USE OF THESES

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MOCHTAR LUBIS

AUTHOR, EDITOR, POLITICAL ACTOR

by

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A thesis submitted for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy of
The Australian National University,
Canberra.

July 1988
This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree of diploma in any university and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published by another person, except when due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

signed:

David T. Hill
ABSTRACT

This thesis is a biographical study of the Indonesian author and journalist, Mochtar Lubis (from his birth in 1922, to 1982, when he turned 60), examining the nexus between journalism, fiction and politics in his life. It sees Mochtar Lubis as a prism, through which one can view his various milieux -- intellectual, artistic, journalistic and political -- and the national history of the times through which he has lived.

Mochtar Lubis has been Indonesia’s best known journalist internationally and was for a long time the country’s most translated author. This study aims to contribute to our general understanding of the socio-political roles of intellectuals like Mochtar Lubis, in Indonesia in the first instance, but also, by extension, in other Southeast Asian countries.

The thesis has been influenced primarily by two main bodies of academic writing: firstly, an ongoing debate regarding the relationship between literature and politics; and, secondly, discussions of the role of Indonesian political intellectuals described variously as secular, liberal, modernising or Westernised.

After detailing Mochtar Lubis’s early life, the thesis follows his career as a journalist and political activist since 1949. Chief concerns are the political characteristics of Mochtar Lubis as editor of the daily newspaper Indonesia Raya in two periods: 1949-58 and 1968-74. The circumstances leading to his detentions in December 1956 and again in February 1975, and the paper’s subsequent closures are examined, as are Mochtar Lubis’s responses to his arrests. Attention is given to his move
away from political journalism, after 1975, towards cultural and sociological writings, as part of his increasing international activities.

The development of his reputation as an author and cultural figure is discussed with reference to the Indonesian cultural politics since 1949. After 1966, Mochtar Lubis has been involved in some of the principal institutions of the national artistic Establishment as well as various international organisations. Critiques of Mochtar's novels and a major public lecture follow, with emphasis on the insight they provide into his attitudes to his society, its history and its structure.

The thesis concludes by locating Mochtar Lubis within his social and political context, with reference to the assessments of other Indonesians and comparisons with his peers, and by reviewing the qualities he has displayed during his public career.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Innumerable people have contributed to the production of this thesis, and to them all I express my appreciation.

I began this project in the Southeast Asia Centre of the Australian National University, continued it while on the staff of the Department of Indonesian and Malay, Monash University, and completed it while at the Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash. I would like to express my appreciation to the staff of each of these institutions. The ANU Southeast Asia Centre fostered me as an undergraduate. Dr David Chandler and Pam Sayers accepted me warmly into the Monash Centre of Southeast Asian Studies. As a member of the postgraduate and staff community there, I enjoyed its camaraderie and lively intellectual exchange. My former colleagues in the Monash Department of Indonesian and Malay made teaching a pleasure and the isolating discipline of writing a thesis into something of a group project. George Miller at the ANU and Helen Soemardjo of Monash, provided much more help with library research than a student can reasonably expect. My thanks to them all.

In the early years in Canberra, Julie Larsen, Megan Seiman and the entire Tench Street mob made communal life a joy, full of sharing, dancing and song. In Jakarta, if not for the soothing care and concern of Harry Bhaskara, my spirit would not have lasted through the first painful days of Christmas 1980, to go on and enjoy two further years of his companionship. In Jakarta, also, the tolerance and acceptance shown to a whimsical 'Oom Bewok' by his neighbourhood in Kelapa Gading (Bangun Cipta) provided him with a welcome haven at the end of the day.

Although there is much in this thesis with which I would not agree, I sincerely appreciated the help and advice of Atmakusumas Astraatmaja, who contributed greatly to my understanding of Indonesia Raya and the
Indonesian press world. Similar thanks to Kustiniyati Mochtar and Jus Soemadipradja. Henri Chambert-Loir, too, generously shared with me his knowledge of Mochtar Lubis, and the Jakarta literary scene.

The fieldwork for this thesis was conducted with the permission of LIPI and under the academic sponsorship of the H.B. Jassin Literary Documentation Centre. I am sincerely grateful to Dr H.B. Jassin, Harkrisyati Harikrisnowo and their staff for providing me a convivial base and the benefit of their research and documentary experience. In addition, I thank all those who have enriched this project by giving me their views, in conversations or correspondence.

Particularly influential in fashioning my view of Indonesia was the time spent in the company of people whose lives have demonstrated an almost awesome resilience and strength after years of repression. I suspect this thesis, so peripheral to the central struggles of their lives, will disappoint them, but I hope that, one day, they may be able to tell their own stories.

Max Lane has challenged me, since the beginning, to question my assumptions, and broken the drudgery of these last months with regular encouraging doses of his dry humour. Keith Foulcher has guided me sensitively through much of the study of fiction, and commiserated with my confusions. Francis Loh, Barbara Hatley and Virginia Matheson read and commented helpfully on various early versions. Angus McIntyre’s proof-reading of the final draft, over several hectic days, is greatly appreciated.

Professor Jamie Mackie, of the Department of Political and Social Change, ANU, and Dr Herb Feith, in the Monash Department of Politics, have been more than supervisors. Together they salvaged me from post-fieldwork flounderings. Jamie’s support at ANU was vital. Herb, the
fatherly 'mentor', has taken his role endearingly to heart. I thank them both very deeply.

On the long journey from fieldwork to thesis submission, Krishna Sen has been an equal partner, like no other. She shared the excitement and discovery of fieldwork, the frustrations of writing, the dismays of redrafting and revisions, and bore the brunt of my despondency, impatience and obsession. Everything I wrote she read, with a constructively critical eye; and discussed with me. Throughout all, she was so much the perfect complement that it is difficult for me to imagine completing the task without her, and impossible to adequately thank her.

It is a great sorrow to me that I will not be able to see the look on the face of my father, John Ernest Winn Hill, as I finish the thesis he awaited so eagerly. His life, his values and his encouragement were an immeasurable support. It is a real joy to be able to share the experience with my mother, Margaret Pryor Hill, who has nurtured my curiosity and sense of discovery, and worked in so many ways to bring me to this day.

Finally, I want to express my respect and sincere gratitude to Mochtar Lubis, who agreed to numerous interviews and provided a great deal of private material for use in this study, much of which he may dispute. I can only hope that, despite the many differences in our analyses of his society, he will accept this thesis as a sincere effort to understand and explain one culture in the language of another.
A NOTE ON SPELLING AND BIBLIOGRAPHIC REFERENCES

For the sake of consistency and clarity, the EYD [Ejaan Yang Disempurnakan] Indonesian spelling system, accepted officially in 1972, is used for all Indonesian words, except personal names.

Indonesian personal names are spelt according to my understanding of the individuals' preferred usage. This presents a difficulty for those not familiar with the development of Indonesian spelling. Roeslan Abdulgani, for example, retains the old spelling 'oe' in his first name, while using the current replacement, 'u', in his second.

Where I have not been aware of an individual's preferred spelling, I have followed Tempo (1981) Apa & Siapa: Sejumlah Orang Indonesia 1981-1982 (Grafitipers, Jakarta), an authoritative contemporary biographical listing.

In bibliographic references, Indonesian personal names have been listed under the first name (e.g. Mochtar Lubis, under 'Mochtar') unless the first name regularly occurs in an abbreviated form, or is used in the sense of a European first name (e.g. Hans Bague Jassin, under 'Jassin, H.B.'), or unless the first name occurs as an aristocratic title (e.g. Sutan Sjahrir, under 'Sjahrir, Sutan').
GLOSSARY

adat  tradition, custom
AJ    Akademi Jakarta, Jakarta Academy
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Aspri Asisten pribadi, personal assistant to the President
BMKN Badan Musyawarat Kebudayaan Nasional, National Cultural Council
BPS   Badan Pendukung Sukarnoisme, Body for the Support of Sukarnoism
Bulog National Logistics Board
CCF   Congress for Cultural Freedom
controleur European district official
cukong Chinese business partner of government official
demang district chief
DKJ   Dewan Kesenian Jakarta, Jakarta Arts Council
DPR   Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, People's Representative Council
dukun practitioner of traditional medicine and mystic arts
GOLKAR Golongan Karya, the government political organisation of Functional Groups
Gemsos Gerakan Mahasiswa Sosialis, Socialist Students' Movement
G30S  Gerakan 30 September, The Thirtieth of September Movement
Golput Golongan Putih, White Group
GPI   Gerakan Pembaharuan Indonesia, Movement for the Renewal of Indonesia
HIS   Hollandsch Inlandsche School, Dutch-Indigenes School.
IACF  International Association for Cultural Freedom
INS   Indonesische Nationale School, Indonesian National School
IPI   International Press Institute
KAMI  Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia, Indonesian University Students' Action Front
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KAPPI</td>
<td>Kesatuan Aksi Pelajar Pemuda Indonesia, Indonesian Student and Youth Action Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KASI</td>
<td>Kesatuan Aksi Sarjana Indonesia, Indonesian Graduates' Action Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kebatinan</td>
<td>mystical spirituality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNIP</td>
<td>Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat, Central Indonesian National Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kopkamtib</td>
<td>Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban, Operations Command for the Restoration of Security and Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LBH</td>
<td>Lembaga Bantuan Hukum, Legal Aid Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEKRA</td>
<td>Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat, Institute of People's Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LKB</td>
<td>Yayasan Lembaga Pengembangan Pengertian dan Kesadaran Berkonstitusi Menurut Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, Institute for Constitutional Awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPKJ</td>
<td>Lembaga Pendidikan Kesenian Jakarta, Jakarta Art Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPR</td>
<td>Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, People's Consultative Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NU</td>
<td>Nahdatul Ulama, Muslim Scholars' Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>Opsus</td>
<td>Operasi Khusus, Special Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pancasila</td>
<td>Five principles of the Indonesian state ideology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pejuang</td>
<td>Independence fighter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pemuda</td>
<td>young person, youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEN</td>
<td>Poets, playwrights, essayists and novelists' international organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peperda</td>
<td>Penguasa Perang Daerah, local military authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>peranakan</td>
<td>Chinese (or other non-indigenes) born in Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PETA</td>
<td>Pembela Tanah Air, Defenders of the Homeland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKI</td>
<td>Partai Komunis Indonesia, Indonesian Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNI</td>
<td>Partai Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pojok</td>
<td>Brief 'corner' column in newspaper</td>
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<tr>
<td>pribumi</td>
<td>Indigenous Indonesian</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRRI</td>
<td>Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia, Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSI</td>
<td>Partai Sosialis Indonesia, Indonesian Socialist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>PWI</td>
<td>Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia, Indonesian Journalists’ Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>rakyat</td>
<td>people, the populace, the masses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTM</td>
<td>Rumah Tahanan Militer, Military Detention Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>satria</td>
<td>knight, noble warrior</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sekolah Ekonomi</td>
<td>Economic High School</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sekolah Rakyat</td>
<td>village People’s School</td>
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<tr>
<td>SESKOAD</td>
<td>Sekolah Staf Komando Angkatan Darat, Army Staff and Command College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIC</td>
<td>Surat Izin Cetak, Printing permit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIT</td>
<td>Surat Izin Terbit, Publishing permit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tapol</td>
<td>tahanan politik, political prisoner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBN(PT)</td>
<td>Tambahan Berita Negara (Perseroan-Perseroan Terbatas), Company Registration Supplement to the Government Gazette</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIM</td>
<td>Taman Ismail Marzuki, the Jakarta Cultural Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>warung</td>
<td>small shop, roadside stall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YLBHI</td>
<td>Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia, Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation</td>
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PROLOGUE

It is difficult not be impressed on first meeting Mochtar Lubis. When he opened the screen door of his Jakarta house to me in January 1981 I was immediately struck by his stature, and then his relaxed informality. He was more than six feet tall and dressed casually in blue jeans and a plain cream short-sleeved cotton shirt.

He greeted me warmly, with fluent English, a broad smile and a lively glimmer in his eyes. A sensitive host, perhaps to put me at ease, he first showed me around the large front rooms of his home, pointing out various favourite carvings or paintings -- his own or those of famous friends -- which adorned the high walls. The old Dutch house, in the prestigious central suburb of Menteng, had been his home since 1945. It had a comfortable, open, 'lived in' atmosphere, with a decor of Indonesian objets d'art and antiques.

Mochtar Lubis chatted about his growing artistic interest in the water-colour medium, and described the satisfaction he got from wood carving, furniture making, ceramics and his various other craft skills. The conversation flowed smoothly, buoyed along by the warmth of his sprightly humour and husky chuckle. His lined, pliant face radiated intellectual vitality and an enjoyment of life.

Two months off 60, he struck me as a handsome, sensual man. I sensed a strong pride in his physical fitness. His body was trim and taut, but his height lent him a looseness of limb which accentuated the relaxed image as he lay back in his chair, his arms spread wide or cocked behind his head. When stressing a point, he would shift forward leaning across his thighs, as if physically backing his argument.
During the three hour interview he ranged eclectically over the breadth and variety of his activities, achievements and opinions: personal and professional reminiscences, political attitudes, ecological issues, his current artistic projects, the state of the press in Indonesia, and more. He spoke of his family: his Sundanese wife Halimah Kartawidjaja (whom he had married on 1 July 1945, and to whom many of his books are dedicated), his sons Indrawan (b. 1947) and Arman (b. 1952) and his daughter Yana Zamira (b. 1953).

Our conversations were punctuated by the occasional visitor: a writer from Malaysia, an admirer wanting an autograph, a former student activist borrowing a camera. All throughout, questions were fielded with the grace and dexterity of a man who had spent his professional life interviewing and being interviewed.

I left this first meeting feeling honoured to have been given such privileged access to a man who, as an author and newspaper editor, had gained a national and international reputation. This thesis is an attempt to come to terms with that reputation.

I was initially attracted to Mochtar Lubis during my first year of university study of Indonesian. I struggled to translate a chapter about him in our Indonesian language reader, which said:

"He always defended and fought for freedom of the press and he did not belong to any political party. He often wrote articles about Indonesian social injustice and also opposed and criticised corruption and the abuse of governmental power, and [he] struggled for democracy.[1]

In addition, as part of my undergraduate Indonesian course I read two novels by Mochtar Lubis, Jalan Tak Ada Ujung (in Indonesian) and

Twilight in Jakarta (in English), and his short story collection Si Jamal. Professor Anthony Johns, translator of Jalan Tak Ada Ujung, spoke to us of Mochtar Lubis's principles and courage. Press reports reinforced this image.

