentration, is important.<sup>39</sup> In the first, administrative powers are delegated from the centre to the regional governments which then will manage their own home affairs. Freeman, who has studied the government system in Indonesia at length, argues that in Indonesia the concepts of decentralisation and autonomy are not distinguished in practice. Both imply that the regions are empowered to conduct their own development and manage their own affairs, consistent with national policies and guidance;<sup>40</sup> except for foreign policy, defence and trade, the management of finance and policy lies in the hands of provincial governments. In the case of deconcentration, the central government delegates powers to the regional governments within a vertically structured hierarchy. Provincial heads (governors), regency heads (*bupati*) and heads of service are empowered as the local officials of the central government to carry out administrative affairs within their jurisdiction.

In fact, from the beginning, West Papua has been more an administrative entity than an autonomous region. This is clear from the secret presidential decree known as In Pres 1963/2. In specifying responsibilities, this decree stipulated that the provincial governor, as a representative of the central government and head of the autonomous region, had full authority over the region, with responsibility for the establishment of rules for police and civil administration; the direction and

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<sup>39</sup> R.J. May and A.J. Regan (1997). "Introduction: The Politics of Decentralisation in Post-Colonial States", in R.J. May and A.J. Regan (eds), *Political Decentralisation in A New State: The Experience of Provincial Government in Papua New Guinea*, Crawford House Publishing, Bathurst, p.4.

<sup>40</sup> Mike Freeman (1993). *Pemerintah Indonesia (The Indonesian Government System)*, AIDAB Community Program Division: An Introduction to Indonesia-Government Agencies Relevant to the Indonesia Australia Development Cooperation Program, pp.37-43.

coordination of administrative activities; the appointment of sectoral chiefs; and "with the approval of the President", the dissolution of existing service provisions and the establishment of an Advisory Council consisting of the governor, the heads of services, the public prosecutor, and the commanders of the armed forces and the police in the Regional Executive Board Council (*Musyawarah Badan Pimpinan Daerah*, MUSPIDA). In 1981, there were 38 departments reporting directly to the central government. Surprisingly, this document did not mention the relationship between the governor and the armed forces; however, Presidential Decree 1963/1, section 8, stipulated that military assistance was to be given to the governor if the governor requested it. This means that the military forces are, in reality, controlled by the central government which has the power to call in reinforcements if a situation requires it. The composition of the MUSPIDA, the strong regional military presence, is particularly important in the light of the *dwifungsi* model. Another essential component of autonomy is a considerable degree of independence in the managing of financial resources, yet Pres Decree 1963/2 was silent about the provincial government's responsibility for managing its financial planning: neither the governor nor the regional parliament is given powers to draw up a budget. In practice, the budget of the regional government is decided and approved by the central government.

Closer examination of In Pres 1963/2 thus makes clear that the central government was not, in fact, willing to give autonomy to the West Papuans. The decree specified the devolution of powers only in relation to the maintenance of public security and order, concern for the material wellbeing of the population, and convincing the population of the correctness of the national revolution. The absence of authority for budgeting has been, and still is, disastrous for West Papua. Lack of financial

responsibility has been apparent from the beginning of the new administration when there was no electricity, water, food supplies, or even buses.<sup>41</sup>

Presidential decree Pen Pres 1963/1, which regulated the political status of West Papua, included clear limitations on the provincial government's powers of domestic management. West Papua was considered to be a very sensitive region politically, and Anti Subversion Law No.11/1963 was introduced early (see above). These limitations were not clearly specified, as this decree only briefly listed, in an appendix, the responsibilities of the province and the regencies for agriculture, social services, health care, education and culture, and public works. The accountability of the governor was also limited by Pen Pres 1963/1, which stated that the governor was responsible not to the local parliament but to the central government; this was more clearly set out in Kep. Pres 1963/57, which regulated the relationship between the provincial and the central governments. This decree contains three important provisions: first, the governor is responsible to and receives direct orders from the president; secondly, the governor is responsible to and receives instructions from the minister for foreign affairs, in his capacity as First vice-premier in the cabinet; thirdly, in routine and technical matters ministers can contact the governor via the foreign minister's office.<sup>42</sup> In the light of the provisions (Articles 1 and 2), the governor in West Papua can be seen as a representative of the central government, not head of an autonomous entity.

The West Papuan parliament was installed on 2 May 1963; it consisted of 42 members of whom 33 were Papuans.<sup>43</sup> Unlike the other regions in

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<sup>41</sup> RIOP, *op. cit.*:26.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*:26.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*:27.

Indonesia, the parliament in West Papua was not given the essential powers to draw up a budget and to make provincial by-laws; instead such legislation "must be approved by the national government. It must be in accordance with national legislation and must follow nationally established guidelines".<sup>44</sup> An additional problem has been that under Pen Pres 1963/1 the governor is deemed to be head of the parliament, which is unusual as it means the governor, who is a political appointee, is head of the executive, with power over the members of the parliament, who are chosen through direct election.

Thus, autonomy has never been implemented in any real sense in West Papua. It has been more a case of deconcentration than decentralisation.

The question remains why was the Indonesian government so reluctant to implement "fullest autonomy"? Jakarta argued that West Irian qualified for "special consideration" on the basis of the existence of harmony and the balance between abilities, rights and responsibilities. But in the view of the central government, without West Papua having the appropriate levels of technical and administrative skills and knowledge, giving it autonomy would be an empty symbolic act that would foster corruption and, more dangerous, could threaten national unity. In short, the national government was worried that the "special status" of the region would lead to "self-government", undermining the political and moral integration through which Jakarta was maintained as the centre of power.

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<sup>44</sup> Freeman, *op.cit.*:37.

### 7.6.1.1. Views on the Autonomy Proposal

Debate about autonomous status for West Papua has been revived in elite circles in the last two years. The Consultative Assembly of Indonesia (MPR) in its decision No. XV/MPR/1998, dated 13 November 1998, decided on arrangements for an autonomous region, which include regulation and distribution, the just use of national resources, and financial balance between the region and the centre. Article 4 declared that financial balance must take into account economic potential, area, geographical position, size of population, and level of GDP of the local people in the region. Although there is need for further clarification, under the terms of this decision West Papua would qualify as a candidate for the status of autonomous region. Indonesia's National Human Rights Commission<sup>45</sup> and the Alumni Students Indonesia have called for the immediate implementation of autonomy, an end of the centralisation of power, and a reduction in the dual function (*dwifungsi*) of ABRI. The history of West Papua, however, suggests that the proposed autonomy is unlikely to solve its problems.

Like many power elites in Indonesia, the West Papuan one is divided over their preferred option. Most Papuans want independence and would not be satisfied with autonomy (see below). However, the official view was expressed by Brigadier General Numberi, governor of "Irian Jaya":

...a referendum for independence is not logical. The Papuans do not understand that West Papua has already been integrated into Indonesia 35 years ago. .. I would only be satisfied with autonomy for economic reasons, not political.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> ABC News 22 July 1998.

<sup>46</sup> *Forum Keadilan* 13 July 1998. "Merdeka, Otonomi Atau Bunuh Diri", Nomor 7, Tahun VII, p.24.

A similar statement was made prior to a November 20-22 1998 seminar in Jayapura: "The national dialogue will not discuss the independence issue but autonomy, because autonomy will answer all problems in Irian Jaya".<sup>47</sup> But what is meant by the claim "it will answer all problems"? The Habibie government called for a special autonomous status for West Papua; but the meaning of "special status" is still unclear. If the intention is to follow the 1960s model of deconcentration, then this will not bring about any fundamental change; instead it will fuel further social and political unrest. The Papuans will continue to oppose vigorously such central dominance.

Jakarta fears that the consequences of the democratisation of Indonesia will break the country apart. Like many others, Jimly Asshiddiqie, a senior lecturer at the University of Indonesia, has argued that immediate implementation of autonomy will prevent further escalation of social and political conflict. Such analyses suggest that decentralisation of powers should not be limited to administrative and political functions, but should include cultural and economic functions as well. Critics of limited autonomy argue that the central government will cling to its centralised authority, ignoring Article 11(1) of the UU No.4/1975 which regulates the autonomous powers of the regency (*kabupaten*). However, even they defend the centre-periphery relationship in which the regional governor is part and parcel of the central government.<sup>48</sup> Governor Numberi recently suggested that even the selection of candidates for the head of a regency (*bupati*) must be agreed to by the Interior Minister.<sup>49</sup> This suggests that the proposed new autonomous structure will, in reality, be a continuation of

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<sup>47</sup> *Cenderawasih Post* 12 October 1998.

<sup>48</sup> "Power of autonomy is still in the hands of regent (Bupati) while the governor is the head of region who represents the central government", *Media Indonesia Online*, 28 September, 1998, in "Decentralisation, Autonomy Daerah Harus Dipercepat", POLKAM, Jakarta.

<sup>49</sup> *Tifa Irian*, Minggu ke IV, 9 May 1998, p.9.

the old power structure. If this is the case, then such a model is not the best alternative for the West Papuans.

In order to prevent national disintegration, a constructive decentralisation of power to West Papua must be established, covering such matters as the withdrawal of the military, the Papuanisation of the army and police, and the abolition of the vertical relationship, thus empowering the Papuans to democratically elect members of the regional legislature and executive. The transfer of powers to the regional government and parliament should include authority over economic policy, investment, health, culture, education, judiciary, immigration, forestry, fisheries, and trade relations; but finance, defence and foreign policy would remain in the hands of the central government. In the area of defence, the current KODAM system with its *dwifungsi* ABRI, must be abolished and replaced with a system of bases for the military, in order to end military intervention in civilian affairs.

In this respect, autonomy is seen not as a final outcome but as a process leading to more fundamental change in the future. This view is shared by Anne Noonan and Joe Collins, members of the Australia West Papua Association. They argue that because the process of gaining independence for West Papua will be long and complicated, autonomy is the best interim option; but in the long run the Papuans must enjoy independence like other peoples in the world.<sup>50</sup>

Autonomous arrangements for the Moro in the Philippines, the Palestinians in Israel, and the Catholics in Northern Ireland demonstrate that, with the involvement of third parties and the will of the people on

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<sup>50</sup> Anne Noonan and Joe Collins (20 August 1998), interviewed by the author, Sydney.

both sides, agreement on power sharing is possible if both parties understand the real meaning of the "fullest autonomy".

But Indonesia is not the Philippines or Northern Ireland, where a democratic tradition is part of the political system. The following comment by Lagerberg is worth considering:

More autonomy for the province of West Irian is by no means the only alternative in the view of the Papuan population, for realistic reasons: nationalist feelings and immigration threats and most importantly the independence of PNG has laid down deeper national sentiments.<sup>51</sup>

A similar view has also been expressed by Lundström, who believes that the OPM is not likely to accept autonomy, since Indonesia and the OPM do not trust each other.<sup>52</sup> These experts see three stages in achieving a satisfactory status for West Papua: dissatisfaction with proposed autonomy arrangements; continuation of the independence struggle; and eventual federation with Papua New Guinea.

### 7.6.2. Federation

Federalism involves a division of powers "so that the general and regional governments are each, within a sphere, co-ordinate and independent".<sup>53</sup> Frequently federations are formed by the coming together of several small states, for economic or security reasons, but there are different forms of federalism. It is often argued that a federal system is more likely than a unitary state to guarantee justice to all groups of peoples, large and small.

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<sup>51</sup> K. Lagerberg (1979). *West Irian and Jakarta Imperialism*, C. Hurst Company, London, p.153.

<sup>52</sup> Lundström, *op.cit.*:4.

<sup>53</sup> K.C. Wheare (1963). *Federal Government*, Fourth edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p.10.

An important difference between a federal system and a unitary state is that in a federal system the division of powers and the sovereignty of the states cannot be unilaterally changed; changes can be made only through amendment to the constitution, in accordance with a constitutional formula which safeguards the rights of the states. In the USA, for example, an amendment must be approved by two thirds of the House of Representatives or by a national convention organised for this purpose, and must be ratified by three fourths of all states' legislatures or by a convention called for this purpose. The major objective of these procedures is to guarantee the rights of the states against arbitrary actions by those who happen to control the central government. In contrast, such safeguards do not exist in a unitary state, even for autonomous regions. The central government in a unitary state can generally revoke powers whenever the majority group in parliament so desires, without seeking consent of any autonomous region.

There are several advantages of a federal system. One is that it enables small independent states, by joining together, to survive economically. Also, it promotes cooperation in nations whose populations are made up of different ethnic groups. Federalism is an implementation of democracy: it aims to harmonise diverse cultures, traditions, ways of life, economic concerns, races and religions in a framework which serves their common interests.<sup>54</sup> The central government exercises powers in areas of common interest, such as foreign affairs, defence, trade and finance. The powers exercised by states within federal countries vary, but exceed those of an autonomous region in a unitary state. Substantial devolution would be most appropriate in the culturally divergent unitary state of Indonesia.

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<sup>54</sup> Hassan di Tiro (1960). *Democracy for Indonesia*, U.S. Joint Publication Research Service, Washington DC, p.40.

The federal solution was first suggested by the Indonesian elite in the 1930s to the Dutch colonial power. One of the proposers was Tenku Hassan di Tiro, who is now leader of the National Liberation Front of Aceh Sumatra. In his book *Demokrasi Untuk Indonesia*, published in 1960, Hassan di Tiro discussed the advantages of a federal system. He suggested that a federal structure would make possible the establishment of a government whose policies reflected the demands of all Indonesian ethnic groups, and not the dominant Javanese alone (as is the case with the present unitary state).<sup>55</sup>

The Dutch established a number of federal states in the period 1946-9 and Indonesia became independent in 1949 as the Republik Indonesia Serikat. The federal states included East Sumatra, Pasundan, East Java and East Indonesia. The State of East Indonesia did not include West Papua. However, at the Denpasar Conference (December 1946) when the state was established, the status of West Papua was one of the most bitterly contested issues, with nearly all the Indonesian delegates demanding that it should be included in the state, as it had been in pre-war administrative arrangements. There were no Papuan representatives at Denpasar.<sup>56</sup>

Among the reformists of the post Suharto Indonesia, some believe that a federal system is the best strategy to avoid disintegration. Amien Rais, the chairman of Amanat National Party, for example, argues that the political stability of Indonesia can be safeguarded if Indonesia returns to the federal model of the 1950s, in which the distribution of national resources was shared between the centre and the periphery; this is particularly

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<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*:39.

<sup>56</sup> See Chauvel, Richard (1998). 'West New Guinea: Perceptions and policies, Ethnicity and the Nation State' in Milner and Quilty (eds), *Australia in Asia: episodes*, Oxford University Press, pp.10-36.

important for resource rich regions such as Kalimantan, Riau, Irian Jaya and Aceh:

Up to date, the profits of those riches are not equally distributed. Out of the profits of the mining exploitation in Irian Jaya, for example, only a small proportion returns to the region. Consequently, the people of Irian Jaya are still poor. In the federal state, the Papuans can determine their own future, using those resources for their own progress.<sup>57</sup>

Rais believes that a federal system within the current state boundaries could give the Papuans control over their own affairs without major interference by the central government. It would also entail the recognition of the sovereign rights of the Papuans; the Papuans could manage their bilateral relationships with foreign countries and move towards economic independence.

