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A HISTORY OF SOUTH-EAST PAPUA TO 1930

MARGRIET ROE

Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Australian National University
The whole is my original work.

Margriet Roe.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction ........................................ vi
Ch. I  Prologue: the Land and the People ........ 1.
Ch. II Discovery and Exploration .................. 31.
Ch. III The Advent of Christianity ............... 56.
Ch. IV The Labour Traffic .......................... 82.
Ch. V The Representatives of Western Commerce before 1906 117.
Ch. VI The Protectorate .............................. 158.
Ch. VII The Period of Joint Control .............. 212.
Ch. VIII The Colony under Australia ............. 275.
Ch. IX Mission Consolidation and Development .... 384.
Ch. X The Unofficial Population from 1906 ....... 451.
Conclusion .......................................... 515.
Bibliography ........................................ 519.
Gazetteer ............................................ 551.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
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<tr>
<td>A.N.C.</td>
<td>Armed Native Constabulary.</td>
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<td>A.N.U.</td>
<td>Australian National University.</td>
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<td>A.N.Z.A.A.S.</td>
<td>Australian and New Zealand Association for the Advancement of Science.</td>
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<td>A.R.M.</td>
<td>Assistant Resident Magistrate.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bris.Courier</td>
<td>Brisbane Courier.</td>
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<td>C.N.A.</td>
<td>Commissioner for Native Affairs.</td>
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<td>Col P.P.</td>
<td>Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers.</td>
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<td>E.D.</td>
<td>Eastern Division.</td>
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<td>Govt.Sec.</td>
<td>Government Secretary later Official Secretary.</td>
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<td>I.N.L.</td>
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<td>R.M.</td>
<td>Resident Magistrate.</td>
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<td>R.G.S.A.</td>
<td>Royal Geographic Society of Australasia.</td>
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<td>S.E.D.</td>
<td>South Eastern Division.</td>
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<td>S.M.H.</td>
<td>Sydney Morning Herald.</td>
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<td>V.C.</td>
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The aim of this thesis is to illuminate the history of Papua by examining in detail a particular area and period. It scrutinises the impact on Papuan society of the three chief European influences: Christianity, capitalist economics, and government. Although arriving last, officials soon occupied the dominant position. Their records, while deficient at many points, comprised basic source material. Thus existence and accessibility of relevant records largely determined the limits, both of place and time, for the thesis.

I do not attempt to give a general political history of the colony, but assume that the reader is acquainted with the main events in that story. These were the establishment of a British Protectorate on 6 November 1884, annexation by Britain on 4 September 1888, and the coming into force of the Papua Act on 1 September 1906. So, too, I do not elaborate the background and achievements of the chief personalities involved: Sir Peter Scratchley, John Douglas, Hugh Hastings Romilly, Anthony Musgrave, William MacGregor, George LeHunte, Francis Winter, Christopher Stansfeld Robinson, Francis Rickman Barton, and John Hubert Plunkett Murray. Nevertheless I have found it necessary to
begin each chapter of administrative history with a general survey of policy in the particular period under review. My emphasis thereafter is to show how personal and social exigencies modified the administrators' attempts, first to control the indigenous and immigrant populations, and then to shape the future development of the colony by creating a multi-racial society.
PROLOGUE: THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE

Mainland New Guinea and its offshore islands lie between the equator and the twelfth degree of latitude south, extending from the one hundred and twenty-ninth to the one hundred and fifty-fifth parallel of longitude east. Slightly less than a quarter of this region constitutes the territory of Papua. This thesis is a study of European penetration and consequent developments in the south-east segment of Papua, comprising the Eastern and South-eastern administrative Divisions. Geographically this area extends from Millport Harbour to the head of Goodenough Bay on the mainland and includes all the off-lying islands, from Tuma and the Trobriands in the north to Rossel in the east and Abau and Mailu in the south-west. This is an area of some seventy one thousand square miles much of which is water. (1) In the triangle which stretches from the Trobriands to Susau in the west and Rossel in the east the total land mass in relation to water is very small.

On the mainland, the south coast from Millport Harbour to China Strait is fronted by a series of barrier reefs broken in places to form passes leading to sheltered anchorages. Most of the terrain is steep and well wooded; there is hardly any

(1) Dept. of the Interior National Mapping Section, see Maps amended to August 1952.
coastal plain. There are no large rivers although many quick-flowing streams dissect the ranges (part of the Cloudy mountain chain) and flow into the sea. Swamps are therefore rare. The Cloudy mountain peninsula is separated from the rest of the land mass by a narrow, fairly low isthmus which extends from Mullens Harbour to Milne Bay. Many islands lie scattered along this coastline: Abau and Mailu in the far west, Dufaure, Brumer, the Lebrid group, then Teste in the east. (2)

China Strait separates New Guinea from the island chains that stretch far eastwards. Navigation through it is dangerous, even for vessels with engines, because reefs and rocky islets abound and these affect currents. There are many of these tiny islands of which the most important are Samarai and Kwato. Geographical features on the mainland do not change significantly once South Cape is rounded. The mountains behind the southern arm of Milne Bay drop sharply to a narrow coastal plain which broadens towards the head of the bay. Although there is only one river of any size, the Gibara, rainfall is heavy and numerous creeks have their headwaters in the mountains. The north shore of Milne Bay, bounded by a long peninsula which has the Sterling

(2) Gt. Britain. Admiralty Handbook Naval Intelligence Division, vol. IV, 55; Fleurieu, Discoveries of the French in 1768 and 1769 to the South East of New Guinea, 85-89 and Charts II and IX; Malinowski, Natives of Mailu, 503-505.
range as its spine, terminates at East Cape, a narrow rugged point between three and four thousand feet above sea level. (3)

As in Milne Bay the coastal plain in Goodenough Bay rises abruptly to the main New Guinea cordillera, at this point the Owen Stanley range. Again there are no large rivers but many mountain streams. The terrain is even more rugged than further south. The rainfall is heavy, particularly in the mountains. (4)

There is little diversity about the mainland topography as terrain and rainfall are similar throughout but the islands vary enormously both in size, geological formation and geographic features. The D'Entrecasteaux group, situated only a few miles north-east of East Cape, consists of three main islands and many smaller ones. Goodenough, the most westerly, is about twenty-four miles in diameter. Most of the island is over one thousand feet above sea-level and odd peaks rise over eight thousand feet. River valleys are deeply etched into the volcanic soil. This factor, in conjunction with a high rainfall, causes bad soil erosion particularly at the higher levels. In the lower-lying parts of the island, mainly in the north and north-east, the

(3) Handbook, 55; Malinowski, Argonauts of the Western Pacific, 38.
rivers tend to ramify so that swamps are fairly extensive. (5)

Moresby Strait, a very narrow stretch of water, separates Fergusson island from Goodenough. Fergusson is also relatively large, some forty miles from east to west and twenty north to south. It is composed of three distinct, irregularly shaped volcanic masses rising to heights over five thousand feet then falling precipitously. The mountains are separated from one another by flat isthmuses. Mangroves fringe most of the coast and there are also inland freshwater swamps of sago and nipa palm. Fringing reefs and coral patches are common in all inlets and harbours. (6)

An island chain of volcanic origin, comprising over a dozen islets, lies to the north-east of Fergusson. The most westerly of these are the Amphletts: infertile, precipitous, rising from great depths and therefore free of coral outcrops. Yabwaia, only two miles broad, rises over one thousand six hundred feet above sea level, others in the group are over a thousand feet high. Further east there is a similar group of islands, but Sanaroa, the largest, is relatively low. To the south lies Dobu a small, perfect volcanic cone rising to nine

hundred feet above sea level. (7)

Normanby, approximately forty miles across at the widest point, is separated from Fergusson by the narrow Dawson Strait. The whole island is hilly, its peaks rising over three thousand feet. There is hardly any coastal plain and relatively little swampland although mangroves fringe the shores of a few bays. Sewa and Sawataitai are the most important landing places. (8)

North-east of Normanby and some ninety miles from East Cape lies the Trobriand group of four main islands and several islets. They form a striking contrast to the D'Entrecasteaux islands being small, flat, and of limestone formation. Kirivina, very much larger than any of the others, is some thirty miles long but very narrow except in the north. Apart from one section of the west coast its shores consist of rugged coral ridges which rise sharply to heights up to one hundred feet. Within this atoll rim the land, which once formed the lagoon floor, is level and low-lying, much of it being swampy. The drier areas are exceptionally fertile, perhaps the most fertile in the whole of New Guinea apart from the Gazelle peninsula. Certainly it is the most productive land in south-

east Papua. Of the other islands only Kailuna has a similar fertile depression, the rest are fairly barren coral atolls. (9)

Some ninety miles east of the Trobriands is Murua, or Woodlark, a large island of approximately three hundred and seventy square miles. Between it and the Trobriands lie a cluster of small raised atolls: the Marshall Bennetts. South-west of Murua is another knot of islets, the Egum group, thirty miles east of them lies the Laughingatoll which supports seven minute islands. All these groups are infertile, fairly flat, and tiny. (10)

Murua itself provides a sharp contrast to the surrounding islands being larger and having a diverse topography. Its western and southern shores are heavily fringed with mangrove swamps but two main areas of high land stand out from the rest of the relatively low terrain. On the north-east coast coral ridges similar to those on Kiriwina rise sharply up to heights of two hundred feet then fall precipitously towards a low-lying trough broken by two conical peaks each of which stands several hundred feet above sea level. South of the central depression is another mass of hills, the highest peak being over one

(9) Ibid, 294-296; Malinowski, Argonauts, 49-51.
thousand feet high. Three fairly long rivers drain the central trough. The coral ridge has little surface drainage but at the foot of its leeward slope three lakes with swampy margins absorb much of the moisture. Madau island, lying very close to Murua in the north-west, is much smaller but of the same formation having only geologically recently become separated from the main island. Murua is farthest east of all islands in this latitude; an unbroken expanse of the Pacific separates it from the Solomons some hundreds of miles to the north-east.

There are however many islands fairly close to the south. (11) These form part of the Louisiade archipelago which extends from China Strait in the west to Rossel island. Close to the New Guinea mainland are numerous small islands, Rogeia, Sariba, Sidia, Basilaki and many others. They are all of metamorphic origin, rugged and high in proportion to their size. Navigation between them is dangerous because of currents, shoals, and coral patches. The Engineer and Conflict groups lie east of Basilaki in a shallow reef-studded sea. The main islands in these groups are of metamorphic origin although the smaller ones are formed of limestone. The Torlesse group, further east, is of limestone formation and the islets are flat and barren. The

Deboyne Islands, adjacent to the Torlesse group, provide a striking contrast to the latter. Although they lie within a large barrier reef they are of metamorphic origin. However superficial limestone deposits, particularly on the coasts, are common to all. Panaeati, the largest, is approximately five miles in diameter and has hills which rise to seven hundred feet. (12)

About eight miles north-east of Panaeati lies one of the largest islands in the Louisiades. Misima, or St. Aignan, is some twenty-five miles long and six wide. Limestone deposits, sometimes rising in terraces over a thousand feet high, cover the original igneous or metamorphic rocks in many of the coastal regions. In the eastern part of the island two mountain ranges with peaks rising to three thousand four hundred feet run parallel to the north and south coasts. There is a broad flat valley between the ranges. Although Misima has a fairly high rainfall droughts are not uncommon because the numerous mountain streams are short, rarely running for more than a few miles. They dwindle rapidly if no rain falls for a few weeks. For this reason the only swamps are coastal mangrove patches. (13)

(12) Ibid., 296-300.
(13) Ibid., 300-301.
Some fifteen miles south-east of Misima lie the Renard isles, raised limestone atolls surrounded by broad fringing reefs. Quite different is the Calvados chain of over twenty islands which is further south. All the islands of the Calvados chain are confined within a barrier reef which has few passes. The islands themselves, from Panasia in the west to Nimoa in the east, are of igneous or metamorphic formation, but their fairly deeply indented shores are usually reef-fringed. All except Tagula or Sudest are small. (14)

Tagula is approximately forty-five miles long but very narrow. The interior is rugged, peaks rising to two thousand six hundred feet above sea level in the central mountain spine. As with Misima there are no large rivers so droughts occur when rains do not fall regularly. Tagula's shores are mainly swampy. (15)

Rossel, at the eastern extremity of the Louisiade archipelago, is irregularly shaped and very rough. A mountain range runs from west to east across the island. From it short spurs descend both north and south. Swift streams course through the valleys between these ridges. A barrier reef with

(14) Ibid. 301-302.
(15) Ibid. 302-303.
very few passes circumvents the island so it is difficult of access. For this reason it is very isolated although but a few miles north-east of Tagula. Even the shoreline is particularly inaccessible as mangrove swamps soon turn into precipitous jungle-clothed mountains. (16)

Except for that portion of mainland New Guinea which extends from Millport Harbour to Goodenough Bay south-east Papua consists of island groups scattered over a reef-strewn sea. Because of the latitude the climate is hot but not truly equatorial. In coastal areas and on the smaller islands diurnal temperatures rarely rise above ninety or fall below seventy degrees. With every thousand foot rise in altitude there is a drop in temperature of approximately three degrees so the mountains can be cold. Variations in temperature are negligible between seasons which are distinguished primarily by changes in winds and rainfall. Prevailing winds are south-easterly from May to October; from December to March they blow from the north-west. April and October are doldrum months characterized by considerable atmospheric instability. Humidity is high at all times; nowhere in the area is the average rainfall less than eighty inches annually. In some places in the

mountain regions rainfall is as high as two hundred and twenty inches per annum. (17)

From this brief description it is plain that topography and climate combine to make the area ecologically rigorous. Movement is difficult because of the rough terrain on all but the small coral atolls. Movement between places is further hampered because so much of the area consists of scattered islands. Navigation is dangerous as numerous reefs, shoals, and coral patches obstruct both open sea and lagoon. There are also strong currents. Marked seasonal winds virtually dictate the course of voyages even in vessels with engines. For the indigenous inhabitants of this area whose technical skills were limited to a few simple processes nature proved an exacting if not harsh task-master. Though some of their techniques were remarkably efficient they had very little control over their environment.

The indigenous population of south-east Papua is racially mixed. Papuan tribes inhabit the interior of mainland New Guinea but Melanesians, probably once sea-faring nomads, have intermingled with Papuans in the coastal areas and on all the

(17) Handbook, 84-101; See also Tables 104-105.
islands except Rossel, where the barrier reef proved impregnable. Anthropologists have termed this Papua-Melanesian stock Massim and sub-divided it into northern and southern strains. The northern Massim comprise the inhabitants of the Trobriand islands, the Marshall Bennetts, Murua, and all the atoll groups in the vicinity. The domain of the southern Massim extends from Orangerie Bay to Cape Nelson on the mainland coast and includes all the other islands except Rossel. (18) None of this area was heavily populated in pre-contact times although Kiriwina, the fairly rich coastal plain in Milne Bay, the sheltered valleys in the D'Entrecasteaux group, Dobu, parts of Murua and Tagula, and Mailu island had a high population density. Some of the atoll group seem to have always been uninhabited. The natives used them only as stopping places when on fishing or trading expeditions.

Very few anthropologists have studied Massim peoples. (19) Some information can be garnered from accounts of early voyages, mission records, or government documents but these sources are not satisfactory. Little accurate and detailed information has

(18) Seligmann, The Melanesians of British New Guinea, 7. (19) There are a number of articles, usually very specialized in various journals as well as the works of Malinowski, Fortune, Armstrong, Saville, Jenness & Ballantyne. See bibliography.
yet been collected. Usually the only aspects of native society mentioned in such records were those which directly affected the observer. He noted whether the natives were hostile or friendly; whether they were honest or stole; whether they were avid traders or not. Sometimes a few words in a particular dialect were collected and a brief description of native arms, ornaments, and artifacts given. Occasional observations were recorded about certain aspects of the social structure but these have little besides antiquarian value. The first Europeans to visit Papua, expecting to find an hierarchical social organization similar to that of eastern Pacific peoples, singled out individuals whom they thought to be chiefs, treated them as such and used them as informants. But no Papuan outside the Trobriands had the status from which to provide a total picture of his community.

Although there must have been great diversity in the social structure and cultural patterns of communities in the area, some generalizations can be made with a fair degree of confidence. To superficial observers, which these early European visitors were, the Massim peoples seemed to be homogeneous. In fact they formed discrete, highly differentiated societies, albeit with some common features. All were pre-literate stone-age communities whose members relied on primitive
agriculture, fishing, and hunting for subsistence. Even in the most fertile areas they wrested only a meagre living. Climatic conditions and the perishable nature of their foodstuffs meant food surpluses from a good season could never be stored for more than a few months. Even in areas like Kiriwina or Milne Bay where food was grown for trading purposes, there was usually a time of scarcity between harvests. (20)

There were no really large settlements in south-east Papua. (21) Few villages had populations numbering more than a few score although there were some exceptions. Mailu island village and a few others in Milne Bay or the Trobriands had several hundred inhabitants. (22) Villages were usually divided into a number of totemic clans. An individual clansman claimed some degree of relationship with all other people of the same totem; if consanguinity could not be traced it was assumed. In all communities which have been studied land tenure rights derived from this clan membership. There was no concept of individual ownership of land.

Agricultural methods were primitive throughout the area and a shifting cultivation cycle universal. (23) The Massim had no knowledge of fertilizers although they burnt the undergrowth on garden plots and worked the ash into the soil. Although the agricultural cycle varied, gardens were rarely used for more than two or three consecutive seasons. After that they were allowed to revert to bushland for a number of years before being cleared and planted once more. Land in the vicinity of a settlement was clan-owned and sub-divided among living members of the lineage. Thus each individual had only usufructory rights to certain land for his lifetime. The size of clans fluctuated continually and sometimes a clan group was very small. (24) When the administration bought the land around Suau for the Crown the transaction concerned only one native. (25) Probably he acted as the sole living representative of his descent line and not in a private capacity. Bushland was common to the whole village community for there they hunted or gathered forest products. In coastal areas or on islands reefs

(24) Seligmann, The Melanesians, 479-498; Malinowski, Natives of Mally, 517-521; Malinowski, Coral Gardens, vol.1. All sections on land are relevant.
were exploited in common by all village members. Bushland and reefs, especially on small islands where they had a scarcity value, were strictly allocated with each village having its special section. (26)

Methods of food production and technological processes varied little among the Massim. The division of labour patterns and life-cycle ceremonies followed the same broad principles throughout the whole area although there were variations in detail between one group and another. Everywhere men did the heavy garden work such as felling trees and fencing, while women weeded and tended the crops. The scanty literature on the subject indicates that garden magicians were male. Malinowski and Fortune were the only observers to treat the subject in detail. Men hewed the logs and constructed house frames while the women gathered and wove pandanus or coconut leaves for roofing and walls. Men built canoes and went deep-sea fishing while women looked for shell-fish or other marine life in the shallows. Men went hunting while the women gathered forest products to add variety to the basic diet of taro, yams, and sago. Women attended to the household chores, cleaned, cooked, fetched water, minded young children, and cared for the aged. Men were the

warriors, the ritual specialists, and they controlled nearly all ceremonies except those directly concerned with childbirth. Male magicians who produced socially beneficial magic to improve crops, ensure rain, to make fleet canoes, or to promote good trading exchanges, must be distinguished from sorcerers who practiced in secret for anti-social ends and who were often females. Only men went on trading expeditions. Each sex manufactured its own clothing and distinctive ornaments. In short, Massim society was male dominated and kept women in a subordinate role. This was so despite many communities having matrilineal descent systems. (27)

The technological level among the Massim varied little but certain peoples made special goods when they had appropriate resources. For instance a particular red spondylus shell found only in Rossel lagoon, and there abundantly, had for decades been manufactured by the islanders into necklaces which all the Massim peoples valued highly. (28) Other spondylus necklaces did not command nearly so high a price. The Mailu and Amphlett islanders made excellent pottery and traded this with other

peoples who had no suitable clays and were therefore ignorant of potting techniques. (29) Muruans manufactured deep-sea canoes called wagas for which they were famous. These vessels were always in great demand by other less competent shipwrights. (30) The Muruans also manufactured ceremonial axes from a special greenstone found only on their island. These axes were highly prized by all the Massim peoples. (31) Islanders in the vicinity of Milne Bay made canoes and shell jewellery which they traded for food from the Milne Bay peoples. (32)

Local groupings were usually small, and linguistic variation great. On New Guinea itself as well as the larger islands completely different languages seem to have been spoken at places only a few miles apart. Speakers of a particular dialect usually numbered only a few hundreds. (33) As each community was practically self-contained, and unable to communicate freely with neighbouring groups, regular, peaceful intercourse between different villages was rare. Except within the kula ring or the Mailu trading cycle natives never travelled

(30) Seligmann, The Melanesians, 8, 526-527.
(31) Ibid, 517-520; Malinowski, Argonauts.
(32) Seligmann, The Melanesians, 535. The whole chapter on trade is relevant.
(33) Capell, The Linguistic Position of South Eastern Papua; Newton, In Far New Guinea, 52.
freely. If a canoe were blown off-course while on such an expedition or while fishing the occupants could expect no succour if they came ashore amongst strangers. W.T. Wawn told the story of how an interpreter he engaged at Teste island met his long lost brother at Conde Point Sudest. Twelve years previously this man, then a small child, was taken on a voyage by his father and some other men. When the canoe reached Sudest all the adults were murdered but the child was spared. (34) But in spite of these disruptive social factors and geographic conditions some unifying factors brought quite large aggregates of people together.

For example there was a trading cycle embracing the south coast of Papua from Aroma to Suau which centred on Mailu island. Early in each agricultural cycle the Mailu men sailed west to Aroma in their rather frail canoes, keeping well within the protecting barrier reef. At Aroma they traded pottery and jewellery for betel-nut, which grew profusely in that district. A few months after returning home from the western trip they visited the mainland swamps close to their island to fell sago palms and process the pith. Mailu island was infertile, producing only coconuts and these in quantities which scarcely

met the inhabitants' needs. They had, therefore, to make gardens on the mainland as well as using its sago swamps. Although they needed much sago for their own consumption, the islanders always made a surplus. This they took on a second expedition westward and traded, again with the Aroma people, for piglets and puppies. Later in the year, when the wind was favourable, the Mailu men made a third expedition this time voyaging eastward. At various settlements they stopped to trade: exchanging the by now full grown dogs and pigs for arm-shells, ceremonial axes, and jewellery. This, and the pottery made by their women, they traded the next year for betel-nut from Aroma. So the cycle continued. (35)

An even more complex trading cycle centred in the Trobriands but extended to Rossel in the east, to the D'Entrecasteaux islands and the Amphletts in the west, and to Tube-tube in the south. Round this circle ceremonial valuables continually travelled; arm-shells in an anti-clockwise direction, necklaces clockwise. Malinowski, after spending a long period in the Trobriands, wrote an excellent study of this trading cycle, known by the natives as kula. Each individual in the kula ring had at least one partner to whom he presented one kind

(35) Malinowski, Natives of Mailu, 622-629.
of valuable and another from whom he received the other kind, so that the limits of the ring extended far beyond the compass of any one man's connections. (36) But the kula was more than a highly formalized ritual. On the annual expeditions partners indulged in gimwali or ordinary trading, as well as making kula presentations. Through the institution of gimwali surplus goods were exchanged for scarce commodities in a particular area.

The process was well illustrated in the Amphletts, notoriously infertile but possessing excellent potting clay. The Kiriwinans who had no suitable clays traded food for pots when on the annual kula expedition. The D'Entrecasteaux islanders who lived near sago swamps exchanged sago for foods they could not grow themselves. Even on Kiriwina itself inland peoples traded vegetables for fish from coastal villages. (37) All such transactions were gimwali. Malinowski also mentions another interesting element in the kula system also found in other Trobriand institutions: pokola. Through pokola an ambitious man could, by hard work in the mundane world, gain for himself prestige and sacred power. If, as seems likely, a

(36) Malinowski, Argonauts, 83. The whole book is relevant. For an early reference to the kula see Moresby, Discoveries and Surveys in New Guinea and the D'Entrecasteaux Islands, 245.

similar principle exists in other Melanesian communities, its
discovery might help resolve the problem which still puzzles
anthropologists: the mechanics of leadership and authority in
such societies.

Malinowski observed that the term pokola was used in
several contexts; to describe the tribute supplied to chiefs
by non-related vassels; (38) to designate payment by a man to
his mother's brother for land or magical formulae purchased in
the latter's lifetime (the nephew, being the rightful heir,
would inherit both land and magic at his uncle's death); (39)
to describe offerings to the spirits; (40) and to describe a
solicitory gift for a kula valuable. (41) Pokola always
consisted of food. When a man made pokola to a kula partner,
he presented food and if his gift was accepted he received in
return some durable kula valuable. Pokola thus seemed to be
the ladder by which an individual could climb from the sphere
of nature to the supernatural, so becoming a man of prestige
and spiritually powerful. If this was so the Trobriand passion
for food display ceases to be a curiosity and falls into

(38) Malinowski, Argonauts, 181; Malinowski, Coral Gardens, vol.
    I, 192, 369.
(39) Malinowski, Argonauts, 186; Malinowski, Coral Gardens, vol.
    I, 338, 345, 349.
(40) Malinowski, Argonauts, 332-333, 378.
23.

While the social structures probably varied in detail from group to group among the southern Massim they were alike in one respect: the absence of an hereditary system of authority. Men probably became leaders if they amassed more wealth than their fellows; if they had dominant personalities; if they belonged to a special age group; if they had special skills or ritual knowledge; if they were particularly good gardeners, hunters, fishermen, or warriors. Belonging to a particular lineage was not all-important. The system of authority was open and depended on free recruitment from the whole community. Theoretically a man could only advise or suggest a course of action, his voice only one among the initiated men; (42) but once an individual was regarded as a powerful magician by his fellows or had acquired any of the other qualifications for leadership, he wielded a good deal of influence.

The northern Massim were different from the southerners in this respect. Among them authority resided in an aristocracy. They were distinct from practically every other

New Guinea people in this aspect of social organization. Malinowski has given a detailed account of the Trobriand system. Each matrilineal clan was divided into a number of sub-clans, one of them being the aristocratic line from which chiefs descended, although the same lineage was not the royal one on every island. On Kiriwina the Malasi clan was pre-eminent, and the Tabula sub-clan the aristocratic line from which the paramount chief always descended. As he wielded authority over a large population the first Europeans thought the Kiriwina high chief was the paramount ruler of the whole Trobriand group. In fact he was only one of a number of high chiefs.

On Kiriwina a chief ruled a district which comprised a number of villages, each under a headman. As residence was not determined solely by clan affiliation the village headman controlled other people besides his own clansmen. A member of the aristocratic lineage could be headman of a particular village, in which case he controlled all the inhabitants, but outside his village of residence he had authority only over clansfolk. Chiefs, particularly district rulers, were men of far greater wealth than commoners. When a chief was also guardian of the most potent magical formulae, as was often the case, he was supreme in both secular and spiritual
matters. (43)

Among the Massim then there were cohesive principles which brought many people together on ceremonial occasions. Totally unrelated people came together regularly for peaceable intercourse. The kula ring, the Mailu trading cycle, the large mortuary feasts, called *gpi*, held by the peoples of the Suau district and elsewhere were examples of this. There seem, however, to have been no such integrative forces in the social structure of other groups in south-east Papua. Especially in Goodenough Bay, and in the mountains of the mainland as well as the larger islands, each tiny community was self-sufficient and usually hostile to neighbouring groups. (44)

Even among the Massim fights between villages seem to have been fairly common. In the whole area warfare was endemic, although casualties were few. Most battles were small-scale guerilla attacks. Surprise raids, often at nightfall, or ambushes of unguarded women or children, were the norm. The usual motive for hostility was revenge; when a death had been "paid back", the raiders returned to their own village as

(43) Malinowski, Coral Gardens, vol.I, 64, 84.
(44) Seligmann, The Melanesians, 431-434; Chignell, An Outpost in Papua, 43, 70, 86, 335; Newton, In Far New Guinea, 434.
speedily as they could. Vendettas between groups were thus self-perpetuating. Cannibalism, where it was practiced, seems to have been a ritual connected with vengeance. (45)

Very few generalizations can be made about indigenous religion. Apparently no native society believed in an omnipotent, omniscient creator, but rather in a pantheistic universe. Myths about the origins of the universe and man revolved around a number of totemic creation deities. Every society had some concept of an afterlife and spirit world as well as of supernatural beings - witches, ogres, monsters and the like. (46) The Kiriwinans for example believed that a human spirit lingered by its earthly body for some time after death and then journeyed to the spirit world. This was a land of plenty but otherwise the same as the earth. It even had a geographical location, on the island of Tuma which the Trobrianders visited to make kula exchanges. However spirit Tuma with its incorporeal inhabitants was invisible to living

humans most of the time. Real people also lived on a real
Tuma and it was with the living not the dead that the
Trobianders made *kula*. Naturally spirits were more easily
seen there than elsewhere; many men on the *kula* voyages saw or
spoke to departed relatives. The ancestral spirits were not
naturally benevolent because they regretted dying. Although
spirit Tuma was an attractive place spirits took a very active
interest in their former villages' affairs and continued to
visit them. They had to be propitiated by *pokola* offerings
and prevented by magic from perpetrating spiteful, even harmful
acts on people who were still alive.

Witchcraft was even more potent in native life than
belief in spirits. To its agencies were attributed most mis-
fortunes: illness, death, drought, crop failure, and so on.
Only the very aged (of whom there were few in these primitive
communities) were believed to die from natural causes. Witches,
ogres, and other supernatural creatures constantly threatened
both the individual's and the community's well being. Their
evil, anti-social intentions had to be continually opposed by
magical rites. The magician was thus the most important
person in the community. Besides countering the influences
of spirits, witches, other supernatural beings, and human
sorcerers, he could make the crops to grow, rain to fall, imbue
a sea-faring canoe with magical strength and swiftness, promote physical beauty in an individual so he would be lucky in love and kula exchanges, and many other things.

Having so little control over their environment yet being so dependent upon it, the natives of south-east Papua attempted to rule it by magic. The sense of psychological security which magic gave, prevented both individuals and society from being beset by feelings of anxiety to a pathological degree. Through their magical beliefs natives were able to create a workable system of logic. It explained natural phenomena and the failure to realise particular aims; it supplied means for control of the environment. (47) Malinowski's excellent inductive analysis of Trobriand society shows that magical beliefs and rituals in that community functioned at several levels. Magic had a sociological aspect and was indeed one of the most important components of the social structure, but it also played a significant role in the province of individual psychology.

Native societies were thus very vulnerable to the ever-quickening changes which began once Europeans started to visit

(47) Malinowski, Argonauts, 125, and Malinowski, Coral Gardens, vol.I. Malinowski, Magic, Science and Religion is also relevant.
the country. Traditional magic failed to avert changes which the natives did not desire. They began to lose faith in its efficacy; soon it was only used for "kanaka fashion" purposes. The new religion also failed to avert undesirable changes. Cargo-cults, a combination of old and new beliefs and rituals, also failed to alter undesirable social conditions or preserve the ancient status quo. Neither were the technological changes nor formal education complete enough to adjust the natives to the whiteman's pattern of living or beliefs. Steel axes, metal knives and hoes, although more efficient hardly differed in construction from native implements; singing 'God Save the Queen' or chanting the monetary systems of the world parrot-fashion were intellectual exercises as meaningless as reciting archaic spells and rituals had been. For the first time these native peoples became conscious of their inability to control the universe. At the same time the new men, the powerful white men, considered themselves to be superior to the brown men. As all the evidence seemed to support this contention the natives accepted it themselves. Significantly the explanations which they gave for the whiteman's superiority made the European a sorcerer figure: very cunning, very greedy, and completely anti-social. Most natives felt some ambivalence towards the whiteman as they did towards indigenous sorcerers. Ordinary people feared or even hated sorcerers but also envied them and
considered them indispensable to society because of their special skills. In the same way natives feared and disliked whitemen yet also accepted them for the benefits they brought: improved techniques and exotic goods.
DISCOVERY AND EXPLORATION

Malayan peoples must have come to New Guinea long before any Europeans visited the region but nothing conclusive is at present known about that phase of exploration and contact. A thorough archaeological investigation of the island would probably prove rewarding in this regard. Only after sailors kept logs of their travels could the exploration of the island be accurately recorded. Europeans probably first sighted New Guinea in 1511 (1) and subsequent voyagers landed at various points on the north-west coast. (2) By the middle of the seventeenth century Spanish, Portuguese, or Dutch navigators had sailed along most of the coastline, mapped it, and published the results. The south-eastern portion of the island alone remained unknown. Torres and Prado had sailed there in 1606, but a report of this voyage was not found and made public until the British captured Manila in 1762. (3) Other documents

(2) Reed, op.cit., 75-76; Gordon, op.cit., 22-23; Thomson, op.cit., 2-3; McFarlane, Among the Cannibals, 16-17; Chalmers & Gill, Work and Adventure in New Guinea, 10.
(3) Burney, A Chronological History of Voyages and Discoveries in the South Sea or Pacific Ocean, part II, 272; Prado & Torres, New Light on the Discovery of Australia, 135-157; Gordon, op.cit., 25.
relating to their expedition went undiscovered until the twentieth century. (4)

The account discovered in the Manila archives shows that Prado and Torres were, somewhere off the New Hebrides, inadvertently separated from de Quiros, the leader of the Spanish expedition which sought Terra Australis del Espiritu Santo. Prado and Torres, once they realized they had lost contact with the rest of the expedition, followed instructions issued by the Viceroy of Peru and cruised south to 20° degrees altitude (latitude). At that point they turned, setting the ship's course for the known north coast of New Guinea. But because they had proceeded so far south they reached instead the unknown south-east coast of the island. Sailing along its shores they charted a new route to the Spice Islands. (5)

Navigators continued to explore the north, west, and south-west shores of New Guinea from 1650 onwards (6) but no European followed Torres' route until 1768. In June of that year Bougainville left Samoa hoping to find the east coast of New Holland; after sighting Pentecost island he sailed west

(4) Prado & Torres, op.cit., ix-xii.
until fierce storms and impregnable shoals forced him to change route. When the weather finally cleared Bougainville saw land which he named Cul-de-sac de l'Orangerie which was that part of the south coast now called Orangerie Bay. From this point Bougainville continued eastward until 20 June when he sheltered from bad weather in the lee of a huge bluff which for this reason he named Cap Délivrance. Everything between that point and Cul-de-sac de l'Orangerie he named the Louisiade archipelago to honour his monarch. After he left Cap Délivrance Bougainville continued in an easterly direction and saw no other land until he reached the New Hebrides. (7)

In 1771, Captain Edwards of H.M.S. PANDORA believed that he had sailed through the Louisiades but in fact he was much further west. (8) The next recorded voyage in the south-east was the 1793 French expedition sent to try and determine the fate of La Pérouse. Admiral D'Entrecasteaux, its leader, reached Cap Délivrance on 11 June 1793. He called the island of which it formed the eastern extremity Rossel. After examining part of the outline of Rossel he sailed westward, exploring other

(8) MacGillivray, op.cit., 172.
parts of the Louisiade. He named Piron, St. Aignan, the Renard, de Boyne, and Bonvouloir island groups. At this last anchorage he ordered his ships to alter course and sail northward. *En route* he sighted much land, including parts of the D'Entrecasteaux group, and the Trobriand islands which he named. D'Entrecasteaux could see no land west of the Trobriands and prevailing winds forced his expedition to alter course. The ships travelled in a southerly direction until D'Entrecasteaux eventually glimpsed high land which he thought was Cul-de-sac de l'Orangerie. It was probably part of the north-east coast of New Guinea. Both his vessels cruised among numerous reefs and small islands until bad weather compelled their pilots to reverse course. Eventually the expedition reached King William Cape, discovered earlier by Dampier. (9)

At the same time as D'Entrecasteaux explored the northern Louisiades, John Hayes, an English adventurer, cruised further south. He had sailed up the east coast of Australia outside the Great Barrier Reef instead of following the usual inner route, and eventually reached New Guinea. After penetrating

some way into the Louisiades he became dissatisfied with his course and so swung back round Cap Délivrance then steered for Dorey on the north coast of the island. (10) In the same year Captain W. Bampton and Captain M.B. Alt tried to find a route through the Louisiades to northern New Guinea but abandoned the attempt and sailed instead through Torres Strait. (11)

A few years later, in 1804, Coutance, a French privateer, explored parts of south-east New Guinea. While in the Louisiades he sighted and named Adéle island, then sailed much further west and made discoveries in the neighbourhood of Freshwater Bay and other parts of the Papuan gulf. (12) In the same year Bristow, master of an English merchant vessel, visited the northern Louisiades but he made no new discoveries. He simply re-named some promontories and islands. (13)

Several decades passed before the next known voyage, that of Dumont d'Urville in 1840. He was in New Guinea for only a short time but did much valuable hydrographic work and discovered many islands including Teste, the Lebrun group, Brumer, and Dufaure. His surveying, particularly in the Calvados chain,

(11) MacGillivray, op.cit., 175.
(12) Idem.
(13) Ibid, 175–176.
was very accurate. This work proved most valuable to future
navigators but his major contribution to European knowledge of
this part of the world was his discovery that a high mountain
range occupied the space formerly supposed to be a canal
separating Cul-de-sac de l'Orangerie from the mainland. (14)

Few of these explorers came into contact with the
indigenous peoples, but even when no effort was made to meet or
trade with natives most of the European vessels would have been
observed and their progress closely followed by the local tribes.
Natives did not record their thoughts and impressions of the
intruders so one has to rely on accounts written by members of
these expeditions to assess both native and European attitudes
when the two did meet. From this one-sided record it is plain
that mutual distrust and misunderstanding characterized early
contacts. Where Prado first landed a bloody skirmish ensued. (15)
On most subsequent occasions when he and his men went ashore they
found either that villages were already deserted, or that the
natives fled after offering some resistance, as soon as the

(14) Dumont d'Urville, *Voyage au Pole Sud et dans l'Oceanie*,
vol. IX, 214. See also pp. 207 to 214 & Atlas Hydrographique;
Fleurieu, *Discoveries of the French in 1768 and 1769*, 85-
89. See charts II and IX; Huxley, *Diary of the Voyage of
H.M.S. Rattlesnake*, 176.
(15) Prado & Torres, *op. cit.*, 137.
whitemen used firearms. (16)

Typical of such contacts was the landing at San Bartoleme island, modern Mailu, on 24 August 1606. The Iberians, believing the natives purposely failed to respond to their signs of goodwill, launched an attack which had some characteristics of a crusade. After praying for heavenly protection they first engaged the warriors of the tribe and then attacked the old men, women, and children. These had retreated to the top of a precipitous cliff and only surrendered after a long bombardment which claimed many native lives. The Iberians took fourteen children prisoner but allowed the rest of the survivors to go free. These fourteen prisoners were taken to Manila and became converts to the Catholic faith. In the battle between the whitemen and the warriors of the tribe there were again many native casualties, and after the fight those who were capable of moving fled to their canoes, quickly launched them, then paddled towards the mainland. They displayed consternation when shot at in the open sea. Before leaving Mailu the Iberians sacked the village. Later they saw a large fleet of canoes sailing eastwards but these gave the foreign ship a very wide berth. A canoe-load of native men,

(16) Ibid, 139-141.
captured some time afterwards, explained in sign language that the survivors of the Mailu engagement, whenever they stopped on the mainland, spoke of men who made fire by their mouths and killed whomsoever they wished. (17) This at least is what the whitemen understood they were told.

From present knowledge of native trading routes it is possible that news of this massacre circulated so far as Rossel and the Trobriands in the east, and the Papuan gulf in the west, doubtless becoming more garbled and inaccurate at each recital. The story may have become a legend, transmitted from one generation to another to affect the behaviour of natives towards Europeans long afterwards, even where there had been no previous contact. This may have been one of the reasons why natives attacked one of D'Entrecasteaux's ships, allegedly without obvious provocation. (18)

From initial contact the whiteman proved himself more powerful than the native. Prado gave an interesting description of one occasion which made white superiority plain. A group of natives, one of the very few which displayed no initial fear of the whitemen, were watching the Iberians give a shooting

(17) Ibid. 151-157.
(18) Rossel, op. cit., 416.
display when one of their number was offered an arquebus. He accepted, held it in the way the Iberians had, made a noise, but naturally failed to kill the pig at which he aimed. He was so ashamed that he could hardly walk away from the scene of his humiliation. His discomfiture, and the other natives' malicious enjoyment, was increased further when a soldier reloaded the gun and killed the pig. (19)

D'Entrecasteaux certainly traded with the natives, (20) and so did Dumont d'Urville. (21) On some of the shorter voyages there may also have been contact between Papuans and the intruders. Hayes, for example, claimed to have landed on both Rossel and St. Aignan. (22)

Bartering, which was the commonest form of contact, nearly always took place offshore. Canoes would come out towards the vessel, anchored in deep water. The natives wanted to trade, but never abandoned caution. In the vicinity of Welle island they came so close to D'Entrecasteaux's ships that the Frenchmen tried, without success, to entice some natives aboard; generally a distance was maintained sufficient to avoid

(19) Prado & Torres, op. cit., 145-147.
(20) Rossel, op.cit., 413-416.
(22) Lee, op.cit., 57-67.
surprise capture. (23) A European would hold up some trade
good; the native indicate his exchange offer; if this was
accepted, the items were transferred by means of a plank. A
number of such transactions occurred simultaneously amid great
hub-bub, movement, shouting, and signalling, altogether making
a vivacious and colourful spectacle. (24)

Trading was the sole point of contact between natives
and Europeans in this first phase of western penetration. The
Europeans had a scientific interest in New Guinea's natural
resources and geography but not in its inhabitants. Nobody
tried to study native institutions or customs, or learn a native
dialect. Some of the Europeans collected native artifacts but
only because they regarded them as curios or museum pieces, not
from any interest in the material culture of the area. However
in the second phase of exploration, during the latter half of
the nineteenth century, navigators attempted to learn something
about native life as well as exploring both land and sea to
determine their potential. (25)

(23) Rossel, op.cit., 414.
(24) Idem; MacGillivray, op.cit., 239–24; Huxley, op.cit., 182–
183, 224–228; Moresby, New Guinea and Polynesia, 215,
248–249.
183–184, 203, 218; Huxley, op.cit., 200–203; M.L.MS
Huxley Diary, 6 July 1849.
This new era in exploration began with the expedition led by Captain Owen Stanley in 1849. Between June and August of that year he charted much of the Louisiade archipelago, returning for a few weeks in 1850 to complete the work. The most important result of his survey was the discovery of a clear, wide channel between the reefs and shoals of the Louisiades from Gap Délivrance to the north-east entrance of Torres Strait, a distance of some six hundred miles. (26)

The surveying expeditions led by Captain Moresby commanding H.M.S. BASILISK were also very important. He made a detailed hydrographic study of the Louisiade and D'Entrecasteaux waters. In March 1873 Moresby set out from Australia primarily to find the south-eastern extremity of New Guinea but also to look for Baron Macklay who had gone to study the culture of the natives who inhabited the north-east coast of New Guinea, and had been living amongst them for over a year. Moresby also had authorization to punish any infringements of the Polynesian Labour Ordinance which came to his notice. (27) By mid-April 1873 he had ascertained that what had hitherto been considered the southern extremity of New Guinea was only a point on an

island which he named Moresby island after his father. He surveyed the waters around it hoping to find a passage north, but was unsuccessful. The BASILISK then moved further eastward. Success seemed to meet Moresby's endeavours when on 20 April the crew saw "a clear bright blue channel, two miles wide, leading fair from sea to sea — fit for a fleet to pass through under sail." Moresby called this the China strait, and bestowed names on the islands dotted about its entrance. The result of this survey was to reduce by forty miles the estimated length of New Guinea. Moresby then went on to prove that a high bluff dipping sheer into the sea was the real termination of the mainland. He then turned the BASILISK north and surveyed parts of a huge bay which he named Milne, after the Senior Naval Lord. Later he ascertained that the D'Entrecasteaux islands were separated both from New Guinea and from each other. He could not find a deep enough passage for the BASILISK to sail round the northern arm (which he named East Cape) of Milne Bay, so leaving her at anchor he went in the galley with a small expedition to survey part of what he entitled

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(29) Ibid. 192–199.
(30) Ibid. 201.
(31) Ibid. 206.
(32) Ibid. 215.
Goodenough Bay. (33) The time at his disposal being limited, he had to leave that work uncompleted and return to Cape York.

In February 1874 H.M.S. BASILISK returned to Moresby island. Moresby was on his way back to England and had permission from the Admiralty to test the new route through China Strait. As he had little time at his disposal, Moresby resolved to make a trigonometrical survey only between Teste island and East Cape. Moresby found, as a result of that survey, that the best route northward was east of Moresby island, not through China Strait as he had earlier supposed. (34) From a point high on an island off East Cape which he cleared and used as an observation post, Moresby saw over fifty previously uncharted islands in the vicinity but did not have time to explore them or survey the waters round them. (35) He did however survey much of the coastline of the main D'Entrecasteaux islands. When the BASILISK sailed north on 27 April 1874, he had taken over two thousand miles of fixed soundings. (36) In opening a new and accurately charted highway, which linked Australia to New Guinea and China, Moresby and his men

(33) Ibid, 222-229.
(34) Ibid, 244.
(35) Ibid, 245.
(36) Ibid, 259.
had fulfilled their ambitions of 1873. (37)

By the middle of 1874 most of the mainland coast and offshore islands had been mapped despite factors which made navigation hazardous for even the most experienced seamen. Voyagers of later years made minor discoveries and charts continually improved, becoming both more detailed and more accurate. Meanwhile the rugged, wild terrain and climatic conditions hampered inland penetration, much of which did not take place until well into the present century. Professional explorers and geographers contributed to this work, but more important were district officials and surveyors employed by the government. Being part of general administrative history, this will form part of our later narrative.

In the first phase of exploration Europeans had hardly come into contact with the natives, but the members of the British hydrographic expeditions led by Owen Stanley and Moresby mixed much more freely with them. With these voyages a new era in the history of contact between Europeans and the inhabitants of south-east Papua began. Most meetings between the two groups in this initial stage were peaceable, even friendly, but Captain Stanley reported clashes with Louisiade

(37) Ibid, 261.
islanders more than once. (38) When H.M.S. BRAMBLE was surveying the waters around Mailu island, trading on one occasion ended in a fight. Hostilities began when a small pig was inadvertently taken aboard without the donor receiving a reciprocal gift. He showed his chagrin by snatching the cap off a marine's head. When asked to return it he refused, brandishing his spear the while. This defiance precipitated a very one-sided fight. A sentry fired point-blank into a canoe full of men at six or seven yards range. Conflicting statements were made about the effect this had, but all agreed on the utter confusion and lack of resistance shown after the first shot. (39) Once again relations between Mailu islanders and the whitemen led to bloodshed. The history of conflict explained why Europeans subsequently found these people recalcitrant, suspicious, and difficult. (40)

Even when intercourse remained overtly friendly both natives and Europeans remained alert and suspicious of one another, and for very good reasons. The language barrier, the completely different *mores* and moral standards, the technological

(40) G309/101 Box 9 Folder 4, Saville, 10 Sept. 1902; G309/102 Box 10 Folder 1, Saville, 14 Jan. 1903.
gap, the short time that the whitemen stayed in any particular place, the absolute inability of either group to know or understand members of the other, all created difficulties.

For the whole time H.M.S. BATTLESHIP anchored at Joannet island Stanley reported the people were "apparently in a state of great agitation, and very suspicious of our intentions." (41) At Brumer island a few natives enticed aboard seemed uneasy but made gestures which the Englishmen interpreted as signs of friendship. (42) One daring fellow actually stayed on the ship over-night. He was dressed like a guy by the sailors, then treated to a magic lantern show, and later watched a rocket which was fired for his amusement but had the opposite effect. Next morning the man's confidence evaporated when for some hours no canoes came off to barter. He jumped into the first that eventually appeared and paddled off, but had to return aboard ship because its destination was not near his village. This calamity reduced the poor man to tears. However his adventure ended happily because Captain Stanley, moved to pity, ordered a boat to take him home. There he was met by two women and a child who greeted him rapturously. (43)

(41) MacGillivray, op. cit., 187.
(42) Ibid, 258.
On Moresby's surveying expeditions, when contact was sometimes more prolonged, the natives soon lost their initial shyness. Yet any unusual behaviour on the part of the BASILISK crew stripped away their confidence. Once, in Milne Bay, firing practice caused the natives to shriek in terror and flee. In Moresby's words, "The panic seized the village, all valuables were hurriedly taken away, ..." (44) On another occasion, a change in the weather having caused sailors to suddenly run aloft to loose the sails, the natives became so alarmed that canoes crushed together as the owners tried to paddle away. Seeing that no harm had been intended they "regained their confidence and seemed immoderately amused at their earlier fears as they swarmed aboard again." (45) At one stop along her 1874 route the BASILISK received a rousing welcome, and in return one of the lieutenants took some fourteen canoes in tow of the steam pinnace. The occupants shouted with pleasure until he blew the steam whistle, whereupon "their consternation was extreme." (46)

This evidence shows that the natives never lost a feeling of apprehension. Moreover all explorers' accounts indicate that the Europeans too remained alert for signs of treachery.

(44) Moresby, op.cit., 216.
(45) Ibid, 249.
(46) Moresby, Two Admirals, 348.
Often they interpreted native actions in a most unfavourable way. (47) For instance, when Joannet islanders attacked a galley for no apparent reason, MacGillivray, the naturalist of Stanley's expedition, believed that this proved the treacherous and savage disposition of all Louisiade tribes, showing that no confidence should ever be placed in them. (48) Moresby, who encouraged his men to mix with the natives at every opportunity, always protected them from their hosts' mercy. Savages were "never to be trusted." (49)

Europeans had a physical advantage over the natives. Even clumsy seventeenth century ships and weapons were far superior to indigenous clubs, spears, daggers, and canoes. Western artifacts, as well as being more efficient, were also more diverse. Rapid advances in European technology in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, without any corresponding development in New Guinea, further widened the gap between the two material cultures. So the natives clamoured for such things as hoop-iron, axes, knives, cloth and beads. Moresby soon found that the Louisiade islanders, unlike the natives of Robert Hall Sound, were alive to the value of iron. He often

(48) MacGillivray, op.cit., 236.
(49) Moresby, New Guinea and Polynesia, 218.
saw carefully preserved specimens of sharpened bolts, spikes or nails which he presumed had been salvaged from wrecks. Europeans had a further advantage in that they had no urgent need for any native product. Even food was not vital: it simply added variety to a monotonous diet. Bougainville, the only explorer threatened by starvation, made no attempt to barter with the natives. His was the only voyage where the latter had a potential advantage, but this was never tested.

Much of the bartering took place at sea, but if a ship stayed any length of time in one place trading also occurred ashore. The following incident gives a general picture of what happened in such cases. A group of men from the Rattlesnake landed on Joannet island, drew lines on the sand, and then explained by signs to the horde of native spectators that an axe would be given when each line had been covered by yams. At first the natives brought vegetables very slowly, but eventually the first line was covered and an axe handed to the deserving person. For some time before the transaction took place the recipient-to-be had been trembling with anxiety, watching the coveted article with eager eye. Possession turned him wild with joy. He laughed, screamed, and danced about flourishing

(50) Ibid, 187.
the axe over his head. After the first exchange the natives worked extremely fast, running to and fro, covering the lines with vegetables. Bartering continued until seventeen axes and a few knives had been given in exchange of three hundred and sixty eight baskets of vegetables. Both parties felt they had the best of the bargain. (51)

Accounts of land and other transaction between Europeans and natives show that this feeling of mutual advantage persisted long after permanent European settlement. (52) Such satisfaction doubtless eased contacts between the two, for striking a good bargain was as important to the natives as to the westerners.

The success of their technology encouraged Europeans to assume that the natives accepted their general moral ascendancy. The language barrier played a part here; so too the brevity of most contacts; but still more the tendency of Europeans to suppose that their mores had innate superiority. But their assumption was false. Once native suspicion had been allayed and intimacy developed the Europeans were treated as strangers but equals. (53) On one occasion a man was so elated by getting

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(51) MacGillivray, op.cit., 228: cf.192.
(52) Seymour Fort, Chance or Design?, 46; MitchellLib. MS Meth. Ch.O.M. 130, Fellows Diary, 10 & 11 Nov. 1891; G309/94 Box 2, Folder 2 McFarlane, 2 Sept.1878; Ibid, Chalmers, 28 Nov.1878.
(53) MacGillivray, op.cit., 228-230; Moresby, op.cit., 186-187, 204; Moresby, Two Admirals, 330-333.
an axe that he caught hold of an Englishman nearby and forced him to participate in "a grand waltz with various poses plastiques". (54) Such behaviour indicated that the native felt no inferiority. Later this same couple exchanged names, which was not the action of men who stood subservient to one another. Another incident on the same voyage is also relevant. A portly member of the gunroom, accidentally separated from his fellows, only saved his life by parting with all his possessions, and keeping his dusky audience amused by performing "an impromptu dance in a state of nature under a boiling sun" until a party came to his relief. (55)

There are other accounts of natives ordering Europeans away, sometimes quite violently. (56) Only after some period of contact and the imposition of British political control did the peoples of south-east Papua ostensibly accept a lower position.

As indicated earlier, most of the early navigators came to New Guinea more by accident than design and hardly worried about its strategic or economic potential. Only after most other Pacific territories had been divided among the European

(54) Huxley, op.cit., 199-200.
powers did New Guinea assume significance in relation to European power politics. This period coincided with the second phase in exploration. MacGillivray thought that New Guinea was strategically valuable and also felt it had some economic potential but that this was hardly worth developing. (57) Moresby annexed the south-eastern part of New Guinea and the adjacent islands for strategic, economic, and moral reasons. His hoisting the flag had no immediate political consequences. Moresby believed the English were the world's best colonists and that the Papuans offered an almost virgin page upon which the dominant race could write the only true moral code. In this way they would atone for past lapses, when they had shed the blood of innocent American Indians and Australian Aboriginals. (58) Yet sometimes his faith wavered and he wished that he had never sailed in to disturb what he considered to be a primitive Arcadia. "Pondering on the fate of other aboriginal races when brought into contact with the white I was ready to wish that their happy homes had never been seen by us; ..." (59) Most of the time however Moresby felt that such pessimistic sentiments were wrong because Providence could be trusted to work its own end. (60)

(58) Moresby, op. cit., 301.
(59) Ibid., 228.
(60) Ibid., 229.
There was a further ambivalence in the later explorers' attitude to the New Guinea peoples. While considering the natives inferior in physique, mind, and spiritually, MacGillivray and Moresby (whom we may take as representative figures) attributed to these people their own systems of value and reasoning. This suggests a belief in universal standards which must have clashed with the notion of inferiority. Of course they did not bother to follow out all their assumptions; they were seamen not philosophers. An episode concerning the Joannet islanders illustrates this contradictory attitude particularly well. A party of natives, meeting a single boatload of Europeans, suddenly turned hostile and attempted, unsuccessfully, to seize the galley. Thirty islanders attacked twenty armed whitemen. This was interpreted as bravery, not as ignorance of the deadly effect of firearms, or as foolhardiness; yet at the same time their action was considered to be proof of utter treachery, of savage and complete degradation. Shortly afterwards an opportunity for punishing these recalcitrants occurred, but for the sake of "humanity" there were no reprisals although the islanders were behaving in a hostile and defiant way. Instead the Englishmen treated the natives with "silent contempt". (61) They assumed that the natives would realize silent contempt

was not craven-hearted withdrawal, even though the English ship went away soon afterwards. There were many such incidents. (62)

Moresby sailed off, confident that Providence would watch over native interests. In fact however, the Europeans who came after such as himself proved of different stamp. The explorers, for all their disinterest and even contempt for native life, set a standard of behaviour which few successors maintained. Many of the latter, particularly bêche-de-mer men, traders, and labour recruiters, were neither honest nor consistent in their dealings. Therefore insecurity, disillusion, and dislike joined the suspicion which natives had always felt for the whiteman.

The Papuans countered European duplicity and cruelty with an indiscriminate slaughter of whitemen. In the period immediately following exploration increasing numbers of bêche-de-mer men, traders, runaway or shipwrecked seamen, missionaries, and scientific travellers visited New Guinea. Thus opportunities for the natives to wreak vengeance for past injuries increased and numbers of these intruders were killed. This

enhanced the Papuan reputation for treachery and evil-disposition. Obviously these contacts with later European arrivals had more profound effects upon native society and produced many possibilities for conflict and antagonism. The explorers and their goods gave Papuans their first vision of a new world and introduced many changes into Papuan life, but they did not seriously threaten traditional social patterns. The Europeans who came to settle did.
THE ADVENT OF CHRISTIANITY

As accounts of voyages and discoveries were published, the attention of philanthropic and economic bodies, learned societies, and the general public focused on New Guinea to a much greater extent than hitherto. Religious groups showed particular interest in the area, and in 1847 la Société de la Propagation de la Foi established a mission on Murua island. For some years prior to 1847 this Catholic society had worked in the Solomon islands but had made very little progress. The priests had suffered from chronic ill-health and the natives did not lose their suspicion and hostility towards the Christians. Attacks on the mission were common and several priests were martyred. (1) Prospects of improvement seemed remote, so the leaders of the Solomons mission decided to start afresh elsewhere. They chose Murua island, having heard good reports of it. (2) Thither went the decimated remnant, a handful (3) of men hoping that the Muruans would prove less obdurate than the Solomon islanders, praying for success, believing that once the Holy Spirit had touched the natives they would endeavour to live for Christ. Their optimism proved unfounded; the Murua field was very

(2) Ibid, vol.22, 86.
(3) There were four missionaries. Annales, vol.22, 91.
similar to the earlier one.

They decided to settle at Guassup, the modern Guasope, and stayed there. Several considerations influenced this choice. The priests wanted a large population, a good and abundant water supply, and cultivable land. (4) They also wanted to settle on the coast so that they could leave quickly if necessary. (5) For the first few weeks the priests studied the new language many hours each day. (6) Beginning to proselytize, they found that the natives listened with great surprise to the tenets of the Catholic faith; their indigenous rules of conduct had a materialist, not a spiritual basis. (7) Few were moved by the story of Christ's passion, yet all evinced a great interest in the theory that the sun and moon were not self-made but created by a great spirit called Jehovah. (8) From what the priests told them of France, the natives thought it a detestable place. (9) The gospel message did affect some people, chiefly children. (10) Several adults sought baptism, and a number of parents had their children undergo the ceremony,

(4) Ibid. vol.22, 90.
(5) Ibid. vol.22, 87.
(6) Ibid. vol.22, 91.
(7) Ibid. vol.22, 92.
(8) Ibid. vol.22, 93.
(9) Ibid. vol.22, 92-93.
(10) Ibid. vol.22, 98.
but probably most subjects were inspired more by desperation than by grace: nearly all were dying when they received the sacrament. (11) The missionaries laboured hard and faithfully for some five years but their attempt failed to bring Muruans into the holy Catholic church. In 1852 they abandoned the field. (12) An Italian society, also Marist, took over from the Frenchmen but they only remained for three years. (13)

Father Montrouzier, a member of the French mission, attributed all the blame for the Marist lack of success to the natives. Yet the Frenchmen showed little interest in native social institutions; nor did they become intimate with the people despite constant and close contact with them. According to Father Montrouzier the natives were materialistic, heartless, and proud. They coveted the mission party's wealth and envied its technical prowess but felt neither pity nor charity; indeed they thought themselves superior to the missionaries. Although as poor as Job, the most miserable of them thought they were doing the mission party a great favour by living under the same roof. (14)

(11) Ibid., vol.22, 95-96.
(12) Monfat, Dix Années en Mélanésie, 290.
Both priests and islanders found these years of intense but not intimate contact difficult and distasteful. Neither sympathy nor insight developed as the two peoples became familiar and behaviour patterns ceased to be surprising. The mission withdrawal probably relieved both parties; although the missionaries regretted that they had been unable to touch the hearts of the people, while native relief must have been tinged with regret that a regular source of supply for European goods was cut off. When the Marists first landed on the island they had been welcomed by the Muruans but in the latter half of the nineteenth century Europeans who came to the islands found the natives hostile, difficult to influence and to control. (15) The mission was thus a double failure. The Muruans clung more tenaciously than ever to traditional beliefs, and consciously alienated themselves from European moral and spiritual influences; at the same time they continued to strive for as many European goods as they could. Because Murua proved to be a rich goldfield, they were able to achieve this aim more easily than most other Papuan peoples. Many years after the Catholic withdrawal a very different mission body, the Wesleyans, attempt to convert the Muruans. They found the task scarcely less

difficult. (16)

After the abortive Marist venture more than twenty years passed before another mission, the London Missionary Society, began work in south-east Papua. This society, largely Congregationalist, had shown particular interest in New Guinea as the country became better known. So early as 1826 John Williams wished to evangelize New Guinea but lack of resources prevented his scheme from being implemented. (17) From 1837 the Directors of the society contemplated working in the islands of Torres Strait, an aim supported by the clergy in the Australian colonies and Pacific territories, (18) but decades passed before the inauguration of the New Guinea mission.

The Loyalty islands mission was nearest to Torres Strait so the Directors decided to organize expansion into New Guinea from Lifu. For years the fieldworkers there had "looked wistfully towards New Guinea and longed to convey to its benighted tribes God's message of mercy." (19) However they

(16) Mitchell Lib. MS Meth.Ch.O.H. New Guinea Letters Received 114, Harrison to Gilmour, 11 July 1909.
(17) King, Ten Decades, 160.
(18) G305/76 Australian Letters, Box 3 Folder 3, Saunders to Ellis, 6 Jan.1840; G309/11 Box I, Murray, Report of the First Voyage to New Guinea, 1871.
(19) G309/11 Box I, Murray, Report 1871; Murray, Forty Years Mission Work in Polynesia and New Guinea, 466-467.
did nothing until political events in 1868 and 1869 made them most anxious to get away from French territories. Protestants had been discriminated against by the administration for years and finally the French authorities expelled Samuel McFarlane. Then the government passed an Ordinance prohibiting all foreigners except Europeans from working as religious teachers. Thus a number of Polynesian teachers were thrown out of work, and had to be supported by the L.M.S. as drones until they were either transferred to another field or returned to their homes. (20) Plans which the Lifu brethren made had to be altered more than once, but finally they chartered a suitable vessel. A small group of native teachers led by A.W. Murray and McFarlane reached Darnley Island on 1 July 1871. The missionaries spent some time sailing about Torres Strait settling teachers on various islands before they returned to Lifu. (21) Four Lifu teachers and four from Mare prepared the way for a white missionary. However not until October 1872 did Murray return with his wife. They stayed two years in Torres Strait. (22) On their leaving the New Guinea field permanently,

(20) G309/118 South Seas Letters Box 31 Loyalties Correspondence 1866-1869; G309/11 Box I Murray, Report, 1871; Murray, op.cit., 446-447.
(21) Murray, op.cit., 447-459; G309/11 Box I, Murray, Report, 1871; King, Christianity in Polynesia, 162.
(22) Murray, op.cit., 462-467.
McFarlane took charge of the mission. (23) Later other missionaries were appointed to the new field; W.G. Lawes and James Chalmers were the most important in the early period. Lawes, who had been in Niue for many years, was the first European missionary to settle on the mainland of New Guinea. He made Port Moresby his headquarters and remained there until 1906. (24) Chalmers, who came from Rarotonga to New Guinea in 1877, worked first in the east and then in the west. He continued working for the L.M.S. until his martyrdom in 1900. (25)

Although planning to expand their sphere of operations almost from the beginning, L.M.S. missionaries did not go further east than Port Moresby until 1876. Lack of resources caused the delay. From the outset, the L.M.S. Directors also had wished to extend to the eastern part of New Guinea, but could not allocate funds for this project until three or four years later. In 1875 the foreign secretary wrote to the field brethren asking them not to concentrate within their present range but to "visit,

(23) Ibid, 490-493.
visit, and find new clusters of people." (26) He suggested China Strait and the D'Entrecasteaux islands as suitable areas for expansion because Captain Moresby had encountered numerous gentle, amiable tribes in that part of New Guinea. When another missionary and an extra vessel (the steamer ELENGOWAN, donated to the New Guinea mission by a Miss Baxter of Dundee (27) arrived, the long projected expedition eastward took place.

