USE OF THESES

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SAMOA TULA’I:
Ecclesiastical and Political Face of Samoa’s Independence, 1900 – 1962

Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
of the
Australian National University

Featuna’i Ben Liua’ana

March 2001
I declare that this study is an original work based on the results of my own research and field work, and where works by others have been used in this study, these have been acknowledged throughout accordingly.

Featuna'i Ben Liua'ana
1 March 2001
ABSTRACT

This study consists of eleven chapters and a conclusion. Chapter One is entitled Introduction – Echoes From the Past. It serves several purposes. It introduces briefly a summation of the political aspirations of Malietoa Vaiinupo, who accepted the LMS mission, and the political mayhem that beset Samoa from the 1850s to 1962. The introduction also introduces briefly the relationship between the Samoan (LMS) Church, the LMS missionaries, and Samoan politics, and how these interacted with one another, during the political turmoil in the late nineteenth century, and the nationalistic fervour of the Samoans in the early twentieth century.

The next ten chapters are presented chronologically as far as it is possible, although the guiding principle for the placement of each chapter is thematic, consisting mainly of case studies. Chapter Two, entitled A German Plantation and Samoan Aspirations, looks at the German administration of Samoa from 1900 to 1914. The study highlights various factors, issues and events that contributed to the motivation of Samoans towards independence. It looks at Germany’s treatment of Samoans under Wilhelm Solf, and how Samoans reacted to Solf’s administration. The chapter points to inconsistencies in the German administration, and Samoan misunderstanding as to their role, and Germany’s role, in the administration of Samoa. The study illustrates Solf’s negative treatment of Samoan protocol, which eventually led to hostility, rejection, and anti-German opinions and the role of the missions in supporting the German regime to the displeasure of the Samoans. The view of the LMS mission, and the Samoan (LMS) Church leaders, on the issue of independence, during the German period is also discussed.

Chapter Three is entitled The Oloa Kamupani Controversy. This is a case study taken out of the German administration era. The Oloa Kamupani (Goods Company) was a Samoan enterprise, which struck a chord with the political aspirations of some of the Samoan leaders. Although initiated by a part-European opportunist, the Samoan Faipule immediately entertained the idea. The Samoans were reeling under Solf’s administration policies, which had taken away most of the Samoan protocol. The political leaders were looking for a way to reassert their authority, albeit an economic one. The Oloa Kamupani gave the Samoans the opportunity to control their own economic future while,
indirectly, voicing an economic protest at the low price offered by the merchants
and the Germans for their products. It gave Samoans like Mata’afa Iosefo and
Lauaki Namulau'ulu Mamoe the opportunity to regain political ascendancy,
especially in the eyes of the Samoans. The German administration’s reaction to
the Samoan enterprise and the consequence thereafter set a bitter anti-German
reaction.

Chapter Four is entitled The Mau a Pule Conflict. This is the second
case study from the German administration period. The Mau a Pule conflict is
further evidence of the anger stored up within the Samoan community. The
German administration had by 1909 destroyed all the customs, tradition, and
authority that meant anything to the Samoans. The failure of the Oloa Kamupani,
and the punishments meted out to the Samoan leaders for defying German
authority, was still haunting the Samoans. The worst affected was Mata’afa
Iosefo whose status as Alii Sili (Primary or Greater Chief) was diminishing as
the Faipule closer to Solf were consulted on important Samoan matters. The
Mau a Pule also provided an opportunity for Lauaki Namulau'ulu Mamoe to
regain some of his authority, and to re-unite Samoa under Samoan control. The
Mau a Pule was not just a reaction to the German administration but a cry and a
call for Samoan independence.

Chapter Five is entitled A Ramshackle Administration and Samoan
Expectations. This chapter looks at New Zealand’s administration of Samoa
from 1914 to 1926. It takes a brief look at the Samoans’ reaction to New
Zealand’s arrival and Germany’s departure because of World War I. New
Zealand’s ‘ramshackle administration’ caused some animosity among the
Samoans and Europeans, especially New Zealand’s role in the 1918 influenza
epidemic, which took many Samoan lives. The chapter highlights how New
Zealand dealt with Samoan rejection, and Samoans called for New Zealand’s
removal. The year 1926 marked the beginning of an era in which Samoan
nationalism began to surface and New Zealand’s competency as administrator
declined. For the Samoans, the Germans’ first fourteen years as administrators,
compared to New Zealand first fourteen years, was paradise.

Chapter Six is entitled An Administrative Blunder and The Logan -
Moore Debate. This is a case study taken out of the New Zealand
administration period. The 1918 influenza epidemic blunder cost many Samoan
lives, and New Zealand its credibility to administer other nations. The lack of
positive action and immediate medical assistance only highlighted the incompetence of the New Zealanders. The Samoans were furious, and from that time harboured angry sentiments that would surface again and again in their future dealings with New Zealand. The pain for the Samoans was not just a result of the epidemic, but also Colonel Robert Logan’s (Samoa’s administrator) insensitivity in his attack on the LMS mission, especially the missionary Elizabeth Moore, and the Samoans. This chapter looks at the impact of Logan’s actions, and Moore’s reactions, and how the Samoans perceived their verbal confrontation in relation to New Zealand’s irresponsibility.

Chapter Seven is entitled Political Incompetence and Samoan Nationalism. This chapter continues the story that ended in Chapter 5. It highlights the beginning and expansion of the Mau movement, and how it became the vehicle for nationalistic fervour and independence aspirations. The chapter highlights the close working relationship between Samoans and other members of the community, especially the half-castes. It discusses New Zealand’s reaction to Samoan nationalism, and also looks at the efforts of those outside Samoa to promote Samoan grievances. The chapter looks at the various petitions drawn up and sent to New Zealand, England, America and the League of Nations (later replaced by the United Nations) - a sign of determination to gain independence.

Chapter Eight is entitled Samoan Patriotism and the Emergence of the Mau Church. This chapter focuses mainly on the relationship of the Mau and the Samoan (LMS) Church, at a specific time in the history of the Samoan Church, when the involvement of the Mau in the Samoan (LMS) Church was at its height (1928 - 1931). Although the relationships between the three main mission societies were cordial, they sometimes deteriorated into hatred and spite. These attitudes were ultimately transferred onto the Mau – Samoan (LMS) Church conflict, especially when the Catholics stood in opposition to the Samoan (LMS) Church. The other minor denominations, such as the Mormons and the Seventh Day Adventists, had very little influence on the Mau. The period covered saw the Mau and the Samoan (LMS) Church unite to form the Mau Church. The alliance formed a strong foundation for propagating Mau beliefs. The alliance also questioned the continuing existence, and the control the LMS mission had on the Samoan (LMS) Church. The issue of the Samoan
Church taking control of its religious life surfaced again during this period to haunt the LMS missionaries.

Chapter Nine is entitled Chinese in Paradise and Indentured Labour Problems. This chapter covers a period that stems from the German era to just after the end of World War II. The previous chapters act as a background to the Chinese problem, and the chapter itself will help fill some of the gaps in the previous chapters. The chapter has been included because it helps paint a bigger picture of the many problems facing the New Zealand administration. The problem was not just with indentured labourers but with the Chinese, Melanesians, and others arriving in Samoa to satisfy the planters' greed. The issue at hand was an ethical one – keeping the Samoan race pure, and the failure of the New Zealand administration to consult the Samoans in its decision to recruit Chinese labourers. The story of the Chinese in this chapter highlights the plight of the Chinese in Samoa and how the New Zealand administration tried to deal with it. The social problems that went with the recruiting of Chinese labourers affected the Samoans greatly. For many Samoans, especially at the height of the Mau period, the Chinese issue was both a problem and a blessing. The treatment of the Chinese by the New Zealand administration and the planters was not condoned by the Samoans. It not only black marked New Zealand's administration, but it gave the Samoans a further opportunity to denigrate New Zealand.

Chapter Ten is entitled A Question of Authority: Samoan (LMS) Church Leadership Challenges. This chapter covers a period that encompasses the German era to World War II. It is a case study chapter that highlights the intense conflict between Samoan pastors, especially the Samoan elders, and the missionaries of the LMS mission. It looks at the relationship between the National Advisory Council and the Samoa District Committee. It also discusses the conflict between Samoan pastors and LMS missionaries in the mission fields, such as Tuvalu and Kiribati, to highlight the Samoans' struggle for leadership and control. The chapter looks at the Goward conflict, Sibree and Hackett's dismissal, and other events, which undermined LMS leadership in the Samoan (LMS) Church. It includes a case study of Samoan pastors trying to replace Christian ideals with fa'ataulaitu or faipale practices. The radical actions reflected a challenge to the LMS for control of their own
spiritual destiny. It happened at a time when the Samoan quest for independence had reached the minds and hearts of the League of Nations.

Chapter Eleven is entitled The Impact of World War II and A Mandate For Independence. This chapter deals with the arrival of Americans troops in 1942 and how Samoans responded to the change of lifestyle and to the wealth the Americans offered. It examines the reaction of the missions to the Americans, and how they dealt with the problems at hand. The chapter also focuses on the events after the war in relation to Samoan's petitions for independence and their dealings with the United Nations. It examines the pressure and the impact of other newly formed institutions, such as the World Council of Churches, on Samoan aspirations for independence.

Finally, the Conclusion places this study in the context of existing literature on Samoan history. The conclusion also collects all the factors, issues and events, which motivated Samoans to seek independence, and shows how these factors impacted on the Samoans in their struggle for independence. These factors, issues and events are evaluated to highlight the intimate relationship between the Samoan (LMS) Church and the political vein of Samoa's independence movement. The conclusion also evaluates whether the Samoan (LMS) Church influenced Samoa's political independence or vice versa. It also evaluates the impact of church independence on the Samoan (LMS) Church itself, and its relationship to an independent political government. Finally, the conclusion attempts to provide an answer to the dilemma as to who made Samoa independent, and explores whether independence was indeed the aim of the Samoan people or something completely different.
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ABBREVIATIONS

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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AJHR</td>
<td>Appendices to the Journal of the House of Representatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCS</td>
<td>British Consul, Samoa, Archives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMO</td>
<td>British Military Occupation Archives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DH&amp;PG</td>
<td>Deutsche Handels and Plantagen Gesellschaft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSG</td>
<td>Deutsche Samoa Gesellschaft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFKS</td>
<td>Ekalesia Fa'apotopotoga Kerisiano i Samoa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAP</td>
<td>German Administration Papers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAWS</td>
<td>German Administration of Western Samoa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBFO</td>
<td>Great Britain Foreign Office Archives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCA</td>
<td>German Colonial Administration Archives.</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCS</td>
<td>German Consul, Samoa, Archives.</td>
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<tr>
<td>GP</td>
<td>Grattan Papers.</td>
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<td>GSA</td>
<td>German Secretariat Papers.</td>
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<td>IT</td>
<td>Island Territories Archives.</td>
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<tr>
<td>LMS</td>
<td>London Missionary Society.</td>
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<td>MAST</td>
<td>Marist Archives of Samoa and Tokelau.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mss</td>
<td>Manuscript</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAC</td>
<td>National Advisory Council.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>Newell Papers.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRC</td>
<td>National Reference Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWO</td>
<td>North-West Outstations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZEF</td>
<td>New Zealand Expeditionary Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZSEC</td>
<td>New Zealand Samoan Epidemic Commission.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZSA</td>
<td>New Zealand Samoa Administration Archives.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMB</td>
<td>Pacific Manuscripts Bureau.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDC</td>
<td>Samoa District Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>Archives of the Samoan Government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKC</td>
<td>Samoa Kautschuk Compagnie.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSA</td>
<td>S. S. Allen Papers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSG</td>
<td>Safata Samoa Gessellschaft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSJ</td>
<td>South Sea Journals.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSL</td>
<td>South Sea Letters.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSO</td>
<td>South Sea Odds.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSP</td>
<td>South Sea Specials.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>South Sea Reports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TP</td>
<td>Tate Papers.</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMMS</td>
<td>Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society.</td>
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<td>WAP</td>
<td>Westbrook Additional Papers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP</td>
<td>Westbrook Papers.</td>
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<tr>
<td>WCC</td>
<td>World Council of Churches</td>
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<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<td>--------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>afakasi</td>
<td>half-caste (European)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>afasaina</td>
<td>half-Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aiga</td>
<td>family, kinship, extended family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aitu</td>
<td>spirit, ghost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aitu fafine</td>
<td>goddess</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali'i Sili</td>
<td>literally – highest chief or highest honoured chief; paramount chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ao</td>
<td>a matai title bestowed by a district or districts on a person as a special honour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Au Fa'atonu</td>
<td>Samoa District Committee (European missionaries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Au Matutua</td>
<td>LMS directors in London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>avaga</td>
<td>elope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fa'alupega</td>
<td>honorific expression associated with a matai title alluding to rank and status of that title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fa'asa</td>
<td>prohibit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fa'asamoa</td>
<td>the Samoan way of doing things. It is everything that makes up the identity of a Samoan, such as culture, traditions, customs, and so forth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fa'atamala</td>
<td>careless, guilty, at fault</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fa'ataulaitu</td>
<td>the person who practices things pertaining to the spirits and the unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>faipele</td>
<td>person who tells the future and makes predictions or reveals the past by using playing cards; the concept of using cards to reveal hidden things.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fa'atonu</td>
<td>adviser, supervisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>faitasiga</td>
<td>union, confederacy; to join together to destroy someone or something</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faifeau</td>
<td>Samoan (LMS) Church pastor, pastor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>Faipule</td>
<td>one who has or performs authority; member of the two houses that made up the government; district representatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fautua</td>
<td>adviser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fono</td>
<td>meeting, assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fono a le nu'u</td>
<td>village council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fono a Faipule</td>
<td>assembly or meeting of the district representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fono a Ta‘imua ma Faipule</td>
<td>assembly or meeting of the Council of High chiefs and district representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gafa</td>
<td>genealogy, family generations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gutu lua</td>
<td>literally — two mouths, hypocrite, liar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ie toga</td>
<td>fine mat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iioga</td>
<td>act of reconciliation, self abasement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamupani</td>
<td>company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kovana Kaisalika</td>
<td>German Governor (formal address)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kovana Siamani</td>
<td>German Governor (informal or mocking address)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lafoga</td>
<td>tax, poll tax,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lafoga oloa</td>
<td>company contribution, share in company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lotonu‘u</td>
<td>patriotic, patriotism, nationalistic, nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lotu Pope</td>
<td>literally — the Pope’s Church, Roman Catholic Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lotu</td>
<td>church, religion, religious worship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>malae</td>
<td>open field or arena used for gatherings or meetings, field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>malaga</td>
<td>visitation; Samoan custom of travelling from village to village and enjoying the hospitality of others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maligi</td>
<td>Marine, American soldier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>maligi se</td>
<td>illegitimate child with an American Marine father</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>maio</td>
<td>victorious, ruling side, government</td>
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<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Translation</td>
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<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mamona</td>
<td>Mormon, Mormon Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>matai</td>
<td>chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mau</td>
<td>opinion, list of grievances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mau a Pule</td>
<td>the opinions or resolutions of Pule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mavaega</td>
<td>dying wish or testament, will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nu'u</td>
<td>village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oloa</td>
<td>goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oloa Kamupani</td>
<td>literally - Goods Company, business enterprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pàpà</td>
<td>the name given to the four titles that make up the tafa'ifa, which is bestowed upon a chief agreed upon by the districts who possess the four titles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>papalagi or palagi</td>
<td>Europeans or European</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pule</td>
<td>designation given to the centres in Savai'i (Safotulafai, Saleaula, Palauli, Safotu, Satupa‘itea, and Asau) whose orators were considered king-makers; political kingpins in Samoan politics on equal status with Tumua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pule</td>
<td>authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pule ma Aiga</td>
<td>refers to Savai'i, especially the centres of Pule and Manono</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puletua</td>
<td>rural authority, name of a political party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulefou</td>
<td>new authority, name of a political party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulenu'u</td>
<td>village authority; government position held by a chief of a village who was responsible for carrying out administration policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sa</td>
<td>prohibition under village rules and regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>soalaupule</td>
<td>to share the authority with one's colleagues, to discuss something in council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sui-Kovana</td>
<td>acting governor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sui Tupu</td>
<td>vice king</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ta'aloalo</td>
<td>Samoan custom of honouring guests with gifts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

xvii
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>tafa'ifa</td>
<td>honourific for a chief who holds the four papa or titles of Tuia'ana, Tuiatua, Gatoaitele and Tamasoali'.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ta'imua</td>
<td>council of high-ranking chiefs; part of the two houses that made up the Samoan government; member of the council of Ta'imua.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ta'ita'i</td>
<td>manager, leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>taligatoga</td>
<td>Samoan custom of distributing fine mats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tama-a-aiga</td>
<td>sons of the families, royal families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tama Uli</td>
<td>literally – black boy, term for Melanesian indentured labourers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>taulaitu</td>
<td>literally - anchored of the spirit; person who communicates with spirits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>taulasea</td>
<td>healer; person who uses Samoan medicine to heal sickness of any kind, including aitu sickness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>taotaomia</td>
<td>oppressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>taofiofi</td>
<td>suppressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tapu</td>
<td>sacred, holy, out of bound, prohibition of social customs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>toto lua</td>
<td>two blooded, mixed blood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tulafale</td>
<td>orator chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tumua</td>
<td>designation given to the centres in Upolu (Lufilufi and Leulumoega) whose orators were considered king-makers, political kingpins in Samoan politics on equal status with Pule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tumua ma Pule</td>
<td>the combined office of the most influential group of chiefs in Samoa, king-makers of Samoa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tupu</td>
<td>king</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>umu</td>
<td>Samoan earth stone oven used for cooking food</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>va'a lotu</td>
<td>mission ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vaivai</td>
<td>weak party, conquered party, opposition party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In 1994 I attended the 150th anniversary of the Malua Theological College in Samoa. The Ekalesia Fa’apotopota Kerisiano i Samoa (EFKS) [Congregational Christian Church of Samoa] General Assembly that year was postponed to 25 September to coincide with Malua’s birthday. It was also an opportunity to commemorate 164 years since the arrival of Christianity in Samoa. Members of the General Assembly and visitors from around the world arrived for the celebration, and it included the last two LMS Principals of Malua, Dr John Bradshaw and the Reverend Dr David Bowen. The celebration was as grand as any other Samoan celebration and it was a great spectacle for the Samoans and their guests.

However, an incident occurred during the deliberation of the General Assembly that, in my opinion, not only marred the celebration but put a question mark on the ability of the church leaders to administer the EFKS. The Assembly was unhappy that there was no ‘landmark memorial’ (a building) erected to commemorate the third jubilee of the college, as was the case with the Fale iupe’i (Jubilee Hall) and the Fale Senetenari (Centenary house). An amnesty was offered to all pastors who were suspended disregarding the magnitude of their sins per se. The issue of ‘amnesty’ saw tempers reach uncontrollable heights as church members denounced the proposal as disgraceful. Many church members believed Malua’s 150th anniversary would always be remembered as the ‘era of the amnesty,’ something many considered o se mea valea (unintelligent or stupid thing) and a political undertaking.

When the celebrations concluded, there was discontentment among the church members, especially when church lay members had not been consulted by the church leaders on the issue. The Elders and pastors were ridiculed for being irresponsible and lacking wisdom and incapable of proper administration of the EFKS after 164 years. Many felt the EFKS was straying away from its calling as a church and its leaders and members were too involved in playing politics outside and inside the church.

It soon dawned on me that the EFKS might claim to be 164 years old, but in reality it was only 32 years old. It was a young independent church. Its administrative structure may have been in place many years previously under the guidance of the London Missionary Society, but as a new ‘independent
church' it was struggling to deal with the problems once dealt with by the European missionaries. The EFKS tendency to maintain a strong political face on par with its ecclesiastical expression stemmed from the strong link it had continued to build up with Samoan politics, and traditions, culture and customs, since its independence in 1962.

The close relationship between the EFKS and Samoan politics and protocol had existed since the missionary era, and the independence of Samoa and the Samoan (LMS) Church [now EFKS] later was a by-product of the resilience of the two bodies. It was with this in mind that the aims and purpose for this study began to take shape.

The title of this work is Samoa Tula'i: Ecclesiastical and Political Face of Samoa's Independence, 1900 - 1962. The title is taken from the first line of Samoa's national anthem, 'Samoa Tula'i, ma sisi ia lau fu'a, o lou pale lea'. The phrase 'Samoa Tula'i,' encompasses the historical struggle of the Samoan people from the time they stood up to voice the loss of their political, cultural, economic, social, and, to some extent, religious identity, to the time they stood up to praise their independence. The following chapters will include examples and case studies, to show how and why Samoans were coerced into initiating an independence movement. The roles played by Europeans, Chinese, and other ethnic groups, are part of the political web and are highlighted throughout the chapters.

The sub-heading 'Ecclesiastical and Political Face of Samoa's Independence' is an attempt to focus on specific events, issues, and factors, in Samoa's history, which challenged and motivated Samoans not only to rise-up and protest against oppression and exploitation, but also to call for independence. Several monographs and recent works of scholarship have touched on some aspects of the political face of Samoa's independence, but the authors concerned only allude to most of these factors, events and issues, as they are writing for quite different reasons and in different contexts. The intention of this study is to show the interconnectedness of the ecclesiastical

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1 Literally translated as 'Samoa Stand! And raise your flag, this is your crown'.

and political face for independence. While the WMMS and the Catholics also contributed to Samoa’s independence aspirations, this study will focus on the influence and impact of the Samoan (LMS) Church on Samoa’s independence aspirations, under the supervision of the LMS mission, an organisation that had simultaneously achieved independence with Samoa. The two movements will be seen to be intractably linked.

It is my intention for this study, being a religious and political history of Samoa, to write in a style that would be readily understandable and coherent to Samoans, Pacific Islanders, and those who are not academics and scholars, but wish to understand this aspect of Samoan history.

The main research for this study started in 1994, although my interest in the EFKS and its close ties with Samoan politics had led me to interview and research into the issue some years earlier. I visited and explored the various archives and libraries in Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, and Samoa, to uncover materials for this study. The archives and libraries explored for this study were within the Pacific and Australasia. They included the National Library of Australia, Saint Mark’s Library, Pacific and Asian History Records Room (Australian National University of Australia), Mitchell Library, National Archives of New Zealand, Alexander Turnbull Library, Victoria University Library, Auckland University Library, National Archives of Fiji, Pacific Theological College Library, University of the South Pacific Library, Pacific Regional Seminary Library, Marist Archives of Samoa and Tokelau, Archives of the Methodist Church, Samoa Legislative Library, Nelson Memorial Library, and the Robert Louis Stevenson Museum and Archives.

There was an abundance of primary as well as secondary sources available to be examined. The sources and materials (the ones that I could locate), which related to my study are listed in the bibliography. The National Library of Australia (Canberra), University of the South Pacific (Suva), and the National Archives of New Zealand (Wellington), the London Missionary Society South Seas Archives, the Methodist Mission Archives, and the Mormon Church materials were amongst the most useful.

The Mitchell Library (Sydney) had an extensive range of materials that complimented those found in other archives relating to various Pacific Islands including Samoa. The Methodist Church materials were excellent including Peter Turner’s Journals, Martin Dyson’s Papers, and George Brown’s Journals
and Private Papers. The Mitchell Library also had a good collection of other manuscripts and microfilms, especially on James Lyle Young and J. C. Williams. The Samoan photographs from the period under study were also interesting and informative. The Pacific and Asian History Records Room (Canberra) had the Gilson Papers and several manuscripts in the Samoan language, which were also valuable.

The National Archives of New Zealand, housed some of the most important papers relating to Germany and New Zealand administration. However, the most important collection was the Island Territories Archives, which contained materials relating to the Mau period and the efforts of Samoa to gain independence. I selected 107 files altogether from a handful of series. The Island Territories Archives contained 88 series, and those read for this study are listed in the bibliography.

There were also excellent materials found in the British and German Administration Archives. These include the British Consul Samoa Papers, Great Britain Foreign Administration Papers, British Military Occupation Papers, German Administration of Western Samoa Papers, German Administration Papers, German Colonial Administration Papers, Archives of the German Consul, Archives of the Samoan Government, New Zealand Samoan Administration Papers, and other bits and pieces. There was an excellent collection of Samoan newspapers, which included the Samoa Guardian, New Zealand Samoa Guardian, Samoa Herald, Samoa Times, and Samoaniche Zeitung.

The Alexander Turnbull Library is an excellent centre for research. It housed the manuscripts of several New Zealand Administrators to Samoa between 1918 and 1945, such Stephen S. Allen, Robert W. Tate and Herbert Hart. The library also has collections and papers by various government officials and personalities that had spent time in Samoa, including the Sir Arthur Gordon Papers, Grattan Papers, Westbrook Papers, Gurr Papers, Shultz Papers, and H. E. Holland Papers. There were other informative smaller collections, which were also useful for this study. The Turnbull Library also houses the New Zealand government Gazette called the Appendix to the Journal to the House of Representative of New Zealand (AJHR), which provided excellent reports on the administration of Samoa. The most important collection for me, however, was the Samoan Collection in the Pacific Section. It contained Samoan
literature relating to the Samoan (LMS) Church and government in the Samoan language. This collection is fully listed in the bibliography.

The National Archives of Fiji provided an interesting perspective on British administration in Fiji compared to Samoa. It also housed some interesting papers relating to Bully Hayes, John C. Williams, and other interesting personalities, who had spent time in Samoa. Samoa is mentioned in the reports by the High Commissioner for the Pacific, and the Anglican Diocese of Polynesia Archive. The typescript ‘Treaty of Friendship Between Germany and Samoa, 1871 – 1881’ was important for this study.

The Roman Catholic Church in Apia houses the Marist Archives of Samoa and Tokelau Islands. There were excellent collections in English, Samoan, and over half in the German and French language. The most notable collection belonged to Bishops Broyer, Darnand and Elloy (Tipasa), the great leaders of the Catholic mission in Samoa in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The Methodist Church Archives in Apia had very little material concerning the study at hand. Most of the information relates to the Methodist church Synods between 1938 – 1960, and referred mainly to financial matters.

The Nelson Memorial Library (Apia) had materials, which were also found in other libraries and archives. It housed the recently discovered Vaimea Collection, which, unfortunately, I unable to examine due to unforeseen circumstances. This collection came to my notice while researching in Wellington in 1996. I was given a copy of the items included in the archive, entitled ‘Official German records – Vaimea – English Translation’. The Vaimea collection would have confirmed and corroborated information already gathered from other libraries.

The Western Samoa Gazette is housed in the Samoan Legislation Library at Mulineu. Unfortunately, it does not have a complete collection, and the earliest copies dated from 1920. It contained information relating to the New Zealand administration’s dealings with the Mau and other organisations, such as the LMS, WMMS, Catholics and the Mormons. It also contains census statistics and government appointments.

The published primary and secondary sources were numerous. The hardest task was locating the sources, as many were rare and out of circulation, but between the libraries and archives I visited, the final collection was more than enough for the task at hand. Some of the rare materials were found in the
Pacific Theological College (the *Chronicle* of the LMS and other LMS materials), the Pacific Regional Seminary (especially on the Roman Catholic perspective), and the University of the South Pacific. The libraries at Auckland and Victoria Universities had theses relating to some of the issues covered in this study.

Perhaps, the most fascinating archive was housed at the Robert Louis Stevenson Museum. It was a collection of Stevenson’s books and other materials, including a few manuscript papers relating to Samoa. At the time of my research (1995 and 1998), the archive was in its infant state, and I believe it will be an excellent archive in a few years time. The curator stated that Stevenson’s personal papers and materials relating to his time were being negotiated for their return to Samoa, and all of it would be housed at the Museum in the near future.

In 1995, I interviewed some of the older Samoan generation (above 70 years) in an effort to establish a closer link with the past through the personal experiences of those who had lived in or near the period of this study. The thirty-two interviews conducted were of mixed personalities (women and men) including ministers, government workers, *Mau* participants, and so forth. These interviews were added to other interviews that had been done in 1992 for a different study but related to the Samoan church. The list of interviewees is given in the bibliography.

This study would not have been possible without the support of many people. I acknowledge the vision and the confidence that was first shown in me by the Reverend Dr Faitala Talapusi, and Dr Andrew Thornley, as a candidate for post graduate studies at the Australian National University. Even though the relationship between myself and the Pacific Theological College, Suva, ended abruptly due to the college’s financial difficulties, its contribution cannot be ignored. Talapusi and his wife Tausala were great supporters, and I owe much to them for their translation of French books and manuscripts that had come to my notice.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank all the people in the archives and libraries mentioned already, who helped me to locate the various sources that I needed for this study. I will not name you all as I might forget one, but your efforts and your guidance are appreciated deeply. I would like to take this opportunity to thank Dr Mark Gallagher who had been my mentor at the Pacific Theological College, and to whom I owed much in my early research into
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I would like to thank the staff members at the Division of the Pacific and Asian History, in the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, at the Australian National University. I would like to thank Professor Donald Denoon, the chair of my supervisory panel, for his guidance, for his words of encouragement, and for reading some of my disconnected drafts. But, most of all, I acknowledge with gratitude the great assistance afforded by Dr Niel Gunson, who was humble and patient with me in his role as supervisor. Thank you friend for guiding me, and for reading drafts and making suggestions to improve the quality and content of the thesis. The use of your personal library, especially in relation to rare manuscript papers, such as the Frank Lenwood Letters and Journals, was invaluable. Thank you for sharing your experience in the Archives, and the humorous discourses with missionaries in the field, it made me appreciate other aspects of mission enterprises. You have been an inspiration in my efforts to be a 'historian' since 1995, and all your efforts would be remembered with prayers.

I would also like to acknowledge the friendship of Dr Brij Lal and Dr Deryck Scarr who in their own ways contributed to the academic discussions related to my study, and the staff of the Cartography Section at the Australian National University for drawing the maps. I also acknowledge the support and friendship of past and present colleagues at the Australian National University, Asiata Va’ai, Asofou So’o, Sina Va’ai, Kambati Uriam, Andrew Hamilton, Christine Weir, Paul D’Arcy, and Kieran Schmidt for their enlightening comments during the weekly seminars, and humorous demeanour, which made life more bearable when ‘writer’s cramp’ and ‘brain seizure’ occurred. Many thanks to the administration team, especially to Marion Weeks for her constant e-mails to Samoa to get me to finish my thesis, and Dorothy McIntosh, for her
kindness and for making my final three months more bearable in providing an office and computer for my use, and sorting out financial expenses.

I would also acknowledge the big part that my church has played in my academic efforts. In 1998 I was asked to return and teach history at the Malua Theological College with a promise that I would return to finish my studies later. Towards the end of 2000, the Reverend Professor Otele Perelini supported my request to take leave for three months to finish my thesis. He arranged finance for my return airfare which made things easier financially for my family. I thank Perelini, the staff of Malua, and the Board of Malua for their prayers and support.

I would like to acknowledge the support of my family in Samoa, New Zealand, Australia, Hawaii and America, especially my mother, Talitiga Liua'ana and her family, and my mother-in-law, Luafulu Roache and her family. I am indebted to Peter and Shane Roache and their family in Canberra for putting up with me for three months, and providing free accommodation and meals for the duration of my stay. Thanks to my daughter, Ella Adeline, for covering some of my expenses. Thank you all for your support and your prayers.

Most of all, I would like to thank my wife Virginia Perise, and my children, John Roache, Grete Lynn, and Franz Richard Charlie, in Samoa for their prayers and support. We were forced to be apart for three months (and over the Christmas and New Year period) because they believed in what I had to do. They made me work hard to achieve something which would mean much for us all, and to them I dedicate this study. Finally, I thank God almighty for his guidance, and for the strength and wisdom that I was able to utilise daily in my writing, and may His name be praised forever.
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION -
ECHOES FROM THE PAST

The legend of Nafanua and her exploits in Samoan history accounts for many existing myths, stories, songs, and proverbial sayings. Nafanua, the *aitu fafine* (goddess) from Pulotu,⁠¹ was believed to avenge her *aiga* (family) at Falealupo for having been enslaved and, through conquest, gathered together the paramount *matai* (chief) titles of Samoa. In the story she subsequently bestowed the first *tafa'ifa* (four paramount titles) upon Salamasina, the daughter of the Tuia'ana.⁠² Nafanua then distributed the rest of the *papa* and *ao* (other high ranking chiefly titles) to the other high-ranking families of Samoa. The story of Nafanua legitimised the power base for Samoan politics, and also gave authenticity to the existence of the *tafa'ifa* and the changes in the fortunes of the *tama-a-aiga* (sons of the royal families or royal families), especially in relation to the Tupua and Malietoa lineages.

The paramountcy of the Malietoa family was also connected to the Nafanua myth. It was believed that Malietoa⁠³ sought out Nafanua for a *papa* or *ao* title to honour his family, but Malietoa found his rivals had taken all the titles. Nafanua told Malietoa to "Tali i Lagi Se Ao o Lou Malo,"⁠⁴ and a few generations later Malietoa Vaiinupo believed the prophecy of the *aitu fafine* was fulfilled when he welcomed and accepted Christianity in the form of the London Missionary Society (LMS). At the time, Vaiinupo was waging war against A'ana in the island of Upolu. The total annihilation of A'ana was not only to avenge the

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² The four titles that made up the *tafa'ifa* are Tuia’ana, Gato'alilele, and Tamasoali'i. See Western Samoa, Historical Notes, Island Territories Archives (henceforth IT) 1 Ex 2/15; see also Niel Gunson, "Great Families of Polynesia," *Journal of Pacific History* 32 no. 2, 1997; Penelope Schoeffel, "Rank, Gender, and Politics in Ancient Samoa: the Genealogy of Salamasina O le Tafa’ifa," *Journal of Pacific History* 22 no. 4, 1987; Henry, 81-110.


⁴ Literally means 'wait for a title of your kingdom from Heaven.'
death of his Manono ally, Tamafaiga, but was also an opportunity for Vaiinupo to consolidate his supremacy over the other leadership claimants to the malo (conquering or ruling side).

The arrival of the new papa-lagi or pa-lagi (European or white man) religion at the moment of Vaiinupo's rise in political status, was not only seen as the fulfilment of Nafanua's prophecy, but also an impetus that would change Samoa's political and religious fortunes. The ascendancy of Vaiinupo and the arrival of the Gospel were also seen as the remedy to curb hostility and warfare in Samoa. For a brief period peace was a reality. However, from 1847 the winds of change from various elements in the community soon returned Samoa to political mayhem for the rest of the nineteenth century, at a scale far beyond the Samoans' own perceptions. The changing political patterns were mainly due to a combination of Samoan chiefly rivalry and papalagi rivalry combined with the pursuit of economic, political and, to some extent, religious dominance.

In 1847, the Samoan political leaders never envisioned that within the next 100 years, they would lose the right to determine their own political affairs. They never envisioned they would compromise their status and authority to generate and indirectly indulge European greed and foster political apathy. The Samoans observed with despair the efforts of the three European powers, Germany, America, and Britain, to exploit Samoan pride, values, traditions, and relationships, to achieve dominancy over each other.

The Samoans tried to regain their political authority by supporting one of the three nations with the hope of eventually re-establishing Samoan political rule. Unfortunately, disunity in family and district allegiances, mission pride, and individual pursuit of power and control, led to a leadership conflict, which the

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5 For a recent study on Tamafaiga, see Tuiatua Tupua Tamasese Efi Tamasese, "Tamafaiga: Shaman, King or Maniac," Journal of Pacific History, 30 no. 1, 1995.

6 The Samoan words for European or white person. The common rendering is papalagi but recent development in the Samoan language has used papalagi as the plural form and palagi as the singular. The author has taken into consideration the connection that the word papalagi rather than palagi has with similar concepts such as papa-atea (Eastern Polynesia), and papa–rangí (Maori) which refers to gods of the earth and sky. (Niel Gunson, Australian National University, Canberra, Interviewed 22 December 2000).

three powers took advantage of to further their own self-interest. Samoa would endure many years of bloodshed without achieving political rule.

When the curtains closed on the nineteenth century, there were no winners – only losers. Germany, Britain, and America dominated the political scene but they failed to organise a workable Samoan government under their control. The efforts of the three powers were continually thwarted by the Samoan efforts to regain political control over their own affairs, even if it meant spilling Samoan blood. The Samoans lost many lives in pursuit of their goals and they were not about to give it all up to satisfy European dominance. The Samoans also witnessed over the years *papalagi* greed and lust for power and wealth at the cost of Samoan lives; an image firmly etched into the minds of many dejected Samoans. The nineteenth century closed as Samoa became a German colony without any consultation with Samoan leaders - a decision that left many Samoans bitter and disillusioned.

Samoa’s new colonial status, however, only encouraged the Samoans to further conspire to make another attempt at regaining political control. At the beginning of the German reign, various events and issues arose, and continued to develop throughout the twentieth century, which kept the Samoans persevering and forever stimulated to achieve control. For instance, Samoans witnessed and despised Germany’s destruction of Samoan protocol. The Samoans condemned New Zealand’s abysmal administrative performance and the perpetual erosion of Samoan traditions and customs. The Samoans questioned their lack of participation in the debate over ‘racial impurity’, especially mixed relations between Chinese indentured labourers and Samoan women. The Samoans also tested the patience of the mission societies, especially those connected with the LMS, as Samoan church leaders entertained the notion of controlling their own religious destiny. The same independent attitude surfaced as Samoan nationalism developed into a strong independence movement. The Samoans also had the opportunity to appreciate the technology and material wealth of World War I and World War II, and wished to share these benefits.

Samoa gained political independence in 1962 and, in the same year, the Samoan (LMS) Church, under the supervision of the LMS mission, became an independent entity called the Ekalesia Faapotopotoga Kerisiano i Samoa (Congregational Christian Church in Samoa [EFKS]). It ended 100 years of
struggle against dominance by a foreign power, and oppression and exploitation under the guise of civilisation to improve Samoan standards of living through economic, political, social, and religious development.

The contention of this study is that the simultaneous independence of Samoa and the Samoan (LMS) Church was not coincidental. It was the result of a close working relationship that had begun in the nineteenth century, and was strengthened in the twentieth century, through the persistence and vitality of the Samoan leaders. It was also a culmination of factors, which had a lasting and detrimental impact on Samoans as they struggled to free themselves from the bondage of colonialism. Thus, throughout this study efforts will be made to show how Samoa's political and religious events, issues, and factors all interacted and finally culminated in the independence of Samoa and the Samoan (LMS) Church.

The outcome of events in the first half of the twentieth century could only be understood against the background of the nineteenth century. Even before the very first European settlement eventuated in the early 1800s, Samoa had contact with other papa/agi, albeit only on sporadic occasions. The sighting of the first European ships gliding across the waters of the Samoan Islands created a relationship and history of events that continued to develop and contribute to the structuring and ordering of Samoa's future. Between 1521 and 1824, French, Dutch, British, and a Russian explorer, visited Samoa. They included Ferdinand Magellan, Jacob Roggeveen, Louis Antoine de Bougainville, who named Samoa L'Archipel des Navigteurs, and Jean Francois de la Perouse, who lost twelve sailors in Tutuila after a misunderstanding with the local people. La Perouse labelled the Samoans 'barbaric and atrocious.' Louis De Freycinet, in 1819, and the Russian Otto Von Kotzebue, in 1824, were the last to visit Samoa before the arrival of the missions.

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These explorers did not establish any lasting relationships, and Samoa was left to enjoy its own traditions, culture, and lifestyle. The casual contacts meant Samoans knew that *papalagi* sailed in huge ships, but it gave them very little knowledge of their character and demeanour. There were probably a few runaway sailors and beachcombers already residing in Samoa, but their scanty presence only influenced the Samoans they came into contact with.¹⁰ It was the arrival of the mission societies, especially the LMS, which opened up Samoa to the world.

The LMS first set foot in the Pacific in 1797.¹¹ The first Protestant organisation to participate in Christian mission in the Pacific landed *papalagi* missionaries on the island of Tahiti. The missionaries, made up of four ordained ministers and twenty-two lower middle class mechanics, were not only earmarked for Tahiti, but for the Marquesses and Tonga.¹² They had high hopes of quickly converting the inhabitants of the islands concerned. They believed that in order to Christianise they first had to civilise the islanders, thus the high percentage of unordained missionaries in the first group. However, their expectations never eventuated as many returned to England shattered by the experience, with only a handful remaining in Tahiti to continue the work. It was not the start the LMS wanted, but it persevered and by 1812 positive results began to appear.¹³

The LMS was not the only mission in the Pacific at that time. The Anglican missionaries were working in Australia and New Zealand, while the WMMS missionaries also had a base in Australia, and were trying to establish a mission in the island of Tonga. The existence of these missions soon spread throughout the Pacific as mission ships and trading vessels visited different ports throughout the year. Many of these trading vessels carried islanders as part of their crew or passengers. Many of them returned to their islands immediately, while others made their homes in their new island surroundings.

only to return many years later, while others never returned. The same pattern transpired with Europeans who escaped their ships and settled among the inhabitants of the various islands. Many stayed for a while and then returned to their countries, while others stayed for good. Many of these Europeans were familiar with Christianity, and many freely took the opportunity, while others had to be coerced, to teach and pass on Christian knowledge, albeit impure, to the islanders.  

The Samoans also had the opportunity to travel on many trading vessels as sailors, helpers, and passengers. They visited other islands such as Tonga, Tahiti, Rarotonga, Hawaii, and even New Zealand and Australia. The experiences and knowledge gained on these visits were later shared with others upon their return to Samoa. The inter-island migrational habits and trading enterprises also established a grapevine that filtered information through the islands on current events. The opportunity was available for Samoans to mimic Christianity picked up from other islands.  

In 1828, Saiva'aia, a Samoan who had been visiting Tonga, arrived at his village Satupa'itea, Sāvai‘i, with a Tongan version of Christianity, and began to teach members of his family about God. While Sava'aia's knowledge and grasp of the Christian faith may have been limited, the fact remained that many Samoans, like Saiva'aia and his family, had practiced what they thought was Christianity. At the village of Lufilufi, a man named Tagipo had his own version of Christianity, which ran parallel to the teachings of a runaway sailor in the same village.  

A Samoan from the village of Eva in Upolu, named Siovili, also

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14 Williams, 463-464; A. W. Murray, Forty Years' Mission Work in Polynesia and New Guinea, From 1835 – 1875, London: James Nisbet, 1876, 32-34; see also Gunson, 167-169.  
16 In the official Methodist history, the official date for Methodism in Samoa is given as 1835 for Peter Turner's arrival at Manono. See A. Harold Wood, Overseas Missions of the Australian Methodist Church, vol. 1, Tonga and Samoa, Melbourne: Aldersgate, 1975; Martin Dyson, My Story of Samoan Methodism, or A Brief History of the Wesleyan Methodist Mission in Samoa, Apia: Methodist Church, 1875.  
17 "Buzacott to LMS, 1836," SSL.  
journeyed the Pacific as a sailor on various trading vessels. Siovili experienced the lifestyle and absorbed the latest changes and developments offered at the various ports of landing. In Tahiti, Siovili picked up a flawed version of Christianity and having arrived in Samoa, he began to teach it to the people of Eva, and consequently influenced many people from surrounding districts and as far as Savai'i. Siovili's teachings remained influential up till the late 1840s. Thus, the sailors, beachcombers, European traders, escaped convicts, who had settled among the Samoans, and Samoans themselves, imparted to the Samoans a crude form of Christianity until the arrival of the mission societies.

The LMS mission ship, the *Messenger of Peace*, with LMS missionaries, the Reverends John Williams and Charles Barff, and six Tahitian and two Aitutakian teachers and their families on board, arrived in Tonga for supplies and to meet the WMMS missionaries. While in Tonga, Williams and Barff highlighted their plans for Samoa, and solicited the support of their WMMS counterparts to leave Samoa solely to the LMS. According to Williams, the Reverends Nathaniel Turner and William Cross represented the WMMS, and gave their blessing and acknowledged the benefits of leaving Samoa solely to the LMS. The fruitful encounter set a benevolent mood as the *Messenger of Peace* set sail for Samoa.

Williams agreed to give passage to a Samoan couple, Fauea and Puaseisei, who have been residing in Tonga for some years. Fauea was a blessing in more ways than one for Williams. He was a chief and native of Manono, and a relative of Vaiinupo. Williams learnt from Fauea that the Manono warrior Tamafaiga, feared by many Samoans, was the leader of the *malo*. Tamafaiga was cruel and barbarous, and would not hesitate to kill those who denied his authority. The people of Manono, as well as his other followers, believed the spirit of the *aitu fafine* Nafanua possessed him. Fauea informed Williams that Tamafaiga would be the greatest obstacle to the acceptance of

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19 *Samoa Reporter*, March 1846.
Christianity, otherwise Fauea was confident that Malietoa Vainuupo would gladly receive the new lotu (religion).\(^{22}\)

The *Messenger of Peace*, under advice from Fauea, detoured from the usual ship route that by-passed Manono to avoid contact with Tamafaiga. The *va’a lotu* (mission ship) remained south of Samoa and sailed northwest where it rounded Cape Mulini'u in Savai'i, and finally found anchorage off Puaseisei's village, Safune. The stopover off Safune proved propitious as news of Tamafaiga’s death greeted Fauea. Williams could not contain his joy as Fauea confirmed and reconfirmed again the news that Tamafaiga was indeed dead.\(^{23}\) Fauea was just as happy because it was probably the barbarity of Tamafaiga that had originally forced him and his wife to take refuge in Tonga. The way was now clear for Fauea to return to his family in Manono. But, most importantly, the chance had been given to Williams to offer Vainuupo the Gospel of Jesus Christ at Sapapali'i.

A message was sent to Vainuupo who was in Upolu destroying A’ana, the district responsible for the death of Tamafaiga. Vainuupo arrived as his brother Taimalelagi entertained the visitors. After the exchange of gifts, Williams outlined the purpose of his visit, and Vainuupo accepted Christianity on behalf of the Samoan people without hesitation. He also offered to protect and provide for all the needs of the teachers in Samoa.\(^{24}\) Ironically, as Williams and Vainuupo shared the Gospel of Christ, and spoke of peace for the Samoan people, smoke continued to rise above the mountains of Upolu as Vainuupo’s warriors continued to destroy and burn A’ana. Williams did nothing and said nothing as Vainuupo refused to accept Christianity personally until the annihilation of A’ana, its people and their possessions, was completed.\(^{25}\)

Williams left soon after with the success of the LMS mission in Vainuupo’s hands. He imparted to Vainuupo the importance for the teachers to spread out and reside throughout the various districts of Samoa. Williams then sailed for Rarotonga via Manono, where he met and promised the chief Tuilaepa Matetau a teacher on his next visit. Matetau had heard of Williams meeting with Vainuupo and was envious of the teachers at Vainuupo’s disposal. Matetau’s request for a

\(^{22}\) Williams, 85-88.

\(^{23}\) Williams, 85.

\(^{24}\) Williams, 87-90.

\(^{25}\) Williams, 87-88.
teacher highlighted the intricacy in relationship between Samoans at various levels of society. Matetau was a chief of Manono, the malo, and his pride would not have his status compromised, nor subordinated to Vaiinupo, by asking for a teacher. Manono, after all, was the power base behind Vaiinupo's leadership.26

Williams took two years before returning to Samoa via Tutuila and Manu'a in 1832. In Tutuila, Williams was overwhelmed by the enthusiasm of the Samoans wanting to receive Christianity. He found that many of the Samoans had received inferior teachings from beachcombers and European settlers, such as William Gray, as well as a Tahitian named Hura who had found his way to Tutuila and Manu'a.27 In Leone, Williams was amazed with the Christian knowledge shared among the people regarding the teachings of the bible. But, most of all, they had their own chapel to worship in. Williams was informed that a young man named Amoamo travelled to Sapapali'i every fortnight. He was given instructions on the bible, and then returned to Leone to teach his people.28

Williams then called at Manono to fulfil a promise. He left the Cook Island teacher Teava and his wife in the care of Matetau.29 Williams arrived at Sapapali'i to find the teachers well and working diligently. Williams was happy with the progress that had been made, although he was disappointed at the rate of progress. But, Williams was more disappointed with Vaiinupo's failure to distribute the teachers to other districts as he had intended. Williams learnt that some teachers had taken it upon themselves to leave Sapapali'i so that they could share the Gospel with nearby villages. Williams' disappointment led to the redistribution of the teachers to other districts, with the majority still remaining in Vaiinupo's care.30 It was an awakening for Williams to quickly provide Samoa with LMS European missionaries, not only to give proper supervision but also to take the teaching and preaching another step further. The island teachers had done the levelling work with the limited knowledge they possessed and there was a need to develop the mission physically and spiritually.

26 Williams, 92-93; see also Gilson, 81.
27 Williams, 107.
30 Williams, 115-116.
Williams' disappointment with Vaiinupo's actions highlighted just how very little Williams knew of Samoan protocol. Williams may have entertained the idea that Vaiinupo's tafa'ifa rank made him king over Samoa, a status equivalent to that of Pomare of Tahiti, Makea of Rarotonga, and Taufa'ahau of Tonga.\(^{31}\) To Williams, Vaiinupo had failed to distribute the teachers to demonstrate that he had absolute authority to do as he pleased. This, in reality was the case but for quite different reasons. Vaiinupo only wanted to protect his elite status and to maintain peoples' respect for his authority, not only as tafa'ifa but through wealth, contact with religious teachers and foreigners. Vaiinupo knew very well that in using Williams and the LMS to his advantage, he could maintain his authority and status over and above his peers. Matetau knew this very well when he had asked Williams for his own personal teacher.

The official arrival of the WMMS in Samoa was due mainly to this obsession to maintain status and chiefly authority. The chief Lilomaiava and Tuinaula of Satupa'itea knew Vaiinupo's status was enhanced by the presence of the Tahitian and Cook Island teachers. They also knew Vaiinupo was guaranteed material possessions every time the va'a lotu visited. Consequently, they asked Vaiinupo to share his teachers, but Vaiinupo refused. Lilomaiava and Tuinaula turned to Tonga for teachers, and as a result the WMMS dispatched Tongan teachers and the Reverend Peter Turner.\(^{32}\)

Turner landed on the island of Manono in 1835, where he was welcomed by several Manono chiefs, especially Matetau. Turner, and especially the Tongan teachers, were easily accepted. Tonga and Manono had very close links through trade and intermarriage. The Tongans would have presented Matetau with some gifts from Tupou Taufa'ahau, the powerful chief of Tonga at the time, as Matetau's daughter, Salote, was one of Taufa'ahau's wives.\(^{33}\) The Manono matai who owed allegiance to Vaiinupo tried to persuade Turner to stay with Vaiinupo without success. After leaving Tongan teachers at Manono, Turner sailed on to Satupa'itea and to Lilomaiava's residence where he was

\(^{31}\) Gunson (1978), 289; see also Native Situation, Sept, 1921, IT 88/5.

\(^{32}\) Dyson, 4. **Note:** The competition for wealth and status based on foreign teachers and white missionaries became a common occurrence in the nineteenth century. See Mulipola to the Directors of LMS, n.d., SSL; Finau (Falealii) to the Directors of the LMS, 10 Jan, 1886, SSL.

once again welcomed. Turner was given land to set up a mission station and immediately found success with many Samoans drawn to his teachings.³⁴

It is unknown just how much Turner's presence had affected Vaiinupo politically, especially when Turner was attached to one of Vaiinupo's rivals. It may have offended Vaiinupo but there was nothing he could do about it. But, it was clear Vaiinupo was eager to have his own *papalagi* missionaries. The presence in Samoa of the Reverends Aaron Buzzacott and Charles Barff in 1834, and the Reverend George Platt in 1835, to prepare the Samoan mission field for the arrival of LMS missionaries, informed Vaiinupo of Williams' plans to provide European missionaries for Samoa.³⁵ Vaiinupo was also aware that not one but five European missionaries were earmarked for Samoa. He was, therefore, not unperturbed by Turner's affiliation with a rival *matai*. Vaiinupo's fore knowledge of the new missionaries was clearly shown when he was present at Sagaga, Mulini'u Peninsula, when Williams arrived with the first quota of European missionaries.³⁶

Vaiinupo's status would have sky-rocketed with the arrival of five missionaries, compared to his rival's one missionary, but Vaiinupo's expectation of having all five missionaries reside at Sapapali'i was quickly quashed. Williams decided to divide the missionaries, as well as the teachers, among the leading districts of Upolu, Savai'i, and Tutuila.³⁷ The move proved significant for Williams as the LMS immediately attracted many Samoans into the Christian faith. It was also positive in the sense that it attracted other notable chiefs into the LMS fold, although Vaiinupo's authority and status was still intact.

The existence of the so-called 'party spirit'³⁸ began soon after as the LMS missionaries began to settle in their various districts. Turner and later Mathew Wilson (who arrived a few years later), were at first, not an issue with the Samoans, as the Samoans did not distinguish between the WMMS and the LMS. The Samoans had been led to the understanding that Williams, Barff,

³⁴ Woods, 269; see also Thomas Heath to Turner, 11 Jan, 1837, SSL; Heath to Turner, 2 Sept, 1836, SSL; Heath to Ellis, 1 Dec, 1836, SSL.
³⁶ Murray, 100–102; Journals of Charles Barff, 6 Apr - 4 Sept, 1836, SSJ; Hardie to Tidman, 9 Feb, 1842,” SSL.
³⁷ Reverend A. W. Murray and Reverend George Barnden were stationed at Tutuila. Reverend Thomas Heath was stationed at Manono, Reverend William Mills was stationed at Apia, Reverend Charles Hardy was stationed at Sapapali'i. Reverend Alexander MacDonald arrived in 1837 and was stationed at Safune. John Williams decided to reside at Fasito'otai (A'ana) from 1838 with his family and use it as a base for the expansion of Christianity to other islands west of Samoa. See Faletoese, 17; Gunson (1978), 344–351.
³⁸ William Mills to Ellis, Apr, 6, 1837, SSL; Buzzacott to Ellis, 'Visitation Report' Jan, 4, 1837, SSL.
Turner, and the Tahitian and Aitutakian teachers were all from the same *lotu*. But, as mission enterprises began to widen from village to village and district to district, Samoans quickly realised that the *lotu* Turner represented was not the same *lotu* Williams had brought to Samoa under the LMS banner.\(^39\)

The differences in the missions, at first, seemed minute for the Samoans but they were a cause of contention for the LMS and WMMS. The Samoans learnt about the differences as they were slowly drawn into the conflict, and it did not take long for the Samoans to attain a taste for it, as each side supported their own mission's attitude. The verbal abuse turned to hatred, and was soon translated into physical abuse, which ultimately led to physical confrontation that resulted in injury to people and destruction of property.\(^40\)

The LMS missionaries in Samoa made a strong plea to London, pointing out the comity agreement made between Williams, Cross and Nathaniel Turner, in Tonga in 1830.\(^41\) The LMS Directors presented their case to the WMMS mission board, and they agreed for the sake of harmony to reprimand the actions of its missionaries. Turner and his Tongan teachers were ordered to vacate Samoa. The news was a bitter blow to Turner's ego and to the WMMS pride.\(^42\) The WMMS in the Pacific protested against the decision with emotional commitment. Turner eventually left Samoa in 1839, but the Tongan teachers refused to abide by the WMMS decision and remained in Samoa to continue the WMMS tradition. The Tongan teachers not only proved to be a thorn in the side of the LMS efforts, but a catalyst in the continuation of the 'party spirit.'\(^43\)

The removal of Peter Turner, despite the insistence of the Tongan teachers for him to stay, was a morale boost for the LMS as it looked forward to controlling the spiritual welfare of the Samoans. Then in the same year, with the LMS mission at the brink of turning Samoa into its greatest mission

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\(^{39}\) LMS Missionaries to Turner, Buzacott (Cooks 1836 – 1837 May 30 – Mar 10) Rarotonga to Navigator Islands, London Missionary Society, South Seas Archives, South Seas Journal (henceforth SSJ).

\(^{40}\) Heath to the LMS, Jun, 11, 1837, SSJ; Heath to Turner, Sept, 2, 1836, SSL; Platt to the Committee in London, Jul, 27, 1836, SSL; Heath to Ellis, Oct, 21, 1839, SSL.

\(^{41}\) The LMS claimed prior agreement with the WMMS in Tonga - Samoa to the LMS, and Fiji to the WMMS. See A. Buzacott (Cooks 1836-1837, May 30 - Mar 10), Rarotonga toNavigators Islands, 1837, SSJ; George Platt to Rev. Thomas (Vavau), 7 Jan, 1836, SSL; Heath to Turner, 12 Jan, 1836, SSL; Peter Turner to the LMS Missionaries, 24 Jun, 1836, SSJ; Peter Turner to Barff and Others, 24 Jan, 1836, SSL; Williams, 79.

\(^{42}\) Decision of the Committee of the Wesleyan Missionary Society, Regarding P. Turner and the Conflict in the Navigator Islands, Dec, 6, 1837, SSL.

\(^{43}\) MacDonald to Ellis, Nov, 28, 1840, SSL; Pratt to Tidman, Sept, 9, 1841, SSL; Hardie to the Secretary of the LMS, Sept, 9, 1841, SSL; Pratt to Tidman, Dec, 1, 1842, SSL; Hardie to Tidman, Sept, 13, 1843, SSL; Powell to Tidman, Oct, 9, 1846, SSL; Pratt to Tidman, Aug, 7, 1858, SSL; See also Martin Dyson, *O Lau Tala o te Lotu Metobisi Samoa*, John Blacket, *Missionary Triumphs*, London: Charles H. Kelley, 1914, 153.
achievement, news of Williams' death at Eromanga, Southern Vanuatu, reached Samoa. Williams' death was a heart-rending reminder of the dangers involved with each new mission enterprise, and those who knew him were greatly saddened by his death, including Vaiinupo who wept when he heard the news. But, the death of Williams was more than just a martyr's death for the LMS. On one hand, Williams' death rekindled the spirit of mission as the Samoans called for a return to Southern Vanuatu. On the other hand, Williams' death also marked the beginning of LMS missionary and Samoan leader dialogues that would challenge the LMS mission throughout the ensuing years.

The decision to continue the mission to Southern Vanuatu was at the insistence of the Samoans, including Vaiinupo, which the LMS missionaries reluctantly agreed to support. The LMS missionaries were forced to agree; in order to paint a glorious picture of courage, co-operation, and love for Christ at all cost, which had been the message preached when the Samoans accompanied Williams to his death in 1839. The frailty of the LMS missionaries was exposed as they quarrelled among themselves as to who would lead the mission to Southern Vanuatu. The Samoans were ready with the manpower and willing to proceed immediately. Eventually, the LMS missionaries appointed Thomas Heath despite his protest at being forced to go. The Samoans had forced the hands of the LMS missionaries and found a weakness in their personal relationships, which the Samoan church leaders would exploit often in future confrontations. The mission to Southern Vanuatu eventually got under way and it gave the LMS missionaries some credibility in the eyes of the Samoans.

Disaster again struck the progress of the LMS mission with the death of Vaiinupo in 1841. Vaiinupo's death, like Williams', had a huge impact on the
future of the mission. Vaiinupo was still the most powerful protector of the LMS mission, but it was his mavaega (farewell or departing will) that was crucial for the future of the LMS mission, especially over his successor to the tafa'ifa. The LMS, Vaiinupo's family and matai from the districts who owned the titles pertaining to the tafa'ifa, gathered in anticipation for the next tafa'ifa, but Vaiinupo failed to satisfy the curiosity and the expectation of his family and peers. He requested that the tafa'ifa be made redundant after his death. He then began to distribute the titles of the tafa'ifa back to their respective districts. The Tuia'ana title went to To'oa Sualauvi, the Tuiatua title went to Mata'afa Fagamanu, and the Malietoa, Gato'aitele, and Tamasoali'i titles, went to his brother Taimalelagi.\footnote{Gilson, 117-119; Meleisea (Modern Samoa), 28-29.} Vaiinupo's distribution of the titles had intended to honour all the tama-a-aiga (sons of the families). For instance, the Tuia'ana title returned to the A'ana district, which was also the stronghold of the Tuimaleali'ifano family. The Tuiatua title returned to the Atua district, which was the stronghold of the Tupua family, while the Tamasoali'i and Gato'aitele titles returned to Tuamasaga, which was the stronghold of the Malietoa family.\footnote{Western Samoa, Historical Notes, IT 1 Ex 2/15.}

The LMS welcomed the wisdom of Vaiinupo's mavaega as all the recipients were LMS adherents,\footnote{Mata'a'afa Fagamanu later became a Roman Catholic. Gilson, 117-118.} and hoped they would encourage growth for the LMS throughout the districts. Most importantly, so it seemed to the LMS, the political decision-making process was no longer the prerogative of a single matai, which in the past had tended to hinder mission progress. It gave confidence to the LMS to distribute its missionaries and teachers without constraint and interference as experienced with Vaiinupo.

A year after Vaiinupo's death, those whom the LMS expected to strengthen its position, surfaced to challenge it. In 1842, Malietoa Taimalelagi isolated himself from the LMS after the death of his son Taupapau. Taupapau, a member of the church at Sapapali'i, had died while living with a new wife, which the LMS had condemned. Taimalelagi asked the LMS missionaries to absolve the sins of his son but the request was refused. Taimalelagi lost control of his senses, and in the presence of the LMS missionaries performed sexual intercourse with his son's new wife. Taimalelagi and his family then left
Sapapali'i to reside on the island of Manono. Taimalelagi's rejection of the LMS was further exposed when he placed himself under the spiritual guidance of Penisimani Latuselu, a WMMS Tongan teacher. For Latuselu, the fall-out between the LMS and Taimalelagi provided an opportunity to further WMMS efforts in Samoa, especially with the strength of Taimalelagi and Manono's status as the *maole*.

The LMS continued its work at Sapapali'i with the comforting thought that the rest of the Malietoa family still supported the mission. The fall-out with Taimalelagi had boosted WMMS activities and revived WMMS sympathy among Samoans. It also rekindled the evangelical spirit of the Tongan teachers to continue their mission activities in Samoa. Taufa'ahau, the paramount and ruling chief of Tonga at the time, also fully supported the presence of the Tongan teachers in Samoa despite the call by the WMMS mission to vacate Samoa. Taufa'ahau not only encouraged the Tongan teachers to remain in Samoa but campaigned vigorously for the WMMS mission in Australia to allow missionaries to return to Samoa. The Tongan teachers remained obstinate as they continued to strengthen WMMS efforts in Samoa.

The LMS's vision of uniting the Samoans under its banner was further shattered with the arrival of the Lotu Pope (the Pope's church or Roman Catholic Church) in 1845. The Catholics, like the LMS and WMMS, relied on Samoan family connections for a favourable reception among the Samoans. The Catholics had left Wallis and Futuna with three missionaries, Fathers Gilbert Roudaire, Theodore Violette, and Brother Jacques Peloux, and two Samoan catechists, Kosetatino (Constantine) and Ioakima (Joachim), and their wives, as interpreters and guides. They anchored off Matautu, Savai'i, but

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52 "Hardie to the Foreign Secretary to the LMS, Sept, 26, 1843," SSL, NLA; Samoan Reporter, Mar, 1849.
54 Heath to the Directors of the LMS, May 30, 1841, SSL; see also Wood, 284; Gilson, 125-126.
could not land there due to strong LMS opposition. They decided to try Lealatele, another village near Matautu, and were duly accepted and welcomed by Tuala Taetafe, who was related to loakima. Tuala, at the time, was not attached to either Protestant mission, although he had adopted some of the beliefs of the Siovili cult. Tuala's acceptance of the Catholics led to a barrage of derogatory remarks and abuse from the LMS supporters. The LMS gave him the title Talipope (receiver of the Pope) as a mocking gesture, but Tuala was unperturbed and gladly witnessed the first Lotu Pope mass being conducted on Samoan soil at his village.57

The Catholic missionaries then set sail for Upolu via Salelavalu, where they were welcomed by Su'a, a chief of Kosetatino's family. They were treated well and did not receive the same abuse accorded them at Lealatele. Salelavalu and Salelolologa villages, at the time had ex-WMMS adherents but there was no strong LMS presence. They sailed to Upolu and anchored off Fa'aleata, where Faumuina favoured their presence, and invited them to his house at Lepea. However, strong opposition once again from LMS supporters, and Faumuina being veted by his fellow LMS chiefs, forced the Catholics to move on. The Catholics then sailed for the Mulinu'u Peninsula where strong LMS opposition also threatened to prematurely end their efforts to establish a strong foothold in Samoa.58

Mata'afa Tuiatua Fagamanu, an ex-WMMS adherent turned LMS supporter, was present at the Peninsula when the Catholic missionaries tried to land. He intervened on their behalf and granted the missionaries permission to land. It turned out that the missionaries had a letter for Fagamanu from Lavelua, the chief of Wallis.59 Lavelua exhorted Fagamanu to protect the Catholic missionaries and provide them land to begin a mission in Samoa. Fagamanu honoured Lavelua's request and gave the Catholics permission to stay on a piece of land on the Peninsula. The Catholics officially set up their mission base on land bought near Apia, and began to pursue their ambition of converting Samoans to Catholicism. Roudaire and Peloux remained in Apia while Violette

57 Monfat, 223 - 259; see also Pratt to Tidman and Freeman, 13 Sept, 1845 SSL; Pratt to Tidman, 8 Jan, 1850, SSL; W. Laws to Tidman, 18 Aug, 1852, SSL; Samoan Reporter, Sept, 1845.
58 Pratt to Tidman and Freeman, 13 Sept, 1845 SSL; see also Monfat, 223 – 259; Samoan Reporter, Sept, 1845.
59 It seems in the previous year, Mata'afa Fagamanu had been blown to Wallis and Futuna by strong winds while on his way to Tutuila. Lavelua hosted Fagamanu and later provided a boat for Fagamanu and his people to return to Samoa. See Gilson, 169 – 170; Heslin, 25.
was sent back to Lealatele to look after Tuala and his people, despite LMS hostility.\textsuperscript{60}

The LMS was unable to focus on its objectives due to the new competition.\textsuperscript{61} The LMS was confident it could handle the reluctant Tongan teachers, but the uncooperative Marist priests stretched LMS irritability to the limit. The LMS fear of Catholicism was highlighted in its efforts to warn the Samoan people of the danger it represented. Tracts containing various attacks and condemnations of the Papacy were produced. Many observers at the time felt the criticism of the Catholics breached the canons of good taste. For instance, the American explorer Lieutenant Charles Wilkes condemned a tract entitled \textit{O le Tala i Lotu Eseese} (The Story of Different Religions). He observed that its sole object “was to prepossess the minds of the natives against the missionaries of the Papal Church, in case they should visit these islands.”\textsuperscript{62} The Reverend John B. Stair, the missionary in charge of the LMS printing press, defended the tract as nothing more than advice to the Samoans to counter teachings that were detrimental to their religious welfare.\textsuperscript{63}

Stair himself wrote and published \textit{Footsteps of Popery}, which was a cruel attack on the Catholics. Stairs’ own colleagues questioned its validity and good taste, and they eventually rejected it.\textsuperscript{64} The Reverend George Pratt also published the anti-papist booklet \textit{Hindrance to the Work in Samoa}, while the LMS’s Malua Seminary prepared a booklet for lectures entitled \textit{The Manual of Popery}.\textsuperscript{65} The Catholic mission was condemned as the “enemies of light and truth,” “Jesuits,” “wolves in sheep’s clothing,” and “poison.”\textsuperscript{66} The propaganda indoctrinated many of the LMS adherents, especially the chiefs, who in turn

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{60} Heslin, 24 – 26.
\item \textsuperscript{61} “Slatyer to Tidman and Freeman, May 28, 1845,” SSL; “Drummond to Freeman and Tidman, Sept. 19, 1845,” SSL; see also Gilson, 82-83.
\item \textsuperscript{63} Louis Wright and Mary Fry, \textit{Puritans in the South Seas}, New York: Henry Holt, 1936, 222; Gilson, 151 – 157.
\item \textsuperscript{64} “Stallworthy to Tidman, 20 Jun, 1849,” SSL.
\item \textsuperscript{65} “40th Annual Report of the Malua Mission Seminary, Nov, 10, 1884, SSL.
\item \textsuperscript{66} Stair to Freeman, Apr, 14, 1843, SSL; Pratt to Tidman, Sept, 13, 1845, SSL; Bullen to Tidman and Freeman, Oct, 27, 1845, SSL; Pratt to Tidman, Jun, 14, 1854, SSL; Murray to Tidman, Oct, 3, 1860, SSL; Newell to Thompson, Aug, 10, 1882, SSL.
\end{itemize}
forbade many of their family and village members to join, or even accommodate any Catholic missionaries.\textsuperscript{67} The Catholic missionaries were not passive. They also embarked on a campaign to discredit Protestant efforts, although not on the same scale as the LMS. The Catholics issued pamphlets, such as \textit{True Principles of a Catholic}, to point out the falsity of the LMS and all Protestant teachings.\textsuperscript{68} The Catholic missionaries taught their adherents that the Protestant faith was false and that Catholicism was the only true religion. The competition for members was an underlying factor for most of the animosity between the missions - unfortunately it led to inter-denominational violence.\textsuperscript{69}

When the WMMS returned to Samoa in 1857, it appeared that it would only create further animosity between the two Protestant missions. The Reverend P. G. Bird expressed the anger of the LMS missionaries in Samoa when he wrote that it was "the opinion of all the Brethren that one Wesleyan only is a greater obstacle to our work than ten priests."\textsuperscript{70} The Reverend James Mathieson, a WMMS missionary, replied to the LMS that "outside the pale of Wesleyanism there is no salvation."\textsuperscript{71} But, under the able leadership of the Reverends George Brown and Martin Dyson, the Methodists regained lost ground very quickly, and bridged the gap of friendship with the LMS.\textsuperscript{72} The two Protestant missions worked closely against the Lotu Pope, with the LMS finally realising that the WMMS was in Samoa to stay, and would be a useful partner in mission.\textsuperscript{73} Brown, for example, realised the importance of working together when he remarked to the Reverend Archibald W. Murray, "I feel deeply that we are suffering now for the acts of others who years ago made a fatal mistake."\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{67} Stair, Minutes of the Meeting held at Apia, Feb, 3, 1841, SSL. See also Gunson, (1978), 179.

\textsuperscript{68} Pratt to Tidman and Freeman, Jan, 24, 1846, SSL; Pratt to the Foreign Secretary of the LMS, Jun, 18, 1847, SSL; Pratt to Tidman, Mar, 31, 1848, SSL. See also Dyson, 58; \textit{Samoan Reporter}, Mar, 1846.

\textsuperscript{69} For example, Reverend A. E. Hunt (LMS) wrote years later about an incident that had happened some forty-five years earlier when Roman Catholic followers burnt the LMS mission house in Falealupu. See hunt to Thompson, Feb, 2, 1894, SSL.

\textsuperscript{70} Bird to Tidman, 17 May 1862, SSL; see also Wood, 283-284; Garrett (1974), 85-80.

\textsuperscript{71} James Lyle Young, Private Journals, 1875 – 1877, Pacific Manuscript Bureau (henceforth PMB) 21; see also disagreement between Reverend S. J. Wittmee (LMS) and Reverend Martin Dyson (WMMS) in S. J. Wittmee Report, 25 Dec, 1866, SSR.


\textsuperscript{73} Pratt to Tidman, 22 Aug, 1859, SSL; Pratt to Tidman, 22 Jun, 1861, SSL; Newell to Thompson, 19 Jun, 1893, SSL; see also Benjamin Danks, "Methodism," in \textit{A Century in the Pacific}, ed. James Colwell, Sydney: William H. Beale, 1914, 493.

\textsuperscript{74} Brown to Murray, 16 Apr, 1866, George Brown Papers, 1859 – 1917, Mss.
The unstable relationship between the missions became entwined in the renewed political unrest in the latter half of the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{75} The unstable political climate began in 1847 with a resurgence of district warfare between old rivals Manono and A'ana.\textsuperscript{76} Manono had watched the fortunes of A'ana improve under the guidance of Christianity. Williams chose Fasito‘otai to build a mission house, which later became the permanent residence for LMS missionaries. A'ana also became the site for the first printing press in Samoa under the management of Stair. A'ana's new lease of life re-established alliances with various other districts and villages in Upolu and Savai'i, especially the districts under mission influence.

Manono probably construed A'ana's sudden elevation of status as a challenge to its own strength and superiority. Manono was still dominant and very powerful and with Taimalelagi still influential, the combination was still lethal for A'ana and, to some extent, for the progress of the LMS mission. A'ana never had the manpower and the resources to engage Manono in war. A'ana still harboured some fear of their old enemy, and this fear was further enhanced with rumours of Manono making preparation to attack its old foe. The rumours made A'ana uneasy and suspicious of Manono, and that suspicion soon led to a misunderstanding.

It began when Manono warriors visited Tuamasaga and A'ana placed men along the shoreline to monitor Manono’s activities. Manono warriors passed on without incident, but were later informed of A'ana's actions. Manono took A'ana's action as an act of aggression, and prepared to punish its old rival. Manono's aggression fulfilled the yearning to reassert political dominance, over the growing influence of other districts, such as A'ana, threatening their status as the malo. A'ana, realising the daunting task ahead, took refuge in other districts, such as Tuamasaga and Atua, who were prepared to offer support.\textsuperscript{77}

The Manono – A'ana conflict also led to closer relations between the warring parties and several European settlers and beachcombers. Manono and A'ana took advantage of the Europeans' boat building skills, weaponry skills,

\textsuperscript{75} The correspondence in the latter half of the nineteenth century highlighted the conflict between the missions in the 1850s. For example see Broyer Correspondence, 1897, Pamphlet 'Silasila Samoa Uma o e Atamai,' 20 Jun, 1898, Marist Archives of Samoa and Tokelau (henceforth MAST); Newell to Thompson, Oct, 10, 1887, SSL; Huckett to Cousins, Feb, 20, 1899, SSL.

\textsuperscript{76} J. C. Williams to Mrs Williams, 15 Jun, 1848, SSL; Samoan Reporter, Mar, 1849, Nov, 1849, Jul, 1850, Jan, 1854, and Jan, 1857.

\textsuperscript{77} Samoan Reporter, Sept, 1847.
fort building skills, and expertise in general warfare, to strengthen their positions. The style of Samoan warfare also changed as Samoan primitive weapons were replaced with European guns, bush-knives, gun-ships, and dynamite, making close combat fighting a thing of the past. A’ana built forts at Lufilufi (Atua) and Siumu (Tuamasaga), while Manono built a fort and blockade at Mulinu’u. The availability of such powerful weapons contributed to the increased number of Samoans being killed over the next 100 years.

The missions worked together and eventually negotiated a truce between the warring factions. The truce left the two sides at a stalemate for neither side had won. Manono’s claim as the malo had been diminished, while A’ana was no longer labelled vaivai (conquered side). The truce failed to achieve final peace, and A’ana remained in exile as small skirmishes continued to occur between the two factions. However, in 1858, Taimalelagi died and Manono lost most of its authority and prestige. Taimalelagi had mesmerised Manono matai into civil war to satisfy his own ego and, to a large extent, discharge his anti-LMS views. A’ana people took the opportunity to return to their own district, but most importantly, Vaiinupo’s son, Moli, took over the title Malietoa, and peace was eventually restored to the satisfaction of Europeans and Samoans. The LMS also found Moli a blessing for the mission, as he strongly voiced his support for the LMS. But, good fortune never seemed to last for the LMS, as Moli died suddenly in 1860.

The peace that Moli had established placed Samoa in the limelight of multi-national interests. The port of Apia attracted trade and commerce, such as the giant German firm of Godeffroy and Sohn, and wild unruly characters, who later contributed to the obnoxious reputation Samoa acquired. Samoa was hailed from being "God’s best, at least God’s sweetest work" to being dubbed as the "hell hole of the Pacific."

On the political front, the three powers,

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80 Moli’s reign as Malietoa had its political drawbacks. He was humiliated by the British and American Consuls over the killing of a European trader, for which he was fined for something he knew nothing of, and was beyond his power to resolve. See O le Sulu Samoa, Oketopa 1898, no. 6, MAST; Western Samoa, Historical Notes, IT 1 Ex 2/15.
81 The stories of Billy Hayes’ adventures in Samoa are one such example. See Billy Hayes, James Lyle Young, Private Journals, 1878 – 1929, PMB 21; see also R. F. Watters, “The Transition to Christianity in Samoa,” Historical Studies 8, no. 32 (May 1959), 399; Western Samoa, Historical Notes, IT 1 Ex 2/15; Trood, 51.
America, Britain, and Germany began to dominate Samoan politics and the Samoan way of life. The call for a centralised government intensified to address European interests, and a government under the guidance of the three powers was perceived as the only alternative to satisfying European frustration.83

Meanwhile, the death of Moli provoked family rivalry over the Malietoa title. Eventually, the title was given to the two claimants, Malietoa Talavou and Malietoa Laupepa. Laupepa was younger than Talavou and more favoured by the Europeans and the LMS mission, while Talavou had been an ally of Taimalelagi and was affiliated with the WMMS. Laupepa had attended the newly established Malua Seminary and was considered a faithful Christian and an asset for the LMS. The Malietoa title dispute, however, prompted Tuamasaga to bestow the Gatoa'itele and Tamosoali'i titles on Tuia'ana To'oa Sualauvi, a nephew of Vaiinupo, with the condition that they would be returned to the Malietoa family in the future.84 Consequently, Sualauvi held three of the tafa'ifa titles, which gave him much respect and authority. However, Talavou and Laupepa were the acknowledged political kingpins, as Sualauvi was not politically active, while Fagamanu remained in Atua and had little contact with the political conflicts in Apia.

Laupepa instigated a new government at Matautu, near Apia, and called it the faitasiga (confederation), where a representative from each district formed the core of the government. Talavou's supporters retaliated by setting up a rival government, called the faitasiga (Union), at Mulinu'u, near Apia. The British consul, John C. Williams supported Laupepa's claim on the grounds that many Europeans supported him. He also felt Laupepa had more support from his own people in Tuamasaga, and from other villages in Upolu and Savai'i.85

The conflict between Talavou and Laupepa resulted in the 1869 faitasiga war. Laupepa was badly defeated but managed to escape under the guidance of Lauaki Namulau'ulu Mamoe.86 During the conflict, the Unionists damaged the British Consulate and tore down the Union Jack. Talavou immediately offered

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84 Sualauvi was also the father of Tuimaleali'iifano Si'u who became a prominent leader of the Mau. See Ella to Tidman, 22 Dec, 1857, SSL; Western Samoa, Historical Notes, IT 1 Ex 2/15.

85 Dr. G. Turner Report, 9 Oct, 1869, SSR; Turner to Mullens, 24 May 1869, SSL; Trood, 60.

an ifoga (act of apology)\textsuperscript{87} for his warriors' waywardness, but was rejected by the British Consul. Talavou took exception to the Consul's action, and viewed him as ally of Laupepa and part of the vaivai side.

Talavou took control of Apia and sold off land belonging to Laupepa and his supporters; much to the delight of the Europeans.\textsuperscript{88} Perhaps, most significantly, the war disclosed the nominal Christian character of the Samoans. The first shots were fired "on the night of Good Friday, 1869, and for three days and nights afterwards the battle raged around town."\textsuperscript{89} Easter was just another day as Samoans exposed their lack of spirituality and Christian maturity, and it was a concern for the missions.

The British and Americans initiated further calls for a stable government to protect European interests, but not all Europeans agreed with their sentiments. Apia's European population by 1870 had increased dramatically with the arrival of other nationalities such as Swedes and Germans, which meant the British and Americans were no longer dominant. Germany had other ideas, and refused to support British and American efforts to meddle in Samoan politics. The German attitude pointed to a messy European political struggle in the future that would eventually trap the Samoans at its core.

As nationalities argued over the right to meddle in Samoan politics, another violent clash between Laupepa and Talavou resulted in a nauseating aftermath. Trood (later became British Consul) described "bodies half buried left to be torn to pieces by the dogs, arms and limbs partly covered with soil, partly stretched out above it, the conquerors making brutal jokes at the spectacle."\textsuperscript{90} Many European properties were damaged and the Germans fined the Samoans for "depredation committed on German property."\textsuperscript{91} The Samoan leaders, Taliaoa, Tupai and Alipia, protested and demanded a meeting with Theodore Weber, the acting German Consul. Weber threatened the Samoans with

\textsuperscript{87} Briefly, the ifoga is a Samoan act of apology whereby the culprit is covered with an ie toga (fine mat) to show remorse. If the apology is not accepted, the victim can choose to ignore the act, or the victim could kill the culprit under the ie toga. If the ifoga is accepted the victim uncovers the ie toga and invites the culprit to his house. For further explanation see Augustin Kramer, \textit{The Samoa Islands}, vol 2, trans. Theodore Verhaaren, Auckland: Polynesian Press, 1995, 107, 397; F. J. H. Grattan, \textit{An Introduction to Samoan Customs}, Apia: Samoa Print, 1948.

\textsuperscript{88} Turner to Mullens, 24 May, 1869, SSL; Resolution of Meeting of Europeans, John C. Williams, British Consul Correspondence, 1872 – 1875, MAST; H. J. Moors, \textit{Some Recollection of Early Samoa}, Apia: Historical and Cultural Trust, 1986, 18 – 19.

\textsuperscript{89} Western Samoa, Historical Notes, IT 1 Ex 2/15; Trood, 61.

\textsuperscript{90} Trood, 62.

\textsuperscript{91} Turner to Mullens, 10 Jun, 1874, SSL; Powell to Whitehouse, 31 Aug, 1874, SSL; \textit{Cyclopaedia of Samoa (Illustrated)}, Sydney: McCarron and Stewart, 1907, 14.
warships if they refused to pay for German property damages. Weber forced the Samoans to sign papers to that effect by placing their hands on his, as he signed on their behalf.92

In 1873, after constant European pressure, the conflict between Talavou and Laupepa finally ceased and the formation of a new government was implemented.93 The peace created gave the Europeans and Samoans time to return their lives to more productive enterprises. It was also a blessing for the missions, especially the LMS, who had lost many adherents in the conflict. It ensured the continuation of mission work without hindrance, for awhile at least, with the hope of encouraging back young Samoans to the Gospel.94

Europeans influenced the newly formed government and it had no place for either Talavou or Laupepa. A council of Ta'imua (literally one who leads) and a council of Faipule (literally one who rules), were established to work together to address Samoan and European issues, but the new arrangement quickly became unsatisfactory for many Europeans, especially over the Samoan government's stance on land ownership. The Ta'imua and Faipule ruled that all lands obtained by Europeans during the Talavou - Laupepa conflict were illegal. It also found that all land sold by the Unionists without the authority of their rightful owners, was illegal and must be returned. It was a massive blow to European land interests, as most of the lands owned by Europeans were obtained in 1873 during the faitasiga war. The Europeans felt cheated by the government's action. Nevertheless, the lands in questions were returned with bitterness and regret.95 Peace remained intact but European greed and dissatisfaction threatened to destroy it.

Soon after the set up of the new government, an American named Albert B. Steinberger arrived in Samoa with gifts and a letter from the President of the United States. The Samoan government received with joy the gifts, but was more impressed with the American warship, the Tuscarora, that carried

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92 Ta'imua and Faipule to German Consul, 16 Apr, 1874, A. Poppe, German Consul, Correspondence, 1874 - 1877, MAST; see also Liardet to Ta'imua and Faipule, Roman Catholic Church, Miscellaneous Papers, 1846 - 1920, PMB 188.
93 King to Mullens, Aug 4, 1869, SSL; Pratt to Mullens, May 11, 1871, SSL; Whitmee to Mullens, Jan 5, 1872, SSL; Nisbet to Mullens, Oct 30, 1873, SSL.
95 See Stewart Firth, "German Firms in the Western Pacific Islands, 1857-1914," Journal of Pacific History 8 (1973), 10-28; Meleisea (Modern Samoa), 34-36.
Steinberger to Samoa. After meeting Steinberger, the Samoan government was left with the impression that an American protectorate was forthcoming. For the Samoan government, such a relationship would not only reduce European criticism, but assist in stabilising Samoan authority and self-government. Several Europeans felt such a protectorate would probably favour them in their struggle with the land issue.96

Samoan's expectations of a protectorate received a boost when Steinberger drafted a constitution, and began to restructure the existing government. The Ta'imua and Faipule councils were retained, with the addition of a tupu (king) and sui-tupu (vice-king).97 The kingship idea was foreign to the Samoans, and even if the Samoans had knowledge of European monarchies, the Samoans had no equivalent concept. The nearest Samoan concept of a monarchical system was the tafa'i model and the Samoans probably accepted Steinberger's kingship proposal with this understanding. The struggle for absolute control and power under the kingship concept contributed to the revival of Samoan protocol, such as the tafa'i, in the ensuing years.

The Malietoa family supported Steinberger's new government structure, especially with Laupepa as king, except for his choice of sui-tupu, Tupua Pulepule.98 Steinberger probably wanted to strengthen the new government, and get rid of the divisive forces that had worked against previous attempts to form a stable government. At the same time, it was a timely suggestion to the Malietoa family that they were no longer the only family capable of ruling the malo. Furthermore, it impressed on the Samoan people the need to work together, live together, and to govern together in peace and harmony. However, the Malietoa family, and many supporters who preferred traditional politics, saw the inclusion of the Tupua family in Steinberger's proposals as a recipe for war.99


98 The conflict between the Malietoa line and the Tupua line goes back to ca. 1800, when F'amafana the last ruler of the Tupua line, bequeathed the right to rule to Malietoa ca. 1802. This has always been disputed by the Tupua line and has seen some violent confrontations between the two families. See Western Samoa, Historical Notes, IT 1 Ex 2/15; Whitmee to Mullens, 29 Dec, 1873, SSL.

99 James Lyle Young, Private Journals, Jan, 1880 - Jul, 1881, PMB 21; see also Western Samoa, Historical Notes, IT 1 Ex 2/15.
Steinberger, from the start, had the support of all the consuls, mission societies, and various sectors of the European community. The three mission societies offered Steinberger their blessings. The Reverend George Turner of the LMS assured Steinberger that he had the cooperation of the LMS mission, while George Brown, offered similar assurances on behalf of the WMMS. The leader of the Lotu Pope, Bishop Louis Elloy, felt the providence of God had given the United States the opportunity to bring about peace as it had the welfare of the Samoans at heart.¹⁰⁰

However, attitudes began to change as the impact of Steinberger’s new constitution was fully realised. The constitution banned Samoan customs, such as tattooing, and the wearing of scanty clothing by women, which infuriated many Samoans. European traders also criticised Steinberger over regulations and laws prohibiting the sale of liquor and other goods. The constitution also created friction between the mission societies. Elloy rejected much of the wording and content of the constitution, and blamed it on a conspiracy between Steinberger and the LMS missionaries. Elloy believed many of the restrictions reflected teachings expounded by the Protestants, especially the LMS. Some of the other issues, such as compulsory military duties for Samoan males between the age of eighteen and forty-five years, also met with mission disapproval.¹⁰¹

Steinberger returned to America in 1874, and arrived back in Samoa in April 1875 with more gifts but no protectorate proposal. Steinberger met the Samoan government, but failed to disclose that he was no longer an official representative of the American government. Steinberger also failed to disclose the fact that he was in Samoa to fulfil his own personal interests, as well as working to obtain land and setting up German business ventures. To achieve his aims, Steinberger set himself up as Premier of the Samoan government.¹⁰²

The rumours regarding Steinberger’s personal activities and German affiliation soon found their way into the community and received little support among the papalagi. The American consul, Samuel S. Foster, found little to be enthusiastic about Steinberger’s treatment of American issues, especially with Steinberger’s failure to inform Foster on matters relating to American citizens.

¹⁰⁰ Masterman, 118 – 125; Brookes, 329; Ellison, 75.
¹⁰¹ Steinberger’s Letter, M.S., 1875, MAST.
¹⁰² *Cyclopaedia of Samoa (Illustrated)*, Sydney: McCarron, Stewart, 1907, 15; Sewall, 14 – 15; Brookes, 325.
Steinberger's lack of recognition and respect for Foster's position as official American Consul prompted Foster to call for Steinberger's removal.\(^{103}\)

The mission societies also lost interest and worked closely with Foster to influence Steinberger's deportation. The mission societies, especially the Catholics, were dissatisfied with Steinberger's handling of issues relating to mission activities and welfare. Elloy, especially, condemned the lack of communication between the government and the church in matters regarding the welfare of the Catholic Church. For instance, the taking of Roman Catholic land for government barracks without notifying the church, making marriage laws too loose and more complimentary to the Protestant missions, and giving too much power to the district governors to evict people from their land without just cause.\(^{104}\) While the majority of Europeans disassociated themselves from Steinberger, the Samoans continued to embrace him. Steinberger's close relationship with the Samoans did not help deter European anger towards him. At the beginning, the Europeans had supported Steinberger in anticipation of favourable treatment on conflicting issues involving Europeans and Samoans, but as Steinberger took control of the Samoans, he became more concerned with Samoan welfare than European interests.

Constant European and Consular pressure, and the influence of the LMS missionaries, led to Steinberger's demise. The LMS missionaries, on behalf of European interests, twisted Laupepa's arm to order Steinberger's deportation.\(^{105}\) Steinberger left in February 1876, and the Samoans fumed with anger. In response to Steinberger's dismissal, the Ta'imua and Faipule deposed Laupepa as tupu. The American Consul, Foster, was recalled, and his British counterpart was reprimanded by his country. An American protectorate over Samoa never eventuated.\(^{106}\) The Ta'imua and Faipule continued to function as the Samoan government under the leadership of Tamasese Titimaea.

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\(^{103}\) Steinberger's Correspondence, Campbell (Secretary of State Office) to Samuel Foster, Jan, 12, 1876, MAST; see also Treaty of Friendship Between Germany and Samoa, 1871-1881, 32; Trood, 78; Gilson, 321-331; Masterman; 126-130.

\(^{104}\) Elloy Letters, 1875-1876, Elloy to Steinberger, Sept, 6, 1875, MAST; Elloy Letters, 1875-1876, Elloy to Steinberger, Sept, 15, 1875, MAST; Elloy Letters, 1875-1876, Elloy to Steinberger, Oct, 2, 1875, MAST; Elloy Letters, 1875-1876, Elloy to Steinberger, Dec, 15, 1875, MAST; Elloy Letters, 1875-1876, Elloy to Steinberger, Jan, 1, 1876, MAST; see also Niel Gunson, "Missionary Interest in British Expansion in the South Pacific in the Nineteenth Century," Journal of Religious History 3 (1954/1955), 306.

\(^{105}\) Ta'imua and Faipule Documents, 1875, Foster (US Consul) to Ta'imua and Faipule, Sept, 12, 1875, MAST; Western Samoa, Historical Notes, IT 1 Ex 2/15.

\(^{106}\) Samoa Times, Jan, 11, 1879; Elloy (Tipasa) Correspondence, 1875-1876, Ta'imua to Tipasa (Elloy), Feb, 9, 1876, MAST; Whitmee to Mullens, Mar, 3, 1876, SSL; Treaty of Friendship, 79-81; Cyclopaedia, 15.
Ta'imua and Faipule continued to pass laws to stop the selling of Samoan lands, which continued to anger European speculators.

The Germans, who were silent over Steinberger's dismissal, and over their own contribution to the debacle, were not restricted to act in Samoan matters compared with their British and American counterparts. The outcome of the Steinberger affair did not agree with German intentions. They defied the newly enacted land laws, and began to put pressure on the Samoan government to rectify German land claims. The Germans had recently formed a huge plantation company called Godeffroy and Sohn, a company once described by Robert Louis Stevenson as the "Gulliver among the Lilliputs."107

Theodore Weber was given the task to rectify and sanction all German land claims, especially Godeffroy and Sohn interests. Weber was once described as "the head of the boil of which Samoa languishes," and was considered a cruel man concerned only with German interests.108 Weber even went as far as arranging three German warships to visit Apia harbour to pressure the Samoan government into settling German claims. The warships had the effect Weber intended, and the Samoan government not only allowed the Germans access to build a harbour at Saluafata, Upolu, but also recognised all German land claims. The Samoan government also guaranteed to protect German commercial activities, allow concessions for German companies, allow Germany the right to recruit and import labour to Samoa, and guarantee German autonomy from Samoan jurisdiction.109

The Germans opened the way for favourable settlement of other European land claims. The European community, with Elloy acting as interpreter, also took advantage of the situation to draw up several resolutions for endorsement by the Samoan government, which were mainly aimed at restricting Samoan activities. They prohibited Samoans carrying guns on government roads, they ordered the Samoan government to implement new laws and tidy up old laws to protect European interests, they directed Samoans

109 Western Samoa, Historical Notes, IT 1 Ex 2/15; Meleisea, (Modern Samoa), 38.
to be good to Europeans and to each other, and for all Samoans to pay tax.\textsuperscript{110} Elloy's presence implied a closer working relationship between the Germans and the Catholics. The lack of representation from the Protestant missions was probably an indication of how the Germans, and other members of the European community, had detested the close relationship between the Ta'imua and Faipule and the Protestant missions. Pressure was put on the Samoan government to fulfil all European demands, while maintaining its stability.

Laupepa did not help ease the situation by forming a rival government, the \textit{puletua} (rural rule), at Malie,\textsuperscript{111} which the Germans and many Europeans supported. The British vice-consul at the time, William Churchward, outlined the motive for the support given to Laupepa.