If federal arrangements were to be initiated in Indonesia, the USA model, with its presidential system, might be the most appropriate.<sup>58</sup> First, a presidential system promotes strong and clear national leadership. Secondly, this leadership does not diminish the roles of either house of Congress. In the USA, the House of Representatives and the Senate both have great power and influence over the policies of the president, who cannot implement policies without the approval of both houses. Congress also has great power over financial affairs. If this model were followed in Indonesia after the return to constitutional government, the Consultative Assembly (MPR) and the Parliament (DPR), which have been controlled by

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<sup>57</sup> Amien Rais, "Usul Negara Federal, Untuk Pemerataan Rezeki Nasional", *Suara Pembaharuan*, 2 November 1998, Banjarmasin. For further discussion see A. Lijphart (ed.) (1992), *Parliamentary versus Presidential Government*, Oxford University Press; J.J. Linz and A. Valenzuela (eds) (1994), *The Failure of Presidential Democracy*, John Hopkins University Press, and the review of the latter by M.S. Shugart, "Parliaments over presidents? (Book Review)" in *Journal of Democracy*, Vol 6, number 2 (1995).

<sup>58</sup> U.S. Joint Publication Research Service, 28 November 1960. *Democracy For Indonesia*, Washington, pp.39-40.

the president, would gain in power and influence. Presidential elections in Indonesia should also use a majority vote system, so that the president must get support directly from the people. Thirdly, the federal model of the USA, and also that of Switzerland, promotes firmness of leadership, political tranquillity, a responsible cabinet, and the avoidance of recurring cabinet crises.

However the system has many disadvantages, one of them being that “a federal system is structurally very complicated and requires vast human resources and capital and relatively high literacy levels”.<sup>59</sup>

Although a federal government seems to have many advantages, would the Papuans be happy living in a system that does not belong to them? Such a system might be seen as a temporary way out of the current impasse but not necessarily as a final outcome. Another alternative might be a federal arrangement with PNG. On both racial and geographical bases, the West Papuans would probably feel more comfortable being united with their Melanesian brothers and sisters in the east. This solution was mooted in the 1950s. Politically, the idea is unlikely to bear fruit in the near future, but according to Lundström<sup>60</sup> and Lagerberg,<sup>61</sup> this possibility is promising, as unification with PNG is a natural extension of the two nations’ racial, cultural and geographical commonalities. The reality of race and geographical location have become more important in the new global political debate than the sanctity of former Western colonial boundaries that are still used to legitimate the current *status quo*.

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<sup>59</sup> I.S. Mohammad, A. Sebina and N.M. Fanana (1989). “Ethnic Conflict And Integration: Malaysia and Sudan” in P. Wallenstein and G. Lindgren (eds), *Third World Dimensions in Conflict Resolution*, Uppsala University, p.57.

<sup>60</sup> Lundström, *op.cit.*:4.

<sup>61</sup> Lagerberg, *op.cit.*:153.

There would, of course, be regional opposition to such a move. Canberra, for one, would be unlikely to encourage such a wild idea because it would have serious political implications throughout the region. In Indonesia, Jakarta would not wish to allow a foreign power to intervene in its internal affairs and territory. Both these governments would be happy to see the current political *status quo* maintained or possibly some political re-arrangement within Indonesia. Yet the formation of a new federal state in the South Pacific could have many regional advantages. It might, for example, create a strong power base for economic and political integration, similar to the experience in the European Union.

### **7.6.3. Self -Determination and Independence**

Self-determination is accepted as the right of all peoples in accordance with international laws and conventions, and in this respect Papuans have the same rights as other peoples. The great majority of Papuans want independence (see below), but we need to clarify what independence means in this context. There are many definitions of the term, and many interpretations of its practice. In political terms, most people define independence as the right of colonised peoples to liberate themselves from colonial rule. I use the term "peoples" here to refer to nations, as distinguished from the term "state" which can encompass several nations or peoples.<sup>62</sup> More than 240 nations or ethnic communities are living in West Papua and each of these nations has its own traditions, ways of life and culture. Yet despite this diversity, as argued in Chapter Two, they strongly feel the truth of "One People One Soul", that they are all West Papuans, historically, racially, culturally and geographically.

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<sup>62</sup> RIOP, *op.cit.*:24.

### 7.6.3.1. The Drive for Self-Determination and Independence in West Papua

Self-determination may be divided into two categories, on the basis of sovereignty and equality: internal and external self-determination.<sup>63</sup> In the first case, an authoritarian state can still undermine self-determination by intervention. External self-determination, on the other hand, recognises, on the basis of international law, the right of a nation to become a nation by itself or to join with another nation, partly or wholly. According to Stewart Firth,<sup>64</sup> an expert on sovereignty and independence in the contemporary Pacific, the political status of countries in the region is unusually varied: there are independent states, semi-autonomous or free-associated states, dependent states and overseas territories. He divides them into two main categories: those that permit sovereignty and those that do not. The two principal forms of non-sovereignty are effective incorporation by a metropolitan state, and semi-autonomy. Semi-autonomy covers both freely associated states and self-determination,<sup>65</sup> with Niue and the Cook Islands as examples of self-governing states in free association (with New Zealand). Here the distinction between a sovereign state and a freely associated state is clear. The Cook Islands Constitution Act provides a foundation for free-association state formation and the Cook Islands now has a constitutionally independent (sovereign) state but lacks political independence.<sup>66</sup> These states are economically heavily dependent on New Zealand and, therefore, their claim to sovereignty is questionable.

In the process of gaining sovereignty, two principles must be upheld: "no state can stop a nation to organise itself, and states must recognise that they have no rights to transfer a nation from one colonial power to another

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<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>64</sup> S. Firth (1989). "Sovereignty and Independence", in *The Contemporary Pacific, A Journal of Islands Affairs*, Vol.1, numbers 1 and 2, Spring and Fall. pp.76-85.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*:77.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*:76.

without previous consent of the people of the territory".<sup>67</sup> Most of the Pacific nations enjoy a sovereign independent status, constitutionally and politically free from any forms of foreign domination, and they freely and independently determine their own foreign policies. They have no hesitation in demonstrating their sovereign capacity in dealing with other states.<sup>68</sup> Such state formations in Melanesia include Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu.

It is becoming clear that self-determination is what most Papuans would like to see happen. A September 1998 opinion poll conducted by independent observers in the Timika regency revealed that of 13,000 participants surveyed, all except two agreed that West Papua must be freed from Indonesian colonialism and imperialism; the remaining two preferred autonomy and a non-federal state.<sup>69</sup> Demonstrations in support of self-determination and independence have also occurred in all the main urban centres of the country. A group of West Papuan youth in Jakarta, for example, called for the independence of West Papua by presenting protest notes to the Indonesian government, parliament and human rights organisations and to the UN representative in Jakarta.<sup>70</sup> They reminded people of the words of Mohammad Hatta, the first vice president of the Republic: "... I recognise that the Papuans have the right to be an independent nation".<sup>71</sup> Indonesian academic George Aditjondro, speaking from Australia, asserted "the people of West Papua should be an

<sup>67</sup> Hassan di Tiro (1985). *The Case & The Cause*, National Liberation Front of Aceh Sumatra Publication, London, p.13. (See also Firth, *op.cit.*:125).

<sup>68</sup> Firth, *op.cit.*:83.

<sup>69</sup> Germanus Onawame, Isak Onawame and Jan Onawame (1998), interviewed by the author, Timika.

<sup>70</sup> "We demand that our independence, proclaimed on December 1, 1961, be returned to us. We are not asking for a new independence, but the independence that was intentionally robbed from us", said Wanimbo Demianus, leader of the All Indonesian Alliance of Papuan Students after having a meeting with Raja, the UN representative in Jakarta, in "Irianese Protesters sit-in at Jakarta UN Office", *The Australian* 21 July 1998.

<sup>71</sup> C. Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong (1988). *West Papua: The Obliteration of a People*, TAPOL, London p.16.

independent state because it is the desire of the majority of West Papuans today".<sup>72</sup>

Inspired by a statement released by fifteen US Congressmen in 1998,<sup>73</sup> demands for independence have intensified. Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Forum Komunikasi—Generasi Muda Indonesia Timor (DPPFK-GMIT) which represents fourteen provinces in Eastern Indonesia, released a statement on 13 August 1998 in Jakarta calling for the independence of West Papua. It is generally accepted that the independence of West Papua is unlikely in the near future but that it is only a matter of time.<sup>74</sup> Eighty-five per cent of the people from West Papua who were interviewed during my fieldwork in 1996/97 in Port Moresby believed that the current problems will end only with the independence of West Papua. Only 5 per cent, mainly professionals, believed that autonomy was the best route to an independent West Papua; no one favoured a federal system.<sup>75</sup>

An independent West Papua would have many advantages. As a sovereign state, West Papua could follow an independent foreign policy and become a full member of the international community. Independence would create new opportunities to distribute national resources equitably and to participate in development programs without fear and uncertainty,

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<sup>72</sup> G. Aditjondro (1998), interviewed by author, Canberra.

<sup>73</sup> Statement of US Congressmen, 22 May 1998 (letter addressed to President Habibie, regarding political status of West Papua and East Timor) and 25 February 1999 letter addressed to President Habibie after holding talks with International Spokesperson of the OPM, Otto Ondawame, in Washington on 18 May 1999 regarding the significance and procedure of national dialogue between the government of Indonesia and the people of West Papua, Washington.

<sup>74</sup> J. van der M. Kroef (1997). "Patterns of Conflict in Eastern Indonesia", *Conflict Studies*, No.79, p.6.

<sup>75</sup> Those interviewed included 20 Amungme at 9 Mile; 4 academics and professionals; 15 former guerillas in Port Moresby, Wewak, Maprik and Kurpianggo; Irianese refugees in Port Moresby; and Papua New Guinea MPs John Tekwie and John Momis, interviewed in Port Moresby, January 1997.

and would open up new trade relationships. It would preserve the Papuan culture, tradition and ways of life.

Self-determination, therefore, provides many more options than semi-autonomy, a federal system, or the status of a dependent trust territory. However, the lack of physical and social infrastructure, skilled manpower, and economic and financial resources means that improvements in a new-born state would be hard to achieve. The prospect of getting sponsorship from Black African nations is minimal, because of the geographical distance. Regional support would also pose problems because West Papua is a sensitive issue in Australia and PNG in relation to Indonesia. Yet national sentiment demands self-determination, and attitudes in Indonesia and abroad may gradually change if the OPM can demonstrate its capacity as a true liberation organisation.<sup>76</sup>

### 7.7. Conclusion

The future of West Papua must be seen within the general political context of Indonesia. The repercussions of the current democratisation process have serious consequences for political change in West Papua. The advancement of the mass movement, the escalation of protests, limited demilitarisation, and the policy change of the OPM are some of the positive developments. On the other hand, negative consequences include the effects of the economic crisis, the widespread orchestration and manipulation of mass protests against change, and the divisions that have been created within the Papuan community concerning political options for peace.

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<sup>76</sup> Cf. Nick Maclellan, October 1990. West Papua Issue: "Inside The Triangle", *Strategic Relations Between Australia, Indonesia & Papua New Guinea*, Issue No. 3, Melbourne, p.14.

Future scenarios for Indonesia are difficult to forecast, particularly concerning the capacity of any new government of Indonesia to promote genuine reform. Economic recovery will take time. Religious conflict, regional and racial intolerance, economic imbalance, ethnic tensions, and the use of state coercion may escalate. If the new government follows the same old policies, disintegration may follow.

In responding to the demands of the people of West Papua for change, three major options for political restructuring are being widely discussed: autonomy, a federal system and independence. Almost all West Papuans want independence. The government of Indonesia and a few of the elite in the province want to maintain the current system, or at most to shift to autonomy or a federal system.

A new consensus needs to be developed in order to save Papuan culture, traditions, and ways of life from total obliteration. In the short term, autonomy seems a logical choice but it runs counter to the demands of the majority of the people of West Papua. A referendum on the three options is called for, but it must be carried out in a manner that upholds the principles of democracy: it must be just, peaceful, secret, and conducted under international supervision.

Papuan self-awareness and sense of separate identity will continue to grow. The emergence of a strong sentiment of Papuan nationalism over the last few years has already laid a strong foundation for frustrating Jakarta's policy of inclusion. It will be very difficult to eradicate the racial and cultural characteristics of the Papuans even if Jakarta continues to impose its current immigration policy; and this program has already been strongly criticised by the world community. Secondly, increasing awareness among

Papuans of the significance of indigenous, environmental and human rights issues has affected their way of thinking and their strategies for achieving their political desires. Thirdly, the role of the military will be significantly reduced when constitutional power is fully restored. With the collapse of the New Order regime in May 1998, a new society is replacing the old forces, and democratic values may assume a central role in the state. Finally, political change in Indonesia will strengthen the opposition in West Papua. In combination with international and national pressures, the OPM will pursue its demands through non-military means.

Any decision on the future of West Papua must proceed from mutual agreement to hold a referendum. The government of Indonesia must show a strong political commitment to ending the conflict and guaranteeing stability, security, social progress and peace to all its citizens, including the Papuans. On the Papuan side, the OPM must present a constructive peace plan that includes a timeframe, a clear political agenda and nominated leaders of high quality in order to convince Jakarta that the OPM is serious about negotiating to end the long and painful conflict.

## Chapter Eight: Conclusions and Reflections

### 8.1. The Central Objectives of the Study

I have attempted in this thesis to show a clear relationship between Indonesian colonial domination, which is manifested in high levels of oppression, and the emergence of the West Papuan nationalist movement. I have argued that the present situation is largely a consequence of denial politics in relation to West Papua during the period of ideological conflict between East and West in the 1960s.

The study has demonstrated that the people of West Papuan are still suffering and are still the target of genocide. Over the last three decades they have waged a continuous war against the colonial power, but they have failed to gain substantive international support or make significant progress with their demands. One objective of this study is to draw lessons from past experiences in order to promote new debate on the future of West Papua. The use of a coercive approach between the Indonesian government and the OPM will not bring an end to the conflict. This study has considered the advantages and disadvantages of three alternative approaches to ending the conflict. While any immediate prospect of Papuan victory is remote, the struggle will continue and will ultimately achieve its primary political goals. The OPM can learn by reflecting on its past experiences and mistakes and engaging in a constructive redevelopment of its organisation to meet the changing political and socio-economic situation.

The thesis, which presents a Papuan view of events, draws on primary and secondary sources, supplemented by insights based on my own experiences. Using a case study of my own Amungme people, I have shown a clear relationship between local and ethnic sentiment and Papuan

nationalism, and argued that local approaches might be used as a model for a national peace process. The objectives of ethnic nationalism at the local level are integral to the general objectives of the OPM, which inspires the wider Papuan nationalism. In terms of organisation, LEMASA, in contrast with the OPM, has good leadership, organisational structure, and programs and strategies, and the local organisation has therefore been able to gain local, national and international recognition and support. However despite its strength locally, LEMASA faces both a local military presence and a lack of political will in Jakarta, so that an immediate solution to the local struggle is unlikely in the immediate future. The unhealthy relationship between the landowners and the multinational company and the government of Indonesia has potentially serious social, economic, environmental and political implications that may escalate social and political unrest.