A mission party left Port Moresby in April 1876. During the three weeks they were on tour the missionaries collected much valuable geographical data, but such material was secondary to their concern with the people they encountered. These they found to be numerous, living in villages dotted along the mainland coast and on the larger islands. Everywhere the ELENGOWAN stopped, the natives seemed friendly and peaceable; so eager for European goods that they traded at every opportunity, often stole, and resented any attempt to restrict bartering. A report of this trip was sent to London; the Directors received it enthusiastically. (28) The most significant result of the voyage

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(26) G309/110 Box 10 Western Outgoing Letters, to McFarlane 5 Mar.1875; Ibid. to Lawes 5 Mar.1875; Mitchell Lib.MS A390 Lawes Letters, Mullens to Lawes, 5 Mar.1875.
(27) Young, Christianity and Civilization in the South Pacific, 46
was in convincing both field staff and central organization that
the society had begun to work the wrong part of New Guinea.
This mistake, they unanimously agreed, should be rectified
immediately. (29) But as was so often the case in L.M.S. affairs
months passed before anything ensued. It took many weeks for
plans to reach fruition when missionaries and teachers had to
be transferred from other parts of the Pacific. (30)

Not until October 1877 did Chalmers, his wife, McFarlane,
and a group of native teachers, leave Murray island to open up
the eastern portion of New Guinea as an evangelical field. By
this time, L.M.S. personnel were experienced in such pioneering
and followed a routine procedure. The missionaries selected
suitable spots on the mainland and islands, and left teachers
at them. They also had to select a head station where the
Chalmers were to reside. After the party had visited most
islands in the area and many places on the mainland coast, they
decided on Suau or South Cape. It was central, possessed a
good anchorage, and seemed healthy. (31) Chalmers had had no

(29) G309/93 Papua Letters Box 1 Folder 4, McFarlane, 19 May 1877
(30) G309/94 Papua Letters Box 2 Folder 1, McFarlane, 26 Apr. 1877
G309/93 Papua Letters Box 1 Folder 4, Lawes, 25 Apr. 1876.
(31) G309/94 Papua Letters Box 2 Folder 1, Committee Resolutions,
4 Dec. 1877; Ibid. Folder 2, McFarlane, 23 Feb. 1878; Ibid.
Chalmers, 9 Jan. 1878; G309/11 Papua Journals Box 2,
Chalmers Voyage from Rarotonga, 1877; Mitchell Lib.MS
ground prepared for him by South Sea Island evangelists. Instead he pioneered the gospel in much the same way as had the original L.M.S. men who, sailing into the Pacific aboard the DUFF, landed in the Society islands in 1797.

As elsewhere in the Pacific, mission work was made difficult by the lack of a European administrative machine. For some years the L.M.S. had to maintain its position supported only by naval captains sent on duty tours of the western Pacific. These co-operated with the missionaries and remained in close contact with them while in New Guinea waters, but called only infrequently. On such occasions the missionaries reported any outrages against whitemen or mission personnel to the commanders of these vessels, who then punished the offending natives. They usually did so by the very arbitrary and ineffective method of shelling the village of the individuals concerned; one such incident occurred when H.M.S. WOLVERINE avenged the Kalo massacre. (32) In the years before 1884 this was by no means the only clash between L.M.S. personnel and native groups. (33)

One of the most hostile encounters of all took place at

(32) Northcott, Guinea Gold, 36; Robson, James Chalmers, 95-98.
(33) G309/94 Papua Letters, Box 2 Folder 2, McFarlane, 10 Dec. 1878; Ibid, Folder 3, Chalmers, 10 Jan. 1879; Ibid, McFarlane, 7 July 1879; G309/11 Box 2, Chalmers, Voyage from Rarotonga 1877.
Suau shortly after the station's inauguration. From the time the mission party settled there in late November 1877, the natives had proved troublesome because of their insatiable demand for European goods. Constant friction over pilfering culminated in a battle on 29 December 1877. One native was killed and others wounded, the mission's only casualty being the captain of the MAYRI who was badly stabbed. He refused to stay at Suau and set off for Murray island immediately. The rest of the mission party chose to remain at Suau without transport, quite isolated from their colleagues, and in the midst of excited, hostile natives. It was a courageous decision because they were in real danger. A massacre seemed imminent despite Chalmers' efforts to intimidate the natives and control his frenzied teachers. He warned the natives that any hostile action would have unhappy consequences when the "Beritani war canoe" next called, implying that he could call one to his service whenever he wished. Chalmers' account indicates that the natives thought this a mere threat which he could not put into action. The natives were not to know that he lacked any control over naval vessels, but may have assumed that his magic had failed, perhaps as a result of counter-magic worked by their own most powerful practitioners. Until 20 January 1878, when the ELLENGOWAN arrived from the west, the natives probably supposed that they had the mission party in their power. Once the ELLENGOWAN
arrived the Susuans admitted defeat and tried to learn all they could of the new ways. (34) The settlement at Suau was important because it was the first recorded account of foreigners and natives living together for some time, without the intruders having a psychological as well as a technological advantage.

By 1879 the L.M.S. had stations along the south coast of New Guinea from Daru, far to the west, to East Cape, as well as on various important and fairly populous islands close to the mainland. To facilitate the administration of this large area the mission was divided into three districts: western, central, and eastern. The eastern district comprised the coastline from Milport Harbour, opposite Mailu island, to East Cape, a distance of some one hundred and twenty five miles, and included all the islands in close proximity to the mainland.

On the second L.M.S. expedition to south-east Papua which took place between October and December 1877, McFarlane and Chalmers had ten teachers with them. They placed two Loyalty Islanders on Teste, or Ware, island, planned to leave two more on Moresby island, or Basilaki, in the vicinity of Hoop-iron bay, but because the natives proved hostile this scheme they abandoned.

placing instead teachers on Heath island in China strait. They then sailed north to East Cape, leaving two teachers on the Killerton islands and another on the mainland at East Cape. Chalmers and the rest of the teachers settled at Suau, or South Cape, which the missionaries chose as the head-quarters of the new district. (35)

A year later the JOHN WILLIAMS visited south-east Papua. She came from the eastern Pacific bringing reinforcements for the whole New Guinea mission; fourteen teachers and their families in the eastern district quota, came to Suau. Chalmers placed teachers on the Leocardie islands, on the south coast of the mainland near the Leocardies, at Isisu, a village on the mainland in Farm Bay, and on Dufaure island. McFarlane sailed about further east leaving teachers at Sareba, or Hayter island, and Samarai, or Dinner island, in China strait, at Wagawaga, a village in Milne Bay, and at a village five miles distant from the one in which a teacher had been placed the previous year. He also landed two teachers on Moresby island. By December 1878 there were thus thirteen stations in the eastern district. These extended from Dufaure island in the west to East Cape in the

north-east.

The JOHN WILLIAMS stopped at Suau between 11 and 20 November 1878 and by 22 May 1879 twenty-five eastern district teachers had died. (36) In July 1879 one teacher stationed at East Cape was the only L.M.S. evangelist stationed on the mainland east of Kerepumu, a village quite close to Port Moresby. (37)

In the years that followed these early reversals were gradually overcome; but the L.M.S. never extended further east or north than it had originally. The JOHN WILLIAMS brought replacements from the Pacific, and Papuans, after a short period of training at the Murray island Institution were placed among their heathen brethren so abandoned stations were remanned.

A missionary had virtual autonomy in his district, and the other brethren in New Guinea could only advise him about procedures or policies. The London Directors had more control over him because they were in charge of finances, but even their control was nominal because of bad communications. In the early period there was only one resident white missionary, Chalmers who had charge of the south coast from Suau to Orangerie bay.

(37) Ibid, McFarlane, 7 July 1879.
McFarlane, working on the itinerant principle he supported, supervised the East Cape and China strait islands section of the district. He had other commitments in the far west. From 1879 when Chalmers left Suau to the time F.W. Walker arrived to take charge of the district, a period of ten years, south-east Papua was without a resident white missionary. Walker, when he arrived, moved the head-quarters of the district from Suau to Samarai. (38)

Chalmers, perhaps the most successful and efficient of all the New Guinea brethren in making initial contact with native groups, worked to a system which he had devised to lull the suspicions of the people. He arrived, made friendly overtures and distributed presents; then left before the people had time to think properly about what had happened. (39) He behaved in exactly the same way on subsequent tours; only when the natives' confidence had been won, usually after several such visits, did he place a teacher among them.

Once he had made a final selection of station sites the European missionary usually bought land in or near a native village. He also purchased or rented a dwelling for the teacher:

(38) G309/96 Papua Letters Box 4 Folder 5, Lawes, 22 Nov.1889; Lennox, James Chalmers of New Guinea, 59.
to live in until they, with the help of local natives, had erected a permanent residence. Building began almost immediately, as for many years local materials were used for everything but European missionaries' houses. The teacher's house had first priority, then a church, and finally a school. Until the church was completed, evangelists held services under a shady tree. Once the mission compound had been built, life became routine for teachers. They spent a few hours each day teaching gospel stories to those villagers, young or old, who desired to listen; they visited and comforted the sick; they gardened and fished; having started a formal school they gave rudimentary instruction in reading, writing, arithmetic, and scripture; the better educated slowly translated the bible into the local language. The Sabbath provided the one break in their week. On that day they preached several times but did no other labour and tried to stop other individuals from working in their gardens, or going fishing, or behaving in other sinful ways.

Teachers often interfered in local politics and gave advice, wanted or not, on any matter that concerned the villagers. (40) Sometimes the South Sea Island teacher became

(40) G309/94 Papua Letters Box 2 Folder 5, Beswick, 30 July 1881.
very popular and influential, sometimes he antagonised the people so much that he had to be removed because his life was endangered. (41) Pi the Suau teacher was one who had a great influence over his flock. The mission compound was very neat and a fair number of natives attended his services. They displayed the utmost attention to everything he said. (42) Ipunesi, the teacher at Samarai, had similar prestige. (43) But he also established close connexion with W.T. Wawn, one of the captains of the labour recruiting vessels which came to the Louisiades in the early 1880's. Such alliances were fairly general, and worried the missionaries, who feared lest traders would work through teachers to further their own interests among the natives. (44) As McFarlane expressed it, the captains of such vessels knew how to close the mouths and blind the eyes of mission teachers. (45) The Ipunesi case was a particular thorn in the L.M.S. side. As Lawes said to the Directors even

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(42) G309/95 Papua Letters Box 3 Folder 2, Chalmers, 28 Oct.1882, enclosure 3.
(43) Chalmers & Gill, op.cit., 322-323; G309/95 Papua Letters Box 3 Folder 5, Lawes, 8 May 1885.
(44) G309/95 Papua Letters Box 3 Folder 4, McFarlane, 18 July 1884; G309/11 Papua Reports Box 2, McFarlane, Visit East, 19 Apr.-23 May 1883; G309/95 Papua Letters, Box 3 Folder 5, Lawes, 8 May 1885.
(45) G309/11 Papua Reports, Box 2, McFarlane, Visit East, 19 Apr.-23 May 1883.
if the charges against Ipunesi were not fully substantiated the Australian public and the Queensland government believed him to be guilty of conniving with the HOPEFUL crew to deceive recruits for the labour traffic. Lawes went on to say that some teachers in the eastern district had acquired great influence and power; as was to be expected when such men came to power, they were certain to abuse it. He felt the only way to avert the evil was to place an English missionary in their midst. (46)

Eastern New Guinea proved to be one of the most difficult mission fields in the Pacific. The climate adversely affected both Europeans and South Sea Islanders, and treatment of all diseases was of the crudest home-remedy sort. The mortality rate, especially among the Islanders, was high. (47) Topography, too, seriously hampered mission activity; the rugged terrain and the scattered island groups made difficult travelling or communication between stations. Soils were not particularly fertile in the Marist or L.M.S. areas, so food shortages were common. Before steam ships or the establishment of telegraphic communication between the Antipodes and Europe, there was no

(46) G309/95 Papua Letters Box 3 Folder 5, Lawes, 8 May 1885.
(47) G309/94 Papua Letters Box 2 Folder 3, McFarlane, 22 May 1879; G309/96 Papua Letters Box 4 Folder 1, Scott, 20 Apr. 1886; G309/112 Western Outgoing Letters, to Lawes, 10 June 1887.
means of quick and reliable communication between field missionaries and the home society. Greater than these disadvantages was the fact that in very few societies did authority reside in an hereditary aristocracy. On Murua there were chiefs, and the Marists took advantage of the fact, by settling in the village of the principal chief. However they did not stay long enough to convert him. In the L.M.S. sphere there were no such societies. As a consequence there were none of the mass movements common in the eastern Pacific, where a chief's subjects followed his example. So it took much more personal effort to gain converts in New Guinea.

Loneliness was also a problem which faced L.M.S. personnel. Because the Marists operated on a different principle from the L.M.S. their missionaries did not have that particular cross to bear. The whole body of priests lived in the one religious community, so they had the intellectual companionship of kindred souls. They did not attempt to spread the gospel beyond a small number of villages in the immediate vicinity of the station. The L.M.S. on the other hand tried to reach the maximum number of people. With hardly more white missionaries than the Marists (for the first years there were barely half a dozen Europeans), it had spread from Daru to East Cape by 1877. Head stations were far apart. In south-east Papua there was only the one,
first at Suau, then at Samarai.

In these circumstances the sole responsibility for a large area devolved upon the missionary in charge of the district. Because he had to make and implement important decisions, often at very short notice and without any consultation but prayer, the success of the mission in a particular area depended largely on the personality, training, and ability of the particular missionary. As he paid only occasional visits to each village within the district the teachers were also important, for they lived permanently in a village, close to the inhabitants. (48) Isolation was their lot also; missionaries, aware that the natives resented those villages which enjoyed teachers and so a local monopoly of European goods, spread evangelists wide. Often a missionary called on a teacher only once a year, when the mission ship JOHN WILLIAMS brought supplies; when a European was settled at the head station he visited accessible teachers every three or four months. (49) One missionary expressed his dissatisfaction with the system: (50)

We found the teachers at each place plodding on seemingly

almost out of the missionary world, and we felt what has been felt before many a time on a like annual visit that the sooner a missionary was appointed to the charge of these outlying islands the better. Brighter days are we hope in store for the east end, not before they are needed, as you will have gathered from reports about the kidnapping and murders that have for the past two years disgraced the Labour Traffic of these parts.

Very few L.M.S. workers were intellectually gifted or resourceful. They were ill-educated, with no gift for the solitary, reflective life. Selection committees considered a brilliant or profound mind, theological subtlety, and wide interests unimportant in the mission field. They preferred simple but fluent preaching, burning faith, zealous conviction of the divinity of the gospels, and a strong constitution. The same criteria were applied in the selection of South Sea Island and later Papuan evangelists. (51)

The L.M.S. brethren, unlike their Marist predecessors, disagreed about methods of penetration and organization. Lawes believed that a missionary should settle permanently in, or very close to, a village and work the area immediately surrounding it as intensively as possible. This was the method adopted by the Catholics. McFarlane however worked on an itinerant principle. (52)

(51) G309/12 Papua Reports Box 1 Chalmers, Report, 1887; Abel, Charles Abel of Kwato, 100; G309/71 Candidates Papers, McFarlane, Bedell to Proust, 2 July 1856, and McFarlane to Proust, Dec.1856.

(52) G309/93 Papua Letters Box 1 Folder 4, McFarlane, 19 May 1876; Ibid. G309/94 Box 2 Folder 2, McFarlane, 2 Sept. 1878; Ibid, Folder 3, 10 Ap.1879.
He kept constantly on the move, visiting each station within his district in turn. Because of the high death-rate amongst his teachers, McFarlane had to modify his policy and form a central refuge and training centre. This did not succeed very well however, as he could not adequately supervise the central station and continue to give the outer stations the attention they warranted. In fact he refused to curtail his peregrinations so the central station suffered from neglect. (53)

When Chalmers arrived in New Guinea he adopted a modified itinerant principle. He agreed with McFarlane that Lawes' policy meant the missionary spent most of his time nursing or burying helpers if he chose an unhealthy place to open a central station. (54) He found Port Morestby, which seemed ideal for a centre, to be far from satisfactory. Lack of resources - funds, manpower, and transport - made it impossible to combine efficient management of a training centre with constant visitation. Chalmers' work in the east, which for a while produced good results, later degenerated. It was easier for a married couple to work a district efficiently than a single man. While Mrs

Chalmers was alive she supervised the head station at Suau when Chalmers was on tour.

Once a mission station was established, the first building erected, and a daily routine worked out, both Marist and L.M.S. missionaries attempted to alter native society. They tried to eradicate pagan religious beliefs, and when they could, prevented the execution of rites connected with such beliefs. They thus attempted to suppress magic and sorcery, rituals and ceremonies connected with ancestor worship, fertility rites, cannibalism, infanticide, and polygamy. They also frowned upon other aspects of indigenous social organizations; dancing, feasting, initiation rites, institutionalized love-making, arranged marriages, warfare and raiding. These Christian evangelists tried to make a traumatic impact upon the individual and expected converts to change completely: to be reborn in Christ. At the same time they deplored imitation of European behaviour and expected native Christians to discard only the evil or unseemly elements in their former way of life. But anthropologists have demonstrated that it is impossible to alter some aspects of the social structure and expect the rest to remain unchanged; in any society once the equilibrium between institutions has been upset the changes that occur cannot be controlled or even predicted.

The Marist mission to Murua failed spectacularly and
obviously after only a few years; the L.M.S. soon showed a steady if gradual increase in the number of converts, as well as improving education and medical services. Yet these pioneers, too, failed in their fundamental object. They created neither an autonomous indigenous church, nor a Christian society. Instead, the L.M.S. was simply another spearhead of the European penetration which caused disintegration of the traditional order among the peoples of Papua. Unlike the rest of the unofficial European community, the L.M.S. did make some attempt to substitute new institutions into the native social structure for indigenous ones which they had suppressed. Nor was this policy successful. Except for the comparatively few individuals who were sustained and comforted by their new faith, and so cut themselves off from their traditional ties to become missionaries themselves, nominal Christians were no more psychologically secure than pagans. In a native village mission introduced sports did not become a substitute for warfare; nor prayer-meetings and socials replace traditional dances, feasts, and courtship ceremonies.

Native societies prior to European contact were not static, but almost certainly there had been no previous social upheavals as great as those caused by the impact of European contact and penetration. Missionaries tended to regard themselves as being outside the mainstream of European influence;
most other whitemen, both mission supporters and those who
opposed mission activity, accepted this view. But it was not
so. The influence of a missionary on the social structure of
a native community was little different from the influence of
the resident white trader, settler, or government official.
The only real difference was one of degree. In some instances
a missionary had more effective control over the natives than
any official, settler, or trader, and was in consequence a more
effective instrument in changing the traditional order of societ-

Withal, missionaries generally drew strength from their
faith to work courageously and well. As their accounts suggest,
mission personnel felt a close mystical communion with God. So
fortified, even an indecisive character might act firmly when
the need arose: he would believe that he was acting in direct
compliance with the will of his Saviour and that his action was
therefore right, and for this reason would remain optimistic in
the face of privation and disaster. Tribulations the mission-
aries saw as a test of faith, and believed that once God saw
their trust in Him, He would cause Christianity to triumph.
This hope gave them strength. With extremely limited resources
they continued to labour cheerfully, seeing cause for encourage-
ment where less dedicated souls would have despaired.

Such were the beginnings of permanent European influence
in south-east Papua. The advent of Christianity did not produce uniform effects on native society; some communities had to adapt immediately to new conditions while others remained virtually unaffected. Yet this in itself altered the traditional economic and political balances between groups. The villages where missionaries or teachers established stations became centres for the distribution of European goods. By their temporal actions as well as with the spiritual message they brought, mission personnel, who were in the vanguard of western penetration, profoundly affected native custom and society. As mission frontiers extended in time and spatially the influence of the Christian evangelists permeated deeper into native life. Mission activity also paved the way for other European enterprise:
Labour recruiters did not come to settle in south-east Papua, but their activities had profound effects on native society, even beyond the groups with which they came into contact. Recruiting inevitably became entwined with the mission story. Especially so since it began in the post 1879 period when there was no resident missionary in south-east Papua and teachers worked with little European supervision. The latter often helped the recruiters to engage interpreters, or even themselves acted in that role. As mentioned in the last chapter Ipuensi, the Dinner island teacher, became involved in a scandal concerning the labour traffic. (1)

For many years Queensland sugar planters had sought Pacific islanders to work their crops. To supply this demand, recruiters had brought in labourers from all over the Pacific but especially the Solomons and the New Hebrides. The trade had always attracted suspicion in some quarters, particularly from missionaries and various imperial and colonial politicians.

In 1880 the Queensland government amended the Pacific Island Labourers Act to forbid the use of firearms as "trade"

(1) Lyne, *New Guinea*, 191; G309/95 Box 3 Folder 5, Lawes, 8 May 1885.
either as inducement for the natives to engage, or as payment when their contract had expired. (2) This made it extremely difficult for Queensland licenced recruiters to attract New Hebrideans or Solomon Islanders who could still get firearms if they worked in German or French territories. Under the same Queensland Act mainland New Guinea, New Britain, and New Ireland were closed to Queensland recruiting vessels. However as the islands off the south-east coast of New Guinea were not specifically mentioned, thither the blackbirders went.

The first labour ship to visit south-east Papua was the STANLEY, commanded by Joseph Griffith Davies. The Government Agent, which he was required by law to employ, was William A. McMurdoo. Sydney D.S. Gerrans, the second mate, seems to have acted as recruiting agent. Sailing from Queensland in 1883 the STANLEY first visited Rossel island where attempts to recruit met with no success. From Rossel the ship sailed to the Lauglânns, thence to Woodlark, and finally to the Duke of York group where she was wrecked. (3)

While the ship lay in the Lauglân lagoon, McMurdoo was

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able to sign on a number of natives. These he allowed to remain ashore until the ship sailed. When no recruits came aboard at the time specified, two boats went to investigate. As they approached the beach, a shot was fired from the compound of the resident trader, an employee of the German firm Hernsheim & Company; but when the party got ashore they found the trader's compound empty and the native villages deserted. Precisely what happened next is unclear, but Davies and McMurdo seem to have ordered the destruction of the trader's house and store. They also burned native dwellings and canoes and captured two Lauglián islanders. (4)

Davies and McMurdo were eventually tried before the Queensland High Court and found guilty of offences under the Kidnapping Act. They were committed to Brisbane gaol on 19 May 1884. (5) Legal machinery moved slowly so though warrants were taken out against them on 10 April 1884 by the High Commissioner's Court of the Western Pacific they were not extradited to Fiji until 16 June. They left Queensland in the custody of Harry L. Ross, Commander of H.M.S. RAVEN, and came before Fielding Clarke, Acting Chief Judicial Commissioner for the Western Pacific, on 29 July. The trial took place on 6 August. Clarke sentenced

(4) Ibid, 775-806.
(5) Ibid, 831-832.
both men to three months' imprisonment. (6)

Davies and McMurdo were released after serving eight days of their sentence by the Governor of Fiji Sir George Des Voeux who was also Acting High Commissioner for the Western Pacific. Des Voeux liberated the prisoners because he thought that McMurdo had atoned for his behaviour in the Laughlins by his subsequent heroism at the time of the wreck when he showed the utmost concern and consideration for the natives. Des Voeux also took into account the considerable time the prisoners had already been confined, and that they had suffered the degradation of appearing in the criminal dock of two colonies. Des Voeux thought that only McMurdo ought to be released, but as the latter had taken the blame for what happened in the Laughlins his release could not be effected without Davies also being freed. (7)

The Queensland government found itself discredited by the STANLEY case on several counts. One issue had repercussions in the sphere of European power politics. Hernsheim & Company, supported by the Imperial German government, brought a substantial claim for damages against Queensland. After a good deal of haggling she paid £550 compensation to Hernsheim & Company for

(6) Ibid. 832-840.
the loss their agent had sustained. (8) McMurdoo was dismissed from the Queensland public service and Davies had his master's certificate cancelled on the grounds of incompetence. (9)

The next recruiting voyage, that of the LIZZIE owned by Burns Philp & Company, was commanded by William T. Wawn who had James Lane as Government Agent. The recruiting agent was not known; possibly Wawn himself acted as recruiter. Wawn knew the labour traffic well, and had also been a trader in Fiji and Samoa. The LIZZIE left Townsville on 23 December 1883 and returned thither on 17 February with one hundred and twenty six recruits, far fewer than the ship was registered to carry. (10)

On leaving Queensland Wawn had steered for Teste island where he engaged four boatmen, two of whom acted as interpreters. His first recruits came from Mewstone island. Wawn then worked the Calvados chain with fair success despite its thin population. The whole shipload of recruits went to the one plantation - Bamleigh, near Ingham. (11)

At the same time as Wawn was engaging labourers in the Louisiades, the CEARA, with William A. Inman as master, J. Burrowes as Government Agent, and John Johnson as recruiting agent, worked

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(8) Ibid, 806-826.
(9) Ibid, 796.
the same area. Inman left Brisbane on 31 December 1883 and returned to Townsville with one hundred and seven recruits on 17 February 1884. (12) Inman did not engage an interpreter until sixty natives had been signed on, an offence against the Queensland law which went unnoticed at the time. The CERARA left on another round trip, which lasted from 13 March to 28 April 1884 and yielded one hundred and thirty seven labourers. (13)

When Inman applied for a renewal of the CERARA'S recruiting licence the Queensland authorities realized that her two previous voyages had been extremely short yet yielded a high return of recruits. Another suspicious circumstance was the fact that the Government Agents' logs vouchsafed very little information. Charles C. Horrocks, an immigration official, therefore recommended to the Under Colonial Secretary that the matter be investigated, especially as rumours of a three-masted vessel which forced natives aboard had spread through Papua, reached the ears of missionaries, and through them had become public. (14) Finally early in June 1884 Robert J. Gray, the Under Colonial Secretary, ordered Edmund Morey, the Townsville Police Magistrate, to hold a searching enquiry. This took place later in June and Morey

(13) Ibid, 822.
submitted his report on 1 July. He concluded that the evidence did not prove kidnapping, or any unfair tactics such as misrepresentation of the agreement. The submissions of both the ship's crew and the native witnesses showed, he thought, that the engagement period had been explained and understood to be three yam seasons. (15)

Meanwhile the LIZZIE, still in charge of Wawn, with the same Government Agent, and Eugene St.Clair as recruiting agent, had left Townsville on 14 March; she returned to the same port with only sixty seven recruits on 2 June. (16) Wawn alleged that the Teste island evangelist's wife spoke against him to the people and so prevented him from engaging interpreters. He therefore recruited without them until he reached Pitt island. There he met the GEARA which had a full complement of labourers. Having no further need of them, Inman allowed four of his boatmen-interpreters to join the LIZZIE. Even after these men had been engaged, Wawn had difficulty recruiting. He maintained that this was because false reports about him were purposely spread by resident traders and mission teachers. His statements may have been exaggerated, but it seems probable that there was

some truth in them. (17) A trader like Nicholas Ministre (who will appear in later chapters) would certainly have done everything in his power to discredit rivals.

Under the command of John Meeny, with C.F. Brown as Government Agent and George Dibble as recruiting agent, the next labour recruiting voyage was that of the SYBIL which left Mackay in April 1884 and returned six months later with forty-eight recruits. (18) She sailed first to the Solomons and New Hebrides with her holds full of time-expired labourers. After they had been returned to their villages the SYBIL went to the Louisiade archipelago to engage labourers for the return voyage. In spite of the Government Agent's objections, the captain recruited at various places without using interpreters, and managed to persuade forty-eight natives to sign on. The Agent reported that almost from the day the ship first left Queensland to the day she returned the master and most of the crew were more often drunk than sober. (19) The port Inspector at Mackay who boarded the SYBIL on her return made this entry in the Government Agent's log. (20) "Have read this log which is a record of drunkenness and incapacity on part of master and consequent

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(19) Ibid, 829.
(20) Ibid, 830.
insubordination of the crew." However no legal proceedings were taken against captain or crew.

The next labour vessel to visit south-east Papua was the HOPEFUL commanded by Louis Shaw, who had H. Schoefield as Government Agent and Neil McNeil as recruiting agent. She left Townsville in May 1884 and returned to Dungeness two months later; on 17 July, with one hundred and twenty three recruits. (21) The Inspector at Dungeness was satisfied that the recruits understood their agreement once he explained it to them through interpreters. (22)

The FOREST KING left Brisbane on 17 May 1884 under the command of M. Dixon who also acted as recruiting agent. John Thompson was his Government Agent. She returned under escort of H.M.S. SWINGER on the last day of October. (23) The captain endeavoured to recruit without interpreters at Rossel, but desisted when the Government Agent protested. Dixon engaged an interpreter at Brierly island; on the latter's desertion he secured the services of another at Teste island. Officers of H.M.S. SWINGER who boarded the FOREST KING at Anchor island, inspected the logs and the recruits, found everything in order,

(21) Ibid, 824.
(22) Ibid, 827-828.
(23) Ibid, 830.
and signed her papers accordingly. (24) Shortly afterwards appeared an L.M.S. schooner which had aboard McFarlane, the missionary, and Hugh H. Milman, the Cooktown Police Magistrate. Using Jerry, a mission teacher, as interpreter, they too examined the recruits. They learned that most believed they would work only for a short time. When Jerry explained what they would have to do in Queensland and the length of the agreement, twenty-two recruits deserted. (25)

On this evidence the FOREST KING case, one of kidnapping on the high seas, came before the Vice-Admiralty Court at Brisbane in October 1884. The Chief Justice pointed out in his summing up that the case for the Crown rested almost entirely on the uncorroborated story of Jerry, who admitted having told the recruits that they would die in two months if they went to Queensland. Officers of the SWINGER had not tested the linguistic ability of her interpreters before Jerry spoke to the recruits. In retrospect this seems extraordinary; in consequence the truth about the matter will never be known. It is plain the Government Agent had complied with all the existing regulations, and that the captain deferred to him in all matters.

relating to recruiting. Neither the missionaries nor any other witness suggested that the Government Agent was a fraud, and the evidence at the trial indicated that he was more conscientious than many. The Crown's case was therefore very weak. The judge ruled that illegal recruiting had not been proven and so the vessel, together with all goods and effects on board, was restored to the owners. They were also granted costs. Their claim for damages went unanswered however, as the judge considered the officers to have been exercising their proper function. (26)

The last labour ship to visit south-east Papua was the HEATH, commanded by Wawn, who had T.R.Y. Thomson as Government Agent and John Stroud as recruiter. She left Mackay on 19 July 1884 and returned to Townsville on 25 November with only nineteen recruits. (27) The HEATH had no interpreters on board when she returned to Queensland because the three who had transferred to Wawn from the CEEAR worked during the actual recruiting but then disembarked at Teste island en route from New Guinea. Wawn, because of the animosity shown him by the mission teacher's wife, was unable to secure replacements. (28) Because there were no

(26) Q'ld P.P. V. & P. 1884 vol.II, 913-915; Brisbane Courier 20 Oct.1884; Wawn op.cit., 349.
interpreters on board, the Inspector at Townsville refused to pass the recruits. The ship's owners had therefore to bring some interpreters from a plantation on the Herbert river before the ship could be cleared. (29) The HEATH also ran into trouble about arms. The port officials were quite certain that she had left Queensland carrying a quantity of firearms which were not on board when she arrived back. They suspected that the arms had either been landed without authority, or otherwise disposed of during the voyage. Both proceedings were illegal. Evidence being scanty, no legal action could be taken. (30)

In the first half of September 1884 a party of Papuans who had escaped from a plantation in the Johnstone river area and attempted to sail home in a stolen boat were apprehended at Thursday island. McFarlane spoke to these natives and discovered that they had been deceived about the length of their indentures. (31) His discussions with South Sea Island teachers and other natives in the eastern district of the mission led McFarlane to believe that recruits had been decoyed aboard a labour vessel while other natives had been kidnapped and murdered. Other rumours spread about New Guinea and finally reached Queensland.

Besides these, there were fairly regular cases of Papuan labourers absconding from plantations. (32)

One result of these ugly stories was the bringing to trial, in November-December 1884, of the chief personnel aboard the HOPEFUL, mentioned above as returning to Townsville in mid-July. As with the FOREST KING, officers of H.M.S. SWINGER had boarded the HOPEFUL and checked both the Government Agent's and the master's logs before clearing the vessel, but it appears that the police work done by the Royal Navy in connection with this traffic was ineffective. All members of the HOPEFUL crew who came up for trial were found guilty. McNeil, the recruiting agent, and Williams, the boatswain, were sentenced to death; Shaw, the master, and Schoefield, the Government Agent, to life imprisonment; another member of the crew, to ten years' imprisonment with hard labour; two others, to seven years' imprisonment. The death sentence was commuted to imprisonment for life, while in 1890 all the prisoners were pardoned and freed. (33)

Even Wawn, a biased man in this regard, admitted that

(33) Brisbane Courier 23 Sept.1884; Wawn op.cit., 352.
the HOPEFUL’s recruiter was a man who should have been barred from serving in the labour trade long before, and that the Government Agent was a drunkard. Yet he still maintained that there had been a grave miscarriage of justice. He stressed that the chief witness for the prosecution was Messiah, a negro cook who prior to the trial had attempted to blackmail all those concerned in the outrages. Wawn also maintained that the Crown had paid Messiah for his evidence. (34) Another important Crown witness, Dingwall the ship’s carpenter, had come out of prison just before he joined the HOPEFUL. The evidence of three white members of the crew had not been included in the indictment because, Wawn claimed, it had been found favourable to the accused. (35) These serious charges cannot now be investigated since the court record has not been preserved. Wawn was so partisan that his testimony must be regarded with scepticism.

The court cases connected with the STANLEY, the FOREST KING and the HOPEFUL, the numerous desertions by New Guinea natives, the high death rate among them, and mission agitation, all brought abuses in the labour traffic to public notice. So in December 1884 the Queensland government appointed a Royal Commission, which between January and May 1885 enquired into the New Guinea

(35) Ibid., 348-352.
traffic. S.W. Griffith, the Queensland Premier at this time, tended to be unsympathetic to the planter interests and to align with the working class. There was some criticism of his government's choice of Commissioners. Wawn maintained that they were all devoted Griffith men but this was certainly an exaggeration. John F. Buckland, the Chairman, who was the member for Buluna, certainly voted with Griffith on the amendment of the Act relating to the recruitment and employment of Polynesian labour, (36) but he does not seem to have been the Premier's creature. Milman, the Cooktown Police Magistrate, was a poor choice in that he had figured so largely in the FOREST KING case and so could be accused of bias, but on the other hand he was well acquainted with conditions in New Guinea. W. Kinniard Rose, the third Commissioner, was a lawyer but newly arrived in the colony from England. (37) Even if the Commission were rigged, the evidence suggests that the Commissioners did not distort the material although they may have been selective. (38) Wawn levelled a serious charge against the Commissioners' honesty when he maintained that the three Government Agents whom he took on his recruiting trips, all well known men, were in Brisbane at the time of the sitting; the Commissioners stated that all

(36) Q'ld P.P. V.& P. 1885 vol. I, 236.
(37) Wawn, op.cit., 360.
(38) cf. Wawn op.cit., 362.
Government Agents had either left the colony or were out of reach. (39) Wawn also alleged that whereas the Commissioners stated that Cago, their interpreter, did not speak to the recruit before they were presented, in fact he had. (40) One suspects that had such criticisms been sound, the press would have fired them at the Commission. In fact, there was apparently no such comment.

The record of the traffic, as presented by the Commission, does not make pleasant reading. The Commissioners concluded that most natives did not understand the nature of their engagement. Even when interpreters were employed, which was not always the case, recruiting agents appeared to have discharged their duties perfunctorily. Many evils arose from the inefficiency or incapacity of Government Agents who did not insist upon absolute adherence to the regulations laid down by the Pacific Island Labourers Act. Some natives were kidnapped or coerced into signing agreements and many were purposely deluded. Hardly any of the native interpreters gave satisfactory service. (41)

Among the more specific findings, that concerning the

(40) Wawn, op.cit., 361.
(41) Q'ld P.P. V.& P. 1885 vol.II, 815-819.
CIAN's first voyage has particular interest, for the Commission did not agree with Morey. It found that the natives he cited as speaking good pidgin English were very difficult to understand the rest, asked through an interpreter why they had signed on, invariably answered "cut sugar" in broken English, thus suggesting that those syllables had no meaning in their minds. (42) The Commissioners concluded that the men had been induced aboard by the recruiter, and that he had scarcely troubled to explain the nature and period of the engagement. Sometimes he simply held up three fingers to signify three years. Indeed the evidence indicated that the interpreters had told recruits that they would be working for various periods; only one native admitted having understood that the indenture term was three years. Having heard this, he did not want to sign on but did so after the recruiter fired a rifle. (43)

Apropos the LIZZIE'S first trip the Commission found that the Mewstone islanders who brought fruit to the ship to barter were induced to go to the whiteman's island for periods ranging from one to three moons. (44) At Joannet island some natives were ordered aboard on the threat of being shot; at other places, too, people were forced to sign agreements. (45) On Sudest a

(42) Ibid, 818-819.
(43) Ibid, 819.
(44) Ibid, 848-851.
(45) Ibid, 850-851, 855-856, 862-863, 865.
number of sleeping men was captured and forced on board. (46) Many recruits said that they were told that they would be working in Queensland for three years only when the LIZZIE was in deep water. (47)

The recruits brought to Queensland by the LIZZIE on her first voyage were all employed on Hamleigh plantation. During their examination before the Commission there was such obvious signalling between witnesses that the room had to be cleared. (48) After all the evidence had been gathered and just before the Commissioners left the plantation two witnesses, the interpreters Dixon and Sandfly, came to them. They confessed to having lied at the hearing, allegedly because they were afraid of the plantation manager. In this interview both said that in fact they had told the recruits that the term was only three moons; previously they swore to have said three years. (49) Obviously many natives perjured themselves when giving evidence and their testimony had to be regarded with caution; anyway, as the Commissioners were aware, the term 'yan' or 'year' probably had no meaning as a period of time for most of the natives. (50)

(46) Ibid. 861.
(47) Ibid. 847-850, 862, 898.
(48) Ibid. 821.
(49) Ibid. 872.
(50) Ibid. 822, 842.
The Commission said of the CEARA'S second voyage that her interpreters seemed from the beginning to have deceived recruits. The latter were told that they would be employed in beche-de-mer fishing for periods ranging from two nights to three borima. (51) A borima was a unit of time which varied from island to island and meant anything from one to thirteen months. (52) Some of the recruits were taken against their will; (53) twice the CEARA was mistaken for a mission schooner and the misapprehension allowed to remain; (54) often to allay suspicion the interpreters said that they were missionary boys who would not "gammon". (55) When the vessel arrived in Townsville the interpreters misrepresented what both the port Inspector and the recruits said. (56)

Because the Government Agent's log for the second voyage of the LIZZIE was not produced, the Commissioners found it hard to follow her route. (57) From witnesses' testimony it seemed that recruits were informed that they would work beche-de-mer for varying periods; then, when the ship was in deep water, they were

(51) Ibid. 822, 925-936.
(52) Ibid. 924-926, 932, 984-988.
(53) Ibid. 961-964, 983.
(54) Ibid. 938-940.
(55) Ibid. 937, 939, 962.
(56) Ibid. 823, 935, 937, 962-963, 983, 987.
(57) Ibid. 823.
told "work sugar", again for times which ranged from two moons upwards. (58)

The HOPEFUL, so the Commission learned, began recruiting at Moresby island. The natives engaged there declared that they were forced into the boats and could understand very little of what the Teste island interpreter said. (59) At Killerton island Diene, an L.M.S. evangelist, interpreted; he told the natives that they would have to work for three years, so nobody wished to sign on. (60) In Milne Bay L.M.S. teachers less scrupulous than Diene interpreted, and spoke of two month engagements, so persuading a number of natives to engage. (61)

Cago, a mission boy protégé of Diene's, discouraged all potential labourers when he spoke of three year engagements; on occasions he was not allowed to speak to new recruits. (62) There were, throughout the HOPEFUL'S cruise, many instances of kidnapping and violence as well as deception. Near Fergusson island the boats chased two canoes, killed some of the occupants and kidnapped the remainder. At Normanby island, and probably many other places also, natives were killed and villages burnt. (63)

(58) Ibid, 841-845, 973-977.
(60) Ibid, 874-877.
(61) Ibid, 826, 885-889.
Neither the Government Agent nor the recruiter aboard the SYBIL troubled to make the agreements clear to natives who signed on. Even after interpreters had been engaged, the term of the contract was 'explained' by showing a yam and biting it three times; by cutting a stick of sugar cane three times; by pointing at the moon and clapping three times; by thrice giving an imitation of digging ground. (64) The FOREST KING interpreters seem to have told recruits that they would work for two moons only, or not work at all but simply pay a visit to the whiteman's land. Where they could not converse with the natives, interpreters simply held up two fingers and displayed trade goods. (65) The HEATH interpreters also told natives that they would work only for short periods. (66)

The Queensland government accepted the Commission's report, and on its advice halted the labour traffic. Even without this move, the episode might soon have come to an end. The Proclamation of September 1884, establishing a Protectorate over south-east New Guinea and the off-shore islands, made Port Moresby the sole port of entry for the possession. It was time consuming and difficult for vessels from east Australian ports to reach the

(64) Ibid. 829-830, 906-911.
(65) Ibid. 830-831, 911-920.
(66) Ibid. 831, 924-925, 968-972.
Louisiades when they had first to beat to Port Moresby and then to retrace their path. An easy passage one way meant a difficult task the other. Other factors inimical to the trade were the high mortality rate among the Papuans, their incapacity as workers and a slump in sugar prices from early 1885. Public feeling throughout Australia was always strong against the entry of cheap labour.

So far, we have discussed the trade chiefly in terms of the European interest. But what of the native? The experience meant much, even to those only indirectly concerned; their reactions often varied from what the whiteman presupposed. Officials were surprised when a few declined the government's offer to return all surviving labourers (ironically, in a vessel - the VICTORIA - commanded by Wawn) (67) to their homes. Yet reasons for this choice easily come to mind. Probably some signed on so as to escape punishment for having infringed the mores of their own society; some may have wished to avoid kinship responsibilities. Others perhaps enjoyed life in Queensland, especially if they had been men of low status at home and then become leaders in the new environment. Gambling, unknown to the natives until they engaged as labourers, became a craze for

many in their new surroundings. If skilful at this game, a poor man might hope to accumulate much more wealth thereby than he ever could in his native village.

One can scarcely assess the value of the evidence given to the Commission by natives. They were, of course, obliged to speak through interpreters, which confused some issues, while many contradicted themselves more than once. Papuans always proved bad witnesses; they were a polite people who inclined to say what they imagined their interrogator wished to hear. Some were outright liars. For instance, in July 1884 seven Engineer islanders who deserted from their plantation, were apprehended and brought before Wallace, the sub-immigration agent at Townsville. All, when questioned, said that they had been engaged for three years; these same men when examined by the Commissioners stated that their engagement had been for three months. (68)

With the methods used by port officials to ascertain if recruits understood their contracts there was much room for misunderstanding. Wallace gave a full description of his routine to the Commissioners which shows how wide the breach

between Queensland officials and the recruits was. When a labour vessel made the Townsville port Wallace, in company with the health inspector, boarded her. The Government Agent handed a list of recruits to Wallace who then asked if there were interpreters aboard. On getting an affirmative answer he called for the ship's log to see that they had been properly engaged. He then mustered the interpreters and enquired if they thoroughly understood their function and had properly explained to the recruits that they would have to work on a sugar plantation for three years. Once satisfied on that score Wallace called up all the recruits and made each interpreter question the natives individually about the nature of the agreement. As each "boy" replied in the affirmative when asked if he had signed on for three years Wallace passed him. Questioned by the Commissioners as to what happened when a native answered in the negative Wallace stated this had never happened in his experience.

Once all recruits had been passed Wallace would take hold of one or two by the sleeve, call for the recruiting agent, and ask the "boys" if they knew "this fellow". In catching hold of them and pulling them to him Wallace would say "This fellow no take you all the same this way?" In every instance the interpreters were most indignant at the idea. After this
pantomime Wallace would collect the health certificate from the Inspector. If any planters to whom licences for recruits had been issued were on board Wallace made out agreements at once. If not he went ashore, made out the agreements in his office, and, the following day, accompanied by the planter's agent, signed on the natives. Before the natives were signed on Wallace spoke to them as a group although each came forward singly to touch the pen. After the recruits had been allotted to their masters Wallace inspected the ship to see if it were kept in order, read the Government Agent's log, and enquired of him if he had any complaints or wished to report any squabbles. If the Agent made any charges these had to be formally stated, Wallace made any comments he thought fit, then sent the document to Brisbane.

As soon as he left the vessel he sent a telegram to the central office stating the ship, the number of recruits aboard, and the islands from which they had come. The agreements and stamp duty monies he later forwarded to Brisbane. The central office kept one copy, returned one to the district office, and forwarded the third to the employer. (69)

From this resume it is clear that the port authorities were entirely dependent on interpreters when communicating with

(69) Q'ld P.P. V. & P. 1885 vol.II, 921-923.
recruits. Many of the interpreters were proven liars and distorters of the facts. (70) Although some recruiting agents purposely deceived natives and acted in collusion with interpreters, by no means all of them did so. Sometimes interpreters could not be understood by the natives to whom they were speaking, and this could not be checked or rectified by the recruiter or Government Agent unless the interpreter confessed his inability.

Even if an interpreter were fluent in a particular dialect it would have been difficult for him to explain the period of a contract. We have already remarked that "yam" was a foreign word which had no meaning for most Papuans. Few peoples in south-east Papua have an indigenous system of reckoning, so that any fairly long period of time would be incomprehensible even if the actual words used to express it were not. The evidence leaves no doubt that to many recruits the European system of time meant nothing. (71)

It was difficult to communicate the nature of their agreements to the natives, even when recruiters and interpreters acted in good faith. Papuans had no experience of what plantation labour entailed. The Commissioners, Inspectors,

(70) Ibid. 823-825, 872, 935, 937, 962-963, 983, 987. (71) Ibid. 843ff. All the native evidence is relevant.
and other officials failed to realise that people who had no experience of producing food except for fairly immediate consumption, who never worked for many consecutive hours at the same occupation, who never laboured with unrelated people on a stranger's land, could not comprehend a sugar contract. It seems that there was deception in this matter for recruits were often told that they would engage in beche-de-mer fishing or pearling, activities of which they had some knowledge and experience. The interpreters' deficiencies are relevant in this context also. When they told a recruit that he would be working beche-de-mer they might have meant only to say that he would be working for a white man.

With all these flaws the voyages generally were not so horrific as their more fervent critics alleged. The HOPFUL crew certainly, and others possibly did resort at times to kidnapping and coercion; yet several vessels returned to Queensland with less than their full complement, suggesting that such methods were not always practised. Probably most natives were willing to come aboard in the first place. Many canoes always came out to the vessels, carrying men anxious to engage in trade. Cupidity would induce some to sign for work with the whiteman. Quite a number of those taken to Queensland already had experience of working with foreigners, usually as boat hands for European or
Chinese bêche-de-mer men. They must have had some, if very limited, concept of what they undertook.

The treatment of natives, once they had signed agreements was fairly good; as good as it would have been on any European vessel. Wasmn stated that accommodation and facilities on the VICTORIA were below the standard required on labour vessels. (72) Rations, clothing, and the blankets issued to the Papuans were probably the cheapest quality but there were no prosecutions against the New Guinea recruiting vessels for infringements of the regulations in these matters. Neither were they prosecuted for accommodation deficiencies.

A study of the labour traffic in New Guinea shows that the Europeans involved, including those who actively campaigned against it, only thought in terms of infringements of the regulations. They did not find distasteful the notion of putting primitive people to work in a strange environment. Even those L.M.S. missionaries most vocal in their opposition did not oppose the principle involved. McFarlane, one of the most bitter critics stated in public that it was better for the natives of New Guinea to learn civilization from the gentleman planters of Queensland

(72) Ibid, 1059-1060.
than from ruffian traders in New Guinea; (73) but he missed the point that "gentleman" planters hardly ever came into contact with their labourers and left everything to overseers who were as ruffianly as any trader in New Guinea.

Some missionaries thought that the natives would, through the agency of Christianity, evolve towards homogeneity with the white races, but few other Europeans believed that the brown men would ever be more than "hewers of wood and drawers of water". There was little criticism of the traffic on the ground that it kept the brown man subservient. Most opposition was against infringements of the regulations, not the regulations themselves; or came from white labourers and their spokesmen. The New Guinea traders also campaigned against the traffic because their interest suffered. Even the missionaries who campaigned against the labour traffic were often as concerned to maintain their own secular influence dominant among the natives as to protest on purely humanitarian and moral grounds. Similar axe-grinding appeared on the international sphere. Frederick Engels cited the case of the New Guinea labour traffic to discredit capitalism; he cared so little about the issue for its own sake that the example he

(73) Brisbane Courier, 10 Sept.1884; Wawn, op.cit., 350; Q'ld P.P. V.& P. 1884 vol.II, 735.
lll.

gave was incorrect in all details. (74) The kanaka trade was an issue on which the self-interest of all protagonists was most evident.

These "blackbirding" vessels made only a few visits to the islands off south-east New Guinea and operated within a short span of time. Hardly a year elapsed between the first voyage and the last, so the natives of south-east Papua were not subjected to constant visits of recruiting vessels as were many peoples of the Pacific. Yet the few recruiters who did come were practically the only channel through which Papuans had been able to visit the whiteman's land, and the men who worked on the Queensland sugar plantations were virtually alone in having suffered first hand experience of the dim-dim world. This must have affected their status in the local community. The prestige of such Papuans would have increased, and as experts on the ways of the whiteman they would have been consulted on all matters relating to contact with the Europeans. One would have expected them to act as bridges between the brown man and the white. The evidence on this point, though scanty, is significant. Whenever the labour traffic is mentioned in later records it is always a result of some old native government servant reminiscing.

about his days in Queensland to a European official. (75)

The labour traffic did not drastically affect the demographic pattern of the islands off south-east New Guinea. The total number of recruits taken to Queensland only amounted to some six hundred and twenty and as only a handful of men were signed on at each point of call the labour traffic contributed very little to the decline in the population.

Over six hundred labourers were taken to Queensland but only four hundred and four returned to south-east Papua in the VICTORIA a year later. Those who elected to remain in Queensland until their agreement expired were some fifty odd; most came from Rossel island and were working on the Burdekin. H.H. Romilly, the official in charge of the evacuation, suspected that these natives did not know they were able to return home, but had finally to accept the interpreters' assurance that all was understood. (76) The other one hundred and fifty odd Papuans had either died on a plantation or absconded, never to be heard of again. The mortality rate was extremely high: some twenty-five per cent of the total.

(76) Q'ld P.P. V.& P. 1885 vol.II, 1067.
For this reason the labour traffic had an extremely important effect on future relations between the brown men and Europeans. When the VICTORIA left Queensland she carried, besides the labourers, bundles of trade goods which were to be given as compensation to the relatives of deceased or missing men. On her cruise among the islands off south-east New Guinea the VICTORIA stopped at no less than forty nine places to discharge recruits and distribute compensation bundles. (77) As was to be expected, there were some oversights which meant that some deserving next of kin did not receive bundles.

Natives of south-east Papua had occasionally killed foreign intruders from the time these strangers had begun to visit the country, but after the 'blackbirding' voyages some half dozen Europeans were murdered in quick succession. Protectorate officials and naval officers investigating these outrages did not report on them very fully but clearly their opinion was that the natives had sufficient provocation in nearly all cases. (78) The murder of one, Miller, at Normanby island was, they thought, an exception. Miller was a trader with a very good reputation, and had never visited the island before. It seemed a particularly vicious killing for which the natives

(77) Ibid. 1069.
(78) Ibid. 1886 vol.II, 955-980.
had no reasonable motive. However investigation showed that
the murderers were close relatives, one a brother, the other a
cousin, of a native who had died in Queensland and whom the
authorities had overlooked when handing out compensation
bundles. (79) According to native custom the relatives avenged
the death. At Hoopiron bay on Moresby island where another
trader named Friar was murdered the authorities had overlooked
the relatives of two dead labourers. (80) Very probably the
other traders were killed for the same reason, not simply because
they had treated the natives brutally. When a warship came to
investigate Miller's death, one of the murderers, Diavara by
name, brought a bundle of native wealth aboard as compensation.
(81) By this action he signified that he wished the blood feud
to end; the Europeans did not accept the peace offer. Diavara
spent a term in prison during which he would have discovered
that the brown man and the white were not equals. (82)

The 'blackbirding' voyages caused a deterioration in
relations between Europeans and natives in several ways. First
the natives lost faith in the word of the white man. Previously

(79) Ibid, 973.
(80) Ibid, 970-971, 973.
(81) Ibid, 973.
(82) C.F.I.(Prot.) Set 2, Douglas to Sec.of State for the Cols.
19 Mar.1887.
they had been suspicious, now they were mistrustful; and with cause. Second, the oversights connected with the return of the labourers seemed quite illogical, and Papuans could find no satisfactory explanation for European behaviour. The lack of communication between the two people became more palpable. Finally the reprisal murders gave the natives a very bad reputation so far as Europeans were concerned. Despite the elucidation of the facts just outlined these atrocities seemed to many to confirm that the natives were irresponsible, treacherous, bloodthirsty savages. Moreover these attitudes, Papuan and European, hardened and remained virtually unaltered up to the end of our period. This was so although after the mid-1880's hardly any Europeans were murdered in south-east Papua and relatively few whites broke faith with natives in the matter of contracts and employment. The deception practiced by some Europeans who attempted to recruit Louisiade natives for the northern goldfields was quickly checked by the administration. (83)

This phase of European contact was doubly unfortunate. It created attitudes which poisoned future relations,

without vouchsafing either wealth to European sugar growing and mercantile interests or new skills and goods to the Papuans.
THE REPRESENTATIVES OF WESTERN COMMERCE BEFORE 1906

From the middle decades of the nineteenth century occasional communications between the natives of south-east Papua and foreigners differed from the pattern established by the explorers. Once the basic hydrography of the area became known, and its coasts and islands mapped, a miscellaneous collection of Europeans entered the area. This process began even before the missionaries and recruiters appeared but became significant only from the mid-eighties. The area's natural resources, real or imagined, attracted most of the men with whom this chapter deals; the rest came fortuitously. Escaped convicts from the French penal settlements established themselves in native communities, and survivors from ship-wrecked vessels sought asylum wherever they happened to land. Such men lived in a native village for long periods, entirely dependent upon the inhabitants. In south-east Papua evidence of such contacts is scanty; almost certainly they occurred more frequently than the records indicate, in spite of New Guinea's relative isolation from recognized trading routes.

There are no accounts of this sort of contact until after missions had been established. Father Monrouzier wrote, in January 1849, of a ship which had been wrecked on the Laughlin
reef some years previously. Unfortunately he did not give its name. According to Montrouzier's account some of the crew survived the wreck and managed to get ashore, but they stayed only a short time on the atoll before they fought the natives. Decimated by this battle the survivors left the Laughlans, presumably in the wrecked vessel which they had managed to repair. They eventually reached Woodlark island and landed there, hoping for asylum. This hope was not realized as the Muruans killed all but one man, who became the protégé of a chief. (1)

Very occasionally, ships engaged in some branch of Pacific commerce called at Woodlark. In June 1848 the Marist priests sent eight young people to Sydney by one such vessel. The missionaries hoped that the wonders of the metropolis would so dazzle the natives' sensibilities and impress upon them the omnipotence of the whiteman's God that they would immediately embrace the Christian faith and on their return convert their fellows. Unfortunately for the priests this did not happen. (2) Much later (1900) another Muruan who had served twenty-five years aboard a whaler returned home. He also was a disappointment, unsettling his comrades and so displeasing the Europeans

on the island who had hoped he would bolster rather than undermine their authority. (3)

After the Marists abandoned Murua there is no evidence of European activity in south-east Papua until 1867. In that year some residents of Port Denison, Queensland decided to form a New Guinea trading company. The main reason for this decision was their belief that Robert Towns, a wealthy merchant, had made large profits trading in New Guinea. (4) This venture, and several other colonizing companies which were formed in the following years, all failed. (5) Captain Webb, who led one of these expeditions, was described by a journalist of the Port Denison Times as having traded for a long time in New Guinea. (6) Webb was eventually (1884) killed by the natives in south-east Papua. Like Miller and the rest he probably died to atone for the death of a Papuan labourer in Queensland.

From the middle seventies there is much more information about European activity. The L.M.S. party which left Port

(4) P.D. Times, 25 May, 1867, 3.
Moresby in April 1876 to study south-east Papua as a potential mission field found a bêche-de-mer vessel working Milne Bay when they arrived. She was the brig RITA from Sydney and had been out fishing for the past ten months. (7) The recommendation of a ship-wrecked sailor who had lived on Ware Island for some months influenced the field brethren in deciding to evangelize this part of Papua. (8) There must have been many other cases where foreign castaways, less fortunate than this man, sought succour from natives; McFarlane, writing to the Colonial Secretary in Brisbane in 1878, said that the inhabitants of all the islands around South Cape had killed ship-wrecked crews and bêche-de-mer parties for the past fifteen or twenty years. (9) Chinese, most of whom operated from Cooktown, Queensland, formed a large percentage of the bêche-de-mer fishers. In 1880 two hundred men with headquarters in Cooktown engaged in this industry, (10) and many of them regularly visited south-east Papua.

In the years before the establishment of the Protectorate news items about New Guinea, particularly the southern part,

(7) G309/11 Papua Reports Box 1, Lawes, 3-22 Apr. 1876.
(8) Ibid, Box 2, McFarlane, 17 Oct.-15 Dec. 1877; McFarlane, Among the Cannibals, 50.
(9) G309/94 Papua Letters Box 2 Folder 3, McFarlane, 10 Dec. 1878.
(10) Cooktown Herald, 8 Dec. 1880, 2.
appeared fairly frequently in local Queensland papers and sometimes in the Sydney and Melbourne press. These reports usually dealt with two topics: the possibility of exploiting natural resources, particularly gold, or tales of massacres. Only later did questions of defence become important. (11)

Typical of such reports was a lecture given by A.K. Collins in Sydney in 1867. He spoke of the island in glowing terms as a field for exploitation by Australians. It was near at hand, and its products the most valuable in the world. Besides there were no tyrannical rajahs to exact tribute, no European administration to petition, no organized and powerful armies to encounter. In Collins' view Australians had but to conquer the natives by prudence, firmness, and courage, to obtain the riches of the most wonderful country in the world. (12)

Perhaps the most notorious case of natives killing shipwrecked foreigners was that of the ST.Paul. On 30 September 1858 she was blown off course on a voyage from Hong Kong to Sydney, and foundered on Rossel reef. The ship was a total wreck but a number of her passengers, all of whom were Chinese

coolies survived the wreck. The captain and crew made off in the ship's boat eventually reaching New Caledonia. They left over three hundred souls to the mercy of the Rossel islanders. According to rumours which circulated afterwards, one chief was so inordinately fond of human flesh that he kept the survivors for meat. They were kept on a small islet close to Rossel and were brought, one at a time to the main island, as the need for meat arose. (13) Certainly when a rescue ship, the ST. PAUL, arrived from New Caledonia in January 1859, she found only one Chinese remained.

This macabre story shocked many Europeans, including the first officials appointed to British New Guinea. It resulted in the Rossel islanders having a very bad reputation among whitemen. So in 1890 when a government patrol visited the island officials were surprised to find that the Rossel natives were among the most harmless and inoffensive in the Possession. (14) On a later administrative visit, Sir William MacGregor, the Administrator, ascertained the natives' version of the ST. PAUL wreck. According to them the Chinese had constructed rafts and sailed away again. This seems a much more plausible explanation of events. (15)

(15) Ibid. 1892-1893, 6.
In the seventies and eighties the islands within the area of our study were, apart from the Torres Strait islands, that part of New Guinea most frequented by foreign traders. The latter dealt in sea products, bêche-de-mer, trocus, black-lip or gold-lip shell, and pearls. They also collected a little tortoise shell, and some copra from palms which flourished in sandy soil close to the salt-water. These products were the staples of the New Guinea commerce. Most of the traders operated from Cooktown or Thursday Island.

A few escaped convicts, runaway seamen of every racial combination, and adventurers who somehow reached New Guinea, lived permanently in the country as beachcombers, planters, or traders. They hardly ever left New Guinea waters, only occasionally visiting a north Queensland port to sell their produce. It is impossible to arrive at any reliable or accurate estimate of the size, racial composition, or social background of this group for their origins are shrouded in mystery. When they are mentioned in the records it is as Papuan residents of long standing.

Such men seem to have adopted most native customs and assimilated fairly well into the Papuan village community. They took native mistresses and lived in, or close to, native settlements. However they did not become completely integrated into
village life as they usually owned a European built boat and engaged in activities which brought them a cash income. They rarely took part in the native agricultural, fishing, and trading cycle. They were lawless men who, eschewing all authority, relied on personal strength, courage, and force of personality to gain an ascendancy over others. We can see them as true anarchists who sinned against society without compunction. Murder, rape, robbery, kidnapping, extortion, perjury and assault were among their crimes. Just such men were Charlie Berlin, Miguel George, Ned Cadigan, Bob Lumse, Augustin, McNair, Jerry Fiji, Mick Callaghan, Tom Manilla.

They did not always perpetrate serious crimes; sometimes

(21) C.P.I.(Prot.) Set 6 Bundle 1, File 24; Ibid, Bundle 2, Lawes to Douglas, 3 Nov.1887.
(22) Ibid, Bundle 2, Pitcairn to Hunter, 15 July,1888.
(23) Ibid, Bundle 2, Musgrave to Hunter, 16 July,1888.
these men took a malicious pleasure in discomforting the organs of authority which in south-east Papua were the administration and the missions. An un-named trader, whose headquarters were the Trobriands, once ostentatiously anchored his craft in front of the mission premises at Kavatari and had the young girls of the sewing class off to his vessel for immoral purposes; they went in batches of three and four, until he broke up the whole class, to attend which the girls afterwards felt ashamed. (25)

Nicholas Minister or Ministre, known as Nick the Greek, was most representative of this outlaw element of foreign trader. Although undoubtedly drawn on a larger scale than any of the others he typified the genus: cruel, flamboyant, untrustworthy, yet courageous. He was beholden to no one, and expected neither pity, charity, nor even justice from his fellows. His background is uncertain. One source states that he was an escaped convict from New Caledonia, (26) another that he was a black sheep from a noble English lineage, (27) a third that he was an Austrian not a Greek. (28) Whatever his origin and history he came to Papua and settled in the Trobriand islands. In the words of one man he knew the reefs and islands of south-east Papua as

(25) C.P.I.(Col.) Set 6 vol.III, MacGregor to Q'ld, 4 Dec.1895.
(26) Cranswick & Shevill, A New Deal for Papua, 13.
(27) Lubbock, Bully Hayes, 168.
(28) Wawn, The South Sea Islanders and the Queensland Labour Trade, 311.
well as a London cabby knew the streets of that metropolis. (29) Many stories circulated about him, probably all with some element of truth but more of exaggeration. Assault, abduction, murder, rape, deception, and robbery were all alleged against him. (30) One fantastic saga relates that his native crew, driven to the limit of their endurance by his depravity and torture, revolted. They knifed him, and, believing him to be dead, tossed the body overboard. They were mistaken however, for despite his wounds Nick managed to cling to the vessel until nightfall, and then, while all the crew slept after a happy celebration, he clambered aboard and murdered every man. (31) Besides being more flamboyant than his fellow traders Nick the Greek was exceptional in that at one time he was employed by the administration. (32) He was also attributed the distinction of being the only one of the early traders who did not meet a violent death. (33) He died in January 1912 of dysentery with complications. (34) Nick would

doubtless have enjoyed this last attribute of singularity, but it too was an apocryphal story. Certainly Miguel Georges, or Michael George, another Greek trader domiciled in the Trobriands, died from natural causes in 1921. (35)

Numbers of coloured men, of diverse racial strains, also engaged in trading. They operated on a small scale, but belong as 'representatives of western commerce', for they did not integrate completely into native life and subsisted on their commercial earnings. Virtually nothing is known of their backgrounds, but almost certainly many of them were run-away seamen. Their number is likewise difficult to ascertain accurately but it would not have been much above a score or two. (36)

After the Protectorate had been proclaimed a third category of settler came to south-east Papua, although never in such numbers as to comprise more than a small minority of the total unofficial population. These were of a type common in all British colonies: members of cadet lines in aristocratic families, or with respectable middle class affiliations. They

(35) C.P.293 Set 3 Bundle 4, Jacket 68a.
(36) See Appendix.
took up land and planned to develop it by cultivating coconuts or other tropical crops. These planters lived chiefly in the coastal areas on the islands; none at all settled in the mountainous interior of the mainland or larger islands. Such men as R.V. Cholmondeley, (37) who had been honourary aide-de-camp to Douglas, H.A. Wickham, (38) or Richard Ede, (39) were all fairly cultivated, well educated, and socially adept. In this they formed a striking contrast to most of the other settlers. Such men planned to do more than exploit the available resources of south-east Papua. Wickham, who leased the Conflicts for some years from 1895, introduced sponge growing into the territory and developed his own pearling beds. Paradoxically, although the Administrator wished to attract settlers of this sort, men with some capital and some plans for the development of new industries, the inducements he was able to offer were negligible. Besides, there were other tropical parts of the empire, with a better climate, nearer to Britain,
and with more of the amenities of civilization; these naturally attracted such men as being a far more congenial field for settlement and investment. The proximity of Australia also told against New Guinea, since there was still plenty of opportunity in her colonies for British immigrants or the Australian born, to develop new industries or improve land which they had taken up.

Most British immigrants to south-east Papua apparently did not go to New Guinea direct, but first tried their luck in Australia or New Zealand. Having met with little success there, they went on to New Guinea as a last resort. The Hunter brothers provided good examples. These twins were reputed members of a good county family in England. This seems hard to believe because they were almost illiterate and had quite uncultivated habits, but it is not impossible; Burke does not clinch the issue. They migrated to Australia, but instead of settling down and working, they drifted aimlessly, and lived as wasters. They squandered their remittance until relatives stopped sending them money. Eventually they reached Thursday Island, and from there crossed to New Guinea in the early 1880's to escape from creditors and other inconveniences of civilization which they could not avoid in Australia. (40)

Finally there was the largest group of settlers: men who came to south-east Papua originally as prospectors, storekeepers, or beachcombers. Unlike the heterogeneous class of Ministre and company, these men generally remained aloof from the native population and, in the short term at least, looked upon New Guinea as merely one stage in their wanderings. Those who stayed in the country amalgamated with the classes of residents previously described. The greater part of this group came to New Guinea because an event of the late 1880's brought south-east Papua into prominence and entailed hundreds of whitemen flocking there. In 1888 a pearl diver named David Whyte discovered gold on Joannet island in the Louisiade archipelago. When his discovery became public knowledge, prospectors from Queensland fields rushed to New Guinea. (41) Even after the alluvial deposits had been worked out, a matter of a few months only, miners continued to flow into Papua. Individuals or parties discovered new fields on other Louisiade islands, then when these were exhausted finds were made on mainland New Guinea. There were rushes to Milne Bay, to the Lakekamu river, and to the rich Yodda and Mamba river valleys.