When I embarked on postgraduate research in 1979 the aura of Mochtar Lubis was part of the reason for my choice. I admired the bravery and determination of an individual jailed for speaking his mind, not once, but several times. Mochtar Lubis also appealed to me for reasons to do with my overlapping interest in politics, journalism and literature. I wanted from the beginning to write a thesis, not of 'pure' literary criticism, but about the man and the many roles he has played.

During the course of two years fieldwork in Indonesia I talked about Mochtar Lubis to a large number of people, people of different generations and occupations, and a great variety of political outlooks. I heard a range of attitudes towards him, from staunch supporters who had worked with him on the newspaper Indonesia Raya to former leftist political prisoners who were scornful of much he represented. The level of criticism, even from those generally sympathetic to him, was considerable.

As I acquired more material about his attitudes, behaviour and activities, as various informants provided their particular views of the man, I was increasingly challenged to think critically about him. I came to believe that my biography should record and evaluate the arguments of those sections of the Indonesian community which are critical of Mochtar Lubis and the roles he has played.

The academic biographer is charged with the responsibility of fairly and accurately representing the person who is the subject of the biography. He is also expected to interpret and evaluate that person's
life. This latter expectation is the more difficult where the subject of
the biography is alive, and particularly where a personal relationship
has been established between the biographer and his subject. In those
circumstances, the biographer may feel constrained by apprehensions about
the subject's response to the work.

During twelve interviews (and various other meetings) with Mochtar
Lubis, over 14 months, some degree of personal relationship developed
between us. I began to realise I was a participant (inconsequential
perhaps but nonetheless interacting) in a continuing 'history'.
Confidentialities were exchanged, personal information was entrusted,
ideas were discussed, disputed, probed. I became unconvinced by some of
his answers, frustrated by his deflections, aware of contradictions, and,
probing further, realised just how sensitive were some aspects of his
life. Conflicts emerged within me, for while my personal admiration for
him grew, so too did my queries about his role in Indonesia.

Personal tensions developed. We had two lengthy discussions
concerning a draft article of mine about him: an amicable one over lunch
at his home; the next, rather spirited, at the office of a publishing
foundation he had established. At the first, he suggested my approach was
reinforcing the myths about him, by beginning from the assumption that he
was "a superman" and then criticising him for not living up to that
reputation in every aspect of his life.[2] At the second cathartic
discussion, as he disputed an interpretation in my draft, he observed
that the way I discussed certain aspects of his life revealed as much
about myself and my values as it did about him.

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2. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 17/3/82.
Mochtar[3] was correct on both counts. The picture of him that I had when I embarked on my fieldwork was indeed larger than life. It was necessary for me to strive to overcome any disenchantment. His second observation raises the biographer's dilemma of how to judge what to include in such a study.

I am not attempting to write comprehensively about Mochtar Lubis. This is not a psychological biography. I have said little about his personal and family life or his leisure activities, and nothing about his dietary habits or musical tastes, though, within the context of a different kind of biography, these could illustrate aspects of his relationship to his society. I have chosen to concentrate upon three overlapping aspects of his life: his roles as newspaper editor, author and political actor. I have selected material which sheds light upon these roles.

While academic training encourages an intellectual detachment from many kinds of conflicts and disagreements, one also learns that any detachment achieved is very limited, that one cannot be either neutral or objective, that every act of judgement is based on distinctive perspectives and presuppositions. The information which I have chosen to present reflects my values, perspectives and assumptions: the privileging of certain stories as being well-authenticated and valuable and the discounting of other information as unreliable or of little importance.

In summary then, this thesis is not 'all my own work'. It is the product of the mediation between myself, as the writer, and the

3. In using Mochtar Lubis's 'first' name, I follow common practice in Indonesian, where he is most frequently referred to either as 'Pak Mochtar' [Father/Mr Mochtar], 'Bung Mochtar' [Brother Mochtar], or simply 'Mochtar'. This usage implies neither disrespect nor excessive familiarity.

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environments -- physical, cultural, social, economic, intellectual and political -- within which it has been produced. It is a product of the physical, temporal and economic constraints upon me during its writing, the cultural and political biases inherent in my view of the world, the social milieu in which I have written and the ideas to which I have been exposed before and during the period of its research and composition. What I endeavour to do is present a detailed, reasoned and thoughtful view of Mochtar Lubis within the context of his society, having due regard to his achievements, but not shrinking from the responsibility of criticism.
CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION

This thesis is a biographical study of the Indonesian author and journalist, Mochtar Lubis (from his birth in 1922 to his sixtieth year), examining the nexus between journalism, fiction and politics in his life. It sees Mochtar Lubis as a prism, through which one can view his various milieux -- intellectual, artistic, journalistic and political -- and the national history of the times through which he has lived.

In its theoretical approach this thesis has been influenced primarily by two main bodies of academic writing. Firstly, it draws upon an ongoing debate regarding the relationship between literature and politics. Secondly, it is related to a corpus of material discussing the role of a section of Indonesian society referred to variously as the secular, liberal, modernising or Westernised political intellectuals.

Literature and Politics

It is rare, if not impossible, for a study of post-war Indonesian literature to omit the name of Hans Bague Jassin (born Gorontalo, 1917). So influential has he been as a literary historian and critic that he provides a ready starting point for an analysis of the relationship between politics and literature in post-war Indonesia. Since he began working as an editor with Balai Pustaka publishing house in 1940, H.B. Jassin has exerted a strong, persistent influence over the development of Indonesian literature and literary criticism, as editor of a series of
literary magazines, confidante of authors, literary critic, and lecturer in Indonesian literature at the University of Indonesia since 1953.[1]

More than any other Indonesian Jassin has constructed the orthodox interpretations of literature in Indonesia and through his position at the University of Indonesia he has fostered a generation of literary critics.[2] In 1975 the university awarded him an honorary doctorate for his services to Indonesian literature.

Jassin's influence has been the greater because of his close cooperation with the Dutch literary historian Andries Teeuw (b. Gorinchem, Holland, 1921), who was a colleague of Jassin's at the University of Indonesia in the 1950s. Teeuw's early writings on Indonesian literature were published in Indonesian translation in 1952 and expanded to two volumes in 1955.[3] This work became standard fare for students. As Andre Hardjana (b. Yogyakarta 1940), formerly with the Yogyakarta Catholic magazine Basis, has noted,

"[f]rom this famous book all kinds of summaries have been published in stencil form for the use of secondary school students..."


2. His students include Boen S. Oemarjati, M.S. Hutagalung, J.U. Nasution, Umar Junus, M. Saleh Saad, Bahrum Rangkuti, Dami N. Toda and Pamusuk Eneste (who has been actively collecting, editing and publishing Jassin's disparate material since 1982).

students, but it is not rare for them to be used also by university students."[4]

In the introduction to the revised English edition of *Pokok dan Tokoh* Teeuw acknowledged "the great debt" owed to Jassin,[5] whom he described as the "custodian of Modern Indonesian Literature".[6] Professional collaboration between Jassin and Teeuw, and similarities in their approach and perception of literature during the 1950s, produced the "dominant, 'correct' and 'legitimate' view on literature".[7] Teeuw was awarded an honorary doctorate from the University of Indonesia a month after Jassin.[8] Their prominence, continuing into the 1980s, caused concern among other critics. In 1981 Andre Hardjana commented that:

"the views and teachings of H.B. Jassin and A. Teeuw have had such a great influence that, as a consequence, they have almost frozen [membekukan] the possibilities for other views and teachings. [This has] been regarded with anxiety for some time by teachers of literature in Indonesia".[9]

According to Indonesian literary critics in the Jassin-Teeuw tradition literature is a discrete category of writing which fulfils certain aesthetic standards in a way which can be evaluated objectively

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6. Teeuw 1967:120.

7. Savitri Scherer (1981) *From Culture to Politics: The Writings of Pramoedya Ananta Toer*, unpublished PhD thesis, A.N.U., Canberra, p.7. Scherer explains that, though dominant, the orthodoxy was not unchallenged, with Pramoedya Ananta Toer becoming "the leader of the attack on the 'Teeuw-Jassin' school and the 'universal humanist' ideal it advocated"(p.8). Her introductory chapter places this orthodoxy into context.


9. Andre Hardjana 1981:51. See also his comments about "graduates trained by H.B. Jassin" (p.9).
regardless of socio-political considerations. Literature may have political themes but is not, in itself, necessarily political. As Jassin explained in a 1982 interview:

"in my opinion, we must talk about [either] politics or literature. For me, even if literature is not particularly good, as long as it gets six [points], then it's literature. Fortunately there are some [works] which get seven, nine or ten. But if it is below six, whatever the content, whether it is about the spirit of the people [kerjaan] or whatever, I cannot accept it as literature."[10]

It is necessary, he argues

"to differentiate between political and literary values. Politics has to be measured from a political angle, while a literary work has to be viewed from the perspective of its aesthetics, its literary value."[11]

Literature is "a product of beauty, in content and form, an artistic world" uplifting the reader and providing an "understanding of humanity and life."[12] The goal of the author is to create a "perfect complete creation" ["hasil ciptaan siap sempurna"], a "literary work which fulfils aesthetic requirements".[13]

The "artistic essence" possessed by the artist is imagination[14] and "the aim of art is the liberation of the human spirit, which also means self-knowledge in relationship to nature at large."[15] The artist is viewed as an individual and unique creator. A literary work is a

visionary creation, the creation of the artist's free imagination, embodying "truth" linked aesthetically with "beauty".

According to this approach aesthetic values are universal and objective. That this school of analysis regards Indonesian literature as following European traditions in a linear development is evident in Jassin's doctoral oration "Sastra Indonesia Sebagai Warga Sastra Dunia" [Indonesian Literature as a Member of World Literature]. In addressing why no Indonesian author has won the Nobel prize, he posits that Indonesians have lacked the "vitamin-enriched food" of world literatures, little of which has been translated into Indonesian.

"Because we do not know about world literature we are always late in our development. [The literary journal] Pujangga Baru came 50 years later, after the Eighties [Tachtigers - DTH] movement in Holland, the Generation of 1945 was several decades late compared to the generation of poets after World War Two in Europe, and so on. It is those who know the world situation who can race with the world champions."[16]

This tradition sees as a goal the elevation of literary works to a "universal plane".[17]

Viewed as universal, literature is not the property of a particular nation, language group, religion or social class, but is accessible to all, through translations and the mediation of the literary critic.

"A [literary] critic or evaluator is an intermediary between the creator and the public. A critic discovers and points out the beauty and the short-comings in a particular creation and in this way makes that creation clear for the public, so they can appreciate it or have their own views too."[18]


17. H.B. Jassin (1984) Surat-surat 1943-1983, (edited and introduced by Pamusuk Eneste), Gramedia, Jakarta, p.176, recommends to a poet the deleting of certain specific references in a poem to raise it to this "universal plane".

Literary criticism is "the weighing up of the good and bad of a particular literary product".[19] In doing this, the critic must produce the "facts" and not simply his or her feelings in response to a work, since "[f]acts are a reality which is the same for all people".[20] A critic should put aside all kinds of personal emotions in weighing up the objective, aesthetic criteria against which a literary work can be evaluated.[21]

The assumptions of this orthodoxy are questioned in Keith Foulcher's study of Lekra,[22] in which he examines Lekra's cultural theory and practice and its response to the literary debates between 1950 and 1965. Foulcher's opening chapter analyses the political history of literary criticism in post-independence Indonesia.

Drawing on earlier work by Savitri Scherer,[23] which traces the association of Teeuw and Jassin, Foulcher describes the establishment of the "anti-leftist critical tradition of writing about post-war Indonesian literature"[24] in the early 1950s. He traces the dominance of this group after 1965 and its conscious efforts to exclude from national discourse those forms of literary theory which "posited some intrinsic relationship between 'art' and 'ideology'".[25] Foulcher challenges the "ideological bases" of orthodox studies (by Teeuw, Jassin, Yahaya Ismail and Boen Sri

25. Foulcher 1986:5.
Oemarjati) noting their dismissal of left wing theorists and acceptance of the political belief that cultural and intellectual freedom were jeopardised by the approach of the leftists. He argues, in challenging assertions by literary critics of the 'Teeuw-Jassin' school that their own writings were objective (untouched by political or ideological bias), that the

"denial of ideology can always be seen as an indication of the very strength of its presence.[...] What is posed as a distinction between art and ideology is in fact a choice between competing ideologies and their implications for social and cultural practice.[... For] the practice of literature and literary criticism in a given social/historical context is an enactment of ideology."[26]

Foulcher demonstrates the 'intrinsic relationship' between literature (and literary criticism) and politics in post-independence Indonesia. The challenge which Foulcher's approach represents to the orthodoxy was indicated by the response to his monograph in Indonesia. Published at a time when the Contextual Literature debate,[27] triggered off by Arief Budiman and Ariel Heryanto at a literary conference in October 1984, was stirring a re-assessment of conventional analyses of literature in Indonesia, the Foulcher study (and related papers) evoked acidic criticism from supporters of the Teeuw-Jassin tradition and accolades from the proponents of the new contextual school.[28]

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27. On the background to this debate and its major papers, see Ariel Heryanto (1985) Perdebatan Sastra Kontekstual. Rajawali, Jakarta.

In his discussion of Indonesia, Foulcher draws on the analyses of British literary theorist Terry Eagleton.[29] Eagleton’s approach[30] makes explicit key premises of the Foulcher study and two points which are fundamental to my exposition of Mochtar Lubis’s writings.

Firstly, Eagleton questions the validity of a water-tight category of writing known as "literature". He believes

"[l]iterature, in the sense of a set of works of assured and unalterable value, distinguished by certain shared inherent properties, does not exist."[31]

There is no "objective" category 'literature', no cut-off point below which writing is not 'literature'. Rather Eagleton posits:

"it is most useful to see 'literature' as a name which people give from time to time for different reasons to certain kinds of writing within a whole field of what Michel Foucault has called 'discursive practices'".[32]

There is no universal quality associated with 'literature' which distinguishes it, for example, from writings like news reports, essays, letters or diaries. Included within this 'literary' study of Mochtar Lubis (and I use the terms 'literature' and 'literary' with Eagleton's qualifications) are all types of his writings: those conventionally categorised separately as 'literature', journalism and reportage.