In seeking to explain the emergence of Papuan nationalism and the failure of the OPM to obtain international support, reference was made (in Chapter one) to two common hypotheses: first, that when economic conditions in West Papua are improved, West Papuan nationalism will die; and secondly, that when the OPM overcomes its internal weaknesses, international support will follow.

I have considered why Papuan nationalism will not die out; why the Papuans are still suffering and why the OPM has failed to achieve its goals; what the OPM can learn from its past mistakes and how, by doing so, it can gain more support; whether a coercive approach can resolve the political problems in the country; what the real political status of West Papua is; and what the future prospects of the people of West Papua may be. It remains now to consider the results of this study.

## 8.2. The Main Findings of the Study

According to international law, the rights of self-determination and independence are the rights of all peoples without exception due to colour, race, religion or social status. The same laws obligate all member states of the UN to end any form of colonialism and imperialism. However these rights have frequently been denied and suppressed by colonialists who have ratified such international laws and covenants in the name of security, stability and development.

Papuans have not escaped such crimes against humanity. The Indonesian administration and its allies continue to deny the rights of the Papuan people to self-determination and independence. Despite Jakarta's denial of wrongdoing, the evidence that has been presented throughout this thesis (especially in Chapter Six) suggests that the presence of Indonesia in West Papua has had negative social, economic, political and environmental consequences. Indonesian militarisation is a major factor in the current problems, and has fuelled the emergence of even stronger Papuan sentiments, translated into an active resistance movement, under the coordination of the OPM.

Yet despite its sacrifices and commitment, the OPM has failed to meet its objectives over the years. As argued in Chapter Four, the inability of the OPM to mobilise resources, the organisational limitations of leadership and management structure, and external pressures are three major reasons for the movement's lack of success. (See also Chapters Three and Five.)

This confidence of the West Papuan people in their ultimate self-determination has been discussed in Chapters Three and Eight.

International instruments provide a legitimate basis for claiming self-determination and independence. Reflecting upon the international controversy before, during and after what was called the Act of Free Choice of 1969, it is apparent that a serious denial of the Papuan rights took place then. This issue calls for re-examination and redress. Continuation of oppression will only sharpen national sentiment further. The recent independence of East Timor, and the new democratisation in Indonesia, encourage Papuan demands for secession.

### **8.2.1. Theoretical Dimensions**

In Chapter Two, relevant concepts and theories were examined with a view to their usefulness in understanding the current political situation in West Papua. The principal explanation of the relationship between Indonesian colonisation and the West Papuan resistance movement has been that Papuan nationalism has emerged as a consequence of colonisation, exploitation and oppression during different colonial periods, although the levels and strategies of resistance have varied over time.

A brief literature review showed that most studies were written by non-Papuans and that an ill-informed picture of the OPM has often resulted in a pessimistic analysis which argues that any solution to the current political problem must be found within the framework of the Indonesian nation-state, and then promotes autonomy as the best solution. This view is supported by John Djopari, a Papuan born writer, who believes that Papuan nationalism will decline as a consequence of economic and social improvement and advocates a radical change in the social-economic policies and the social behaviour of the Indonesian authorities. Those who argue this view believe that in this way the people of West Papua can preserve their culture and tradition from total destruction. They advocate a social

approach as the most promising solution, and they are reluctant to acknowledge the fundamental political problem or to discuss its root causes.

I have argued that the nature of the Indonesian occupation of West Papua was coercive, and that this led to the challenging the *status quo*; the coercive approach, and the generally negative behaviour of the Indonesians towards the Papuans, reinforced the view that West Papua was actually a colony of Indonesia. This view was strengthened by the historical, racial and cultural factors that make the people of West Papua feel different.

### **8.2.2. The Handover to Indonesian Control**

Dutch colonial policy did not demonstrate any real political commitment to decolonising West Papua. The promise of decolonisation by the Dutch in the beginning of the 1960s was aimed at improving their colonial image by presenting the Netherlands as a good and responsible guardian of its last colony in the Indonesian archipelago. The inherent political ambiguity created many problems: the Papuan community became divided along ideological lines between those for and against the independence of West Papua; this has had serious consequences from the 1960s up to the present. On the other hand, by initiating decolonisation the Dutch encouraged the growth of Papuan nationalism.

The United Nations, as one of the key political actors at the time of the hand-over, failed to live up to its role as a peace-keeper. Instead of protecting the rights of the people of West Papua, the UN violated the international laws and conventions that guaranteed the rights of colonised peoples to be free, and without even consulting the people concerned transferred the territory of West Papua to the new colonial power, Indonesia, in 1962. This action was confirmed in 1969 as a result of the shameful Act of Free Choice.

Consequently West Papua became “an integral part of Indonesia”, though most Papuans consider it merely a new colony of Indonesia.

It is clear that West Papua became a political victim of international rivalry during the cold war. The main actors, the USA, Australia, Holland and the UN, all failed to address the key political issue, namely the rights of the Papuans to be an independent state. Instead they sold out the country to Indonesia for their own strategic, economic and political interests, violating the principle of one-man-one-vote that is generally applied in a plebiscite. The substitution of the Indonesian system of *Musyawarah* made a mockery of the process. It is also clear that the UN and its associated members ignored the procedures that they themselves had agreed on in the New York Agreement on 15 August 1969. Moreover, the result of the plebiscite was not debated when it was reported back to the General Assembly of the UN, but was merely “noted”. This implies that the UN did not actually endorse the result of the Act of Free Choice of 1969. Given this situation, two alternative scenarios are possible: first, a re-opening of the case; secondly, the Indonesian administration can continue to regard the whole issue as dead, so there is no need to debate it further.

### **8.2.3 The Role of the OPM**

Papuan resistance against foreign invaders is not a recent phenomenon but, as outlined in Chapter Four, can be traced back to the slave trade era in the eleventh century. Papuan nationalism can be traced back to the early 1930s; and in the 1950s it was encouraged by Dutch promises of decolonisation and the creation of the national symbols.

From 1965 West Papuan nationalism emerged as a resistance movement under the leadership of the OPM. This study shows that despite

the bitter feelings against colonialism, the transformation of such sentiments into effective action has always been problematic. The movement is still characterised by small scale and very localised operations.

The OPM has made many positive contributions to West Papuan resistance: it has aroused the nationalist aspirations of the people of West Papua; it has played a vanguard role in organising, promoting and coordinating the national liberation struggle; it has demonstrated capacity to mobilise the masses and organise protests in rural and urban areas; and, most importantly, it has demonstrated its ability to internationalise the liberation issue by engaging in both military and political campaigns. Its successes are made possible by popular support, the high level of commitment, discipline and morale, ability to learn from other liberation movements, and local knowledge of the human situation and of the environment (as discussed in Appendix No.2). The OPM has been able to bring together many divergent groups.

Nevertheless the OPM has serious organisational problems, due to both internal and external factors. The problems of leadership, structure, and political program have been a continuing issue. The OPM faced a serious setback in the early 1960s because of problems with regionalism, factionalism, power struggles, a leadership split, and the lack of a clear organisational structure, political program, and vision. As a result, it became a clandestine and highly factionalised movement. These weaknesses were exploited by the colonial power, which presented a caricature of the OPM as 'Wild Gangsters', or a terrorist group consisting of a handful of dissatisfied people. In this way the Indonesian government was able to undermine support for the OPM in the international community.

On the other hand, the early split in the OPM had some positive results in decentralising power, encouraging mass participation and mobilisation over a wider area, increasing self-reliance and self-respect, and promoting stronger accountability. The OPM thus began to improve its image at the end of the 1960s and, with a clearer structure and political program, the movement gained a measure of international sympathy (if not support) and forced the colonial power to review its rural development policies.

Papuan ethnic politics, disguised as regional loyalties, however, pushed the OPM into a new period of self-destruction that culminated in the leadership split in 1976. This resulted in serious social and political problems for many years. The continuing leadership problem, power struggles within the OPM, and the growth of strong regionalism leading to the emergence of many small factions severely weakened the OPM.

Ethnic sentiment has played a major role in the national liberation movement, not always for good. The OPM has made many attempts at reconciliation and re-unification but efforts have failed through lack of commitment among rival groups, lack of managerial know-how, and failure to undertake consultation. These internal rivalries have diverted the OPM from its real objective of independence. What is now needed is consultation and coordination of resources and manpower, an accountable plan with a clear vision, and a national congress to decide on a new structure for the movement that will provide a strong legal foundation for future operations.

#### **8.2.4 The Military Situation**

The general perception of threats to the stability and security of the state, particularly in relation to political instability in West Papua, has been a

continuing concern for Indonesia and, as this study shows, a major reason why the Indonesian armed forces have been given their special position in the Indonesian state. The OPM itself has not been considered a significant threat even though West Papua has become a major target for militarisation. Today, although the territory is no longer regarded as *Daerah Operasi Militer* (Military Operational Zone), Jakarta continues to deploy on a large scale Indonesian troops in the country. This has raised serious concern.

This study shows that there is an imbalance of power between the Indonesian armed forces and the OPM. Even though the Indonesian armed forces have weaknesses in morale and discipline and are operating in a foreign and hostile environment, the military enjoys a marked superiority in manpower, financial resources, logistics, effective organisation, communication networks and international support. In contrast, the OPM enjoys mass support, good tactics and morale in fighting and geographical advantages, and it is currently benefiting from the effects of democratisation in Indonesia, but the organisation suffers severely from lack of logistical and international support, and from the ineffectiveness of its organisation in terms of leadership, structure, programs and strategies.

I have argued that neither the Indonesian armed forces nor the OPM will win an outright military victory; but for West Papuans the struggle for independence will continue no matter what happens. The OPM stands firmly on its own soil and is engaged in its own national liberation struggle, which involves a total system change (outlined in Chapter Two). The Indonesian military will not easily quit West Papua, however, because the country is an important source of national wealth and a destination for transmigration. Both parties therefore have strong political and social reasons for pursuing their goals.

### 8.2.5 Political Status and International Recognition

The political status of West Papua has been a major focus of discussion for many years. There is a significant division between those who support integration with Indonesia and those who oppose integration. The integrationist view is expounded by Indonesian nationalists, owners of capital, and institutions incorporated into the Indonesian state system such as regional governments and foreign companies. These groups believe that West Papua is an integral part of Indonesia, for both historical and legal reasons, and that any change in its political status must be within the framework of the existing Indonesian nation-state. Indonesians generally believe that West Papua is a non-issue because the international community has already recognised it as an integral part of Indonesia. However, in the last few years, this view has shifted. Particularly since the fall of Suharto, new voices have been calling for a review of Indonesian policies in West Papua, although so far most of these calls have focused on non-contentious issues, such as human rights, land rights and environment destruction.

Against this, in the view of the people of West Papua their country is nothing but a colony of Indonesia. In the light of the political concepts presented in Chapter Two, this study argues that there is no practical difference between the old colonial system and the current system. The common characteristics of a colonial system—territorial expansion, exploitation, oppression, genocide, immigration, discrimination and militarisation—are still dominant in West Papua. The Papuans have become second class citizens in their own land. Yet despite the evidence of continuing colonialism, the international community fails to recognise West Papua as a colony and so does not look for a solution within the framework of the decolonisation process laid down in international laws

and conventions. West Papua poses a relatively minor threat to Indonesian stability and security, but, especially since the collapse of the New Order Regime in May 1998, the potential threat is growing.

This study has demonstrated that international support for the OPM is insignificant, but growing. The black community throughout the world has continuing sympathy with the views of the Papuans. Public opinion in Indonesia and elsewhere has begun to change, and the OPM is now being recognised as an essential player in any process of negotiation. In comparison with East Timor, West Papua has attracted very little international support. East Timor had strong international sponsors, good leadership, a well organised political and military structure, and a clear political vision. These factors are still lacking in the OPM, and so long as they are lacking, substantial international political support is unlikely.

#### **8.2.6 Local Reactions**

To illustrate the complex issues of colonisation and ethnic nationalism, a detailed case study of the Amungme-Kamoro people in the Mimika Regency has been presented.

There are fundamental differences between the state and landowners in perception of the meaning and value of land, distribution of wealth, and questions of compensation. This has created a major barrier to common understanding and a good relationship between the major parties. The Indonesian state has become increasingly interventionist in the name of *Realpolitik*, protecting the interests of the multinational Freeport McMoRan mining company, a primary source of state income. The Indonesian military has been deployed in considerable numbers and has carried out systematic abuses of human rights in the area.

The effects of the Freeport mining operation on the local people have been examined, including social, economic, and political disparities, and the implications of environmental destruction. The imbalance in job opportunities, in health and social services, and in economic and financial resources, together with the dispossession of the landowners, the environmental destruction, and the many human rights abuses, have created misery and anger among the Amungme and the Kamoro.

This case study also throws light on the interplay between the colonial authoritarian state and the locally based resistance movements. The Indonesian government has failed to present an integrated development plan involving consultation and agreement among the main actors—the landowners and their local organisation, LEMASA, the local and provincial governments, and Freeport Indonesia. Instead, the government and the company excluded the landowners from the decision-making process. The local response to this top-down approach has been social and political unrest, which has become a major threat to the company and the state, as well as to the lives of the people. The resulting ethnic nationalism in the area has become an important contributing factor to the strengthening of Papuan nationalism. The local social organisation, LEMASA, has transformed itself into a mass political organisation taking a national stance and calling for an independent West Papua.

The landowners themselves have resorted to both violent and non-violent measures in the face of the authoritarian stance of the government and the company. These actions have met with little success and the fundamental problems remain unsolved. Local injustices have not been acknowledged by either the state or the company. Recognition of the

fundamental human rights of the Amungme and Kamoro, including the rights to land and compensation for the loss of it, and to significant improvement in social and economic conditions, has not occurred. Rapid militarisation in the region has not created peace and security but has actually encouraged violence and ethnic sentiment. In order to reduce the level of violence in the region, a new consensus must be negotiated in which the rights and obligations of all the interest groups must be clearly addressed. If the government and the company were to meet the twenty-three demands submitted by LEMASA, an agreement might be reached; but the political will for such a move appears to be lacking.

Most of the issues, problems, reactions and potential solutions that the Amungme case study throws up are reflected, on a larger screen, in the struggle of the West Papuan people for their rights, and in the role of the OPM as the voice and vehicle of their resistance. There is a strong relationship between local and national sentiments, because local sentiment is integral to, and a foundation for, Papuan nationalism. At the local level, deep understanding of traditional values, belief systems and sense of belonging, and strong commitment to defending such rights, becomes the basis for wider national sentiments. Cultural values are facing serious challenges from the Indonesian government and Freeport McMoRan, with serious social, economic, environmental, health and political consequences. Local resentment has transformed itself into organised political resistance. The OPM has encouraged such unrest and even taken a part in some actions. Equally, the local organisation has supported the OPM in calling for an independent West Papua.