How was this new European population constituted? It was overwhelmingly male, working class and Australian born, although individuals of various nationality, social rank, and educational level leavened the whole. Many of the new men were illiterate; most had completely undistinguished backgrounds and remain anonymous. Some, but probably only a small proportion, were originally Queensland beachcombers who drifted across to New Guinea rather aimlessly. Certainly not typical, yet suggesting how strange the origins of such Europeans who settled in south-east Papua might be, was the story of a man who appears in the archives as H.M.S. Donovan. His history was related by K. Bushell, for some years a field officer in the Eastern Division. The events he described would have occurred in the 1890's and early years of the twentieth century.

There are some inconsistencies in the tale, and it seems scarcely credible, but as the central figure undoubtedly existed the account cannot be dismissed as a complete fabrication. (42) While Bushell was patrolling the more remote islands of the district, he discovered a hermit whom he first mistook for a mad native but subsequently discovered to be a white man named

Donovan. Bushell gradually tamed Donovan and taught him to speak properly. Once he could converse Donovan gradually divulged his singular history. He had been born on a farm in coastal north Queensland. While he was still an infant some Chinese raided the property and murdered his father, but his mother managed to escape with her baby. She fled to an uninhabited island on the barrier reef. There the pair lived for some years until the mother died; Donovan was still a child. The boy grew up a solitary, his only human contacts being with the coastal aborigines, who occasionally came across from the mainland on fishing expeditions. When he reached adolescence Donovan became unsettled, and suddenly decided to seek change and adventure on the mainland. Thither he went and roamed about the unfamiliar jungle until he was captured by aboriginal cannibals. In their camp he met other whitemen for the first time. Also captive, they were shipwrecked English sailors. Donovan managed to break his bonds and then freed the other prisoners. The whole party evaded recapture. Donovan then led the group along the coast in search of a settlement. Eventually they reached Townsville, where Donovan separated from his companions. He worked as a miner for a short while but soon left that distasteful occupation and returned to the jungle. He walked along the north Queensland coast to Cape York and from there crossed to Thursday Island where he worked
as a diver until he quarrelled with his employer. After giving up his job he went to Daru and then, visiting one native village after another, gradually made his way along the New Guinea coast until he reached the spot where Bushell found him. (43)

Donovan was quite illiterate and did not even know his given names. Having learned to behave in a relatively civilized way he was granted the lease of a forty acre island off East Cape. This he turned into a copra plantation. Donovan also became a temporary civil servant for a short time in 1908; as European goaler at Samarai he gave every satisfaction. Indeed the Resident Magistrate regretted that he was not made a permanent officer. (44) Donovan married a native and worked his plantation well, until the murder of his young son drove him mad. He died soon after that tragedy. (45) Donovan was an exceptional case, but there were other whitemen in Papua about whom the administration or other Europeans knew hardly anything. (46)

Another native of north Queensland who drifted to Papua was J.W. Collinson. He grew up in north Queensland, left

(43) Bushell, op. cit., 23, 55-310.
(45) Bushell, op. cit., 305-310.
(46) cf. Pratt, Two Years Among New Guinea Cannibals, 46.
school at a very early age, and, after working as a saddler's apprentice for some time, decided to go to the Russel diggings. Then he became a clerk in the Queensland railways, but after a short time was suspended. He got a job as a timber worker, and then became a clerk in Clunn and Sons head-quarters office which was situated at Cooktown.

In 1901 Collinson went on a trip to New Guinea for the firm. The shortage of fairly trustworthy men with any training in commercial principles was so acute that after he had been a fortnight in Samarai, William Whitten, one of Papua's modest moguls, offered Collinson a job as manager of the northern goldfields store. Collinson accepted, evidently leaving Clunn and Sons without compunction. After three months he returned to Samarai looking for work, and then decided to try his luck at Murua. Again he was unsuccessful in his quest for work, so he came back to Samarai in a few days. Collinson found the little town buzzing with news of a rich gold strike in the Cloudy Bay area. He went thither not as a prospector but as Whitten's representative: a much more secure and lucrative position. However the job lasted only a few weeks as the field proved a duffer. Whitten had no other work when Collinson returned to Samarai but the latter decided against going back to Queensland, hoping that something would turn up shortly.
Instead, he contracted a severe illness. After his recovery Collinson worked temporarily as a tally clerk for Glunn and Sons' branch office in Samarai, and then went on a recruiting trip with another important Samarai settler, Bob Bunting.

For the next few months Collinson took various temporary jobs, chiefly as a recruiter's assistant, but also in Samarai where he worked as a clerk, as a billiard marker in one of the hotels, as a hospital wardsman. Then he got a permanent job in the Burns Philp office and stayed in Samarai for several years. He became a respected, socially useful member of the white community. During this period he claimed to have revived the Samarai School of Arts, of which body he was secretary until he left the country at the end of 1907. He was prominent in Anglican church affairs and became a church warden. He also belonged to the local white cricket team. His career, aimless so long, had at last found shape. (47)

There were some ordinary, respectable men among this class of settler. A.H. Kissack provided one of the best examples. He had been a Melbourne photographer who, forced to give up that profession for health reasons, went north. He worked for a time as a Government Agent on a labour vessel and

(47) Collinson, Tropic Coasts and Tablelands, 1-87.
then decided to visit New Guinea. He went as a trader. How he concluded that such an occupation would be less of a strain than photography is unknown. However he settled in south-east Papua, on Tese island, made an adequate living, and died a highly respected man. (48) Frank Rochfort was another of this type. Although he came to Papua as a miner he was an educated gentleman. (49) Rochfort was a strong critic of the administration in the period around the turn of the century. Indeed C.A.W. Monckton, for several years a Resident Magistrate in the goldfields area of Papua, described him as an agitator of the de Valera class. Later he settled on Murua and his life there was uneventful; when he died his funeral was attended by all the Europeans on the island including the Assistant Resident Magistrate. (50)

The sudden influx of miners benefited traders and storekeepers already resident in the territory as well as those who


(49) Monckton, New Guinea Recollections, 171-172; C'whth P.P. General, vol.II 1905, 197-207; Royal Comm., 73-74.

opened businesses early in the boom years. Kissack who had a very modest establishment in 1885 grew wealthy by Papuan standards and acquired plantations, stores, and boats. A man named Thompson who went into partnership with him also prospered. (51) Another settler with commercial interests was William Benjamin Patching who built up a lucrative cordial and aerated waters business. He was also an auctioneer. Patching became an influential member of the Samarai Chamber of Commerce when it was formed. (52) The Whitten brothers, William, and Robert, the John Clunns (both father and son), and Arthur Herbert Bunting, all grew rich. (53) John and Elizabeth Mahoney, or Mahony, and their children owned hotels, stores, plantations, and several vessels. In fact they created a commercial empire albeit on a minor scale. (54) The Clunns and the Buntings were originally from north Queensland (55) as probably were the

(55) Collinson, op.cit., 27; Cairns Morning Post, 10 Sept.1896, 4.
founders of most of these settler and mercantile dynasties.

What can be said about the inner life of these Europeans of varying type, background and occupation? There are virtually no extant memoirs, letters, or other personal records from any of the unofficial population except missionaries. This makes the historian's task difficult indeed. One can never know or understand the personalities of names which occur at random in the records. One cannot easily establish the ideals or ascertain the attitudes of the European population until after newspapers were published in the territory. These early settlers, even those about whom there is most information, are insubstantial figures: grey ghosts but vaguely defined. One has to form impressions rather than transmit their own statements.

Despite this it can be said with some confidence that those Europeans who settled in south-east Papua became emotionally attached to the country and took pleasure in helping to shape the course of her future development. There they invested their money and built up a business reputation; there they were accepted by their fellows as important, influential figures; in the congenial Papuan environment they found security, and with it achieved personal dignity, confidence, and a sense of controlling destiny. To the outsider their life might seem.
dull, petty, brutish, and nasty; to the people concerned it was full of interest, importance, and rich incident. Some of these individuals did score a real personal achievement. Families like those mentioned above became truly prosperous. Other individuals succeeded on a lesser scale: men like John Gusth Nelson, and the Finn brothers who were traders on Murua, (56) Henry Burfitt (57) and Charles Arbouin who were employees of John Mahony. Arbouin worked himself up into an independent position. Indeed an official writing much later, described him as being the person on whom most of the natives around Sudest turned to for assistance in any emergency. (58)

Most miners on the other hand regarded Papua as simply another land to be despoiled of its mineral wealth and then left without compunction or regret. Certainly a miner's life in Papua was far from pleasant. Miners could hardly be expected to become attached to a land which gave so much promise, most of

it unrealized, and which proved so hard to conquer. (59) Their sole great pleasure was drink. Most left the country either jubilantly successful, or in the despair of feeling that they had exhausted the possibility of winning a fortune.

Features which hampered social cohesion were the paucity of Europeans and their wide dispersal. In November 1884, according to one account, there were only some twenty whitemen in the whole of British New Guinea. (60) Until officials kept records with some degree of regularity an estimate of the white population in south-east Papua can only be approximate; but in the nineteenth century, excluding miners of whom there were sometimes several hundred on a field, (61) it would never have risen much above a hundred. (62) One visitor describing the area in the late nineties wrote of the small number of white merchants who roamed about the coasts in little sailing boats "exchanging tobacco, beads, knives and axes, for some products

(60) Lindt, op.cit., 154.
of the country principally copra, tripang, and tortoiseshell." (63) He also stated that there was hardly a European plantation or establishment on a large scale. Settlers and traders - the people with a deep interest in the place - lived far apart. The miners concentrated together, but to no social purpose. There was only one sizeable permanent settlement in the area: Samarai, the sole port of entry in south-east Papua. As such it was the funnel through which the miners passed, and the centre to which traders and planters brought their produce for sale. This gave it life of a sort: from the late eighties brawls were very frequent occurrences and the hotels boomed. (64) In 1901 there were three, one owned by Mrs Mahony, another by Mrs Clunn, and the third by W. Widdell. (65) In the nineties there were only two stores, the Burns Philp establishment and one owned by William Whitten, (66) but by 1901 Clunn and Sons had also opened a business. (67) It was thus a very small settlement. (68) Though missionaries were shocked by the depravity of life in Samarai and the "useless and meaningless

(63) Semun, op.cit., 338.
(64) C.P.I.(T.) Set 35 Bundle 51, Samarai Reports & Journals especially gaol returns and other court records, and Ibid. Bundle 53, Customs Journals 1898-1901.
(65) Collinson, op.cit., 35.
(67) Collinson, op.cit., 35.
blasphemy" (69) which they heard, life there was rarely exciting. Most whites living in Samarai for any length of time found existence very boring. There were few institutions which gave the Europeans any feeling of corporateness. The School of Arts formed in the late nineties had a very checkered history and was used mainly for social gatherings of a distinctly un-intellectual sort. (70) Residents also formed a cricket and a tennis club. (71) Indeed, the inhabitants were bound together simply by common recreational interests; no cultural ties united them. The island's beauty could not compensate for such disadvantages.

Other factors added to this lack of an urban centre to create a very grey picture. The white community was relatively undiversified in its range of occupations; (72) even the Nonconformist missionaries as well as the traders, miners, and planters tended to come from the poorly educated sections of society in Britain and Australasia. The coloured and half-caste traders had no education and showed no interest in group activities of any description.

(69) Newton, In Far New Guinea, 15-23.
(70) Collinson, op.cit., 36.
(71) Ibid, 36-37.
(72) See Pup.Govt.Gazettes for Jury Lists and Intestate Notices.
For these reasons there was no vigorous intellectual life in British New Guinea; not much interest in political or cultural matters. Publication of the first local newspaper did not begin until 1911, there were no good libraries, and as mails were sporadic even publications from overseas arrived in the colony weeks after they came out and then irregularly. There were no elected representatives on the Legislative or Executive Councils until well into the twentieth century. Even public agitation for such electoral representation did not become a live issue for many years.

The natives could hardly be expected to indulge in politics, but it is surprising that the unofficial community, of which a large percentage were miners, did not seek a more active participation in the colony's affairs. Sometimes they took action of a rudimentary sort; as when the white residents of Tagula, nearly all of them miners, wrote to Robert Philp, a Queensland politician, complaining about the lack of administrative control on the island. The cause for their taking such a step was the murder of a solitary old miner, one of the very few instances when natives showed open hostility to the miners. Because there was no government official on the island the Europeans felt that they had to take steps for their own protection. Sixteen of them formed a party and set out to
arrest the principal criminals. This they achieved without bloodshed although they destroyed the village and gardens belonging to the murderers. It took them nine days to accomplish the task. The Europeans thought such work should be done by the administration, and that officials should spend much more time on Tagula dealing with European affairs. The whites were particularly chagrined that on the last administrative visit, some four months previous, officials went only to native villages and did not call at the white settlement. (73)

From about 1897 alluvial mining had all but ceased on the islands, and only Murua, where payable quartz lodes had been found still functioned as a gold field. As the extraction of the ore from the quartz was a costly process the gold was now worked by companies, formed in Australia and employing a manager. Such companies also had a number of other whites on the payroll. They were skilled workers or overseers of native labour. In 1900 the European employees of the Woodlark Island Propriety Gold Mining Company went on strike for higher wages. The manager, becoming alarmed, asked the Resident Magistrate for police protection. The latter refused the request because

(73) C.P. 74, B.N.G. Despatches to Q'ld, vol.5, Jan. to June 1891, Sudest Residents to Robert Philp, 29 Nov.1890.
he thought the strikers, who had been orderly and moderate, would turn nasty if native police were put over them. The affair blew over without incident. (74)

The whites' general lack of concern with politics or social issues probably illustrates two things: one, that the administration had little relevance to European life as even the most conscientious official could visit a particular island or district but five or six times a year; the other, that many of these men were anti-authoritarian individualists who chose to ignore rather than participate in the functioning of the social order.

Having sought to estimate the quality of the Europeans' life and attitude to the country, we have now to turn to their impact on the natives. To what extent, first of all, did the coming of these foreigners result in a struggle for land? Although relatively large numbers of miners took part in rushes to quite small islands like Tagula, Misima, Joannet, or Murua they pegged out claims along watercourses or in rugged terrain which was unsuitable for native agricultural purposes. Because the rainfall was both heavy and fairly regular the natives of

south-east Papua, with the exception of the Wamira peoples on the north-east coast of the mainland, had not devised any means of irrigating crops. Even the Trobriand islanders who were skilled agriculturalists by Papuan standards, relied entirely on the rainfall to grow their crops. As the miners used land for which the natives had no need, there was never any friction between the two on this head. (75) Moreover, the mining claims were always small; and as alluvial fields were soon worked out miners never permanently alienated land.

Those traders like Nick Ministre, Miguel Georges, George and Edward Auerbach, or Ned Cadigan, who had been resident in south-east Papua from pre-Protectorate days, depended largely on sea products for a living. They needed only small plots on which to erect trading stations or beche-de-mer curing houses. This land was never suitable for agricultural purposes as it was always on the beach. After Britain assumed control over part of New Guinea, officials set about investigating outstanding land claims; they had little work to do in south-east Papua. Not interested in becoming planters, these early settlers had no desire for land to develop. For instance Charlie Tetzlaff, who had figured in the STANLEY case, and had been a

resident trader in the Lauglins for many years, only wanted to lease the atolls although he had documentary proof that the land had been sold to him by the natives. (76) Tetzlaff was concerned only with the copra he could make from the coconuts which grew prolifically on the otherwise barren islets. So these immigrants too, did not come into conflict with the natives over land.

The planters required more land than either miners or traders. However the Papuans were more fortunate than most other Pacific peoples in that the relative isolation of New Guinea, its difficult climate and terrain, and the bad reputation which its inhabitants had in the minds of Europeans, meant that it was not an attractive field for white settlement. The planter came only after the administrator, and therefore had to abide by the laws of the Possession. In British New Guinea only the Crown could purchase land from the natives, and then the consent of the individuals to whom any tract belonged had first to be obtained before it could be alienated from them. Even Theodore Bevan, a man of exceptional tenacity of purpose, and a well known explorer and adventurer, found this. He wished to have a monopoly of the blackwood timber industry

(76) C.P.I.(Col.) Set 6 vol.I, MacGregor to Q'ld, 16 Sept.1890.
in south-east Papua, and planned to plant uninhabited islands with coconuts, fish bêche-de-mer, and trade generally. But he had to adapt his grandiose schemes to the more modest course which the administration permitted. (77)

Although the administrative field staff was small, so too was the number of immigrants to the country: officials knew them all. It would have been very difficult to occupy land as squatters for long before their illegal action came under official notice. Missionaries, in the matter of maintaining law and order, functioned as watch-dogs for the administration. In spite of the difficulties of communication news spread remarkably quickly about south-east Papua.

Planters needed land, but having to obtain it through legal channels they usually only applied for as much as they could easily develop. Finance and topography combined to limit their demands. Parts of the Milne Bay hinterland and parts of the coastal plain along Crangerie Bay were the only areas suitable for large scale economic ventures. Few overseas companies took up vast tracts of land to develop even after the Papua Act had been passed. Thus in south-east Papua, from the

(77) C.F.I.(Prot.) Set 8 Memo to T. Bevan, 7 Oct.1885; Ibid, Set 5 Bundle I, File 91. All documents are relevant.
earliest times onwards, the individual planter with limited
capital reserves was the important economic unit. Such men
applied for tracts of land which were usually quite small;
seldom did they acquire more than two or three hundred acres.\textsuperscript{(78)}

Often they leased or bought part or the whole of a small island
and planted it with coconuts. In 1900 the total acreage of
land granted, excluding mission and mining leases was but three
thousand three hundred and forty six acres in the Eastern
Division and seven hundred and fourteen acres in the South-
eastern Division. \textsuperscript{(79)}

The whole area was sparsely populated. Even in the
Trobiands or the D'Entrecasteaux islands the population density
was not high, and native numbers, which began to fall from the
time Europeans first settled there, continued to decline steeply
in most areas throughout the period under review. So there was
ample land for the needs of both the indigenous inhabitants and
the immigrant settlers. The natives were nearly always willing
to sell land for which Europeans had applied to the Crown.
Even when they refused to sell a particular block it was never
because they had insufficient lands for their needs, but for

\textsuperscript{(78)} C.P.I.(T.) Set 30, See mins. of Ex.Co. Also Divisional
some other reason. There was thus no real friction, and certainly no competition, between the natives and planters over land. There were sometimes disputes over boundaries, but these never became serious. The Mahony family, which owned and leased much more land than was usual among settlers in south-east Papua, had quite substantial pastoral and agricultural holdings on Tagula island. They never developed their lands fully and it was unclear for many years exactly where the boundaries of certain blocks were. At length an official of the South-eastern Division went into the matter thoroughly and settled it. He stated in his report that the natives had evinced much satisfaction that the matter had been settled, but it was obvious from the account that there had been no great friction and that the natives did not urgently need the land under dispute. (80)

Neither was there any dire shortage of labour for European enterprises before 1906. Most employers required only a few plantation workers or boat-hands. Plenty of natives were willing to sign on for such work. Besides providing labour for local enterprises, the whole of south-east Papua,

but most particularly the D'Entrecasteaux islands, was one of the main recruiting areas for British New Guinea at large. The supply of labour never came seriously below the demand, although at the time of the transfer to Australia there was some anxiety by Europeans on this score. Sometimes natives were reluctant to sign on for a particular class of work; the northern gold-fields were unpopular for good reason, but even there the shortage did not become acute. (81)

Not only in land matters did officials manage to superintend relations between the natives and the unofficial population fairly well. Administrators in this early period were constantly bringing prosecutions against planters, traders, and miners for breaking the law. This was particularly so with regard to their employment of natives. (82) If the misdemeanours related simply to some minor breach of the labour ordinance, officials did not take them very seriously. Wickham, for example, never fed his labourers properly; officials took no strong action against him, but assumed he would have trouble with deserters. And indeed he did: as one official put it, he could not expect labourers to dive for sponge on food so insub-

sthal as Pumpkins and pawpaw. (83) Such offences as illegal recruiting or assaults on labourers were viewed much more seriously, and punished quite severely. (84) Resident Magistrat A.M. Campbell once sent a detailed despatch to the Government Secretary, enclosing statements made by a number of Tagula natives who alleged that they had been ill-treated by Mahony and his employees Patrick Carvey and Henry Burfitt. (85) Mahony had allegedly hand-cuffed a native to a truck and left him in a tunnel for some time. There were also many other complaints. Campbell thought that most of the complaints were probably exaggerated but he pointed out that Mahony and his employees always carried firearms in a very conspicuous manner, while all the other traders went about unarmed.

Thus several distinct factors lessened tensions between the indigenous population and Europeans. First, as Britain assumed political control over New Guinea before there was any great influx, the unofficial population was forced to be subservient to the administration. Second, the natives were never obliged to dispose of their land to the Crown and live on

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(85) C.P.I.(T.) Set 35 Bundle 44, Campbell to Musgrave, 7 July 1898 and enclosures.
reserves; what land was alienated, the natives gave up willingly. Third, as there were never many white inhabitants in the area, officials were able to exert a good deal of control over contacts between the races.

The final and most important reason for this lack of friction was that Papuans continued to be most anxious for European goods. This demand far exceeded the supply. To gain such goods natives disposed of their land, sold produce, and worked willingly under conditions which to the outsider might seem very bad, for a paltry remuneration. In all probability the natives were quite satisfied; indeed they probably felt that they were getting the best of the bargain.

On the surface therefore, relations between the natives and the unofficial population were generally harmonious. Yet modern anthropological studies would suggest that turbulence probably lay beneath. (86) The Papuans who so eagerly desired to acquire European skills and western goods were at first hopeful that the whitemen would divulge the secret of their wealth and power. This hope died soon after Europeans

(86) Burridge, Mummy; Lawrence, "The Madang District Cargo Cult", South Pacific, vol.8 no.1; Belshaw, "Wagawaga", South Pacific, vol.5 no.2; Belshaw, "Native Administration in South-east Papua", South Pacific, vol.5 no.6.
settled permanently in the territory. When it became quite evident that the whiteman repudiated any obligations to hand on information about where and how European goods were manufactured, the Papuan would have censured the whiteman for his ungenerous avarice. Despair, self-pity, and bitter envy were the emotions which normally accompanied such disappointment. This passion in the hearts of individuals found group expression in such cults as that connected with the Milne Bay prophet, examined in detail below, and strange rumours which circulated about the district from time to time.

Indicative of this sort of rumour was an incident which occurred in 1905. In December of that year the Resident Magistrate of the Eastern Division was on patrol in the Trobriand and D'Entrecasteaux island area. A missionary reported stories which had come to his ears of a sorcerer who lived in the mountains behind Bergassi on Fergusson island and who was making a great name for himself by uttering strange pronouncements. Many people believed in him and were making him valuable presents. The missionary related that the magician declared himself to have direct communications with the ancestral spirits and to derive his power from them. He was prophesying that there was to be no government in the land besides himself. If white officials gaolèd him he would turn them into white stones; if the native
police arrested him they would be transformed into black stones. The spirits wished neither missions nor the administration to remain in the land, and had given the sorcerer power to effect that great undertaking and so transform society. He was to pass through the earth to Samarai, take away all the goods in the government and other stores, and distribute them to the faithful. This was presumably to happen after the Europeans had been expelled.

The Resident Magistrate immediately set out to investigate the truth of the report. The government party reached the sorcerer's village just as he was holding a numerously attended levée. However he managed to make good his escape, although the police captured his father and his brother. The sorcerer refused to give himself up and so the administration kept his relatives as hostages. The government party waited in the village three hours to give the magician time to surrender, but he remained in hiding. After the Resident Magistrate delivered a homily to the natives cautioning them against heeding the idle talk of foolish men, the administrative party left for the coast. The Resident Magistrate was certain that the sorcerer's power, which had been a serious threat to peace and good order in the islands close to Fergusson, had been broken for ever. As the patrol passed through villages on the return journey, he heard
many natives laughing when they saw the basket full of native wealth, and the sorcerer's relatives in the hands of the police. So far as the Magistrate was concerned, the incident now closed; (87) European ascendency remained triumphant.

In south-east Papua the whiteman did not dispossess the brownman of his land, nor decimate his numbers by introducing firearms and siding in native wars. However in more subtle psychological and private ways he caused great turmoil in native societies. Europeans regarded the Papuans as inferior, and indeed the Papuans themselves came to believe that this was true. But one suspects that they bitterly resented the fact and blamed the Europeans, not themselves, for it.

APPENDIX  The Representatives of Western Commerce Before 1906.
C.P.I.(T.) Set 38.

List of Trading Stations in the South-eastern Division 9 Aug. 1902

Tanati (Jap) Louis Benaldo (Manilla man) Curio Lebac (Manilla man) Pedro Bilias (Manilla man) Florentine Palastro (M'illa) D. Carruth W. Allerton Dominc Michael George N. Campbell Pedro Castro Martin Androme Joseph (Manilla man) Anaizi Jimmy Ambrym Tom George Parascos


List of Trading Stations in the Eastern Division 7 Aug. 1902.


South-east Papua, like the rest of the Protectorate area, had certain qualities which promised that the task of government would not be easy. The hundreds of native societies had for ages past pursued their independent way, similar to each other in many respects, yet ill-suited to treatment as a political unit. Nor did the foreigners resident in the area make up a community; rather they were a collection of individuals with widely divergent aims and interests.

Only with reluctance did Britain plant the flag in this corner of the world. The liberal conscience disliked the extension of rule over people, even savages, who had not expressed their consent to that boon; the bourgeoisie pocket disliked the idea of paying out more taxes to maintain such ventures. (1) The Imperial government, though subject to pressure from the colonial governments, adamantly refused to assume control over New Guinea. It repudiated Queensland's attempted coup in 1883, suspecting the colony of seeking quasi-slave labour from New Guinea. It also thought Queensland unduly suspicious of German intentions to annex part of the island. Pressure from

the Australian colonies continued however, and, compounded with
the scandals of the Louisiade labour traffic, forced the
Gladstone government to alter its policy. Commodore Erskine
was despatched in the NELSON with instructions to declare a
Protectorate over that part of the southern mainland not claimed
by the Dutch. (2) This he did on 6 November 1884. A small
squadron of naval vessels took part in the ceremony as the
RAVEN, the HARRIER and the SWINGER also lay in Port Moresby
harbour at the time. (3)

Britain hoped that such restricted intervention would be
sufficient to control the activities of Europeans in the area,
the sole subject of concern at this stage. But almost simul-
taneously Germany annexed New Britain, New Ireland, the
Admiralty islands, and parts of the northern mainland. The
British government, surprised at Germany's action, responded by
authorizing Erskine to extend the Protectorate over the Louisiade
the D'Entrecasteaux island, the mainland to the southern limit
of German territory, and all islands adjacent. (4) Britain did
this only to find that the Australian colonies now objected to
contributing toward the cost of administering British New Guinea,

(2) Legge, op.cit., 24-30; Morrell, op.cit., 250-256.
(3) Lyne, An Account of the Establishment of the British
Protectorate over the Southern Shores of New Guinea, 1-6.
(4) Morrell, op.cit., 256-259.
on the ground that it no longer had much strategic value. Having no voice in formulating policy they considered it hardly fair that they should be expected to pay for the administration.

(5) At length, and with great reluctance, the Australian colonies, New Zealand, and Fiji, agreed to contribute between them a total of £15,000 toward the cost of administering the Protectorate. The chief executive officer, the Special Commissioner, was thus responsible to them all as well as to the Imperial government. Besides, fresh financial agreements had to be made annually. South Australia, Western Australia, New Zealand, Tasmania, and Fiji soon pulled out, leaving Queensland, N.S.W. and Victoria sole contributors. The Protectorate therefore depended for its funds on a very unstable source. (6)

Besides having to contend with these financial problems, the Special Commissioner was further hampered by having very restricted legal powers. (7) Sir Peter Scratchley, the first Special Commissioner, set about his work with a missionary zeal, and chafed at the delays caused by financial and legal difficulties. A letter he wrote to Sir Samuel Griffith, the

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(6) Legge, op.cit., 36-37.
(7) Ibid, 26-27, 32-34.
Queensland Premier who was a lawyer by training, expresses his exasperation and disillusion at this time. (8)

"The whole New Guinea affair is unsatisfactory. The Colonial Office keeps one in the dark, probably because the Officials there are in the dark themselves. The Australian Governments will not move and I am losing [sic] valuable time.

Griffith sympathized with Scratchley but held he could not pass resolutions having the force of law. Nor, in Griffith's opinion, could the Special Commissioner legally impose and collect licences; nor exercise any judicial function in the Protectorate. (9) Pending an extension of his powers by the Crown, Scratchley had the choice of acting illegally or not at all: a dilemma for a man of his character. He chose to act.

Yet, with all these limitations, the Special Commissioners were important men. None of the contributing governments in fact interfered much with their work, largely through their disinterest. Whitehall was far, far, away. The nature and implementation of practical policy was very much the Commissioners' own field.

Scratchley regarded the natives as primitive children without any moral sense. They were in his view not truly evil,

(8) C.P.I.(Prot.) Set 7, Scratchley to Griffith, 7 May 1885.
(9) Qld P.P. V.& P. 1886 vol.II, 955; Cooke, Australian Defences and New Guinea, 273-274.
although their actions were often wrong. He felt that they had been preyed upon, and deprived of their innocence by morally degenerate whitemen. (10) His basic task, Scratchley believed, was to show, by precept and example, the advantages of civilization. Active encouragement of the L.M.S., he felt, would also further this end. He aimed to instill a moral awareness in the native soul and to teach the savage tribes the ways of civilization. (11)

To help him in this task Scratchley had authority from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to appoint subordinates, but was told in the same despatch to limit his staff to one assistant and a private secretary. (12) H.H. Romilly, a Deputy Commissioner for the Western Pacific who had been stationed in New Britain, became Scratchley's assistant. These men were later joined by Anthony Musgrave, formerly private secretary to the Queensland Governor, who was his uncle. Musgrave also had the rank of Deputy Commissioner. There was no provision in this early period for the appointment of any district officials.

With this tiny staff and the slender funds at his disposal

(10) Cooke, op. cit., 314, 337; Romilly, Letters from the Western Pacific and Mashonaland, 4.
(11) Lindt, Picturesque New Guinea, 150; Fort, Chance or Design? 44-50.
Scratchley intended to ascertain first if it were possible to establish along the coast two or more government stations which might serve as centres for administering the surrounding areas. He planned then to visit all those places at which Erskine had hoisted the British flag, in order to place himself in direct communication with the natives. He hoped to extend his influence by degrees over all parts of the coast which had not yet been visited by the administration. (13)

Although Scratchley's chief interest was the natives, he also concerned himself with the European residents of the territory. He intended to acquaint himself with their activities as well as assist them in their enterprises and promote legitimate trading. (14) Unfortunately Scratchley died before he completed his first tour of inspection. While on a visit to the southeastern part of the territory he contracted a fever which proved fatal. He refused to curtail his visit to the German boundary and on his return from Mitre Rock fell seriously ill at Samarai. The GOVERNOR BLACKALL sailed immediately for Queensland but Scratchley died before the ship reached Townsville. (15)

(13) C.P.I.(Prot.) Set 7, Memo re the estimated cost of the Government, 1 Ap.1885.
(14) Idem.
(15) Cooke, op.cit., 35, 357-358; Fort, op.cit., 75-76.
Scratchley, when formulating policy for British New Guinea, was influenced by colonial experiments in other parts of the world, particularly Fiji and the Dutch East Indies. He had an interesting correspondence with Captain Cyprian Bridge R.N. (Australian Squadron) a man conversant with conditions in all territories of the western Pacific. Bridge advocated a system of administration which would benefit the natives as well as Britons resident in the territory. He advised Scratchley to make plain that the new dependency was to be governed on principles that best suited it, no matter if they did not accord with the ideas of English and Anglo-Colonial politicians. In Bridge's view:

(16) A very little political pedantry about freedom of contract, individual property in land, free trade with foreign visitors, legal procedure, or any other of the weapons that furnish the armoury of the speculating white man when he sets about oppressing an inferior race and making a fortune quickly, will completely frustrate all hope of good government in New Guinea — as all previous experience of our relations with barbarians proves — will destroy the natives.

Yet the practical advice Bridge gave was not innovatory, but simply copied from the Fijian experiment:

(17) First, we should endeavour to ascertain who is the real chief in each tribe or district and what are the laws or customs relating to the succession. The chief
should then be made to consider himself as also an official of the British Government as regards his tribe. As such he should receive advice and support from, and be restrained from doing wrong by, some white agent of the Government ..... Probably in many tribes there is an informal tribal council which meets to discuss important matters, ..... It might be as well to put such councils on a more regular footing, or even to institute them where they do not exist ..... As a rule, no step for the government of the natives should be taken without consultation with them; and the exact meaning and real object of every proceeding should be explained to them with the utmost frankness.

Although he died so soon after he assumed control of British New Guinea, Scratchley attempted to resolve one of the problems confronting his administration: the problem of how to deal with these native outrages against whitemen. Scratchley had heard horrible tales about the actions of some of the traders and was determined with God's help to "let the light of day into them". (18) At the same time he felt that the killing of whites should be punished, no matter how justifiable such murders might be from the native viewpoint. Scratchley was opposed to the adoption of such methods as the shelling of the village to which the murderers belonged, because such an action did not distinguish between the innocent and the guilty, but was simply a means of avenging an injury by wholesale slaughter. He also refused to countenance the capture of native murderers

(18) Cooke, op.cit., 324.
by treachery. Thus he could see no way of punishing these outrages in accord with his interpretation of justice. He was further constrained by having no other weapon of punishment than ships of the Royal Navy, equipped only for crude bombardment. So he took recourse to shelling and fireing of villages.

Issues involved in this question well illustrate how the practical consequences of culture contact complicated administrative procedures and resulted in an impasse soluble only by compromise, usually of principles. It is always hard to implement theoretical principles in the actual government of subject races. Scratchley tried to treat the natives honourably and justly, but his standards and actions must have seemed quite arbitrary to them. The classic illustration of this was the way in which the administration dealt with the murders (mentioned towards the close of Chapter four) of traders in south-east Papua.

Before Scratchley arrived in New Guinea the natives of Millport Harbour had murdered a trader named Webb and his wife. Captain Marx of H.M.S. SWINGER who happened to be in the vicinity heard rumours of the massacre and went to investigate. He was himself attacked, finding it necessary in self-defence to fire

on the natives. Nobody appeared to have been hit. Marx withdrew and then communicated with Scratchley, but the latter did not feel himself justified in requesting Marx, with the small force at his disposal, to undertake a serious operation against the natives. Scratchley and Admiral Tryon R.N. (Australian station) conferred, finally deciding to send H.M.S. DIAMOND under the command of Captain Clayton to punish the murder. Romilly, who was already resident at Port Moresby, was to obtain fuller information, then confer with Captain Clayton about what further steps should be taken. In the upshot, the Millport Harbour villages were shelled and burnt. (20)

News of the Miller murder, which seemed an unprovoked and senseless killing, also shocked Protectorate officials; and they determined that the outrage should be punished. Webb was a marked man at many places along the south coast of New Guinea, Miller had never treated the natives badly. At the time H.M.S. DART was surveying in the vicinity of Normanby, but her commander knew nothing of the affair and was completely non-plussed when Diavara came on board voluntarily, carrying a basket of armshells and other native valuables as compensation for

(20) Q'ld P.P. V. & P. 1886 vol.II, 980; C.P.I.(Prot.) Set 2, Scratchley to the Sec. of State for the Cols, 10 Mar. 1885.
Miller's life. (21) The Captain of the DART did not view homicide in the same light, so he made Diavara captive and then sailed from Normanby to seek instructions about what should be done with the prisoner. As the DART sailed through China Strait she met H.M.S. DIAMOND, H.M.S. RAVEN, and the GOVERNOR BLACKALL. This vessel was the floating residence of the Special Commissioner and had Scratchley, his private secretary, and Romilly aboard, besides sundry observers. All three vessels had come to south-east Papua to investigate another murder. The commander of the DART delivered Diavara aboard H.M.S. DIAMOND, still under the command of Captain Clayton.

After this transaction the original flotilla sailed to Normanby to carry out further enquiries into the Miller outrage and to administer fit punishment. Some unfortunate natives who were sailing about Avenger Bay were captured by the Europeans who suspected that they might be the culprits or could vouchsafe some information about the matter. Chalmers, the missionary, who was acting as interpreter, questioned the men and discovered that they had come from the north. They were kept in custody overnight, but soon showed next day that they had nothing to impart and so were given a few presents and dismissed. When:

the convoy reached the island where Miller had been murdered, the chief refused to meet with the Europeans; doubtless he felt that they had treated Diavara treacherously. (22) Scratchley, after consultation with the naval officers decided to punish the natives, who refused to give up the second murderer. Had they read the eye-witness account of Miller's death carefully, they would have seen that the other murderer had been shot by a member of Miller's crew at the time of the outrage. (23) Villages were burnt, and the Europeans left the area. (24)

Scratchley realized that Diavara's coming aboard with blood-money had, according to native custom, completely vindicated himself, and that native law required the man to be released. (25) This Scratchley refused to do, but neither would he execute the man. Finally he decided to remove Diavara to Fort Moresby to serve a prison sentence. Scratchley intended to return Diavara

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(23) C.P.I. (Prot.) Set 2, Evidence taken in the Miller Case, 8 Oct.1885.


(25) C.P.I.(Prot.) Set 2, Scratchley to the Sec. of State for the Cols, 18 Nov.1885; Cooke, op.cit., 341.
to his village after the term expired. Scratchley died before he could implement this plan but his successor did so, and reported that Diavara was "a model of the reformed savage". (26)

The course Scratchley followed was one which attempted to reconcile western concepts of justice with those held by the D'Entrecasteaux islanders. Although he saw the native point of view he did not question the premises upon which his own concepts depended. To his mind Christian values were superior to Papuan mores. As his secretary put it:

(27) ... when the occasion required he had to compel the latter [the natives] to adopt the Western ideas of justice, to recognize that human life, whether that of White or Black was sacred: that under no circumstances whatsoever was it vendable - and that cannibalism was a sin against the brotherhood of man, and as such would not be tolerated.

Because he held such views Scratchley, an intelligent man, could make such a statement as the following to the Secretary of State for the Colonies when suggesting that Diavara be imprisoned and then returned home:

(28) ... such a course will produce a good effect upon the native mind, and it will tend to show that the whiteman does not act entirely from revenge, but in accordance with law and justice.

From the native viewpoint, however, the government's action would have seemed thoroughly unjust. The same judgement would

(26) Ibid, Douglas to the Sec.of State for the Gols, 19 Mar.1887.
(27) Fort, op.cit., 58.
(28) C.P.I.(Prot.) Set 2, Scratchley to Sec.of State for the Gols 18 Nov.1885.
apply in the following episode, which had its origin before the Miller murder but was dealt with later.

In September 1885 news of the murder of Captain Friar or Fryer, of the schooner LALLAH ROCK, reached the Special Commissioner in Port Moresby. (29) The natives of Hoopiron Bay, Basilaki island, were the culprits. Admiral Tryon sent H.M.S. DIAMOND and H.M.S. RAVEN to investigate, and Scratchley arranged to meet those vessels at Samarai. He arrived there on 7 October. At Samarai Scratchley was informed of Miller's murder which had occurred on 3 October. He was also told that the survivors of the attack had taken Miller's cutter, the DAISY, to Teste island. As he was early for his rendezvous with the DIAMOND Scratchley determined to visit Teste and get what information he could from the survivors. This he did before meeting the naval vessels. (30) When the DIAMOND and the RAVEN arrived Scratchley explained developments and decided to punish the Miller outrage before investigating the Friar murder. On their return from Normanby Scratchley and Clayton spent several days attempting to arrest the murderers of Friar. In this they were unsuccessful although they captured several

canoes and arrested a man suspected because he, like one of the murderers, had red hair. In fact, the man was innocent. Fortunately the mistake was found out, and the man returned to his home "loaded with presents". (31) The Europeans managed to induce the natives to give up the heads of Friar and his carpenter as well as Friar's gun. No action was taken at the time but a month or so later H.M.S. DIAMOND returned to Hoopiron Bay and burnt the villages implicated in the attack. (32) Meanwhile the Europeans had learned that they had actually spoken to one of the murderers. This discovery might have decided them to teach the Basilaki natives a lesson; (33) otherwise it is hard to explain why there was such a delay in administering punishment.

From Hoopiron Bay the GOVERNOR BLACKALL sailed to the Engineer group to visit the scene of another murder, of a trader named Reed who had been killed shortly before. After conducting investigations Scratchley decided to take no action because he felt that Reid had been so cruel and lawless no blame could attach to his murderers. (34) Yet another trader, Bob Lumse, was killed at Hayter island on 19 October and it was found that

(31) Lindt, op.cit., 91; Cooke, op.cit., 344-345.
(32) Q'ld P.P. V. & P. 1886 vol. II, 970-971.
(33) Lindt, op.cit., 91.
(34) Q'ld P.P. V. & P. 1886 vol. II, 978-979; Lindt, op.cit., 92; Cooke, op.cit., 342.
he too cheated the natives. (35)

These incidents highlight the basic problem which faced all the administrators of British New Guinea: how to treat the natives honourably and justly, while at the same time imposing alien institutions upon them and encouraging European economic enterprises and settlement. None resolved it to their entire satisfaction.

A detailed examination of the reprisals against native attacks on Europeans shows how the difficulties of restricted finances and an acute shortage of manpower were overcome in practice at the district level. The Royal Navy provided the Special Commissioner with his police force gratis, and the L.M.S missionaries acted as interpreters. Mission personnel also reported anything untoward which came to their notice to the administration, and even acted as quasi-government agents in an emergency. For instance the Samarai teacher on hearing of Friar's murder went at once to Hoopiron Bay. He found natives pillaging the LALLAH ROOKH. At risk to his life he drove them off, then navigated the schooner back to Samarai. For his bravery and help the government presented him with a watch. (36)

(35) Qld P.P. V.& P. 1886 vol. II, 972-973; Cooke, op.cit., 347.
James Chalmers accompanied Commodore Erskine and acted as interpreter when the latter proclaimed the Protectorate at Suau, Samarai, Milne Bay, Killerton, and Tete. (37) When the Special Commissioner visited south-east Papua in October–November 1885 Chalmers accompanied him, introducing him to the natives and again acting as interpreter. In fact Chalmers worked so closely with the administration that word went round that he was to become an official. This may have been simply idle gossip bruited about by traders based in Cooktown, or Torres Strait, but Chalmers felt obliged to explain to the Directors that there was no truth in the rumour. (38)

From the time Erskine proclaimed the Protectorate some attempts were made to lay the foundations of a district administration which controlled both the native and immigrant population. Erskine, wherever he conducted his ceremony, selected the native who seemed to have authority over his fellows, singled him out, made presents to him, and through an interpreter explained that this person was to be chief. At Milne Bay the oldest of three important men, a person so venerable he could not chew betel, was appointed principal chief. (39)

(37) G309/95 Papua Letters, Box 3 Folder 4, Chalmers, 1 Dec.1884.
(38) Ibid, Folder 5, Chalmers, 13 Nov.1885.
The first official report on British New Guinea describes how Scratchley set out to establish native participation in the government. Wherever possible at the GOVERNOR BLACKALL's anchorages, the headmen were gathered together and given presents then the intentions of the government and its wish to protect both natives and whitemen was explained to them. They were told that in future all complaints against whites had to be made to the Special Commissioner or his representative, who would constantly patrol the coast. It was also stressed that no chief was to take the law into his own hands, that tribal war was to be discouraged, and that the absolute authority of the chief was to be recognized by everyone else. (40) Thus some contact was made with the natives at this early stage; but its effect was very small.

The control the government exercised over Europeans was stronger. The Proclamation which Erskine read declared that Port Moresby was the sole port of entry for the Protectorate; forbade the landing of spirituous liquors; prohibited the entry of firearms; banned any alienation of land; prevented the settlement of Europeans in the country and stated other minor

(40) Q'ld P.P. V.& P. 1886 vol.II, 942-943.
Scratchley took Bridge's advice and made anyone wishing to visit or live in the territory apply for a permit. Even traders who had been calling there regularly for years, or actually resided in the country, had to comply.

Not until October 1885 when the Special Commissioner first visited south-east Papua did traders in the area feel the effect of government. On 6 October Scratchley pinned a notice up at Suau which informed the non-native public that no spirituous liquors, firearms, gunpowder, dynamite, or explosives were allowed in the possession, and that trading and other licences had to be procured from Port Moresby. They were also warned that the coast of British New Guinea from Kerepunu to South Cape, and from East Cape to the German boundary, as well as Moresby island, the D'Entrecasteaux group, the Engineer islands, the Woodlark group, Jouvien and Jouvency, were unsafe and should not be visited. Any acquisition of or settlement on the land was forbidden.

Kissack, a law-abiding man with head-quarters at Teste island, was given a general permit to carry on his business, and sent a copy of the Regulations then in force in British New Guinea. The permit was revocable on proof that the holder had

(41) Ibid. 976; C.P.I.(Prot.) Set 2, Scratchley to Sec.of State for the Cols, 7 Feb.1885 and enclosures.
(42) C.P.I.(Prot.) Set 8, 5 Oct.1885.
not complied with the regulations, and stated that the government
took no responsibility for the holder's safety, but that he
remained in New Guinea at his own risk. (43) More lawless
individuals were treated more sternly. One William Cornick of
Killerton was informed that as he had not the necessary permit
to reside or trade in British New Guinea he was liable to such
fines as might subsequently be enforced. Cornick was also told
that he might be removed from the possession without notice, and
that the government took no responsibility with regard to his
protection. Further, it had come to their notice that he was
not paying fair prices to the natives he employed in collecting
and shooting birds, and so he rendered himself open to pro­
secution under the Western Pacific Orders in Council. (44)
Charles Berlin, who traded in the area around East Cape, was
told he would have to take out a permit. (45) Scratchley decided
to take action against Nicholas Ministre for infringements of
the law. (46)

Individuals who applied for permits to enter the south­
east portion of the Protectorate were usually refused. One
trader who wished to visit Milne Bay was told that the Special

(43) Ibid. Fort to Kissack, 9 Oct.1885 and enclosures.
(46) Ibid. Scratchley to Romilly, 17 Nov.1885.
Commissioner did not understand what he meant when applying for a permit which would guard against any contingency that might arise; Scratchley had requested the Sub-Collectors of Customs at Cooktown and Townsville to refuse his clearance until he made the real object of his visit known. He was further informed that there was no opening for traders in that part of the Protectorate and that because of the irregular proceedings of certain men who had been warned to leave, the natives were troublesome. (47) Theodore Bevan's failure to persuade the government to accept his grandiose schemes in toto was mentioned in the previous chapter. But he was given permission to erect a bêche-de-mer smokehouse and trade store at Suau and Samarai. (48)

Scratchley was undecided about a land policy and died before he could devise one. He simply prohibited alienation from the natives except by the Crown. During his term of office even the government bought very little land and then only in two places: Port Moresby and Suau. The land at Suau Scratchley bought on 7 October 1885 and comprised about half the island, approximately one thousand acres. Only one claimant for the

(47) Ibid, Fort to Tappe, 14 Nov. 1885.
land came forward, and the government paid him one axe, one adze, three tomahawks, three sheath knives, one grass knife, twelve looking glasses, one bundle of hoop-iron in small pieces, six long pipes, twelve short pipes, three wooden pipes, one piece of turkey red cloth, one piece of trade handkerchiefs, five pounds of tobacco, and a gimlet. (49) All this was worth about five pounds.

Scratchley received his Commission on 20 November 1884, did not reach New Guinea until 28 August 1885, and died on 2 December, so the pattern of his administration had not time to emerge. John Douglas, his successor, remained in office from February 1886 until British New Guinea became a Crown Colony on 4 September 1888, and so his regime can be better appraised. As he appointed a Government Agent at Samarai, his opinions had far more influence on south-east Papua than did his predecessor's Douglas' attitude to Papuans was probably influenced by his experience of Australian aboriginals, as he had been Government Resident at Thursday Island before he became Special Commissioner. Certainly Douglas was much harsher in his dealings with the natives than had been Scratchley. Douglas felt that the white-man's superiority should be made unequivocally plain. He wished

(49) Q'ld P.P. V.& F. 1886 vol.II, 979; Fort, op.cit., 46.
the territory to develop, and to advance through white settlement. Douglas had no misgivings about changing the basis of native society by using coercion. "The future civilization of the Protectorate" he wrote, "will depend very much ... on the determination of its rulers to make their power felt and respected, to do so in moderation but decisively." (50)

White settlement being so important to him, Douglas was concerned with establishing peaceful intercourse between traders-and-settlers and the native peoples. In latter-day terms he tried to lay the foundations of a multi-racial society in which the Europeans formed an elite. (51) Had the natives massacred fewer Europeans in the crucial formative years, perhaps the Special Commissioner and his staff might have had a higher opinion of them. As it was, hostile acts by the natives provoked a choleric response from officials who saw in such behaviour proof that Papuans were irresponsible barbarians. Examples of this will appear below.

At the same time as he attempted to deal with problems caused by contact between the indigenous population and outsiders,

(50) O.P.I.(Prot.) Set 7, Douglas to Tryon, 21 Aug.1886.
(51) O.P.I.(Prot.) Set 7, Douglas to Q'ld, 21 Apr.1886; Ibid, Set 2, Douglas to Sec.of State for the Cols, 8 July 1886, and 1 Sept.1886.
Douglas also tried to plan ahead and shape the destiny of British New Guinea. He realized that Britain had neither consulted the natives nor formed any treaty with them when she assumed control over their land; that she was restrained only by self-imposed limits. Douglas was as conscious as Scratchley of the paradox in colonial rule: on one hand the principle of protection and recognition of traditional native rights, on the other the principle that the natives' interest dictated attempts to civilize them and to develop the resources of their land. Douglas resolved the dilemma by paying lip service to protection but directing all his policies toward change: change towards a centralized and authoritarian government: (52)

If the Protectorate of New Guinea is to be fraught with benefit to its future inhabitants it must be based on order, on progress, and on the supremacy of constituted authority intelligently interpreted - without these aids the Missionary enthusiasm and the Trading enterprise which are at present relied on will most surely fail to produce satisfactory results.

For Douglas progress was synonymous with white colonization. He felt that until Europeans could be attracted to the country to settle its potential wealth would remain untapped. He repudiated Scratchley's doubts whether the Protectorate could ever become self-sufficient. From his previous experience in

(52) C.P.I.(Prot.) Set 2, Douglas to Sec.of State for the Gols, 16 July 1886.
Thursday Island Douglas believed that if European settlement were encouraged New Guinea would develop quite rapidly. (53)
Yet he was perfectly aware that western civilization was not a panacea which would act only for the better on native society. In a confidential despatch he wrote: (54)

The Problem now before us is how to civilize and humanize these savages, and yet, at the same time how to encourage the settlement of the country in accordance with the prevailing principles of colonization. Experience elsewhere has proved that colonization wherever it is really successful kills out those uncivilized races which are not strong enough to combine in self-defence against it. In this sense we are pledged to do our best that colonization shall not succeed in New Guinea.... When life and property are rendered secure they [the colonizing armies of Europe] will come and their coming may, I think, be made beneficial to the natives themselves. But there will be a conflict of races which will, for many years, tax the patience and judgement of the future Administrators of British New Guinea.

This statement perfectly illustrates Douglas' main policies. The natives had to be protected from exploitation by unscrupulous whites but they were not allowed to manage their own affairs, or to have a voice in the future development of the colony. The present generation had to be sacrificed to allow for the growth of a multi-racial society with a self-sufficient, viable economy. Douglas and his subordinates expected the

(54) C.F.L.(Prot.) Set 2, Douglas to Sec. of State for the Cols, 1 Sept.1886.
early period of contact between races to be a time of instability and conflict. However they also thought that administrative measures could eventually resolve the state of flux. They sanguinely expected to be able to control the development of a new social order. In one sense ideal conditions existed for such an experiment as officials had a near-monopoly of political power. But lack of funds joined with demographic and geographic factors (a scant population distributed thinly over a wide area, much of which was precipitous, impenetrable jungle, or swamp) to hamper the implementation of any theoretical schemes. Douglas had neither means nor men, to create a powerful and efficient administrative machine at the district level.

Thus head-quarters staff helped shape policy at all levels. Of these men Anthony Musgrave was by far the most important, although he very rarely left Port Moresby. He was the pivot around which the administration revolved. This role continued throughout both the Protectorate and the colonial period. Musgrave, a rather self-important, unbending person, tended to be critical of faults in others. (55) Such qualities somewhat obscured those which contributed to his very real worth as a civil servant. He was systematic, an efficient

(55) C.P.I.(Prot.) Set 5 Bundle 2, file on Liljeblad, Sept.1886.
worker, conscientious, and scrupulously honest. His real wants as a colonial administrator were breadth of vision, a flexible mind, and (in this joined by Romilly (56)) sympathetic understanding of primitive people. He could never have made a good field officer as he lacked physical stamina and a temperament suited to makeshift living or personal contact with the natives' crude habits. The position of Government Secretary suited his talents much better.

Scratchley had a very high opinion of Musgrave; indeed he secured for the latter the position of Deputy Commissioner. (57) "A man of good judgement," Scratchley declared, "energetic, thoughtful, tactful ..." Such an officer, Scratchley believed, would be able to establish the required administrative machinery. (58) Musgrave, who was already on the Colonial Office list of potential employees, was thirty-five years old at the time of his appointment. (59) Scratchley died before it could be ascertained if the two would work together as harmoniously as each anticipated. One suspects that there might have been

(56) Romilly, From my Verandah in New Guinea, 43-70.
(57) C.P.I.(Prot.) Set 2, Scratchley to Sec.of State for the Cols, 25 May 1885; Ibid, Set 5 Bundle 2, Telegram Griffith to Scratchley, 24 May 1885.
(58) C.P.I.(Prot.) Set 2, Scratchley to Sec.of State for the Cols, Sept.1885.
(59) Ibid, 28 May 1885.
disputes about native policy: certainly their attitude toward
native rights differed considerably. Douglas and Musgrave got
on well together all the time. (60)

Although appointed in February, Douglas did not leave
Cooktown until 10 June 1886. He called at Suau, Samarai, and
Tese before sailing west to Port Moresby. (61) Having already
decided that before the country could progress land would have
to be made available for white settlement, Douglas took a
surveyor with him. As soon as he reached the capital, the
Commissioner set about having the land around Port Moresby
surveyed. He also contemplated laying out a small township
area available for European settlement. (62). Before long his
plans were upset by a certain group of natives who refused to
sell land adjoining some which had been purchased earlier and
on which government buildings had been erected. (63) Musgrave
now made his views clear. He believed that the government
should have the right to alienate any land it required, even if
the natives were unwilling to sell. His argument denied that

(60) C.P.I.(Prot.) Set 2, Douglas to Sec.of State for the Cols,
19 Mar.1887; Ibid, 11 July 1886; Ibid, Set 7, Douglas to
(61) Ibid, Douglas to Sec.of State for the Cols, 8 July 1886, 2
letters.
(63) Ibid, 11 July 1885 and 16 July 1885.
Erskine or his deputies had ever implied that British New Guinea should not become a field for white settlement in the future; nor had he been able to discover any hint that the Imperial government intended the territory to remain indefinitely as an almost unbroken native reserve upon which only missionaries and traders should have a footing. He believed native wishes should be given no real consideration since a "barbarous population who could not understand or forecast the advantages they must necessarily derive from contact with higher grades of Civilization and various public improvements" (64) was incapable of rational judgement.

Musgrave's view was in direct contrast to that of the L.M.S. as advanced by Lawes. The missionaries opposed any alienation without the natives' consent. From this principle they deviated only when coercion by the government appeared to them manifestly to serve the natives' good; when, for example, the land required was for a cemetery! (65)

Neither did Musgrave consider that the social condition of the inhabitants warranted the preservation of British New

(64) C.F.I.(Prot.) Set 6 Bundle 2, Musgrave to Douglas, 7 July 1886.
(65) Q'ld P.P. V.& P. 1887 vol.III, 673-676.
Guinea in its present primitive state: (66)

It is no scene where an innocent and united people dwell in conditions of Arcadian simplicity and peace and plenty which should be sympathised with and respected .... they have all the vices and customs of savages and will require an extraordinary union of firmness and consideration in their management.

Musgrave found it equally impossible to believe that a paternal government could suffer the plans for the general good to be thwarted "through the prejudice and obstinacy of a tribe or some of its members". (67) He stated that (68)

Sacrifice of individual interests on a reasonably assessed value for public purposes and the general good - is an admitted principle, (as I understand it,) in all forms of administration and I feel no hardship in applying it to British New Guinea.

"The general good" has a wider variety of meanings than any other phrase in administrative parlance. Musgrave was more prone to define than most of his colleagues, but even he failed to say what he meant by the term. Essentially, it would seem, the substitution of British social concepts for indigenous ones. He believed that the administration should try to change both native society and individuals. Musgrave was always on the side of native change and development, and he worked hard to

(66) C.P.I.(Prot.) Set 6 Bundle 2, Musgrave to Douglas, 7 July 1886.

(67) Idem.

(68) Idem.
create his utopia but New Guinea eventually broke him. Meanwhile, however, his ideas had the full support of the Special Commissioner. (69)

Even before he left Australia Douglas felt that a government representative was needed in the eastern part of the Protectorate. So early as June 1886 he appointed the Government Agent to Samarai. (70) The holder of this post was the sole representative of government in south-east Papua. For many thousands of the natives he was the administration. Unsupervised and far distant from Port Moresby, he often had to take action without reference to head-quarters. The presence of comparatively numerous traders, and the busyness of Samarai port, made his load of routine administration heavier than that of his counterparts elsewhere in the Protectorate.

The successive Agents at Samarai were untrained and hardly impressive men. They had been selected from the few whitemen in the country. The first appointee, H.O. Forbes, was a geographer temporarily out of funds. (71) He served from June

(69) C.P.I. (Prot.) Set 2, Douglas to Sec.of State for the Cols, 11 July 1886.
(70) C.P.I. (Prot.) Set 8, Douglas to Forbes, 7 June 1886; C.P.I. (Prot.) Set 2, Douglas to Sec.of State for the Cols, 1 July 1886.
(71) C.P.I. (Prot.) Set 2, Douglas to Sec.of State for the Cols, 1 July 1886; Ibid, Set 8, Douglas to Forbes, 7 June 1886.
1886 to April 1887. (72) His successor, F.E. Lawes, son of the missionary, served from April 1887 to March 1888, (73) and was succeeded by Robert Hunter, a semi-literate adventurer. He remained in office only a few months and was succeeded by E.G. Edelfelt who was in office at the time of annexation. (74)

Forbes, who was paid £50 per month for not more than six months, received extremely vague instructions. He was given a small sailing vessel, the CORAL SEA, and told to make the best use of her in order to become acquainted with the natives in the vicinity. Besides, he had to keep a record of proceedings and report from time to time on (75) "... everything which you may consider useful or interesting as regards the habits, customs, and dialects of the natives". He was also asked to pay particular attention to selecting a suitable locality for a port. Lawes' salary was but £30 a month, and he had only a whaleboat. Before he was appointed Samarai had been declared a port of entry (76) so his instructions were more specific: his chief duty was to attend to all matters connected with the

(72) Ibid, Set 8, Douglas to Lawes, 6 Ap.1887.
(74) Q'ld P.P. V.& P. 1889 vol.III, 238; Govt.Gazette, 29 Sept. 1888.
(75) C.P.I.(Prot.) Set 8, Douglas to Forbes, 7 June 1886.
(76) C.P.I.(Prot.) Set 8, Douglas to Lawes, 6 Ap.1887; C.P.I. (Prot.) Set 2, Douglas to Sec.of State for the Cols, 4 May 1887.
clearing of vessels. In all matters connected with the maintenance of order at Samarai and its vicinity, he was authorized to act on the Special Commissioner's behalf. He had especially to concern himself with the well-being of the natives in China Strait, but could not be absent from Samarai for more than forty-eight hours. (77) Placed at his disposal in Cooktown was a cash account of £100 on which he was to draw for small items. Vouchers of such expenditure had to be sent immediately to head-quarters. For larger undertakings, such as building, the vouchers had to be forwarded to the Special Commissioner to be paid by his cheque. If at any time Lawes found it necessary to enter into "contracts" or "agreements" for labour, copies had to be forwarded to Port Moresby at once. (78)

Hunter was instructed to take delivery of all government property from Lawes, and told to ask the latter for all details of duties, especially those connected with shipping and post office matters. His chief duty was to see that proper order was maintained at Samarai. He was to protect the people living on the island from any external violence such as might arise from the intrusion of strangers; he had to inform himself

(77) C.P.I.(Prot.) Set 8, Douglas to Lawes, 6 Apr. 1887.
(78) Ibid, Hely to Lawes, 3 May 1887.
accurately of all matters affecting the interest of the natives and learn the native language. Were life or property endangered he should act to save and protect them, but must be very careful in exercising any powers of compulsion. He was not, without leave of a superior officer, to leave the vicinity of China Strait. He had to keep a daily journal and send monthly report to head-quarters, but was to avoid lengthy correspondence. (79) Hunter had the same sum as Lawes to draw upon at Cooktown and his instructions about vouchers were the same. In addition he was told that on no account, except in extraordinary circumstance was his incidental expenditure to exceed £10 per month. For the first time there was provision for subordinates. Hunter employed two South Sea Island boatmen, one at £5 and the other at £3 per month, both with rations. (80)

Virtually the sole evidence telling how the Agents implemented the Protectorate is in the correspondence which passed between themselves and head-quarters. It is scanty but provides some picture of how the government functioned at the district level. Very little additional land was purchased in south-east Papua during Douglas' term as Special Commissioner. However the government did acquire part of Samarai, and Kwato

and Eboma islands, both very close to Samarai. The owners of Eboma refused to sell; the administration felt certain that the mission had influenced this decision and so finally the natives were forced to forgo their claims. (81) Because Samarai was so small there could be no provision for a permanent cemetery on the island and Eboma became the burial ground.

The administration acquired only part of Samarai because the island was inhabited and bore a mission station. (82) In 1888 after some negotiations the L.M.S. gave up all claims to Samarai and received instead the whole of Kwato. (83) The administration found it more difficult to persuade the natives to give up their rights. For a time officials considered


(82) C.P.I.(Prot.) Set 6 Bundle 2, Lawes to Douglas, 9 June 1887.

moving the seat of government, although that entailed an increased risk of attack from strange natives. However Musgrave felt that the administration had to grapple with that difficulty; it was ignominous for the administration to be following at the heels of the mission, pleading for places upon which to erect government buildings. He felt that if an official at a new site were supported for a few months by a schooner, the natives would speedily realize his power. Musgrave even considered it might be best to select a spot outside the mission sphere, where (as his satire put it) the natives had not been taught that the power of the Royal Navy and that of the L.M.S. were identical. (84) But he soon realized that Samarai was the most central and suitable site. He then objected to the "glaring absurdity" that the government had to build right over a pestilent swamp, because half a dozen aboriginals choose to scratch a living on the only really suitable area. (85) Eventually the government took over the whole island. (86)

The administration erected few buildings. For most of the Protectorate period the Agent lived in premises rented from

(84) C.P.I.(Prot.) Set 5 Bundle 2, Musgrave to Douglas, 25 Mar. 1888.
(85) Ibid, Musgrave to Douglas, 9 Apr.1888.
(86) C.P.I.(Prot.) Set 6 Bundle 2, Notice, 4 Dec.1888.
the mission. (87) The Agent contracted with Kissack for the erection of a government cottage on Kwato when that island briefly won favour as the site for headquarters; but with the reversion to Samarai that project ended. (88) Finally a residence was built in 1888. (89) In addition officials supervised the draining of Samarai swamp, which work Kissack also undertook. (90) He tendered, too, for the construction of a wharf at Samarai anchorage for £100, the government to contribute £50 and himself the other half. Musgrave said it would be impossible to get the job done cheaper. (91)

Most of the Agent's time was spent inspecting vessels which called at Samarai. Soon after he took up duties Forbes wrote to Douglas that most of the vessels coming to the south-east committed a breach of the regulations which declared Port Moresby the sole port of entry; they not only refrained from going there but did not even call at Samarai. He pointed out

(87) Q'ld P.P. V. & P. 1887 vol. III, 634.
(88) C.P.I. (Prot.) Set 5 Bundle 2, Musgrave to Douglas, 20 Mar. 1888.
(91) Ibid, Kissack to Musgrave, 10 Apr. 1888. See note by Musgrave attached.
that unless ships called at either port, Queensland had no
protection against bonded stores being distributed illegally to
vessels along the barrier reef; nor had the Protectorate means
of checking the illicit landing of prohibited articles or
preventing the introduction of infectious diseases. (92) Although
the island was not then a port of entry, Forbes acted as though
it were. He cancelled the permit of one trader, Ah Gim, because
the latter had breached bonded stores aboard his vessel and left
some at Suau. After giving Forbes false information the Chinese
deserted his ship, which proceeded to the Engineer group without
any of the crew having a shipping certificate of any description.
(93)

An interesting episode concerned an employee of Kissacks,
one Captain Mullens of the Alice Meade, who went to the Renard
isled in September 1886 to visit Kissack's native agent there.
Mullens found that the boy had been killed by Sabari islanders,
who had also stolen all the trade goods. Mullens took justice
into his own hands by visiting the village to which (according
to information he received) the murderers belonged, and firing at
it. As the Agent said, the whole episode had to be seen as a
raid perpetrated by Mullens on the Sabari islanders; retribution

(92) Ibid., Forbes to Douglas, 12 Oct. 1886.
(93) Idem.
on natives whom the man took upon himself to judge and punish, without even informing the government. Furthermore, it seemed that the people punished were not the guilty ones. The Agent thought that if this was proved, Kissack and Company should be made to pay restitution (94) "to show that the government has caused an injustice done by a white man to be repaired". A prohibition order was served on Mullens as soon as he returned from Cooktown, much to his surprise. (95) Until the Agent was able to hold a full enquiry into the matter he gave Mullens a provisional permit. (96)

Forbes acted again on discovering that Fierey Augustin, a half-caste Mauritian islander, had committed a breach of the liquor regulation by importing spirits off the ship VICTORY. Augustin, suffering from delirium tremens, was taken into custody and told that he could work round the residency for pay. This he declined to do. "He not only refused to recognise but even tried to resist before the natives my authority," (97) wrote Forbes, who therefore put Augustin under restraint aboard the

(94) C.P.I.(Prot.) Set 5 Bundle 2, Forbes to Douglas, 4 Sept. 1886 and enclosures; Ibid, Set 6 Bundle 2, Forbes to Douglas, 13 Jan.1887.
(95) C.P.I.(Prot.) Set 8, Douglas to Lawes, 3 May 1887; Ibid, Set 6 Bundle 2, Lawes to Douglas, 9 June 1887.
(96) C.P.I.(Prot.) Set 6 Bundle 2, 12 June 1887; Ibid, 13 June 1887 and enclosures of evidence. The matter does not appear in the records again.
(97) C.P.I.(Prot.) Set 5 Bundle 2, Forbes to Douglas, 10 Sept. 1886.
CORAL SEA and finally deported him from the country aboard H.M.S. HARRIER. (98) Even Nick Ministre could not completely avoid the processes of the law. (99) Nor could Burns Philp break regulations with impunity. In January 1886 one of their ships, the ELSSEA under Captain Hovell, took a native of Sudest aboard and promised to return him in a month. In September he had still not been returned and the natives, who supposed him dead, became very restless. Forbes protested to Douglas, who in turn remonstrated with the Company. (100) Traders thus began to feel the effects of the administration although few troubled to keep strictly within the law.