Following the British sociologist, Janet Wolff, we can argue that literature, like any other art form, is not some mysterious "transcendent, universal fact" created from nothing by an inspired and


visionary individual, but a "complex product of economic, social and ideological factors... owing its existence to the particular practice of the located individual".[33]

A second point discussed by Eagleton and Wolff and central to this thesis derives from a rejection of the claim that knowledge is 'value-free', a "claim that... is itself a value-judgement".[34] "Value-free" beliefs may assume the guise of universality, but, in Wolff's analysis, "natural social facts and relations" are in fact "historically specific", and "art as a product of consciousness is also permeated with ideology, although it is not reducible to ideology".[35]

In extending this judgement to the field of literary criticism, Eagleton argues that "'pure' literary theory [i.e. literary theory devoid of political value judgements and based, in Jassin's terms, on 'facts'(see page 6)] is an academic myth".[36] He asserts that historically literary theory "has been indissociably bound up with political beliefs and ideological values".[37] The analysis of literary

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35. Wolff 1981:119. In this thesis I broadly follow Wolff's use of the term 'ideology', to refer to an interpretive system, a set of ideas and beliefs which systematically mediate a person in his/her relations with the material, social and political environment (Wolff 1981:50). It is not my intention to confer upon the term a sense of the juxtaposition of 'false' or 'true' consciousnesses, nor to engage in a discussion of the various interpretations and applications of the term. Such discussions can be found elsewhere [e.g. Colin Sumner (1979) Reading Ideologies: An Investigation of the Marxist Theory of Ideology and Law, Academic Press, London, pp.3-56; and Nicholas Abercrombie, Stephen Hill and Bryan S. Turner (1980) The Dominant Ideology Thesis, George Allen & Unwin, London (1984 edition), pp. 187-91.]


products must take into consideration that the "accredited judges of art and arbiters of taste are themselves socially defined and constituted, and bring to bear in their judgements specific ideological and positional values."[38] These beliefs and values -- institutionalised in such bodies as university literature departments, literary magazines, publishing and advertising houses -- influence assessments and categorisations of literature.

More than simply denying the possibility of separating politics from literary criticism, Eagleton contends that

"[t]he idea that there are 'non-political' forms of criticism is simply a myth which furthers certain political uses of literature all the more effectively".[39]

The enmeshing of politics and literary criticism is thus seen as inevitable. Such challenges to the Indonesian orthodoxy, both within and outside of Indonesia, provide one context for this study of Mochtar Lubis.

Secular Modernising Intellectuals

A second set of arguments to which this dissertation relates has to do with the role of Indonesian intellectuals, specifically those secular 'democratic socialist' intellectuals (influenced by the thinking of Sutan Sjahrir), who comprised one of the five "streams of political thinking" in Indonesia between 1945 and 1965, as identified by Feith and Castles.[40] The Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI), founded by Sjahrir in


February 1948 and banned in August 1960, was always small but was Indonesia's most vocal promoter of democratic, liberal socialism. Its members, generally urban and highly educated in the Western tradition, demonstrated their "concern for individual freedom, their openness to world intellectual currents, and their rejection of obscurantism, chauvinism, and the 'personality cult'". Although Mochtar Lubis has never been a member of the PSI, his thinking has consistently been within this 'democratic socialist' stream and this biography of him relates to studies of the PSI and related groups.

Sjahrir and his colleagues were articulate and industrious in recording their ideas and self-perceptions. Apart from Sjahrir's major (and translated) works produced during his lifetime, his followers, University Press, Ithaca, particularly p.13). The streams were Radical Nationalism, Javanese Traditionalism, Islam, Democratic Socialism and Communism.

41. Feith and Castles (eds.) 1970:227 discusses the appropriateness to these labels.

42. Despite the imprecision of the concept of 'the West', it is used in this thesis in a functional way to refer to the USA, Western Europe, Britain and Australia, and the broad common social, cultural and political practices they share.


44. In a 1972 interview, Mochtar Lubis stated that his closest friends in the 1950s were Sutan Sjahrir, the most prominent intellectual in the democratic socialist group, and Adam Malik, a sympathiser of the radical nationalist Murba Party [see Henri Chambert-Loir (1974) Mochtar Lubis: Une Vision de l'Indonésie Contemporaine, Publication de l'École Française D'Extrême-Orient, Paris, p.38, note 30]. Mochtar told John Legge that he was drawn to Sutan Sjahrir and moved on the fringes of his group, but "preserved his independence". [Interview 7/8/80, cited in J.D. Legge (1988) Intellectuals and Nationalism in Indonesia: A Study of the Following recruited by Sutan Sjahrir in Occupation Jakarta, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Ithaca, see p.141. I would like to thank John Legge for making drafts of this work available to me.]

many of whom have themselves gained intellectual and political prominence, have kept his reputation alive by publishing (or reprinting) less well known works.[46] and a major memorial volume.[47] Members of the Sjahrir group, which extended well beyond PSI party members, have had an ongoing influence on the way they are perceived far beyond that determined by their own writings. They have provided the entrée, the point of personal and intellectual contact, for numerous foreign scholars (and journalists[48]), whose subsequent analyses reflect this sympathy of orientation.

Their view of Indonesia and its politics has been privileged in a mainstream tradition of English-language scholarship on Indonesian politics, which presents the democratic socialists positively. The following survey will juxtapose the traditions of scholarship exemplified by Kahin and Legge, with critiques of that position by Anderson, Mortimer and Ransom, and conclude with Liddle's assessment of the achievements of this group of Indonesian intellectuals.

George McTurnan Kahin, founder of the dominant liberal tradition of Indonesian political studies in America, spent 1948-49 in Indonesia

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Anderson), Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, Ithaca, 1968 (originally published as Perjuangan Kita circa 1945).


48. For example, Arnold C. Brackman, the United Press Bureau chief in Jakarta in 1948-50 who returned a year later for five more years, became a "close friend" of Sjahrir, dedicating his book The Communist Collapse in Indonesia to him. [Brackman (1980) "Sjahrir pejuang kemerdekaan tanah airnya" (pp.293-299) in Rosihan Anwar (ed.) 1980.]
researching his seminal work *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*. [49]

He was obviously impressed by Sjaithir, writing later that

"[f]ew Indonesians have done as much thoughtful writing about Indonesia and her problems as ... Sutan Sjaithir". [50]

Returning from fieldwork in 1949 Kahin collaborated enthusiastically with members of Indonesia's United Nations mission [51] including Soedjatmoko, later "widely regarded as the most outstanding of the young intellectuals of Sjaithir's Indonesian Socialist Party", [52] to promote the Indonesian Republic's cause in America. Foreigners and Indonesians recognised Kahin's "principal identification ... with Sjaithir" and his group both in the perspective of his study of the Revolution and in his personal relations. [53] Kahin's view that Sjaithir and his group were "as progressive as they were practical and moderate" and that they embodied the greatest potential for socio-economic change, [54] was shared by many.


51. The UN mission included a strong pro-Sjaithir contingent: Soedjatmoko, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo and Charles Tambu, a Ceylonese who took over the editorship of the Jakarta English-language paper *Times of Indonesia* after Mochtar Lubis's departure in June 1953. (I would like to thank John Legge for making this information available to me.)


53. Herbert Feith (1982) "The Study of Indonesian Politics: A Survey and an Apologia" (pp.41-53) in Benedict Anderson and Audrey Kahin (eds.) (1982) *Interpreting Indonesian Politics: Thirteen Contributions to the Debate*. Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Ithaca. Quotation from p.44. The Masyumi leader Mohamad Roem wrote: "Kahin was considered as having many contacts with PSI people, especially Sjaithir, and Sjaithir's stance can be considered as being in line with what has been expressed by Kahin."["Bung kecil yang berbuat besar" (pp.139-165), in Rosihan Anwar (ed.) 1980. Quotation from p.156.]

54. Feith 1982:44.
of his students, including, in the Australian context, J.D. Legge and Herbert Feith.

In a 1986 tribute to Legge, Feith has described the personal and intellectual pull of Kahin (and the Cornell program he directed), Sjahrrir and his younger colleagues upon John Legge (and by implication upon himself). Legge's interest in the Sjahrrir group, traceable to his early contacts with Indonesia in the mid-1950s, continues with his most recent project, a study of the inner core of the Sjahrrir circle in the middle 1940s, examining about 60 of its members in detail.[55] The secular, democratic socialist intellectuals provided such Western academics with a sense of companionship, guidance and community.[56]

A critique of the link between Western scholarship and the secular 'democratic socialist' intellectuals was provided from within Cornell. Widespread questioning of liberalism (and especially 'cold war liberalism') at the time of the Vietnam War had changed perceptions of the Sjahrrir group. In 1972 a student of Kahin, Benedict Anderson, had published a "a radical revision of Kahin's interpretation, in which the militant youth of 1945 emerged at centre stage and Sjahrrir and his followers were accorded much reduced parts".[57] In a 1973 essay Anderson pointed out the limitations of the Kahinian approach:

"[The] liberal-democratic concerns of the Kahinians led to a pronounced focus on constitutional politics and parliamentary institutions. In a narrower sense, it was particularly the Westernized political leaders of Sjahrrir's Indonesian Socialist Party and Mohammad Natsir's wing of the Islamic


56. Feith 1986:87 describes the particular role of Soedjatmoko's house as "a place of pilgrimage for Western academics".

57. Feith 1986:89. The work referred to was Benedict R. O'G. Anderson (1972) Java in a Time of Revolution. Cornell University Press, Ithaca. This work had been Legge's "point of departure", his motivation for returning the Sjahrrir group to centre stage.
Masyumi party whose ideas and programs were treated with the most sympathy and respect."[58]

The foreigners' identification had been with these sections of the "postrevolutionary political and intellectual elite"[59] (rather than groups with competing nationalist credentials or those dubbed 'traditional'), a phenomenon Anderson traced to "the paradigm of American liberal culture [which has] shaped the contours of American research on Indonesia in the most basic sense".[60]

In 1972 Australian Rex Mortimer developed a variant of the challenge to liberal scholarship initiated by Anderson. Drawing on a 1971 version of Anderson's 1973 essay, Mortimer analysed "The Liberal Impasse in Australian Scholarship on Southeast Asia", citing various Indonesian examples.[61] Writing on the basis of a detailed study of the Indonesian Communist Party,[62] he described Australian liberal scholarship's "sympathies with Westernised elites of the pragmatic kind [and] its uncomfortable reaction to nationalism, militarism and novel communist strategies of development".[63] He called for a questioning of "the


60. Anderson 1982:70. Anderson used the term 'American research' to refer to "scholarly writing published in America by Americans or non-Americans" (1982:69).


liberal world outlook, and its implications for research formats, teaching and public activity". [64]

The role of the modernising intellectuals as "technocrats" within a US-fostered military government was a principal theme of David Ransom's study of American educational programs which had prepared the ground for Indonesia's big rightward turn of 1965-66. [65] The aim of funding organisations such as the Ford Foundation, operating in Indonesia throughout the 1950s and 1960s, was the creation of a "modernizing elite" whom Ransom accuses (along with the American "modernizers") of being "paid to protect" the resource-potential of Indonesia for foreign investment. [66]

In a 1973 essay R. William Liddle assessed the achievements of a "group of power seekers, active in Indonesian politics since 1965, who have attempted to articulate and to act upon an ideology (although they would not call it that) of modernization". [67]

He dubbed his subjects "secular modernizing intellectuals". Their characteristics included a commitment to imposing their particular conception of "modernisation" upon policy-makers, "their articulateness, their command of elite newspapers, and their self-proclaimed role as conscience of the regime", and their "inability to unite organizationally". But Liddle saw their primary characteristics as the

64. Mortimer (ed.) 1973:130.

65. Published initially as "The Berkeley Mafia and the Indonesian Massacre". (Ramparts, No. 9, 1970), the material was expanded and revised as "Ford Country: Building an Elite for Indonesia" (pp.93-116) in Steve Weissman (ed.) (1974) The Trojan Horse: A Radical Look at Foreign Aid, Ramparts Press, San Francisco.


"intensity of their activities both in ideological formulation and dissemination and ... their willingness to act upon their beliefs". It is this ideology and its intellectual antecedents which primarily occupied Liddle, who argued that though "their views have dominated public political discussion since 1967...their influence -- in the sense of success in achieving their objectives -- has been minimal".[68]

While Liddle argues that this group, as he constitutes it, has been active since 1965, its intellectual antecedents, traceable to the early twentieth century, find their strongest line of influence through Sutan Sjahrir, and the intellectual circle of which he was the centre. One way in which Liddle's "secular modernizing intellectuals" have attempted to assert an influence upon national politics has been as prominent and outspoken individuals, who declare themselves to be non-partisan and beyond the ideology of party politics. This thesis examines the career of one member of this intellectual tradition who chose journalism and fictional writing as vehicles for his ideas.

**Mochtar Lubis as an Object of Study**

Soon after my arrival in Jakarta to commence the preliminary fieldwork for this study I met socially a historian from the University of Indonesia, a man with no significant involvement in party politics. This man, who had spent several years living abroad, was annoyed when I told him of my research topic. "Not another foreigner coming to make a hero out of Mochtar Lubis! Why is it that all you Westerners are so

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attracted to this man? Why do you all exaggerate his importance?" [69]

Though expressed on this occasion with a startling degree of irritation, these sentiments were to be a frequent response during my fieldwork.

Mochtar Lubis has captured the attention of Westerners since the mid 1950s. He gained Western admiration for his maverick domestic journalistic and literary activities, which contributed to his rising profile in international organisations like the International Press Institute and the Congress for Cultural Freedom. [70] He has been Indonesia's best known journalist internationally and was for a time the country's most translated author.

There have been a number of studies of Mochtar Lubis, most of which, although including a basic biographical outline, are essentially literary analyses of specific major texts. [71] In addition, a comparative study has been made of the philosophical content of selected works by Mochtar Lubis and Catholic pastor and author Y.B. Mangunwijaya (b. Ambarawa, 1929). [72] While such studies are relevant to particular aspects of Mochtar Lubis's life and writings, there has only been one comprehensive

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69. The conversation is paraphrased from memory.