Success has been more evident at the local level than nationally. Good leadership, an effective organisational structure (LEMASA), and the

commitment of the local landowners, together with the dominant presence of the multinational mining company, and the associated oppression and exploitation, have been major reasons for the success of the local resistance. Such factors are still problematic at the national level. The OPM believes that the US, as the host government of the parent company, Freeport McMoRan, must accept some moral responsibility for resolving the political problem. Local and national resistance movements have taken up this call to intensify their international campaigns.

### **8.2.7 Future Prospects**

The future prospects of West Papua are examined in Chapter Seven. The democratisation process in Indonesia will have serious implications for the future of West Papua. Corruption, collusion and nepotism under the Suharto leadership were major reasons for the collapse of the New Order regime. The Jakarta elites have enriched themselves at the expense of the periphery for almost three decades. Disintegration of Indonesia along ethnic and religious lines is likely if Jakarta continues to follow the same policies, if power remains centralised in the hands of a small elite, if excessive use of military power is deployed, and if the economic crisis continues. This thesis suggests that any lasting solution to the West Papua issue is dependent on a process of progression from ceasefire to third-party involvement and then to national dialogue.

Three possible political solutions—autonomy, federation and independence—were discussed from the West Papuan perspective. For historical and political reasons autonomy and federalism are rejected by the vast majority of the Papuans. Autonomy within the existing nation-state is rejected because it is seen as an empty process which would permit only limited power within a marginally decentralised system, and because it

appears to be merely a continuation of the colonial system in a more humanistic guise. Autonomy was promised to West Papua as a strategy to win the support of the Papuans and the international community at the beginning of the occupation. The people of West Papua also reject federation because such a structure will serve the interests of the central government, with only limited power to West Papua over trade and financial arrangements with the other sovereign countries. Ninety-five per cent of Papuans prefer an independent West Papua and believe that they have a legal right to this status in accordance with the principles set out in international law regarding the rights of colonised peoples. They believe that independence will make it possible to solve the political and economic problems in West Papua. As in the OPM's earlier statements, Team 100 statement of 26 February 1999 calls for independence for West Papua as an ultimate political goal.

As indicated in Chapter Three, the application of game theory in conflict resolution had relevance for the earlier Dutch-Indonesia relationship because the two parties were able to negotiate agreement on the unconditional transfer of West Papua to Indonesia; but this agreement was a disaster for the people of West Papua. In the future, however, the application of game theory in structured conflict resolution may offer some hope for the people of West Papua, especially if FORERI's peace initiative leads to negotiations between Jakarta and the people of West Papua. The recent resumption of national dialogue has at least indicated goodwill on both sides in attempting to reach agreement on the future political status of West Papua. A fair and free referendum on options, with the involvement of third party, are vital for allowing the people of West Papua to decide their own future. Here the OPM can learn from the East Timor experience, in which third party involvement has been so important. The ongoing

democratisation of Indonesia and the independence of East Timor may encourage foreign governments to change their attitudes towards West Papua and play a mediating role.

But even if Jakarta agrees to engage in some form of national dialogue with the people of West Papua, it will have a fundamental problem with the OPM: Jakarta is likely to continue to defend the *status quo* and reject international peace missions, independent monitoring groups, or third party involvement in the peacemaking process; as always, Jakarta will insist this is an internal affair and so there is no need to have third party interference. It will also argue that the problem is not political but rather is caused by dissatisfaction over economic and social development. On the other hand, a third party would recognise that military repression, human rights abuses, and environmental destruction encourage social and political unrest, which may destabilise the region. It is, therefore, important that Jakarta can be convinced to engage in a constructive negotiation aimed at reaching a lasting agreement.

As far as discussion of independence is concerned, however, it will be very difficult to engage Jakarta in a constructive debate, particularly as the experience of East Timor has raised fears about further secessionist demands. The options of autonomy and federalism may remain open, but it is independence which the people of West Papua want.

### **8.3. Implications of the Study**


One of the main themes of this study concerns the way in which social and political factors have impacted on the progress of the OPM. As H. Arndt contended in 1986<sup>1</sup>, a political solution to the West Papua problem is

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<sup>1</sup> H. Arndt (1986). "Transmigration to Irian Jaya" in R.J. May (ed.), *Between Two Nations*, Robert Brown and Associates (Aust), Bathurst, pp.167-169.



Map 5: KODAM VIII-TRIKORA



Source: O'Hare, Martin (1989). *The Indonesian Military in Irian Jaya*, ANU, Canberra, p.29

unlikely in the immediate future. The present study has concentrated on this proposition—the continuation of conflict—with a focus on the relationships between different actors—state, military, company, local people and the international community—and the impacts of these relationships on the process of reaching a political solution. A major intention has been to provide a narrative picture of the real political situation in West Papua as understood from a Papuan perspective, drawing on my own experiences.

The study shows that over the years the OPM has failed to achieve its objectives. Its inability to develop productive strategies and to strengthen its organisation and leadership have continually undermined its effectiveness; these weaknesses have been exploited by the occupation forces to shape their counter insurgency campaigns against the people of West Papua. On the other hand, reaction against Indonesian colonisation has taken deep root in West Papua. Militarisation, the exploitation of natural resources, high levels of immigration, and policies directed at wiping out Papuan cultures, have created serious social, economic, and political problems in West Papua, fuelling Papuan nationalism as the expression of a common feeling of nationhood among the 250 ethnic groups.

In order to identify the key elements in the situation, studies of Indonesian colonisation and the nationalist movement in West Papua must continue. Perspectives will vary. The government of Indonesia will continue to regard itself as non-colonialist. In attempting to persuade the world community that it is in the Papuans' own best interests to stay within the current political system, Jakarta promotes itself as the godfather of development and a force for stability which is responsible for making laws and regulations that guarantee the rights of the Papuans. The Indonesian

government will promise new reforms of the governmental system, but while these may include autonomy or a federal system, the West Papuan preference for independence will be firmly ruled out.

The government of Indonesia, as a major power in the region, may seek to achieve its political goals in West Papua in a range of ways. First, it could try to win back the support of the Papuan people by reducing its military presence in West Papua and changing its strategic approach to a territorial one, emphasising regional development and social progress. Secondly, it could seek to encourage divisions within the Papuan community with the aim of destroying national unity and internal cooperation. Such a provocative strategy could result in outright civil war, with devastating effects for all the main actors. Thirdly, while the economic crisis lasts, the government could encourage multinational companies to invest in West Papua and exploit as much as they can of the country's natural resources, on the assumption that at some point the Papuans will simply be wiped out, as in the case of the Spanish exploitation of the indigenous peoples in Latin America. Fourthly, the Indonesian state could become even more interventionist, creating laws and regulations to protect foreign companies operating in West Papua, and giving the military special responsibility for protecting those companies; in return, such companies would preserve the interests of the state by providing finance and economic development. This strategy would be seen by Papuans as a prolongation of the old system, and would translate into greater political and social unrest, which would affect regional politics. Such a policy might also affect the OPM's own strategies, shifting it from a more military to a more political approach.

The research in this thesis may also have further specific implications. Some members of the Papuan community may disagree with certain interpretations and subjective statements presented in this thesis. For example, I have been critical of the OPM's general policy and programs, and have criticised certain actors for a lack of vision, mismanagement, and abuse of power. Hopefully, however, these criticisms will motivate Papuans to rethink, reflect upon and revise their policies, strategies and approaches. The OPM as a liberation movement clearly requires improved leadership and strategies, political vision and coordination, and this must involve recognition and acknowledgment of the mistakes of the past.

Since at present there is no political will on either side to reach consensus, nor international support to provide a mediating force, no quick solution is likely. The OPM must demonstrate its commitment to serious negotiation in order to avoid escalation of war by emphasising the less contentious issues, such as development, human rights, land rights, indigenous peoples' rights, militarisation, immigration, and the environment, rather than focusing solely on the contentious issue of independence. It might start with agreement on some form of special autonomy, federal system, or free association.

This could open the way to the next step of national dialogue, with a referendum on independence as a potential solution. If Papuans are to be given a chance to reject autonomy and choose independence, then a just, free and fair referendum must be held under supervision of the UN, in the presence of international mediators and peace-keeping forces. For this, the OPM must present a clear peace plan, and obtain international sponsorship. Such a peace plan, possibly based on the model presented by the National Council of Maubere Resistance in East Timor, should include an

organisational timeframe, an agenda for discussion (including the referendum options), the general terms under which a peace process can take place, and the participation of an agreed-upon third party.

#### **8.4. Conclusions**

In analysing the role of the OPM in the West Papuan resistance to Indonesian colonial rule, it has become clear that the weakness of the OPM itself remains a serious and urgent problem. However, the problems of the situation are even more complex than merely the failings of this key player. First, while Papuan nationalism will never evaporate, the OPM's own power would decline if any dramatic easing took place in the relationship between Indonesia and West Papua. And even if the OPM could improve its organisation and image, international support is still unlikely; this is because the OPM is not a social movement that seeks adjustment within the existing state system but a liberation movement with a radical political agenda. Secondly, as the international community does not wish to upset Jakarta, they will increase pressure on the OPM to work within the *status quo*. But the OPM will continue to seek self-determination and independence. This will make progress difficult. Moreover the issue of regional stability and security is likely to be a subject of concern after the painful experiences in East Timor, and that may affect attitudes towards the OPM.

However world opinion is shifting, as can be seen in the changing attitudes of international NGOs and the demands for reopening the discussion on the Act of Free Choice of 1969. The OPM should adjust to this new international context by presenting a peace plan in which all possible solutions are canvassed, including a referendum on political options. The

OPM must intensify its international campaigns, in part by lobbying members of the South Pacific Forum.

Jakarta must also undertake reforms in order to save face in the international arena. Those reforms should include demilitarisation, an immediate reduction in the number of transmigrants to Papua, encouragement of the development of Papuan culture, tradition and ways of life (for example, adopting Papuan place names), recognition of land rights and indigenous rights, and offering adequate compensation for past abuses. Additionally it should open the border between PNG and West Papua, allow PNG, the Netherlands, USA, the UN and Australia to open consulates in West Papua, permit international monitoring groups and UN agencies to operate in the country, and create new roles in West Papua for UN agencies and regional organisations such as ASEAN and the South Pacific Forum. Finally, it must be ready to discuss the future of the country, including the question of a referendum on special autonomous status or independence.

There is a responsibility on both sides to undertake reforms that will facilitate agreement without loss of face. The government of Indonesia must show a strong political will to end the conflict in order to guarantee stability and security, social progress and peace to all its citizens, in West Papua and elsewhere. On the other hand, the OPM must present a systematic and constructive peace plan that can convince Jakarta that the OPM is serious about ending the long and painful conflict.

Inevitably, the findings of this thesis open up new areas for research. One of the objectives of the study was to examine the barriers to the progress of the OPM. Using similar theoretical approaches and concepts, a study of

different movements in different periods and regions might result in a clearer understanding of the comparative factors which contribute to the failure and success of such movements.

The present study suggests a serious lack of organisational tradition in West Papua, particularly at the national level. The OPM and the people of West Papua have largely been inspired by a cult mentality, trusting that the liberation of West Papua will be a blessing that will come down from heaven; this attitude has undermined the realisation of their own aims. Lack of personal commitment and political vision have also seriously impacted on the development and progress of the OPM as the main liberation movement in West Papua. LEMASA has been more successful at the local level. If a new paradigm emerges, a further study of the OPM from an organisational viewpoint would be essential; this might focus on leadership, decision-making processes, structural models, management and effective communication networks.

Another area for further study concerns the status in international law of a nation seeking its political independence. The international community has denied the rights of the people of West Papua. The thesis has commented on this denial policy but without exploring the possibility that the case of West Papua may be re-opened under international law. The attempts of LEMASA to bring their case before American courts suggests that this may offer West Papuans a new strategic arena.

## Appendix 1: Military Balance of Power Between the Indonesian Armed Forces and the OPM

### Introduction

The myth of military supremacy as an effective means to end conflict has been the driving force behind most of the wars and violence around the world since our human ancestors first set foot on the earth. During the Vietnam war in 1965, and during "Desert Storm" between Iraq and the USA allies in 1991, this belief in a military capacity in solving conflicts was generally accepted, despite the devastating effects of deploying modern weapons of mass destruction. Yet both these wars demonstrated that armed force cannot always wipe out an opponent. Both the communist regime of Vietnam and the military regime of Saddam are still in power.

If this is so, why have the Indonesian armed forces and the OPM continued to believe in the power of the military and to give the military such special status? The Indonesian military is the biggest armed force in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. According to Australian Federal Parliament, the Indonesian armed forces in 1991 have 278,000 men of whom 212,000 are in the army, 42,000 in the navy and 24,000 in the air force while 800,000 are reserves.<sup>1</sup> Yet despite its size, these forces are thinly spread over the vast country of Indonesia, which consists of some 17,500 islands stretching 5,000 kilometres (3,120 miles) along the equator.<sup>2</sup> Even so, Indonesia's military strength and capacity have raised concern among its neighbours for many years. The main concern of the people of West Papua is that rapid militarisation has brought serious social and political consequences to their country. The Indonesian military maintains the

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<sup>1</sup> Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, of the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, *Australia's Relations with Indonesia*, Canberra, November 1993, p.65.

<sup>2</sup> *Reuters* 9 August 1998..

strong conviction that it can wipe out the OPM. Both parties plan in the expectation of winning the war. By comparison with the Indonesian military, the OPM is very small and isolated. Despite this, the OPM also holds a strong conviction that the movement can, if it gets military support from abroad, destroy the occupation forces in West Papua. Neither conflicting party believes in the word "defeat".

This chapter will analyse the perception of "threats" and will examine the strengths and weaknesses of the two conflicting parties.

### **Indonesian Perception of Security Threats**

Perceived security "threats" have been a major concern among Indonesia's leadership, particularly within the armed forces, which acts as guardian of the state. Threats can be internal or external, and one may well lead to the other.

#### **Internal Security Threats**

As the term implies, internal security threats are those threats that come from inside Indonesia and tend to destabilise the state. Secessionist, secular or ideological motives may lie behind the movements that create such threats. Although actual destabilisation has traditionally been seen as only a remote possibility, the recent emergence of secular political movements under the banner of Islamic slogans has already raised fears in Jakarta in the post-Suharto era.

In the view of the Indonesian armed forces, internal security threats come from three sources: the extreme right (nationalist fanatical Muslims), the extreme left (communists), and national liberation movements such as the OPM in Irian Jaya, formerly Fretilin in East Timor, and the National

Liberation Front of Aceh, all of which are termed "terrorist groups" by Jakarta. This last source poses some threat, but has not been assessed as of major significance,<sup>3</sup> as Jakarta does not consider these liberation movements as potential threats to national unity and security - an ironic assessment in view of developments in East Timor. On the other hand, extremists of both the right and left wings are seen as posing major potential threats to the state's ideological foundations - Pancasila and the State Constitution of 1945. One group desires to establish an Islamic state, while the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) is seen as wanting to impose a communist Chinese model of government. Both reject the state ideology set out in Pancasila. For these reasons, these groups are regarded as more dangerous than the liberation movements in West Papua and Aceh Sumatra.