Although they spent most of their time in Samarai, Agents occasionally visited East Cape, Giligili in Milne Bay (where Kissack collected copra from the natives), and the islands in China Strait or the Louisiades. Even so, the circle of government influence remained very restricted. Agents made no attempt to go out and establish friendly relations with the natives. Indeed, as Forbes said, the exploration and examination

(100) C.P.I.(Prot.) Set 5 Bundle 2, Forbes to Douglas, 4 Sept. 1886; Ibid, Set 8, Douglas to Burns Philp, 8 Dec.1886.
of the Louisiades could be undertaken only contrary to the wishes of the Special Commissioner, who believed the risks to be too great. Forbes felt these would be minimized by the permanent presence of a vessel of war at Samarai. (101) But the fact remained that when the agents left Samarai it was to investigate specific clashes between the natives and foreigners; or to supervise the activities of pearlers when large numbers congregated together late in 1887 and early in 1888.

Forbes travelled more than his successors. He arrived at Samarai late in June 1886, and in September he proceeded to East Cape to visit the L.M.S. teacher who had complained that the natives had threatened to kill him and had destroyed his garden. He admitted poaching on their preserves, so Forbes cautioned both teacher and natives. (102) On the way back to Samarai he visited Giligili where Kissack's representative had reported trouble with the natives. (103) Forbes settled the dispute amicably. Charlie Berlin also reported that he had been attacked and nearly killed by the Maivara natives of Milne Bay, but Forbes did not investigate as he had warned Berlin.

(101) C.P.I.(Prot.) Set 5 Bundle 2, Forbes' Report, 8 Sept.1886.
that he visited the area at his own risk. (104) In all probability Berlin had provoked the natives. Forbes also visited Heath island in China Strait to look for a suitable site for a government residence. (105)

In October Forbes reported news of the massacre of Captain J.C. Craig of the EMILY and his crew by Joannet islanders (106) In November he was authorized by Douglas to investigate the outrage and told that if he thought it necessary to leave a caretaker on Samarai while he was away he should employ William Whitten at £3 per week. (107) Forbes was hardly back from that expedition (detailed below) before he left Samarai.

His successors rarely left Samarai and were never authorised to conduct punitive expeditions. Lawes only left the island once, to visit the pearling fleet in Joannet harbour in February 1888. At that time thirty two boats were anchored there, and over two hundred men, mostly Manillamen, Malays, or South Sea Islanders, were engaged in diving for pearlshell. All the boats except two (the ALBERT, belonging to J.C. Robinson, and Nick Ministre's vessel) were leaving on a prospecting

(104) Ibid, 2 letters, 6 Aug.1886 and enclosures of Berlin's evidence.
(105) Ibid, 10 Sept.1886.
(107) C.P.I.(Prot.) Set 8, Douglas to Forbes, 26 Nov.1886.
expedition to Murua because the Joannet shell had been worked out. If they found no good shell at Murua they planned to return to Torres Strait because the Louisiade shell was not of very high quality. It averaged but £80 a ton on the London market where Torres Strait shell fetched from £115 to £120. (108)

All the captains complained to Lawes of being obliged to go so far leeward to Samarai before they could clear for Cooktown. He therefore suggested that it would be advisable to have a floating officer always among the boats if they stayed in the Louisiades. He pointed out that the current system meant that if a diver offended the master of a vessel in the slightest regard, the latter simply took the law into his own hands and a fight resulted. (109) Forbes had reported in similar vein of the lawless behaviour of pearlers and traders when reporting on the Craig massacre. He regretted the inhumanitarian feeling of the traders who continued to barter on the most friendly terms with the very people "whose hands are fresh dripping with the blood of one of their rivals". (110) While at Huxley Point a member of the government party had to board the schooner ALBERT to quell a drunken disturbance. Scarcely a

(108) C.P.I.(Prot.) Set 5 Bundle 2, Lawes to Douglas, 20 Feb. 1888
(109) Idem.
(110) C.P.I.(Prot.) Set 5 Bundle 2, Forbes to Douglas, 24 Nov. 1886.
single person aboard, white or black, was sober and all were fighting. Forbes remarked that it was no wonder such crews were caught off their guard and murdered. He thought they should all be banned from entry to New Guinea. (111)

Lawes and Hunter were concerned chiefly with port duties and post office work. Although they stayed in Samarai they served a valuable function by passing on to head-quarters any information they received about events in the area. Ships were constantly arriving and departing and information came from all the places which traders visited. The Agents informed the Special Commissioner of 'unofficial' views, and reported on native attitudes to European actions. For example Lawes sent information about the natives' reaction to the division of Samarai between themselves and the government, (112) and reported on the Basilaki islanders' response to the bombardment of their villages as a reprisal for the massacre of a Chinese beche-de-mer party aboard the PRIDE OF THE LOGAN in 1887. (113)

Massacres and attacks on foreigners continued normally to be punished by the Royal Navy, acting in response to the

(111) Idem.
(112) G.F.I.(Prot.) Set 6 Bundle 2, Lawes to Douglas, 9 June 1887.
(113) Ibid, 11 Aug.1887.
request of the Special Commissioners. (114) However when Hern and Hansen of the CECEILIA were murdered by the natives of Orangerie bay, Protectorate officials burnt the villages concerned. (115) Sometimes attempts were made to secure the actual culprits and punish them alone. This happened with the PRIDE OF THE LOGAN massacre. Six Chinese were murdered by the Basilaki natives, who cut off the heads and kept them as trophies but burned the bodies. They also plundered the vessel, which had firearms aboard. Douglas sent a message to the Basilaki people requesting them to send the skulls, the firearms, and everything belonging to the ship, to Samarai. Further, six men belonging to the bad villages had to be sent to Samarai where they would be tied up but not killed. Until this was done there would be no peace for the Basilaki people. (116) Douglas had sanguine hopes that patience would achieve his aim, without vindictive reprisals. (117) In fact the Basilaki natives jeered at the administration and caused disaffection.
among the more peaceful tribes. For instance they called the Milne Bay people old women for attending church and listening to the foreigners, instead of getting heads and guns. (118)

Finally the navy acted in its usual fashion and bombarded the villages concerned in the outrage. Although nobody was killed Lawes reported that the natives were very much frightened by the shelling and sent a message that they had had enough and wished the man-of-war would go away. (119)

Senior officials rarely visited the south-east portion of the Protectorate. Douglas called at Suau, Samarai, and Teste island on his way to Port Moresby in 1886 but he did not reach Suau until 13 June and was in Port Moresby by 1 July. (120) In November he was again at Samarai for a short period, this time in connection with the Craig massacre. (121) He did not pay another visit to the east until April 1887. On that visit he supervised the return of some sixty Louisiade islanders who had remained in Queensland after the bulk were returned by S.S. VICTORIA. (122) Douglas had gone to some trouble to ascertain

(118) C.P.I.(Prot.) Set 6 Bundle 2, Lawes to Douglas, 13 June 18
(120) C.P.I.(Prot.) Set 2 Douglas to Sec.of State for the Cols, 3 July 1886.
(121) Ibid, 2 Dec.1886.
how many Louisiade natives still remained alive in Queensland, and pressed the government of that colony to take some action. (123) By returning the labourers to their homes Douglas hoped to establish friendly links between the Louisiade peoples and officers of the Protectorate. (124) Musgrave went on a collecting expedition to the eastern portion of the Protectorate early in 1888 and was at Samarai, his furthest point east, for part of March and April. While there he took an active part in deciding on the site for a permanent government settlement in that part of the territory. (125)

The above account has indicated that throughout the Protectorate the officials' chief concern was to investigate reported clashes between the natives and foreigners. The most important of these incidents concerned the attack on Captain Craig of the schooner EMILY, referred to above. It illustrates Douglas' attitude, the technique of administration, and the way in which public opinion in Australia, (126) chiefly interested

(124) C.P.I.(Prot.) Set 2, Douglas to Sec.of State for the Cols, 4 May 1887.
(126) P.D.Times, 20 Nov.1886, 3; Queensland Figaro, 13 Nov.1886, 7
in the activities of traders in south-east Papua, could affect government action.

Douglas, as soon as he had been informed by Forbes of the outrage, sent the following telegram to the Premier of Queensland: (127)

This unprovoked massacre of Craig and his crew demands all the reparation which can be justly obtained .... The "Diamond" is probably on the spot, but ... you might arrange with the Admiral to despatch the "Gayundah" with instructions to arrest the murderers at all hazards. I must request your co-operation in vindication of justice for a most foul outrage.

A letter Douglas wrote to Admiral Tryon about the massacre reads like an apology for Protectorate policies: (128)

There are two ways of dealing with savages such as the perpetrators of the Craig massacre. There is the principle of the forgiveness of injuries ... It is a sublime and potent principle, and it governs the dispensation of mercy. - But justice also demands its victims, and I cannot but think that you and I are Ministers of Justice .... The office of an Executioner is one which every humane man would shrink from, himself, undertaking, - but, if the cause of order, and the work of civilization among these savages renders it necessary, no hesitation should be shown in punishing the guilty .... I can well understand the reluctance which officers and men in H.M. Service must feel when they are called upon to fire on naked savages who are not worthy of their steel - it is a duty which would best be discharged by a local body, organized, as in Fiji, for police purposes, and maintained under proper discipline.

(128) Ibid, Douglas to Tryon, 3 Jan.1887.
So Douglas conceived a native constabulary which would dispense western justice in such a way that European sensibilities would not be offended by the arbitrary and cruel effects of culture contact. Douglas told Forbes that if events after the massacre pointed to the expediency of employing South Sea Islanders for police purposes, he (Forbes) could retain three or four under the strictest conditions of discipline and obedience. (129)

Douglas was himself unable to go to the Louisiades immediately, and thinking that a naval vessel would be unable to cope with the cunning savages who had perpetrated so foul a crime, he authorized Forbes to investigate fully the circumstance surrounding the massacre. Forbes was also told to arrest all the natives who had taken part in the affair. (130) Captain Robinson of the ALBERT reported to Forbes that the natives had given him several reasons for the massacre; one was that Craig returned to a village where he had previously left trade goods in anticipation of the inhabitants collecting pearlshell, but found that they had none and so refused to leave more trade. He went on to barter goods at a neighbouring village where the inhabitants had collected shell. The disappointed and jealous

(129) C.F.I.(Prot.) Set 8, Douglas to Forbes, 26 Nov.1886.
(130) C.F.I.(Prot.) Set 7, Correspondence relating to the Joannet expedition, 24 Nov.1886.
residents of the first village decided to attack Craig. Another story related that Craig had given a rifle to one man but not another, who felt aggrieved therefore and decided to attack the trader. In each version an individual or community had been publicly slighted, and our knowledge of native social organization indicates that this would have been sufficient cause. The use of firearms as payment for goods or services was strictly forbidden; so Craig's behaviour displays how little regard most traders had for the law and how hard it was to enforce.

From Robinson's report Forbes found out the names and villages of the ring-leaders. He left Samarai immediately and sailed for Pig island (Nimoa) to try and secure a key witness. On the way he met H.M.S. DIAMOND and Captain Clayton decided to accompany Forbes. As the Europeans could not get guides to lead them where they wanted to go they had to return to Samarai. (131)

After this abortive attempt Forbes organized a large punitive expedition, determined this time successfully to punish the offenders. He led a party of seven Europeans, three Malays, four South Sea Islanders, and forty-five natives from various islands in the Louisiades. One of the Europeans was Nicholas

(131) C.P.I.(Prot.) Set 5 Bundle 2, Forbes to Douglas, 24 Nov. 1886.
Ministre, whom officials knew to be a lawless murderer feared by all the natives in the district. But because Ministre's knowledge of the Louisiades far exceeded that of any other European, Forbes employed him. Ministre provided his own vessel and crew. (132)

This expedition was also badly mismanaged. From the start Ministre disobeyed instructions, and through negligence a number of prisoners who could have given warning of the advancing white party to the murderers, escaped. When (at night) the expedition reached the village most deeply implicated, Ministre stumbled over a pig. This roused the sleeping inhabitants who escaped before the village could be surrounded. As the natives fled the administrative party fired at random, killing one man and wounding others. The culprits escaped. At daylight Forbes searched the village and found rifles, a revolver, quantities of gunpowder and cartridges as well as knives and axes. He kept the arms but distributed the other articles among the natives who had assisted him. He then ordered the village to be burnt. Another village, whose inhabitants had refused to guide Forbes on his first expedition, was also fired. (133)

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(132) Ibid, Set 6 Bundle 1, Agreement with Ministre, 24 Nov.1886.
(133) Ibid, Set 5 Bundle 2, Forbes to Douglas, 24 Nov.1886.
Douglas' reply to Forbes' report of the expedition, though full of impressive policy statements, illustrated the extent to which practice differed from theory; even more important it showed how, at this early period, the administration functioned not from the central policy directing subordinate officers, but vice versa. Forbes acted on his own authority more often than not; subsequently his actions were praised or censured by the head of the government. Future Government Agents had much more specific instructions and restricted powers.

Douglas' comments on the Craig expedition were couched in such vague terms that it would have been difficult for an Agent to know what future policy to follow: (134)

I feel also bound to observe on that portion of your report in which you express a belief that the neighbouring tribes avail themselves of opportunities further to weaken the Joannet islanders, that it can never be my duty, or yours, to permit strife between neighbouring tribes. It may be necessary to visit offending natives with exemplary and judicial punishment. In the case now under discussion, the natives of Joannet doubtless richly deserved punishment, and I do not take exception to the fate which, at your hands, befell some of them, when the arms and ammunition were recovered from them, but the gratuitous burning of villages, even though those villages were deserted, I entirely disapprove of.

It is necessary that the white man should, under proper limits, assert his power, and I should not myself hesitate to take life in order to vindicate justice,

(134) Ibid, Set 7, Correspondence re the Joannet Expedition, Douglas to Forbes, 16 Feb.1887.
but I am most desirous to avoid not only the appearance but the reality of practices which are as barbarous as those of the natives themselves.

I wish you to understand that it is my duty to discourage and, if possible, to repress intertribal devastation.

In the microcosm of south-east Papua the administration muddled along, unplanned, haphazard, unable to implement many policies for lack of funds: a faithful reflection of conditions throughout the territory. The future of the Protectorate was uncertain, its financial position deplorable, its political and economic development the subject of vituperative conference between the contributing colonies, Britain, and the Special Commissioner. In Britain the Colonial Office, burdened by the administration of many other colonies more profitable and strategically important, and continually chided by the Treasury for the sums it spent, emphasized the need to protect native rights and promote native welfare, but did not assume responsibility for the implementation of such policies. The governments of the Australian colonies, even of Queensland which naturally showed the most interest in New Guinea, had to contend with too many domestic issues to trouble much about Protectorate affairs. The Special Commissioner spent most of his time and energy trying to raise enough money to keep a skeleton administration functioning. This limited the extent to which he could supervise his subordinates or formulate and augment policies.
Finally in September 1888 Britain annexed the Protectorate and the Crown appointed William MacGregor, previously Chief Medical Officer of Fiji, administrator. But the three Australian colonies continued to have a share in determining policy and kept contributing towards the cost of the administration. MacGregor had the guarantee from the Australian colonies, of an annual grant of £15,000 to be paid for ten years. Britain provided a steam yacht and contributed the cost of its upkeep. The new colony's financial resources were these contributions and whatever revenue it might itself produce. Such parsimony augured ill for the future. Certainly the economic development of the colony was slow, and political and social progress even more tardy, yet the subsequent history of the colony was interesting and at times exciting.
THE PERIOD OF JOINT CONTROL

Most Protectorate officials faced the numerous practical problems which confronted them with admirable fortitude, although they did not anticipate any rapid progress towards a well-ordered self-supporting state. Officials at Whitehall and in the Australian colonies held the same view, and believed New Guinea a particularly difficult territory to administer. William MacGregor, the first governor, was also the first person to make use of the advantages which British New Guinea had over more civilized territories to turn it into a unified state.

It did not present the administrative difficulties of those British colonies which comprised peoples with divergent social systems and religions, and with material cultures ranging from the highly sophisticated to the very simple. Even in the coastal areas or island groups where natives had been in contact with Europeans for many years, their social structure and technology had not significantly altered. There was no homogeneity but there was surface uniformity. Their primitive technology and the smallness of their political units prevented the natives from making any effective and ordered protest against the government, although occasionally the men of a village would defy the administration. Such revolts were purely defensive: the natives attempted only to prevent interference from outsiders.
The non-indigenous population remained so small that there was no effective opposition from that quarter to the implementation of unified political control. The few whites antagonistic to the government never achieved coherence. Nicholas Ministre set the tone for white opposition to authority in his bombastic futility. He openly stated that he should have been king of the Trobriands, but took no steps to achieve that end. When asked by a Wesleyan missionary what he would do if in power, Ministre retorted: "I would first of all pass a law for the protection of natives." (1) He meant protection from interference by missionaries and the administration. Most Europeans, and particularly the missionaries, supported the government. Often they did so, unconscious of the function they were fulfilling. The curiosity they evinced in the affairs of their neighbours both white and brown, was no different from native inquisitiveness, but most of them spoke English and could much more easily approach officials. Missionaries and their teachers, but also traders, planters, and miners, were very ready to publicize the moral or social misdemeanours of others. The success of the administration at the district level depended to quite a marked extent on such help from the foreign population.

(1) Bromilow, Twenty Years Among Primitive Papuans, 1929.
During these years W.E. Bromilow, the head of the Wesleyan Mission, carefully explained to his flock that British law punished the actual wrong-doer and no other because guilt was really personal not communal. Missionaries tried to instil patriotic as well as religious feelings among the natives. Another Wesleyan, Samuel Fellows, wrote in his journal that he had held a particularly good service at which he had shown a picture of the Queen and spoke to the natives about their duties as subjects. He also pleaded for the lightening of the labours of the women, then went on to speak of Albert the Good as having only one wife, and in his own words "bashed polygamy".

The condition of society gave officials, in relation to the population, very great power. The Administrator was virtually an absolute autocrat, and his subordinates in the field were responsible only to him. MacGregor's influence was great, particularly as he had a very forceful personality. He had exceptional physical courage and stamina, combined with outstanding intellectual qualities. His mind was penetrating and flexible, perceptive and resourceful; his view of human nature was liberal, optimistic. MacGregor believed non-

(2) Ibid. 154.
(3) Mitchell Lib. Ms. Meth. Ch. O. M. 130, Fellows, Diary, 15 Nov. 1891.
Europeans could be civilized and trained to become rational, responsible, individuals. He aimed to promote that end. His powers in practice were limited simply by the resources at his disposal and the physical conditions of the area. These factors seriously restricted implementation of unified control at the district level.

The contributions from the Australian colonies and Britain were small, as was the revenue produced in the territory. The latter came chiefly from import duties; export duties on gold and other minerals such as osmiridium, graphite, and plumbago; or from licences of one sort or another. Most came from the south-east, where the white population was concentrated. The returns from which the revenue figures in the annual reports were compiled gave a lower figure than the true one for a number of reasons; the most important being that the amount of gold declared was false, for miners continually smuggled quantities out of the country. Had there been true returns, the revenue would still have been very small. British New Guinea met only a tiny percentage of the world demand for tropical products, and minerals were never found in really large, profitable quantities. Because of the colony's hopeless economic position governors could only plan and implement long-range social or economic policies if they cost almost nothing.
Another result of financial stringency was an inadequate staff. Although the political future of the colony had been temporarily settled the climate, poor salaries, and primitive living conditions, as well as the lack of medical services or pension schemes, made it virtually impossible to attract trained men to the civil service. The colonial governors were forced to continue the practice of the Special Commissioners and employ local men however unsuitable.

The extension of Burns Philp's interests in the colony, the gold rushes, and his contacts in Fiji meant that MacGregor had a wider selection from which to choose than had his predecessors. The men appointed after annexation were never so close to the Papuans as some of the Protectorate officials, who were bound by a close emotional attachment to both the country and its inhabitants. Yet one of the paradoxes of colonial history is that the latter class complicate race relations, and add to the administrator's problems because they never quite identify themselves with the natives but always consider themselves an elite. Europeans, often much less sympathetic towards the people, who see themselves as expatriates with a job to do, better serve a dependency where the ultimate aim is native participation in government.

With hardly more resources at his disposal than had the
Special Commissioners, but with the advantage of properly defined powers, MacGregor proceeded to establish an administrative system, and then to supervise its functioning. Within a few years he succeeded in creating a machinery of government which worked surprisingly well. Under his rule British New Guinea slowly began to take shape as a social and political unit: a process which still continues.

MacGregor did not devise an original plan for the administration of British New Guinea, but with modifications adopted the system then in practice in Fiji. He divided the possession into districts and placed a Resident Magistrate with extensive judicial powers in charge of each. The Resident Magistrate resided at the head-quarters of the district but was supposed to go on tour frequently. Resident Magistrates exercised three kinds of jurisdiction; they held inquiries into Indictable Offences; they tried Summary Jurisdiction cases; and they tried Small Debts cases. They could also hold inquiries by special statutory authority, into cases of death or fire. Cases beyond their competence came before the Central Court and were heard by the Chief Judicial Officer sitting alone. For most of the period under review Francis Winter held the position. He was succeeded by C.S. Robinson and then J.H.P. Murray. The Central Court Circuits usually co-incided with the Administrator's
visits of inspection. Resident Magistrates were also Magistrates for Native Matters, and enforced the regulations of the Native Regulation Board. If there were goldfields in the district the Magistrate would also be a Goldfields Warden with powers of the same functionary in Queensland law. All district officials were also Sub-Collectors of Customs. They had thus much greater authority than Government Agents, who, in the colonial period, had the same powers as under the Protectorate. Because of the chronic shortage of staff, an individual often held a plurality of offices.

MacGregor, though not a harsh man, expected very high personal standards in his subordinates. He continually found fault with them for not adhering to the loftiest ideals of service. They, in turn felt slave-driven. Boisterous social behaviour also shocked MacGregor, although he must have witnessed much drunken and profligate conduct. His attitude of outrage towards the Commandant of the Armed Native Constabulary who said "Upon my soul" in front of Lady MacGregor illustrated how wide was his definition of behaviour undesirable in an officer.

(6) C.F.74 vol.IX, Moreton to Drury, 17 Mar.1895.
(7) Nat.Lib.Ms MacGregor, Diary, vol.4, 5 May 1892.
Yet moral repugnance did not affect his judgement of an individual's worth as a civil servant. A case in point was his treatment of David Ballantine. MacGregor saw him as a "very disagreeable young man, snappy in temper and conceited"; a man who could not get on with others. (8) For this reason MacGregor refused to make Ballantine a Magistrate for some time and made it clear that the officer, then Sub-Collector of Customs at Samarai, was under the Magistrate's orders except for Customs and Post Office business. (9) Yet later MacGregor recommended Ballantine as Treasurer. (10) This office he fulfilled at first without much distinction but adequately. When he began to drink heavily he became much less efficient and at the time of the Royal Commission his department was a disgrace.

Because so few potential officers were available, MacGregor was forced to supplement his civil service with temporary European appointments and native officials. He created an Armed Native Constabulary, and the office of Village Constable. Both these institutions, he hoped, might form the nucleus of a native administration which would develop along lines similar

(10) C.P.I.(Col.) Set 6 vol.II, MacGregor to Q'ld, 5 Aug.1893.
to the Fijian. The Armed Native Constabulary and the Village Constabulary were the first native-based institutions which were common to the whole of British New Guinea. As soon as he took up residence in New Guinea, MacGregor or his officers began to appoint Village Constables. (11) They were expected to report all misdemeanours or untoward events which occurred in the villages under their supervision to the European official when he came on tour. The Village Constable was the channel through which the administration explained its policies to the village natives. Further, it gained from the Village Constable some idea of native views and attitudes to its policies.

Papua was a particularly difficult territory in which to make any attempt at government through native agencies because very few societies had hereditary chiefs or even leaders with well defined political or legal functions. An office can be created but an alien system of authority cannot be grafted onto a functioning social structure. Village Constables, in their official capacity, were little more than government stooges.

Most Village Constables or members of the Armed Native Constabulary were recruited from the gaols. After a short and specialized period of contact with the government, and virtually

no training, they were expected to implement certain government policies, albeit on a very minor scale. As was to be expected they did not play an effective part in the process of government for many years, but the Armed Native Constabulary was, almost from its inception, most successful both in extending government control and maintaining law and order. A native who joined up, whether he volunteered after a term in prison or was recruited on a government patrol, was trained at the Port Moresby headquarters for some months before being sent to serve with a district detachment which was directly under the control of the Resident Magistrate.

For the whole period of joint control government policy toward the Papuans continued to be authoritarian. Despite the appointment of Village Constables, and the employment of a few native clerical assistants, (12) the indigenous population played no part in the formulation of policy and hardly assisted in its implementation.

This was the framework of administration which MacGregor devised, but his system needed money to be kept in motion. Even with a grossly inadequate staff a third of his grant approx-

imately went on salaries. (13) When preparing his first estimates MacGregor wrote to the governor of Queensland saying that a small sum had been unappropriated, not because no use could be found for it but because it was uncertain which vote would need supplementing most. (14) The administration of the possession was extremely frustrating, if also a challenge to the ingenuity and financial acumen of officials.

What endowed the system with life and interest were the administrators' beliefs and their grass-roots experience. All officials were paternalists who believed that Britain had a sacred trust to fulfil in her tropical dependencies. For them protection of the indigenes was the paramount aim of government. Yet at the same time as they endeavoured to shelter the natives from exploitation they also tried to expose them to as many "beneficial" western influences as possible: (15)

Unless ... natives of these islands learn to look to the Government for protection and guidance, I am quite sure they will enter on a stage of decadence that will be rapid and disastrous. MacGregor, his successors, and district officials, tried to foster the steady development of British New Guinea towards an

(13) See Ann.Reps.
(14) C.P.I.(Col.) Set 6 vol.I, MacGregor to Q'ld, 22 Aug.1889.
(15) Ibid, 8 July 1889.
ideal: a well ordered self-supporting state in which the Papuans had become civilized participants. (16) For this reason they encouraged mission activity; MacGregor declared that to his official eye all Christian churches were exactly alike, and the one which did the best work would be the most appreciated. (17)

What features marked the legislation which MacGregor and his successors promulgated, and which district officials enforced? Early legislation was protective. Natives could not be removed from the territory, nor taken more than ten miles from their village; (18) they were forbidden the use of alcohol, drugs, and explosives; (19) land could be alienated only by the Crown, and then the consent of the owners had first to be obtained except in special circumstances; (20) the importation of Asiatic labour was forbidden because officials foresaw the social problems it would entail. (21) The first legal code incorporated little native customary law, but it was taken into account for the formulation of native regulations. Thus adultery was made an indictable offence; so too the spreading of lying reports. (22) There were all sorts of minor prohibitions:

(17) C.P.I.(Col.) Set 6 vol.I, MacGregor to Q'ld, 9 Mar.1890.  
(18) Ibid. 16 Aug.1888.  
(19) Ibid. 15 Aug.1888.  
(20) Ibid. 16 Aug.1888.  
(21) Ibid. 22 Aug.1889.  
(22) Ibid. vol.II, 28 Feb.1891 and 9 May 1891.
to bury corpses in the village, (23) to cut down coconut trees, (24) to dispose of land by will, (25) to sell or buy vessels other than canoes in commerce with whites. (26)

Sorcery too became a crime. (27) Its punishment raised a problem which continued to plague officials for many years. The administration wished to stress to the Papuans that sorcery was imaginary, not real; yet it had to be punished. Sophistry may have comforted officials who brought convictions for false pretences, disturbing the peace, spreading false rumours, extortion, uttering threats, and so forth against sorcerers, but this could have had very little effect on altering Papuan beliefs about black magic.

The whole trend of the governors’ policies was toward lifting a barbarous population to civilization, or by an analogy which one suspects was often taken literally, to supervise the social development of a child to adulthood. At first the natives had to be sheltered from harmful influences, and firmly controlled, but as they became accustomed to British methods of

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(23) Govt. Gazette 1890, Reg. no.XIII.  
(24) C.F.I.(Col.) Set 6 vol.II, MacGregor to Q’ld, 28 Feb. and 9 May 1891.  
(26) Idem.  
administration they were to be allowed more freedom, more choice in ordering their lives. This concept dominated the Native Labour Ordinance, successive amendments to which removed restraints upon native freedom of action. Originally they could not be taken more than a few miles from their village; (28) in 1891 they could be employed anywhere in the colony; (29) in 1893 employers were allowed to take Papuans out of the territory for a single voyage so long as the vessel they travelled on was currently registered in British New Guinea; (30) in 1897 natives could be signed on or off as contract labourers by any qualified officer, not only a Resident Magistrate. (31) Most natives who left the territory were engaged in the Torres Strait pearling industry although some were taken to Australia as servants, or deputation speakers for the missions.

During Douglas' term as Special Commissioner the emphasis of government shifted slightly away from the protection of native interests towards an extension of white interests, but after annexation the balance reverted to protection. MacGregor himself was not such a strong advocate of European economic activity as most of his subordinates, but he could not ignore.

(28) C.P.I.(Col.) Set 6 vol.I, MacGregor to Q'ld, 16 Aug.1888.  
(31) Ibid, vol.IV, MacGregor to Q'ld, 10 July 1897.
the white section of the community, if only because its numbers increased rapidly when gold was discovered. MacGregor wished, before allowing an influx of settlers into the country, to acquaint himself with the people and the country. He realized that progress in that direction would be slow, and that the administration might appear to be throwing obstacles in the way of settlers; but remained confident that it was better to make sure of the ground before proceeding to promulgate much legislation or to take sweeping administrative action. (32)

In fact none of MacGregor's legislation was pro-European. Even his plans for the New Guinea Syndicate, which caused so much indignation in Australia and marred his last months in office, should be seen as a means for attracting much capital to the territory without a correspondingly large increase in white settlement. Australian politicians who favoured the adoption of a policy which encouraged the small settler to invest his money in the colony, rightly considered that MacGregor had betrayed their interests. They forced him to repudiate his promises to the Syndicate promoters. This quarrel was crucial to the future of the colony. Previously the governor, as representative of a policy which stressed protection, was

stronger than his opponents and those critics in the Australian parliaments who saw New Guinea as a strategic bulwark, and a field for economic exploitation by Australians. From MacGregor's defeat over the Syndicate plan Papua began to develop as an Australian rather than a British dependency although the actual political transfer came years later.

However there was a despotic side to the benevolence which characterized the colonial period. This was most apparent in the legal code which MacGregor drew up. He did not think it necessary for natives to have legal representation in court; in their semi-barbarous state they could not use a counsel and plead not guilty as a technical move. Actually MacGregor did not think it at all desirable that natives should escape punishment on technical grounds as he felt the situation would be misunderstood by them. Field officials always acted on this principle when they heard cases. MacGregor also objected to a jury system on the grounds that the non-indigenous population was too small to allow for the calling of an impartial jury and assessors.

One of the Queensland parliamentary draughtsmen who commented on the legal code MacGregor drew up, objected to the lack of safeguards for a fair, unbiased trial. He also disapproved of the almost unrestricted powers of the Chief
Magistrate. Especially he objected to the Chief Magistrate being acquainted with a case before it came to him for a final trial. MacGregor dismissed this objection summarily and indeed rather illogically by saying that it seemed immaterial to him at what stage the Chief Magistrate became convinced of the guilt of the accused. MacGregor also pointed out that if the Chief Magistrate formed the opinion that the accused was innocent then the advantage would have been all on the side of the latter. However he had to admit that the position of the Chief Magistrate was invidious, but he pointed out that this was always the case with a capital charge judge. He also stated that the Fijian judicial system which was very similar to the one he advocated, worked very well in practice.

Yet he was not harsh. In the early years of the colony's history prisoners who had been gaol for actions which did not constitute crimes in their own society, and who were often unable to communicate properly with fellow prisoners or warders, languished and became ill however fair their treatment. MacGregor saw that confinement, or even restraint, was foreign to native habits. This, the fact that convicts had to eat strange food, and the unaccustomed work, all meant, so MacGregor thought, that

(33) Ibid, MacGregor to Q'ld, 19 Aug. 1889.
"long imprisonment clearly cannot without cruelty be made a means of punishment". (34) He also opposed capital punishment in most cases, even for serious offences such as the murder of a white man. (35) District officials had to carry out headquarters instructions in such matters whatever their personal views.

MacGregor's views on flogging nicely reflect his position as a Christian and moralist. He thought it should be resorted to only when crime was endemic in the lowest criminal class of society. By implication this could happen only in an urban, industrialised community. In New Guinea: (36)

... to introduce the lash as a systematic means of punishment would ... be brutalizing and would in all probability create a very undesirable state of feeling in the native mind.

MacGregor's comments on both the Marriage and Coconut Planting Ordinances illustrate both aspects of benevolent despotism. The marriage regulations attempted to curb any tendency on the part of pagan natives to evade responsibilities of traditional marriage. Peace, better transport, increased opportunities for employment outside the village, meant men

(34) Ibid. a second letter dated 19 Aug.1889.
(35) Ibid. vol.III, MacGregor to Q'ld, 13 Nov.1893.
(36) Ibid. vol.I, MacGregor to Q'ld, 19 Aug.1889.
could more easily than hitherto form liaisons with women and then desert them. Both missions and the administration recognized native marriages as valid, and deplored any tendency on the part of the natives to regard them as less binding than Christian unions, although both groups felt that native marriage would fall into disrepute sooner or later. They also felt that its "objectional" features should be discarded as soon as possible.

MacGregor, usually intelligent about native customs, strongly objected to brideprice, which gave native marriages stability and made them legal: (37)

No person is more keenly alive ... to the desirability of maintaining all laudable native customs or even all harmless customs of these natives, but that of payment for a girl I can by no means admit into either category. It is a custom that should in every way be discouraged because unfortunately it cannot be summarily suppressed in certain districts.

He realized that brideprice was an integral part of the societies in which it existed, but felt that those societies were at fault, and that once the administration changed the system of bride-wealth those societies would die out, because payment for wives only existed amongst degraded peoples "... and our first function in this country is to lift the natives out of that state". (38)

(37) Ibid, vol.IV, MacGregor to Q'ld, 9 July 1897.
(38) Idem.
The Coconut Ordinance specified that a certain number of trees had to be planted by the males of each village where the nuts grew naturally. MacGregor saw the rule as bearing directly on the industrial, economic, and commercial future of the natives. The ownership of palms planted by an individual passed at his death to his male heirs, so a continuity of copra production was assured, and with it a viable native economy became possible. This MacGregor felt to be essential to the development of the territory: (39)

If the natives do not become producers on their own account if they cannot greatly increase present exports and create new ones they cannot exist long as a race.

It may safely be predicted that if they are not taught and made to develop and utilize their own country they will be dispossessed and die and it will pass into the hands of others. It is a cultivation that is understood by natives. It is a favourite article of food with them. It is of a permanent character as a product and is easily worked by unskilled labour.

From such modest beginnings MacGregor optimistically envisaged the development of a self-supporting colony in which the natives were more than employees of European firms or individuals. In fact British New Guinea produced such a small portion of the world's copra requirement, although copra was one of her main exports, that she was particularly vulnerable to

(39) C.P.I.(Col.) Set 6 vol.III, MacGregor to Qld, 25 Nov.1893.
fluctuations in world prices and demands. Neither MacGregor nor his successors took this into consideration when they set about enforcing the Ordinance.

Officials in British New Guinea tended to have a false view of the position of the colony in the international scene, and of its independence from outside pressures and events. In fact the development of British New Guinea was circumscribed by external political and economic factors. MacGregor created a social model, and then district officials tried to set it functioning as a self-contained unit. In practice all sorts of external pressures forced development to remain within circumscribed limits. Even purely domestic affairs, though much more open to administrative directives, could not be absolutely controlled. There was a marked divergence between policy and practice. In this context the local administration was important because it was the point at which the mutation of policy into action often broke down.

We must therefore turn our attention from the general quality of rule in the period of joint control to the particular circumstances of south-east Papua. The colonial governors never had sufficient means to fill all positions on the civil list, so they had to study the needs of the colony as a whole, and place men where they were most urgently needed. The discovery of
gold in the Louisiades had a dynamic effect on affairs in the east, so the Eastern Division needed a larger staff to be governed effectively than did the Western Division for example. The influx of Europeans greatly increased the volume of work in customs, postal, and judicial fields. This additional burden had to be met without too much sacrifice to the routine supervision and inspection of the district.

Under the Protectorate the Government Agent was, formally at least, limited to Samarai and its immediate environs, and the Eastern district boundaries were never defined. As part of his scheme for the gradual extension of government control MacGregor divided the colony into Divisions. On 21 October 1888 the Eastern Division was formed. It extended from Keppel point to the German boundary on the mainland and included all the islands to the east. (40) Later the western boundary was shifted to the mainland opposite Mailu island. In 1892 part of the Eastern Division became a new administrative district: the Louisiades (South-eastern) Division. It comprised all the islands off the south-east coast except the d'Entrecasteaux and Trobriand groups which continued to be part of the Eastern Division. In 1889 ten acres of land were bought at Sagara on Misima as the

site for a station for the Goldfields Warden, but alluvial deposits on the island were soon worked out and the Warden left. When the Louisiades became separated from the Eastern Division, Nivani, (a small island in the Louisiade archipelago) became the head-quarters of the Division. Nivani was chosen because it was fairly central.

From April 1900 a second government station under an Assistant Resident Magistrate, who acted primarily as Goldfields Warden, was established at Bonagai on Murua. In 1902 the head-quarters of the South-eastern Division were moved from Nivani to Bonagai. Thus although there were two government stations in the Division for a short time the number was again reduced. The transfer showed that official policy attempted to control the Europeans rather than alter the status quo of native societies. The transfer took place because the Louisiades goldfields had declined and Murua was now the centre of mining activity. The Louisiade natives were so orderly they required little supervision. (41)

In 1901 the Trobriands were incorporated into the South-eastern Division but not until October 1905 was a government

station opened at Losuia, on Kiriwina, the largest island in the group. The officer put in charge of the Trobriands, R.L. Bellamy, had the status of Assistant Resident Magistrate and was also a medical officer. From pre-administration days there had been in the Trobriands a small number of white traders, most of whom were particularly lawless; the Trobrianders and nearby Marshall Bennett islanders were the only peoples in south-east Papua with a well defined if primitive system of civil administration, centreing on an hereditary group of offices; yet the government showed little interest in the area until it became apparent that venereal disease was spreading rapidly, and the population decreasing.

The administration felt that some action had to be taken before the infection spread to surrounding island groups. (42) From early days Trobriand women were notorious for their sexual freedom, a reputation enhanced by further contact. To Europeans the people seemed licentious, but Trobriand rules of hospitality prescribed behaviour very different from that of western mores. The Methodist mission staff frowned on any display or enjoyment of physical appetites and so possibly exaggerated Trobriand lewdness. Nevertheless the social customs of the Trobrianders

did aid the spread of venereal infection, once it had been introduced into their community by whitemen. The problem was common to all native societies in the area, but only here did social habits make the disease a serious health threat to the community.

On 20 November 1895 a Government Agent was appointed to the district known as the North-east Coast, but this still formed part of the Eastern Division. (43) In 1899 the Northern Division was formed, and a year later portion of this new district became a separate Division: the North-eastern. Its southern boundary, first at Cape Vogel at the head of Goodenough Bay, was later moved further south on Goodenough Bay. (44) This substantially reduced the size of the Eastern Division and more or less fixed the boundaries permanently. A perusal of the Government Gazettes shows that there were minor alterations at different times.

Staff appointments were a matter of particular concern in south-east Papua. The concentration of outsiders in the area impelled MacGregor to put there, not Agents, but Magistrates who would be legally and personally equipped to deal with urgent

(43) *Govt. Gazette*, 20 Nov. 1895.
matters without reference to Port Moresby. Robert Hunter remained only a few months in Samarai and was replaced by E.G. Edelfelt who was Agent at the time of annexation. (45) He remained at Samarai as Agent and Sub-Collector of Customs until 4 December 1888. Th MacGregor appointed Bingham A. Hely, originally a clerk in the Queensland Audit Office and later Accountant for the Protectorate, as the first Resident Magistrate. (46) Hely took up his duties in October 1888 and remained in charge of the Eastern District until April 1892. He was a man of sluggish disposition, even physically lazy; he sent impressive reports to head-quarters but could not cope with conditions. So MacGregor transferred him to the west where affairs were as stagnant as the swamps which formed the landscape. (47) Hely's place was taken by James M. Hennessy, formerly master of the government steam yacht MERRIE ENGLAND. (48) In February 1895 he was succeeded by the Honourable Matthew H. Moreton who had been Private Secretary to MacGregor. (49) Moreton remained in office until 29 April 1902 when he was

(49) Ibid, 28 Feb.1895.
transferred to the South-eastern Division. (50) Alexander Malcolm Campbell, who had been in the Fiji and Tongan civil services before he came to British New Guinea, took Moreton's place. He remained in office, as senior Magistrate of the Possession, until after the transfer of sovereignty to the Commonwealth, when he became Government Secretary.

At first the Resident Magistrate had under him only one assistant; the Sub-Collector of Customs. Edelfeldt's successor, David Ballantine, was appointed in 1889. He had been a clerk in Burns Philp's Samarai office. (51) He was succeeded, in 1893 by R.J. Kennedy (52) who remained in office until W.E. Armit replaced him on 20 November 1895. (53) A.H. Symons, who had been purser of the MERRIE ENGLAND took Armit's place in November 1897 and remained in office until 1901, (54) when H.A. Fielden replaced him. Fielden was replaced by S.P. Haughton on 31 January 1903. (55) From 1896 there had been a clerk in the Samarai office, (56) Alexander Mair MacAlpine was the incumbent until 1903 when he

(51) C.P.I. (Col.) Set 6 vol.1, MacGregor to Q'ld, 19 July 1889.
(53) Govt.Gazette, 20 Nov.1895.
became European gaoler at Samarai, although still carrying out clerical duties. (57) As gaoler he succeeded William Frazer who resigned for health reasons soon after his appointment and died in Australia. (58) Leo Armit, son of W.E. Armit, and R.W.T. Kendrick were both appointed clerks to the Samarai office in 1903. (59)

The Sub-Collector of Customs also acted as Assistant Resident Magistrate until 1902 when another assistant to the Magistrate was appointed. Charles Owen Turner took up duties on 15 July 1902 and remained in office many years. (60)

In 1900 a Medical Officer was appointed to Samarai. (61) Cecil Vaughan, formerly of the Indian Medical Service, held the office until 11 May 1903 when he was succeeded by J. Taylor Hancock. (62) Hancock died in office on 4 August 1904. A.J. Craigen, the Chief Medical Officer of the Possession took his place until November when R. Fleming Jones arrived. (63)

The first official in the future South-eastern or

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(58) Idem.
(60) Govt.Gazette, 15 July 1902.
Louisiades Division was J.B. Cameron, formerly one of the Private Secretaries to MacGregor, and who became Goldfields Warden on Sudest in October 1888. He was succeeded four months later by M.H. Moreton who held the office for the rest of the financial year. (64) In 1890 MacGregor placed a Magistrate in the Louisiades, choosing W.T. Campbell for the position. At first this officer was subordinate to the Samarai Magistrate but in 1891 MacGregor placed him on an independent footing, so creating the new Division. (65) Campbell who was appointed on 7 November 1890 resigned on 26 June 1891 and was succeeded by Henry Neville Chester. (66) Chester remained in office until 1894 when he was succeeded by J. Graham, A.W. Butterworth, W.T. Campbell, who had been for a brief term Head Gaoler of the Possession and returned to the South-eastern Division for a short while, and R.J. Kennedy. Early in 1896 Alexander Malcolm Campbell took charge. (67) He remained in office until 1902 when he was transferred to the Eastern Division and Moreton took his place. Moreton held the post for many years. Meanwhile,

(64) Ibid. 1888-1889, 20.
in 1899, the post of gold-fields Warden was re-created and B.W. Bramell appointed, this time to Murua which had become the mining centre of south-east Papua. (68) Bramell was also an Assistant Resident Magistrate. Bramell was succeeded by Francis Gill in October 1904. (69) In the same year a Gaoler and Overseer of Works, Alexander Elliott, was also appointed to Murua. (70)

Thus it is apparent that the turnover in officials was high. The list above tends to give a somewhat false picture in one sense because permanent officials were frequently on leave, usually to recuperate their health, and their place would be filled by someone temporary or simply left vacant until their return. (71) For example C.A.W. Monckton had no intention of joining the Civil Service when he came to British New Guinea. Having a wanderlust and the means to indulge it he came to New Guinea seeking adventure. He happened to meet the Governor on Samarai wharf, and MacGregor offered him a temporary job as Resident Magistrate of the Eastern Division because Moreton needed to go on leave for his health. Monckton accepted the offer and his official career began. (72)

(70) Idem.
On very rare occasions administrators recruited non-official Europeans for special service. At the beginning of MacGregor's term natives of the north-east coast murdered a trader named Ancell and looted his vessel the STAR OF PEACE. MacGregor decided to act firmly and make an example of the affair. He swore in twelve prospectors and some of his staff as special constables, then led an expedition which captured a number of the ringleaders. These were tried in an open Court attended by many natives; the five most guilty were sentenced to death, then publicly hanged, while others were imprisoned. (73)

On the Gibara patrol (described below) Symons organized a party which included a number of white volunteers, again miners.

The mere record of the many changes noted above indicates that the colonial governors had great difficulties in maintaining their staff. A close examination of the reasons for this unusually high turnover in officials reveals a wide variety of human frailties. Both Robert Hunter and Frank Lawes were involved in scandals concerning immorality with native women. (74)

MacGregor realized that Hunter and his brother George were

"active, seasoned, dashing men, but they are not truthful, are intemperate, quite uneducated, destitute of patience, harsh and domineering with natives, and revengeful." (75) Robert he considered quite unfit for government employment, George continue as an Agent until he was murdered. Hely was incompetent and had to be transferred from the Eastern Division. MacGregor felt a real distaste when he heard that Hennessy spent most of his time dandling his baby instead of attending to district affairs. (76) Hennessy eventually resigned, ostensibly for his health, but MacGregor was sure that the real reason was higher pay in the new job. (77) W.T. Campbell was another officer who resigned officially for health reasons but really because conditions in the territory were too primitive. (78) He went to the Gilberts where he became Resident Commissioner. (79) Kennedy had to resign before he was sacked. He did not conceal his attraction to native women, and had used native police and boat hands to procure them for him. (80) Fielden drank excessively even by New Guinea standards; he was often incapable of working. His resignation was accepted with relief although the service was

so undermanned. (81) W.E. Armit, after being drunk for a week, was interdicted from further duty by MacGregor who gave his place to Symons. Yet because of the shortage of personnel Armit was made first Resident Magistrate of the Northern Division. There he used to "crucify" natives by tying them up with their arms outspread, and then practice shooting, using them as targets. When drunk he used to go about stark naked, and thus even drill the police. (82) Symons and Moreton, in circumstances which will be detailed later, were also found wanting. Moreton was demoted by being transferred to the South-eastern Division and Symons sent to head-quarters. Turner, who came to the territory originally as assistant to the government surveyor, was on his way to the north-east coast when he met a daughter of the Mahony's at Samarai. He fell in love with her, and, after returning from the surveying trip, applied for and got the job as Assistant Resident Magistrate of the Eastern Division. According to a brother officer, Turner had a private income of £200 per annum, and was an uppish individual as well as a lazy and rebellious officer. (83) One suspects that family connections:

(83) Monckton, op.cit., 146-147, 165-166.
must have affected his administration of liquor and labour laws.

Personal failings, and the shortage of staff and stores hampered efficient administration at the district level. Field officers continually received directives from the central authority and were expected to follow set ways in both matters of office procedure and the implementation of policies. The staff shortage and the fact that stores requisitioned from headquarters often arrived months late or not at all (84) precluded any such thing. The actual process of government varied according to the interests and health of the officers in the district at a particular time.

Despite these difficulties the administration made an impact on society in south-east Papua in the period of joint control. The chief technique by which this was brought about was the patrol. Hundreds of patrols were undertaken during the period under review as the appendix to this chapter illustrates. Roughly some two hundred days per annum would be spent on patrol. In the year 1904-1905 for example officers of the Eastern Division spent one hundred and ninety days on patrol, covering three thousand one hundred and three miles,

(84) See Station Journals and Reports.
and visiting six hundred and ninety villages. In the South-eastern Division two hundred and sixty days were spent patrolling. (85) By 1906 the government had penetrated to all the coastal areas of the mainland, and the larger islands, as well as to the smaller islands. Most of the interior of the mainland, the D'Entrecasteaux islands, and Rossel remained virtually uncontrolled. Naturally the periphery of the area, Rossel in the east, the main D'Entrecasteaux islands, except for those parts of Normanby and Fergusson close to Dobu, and the Amphletts in the north, and Mailu in the west, were visited less frequently than places which were close to the government stations or had a relatively large European population. In the South-eastern Division for example the mining areas received much more frequent and prolonged Magisterial visits than other parts of the district.

Although south-east Papua was better known to Europeans than most other parts of the Possession, most of it was uncontrolled during the Protectorate. MacGregor set the tone for the future when in October, hardly a month after coming to the territory, he went on an extensive tour of the south-east. He visited Rossel, Joannet, Sudest, St. Aignan, the main islands of the D'Entrecasteaux group, Dobu, and Welle island or Sanaroa.

However the government party spent only a short time at most of these places; it hardly came into contact with the people of Rossel and visited thirty one villages on Normanby in a day, yet spent nine days on Fergusson island. On Normanby and Fergusson the natives proved somewhat hostile, but they did not actually "break the peace”. The Goodenough islanders proved far different: quiet, friendly, and undemonstrative. (86) From November to February MacGregor remained in the Eastern Division investigating Ancell’s murder and trying the culprits. (87) While he was in the district MacGregor also visited the islands around China Strait. (88)

In this first year the government appointed two natives as agents for the government, Komoda at Porotona in Bentley Bay, and Yakoba at Mita in Milne Bay. Bely was able to report that the men had done very good service, and recommended that in all populous districts the principal man, or the one with most energy and determination, should be recognized as a representative of the government. He also reported that all over the East Cape and Milne Bay area the natives were aware that the two men were supported by the government. There had been no disturbances in

(87) Ibid, xii-xvi, and Appendices K, L, M, & N.
(88) Ibid, Appendix O.
any part of the district which had been visited by officials. (89)

In mid July 1890 Murua was visited for the first time, and a hurried examination made of part of the Trobriands, where the natives were found to be friendly. On 17 July the government party inspected the small but interesting group of Nada or the Laughlan islands. The natives were found to be peaceful and to have made some advance in industrial pursuits under the influence of Charles Tetzlaff the resident trader. (90) Finally the extremities of the area were visited. The occasion of the Murua visit was the murder of two traders. Still, then, the extension of government control followed in the path of the unofficial white: the disciple of God or the disciple of Mammon.

Patrolling by the Governor or local officials soon settled into a routine procedure which was usually peaceable. It was exceptional for lives to be lost or villages burned. On most patrols the only violence was physical punishment meted out to natives who had disobeyed instructions, although this was theoretically forbidden. When on tour officials inspected villages to see that they were clean and the houses in repair, they tried all breaches of the Native Regulations; cases of

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(89) Ibid, Appendix T.
(90) Ibid, 1890-1891, xii, and Appendices B & C.
adultery, sorcery, the spreading of lying reports, extortion. They also tried more serious matters, such as murder and assault. They issued instructions to Village Constables about keeping villages clean, planting useful trees, building latrines, burying the dead in cemeteries, sending the children to the mission school if there was one in the vicinity, and so forth. In districts which had no Village Constables, or when a Constable died or retired, the Magistrate would select the person he thought most suitable from among the men, then declare him to be the Village Constable before the assembled villagers. Selection was entirely a matter of personal choice on the part of the European official. A Village Constable was theoretically provided with a uniform and pay of £1 annually; in fact they sometimes did not get paid for several years if European patrols did not pass through the district.

Once appointed the Village Constable was expected to supervise the village or villages under his control and enforce adherence to the Native Regulations in them. He was also obliged to report all breaches of the peace, murders, robberies, assaults and the like to the Magistrate when the latter next came on patrol. Village Constables were issued with handcuffs so they could arrest serious offenders and bring them to headquarters for trial, but to prevent indiscriminate arrests they
were not issued with keys. The Magistrate could, at any time
dismiss a Village Constable if he failed to fulfil his duties
adequately or abused his position, as happened not infrequently.

Officials also dealt with European affairs when on
patrol. They inspected vessels to see that all hands had
signed properly drawn up agreements; they inspected plantations
to see the labour regulations were upheld; they signed labourers
on for Europeans and witnessed the termination of such contracts;
they issued beche-de-mer licences, liquor licences, storekeepers
licences, trading site licences, and miner's rights; they
collected judicial and survey fees. If there was no resident
Warden on a goldfield they also conducted all sorts of mining
business. The revenue the Magistrate collected never amounted
to much, as is clear from the Annual Reports, but a full
realization of the minor scale of British New Guinea business
comes when the monthly station reports are read. In February
1898 the total revenue for the South-eastern Division amounted
to ten shillings, (91) in November 1901 it was thirty pounds
seven and sixpence. Survey fees amounted to twenty pounds, so
the total was fifty pounds seven and sixpence. (92) Magistrates
also bought land from the natives and in centres where there

(92) Ibid, Nov.1901.
Indictable offences, whether committed by whites or natives were tried first by the Magistrate. If he found a person guilty at this preliminary hearing the prisoner was taken to the district head-quarters and kept in custody until the next sitting of the Central Court, or released on bail. When the Central Court came on Circuit the case was heard again before the Chief Judicial Officer. Court procedure at the district level was most informal. If any cases had to be tried the Magistrate simply called for witnesses to be brought before him, and then sat down after inspecting a village, mining settlement, vessel, or plantation, and proceeded to hold the relevant court.

Most cases which came before the Magistrate were clear cut and presented no problems. In trying to maintain law and order he usually acted within clearly defined limits. He did so, for example, when summoning Henry Burfitt for trading on a goldfield without a licence; or when he fined a Malay trader forty shillings, or a month's imprisonment in default, for tying up a native from noon to sunset because the latter owed money; or when he sentenced natives to terms of imprisonment for adultery; or when Patrick Finnigan, one of two miners charged with stealing gold, a watch, and a revolver, became very abusive during the hearing, and after repeatedly being cautioned, was
fined forty shillings, or four day's imprisonment in default, for gross contempt of court. (93) Both accused were committed for trial at the next sitting of the Central Court but were allowed bail. But sometimes the Magistrate had to act without any constituted authority; as when he cautioned a miner for living with a native girl and sent the child to her home; (94) or removed another miner from a Murua camp against his will because he was covered with loathsome sores, and the other diggers objected to his presence. (95)

Officials were dependent for transport on sailing vessels or whaleboats until after the turn of the century. This meant journeys could be very uncomfortable and time consuming in bad weather. It once took Campbell over eight days to travel between Nivani and Murua, a distance of roughly one hundred and twenty miles. On another occasion it took three days to get from Pantava to Griffin Point, Sudest, a distance of only a few miles. (96)

The tenor of life in south-east Papua was slow, often monotonous, but the official had his time fully occupied.

(94) Ibid, 19 July 1899.
(95) Ibid, 10 Mar.1897.
Drunken brawls were common among miners, the traders were litigious, and the natives occasionally indulged in murder, infanticide, cannibalism, or raiding. The range of an official's duties was great. This was a major theme for the books which Charles Monckton wrote about his experiences as a Magistrate in New Guinea; they throw a valuable light on district affairs although sometimes open to suspicion as Monckton tended to exaggerate and embellish accounts of events. He found his duties to be very extensive. In the absence of a surveyor the Magistrate had to survey land, and purchase it for the Crown; he had to act as doctor, gaoler, undertaker, registrar, ship's captain, and train police. He had to do any job from a blacksmiths' upward, not expressly allotted to anyone else, and his most exacting task was to make every shilling of the government's money go as far as half a crown. (97) Such a passage as this accurately depicts the life of a field officer: (98)

Murder at Awaiama, man cut mother-in-law's throat, catch; there is to be a new Mission Station at Cape Vogel, survey and buy land from the natives; Fellows is in trouble in the Trobriands, go and put him right; Bromilow has collected a lot of orphans at Dobu, go and mandate them to mission; a man named Ryan has shot a native at Fergusson Island, arrest him and enquire into the case; Carruth has been supplying grog to the natives on Burns Philp's diving boats, catch Carruth and deal with him; the "Siai's" decks need caulking and she needs new wire rigging; I've got the wire, but there is no money with

(98) Ibid., 117.
which to pay anyone to do the job.

Monckton hated office work, but the journals and returns kept by such men as A.M. Campbell (whom Monckton despised) equally demonstrate that the Magistrate was indeed expected to perform multiferous and diverse duties. The official journals of the Resident Magistrate for the South-eastern Division for October and November 1901 are a case in point. Early in October Campbell sent the divisional launch the MURUA to Samarai for stores. When she returned he went on a patrol of Tagula, inspecting villages, paying Village Constables, and visiting Griffin Point, which was the centre of the white population. There he held an enquiry into the desertion of a labourer. Campbell discovered that the boy had deserted ten days before his contract expired because he had been "hammered" by his employer who had not taken out proceedings for desertion. Campbell suspected this was partly to conceal the assault, and partly to try and evade paying the wages due to the native. (99)

Later in the journal Campbell discussed faults in the administration of the Native Labour Ordinance, and pointed out that until there was mutual co-operation between districts it could never be satisfactory. He quoted the example of seven

Rossel island natives who had signed agreements to work for a trader for twelve months immediately after serving a term on the Mambare as carriers. They had been paid off and were on their way home when they met a trader they knew; a man who had treated the natives fairly well while he had been on their island. The natives were delighted to see someone they knew, the trader saw an opportunity too good to lose, and got them to sign on before a Magistrate, to work for him. This offended the law which stated that natives who had worked for twelve months on the northern goldfields were obliged to return to their villages and remain there for some months before signing another contract of service. The Magistrate could not be blamed altogether for signing them on because they answered yes to every question he asked. The natives were aware that the trader knew where they lived and believed he would take them home when their contract had expired. They had been told that they were going home in the first place, but strangers had said so; and strangers had told them earlier that they would work in Samarai when in fact they were taken to the Mambare. Little wonder that they signed on to work for someone they knew.

This had all happened some time previously, but when the trader visited his district Campbell inspected the vessel, discovered the situation, and immediately had the natives paid
off and sent straight to their homes. He spoke to the whiteman about the mean advantage he had taken of the natives and received the reply: "Poor devils, They would have signed on for ten years if I had asked them to do so." (100) Campbell wrote to headquarters that he thought a native labourer ought to be signed off before an officer other than the one who had signed him on only if the latter was less than sixty miles away from the residence of both employer and native. He also thought that trading vessels should be inspected more frequently, for some traders made a practice of taking natives aboard and using them for a crew, probably without payment, for a short period only; then sent them ashore and picked up a fresh set of natives; and so on ad infinitum. (101)

Campbell was not above resorting to guile in order to catch traders breaking the law. Early in this same month he saw off-shore a yawl skippered by one David Carruth, notorious for disregarding the labour regulations. Campbell accordingly sent a Constable, dressed native fashion, to ask for a shilling's worth of tobacco, but in fact to discover how many natives were employed aboard ship. When the Constable returned with the information, Campbell went out and officially inspected the

(100) Ibid, 31 Oct.1901.  
labour agreements to see if they tallied with the true number employed. In this instance all was in order. (102)

On the first of November Campbell was on patrol in the Louisiades. During the afternoon he interviewed the Village Constable of Pantava, and granted a business licence to one of Mahony's employees. Next day he received the purchase money and survey fees for eighty acres of land granted to a whiteman as well as ten pounds paid to the Small Debts Court on account of a judgement decided twelve months previously. The same day Omai, a Manillaman trader, laid a complaint against Henry Burfitt for using threatening language, and also said Burfitt took a large dog about with him which he used to set onto the natives. Later in the day Campbell held a Court of Petty Sessions in which there were two cases. In the first a whiteman charged two natives with larceny; the other was the case of Omai versus Burfitt. After the Court had risen Campbell paid off some native labourers who had been working for a Malay trader.

On 5 November Campbell was engaged with labour matters connected with John Mahony. Some natives he refused to sign on

(102) Ibid, 3 and 4 Oct.1901.
for contracts of service, others he allowed Mahony to engage. The next day he held another Court of Petty Sessions in which a Japanese trader, Tom Toto, was charged with having put to his own use the property of John Mahony. It was a common practice for traders to give agents goods to sell on commission. This had happened with Toto, who, when the time came to settle up with Mahony, could not account for certain articles. Toto pleaded guilty and was sentenced to three months imprisonment with hard labour.

After the sitting of the Court Mahony lodged an application for the purchase of one hundred and fifty acres adjoining the three hundred already granted to him, but as the natives were unwilling to sell and a small village was on the land Campbell refused to recommend the application. In the previous days Campbell had sent Constables to investigate the matter of Burfitt's dog, and also to see if there was any truth in a rumour that a man at Rewa had been speared. When he was satisfied that neither story was true Campbell returned to the district head-quarters at Nivani where he spent the rest of the month. His time was occupied with interviewing natives who called, keeping office records up to date, and supervising the maintenance of government buildings and equipment. (103) On

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(103) Ibid. Nov. 1901.
the twelfth Campbell held a Court of Native Matters and sentenced one Dagaroga, native of Panaeati island, to three days' imprisonment for using threatening language. (104)

Despite the white residents' assertions to the contrary, and although government policy was directed chiefly towards pacifying and civilizing the natives, field officers in south-east Papua spent more time on European than on native affairs. In many cases the two could not be separated, but it is evident that the Magistrate spent a good deal of his time both on patrol and at head-quarters, conducting cases in the Warden's Court, the Court of Petty Sessions, or the Small Debts Court. Most of such cases dealt with non-native matters. By contrast there were relatively few sittings of the Native Magistrate's Court.

Although traders, and to some lesser extent the natives themselves were forever bringing complaints to the Magistrate, very few cases actually came before the Courts. In 1890-1891, the first year in which the Louisiades were separated from the Eastern Division there were but ten people tried before the Central Court in the whole of south-east Papua. Most were charged with murder, a couple with intent to wound, one with breaking gaol. In the Eastern Division there were only three

(104) Ibid, 12 Nov.1901.
Summary Offences cases; one of larceny, one of receiving stolen goods, and one of wilful destruction of property. There was also one breach of contract case involving a sum of twenty five pounds which came before the Small Debts Court. (105) The South-eastern Division accounted for five of the ten criminal cases. Otherwise the district was quiet as the Magistrate only tried four people for committing forbidden acts: two for stealing rifles, one for abducting a woman, and one for the wilful destruction of property. (106) The Resident Magistrate for the Eastern Division did not send in a report so the number confined in the jail could not be stated exactly but would probably have averaged half a score, (107) so the number of cases which came before the Native Magistrates Court could not have been large.