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academic study, by Henri Chambert-Loir, which is comparable to this dissertation in the choice of subject matter and general biographical approach.[73]

Though produced outside the Kahinian school, Chambert-Loir's thesis shares many of its perceptions. It is a well researched study, revealing a very full familiarity with Mochtar Lubis's writings. While the major part deals with Mochtar Lubis's literary works, it also includes detailed chapters on his biography and the history of his newspaper Indonesia Raya.[74] Chambert-Loir based his study substantially on Mochtar Lubis's own writing: published diaries, novels and newspaper articles. He evaluates Mochtar Lubis's actions within the perception of the world that Mochtar Lubis himself provides and reflects a strong sympathy for Mochtar Lubis and his aspirations. The arguments of critical opponents of Mochtar Lubis are rarely audible in his analysis. Mochtar is seen fundamentally as a journalist and author, yet the political implications of these roles are not pursued to a critical conclusion. When I asked Mochtar Lubis what he thought of Chambert-Loir's study he replied that the French scholar had been "too kind to me".[75]

As I see it, Chambert-Loir has left room for further biographical research and especially for research which goes beyond written evidence to the non-literary political activities of the man, to analyse the relationship between the writer, as both journalist and author, and his political and social environment. A biographical study may contribute to our general understanding of the roles assumed by intellectuals like


74. Approximately 19% of the substantive body of the study is given to each of these chapters.

75. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 13/1/81.
Mochtar Lubis. As a member of the secular modernising intellectual community, Mochtar Lubis has experienced the ebb and flow of influence of this group and he has adjusted his roles accordingly. The late 1940s and early 1950s were years of promise for this group, but by the end of the 1950s they were hard-pressed by other social and political forces. Following their re-emergence after 1965-66, as 'technocrats' and as tolerated moderate critics, the influence of the PSI-type of intellectual had waned by the late 1970s, diluted within an expanding diversifying intellectual community. The times of Mochtar Lubis's greatest prominence correspond fairly closely to the two periods of influence of the group of which he is a part.

Chambert-Loir's study is representative of the time it was written. Researched in the early 1970s when Mochtar Lubis's reputation was soaring, it reflects an assessment of him common amongst university-educated urban youth, activists involved in the 1966 student movement, and liberal intellectuals of the time. Mochtar had been elevated to hero status by these sections of the community when he emerged in 1966 from long periods of house and jail arrest. Access to contrasting views was then difficult, for the leftists most sharply critical of Mochtar Lubis were in detention. By presenting a picture of Mochtar from this sympathetic perspective the Chambert-Loir study confirms the well-established conventional picture of him.

The changed circumstances of the late 1970s and 1980s have enabled me to have access to more variegated opinions and information about Mochtar Lubis, and to draw on new writings on the secular modernising intellectuals as a group. It is my intention in this thesis to re-examine Mochtar Lubis, bearing in mind challenges to the liberal traditions of Western scholarship and taking account of shifting domestic perceptions of him. I see a need to examine Mochtar Lubis as an exemplar of a
particular kind of political opposition, as a cultural activist promoting
certain views of society and the world, and as a channel linking
Indonesia with a transnational intellectual community (and transmitting
its perspectives). My approach will question, as Mortimer has urged, the
sympathies of many foreign scholars with "Westernised elites of the
pragmatic kind", and scholars' acceptance of the appropriateness of the
strategies and goals of these elites.[76]

Research Methods and Sources

This dissertation is based on research conducted during 24 months
fieldwork in Indonesia and library-based research in Australia. During my
two years in Jakarta, I mainly used the H.B. Jassin Literary
Documentation Centre, augmented by material in the Jakarta Central Museum
library, the Idayu Foundation library, and holdings at the former
Indonesia Raya offices in Jalan Suprapto.

In the library and archival research, the most important single
written source was Indonesia Raya, available on microfilm covering the
periods 1 July 1955 - 3 January 1959 and 30 October 1968 - 21 January
1974 (incomplete in places).[77] I located some pre-1955 material,
notably around October 1952, in Indonesia Raya's own collection. I had
access to a virtually complete collection of Mochtar Lubis's fictional


77. When Chambert-Loir was conducting his research about 1972, he had
access to the Jakarta Central Museum Library's collection of
Indonesia Raya, then lacking only most of 1950 and part of 1951
(Chambert-Loir 1974:62). Since then the Museum Library's collection
of pre-1955 Indonesia Raya has been mislaid. Indonesia Raya's own
collection was kept in unsorted flood-damaged piles. Many years'
copies were irreparably brittle, and largely illegible.
and non-fictional bound volumes, most short stories,[78] Horison literary magazine and several bundles of Mochtar Lubis's personal papers (some unpublished, though most being draft versions of subsequently published material).

I have also used oral sources extensively. Information was obtained in three ways: formal tape-recorded interviews, formal unrecorded interviews during which I took notes, and informal unstructured conversations at which no notes were taken, but which were written up at the earliest opportunity. In the first two situations I was usually interviewing a single individual, while the informal conversations sometimes took place on social occasions in varied settings when the purpose of my research may not have been explicitly under discussion. In the chapters that follow I differentiate between the two forms of interview and the conversations or discussions.

During the period January 1981 to March 1982 I had 12 interviews with Mochtar Lubis, averaging about three hours in length and in one case lasting six and a half hours.[79] I observed him on several public occasions, most notably when he gave a speech at the Jakarta Legal Aid Institute's anniversary, a public lecture at the Jakarta Cultural Centre, and a paper at a literary conference. Other Indonesians interviewed, or with whom I discussed my thesis, included literary and cultural figures, academics, religious and political figures, publishers, journalists and editors (past and current), film and theatre directors and artists, former army officers, former student activists, business people, human


79. We usually spoke in English (one of several languages in which he is fluent) though Indonesian was interspersed and used when other people were present.
rights activists and lawyers, and former and current employees and colleagues of Mochtar Lubis. Indonesian was used in most cases though a handful were conducted largely or entirely in English. I also spoke to, or interviewed, non-Indonesian journalists, business people and academics in Indonesia and Australia, and corresponded with several people in America and Europe.

Some informants requested that they not be sourced by name. This was usually because of the possible consequences on their relationship with the person under discussion, or because they were apprehensive, due to their sensitive political circumstances.[80] In such cases, I have corroborated their information, where used, to my satisfaction. Some informants gave permission for their names to be revealed selectively as the source of some details, but not others. I have endeavoured to respect all such requests.

Thesis Structure and Chapterisation

The academic context of this study and the research upon which it is based have been discussed in this introductory chapter. Chapter Two details Mochtar Lubis’s early life from his birth in 1922 to his assumption of key roles on the national literary and journalistic stage at the close of 1949. It locates Mochtar Lubis within his family, region, educational and employment background and intellectual milieu, during this period.

80. A List of Confidential Informants is provided as an separate appendix for examiners.
This provides the setting for a closer study of his career as a journalist and political activist in the next two chapters. Chief concerns in Chapter Three are the political characteristics of Mochtar Lubis as editor of the daily newspaper *Indonesia Raya*, the political circumstances leading to his detention in December 1956, the paper's subsequent closure and Mochtar Lubis's activities until his release in May 1966. His re-appearance after detention and the re-establishment of *Indonesia Raya* introduce Chapter Four, which discusses a sequence of *Indonesia Raya* campaigns leading to the paper's banning in January 1974. Mochtar Lubis's responses to the ban and his move away from political journalism towards cultural and sociological writings are discussed in this chapter.

The following two chapters deal with Mochtar's cultural and literary activities. Chapter Five, covering the period 1949 to 1982, details the development of his reputation as an author and his stand on various intellectual and cultural debates. Mochtar's post-1966 artistic endeavours are examined, with reference to his involvement in some of the principal institutions of the cultural establishment.

Chapter Six deals exclusively with Mochtar Lubis's fictional works, with two novels published after 1965 selected for particular attention. The chapter examines the texts' representation of two over-lapping and frequent themes in Mochtar Lubis's fiction: the 1945-49 'Revolution' and leadership in Indonesian society.

The focus on texts continues in Chapter Seven which analyses what is perhaps Mochtar Lubis's most significant statement on his society, a 1977 public lecture published as a best-selling monograph entitled *Manusia Indonesia* (Sebuah Pertanggungjawaban) ['The Indonesian Character (A
Statement of Responsibility]).[81] The chapter reviews the lecture's content and some of the Indonesian reactions to it, and then attempts a critique of the assumptions and ideas in the lecture.

The concluding chapter locates Mochtar Lubis within his social and political context. Firstly, it presents assessments of him by three particular groups with which he has been associated: journalists and editors, student activists and colleagues in the moderate opposition. Secondly, his position in Indonesian society is illustrated by comparing him with a select range of other journalists, intellectuals and artists. Finally, the thesis reviews the qualities Mochtar Lubis has displayed his public career.

CHAPTER TWO

BUREAUCRAT'S SON TO NATIONALIST INTELLECTUAL:

THE EARLY INFLUENCES ON MOCHTAR LUBIS

Mochtar Lubis was born in Padang, West Sumatra, on 7 March 1922, the sixth child of Raja Pandapotan Lubis and his wife Siti Madinah, both of Mandailing descent.[1] Mochtar's father, a senior public servant in the Dutch colonial government, came from the village of Muara Suro, about 180 kilometres south of Padang Sidempuan, in Tapanuli. Siti Madinah was his second wife, the first having been divorced at Siti Madinah's insistence. She was the daughter of the chief of a village complex (kuria) whose title, Mangaraja Sorik Merapi, refers to the Sorik Merapi mountain which towers over the Mandailing district. The two dominant clans of the region are Nasution and Lubis; Mochtar's mother came from the first and his father from the second. Both belonged to the village elites who hereditary position had been strengthened by Dutch rule.[2]

In 1915 Raja Pandapotan Lubis had been elevated to the position of assistant demang[3] in Padang, and, as a result, the family lived away

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2. Following tradition, the family council bestowed upon Mochtar the sonorous Mandailing aristocratic title (gelar) of "Sutan", in absentia during the wedding ceremony of his youngest brother Firman in Muara Suro around 1973. He has never used the title. (Correspondence with Mochtar Lubis, 15 June 1988.)

3. The title demang was used after 1914 for a district chief in West Sumatra, "theoretically chosen on the basis of ability rather than birth", according to Elizabeth E. Graves (1981) The Minangkabau Response to Dutch Colonial Rule in the Nineteenth Century, Cornell
from their ethnic home region of Mandailing.

West Sumatra in the 1920s was a centre of political and social ferment. Mochtar Lubis's childhood was a period of fast social change, when communism and radical populism in West Sumatra were antagonistic to Dutch interests and those who served them. In March 1923 a section of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was established in Padang, and, in just over 18 months, the membership of the party's People's Associations had grown to 660, drawn from the ranks of disgruntled former government personnel and small tradespeople.[4] The Dutch administration in West Sumatra was concerned about what it regarded as the "provocatively presumptuous, insolent, and defiant attitude many communists adopted towards headmen, native authorities and European government officials".[5] The PKI was gaining strength in various parts of the colony, becoming the strongest communist party in Asia by the middle 1920s.[6] Government scrutiny and restrictions on its activities increased.

University, New York, p.145. Chambert-Loir 1974:16 uses the term wedana, the Javanese equivalent of the Sumatran demang.

4. The party policy was to form offshoots called People's Associations (Sarekat Rakyat), nominally independent of the PKI but later centralised [B. Schrieke (1960) Indonesian Sociological Studies, Part One, 2nd ed., Sumur Bandung, Bandung, p.86]. Schrieke's 1928 essay, "The Development of the Communist Movement on the West Coast of Sumatra" (pp.84-166), provides valuable contemporary Dutch perceptions of the Communists. Ruth T. McVey (1965) The Rise of Indonesian Communism, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, (2nd printing 1968), p.183, claims that by 1924 there were Sarekat Rakyat branches in nine towns and a membership estimated by the government to number 1,000.


In a December 1925 conference, the central PKI leadership decided that a revolt planned for mid-1926 was to begin at Padang,[7] but plans for coordinated rebellions went astray and on 1 January 1927 the PKI group in Silungkang, a PKI stronghold in West Sumatra, decided to act independently. The movement gained support from amongst peasants and levels of the society with some schooling,[8] but the ill-planned revolt was put down by 12 January with only one European killed.[9]

As appreciated by contemporary analysts, like the Dutch sociologist Schrieke, the ground upon which communist thought fell in West Sumatra during the 1920s was rendered fertile by dislocation accompanying rapid social transition. Traditional values were under threat as the Dutch deepened their penetration into the society, with collaboratist figures such as the demangs spearheading such influence. Schrieke observed various indications of transition. The young people who had had the opportunity of some schooling were disillusioned when "ideas acquired outside and fed by newspaper reading could not be fitted into the framework of the traditional social system".[10] They were still obliged to defer to traditional figures of authority whom they saw as ill-informed about the challenges of the "modern" world.