> Having no interest in the country, beyond filling their pockets anyhow, and caring nothing who lost, as long as they held some sort of position whereby dollars could be ever so doubtfully obtained, they were ever at work inciting international animosities and ill-feeling.\textsuperscript{112}

In 1877, the Samoan government clashed with the \textit{puletua}, and Laupepa's warriors were crushed and forced to take refuge in the British consulate. The Ta'imua and Faipule reasserted their right to rule, but increasing pressure from every conceivable corner of the community, the Europeans especially, continued to plague the Samoan government. For instance, the British consul, Edward Liardet, slapped a $40,000 fine on the Samoan government for abusing British citizens and damaging British properties during the conflict with Laupepa. Liardet held Samoa as security for the fine. The British government later reprimanded Liardet for his action.\textsuperscript{113} The pressure finally forced Ta'imua and Faipule to disband in 1877, although they never left the political arena. They continued to remain active under the leadership of Titimaea, and waited for a chance to return as leaders of the Samoan people.

Talavou, who had remained passive throughout the conflict, exploited the misfortune of Ta'imua and Faipule to set up a new government in Mulinu'u called the \textit{pulefou} (new rule). Talavou claimed the kingship, and made his nephew, Laupepa, \textit{sui-tupu}. Europeans, again, shifted their allegiance to the

\textsuperscript{110} John C. Williams, British Consul, Correspondence, Feb, 1872-Apr, 1876, Ta'imua to Tipasa (Elloy), Apr 11, 1876, MAST.

\textsuperscript{111} Western Samoa, Historical Notes. IT 1 Ex 2/15; Gilson, 343-344; Ellison, 83-86.


\textsuperscript{113} Treaty of Friendship, 73-96; see also Liardet to Ta'imua and Faipule, Roman Catholic Church, Miscellaneous Papers, 1846 – 1920, PMS 188.
newly formed pulefou party. But perhaps the most significant episode of this whole charade, was the decision by Mata'afa losefo, a nephew of Fagamanu, and strong supporter of the Catholics, to support Talavou. He had been observing the political pendulum for a few years. He was ambitious and very capable of leading a Samoan government, but did not have enough support to fulfil his desire. Furthermore, the Ta’imua and Faipule had opted for Titimaea as leader, and the non-recognition of losefo may have prompted his decision to side with Talavou. Many felt losefo had made the right move when Talavou died in 1880, as many expected losefo to succeed Talavou. But, the consuls favoured Laupepa and, consequently, losefo withdrew his support and joined the Ta’imua and Faipule party.

The latest conflict between Laupepa and Ta’imua and Faipule hindered the work of the missions, especially the LMS. In Savai’i the LMS mission was concerned at the large number of LMS men joining Laupepa and taking up arms. Turner (the LMS missionary) in Upolu also blamed the conflict for the decline in spirituality of the Samoan people. He called upon the consuls of Britain, America, and Germany, to find an end to the hostilities. But the call for help received little attention, as the relationships between the three powers themselves were deteriorating.

The British and Germans drew up their own sets of laws to govern their own people, as each refused to be governed by Samoan laws. The Americans did not follow the British and German example, but they refused to be guided by laws drawn up by another power. The call for peace could not be implemented because the three powers would not cooperate. Instead, each wanted to influence the Samoan government directly for its own ends. This led to Samoan opposition governments being set up and supported by one of the three powers.

For instance, when Laupepa failed to endorse German proposals in 1887, including the Treaty of Equality, the Germans abandoned Laupepa and supported a joint German - Samoa government under the leadership of

114 Samoa Times, Dec. 22, 1879; see also Newell to Thompson, Mar, 20, 1885, SSL; Phillips to Thompson, May 30, 1885, SSL.
115 Western Samoa, Historical Notes, IT 1 Ex 2/15.
116 Davies to Thompson, Mar, 15, 1881, SSL; Turner to Thompson, Sept, 28, 1881, SSL.
117 Churchward, 159-161; Moors, 26.
118 Newell to Thompson, 10 Oct, 1887, SSL; see also Churchward, 374 – 376; Stevenson, 46 – 48.
Titimaea and Eugen Brandeis. The Germans accused the American and British consuls of influencing Laupepa. In August 1887, the German backed government clashed with Laupepa’s forces, and a well-armed Titimaea - Brandeis army crushed Laupepa’s forces. Laupepa surrendered and was later exiled.\textsuperscript{119}

Germany’s chance to dominate Samoan politics was short lived. Losefo decided to take up the leadership left vacant by Laupepa, and began to offer resistance to the Titimaea – Brandeis government. For two years, the two warring factions continued to create political uncertainty. The political turmoil also disrupted mission efforts, as Samoans flocked to join the war parties. The Reverend A. E. Claxton wrote to his superiors in London that nearly all LMS men had gone to war. He remarked, "surely our work is destined to collapse if we do not have...a miracle."\textsuperscript{120}

The endless wars continued to March 1889 with many Samoans, including people from Tutuila, joining the war camps.\textsuperscript{121} The Germans lost many soldiers in the bush, and tried to compensate by using Germans warships, the \textit{Erber} and the \textit{Olga} to shell villages belonging to Losefo and his supporters.\textsuperscript{122} Warships belonging to America and Britain soon gathered in Apia harbour creating an impasse. The warring factions waited and contemplated each others moves as they kept a close watch on the activities offshore. But then a powerful hurricane struck Samoa without warning. The warring factions forgot all about their bitterness and banded together to save sailors drowning in the harbour. Out of the seven warships anchored in Apia harbour, only the lone British warship, \textit{Calliope}, escaped.\textsuperscript{123} The Samoans waded through rough seas and strong winds to rescue German and American sailors, and European friends, and foes, without thinking about their own lives. The hurricane, in the end, took the lives of ninety-two Germans and sixty-three Americans. The Americans later

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[119] Review of the Samoa Mission 1880-1890, SSR; Newell to Thompson, Oct, 10, 1887, SSL; see also Western Samoa, Historical Notes, IT 1 Ex 2/15; Moors, 49 – 57; Robert Watson, \textit{History of Samoa}, Wellington: Whitcombe & Tombs, 1918, 69-76; Trood, 80-85.
\item[120] Claxton to Thompson, Dec, 3, 1888, SSL; see also Newell to Thompson, 8 Oct, 1888, SSL; W. E. Goward to Thompson, 5 Nov, 1888, SSL.
\item[121] Newell to Thompson, 8 Oct, 1888, SSL; Claxton to Thompson, 25 Feb, 1889, SSL; Stevenson, 113 – 118, Watson, 79; Wright, 226.
\item[122] Alexander Wilson, \textit{A Cruise in the Islands}, Dunedin: Union Steamship, 1895, 18; Trood, 87; see also Watson, 81 – 82; Franz Reinecke, “Recognition of Conditions on the Samoa islands,” typescript, trans. By Hans Ballin, 1985, 2 – 3 (This article was originally published in German in \textit{Globus}, 76, 1899, 4 – 13).
\item[123] Those destroyed included the German warships \textit{Erber}, \textit{Adler}, and the American warships \textit{Vandalia}, \textit{Nipsic}, and \textit{Trenton}. The Calliope had 300 British sailors on board. See Western Samoa, Historical Notes, IT 1 Ex 2/15.
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presented a boat to the Samoan government as a gesture of appreciation. The Germans showed their appreciation by paying the Samoan government three dollars per German saved.\textsuperscript{124}

The Germans then did the unexpected and returned Laupepa from exile. The Germans were dissatisfied with Titimaea, and were probably looking at Laupepa to counter losefo’s strong anti-German stance. Laupepa, however, returned with the hope of supporting losefo.\textsuperscript{125} In a meeting in Berlin, the three powers reinstated Laupepa as \textit{tupu}. At first Laupepa and losefo took the decision well and there were no signs of animosity between the two leaders,\textsuperscript{126} but peace did not last. The supporters of losefo soon declared that the decision to make Laupepa \textit{tupu} was unlawful. They claimed that the Berlin Act, 1889, gave the Samoans the right to choose their own \textit{tupu}. The wording losefo and his supporters took to heart stated that,

\begin{quote}
The three powers recognise the independence of the Samoan Government, and the free right of the natives to elect their Chief or King and choose their forms of government according to their own laws and customs. Neither of the powers shall exercise any separate control over the islands or the government thereof.\textsuperscript{127}
\end{quote}

Therefore, as far as losefo’s supporters were concerned, the appointment of Laupepa was temporary. They also took heart at the wording of the section to mean self-government, and even the right to be independent one day.

The three powers pointed out that the Act specified that a Chief Justice had to be appointed in order to initiate such an election. The Samoans pushed for the immediate appointment of a Chief Justice, but it was not until 1891 that Baron Cedarkrantz was officially appointed. Cedarkrantz did the unthinkable and told the Samoans that their right to choose a \textit{tupu} had been revoked, and reaffirmed Laupepa’s appointment. losefo and his supporters went into a rage.\textsuperscript{128}

A few months later Titimaea died, and the Tuia’ana title was bestowed on losefo, and with the Tuiatua, Gatoa’itele, and Tamasoali’i titles also bestowed on losefo, he was entitled to be recognised as the \textit{tafa’ifa}, the first since

\textsuperscript{124} Western Samoa, Historical Notes. IT 1 Ex 2/15; J. Jefferey, Samoa: A Pearl from the Pacific Where Everything is Different; Dunedin: J. Wilkie, 1914, 22; Wilson, 20.


\textsuperscript{126} Samoa Times, Nov, 16, 1889; see also Cyclopaedia, 22; Gilson, 418-419.

\textsuperscript{127} Moors, 155; see also Cyclopaedia, 22.

\textsuperscript{128} Newell to Thompson, Jan, 26, 1891, SSL; see also Stevenson (1892), 279; Cyclopaedia, 23.
Vailnupo, Laupepa and Iosefo remained passive, but European counsel and stimulation forced them into a confrontation. According to the Reverend James Newell, of the LMS, both men were "distressed at the necessity of war." In preparation for war, both men received help from Europeans in building boats and obtaining guns and ammunition. Iosefo found it hard to obtain arms due to an arms embargo relating to Iosefo's forces. Iosefo had to rely on the generosity of Europeans who supported him to smuggle arms into Samoa on his behalf. One such shipment arrived in a British ship, the Richmond, with the compliments of the European trader Harry J. Moors. The Germans, on the other hand, supplied Laupepa with dynamite and other weapons of destruction.

The wars began in 1893 at the cost of many Samoan lives, including women, who were fulfilling their traditional role of following their men folk into battle. The taking of heads as battle trophies also returned to the nature of Samoan conflict. Iosefo's forces suffered heavy casualties, and they were forced to move from their villages in fear of bombardment and further fatalities. Iosefo finally surrendered in July 1893 to a German warship anchored off Manono. He was imprisoned with several of his leading matai on board a German warship, while the rest of his men were flogged through the streets of Apia on their way to prison. Iosefo and some of his men were later exiled to Jaluit, Marshall Islands. On his departure, his European friends farewelled him with gifts. Father Eugene Didier, of the Latu Pope, presented him with a crucifix and a piece of cloth. Laupepa governed Samoa in relative peace, with the only opposition coming from Tamasese Lealofi, a son of Titimaea, who had established a rival government in Leulumoega, in 1894, but in a short battle that...
ensued, Lealofi was forced to surrender and later offered Laupepa an apology and his support.  

In December 1897, Laupepa was confined to bed with a form of paralysis. As he lay dying, Samoans, including the Catholics, rallied and pressed the Germans for Iosefo's return from Jaluit. Laupepa also requested the German Consul, Herr Rose, to release Iosefo. The German consul yielded to Samoan pressure and granted Iosefo's release in July 1898 with the condition that Iosefo treat German interests more favourably. Iosefo arrived in Samoa a few weeks after Laupepa's death. Samoans felt the time was right for Iosefo to unite all Samoans under his leadership, but Iosefo did not share the same enthusiasm. He wanted to stay away from politics and live out the rest of his life in peace by doing work for the Catholic Church, but Samoans and Europeans alike pressured him to take up the vacant kingship. The Catholics also did their best to promote Iosefo as king. Bishop Pierre Broyer promised that a government under Iosefo would not interfere with the practice of religion.

On 12 November 1898, Iosefo's supporters declared him tupu at Mulinu'u. The three consuls also recognised his kingship and gave their approval. However, the LMS missionaries and their supporters rejected Iosefo's kingship. Malietoa Tanumafili, a son of Laupepa, also disputed Iosefo's right to succeed to the throne. Lealofi and many Europeans supported Tanumafili's claim. Iosefo reacted by calling Tanumafili "a boy" ill-advised by white men. The kingship issue went before the Supreme Court, and on 31 December 1898, Chief Justice Chambers found in favour of Tanumafili as tupu.

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136 Newell to Thompson, Oct, 9, 1894, SSL.
138 Malietoa Laupepa died in August 1898. For details of Malietoa Laupepa's final service and funeral see O le Sulu Samoa, Oct. 1898, No. 6, MAST.
139 Report of the Apia District, Dec, 26, 1898, SSR; Mata'afa Iosefo, The Cry of Mata'afa For His People to the Three Great Powers, ed. W. Cooper, Auckland: William and Horton, 1899, 5-8; Moors, 115.
141 Western Samoa, Historical Notes, IT 1 Ex 2/15, NA; Mata'afa, 10-27.
142 Newell to Thomson, Oct, 31, 1898, SSL.
143 Mata'afa, 5-8; see also Mackenzie, 161.
and Lealofi as *sui-tupu*. Losefo and his supporters reacted angrily, and called Chambers all kinds of derogatory names. Losefo defied the court's decision and set up a rival government in Mulinu'u with the assistance of three German government officials, Dr Raffel, the German consul, Herr Rose, and his assistant Wilhelm van Bulow. Within twenty-four hours, Samoa braced itself, once again, for civil war. On New Year's Day, 1899, the two sides clashed without casualty.

The American consul interpreted Losefo's action as a revolt against the Chief Justice, and advised him to abide by the court's decision. Losefo refused. Consequently, Losefo's village, and the dwellings of those who offered him refuge, were shelled and bombarded by British warships. Casualties were high. But it did not stop Losefo's supporters from attacking, burning, and pillaging villages belonging to Tanumafili's supporters. They also looted the LMS mission house in Apia, and while seeking medical help and refuge at the LMS Malua Seminary, Losefo's men threatened students and plundered their plantations. When Easter Sunday dawned, Captain Sturdee of the *Porpoise* was remorseless as he continued to bombard Losefo's strongholds. A reporter on board the *Porpoise* described how Sturdee could plot the movement of his men by the smoke of burning villages, and in his delight for the destruction, he thanked God for the actions of his men, and the privilege of fighting with them.

The Germans could not answer the wrath of the British and American warships, as they abandoned Losefo in his time of need. The Germans could only voice their condemnation of British and American actions, but could offer no physical assistance. Losefo could only write a letter, entitled "The Cry of Mata'afa For His People to the Three Great Powers," to highlight the enormity of the horror that he and his supporters had to endure. The letter eventually

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144 Western Samoa, Historical Notes, IT 1 Ex 2/15; Trood, 108.
145 Mata'afa, 5-8; General Situation of Samoa, M.S., 1899, MAST; S. A. Beveridge to Thompson, Feb, 3, 1899, SSL; Trood, 108.
146 Jolliffe, Report of Papauta School for 1899, SSR; Moors, 151.
147 Newell to Thompson, Mar, 19-22, 1899, SSL; Sibree, Report of the Tuasivi District, Feb, 17, 1900, SSR; Trood, 111; Mata'afa, 15, 23-24; Cowan, 53.
148 55th Annual Report of the Malua Institute, 1899, SSR; Huckett to Thompson, Jan, 10, 1899, SSL; Huckett to Cousins, Feb, 20, 1899, SSL; Newell to Thompson, Apr, 17, 1899, SSL; see also Trood, 109, 113.
149 Western Samoa, Historical Notes, IT 1 Ex 2/15; Mata'afa, 25.
150 Mata'afa, 5-8; see also Cyclopaedia, 24.
raised awareness in the United States and Britain of the treatment of the Samoan people by military personnel under their control. Consequently, both countries condemned the actions of their consuls, and had them both reprimanded. The United States also, reluctantly, apologised to the German government.\textsuperscript{151}

The fighting was finally over, but there were no winners. The Samoans had not regained control of their own country. The three powers had not given Samoa what she wanted because of their own political ambitions and economic greed. The mission societies failed to utilise the influence of the three powers, and Samoan differences, to gain supremacy over one another. In the end, on 2 December 1899, after deliberation by the three powers in Washington, Germany was given [Western] Samoa (Upolu and Savai'i) to rule as a colony. The United States took control of Eastern Samoa (Tutuila and Manu'a) only because of its beautiful harbour, while Britain renounced all claims on Samoa in exchange for rights in Vanuatu and New Guinea.\textsuperscript{152} The realisation that for the first time someone else would rule while Samoans obeyed and no longer had the right to make decisions and practice their own unique politics, only impelled the Samoans to react with more conviction to win back their prerogative at all cost, and by any 'God-given' means.

\textsuperscript{151} Cyclopaedia, 24.

\textsuperscript{152} Western Samoa, Historical Notes, IT 1 Ex 2/15; Cyclopaedia, 22-23.
CHAPTER TWO

A GERMAN PLANTATION AND SAMOAN ASPIRATIONS

The chaotic ending to the nineteenth century, left Samoa without a workable government. As the Samoan leaders pondered upon their political future, their confusion turned into shock and disbelief as the news of the partitioning of Samoa arrived. To rub salt into Samoan pride, Germany, instead of Britain or America, was given the administration of Samoa. In a letter to the LMS Secretary, Elizabeth Moore mentioned that the Samoans felt that Peretania (Britain) had deserted them. The Samoans began the twentieth century with little excitement, and a future that was uncertain and insecure.

The German flag was raised on 1 March 1900 at Mulinu'u Peninsula. The government representatives of America and Britain were present. The two countries had continued to meet with the German administration, giving advice on various matters pertaining to the welfare of the Samoans, while recognising and committing themselves to the aims of the German administration. The missions were also well represented. The LMS school students marched in a procession from Apia to Mulinu'u. In addition, the LMS schools sang a German chorale (Lobe den Herrn der mächtige...) and the German National anthem, and gave the new administrator, Dr Wilhelm Solf, a bible as a gift.

Many German citizens were impressed with the LMS’s participation. Solf also wrote to the Au Fa’atonu (Samoan LMS missionaries) to demonstrate his appreciation.

After having seen the exceedingly well organised procession of your teachers and schools I am better able to understand and appreciate the attempts expressed in your address: to make the London Missionary society a powerful factor in conserving loyalty, peace and civilisation in Samoa. A mere glance into the history of the L.M. Society... shows ... that you have understood the patriarchal instincts and tendencies of the people, and gradually

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1 Lizzy Moore to R. W. Thompson, 29 Nov, 1899, London Missionary Society, South Seas Archives, South Sea Letters (henceforth SSL).
2 Minutes of a Government Meeting, 3 Feb, 1900, British Consulate Samoa (henceforth BCS); Grunow (Acting Consul of Germany) to Hunter, 27 Feb, 1900, BCS; Western Samoa Historical Notes, 1935, Island Territories Archives, National Archives (henceforth IT), 1 Ex 2/15.
3 Samoa District Committee (henceforth SDC), Minutes of Meeting, Apia, 24 Feb, 1900, SSL; SDC, Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 13-18 May 1901, SSL; see also Solf to Broyer, 3 Mar. 1900, Marist Archives of Samoa and Tokelau (henceforth MAST); Broyer to Solf, 5 Mar. 1900, MAST.
4 Testimony from Dr Solf to the LMS (Quotation from a letter from a trader in Samoa), Mar, 1900, SSL.
prepared them to receive willingly from any subsequent Government the legislation necessary to their welfare.\(^5\)

The LMS saw the compliment as a catalyst in creating a solid platform for future positive dialogue,\(^6\) although the latter part of the letter revealed German expectations that the LMS would encourage the Samoans to accept German rule peacefully. For the Samoans, however, the praise accorded Solf did not take into account his insensitive attitude to the real needs and expectations of the Samoan people.

The Au Fa’atonu described Solf as a good man, and “extremely affable & courteous & whenever opportunity has offered, he has been willing to assist our mission publicly, ever drawing some censures upon himself from certain quarters.”\(^7\) However, the chance of a rosy relationship never eventuated. The Au Fa’atonu annoyed Solf over a number of issues, therefore giving Solf ample excuses and opportunities to ridicule the LMS mission. Thus, from the beginning, it never was an easy matter for the LMS to have a good relationship with the German administration. But, the LMS had two astute and experienced missionaries in James Edward Newell, and Franceska Louise Valesca Shultze, whose work gave the LMS some credibility.

Newell had been in Samoa since 1880, and was present during the crucial events leading up to the German take-over of Samoa in 1900. Newell maintained the LMS was neutral during the kingship struggle. In a letter to the Au Matutua (LMS directors), Newell advised them not to meddle with Samoan politics, as it would be detrimental to the LMS.\(^8\) Newell maintained that he could not be made responsible for the actions of the Samoans and British soldiers who took up arms against Mata’afa losefo, nor for the misguided actions of some colleagues. Newell maintained that his only function in the dispute was one of mediator. The Samoan pastors wrote to R. W. Thompson, the Secretary of the LMS, expressing their concern at the charges implicating Newell as the cause of all the trouble in Samoa. In the letter, pastor Alama wrote “e toe ina oo lima o nisi e toatele ia Neueli, atoa ma i matou [people nearly caused violence

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5 Dr Solf to J. Hills, Feb, 1900, SSL.
6 Shultze to Cousins, 22 Mar, 1900, SSL; SDC, Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 13-18 May 1901.
7 Barradale to Thompson, 9 Jan, 1901, SSL; Huckett to Thompson, 17 May, 1900, SSL. Many other scholars have described Solf in their own words, such as J. W. Davidson, *Samoa mo Samoa: The Emergence of the Independent State of Western Samoa*, Melbourne: Oxford University, 1967, 78; Peter J. Hempenstall, *Pacific Islanders Under German Rule: a Study in the Meaning of Colonial Resistance*, Canberra: ANU, 1978, 32.
8 J. E. Newell to R.W. Thompson, 31 Oct, 1898, SSL.
In the aftermath of the kingship struggle, Newell was invited by the special commission set up to resolve the crisis to advise on what action to take.10

When the news of Germany ruling Samoa broke at the end of 1899, Newell was away on a visitation trip to LMS mission stations in other parts of the Pacific. Newell was also absent from the German flag hoisting ceremony. He had left Samoa for England for an extended furlough in February. During this time, Newell visited Germany and tried to clear up any misunderstanding the Germans may have had regarding the LMS’s role in the recent kingship controversy. But most importantly, Newell had the chance to personally meet Solf and other government dignitaries, as well as meeting several German Mission Boards and independent church denominations who were willing to participate in mission enterprise in Samoa. Newell explained the LMS’s position with regard to Sabbatarianism, freewill contributions, German donations to schools, erection of expensive church buildings, recruitment of Samoans for hired labour, church marriage as against civil marriage, and so forth.11

Newell wanted to implement German policies within LMS mission schools as soon as possible. It was one way of proving LMS support to Solf and the new German administration. Obtaining German missionaries proved fruitless, although several of the missions preferred to take-over the work of the LMS in Samoa. Nevertheless, Newell had high hopes of acquiring missionaries in the future. Meanwhile, Newell was confident that the existing LMS staff in Samoa could fulfil Solf’s policies regarding education and other matters.

This leads us to the LMS’s other great asset during the German occupation, Franzeska Louise Valesca Shultze. Shultze founded the LMS Papauta Girls School in 1890. She was present with the Au Fa’atonu in welcoming Solf and the new German regime to Samoa. Shultze at the time was preparing to move to Tutuila, but the LMS felt that she was "an advantage to the

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9 See Pastor Alama to Tomasone (R. W. Thompson), 26 Jan, 1901, SSL.  
10 C. N. E. Elliot (Head of Commission) to J. E. Newell, 9 Jan, 1899, SSL; Capt. Sturdee to W. Huckett, 8 Jan, 1899, SSL; E. G. B. Mace to W. Huckett, 10 Jan, 1899, SSL; Mrs Bevan Wockey to R. W. Thompson, 16 Apr, 1899, SSL.  
11 Newell’s Diary, Newell Papers, London Missionary Society, South Seas Archives, South Sea Odds (henceforth SSO); Huckett to Thompson, 9 Sept, 1901, SSL, NLA; Marrick to C. Cousins, 22 Aug, 1903, SSL; Huckett to Thompson, 23 Sept, 1903, SSL. The Catholics in later years also had a problem with New Zealand over the Sabbatarian issue. See Father J. Delhi to Capt. Cotton, 19 Jan, 1920, MAST. Delhi to Tate, 9 Jul, 1921, MAST.
mission in its relation with the German government." Soon after the official flag raising, Shultze began to teach the German language and German history to the girls at Papauta School but, according to Joliffe many of the girls were reluctant to learn as they were expecting England to return and take over Samoa again. The girls soon got over their wishful thinking and settled into learning German.

Shultze quickly pushed through the Germanisation of Papauta despite Solf's advice to continue teaching in the Samoan language, until policies could be implemented. Solf felt that by teaching in the Samoan language the Samoans would remain Samoans. Solf contemplated using the German language only at court. But, Shultze had other ideas. In a letter to the LMS Secretary, Shultze outlined the need to expand Papauta as Samoans were crying out for education. She wrote that "never have I known Samoans more eager for education as they are now....they are very eager now to learn German." Shultze was a proud German and was doing all she could to promote German interests. She obviously contemplated a long association between the Samoans and Germany, something that the rest of the Au Fa'atonu also learnt to accept. Shultze also proudly supported Solf's proposal for all missions and schools to be under the control of the German governor in all German colonies.

From the beginning, Samoans felt Solf was the right man to establish and guide a Samoan government capable of governing its own people. The Samoans were confident as Solf did not change much of the way Samoan politics functioned from the previous government. In fact he advocated an administration that favoured Samoan traditions, whereby the Samoans would govern themselves according to the fa'asamoa. Solf's address to the Samoan people on 11 April 1900 would have suggested nothing else to the Samoans. Solf promised:

...to respect old traditions as far as these are not against the laws of Christianity and the welfare and security of the individuals. The Government has confidence in the Samoans, that they will be able

12 SDC, Minutes of Meeting, Papauta, 13-14 Dec, 1899, SSL.
13 Joliffe to Thompson, 9 Jul, 1900, SSL.
14 Shultze to Thompson, 6 Sept, 1900, SSL.
15 Shultze to Thompson, 6 Sept, 1900, SSL.
16 Shultze to Cousins, 6 Aug, 1904, SSL; Newell to Thompson, 13, Aug, 1904, SSL; Newell to Thompson, 13 Aug, 1904, NP.
to govern themselves, subject to its control and promises to make such laws, and issue such orders as shall be for the benefit of the country and in conformity...with Samoan ideas. 17

Samoan expectations went closer to reality with the appointment of Mata'afa Iosefo as Ali'i Sili. 18 This was expected by the Samoans as the first act towards revitalising Samoan traditional rule. Solf also decided to recognise the paramount descent groups in Samoa, namely the tama-a-aiga by designating Tupua Tamasese Meaole I, Tuimaleali'iifano, Saipa'ia (Sa Tupua family), and Fa'alata (Sa Malietoa family), as Ta'imua, and he selected twenty-eight matai as Faipule. This kept alive the old Ta'imua and Faipule aspect of the previous Samoan government. 19 Iosefo was given the task of appointing Samoans to various government offices, such as councils, district chiefs, district judges, village mayors, district clerks, and constables. This act by Solf was seen by the Samoans as another step towards legitimising Iosefo's authority to rule Samoa under German protection. 20

However, early Samoan participation in setting up the new German administration gave the Samoans a false sense of security that Germany had their best interests at heart. In fact, there were even suggestions that Germany was setting up the administration of Samoa in similar fashion to the way Britain had given the Tongans their right to rule under a British protectorate. There was no mistaking how Iosefo perceived the situation painted by Solf at the beginning. He was confident Solf had given him power and authority to govern, and he acted accordingly.

For instance, soon after the flag raising ceremony, Iosefo and his supporters went to various villages in Anoama'a, Faleata and Tuamasaga, and destroyed the plantations and possessions of the villagers, in an effort to show that he had absolute authority. Solf took exception to Iosefo's action and asked him to cease all aggression. 21 In another show of power, Iosefo issued a

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17 Solf's Address, 11 Apr, 1900, German Administration of Western Samoa (henceforth GAWS).
18 Mata'afa Iosefo's title of Ali'i Sili was officially bestowed on 14 August 1900. See Order by Solf, 14 Aug, 1900, GAWS; Report of Dr Solf to the Imperial Office, Berlin – Unforwarded, 1907 (copy in author's possession).
19 List of Malo, 1904, German Secretariat Archives (henceforth GSA). The list includes Moefaauo, Mata'afa, Leatutau, Tusa, Toelupe, Lauaki, Tafua, Tatoo, Liumauga, Talo, Fonoiroma, Maumalo, Molioo, Lioama, Fue, Sagapolu, Tuaatu, Vai, Autagaavai, Le Tagaloa, Asiata, Faumalea, Laufa, Tuliatu, Tufuga, Gale, Solaia, and Taueeta. See Western Samoa Historical Notes, 1935, IT 1, Ex 2/15.
20 Mata'afa to Solf, 17 Mar, 1900, GAWS; Minutes, Solf, 31 Mar, 1900, GAWS; Mata'afa to Solf, 1 May 1900, GAWS; Mata'afa to Solf, 26 May 1900, GAWS; Solf to Mata'afa, 24 Jul, 1900, GAWS; Hauhe to Cousins, 11 Jun, 1900, SSL; Shultze to Thompson, 6 Sept, 1900, SSL.
21 Tuisamau and Amituanai to Hunter, 6 Mar, 1900, BCS; Solf to Hunter, Mar, 1900, BCS.
proclamation, without Solf’s knowledge, ordering all missions to conduct religious services on 24 April 1900, to commemorate Samoa’s preservation during the 1899 war, and to give thanks that “the authority of Samoa remains in customs & practices of Samoa.” Solf issued a counter proclamation, and wrote letters to the various missions, making losefo’s orders null and void.

Losefo also tried to interfere with Judge Knipping’s administration by issuing an order to release one Tuaiifaiva, who had been sentenced by Knipping to prison. Solf told losefo never to interfere with the work of Knipping. Furthermore, during the instalment ceremony of various matai to government appointments, losefo remarked to Franzeska Louise Valesca Shultze at Papauta, that “things will undergo a great change & only have to do it slowly to avoid trouble.” In June, losefo ordered the Faipule and soldiers to Mulinu’u without Solf’s approval. Solf believed losefo had gone too far, and wrote to him pointing out who had real power and authority in Samoa.

All these circumstances compel me to believe that you are inclined to exceed the powers attaching to the position as Alii Sili granted to you by the Imperial government…..I trust that you will give me proof by complying with my wishes that you are now fully aware that there is only one Pule [rule or authority] in Samoa, namely the Pule of the Kaiser, whose representative I am.

The taligatoga ceremony that followed awakened losefo to the reality of his situation. Losefo and his family wanted to give gifts of ie toga (fine mats) to matai of various districts who honoured and recognised his position as Ali’i Sili. It soon became clear to losefo that Solf’s permission was required in order to carry it out. It was quite a shock that a Samoan traditional ceremony needed a papalagi’s permission for its fulfilment. Furthermore, Solf intervened and instructed losefo on how to distribute the ie toga. Solf decreed that every matai should receive the same amount of ie toga incase one would feel he was superior to the other. Solf’s action brought every matai to the same level, status, and rank. Losefo had intended to give more to the higher ranking matai,

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22 Minutes, Solf, 19 Apr, 1900, GAWS; Mata’afa to Newell, 17 Apr, 1900, SSL; Mata’afa to J. E. Newell, 19 Apr, 1900, SSL; Pule & Tumua to Mosiniolo, 17 Apr. 1900, MAST.
23 Solf to Hucket, 21 Apr, 1900, GAWS; Solf to Broyer, 21 Apr, 1900, GAWS; Broyer to Solf, 23 Apr, 1900, GAWS.
24 Mata’a to Solf, 11 Jun, 1900, GAWS; Imperial Judge (Knipping) to Solf, 12 Jun, 1900, GAWS.
25 Shultze to Thompson, 6 Sept, 1900, SSL.
26 Solf to Mata’aafa, 26 Jun, 1900, GAWS; Mata’afa to Solf, 27 Jun, 1900, GAWS.
27 Proclamation, Solf, 31 May 1901, GAWS; Minutes, Solf, no date, GAWS; Solf to Mata’afa, 24 Jun, 1901, GAWS; Minutes, Solf, 25 Jun, 1901, GAWS.
especially Tumua and Pule, and less to the lesser-ranked *matai*. Losefo wanted to keep Tumua and Pule on his side as they were considered the real king-makers in Samoan politics. Solf's action was an insult to losefo and to Tumua and Pule. It was beyond any Samoan's imagination. For losefo and his family, and for the *matai* who attended, Samoan culture had been denigrated.26 Solf had made a mockery of losefo's intention to show-off his prestige and power.

For Solf, it was huge psychological victory. Losefo was given a clear message regarding his status and position within the new German administration, while the whole of Samoa was given a dress rehearsal of what to expect in future.25 The lowering of Tumua and Pule status by virtue of receiving the same *ie toga* as all other *matai*, was Solf's way of telling such powerful groups that they had no power and authority in a German Samoan government.30 Solf deliberately sought to destroy the dignity and pride of Tumua and Pule. Solf claimed it was something he had always planned to do. In a letter to the Colonial Office in Berlin, Solf clearly outlined his intention and aim for Samoa's future.

The appointment of the Alii Sili is difficult to unite with my own plans for an enlarged future Samoa self-government. I have appointed Mataaafa Alii Sili against my conviction.... Also at the time when the flag was hoisted Tumua and Pule had their powers geared for war. To maintain peace, I was forced to compromise Mataaafa, and by not recognising his Tupu, I had to give him the title and appointment of Alii Sili instead. The government's aim must be to get rid of the central Government in Muliniu, and to confine the Samoa self-government to districts and villages.31

Solf subsequently reiterated his real intention for Samoa by forcing losefo to give a speech to the Samoan people on 14 August 1900. The day in question was the day losefo was officially bestowed with the title Ali'i Sili. The

26 There were 1899 fine mats distributed. The Kaiser received one, with 4 more to German officials, and five fine mats to the missionaries, including the nuns. See list in Note by J. Sooalo Tolo, MN, 22 Jul, 1901, Gilson Papers – Pacific Manuscript Bureau (henceforth PMB) 479; see also Ali'i and Faipule of Fasito'otai and Falesela to Solf, 3 Sept, 1901, GAWS; Proclamation, Muliniu, 29 Mar, 1901, PMB, 479; Samoanische Zeitung, 22 Jun, 1901, PMB 479.

29 Tamasese Meaole I and his family also had to obtain permission from Solf to hold a ta'aalo. Solf gave permission because it was not political, and told Tamasese not to invite too many people, and to finish early. See Solf to Tamasese, 8 May 1900, GAWS; Minutes, Schnee, 17 Jan, 1902, GAWS; Memo by C. Taylor, 30 Nov, 1903, GSA.

30 Note that in 1907, Mata'aafa losefo and Tumua and Pule chiefs petitioned Solf to reinstate Tumua and Pule. Solf denied the request, and told the Samoans that it was a thing of the past. See Memo by Taylor, 28 Feb, 1907, GSA; Solf, Minute, 1 Mar, 1907, GSA; Trood to Secretary of Pule Aiga - Tuamasaga, undated, BCS.

31 Solf to Auswartige Amt, 6 Feb, 1901, GAWS; Minutes, Solf, 2 Sept, 1901, GSA; Cable From Solf in Rotorua, NZ, to Samoa Govt, 13 Nov, 1909, GSA; Solf to Secretary of State, Colonial Office, 12 Dec, 1909, GSA; see also Solf to Amtmann, Gilson Papers – Amtmann, Savai'i, XVII. C.1, PMB 479; Solf to Secretary of Colonial Office, 12 Dec, 1909, XVII, A.2, PMB 479.
speech, written for losefo by the German administration, advised the people of Samoa that the days of Tumua and Pule were gone, and so were the laws and customs of Samoa. losefo also openly declared that his Ali‘i Sili was bestowed by the Kaiser, who was greater than he was, and the only ruler of Samoa.32

losefo and his supporters had not expected such a complete and hasty change to Samoan traditional rule. losefo, for a while tried to defy the German administration by refusing to obey Solf’s orders and refusing to carry out his government duties. He even tried to set up a fort at Leulumoega with the idea of ruling Samoa with the help of either Britain or America. losefo soon accepted the fact that Germany had complete control and that the old days of having another nation interfering were no longer possible. He could only accept his circumstances with sadness and humility; a trait that the German government continued to admire in losefo, and for which he was rewarded accordingly.33

The damage done to Samoan pride was due to the Samoans’ own lack of political perception. The Samoans failed to perceive the true significance of Solf’s earlier address in April. Solf had clearly told the Samoans that from the onset of any Samoan - German relations, Samoa would have no power and authority, but Germany would control all. In short, German interests needed to be addressed first over and above any Samoan welfare.

A strong Christian government and the welfare of the individual were two important aspects of the German administration, which went against Samoan traditions, and the idea of communal aspirations promoted by the fa’asamoa. Samoan traditional government was always based upon warfare and the enticement of matai support from various districts to elevate one individual to lead the malo. In the nineteenth century, much of the conflict in Samoa was precisely caused by the rivalry for kingship or for paramount authority. However, such rivalry was not all in response to Samoan political fervour but in the main to satisfy the greed and selfishness of various papa/agi, in which Christianity not only played a very manipulative role, but also had a strong sanctioning affect.34

The Samoans themselves also learnt to play both the missions and the German

32 Order by Solf, 14 Aug, 1900, GAWS; Proclamation, Mulinuu, 29 Mar, 1901, PMB 479; Excerpts From Annual Report, 1900-1901, PMB 479.
33 J. E. Newell to R. W. Thompson, 24 Jan, 1900, SSL; Huckett to Cousins, 22 Mar, 1900, SSL; Solf, Auswartige Amt, Berlin, 14 May 1900, GAWS; Auswartige Amt (Colonial Dept.) to Solf, 31 Oct, 1900, GAWS.
34 W. Huckett to R.W. Thompson, 1 Sept, 1899, SSL; J.E. Newell to R.W. Thompson, 31 Oct, 1898, SSL; W. Huckett to R.W. Thompson, 20 Mar, 1899, SSL.
administration against one another for their own benefit, although at times it caused more pain than gain.

When Solf toured the islands of Upolu and Savai'i in 1900, he realised just how much the missions had affected the lives of the people. The mission had implanted itself in the fa'a Samoa and had educated many Samoans to become useful in Samoan society. Solf admitted these people would eventually become helpful informers, interpreters, and mediators for his administration. Thus, Solf recognised early the importance of the work done by the missions in Samoa. He knew that with their help in continuing to teach Christian ideals, he could develop Samoa as a profitable German colony. Solf believed the work done by the missions was for the good of the country, and it was their contribution to 'Germany's God-given' task of developing Samoa. The relationship between the missions and the German administration was not always complementary. Nevertheless, the missions accepted their fate in the hands of the Germans.

The relationship between the missions themselves was also unpleasant. During the period of German administration, one mission would try to gain the favour of the government at the expense of the other; depending on the issues and events transpiring at any given time. The two missions that caused the most agitation in state and church relations were the LMS and the Lotu Pope. As will be seen later, they took every opportunity for censuring, condemning, and insulting each other. In their effort to 'do the Christian thing' both missions would drag along their Samoan adherents to the extent of encountering the wrath of the German administration. The WMMS and the newly arrived Mormon Church (LDS) also contributed to the disharmony of the missions and Samoan people.

The WMMS remained small and modest, but was still strongly active under the leadership of the Reverend Ernest G. Neil. They did not like the Catholics because of their strong Protestant bias, but they were also at odds

35 Report of Solf's Tour of Savai'i, Samoa Zeitung, 3 Aug., 1901, PMB 479; Record of Malaga to Savai'i, 18 Jul, 1901, PMB 479.
36 Shultze to Thompson, 6 Sept, 1900, SSL.
37 An example is the case concerning the LMS pastor Liuvao and a story he had told about the retention of the cup in the case of the laity in the Roman Catholic tradition. Bishop Broyer took it as an insult to him and the church. The issue became a debate on beliefs between the LMS and the Roman Catholic. In the end the Chief Justice got involved. Liuvao was jailed for one month. The conflict took almost six months to resolve. See Hills to Thompson, 19 Oct, 1910, SSL; Hills to Thompson, 10 Dec, 1910, SSL; SDC - Minutes of Meeting, Leulumoega, 21-23 Dec, 1910, SSL; Hills to Thompson, 16 Jan, 1911, SSL; Hills to Thompson, 14 Feb, 1911, SSL.
with the LMS over doctrinal and administrative matters. The LMS maintained that the WMMS should not have returned to Samoa, and was further infuriated by the WMMS effort to begin a mission in Tutuila. As far as the LMS was concerned, the WMMS was adding to its problem with the Lotu Pope and LDS in Tutuila. In Upolu, the Reverend John G. Hawker of the LMS, complained that a WMMS missionary went to one of the LMS villages and, in the absence of the Samoan pastor, used the LMS church to marry a matai to a woman he had being living with for two years. The problem was, the same matai has been married to another woman by the Samoan pastor some four years earlier. In 1909, a conflict between the LMS in Afega and the WMMS in Malie, over the inauguration of a new WMMS church in Afega, not only involved the pastors and congregations but Samoan government officials. The animosity between the two Protestant rivals continued to thrive in a very subtle way, throughout the first half of the twentieth century.

The LDS caused a few headaches for the other missions, especially the LMS. They were especially active in American Samoa and became very prominent in Samoa during the German administration. The Mamona (Mormon missionaries) proselytising work among Samoans already committed to other denominations led to hostility and, at times, violent reactions from the Samoan community. For instance, in the village of Suipapa, Lepa, the matai Sagale gave the Mamona permission to hold a church service, but the LMS pastor and congregation retaliated and beat up the Samoan Mamona missionary and threatened his European colleague. Nevertheless, the Mamona continued to persist in Suipapa as they had the support of another matai named

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38 Huckett to Thompson, 2-10 Jul, 1903, SSL.
39 Hawker to Thompson, 15 Jan, 1904, SSL; Hawker to Thompson, 5 Feb, 1904, SSL; Hawker to Thompson, 15 Dec, 1904, SSL.
40 Hawker to Thompson, 15 Dec, 1904, SSL.
41 Mamoe (F.S. - Afega), O le Tala i le Mea Sa Tupu i le Nuu o Afega i le Aso 15 Aukuso, 1909, 4 Sept, 1909, South Seas Special Personals (Newell Papers) [henceforth NP]; lerome (Wesleyan Pastor at Malie) to Mamoe (F.S. - Afega), 4 Sept, 1909, NP.
42 There are several records of the LDS in their Journals, pamphlets, and magazines, published in the early 1900s. For example see Improvement Era, PMB 589; Solf en den Deutechen...., Jun., 1899, PMB 589; General Conference, PMB 116; Samoan Bulletin, PMB 118; Samoan Mission, PMB 114.
43 Hawker to Thompson, 16 Mar, 1902, SSL; Huckett to Thompson, 26 Apr, 1902, SSL; Hawker to Thompson, 5 Feb, 1904, SSL; Hawker to Thompson, 23 Jul, 1904, SSL.
Tupua. The LDS had thirty to forty missionaries and teachers in Samoa. They had stations at Malaela, Manunu, Pesega and Sauniatu in Upolu.

In Savai‘i the LDS grew in numbers at Falelima, Tuasivi, and Vaiola. In a report in 1910, Elder W. E. Tangreen, wrote about the work of the LDS in Falelima. He records how the other denominations worked to poison the minds of the people with false stories about the Mamona. He also mentioned how a number of people were made to take oaths not to join the LDS. While the Falelima branch of the church was the largest in Savai‘i, the report stated that in other villages, "it needed only a little work in some villages to give them prestige enough to establish a branch of the church." Tangreen also described the problems faced by the Mamona as they tried to establish a branch in Lalomalava. At first, Solf had forbidden the Mamona from invading strong Protestant villages, but, the decision was later reversed and Solf told the people of Lalomalava not to interfere with the Mamona. The LDS were very successful at utilising their schools as an effective way of spreading their message. They also offered relief for poor families, as well as promoting talent through their choir.

At the beginning of 1900, there were some 1,100 Mamona and twenty-two schools in Samoa. According to Elder Wood, the LDS’s success was also due to its evangelisation method.

He [Mormon missionary] must speak strait to the souls of these natives; and there is no hypocrisy among them in religion. They look at the very soul of an Elder, and the Elder must get down and talk as if to a child, and yet not be a child himself. He must instruct these people and yet retain the dignity of his calling.

The Mormons’ arrogance made the LMS very unforgiving, especially when they tried to discredit the work done by other missions. Elder Edward W. Little felt the Mormons were far superior.

Wherever we went we were the centre of attraction and the people hung upon our words and praised the actions and ability of our

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44 Minutes, Shultz, 4 Oct, 1904, German Administration Papers (henceforth GAP).
45 Shultz to Solf, 22 Apr, 1905, (Report of trip to Aleipata on 19-21, Apr, 1905); GAP; Jolliffe to Thompson, 9 Jul, 1900, SSL; Huckett to Thompson, 30 Sept, 1900, SSL.
boys as though instead of our being human beings and Faifeau Momanos [Mamona], as they term us, we were something superior to those who had been labouring among them for years.  

The Samoans called the Mamona missionary, *Mamona ma le ato pa‘u* (Mamona with a suitcase) as they became an eyesore for the LMS and other missions. The LDS also took every opportunity to discredit the LMS and other missions with unfounded accusations, but, every effort to rid themselves of the Mormons failed. Instead, the Mormons continued to thrive, buying up large quantities of land for their mission schools and other special projects, as Samoans continued to embrace their materialistic approach.

The Lotu Pope was not really concerned over who administered Samoa. Germany was a predominantly Protestant nation, and Solf was an adherent, even if it was only by name. The centuries old conflict between the Protestant and Roman Catholic Church was slowly vanishing, as the Pope's influence gradually re-established Catholic traditions in Germany through the Catholic dominating political group called the Central Party. They had the power to influence the ruling government to assist Catholic missions anywhere in the world, including Samoa. For the Catholics in Samoa, the German administration may have been pro-Protestant but the changes in the religious environment in Germany was more favourable for the Catholics. This became even more significant with the establishment of a Marist Order in Germany itself. It meant, the Catholics in Samoa could obtain German speaking missionaries to implement Solf's policy of teaching German subjects within all mission schools. The Catholics also felt more comfortable with their relationship with the German administration because of losefo's influence, and being Lotu Pope and Ali'i Sili, he was expected to use his influence to benefit his church.

The LMS should have been more joyous with the German administration, but sadly no. The LMS had a monopoly on mission work in Samoa, and clearly, had expected Samoa to become a British colony. In a letter to England, Elizabeth Moore contemplated the outcome of the LMS work in Samoa.

We thank God that the Samoans have been grounded in the faith...if a testing time is coming, it may serve to strengthen and establish them. One thing we rejoice over, that it is a Christian and

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50 *Deseret Evening News*, 17 Mar, 1900, PMB 114.
51 Hawker to Thompson, 15 Dec, 1904, SSL.
52 *Millennial Star*, 23 Oct, 1904, PMB 114; *Liahona*, vol. 18: 400, 12 Mar, 1921, PMB 114; *Native Affairs*, *Tuamasaga*, vol. 10, 1912–1913, GAP.
a Protestant nation, which is to have control over our beloved Samoans; but oh how we wish it had been England.\textsuperscript{53}

Thus, the advent of a German government was not a stumbling block, but a setback, in LMS efforts to increase and expand its work in Samoa. The LMS realised the big advantage the Lotu Pope had over them in terms of German missionaries. In order to fulfil German policies, the LMS had to work much harder in obtaining German missionaries for Samoa. The LMS was also at a disadvantage politically. In the previous conflict in 1898 and 1899, the LMS supported Malietoa Tanumafili I against losefo in the kingship issue. The Germans had supported the latter. Thus, as far as the Germans were concerned, the LMS was not an ally of Germany.

Nevertheless, the LMS was willing to work closely with the German administration, especially after being reassured of the freedom to carry out mission work without hindrance.\textsuperscript{54} But, high on the LMS agenda was the desire to re-establish the good association it had first enjoyed with the German administration. As mentioned earlier, the LMS was on the receiving end of Solf's anger many times. The most stinging attack faced by the LMS related to charges of disloyalty to the German administration. The most serious included 'interfering with native conduct' and 'lack of respect shown on the occasion of the Kaiser's Birthday.'\textsuperscript{55} Solf wrote to the LMS stating his outrage at Newell's action in stopping the Samoans' ta'alo\textsuperscript{o} (presentation of gifts including ie toga) to honour the Kaiser on Sunday. For Solf this was proof enough of disloyalty.\textsuperscript{56} For the LMS it was a blatant violation of the 'Sabbath Law'. The incident not only became a catalyst for attacks on the LMS by the Germans, but also provided an avenue for other factions in the community to criticise the LMS.\textsuperscript{57}

Solf used the opportunity to attack the LMS, calling upon them to "meet the wishes and aims of the government, and adapt themselves to the changed needs of this colony."\textsuperscript{58} Solf then took the opportunity to point out there was a need for reform in the LMS's contributions, excessive church building, and

\textsuperscript{53} Lizzy Moore to R. W. Thompson, 29 Nov, 1899, SSL.
\textsuperscript{54} Marriott to Thompson, 8 Jan, 1902, SSL.
\textsuperscript{55} SOC, Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 13-18 May 1901, SSL
\textsuperscript{56} Hills to Thompson, 24 Jul, 1901, SSL.
\textsuperscript{57} For an example, a German in Savai'i named von Hayderbrent falsely accused the LMS missionary Beveridge of refusing to use German coins. He was later prosecuted for lying. See Huckett to Thompson, 9 Sept, 1901, SSL; Interview with the Governor Dr Solf, 18 Apr, 1904, SSL.
\textsuperscript{58} Solf to Hills, 12 Jun, 1901, SSL.
Sunday observances. Solf requested the LMS to adapt religious methods and observances to the German model in both religion and festivity. He also asked them to limit the cost of churches, and to urge the villages to combine to build one church for the use of several villages. On church contributions, Solf ordered that all such contributions be kept in Samoa.\(^5^9\)

The LMS felt threatened by Solf and, at the same time, was concerned at how the Samoans would respond if Solf carried out his proposed reforms.\(^6^0\) The LMS wrote to Solf and explained its position, and after some lengthy soul searching Solf exonerated the LMS of all charges and wished that both parties would maintain a close working relationship. Regarding Solf's attitude to annual contributions and church buildings, the LMS remained optimistic it was only a passing remark.\(^6^1\) But German slanderous accusations about the LMS did not cease in Samoa and in Germany itself. One such attack in a newspaper in Germany almost destroyed German - LMS relations, but Newell's visit to Germany, where he met up with Solf, quickly restored peace.\(^6^2\)

The LMS went to great lengths to refrain from provoking the Germans. They went as far as making sure that Au Fa'atonu, as well as Samoan pastors, refrained from anti-German gestures. For instance, the Samoan pastors returning from Northwest Outstations were warned "to be careful not to draw comparisons between British officials in the Northwest Outstations and German officials in Samoa."\(^6^3\) Barradale also advised the pastors in each district of Samoa

...to be loyal to the new government & to influence the people of their villages to yield a cheerful & ready obedience. They had long been asking God to give their land a settled government & now their prayers were answered. Let them be true to their Christian profession & above all things exercise a wise caution, so as not to

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\(^5^9\) Annual Report, Apia, Feb, 1902, SSR.

\(^6^0\) Solf to Hills, 12 Jun, 1901, SSL; Marriott to Cousins, 26 Jul, 1901, SSL; Hills to Thompson, 7 Sept, 1901, SSL.

\(^6^1\) Huckett to Thompson, 9 Sept, 1901, SSL; Marriott to C. Cousins, 22 Aug, 1903, SSL; Huckett to Thompson, 23 Sept, 1903, SSL.

\(^6^2\) A Lieut. Decker published a book in Germany, which mentioned the LMS had a negative attitude against German authority in Samoa. See Hills to Thompson, 20 Feb, 1902, SSL; Copy of Protest Send to German Newspaper, 17 Feb, 1902, SSL; Hills to Thompson, 6 Apr, 1902, SSL.

\(^6^3\) SDC, Minutes of Meeting, Papauta, 2-5 Dec, 1901, SSL. \(\text{Note:}\) The term 'Northwest Outstation' was the designation given to the mission stations to the northwest of Samoa. These islands were evangelised by the LMS, primarily through the work of Samoan and Cook Island teachers. The islands included Kiribati and Tuvalu.
create any circumstances that would hinder the work offered in Samoa.\textsuperscript{64}

But, despite the efforts by the LMS and the German administration to maintain peaceful working relationships, the two sides always managed to stumble across an insignificant issue that would provide a reason to continue animosity. For instance, the different attitudes towards Sunday observance prompted many arguments.

The LMS missionaries were very strict observers of the 'sabbath law' - keep it holy and no work or play on Sunday. The Germans, on the other hand, had a very different attitude to Sunday observance. They believed that the LMS observed the British Sunday and the Germans observed the German Sunday. The difference was that, the Germans took the attitude that Sunday finished at 12.00pm in the afternoon, and Sunday afternoon was free for pursuing personal entertainment and recreation.\textsuperscript{65} The LMS soon began to experience problems with Samoans, especially \textit{afakasi} (part-Europeans), attending German horse-racing and dances held on Sundays. The LMS felt it was an attempt by the Germans to entice Samoans away from the church and "give the place a German atmosphere."\textsuperscript{66} It was not just an LMS problem, but one that held fears for all the missions. However, it was a problem the Germans were not going to compromise on. Solf pointed out that quiet Sabbaths were not familiar to Germans. The LMS maintained their stance and remarked that "Solf should not expect missions to be senile."\textsuperscript{67}

The conflict over who had the right to use the Apia Protestant Church became an issue over who owned the same. It was a conflict that could have been avoided with a bit of diplomacy on both sides. It all started with a simple request from the German community to use the Apia Protestant Church for their services since they had obtained the services of Herr Beuteumuller, a German missionary.\textsuperscript{68} Newell felt he had to ask for advice from the Au Matutua (LMS directors) in London, because he believed the land was freehold and the church.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[64] V. A. Barradale to R. W. Thompson, 10 Jan, 1900, SSL.
\item[65] Marriott to C. Cousins, 22 Aug, 1903, SSL; HucKett to Thompson, 23 Sept, 1903, SSL.
\item[66] HucKett to Thompson, 2-10 Jul, 1903, SSL; Marriott to C. Cousins, 22 Aug, 1903, SSL; HucKett to Thompson, 23 Sept, 1903, SSL.
\item[67] Hills to Thompson, 28 Mar, 1903, SSL.
\item[68] Newell to Thompson, 14 Nov, 1903, SSL; Newell to Thompson, 15 Nov, 1903, SSL; Newell to Thompson, 5 Feb, 1904, SSL.
\end{footnotes}
was built with no German contribution. But, Dr Erich Shultz, the German administration secretary and acting-Consul, pointed out that the church was built on Native land and all foreign nationalities in Apia contributed to its construction when it was under the Seamen's Foreign Mission.

Furthermore, the Germans claimed that the reference to the church as the 'Apia Foreign Church' suggested that the word 'foreign' applied to all foreign nationalities. The LMS, however, disagreed and took the word 'foreign' to mean 'English Foreign Church.' The Reverend Walter Huckett also refuted Shultz's claim by writing a letter to the German newspaper *Samoanische Zeitung*. Hackett pointed out that the LMS had bought the land and the LMS contributed 30,000 marks of the 32,000 marks total cost of the building. Solf became very angry at Huckett's comments being published in the newspaper and not shared with him personally first. Solf admitted the land did belong to the LMS, and that was the reason why they had asked for permission in the first place. Solf then told the LMS the Germans would use the church with or without LMS permission. Meanwhile, the Au Matutua approved the usage of the church by the Germans, although Huckett felt "the business is not quite as straight as we should like it to be, nor have the Germans shown that gentlemanly behaviour we expected." LMS missionary prejudices showed up plainly for all Germans to see.

The conflicts between the LMS and the German administration were, at times, due to the Au Fa'atonu's lack of tact. The Apia Protestant Church issue is one example. But, there were also other issues, such as the German administration efforts to put all missions in German colonies under the control of the governor of the colony, even to the extent of removing missionaries, shutting up missions, and to controlling all mission schools. The proposals also suggested that if the locals retaliated, the missionaries would not remain neutral but take the side of the government. While Solf's proposal may have been harsh, it seems the missions, especially the LMS, indirectly contributed to Solf's radical plans of action. Earlier, Solf had written a stern letter to the Au Fa'atonu in Apia, pointing out the continuing interference of the Samoan pastors with the

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69 Newell to Thompson, 5 Feb, 1904, SSL.
70 Huckett to Thompson, 23 Dec, 1904, SSL.
71 Ridell to Huckett, 2 Mar, 1904, SSL.
72 Huckett to Thompson, 27 Feb, 1904, SSL.
73 Newell to Thompson, 13 Aug, 1904, SSL.
duties of the Samoan government officials, especially those of the native magistrates. Solf points out that "the faifeau was so mamalu (influential) that the people would not testify against them."74 Solf wanted the LMS to stop giving Samoan pastors titles of authority, and refrain from giving them any form of power and authority. Solf believed Samoan pastors were interfering too much with the daily work of the German administration.

The LMS also angered the German administration by publishing an article in the church magazine, O le Sulu Samoa, which mentioned an outbreak of heresy in the German protectorate of South West Africa, now known as Namibia. Solf could only take the LMS action as a further attempt to make his administration look bad. The LMS, through Newell, apologised but it left a large scar in friendly relations.75 Solf, at times, would retaliate by putting some restriction on LMS activities. For instance, Solf decided to recognise the fact that all Samoans were German citizens, and refused to allow any Samoans to leave the territory without special permits from Berlin. This affected the movement of Samoan missionaries throughout the Pacific. Solf commented that Samoans were dying in New Guinea and travel to such places needed regulating. He was quite happy for Samoans to travel to Tuvalu and Kiribati, as they were healthier.76 The LMS complained and pointed out that the regulations interfered with the work of the LMS, something that the German administration had promised not to do. Solf told Newell that he had the right and power to prevent any native leaving Samoa. He was concerned for the Samoans' health and safety. In the end, Solf conceded to pressure, especially after he was criticised for being anti-mission in failing to support efforts to propagate the gospel. Reluctantly, he allowed the LMS Samoan missionaries to travel to their mission stations without permits.77 Solf later explained his position more clearly to the various missions, especially to the WMMS and LMS. In a letter to the Reverend John W. Hills, he remarked that,

74 Interview with the Governor, Dr. Solf, 18 Apr, 1904, SSL.
75 Huckett to Thompson, 12 Apr, 1904, SSL.
76 Newell to Thompson, 14 Oct, 1904, SSL; Newell to Thompson, 14 Oct, 1904, SSL; Hawker to Thompson, 15 Oct, 1904, SSL. Note, a later case in 1910 of maltreatment of Samoans in New Guinea also concerned Solf. See Solomona to Solf (Tafua), 3 Aug, 1910, GAP; Report by Williams re Solomona, 28 Dec, 1910, GAP.
77 Sibree to Thompson, 15 Oct, 1904, SSL; Newell to Thompson, 15 Oct, 1904, SSL. Note, that Schultz put in place a similar law in 1913 regulating Tuvalu girls entering Samoa. See Hills to Dep. Governor, 16 Oct, 1913, PMB 143.
...[he was] not in favour of the emigration of Samoans to countries with malaria fever like New Guinea and... I had spoken already with one of the members I believe of the Wesleyan mission to the same effect. But I never went as far as to prohibit principally the propagation of the Christian creed by the Samoan teachers in foreign lands. 

By the beginning of 1901, the German language was compulsory in all mission schools. In some cases, English was banned from the curriculum, although concessions were allowed for the teaching of English to students from islands under the control of English speaking governments. The LMS began to bulk order German readers and literature for their schools. It was also decided to begin putting together a Samoan-German, German-Samoan dictionary, an undertaking that was gladly taken up and completed by Shultze in March 1902. Towards the end of the year, the German community acknowledged Shultze's efforts at Papauta by attending an exhibition day at the school. The Papauta girls sang and recited German songs and literature to the delight of the German audience present.

The successful work done at Papauta by Shultze was a feather in the cap for the LMS. It was Papauta that the German authority could cite to confirm LMS support for German policies. The LMS's other major educational centre, the Malua Seminary, was also doing it's best to conform but did not have any German missionaries in the mould of Shultze. The Seminary relied heavily on the experience of Newell to carry out the German part of the curriculum. Solf did his best to put pressure on Newell to obtain the services of a German missionary for Malua. In 1904, the Reverend Ernst F. W. Heider arrived in Samoa to teach and provide German instruction at Malua. Heider's appointment was welcomed by the LMS for it provided the German administration with further evidence of the LMS's effort to fulfil German policies. Solf was so delighted with Newell's effort that he made Newell a close confidante. This relationship soon developed into one of trust, which not only...
helped the LMS operate smoothly in Samoa, but also shaped Soli's own conviction that Samoans would be better Christians if guided sympathetically. Heider's effort in Malua helped develop and prepare Samoans to eventually teach the German language to students of the seminary at an elementary level. This took a load off Heider and Newell, allowing them to pursue other important matters.  

However, by the beginning of 1910, maintaining the status quo was the real challenge for the missions. As German policies demanded more effort on the part of the missions with regard to education, the LMS contemplated reducing its mission activity in the Pacific. The proposal did not help the strained relationship between the LMS and the German administration. Hills had written a strong letter some years earlier, reminding the Au Matutua of the mission's need in Samoa. It seemed his plea fell upon deaf ears. Hills wrote,

> We have reached now the stage when we feel that our case is getting desperate and we can afford no longer to allow no representation as to our need to be informed in the fashion which has obtained hitherto.

The Lotu Pope succeeded in their efforts to fulfil German policies, and received the gratitude of the German administration. They opened a new school in Apia, to coincide with German expectations and, consequently, pressed the LMS to do likewise. Furthermore, the LMS could not sit back and allow many of the children of LMS adherents to attend a Lotu Pope school because there was no similar Protestant school. The LMS missionary, John G. Hawker, was "disgusted" when he found out that the Malua tutor, Sa'aga, had enrolled his son Ropati at the Lotu Pope school. In response, the LMS built a new school, but by the time it opened it had not found a German schoolmaster. There was a shortage of volunteers in Germany. Heider offered to help until a suitable person could be found, but it was a short-term solution, as Heider was also needed at Malua.  

Hawker suggested getting a "German speaking British." The Reverend Perez Hall was eventually chosen but to the resentment of the German

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84 Newell to Thompson, 16 Apr, 1907, SSL.
85 Hills to Thompson, 12 May 1905, SSL.
86 Hawker to Newell, 1 Jul, 1907, NP, SDC, Minutes of Meeting, Papauta, 20-23 Dec, 1909, SSL; Hills to Thompson, 8 May 1912, SSL.
87 Hills to Thompson, 8 May 1912, SSL.
88 Hawker to Thompson, 4 Jan, 1912, SSL; SDC, Minutes of Meeting, Leulumoega, 21-23 Dec, 1910, SSL.
administration. Dr Shultz, the new German Governor in place of Solf, sent for Hawker, Hills, and the Reverend James W. Sibree, to personally vent his frustration and disappointment at them choosing an Englishman. According to Shultz, it was "not at all in accordance with his sense of fitness of things." Shultz believed that the appointment of Hall was an attempt by the LMS to "anglicize the Samoans." Shultz was also disappointed with Heider "for not better upholding German prestige in the colony." Shultz pointed out, as an example, the great work that the Catholic mission was doing in fulfilling German policies. Shultz then called upon the LMS to show a bit more loyalty to the German government and its policies and appoint a German pastor as schoolmaster.

Shultz also told the LMS that it had no official status as a mission society under German law. Shultz commented that, "in their colonies all recognised Missionary bodies shall have liberty of conscience and permission to carry out their work. But...the LMS does not appear [in the official list of the German Administration], while the Roman Catholic Church does." Shultz had found a loophole to blackmail the LMS into conformity with German policies. The LMS told Shultz it was doing exactly the same thing as the Lotu Pope, and yet it escaped the administration's criticism. The LMS argued that the Lotu Pope was registering its schools as foreign schools and, therefore, was entitled to recruit any schoolmaster, receive Europeans, Samoans and part-European children, and could teach two foreign languages. On the other hand, if a school was registered as a Samoan school, then it must appoint a German schoolmaster, and could only receive Samoan children, and it was compulsory to teach German only as a foreign language. The LMS contested that the Lotu Pope had bypassed the requirement for a German schoolmaster for years. Shultz told the Au Fa‘atonu to abide by the law, while he investigated the charges against the Lotu Pope.

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89 Hills to Thompson, 23 Jul & 27 Aug, 1912, SSL.
90 Hawker to Thompson, 23 Jul, 1912, SSL.
91 Hills to Thompson, 23 Jul & 27 Aug, 1912, SSL.
92 Hills to Thompson, 23 Jul & 27 Aug, 1912, SSL; Hawker to Thompson, 23 Jul, 1912, SSL; Shultz to SDC, 30 Jul, 1912, SSL.
93 Hawker to Thompson, 23 Jul, 1912, SSL.
94 See Translation Letter of Shultz to SDC, 30 Jul., 1912, PMS 143; see also Hawker to Thompson, 23 Jul, 1912, SSL; Hills to Thompson, 30 Jul, 1912, SSL.
Hills endorsed Shultz’s suggestion and asked the Au Matutua to seek a missionary from the Rheinish Mission Society in Germany. hills was also concerned that a Samoan school for Savai’i was also nearing completion and would also face the same staff shortage as the Maluafou school in Apia. The Au Matutua continued negotiations for one Herr Heiss but administration setbacks delayed his arrival. By the middle of 1913, the Maluafou School had obtained the services of one Herr Sawade, but the Savai’i schools remained without German schoolmasters. It was a situation that prompted Sibree to write to London pointing out that the Catholics had German staff and the LMS efforts were laughed at. He pointed out that the LMS also faced a diminishing attendance role at their new school, due to the lack of white teachers at the school.

Heider also tried to recruit teachers through private correspondence with suitable people in Germany. Heider in his efforts revealed that, perhaps, the Au Matutua was not trying hard enough. Heider pointed out that many Germans were willing to work in Samoa but the directors were rejecting their applications. Heider also believe that the German people were not informed widely by the LMS regarding their need for missionaries. Heider pointed out that Germany was at its height in mission activity especially in German colonies, and there was a strong lay movement for mission work. There was also strong support for mission from the Student Volunteer Movement, and the Teachers Mission Union, with some 6000 members. Heider believed the LMS was relying solely on prayers and advertising, and no action. In short, Heider believed the LMS was contributing to its own demise. Heider’s premonition regarding the LMS’s attitude towards Germans was not wrong. For as far back as 1904, the LMS missionaries in the mission fields had set up various criteria, which limited the scope for obtaining German missionaries. For instance, the LMS wanted all

95 The Rheinish Missionary Society was very active in Papua New Guinea in the late nineteenth century. It was one of three German mission societies active during this period. The other two mission societies were the Neuendettelsau Mission and the Society of the Divine Word. For a good background on these German Missions, see John Garrett, *Footsteps in the Sea: Christianity in Oceania to World War II*, Suva/Geneva: University of the South Pacific/World Council of Churches, 1992; Charles Forman, *The Island Churches of the South Pacific: Emergence in the Twentieth Century*, Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1982.
96 Hills to Thompson, 23 Oct, 1912, SSL; Heider to Thompson, 18 Nov, 1912, SSL; Hawker to Thompson, 18 Dec, 1912, SSL.
97 Hills to Thompson, 7 May 1913, SSL.
98 Hills to Thompson, 2 Jul, 1913, SSL.
99 Hawker to Thompson, 10 Feb, 1913, SSL; Sibree to Thompson, 4 Sept, 1913, SSL.
100 Heider to Thompson, 28 Jul, 1913, SSL.
German missionaries obtained to be subordinate to all English missionaries, and to select only Germans who were sympathetic to the LMS.\textsuperscript{101}

Moreover, the LMS effort was not helped by the efforts of the Germans to entice Herr Sawade to serve at the new German school built opposite Maluafou.\textsuperscript{102} The school, according to the German administration, was built to cater for sons of *matai*. But, as far as the LMS was concerned, the German school was set-up to compete, and to eventually destroy LMS efforts.\textsuperscript{103} The LMS lost many of their children to the German and Lotu Pope schools. To make matters worse, the Mormons also opened a new school near Apia under a German American.\textsuperscript{104} The LMS eventually had to dismiss Herr Sawade, and engaged a German woman, Fraulein Haslermann, to assist them in the running of the school while negotiations were completing for the services of Herr Doll and Herr Muller.\textsuperscript{105} Herr Muller eventually got to Samoa after being stranded in Sydney because of the outbreak of war.\textsuperscript{106}

Germany declared war in Europe and New Zealand troops arrived in August 1914, to secure Samoa. The German school was closed immediately and Sawade was taken prisoner. He was later released and he sought employment with the New Zealand administration. Colonel Robert Logan, the officer in command of the New Zealand Forces, refused him work on the grounds that he was untruthful, and told him to seek occupation with the LMS. Sawade left Samoa soon after.\textsuperscript{107}

The outbreak of war meant the LMS eventually had to decide on what to do with their German missionaries, namely Carl A. A. Muller, Heider, and Shultze. Muller and his family were moved to Apia from Savai'i under New Zealand orders but, Heider was arrested and brought before Logan to answer to the charge of 'inciting the natives.' He was released after he had declared his intention of leaving Samoa and retiring from the LMS.\textsuperscript{108} Hills wanted to retain

\textsuperscript{101} Sibree to Thompson, 23 Jul, 1904, SSL.
\textsuperscript{102} Heider to Thompson, 15 Jan, 1914, SSL.
\textsuperscript{103} Note that earlier, the German government passed a regulation requiring the LMS and WMMS to give up 30 boys, and the Roman Catholic, 10 boys, to start a new government school for boys in Apia. See lugafono Kovan'a ma Faipule Kaisakika i Mulinuu, 30 Jan, 1909, NP.
\textsuperscript{104} Heider to Thompson, 15 Jan, 1914, SSL.
\textsuperscript{105} Hills to Thompson, 5 Jul, 1914, SSL; Hills to Lenwood, 4 Aug, 1914, SSL.
\textsuperscript{106} Muller to Lenwood, 20 Aug, 1914, SSL; Muller to Lenwood, 10 Nov, 1914, SSL.
\textsuperscript{107} Logan to Sawade, 13 Aug, 1915, PMB 144; Logan to Sawade, 13 Dec, 1915, PMB 144.
\textsuperscript{108} Hills to Lenwood, 27 Sept, 1914, SSL.
Heider, as he acknowledged his worthiness as a kind of 'government chaplain' during the German administration, but Heider became bitter and anti-British. He had been with Governor Shultz just before the Germans surrendered, but soon after, according to Hills, Heider seemed to have "lost his balance completely." Heider left Samoa soon after because of "the total collapse of all his hopes concerning the German language. He [had] worked prodigiously to make the teaching of German a success. At a moments notice it [was] swept away, and naturally [felt] very sore." Some of the LMS English missionaries wanted to retain their German colleagues in case Samoa reverted back to Germany after the war. This was the impression among many Samoans as well, whether Germany won the war or not. Hills warned the LMS not to "whitewash the German Governor" in its magazine, The Chronicle, just in case. But others, like Sibree, wanted his German colleagues deported. Sibree was the first to celebrate when Shultze left. For a while, Heider was free to do as he pleased. But out of the blue, his house and possessions were thoroughly searched, and Heider and his friends were later interned in New Zealand. According to Sibree, Heider was expelled from Samoa because "his influence over the Samoans was not to the advantage of the...Administrator." In New Zealand, Heider sought help from the Au Matutua to secure his release. He asked the LMS to consider his ten-year service with them, especially his work for the LMS during the German administration. The directors sought clarification of Heider's internment from the New Zealand administration in Samoa as the "Society naturally wished to know if he [Heider] had acted in such a way that would affect his relation with the Society." Logan pointed to Shultz's diary, which implicated Heider as part of a group that had met just before the arrival of New Zealand troops in Samoa. Logan wrote to the directors, "Heider's influence on the Samoans was after

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109 Hills to Lenwood, 27 Sept, 1914, SSL.
110 Hills to Lenwood, 27 Sept, 1914, SSL.
111 Hills to Lenwood, 5 & 13 Mar, 1915, SSL; Hills to Lenwood, 3 Apr, 1915, SSL.
112 In a written note, Shultz remarked that "it was so hard to leave my 120 beloved girls...", See Miss Shultze, Note, 14 Sept, 1919, London Missionary Society South Seas Archives, South Seas Personal (henceforth SSP).
113 Sibree to F. H. Hawkins, 20 Dec, 1915, SSL.
114 Heider to Lenwood, 10 Apr, 1916, SSL.
115 Sibree to Hawkins and Lenwood, 17 Jun, 1916, SSL.
careful observation detrimental to British rule, and subversive to the peaceful
government of Samoa."\(^{116}\)

The war took its toll on German resources and there was talk that it
would soon be over. The LMS used the turn of events to discuss its future in
Samoa, especially in relation to staff. Sibree maintained his stance of not
allowing Shultze and Heider to return.\(^{117}\) As for Muller, Sibree would have liked
to see him deported as well. Sibree pointed out that he was not anti-German.
He felt Shultze was no longer young and had served long enough for the LMS,
while Muller was only appointed for a special task and his services were no
longer required.\(^{118}\) But Sibree's motive was racial. He was a British nationalist
and wanted nothing to do with Germans. He wrote to Lenwood stating that "it
has been one constant jarring of nerves and feeling and the engendering of
unchristian thoughts. You give a German an inch and he will take an ell. He is
forever on the lookout for slights, and forever finding faults."\(^{119}\) Earlier, Sibree
had condemned the petition by several planters and Europeans to prevent
Samoa from being governed by New Zealand, preferring to keep it German.\(^{120}\)

Lenwood openly criticised Sibree and other LMS missionaries for the
lack of forgiveness of their German missionaries, but Sibree defended himself
by pointing the finger at the Germans themselves for "endangering our work
and our future relations with the Administration."\(^{121}\) Sibree also pointed out that
his premonition regarding his German colleagues was correct when they were
arrested by the New Zealand Administration. Sibree represented the intolerant
side of a small number of LMS British missionaries, as well as the attitude of
some LMS directors towards German missionaries, but there were people, such
as Hills who represented a small group who had some compassion and
sympathy for their fellow workers in Christ.\(^{122}\) Lenwood did not openly criticise
the German staff of the LMS, but nevertheless, he had a dislike for them. In a
letter to the Reverend Francis. H. Hawkins, he betrayed his feelings by pointing

\(^{116}\) Sibree to Hawkins and Lenwood, 17 Jun, 1916, SSL.
\(^{117}\) Sibree to Lenwood, 31 Aug, 1917, SSL; SDC, Minutes of Meetings, Malua, 29 Apr-8 May 1920, SSL.
\(^{118}\) Shultze to Lenwood, 26 Dec, 1917, SSL; Sibree to Lenwood, 21 Feb, 1918, SSL.
\(^{119}\) Sibree to Lenwood, 21 Feb, 1918, SSL.
\(^{120}\) Sibree to Lenwood, 28 Jan, 1916, SSL.
\(^{121}\) Sibree to Lenwood, 4 Apr, 1917, SSL; Sibree to Hawkins & Lenwood, 17 Jun, 1916, SSL; Logan to
Sibree, 16 May 1916, SSL.
\(^{122}\) Sibree to F. H. Hawkins, 20 Dec, 1915, SSL; Hills to Lenwood, 27 Sept, 1914, SSL; Sibree to
Lenwood, 4 Apr, 1917, SSL.
out that all German staff, except Shultze, were patriotic and discussed the war "with a good deal of bad temper." Lenwood wanted to make it clear that he did not want any Germans on the LMS staff.

The LMS's German missionaries in Samoa were officially relieved of their services after it became known that Samoa would no longer be under German administration in 1918. At a meeting of the Au Fa'atonu in Malua, the services of Muller, Heider, and especially Shultze, were fully acknowledged. Shultze had left sometime after New Zealand's occupation of Samoa on her own accord. She wrote to the Secretary of the LMS, outlining just how strongly she felt for her country, and how she sympathised with her country during the war crisis. She pointed out that England had "not entered this war out of purely disinterested motives; and that Germany and our Kaiser did not want the war but that they were forced to it." Shultze felt her work in Samoa was a priority and it was hard to leave the girls at Papauta. However, she did have great concern for her family back in Germany. In the end, Shultze's passion for her country, and great fear for her family, finally persuaded her to leave Samoa in 1915.

Heider on the other hand returned to Germany in October 1916. Heider was paid in advance a year and a halfs' salary, while Shultze received only her normal salary while she remained outside Germany. Muller, on the other hand, was the last to leave Samoa. He had arrived just as Germany declared war in Europe. He had left his family back in Germany, and they had only managed to join him after several pleas to the Au Matutua. And even then, two of his children were too old to accompany Muller and had to be left behind in Germany. He worked wherever the LMS appointed him. The Au Fa'atonu had never liked him although he was accepted in December 1915, as a bona fide LMS member. He continued to work in Apia for the LMS doing all kinds of

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123 Lenwood to Hawkins, 24 & 27 Oct, 1915, SSL.
124 SDC, Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 29 Apr - 8 May 1920, SSL.
125 Shultze to Lenwood, 15 Jan, 1915, SSL.
126 Miss Shultze 'Note', 14 Sept, 1919, SSP.
127 Shultze died in Germany in 1935 and the Papauta School erected a house in her honour and called it 'O le Fale Sulesa.' See, Muller to Lenwood, no date, SSL; Sarai (Acting Principal), 'The Story of Papauta,' in News From Afar, Nov, 1945, SSP.
128 Muller to Lenwood, 31 Dec, 1914, SSL; Muller to Lenwood, 15 Mar, 1915, SSL; Sibree to F. H. Hawkins, 20 Dec, 1915, SSL; Muller to Lenwood, 26 & 27 May 1916, SSL; Sibree to Bradford, 23 Aug, 1917, SSL; Lenwood, Journal no. 6, Fiji, 29 Jul, 1915, Frank Lenwood, Journal Letters on Deputation, South Seas and Papua, 1915 - 1916, [copy in possession of Dr. Niel Gunson].
129 Hills to Lenwood, 23 Mar, 1915, SSL; SDC - Minutes of Meeting, Papauta, 14-17 Dec, 1915, SSL.
tasks. In January 1919, Muller wrote to the directors to reconfirm his position as an LMS missionary in Samoa as his contract was due to expire. Muller wrote,

I am not working as a German in the mission, but as an International being, which is not influenced by wars or politics. I just want to do my work for Christ and serve the mission faithfully, and I expect just to be judged whether I am qualified for the work or not.\textsuperscript{130}

Muller’s request was never acknowledged. Instead, he found out his fate when the New Zealand government ordered all German citizens to leave Samoa.\textsuperscript{131} He left Samoa in the SS Main in June 1920, receiving only his basic salary until he reached Germany.\textsuperscript{132} Muller wrote to Hough to spare him the indignity and embarrassment. He wrote, "we don't want to be sent away like criminals and that our committee and society should protest against it."\textsuperscript{133} Muller had arrived in Samoa a free man and had served the LMS faithfully, and he expected full support from the LMS, but the best the LMS could do for Muller and his family was to pay the extra £26 (pounds) for their first class travel in the SS Main.\textsuperscript{134} The Au Fa’atonu in Samoa was relieved to see Muller depart from Samoa. He was the last of any German reminder of the LMS mission, the last hurdle to negotiate in order to return the LMS mission to British domination.

The LMS’s problems were not restricted to internal issues. As we have seen, the society continuously came into confrontation with the German administration. But, that was not all. The LMS also had to defend itself, and deal with charges and allegations raised by the Lotu Pope. The conflict between the two missions in the twentieth century was a consequence of mission confrontation during the nineteenth century. The promotion of a single government did not help to abate hostility. Instead, it provided an environment for promoting self-interest at the expense of the other. The installation of losefo as Ali’i Sili may have helped to unite the Samoans politically but it created a rift among the Samoans religiously. The LMS held the opinion that losefo would wield his influence on the German administration to gain favoured status for Catholics in matters of religion. German administration records of Samoa during

\textsuperscript{130} Muller to Lenwood, 25 Jan, 1919, SSL.
\textsuperscript{131} Muller to Lenwood, 25 Jan, 1919, SSL.
\textsuperscript{132} The LMS missionaries in Samoa had earlier complaint about LMS’s proposal of paying all of Muller’s expenses to Germany. It never eventuated. See J. H. Morley to Bradford, 10 Mar, 1915, SSL.
\textsuperscript{133} Muller to Hough, 31 May, 1920, SSL.
\textsuperscript{134} Joseland to Bradford, 19 Jun, 1920, SSL.
1900 - 1914 reveal many conflicts between the LMS and Catholic adherents, which were either instigated by losefo, or he was seen to interfere with its development and outcome.

For instance, a religious disagreement between the Catholics and the LMS at the village of Solosolo started over a "disrespectful" remark by a Lotu Pope tulafale (matai orator) regarding the amounts of food apportioned to the LMS faifeau (pastor) and Catholic priest. The tulafale had charged the LMS with giving their priest a smaller portion. He also remarked on the unwillingness of the LMS to work together by failing to invite Catholic adherents to help in the building of the LMS church. The LMS refuted the claims and charged the Catholics with failing to take part in the LMS ta'aloalo.135 The villagers settled their own dispute and Solf accepted their reconciliation efforts, but losefo raised the matter with Solf again, putting the blame wholly on the LMS. Losefo asked Solf to dismiss Seiuli, a government pulenu'u, and an LMS member, for the disturbance.136 Solf did not respond to losefo's request. He wrote later that losefo's judgement had been clouded by his favouring the Lotu Pope, and was not based upon the facts.137

Losefo's interference had rekindled the conflict and the villagers were pressed to find a solution. The matai Pulepule was at the centre of reconciliation efforts. By July, Solf was advised that the Solosolo people had reconciled their religious differences,138 but the religious conflict continued to surface often, especially when government officials were at odds with one another. For instance, Napoleone, one of the pulenu'u lodged a complaint with Shultz regarding efforts by LMS pulenu'u to stop him from attending mass. The charges were later proven false and Napoleone was exiled from Solosolo.139

The Catholic - LMS conflict at Samusu regarding the building of an LMS pastor's house was also initiated by losefo. He claimed ownership of the land in question. Solf advised both parties to seek the guidance of the Lands and Titles Commission to resolve their dispute.140 A similar dispute also involved losefo

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135 Memo by Te'o Tuvale, 11 May 1905, GAP.
136 Solf to Alii & FP Solosolo, 10 Jun, 1905, GAP; LMS Ali'i & FP Solosolo to Solf, 27 May 1905, GAP; Mata'afa to Solf, no date, GAP.
137 Minutes, Solf, 10 Jun, 1905, GAP.
138 Pulepule to Solf, 27 Jun, 1905, GAP; Pulepule to Solf, 19 Jul, 1905, GAP.
139 Napoleone to Shultz, 18 Nov. 1906, GAP.
140 Solf to Mata'afa, 1 Sept, 1905, GAP.
terminating the building of a pastor's house at Tufutafoe. He also claimed the house was built on his land. He ordered the LMS pastor to leave, but the pastor refused, and refuted losefo's claim.141 In another matter, losefo found himself in dispute with the Gautavai LMS. Tagaloa, the paramount matai of the village, and the rest of the LMS clan, were incensed at losefo introducing a Catholic catechist to Gautavai. Tagaloa claimed that Gautavai matai in the past had passed a law to promote only LMS affairs within their village. 142 Solf wrote to Tagaloa to express his concern at losefo's action and to reassure Tagaloa that the German administration would honour the law already passed by Gautavai. Solf also wrote to losefo and informed him not to use his position as Ali'i Sili to "promote Roman Catholic propaganda."143

losefo never missed an opportunity to exercise his authority, whether it be through the political arena or the church. By 1910, he was still involved politically and religiously in matters out of his jurisdiction. In 1911, he was at the centre of a controversy over boundaries of the various villages in Aleipata. Losefo had made a decision favouring his own interests in Amaile village.144 Shultz investigated the various claims later and found losefo to have misled the Samoans and German administration regarding the boundaries, but his actions also created animosity between Catholics and LMS members involved in the dispute.145 Losefo was very much a puppet in the hands of the Lotu Pope. The German Pastor, Herr Holzhausen, observed that losefo was "entirely in the hands of Dr. Broyer...[and he] allows himself to be led by the Roman Bishop."146

Samoan customs became the centre of much controversy between the German administration, the missions, and Samoan people. The Samoans wanted to keep the status quo, the missions wanted to Christianise everything, while the German government just wanted to be rid of it totally. The most debated issues included marriage and divorce laws, which the German

141 Memo by Taylor, 20 Apr, 1905, GAP; Mata’aafa to Ali’i and FP LMS Tufu, 2 Jan, 1905, GAP; Mata’aafa to Taele, Isala, Amiutuana and Tuisafi, 23 Mar, 1905, GAP; Mata’aafa to Sibree, 5 Apr, 1905, GAP.
142 Solf to Tagaloa, 9 Mar, 1903, GAP; Solf to Mata’aafa, 19 Mar, 1903, GAP; Annual Report of the Matautu and Tuasivi Districts, 1903, SSR.
143 Mata’aafa to Shultz (Act-Gov.), 28 Oct, 1910, GSA; Shultz to Ali’i & Faipule of Amaille, 14 Nov, 1910, GSA.
144 Shultz to Mata’aafa, 12 Mar, 1911, GSA.
145 Newspaper Article by Pastor Holzhausen in Reichshote, Berlin, 28-29 Jul, 1901, NP.
government tried to unify under the German system. The interpretation of the new rules and regulations was diverse, and it covered religious marriages, civil marriages, mixed marriages, and the Samoan custom of avaga (eloping).\footnote{For examples, see Huckett to Thompson, 2-10 Jul, 1903, SSL; Mata’afa to Schnee, 13 Aug, 1902, GAWS; Memo by Taylor, 1 Aug, 1904, GSA; Memo by Taylor, 16 Aug, 1904, GSA; Minutes of Solf, 7 Oct, 1904, GSA; Abuse of Power by Suatete, no date, GSA; Suatate to Solf, 17 Aug, 1901, GSA; Solf to Mata’afa, 19 Aug, 1901, GSA; Memo by Taylor, 13 Feb, 1911, GAP; Memo by Tolo, 3 Sept, 1910, GAP; Stockicht to Shultz, 10 Sept, 1910, GAP; Villiers to Trood, 4 Mar, 1901, BCS; Langley (Foreign Office) to Trood, 19 Jul, 1901, BCS; Huckett to Hunter, 29 Apr, 1900, BCS; Trood to Schlettwein (Imperial Judge), 24 Dec, 1910, BCS; Newell to Dr. Kurze, 21 Jul, 1902, NP.}

The other pressing issue was in relation to land alienation, which looked at legitimising land claims by Europeans, traders, as well as scrutinising land applications for trade and commercial purposes by outside interests.\footnote{This was the biggest German company in Samoa. It was originally known as Godeffroy and Sohn. See Skeen to Walter Coumbre, 2 Nov, 1900, BCS; Solf to Trood, 27 Nov, 1900, BCS; Wulff (Samoa Estate Ltd) to Trood, 11 Jan, 1901, BCS; Weaver (Samoa Estate Ltd) to Trood, 26 Jan, 1901, BCS; Solf to Weaver, 22 Jan, 1901, BCS; Sol to Trood, 17 Aug, 1901, BCS.} The Germans also looked at ways of protecting the lands still in Samoan family ownership. Solf was quite severe in his comments on people who tried to take advantage of the Samoan land situation. Although, it was a never an issue with regard to his dealings with Deutsche Handel and Plantagen Gesellschaft (DHPG) land claims.\footnote{The debate over who had authority in Samoa was finally put at rest when the Germans changed Samoa’s fa’alupega from one which gave honour to the tama-a-aiga to one which honoured the Kaiser and the German government. See New Faalupega of Samoa, 12 Jun, 1913, GAP.} There were also the issues of burial locations,\footnote{Statement by Solf to AA (Berlin), 23 Nov, 1905, GSA; Bayerlein to Solf, 29 Jul, 1907, GSA; Statute Drafted and Sent to Ali’i & Faipule of Villages, no date, GSA; DH&PG to Shultz, 21 Feb, 1908, GSA; Williams to Shultz, 4 Feb, 1910, GSA.} Samoan protocol in relation to fa’alupega (honorary title designations) and gafa (family generations),\footnote{Sagapolutele (PN Saluafata) to Solf, 14 Nov, 1907, GSA; Moors to Solf, 16 Nov, 1907, GSA; Gilson Papers, vol 8, 1912, GAP; Memo by Laupe T., 24 Feb, 1912, GAP; Hough (LMS) to Shultz, 14 Feb, 1912, GAP; Morley to Shultz, 21 Oct, 1913, GAP.} and borrowing using a credit system.\footnote{The credit system, usually guaranteed with the next copra harvest, led to a lot of problems. For the Samoans, non-repayment of credits led to the loss of family land. For the missions, it meant receiving very little in terms of contributions and very little funds available for new church building projects. For the German administration, it caused a lot of headaches as Samoans asked for loans to prevent traders possessing their land.}
He [Samoan] has no conscience in such matters....Childlike, the Samoan wants everything he sees; the price and where he is to raise it, troubles him but little as long as he gets his desire. The inducements to run up debts become greater as the competition among traders becomes keener and in many cases the prospect of paying back are remote indeed.\textsuperscript{154}

German administration to 1914 did not satisfy Samoan aspirations, nor did it fully accomplish mission expectations. In the end, the Samoans accepted the existing conditions and hoped for a better deal from the Germans. The LMS remained British in its efforts to Christianise the Samoans, but was well aware of its commitment to the German regime. When Solf left Samoa in 1910, the LMS congratulated Solf for the work he had done for Samoa. In an address given in German, English, and Samoan, the LMS expressed their satisfaction "with the work over the last 10 years on the development of the people and the general progress of the colony."\textsuperscript{155} Most of all, the LMS expressed their gratitude to Solf for the religious liberty enjoyed by all missions in Samoa, and especially the German government for recognising the "uplifting influence of religious institutions upon the native character, and has sought to encourage the growth and development of native sentiment and native customs on enlightened lives."\textsuperscript{156}

During Shultz's time as governor the same issues continued, which previously besieged the Solf administration. Samoan officials remained arrogant and continued to make decisions contrary to the welfare and interests of the Samoan people, in order to promote their own self-esteem and self-interest. The LMS continued to face hostility from the Latu Pope, and vice versa. Shultz's administration continued to put into practice more rules and regulations, supposedly for the welfare of the Samoans. The laws and regulations regarding the keeping of pigs enclosed, dogs muzzled, the usage of firearms, intoxication laws, gambling laws, and the use of common burial grounds, kept the Samoans busy. Most of the time the Samoans spent their time working off a fine, or spending time in prison, for breaking such laws and regulations.\textsuperscript{157} The

\textsuperscript{154} H. S. Griffin to Thompson, 19 Feb, 1907, SSR.
\textsuperscript{155} Address by LMS to Solf on Completion of 10 years Rule in Samoa, no date, PMB 143; see also LMS to Solf, 1910, NP.
\textsuperscript{156} Address by LMS to Solf on Completion of 10 years Rule in Samoa, no date, PMB 143; see also, Newell to Herbert Newell, 14 Mar, 1910, NP.
\textsuperscript{157} For examples, Order by Solf, 1 Sept, 1901, GSA; Shultz to Fries, no date, GSA; Solf to Fries (Police Inspector), 10 May 1904, GSA; Solf to Ali'i & FP Levi, 30 May 1904, GSA; Draft Amendment to Pig Ordinance, Jun, 1904, GSA.
Samoans, however, complained that the laws and regulations were aimed at them, as *papalagi* did not seem to abide by them.\textsuperscript{156} Shultz also received complaints of favouritism towards Samoans by Samoan officials in cases between Europeans and Samoans. Samoan officials were also alleged to over-charge Samoans in fines for offences committed. The German administration was, at times, found wanting in enforcing its laws and regulations.\textsuperscript{159}

When New Zealand took over Samoa in August 1914, the relationship between the German administration, the LMS, and the Samoans, was one of familiarity but full of contradictions. All sides remained committed to their own aims and aspirations, but were not really fulfilling them to a degree of complete satisfaction. They all had good intentions but none achieved anything because of the animosity and selfishness of each side. The occupation of Samoa took away Germany's chance of improving its prestige. The Australian statesman, Alfred Deakin, best summed up Germany's failure some years before the German administration fell. He wrote that Samoa was still "far removed from other German interests in the Pacific, and merely as planting and trading stations, they can never become so valuable as to make their retention a matter of great moment to Germany."\textsuperscript{160} Deakin was probably right. If Germany had failed in Samoa, it was because Samoa was just an enormous plantation rather than a proud possession.

Notwithstanding Germany's unexpected demise, New Zealand's presence gave the Samoans, and the LMS, a chance to begin afresh the struggle to fulfil their aspirations and expectations, under a familiar, although insignificant, ally. For the Samoans, the deeds of Lauaki Namulau'u Mamoe,\textsuperscript{161} and other revolutionary thinking *matai* during Solf's reign, personified the ultimate aspirations of all Samoans - the desire to be self-governing, the longing to be economically self-sufficient, and the expectation of fully restoring Samoan etiquette. The Oloa controversy and the Mau-a-Pule conflict were two significant events in the Samoan people's struggle to achieve its aspirations.