At the other end of the period, the financial year 1904-1905, the number of cases had risen but even so was far from large. In the Eastern Division indictable offences were charged against twenty-two people of whom seventeen were committed for trial by the Central Court. There were two hundred and twenty six Summary Jurisdiction cases of which one hundred and two were for desertion. Twenty nine of the total

(106) Ibid, Appendix W.
(107) Ibid, xxiii.
number were acquitted. Of eighty three cases in the Native Magistrate's Court five were acquittals. There were only five cases in the Small Debts Court. Three hundred and twenty nine prisoners had been on the gaol register for the year; of these only sixty seven remained in custody. (108) Ninety four prisoners had passed through the South-eastern Division gaol through the year but only twenty five were still "inside" on 30 June. Nine convicts were serving terms for murder, thirteen for assault, thirty five for stealing, eighteen for desertion, eight for rape, five for neglect of duty, two for adultery, two for sorcery, and two for breaches of the liquor regulations. (109)

Officials, often quite untrained, did what they could to administer a district but it was physically impossible for them to fulfill all their duties adequately. What usually suffered most was routine office work because this had less obvious and disastrous consequences. Campbell, a particularly healthy and able man, managed his district in a way that delighted head-quarters staff. He was exceptional however. Sheer physical discomfort was another bug-bear. In November 1901 the inside lining of the Nivani residency, as well as parts of the flooring joists and wall plates had been eaten by

termite. Materials for repairs, though requisitioned long ago and ordered by the Central Stores Department some months prior to June 1900, had still not come to hand. (110)

Officials' views about the aim of government naturally had a marked effect on their interpretation of directives and implementation of policies. Without exception they watched for signs that the natives were being oppressed by whites, and in such cases championed the native cause. But again without exception they felt the native was inferior to the European, and that a certain amount of coercion was legitimate, even essential, to the good government of natives. The temperament of the individual played an important part in this context. Monckton for example loved military discipline and had besides a rather violent nature; he treated his police as a commando squad and felt this was their proper function. One of Monckton's chief objections to Campbell was that the latter did not train his police to be a fighting body. In south-east Papua the native police operated rather as civil guardians of the law. Campbell and most other officials worked by persuasion rather than force, although they were at the same time unyielding.

Campbell's reports contain a clear expression of his

views about colonial administration. Most other district officials though much less explicit or even articulate, may be judged by their actions to have held similar beliefs. Campbell was a paternalist, just but fairly strict, who plainly regarded the natives as children. He did not question the proposition that British New Guinea should become a multi-racial society with the whiteman in a dominant position. This view became very clear when he discussed the question of European assaults on natives. Commenting on information he had received about Patrick Carvey perpetrating an assault on a Louisiade native he wrote: (lll)

... it was only a blow with the open hand... Anyhow to take up such petty cases would do no good to anyone. The white man would look upon it as persecution which it would not be far short of, and the native, as a consequence of being able to haul a white man before the court upon any petty or trifling thing, would, in a short time, become simply unbearable in his behaviour to everyone not in authority.

For Campbell, and for the other district officials, there was a vast difference between a brutal beating and a slap, push, or kick. He and his colleagues distinguished between them although all were technically assaults and forbidden by law.

In coming to a conclusion about the nature of district administration in this period one should note that despite the

manifold difficulties facing field officials there was but a single grave scandal. At the turn of the century gold was discovered in the mountains behind Milne Bay and a minor rush to the Gibara river ensued. The miners were troubled by native pilfering, and continually reported thefts to the administration but the government did nothing to solve the problem until a miner named McLean was murdered. Moreton was absent on leave so Symons organized a party which included a number of unofficial white volunteers, to investigate the murder.

During this patrol unarmed natives, including women, were shot and villages burnt. At a subsequent trial a native woman was convicted of the murder and sentenced to two years imprisonment: an unusually light sentence for the unprovoked murder of a European. There the matter rested until an L.M.S. missionary, Charles Abel, questioned the court judgement and openly stated that he believed McLean had been murdered by other miners. Abel also said Symons had attempted to pervert the course of justice by bribing natives to give false witness. (112) As the case had been tried before the Central Court no power, executive or judicial, within the Possession could re-open it. Judge Winter advised Abel that his only course would be to appeal for

the woman's release. The evidence does not show whether Abel acted on that counsel. Abel's disclosures so shocked the current governor, George LeHunte, that he instituted an enquiry which resulted in a trial of four miners for murder.

Details about the punitive patrol led by Symons came out in evidence before this enquiry. Symons apparently believed that the guide he employed, one Sipilei, wilfully led the expedition astray; he was cautioned once, the next time handed over to some of the unofficial members of the expedition who took him away, bound and in irons. These miners later returned the handcuffs to Symons and said Sipilei had escaped. Natives subsequently found a body shot through the head but it was too decomposed to be positively identified as Sipilei. At the same time a Village Constable from the Gibara area suddenly disappeared. Natives found a body that had the missing man's armlets on it but there was not sufficient evidence for a charge.

Henry Morley, one of the four men on trial, admitted to shooting a woman, but was acquitted on the ground that he had a very nervous temperament and so fired uncontrollably. The only one of the four convicted was Steve Woolffe. For killing an unarmed native he was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to six months imprisonment with hard labour. He publicly complained of discrimination by the Court because he was foreign,
but at that point a fellow miner called out: "Come out Steve, take it like a man, the Bloody missionary had got home on you for once." (113)

As a result of the enquiry Symons was transferred to the Treasury Department in Port Moresby and Moreton demoted to the South-eastern Division. The Court records are now destroyed so the chief source for an account of the trial is Abel, a biased witness. He declared that Judge Winter received Symons' testimony without question, and that the trial was a disgraceful travesty of justice because Winter did not accept natives and whites as equal before the law. Winter reputedly said: (114)

Racial feeling is so general and so strong in this country, that I cannot regard the defendant morally culpable in taking the life of a native.

Abel also stated that the truth about McLean's murder was eventually discovered and the Gibara miners forced the culprits to leave the district. (115)

The Symons affair brought to light the fact that Moreton had completely delegated all authority for the Milne Bay area to Symons who even illegally appointed Village Constables without

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reference to his senior. Moreton had no idea of the McLean murder or the punitive patrol because he did not even read the reports Symons wrote. He was free of moral implication in the sordid story but was shown to have neglected his duties by failing to supervise his district properly so that affairs in the Milne Bay area had become chaotic. (116)

When all factors are taken into account, the history of south-east Papua in the period of joint control must fundamentally appear as a history of failure: failure to create a controlled society in which simple savages and lawless whitemen progressed toward civilization, and reasoned, orderly behaviour. Yet on another level it was a history of success. An understaffed administration did succeed in creating and maintaining some forces of social cohesion in a particularly difficult environment. The question therefore remained open: mistakes could still be rectified.


**South Coast**

29–31 Dec. 1890 Mailu to Kwato.
3–12 Jan. 1891 Dufaure and mainland opposite
Feb. 1891 ditto.
3–10 June 1891
19 July 1891 Also to East Cape.
19–21 Dec. 1898 Port Glasgow.
19 July 1898
23–27 Sept. 1898
14–16 June 1900 Fyfe Bay, Dufaure etc.
2–3 July 1900 Fyfe Bay.
13–19 Sept. 1901 Port Glasgow.
1–9 Mar. 1903
1–7 Jan. 1904
27 Dec. 1904 Fyfe Bay.
5 Mar. 1905
mid July 1905 Fyfe Bay, Millport Harbour.
10–21 Nov. 1905

**North-east Coast**

Oct.–Nov. 1888 Chads Bay
Dec. 1888
July 1890 Chads Bay
Aug. 1890
12–15 June 1891
23 Dec. 1891
29 Aug. 1892
13–23 Nov. 1894
18–19 Mar. 1895
17–22 Aug. 1895
11 Nov.–17 Dec. 1896 Suau to north-east coast.
Feb. 1897
26–30 June 1898
1–16 July 1898
11–20 Oct. 1898
20–21 Nov. 1898 Also D'Entrecasteaux.
Dec. 1898 Also D'Entrecasteaux.
2–9 Jan. 1899
24–30 Apr. 1899
1–11 May & 30 May 1899
8 June 1899 Wedau
21-31 Dec.
23-31 Oct.
1-13 Nov.
Nov. 1901 - Jan.

May-June
1-3 Jan.
6-17 Ap.
29 Aug.
14-15 Oct.
8-9 Dec.
30 Mar.
1-4 Ap.
21-22 Aug.
16-19 Oct.

Milne Bay
Dec.
June-July
25-27 Jan.
7-10 Aug.
11 Nov.- 17 Dec.
1-5 May
30 July
12-13 May & 19 May
10-21 June
20-27 Mar.
20 Sept.
Aug.
16 Jan.
9-15 July
18 Jan.
mid July
2-11 Sept.
5-7 Dec. & 18 Dec.

D'Entrecasteaux Group
Oct.-Nov.
Aug.
16-24 June
13-29 July
21-23 Dec.
24-27 Dec.

1899
1900
1900
1900
1902 Inland north coast to south coast.
1902 Also D'Entrecasteaux, Milne Bay etc.
1903
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1903
1904
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1888 Also north-east coast.
1890
1891
1891 Inland to south coast.
1896 Also Suau and north-east coast.
1898 Inland to south coast.
1898
1899
1899 Gibara gold field.
1900
1901 Gibara.
1902 Inland to south coast.
1903
1904 Inland to south coast.
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1905 Gibara and Giligili.
1888
1890 Parts Normanby, Fergusson, Dobu.
1891 ditto.
1891 Also Trobriands.
1891 Dobu, Fergusson.
1891 Inland Normanby.
1892 Around Normanby.
1892 Fergusson, Amphletts. Also Kiriwina.
1892 Fergusson.
1892 Fergusson and Dobu.
1894 Dobu.
1894 Fergusson.
1895 Dobu.
1895 Fergusson to Samarai.
1895 Fergusson.
1895 Dobu and inland Fergusson.
1895 Normanby.
1898 Dobu.
1898 Amphletts, Fergusson, Dobu.
1898 Fergusson, Goodenough. Also Trobriands.
1898 Fergusson, Dobu. Also north-east coast.
1899 Also Trobriands.
1899 Normanby and Goodenough.
1899 Also Trobriands.
1899 Amphletts and Goodenough.
1900 Normanby. Also north-east coast.
1900 Goodenough. Also Trobriands and north-east coast.
1900 Fergusson and Goodenough.
1902 Also south coast, north-east coast, Trobriands etc. and Murua.
1902 Normanby, Fergusson, Dobu. Also north-east coast, Muru and Trobriands.
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1-6 Jan.
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9-30 Jan.
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4-19 Sept.
22-31 Oct.
1-6 Nov.
26-30 Mar.
2-10 Apr.
23-25 Apr.
29-30 Apr.
1-5 May
8 May
7 Aug.

1897 Sudest, Misima.
1897 Moturina.
1897 Not Rossel.
1897 Sudest etc.
1897 Misima.
1897 Sudest etc.
1897 Sudest etc.
1898 Sudest etc.
1898 Misima etc.
1898 Panaeati.
1898 Misima, Sudest etc.
1898 Sudest etc.
1898 Islands west Misima.
1899 Sudest.
1899 Panaeati.
1899 Louisiades including Rossel. Also Murua and Trobriands.
1899 Panaeati.
1899 Misima.
1899 Kimuta.
1899 Small islands.
1899 Sudest etc.
1899 Small islands.
1899 Sudest etc.
1899 Conflicts, Nivani, Misima. Also Nada and Murua.
1900 Panaeati.
1900 Misima.
1900 Misima.
1900 Sudest etc.
1900 Panaeati.
1900 Misima etc.
1901 Sudest etc.
1901 Sudest, Rossel etc.
1901 Rossel, Sudest etc.
1901 Islands west Misima.
1901 ditto.
1901 Not Rossel.
1901 Sudest etc.
1901 Sudest.
1903 Nivani to Sudest.
1903 Rossel.
1903 Misima.
1903 Sudest.
1903 Sudest etc.
1903 Panaeati.
1903 Misima.
**Muma etc.**

July

19-24 Jan.
22-29 July
14-17 Jan.
18-19 Jan.
19-27 Aug.
2 Nov.
9-30 Jan.
26-31 Feb.
1-31 Mar.
1-22 Apr.
4-24 Sept.
2-20 Dec.
11-31 Mar.
15-30 June
7-9 Feb.
1-9 Mar.
20-31 May

1-6 June
13-30 July
16-30 Sept.
3-5 Oct.
11-30 Nov.
1-11 Dec.
15-31 Dec.
21-31 Jan.
6-24 Feb.
16-22 Apr.
11-31 Aug.
2-20 Sept.
1-30 Nov.
1-16 Dec.
3-11 Apr.
4-25 May
28 May
1-27 July
10-31 Dec.
May-June

13-23 Feb.
1-5 July
That many records for this early period have been destroyed is witnessed by the fact that in the year 1904-1905 officers of the South-eastern Division spent 260 days patrolling. In the same year Eastern Division officials spent 191 days on patrol.
From March 1902 when Britain formally transferred her sovereignty over British New Guinea to the Australian Commonwealth, (1) until September 1906 when Australia finally accepted responsibility for the Possession, (2) the political status of the colony was obscure. The natural consequence was a state of confusion, the unhappy effects of which were felt all the more because the Administrators of these years possessed no outstanding ability. Sir George Le Hunte was succeeded in May 1903 by Christopher Stansfeld Robinson, and in June 1904 by Francis Rickman Barton. The latter was a Resident Magistrate in British New Guinea when the Colonial Office selected him to succeed Robinson. The appointment was only temporary, yet it was an odd choice. Barton was neither a particularly able officer, nor could be claim seniority. His previous record of service in the West Indies was also undistinguished. (3) He had certain character traits which may have been admirable in another environment, but severely handicapped his management of such a politically backward, socially fragmented, and economically undeveloped colony.

(3) Ibid, 1903-1904, 58.
With his rather weak, vacillating character Barton lacked the self-confident assurance essential in such a post. He needed companionship and the approbation of his fellows, and so their probable reaction influenced his every move and decision. This dependence on the opinion of others meant that Barton was not a man of principle. Although he enjoyed wielding autocratic powers he could not endure the isolation they properly entailed. His rule was an uneasy merger of despotism and reliance on subordinates. In the British New Guinea context this had disastrous effects. (4) Jealousy and pique at the elevation of an undistinguished colleague alienated the support of a number of officials; Barton then depended on others to such an extent he became virtually a figurehead, and certainly showed the most arrant favouritism. Within the administration he had a coterie of supporters, and a violent opposition. By his open championship of native rights, and his undisguised distaste for most miners and traders, he alienated all sections of the unofficial population except the missionaries. (5)

Finally dissatisfaction with Barton's administration came to a head within the civil service. His opponents claimed to produce concrete instances of malpractice by the Governor and

his followers. Eventually Barton appealed to the Commonwealth for a Royal Commission to investigate conditions in the colony. (6) His request was granted. From the evidence given to the Commissioners it would seem that Barton was both a liar and a cheat, but it is possible his enemies conspired against him to the extent of committing perjury. (7) Charles Abel, the L.M.S. missionary, by no means an impartial observer but certainly an honest man, saw the troubles as an expression of the conflict between the British or "moral" approach to colonial administration and an Australian policy of exploitation of the indigines. (8) With less justification he saw a "popish" plot. Cardinal Moran a sinister emissary of Rome, manipulated his puppets in the Australian Natives Association, the Federal parliament, and the Commonwealth Public Service; J.H.P. Murray, then Chief Judicial Officer of British New Guinea, was Moran's particular agent in the colony. (9)

One faction held that Barton was an innocent scapegoat, (10) the other that he was completely immoral and would stop at

(8) G309/103 Papua Letters, Box 11 Folder 6, Abel, 4 Sept.1907.
(9) Idem.
nothing to break any opposition. In private correspondence a former official maintains that Murray, as leader of the opposition, feared for his life and slept with a gun beside him. (11) The whole truth will never be known even when there is open access to all relevant archival material.

The report of the Royal Commission was a fascinating commentary on events which took place during the interregnum but gave a rather distorted picture of conditions at outstations. While Port Moresby was a centre of intrigue and open factionalism district officials were still isolated and easy communications between them impossible. In south-east Papua the Resident Magistrates and their subordinates continued to work in the same old way. They complained about head-quarters inefficiency, but precisely as they always had, about requisitioned stores which did not get sent; about needing more help; and so forth. (12) Officers were still underpaid, ill-housed, and poorly equipped; they were still expected to perform multiterous tasks. It was on such issues they expressed strong views. They made no complaints about malpractices by the governor or his favourites. (13) As there was relatively little supervision from Port

Moresby during this period field officers were almost "a law unto themselves". For this reason alone they would have been disinclined to form a conspiracy against the Governor. True, both the official and unofficial population willingly aired their views about the administration once the Commissioners arrived. But the complaints they made would have been the same under any previous Governor, and certainly continued to be grievances after Murray became Administrator.

Turner, whom we have seen to be an officer with no good reason to expect promotion, nevertheless claimed to have been passed over and belittled in the eyes of the natives and the settlers. (14) Haughton, the Sub-Collector of Customs at Samarai, claimed that Barton failed to honour a promise made by Le Hunte, to the effect that he, Haughton, would get an annual rise of twenty five pounds to a maximum salary of three hundred and fifty pounds. Haughton added that his treatment by the head-quarters Treasury staff lacked common civility. (15) Such grievances were of a most subjective and intangible kind, and gave no evidence of actual mal-administration. Moreton, the Resident Magistrate of the South-eastern Division, said the Treasury officials treated him less courteously than members of

(14) Ibid, 43-44.
(15) Ibid, 43.
the Government Secretary's Department, but made no specific charges against individuals or Departments. (16) Bellamy, the Assistant Resident Magistrate in charge of the Trobriands had no complaints. (17) Campbell, the Eastern Division Magistrate, expressed his views on a number of subjects but in no way criticised the central administration. (18)

The only field officer who accused head-quarters of being incompetent was Francis Gill, Assistant Resident Magistrate and Gold Warden for Murua. He made concrete charges of inefficiency but not of malpractice. He complained about not receiving specified stores, and about being reprimanded for administrative mistakes he had not committed. Gill also pointed out that anomalies arising from the government's policy of pluralism affected the efficiency of the service. As Inspector of Mines he had to report to the Warden: himself. As Assistant Resident Magistrate he was senior to the European gaoler, but as Assistant Gaoler subordinate, and so on. (19)

The findings of the Royal Commission directly influenced subsequent Commonwealth decisions about Papua, although many

(17) Ibid, 62.
recommendations were either abandoned or left in abeyance for many years. Government control of recruiting to replace the system of licenced private recruiters, and a vigourous public works policy, fell into the former category; native taxation, and tariff preferences for Papuan products, into the latter. (20) The Commissioners' findings did have a direct and immediate effect on land policy and the related field of immigrant settlement, one of the most important aspects of colonial administration. The Commissioners believed that the Imperial government had purposely evaded facing the problem of white settlement because it thought land alienation would have a detrimental effect on the aboriginal inhabitants. (21) They admitted it had once been necessary to protect the natives and their land from "lawless and evil-disposed persons", but felt that that time had long passed. In their view the hour had struck for the commencement of a vigourous forward policy so far as white settlement was concerned. (22) The Commissioners emphatically stressed that the East, by which they presumably meant tropical or semi-tropical countries inhabited by non-white "should be exploited for colonists". (23)

(20) Ibid, cxxiv-cxxvi.
(21) Ibid, x.
(22) Idem.
(23) Ibid, xii.
The Commissioners believed that it was no breach of the letter or spirit of the Proclamation of 1884 to give the government power to purchase land compulsorily. (24) The federal parliament had eliminated a clause of the 1906 Land Ordinance which allowed the government to alienate land not required by the natives, even when the latter withheld their consent. The Commissioners suggested that all waste land should be declared Crown land, but that the natives should be able, for six months afterwards, to mark out and claim any waste and vacant lands which they might require in the future. (25)

The Commissioners stated quite bluntly that her natives were one of the best assets which Papua possessed; but that the present administrative policy aimed at dissipating that asset since protection plunged the native into a condition of peaceful sloth. (26) Encouragement of white settlement they saw as one of the surest methods of arousing the natives from the indolent, apathetic state into which they had sunk because of a too benevolent paternalism. (27) The Commissioners saw taxation as another tool which would force the Papuans to become vigourous, self-reliant workers. In their view the natives would be

(24) Ibid. xxvii.
(25) Idem.
(26) Ibid, xiii.
(27) Idem.
improved simply by being made to work. (28) They argued, undeniably, if rather speciously, that culture contact had proceeded too far for Papuans to be allowed to work out their destiny in their own way. (29)

The Papuan was to work for the European, but the Commissioners objected to the methods in force for engaging labour. They suggested that for several reasons the government should take over recruiting. One was to prevent abuses, another that the revenue would benefit, a third, that recruits could work on government plantations or public works projects while waiting to be drafted to an employer. (30) The labour system was to work in conjunction with native taxation which should take the form of "forced labour", with provision for cash payment instead of labour. (31)

The aim of all these recommendations was to conserve and preserve the Papuans' racial stamina. This would have a dual purpose: it would ensure a virile work force and soldiers in time of war. The Commissioners saw New Guinea as a bulwark sheltering Australia from attack and her inhabitants as providin

(28) Ibid, xiv.
(29) Ibid, xliv.
(30) Ibid, xxix-xxxi.
(31) Ibid, xli-xlvii.
manpower to augment the Commonwealth's defence force. (32)

The native population was only one resource of many that, in the Commissioners' sanguine view of Papua’s future, awaited exploitation by white settlers. They recommended the appointment of an agricultural expert, (33) the formation of government experimental stations, (34) that mining legislation should be clarified, (35) and that the timber potential of the country should be investigated. (36)

The Papua Act was proclaimed early in September 1906 and so the Commonwealth took formal responsibility for the territory. The Royal Commission appointed to enquire into conditions in the colony began to conduct its investigations almost immediately afterwards, but even after its report had been published the federal government took no decisive action. Murray became merely acting Administrator. Not until 1909 (37) was this appointment confirmed; then the central figure in the history of Papua was able to take firmly the reins of power.

(32) Ibid, xiv-xv.
(33) Ibid, xxiii.
(34) Idem.
(35) Ibid, xxviii-xxix.
(36) Ibid, xxiv-xxvi.
Murray was an interesting, if in some ways unattractive man. As his letters to his brother show, it was only after his appointment to British New Guinea that he felt his talents had received a modicum of their proper recognition. From 1912 when it became plain that he would not be able to transfer to the Colonial Service and become Governor of a more important colony, he decided to make every effort to gain renown for his Papuan policies. (38) As Governor, within the restricted compass of Papuan society, he was autocratic in both status and power. Success came to him late in life, so it was not surprising that he then lacked some of the academic objectivity he had when younger. He attempted to control completely the development of a society with remarkably little reference to external situations or even internal conditions.

His refusal to admit that his ideas ever came to fruition makes one of the most interesting chapters in the history of Papua, and provides a fascinating commentary on his character and Australian attitudes. It was remarkable how Murray was able to persuade himself and his compatriots of his success in Papua. One feels that Murray was held in renown not directly through his achievements in colonial administration, but because

in the imagination of Australians the administration of Papua symbolized Australia's national maturity, unity, and independence in the colonial sphere, just as her part in the Gallipoli campaign did in the military context.

As indicated above Murray, as leader of the opposition faction, had been instrumental in forcing Barton to demand an enquiry into the administration. He was a key witness before the Commission. Barton maintained that Murray's evidence was an ingenious blend of truth and fabrication, and there seems to have been some justification for this contention. (39) For instance Murray accused the Administrator of being opposed to white settlement, partly because of his (Barton's) sympathy for the natives but largely because he lacked sympathy with democracy and had a nervous dread of Australian ideas. (40) Such a statement plainly aimed at prejudicing the Commissioners against Barton. Another example was Murray's analysis of the reasons for delays in the treatment of land applications, and the causes for stagnation in the rate of white settlement. (41) Murray said these were caused chiefly by Resident Magistrates not wanting extra labours, and because they desired to stand in favour with

(39) Report of the Royal Commission, 118.
(40) Ibid, 86.
(41) Ibid, 85.
the Administrator who was anti-settlement. Murray must have known that local officials were extremely hard-working and that most of them favoured white settlement. He blamed present policy and officials for the lack of white settlement and economic development when he knew the causes were more basic. Settlers had never been attracted to New Guinea.

Murray, having influenced the Commission, on becoming Administrator naturally shared its attitude to the basic question of the territory's development. He wanted this to be as speedy as possible, and through the agency of European settlement. Natives were expected to remain, for the foreseeable future, subordinate in both the economic and political structure. On the other hand they were to be protected from gross exploitation, and Murray formulated welfare policies which aimed to raise them ultimately to a higher economic, political, and social level. The appointment of a Government Anthropologist in 1921 marked a high spot in the implementation of welfare policies. Yet Murray believed in, and acted upon the principle that although the best Papuans might rise superior to the lowest whites, equality between the races could not prevail. (42)

Over the long span of Murray's rule the preconditions for an effective policy were never abundant, and sometimes very scanty. An increased subsidy as well as continually expanding revenue enabled Murray to increase the establishment and further the work of bringing the whole territory under control. Nevertheless there was never enough money to implement all the policies Murray would have liked. A woefully inadequate system of communications; a necessary parsimony with regard to Public Works which retarded the economic development of the country; and insufficient resources to deal with more expensive aspects of native welfare such as health, education, or economic projects: these were some of the most important results of this financial stringency. The consequent reliance on missions, for medical and educational services particularly, allowed the government to evade its proper responsibility when its financial position improved. The World War and the great depression both hit the colony hard. Falls in the prices of tropical products dampened the interest of potential European investors. Constrained by these factors, Murray did not in fact guide Papua into a course of development distinct from that which he had earlier criticized.

Helped by his relative affluence he did carry through considerable administrative reform. Not only did he have more
staff at his disposal, but he strove to maintain control and
guidance over them. He tended to treat field officers less
like junior partners, which had been the trend with previous
Governors, and more like office boys. Resident Magistrates
had been members of the early Legislative and Executive Councils,
but under Murray all "official" members were head-quarters men.
Early in his regime he instituted more efficient and regular
methods of keeping records.

As indicated above, Murray was able to employ more men
than his predecessors, but their quality remained variable.
The Commissioners freely criticized the haphazard system of
recruitment to the civil service in British New Guinea and
strongly recommended that all future appointments be made
systematically through the Commonwealth Public Service Board. (43)
That policy may formally have been adhered to, but probably
because Papua was regarded as a rather unattractive billet few
men applied for posting there. Murray had no alternative but
to follow the lead of his predecessors and select officers
locally. As the European population continued to increase so
the Governor had a wider choice than formerly; he did not have
to employ such obviously unsuitable men as had sometimes been

accepted. Nonetheless, Murray, according to his own admission, had few officers that he could trust, (44) and certainly very few whom he considered ideal. The standard of education continued to be fairly low. Murray quotes the case of one of his men, better educated than the majority, who came and asked him if a piece of rather obscene doggerel had been written by Tennyson. (45)

A formal education up to university entrance was far from being a necessary pre-requisite for joining the Papuan Civil Service. Indeed selectors regarded technical or medical training much more highly, as these were of obvious practical use. Even Murray, who when he first came to Papua railed against the intellectual limitations of his colleagues, and spoke of the relief of turning to the classics, soon became affected by local conditions. (46) Because of the problems of recruitment he preferred to employ young men with little learning and untrained in the methods of intellectual enquiry. These people could be acquired more cheaply, and had perhaps the attraction of being easier to dominate. He particularly favoured local youths. In one Annual Report, while discussing

the question of recruitment to Papua and the Trust Territory he wrote a justification of this policy well calculated to impress Commonwealth politicians: (47)

We recruit many of our officers from young men who have been born or brought up in the country, and who have the advantage of being used to the climate and the life, and who generally can speak at least one native language fluently. Seventeen or eighteen of these young men are all doing well. We prefer to retain this source of recruitment and not rely entirely upon the appointment of cadets in Australia.

Murray did not add that local men were rarely stationed in their home district where they knew the language, and that even where they were, variations in dialect among immediately neighbouring peoples made communication difficult. Neither did Murray point out that local ties could seriously hamper the impartial administration of justice, or that it was almost impossible for the locals to observe society objectively. Racial prejudice is usually most strongly felt by the locally bred Europeans and not the expatriates in a multi-racial society.

The administrative geography of south-east Papua underwent some alteration during the period of Australian rule. The centre of government for the Eastern Division remained Samarai, although from the beginning of British rule it was regarded as a temporary site, and the Commissioners recommended that the

head-quarters be moved. (48) At one time the administration considered transferring the head station to Fyfe Bay on the south coast, but chiefly for financial reasons nothing came of the scheme. The main objections to Samarai were its size and the rather treacherous currents in China Strait. Not until 1911 did the inhabitants of the Mailu district and the populous areas around Mullens Harbour have a permanent official in their locality. In 1911 a Resident Magistrate, with his head-quarters on Abau island, was put in charge of a new district: the East-Central. This comprised an area of approximately one hundred miles along the coast, fifty on each side of Abau island, as well as the interior to the border of the North-eastern Division. (49) An official was stationed in the area only after a number of plantations were started in the fairly rich, well-watered, and flat coastal plain on the mainland opposite Abau. For a few years from 1916 there was also a minor gold rush to the area. During the World War, in 1915, the East-Central Division became part of the Eastern Division, with an Assistant Resident Magistrate in charge. (50) This officer, besides patrolling the coastal villages and the plantations also visited the hitherto virtually unknown interior, making

contact with new native groups and discovering quite extensive areas of land which seemed suitable for plantation agriculture and white settlement. (51) His presence also acted as a deterrent to the mountain peoples who formerly used to make periodic attacks on the coastal tribes. This endemic raiding had embarrassed the administration for decades, but only after an official was permanently stationed in the area could it be brought under proper control. Previously a patrol visited the district only to arrest offenders in a particular outrage. The local officer with his own detachment of police and his special knowledge of both the area and the peoples who inhabited it, was much more successful. (52)

Otherwise there were no boundary alterations, but in 1927 there was another move toward decentralization in the Eastern Division. In that year a police camp, under a Patrol Officer, was established at Mapamoiwa on Fergusson island. (53) For many years previously officials had pointed out the need for a government station somewhere in the D'Entrecasteaux

(51) Ibid. 1918-1919, 37-38; Ibid. 1925-1926, 44-46.
(52) Ibid. 1923-1924, 21; Ibid. 1925-1926, 16, 44.
islands, (54) which were, by Papuan standards, quite densely populated. The natives lived in small scattered hamlets, not in large settlements. Although there were no villages above a certain altitude many natives lived in the mountainous interior in tiny hamlets perched atop precipitous slopes. This made patrolling slow and very arduous. For instance one officer had to cut a patrol short because his boots, new at the beginning of it six weeks earlier, had disintegrated. (55)

The boundaries of the South-eastern Division remained unchanged but in 1912 the divisional head-quarters were moved from Bonagai to Kulumadau on Murua. (56) In 1920 there was another move, this time to Bwagaoia on Misima where there had been a revival of deep-shaft mining. (57)

In south-east Papua government stations did not proliferate as the territory's finances improved; instead the district head-quarters staff increased. While the Possession had been administered jointly by Britain and the Australian colonies the divisional staffs hardly ever exceeded two or three officers

and a clerk or two. Once Australia assumed complete responsi-

ability for the Possession the divisional staff increased slowly
although at outstations there was still only a single white

officer. Although the number of officers attached to a division

increased, plurality of offices was still the norm.

During the Great War there was an acute staff shortage but

afterwards numbers more than doubled. In each of the Divisions,

besides the Resident Magistrate there were usually a couple of

Assistant Resident Magistrates, one of whom acted as Sub-Collecto

doing Customs, a clerk or two, a couple of Patrol Officers, one

usually an engineer in charge of the district vessel, and the

Government Medical Officer. In Samarai there was also an

Inspector of Native Labour employed full time in dealing with

indentures. When there were white prisoners in the district a

European gaoler figured on the staff list; he was also Overseer

of Public Works. Sometimes a Government Surveyor and Land-

buyer would be attached to the division, and a white carpenter

sent from Port Moresby to do a special job. (58)

As with the earlier period, the extension of government

was carried out through the patrol. A list of these is given

(58) See Appendix II, and also establishment lists in the Ann.

Reps.
in appendix three. By the end of the period under review the whole area had been brought under control although the interiors of the mainland, of the main D'Entrecasteaux group, of Rossel, and of the larger islands in the Louisiades, were less frequently visited by government parties than more accessible places. Officials usually kept to the coastal regions in the vicinity of anchorages. After the introduction of native taxation, and once a census had been taken, there was usually an annual patrol to even the most inaccessible areas; but inland, officials were long unable to proceed beyond initial pacification and the imposition of basic restraints.

 Usually there was only one inland patrol from the northeast coast to the south coast although the littorals were visited several times. Officials toured Milne Bay, which was both close and accessible, every month or two, more to inspect the European plantations in the area than the villages. Of the local islands Nari, where there was a Government plantation, received frequent short visits from the Magistrate; the others were usually visited only on the annual tax patrol. The D'Entrecasteaux islands were patrolled several times a year. Except for parties sent to investigate a specific occurrence, the D'Entrecasteaux patrols usually lasted for several weeks. It took a long time to circumvent the islands even without
visiting hill settlements. Trobriand villages, especially those on Kiriwina, were frequently reviewed, but the Assistant Resident Magistrate visited the other islands only once or twice a year. Elsewhere in the South-eastern Division, except for the centres of European population, most islands were touched upon once or twice annually. Thus officials rarely patrolled Rossel more than once a year whereas Sudest or Misima were visited four or five times. Murray paid visits of inspection to south-east Papua some two or three times annually, but the official party usually only visited government stations, centres of white settlement, European plantations, or mission stations in coastal areas. In this part of the territory after 1906 head-quarters officials never went on inland patrols.

Patrol procedures remained much the same as they had been in the earlier period, although there were variations from place to place. Characteristically officers hurried as much as circumstances allowed. They rarely stayed long in any particular place but passed through several villages in a day. They arrived. (never unexpectedly but heralded long since by neighbouring settlements) with a customary retinue of Armed Native Constables, locally recruited carriers, interpreters if they were needed, and prisoners either due for release or on their way to gaol. The Village Constable, and any chiefs or
important men, ceremonially met the government party on the outskirts of the village. One Patrol Officer gave an account of a typical meeting which is most interesting in its naïve and succinct account of culture contact: (59)

The V.C. showed up in the evening and coolly approached me with hand outstretched and his face wreathed in smiles. I spoke sharply to him and got one of the A.C's to show him how to approach an Officer. During the evening he came to me and told me that he did not want to be V.C. so I payed him off and gave his Clothes to Ledimo an ex-Armed Constable (his appointment awaiting confirmation.)

This incident, to which the Patrol Officer attached so little significance, must have been one of the most important events in the deposed Village Constable's life. The memory of it would have nurtured in his breast a constant sense of outrage and humiliation which coloured his future attitudes and actions towards the administration. The subtlety of personal relations escaped most officials.

Once a patrol arrived in a village the European in charge inspected the settlement and, if it had one, the plantation. He paid the Village Constable and issued him with his uniform, collected tax monies, amended the census, distributed any next-of-kin payments to the relatives of deceased indentured labourers,

paid any baby bonuses due, enquired into village affairs, tried any breaches of the Native Regulations, arrested anyone who had committed felonies or deserted from an employer. He then moved on, leaving any time expired prisoners behind. Fairly frequent, the white officer also left some police to arrest offenders who had decamped into the bush as news of the patrol's approach reached the village. Only in the D'Entrecasteaux islands did patrols find deserted villages or meet with armed opposition from the natives fairly frequently after the turn of the century. (60) In the rest of south-east Papua natives only very occasionally fled from the government or threatened violence. (61) Indeed a striking feature of the extension of administrative control was its uneventful nature. Most natives with whom first contact was made seemingly accepted the advent of the government without astonishment or fear: passively, almost fatalistically. Officials had a most matter-of-fact even incidental approach to this part of their work. Such tranquillity would seem to


indicate two things. First, that most of the natives were unusually tractable; second, that even the most isolated communities had some contacts, probably trading, with other groups that knew of administrative procedures from experience or hearsay.

In 1921 occurred the sole instance of a group — the Gwabigwabi of Fergusson — killing a member of a patrol. He was not a government employee, but a prisoner. Following the incident another patrol was sent out to learn the reason for the attack. The entourage, much larger than usual, consisting of twenty Constables and forty carriers, was set upon by an ambush of Gwabigwabi natives. They had hidden along the track, concealed by heavy cloud and fog. During the affray the official in charge ordered the police to fire upon their assailants. After the Gwabigwabi retreated the police discovered one body which turned out to be that of the man who had killed the prisoner; another wounded native made good his escape. The following day the officer sent the Village Constables of local friendly villages to try and entice the Gwabigwabi people into the government camp. The native officials were successful and a score or so of the Gwabigwabi men bearing gifts of a pig and betel nut visited the camp. The officer spoke through an interpreter to all the men, including
their aged leader. He it was who had persuaded his more reluctant fellows to fight the government. Further enquiries revealed that six men had been involved in the murder of the prisoner: the ringleader had been shot the previous day. Five others had thus to be apprehended. They were not caught.

In his summary at the end of the report the officer stated that it was very hard to find any reason for the original attack, although there may have been an underlying feeling of hostility towards the government since two years previously, when he had wanted a Gwabigwabi deserter and sent word to the village to that effect. The people replied that they would not give up the wanted man, but intended to fight the government. The Officer then had to visit the village. He took with him three police and arrested the deserter without any difficulty. He thought no more of the incident. (62) This was a nice example of how a member of the Papuan civil service - untrained, unable to communicate directly with the natives - failed to grasp complexities implicit in situations which were a common feature of his work. He failed to see the significance of the original act of defiance, but unquestioningly accepted the surface passivity when he went to arrest the deserter.

In the Trobriand islands the population density was fairly heavy, yet patrolling was less arduous than in most other parts of south-east Papua for the islands were small, compactly grouped, and flat. Moreover officers there served long terms; Bellamy stayed in the Trobriands from 1905 to 1918, and his successor Ernest Whitehouse remained for most of the twenties. Bellamy was an excellent choice in that he was dedicated, conscientious and intelligent. He was an Englishman who had studied medicine at Cambridge, but as he failed in anatomy he did not take out a medical degree. (63) The Papuan administration found it difficult to attract suitably qualified men so a man like Bellamy could find a billet in Papua although his failure would have precluded an appointment in most British colonies. Such apparently second rate men often performed their duties most ably.

During the time he was stationed at Losuia, Bellamy went on frequent patrols. In a geographically compact area like the Trobriands, where the government station was less than half a days journey from many native villages, the Assistant Resident Magistrate exerted a real influence on village affairs. Bellamy instituted a weekly levee which all Village Constables in the

vicinity of the station were obliged to attend. (64) Each gave Bellamy a report on affairs in the villages under his supervision. He gave details of births, marriages, illnesses, deaths, and reported any unusual occurrences or misdemeanours committed by natives or foreigners resident in the area. Not all Village Constables performed their duties satisfactorily; doubtless those dismissed because they were lazy, inefficient, or corrupt represented only a fraction of the number that indulged in some sort of malpractice, even in such a closely supervised area as the Trobriands.

These islands formed a cohesive social unit where a single language prevailed. It was therefore relatively easy for officials to implement government policies and then supervise their functioning, especially as they were able to converse with the people without using interpreters all the time. As a consequence the administration was more effective there than in most other parts of south-east Papua.

As soon as it was financially able, the government took some rudimentary steps toward improving village health. From 1900 there had been at Samarai a Medical Officer, who cared for both the European and the native population. Dr. Jones remained...

at this post until 1913 when he was succeeded by William Eric Giblin, (65) still there at the end of the twenties. The doctor did not leave Samarai, so serious cases had to be brought to him. Very few natives from outlying areas ever came voluntarily to him for treatment. He treated sick prisoners and police. Besides the three hospitals on Samarai, the European, the native, and the gaol, two others were opened in 1905 on nearby islets. (66) These were 'lock' hospitals for infectious diseases, one for male and one for female natives. Most inmates were venereal patients who had been brought to Samarai forcibly. Officers when on patrol examined village natives for venereal disease and any infected individuals were taken to Samarai for treatment and not released until cured.

The European hospital from its inception had a white matron in charge. (67) It was closed from 31 March 1904 until 31 July 1913 because the European population could not raise the necessary £200 per annum. When it reopened it was subsidised by the government. (68) The native hospitals until the twenties were run by native orderlies who received very

(65) Ibid, 1913-1914, n. o.
(66) Ibid, 1905-1906, 16-17, 32.
little training, and were under the direct supervision of the
doctor. In the late twenties a white assistant, not a fully
trained medico, worked in the native hospitals full time. (69)
There were no doctors in private practice either at Samarai or
anywhere else in south-east Papua.

There was another native hospital at Losuia. Between
October 1905 and the outbreak of the Great War Bellamy reduced
the percentage of venereal infection in the Trobriand population
from ten to two per cent: a remarkable achievement especially
as he could not afford to use the most efficient drugs or give
the best treatment. (70) Fortunately syphilis was very rare in
Papua. Bellamy's success depended on his using dictatorial
tactics to eradicate the disease. He was constantly on tour
of the Trobriands, visiting every village and forcing the
inhabitants to line up for a medical inspection. Those he
found infected he forced to go to hospital at Losuia where they
had to remain until they were cured. (71)

Yet Bellamy's tours were always less efficient than he
hoped. News of his movements inevitably preceded him and sick
natives could hide in the bush until the government party had

(69) Ibid, 1927-1928, 75-77.
(71) see C.P.I.(T.) Set 35 Bundles 37 and 38.
left the village. A certain number of patients managed to escape from the hospital too, although they were usually caught again. Yet most natives willingly accepted treatment and the rest, with very few exceptions, submitted fatalistically. There were only occasional rebels such as the chief who objected to being treated equally with his subjects and showed his displeasure at the cavalier treatment of the government by taking extreme action. He hacked off his diseased prepuce. (72)

From the financial year 1910-1911 a private individual, John Taaffe by name, got a grant from the government to attend to both whites and natives in need of medical treatment. (73) Taaffe lived at Kulumadau which was a centre for the mining industry. He had been in Papua since the nineties and although an unqualified practitioner he soon became famous for the competent and tender way he ministered to miners and natives without expecting any payment. (74) He was put in charge of the Murau clinic, given supplies and a nominal fee. (75) In 1920 Taaffe took on additional work for the government and became

(72) Ibid, Bundle 37, Pat.Rep. 2-7 June 1914, 2 June.
an Inspector of Native Labour. (76) Thus at the age of sixty-five and after twenty-four years hard work among the white and brown inhabitants of Murua, often with little or no reward for his efforts, Taaffe shouldered new burdens and came to the aid of the government again. He took on the extra work because there was nobody else to do it, once the government station had been moved to Misima. But for the intervention of the Resident Magistrate he would have asked only a nominal salary for his new and important duties. (77) Taaffe served his fellows until he died in December 1921. After his death nobody succeeded him as medical officer because the European population had by that time dwindled through the decline in mining on Murua and the removal of the government station to Misima. When the mining companies ceased operation the native population fell too as indentured labourers were no longer imported.

Those were the only government hospitals in south-east Papua, but after the Great War travelling medical officers did something to alleviate common diseases at the village level. (78)

Such officers used to give hookworm treatments and injections

(77) Ibid, 4 June 1920.
for yaws, dress ulcers and so forth. Bellamy after the war became a travelling medico. He spent a good proportion of his time in south-east Papua.

Besides the government-run hospitals the Wesleyan mission employed a qualified doctor from 1925, while in 1929-1930 the L.M.S. mission at Fyfe Bay opened a hospital in charge of a native orderly formerly employed at the Samarai native hospital. The Salamo hospital received a fairly substantial grant, some £1,000 annually; the Fyfe Bay hospital £100. The missions had always extended what medical help they could to natives in the vicinity of their stations, but such aid was of the simple home-remedy sort. Until they established proper hospitals they got no grant from the government.

From a total population of roughly eighty thousand, the number of natives who received treatment was small. In 1913-1914 the Trobriand hospital treated one hundred and twenty cases, most of them venereal. Besides, numerous outpatients, of whom no record was kept, availed themselves of drugs and treatment. On Murua one hundred and seventy seven natives were hospitalized and five hundred and sixteen outpatients treated. The Samarai native hospital had two hundred and eighty four patients and the special hospitals one hundred and thirty nine male and ninety female inmates. In 1929-1930 six hundred and five male and
one hundred and fifty female patients were treated. The Murua clinic was closed, and as no magisterial reports were printed that year for economy, the number of natives treated in the Trobriands was not given. The Methodist hospital at Salamo treated six hundred and eighty three patients. (79)

After the colony came under Australian rule the government had thus done something to alleviate the suffering caused by venereal disease, yaws, malaria, and the ravages of intestinal parasites but its achievement in the field of public health was meagre. There were few hospitals and not a single infant welfare clinic in the whole of south-east Papua. The cost of the latter would have been comparatively slight, yet the results most beneficial in combating the high infant mortality rate. Moreover the decrease in population was a matter of concern to the administration.

Labour policy under Murray's regime continued to be controlled and protective despite his criticisms of Barton's policy. (80) Recruiters continued to be licenced, and all natives engaging to work more than three months had to sign a written contract witnessed by an Inspector of Native Labour.

(80) See Legge, Australian Colonial Policy, 155-167.
This office was automatically vested in all Resident Magistrates, Assistant Resident Magistrates, and Patrol Officers. Inspectors had to make sure that the natives engaged were physically fit for the work; that they signed on voluntarily; that they knew what work they would be expected to perform; and that they received a fair remuneration. Ten shillings a month was virtually the minimum wage in Papua. Further, all employers had to guarantee to repatriate a recruit at the end of the contract of service. Inspectors witnessed the signing on of natives and watched as they were paid off. When on patrol, district officials, in their capacity as Inspectors, went over plantations and mines to see the conditions laid down in the Labour Ordinance were fulfilled. They also heard any complaints and rectified abuses perpetrated by either the management or the employees. Most officials acted in the capacity of Inspector only part of the time, but as mentioned above, in Samarai one officer was engaged in such work full time.

By the time the Papua Act had been passed several thousand natives from south-east Papua were signing indentures annually. In 1906-1907 two thousand and ninety-three labourers had been signed on in the Eastern Division. No figures were given for the South-eastern Division. In 1913-1914 the total for the Eastern Division was two thousand, four hundred and sixty six.
In the South-eastern Division six hundred and eight had been signed on at Murua and one hundred and fifty four at Losuia.

Of the natives paid off in the same year two thousand six hundred and eighty came from the Eastern Division, and two hundred and forty four from the South-eastern. In 1919-1920 one hundred and ninety four natives signed on at Abau, two thousand, three hundred and fifty two at Samarai, one hundred and sixty four at Murua, and thirty five at Losuia. In the same year the numbers paid off were Abau, sixty nine, Samarai two thousand, eight hundred and eighty five, Murua two hundred and three, and the Trobriands thirty six. In 1927-1928, a period of relative prosperity between the depressions of the early and late twenties, the numbers were two thousand, two hundred and sixty seven for the Eastern Division, and one hundred and sixty three for the South-eastern Division. In the same year two thousand, one hundred and eleven Eastern Division natives and two hundred and forty four South-eastern Division natives were paid off. (81) As the table of occupations at the end of the chapter shows, the only marked change was between 1906-1907 and 1913-1914. In the early period most natives were employed in the mining industry; in the later agricultural

workers formed the largest group.

Native taxation was introduced in 1918 chiefly as a revenue producing measure, although as Legge points out it did have the effect of stimulating the flow of labour to European-owned enterprises in some parts of the territory. (82) Indentured labourers were not exempt from the tax. Funds from this source were kept separate from the general revenue and used solely for native welfare projects. It would have been impossible to levy taxes without first taking a census of the population, and although census taking and checking in Papua left much to be desired, from this period the government did have much more effect at the village level.

When a tax patrol arrived the Village Constable would gather his people together and the European official in charge would get some demographic picture of the village. Once his table and chair were set up, the men of taxable age would come forward with their money or else explain why they could not pay. The official would then decide whether the excuses were valid, and he would punish the offenders if he thought fit. Natives could be imprisoned for short terms for failure to pay the tax, although some evaded the burden with impunity. For

(82) Legge, op.cit., 162-164. See also 175-177.
instance one man of Giligili in Milne Bay consistently refused to pay his tax; but relatives would come to his rescue because, as they explained to the official, it brought shame on them otherwise. (83) Another village ne'er-do-well from Rabi in Milne Bay was not so fortunate. Villagers finally got tired of paying his tax and the defaulter was sentenced to a term of imprisonment. (84)

The baby bonus dates from the establishment of a native taxation fund. Five shillings annually were issued to the mothers of four living children by the one father, with an additional shilling for each subsequent child. The fathers of four or more living children were exempt from tax. They, besides native civil servants and idiots, were the only natives between the ages of sixteen and thirty six who did not have to pay tax. There was also a prize of £5 given each year for the best kept village and the best village plantation in each administrative division. This money would be paid on the annual tax and census patrol. The natives could do what they wished with the money but usually bought tools, or installed a tap, or used it for some sort of village improvement.

Education was another aspect of native welfare which benefited from the proceeds of taxation, but only on a very minor scale. (85) Education continued to be the monopoly of the missions and the number of schools which were eligible for aid from the government was very small. To qualify for aid schools had to teach English. In 1921-1922, two years after the scheme had been introduced, nine Anglican, eleven L.M.S. and six Methodist schools applied for grants in the whole of Papua. The number remained fairly constant throughout the twenties; the L.M.S. at twelve, the Anglican at eight, and the Methodist at eight. Schools could apply for £50 as a grant for books and equipment in the first year and £5 in subsequent years. Besides ten or twenty shillings was given for each pupil passing prescribed examinations. The examiner was appointed by the Governor. At first the schoolmaster in charge of the European school at Port Moresby acted as examiner, later an Inspector from the New South Wales Education Department took over that duty. The total payment to any one mission for successful examinees could not exceed £250 in any one year. £1,000 a year for five years was offered to each mission on condition that they extended education facilities. Provision was also made for grants to technical schools. The number of

(85) Legge, op.cit., 177-178.
schools receiving aid was small but over half of these were in south-east Papua. The L.M.S. schools at Mailu and Fyfe Bay certainly received grants, and possibly the Duobo school which was also under a white missionary. All the Methodist schools, some of the Anglican, and the Kwato Industrial Mission were all in this area.

The number of natives who benefited from this aspect of welfare was small. By 1926-1927 only twenty four youths were in training at the Kwato Industrial Mission. In the same year the Methodist schools presented seventy five candidates, of whom sixty two passed, for the first grade examination; ninety five, of whom eighty passed, for the second grade; fifty one, of whom fifty passed, for the third grade; and twenty six, all of whom were successful, for the fourth grade. L.M.S. and Anglican figures, which were for the whole territory, were somewhat higher. They presented five hundred and thirty five, and three hundred and sixty candidates respectively; of these four hundred and twenty one and three hundred and thirty four passed. (86) Education was the prerogative of very few natives.

The appointment of a Government Anthropologist and an

assistant was another aspect of native welfare which bore little fruit in south-east Papua. Salaries and the costs of printing reports were met from the proceeds of taxation. (87) Both men were on the establishment of the Department of Native Affairs. The anthropologists were expected to engage in research of practical use to the administration, but were given a good deal of freedom in their selection of topics for study. (88) The concept was admirable but the achievement rather disappointing. W.E. Armstrong, who arrived in Papua in May 1920, while he was assistant anthropologist spent a total of nine months in the Suau district and wrote a report on the people. In 1921 he spent some months on Rossel island and wrote, besides a monograph on them, a report on the peoples of the South-eastern Division excluding Murua. (89) F.E. Williams was for a couple of months in the Suau district of the south coast first in 1926 and again in 1932. These studies were the only ones undertaken which specifically dealt with the peoples of south-east Papua. The administration was financially unable to sponsor an exhaustive detailed survey of native social systems, and for the same reason could not always follow lines of action recommended by the

(87) Legge, op.cit., 176.
anthropologists.

Thus Williams in a report on depopulation among the Suau suggested several means of checking the decline, but none were properly implemented. For the six years prior to 1925 in the Suau district, which had a total population of six thousand two hundred and eleven, there had been one thousand and seven deaths but only three hundred and sixty nine births: a decrease of over six hundred. (90) The situation was serious. When Williams questioned the natives they ascribed the decline to sorcery, and to fewer births because of contraceptive practices or abortions on the part of the young women. (91) Williams did not altogether dismiss the possibility of natives using some sort of contraceptive, but he believed the number, presumed to be high by the natives themselves, was in fact quite low. (92) He believed native sterility, caused by venereal infection or sexual promiscuity, may have been one factor responsible for the decline. (93) However he thought the effects of other introduced diseases, the system of indentured labour, and a psychological malaise brought about by the conflict between traditional and European ideas were much more important.

(90) Anthrop. Pamphlet No.13, 1.
(91) Ibid, 6.
(93) Ibid, 21-22.
For this reason he felt that substitutes for pagan customs and ceremonies would have to be presented to the natives and accepted by them before they could shake off the fatalistic apathy which was decimating their numbers. Christianity he saw as one of the best substitutes; others were education, work, and play. He recommended that education have a technical bias, and that work should take the form of small scale enterprises imitative of European economic ventures. Play he felt should consist of western sports and indigenous feasts and ceremonies suitably modified. (94) Williams was quite aware that the mortuary feast was a much bigger event for the Suau peoples than the Melbourne Cup or Christmas was for Australians, yet he thought it could be compressed and modified by the administration and still fulfill the same functions in native society. (95) Anthropological data from all over the world has disproved such a contention. Moreover the official staff and resources would have needed to increase many times before the natives could have been encouraged to play, let alone found and operate European type business enterprises.

The line between welfare policies and those aimed at economic development is slight, but certain policies belong more
emphatically to the second category. The introduction of taxation was prominent among these. The natives were not consulted before taxation was introduced, nor did they have any say in determining the amount levied. District officials recommended which peoples could afford to pay a pound tax, which ten shillings, and which ought for the time being to be exempt. Once the head-quarters decision had been taken, officers on patrol gave notice to the people that a tax would be collected at a certain time. There was no overt opposition to the measure; the natives accepted it passively, as they did everything else the government introduced. They did not understand the purpose of the tax, even in relatively sophisticated areas like Milne Bay, as officials continually remarked. (96) To the natives it was simply another arbitrary and puzzling feature of the government, but one which had to be complied with unless they were to suffer an harangue or a term of imprisonment. Not for several years did officials begin to report that the people were starting to comprehend that the tax benefited them in concrete ways. In 1923 for example an Assistant Resident Magistrate reported that Bellamy's visit to the north-east coast had done a lot of good because the natives could see something

coming back to them. (97)

So apathetically compliant were the people, and for this reason so depressing the annual tax patrol, that one Assistant Resident Magistrate suggested the government contribute a pig to each of the five main districts of Milne Bay for an annual tax feast. He pointed out that this might cost £20 which was not extravagant as a total of £862 had been collected from the area in 1927. He pointed out that anything which the government might do to stir the native from his lethargic state and make him look forward with keen anticipation to any event was worthy of consideration. (98) His recommendation was not implemented.

In south-east Papua the introduction of taxation did not have any marked effect on the annual number of indentured labourers, which suggests that the economic pattern had been set beforehand. In fact it was set by the time the Papua Act passed through the Commonwealth parliament. The demand for European goods was already great, and the natives habitually left their villages to work for the whiteman. Because they had always worked to get cash the introduction of taxation did not

cause major social and economic changes at the village level.

In this context it is significant that in the Eastern Division, except in the Abau area, there was not a single plantation established under the Native Plantations Ordinance. This aimed at preventing social and demographic upheavals in the village by keeping the natives gainfully employed at home. Under its terms the administration and villagers were joint owners of a plantation. (99) The natives supplied the labour, and for a certain number of days work, usually about two months, received labour certificates which exempted them from paying tax. The government provided seeds, tools, and supervised operations. The crop was divided, usually equally, between the two parties, and the government's share was paid into the taxation account to be used for welfare projects.

On paper the scheme looked good, but in practice it was a relative failure. In the Eastern Division natives preferred either to sell copra from their own small plantations or to work for private enterprises. In 1921-1922 four rice plantations, one on Nimoa, one on Panawina, and two on Joannet were started, as well as four coconut plantations, one on Misima, one on Kimuta, one on Nurabena, and one on Panapompos. A fairly

large coconut plantation was begun at Kaibola on northern Kiriwina. (100) By 1926-1927 there were nine such plantations in the South-eastern Division excluding the Trobriands. These varied in size from one hundred to five acres. Besides the four coconut plantations previously mentioned the whole of the Torlesse group, Managum island close to Bwagacia on Misima, fifteen and a half acres on Kitava, five on Iwa, and seventeen on Gawa were planted with coconuts. The four rice plantations were not replanted, as yields had been disappointing and cockatoos had ravaged the crop. (101) In the Trobriands two hundred acres planted at Kaibola continued to flourish. There were besides three smaller plantations in Kiriwina, as well as one on Kaileuna, two on Vakuta, and one on Kadai. (102)

On Murua, another part of the territory where natives had been in close contact with Europeans for a relatively long period, and where they could fossick for gold, there was only one Native Plantation, on Eowan island. Most natives preferred to find their tax money independent of the administration. According to the official stationed there, after the decline of mining most dived for beche-de-mer or pearl-shell, or sold copra.

(100) Ibid, 1921-1922, 23, 63.
(101) Ibid, 1926-1927, 45.
(102) Ibid, 47.
to traders. (103)

Quite early in his tenure of office Murray revived a Native Regulation promulgated by MacGregor, which forced male natives to plant a specified number of useful trees. In most of south-east Papua these were synonymous with coconuts. By 1907-1908 it was estimated that there were some one hundred and fifty thousand acres of native owned coconuts in the Eastern Division and twenty five thousand acres in the South-eastern Division. This estimate assumed that an acre averaged one hundred nuts. (104)

Until after the introduction of taxation, there was no intensive attempt to enforce the regulation in south-east Papua. Nevertheless by 1919-1920 the Resident Magistrate of the Eastern Division estimated some one hundred thousand trees had been planted by natives. (105) In the Abau district there were thirty six thousand, six hundred and sixty four trees under seven years of age, (106) and in the South-eastern Division, excluding the Trobriands, the natives had planted sixty five thousand, seven hundred and thirty palms. (107)

(103) Idem.
(104) Ibid. 1907-1908, 116.
(105) Ibid. 1919-1920, 41.
(106) Ibid. 43.
(107) Ibid, 51.
These figures give a rather optimistic picture as by no means all nuts reached maturity. The implementation of the scheme was rather haphazard. When the directive from headquarters arrived, field officers while on patrol would tramp from village to village, staying only a few hours in each, and through interpreters pass on the order to the village headmen and the Village Constables. (108) If a sufficient number of nuts for planting could not be obtained locally the officer would arrange for a supply to be sent. (109) Then months would pass before another patrol visited the village again; more often than not the original officer would not return, but a stranger who had no knowledge of the original order would appear in his place.

Even when the government instructions had been obeyed and the requisite number of nuts gathered and planted, that was frequently the end of the matter so far as the villagers were concerned. Often officials lost interest in the scheme because there was so much to be done in a brief stop at a particular village. Many young trees died from lack of water, because they

were overgrown with weeds, or as a result of being damaged by insect pests, animals, or the villagers themselves. Both officials and natives became dispirited and lost any enthusiasm for the project. In most instances enforcing the useful plants regulation degenerated into an unpleasant and futile chore. (110) A histrionic display by the official would be received with surly indifference by his audience. Even sentencing offenders for short terms of imprisonment had little effect, and certainly did not make the natives attend any better to the trees they planted. Many continued to die of neglect.

In the Trobriands the story was different. Bellamy personally supervised the planting of tens of thousands of seed nuts. (111) He decided the best plan would be to plant systematically rather than haphazardly, and after consultation with the people the nuts were planted along the tracks between villages, thus serving the dual purpose of providing shade as well as food or copra. Bellamy busied himself getting adequate supplies of nuts, and acted as a distributing agent when necessary. He explained to the natives in their own language

what the government's aim was in enforcing the planting, and pointed out how they would derive considerable profit from the sale of copra as well as benefit in the lean years from an augmented food supply.

Once the nuts had been planted Bellamy's vigilance increased. As he travelled from village to village he inspected the growing palms, noticing which needed attention, and which were diseased. He then drew the appropriate villagers' attention to the matter, giving detailed instructions about weeding or cultivating certain trees, and destroying others. New nuts had to be substituted for all trees which were destroyed or had died. Because of his zeal many thousands of palms reached maturity in the Trobriands. (112)

Once taxation had been introduced the sowing of nuts was intensified at the district level. By 1924-1925 one hundred and forty seven thousand, five hundred and sixty six had been planted in the Eastern Division, almost thirty six thousand on Goodenough island alone. (113) By 1926-1927 there were three thousand, six hundred and forty nine acres of native planted coconuts in the Abau district, one hundred acres in the Eastern Division, four

hundred and sixteen acres in the South-eastern Division, excluding the Trobriands, and three hundred and two acres in the Trobriands.  (114)

Unfortunately most native plantations, either under the Regulation or the Ordinance, had hardly been established before the depression caused the prices for tropical products to tumble drastically. The price for copra and rubber continued to fetch very low prices for years. Many white planters were ruined, and others took years to rehabilitate themselves, but at least they understood what had happened. To the natives it was a mystery which could only be explained as white treachery.  (115)

Besides forcing the natives to plant trees, officials had planted small areas attached to government stations from the beginning of British rule. This was chiefly to demonstrate better gardening techniques, and to illustrate the advantages of hard work and foresight to police, prisoners, and village natives in the vicinity. The success of such ventures depended on the official in charge of a district. A.M. Campbell for instance created a smiling garden from the wilderness wherever

(114) Ibid, 1926-1927, 10.
he went. Yet by 1907 there were very few government plantations in south-east Papua. Nivani, when it ceased to be the headquarters of the South-eastern Division, was leased to John Mahony for agricultural purposes. It soon became desolate: (116) there were forty six acres of coconuts planted on Samarai, and eight acres on Gesila island, very close to Samarai. Twenty acres on Murua island had been selected for a government plantation and experimental plot, five of them were cleared by 1906-1907. (117)

Then in 1910 Murray decided to start a large plantation in Orangerie Bay, and an experimental station and small plantation at Wagawaga in Milne Bay. (118) The Orangerie Bay plantation had an area of one thousand, three hundred one and three quarter acres, of which one hundred and fifty were unsuitable for planting. Later more land was bought from the natives bringing the total area to two thousand, seven hundred and eighteen acres. It was in charge of Henry Edward Catt throughout the period under review. It prospered: by 1912-1913 four hundred and seventy three acres had been planted, by 1918 one thousand, three hundred and two acres were under cultivation, and by 1921-22 it produced one

hundred and eighty two tons of copra. In 1925-26 it produced three hundred and eighty six tons, and returned a profit of £4,500 by Murray's reckoning. (119) Yet the administration was at an advantage so far as import duties and labour fees were concerned, and part of an initial Commonwealth loan had still to be paid. Just as it was coming into full bearing the depression hit Papua, and in the 1929-1930 Annual Report Murray had to admit that as the government plantations had not had time to create profit reserves they might not be able to see the crisis through. (120) The Milne Bay plantation had a rather more checkered history. In its early years changes in personnel were frequent and only thirty acres were planted with coconuts. It cost £2,324:17:6 to develop and in 1922 was leased to the Kwato Extension Mission for £130 per annum. (121) Besides these two plantations under the management of the Department of Agriculture there was the Nari island plantation of two hundred acres under the direct supervision of the Resident Magistrate, and worked by prison labour. It produced forty tons of copra in 1919-1920 when the trees were between seven and eight years old. (122) By

(120) Ibid, 1929-1930, 3.
(121) Ibid, 1921-1922, 83.
(122) Ibid, 1919-1920, 41.
1924–1925 it produced eighty two and three quarter tons, which fetched £1,703:15:4 on the local market. (123) In 1927–1928 it was regularly producing half a ton of copra to the acre; in fact two years before it had yielded over one hundred and sixteen tons. (124) There was also a small government plantation on Abau island which produced fourteen tons of copra in 1926–1927. In the year previous copra from this station fetched £194:7:10 at Port Moresby. (125)

The influence of the administration on improving the native economy was not very great before 1930. The concept of the Native Plantations Ordinance was admirable in theory, but in practice the amount of money each native received, only a few shillings, made it virtually impossible for them to save enough money to set up a plantation or business of their own. (126) The government and native communities hardly ever co-operated over the implementation of social and economic plans. But there was one fruitful exception to this rule: the Wamira irrigation project. Officials had long noticed that the north-east coast natives irrigated their gardens by means of an ingenious system of aqueducts. The government in 1927 devised a scheme whereby

(126) C.P.293 Set 20 Bundle 1, Native Plantations. See also Set 1
the whole Wamira district would benefit from a large-scale irrigation project. As a result of consultation between officials, the local natives, and representatives of the Anglican mission, the government agreed to provide materials for the scheme if the natives provided the labour. The completed project was opened in 1928 amid great feasting and jollity. (127)

There were many obstacles confronting interaction between the government and the people. Chief of these on the administration side were lack of funds and the consequent shortage of personnel, and the psychological barrier in officials minds. The whole emphasis of the government was towards protecting the natives in their dealings with the unofficial population rather than towards assisting the natives to become independent economically. Paradoxically, with its strong emphasis on protection and paternalist supervision the government retarded rather than assisted economic progress and development. Those exceptional individuals who managed to accumulate a little wealth and engage in some sort of specialized economic activity instead of bare subsistence agriculture, spent

a lifetime attaining their goal. Even then they did not have the resources of even the humblest foreign trader or planter. They were thus never in a position really to compete with foreign enterprise. The administration thoroughly approved of individuals who attempted some such business but rarely took imaginative action to bring about social conditions under which an ordinary native could earn a living independently of the unofficial population.