Schrieke noted that the extension of commercial crops, such as coffee and rubber, (rather than subsistence crops like rice), and the consequent penetration of a money economy, was breaking down traditional


9. For a discussion of the consequences of these rebellions on the nationalist movement see John Ingleson (1979) Road to Exile: The Indonesian Nationalist Movement 1927-34, ASAA-Heinemann, Singapore, pp.24-29.

forms of ownership and prohibitions against the individual division and sale of traditional family land holdings.[11] Common family holdings had provided social and economic security for all members, but the money economy was stimulating a growing financial individualism. Traditional obligations were weakening and being replaced by obligations to the state, in the form of taxes and passivity.[12] There was strong resentment at having to pay taxes to a Dutch colonial government. As the people saw it, "the government with its corps of high-salaried civil servants was wealthy. And yet it still demanded taxes."[13]

**Family Life**

As a senior civil servant, Raja Pandapotan Lubis was able to provide a comfortable life for his family of ten children: five sons and five daughters.[14] In 1929 he became demang of Kerinci, in a remote part of West Sumatra, and the family moved to the small town of Sungai Penuh. He enjoyed the prestige of both an administrator and an aristocrat. A demang

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14. The family consisted of: Nurhalijah, Nurleila (sisters), Amzar, Bachtar (brothers), Nurjani (sister), Mochtar, Achmad (brother), Rosniyah, Asniah (sisters) and Firman (brother). (Correspondence with Mochtar Lubis, 15 June 1988.)
was "truly a member of the Dutch administrative circle and participated in the Dutch-Indies society"[15] but was also "essentially the instrument of the overruling will of the [Colonial] administration".[16]

A graphic illustration of the demang's unsavoury role as an unwilling agent of Dutch authority is reflected in one emotional episode in Mochtar Lubis's childhood, which had a great impact on him. As a child of about seven, he witnessed his father supervising the meting out of corporal punishment to some indentured labourers who had been caught after running away.[17] The three labourers had escaped after stabbing a Dutch overseer who had interfered frequently with their wives. The indenture system legislated by the 1880 Coolie Ordinance, under which labourers were brought to Sumatra from other islands (usually Java), permitted penal sanctions from imprisonment to corporal punishment. Any unwillingness to work could be regarded as a breach of contract.[18] The young Mochtar, forbidden from going outside the house on the day the three escapees were to be punished, climbed a tree in the back yard overlooking the jail and watched the lashing. As he later recalled, "that cruel treatment left its mark upon me and caused a trauma."[19] He

19. "Menguak Realitas yang Timpang", Fokus, 28 July 1983, p.10. There are parallels between the backgrounds and careers of Mochtar Lubis and Adam Malik, another Mandailing journalist, a founder of ANTARA News Agency and later Vice President of the Republic. Adam Malik calls the first chapter of his autobiography, In the Service of the Republic, Gunung Agung, Singapore, 1980, "The Sufferings of the Coolies", and
attributes to it the genesis of his concern for human rights and it became the theme of his autobiographical short story "Kuli Kontrak" [Contract Coolies].[20]

At Sungai Penuh, after a year at a Sekolah Rakyat [village People's School], Mochtar Lubis was enrolled in a newly-opened Dutch-Native School [Hollandsch Inlandsche School, HIS].[21] Evidently, the seven-year-old boy was unimpressed by the parochial atmosphere in Kerinci in the 1920s and 1930s which he described (in a short story written as an adult), as being "still in the middle ages".[22] Yet the Kerinci sub-division could boast of a hundred motor cars (one owned by Mochtar Lubis's father[23]) and traffic of 1100 motor vehicles a year along its access road. With 700 people, or one per cent of the total population, heading off to Mecca during the 1926-27 pilgrimage season, it appears to have supported a moderately wealthy class.[24]

The small Dutch population in this isolated area consisted mainly of the families of the assistant resident, the controleur.

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in it he describes how, despite his "relatively affluent" background in a family of "prosperous merchants", he was "deeply affected when [he] observed how these coolies eked out a life of bare subsistence"(p.4).


21. Chambert-Loir 1974:17. These 'Dutch-Native' primary schools were only established from 1914.


24. Figures on cars and pilgrims from Schriek 1960:269 footnote 14. Mochtar Lubis later recalled that the proportion of hajis (Muslims who have conducted the pilgrimage to Mecca) in the population was the highest in the country ("Of Things Remembered from the Past", Quadrant, October 1969, p.19).
European civil servant) and some of the staff of the large commercial estates. They preferred to send their children to Java or Padang to school rather than to the local Dutch-Native School.[25] The HIS was co-educational and Dutch was the medium of instruction. Classes were formal, stressing rote-learning and reciting of facts.[26] But the tentative beginnings of Mochtar's literary future were laid at the HIS, where he started composing stories, submitted to the children's page of the Medan newspaper, Sinar Deli, to which his father subscribed.[27] An elder brother later recalled the young Mochtar as rather frail and taciturn, and preferring the solitude of his books to the rough and tumble of childish games.[28] That Mochtar Lubis had the opportunity for a HIS education set him apart from most of the local children who were either unschooled or attended village schools.

As the effects of the Great Depression hit the Netherlands East Indies the colonial government laid off employees and reduced wages which, together with the decline in the export of raw materials,

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25. A primary education at HIS enabled a non-European student to continue to higher education, in the 'European' educational system. After seven years at HIS, pupils could continue to MULO (Meer Uitgebreid Lager Onderwijs, More Extended Lower Education, a lower secondary school), or to university entrance standard at the AMS (Algemeene Middelbare School, General Middle School). See Abdurrahman Surjomiardjo (1978) "National Education in a Colonial Society" (pp.277-306) in Haryati Soebadio & Carine A. du Marchie Sarvaas (eds.) (1978) Dynamics of Indonesian History, North-Holland Publishing Co., Amsterdam, particularly p.277. For a detailed analysis of the place of the HIS within the colonial education system, and data on the social background of HIS students, see Paul W. van der Veur (1969) Education and Social Change in Colonial Indonesia (I), Ohio University Center for International Studies, Athens, Ohio.

26. School recollections were given by Mochtar Lubis in an interview, 13/1/81.

27. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 13/1/81. Mochtar could no longer recall the pen-names he used.

28. Chambert-Loir 1974:20 provides these recollections from Bachtar Lubis, Mochtar's second eldest brother.
triggered off a spiralling economic decline. The effect on the Minangkabau area was drastic.

"There were no buyers for primary products or jungle produce. Even when there were, the prices which were paid were less than the expenses involved in finding, collecting and transporting the goods. Trade stagnated. The people lost their source of livelihood. Poverty and suffering were rampant."[29]

Despite the economic, political and social tensions of West Sumatran society during the 1920s and 1930s, life seemed comfortable for Mochtar Lubis. His father's status as a government official meant that the family belonged to a class of "officials, native chiefs, [and] teachers of religion" which comprised less than 2 per cent of the Native population, and was regarded as occupying the pinnacle of the social scale.[30] Mochtar's father bought him the best toys available, including some made in Germany.[31] As Mochtar Lubis later recalled:

"From the time I was small I was never short of money. My life never lacked anything... Just imagine it. My parents had money in abundance... If I went to the market and wanted to eat some peanuts, then I would just take some. You can bet the people were not happy, but they were not game to forbid me. In fact, if they knew that I was the son of the Demang, I would be offered more. If I wanted to watch [the movies], absolutely no-one would ask for my ticket."[32]


31. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 13/1/81.

Mochtar Lubis was impressed deeply by his father's disciplined and highly principled attitude to his work. The boy often travelled with his father on tours of the district surveying construction and other activities. Raja Pandapotan Lubis tried his hand at many skills, designing bridges, market places, irrigation systems, roads and supervising the development of the area. He educated the children by example, explaining the importance of such things as the balance between nature and the needs of the inhabitants of the district.

While Raja Pandapotan Lubis imbued a strong work ethic in his children, he also firmly stressed the principle that they should never work for the colonial government. Mochtar Lubis says his father advised the children to be independent of the government. It was enough, he said, that he should have to work for the government to feed the family without any of his children having to follow suit. When telling this story years later, Mochtar added with a smile that perhaps his father could not have imagined then that Indonesia would one day expel the Dutch and form a government of its own. With the exception of a brief period during the Revolution and immediate post-revolutionary years when some of the sons joined the Indonesian military forces, all the siblings have followed their father's advice. None have taken permanent government positions.

Undoubtedly his father had a strong impact upon Mochtar Lubis. He recalls that Raja Pandapotan Lubis was a harsh man, for whom he then had

33. Mochtar Lubis discussed his recollections of his father in an interview, 13/1/81.

34. Mochtar Lubis recounted this tale in several interviews (including 11/3/81). It appears in various published accounts of his childhood, and is incorporated in his autobiographical short story "Kuli Kontrak" in Kuli Kontrak, Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 1982. Mochtar has mentioned that, despite such reservations, Raja Pandapotan Lubis "worked so well and the colonial government was so pleased with him that he got three silver medals and one gold medal from the Dutch queen" (Avena 1987:78).
no great fondness.[35] In dealing with his children, the father "was very strict and adhered very strictly to the adage: if you love them, beat them", Mochtar recounted.[36] In common with many members of the post-independence elite, Mochtar appears to have regarded his father with mixed feelings of "respect, deference, and, occasionally, fear",[37] in contrast to his relaxed and very loving relationship to his mother.

Mochtar retained fond memories of his mother. "She was a lovely woman and a most wonderful Mother", he later wrote. It was to her that he fled "for protection and comfort when Father was angry with us, or when we were frightened or sad."[38] She was a deeply religious Muslim, observing the five daily prayers and the Ramadan fast (and later fulfilling the pilgrimage), in contrast to her husband's rather lax religious adherence. The children were trained in prayer and Qur'anic recitation, but tended to adopt their father's casual attitude to religion.[39] Although his father died in 1953, Mochtar Lubis's mother lived well into her nineties, passing away in Medan on 22 May 1986. For most of her later life she had lived with Mochtar's youngest sister, Asniah, in the Lubis's ancestral village of Muara Suro. Having been born

35. In 1981, Mochtar reflected that, once he became a father himself, he appreciated the wisdom of his father's child-raising strategies, although his own children chide him as 'old-fashioned' (interview 11/3/81).


37. Donald K. Emmerson (1976) Indonesia's Elite: Political Culture and Cultural Politics, Cornell University Press, Ithaca. Quotation from p.134. Mochtar Lubis discussed his attitudes to his father in similar terms in an interview on 11/3/81. Emmerson's study of the Jakarta elite, based on 40 sample leaders interviewed between 1966-67, showed these attitudes to parents as being dominant, particularly in the group he called the "administrators", drawn from higher central administrative departments of the government.


and raised while his father was being moved around by the colonial government, Mochtar himself has never lived in the ancestral home.[40]

Schooling at Kayutanam

At the end of his primary schooling, Mochtar was keen to study medicine and become a doctor but, in 1935, after his father showed him a prospectus, he enrolled in a newly established Sekolah Ekonomi (Economic High School) founded at Kayutanam by the educationalist S.M. Latif (1888-1978).[41] Raja Pandapotan Lubis did not want his sons to go to Dutch government schools, which primarily trained civil servants. The eldest son, Amzar, went to a College of Commerce, in Singapore.[42] The second son, Bachtar, was sent to an American Methodist Mission school in Medan.[43] Kayutanam was an important educational centre, being also the site of the innovative INS (Indonesische Nationale School) founded in 1926 by Mohammad Sjafei (1897-1969).[44] During the early 1930s, there was an increasing call by nationalist intellectuals for the provision of

40. The village's isolation is indicated by the fact that it was only connected to the electricity grid on 23 November 1980. Villagers believe even this was only made possible by the then Vice-President Adam Malik, who originated from a village close by, Mochtar Lubis records in Het Land Onder de Zon: Het Indonesië van nu [The Land Under the Sun: Indonesia Now], A.W. Sijthoff, Alphen aan den Rijn, 1981, pp.99-100.

41. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 27/4/81.


43. Chambert-Loir 1974:262-3 provides a brief biography of Bachtar Lubis. The other children went to Dutch primary and secondary schools. (Correspondence with Mochtar Lubis, 15 June 1988.)

44. For a description of this school, see Abdurrachman Surjomihardjo 1978:283-6.
a 'national education', as an alternative to the Dutch system. Schools like those of S.M. Latif and Mohammad Sjafei attempted to imbue a modern Western-style education with a nationalist-orientation, providing practical skills to enable graduates to be independent of the government, and of use to society.[45]

Initially Mochtar Lubis did not like the Sekolah Ekonomi because all the students had to do an hour's compulsory early morning hoeing in the fields from 6 am. He had been previously spared such physical labour.[46] The stress at the school was on practical education, with the students being taken for long instructive walks in the forests to develop their love of nature. The more conventional academic studies developed an active skill in English and Dutch and encouraged wide reading of economic, political and literary works in these languages.

Soetan Mahmood Latif, a graduate of the Middelbare Koloniaal Landbouwschool [Colonial Secondary Agricultural School] at Deventer,[47] had a profound influence upon the young Mochtar Lubis, particularly encouraging the boy scholastically. As Mochtar later wrote, S.M. Latif "never grew tired of reminding us that, as human beings, we had to study, study, study, continually, and to facilitate this, during the Dutch colonial period before the Second World War, he built up the largest library on the island of Sumatra, consisting of all kinds of books, both general knowledge and literature, in a range of languages."[48]
Latif showed a singular devotion to educating his students to a love of knowledge and developing their nationalist conscience. In this capacity he led a pedagogically inventive and nationalist-inspired teaching staff.

At Kayutanam, Mochtar became a member of the boy scouts and the nationalist Indonesia Muda [Young Indonesia] youth movement, joining proudly in singing the future national anthem, "Indonesia Raya", and marching through the small town beneath the Red-and-White nationalist flag.[49] In the Sekolah Ekonomi, Mochtar Lubis studied a range of subjects from chess (which was compulsory, to inculcate tactical skill and forward planning), mathematics and languages, to economics and politics. He developed a particular interest in politics, reading select passages by, and longer works about, political thinkers and philosophers like Adam Smith and Marx (dipping into The Communist Manifesto).

Mochtar's initial attraction to Marxism was quashed by a teacher's response. He recalls mentioning, when he was about 15 years old, that he was attracted to Communism, only to be told that, if the Communists came to power in his district, his father would be the first person killed! The teacher explained that Raja Pandapotan Lubis was a member of the elite, a feudal aristocrat, working for the colonial government, and would be an initial target for the Communists. It was this realisation, Mochtar later claimed, that first aroused his suspicions of Communism.[50]

Quotation p.201. From 1937 Latif published a periodical, Resensi [Review], surveying recently obtained academic publications in Dutch, German, French and English. In 1969, the daily newspaper Indonesia Raya revived the name 'Resensi' for its book review column, edited for a time by Latif (Chambert-Loir 1974:23).