The OPM, while not considered a major "security" threat, certainly creates disturbances for the national development program, and so West Papua is often regarded as a "trouble zone". The use of coercion and the militarisation of West Papua are considered to be part of a preventive approach rather than a total offensive engagement against the OPM. However, the strategically important position of West Papua in relation to its neighbours, Papua New Guinea and Australia, means that the threat of the OPM in West Papua cannot be ignored. The issue has become more complicated than most military experts in Jakarta and Canberra expected.<sup>4</sup> The complexity of the local problems, and the special geo-political, social and economic relationships between PNG and Indonesia ensure that this security problem will continue.

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<sup>3</sup> Martin O'Hare (1989). *The Indonesian Military in Irian Jaya*, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, p.20.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*:52.

### External Security Threats

External threats cover a range of challenges to the state's security and stability from foreign powers. These include territorial, economic and technological threats. Territorial threats often come from neighbouring countries, and have been a major cause of international conflict. Conflict in the South China Sea in 1994 between Indonesia and China, for example, could have escalated into a serious military confrontation.

External economic and technological pressures create another type of threat. Indonesia certainly fears that domination by foreign economic compradors could destroy its domestic economy, making Indonesia dependent rather than an active participant in world affairs.

In the view of the Indonesian military, these external threats could be linked to internal threats. For example, a right wing Muslim organisation or the liberation movements of the OPM or Aceh-Sumatra may be supported by foreign powers who might wish to encourage internal conflict in their own interests. The Indonesian military, in pursuing a preventive approach, might choose to challenge internal secessionist and secular movements in order to develop its conventional military capacity. Jakarta has already built up its military capacity by developing a two-divisional core force, through the purchase of state-of-the-art air and naval equipment, and by developing its own technical capabilities particularly in the weapons industry.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*:20.

### **The Structure of the Indonesian Military in West Papua**

The Indonesian armed forces are generally regarded as one of the strongest armed forces in the Southeast Asia and South Pacific regions. The military has held political power in Indonesia for more than three decades. Unlike in most other countries, the Indonesian armed forces have a dual function which means the military has the right and duty to intervene in both political and military affairs. Due to this special mandate, and for security reasons, as Jakarta normally argues, the militarisation process in Indonesia has been an integral part of the state's policy.

For security reasons, Indonesia has been divided into fifteen regional military commands, including West Papua (Irian Jaya). The military regional command in West Papua, originally called Komando Daerah Militer XVII Cendrawasih (KODAM XVII), was formed in 1964, one year after the Indonesian occupation (see Map 3 above). On 8 May 1985, as a result of a major nationwide reorganisation, KODAM XVII Cendrawasih of Irian Jaya was unified with KODAM XV Pattimura of Moluccas and renamed KODAM VIII TRIKORA, which today operates from its new headquarters in Polimak, Jayapura.<sup>6</sup>

### **Strengths of the Indonesian Military in West Papua**

The force strength of the Indonesian armed forces in West Papua has doubled since West Papua was declared a Military Operational Zone in 1965. The massive deployment of Indonesian troops in West Papua has been unique. More than 9,000 Indonesian armed forces were stationed there in 1990, comprising 5,000 army, 3,500 police and 500 navy and air force personnel.<sup>7</sup> They have increased an already tight control over the lives of

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<sup>6</sup> Kommando Daerah Militer (KODAM VIII/TRIKORA) (1990). *Sejarah KODAM VIII Maluku dan Irian Jaya, 1982-1990*. KODAM XVII Cendrawasih, Jayapura, p.62.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*:37.

West Papuans in many important sectors. Ninety-five per cent of the police force are West Papuans but they are mostly restricted to low level ranks as the Indonesians do not trust them. Reinforcements are required whenever social and political unrest takes place in West Papua. During the hostages crisis in Mapenduma in January 1996, for example, a rapid militarisation occurred in the region, greatly alarming the Papuans. More than 5,000 troops were deployed in Timika in the south and in Wamena in the highland north-east.

The Indonesian armed forces possesses a much more effective institutional structure than that of other central government institutions. Like military structures throughout the world, the power relationship between the central and local levels is vertically defined, with decisions made at the top and passed down. Each cell of each military unit is obliged to carry out the orders given to it by its superiors. For administrative and control purposes, KODAM VIII TRIKORA in West Papua is divided into four sub-commands.<sup>8</sup> This extends from regency (KOREM) to military district commands (KODIM) to military sub-district commands (KORAMIL) and ends at the village level (BABINSA) which consists of a few villages that share in intelligence activities and report to the local military. For effectiveness of manpower and control, only three out of West Papua's 12 regencies have a KOREM. KOREM 172 in Jayapura, for example, covers the areas of responsibility for Jayapura, Merauke and Jayawijaya. Each KOREM is divided into three KODIMs which in turn are divided into a number of KORAMIL, depending on how many sub-districts there are in each KODIM. For example, Merauke regency has 18 sub-districts and could be expected to have 18 KORAMILs (see Map No.3 KODAM VIII-TRIKORA). For operational purposes, KODAM VIII TRIKORA Command has one infantry

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<sup>8</sup> KODAM VIII, op. cit.:67. (See also O'Hare, op.cit.:32-37 and Lander Fickformat(1985). Indonesien, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm, p.23.

battalion in each KOREM which functions as a task force. These battalions are well trained and equipped, and receive privileges. Eighty five per cent of soldiers in a battalion are "West Papuans" but with officers from outside, usually of Javanese or Batak origin. Most often, the battalion is assigned to an area of high security risk. If the local security situation deteriorates further, then reinforcements from the other KODAMs become necessary. In this case, KODAM VIII TIKORA receives reinforcements from the central Army Strategic Reserve Command (KOSTRAD). If these two forces cannot overcome the security problem, additional reinforcements can be called in. In most emergencies the Special Elite Forces Command (KOPASSUS) is sent for.

Apart from the infantry troops, Jakarta also has navy and air forces on call. The military has built air force and navy bases in many parts of West Papua. The navy headquarters is located in Ambon, Moluccas, but there are also naval depots in Jayapura, Sorong, Biak, and Amamapare in West Papua and in Tual in the Kei Islands, and more limited naval support bases are located in Manokwari and Merauke. Unlike land and naval forces, the air forces are located outside KODAM VIII as a part of Air Force Operational Command III which has its headquarters in Ujung Pandang, in south Sulawesi, and is responsible for all eastern regions of Indonesia. In West Papua, support air force bases are located in Biak, Timika, Jayapura and Merauke. All heavy fighter bomber aircraft are based in Java, but occasionally reinforcements from Java are used in other regions. The air force uses a range of planes, including the DC-130, the Bronco OV-10 and the Skyhawk; civilian aircraft are also used in operations or to supply troops and provide logistic support. In West Papua there are small air force bases in Jayapura, Biak, and Merauke. Police forces were also part and parcel of KODAM VIII TRIKORA. The police forces are solely responsible for law and

order, investigations and traffic control. But like the army, the police forces are divided into specific levels of responsibility: Regional Police Command (POLDA), District Police (POLRES) at regency level, and Sectoral Police (POLSEK) at both district and sub-district levels.

The Indonesian military also has control over the modern communication system and mass media, which is another important factor in the defense system. Communication networks can play a very important role in security operations. Due to this control opposition attempts to expose the silent and systematic genocide perpetrated by the occupation forces have been unsuccessful. The Indonesians are well aware of the importance of mass communications and therefore tight control and censorship are generally imposed. In conjunction with the state, the Indonesian military has access to a satellite communication network through the US-assisted national satellite, which is called *Palapa*, built in 1976 in Surabaya. As it also exercises control over 500 commercial radio and TV stations, the military in the region can easily locate and monitor much of the guerilla movement. As the struggle in Irian Jaya involves many strategic and sensitive situations, the satellite is particularly vital for communications.<sup>9</sup> During the operation to release the 24 hostages who had been taken by Kelly Kwalik on 8 January 1996, for example, the use of the satellite communication system was particularly successful. The military could accurately locate the position of the guerrillas and then deploy both offensive attacks and persuasive approaches. The Indonesian armed forces also have control over the print mass media including *Kompas*, *Post Kota*, *Sinar Harapan*, *Cenderawasih Post*, and *Suara Karya* (Golkar), as well as the TV and radio stations. The

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<sup>9</sup> "Irian Jaya province is not only highly dependent on satellite systems but also on small earth stations. There are seven operating stations in the province: four in Teminabuan, one in Kaimana, one in Tanah Merah, and one in Sarmi. The cost of the earth stations amounted to approximately Rp.2-3 million per month including salary, diesel oil and the other expenses" *Jakarta Post* 26 December 1990.

*Cenderawasih Post*, published in Jayapura and having a wide daily circulation, has been sponsored by the military. Notwithstanding this, any publication must be approved by the military. Censorship of local privately-owned daily newspapers, such as the Catholic daily newspaper *Tifa Irian*, and of imported video and films is commonplace. Foreign journalists are also restricted from entering or travelling freely around West Papua. The major objective of this control is to isolate the OPM; but since the reformist regime came to power in 1998, limited press freedom is now opening up.

The military enjoys special political status through its *dwifungsi* (dual function). It is permitted to play a dual civilian and military role in politics. Unlike other members of the parliament, the military members are appointed by the government, most often directly by the president. In 1992, the military had nine seats in the Irian Jaya regional parliament out of a total of 45 seats.<sup>10</sup> The military and police commanders are also members of the Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah (MUSPIDA) or Consultation Council of Regional Leaders (CCRL), giving them a powerful influence in the parliamentary decision making process.

The Indonesian military has the advantage of much better logistics than the OPM and uses modern weapons supplied by foreign countries, giving it the mobility to engage rapidly in both offensive and conventional warfare. It is difficult to trace how much material and technical support the military receives but supplies come from many Western countries. According to an analysis by Budiardjo and Liem, Indonesia had, for many years, relied on the Eastern bloc countries for material support during the Sukarno regime but thereafter the greater part of such aid came from

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<sup>10</sup> Kerjasama Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah Tingkat I dan Kantor Statistik Provinsi Irian Jaya (1991). *Irian Jaya Dalam Angka*, Jayapura, p.35.

Western countries through military supplies and training.<sup>11</sup> During the confrontation over West Papua in 1962 90 per cent of Indonesian arms support came from socialist countries, primarily the Soviet Union (see Chapter One). After General Suharto took power in 1965 through a bloody coup d'etat, all military support came from Western countries such as the USA, the United Kingdom, France, Sweden and Australia. West Papua become a major target of sophisticated weaponry, including American supplied warships and planes, helicopter gunships, armoured personnel carriers, M16 rifles, and a variety of small arms.

The intensity of the campaigns in West Papua in which these advanced weapons were used has been described as alarming.<sup>12</sup> In the 1970s, the USA supplied 16 AHE Skyhawks from surplus stock in Israel and 16 OV-10 Bronco counter-insurgency planes (low flying, slow moving aircraft used to spray bullets on the ground).<sup>13</sup> During the counter-insurgency campaigns in the late 1970s, the military used this type of plane to bomb the villages of Manokwari, Paniai, Jayapura, and Mimika regencies, where guerrilla uprisings occurred. The US also supplied Lockheed C-130 transport aircraft, machine guns, motors, mortars, cannons, smoke and tear gas, and rocket launchers. In the late 1970s, it supplied another 16 Skyhawks, and 16 Bell UT Huey helicopters.<sup>14</sup> These helicopters were used in strafing operations against the OPM, as recorded earlier in this thesis, and were also used in many operations across the border into Papua New Guinea. During the period 1974-1984, US military aid was valued at 504.5 million pounds. In 1988, the United States supplied 12 F-16 fighter strike and four F16-fighter aircraft. However, its military aid was subsequently reduced from a value of

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<sup>11</sup> Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Lie (1988). *West Papua: The Obliteration of a People*, TAPOL, London, p.115.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*:115-117.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*:115.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*:116.

22 million pounds in 1988 to 11.9 million pounds in 1989, a decrease of 50 per cent.<sup>15</sup> M16 rifles continue to be imported into Indonesia from South Korea. From the French government, Indonesia purchased Puma and Super Puma helicopters, AMX tanks, infantry combat vehicles (MICV), and a large number of Exocet missiles and launchers.<sup>16</sup> From West Germany, Indonesia purchased two submarines, while from the Netherlands it obtained three frigates and more than a squadron of helicopters. Sweden has supplied Indonesia with 150 RBS-70 guided missiles. For the United Kingdom, weapon sales to Indonesia have been a profitable affair.<sup>17</sup> In 1978, based on a military bilateral agreement between the two countries, the UK supplied 8 Hawks, 3 refurbished naval frigates, seacat landing craft, and 700 Rapier missiles. One year later, British Aerospace (BAe) was handling a contract with Indonesia worth US\$220 million, including a battery command post computer software system. Another British company, Plessey, signed a contract with Indonesia to supply a computer for defence commanders to collect information about enemy forces in the air, at sea and on land,<sup>18</sup> which was successfully used in counter insurgency operations. Indonesia also signed a contract to purchase 600 Scorpion tanks. When the Blair Labour government came to power in Britain, the United Kingdom continued to increase its arms sales to Indonesia and the government still permits the sale of howitzers, mortars and flame-throwers to Indonesia.<sup>19</sup>

Apart from this extensive external support, Indonesia itself has modernised its armed forces with advanced weapons systems and technical training. The British have offered training facilities to Indonesia since 1985. In 1988, BAe decided to set up its first overseas technical training college in

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<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*:116.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*:117.

<sup>19</sup> *Sunday Times* (London) 13 March 1999.

East Java with ex-President Habibie being the contact for the project. Indonesia is now developing its own military industrial complex under IPTN, an Indonesian aerospace company. Technical and managerial training has also been supplied by the West Germany aircraft manufacturer, Messerschmidt Boelkow Blohm, a project that was also supported by Habibie.<sup>20</sup> The IPTN has already concluded a number of joint production ventures. For example, the Spanish company CASA has constructed CN 235 military aircraft in Indonesia. Indonesia also has contracts with France, West Germany, and the USA for producing helicopters. Some countries, such as Ireland, Holland and Sweden are prohibited by their own state laws from exporting weapons to a state that represses its own citizens or might possibly use the weapons to oppress its opposition; despite this, these countries have sold weapons to Indonesia, which have been used in support of repression in East Timor and West Papua. Even worse, certain countries, including Australia, have established military cooperation agreements with Jakarta. Military cooperation between Indonesia and Australia has been going on for over three decades. Australia has regularly provided two week training courses for the Indonesian Special Forces (KOPASSUS) and the Special Air Regiment,<sup>21</sup> and the two countries have held joint military exercises in the Arafura sea north of Australia. Canberra also assisted in military mapping in West Papua in 1977/78. In 1998, 100 Australian troops were deployed in relief operations in West Papua. This is justified as preventive diplomacy.