On the native side obstacles were even more formidable. One of the most important was a lack of ambition. The best illustration of this attitude came from the Navabu people who lived in the area around the head of Baxter Harbour on the south coast. The most influential men of the tribe had stopped work as soon as they had earned enough, as houseboys or waiters, to pay tax for the rest of their taxable lives. They were very much against the formation of a native plantation in the district because it would have meant working to earn money for which they saw no use. (128)

Poor education was also important in limiting native enterprises. Natives were not sufficiently well educated to

cost, account, and manage any enterprise unaided. Most had to
depend on the administration, the missions, or traders, to treat
them honestly. The following letter, sent to the Resident
Magistrate of the South-eastern Division by the son of a Manillam
trader, better educated and more experienced in business than
village natives, shows how vulnerable natives were in any economi-
endeavour. This man had contracted to transport the produce of
the Native Plantations in the Nimoa area to the administration
head-quarters. (129)

To you official highness.
Mr A. Rentoul

Dear sir,

Here within my boat am sending in, to you
thirteen bags of copra from kakama, Government plantation,
I will send in another seven bags more next time which is
not bagged up yet. Thanking you the same.

Yours trustfully servant.
Leo Paulisbo
Councillor at, Nimoa, I's.

All most natives could do, to earn a little pocket money so that
they could purchase a few European consumer goods, was to be
trustful servants of some employer.

There were exceptions of course, natives who could more
or less manage to operate small businesses. Some of the local
traders employed such individuals to manage branch stores at

(129) C.F.293 Set 20 Bundle 1.
various places. Ioane was one such native who worked for one of Samarai's oldest trading families, the Buntings. Once, when paying off Ioane, who had then been in his employ for fifteen years, A.H. Bunting deducted the sum of £53:17:6 from his wages. Bunting claimed that this was the value of goods Ioane had failed to account for. The Resident Magistrate did not accept Bunting's view of Ioane's culpability and wrote to the Commissioner of Native Affairs expressing the opinion that the law was supposed to protect natives from exploitation. To his mind Bunting's attempt to make his native manager financially responsible for even his wrongful acts, would, in the case of a placid and careless individual like Ioane amount to exploitation. The Commissioner agreed with the Magistrate so the money had to be refunded. (130)

A similar case occurred at Panapompom where Ankok, after having been paid off at the divisional head-quarters, was taken to his village by his employer, Florentine Paulisbo, and there deprived of earnings totalling twenty pounds and twelve shillings. Paulisbo claimed that he had given a pig worth twelve pounds to Ankok, and that the rest of the sum was for money which Ankok owed him for goods sold on account during his three years contract of service. When the dispute came before the Magistrate,

he decided, and both parties agreed, that Ankok would return the pig and receive twelve pounds cash instead; and that the Inspecto of Native Labour would inspect the invoice of goods before deciding what should be done about the other nine pounds twelve shillings. (131)

Natives sometimes combined to do other work besides agricul­
tural or mine labouring for Europeans. For example the people of Dekoias and Kaurai villages on Murua contracted to build a road for the government, and did a very good job. Here again an individual share of the pay amounted to but a few shillings. (132) Neither was there sufficient work for them to be fully and permanently employed on such work. Other natives on the south coast of the mainland contracted with an agricultural company to clear one hundred and thirty acres of land. This contract between fifteen men of Domara village and the Domara River Plantation Company was one of the first between natives and Europeans to be written and witnessed in the European manner. The natives were to clear the land for fourteen bags of rice, one thousand four hundred pounds in weight, and £113:16:0 in cash. The timber was to be felled not more than three feet

(131) Ibid, Set 21 Bundle 5, Miscellanee Acting R.M.S.E.D., 6 Jan.1931.
from the ground, and the natives would forfeit one pound for each acre not cleared by a specified date. They did clear one hundred and twenty six of the one hundred and thirty acres, and drew one hundred and ten pounds. The work was well done and if the younger men had not got tired and left the job after a short period the contract would have been absolutely fulfilled. (133)

Occasionally an individual native with no positive help from the administration, settlers, or the missions, would rise above the economic level of his fellows. One of the best examples was "Jack" Yaruka, a man of great initiative and energy. He owned a coconut plantation of over one thousand trees situated opposite Suau island on the south coast. (134) On this plantation he employed six indentured labourers. "Jacky" stayed in his village putting his ancestral acres to good use, and continued to take part in the ceremonial life of his people. For example to enhance his prestige he planned to purchase a bullock for the next goi feast and so rise in the estimation of his fellows who could only contribute the customary pig. Yaruka was the incarnation of the government's ideal Papuan. Administration policies particularly with regard to taxation and legislation dealing with

(133) Ibid. 1925-1926, 19; Ibid. 1926-1927, 9.
(134) Anthrop. Report no.13, 47.
native plantations, aimed at creating a society of "Jackies": natives who were provident, responsible, yet not that anathema—the detribalized native. On the other hand it refused to see that the rise of such people entailed new social problems. For example it ignored the question of what would happen when, as would inevitably be the case, "Jacky's" estate came up for inheritance by his descendants.

There was a similar case of a very energetic Muruan who gradually cleared and planted up a hundred and fifty acres of coconuts on land which did not belong to him. The land dispute came before the Resident Magistrate who, with the consent of the rightful owner, gave the squatter the title to one hundred and forty acres. Another thirty acres of planted land reverted to the rightful owner who had to pay one hundred pounds cash for the improvements made on it. (135) This was a particularly interesting case as one native sold unwanted land to another who presumably held it under a freehold title. The purchaser had deviated completely from traditional patterns of land tenure: he held land as the whitemen held land. That his activities aroused animosities in his fellows soon became apparent as he could not engage labour to work his plantation. (136)

A Teste island native Sepulai Sibukara, commonly known as "Charlie", who died in August 1927 left two cutters, a whaleboat and other articles of value. The Resident Magistrate paid a visit to Teste to take a list of Sepulai's goods and chattels. His next of kin were taken to Samarai to fetch the cutters. (137)

So late as 1928 only four hundred and thirty nine natives in the whole territory held bank accounts, and the total deposit amounted to just on £6,500:0:0. (138) An Eastern Division native had the honour of keeping an account open for the longest period. While employed as a warder at the Samarai gaol he made his first deposit in March 1916. He continued to save, and in ten years had accumulated £126:16:3. He then bought a whaleboat which took practically all his capital, leaving a balance of only a few pounds. With this he set out to make a living fishing for bêche-de-mer and trochus shell.

It had taken ten years of hard saving for this native to accumulate a small sum of money. Almost certainly his boat was not insured; he had no capital resources to fall back on in a time of difficulty; he could not have got an overdraft from the bank or a loan from the European trading firms. His only

recourse in an emergency would have been to become a wage-earner again either in the government employ or for private enterprise. The government protected him in some ways, for example by inspecting his boat each year to see that he kept it seaworthy, but almost certainly it would not have loaned him money if he had required it. Nor did it prevent Europeans, from whom he was forced to buy his supplies, charging him more for goods than they did whitemen. For instance natives had to pay one and sixpence for a sack that cost a whiteman only one and a penny. (139) Probably the merchants also underpaid for produce bought from natives.

The Papuan played a very subordinate role in economic life, but he was nonetheless active to some degree. His place in politics was much smaller. The native civil servants comprised only a very small percentage of the population. At the beginning of Australian rule there were seventeen Armed Native Constables in the Eastern Division and eight in the South-eastern Division. (140) Of the half dozen in the South-eastern Division two were stationed in the Trobriands, the other four at Murua head-quarters. At the same period there were

(139) C.P.293 Set 20 Bundle 1; R.M.S.E.D. to G.Sec. 6 Mar.1933. (140) Ann.Rep.1906–1907, 100.
eighty three Village Constables in the Eastern Division and fort one in the South-eastern Division. (141) In 1927-1928 the Samar detachment was twenty six men strong, there were twelve Constabl at Abau, ten at Ewagacia, three at Kulumadau, and two in the Trobriands. (142) By this time there were one hundred and nine; nine Village Constables in the Eastern Division and seventy in t South-eastern Division. (143) There were also one or two gaol warders, hospital orderlies, and sometimes a native artisan at the main government stations. The Village Constables, who form by far the largest group, were sometimes unsupervised for long periods and came into contact more frequently with the junior ranks of the civil service.

Recruitment and appointment to both the Armed Native Constabulary and the Village Constable force continued in the same way as in the period of joint control. That is, field officials accepted Armed Native Constabulary recruits, or appointed as Village Constables the persons they considered most suitable for the post. The Village Constable force, taken as a whole, functioned quite efficiently although the number of men who constantly fulfilled their duties with assiduity and will

(141) Ibid, 23.  
(143) Ibid, 15.
was small. Some however served the government faithfully for long periods. Two Village Constables in the D'Entrecasteaux islands had, in 1925, been in office for a quarter of a century or more, and both had extremely good records. One had served twenty six years as a Village Constable, and before that had been in the Armed Native Constabulary in MacGregor's period as Governor. (144)

Yet recruitment continued to be a problem under the Australian regime, not because of any shortage of applicants but because, as with the Armed Native Constabulary, suitable men were fairly rare. Men who had served in the Armed Native Constabulary, or who had been for a term in prison, or who worked for Europeans in some capacity, or who were mission trained, were usually selected because they had some experience of administrative processes or could communicate directly with the European official. (145) The little English they could speak led officials to suppose Village Constables clearly understood instructions when in many cases they had not.

Doubtless many charges of inefficiency arose from this mutual incomprehension.

The official attitude to Papuan capabilities joined with the village natives' inexperience and lack of education to preclude them from taking an effective part in policy discussion. Even an intelligent man like Murray assumed that the Papuan's position in the human hierarchy was fixed, well below that of the whiteman. This affected administrative processes at every level. Although Murray formulated schemes which enabled native to participate in the government it was always in an advisory capacity. From 1924-1925 district officials appointed Village Councillors and from 1930-1931 Court Assessors, but such natives had no power to legislate. (146) Village Councillors did not become an effective political force before 1930 and Court Assessors in Murray's view would not be useful to the administration for at least a generation. Murray, and his subordinates, did not believe Papuans were the equals of Europeans. (147)

Officials took a paternalist interest in native welfare and there the matter ended, despite Murray's fascination for the

tenets of indirect rule and the way these functioned in Papua. District officials rarely attempted to ascertain native opinions about the work of the administration, nor did they take customary law much into account. For humanitarian motives the death sentence was rarely carried out for murder; in this, and by imposing light sentences for sorcery, stealing, and adultery, the administration contravened customary law. In native communities no stigma attached to certain sorts of homicide whereas adultery, stealing, particularly from gardens, and sorcery were capital crimes.

Untrained and unqualified though they generally were, the European field officials had some worthy qualities. Whatever their motives had been in joining the service, some dedicated themselves to serving less fortunate people and became passionately concerned with improving the natives. Although they did not themselves devise welfare schemes, district officials became involved in their implementation. The decline in population aroused vehement feelings in most officials. The natives' failure to reproduce was regarded by some as practically sedition in the form of passive resistance. C.B. Higginson, while Resident Magistrate of the Eastern Division, was once disconcerted to find a group of natives grinning while he lectured them for not sending their children to school. When
taxed about this unmannerly display they explained that they had been laughing about Kadeni, a man who had eight children. Higginson plainly thought they were idiotic and ended his report by writing "Kadeni is, as far as I am aware, the most valuable native citizen in the Eastern Division." (148)

Indeed, the district administration functioned remarkably well considering the deficiencies of resources and personnel. There were few examples of flagrant mal-practice. Official scandals could be camouflaged perhaps, but in almost thirty years only one officer in south-east Papua committed a major breach of duty. In 1919 the Murua managers of two local firms, Whitten Brothers and Nelsson and Sheddon, called on the Resident Magistrate to make a serious complaint. The Inspector of Native Labour had proposed that they should deduct one pound from the wages of each native they signed off before him. He suggested that the sum be divided equally between themselves and him. If any questions were raised about the labourers not getting full wages, he would be prepared to swear that they had received the money. (149)

Head-quarters could act quickly when necessary and within

six days the Government Secretary had told the Resident Magistrate to notify the Inspector that his appointment had been terminated. This the Resident Magistrate did, taking control of the cash and stamps in the Inspector's possession. Murray formally discharged him in May when he visited Muriua. Perhaps Murray's policy of employing physically strong, intellectually weak officers prevented the occurrence of many more such cases. Drinking to excess or "hammering" natives were lapses which could be ignored, but fraud, particularly with the cognizance of non-official Europeans, could not.

Even when dedicated to the service, district officials did not always act in a way which promoted native advancement. The Rich brothers, sons of the L.M.S. missionary, tended, even more than most of their fellows, to regard the natives as children. Lack of education, imagination, and insight prevented any real understanding of the natives. Perhaps because they were too involved, the drama of culture contact escaped the officials' vision; unaware of the central issues they became swamped in a morass of detail. Busy with a thousand and one tasks officials hardly had time to think at all in the course of their execution; certainly they could not reflect on the future

(150) Ibid, 6 Mar. 1919.
(151) Ibid, 16 May 1919.
development of the territory or the fate of its inhabitants. Mess quarters, a patrol camp, or even conjugal life under Papuan conditions allowed hardly any scope for intellectual pursuits. Drinking and, in centres like Samarai or Kulumadau, gossip, or various social functions left little time for philosophic pondering. The Gwabigwabi affair was one of the best illustrations of the consequent lack of insight.

Even intelligent officials had but a slight influence on the natives, as the story of Charles Adolphe Gough Belgrave Smith bears witness. Smith, when first appointed a Patrol Officer, and after having been only a few months in the territory sent to head-quarters a long and highly critical report of current administrative procedures in the South-eastern Division. He thought it useless to keep a patrol within a pre-determined time limit as the result was work done inadequately. He thought that one particular officer should be in charge of a patrol because any party without a recognized leader lacked organization and this led to confusion and ultimately to an unsuccessful conclusion. (152) Smith also objected to the high-handed treatment of natives by one of the Methodist missionaries and

his staff. He declared that both missionary and teachers used to hold their own courts and mete out punishment illegally, but he had insufficient evidence to prosecute. (153) However from evidence obtained on the patrol Smith found the mission staff guilty of forcibly removing native girls from their natal villages to other parts of the territory. Smith further complained of the calibre of native teachers appointed by the mission synod. They were, he thought, stupid and indolent. "The ignorance of the so called native student teachers is damnable, and what they preach to the people is simply abominable rot." (154)

Besides objecting to administrative procedures and the lack of supervision over the unofficial immigrant community, Smith also found fault with the way officers interpreted various regulations. For example when he heard adultery cases arising from young girls with old husbands taking lovers, he invariably liberated the young women from matrimony on condition that her people returned the bride-price. He stated that the natives regarded this course as just; but other officials in such cases compelled the erring wife to return to her spouse, which led, in some cases to her suicide. (155) Smith also disapproved of

(153) Ibid, general notes.
(154) Ibid, and 2 Dec.
(155) Ibid, general notes.
the lax treatment afforded prisoners. He thought that they should not be allowed to take lime pots and other paraphernalia to jail. Thus it would be made clear that they were imprisoned for punishment, not pleasure.

The only thing Smith did approve of was the system of public trial, which he thought gave the natives a good opportunity of learning right from wrong. Murray, though he must have been surprised by the diatribe, simply minuted the report "Mr Smith will probably make a good officer but the work is new to him." (156) In fact Smith never accepted the status quo nor submitted to what he considered arbitrary orders. He continued his battle against the fates for a couple of years, but coming to suspect his wife of infidelity, he committed suicide. (157)

District officials tended to be high-handed in their treatment of the natives. They usually acted from entirely commendable motives, hoping to protect the people from the consequences of ignorance and sloth, but this did not prevent them from being overbearing. Once the Modewa natives of the south coast offered an Assistant Resident Magistrate the use of their whaleboat to visit Swau island. He could not refrain

from telling the owners that the boat would be inspected by the
government each tax collection to see that it was properly
looked after. (158) A syndicate of the Modewa men had purchased
the boat for one hundred and forty pounds from a Samarai trader,
and in the officer's view it was equal to any he had seen in the
area; but he was certain that once the novelty of ownership wore
off, the natives would fail to keep it sea-worthy.

The over-riding defect of the district administration
was the failure of officials to come into effective contact with
the people. There was no communication, except at a very
superficial level, between the government and the Papuans.
Chiefly responsible were the language barrier and the officials' inability to spend sufficient time studying native societies.
While in a village, officials spent their time explaining the
advantages of better methods of garbage disposal; or in supervising the construction of latrines; or in making sure that bodies were interred in a cemetery and not in the village; or in explaining the benefits which would accrue from the planting of coconuts. They never thoroughly explained the motives behind any regulation. So late as 1924 an officer matter-of-
factly wrote that in every case where mothers received baby

(158) C.P.I.(T.) Set 35 Bundle 50, Pat.Rep. south coast 17 Feb. -
bonuses in the Milne Bay and north-east coast area, they presented themselves at tax time with all the money intact and declaring that they were frightened to spend the government money. One woman said she was keeping the bonus for her son to use as tax money, and this proved to be a fairly common practice. The people had no idea why they had to pay a tax at all and every penny, from whatever source, was put towards it.

(159) The Milne Bay natives had been in fairly close contact with Europeans from the 1870's and were considered to be exceptionally "civilized".

Fergusson island contributed another episode which showed both field officers failing to grasp the purpose of certain policies and the want of understanding between them and the natives. An officer refused to give three qualified women the baby bonus, because the children's origins were unorthodox by European standards although not by native custom. (160) If the administration did not recognize native adoption its purpose in giving the bonus could never be understood by the Papuans. Cases of fraudulent attempts to obtain payments might indicate that the logic of its distribution was a mystery as much as

that the natives involved were dishonest. (161)

Even in such routine procedures as those connected with native labour, occasional cases showed how ineffective were the provisions of the Ordinance because there was no real communication between the Inspector and recruits. For instance a native, one of a batch of three from the Northern Division, deserted from a Milne Bay plantation the day after his arrival. He ran into a swamp and there disappeared. The government investigated the matter and police found his body. The dead man's companions were then arrested but it transpired that nobody could speak the prisoners' language so they could not be interrogated. Murray, when he read the report, wished to know how the men had been signed on if they spoke an unknown language. The Samarai Inspector's reply was most illuminating. He said that the trio were brought into his office by a recruiter named Doig, together with three other recruits, Eastern Division natives. He followed the usual procedure. The Northern Division men showed no hesitation but touched the pen as did the Eastern Division natives. His explanation must have been accepted as sufficient, for the matter ended there. (162)

Also hindering effective government was the ambivalent role of the field officer. At one level, the theoretical, field officers were unimportant. They neither planned attempts to modify the status quo nor formulated schemes for future developments. This was left to the Governor and his advisors at the capital or in the Commonwealth. The execution of policy depended on the usual machinery of an Executive and Legislative Council with the Governor in a dominant position on both bodies. Yet field officers were, in one very tangible sense, the most important link in the administrative chain. They were also, at the district level, the most important men in the community. Individuals, Papuan or foreign, might be influential in a particular area but the discrete nature of settlement, and the composition of society, precluded the development of any body powerful enough to challenge the government. Only the "government man" could invoke sufficient temporal force to have his will obeyed.

No matter how puzzled they might have been by administrative actions the natives had to accept them. All sections of the non-indigenous population were in a better position vis-a-vis the government because they could communicate freely, and had some experience of living in a centralized, unified state. Also they tacitly accepted the principle of European
domination over the Papuans. No matter how opposed they may have been to the government on particular issues, the unofficial population unquestioningly admitted its legality. Local officials were thus men of power, yet without a personally decided goal towards which they aimed.

South-east Papua felt the impact of Murray's administrative policies which both reformed and stultified. Field officers were expected to acknowledge instructions and memoranda, and besides send regular reports and returns to the Government Secretary's Department. But the system did not work perfectly. Divisional stations remained chronically understaffed, and the turnover of officers continued to be fairly high among the lower ranks where transfers and promotions were common. (163) The incorporation of technical aids such as radio or the typewriter improved the administrative routine. Thus after Murray became Governor the improvement in communications and office procedures was marked although the Government Secretary still had, on occasion, to rebuke officials for being late with reports, or for not replying to questions.

Another feature of the Australian regime, and one which more than any other factor curbed the autonomy of district

(163) See list of officials at end of chapter.
officials, was Murray's personal reading of every report sent to head-quarters. He continually made marginal comments and gave instructions. His comments ranged from reproving Patrol Officers for writing slangy journalesse and not sending full reports; (164) to instructing a Resident Magistrate not to employ labour but use prisoners to work a government plantation; (165) to suggesting that a certain Village Constable should get two pounds extra per annum since he had held office for twenty three years and was still full of enthusiasm. (166) He repeated emphasised that patrolling had been especially neglected in the Eastern Division and requested the Resident Magistrate to show more activity in that direction. (167)

Murray was quick to notice any illegalities in the district administration and drew attention to them immediately. For instance he reminded Eastern Division officials that

Assistant Resident Magistrates had no power to appoint or dismiss Village Constables after one officer had reported that he found it necessary to do so. (168) On another occasion Murray pointed out to a Patrol Officer that he had no right to threaten to cut down betel palms because natives of a certain village had not obeyed the coconut regulation. (169) He also pointed out that land used by the natives should never be alienated from them. (170) This matter arose in connection with some land in Milne Bay which the Commonwealth Copra Company wished to exchange for another piece owned by natives. The latter refused to negotiate, one of the chief reasons being that the Company owned the village sago patch. Murray wished to know who had bought the land for the Company and requested the Government Secretary to tell the Resident Magistrate that supervision in the Eastern Division was too lax.

In the early war years Murray consistently found fault with the administration of the Eastern Division. He chided an Assistant Resident Magistrate for neglecting to investigate

thoroughly a robbery on the grounds of insufficient time. (171) On another occasion he rebuked the Resident Magistrate for not arresting a murderer. (172) His invective against Higginson reached its acrimonious height in two minutes dated 2 November 1916. Patrols were often accompanied by sketch maps and when he read one such report Murray commented "I suppose the villages marked X of the Patrol Officer as visited for the first time [to be] new villages. Otherwise it shows great remissness on the part of the R.M. - He seems to have a conscientious objection to inland patrols." (173) Higginson naturally felt goaded and replied that the villages had been visited before although the Patrol Officer alleged that they had not. (174)

Besides this greater supervision from Port Moresby the increase in personnel was another factor which limited the autonomy of any individual officer. It was more difficult to conceal autocratic or brutal actions or lapses of any kind from head-quarters when they were observed by a colleague not simply native police and carriers. Rather paradoxically the increase

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in personnel helped to strengthen Murray's autocracy. To escape censure officers of this period preferred always to take action which was unequivocally supported by the law. So their independence shrank further.

Suggestions made to Port Moresby were almost always concerned with minor matters or requests for extra staff and additional equipment. For example in 1920 one officer suggested that the government ought to lay down a minimum quality for blankets issued to native labourers. (175) He pointed out that an employer committed no breach of the regulations if each labourer had a blanket even if it were inadequate protection against the cold. In 1921 another officer thought that labourers whose contracts had expired ought not receive goods such as shirts or vests in part payment for wages, when it was an offence for a native to wear clothing on the upper part of his body. (176) Other suggestions ranged from requests for regular three monthly medical patrols so that up-country people would benefit directly from taxation, (177) to a plea that the format of baby bonus cards be altered so as to facilitate census checking. (178)

(177) Ibid, south coast 2-22 May 1926.
Once Murray came to power no Magistrate could act as Campbell once did when the natives of Basilaki complained to him about the lecherous conduct of a Malay trader. Campbell told the man that unless he mended his ways he would be forced out of the Eastern Division whether it was legal or not. (179) By the same token, officers of the calibre of Monckton or H.L. Griffin, who both resigned from the service as a result of the transfer of sovereignty to Australia, (180) or Campbell himself (who became Government Secretary) would never have submitted to being simply the channel through which policies from above were put into practice. This curtailment of the district officials' powers was the one striking feature peculiar to the Australian administration, and had unhappy consequences. Having no part in policy making the men in the field became more prone to misunderstand and mis-implement directives from above.

By 1930 it was plain that Australia had failed to create a multi-racial society in which natives and whitemen progressed in politics, economics, and socially. Yet officials had tried hard; their efforts showed how difficult the task was. Perhaps the chief reason for Australia's failure was that her leaders

still adhered to nineteenth century theories of colonial administration. Papuans had a stone age technology at the time their country became a British possession. In the following years neither Britain nor Australia was prepared to spend more than was absolutely necessary to bring the natives under control and allow some incentives to European settlement. The contributing powers refused to subscribe sufficient money to alter the village environment by introducing its inhabitants to current western social, economic, and political institutions, and the revenue of the territory was insufficient to allow the Governor to introduce such changes except to a very minor degree. It was thus easy for the people in control to suppose that the natives were incapable of progress except under the strictest supervision and control. Australian policy makers did not accept the principle of human equality. This, more than any other single factor, retarded the advancement of the Papuans.
Appendix I.

Return of Eastern Division Natives Engaged under Contract of Service 1906–1907.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Samarai</th>
<th>Murla</th>
<th>Trobriands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural workers</td>
<td>207</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boat boys</td>
<td>355</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carriers</td>
<td>140</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. servants and store</td>
<td>108</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. labourers</td>
<td>135</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House boys</td>
<td>81</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>1,043</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timber getting</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2,103</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Return of Eastern and South-eastern Division Natives Engaged under Contract of Service 1913–1914.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Samarai</th>
<th>Murla</th>
<th>Trobriands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ag. and Pastoral</td>
<td>1,168</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>324</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boat boys</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Store boys</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House boys</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bèche-de-mer</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Occupations</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2,466</td>
<td>608</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Return of Eastern and South-eastern Division Natives Engaged under Contract of Service 1921–1922.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>E.D.</th>
<th>S.E.D.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ag. and Pastoral</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timber getting</td>
<td>43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boat boys</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carriers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Store boys</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House boys</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bèche-de-mer</td>
<td>105</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. labourers</td>
<td>802</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Occupations</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,974</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Return of Eastern and South-eastern Division Natives Engaged under Contract of Service 1927-1928.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>E.D.</th>
<th>S.E.D.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ag. and Pastoral</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timber getting</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boat boys</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carriers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Store boys</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House boys</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bâche-de-mer</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. labourers</td>
<td>895</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Occupations</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2,267</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Appendix II.**

List of Officials in South-east Papua 1906 to 1930.

This is not exhaustive. Temporary or relieving officers were in the district at various times.

**Resident Magistrate Samarai.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>to 1.7.1908</td>
<td>Campbell, Alexander Malcolm. Became Gov. Sec.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.7.1908 to 27.8.1910</td>
<td>Turner, Charles Owen. Resigned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.7.1924 to 1.7.1930</td>
<td>Lyons, Arthur Power.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Assistant Resident Magistrate Samarai.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From 1906 to 1919</td>
<td>MacAlpine, Alexander Mair.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 1906 to 27.8.1910</td>
<td>Turner, Charles Owen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>Bowden, W.J.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>? Baldie, James Webster.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In 1910-1911</td>
<td>Hughes, Walter Thomas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In 1916</td>
<td>Humphries, Walter Richard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>Connolly, Lincoln Grant Gartrette.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In 1919-1920</td>
<td>? Armit, L.P.B.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In 1920</td>
<td>Barnes, William Albert.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In 1921</td>
<td>Zimmer, George Frederick William.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In 1921</td>
<td>Hughes, Walter Thomas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In 1923</td>
<td>Leonard, Cyril Ambrose.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In 1925</td>
<td>Vivian, Reginald Arthur.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In 1926</td>
<td>Austen, Leo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In 1928</td>
<td>Cridland, Alfred Ernest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In 1928</td>
<td>Ashton, Sydney Layton Allensleigh.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In 1929</td>
<td>Dick, Robert Lamb.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In 1929</td>
<td>Woodward, Ronald Austin.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Assistant Resident Magistrate Abau.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>Bastard, Edwin Montague.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921-1922</td>
<td>Humphries, Walter Richard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927-1928</td>
<td>Flint, Leopold Aclin.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Collector of Customs Samarai.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From 1906 to 1910-1911</td>
<td>Kendrick, Robert William Turner.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910-1911 to 1913-1914</td>
<td>Fitzgerald, James Paul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913-1914 to 1926-1927</td>
<td>Harris, Edward Charles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Clerks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>Armit, Lionel Percy Barton. 2nd clerk Treas. and Customs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>MacDonnell, Frank. Clerk R.M.'s Office. I.N.L.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908-1909</td>
<td>Fitzgerald, James Paul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911-1912</td>
<td>Baldie, James Webster. Chief clerk Customs etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913-1914</td>
<td>Brown, Allan. Clerk Treas. &amp; Customs etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916-1917</td>
<td>Nevitt, Albert Lewis. Clerk Treas. &amp; Customs etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918-1920</td>
<td>Giles, Alfred Willett Linzee. Clerk Treas. &amp; Customs etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921-1922</td>
<td>Wilson, Percy Serverne. Clerk R.M.'s Office. I.N.L.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923-1924</td>
<td>Bastard, E.M. Replaced Skelly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925-1926</td>
<td>Giles, A.W.L. Clerk Treas. &amp; Customs etc. Resigned 14.7.1913.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927-1928</td>
<td>Button, Alfred Keith. Chief clerk Treas. etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929-1930</td>
<td>Imlay, George Norman. Acting Chief clerk Customs etc. until 1.12.1916.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930-1931</td>
<td>Turnbull, Gilbert Munro. Clerk Treas. &amp; Customs etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933-1934</td>
<td>Replaced Hickey.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Patrol Officers Samarai.** Most of these men were temporary and served only a short time.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1910-1911</td>
<td>Burrowes, Sydney Douglas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913-1914</td>
<td>Bushell, N.K.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bastard, E.M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dexter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>Fitzgerald.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hannant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>Cawley, Frank Reginald.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>Wilson, Percy Serverne.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cameron.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tracey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>Cloherty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Topal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Waugh.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>Zimmer, George William Frederick.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ellery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>McCleland, Kenneth Cyril.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>Hughes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>Chance, Sydney Howard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>Thompson, William Henry Halford.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rich, Clement Herbert.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rich, M.C.W.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Atkinson, Cecil.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Engineer Ruby, E.D.Vessel.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To 31.1.1908</td>
<td>Clark, T. McDuff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910 to 1.2.1918</td>
<td>Doig, William. Replaced Clark.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>Bulk, Frederick.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Gaoler Eastern Division.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.8.1907 to 30.10.1907</td>
<td>Ryan, Henry Joseph.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.8.1908 to 26.11.1908</td>
<td>Crouch, George Andrew. Assistant Gaoler.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>Hogan, Louis P.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910-1911</td>
<td>Leslie, Rupert Nugent. Resigned 12.4.1911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.4.1912 to 30.9.1913</td>
<td>Ring, Frederick Ernest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.2.1914 to 24.4.1914</td>
<td>Slater.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916 to 1925</td>
<td>Headon, Frederick.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>Speedie, Charles Sheridan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Medical Officer Samarai.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To 10.4.1913</td>
<td>Jones, Robert Fleming.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 1.7.1913</td>
<td>Giblin, William Eric.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Matron European Hospital Samarai.
From 1913 to 1922 Fleming, Johanna.
From 1922 D'Arcy, Ruby.

Officer in Charge of Wagawaga Nursery.
11.9.1907 to 6.4.1908 Solomon, Elias.
1910-1911 Murray-Strachan.
1914-1915 Young, Henry Francis.

Manager Orangerie Bay.
Whole period Catt, Henry Edward.

Resident Magistrate South-eastern Division.
To 30.6.1907 Moreton, M.H.
1.7.07 to 16.1.1910 Gill, Francis.
17.1.1910 to 31.1.1920 Symons, A.H.
31.1.1920 to 1.6.1921 Humphries, Walter Richard.
1.6.1921 to 1925 Leonard, Cyril Ambrose.
From 1925 Berge, Frederick James.

Collector Customs S.E.D.
To 1908-1909 Haughton, Samuel Pierson.
1908-1909 to 1910-1911 Fitzgerald, James Paul.
1910-1911 to 1913-1914 Harris, Edward Charles.
25.5.1915 to 1918-1919 Davies, Norman Frederick.
1.7.1919 Imlay, Norman George.
1920-1921 James, Alfred Ernest.
1923-1924 Imlay, Norman George.
1925-1927 Vacant.
1927-1928 Rogerson, H.W.

Assistant Resident Magistrate S.E.D.
To 1.4.1907 Elliot, Alexander. Resigned.
1908-1909 Celrichs, Alfred Edward.
6.6.1910 Baldie, James Webster.
1910 to 14.2.1915 Norrie, Charles Percy. Died in Brisbane on way to war.
1913-1914 Hughes, Walter Thomas.
1915 Humphries, Walter Richard.
1921 Leonard, Cyril Ambrose.
1923 Cridland, Alfred Ernest. From 5.10.1921
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Assistant Resident Magistrate and Medical Officer Losuia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>Brown, N.L. I.N.L.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>Inlay, Norman George.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>Zimmer, George Frederick William.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>Ashton, L.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Berge, F.J. From 7.5.1928.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assistant Resident Magistrate and Medical Officer Losuia:

- To 1919: Bellamy, Raynor Laming.
- 1.1.1919 to 1928: Whitehouse, Ernest.

Patrol Officers South-eastern Division:

- Greenland.
- 4.7.1914 to 19.11.1914: Woodward, Ronald Austin.
- Mears on leave. Relieving.
- 1926: Waldron, Joseph Herbert Charles.
- 1927: Hall, Arthur Alfred Cornelius.
- 1930: Rich, Clement Herbert.
- Fowler, James Grant.

Medical Officer Murua:

- 1910 to 1921: Taaffe, John.
## Appendix III.

**Extant List of Patrol Reports for south-east Papua 1906-1929.**

### South Coast

| Date Range            | 1906  | 1907  | 1908  | 1909  | 1910  | 1911  | 1912  | 1913  | 1914  | 1915  | 1916  | 1917  | 1918  | 1919  | 1920  | 1921  | 1922  | 1923  | 1924  | 1925  |
|-----------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| 1-13 Jan.             | R.M.  |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 5-17 Apr.             | R.M.  |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 10-20 Oct.            | A.R.M.|       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| To Cloudy Bay 14 Mar. |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 3 June                |       |       |       | Special L.L. Bell |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 5-10 Nov.             | A.R.M.|       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 13-20 Nov.            | A.R.M.|       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 18 Feb. - 20 Mar.     | A.R.M.|       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 19-24 May             | R.M.  |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 15-26 May             | R.M.  |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 4-17 Dec.             | A.R.M.|       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 19-28 June            | R.M.  |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 5-26 Jan.             | P.O.  |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 18 Nov. - 14 Dec.     | P.O.  |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 24-26 Sept.           | P.O.  |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 27 Dec. 1915 - 3 Jan. | A.R.M.|       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 22 Jan. - 23 Feb.     | A.R.M.|       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 18-29 Feb.            | R.M.  |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 19-22 May             | R.M.  |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 16-19 June            | R.M.  |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 30 July - 7 Aug.      | R.M.  |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 10 Mar. - 6 Apr.      | P.O.  |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 21-26 Nov.            | P.O.  |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 9-27 Mar.             | A.R.M.|       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 16 Aug. - 7 Sept.     | P.O.  |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 14 Jan. - 4 Feb.      | P.O.  |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 14 Mar. - 26 Apr.     | P.O.  |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 26 May - 16 July      | P.O.  |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 27 Jan. - 23 Feb.     | A.R.M.|       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 27 Apr. - 3 May       | R.M.  |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 11 Aug. - 15 Sept.    | A.R.M. Inland |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 26 Sept. - 16 Oct.    | A.R.M.|       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 22 Jan. - 23 Feb.     | A.R.M. Also inland |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 4-25 Apr.             | P.O.  |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 26 Nov. - 10 Dec.     | R.M.  |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 26 Nov. 1923 - 12 Jan.| A.R.M.|       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 16-23 Dec.            | A.R.M.|       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 16 Feb. - 12 Mar.     | A.R.M.|       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 23 July - 6 Aug.      | R.M.  |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| 22 July - 6 Aug.      | P.O.  Inland to Milne Bay. |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |       |
13–22 May 1926 R.M.
2–22 May 1926 A.R.M.
19 Aug.–2 Sept. 1926 P.O. inland.
23 Dec. 1926–3 Jan. 1927 P.O.
12 May–1 June 1927 A.R.M.
2–6 Aug. 1927 A.R.M. special enquiry inland.
5–11 Feb. 1928 R.M.
17 Feb.–18 Mar. 1928 A.R.M.
21–28 May 1928 A.R.M.
21–26 Feb. 1929 R.M.
21 Feb.–21 Mar. 1929 A.R.M.

North-east Coast

1–7 Aug. 1906 R.M.
23–26 Aug. 1907 R.M.
14–22 Oct. 1909 A.R.M.
1–7 Oct. 1911 P.O. and Fergusson.
17–31 Oct. 1911 P.O.
1–16 Nov. 1911 P.O. inland to south coast.
19–27 June 1912 A.R.M.
14–26 Nov. 1912 R.M.
25–31 July 1914 P.O.
21 Jan.–23 Feb. 1915 A.R.M.
22 Feb.–20 Mar. 1916 P.O.
21 Aug.–8 Sept. 1916 A.R.M.
6–26 Jan. 1917 P.O.
7–27 Sept. 1917 P.O.
4–24 Feb. 1919 P.O.
3–20 Aug. 1920 P.O.
17–19 Nov. 1920 A.R.M.
20 Mar.–29 Apr. 1921 A.R.M.
27 May–1 July 1921 P.O. inland to south coast.
3–24 May. 1922 A.R.M.
6 Mar.–3 Apr. 1923 A.R.M.
19 Mar.–24 Apr. 1924 A.R.M.
27 Mar.–26 Apr. 1925 P.O.
2–31 May 1925 P.O. inland to south coast.
2–8 May 1925 R.M.
3 July–31 Aug. 1925 P.O.
30 Mar.–24 Apr. 1926 A.R.M.
14 June–1 July 1926 A.R.M.
18 Feb.–25 Mar. 1927 A.R.M.
23–28 Aug. 1927 R.M.
17–20 Jan. 1928 R.M.
17 Jan.–11 Feb. 1928 P.O. inland to south coast.
19–24 Apr. 1928 R.M.
5-26 May 1928 P.O.
16 Jan. - 14 Feb. 1929 P.O.
21 Jan. - 21 Feb. 1929 P.O. inland to south coast.
16-30 Aug. 1929 A.R.M.

**Milne Bay**

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6-8 Feb. 1921 P.O.
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31 Jan. - 11 Feb. 1922 A.R.M.
7-13 Feb. 1922 A.R.M.
16-22 Mar. 1922 A.R.M.
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16-23 Feb. 1923 A.R.M.
14-24 Ap. 1923 A.R.M.
4-9 Ap. 1923 A.R.M.
7-30 June 1923 A.R.M. and north-east coast.
25-31 Aug. 1923 A.R.M.
6-11 Oct. 1923 A.R.M.
30 Oct. - 21 Nov. 1923 A.R.M.
4-10 Feb. 1924 A.R.M.
16-20 and 24-29 Dec. 1924 P.O.
9-12 Jan. 1925 P.O.
18-25 May 1925 R.M.
17-21 Aug. 1925 A.R.M.
27-29 Sept. 1925 R.M.
9-12 Dec. 1925 R.M.
11-20 Feb. 1926 A.R.M.
7-22 Mar. 1926 A.R.M.
7-11 Apr. 1926 A.R.M.
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8-18 Sept. 1926 A.R.M.
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**Local Islands**

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<td>24-26 Mar.</td>
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D'Entrecasteaux Islands

19–20 Dec. 1926 R.M.
22 Dec. 1926 P.O.
26–27 Mar. 1927 R.M.
12–13 Apr. 1927 A.R.M.
15–22 June 1927 P.O.
10–11 Aug. 1927 R.M.
21 Aug. – 3 Sept. 1928 A.R.M.
23 May – 13 June 1929 A.R.M.
23–29 June 1929 R.M. also visited Police camp
              Ferguson and north-east coast.

13–18 Feb. 1906 R.M.
15–31 May 1906 A.R.M.
10–18 June 1908 A.R.M.
7 Sept. – 6 Oct. 1910 A.R.M.
19–31 May 1911 P.O.
1–18 June 1911 P.O.
1–29 July 1911 P.O.
6–23 Aug. 1911 P.O.
15–29 Sept. 1911 P.O.
1–7 Oct. 1911 P.O. Ferguson and north-east coast.

14–24 Dec. 1911 P.O.? 1911 P.O.
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22 Apr. – 24 May 1912 R.M. 1912 A.R.M.
18 Apr. – 16 May 1913 A.R.M.
20–30 May 1914 P.O.
11 Mar. – 16 May 1915 P.O. Normanby and Dobu.
13 Mar. – 6 Apr. 1916 R.M. also East Cape and Milne Bay.
11 Sept. – 7 Oct. 1916 P.O. Ferguson, Goodenough, and

1917 R.M. Dobu passage.
18 Apr. – 10 June 1917 P.O. Normanby.
14 July – 5 Aug.
18 Dec. 1917 - 11 Feb. 1918
16 Sept. - 13 Oct. 1918
31 Oct. - 21 Dec. 1918
22 Mar. - 18 Apr. 1919
29 Oct. - 6 Dec. 1919
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9 Feb. - 9 Mar. 1920
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<td>6–10 Mar.</td>
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<td>22-25 Nov.</td>
<td>1929 R.M.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Islands west of Murua**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25-28 Feb.</td>
<td>1911 R.M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-27 Oct.</td>
<td>1912 R.M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Mar. - 6 Ap.</td>
<td>1913 A.R.M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-17 July</td>
<td>1913 R.M. Trobriands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 July - 7 Aug.</td>
<td>1913 A.R.M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 May - 22 June</td>
<td>1914 P.O.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-12 Sept.</td>
<td>1914 P.O.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 May - 26 June</td>
<td>1915 R.M. including Trobriands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-15 Oct.</td>
<td>1915 R.M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-19 Dec.</td>
<td>1915 P.O.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-14 Jan.</td>
<td>1916 P.O. including Trobriands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-15 Mar.</td>
<td>1916 P.O. including Trobriands and Lusancay islands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 May - 10 June</td>
<td>1916 R.M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-21 Dec.</td>
<td>1916 A.R.M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-24 Feb.</td>
<td>1917 R.M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Feb. - 5 Mar.</td>
<td>1917 A.R.M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 May - 5 June</td>
<td>1917 A.R.M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-9 July</td>
<td>1917 R.M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-31 Dec.</td>
<td>1917 R.M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-4 June</td>
<td>1918 R.M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 July - 7 Aug.</td>
<td>1918 A.R.M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-10 Oct.</td>
<td>1918 A.R.M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-10 Nov.</td>
<td>1918 A.R.M.</td>
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</table>
18-30 June 1919 R.M. Kitava and Trobriands.
28 Oct. - 5 Nov. 1919 R.M.
30 Apr. - 11 May 1921 Murua to Misima.
25 July - 22 Aug. 1921 R.M. including Trobriands.
24 Nov. - 2 Dec. 1921 R.M. Murua and Egum.
14-29 Mar. 1923 R.M. including Trobriands.
12-23 Mar. 1924 R.M. Murua, Trobriands, and islands.
28 Apr. - 20 May 1925 R.M. ditto.
18 May - 6 June 1926 R.M. ditto.
9-12 Dec. 1926 R.M. Murua and Alcesters.
30 May - 6 June 1927 A.R.M. Murua and Kitava.
7-21 Sept. 1927 R.M. Murua, Trobriands, and islands.

Islands east of Murua
4-20 Dec. 1924 R.M. ditto.
20 Feb. - 7 Mar. 1926 R.M. Laughlans. Also Murua and islands west.
6-15 May 1926 R.M. Laughlans. Also Murua.
11-13 July 1928 A.R.M. Laughlans.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date Range</th>
<th>Events</th>
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<tr>
<td>9 June - 19 July</td>
<td>1908 Rossel. Special patrol L.L. Bell.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. - Nov.</td>
<td>1909 R.M. Misima, Kimuta, Sudest etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Also Brooker, Nike and Trobriands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 July - 14 Oct.</td>
<td>1911 R.M. Sudest, Rossel etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Apr. - 11 May</td>
<td>1912 R.M. Misima and islands east. Also islands west.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Jan. - 14 Mar.</td>
<td>1913 R.M. Rossel, Sudest etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Apr. - 30 May</td>
<td>1913 R.M. Misima, Rossel etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-19 Sept.</td>
<td>1913 R.M. Misima. Also Laughlans and islands west Misima.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-26 Jan.</td>
<td>1914 R.M. Misima, Sudest, Rossel etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Nov. - 5 Dec.</td>
<td>1914 P.O. Misima, Sudest, Rossel etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Also islands west Misima.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 Aug. - 3 Sept.</td>
<td>1915 R.M. Misima, Sudest, Rossel etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Also islands west.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-15 Nov.</td>
<td>1916 P.O. Misima.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Sept. - 1 Oct.</td>
<td>1916 A.R.M. Misima, Sudest, Rossel etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Oct. - 5 Nov.</td>
<td>1916 A.R.M. Misima, Sudest, Rossel etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Apr. - 23 May</td>
<td>1917 A.R.M. Misima, Sudest, Rossel etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10 Aug.</td>
<td>1917 R.M. Misima to Murua.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 Nov. - 6 Dec.</td>
<td>1917 A.R.M. Misima, Sudest, Rossel etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Also islands west and Laughlans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-12 Feb.</td>
<td>1918 A.R.M. Misima.</td>
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<tr>
<td>28 Apr. - 9 May</td>
<td>1918 R.M. Misima and smaller Louisiades.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-24 July</td>
<td>1918 R.M. Misima and smaller Louisiades.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Aug. - 23 Sept.</td>
<td>1918 R.M. Misima, Sudest etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24-30 Oct.</td>
<td>1918 A.R.M. Misima, Sudest, Rossel etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>19 May - 7 June</td>
<td>1919 A.R.M. Misima, Sudest, Rossel etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>21-31 July</td>
<td>1919 R.M. Misima.</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 Nov. - 6 Dec.</td>
<td>1919 R.M. Misima and smaller Louisiades.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10-16 Nov.</td>
<td>1920 R.M. Sudest and islands north.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7-9 Dec.</td>
<td>1920 R.M. Sudest.</td>
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<td>11-12 Jan.</td>
<td>1921 A.R.M. Kimuta.</td>
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<td>5-15 Mar.</td>
<td>1921 R.M. Sudest, Rossel etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date Range</td>
<td>1921-22 R.M. Sudest, Rossel etc.</td>
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<td>7-15 Ap.</td>
<td>1921-22 A.R.M. Sudest etc.</td>
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<td>17-24 June</td>
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<tr>
<td>8-23 Dec.</td>
<td>1922-23 R.M. Sudest etc.</td>
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<td>16-22 Feb.</td>
<td>1922-22 R.M. Sudest, Rossel etc.</td>
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<td>28 Ap. - 1 June</td>
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<td>13-25 July</td>
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<td>11-14 Dec.</td>
<td>1923-23 R.M. Kimuta. Also islands west Misima.</td>
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<td>16-19 Jan.</td>
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<td>31 Jan. - 9 Feb.</td>
<td>1923-23 R.M. Sudest etc.</td>
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<td>18-21 May</td>
<td>1924-24 A.R.M. Sudest, Rossel etc.</td>
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<td>2-6 June</td>
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<td>2-24 June</td>
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<td>1924-24 A.R.M. smaller Louisiades.</td>
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<td>23 May - 29 June</td>
<td>1925-25 A.R.M. Sudest, Rossel etc.</td>
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<td>10-13 Feb.</td>
<td>1925-26 P.O. ditto.</td>
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<td>27-28 Mar.</td>
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<td>16 June - 9 July</td>
<td>1926-26 P.O. Sudest, Rossel etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7-8 Aug.</td>
<td>1926-26 R.M. Kimuta etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11-18 Aug.</td>
<td>1926-26 P.O. inland Misima.</td>
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<tr>
<td>18-19 Dec.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 June - 14 July</td>
<td>1927-27 A.R.M. Sudest, Rossel, etc. Bellan went too as it was also a med. pat.</td>
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<td>28 Nov.</td>
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<td>1929-29 R.M. Sudest etc.</td>
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<td>Misima and Islands West</td>
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<td>10 Apr. - 11 May</td>
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<td>5-19 Sept.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 Nov. - 5 Dec.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 Aug. - 3 Sept.</td>
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<td>23-31 Jan.</td>
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<td>4-10 Apr.</td>
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<td>12-17 June</td>
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<td>6 Nov. - 6 Dec.</td>
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<td>16-26 Jan.</td>
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<td>19 May - 7 June</td>
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<td>21-31 July</td>
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<td>20 Nov. - 6 Dec.</td>
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<td>25-28 Mar.</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 Nov.</td>
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<td>6-8 July</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-18 Nov.</td>
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<td>27-29 Nov.</td>
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<td>16-19 Jan.</td>
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<td>27-30 Sept.</td>
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<td>31 Aug. - 12 Sept.</td>
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<td>16-21 Mar.</td>
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<td>28 July - 4 Aug.</td>
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<td>8-13 Aug.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-11 Dec.</td>
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<tr>
<td>22 Mar. - 4 Apr.</td>
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<tr>
<td>29 Oct. - 1 Nov.</td>
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<td>27-31 July</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>23-26 Sept.</td>
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</table>

1909 R.M. Also islands east.
1912 R.M. Misima and Panapomom.
1912 R.M. Misima, islands west. Also islands east.
1913 R.M. Misima and islands west.
Also Lauklans.
1914 P.O. Misima and islands west.
Also islands east.
1915 R.M. Misima and islands west to Samarai. Also islands east.
1917 R.M. Misima and islands west.
1917 R.M. Misima and islands west.
1917 R.M. Misima and Panaeati.
1917 A.R.M. Misima and islands west.
Also islands east.
1919 R.M. Misima and islands west.
1919 R.M. Misima to Samarai.
1919 R.M. Misima to Samarai.
1919 R.M. Misima and islands west.
Also islands east.
1921 R.M. Islands west.
1921 R.M. ditto.
1921 A.R.M. ditto.
1921 R.M. islands west. Also islands east.
1922 P.O. islands west.
1923 R.M. ditto.
1923 A.R.M. ditto.
1924 A.R.M. ditto.
1925 A.R.M. ditto.
1926 R.M. ditto.
1926 P.O. Nivani and villages east end Misima.
1926 R.M. islands west Misima.
1927 P.O. ditto.
1927 R.M. ditto.
1927 R.M. ditto and villages northern Misima.
1927 R.M. islands west Misima.
1928 R.M. islands west Misima. Also Murua and Kitava.
1928 P.O. islands west Misima.
1929 A.R.M. ditto.
1929 A.R.M. ditto.
<table>
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<td>4-7 Dec.</td>
<td>A.R.M. north Kiriwina.</td>
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<td>2-7 June</td>
<td>A.R.M. south Kiriwina and Vakuta.</td>
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<td>13-14 June</td>
<td>A.R.M. Boitalu etc. Kiriwina.</td>
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<td>11-14 May</td>
<td>A.R.M. east Kiriwina.</td>
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<tr>
<td>16-17 June</td>
<td>A.R.M. west and central Kiriwina.</td>
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<td>24-26 June</td>
<td>A.R.M. Vakuta etc.</td>
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<td>8-11 Oct.</td>
<td>A.R.M. Kaileuna etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>16-18 May</td>
<td>A.R.M. islands north and west Kiriwina.</td>
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<tr>
<td>13-15 June</td>
<td>A.R.M. Vakuta etc.</td>
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<td>4-6 Nov.</td>
<td>A.R.M. Vakuta.</td>
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<tr>
<td>17-19 Jan.</td>
<td>A.R.M. Obulaku etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4-6 Sept.</td>
<td>A.R.M. Vakuta.</td>
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</table>
17-18 Jan. 1918 A.R.M. Obulaku etc.
4-6 Oct. 1918 A.R.M. Kaileuna etc.
4-7 Feb. 1919 A.R.M. north-west Kiriwina.
29 July - 1 Aug. 1919 A.R.M. south Kiriwina.
8-12 Mar. 1920 A.R.M. south Kiriwina and islands.
20-30 July 1920 A.R.M. Vakuta.
3-6 May 1921 A.R.M. islands west and north.
9-14 May 1922 A.R.M. Kaileuna etc.
5-9 June 1923 A.R.M. north Kiriwina.
10-16 Sept. 1923 A.R.M. Vakuta.
27 Nov. - 7 Dec. 1923 A.R.M. Sim-sim and islands west and north Kiriwina.
2-5 Feb. 1924 A.R.M. Kaibola.
27-31 May 1924 A.R.M. Vakuta.
5-13 June 1924 A.R.M. north Kiriwina.
23-28 June
1924 A.R.M. south Kiriwina.
8-22 July 1924 A.R.M. north Kiriwina.
29 July - 2 Aug. 1924 A.R.M. Kaileuna etc.
5-6 Aug. 1924 A.R.M. Kaileuna, Tuma etc.
21-23 Aug. 1924 A.R.M. islets west Kaileuna.
2-8 Nov. 1924 A.R.M. Kaileuna.
1-7 Dec. 1924 A.R.M. all islands west and north Kiriwina.

16-19 Dec.
1925 A.R.M. Sinaketa.
27 Dec. 1924 - 1 Jan.
9-13 Feb.
9-13 Mar.
1925 A.R.M. Kaibola.
23-26 Mar.
1925 A.R.M. Vakuta and Sinaketa.
13-16 Mar.
1925 A.R.M. north Kiriwina.
20-22 Mar.
1925 A.R.M. islands west.
26-30 May
1925 A.R.M. Vakuta, Sinaketa etc.
16-22 June
1925 A.R.M. Kaileuna and north Kiriwina.
20-30 Oct.
1925 A.R.M. coastal villages lagoon.
2-8 Nov.
18 Nov.
1925 A.R.M. village vicinity Losuia.
24-25 Nov.
26-27 Nov.
1925 A.R.M. north Kiriwina.
9-13 Dec.
1925 A.R.M. Vakuta etc.
12-30 Jan.
1926 A.R.M. north Kiriwina.
15-20 Feb.
1926 A.R.M. Kaileuna etc.
9-18 Mar.
1926 A.R.M. Kaileuna and north Kiriwina.
1926 A.R.M. north Kiriwina.
1926 A.R.M. south Kiriwina.
2-7 May
1926 A.R.M. islands north and west to Sim-sim.
1-4 June
1926 A.R.M. north Kiriwina.
9-11 June
1926 A.R.M. south Kiriwina.
28-31 July
1926 A.R.M. Kiriwina.
19-24 July
1926 A.R.M. north Kiriwina.
8-10 Aug.
1926 A.R.M. Sinaketa.
1926 A.R.M. north Kiriwina.
20-23 Oct.
1926 A.R.M. ditto.
8-27 Nov.
28 Nov. - 4 Dec.
1926 A.R.M. south Kiriwina.
3-8 Jan.
1927 A.R.M. islands north-west Kiriwina.
23-27 Jan.
1927 A.R.M. west Kiriwina.
21-26 Mar.
1927 A.R.M. north Kiriwina.
4-9 Ap.
<table>
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<th>1927</th>
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<th>1929</th>
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<tr>
<td>17-18 May</td>
<td>A.R.M. Vakuta.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-7 June</td>
<td>A.R.M. north Kiriwina.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-6 Dec.</td>
<td>A.R.M. Vakuta.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-9 May</td>
<td>A.R.M. ditto.</td>
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<tr>
<td>12-13 June</td>
<td>A.R.M. Sinaketa.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10-12 July</td>
<td>A.R.M. north Kiriwina.</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-25 July</td>
<td>A.R.M. ditto.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Prior to annexation the L.M.S. was the only mission in south-east Papua. MacGregor realized that his government had insufficient resources to pacify and civilize the natives and saw the L.M.S. as a valuable adjunct to the administration in this regard. Therefore in 1888 he invited the L.M.S. to expand and work the islands off the south-east coast, but for financial reasons the Directors of the society regretfully refused the offer. (1) MacGregor then approached the Wesleyan church in Australia, having been impressed by its good work in Fiji. It accepted responsibility for the evangelization of the Louisiades and other island groups. (2) At the same time an Anglican body, the Australian Board of Missions, which had four years previously made an agreement with the Special Commissioner to establish a mission in the Louisiades but had not done so, decided to begin work in New Guinea. (3) There was thus some confusion about the area in which each mission would operate. MacGregor refused to countenance rivalry between missions and insisted that each denomination select a sphere of influence which the others found acceptable. He had control of the situation because land could

(3) Tomlin, Awakening, 19-29; Brown, op.cit., 467-468.
only be purchased through the government and the Administration could disallow any land application. Accordingly at a conference held in June 1891 the boundary question was thrashed out and settled satisfactorily. (4)

The L.M.S. had worked in Papua for thirteen years before the formal establishment of government but as we have seen many obstacles had prevented its missionaries from exercising political control over the natives as had some of their brethren in other parts of the Pacific. In temporal affairs then, all missions were subservient to the administration; at most, missionaries acted in an advisory capacity toward officials.

By 1884 the limits of the L.M.S. eastern district had been fixed. The area embraced the mainland coast from Millport Harbour to East Cape and included various islands off the south coast and in China Strait. As indicated above there was at first only one missionary in charge of the district, but in 1891 Charles W. Abel joined F.W. Walker. In 1896 the south coast head station was moved from Suau to Isuleilei in Fyfe Bay. In 1898 the first white missionary was appointed to Mailu although a South Sea Island teacher had been there for a number of years. The head station of the Mailu district

(4) Tomlin, op.cit., 27; Brown, op.cit., 467-468.
was moved to Millport Harbour in 1900, then back to Mailu in 1909. In 1906-1907 another head station was opened at Duabo in the Buhutu area inland from Milne Bay. (5) Because the original settlement had been so wide further expansion was virtually impossible. The number of stations in the Mailu area remained at five. (6) Even in the mid thirties there were only fourteen outstations in the Isuleilei district. From 1924 Lawes College, the L.M.S. training institution, which was originally established in Port Moresby and then moved to Vatorata, transferred to Fyfe Bay. (7) The number of outstations in Milne Bay would not have exceeded a dozen or so.

The Papuan Church never became self-supporting; by 1920 "Mays" contributed just over £1,000 towards the cost of the local ministry. The Society's grant for the same period was £1,700. In 1938 the L.M.S. had, in the whole of Papua, between six and seven thousand communicants, ten thousand scholars, eighty two native pastors, and some fifty other full-time teachers. (8)

(5) G309/12 Box 1, Kwato Report 1891; Ibid, Fyfe Bay Report 1896; G309/100 Papua Letters, Box 8 Folder 1, Cribb, 8 Nov.1898; Ibid, Folder 4, Saville, 28 Nov.1900; Northcott, Guinea Gold, 73; Ann.Rep.1906-1907, 118.
(7) Northcott, op.cit., 76, 88.
(8) The L.M.S. records are not available after 1906 so an accurate figure for south-east Papua cannot be given. cf. Goodall, A History of the London Missionary Society 1895-1945, 435-441.
The Methodist mission worked among the peoples of the Louisiades, the D'Entrecasteaux islands, the Trobriands, and Murua. It also had a station on the mainland at East Cape. This district lay wholly within south-east Papua. The field was first divided into four circuits: Dobu, Panaeati, Tube-tube, and Kiriwina. In 1897 the Dobu circuit was in charge of a white missionary. Under him were four mission sisters and ninety native workers: teachers, local preachers, class leaders. Although there were but seventeen churches in the circuit the gospel was preached at thirty three other places. There were two hundred and forty four native church members, eighty five on trial, and two hundred and forty catechumens. Eight hundred and seventy six scholars attended fourteen schools. Five thousand six hundred and seventy nine natives attended public services. In the Panaeati circuit the missionary was assisted by twenty two native workers; the gospel was preached at eight places. There were seventeen native church members, twenty one on trial, and thirty one catechumens. Eighty pupils attended three schools and one thousand natives went to public worship. In the Tube-tube circuit the missionary was in charge of twenty three native workers and gospel services were held at seventeen places. There were forty native church members, fifty two on trial, and sixteen catechumens. One hundred and seventy five scholars attended six schools. One thousand eight
hundred and eighty six souls participated in public worship. The Kiriwina missionary had a European sister, an S.S.I. catechis and eleven native helpers. Although there were only three churches in the circuit the gospel was preached at twenty eight places. There were twelve native church members and fifteen catechumens. The one school in the circuit had a roll of one hundred and twenty. Three thousand five hundred natives took part in public worship. (9)

In 1925 although the number of circuits had increased by only one the mission had progressed. The Dobu circuit was divided into five districts: Dobu, Cape Pearson (Pierson), Salamo, Ubuia, and Murua. In the Dobu district services were held at fourteen churches and fifteen other places. One missionary was assisted by three catechists, one S.S.I. and seven Papuan teachers, five local preachers and forty three class leaders. There was one training institution with one tutor and five students; a boarding school with forty eight boarders and one hundred and forty six pupils; and sixteen day schools employing twenty two teachers. These were attended by eight hundred and seventy two scholars. Native church membership was four hundred and thirteen strong, a further one hundred

(9) Meth.Ch.O.M. vol.174, Mins. of Synod 1897.
and eighty seven souls were on trial, and one thousand and twenty three were catechumens. Seven thousand natives attended public worship. The Cape Pearson district was supervised by a missionary, two S.S.I. and two Papuan Catechists, two local preachers and twelve class leaders. They preached the gospel at five churches and seven other places. There were six school at which three hundred and ninety seven natives were receiving instruction. Church membership stood at seventy nine, one hundred and five natives were on trial, and another six hundred and six were catechumens. One thousand two hundred people attended public worship. The Salamo district contained eight churches and services were held at thirteen other places. Because Salamo was the central training institution there were besides the missionary in charge, four lay missionaries, three sisters, and two native ministers besides one S.S.I. and six Papuan teachers, twenty five local preachers, and thirty three class leaders. The training institution boasted four tutors and fifty five students. One hundred and sixty nine boarders and four day scholars attended the boarding school. Three hundred and seventy five pupils received instruction at five other schools. There were two hundred and nine native church members, one hundred and thirty two on trial, and six hundred and sixty nine catechumens. Two thousand five hundred souls participated in public services. The Ubuia district was in the
care of a missionary, two Catechists, five Papuan teachers, one local preacher and twenty class leaders. They preached the gospel at eight churches and twelve other places. There were seven schools in the care of twelve teachers who instructed four hundred and twenty three pupils. One hundred and twenty four natives were church members, eighty three were on trial, and five hundred and sixty five more were catechumens. One thousand five hundred people attended services. When Murua had enjoyed a mining boom, a lay missionary was stationed there but by 1925 the Murua district was run by three Papuan teachers helped by five class leaders. Only three churches had been formed but the gospel was preached at four other places. There were three schools attended by forty eight pupils. There were only sixteen church members, a further nineteen souls on trial, and one hundred and eighty seven catechumens. Three hundred and seventy people participated in public worship.

The Duau circuit was divided into two districts. In the Duau district one missionary, twelve Papuan teachers, nine local preachers and thirty six class leaders ministered to the people. They preached at thirteen churches and thirty three other places. There was one training institution and a boarding school with fifty four boarders and one hundred and five pupils. A further sixteen day schools employing thirty seven teachers instructed
six hundred and fifty six scholars. Four hundred and forty seven natives were church members, one hundred and sixty seven were on trial, and five hundred and seventy six were catechumens.

Four thousand one hundred and thirty five souls attended public worship. The East Cape district was in the care of a missionary assisted by one Catechist, one S.S.I. and three Papuan teachers, three local preachers and nine class leaders. They preached the gospel at six places, three of them churches. Four schools employing seven teachers, taught one hundred and sixty eight pupils. There were sixty eight native church members, thirty one on trial, and sixty nine catechumens. Seven hundred and forty people participated in public worship.

The Kiriwina circuit was in charge of a missionary assisted by three sisters, one Catechist, one S.S.I. and seventeen Papuan teachers, eleven local preachers and forty four class leaders. They preached at twenty four churches and seventy three other places. There were three hundred and ninety three church members, a further one hundred and sixty eight on trial, and seven hundred and eighty seven catechumens. Seven thousand four hundred souls attended services. The training institution employing one tutor had seventeen students; the boarding school had eighty boarders and two hundred and two students. There were besides twenty two day schools at which thirty eight
teachers taught one thousand four hundred and sixty scholars.