49. Recollections in an interview with Mochtar Lubis, 13/1/81.

50. Interview with Mochtar Lubis 13/1/81.
Mochtar Lubis completed his schooling at Kayutanam in 1939. He emerged as a confirmed nationalist, having been exposed to the ideas of the major intellectual nationalist movements and become familiar with the writings of leaders like Hatta, Sjahrir and Sukarno. Latif and the other school teachers had also imbued him with a faith in the power of education to change a society. Although a small-town boy, through his reading and the instruction of his teachers (several of whom had studied in Holland, another in the Philippines), Mochtar Lubis had been exposed to a wide range of Western knowledge. His education and home environment had led him to believe that he, as one of a small minority of his countrypeople with a Western-style education, had a role to play in ameliorating the conditions of the down-trodden. The constant honing of intellectual skills and stress on the nationalists' mission for the future combined to create in him the expectation that the intellectuals and educated elite would play a pivotal role in the movement for Indonesian independence.

After graduating from Kayutanam Mochtar encountered pressure from his father to marry a girl chosen for him at the family's home village. The frustration Schrieke observed (see page 28) in the young educated West Sumatrans in the 1920s, who felt their 'modern' ideas could not fit into traditional society, may have been one reason Mochtar Lubis never returned to live in the region of his birth or his traditional family village on completion of his studies. The youth rebelled against the father's marriage arrangements. While visiting Padang, Mochtar Lubis saw an advertisement seeking a teacher for a HIS school run by the demang

52. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 13/1/81.
53. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 13/1/81.
[district head] at Teluk Dalam, on Nias Island. He was accepted and began his working life, teaching Dutch and arithmetic.[54]

After about nine months at his Nias teaching post, Mochtar Lubis was asked by the local contrôleur to leave the island. He had been spreading the nationalist ideas he absorbed at Kayutanam to his students, and had them singing "Indonesia Raya" under the Red-and-White flag. However, since the contrôleur knew Mochtar's father, he took no other punitive action.[55]

The Move to the Capital

Out of work and only about 17 years old, Mochtar Lubis decided against returning home to his family. His father was still keen for him to marry the young woman chosen for him, but he preferred to sail to Batavia where his elder brother, Bachtar, was working in the information section of the British Consulate-General. Mochtar was met at Jakarta's Tanjung Priok harbour by an old school-friend from Kayutanam, Djanamar Adjam (born Bukittinggi, 1921), and he stayed with Bachtar in Sawah Besar, in the north of the city.[56] Life in the capital quickly came to delight him. It provided great intellectual stimulation and he soon

55. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 13/1/81.
became involved in discussions and debates about political and social problems which faced the nation. [57]

In the capital, the world which he had only glimpsed through his library books and his teachers' stories would open up before him with a speed and immediacy that gripped the major cities of the world during the years leading up to the Second World War and through the national independence struggles that followed it. The transition was a smooth one for the young man. Like many other Sumatrans, who are disproportionately over-represented among the political figures of the early nationalist movement, he seems to have been able to embrace (what Reid has termed) a "Western dialectical manner of thought" and adopt it as his own, without suffering unduly from the cultural contradictions inherent in such a grafting of values. [58]

A fellow Sumatran, long active in leftist cultural and political affairs in the capital, observed that Mochtar Lubis was

"one of the prototype Sumatran priyayi [59] who it can be said virtually do not have any feudal cultural or ethnic cultural "baggage" to prevent the development of their personalities in absorbing and adopting modern science and culture, especially that coming from the West. Mochtar Lubis, in common with other Sumatran priyayi like Sutan Syahrir, Hatta, Agus Salim and others, [60] has all the attributes for working hard rationally for his own advancement and identity. As a petty bourgeois, he accepts bourgeois liberal-democratic Western science and culture." [61]

57. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 24/4/81.

58. Reid 1974:8 notes this as a feature of many Minangkabau political leaders in particular.

59. Priyayi were the traditional aristocratic elite frequently co-opted into working in the interests of the Dutch colonial government.

60. We could also include here such people as Tan Malaka and Amir Sjarifuddin.

61. Private correspondence with a former LEKRA office-bearer (whom I shall refer to as Informant A), dated 25 November 1982. His
Growing up in an environment when traditions were under siege from encroaching Western values and modes of behaviour, Mochtar embraced the ethic of individualism, rationality and a spirit for hard work for individual advancement. His education in Western knowledge and political thought built on these values and provided a fertile ground in which his attitudes towards democracy, nationalism and economic progress grew.

Mochtar Lubis's training at the Sekolah Ekonomi proved an asset as he sought employment in the capital. After several months working as an accountant in an pharmacy,[62] he got better-paid work as a clerk in the Dutch N.V. Nederlandsch Handel Maatschappij (N.H.M.) bank (whose building still stands across from the Kota railway station). Apart from the central bank (De Javasche Bank), the N.H.M., known simply as 'De Factorij Bank', was the largest private Dutch bank in the Indies. Founded in the Netherlands in 1824, by 1940 the Indies was the location of the bulk of its international operations. There, its main concern was commercial banking, although it had its own trade and estate interests.[63] Mochtar later recalled that his experience with the bank, seeing the money the Dutch were syphoning out of his country from commodities such as sugar and rubber, made him even more aware of the need for independence.[64]

His nationalism, which he combined with an assertive manner, brought him into conflict with Dutch officials in the bank whom he felt discriminated against him. He also sometimes fought with Dutch youths on

underlining. Confidential informants are listed for Examiners in the Confidential Appendix.


64. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 13/1/81.
the streets. He was incensed, as he recalls, with the treatment that "Natives" received from their colonial overlords.[65] Yet some personal relationships with Dutch colleagues were warm and friendly. For example, he jovially teased a young Dutch girl, with whom he worked at the bank, about how her countrypeople were stealing the wealth of his country.[66]

The nationalist friends he acquired in Batavia followed events in Europe closely and read them in the light of active hostility to Nazism.[67] Mochtar was also apprehensive about the growing power of Japan. Through his contact with the Dutch at the bank he could sense their worries about increasing Japanese commercial interest in the Netherlands East Indies. They were anxious about strengthening Japanese demand for raw materials from Asia and particularly Netherlands East Indies oil.

The Japanese Occupation

When the Japanese finally marched into Batavia on 5 March 1942, Mochtar Lubis was puzzled. The atmosphere was one of liberation, but one image stuck firmly in his mind: that of a young girl watching the Japanese troops parading by. The girl said that she thought that the Japanese flag was ugly. Her mother’s terrified response as she hushed the girl up suggested to Mochtar that "liberation" was tinged with fear and

66. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 13/1/81.
67. Mochtar recollected later that his concern about "German fascism" began in Sumatra, when he read critical 'Indonesia Muda' material sent from Java (Interview, 13/1/81).
With the closure of the Dutch bank by the Japanese, Mochtar Lubis applied for work in the foreign-language radio monitoring service of the Japanese Military High Command and passed the necessary English language test with ease. The service was located in Jalan Biliton, (behind the current location of the President Hotel) and his job was to listen to the Allied English language broadcasts and then write news summaries, also in English, for the Japanese.[70] His brother, Bachtar, had been asked by the Japanese to move from his job at the British Consulate-General to the Japanese military radio (Hoosoo Kyoku).[71] Bachtar Lubis, whom Mochtar admired greatly, was the only Indonesian to become Chief News Editor in the Japanese Military Radio in Jakarta.[72]

Mochtar Lubis was once more working side by side with Dutch people, this time those pressed into service in the radio monitoring section. The Dutch workers were detained in the Jalan Biliton camp. Fond memories of his close personal relations with various of these foreign colleagues

68. Mochtar Lubis includes a similar incident in his first novel Tidak Ada Esok [There is No Tomorrow], Pustaka Jaya, Jakarta 1982 (1st ed. 1950), p.45.

69. Accounts from interview with Mochtar Lubis, 13/1/81, and "Of Things Remembered from the Past", Quadrant, October 1969, p.21.


71. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 13/1/81. Bachtar, along with various other Indonesians, was given a three month training and indoctrination course [Sendenjooin Joeisihos in journalism at Jalan Minangkabau, Manggarai, which he passed with merit [M. Gani [1978] Surat Kabar Indonesia pada Tiga Zaman. Proyek Pusat Publikasi Pemerintah, Departemen Penerangan R.I., Jakarta, p.121].

were to stay with him for decades. Mochtar struck up a firm friendship with Dr Jansen, an interned Dutch lawyer and former secretary to the colonial government's quasi-cabinet, the Raad van Indië [Council of the Indies]. Knowing that he would not be permitted to keep his extensive personal library in the camp, Jansen had left it with an Amboinese family outside. Mochtar, who was provided with a house in the detention compound but was free to come and go, willingly acted as courier, keeping his friend supplied with books. In return, he was allowed free access to the collection. Jansen became a mentor to Mochtar, discussing their common interests in world affairs, history, economics and world (especially Dutch and Japanese) literature. This relationship was extremely influential at such a formative stage on his intellectual development. [73]

In addition to his radio monitoring work, Mochtar also assisted in the making of a Japanese propaganda film about Japanese treatment of the Dutch prisoners of war in Indonesia. Because of his fluency in Dutch and English, Mochtar was instructed to help with dialogue and general preparation for the film, which, he recalls, was sent to Australia via the Red Cross. [74] Working for the Japanese himself, Mochtar was not critical of those national leaders who cooperated with the Japanese. However, he could not accept Sukarno's active encouragement of the Japanese romusha [forced labour] program which involved the recruiting of about a quarter of a million Indonesians for labour in other parts of the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere". In this, Mochtar thought Sukarno had betrayed the people's confidence.


74. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 27/4/81. I was unable to trace the film through the Australian War Memorial film archives in Canberra.
Mochtar's command of English, as he worked monitoring broadcasts from the ABC, BBC, Voice of America and other foreign transmissions, and his close association with Dutch fellow workers, opened up a world beyond his country's borders. It is not difficult to imagine the young Mochtar, sociable, friendly, direct, mixing easily with Westerners, like Jansen, discussing with them his country's aspirations for independence and drawing from them knowledge of the world outside. On the one hand he could develop a global perspective on events, yet on the other he could feel the stirrings for independence that were developing in the underground nationalist movement.

The general public was forbidden to listen to Allied broadcasts, with heavy penalties. [75] Monitoring foreign broadcasts, Mochtar was in a unique position to learn of the Japanese surrender on 15 August 1945, a few days after the atom bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. [76] Immediately, he passed the news on to his brother, Bachtar, who had links with the underground and other pemuda (young Independence fighters), many of whom were associated with the Sjahrir group. [77] After the Declaration of Independence on 17 August, Bachtar also assisted in translating the proclamation text into English and broadcasting it internationally on a Japanese transmitter. [78]


77. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 13/1/81.

The Independence Struggle

In generational terms, Mochtar Lubis was part of a group with a central place in the independence struggle. Ganis Harsono describes a "Pyramid of Strength" which stood behind the Indonesian proclamation of independence. The pyramid was divided into five layers based on age, breadth of experience and level of school education. Sukarno and Hatta held the summit with their contemporaries and "brothers-in-arms" such as Sjahrir, Tan Malaka, Amir Sjarifuddin and Djuanda holding the second layer. They were followed by men and women aged 30-35 who were to become the secretaries-general of government departments and the members of parliament. Layer four contained college and non-college educated people aged between 20-30 years of age who would become divisional heads of government departments, military officers, correspondents, commentators, writers and later cadres in the political parties. It was in this group, along with people such as Rosihan Anwar, Mohamad Sadeli, Manai Sophiaan, Suharto, Bung Tomo and Isnaeni, that Ganis Harsono placed Mochtar Lubis. Ganis Harsono's fifth layer consisting of high school students, aged 15-20 years, fighting in student brigades and other fighting groups, included Ali Sadikin, Untung and Njoto.

After the Japanese surrender, Mochtar Lubis joined the Indonesian News Agency, ANTARA. He started as a reporter for an English language bulletin that ANTARA was publishing for the Allied forces in Indonesia.


80. Having been established in 1937, ANTARA was incorporated by the Japanese administration as the Indonesian section of the Japanese DOMEI news agency in 1942. With the Declaration of Independence, it re-emerged as a separate entity. Mochtar was urged to join ANTARA by Sjakhruddin, an ANTARA journalist later killed in an explosion in Singapore during the independence struggle, and to whom (among others) Mochtar dedicated his novel Maut dan Cinta [Death and Love] (1977).
During this period, he got to know British army officers and soldiers, and taught bahasa Indonesia to pilots of the British Royal Air Force in Jakarta in return for munitions and canned food. He felt the English bulletin was an important part of the propaganda war, through which "we gained many friends. I personally received from British and Indian soldiers a lot of guns and bullets, which they contributed to our boys."[82]

With his admission to ANTARA, he began to read about journalism to teach himself the skill.[83] Mochtar applied himself to learning his profession and following political events with a journalist's keenness. When the Republican government moved to Yogyakarta in January 1946, the ANTARA headquarters followed. Mochtar Lubis remained with Asa Bafagih,[84] a senior journalist, to run the Jakarta office. An enthusiastic Mochtar assumed the role of foreign relations editor, establishing contacts for ANTARA abroad, often through Indonesian students marooned overseas by the war.[85] ANTARA soon had representatives in Amsterdam, London, Cologne, Hong Kong and Tokyo.[86] On 9–10 February 1946 he was one of about 300 journalists who came to

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85. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 13/1/81.
86. Adam Malik 1980:15.
Solo to form the Indonesian Journalists' Association [Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia, PWI].[87]

In the following years, Mochtar lived in Jakarta, participating in what has been described as the "metropolitan superculture" of Indonesia.[88] Although Republicans were operating under constraints, with a strong Dutch presence, and separated from the Republican heartland of Yogyakarta, Jakarta retained a vibrant press, intellectual, artistic and cultural life. The city remained a major point of entry for the flow of ideas and materials into the country.[89] It was the site of a large corps of foreign press, and representatives of interested foreign governments, such as Australia, India and America. The nationalist community there tended to view Indonesian Independence in an international perspective, in a future determined by international politics and intellectual currents.[90]

As a journalist, Mochtar Lubis travelled frequently between Yogyakarta and Jakarta, covering the course of the Dutch-Indonesian negotiations, including those held under United Nations auspices. He was chosen for this task because he could interview Indonesian, Dutch and


88. The term is from Hildred Geertz (1963) "Indonesian Cultures and Communities" (pp.24-96) in Ruth T. McVey (ed.) (1963) Indonesia, HRAF Press, New Haven. See particularly pp.34-38.