\textsuperscript{156} For examples, Solf to Krauss, 12 Apr, 1904, GSA; Fries to Government, 7 Jun, 1904, GSA; Solf to Scanlon, 20 Jun, 1904, GSA; Kaufmann to Solf, 6 Nov, 1904, GSA; Solf to Stockicht, 11 Nov, 1904, GSA.
\textsuperscript{159} Minutes, Solf, 19 Dec, 1903, GSA.
\textsuperscript{160} Alfred Deakin to Governor - General Office, 23 Dec, 1907, Archives of the Great Britain Foreign Office.
\textsuperscript{161} Lauaki Namulau'u Mamoe was one of the most significant figures in Samoa politics. His political endeavours will be discussed in Chapter Three and more fully in Chapter Four of this study.
CHAPTER THREE

THE OLOA KAMUPANI CONTROVERSY

The Samoan (LMS) Church failed to function to its capacity as it got bogged down with Germany's administration policies. We saw in the previous chapter the relationship between the administration and the LMS was cordial but inflexible. As the LMS fought to maintain its mission status and spirituality, Samoans were more interested in exploring ways to avoid and reverse Solf's political and social agenda. The Samoan leaders found little assistance from the missions as they were having their own problems with the Germans. It was left to the Samoans themselves to explore avenues to vent their frustration and fulfil their aspirations. During the German administration the Samoan political leaders exploited two such opportunities, the Oloa Kamupani and The Mau a Pule. The Oloa Kamupani is the focus of this chapter.¹

The end of the nineteenth century found Samoa developed economically as more and more planters, traders, and merchants arrived to accomplish their purposes. Under a government that promoted large-scale business ventures, Samoa became one of Germany's most lucrative South Sea possessions. The Samoans slowly became aware of the wealth that was slipping through their fingers to European pockets and soon worked out that having plenty of money carried with it prestige and power. Therefore, it was not surprising that some Samoans in 1905 contemplated starting a company for the benefit of Samoans. Economic benefit, however, was not the only motive behind the business venture. The Samoans, especially losefo and the powerful Tumua and Pule, had major aspirations to fulfil. Although they had yielded to German rule, they continued to seek avenues to achieve their hopes and dreams. In order to understand the passion of the Samoans to succeed in such a business venture, we need only refer to the climate of political delusion.²

¹ The Mau a Pule will be dealt with in Chapter Four. The Samoan (LMS) Church also had problems with the LMS itself during the German administration, and these conflicts will be dealt together with other issues relating to leadership and authority in Chapter Ten.

² The kingship conflict from 1898 resulted in Samoans being condemned as the catalyst of all the troubles in Samoa, and led soon after to the abolition of the kingship office, in place of a more stable government, which in 1900 was fulfilled by Germany. See Chapter One for discussion. See also Western Samoa, Historical Notes, Apr, 1935, Island Territories Archives (henceforth IT), IT/1, Ex 2/15.
When Germany took over Samoa in 1900, the Samoans felt that Solf was appointed by the Kaiser to govern Samoa together with losefo, and the thirteen Faipule representing Tumua and Pule. In a letter written to the Kaiser by losefo, he reaffirmed this point. He wrote,

I rejoice greatly to obey your Majesty, because the Tumua and Pule have assigned to me the rule (pule) according to Samoan customs, and I alone - the High Chief - am able to make Samoa obey my commands, and, consequently, to make it possible for all persons (including myself), to obey your Majesty's commands.³

losefo also wrote to Solf, asking him "to order that the laws for the Samoans be made in conformity to the rules and customs of Samoa."⁴ In the letter he reaffirmed that Tumua and Pule gave him the authority and right to pule. However, Solf's speech on 17 August 1900 to the Faipule in Mulinu'u, laid to rest any doubts as to who ruled. Solf clearly stated his position and the position of Germany.

Nobody may rule in the country except the Governor; his power extends over the white inhabitants of the islands and over you Samoans. It is not the intention of the German Government to force you to adopt our morals and customs: the Government has regard for your old traditions, and respects them in as far as they do not offend against the precepts of Christianity, or the well-being and safety of any individual. The Government reposes confidence in you that you are able to administer your own affairs under the supervision and control of the Governor...⁵

Solf had carried out the organisation of the government as he intended, reconciling the various Samoan factions, abolishing the kingship, and breaking up the power of Tumua and Pule.⁶ Solf got losefo to accept some of his rival matai as government officials. He also spoke to the head of the Lotu Pope, Bishop Pierre Broyer, "who had long been losefo's confessor, to convince the High Chief of the impossibility of the tupu [king] idea, and to impress upon him the injustice of one-sided party politics."⁷

losefo took the disappointment humbly and satisfied Solf with his personal assurance to conform. However, he continued to seek advice and guidance from Tumua and Pule, while playing cat and mouse with the German

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³ A Report of the Governor Dr. Solf to the Colonial Office in Berlin, 19 Apr, 1900, Grattan Papers, MS-Paper 4879 (henceforth GP).
⁴ Mata'aafa losefo to Solf, 9 Mar, 1900, GP.
⁵ Address of the Governor to the Samoan Chiefs in Mulinuu on 17 August, 1900, GP.
⁶ Report of Governor Solf, 4 Sept, 1900, GP.
⁷ Report of Governor Solf, 4 Sept, 1900, GP.
administrator. Losefo cunningly wove his way out of mayhem with Solf. He used his wit and fa'asamoa to manipulate every conceivable avenue to maintain his German given powers, or better still, regain his Samoan authority. Losefo, nevertheless, relied on Tumua and Pule to maintain his traditional authority. Tumua and Pule, on the other hand, needed losefo as the vehicle for expressing pule in Samoa. At times, losefo would backslide and seem to relinquish his nonconformist spirit to the continuous provocation of the German government. Tumua and Pule would continually recharge losefo’s interest, and keep him on track of their political design.

By the end of Solf’s third year in office, losefo had resigned himself to fulfilling his position as Ali’i Sili in the manner expected of him. Solf from time to time rewarded losefo for his loyalty by granting him special privileges and he tried to keep him honest through monetary and personal gifts. It was also during this time that Solf began to discern the intricate, but strong and firm relationship between losefo and Tumua and Pule. In particular, Solf singled out two matai, Moefa’auo and Lauaki (known also as Lauati). The former, Solf described as being "too well known to the Samoans in general, and his words have little effect....a man always hankering after money." Solf, however, was more concerned about Lauaki Namulau’ulu Mamoe. He referred to him as "a grand, eloquent speaker, [who] carries much weight in the eyes of the Samoans. Hence he has many followers." Political antics and his forceful demeanour fuelled Lauaki’s popularity among the Samoans. Although he was an LMS adherent, he also fostered good relationships with Catholic adherents because of his relationship with losefo. Lauaki was able to command respect and support from many Samoans.

Solf met losefo at Moto’otua in November 1903, and informed him of his concern regarding the power and authority that Tumua and Pule seemed to have usurped. Solf was also concerned at losefo’s lack of action to control

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8 Solf, Auswartige Amt, Berlin, 14 May 1900, series 1-4, German Administration of Western Samoa (henceforth GAWS); Auswartige Amt (Colonial Dept.) to Solf, 31 Oct, 1900, GAWS.
9 Memo of Conference Between Governor Solf and High Chief Mataafa, Moto’otua, C. Taylor, 27 Nov, 1903, GP.
10 Memo of Conference Between Governor Solf and High Chief Mataafa, Moto’otua, C. Taylor, 27 Nov, 1903, GP.
11 Lauaki’s role in the Oloa Kamupani was important, but he was just part of a group of Faipule and ex-Faipule working with Mata’afa to achieve a variety of aims. Lauaki was at the forefront of the Mau a Pule. Lauaki’s biography and achievements, including his LMS connections, will be discussed fully in Chapter Four.
Tumua and Pule. Solf told losefo that he had "at last found the real mischief makers in Samoa"\textsuperscript{12} in Lauaki and Moefa'auo. Solf told losefo that he was concerned about the rumours that Lauaki had been spreading among the Samoans. According to Solf, the rumours had started after a meeting with the Samoan officials at Mulini'u regarding Suatele's resignation as the Samoan Fa'amasino Sili (Samoan Chief Justice). Solf decided not to seek a replacement.\textsuperscript{13} Lauaki argued strongly and forcefully with Solf to retain the post, but give it to a stronger Samoan matai. Perhaps Lauaki had himself in mind. Solf remained firm and dismissed Lauaki's motion without further deliberation. Lauaki accused Solf of poisoning Samoan minds by saying:

Oh, the Governor is a very good man, but he is too tricky. At first he cuts up all the different districts so as to weaken them, and gradually takes away the power from the Taitai Itu (district officers), and lastly, he deprives the Samoans of the high position of Faamasino Sili. After this the Governor will even take away the position of Le Alii Sili, so that no higher office remains for the Samoan people.\textsuperscript{14}

Lauaki taunted Solf with his antics. Lauaki told the people at Lealatele, Savai'i, who were mainly Lotu Pope, not to obey Solf, and that in him alone "all the powers of the good old faa-samoa are vested."\textsuperscript{15} In 1902, he took matters into his own hands and stopped Samoans working on government projects until they received fair wages and adequate food rations.\textsuperscript{16}

Solf would have been threatened by Lauaki's actions. Solf believed Lauaki was capable of instilling fear in the hearts of every Samoan, including losefo. Solf also understood that losefo knew very well that Lauaki, the man of 'a thousand tongues,' conducted himself in such a manner in order to undermine German authority.\textsuperscript{17} Solf also told losefo in their meeting that he had

\textsuperscript{12} Memo of Conference Between Governor Solf and High Chief Mataafa, Moto'otua, C. Taylor, 27 Nov, 1903, GP; Memo for H. E. by C. Taylor, 27 Nov, 1903, German Secretariat Archives (henceforth GSA).
\textsuperscript{13} Report by the 'Condor' Commander, 30 Mar, 1904. GP.
\textsuperscript{14} Memo of Conference Between Governor Solf and High Chief Mataafa, Moto'otua, C. Taylor, 27 Nov, 1903, GP; Memo for H. E. by C. Taylor, 27 Nov, 1903, GSA.
\textsuperscript{15} Memo of Conference Between Governor Solf and High Chief Mataafa, Moto'otua, C. Taylor, 27 Nov, 1903, GP; Minute, Solf, 5 Sept, 1903, Gilson Papers - Saleaula, XVII. C.3., Gilson - Pacific Manuscript Bureau (henceforth PMB) 479; Minute, Solf, 3 Nov., 1900, PMB 479; Report by Soaolo Tolo on the Lealatele Affair, 10 Jun, 1901, PMB 479; Tuala Silivelio to Schnee, 8 Apr, 1901, German Administration Papers (henceforth GAP); Account of Reconciliation of the Lealatele People, 7 Feb, 1901, GAP; Minute, Solf, 1 Oct, 1900, GAP; Solf to People of Safotulafai, Lealatele, Amoa, and Salago, 2 Oct, 1900, GAP.
\textsuperscript{16} Stunzer to Schnee, 19 Jun, '1902,' German Administration of Western Samoa (henceforth GAWS); Schnee, Minutes, 8 Jul, 1902, GAWS.
\textsuperscript{17} Memo of Conference Between Governor Solf and High Chief Mataafa, Moto'otua, C. Taylor, 27 Nov, 1903, GP; Memo for H. E. by C. Taylor, 27 Nov, 1903, GSA.
been informed by the British Consul, Hamilton Hunter, that Lauaki had even offered his service, and that of the Malietoa side, to the British if they required it to defeat the Germans.\textsuperscript{18}

Iosefo pretended that he knew nothing of Lauaki’s activities, and promised Solf that Lauaki would be punished as “an example before the face of all the people.”\textsuperscript{19} In the end, Iosefo was warned to keep his Samoan officials loyal to the government, while Lauaki continued to gain influence and popularity. The lack of action regarding Lauaki was perceived by Samoans as weakness on Solf’s part. But more importantly, Lauaki’s action was perceived to be the ‘communal’ reaction against the continuous deprivation of Samoan honours and dignities, and lack of respect for Samoan protocol. It was a reaction that went unanswered and unpunished.

The rest of 1903 continued smoothly, but with unconfirmed rumours that Germany was considering giving up Samoa. The Samoans were also complaining about the poll tax, and other economic and general policies of the government. The news of the fall of price in copra to as low as two cents a pound, further dampened Samoan hopes of gaining prosperity.\textsuperscript{20} The Samoan grievances began to foster anti-government reactions among the afakasi, and papa\textit{lagi} small-scale planters, who were feeling the weight of Solf’s economic policies, and the uncertainty of world market prices for their commodities. The fact that Solf supported and preferred to advocate large-scale firms such as DHPG also contributed to the growing dissatisfaction.\textsuperscript{21} For the Samoan leaders, the fear of Samoa being left without any financial support when Germany withdrew played heavily on the minds of the Samoan leaders. The arrival of an afakasi (part German – Samoan) entrepreneur in the beginning of 1904 took the Samoans on an unlikely path in achieving their political ideology.\textsuperscript{22} In this climate of political delusion, and political enigma, the Faipule at Mulinu’u began to toy with the idea of starting a Samoan trading company.

\textsuperscript{18} Memo of Conference Between Governor Solf and High Chief Mataafa, Moto’otua, C. Taylor, 27 Nov, 1903, GP.
\textsuperscript{19} Memo of Conference Between Governor Solf and High Chief Mataafa, Moto’otua, C. Taylor, 27 Nov, 1903, GP.
\textsuperscript{20} Felix David and Trader to Solf, 1 Jun, 1904, GSA; Gebauer to Solf, 30 Aug, 1904, GSA.
\textsuperscript{21} Skeen to Walter Coumbe, 2 Nov, 1900, British Consulate Samoa (henceforth BCS); Solf to Trood, 27 Nov, 1900, BCS; Wulff (Samoan Estate Ltd) to Trood, 11 Jan, 1901, BCS; Weaver (Samoan Estate Ltd) to Trood, 26 Jan, 1901, BCS; Solf to Weaver, 22 Jan, 1901, BCS; Solf to Trood, 17 Aug, 1901, BCS.
\textsuperscript{22} Untitled Article, \textit{Samoanische Zeitung}, 3 Dec, 1904, GP.
The German government did not think highly of Europeans with Samoan blood, the so-called half-Europeans, commonly known as *afakasi*. Herr Pullack, a son of a Samoan mother, arrived with the idea of setting up a trading firm on behalf of the Samoans. Pullack, who had received some education in America before returning to Samoa, arrived with no money and no prospect of obtaining employment.\(^{23}\) Pullack raised the idea of starting a Samoan operated company to produce and market Samoan copra. The co-operative was to be called the Oloa or Kamupani. It seemed Pullack had offered the Samoans four cents a pound for copra, twice that offered by the German firm DHPG, and other traders, if the Samoans cut out the traders or middle-men.\(^{24}\) In addition, Pullack also proposed to purchase a full-rigged ship for the Samoan company capable of carrying enormous tonnage of copra. It seemed Pullack had told the Faipule in Mulini'u'u that the cost of the ship was only $5000-00, a small outlay for an expected higher profit from the world market.\(^{25}\)

The German community reacted with animosity. The Inspector of Police at the time, A. L. Braisby, felt that educated half-castes were "a dangerous acquisition should [they] return to [their] native Samoa", and such danger was "manifested by a ridiculous consciousness of self importance and a dangerous amount of cunningness."\(^{26}\) The Samoan newspaper, *Samoanische Zeitung*, was just as severe in its attack on Samoans and *afakasi*.

We can expect a Samoan to propose a childish and ridiculous scheme such as this, they are, metaphorically speaking, children and knaves, with few exceptions; but we expect a young man of half European descent, educated in Europe, and travelled, to be mentally superior to the Samoans, even though he has native blood in his vain.\(^{27}\)

The newspaper went on to attack the actions of the Faipule. It compared its involvement in the scheme to the case of 'the tail wagging the dog.' It seemed the Samoans wanted to wag the government. The newspaper called upon the government that it was time for the government to wag the Samoans, "and it should be in no meanhearted way."\(^{28}\)

\(^{23}\) Dr. Shultz, *The Imperial Government of Samoa*, Report No. 44., 18 Feb, 1905, GP; Minutes of Soll, 22 Nov, 1904, GSA; *Western Samoa Historical Notes*, 1935, IT 1 Ex 2/15.

\(^{24}\) Minute of Soll, 22 Nov, 1904, GSA.

\(^{25}\) Untitled Article, *Samoanische Zeitung*, 3 Dec, 1904, GP; Dr. Shultz, *The Imperial Government of Samoa*, Report No. 44., 18 Feb, 1905, GP.

\(^{26}\) A.L. Braisby, Introductory Note, *Lafoga - Oloa*, 1905, GP.

\(^{27}\) Leader, *Samoanische Zeitung*, 17 Dec, 1904, GP.

\(^{28}\) Leader, *Samoanische Zeitung*, 17 Dec, 1904, GP.
The Faipule were easily swayed by Pullack's proposal, especially with the prospect that the company would receive a huge profit. There was no doubt that there was some merit in the proposal. The chief product of Samoa was copra, and the estimated output for the year was 10,000 tons of copra. Almost 55% of the total tonnage was provided by Samoans, 26% by the D.H.&P.G., and the rest, some 19%, by the smaller plantations. In light of this, the Faipule decided to start the company on 14 December 1904. They began a campaign through their district representatives, enticing people to participate and support the new venture. The Faipule quickly worked out the finance for the new venture. They proposed to levy a _lafoga oloa_ (company contributions) of eight marks (about 2 cents) for each family head, and four marks each (about 1 cent) for all other adults in the family. The proposed _lafoga oloa_ was intended to raise $30,000 within a few months.

Solf had always maintained that Samoans had no finesse for business enterprises. Samoans were more inclined to receive things, if they could, without 'raising a sweat'. A Samoan would not do a days work if he felt it would not benefit him and his family directly. Therefore, when talk of a Samoan trading company was first initiated no one but a few Samoans took it seriously. This was the general feeling also among the _papalagi_ as reported in the _Samoanische Zeitung_ on 3 December 1904. It said:

> We had hoped that it would have been unnecessary for us to refer in our columns to the suggested Co-operative Society for Samoans. These visionary schemes, as a rule, evaporate almost as quickly as the initial idea is enunciated; but in the present case, what appeared at first sight to be a rather foolish joke seems to have gained considerable hold on the native mind.

According to the article, traders and merchants, and anyone with an enlightened mind, would applaud the Samoans for their initiative, but the scheme was unworkable. Nevertheless, having said that, the article went on to warn the German administration not to be complacent, as such a company would be detrimental to the economy, especially "when the natives realise their

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29 Dr. Shultz, _The Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 44.,_ 18 Feb, 1905, GP.
30 _Cyclopedia of Samoa_, 26; liga Pisa, MS-Paper 4879-077, undated, GP; Shultz to Solf, 8 May, 1905, German Administration Papers (henceforth GAP).
31 Untitled Article, _Samoanische Zeitung_, 3 Dec, 1904, GP.
32 Dr. Shultz, _The Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 44.,_ 18 Feb, 1905, GP.
33 Untitled Article, _Samoanische Zeitung_, 3 Dec, 1904, GP.
commercial importance." The article further suggested "it is monstrous that the legitimate trade of the country should be jeopardised, even temporarily, at the whim of a few Faipule and an inexperienced youth." The article definitely prompted Solf to act. In a letter to H. J. Moors, he stated his intention of personally going to Savai'i "to repress some foolish measures put into the heads of the Samoans by a half-caste."

Solf had met the Faipule at Mulinu'u in November 1904, in relation to the proposed Oloa. At that meeting Solf clearly pointed out the disadvantages and risks, as well as financial commitment needed, for such a venture. Solf indicated to the Samoans, and Pullack, that a working capital of $10,000-00 must be shown before contemplating starting the Oloa. Solf prohibited the setting up of the Oloa because he felt it was risky. Solf was later aware that a meeting had taken place at the beginning of December 1904, which was attended by a large number of Samoans, to discuss the proposed Oloa. He knew from the intelligence he received that the Faipule had used his name to entice the Samoans to attend. Despite this, Solf was quite calm, although mildly concerned, about the Samoans' intention. The Samoans who had contact with Solf over the matter took the view that Solf had left it to them to decide. It seemed Solf had left that impression on the Samoans. This was the same interpretation shared by Tupua Tamasese in a letter to Solf. Therefore, the article in the Samoanische Zeitung, and Moors' letter, which criticised Solf's lack of action, prompted Solf's subsequent action against the Oloa. For the first time, Solf began to realise the negative repercussions if the Samoans were allowed to fulfil their aspirations.

Consequently, Solf went on a malaga (visitation tour) to Savai'i. He discovered for the first time, so he said, that a letter from the matai in Mulinu'u had been circulating, ordering people to contribute towards the Oloa. In a stinging letter to the matai in Mulinu'u, Solf clearly stated he had never given his permission to start an Oloa. Solf went on to chastise verbally the Samoans responsible, losefo and the Faipule.

34 Untitled Article, Samoanische Zeitung, 3 Dec, 1904, GP.
35 Leader, Samoanische Zeitung, 17 Dec, 1904, GP.
36 Solf to Moors, 3 Dec, 1904, GP.
37 Minutes of Solf, 22 Nov, 1904, GSA.
38 Solf to the Malo in Mulinu'u, 11 Dec, 1904, GP.
39 Tamasese to Solf, 21 Feb, 1905, GP.
You always call me the Father and Mother of Samoa, and that you will always abide with my parental advice; yet you have not shown it here. You have listened more to the words of a stranger, who is the young man Pullack, whom you have never met or known before. I never dreamt that you were so 'pouliuli' [darkness] and 'faavalea' [stupid]. Is not this a special instance that should keep me on my guard and harden my ears to all your future flowery speeches?  

Solf went on to enlighten the Samoans on how he had saved them from being ripped off. He then ordered Pullack to stop promoting the scheme.

On 14 December 1904 an Ordinance was issued, and signed by Solf before he left for New Zealand, which officially stated the German administrations' position on the matter. It stated:

The Lafoga-Oloa [store contributions] has to be stopped at once, as utterly illegal. No Tulafono [ordinances] or letter, be it printed or written, issued by the Malo in Mulini'u'u are valid. All Tulafonos and letters concerning Malo matters can only be issued by the Imperial Government, and will bear in such case my hand and seal, which is the Imperial eagle.  

The ordinance was accompanied by a letter addressed to all Samoans, explaining the position of the government, and to "deny to all that the Governor and [Shultz] have anything to do with this wrongful and foolish scheme as deliberated upon by the Malo in Mulini'u'u." Furthermore, the German administration also issued a clear order to all government officials in Mulini'u'u to immediately sever any connection with the Oloa. It also forbade all officials paying the lafoga oloa, and to participate in any way in the running of the Oloa. All officials who did not comply with the orders were to be dismissed immediately.

The circular also gave the Samoans an explanation for the administration's non-acceptance of the Oloa. Firstly, the way that the company had enticed the Samoan people to contribute to the Oloa was illegal, because those involved knew they could not fulfil their promises of paying four cents a pound for copra. To the German administration the Oloa was guilty of embezzlement. Secondly, the Oloa had not been registered as a company as required by law. Under the law, a company of such nature had to be properly

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40 Solf to the Malo in Mulini'u, 11 Dec, 1904, GP.
41 Tulafono, issued by Solf, Kovan Kaisalika, 14 Dec, 1904, GP.
42 Circular Letter to All Men, 14 Dec, 1904, GP.
43 Circular Letter to All Officials, undated, GP.
examined by the proper authority, and registered by the court. All such requirements were not fulfilled and, therefore, the Oloa was illegal.\textsuperscript{44}

The German administration would have been excused if they felt they had forced the Samoans to concede and abide by the ruling given, but Solf and his administration had learnt to expect the unexpected, especially when dealing with losefo and Tumua and Pule. In a strange twist in the events of 14 December 1904, losefo and the Faipule did the unexpected. The German administration had already informed losefo and the Faipule in Mulinu'u of the government's position,\textsuperscript{45} but as Solf and Shultz were busy delivering the copies of the Ordinance, Circular Letter to All Samoans, and the Circular Letter to all Faipule, losefo, on behalf of the Faipule, secretly sent a letter on the same day to Tuala and Maiava, both district judges in Savai'i. The Resident Commissioner at Fagamalo, Amtmann Richard Williams, intercepted the letter. The letter, signed by losefo, said:

I make it known again to Your Highness that our Oloa (Company) is accepted. We are here in council, I and the alii Taimua and Faipule, and we cannot give up our Oloa here at all since it is made. Money is collected here by the Taimua and Faipule and brought here to Mulinu'u, and I urge you herewith very much. Collect quickly your money and bring it to Mulinu'u. I set my hopes in your great patriotism, and the Oloa of the Samoans will be a success.\textsuperscript{46}

The content of the letter did not come to Solf's attention until Christmas day. But it was too late for him to do anything about it as he was leaving in two days for a holiday in New Zealand.\textsuperscript{47} When Solf left and nothing had been said about the letter, losefo felt he was in command, and for the first time was able to express his authority without interference from Solf. The letter provided Solf with ample evidence of losefo's slyness, although it was losefo's own way of declaring his intentions and aspirations. It also revealed his determination to function on any given sphere as long as it legitimised his rule. The letter could also be taken as a desperate effort to undermine the growing power and authority of Solf, while reaffirming and providing needed evidence for the Samoans that their own authority had not been weakened or lost.

\textsuperscript{44} Circular Letter to All Officials, undated, GP.
\textsuperscript{45} Solf to Lauati, 25 Dec, 1904, GP.
\textsuperscript{46} losefo to Tuala and Maiava, 14 Dec, 1904, GP.
\textsuperscript{47} Solf to Lauati, 25 Dec, 1904, GP; Dr. Shultz, The Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 44., 18 Feb, 1905, GP.
In any event, losefo may have felt confident to challenge Solf's power after being assured of the support by all the Faipule. The strong support and part played by Lauaki in Savai'i, and Moefa'auo in Upolu, would have also encouraged losefo. In the letter, losefo appealed to the Samoans' loto n'u (patriotism), knowing full well in using such a phrase, many Samoans would rise to the occasion and join blindly. 48 losefo appointed two non-official matai, as a precautionary measure, to receive and accumulate the lafoga oloa. If Solf questioned the lafoga oloa he could claim ignorance and, at least, had two matai as scapegoats.

The determination that losefo showed in collecting the lafoga oloa, even after Solf had given a direct order, suggested he had other alternative motives. Losefo knew Solf had visited Savai'i, and then issued an Ordinance, which meant no one would have paid any lafoga oloa to the scheme. Thus, the rushing of the letter, scribbled with pencil, to the Savai'i participants, was in order to collect the money before Solf's Ordinance and Circulars reached Savai'i. But even if the money had been collected, there was no way it would have been used for the Oloa as Solf had banned it. Losefo knew Solf well and would have suspected that the probability of the Oloa making a start was very remote. Losefo had other personal plans for the money. 49

Losefo's intentions may have been egoistic, but there were a few matai who were determined to see the Oloa come to fruition for the original purpose it was created - for the welfare of the Samoans; albeit for political expediency. The Samoans collected very little revenue for the Oloa. It appeared that Lufilufi, and a few Faipule of certain districts offered contributions. 50 The lack of response was due to the quick action by the government, and the contributions made by the business sector of the community to discourage the Samoans. The missions, including the LMS, also did their best to discourage their members from paying the lafoga oloa. The LMS published several notices in their church magazine, O le Sulu Samoa, to advise their members. The business

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48 See, Memo, Dr. Shultz, 20 Jan, 1905, GP; Dr. Shultz, The Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 44., 18 Feb, 1905, GP.
49 Peter Hempenstall and Noel Rutherford concluded that losefo would have used the money to give the mako prestige, and to reaffirm his authority, if the Oloa scheme failed. See Hempenstall, Peter & Noel Rutherford, Protest and Dissent in the Colonial Pacific, Suva: University of the South Pacific, 1984, 25.
50 Dr. Shultz, The Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 62., 11 Mar, 1905, GP.
community, as well as the missions, had much at stake in terms of trading and contributions, if the *lafoga oloa* had been collected.\textsuperscript{51}

At the time losefo wrote the letter, Solf did not believe losefo was the leading agitator of the Oloa.\textsuperscript{52} He believed losefo was only a pawn in the whole affair, and had used his position to influence the Samoans. The real culprit, Solf felt, was Lauaki. Solf's conviction was based on the facts that Pullack had instigated the whole thing in Savai'i, and that Lauaki's name had been frequently mentioned in Savai'i in connection to the scheme.\textsuperscript{53} Solf returned from Savai'i and arranged to meet Lauaki at Moto'otua.\textsuperscript{54} losefo was not invited, thus reaffirming Solf's view that Lauaki was the leader of the Oloa scheme. In the presence of Shultz and Dr Krauss, the District Judge, Solf solicited from Lauaki a promise to do his best "to persuade the Malo of the nonsense and the impracticability of the so-called *lafoga oloa.*"\textsuperscript{55} In essence, Solf made Lauaki promise to work against the Oloa. On Christmas day, Solf wrote to Lauaki to remind him of his promise at their earlier meeting. Solf also told Lauaki that he was in possession of losefo's letter of 14 December 1904, which defied his orders. Solf told Lauaki he would not allow anyone to go against the German government, and even if he was away from Samoa, he had already put in place plans to enforce the orders already given.\textsuperscript{56}

Solf left for New Zealand, and left Shultz to tidy up and put an end to the Oloa. Shultz went on a *malaga* around the districts of Upolu in an effort to gauge the feeling among the Samoans regarding the Oloa. At Lotofaga, the village of losefo, Shultz was reassured by the Catholic priest that the Ali'i Sili had fully conceived the absurdity of the scheme and was fully committed to enforcing the will of the government.\textsuperscript{57} Shultz also reported that many Faipule had stayed clear of the scheme, with a few still contemplating the idea. But, perhaps the most vital information Shultz received from his trip, was the realisation that Lauaki was still very active in trying to revive the proposal.

\begin{footnotes}
\footnoteref{51}
\footnotetext{Dr. Shultz, *The Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 62.*, 11 Mar, 1905, GP; *Miga Pisa, MS-Paper 4879-077*, undated, GP.}
\footnoteref{52}
\footnotetext{Solf to Lauati, 25 Dec, 1904, GP.}
\footnoteref{53}
\footnotetext{Memo, Dr. Shultz, 20 Jan, 1905, GP.}
\footnoteref{54}
\footnotetext{Memo, Dr. Shultz, 31 Jan, 1905, GP; Solf to Lauati, 25 Dec, 1904, GP.}
\footnoteref{55}
\footnotetext{Solf to Lauati, 25 Dec, 1904, GP; Dr. Shultz, *The Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 44.*, 18 Feb, 1905, GP.}
\footnoteref{56}
\footnotetext{Solf to Lauati, 25 Dec, 1904, GP.}
\footnoteref{57}
\footnotetext{Memo, Dr. Shultz, 20 Jan, 1905, GP.}
\end{footnotes}
According to Shultz, Lauaki had falsely related to the Samoans the content of his meeting with Solf at Moto'otua. In all the districts Shultz visited he was told of Lauaki's own version of the outcome of their meeting. In a memo, Shultz wrote:

The following rumour was spread on the South Coast of Upolu - that a short time ago the Governor had held a conference with Lauati in the presence of the Chief Judge and the District Judge, and asked him to stop the Oloa (Company), which Lauati had promised to do, but under the condition that the Governor would increase the copra purchase price to 2-1/2 cents, and that the Governor had pledged himself to do it.58

There is no doubt that the rumours were correct. For Lauaki, his status would have been reduced to nothing if the Samoans were told that he did not bargain and had received some kind of concession from Solf. In his effort to save face, Lauaki distorted the outcome of the meeting with Solf. As a result, some of the Samoans got the impression that the Oloa was still up and running. In such circumstances, Lauaki had no choice but to continue the scheme. For Shultz, the previous orders needed to be reaffirmed to the Samoans. Firstly, the Oloa must be fa'asa (prohibited) rather than taotaomia or taofiofi (suppressed). The latter would give the Samoans the impression that the government was non-supportive and trying to disrupt its efforts in favour of papa/agi traders. Shultz also wanted to explain to the Samoans the real motive behind the scheme, and the fraudulent intention of those involved to use the money for other matters.59

On his return from Lotofaga, Shultz was given a letter from Savai'i which confirmed Lauaki's efforts to continue the Oloa.60 The letter was sent from the village of Lauaki, Safotulafai, and stated that Namulau'ulu Siaosi had called a meeting on 5 January 1905. At the meeting, Namulau'ulu relayed a message from Lauaki to about 500 matai, who favoured the continuation of the Oloa.61 During the final comments of the meeting, an excited Malaeulu, a matai of Lano, jokingly remarked, "if the papa/agi [the Governor] does not consent to the Oloa one had to take pipi shells and scrape his body with them."62 The report of the

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58 Memo, Dr. Shultz, 20 Jan, 1905, GP.
59 Memo, Dr. Shultz, 20 Jan, 1905, GP.
60 Memo, Dr. Shultz, 31 Jan, 1905, GP.
61 Dr. Shultz, The Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 44., 18 Feb, 1905, GP.
62 Memo, Dr. Shultz, 31 Jan, 1905, GP.
meeting, especially the remarks about Solf, was confirmed by Williams, the German Resident Commissioner in Savai'i.

Shultz decided to deal immediately with the most serious matter, the insult to Solf. After the celebration of the Kaiser's birthday, Malaeulu and Namulau'uulu were both taken prisoner on board the Samoa, the government ship, and tried in court on 27 January 1905. Both men were sent to prison.63 Two days later, on Sunday, Shultz received a letter from losefo requesting the release of Namulau'uulu and Malaeulu, as they were only carrying out the wishes of the malo. Losefo also pointed out that papalagi made similar insulting remarks about Solf but were still walking about free. Before Shultz could reply to the request, he received news that the prisoners had been freed by the Samoans.64

In a letter to Shultz, Laufa, a Faipule from Safotu, stated that losefo, Moefa'auo, and Lauaki encouraged the fono (meeting) to free the two prisoners as soon as possible. Laufa stated that some matai had urged the fono to take the matter up with the Sui-Kovana (Acting-Governor) first but this was rejected. Tamasese was persistent and even offered to do it himself. Tamasese had been accused by his peers of being pro-German, and he took the opportunity in question to eliminate any such suspicion.65 The prison guards were powerless as eight matai, including Tamasese, Moefa'auo, Autagavaia, and Patauleave, forced their way in and smashed the holding cell door with stones. The two prisoners immediately made their way to Savai'i.66 Shultz was even more surprised when a letter arrived from losefo requesting his attendance at a fono with the Samoan representatives at Mulinu'u the following day.67

Shultz attended the fono and gave the Samoans the chance to redeem themselves by returning the two prisoners back to Vaimea Prison. The fono asked for pardon and promised to abide by the decision, but as Shultz retreated, Lauaki and Moefa'auo, tried to change the agreement already made. On 4 February 1905, Namulau'uulu and Malaeulu were returned to the Vaimea prison. On the same day, the Samoans requested and received an audience with Shultz. They expressed their opinion that the two prisoners should not be in

63 Memo, Dr. Shultz, 31 Jan, 1905, GP.
64 *Memo, Dr. Shultz, 31 Jan, 1905, GP; Dr. Shultz, The Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 44., 18 Feb, 1905, GP; Report of 'Condor' Commander, 6 Jan, 1905, GP.
65 Memo, Dr. Shultz, 15 Feb, 1905, GP.
66 Dr. Shultz, The Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 44., 18 Feb, 1905, GP; Minutes, Solf, 30 May, 1905, GSA.
67 Memo, Dr. Shultz, 31 Jan, 1905, GP.
prison as they were just following orders of the *malo*. They also referred to the insult to Solf as "a harmless joke." Shultz decided to release Namulau’ulu on the condition that he remained in Safotulafai to appear before the Governor when called upon. Shultz decided to keep Malaeulu in prison "to avoid the unpleasant impression it would have made if a Native who had made a verbal insult against the highest official in the country, had been left unpunished, when violent reparation was indicated *fa’a-samoa*."

The German administration believed that some of the European residents of Apia had a hand in the Samoan agitation. Many of the pro-German settlers, such as Riedel, Lober, Voight, and Krause, had informed Shultz of this fact. The Catholic Bishop was high on the list as he was observed to be rather prominent around Apia on the morning of the breakout. Furthermore, his close connection with losefo’s political interests could only be a huge temptation to sin once and awhile. On the day after Namulau’ulu and Malaeulu were returned to Vaimea Prison, losefo, and some of the Lotu Pope Faipule went to the Bishop at Moamoa and asked his advice on the Oloa. According to Laufa, the Bishop had told the Faipule it was a good thing, but only if it was run by a person with intelligence and plenty of money. He warned that there was always a danger that such a person would disappear with all the money, and Samoans would be left to regret their decision.

In Shultz’s report to Germany in 1905, he wrote, "the Bishop Broyer as far as we see has behaved absolutely loyally in the Oloa affair as well as in the matter of the Vaimea incident." Shultz suggested that because of the competition between missions, "the Catholic Mission may be urged on many occasions into making compacts with the Native." A small time planter in Savai’i, named von Heydebrant, who was married to a Samoan woman, was particularly disliked. He was reported, by Amtmann Williams, to be an active supporter of the Oloa, who at times, acted as a go-between for a small time planter named Deeken and another Oloa supporter named Tyszka.

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68 Dr. Shultz, *The Imperial Government of Samoa*, Report No. 44., 18 Feb, 1905, GP.
69 Dr. Shultz, *The Imperial Government of Samoa*, Report No. 44., 18 Feb, 1905, GP.
70 Memo, Dr. Shultz, 15 Feb, 1905, GP.
71 Dr. Shultz, *The Imperial Government of Samoa*, Report No. 44., 18 Feb, 1905, GP.
72 Dr. Shultz, *The Imperial Government of Samoa*, Report No. 44., 18 Feb, 1905, GP.
H. J. Moors' name was also mentioned as a corroborator with the Samoans. The fact that Moors had no money, and was on the verge of selling his station and stocks to the Oloa for a good price, made him a primary target. Shultz was also very suspicious of the small-scale German planters. The fall in copra and other commodity prices had made them rather incensed at the governments' lack of assistance and action regarding their plight. Many of them silently supported the Samoans in their scheme. Shultz was worried that the actions of a planter in American Samoa who petitioned Washington against the administration, would be followed by people like Richard Deeken in their efforts to discredit the government.

While Pullack had been the initial mover of the Oloa scheme, there was no doubt that Deeken attached himself immediately to the project, and later took over as advisor when Pullack returned to America. Iosefo and Deeken were very close friends. One of the reasons for Iosefo's distrust of Tamasese, was over Tamasese's unwillingness to attend meetings with Deeken at his Tapatapao plantation. It was Deeken who had passed on to Iosefo a letter from Pullack in America which contributed to the decision to continue with the Oloa even after Solf had made it illegal. The letter invited the Samoans to choose whether they wanted a steamer or a sailing ship, for the company vessel. It also contained Pullack's recommendation and advice to sanction Deeken as the ta'ita'i (manager) of the company. Shultz was convinced that Deeken had led the Samoans astray and had tried to revive the Samoan passion for playing one power against another for personal gain.

There were also rumours, which caused some excitement among the Samoans, and carried Deeken's name, that Solf had fallen into disgrace and that the Kaiser had ordered his dismissal. The German administration's fear of a petition reaching Germany was realised when news was received confirming such an act. It was attributed to Deeken and signed mainly by Samoans, including Lauaki. A small number of papalagi signed the petition; many were

74 Memo, Dr. Shultz, 6 Feb, 1905, GP.
75 Memo, Dr. Shultz, 6 Feb, 1905, GP.
76 Dr. Shultz, The Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 44., 16 Feb, 1905, GP.
77 Hackett to Thompson, 23 Sept, 1903, SSL; Memo, Dr. Shultz, 15 Feb, 1905, GP.
78 Dr. Shultz, The Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 62., 11 Mar, 1905, GP.
well known merchants in Apia, such as Peemuller, Hoeflich, and Fabricius.\textsuperscript{79} The strained relationship between Deeken and the government led to his deportation to Germany, a few weeks prior to Solf's return to Samoa. Shultz was disappointed later to hear that Deeken was given a pardon back in Germany.\textsuperscript{80}

Shultz remained calm under all the strain of the past events in the absence of Solf. The Samoans had tested Shultz's ability to deal with political innuendo and had come through with flying colours. The Samoans were now in a good position to compare Shultz to Solf, and no doubt had found Shultz to be far more approachable and, in losefo's own words, "a man with a tender heart, ever ready to answer the prayers of us and others individually."\textsuperscript{81} The Samoans knew that Shultz had dealt with them respectfully. They also knew that Solf would be much harsher under the same circumstances. The news of Solf returning to Samoa on 18 March 1905 left the Faipule with an uneasy feeling. They had dialogue with Shultz over the Oloa incident, and had accepted the charges against Namulau'ulu and Malaeulu over slurring remarks about Solf, yet the Faipule could not find any comfort. They contemplated Solf's return would not be beneficial for them. They could feel that the Oloa incidents during the past months would not be laid to rest. Shultz flippantly diagnosed the Samoan disorder as "depression after the frenzy."\textsuperscript{82} A month away from Solf's arrival the first sign of Samoan anxiety surfaced.

losefo was the first to crack. He knew full well that Solf expected much from his leadership while he was away. He also knew that everything that had taken place had already been made known to Solf in New Zealand. He knew Solf would not concur with Shultz's decision over the matter, and that Solf would increase the punishment for those involved. losefo began to soften the blow by trying to appeal to Shultz's understanding. He offered an apology on behalf of his colleagues, and begged Shultz to assist them by "applying cold water" to Solf's heart regarding the insult incident, and the breakout from Vaimea Prison.\textsuperscript{83} He wrote,

\textsuperscript{79} Dr. Shultz, The Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 62., 11 Mar, 1905, GP; Western Samoa Historical Notes, 1935, IT 1, Ex 2/15.
\textsuperscript{80} Dr. Shultz, The Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 44., 18 Feb, 1905, GP; Dr. Shultz, The Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 62., 11 Mar, 1905, GP.
\textsuperscript{81} Mata'afa to Dr. Shultz, 18 Feb, 1905, GP.
\textsuperscript{82} Dr. Shultz, The Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 62., 11 Mar, 1905, GP.
\textsuperscript{83} Mata'afa to Dr. Shultz, 18 Feb, 1905, GP.
The Malo and myself depend entirely upon the light which you will
declare to His Excellency concerning our wrong, in order that we
are forgiven in our crime; that it will serve as a lesson, and that
such a thing will never occur again since we are under the control
of His Majesty and Government.  

losefo truly believed that Shultz was the key to appeasing Solf's anger and,
perhaps, a lighter punishment for all concerned.

Tamasese also got cold feet and decided to write a letter to Solf,
although Solf was still in New Zealand. Tamasese had as much to fear as
losefo as he was one of the culprits in the breakout incident. Tamasese offered
an explanation for his action, claiming that it all happened "through the
ignorance of the Aifoaga of the Alii Sili and the Taimua and Faipule, who thought
that the failauga (the orators) were confined to jail by reason of the Samoan
Oloa." According to Tamasese, he had no knowledge of the incident whereby
the two matai in question, Namulau'ulu and Malaeulu, had insulted Solf. If they
had known at the time, they would not have considered the action they took. In
one of Shultz's reports to Germany, he also mentioned that the Samoans had
freed Namulau'ulu and Malaeulu under the impression they were penalised over
the Oloa scheme. Shultz was told that the Faipule in Mulinu'u decided to free
the two orators in order to conceal from those against the scheme, any
unfavourable reasons for rejecting it.

On 21 February 1905, Lauaki approached Shultz to charm him. He told
Shultz that he and losefo had agreed to give up the Oloa scheme. Lauaki
offered to return to Safotulafai and reverse the decision of the fono held on 5
January 1905. Shultz believed Lauaki changed because of fear, especially at
the thought of Solf's imminent return, but Lauaki was not stupid. He had
remained aloof from Shultz as he assessed the situation. He realised that he
would carry the blame alone if he kept his distance from Shultz. Shultz would
have taken his aloofness as an expression of guilt, but Lauaki's sudden
appearance before Shultz had a twist to it. In severing his connection with the
Oloa, Lauaki forced many Samoans who had followed him to return to their
homes disgruntled, and their hopes of a better return for their coconuts in the
future were shattered.

84 Mata'afa to Dr. Shultz, 18 Feb, 1905, GP.
85 Tamasese to Solf, 21 Feb, 1905, GP.
86 Dr. Shultz, The Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 62., 11 Mar, 1905, GP.
87 Dr. Shultz, The Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 62., 11 Mar, 1905, GP.
losefo and Tamasese had only asked for pardon, regarding their role in the Vaimea Prison incident. They had never contemplated giving up the Oloa so soon. Even if they did, they would have wanted to wait and inform Solf rather than Shultz. It would have lightened their guilt, so they felt, in Solf's estimation. But, Lauaki wanted to create an impression on Shultz, that he, in taking the initiative, was the mastermind of the decision. In doing so, perhaps, Shultz would influence Solf to be lenient for his part in the whole mess. Furthermore, Lauaki wanted to personally appear before Shultz as an act of faith and, therefore, guarantee Shultz personally that he had reformed his ways. If he had failed to do so, Solf would have interpreted his absence an affront to his rule. In facing Shultz, and taking a stance together with losefo, Lauaki made the point that they all shared the burden for all that had happened.  

The news of Lauaki informing Shultz of the decision to give up the Oloa caused a few minor wars of words between losefo and Lauaki. As already mentioned, losefo wanted to collect all the money and then do the honours himself when Solf arrived. According to Shultz, losefo had wanted to plead with Solf, again, for permission to operate the Oloa. He was willing to give it up if Solf once again responded in the negative. losefo's pride was damaged. He called Lauaki gutu-lua (two mouths), pointing out that the whole Vaimea incident had first been raised by Lauaki wanting to set free his brother Namulau'ulu. It seemed Lauaki and losefo both played to the existing circumstances, especially Solf's absence from Samoa, for personal and political advantage. Both men lost. But Lauaki headed losefo in the popularity stakes in the eyes of the Samoans. Solf's summation and final punishment, however, would determine the real winner.

Solf returned to Samoa and a week later held conference with losefo. Solf made it clear to losefo that he was "just as much culpable as the other Faipule." Solf told losefo that the position of the Ali'i Sili would not be shamed in public, with people saying that "the man who is nominated to be the first support for the Governor, and who has been greatly honoured by the Kaiser, had himself broken his oath of fealty." Solf told losefo he would be treated

88 Dr. Shultz, The Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 62, 11 Mar, 1905, GP.
89 Memo, Dr. Shultz, 13 Mar, 1905, GP.
90 Note, Conference of Solf with losefo, 27 Mar, 1905, GP.
91 Note, Conference of Solf with losefo, 27 Mar, 1905, GP.
differently from the rest if he severed his connection with the rest of the Faipule. If he failed to do so, he would share their fate. Solf went on to condemn the Ta'imua and Faipule, saying that they were "once honoured" but were now on the "black list of treacherous rebels."\(^\text{92}\) Solf then hinted at his course of action.

If the people in Mulini'u think that they can make their punishment easier by sticking together and pretending to be unanimous, they are mistaken entirely! This very attitude of the Mulini'u people has the tendency of threatening, and bears the character of open and wilful disobedience. ...Now they will soon see what they have done. It is too late now for either trickery or sweet words.\(^\text{93}\)

The Faipule also tried to reconcile their differences with Solf. Tamasese wrote to Solf to explain his involvement. Tamasese did not deny the truth of what had been reported, especially the part he had played. He apologised to Solf and begged his forgiveness, but Tamasese then went on to "declare faithfully" that losefo, and those who followed him, "was the root" of all the trouble.\(^\text{94}\) Losefo, sensing the anger of the Governor and realising the extremity of Solf's anger, performed an *ifoga* (public apology) on 17 April 1905. Solf rejected it. He told losefo that he was "unable to accept any *ifoga* having as its purport a reconciliation over the violent act in Vaimea and the rebellious words of Uo."\(^\text{95}\)

During the weeks that followed, Solf made several speeches condemning the Samoan Faipule, and reasserting German authority.\(^\text{96}\) In a speech to Tumua at Lufilufi, one of the Oloa strongest supporters, Solf compared the lack of respect shown by the Faipule for the German administration with the analogy of the 'rat placing filth on the head of its benefactor - the octopus.'\(^\text{97}\) Solf also demanded from losefo a copy of the letter that he, and the Faipule, had sent to the Kaiser.\(^\text{98}\) Losefo provided Solf with a copy of the letter, which was sent to Germany on 6 January 1905. Losefo then pleaded with Solf to dismiss Tamasese. Solf's main interest, however, was the

\(^{\text{92}}\) Solf to losefo, no date, GP; Solf to losefo, 20 Apr, 1905, GP.

\(^{\text{93}}\) Solf to losefo, no date, GP; see also Shultz to Pay Office, n.d., GSA; Deputy Governor Shultz to A.A., 19 Jan, 1906, GSA.

\(^{\text{94}}\) Tamasese to Solf, 22 Apr, 1905, GP.


\(^{\text{96}}\) For full speeches see Editorial Comments of Solf's Speech, *Savali* Sept, 1905, PMB 479.


\(^{\text{98}}\) Solf to losefo, 20 Apr, 1905, GP.
content of the letter. The letter appealed to the Kaiser to decide on several matters. These included a uniform for losefo suitable for his status of Ali'i Sili, uniforms for Ta'imua and Faipule, the re-appointment of a Samoan Chief Justice, to stop the inhumane treatment of Samoans sent to jail, to withdraw unfair custom duties, and for permission to commence the Oloa. As far as the Oloa was concerned, the letter stated that Solf had gone against the company in order to please several European merchants. The letter also outlined how the matai had defied Solf and told him "we will form a company, as nothing in it breaks the law."99

Solf's reaction was nothing short of rage. In a stinging reply to losefo and the Faipule, Solf objected to the letter having been sent in the first place, and expressed disappointment at losefo having signed it. Solf was quite critical of the Ali'i Sili.

Do you think your double game is unknown? Everyone knows your two faces! Speaking to me and the Malo Kaisalika, you show the face of the Alii Sili - appointed by H.M. the Kaiser, and loyal to him and his representative here, the Governor; but, looking to the Samoans, you show the face of the Tupu [king] faa-Samoa, chosen and anointed by Tumua and Pule! Try not to make excuses and explanations! Your secret acts lie open before me, and your many fold togafitis [tricks] have led you into a trap. All your schemes have been discovered.100

The blame was clearly on the Ali'i Sili's shoulders, just as Tamasese and Lauaki had envisaged. Solf clearly pointed the finger at losefo for all the latest troubles.

It is you who, against my order, appointed Tamasese to be Faamasino Sili [Chief Judge] in lieu of Suatele. It is you who organised the Oloa. It is you who delivered the first speech in that fono in which the Malo passed the outrageous resolution to break into the prison at Vaimea. Besides, letters written by you and brought to me in the cause of my careful enquiries show that you have no love for your own people!101

Solf also ordered losefo to account for the money collected and how it was used, as he was on the verge of charging many of the Faipule with embezzlement. The Samoan secretary, Toleafoa Maua Afamasaga, reported that only $73-00 was collected, but only a little of the money was left, as most had been returned to the Faipule who had collected it.102 Solf then ordered all

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99 Losefo, Ta'imua & Faipule to the Kaiser, 6 Jan, 1905, GP.
100 Solf to Losefo, undated, GP.
101 Solf to Losefo, undated, GP.
102 Memo by T.M. Saga undated, GP.
the Faipule to leave Mulinu'u, dissolving the malo and creating a new 'native council' in its place. Solf ordered all matai to be present on 14 August 1905, when he would announce his new government.103

The appointed day marked the fifth anniversary of the inauguration of the previous 'native government' in 1900. Solf outlined the aim of his administration in the changes to be made.

My speech to you today must not only be listened to during the time of our gathering; but it must repeat itself in your ears and hearts, and be heard by Samoans and white people throughout Samoa, for it is judgement as to the past and a law for the future. It is like a knife that cuts away the rotten part of the breadfruit and leaves only the healthy part.104

Solf's new government consisted of twenty-seven deputies who would reside in their own districts, and would only meet twice a year at Mulinu'u. He also appointed new district administrators, plantation inspectors, and other posts already created. The bulk of the new officials reflected Solf's desire to select matai who were loyal and had not taken part in the Oloa.105

Solf's speech went on to outline the relationship between the German government and the Samoans in the past. He stressed how the administration had tried to rule in order to promote peace and justice for the Samoans. It was also pointed out that Samoa's troubles had occurred because of the malevolent influence of Tumua and Pule, and the "double - face" attitude of its Samoan leaders.106 Solf then warned the Samoans that he was aware of all their insidious schemes, as well as their attempt to use his name in order to promote the Oloa. Solf again reiterated the point he had been making since Germany ruled Samoa - "there is only one rule in Samoa, and that is the rule of His Majesty the Kaiser."107

The most important part of Solf's speech, as far as Samoans were concerned, related to the punishment meted out to those who offended the German administration. Solf referred to Moefa'a'uo and Lauaki as 'ringleaders,'

103 Solf to Toelupe, Seumanutafa, etc..., 16 Aug, 1905, GSA; Haidlen to Shultz, 6 Mar, 1912, GSA.
104 Reconstruction of Native Parliament,' Samoanische Zeitung, 19 Aug, 1905, GP.
105 Solf to Toelupe, Seumanutafa, Flame, etc..., 16 Aug, 1905, GSA; Solf to Ama Fui, etc..., 16 Aug, 1905, GSA; Solf to Tia, 16 Aug, 1905, GSA; Solf to Salanoa, 16 Aug, 1905, GSA; Deputy Governor Schultz to AA, 19 Jan, 1906, GSA. 
106 Shultz to Solf, 3 Aug, 1905b, GSA; Reconstruction of Native Parliament,' Samoanische Zeitung, 19 Aug, 1905, GP.
107 Solf to Toelupe, Seumanutafa, Flame, etc..., 16 Aug, 1905, GSA; Reconstruction of Native Parliament, Samoanische Zeitung, 19 Aug, 1905, GP.
and they were earmarked for deportation. Moefa'auo was sent to Rabaul, New Britain, a German colony north of New Guinea, in the ship Samoa. On the day of his departure, his supporters had tried to change Solf's decision, but to no avail. Moefa'auo left on 29 October 1905, accompanied by his wife. Lauaki was later put on probation for a year and exiled to Savai'i. According to Solf, Shultz and Williams had spoken very highly in favour of Lauaki during the whole affair. It seemed Lauaki had been right all along. He had saved his skin due to his positive demeanour in his earlier dealings with Shultz. The Ta'imua were all dismissed except for Tamasese and Tuimaleali'ifano, who would live in Mulinu'u under probation for six months before they could fulfil their official appointments. Solf then dealt with the matai who were involved in the Vaimea Prison incident. They were fined 1000 marks, each paying an equal share of the fine. Malaeulu lost his position as village superior, and was reproved by Solf in the presence of his peers. Namulau'ulu, according to Solf was insignificant and therefore, not worthy to be deported. He was jailed for two months, and fined 100 marks.

Solf's action was heavy-handed. There seemed to be some discrepancy in Solf's attitude and that of Shultz towards the whole affair. Shultz felt that he had already dealt with the various incidents fairly, and that Solf would only affirm and, if needed, would have added very little to the penalties already given. Shultz was just as surprised as the Samoans at the severity of Solf's action, but Solf was in his element. He knew the incident of the Vaimea Prison, the Oloa, and the insult charges, had all come together at a time when he was looking for an excuse to change the structure of the Samoan government, without Samoan approval. The Samoans could be said to have, literally, hanged themselves.

Nevertheless, it presented Solf with a great opportunity, and he used it to its fullest. He got rid of Tumua and Pule, and he got rid of the matai who had a bad influence on the other loyal matai. It also gave Solf the opportunity to reorganise the government into a group, which the Governor would control without Samoan interference. At the same time, any prestige that losefo may

109 Reconstruction of Native Parliament,' Samoanische Zeitung, 19 Aug, 1905, GP.
110 Minutes , Solf, 30 May 1905, GSA; Memo by Taylor, 19 Jun, 1905, GSA; Reconstruction of Native Parliament,' Samoanische Zeitung, 19 Aug, 1905, GP.
have add, had been reduced after Solf had publicly humiliated him. Solf was given more reasons to justify eliminating the office of the Ali'i Sili in the future.\footnote{Western Samoa, Historical Notes, Apr, 1935, IT 1 Ex 2/15; Report of the 'Condor' Commander, 23 Oct, 1905, GP; Report of the 'Condor' Commander, 2 Jun, 1909, GP.}

The Samoans had attempted to rise above German sovereignty and fulfil their expectations through the Oloa. Although they failed, it created a lasting impression on the minds of several leaders who had not completely given up their struggle for self-rule. The leaders, such as Iosefo, Tamasese, and Lauaki, went their own ways and would contemplate the events that had taken place, and the lessons learnt from it for the future. The Samoans knew they could unite if they wished, but working together and trying to stay one step ahead of the administration was a problem. The Samoans returned to the normality of Germany's daily rule, and tried to work together with Solf to regain the confidence of the administration in its Samoan members, while searching and hoping for other opportunities to present themselves. Iosefo and Tamasese soon after mellowed into a peaceful state of mind. Lauaki, however, remained in Savai'i for an opportunity to regain his position in Solf's government, but more importantly, a chance to reclaim the status of Tumua and Pule as kingmakers, and to re-establish Tumua and Pule as the power base of Samoan authority. The Oloa controversy was just the beginning of Samoan dissatisfaction finding expression within the economical and political arena of its colonial masters. The Mau a Pule was the next step.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE MAU A PULE CONFLICT

The German administration dealt with the Oloa Kamupani severely to discourage Samoans from such undertakings, and to reaffirm Germany’s sovereignty in all matters in Samoa. The missions knew about the scheme but could only offer advice, as they cautiously remained neutral. Solf had punished the culprits, but he would have been mistaken if he believed the Samoans involved were made redundant. Solf, within three years, would witness the resilience of the Samoans in pursing their aspirations. Solf had dealt lightly with Lauaki for his part in the Oloa perhaps to entice Lauaki’s loyalty, but it was a gesture that Lauaki failed to comprehend. Lauaki, instead, took the time to re-examine his options in his quest to restore the status and authority of Tumua and Pule.

Lauaki Namulau’ulu Mamoe was an orator of Safotulafai, Savai’i. He stemmed from a family, which is held in high regard among the major lineages of Samoa, especially among Tumua and Pule. Lauaki descended from the Namulau’ulu family, which has a salutation in the honorifics of Samoa – to’oto’o o Fuifatu (the staff of Fuifatu).1 Lauaki’s father was Namulau’ulu Faleseu, who had adopted Christianity from the LMS at an early age. He was baptised Atamu (Adam), and was bestowed with the matai title Lauaki.2 Atamu had two sons, namely Pulali, who took the title Namulau’ulu after his father’s death, and Mamoe,3 the younger brother, who took the title Lauaki. But the title Lauaki did not give Mamoe much influence among other prominent matai, as it was not a Samoan title. Mamoe, in order to gain some recognition, would use from time to time his family’s title of Namulau’ulu to speak before his peers.

Lauaki married Suilolo, a daughter of Tofaeono, in Vaiala, while his brother Pulali married Ali’itasi, a daughter of Malietoa Talavou. Tofaeono also

1 Fuifatu is an important matae (meeting place) of Pule in Safotulafai. Safotulafai belongs to the district of Fa’asaleleaga, and various other villages in the Faasaleleaga District, such as Salelologa and Iva have salutations that connect them to Fuifatu. See Augustin Kramer, The Samoa Islands, vol. 1, trans. Theodore Verharen, Auckland: Polynesian Press, 1984.
2 According to Davidson, this title was bestowed by Taufa’ahau of Tonga in appreciation of the Namulau’ulu family’s hospitality to himself and his people during a visit to Samoa. See J.W. Davidson, “Lauaki Namulau’ulu Mamoe: A Traditionalist in Samoan Politics,” in Pacific Islands Portraits, eds, J.W. Davidson & D. Scarr; Canberra: Australian National University, 1970.
3 The name Mamoe is biblical. It means sheep, but it is used as a Christian name by the Samoans to emphasise the character of the sheep – peaceful and humble.
had strong family ties with the Malietoa family. These marriages connected the Namulau'ulu clan to most of the ‘royal’ families of Samoa. Like his father Atamu, Lauaki Mamoe was an adherent of the LMS, and his political ideologies and religious life went hand in hand with Samoan protocol. Lauaki was a deacon of the Safotulafai Church and was highly regarded by Newell and other missionaries of the LMS, as well as the Samoan pastors and the Samoan church as a whole.

Lauaki had learnt very early the importance that emotion played in politics. He also learnt the importance of knowing the various lineage connections and their salutations in the Samoan honorific system. He had used this knowledge to effect when enticing support for Malietoa Laupepa during the bitter kingship conflict towards the end of the nineteenth century. Solf had kept an eye on Lauaki’s political career and his slow rise to prominence. Solf knew Lauaki’s ambition and wrote about it.

He [Lauaki] could not conceive that Germany for all time and alone – without recourse to America and England – was ruling in Samoa. He found Germany tedious – he wanted a change, and his wife wanted to see her husband again in Mulinu’u as ruler over politics of Samoa.

Lauaki, like many Samoans, did not mind being told that business ventures, like the Oloa, was out of his depth. He did not mind being humbled before the Governor and his administration, and kow-towing to their every ordinance. He did not mind following orders, even though at times they were unfair and unjust. But, Lauaki, like many Samoans, reacted negatively if he was forced to run the gauntlet each time the sovereignty of the German administration was threatened. Lauaki, like many Samoans, detested being controlled, spoon fed, and being treated like a child. But, most of all, Lauaki,

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5 For further discussion on this period, see Chapter One.
7 For example, see Report of Solf’s Tour of Savaii, *Samoanische Zeitung*, 3 Aug., 1901, PMB 479.
unlike many Samoans, was unforgiving when foreigners tried to take away, replace, or change his Samoan identity.6

When news of German sovereignty reached Samoa, Tumua and Pule remained adamant in their efforts to achieve a peaceful government under the leadership of Losefo. Of course, in such a set-up, Tumua and Pule expected to be at the bow, at the stern, at starboard, and, mostly, at the helm, of such a government. The Tumua and Pule group was strong. It was made up mainly of three districts, Leulumoega (A'ana), Lufilufi (Atua), and Safotulafai (Fa'asaleleaga).9 The Samoans understood very well the function and importance of Tumua and Pule in the Samoan political, religious, social, and economic modus operandi. But, most importantly, Samoans understood that without Tumua and Pule, the rest of the matai confederacy would fail to function.10

The political troubles throughout the nineteenth century in Samoa occurred, not because of the incompetence of Tumua and Pule to maintain a workable government, but because of the inability of the papalagi to understand the intricacy of Samoan politics. Consequently, the Samoans were cast as uncontrollable, uncivilised, and violent 'natives', while 'tunnelled vision' papalagi usurped the right to instigate a civilised and workable political scheme for the Samoans. Sadly for the Samoans, a workable political scheme was equated with a European political ideology.

There were three problems in the equation - Britain, America, and Germany. While each country promoted its own political ideology, they remained indifferent and lacked unity over political 'correctness'. Many Samoans blamed the three European powers for the various conflicts during the second half of the nineteenth century as an outcome of papalagi quarrelsomeness rather than Samoan disagreements. When the 'day of atonement' dawned upon every little conflict that occurred, the Samoans,

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9 The other 5 Pule includes Saleaula, safotu, Satupa'itea, Palaui, and Vaisigano.

10 For a discussion on traditional authority see Gilson, 1-64; Malama Meleisea, Lagaga: A Short History of Western Samoa, Suva: University of the South Pacific, 1987, 24-38; see also Extract From Secret Report by Emasmann to His Majesty the Kaiser, 22 Mar, 1900, PMB 479.
especially Tumua and Pule, ‘filled the hoofs of Azazel,’ and on his head was placed the blame for making life miserable for the ‘righteous’ papalagi.\textsuperscript{11}

The Germans had formed such an opinion of Tumua and Pule, and of the character of Samoan protocol, early in their relationship with the Samoan government during the latter part of the nineteenth century, but despite their ‘infallible’ wisdom, they relied more often on Tumua and Pule to enhance and advance German interests in Samoa. The Germans, like the British and the Americans, were inclined to overlook justice and Samoan welfare when papalagi interests were at stake. The Germans had a knack of achieving the radical, and detaching themselves from the \textit{status quo}, especially when the \textit{status quo} did not equate with German interests. The Germans achieved the radical through the shrewd utilisation of Tumua and Pule protocol. The most violent and prolonged periods of agitation in the late nineteenth century involved Germany reacting to American and British domination. There were two clear examples. Firstly, the formation of the Tamasese - Brandeis government, in 1887, to counter the official Malietoa Laupepa government, and, secondly, the reaction of the Germans, who had supported losefo, to the installation of Malietoa Tanumafili I as king of Samoa in 1899. In each case, Germany was the instigator of the violent encounters at a cost of many Samoan lives. At the end of it all, it achieved, to a certain degree, Germany's purpose — to protect its political and economic interests in Samoa.\textsuperscript{12}

The political mayhem also acted as a testing ground for Samoan traditional obligations to the various \textit{tama-a-aiga}, as well as evaluating the strength and authority vested in Samoan traditions. For Tumua and Pule, the violence was unfortunate but necessary in order to filter out the weak, and help install and reaffirm authority upon a leader who was strong and able to rule Samoa. The papalagi reaction to the political conflict was to reinstate the weak ruler with the backing of a European community, the problem Tumua and Pule was trying to eradicate. Tumua and Pule remained angry and agitated, and in the events leading up to the official placement of Samoa under Germany,

\textsuperscript{11} In Hebrew religious culture, Azazel was the scapegoat upon whom all the sins of the nation were bestowed, and who was then sent away to the wilderness to die (Leviticus 16: 6-10)

Tumua and Pule worked secretly to avert the situation, and perhaps reverse the decision in favour of Britain.\(^\text{13}\)

The German administration took over a nation with a long record of violent agitation against previous Samoan governments. The Germans knew the Samoans' expectations for their new regime. They would also entertain ideas as to the hopes and aspirations of the Samoan people for the future. The Germans would have also learnt a great deal about Samoan protocol from past experiences, and that Tumua and Pule were a powerful group in Samoan politics. The Germans knew also that Britain and America were no longer part of their political equation, and the Samoans had no other avenue to address their resentments. Thus the political arena was restricted to two players, the German administration and Tumua and Pule.

Solf knew that the 'achilles' heel' of the Samoans, as far as they were concerned, was Tumua and Pule, and he was confident he had them under control. Nevertheless, Solf was cautious and took the view that Tumua and Pule were far too dangerous to be fully ignored.\(^\text{14}\) Solf believed that the only solution for a better and peaceful Samoa was to eradicate the problem - Tumua and Pule. Solf began the process during the inauguration of the new government on 14 August 1900. On that day, Solf failed to recognise Samoa's elite group, and the depressing task of devising a slow death for Tumua and Pule had begun. At the same time, however, Tumua and Pule also began the daunting task of personally undermining German authority.\(^\text{15}\)

In the thick of all the agitation against the German administration were the leading heads of the principal Samoan families, such as Iosefo, Tupua Tamasese, Tuimaleali'ifano, and Malietoa Tanumafili I. But, none of these men had the nubus of Lauaki. Solf feared Lauaki the most because of his orator skills and persuasive demeanour. Lauaki possessed the tenacity and strength of character, with an astute and brilliant manipulative mind, to use any given situation to advance Samoan political aspirations. Lauaki was the role model for all Samoans who were proud of their Samoan identity. Lauaki stood, voiced,\(^\text{13}\)

\(^{13}\) Memo for H. E. by C. Taylor, 27 Nov, 1903, GSA.

\(^{14}\) Colonel S. S. Allen – Notes on Samoa, MS-Papers 1499 (henceforth SSA).

\(^{15}\) Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 1909, Grattan Papers (henceforth GP); H. A. Hough Report on Samoa, 1909, London Missionary Society, South Seas Odds (henceforth SSO); Memo, Solf, 11 Aug., 1905, PMB 479; Western Samoa Historical Notes, 1935, IT 1 Ex 2/15.
and put to action, all the wishes and aspirations of his people, which could not be otherwise expressed for fear of punishment.\footnote{Note the previous example (Chapter Two) when Lauaki tried to stop Samoans working on government road projects, as he demanded from Solf better wages and food for the workers. Stunzer to Schnee, 19 Jun, 1902, German Administration of Samoa (henceforth GAWS); Schnee, Minutes, 8 Jul, 1902, GAWS.}

The announcement of Solf's new government was a setback for Tumua and Pule. The abolition of the \textit{tafa'ifa}, and its replacement with a foreign concept, Ali'i Sili, was not what Tumua and Pule had in mind. Nevertheless, the Samoans equated the Ali'i Sili with the holder of the \textit{tafa'ifa}, and treated the Ali'i Sili's status, duties and tasks, as equal to that of the \textit{tafa'ifa}.\footnote{Report of Dr Solf to the Imperial Office, Berlin — Unsent 1907, (copy in author's possession).} Thus, as losefo was still the preferred Samoan leader, his position as Ali'i Sili had elevated him to a status the Samoans recognised to be equivalent with holding the \textit{tafa'ifa}. The Tumua and Pule \textit{matai}, despite their opposition and some reservations, also took their respective positions in the Ta'imua and Faipule ranks. They, however, never relinquished the thought that their old political positions, as 'king-makers', still remained intact. In fact, Lauaki and supporters felt convinced that Solf had only changed the pattern, but had maintained tradition. Thus, Solf was still continuing the administration of Samoa by Samoans under German guidance.\footnote{Mata'afa to Solf, 17 Mar, 1900, GAWS; Minutes, Solf, 31 Mar, 1900, GAWS; Mata'afa to Solf, 1 May 1900, GAWS; Mata'afa to Solf, 26 May 1900, GAWS; Solf to Mata'afa, 24 Jul, 1900, GAWS; Hackett to Cousins, 11 Jun, 1900, SSL; Shultze to Thompson, 6 Sept, 1900, SSL.}

Lauaki's distrust of Solf's new government proved accurate. The three different incidents, which involved the distribution of losefo's fine mats, the implications of Solf's speech on 14 August 1900 regarding the abolition of Tumua and Pule and other Samoan customs, and the confirmation of German rule over and above Samoan authority, provided ample evidence.\footnote{Proclamation, Solf, 31 May 1901, GAWS; Minutes, Solf, no date, GAWS; Solf to Mata'afa, 24 Jun, 1901, GAWS; Minutes, Solf, 25 Jun, 1901, GAWS; Ali'i and Faipule of Fasito'otai and Faleseela to Solf, 3 Sept, 1901, GAWS.} The changes not only served as a warning to all Samoans not to interfere with Germany's administration, but it also challenged Samoan traditional authority. Tumua and Pule, consequently, refused to accept Solf's ideology and intentions. While they performed their duties as German officials, their efforts and intentions were aimed at regaining and re-establishing Samoan traditional authority. For the first four years Solf continued to implement plans to develop his ideals and undermine Samoan aspirations, while the Samoans planned...
secretly to use their existing situation to advance their own authority. The first Samoan reaction took the form of an economic protest in the Oloa Kamupani, which not only gave Lauaki and his supporters the avenue to test the strength of Solf's schemes, it also helped to evaluate the commitment of the Samoans to their own cause.20

Solf successfully manipulated the Samoans loyal to the government, and the missions and European community, during the Oloa to halt what Solf had deemed progress detrimental to German interests. Those who had led the charge included Lauaki, who had to ponder upon the shame and indignity of being left out of Solf's calculation for new government officials. In doing so, Solf further punished Lauaki, but he indirectly gave Lauaki a further reason to remain defiant and uncooperative. Shame was something that was very hard to swallow in the fa'asamoa and the condition usually entertained revenge as a form of therapy.21

It took a further four years for Lauaki to rise again and once more present Samoa's case to Solf for political autonomy. This time Lauaki was more determined to succeed and willing to sacrifice his status and authority in order to achieve Samoan rule; if not, then at least achieve some concessions for the Samoans' struggle. The Mau a Pule was, for years, like a sleeping volcano – dormant but full of underground activity. Lauaki was the Mau a Pule personified. From the time he entered the political arena and sided with various Samoan leaders in their struggle to gain political ascendancy, Lauaki had only one aim in mind - to advance Samoan traditional protocol. In doing so, Lauaki knew it would also improve his standing, and the fortunes of Tumua and Pule. Most of the time, Lauaki planned and acted alone as many of his fellow matai settled into comfortable positions within Solf's administration.

The little changes that Solf continued to implement to erase Samoan customs soon added up, and created an identity crisis for the Samoans. In the Oloa controversy, Lauaki had the support of Tumua (Leulumoega and Lufilufi) at the beginning, but as the controversy heated up, only some of Tumua, mainly Lufilufi, remained faithful. The heavy hand of Solf destroyed much of the faith in Tumua and, to some extent, Pule. Thus, Lauaki was uncertain how much

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20 Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 1909, GP.
21 Solf to Williams, 15 May, 1907, German Administration Papers (henceforth GAP); Williams to Solf, 26 May, 1907, GAP; Taumei to Solf, 19 Jun., 1907, GAP.
support Tumua would furnish and when the Mau a Pule rose to prominence, it was just that – the Mau a Pule – a political front supported mainly by Pule. Even with Pule, Lauaki had very little support, mainly restricted to villages in Savai‘i who shared his discontent. Since the Oloa affair, Lauaki had reconciled himself to growing old while his hatred for the German administration remained unsettled. At times, he felt unable to maintain his silent seditious protest against the Germans, almost to the point of relinquishing his struggle and begging Solf for a position in his government.

The Mau a Pule had been building up for many years and it was just a matter of time before it exploded. It had gathered enough momentum to legitimise any radical confrontation with the German administration. However, the Mau a Pule needed a catalyst, something to kick-start it. Lauaki fitted the description, but he needed something or someone to provide him with the passion and a sense of patriotism to do it. The opportunity presented itself in 1908. Lauaki visited losefo in Mulinu‘u and felt the urge to explode after listening to losefo’s whispers of sadness. Losefo wept and shared with Lauaki his bitter regret at having very little power and authority since the Oloa. Losefo told Lauaki that lesser matai had higher honour bestowed on them, and were recognised and consulted by the German administration regarding matters of importance. Losefo felt belittled at not receiving due recognition as the leading matai – the Ali‘i Sili – of Samoa.22

Lauaki knew losefo was right. Losefo had touched upon an issue closer to Lauaki’s own heart. The authority and recognition once accorded to Samoans of chiefly families were fast disappearing. Samoan traditions were turned upside down to maintain papalagi domination. For Lauaki, losefo’s sorry state was also a sign that losefo’s dominance was slowly depreciating. Lauaki was probably aware that his own days would soon be numbered if losefo lost all his prestige. The conversation with losefo stirred Lauaki to action. The passion and the fire had returned. The Germans may have given up Lauaki as a spent force, but Lauaki could never remain dormant, as it was not his nature. A German Naval officer observed this part of Lauaki’s personality. He wrote,

... a man like Lauaki who had for decades nearly unlimited influence upon the course of Samoan history, who installed and dethroned kings, whose whole life was interwoven with political

and demagogic activity, could by no means satisfy himself with the role of the dumb onlooker for any considerable length of time.\textsuperscript{23}

Lauaki told losefo of his intention and, after further deliberation, both men agreed to invite former Ta'ímu u and Faipule to participate. A meeting was planned and was well attended, and it gave Lauaki and losefo some proof that many Samoans were dissatisfied with the German administration, and were ready to support any efforts to restore Samoan protocol. But, the absence of Solf from Samoa and the fact that the meeting was held without the knowledge of the German administration probably enhanced the large attendance.\textsuperscript{24}

The meeting agreed on various demands to be furnished before the German administration. It demanded that the status and functions of the Ali'i Sili be recognised and increased by allowing his signature to appear next to Solf's on all government documents, especially orders and ordinances. The Samoans also requested that the Ta'ímu u and Faipule, who had lost their position in the government, be reinstated with an increase in salaries. They also demanded reductions in taxation, and proposed that all Ta'ímu u (mainly tama-a-aiga), be allowed to reside permanently at Mulini'u, and take part in all aspects of Samoa's development as in the past. Furthermore, they requested that a successor to losefo be appointed before his death.\textsuperscript{25} In essence, the requests essentially demanded Solf to restore Samoan traditional protocol, which Solf had reverted in replacing distinguished matai with lesser-known matai in his government in 1905.

According to the LMS missionary Newell, the proposed political agitation was a desperate effort to regain lost prestige and power. Newell wrote,

\dots [it was a] last supreme effort on the part of our electors and law makers - the influential class of tulafale with whom the titles of Samoa ultimately rest - to regain authority and place they lost when Governor Solf proclaimed that the supreme titles associated with the prestige of all the native governing bodies were to cease.\textsuperscript{26}

Solf was in Germany during this time, and was expected soon to return to Samoa with his new wife. Lauaki felt the return of Solf was the right time to

\textsuperscript{23} Vice-Admiral Coerper to the Emperor, 9 Apr, 1901, GP.
\textsuperscript{24} Newell to Laurance N., 30 Jan, 1909, London Missionary Society South Seas Archives, South Seas Special Personals (Newell Papers), [henceforth NP].
\textsuperscript{26} Newell to Thompson, 1909, SSL.
present their *mau* (opinion). Lauaki sought permission from Shultz to allow the Samoans to assemble in Mulinu'u to welcome Solf and his wife. Shultz at the time was unaware of Lauaki's intention to present Solf with a list of their grievances. Shultz granted permission on the understanding it was purely an act of respect towards Solf. Lauaki and the Samoans prepared with vigour, as they truly believed that they could achieve their aim this time round. Lauaki had told losefo that his status had slipped because he was weak, but he would defend the rights of Samoans and elevate losefo back to his former glory.²⁷ Lauaki was determined to show losefo that he still had the tenacity to rouse many of the dissatisfied *matai* to oppose the German administration. Lauaki made several *malaga* around Upolu and Savai'i, explaining to people the intention of the German administration for Samoa's future, and called upon each one to join him to 'put things right' again.

Lauaki received very little response. In fact, the very people he was counting on for support not only remained aloof from his scheme, but also encouraged other Samoans not to join Lauaki. The most shameful response was from losefo, who had been the catalyst and inspiration for Lauaki's actions. He abandoned Lauaki and joined Tamasese Tupua, Tuimaleali'i'ifano, Fa'alata and Tanumafili in a joint statement entitled 'O le Talaiga i Samoa Uma', exhorting the Samoans to boycott Lauaki. Part of that statement read,

...matou te matua faasilasila atu nei lo matou le aia i le anuilagi a lena failauga. Matou te matua faafiti atu lava....Na ona matou faanoana lava i le ta'ufuaina o matou igoa i nei mataupu, ae matou te le aui. Matou te tatalo foi i le Atua ia na faamalamalamaina mai tagata Samoa valea na faaeseina e leni failauga, i le poto o Iona laulaufaiva. O leni Samoa...ia outou alo ese nei lava mai lena failauga...

*(Author's translation):* "...we strongly proclaim that we have nothing to do with the intentions of that orator. We strongly deny it....We are sad that he has mentioned our names with regard to this matter, but we do not support it. We pray to God to enlightened the unintelligent Samoans who have been led astray by this orator, because of the wisdom of his tongue. Samoa...remain at a distance from that orator...."

The support from *tama-a-aiga* was crucial for Lauaki, but none was forthcoming. losefo had not forgotten his misfortune in the Oloa controversy,

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²⁷ Western Samoa, Historical Notes, Mar, 1935, IT 1 Ex 2125.
²⁸ See *O le Talaiga i Samoa Uma: Ae Maise Lava i Latou Na Ua Faaseseina e le Failauga i Safotulafai*, 26 Mar, 1909, Marist Archives of Samoan and Tokelau (henceforth MAST).
especially the humiliation he had suffered when Lauaki and Tamasese abandoned him to take the blame. Losefo probably withdrew his support to avoid further shame. Furthermore, the other four tama-a-aiga were LMS deacons and the fact that they had withdrawn their support from Lauaki, left losefo in an uncomfortable position. Perhaps, the tama-a-aiga also sensed the uselessness of Lauaki’s situation and decided to remain passive.

Many other Samoans remained neutral because of either fear of the German administration or just plain loyalty to Solf and his administration. Solf had implemented the practice of offering inducements to entice many matai, such as material rewards and his personal friendship. Consequently, Lauaki’s every word and every move was duly reported to the German administration, at times prompting misgivings in the German administration as to Lauaki’s real intention. In the absence of Solf, Shultz dealt with Lauaki as discretely as possible. Shultz had followed Lauaki’s every move around the country, and as reports piled up, Shultz took the view that Lauaki had seditious intentions.

Lauaki, however, still managed to elicit support from members of the Malietoa and Tamasese families, although they were mainly from Samoans who had previous grievances with the German government. Shultz knew well the danger of allowing a group of Samoans the chance to express their anger. The volatile situation was not helped in any way when Lauaki and his supporters were under the false impression they had the backing of the LMS. Lauaki had good reasons to expect some support from the Samoan (LMS) Church, and this belief was also shared by the German administration as rumours filtered through from the various districts. The possibility of Lauaki being supported by the Samoan (LMS) Church was real enough to force Shultz to issue an order to confine Lauaki in Savai’i on the day of Solf’s arrival.

The news of support for Lauaki began at Malua, and Newell was under pressure to refute rumours that he had told students at Malua that all matai in Savai’i should “hold on to their opinions and stick up to the Governor.” These rumours would have reached Lauaki and further encouraged him to continue his political stance. There is no doubt that Newell was aware of the rumours,

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29 Shultz to Pay Office, 17 Jan, 1912, GSA; Shultz to Colonial Office, 18 Feb, 1914, GSA; Mata’aafa to Solf, 26 Feb., 1909, GSA; Mata’aafa to Solf, 13 Apr, 1909, GSA.

30 Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 1909, GP; Morley to Thompson, 21 Nov, 1908, SSL.

31 Newell to Laurance N., 30 Jan, 1909, NP.
especially as students travelled from Savai‘i back to Malua after their weekend leave. The fact that the LMS had little affection for the Germans, would have also encouraged Lauaki to believe the rumours. Newell later apologised to the German administration after discovering that a student from the Malua Seminary had spread the rumour. Aurelio was dismissed, but he was seen as a ‘sacrifice’ to preserve the pride of the other Samoans in Malua who held the same ideology. The incident only confirmed that many Samoan church members supported Lauaki’s political endeavours silently.\(^\text{32}\)

Solf later advised Newell when he heard of Aurelio’s dismissal.

\> You shouldn’t dismiss the fellow. If I dismiss every chief who lie and you turn out all who lie, I should have empty mats and you soon empty benches.\(^\text{33}\)

Meanwhile, Shultz continued to diffuse Lauaki’s dominance by campaigning hard to convince the Samoans of the folly of Lauaki’s actions. The Samoan government officials, such as Te‘o Tuvale and Afamasaga Maua, revived old Samoan factionalism to achieve the German administration’s aim. They spread rumours that Lauaki was preparing to depose losefo in favour of Malietoa. Solf arrived on 19 November 1908, and once again faced a Samoan movement with Lauaki in the forefront. The previous time Solf was away, the economic protest under the guise of the Oloa welcomed him to Samoa. Now, it was a political protest that welcomed him back from his honeymoon.\(^\text{34}\)

The news that Solf had arrived reached Lauaki, and he immediately left Savai‘i with his supporters. He had already made his plans and was determined to carry them out. On his way to Mulinu‘u, Lauaki heard rumours that Solf would not receive him. But, as planned, he arrived at Leulumoega, a stronghold of Tumua, and found that A‘ana would not give him the support that had been promised. Instead, he was given a letter from the German administration ordering him to return to Savai‘i. To make matters painful for Lauaki, a letter from losefo was also furnished to support the German administration orders, and confirmed his stance with the other tama-a-aiga.\(^\text{35}\) Lauaki was shattered. The loyalty of losefo was once again tested and found wanting, as far as Lauaki

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\(^{32}\) The Roman Catholics in Lepa village also complaint of the affect Lauaki was having on its church members. See Soliola to Moaseniolo, 28 May, 1909, MAST.

\(^{33}\) Newell to Laurance N., 30 Jan, 1909, NP.

\(^^{34}\) Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 1909, GP; Newell to Laurance N., 30 Jan, 1909, NP.

\(^{35}\) Short Summary of Lauaki Rebellion, undated, GP; Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 1909, GP.
was concerned, at a crucial political moment. Lauaki went home with his tail between his legs, realising just how much his countrymen had not only let him down, but had let Samoa down. Even before the requests were delivered at Mulinu'u, the movement had collapsed because of the helplessness of losefo to encounter Solf, and the inability of the Samoans to unite. Losefo may have seemed weak to Lauaki but in his weakness losefo found the strength to put the welfare of the Samoans ahead of his personal aspirations. 36

One month after the big disappointment, Lauaki had regained his composure and put aside the shame of a shattered man, and called all Savai'i to a meeting at Safotulafai. Lauaki's heart was hardened even further against the German administration. He told the six districts of Pule (Safotulafai, Sale'aula, Safotu, Satupa'itea, Palauli, and Vaisigano) to oppose the German administration until they accepted their resolutions. This was the beginning of what came to be known officially as the Mau a Pule (the opinions or resolutions of Pule). For Lauaki, the political opinions of Pule represented feelings of the whole of Samoa, although Samoa remained aloof. Lauaki employed his closest friends to seek support from aiga of Samoa. I'iga Pisa was one such faithful friend. He was a matai from Amoa, Savai'i. He was respected among his peers for his wisdom and charisma, although he was only twenty-nine years of age. I'iga Pisa was a tower of strength for the movement. 37

I'iga Pisa was present in Amoa when the order from the German administration circulated inhibiting people attending Mulinu'u to welcome Solf. On that occasion, I'iga Pisa was reported to have told the government messengers that it was "impossible, all Amoa will go to Upolu, they cannot stay." Furthermore, he taunted Solf's messengers and issued a challenge as to whether it was "true that Germany [was] really pule of Samoa?" 38 In his effort to secure support for the Mau a Pule, I'iga Pisa sought out Tamasese at Lufilufi, Tuisamau in Tuamasaga, and the paramount matai of Leulumoega. I'iga Pisa gained for Lauaki the support of Tamasese, Fata Ioeta, and the matai of Leulumoega, who further encouraged Lauaki to be strong and press forward the

36 Shultz had hand picked a special committee from members of the Samoan committee to welcome Solf. Each had to bring three taros, one big fish, and one cooked chicken. Eleven districts were selected to provide entertainment, while another eight districts provided ta'a/o/o (presentation of gifts). See Newell Papers, (Box 5, 2053), SSO.

37 Thomas Trood, the British vice-consul, expressed his non-surprised at the outcome of Lauaki's action. See Thomas Trood to Solf, 6 Feb, 1909, BCS; Western Samoa Historical Notes, 1935, IT 1 Ex 2/15.

38 Taumei to Solf, 29 Dec, 1908, GP.
matters concerned. I'iga Pisa tried to travel to American Samoa with a letter from Lauaki soliciting support. In order to reach Tutuila, I'iga Pisa stowed away in a box of kapok on the ship, but he was discovered and deported back to Samoa. 39

On 29 December 1908, Solf was informed that I'iga Pisa had received a 'strong letter of encouragement' from Tutuila. The informant, named Taumei, was a loyal official of the German administration. He expressed his concern that such a letter would lead the people astray, although Lauaki had already informed Taumei that the letter was a tusi fa'aleaiga (a personal family letter). 40 I'iga Pisa was later arrested and a letter was found on his person which contained speculations as to the misuse of Samoan money by the government. The German administration blamed 'whiskey politicians' in the white community who play 'pothouse' politics in encouraging the Samoans and using the Samoans for their selfish ends. 41

Solf received news that Pule was gathering in Savai'i and decided to undertake a personal malaga to meet the people concerned during December 1908. But, the effort to reconcile Pule's differences with the German administration failed. Solf failed to dissolve the Mau a Pule movement and to destroy the resolutions raised therein. Lauaki got the best of Solf in a verbal encounter at Safotulafai, and Solf returned to Upolu a very angry man. For four long months afterwards, Lauaki and his supporters made life miserable for the German administration. 42 The news of Lauaki defying the Governor spread throughout Samoa.

Lauaki took advantage of the situation to order his supporters to pay all their taxes to the Mau a Pule and not to the German administration. Those who had earlier distanced themselves from Lauaki began to rise up and offer their support. Pule's traditional allies, such as Manono and Tuamasaga, rallied behind Lauaki, especially when the news broke that Solf had asked to meet Lauaki at Mulinu'u. Districts in Savai'i who joined Lauaki included Fa'salaleaga, Lealatele, and Gaga'emauga. There was a feeling of confidence among the

39 Kapok is a fine cotton-like material from a tropical tree used as padding. It was mainly stored in the small places similar to cupboards. See Taumei to Solf, 29 Dec, 1908, GP.
40 Taumei to Solf, 29 Dec, 1908, GPL; Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 1909, GP.
41 Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 1909, GP.
42 Short Summary of Lauaki Rebellion, undated, GP; Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 1909, GP; Western Samoa, Historical Notes, Mar, 1935, IT 1 Ex 225.
Samoans that the meeting at Mulinu'u would settle all their conflict, and Samoa would be returned to its own protocol.

On 10 January 1909, prior to meeting Lauaki, Solf gathered many of the Samoans to Mulinu'u, especially Tumua and matai in Upolu, and demanded total loyalty to the German administration. Solf challenged Tumua (Lufilufi and Leulumoega) with some biting remarks.

Poor Lufilufi! Poor Leulumoega! Where is your power and splendour! You are living in the shade. Tear down your huts and go to Safotulafai. There is power and splendour. There is the rule of Samoa, your glory is gone, for Lauaki is the maker of kings. He confers the high honours, not you. He inuncted Mata'afa. He will inunct himself, as tafa'i'a, he will go with his queen Sialataua to Mulinu'u and will be Lord over you fools.43

Consequently, Tumua renounced Lauaki and Pule before Solf, and thus remained aloof from his uso tu ofe.44 A key element to Lauaki's success fell at the last hurdle, and weakened the efforts of the Mau a Pule to gain glory. Unfortunately, for Lauaki and his supporters, this 'Judas act' was not relayed to them. Lauaki had no idea he was lured into a political death trap with the helping hand of his peers. The support that Lauaki felt was forthcoming from the Samoan (LMS) Church was also a myth, but it was most probably withdrawn after the tama-a-aiga's proclamation.

Solf met Lauaki in Mulinu'u on 16 January 1909.45 Lauaki contemplated using the opportunity to present the mau (grievances) of the Samoan people. Lauaki called at Vaiusu, Tuamasaga, with a fleet of supporters from Savai'i and Manono. Vaiusu became the Mau a Pule headquarter as it was across the bay from Mulinu'u. Even with Tumua neutralised, Solf was surprised at the strength of Lauaki's support. He decided not to ruffle Lauaki's feathers; especially as Lauaki's 'blackened faced' warriors appeared restive and edgy. In a bold move to diffuse a hostile situation, Solf offered Lauaki a pardon for his past misdeeds. He then sought dialogue with Lauaki to reach a peaceful settlement. He also ordered Lauaki to return immediately to Savai'i, but the meeting ended with no solution, as both sides refused to accept each other's proposal.46

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43 Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 1909, GP.
44 *Uso tu ofe*, literally translated 'brothers who stands like bamboo plants'. It is a Samoan concept, which refers to brothers who have emerged from a common root. Tumua and Pule are considered 'uso tu ofe'.
46 H. A. Hough Report on Samoa 1909, SSO; Short Summary of Lauaki Rebellion, undated, GP.
returned to Vaiusu from Mulinu’u with a sense of victory. He felt he had
successfully argued with Solf, and had defied the German administration into
confusion. However, Lauaki, still had to think about Solf’s order for him to return
to Savai’i.

Solf did not ask Lauaki to go back to Savai’i, he ordered him. Lauaki
knew Solf well, and such an order would not have been made if Solf was not
prepared for a confrontation. Lauaki was confused as to what Solf had in mind.
Solf had not let on to Lauaki his plan if Lauaki failed to obey German orders.
Lauaki ignored Solf’s order and he remained encamped in Vaiusu. He offered
various excuses ranging from the weather to observing Sunday taboos in his
efforts to defy Solf’s order. Lauaki then took the initiative without waiting to see
what Solf had up his sleeve. Lauaki felt he had the upper hand, and that Solf
was probably bluffing.

On 18 January 1909, at about 10 o’clock in the morning, Solf received
two letters. One was signed by Lauaki, and the other signed by Pule and Aiga
(Savai’i and Manono). Lauaki’s letter was rebellious from the beginning. Rather
than being addressed to the Kovan Kaisalika (Imperial Governor) it was
addressed Kovana Siamani (German Governor). In the letter, Lauaki stated that
he would not be deported or be sent back to Savai’i, but would remain at Vaiusu
and enjoy watching the war between Pule and Tumua, as Solf wished. Lauaki
then signed the letter as “Lauaki, your true friend.” The second letter contained
a number of wishes and proposals of the Mau a Pule. Lauaki defied Solf and
was calling his bluff regarding Tumua remaining aloof if war broke out. While
Solf, Shultz, Haiden, and the German administration, met to discuss the content
of the letters, Lauaki’s men paraded near Apia with blackened faces ready for
war.