In the Misima-Panaeati circuit the missionary, two Catechists, seven Papuan teachers, eleven local preachers and thirty nine class leaders spread Christianity among the people. At eleven places churches had been formed and the gospel was preached at fifteen other places. There was a training institution with two tutors and eleven students besides a boarding school attended by seventy three boarders and seventeen day students, and thirteen other schools where thirty six teachers instructed six hundred and seventy five pupils. Three hundred and nineteen natives were church members, three hundred and seven were on trial, and nine hundred and sixty eight were catechumens. Two thousand people attended services. (10) In 1914-1915 a white missionary was placed on Rossel island but he only stayed a year. Not until 1928 was another placed there. (11)

The Bwaidoga circuit was in charge of a missionary assisted by one native minister, one S.S.I. and eight Papuan teachers, six local preachers, and twenty eight class leaders. They held services in eight churches and nineteen other places. The

training institution had three pupils and the boarding school
twenty seven boarders and one hundred and eighty six scholars.
At twelve day schools nineteen teachers instructed seven hundred
and forty pupils. In the circuit there were two hundred and
eighty six native church members, one hundred and eighty six
more were on trial and one thousand three hundred and seventy
seven souls were catechumens. Five thousand people participated
in public worship. (12)

The Anglican mission sphere extended from the southern
point of Goodenough Bay to the German boundary, some two hundred
and forty miles. Thus it lay for the most part outside south­
east Papua, for which there are no separate statistics. A
bishop administered the diocese from January 1898. (13) Dogura
was the head-quarters of the mission and the site of the training
institutions. In 1901 the mission staff consisted of the bishop,
four priests, one deacon, nine laymen, eight ladies, and five
S.S.I. teachers. (14) By 1920–1921 besides the bishop there
were twelve priests, six deacons, four laymen, fourteen ladies,
fifty five Papuan teachers and nine lay readers. Services were
held at over two hundred places and the bishop estimated that

(12) Meth.Ch.O.M. vol.193, Mins of Synod 1925.
(13) Tomlin, op.cit., 45.
some six thousand natives were Christians. (15) In the thirties an estimated eleven thousand natives were Christians and the mission had fifteen central stations, twenty nine outstations. (16)

On the role of the missionary church all denominations agreed. A.K. Chignell stated that this was: "... to preach Christ to the people who have not heard His name; and to bring individuals unto union with Him by Holy Baptism, ..." (17) At the same time a native ministry had to be trained and the people had to be given new values. To achieve their aim missionaries had to be iconoclasts and change the traditional social order and morality. From earliest contact they found the Papuans untrustworthy, and this was the first of many characteristics they attempted to rectify. Missionaries tried to create a new sense of right and wrong. They sought to prevent infanticide, cannibalism, polygamy, courtship ceremonies and even dancing, bridewealth payments, and warfare. Lying, stealing, and sexual laxity also came under criticism. In the words of W.E. Bromilow missionaries tried to create a sense of sin and shame in their flock. (18) Some tried to do this by a process of spiritual catharsis. S. Fellows discussed questions of morals and conduct

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(15) Ibid., 1920-1921.
(16) Devitt, A Cathedral in Papua, 3.
(17) Chignell, An Outpost in Papua, 80.
(18) Bromilow, Twenty Years Among Primitive Papuans, 82.
freely in full congregation. Sinners were summoned, interrogated and admonished before the whole assembly. (19) Such an endeavour illustrated the Christians' limitations. Papuan morality was not British morality, but had the missionaries come close to the natives they would have seen that Papuans had as marked a moral sense as their own.

The missions besides being concerned with the spiritual salvation of individuals, attempted to create a society in which responsible Christian Papuans helped shape their own destiny. As Abel put it: (20)

If we do not boldly champion their [Papuans'] cause and insist upon their right in their country to fair and open competition with foreigners, we shall lend our hand to their destruction, and a "white" New Guinea will, at no distant date, reward our pains.

This meant that an important secondary aim of mission activity, especially with the Nonconformists, was to civilize the native so that he could participate in economic activities similar to those of western European man. As soon as he arrived Samuel Fellows, a Wesleyan missionary, informed MacGregor that he felt religious and industrial education should go hand in hand. (21)

The L.M.S. brethren also supported the principle of industrial

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training. The Fyfe Bay mission for example had a plantation and a technical school which taught various trades to the men and skilled needlework, lacemaking and so on to the women and girls.

What kind of men became missionaries? Most Nonconformist were of humble origin and had little formal education before they received the call to serve God. Of the L.M.S. staff working in Papua in 1905 very few had been engaged in intellectual work before they joined the mission. One had been an itinerant labourer working in New Zealand, one was a printer, one a hardware warehouse man, one a shoemaker, one a reporter, one a chemist, one a decorative painter, two drapers' assistants, one a clerk, and one a student. (22) For some of them preparatory theological training had been curtailed because of the acute shortage of men in the field. (23) What information is available about the background of the Wesleyan missionaries suggests most of them were of working class origin. (24) Anglicans usually had more cultivated backgrounds, a broader education, and more intensive theological training than the Nonconformists.

(22) G309/103, Papua Letters, Box 11 Folder 1, Mins. of 1905 Committee; Abel, op.cit., 14-22.
(23) G309/98, Papua Letters, Box 6 Folder 1, Abel, 13 July 1893; Lovett, Tamatea, 24.
Copland King was the great-grandson of a former governor of New South Wales, and A.A. Maclaren's parents were well to do people. (25)

As Independent churchmen, L.M.S. missionaries opposed a strong clerical organization. Sometimes this was taken to extremes: Abel always regretted that he had been persuaded by the principal of Gresham College to accept ordination. (26) Some L.M.S. brethren had dramatic conversions; (27) others though pious from childhood were nonetheless aware of having consciously accepted Christ as master. (28) The Nonconformists considered outward devout observance important but only because it reflected inner faith and sanctity. All would have agreed with McFarlane when he wrote: (29)

... I am determined not to know any thing among men save Jesus Christ and Him crucified. I am conscious of my weakness & my utter inability to do anything of myself. I should be a fool to enter the mission field relying on self... I wish to become dead to the world, to find all my happiness in the service of Christ. May we be content with nothing less, than the entire abolishment of idolatry.& the establishment of the Kingdom of Christ...

(25) Rogers, A Pioneer of New Guinea, 1-8, 100.
(27) Lovett, James Chalmers, 22-24; G309/71 Candidates Papers, McFarlane to Proust, 5 July 1856.
The Nonconformist records frequently refer to missionaries seeking direction from God. (30) They tried hard to be free of the sin of pride, and did usually have a very humble opinion of themselves. Yet when interpreting the will of God personal humility was irrelevant. Most missionaries were arrogant and inflexible when it came to opposing things which they considered offensive to the Lord. This attitude had serious effects on native society. In the late nineteenth century anthropology had hardly emerged as an academic discipline, and no evangelizing body thought that missionaries should give serious attention to the social organization of the people amongst whom they laboured. Thus when a missionary became acquainted with conditions in his district he made rules: forbade certain customs, permitted and preserved others, and instituted new mores without reference to the indigenous social structure. Then he worried about a declining birth-rate, increasing native apathy, and the failure of the people to preserve worth-while traditions. The missionaries had many worries, but considered not whether they interpreted their own desire as God's. This was fortunate as head stations were far apart in every mission field. It was rare for more than one European family to live on each head station.

(30) e.g. Abel, op. cit., 31, 95-96; G309/100 Box 8 Folder 1, Schlencker, 1 Nov. 1898.
Sole responsibility for a large area thus devolved on a missionar
who had only sporadic contact with his colleagues.

In Papua Anglican churchmen were "high", and so the
potential differences between their creed and Nonconformity
occasionally became clear. In particular the Nonconformists
were readier to identify metaphysics and morality. Thus they
believed that "love" had everywhere the same form, the form it
took in the society of their own origin. So Abel declared:(31)

... we teach lawless men to become obedient, inhuman men
to love, and savage men so to change their thoughts and
lives that they become our fellow-labourers in the
extension of Christ's kingdom.

According to that view Papuans in their natural state were
incapable of loving, and recognized no legal restraints. Both
points have been disproved by anthropologists. Nonconformists
thought it an excellent thing when a chief was anxious "to lead
his people from heathen darkness to Christian light, and to
participate in the blessings of civilization." (32) Because of
their emphasis on morality Nonconformist missionaries concerned
themselves with schemes whereby converts and the children of
teachers could be kept away from village life which they con-
sidered, rightly from their point of view, contaminating. For

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(32) G309/11 Box 2, McFarlane, 19 Apr.-23 May 1883, 3 May.
this reason boarding schools and industrial ventures were starte

The Anglicans, making some distinction between metaphysic
and morality, conceived of Christianity as meaning something
different to a Papuan than to a European. The Papuan church
would bring its special contribution to Christ's body. It was
unnecessary to civilize converts; this was of questionable value.
The priceless gift which only the Church could bring, was
Christianity. (33) Anglicans felt that they could not "praise
a fugitive and cloister'd virtue, unexercis'd and unbreath'd,
that never sallies out and sees her adversary". They shrank
from glass-cage Christians and the concept of the church as a
body distinct from native life. (34) This more critical and
less optimistic attitude towards culture contact did not mean
that Church policy aimed at, or even desired, to limit the
impact of the western world on native society. However, the
Anglicans were aware of the dilemma and had some comprehension
of the issues involved in the exposure of a stone-age culture to
European influences.

Educational policies are most important since they
illustrate very clearly the ends to which each denomination

(33) Chignell, op.cit., 136, 344.
(34) Ibid, 71; Newton, In Far New Guinea, 252.
aimed. They were crucial in another regard, for they influence outside opinion about the capabilities of natives. In Papua all the missions adopted teaching methods used in Britain or Australia for rudimentary primary education. Not until the late nineteen twenties did they attempt to adapt syllabi to local conditions. (35) They never altered teaching methods for illiterate adults, who were taught in the same way as the small children.

In 1898 the Kwato lower school subjects were scripture, reading, writing, arithmetic, geography, plain sewing and native mat making. These subjects were continued to a more advanced level in the upper school. Also taught there were part-singing (Farmer's Nursery Rhymes) solo singing, reciting, speaking and dictation in English, and fancy needlework. (36) The first school book printed in the Suan language was a picture-com-reading book in three parts with illustrations considered to be highly moral and uplifting. Family prayer, the tender care of a mother, were among the subjects depicted. The final section of the book was simple arithmetic. (37) The training seminaries which gave the highest education for converts in Papua taught scripture, geography, arithmetic, and English but none to a

(36) G309/12 Box 1, Kwato Report, 1898.
(37) Ibid, Outstations Report Eastern District, 1892.
very advanced level. The first written examination conducted at the Murray island seminary lasted four days. The geography paper was divided into three sections: a definition of terms, a general geography of the world, and European geography. The answers to the first two sections were "good", although none of the students was able to name the five oceans. In the third section all students knew the countries of Europe and their capitals. The scripture examination demanded accounts of Cain and Abel, Noah and the flood, and Peter and John at the Gate Beautiful. The arithmetic paper covered reduction, compound addition and subtraction. Only one student got every sum right although others showed that "they grasped the principles in hand". The English paper consisted of three sentences in the Murray island language which had to be translated into English, and three English sentences which had to be translated into the native language. (38)

The educational level did not improve much. In the late twenties or early thirties one student of Lawes College wished to illustrate how people thought wrongly about God and so wrote: "God's not a Papuan, God's not a Chinaman, God is not a Japanese, but God is an Englishman ten feet high." (39) The tutors of the

(38) L.M.S. Chronicle Sept.1888.
(39) Northcott, Guinea Gold, 89.
College tried to shape their human material and used such amusing errors for the students' benefit. At the village level, descent into childishness always threatened. In 1934 a Mailu native wrote of W.J.V. Saville who had been in the district since the turn of the century: (40)

He taught people to play games and sing part-songs with the organ and all were happy. He made good schools and churches, and went round to see them all very often in his launch. All people were made better in the power of Christ. Every day we had school or church and worked hard at many things. He made God's book in Mailu language ... Everyone of us will remember Rev. and Mrs Saville until we are dead, and then we will see them again.

The standard of Wesleyan and Anglican education was much the same as that of the L.M.S., if reports of examinations by an outside inspector (published in the Annual Reports) speak fairly. However by 1918 the Anglicans had ordained one Papuan as a priest. (41)

All denominations used magic lantern slides and posters in education work. These were, in the words of one Anglican missionary, "ostentatiously Saxon". (42) The subjects taught by European missionaries rarely related to native life and experience; while classes under a native teacher often degenerated into gibberish. The only fairly full account of native teaching

(40) Ibid, 74.
(42) Chignell, op.cit., 69.
methods is from an Anglican source and for many years Anglican teachers were of a lower educational standard than either their Wesleyan or L.M.S. counterparts. Nevertheless the lesson described was remarkable and revealing. It consisted of the teacher and class repeating some ten or a dozen times: "Four fundle one penny, ten fardles t'ree penny, fourteen fartles seven peness, fifteen bartles eight penny". (43) This teacher could not read or write properly, and obviously had no idea of arithmetic. Others were no better. (44)

Most Nonconformists admitted the futility of "...teaching children to write copperplate, and to parrot off the multiplication tables...", (45) and the Anglicans also felt that formal education had little relevance to native life. The latter emphasised that the mental horizon of converts had to be widened so that they could cope with the dangers and temptations of a changing order. Christianity had to permeate the whole of native life. (46) Conversely, wicked teaching and example could lure people away from Christianity; so education and civilization could be evil as well as good. (47)

(43) Ibid, 57.
(44) Ibid, 50-80; Newton, op.cit., 253-255.
(45) cf. G309/102 Box 10 Folder 1, Abel, The Aim and Scope of an Industrial Branch to the New Guinea Mission, Mar.1903.
(47) Chignell, op.cit., 334.
While their attitudes to education and civilization were ambivalent, the Anglicans strongly opposed taking Christians from the village environment into a special industrial community. With this view the Nonconformists disagreed. The Methodists and the L.M.S. wanted to make their converts "economic men". So high priority was given to the teaching of trades (carpentry, boat building, engine maintenance, smithy work, etc.) and the employment of natives in developing the colony's copra and timber resources. The missionaries believed that such training would widen the natives' mental horizon and provide some alternative for mission educated children, other than a return to sinful, slothful village life. It would produce stronger, more self-conscious Christians, and provide a means whereby proper moral standards and civilized habits could be maintained. (48) Even the non-Christian might benefit from the material improvement which would ensue. (49) Most Nonconformists who opposed this teaching acted on the ground that any division of mission energy was wrong. (50) Others approved generally, but were against mission operated plantations or trading schemes.

(49) G309/103, Papua Letters, Box 11 Folder 1, Committee Mins. 1905; Ibid, Folder 6, Abel, 4 Sept.1907.
run for profit. (51)

To its supporters, technical training represented the acme of progress currently desirable. Perhaps the Nonconformist humble backgrounds encouraged them to equate labour with civilization. Anyway, current notions precluded any Papuans getting employment outside the mission as anything but skilled or unskilled workers, or base grade clerical assistants; within them there were only limited openings for teachers, ministers, and secular workers. Even the most advanced missionaries believed that the development of the Papuans from savagery to civilization would be a long, slow process: none contemplated that the natives would become their equals in the foreseeable future. Higher academic education for Papuans was hampered by several other factors besides the European attitude toward Papuan capabilities: a lack of resources on the part of the missions; government legislation which forbade the removal of natives from the territory except in special circumstances; attitudes in Australia. One Kwato lad, a blacksmith, was sent to the Sydney Technical College for an academic year. The experiment was not repeated because Trade Unions decreed only whites could attend that

(51) G309/12 Box 2, Jones Report 1903; G309/91 Aust.Letters Box 17, King, 5 Mar.1902; Mitchell Lib.Ms.Meth.Ch.O.M. 119, Letters Received, Winn to Danky, 28 June 1912.
institution. Abel bitterly resented this. Although the Australian flag was flown in Papua, and any Australian was allowed to come and seek his fortune in the territory, no Papuan could receive the benefit of instruction in the Sydney Technical College. (52)

The industrial question was further crucial because thereby missionaries became involved in the temporal as well as spiritual state of their converts. Even the Anglicans sympathised with those natives who wished to live differently from the traditional village pattern. Mission trained youths, and for many years there were more boys than girls converted, usually worked for Europeans. Most whites were, by mission standards, degenerate, irreligious creatures whose influence on Christian natives was as contaminating as that of pagan villagers. Most Nonconformists tried to keep converts away from such people, and the only way they could do so was to offer alternative employment.

Did the missionaries hope to pioneer a radical change in the native economy? Circumstance never forced them to answer this question, but probably most would have liked to see every village raising a cash crop. Yet their thought was unimaginative, lying within constricted, already defined bounds; none

(52) Abel, op. cit., 163
envisaged starting, say, a button factory or a fish-processing plant. The Nonconformist utopia was a society of fairly prosperous peasant proprietors, with a sprinkling of specialist craftsmen, all working under European guidance. (53) Herein the Christianized Papuan could live, free from sin and temptation. Thus industrial training was intended to serve Christian ends, rather than directly to change the economic development of the colony.

Towards this end the Fyfe Bay mission operated a copra plantation. So did the Methodists on Ubuia island. Abel leased the original government experimental station at Wagawaga in Milne Bay and worked this as much to provide employment for converts as to make profits. By 1916 Abel had five hundred acres of plantations at Kwato and Milne Bay which were, at a conservative estimate, worth £15,000. When the L.M.S. Directors rebuked Abel's enthusiasm for the plantation, at which he kept all converts and many native children, the missionary resigned, (1917). (54) However, the society agreed to lease Kwato to him for ten years, and to retain him as an honourary missionary. Thus was the Kwato Association formed, with Sir William MacGregor

(53) cf. G309/100 Papua Letters, Box 8 Folder 1, Walker, 22 June 1898.
(54) Abel, op.cit., 145; Goodall, op.cit., 430-431.
as first President of the Board of Directors. (55) In 1927 the L.M.S. sold out all rights to the Kwato Association. Much later an Anglican visitor to New Guinea described it as Oxford group and largely a commercial concern! (56)

For the man in the field such long-term aims were secondary to the day-by-day grind of finding and holding his flock. Initial contact with 'new' natives followed the pattern established by early explorers and early traders. Missionaries used as evangelizing agents trade goods, beads, tobacco, cloth, iron, axes, and knives, instead of bibles or tracts. (57) Although there were minor differences, methods of organization, evangelizing techniques, and station routine varied little between missions. At all head stations, which had a resident white missionary and a boarding school, early prayers were followed by some manual work, usually gardening or building. School started at nine a.m. and continued until midday. On some stations the advanced scholars had more lessons in the afternoon. A free period followed, frequently devoted to playing introduced games. After evening devotions the students retired early. Every Saturday morning the boarders cleaned the station buildings and grounds.

(56) Henslowe, Papuan Post, 27, and 172-173.
(57) King, W.G. Laves, 143.
then had the rest of the day free. Sunday was a day of rest and devotion for the missionary, his family, and other workers on the station, the boarders, and the village converts. (58) The stations under native pastors were more haphazardly managed but followed the same pattern. Occasionally the more zealous converts enforced Sabbath observance on non-believers. (59)

The daily round of the missionary was exacting. He ministered to the physical and spiritual needs of his flock; held services and prayer meetings, taught school and Sunday school, ran an outpatients clinic, visited the sick and dying, buried the dead, baptized and married, and spent some time each day studying the native language. Besides, he had to entertain any passing Europeans. From the 1890's some Nonconformist missionaries also supervised industrial training. Native pastors performed the same duties as the white missionary, if to a lesser degree. At outstations all aspects of education were particularly neglected.

It was customary in many Papuan societies for infants to

(58) Chignell, Twenty One Years in Papua, 131-140; Somerville, Our Friends the Papuans, 55-57; Burton, Papua for Christ, 66-67; Bromilow, op.cit., 308; Robson, James Chalmers, 43-44. Also G309/12,Reports.
(59) Chignell, op.cit., 105; Mitchell Lib.Ms.Meth.Ch.O.M. Letters Received, Bromilow to Brown, 14 Nov.1899.
be buried with their mother should she die. This practice horrified mission workers and so all denominations started homes for the children saved from this death. (60) Such babies, brought up as Christians, were a valuable source of supply from which native evangelists, government workers, or employees for Europeans were drawn. (61)

All denominations, especially in the years before indigenous workers were trained, made extensive use of S.S.I. evangelists. Yet there were difficulties in using such workers. Both the L.M.S. and Wesleyan mission found Polynesian teachers sometimes antagonized the Papuans. (62) For instance Jakobo, the Teste island teacher, had to be removed because he became so violent and tyrannical. (63) Pride was a Polynesian characteristic and some teachers were overbearing even towards missionaries. Abel and Walker found their Samoan teachers difficult to manage; when Walker was transferred to the western district and no one replaced him Abel wrote to the Directors: (64)

(60) Bromilow, op.cit., 141; Chignell, op.cit., 67; G309/102 Box 10 Folder 2, Rich, 25 Aug. 1903.
(61) cf. Burton, op.cit., 86; Bromilow, op.cit., 141.
(64) G309/12 Box 1, Kwato Report 1894.
... since I cannot undertake to be responsible to the Society for work which I am not in a position to supervise properly, especially if it is in the hands of men who cannot be trusted to carry out my instructions, I shall be obliged to ask the Committee to take my Samoan teachers to another district.

These were strong words considering the acute staff shortage. Once matters came to a head in this way the teachers apologised to Abel and stayed where they were. (65) Discipline was not the only reason why some S.S.I. teachers gave unsatisfactory service. Very few were good teachers, some were tempted by fleshly lusts and had to be punished for fornication or adultery, (66) others were lazy, (67) or worshipped Mammon and indulged in various trading ventures, or bored congregations by interminable sermons, and panicked in emergencies. (68)

One case appeared in the Methodist records. A Samoan teacher, Faa'sola Si'io, worked on Kirivina for slightly over eight months at a wage between twelve and eighteen pounds per annum. In that time he repaid a five pound debt incurred

(65) G309/99 Papua Letters, Box 7 Folder 2, Abel, 30 Oct.1895.  
(67) G309/103 Papua Letters, Box 11 Folder 2, Abel, 2 Sept.1905.  
(68) Mitchell Lib.Ms.Meth.Ch.O.M. Letters Received 119, Holland to Danks, 9 June 1911; Bromilow, op.cit., 101; Chignall, An Outpost in Papua, #57; G309/94 Papua Letters, Box 4 Folder 4, Beswick, 28 Dec.1890; Ibid. Folder 5, Beswick, 24 Mar.1881; G309/99 Papua Letters, Box 7 Folder 4, Abel, 29 Nov.1899; G309/12 Box 1, Kwato Report 1896.
before he came to Papua and took over twenty pounds back to Samoa. There he was dismissed from the mission. The white missionary, when commenting on the case said "... my experience so far as the Samoans are concerned is that they come here more to make money and advance quickly than to work for the people."

The usual medium in their trading transactions was pigs, or sometimes manufactured foreign goods.

Nevertheless in some respects the islanders were more suitable for work among the Papuans than were Europeans. Even their lack of formal education and theological training was not necessarily a drawback in aiming simply at conversion. They discoursed feelingly on personal regeneration, and cited from experience benefits gained from an acceptance of the gospel. This sincere, simple, forceful exposition was most valuable in initial mission effort. S.S.I. teachers in their sermons on biblical texts illustrated the points they wished to make with examples which were familiar to Papuans. The gospel thus interpreted would be more comprehensible to the Papuan than when transmitted by the white man.

Such workers were also much cheaper than Europeans.

(69) Mitchell Lib. Ms. Meth. Ch. O. M. Letters Received 119, Holland to Danks, 9 June 1911.
They received much lower wages; had no regular furloughs; were rarely transferred; and grew most of their requirements except prestige luxuries like tea and sugar. Because they stayed at the one station in a native village they got to know their flock more intimately than the European missionaries, who remained mostly at the head station and so had relatively little to do with the other natives under their care. It was L.M.S. and Methodist policy to employ married teachers to prevent sexual scandal, but Anglican teachers, the majority of whom were converted while working on the Queensland sugar plantations, sometimes married local girls.

The artifacts and living standards of an S.S.I. teacher and his flock were similar, and often so were the mores of the two. The case of Faa'sola Si'io demonstrated this very well. McFarlane quoted another example. Once when he visited the eastern district, natives formally presented food before they made a public confession of Christianity. He gave return gifts which the teachers made a great point of displaying to the best advantage. Only then were the gifts ceremonially distributed. (70)

The islanders' attitude to children more nearly approached

(70) G309/11 Box 2, McFarlane, Visit East 19 Ap. -23 May 1883, 2 May.
the Papuan than did the Europeans'. Many teachers were very good with children and exerted a strong influence over them. (71) This was difficult for Europeans, most of whom were sure children needed discipline as much as love. (72)

For these reasons, S.S.I. teachers often wielded a good deal of influence. Abel wrote of some Samoans placed in Milne Bay who had, in his words: (73)

... gone into their new work with the zeal of the Salvation Army.... They are aiming at the conversion of their people and I was astonished to see what could be made of rough people in a very short time by the teaching of the gospel and the example of a Christian life.

One of the Methodist teachers had such power over his flock that he sent several of them to the Resident Magistrate: four because they had committed fornication, and one for not attending service. He, and they, fully expected punishment by the law. (74)

But however zealous and influential islanders were, their limited education meant that they could work only to a certain level. They were incapable of training evangelists themselves.

It was for this reason that all missions started local

(71) cf. G309/12 Box 1, Kwato Report 1896.
(72) Ibid., Kwato Report 1891.
(73) G309/97 Papua Letters, Box 5 Folder 4, Abel, 28 June 1892.
training institutions under European missionaries. The L.M.S. and Church of England had but one each; the Methodist mission several, as practically each circuit had its own. So each mission was able to train local youths, but the numbers were never very high and the demand for teachers continued to outstrip the supply. Moreover the training of the indigenous ministry was sketchy to say the least. Yet the training institutions did at least help counter the high death-rate among the islanders.

Papuans had one or two advantages over S.S.I. teachers. They were unwilling to go far from their own village and so often had a linguistic advantage. They were even cheaper, and did not succumb to the climate. But their shortcomings were grave. Because of their sketchy training they were even less capable than South Sea Islanders as teachers. They were no more devout and very few had any sense of personal responsibility. This was not surprising in men coming from societies which lacked any strongly developed system of individual leadership. Significantly in the Trobriands, with its hereditary system of authority, good Papuan teachers were more common. Indigenous teachers

(75) G309/12 Box 1, East End District Outstations Report 1893.
rarely evoked the same respect as foreigners. (77) But the biggest disadvantage of native teachers was their lack of education. Nor as time passed did the ratio of missionaries to teachers fall. Thus much of the work of teachers, who could only go to a certain point, was not followed up.

The above account has already indicated some of the difficulties of the missions, but yet more have to be taken into account. The establishment of the British government reduced the physical dangers confronting missionaries but hardly made it easier to reach and influence the natives. The climate adversely affected both South Sea Islanders and Europeans; even in the twentieth century there were very few trained doctors, although most missionaries had some sketchy medical knowledge and were able to treat the less serious illnesses. Topography made both evangelization and communication between stations difficult. Except for parts of the Trobriands soils were not particularly fertile so food shortages, sometimes reaching famine proportions, occurred fairly frequently. This substantially increased the cost of running stations, especially those with boarding establishments. (78) Everyone had to work

(77) G309/12 Box 2, Port Moresby Report 1904.
(78) Mitchell Lib.Ms.Meth.Ch.O.M. Letters Received 119, Gilmour to Danks, 24 May 1912; G309/100 Papua Letters Box 8 Folde 2, Abel, 22 Feb.1899.
hard manually, as well as spending many hours preaching and
teaching. Even Montague Stone-Wigg the first Anglican Bishop
laboured like a navvy. (79)

Finances were a constant plague to both the home authorities
and the field brethren. Limited funds, high freights, and duties
which had to be paid on many goods, caused organizing bodies
constantly to urge retrenchments in both personal and district
expenditure. (80) The L.M.S. Directors often accused missionaries
of financial extravagance, or chided them for conducting business
affairs irregularly. (81) Methodists and Anglicans also objected
to the lack of friendly concern in Australia, and complained of
financial difficulties. (82)

Because their stipends were so small all the L.M.S. brethren
had overdrafts with the Society which were a constant source of
worry and irritation both to themselves and the Directors. (83)

(79) Newton, op. cit., 58.
(80) Tomlin, op. cit., 19-20; Chignell, op. cit., 31; Mitchell
Lib. Ms. Meth. Ch. O. M. District Estimates and Accounts; Ibid,
Letters Received 114, Gilmour to Danks, 8 Jan. 1909;
G309/103 Papua Letters Box 11 Folder 4, Rich, 12 Oct. 1906;
G309/99 Papua Letters Box 7 Folder 4, Abel, 8 Aug. 1897.
(81) cf. G309/99 Papua Letters Box 7 Folder 3, Abel, 26 May 1896;
Ibid, Folder 4, Abel, 8 Aug. 1897; G309/112 Western
Outgoing Letters Box 13 to Lawes, 29 June 1883, to McFarl;
8 Aug. 1884.
(82) Mitchell Lib. Ms. Meth. Ch.O.M. Letters Received 114, Gilmour
1910; Chignell, op. cit., 31; Tomlin, op. cit., 92.
(83) G309/97 Papua Letters, Box 3 Folder 4, Walker, 27 June 1892;
G309/100 Papua Letters, Box 8 Folder 2, Abel, 19 Feb. 1899.
Tobacco, almost the currency of Papua, was subject to a high import tariff, as were other articles used by the missions. Even used clothing collected by the home charities and sent to New Guinea was dutiable. Few missionaries had business acumen: even men like Walker (L.M.S.) or Osborne (Methodist) who resigned from their societies to become traders had little commercial flair. (84) Local contributions were a negligible source of income; none of the Papuan missions became self-supporting as did so many of the Pacific island churches. Consequently whenever missionaries went on leave they became virtually itinerant beggars. (85) This lack of money severely limited mission endeavour so rosy schemes of development and progress often resulted in grey stagnation.

Even at Kwato, which was the most advanced institution in south-east Papua, neither formal nor technical education reached the standard which Abel visualized. At the other

(84) Mitchell Lib. Ms. Meth. Ch. O. M. Letters Received 114, Francis to Danks, 19 Feb. 1909; _Ibid_. Gilmour to Danks, 5 Dec. 1910; G309/99 Papua Letters, Box 7 Folder 3, Walker, 13 May 1896; G309/101 Papua Letters, Box 9 Folder 1, Mins. of 1901 Committee. Osborne resigned ostensibly because of ear trouble. Walker left the L.M.S. in 1896 to supervise a business concern, Papuan Industries. He rejoined the L.M.S. in 1901.
(85) Chignell, _op. cit._, 7-8; Mitchell Lib. Ms. Meth. Ch. O. M. Letters Received 119, Burgess to Wheen, 12 May 1913; G309/95 Papua Letters, Box 3 Folder 5, Lawes, 8 May 1885; _Ibid_. Chalmers 10 Feb. 1885.
technical institutions divergence between policy and practice was even more marked. All remained on a small scale. In ordinary schools there was an acute shortage of equipment and facilities. For instance one lad received an atlas for Christ and made the missionary's life a burden, begging for lessons all the time, until the book fell to pieces and was too grimy to read. (86) It was not replaced. Even when resources and personnel increased, the standard of teaching at most stations remained very low.

There was also a chronic shortage of white personnel. Few strong young men and women were willing to serve God in Papua. The L.M.S. staff in the south-east remained very small; the Methodist and Anglican contingents were never large. People were frequently ill and went on furlough fairly often, which entailed chronic understaffing. This, coupled with the high death rate among teachers, severely taxed the remaining staff and the work suffered. (87)

Next to inadequate funds, the illness and death of workers loomed largest of all field problems. Often missionaries were

(86) Chignall, An Outpost in Papua, 89.
(87) Mitchell Lib. Ms. Meth. Ch. O.M. Letters Received 119, Williams to Danks, 7 April 1912; Ibid, 130 Fellows Diary, 26 June 1892; Chignall, Twenty One Years in Papua, 24-25, 44-46; G309/101 Papua Letters, Box 9 Folder 1, Rich, 12 April and 12 May 1901.
temporarily disheartened by the inscrutable ways of God when the best workers died and the useless ones stayed healthy. (88) The death rate amongst S.S.I. teachers was alarming, especially in the years when the L.M.S. was the sole mission body. Indeed the Secretary, commenting on the very serious loss of life among the S.S.I. teachers, remarked that had they been Englishmen there would have been a great outcry in Britain. But, he said, the death of men of another race did not come home, even to Christian people, with anything like the same force as the death of Englishmen. (89) The usually humane Lawes rationalized the situation by stating that the Pacific island churches seemed to demand an outlet for missionary effort, making irrelevant the excessive mortality rate amongst volunteers for New Guinea service. (90) Disease caused most deaths but a few mission workers died violently. (91) However in south-east Papua no European mission worker was murdered in the period under review. Because of the high mortality rate stations went unmanned over long periods. One of the Anglican stations was without a teacher for eleven years. (92)

(88) G309/100 Papua Letters, Box 8 Folder 3, Lawes, 20 Oct.1899; G309/103 Papua Letters, Box 11 Folder 4, Rich, 12 Oct.1906
(89) G309/113 Western Outgoing Letters, Box 15 to Lawes, 10 June 1887.
(90) G309/95 Papua Letters, Box 3 Folder 4, Lawes, 30 Oct.1884.
(91) Bromilow, op. cit., 169; G309/94 Papua Letters, Box 2 Folder 3, Chalmers, 3 Jan.1879.
(92) Chignell, op. cit., 43-44; cf. G309/103 Papua Letters, Box 11 Folder 2, Abel, 2 Sept.1905.
To further complicate the running of the Nonconformist missions there were sometimes disagreements between the central authority and the field staff. The Anglican mission was, after the appointment of a Bishop, an independent diocese so the problem did not arise. The independence was only administrative condos for maintenance were raised mainly in Australia by churches and charitable organizations.

In the L.M.S. differences arose over consolidation, tradir schemes (which led to the resignations of Walker and Abel), and other less explosive issues. Of these the most important was over the language question. Lawes preferred to restrict rather than multiply translations. He wanted Motuan to be used at the primary school level and English at all training institutions. Chiefly because of district autonomy his advice was rejected. (93) Other differences arose over such matters as issuing firearms to teachers; (94) furlough regulations; (95) or the use of tobacco

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(93) G309/102 Papua Letters, Box 10 Folder 1, Lawes, 23 Mar. 1903; G309/97 Papua Letters, Box 5 Folder 4, Lawes, 3 Sept.1892; G309/98 Papua Letters, Box 6 Folder 1, Lawes, 15 & 22 May 1893; G309/114 Western Outgoing Letters to Lawes, 23 Dec.1892; Ibid to Abel, 20 Oct.1893.
(94) Mitchell Library Ms. Lawes Letters, Mullens to Lawes 5 Mar. 1875.
(95) G309/99 Papua Letters, Box 7 Folder 2, Abel, 30 Oct.1895.
as currency. (96) The Methodists also quarrelled with the central body about finances, (97) development schemes, (98) and furlough rules. (99)

Friction among field brethren was not uncommon. Personal bickering, aggravated by ill-health and poor salaries, formed part of mission life, (100) while really important divergences over policy sometimes appeared. Julia Benjamin, one of the more articulate Methodist sisters, railed against the subservient position the sisterhood occupied. (101) The L.M.S. brethren continued to disagree about methods of penetration and organization, as noted in chapter three. However these differences usually subsided, because each missionary had virtual autonomy in his district and was able to act without much interference from colleagues. His only real restraint was that of finance, imposed by the central organization.

(96) G309/112 Western Outgoing Letters to Lawes, 3 Nov.1882; Ibid. to McFarlane, 8 Aug.1884; G309/95 Box 3 Folder 3, Chalmers, 11 Feb.1884.
(97) see Mitchell Lib.Meth.Ch.O.M., mins of District Synod.
(98) Ibid. Letters Received 167, Williams to Brown, 31 Mar. 1902 and also mins of District Synod.
(99) Ibid. Letters Received 119, Avery to Danks, 27 July 1911; Ibid, Gilmour to Danks, 15 Aug.1912.
(100) Ibid. Letters Received 114, Gilmour to Danks, 25 Nov.1910; G309/102 Papua Letters, Box 10 Folder 2, Lawes, 17 June 1903; Ibid, Folder 1, Lawes, 23 Mar.1903.
'Another disadvantage was the lack of congenial companions with whom the missionaries might converse intellectually, or enjoy social intercourse. Very few of the other Europeans were interested in discussing political, religious, or social problems. Native converts were inarticulate and still close to their former culture and traditions. By comparison even Australian society was rich, diverse, and intellectually stimulating. The structure of Papuan society, the strain of over-work and ill-health, as well as their isolation from one another, meant that missionaries rarely took part in discussions on controversial issues. Missionaries concerned themselves with little besides the daily round: practical matters directly affecting the administration of the mission, and personal contact with God.

Yet the mission field did have some advantages. Expense for some things were very much lower than at home. Once a missionary, white or brown, converted a nucleus of people in a village they erected the church and often other buildings in the mission compound with voluntary labour. They also worked gardens to supply food for the mission station. Prices for land, labour, local foodstuffs, and building materials were

(102) Devitt, A Cathedral in Papua, 13-14, 21; Mitchell Lib. Ms. Meth.Ch.O.M. 130 Fellows, Diary, 8 and 9 Jan. 1892; Chignell, op. cit., 19.
cheap by Australian or even British standards. Educational equipment (books, writing materials, etc.) could be much below the standard accepted as minimum elsewhere. (103)

The missionaries' most important advantage was that the Papuans lacked the background, knowledge, or experience, to question or reject the presentation of Christianity put to them. The Papuan acceptance of European superiority in the field of material culture facilitated the imposition of European standard of behaviour. The Papuans were, on the whole, most anxious to adopt the visible manifestations of the western way of life. Thus in his relation to his flock the missionary had an advantage over the home field. By that standard, too, he had more assistants, if in the doubtful form of native teachers and preachers.

Previous references have indicated that the missions and the government established generally harmonious relations. Cordiality and co-operation began in 1884 when Chalmers did everything in his power to assist Commodore Erskine proclaim the Protectorate in the eastern parts of British New Guinea. (104)
Officials and missionaries were often closely linked. A.A. Maclaren acted as MacGregor's private secretary for some months; (105) both MacGregor and Murray counted the missionaries as personal friends. A governmental policy which the mission especially approved was that of using native civil servants as much as possible. The office of Village Constable they saw as the first step towards intelligent native participation in the government of the territory. The missions usually worked harmoniously with these men although they were aware that the office was sometimes abused. (106)

Several Christian natives were appointed to government posts. The first was the L.M.S. teacher who interpreted for the Commission of Enquiry into the Labour Traffic. The only schools in Papua were mission run, and so all literate natives had been under mission influence. (107) Patrol reports frequently refer to mission adherents being chosen as Village Constables, and missionaries mentioned how some Village Constables used to call villagers to service. (108) Bromilow related how the first child saved from burial with his mother

(106) Bromilow, op.cit., 274; Newton, op.cit., 241; Chignell, op.cit., 150; Burton, op.cit., 43-44.
became a member of the Armed Native Constabulary and a skilled English interpreter. (109) Many other native civil servants would have been recruited from the ranks of mission trained youths, although the majority doubtless came from the ranks of ex-prisoners. (110)

However, church-state relations were not always harmonious. From the beginning missions bought land from the natives, often very cheaply; (111) these and further acquisitions later received ratification from the government. In the period of joint control most mission land was held in fee-simple, (112) and after 1906 by Proclamation of the Governor appointing Trustees over specified sites. (113) Throughout, the missions' applications had an easier passage than most. (114) Yet on occasion they were rejected. This caused offence, even if the government had good reasons: as when a mission applied for a whole village site; for most of the land round a native settlement; for strategically valuable sites; or for land on which a rival mission station was planned. (115) Another clash arose in 1897 when the L.M.S. 

(109) Bromilow, op.cit., 141.
(111) Chignell, Twenty One Years in Papua, 19; Mitchell Lib.Ms. Meth.Ch.O.M.130 Fellows Diary, 10-11 Nov.1891.
(112) Q'ld P.P. V.& P. vol.III 1890, 1591-1592.
(113) Handbook of the Territory of Papua 1909, 2nd ed., 76-83.
(114) see C.P.I.(T.) Set 43, Register of Lands.
(115) G309/99 Papua Letters Box 7 Folder 4,MacGregor, 16 July 189
District Committee disapproved of a Native Regulation which made attendance compulsory at Schools which taught English. It objected because parents who refused to send their children to schools run by native teachers, could not be forced to do so. MacGregor thought this excessive, and remarked that the mission might as well "expect moonlight were Cynthia draped in crape." (116) Some missionaries objected to the Ordinance which forbade the removal of natives from the territory. (117) A graver quarrel concerned the redoubtable Abel's attack on the court judgement sentencing a native woman to two years' imprisonment for the murder of McLean.

After the Australian Commonwealth assumed control of British New Guinea, relations between the missions and the administration deteriorated, for several reasons. Many missionaries felt that Commonwealth policy was going to promote Australian settlement and investment at the expense of native interests and rights. Further, most Nonconformists believed that the government was biased against Protestants. There was a widespread feeling in Papua, not only among missionaries, that religious discrimination operated in administrative appointments

and promotions. (118) The missions also feared lest the "sphere of influence" system was to be altered so that Catholic missions could open stations in Protestant areas. (119) This in fact did happen, but not for many years.

In 1905 Lawes wrote to Atlee Hunt, secretary of the Australian Department of External Affairs, bemoaning the Commonwealth's declaration that the Administrator would help the missions only in so far as consistent with his view of the natives' best interests. Lawes felt that this represented a shift from the earlier governments' position, and that mission support should not depend upon the personal beliefs of the current governor. (120) In another letter to Dr. Blayney, the medical officer at Port Moresby, in which he discussed the matter of mission teachers attempting to prevent native dancing, Lawes wrote: (121)

... our work ... will be infinitely more difficult if the Government supports profligacy and the teachers will be much more discouraged if they are intimidated by a Government officer threatening them with handcuffs and prison while to the best of their ability they are trying to do their duty.

(118) Griffin, op.cit., 157; G309/103 Papua Letters, Box 11 Folder 6, Abel, 4 Sept. 1907.
(119) G309/103 Papua Letters, Box 11 Folder 6, Abel, 4 Sept. 1907; Ibid, Dauncey, 28 June 1907; Mitchell Lib.Ms.Meth. Ch.0.M. 178, Mins of District Synod 1909 Appendix Resolution XIV "Additional Workers".
(120) G309/103 Papua Letters, Box 11 Folder 2, Lawes to Atlee Hunt, 11 Aug. 1905.
(121) Ibid, Lawes to Blayney, 14 July 1898.
Lawes, the unofficial leader of the L.M.S. in Papua, in 1905 wrote again to Atlee Hunt stating in unequivocal terms the mission view: (122)

So far as we and our work are concerned you might as well never have come ... if the policy of the present Administrator is continued, the peaceful conditions must come to an end ...

The Report of the Royal Commission further widened the breach between the L.M.S. and the government. The mission's District Committee of 1907 found many points in it grossly unfair, and not supported by the evidence. (123) As indicated in chapter eight it saw the Royal Commission as the manifestation of a popish plot. The hand making the changes was Esmé (the Australian Labour Party) but the directing voice was that of Jacob (Cardinal Moran). (124) The Commission was thoroughly Australian in being anti-native. Moreover the missionaries felt that both the Commonwealth review of past policy and the land boom boded ill for the Papuans. Most brethren would have agreed with Abel when he wrote: (125)

>The Government sentiment with regard to the natives which was held in unbroken succession by MacGregor, Le Hunte and Barton, has ceased under the Administration of the Commonwealth, and we stand alone now to safeguard the interests of our people, and to do what may be

(122) Ibid, Lawes to Atlee Hunt, 4 Sept.1905.
(123) Ibid, Folder 5, Mins of Committee 1907.
(124) Ibid, Folder 6, Dauncey, 28 June 1907.
(125) Ibid, Abel, 4 Sept.1907.
possible to help them to meet the changes which are sweeping the country.

There had been what Abel described as some stirring political meetings in his district, and prayer meetings no less earnest. Kwato youths were willing to make any sacrifice to help their fellows.

What really upset all the missions was the Commonwealth's land policy. They objected in particular to the threat of compulsory purchase, just as had Lawes in 1886. Because of mission protest and objections from Commonwealth parliamentarian the administration dropped the clause from the Ordinance although in practice the rule did prevail. (126) Meanwhile the L.M.S. had taken up specific issues in which, they felt, the Government was over-riding native interests. Abel, for example, disapproved of the Buhutu area being set aside as an area of white settlement. (127) Animosity deepened as the missionaries suspected that the government rejected certain land applications in retaliation. (128)

The stage seemed set for a bitter clash of spiritual and temporal powers. Yet matters worked out differently. Murray

(126) Mitchell Lib. Ms. Meth. Ch. O. M. 3, Mission Board Mins, 20 June 1907; G309/103 Papua Letters, Box 11 Folder 6, Abel, 4 Sept. 1907.
(127) G309/103 Papua Letters, Box 11 Folder 4, Abel, 12 Oct. 1906.
(128) cf. G309/102 Papua Letters, Box 10 Folder 2, Abel, 12 June 1903.
and his men proved not to be agents of either rampant papalism or European ruthlessness. The old amicable, almost symbiotic relationship continued.

Both before and after the crisis period there was sometime friction between field officers and mission staff. During his short stay in Samarai early in 1888, Musgrave clearly indicated that he felt the L.M.S. missionaries supervising the eastern district were attempting to thwart the government. A.M. Campbell made no secret of his occasional antipathy, (129) but gave assistance to what he considered the valuable aspects of mission effort. (130) Moreton, while he was Resident Magistrate of the Eastern Division, and Saville feuded incessantly. Saville wrote of Moreton: (131)

The village constable in Fort Glasgow has been trained by the Hon. M.H. Moreton to thwart the efforts of any missionary who may come near him ....and this gentleman said to "Charlie" when I was applying for land "What do you want to sell your land to a missionary for?"

Saville had as little as possible to do with that Village Constable, alleging that he kept a seminary in stealing and the higher arts of devilry; and that he received more than ten

(129) *Idem*.
(131) G309/101 Papua Letters, Box 9 Folder 4, Saville, 10 Sept. 1902.
shillings at a time to procure women for the traders who came into the harbour. Saville also declared that Moreton gave Charlie a bottle of whiskey now and again. (132) Patrol Officer Smith openly objected to the high-handed way the Methodist mission worked in the Louisiades.

While relations between the missions and the government were generally amicable, the reverse was true with regard to the unofficial population. Only the Anglican mission, perhaps because it disapproved the Nonconformist policy of providing secular work within the missions, did not discourage converts from working for Europeans. (133) The missionaries did not admire the type of European attracted to New Guinea. Nearly all the miners on Murua were Australians whom the Methodist missionary thought "... worthy representatives of a people who are educating their children without the Bible". (134) Saville complained of the ill effect traders and labour recruiters had on the people of his district, and other missionaries did the same. (135) Abel felt particularly on the matter, as he felt

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(132) Idem.
(134) Mitchell Lib. Ms. Meth. Ch. O. M. Letters Received, Harrison to Danks, 10 Jan. 1910.
(135) G309/101 Papua Letters, Box 9 Folder 4, Saville, 10 Sept. 1902; G309/102 Papua Letters, Box 10 Folder 1, Saville, 14 Jan. 1903; Bromilow, op. cit., 192; Mitchell Lib. Ms. Meth. Ch. O. M. Letters Received 119, Johns to Danks, 6 Dec 1912.
the Europeans' faults answered those of the brethren who objected to his plans for competing with white men. The latter, he argued, could retire if they so wished, to white Australia. His plantation scheme, to which there was so much opposition, would bring the mission into competition only with copra traders of the worst sort. Yet his opponents disapproved, while supporting technical training which brought Kwato into competition with the few boat builders of Samarai, all respectable men. In Milne Bay the traders were "... Harry Morley, the murderer of McLean, Jack Gray his abetter, & Joe-one-arm, a native brothel keeper." (136) The latter had been imprisoned at Abel's instigation for allowing a white man to rape a small girl in his house. (137)

In spite of the animosities they felt toward the profligate and sinful, the missionaries tried to minister to the Europeans in their districts. In most cases they found it difficult to do more than bury them. Abel went from Kwato to Samarai each Sunday for a number of years to hold a service in English, but the congregation was never large. Often some present would be drunk and contradict points in the sermon. Once, only two inebriates and MacGregor attended service. (138) The Anglicans

(136) G309/102 Papua Letters, Box 10 Folder 1, Abel, 7 Feb.1903.
(137) Ibid.
(138) Abel, op.cit., 67-68.
had a parish church on Samarai for the whole period under review. From 1912-13 they also ran a school for European children on Samarai. But the missions made very little impact on the white population. Nor were they any more successful in the field.

To Bishop Stone-Wigg most miners at first sight seemed to be simply dirty, swearing, drunken, spitting animals. (139) The missionary on Murua found that the vast majority of Europeans on the island were not in sympathy with mission work, and many actively against it. He felt appalled by the unreasoning vindictiveness shown towards the mission by the majority of traders and miners. (140)

Missionaries tended to ally themselves with government officials as a reflex of their hostility to other Europeans. Church and state had similar ideals and aims. They were united by more than the common front against the natives which gave the rest of the white population what little cohesion it had. Both were concerned with the decline in population and tried to remedy this by control of recruiting (141) or by introducing new

(140) Mitchell Lib. Ms. Meth. Ch. O. M. Letters Received, Harrison to Danks, 19 Jan. 1911.
(141) Mitchell Lib. Ms. Meth. Ch. O. M. Letters Received 119, Gilmour to G. Sec. 4 Dec. 1911; Ibid, G. Sec. to Sec. of Synod 19 Mar., 28 June and 22 July 1912; R.M.E.D. to G. Sec. 18 Jan. 1912.
"interests". The rest of the white population vouchsafed no interest in the problem. The missions and the government wanted also to preserve native land rights, whereas the rest of the unofficial population thought that the interests of Europeans ought to be pre-eminent. Again both sought to improve the material lot of villagers by providing educational and medical services. John Taaffe was the only other whiteman who showed an active concern for native welfare.

Only once did the missions speak out on a public issue unconnected with native welfare: prohibition, which they opposed. Abel publicly spoke against its introduction which caused deep regret and consternation among Christian and temperance workers in Australia. (142) At the time of the transfer of sovereignty Alfred Deakin, then responsible for the colony, was shocked to discover the quantity of alcohol annually imported into the territory. He thought the natives must be drinking and so proposed total prohibition. The mission objected to this measure for the usual reasons. First, spirits had to be used medicinally; second, the administration could not adequately enforce the law or control the sly grog traffic. For once the whole European population, administration, mission, and the rest of the

(142) G309/102 Papua Letters, Box 10 Folder 3, Abel, 20 Oct.1903; Ibid, Mins. of Committee 1904; G309/91 Aust.Letters, Box 17, Clark, 3 Dec.1903.
 unofficial community, were in complete agreement. A referendum
was held, and subsequently the measure abandoned. (143)

Relations with the rest of the unofficial community or
the government, though important, were a subsidiary concern of
the missions: their chief interest was the native population.
Because of this, and the dedication of mission workers, village
natives felt the impact of Christianity more than any other
facet of western culture. Although the number of church
members was relatively small many thousands of natives attended
services, as the figures at the beginning of this chapter
indicate. Yet to gauge the effect of Christian doctrines on
the Papuans is virtually impossible. All the evidence is from
the missionaries, who had a much stronger spiritual bond with
God than did most of their flock. As congregations consisted
chiefly of illiterates, there is no lay literature. Mission-
aries hardly ever explicitly stated the effect their doctrinal
views or statements of dogma had on listeners. They mentioned
only the Papuan reaction to the social ethic of Christianity.

Successful conversion entailed a change in the individual.

(143) GMF.P. General 1904, vol.II, 177-202; C.P.I.(Col.) Set 6
vol.V, Robinson to Gov.Gen.3 Sept.1903; Ibid, Barton to
Set 5, Deakin to Barton, 25 Ap.1906; C.P.I.(Col.) Set
11, King to Barton, 29 July 1904; C.P.146 04/6645 Liquor
referendum.
moral code, his view of man's place in nature, and his eschatology. The evidence indicates that this substitution was easiest in cases where the individual was ill-adjusted to his own society. Missionaries accepted outward manifestations as proof of an inner genuine religious experience, perhaps being influenced by the wish to appear successful. Yet who could determine if converts had truly been "reborn in Christ"? Few missionaries were interested in native religion and magic, and so made any attempt to discover how far these permeated the thinking of converts. Moreover the natives were reticent, and suspicious of questioning in such matters. Anthropologists' accounts of peoples under mission influence for decades have shown that Christianity was accepted but superficially, almost as a protective colouring.

Most natives among whom missionaries or teachers settled welcomed the newcomers and at first listened with interest to what they had to say. For example three hundred natives attended the service when the Panaeati church was opened on 14 February 1892. All the limespots, pipes, betel-nut bags, knives and so forth were collected and put in the porch. The behaviour and attention of the crowd was perfect. The organ, which attracted much attention, was, in the missionary's words "a
great help". (144) Generally there was very little open hostility to the Christians, although Dobuan sorcerers laughed at the funeral procession of the first Methodist worker to die. She was the wife of one of the S.S.I. teachers, and the magician thought it was their incantations which had caused the death. (14

The number of converts and church members grew steadily if very slowly in all the mission fields, and a native church developed. Kwato island became entirely Christian. Although the Papuan churches did not become self-supporting, native contributions collected at L.M.S. "Mays" and Methodist annual "Meetings" increased. For example in 1909 the Kirivina circuit raised £25, while the following year its contribution increased to £72. The Panaeati circuit contribution jumped from £57 in 1910 to £141 in 1911. (146) At very few places did Christianity fail to make some impact. Murua was probably the only one, although for many years the missionary in charge of the Mailu district found it difficult to touch the people.

Yet Papua was not an easy mission field. After the

(145) Bromilow, op.cit., 68.
first enthusiasm there followed a period when reversals came thick and fast. Missionaries had to prevent themselves from becoming pessimistic and losing faith. So late as 1892 four females from Milne Bay dug up and ate a body. (147) Missionaries cited many cases of zeal and congregations dwindling. (148) Can any causes for this reversal be deduced? Our earlier chapter and the whole history of mission activity suggest the answer. Inspiring the early acceptance of mission teachers was the desire not for their message, but for the goods they distributed and the prestige that accrued from having a wealthy foreign resident in the village. A clue to this attitude is found in one account of the fight between the mission party and the Suau natives discussed in chapter three. Relatives of the murdered man desired Chalmers' life as revenge payment but one Suau man said: "You have no white man to give you tomahawks and beads, and if you try to kill him, you kill him over my dead body." (144) Thus it was that a cannibal chief saved Tamate's life.

The Mailu people received the settlement of a missionary amongst them with great pleasure, because of the prestige it

(147) G309/97 Papua Letters, Box 5 Folder 4, Abel, 28 June 1892.
(148) cf. G309/12 Box 1, Abel, Report 1894; G309/103 Papua Letters, Box 11 Folder 2, Abel, 2 Sept.1905; Tomlin, op.cit., 111.
(149) Nairne, James Chalmers, 46.
brought. Previously they had felt slighted through having only a S.S.I. teacher. The missionary soon found that the Pauans were more interested in the imported manufactures he brought than in the gospel message. He found them "proud, ungrateful, selfish, owning none, white or black, superior to themselves." (150) So late as 1902 there was no church formed though they knew the gospel off by heart. They refused to allow their children to attend school, and, in the missionary's opinion, were a people whose ideal was pig and whose God was their belly. (151)

The Methodists also worried about the strong commercial spirit among the people and realized by 1912 that the days of romance in the mission field were over. Once the novelty of their presence wore off the missionaries spent years plodding, waiting hopefully, and praying for the first genuine conversions. (152) In some places the people remained indifferent so that it was difficult to get a congregation together; children ran away from school; (153) and sometimes people wanted payment for

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(150) G309/101 Papua Letters, Box 9 Folder 4, Saville, 10 Sept. 1902.
(151) Idem.
(152) Mitchell Lib. Ms. Meth. Ch. O. M. Letters Received 119, Burgess to Danks, 10 Sept. 1912; G309/102 Papua Letters, Box 10 Folder 4, Abel, 30 July 1904.
attending church. (154) Such evidence illustrates that the Papuan first saw the gospel as a means to the end, not of eternal life, which they expected anyhow, but of an epicuran existence on the earth. The wonders of the white man and his goods were well known. Once Europeans or S.S.I. teachers settled amongst them the Papuans did what they could to get foreign artifacts.

Even when the channels through which such goods reached the natives ramified, the demand still far exceeded the supply. When the gospel failed to produce adequate quantities of desirable commodities the natives tried all other sources. They even reverted to traditional magic. For example in 1893 a man from Milne Bay, Tokeriu by name, announced a sensational prophecy and prescribed certain rites and observances. According to Tokeriu all coastal villages were to be inundated after a series of natural upheavals; earthquakes, hurricanes, and tidal waves. He advised the inhabitants to slaughter all pigs, uproot their gardens, discard all foreign goods, wear special insignia, and flee to the mountains. After the cataclysm a huge mountain would rise from the sea, peopled by the ancestral spirits and fully supplied with all the good things of life. A ship would appear, pick up the spirits and

(154) Mitchell Lib.Ms.Meth.Ch.O.M. Letters Received 119, Burgess to Danks, 10 Sept.1912.
return them with the "cargo" to their former homes. At this point the millenium commenced. All whitemen would either die or become slaves of the natives. (155)

News of the prophecy reached Kwato, and immediately Abel and Walker went to investigate. They were amazed to find twenty new houses, and others under construction at the inland spot selected by Tokeriu as being high enough to avoid inundation. There was an air of busy activity about the place which bore eloquent testimony to the inhabitants' belief in the prophet. (156)

Between three and four hundred pigs had been slaughtered. (157) The missionaries tried to reason with Tokeriu and his followers, without success. For the only recorded time, natives who had been in contact with Europeans for decades refused tobacco. (158) Once the movement spread the government intervened and the prophet spent two years in gaol. (159)

Several important features emerge from this cult, which is one of the earliest recorded. First, every village added

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(156) G309/12 Box 1, Outstations Report Eastern District 1893.
(158) Abel, op.cit., 118-125.
(159) Ibid, 126-127; G309/12 Papua Reports Box 1, Walker, 11 Feb. 1894.
something to the account so that thirty miles away from the
source the story was hardly a recognisable version of the
original. (160) Unfortunately Abel did not give the original
version nor indicate how it differed from the Kwato account.
In one account the ship was a sailing vessel, probably a huge
canoe, in another a steamer larger than the MERRIE ENGLAND.
Either alternative was logical because the ancestors knew the
"cargo" secret and could make a steamer, but it would have been
in keeping for them to use the traditional waga. Features
which remain constant in the different accounts are the rejectio
and hatred of the whitesman, and the idea that they could be
defeated only by a return to traditional ways.

Second the evidence shows that there had been similar
prophecies previously. The native teacher in the village where
the cult first started spoke to Tokeriu's followers, reminding
them of the disastrous prophecy one Domu of Mita had delivered
some twenty years previously. (161) This would have been about
the time of Moresby's voyages. In south-east Papua there is
no proof that such revelations and cults were a feature of nativ
society before European contact, but anthropological material
from other parts of New Guinea would suggest that perhaps this

(161) Ibid, 111.
was so. Other cults were reported later. (162) Such prophecies indicate that most Papuans did not distinguish between missionari and other Europeans but regarded them all indiscriminantly as the medium through which foreign manufactures came in such small quantities. It was logical for them to suppose that as the whiteman had the "cargo" it was through malice he refused to give the secret to his brown brother.

Finally, Tokeriu was not an old man. So his dissatisfaction with changing conditions could not be ascribed to the aged's conservatism, unreasonable distaste for modernity, and nostalgic romanticization of the past. Tokeriu has to be seen as an intelligent young man, a leader who wanted changes to occur with an increased impetus. He wanted too that the brown man participate in shaping the new world. His solution to the problem of Papuan adaption to the new order was drastic. It postulated both an improved material condition and destruction of the white ascendancy. An alternative solution was to adopt Christianity. It was less revolutionary, yet almost as satisfying. For the majority material benefits counted most, but for some Christianity was more than this.

There is very little information about the type of native who became attached to the missions, but what does exist is significant. All case histories, except those of infants rescued from burial with the mother, show that converts were unhappy in their own societies. Such people would throw themselves on the mercy of God. (163) Josia Lebasi, one of Abel’s most trusted workers, who served Kwato for twenty four years, had been an abandoned child. (164) He finally went insane. (165) The first Wesleyan convert was a middle aged woman who claimed to have died and seen Jesus. (166) Whether popularity among such people is evidence of Christianity’s falseness might be argued, but it certainly reflected on the creed’s social efficacy. Although each of the missions could, with the passage of time, claim an increasing number of adherents by their own standards the growth was slow. Even the social services they provided did not touch so many natives. Because they had inadequate resources only a small proportion of the native population received any schooling or benefited from medical care.

(163) Abel, op.cit., 93; Abel, Savage Life, 54-57; Chalmers and Gill, Work and Adventure, 264-265.
(164) Abel, Charles W. Abel of Kwato, 52.
(166) Bromilow, op.cit., 103-105.
Missionaries helped to perpetuate a feeling of western superiority. Although considering themselves the protectors and champions of the natives, missionaries regarded them as an inferior order. Here mission wives were most important. They were among the first white women to settle in south-east Papua, and set a pattern in native relations which is still prevalent. Many were ministering angels in every sense: they did much good but were beyond human approach. Once the mission wife established her home easy social relations between the brown men and the white became near impossible.

Most missionaries regarded the natives as children, or even as queer animals who had to be strictly disciplined to be managed at all. Abel and Walker had a higher opinion of native capabilities than most. The former held the view that most Europeans refused to credit a native with real ability because they thought that it denigrated their race if the Papuan was capable of doing something better than they. He considered Josia Lebasi to have a better appreciation of the bearing of the present on the future than any other Papuan. Yet he felt even

(168) G309/100 Papua Letters, Box 3 Folder 3, Lawes, 20 Oct. 1899.
Josia to be intellectually inferior to the whiteman (169) and to an outsider seemed to uphold the prestige of the white race. (170) Even the Anglicans, who were not whole-hearted advocates of "civilization" and appreciated the distinctive features of Papuan society, instinctively placed Europeans above the natives. At least one of them believed that friendship between a European and a Papuan was impossible: (171)

My dog and I have much more in common, in the realms of familiarity and friendship, as far as the things of daily life are concerned — the eating, and walking, and talking together, the understanding of each other's moods — than the Wanigela people and I, ...

The "holier than thou" attitude, and notions about the white man's burden which nearly all missionaries held, helped to create a belief in the superiority of the white man which became firmly entrenched in all sections of society. They could not afford to provide extensive educational facilities which might further bolster European notions of Papuan capabilities. The Papuans themselves knew they were inferior in dealing with whitemen, and refused to accept full responsibility for anything. This made it difficult for either the missions or the administration to delegate authority to the natives.

(171) Chignell, op. cit., 71.
Mission effort in south-east Papua may be judged at two
levels: first whether it achieved what it set out to do, and
second whether the implementation of policies had the desired
effects. The primary aim of all denominations was the spiritual
salvation of individuals. In this they met with some success
although conversion figures were not spectacular. The Methodist
mission must be deemed the most successful in this regard,
although Murua, the only area where the gospel positively failed
came within their sphere of influence. Neither did they produce
any indigenous spiritual leader of note. The nearest approach
was one Matthew who, significantly, came from the Trobriands. (17:
The Anglicans admitted a Papuan to the priesthood in 1918. He
was a deeply religious man, but not an evangelist who had
spectacular success in leading his people from paganism to
Christianity. The creation of an indigenous church was far,
far distant.

The missions also hoped to make the transition from
savagery to civilization as painless as possible for the Papuans.
Yet their solution, besides lacking in imagination, was unfeasible
They wished to provide harmless substitutes for those traditional
activities and pleasures which were incompatible with Christianit

(172) Mitchell Lib.Ms.Meth.Ch.O.M. Letters Received 114,
But change in certain institutions affected others which the missions sought to preserve or considered innocuous. For instance their ban on magic affected all sorts of arts and crafts: precisely those features of native society which the missions wished to sustain as giving the natives an interest in life. As substitutes for traditional ceremonies hymn singing, European sports, or sewing circles were failures because they served no function in the social systems to which they were applied. Such activities were indulged in only by station natives, never by villagers. Attempts to improve village life by providing educational and medical facilities or, in the case of the Nonconformists, altering the traditional economic pattern, were also inadequate. Besides being concerned with personal salvation, all the missions hoped to create a society in which responsible Christian Papuans helped shape their own destiny. Yet by inadequate teaching, paternal concern, and constant supervision of the people, all of which helped foster a feeling of inferiority, mission activity had rather the opposite effect.
The period after 1906 saw no radical change in European life as depicted in chapter five. Nonetheless there were from time to time certain modifications, actual and potential, which throw further light on the total subject. The nature of the Murray government's approach to the issue also has an intrinsic importance. Yet the most significant fact remains the general negative quality of the story, for there lodged the peculiar quality of Papuan history.

The following account has necessarily to treat the European population in occupational groupings. Yet it is somewhat misleading to draw even such faint distinctions as they will prove to be. Many of the immigrants continued to be of the Collinson-Donovan type. Some stayed permanently, bringing wives thither or marrying local women, but the majority stayed only a few years before wandering off once more. They would engage in all sorts of ventures hoping to get rich quick, but their initial lack of capital usually doomed their efforts. This background of shiftless frustration lies behind the whole narrative.