English speakers with about equal ease, a skill highly valued and found only in a small band of intellectuals. The social and professional skills Mochtar Lubis displayed in his relationships with Westerners enabled him to play a distinctive set of roles moving between two groups: the committed nationalist forces struggling for complete and recognised independence, and the representatives, both official and unofficial, of the Western countries which were to provide the diplomatic and political pressure that helped turn the scales of the Indonesian-Dutch contest in favour of the Indonesians.

In 1947, having just turned 25, Mochtar Lubis was part of the entourage accompanying Prime Minister Sutan Sjahrir to the Inter Asian Relations Conference, held in New Delhi in April. This was Mochtar's first trip overseas and he relished it, spending time en route in Malaya and Burma. The experience provided the journalist with a rich opportunity to observe Asia's political leaders, since more than 41 delegations attended. The conference, chaired by Sarojini Naidu, a poet and leader of the women's movement, was opened by Jwaharlal Nehru. Members of the Indonesian delegation were deeply impressed by Mahatma Gandhi, who spoke on the final day.

In his day to day work as a journalist, Mochtar had many opportunities to meet and become close to, national political figures, but few attracted him like Sutan Sjahrir. Mochtar became personally very


close to Sjahrir. While he "preserved his independence", not participating in Sjahrir's political organisational activity, he moved on the fringes of the group of young admirers who gathered around Sjahrir[93] and embraced many of the attitudes and ideological values of that group. Mochtar Lubis was attracted to Sjahrir's hope for a democratic and egalitarian Indonesia with a strong economy based on industrialisation, tempered by a comprehensive system of social welfare.[94] He readily accepted Sjahrir's view that this could only be achieved once the feudal nature of Indonesian society was broken down and replaced by rational human relations and efficient modes of behaviour and production. On a personal level, Mochtar was particularly drawn to Sjahrir's simplicity of life and sense of humour.[95] Like many young 'democratic socialists', Mochtar warmed to the much more experienced Sjahrir, who was approachable and open, and knew how to relate to young enthusiasts on a fraternal basis. As Mochtar Lubis wrote in 1980, during the next two decades he developed a

"close personal relationship with Bung Sjahrir, a relationship full of mutual trust between a journalist and a political and national leader, which was based on an intimate human relationship."[96]

Mochtar Lubis regarded Sjahrir's Perjuangan Kita [Our Struggle] pamphlet as an astute analysis of the problems facing the Independence

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movement. [97] Reflecting on this period, he recalled Sjahrrir discussing with him Indonesia's foreign policy, and supporting independent non-alignment, cautious of the Russian and American blocs. [98] Having listened to the war-time speeches of Churchill and Roosevelt, and expecting them to oppose the re-colonisation of Indonesia, Mochtar was disappointed when the Dutch returned with American-supplied equipment. [99] What particularly worried him was the way in which US and British support for the Dutch served to increase the power of the Communists within the Republic.

In September 1948, pro-PKI military groups in Madiun, fearing a general government crack-down on PKI elements in East Java, launched an ill-planned and badly conducted revolt, which was then presented to the PKI leadership as a fait accompli. [100] The officers of the Siliwangi Division, which was instrumental in putting down the revolt, interpreted the incident as a traitorous threat to the unity of the state. Some felt that the Dutch would take propaganda advantage from it by claiming that Indonesia was falling into the hands of the Communists. Mochtar Lubis shared their reaction, fearing further that the United States of America would not stand by idly and let the Communists gain control in Indonesia. He believed, if the PKI had taken over the leadership from Sukarno and


99. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 13/1/81.

100. For details of the Madiun incident, see Kahin 1970:256-303, particularly pp.286-7.
Hatta, the USA would probably have intervened more directly to support the Dutch, against Indonesia's independence.[101]

His opposition to the revolt is evident in his inserted editorial comments published with a document written in jail by Suripno, a member of the PKI politbureau, entitled "Why We Lost", analysing the Madiun affair.[102] On the basis of 'news', from unspecified 'insiders',[103] which Mochtar heard when in Yogyakarta three months prior to the events in Madiun, Mochtar rejects Suripno's assertions that, prior to the outbreak of hostilities, "to the best of my knowledge, the PKI never discussed nor accepted plans to engage in resistance against the government by force of arms."[104] Mochtar discounts Suripno's evidence that the incident was triggered by the Madiun branch without central approval, and he argues the PKI leadership was fully responsible morally.[105] The final photograph illustrating the document depicts "[m]embers of the Siliwangi Division, the Indonesian National Army's select division, which has done a great service in extinguishing the communist revolt."

Mochtar Lubis had a number of friends in the Siliwangi officer corps. His brother, Bachtar, who went to a military academy in Yogyakarta, had joined Mochtar's cousin, Colonel Zulkifli Lubis, who was head of military intelligence. Bachtar had the rank of major and was a

101. According to an interview with Mochtar Lubis, 27/1/81.
103. Literally "orang-orang dalam". Perhaps the allusion is to intelligence sources.
senior spokesperson for the Army and Ministry of Defence (from 1949 to 1953). A younger brother, Achmad, reached the same rank in the Navy.[106] Mochtar had a considerable respect for such officers, but he himself was never a combatant, never firing a shot.[107] At one point, he approached ANTARA head, Adam Malik, wanting to resign to join Bachtar in the physical struggle, but he was dissuaded. Indonesia has enough soldiers who could carry rifles, Adam Malik told him, but what it needs is soldiers to fight with the pen.[108]

On the evening of 18 December 1948 when the Dutch were poised for their midnight attack on Yogyakarta at the beginning of the Second Dutch Military action,[109] Captain 'Turk' Westerling, a counter-insurgency specialist infamous for his brutal commando tactics, arrested Mochtar Lubis at his home in Jalan Bonang, Jakarta. The journalist was taken to the ANTARA offices which the Dutch then closed down. They confiscated the office keys and inventory and held Mochtar Lubis throughout the night. A lieutenant guarding him explained that the Dutch had taken Yogyakarta, Sukarno had stood down and the war would soon be over. Mochtar declared that Sukarno had said he would never surrender and that the Revolution would continue. He was bitterly disappointed and felt sorely betrayed when the following day proved that the President had indeed allowed himself to be captured by the Dutch.

106. Interviews with Mochtar Lubis, 13/1/81 & 24/9/81. Later activities indicate that Mochtar was close to various military figures, a number of whom (such as Daan Jahja, the fourth Commander of the Siliwangi Division) were involved in the establishment of Indonesia Raya.

107. Mochtar Lubis did six weeks military training while working with the Japanese radio monitoring service, but he never took up arms in the Revolution (Interview, 27/1/81).

108. Paraphrased by Mochtar Lubis in interview, 13/1/81.

109. For details, see Reid 1974:151.
Mochtar Lubis's detention lasted only 24 hours. During that time the Dutch tried to persuade him to collaborate, promising to educate him further in Holland, offering him a car and assuring him that Indonesian independence would come in due course anyway, whatever the fate of the Sukarno-Hatta Republic. When Mochtar declined the offer they told him it would remain open.[110] His loyalty was rewarded when the tide turned against the Dutch in the first half of 1949. On 30 June 1949, Mochtar was amongst the first group of local and overseas journalists to fly in to witness the triumphant return of the Republican government to Yogyakarta.[111]

For several months, during the temporary closure of ANTARA, Mochtar Lubis and Asa Bafagih worked for B.M. Diah's nationalist newspaper, Merdeka. Mochtar had first met Diah during the Japanese period when Diah had worked for the Japanese in radio broadcasting while Mochtar was in military radio monitoring.[112] They got on well, but as soon as ANTARA was able to re-open, Mochtar and Asa Bafagih returned. It was during such lulls at ANTARA that Mochtar wrote his satirical Si Jamal [a name] short stories and his first novel, Tak Ada Esok [There is no tomorrow].[113] As in later life, when his journalistic activities were thwarted for one reason or another, Mochtar often turned to fictional writing. Apart from literature, he had a strong interest in painting, and in 1948 he was involved in the formation of the Indonesian Artists' Association.

110. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 13/1/81 and Chambert-Loir 1974:30.

111. His report was published as "Kembali ke Yogy" [Return to Yogyakarta], Mutiara, I, No. 6, 1 August 1949, pp.13-16 & 23.

112. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 24/4/81.

113. The Si Jamal stories were published initially in magazines like Siasat and later collected as Si Jamal dan Cerita-cerita Lain [Jamal and other stories], 1st ed. February 1950, Usaha Penerbitan Gapura, Jakarta. Tak Ada Esok was published by Gapura, Jakarta, in 1950. Mochtar Lubis discussed this period in an interview, 13/1/81.
Aside from his work with ANTARA, he developed editorial skills by working on a number of short-lived magazines published in Jakarta, such as *Masa Indonesia* [Indonesia's Time] (a weekly started in 1947) and *Masa* [Time] (of which he was editor-in-chief in 1948). Later he worked as editor-in-chief of *Mutiara* [Pearl], a fortnightly general magazine, which ran for about two years from 15 April 1949. He was also a contributor to a magazine, which largely spoke for the PSI, titled *Siasat* [Strategy, Tactic], established in January 1947. Mochtar assisted with its cultural section, *Gelanggang* [Forum, Arena], throughout 1949. All of this helped to prepare him for the role he was to play from 29 December 1949 in the new daily newspaper *Indonesia Raya*.

CHAPTER THREE

THE FIGHTING EDITOR:

THE FIRST INDONESIA RAYA AND THE YEARS IN DETENTION (1949-1966)

Two days after the Transfer of Sovereignty on 27 December 1949, Indonesia Raya, the Jakarta daily newspaper with which Mochtar Lubis's name is inseparably associated, began publishing. Mochtar retained his position at ANTARA for the next eight months but Indonesia Raya was already the centre of his working life. This chapter will follow the fate of the newspaper till it closed on 2 January 1959, and of Mochtar Lubis till October 1965. Mochtar Lubis was detained on 21 December 1956 and released from house-arrest on 29 April 1961. Returning from a trip abroad where he spoke at an International Press Institute conference in Tel Aviv, Mochtar was re-arrested on 14 July 1961 and later sent to a prison in Madiun where he remained till the climactic events of October 1965. His transfer to a Jakarta military prison on 25 October 1965 signalled the beginning of a slow political rehabilitation which led to his release on 17 May 1966.

This chapter will examine the establishment of Indonesia Raya and the newspaper's political stance on a number of select issues. The purpose is to determine the paper's attitude to the military, the president, cabinets and the parliamentary process, and to examine some characteristics of Mochtar Lubis's style of journalism, particularly regarding questions of 'independence' and 'professionalism'. Although Mochtar Lubis did not personally write all Indonesia Raya's copy, the paper's editorial policies and general tactics were fashioned under his guiding influence and did not significantly deviate from his own attitudes. The later sections of this chapter discuss his leadership style, the working atmosphere engendered at Indonesia Raya, his overseas
experience and his stances in relation to Cold War politics. The chapter
draws primarily on two sources. One is Indonesia Raya itself, the other
Mochtar Lubis's reports on his overseas travel, specifically his
despachtes from the Korean War in 1950 and his published reports of a
trip to the USA in 1951.

The Establishment of Indonesia Raya

In the very first issue of Indonesia Raya the editors were at
pains to stress their 'independence', declaring the journal non-party,
independent of both political 'groups' [golongan] and 'streams' [aliran].

"In this publication are gathered Indonesian journalists of
independent stance, journalists who are not tied to party
standpoints or those of a particular group [golongan].
Fundamentally Indonesia Raya stands apart from all
political parties or political streams [aliran]... We will
avoid the political biases of unbalanced news reports, which
advantage one group and disadvantage another." [1]

The idea of establishing Indonesia Raya came from officers of
the Siliwangi Division of the Indonesian army. The Siliwangi Division,
which assumed control of the capital on behalf of the Republican
government on the Transfer of Sovereignty, saw itself as having the task
of interpreting the Revolution to the people living in what had been a
Dutch-controlled city. The officers began considering the idea of a

1. Quoted on p.187 of Atmakusumah (1980) "Kasus Indonesia Raya"
(pp.181-245), in Abdurrahman Surjomiardjo (ed.) (1980) Beberapa Segi
Perkembangan Sejarah Pers di Indonesia, Deppen RI & LEXNAS-LIPI,
Jakarta. A similar 'independent and impartial' stance was declared by
the Jakarta English daily, The Times of Indonesia, which Mochtar Lubis
founded as editor-in-chief on 5 May 1952 (relinquishing the post to
Charles Tambu and withdrawing on 29 June 1953). See Chambert-Loir
in Indonesia, 1949-1965. PhD, University of Iowa, University
Microfilms, Ann Arbor, pp.143-4.
newspaper about three months before the Transfer of Sovereignty. [2] About two weeks before the transfer, they approached Mochtar Lubis to ask whether he would be interested in working on such a paper. [3]

Mochtar Lubis's brother Major Bachtar Lubis, then an Army spokesperson, was involved in the discussions about setting up the paper. The two brothers were very close and Mochtar seemed to be strongly influenced by the elder brother for whom he had great respect. [4] Mochtar's sympathies for the Siliwangi group, his previous journalistic experience, and his good relationships with numerous political leaders built up during his time working in Jakarta and travelling to Yogyakarta, made him a suitable choice.

The Siliwangi played an important role in the transfer of power from the Dutch to the Indonesian civilian government. The first troops to enter the city, in effect, they divided into two task-forces, with one continuing in its military function, while the other joined the city's civil bureaucracy under Daan Jahja, the Military Governor of Jakarta. Some filled senior positions. For example, wielding considerable power as an intelligence officer in the Ministry of Defence was Major Brentel

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2. The military officers named by Mochtar Lubis are: "Major Brentel Susilo of the Army, Military Governor Daan Jahja (acting Commander of the Siliwangi IV Division till the end of 1948), Basarudin Nasution (director of the Army Law School), acting Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Colonel Tahsi Bonar Simatupang, Chief of Staff of the Army Colonel Abdul Harris Nasution, Army spokesperson Major Bachtar Lubis (Mochtar's brother), Lieutenant Colonel S. Parman (Staff officer of the Jakarta military governor) and Lieutenant Colonel Sutojo Siswornhardjo (commander of the Fifth Military Police Battalion)..... Aid was also given by Sjahsam, Sutan Sjahrir's younger brother." Quoted from Atmakusumah 1980:185.