Solf took losefo and went to Vaiusu to appease Lauaki. Solf also invited
Newell to the meeting to influence Lauaki. When Solf met Lauaki, Lauaki
pointed and said to Solf, “Samoa fa’a-leaga ina” (Samoa spoiled), to which Solf
replied, “e leai, oe fa’a leaga ina Samoa” (No, you spoil Samoa). Deliberation
then went on for hours, especially Lauaki’s speech, which gathered up the past
history of the relationship between the Samoans and the German

47 Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 1909, GP.
48 Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 1909, GP; see also Western Samoa, Historical
Notes, Mar, 1938, IT 1 Ex 2/25.
administration. Lauaki then pointed out that losefo all along had been the instigator of all the troubles in Samoa. A bible was brought to Lauaki upon which he swore regarding the truthfulness of his speech.⁴⁹ Lauaki then asked for peace, and pointed out his disappointment at the government using Togisala, a matai of Lufilufi, to stir up Leulumoega (Tumua) against Pule.

Solf felt that Lauaki's accusation against losefo, if proven, would initiate charges of conspiracy against losefo, and it would certainly give Lauaki and Pule some foundation for their rebellious mood. Thus, for Solf to punish Lauaki and let losefo unpunished would promote injustice and possibly a civil war among the Samoans. Newell also spoke to Lauaki and convinced Lauaki to accept Solf's offer. In the end, Lauaki agreed to denounce the improper letters and accept Solf's pardon. Solf also promised he would examine the proposals and demands of the Mau a Pule. Lauaki accepted Solf's address and asked only of Solf to declare again that he would not be punished for any of the events that had occurred. This request angered Solf, and he responded,

There are two matters to be considered in this, that in themselves have nothing to do with each other. One of them I can see clearly, that is your inobedience against my representative and against myself, and your menacing attitude against my intention to call you to account. For both facts you have explanations and made excuses, and as regards them I have the power and feel inclined to let once more mercy come before justice.⁵⁰

Solf wanted Lauaki to understand that he did not deserve to be pardoned, but circumstances had saved him. Lauaki promised Solf again that peace would be kept, and he would return to Savai'i. Lauaki, had ingeniously used losefo once again to 'save face' before Solf and the Samoan people.

However, Lauaki's antics had caused some jealousy among the ranks of Tumua, especially when the words of Solf regarding their subservient attitude to Pule were still ringing in their ears. Solf had sensed that the white population, especially the afakasi had somehow contributed to the determination of the A'ana, Vaimauga, and Safata, people to declare war on Lauaki, especially when Lauaki had opted for peace. Solf had to step in with an ordinance forbidding Tumua and any other group taking up arms against Lauaki and his supporters. Afamasaga, and other government officials, worked around the clock defusing the volatile situation. The order by the government had reached all people.

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⁴⁹ Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 1909, GP.
⁵⁰ Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 1909, GP.
concerned and averted an unpleasant event. Samoan pastors in various villages around Samoa also did their best to dissuade further Samoans joining Lauaki and the Mau a Pule. The conflict was an extension of Solf’s comments earlier regarding Pule, which agitated Tumua into a frenzied mental state. The Samoan church was not keen to see Samoans fighting Samoans, as it would split the support of the LMS church, and in the end Tumua and Pule, as well as the Samoan church, would be the losers. The LMS missionaries were also keen to avert conflict to assure Solf of their commitment to strive for peace in Samoa.

Many supporters of Lauaki saw his pardon as a stepping stone towards future favourable negotiations with the government. But, the rumours that followed soon after that Solf was scared of Lauaki, and that Lauaki and his men proposed to kill every German in Samoa and Solf was powerless to prevent it, destroyed any chance of lasting peace. News of Lauaki meeting several villages in Savaii to encourage and reaffirm the Mau a Pule reached Upolu. Lauaki further added fuel to the fire by twisting and falsely preaching the outcome of his meeting with Solf at Vaiusu and Mulini'u. At Palauli, Lauaki told the people that Solf had agreed to the four tama-a-aiga ruling together with losefo at Mulini'u, and losefo would have “a salute, uniform, sword and helmet - that the lafoga (poll tax) would be reduced, and Tolo and Laupu'e [Samoan Faipule] removed from office.” Lauaki also spoke to the Manono people. He told them that the demands of the movement were accepted, and Solf declared to Lauaki that he "will accept all the things you declared to me just now, and will carry it all out in accordance with your wish."

In response to Lauaki’s efforts, the tulafale of Palauli arose and thanked Lauaki for having succeeded in his endeavour, and regretted that Palauli had not joined Lauaki. However, the tulafale did counsel Lauaki, and Safotulafai, to obey the malo and “not get up to any more foolish things.” Palauli, and

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53 Short Summary of Lauaki Rebellion, undated, GP.
54 Lelei F. K. to Williams (Residence Commission), 16 Feb, 1909, GP.
55 Lelei F. K. to Williams (Residence Commission), 16 Feb, 1909, GP.
56 Lelei F. K. to Williams (Residence Commission), 16 Feb, 1909, GP.
perhaps other villages in Savai'i, welcomed the efforts of Lauaki but they insisted that it was better to quit while he was ahead, at least be content with Solf's offer. The Samoan members of the administration also exhorted pastors in Savai'i to work on Lauaki to give up his mau and obey the government. The plea of the Samoans to the Samoan pastors, suggested that the Samoan church in Savai'i was supporting Lauaki, and the Samoan pastors were probably inactive in restraining their members from supporting Lauaki's efforts. The LMS would have had some idea of the support the Samoan church had for Lauaki, but was not concerned enough, or probably did not care, to address it.  

Lauaki continued to raise the hopes of the Mau a Pule, in maintaining his own positive notion of how things stood with Solf, as he tried to entice Savai'i to force the hand of the German administration in his favour. Lauaki probably knew he was fighting a losing battle against Solf, but he was determined to push Solf to the limit on an off chance that Solf would somehow change his mind and grant his demands in return for the termination of the Mau a Pule. But, rumours of Lauaki's undertaking, and the fact that he was residing in Manono and not Safotulafai as ordered, disturbed and angered Solf.

While Lauaki celebrated, Solf vibrated. Lauaki was quite content to play the waiting game. Time could only help with the Mau a Pule's struggle, especially if Solf failed to act, but Solf did act and acted quickly. In a meeting with the Samoan Faipule from 25 to 31 January 1909, Solf manipulated them to request a deportation order for Lauaki. This was easily obtained with only four voting against the move. Solf then requested the presence of several German warships in Samoa as soon as possible. Solf continued to play dirty politics by again hitting hard at Tumua's pride, and in doing so, he kept Tumua inactive.

Furthermore, the news that Malietoa Tanumafili I was on the verge of usurping the throne dictated losefo and Tamasese's final choice to remain loyal
to Solf. The LMS missionaries were unable to quell the rumours spreading within the Samoan (LMS) Church. It was unknown where the rumours emanated from, but the LMS believed they could have originated from the Lauaki camp to enhance support, or from the German administration to agitate Tumua and supporters of losefo and Tamasese. The LMS monitored Lauaki’s efforts through the news brought back by Malua students from Savai‘i. The LMS could no longer deny that the Samoan (LMS) Church was supporting Lauaki, even if it was only Savai‘i.

Solf’s plans were not revealed to Lauaki and his supporters. This made Lauaki even more daring and his supporters more outspoken, as they preached Solf’s inactivity as a sign of Lauaki’s strength. Many Samoans kept reminding themselves of the Samoan adage - sau aso (the day will come), and remained pacified. That day did come. During 18 to 26 March 1909, four German warships, Leizpig, Arcona, Jaguar, and the steamer Titania, arrived. On that day Solf made an order for the deportation of nine matai and their families, including Lauaki.

In the orders, Solf stated that the matai were deported for their “violent acts and for [their] disobedience towards the Government’s orders, even after [Solf’s] alofa (kindness) was shown to you in Vaiusu.” losefo also made an order asking Lauaki and those involved to surrender, for “it was best that a few should suffer for the violent acts of the past than that the whole of the country should suffer.” Those involved were given seven days to surrender. Lauaki, Namulau‘ulu, and Letasi, on 25 March 1909, informed Solf they were going into the bush, and refused to obey the orders given. Reports of Lauaki’s supporters taking provisions into the bush, and traffic flowing from Tuamasaga and Manono to Savai‘i, confirmed to Solf the intention of the Mau a Pule. Solf took steps to stem the flow of the supporters from Upolu by placing two warships in the strait between Upolu and Savai‘i.

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61 Lelei F. K. to Williams (Residence Commission), 16 Feb, 1909, GP; Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 1909, GP.
62 Short Summary of Lauaki Rebellion, undated, GP.
63 Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 1909, GP.
64 Short Summary of Lauaki Rebellion, undated, GP; Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 1909, GP.
65 Short Summary of Lauaki Rebellion, undated, GP.
66 Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 1909, GP.
On 25 March 1909, Lauaki and his supporters held a meeting at Safotulafai. According to Williams, there was great fear among Lauaki’s supporters as rumour had spread that Solf had decreed that all ‘rebels’ would be hanged. The Mau a Pule declared they would rather fight and die than be hanged. Solf decided to act slowly and give Lauaki time. Solf issued two more proclamations, but with no positive response from Lauaki. Solf, while overjoyed at the arrival of the warships, did not want to use the warships early, as their presence could trigger an outbreak of civil war, rather than force Lauaki to surrender, and Solf did not contemplate returning Samoa to its violent past. Solf’s only hope to avert such violence was for Lauaki to surrender.

The solutions available to Solf were minimal, either engage Lauaki in battle or grant the Samoans some of their demands. Neither fitted Solf’s agenda, but he had to put pressure on Lauaki before he could regroup. The warships that had arrived had one hundred and twenty New Guineans on board for the purpose of pursuing and hunting down Samoans in the bush. Solf decided against utilising the New Guineans as it would only motivate more Samoans to ‘go-bush’ with Lauaki.

On 26 March 1909, Solf looked to the missions as the only avenue left to defuse the hostile situation. The mission societies in Samoa also realised the volatility of the situation and quickly went into action. The WMMS and LMS worked around the clock to convince their own adherents of the consequences that would engulf Samoa if they persisted in their aggression. Newell, on a fautasi (long boat) crewed by the Malua students, went across to Savai’i to meet Lauaki. He pointed out to Lauaki the futility of allowing Samoa to engage in another bush war. Newell told Lauaki that Tumua and Manono, as well as other leading allies of Pule were abstaining from any political process which would destroy the peace in Samoa. Newell also told Lauaki that the LMS people in Savai’i had withdrawn their support for any armed confrontation. Newell’s statement to Lauaki proved that the Samoan (LMS) Church, in Savai’i at least, supported Lauaki’s endeavours. Newell and the LMS knew about it but had

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67 Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 1909, GP.
69 H. A. Hough Report on Samoa, 1909, SSO.
remained silent in fear of the Germans. Newell’s statement, however, could have been a clear message to Lauaki that LMS support would never eventuate. Newell preached in Savai‘i the following weekend while allowing Lauaki and his supporters some time to consider Solf’s proposal.

The same message was carried to Methodist villages in Savai‘i by the Reverend Ernest G. Neil, the chairman of the Methodist mission in Samoa. He persuaded Asiata Taetoloa and Asiata Meagaolo to surrender.71 Meanwhile, Solf delivered a message on 28 March 1909, reminding Lauaki of the significance of the eagle.

The eagle [was] still willing and waiting to shelter you under his wings. It is for you to choose the wings or the talons and do not believe the foolish stories that the German pule of Samoa lasts but 10 years. It will last forever, and no other nation would interfere with the pule of the Kaiser in Samoa.72

Lauaki approached Newell on Monday morning, 29 March 1909, and advised him of his decision to surrender to the German administration. According to Newell, Lauaki’s decision had been made “after two days of severe mental conflict.”73 Lauaki himself probably knew what the end result would be, but had continued for the sake of pride. Lauaki probably knew the Samoan church was never in a position to support him, but had continued to prey on its sympathy. According to Newell, Lauaki surrendered so that steps could be taken to reorganise the administration of Samoa in such a way that the Governor’s authority could be upheld in the eyes of the Samoans and the world. Furthermore, Solf had promised Lauaki and his supporters a light punishment, and permission to communicate with the missionaries if they were sent into exile.74 On hearing the good news Solf decided to remain in Upolu with his troops. He dispatched a warship to retrieve Lauaki and his supporters from Savai‘i. On 1 April 1909, the Leipzig picked up Lauaki and five supporters from Safotulafai. Newell pleaded with Solf to make Lauaki’s punishment as light as possible.75

72 Short Summary of Lauaki Rebellion, undated, GP.
73 Newell to Solf, 29 Mar, 1909, NP; SDC – Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 3-8 May 1909, SSL.
74 Newell to Solf, 29 Mar, 1929, NP.
75 Newell to Solf, 29 Mar, 1909, NP; Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 1909, GP; Western Samoa, Historical Notes, Mar, 1935, IT 1 Ex 2/25.
The day after Solf had approached the missions for assistance, Lauaki wrote a letter to the British Consul in Apia. Lauaki was desperate to avert, or at least postpone, his imminent downfall. The arrival of an American warship in Apia had further encouraged Lauaki to defy Solf. The warship had revived old recollections of the days when other powers would intervene in Samoan politics. Sivaotele, Lauaki's second wife, also encouraged her husband to pursue the assistance of Britain and America. In his letter to the British Consul, Lauaki argued that the agreement regarding Samoa and Germany had not invalidated the right of the other powers to interfere in Samoan politics, especially when Samoan wishes were not fulfilled. Lauaki pleaded with the British Consul to intervene and fulfil its obligation, which they had sworn to do on the bible. Lauaki wrote, "where is the word spoken by the Commissioners that Germany should protect Samoa; guide her, but that Samoa should be the government?"

The letter was a desperate plea from a man who was about to be sacrificed, as far as Samoans were concerned, and punished for his rebelliousness. The British Consul, Thomas Trood, wrote to Lauaki and reiterated what Germany had been ordaining in the past - only the Kaiser ruled in Samoa.

Lauaki surrendered after taking the missionaries and Solf to the edge, and exploiting every conceivable avenue to counter German authority, and revive Samoan hope. Lauaki's honourable character remained intact, as he surrendered without a hint of returning Samoa to its violent wars, and knowing that he had taken Samoans' complaints to the limit without bloodshed. Solf retained his supreme authority as he made an example of Lauaki in front of his peers. Lauaki's final demise came ominously on April Fools Day. Solf deported Lauaki to Saipan in the Mariana Islands. Lauaki sought out Newell, and wanted to know what had happened to Solf's promise of a lighter sentence, which was advocated by the LMS. Lauaki told Newell he was going to exile because of that promise, and asked Newell to intercede on his behalf to the German

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76 Lauaki had replaced his first wife, Suilolo, with Sivaotele, a daughter of Ala'iasa of Falefa.
77 Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 1909, GSA.
78 Pule, Aiga, Tuamasaga, to Trood, 27 Mar, 1909, GBFO; see also Pule Aiga Tuamasaga to British Consul Kuruku, 27 Mar, 1909, British Consulate (Samoa), General Outward Correspondence, Series 2, vol. 26 (henceforth BCS); Short Summary of Lauaki Rebellion, undated, GP.
79 Trood to Pule, Aiga, Tuamasaga, 28 Mar, 1909, GBFO; Trood to Secretary of Pule Aiga - Tuamasaga, undated, BCS; Short Summary of Lauaki Rebellion, undated, GP.
80 H. A. Hough Report on Samoa, 1909, SSO; SDC - Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 3-8 May, 1909, SSL; Trood to Grey, 5 Apr, 1909, BCS; Trood to Grey, 9 Apr, 1909, GBFO.
Lauaki had forgotten that a light sentence for Solf was exactly what he got.

Lauaki was accompanied by his closest advisers and supporters, namely Tuilagi Letasi (Safotulafai), I'iga Pisa (Amoa), Malae'uulu Moefiu (Amoa), Asiata Taeteloa (Satupa'itea), Le'iataua Mana (Manono), Tevaga Matafâ (Lealatele), Namulau'ulu Pulali (Safotulafai), Asiata Meagaolo (Satupa'itea), Taupau Pauesi (Manono), and Tagaloa Maumausolo Va'aiga (Tufu Gautavai). They were also accompanied by LMS pastors, named Uria and Areta, wives and children numbering seventy-two. The rest of Lauaki's supporters, including Samoan officials from Fa'asaleleaga, Saleaula, and Satupa'itea, were dealt with severely with fines, prison terms, exile within Samoa, and loss of rights and privileges.

In a German report in 1909, it stated that Lauaki was a highly gifted man, but lacked vision and the ability to move with changes. In the report Lauaki was described as,

...a truly great Samoan, the like of whom only seldom before and never since appeared in Samoan history, in spite of his inborn intelligence, in spite of his practical political schooling in praxis, could not acquire sufficient ability, intellectual and psychological, to adapt himself during 10 years of existence of German rule in Samoa to the essential changes of politics that took and were taking place...

The sun had finally set for Lauaki. The trip to Saipan would be the last time he would see his beloved Samoa. In 1915, on board a New Zealand steamer, Lauaki was filled with joy as he contemplated returning to Samoa to savour what he had fought for all his life – a victory over the Germans. Unfortunately, Lauaki died from dysentery on Tarawa Atoll, in the Kiribati group, enroute to Samoa. The celebration that was given in his district,

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81 Areta to Newell, 15 Oct, 1909, NP; Western Samoa Historical Notes, 1935, IT 1 Ex 2/15.
82 A letter from Saipan described the conditions of the exiles in Saipan, as they established a village and called it Samoafou (new Samoa). See Uria to Newell, 10 Jun, 1909, NP; Areta to Newell, 15 Jul, 1909, NP; Areta to Newell, 15 Oct, 1909, NP; Uria to Newell, 14 Oct, 1909, NP; Tala Sa'o le Folauga i le Paopao a I'iga Pisa – Guam, Tate Papers – MS 4875-086 (henceforth TP).
83 Imperial Government of Samoa, Report No. 143, May 1909, GP; Western Samoa, Historical Notes, Mar, 1935, IT 1 Ex 2/25.
84 Imperial Government Report No. 143, May 1909, GP.
85 Namulau'ulu and Asiata Toleafoa died in Guam. See Areta to Newell, 15 Oct, 1909, NP; H.A. Hough Report on Samoa, 1909, SSO; Cable Shultz to Colonial Office, 10 Jul, 1913, GSA; Garrett, 199. Note: The escapades of I'iga Pisa, which included his swim from Saipan to Guam to escape, are well documented in his brief biography. See I'iga Pisa, "The Mau a Pule 1909," typescript (in possession of author).
Fa'asaleleaga, on the return of other exiled members was one of 'great rejoicing' but with a touch of sadness.66

Perhaps, Lauaki, and his ideas, were never meant to return to Samoa. Germany had lost the war, and was also deprived of returning to Samoa. Samoa, perhaps, needed a fresh start and needed to get rid of the old. Nevertheless, Lauaki's death buried with it the last hope of Tumua and Pule ever retaining their traditional status. It also buried with it any further notion of Tumua and Pule influencing Samoan politics in the foreseeable future.

Lauaki's influence over many Samoan leaders remained. He was respected for his boldness in exposing the true intentions of the German administration regarding Samoa. He knew that to give up his identity as a Samoan completely as the Germans demanded was nothing short of racial extermination. In the end, Lauaki was the only one brave enough to assert the legitimate rights of the Samoan people to independence. Lauaki was willing to suffer for this right, and many Samoan leaders that followed later were willing to imitate his patriotism.

Lauaki may have been buried. Tumua and Pule may have been conquered, but no one could bury an idea and conquer a spirit that was determined to free itself. Lauaki gave the Samoans courage and strength to pursue their aspirations, and free themselves of all foreign domination. Lauaki also imparted to his people the notion of perseverance and patience, and the importance of making sacrifices in order to achieve a purpose. Perhaps, Lauaki did win and, like Moses in the Old Testament, was not allowed to partake and enjoy the fruits of the promised land. Meanwhile, the Samoans, giving due consideration to the oppressive circumstances under Germany, perceived the arrival of New Zealand as a 'God-given' intervention and a benevolent act in advancing Samoan aspirations.

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66 Lauaki's widow, Sivaotele, reached Samoa January, 1916; see Muller, Report of Faasaleleaga District, 1916, SSR.
CHAPTER FIVE

A RAMSHACKLE ADMINISTRATION
AND SAMOAN EXPECTATIONS

The German administration unexpectedly ended just as Samoa was moving into an era of passive acceptance of Germanisation. The Samoans' political aspirations had become mere words and wishes. Tumua and Pule were compelled to accept the status quo, as options to regain their mantle ceased. The missions were also content to carry out German policies, and Samoan church members slowly learned to appreciate German influence in their spiritual life and academic achievements. The aspiration of the Samoans to control their country was more of a dream rather than an achievable goal, and the Samoans desperately needed another avenue, politically or religiously, to regain Samoan protocol. World War I became the catalyst for Samoans to rekindle the spirit to achieve their aspirations.

The outbreak of World War I on 5 August 1914 initiated unwanted changes to the German colonial regime in the Pacific. The Germans would have received the news soon after through their wireless communication, and likewise the papa/lagi and missionaries who monitored radio broadcasts. The rest of Samoa would have heard the news soon after. When the news was received, there was no panic and Samoans showed little enthusiasm. The German residents were also unruffled and acted quite confidently that Germany would quickly put an end to the conflict and things would return to normal for Samoa. But, Britain joined the war and made things a bit more complicated for the Germans, although the Germans in Samoa maintained their confidence in success.1

On 14 June 1914, the annual inspection tour to Germany's colonies in the Pacific took place, and the German fleet was expected to anchor off Apia harbour on 27 July 1914. However, Count Maximilian Johannes Maria Hubertus von Spee, the commander of Germany's Pacific Fleet, was restricted in fulfilling his schedule. The tension in Europe had delayed von Spee and forced him to

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remain out in the open sea while awaiting news of further developments. When von Spee received news that war had been declared, he decided to return to Germany. He was probably thinking of utilising the large fleet under his command to assist Germany's effort back in Europe. But, von Spee failed to consider the expectations of the many German residents living in German colonies around the Pacific, to whom their safety had been entrusted.

In Samoa, the German administration expected von Spee to arrive soon and take control of the German colony. Shultz and German residents that met to consider the future of Samoa had that expectation and were only considering how to treat other foreign residents in Samoa; such was their confidence in retaining Samoa. A day after the declaration of war, the British Secretary of State, Sir Lewis Harcourt, sent an urgent message to its representative in New Zealand, the Governor General, Earl Liverpool. Harcourt informed New Zealand that Britain wanted Samoa seized as it contained a wireless station capable of receiving and sending messages to Germany. A similar message for Australia to act likewise in relation to New Guinea, Yap, Marshall Islands, and Nauru was also delivered. New Zealand took up the challenge immediately, and eventually arrived in Samoa on 29 August 1914.

Colonel Robert Logan was the commander of the 'Advanced Force of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force' (NZEF). Logan's first 'Operation Order' was to sail to Samoa to capture Samoa and take possession of the German wireless station. The soldiers were issued with ammunition, and orders were given to destroy the wireless station first if bombardment was deemed necessary. The NZEF arrived at dawn off Matautu, with the convoy headed by the Psyche, followed by the Philomel, the Pyramus, and the supply ship Monowai. The New Zealand convoy was, at first, mistaken for von Spee's delayed German Fleet,

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2 Graf von Spee had under his command a large fleet made up of two battleships, the Schamhorst and the Gneisenau, two cruisers, the Prinz Friedrich and the Nürnberg, two escort ships, the Markomannia and the Titania, and one gunboat, the Cormoran. For an account on the activities of the German Pacific Fleet and the intention of von Spee to conduct a 'cruiser warfare' in the Pacific as it made its way home. See Arthur W. Jose, *The Royal Australian Navy*, Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1928; John A. Moses & P. M. Kennedy eds, *Germany in the Pacific and Far East 1870 – 1914*, St Lucia: University of Queensland, 1977.

3 Logan to Liverpool 8 Jun, 1916; Island Territories Archives (henceforth IT) 2/14; Shultz Diary, Minutes of Meeting, English translation, 5 Aug, 1914, IT 2/10; Administration – Colonel Logan, IT 2/1; Occupation of Samoa, Instructions to Colonel Logan, 1914, IT 39/2.


5 Occupation of Samoa – Instruction to Colonel Logan, Operation Orders, No. 1, 26 Aug, 1915, IT 39/2.
but the mistake was soon realised, as the residents of Apia contemplated with little fuss what the ships on the horizon would do.\(^6\)

The *Psyche* cruised into Apia harbour, and soon despatched a message for the Germans to surrender unconditionally. On shore, the message bearer soon realised that the German administration were not present among the passive but inquisitive crowd that had gathered to watch. A local citizen was sent with a message for the German administration, which called for immediate surrender to avoid unnecessary bloodshed. It also called upon the German administration to surrender Apia Township forthwith, as well as ceasing all communication on the wireless station immediately. The German administration was given half an hour to respond or face bombardment.\(^7\) Meanwhile, the British and American consuls, and their respective residents, took the time to send a petition to Logan to consider the kindness shown by the Germans to Europeans and Samoans since the declaration of war. The NZEF waited for hours before a reply eventuated.

The delay in a German response was not intentional. Shultz, the German Governor, had been meeting with the Samoan *matai* to discuss the best way to deal with the situation at hand. After weighing up all the possible solutions, Shultz and his administration decided to surrender. He rejected the offer from the Samoans to defend the colony, as it was their fight.\(^8\) Shultz also took into consideration the Germans' lack of weapons and manpower. The Acting German Governor, S. N. Rimberg, relayed this response, which included a strong protest against the threat of military action, and the outcome for non-compliance. Rimberg informed the NZEF that the German administration would offer no resistance, and that the wireless station had been dismantled.\(^9\)

The NZEF landed without incident. The soldiers located the wireless station and found it to be booby trapped with dynamite. It took sometime to disarm it, but eventually the station was back in operation order. The day after saw the Union Jack raised in place of the German flag. Shultz presented

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\(^6\) *Samoanische Zeitung*, 5 Sept, 1914.

\(^7\) *Samoanische Zeitung*, 5 Sept, 1914; Harcourt to Liverpool, Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representative of New Zealand (henceforth AJHR), 1914; Western Samoa Historical Notes, 1935, IT 1 Ex 2/15.

\(^8\) Shultz Diary, Minutes of Meeting, English translation, 5 Aug, 1914, IT 2/10; Shultz's Diary, 9 – 27 Aug, 1914, English translation, IT 2/10.

himself before Logan and was informed that he and other German officials would be taken as prisoners to New Zealand. This was duly carried out on 1 September 1914. Logan confiscated German administration records, as well as personal private correspondence and diaries. Logan had intended to keep many of the German officials in their capacity as government employees, as advocated under the Hague Convention, which stressed that Samoa's administration would continue under German law, and close as possible to the German pattern. However, contrary orders from Wellington forced Logan to use some of his military men, and local British residents, to staff the administration office.

One of Logan's first objectives was to maintain order and discipline and to make sure the daily routine of the residents was maintained with very little interference from the military. Logan did not make many significant changes, as his task in Samoa was one of military occupation for an uncertain period of time. He maintained much of the existing policies and administrative management, and enforced much of the existing laws. Logan, however, replaced and repealed laws and procedures, which contravened military occupation policies. All in all, Logan and his appointed officials continued where the Germans left off, although they were far less experienced and lacked professional qualifications for their assigned tasks. For instance, Logan appointed a local resident as District Court Judge even though he had no legal training. Furthermore, Logan appointed his aide de camp as the secretary for Native Affairs. There was also confusion over the interpretation of various laws, as well as confusion over whose laws and regulations the administration upheld. The confusion led to mismanagement and instability. James W. Davidson, some years later, referred to Logan's administration as a "ramshackle administration."

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10 Logan to Liverpool, 2 Sept, 1914, AJHR; Report of the Royal Commission Concerning the Administration of Western Samoa, 1927, AJHR; New Zealand Captured German Samoa, 3 Aug, 1914, Chronicle of the 20th Century.
11 Administration – Colonel Logan, IT 2/1; Occupation of Samoa, Instructions to Colonel Logan, 1914, IT 39/2; Report on Samoan Affairs, IT 2/9; Policy on Samoan Affairs, IT 2/11.
12 Western Samoa Historical Notes, 1935, IT 1 Ex 2/15.
13 R. W. Tate, Native Situation, Sept, 1921, IT 89/5; Robert W. Tate Papers MS-Copy-Micro 0082-04 (henceforth TP).
The Samoans reacted very slowly and cautiously to the presence of the New Zealand military. Logan’s various proclamations were geared towards the existing military situation, and had little concern for the civil aspect and everyday demands of the Samoan people.\(^\text{15}\) The Samoans themselves noticed the low-key-lazy-approach of their new mentor, especially in making very little demands upon them compared to the Germans. The \textit{papalagi} were just as surprised at the minimal attention received from the New Zealand military, and the ease with which everyone had picked up their lives and continued with very little impediment. Nevertheless, a few staunch British residents detested New Zealand’s take-over of Samoa. This group felt the presence of a military regime would lead to the destruction of Samoan customs, and the disturbance of the peaceful lifestyle, which had been created under German rule. The concerns of the \textit{papalagi} residents were also shared by many Samoans.\(^\text{16}\) The older \textit{papalagi} members of the London Missionary Society (LMS), such as the Reverends Alexander Hough and John W. Hills expressed this attitude, although not all LMS missionaries shared the same view. For instance, the Reverend James W. Sibree praised Logan for his “wisdom and foresight in dealings with the Samoans.”\(^\text{17}\)

The LMS mission was under the impression that the Samoan leaders were doing a good job keeping the church ‘Samoan’ under European missionary supervision. They were concerned that an influx of \textit{papalagi} military men would compromise and ‘water-down’ LMS efforts in keeping Samoans on a religious path. The LMS missionaries feared a decrease in morality would stem from unethical and immoral characters in the NZEF. The LMS missionaries were very comfortable with the way things had been going under the German administration in relation to morality and spirituality, although relationships with the Germans were hardly intimate.\(^\text{18}\)

The LMS missionaries also felt they were finally in charge and were, since the early euphoria of mission, enjoying harmonious relations with Samoan

\(^{15}\) For example, Logan’s Proclamation No. 1, 2 Sept, 1914, AJHR.

\(^{16}\) Many Samoan \textit{matāi} loyal to the German regime remained confident of Germany winning the war. They secretly encouraged many Samoans to remain loyal and pray for Germany. See Aloio Toalepai to Saga, 13 Aug. 1915" Grattan Papers, MS-Papers – 4879-041 (henceforth GP).


\(^{18}\) Shultz to SDC, 2 Feb, 1914, Correspondence of LMS, Samoan District, with the German Administration, 1905-1915, Pacific Manuscript Bureau (henceforth PMB) 143.
church leaders. The arrival of the NZEF saw changes taking shape, which were beginning to have an impact on Samoan minds. The soft-handed approach by Logan had given some Samoan leaders latitude to express themselves and put into practice some of the customs and culture, and political ideology, which had been banned by the German regime. The LMS mission feared that the relaxed atmosphere would be detrimental for Samoan development, but perhaps their major fear was not so much the return of the Samoans to old ways, as the fact that a change in attitude would undermine their authority as leaders of the Samoan church. The LMS missionaries' concern was probably genuine knowing that the Samoans would not pass up an opportunity to take control of their affairs.

Even under the German regime, the LMS missionaries had observed Samoan elders trying to take control of church matters without the missionaries' input. The missionaries observed a closer working relationship between the matai system and the Samoan church leaders to strengthen the church, to solve congregational problems, and to shape decisions and resolutions, something that had been missing earlier. The opposite was also clear, the Samoan church leaders were also strengthening, indirectly, the positions of many Samoan political leaders.

While life for the papalagi and Samoans seemed normal, Logan's rule was, nevertheless, strict and autocratic. Logan's autocratic character was perhaps made less unpalatable in the eyes of the Samoans by the enormous prosperity Samoa was enjoying under his leadership. By the end of the war, total exports in copra and cocoa were valued at £264,000. However, the imports almost equalled exports, and Samoans blamed the greed of the traders rather than any lack of control by Logan's administration for the increase in imported goods.

Logan made sure everything was carried out with precision, although at times the standard achieved fell far below his expectation, but no one could be blamed for such below par performances. After a few months of watchful

19 Proclamation, Solf, 31 May, 1901, German Administration of Western Samoa (henceforth GAWS), series 1-4; Minutes, Solf, no date, GAWS; Solf to Mata'a'afa, 24 Jun, 1901, GAWS; Minutes, Solf, 25 Jun, 1901, GAWS; Ali'i and Faipule of Fasito'otai and Faleseela to Solf, 3 Sept, 1901, GAWS; Annual Report, Apia, Feb, 1902, SSR.
20 Newell to Thompson, 3 Jun, 1907, SSL; see also Chapter 2 for further discussion and examples.
21 Visit of Parliamentary Party to Pacific Islands, Report, 1920 – 1921, AJHR.
alertness for enemy intrusions, the NZEF settled into a routine that induced boredom and homesickness. Soon the soldiers began a newspaper with the title *Pull-Thro*, which expressed the mood of the occupied forces. The listless soldiers soon looked for other means of diversion to occupy their time.

Many established relationships with Samoan women, as well as closer ties with many Samoan families. Many others took the time to visit more of the islands, especially Upolu, and familiarise themselves with some of the traditional sights in Samoa. The soldiers also began to engage in gambling by attending horse racing and introducing Totalisator (or Tote) Betting. Orders were issued to remind all members of the NZEF of the strict discipline required in all matters. Orders also reminded the soldiers that they were forbidden from "all gambling in Garrison, Camps, or Cantonments. This include book-making or acting as an agent for a book-maker." 23

The problem must have been on the increase and may have affected some of the Samoans especially those attached to the LMS. The Au Matutua wrote to Logan in protest at the introduction of 'Tote Betting,' and later furnished Logan with a five-page document pointing out the evil of gambling. 24 It became a serious enough matter for the LMS and WMMS to write a combined letter to the administration airing their dissatisfaction regarding gambling as a whole. The letter, signed by the Reverends Hills, Sibree, and E. G. Neill, included the following:

We view with the greatest concern the attempts being made to popularise its [betting] use amongst Samoans; an experience of many years educational and religious work for their moral and spiritual betterment assuring us of the evil effects which will certainly follow its introduction....we consider the introduction of systematized gambling as a most dangerous element and strongly protest against it. 25

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22 There were two little incidents in September 1914, which helped kept the troops on their toes. The first was the arrival of two German warships, the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau off the coast of Samoa but they left just as quick, and secondly the capture of German sailors who had escaped from the ship Elsass in Pagapago. The sailors were captured in Samoa after they had arrived thinking Germany had retaken Samoa. See Jose, 49 – 63; Watson, 143-144.

23 Regulation No. 459 of King's Regulations, Correspondence of LMS, Samoan District, with New Zealand Administration, 1915-1946, PMB 144; Richards Routine Orders No. 52, Correspondence of LMS, Samoan District, with New Zealand Administration, 1915-1946, PMB 144; SDC - Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 15-23 May, 1918, London Missionary Society, South Seas Archives, South Seas Letters (henceforth SSL); Hough to Lenwood, 31 Jan, 1919, SSL.

24 SDC to Logan, n.d., SSL; Correspondence of LMS, Samoan District, with New Zealand Administration, 1915-1946, PMB 144; Regulation No 459 of King's Regulations, Correspondence of LMS, Samoan District, with New Zealand Administration, 1915-1946, PMB 144.

25 See Hough to Lenwood, 31 Jan, 1919, SSL.
But life was not all fun and play for the New Zealand armed forces. Many soldiers suffered from local ailments throughout the year, including dysentery, fever, and skin diseases.26

Relief finally arrived for the lethargic group of soldiers during April 1915, when a smaller garrison took over the occupation of Samoa. Logan and the men who served as administration officers remained to continue serving in their existing civil capacity. Logan continued to be in command of the newly arrived soldiers. Logan and the new soldiers were again reminded of their task as military occupants as stressed by the Hague Convention.

Logan tried hard to fulfil the convention throughout his time as administrator, but his administration was not free of complaints from various sectors of the community. Most complaints were from papa/agi concerning economic issues. There were also complaints of inconvenience caused by the confiscation and liquidation of German owned businesses, the shortage of indentured labour and the imposition of more stringent labour laws, and the imposition of export duties. Many businesses became bankrupt. The economic difficulties that had spawned in Europe had hatched elsewhere and, consequently, affected the economy of the lesser countries such as Samoa. But, despite the economic difficulties under Logan’s administration, most of the papa/agi and Samoan afakasi should have been overjoyed as many gained prominence in the Samoan community through the closure of German businesses. Logan wanted to encourage small planters and, unlike Solf who wanted to control the missions, praised the work the missions had done for the Samoan people.27

The worst disaster that occurred under the military administration of New Zealand took place in November 1918. The ship S. S. Tafune arrived in Apia harbour from New Zealand, via Fiji, with a group of passengers suffering from the deadly Spanish influenza. The administration’s health authority in Samoa failed to quarantine the S. S. Tafune infected with influenza and, consequently, a huge percentage of the population died.28 The New Zealand administration was also caught-out and surprised at the intensity and magnitude of the epidemic. The Samoans searched for answers to many questions, just as

26 Hills to Logan, 4 Oct., 1917, PMB 144; Logan to SDC, 13 Oct, 1917, PMB 144; Hough to Logan, 3 Sept, 1918, PMB 144; Hough to Chief of Police, 9 Sept, 1918, PMB 144; Administration – Colonel Logan, IT 2/1.
27 Report on Samoan Affairs, IT 2/9; Policy on Samoan Affairs, IT 2/11.
28 Hough to Lenwood, 17 Dec, 1918, SSL.
Logan and his colleagues had many unanswered questions. At the end of the day, the Samoans looked no further than Logan and New Zealand's administration as the fa'atamala (guilty or at fault) party.29

After the epidemic, the Samoans called for America to take over the administration of Samoa, but later withdrew the petition when Logan was removed from Samoa, and the newly appointed acting administrator, Colonel Robert W. Tate, showed sympathy and sincerity towards Samoan grievances. Logan was not impressed at all with the Samoan petition to have New Zealand replaced by America.30 He blamed some of the European residents as well as prominent Samoan government officials for originating it. Logan's reaction achieved the real aim of the petition in the first place; to upset the New Zealand administration and undermine Logan's authority. Logan's allegations angered the Samoan and European communities who bitterly rejected the charges. Interestingly, these were the same Samoans and Europeans who had been strong supporters of the New Zealand administration prior to the epidemic and Logan's fall-out with the Samoan people. In looking for a scapegoat, Logan quickly chastised his 'friends' to cover-up his own deficiency in administrative skills. Logan's impertinence did not help to smooth over New Zealand's disastrous efforts to administer Samoa and to annul Samoan aspirations to be under American control.31

The epidemic had overwhelmed the Samoans so much that they lost contact with the events and news of the world after World War I. Tate arrived soon after to take up his new post,32 while the United Nations met to decide the fate of German colonies and territories around the world, including Samoa. Many countries, including Germany, eagerly awaited a final settlement. By March 1919, unofficial news had reached Samoa that she would remain under New Zealand's administration.33 By October the same year, the New Zealand parliament began to debate the administration of Samoa although the mandate from the United Nations had not being officially announced. New Zealand's

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29 A broad account of the 1918 Influenza Epidemic and its impact on Samoa and the Samoans, and the controversy between Logan and the LMS, would be discussed in the next chapter (Chapter Six).
30 Lagolago to the Commission, 1919, NZSEC.
31 R. W. Tate, Native Situation, Sept, 1921, IT 88/5; see also Stout to Massey, 24 Feb, 1921, IT 1 Ex 18/1; Lagolago to the Commission, 1919, New Zealand Samoa Epidemic Commission (henceforth NZSEC); Samoa Times, 7 Jun, 1919.
32 Samoa Times, 1 Feb, 1919.
33 Liverpool to Governor-General, 10 Jan, 1918, IT 88/7; Logan to Liverpool (Secret), 11 Jan, 1918, IT 88/7; Logan to Liverpool, (Secret), 31 Jan, 1918, IT 88/7.
action only reaffirmed the rumours regarding Samoa’s future. Many in Samoa were unhappy with the decision.34

In New Zealand, the Reform Party, led by William Ferguson Massey, took the view that Samoa was an important acquisition for New Zealand. Massey and his fellow party members took the traditional view that taking possession of Samoa would not cost New Zealand a cent as Samoa was already self sufficient. Massey also announced that his government would back the importation of indentured labour to continue the economic viability of the existing plantations. The Reform Party also had in mind taking over the Samoan civil administration and making it part of the New Zealand civil service. The New Zealand government took this attitude as they felt Samoans were not yet educated enough, or sufficiently capable to decide their own destiny.35

However, the Reform Party did recognise that Samoa was independent to some degree in terms of their own customs and cultures. Somehow, the New Zealand government saw Samoan culture and customs as being detached from Samoan political ideologies. Consequently, the Reform Party failed to realise that customs and culture were absorbed into the administration of Samoa. It was important for the New Zealand government to understand this aspect of Samoan politics, to realise that the governing of Samoa was not a task for non-experienced and uneducated staff. Unfortunately, the New Zealand government failed to grasp this aspect of Samoan politics, as it blindly made ill-advised proposals for the administration of Samoa.36

While the Liberal Party supported the Reform Party’s proposal, the Labour Party vehemently opposed it. The Labour Party pointed out that Samoans were quite capable of self-government as long as it was under international supervision. According to the Labour Party leader, Henry E. Holland, and Labour Party Member of Parliament, Peter Fraser, the Reform Party’s proposal was nothing more than a form of autocracy. The Labour Party also rejected the Reform Party’s stance on indentured labour. At the end of the

34 The distribution of Germany’s possessions was made possible with the signing of the Versailles Treaty in 1919. Samoans were also unhappy as New Zealand had recently been a colony itself. It only changed its status from colony to a Dominion on 26 Sept, 1907. See S. H. Meredith – How NZ Administers its Mandate From the League of Nations – 24 Feb. 1927, London Missionary Society South Seas Archives, South Seas Odds, Samoa Correspondence, (henceforth SSO); R. W. Tate, Native Situation, Sept, 1921, IT 88/5; Occupation of Samoa – Cost to New Zealand, 1918 – 1921, IT 39/3; Chronicle of the 20th Century, Ringwood: Penguin Books, 1999.


debate session, there was some scepticism among parliament members, including the government members, as to the ability of the New Zealand government to administer Samoa.\textsuperscript{37}

The Samoans were not ignorant of New Zealand's proposed policy for Samoa. The epidemic debacle was still fresh in the minds of the Samoans. All in all, the Samoans would rather not have New Zealand guide them. The rejection of New Zealand was not restricted to the Samoans, but had also found support among the European community, especially the traders and merchants who rejected prohibition orders on alcohol importation into Samoa, ordained by the New Zealand administration.\textsuperscript{38}

The Samoans were also unhappy that in May 1920, a Samoa Constitutional Order was created without their prior knowledge. The Samoa Constitutional Order outlined the basic political structure for Samoa. It stated that the Administrator had executive power, and that the Administrator and a Legislative Council\textsuperscript{39} held legislative power. The Legislative Council would consist of official members and unofficial members. The unofficial members were given to three Europeans. The Samoa Constitutional Order maintained the existence of the Fono a Faipule, although it was not legally recognised. In doing so, the government aimed to maintain its policy of separating legally constituted bodies from non-government organisations, especially Samoan movements related to Samoan customs and culture.\textsuperscript{40}

New Zealand government officials visited Samoa prior to enforcing the Samoa Constitutional Order. The Fono a Faipule and the European 'Citizen's Committee' met the New Zealand delegation led by Sir James Allen. The


\textsuperscript{38} Samoa Times, 14 Jun, 1919. Note: The issue of alcoholic prohibition was a major concern not only for the Samoan church but for all Protestant missions in the Pacific. The LMS missionaries opposed church members partaking in alcohol, although it was difficult when many of its leading members were also matai prominent in the administration and were given free supplies as allowances for their services. The competition for church membership, especially the Roman Catholic Church's freer approach to alcohol consumption made it very difficult for the LMS to discipline church members. There was, of course, the added problem of missionaries themselves being exceptions to the rule. See William Hartutt to Tidman, 25 Mar, 1844, SSL; see also Charles W. Forman, The Island Churches of the South Pacific: Emergence in the Twentieth Century, Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1982, 114 – 116; Niel Gunson, "On the Incidence of Alcoholism and Intemperance in Early Pacific Missions," Journal of Pacific History 1, 1966, 43 – 62.

\textsuperscript{39} For clarification regarding the Legislative Council as in the Samoa Constitution Order, see Samoa's Problem – Series of Reports by the Citizen's Committee, 1920, Miscellaneous, MS-Papers 4879, GP; R. W. Tate, Native Situation, Sept, 1921, IT 88/5.

\textsuperscript{40} The two Samoan Advisers appointed were Malietoa Tanumafili I and Tuimaleali'ifano S'i'u. See Tate to Allen, 20 Nov, 1921, IT 1 Ex 1/20; Visit of Parliamentary Party to Pacific Islands, Report, 1920 – 1921, AJHR. For a list of the NZ officials appointed under this Order see also The Western Samoa Gazette, No. 1, 1 May 1920 and also The Western Samoa Gazette, No. 8, 5 Jan. 1922.
Samoans likewise petitioned the delegation to legally recognise the Fono a Faipule, and grant it legislative power to control finance in conjunction with the Administrator and the Fautua (Advisors). The Samoans also wanted Samoan representation in the New Zealand parliament, better education facilities, and more training for Samoan government officials. The European 'Citizen's Committee', on the other hand, wanted elective representative in the Legislative Council, a municipality at Apia, freedom of the press, a nullification of the ban on alcohol importation, and to resume importation of indentured labour. The demands from both sides were different in substance and it prompted the European community to reconsider the New Zealand government's proposal for the separate handling of Samoan and European affairs, but both Samoan and European proposals received unsatisfactory responses from the New Zealand government. It was a discourteous attitude on the part of the administration, which later provided an excuse for the Samoan and European communities to utilise their kinship ties for a united stand.

The 'Principal Allied and Associated Powers,' under the auspices of the United Nations, officially allocated Samoa to New Zealand with a mandate, which stated:

A mandate should be conferred on His Britannic Majesty, to be exercised on his behalf by the Government of the Dominion of New Zealand to administer German Samoa.

Under the mandate New Zealand agreed "to promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the Territory [and also] ensure freedom of conscience." The mandate prohibited slavery, forced labour, arms trafficking, compulsory military training, and supplying of 'intoxicants'. It also stressed that New Zealand and Britain did not possess Samoa. The United Nations could return it to Germany at any time. New Zealand held Samoa in trust for the nations of the world.

The news of the mandate did not reach New Zealand until December 1920. An official Act to govern Samoa, which incorporated much of the Samoa

41 R. W. Tate, Native Situation, Sept, 1921, IT 88/5.
42 Visit of Parliamentary Party to Pacific Islands, Report, 1920 – 1921; Nelson to Pomare, 13 Aug, 1919, IT 1 Ex 79/2/1; Western Samoa Historical Notes, 1935, IT 1 Ex 2/15; R. W. Tate, Native Situation, Sept, 1921, IT 88/5.
43 S. H. Meredith, How New Zealand Administers its Mandate From the League of Nations, 24 Feb, 1927, SSO.
44 S. H. Meredith, How New Zealand Administers its Mandate From the League of Nations, 24 Feb, 1927, SSO.
Constitutional Order, was immediately rushed through parliament. It became known as the Samoa Act, 1921. This Act stated that Samoa would be governed by ordinances, and that the administrator, on advice of the Legislative Council, could make laws, which would come into force immediately if passed. The Legislative Council, appointed by the Governor-General, consisted of not less than four official members being officers of the Samoa Public Service, and unofficial members, who were not more than official members. The President of the Council was the Administrator. There were no provisions made for afakasi or Samoan representatives. The set-up of the Legislative Council was rejected by the Samoan and European communities. Many declined to serve on the Legislative Body.45

The Samoa Act, 1921 came into effect on April Fool's Day, 1 April 1921; an ominous sign of things to come. The Samoa Act, 1921 would govern Samoa for the next forty-one years, undergoing several amendments throughout the ensuing years. The Samoa Act, 1921 and the official recognition of Tate as the newly elected administrator of Samoa, further endorsed what the Samoans had not wanted - New Zealand becoming Samoa's mentor. Tate was no stranger as administrator in Samoa. He had taken over from Logan as acting administrator, and had helped to appease the Samoans after his government's blunder with the Spanish influenza. Although only acting as Administrator at the time, the Samoans quickly related to his modesty and his ability to listen with understanding. He managed to subdue most of the Samoan criticism of New Zealand's administration, which contributed to the healing process between Samoans and New Zealand. But the Samoans had not expected New Zealand to remain as Samoa's mentor.46

Soon after, the Samoans petitioned Britain, namely King George V, to grant Samoa self-government under a British Governor.47 The Samoans did not receive any response for their request and, consequently, remained inactive in this direction for years to come. The Samoans also sought concession from the New Zealand government in demanding reforms within the New Zealand

45 S. H. Meredith, How New Zealand Administers its Mandate From the League of Nations, 24 Feb. 1927, SSO.
46 Report by Colonel Tate on the Administration, Samoa, 1923, IT 1 Ex 1/32; Samoa Times, 1 Feb, 1919.
47 The Samoans not only sent Britain a petition but to the Prince of Wales and to the League of Nations. See Petition to H. M. The King, 1921; IT 1 Ex 88/6; Native Petition 1921, IT 1 Ex 88/6; Petition Sent by the Samoan Chiefs to His Royal Higness the Prince of Wales, 1921, IT 1 Ex 88/6; R. W. Tate, Native Situation, Sept, 1921, IT 88/5; see also Percy S. Allen, "The Pacific Islands: Fiji and Samoa," Reprint of Article in Sydney Morning Herald 1921," TP.
administration in Samoa. The Samoans also failed to impress the New Zealand parliament. The lack of action caused strong resentment among the Samoans, and encouraged further allegations that New Zealand did not possess the know-how in mandate administration. Perhaps the problem lay with Tate’s own failure to deal with Samoan demands personally, as he was quite happy with the status quo. As a practice, he passed on to New Zealand Samoan proposals for perusal and for the final decision of the government. The Europeans were also not supportive after Tate’s prohibition orders on the importation of liquor.

While Tate tried hard to bridge the gap between the two countries, he became more concerned with infrastructure and the development of Samoa than attempting to satisfy political demands of the Samoans. Furthermore, Tate did not have the staff and the experience needed to tackle such issues so early on in his administration, as the Samoans demanded. However, despite his failure to address these more important issues, Tate did take Samoa steadily along its economic development and, in his own modest way his healthy personality helped create a peaceful atmosphere for Samoans to grow socially, politically, economically, and religiously. According to Tate, his most notable achievement was terminating the Toeaina Club, an economic enterprise run by prominent Samoan matai, which threatened to transform into an influential Samoan political party. Tate returned to New Zealand in March 1923, having failed to secure total Samoan support for New Zealand’s administration. The LMS respected him and believed that he was a “humble minded Christian” who would be welcomed back in the future. Tate himself may have achieved much in terms of personal relationships with the Samoans, but at the end of the day,

48 The Minister of External Affairs, S. M. Lee did not accept there was any criticism in Samoa regarding New Zealand’s administration. See Lee to The Prime Minister, 10 Mar, 1921, IT 1 Ex 18/1; Samoa Times, 14 Jun, 1919.

49 R. W. Tate, Native Situation, Sept, 1921, IT 88/5; Hough to Gray, 8 Mar, 1921, IT 79/4; Gray to Hough, 29 Mar, 1921, IT 79/4; Gray to Hough, 7 Oct, 1921, IT 79/4.

50 J. Allen Thomsen, Administration of Samoa, 15 Jan, 1921, IT 1 Ex 1/18.

51 Report by Colonel Tate on the Administration, Samoa, 1923, IT 1 Ex 1/32; Samoa Times, 1 Feb, 1919. Note: Before the New Zealand Samoa Epidemic Commission, the Samoan matai Lagolago vented his anger regarding Logan’s comments about the Toeaina Club. Logan told the commission that the Toeaina Club was in financial strife and was responsible for poisoning Samoan minds to seek American protection. See Lagolago to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC. For a more broader picture of the Toeaina Club, see Mary Boyd, ’Coping with Samoan Resistance after the 1918 Influenza Epidemic,’ Journal of Pacific History, no. 15, 1980, 155 –174.

52 The LMS missionaries probably would have thought differently if they knew Tate’s attitude towards them. In Tate’s report on Samoa, he referred to the LMS as giving the Samoans too much theory and less labour intensive work in the plantations, and in doing so have given the Samoans ideas detrimental to their welfare. See SDC – Minutes of Meeting, Papauta, 11-19 Dec, 1922, SSL; The Missions, 1921, IT 88/5; Speech By Toleafoa Afamasaga at the Farewell Feast...Tate, 3 Mar, 1923, IT 1 Ex 2/9; Tate to the Minister of External Affairs, 28 Mar, 1923, IT 1 Ex 2/9.
New Zealand still had a lot of work to do to convince them that they could fulfil the content of the mandate.

A more dynamic leader in Brigadier-General (later Major General Sir) George Spafford Richardson replaced Tate.53 Richardson had arrived in New Zealand from Britain in 1891 on loan as a gunnery instructor. During World War I he received a commission in the New Zealand Forces. After the war, he served in the administration section of the army in Wellington. Richardson was ambitious and was determined to succeed. It was a test of his ability to fulfil the confidence and great expectations of the New Zealand government that he would be a more dynamic administrator than his predecessors. This fitted well with Richardson’s arrogance, which had led him to believe that Samoans would simply follow his examples as the Samoans were nothing more than simple-minded children.54

From the onset, Richardson was, surprisingly, well received by the Samoan and the European communities despite having such a paternal attitude. Perhaps the newness of the relationship, and the high expectations of both communities for closer working ties with Richardson, may have produced such a warm reception. Furthermore, Richardson’s enthusiasm had made him more accessible to both communities.55 The Samoans also believed he was more approachable than Tate, a trait the Samoans put down to Richardson’s respect for the Samoans. Richardson was further embraced for his effort to understand Samoan predicaments and local situations, learning the Samoan language and trying to understand the Samoan culture and customs. The LMS mission spoke very highly of Richardson and vice versa.56 He was also praised for his efforts to reduce spending and minimise administrative excess, while promoting administrative efficiency. Most felt Richardson did more for Samoa than his predecessors, and more than expected by the government in Wellington.57 It seemed the New Zealand government had finally found a man

53 Western Samoa Historical Notes, 1935, IT 1 Ex 2/15; Tate to the Minister of External Affairs, 28 Mar, 1923, IT 1 Ex 2/9; G. H. Scholefield, A Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, Wellington: Internal Affairs, 1940.

54 Correspondence 1899 – 1934, Westbrook Papers (henceforth WP) 0061; Report of the Mandated Territory of Western Samoa, 1925, AJHR; Richardson to Bell, 21 Aug, 1924, IT 2/11; Administrator to the Minister of External Affairs, 9 Feb, 1929, IT 1 Ex 1/23/8.

55 Samoa Times, 14 Sept, 1923.

56 Richardson to Lenwood, 2 Apr, 1925, SSL; Richardson to Barradale, 4 Aug, 1925, SSL; Richardson to Liston, 17 Jan, 1926, SSL.

57 Report of the Mandated Territory of Western Samoa, Fifth Report, 1925, AJHR.
to reverse the resentment among the Samoans, and regain for New Zealand the due respect it so desperately wanted.

Richardson’s popularity with the Samoan and European community, may have also been prompted by a change in attitude in the New Zealand parliament. The New Zealand government finally decided to accept the Fono a Faipule and gave it legal recognition, as well as accepting elective representation to the Legislative Council. These changes were implemented in the Samoa Amendment Act, 1923, prior to Richardson’s appointment to Samoa. The Act was implemented to address some of the Samoan contentions. It was also implemented to help Richardson build up New Zealand’s reputation.

Richardson’s job was also made easier with the support of Sir Francis Bell, the Minister of External Affairs, who gave Richardson the freedom to implement and carry out his own policies. Richardson’s philosophy was that the less interference by the External Affairs’ Minister, the better things would be for Samoa.68

Richardson accepted the New Zealand objective to promote Samoan welfare and develop Samoa as a nation. He pinpointed three areas of concern, which he termed as the principal ‘native problems’, and they included health, education, and the economy. Richardson wanted to make Samoans healthier to increase their numbers, more educated in order to maintain their happiness, and more resilient in working their land to increase productivity.59 Richardson also recognised European concerns and the problems they faced. He admitted that the prohibition on liquor importation was harsh,60 but he was powerless to repeal it. However, Richardson did manage to address other European issues to the satisfaction of its promoters. For instance, Richardson managed to gain permission to have old German businesses and plantations, which were currently under New Zealand management, leased to private interests. The government wanted to lease all property and business in order to remove all government competition with private firms. The plan was aimed at improving

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58 Bell to Richardson, 31 Mar, 1924, IT 1 Ex 1/33/1; Richardson to Bell, 18 Jun, 1924, IT 1 Ex 1/33/1; Richardson to Bell, 8 Jan, 1925, IT 1 Ex 1/33/1.
59 Samoa Times, 28 Dec, 1928; Samoa Times, 1 Feb, 1924; Samoa Times, 8 Feb, 1924.
60 The Administrator and Health Department worked closely to carry out the regulation. See The Western Samoa Gazette, No. 8, 5 Jan. 1922; The Western Samoa Gazette, “The Census Ordinance, 1926”.
papalagi standing, and addressing some of their fears with regard to trade and commerce.\textsuperscript{61}

Such a move was not easily implemented. Richardson needed the support of the Samoans to privatise German businesses and plantations. In 1923, he set up the Fono a Faipule and through them, Richardson sought to gain the loyalty of the Samoans by promising to recognise their legal position within his administration. But, Richardson did not get things his own way. Many Samoans declined the offer to serve as Faipule because Richardson had failed to appoint the Faipule according to Samoan custom. Richardson had deliberately ignored this fact. Richardson, in order to arrest any conflict used the powers given to him under the Samoa Offenders Ordinances 1922, to force many of the matai to accept their nominations as Faipule. The punishment for failing to comply meant exile without trial or right of appeal.\textsuperscript{62}

In Richardson's first meeting with the Fono a Faipule in June 1923, he officially recognised that Faipule had powers within his administration, and were also advisers to the administrator. Richardson ordered that all district communications to the administrator were through the Faipule who would comment on it and make recommendations on behalf of the administrator. Richardson also used the Faipule as advisers on various matters pertaining to Samoans. He also gave the Faipule power to make regulations, which Richardson enforced by law. The effect of such delegated power was soon evident. As Richardson envisaged, the Faipule accepted their vocation with pride and praised Richardson's administration. The Faipule were eager to support whatever reforms Richardson advocated, especially in relation to Samoan customs and traditional practices relating to malaga and ie toga distributions, which Richardson had viewed a waste of resources.\textsuperscript{63}

Richardson moved to abolish the fono a le nu'u (village council) and replaced it with District Councils under the presidency of the Faipule. Richardson also changed the boundaries of various districts in order to achieve twenty districts to coincide with the number of his loyal Faipule.\textsuperscript{64} The District

\textsuperscript{61} On top of this, German and Austrian goods were not allowed to enter Samoa from Sept. 1923 until Apr. 1924. The Western Samoa Gazette, No. 8, 5 Jan. 1922.
\textsuperscript{62} S. H. Meredith, How New Zealand Administers its Mandate From the League of Nations, 24 Feb, 1927, SSO.
\textsuperscript{63} Richardson to Bell, 8 Jan, 1925, IT 1 Ex 1/33/1; Richardson to Bell 16 Jan, 1925, IT 1 Ex 1/33/1.
\textsuperscript{64} Report of the Royal Commission Concerning the Administration of Western Samoa, 1927, AJHR.
Council was made up of representatives from each *nu’u* (village) in the district. They were called upon for judicial duties as well as enforcing regulations made by the Faipule and enacted by the administration. The District Council was under the department of Native Affairs, who in turn was answerable to the administrator. Richardson also initiated ‘village committees’ to make rules and enforce orders and regulations issued by the government and district councils. There were also women’s committees, which functioned as assistants to the department of Health in enforcing regulations regarding hygiene and medical responsibility. In setting up such a political structure, Richardson utilised old Samoan customs and culture to manipulate Samoans to do his bidding.⁶⁵

Richardson’s other achievements included changes to the land tenure system. This was a very sensitive issue under the German administration, but Richardson, with the help of the Faipule, managed to impose his authority upon the distribution and use of Samoan land. Richardson ordained the allocation of five-acre land blocks to every Samoan taxpayer to plant and cultivate with a further five-acre block on the complete planting of the first five-acre block. The supervision of the scheme was left to the District Council who also had the authority to grant holders of the five acre blocks a ‘lifetime leasehold title’ on payment of an annual lease. The land would be passed on to the next of kin under the direction of the District Council. The Samoans were not allowed to sell, lease, or buy the land in question without authority of the government. Richardson had managed to turn a birth right into a profitable scheme in the name of progress and development.⁶⁶

The Legislative Council was set up with the hope of providing more help and assistance to the government. It was also intended to include both Samoans and Europeans, but the Fono a Faipule decided, at the last minute, not to be involved. The Faipule probably felt they would be overwhelmed by the presence of the *papalagi* on the Legislative Council, and would lose their prestige and status if they joined together.⁶⁷ Richardson preferred to keep the Faipule under his influence to take advantage of their submissive nature. The Legislative Council was made up of three Europeans from the community and European officials from the government. It provided an atmosphere of goodwill.

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⁶⁵ Report of the Royal Commission Concerning the Administration of Western Samoa, 1927, AJHR.
⁶⁶ Report of the Royal Commission Concerning the Administration of Western Samoa, 1927; *Samoa Times*, 29 May, 1925.
⁶⁷ Richardson to Bell, 9 Mar, 1925, IT 1 Ex 33/1; Legislative Council Debates, 1925.
early on, but soon became an unsatisfactory avenue for promoting *papalagi* interests. The *papalagi* were especially unhappy as Richardson had a majority in the council under the Samoa Act. But Richardson was unmoved, and clarified that the three *papalagi* in the Council represented the interests of the European community, while the government members were there to seek not only *papalagi* interests but, primarily, to promote Samoan welfare.\(^{68}\)

The Europeans soon realised that their input was minimal. They could only speak on behalf of the European community. This angered some of the *papalagi* members, especially those who had Samoan blood, such as Olaf F. Nelson. The European representatives sought to reintroduce Samoan members into the Legislative Council but Richardson again denied the request. Richardson pointed to the fact that the Fono a Faipule had not sanctioned it earlier. The European demands highlighted Richardson’s ability to manipulate both communities.\(^{69}\)

While the Europeans sought Samoan representative, they failed to listen to the voices of the Samoan leaders (Faipule) who rejected any participation with *papalagi* in the Legislative Council. The Europeans had failed to realise that the Faipule wanted to protect their existing authority. It seemed the *papalagi* had come to terms with the fact that they could achieve none of their personal and selfish goals without Samoan support. Richardson had also rejected such *papalagi* proposals because he took the view that Samoans did not have the intellectual background to participate fully in the Legislative Council. Richardson’s view was meant to down-play *papalagi* demands, but it, indirectly, insulted Samoan pride.\(^{70}\)

Samoans have a saying, "*e pala le ma’a, ae le pala le tala* (stones rot, but words will never rot)." Richardson’s misdirected opinion turned Samoans away from ‘the fold’. Richardson had misjudged the reaction of the Samoans, including the *afakasi*, to his remarks. Richardson had failed to take into considerations the status and influence of many prominent Samoans, such as Tupua Tamasese Lealofi III, who had already visited much of Europe with his father and communicated well in English. There were also Faumuina Flame Mulinu’u I and Afamasaga Toleafoa Lagolago, who were prominent in the

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\(^{68}\) Richardson to Bell, 9 Mar, 1925, IT 1 Ex 33/1; *Samoa Times*, 10 Apr, 1925.

\(^{69}\) Data Compiled and Sent to NZ at the Time of the Mau Deputation to Wellington, GP; *The Western Samoa Gazette*, "The Census Ordinance, 1925".

\(^{70}\) *Samoa Times*, 13 Nov, 1925.
German administration and had been schooled in European etiquette in their close social and business contact with Europeans. Lagolago, especially, owned several businesses and was very ambitious and influential.\(^71\)

The most influential *afakasi* Samoan was Olaf F. Nelson,\(^72\) a very wealthy businessman and influential figure in both Samoan and European communities. He was seen by his peers to rival the best in European culture in both style and character. He was an idol who many *papalagi* aspired to imitate. At the beginning Nelson and Richardson became close and relied on each other for advice and inspiration. They had, at first, felt comfortable with the notion that the other embraced the agenda of the other. But, both men soon realised that they had differences, which would ultimately contribute to widening the gap in their friendship.\(^73\) Soon Nelson and Richardson worked towards undermining each other, while they tried to appear courteous in order to keep whatever means of communication open for political expediency. Both men kept their personal criticism of each other private in fear of inviting an adverse response, which was harder to do if Samoans were within earshot.

New Zealand’s administration and Richardson’s heavy-handed attitude soon led to criticism of the administration among the Samoans and *papalagi*. The Samoans again reverted to accusing New Zealand of being inexperienced in administration matters. And the Samoans were right. Most officials had no experience to fulfil their task, including Richardson. Richardson may have been highly regarded in the military for his strictness and ‘play it by the book’ routine, but as far as administrator and leading a country like Samoa, he was not flexible in its ideology. Admittedly, at first, Richardson tried to get as close as possible to the Samoans through numerous visits to the various districts, and learning the Samoan language in order to communicate with his subjects. However, his efforts were destroyed by his vainglory over and above human sympathy. For instance, a letter to the Secretary of External Affairs revealed Richardson refused medical help to a pregnant mother, who was having difficulty giving birth, so that his *malaga* would not be delayed. Richardson felt the woman was

\(^71\) Lagolago was the leader of the Toeaina Club, which functioned like a business venture. It was supported by many prominent *mafai* during Logan’s administration. See Lagolago to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC; Boyd, 155–174.

\(^72\) Data Compiled and Sent to NZ at the Time of the Mau Deputation to Wellington, GP; Nelson Correspondence, 1826 – 1937, FMB 712; S. S. Allen, Notes on Samoa, Colonel S. S. Allen Collection, MS-Papers 1499 (henceforth SSA); Westbrook Papers (henceforth WP) 0061.

\(^73\) Richardson to Gray 29 Jul, 1926, IT 1 Ex 79/2/1; Richardson to Nosworthy, 26 Jul, 1927, IT 1 Ex 1/33/1; Nelson to Richardson, 21 Aug, 1924, IT 79/2/1.
beyond his ability to help and told the family to take the woman to hospital. Both the mother and her baby died. Richardson's unfortunate lack of human kindness was magnified by the fact that a doctor and a medical officer were part of his malaga. The Samoans never forget such unsympathetic acts, which also served as reminders of the 1918 epidemic blunder by the same administration.

It may be argued that Richardson lacked a good advisor. But, perhaps Richardson was never meant to have an advisor. After all, Richardson relied mainly on his own opinion and did not pay heed to other people's opinions. Thus, he fell into the trap of spending most of his time talking rather than listening. Consequently, he could not hear the grievances of the Samoans, as well as papalagi complaints. But although Richardson failed in this department, his intention of giving the Samoans what was best for them was real. Richardson's intention was shown clearly in the slogan which he had conjured up – Samoa mo Samoa (Samoa for the Samoans), which meant to reflect the policies and objectives he had devised, adopted, and implemented for the welfare of the Samoans. But, sadly for Richardson, he alone determined what was best for Samoa. The Samoans were never really consulted on matters that affected their welfare. If they were consulted, it was merely to rubber stamp and approve one of Richardson's regulations. The policies were easily carried out with the loyalty of the Samoan Faipule, whose benevolent change of status and rewards made it easier for Richardson to administer Samoa. On the other hand, those who were severed from such privileges grew more hostile, and led to a counter reaction among the people in nu'u and districts. Richardson reacted with counter measures that further undermined Samoan customs.

The negative reaction of the Samoan matai saw many of Richardson's policies remain unimplemented. For instance, when Richardson tried to implement a new method of selecting Samoans for matai titles, the Samoans felt Richardson had gone too far. Even the Samoan Faipule sided with the indignant Samoans. Richardson never managed to remove the traditional way of selecting title-holders. The Samoans became vigilant for any such policies,

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74 Report of the Royal Commission Concerning the Administration of Western Samoa, 1927, AJHR; Samoa Guardian, 9 Jan, 1930.
75 Richardson to the Minister of External Affairs, 10 May, 1923, Annual Report by the Administrator on Western Samoa, 1922 – 1923.
76 Samoa Times, 23 Oct, 1925.
which denied them their traditional rights. As Richardson attempted to carry out his vision of *Samoa mo Samoa*, the Samoans were concocting to give Richardson’s motto a different definition. The only hope for Samoans to achieve their aspirations and to solve their grievances was to take full control of their own political destination. Richardson’s policies were degrading and diminishing Samoan protocol further and the time had come for the Samoans to show they were capable of expressing their nationalistic spirit. The hatred and the hostility that had been bottled up since the 1918 epidemic blunder finally exploded, as the Samoans took their political agitation to its pinnacle in the aggression of the Mau movement.
CHAPTER SIX

AN ADMINISTRATIVE BLUNDER
AND THE LOGAN – MOORE CONTROVERSY

The 1918 Spanish influenza epidemic was not only a political disaster for the New Zealand administration but it was also a religious tragedy for the Samoan (LMS) Church. The disaster itself concealed events that fuelled the hatred of the Samoans for the administration, especially in relation to the treatment of Samoan girls at the LMS Papauta School. The Logan – Moore controversy was more than just a personal dispute between two individuals or between the LMS and the New Zealand administration. It was a controversy that highlighted not only Logan's inadequacy but also the LMS's lack of tact and insight.

New Zealand's new role as administrator of Samoa under a League of Nations (later United Nations) mandate,1 was plagued with dissatisfaction from the beginning. The appointment of Logan, Tate, and Richardson, within a space of five years, was supposed to raise the image of New Zealand and confirm the confidence the nations of the world had for her as a worthy executive, but even before New Zealand had been given the mandate of Samoa officially, it was already dealing with a major catastrophe. A few days before the declaration of Armistice2 and the hand over of the mandate to New Zealand, Samoa was devastated with the infectious Spanish influenza. The New Zealand administration from that time onward had an uphill battle, not only in enforcing its authority and leadership upon the Samoans, but also in trying to appeal to Samoan sympathy and support. The 1918 influenza epidemic not only had political connotations, which later put pressure on the administration, but it also fuelled discontent within the Samoan church. The controversy between the LMS

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1 The League of Nations was inaugurated in 1920 in London with its members including Britain, France, Spain, Greece, Italy and Brazil. See League of Nations Launched in London, 11 Feb, 1920, Chronicle of the 20th Century.

2 Tate to Pro-Vicar, 9 May, 1919, Darnand Correspondence, Marist Archives of Samoa and Tokelau (henceforth MAST); Pro-Vicar to Tate, 11 May, 1919, MAST; Victory! German Signs the Armistice, 11 Nov, 1918, Chronicle of the 20th Century.
and Logan, may not have been the “major scandal of the epidemic,” but it was a ‘boil’ that was never treated properly and, in the end, infected the Samoan (LMS) Church and Samoan politics. The 1918 influenza epidemic was an important event in the independent story of Samoa and the Samoan (LMS) Church.

Throughout Samoan villages, there are scattered unmarked mounds, which stand as icons of the tragedy that completely changed the way Samoans perceived New Zealand rule. The 1918 influenza epidemic remains the single most destructive event in the history of Samoa. To this day, many Samoans recall the horror of the disaster. Some recollections were too clouded due to memory loss, while others reflected the accepted second-hand versions of other people’s past experiences. Nevertheless, the accounts confirmed that Samoans suffered horrendously in the epidemic. In one account, an elderly woman from the Fa’asaleleaga District recalled that she was ten years old when the epidemic struck Savai’i. She could not recall in detail what actually happened, but she remembered following her father and uncle to Sapapali’i to bury the bodies of families and friends. She remembered some of the bodies being torn apart and badly decapitated by the dogs, and that image, she said, was ingrained in her mind for the rest of her life.

The influenza epidemic that struck Samoa had killed many soldiers in the battlefields in Europe. The deadly virus had reached Europe from America, but it was not until after the war that the real impact of the epidemic was finally revealed by the Spanish government, after it had devastated that nation in 1918. The deadly virus reached New Zealand in September with the arrival of troops on board the Niagara, which was also carrying New Zealand Parliamentarians. The Niagara was quarantined in Suva on the advice of the ship’s doctor, and the officers of the Niagara officially advised the New Zealand

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3 Michael Field suggested that the Papauta incident was an insignificant event compared to other issues that had been raised. Field failed to grasp the importance of the LMS and the Samoan (LMS) Church to Samoa’s struggle for independence. Field seems to give the church little influence in Samoa’s struggle to autonomy. But anything that affected the Samoan church affected the political leaders of Samoa, who were faithful members of the church. See Michael Field, Mau: Samoa’s Struggle for Freedom, Auckland: Polynesian Press, 1984, 44.


5 Spanish Flu Take its Toll in Britain, 30 Sept, 1918, Chronicle of the 20th Century.

Naval Base in Auckland to inform the Health Department that passengers from
the *Niagara* were suffering from the deadly Spanish influenza. The New
Zealand Health Minister, George Russell, in consultation with Auckland’s Health
Officer, Thomas Hughes, cleared the *Niagara* for berthing after Hughes had
assured Russell it was simple influenza. A few days later, the extent of the virus
surprised everyone, especially after people died, but was not serious enough for
officials to act upon.7

A week later another ship the *Talune* arrived in Auckland, and some of
the passengers, including Robert Carter, the Samoan Labour Commissioner,
were surprised that the *Niagara* was not quarantined,8 as it had on board sick
people diagnosed with influenza. A few days later, the *Talune* sailed for its
usual round trip to Samoa, Fiji, and Tonga, and in Suva, it allowed people to
dismark, although the health authorities quarantined the *Talune* after the
discovery of influenza on board. John Mawson, the captain of the *Talune*, had
signed a declaration that as far as he knew the ship was free of any infectious
diseases, and that allowed people off the boat. It was a disastrous decision for
Fiji.9

Nevertheless, more passengers were taken on board, mainly Fijians, and
the *Talune* sailed for Samoa. On the morning of 7 November 1918, the *Talune*
weighed anchored at Apia harbour and on board were very sick passengers,
including Samoans, Fijians, and *papalagi*, and most of the *Talune*’s crew,10 but
the Samoan Health Officer, Captain Frank Atkinson, passed it off as mild
influenza. Atkinson was not trained as a doctor and had no idea whether the
influenza was contagious or not. Nevertheless, he was happy to clear the
*Talune* on advice of the ship’s captain, and the fact that the ship’s log had not
declared any cases of infectious diseases on board. Mawson also declared he
had a clean bill of health from its last port of call, that being Suva.11

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7 *Note:* By December 1918, 2000 people had died in New Zealand (1000 in Auckland alone) from the
influenza. See Influenza Brought Back From the War, 1 Dec, 1918, *Chronicle of the 20th Century*; Collier,
94.

8 Carter to the Epidemic Commission, New Zealand Samoa Epidemic Commission Collection, 1919, MS –
2031 (henceforth NZSEC).

9 Mawson to Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC.

10 Atkinson to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC; Hough to Lenwood, 2 Dec, 1918, London
Missionary Society, South Seas Archives, South Sea Letters (henceforth SSL); SDC – Minutes of Meeting,
Malua, 7 – 9 Jan, 1919, SSL.

11 Atkinson to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC; Mawson to Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC.
There were surprised reactions from the passengers who felt the *Talune* should have been quarantined after being quarantined in Suva. Many people felt the number of sick people on board should have persuaded the health authority to take more stringent measures than it did. The Reverend Paul Cane of the LMS was very surprised that he was allowed to leave the boat, as he had admitted to the health officers that he had influenza when he left Auckland. He had hoped the sea air would help clear it up but upon arrival in Apia, his condition worsened. He went to hospital immediately and convalesced for eight days before he was released, and even then he was still very weak. He felt the influenza that he had suffered was rather different from any he had experienced.\(^\text{12}\) The Samoans, whom the authorities considered ignorant regarding such matters, were just as shocked that the ‘yellow flag” had been lowered on the *Talune* when clearly there was something wrong. Tuatagaloa, a Falealili *matai* was surprised, when he went to pick up members of his family, to find so many people sick who appeared to be dying on board the ship.\(^\text{13}\) It seemed that none of the passengers were interviewed or taken seriously by the health authority, and that the decision was purely made in consultation with Mawson, supported by Atkinson’s own inadequate knowledge.

On board the *Talune*, there were twelve soldiers earmarked for work in Samoa. On arrival at the military barracks, Major Andrew A. Richardson was concerned that some of the men could not stand up properly and looked very weak. Richardson advised General Sydney Skerman, the Public Medical Officer (P.M.O), of the men’s condition. He tried to ascertain how quickly he could examine the new soldiers, as it was the policy to examine all military personnel who arrived in Samoa. Skerman gave the twelve men a routine medical examination, and found that they were all suffering from influenza. The men informed Skerman that they had been infected even before they left New Zealand, and revealed that the plans to send them to Samoa had been postponed because of their condition, but at the last minute their orders were changed and they left for Samoa. Skerman seemed unperturbed by the condition of the men as he confined them to bed and rest for a couple of days.\(^\text{14}\) Skerman’s decision was probably correct, but given the fact that Skerman had

\(^{12}\) Cane to Lenwood, 16 Dec, 1918, SSL; SDC – Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 7 – 9 Jan, 1919.

\(^{13}\) Tuatagaloa to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC.

\(^{14}\) Richardson to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC.
earlier left the hospital after treating Cane, and other papa/agi and Samoans suffering the same illness, one would expect some kind of concern or curiosity on Skerman’s part. Perhaps, twelve men with influenza, and a hospital full of similar cases, was nothing out of the ordinary for Skerman.

For the next two days, stories began to surface that the Talune had carried passengers infected with the deadly Spanish influenza, and that New Zealand had been infected with the Spanish influenza. The rumours were, in fact, true. New Zealand had declared the Spanish influenza an infectious disease, and Atkinson was later aware of this information, but was too afraid to speak out. The health department should have suspected the worst after two deaths at the hospital the day after, but the authorities remained unconvinced until the enormity of the situation was realised, but by then it was too late to properly control it.15

The news was not just about the influenza arriving in Samoa. Stories also began to circulate that there had been a cover up to allow the Talune to berth in Apia and offload its passengers and cargo as it had a schedule to keep. Furthermore, it was later discovered that Arthur Davey, who was to be the next captain of the Talune, was on board and had advised Mawson to conceal the fact that the ship had on board sick passengers unless the authority demanded it. Davey was anxious to take charge of his new ship, but it would only take effect after it had completed its Pacific round trip. According to Mawson, Davey relied on the clean bill of health documentation to solve everything.16 The Samoans who had travelled in the Talune spread stories that passengers were advised to pretend that all was well, otherwise they would not be allowed off the ship. Others told stories that they could not pretend as they were too sick, but they were allowed to go home.17 It seemed Mawson’s ignorance, and Davey’s desire to fulfil his new command, discarded their obligation to humanity.

The New Zealand administration first realised the enormous extent of the epidemic three days after the Talune arrived. The news of New Zealand itself being infected and that the Talune had carried the disease with her to Samoa also began to sink in. Furthermore, the administration found that the epidemic had taken its toll on Samoan families in Apia. Richardson was a friend of the

15 New Zealand Samoa Epidemic Commission Report, 1919, Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representative of New Zealand (AJHR); New Zealand Epidemic Commission Collection, MS-Papers 2031.
16 Mawson to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC.
17 Faasiusiu to Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC; Titipa to Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC.
Samoan *matai* Amatua, and he had summoned Richardson to visit him. When
Richardson arrived, Amatua looked weak and admitted to him that he was
dying. Richardson soon realised something was very wrong, especially after he
had noticed that all the shutters of Amatua’s house were drawn. Richardson
investigated what to him was an odd situation on a hot day. Richardson’s mind
reeled as the reality of the influenza epidemic dawned on him.

The shutters were all down, and about a dozen people
were lying sick, with one or two children on their feet. I tore
the shutters off, as the air was stifling. I went around the
other fales (native house) in the village, and everywhere I
went was the same thing – no kaikai [food], shutters were
up, and no one able to do anything.18

The New Zealand Forces were immobilised and tried to do everything to
stem the epidemic. The Market Halls in Apia was quickly converted into a make-
shift hospital and sick people were moved there for care. Many Europeans
offered their assistance by providing transportation in getting the sick Samoans
to the Market Halls. The news of the epidemic spreading in the surrounding
districts only added to the confusion and total disbelief of the administration.
The situation at Vaimoso, a village on the fringe of Apia, was so badly
affected that a European woman personally sought out Skerman to give urgent medical
attention to the Samoans. Skerman was overwhelmed at the hospital with the
number of cases that had filled the hospital to capacity. Skerman, whining and
complaining, went to Vaimoso to fulfil the demands of the wife of the Secretary
to Native Affairs.19

Logan was informed of the situation but could not respond immediately
as he was also feeling ill. Logan eventually turned up and found the situation at
the Market Halls chaotic, although his presence made things easier as he gave
orders to employ all administration resources available to deal with the
epidemic. Logan called a meeting of every available *papalagi*, Samoans, and
mission staffs, to put into action a more practical plan to utilise fully the available
resources. The helpers were divided into various groups to look after the supply
store, cook and distribute meals, collect and bury the dead, nurse and provide
medical care, and provide transportation. They were also allocated an area or a
district near Apia to look after. The Papauta School on the out-skirts of Apia

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18 Richardson to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC.
19 Cotton to Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC.
under the care of Miss Elizabeth Moore and Miss Hilda Small of the LMS was also allocated a district to its care. The Lotu Pope, the WMMS and the LMS offered their assistance personally, and were further supported by their Samoan adherents and students. The Papauta School had 150 girls on campus and was honouring its commitment to Logan as it also took responsibilities for its many students affected by the epidemic.

The distribution of food and the pick up of dead bodies was a daily routine. The dishonourable responsibility of digging graves and burying dead bodies fell on the Chinese indentured labourers. In Apia itself, two cemeteries were dug. The Chinese were made to dig all day in the hot conditions, and when they had finished, they were made to bury about 400 dead bodies in one grave and 150 bodies in the other. The administration took another gang of Chinese to Toamua, another village near Apia, where they dug up a lime pit near the pastor's house, which had been used recently to produce lime for the building of a new church. The turning of the lime pit into a grave was probably an omen for the Toamua church that there would be no brethren to fill it. At the beginning the missionaries offered prayers, read comforting verses from the bible, and gave individuals a Christian burial, but eventually, the number of deaths became too great so that just burying the dead was the most humane and Christian thing to do.

For three weeks, the death toll continued to increase at an alarming rate, and it was sapping the energy of helpers, who were pushed to their limits twenty-four hours a day. The situation was not helped by a reduction in the number of helpers through deaths and illness, and diminishing supplies. Consequently, many sick Samoans could no longer wait for transport to pick them up, or deliver food. They made their way to the Market Hall or to families in or near Apia where they could be near the food distribution stations. The flow into Apia was not what the administration wanted, but they were encouraged by the fact that the crisis in Apia itself had shown signs of subsiding. The arrival of additional people was probably more of a nuisance than an unwanted burden. Patrols were sent out to the outer districts and news

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20 Moore to A. E. Hunt, 1919, NZSEC; Logan to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC.
21 Hough to Lenwood, 17 Dec, 1918, SSL; Cane to Lenwood, 16 Dec, 1918, SSL; Richardson to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC.
22 Cane to Lenwood, 16 Dec, 1918, SSL.
23 Richardson to Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC.
received was discouraging. The administration knew it had to provide further assistance to the worst infected areas, but resources and supplies were stretched to the limit. Some relief supplies later arrived from New Zealand, but were not enough to solve the administration’s dilemma. The distribution of food was organised from time to time by the families who could make it to the Market Halls. The handouts provided only very little relief, and the method of distribution meant the villages further out from Apia and the people who were too weak to travel to Apia missed out.

When the influenza finally abated and the surviving remnant regained their health and strength, the process of answering many questions relating to the epidemic disaster began. It was also a time for many to relive the horror of the epidemic itself, and to unfold the many stories of people’s ordeals. There were stories of whole families being wiped out completely from their villages. The stories of missions facing empty pews and a grim future were further sad tales, which only exemplified the horror of the epidemic itself. Samoans knew that they had just experienced an event that had touched them deeply and they would probably never be able to comprehend it. In the end, the Samoans blamed the New Zealand administration for the disaster on several counts.

Firstly, the Samoans blamed the incompetence of the administration’s health officials for the disaster in their failure to quarantine the Talune. The evidence showed that the health department had done what could have been done given the circumstances. However, the Samoans had every reason to be angry. The health officials were incompetent and the administration had no excuse to employ people like Atkinson who had no prior training as a medical officer. The health department could also have done more once they suspected an epidemic brewing. The fact that Atkinson knew more than he had revealed was a violation of administration policy. If Atkinson had no idea what Samoa was facing with the number of sick people at his disposal, then a ‘witch-doctor’ must have trained Skerman. Skerman, of all people, should have at least been more conscious of the events that were unfolding, especially when deaths began to occur and the hospital overflowed with sick patients. Skerman’s

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24 The first assistance regarding other supplies and medical help arrived from Australia four weeks after the incident. See New Zealand Samoa Epidemic Commission Report, 1919, AJHR; New Zealand Epidemic Commission Collection, MS-Papers 2031; Logan to Liverpool, 27 Dec, 1918, Island Territories (henceforth IT) 8 Ex 8/10.

25 Moore to A. E. Hunt, 1919, NZSEC.
reaction questioned his professionalism and ability to be in a position of responsibility for the Samoans’ health. Skerman, it appears, cared very little for the situation at hand.\textsuperscript{26}

Skerman’s carelessness was clearly displayed after being informed of the crisis in Apia. He had left the hospital filled to capacity, and had not counted on finding a make-shift hospital in the middle of town. Perhaps, the enormity of the disaster may have dawned on him when he saw the number of people being cared for at the Hall. Skerman’s reaction was not one of concern for human lives, but anger when he saw the sign ‘Temporary Hospital’ above the doors of the Market Halls. The make-shift hospital at the time was crowded with very sick people, but the facility helped relieve the main Hospital, which was full. Skerman was incensed with the idea, and immediately sought to pour abuse on the people responsible. Skerman then turned his attention away from the make-shift hospital, and focussed on the lack of professionalism and qualifications of the volunteers who were nursing the sick. Skerman in a rage ordered everyone, including the sick, to vacate the hall immediately. He even assisted in personally kicking out a Samoan that was sick and asleep. Skerman stormed out of the hall and left. The sick and everyone who had been evicted returned to the hall. Two days later, Skerman fell ill and did not hesitate to take the next available ship out of Samoa for New Zealand.\textsuperscript{27}

The lazy approach by the health department towards the epidemic was widespread. Lieutenant Herman Wollerman criticised the Hospital’s unprofessional attitude over the disposal of dead bodies infected with influenza. The doctors and health officers returned the deceased corpses to their families for burial. The Samoans took the bodies back to their village and, eventually, the villagers fell victims to the virus. Many villages near Apia had not been infected prior to the dead bodies of family members arriving to be buried. The incompetent hospital staff contributed to the rapid spread of the epidemic rather than taking steps to contain it.\textsuperscript{28} Skerman was denounced by the Samoans, and he never returned. At Savai’i, the medical officer, William James, refused to make house calls or visit any patients brought to his attention. The Samoans, and many Europeans, believed that if James had done his duty and visited the

\textsuperscript{26} Richardson to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC.
\textsuperscript{27} Richardson to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC; Wollerman to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC.
\textsuperscript{28} Wollerman to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC.
sick, more lives would have been saved. Atkinson, albeit a culprit in the eyes of the Samoans, redeemed himself. Richardson recalled that "no man could have worked harder. At all hours and at any time he was on call. His temperature was taken, and I believe it was a point over 100, yet he never relaxed in his work."  

Secondly, the Samoans blamed Logan personally. Lagolago summed up the general feelings of the Samoans that Logan betrayed them in failing to exploit every available option to help the plight of the Samoan people. In Lagolago's statement to the Epidemic Commission, he mentioned that the American Consul, Mason Mitchell, had informed him that Logan ignored an offer of help from Pago Pago. Lagolago recalled his deep disappointment in hearing the news.

Tears dropped from my eyes to think that this was true, for Col. Logan should have accepted the offer for the sake of the people. The doctors would have arrived in one day, and they would have saved some of my people, and also the people of Samoa who died. As far as I am concerned, everything should have been done by the leading people to save the people of Samoa from the epidemic. I must say that every necessary thing was done but one, and that in relation to the offer from Pago Pago.  

In a statement to the Epidemic Commission, Logan, at first, denied receiving such a telegram, but after being confronted with evidence from members of his own staff and Mitchell, Logan finally admitted that a telegram was received but he had ignored its content, except for the part referring to Samoan ships having to undergo quarantine in American Samoa until the epidemic ceased. Mitchell gave further evidence to show that the content of the telegram confirmed an offer to help was furnished, and that the Americans were waiting to hear from Logan.

In connection with Governor Poyer's offer of assistance I desire to say on learning of the ravages of Influenza in Apia he called a meeting of his medical staff and nurses and stated he thought they should offer their services, notwithstanding the risk, and he felt if he could be of any service he would go himself. All the medical officers and nurses some 30 in all immediately offered their services and were prepared to go as soon as word was received from Colonel Logan.

29 New Zealand Samoa Epidemic Commission Report, 1919, AJHR; New Zealand Epidemic Commission Collection, MS-Papers 2031.
30 Richardson to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC.
31 Lagolago to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC.
32 Logan to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC.
Logan gave two reasons for his decision to ignore Governor J. M. Poyer’s offer. Firstly, the telegram was handed to him personally and therefore was not an official telegram from the American Samoan Governor, if normal protocol was observed in such matters. It was Logan’s belief that such telegrams did not require any official recognition on his part. Logan also pointed out that the telegram had been addressed to Consul Mitchell, and he was, therefore, not obliged to take note of its content, except for the part Mitchell had pointed out to him referring to the quarantine ruling. Regarding the wording of Poyer’s offer to help, which stated “please inform me if we can be of any service or assistance,” Logan understood the offer to have been addressed to Consul Mitchell’s wife who was bed stricken with influenza.33

Samoans further endorsed their belief that Logan had rejected Poyer’s action when it was revealed that Logan had made an order to sever all communications with Pago Pago soon after receiving the message. Logan had not denied that he had made an order to that effect, but he denied that it was related in any way to his ignoring Poyer’s offer. Logan maintained that the order regarding the disconnection of radio communication with Pago Pago was an administration decision to give the men who manned the radio station ample time to rest. Logan’s reasons were later discredited by evidence from the soldiers manning the radio station, who rejected the idea that they did not have enough rest. The soldiers speculated that the closure of all communication was probably Logan’s reaction to the restrictions the American had placed upon Samoan mail and ships.34

The Samoans took Logan’s evidence no other way, but that of a deceitful and untrustworthy person. The Epidemic Commission, on the other hand, could not refute nor deny Logan’s reasoning for ignoring Poyer’s offer of assistance, as the telegram was ambiguous and the evidence were inconclusive to suggest that Logan understood the telegram as such. Nevertheless, the Samoans believed otherwise and would not accept that the words “please inform me if we can be of any service or assistance” meant something other than an offer to help Samoa in its crisis.35 The commission may have been reluctant to attribute blame to Logan for his lack of vision to utilise everything in his power to help the

33 Logan to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC.
34 Richardson to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC; Davies to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC; Logan to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC.
35 Davies to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC.
Samoans, but it was a fact that Logan closed the only lifeline open to appeal for assistance. Logan’s own staff had commented that he was not on good terms with the American Governor, and was not enthusiastic about anything American. It seemed Logan had put his personal feelings before the welfare of the Samoans.  

Even if Logan was right regarding his version of the telegram and the Radio shut down incident, his creditability was fully expunged in the eyes of the Samoans after making a derogatory statement regarding the status of Samoan matai. Logan called some of Samoa’s leading matai ‘minor chiefs,’ and the Samoan political leaders were irate. The Samoans were deeply wounded that Logan could lower the status of “Samoas king-makers.” The Samoans made it clear that in the old days such comments had led to death. Logan tried to patch things up with the Samoan community, and called a meeting at Muliniu’u to hold a post-mortem to discover the cause of the epidemic. The Samoans bombarded Logan with so many questions that he lost control and stormed out of the meeting in anger. The Samoans were upset with Logan’s disrespectful attitude, especially when Logan had walked out while one of the matai was addressing him. The Samoans took Logan’s action as a refusal to talk about the epidemic and, therefore, proof of his refusal to assist Samoans. Logan was probably angry at the continuing remarks regarding New Zealand’s incompetence as a ruler compared to Germany and America. For the Samoans, the epidemic disaster and Logan’s attitude was enough to convince them that New Zealand could not administer Samoa. The fact that American Samoa was protected from suffering the same fate, was ample evidence of New Zealand’s mismanagement. For the Samoans, the call for American protection was not a hoax, but an appropriate avenue to pursue. The new group of matai was far more progressive than their deceased predecessors were. Unfortunately, for Logan, it was not just the Samoan matai who were disgusted with Logan’s political performance. The Samoan (LMS) Church was also trying to understand the effect of the influenza epidemic, and the implication of Logan’s actions in relation to the LMS’s work in Samoa.

36 Wollereman to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC; Richardson to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC; Davies to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC.
37 Lagolago to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC; Samoa Times, 7 Jun, 1919.
38 R. W. Tate, Native Situation, Sept, 1921, IT 88/5; see also Stout to Massey, 24 Feb, 1921, IT 1 Ex 18/1; Lagolago to the Commission, 1919, NZSEC; Davidson, 96.
The cost of the epidemic to the LMS was enormous according to letters, reports, and journals, submitted from the Au Fa’atonu to the Au Matutua. Hough wrote some four months after the epidemic, "we are just struggling through to the light once more. Samoa has been down into the valley of the shadow of death."\(^{39}\) He went on to describe the horror of the epidemic and the cost to the Samoan (LMS) Church.