Indonesia has also received continuing financial aid from Western and Asian countries. Seventeen Western countries, including the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, have provided a significant amount of financial aid to Indonesia. In the 1980s, foreign aid reached US\$2,000 million

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<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*:117.

<sup>21</sup> The Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (Australian Parliament) (1993). *Australia's Relations With Indonesia*. Canberra, pp.68-79.

per year.<sup>22</sup> World Bank funding was US\$2,519 million in 1986-1987 and was then increased to \$3,165 million in 1990, an increase of 21 per cent. At the end of 1987, bilateral aid from the United States, France, the UK and Japan increased by 60 per cent over the previous year. In 1988, Japanese aid was reported at \$2.3 billion per year, while its special aid in the same year was US\$1.7 million. Japan is currently Indonesia's leading creditor, providing 35 per cent of the total foreign aid received. Australian aid to Indonesia in 1994/95-1997/98 totalled AUS\$420 million dollars, as reported by Margaret Regnault, Counsellor of the Australia International Development Bureau (AIDAB), during a seminar in Jakarta.<sup>23</sup> This included US\$70 million in the previous three years for special training programs, scholarships, human rights work, food aid, drought relief operations and small projects.<sup>24</sup> Responding to the current economic crisis, in April 1998 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) released US\$3 billion to Indonesia out of its total commitment of US\$43 billion dollars (ABC News, 27 July 1998). The World Bank also pledged financial assistance to Indonesia with a total sum of US\$6 billion during the financial years 1992-1995).

Half of the total aid has been used for military and transmigration expenses. During the Fourth Development Program, or Pelita IV, from 1985 to 1989, US\$500 million was used for transmigration expenses.<sup>25</sup>

The major strengths of the Indonesian armed forces can, therefore, be summarised as: a large force and a well-organised structure for operations in West Papua; the enormous potential of its weaponry, including planes and helicopters, and financial aid from Western countries; a good

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<sup>22</sup> TAPOL Bulletin February 1987. London.

<sup>23</sup> Suara Pembaruan 30 November 1994.

<sup>24</sup> M. Purcell (1998). *Sinking Asia: Capital Flows and the Collapse of the Asian Miracle*, Development Issues No. 4 (ACFOA), Canberra, p.18.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*

communications network system, highly qualified personnel, easy recruitment of new personnel, and high mobility and the ability to mobilise a heavy concentration in strategic areas.

### **Weaknesses of the Indonesian Military in West Papua**

Despite the strengths of manpower capacity, economic and financial resources, and technical capacity, the Indonesian armed forces have shown significant weaknesses in West Papua. Unlike Singapore, for example, which has a relatively small population but is technically highly advanced, the Indonesian weapons industry is relatively small and its technical skills are heavily dependent on foreign assistance. During the New Order period, the Suharto regime attempted to develop high technology weaponry and aircraft industries but these plans failed as a consequence of corruption, nepotism and collusion that have for a long time been debilitating cancers within the established power structure. Most Indonesian armed forces operating in West Papua are reliant on their readily available manpower, foreign military assistance and local loyalists.

Since the collapse of the New Order regime, the Indonesian armed forces have become weak and divided. The future role of the Indonesian military is uncertain; but there are two possible scenarios that might restore its power and influence. If power is not handed over to a truly democratic movement, then new political leaders and democratic forces could take to the streets and encourage more mass unrest. In the face of such a development the military could have its power restored in the name of state stability and security. On the other hand, the Indonesian military could pull back, reflect on its past mistakes and attempt to restore its image by recognising and supporting public demands. "Redefining ABRI's role in politics is a must in this period of political transition in Indonesia. ABRI's

involvement in politics must be changed and its new role must be as a source of ideas for public policy".<sup>26</sup>

The Indonesian armed forces also currently suffer from morale and discipline problems. This was confirmed by its own military sources which reported in August 1998 that "morale is very low within the army".<sup>27</sup> Because of these failings, the military presence in West Papua is heavily criticised for its high record of human rights violations including killings, torture, and other human rights abuses in its areas of operation. Similarly, "the army has been under growing pressure to withdraw from politics and is facing a myriad of criticisms over human rights abuses, poor discipline and its failure to quell ongoing religious riots in the eastern Island of Ambon".<sup>28</sup> The army is now in a very difficult position because of the disclosure of its many misdeeds during the Suharto regime.

The reasons for these problems are diverse. There is a lack both of education, particularly in human rights issues, and of professionalism. Many rural dwellers and former convicted criminals from Indonesia joined the military, because it was seen as a good job prospect in a country with an alarmingly high record of unemployment. For these illiterate youths, joining the military was a golden opportunity for survival and promotion. In order to hold their jobs in the military and to qualify for promotion, soldiers must obey all orders even if these may involve immoral and unethical actions, and they remain very loyal to their superiors. Due to these factors and to their own social backgrounds, soldiers have killed a

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<sup>26</sup> J. Kristiadi (1999) "The Future Role of the ABRI in Politics" in Geoff Forrester (ed.) *Indonesian Assessment 1998: Post-Suharto Indonesia Renewal or Chaos*, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, Crawford House Publishing Pty-Ltd, Bathurst, p.58.

<sup>27</sup> *Reuters* 9 August 1998.

<sup>28</sup> *Sydney Morning Herald* 11 March 1999, "Military Chiefs Look to Australia For Reforms", p.13.

considerable number of civilians, raped women, and destroyed villages and properties. The brutal murders of civilians in Hoesa in 1995, killings in Jila, Alama, Bela and Mapenduma in 1996 and in Biak in July 1998, and the killing of 19 soldiers and officers by a member of the 752 Battalion on 15 April 1996 in Timika airport, are all signs of low morale, lack of discipline or direct disobedience.<sup>29</sup>

Most importantly, the Indonesian armed forces are content for the conflict in Irian Jaya to continue at its present low-intensity level. It provides troops with combat practice and enables commanders to gain promotion through military achievements in engaging and capturing OPM and in controlling dissent. Indeed, many current Indonesian military officers have earned their stripes as a result of their actions in East Timor and West Papua. The successful killing of members of a political opposition are traditionally rewarded by promotion. Former General Suharto himself gained promotion for the success of the Mandala Operation which he led as a colonel during the confrontation between the Dutch and Indonesia in 1962. Similarly, General Prabowo, a son-in-law of former President Suharto, and five other officers of the KODAM VIII TRIKORA were promoted in Jayapura on 2 May 1996 for their efforts in releasing the 26 hostages taken by the Kelly Kwalik group in Mapenduma on 8 January 1996.<sup>30</sup> General Prabowo himself promised: "all participants (cadres) in the release operation will be promoted".<sup>31</sup>

Any democratisation of Indonesian politics will also weaken the role of the Indonesian armed forces, and this will have a serious impact on future military structure and strategies generally and in the occupied

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<sup>29</sup> Indonesia Media Network, 7 April 1996.

<sup>30</sup> *Suara Pembaharuan* 2 May 1996.

<sup>31</sup> *Suara Pembaharuan* 8 May 1996.

territories such as West Papua in particular. There are two possible scenarios. First, although any withdrawal of the military from West Papua will affect the military capacity there, in order to improve its image, a limited withdrawal may well occur. Three years ago, the general command of the Indonesian armed forces at both the central and regional levels demonstrated a more moderate approach to the situation in Irian Jaya; the convicted soldiers in the Hoesa case were courtmartialled in Jayapura, and in August 1998 eight soldiers who were suspected of involvement in shootings in cities of West Papua were identified. The withdrawal of more than 1,000 soldiers, mainly members of KOPASSUS, in Mimika recently is an instance of pulling back. Secondly, a limited shift in the military's regional approach over the last two years indicates that the Indonesian armed forces in West Papua are under tremendous pressure. The shift from their customary coercive approach to a more humanist approach, described as a social approach by Djopari,<sup>32</sup> will also affect the role of the military in the future. Such fundamental changes may force the military to return to barracks; they have already been under media scrutiny for their involvement in civil affairs and have been criticised for becoming more bureaucratized, unprofessional and corrupt, and of taking over the political system rather than being its guarantor. The younger generation of generals is concerned about such criticisms and is more interested in its status as professional soldiers than in acting as politicians. For this new generation, continuation of the old Suharto style policies seems problematic and they urge the older officers to either retire or step down.

When the Indonesian economy recovers, the position of the military will also be affected. With recovery, and the development of a more export-oriented economic structure, there will probably be an attempt to

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<sup>32</sup> John R. Djopari (1993). *Pemberontakan Organisasi Papua Merdeka*, Grasindo, Jakarta, p.160.

reduce the high level of military expenditure. There will be a move to develop a more professional army, less corrupt, and less wasteful of resources, in an attempt to improve Indonesia's international image. In these circumstances, the military would return to barracks and regain its professionalism, intervening only when the state is facing serious threats.

The natural environment of West Papua also poses many disadvantages for conventional military operations, by restricting the deployment of the Indonesian army and the mounting of an offensive operation against the OPM. The terrain, which consists of swamps, deep valleys, tropical rainforests, long and dangerous rivers, and high mountains, makes its own unique contribution to the West Papua struggle and gives an advantage to the mobile local guerrilla units. These geographical features have played an important role in protecting the OPM from attacks; as General Prabowo Subianto himself admitted: "the field in Irian Jaya is so heavy".<sup>33</sup>

The Indonesian armed forces have undertaken many campaigns aimed at eliminating the OPM but for various reasons none of them has succeeded. My own experiences in 1978 proved to me that the soldiers could not operate in deep jungle on their own.<sup>34</sup> Also the geographical position of West Papua gives the OPM access to a relatively safe haven in PNG. Even though the Indonesian military have violated the sovereignty of PNG territory on many occasions, Indonesia is careful not to escalate the conflict to the extent that another flood of refugees pours into PNG, as this would

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<sup>33</sup> *Kompas* 18 May 1996.

<sup>34</sup> "When the guerrillas held hostages in 1978, 75 kilometres from our camp, the military could reach our camp. They were very afraid of getting out from their camp which was our old camp. They spent ammunition by shooting on the air for nothing. This is normal practice for the Indonesian military. When they report to their superiors, they say that they spent ammunition in weapon confrontation with the OPM. This episode indicates how fearful they are, their low morale and the lack of commitment", Otto Ondawame (1999).

generate much adverse international publicity and would expose as false Indonesia's oft repeated claims that the OPM is a spent force.<sup>35</sup> Offensives against the OPM's strongholds in remote areas along the border and in the highlands have always failed. The military failed to release hostages taken by the OPM in many cases despite its massive resources. A full-scale deployment of the military in West Papua therefore seems unlikely. Indonesian military air strikes, however, may be continued. By combining infantry troops and intensive air bombardments, ABRI has been able, in the past, to capture OPM bases and destroy civilian property. In most situations, the civilians eventually become the main target. Harrassment, threats, and intimidation of unarmed civilians by the Indonesian military will probably continue in cities and rural areas.

A Four Corners program of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation in 1999, titled "Blood On The Cross", raised serious allegations against the International Red Cross Committee, South African and British mercenaries, British SAS and military advisers, and Dutch advisers, over the controversial hostages crisis and human rights abuses in the Mapenduma district of West Papua on 9 April 1996. This damaging report exposed how these forces violated the symbol of the International Red Cross, manipulating the name of the organisation for military purposes during a desperate hostages release attempt.<sup>36</sup> Deploying foreign mercenaries with the military demonstrated the inability of the Indonesian military to release the hostages on its own, and damaged the credibility and reputation of the Indonesian armed forces.

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<sup>35</sup> Jim Elmslie (1995). *Irian Jaya in the 1990's: Economic Expansion and West Papuan Nationalism*, University of Sydney, p.22.

<sup>36</sup> Mark Davis 12 July 1999. "Blood on the Cross", Four Corners, ABC-TV, Sydney. [See also Otto Ondawame (12 July 1999), "International Controversy and the Cries of the People". Press Release, Canberra.]

Given the hostile attitude of the local people and the low fighting morale of the Indonesian military, it is difficult to predict how long the military's commitment to hunting down the OPM can continue. The classical counter insurgency activities of the military, such as orchestrating social and political unrest, hostage taking, rape and other forms of intimidation, will continue in an attempt to discredit the power of the OPM. The military will also undertake counter-propaganda campaigns by publicising OPM defeats and claiming that the OPM has been wiped out, labelling it as a mere terrorist group comprising a handful of people. But without forcing the involvement of the people of West Papua who have so often demonstrated their unwillingness to cooperate, the Indonesian military will continue to fail to crush the OPM and its spirit. The political atmosphere today is different from that in the 1960s; the Papuans now have much higher levels of political awareness and much stronger commitment to nationalism, and they are no longer so isolated.

The Papuans are now well aware that the Indonesian armed forces have serious problems, including low morale and lack of discipline. Moreover, the forces now face national and international scrutiny of their record of oppression, manipulation, provocation, and high occurrence of human rights abuses. Helicopters and aircraft are now used not merely to transport troops and equipment but also in the counter-insurgency campaigns in an effort by the Indonesian military authorities to boost the morale of their forces. Reliance on foreign mercenaries and Western military in operations such as the Mapenduma case, indicates serious weaknesses in the Indonesian armed forces' capacity to release hostages by their own efforts. Every attempt by the Indonesian army to crush the OPM has been unsuccessful, and an outright victory for Indonesia, as advocated by the Indonesian military, is unlikely in the future.

## The Military Capacities of the OPM

Like the Indonesian military, the OPM has its strengths and weaknesses as a fighting force. Before analysing these factors, let me first describe the present situation in the field.

The OPM's guerrilla forces have been decentralised into more than eight strategic areas. Over the last 30 years, these forces have been able to increase their tactical operations in both urban and rural areas. Each guerrilla unit in the region must follow general principles and guidelines in operating flexibly to maintain sufficient strength to increase its guerrilla activities independently. Military activities have to be localised within certain directions; in most cases, the regional command can plan most appropriately for local defensive and offensive guerrilla campaigns. From the end of December 1989 to June 1990, for example, the OPM withdrew its guerrilla units from physical confrontation with the enemy troops, and engaged more heavily in propaganda work, such as mass political awareness programs and training, and in psychological warfare. This defensive strategy was necessary because the enemy had already intensified its clean-up operation against the OPM in response to the events of 18 December 1989 when the OPM attacked transmigration site IV Arso in Jayapura district, killing 30 people and seriously wounding 30 others. In August 1990, the OPM resumed its military operations, first attacking Kiwirok ABRI outpost in Oksibil district in Wamena province, where 20 Indonesian soldiers were killed and two Indonesians were captured. Later, in the East Mimika region Kelly Kwalik engaged in guerrilla campaigns in 1994/95 and 1996, and Marthin Wenda, in the headquarters of the OPM, undertook a range of guerrilla activities, as described in chapter 4, between 1995 and 1999. Lastly, Bernard Mawen's group in the Merauke region resumed its guerrilla activities in Muting village, taking 109 Indonesians as hostage of war in

March 1999. All these actions demonstrate the capacity of the OPM to adapt defensive and offensive guerrilla campaigns to suit conditions at both local and national levels.