At least until the mid-twenties miners formed the largest single class within the unofficial population, and were the most
mobile and transient of all. However there were no rushes on
the former scale and the number of miners on a field never rose
above seventy odd. In 1906-1907 there were sixty nine men on
the Murua field, thirty six were employees of companies and the
rest worked as alluvial diggers. They employed two hundred and
twenty seven natives. The field produced five thousand, two
hundred and ninety six ounces of gold worth £18,536. There
were six mines on the island: The Woodlark Island Mines, a
Sydney concern; The Kulumadau Woodlark Island Gold Mining Company
owned by Charters Towers' interests; The Murua Syndicate which
was locally owned; and three small local ventures worked by Fred
Weekley and party. The Woodlark Island Mines had been idle the
whole year, and the Kulumadau Company's mill had worked less
than half the year. Eleven Europeans fossicked on Misima;
their return must have been small because no figures were given.
All were old residents, indeed one man had not been off the
island for eighteen years. Gold bearing quartz had been
discovered on the island but no work had been done. Seven
leases had been taken up; three lessees had paid rent. Thirty
five indentured labourers were employed on the field and the
Warden felt the industry had a future if capital could be
introduced. Seventeen miners' rights had been issued for the
Milne Bay alluvial field, but at the end of the year only seven
Europeans were left. They employed twenty five natives under
indentures and thirty local people. The field produced three hundred and fifty seven ounces of gold valued at £1,250. The Gira and Yodda fields were in the Northern Division but their workers visited Samarai regularly to obtain supplies and labour; hence these fields must be included in the present discussion. On the Gira field there were forty two whites employing three hundred natives. It produced five thousand ounces of gold valued at £18,750. Sixty one Europeans with three hundred and five indentured labourers won five thousand ounces worth £18,750 from the Yodda field. Both fields were alluvial. (1)

By 1914-1915 there were fifty eight whites and four hundred and fifty natives on the Murua field, which produced seven thousand, one hundred and seventy ounces of gold, worth £24,449. The Kulumadau Woodlark Island Gold Mining Company had twenty eight Europeans and two hundred and fifty three native employees. Six more Europeans were expected in the next boat from Australia. This mine produced £20,099 worth of gold. The Woodlark King mine had been under option to a Sydney syndicate for most of the year. It employed five whites and sixty natives, but had only crushed for one month. A Mr. McLeish took over working the mine when the Sydney syndicate's option expired.

All the other mines were idle the whole year. Very little had been done on the Misima field until late 1914 but since then Broken Hill Propriety's Block 10 Limited, the St. Aignan Mining Company Limited, and the New Guinea Option Syndicate had been active. The New Guinea Option Syndicate had taken option over the St. Aignan Company, and the Mount Sesa Company had gone into liquidation. There were thirty one Europeans, sixty indentured natives, and two hundred local natives employed on the field which produced one thousand, three hundred and forty one ounces of gold for £2,610. Only one whiteman and ten natives worked the Milne Bay field which produced one hundred and twenty nine ounces of gold for £500. Minerals were discovered on Sideia island in June 1915 by W. Newton who laid a thirty nine acre claim. Three other Europeans also put in claims but the field proved a duffer. Nine whites and ninety six natives obtained one thousand, seven hundred and fifty ounces of gold worth £6,562 on the Yodda field, and seven Europeans employing one hundred and thirty one natives got one thousand, two hundred ounces worth £3,600 from the Gira field. (2)

All mining, but particularly the alluvial fields continued to decline. By 1920-1921 virtually the only work on the Murua

and Misima fields was carried out by Block 10 which crushed eleven thousand, four hundred and sixty two tons of ore for £15,668 worth of gold. The company employed forty eight Europeans and four hundred and thirty three natives. Murua was at a standstill but some predicted a big revival. On the Gira four whites employing eighty labourers got some two hundred and ten ounces of gold and three hundred ounces of osmiridium. Seven Europeans and one hundred natives won three hundred and fifty ounces of gold, and sixty ounces of osmiridium from the Yodda field. (3)

In 1928-1929 there were twelve Europeans and ninety four indentured labourers on the Murua field. It produced one thousand two hundred and fifty eight ounces of gold which brough £4,019. There were seven whites and one hundred and twenty natives on the Misima field which produced one thousand and twenty nine ounces of gold worth £2,882. The Yodda field was deserted and only four whites employing fifty four natives worked on the Gira. No production figures were given. (4)

Alluvial mining, one of the most democratic occupations in other parts of the world, worked differently in Papua. Ever,

(4) Ibid, 1928-1929, 49.
white miner employed several natives as carriers and general labourers. The miners, most of whom were rough, hard-drinking, poorly educated men, were generally intolerant of anything divergent from the norm of Australian goldfields life. Most were completely bewildered by the exotic qualities of the Papuan goldfields. Unused to living or working amongst people with a different social organization and material culture, they tended to regard the natives simply as pack-animals. Any other view would have entailed a re-appraisal of basic political and social tenets. The easiest way to preserve egalitarianism on the Papuan goldfields was to see the native as less than human.

Few miners had previous experience as employers and so lacked any conception of the obligations of a master-servant relationship. They knew only their rights, and protested forcibly when the administration sought to stress the other half of the picture. In the absence of a lingua franca, a prospectiv employer could not attempt to learn the native language before labourers were signed on to him. He could, if he so desired, attempt to master the dialect of his indentured labourers once they were assigned, but as the maximum period for which a native could sign on for goldfields work was twelve months this became hardly practicable. (5) Most miners only went so far as to pick

up odd words and phrases of a dialect. In the particularly
close physical relationship which existed between a miner and
his labourers the consequent inability to communicate resulted
in misunderstandings. Sometimes these led to assaults, and
very occasionally to murder. (6)

The geography of the industry further conduced to rather
violent relations between miners and natives. Most fields were
fairly isolated from government stations or mission compounds.
Auriferous country was always rugged and difficult of access.
On each field miners' camps were thinly scattered over a
relatively large area. Some men formed partnerships, but most
often a claim was worked by a single European assisted only by
his "boys". Working a claim but a few hundred yards from
another, the miner would not be visible, and could even be
outside calling range. It was thus relatively easy for either
indentured labourers or other natives to attack a miner or rob
his camp. Yet attacks were very uncommon. This may have been
the result of the natives having already learned respect for
European weapons; or the effectiveness of the miners' reprisals.
By contrast, thefts of gold and other goods were fairly frequent.

(6) Monckton, "Some Experiences of a New Guinea Resident
86-87.
Some diggers stole from their fellows but suspicion usually fell on the natives.

Desertion was by far the most common way in which the indentured natives broke the law, particularly on the northern goldfields. The desertion rate was far higher than that which prevailed in any other class of work for which natives engaged. The industry suffered from a chronic, though by no means acute, labour shortage. Natives always preferred other work. (7) The reason for the unpopularity of the northern goldfields especially was obvious. Particularly in the early years the mortality rate among indentured labourers was extremely high. At its highest it reached twenty per cent of the total labour force. (8) Fear of dying in an alien land as much as dissatisfaction with their treatment or the work was the chief reason why so many natives deserted. Sometimes the cause was unequivocally maltreatment. On one occasion a group of natives deserted in a body then travelled to the government station, where they declared that they would go to gaol rather than work for their employer. (9)

The miners considered the native to be an inferior,

untrustworthy creature who should not be allowed any civil rights. This appeared most clearly in the evidence given to the Royal Commission by representatives of the class. One, though satisfied with the mining laws, disapproved of other administrative policy thought that the natives were over-protected. He believed that troublesome they should be dispersed from white settlements and camps by being fired upon. (10) Fred Weekley, whom the administration respected highly and who was one of the first unofficial nominees to sit on the Legislative Council, objected to the Resident Magistrate of the South-eastern Division being employed almost entirely on native affairs, while a minor officer dealt with the white population on Murua. He thought the roles should be reversed. Further Weekley argued that white police would be advantageous because "We would not stand a black policeman here". (11) In fact native civil servants were used as little as possible in connection with mining affairs. In December 1912 when one William Keegan, in a fit of delirium tremens, shot Weekley in the head he remained at large until he surrendered himself. A special European warder, paid £1 per diem, was engaged to guard Keegan. (12) Opinions such as Weekley's were expressed fairly frequently. One old German digger on Misima,

(10) Rep. of Royal Commission, 46.
(11) Ibid, 53-54.
who subsisted almost entirely on native charity and lived in utter squalor, once expressed the view to the Governor, that the natives (like the French) needed a hammering every five years.

Joseph O'Brien was arch-representative of the way in which miners expected a whiteman to have immunity from normal judicial processes. A Queenslander by birth, O'Brien came to Papua as a miner. From the time of entering the country he proved to be a trouble-maker. He had an ungovernable temper and when inflamed by alcohol became very dangerous. Savage assaults on natives, rapes, gold thefts, all were among his crimes. O'Brien's hatred of the native police was such that he used to open the breach of his rifle and put a cartridge in it whenever a native policeman, unaccompanied by a European, passed him. Finally in 1905 he was arrested and charged on several counts: assault, robbery, shooting with intent to kill, arson, rape, unlawful destruction of animals.

O'Brien was convicted on two charges of assault, and sentenced to serve two months imprisonment with hard labour on each count. He was not allowed the option of a fine. The Yodda gaol being an open hut, he was kept in irons until removed.

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to the Kokoda prison. Sometimes armed native police stood guard over him, though more often he was under the supervision of a European officer. Part of his hard labour consisted of giving clerical assistance to the Resident Magistrate. O'Brien received special rations, but continued to complain about his food. Once he had been transferred to Kokoda, O'Brien's irons were struck off and he promised not to escape. But he broke his word. To perpetrate his escape O'Brien attacked and almost killed the native policeman guarding him, stole his rifle, and then disappeared. On the day of his breakaway O'Brien visited two miners, but after that was never seen again. Although rumour went round that he had been identified in Sydney, O'Brien probably perished from exposure in the jungle or was killed by natives. (15)

O'Brien was exceptionally violent but his attitudes were typical. Miners thought nothing of bellowing at their labourers or even beating or kicking them. Toward Europeans they behaved a little more moderately. The consumption of alcohol on the goldfields was spectacularly high even for Papua. Most miners became even more aggressive and turbulent under its influence.

O'Brien won considerable personal sympathy from his fellows. Miners thought it disgraceful that the evidence of a native was considered against a whiteman; that O'Brien should have been guarded by a native policeman; that in the course of proceedings some of them should have to suffer the ignominy of receiving messages through a Papuan policeman; that the Resident Magistrate should issue a Proclamation to the effect that O'Brien was to be brought in, dead or alive, by any man, white or brown. (16) Europeans in the territory inclined to believe that O'Brien was the victim of poor administration. (17) When writing the story of Papua's goldfields Lewis Lett devoted a whole chapter to O'Brien. It bore the title "A Wasted Hero". (18)

However life on the goldfields was not all violence. For weeks at a time nothing broke the monotony of the individual miner's hard existence. He was cheered only by the effects of alcohol and sustained by hopes of a rich strike. Then something out of the ordinary would happen: a brawl, or a fight which he could discuss with his mates. Perhaps somebody who made a good find would hold a party to celebrate. Individuals in delirium tremens always provided some excitement; either they perpetrated

(17) Ibid, 3-4 and 10-11.
(18) Lett, Papuan Gold, 137-152.
some violence or wandered off and got lost in which case search parties had to be organized. The few occasions each year when missionaries or the Governor and the Chief Judicial Officer visited the goldfields further broke the routine. On official visits deputations frequently petitioned the Governor, and there was usually a case or two heard before the Central Court. Although a miner's existence was less monotonous than that of whitemen following other callings, it was no carnival.

Similarly, one must modify the emphasis on the barbarity of the miners' treatment of their labourers. Doubtless through their desire for European goods, the latter were prepared to accept hardships and humiliation. Officials and missionaries frequently remarked that relations between the two groups could logically have been much worse than in fact they were.

Most alluvial miners left the territory after a few years. A few, quite destitute and wishing to leave Papua, had their passages to Cooktown or Cairns paid for them by the government. (20) Of those who remained in Papua most became public servants, (19)

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recruiters or traders, (21) which occupations will be treated below. Yet a few continued to fossick on abandoned fields, hardly making a living. Some of these gained a reputation as harmless eccentrics and were well treated by the rest of the population including the natives. In 1920 an Eastern Division official discovered an old miner living in a government rest-house at Milne Bay. The old man contended he was only there temporarily, looking for "boys". His excuse did not convince the official, who nonetheless made no attempt to evict the senile squatter. Some time afterwards the same officer returned to the district, found the miner still in residence, and was told the same story. (22) But not all those who continued mining became hatters. Some went on making a living and earning the respect of the rest of the white population. The best known man of this type was Matt Crowe, (23) but there were others; two on Misima were a man called Boyd (24) and Alexander Grant. The latter, who died in 1928, worked as an alluvial miner for over

thirty years without a break, almost to the day of his death. (25)

On Murua and Misima after the alluvial diggings had been practically worked out, mining moved into its customary second stage of machine treatment. As has been indicated earlier most of the capital for these ventures came from Australia but sometimes local residents took the initiative in this work. The Australia companies brought skilled workmen to Papua for a specified period of service.

Very few of these companies were successful. Indeed the history of such ventures had a depressing uniformity. A company would import expensive machinery to Papua, bring white artisans, and employ hundreds of natives. Then when it began crushing it would find the returns disappointing. After a year or two it would apply for exemptions from the improvement conditions of its lease and so on. Eventually most companies went into liquidation or pulled out of the country. Sometimes a company would cease operations for a period while directors tried to raise more capital in Australia. In such cases a caretaker would be left in charge of the plant to prevent too rapid a deterioration of assets. Mining operations would begin, then

cease, then start again in a fine flurry of optimistic activity only to slow down gradually and finally cease. Nobody made a fortune out of minerals in south-east Papua although the richest fields in the territory were there and for many years officials, settlers, and presumably mining interests in Australia considered them to be one of Papua's best assets.

The Murnan and Misima mining centres more nearly approximated in microcosm, to Australian social conditions than any other part of south-east Papua. Nowhere else were so many whitemen, let alone with wives and families, brought together. Such men moreover had acquaintance with the skills of western capitalism. Relations between the management and white employees were on the whole good although there were some disputes. Individuals brought claims for wages and fares before the Small Debts Court every now and again, (26) and very occasionally a man would bring a charge of assault. (27) In May 1915 after there had been a spate of accidents, which proved fatal to several natives, at the Kulumadau Company's mine the Resident Magistrate stated that there was a deal of discontent among the European employees on account of the accidents. (28) There was only one strike, in

(26) C.P.293 Set 10 Bundle 2, Small Debts Court.  
April 1912 at the Kulumadau Company's mine. The strikers aimed at an increased wage and better conditions. The strike was settled amicably within a few days and a majority of the men returned to work, but some determined to leave the country. (29) The precedent established might have been significant in shaping future relations between labour and management in the territory, but with the decline in mining and then the depression, few skilled workmen entered Papua and so the strike had no repercussions. Native employees of the company were not involved in the strike. In the period under review they never united to make any conscious efforts to improve their working conditions or wages. Officials when they inspected indentured labourers working in the mines occasionally brought prosecutions against companies either for infringements of the Labour Ordinance or because white employees had assaulted natives. (30)

The mining companies formed locally were always small-scale. Fred Weekley and Henry Morley had interests in such mines on Murua and Misima respectively. (31) Almost certainly Morley was the Henry Morley implicated in the Gibara scandal. If that were so, no stigma attached to him in the eyes of the

(29) Ibid, April 1912.
(31) Ann.Rep.1914-1915, 76-83; C.P.293 Set 21 Bundle 1, Miscellanea, Correspondence of H. Morley.
European residents of south-east Papua. He became, if not one of the leading citizens, at least a highly respected member of the unofficial community. Morley eventually settled on Tagula. He married a native woman, by whom he had at least one son and one daughter. The son went into partnership with his father in both mining and planting interests. No Morley venture was really profitable.

Agricultural pursuits provided the second chief occupation for the non-official population. Some plantations had been established from the beginning of British rule but the industry remained small-scale. The Royal Commissioners declared that there were only ten plantations in British New Guinea at the time of their investigations. They did not define what they meant by a plantation and the figure obviously excluded many small agricultural plots under cultivation.

Immediately after 1906 a small land boom developed. The number of applications for land swelled markedly; numerous plantations were established. On the other hand some land taken up in the boom years before the Great War (and after) was forfeited because improvement conditions had been neglected. The writer Beatrice Grimshaw and the naturalist A.S. Meek were

(32) Rep. of Royal Comm., x.
among those who gave up their land after only a year or two'sendeavour. Both had plantations on the mainland opposite Samarai. (33) Rarely was any plantation fully developed. Mrs Whitten had a freehold plantation of over eight hundred acres on the south coast yet in 1912 it produced only some forty to sixty tons of copra annually. (34)

By 1912-1913 there were seventy six plantations in the Eastern Division with a total area of some twelve thousand nine hundred and forty acres. Of these, one thousand, one hundred and eighty acres were under rubber, ten thousand seven hundred and nine under coconuts, seventeen under hemp, one hundred and four under cotton, and nine hundred and thirty under other cultures. In the same period there were thirty one plantations in the South-eastern Division, excluding the Trobriands. The total acreage under cultivation was two thousand three hundred and eighty eight acres. Two thousand three hundred and seventy nine acres were planted with coconuts, two with rubber, and seven with other cultures. (35) At the end of the period under review, in the financial year 1930-1931, there were one hundred and twenty five plantations in the Eastern Division. The total

(33) Grimshaw, Isles of Adventure, 210-215; Meek, A Naturalist in Cannibal Land, 100-107.
(35) Ibid, 1912-1913, 23.
acreage under cultivation was twenty five thousand seven hundred and fourteen acres. Of this some twenty four thousand six hundred and eighteen acres was under coconuts, eight hundred and eighty under rubber, fifty under kapok, seventeen under coffee, two and a half under cocoa, and one hundred and thirty five under other cultures. By 1930 there were sixty seven plantations in the South-eastern Division. Copra was the staple there still. The total acreage was six thousand one hundred and fourteen acres; of this some six thousand and sixty three acres were under coconuts and fifty one acres under other cultures. (36) In twenty years both the area under cultivation and the number of plantations had doubled.

For topographical reasons most of south-east Papua did not participate in the boom to the same extent as other parts of the territory. Investment companies were interested in getting the best returns on capital. Such concerns therefore desired large, flat, well watered but not swampy tracts of land. In south-east Papua such land was to be found only on certain parts of the mainland: chiefly around Milne Bay or parts of the south coast especially opposite Abau island where the coastal plain, before rising into the foothills of the main range, was reasonably extensive.

Companies were fairly active in developing this area. In 1911-1912 the British New Guinea Development Company had three plantations in the Abau district. One comprised six thousand one hundred and fifty acres, of which two hundred and sixty six were under rubber and ninety six under coconuts; another, two thousand seven hundred acres, one hundred and forty under coconuts and ten under rubber; a third, nine hundred acres of which two hundred and forty acres were planted with coconuts and fifteen with para rubber and one hundred and nineteen and a half with ceara rubber. Domara River Plantations Limited had a two thousand acre tract; two hundred and thirty nine acres under rubber and twenty three under coconuts. There were also six privately owned plantations. Of these Mrs Whitten's was by far the largest. The others ranged in size from twenty five acres to five hundred. (37) By 1920-1921 there were a dozen plantations in the area and nine thousand acres had been planted. By this time only the Domara River plantation was growing rubber, some two hundred and forty acres. The rest concentrated on coconuts. Upwards of seven hundred natives worked on the plantations. (38)

In 1914-1915 there were five or six company owned plantations in Milne Bay. The biggest was the three and a half

(38) Ibid, 1920-1921, 54.
thousand acre Commonwealth Copra Company's plantation. The
British New Guinea Development Company and the Milne Bay Rubber
Company each had one thousand six hundred acre holdings. Others
ranged from six hundred to one hundred and seventy acres. The c
plantation of any size outside Milne Bay was in the Conflicts whe
one thousand two hundred acres had been planted. (39)

The South-eastern Division was scarcely developed. In
1920-1921 the total area planted was five thousand acres, four-
fifths being on Murua. (40) The larger Louisiade islands,
especially Tagula and Misima, were less suited to coconuts than
cattle-raising, but that industry did not expand much either.
The Trobriands' availability for European exploitation was
restricted by the relative density of native settlement. In
1912 the sole three plantations comprised twenty, sixty-five,
and two hundred and forty acres respectively. The largest of
these, on Muwo island and owned by the Auerbach brothers, still
had one hundred acres unimproved. (41) The plantations in the
South-eastern Division were as a rule small, and owned by
individuals.

As indicated above companies operating in Papua were

(40) Ibid, 1920-1921, 55.
usually Australian firms rather than the International cartels. On each plantation they employed a European manager, one or two assistants, and several overseers of native labour. It is impossible to determine exactly how they recruited personnel. The managers were doubtless sent from Australia, with overseers recruited locally.

The turnover in personnel, especially overseers, was quite high. One reason for this was that such men were, in the main, rather brutal individuals who continually disregarded the conditions of the Native Labour Ordinance. As always, communication with Papuans proved a major difficulty. Often when an overseer tried to explain a point the natives would appear to him dull-witted or even purposely obstructionist. In such cases the whiteman sometimes lost patience and his gestures, originally used to demonstrate a point, became assaults. Throughout the period under review officials on patrol examined, in their capacity as Inspectors of Native Labour, all plantations in the area. The majority of complaints they heard against whitemen dealt with such attacks. Sometimes the Commissioner of Native Affairs prevented certain Europeans, often plantation overseers,

from being put in charge of natives. (43)

Among individual planters two groups may be distinguished: those who planned to be agriculturalists and came to the country with some capital, bought or leased land, then proceeded to create an estate in the wilderness; and those who originally came to Papua for some other reason then decided to turn to agriculture, at the same time maintaining several other interests. Frank Osborne was representative of the first class. An Australian, he migrated to Papua in 1902 as a young man, having determined to invest the capital he brought with him in a coconut plantation. He chose to settle on Rossel island, and applied for a tract of land which he thought was about three hundred acres. When the Resident Magistrate came to purchase the land from the natives he discovered there were only some two hundred acres in the block. (44) Osborne engaged a couple of dozen natives and proceeded to clear and plant. Before his palms came into bearing he earned a living by trading. He bought gum, copra, and sea products, especially sapi-sapi shell, which fetched a high price in Samarai because it was in great demand by natives all over south-east Papua. Necklaces made from sapi-sapi were a coveted form of native wealth. In 1913

(43) C.P.293 Set 13 Bundle I, C.N.A. Circular Instructions.
Osborne got £25 a sack for sapi-sapi, and £12 for pyramid shell. (45) For some years he was the only white resident on the island; later his brothers joined him.

The Osbornes had a monopoly of Rossel trade, and as a result became very high-handed in their treatment of the natives. On a patrol in 1911 an official found that the brothers had been breaking the law in many respects. If a man refused to work for them they burned down his house or destroyed his gardens. (46) Another misdemeanour was to detain forcibly the wives of deserter until the recalcitrant labourers had returned to work. (47) The brothers had also built houses and made gardens on land which did not belong to them; (48) operated unlicensed beche-de-mer boats; (49) worked saw-mills without having permits to fell timber; (50) and supplied natives with shot-guns. (51) Frank Osborne, once found out, was overcome with remorse, consulted with the official, and decided that his best course would be to throw himself on the mercy of the Governor. The latter showed

(47) Ibid, 18 Sept.
(48) Ibid, 8, 9, 11, 16 Sept., and 1 Oct.
(49) Ibid, 11 Sept.
(50) Ibid, 12 Sept.
(51) Ibid, 18 Sept.
his clemency by taking no action. However the officer did hold a Court of Petty Sessions at which Osborne was found guilty of supplying natives with arms. He was fined £20. (52)

This was the first time in three years that a government party had visited Rossel. Its arrival must have surprised both the Osbornes and the natives. Until the island was visited regularly by the government neither the natives nor the Osbornes changed their habits. Frank Osborne's contrition soon disappeared. (53)

The Edes and the Berniers were other representative member of this category of settlers. Richard Ede was a pioneer settler and Isodore succeeded his father as a planter. Ede senior leased the Laughlan islands and grew coconuts. The family also had plantation interests on Murua whither by 1924 they had moved, although continuing to visit the Laughlans regularly. No other traders called at the infertile, arid group of islets, so the Edes had a monopoly of the local copra market. They exerted an enormous degree of control over the natives and fixed prices for copra, very low even by local standards. In September 1913 when copra fetched £20 a ton at ship's side they paid the

(52) Ibid, 20 Sept.
equivalent of five shillings per sack. Twelve or thirteen sacks weighed a ton. At this time the natives refused to gather the nuts but simply allowed them to rot on the ground. (54) When affairs had reached an impasse the Resident Magistrate happened to visit the group. After a discussion between the natives, the Resident Magistrate, and Mrs Ede who was alone at the time of the patrol, an agreement was reached. The Edes were to pay seven shillings cash per bag, and the natives were in future to be refused credit in advance for the crop. (55)

This system of giving credit in advance to natives for crops or services was commonly practised by traders. It troubled officials because the natives, without a proper understanding of what was involved, often became hopelessly indebted. The sums involved were not large by Australian standards but the natives could never hope to repay them.

Besides having a monopoly of the Laughlan crop, the Edes made additional profits by selling European manufactured goods and foodstuffs virtually at their own prices. The islanders could have made the canoe trip to Murua to purchase their requirements but that was both time-consuming and dangerous. In 1913

(55) Ibid, 10 Sept.
the Edes gave one bag of rice for two sacks of copra; one bag of flour for two sacks of copra; one half axe for half a sack of copra; one white coat for one sack of copra; one leghorn rooster for one sack of copra; one stick of derby tobacco for one sack of copra; fifteen sticks of trade tobacco for one sack of copra; one pocket knife for half a sack of copra; one large axe for four sacks of copra. (56) It is impossible to determine how long they continued to pay seven shillings per sack. In 1924 it was back to five shillings although copra fetched £18 per ton at ship's side. Thus the Edes garnered a substantial profit even after expenses had been deducted. (57)

Once native taxation had been introduced the Edes had an even stronger economic hold over the natives because copra was the only product of the barren atolls. The islanders had to sell it to pay their tax or else spend a term in prison as defaulters. Officials thought the family exploited the Laughlan islanders but took no firm action, probably because they all believed that if the government forced the Edes to raise their prices the natives would become less industrious. (58)

Why the Berniers, a Frenchman and his wife, decided to

(56) Ibid. 9 Sept.
(58) Idem.
settle in Papua is a mystery. They were no longer young when they came, probably with the pre-war boom, or perhaps during the war. They did not make a fortune in the country, and indeed did not seem to be particularly happy. Officials thought that M. Bernier had a persecution complex. (59) Perhaps Bernier had served a term in prison in New Caledonia, or had been an official there. Alternatively he may have come from one of the French peasant settlements in Australia or direct from metropolitan France.

The Berniers settled on Misima and were exceptional in having only the one financial interest: their plantation. They treated their indentured labourers particularly well. The rations besides being sufficient and varied, were palatably cooked and served. Labourers were expected, indeed obliged, to take nightly baths at which they used real soap. Medical treatment was also particularly good. One Inspector of Native Labour remarked such conditions were unique in his experience. (60) The Berniers had very little trouble with their labourers, although relations with village natives were sometimes strained. (61)

There were not many settlers like the Osbornes, the Edes, and the Berniers. Agriculture remained more in the hands of the second category of planters — those who scraped enough together after coming to the country to indulge in this pursuit. White and coloured, most had been in the country for years. Some were second generation; all regarded Papua as home. Their plantations were rarely managed with efficiency. Such settlers took up yet smaller areas of land; sometimes so little as ten acres, hardly ever more than two or three hundred. They gradual cleared and planted their land with coconuts because that was the easiest crop. Quite frequently these settlers had long held freehold lands which they worked in conjunction with leases subsequently procured. (62) The Mahonys, the Whittens, Nelsson, Sheddon, Arbruin, the Auerbach brothers, the Morleys, George Burfitt, Florentino Paulisbo, Mick Cadigan: these were the outstanding representatives of this class and the most influential people in south-east Papua. The degree to which agriculture was important in their lives fluctuated from family to family and from time to time.

George and Edward Auerbach lived in the Trobriands and their lives reflect general development in that part of the

territory. In Protectorate days they had a reputation as lawless, troublesome adventurers, but by the second decade of the twentieth century officials regarded them more as men of some substance with rights which had to be protected. (63) Once a permanent officer had been stationed in the district the entire immigrant population conformed to the law much more. After 1905 a violent, turbulent era in Trobriand history gradually came to an end. Its final passing was marked by the death of Ministre.

Besides their plantation on Muwo island the Auerbachs, in common with the other Trobriand settlers, bought pearls from the natives. Pearls were in fact the most valuable economic resource of the Trobriands. These were found in the lapi oyster which the islanders used for food. Until whitemen came to the islands the natives had discarded any pearls found in the lapi. From 1906 all pearl buyers had to pay £50 annually for a licence. The season was limited (from October to March) and divers could only operate in water up to a specified depth. Earlier, mal-practices had been common; from 1906 they were much less so. The trade also became much more stable. Natives soon became aware of current values so dealers could not cheat them by offering a low price for a valuable pearl. The pursuit ceased

to be so highly speculative.

Besides pearls, abundant quantities of chalk fish, an inferior sort of bêche-de-mer, were found in Trobriand waters. This was collected chiefly by Malay traders although the Auerbachs were ready to purchase any sort of agricultural and sea product from the natives. Immigrant settlers in the Trobriands were thus Jacks of all trades. Agricultural pursuit tended to be a side line; the Auerbachs planted coconuts on Muwo island in a haphazard sort of way and most of their ilk showed a desultory interest in agriculture.

The Trobriand settlers as a whole preferred to live in a state of anarchy. They, white or coloured, were always opposed to authority either temporal or spiritual. They evaded the law when they could and took pleasure in thwarting the work of the missions. The Auerbachs, in common with the others, married or lived with native women. One of the brothers married the half-caste daughter of a fellow pearl buyer and trader. Marion Hancock was the woman's name. She had been acknowledged by her father but was brought up as a native. Suspecting her husband of philandering, she attempted to poison her rival. Murray, as Chief Judicial Officer, was rather perplexed by her case. He could not decide how to punish her. Certainly there was no provision for the accommodation of such people in the Papuan
Although the Auerbachs, as most other settlers, lived almost in the same fashion as natives they were never incorporated into the Papuan community. They tried to evade as many of the responsibilities such a position entailed, without forfeiting the benefits of intimacy with the natives. Such people had advantages over both the unassimilated and the indigenous peoples themselves. They got economic assistance in the form of goods and services from their native relations much cheaper than they could be obtained in the open market, but they refused to share their wealth equally with kinsfolk. Neither did they feel obliged to keep up appearances and maintain a European standard of living.

In fact most of the Trobriand settlers lived under primitive conditions even when they were fairly well off. One Greek trader who had been in the Trobriands from Protectorate times left quite a valuable estate when he died in 1921: £5,000 as a fixed deposit in a Samarai bank, and about £500 in other assets which included a half share in a launch, and thirteen and a half acres of land plus his dwelling. The latter must have been very meagre.

(65) C.P.293 Set 3 Bundle 4, Jacket 688.
Ellis Silas, an artist who lived in the Trobriands for over a year in the early twenties, graphically described some of the Trobriand settlers. He wrote of one trader's dwelling which was a rickety hut that had a sow wallowing in the muck underneath. Arriving at the establishment he was greeted by a man one side of whose face was eaten away by a cancerous growth: (66)

He is attired in pyjamas, the nether garments tucked into his boots, the laces of which trail on the ground. around his neck is swathed a piece of grey cloth, at one time white. His companion is a jovial fellow, ... He is unshaven and wears a shirt open at the throat, kaki pants and feet encased in shoes long since innocent of boot polish. He gives us a most cordial welcome. The roofing of the house like the rest of the structure, consists of a mixture of palm branches and corrugated iron, .... beneath this bed a dog lies, eying me suspiciously, its head resting against a bedroom utensil of much chipped blue enamelled metal, on the left, a meat safe much besmeared with grime, upon this are resting bottles in various stages of depletion, together with a medley of empty tobacco tins— .... A few deck chairs in various stages of disrepair .... An easy chair of considerable discrepitude supports it ancient frame against the wall, one castor missing, the stuffing oozing from rents in the well worn leather, ... Whiskey & beer bottles litter the ground.

The first questions asked Silas when he entered were how things went down south and what copra fetched a ton.

Florentino Paulisbo, or Ah Gow as he was commonly called, was representative of this class' coloured element which also

included Papuan half-castes like Henry Morley junior, George Burfitt, or Mick Cadigan. It is not known how Paulisbo reached the Louisiades. Most probably he deserted from a ship. Once in Papua he never attempted to return to his native Philippines but married a native woman and settled on Nimoa island. This he made his head-quarters, but spent most of his time sailing about the Louisiades collecting copra, pearl-shell, beche-de-mer, and any other sea products from the natives. He also ran plantations of his own. With his various interests he naturally employed a number of natives under contract of service as boatmen, agricultural labourers, or trading agents. (67) He was a good employer but sometimes came before a Magistrate for some breach of the regulations. On one occasion he failed to provide sufficient food for some labourers. The Magistrate who tried the case did not think the breach had been intentional, but felt that Paulisbo had charge of so many separate ventures that it was impossible for him to supervise all adequately; and that his wife to whom he had delegated responsibility for those particular labourers, had neglected her duty through miserliness. (68)

Paulisbo was in many ways an ideal settler. He taught

the natives new agricultural techniques and pioneered the growing of rice in the Louisiades. (69) Later when they, in conjunction with the administration, started a rice plantation, he supervised it in the initial stages. (70) Further, he contracted with the natives of Urien island to take all the copra they could produce for a fixed period and at quite a generous price. (71) On expiry, the agreement was renewed at the request of the natives. (72)

Finally we must add the solid citizen, Anglo-Saxon type, who had various economic interests. Mrs Mahony and her family, the Buntings, the Clunns, and the Whittens were its best representatives. They had lived in the country for a very long time, but never formed a close personal relationship with any native. The Mahonys never learned to speak a native language fluently; acquaintance with the natives did not proceed beyond a superficial level. Mrs Mahony imagined herself to be, and was regarded by other Europeans, as a modern Lady Bountiful. Indeed the image was fairly apt, as an incident recounted below illustrates, although her social background and the exotic,

(69) Ibid, Louisiades 16-23 Feb.1922.
(72) Ibid, Moturina, Panawina, Sudest etc. 10-16 Oct.1929.
rough, colonial environment made the replica differ far from the original.

Enough has been said already to suggest that agriculture enjoyed no golden age in this era. The world price for tropical products was at no stage so buoyant as to firmly establish the nascent industries of Papua. Then came the depression: at precisely the time when most plantations were reaching full bearing. At once the impact was felt; especially by those who had no alternative source of income. The period under review ended with the agricultural future black indeed.

The division between agriculture and commerce was always very blurred. Commerce has necessarily entered the previous discussion at several points, but must now receive more direct examination. In essentials, the general picture changed only in degree from earlier days. Burns Philp was a really large scale trading and shipping concern, and as such atypical. Even Whitten Bros. with its own steamer was a relatively small scale concern. Indeed in south-east Papua Burns Philp's stores were much the same as the rest. In Samarai all stocked furniture, crockery, and luxury foods, but elsewhere merchandise consisted of hardware (nails, tools, knives, axes, building materials etc.) cheap enamel or tin plates, pots and so forth; paint; fuel for boat engines and lamps; tinned European foods and staples such
as flour, tea, sugar, and rice; cotton prints, mosquito netting and clothing for men and women; mirrors; beads; pipes and tobacco. All these goods were imported as nothing was manufactured locally.

The smaller independent traders, or agents for larger concerns like Burns Philp, Whittens, Clunns, Buntins, or Mahony's, used to sail about the islands purchasing agricultural produce or sea products from the natives in exchange for such goods. Money played a relatively unimportant part in such exchanges, at least until the natives needed cash for their tax.

Most of the coloured population in south-east Papua were traders of this petty sort. Jimmy Kota, a Japanese, may be taken as representative. After having lived twenty-four years continuously in the Louisiades, he decided in 1913 to become a naturalized Australian. His application was refused. (73) Almost certainly Kota came to New Guinea as a diver employed on one of the pearling lugger. Evidently deciding to follow some less exacting calling, he chose trading. He acted for many years as an agent for Mrs Mahony, but also had some independent interests. Kota associated with the natives of the islands around Tagula on a much more intimate level than did his European counterparts. He learnt several of the local languages.

and could speak them fluently. His mingling with the natives culminated in his marriage to a Papuan. Yet he never became completely merged into any native community, as his attempt to become an Australian demonstrated. Another occasion which emphasised his separation from the natives occurred in 1908 when the administration made a special attempt to discover how prevalent venereal disease was on Tagula and its surroundings. Mrs Mahony put Kota's services at the disposal of a special government patrol sent to investigate the matter. He, with great zeal, acted as interpreter, guide, and navigator; had it not been for his co-operation the expedition could not have succeeded. At the conclusion of the patrol Mrs Mahony provided a large feast for the administrative party and the natives they had collected to take to hospital. (74)

Men like Kota became fewer as the years went by. Largely through the government's hostility the immigration of coloured men ceased. Hence as the old guard died their places were taken not by men of like background, but by Australians or their progen. The latter were often Papuan half-castes: that this class often engaged in small trade is, perhaps strangely, the one substantial fact about their place in society.

The trade in human bodies, that is labour recruiting, was central to all economic development. Yet their numbers were few, and often they had other interests as well. Many had been prospectors who came to see that the best gold was under black skin. (75) In 1914-1915 there were but five recruiters in the Eastern Division and three in the South-eastern Division. These few made it their living, but as the figures show many more took out licences. In 1913-1914 fifty six recruiters' licences had been issued; in 1911-1912 the number was forty seven, and in 1910-1911, sixty six. (76) Recruiting vessels were equipped in the same way as trading vessels, and sailed about the area, visiting especially the D'Entrecasteaux islands. (77) Instead of exchanging trade goods for copra or sea product they received humans. Recruiters usually employed several assistants, including natives, who went into the less accessible areas seeking recruits for their master. In 1913 there was an amendment to the Native Labour Ordinance, which compelled the person to whom a licence had been issued to do all recruiting himself. One T.J.A. Thomson, who had followed that calling for eighteen or nineteen years wrote to the press about the regulati

(75) Sinclair, op.cit., 44.
(77) Ibid, 1924-1925, 36.
which he wrathfully described as the most idiotic and unreasonable ever put in force. As he pointed out, the terrain in eastern Papua where most natives were recruited, was very broken and rugged. He thought no whiteman should be expected to perform the arduous work of wading creeks and climbing hills day after day. In fact the law was modified shortly afterwards. (78)

Recruiters had to bring all the natives they engaged either to Samarai or Murua. Thither too went all prospective employers wishing for indentured labourers. Before they could be passed on to an employer, an official inspected each native, rejecting any he thought medically unfit. The Annual Report returns show that by this time no recruits were rejected through misunderstanding what work they would be doing.

Commerce remained the dominant force in the life of Samarai. Through it went most of the exports and imports for south-east Papua and the north although in 1906 Bonagai, on Murua, also became a port of entry. (79) In addition, the smuggling of gold still continued. Customs revenue, almost all collected at Samarai, provided a major part of local revenue. In 1906-1907 such receipts accounted for £11,449.18.7. out of a total

£12,417.7.2. for the Eastern Division revenue. In the South-eastern Division the figures were £399.14.6. and £1,414.11.8. Goldfields receipts were more important there, accounting for £521.12.11. At this time the total revenue for the territory was but £21,813.9.6. so south-east Papua was the major contributor. At the end of the period under review the revenue was not broken up into Divisions, but the south-east would have remained pre-eminent. The total revenue was £134,917.17.10. to which Customs receipts contributed £35,050.17.4. This was a drop of over £16,000 for Customs receipts from the previous year, and the total revenue was down by some £15,000. (80)

In the opinion of one observer more actual business was transacted in Samarai than Port Moresby. (82) The harbour was perhaps never so busy again as it had been during the gold rushes of the nineties, but at times many craft lay at anchor. The government owned a slip and one wharf, Burns Philp the second wharf. All were modest structures but sufficient. "Down town" lay the few stores which supplied not only the town's residents, but recruiters, miners, planters, missions, and country traders. A branch of the Commonwealth Bank opened in 1913.

(80) Ibid, 125.
(81) Ibid, 1930–1931, 32.
(82) Cameron, Two Years in Southern Seas, 97.
Residents formed a Chamber of Commerce in 1916. (83) In the manner of all Samarai institutions its development was erratic. For a while it would be a thriving, active body; then it would become moribund prior to reviving again. (84) The established trading interests predominated, and the Chamber acted both as a quasi Progress Association and a political pressure group. Members sought to press the administration to put seats along the ornamental walk round the island, to repair the swimming baths, to build a new wharf, to construct a lighthouse, to synchronize mail services, and to stamp out venereal disease amongst the natives. (85) More important, it also tried to force the administration to amend legislation. One particular aim was to win reciprocal tariff with the Commonwealth government. Protests met an increase in the import duty on trade tobacco. (8)

The Chamber felt that the natives were over-protected, and consistently sought to reduce the restrictions imposed on employers. Members believed that if a labourer had been engaged by an employer's agent in Samarai and then had to wait for a vessel to take him to his place of employment, he should have to make up the lost time instead of it being counted as

part of his contract of service. \(87\) They wished that natives under white supervision could use explosives for agricultural purposes; \(88\) and felt that when indentured labourers had been convicted of desertion or other misdemeanours, their fares to and from gaol should be met by the guilty party and not the employer. \(89\) They also wanted the government to allow settler to have ten per cent of their work force boys under the age of fourteen, \(90\) and to employ labourers for six years instead of three. \(91\)

Although usually critical of the government the Chamber supported the administration on some issues. Most notable was the imposition of native taxation. Its members, after considering the matter, favoured implementing the scheme outline in the Report of the Royal Commission. As they thought a money tax would force the natives to seek employment with private enterprises they favoured an annual cash payment, not a system of forced labour for the administration. \(92\)

Samarai was more than simply a commercial centre and

\(87\) Ibid, 31 May 1916, 2.
\(88\) Ibid, 12 July 1916, 3.
\(89\) idem.
\(90\) PAP. Courier, 7 May 1920, 2.
\(91\) Ibid, 14 Mar. 1917, 3.
\(92\) PAP. Times, 13 Dec. 1916, 2; PAP. Courier, 21 Feb. 1917, 2.
entrepot port. Although never having more than one hundred inhabitants (93) it remained the one place in south-east Papua possessing any vestige of community life and institutions. The miners' canvas towns totally lacked stability while the declaration of Bonagai as a port of entry led to little development there. K. Mackay who accompanied the Royal Commissioners on their tour of Papua described the township on Woodlark as consisting principally of a few miners' humpies and two stores; very drunk diggers wandered about it even in the middle of the day. (94) The magnificent setting of Samarai township had received a few additional touches from man. The administration early filled in a swamp which became the tropical equivalent of the English village green. Subsequently officials built an ornamental foot road round the island which the inhabitants and visitors used as an esplanade. Shaded by coconut palms, with crotons and other decorative shrubs planted along its verges, it attracted many people. Locals, but more especially tourists or visitors, enjoyed strolling along it in the cool of the morning or evening to look at the superb views. (95)

(93) Silas, A Primitive Arcadia, 35-37.
(94) Mackay, Across Papua, 65.
Most of the island was Crown reserve on which stood government offices, the residency, other officials' quarters, the police barracks, the gaol, the government hospital. None of these buildings were imposing; simply one story shacks built of native materials, or ugly wood and corrugated iron structures of the Australian outback model. Municipal benefits hardly existed. Tanks provided the only water supply; there were no sealed roads or footpaths; no controlled system of garbage disposal; and drains were rudimentary open ditches. For a small charge a sanitary gang from the gaol visited each dwelling in Samarai nightly; the matter they collected was loaded aboard the gaol punt, then emptied into China Strait. (96) Electricity was generated and used for the first time in government buildings in 1926-1927. (97)

As in any frontier society, the most important buildings were the hotels. For most of the period there were only two. (98) The licencees were usually women. The rest of the private buildings were no better than the government structures. The township was re-surveyed in 1901 and a few applications for town allotments trickled in over the following years, so that by 1907

(97) Ibid. 1926-1927, 74.
(98) Ibid. 1907-1908, 25; Ibid. 1914-1915, 100; Silas, op.cit., 35-37.
the total stood at thirty nine. (99) Thenceforth it remained fairly static.

The various branches of western culture had their insubstantial dwellings. The Anglican church was used both by that and other Protestant communions. Then there was the School of Arts, the site for social more often than intellectual events. In 1913 residents were very proud because it had a piano and over a thousand books. The building fund for a new hall stood at £121; of this £100 had been granted by the administration! (100)

Another institution, dating from the twenties, was the cinema. It was segregated; the Europeans sat up the back in seats, the natives on the floor in the front. Ellis Silas had little to say about white audiences but described how the natives, all dressed in their best, used to get very excited during the shows, particularly if the film were humorous. He hastened to add that they were easily kept in hand. Indeed he had seen many a worse behaved audience in England and Australia. (101) There was a primary school for white children which was run first by the Anglican Mission, later by the government, (102) and the European hospital.

(100) Pap. Times, 9 July 1913, 6.
(101) Silas, op.cit., 35-37.
Most of these institutions, except the church which was maintained by an outside body, had a checkered history. They closed down because of public apathy, were revived by zealots who, undaunted by a lack of support, were willing to devote a lot of time and energy to community service, but after a few years another period of decline would commence.

To the permanent residents of Samarai were added occasion tourists, a comparatively large number of visitors from up-count and men waiting for a ship to take them somewhere else in the territory, usually the goldfields. Many of these temporary inhabitants were wild, tough men used to behaving as they pleased, impatient of restraints, and contemptuous of social sanctions. Silas states that by the twenties Samarai was a sedate settlement although glorious binges and wild orgies were common earlier. (10)

Another visitor observed that nobody on the island really liked anyone else and that general unhappiness prevailed. In the six weeks she spent on the island in the twenties three men attempted suicide, two successfully. (104) One youth remarked to her that there was nothing to do except "walk to one hotel and get a drink, then back to the other and get another so long as your money or your pals last out..." (105) The same visitor

(103) Silas, _op.cit._, 35-37.
(105) _Ibid._, 25.
observed that the population of Samarai consisted of an ever-shifting but never truly changing group. It comprised gold and osmiridium miners, men seeking for oil, sea captains and traders, pearl buyers, and wasters of every sort who were continually drinking on the hotel verandahs. (106)

Because most visitors drank heavily while they were in the metropolis, assaults, brawls, and minor disturbances were still fairly common. One American visitor described such an incident: In the early thirties he and a companion were walking down the town's only street one evening, when they were suddenly violently abused by a complete stranger who hit one of them over the head with a bottle. Once a scuffle started others converged on the site and joined in. Pandemonium raged for a short time. (107)

One class was notable in its absence from south-east Papua: artisans. Some skilled men were employed by the mining companies, but otherwise the number of such men was extraordinarily few. Murray did not consistently publish a list of occupations in the Annual Reports but the tables which did appear emphasised the absence of skilled workers. In 1914-1915 in the Eastern Division there were eighteen officials, seventeen missionaries, (106) Idem.
(107) Fahnestock, Stara to Windward, 221-222.
thirty four planters (including managers and assistants), one bank manager, twenty nine shopkeepers and clerks, thirteen traders and assistants, three mariners, two hotel keepers, five miners, two pearl-shell buyers, five labour recruiters, eight shipwrights, plumbers etc., two engineers, and sixteen "other occupations". For the South-eastern Division the figures were six officials, two missionaries, nine planters, four shopkeepers and clerks, five traders and assistants, two hotel keepers, fifty eight miners, six pearl-shell buyers, three labour recruiters, ten carpenters, shipwrights, plumbers etc., seven engineers, two beche-de-mer men, and thirty two "other occupations". (108)

What did this conglomeration of Europeans think of Papuan life and problems? For officials and missionaries the answer has been given. For the rest of the unofficial population this vitally important question is most difficult to answer. Only one point is open to confident assertion: contempt for the Papuan, already noted vis-a-vis the miners, was general. The settlers, Murray once remarked, though not actually cruel to Papuans, were utterly indifferent to native life and suffering,

far more so than they were, say, in the case of a horse. (109)

In 1911 the Samarai correspondent for the *Papuan Times* wrote that after long experience with Papuan seamen he could truthfully state they they were unreliable through becoming hopelessly nonplussed in emergencies. (110) When there was an outbreak of dysentery in Samarai in 1912, Patching wrote to the paper protesting about native patients being treated on the island. He thought it wrong Europeans should be in any way endangered. In fact a petition was sent to the Medical Officer who replied that there was no danger to any European. (111) The attitude of the Samarai Chamber of Commerce was similar to that of one J.G.F. who fancied himself as a versifier: (112)

Wake Up Papua!

Haul up the white man's standard, fall in the little band
Of plucky Europeans who suffer in this land.
We can't be taxed for Papuans, to neither toil nor spin;
The Papuans can't be "lillies", or be preserved in tin.

The fittest must "gang forward", the weakest lag behind,
Despite the ranting bigots and people of that kind,
The coloured races ere this have for the white made room,
And so it ever must be until the crack of doom.

(112) Ibid, 21 June 1911, 2.
The gulf between the peoples was quite as wide as that between Disraeli's "Two Nations". Hence European ways tended not to enlighten the Papuans but to lead them into deeper obscurity. Native explanations of the whiteman's technology were usually ludicrous, albeit logically developed from the natives' premises. The prevalence of cargo cults is again relevant.

As in the earlier period, the lack of vigorous political action is striking. The chief reason has been indicated by the survey of the Europeans' occupations. Most had their fingers in the few activities going on, and so there was no energy-producing sectional conflict within the group. The missionaries alone took up any attitudes differing from the norm. The non-representative character of the government, and the fact that there were no elections which might have helped spark off political interest was an additional cause of political apathy. Finally the vagrant type who were relatively numerous were far from being political activists: passive anarchism was rather their ideal.

The little activity which did prevail followed very mundane lines, inspired by self-interest on particular issues rather than any theoretical concern for social justice. Action did reach a quite sophisticated level in 1911. In June of that year participants in a public meeting at Samarai considered
pressing not only for a proper beacon system along the coast, wireless communication with Australia, and more regular visits from the **MERRIE ENGLAND**, but also for changes at high political levels. They wanted members of the local legislature to be chosen by election, and to receive £300 per annum salary.

Further, they wished an elected representative from the territory to sit as advisor in the Commonwealth House of Representatives. (113) The latter demands were repeated in three petitions which were circulated among the Europeans, and which William Whitten ultimately sent to the Australian Minister for External Affairs. (114) These requests were also submitted to a delegation of federal parliamentarians then visiting Papua. In 1913 Europeans throughout the territory pressed for such things as trial by jury for Europeans charged with indictable offences; (115) in 1920 again for a larger number of unofficial seats on the Legislative Council. Other demands were consistently more provincial.

Miners' agitation caused Bonagai to be made a port of entry. (116) The community wanted a regular mail service between Port Moresby, Samarai, Murua, and the Australian ports, as well as radio communication (when it came, the chief revenue derived from

messages to Australian bookmakers) (117) and that the government build and maintain roads where white settlement was fairly dense. (118) In 1920 a substantial number of Europeans in Papua telegraphed directly to the King requesting that Murray be removed from office because his regime thwarted rather than supported European settlement and enterprises. (119) That was the only attempt at organized resistance to the government, although individuals freely criticized the administration, particularly through the columns of the local press.

The files of the newspaper confirm that the Europeans in Papua had no well thought out philosophy, but thought whites should be dominant. (120) Their conviction that the natives ought not have equal rights before the law affected their reactions to any measures seeking to regulate relations between Europeans and Papuans, or to preserve native rights. Thus settlers objected to the administration prescribing conditions under which indentured labourers could work. They disapproved of a set ration scale; of being made to provide specified accommodation of having a prescribed number of hours per week which a labourer

(117) Col.P.P. vol.III 1911, 851-852; Allied Geographical Section Southwest Pacific Area, Terrain Study no.34, 23 Nov.1942, 5.
(119) Ibid, 7 May 1920, 2-5; Murray, Papua of Today, 216-217.
could work; of the government setting a minimum wage. (121) On the other hand they did not support administrative moves to increase the ratio of free labourers to those under indenture. Settlers overwhelmingly favoured the contract system, and indeed wished the period of service to be raised from a maximum of three years to six. (122) Conditions at a plantation or mine had to be good before free labourers would seek employment and stay willingly. Moreover it took some time to train a native, even in simple agricultural techniques; employers did not wish to lose a man's services shortly after he became an efficient worker. An employer had no control over a free labourer whereas if one under indenture deserted he had legal redress. For these reasons, and despite their opposition to those aspects of a contract which protected the native, employers wanted the indenture system to prevail. In short they wished to have the benefits of the law without its restraints.

Furthermore the Europeans had always believed that in the interests of progress land should be alienated forcibly from the natives when needed for white settlement. (123) They maintained, with no good reason, that Europeans developed their land to

(123) See Evidence before the Royal Commission; Pap. Courier, 3 Jan. 1919, 4.
great effect. The unofficial whites thought too that the natives should be taught that their proper station in life was below the whiteman. Otherwise they feared mutiny, or even Bolshevism, and that the whiteman would "go under". F.W. Walker lived on Samarai after his retirement and was, according to Murray, the most unpopular man in the territory because he had always been a champion of the natives. (124) They supported native taxation, seeing it as a means of incorporating the native into the European economy while keeping him subordinate.

Such was the attitude of the unofficial community to the government and to the indigenous inhabitants of the territory. What was the attitude of the administration to the issues raised by white settlement? This is another subject difficult to consider simply in relation to south-east Papua. It goes to the heart of the paradox and anti-climax which characterized the Murray regime.

It has already been remarked, first that the Governor himself, and the Australian Commonwealth also, hoped to see rapid economic development of the colony under the new order; and second, that this hope did not come to fruition. In the

circumstances the administration never had to face what, in retrospect, appears to be a double contradiction within its attitude: that large-scale European enterprise and settlement could flourish, while simultaneously the natives could be both protected from and improved by this process. Murray's confidence in his power to control the course of the colony's history probably explains why he was able to maintain the hypothesis.

The treatment of labour was one issue which, even with development so limited as it was, revealed weaknesses in the Government's approach and equipment. The administration of the Labour Ordinance was generous to settler interests, and demonstrated how such sympathy inevitably ran counter to the ideal of protecting natives. Officials knew that virtually all whitemen scorned the Papuan, but took no action to control their relations until the law was actually infringed. Nor did they discriminate when issuing recruiters' licences. Even after a recruiter had come before the courts his licence was rarely cancelled; fines were the common form of punishment. For instance in December 1917 Peter Bonderson, a recruiter, who also had plantation interests on Murua, was fined £2 and 3/6 costs for assaulting a native. He elected to go to jail. (125) Only

if a man had been found guilty of a very grave misdemeanor such as a grave assault, was his licence revoked. (126) In such case a circular from the Department of Native Affairs was sent to all districts notifying the Resident Magistrate that the particular individual was to be prevented from recruiting natives. Murray wrote an entertaining description of an interview with one of the Greek traders from the Trobriands, who came to the Governor in person to protest the refusal of a recruiter's licence. Murray pointed out that this had been done because the Greek was well known for ill-treating natives. Upon receiving this information the man became very cordial; he had thought that he had been refused because of his nationality, and came to point out that the Greeks had civilized Europe. (127)

The same administrative machinery operated in other cases besides those which dealt with recruiting abuses. The Commissioner for Native Affairs occasionally prohibited the employment of certain natives, or, if an individual had been accused of indecent assault, from having employment in which he came into contact with white women or children. He might also bar infamous white men, usually plantation overseers, from employing or working native labour.

Officials who signed on labourers to various employers after a recruiter brought them to the government station, nearly always did so in a routine, even perfunctory, way. They observed no more than the form of the law, although in many other aspects of administration officials exhibited remarkable vigilance to check the individual native's liberty or regulate his conduct. Similarly the administration professed concern at the way in which natives were exploited by such people as the Edes, yet rarely directed its (admittedly limited) resources to preventing this.

Yet to suggest that the administration considered settler interests pre-eminent would be utterly misleading. The unofficial population had, on the contrary, to suffer many frustrations. The 1906 Land Ordinance aimed at attracting investment from companies and individuals. For the next few years there was a great increase in the number of applications for land. To cope with the demand, additional surveyors and land buyers were appointed to the Lands Department. At the district level these men worked in conjunction with the Magistrates, who had formerly bought all the land. But although the reserves of Crown land continually increased, and always outpaced the demand, an individual application might take months to be either granted or disallowed. This was especially
probable if the land happened to be a long way from a government station, or the block was unusually large, or hitherto unsurveyed. If the site had first to be purchased from the native owners, many individuals with various sorts of rights to the land had claims which had all to be studied. Except in special cases, every claimant had to give his consent to the sale before it could be effected. Then the block had to be properly surveyed and the deeds of transfer drawn. A single transaction could thus mean months of work for several civil servants. Such delays, especially when resulting in an application being refused, discouraged investors from contributing to Papua's progress. (128)

Furthermore the government did not welcome every type of settler who might be offering. It prohibited, for example, the further entry of Asians. MacGregor imposed such a ban, because he wished to see neither an influx of cheap Asiatic labour, nor the Papuans dispossessed of their land and so become parasites feeding off the body politic. This concern for the indigenes continued as the major defence of the ban. Yet men like Kota and Paulisbo had gone closer than virtually any European to

bridge the gulf between the Papuans and the newcomer, without disruption and tension. They practised more efficient agricultural and fishing methods which could be easily learnt and adopt, requiring no capital resources or expensive equipment. Moreover, coloured settlers were able to participate in native life, while remaining to some degree outside the social system. They could have become the bridge over the chasm dividing western mores and those of the stone-age Melanesians. Through them the government might have pursued its aim to introduce the Papuan not only to western technology and economics, but also intellectual concepts and patterns of behaviour.

More logical in some ways, yet showing more clearly the contradictory element in his principles, was Murray's opposition to ex-servicemen settlers. He wrote to his brother that "Returned soldiers are heroes and all the rest of it, but their idea of a native policy differs from mine and I am not going to adopt it". (129) The soldier settlers of New Guinea did in fact tend to exploit the natives. As such they stood opposed to the native welfare ideal, an aspect which Murray especially stressed in the post-war years when it became clear that he would not be put in charge of a greater Melanesia. Yet here again was a

source from which settlers could have been recruited and which perhaps deserved more consideration than it seemingly received.

Finally the validity of the established settlers' grievances merits recognition. They did, after all, provide a certain amount of revenue; they had put some of their life's blood into the colony. This point applied even to the companies, with whom Murray could be particularly adamant. He wrote to his brother in March 1915 that the British New Guinea Development Company, because of its considerable interests in the country, expected to be quite unrestricted. It disliked abiding by regulations promulgated by the government in its efforts to protect the interests of all sections of the community, including the natives. (130) Murray was, indeed, somewhat suspicious of the unofficial population and made no attempt to draw it into the task of creating a new social order. The crucial function of the non-official members of the Legislative Council was apparent to reveal extremist attitudes to the administration, which then took action to prevent such views having effect. The extension of administrative control meant little more to the European than that as the natives became more familiar with the law they would more readily report assaults. (131)

(130) Ibid., 9 Mar. 1915.
Thus the negativism of the government, the inferior quality of the people concerned, and the lack of world-profitable economic resources, determined that the unofficial population should have but a marginal impact on south-east Papua. The pioneers of this group had achieved nothing vast, but at least they might think of themselves forerunners of a more dramatic process. By 1930 that hope would seem to have proved forlorn, and no other vision had taken its place.

Meanwhile the unofficial population contributed to the disintegration of traditional Papuan social patterns. Despite the little intercourse between the two groups, there was some contact. The example of whitemen affected the social behaviour of natives, most of whom aped the European as well as their resources permitted. Natives, particularly the men, wore imported clothing, used foreign tools, and bought as many other European manufactures or foodstuffs as he could afford. The traditional house was modified to more nearly approach the European. All Europeans offered some opportunity for employment to the Papuans, and the introduction of the concept of an individual wage, as well as the payment of money, helped to break down both traditional economic practices and the basic institution, the kin group. A Papuan who was particularly ruthless in denying his relatives' demands might build up small
capital reserves and even compete with coloured traders, although he could not hope to reach the whiteman's level. Thus the unofficial Europeans were, like the law-givers and the man of religion, agents of destruction. They alone had no element of construction to offer the Papuan.
CONCLUSION

The first Europeans to venture into south-east Papua found it an exotic region inhabited by brown skinned men with a material culture so primitive that there was no knowledge of metals. At first shy, and always somewhat suspicious of the powerful and unpredictable intruders, the Papuans quickly realized how superior were the new tools and weapons for all but ceremonial purposes. The natives thus placed a very high value on such goods and did all they could to procure them. Because the Papuans were so avid for both European manufactures and the knowledge of their production, they did not shun the strangers but sought to meet them for trading as often as possible.

Nor was the desire for inter-action one sided. The intruders wished to establish contacts with the Papuans. They tended to fall into two broad although not exclusive categories: those anxious to exploit the natural resources of the country, and those whose primary concern was to "civilize" the natives. Numerically the former were stronger, but, from the mid-nineteenth century, when New Guinea became a subject of interest to some sections of the public in Britain and the Australian Colonies, the "idealists" were more effective politically. The influenced the policy-makers. From the beginning this idealist
group was optimistic about the result of contact between the Papuans and Europeans. They expected the natives, once educated voluntarily to give up all barbarous behaviour. William Woolls, a botanist and Anglican churchman in New South Wales, wrote so early as 1850: (1)

...Thus whilst new empires in Australia rise, And men foretaste their noble destinies, From isle to isle behold the heavenly light Rise in majestic pomp o'er heathen night, And superstition's shadows fade away Before the bright effulgence of the day. Safe o'er the waves the stout-built vessels ride Where once the fragile proa dared the tide, And unskilled wanderers vainly sought the coast, Without a compass on the ocean lost. Changed is the scene, when Papuans taught to love The first great cause of harmony above, No more in fury hurls the poisonous dart Or strikes the hapless stranger to the heart Who, forced by tempest, seeks the fiendish shore And to dread idols adds one victim more. Now the fierce savage knaps the murderous spear, Burns the carved club and images once dear. Knowledge and truth assuage the untutored breast, And in the gospels' love, he looks for rest, While Art and Science from Australia flow To cheer his checkered pilgrimage below....

In fact, the creation of this utopia proved most difficult Once Britain assumed responsibility for part of New Guinea the task of practical administration forced the "idealists" to a

(1) Lines Written to Commemorate the Passing of a "Bill to incorporate and endow a University, to be called the 'University of Sydney'." Paramatta, 1850. 2nd ed.
more sober view. Yet their optimism did not dissolve. The final result they felt to be assured, while admitting that it would take much time and effort to bring about. This view remained predominant throughout the period under review; indeed in a less naïve form, remains part of current thinking in some quarters.

How far was such a belief justified by events? The preceding pages attempt to give an answer which is neither a simple negative nor a simple affirmative. However one or two points can be declared. Both Britain and Australia failed to make the most of their opportunities. Papua was, in many ways, eminently suitable for social experiment: it was fairly large and diverse, but not immense; the indigenous population was relatively small, socially fragmented, and economically backward; the immigrant population was tiny. Thus there was no effective threat to the omnipotence of the administration. However in the nineteenth century the contributing powers were not prepared to spend sufficient money, or to send enough men to the colony. Thus attempts by officials to create a new society were abortive. The whole field of education was mandated to the missions who themselves had insufficient resources to teach effectively even the rudiments to the whole population. By the twentieth century, when Australia became
solely responsible for the colony, Europeans had been in political control for nearly a generation; yet all but a tiny minority of natives were as "uncivilized", if more peaceable, than they had been formerly. The transfer of sovereignty took place at the same time as Australians were involved passionately in the "white Australia" controversy. It was thus easy, if logically fallacious, for those in power to assume that the Papuans had not advanced because they were physiologically incapable. None questioned if environmental factors might have been responsible for the failure. After Murray came to power administrative policies had more effect on native society than hitherto; yet now the pernicious restraints created by this belief in Papuan inferiority, coupled with a continued lack of resources, inhibited social, political, and economic development. The missions and the unofficial population also failed to transform the country as Woolls had prophesied. The history of Papua, measured against his forecast, shows the fallacy of applying one culture's experience to shaping another. The thesis serves a purpose if it suggests that the outside world must see the Papuan as an element in a particular environment with its own laws and validity. At the same time outsiders must give freely of the knowledge of Europe as it is desired by the indigènes. Then, eventually, might the "idealistic" vision triumph.
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Set 17 Personal Diaries Hon. C.S. Robinson May 1903-May 1904.
Set 19 Minutes of the Native Regulation Board 1890-1909.
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Set 32  Mins. of Leg. Co. 1888+
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Set 20  Station Cash Books 1909-1945.
Set 21  Miscellanea 1915-1945.
For technical reasons all places west of 149°21'E long. had to be omitted from the map. For the same reason the Leocardie islands and the Gwabigwabi area of Fergusson were left unnamed.

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