We lost more by comparison in three weeks than the British Empire has lost in four years of the world war. The dead lay with the living, until at last someone dragged himself out and dug a shallow grave and rolled the corpse into it. The Churches have lost their deacons, who were also government officials. We have lost our pastors. Not only have we lost the old men, we have lost heavily amongst the younger men. We don't know where we are.\(^{40}\)

Hough's comments highlighted just how much the Samoan (LMS) Church had contributed to the political and social aspects of Samoan life. The loss of its church members was also a blow for the administration officials. The Samoan (LMS) Church members dominated Samoan politics. Cane witnessed the devastation in Savai'\(\text{i}\), and while it had less deaths than Upolu, the impact on the people and for the church was just as devastating. Cane recalled how he could only watch as "the poor people were stricken dumb with grief and fear, no cry in them no complaint, just resignation to blind fate."\(^{41}\)

The epidemic, according to LMS accounts, killed between twenty and twenty-five percent of the Samoan population, which at the time totalled approximately thirty-seven thousand. In the Itu-o-tane district in Savai'\(\text{i}\), the LMS mourned the deaths of all their Samoan pastors, and the Itu-o-tane's population of five thousands was reduced with the deaths of approximately one thousand people.\(^{42}\) The Samoan (LMS) Church was shattered. The LMS greatly mourned the loss of key Samoan pastors, who were earmarked to eventually takeover control of the church. Out of the forty members of the Au Toeaina, only twelve survived, while every member of the newly formed Samoa Financial Committee

\(^{39}\) Hough to Lenwood, 2 Dec, 1918, SSL.

\(^{40}\) Hough to Lenwood, 17 Dec, 1918, SSL.

\(^{41}\) Cane to Lenwood, 16 Dec, 1918, SSL.

\(^{42}\) According to R. W. Tate's memorandum to the Minister of External Affairs, the official death toll was 7,554 out of a population of 38,302, which accounts for 19-20% of the population. Samoa's total population as of 1 Jul, 1917 was 37,491. The number of Samoans alone was 35,404, which means the numbers of Samoan deaths in the epidemic was around 22% of the population. See R. W. Tate, Native Situation, Sept, 1921, IT 88/5; British Military Occupation of Samoa, Census, 1 Jul, 1917, IT 1 Ex 88/7; see also Hills to Lenwood, 16 Dec, 1918, SSL; Cane to Lenwood, 16 Dec, 1918, SSL; Clarke to Bradford, 7 Mar, 1919, SSL.
perished. The LMS estimated that approximately one hundred Samoan pastors lost their lives in the epidemic. The Au Fa’atonu met at Malua in January 1919, and envisioned a bleak future for Samoa.

The effect of this epidemic is not only immediately felt, but we fear will continue to be felt for years to come. Leulumoega will have to become the heads of their families and clans, and so there is, sure to be a dearth of candidates for the ministry....It is a lamentable fact that just at this crisis when Samoans are faced with far reaching political changes they have lost at one fell blow not only nearly all their leading pastors and teachers but the majority of the more experienced and sagacious chiefs.43

The epidemic took men considered to be "pillars of the church."44 They included Esene, Elder and Chairman of the Au Toeaina for three years, whom Cane described as "a grand old man full of vigour,"45 and Kirisome, Secretary of the Au Toeaina, and described as "a man of great ability and geniality."46 The mission also lost Imo, the secretary of the Fono Tele and the Samoa Finance Committee, described as "a giant for work" and "one of the most valuable men in all Samoa."47 Petaia was also an enormous loss, being one of the original members of the Au Toeaina, and deemed "a useful man in Samoa, not only because of the dignity he lent to [the] deliberations, but also because of the restraining influence he exercised on the younger pastors."48

The death of Malaefou, a tutor at Malua, was irreplaceable, and some of his European colleagues remembered him as "the perfect gentleman and kindness personified."49 Malaefou was also admired as "a man of seemingly wonderful vitality, good tempered, energetic and with that knack of leading men that only the limited number possesses. He was indeed the right hand of us missionaries. He will be difficult to succeed, if ever we can obtain a man approaching him even, in these qualities which made him so valuable to us."50

43 SDC, Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 7-9 Jan, 1919, SSL.
44 Cane to Lenwood, 16 Dec, 1918, SSL.
45 Cane to Lenwood, 16 Dec, 1918, SSL.
46 Cane to Lenwood, 16 Dec, 1918, SSL.
47 Cane to Lenwood, 16 Dec, 1918, SSL; Report of the Malua District, 1918, SSR.
48 Report of the Malua District, 1918, SSR. Note: J. W. Davidson made reference to Petaia, and later acknowledged the great work done by Petaia's sons in the church and, especially as government officials. Petaia's great-grandson, Tofiau Vaaelua Et Alesana was a Prime Minister of Samoa (died in 1999). Davidson's comments on Petaia and his off-springs contribution to later Samoan life was one example of the kind of loss Samoa sustained during the 1918 influenza epidemic. See Davidson, Samoa mo Samoa: The Emergence of the Independent State of Samoa, Melbourne: Oxford University, 1967.
49 Cane to Lenwood, 16 Dec, 1918, SSL.
50 74th Annual Report of the Malua Theological Institution, 1918, SSR.
The list of quality pastors who perished included Viliamu, Metu, Faimalo, Uili, Molimauina, Liuvao, and Alefaio, who had all given so much to the church. The quality of leadership needed to take Samoa towards self-determination had been wiped out in a flash. The United Nations later rated the epidemic disaster as "one of the most disastrous recorded anywhere in the world during the present century, so far as the proportion of deaths to the population is concerned."

The loss of so many members and fellow workers in the church was not the only issue the LMS had to deal with after the epidemic. During the crisis, Logan found himself at Papauta School one Sunday morning, on 24 November 1918. In a subsequent meeting that followed with Miss Elizabeth Moore, the head of the school, Logan sparked off a set of circumstances that almost destroyed the amicable relationship between the LMS and the New Zealand administration. The controversy between Logan and Moore was put aside during the height of the epidemic, but its impact on Moore and the Papauta School was never forgotten. When the epidemic subsided, the Au Fa'atonu had many unanswered questions regarding Logan's behaviour. The Samoan pastors, and Samoan (LMS) Church members were also asking the same questions, not so much in support of the Au Fa'atonu, but for the treatment of the Samoan girls at Papauta School. The Logan – Moore controversy was also of special interest to the matai who had daughters at the school. Many Samoans viewed Logan's attack on Moore and the Papauta School as an attack on the Samoan (LMS) Church, and Samoan matai.

The two LMS missionaries at Papauta, Moore and Small, assisted the efforts of the administrator to feed all the sick in Apia and its surrounding districts. It was a daily routine that Small and students, who were strong enough to do the work, had done with all sincerity and seriousness, although most of the time the girls at Papauta School were too ill to help themselves. When Logan visited Papauta on the day in question, Small and the Samoan girls had been unable to fulfil their obligations for several days. Small was ill and there were only a small number of girls well enough to look after the infirm and bury

51 Reports of the Malua District, 1918, SSR; 74th Annual Report of the Malua Theological Institution, 1918, SSR; Hills to Lenwood, 16 Dec, 1918, SSL; Cane to Lenwood, 16 Dec, 1918, SSL.

the dead at the school. The following account of Moore's recollection of the events was contained in a letter to the Reverend A. E. Hunt, the secretary of the Congregational Union of New Zealand in Wellington.

It was about 10 A.M. on Sunday, November 24—on the ninth day after the appearance of influenza in our school. About 80 girls were lying ill in the various dormitories, Miss Small was going about among them attending to their wants, while I, with two girls, was on the balcony preparing for burial the girl who had died the day before, when I was summoned below by the loud voice of the Administrator calling my name. Scarcely waiting for greeting, he began ---as far as I can remember---by saying in a voice which became louder and more angry, 'Miss Moore, I believe you have sent down this morning for meat. I wish to inform you that no meat will be given you. I consider this the most disgraceful institution in Samoa, and I intend to inform your headquarter in London of the fact. Send them food! I would rather see them burning in Hell! There is a dead horse at your gate---let them eat that! Great, fat, lazy, loafing creatures....Send them down to the public burial ground to dig graves! A disgrace to Christianity! I should send them all to Hell.'

Moore told Logan the girls were too ill to dig graves, but it only inflated Logan's anger. Logan told Moore "if you do not send me 25 of these girls to dig graves, I will come back this afternoon and burn down the school." Logan's demands were never met, because Moore had no girls well enough to be sent. Logan's comments soon found their way to the ears of the Samoans, and it further fuelled their anger against the New Zealand administrator. At the time, anger was all that the Samoans could express, as they were too weak, and the circumstances were not conducive for them to do otherwise. The news regarding Logan's altercation with Moore surfaced after the disaster. The treatment of the Papauta girls soon also emerged and the Samoans, especially the matai, began to realise just how much Logan's threats had attributed to the demise of their daughters.

Small heard every word that Logan's anger was able to manufacture. Small also tried her best to comfort the many sick girls who had also heard the exchanges between Logan and Moore. Small and Moore were glad that the girls had very little command of English, and were not able to understand any of the coarse words Logan used. But, Logan's anger was enough to put fear in the hearts of the girls, and many of the girls wanted to leave Papauta immediately.

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53 Moore to A. E. Hunt, 1919, NZSEC.
54 Moore to A. E. Hunt, 1919, NZSEC.
and return to their families before Logan returned to carry out his threats. Small saw the fear in the girls and considered their request. Small then advised the girls once they felt strong enough "to crawl to the next village, to go away, as the sight of them made Col. Logan angry." 55

According to Moore, about forty girls left on Sunday afternoon "and started walking towards the direction of their homes, sleeping in the infected villages by the way." 56 Many of the girls lived more than twenty kilometers (12 miles) from Papauta School, while other girls had to find boats and fautasi (long boats) to transport them to Savai'i and Manono. It was a task that was impossible given the circumstances surrounding the epidemic. Some of the girls tracked across mountainous terrains in order to shorten travel time to their villages. Wollerman told the epidemic commission that on the afternoon in question, he was on his way from A'ana and Tuamasaga Districts, where he had been collecting dead bodies. He recalled he "passed a dozen girls walking in the direction of Malua, each with a little bundle of clothes and looking very sad. I ascertained that these were the girls from Miss Moore's school." 57 Wollerman later met the manager of Rothschild's store who commented that "it was a shame for the missionaries to kick those girls out at such a time." 58 Wollerman enlightened his manager friend of the circumstances and he was rather stunned by what Wollerman revealed. Wollerman's final comments blamed Moore and Small for the girls' heart-rending circumstances.

I thought it absolutely criminal to send those girls to their home, probably to die, when they were at the time in a place, which was practically a hospital, and the best place they could be. 59

The girls were probably heading for the Malua Seminary to find shelter as it would have been very late when Wollerman saw them. In hearing Wollerman's description of the sick girls carrying their little bundles, Samoans would have shed tears. For the Samoans, these girls were not just any girls, but daughters of Samoa, who had been abandoned to survive on their own because of a pompous administrator, and two insensitive women missionaries. It was a strange decision by Small, and one that Moore also supported, as she had not

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55 Moore to A. E. Hunt, 1919, NZSEC.
56 Moore to A. E. Hunt, 1919, NZSEC.
57 Wollerman to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC.
58 Wollerman to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC.
59 Wollerman to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC.
tried to stop the exodus later.\textsuperscript{60} It seemed the fear of Logan was the only reason given, and that, unfortunately, outweighed compassion and solace that should have been a priority. The Au Fa'atonu's own bias and looking to Logan as the aggressor in the controversy exonerated Moore and Small of any injustice.

The Au Fa'atonu in its monthly meeting declared their "indignation and disgust at the unseemly and unprovoked attack made upon Miss Moore and the Papauta School by the administrator Col. Logan during the time of the recent epidemic."\textsuperscript{61} However, under instruction from Moore, the Au Fa'atonu took no official action against Logan. It was agreed that a letter to the New Zealand government would be sufficient to put the matter on record. The decision was later retracted when it was revealed that the Congregational Union of New Zealand had laid a formal complaint before the New Zealand government regarding the actions of Logan and the administration during the influenza epidemic.\textsuperscript{62} Sir James Allen, the Minister of External Affairs, took the allegations contained in the letter seriously, especially when Allen had already being petitioned by the Auckland Chamber of Commerce (ACC) to investigate Logan's administration. The President of ACC, Robert Burns, spelt out their concerns.

The complaints were practically those of incompetence and there was no complaint which was of sufficient importance...for us to urge you to take any steps in this matter until the war was over. We would now, however, like to know if it is proposed that the administration should be carried on in its present form and under the present administrator.... If not, we think in justice to those in Samoa who seem to feel very strongly that they have been unfairly treated, that an investigation should be made into their complaints.\textsuperscript{63}

The petitions led to Logan's recall to New Zealand. Allen also initiated the formation of a commission to look at the New Zealand administration and its handling of the epidemic disaster.\textsuperscript{64} Logan later wrote to Allen, to point out

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\textsuperscript{60} The LMS never addressed the reasons behind Moore and Small's decision to allow the girls to leave. The epidemic commission concentrated so much on the political aspects of the epidemic that had contributed to the deaths of Samoans, some of the little issues were overlooked. Logan and New Zealand became the scapegoat and it drew attention away from Moore and Small, and the accountability of the LMS. Nevertheless, it was a decision that tarnished the image of the LMS in the eyes of many Samoans.

\textsuperscript{61} The Au Fa'atonu was much more concerned with the Logan – Moore controversy, although it was aware of other occasions Logan had attacked the LMS. For instance, Logan condemned Harry Griffith, the LMS printer, for not allowing a Malua student trying to commit suicide to drown. See SOC – Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 7 – 9 Jan, 1919, SSL; Griffith to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC.

\textsuperscript{62} Minutes of Meeting, Allen and Congregational Union, 29 Apr, 1919, IT 8 Ex 8/10.

\textsuperscript{63} Burns to Allen, 2 Dec, 1918, IT 1 Ex 1/18.

\textsuperscript{64} Minutes of Meeting, Allen and Congregational Union, 29 Apr, 1919, IT 8 Ex 8/10; Moore to Hawkins, 12 Jul, 1919, SSL; Hough to Lenwood, 22 Jul, 1919, SSL.
Moore's rude conduct during the epidemic and charged her with having "no feelings of humanity towards a stricken people in their hour of need."\(^{65}\) It was a charge that was totally refuted by Moore and her LMS colleagues in Samoa. Moore only regretted that an explanation for Logan's behaviour was not demanded at the time.

Logan, under oath and before the Epidemic Commission, agreed with Moore’s version of events, but denied some of the wordings. Logan's version of the incident suggested that a misunderstanding over comments made by Small a few days before was the catalyst for his unfortunate outburst. Logan had asked Small for some girls to assist in feeding the sick not, as Moore had stated, to bury the dead. Small told Logan she could not promise anything, as she had to consult with Moore, and ascertain the state of school. Three days after, Small had not turned up with any girls due to illness, and Logan took exception to their absence.\(^{66}\)

What made me angry with them was this; they did practically nothing except attend to their own people right from the start, whilst other missions situated the same way were doing most excellent work. For instance, the Wesleyan Missionary and his wife were working all they could and said they could get on quite well and attend those immediately surrounding them....they took the entire care of their particular district off my shoulder.\(^{67}\)

Logan refused to admit that Moore, Small, and the Papauta girls had been faithful to their assigned tasks, even when pressed to do so by the overwhelming evidence presented before him. He did, however, acknowledge that he was misled by some of the European helpers, who had pointed out that the Papauta School had ignored their responsibilities and had not turned up to fulfill their obligations to the administration. Logan was ‘passing the buck.’ He would not admit that he had no knowledge that the LMS institution had not been fulfilling its task. But, despite being enlightened with the truth, Logan refused to admit he was mistaken, and that he did not know the circumstances of the Papauta School when he burst into their compound with his abusive remarks. Instead, he continued to ridicule the Papauta School before the Commission.

The Wesleyan girls were doing good work and the Catholic sisters were doing extraordinary good work in Apia. As a matter of fact,

\(^{65}\) Moore to A. E. Hunt, 1919, NZSEC.


\(^{67}\) Logan to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC.
the conduct of this particular school was unchristian. It had been tried in the balance and had been found wanting. I think I went as far as to say to Miss Moore that her school was a disgrace to Christianity, and that she was encouraging the girls to do nothing when they might have been doing splendid work. I was thoroughly disgusted with their conduct and left them severely alone until this particular day. But, when I heard that not only were they doing nothing but were sending down for food, I was disgusted and said they must either work like everyone else or starve.  

Logan’s comments revealed the characteristics of an injured animal. Logan’s hatred of the LMS had stemmed from the relentless battering the LMS was dishing out. Logan’s reputation was not just under scrutiny in the political sphere, but was also under inquiry by the church. But, the comments also revealed a possible motive for the two women missionaries to send the students home. It was obvious that the girls were well looked after at Papauta, and Small and Moore did everything to keep the girls healthy. The vision of seeing the girls digging graves, and the fact that Logan had declared an embargo on food for the school, may have prompted the decision to get them out for their own good.

The commission gave Logan the opportunity to examine Moore’s evidence closely and to offer criticism. Logan refused. He was unable to convince the Samoans and members of the commission that he had acted fairly. Logan’s own member of staff, Wollerman, was at the Papauta School on the morning in question, and he corroborated the stories given by Small and Moore. Logan had not told the truth and his own evidence before the Epidemic Commission, incriminated him. Allen and a New Zealand Parliamentary party visited Samoa in an effort to reassure the Samoans of New Zealand’s care for its people. Allen also made a goodwill visit to Malua and Papauta, and later apologised for the treatment of the LMS missionaries by Logan.

The epidemic commission was unable to find any solid motive for Logan’s hatred for Moore, Small, and the Papauta School. The LMS was not aware of any conflict with the administration. Moore believed Logan was “distracted by his anxiety and distress at the whole situation in Samoa, at the time he scarcely knew what he said.” Skerman believed Logan was suffering

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66 Logan to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC.
66 See Chapter 5 for examples; see also SDC – Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 29 Apr – 8 May, 1920, SSL; Moore to Hunt, 1919, NZSEC.
70 SDC – Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 29 Apr – 8 May, 1920, SSL; see also Logan to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC; Wollerman to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC; Moore to Hunt, 1919, NZSEC.
71 Moore to A. E. Hunt, 1919, NZSEC.
from the 'tropics sickness', which affects people who reside in one place for too long. 72 Logan's own staff also commented on his mental state at the time and observed that Logan was not himself. Mrs Logan also observed and commented that she wished her husband had stayed home because he was full of fever; it was no use suggesting a doctor to him, to do so was "like a red rag to a bull." 73 Perhaps Logan's state of mind was responsible for his attack on the LMS institution, but it has not been able to explain the LMS's dilemma, as to why Logan turned his distress on Papauta.

The Au Matutua sent the Reverend Victor A. Barradale to Samoa in 1919 to offer assistance to the Au Fa'atonu in dealing with the trauma of the epidemic crisis, and to comfort the Samoan (LMS) Church. The arrival of Barradale was a positive move by the Au Matutua in terms of creating good relations with the Samoans and the Samoan (LMS) Church. The Au Fa'atonu appreciated Barradale's efforts in strengthening the hearts of the Samoans to overcome their grief and find courage to return to their normal lives. 74 The Samoan church also showed its gratitude through Faletosee, who thanked the Au Matutua for thinking of Samoa in such difficult times. Some of the church districts had not attended Barradale's welcome, but were also comforted by Barradale's visit. To show their appreciation, thirty-three letters from the same number of churches in the Fa'asaleleaga District, and a few letters from the Itu-o-tane and Falealili Districts, reached Barradale to reaffirm their love for the Au Matutua. 75 Barradale had put confidence back into the Samoan (LMS) Church and Samoans as a whole. Some of the deacons and lay members, especially the matai, found courage to review the epidemic, and to peacefully demand an explanation from the New Zealand administration. According to the Au Fa'atonu, Barradale's presence had lessened the hatred that the Samoans were harbouring over New Zealand's blunder. 76 It was, perhaps, a misleading observation from a political point of view.

The influenza epidemic affected the whole life of the Samoan (LMS) Church. The school rolls in all of the LMS's institutions fell dramatically. Papauta

72 Skerman to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC.
73 Richardson to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC.
74 SDC – Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 7 – 11 Jul, 1919, SSL; Moore to Lenwood, 12 Jul, 1919, SSL.
75 O le Lauga mo le Savaii a Misile Peletele, Malua, 10 Jul, 1919, SSL; Tafuna'i to Barradale, 14 Jul, 1919, SSL; Tupe to Barradale, 16 Jul, 1919, SSL; Enosa to Barradale, 23 Jul, 1919, SSL.
76 Hough to Hawkins, 21 Mar, 1919, SSL; Lagolago to the Epidemic Commission, 1919, NZSEC.
and Leulumoega school rolls, especially, were severely affected as many girls and boys that survived the epidemic stayed home to take care of their depleted families. The girls were suddenly thrust into motherhood, and performed all the roles of their deceased mothers. The boys were also thrust into responsible positions and caring for the families, as older brothers took on the responsibilities as mātai in the decision making process. The administration found it not easy to deal with the new generation of mātai who had been chosen not for their ability but for reasons of family necessity. The epidemic took the lives of older mātai who had counselled and guided the Samoans throughout the German period, and for four years under New Zealand's administration. The death of the older generation created a gap that, according to the administration, the younger generation could not fill adequately. In Tate's report to the Minister of External Affairs in 1921, he referred to the leadership of the younger mātai as "the leadership of boys."

The Au Fa'atonu wrote to the Au Matutua that the monetary contributions of the Samoan (LMS) Church would be affected by the epidemic, and that they believed the Samoans would not get near the required target. The Au Fa'atonu miscalculated the ability of the Samoans to survive difficulties in times of suffering. Samoans proved the Au Fa'atonu wrong, and showed their versatility and support for the church by not only raising the £5000 that the Au Matutua had set for self-support, but also raising an extra £3000. The Au Fa'atonu appreciated the effort of the Samoan (LMS) Church in reaching the target, and accepted the £5000 contribution for the LMS's work in Samoa. Regarding the £3000, the Au Fa'atonu suggested that the £3000 be given to the Au Matutua for the work of the LMS. The Samoan pastors rejected the proposal in favour of the money being used for foreign mission. The Au Fa'atonu was surprised by the attitude of the Samoan pastors. Clarke attributed the Samoan pastors' attitude to the lack of mature leadership. He wrote to the Au Matutua that "the epidemic has swept away nearly all the old pastors and leaders whose opinions were trusted and whose decisions were final; the young men have now taken their places will soon be asking for detailed balance sheets to be laid

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77 Moore to Lenwood, 2 Feb, 1919, SSL.
78 R. W. Tate, Native Situation, Sept, 1921, IT 88/5.
79 Cane to Lenwood, ? Feb, 1919, SSL.
80 Clarke to Bradford, 7 Mar, 1919, SSL; Clarke to Bradford, 25 Mar, 1919, SSL.
The Au Fa’atonu felt that the new group of younger pastors would be easier to control, but it was soon obvious that they would be a handful.

From an administration point of view, the epidemic disaster taught the health department a lesson they would never forget. According to the Reverend Stanley Phillips, the administration was more professional in its approach to ships arriving in Samoa. Strict quarantine laws were implemented, and all other aspects relating to the good health of the Samoans were implemented. The 1918 influenza epidemic, and Logan’s irresponsible performance in dealing with the catastrophe, fermented to erupt into a political catastrophe within the next two decades. The Samoan (LMS) Church was more peaceful, and although the impact of the epidemic and the Logan – Moore controversy remained buried, it was never forgotten.

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81 Clarke to Bradford, 7 Mar, 1919, SSL.
82 S. G. Phillips to G. E. Phillips, 30 May, 1936, SSL; Stallan to Phillips, 30 Jul, 1935, SSL; Stallan to Phillips, 6 Apr 1936, SSL; Stallan to Phillips, 2 Jun, 1936, SSL; Perkins to Phillips, 22 Aug, 1936, SSL.
83 J. W. Davidson was involved with the preparation of Samoa for independence. When he was in Samoa in 1947, Samoans were still talking about the epidemic and New Zealand’s role in it. See J. W. Davidson, *Samoas mo Samoa: The Emergence of the Independent State of Samoa*, Melbourne: Oxford University, 1967, 97.
CHAPTER SEVEN

POLITICAL INCOMPETENCE
AND SAMOAN NATIONALISM

The influenza epidemic in 1918 etched gruesome snapshot images of death and destruction into the memory reservoir of Samoan consciousness. It affected every niche of Samoan existence to a point where it became the eleventh commandment, as the pain and rage from the event was related from victims to heirs. Thus, when New Zealand continued to enhance the pain through Richardson’s insensitive policies, the Samoans reacted with passion and rejection. Richardson was on the verge of witnessing Samoan nationalism for the first time.

The gap between Samoan aspirations and Richardson’s expectations continued to widen during 1926. It was not that Richardson was unkind in his policies, but the fact that his policies were formed around the concepts and values of his New Zealand culture, the Samoans found oppressive. The Samoans tried to implement ways to counter Richardson’s insensitivity, but failed to pierce Richardson’s arrogance. The Faipule’s loyalty to Richardson, and their duty to fulfil Samoan aspirations caused much internal conflict that rendered them useless. They condemned themselves to becoming fence sitters.¹

The matai wanted to advance their views but were powerless through the indecision of the Faipule. The Samoans reluctantly carried this burden as they also tried to side with the administrator and to satisfy their own desires. There seemed no stopping Richardson marching towards self-glorification and Samoan mortification. Richardson himself was confident that the loyalty of the Faipule meant loyalty of the Samoans, and failed to contemplate any adverse reaction from any section of the community, including the papalagi. However, it was precisely Richardson’s over confidence in his ability to control the Samoans and papalagi at the extreme end of the spectrum, which blinded him to the real threat to his administration – the afakasi.²

¹ S. S. Allen, Notes on Samoa, S.S. Allen Collection, MS-Papers 1499 (henceforth SSA); Native Administrations and Local Government in Western Samoa, 21 Jul, 1947, Grattan Papers 4879 (henceforth GP).
² S. S. Allen, Notes on Samoa, SSA.
The year 1926 not only marked a changed of attitude towards New Zealand's administration, but it was also the year in which Samoans, *papalagi*, and *afakasi*, began to leave their passive shells and campaign to reject Richardson's paternalism. Olaf Nelson's trip to New Zealand during September, and the meetings with some of New Zealand's leading parliamentarians, led to a change in attitude and vigour among the Samoans, *papalagi*, and *afakasi*. Nelson had used his influence to table before the New Zealand parliament some of the problems faced by the Samoans and *papalagi* under Richardson's administration. Nelson's account of the Samoan political situation highlighted a discrepancy between the New Zealand government's policy for Samoa and Richardson's own personal agenda for the Samoans.

Nelson returned with good news that the Minister of External Affairs, the Hon. William Nosworthy, would visit Samoa to investigate some of the complaints received through Nelson. Nelson quickly activated several meetings, which brought together Europeans and Samoans, and resulted in setting up a committee made up of equal number of Samoans and Europeans. The second meeting saw an increased number of Europeans attending but Europeans still greatly outnumbered by the Samoans. The increase in Samoan numbers reflected a new attitude within the Samoan community. Many Samoans were willing to work together with Europeans to address the problems imposed by the Richardson regime. It further showed that people like Nelson had made a deep impression on the Samoan people, especially, as an *afakasi*, he demanded respect due to his Samoan connection. Nelson was connected to the Sa Tupua family through his mother. He held the title Taisi and, with his immense wealth, he commanded respect and honour from other families.

Richardson disapproved of *papalagi* meeting together with Samoans. Richardson felt the *papalagi* were insensitive to the problems faced by the administration. Richardson bluntly pointed this out to the European Citizens' Committee.

You are doing a thing unheard of in the annals of colonial administration, and are almost certain to discredit the European community....I wish all people here to clearly understand that I do

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3 Report of the Royal Commission into the Administration of Western Samoa, Appendices to the Journal of the House of Representatives (henceforth AJHR), 1928.

4 Data Compiled and Sent to NZ at the time of the Mau Deputation to Wellington, GP.
not approve of a political meeting which mixes native politics with European politics.\(^5\)

Richardson saw the merging as disregarding his orders on two counts. Firstly, the Europeans must not meddle with Samoan affairs and, secondly, the Samoans must channel their complaints through the district councils and Fono a Faipule. Richardson saw the newly found unity in the European and Samoan communities as a challenge to his authority, and this prompted him to advise Nosworthy to postpone, or better still, cancel his visit to Samoa.

Richardson’s ego blinded him to the folly of his action. He had missed the opportunity to listen and address both parties at once. It was an opportunity to examine closely the ringleaders and those who were behind the Samoan hostility. Samoans and \textit{papalagi} would not accept the six months delay and requested Nosworthy to receive a delegation in New Zealand. Richardson did all in his power to curb this proposal by censoring mail, impeding every effort by the group to raise funds. Richardson also drew up ordinances to restrict Samoans movements and stop Samoans living outside their own \textit{nu’u}, and enacted regulations that made it hard for Samoans to obtain a passport.\(^6\)

Most of the administration officials felt Richardson had done well in putting in place such restrictions. Many felt it only turned a probable hostile situation into “a storm in a tea cup,” while others preferred to call it “a kick by the half-caste at the white man.”\(^7\) Richardson felt confident that Nelson had lost some of his influence on the Samoans, and that the joint actions of the \textit{papalagi} and Samoans had lost its momentum. But Richardson got it all wrong. In fact, his restrictions turned a peaceful avenue of presenting complaints and grievances into a movement that later fermented into civil dissatisfaction.

The Samoans continued with their plan to meet Nosworthy, despite having to wait six months or even a year. Reports were prepared, and a petition listing grievances was circulated to be signed by all Samoans and Europeans in Samo’i and Upolu. A pamphlet was published, which spelled out Samoa’s problems and relationship with New Zealand’s Samoa administration, and money was collected to carry out the wishes of the group. Furthermore, Nelson

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\(^5\) Royal Commission Report on Agitation in Samoa, 1927-1928, Island Territories Archives (henceforth IT) 1 Ex1/46 (part 2).

\(^6\) Nosworthy to Richardson, 18 Oct, 1926, IT 1 Ex 1/23/8; Administration to Minister, 6 Dec, 1926, IT 1 Ex 1/23/8; Report of Visit by Nosworthy, Minister of External Affairs, 1927, AJHR; Report of the Royal Commission Concerning the Administration of Western Samoa, 1928, AJHR.

\(^7\) Hutchen to Gray, 17 Dec, 1926, Colonel J. W. Hutchen , Personal Correspondence, IT 1/79/76.
initiated a newspaper, called the Samoa Guardian in opposition to the pro-
government newspaper called the Samoa Times. The Samoa Guardian aimed
to voice in print the concerns of the Samoans and Europeans. By March 1926,
the group had swelled into a large movement, and was given the name 'the
Samoan League.' The movement later became well known as the Mau. The
rise of the Mau prompted H. E. Holland, the Leader of the Opposition in the
New Zealand Parliament, to comment that "New Zealand was not administering
its Mandate over Samoa on the foundations intended by the League of
Nations."

Nosworthy finally visited Samoa in June 1927. He met Richardson first
and an outline of the Samoan situation was tabled before Nosworthy.
Richardson was especially critical of the Samoans' continued rejection and
neglect of government policies. Richardson pointed the finger at Nelson, and
the European Citizens' Committee, which was now acting as the executive arm
of the Mau, for Samoan disobedience. Richardson had painted such a gloomy
picture, Nosworthy failed to listen to the cry of the Samoans, when it was their
turn to table their concerns. From the beginning Nosworthy condemned the
Samoan people for the problems besiegging the administration of Samoa.

The European Citizens' Committee also received the same
unenthusiastic response from Nosworthy. Consequently, it dawned on the
Samoans and Europeans that Nosworthy had no intention of even considering
their grievances and complaints. When Nosworthy left Samoa, he promised, in
his final address to the Mau, to pass a new law that would give Richardson the
power to deport papalagi and afakasi that would oppose the government.
However, the meeting between Nosworthy and the Citizens' Committee cleared
up a misconception on Richardson's part that the Mau was an insignificant

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8 S. S. Allen, Notes on Samoa, SSA.
9 A detailed discussion on the Mau and its inauguration will be given in Chapter Eight. While the Mau will
be mentioned throughout this chapter, it is done so in order to keep the political narrative flowing. The Mau is
only mentioned in connection with New Zealand administration efforts.
10 Secretary External Affairs Department to Prime Minister, 9 May 1927, IT 1 Ex 1/18.
11 Reply to the Administrator's Official Statement by the Elected Members of the Legislative Council of
Western Samoa, 22 Mar, 1927, IT 1 Ex 1/8, no.1; Richardson to Members of the Legislative Council of
Western Samoa, 26 Mar, 1927, IT 1 Ex 1/8, no.1.
12 Report of Visit by Nosworthy, Minister of External Affairs, 1927, AJHR; Royal Commission Report on
Agitation in Samoa, 1927-1928, IT 1 Ex 1/46 (part 2).
13 Proclamation - Nosworthy, 15 Jun, 1927, IT 1 Ex 1/23/8; Report of Visit by Nosworthy, Minister of
External Affairs, 1927, AJHR; Report of the Royal Commission Concerning the Administration of Western
Samoa, 1928, AJHR.
group. Although Nosworthy had left Samoa with some strong words being said to the Samoans and confidence in Richardson's ability to administer Samoa being affirmed, Richardson himself was not confident and secure. The numbers alone in the Mau made Richardson uncomfortable.

On 25 June 1927, Richardson issued a proclamation ordering the Mau to disband. He threatened to punish all Samoans and deport non-Samoans who continued to associate with the Mau or interfere with Samoan affairs.

Richardson's power to deport Europeans or to deal with the Mau in such a manner came into effect on 4 August 1927. Richardson also wrote to the various missions to remain aloof from the Mau and to advise their members likewise. In a letter to Father F. Meyer, of the Catholic mission, Richardson was unhappy with members who "openly expressed their approval of the movement now disturbing the minds of the natives." Meyer assured Richardson that they had demanded that their catechists and members remained neutral.

However, as Meyer assured Richardson of their mission's co-operation, Nelson received a letter, which suggested a very different attitude from another Roman Catholic leader, Father Deihl. According to the letter to the Citizens' Committee, Father Deihl offered to "wait upon the Administrator" with other prominent mission leaders (LMS and WMMS) and demand some concessions for the Samoans. The concessions included an amnesty for all Mau members that had being banished or imprisoned, matai titles to be returned to their original title-holders, a declaration that all Faipule would retire after a three year term and the administrator would consult the districts for their replacements. It also required the administrator to meet the Mau leaders at Mulinu'u, and in the future the administrator to set aside a day to hear Samoan grievances. Nelson supported the idea, and Deihl and eleven other signatories wrote to Richardson for a meeting. Richardson replied that no meeting would take place, but asked

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14 Mau Period Papers (Miscellaneous), Circular to Faipule -- Nosworthy, 1927, Westbrook Additional Papers 79-270 (henceforth WAP).
15 Mau Period Papers (Miscellaneous), 1927, WAP; see also Report of the Commission into the Administration of Western Samoa, 1928, AJHR.
16 Richardson to Father F. Meyer, 30 Aug, 1927, Damand Correspondence, Marist Archives of Samoa and Tokelau Islands (henceforth MAST).
17 Meyer to Richardson, 1 Sept, 1927, Damand Correspondence, MAST.
18 F. D. Baxter to O. F. Nelson, 20 Dec, 1927, Damand Correspondence, MAST.
19 F. D. Baxter to O. F. Nelson, 20 Dec, 1927, Damand Correspondence, MAST.
Deihl and his peers to advise those in the Mau to cease their activities.20 Richardson's arrogance and authoritarian paternalistic attitude clouded his judgement, and made him transcend and misuse the law to assert his power and authority. The Samoans prominent in the Mau, such as Faumuina Fiame Mulinu'u and Afamasaga Toleafoa Lagolago, were banished from their homes and villages, while others had their matai titles removed.21

As Richardson tightened his grip on the Mau, the Mau became more and more intensified and free to operate more widely among Samoans. The character of the Mau also changed as many Samoans began to take over the Mau purely as a Samoan movement. Richardson's motto, 'Samoa mo Samoa' returned to haunt him as Samoans took the motto as an expression of their purpose – to free Samoa from New Zealand administration.22 The Mau asked all Samoans and papalagi to boycott, and not to co-operate with, the administration. This led to various village committees ceasing to operate and carry out their usual duties on behalf of the administration. Government representatives were given the cold shoulder by villages, and Samoan children were re-registered with mission schools, or stopped from attending government schools. Samoans also refrained from producing copra, as well as refusing to attend to their plantations. Registration of births and deaths was boycotted, while taxes were unpaid.23

Nelson went to New Zealand to throw some light on a new Samoan petition tabled before Parliament, but Richardson intervened and requested an independent commission to look at the Samoan situation.24 This was accepted. The Samoan petition was shelved once again, and Nelson was forced to return to Samoa to await the arrival of the Commission of Inquiry, which included two judges, Sir Charles Skerrett and C. E. McCormick. The commission reportedly received the views of about 300 Samoans, papalagi, afakasi, and members of

20 Deihl to Richardson, 20 Dec, 1927, Darnand Correspondence, MAST; Richardson to Deihl, 22 Dec, 1927, Darnand Correspondence, MAST.
21 Report of the Royal Commission Concerning the Administration of Western Samoa, 1928, AJHR; see also S. G. Fetherston – Faasamoa, Robert W. Tate Papers, MS-COPY-MICRO 0082-04 (henceforth TP).
22 Data Compiled and Sent to NZ at the time of the Mau Deputation to Wellington, GP; S. G. Phillips to G. E. Phillips, 15 Feb, 1933, London Missionary Society (LMS) South Seas Archives, South Seas Letters (henceforth SSL); S. S. Allen, Notes on Samoa, SSA.
23 Royal Commission Report on Agitation in Samoa, 1927-1928, IT 1 Ex1/46 (part 2); Report of the Royal Commission into the Administration of Western Samoa, 1928, AJHR; see also Confidential Report of Two Years in Samoa, - Bartlett, SSL.
24 Petition Dated 1 June 1927 from Mr. Newton Rowe, IT 1 Ex 1/64; Petition From Samoans, IT 1 Ex 1/61; Petition – Anti-slavery, League of Nations, 2 Jul, 1928, IT 1 Ex 1/63.
the New Zealand administration in Samoa. The outcome of these interviews became the basis of the Commission of Inquiry's report to Parliament.\textsuperscript{25} The Commission of Inquiry felt that, while there was some concern over Richardson's Administration of Samoa, they could find nothing to substantiate the Samoan complaints against Richardson and his administration in Samoa.\textsuperscript{26}

The Samoans and the \textit{papalagi} had feared that the limited sample of people interviewed would only produce a very narrow view and interpretation of the Samoans' grievances. The Commissioner of Inquiry's report confirmed this fear. While the Samoans were unhappy about the report, the commission did find that the introduction of taxes for the development of various needed services, such as educational and health services, was a burden to the Samoans and \textit{papalagi}. The commission also felt that the continuation of the prohibition order was an infringement of individual freedom. The commission also criticised the manning of the public service with inexperienced and incompetent expatriates.\textsuperscript{27}

The most pressing issue the commission had to review concerned the regulations the government had placed on copra, but the commission did not find any evidence that Richardson was restricting private business ventures in favour of government business enterprises, as the Samoans and \textit{papalagi} had charged.\textsuperscript{28} The commission had been told that the government suspected merchants cheating the Samoans by buying copra at a low fixed price, and making huge profits on overseas markets. According to the report, the greed of the merchants had left him with no choice, but to take over the handling of Samoan copra products.\textsuperscript{29} Richardson proposed to do this through the New Zealand Reparation Estate, and pay a higher price in advance when the copra was received. Richardson and the commission's appraisal of the situation was

\textsuperscript{25} Report of the Royal Commission into the Administration of Western Samoa, 1928, AJHR; see also Royal Commission Report on Agitation in Samoa, 1927-1928, IT 1 Ex1/46 (part 2).

\textsuperscript{26} Report of the Royal Commission into the Administration of Western Samoa, 1928, AJHR; Royal Commission Report on Agitation in Samoa, 1927-1928, IT 1 Ex1/46 (part 2); see also Smart to Barradale, 23 Apr, 1928, SSL.

\textsuperscript{27} Report of the Royal Commission into the Administration of Western Samoa, 1928, AJHR; Royal Commission Report on Agitation in Samoa, 1927-1928, IT 1 Ex1/46 (part 2); see also O. F. Nelson – Memorandum on the Fundamental Causes of the Samoan Unrest, Jun, 1928, WAP; Davidson, 123-124.

\textsuperscript{28} Report of the Royal Commission into the Administration of Western Samoa, 1928, AJHR; Royal Commission Report on Agitation in Samoa, 1927-1928, IT 1 Ex1/46 (part 2).

\textsuperscript{29} Report of the Royal Commission into the Administration of Western Samoa, 1928, AJHR; Royal Commission Report on Agitation in Samoa, 1927-1928, IT 1 Ex1/46 (part 2).
probably correct given the fact that some of the same merchants and traders had acted similarly in the past.\textsuperscript{30}

Nevertheless, many merchants felt Richardson's action was aimed at destroying European merchants, especially those who irritated the administration.\textsuperscript{31} The merchants were probably right. The commission's findings were more favourable to Richardson and his administration, even though in the report there were no evidence to suggest that the Samoans had complained to the administration they had been cheated by European merchants and traders; it was solely a complaint from the administration. The report suggested that the administration only 'suspected' the merchants and traders to be cheating the Samoans, which suggested the administration and the commission had no proof of the charges within the report. In any case, Richardson had the upper hand.

The commission also found no evidence that Richardson had misused his powers especially in relation to Samoan customs. According to the commission, the power to banish Samoans and strip them of their matai titles had been introduced in 1922 under the \textit{Samoan Offenders Ordinance} prior to Richardson's arrival.\textsuperscript{32} The Samoans had despised such actions under the Solf administration and they were not about to accept them under any other administration. Richardson wanted to assert his authority early, and to show the Samoans who really had the power to rule Samoa. Punishing those in the forefront of Samoan authority, and stepping on Samoan pride early, was Richardson's novel way of asserting that authority in the hope that it would bring about a peaceful subdued Samoan nation. For the Samoans, the treatment of their leaders, the banishment of their elders, and deprivation of their family matai titles, were abuses and misuses of Samoan customs. For many Samoans, this was part of the impetus for the Mau movement, and yet the commission found Richardson's actions proper.\textsuperscript{33} Richardson used the power of the \textit{Samoan Offenders Ordinance} regularly in order to suppress Samoan

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\textsuperscript{30} See Chapter 5 for discussion and examples.

\textsuperscript{31} Report of the Royal Commission into the Administration of Western Samoa, 1928, AJHR; Royal Commission Report on Agitation in Samoa, 1927-1928, IT 1, Ex1/46 (part 2).

\textsuperscript{32} Report of the Royal Commission into the Administration of Western Samoa, 1928, AJHR; Royal Commission Report on Agitation in Samoa, 1927-1928, IT 1 Ex1/46 (part 2).

\textsuperscript{33} Royal Commission Report on Agitation in Samoa, 1927-1928, IT 1, Ex1/46 (part 2); Report of Visit by Nosworthy, Minister of External Affairs, 1927, AJHR; Petition, dated 19 May 1930, From Mr. O. F. Nelson, IT 1 Ex 1/58.
uprisings, especially as the Mau became more and more intensified. Richardson's insensitivity continued to fuel Samoan resentment. He became more and more authoritarian as he neglected the wisdom of his Fautua – Malietoa Tanumafili I and Tuimaleali'i'ifano. Richardson had faith only in the Samoan Faipule because they were loyal and able to continually carry out his wishes.

For this reason alone, the Samoans were incensed at Richardson's choice of the Faipule, which often by-passed important titled holders in favour of lesser matai, but Richardson knew the Samoans' pride and the competition in existence to gain higher status through recognition by those in authority. The Samoans became pawns, or as Samoans would like to call it – fa'atau moa, for the administrator's self-esteem on one side, and papalagi frustration on the other. The Samoans were once again pitted to destroy each other while the real perpetrators sat and watched and hoped to pick up the pieces later. Kilifoti Eteuati vividly describes the tension between Mau members and those loyal to the New Zealand administration.

After Palauli had insulted the malo, just prior to Nelson's departure, non-Mau Samoans from Vaimauga had gathered and planned to punish the Mau offenders themselves. Richardson and the Faipule persuaded this group not to carry out its plans. But as Mau activities increased around Apia, ridiculing government and by implication the non-Mau Samoans, many more from outer districts, joined their Vaimauga colleagues and threatened a confrontation.

The Mau from the onset worked towards addressing the problems of the Samoans, afakasi, as well as those of the papalagi. The papalagi recognised early the importance of the Samoan Mau movement and immediately supported it. Papalagi gave their consent for the inclusion of equal numbers of Samoans in the Legislative Council. The move countered the Faipule's power, although primarily, it was a way to give Samoans the opportunity to participate in the law making process of the administration. The Samoans, as well as papalagi, saw this as an opportunity to slow down the changes which Richardson had initiated, especially in relation to culture, Samoan political ideology, community

34 Fa'atau moa is a Samoan phrase which describes those who do the fighting for someone else.
36 The set-up for the Legislative Council was specified under the 'Samoa Constitution Order.' See Samoa's Problems – Samoa Citizens Committee, GP.
aspirations rather than individualism, and to re-emphasise value judgements affected by monetary incentives and other forms of inducements and rewards.

The Mau wanted to return Samoa to its past when it ruled under its own political ideologies. They wanted to be treated as people and as equals, and not as subservient servants of another nation. The commission had failed to realise this issue because, firstly, it had taken Richardson's views more seriously and, secondly, as far as Samoans were concerned, it was not an independent inquiry because it was carried out by people biased in favour of Richardson and the New Zealand government. Thus, the activities of the Mau continued with renewed vigour and increasing support from the Samoans and the *afakasi* population.37

Nelson became more and more in the forefront of the Mau as he continued to assist the Samoans in pursuing their aim, which was becoming clearer and clearer to every Samoan and to Richardson - self government.38 Richardson considered the strength of the Mau movement and the power and authority of Nelson and other *papalagi* around him dangerous. This was clearly confirmed by Richardson's action in exiling Nelson, E.W. Gurr, and A.G. Smyth to New Zealand for five years. Richardson felt that with these three influential *papalagi* out of the equation, the Samoans would be unable to sustain their efforts. Furthermore, at the request of Richardson, Nelson agreed to speak to the Mau and ask them to disperse. But the exercise was a waste of time as the Mau was hard of hearing. Richardson, in deporting Nelson, gave the Samoans another reason to remain resilient in its efforts. Nelson left Samoa voluntarily, contrary to the advice of his closest friends, to avoid any violent confrontation and reduce the risk of injuries to the Samoan people.39

Richardson had under estimated the strength and the ability of the Mau to survive. The message to Richardson was clear, the Mau was not Nelson - the Mau was the Samoan people. On the day Nelson left for New Zealand, 13 January 1928, the Mau gathered to farewell him wearing purple uniforms. It was a reminder to Nelson that the Samoans had united and his deportation would not be without meaning and significance. It was also a reminder to Richardson

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37 It even received support from American Samoa. See J. A. C. Gray, *Amerika Samoa and its Naval Administration*, Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1960, 209.
38 S. S. Allen, *Notes on Samoa*, SSA.
39 Richardson to Nelson, 14 Dec, 1927, IT 1 EX 1/23/8; Richardson to Nosworthy, 17 Dec, 1927, IT 1 EX 1/23/8; Nelson to Richardson, 17 Dec, 1927, IT 1 EX 1/23/8.
that the Mau was in Samoa to stay, and whether Nelson or no Nelson, the Samoans were in control. Richardson knew the time had come to take much firmer actions to break the Mau.  

However, instead of reacting in a more diplomatic way, Richardson resorted to a show of power and strength. He requested the presence of military hardware in Apia harbour, and the arrival of *HMS Dunedin* and *HMS Diomede* gave Richardson the confidence to enact against the wearing of the Mau uniform and the collecting of funds for the Mau. Richardson also declared certain areas around Samoa ‘disturbed’ so that the Mau could not hold meetings or gatherings. Richardson acted unlawfully as his ego and authoritarian arrogance replaced law and common sense.  

Richardson carried out his threats by arresting and imprisoning many Mau adherents found in contradiction of his laws. Other members of the Mau made a mockery of Richardson’s efforts by presenting themselves personally to be locked up. The prison was too small for all the Mau members, and the gathering of a large group considered hostile in one place was not a safe option for Richardson. Consequently, Richardson offered pardons to many Mau adherents. In the eyes of the Samoans, Richardson was weak. They saw their release as a victory over Richardson’s oppression. Richardson then tried to appease the situation by playing the role of a concerned and humble diplomat. He asked the Mau leaders to work together with him in developing the existing administration. The leaders of the Mau felt Richardson’s sudden change of attitude came too late. Tupua Tamasese Lealofi rejected the offer on behalf of the Mau, as he once again restated the aim of the Mau – self-government.  

Richardson’s action was that of a desperate man in need of a solution to a situation that was now far beyond his capabilities to handle. What was more remarkable was his insistence to continually punish the Samoans as a way of dealing with the issue at hand, especially when a sustained reverse in attitude would have salvaged some of the respect that the Samoans still had for the administration. Richardson was ill advised by his own European administration officials and those whom he trusted, and as a result took the wrong options and  

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40 Richardson to Nosworthy, 16 Jan, 1928, IT 1 EX 1/23/8; Richardson to Nosworthy, 10 Feb, 1928, IT 1 Ex 1/23/8; Liston to Barradale, 18 Feb, 1928, SSL.  
42 Administrator to the Minister of External Affairs, 28 Feb, 1928, IT 1 EX 1/23/8; *Samoan Guardian*, 8 Mar, 1928; Commodore to Naval Secretary, 24 Feb, 1928, IT 1 EX 1/23/8.
made the wrong decisions. On 8 April 1928, Richardson left Samoa cheered only by his own ego and incompetent administration. The missions attended Richardson's farewell. For instance, Bishop Darnand wrote Richardson a little farewell note:

> There is no friend of the Samoan people failing to recognise your sincere love of the natives. During the five years of your administration, you spared no effort to promote the well-being of the people and the welfare of the country.\(^{43}\)

The Au Fa'atonu attended despite the call from the Samoan (LMS) Church to boycott the event. The Samoan church leaders were not impressed with the LMS missionaries' support for Richardson, and took the LMS's action as a challenge to their authority. Colonel Stephen Shepherd Allen, another military man, took over from Richardson.\(^{44}\)

Tupua Tamasese Lealofi was seen as the new leader of the Mau with Nelson's departure. The Mau took the opportunity to build up its own administration throughout the villages before Allen, the new Administrator, had time to 'set up shop.' The Mau performed all the functions of a government in terms of enacting regulations, collecting taxes, collecting fines, and so forth. They also prepared a petition to the League of Nations, which was signed by some 8,000 out of 9,300 tax paying Samoans. Tumua and Pule threw their weight behind the Mau as they sought to rekindle traditionalism. This meant more people, especially those influenced by Mau matali, were recruited by the Mau.

On the other side, Samoans who held allegiance to the government, mainly Faipule and their families through official capacities and other means, campaigned strongly among the Samoans to uphold the law. They feared that the Mau had grown to a level that its leaders would not be able to control, but even government officials could not maintain their loyalty to the New Zealand administration, even when Allen had officially taken over his duties in Samoa. For instance, Tuimaleali'ifano was dismissed as Fautua when he joined the Mau. Members of the Mau also changed sides, such as Afamasaga Lagolago and others, as they felt the Mau was losing its strength and vitality and, more importantly, loosing its support, soon after Allen's arrival. While the actual

\(^{43}\) Darnand to Richardson. 4 Apr, 1928, Darnand Correspondence, MAST; see also Richardson to Darnand, 2 Apr, 1928, Darnand Correspondence, MAST.

\(^{44}\) Stephen S. Allen to be Administrator of Samoa – Nosworthy, 14 Apr, 1928, The Western Samoa Gazette, No. 49, 29 Mar, 1928.
number of supporters for each side was unavailable at the time Allen took control of Samoa, there was no doubt the Mau was in control.  

Allen felt he could contain the Mau by using the police to uphold law and order and by placing Mau law breakers in prison. Allen's confidence was further boosted after he was informed of the Permanent Mandate Commission's acceptance of New Zealand's version of the Samoan situation. He felt such news would prompt many Samoans to see the hopelessness of their rebel activities and discontinue anti-government efforts. The Samoans, however, were reluctant to give up without a struggle. Allen not only imprisoned Mau members, but was also vigilant in bringing to justice Mau members wanted for various violations of the law. The arrests, at times, led to some violent clashes between the Mau and the police. On one such occasion on 6 December 1928, Tupua Tamasese Lealofi was arrested for non-payment of taxes. He was charged and then sent to New Zealand to serve a six months term of imprisonment.  

Allen targeted the Mau leaders, but the Mau remained stubborn and refused to back off or reduce its hostility. The Mau continued to confront the government. The violence seemed to increase with each effort of the government to counter it, and Allen soon realised the danger of pushing the Mau too far too quickly. Allen backed off and allowed the situation some breathing space to achieve calmness while he sought solutions.  

Meanwhile, in New Zealand, Nelson started a weekly newspaper called the New Zealand Samoa Guardian, to promote Mau efforts and seek sympathy from the New Zealand Labour party, and from the New Zealand public as a whole. Nelson's editorial comments, together with articles published in other New Zealand newspapers, exposed the New Zealand public to some of the administrative mismanagement in Samoa. Consequently, such articles initiated some serious questions on many defective aspects of New Zealand's administration of Samoa. The New Zealand Samoan Guardian was a blessing for the Mau and a curse for the New Zealand government. The Mau hoped the widespread publicity of the Samoan situation would force the New Zealand government to accept its proposals and act upon it immediately.
A change of government in New Zealand resulted in some changes to the administration of Samoa taking effect. The Fono a Faipule and the various district councils were dismissed, while the Legislative Council received a facelift with Malietoa Tanumafili and Mata'afa Salanoa being added as members. The Fautua post was no longer part of the administrative process. Furthermore, copra, taxation, and military police issues were also addressed to some degree of Samoan satisfaction. However, while these efforts by the New Zealand government went as far as curbing some criticism of New Zealand's administration, it only checked for a moment Mau defiance.

The mood of the Mau was passive and non-violent throughout 1929, and Allen was misled to believe that it was slowly dismantling and disappearing. As Allen visited many districts throughout Samoa he misinterpreted the kindness of the Samoan people as total support for the New Zealand administration. The Samoans had respect for Allen, but were very critical of his inability to control the activities of the police, especially towards the Mau. The Samoans were worried about the police being armed and carrying guns publicly without Allen's official authorisation. The uncertainty of the police motives in carrying guns only contributed to the Mau becoming more fanatical in order to protect itself. It also made the Mau more aggressive, especially in marches and demonstrations, such as that held to welcome exiled members such as Tupua Tamasese, in June, and Tuimaleali'ifano and Faumuina, in November.

A similar march and demonstration was held to welcome other exiled members in December of the same year. The government warned Mau members wanted on various violations of the law not to march. But the Mau members ignored the warning and as a result a violent confrontation took place, and within minutes gunshots filled the air as police and Mau members became engulfed in a frenzy that took many lives. A European policeman was killed, and many Samoans were seriously injured including Tuimaleali'ifano, Faumuina, and Tamasese. Tupua Tamasese and ten other Samoans later died from gunshot injuries. The day of 28 December 1929 became 'Black Saturday' for the Mau movement and for the Samoan people. The Samoans blamed the New

48 Eaglesham, 154 – 155.
49 Allen to Ward, 1 Jun, 1929, IT 1 Ex 1/23/8; Allen to Ward, 19 Nov, 1929, IT 1 Ex 1/23/8; Allen to Ward, 20 Dec, 1929, IT 1 Ex 1/23/8; see also Petition from O.F. Nelson, 3 July, 1930, IT 1 Ex 1/58.
50 Coroners Inquiry into the Shooting, 1930, IT 1 Ex 1/23/11; Westbrook to Nelson, 9 Jan, 1930, Westbrook Papers MS-Papers 0061 (henceforth WP); see also Bartlett to Chirgwin, 29 Nov, 1931, SSL.
Zealand authorities, while the New Zealanders blamed the Samoan Mau leaders, but the incident marked the point of no return for both sides in their efforts for reconciliation. Samoans had no other point of direction but self-government. New Zealand had no other choice but to find a way out with dignity.

New Zealand declared the Mau a seditious organisation. Under the Samoa Seditious Organisation Regulations, 1930, Colonel Stephen S. Allen declared the Mau a seditious organisation. The Regulation defined clearly the difference between an organisation *per se* and a 'seditious' organisation. According to the regulation an organisation meant:

> Any society or body, any two or more persons associated for any purpose who act or intend to act in conjunction with each other or who associate together with the object of considering or carrying out purposes as an organisation whether such purposes are to be carried out by any number of such persons or any other person or persons acting on their behalf.

The Regulation went on to define a 'seditious organisation' as "an organisation declared to be seditious by the Administration of Western Samoa." The regulation made sure the Mau or any other organisation hostile to New Zealand rule was quickly eliminated. The Administration also made sure that districts and individuals were kept checked through a series of regulations and orders.

Consequently, the presence of the military and the outlawing of the Mau forced Mau members to find refuge in the bush. Allen used Tiger Moth planes to drop leaflets over Samoan villages. In the leaflets, the message was clear, as Allen tried to entice Mau members to surrender:

1. During last week, 100 of the Mau were arrested. They were all very pleased at being able in this way to come out of the bush and be finished with the Mau.

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2. The men of several villages have returned to their homes. As they have done with the Mau and are paying taxes, these villages are now being left in peace.

3. Other villages will be left in peace when their men, too, renounce the Mau and return to their home and pay their taxes. They must give their names to the Pulenuu, who will send notice at once to the Native Office, otherwise they may still be arrested.

Despite the content of the leaflets indicating a decline in Mau activity, it was not forceful enough to have an affect on the rebellious activities of the Mau.

The police engaged in search and arrest operations found it very difficult to locate members of the Mau, because Samoans continued to assist their escape. The government issued regulations forbidding Samoans travelling in order to stop further assistance to the Mau. The families of Mau members were searched and had their properties ransacked by government officials during unannounced raids at night time. The police were heartless and unsympathetic as they entered Tamasese’s house as the family mourned his death. The Police arrested Tamasese’s relatives, including Faumuina, and nineteen others, for various offences ranging from threatening to kill, assault, abusive language, intimidation, and escaping custody. The New Zealand government had no sense of shame. Allen’s insistence on putting things back on track and restoring administration pride clouded his moral judgement to allow the Samoans peace in their time of grief.

New Zealand government Minister, the Hon. John G. Cobbe, visited Samoa and praised New Zealand's policy on Samoa, although he had some concern about Allen’s attitude towards destroying the Mau. Cobbe offered the Mau an amnesty in order to initiate dialogue with its leaders. In a meeting that followed, Cobbe told the Mau to dissolve immediately, and Mau members wanted by the police to surrender peacefully, and for all Samoans to respect the Administrator and adhere to his rule. Faumuina, who acted on behalf of the

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57 Mau Members Arrested, Samoa Guardian, 11 Jan, 1930.

56 Allen to Ward, 3 Jan, 1930, IT 1 Ex 1/23/8; Allen to Ward, 15 Jan, 1930, IT 1 Ex 1/23/8; Police v Slipper, 26 Feb, 1930, IT 69/56/5; see also Petition from O.F. Nelson, 3 July, 1930, IT 1 Ex 1/58.

59 Report on Visit to Samoa, Memo for Cabinet, 20 Mar, 1930, IT 1 Ex 1/23/8; Allen to Ward, 15 Jan, 1930, IT 1 Ex 1/23/8; Allen to Ward, 10 Mar, 1930, IT 1 Ex 1/23/8; Allen to Ward, 28 Jan, 1930, IT 1 Ex 1/23/8; Samoa Guardian 3 Jul, 1930; Auckland Star, 18 Feb, 1930.
Mau, agreed only to surrender Mau members wanted by the police. On the other requests by Cobbe, Faumuina rejected the plea for the Mau to be subjected to the Administrator's will. The Mau would not submit to the Administrator, as it would mean submitting to the will of the Samoans loyal to the administration. According to Faumuina, Samoa was the Mau, those not in the Mau were not Samoans.

However, the Mau members did disperse to their villages, and Allen acknowledged the part played by the missions in a letter of gratitude for their support. The New Zealand Prime Minister, the Hon. Joseph Ward, also wrote to thank the missions. In a letter to the Catholic Bishop, Joseph Darand, he thanked him for service rendered "in inducing the leaders of the Mau movement to come out of their concealment in the bush and meet the Administrator and the Minister in conference." The meeting that the two parties had agreed to before Cobbe eventually took place, but only a third of the Samoan matai supported it. The small numbers would either indicate the continuous defying attitude of the Samoans to the administration, or the matai who attended were none other than the loyal supporters of the administration. Nevertheless, Allen used the opportunity to restore the Fono a Faipule with the clause that members would be nominated by matai of each constituency. Afterwards, Allen felt content that finally the Mau era had being broken, while the Samoans saw the situation as a recovery period, or as in the Samoan adage – moe le toa (let the cock sleep).

The Mau may have dispersed but the ideology of self-government had remained etched in the Samoan mentality. The Mau leaders who returned to their villages continued to strengthen the support for the Mau. The Mau leaders continued to meet regularly at Vaimoso. The Mau remained active and continued to function with taxes collected from members, as well as voluntary donations and contributions from supporters. Keesing correctly pointed out that Allen had misread the dispersion of the Mau as a sign of defeat, but Allen

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60 Report on Visit to Samoa, Memo for Cabinet, 20 Mar, 1930, IT 1 Ex 1/23/8; Notices, Samoa Guardian, 26 Feb, 1930; Notice by Allen and Cobbe, 1 Mar, 1930; Administration and Mau: Meeting at Vaimoso, Samoa Herald, 7 Mar, 1930.

61 Report on Visit to Samoa by J. G. Cobbe, Memo for Cabinet, 20 Mar, 1930, IT 1 Ex 1/23/8; Bartlett, Confidential Report of Two Years in Samoa, 28 Nov, 1931, SSL.

62 J. Ward (N.Z. PM) to Darand, 1 Apr, 1930, Darand Correspondence, MAST; see also Darand to Ward, 28 May, 1930, Darand Correspondence, MAST; S.S. Allen to Darand, 18 Mar, 1930, Darand Correspondence, MAST.
should have known better that dispersion for the Samoans usually meant re-
strengthening of the movement.63

The Mau members who had boycotted the meeting that reinstated the
Fono a Faipule, further refused to participate in the election of new members for
the Fono a Faipule as Allen had planned.64 The re-strengthening period was
over, and once again, the Mau re-emerged stronger and more determined to
take control of Samoa. The Mau that Allen thought was ‘broken’ was still intact
to strike at the heart of the New Zealand administration in its own time. Allen left
Samoa in April 1931, with the belief that the Mau could have been pacified if it
was not for the influence of the afakasi. Allen felt that a civil ruler, and not a
military man, would better administer Samoa.65

Allen’s failure in administrater Samoa deprived him of his credibility as
the New Zealand government shoved aside his recommendations. New
Zealand opted for another military leader to turn New Zealand’s fortunes
around. He was Brigadier-General Herbert Ernest Hart, a solicitor and a
soldier.66 Hart had the required qualities to succeed if given the opportunity and
if Wellington refrained from dictating how Samoa should be administered. When
Hart arrived, the Mau was practically running Samoa economically and
politically. A women’s Mau also indicated that support for the Mau still
remained. Hart, on the other hand, was comforted by the thought that the
administration still had the support of the missions, especially the Lotu Pope.67

While Hart tried to find a quick solution for a peaceful reconciliation, the
Samoans were hard at work gaining support for self-government. The Samoans
again presented their case before New Zealand’s parliament, and before the
League of Nations. A petition was also sent to Britain, United States, and

187-190. Note: Keesing was present in Samoa in 1947 as part of the United Nations visitation team
investigating the possibility of Samoa becoming self-government. Keesing had kept a close eye on the
Samoan political scene before that and his book is a result of research and visits to Samoa at the
aftermath of the Mau shooting in 1929.
65 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, cccxxvi, 19 Sept – 25 Oct, 1930; Women’s Mau to Allen
(Farewell), 3 Apr, 1931, IT 1 Ex 1/23/8; S. S. Allen, Notes on Samoa, SSA.
66 Herbert Hart Papers, Correspondence, 1932 – 1951; Herbert Hart Papers, Scrapbook, Oct, 1882 – Mar,
1958.
67 S. S. Allen, Notes on Samoa, SSA; Bartlett to Chirgwin, 28 Mar, 1930, SSL; Bartlett to Chirgwin, 24 Apr,
1920, SSL; Western Samoa and Samoan Women, WP; Some of the Grievances of the Samoan Women,
Starting From 28 December 1929, IT 1 Ex 1/52; Damand to Hart, 22 Dec, 1934, Damand
Correspondence, MAST.
Germany. The Samoans hoped that their problems would be acknowledged and be dealt with promptly by any of the recipients. Hart’s problems were further intensified with the return of Nelson to Samoa in 1933. Hart felt Nelson would take the Mau to new heights, and saw him as a very dangerous adversary. He tried desperately to have Nelson detained in New Zealand for a further period, but Nelson prevailed and returned promptly to Samoa.

The Mau immediately chose Nelson as its mouthpiece and demanded a meeting with Hart to settle their differences. Nelson processed knowledge and had dealings with the New Zealand government. The Mau felt that Nelson was the best person to promote its aim for self-government. Furthermore, the Mau also acknowledged Nelson as one of them as he held the *matai* title Taisi.

Hart found it very hard to establish dialogue with the Mau leaders as they often refused to meet. By August 1933, the Mau had made a decision not to have any contact with Hart and his administration. They felt Hart no longer had the power to prevent and disrupt Mau activities. Under Tupua Tamasese Meaole, a son in law of Nelson, the Mau turned inward to strengthen its own administrative structure and to consolidate its aim of self-government. But within this structure, individual Mau leaders were well aware of their own motivations and personal aspirations. For instance, Tupua Tamasese Meaole saw the movement as a way to fulfil his ambition to be the leader of the Samoan people, while others, such as Autagavaia Siaupiu from Savai'i, saw the success of the Mau as an opportunity to revive Tumua and Pule authority.

The Mau drafted a constitution under the guidance of Nelson. The constitution was taken around Samoa and its content explained to the people. The aim of the Mau was clearly presented to the people. Nelson wrote, "New Zealand will wake up one day to find that by [the] peaceful penetration of the Mau...the Samoans will have wrestled the last vestige of control...from the Mandatory Government." The Mau published newspapers and pamphlets to inform its members. This led to a regulation, the *Samoa Publication Order 1933*.

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68 Petition From Samoans, IT 1 Ex 1/61; Herbert Hart Papers, Correspondence, 1932 – 1951; Herbert Hart Papers, Scrapbook, Oct, 1882 – Mar, 1968.
70 Data Compiled and Sent to NZ at the time of the Mau Deputation to Wellington, GP.
71 Memorandum, Secretary Native Affairs, 10 Dec, 1937, IT 1 Ex 1/23/8; Turnbull to Minister of External Affairs, 1 Jun, 1938, IT 1 Ex 1/23/8.
72 *Samoa Herald*, 22 Dec, 1933.
which banned any newspaper the administration felt was seditious. A seditious newspaper, according to the regulations was...

...any newspaper which invites, encourages, advises, or advocates violence, lawlessness and disorder, or express any seditious intention, or misrepresents or tends to bring into hatred or contempt the Parliament or Executive Government of New Zealand of the Administration or Public Service of the territory by intemperate language, malicious or reckless criticisms or otherwise tends to interfere with the peace, order or good government of the territory... 

The regulation took away the Samoans' right to express themselves, and it also gave Hart the power to declare Nelson's *New Zealand Samoan Guardian*, the Mau vehicle for its propaganda, a seditious newspaper.**

Many Samoans informed on the Mau and its activities. Consequently, the administration intercepted copies of the constitution circulating around Samoa. The administration also searched Nelson's house and seized documents, which implicated his involvement with Mau and his part in the plot to overthrow the administration. As a result many Mau members were imprisoned while Nelson was not only sentenced to prison for eight months, but to exile for ten years.** However, the Mau spirit remained strong as they rallied to support each other, and continued to frustrate Hart's efforts for a peaceful solution. The Mau spirit found form in other bizarre groups being formed, such as the Samoa Nazi, in 1934. The group, started by Alfred Mathes, was following the rise of Hitler in Germany and the Nazi Party. It was made up mainly of German blood descendants. Mathes and his followers began to spread rumours that Germany was on the verge of inflicting punishment on Samoa and New Guinea.**

In 1935 the Labour Party was elected to government in New Zealand. The Prime Minister, Michael Joseph Savage, terminated Nelson's exile and

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73 Samoa Publication Order, 1933, 15 Dec, 1933, The Western Samoa Gazette, No. 81, 9 Jan, 1934.
74 Samoa Publication Order, 1933, 4 Jan, 1934, The Western Samoa Gazette, No. 81, 9 Jan, 1934.
75 Hart to Forbes, 18 Oct, 1933, IT 1 Ex 1/23/8; Police v Nelson, 3 Jan, 1934, IT 1 Ex 1/23/8; Nelson to Forbes, 1 Aug, 1934, IT 1 Ex 1/23/8; Nelson to Forbes, 27 Sept, 1935, IT 1 Ex 1/23/8; Perkins to Chirgwin, 8 Mar, 1934, SSL.
76 The Samoa Nazi party contemplated Germany attacking the Pacific, and was determined to take over many Samoans institutions once news of war from Germany was received. But, in 1939 after Germany had declared war, the Samoa Nazi party received a letter from Germany informing them that their application for membership in the Nazi Party had been turned down. Mathes and many of his supporters were sent to New Zealand when war started. See Department of External Affairs to Island Territories, 29 Jul, 1946, IT 79/131; Braisby to Turnbull, 2 Dec, 1934, IT 79/131; Department of External Affairs to Turnbull, 15 Jul, 1936, IT 79/131; Braisby to Turnbull, 18 Jul, 1938, IT 79/131.
promised the Samoans a better working relationship. In 1936, several government ministers visited Samoa and were greeted with great pomp. They repealed the ordinance, which had declared the Mau a seditious organisation. They were an immediate success with the Mau and Samoans generally. The visitors also influenced the Samoans to such a degree the Samoans set up their own Labour Party under the auspices of Amando Stowers. The Samoan Offenders Ordinance was repealed, and taxes which had been unpaid, were written off. The visitation team also promised to consider other Samoan proposals in the future.

New Zealand's willingness to work closely with the Samoans, took a step forward when Savage made good his promise to replace Hart. In 1935, Alfred Clarke Turnbull was appointed Acting Administrator in Hart's place, a post he held until 1945 when he was promoted to Administrator. The New Zealand government further cemented good relationships with the Samoans by revoking the Samoa Seditious Organisation Regulation 1930. On 24 June 1936, Turnbull declared the Mau a non-seditious organisation. Furthermore, several Samoan districts that were declared 'disturbed areas' under the Maintenance of Authority in Native Affairs (no. 2) Ordinance 1928, because of their support for the Mau, also had their label revoked. The districts included Anoama'a, Vaimauga, Faleata, Sagaga, Læauva'a, and A'ana (Lefaga and Falelatai). The Mau, for the first time, felt they were finally given the opportunity to be heard, and despite not having all of their demands and proposals granted immediately, they were happy at the outcome of the visit by members of the New Zealand government.

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77 H. E. Holland, Revolt of Samoa, FERG 6289; H. E. Holland Papers: Pamphlets and Letters, MS-MICRO 831-02; Perkins to Phillips, 22 Aug., 1936, SSL.
78 Meeting at Vaimoso Between the Ministerial Delegation, the Mau, Faipule and Mr. Nelson, July 23, 1936, IT 1 Ex 1/65; Meeting Between the Mau and Ministerial Party at Central office on 26 June, 1936, IT 1 Ex 1/65.
79 Western Samoa Mail, 17 Jul, 1936; see also Samoa Guardian, 9 Jun, 1927. 1927.
80 Meeting at Vaimoso Between the Ministerial Delegation, the Mau, Faipule and Mr. Nelson, July 23, 1936, IT 1 EX 1/65; Meeting Between the Mau and Ministerial Party at Central office on 26 June, 1936, IT 1 Ex 1/65; Notes on Educational Matters, Western Samoa, IT 1 Ex 1/65.
81 Turnbull to Savage, 3 May, 1936, IT 1 Ex 1/23/8; Turnbull to Savage, 30 Jul, 1936, IT 1 Ex 1/23/8; Bartlett to Barradale, 14 Jul, 1939, SSL.
83 Proclamation – The Maintenance of Authority in Native Affairs (No. 2) Ordinance, 1928, The Western Samoa Gazette, No. 95, 29 Jun, 1936; Disturbed Areas Declared, 10 Jan, 1930, The Western Samoa Gazette, No.60, 11 Jan, 1930; Future Development of Native Administration and Local Government in Western Samoa, IT 25/1/38; Native Administration and Local Government in Western Samoa, 21 Jul, 1947, GP.
Nevertheless, it was not all plain sailing for Turnbull. The following years saw the missions maintaining their support for the administration, but some Samoan animosity began to surface again over the lack of action taken by the New Zealand government to address further some of the problems the Mau had tabled in 1936. The Mau had called for the removal of several staff members in the New Zealand administration who were still active in 1945. For instance, the Mau demanded the removal of the Inspector of Police, Inspector Braisby, as he was a constant reminder to the Samoans of the oppressive and savage nature of their colonial masters. The horror of ‘Black Saturday’ was imbedded and remained fresh in the minds of the Samoans. Inspector Braisby was an unwanted reminder of that ‘bloody’ day. Furthermore, the Samoans were also not impressed with Braisby’s lack of respect for the Mau.

Chinese indentured labour was hotly debated in Turnbull’s administration, the Samoans, planters and papalagi, and the church. The European planters were especially incensed with administration policies that undermined their livelihood in preference to protecting the welfare of the Samoans. The indentured labour issue led to deterioration in relations between the administration and the people it relied upon most for support – the planters and papalagi, but the humble and steady charisma of Turnbull helped the administration to function despite the difficulties over the labour issue. The Mau was relentless in its efforts to dominate Samoan politics. They sent a delegation to Lauili’i and Malie villages to persuade the matai to join the Mau. The Faipule fono also began to reflect not only the strength of the Mau regarding membership, but its policies also reflected Mau aspirations. The Faipule fono had carried out the wishes of the administration without question. The new fono, with Mau influence, began to question the validity and the intention of New Zealand’s policies for Samoa.

The Faipule demanded many changes, which reflected Mau aspirations. These included changes to the Legislative Council membership, changes to

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84 For example, see Turnbull to Darnand, 21 Dec, 1935, Darnand Correspondence, MAST; Darnand to Turnbull, 24 Dec, 1935, Darnand Correspondence, MAST.
85 Dora Phillips to Friends, 28 Jul, 1937, SSL; Stallan to Chirgwin, 27 Aug, 1937, SSL.
86 NZMC Minutes, 1921, SSL; Mawson to Darvill, 29 Aug, 1927, SSL; Darvill to Barradale, 9 Nov, 1927, SSL.
87 A. Stowers to the Acting Administrator, 27 Apr, 1942, MAST; S. S. Allen, Notes on Samoa, SSA; Meeting Asau, 21 – 24 Nov, 1939, Minutes 1938 – 1960, Methodist Archives, Apia; H. E. Moston, Visit to Western Samoa, 22 Jun, 1945, GP.
judges of the High Court, changes to the salaries of Samoan officials, and changes to the number of Samoan officials appointed to various districts. Turnbull realised that the respect, which was once shown by the Faipule, had turned to arrogance, and the administration was forced to slowly give way to some of the Mau demands.\footnote{Grattan to Monaghan, 12 Aug, 1944, GP; Grattan to Monaghan, 20 Aug, 1944, GP; Memo: Mau Activities, 3 Sept, 1937, IT 88/13.}

In 1938 further demands from Samoans for self-government were tabled before New Zealand's parliament. These were also rejected, and the Mau blamed Turnbull and his administration. As a result, the Mau sent its own delegation, Tamasese Meaole and Nelson, to present Samoa's case personally. The government assured the delegation that they were doing all it could. It also assured the delegation that policies would be in line with Samoan aspirations. The government called for a report on the best way to develop Samoa in the future and to guide the New Zealand government in its future policies.\footnote{Future Development of Native Administration and Local Government in Western Samoa, 25 Jan, 1938, IT 25/1/38.} The friendly reception prompted the delegation to abandon and withdraw many of their other demands, including the proposal to appoint Nelson as the Fa'atonu (adviser or supervisor) for the proposed Samoan Mau government.\footnote{Western Samoa Mail, 5 Feb, 1938; Western Samoa Mail, 11 Feb, 1938.}

Nelson arrived in Samoa with the intention of accepting the New Zealand government proposal, and joined the Legislative Council as a European member. The Samoans on the other hand saw Nelson's case as a blessing in disguise. The Mau could put another of its Samoan members in the Legislative Council while treating Nelson as one of them. In the first session of the Legislative Council, one of the Samoan members remarked, 

\begin{quote}
Although the Honourable Taisi [Nelson] stands on the European side, yet we still look to him to help us representatives of the Samoans in all matters to advance the welfare of the whole community.\footnote{Western Samoa Mail, 5 Feb, 1938.}
\end{quote}

Between 1938 and 1945, several important changes began to emerge. Firstly, there was a break down in village and district relationship with the main administration in Apia. Districts took matters into their own hands and set up their own government, police and judicial system. Villages relied on matai to maintain law and order, and to elect Faipule when necessary. Secondly, the
Mau lost three leaders in Tuimaleali'iifano, who died in 1937, Malietoa Tanumafili I, who died in 1939, and Nelson, who died in 1944. Malietoa Tanumafili II, Tupua Tamasese Mea'ole and Mata'afa Fiame replaced the late Samoan leaders in the Legislative Council as joint Fautua to the government.  

All three were respected by the Samoans as tama-a-aiga. The change in leadership should have been an incentive for the administration to assume and continue dialogue. Instead the administration continued with its old ways and the opportunity for a peaceful solution went begging, and consequently, the administration watched as the new Samoan leaders resumed with vigour the struggle for self-government. The advent of World War II, exposed Samoa to many changes that had a lasting impact on its leaders and people.  

World War II took away the opportunities that Turnbull was building on to restore good relations with Samoa. World War II left New Zealand marking time, while the Samoans continued to pressure the administration to resolve their grievances. New Zealand was involved with the war in Europe, and it had no time to deal with Samoan problems. The Fono a Faipule tried to usurp the authority of the foro to remove New Zealand officials from various administration positions. The Faipule wanted Samoans to fill the positions. There were also demands for more Samoans to be trained to replace expatriates in government positions. Samoan grievances were often placed before the administrator, but Turnbull was powerless to address it fairly. Turnbull did its best to pacify the situation through the war period. But, the arrival of the Maligi (American Marines) in Samoa further complicated matters for the administration, as Samoans warmed themselves to American wealth and lifestyle. The inclusion of Afro-Americans in the American contingents as equals, and not servants or slaves, of the white Americans impressed many Samoans. The wealth flaunted by Afro-Americans was even more impressive. Within a few years, the Maligi in Samoa would not only change the way Samoans perceived the world, but it would change the way Samoans behaved and envisaged their future.

93 Bartlett to Barradale, 14 Jul, 1939, SSL; Bartlett to Goddall, 14 Jun, 1940, SSL.  
94 Bartlett to Chirgwin, 27 Aug, 1939, SSL; Bartlett to Barradale, 30 Sept, 1939, SSL.  
95 The Samoans took the opportunity in 1944 and 1945 to present the same to Peter Fraser, the New Zealand Prime Minister, when he visited Samoa at the end of 1944. See Representations Made on the Prime Minister's Visit to Samoa and Cook Islands, Dec, 1944 – Jan, 1945, IT 1 Ex 1/67/1; Visit to Samoa and Cook Islands by the Prime Minister, Dec 1944 – Jan, 1945, IT 1 Ex 1/67.  
96 The impact of the American occupation of Samoa will be discussed later in Chapter Eleven.
CHAPTER EIGHT

SAMOAN PATRIOTISM AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE MAU CHURCH

The climax in political agitation reached its height during Richardson's term as administrator. The Mau not only touched the political disposition of the Samoan people, but also its religious vein. Samoan nationalism reached a point of no return and led New Zealand, the missions, *papalagi*, and the country towards the path of independence. The support of the Samoan (LMS) Church was crucial and the Mau received it, as they bonded to demonstrate to Richardson the extremity of Samoan patriotism.

The emergence of an independent Mau Church was not an accident. The writing was already on the wall for sometime, even before the formation of the Mau movement. The establishment of the Fono Tele (General Assembly) in 1875, gave the Samoan pastors a chance to attend and observe the *fono* of the Au Fa'atonu, made up entirely of LMS missionaries. The inauguration of the National Reference Council (later to become known as the Au Toeaina [National Advisory Council [NAC]]) in 1907, also gave the Samoan pastors the chance to participate in the decision making process of the Samoan church.

Part of the mission strategy of the LMS mission was to give the Samoan church autonomy, and the formation of the Fono Tele and the Au Toeaina were a step in that direction. The dwindling finances of the LMS was also a factor in the Au Matutua's decision to prepare the Samoan (LMS) Church for independence.

The LMS missionaries in Samoa were not enthusiastic about the Au Matutua's proposal, especially when turning over authority to the Samoans

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1 This council, although officially known as the National Reference Council (NRC), was in later years called the National Advisory Council (NAC), which later became the Council of Elders or Au Toeaina. The Council originally included the missionaries in charge of districts, but later became a Samoan pastors only council. The council of elders was made up of elder pastors and deacons from Ifututu (6), Faasaleleaga (8), A'ana (4), Malua (3), Apia (8), Falealili (8), and Tutuila and Manu'a (8). The council was responsible for matters relating to government and church, district matters, matters relating to public worship, appointment of Samoan ministers, and ordination. 10% of the annual collection was given to the council to carry out their work. See The Church in the Mission Field and its Workers, South Seas Special Personal, Newell Papers (henceforth NP); Newell to Thompson, 12 Mar, 1909, London Missionary Society South Seas Archives, South Seas Letters (henceforth SSL); Newell to Thompson, 3 Jun, 1907, SSL; see also SDC – Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 25-30 May 1908, SSL; Newell to Thompson, 12 Mar, 1909, SSL.

2 Thompson to Hills, 17 Jun, 1905, SSL; Thompson to Hills, 30 Sept, 1905, SSL; Kinnersley to Bradford, 11 Jan, 1915, SSL.
meant turning over control of funds and educational work. However, the Au Matutua's proposal took a step further towards its fulfilment with the LMS's failure to maintain its missionary quota in Samoa. The shortage of staff transferred some of the responsibilities to the Samoan pastors, which presented them with a chance to work without supervision.

In 1914, the Au Matutua sent a deputation to investigate the possibility of transferring control to the Samoans. The Deputation made up of the Reverends Frank Lenwood, A. J. Viner, and G. J. Williams, arrived in Samoa in October 1915. They expressed the opinion that Samoan pastors were not ready to administer the Samoan (LMS) Church. The Deputation believed that the Samoan pastors were intellectually backward and morally weak. Lenwood wrote:

The impression I have gathered is that this is impossible, if they were left [alone] they would rapidly degenerate unless others took up the work that we abandon.

Instead, the Deputation advised the Samoan church leaders to prove they could financially support the Samoan (LMS) Church by raising five thousand pounds a year for five years without assistance from the Au Matutua. According to Lenwood, the whole idea of self-support made the Samoan church leaders nervous of their future, and he felt that "the native wasn't fit for this [autonomy] and wouldn't be for years... Samoans were childlike and incapable." The Samoan church leaders felt that 1930, the centenary year of the LMS mission in Samoa, would be a much better time to reconsider such a proposal. However, Lenwood was wrong about the attitude of the Samoans; they took on the challenge enthusiastically.

The influenza epidemic in 1918 was a significant turning point in the independence debate. The younger Samoan pastors took over leadership responsibility at a time of great Samoan detestation for the New Zealand

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3 SDC, Minutes of Meeting, May 1905, SSL; Newell to Thompson, 12 Feb, 1909, SSL; Thompson to Hills, 4 Mar, 1909, SSL.
4 Hawker to Thompson, 4 Jan, 1912, SSL; Hills to Thompson, 8 Mar, 1912, SSL; Hills to Thompson, 23 Jul, & 27 Aug, 1912, SSL; Hawker to Thompson, 20 Jan, 1906, SSL; SDC, Minutes of Meetings, Leulumoega, 10-15 Dec, 1906, SSL; SDC, Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 5-9 May 1914, SSL.
5 Notes on the Visitation by Frank Lenwood, Aug, 1914, SSL.
6 SDC, Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 2-11 May 1917, SSL.
7 Lenwood to Hawkins, 24 & 27 Oct, 1915, SSL; see also Fono Tele to Directors of LMS, 4 Jun, 1916, SSL.
8 Fono Tele to Directors of LMS, 4 Jun, 1916, SSL; see also SDC - Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 3 – 13 May 1922, SSL; Kirisome, Sosene, Imo, Samoa's Response to the Holy Deputation: Let the Control Remain, Chronicle of the LMS, Jan, 1917.
9 See Chapter Six for details regarding the 1918 Influenza Epidemic.
administration, and for which, there was a strong call for New Zealand's departure from Samoa. How much this may have affected the Samoan pastors' mentality, can only be speculated, but the call for an independent Samoan (LMS) Church was voiced, as the relationship between the Samoan church leaders and the Au Fa'atonu began to deteriorate. Eventually, both sides settled down to work together, although it only took a minor disagreement or some negative criticism to trigger Samoan opinions against the Au Fa'atonu. The LMS missionaries were wary of the unpredictable nature of the Samoan pastors, but remained confident that as long as the Samoan political circumstances remained stable and peaceful they could control the Samoan (LMS) Church.

The arrival of George Richardson in 1923, saw the creation of unnecessary new laws, especially in relation to the fa'asamoa. The most radical of his ordinances gave Richardson the right to remove matai titles from their bearers. In a letter to a member of the New Zealand Parliament in 1924, he highlighted his position when he wrote: "If I find any of the natives intriguing against the Government, I shall remove their titles, which I have discovered, is the greatest punishment one can give."\(^\text{10}\) Richardson ventured into territories that had caused much agitation during the German administration and raised much condemnation for his predecessor Tate. It was precisely the kind of policy that triggered anti-government sentiments and provoked Samoan hostility.

The next significant incident was the conflict over the involvement of the government in fixing the controlling price of copra in 1926, which led to the disintegration in relationship between Richardson and the traders.\(^\text{11}\) The stand off between the administration and the traders soon found a supporting ear among the Samoans, especially those who had unpleasant dealings with the administration. The Samoan pastors could also feel the winds of change and tried to understand their own independent aspirations within the new political atmosphere. The Au Fa'atonu, however, was not able to comprehend the changing political environment and failed to observe the rise in Samoan patriotism. In fact, in 1926, the LMS missionaries painted a rosy picture of Samoan conditions and contemplated no problems or any interference with the work of the LMS in Samoa in the near future. Despite the shortage of missionaries in Upolu, Darvill wrote...

\(^{10}\) Richardson to Gray, 18 Jan, 1924, Island Territories Archives (henceforth IT), Series 79/78.

\(^{11}\) Royal Commission Report on Agitation in Samoa, 1927-1928, IT 1 Ex 1/46 (part 2).
...the Christian witness has been maintained and signs are evident that the churches centre is fixed in spiritual realities. Great advances have been made under the progressive policy of the administration and the church is alive to the necessity of using her power to moral and spiritual ends. I am glad to report that in every branch of work harmonious relationships between the missionaries and natives have been reflected, and if such is preserved, the temptation that follow material prosperity will be mitigated.12

Darvill also wrote enthusiastically about the progress of Savai‘i.

The spirit of suspicion which lurked in the hearts of the people two years ago has given place to keener and sensible interests in our endeavour to help them, and also, they are beginning to feel their own responsibility in all matters undertaken for the common good.13

Darvill’s appraisal of the church and conditions in Samoa was personal. Darvill was aware of the Au Matutua’s plans to hand over authority to the Samoans because of their financial and resource problems, and the rosy picture was an effort to delay such action. The real situation in Samoa was soon revealed, as their benevolent vision of the future was shattered with the emergence of the Mau movement. Political instability, the very thing the LMS missionaries feared would destroy their work, threatened to engulf the mission without their knowledge.

The Mau embodied Samoan patriotism. There was no other event or organisation in the history of Samoa that had a greater impact on the magnitude and direction of Samoan nationalism than the Mau. While the previous chapter highlighted the attitude of the Mau towards the New Zealand administration, the interconnection between the Mau and the missions, especially with the LMS, was an issue that had a huge impact on Samoan aspirations for independence and, therefore, needs to be discussed more fully.

According to the administrator, Brigadier-General Richardson, the Samoan uprising began in 1926 with Olaf Nelson, a trader and merchant, inciting the Samoans “in order to increase his power and influence particularly in native matters, and so materially enhance his commercial interests.”14

Richardson charged that Nelson enticed a matai and trader named Lagolago,

12 Darvill, Report for 1925, Apia District, 2 Mar, 1926, London Missionary Society South Seas Archives, South Seas Reports (henceforth SSR); see also SDC – Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 20-30 May 1925, SSL.
13 Darvill, Report for 1925, Apia District, 2 Mar, 1926, SSR; see also SDC – Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 20-30 May 1925, SSL; Smart to Barradale, 4 Jun, 1928, SSL.
whom Richardson describes as "a trader in Apia with a notorious bad record," to promote discontent among other matai and induce them to believe government policies were wrong for Samoa. Lagolago also promoted Nelson as the only person who could return the matai to their political status and authority. Many of Lagolago's supporters were either dismissed government officials, or Samoans who had been constant law-breakers and enemies of the administration.16

The Samoan League, or more popularly known as the Mau, formally took shape on 19 March 1927. Dominated by Samoans and supported by a few afakasi and papalagi, it declared its objective to be:

The advancement of Samoa, and to present to the Administration and the Government of New Zealand from time to time subjects concerning the Government of Western Samoa which may be considered by the members of the League essential for the promotion of the peace, order, good government, and the general welfare of the territory.17

This declaration of purpose was accompanied by a solemn declaration from its members in four parts, which stated:18

1. We declare and believe that man's heritage from God is to help each other irrespective of station, race, colour, and creed and that all men are equal in the sight of God.

2. We declare and believe that it is the inherited privilege of a person living under the British flag, and especially the duty of the British subject, to assist the members of a subject race in advancement towards civilisation. Good morals, and a government of the people in accordance with the will of the people.

3. We declare and believe that all constitutional authority shall be maintained, and respect must be shown to all persons placed in authority, from the Administrator to the village policeman.

4. That, whilst maintaining authority and showing respect, we declare and believe that it is a privilege, and a duty to society and Government, of every person to endeavour to procure by lawful means the alteration of any matter affecting the laws, government, or constitution of the territory which may be

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15 G. Richardson: Political Situation in Samoa, 25 Jul, 1927, SSO; see also Western Samoa, Historical Notes, IT 1 Ex 2/15.
16 G. Richardson: Political Situation in Samoa, 25 Jul, 1927, SSO; Richardson to Gray, 22 Oct, 1926, IT 79/78; Report of the Royal Commission into the Administration of Western Samoa, 1928, Appendices to the Journal of the House of Representatives (henceforth AJHR).
17 Report of the Royal Commission into the Administration of Western Samoa, 1928, AJHR.
18 Report of the Royal Commission into the Administration of Western Samoa, 1928, AJHR.
considered prejudicial to the welfare and the best interests of the people.

Various definitions have been attached to the word Mau and its usage by the Samoan movement, but perhaps the best definition comes from the initiators of the movement itself. In 1927, the official report of a visit to Samoa by the New Zealand Minister, the Hon. William Nosworthy, quoted Nelson's definition of the word Mau as...

...an opinion, and also represents anything that is firm or solid. In this case the Mau represents that very large majority of the people of these Islands [Samoa] who are of the firm opinion that drastic changes are necessary in the Administration and in the method of government in Samoa.

When the Mau officially began, many Europeans, including missionaries, constantly questioned the motives behind the Mau's inauguration. Some papalagi felt Samoans blindly joined the movement but had no knowledge of what the Mau represented. Richardson also commented on the absurdity of the Samoans supporting something they did not understand.

The majority of them [Samoans] did not even know the objects of the so called 'Mau' movement were, but they heard Mr Nelson speak or they saw a big demonstration in his favour and as the government did not prohibit the demonstration they naturally interpreted it as a victory for the Mau.

For Samoans, many saw the Mau purely as a Samoan struggle for independence and nothing else, while others believed the Mau was a European political protest, and those involved had used the Samoans and the Mau for their own benefit. Some Samoans felt the Mau was just a vehicle to promote European economic prowess, especially Nelson's economic gains, but had turned into a personal political conflict between Nelson and the New Zealand administration with the Samoans caught in the middle. Richardson also believed that the European community had used the Samoans and later the Mau to promote their own self interest. Richardson, however, wrote that the

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19 Several meanings could be rendered to the word Mau have been put forth by Samoans interviewed by author in 1995. They include 'opposition,' 'objections,' 'lists of resolutions,' 'a Samoan political party,' and 'an economic complaint'. (Interviews conducted during Field Work in Samoa August 1995 - December 1995. All tapes and list of interviewees with author). For other rendering of the word Mau see also Field, 85.