The military campaigns in the border region have had a range of political and social consequences. More than 12,000 West Papuan refugees in 1984, 640 in 1990, and 2,000 in 1995 have sought political asylum in Papua New Guinea. The sovereignty of Papua New Guinean territory has been repeatedly violated by the Indonesian armed forces. In 1990, the Indonesian army crossed the border into PNG while seeking OPM. Using aircraft and infantry troops, they bombed villages and destroyed property. Sixteen Papua New Guineans were killed in Yapsie and Bewani districts. In August 1990, an Indonesian joint land and air forces operation again crossed the border into PNG and bombed nearby villages, killing five people in the Imnai refugee camp and destroying property. Despite these violations, the government of PNG kept silent. Instead of lodging a protest, a joint PNG and Indonesian force intensified counter-attacks on the OPM and the PNG people in the border areas, particularly in the Sandaun (West Sepik) and East Sepik provinces in the north and the Western Province in the south of Papua New Guinea. Local reaction was massive. Local youth joined the OPM and systematic attacks took place. Earlier, in 1988, the OPM blew up bridges along the Trans Irian Highway, being built to connect Jayapura in the north to Merauke in the south of the country. But the OPM could not maintain its control over the area and the enemy regained control of the highways and doubled the number of its troops, with two battalions of the Special Command of the Cendrawasih Division deployed along the road. These incidents demonstrate that the OPM has the ability to regionalize the issue of West Papuan nationalism, even militarily; but can the OPM maintain its military capacity?

Many factors have played a role in maintaining the struggle over the years, but in analysing the military strengths of the OPM, I will focus on fighting capacity, natural environment (or co-existence with nature) mass support, the use of effective guerrilla tactics, learning from other liberation movements, and the impacts of the political and economic crisis in Indonesia as among the most significant factors.

### **Military Strengths of the OPM**

Fighting capacity and individual commitment are two major strengths of the OPM. The qualities of bravery, nationalist feeling and willpower are supported by technical fighting skills in the field. Yet despite these strengths, the OPM has been forced into a defensive position. It has sought to minimise this problem by trying out alternative tactics, including attacking the enemy when he is on the move, concentrating attention and operations on the main target areas, implementing more tactical warfare, and increasing solidarity with the opposition in Indonesia. To successfully attack specific targets, there is a need for solidarity and coordination among all guerrilla units, regional commands and even with the other liberation movements in Indonesia. Since the OPM reform program was introduced in 1976, guerrilla campaigns have been intensified. Bridges, installations, electric lines, radio stations, oil tanks, and harbours have been targeted in major operational actions. The success of such activities has been a direct result of cooperation, concentration and a well-planned defensive strategy.

Familiarity with the natural environment is another great strength for the OPM. In combination with higher fighting morale and improved mobility, it is because of their intimate knowledge of local conditions and situations, and, most importantly, their ability to adapt to the natural

environment, that the OPM has felt confident to conduct military campaigns on its own soil. This knowledge of natural conditions has both negative and positive outcomes. The local terrain creates massive difficulties for coordination of activities and in the delay of information flows and the movement of personnel and goods. On the other hand, the environment protects the patriots in the field, and provides them with their basic needs such as food (for example the abundance of sago palms, which provide a Papuan staple food). Consequently, the Indonesian military has difficulties in deploying against the OPM in rural areas. It has little knowledge of the local terrain and natural conditions in West Papua, and is dependent on the local people, often forcing them to serve as guides and be incorporated into the occupation forces. In the release operation in Mapenduma, for example, the Indonesian occupation forces forced the Dani people in Tiom town to take a "pig oath" to confirm their cooperation with the Indonesian military in the release operation. The food preferences of the two parties also influence their ability to survive and continue their military campaigns in the rural areas. The Indonesian military depends on food supplies from its headquarters, particularly rice and tinned fish. On the other hand, the OPM relies on readily available local foods such as sweet potatoes and sago. The undeveloped communications network in West Papua can also be an advantage for the OPM, as the mobility of the Indonesian military is severely reduced because of the bad condition of the road network. As a consequence, the Indonesian military mostly has to depend on aircraft in its counter-insurgency operations against the OPM, bombing camps and food stocks.

The OPM also enjoys mass support. Most West Papuans support the struggle directly or indirectly. The OPM enjoys widespread sympathy and support among the population in the very heartland of the colonial regime.

Many Papuan civilians who are working in the Indonesian administration or at Cendrawasih University have proved to be active OPM supporters.<sup>37</sup> Papuans in the army, police, the public administration, intellectuals, students, women, and people in the towns and villages all support the idea of independence. The forms of support vary but include, according to Djopari,<sup>38</sup> active participation in OPM activities (physical action, distribution of information and pamphlets, the provision of information, and taking part in secret meetings); the provision of materials such as food, medicines, clothes, money and cigarettes, and assistance in maintaining the communication network, and providing security and transport; encouraging and recruiting others by telling about the OPM's objectives, its heroic experiences and its social value; and providing critical social and political feedback to the OPM's leaders. The OPM is confident that with such mass support the national liberation struggle can never be stopped.

Another important factor is the OPM's ability to use guerrilla tactics and local materials which are appropriate to a particular time and location.<sup>39</sup> Any wastage of limited resources is regarded as a serious abuse and is not, therefore, acceptable within OPM general policy. In line with this view, guerrilla campaigns are a particularly appropriate strategy for the OPM: they make limited demands on resources of manpower and materials, and the local conditions of the people do not permit engagement in large scale confrontations.

In the post-Suharto period, the mass movement inside the country has taken firm root. Team-100 of the Forum for Reconciliation for the

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<sup>37</sup> Budiardjo and Liem, *op. cit.*:74.

<sup>38</sup> Djopari, *op.cit.*:130-131.

<sup>39</sup> Ivor Hedberg (12 July 1999) "I am very happy to be killed by weapon rather than local poison, made from orchid. These local people are capable to produce those things, therefore, we must very careful about it", in "Blood on the Cross", Four Corners, ABC-TV, Sydney.

People of West Papua (FORERI), a new call for the independence of West Papua was expressed to President Habibie during the national dialogue on 26 February 1999 in Jakarta. None of the 100 delegates to the national dialogue nor the people of West Papua opposed this proposal. Moreover, a public opinion poll taken in West Papua in February 1999 indicated that 99 per cent of the Papuans want independence. Neles Tebay reported on this first public opinion poll as follows:

Public opinion poll was taken in West Papua before national dialogue taken place in Jakarta. Taken examples, in Mimika regency: out of 13,755 people, only three wanted autonomy. In Japen Waropen in the north: out of 16,281 people, only 200 wanted autonomy and only five agreed to federal system. In Manokwari: out of 24 districts, only two districts wanted autonomy.<sup>40</sup>

The general public in West Papua fully understands that the OPM is waging a national war against the Indonesian occupation forces. They are well aware that the international community denied the rights of Papuans to freedom and independence in the New York Agreement in 1962 and again in the Act of Free Choice in 1969. Most importantly, the experience of colonisation, exploitation and human rights abuses in the country has created a deep-seated resentment against the occupation forces, which will continue for generations. There is a world of difference in morale between the people of West Papua and the occupying Indonesians. The OPM is waging a war for their survival and dignity and waging it on their own soil. In contrast, the occupation forces are a foreign power and they are forced to defend Jakarta's political ambitions and brutalities at any cost. Thus, the level of moral obligation is also different between the OPM and the occupation forces. The moral duty of every Papuan is to defend his or her land, country and dignity. The OPM enjoys mass support because the OPM is

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<sup>40</sup> *Jakarta Post* 19 February 1999. "Irianese poll snub of General Election".

not fighting its own government for social change but is fighting against an external occupation force in order to achieve a fundamental change.

Lessons from the successes of liberation movements elsewhere in the world have also inspired the OPM and strengthened its firm conviction that the movement will achieve victory in the end, no matter how long it takes. Many of the national liberation struggles of the colonised and oppressed peoples in Africa, Asia and Latin America against powerful Western colonial powers in the 1950s and 1960s succeeded in achieving victory. This historical evidence convinces the people that their national liberation struggle in West Papua will achieve the same success. The defeat of the United States in the Vietnam War and of France in the Algerian War provide inspiration. The willpower of the people and their stand on their own soil were two major factors in these victories. Also the United States and France had their own sophisticated weapons, whereas Indonesia is heavily dependent on external assistance.

The current political and economic crisis and the emerging process of democratisation in Indonesia will also affect the Indonesian military structure, functions and strategies. Today the different ethnic groups that comprise "Indonesia" (the various people that comprised the "Dutch East Indies") are still struggling to regain their freedom and independence from Javanese colonial domination. The fate of the unitary state is under serious challenge. The Dayak people in West Kalimantan, the Moluccans, the Acehnese, the West Papuans, the people of Riau, and the East Timorese have openly stated their political desires during the post-Suharto period.

The ease of recruitment to the OPM has been another important factor. While the occupation forces portray the OPM as a "handful of

gangsters " for the Papuans, "We are all OPM." Despite this political reality, in relation to the OPM "the Indonesians continue to claim they are a small group of bandits who enjoy no local support. "The reality is that the majority of the indigenous population identify with (them)".<sup>41</sup> The OPM provides a forum where the general aspirations of the people can be expressed; all segments of Papuan society support the aims and objectives of the movement. It is, truly, a mass movement. In all of the OPM's nine military regional commands, the masses are fully aware that in their villages, towns, districts and regions a war for freedom and independence is being waged. Such political awareness is an important tool for mass mobilisation, as regular or irregular (militia) units. The handful of regular guerrilla units is supported by several hundred irregular and militia guerrilla units operating in West Papua.

The OPM cadres and fighters possess three distinctive qualities: bravery, deep commitment, and the willpower to continue the struggle and make sacrifices to defend the very survival of the nation. These are the driving forces for success, but these qualities alone cannot end colonial domination; they must be supported by armed struggle. Regular basic military training, with high levels of discipline, has given positive results. The OPM has attracted a considerable number of soldiers who have deserted from the Indonesian military; these can offer new recruits valuable training and experience.

The capability of the OPM can also be measured in terms of recruitment and replacement of leaders. When a leader has been captured there has been no difficulty in identifying a suitable replacement. The OPM has the capability to produce new qualified cadres for leadership positions

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<sup>41</sup> *Sunday Tasmanian* 7 March 1999. "Man who made dreams reality".

and has no problems in recruiting new cadres.<sup>42</sup> The Papuan youth who have suffered from colonial repression, in refugee camps and in liberated areas, have high morale and willpower and are highly motivated to join the national liberation struggle. In the last few years, the numbers of trained operational leaders has increased in the rural areas.

### **Military Weaknesses of the OPM**

Despite these strengths, the OPM has some continuing weaknesses as a military organisation, particularly in relation to: logistical capacity, communications, personnel capacity and distribution, organisational structure, leadership, political vision and strategic choices.

Logistical capacity in any organisation is vital; without logistical support, a national movement cannot survive and progress. The OPM still suffers from a seriously limited logistical capacity. As the OPM has not received foreign support, it has had to rely on its own efforts and local support. A very significant source of logistics has been the seizure, or purchase, of arms from the Indonesian military. The OPM has a slogan: "the enemy's arms are ours".<sup>43</sup> But these weapons are used only when there is real necessity or if there is a good chance of success. For the most part, the guerrilla units of the OPM are equipped only with traditional weapons - namely bows and arrows. Yet in guerrilla warfare these traditional weapons have been remarkably successful. During the uprisings which occurred in the highlands in the 1960s-1990s, in Paniai, Wamena, Akimuga and Ilaga for example, traditional weapons played a significant role. These have been supplemented by home-made guns and explosives. During the uprising in Freeport in 1977, a pipeline, bridges and an electricity station were

<sup>42</sup> Budiardjo and Liem, *op. cit.*:64.

<sup>43</sup> Marthen Tabu (1978), the former Chief of Staff of Tentara Pembebasan Papua Barat (TEPENAL), Markas Pemka, 1978.

successfully blown up. Nevertheless, the lack of logistical support is a major problem, the OPM often cannot defend liberated territories and most actions are necessarily tactical operations, with hit and run raids an important tactic. The OPM is fully aware that traditional weapons alone cannot repel an enemy which continues to acquire more lethal weapons. Other supplies such as food and medicines have also been limited, but the OPM has mostly been able to rely on the local environment.

Access to an effective communications network is also vital to any liberation movement, and here also the OPM has a serious weakness. Lack of press freedom and tight security measures imposed by the Indonesian authorities,<sup>44</sup> combined with lack of access to foreign and national mass media personnel and the limited mass media facilities, has ensured that events in West Papua are seldom reported accurately. In the 1970s the OPM attempted to improve this situation by building up communications networks inside and outside West Papua. Besides a regular courier network, radio communication networks were established inside West Papua, facilitating communication among guerrilla units at regional and district levels. Despite the low level of technology, such measures were effective in exposing the brutality of the occupation forces. A radio communication centre was also established in Vanautu with the same objective. However the local communication networks were destroyed by the Indonesian military during its counter-insurgency campaigns against the OPM. Using OV-10 Broncos, the Indonesian forces bombed the OPM camp in the north in 1978 and destroyed these vital assets.

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<sup>44</sup> Beverley Blaskett (1993). "Resistance Movement As a Nationalist Force: A Brief History of the OPM", in Garry Trompf (ed.), *Islands and Enclaves: Nationalism and Separatist Pressures in Islands and Littoral Context*, Sterling Publishers Private Limited, New Delhi, p.313.

In terms of structural communications, as mentioned earlier, the country's infrastructure is also very poorly developed. There are few roads, and air traffic (which is expensive) is controlled by the Indonesian military. It has therefore been very difficult for the OPM to coordinate regional activities effectively as information flows have always been subject to delays. The OPM does have a few trained technical personnel but their skills have not been used effectively. There is still need for higher levels of education and more training, particularly in technical communications areas.

Due to these weaknesses, even when events are reported accurately, the OPM's communications are regarded as unreliable and propagandist, leaving the OPM with low credibility.

The OPM has a loose organisational structure, without clear directives, lines of control, or effective leadership. Ideally, such a movement should have a national congress, whose decisions would be executed by some form of national executive council, with bureaux providing sectoral leadership at national and regional levels. However, this does not exist in the OPM. For operational purposes, the OPM is divided into two major bureaux: one political and one military. The major tasks of the political bureau are engaging in political campaigns abroad, encouraging mass political education, seeking support, and giving advice to the military wing inside the country. Currently, the OPM political bureau operates from an office in Malmö, Sweden. The military wing, which is also called the National Liberation Army of West Papua (NLAWP), is located within the country with the primary task of engaging in military campaigns and training, and the secondary task of providing support for political action. For operational and geo-political reasons, the OPM is necessarily a highly decentralised organisation. There are nine regional commands in West

Papua, as outlined in Chapter Four, but only five of these are consistently active. The regional commands have been given full autonomy to implement central policy in accordance with regional capacity, needs and conditions. They have responsibility for carrying out basic military training, implementing guerrilla warfare, and launching political campaigns. At the district level, a squad of regular units can cooperate with other units to carry out the orders of the regional command, such as military operations in the districts and villages, and development programs in the rural areas. There are also special commands which have equal status with the regional commands. These include the West Papuan Intelligence Service (PIS) and the Special Headquarters Command. Apart from carrying out their regular duties, these commands are also involved in civilian activities such as rural development programs, health care, education, and building houses, bridges, and schools for the local community. Yet despite this well-conceived command structure, the OPM's organisational capacity is still constrained by the lack of national unity, strong leadership, and clear political vision.