20 Royal Commission Report on Agitation in Samoa, 1927-1928, IT 1 Ex 1/46 (part 2); see also Davidson, 1:19.

21 Hoad to Barradale, 12 Mar, 1928, SSL; Perkins to Chirgwin, Report 1929, 31 Dec, 1929, SSR.

22 G. Richardson: Political Situation in Samoa, 25 Jul, 1927, SSO.

23 Royal Commission Report on Agitation in Samoa, 1927-1928, IT 1 Ex 1/46 (part 2); see also Report of the Royal Commission into the Administration of Western Samoa, 1928, AJHR.
combined Samoan and European committee (which later became the Mau) was initially set up to address Samoan interests. But, it became nothing more than a pretext to promote European influence and increase their political and commercial interests.\textsuperscript{24}

The Mau had a huge impact on the European community as it divided many \textit{papalagi} into Mau and government supporters. When Richardson sent a letter to the Europeans’ Citizen’s Committee calling for restraint in European activities and support for Samoan opinions, many of Nelson’s European committee members resigned and sided with the government,\textsuperscript{25} but it did not have the effect Richardson intended. Instead, the Samoans regarded the \textit{papalagi}, as well as Samoans loyal to the government, as anti-Mau. Vaimoso continued to function as a political cocoon for Mau supporters from other villages.\textsuperscript{26} When Richardson toured the islands of Upolu and Savai‘i he found many of the villages had been influenced by the Mau to the extent that they passively resisted village authorities and disobeyed government orders.\textsuperscript{27} In Tutuila, the American administration also felt the extent of the political unrest in Samoa as people refused to pay taxes, and there were several meetings being called to hear people’s grievances. According to the Reverend Harold Perkins, LMS members were the main advocates.\textsuperscript{28}

Richardson felt he could have done a lot more to quash the influence of the Mau, but he was powerless to do anything more than to warn \textit{papalagi} affiliating with and inciting Samoan rebellion, as he had no power to punish \textit{papalagi} for such affiliations. As for the Samoans he had only limited power to punish them for petty offences for only a short period of time. Richardson was further restricted when the Mau hired a lawyer to help keep Richardson ‘honest and above-board’ in his treatment of the Mau.\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{24} G. Richardson: Political Situation in Samoa, 25 Jul, 1927, SSO.
\textsuperscript{25} G. Richardson: Political Situation in Samoa, 25 Jul, 1927, SSO; see also Report of the Royal Commission into the Administration of Western Samoa, 1928, AJHR.
\textsuperscript{26} See discussion in Chapter Seven regarding Richardson’s reaction to the Samoans resistance. See also G. Richardson: Political Situation in Samoa, 25 Jul, 1927, SSO; Report of the Royal Commission into the Administration of Western Samoa, 1928, AJHR.
\textsuperscript{27} In fact, a Commission of Inquiry looking at ways to improve the administration of Samoa in 1928 found the Richardson’s administration to be inefficient, extravagant, and did not know how to govern. The V. P. B. Report in 1928 confirmed that the Samoans complaints had some grounds to it. See Crossman to E. A. Ransom, 7 Sept, 1930, IT 1/23/16, see also G. Richardson: Political Situation in Samoa, 25 Jul, 1927, SSO.
\textsuperscript{28} Perkins (Tutuila) to Barradale, 31 Dec, 1927, SSR.
\textsuperscript{29} G. Richardson: Political Situation in Samoa, 25 Jul, 1927, SSO.
The Mau also influenced the missions although each mission's involvement was different in magnitude. The biggest and most influential players were the Catholics and the LMS. The involvement of the Catholics and the LMS was not coincidental. They had been key players in the competition for church members since 1845. This competitive spirit not only infected the Samoans within the religious sphere of the mission, but it also infected their social and political environment. The placing of the missions under the umbrellas of colonial administrators, such as Germany and New Zealand in later years resulted in a more stable relationship as each mission concentrated in trying to fulfil the policies of the administration.

Germany and New Zealand tried hard to provide Samoa with a stable government, albeit unacceptable to the Samoans. Maintaining such a stable government was important as it released some of the tension that plagued Protestants and the Catholics mission under previous administrations and governments. There were a few times when the old wounds of the nineteenth century reopened to haunt both missions, especially when the loyalty of the missions and their adherents was divided between the ruling administration and the Mau. The Samoan (LMS) Church members (in this case Samoan pastors, deacons, and Samoan church members of the LMS mission), took a very different view of the political atmosphere compared with its mentors, the LMS missionaries, and such differences in opinions and allegiance eventually led to bitter disagreements.

The LMS missionaries tried to maintain their 'no politics' principle, but at times were found wanting as they acquiesced in and promoted much of New Zealand's colonial agenda. This was partly due to the LMS's 'Fundamental Principles' which forbade its missionaries from being involved in politics. However, the LMS's actions were not always in line with these principles, and this led to tension and disagreements within the mission. Despite these challenges, the LMS remained a powerful force in Samoa, and its influence continued to be felt long after its formal withdrawal from the island.
Zealand's administration policies. Although the LMS, as well as Catholics and WMMS, missionaries were guilty of this many times, their intentions were, in many cases, for the good of the Samoans and their country. Perkins not only commented on the LMS missionaries' dilemma over the issue of political participation in Samoan affairs, but also found Samoan exploits in the conflict amusing.

Though believing strongly that the missionary should not be mixed up in Native politics, yet in times of stress the Samoans perhaps not unnaturally, thinks he [they] should come over solidly to the side which the majority of Samoans may happen to be. There is a humorous side to things, for whilst in mass, refusing to recognise the administration, yet individually they come and ask me to try and obtain some favour or concession for them.35

At the height of Mau activities, the missions, especially the LMS, tried to help the Mau overcome administration violence, by assisting in the call for Mau members to surrender to New Zealand authorities. Many Mau members, including Samoan church leaders, saw the LMS's actions as siding with the enemy.36 Understandably, the dilemma for the LMS was not so much over their participation in Samoan politics, but the knowledge that the greatest supporter of Samoan patriotism was none other than the Samoan (LMS) Church—pastors, deacons, and church members.

The LMS, compared with other missions in Samoa, had a huge indigenous ordained ministry, working as pastors in villages. It was also a priceless resource base for the various LMS mission enterprises throughout the Pacific.37 It also became the power base for Samoan patriotism, as the LMS indigenous ministry became the backbone and vehicle for Mau agitation. The LMS Samoan pastors, teachers, deacons, and church members, were the dominant manipulating force in coordinating and procuring political support for the Mau. While other missions lost many adherents to the cause of the Mau, it was the Samoan (LMS) Church that contributed the biggest support numerically.38 The LMS missionaries condemned the menacing influence the Mau had on the church, and lamented the negative effect Samoan patriotism

35 Perkins to Chirgwin, Report 1929, 31 Dec, 1929, SSR.
36 Bartlett to Mau Council, 29 Nov, 1929, SSO; Bartlett to Bitton, 18 Dec, 1929, SSO; Bartlett to Bitton, 29 Nov, 1929, SSO; G. Richardson: Political Situation in Samoa, 25 Jul, 1927, SSO.
37 Fono Au Toeaina to Au Matutua (LMS), 19 Dec, 1921, SSL.
38 Perkins, Statistical Report, 28 Feb, 1938, SSL.
had on the work of the mission.\textsuperscript{39} For the whole of 1927 the Mau movement overwhelmed almost every village in Samoa. At the beginning of 1928, the political situation in Samoa reached new heights, as efforts to bring together the administration and the Mau for dialogue failed. The enormity of the conflict saw Samoa being dubbed with such expressions as the 'Isles of Unrest' and 'Tragedy Island.'\textsuperscript{40}

The LMS missionaries continued to be concerned with the impact the movement was having on the mission and Samoa as a whole. According to the Reverend Frank S. Hoad, the Mau called itself "the people of Samoa,"\textsuperscript{41} to highlight its dominance over Samoa and the Samoans. Hoad confirmed the control the Mau had by estimating that 95\% of the population sided with the Mau. The other 5\%, according to Hoad, were either employees of the administration, people who were waiting to see which side won, or people who were "careful at how they walk."\textsuperscript{42} The Mau even controlled Apia, as they freely walked around with knives and guns, and threatened the peaceful atmosphere of the European community. It was within this arrogant environment, the Mau issued three demands. (1). Withdrawal of all government native Faipule, (2) Richardson to leave Samoa, and (3) New Zealand's administration of Samoa to cease.\textsuperscript{43} For the Samoans, Richardson's Samoa mo Samoa ideology was given a new dimension, and a solution to its fulfilment - Samoa without New Zealand.

The LMS missionaries could only pray for its members, as the Mau intensified its activities. They could not deny that many of the leaders of the Mau were deacons and church members of the Samoan (LMS) Church. The LMS missionaries could not comprehend the actions of Samoans who held church offices, and positions of leadership in the church, being in the forefront of Mau activities. Prominent leaders such as Tupua Tamasese Lealofi I, from Vaimoso, Faumuina Fiamoe of Lepea, who later became Mata'afa, Afamasaga Lagolago of Fasito'otai, Tofaeono of Siumu, Toelupe of Malie, Umaga Pau,

\textsuperscript{39} Darvill to Barradale, 25 May, 1927, SSO.
\textsuperscript{40} Perkins to Chirgwin, Report 1929, 31 Dec, 1929, SSR.
\textsuperscript{41} Hoad to Barradale, 19 Feb, 1928, SSL; Hoad to Barradale, 12 Mar, 1928, SSL; see also Translation of Some Representation of 'New Mau' Delivered at the Acting Administrator's Office, 19 Apr, 1938, IT 88/13.
\textsuperscript{42} Hoad to Barradale, 12 Mar, 1928, SSL.
\textsuperscript{43} Hoad to Barradale, 19 Feb, 1928, SSL.
Tagaloa, Alipia Siaosi, Moananu Fa’afo’i of Mulifanua, Molio’o Saoletai, Sa’u from Apolima, and many others.44

The volatile situation raised fears among the European community, and the arrival of two New Zealand warships in Apia harbour probably allayed some of the fears.45 But, many papaliagi saw the presence of the warships as provocation and “part of a big stick policy.”46 The LMS missionaries shared the same opinion, and according to Hoad, “it certainly did seem from an outsiders point of view that the present government has done many things the wisdom of which is exceedingly doubtful.”47

For the most part, Europeans, and some LMS missionaries, felt the administration was uncertain and indecisive at what to do with the Mau, and this only gave the Mau strength and determination. They criticised the administrator for being too aggressive at one time and then lenient the next. For instance the police arrested 400 Mau supporters including the Mau committee, but the next minute they were all released. Then the administration tried to arrest a Mau leader and the Samoans surrounded him and told the police that they could arrest him only if there was bloodshed. According to Hoad, “the Samoans were wonderfully tactful and so arrange their forces that any attempt at violence would have had to be made by the government forces.”48 The Mau leader was not arrested, and the administration police walked away with more pie on their face.

Some LMS missionaries blamed Richardson personally for the popularity of the Mau. According to Smart, Richardson was slow to recognise Samoan grievances, and his reforms had been implemented too quickly. On Richardson himself, Smart claimed his “over zealousness has been perhaps his worst fault, coupled with a certain personal vanity and a somewhat autocratic military method of doing things.”49 Smart also blamed the New Zealand government. New Zealand's failure to carry out its threats with warships, and its restraining policy on Richardson in taking stronger actions against the Mau, had given the

44 G. Richardson: Political Situation in Samoa, 25 Jul, 1927, SSO; see also Report of the Royal Commission into the Administration of Western Samoa, 1928, AJHR.
45 Hoad to Barradale, 12 Mar, 1928, SSL; Meeting of SDC and Deputation, Apia, 29 Sept – 1 Oct, 1928, SSL.
46 Hoad to Barradale, 12 Mar, 1928, SSL.
47 Hoad to Barradale, 12 Mar, 1928, SSL.
48 Hoad to Barradale, 12 Mar, 1928, SSL.
49 Smart to Barradale, 23 Apr, 1928, SSL.
Mau a sense of superiority. Smart stated that Richardson’s administration had not only become “a comical farce” but had been ridiculed by the Samoans. Samoans believed New Zealanders were all talk but no action.\(^{50}\)

The deacons and Samoan members of the Samoan (LMS) Church were not the only people causing concern for the LMS missionaries. The pastors, whom the missionaries had relied upon to dissuade people from the Mau, were the very people promoting and instigating many of the Mau activities. The missionaries called especially upon the Au Toeaina, the authority and power behind Samoan pastors, to try and influence Mau members to cease all agitation and to accept the decision of the administration. But the influence of the missionaries on the Au Toeaina was also waning, and with the cultural and traditional interaction between the Mau and the Samoan (LMS) Church being very close, it was not easy for the Au Toeaina to take such action. The Au Toeaina found it hard to advise the pastors and Samoan members of the church, let alone to persuade the whole Mau movement to give up their struggle. Samoan politics and Samoan Christianity \textit{per se}, had reached the crossroads in their struggle for traditional protocol and the pursuit of autonomy.

When the 1928 report of a New Zealand Commission was released,\(^{51}\) the Samoans refused to accept it. Richardson appealed to Smart for assistance.

\begin{quote}
I do not ask for the Native Pastor to participate in political controversies, to express opinions as to the right and wrong of any of the government’s actions, but merely request and hope that they use their influence with their people to obey the law and respect the government and constituted authority; and so help me bring about that peace and harmony which formerly prevailed and without which all our efforts on behalf of the natives will be of little avail.\(^{52}\)
\end{quote}

Smart approached the Au Toeaina to assist in getting the Mau to accept the Commissioner’s report and to influence them to return to their villages. The Au Toeaina bluntly told Smart it was not a wise move.\(^{53}\) Smart approached the other missions for a combined effort in getting the Mau to abide by the Commission’s decision, but without success. The refusal stemmed from the fact that the LMS and the administration initiated the idea without consulting the

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\(^{50}\) Smart to Barradale, 23 Apr, 1928, SSL.

\(^{51}\) Royal Commission Report on Agitation in Samoa, 1927-1928, IT 1 Ex 1/46 (part 2); Western Samoa, Historical Notes, IT 1 Ex 2/15.

\(^{52}\) Richardson to Smart, 26 Aug, 1927, Pacific Manuscript Bureau (henceforth PMB) 144.

\(^{53}\) Smart to Barradale, 23 Apr, 1928, SSL.
other missions. It may also have been the result of the threats to those who supported the administration, but many may have refused to be involved as the situation at hand pointed to a future under Mau. The LMS's authority in the Samoan (LMS) Church was challenged and their efforts to sever the close ties between the Samoan church leaders and the Mau were foiled.54

The bond between the Mau and the Samoan (LMS) Church grew stronger as the call for independence and self government struck a chord in the Au Toeaina and the pastors of the church. The Mau had more respect for the Samoan church leaders to conduct and direct church activities than for European missionaries. In an incident involving the Reverend Harold Darvill's comments about the Mau in New Zealand newspapers, the Mau promised to support the Samoan church leaders to boycott his return to Samoa. When the Samoan pastor Sa'aga left for New Zealand at that time, the Mau instructed Sa'aga to tell Darvill not to return to Samoa.55 For the LMS missionaries, it was a blatant attempt by the Mau to infiltrate and control the Samoan church leaders and the Samoan (LMS) Church. But, as far as the Mau was concerned, it was in control.

In 1928, as the Samoan (LMS) Church prepared for its annual Fono Tele, the Mau ordered pastors in the Malua district to dispense from holding prayer meetings every Thursday morning. The Mau suggested that it restricted its prayer activities to once a month, and confined the prayers to two central themes, which were “thanking God that the Mau has been kept safe when soldiers and warships arrive”, and to ask for “God's blessings on the Mau.”56 The Mau further informed the parishes in Malua, Leulumoega and Apia not to pay taxes, and to abstain from sending any boats to farewell Richardson, who had recently been recalled and was due to leave Samoa.57 The Mau warned that if any of its orders were disobeyed, the perpetrators would be exiled. Furthermore, pastors who refused to vacate their villages when requested

54 Smart to Barradale, 23 Apr, 1928, SSL.

55 A discussion regarding Darvill's actions and conflict with the Mau and the Samoan (LMS) Church will found in Chapter Ten of this study. See also Smart to Barradale, 23 Apr, 1928, SSL.

56 Smart to Barradale, 23 Apr, 1928, SSL.

57 The Samoan church leaders did not farewell Richardson. Instead, they placed a short farewell note in the Samoa Guardian. See Church Address to Sir George Richardson, Samoa Guardian, 21 Apr, 1928; see also Smart to Barradale, 23 Apr, 1928, SSL; Meeting of the SDC and Deputation, Apia, 29 Sept - 1 Oct, 1928, SSL; Report of the Royal Commission into the Administration of Western Samoa, 1928, AJHR.
would earn that village a fine of £40, and if government villages worshiped with a prohibited pastor, they would also be fined £40.\textsuperscript{58}

The European missionaries were enraged with the Mau’s heavy-handedness, and having the nerve to order pastors and church members under their authority and supervision. The influence of the Mau movement on the Samoan (LMS) Church became more concrete when the Au Fa’atonu clashed with the Au Toeaina over what to include in the agenda for the Fono Tele. The Au Fa’atonu felt the Au Toeaina was trying to undermine the whole purpose of the Fono Tele in insisting on discussing matters outside the sphere of the church. In a letter to the Au Matutua, Mr E. H. Feather suggested that the Au Toeaina “desire absolute control of the church,” because the aims of the Mau “ran along parallel lines, for the aim of the latter was to gain full control of the state.”\textsuperscript{59}

Feather commented further on the similarity of the visions of the Mau and the Au Toeaina and its effect on the Samoan (LMS) Church.

The similarity of their [Mau] aims and those of the...NAC, together with the fact that a large proportion of the controlling Committee of the anti-government party were members and deacons of our own churches, enable them seriously to interfere in the affairs of the church....Pastors refusing to comply with these orders were threatened with dismissal: attempts were made to dictate as to what should be done in the institutions, and definite instructions were issued with regard to certain services and their conduct. The people were also ordered not to pay contributions to the church.\textsuperscript{60}

The LMS missionaries blamed the Au Matutua for having given the Au Toeaina the chance to shoulder some of the financial burden of the mission. In doing so, the Samoan church leaders interpreted ‘financial control’ to mean ‘absolute control’ of the affairs of the Samoan (LMS) Church.\textsuperscript{61}

The impact of the Mau eventually created disunity within the Samoan (LMS) Church. Some weeks before the Fono Tele, the Mau disrupted Sunday worship, as their supporters refused to worship with supporters of the administration, and those who remained aloof from the Mau. The Mau wanted to conduct their own church services, and to have their own pastors. The Mau wanted to identify with a church that was not symbolic of the Au Fa’atonu, and

\textsuperscript{56} Smart to Barradale, 23 Apr, 1928, SSL.
\textsuperscript{59} Feather to Barradale, 28 May, 1928, SSL.
\textsuperscript{60} Feather to Barradale, 28 May, 1928, SSL.
\textsuperscript{61} Feather to Barradale, 28 May, 1928, SSL.
wished to separate Mau supporters from those loyal to the administration. The
Au Fa’atonu refused, and as a result, the Mau took control of all the parishes
in the villages under Mau control. The pastors who supported the Mau were
quite happy to conduct church services in those villages. The people in Mau
dominated villages loyal to the government were forced to find other places to
worship. In Mau villages that had no pastors, the Mau would send a pastor from
another district to perform church services. In villages that were dominated by
government supporters, the Mau established its own church and nominated a
pastor loyal to the Mau from a government village to conduct the service.

The Mau Church became dominant, as the Samoan (LMS) Church took
on the character of a remnant church. The movement away from the Samoan
(LMS) Church was a declaration of a new independent church – the Mau
Church – and despite the different controlling authority and differences in
motives and emphasis, the Mau Church still considered itself part and parcel of
the LMS. The Mau Church, as far as the Mau was concerned, was an LMS
church and looked forward to attending the Fono Tele. The Mau church
probably took the view that with its dominance the Au Fa’atonu would
reconsider the agenda for the Fono Tele, but the Au Fa’atonu reacted severely
and postponed the Fono Tele; a decision that did little to pacify and initiate
reconciliation regarding the conflict at hand.

The Au Fa’atonu, after consultation with a few Samoan pastors that
remained loyal to the Samoan (LMS) Church, reversed its earlier decision in
favour of having the Fono Tele. There was a great possibility that the Mau
church would create its own independent body and become a separate identity
without the LMS. For the Au Fa’atonu, the best solution was to have the Fono
Tele and continue dialogue and reconciliation efforts within the LMS circle. In
response to the positive news about the Fono Tele, the Mau church reaffirmed
its participation. It also sent a copy of the issues it wanted to include in the
agenda. The Mau demanded the dismissal of Darvill, and the removal of the
designation ‘toeaina’ from a certain unnamed Samoan elder. The Au Fa’atonu
bluntly told the Mau “hands off the church.”

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62 Feather to Barradale, 28 May, 1928, SSL.
63 Feather to Barradale, 28 May, 1928, SSL.
64 Feather to Barradale, 28 May, 1928, SSL.
65 Feather to Barradale, 28 May 1928, SSL; Tamasese to Deputation, 26 Sept, 1929, SSO.
The Mau pastors and church members attended the Fono Tele despite the LMS missionaries' refusal to accept their proposals. An agenda for the following day was discussed and the LMS missionaries ensured that nothing on the agenda related to the existing political problem. On the day of the fono, the Au Toeaina requested a postponement to the afternoon, which was granted. The Au Toeaina then sent a further message stating that they were not attending unless the Au Fa'atonu accepted their resolutions; this time for the dismissal of Darvill, and Faletose, a toeaina, from their positions. The Au Fa'atonu responded with a clear message for the Au Toeaina as to who was in control.

The Au Fa'atonu wish to inform the Au Toeaina that their hearts are heavy because of the resolutions showing their will that Faletose should retire from the office of toeaina, also they wish that the fono should discuss the address of Mr Darvill in NZ. It is obvious to us that these subjects have come from the committee of the malcontents of Samoa [Mau], and have not come through the proper channels, the recognised tofiga of the districts. The Au Fa'atonu has already informed the Au Toeaina of their wish in this matter namely, no interference from outside bodies can possibly be accepted in church matters. Therefore, we express again with sorrow our feeling with regard to these resolutions. If the Au Toeaina is not willing to eliminate entirely these two subjects, no gathering of the fono can take place; it will end from this very hour and the fono should disperse at once.66

The Au Toeaina rejected the Au Fa'atonu's position, and requested once again that their resolutions be accepted. The Au Fa'atonu remained firm in its position and made the decision to call off the Fono Tele. The Au Toeaina realised the absurdity of the situation and retracted its resolutions. They also apologised to the Au Fa'atonu and requested that it reconsider its decision and allow the Fono Tele to take place. However, the Au Fa'atonu stood by its decision, and informed the Au Toeaina that their "apology lacked sincerity and the full backing of the NAC, and was prompted more by a realisation of the shame that would be theirs if the fono was thus summarily terminated."67 The Au Fa'atonu then threatened to report the Au Toeaina to the Au Matutua, and reminded the Samoan leaders that "we know we are doing God's will in this matter."68 The Au Fa'atonu's forceful approach produced the result they wanted,

66 Feather to Barradale, 28 May 1928, SSL.
67 Feather to Barradale, 28 May 1928, SSL.
68 Feather to Barradale, 28 May 1928, SSL.
but their lack of diplomacy and not knowing when to show sympathy was its downfall.

Consequently, the Au Toeaina ordered Samoan church members to remain at Malua and conduct the Fono Tele themselves. The Au Fa'atonu lost more authority and respect as the Au Toeaina took another step towards 'absolute control' of the church; something the Au Fa'atonu dreaded. In the end the Fono Tele discussed the upcoming centenary celebration, and agreed to advise the Au Matutua of the Au Fa'atonu's behaviour. The Au Toeaina and the Au Fa'atonu went their separate ways, and as far as the Mau church was concerned, the Au Fa'atonu and the Samoan (LMS) Church were anti-Mau. The church services on Sundays continued to be divided into the Mau Church and Samoan (LMS) Church. The Au Toeaina had control of the Mau church with the knowledge that total control was still with the Au Fa'atonu as long as they remained in Samoa under the LMS. For the Au Toeaina, the hope for reconciliation, or better still independence, rested with the Au Matutua, whom they had written to for a solution.

The Au Matutua responded to the request of the Samoan church leaders, by sending a Deputation, made up of the Reverends Alexander Hough and G. Parker, which arrived in October 1928. Some of the LMS missionaries were unhappy with the Deputation taking place, as they felt it was nothing short of an inspection tour and missionary assessment, but others like Miss E. A. Downs supported the idea and felt a Deputation would help the Samoan crisis. Some of the LMS missionaries' fears were soon realised as the Deputation found the Au Fa'atonu to be at fault in all matters that had led to the split between the Mau church and the Samoan (LMS) Church. The Deputation also blamed the Au Fa'atonu for spreading false stories regarding the Samoan church wanting to set up a "Free Church". The Deputation felt this had encouraged many Samoans to abandon the Samoan (LMS) Church for the Mau church; thinking

Feather to Barradale, 28 May, 1928, SSL.

The centenary celebration started at Savai'i on the 21 August and ended at Malua on the 1 September 1930. Mission Council, Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 5 May 1930, SSL; see also Feather to Barradale, 28 May 1928, SSL; LMS Centenary: Great Rejoicing, Samoa Herald, 9 Sept, 1930.

Board of LMS to Hough, 23 Jan, 1928, SSO; Barradale to Toma and Mali, 15 Aug, 1928, SSO; Bartlett to Mau Council, 29 Nov, 1929, SSO.

Hough and Parker to Barradale, 20 Sept, 1928, SSL.

Smart to Barradale, 6 Aug, 1928, SSL.

Feather to Barradale, 6 Aug, 1928, SSL; Feather to Barradale, 27 Aug, 1928, SSL; Downs to Barradale, 4 Aug, 1928, SSL; Liston to Barradale, 17 Sept, 1928, SSL.
that the Au Fa’atonu was about to abandon the Samoa mission. It was established that the idea of a ‘Free Church’ came from the imagination of the Reverend Arthur R. Smart.\textsuperscript{75}

Some of the LMS missionaries were disappointed with the Deputation findings, and for not considering their side of the story regarding their relationship with the Au Toeaina. One of the LMS missionaries expressed his disappointment in a letter to the Au Matutua “we are sick to death of the Au Toeaina.”\textsuperscript{76} But, in the end, the Au Fa’atonu apologised to the Au Toeaina. The Deputation promised to look at some of the grievances and needs of the church, and the possibility of an early transfer in the administration of the church to Samoan hands. This was later carried out when the Deputation made the Fono Tele the supreme head and final authority of the Samoan (LMS) Church. The Samoans received the right to dominate and make decisions for the church.\textsuperscript{77} The deputation also drafted a new constitution for the Samoan (LMS) Church, which not only legitimated the Fono Tele, but also initiated three committees, which gave many Samoan pastors the chance to participate in decision making.\textsuperscript{78}

The Deputation relieved some of the tension in the Samoan (LMS) Church, but the Mau remained dominant, even over the Samoan (LMS) Church, throughout 1929. However, the church was less bitter in its division in worship life as a few villages took the opportune peace to again worship together, albeit in a superficial manner. The Au Fa’atonu was still unsure whether the services on Sundays were under the LMS banner or the Mau emblem, although the Au Fa’atonu rightly conceded that the churches in Mau dominated areas were still under the influence of the Mau. The churches under administration dominated villages, such as Lauli‘i, Letogo, Moata‘a, Vaiala, and Magiagi were, at least, under the influence of the Samoan (LMS) Church. Nevertheless, the rift

\textsuperscript{75} Joint Meeting of the SDC and Deputation, Apia, 29 Sept, – 1 Oct, 1928, SSL; Parker and Hough to Barradale, 7 Oct, 1928, SSL; Hough and Parker to Barradale, 27 Oct, 1928, SSL; Hough to G. E. Phillips, 26 Aug, 1930, SSL.

\textsuperscript{76} Head to Barradale, 14 Sept, 1929, SSL.

\textsuperscript{77} Joint Meeting of the SDC and Deputation, Apia, 29 Sept, – 1 Oct, 1928, SSL; see also Mission Council, 1928-1929, SSL; The Executive Council, 1928-1929, SSL; The Ministerial Committee, 1928-1929, SSL; General Assembly of Samoa Church, Malua, 14-27 May 1929, SSL.

\textsuperscript{78} The three committees included the Komiti Au Toeaina (Elders Committee), Komiti Tupe (Finance Committee), and the Au Taitai Tausi le Ekaesia (literally, the Leaders who looks after the Church or the General Committee). See Faletoese, 63.
between the Mau church leaders and the Mau, and the LMS missionaries remained unresolved.

The Reverend Reginald Bartlett, an ex Papuan Missionary, was given the task to put the Samoan (LMS) Church back in order. While Bartlett's mission was to reconcile the Mau church and the Samoan (LMS) Church, Bartlett also wanted to re-establish the good relations and peaceful coexistence between the LMS mission and the Mau itself. Bartlett wrote to the Mau council to assure them that the LMS took no side in their political conflict with New Zealand. Bartlett exhorted the Mau to seek peace and to “think about Jesus Christ who has brought Samoa out of darkness...such [violent] actions by the Mau hinders the coming of the Kingdom of God.”

Bartlett requested a meeting and the Mau Council granted it, and the two parties met on 21 December 1929 at Vaimoso. Tamasese acted as secretary for the meeting as Bartlett, Smart and Darvill listened as Mau leaders took turns to outline their grievances, especially in regard to the payment of government taxes, and the Samoans’ ban on copra production. Bartlett told the Mau, that his main concern was the effect the ban on copra was having on the LMS financially, but the Mau reminded the LMS missionaries that by asking the Mau to remove the ban on copra was the same as siding with the administrator and those who spoke against the Mau. Bartlett had made contact even though he found it hard to convince the Mau to abide by the government's orders. For Bartlett it was a positive start to re-establishing good relations, but his arrogance blinded him to the fact that Samoans were no longer ignorant ‘natives.’ What Bartlett wanted was not going to be bargained for easily, especially because his comments on the 'copra ban' reflected his bias and concern only for the welfare of the LMS.

A week later, the bloody events of Black Saturday, 28 December 1929, brought confusion to the Samoan people, and destroyed any hope Bartlett may have had for reconciliation. A Mau procession through Apia to welcome back


80 Bartlett to Mau Council, 29 Nov, 1929, SSO.

81 Bartlett to Bitton, 28 Dec, 1929, SSO; Bartlett, Confidential Report of Two Years in Samoa, 28 Nov, 1931, SSL.

82 Coroners Inquiry into the Shooting, 1930, IT 1 Ex 1/23/11; Westbrook to Nelson, 9 Jan, 1930, WP; see also Bartlett to Chirgwin, 29 Nov, 1931, SSL; see also Crossmann to Ransom, 7 Sept, 1930, IT 1/23/16.
European supporters of the Mau, namely Alfred Smythe and Hall Skelton, ended in a violent confrontation with New Zealand police. According to Perkins, the noise made by the Mau's marching sounded like 'fireworks' due to their numbers, which he estimated at 2000. The police moved to arrest a Samoan wanted for criminal offences but lost control of the situation. As a result, a young policeman was 'clubbed' to death, and thirteen Samoans lost their lives in the worst affray between the Mau and the New Zealand administration.

The administration reacted by landing further armed police from New Zealand as Mau members absconded to the bush to avoid captivity. Among the fugitives were prominent members of the Samoan (LMS) Church. This prompted the Au Fa'atonu, especially Bartlett, to find a solution, not only to save Samoa politically, but to save the Samoan (LMS) Church, from extinction as Samoans reaffirmed their commitment to the Mau and to the Mau church. Bartlett approached Tuimaleali'iifano and exhorted him to strive for peace and deliver Samoa from any further suffering. Tuimaleali'iifano agreed wholeheartedly with Bartlett, and challenged Bartlett that all "must pray to God to help us to finish this up quickly and to let Samoa to have [sic] another country." The Mau was willing to find peace, but without New Zealand being part of the equation. The Mau told Bartlett they could not give him an answer but would be happy to talk further. Bartlett showed his disappointment by later writing; "was there ever a nation in all the world that talked as these Samoans talk." Bartlett's attitude was far from being objective and this was probably due to his lack of background in Samoan etiquette.

Nevertheless, it was the efforts of all the missions, prominent papalagi and Samoans, and the arrival in Samoa of the Hon. John G. Cobbe, New

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83 Coroners Inquiry into the Shooting, 1930, IT 1 Ex 1/23/11.
84 Perkins to Chirgwin, Report 1929, 31 Dec, 1929, SSR.
85 The outcome of these events has already being discussed in Chapter Seven. See also Bartlett to Bitton, 1 Jan, 1930, SSO; Perkins to Chirgwin, Report 1929, 31 Dec, 1929, SSR; Western Samoa, Historical Notes, IT 1 Ex 2/15.
86 Bartlett to Bitton, 1 Jan, 1930, SSO; Perkins to Chirgwin, 1 Jan – 13 Mar, 1930, SSR; Bartlett, Confidential Report of Two Years in Samoa, 28 Nov, 1931, SSL; Crossmann to Ransom, 7 Sept, 1930, IT 1/23/16; Some of the Grievances of the Samoan Women, 28 Dec, 1929, IT 1 Ex 1/52.
87 Tuimaleali'iifano to Bati, 10 Jan, 1930, SSO.
88 Bati to Bitton, 28 Mar, 1930, SSL.
89 J. Ward (NZ PM) to Damand, 1 Apr, 1930, Damand Correspondence, MAST; S. S. Allen to Damand, 18 Mar, 1930, Damand Correspondence, MAST; Bartlett to Barradale, 14 Jul, 1939, SSL.
90 Samoa Guardian, 6 Aug, 1932; Western Samoa, Historical Notes, IT 1 Ex 2/15; Crossmann to Ransom, 7 Sept, 1930, IT 1/23/16.
Zealand's Defence Minister that persuaded the Mau to leave the comfort of the bush and participate in meaningful dialogue. The New Zealand administration met the Mau on 28 February 1930 and offered the Mau three conditions for peace; a renouncement of the Mau, that all Mau prisoners would be released, and that the government would be available for any discussions. The Mau reversed the order of the terms and wanted to talk first, release all prisoners, and then the Mau would consider dispersing.  A further meeting two days later failed to find a solution; but this time it was the Mau dividing over the terms for peace. Eventually, the Mau agreed to disperse and for everyone to return to their villages. The Mau had finally cracked and all because it had given up the only thing that had given it strength and authority to stay on top – solidarity. The Mau weakened as they failed to agree on the order of priority for the terms offered. The Mau dispersed prematurely because of their differences of opinion, rather than an acceptance of New Zealand’s terms for peace.

Bartlett, still insensitive to the Samoan psyche made LMS Mau members swear on the Bible not to return to the movement, and to obey all administration orders. Bartlett wanted to be certain that the LMS’s work in Samoa would not be disrupted again. Thus, when orders were received banning the wearing of the Mau lava/ava (cloth), Bartlett exhorted the Mau to obey the order, as they had already sworn on the Bible. The Samoans were irate as they had only sworn to obey the administration’s order to disperse and return to their villages. The Mau cried out, "Misi faalata le Mau (Missionary [Bartlett] betray the Mau)." Many Mau members were fined and imprisoned for disobeying the order as the administration reasserted its authority. The ill-treatment of the Mau members only led to the formation of the women’s Mau led by Nelson’s wife and his sister. But, it was a short-lived affair as the administration dispersed the women back to their villages, and fined the sisters five pounds each.

Bartlett deceived the Samoans, and such deception remained ingrained in the minds of the Samoans for a long time.

91 Notice by Allen and Cobbe, 1 Mar, 1930, Report on Visit to Samoa, Memo for Cabinet, 20 Mar, 1930, IT 1 Ex 1/23/8; Darman Correspondence, MAST; Bati to Bitton, 28 Feb, 1930, SSO; Administration and Mau: Meeting at Vaimoso, Samoa Herald, 7 Mar, 1930; Bartlett, Confidential Report of Two Years in Samoa, 28 Nov, 1931, SSL.

92 Report on Visit to Samoa, Memo for Cabinet, 20 Mar, 1930, IT 1 Ex 1/23/8; Bartlett to Toeaina (LMS Directors), 15 Mar, 1930, SSO; Bartlett, Confidential Report of Two Years in Samoa, 28 Nov, 1931, SSL.

93 Bati to Bitton, 4 Apr, 1930, SSO; see also Bartlett to Chirgwin, 28 Mar, 1930, SSL.

94 Memo – Women’s International League For Peace and Freedom, 23 Oct, 1930, IT 1 Ex 1/52; Bati to Bitton, 4 Apr, 1930, SSO; Bartlett to Chirgwin, 28 Mar, 1930, SSL; Bartlett to Chirgwin, 24 Apr, 1930, SSL.
Peace was finally achieved, but it never undermined nor swept away the wish of the Mau for political independence. The Samoan (LMS) Church celebrated the chance for peace, as it returned to its calling as a church. Many Mau church members also returned to the fold, as the Au Fa’aatonu and the Au Toeaina began dialogue, albeit on the surface, to revitalise the Samoan (LMS) Church, but disunity remained within the Samoan (LMS) Church itself as small number of villages continued to worship separately, as Samoan pastors continued to encourage the existence of the Mau Church. It was not until the end of 1930, that the Mau church lost momentum and was no longer a distinct entity as it submerged itself back within the Samoan (LMS) Church, but it was not a sign that the Samoan (LMS) Church was free from Mau influence.

The 1930 Fono Tele saw many Mau members wanted on warrant by the administration attend, although they had been warned not to do so. The Samoan church leaders requested Bartlett to speak to the administrator not to arrest them. He agreed and the Mau members were allowed to attend the Fono Tele without any interference from the administration. Bartlett could still not believe that the Samoans wanted for criminal offences were active members of the Samoan (LMS) Church and, most of all, confessors of Christianity.

These people [Mau] know their bible almost by heart. Yet so many, even of the pastors, are ruled by Nelson & Co., rather than by the bible. If only we could get our LMS pastors to do the right thing I believe we could break the Mau forever. So long as there is a Mau, Samoa is doomed to trouble. Nelson is clever, and he has around him men of brains, brains but no conscience. And what can Samoa do against such forces?

Bartlett was right as far as Nelson’s influence was concerned, even from New Zealand.

Leading up to the anniversary of Black Saturday, the Mau, with the help of four Samoan pastors, tried to organise a procession to commemorate the event. According to Bartlett, Nelson initiated the idea from New Zealand. The administration quickly stepped in and banned it. Instead, a commemorative service was allowed and it took place without any reference to the bitterness and anger that had encompassed Samoa. Samoans, papalagi, and even the

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95 Bartlett to Chirgwin, 24 Mar, 1930, SSL; Bartlett to G. E. Phillips, 9 Dec, 1930, SSL.
96 Downs to Chirgwin, 10 May 1931, SSL; see also Downs to Chirgwin, 25 Jun, 1932, SSL; Hoad to Chirgwin, 5 Aug, 1932, SSL; Bradford to G. E. Phillips, 30 May 1933, SSL; Bradford to Chirgwin, 18 Dec, 1933, SSL.
97 Bartlett to G. E. Phillips, 9 Dec, 1930, SSL; see also Bartlett to G. E. Phillips, 27 May, 1931, SSL.
administrator attended the packed church service. Even though no bitter words had been spoken, the presence of many Samoan church and Mau leaders only confirmed to the New Zealand administration that the Mau still existed.\textsuperscript{98} Perhaps, Bartlett finally understood the intricacy of the Mau and its relationship to the Samoan (LMS) Church. Perhaps, also, he understood what peace meant in Samoa after the Mau had dispersed. Perhaps, he was no longer ignorant of the Samoan psyche when he wrote to the Au Matutua, "Samoan is wearing no wrinkles, and there are no lines of pain on her features. That does not mean there is no trace of stiff joints and rheumatism."\textsuperscript{99}

The Mau's influence remained strong in the Samoan (LMS) Church for many years after. It prompted some of the LMS missionaries to complain continuously of its detrimental effect on the Samoan (LMS) Church.\textsuperscript{100} The Samoan church leaders were just as assertive as their political counterparts in their efforts to be independent. They were still searching to discredit many LMS missionaries to achieve their vision, as Downs noticed that "the most difficult thing to bear is their [Samoans] attitude of suspicion with which they regard our [LMS] efforts, and the skills at spoiling something by wicked gossip."\textsuperscript{101} But, although Downs believed the Samoans still needed good strong leadership, she was intelligent enough to realise that the Samoan church leaders would never accept such leadership again because they had been conditioned and strengthened by the past events to believe they were the final authority in all church matters. In the end, other LMS missionaries shared the same sentiment and put it down to "the price of independence."\textsuperscript{102}

The Au Matutua did not view missionary leadership as the solution for Samoa's future. In 1931, the Au Matutua broadened the Samoan church leaders' horizon by granting a request from the Au Toeaina to give all Samoan delegates to the Fono Tele the right "to speak and vote."\textsuperscript{103} It was further evidence that the Au Matutua wanted to move the process of church independence forward as planned. The last time the question of independence

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{98} Bartlett to G. E. Phillips, 30 Dec, 1930, SSL.
\item \textsuperscript{99} Bartlett to Chirgwin, 15 Jun, 1930, SSL.
\item \textsuperscript{100} S. G. Phillips to G. E. Phillips, 15 Feb, 1933, SSL; Stallan to Chirgwin, 27 Aug, 1937, SSL; Bartlett to Barradale, 14 Jul, 1939, SSL.
\item \textsuperscript{101} Downs to Chirgwin, 15 Sept, 1932, SSL.
\item \textsuperscript{102} Bradford to G. E. Phillips, 30 May 1930, SSL; see also Downs to Chirgwin, 15 Sept, 1932, SSL; Bartlett to G. E. Phillips, 9 Dec, 1930, SSL.
\item \textsuperscript{103} Bartlett to Chirgwin, 29 Nov, 1931, SSL.
\end{itemize}
was raised, the Samoan church leaders postponed it to 1930; its centenary year. The Au Matutua was just taking that request a step further, although it raised very little enthusiasm and support among the LMS missionaries in Samoa.

The Mau had come in from the bush, and Nelson was again exiled to New Zealand, but it continued to remain influential throughout many Samoan villages under the guidance of Samoan leaders, who had gained experience as the conflict broadened. In its own passive ways, the Mau continued to push for independence through petitions and submissions to the New Zealand government, League of Nations, and other countries. The Samoan (LMS) Church remained silent as many of its church members took the lead on behalf of the Mau. For the Au Toeaina and the Samoan (LMS) Church members, the Mau was just an instrument to achieve absolute control of the Samoan (LMS) Church. World War II momentarily delayed the quest for independence.

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104 Memo - Mau Activities, 7 Nov, 1936, IT 1/23/16; Meeting at Vaimoso Between the Ministerial Delegation and the Mau, 23 Jul, 1936, IT 1 Ex 1/55; Mau Activities, 2 Sept, 1937, IT 88/13.

105 The Samoans sent petitions to England, Wales, New Zealand, America, and the League of Nation. See, for example, Bartlett to Chirgwin, 28 Mar, 1930, SSL; see also Western Samoa, Historical Notes, IT 2 Ex 2/15.
CHAPTER NINE

CHINESE IN PARADISE AND
INDENTURED LABOUR PROBLEMS¹

The treatment of the Chinese indentured labourers was another issue that alienated the Samoans from the New Zealand administration and the missions, especially the LMS. The injustice and bad management of the Chinese labourers further pressed the Samoans to demand independence. The Samoans were a proud people, and before it had become a colony in 1900, they were conscious of keeping Samoa free from being *toto lua* (mix blood). They took steps to arrest the problem of mixed relationships with other ethnic groups, especially with the Chinese. Germany, and later, New Zealand, not only took over the administration of Samoa, but failed to take into consideration the feelings of the Samoan people regarding the introduction of Chinese into Samoa, and within three years Samoa was inundated with Chinese from all walks of life. Germany and New Zealand, in the end, failed to control the Chinese and, consequently, anger the Samoans in more ways than one.

The arrival of Chinese, and later Melanesians, as indentured labourers was a constant issue for discussion as to its merit. The missions, the traders and merchants, the administrators, and even the Samoans expressed varied opinions regarding the importation of indentured labourers. In the end, the Samoans had no real say in the matter, the missions sat on the fence mostly, and now and then would side with the administration, while the administration tended to reject the importation of foreign labour but usually changed its mind under pressure from plantation owners and traders. The plantation owners, on the other hand, were not always in agreement, especially on the ethnicity of the labourers to be imported. Nevertheless, by the time Germany had taken over the administration of Samoa, their large-scaled plantation operations saw boatloads of Chinese being introduced into Samoa. Later, under New Zealand's administration, Melanesian labourers were indentured but not at the same scale as the Chinese had been indentured.

¹ A brief version was published under the title "Dragons in Little Paradise," *Journal of Pacific History* 32: 1 (1997).
In Samoa today, there are many graves of Chinese indentured labourers dotting Samoan soil, perhaps the only remaining meaningful icons of the Chinese contribution to the development of Samoa during the first half of last century. Many of the graves are unmarked and the identity of many cannot be established. Some graves have tombstones with their names inscribed on them. On one particular tombstone, the identity of the Chinese labourer could not be established for his name was not etched into the brittle slab. Yet, in the small area provided for an inscription, four Chinese characters appeared distinctively, which literally translates 'dragon, came, thousand, miles'. Nancy Tom, an educationalist and writer, simply puts it; “the dragon came from afar.”

The tombstone epitaph is a strong historical reminder of the diasporic spirit of the Chinese, which found enthusiastic hosts among Chinese eager to escape population pressure, war and hostility, unemployment, famine, and other catastrophes.

Samoa’s chance to experience first hand the ‘dragons from afar’ began prior to the introduction of indentured labour in 1903. A handful had already made Samoa their home. Three had arrived prior to Malietoa Laupepa’s 1880 law, which forbade Chinese entering Samoa. They had married into well-known Samoan families, pursued very lucrative businesses, and enjoyed European status. Other Chinese settlers found their way to Samoa as servants of government officials. When Germany took over the administration of Samoa in 1900, they became free to pursue their own business activities. In 1904, they successfully applied to Governor Solf for ‘free settler’ status, thus maintaining their business pursuits and strengthening ties with their Samoan families.

These Chinese were a marked contrast to the Chinese who arrived under the indentured labour scheme, in terms of wealth and freedom. They kept very

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2 Nancy, Y. W. Tom had used this interpretation as the subtitle of her book The Chinese in Samoa, 1875-1985: The Dragon Came From Afar, Apia: Western Samoa Historical and Cultural Trust, 1986.


4 One such early Chinese settler, Ah Mu, married into the Malietoa family. See Notes on Samoa, 1928-1931, S.S. Allen Collection (henceforth SSA); Westbrook to Samoa Guardian, n.d., Westbrook Additional Papers, 79-270 (henceforth WAP); see also Tom, 38-43; H. J. Moors, Some Recollections of Early Samoa, Apia: Western Samoa Historical and Cultural Trust, 1986, 41.

5 One Chinese businessman, a box maker, complained to Solf regarding concessions granted to the London Missionary Society (henceforth LMS) school at Leulumoega to make boxes without a license. The Chinese man feared that such special favours to the LMS school threatened his business. See Leulumoega School Report, 1901, LMS South Seas Archives, South Seas Reports (henceforth SSR); Hills to Thompson, 7 Sept, 1901, LMS South Seas Archives, South Seas Letters (henceforth SSL); see also D. R. Haynes, "Chinese Indentured Labour in Samoa, 1900-1950," M.A. Thesis, Otago University, 1965.
much to themselves as an elite group of Chinese. They eventually employed Chinese indentured labourers in their businesses as time went by.

The Germans administered Samoa, according to Solf, "merely to guard it as what it is – a little paradise – and to do my best to keep the passing serpent out of our garden of Eden," but at the same time developing Samoa for economic gain. Samoans, first and foremost, pledged their loyalty and total commitment to their matai, aiga, and nu'u. This diminished any chance of securing a permanent and consistent labour supply. The DH&PG, backed by the German government, had a monopoly on tama uli (black) labour from the Bismark Archipelago and Solomon Islands, and labour shortage was never an issue. However, the newly arrived individual investors and small businesses, which poured unlimited wealth into plantation developments, soon faced a huge labour shortage. Some observers have assumed, incorrectly, that it was "the disinclination of the Samoan to sell himself into wage slavery" which created a vacuum in the labour pool. Clearly, it was the idea of 'wage deficiency' rather than 'wage slavery', and a disinterested capitalist attitude, which kept Samoans distant from plantations. Nevertheless, the labour shortage provoked an outcry for government assistance.

In 1903, Solf, with approval of the Samoan fono of Ta'imua and Faipule, issued an Ordinance which superseded the old Malietoa Laupepa immigration law, opening the way for the planters to recruit Chinese labour. The traders, such as H. J. Moors and R. H. Curruthers, argued strongly against implementing the planters' aspirations, fearing an increase in Chinese business interests. However, the planters, such as Charles Roberts, and Francis Harman, tried to alleviate anti-Chinese feelings by pointing out that Samoa would not have the same problems with Chinese as did Hawaii and Tahiti, an opinion based mainly on speculations that the government would exercise tight control.

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6 Tate to External affairs, 22 Oct, 1921, Island Territories Archives (henceforth IT) 1 Ex 1/20.
8 A. Eaglesham, "Bible and Bayonet in Western Samoa", *The Labour Monthly* 12, 1930: 152.
9 Diary, 26 Feb, 1919, R.W. Tate Papers (Diaries), MS-COPY-MICRO 0082-07 (henceforth TP).
10 Solf: Programme for Fono, 30 Jan, 1903, German Samoa Administration Papers, (1900-1914) Vol. 3, (henceforth GSA).
The planters, initially, failed to secure expired Chinese contract workers from Hawaii. It then took several more months, and shrewd negotiations with Chinese officials, before the first lot of Chinese arrived in Samoa in 1903, in the Decima. There were mixed reactions to the 289 Chinese from Swatow. While many planters praised the enthusiasm of the new arrivals, others belittled the early euphoria. According to Harman, some of the Chinese recruited were "practically useless," but Harman represented a dissatisfied minority.

In 1904, the German Administration agreed to oversee the recruitment of future Chinese labour. The fierce competition for Chinese labour meant recruiting agents had to be more inventive and more resourceful, improvising and offering attractive employment packages, to woo candidates to sign labour contracts. The German government’s Chinese Commissioner was A. R. Fries, and his recruiting methods were no different from those previously used by British, Americans, and Chinese agents. Fries displayed posters of a Samoan drawing a rickshaw, on which sat a Chinese coolie fanned by Samoan women. On other posters, Fries depicted scenes of happy receptions of Chinese upon landing in Samoa by beautiful women.

In June 1905, a further 528 Chinese left Swatow for Samoa, and this was followed by five more shipments before the outbreak of war in 1914. In total some 3,868 Chinese arrived in Samoa between 1903 and 1913 under the German administration. The biggest single shipment totalled 1,039 Chinese in 1913. The recruitment of Chinese did not resume until 1920, and for fourteen years, New Zealand arranged eight shipments, totalling 3,116 Chinese. Interestingly, the last shipment, in July, 1934, included Chinese from Toisan District who had been lured into signing contracts by agents who once again "wove an appealing tale of happy and well-fed Chinese in the islands accompanied by pretty brown-skinned belles clutching almond-eyed babies in their arms relaxing under the swaying fronds of stately coconut palms."
Chinese in Samoa were recruited mainly from Fukien and Kwangtung Provinces, with their port of loading and departure centred on Swatow and Hong Kong.

The voyages to Samoa took on average three weeks, with no other ports of call prior to Samoa. Given the appalling conditions of some of the ships, the Chinese showed aptness to survive extreme conditions. A Chinese labourer recollected the boredom, the discomfort, and the feeling of emptiness, during the voyage.

Life on board ship was monotonous. Long hours were spent simply day-dreaming. No typhoons buffeted the ship. No sighting of playful dolphins nor whales, mammoth denizens of the deep. Not even that of a passing freighter. Crowded conditions prevailed. The men slept on double and triple-decker bunk beds in the hot and stuffy hold of the ship. Ventilation was poor, lighting dim, comforts minimal and sometimes the stench overpowering from the vomit of the seasick.\(^\text{16}\)

The paradisal images of the posters quickly vanished as the harsh realities of Samoan plantation conditions emerged. The Chinese soon discovered that their employers did not strictly adhere to the terms of contract agreed upon in China. And to make matters worse, the German government sanctioned flogging for the minutest misconduct, at twenty lashes each, once a week, before a government official, as if his presence made it less barbaric.\(^\text{17}\)

Towards the end of 1905, Chinese began to write home detailed descriptions of their ordeals in Samoa. The German government, and employers of Chinese labour, were unaware of the mounting literature circulating in Hong Kong, and areas of South China, regarding the treatment of Chinese. The literature took the form of large posters displayed in well-patronised areas. One of the many posters printed was a letter from a very distressed Chinese, named Cheng Wing, to his uncles. Part of the letter included the following:

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\text{I am undergoing unbearable hardship, but repentance is too late. The monthly rate are [sic] only 10 marks equal to $2.50. I do not mind receiving this low wage but the tortures are hard to suffer. In}\]

\(^{16}\) Not all 6,984 who left China reached Samoa. Some Chinese died during the voyages, while others never landed but returned after failing medical checks. See Tom, 21-37.

\(^{17}\) The contracts for the Chinese to Samoa varied little with each shipment. The basic contract was over three years indentured. Passage and repatriation paid by employer. One month's wages paid in advance and repaid once employed in Samoa. Each Chinese was entitled to free housing, food, some clothing, and medical care. During New Zealand Administration, re-indenturing was introduced, which varied from time to time, and contract to contract. The flogging of Chinese resulted from laziness, running away, disobedience, insulting behaviour, and not bowing low to masters. See Tom, 4-5.
case of sickness, one mark per day will be taken away from the wages and you will not be allowed to return to the house for rest but will be driven out of it and required to cut and carry grass, no medicine being given to you - If you do not recover in a few days you will be hit and kicked and if you are still not recovered in a week or ten days you will be carried out in the street and receive strokes with a cane. I cannot describe the bitterness of the sighs of the sick. Besides the food is [too] hard to be eaten; four men seat at a table with a bowl of salmon each day; at breakfast only one biscuit and a half are given to each man, at luncheon bananas and taro are eaten and supper consists of boiled rice and beans. Those who take this food have weakness in legs and swelled stomachs. I do not think I can live for three years more. [The Masters are wicked], over ten men have been beaten to death and the number of deaths cannot be counted. Even Cha Wa [a close friend] he has been bribed by the foreigners and forgets that I am his countryman, regarding me as an insect and inflicts heavier punishment on me....We are living in Shan Pui and can be compared with the fish caught by the net, the meat on the chopping block, the bird confined in a cage, or the ox under the yoke....What I hope is that the spirits of my ancestors will secretly help me that I may leave through these three years.\(^{18}\)

The posters created a political stir in China and Hong Kong, resulting in the Colonial Secretary for Britain, in Hong Kong, demanding a report from Thomas Trood, the British acting Consul in Samoa, to confirm or deny the allegations. The Colonial Secretary highlighted in several memos the main core of Chinese complaints. These included; the terms of contract being changed; Chinese treated as _chu chai_ (slaves); Chinese battered by overseers and when they complained, their masters beating them again; Chinese confined to gaol for minor matters; Chinese being killed as a result of brutality by masters and overseers, and then buried uncoffined; and Chinese appeals to German courts resulting in more beating of the complainants.\(^{19}\)

One of the letters, signed by 1,300 Chinese, mentioned a labourer named Wong being beaten to death for eating while working. In another letter, it is stated that the overseer "has done five men to death" and his "extortion [$3 a month] is unbearable."\(^{20}\) As a result, the Chinese labourers killed the Chinese overseer involved. This was followed soon after by an uprising, which resulted in several Chinese been shot; fortunately, there were no deaths. According to

\(^{16}\) Translation - Placard in Streets of Hong Kong, BCS.

\(^{19}\) See Precis 1-7, BCS.

\(^{20}\) Precis 6: Plaint of 190 odd Chinese, BCS.
the British Colonial Secretary, over 1,700 Chinese had signed the various complaints received.

The mounting accusations and pressure from other Consuls in Samoa, together with the disturbing news of the ill-treatment of Chinese circulating in China and Hong Kong, forced Solf to initiate an investigation. The investigation proved the allegations beyond doubt. The larger German firms, such as Safata Samoa Gesellschaft (SSG), the Samoa Kautschuk Compagnie (SKC), and the Deutsche Samoa Gesellschaft (DSG), caused the Chinese much misfortune and suffering. In particular, Richard Deeken, of the DSG, was singled out. He personified the most heartless element of labour treatment and plantation management, although he was not unique. Deeken alone was charged and sentenced to prison for ill-treatment of Chinese, and causing the death of Chinese under his care. Deeken became the scapegoat in a face saving exercise for the German Administration.

In 1908, the Chinese government sent two of its own officials to ascertain independently the plight of the Chinese in Samoa. The consequent reports to China were very incriminating, which further distanced any hope of re-establishing any kind of relationship. The Solf Administration was forced to revise its labour policy by modifying and improving various facets of the labour contract, including the eradication of corporal punishment. The establishment of a Chinese Consulate office in Samoa also created a favourable impression among Chinese officials. The concessions agreed upon by the German government under great pressure from the Chinese authorities, only served to strengthen Chinese bargaining powers. By 1913, the planters and the German administration contemplated replacing Chinese labour. Such sudden contrary attitudes reflected the uneasiness felt by the employers and the government over increasing wage demands and, especially, intensifying Chinese strikes, revolts, violence, and criminal activities.

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21 Trood to Solf, 19 Jan, 1907, BCS; Trood to Solf, 4 Aug, 1909, BCS.
22 Tom, 5.
23 Wendt & Co., to Colonial Secretary (Hong Kong), 4 Feb, 1908, BCS; Trood to Colonial Secretary (Hong Kong), 2 Sept, 1909, BCS; Trood to Solf, 26 Mar, 1910, BCS; see also, Chinese Contract Ordinance, R.W. Tate Papers, MS-COPY-MICRO 0082-05 (henceforth TP); Chinese Contract Ordinance - Amendments - Proclamation 17, Samoa Times, 15 May, 1915; Seventh Transport Contract, 1913, TP.
24 The German government had made arrangement for Javanese labour just prior to the outbreak of World War I. See Reply to the Administrator's Article in the Samoa Times, 3 Sept, 1926, Westbrook Papers, 0061-010 (henceforth WP).
A New Zealand Expeditionary Force occupied Samoa with the advent of war in 1914. At that time, there were over 2000 Chinese employed on plantations. Many took advantage of the changing political situation to rebel against their employers. A New Zealand soldier wrote home “it was something worth seeing. It resembled some of the scenes during the strike in Wellington last year, and I guess there were some sore Chinese heads about after that.” Soon after, New Zealand forces suppressed a riot by 120 Chinese at Tapatapao plantation, objecting to an order for ration reduction. Colonel Logan, in charge of the New Zealand forces, gave no indication that he wanted to terminate the supply of labour from China, although he did intend to fulfil German plans to repatriate all Chinese whose contracts had expired or were due to expire in 1915.

It was at this time, according to administration records, that Mata'afa losefo visited and drew Logan’s attention to the “intermixture of Samoa & Chinese blood.” Losefo’s visit to Logan coincided with Chinese efforts to secure ‘free settler’ status. It seemed to be an unexpected act on losefo’s part, and one most likely to have been spurred into action under duress from anti-Chinese Europeans. Logan immediately took steps to repatriate the Chinese labourers without replacements. Logan dismissed the notion of acquiring more Chinese labour, as he truly felt the Samoans had the potential to do the work themselves. Between 1914 and 1920, over one thousand and two hundred Chinese returned home.

The resulting critical shortage of Chinese labour led to a petition from the Samoa Planters Association, suggesting that New Zealand look for alternative labour, or permit the re-indenturing of expired Chinese labourers. The

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26 *Evening Post*, 7 Sept, 1914, Wellington.
27 Chinese Labour - Samoa, TP; see also Samoa: The Labour Problem, n.d. WAP; Field 13-15.
28 Chinese Labour - Samoa, TP.
29 Samoa Problems, 26 Jan, 1920, Grattan Papers - Miscellaneous, 4879-123 (henceforth GP); Note: In 1916, Australia offered New Zealand, and later Samoa, 214 Maltese labourers whom the Australian government had refused entry into Australia. A response from the New Zealand Administration in Samoa said there was enough labour for Samoa planters and there was no need for Maltese labour. A statement Logan made knowing it was false. See Administrator to Governor (NZ), 5 Dec, 1916, IT Ex 17/5.
30 Some of the planters approached the Colonial Office to resume negotiations for Javanese labour. But the Netherlands government refused the request, and the New Zealand government never pursued the matter again. See External Affairs to J. Allen, 10 Mar, 1920, IT Ex 17/2; Governor-General to Secretary for the Colonies, 1 Apr, 1920, IT Ex 172; A. M. Snouck Hurgronja to Foreign Affairs, 2 Jun, 1920, IT Ex 17/2; Massey to Governor-General Netherlands East Indies, 23 Jan, 1923, IT Ex 17/2; see also Samoa’s Problems: Report by Citizens’ Committee...to Sir James Allen... 26 Jan, 1920, GP.
government felt comfortable with the latter suggestion, although it was apprehensive at the planters’ capacity to exercise strict control, in order to “prevent contamination of the Samoans.”

Some planters suggested Indian labour as an alternative, although they all agreed, there was “no room for an alien coloured population in Samoa.” The Samoa administration sought the opinions of the various missions. The Au Fa’atonu wanted nothing to do with Indians in Samoa, as it was its duty “to safeguard our Samoans as far as possible, physically and morally.” The Au Fa’atonu, however, supported more Chinese labour in order for Samoa to continue developing despite its earlier fears of Chinese defiling the purity of the Samoan race.

The Au Fa’atonu believed Chinese were no longer a physical and moral hindrance to the Samoans because they were on strict contract. The Au Fa’atonu went on to say that it believed people in New Zealand and Britain were misinformed, and wrongly condemning the Chinese. In a way, it was a compromise to show support for the administration over the issue, and a way to reject Indians entering Samoa. The missions positive attitude prompted Logan to negotiate the recruitment of 600 Chinese, but Logan received a prompt reply from the Chinese Consul, in Apia, stating that “the exportation of coolies from China has been prohibited during the war.” This view was not only reiterated by the Chinese government, but also added; “it is against the fixed policy of the Imperial government to allow the indenture of Chinese coolies.” It implied that any further Chinese emigration to Samoa would be under a ‘free’ labour system. Logan reacted strongly:

If Chinese cannot be imported under indentured [labour] they should not be imported at all, the importation of free labour would probably lead to a rising of Samoans. The result of importing further Chinese labour would be utter ruin of the Samoan race. At present there is considerable admixture of races, and it appears that complete destruction of the Samoan race would be the lamentable result of British occupation.

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31 Administration of Samoa: Report by Col. Logan, 8 Jul, 1919, IT 1 Ex 1/10.
32 Petition from Residence, 18 Dec, 1915, IT 1 Ex 1/16.
33 SDC to Lenwood, 20 Jun, 1916, SSL.
34 SDC, Minutes of Meeting, Papatua, 20-23 Dec, 1909/1910, SSL; SDC, Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 3-8 May, 1909, SSL.
35 SDC to Lenwood, 20 Jun, 1916, SSL; Sibree to Lenwood, 28 Jan, 1916, SSL.
36 Chinese Labour - Samoa, TP.
37 Chinese Labour - Samoa, TP.
38 Chinese Labour - Samoa, TP.
In 1918, New Zealand policy regarding Chinese took on a mood of condemnation. But, the influenza epidemic killed thirty-one Chinese, and as the epidemic intensified, planters feared that plantations in Samoa were on the brink of total devastation. In 1919, according to Colonel Robert Tate, who replaced Logan as Administrator in 1919, Logan had been in Samoa too long, and his strained relations with the Chinese showed he did not have a full grasp of all his faculties. With Tate, New Zealand's attitude towards Chinese labour took on a new direction, and many planters felt optimistic about their future. Tate had no objection to Chinese labour as long as the labourers were repatriated at the end of their contracts. According to Tate, compared with Indians, the Chinese were the better of the two 'evils' available. The LMS continued to support the recruitment of Chinese labour, and further affirmed that Chinese do not "constitute any serious moral danger to the Samoan people."

Despite such positive statements, there was growing opposition to Chinese labour, not only from the European community but also from Samoans. Tate later admitted that some Chinese were "worthless" and "troublesome," but they were dealt with severely. Tate also planned to send back Chinese who were incompetent. At the same time, he was well aware of the resentment in New Zealand, and elsewhere, over the ill-treatment of Chinese. Furthermore, Tate was equally wary and cautious of the Chinese Consul; whom he felt was too well educated to be ignorant of any unfair treatment of Chinese. Tate wrote to his wife, "I do not suppose that we shall be able to sustain imprisonment for a punishment for disobedience, especially as the new Chinese Consul is an M.A. of Cambridge." Tate decided to exploit the Samoa Immigration Act, 1920 in dealing with disobedience and ill-disciplined Chinese. In 1921, Tate deported twenty-seven Chinese under the Act because they were "a source of danger to peace, order and good government of Samoa and that they are aliens not born in Samoa."

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39 See previous chapter (Chapter Six) for evidence of Chinese helping both the church and the New Zealand administration dig graves and bury the dead.
40 Samoa Problems, 25 Jan, 1920, GP; Hough to Lenwood, 12 Dec, 1918, SSL.
41 See Alan Cobcroft, A Plea for Indentured Labour, Samoa Times, Sept, 1919.
42 SDC to J. D. Gray, 24 May, 1920, Correspondence of LMS, Samoa District, with the NZ Administration, 1915-1946, PMB 144; Tate to Robin, 11 Aug, 1919, TP; Tate to Gray, 7 Nov, 1920, TP.
43 Tate - Confidential Report, 1 Jan, 1922-31 Mar, 1922, IT 1 Ex 2/11.
44 Tate to Maud, 25 Jul, 1920, TP; Tate to Gray, 7 Nov, 1920, TP.
45 Order of Deportation, 1921, IT 1 IT 69/56; see also: Tate to Gray, 6 Dec, 1920, TP.
However, in 1922, Chinese persistence, and Chinese Consular pressure, paved the way for positive negotiations over conditions and wages. Changes to contract conditions included the eradication of all forms of corporal punishment, and a ‘no work no pay’ system, which offered higher wages, and better living conditions, but made the Chinese responsible for their own upkeep. However, there was still no concession on the question of a ‘free’ labour system. Captain Carter, the Chinese Commissioner, noticed that the Chinese had become much harder to handle, and gave his reasons for their change in mood.

With the advent of the Chinese Republic brought about by the Revolution of 1911, the thinking power of the Chinese, which include the coolie class, has been awakened and has undergone an entire change, and having taken his cue from our own labour organisation, is proving himself an exceedingly difficult proposition to handle....Coolies as well as other classes of Chinese workers have their own guilds or unions as we have, with educated Chinese at the head....The indentured system of labour is repugnant to all enlightened Chinese and also to the coolie after he has tried it.

However, Carter felt this was no excuse for the ill-treatment of Chinese. Carter encouraged employers to be more humane in order to succeed with Chinese labour.

Coolies though they are, they are human beings, and are entitled to be treated as such. The days have long since gone by when they were looked upon as beasts of burden, and any one who entertains any such ideas is far behind the times. In order to get the best out of the coolie, you must understand him and his customs, and unless you are capable of looking at things from the Chinese point of view as well as your own, you are at a dead end and can never expect to succeed with Chinese labour....

After Richardson replaced Tate as administrator of Samoa, despite the efforts to implement improvements, the harsh treatment, forced deportation, and a persisting unsympathetic spirit, continued to be the New Zealand administration's policy. Richardson, like his predecessor, also relied on

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46 New Zealand had to be very careful with the issue of ‘free settler’ as they got into all kinds of difficulty with the case of a Chinese woman, Mrs Ah Lam, whose husband had died in China but returned to Samoa and bought land and ran a business. See A. McCarthy: Memo re: Mrs Ah Lam, 29 Jun, 1929, IT 1 Ex 17/12; Secretary of Administration Samoa to Department External affairs, 4 Jul, 1929, IT 1 Ex 17/12; Tate to Minister of External Affairs, 24 Aug, 1921, IT 1 Ex 17/12; J.D. Gray to Tate, 28 Sept, 1921, IT 1 Ex 17/12; Extract from a Memorandum by Col. Hutchen, n.d., IT 1 Ex 17/12; see also: Terms of Labour Contract For Chinese Labour in Western Samoa, Appendices to the Journal of the House of Representatives (henceforth AJHR) 1922 - Appendix (A-4a); Extract From Report of Receiver D.H.&P.G. to Minister, 1919, TP.

47 Carter’s Speech on a Luncheon Farewell to Tate, 1922, TP; see also, Report of the Secretary for Chinese Affairs for the Year 1922, IT 1 Ex 20/1/1.

48 Carter’s Speech on a Luncheon Farewell to Tate, 1922, TP; Gray to Tate, 2 Aug, 1923, TP.
enactments, such as the Samoa Immigration Consolidation Order, 1924, to deal with undisciplined Chinese. Richardson's abusive use of the Samoa Immigration Consolidation Order, resulted in the deportation of twenty-one Chinese for medical reasons, and nine for being undesirables. Chinese who escaped while in Police custody were also deported. Deportees awaiting transportation were imprisoned for the amount of time it took to secure such transport. The Chinese Consul intervened and appealed to the High Court, questioning the legality of Richardson's actions. The High Court ruled that under the Samoa Immigration Consolidation Order, which Richardson himself had been exploiting, deportees could not be imprisoned. Richardson was furious, and consequently, when the time came for the deportees to depart, many failed to show up. Richardson angrily blamed and condemned the decision of the High Court. On Richardson's return to New Zealand he commented,

> If some steps were not taken very quickly the destiny of Australia and New Zealand and of the rest of the Pacific would be very different from what we wished it to be... a barrier [must] be set up to prevent the yellow taint which was coming down through the Pacific and gradually polluting the British and other races.

The deportation of Chinese continued under Richardson's successor, Colonel Stephen Allen. It satisfied anti-Chinese factions, and served the purpose of reducing the spread of the 'yellow taint'. While imprisonment and deportation were preferred form of punishments, the hanging of Chinese did continue to occur while other incidents involving the Chinese rioting and attacking employers decreased, but much more common occurrences were individual and gang related incidents, which not only invited the attention of the Administrator, but caused fear among Samoans, and instilled terror among other Chinese.

According to G. E. L. Westbrook, a resident of Samoa and an LMS adherent, one of the unfortunate legacies introduced with the very first indentured Chinese was the inclusion amongst the recruits of "gangsters, gamblers and other bad eggs." The German administration continuously dealt with Chinese criminal activities, which increased with the arrival of more

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49 Secretary External Affairs, 25 Oct, 1922, IT 1 Ex 69/56; Order of Deportation, 1921, IT 1 Ex 69/56; Secretary External Affairs, Memo, 15 Aug, 1923, IT 1 Ex 69/56; Richardson to Minister External Affairs, Memo, 11 Jan, 1928, IT 1 Ex 69/56; Memo to Secretary External Affairs, 11 Jan, 1928, IT 1 Ex 69/56.

50 That Yellow Taint, New Zealand Times, 28 Feb, 1923.

51 R. A. North, Coolie Deserters, 7 Jul, 1922, IT 1 Ex 69/56.

52 Pros and Cons Regarding the Chinese Labour Question in Samoa, n.d., WAP.
Chinese. These criminal activities ranged from minor assaults and theft to gang conflicts and murder. For instance, in 1913, German authorities hanged four Chinese at Vaimea gaol for the murder of a storekeeper. In a separate murder case, two Chinese were, fortunately, sentenced only to life imprisonment. But, both men escaped, resulting in the shooting of one of the Chinese by Police.\footnote{Ten Years After Berlin Treaty, WAP; Diary of Government (Samoa), 193-1914, GP.}

Westbrook also recalled an incident involving a plantation owner, where a Chinese labourer "broke into her [plantation owners] sleeping quarters at night, and tried to ravish her. In the struggle the lady received seventeen cuts and bruises."\footnote{Pros and Cons Regarding the Chinese Labour Question in Samoa, n.d., WAP.} When Logan first arrived in Samoa, he was astonished by the number of Chinese in gaol for serious violent offences.\footnote{In fact, by 1931, Chinese rank second behind the Samoans in numbers gaoled. See Police and Prison: Quarterly Report, 31 Dec, 1931, IT 1 Ex 1/17/9; see also Pros and Cons Regarding the Chinese Labour Question in Samoa, n.d., WAP.}

In 1921, charges were laid against two Chinese for the attempted murder of Wong Suikan, while charges of conspiracy and inciting to murder were laid against twelve other Chinese, and the Chinese Consul. Suikan, the government Chinese interpreter, had his eyes poked with sharp needles. The culprits admitted it was their intention to kill Suikan slowly by chopping him from the ankles upward.\footnote{The attempted murder charges were laid against Wong Ling (No. 4287) and Ho Ip (No. 4233). The Chinese Consul charged was Dr. Leefong Ahlo. The other Chinese included Chu Chi (No.4329), Ah Sam (3722), Wong Mow (No. 1641), Wong Chee (No. 2244), Ip At (No. 1873), and Chee Him (No. 1873). See Report of Proceedings of the High Court of Western Samoa, 14 Jul, 1921, IT 1 Ex 20/2; Tate to Wohlmann, 16 Jul, 1930, TP.}

In July 1931, a disturbance in Apia town among Chinese resulted in the stabbing of Chan Chong. Chiu Sung was charged and convicted of murder,\footnote{Police and Prison: Quarterly Report, 30 Sept, 1931, IT 1 Ex 1/17/9.} but perhaps, the most heartless incident involving Chinese occurred on 15 October 1927, with the brutal murder of two young girls. Westbrook graphically detailed the discovery of the young girls by two Europeans.

They discovered first the Samoan girl on the verandah, with her head chopped off and just hanging by the muscles of the neck. [The other girl was found inside]...she was all slashed to pieces one side of the face was gone, and there were 21 cuts from a very sharp knife, in some instances the flesh was cut away from the limbs exposing the bones, she also had a nasty cut in the stomach and part of her intestine was exposed.\footnote{Westbrook to Rowe, 17 Oct, 1927, WP.}
The search for the culprits involved the police, Europeans, and many Samoans, who were shocked and horrified at the extent of the crime. The search lasted all Saturday night and well into Sunday, but failed to uncover any clues as to the identity of the offenders. In December 1928, Westbrook commented that “it was now 15 months ago since the two young girls of 14 were done to death, yet the police have failed in every way to find the murderer or murderers.” It was not until the beginning of 1929, that the police arrested and charged five Chinese with the murders of the girls. Chu Fook, one of the offenders, was forced to give evidence that they had planned only to rob the house, belonging to Charlie Mugele, but things went terribly wrong when the young girls disturbed them. Chu Fook gave evidence that they washed their blood stained clothes at the river nearby afterwards. The case became a head hunting, face saving fiasco, for the police and anti-Chinese factions.

Nevertheless, these examples highlight the extent of unlawful activities of the Chinese and the ferocity of the murders in which some of the Chinese became involved. While a few of the Chinese involved in such violent crimes were eventually hanged, most were deported after serving a few years in prison. On the other hand, the treatment of the Chinese by the justice systems of both Germany and New Zealand administration can only be described as heartless and oppressive. Both legal systems seemed to regard Chinese complaints, and complainants, as affronts to the administration, and to their Chinese employers. Under German administration, all Chinese cases were dealt with by the Chief of Police, who “decides all cases in which they [the Chinese] were involved, and who often sent them to be punished by whipping, which was regarded as the best way of dealing with some of these people.......no appeal.”

The eradication of corporal punishment and the promotion of the better treatment of Chinese labour, failed to curb the influx of Chinese into prison. For those who were unfortunate enough to receive long term imprisonment, especially for violent crimes such as murder, serving out their prison sentences was pure hell. For many Chinese, the death penalty would have been a far more humane and a less painful ordeal than prison. The New Zealand

59 Westbrook to Holland, 8 Dec, 1928, WP.
60 Those involved included Chu Fook (No. 5475), Ah Mau, Chang Sang, Ah Sui, and Ah Fung. See Chinese Prisoners...Convicted of Murder, 1928/1929, IT 1 Ex 7/1/4.
61 H. J. Moors, Notes on Police Affairs, 1875-1914, GP.
administration police and prison wardens were especially cruel to Chinese inmates. The reports of the ill-treatment of Chinese while in police custody or in prison found its way into the New Zealand Parliament debates. Holland, the leader of the Labour Party, was especially hostile in condemning the Samoa administration's efforts to repress the reports.\(^6\)

Holland tabled before Parliament reports of police kicking, punching, starving, and denying injured Chinese medical treatment. One report mentioned the case of an innocent Chinese whom the police arrested, in 1931, for murder, but later found no evidence to proceed with the case. He was starved and "hammered in his cell by fists of his assailants and was also lashed with a whip and eventually he confessed to a crime for which he was not guilty."\(^6\)

But, perhaps, the worst case of Chinese abuse in custody, involved the offenders (Chu Fook, Chang Sang, Lei Mau, and Wong See) in the Mugele girls' killing. Chu Fook and Chang Sang protested against the inhuman treatment that they had received from the police while in custody. They alleged that European policemen had starved them prior to making their confessions. An inquiry was opened, reluctantly, and quickly concluded that the allegations were false.\(^6\) Lei Mau and Wong See were found guilty and received death sentences. While awaiting their fate in prison, they were forced to give evidence against Chu Fook and Chang Sang.

The New Zealand Parliament was informed of the savageness with which the police treated Lei Mau and Wong See. The report graphically described how one of the Chinese men, due to be executed the next day, was transported to Court, cross examined for some six hours, and then returned back to Vaimea prison at night without a meal, and was then executed early the next morning. The second Chinese man was also subjected to the same degrading treatment. He was carted off to court the day before his execution and returned to his cell late in the evening. The next morning he was found dead in his cell; strangled with strips torn from a blanket. He was still handcuffed, had his legs in irons, and chained to the floor. The police report stated that the victim had committed suicide by strangling himself. The police also admitted that they knew the victim was sick, but the prison authorities did not

\(^6\) Holland Speech to NZ House of Representative, 1933, WP.

\(^6\) Holland Speech to NZ House of Representative, 1933, WP; see also Westbrook to Holland, 8 Dec, 1928, WP.

\(^6\) Baxter to Administrator of Samoa, 3 Apr, 1929, IT 1 Ex 7/1/4.
believe his condition was serious enough, otherwise, "they would have carried out the execution sooner." 65 As for Chu Fook and Chang Sang, the fabricated evidence provided by the police failed to secure a conviction.

Many Chinese, struggling to survive plantation conditions, and physical and mental misfortunes, found very little practical assistance from the Chinese Consulate, not so much because the Chinese Consuls failed to assist the Chinese in their predicaments, but because they themselves received very little respect and co-operation from the New Zealand administration. When the first Chinese Consul, Lin Jun Chao, took up office in 1909, he promptly took up Chinese complaints with the German administration. Chao’s determination and successful dealing with the German administration gave the Chinese a much needed avenue for fairness. The relationship between the German administration and the Chinese Consulate was difficult, but co-operative.

Dr Leefong Ahlo arrived in June, 1920, as the Chinese Consul in Samoa. He was accompanied by his wife and daughter, and the Chinese vice-Consul, Pan Chengfu, a secretary, Tang Changpin, and two maids, Mrs Li and Mrs Lo. 66 A year after taking up his post, Ahlo found himself in Tate’s list of enemies. Tate demanded Ahlo’s removal from Samoa for “he has interfered with the administration of justice, has interfered with the political situation with the natives, and has improperly influenced Chinese labour.” 67 Tate accused Ahlo of influencing witnesses in an opium criminal case, influencing Chinese not to take up the option of re-indenturing, and trying to influence Samoan matai to help Chinese with Samoan families stay as free settlers. 68

The conflict between Ahlo and the Administration reached an irreconcilable position, in June, 1921, when the police arrested and charged Ahlo with inciting Chinese labourers to murder the government Chinese interpreter. 69 Ahlo’s arrest was bitterly condemned and harshly criticised by the U.S. vice-consul, Q. F. Roberts, and the French consular agent, G. H. MacKenzie. Roberts accused Tate of a “serious breach of privilege and courtesy usually extended to Consuls of friendly nations.” 70

65 Holland Speech to NZ House of Representative, 1933, WP.
66 The Samoa Times, 24 Jul, 1920, TP.
67 Tate to Minister of External Affairs, 11 May, 1921, IT 1 Ex 69/56; Tate to Wohlmann, 16 Jul, 1930, TP.
68 Tate to Wohlmann, 16 Jul, 1930, TP.
70 Q. F. Roberts,...to Administrator of Samoa, 18 Jul, 1921, IT 1 Ex 20/2.
upheld Ahlo's good character and acquitted him of all charges. Ahlo left Samoa in July 1921.\textsuperscript{71}

Chao-Song Lee arrived in July, 1922, commended by the New Zealand government as a "modern Chinese, a radical but hardly a firebrand. He is very popular with local Chinese...quiet and friendly in manner."\textsuperscript{72} Lee found himself flooded with complaints from Chinese,\textsuperscript{73} and pressure from employers and the administration which continued to arrest and charge Chinese labourers with petty vagrancy offences, and disobedience; further creating tensions.\textsuperscript{74} The Chinese Consulate continued to operate in Samoa with no real influence, until the administration finally choked the life out of it. The Consulate closed in 1947.\textsuperscript{75}

Accusations of tong (secret society) links did not help the reputation of the Chinese Consuls. According to Tate, the tongs had a lot to do with the violent criminal activities involving Chinese. Tate's accusations first surfaced in 1921 when he accused Ahlo of using secret societies to incite Chinese not to re-indenture, but to coerce the administration to grant 'free settler' status. Tate also believed secret societies extorted money from Chinese, threatening injuries if such money was not paid. According to Tate, Ahlo belonged to the Wai-Chao Pu society, which controlled various unlawful operations at different plantations. Tate called for stringent selection guidelines and an assurance from the Chinese government, that future Consuls would not have secret society connections.\textsuperscript{76}

Many Chinese had serious opium addictions. Secret societies were accused of smuggling and distributing the drug. During the German Administration, importation of opium into Samoa was strictly controlled.\textsuperscript{77} With the advent of war in 1914, the question of opium usage and opium importation gained little attention. It was not until 1920 that a huge opium addiction problem

\textsuperscript{71} Reports of Proceedings of the High Court of Western Samoa, 14 Jul, 1921, IT 1 Ex 20/2; Q. F. Roberts...to the Administrator of Samoa, 18 July, IT 1 Ex 20/2.
\textsuperscript{72} Thomas Harrington to Marquess Curson of Kedleyton, 2 Dec, 1921, IT 1 Ex 20/2/3.
\textsuperscript{73} Mandated Territory of Western Samoa, First Report, 1 May, 1921-31 Mar, 1922, AJHR 1922 (A4).
\textsuperscript{74} Quarterly Report Chinese Commissioners Department, 30 Sept, 1922, IT 1 Ex 1/17/2.
\textsuperscript{75} Confidential Report (December) No. 16, 1947, Confidential Papers from Col. F. W. Voelecker (High Commission), 1947-1949, IT 1 Ex 1/36/4.
\textsuperscript{76} Mandated Territory of Western Samoa - Report, 1921, WP; Tate to Minister of External Affairs, 11 May, 1921, IT 1 Ex 20/2; Tate to Gray, 4 Sept, 1921, TP; Minister of External Affairs - Memo, 10 Aug, 1921, IT 1 Ex 20/2/1.
\textsuperscript{77} Harman to Imperial Government, 4 Jul, 1904, GCA, Micro-R 5768.
surfaced among Chinese. The Chinese Commissioner and several employers noted that many Chinese worked just to maintain their addiction. Tate took steps to prohibit the importation of opium, but only succeeded in creating an opium black market.

Several *papalagi* and Chinese merchants financed opium shipment into Samoa. Ships carried large quantities of opium from China and Hawaii for distribution. The island steamers trading between islands, which were exempted from custom clearances, also carried opium supplies for distributors. New Zealand business-men travelling to China and other parts of Asia also returned via Samoa with quantities of opium for distribution. Rewards were offered for information leading to the seizure of opium, and the arrests of opium offenders. When opium supplies dried up, the Chinese turned to the manufacturing of drugs, and the distilling, of proof spirits, from cocoa juice. They made more money selling drugs and proof spirits in one night than working on a plantation for a month. According to the police, the increase in such activities stemmed from a High Court decision, which ruled that the manufacturing of drugs, and distilling proof spirits, from cocoa juice, did not constitute an offence. The number of addicts increased with an increase in drug supplies.

The Chinese gambling houses were the nerve centres for much of the Chinese misfortunes. The Chinese spent their Sundays, Chinese holidays, and public holidays, gambling or learning to gamble within such premises. The gambling dens trapped many Chinese into debt, some picked up criminal habits, while others became drug addicts. The Chinese government became

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78 Report by the Government of NZ...Traffic in Opium and Dangerous Drugs, 1925, IT 1 Ex 5/12/2.
79 Importing opium and other drugs into Samoa were made easy by the non-existence of a wharf. Ships anchored out at sea and small trading vessels load and unload cargoes at will. Customs found it very hard to control movements of ships in Samoan waters. See Tate to Minister of External Affairs, 24 Aug, 1921, IT 1 Ex 17/12; Tate to Collector of Customs, 8 Feb, 1921, IT 1 Ex 5/12; Braisby to Commissioner of Police, 16 Feb, 1921, IT 1 Ex 5/12; Governor of Fiji to Governor-General of NZ, 13 May, 1921, IT 1 Ex 5/12; Commissioner of Police Report, 31 Dec, 1922, IT 1 Ex 1/17/9; Forty-Two Years in Samoa," WP.
80 The case of Alexander (Max) Sutherland who worked for Burns Philp, is an example. See J. D. Gray to Robert Burns, 7 Oct, 1922, IT 1 Ex 5/12/1; Administration to External Affairs (Telegram), 16 Oct, 1922, IT 1 Ex 5/12/1; R. Burns to Gray, 27 Oct, 1922, IT 1 Ex 5/12/1; see also, Gray to Inspector of Prison, 27 Aug, 1920, IT 1 Ex 5/12; Rewards for Opium Seizures, 26 Jun, 1920, IT 1 Ex 5/12; S. G. Trail to Acting Secretary, 17 May, 1921, IT 1 Ex 5/12.
81 Police and Prison: Quarterly report, 30 Sept, 1922, IT 1 Ex 1/17/6; Tate to Secretary External Affairs, 30 Sept, 1922, IT 1 Ex 65/6; The Story of the Snake, n.d.," WP.
82 The Chinese celebrated most of the Chinese holidays, including the Chinese New Year, Revolution Day, and so forth. See Tom, 56-60. On the effect on Samoans of the gambling houses see Western Samoa Historical Notes, 1935, IT 1 Ex 2/15.
83 It seems Chinese labourers complaints may have been true. Samoan policemen carried out a raid of their own and took money from a gambling school in 1914. See Ten Years After Berlin Treaty, WAP.
aware of the Chinese addiction problems and tried to address them with the help of the Anti-Opium Society. The Chinese government was advised that, in order to succeed in “eradicating the said evil from these [Chinese] unhappy people,” New Zealand needed to implement the recommendations of the Anti-Opium Society. There is no evidence to show that the New Zealand administration in Samoa was aware of such recommendations. But, even if it did, the administration would have ignored it, as Tate’s policy focused more on the elimination and deportation of Chinese addicts, rather than curing them.

Melanesian labourers created far less problems compared to the Chinese. One reason for this was the great interest shown by the missions, especially the LMS, towards Melanesian labourers. While the LMS failed to fully implement any kind of evangelisation work among the Chinese, it ensured that Melanesian workers received a pastor, and full usage of LMS resources. The Lotu Pope and the WMMS also had little to do with Chinese, although, by the late 1950’s, a few Chinese had adhered to the Lotu Pope. Other missions, such as the Mamona, also distanced themselves from the Chinese at the beginning. In a letter to the President of the Mamona church, a goodwill mission to Samoa wrote, “we do not like cheap labour. We hate it as we hate the devil, and it is no good talking to us about Chinese.”

LMS interest in the Chinese began in 1911, when Chinese relations with Samoan women increased, and Chinese gambling activities increasingly fascinated Samoans. The Au Fa’atonu searched for a Chinese pastor to work among the Chinese, but would not commit to it any LMS support. In 1913, the German administration approved Li-Shiu Kwai as the Chinese pastor. Kwai,
who spoke very little English, commenced work in Samoa in May 1914.\textsuperscript{90} In 1916, fifteen Chinese offered themselves for baptism during the Samoan Church General Assembly, with a further seventeen Chinese baptised in 1917. Unfortunately, the Au Fa‘atonu commended Kwai for missionary work in China, leaving the work among the Samoan Chinese in obscurity.\textsuperscript{91}

It seems the Au Fa‘atonu was under the impression that Kwai was no longer needed. The repatriation policy of the Samoan administration after the war may have influenced the Au Fa‘atonu in its decision. Nevertheless, it was a decision that haunted the Au Fa‘atonu for a long time. By 1919, unchristian Chinese activities impelled the Au Fa‘atonu to call for a re-commencement of Chinese evangelisation in Samoa. The Au Fa‘atonu wrote, “the place [Apia] is rotten with Chinese gambling dens.”\textsuperscript{92} The Au Fa‘atonu tried to deal with the problem by appointing one of the Chinese converts as a caretaker pastor, but his forced repatriation created a further dilemma for the Au Fa‘atonu.\textsuperscript{93} Tate also initiated enquires to obtain a Chinese missionary from Hawaii, but with no success. The Au Fa‘atonu finally turned to New Zealand churches in a desperate effort to recruit a Chinese pastor, but to no avail. The problem, according to the Au Fa‘atonu, was finding the right person who could understand the different dialects of the Chinese.\textsuperscript{94}

In 1927, the Reverend W. Mawson of the New Zealand Methodist Conference, visited Samoa in a bid to find a solution to the problem of appointing a Chinese pastor to Samoa. Mawson’s visit highlighted the idleness of the Au Fa‘atonu in finding a solution to the problem. Mawson surveyed the various plantations and found that the majority of Chinese were Cantonese from the districts of Sze Yap, Heungshan, Yan Ping, and P‘oon Yue. There were also some twenty Foochow men and a number of Hakkas. Mawson recommended a Cantonese pastor familiar with various other dialects. Mawson also recommended that the LMS should initiate the evangelisation of the many half

\textsuperscript{90} SDC – Minutes of Meeting, Papauta, 12-17 Dec, 1911, SSL; SDC – Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 26 Apr-4 May, 1912, SSL; SDC – Minute of Meeting, Malua, 2-10 May, 1913, SSL; Hills to Thompson, 11, 14 May & 9 Jun, 1914, SSL; SDC – Minutes of Meeting, Apia, 15 Dec, 1914, SSL; SDC – Minutes of Meeting, May, 1915, SSL.

\textsuperscript{91} Kwai prayed and preached in Chinese during the service in 1917. See SDC – Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 3-12 May, 1916, SSL; SDC – Minute of Meeting, Malua, 2-11 May, 1917, SSL.

\textsuperscript{92} SDC – Minutes of Meeting, Papauta, 6-15 Dec, 1919, SSL; SDC – Minute of Meeting, Papauta, 10-18 Dec, 1917, SSL.

\textsuperscript{93} SDC – Minute of Meeting, Papauta, 12-17 Dec, 1921, SSL.

\textsuperscript{94} Tate to Gray, 31 Jan, 1921, TP.
Chinese children, whom Mawson believed were “susceptible to good [Christian] influence.”

The Au Fa’atonu rejected Mawson’s recommendations. The Reverend H. Darvill favoured a non-Chinese pastor who can speak Cantonese. Darvill pointed out that:

The limited scope of the Chinese mission field will hardly justify the appointment of a Chinese pastor. Moreover, the Administration would not be greatly interested in supporting any scheme of religious instruction to Chinese in Samoa, which included in its objects the introduction of a pure-blooded Chinese pastor. Being obsessed with the Samoan [sic] problem, the Administration would be apprehensive lest in the pursuance of his work the Chinese pastor should take up certain social problems, the essence of which may not be for the good of the territory.

This was a blatant excuse for the Au Fa’atonu non-commitment in finding a solution to the problem. Instead, the Au Fa’atonu laid the blame squarely on the New Zealand administration. Another Au Fa’atonu member, the Reverend E. H. Feather, pointed to the cost involved, and the administration’s own policy, which “discountenanced anything likely to interfere with the progress of the Samoans as a race and such a step [appointment of a Chinese missionary] might be regarded as one that would be a danger to the welfare of such a small nation.”

The Au Fa’atonu’s position created a negative impression of the Chinese among members of the Samoa (LMS) Church. Pastors and village congregations man-handled, and ejected Chinese from villages, as they attempted to conduct trade on Sundays. The notion of securing a Chinese pastor for Samoa was never again considered.

It was within such a depressed unreasonable religious atmosphere, that a New Zealand government goodwill mission visited Samoa in 1927. They heard numerous complaints from planters regarding unfair Chinese demands and the labour shortage, which had forced the closure of several large plantations. Traders and merchants also complained of Chinese expropriating

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95 Mawson to Darvill, 29 Aug, 1927, SSL.
96 Darvill to Barradale, 9 Nov, 1927, SSL.
97 Feather to Barradale, 2 Apr, 1928, SSL; see also Feather to Barradale, 25 Jun, 1928, SSL.
98 Interview with many elderly Samoans recalled many such incidents occurring. Many of those interviewed recalled taking part in such actions as young boys. (Interviews conducted between 1992 and 1995. Audio tapes and transcript in author’s possession).
jobs, which rightly belonged to them.\textsuperscript{99} There is no doubt that the shortage of labour gave the Chinese leverage to negotiate for high wages, and to move from one employer to another, at will. Such freedom to act at will created friction between labourers and employers, and between employers competing for the same labourer. It installed little sympathy for the Chinese among employers. In 1928, a frustrated manager of the Vailele plantation named Heycock, badly beat up one of his Chinese workers over what he considered unfair demands, and his unwillingness to work. The matter was reported to the police by the Chinese Acting-Consul, but the court case cleared Heycock of any misdeed.\textsuperscript{100}

During this time, the Mau activities gained momentum and attracted large followings among Samoans. In 1929, Mau aggression towards the administration amplified, and not surprisingly, the Chinese used such political instability to continue hostility against employers.\textsuperscript{101} In August 1929, some 300 Chinese employed by the government owned New Zealand Reparation Estate (NZRE).\textsuperscript{102} went on strike over the failure of the Chinese Department to resolve a dispute over the question of foreman. The two rival tongs of Taumoon and Haiyan origins fought over the post, with a Haiyan candidate winning. The police arrested a small group whom they considered to be the ring-leaders. The arrests did not deter the Chinese from marching again in numbers to the Chinese Department two days later. The confrontation with government officials turned violent and the police unrestrainedly used batons and firearms to diffuse the situation. Five Chinese received gunshot wounds with nine others being treated for baton injuries. Of those arrested, fourteen were convicted, with four receiving deportation orders.\textsuperscript{103} A few months after the NZRE Chinese riots, New Zealand police used the same batons and firearms to pacify the Mau procession in Apia.\textsuperscript{104}

\textsuperscript{99} European Planters' Report, ca. 1927, IT 1 Ex 1/23/8; Notes of Deputation From European Planters...Upon the Hon. W. Nosworthy, 19 Jun, 1927, IT 1 Ex 1/23/9; Petition by Traders, n.d., WP; Pros and Cons Regarding the Chinese Labour Question in Samoa, n.d. WAP; Haynes, 25.

\textsuperscript{100} Westbrook to Holland, 8 Dec, 1928, WP.

\textsuperscript{101} It was also a time of heightened political conditions in China - with the Chinese revolution in full swing, there is no doubt Chinese everywhere, including Samoa, would have been heartened by such uprising in their struggle against oppression. See S. Lautenschlegel, Present Conditions in China, 23 Mar, 1927, IT 1 Ex 1/17/2.

\textsuperscript{102} NZRE was the largest employer of Chinese labourers in Samoa. See Memorandum, J. D. Gray, 27 Sept, 1921, IT 1 Ex 1/17/2.

\textsuperscript{103} Police and Prison: Quarterly Report, 30 Sept, 1930, IT 1 Ex 1/17/8; Field, 143.

\textsuperscript{104} Perkins to Chirgwin, Report 1929, 31, Dec, 1929, SSR; see also Chapters Seven and Eight.
The unstable political conditions also encouraged many Chinese to seek permanent and free settler status. The 'no Chinese in Samoa' stance taken by the administration, and the unwillingness of many Chinese to leave Samoa, was motivation enough to rebel against the administration. The Chinese confrontation with administration officials in 1929 may not have been connected with the Mau confrontation a few months later, but its impact on the minds of Samoans embracing the Mau cause, meant nothing other than support for the Mau. While there is no written evidence to suggest this connection between the Mau and the Chinese in Samoan politics, there is oral evidence, and land and chiefly title evidence, which suggest otherwise. Many Chinese, traders, merchants, and even labourers, passively and actively, assisted and supported the activities of the Mau through provisions, logistics, and monetary assistance. Those who served the Mau faithfully were generously rewarded fa'asamo.106

It is true that one of the grievances the Mau wanted addressed was the question of Chinese repatriation, but evidence suggests that 'pure' Samoans were very much in favour of Chinese, especially those who had established themselves with Samoan connections.107 It seems the Mau had used the 'mongrelisation of the Samoan race' issue only as ammunition against the New Zealand administration, while all along Mau leaders had no intention of seeking a satisfactory outcome. It certainly gave New Zealand a bad name, and highlighted Mau contention that New Zealand was unfit to administer Samoa. The Mau found ample support for its contentions in the Labour Party and the New Zealand press.108

The idea of mixed relations between the Chinese and Samoan women was an issue that did concern a cross section of the Samoan community. The German administration had no law against such relationships, although labour contracts prohibited Chinese entering into relationships with Samoan women.

105 The transferring of matai names to non Samoans occurred regularly, especially when the Samoans concerned have much to gain from the exercise. In the middle of a power struggle between chiefs of Vaimoso village in 1909, Tamasese illegally gave away Vaimoso titles to Melanesian labourers. See Memo by Tolo, 6 Feb, 1909, German Administration Papers : Samoan Affairs XVII B4 (henceforth GAP); Shultz to Sotf, 12 Dec, 1908, GAP.


107 Tate commented on the close relationship between Chinese and Samoans during his term as Administrator, something that many Europeans and outsiders had failed to observe. See Tate to Liverpool, 21 August, 1919, BCS; see also Field, 216-217.

Self dealt with several violent disputes arising from such mixed relationships, such as complaints concerning Chinese sleeping with Samoan women within village boundaries, and disputes concerning Samoans prohibiting Chinese from cohabiting with their de facto wives. The LMS provided Self with practical solutions to the problems, while the planters' selfish resolution called upon Self to sanction Samoan women to work in the plantations; thus helping to keep the Chinese within the boundaries of the plantations. Self finally issued an order forbidding Chinese entering Samoan houses. However, the order failed to restrict the movement of Samoan women into Chinese dwellings.

The problem escalated, and continued unmonitored between 1914 and 1918. After the war, an enormous increase in the number of illegitimate half-Chinese children forced the administration to consider forced repatriation in order to arrest the problem. The administration also called for future Chinese labourers to be accompanied by their Chinese wives, an idea also favoured by the missions, but it never eventuated. Single Chinese continued to be recruited to cut costs, and for those who were married, low wages meant they could not afford passage for their wives.

According to Tate, mixed relationships was not a Chinese problem, but a Samoan one, because "the Samoan women recognise them [Chinese] as better husbands than Samoan men" and "they are prostitute at heart both men and women; the whole thing for the gain of the Samoan family." But, several European residents reminded Tate that the Chinese were not the only ones defiling Samoan women. Westbrook wrote:

Why are the blackboys, an inferior race, time expired labour, allowed to remain in Samoa, and live fa'a-Samoa with Samoan women, and would it not be better if they were returned to their homes, and some arrangement made to get others to take their place accompanied by their wives? Is it good for the Samoans that their blood should be mix [sic] with that of a race (Melanesian) that is inferior?

109 Notes of Deputation From European Planters...Upon the Hon. W. Nosworthy, 19 Jun, 1927, IT 1 Ex 1/23/9.
110 Memo by Tolo, 3 Sept, 1910, GAP; Stockicht to Shultz, 10 Sept, 1910, GAP; Stockicht to Shultz, 11 Oct, 1910, GAP, B4; Newell to Solf, 28 May, 1909, NP.
111 Imhoff to Shultz, 21 Oct, n.d. GAP; Tate to Robin, 11 Aug, 1919, TP.
112 Liversedge to SDC, 28 Jun, 1922, SSL; Lin Shih-Yuan to Prime Minister (NZ), 12 Aug, 1920, IT 1 Ex 7277; Tate to Maudie, 1 Jan, 1921, TP.
113 Tate to Robin, 11 Aug, 1919, TP.
114 Memorandum, J. D. Gray, 27 Sept, 1921, IT 1 Ex 1/17/2.
115 Westbrook to Holland, 23 Apr, 1927, WP.
Westbrook also noted that a number of white New Zealand policemen would also leave behind "a number of bastards."  

Several proclamations were enacted but failed to alleviate the growing and deep relationships fathomed by the Chinese and their Samoan families. In 1931, the administration issued a further proclamation, forbidding Chinese entering Samoan houses, and Samoan women entering labourers' homes. The administration also rejected Chinese applications for 'free settler' status, for those who arrived in Samoa after 1900, to further discourage mixed relationships. The administration also made laws to stop Samoans marrying Chinese, but the missions were at odds as to how they should tackle the problem regarding church memberships for Samoans involved in such de facto relationships. The Methodist Synod in 1939 spelled out its position in relation to Samoans living with Chinese for its pastors.

Where Samoan women are living faithfully as the wives of Chinese...the fact that the government does not permit these to marry shall be no bar to full church memberships if the catechist vouches for their good character.

The stories of the Chinese "bastarding of Tahiti", Hawaii, and other places in the Pacific, circulated widely in New Zealand. Eventually, the New Zealand government bowed to public pressure, and proceeded to implement plans to repatriate the remaining Chinese in Samoa; a move which further infuriated the planters. But the advent of the World War II put a stop to the repatriation plans as transport became limited, and the fact that China was at the mercy of the Japanese army. After the war, there were about 285 Chinese in Samoa. Of these, eighty-seven were elderly, and only a hundred

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116 Westbrook to Logan, 1 Dec, 1930, WP.
117 In 1921, the New Zealand Administration had issued a Proclamation prohibiting marriages between Chinese and Samoans. Unfortunately, it did not stop mixed relationships. In 1936, there were 898 Chinese in Samoa, of which 778 were a mixture of Samoan and Chinese blood. See Chinese Labourers and Samoan Women Proclamation, 26 Oct, 1931, IT 1 Ex 37/11; Mandated Territory of Western Samoa, 1938, GP.
118 Minutes of the Annual District Synod of the Samoan District, Asau, 21 – 24 Nov, 1939, Archives of the Samoan Methodist Church, Apia.
121 Mandated Territory of Western Samoa, 31 Mar, 1937, GP; Confidential Political Report – German Samoa, 30 May, 1937, GP; Mandated Territory of Western Samoa, 20th Report, 1940, AJHR, 1940, vol. 1.
and twenty six persons wanted to return to China. But the cost of repatriating was in the vicinity of £17,000; a sum the Chinese Repatriation Funds, and the New Zealand administration, could not accommodate.\textsuperscript{122}

By 1948, the government, grossly embarrassed, had still not managed to arrange a ship for the repatriated Chinese.\textsuperscript{123} The delay increased the possibility of all Chinese remaining permanently in Samoa. The League of Nations (later United Nations) reiterated that if the Chinese remained in Samoa, they were entitled to privileges as any other immigrants. Under the League of Nations Charter, there was no discrimination, and no restrictions on employment and way of living which were not imposed on other nationalities.\textsuperscript{124} Furthermore, there was strong support from the Samoans for Chinese with Samoan families to remain in Samoa.\textsuperscript{125} However, in September 1948, the last Chinese repatriates were dragged onto small boats, despite the emotional and physical protests of Samoan families and friends, and were ferried to the S.S. Yunnan which took them away from Apia. Out of the one hundred and twenty-six Chinese who had indicated their willingness to return home, only one hundred and four persons embarked for China; twenty-two found something more precious in Samoa than a free trip home.\textsuperscript{126}

The Chinese made enormous sacrifices in pursuit of material fortunes and, at the same time, contributed to the development of Samoa. However, it seems the misfortunes outweighed the fortunes; and the sacrifices were not worth the pilgrimage to Samoa. Just how precise this appraisal may be, I cannot say with any amount of certainty, but perhaps, the epitaph on a Chinese labourer's tombstone at Talimatau cemetery provides a better insight as to the 'tainted dragon's' fortune in paradise. The identity of the Chinese labourer is also unknown, but the unusual inscription on his tombstone explains why. It reads: "Who knows why unlucky be I to die in a foreign country?"\textsuperscript{127}

\textsuperscript{122} Mandated Territory of Western Samoa, 23\textsuperscript{rd} Report, 3 Mar, 1946, AJHR, 1946, vol. 1(A4); Confidential Report (March), no. 2, 1947, Confidential Papers From Col. F. W. Voelecker, 1947-1949, IT 1 Ex 1/36/4.


\textsuperscript{124} Western Samoa - NZ Government, Policy, 10 May, 1948, IT 1 Ex 1/36/1.

\textsuperscript{125} Confidential Report (June) No. 6, 1947, Confidential Papers From Col. F. W. Voelecker (High Commission), 1947-1949, IT 1 Ex 1/36/4.

\textsuperscript{126} Tom, 66.

\textsuperscript{127} Tom, 104.
The treatment of the Chinese and other indentured labourers found a soft spot in the Samoans, especially with those who had built up connections with Samoan families. While missions and many Europeans detested Samoan mixed marriages with Chinese and Melanesians, the Samoans sympathised with the indentured labourers because of the harsh treatment at the hands of the authorities. The Chinese, especially, had found favour with many Samoans during the Mau troubles and their support had not been forgotten by the Samoans. The indentured labourers’ predicaments found a compassionate ear during Samoan’s struggle for self-determination.
CHAPTER TEN

A QUESTION OF AUTHORITY: SAMOAN (LMS) CHURCH LEADERSHIP CHALLENGES

The New Zealand administration took over Germany’s labour problems and tried to deal with them according to suggestions and advice from the various plantation owners, papalagi and the missions. The last time Samoans had the right to control immigrants, such as Chinese, entering Samoa was in 1880, and the last time they spoke up regarding Chinese ‘tainting’ Samoan blood was in 1915. But overall, papalagi, including missionaries, maintained the view that Samoans were ignorant and incapable of making decisions beneficial to their welfare, and in doing so, failed to canvas Samoan opinions on matters important to the Samoans. The Chinese indentured labour problems highlighted this superiority mentality among the papalagi and the missions. For instance, the LMS missionaries were aware of the problems of having Chinese labourers in Samoa, but in consultation with the New Zealand administration, they relinquished their moral obligation to the Samoans and supported the importation of Chinese labourers. Samoans and Samoan church leaders were not even invited to submit their views.

The Samoans had always done things the soalaupule way. When the opinions of influential and important members of the Samoan community were overlooked, their pride was usually injured. Such offences usually resulted in warfare and revenge in order to redeem one’s pride and family honour. It was, therefore, unacceptable to make final decisions on any matters on which the Samoans themselves had not been given the opportunity to offer an opinion. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Samoans found it hard to express their opinions on matters important to their welfare, because of the interference of other nations, Europeans and missions. Consequently, they kept

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2 Mata'afa Iosefo approached the New Zealand administration to express his concern at an increase in mixed blood Samoans. See Chinese Labour – Samoa, R.W. Tate Papers (Diaries) [henceforth TP].
3 SDC to Lenwood, 20 Jun, 1916, SSL; SDC, Minutes of Meeting, Papauta, 20-23 Dec, 1909/1910, SSL; SDC, Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 3-8 May, 1909, SSL.
4 This is a word that describes the mentality of the Samoans towards making a final decision on any important matter. Soalaupule means to talk about something openly and everyone expresses an opinion before a consensus is reached regarding a final solution.
their grievances to themselves, while exploring ways to recover their right to free expression. At times, various avenues for expression presented themselves, but they only led to punishment and, consequently, the Samoans relapsed back into their shells.\(^5\)

The political conflicts that followed were just further avenues towards free expression, and the consequent petitions for independence, but the motivation for control was not restricted to the political arena. The Samoan pastors, on many occasions, also challenged the LMS's leadership on matters they felt warranted their opinion. At times, out of frustration for lack of being consulted, the Samoan church leaders took an aggressive stance to the point of meddling in church matters without the consent of the Au Fa’atonu.

The leadership dispute between the Au Fa’atonu and the Samoan church leaders was never an issue in the nineteenth century.\(^6\) There were times the Samoan pastors tried to influence the decisions of the Au Fa’atonu, but the Samoans were generally of the idea that the Au Fa’atonu was in charge. At the height of the political stand-off between America, Britain and Germany over the kingship issue in 1889, and later in 1899, the Au Fa’atonu voiced its support for the LMS candidate the Samoans’ supported.\(^7\) The establishment of the Fono Tele gave the Samoan church leaders the chance to observe the running of the Samoan (LMS) Church, but the leadership of the church remained firmly in the hands of the Au Fa’atonu.\(^8\)

The events that took place early in the twentieth century triggered opinions on church autonomy, and the first signs of a challenge to the Au Fa’atonu’s authority occurred in 1902. The Samoan pastors took the initiative and invited the Au Fa’atonu to a meeting to discuss the issue regarding the Reverend William E. Goward and the dismissal of four Samoan pastors from their post in Beru, in the North West Outstations (NWO); comprising the Gilbert [Kiribati] and Ellice (Tuvalu) Islands. The LMS missionaries were not prepared for what was about to take place, and later revealed it was one of the most

\(^{5}\) For instance, the Oloa Kamupani and the Mau-a-Pule. See Chapters Three and Four.

\(^{6}\) Note: Although relations between the Samoan pastors and LMS missionaries remained cordial, there was within the ranks of the LMS Samoan District Committee [Au Fa’atonu] a dispute over leadership in 1871. See Pratt to Mullens, 11 May 1871, SSL; Whitmee to Mullens, 11 May 1871, SSL.

\(^{7}\) For examples, see previous Chapter One - Introduction: Echoes From the Past.

\(^{8}\) Newell to Thompson, 8 Oct, 1888, SSL; Claxton to Thompson, 25 Feb, 1889, SSL; Newell to Thomson, Oct, 31, 1898, SSL; S. A. Beveridge to Thompson, Feb, 3, 1899, SSL.
sorrowful and bitter meetings they had ever encountered with the Samoan pastors.9

The Samoan pastors, Apelu, luta, Isai, and Luka, claimed the controversy began over Goward’s comments that “Samoan teachers were of no use; they were foolish and that the work here [in the Gilberts] was badly begun.”10 The Samoans demanded that Goward withdraw his statement regarding Samoan pastors, and threatened to return to Samoa if Goward failed to apologise.11 Goward refuted the Samoans’ claim, and Goward threatened to send the Samoans home if they refused to withdraw their abusive remarks. Goward’s ego was too inflated for such a proposal, and the Samoan pastors returned to Samoa where they took up their grievances with the Samoan senior pastors.12 Goward later charged that the Samoans had left on their own accord after having insulted him.

At the meeting between the Samoan pastors and the Au Fa’atoni, the Samoans spoke strongly against Goward’s action. The speeches outlined some of Goward’s misconduct when he was in charge of Falealili. According to the Samoan pastors, Goward’s cruelty to the Samoan pastors in Beru, was a repetition of the same treatment that was handed out to the Samoan pastors in Falealili.13 The Samoan pastors believed Goward was at fault, but the Au Fa’atoni remained impartial as it struggled to comprehend the truth.

The Au Fa’atoni refrained from casting blame, but admitted that the Goward affair was a crisis for the LMS mission. According to the Reverend John W. Hills, the issue at hand would decide the future and the fate of the Samoan church, and the LMS’s work in Samoa and the NWO. Hills believed the Samoans exploited the Goward affair to advance their efforts to control the affairs of the church. Hills called upon his colleagues to support Goward. He warned that the Samoan pastors were determined to “hinder Mr Goward’s work… [and] something Mr Goward has said has been twisted so as to wound

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9 SDC – Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 20 Sept, 1902, SSL.
10 SDC – Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 20 Sept, 1902, SSL.
11 Goward to Thompson, 1 Nov, 1902, SSL.
12 SDC – Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 20 Sept, 1902, SSL.
13 SDC – Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 20 Sept, 1902, SSL; Hills to Thompson, 24 Jan, 1903, SSL.
the Samoan pride (their greatest asset), yet they have taken extreme measures to show their resentment. "14

The Reverend John Marriott felt Goward was telling the truth, and that the Samoan pastors should apologise to Goward. Marriott believe Goward should not apologise to the Samoans, as it would be acknowledging that he was wrong. Marriott proposed dismissing the four Samoan pastors involved, although he felt one should "never put pastors out of work unless Samoan pastors are not with us, and we could see from the language of their leading Samoan pastors we were uniting with that; if we took such a step, it would lead to our humiliation."15 Marriott’s narrow vision seemed to expect Samoan pastors to be like puppets on strings, and kowtow to their every command.

But, there were LMS missionaries who felt the issue was not about truth, but attitude. The Reverend James E. Newell criticised Goward for his remarks regarding the worth of the Samoan pastors. Newell pointed out that many people outside the LMS respected and admired the work done by the Samoan pastors throughout the Pacific. Newell quoted a letter from the Reverend William G. Lawes in which he stated that "I have known South Sea Island Teachers for forty years and there are none trustworthy and capable of such splendid work as Samoans."16 Newell reminded his colleagues of the enormous contribution the Samoans were making to the work of the LMS. Newell believed Goward started his work in Tuvalu and the Gilbert Islands with prejudice against the Samoans. It only distorted his judgement and prevented the Samoan pastors from enjoying a more intimate relationship with him. Newell, however, was not enthusiastic about his colleagues’ suggestions to transfer the LMS mission to a German society.17

The suggestion of a German society as an alternative to a Samoan independent church was raised by the Reverend Walter Huckett to counter, what he believed, was a growing passion for independence among the Samoan pastors. Huckett wrote with passion to the Au Matutua.

14 Hills to Thompson, 7 Oct, 1902, SSL; see also SDC – Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 20 Sept, 1902, SSL; Marriott to Thompson, 11 Oct, 1902, SSL.
15 Marriott to Thompson, 11 Oct, 1902, SSL.
16 Newell to Thompson, 12 Sept, 1903, SSL; Newell to Thompson, 21 Jun, 1903, SSL; see also E. Hawker to Thompson, 31 Jul, 1903, SSL; Huckett to Thompson, 2 – 10 Jul, 1903, SSL. Note: When the LMS were in dire straits with Self over fulfilling German policies, the idea of being transferred to a German mission society was raised by Reverend E. F. W. Heider. See Heider to Thompson, 29 Jul, 1913, SSL.
You will be sorry to see how the Samoan pastors are playing into the hands of the Directors who want us to withdraw. Unluckily their thick headedness shows their incompetence to govern themselves, and worst still there is no recognised authority when matters of the present nature are brought up. Apparently the wisest course for the good of the Samoans would be to hand them over to some German evangelical society. They would then come under German discipline. This lax system of church government crumbles to pieces at once in the force of idiotic obstinacy.\footnote{Huckett to C. Cousins, 20 Sept, 1902, SSL.}

A joint letter by the Au Fa‘atonu reaffirmed its anger.

We take a serious the view of the attitude of Samoan pastors in this matter. We feel that the one incident is sufficient answer to those who are advocating the withdrawal of men from Samoa while Samoans are proving themselves so utterly incapable of taking an enlightened view of a difficult situation.\footnote{SDC – Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 20 Sept, 1902, SSL.}

In the end, the Au Fa‘atonu concluded that the Goward affair was just a personal quarrel between Goward and the Samoan pastors under his supervision.\footnote{Newell to Thompson, 3 Jun, 1902, SSL.} Goward took exception to the assertion and reacted that “it was just as correct to say that a man attacked by four foot-pads, and was entirely at their mercy, had a personal quarrel with them.”\footnote{Goward to Thompson, 1 Nov, 1902, SSL.} Goward protested to the LMS missionaries regarding their lack of support, as he further attacked the Samoan pastors' credibility in the mission field.

The present generation of Samoan pastors are not what they ought to be, and they are not doing their work as it should be done, many of them; and the fact they consider that they owe their first allegiance to the Samoan pastors, and not to the English missionaries, settles the question for me, Let them go back to Samoa, all of them, and give me colleagues as soon as possible.\footnote{Goward to Thompson, 1 Nov, 1902, SSL.}

In this view, Goward blamed the fa‘asamoa for the Samoan pastors’ downfall,\footnote{Goward to Thompson, 25 Nov, 1902.} a view shared by several members of the LMS, including the Reverends Victor A. Barradale and Frank Lenwood.\footnote{Barradale to Thompson, 9 Jan, 1902, SSL; Lenwood to Hawkins, 24 & 27 Oct, 1915, SSL.}

The Samoan pastors remained firm in their decision to withdraw all Samoan pastors from the NWO.\footnote{Marriott to Thompson, 11 Oct, 1902, SSL.} The Au Fa‘atonu suggested that a letter be
sent to the Au Matutua and allow them to suggest a solution, but the Samoan pastors refused and suggested that such action would only damage Goward in the eyes of the Au Matutua. If the Samoans were returned home, then by "withdrawing the men who are present there [Kiribati and Tuvalu], they would simply relieve Mr Goward of these men who are no good." Furthermore, the Samoans had not forgotten Goward's harshness towards Samoan pastors, and the fact "that he cared little for their reputation. Good men who go to him, many of them returned with damaged reputation." The Au Fa'atonu even appealed to the wrath of God to frighten the Samoans. Goward added to the threat by pointing out that it was God's "guidance" to get rid of all the faithless. The Au Fa'atonu also invited the Samoan pastors to think of the 10,000 people without guidance, without Scripture leaders, and the thought of returning back to 'heathenism' after recently emerging from it. The emotional psychology and wrath of God approach failed to impress the Samoans. The Samoans were no longer ignorant.

Despite the failed dialogue, and the insistence of the Samoan pastors to carry out its decision, the Au Fa'atonu continued to gamble that the Samoan pastors would withdraw their statement and admit that it was all a bluff. But a few days later at a function held at Papauta School, the Samoan pastors interrupted the proceedings, and demanded a time frame for carrying out their decision. There were blushing faces everywhere as the LMS missionaries tried to contain their humiliation in the presence of their guests. The Au Fa'atonu finally got the message as it silently condemned the efforts of the Samoan pastors to control the church. It was another reminder to the Au Fa'atonu of the power in the hands of the Samoan pastors.

A renewed effort and a more humble approach by the Au Fa'atonu resulted in a settlement conducive to all parties concerned. The Samoans agreed to withdraw their demand for total withdrawal of the Samoan pastors from the NWO, if the Au Fa'atonu agreed to refrain from putting pressure on the four Samoan pastors involved in the conflict. The Samoans also agreed that the

26 SDC – Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 20 Sept, 1902, SSL.
27 SDC – Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 20 Sept, 1902, SSL; see also Goward to Thompson, 25 Nov, 1902.
28 SDC – Minutes of Meeting, Apia, 13 – 18 Dec, 1920, SSL; Marriott to Thompson, 11 Oct, 1902, SSL; Goward to Thompson, 25 Nov, 1902, SSL.
29 Marriott to Thompson, 11 Oct, 1902, SSL.
The Samoans, however, demanded that the Au Fa’atonu take further action regarding Goward. The Au Fa’atonu agreed to review the matter but, eventually, Goward only received a slap on the hand and returned to the NWO. The Au Fa’atonu’s lack of diplomacy, and its continuing assertion of superiority in dealing with Samoan pastors, failed to encourage any lasting relationships. The Au Fa’atonu remained blind to the issues overwhelming the mission and failed to comprehend the implications of continuing to show superiority and disrespect towards Samoan pastors.

For Goward, his attitude towards Samoan pastors remained inflexible over the ensuing years. He initiated a call for ni-Kiribati and Tuvaluan pastors to replace Samoan pastors in the NWO. In the years that followed, Goward continued his character assassination of Samoan pastors, as well as sending Samoan pastors home charged with disgracing the LMS mission. Goward even furnished the Au Fa’atonu with a proposal to “draw up regulations which shall make Samoa pastors quite clear as to what is expected of them.” Goward wanted to put the Samoan pastors in their place as servants of the white missionary rather than as equal partners in the mission field. The Au Fa’atonu discussed the proposal privately (without any knowledge of the Samoan pastors) and, in sheer stupidity, upheld the proposal. A letter was drafted and sent to all Samoan pastors in the mission field pointing out the nature of their relationship to the white missionaries, and “correcting certain misconceptions as to their position in relation to the committees and Fono Tele.” The Au Fa’atonu, sadly, was again travelling along the same stretch of road that had almost destroyed previous LMS relations with the Samoan pastors.

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30 The Samoan pastors never kept their promise and finally had their own way. To the disgust of Goward and the Au Fa’atonu, the four pastors concerned returned to Beru in 1908. See Goward to Thompson, 3 Mar, 1908, SSL; see also SDC – Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 12–16 May 1903, SSL; Hills to Thompson, 24 Jan, 1903, SSL.
31 Hills to Thompson, 24 Jan, 1902, SSL.
32 Goward to Thompson, 20 Dec, 1902, SSL; Campbell to SDC, 28 Jun, 1903, SSL; Goward to Hills, 16 Nov, 1903, SSL.
33 Report of Visitation to the Tokelau and Ellice islands, Jul, 1905, SSL; Goward to Thompson, 1 Aug, 1905, SSL; Goward to Thompson, 24 Nov, 1905, SSL.
34 Newell to Thompson, 19 May, 1904, SSL.
35 Newell to Thompson, 19 May, 1904, SSL.
36 SDC – Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 9–14 May 1904, SSL.
The Samoan pastors in the NWO were furious over the letter and likewise the Samoan pastors in Samoa, as news of its existence and content filtered back to Samoa. The Samoan pastors in NWO distanced themselves from Goward and, consequently, ignored his presence. In Samoa, the same attitude towards Goward existed. For instance, on a trip to Samoa in 1904, the Samoan pastors boycotted Goward.

No welcome of any kind was accorded me, no united services arranged, and no chance given for meeting with my old native pastors; it was a strange return to Samoa for a missionary who had done ten years good work there [Samoa].37

But, some of Goward's colleagues were just as stubborn in their attack on the Samoan pastors. Huckett, who was incensed with the attitude of the Samoan pastors, had insisted all along that the blame rested entirely with the younger Samoan pastors.

Samoans are such an utterly lawless lot and absolutely unreasonable when their backs are up... The younger men unluckily are more hairbrained and less manageable than their elders and would not hesitate I think to take responsibility of an independent Samoan Church.38

The relationship between Goward and the Samoan pastors in the NWO remained unstable for several more years. The Resident Commissioner in Tuvalu and Kiribati had sensed the deterioration in relationships and wrote to the LMS missionaries, and advised them on how best to conduct their work in NWO.39 Newell, feeling incensed at being told to sort out LMS problems in NWO, sent a Deputation to pacify the situation and generate reconciliation. The selection of two senior and respected Samoan pastors, Malaefou and Alama (there was no LMS missionary in the Deputation), not only highlighted a shortage of LMS missionaries, but indicated the displeasure the Samoans in the NWO felt for LMS missionaries. Goward was ecstatic with the Deputation and felt confident that Alama and Malaefou would influence the Samoan pastors in the NWO, and also solve the problem at hand.40 The Samoan adage e mu loa

37 Goward to Thompson, 30 Aug, 1905, SSL.
38 Huckett to Thompson, 11 Dec, 1902, SSL.
39 Resident Commission to LMS missionaries in Samoa, 1906, SSL.
40 Goward to Thompson, 6 Aug, 1906, SSL; Newell to Thompson, 5 Jun, 1906, SSL.
le lima tapa i le iofi (when the hand burns reach for the fire tongs) best describes Goward's thoughtless attitude.

The conflict between Goward and the Samoan pastors affected other areas of the mission, including its educational institutions. In August 1904, the Leulumoega High School erupted into rebellion while the Reverend John W. Hills, the missionary in charge, was visiting the Falealii District. The Samoan teacher, Mose, disciplined the students over comments made about other students in the school. The students became hostile and decided to abscond from school. Hills refused to accept back any of the students involved, as he wanted to make an example so that a similar situation would never happen again. In the end, the students concerned had to prove their worth to the LMS missionaries in their district in order to re-enter the school.

The Goward incident left a lasting impression on the minds of the Samoan pastors, especially on those who felt justice had not been truly dispensed. For the next fifteen years, the working relationship between the Au Fa’atonu and the Samoan pastors slowly improved. The introduction of a separate women’s meeting during the Fono Tele in 1906, and the formation of the Au Toeaina in 1907, were fruits of the benevolent relations enjoyed by the Au Fa’atonu and the Samoan pastors, but while the Samoan pastors saw it as a recognition of their status in the Samoan church by the Au Fa’atonu, Newell believed the decision was also one of timely necessity.

Newell had observed and was concerned that “the chiefs have come to usurp the true functions of the church meeting in such matters as the calling of a pastor, and other things.” According to Newell the only solution was to establish an Advisory Council or Presbyter with limited powers, to deal with such matters within the Samoan (LMS) Church itself. Furthermore, the Au Fa’atonu could not fully supervise the many parishes within their districts. Consequently, the Au Fa’atonu divided the congregations within the large

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41 The implication is that, a person who rashly ventures upon an undertaking and having come to grief, asks for help.
42 Newell to Thompson, 23 Sept, 1904, SSL; Hills to Thompson, 4 Oct, 1904, SSL.
43 SDC – Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 9 – 14 May 1904, SSL; SDC – Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 8 – 13 May 1905, SSL; Newell to Thompson, 28 Oct, 1905, SSL; SDC – Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 15 – 19 May, 1906, SSL.
44 SDC – Minutes of Meetings, Malua, 15 – 19 May, 1906, SSL; SDC – Minutes of Meetings, Malua, 20 – 26 May, 1907, SSL; Newell to Thompson, 3 Jun, 1907, SSL; SDC – Minutes of Meeting, Papauta, 2 – 4 Dec, 1907, SSL.
45 Newell to Thompson, 3 Jun, 1907, SSL.
districts into sub-districts, and Samoan pastors were selected as Toeaina to supervise the newly established sub-districts. The creation of the Au Toeaina followed immediately.

The Au Toeaina considered and advised on all church matters before they were presented to the Fono Tele. The Au Toeaina supervised Samoan pastors in their sub-districts as well as having the power to make appointments and dismissed pastors. The formation of the Au Toeaina also gave the Samoan pastors and deacons the opportunity to chair the Fono Tele with a member of the Au Fa’atonu, as well as fulfilling the role of General Secretary. For the Au Fa’atonu, it was a step in the right direction in filtering out Samoan culture and cementing good relationships with the Samoan pastors. The Samoan pastors’ sense of loyalty to the Au Fa’atonu and recognition of its authority in final decision making was, for the moment, unquestionable.46

The LMS missionaries revelled in the latest harmonious environment as they wrote praising of their work. The gloating reports probably prompted the Au Matutua to renew its efforts to transfer control of the Samoan (LMS) Church to the Samoans. A Deputation was sent not to ascertain whether Samoa could become independent, but to assess ways that would best initiate full control of the Samoan (LMS) Church. Despite the praises, the Deputation, to the relief of the Au Fa’atonu, found Samoa incapable of taking control of the Samoan (LMS) Church.47

In fact, the Au Toeaina rejected the idea and refused to give it any consideration. The secretary of the Fono Tele, Imo, the secretary of Au Toeaina, Kirisome, and Sosene, a representative of the Samoan pastors, conveyed their decision and their intention to the Au Matutua.

_Ua le loto lenei Fono Tele Aao i Samoa ina ia tu'uina mai le pule ia Samoa e tausia le galuega i lenei atunuu... seia oo le senetenari o le galuega i Samoa o tausaga ia e 14 o loo lumanaiai ona atoa lea o le 100 tausaga. Afai ua aulia na ona aso ona toe iloilo lea ma suesue lenei mataupu, po ua tatau ona faia e pei o le finagalo o le Savali na outou auina mai._48

(Author’s literal translation): This General Assembly of Samoa does not accept the proposal to give Samoans the authority to look after the work in this country...until the centenary of the work.

46 Newell to Thompson, 12 Mar, 1909, SSL; see also Kenape Faletoese, _O le Tala Fa’asolopito o le Ekalesia Samoa (LMS),_ Apia: Malua Press. 1958, 81.

47 Notes on the Visitiation by Frank Lenwood, Aug, 1914, SSL.

48 Fono Tele to Directors of the LMS, 4 Jun, 1916, SSL; see also Lenwood to Hawkins, 24 & 27 Oct. 1915, SSL.
in Samoa, 14 years in the future, then 100 years would be achieved. When we reach those days then we shall reconsider this subject, whether it would be carried out as the deputation has brought.

The Au Toeaina went on to explain the reasons for its stance.

Ua matua matou taofi e le i ona po ua tatau ai ona tu toatasi le Ekalesia i Samoa; aua e lei masani ma le faatatauina tonu o itu esese e pei ona faatonuina ai e Alii o le Au Faatonu, a sei a'oa'oina atili ia malamalama lelei le uiga moni o ala esese; i le ua le lava foi le malosi o le Ekalesia i Samoa e mafai ai lea feau i nei ona; aua ua le matua mavae atu nei tu ma masani faaleatunuu nei, e fai ma mea e faigata ai ona tuuina atu le filifiliga i se toaititi e pei ona masani ai outou, e lei matua mafai foi ona autasi gofie tagata Samoa i nisi o i latou, vagana se faatonuga mai Alii o le Au Faatonu, ona talia vave lea ma le le masalosalo....E le'i matua lava se pito i Faifeau Samoa e mafai ai ona faatasi ma le Au Faatonu i ona po nei.49

(Author's literal translation): We truly know that the time is not at hand for the Church in Samoa to be independent; because it has not fulfilled all the tasks commanded by the Directors, and to understand all the different ways; and also the Church in Samoa does not have the strength to do the work at this time; because it has only just recently put aside customs and traditions, which makes it hard to give to a few people the power of decision making as you are accustomed to; and some of the Samoa people are not obedient, unless ordered by the directors, then they will accept it without suspicion....The Samoan pastors have not been educated enough to be on par with the Samoa District Committee [LMS missionaries] at this time.

The Au Toeaina was content with the way the Au Matutua was guiding the Samoan (LMS) Church. They never entertained the idea of an independent Samoan (LMS) Church without the Au Matutua. In all their earlier efforts to take control of the church, it was only to take away some of the authority from the Au Fa'atonu. The Au Toeaina wanted to remain under the umbrella of the Au Matutua, and also made it clear that they would rather seek self-support than independence.50

Infrequent misunderstanding and conflict of opinions persisted from time to time to put the Au Fa'atonu on guard. For instance, the Reverend Peter Cane, while stationed at Matautu, Savai'i in 1914, visited Falealupo sub-district to avert trouble brewing between four LMS villages. Cane found that one of the LMS deacons, a matai, in the Tufutufaoe parish was running the church because

49 Fono Tele to Directors of LMS, 4 Jun, 1916, SSL.
50 Kinnersley to W. F. Bradford, 11 Jan, 1916, SSL; Fono Tele to Directors of LMS, 4 Jun, 1916, SSL.
it was without a pastor. Cane gave the matai advice in order to maintain peace with the other LMS villages, but Cane was frankly told, “if you don’t like our way then we will all change our religion.”51 For two years, Cane tried to reconcile the LMS villages who had become split over church contributions. The placement of a pastor at Tufutafoe changed the attitude of the matai concerned, and encouraged him to work positively.52

A similar conflict between deacons in the Matautu church, at Falelatai, in the A’ana district in 1915, also highlighted the growing passion for absolute authority. The Tuimaleali’ifano family was divided over several matters pertaining to the family itself.53 When Tuimaleali’ifano was absent from Matautu, one of the family matai sacked the LMS Samoan pastor Setope. Tuimaleali’ifano returned to Matautu and closed the doors of the church, and then laid a complaint against the matai involved before the administration. The parties were later reconciled and Setope was returned to his post.54 But, the incident highlighted the power of the matai to meddle in the affairs of the church. Newell had envisioned the problem with matai interfering with church matters, but the LMS was not fully prepared to deal with it due to staff shortage. Consequently, many Samoan parishes were left to the supervision of the Samoan pastors, but at the mercy of the matai.

A few years after the 1918 influenza epidemic, the Au Toeaina again challenged the authority of the Au Fa’atonu. The transition of power from the older and more experienced Samoan pastors to younger pastors caused a serious communication breakdown and misunderstanding. The Au Fa’atonu blamed the younger pastors’ materialistic inclinations for the problem.

The young men now in charge, in the majority of cases, are the poorest of Samoan pastors. We are deeply distressed to see the growing tendency towards material things. Wealth is pouring in on

52 Cane, Matautu Report, 1917, SSR.
53 This family conflict maybe linked to the differences between Catholics and LMS adherents in the family. This had caused much trouble after 1901. Leading up to this incident, the Roman Catholic had applied to Solf for permission to establish a Roman Catholic church in Falelatai. The Catholic – LMS conflict will surface again after the Mau in 1937. See A'ana District Annual Report, 31 Dec, 1901, SSR; Broyer to Shultz, 14 Feb, 1912, Marist Archives of Samoa and Tokelau Islands (henceforth MAST), Apia; Shultz to Broyer, 12 Mar, 1912, MAST, Apia; Deihl to Turnbull, 21 Oct, 1937, MAST; Treatment of Catholic Samoans in Falelatai, 27 Oct, 1937, MAST; McKay to Deihl, 4 Jun, 1937, MAST.
these people. They are exceedingly rich...it is all having an effect on the life of the church.\textsuperscript{55}

The charge of materialism was probably unfair as the LMS had given the parishes the responsibility to look after their own pastors compared to a set salary that had existed previously. The Au Fa’atonu pointed the finger at the \textit{fa’asamoa} and the spirit of competition between villages and district, for the exceptional high standard of living the Samoan pastors were enjoying.\textsuperscript{56} The Samoan pastors must have puzzled over the Au Fa’atonu’s attitude regarding the \textit{fa’asamoa}. It was, after all, the same \textit{fa’asamoa} that was keeping the LMS afloat and making the work of the LMS missionaries and Samoan pastors more accessible. The Au Fa’atonu had never complained about that.

The materialism debate aside, the Samoan church was reeling from the incompetence of the New Zealand administration. The political fall-out between New Zealand and the Samoans over the influenza epidemic started a chain reaction that shot Samoa into a political frenzy less than a decade later.\textsuperscript{57} The emergence of the younger pastors and their call for independence coincided with the Samoans’ challenge to the political leadership of New Zealand. The two groups would pursue their dreams independently but eventually sought the same goal as their determination for autonomy intensified. The Samoans finally realised they could not isolate the Samoan church from Samoan politics.

For the Samoan church things started to move with the Reverend James W. Sibree’s comments in an American newspaper in 1919. It was the beginning of a renewed leadership challenge that would push the Au Fa’atonu to the brink of its endurance. Sibree and his wife, Gertrude, arrived in Samoa in 1898 and worked at Tuasivi in the Fa’asaleleaga District, Savai’i. They were very well liked and contributed to the development of Christianity in the district,\textsuperscript{58} but tragedy struck the Sibree household when Gertrude died in 1900. After a short furlough he was transferred to Apia when staff shortage hit the LMS mission in 1905, although he was still in sole charge of Savai’i. The Savai’i pastors vetoed

\textsuperscript{55} SDC – Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 29 Apr, – 8 May 1920, SSL.

\textsuperscript{56} Cane to Hawkins, 22 Jul, 1915, SSL; Clarke to Bradford, 12 Jul, 1918, SSL; W. E. Clarke to Lenwood, 28 Aug, 1917, SSL; SDC – Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 29 Apr, – 8 May 1920, SSL; Report Districts of Falealii and Itucane, 1921, SSR.

\textsuperscript{57} See earlier discussion in Chapter Six.

\textsuperscript{58} For instance, Mrs Sibree, with very little resources and assistance, managed to teach and maintain a small class of Samoan girls. See Mrs Sibree to R. W. Thompson, 19 Feb, 1900, SSL; see also Sibree to Thompson, 5, 15, 18, Oct, 1912.
the idea, and threatened to boycott the Fono Tele if Sibree transferred. Eventually, the Savai'i pastors recanted their threat and obeyed the will of the Au Fa'atonu.

Sibree remarried in 1905 to Lucy Johnson at the Apia Protestant Church. After another furlough to England, Sibree and his wife returned to Samoa and were again posted to Tuasivi in 1910. For four years, Sibree fulfilled his ministry earning great respect, while also doubling as a medical officer, but staff shortage remained the stumbling block for the LMS and Sibree was transferred to the High School at Leulumoega in 1914, with the added responsibility of looking after A'ana District. Sibree was also involved in the visitations to the NWO, and was an activist in improving the welfare and working conditions of the Samoan pastors.

After the World War I, Sibree went on furlough and visited friends and colleagues in Australia and England before returning via America. The success of the LMS in its worldwide mission, and global interest in the Samoan political scene, made Sibree a target for journalists and other interested church groups. In an interview with the Sunday Origonian in Portland, on 15 August 1919, Sibree was reported to have commented that the "natives of Samoa were fools; the missionaries could get them to do anything they liked; they could get all the money they [LMS] wanted from them." According to J. Gillespie, the District Commissioner in Tutuila, Sibree was the victim of a long-standing feud between the LMS missionaries and Mrs Field, a step-daughter of Robert Louis Stevenson living in America. It started with comments made by the Reverend William E. Clarke in his American Lectures earlier in the year, which according to Field, discredited the character of her late father Stevenson. According to Gillespie, Field was responsible for the alleged comments attributed to Sibree, and for the report that circulated in Tutuila, which implicated Sibree for making improper remarks about the Samoan chief Mauga. Sibree returned to Samoa via Tutuila and tried to clear up the misunderstanding. Sibree had with him a

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59 Sibree to Thompson, 15 May, 1904, SSL.
61 SDC – Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 13 - 18 May, 1901, SSL; see also London Missionary Society Register.
62 J. Gillespie to the Secretary of Native Affairs, 6 Nov, 1920, SSL; R. W. Tate, Native Situation, Sept, 1921, IT 88/5; London Missionary Society Register.
63 J. M. Gillespie to the Secretary of Native Affairs, 6 Dec, 1920, SSL; see also Hough to Lenwood, 20 Apr, 1921, SSL; Samoan Elders to LMS Directors, 18 May 1921, SSL; Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 11-20 May 1921, SSL.
copy of the article in question, but the new evidence had no effect on the attitude of the Samoans in Tutuila.\textsuperscript{64}

When the stories reached Samoa, the Au Toeaina called for Sibree's removal. The Au Fa'atonu tried to reason with the Au Toeaina, pointing out that it was a Mormon\textsuperscript{65} in America who had misreported Sibree's comments in order to discredit the LMS. The Au Toeaina argued that the Mormons would never have been misled if Sibree had not misled the Mormons in the first place by giving the interview. The Au Toeaina argued that Sibree should have taken into consideration Samoan customs and cultural etiquette. The Au Toeaina agreed that newspapers take information, and expand and add to it, but Sibree knew about it, and whether he said only a little, it was enough to "spark a big fire."\textsuperscript{66}

The more the Au Fa'atonu pressed for Sibree to be exonerated, the more the Au Toeaina remained defiant in their stance.

The Au Toeaina, the Samoan pastors and members of the Samoan (LMS) Church, felt Sibree had brought disrespect upon the Samoan (LMS) Church. They felt that the stories referring to Samoans being 'fools' may not have been printed but the story had circulated widely and it insulted the Samoans. For the Au Toeaina, the comment was not just an attack on any Samoan, but a direct attack on the Samoan (LMS) Church. The comments made the Samoan pastors the laughing stock among other rival missions. Sibree had brought disgrace on the Samoan (LMS) Church, and had hurt the pride of every Samoan pastor. The Au Toeaina believed Sibree could have used a bit more diplomacy.\textsuperscript{67}

The Au Fa'atonu was exasperated with the Au Toeaina's anger against Sibree. Sibree had worked hard and long in developing the spiritual life of the Samoan church. He was well liked and respected, and a friend to the Samoans during the years that he was in Samoa,\textsuperscript{68} but it all counted for nothing after the pride of the Au Toeaina was tarnished. The Au Fa'atonu, especially the Reverend Alexander Hough, felt Sibree was a victim of Falealili \textit{matai} and

\textsuperscript{64} J. Gillespie to the Secretary of Native Affairs, 6 Nov, 1920," SSL.
\textsuperscript{65} The Sibree incident occurred at a time when Mormon - LMS competition for members in Tutuila continued to reach explosive heights. See Hawker to Thompson, 16 Mar, 1902, SSL; Hawker to Thompson, 5 Feb, 1904, SSL; Hawker to Thompson, 15 Dec, 1904, SSL.
\textsuperscript{66} Samoan Elders to LMS Directors, 18 May, 1921, SSL; see also SDC - Minutes of Meeting, Apia, 13 - 18 Dec, 1920, SSL.
\textsuperscript{67} Samoan Elders to LMS Directors, 18 May, 1921, SSL.
\textsuperscript{68} SDC - Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 13 - 18 May, 1901, SSL; Sibree to Thompson, 24 Aug, 1911, SSL.
pastors pressuring the Au Toeaina at the initiation of Malietoa Tanumafili.69 Hough’s statement provided no proof of Malietoa’s involvement, but it revealed there was a problem in relations between the LMS and its greatest Samoan supporter and protector, Tanumafili, but even though there was no evidence of Tanumafili’s involvement, Hough may not have been wrong in pointing the finger at Falealili pastors and matai.

Clarke had earlier been concerned at the lack of an LMS missionary at Falealili district where “young pastors [were] shouldering responsibility with enthusiasm.”70 Falealili was a rich district but the influence of the younger Samoan pastors on the people was limited.71 Sibree was temporary assigned, in addition to his other duties, until the appointment of a permanent missionary. In 1920, the Falealili district began to show signs of taking control of their own affairs. The Samoan pastors constantly encouraged members to maintain a high level of annual contribution to the church, as they aimed to be financially self-supporting.72

The Au Toeaina had put forth charges that Sibree often quarrelled with the Falealili pastors, although these differences were never brought to the notice of the Au Fa’atonu out of respect. The Falealili pastors were also dissatisfied with Sibree’s failure to fulfil his commitment to the district. The charges were not by any means unreasonable, but the Au Toeaina had failed to take into consideration that Sibree’s first responsibility was to the High School at Leulumoega and he was only obliged to make the occasional visitation to Falealili. In relation to the charge of quarrelling, the Falealili pastors may have been recalling past relationships with Goward.73

Sibree could also have been a victim of the LMS’s unsympathetic treatment of its German missionaries after the First World War. The German missionaries, Shultze, Heider, and Carl A. A. Muller were loved and respected by the Samoans for their total commitment to the Samoan church.74 After Germany lost the war, the Samoans detested the attitude of the Au Fa’atonu,

69 Hough to Lenwood, 20 Apr, 1921, SSL.
70 Clarke to Lenwood, 6 Dec, 1919, SSL.
71 Clarke to Lenwood, 6 Dec, 1919, SSL; see also Report of the Falealili District for the Year 1906, SSR.
72 SDC – Minutes of Meeting, Apia, 13 – 18 Dec, 1920, SSL; Muller to Lenwood, 25 Jan, 1919, SSL; Clarke to Lenwood, 6 Dec, 1919, SSL.
73 Samoa Elders to the LMS Directors, 18 May, 1921, SSL.
74 SDC – Minutes of Meeting, Malua, 26 Apr – 4 May 1912, SSL; Muller to Lenwood, 5 Apr, 1916, SSL; Letter From Faasaleleisaga District, 8 Jun, 1920, SSL.
and in general the LMS mission, towards its German colleagues. For the Samoan pastors, the LMS had forgotten all the good work the German missionaries had done for Samoa and the LMS, just because they were Germans. The prejudice of the Au Fa’atonu was exposed, and Sibree, especially, was singled out as the most outspoken of the Au Fa’atonu.75

The Au Toeaina probably knew that most of the charges against Sibree were fabricated, but that was no longer the issue at hand. They comforted the Au Fa’atonu regrading its decision; pointing out that they had not taken the Sibree affair lightly but justice had to be done. The Au Toeaina believed their decision was not for revenge but for the good of the church. In a letter written in Samoan, the Au Toeaina poured out their inner most feelings in relation to their decision.

_Ua matou le faia lenei mea ia Misi Saipele ise agavale poo se tuuaaina lua, ae le o lagona ai i o matou loto fuatia ifo e lelei; po ua matou faia ise fia tai ma sui ise itu faa-le-tino, ae na o le alofa moni lava i le galuega a lesa ma lana Ekalesia...matou te tautino atu ai, matou te lei faia ma se manatu o se mea faafoalofao, pe pipisi atu e pei o se faamai. E leai lava._76

_(Author’s literal translation): We have not done this thing to Sibree out of spite or malice, and knowing in our heart it is not a good thing, or had we done it for personal revenge, but only for true love for Jesus and his church...we truly declare, that we had not done this thinking it was easy, or it would become a sickness with us. No it’s not._

The younger pastors were determined to show the Au Fa’atonu that they had the intelligence to make decisions for the Samoan church. Unfortunately, Sibree found himself in the centre of a power struggle between the Au Toeaina and the Au Fa’atonu. Sibree, on his own accord, resigned and left Samoa in 1920.77

Sibree wrote to Lenwood afterwards and stated that he was dazed and crushed by the events that had taken place.78 Lenwood agreed that Sibree’s demise and rejection, and the humiliation of the LMS mission, was due to a younger and inexperienced ministry, but Lenwood believed the Au Fa’atonu had contributed immensely to their own misery by “holding on to power a day too

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75 SDC – Minutes of Meeting, 29 Apr – 8 May, 1920, SSL; SDC – Minutes of Meeting, Apia, 13 – 18 Dec, 1920, SSL; Sibree to Lenwood, 28 Jan, 1916, SSL; Sibree to Hawkins/Lenwood, 17 Jun, 1916, SSL; Sibree to Lenwood, 4 Apr, 1917, SSL; Sibree to Lenwood, 31 Aug, 1917, SSL; Shultze to Lenwood, 26 Dec, 1917, SSL; Sibree to Lenwood, 21 Feb, 1918, SSL.

76 Samoa Elders to the LMS Directors, 18 May, 1921, SSL.

77 Samoa Elders to the LMS Directors, 18 May, 1921, SSL; SDC – Minutes of Meeting, Apia, 13 – 18 Dec, 1920, SSL; London Missionary Society Register.

78 Sibree to Lenwood, 22 Dec, 1920, SSL.
Hills disagreed with Lenwood and pointed the finger at the Au Matutua for planting the idea of independence in the Samoans' minds, which had eventually led to the seed of discontent being sown between the Au Fa'atonu and the Au Matutua. Hills was merely pointing out the strength and vitality of the Samoans in pursuing independence, and their ability to create friction between the Au Fa'atonu and the Au Matutua.

The Sibree affair was a big blow to the LMS mission, especially when it was faced with missionary shortage. The Au Toeaina and the Samoan pastors had called the shots and it was a reminder to the Au Fa'atonu that the Au Toeaina would go to any lengths to reinforce their authority. Tate, the New Zealand administrator at the time, felt the Samoan pastors had been given too much power and control for which "they are not yet fit to possess." Time again healed discontent and, eventually, the LMS missionaries managed to overcome the humiliation of the Sibree affair. The vision for independence had been sown, and it would take only a minor disagreement or a negative criticism to again trigger independence sentiments.

For instance, between 1927 and 1928, the Reverends Harold Darvill and Arthur R. Smart upset the Au Toeaina. Darvill's sin, like Sibree's earlier, was offering comments to newspaper journalists; this time over Samoans' role in the Mau, and New Zealand's administration of Samoa in the Samoa Guardian. Darvill was portrayed as a "political agent of the government" as he exonerated George Richardson, the administrator, of any blame for the crisis besieging Samoa. Darvill then went too far and passed judgement on the Mau.

The natives followed a movement, the significance of which they could not understand. Suspicion was enthroned and grievances became easy to manufacture when natives were uninformed, as they had to be, that their grievances were without foundations, suspicions passed into hatred.

The New Zealand Herald, The Auckland Star and The Sun newspapers all quoted Darvill praising the New Zealand administration's efforts, and blaming

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79 Lenwood to Hills, 7 Feb, 1921, SSL.
80 R. W. Tate, Native Situation, Sept, 1921, IT 88/5.
81 Smart to Barradale, 23 Apr, 1928, SSL; see also Bartlett to Barradale, 19 Feb, 1928, SSL; Moli and Iosia to Barradale, 29 May, 1928, SSL; Political Parsons in Samoa, Samoa Guardian, 12 May, 1932.
82 Newspaper Article on Darvill's Visit to New Zealand, n.d., SSO.
Samoans and European merchants for the troubles in Samoa. In the *New Zealand Herald* Darvill praised Richardson.

He has given himself wholeheartedly to the welfare of the people and New Zealand has every reason to feel proud of his work. The administration of the territory deserves credit all over the world. Perhaps it was not surprising that Darvill had openly expressed his resentment of the Mau. A few years earlier, he wrote to the Au Matutua about the Mau and the Samoan (LMS) Church. He wrote:

The influence of this movement [Mau] is becoming a menace to the church. The Samoan committee is composed of prominent leaders in the church, and absorbed in political excitement they are losing sight of their spiritual obligations.

Darvill's behaviour in New Zealand not only captured the attention of the Samoan church, but also the interest of the Mau leaders.

The Au Matutua's Deputation in October 1928, led by the Reverends G. Parker and Alexander Hough, met thedeacons of the LMS church at Faleata District. Tamasese Lealofi I, a deacon of the LMS church at Vaimoso (the home of the Mau), requested the Deputation on behalf of the Mau to remove Darvill from Samoa, as he was "no use to the work of God in Samoa," and would only "harm the work of God in Samoa." The Samoan church leaders condemned Darvill's actions, but their anger was more controlled than it had been over the Sibree affair, and as a result, Darvill was spared the humiliation Sibree suffered. The Mau was seeking a repetition of Sibree's fate.

Smart, on the other hand, faced the wrath of the Samoan pastors over finance mismanagement allegations. Smart went on furlough before the Fono Tele of 1927, when the Samoans were expecting him to furnish a financial statement outlining the cost of the rebuilding of Malua and Leulumoega schools. The Falealii District had petitioned Smart to postpone his furlough until after the Fono Tele, but Smart went ahead with his plans. In the Fono Tele, Smart's...
financial statement was rejected, and a revised statement by the Au Fa'atonu was shunned. The Fono Tele demanded to see every receipt before they would approve any statements.\textsuperscript{89}

The districts of Apia, Falealili, and Fa'asaleleaga called for the removal of Smart. The Falealili pastors were unhappy with Smart's lack of commitment to the Samoan church and labelled him “ua matua le faamaoni [completely untrustworthy].”\textsuperscript{90} The Au Toeaina called Smart a “taulealea osovale [an uncontrollable untitled man]” who should not be “taalo i le tupe a le Ekalesia.... matou te le fia faasatauroina o ia, matou te le fia faatautauina o ia [playing with the church's money...we do not want to crucify him, we do not want to hang him].”\textsuperscript{91} But, although the Au Toeaina was infuriated with Smart, they found it prudent to forgive him.

Smart was despondent that the Samoan church had made him a scapegoat for the excessive spending on the Malua and Leulumoega projects. Smart believed he was not criticised for any misappropriation of money, but that the Samoan church had over spent their budget. According to Smart the Samoan pastors had approved the use of reserve funds for the projects.\textsuperscript{92} The LMS missionaries continued to be astonished at the unpredictable nature of the Samoan church leaders, but still remained confident that as long as the political circumstances remained stable and peaceful they would always control the Samoan (LMS) Church.

Prior to the Smart and Darvill incidents the Mau leaders had detached their political aspirations from the Samoan church, but soon after, especially after Darvill's comments, the Mau was presented with an opportunity to meddle in the affairs of the Samoan (LMS) Church. The Mau's immediate response was to shut down Samoan (LMS) Church programs and replace them with their own agenda.\textsuperscript{93} The events between 1928 and 1930 were the most challenging for the Samoan church and for the political aspirations of the Samoan people. In a period of three years the authority of the administrator was challenged time and time again through passive resistance, and disobeying administration orders

\textsuperscript{89} Barker to Smart, 21 May, 1927, SSL.
\textsuperscript{90} Barker to Smart, 21 May, 1927, SSL.
\textsuperscript{91} Barker to Smart, 21 May, 1927, SSL.
\textsuperscript{92} Smart to Barradale, 14 Sept, 1927, SSL.
\textsuperscript{93} Smart to Barradale, 23 Apr, 1928, SSL; Smart to Barradale, 23 Apr, 1928, SSL; Meeting of the SDC and Deputation, Apia, 29 Sept – 1 Oct, 1928, SSL.
and regulations. In the Samoan (LMS) Church, the leadership challenge culminated in the emergence of the Mau church. When the dust settled, the crusade towards political independence was unrelenting, while the momentum for an independent Samoan (LMS) Church was revitalised. In 1931, the LMS missionaries revealed that their authority was no longer effective, as Samoan pastors took over the running of the church. The Au Fa’atonu became disheartened with the state of the church. The Reverend Frank S. Hoad was especially concerned with the minimal effect the church was having on the young people.

The modern young youth is a wild rough thing, becoming more like the natives of South Africa, crimes which were hitherto unthought of are no longer so, but a degeneracy seems to have come over the people.

Hoad was also concerned with the Samoan pastors’ enthusiasm in using their positions in the church to advance their own wellbeing and family interests. The Samoan pastors were also using their position to push unworthy students into the Malua Seminary. For the Samoans, the pastoral ministry was the ultimate lifestyle; as Bartlett pointed out a few years later, for a Samoan “to be a theological student is to have eternal life.” In one of the districts, a Samoan pastor called himself “Misi Toeaina” to highlight his standing in his district. Hoad believed the lack of European supervision was one of the main causes for this laxity.

At Fa’asaleleaga, two of the elders, Tafuna’i and Amosa, staged a coup to eliminate Hoad and Kirisome’s authority in the Fa’asaleleaga, but after a bitter struggle Tafuna’i and Amosa were dismissed. The District of Itu-o-tane was also overwhelmed by conflict between pastors and deacons arguing over financial contributions, which eventually led to a boycott of the annual church Me (May) contributions. The differences between the twelve villages within the district were finally healed, but it had affected the church as a whole. The

94 See Chapter Eight for a discussion of this period, 1928 – 1931.
95 Hoad, Report of the District Missionary, Savai’i, 1931, SSR.
96 LMS Annual Report, Malua College, 1934, SSR; see also Bartlett to Barradale, 13 Dec, 1939, SSL.
97 Hoad, Report of the District Missionary, Savai’i, 1931, SSR.
98 Report of the District Missionary, Ituotane, Faasaleleaga, Aana, Falesa’ili, 1932, SSR.
boycott was a protest to the Samoan (LMS) Church over the treatment of the Mau church by the Au Fa’atonu.\footnote{Report of the District Missionary, Ituotane, Faasaleleaga, Aana, Falealili, 1932, SSR; see also SDC - Minutes of Meeting, 10–15 Dec, 1923, SSL; Hough to Lenwood, 9 May, 1924, SSL.}

In the Falealili District, the Samoan pastors refused to recognise the leadership of the Elder pastor Enosa, who had called himself "Missionary Elder"\footnote{Report of the District Missionary, Ituotane, Faasaleleaga, Aana, Falealili, 1932, SSR.} to enhance his authority. He tried to dismiss the Samoan pastors Sione and Esera from their parishes as a show of power. Consequently, the Falealili pastors plotted Enosa’s downfall and, according to Hoad, “tongues have wagged until Samoa is full of tales of Enosa and the wife of Esera.”\footnote{Report of the District Missionary, Ituotane, Faasaleleaga, Aana, Falealili, 1932, SSR.} The tales were believed and Enosa and Esera were dismissed, and the pastors responsible for the rumours were also dismissed for misbehaviour. According to Hoad, the only Samoan pastor left to take responsibility for the Falealili District was “temporarily insane.”\footnote{In the Malua District a similar report criticised the pastors trying to take over the leadership but they lacked spirituality, and were irresponsible. See A Brief Report in the Work in the Malua District, 1932 – 33, SSR.} Falealili District was left to the supervision of incompetent young pastors. Nevertheless, the Falealili district had established itself as the leading threat to LMS missionary authority.\footnote{Liston to Chirgwin, 6 Jul, 1932, SSL; Liston to Chirgwin, 4 Aug, 1932, SSL.}

The hostility towards the Au Fa’atonu plagued the Fono Tele in 1932. The Samoan pastors and the LMS missionaries were drawn into a heated debate over the authority and leadership of the Leulumoega Fou High School. The Sibree and Darvill affairs were still fresh in the minds of the church, and the Samoan church leaders made sure the Au Fa’atonu had not forgotten it during the heated debates.\footnote{Tuatagaloa to Directors in Britain, 22 Jun, 1932, SL, NLA; Vaega to Chirgwin, 30 May, 1932, SSL.} The crisis began with the appointment of Ariu to the High School as Samoan Master, and the Reverend Stanley G. Phillips as Principal.

From the beginning, both men tried to assert their authority over the school but this only led to disruption and chaos. Ariu refused to obey Phillips, and chose to do things his own way.\footnote{Tuatagaloa to Directors in Britain, 22 Jun, 1932, SL, NLA; Vaega to Chirgwin, 30 May, 1932, SSL.} Phillips could not maintain discipline as many students obeyed Ariu. Phillips eventually condemned Ariu and called for his dismissal. The LMS missionaries and Samoan pastors in the newly formed
Mission Council (combined LMS missionary and Samoan pastors committee) found in favour of Phillips and recommended the dismissal of Ariu.\textsuperscript{106}

During the Fono Tele in 1932, the matter regarding Ariu was raised, and soon after escalated into a heated debate. The LMS missionaries, with support from a few Samoan pastors, maintained their view regarding Ariu. The Fono Tele, however, insisted that both men be retained, but pursued an effective reconciliation whereby Ariu and Phillips settled their differences through “mutual forgiveness.”\textsuperscript{107} Phillips refused to accept the resolution and threatened to resign if Ariu was retained. Phillips told his colleagues that “the way for most peace in the church is for me to tell the Directors that I have done my best for Samoa, and that my sphere of usefulness may lie in another way in another land.”\textsuperscript{108} The Au Fa’atonu was sympathetic to Phillips, but they were powerless as the Fono Tele and the Au Toeaina contained powerful family connections of Ariu.\textsuperscript{109} The Au Fa’atonu had not forgotten Sibree, and losing another missionary was not an option. Nevertheless, the Au Fa’atonu wanted to solve the matter quickly, and it looked to Phillips for understanding. Hoad wrote that the LMS missionaries “met, wept with, prayed over, and advised Phillips to relent, all did this, in the hope that he would alter his position,” but Phillips “turned a deaf ear.”\textsuperscript{110} According to Stallan, Phillips maintained his stance and “failed to understand the difficulty of the situation” for his other colleagues.\textsuperscript{111}

The Samoan pastors on the Mission Council, such as Sa’aga, Alesana and Vaega, pressed Ariu to accept the decision of the Mission Council and not to have the matter dragged on any longer, but their efforts were also in vain as Ariu refused to resign, although he was willing to abide by the decision of the Fono Tele and settle matters through reconciliation. Sa’aga was disappointed

\textsuperscript{106} Hoad to Chirgwin, 30 May, 1932, SSL. \textbf{Note:} The formation of the Mission Council replaced the Samoan District Committee (SOC) which was made up entirely of LMS missionaries. The Mission Council was a combine committee of Samoan pastors and LMS missionaries set up to deal with various issues within the church. It gave the Samoan pastors the same rights as the LMS missionaries in dealing with issues involving Samoan pastors and LMS missionaries. Samoans became dominant within the Mission Council as the years went by. The Mission Council controlled all church matters, including the work of the missionaries, and school institutions. Under this council, a Samoa pastor was appointed Treasurer for the first time. Thus, the Mission Council increased the power and authority of the Samoan pastors within the LMS Samoan church. See SOC to Barradale, 28 May 1928; Constitution of the Samoan Church, Apia: Malua Press, 1928.

\textsuperscript{107} Hoad to Chirgwin, 30 May, 1932, SSL.

\textsuperscript{108} Hoad to Chirgwin, 30 May, 1932, SSL.

\textsuperscript{109} Vaega to Chirgwin, 30 May, 1932, SSL; Downs to Chirgwin, 25 Jun, 1932, SSL.

\textsuperscript{110} Hoad to Chirgwin, 30 May, 1932, SSL.

\textsuperscript{111} Stallan to Chirgwin, 6 Jun, 1932, SSL.
with Ariu's attitude and suggested that Ariu had been brought up, in the old
ways, like his father Sio before him, at Leulumoega High School. Sa'aga also
suggested that Ariu was "only a boy [who] wants to take full charge of the
school himself."\(^{112}\)

In the end the Mission Council and the Fono Tele's resolutions were
carried out. A reconciliation service was to take place and Ariu was to remain at
the High School pending a decision from the Au Matutua. Ariu was also
informed that he faced dismissal if his conduct deteriorated. The decision was
accepted by the Samoans and it eliminated any possibility of the Fono Tele
being disrupted. Phillips and Ariu attended the reconciliation service, but Phillips
had no idea what was happening, as he did not understand Samoan and no
one had bothered to inform him. When Phillips found out later, he was furious
and rejected reconciliation, although he could not change Ariu being retained at
the High School.\(^{113}\)

Samoan pastors and the LMS missionaries afterwards criticised Phillips
for lack of sympathy towards Ariu and the situation that had arisen, which led to
the controversy. Hoad felt Phillips had "over exerted his authority,"\(^{114}\) while
Stallan believed his ego had been his undoing as "he had concluded that he
was doing the will of God."\(^{115}\) From a Samoan point of view, Sa'aga felt Phillips
was too strict and "strikes too soon;"\(^{116}\) a weakness that Alesana also
confirmed.

\begin{quote}
He deals in haste, remembering he is the Headmaster and does
as he pleases instead of consulting or respecting those who are
under his supervision; this fault will only despise his good zeal.
This same fault of his is formed inside the school and it has also
reached the matters concerning the whole church.\(^{117}\)
\end{quote}

The fate of Ariu was decided towards the end of 1932. The Au Matutua
ordered that Ariu be dismissed from the High School.\(^{118}\) The decision probably
satisfied Phillips and the Au Fa'atonu, but it caused some resentment among
the Samoan members of the Mission Council, as well as the Au Toeaina and

\(^{112}\) Saaga to Chirgwin, 9 Jun, 1932, SSL.
\(^{113}\) Hoad to Chirgwin, 30 May, 1932, SSL.
\(^{114}\) Hoad to Chirgwin, 30 May, 1932, SSL.
\(^{115}\) Stallan to Chirgwin, 6 Jun, 1932, SSL.
\(^{116}\) Saaga to Chirgwin, 9 Jun, 1932, SSL.
\(^{117}\) Alesana to Chirgwin, 10 Jun, 1932, SSL.
\(^{118}\) Mission Council, Minutes of Meetings, 6 Jan, 1933, SSL; Mission Council, Minutes of Meetings, 10 – 11
Jan, 1934, SSL.
Samoan pastors. The Samoans wanted to reopen discussions immediately but the Au Fa’atonu refused. It was clear that the Samoans were not taking the decision lightly.

The decision regarding Ariu reached Elder pastor Sio, Ariu’s father. Sio immediately called upon the pastors and members of the Fa’asaleleaga district to boycott the up-coming Fono Tele until the Au Fa’atonu agreed to discuss his son’s case. Sio was angry that the decision had been made public without the sanction of the Fono Tele. Sio believed the Fono Tele was the supreme authority of the Samoan church. The Au Fa’atonu rejected Sio’s request, and in retaliation Sio removed his son from Malua and placed him as a teacher at the government school at Malifa. Ariu took on another government post at Avele School.\textsuperscript{119}

Sio had very powerful family connections within the church, and was also related to the Tamasese family, and as the Fono Tele loomed near, the Au Fa’atonu feared Fa’asaleleaga’s absence would cause dissension in the church,\textsuperscript{120} but the Au Fa’atonu was expecting the imminent arrival, just before the Fono Tele, of an LMS Deputation, and was counting on its presence to solve the tension. The Deputation, led by the Reverends J. A. Kaye and Nelson Bitton wrote to the Fa’asaleleaga District to attend the Fono Tele.\textsuperscript{121} For the Au Fa’atonu the letter from the representatives of the Au Matutua was enough to put the Samoan pastors in their place.

Sio carried out his threat, and showed his influence on the Fa’asaleleaga District by boycotting the Fono Tele. The Au Fa’atonu’s pride as well as that of the Deputation was dented. The Samoan pastors from the Fa’asaleleaga district had enhanced their bargaining power by defying the LMS. The challenge to the Au Fa’atonu’s leadership was real and it was no longer confined to Falealili. After the Fono Tele, the Deputation agreed to meet with the Fa’asaleleaga District. Sio’s accusations and Fa’asaleleaga’s grievances were tabled and the Deputation promised that their grievances would be addressed in the next Fono Tele.\textsuperscript{122} The success of the Fa’asaleleaga District in defying not just the Au Fa’atonu but representatives of the Au Matutua, was disheartening news for the

\textsuperscript{119} S. G. Phillips to G. E. Phillips, 15 Feb, 1933, SSL.

\textsuperscript{120} Hoad to Chirgwin, 14 Feb, 1933, SSL.

\textsuperscript{121} Hoad to Chirgwin, 14 May, 1933, SSL; Tala i le Fono a le Savali Mai le Au Matutua ma le Matagaluega a Faasaleleaga, Sapapali’i, 31 May – 1 Jun, 1933, SSL.

\textsuperscript{122} Statement Handed to J. A. Kaye by Sio, Faasaleleaga District, 30 May, 1933, SSO.
Au Fa'atonu. It would only encourage other districts and Samoan pastors to take matters into their own hands, but the Au Fa'atonu's had a far bigger dilemma in trying to explain to the Samoan districts and pastors loyal to the Au Fa'atonu and the Fono Tele, the Deputations' handling of the Fa'asaleleaga situation.123

In the 1934 Fono Tele, the Fa'asaleleaga District attended en mass. Hoad suggested to his colleagues “have a cigar and if it comes to a showdown we must all stand together.”124 The comment was meant to reassure the Au Fa'atonu of its own leadership and superiority, but it also highlighted the strength of the Samoan church leaders in their challenge for that leadership. Hoad's comment was an expression of fear and an acknowledgment of the strength and vitality, and determination of the Samoans to assert their authority in the church. However, the excitement fizzled out into nothing as both sides settled their differences and proceeded to work together for the rest of the Fono Tele. For some of the LMS missionaries, the events that had taken place were a powerful display by “the pastors and even the deacons to have their own way.”125

The influence and attitude of Hoad on Samoan church matters, and his lack of respect for Samoan pastors finally caught up with him in 1935. During the Fono Tele, the Au Toeaina resolved that Hoad, who was on furlough in England, be relieved of his position in Samoa “because his conduct is not in keeping with one who leads the work of the Samoan church.”126 Hoad was unpopular in the 1934 Fono Tele because of his cigar remark and insensitive attitude towards Sio and other Samoan elders. According to Downs, Hoad had upset some of the Au Toeaina.

When their [Au Toeaina] objections are personal it will be next to impossible to get them to face it out with the person involved; their habit of insincere courtesy is too deeply ingrained; they will either wait until you are away, as in the case of Mr Hoad, or they will wait and catch you out on some mistake or failure which all human beings, including missionaries, are liable to make.127

123 Hoad to Chirgwin, 23 Sept, 1933, SSL.
124 Hoad to Phillips, 7 Nov, 1934, SSL.
125 H. S. Balsford to Phillips, 11 Feb, 1935, SSL; see also Hoad to Phillips, 7 Nov, 1934, SSL;
126 Fono Tele, Malua, 30 May – 1 Jun, 1935, SSL.
127 Downs to Phillips, 15 Nov, 1935, SSL.
The Au Toeaina’s decision to terminate Hoad’s services was further evidence of the Samoans unrelenting pursuit of authority and church autonomy. For the LMS mission, Hoad’s demise led to a deterioration of their work and an increased sense of failure, which led some LMS missionaries to keep company with ‘the bottle’. Phillips was a victim, and on his own free-will left Samoa at the beginning of 1936. Phillips later blamed the Samoan church leaders for trying to “legislate work” at the High School, which kept him from exercising his authority. For the Samoan pastors, especially Sio, Ariu, and the Fa’asaleleaga, justice had finally been served.

The LMS missionaries also gave the Samoan pastors motivation for independence when they disagreed over important issues. For instance, the question of ordination, especially in relation to Miss Evelyn A. Downs and the Samoan pastors, divided the Au Fa‘atonu in 1937. Stallan wanted Samoan pastors to concentrate more on the lay-ministry. He pointed out that “ordination for Samoans in the LMS church is so cheap that there is a good reason for every case of non-ordination.” Stallan believed the ordination of Samoan pastors had got out of hand compared to the WMMS and the Catholic mission. He called upon the LMS not to fall for the Samoan pastors’ point of view that people do not respect non-ordained pastors. Stallan also criticised Downs’ role in examining Samoan pastors for ordination. He felt as Downs was not ordained she was, therefore, “neither expected nor allowed to inquire into any of the aspects of the lives and work of the ordained native ministry.”

Bartlett also criticised Downs’ attitude regarding Holy Communion but not because she was not ordained. Bartlett felt it did not set a good example for the Samoan pastors who were not ordained when Downs conducted Holy Communion. However, he believed Downs has every right to do it, because “to say she must not we simply say Miss Downs is a missionary of a lower grade, only a missionary in part.” Bartlett also agreed with Downs’ view that the custom of women not conducting Holy Communion applied only to Samoan women “for the church is very young… the time has not yet arrived when

128 S. G. Phillips to G. E. Phillips, 17 Apr, 1936, SSL; see also S. G. Phillips to G. E. Phillips, 10 Feb, 1936, SSL; Stallan to Phillips, 2 Jun, 1936, SSL; S. G. Phillips to G. E. Phillips, 2 Nov, 1936, SSL.
129 Stallan to Goodall, 9 Mar, 1937, SSL.
130 Stallan to Goodall, 9 Mar, 1937, SSL.
131 Bartlett to Barradale, 9 Jan, 1940, SSL.
Samoan women can be allowed to conduct this service.” Bartlett felt the Samoan pastors understood the situation regarding Downs and had accepted it. Bartlett may have been right on the surface, but he had no idea of the real feelings of the Samoan church leaders. A woman, and not a Samoan pastor, conducting Holy Communion was a sin as far as Samoan pastors were concerned. For Bartlett to say the Samoan pastors understood and accepted what was clearly their hypocrisy only revealed the ignorance and inconsistency of the missionaries in treating the Samoan pastors as equals.

The ordination issue was just a storm in a teacup, but it indicated the ‘mean spirit’ that was slowly eating into the LMS missionaries’ relationships. When the Reverend Norman Goodall visited the Samoan mission in 1939, he found the relationship between the LMS missionaries unpleasant. He felt the problem with the Samoan mission “is the failure in the fellowship on the part of the missionaries...the amount of evidence for it is appalling. I doubt if there is any more confidence and love between the missionaries as a whole than there is in beach society at its worst...mistrust, slander, and malicious gossip have been made.” Goodall felt none of the Au Fa’atonu was worthy to keep its place in Samoa. The Samoans’ challenge for leadership and independence thrived upon such inadequacy and failures.

The Au Fa’atonu agreed with Goodall and believed the Samoan (LMS) Church itself was in good shape, except for the European missionaries’ disunity, which had kept the Samoan pastors at a distance, but they all failed to see the splinter in their colleagues’ eye through the log in their own eye. The conflict between the Au Fa’atonu finally found its way into the 1940 Fono Tele, and the failure of the LMS missionaries to solve their differences, put a strain on Samoan church leaders’ loyalty. The Au Fa’atonu noticed the negative reactions of the Samoan pastors, but it was powerless to put an end to their hostility. The Samoans took the Au Fa’atonu’s disunity as frail leadership, and it only strengthened the Samoan pastors’ pursuit for control of the Samoan (LMS) Church.

132 Bartlett to Barradale, 9 Jan, 1940, SSL.
133 Downs to Barradale, 10 Dec, 1937, SSL.
134 Goodall to Barradale, 22 Apr, 1939, SSL.
135 For examples, see Bartlett to Barradale, 9 Jan, 1940, SSL; Statement by Miss Downs to Accusations Made by Some of Her Colleagues, undated, SSL; Bartlett to Barradale, undated, SSL; Downs to Goodall, 27 Mar, 1940, SSL.
136 Downs to Goodall, 30 May, 1940, SSL; Bartlett to Chirgwin, 25 Jun, 1940, SSL.
The resurgence of old Samoan superstitions within the Samoan (LMS) Church was also a challenge to the leadership of the church. Although very rarely practiced in the open, the Au Fa’atonu was aware of their existence within the Samoan church. Much of the superstition involved aitu (spirits) possession, and the usage of traditional medicine to rid oneself of such aitu. Many Samoan church members believed in aitu, but were careful to conceal it from European missionaries. When such cases captured the attention of the Au Fa’atonu, the Samoans took avid interest in its outcome, especially if the missionary's medicine failed to treat such illness. In such cases, the Samoans' attributed the deaths to aitu power. The German administration was also aware of such practices and issued an order prohibiting superstitious practices in the treatment of illnesses. The order was prompted by the behaviour of Vasati, the wife of a Methodist pastor named Mose, who ordered people to cut down breadfruit and coconut trees when family members died of suspected aitu sickness. The German administration order, however, had no affect on Tutuila where superstition also affected the work of the church.

The Reverend John G. Hawker reported Samoans in a Tutuila church believed their pastor and his wife had power over evil spirits and could cast out demons. They were summoned before the administrator but were later dismissed with a warning. Two days later, two people died and aitu possession was blamed for their death. Hawker realised Samoans truly believed in aitu and the occurring deaths only reaffirmed in the Samoan minds the power of the aitu. Hawker was not far from the truth when he wrote that “medicine and charms are indissolubly connected with one another in the mind of the average Samoan, who believes that most of his ailments are work of evil spirits. I am afraid that even the medicines we ourselves dispense are frequently expected to act magically.”


138 For example, in 1905 Miss Elizabeth Moore gave medicine to an ex-student, Saiperia, for an illness. The Samoans believed she was possessed by the spirit of her husband’s ex-wife. Within two days Saiperia died and the Samoans believed it was an aitu that had killed her. The aitu was stronger than the medicine of the missionary. See Fifth Annual Report of Atauloma Girls school, 1905, SSR.

139 Shultz to Vasati (Sataoa), 4 Dec, 1911, German Administration Papers (henceforth GAP), vol. 1; Savati, May 1912, GAP.

140 Hawker, Report of Work in Tutuila and Manu’a, 1907, SSR.
The greatest challenge to the Samoan (LMS) Church took place in the A'ana District regarding “witchcraft.” According to Hoad, it was the biggest threat since the introduction of Christianity into Samoa; the “whole of Christendom in Samoa was jeopardised.” The practice of “witchcraft” surfaced in 1931 but evidence showed that it had been infecting the church for many years. Mr John W. Liston, in charge of the Printing Press, claimed the practice had started within the Falealili District and its popularity was unquestionable as “a narrow track across the mountain is now wide enough to drive a car across.” The practice, also called by Hoad as “consulting the oracle,” soon spread to the nearby district of A’ana, especially in the parishes in the sub-district of Lefaga, Alofi, Lotofaga, Falelatai and Manono. It practically turned Samoan pastors into “quack doctors and fortune-tellers.”

Hoad immediately set up plans to curb the practice, which had spread like fire and enticed many Samoan church members under its power. Samoan pastors, Alesana and Sa’aga visited the perpetrators, and tried to stop all “witchcraft” activities, but were unsuccessful. A Deputation was then formed, made up of Hoad, and Samoan Elders Samelu and Filimoni, Samoan pastors Epelu, Tamate, Perelini, Laiva, Pilitati, and Samoan deacons Fata, Va'afusuaga and Nanai. The Deputation visited all the pastors and parishes involved in the “witchcraft” phenomenon, which included Amosa (Safa'atoa, Lefaga), Apela (Savaia, Lefaga), Iuvale (Si'ufaga, Falelatai), and Aseta (Salua, Manono). Two other Samoans pastors also involved, Elder Enosa (Falealili) and Solomon (Lotofaga), appeared before the Deputation under summons.

The Deputation were soon informed of the details of the so-called ‘consulting the oracle.’

A bible has a key partially inserted about the middle with the loop of the key protruding, and it is then bound tightly on both sides of the key so that the bible may be suspended by means of the key.

141 There is no Samoan term to describe what happened at Lefaga. The event described does not constitute ‘witchcraft’ as far as Europeans understood the concept. The pastors performed the functions of a Samoan taualaeua (one who treats sickness with aitu medicine) and also of a taualaitu (one who exercised spirits and communicates with the spirit world). I do not believe the Samoa pastors saw themselves as performers of witchcraft. See also Aitu Stories, Samoa Herald, 18 Aug, 1933.

142 Hoad to Chirgwin, 18 Mar, 1932, SSL.

143 Liston to Chirgwin, 24 Nov, 1931, SSL.

144 Phillips to Chirgwin, 15 Dec, 1931, SSL; see also Liston to Chirgwin, 24 Nov, 1931, SSL.

145 Hoad, Report on Recent Witchcraft Practice in Aana, 3 May, 1932, SSL.

146 Liston to Chirgwin, 24 Nov, 1931, SSL; Hoad, Report on Recent Witchcraft Practice in Aana, 3 May, 1932, SSL.
Two ways are then open, (1), for two people each using their index fingers beneath the loop of the key or, (2). For the pastor to use the index finger of both hands, Prayer is then offered on the following lines 'O God Almighty, thou knowest all things, and thou dost reveal thy will unto thy people through thy Holy Word, tell us therefore we beseech thee. (Then follows the question). If the answer is 'Yes' turn the bible we are thy children. Amen.\textsuperscript{147}

If the key turned, the answer was 'Yes', if not, the answer was 'No'. The simplicity of the method, and the fact that it actually entertained and fulfilled the longings and aspirations of many Samoans, made 'consulting the oracle' a very biblical and Christian thing. The fact that Samoan pastors promoted and took part in the matter gave it authenticity. It was another vehicle for young pastors to express their free will and take control of their own spiritual welfare.

In the end, the Deputation managed to convince the Samoan pastors involved to renounce their activities, especially when the police became involved after the death of four people. The deaths included a baby who was overdosed with ten calomel tablets, a Samoan who was ordered to drink an excessive amount of neat Lysol, a woman starved to death, and a man poisoned by Samoan medicine.\textsuperscript{148} When l'uvale was asked as to why he had given a baby 10 calomel tablets, he replied "I am clean in the sight of God, only such things as His Holy Word tells me I do."\textsuperscript{149} Apela also proved difficult as he referred to the so-called 'consulting the oracle' as the new way for God to reveal his will. This was a common mentality among the Samoan pastors involved.\textsuperscript{150}

The Samoan pastors involved and their parishioners, at first, stood their ground and defied the authority of the LMS deputation. According to Hoad, their task was not just to extinguish "witchcraft," but to secure the future of the Samoan (LMS) Church from the clutches of fanatical authoritarian Samoan pastors. In the end, the parishes concerned surrendered and agreed to part with their pastors. In all, eight pastors were imprisoned for manslaughter and witchcraft. The Samoan (LMS) Church itself dismissed all the pastors that had participated in any way with the phenomenon.\textsuperscript{151}

\textsuperscript{147} Hoad, Report on Recent Witchcraft Practice in Aana, 3 May, 1932, SSL.
\textsuperscript{148} Hoad, Report on Recent Witchcraft Practice in Aana, 3 May, 1932, SSL.
\textsuperscript{149} Hoad, Report on Recent Witchcraft Practice in Aana, 3 May, 1932, SSL.
\textsuperscript{150} Hoad, Report on Recent Witchcraft Practice in Aana, 3 May, 1932, SSL.
\textsuperscript{151} Hoad, Report on Recent Witchcraft Practice in Aana, 3 May, 1932, SSL. For a fuller picture of the incident, see Appendix B: Report on Recent Witchcraft Practice in Aana.
The challenges to the leadership of the Samoan (LMS) Church continued to perturb the Au Fa’atonu up to World War II. The impact of World War II on the lives of the Samoans took the Samoans’ independent visions to new heights, and provided new challenges. Many of the challenges were subtle, but occasionally, a major issue gripped the attention of the Samoan church leaders, and threatened to seize control of the Samoan (LMS) Church. The ongoing petitions for independence, during and after World War II not only stirred up political emotions, but also gave the Samoan church leaders further incentive to achieve their aims. The Samoan political vehicle also advanced to achieve its goal – independence.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE IMPACT OF WORLD WAR II
AND A MANDATE FOR INDEPENDENCE

The beginning of World War II was the final catalyst that set off a chain of events, which eventually took Samoa towards independence. World War II provided an opportunity to expose the Samoans to the technology and wealth of America, and an opportunity for the Samoans to re-evaluate their future together with New Zealand. Furthermore, World War II provided the allied nations of the world with an opportunity to consider the destiny of the axis powers’ colonies and to seek political and religious avenues to halt further incalculable destruction of world peace.

The scale and impact of World War II for Samoa was far greater than World War I, and unlike World War I, it overflowed the boundaries of Europe.¹ When war began in 1939, Turnbull put Samoa on military alert and was forced to place German citizens under house arrest, who were later interned in New Zealand.² Two German priests were among the internees and Darnand wrote to Archbishop O’Shea of the Catholic Church in New Zealand pointing out, “it is our earnest desire that they be not kept in any concentration camp.”³

On 7 December 1941, Japan bombed Pearl Harbour in Hawaii, but only succeeded in forcing America to join the war.⁴ America supported the allied nations against Germany and Italy in Europe, while in the Pacific it committed all its resources to protect mainland America and its Territories, including American Samoa; a key strategic location for the American Navy. New Zealand

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¹ The axis powers included Germany, Italy and Russia, and Japan. Russia, however became an ally against Germany after Germany attacked Russia in 1941. The allied nations included America, Britain and France. Britain and France declared war on Germany on 3 September 1939 after Germany had invaded Poland. See “World War II,” in Encyclopedia of the 20th Century, ed. John Drexel, Oxford: Facts on File, 1991; Chronicle of the 20th Century, Ringwood: Penguin Books, 1999.

² The application for the Germans’ release came from certain sectors of the community. The ‘Alien Emergency regulations, 1940’ was later implemented to restrict the movements of Germans in Samoa. See Unknown to Acting Administrator, 13 Oct, 1939, Darnand Correspondence, Marist Archives of Samoa and Tokelau (henceforth MAST); Turnbull to Darnand, 21 May, Darnand Correspondence, 1940, MAST; Alien Emergency Regulations, 1940, Darnand Correspondence, MAST.

³ Darnand to Archbishop O’Shea (NZ), 29 Apr, 1942, Darnand Correspondence, MAST; Turnbull to Darnand, 28 Apr, 1942, Darnand Correspondence, MAST; Darnand to Turnbull, 11 May, 1943, Darnand Correspondence, MAST.

⁴ Pearl Harbour Bombed: US is at War, 7 Dec, 1941, Chronicle of the 20th Century.
and Australia were also put on alert as they had interests in Samoa and Papua New Guinea respectively.\(^5\)

New Zealand and Australia were committed to Britain’s war effort in Europe and North Africa, although Australia was heavily committed to the defence of its own territory, and that left America dominant in the Pacific. A Japanese submarine shelled Pago Pago harbour in 1942, and prompted America to set up a permanent base in Samoa.\(^6\) Magia in Upolu was chosen for the campsite while at Faleolo, an airfield was constructed. A cross-island road linking Leulumoega in the west and Aleipata in the east was also constructed for easier troop and machinery movement, and to monitor the enemy presence. Many underground bunkers were built for the storage of ammunition and other combat increments. Apia harbour was also a very busy point of entry for American supplies and personnel.

Magia was the main American camp. It was fenced and well guarded, and very large to the extent that the Samoans referred to it as the ‘Taulaga Meleke’.\(^7\) The camp maintained a number of personnel to monitor and check supplies, and to guard the airfield. Many Samoans sought and received employment at Magia,\(^8\) and there was a continuous flow of Samoans to and from the Taulaga Meleke daily.

The contact between Maligi (American Marines or soldiers) and Samoans was not restricted to the camp at Magia and to the town of Apia. The

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\(^6\) Japan had been expelled from the League of Nations in 1933 for starting the war with China. After bombing Pearl Harbour, the Japanese advanced quickly through Asia, taking the American base and territories in the Philippines, Wake Island, and Guam. The Japanese took the British base in Hong Kong, and then captured 70,000 British troops as it routed Singapore. From Singapore, the Japanese planned to take Papua New Guinea and use it as base to attack Australia and New Zealand. The Americans recovered from the shock Japanese attacks and decisively won the Battle of the Coral Sea and the Battle of Midway, followed by their victory in Guadalcanal. Solomon, Kiribati, and Guam were all recaptured, and from then on the Japanese started to lose ground. See “World War II,” in Encyclopedia of the 20th Century, ed. John Drexel, Oxford: Facts on File, 1991; Chronicle of the 20th Century, Ringwood: Penguin Books, 1999.

\(^7\) Literally translated “American town.” Koke Aiono was 15 years old when the American occupation took place. She lived at Nofoalii, a village situated a few miles from the American base at Magia. Koke Aiono (58 years). Personal Interview, National University of Samoa, Apia, October 1995; also Toala Malaki (78 years). Personal Interview, Faga, Savai’i, September, 1995; Fa’i Maui’u (71 years). Personal Interview, Saleaula, Savai’i, September, 1995.