The lack of national unity, leadership and political vision has many roots. First, the OPM is a highly factionalised organisation,<sup>45</sup> largely because of the traditional strength of regionalism and ethnic sentiments. Discrimination frequently occurs between different groups within the Papuan community on the basis of ethnic, religious, social class and gender differences. One group of people believes itself to be superior to another; for example, the Papuans of the islands and coastal areas believe that they have the right to control the other groups because they were the first communities to be civilised. This leads to the second problem: leadership disputes within the OPM. The major leadership split that occurred in the

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<sup>45</sup> Osborne, *op. cit.*:77-113. (See also Blaskett, *op.cit.*:320-326).

OPM in 1976 was a reflection of these social divisions. As argued in chapter 4, the split was based not on political ideology but on social differences. While as yet no natural leaders with clear political vision and high personal integrity and discipline have gained the support of the masses, certain ethnic groups in West Papua believe that leadership of the OPM must be in their hands. The struggle over leadership and representation has become an endemic problem within the OPM.<sup>46</sup>

Constant leadership struggle within the movement helps to create the third problem, namely that of presenting a unified political vision and strategy to the world community that can become a basis for international trust and support. What is needed is a clear definition of the OPM's main objectives and aims, together with strategies and tactics to achieve these goals. The OPM has a clear vision of the type of society it would like to establish in an independent West Papua, but the gaining of political independence will not mean that every citizen can immediately and equally enjoy the fruits of the struggle. Issues of social justice and discrimination remain major problems in every independent state, because political elites are seldom tuned in to the real motivation of their people in their struggle for liberation from the colonial powers. The OPM and its entire leadership must understand this and begin to establish a mechanism for minimising the dangerous social gaps that are likely to emerge in the future. In the last fifteen years, the OPM has attempted to improve internal cohesion by organising seminars, workshops and conferences, but as described in Chapter Three, these attempts have been hampered by financial difficulties and the lack of knowledge about how to resolve such problems. This failure then becomes a strategic problem. In the ongoing struggle for independence, these social divisions have been used by the occupation forces in their

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<sup>46</sup> Blaskett, *op. cit.*:312.

divide-and-rule policy. Manipulation, orchestration of social and political activities, and bribery have been deployed to achieve Indonesian political objectives.

The OPM has demonstrated its ability to maintain the struggle over all these years without getting any strong external support, but it has failed to maintain its focus on selective strategic choices. For example, the organisation has not consistently worked on the regionalisation of the struggle; this has thus become only a periodic interest, leaving room for factional disputes. The OPM has been unable to develop effective organisation and leadership that could convince the regional powers to cooperate and coordinate. In order to improve its image, a new initiative has called for yet another attempt at national reconciliation and yet another restructuring of the OPM. However the question remains whether even if the OPM were able to resolve its internal problems, the international community will then support the OPM.

### **5.5. Conclusion**

The Indonesian military's perception of "threats" has regularly been used to justify the occupation forces' building up of their military capacity and gaining special status for their operations in West Papua. As a consequence, an unhealthy relationship between the OPM and the occupation forces has existed for many years, and high levels of brutality and mass destruction have been widely reported. The Indonesian armed forces have both strengths and weakness. The occupation forces have large numbers of personnel, an effective organisational structure, an efficient communication network, a good logistical support, and enjoy lavish foreign aid. Yet despite such advantages, they have still been unable to crush the OPM. The combination of low morale, discipline problems, geographical obstacles and

the hostile attitudes of the local people has contributed to their failure to defeat the OPM. Despite its apparent superiority, the Indonesian military is unlikely to be victorious in West Papua.

On the other hand, the OPM also its problems. Despite high morale, better knowledge of the local situation, mass support, inspiration from the experiences of other liberation movements in the world, and the ability to take advantage of the current political and economic crisis in Indonesia, the movement has weaknesses that pose obstacles to its progress. Lack of logistical support, an effective communications network, well-trained personnel, an effective organisational structure, and of national unity, leadership and political vision, and international support makes any hope for outright military victory untenable in the immediate future. The OPM is alone; no external backer is likely to oppose Indonesia on behalf of the Papuans. According to Elmslie, an independent West Papua remains a remote possibility, in the context of a possible collapse of the Indonesian state.<sup>47</sup>

In order to achieve its political goals, the OPM must overcome its internal weaknesses. The issues of organisational structure, national unity, leadership and political program must be redefined clearly, and the OPM must counter the divide-and-rule policy of the colonial power by undertaking an intensified international political campaign in order to gain support. However, in the foreseeable future the only developments which might enable the OPM to make a breakthrough militarily would be either a significant upsurge of the separatist movements in Aceh, the Moluccas, Kalimantan and Sulawesi or, more likely, a Balkanisation of Indonesia involving prolonged conflict between military factions in Java. It is unlikely

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<sup>47</sup> Elmslie, *op. cit.*:17.

that a negotiated outcome similar to that in East Timor will occur in West Papua: first, West Papua is not on the United Nations list of non-self-governing territories but is accepted by nearly all governments as being an integral part of Indonesia; secondly, West Papua does not have the advantage of a guilty former colonial power to champion its cause in the international arena, as Portugal does for East Timor; thirdly, West Papua does not at present have regional support - the South Pacific Forum (SPF) has declined to offer support as it has in the case of Kanaky; fourthly, West Papua is so rich in land, gold, oil, forests and mineral resources that Indonesia will not give it up without struggling to the bitter end; finally, any opposition within the country is also still weak, even though there is momentum for change coming from non-violent groups such as the Forum for Reconciliation of the People of West Papua (FORERI).

Despite all these obstacles, the OPM as a nationalist movement stands on its own soil and is supported by a majority of the people of West Papua. The intensification of colonial oppression has merely reinforced public sentiments; this can be seen from the increase in opposition to the occupation forces in the post-Suharto period.

## Epilogue

Following the downfall of President Suharto in May 1998 and the opening of some democratic space in Indonesian politics, and especially after East Timor's vote for independence, West Papuans began more openly discussing their aspirations for independence. Amongst other developments, in July 1998 a Forum for the Reconciliation of the People of Irian Jaya (FORERI) was established among a group of church leaders, NGO activists and intellectuals, to press for a national dialogue on the future status of West Papua (see Chapter 7). The following year, in February, a group of 100 representatives from various sectors of West Papuan society met with President Habibie in Jakarta. The "Team-100", led by LEMASA chair Tom Beanal, presented a list of demands, including a demand for national dialogue, but surprised President Habibie when Beanal also called for West Papua's independence.

In February 2000 supporters of West Papuan independence organized a "Great Consultation" (*Musyawaharah Besar Papua 2000*) at Sentani, in which 350 delegates participated. This meeting repudiated the 1969 so-called Act of Free Choice and created a thirty-person Papuan Presidium Council (*Dewan Presidium Papua*), with Theys Eluay and Tom Beanal as co-chairs. (The Presidium was subsequently expanded to thirty-one members.) Theys, a traditional chief from Sentani, had been, before the fall of Suharto, a senior official in the provincial government and a prominent local member of the ruling Golkar Party; in 1998 he emerged as an opponent of the regime and a strong advocate of Papuan independence. The Presidium Council was mandated to organize a Second Papuan Congress (*Kongres Papua*)—the First Papuan Congress having been held in December 1961. This Second Congress was held in Port Numbay (Jayapura) in May-June, with financial assistance from President Wahid. Eluay emerged from this meeting as sole chairman,

with Beanal as vice chairman. The Second Congress declared that West Papua had been independent since December 1961, when the Morning Star flag had first been raised in the West Papuan capital. It spoke of a new unity within the national movement and tasked the Presidium with seeking international support.

Although the OPM is represented on the Presidium Council, neither the leaders of FORERI nor the organisers of the Second Congress consulted adequately the OPM about policies, programmes or strategy. Eluay has said that that the Presidium Council seeks a diplomatic solution to the West Papuan struggle, not a military one. The OPM, in contrast, advocates both a military and a political approach. There are also differences within the Presidium between the Eluay and Beanal factions, concerning questions of leadership and of strategy.

Shortly after the Second Congress several West Papuan leaders, including Eluay, were arrested and now face charges of treason. The Indonesian military has also reimposed the ban on the flying of the Morning Star flag. As 2000 came to a close the prospects for meaningful national dialogue appeared to be diminishing.

## Appendix 2: The Demands of LEMASA

### I. Recognise the Existence of the Amungme and their Fundamental Rights

1. Recognition of and respect for the existence of the Amungme and their traditional rights over resources including land, mountains, valleys, forest, secret places and all their integrity in Amungsa.

2. Denounce the cooperative plan to dispossess the Amungme from their traditional land. The Amungme have rights to preserve their own dignity and the future of coming generations including deciding on places where they want to live in Amungsa, whether in foothills, valleys or low land. Foreigners do not have rights to determine their future or to dispossess them.

3. Protection for the Amungme and their traditional secret places, including those of the Kamoro and the other indigenous people of Irian Jaya, from all types of exploitative development activities.

4. Guaranteed freedom of movement for the Amungme to visit their relatives in all villages between Jigi-Mugi and the new Delamatagal resettlement, and to practise gardening, hunting and all aspects of their culture in Amungsa.

5. An ending of all types of discrimination, humiliation and repression that undermine the existence, dignity and self-respect of the Amungme and Kamoro and other indigenous peoples of West Papua (Irian Jaya).

6. The cessation of all types of oppression, repression, and intimidation, and of all empty promises made to the Amungme in return for releasing their traditional land, forestry, mountains, stones, coast and other natural resources.

7. Any release of the traditional land, mountains, forest, rivers, stones, and so on which have been or are owned by individuals or the Amungme in Amungsa in the past years, in the present and in the future, will only be valid when the Amungme Naisorei, the Amungme Consultation Council (LEMASA), has agreed to it.

8. Ultimate priority in any opportunity of education, training and employment must be given to the Amungme, Kamoro and the other indigenous West Papuans (Irianese) in every development activity in Amungsa and Mimika.

9. Improvement of the social, economic and cultural conditions of the Amungme to be conducted under the direction of the Amungme Naisorei in cooperation with other selected institutions.

## II. Normalise Daily Living Conditions

1. Withdraw all the Indonesian Armed Forces from the province of Irian Jaya, particularly from Amungsa and Mimika. Reduce the intelligence activities and tight controls over the daily life of the local civilians. Increase the quality of the function of the police of Indonesia in accordance with law and valid regulations.
2. Stop all types of human rights abuses against civilians, particularly the Amungme, Kamoro, Dani, Ekagi/Me and Moni and the other indigenous peoples in Irian Jaya (West Papua).
3. Stop all types of politics and practices of divide-and-rule policy which attempt to divide people in Irian Jaya, whether within a tribe or between tribes, as experienced in the cases of the killing of 11 Amungme civilians in Hoesa perpetrated by a soldier of the Indonesian armed forces originating from Moni, and of the killing of Notomkal Janapa, an Amungme, in Aroanop perpetrated by a group of Dani after the OPM flag raising and demonstration on 25 December 1994 in Tembagapura.
4. Discard and cease all types of false labelling, such as the Security Disturbance Movement for the OPM, of any struggle for justice and democracy made by the Amungme and Kamoro and the other indigenous peoples in Irian as citizens of Indonesia.
5. Freeport McMoRan Copper and Gold Inc. as a multinational company operating in Indonesia must be brought to face charges in court both in the USA and Indonesia in relation to its involvement in all types of human rights abuses and the destruction of the environment since its presence in Irian Jaya, starting from 1967.
6. The Commission of Human Rights and the Working Group for Indigenous Peoples of the United Nations must be called on to investigate the issues of human rights abuses perpetuated by the apparatus of the government, the Indonesian armed forces and transnational companies operating in Irian Jaya province, particularly in Amungsa and Mimika.
7. Prosecute and expose the identity and crimes of all persons who have been involved in human rights abuses in Irian Jaya.
8. Proceed against and prosecute persons who have been involved in human rights abuses, whether as individuals or on behalf of an institution, in accordance with the valid law.
9. Persons who are found fully accountable for human rights abuses must pay compensation to victims or the family of the victims and restore their credibility, whether individual, institution or tribe.

10. Persons who are found accountable for human rights abuses must immediately release prisoners and return "the disappeared persons" (if they are still alive) or the bodies or bones of the victims to their families to bury them peacefully.

11. Freeport Indonesia must immediately stop all indiscriminate dumping of wastes and clean up all tailing wastes from the rivers and the overburden of rocks and soil in valleys and lakes in the mountain ranges of Amungsa and Mimika.

12. Allow international independent institutions to monitor and investigate the destruction of the environment in Amungsa and Mimika and its impacts on the indigenous peoples caused by Freeport Indonesia since its initial presence in 1967.

13. Freeport Indonesia must pay full and fair compensation for its exploitation of mineral resources (copper, gold, silver and so on) and for the land it has confiscated and exploited between 1967 and 1995 (the present).

14. Freeport Indonesia must pay full and fair compensation for the environmental destruction of mountains, rivers, land, forest and so on it has caused in Amungsa and Mimika since its presence from 1967 until 1995 (the present).



### **Appendix 3: Political Communique From the People of West Papua to the Government of the Republic of Indonesia**

The basic problems which have caused political instability and insecurity in West Papua (Irian Jaya) from 1963 to today are not solely due to failure of the Development Programs but due to the Political Status of West Papua which on December 1, 1961 was proclaimed as an independent nation among other nations in the world. The Declaration should have marked the realization of the hopes and expectations of the West Papuans, who were then annexed by the Republic of Indonesia.

On this basis, we honestly declare to the President of the Republic of Indonesia that there is no possibility of consenting to the desire of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia to develop the People of West Papua in the context of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia in the future.

On this day, Friday, 26 February 1999, we the People of West Papua declare to the President of the Republic of Indonesia that:

Firstly, we the people of West Papua want to separate ourselves from the Unitary Republic of Indonesia to be fully sovereign and independent among other nations in the world.

Secondly, to establish as soon as possible a Transition Government in West Papua under the auspices of the United Nations, democratically, peacefully and accountably, at the latest by March 1999.

Thirdly, if there is no response to this Political Statement, specifically to the First and Second Statements, we then demand:

- i. an International Dialogue between the government of the Republic of Indonesia, the West Papuan People and the United Nations;
- ii. that we the people of West Papua hereby declare our intention to abstain from the General Election of the Republic of Indonesia in 1999.

This Political Statement is made and handed to the President of the Republic of Indonesia in Jakarta.

Prepared in: Jakarta on the day of February 26th 1999

(Signed on behalf of the people of West Papua)

100 delegates from West Papua.



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