\(^8\) Su’a Isaia (83 years). Personal Interview, Saipipi, Savai’i, September 1995; Tupa’i Posese (70 years). Personal Interview, Safua, Savai’i, September 1995; Va’afusuaga To’oto’o II (75 years). Personal Interview, Sa’asa’aii, Savai’i, September, 1992; Su’a Toala Sami (78 years). Personal Interview, Salelavalu, Savai’i, September 1995; Soana’i Oeti (60 years). Personal Interview, Safua, Savai’i, November, December 1992.
Maligi maintained small bases throughout Upolu, Savai'i, Manono and Apolima, and from these bases they patrolled nearby villages. The Maligi became friendly with many Samoan families and as time passed, Samoan families adopted them.\(^9\) The Samoans washed the Maligis' clothes and provided Samoan goods on request. The Maligi gave the Samoans money, pocket-knives, screwdrivers and hammers, torches, hurricane lamps, canned food, *mitiafu meleke* (American singlets), cigarettes, alcohol, and other items the Maligi took for granted but the Samoans regarded as luxury items.\(^10\) In Apia, American wealth led to the establishment of new restaurants, stores, laundry outlets, dance halls, movie houses, and motels.\(^11\) It was the beginning of an association between two different cultures and diverse customs that would leave a lasting impression on the Samoans.\(^12\)

The presence of America in Samoa was positive for the Samoans. Samoans felt America cared more for them than New Zealand, especially when New Zealand had opted to defend Britain instead of Samoa. The Samoans showed their support and appreciation in obeying all orders and curfews without criticism, even when the Maligi acted violently towards Samoans who disobeyed.\(^13\) The Samoans took such violent outbursts as the result of ill-discipline on their part, and a true indication of the Maligi's willingness to safeguard Samoans from the Japanese. America was seen as the providers of goods, employment, and wealth. The sight of fighter planes, trucks, jeeps, and other mechanical wizardry impressed the Samoans immensely. The equal coexistence of Afro-American and white American soldiers impressed the

\(^9\) Koke Aiona (68 years). Personal Interview, National University of Samoa, Apia, October 1995; Vaolele Laulu Tevaga (96 years). Personal Interview, Safua, Savai'i, September, 1995; Ta'aseu Kuini (63 years). Personal Interview, Saipipi, Savai'i, September 1995.


\(^12\) For an appraisal of the impact of American occupation on other islands of the Pacific, and in the churches of those islands, see Charles Forman, *The Island Churches of the South Pacific: Emergence in the Twentieth Century*, Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1982, 139 – 144.

\(^13\) The curfew imposed from the 1 October 1942, was mainly between 9pm and 6 am the next morning, and it restricted movement and absenteeism from residence. Samoans that I interviewed revealed stories of Maligi brutality for Samoans lighting a match for a cigarette, lighting lamp for emergencies or a sick person. Babies were born in the dark. The curfews and orders relating to such curfews were revoked towards the end of 1944. See Curfew Orders, *Western Samoa Gazette*, no. 130, 1 Oct, 1942; Samoa Emergency Regulations, 1942, *Western Samoa Gazette*, no. 131, 24 Mar, 1943; Samoa Energy Order No. 7, *Western Samoa Gazette*, no. 131 & 132, 21 Jul, 1943 & 15 Mar, 1944; Curfew Revoked by Samoa Emergency Order No. 10, *Western Samoa Gazette*, no. 136, 1 Dec, 1944.
Samoans, and left them bitter towards their oppressive mentors. The Samoans envied American materialism and freedom, and sought to possess it, either under American rule or as an independent nation.\textsuperscript{14}

The presence of the Maligi led to a decline in morality and church attendance. Apia town attracted many Samoans, especially young men and women seeking opportunities to make money through work, gambling, and companionship. Some thirty-six kilometres from Apia, the Taulaga Meleke was not only a buzzing location daily but once a week a dance was held on Saturday night. The dances were restricted to Maligi and Samoan women who needed no invitation to attend. The dances not only attracted women from nearby villages but from other districts and Apia. The women learnt of the dance some days before and would travel and stay with families at villages near Magia. The dances provided Samoan women with an opportunity to smoke cigarettes and drink alcohol, a lifestyle that many Samoans were learning to imitate.\textsuperscript{15}

The dances fostered relationships between Maligi and Samoan women. The matai and pastors in many villages found it difficult to combat the problem of \textit{de facto} relationships, especially when the \textit{sa} [prohibition under village rules and regulations] and \textit{tapu} of the \textit{nu'u}, and Christian regulations were transgressed. At times, the task was much harder when those in leadership of the \textit{nu'u} promoted and encouraged such relationships for wealth.\textsuperscript{16} Samoan women became pregnant and by the end of the war, there were numerous 'blond hair blue eyes \textit{maligi se}' in Samoa.\textsuperscript{17} A Samoan, who had lived through the American occupation of Samoa, wrote a song soon after the war regarding relationships between the Maligi and Samoan women.

1. \textit{Outou teine o le atunu'u}
   Na ou fa'apea e le valea lou ulu
   Tama mai Meleke ua taunu'u
   Ae vali ai fua lava ou laugutu

1. You girls of the country [Samoa]
   I thought you were not foolish
   The boys from America arrive
   And you begin to paint your lips

\textsuperscript{14} Nanai Fa'asa (75 years). Personal Interview, Falelatai, Upolu, October 1995; Va'afusuaga To'oto'o Il (75 years). Personal Interview, Sa'asa'ai, Savai'i, September 1995; Su'a Toala Sami (78 years). Personal Interview, Salelavalu, Savai'i, September 1995; Tutuaitu Ualesi (66 years). Personal Interview, Saipipi, Savai'i, September 1995.

\textsuperscript{15} Koke Aiono (68 years). Personal Interview, National University of Samoa, Apia, October 1995; Reverend Lupeli Lupeli (82 years). Personal Interview, Alafua, Apia, October 1995.

\textsuperscript{16} Nanai Fa'asa (75 years). Personal Interview, Falelatai, Upolu, October 1995; Taefu Tupou (77 years). Personal Interview, Falelatai, Upolu, October 1995; Taefu Matai (69 years). Personal Interview, Falelatai, Upolu, October 1995.

\textsuperscript{17} The term \textit{maligi se} (lost marine or accidental marine) was used as a derogatory term for the illegitimate children of the Maligi. The term \textit{maligi} itself was later used for identity as the derogatory term \textit{maligi se} disappeared. See Koke Aiono (68 years). Personal Interview, National University of Samoa, Apia, October 1995
Su'e mai se'evae ma fa'amaulu
Ae le masani talu o na e tupu
E te usu lava i le togaulu
E toli mai ni ulu e fai se umu

You find the shoes and put it on
But you never use to do it since birth
You go early to the breadfruit trees
To get breadfruit for an umu

2. Sosola uma o seila i Meleke
   Tia'i oe i le alatele
   Nofonofo solo i le aualatele
   Ma si ou foga ua tau malepe
   Ua uma fo'i aso o le fa'apepe
   I talane o le tama mai Meleke
   Ua uma na ou faiatu
   Aua e te mateletele
   E te i'u lava i le tu sameme

Sailors have all run away to America
Abandoning you on the road
You sit by the roadside
With your face falling apart (crying)
Over were the days of romancing
Next to the boy from America
I have already told you
Don't be arrogant
You will end up with nothing

The lyrics of the song suggested that Samoan men detested the relationships between Samoan women and the Maligi. The animosity was probably prompted by the jealousy of young men over a shortage of women due to the Maligi's presence. The song also suggested that women neglected their responsibilities to their families, as they preferred to patronise Apia in the company of the Maligi, and ultimately described the women's disappointment when the Maligi left Samoa.

The song also highlighted a negative aspect of the American occupation of Samoa — prostitution. The wealth of the Maligi drove families to set up small brothels within their own homes. Samoan families would invite Maligi to their homes for fellowship and, eventually, recreation and pleasure. Many families had special curtains drawn for the benefit of the Maligi and a female member of the family. At times the financial gain was so overwhelming a Samoan would offer his wife for sexual favours. The church leaders from the various missions were not immune from temptation. At the Methodist Synod in 1946, a teacher was expelled from the church "for having allowed his house and daughter to be used for infamous purposes [prostitution]." Wealth tempted and encouraged many Samoans to sacrifice their daughters and family members. Samoans

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18 An umu is a Samoan way of cooking food with hot stones covered by banana and breadfruit leaves.
19 The song, entitled 'Oe Teine o le Atunuu,' was composed by Siaki Lapana of Palolo Deep, Matautu-tai, Upolu. The English translation is only a literal translation provided by the author. I cannot date this song, although when I grew up as a child in Samoa in the 1960s it was already a very popular song.
20 But, the Samoan women were not the only ones neglecting their duties. The young Samoan men preferred to play maligi all day rather than tending the family plantations. Consequently, many plantations laid waste. Reverend Lupeli Lupeli (82 years). Personal Interview, Alafua, Apia, October 1995.
21 The incident occurred in 1945 before the Maligi had left Samoa and was only dealt with in the 1946 Synod. See Minutes of the Annual District Synod of the Samoan District, Saleaula, No. 26 – 29, 1946, Samoa Methodist Church Archives.
blamed the Maligi for demanding sexual relationships with Samoan women, and for offering large sums of money that were too tempting to resist.\textsuperscript{22} In the end, it was the greediness of the Samoans' themselves that contributed to a decline in morality. The Samoan leaders wanted to take control of their country to counter the 'evil' influences affecting their society.

The missions were also concerned about the lack of morality displayed by their members. The Samoans mimicked Maligi lifestyles to the point of spending Sundays with the Maligi. Furthermore, the \textit{matai} and church members that the missions relied on for maintaining church discipline promoted immorality. The Samoan pastors lacked the authority to discipline young people of the churches, because the \textit{matai} they relied upon for carrying out the discipline in the villages were ill-disciplined themselves, and lacked moral standards. It was not easy for the Samoans to maintain a strict spiritual life in competition with wealth. The increased wealth being contributed to the church would have also compromised the moral positions of the \textit{matai} as well as the pastors.

American troops entered Japan in April 1945. At the same time, the allied nations inaugurated the United Nations on 25 April 1945.\textsuperscript{23} On 7 May 1945, Germany surrendered unconditionally, while America gave Japan an ultimatum to surrender. Japan remained defiant, and on 6 and 9 August 1945, America dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki respectively. Japan surrendered five days later, and America emerged as a superpower. By the end of the war, over 55 million people, including Pacific Islanders, had sacrificed their lives for world peace.\textsuperscript{24}

The Maligi left Samoa at the end of 1945. They were forced to leave behind 'sweethearts' and \textit{many maligi se} as a legacy of their occupation. It was not easy for Samoans as well, especially women who had developed intimate relationships with the Maligi, to disguise the pain as close ties were severed unexpectedly. Many Samoan families lost not just relationships, but also a regular income. The Maligi probably felt the same pain, but they were comforted

\textsuperscript{22} A similar problem was also prevalent in Tonga during the American occupation of that island. See Siosua F. Pouvalu Lafitani, "New Behaviours and Migration Since World War II," in Echoes of Pacific War, eds. D. Scarr, N. Gunson, J. Tyrrell, Canberra: Target Oceania, 1998.

\textsuperscript{23} This replaces the old League of Nations. It had forty-six participating members. See UN is Born in San Francisco, 25 Apr, 1945, \textit{Chronicle of the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century}.

by the idea of returning home as heroes for their country; an honour the Maligi felt was far more important. Many Samoans were happy with the departure of the Maligi, as they contemplated the immense impact the Maligi had on the Samoans. The wealth and technology, and a different lifestyle created a craving among the Samoans for material goods and independence. For the Samoan leaders, they were again given the chance to preserve the purity of the Samoan race and the normality of Samoan life.\textsuperscript{25}

The missions were also happy in more ways then one. On one hand, the departure of the Maligi was an incentive for young Samoans to return to church. Most importantly, it was a chance to halt immoral practices, such as prostitution and to return Samoan families to the practice of Christian principles.\textsuperscript{26}

Lieutenant-Colonel Francis William Voelcker, the new administrator of Samoa in 1946, wrote to the various missions regarding Samoan morals as the basis to unity. He wanted to see “every Samoan catechist and pastor an active force, seven days a week, for Christian morals and clean Christian government.”\textsuperscript{27}

Voelcker further reminded the missions,

To my mind it is not enough to talk of love and inveigh against sin from the pulpit on Sundays. These Samoan clergies must know who are the thieves, adulterers, trouble makers, produce cheats and all who offend against the laws of God and man. Even those who do not send their children to school, are cruel, or lean lazily on their aiga and do not do their share in the community life.\textsuperscript{28}

Voelcker’s comments highlighted the problems with children and young people failing to attend school, and not attending their family plantations; a problem that started with too much attachment to the Maligi. Voelcker shared the missions’ vision to influence the Samoans to regain their sense of industriousness.

The missions were concerned with the number of maligi se left behind to be cared for by Samoans, without any assistance from America. The rise in crime was also a concern as the taste for luxury goods, and the ready availability of alcohol, tempted the Samoans. The missions called for an establishment of a Board to distribute and monitor the availability of alcohol.

\textsuperscript{25} Reverend Lupeli Lupeli (82 years). Personal Interview, Alafua, Apia, October 1995.

\textsuperscript{26} There are no indications of sexually transmitted diseases having spread among the Samoans due to contact with the Maligi, but it was possible that such diseases were prevalent. For a comparison see example from Tonga in Siosua F. Pouvalu Lafitani, “New Behaviours and Migration Since World War II,” in \textit{Echoes of Pacific War}, eds. D. Scarr, N. Gunson, J. Tyrrell, Canberra: Target Oceania, 1998.

\textsuperscript{27} Voelcker to Darnand, 25 Oct, 1946, Darnand Correspondence, MAST.

\textsuperscript{28} Voelcker to Darnand, 25 Oct, 1946, Darnand Correspondence, MAST.
The Catholic leaders advised Turnbull, "there should always be some very definite control of distribution in view of our native population and of the overwhelming evils and abuses that would overtake our young people were they permitted easy access to strong drink."\textsuperscript{29}

The end of the war saw changes in the Samoans' attitude towards the New Zealand administration. The Fono a Faipule began to dominate and influence political decisions, as it restricted the role of the administrator into taking malaga and distributing gifts. The new attitude rendered the administrator almost useless as he tried to maintain his integrity and the precedence of his position under the circumstances. On the other side of the world, the United Nations decided the fate of Germany's colonies. Samoa was put under a United Nations Trusteeship with trusteeship entrusted to New Zealand. Under the terms of the Trusteeship, New Zealand was ordained to carry out four basic duties.\textsuperscript{30}

1. To promote progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each Territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned.

2. To foster the development of free political institutions suited to Western Samoa.

3. To assure to the inhabitants of Western Samoa a progressively increasing share in the administrative and other services of the Territory.

4. To develop the participation of the inhabitants of Western Samoa in advisory and legislative bodies and in government of the Territory.

The Samoans first realised their fate when Turnbull presented to the Fono a Faipule a Trusteeship Agreement for Samoa on 28 October 1946. The Samoans unequivocally rejected the proposal, citing that they were not consulted on the matter, and wrote to the United Nations objecting to the trusteeship proposal.

We...submit to the present session of the United Nations' Organisation... the freely expressed wishes of the Samoan people as declared at the Fono held at Mulineu... based on our firm belief in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, which have been

\textsuperscript{29} Darnand to Turnbull, 17 Feb, 1946, Darnand Correspondence, MAST.

proclaimed throughout the world and confirmed by the House of Parliament in New Zealand and for which millions of lives have been sacrificed. The proposed draft Agreement of the Trusteeship concerning which you sought our views was discussed at length at the said Fono and, while we recognise that this represents an advance upon the Mandate, we feel that an acceptance of it would bring us no nearer [to] our ultimate aim of self-government for which we have earnestly and consistently striven under the Mandate.\textsuperscript{31}

The Samoans set out before the United Nations three issues they believed should be considered.\textsuperscript{32}

1. We humbly beseech that Samoa be granted self-government.

2. We earnestly pray that New Zealand will see fit to act as Protector and Advisor to Samoa in the same capacity as England is to Tonga.

3. We sincerely pray that the unnatural division of the islands of Samoa Groups enforced by the Three Powers in the past without the consent of the Samoans be left in abeyance until a meeting can be arranged between Eastern and Western Samoa.

The petition was a protest over the United Nations' failure to canvass Samoan opinions, and a 'shot in the eye' for New Zealand's deceitful treatment of the Samoans. The Samoans were irate with New Zealand tabling the agreement before the United Nations, while discussion was taking place in Samoa.\textsuperscript{33}

The petition presented several demands. The Samoans, while appreciating the efforts of the United Nations, rejected the idea of Trusteeship in favour of immediate self-government instead of full independence. It also requested New Zealand to act as protector and adviser, although it was not a sign that New Zealand had been forgiven, but only a goodwill gesture to the United Nations. The petition was also a message to the United Nations that Samoans had had enough foreign rule, and that the idea of a trusteeship was

\textsuperscript{31} Fautua, Members of the Legislative Council, Associate Judges, Faipule and District Representatives to The Administrator of Samoa, 18 Nov, 1946, MAST.

\textsuperscript{32} Fautua, Members of the Legislative Council, Associate Judges, Faipule and District Representatives to The Administrator of Samoa, 18 Nov, 1946, MAST.

\textsuperscript{33} Report to the Trusteeship Council by the United Nations Mission to Western Samoa, 4 Jul – 28 Aug, 1947, GP.
no different from a mandate; it placed Samoa under the authority of another nation.\textsuperscript{34}

New Zealand presented Samoa's petition to the United Nations General Assembly in November 1946, and its representatives, Sir Carl Berendsen and C. G. R. Mckay, argued that Samoa was not ready for self-government.\textsuperscript{35} The Trusteeship council approved New Zealand's plans for trusteeship, and postponed the discussion on the Samoan's petition to 26 February 1947. In that meeting, the council proposed that a United Nations visitation team would personally ascertain for itself Samoans' readiness for self-government. The council proposed two aims for the visit.\textsuperscript{36}

1. To investigate the petition dated 18 November 1946 of the Fautua, members of the Legislative Council, associate Judges, Faipule and district representatives of Western Samoa that Western Samoa be granted self-government, and

2. To visit Western Samoa for this purpose, to remain in the Territory for a sufficient period to ascertain all the relevant facts and to report back to the Trusteeship Council.

New Zealand conducted its own investigation and reaffirmed its earlier view that Samoa was not ready for self-government.\textsuperscript{37}

The visitation team arrived in Samoa between 4 and 9 July 1947, and stayed on until 28 August 1947 to complete its investigation.\textsuperscript{38} The visit exposed the United Nations to the feelings of the Samoans regarding their future and

\textsuperscript{34} Samoans seemed to misunderstand the difference between Mandate and Trusteeship. Mandate does not specify self-government, while a Trusteeship includes preparing a country for self-government. See Report to the Trusteeship Council by the United Nations Mission to Western Samoa, 4 Jul – 28 Aug, 1947, GP.

\textsuperscript{35} Record of the Sixth Meeting of Sub-committee 1 of the Fourth Committee of the First Session of the General Assembly, 23 Nov, 1945, GP; Record of the Sixth Meeting of Sub-committee 1 of the Fourth Committee of the First Session of the General Assembly, 25 Nov, 1945; GP; Summary Record of the Thirteenth Meeting of the Sub-committee 1 of the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly, 30 Nov, 1946, GP.

\textsuperscript{36} Report to the Trusteeship Council by the United Nations Mission to Western Samoa, 4 Jul – 28 Aug, 1947, GP.

\textsuperscript{37} The administrations' Secretary for Native Affairs in Samoa, F. J. H. Grattan, and another member of the New Zealand team to the United Nations' visitation team, J. W. Davidson, produced several reports that were later presented to the United Nations' visitation team. See A Political Review, May 1947, GP; The Political Structure of Western Samoa..., 10 Jul, 1947, GP; Western Samoa – Fitness for Self-Government, 10 Jul, 1947, GP; Grattan to Shanahan, 1 Feb 1947, GP; Native Administration and Local Government in Western Samoa (Davidson), 21 Jul, 1947, GP.

\textsuperscript{38} The team consisted of United Nations staff, Francis B. Sayre, Pierre Ryckmans, Eduardo Cruz-Coke, and Felix Keesing (Professor of Anthropology Stanford University). Members of the secretariat included Peter Anker, Jean de la Roche, Cearlho de Palva Leite and Regina Raspler. The New Zealand delegation included C. G. R. McKay, J. W. Davidson (Professor Colonial Administration Cambridge University), Ernest Beaglehole (Professor Anthropology Victoria University), Dr. Beeby, Mr Parsonage, G. Larkin, and P. T. G. Patrick. See Report to the Trusteeship Council by the United Nations Mission to Western Samoa, 4 Jul – 28 Aug, 1947, GP.
their aspiration for self-government, and clarified for the Samoans many issues New Zealand had failed to explain or, at least, the Samoans had failed to hear New Zealand’s explanation. It showed Samoan reluctance to believe New Zealand in any matters regarding their future. The team heard statements from all sectors of the Samoan community, including papalagi and missionaries. The Samoans’ constant demand was “we want to be free; we want self-government because it is our birthright….we want roads, and schools, and health….more than New Zealand has given us,” while others pointed out that “the Samoans should control [their] own Government, and run it according to [their] will.” Many Samoans wore the Mau uniform to re-enforce their stance for self-government. The papalagi were not against self-government but wanted a ‘transitional period’ of ten or more years before self-government. They submitted a four-point document outlining their views and suggested ideas to be included in the final plans for self-government. The idea of a transitional period was also suggested by the matai of Falealili District. Falealili matai were more loyal to the administration than most Samoans, and believed a transitional period would give the Samoans more time to learn how to govern, as immediate self-government would take Samoa back to the rivalries of the past.

The working relationship between the missions during this period was benevolent, as they absorbed the euphoria of the period. The WMMS and Lotu Pope were very supportive of Samoan aspirations, as a change in government would not greatly affect their mission status. The Lotu Pope, especially, would remain a foreign mission using Latin for its Mass, while maintaining a clergy that were mainly European priests, who continued to fa’alologa le koluse (sign the cross) under the authority of the Pope. For the LMS missionaries, it was a case

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41 The four points referred to a ‘transitional period’ before granting self-government, included memberships in the legislation, finance matters, and education. See Points to be Recommended to the Samoans by the Citizens Committee on Self-government, GP.
43 Damand to Voelcker, 26 Dec, 1948, Damand Correspondence, MAST; G. Powles to Damand 21 Dec, 1949, Damand Correspondence, MAST; Powles to Damand, 1 Jun, 1953, Damand Correspondence, MAST.
of ua le o gatasi le futia ma le umele (the sinnet ring and the stand for the fishing rod do not go together).\(^44\)

The LMS missionaries in Samoa were probably ecstatic about the move towards political independence, but were not so overjoyed with the knowledge that they would also surrender the leadership of the Samoan (LMS) Church. There was a rift between the Au Fa’atonu and the Au Matutua over the plans to continue efforts to give the Samoan (LMS) Church independence. The LMS missionaries would have preferred a transitional period in the same way some Samoans and papalagi were advocating, than to give up total control of the mission. But, the LMS missionaries were hard pressed to stop the Samoan church from achieving its aspiration, especially when its members, such as Mata’afa Faumuina Fiame Mulini’u II and Malietoa Tanumafili II, were also at the forefront of negotiations for political self-government. The support of the church for their efforts was unquestionable, and observers would have been excused in thinking that it was the independence of the Samoa (LMS) Church that the Samoan political leaders were pursuing; such was the intimacy of the two organisations. This was an aspect of the independence movement that the LMS missionaries failed to perceive, because they were blinded by their obsession to remain ‘lords’ over the Samoan church.

The visitation team gave the Samoans confidence that they were finally being heard, and their wish was being seriously considered. Self-government had been launched in a way more meaningful to the Samoans, and nothing was going to impede its progress. The United Nations had confirmed self-government by their visit.

The petition to the United Nations, the meeting among both Samoans and Europeans to work out the details of the case of self-government, the appointment of the Commission by the Trusteeship Council; have given the movement its own momentum; even the leaders could not stop it now, if they would; they can merely clarify and modify the form of their demands.\(^45\)

The Samoans presented a draft as the basis for a government structure. It proposed a change in the existing constitutional bodies, which comprised a

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\(^{44}\) The bonito fishing rod is fastened to the thwart by means of a sinnet ring (futia). The lower end rests in a stand to which it is tied by means of a rope (umele). Both ropes must be of equal strength, lest one of them tear when a bonito bites. It’s a saying, which implies that when two people or sides are in partnership, they must be of one mind. Should one be weak and faint-hearted, the undertaking will fail.

Primary Authority (the authority of New Zealand over Samoa from the United Nations), a Secondary Authority (the authority of the administrator of Samoa), and an Advisory or Assisting Authority to the Administrator (the Fautua and Fono a Faipule). In its place, the Samoans proposed to change it to the authority of the three tama-a-aiga, Malietoa, Tuiatua, and Tuia'anana. The respect accorded to them was very clear.

Each of them should be provided with a residence proper for their rank....They should be provided also with furniture, cars, servants as at present allowed to His Excellency the Administrator.\(^{46}\)

It was also proposed that the Samoan Parliament would consist of the Fono a Faipule, and from it a Premier, Ministers, and a tulafale (orator) of the House\(^ {47}\) would be elected. The proposal also clarified the positions relating to various government departments, and other aspects of government such as duties and taxation. It also aimed at replacing expatriate New Zealanders with Samoans, while keeping the existing monetary rewards and perks intact.\(^ {48}\) The proposed government structure reflected the materialistic position of the Samoan leaders.

The visitation team recommended that New Zealand continued to be responsible for Samoa and that Samoans be kept informed of all transactions regarding their future in order to keep peaceful relations intact. New Zealand assured the United Nations it would be carrying out its trusteeship of Samoa according to United Nations recommendations.\(^ {49}\) The Samoans made sure New Zealand moved things along according to their will. For instance, in 1948 the Fono a Faipule wrote to the New Zealand Prime Minister that Samoa had adopted its own flag, and proposed to cancel the office of Fautua in favour of a Council of State, occupied together by the High Commissioner of New Zealand and the existing Fautua.\(^ {50}\) It was part of the continuous campaign to exorcise European authority or, at least, to achieve equal footing.

Preparations for independence began in March 1950. A special commission was appointed to draft a constitution based on Samoan protocol

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\(^ {46}\) Constitution of the Government of Samoa, Draft, 1947, GP.

\(^ {47}\) It is interesting that the Samoans preferred to use the concept of orator (tulafale) rather than speaker of the house. It was intended to keep Samoa's parliament close to the fa'asamoa.

\(^ {48}\) Constitution of the Government of Samoa, Draft, 1947, GP.


\(^ {50}\) Legislative Assembly of Samoa Debates 1948, vol 1, 2 Jun, 1948 and 29 Jun, 1948.
and one that would also reflect democracy. The commission included three *matai* each from Savai'i and Upolu. They included Tofa Tomasi, an *afakasi*, Tuala Tulo, Matai'a S'i'u, and Tofilau Siose, who held other official government posts, and Fa'amatuaina Tulifau and Namulau'ulu Siaosi, well known *tulafale* of Lufilufi and Safotulafai respectively.\(^{51}\)

The committee added two translators and interpreters, namely Etene Sa'aga and Arorae Petaia. Etene Sa'aga's father was a lecturer at Malua and a great leader of the church in the 1930s, while Arorae Petaia was a grandson of Va'aelua Petaia, another great leader of the church who died in the 1918 epidemic. Both men were educated at Malua, but chose to serve in the government administration. They possessed the intelligence and commitment of their forbears, and had gained the respect of Samoans within the church and in the political arena. The commission relied on them to explain and clarify the issue of independence to the Samoans, and it gave them an avenue not only to fulfil their role as government officials, but also to influence Samoans to support Samoa's quest for independence.\(^{52}\)

The committee embarked on a *malaga* to ascertain Samoan opinions on the content of the constitution and enlightened the Samoans on the process of independence. Davidson, who was part of the committee, was surprised with the number of Samoans, *afakasi*, and *papalagi* entrepreneurs who were reluctant to support the *status quo*. The planters, such as Va'ai Ropati Sale'imoa and his sons Va'ai Kolone and Lesatele Rapi, Tufuga Fatu, Seumanutafa Lafoaiali'i, To'omata Tua, Usu Tevita, and Anapu Solofa, had wealth and preferred the existing conditions. In other villages, the leading *matai* rejected any form of Samoan authority or interference from a central government, and saw independence as an avenue for free speech and individuality.\(^{53}\) The commission was not impressed with such philosophy, as it would undermine any proposed constitution for a future independent state, and could influence Samoans to reject independence.\(^{54}\) The opposition to

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\(^{51}\) Namulau'ulu Siaosi died early in the work of the commission and was replaced by Tuilagi Fetu, also of Safotulafai. See J. W. Davidson, *Samoa mo Samoa: The Emergence of the Independent State of Samoa*, Melbourne: Oxford University, 1967, 265.

\(^{52}\) Davidson, 268 – 271.

\(^{53}\) For instance, Ulupoao, a son of Tamasese Tupua Lealofi, in the village of Papa, Palauli, abolished all village *fono* and regulations in favour of free speech for all village members in matters pertaining to the village's welfare.

\(^{54}\) Davidson, 234 – 249.
independence persisted as the committee continued their malaga around the islands, especially from villages and districts loyal to New Zealand. But, over time, many Samoans embraced the call for independence, although their real feelings regarding the issue remained concealed, as they awaited the outcome of the new constitution.

The period after the war also witnessed an explosion in missionary work in the Pacific. New Protestant missionary efforts, especially from America under new Christian and non-Christian church denominations and mission groups, entered the Pacific as some of the mainline missions were preparing to leave. Furthermore, in 1948, the Christian churches worldwide celebrated the inauguration of the World Council of Churches (WCC) in its first assembly in Amsterdam. It was a significant event for Christianity because WCC used the assembly to challenge the various missions to give local churches the opportunity to participate in the ecumenical movement as independent churches. For the LMS it was a challenge that was in line with its own philosophy regarding the Samoan (LMS) Church, and the fact that the Cook Islands Church was given self-government just after the war in 1945, confirmed their commitment to church independence. The WCC’s vision for independent churches made it easier for the Samoan church leaders and, to some degree, the LMS missionaries, to accept the proceedings at hand.

The arrival of Dr John Bradshaw as Principal of Malua Theological College in 1956 was more than just a missionary appointment. It was an attempt by the Au Matutua to prepare Malua to endure the changes effected by independence. Bradshaw was a scientist and inventor and he took Malua to new heights in academic discipline. He was a practical man who truly believed in hard physical work and academic excellence. He used his scientific knowledge to install an electric generator in Malua, the first outside Apia.

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55 This was the period of great Mormon insertion into the Pacific including Samoa. See Forman, 144.
57 In an excellent study by Charles Forman in relation to Church independence, it was found that eventually many of the churches in the Pacific had independence forced upon them (except for Samoa and Tonga) as mission societies began to divert their resources to other aspect of mission elsewhere. Fortunately, the transition period was long enough to achieve independence of these churches with ease and very few problems. The delay was very much due to the lack of indigenous trained leadership available. See Forman, The Island Churches of the South Pacific.
enisini o lamepa (the engine of lamps), as it was dubbed, lit Malua so brightly, many referred to it as New York city. It astounded so many people, especially during the Fono Tele, that there was an instant demand by Samoans to implement such esesini o lamepa in their own villages.

Bradshaw raised the standard of the entrance examination to Malua to ensure that only quality students entered the college, and consequently, the number of entrants was reduced. Bradshaw made English compulsory to further raise the standard of education, and to increase the chance of perusing the vast amount of printed knowledge available. Many students were made to attain the 'Certificate of Proficiency in Religious Knowledge' from the University of London as part of the plan to prepare educated leaders for the new Samoan independent church. The pursuits for academic excellence not only benefited the Samoan church in later years, but also provide educated Samoans to fill government positions.

The formation of WCC did not, at first, have any influence on the Roman Catholic Church to review its stance regarding ecumenism and the indigenous status of its many parishes around the world. It was still carrying out its own reforms which had been put in place by the first Vatican Council of 1869. However, in 1959, under new Pontiff leadership, Pope John XXIII called for an ecumenical council to look at ways of renewing the spiritual life of the church, to update the teaching, discipline, and organisation of the church, and to address the issue of Christian unity. In 1960, Pope John XXIII took a further step in fulfilling his vision by establishing the Secretariat for Promoting Christian Unity, in an effort to develop ecumenical relations with WCC. In 1961, the Roman Catholic sent representatives for the first time to a WCC assembly. In 1962, the second Vatican Council gave the Roman Catholic parishes around the world the opportunity to worship and conduct their ministry in their own vernacular and cultural expressions. For the Lotu Pope in Samoa, it was the closest they would ever get to independence; the Pope still remained the head of the Roman

58 This term is common among oral traditions about Malua's history. Today it is mainly heard in one of the old anthems of the college, namely 'Malua e, Io'U Sei (Malua my flower [worn on the ear]).

59 Dr. Otele S. Perelini, Principal Malua Theological College, “A History of Malua Theological College 1944 – 1994,” Address given at the 150th Anniversary of the Malua Theological College, Malua, 24 Set, 1994 (I was present in the celebration and heard the address personally).

Catholic Church in Samoa. The indigenisation process took some time before it was implemented due to the reluctance of the European priests to advance and carry out the resolutions, and the lack of trained indigenous leaders, delayed the transition from a 'foreign' liturgy to worshipping fa'asamoa.\(^6\)

On 9 December 1960, the United Nations independence committee heard submissions from the New Zealand government, and Samoan government representatives. The New Zealand government proposed to give Samoa its independence on 1 January 1962 and, in doing so, released New Zealand from the terms of the Trusteeship. Fiame spoke and reaffirmed Samoa's commitment to independence.

The Samoan people have never wavered in their desire for independence....Samoan aspirations have been fully accepted by the New Zealand Government. But, although our relations with New Zealand are – and are likely to remain – close and friendly, we believe that the time has come for us to attain the status of an independent nation.\(^6\)

Fiame assured the Council of the Samoans acceptance of a plebiscite under universal suffrage, although in his opinion the plebiscite was unnecessary. The council recommended that a plebiscite be conducted in May 1961.

The year 1961 was an eventful one for the Samoans. Between 22 April and 4 May 1961, mission churches from around the Pacific met at Malua. It was an event that further encouraged Samoans to embrace church independence and participate fully in Samoa's political aspirations. The Pacific church leaders had gathered to meet each other, and to implement ways to promote ecumenism within the Pacific churches. The meeting at Malua was the forerunner in the establishment of the Pacific Conference of Churches, and the Pacific Theological College.\(^6\) It was an important stage for the Pacific church leaders to make an impression, especially with Samoa in the limelight of international interest over its preparations for independence. The Pacific church leaders were exposed to the phenomenon of political and church

\(^6\) The ascendancy of Cardinal (later Archbishop) Pio Taofinuu to the leadership of the Lotu Pope in Samoa in the 1970s, implemented changes recommended by Vatican II. The fa'asamoa became an integral part of the worship life of the members to the extent of using the Samoan language and its culture and customs (such as ie toga, presentation of a sua [offering of food], and wearing traditional Samoan dress and flower necklaces) to advance their spirituality.

\(^6\) Davidson, 402.

\(^6\) For a background of the Malua meeting and the history of the Pacific Conference of Churches, see Charles Forman, The Voice of Many Waters: Story of the Life of the Pacific Conference of Churches In the Last 25 Years, Suva: Pacific Conference of Churches (Lotu Pasefika Production), 1986.
independence; a challenge and a catalyst for their own independence aspirations.

The Pacific church leaders dispersed with God's blessings, and five days later, on 9 May 1961, the committee carried out a plebiscite under universal suffrage to canvass Samoan opinions on a newly drafted constitution and whether Samoa should be given independence. The Samoan political leaders rejected the proposal of universal suffrage in favour of matai voters only and, in doing so, made a mockery of Fiame's earlier assurance to the United Nations.

The Samoan leaders felt that the matai had fully grasped the significance of the constitution and the importance of independence, a plebiscite under universal suffrage would, therefore, undermined matai status and role as sole representative and speaker for their families. The plebiscite was viewed as an insult and a sign of disrespect to the matai honour. The Samoan matai eventually conceded to universal suffrage when it seemed their objection would jeopardise their struggle. The Samoans had witnessed the church leaders of the Pacific taking charge of their own affairs, and many deacons, lay preachers, and stewards of the church who participated in that event took the lead in fulfilling the plebiscite. The Samoan pastors, in pursuing their own independent aspirations, persuaded their members to display a similar inclination towards political independence, and with the existing euphoria for independence at its height, the combination of the church and political groups was a recipe for success. The result of the plebiscite was overwhelming with 80% supporting the constitution and 70% affirming Samoa's independence, while a quarter of the Samoans remained dejected and undecided. On 1 January 1962, the resilience of the Samoans was finally rewarded. The New Zealand flag was lowered and for the first time the Samoan flag fluttered by itself in the breeze at Mulinu'u to signal its new status as the independent State of Western Samoa. A few months later, the Samoa (LMS) Church became independent as the Ekalesia Fa'apotopotoga Kerisiano i Samoa (EFKS).

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64 Davidson, 406.
65 One such deacon was Mata'afa Faumuina Fiame Mulinu'u II, who spoke at the United Nations in 1960 and later became the first Prime Minister of Samoa in 1962, and in the following year became the first Chairman of the General Assembly of the EFKS.
66 Davidson, 406.
67 In July 1997, a change in the constitution changed the name from Western Samoa to the Independent State of Samoa. The Ekalesia Fa'apotopotoga Kerisiano i Samoa (EFKS) is also known as the Congregational Christian Church in Samoa (CCCS).
CONCLUSION

The independence of Samoa and the Samoa (LMS) Church did not happen overnight. They were not triumphs that resulted from an isolated incident or a single event prior to 1962. They were not accomplishments that could be attributed to any heroic deeds or to any one organisation or nation, although it cost the lives of people from several nations. The ecclesiastical and political face of Samoa's independence has been outlined in the preceding chapters, and it influenced and coerced the Samoans to aspire for independence. While the political face of independence has been expanded with new materials to give Samoan political history breadth, the ecclesiastical factors have been important in filling a void that has plagued Samoan history overall – the lack of a church perspective and analysis in Samoan history. This study has attempted to fill that void, especially in drawing attention to ecclesiastical factors, which had a significant impact on Samoa’s independence aspirations. It is hoped a broader and yet compact history of Samoa, which was not only influenced by the political notions, but also church ideas, has been achieved.

In recent years there have been specific studies of the New Zealand and German administrations in Samoa, focusing on specific issues such as the Mau, mandate and trusteeship, Chinese labourers, decolonisation, law and the fa’asamoa, genealogy, and Samoan traditions and culture, by scholars such as Kilifoti Eteuati, N. Plimmer, D. R. Haynes, William Lowe, S. M. Rutherford, M. C. Gilford, Jack Gill, I’uogafa Tuagalu, Asiata Va’ai, and Atoese M. Tuimaleali’ifano, all of whom concentrated on a specific aspect of Samoan history from a political perspective. The church perspective and how the missions and church members perceived such aspects of Samoan history were dealt with only briefly.

There have also been numerous publications, older and recent, relating to Samoan political history, by J. W. Davidson, R. P. Gilson, Sylvia Masterman, Paul Kennedy, Michael Field, Nancy Tom, and Malama Meleisea, Mary Boyd, Stewart Firth, and Hugh Laracy. While these historians attempted to outline a comprehensive history of Samoa, their efforts were generally hindered by their personal focuses and because they largely viewed their subject from a political perspective. Again, the church and mission perspectives were largely ignored.

For instance, Davidson’s excellent account of Samoan history is generally restricted to a political history that highlights the Samoan struggle for self-government, and a history that reflects Davidson’s own personal involvement in Samoa’s trusteeship for independence. Field’s superb study on the Mau is very much restricted to the political aspects of that period, and has the tendency to highlight the contributions of Olaf Nelson and the Tamasese family. The role of the church and mission, especially the LMS, is mentioned but has not been analysed and linked to the Mau itself. Tom’s admirable study of Samoan Chinese was restricted to a Chinese perspective, and lacked a firm connection to Samoa’s overall political history. Meleisea’s *Lagaga: A Short History of Western Samoa* provides a good broad account of Samoan history, while *The Making of Modern Samoa*, addresses such issues as land alienation and the work of the Samoan Land Commission. A general history has been presented without the church and mission perspective. When these specific studies, both theses and monographs, are incorporated and read as a single study of Samoan history, they present a broad and rich political history of Samoa without a doubt. The addition of an ecclesiastical perspective, as attempted by this study, has hopefully provided new detail and insights to enrich, enhance and expand our view of Samoan history.

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The present study took up various political issues, including those already adequately studied, and attempted to re-evaluate their significance and contribution to Samoa's independence from the point of view, and participation, of the missions and the Samoan churches. It is not implied here that the missions and Samoan churches were excluded from current literature on Samoan history, but that their significance and impact in relation to the political history of Samoa has been neglected. It seemed when the Samoan churches and missions were mentioned, it was mainly to 'fill the gaps' in the political history of Samoa.

The lack of a church perspective has left Samoan history mundane and has created a false impression that the church had no impact on the overall history of Samoa. This study has attempted to highlight, link and show that the main players in the Samoan political history were also adherents and leaders of the church, and that the decisions they made affected the missions, the churches, and Samoan politics. Several church historians, such as John Garrett, Charles Forman, and T. K. Faletoese, allude to Samoan church members participating in Samoan politics in their writings but the broadness of their subject matter restricted them to generalities.

The church perspective in this study has enhanced the political side of Samoan history by pointing out the intimate, and at times complicated, relationship between church and politics, in particular the Samoan (LMS) Church and Samoan politics, and how this relationship developed to the point of creating an inseparable identity in quest of independent glory. The church perspective has also given the political face of independence a facelift per se, with the concentration on mission and church sources. The Samoan political story had been given a clearer picture, providing a well-based understanding, of the participants and their backgrounds, and their involvement in the process of independence.

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From the time the Samoans lost the right to govern their own nation in the 1900s, the ecclesiastical and political face of Samoa's independence began to take shape and eventually found expression in 1962. The Samoans were proud of their traditions, culture and customs, and were willing to be guided by America, Britain, or Germany, as long as they had the power to govern fa'asamoa. The fa'asamoa was the guiding principle in everything the Samoans accomplished. It gave them pride and identity in Samoan concepts such as matai, tama-a-aiga, pule, soalaupule, fono, nu'u, aiga, feagaiga, malaga, taligatoga, lotu, faipule, aitu, and so forth, which encompassed every aspect of their social, political and religious life.

The Samoans maintained that in their efforts to govern, they tried to preserve the fa'asamoa (existing Christianised culture and customs), rather than to revive traditionalism (past 'pagan' ideologies). The papalagi misunderstood Samoan protocol, and the Samoans never understood what the papalagi misunderstood about them. In the end, misunderstanding prevailed and Germany took away the right of the Samoans to control their own affairs. There was no soalaupule, and to be ignored on such important decisions, wounded their pride deeply. Nothing ever completely healed this wounded pride, except vengeance fa'asamoa — an ifoga and the return of Samoa to the Samoans. The seed for self-government, together with aspirations for independence, was sown, and throughout the next six decades the various foreign administrations indirectly nurtured it to fruition.

The Germans watered the seed of independence with their oppressive stance and lack of sympathy for the fa'asamoa. Solf wanted to make Samoa German and to be rid of the fa'asamoa by taking away their right to govern, and forcing on them the rule of the German Kaiser as the only rule in Samoa. The idea of replacing the tafa'ifa with the Ali'i Sili buried part of the Samoan identity, and reduced the authority and influence of tama-a-aiga and the role of Tumua and Pule in Samoan politics. Solf castrated Samoan protocol by restricting ietoga distribution, banning malaga, terminating matai titles, and exiling matai from their villages. Solf had ventured into tapu (sacred) territory and meddled with the prerogatives of the matai. Solf refused to listen to Samoan grievances, and consequently, the Samoans voiced their disapproval and rejected Solf's efforts to eradicate fa'asamoa.
The Samoans found Shultz more responsive to Samoan grievances, and less strict in administering punishments than Solf. Shultz's understanding of Samoan culture and customs made him a target for Samoan grievances. For instance, during the Oloa Kamupani and the Mau-a-Pule controversies, Shultz dealt with the issues competently and in a manner respected by the Samoans. For the Samoans Shultz was there to be manipulated to advance their aspirations. The Oloa Kamupani was a genuine effort by the Samoans to express their authority through economic means. It gave the Samoans the chance to show they could administer their own affairs, but it failed because Solf not only took it as a challenge to Germany's business enterprises, but an idea detrimental to smaller German businesses.

The Mau-a-Pule was a political statement to Solf to release the fa'asamoa from bondage. It was a statement to revive Samoan culture and customs, return to the Samoans the right to rule or at least to rule together with the Germans on an equal footing, and most of all, restore the dignity of Tumua and Pule. The Mau a Pule never had a chance to succeed, as Solf reasserted his authority with military backing and Samoan leaders under Solf's influence recanted their support. Solf's ability to pit the Samoans against each other created uncertainty and suspicion, and in the end, Samoan pride was the biggest sacrifice. Tumua and Pule never regained their mantle as king-makers and the authority on Samoan protocol; a position that would remain till Samoa's independence. It was not easy for losefo, Tamasese and Lauaki to face defeat and to be ridiculed in the presence of fellow Samoans. They had raised Samoan hopes and given them reasons to believe in their dreams, only to have them shattered by the lack of cohesion and the disunity of the leaders. It was also hard for the Samoan leaders to face their spiritual mentors in more ways than one. On one hand, they were respected leaders in their churches and as such they felt shame in tarnishing their mission's good name. On the other hand, they were probably disappointed with the mission's lack of support and intercession on their behalf. For the LMS, to show support for the Samoans' aspirations was unrealistic, although silent and secret support existed, but it knew its limits and played to them accordingly. The fear of being evicted from Samoa and replaced by a German mission kept the LMS in check.

The Samoan (LMS) Church was a different matter. The Malua seminary and LMS schools became culture dishes for Samoan aspirations. The Samoan
(LMS) Church failed Lauaki because it was forced to remain passive by the non-commitment of the tama-a-aiga to Lauaki and, thus, the opportunities to achieve self-determination went begging. In failing, however, the Samoans became more determined to succeed, if not to accomplish their aspirations then to restore their pride. Lauaki’s death in exile at least would have stirred Samoan emotions not to allow his death to be in vain.

The Germans, who in their own ways, tried to develop Samoa and lead Samoans to a better life, failed miserably to give Samoans what they desired, because of their egoistic and oppressive approach. Germany never administered Samoa as a proud possession, but as a huge plantation to be reaped, sowed, and exploited as it saw fit. Samoan grievances piled up, as the thought of independence became firmly ingrained in their minds. World War I not only averted a possible future violent encounter with the Germans, but it presented the Samoans with a fresh opportunity to reassert their objectives. At first, the New Zealanders were less intimidating than the Germans, as they were only interested in promoting military law and order, and consequently allowed the Samoans space to practice their fa'asamoa. New Zealand’s reliability was soon exposed in its role as caretaker administrator and the Samoans were not happy to be administered by a Dominion of the British Empire that had only just shed its ‘colony’ tag a few months earlier.

New Zealand proved to Samoans beyond doubt it was ‘a ramshackle administration,’ and incompetent to rule, when it permitted the deadly Spanish Influenza to enter Samoa. In the aftermath, the Samoans called for self-government and independence. The knowledge that assistance was readily available from American Samoa, and that Logan had not explored all the avenues available to combat the disaster, fuelled Samoan anger. While the Au Fa’atonu had a few unkind words to say to Logan regarding his treatment of Moore and Small at Papauta School, the Samoans went into a rage regarding the treatment of the Samoan girls at Papauta School. Many of the girls were matai’s daughters, and the thought of them being harassed, shamed, and kicked out of the school at the height of the epidemic was a transgression against all Samoans. Moore and Small cannot be exonerated from the incident as they had the power to detain the girls, but they were eventually forgiven and Logan chastised. But, the incident gave the Samoan church leaders more
reason to take control of their own spiritual welfare. The influenza epidemic was a ‘sin’ that was never forgiven nor forgotten.

Tate added nourishment to the seed of independence. He took a leaf out of Soli’s administration and found himself out of favour with the Samoans. The Samoans continued to resist New Zealand rule and remained firm in their passion for independence. New Zealand cursed the influenza epidemic because it gave young matai who were hungrier for power and authority the opportunity to fulfil their aspirations. The Au Fa’atonu also faced similar challenges from the Samoan pastors, and church members determined to vent their frustration on the missionaries for their part in the epidemic crisis. The appalling treatment of German missionaries after World War I, at a time when Samoans cried out for more missionaries, and healing relations should have been a priority, left an unpleasant sensation on the Samoans. The church leaders vented their frustration on the Au Fa’atonu, and Sibree was just one of the casualties.

Richardson never rose to the expectations of the New Zealand government. He was too officious, and had tunnel vision in his treatment of the Samoans as inferior beings. Richardson continued Tate’s policies on a grander scale with a broader range of rules and regulations to contain the Samoans and keep them industrious. Richardson forced Samoans to work on their land or have their land confiscated. He implemented new village models in order to achieve more cohesiveness, but the Samoans found this a nuisance and less akin to their more spacious nu’u. The Samoans rejected Richardson and his policies and called for his resignation. Richardson’s insensitivity and oppressive administration gave rise to Samoan nationalism, which culminated in the Mau. Richardson’s dream of a Samoa mo Samoa in his image was no more than an illusion. New Zealand’s intimidating and oppressive approach was finally challenged to its core. The Mau was the pinnacle of Samoans’ struggle for freedom, self-government and independence. It was Samoan nationalism at its climax, as it united afakasi, Chinese, and papalagi with Samoans. The laws and ordinances of the Mau counteracted the laws and ordinances of the administration. The Mau found an ally in the Samoan pastors, who had been ‘learning the trade’ in administration and control of the Samoan church under the Au Fa’atonu. The significant reduction of LMS missionaries led to a significant increase in their leadership role in the Samoan church, and the
experience eventually led to a desire to control the Samoan (LMS) Church. It was in this desire of the Samoa pastors that the Samoan political leaders found their strength, and ultimately led to a merger between church and politics.

The nationalistic euphoria split the Samoa (LMS) Church. The Mau supporters created their own church, as Mau and government loyalists served the same God under the same banner (LMS) on separate pews. Politics in the church, rather than 'party spirit', separated the Samoans. The Mau received its strength from the Church, and the movement of Samoan church leaders to support the Mau was not surprising, as Mau leaders were also pillars of the Samoan community and the Samoa (LMS) Church. The Samoan church and the Mau movement were part and parcel of the Samoan identity – fa'asamo'a. The Mau was a political protest that gained a spiritual dimension along the way. The merge only confirmed for the Samoans that God was with them in their struggle for independence. The Samoan pastors would have exhorted the Mau with readings from the bible and Paul's words to the Romans, "if God is for us, who can be against us?" (Romans 8: 31); it would have been a very popular text. The Mau remained a menace and constantly reminded New Zealand of the Samoan quest for independence.

The ill-treatment of the Chinese and the shameful handling of the indenture labour issue enraged the Samoans, and prompted demands for immediate action. New Zealand admitted it was a problem that stretched its resources in the 1940s. After World War II, the Samoans were divided over the repatriation of the Chinese, and their anger was focused squarely on the New Zealand administration's failure to deal with the problem when it had the chance under Richardson. At that time, the Samoans expressed their concern over Chinese criminal activities, gambling dens, and drug trafficking, which influenced and encouraged Samoan participation.

The Samoans also protested at the increasing number of relationships between Chinese and Samoan women, but New Zealand ignored the pleas as it considered the wealth of merchants and planters a priority. The missions were also against mixed relations but were more inclined to support the administration's effort in obtaining more labourers than in minimising the population of illegitimate afasaina (half-Chinese). While the Samoans wanted the problem addressed, they were in a dilemma regarding Chinese repatriation.

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4 See Chapter 9 for further discussion and examples.
Many Samoans had fostered close relationships with the Chinese, especially during the Mau conflict. The Chinese probably anticipated changes to the existing political climate, and would have supported Samoan efforts in order to achieve their own needs and aspirations. The closer ties saw many more Chinese foster relationships with Samoan women despite the administrations' sudden interest in the 'purity of the Samoan race' soon after.

The images of Chinese indentured labourers being dragged onto boats in 1948, leaving behind wives, children and Samoan families, triggered memories of the Maligi's departure earlier. The separation of families was the hardest thing for the Samoans to accept, and they charged the New Zealand administration with cruelty and lack of sympathy. The LMS's lack of support to retain Chinese with Samoan families was not on account of any willingness to see the Chinese removed from Samoa, but on account of loyalty to the administration. It was also an opportunity to be released from its obligation to provide Christian support for the Chinese in the same way the LMS was catering for the Melanesian labourers. The Samoans noticed and took to heart the LMS missionaries' indifferent attitude towards the Chinese.5

The LMS missionaries continuously (perhaps through ignorance) failed to comprehend the sympathetic and often changeable mood of the Samoans over personal relationships, especially when it involved loved ones, family members, or themselves personally. The continuous challenge to the Au Fa'atonu's leadership in the Samoa (LMS) Church during the twentieth century resulted from personal conflicts between the missionaries and the Samoan pastors. The subject matter was insignificant. The missions promoted complete isolation of the church from Samoan politics. But, it was a vision that was easily pronounced but difficult to put into practice. Samoans tried to separate church and politics but when family pride, district honour and Samoa's dignity were at stake, there was no barrier between church and politics. The Samoans had the attitude they could cross from church to politics and back without compromising their status in the church or in Samoan politics. Church and politics were inseparable. The Samoan church leaders shamelessly used their position to advance Samoan ideologies that were beneficial to all Samoans and kept Samoan pride intact. Right and wrong were usually left out of consideration and consultations.

5 See Chapter 9 for further discussion, especially pages 218, 227-234.
The LMS missionaries in later years found it difficult to work with Samoan church leaders. They blamed the Samoans inability to truly comprehend Christianity, and being too influenced by the fa'asamoa. They also criticised the Samoan church leaders for being too young and inexperienced, too materialistic, and having too much authority. But, the Samoan pastors felt the Au Fa'atonu were always too quick to find fault and cry 'unchristian behaviour' without first understanding the Samoans and their particular perspective. While relations improved for many years, discontent on both sides usually erupted over the slightest issue and personal attacks were not uncommon. The Samoan church leaders, unfortunately, resorted to dismissing LMS missionaries to authenticate their authority in the church and over the LMS missionaries. The Samoans also found no comfort in the leadership of the LMS missionaries as the missionaries became more impatient and resorted to personal attacks on each other. The LMS missionaries took time to accept the fact that the Samoans were not only going to be in control, but were in control of the Samoa (LMS) Church. During negotiations for independence, the LMS missionaries were revered as mere icons of the LMS mission, playing second fiddle to the Samoan pastors, and filling the role of silent advisers.

Independence was finally achieved and the Samoans began to count their blessings and the cost of independence. For the Samoan church, the Au Matutua continued to provide a European missionary for the principalship of the newly named Malua Theological College, and also to work as an adviser on matters the Samoan church felt diffident to deal with. The Samoan pastors fully appreciated the gesture, and finally admitted their inexperience to completely take over the reigns of the church. The Samoans admitted that theorising about independence was not the same as being independent. The Samoan pastors finally realised that full autonomy meant being 'fully blamed' for everything. There were no more LMS missionaries to be chastised, and the burden of accountability was an even bigger responsibility. Nevertheless, the transition from the Samoa (LMS) Church to the EFKS provided very few problems. It seemed all the changes to the structure of the church in the past years had paid dividends. The EFKS was self-supporting financially, and the various committees and boards that had been put in place for several decades, provided a much smoother transition to autonomy. The EFKS did not receive the criticisms that the political side of independence had to endure.
The euphoria of political independence was soon over, and questions whether independence was the real aim of the Samoans began to emerge. There was concern by those who had rejected independence over the words ‘self-government’ and ‘independence’. Many Samoans took the word ‘self-government’ to mean self-govern in all matters but Samoa remained under the protection and overseeing of another nation, while the word ‘independence’ was taken to mean full self-govern with no strings attached. The conflict in terms had started with the wording of the Trusteeship Agreement, which only referred to self-government; an idea the Samoans had embraced during the United Nations’ visit to Samoa and believed it to be the final destiny for Samoa. According to J. W. Davidson, a member of the Committee preparing Samoa for its independence, Samoans had only considered the idea of independence when in drafting the constitution the United Nations used the two words synonymously. The independence committee only then realised that the Samoans took self-government and independence as two separate concepts. When the Samoan political leaders realised it was independence and not just self-government being addressed they immediately gave their blessings. The Samoan people were not informed of the misunderstanding, and the Samoans continued to think they were getting self-government per se rather than independence.

There was also concern over the result of the plebiscite. The result was impressive as far as the Samoan political leaders were concerned, but the fact that Samoans were intimidated into supporting Samoan independence and the constitution suggested that the result could have been much different. Davidson recorded that “Tupua Tamasese and Fiame and other leaders delivered broadcast addresses, in which they not only stated the case for the constitution and for the independence but also suggested that casting a negative vote would be an act of treachery.” The intimidation and the manipulative influence of the matai on their aiga would have also made an enormous difference to the end result. One group that had a huge impact was Tumua and Pule. For over sixty years, their power as political kingpins had been quiescent, but the plebiscite gave them the opportunity to influence the political outcome of Samoa’s independence, and to begin the long process of becoming involved again in Samoan politics. The fact that 30% of the Samoan people rejected the proposal

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6 Davidson, 405.
for independence suggested that either Samoans were confused over what they were voting for, or the Samoans were content with New Zealand's administration. The latter suggestion, however, may be doubtful when we consider that 95% of the Samoans rejected New Zealand's administration during the Mau. The real intention of the Samoans regarding independence was a matter for speculation, but it is a fact that the Samoan independence negotiators saw the opportunity to gain absolute authority, and dropped all notions of it being self-government without considering the real intention of the Samoans.

Nevertheless, independence was the final result and despite the criticism, the end result coincided with the initial aspirations of the Samoans. There is no doubt the United Nations gave the Samoans their independence, but the decision would not have been made if Samoa had not persevered in its efforts to entice the attention of the world to its problems, and its continuing hostility and aggression against unsympathetic and oppressive administrations. Many events and issues, both political and church related, arose to generate a huge impact in the way the Samoans eventually perceived their future. It also affected the Samoans in such a way that their vision of the future could only be achieved through the recovery of their identity - the fa'asamoa. Samoans slowly found in the events and issues that transpired avenues to achieve that future, but only to suffer humiliation and censure in the hands of their mentors. Samoan protocol was seen as inferior as its mentors advanced the Samoans towards Europeanisation. It only strengthened the Samoan passion for independence, and provided an incentive to initiate a nationalistic spirit. The painful issues and events of the past, such as the eradication of customs and culture, Goward's racist attitude towards Samoan missionaries, the Oloa Kamupani, the Mau-a-Pule, the exiling of respected Samoan matai, the horror of the influenza epidemic, the mixed marriages dilemma and the indentured


8 The legacy of this issue was presented in a case, Lesa v. Attorney General of New Zealand, to the Privy Council in 1982, which appealed New Zealand's decision to deport overstayers on the notion that Samoans born prior to 1948 (trusteeship), and their children were entitled to New Zealand citizenship. During the case, statements were made in reference to the New Zealand government lack of diplomacy in dealing with Samoans who did not want independence for Samoa. The Privy Council's upheld the appeal and forced New Zealand to enact new laws to stem the flow of Samoans into New Zealand. See Asiata A. V. S. Va'ai, "The Rule of Law and the Faamatai: Legal Pluralism in Western Samoa," Ph.D. Thesis, Australian National University, 1995.
labour problems, the insensitivity of missionaries such as Sibree, Darvill and Smart, the imprisonment of tama-a-aiga members and the assumption of superiority by the missionaries over the Samoan church leaders, culminated in the Mau. The impact of the Mau drew world attention to Samoa's troubles; and with the numerous petitions being sent to every corner of the globe, Samoa's mentors were also made to take notice. It made many people sympathise with the Samoans, and in the end it made an impact on the United Nations.

The Samoa National Anthem summed up the feelings and the emotions that had gone into the Samoan struggle for independence. It expressed the message that their independence was not only achieved through political means, but that God himself had given it. The independence of the Samoa (LMS) Church may have been in the wake of Samoa's political independence, but its impact was central to achieving it. The EFKS and the independent state of Samoa are the ecclesiastical and political expressions of Samoans' independence. Samoans sing their National Anthem to remember their struggle and to reaffirm their independence, and to testify passionately their nation's motto, 'Fa'avae i le Atua Samoa' (Samoa is founded on God).\(^9\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Samoa Tula'il</th>
<th>Samoa Stand!</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ma sisi ia lau fu'a</td>
<td>And raise your flag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O lou pale lea</td>
<td>This is your crown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoa Tula'i,</td>
<td>Samoa Stand!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ma sisi ia lau fu'a</td>
<td>And raise your flag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O lou pale lea</td>
<td>This is your crown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Va'ai i le fetu</td>
<td>Look at the stars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O lo'o ua agiagia ai</td>
<td>Fluttering in the wind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O le fa'ailoga lea</td>
<td>It is the symbol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O lesu na maliu</td>
<td>Of Christ who died</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fai mo Samoa</td>
<td>Adopt it for Samoa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Oi Samoa e, u'umau     | Oh Samoa, hold firmly            |
| Lau pule ia fa'avaavau | Your authority be forever        |
| Aua e te fefe,         | Don't be afraid                  |
| O le Atua lo ta fa'avae| God is our foundation            |
| O lo ta sa'olotoga     | He is our freedom                |
| Samoa Tula'i,          | Samoa Stand!                     |
| Ma sisi ia lau fu'a    | And raise your flag              |
| O lou pale lea         | This is your crown               |

\(^9\) The Anthem was composed by l'iga Kuresa, a member of the Samoan parliament at the time. The anthem is included in the latest hymn book of the EFKS. Its inclusion is a recognition of the independence of Samoa and the EFKS simultaneously, and to re-emphasise the close relationships between the EFKS and the Malo Tuto'aliasi o Samoa (the Independent State of Samoa). [The English translation is by the author].
APPENDIX A

MEMORIAL LIST:
THOSE WHO DIED FROM THE 1918 SPANISH INFLUENZA EPIDEMIC

The official death toll was 7,564. This list represents only a minute sample of those who died in the epidemic. It is an effort to record the names of Samoans who suffered so that they maybe remembered as individuals and not just a statistic. It also highlights the number of Samoan political (government and Mau) and church leaders who died in the epidemic. (All are males unless otherwise stated).

Key:

C = Chinese
Ct = Catechist
El = Elder
Er = European
F = Female
FP = Faipule (Government Official)
LDS = Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormon)
LMS = London Missionary Society, Samoan (LMS) Church
Me = Melanesian
NZ = New Zealand
P = Pastor
RC = Roman Catholic
T = Tutor at Malua
WM = Wesleyan Methodist
### MEMORIAL LIST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Village/District</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afamasaga Maua</td>
<td>FP</td>
<td>LMS</td>
<td>Apia</td>
<td>Govt. Secretary, Translator, Interpreter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afualao Tautalatasi</td>
<td></td>
<td>LDS</td>
<td>Fa'a'ai</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ah Sue, James</td>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
<td>Apia</td>
<td>Editor, <em>Samoanische Zeitung</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aiga Lesa Samuelu</td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
<td>Saanapu</td>
<td>Died at Saanapu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alefaio</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>LMS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amatua</td>
<td></td>
<td>LMS</td>
<td>Apia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amoa</td>
<td></td>
<td>LMS</td>
<td>Sapapali'i</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ana</td>
<td>F, Ct-wife</td>
<td>RC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Died Saleufi (Apia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anetele'a, Father</td>
<td></td>
<td>RC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Died at Safotufafai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asi Falana'ipupu Va'a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Moata'a</td>
<td>Principal chief of the family (see footnote 2 below)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ataline Tulutu</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>LDS</td>
<td>Neiafu</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atigilauga</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Died at Faleasi'u</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atonio Faivale</td>
<td></td>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Amaile</td>
<td>Member of the Aleipata Parish, died at Amaile</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The following names had been taken from the records of the LMS South Seas Archives, Marist Archives of Samoa and Tokelau (Apia), the Mormon Church Registrar, Pesega, the Memorial Stone at Leulumoega Church, Mapuifagalele Home For the Elderly (Vailele), J. W. Davidson. *Samoa mo Samoa: Emergence of the Independent State of Western Samoa*, Melbourne: Oxford University, 1967, Newspapers, and interviews. **Note:** According to LMS records Malua lost 16 Students (3 singles) and three wives, Papauta (6 girls), Leulumoega Fou High School (20 boys).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Village/District</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autu Ioane Letufuga</td>
<td></td>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Safotulafai</td>
<td>Member of the Safotulafai Parish, aged 50 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ave Mupalu</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>LDS</td>
<td>Moataa</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avau Poloa</td>
<td></td>
<td>LDS</td>
<td>Avao</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burgess, Mele</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>LDS</td>
<td>Asau</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burgess, Selepa</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>LDS</td>
<td>Neiafu</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burgess, Siaosi (George)</td>
<td></td>
<td>LDS</td>
<td>Neiafu</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betham, Emanuel</td>
<td>Er</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Died 30 Nov. 1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunt, Andrew</td>
<td>Er</td>
<td></td>
<td>Matautu, Apia</td>
<td>Soldier, died at Saleufi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cagliari, Private</td>
<td>Er,</td>
<td></td>
<td>NZ</td>
<td>8 months old, daughter of Taito and so'o, Members of the Malotau Parish.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christine</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Safotulafai</td>
<td>Member of the Safotulafai Parish, aged 50 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duseigneur, Filomena</td>
<td>F, Er</td>
<td>RC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Died at Faleasi'u</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eelele Sauvao</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Faleasi'u</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emele Mati</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>LDS</td>
<td>Falelatai</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ericksson, B</td>
<td>Er</td>
<td></td>
<td>Salelavalu</td>
<td>Manager Moors' Store</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esene</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>LMS</td>
<td>Papauta</td>
<td>Chm. Elder's Comm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fa'aaliga</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>LMS</td>
<td>Leulumoega</td>
<td>From Memorial at Leulumoega Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fa'ae'e Kalala</td>
<td></td>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Lano</td>
<td>Member of the Safotulafai Parish, aged 35 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
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<td>Mission</td>
<td>Village/District</td>
<td>Comment</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fa'ali'a Kuresa</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Apia ?</td>
<td>Passenger in the Talune</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faati pa'o Mataese</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Salani</td>
<td>Died at Salani, aged 57 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fa'auliuli</td>
<td>F, P- wife</td>
<td>LMS</td>
<td>Afega</td>
<td>Died at Malua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fau</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>LMS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Translator-Interpreter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faimalo</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>LMS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faipule Aiolupotea</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Falelima</td>
<td>Died at Falelima</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faleagea</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Saleaula</td>
<td>Died at Lepea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fau Tofa</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>LDS</td>
<td>Sala'ilua</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felaga'i</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>LMS</td>
<td>Leulumoega</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faleniko</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Mulifanua</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fepulea'i Sivia</td>
<td></td>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Asaga</td>
<td>From Memorial at Leulumoega Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fetineia'i Patu</td>
<td></td>
<td>LMS</td>
<td>Saleaula</td>
<td>Member of the Malotau Parish, died 11 November 1918.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filemu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pesega</td>
<td>Died at Pesega, aged 68 years</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fourmeaux, Walter</td>
<td>Er</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Died 30 Nov. 1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank Aivao</td>
<td></td>
<td>LDS</td>
<td>Fa'ala (Palauli)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuaifale Fesola'i</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Faleasi'u</td>
<td>Died at Faleasi'u</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Futi</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Matasiva</td>
<td>Member of the Malotau Parish, died 11 November 1918.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerhard, Ihren</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Died 3 Dec. 1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Hadley, Private Er, S</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>NZ</td>
<td>Soldier</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hegelagi</td>
<td>P</td>
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<td>From Memorial at Leulumoega Church</td>
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<tr>
<td>Huberty, R.P. Nicolaus (Father)</td>
<td></td>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Luxemburgensis</td>
<td>Priest of the Aleipata Parish, died at Amaile</td>
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<tr>
<td>lake</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ieremia Fesola'i</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Faleasi'u</td>
<td>Died at Faleasi'u</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imo</td>
<td>EI, T</td>
<td>LMS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Sec. Elder’s Comm, Sec. Finance Comm.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ioane Fuimaono</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Amaile</td>
<td>Member of the Aleipata Parish, died at Amaile</td>
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<tr>
<td>Isaia</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>LMS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Died at a parish in Savai'i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iulio Alivaai</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Samusu</td>
<td>Member of the Aleipata Parish, died at Samusu and buried in Saluafata</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iulio Uili</td>
<td></td>
<td>RC</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Member of the Aleipata Parish, born in Rotuma; mentor of Father Huberty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jackson, Mr Er</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>NZ</td>
<td>Manager Burns Philp Ltd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jensen, Aiga Er</td>
<td></td>
<td>LDS</td>
<td>Sala'ilua</td>
<td>Policeman, died at Saleufi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Tuataga</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Member of the Safotulafai Parish, aged 55 years.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joseph, Puni Er</td>
<td></td>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Faga</td>
<td>Has worked on the Malua Printing Press</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kirisome, R El</td>
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<td>LMS</td>
<td>Iva</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lagatasia Fesola'i</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>Lamese Lauulu Logo</td>
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<td>Palauli</td>
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<td>Laulu Logo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lavu</td>
<td>Me</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Indetured Labourer Vailele planatation, died at Vailele</td>
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<tr>
<td>Leitaua Seleni</td>
<td>RC</td>
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<td>Member of the Malotau Parish, died 11 November 1918.</td>
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<td>Leonia Lili</td>
<td>RC</td>
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<td>Satitoa</td>
<td>Member of the Aleipata Parish, died at Saleufi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lesina Pio</td>
<td>RC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Saleufi</td>
<td>Farmer for RC mission, died at Saleufi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Levila Faitau</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>LDS</td>
<td>Falelima</td>
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<td>Lise</td>
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<td>Liuvao</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lolesio</td>
<td>Ct</td>
<td>RC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Died at Vaiusu</td>
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<tr>
<td>Losa Faafaofao</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>LDS</td>
<td>Tafua</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Lovine Aloi</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>LDS</td>
<td>Neiafu</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maka Ulumii</td>
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<td>LMS</td>
<td>Afega</td>
<td>Died at Malua. Son of Tema (El)</td>
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<td>RC</td>
<td>Iva</td>
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<td>Malia Lusia (Sister)</td>
<td>F</td>
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<td>Mareta Leilua</td>
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<td>RC</td>
<td>Safotulafai</td>
<td>Member of the Safotulafai Parish, aged 65 years.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Masoe Panapa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Asau</td>
<td>Died at Asau</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mataafa</td>
<td></td>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Salani</td>
<td>Died at Mulinu'u Peninsula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mataese Pa'o Fuimaono</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Iva</td>
<td>Died at Salani, aged 60 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matagi Samu Tafi</td>
<td>F</td>
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<td>Palauli</td>
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<tr>
<td>Matatia Fiapai</td>
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<td>England</td>
<td>Died at Faga (Savai'i), aged 82 years</td>
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<td>Metu</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>LMS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mikaele Faliu</td>
<td></td>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Satitoa</td>
<td>Member of the Aleipata Parish, died at Satitoa</td>
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<td>Mikaele Pulusi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moamoa Fuimaono</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moegoa losefo</td>
<td></td>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Amaile</td>
<td>Member of the Aleipata Parish, died at Amaile</td>
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<tr>
<td>Molimauina</td>
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305
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<td>Indentured Labourer Vailele planatation, died at Vailele</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moors, M</td>
<td>Er</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Palaui</td>
<td>Died 3 Dec. 1918.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neitmann, Peter</td>
<td>Er</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Matautu, Apia</td>
<td>Died 3 Dec. 1918.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Leulumoega</td>
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<tr>
<td>P. Atelea</td>
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<td>Pu'apu'a</td>
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<td>Patisone Sufia</td>
<td>F</td>
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<td>Matautu (Savai'i)</td>
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<td>Pa'u Fa'aonea</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Pelenatino Pelenatino</td>
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<td>RC</td>
<td>Iva</td>
<td>Member of the Safotulafai Parish, aged 45 years.</td>
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<td>Penisio Malo</td>
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<td>Member of the Aleipata Parish, died at Amaile</td>
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<td>Village/District</td>
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<td>Petelo Aatoe</td>
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<td>Sala'ilua</td>
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<td>Pole</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>Saleaula</td>
<td>Died at Lepea</td>
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<td>Poliako Fepulea'i</td>
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<td>Samusu</td>
<td>Member of the Aleipata Parish, died at Samusu</td>
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<td>Pua Vitolina</td>
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<td>Raphael, Joseph</td>
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<td>Er, S</td>
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<td>NZ</td>
<td>Soldier with New Zealand Army</td>
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<td>Samu Tamapua</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>Moata'a</td>
<td>Planter, died at Moata'a</td>
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<td>Apia</td>
<td>Esene's son</td>
</tr>
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<td>Sauvao Fuafale</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>Faleasi'u</td>
<td>Died at Faleasi'u</td>
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<td>From Memorial at Leulumoega Church</td>
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<tr>
<td>Schmidt, Louis</td>
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<td>Tafua</td>
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<tr>
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<td>F, P-wife</td>
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<td>Siana Laulu</td>
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<td>Talitiga Soana'i</td>
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<td>Safua</td>
<td>Married to Auava of Sapapalii. Died at Safua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>F</td>
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<td>F</td>
<td>LDS</td>
<td>Lalomalava</td>
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<td>Tauilili Magele</td>
<td>F</td>
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<td>Iva</td>
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<td>Falelima</td>
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<td>Satalo</td>
<td>Died at Lalomauga, principal chief of the family</td>
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<td>Faleasi'u</td>
<td>ex Govt. translator German period</td>
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<td>Timu Tanuvasa</td>
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<td>LDS</td>
<td>Sili</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Tina Faasalalau</td>
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<td>Falelima</td>
<td>née Malaeulu</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tulina</td>
<td>Me</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Indetured Labourer Vailele planation, died at Vailele</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulivaa Aiolupotea</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>Falelima</td>
<td>Died at Falelima</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tumanuvao Fanafana</td>
<td>LDS</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tapueleele</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

2 Te'o Fagalima is the brother of Asi Fatanaipupu. Te'o had left Satalo Falealili to attend his brother's funeral at Moata'a, and on his way back to his village he died enroute at Lalomauga from the influenza.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Village/District</th>
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<tr>
<td>Tuu'u</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>LMS</td>
<td>Leulumoega</td>
<td>From Memorial at Leulumoega Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulii</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>LMS</td>
<td>Safua</td>
<td>Died at Vailoa Parish, Palauli</td>
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<tr>
<td>Usu Lui</td>
<td></td>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Safotulafai</td>
<td>Member of the Safotulafai Parish, aged 48 years.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Va'aelua Petaia</td>
<td>Ei</td>
<td>LMS</td>
<td>Lalomalava</td>
<td>Elder's Comm. Died Faleasi'u Parish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaotogo</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Apia</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
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<td>Viliamu Viliamu</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>LMS</td>
<td>Sapapali'i</td>
<td>Died at Leulumoega Fou High School, Principal Leulumoega Fou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visesio</td>
<td>Ct</td>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Mutiatele</td>
<td>Member of the Aleipata Parish, died at Mutiatele</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Williams, Jenny</td>
<td>F, Er</td>
<td>LDS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Died at Sala'ilua</td>
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APPENDIX B

The following report is taken from the LMS South Seas Archive, South Seas Letters (SSL). It is twelve pages long in the original document, and the pages are indicated in this reproduction of the report. The report has been reproduced as it is in the original. I have, however, included in the text English translations [ ] for Samoan words and terms used for clarification.

REPORT ON RECENT WITCHCRAFT PRACTICE IN AANA, 3 May 1932

[Page 1]. The beginning of the second century in the history of the Samoan church was considerably overshadowed by the probability of the imprisonment of a number of LMS pastors on charges of witchcraft. A number of deaths caused the Police to take action, and it was probably due to the wisdom of the Governor in allowing the LMS to settle the matter, that no more serious state is prevalent in Samoa. The government, which has had its hands full in recent years with the Mau trouble, would have been in an infinitely more serious position had they found themselves called upon to defend themselves against a charge of religious persecution. I was in Savaii conducting Faamasani [preparatory] examination when the first news came to me that witchcraft was being practiced in the Aana district of Upolu, that thousands were going to receive healing, but some were dead. I arrive at [sic] Upolu at 11 o’clock on the morning of Nov, 12th and went to Leulumoega, there, although the time was late I found considerable consternation prevailing, as the Police had threatened a number of our pastors with imprisonment on the charge of witchcraft. We snatched a couple of hours of sleep, and at 5 o’clock I went to Satapuala, for the purpose of conducting school examination. After a short while in the examination, I was asked to meet the pastors and deacons of Aana on a matter of grave importance and I left the examination in the hands of the district schoolmaster. There were present at the meeting Elders, pastors and deacons from three of the sub-divisions of the Aana district, namely Alofi, Manono, and Falelatai. Lefaga was not represented. The meeting proceeded as follows:

It was explained that during my absence in Savaii, Filemoni, the elder of the Falelatai sub-division had been to see me about an outbreak of ‘consulting the oracle’ practiced by one l’uvale in the village of Siufaga, Falelatai. As a consequence of this practice, four people were known to be dead and the

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1 Hoad, Report on Recent Witchcraft Practice in Aana, 3 May, 1932, SSL.
Police were threatening action – (no attempt was made to consult the missionaries until Police action was threatened). [Page 2] Explanation further showed that a deputation had been sent by the district to the Lefaga sub-division namely Safaatoa, pastor, the Elder Amosa I, and Savaia, pastor Apela, and also to Siufaga in Falelatai, pastor I'vale, to beseech them to stop this practice of witchcraft as the Police were on the point of interfering. This deputation went on Monday, November 11th. In each case the reply was the same namely that they were interpreting the will of God and would brook no interference whatsoever, thus defying the District authority. Later, in the same day, the District officer arrived with Police. They notified Amosa I, Apela, and I'vale, that unless there was an immediate discontinuance of the practice of witchcraft, they would be under the necessity of arresting the pastors. The pastors answered that it was not witchcraft, but the interpretation of the will of God, and as such it was their legitimate business. Amosa I, and Apela replied that they were willing to discontinue under protest, but I'vale would give no undertaking.

Alesana, Elder, Leulumoega Fou, also wrote to Apela beseeching him for the love of Christ to stop such an iniquitous practice. Saaga, Malua, also wrote to Samuelu the Secretary for the Aana district, asking that some action be taken, as the Police were getting busy and calamity would come upon the church. The Police notified the district secretary that I'vale would be arrested the following day, and the district therefore was most anxious that I should endeavour to see the Governor and deliver our pastors from judgement and prison. I next requested that a demonstration should be given of the method of consulting the oracle, so that we should not pass judgement upon it, without understanding. Some of the pastors were inclined to protest but the examination continued. It revealed the following:-

'A bible has a key partially inserted about the middle with the loop of the key protruding, and it is then bound tightly on both sides of the key so that the bible may be suspended by means of the key. Two ways are then open. (1). for two people each using their index finger beneath the loop of the key or (2). for the pastor to use the index finger of both hands. [Page 3] Prayer is then offered on the following lines 'O God Almighty, thou knowest all things, and thou dost reveal thy will unto thy people through thy Holy Word, tell us therefore we
beseech thee. (Then follows the question). If the answer is "Yes" turn the bible we are thy children, Amen.' Note, if the bible turns, the answer is 'Yes' if it does not turn, the answer is 'No'.

The process is often a lengthy one as the answers are limited to 'yes' and 'no,' thus in the case, let suppose, of a sickness, the questions would be along these lines, - Can this be treated by prayer or medicine? If medicine, who shall prescribe, the hospital? the chemist? the misi? [European missionary] the store? the pastor? etc? What shall we give? Under this method, a four year old child had been given ten Calomel tablets at one dose, a woman starved to death, a man ordered to drink neat Lysol by the spoonful, and another poisoned by Samoan medicine (since this, other cases have come to my notice). I said it was a wicked and dangerous practice and that (a) the pastor concerned did not seem to understand that the Bible had been translated into many tongues in order that people might read and meditate thereon and thus come to the knowledge of the saving grace of God. (b) Nor was prayer understood, for in these cases their prayers amounted to Heathen Incantations. (c) Further, the Elder responsible should have reported immediately to me, and not himself have been a follower of the strange craft. I stressed the point that what most worried me, was not that the Police were about to take action for the preservation of lives, but the church itself should countenance this return to Heathenism. Under the circumstances, it was my opinion that the four pastors concerned should be dismissed.

The idea of the dismissal of the pastors and the Elder concerned rather startled the assembly, whose main aim and object was to deliver them from judgement and prison. They argued that Falealili had taught them and that the four pastors were practicing the same thing. I refused to take any steps for the pastors threatened, unless the district would consent to [Page 4] their dismissal. I was willing to see the Governor, if on being asked the question "What had we done to stop it" I could answer "they have been dismissed." As the sub-division of Lefaga was not represented, it was decided to send a messenger post haste, calling the whole district to a meeting at Leulumoega on the following day, and in the meantime, I returned to the examination of the village children. I was appalled at the enormity of the danger, the whole of Christianity in Samoa seemed threatened, the thing would spread like wild fire, Perkins was on sick leave, and Phillips was young and it seemed that the full weight would fall on
me, under these circumstances I thought I would like some sane, experienced Samoans, and I went for Saaga and Alesana, from Malua, that I might talk the matter over with them before meeting the district.

The following day began with village examinations, from which I withdrew when the district had gathered. First I met Saaga and Alesana. They were horrified at the position, and stated that never in the history of the Samoan Church has such a crisis of such a magnitude arisen. The district was unwilling to call Alesana and Saaga into their conference, as between us we held offices of Chairman of the General Assembly, Vice Chairman, and Secretary, and they were unwilling to lay what they considered a district sin before the church until at least they had passed a resolution upon it. The meeting proceeded much on the same lines as the previous day, with the exception that three of the culprits were present and were able to give an explanation of their conduct, the fourth was in prison with every prospect of a serious charge against him. Amosa I, the Elder, made a humble apology and said that they had found the procedure exceedingly useful for the church and its work, the culprits were then asked to withdraw. The remaining three Elders were of the opinion that the apology was sufficient and that the Elder concerned in the witchcraft, should not be suspended. I however stuck to my point that it would be worse than hopeless for the matter to end in words only. The vision of poisoned babies was far too strong to allow an ending to be countenanced.

[Page 5] With the exception of the three Elders, the district unanimously agreed to the dismissal of those concerned and eventually the Elders agreed to be included in the decision. The miscreants were then called and told the conclusion of which we had arrived. Much time was taken up in discussion on how we should approach the villages concerned and it was decided to send a big deputation, myself, the three Elders, and four pastors and four deacons were appointed. Saaga and Alesana were then called and informed of the point at which we had arrived, and they expressed hearty agreement. I next proceeded to interview the Governor. I found the government offices in a state of great excitement. The Public Prosecutor and Chief of Police were keen to proceed on a manslaughter charge. The secretary seemed to think I had better not interfere, and the chief medical officer was waiting for an order to exhume the bodies, I found myself in most unbelievable position, namely, that of adviser to the government. The Public Prosecutor pointed out the weakness from their
standpoint in that it would be difficult to secure a conviction on the major charge, as all the witnesses would be accessory to the fact, and only the charge of witchcraft could be counted on as a certainty, the maximum penalty for which is six months. I pointed out to His Excellency that the Government could not stop the practice, and that the government action would only resolve itself into what the Samoans would consider religious persecution, since the accused would argue that they were showing the will of God in a new revelation, and that the end of such a position no one could foresee, but if the Mau had been a difficult subject, the matter of a religious persecution in which all Samoan pastors were concerned would be a thousand times worse.

'But you are able to stop it' asked the Governor. 'It is stopped' I replied. 'The pastors are dismissed, and dismissal from that office is more punishment to them than imprisonment or death, and all Samoa has been warned,' The Governor was exceedingly wise and very gracious in taking the advice given and the order was not given to exhume the bodies, even though the doctor was waiting in the office for the order to exhume the bodies, even though the doctor was waiting in the office for the order to exhume; nor were the pastors prosecuted, except l’uvale who since he was already in custody, could not easily be released. He is detained during His Majesty’s Pleasure. I next interviewed l’uvale, I asked him why he had been so foolish as to give ten Calomel tablets to a baby, he said 'I am clean in the sight of God, only such things as His Holy Word tells me I do.' (i.e. the bible turning on a key).

We next proceeded on the Deputation, and although the story is likely to be a long one, if ever there was a missionary journey, this was one. The deputation consisted of myself, Elders Samuelu, Filimoni, pastors Epelu, Tamate, Perelini, Laiva, Pilitati, deacons Fata, Vaafuga [Vaafusuaga?] and Anai [Nanai?]. We went first to Lefaga sub-division, Safaatoa pastor, the Elder Amosa I. We heard that until a late hour the previous night the village was trying to persuade Amosa to defy the district, but his better council prevailed, and they received us with grace. After a long discussion, they agreed to the dismissal of Amosa I, subject to the confirmation of the Ministerial Committee, with the thinly veiled threat that if Amosa were [sic] not [sic] immediately reinstated by the committee, there would be trouble. (The village has since applied to the Mormons for a teacher). In the afternoon we went to Savaia where Apela, a young Samoan pastor worked. The people were ungracious and surly, and after a few minutes we were invited to enter the church, where the seances were
accustomed to be held. Here the whole village was gathered together, the place was crowded out, men, women, and children being present, and those who could not find room inside, crowded the windows outside. They looked the part of heathen darkness. I was asked to conduct the proceedings, so I said 'Apela will explain what he has done and why, after which, Samuelu, Filimoni, Tamate, and I will tell you what we think about it.' Apela sent off for his wife, who arrived with the tied up bible amidst suppressed cheers. We then sang 'Stand up, Stand up for Jesus' and Apela was then called upon for his statement. Briefly [Page 8] it was that he was absolutely certain what our opinion on the matter would be, and to what conclusion we should come to. With regard to the district meeting of the previous week, he had known for certain before starting, thanks to the turning of the bible, what would be the outcome. He had heard it called witchcraft, a devils thing and everything bad. He absolutely denied that it was so. With regard to the apology in which he had been included, he absolutely dis-associated himself with that. He would now proceed to give us a demonstration of the way in which this new revelation of the will of God worked. I said 'not in this church' he said it was their church and that all their seances were conducted in it. But we had our way and no demonstration was given. Then Samuelu, Filimoni and Tamate addressed the meeting. Tamate pleaded with his dear brother to give up this wicked thing. I followed and pointed out that our God was a very different being from the one Apela served. Ours was absolute and infinite, could answer prayers and in his love gave His Son. Apela's God was ignorant and foolish, he poisoned babies, he could only answer yes or no, and so weak was his intelligence, that questions had to be arranged in such a form as to permit of his answering by means of the only two words he knew. There were frequent interruptions, but we made those responsible wait until 'question time'. In due course question time arrived, and the questioners proceeded to revile us. They call us, a fool party. Said that we had come in the devil's way to do a devil's thing and limit the power of God. That where great tracks had been made through the forest to enable people to consult this new revelation, we wished to put a stop to it. In the end I said 'well friends it is perfectly obvious that you have been led astray by a wolf, Christ says 'if they receive you remain, if not wipe the dust from off your shoes against them and depart. You have not received us, we will depart. You poor lambs, remain with
the wolf.' Closed with benediction and we departed for Safaatoa. On the way we were stoned. But the light was bad and the aim worse, and no one was hurt.

However, we returned the next morning, for, having left the fight on the previous day, we felt that we could not leave the matter as it stood. The action of this village and the young pastor is probably unprecedented in the annals of the Samoan church. For us to return home, successfully defied by a youth and a village, would mean the end of many things beside Christianity. On this occasion the 'high falutin' Samoan beat us, for three sections of us understood the matter in different ways as we found by comparison afterwards. However, it occurred to me to take the ordination certificate from Apela, and he was instrumental in his own undoing in that he gave it to me. Thus we parted, telling them that they could remain with the wolf, but he could do no more harm now, and his official recognition as a pastor was in the Misi's [missionary] hands (Three days afterwards, he left the village). It was chiefly on the word of Lepale, the most important man in the village, that the church would be closed until we ordered it to be opened, that we left, as it meant, that the seances would stop, but could authorise re-opening. Three days afterwards Apela left and at once instructed Perelini to re-open the church, and services are now being conducted as in the case of a vacant pastorate. We next proceeded to Siufaga the village of I'uvale, who was in prison, and to whom no less than six deaths can be definitely traced, probably more.

Siufaga received us with disdain. Although Apia was a long way off, they had heard that Misi [missionary] had been to the Governor and had asked him to put I'uvale in prison for ten years. Very well, whether it was a month, a year or ten years, they would wait for I'uvale, and in the meantime, no services of any description would be held nor would children be taught. We argued. We explained just what happened at the government office. At the end of four hours, our deputation turned to me and said 'we can do nothing.' I said, 'If these people have their way and defy us successfully now, the church will die, let us die rather at our posts.' So for seven hours, we sat without a break, no refreshments, or going to stretch our legs, we beat the village and they absolutely surrendered. Services are to be held, and when I'uvale returns, whether he is found guilty or not, [Page 10] they will farewell him, his wife is to remain in their care until the husband is released from prison. (note: I'uvale is now out of prison and living in Leulumoega). From thence, we proceeded to...
Manono, where is Salua, pastor Aseta, the village had been so distressed about the breach with the Wesleyans, that they were ready to do anything to make the matter right. It seems that by a process of elimination it had been shown through the oracle, that no other denomination had the 'new power' and the family being Wesleyan that required healing had turned to the 'true faith.' Rev. G. Shinkfield Chairman of the Wesleyan Church, was in Manono at the time, and much was done, by our personal friendly relations, to restore the good relations between the two denominations. I had lunch with him and afterwards, returned to Upolu in his boat.

An interesting feature is that the oracle was asked by the villages concerned, whether or not it was right to give 'offering for general church purposes this year' and it gave the answer 'no', as a consequence, where we expected the sum of £200 from these villages, we received the sum of 13/-. The village examinations and annual meetings were held in Lefaga Nov 25/26, we made another journey there for that purpose, the children of Savaia were not present. The children of Safaatoa were present. A deputation came to us asking whether, under the circumstances it would be possible to let the Me [contributions to the church] stand over for this year while chiefs of Matautu [Lefaga] tried to fix things up with the affected villages. As the wolf had departed, and there were already distinct signs of improvement we agreed, and the Me was not held this year. Subsequent events have justified our action in that the sum of over £100 has now been contributed by these villages. There have been many visits to the affected parts and a good deal of bitterness has been prevalent. On one occasion Phillips and I visited the storm centre of Falelatai, Siufaga. Phillips' remark on a real Samoan village were illuminating, hitherto his experience has been confined to nice villages specially prepared.

[Page 11] No attempt was made by Siufaga to welcome us, although we stayed at the pastor's house, he being in prison. That seemed to be their idea of 'serving us right.' I took the morning service for Samatau and Siufaga (a united service) at Siufaga, followed by the communion service. All responsible people were present and reverent. In the afternoon I took a special evangelical address for Siufaga, dealing with Saul and the witch of Endor. The entire village was present. The village has since asked for the appointment of a new pastor. (It might here be said what a wonderful chance this country still offers for the preaching of the very rudiments of Christianity and the conversion of the
heathens. The white coats of Malua and Leulumoega Fou students often blind our eyes to the condition of the night outside the villages).

During this period, it has been abundantly evident that the root of the trouble has been in Falealili. Most of our problems seem to come from there. Enosa the Elder in charge ought to be and probably some day will be in prison. But I have on other occasions mentioned the deplorable conditions existing in Falealili and the unsatisfactory nature of Enosa the Elder to make it necessary to add further here.

At the Ministerial Committee which met in December, Enosa gave an account of the trouble in Falealili. It had all been settled, apologies had been accepted, all was well. But the Ministerial Committee took an entirely different view of the matter, the whole work of Christianity had been jeopardised. The R.C., Wesleyans and other denominations had all been gravely concerned and did not think that our present constitution would enable us to tackle a thing of this nature. The Seventh day Adventist had written columns about us. The Ministerial Committee realised that the only possible satisfactory way was in the dismissal of those concerned. Kirisome of the Mission Council, and of Faasalelaga said, in his usual brief but thoughtful way. 'They have betrayed the faith, let them be buried. If there had been 100 of them it would have been better to dismiss them all and begin again, than to retain them. Scores had been on the brink of yielding to this devil's way, and only the group action in dismissing those concerned and at once informing the church, saved a calamity of a degree that this church could not realise. Never in the history of the church's hundred years, had there been the likes of it.' Sentence was passed as follow:- Four pastors from Falealili and two from Aana are suspended for two years, and to come up at the end of that time for reconsideration. Two who had not repented in Aana were dismissed, not to return again.

With the prospect of several of our pastors being in deadly peril of prison and their lives through exercising witchcraft, the new centenary opens. Thanks to the wisdom of the government in allowing the mission to settle a matter which was beyond the government's power, order has been restored, probably, in a few weeks time things will be normal again. But it has been an experience which will serve as a warning at least to the present generation, of how near these people are to heathenism, only a little flame is required to kindle the old fire. Our thanks are due to Almighty God that he had brought the Church
through this grave trial, and has cleaned it and given it a fresh start. Let us hope that these unsettled days may always find the church willing to accept a lead, and always ready to be guided back to the Father.

Frank S. Hoad

I should be extremely grateful if this report is kept entirely confidential. Publication in the Chronicle or any other publication would mean the immediate circulation in Pacific Publication.

FSH
For clarity and easy locating of sources, the following abbreviations are used for the various libraries, archives, and institutions, where the source materials, especially primary materials, were located.

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