3. Confidential interview with Informant B, one of the officers involved, 1981, and Mochtar Lubis, 13/1/81.

4. Interview with H.J.C. Princen, 1/9/82, who has been close to both men.
Susilo,[5] regarded, like Daan Jahja, as sympathetic to the PSI.[6] He played a particularly important role in the establishment of Indonesia Raya.

Initially, Mochtar Lubis was not listed as part of the staff of Indonesia Raya since he was still formally working with ANTARA until August 1950. However, he remembers covering stories for the paper from the Transfer of Sovereignty.[7] A key military intelligence officer involved in the formulation of the Indonesia Raya project claims that about three months before Indonesia Raya was first published a journalist, Julli Effendi, was selected from the army's intelligence staff under Major Brentel Susilo, to head the paper, along with Hiswara Darmaputra from Mutiara, a magazine from which a lot of Indonesia Raya staff came. Mochtar Lubis assisted but less prominently. However, after some months, it seems Brentel Susilo was dissatisfied with Julli Effendi and so replaced him with Mochtar Lubis.[8] The financial administration

5. From May 1947 Brentel Susilo was apparently head of the economics section of the Ministry of Defence's Jawatan 5 [Office 5], established to unite various military-connected intelligence bodies. When this office was dissolved with the military re-organisations in mid-1948, he became chief of staff in charge of economic intelligence in Bagian C3 [army intelligence]. (Details from personal correspondence with Dr Ruth McVey, 11 June 1988.)

6. Information from interviews with H.J.C. Princen (1/9/82), a former intelligence officer, Informant B (1981), and Dr Azis Saleh (13/9/82).

7. Interview with Mochtar Lubis 12/1/82. Mochtar Lubis and Brentel Susilo have different stories about the origin of the name 'Indonesia Raya'. Mochtar claims that the name was taken from the national anthem, as suggested by Teuku Sjahril (a neighbour then working as an assistant on the journal Mutiara), at a preliminary meeting at Mochtar's house (see Atmakusumah 1980:189). Brentel Susilo recalls he named the paper after Partai Indonesia Raya (Parindra), of which his uncle Raden Sutomo had been a founder. (Interview with Brentel Susilo, 14/10/81. Chambert-Loir 1974:63 accepts this version.) There appears to be no link between this paper and an identically named tabloid magazine published in Yogyakarta (1947-48) by the Masyumi, edited by Zainal Abidin Ahmad (see Soebagijo I.N. 1981:479-80.)

8. Confidential interview with Informant B, a former member of the military intelligence, 1981.
of the business was placed in the hands of Hasjim Mahdan, a former spokesperson for the Military Governor Daan Jahja, on the insistence of Hasjim Mahdan's superior officer, Brentel Susilo.[9]

Hasjim Mahdan, Mochtar Lubis and Sarhindi were shareholders in the venture. Sarhindi's involvement in the project is shrouded in mystery. Appointed by Brentel Susilo, he took little interest in the paper. In fact, at least two former members of the editorial staff, when asked in 1981-82, said they believed that 'Sarhindi' was a pseudonym for Brentel Susilo. While this appears not to be the case, it is an indication of the degree to which Sarhindi was acting on instructions from Brentel Susilo.[10] The picture we have, then, is of military officers, primarily Major Brentel Susilo, bringing together a staff of sympathetic journalists and administrators to run the paper, while the officers retained the initial authority to sift out staff who were unsuited and move in new contenders.

Atmakusumah, a managing editor of *Indonesia Raya* in the 1970s, has noted that the "close relationship between *Indonesia Raya* and the army led to this newspaper, for many years, being dubbed an 'army paper'."[11] While listing military officers whom Mochtar Lubis had acknowledged had

9. Chambert-Loir 1974:63. This description of the sequence of events varies somewhat from that given in Chambert-Loir 1974:63, who claims that Julli Effendi and Hiswara Darmaputra lead the paper with the latter holding the position of chief editor. Hiswara left in 1951 to join *Merdeka*, and by October 1951 Julli Effendi had been replaced by Hasjim Mahdan, with Mochtar Lubis having been listed as officially joining the paper in August 1950 when he resigned from ANTARA. See also Atmakusumah 1980:185.

10. After the split and closure of *Indonesia Raya* in 1959 the major figures involved in the paper lost contact with Sarhindi, whom I was unable to trace.

"provided at least moral support", Atmakusumah also states that during the early years

"the army gave not only moral support and protection to this newspaper, as it did to other Republican publications. It even provided financial assistance to buy newsprint, [to pay] the cost of printing or employees' wages if required from time to time".[12]

Even newsprint was initially obtained after Brentel Susilo intimidated B.M. Diah, who, in addition to being head of Merdeka daily, also had a grip on the supply of newsprint in the capital. According to one informant who was present, "a little bit under the pressure of the gun" Diah agreed to supply enough newsprint for 5,000 copies per day to Indonesia Raya the day before the fledgling paper hit the streets.[13]

With insufficient guaranteed revenue for wages, newsprint and other necessities, financial help from supporters was vital. The issue of military funding and support for Indonesia Raya is a sensitive one for Mochtar Lubis.[14] In interviews in 1981-2, he argued that there was a confluence of interests between the military officers with whom he was co-operating and the needs of the population at large in the immediate post-revolutionary period. He emphasised that any assistance given by certain officers was based on personal friendships and not because of any institutional link with the military.[15] Seeing much to admire in the political outlook of the men who were then in control of the army, Mochtar would have seen advantages both for himself personally and for

14. While admitting shortfalls in income were covered by "friends", Mochtar declined to specify benefactors, claiming some were still in, or close to, the government and may be subject to retaliation (Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 27/1/81).
15. Chambert-Loir 1974:63 accepts Mochtar's argument that support was 'personal', but appears not to have known that direct financing was involved.
the nation as a whole, in the establishment of the paper suggested to him by his army friends.

Mochtar felt sympathetic to their view of the independence struggle. The Siliwangi Division had eliminated the leftist uprising in Madiun in 1948, which Mochtar Lubis had regarded as a communist betrayal of the revolution. The Siliwangi also had a large number of the Republic's professionally trained officers and a reputation for high professional standards and its political orientation was sympathetic to Sjahrir and the PSI. Mochtar was personally close to General Simatupang (then Chief of Staff), General Nasution and certain division commanders.[16] As Mochtar Lubis saw it, the "ideals of the Revolution" were synonymous with the ideals of the military who had spear-headed the return of the Republican government to Jakarta. Mochtar believed in the right of the Indonesian military to play a role in the administration and government of Indonesia.

The following years were a turbulent period for the armed forces, both internally, and in their relations with civilian governments. As Crouch observed, the army leadership, "had been taken over by a small group of 'military technocrats'" which was trying, with the support of cabinets between 1950 and 1952, to re-organise and rationalise the armed forces, then "still more an alliance of local fighting units than an integrated force".[17] Like Sjahrir, Hatta was close to Simatupang, Nasution and the Siliwangi officers, and was convinced the military

16. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 27/1/81.

should adopt a professional rather than a political role.[18] Like Hatta and Sjahir, such officers could be characterised, in Feith's terms, as 'administrators'.[19] Sukarno was drawing support from rival factions. The officers to whom Mochtar Lubis was close were generally those more attracted to the politics of Hatta and Sjahir, rather than Sukarno. They represented the professional and professionalising group, rather than militia ('laskar') forces, within the army and they were keen to regularise the armed forces.

_Indonesia Raya_ was not officially the army's paper.[20] Having agreed to establish the paper and made the decisive choices of initial staff, the military officers permitted the staff to work without encumberances. To emblazon such an alliance on the paper's bannerhead (in the manner of _Angkatan Berseniata_ or _Berita Yudha_ of the 1960s) would have undermined _Indonesia Raya_ 's potential influence. The presumed 'independence' of the paper provided much of its moral authority and factual credibility.[21]

Whether one regards _Indonesia Raya_ 's link with the military as 'coincidental and personal' or 'structural and institutional', it is clear that support from military officers kept the paper alive not merely in the form of regular purchases of the paper for distribution to troops

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19. Herbert Feith (1962) _The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia_, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, juxtaposes the characteristics of 'administrators' and 'solidarity makers' in national politics (pp.113-122).

20. Nonetheless Feith (1962) notes that it was "often called the paper of the army command" (p.200) and that it "had very close connections with the army leadership" (p.263).

21. Atmakusumah 1980:186 also contrasts _Indonesia Raya_ with the overtly military papers _Angkatan Berseniata_ and _Berita Yudha_.

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(as was the case with a number of papers during the early post-
Independence years)[22] but because intelligence officers were actively
seeking outside financial aid for Indonesia Raya.[23] Such sporadic
assistance appears to have continued until about 1958.[24]

Perhaps because of the convergence of interests and outlooks between
Mochtar Lubis and the military officers he worked with, no overt
conditions were placed upon Mochtar by persons providing financial
support. Those close to him believe that he would not have willingly used
the paper to serve the interests of those backers should that have
contradicted his own judgment of right and wrong. Mochtar Lubis's
relationship to Brentel Susilo and other officer friends was symbiotic.
Mochtar needed their financial assistance but insisted on editorial
autonomy. They in turn took a gamble that he would share their views on
crucial issues. Atmakusumah records that, from time to time, Indonesia
Raya criticised the military.[25] Intermittent criticisms
notwithstanding, it seems that, at least during the first three years,
Indonesia Raya's views largely coincided at least with those of the
intelligence officers who raised money for the paper. As one intelligence

22. As one form of financial support, till about 1952 the army held a
regular daily subscription of thousands of copies of Indonesia Raya,
as well as other papers like Pedoman. See Chambert-Loir 1974:631 and

23. Information suggests that the military officers did not provide the
money from their own pockets, but obtained it from other sources in,
what one security officer, described simply as, the "usual
way"!(Interview with Informant B, 1981.)

24. This information is corroborated by separate interviews with two
former intelligence officers, H.J.C. Princen (1/9/82) and Informant B
(1982).

25. See, e.g., the incident described by Atmakusumah (1980:186), who
qualifies his comments by noting that he was unable to obtain an
adequate set of the early years of Indonesia Raya. For these reasons,
it is difficult to verify the nature of such criticism during the
first few years of the paper.
officer said in 1981, when I asked about whether any editorial pressure was placed on the paper, "If you write what I want to read, then why should I bother you?"[26]

Press Styles and Issues

In its first series, Indonesia Raya, led by Mochtar Lubis between 1950 and 1958, established a reputation as "the leading muck-raking paper in Jakarta", with a sensationalist style and an aggressive, investigative editorial policy.[27] In the post-revolutionary climate, political parties multiplied, with more than 28 political parties or organisations contesting the nation's first general elections in 1955. National politics, however, was dominated by four major parties: the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), the modernist Islamic Masyumi, the more traditional Nahdatul Ulama (which left the Masyumi in 1952), and the PKI, each of which polled more than 16 percent of votes in 1955. Despite its poor electoral performance (scoring only two percent of votes), the PSI was an influential minority party within elite politics and the senior civil service.[28] After Vice-President Hatta's non-party transitional cabinet till August 1950, there followed a succession of six coalition cabinets in under seven years, three headed by Masyumi and three by PNI prime ministers. Mochtar Lubis regarded both the frequent changes of cabinet and the multiplicity of parties as indicative of the instability


of the party system, in which, he felt, bargaining and 'horse-trading' between party leaders determined the policies of government.

Throughout this period, it was not uncommon for journalists to feel that the government of the day favoured newspapers sympathetic to its party, or its coalition partners, both with the provision of news and material support. For example, Rosihan Anwar, prominent editor of the PSI paper *Pedoman* [Guide], has been particularly critical of the treatment of the press by the Ali Sastroamijoyo cabinets,[29] which, he claimed,

"ignored newspapers which could be counted among the large [circulation] ones of the time, like *Pedoman*, *Indonesia Raya*, and *Abadi*, and gave favour to what were actually small circulation newspapers, like *Merdeka* and others."[30]

As Rosihan Anwar has alluded, *Pedoman*, the Masyumi's *Abadi* [Eternal], edited by Suardi Tasrif, together with the Chinese daily *Keng Po*, described by Feith as "politically independent (but somewhat Socialist-inclined)",[31] were often regarded as broadly grouped together with *Indonesia Raya*. Rosihan Anwar, Tasrif and Mochtar were good friends, and, despite their occasional disputes and frictions, more often than not, directed their strongest criticisms towards another assorted cluster of papers. These radical-nationalist journals included the PKI's *Harian Rakyat* [People's Daily], the PNI party paper *Suluh Indonesia* [Torch of Indonesia], B.M. Diah's *Merdeka* [Freedom], and the peranakan Chinese *Sin Po*.[32] *Indonesia Raya*'s disagreements with *Merdeka*, *Harian Rakyat* and


32. 'Peranakan' refers to those Chinese who are Indonesian-born, have mixed ancestry or who have adopted Indonesian cultural practices. They are juxtaposed against the 'totok', those who are China-born or China-oriented culturally. See Charles A. Coppel (1983) *Indonesian Chinese in Crisis*, ASAA-Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, p. 9.
Suluh Indonesia, were often evident through polemics and spirited debates in the pages of the papers.

While not one of the largest of these papers, Indonesia Raya achieved a middle ranking by 1956. In round figures (bearing in mind sales figures are notoriously unreliable being boosted for advertising, and other, purposes), Indonesia Raya's circulation, from a base of 5,000 in 1950, dropped to 3,500 by October 1951, climbed to 10,000 by 1954 and exceeded 20,000 from 1955 to 1957. At this time the largest circulation dailies were Harian Rakyat (55,000), Pedoman (48,000), Suluh Indonesia (40,000) and Abadi (34,000) with most papers selling less than 10,000.[33] In 1957 Indonesia Raya sales increased to over 40,000, peaking at 47,500 in the second half of 1958, just before Mochtar Lubis's newspaper ceased publication.[34] Nationally, in 1950 there were 92 registered daily newspapers, with a total circulation of 499,500. Sales for the decade to 1959 peaked in 1957, when there were 120 dailies selling 1,049,500 copies, but declined in 1958 to 95 and 961,500 respectively.[35]

In order to locate Mochtar Lubis within the contemporary politics of his society, I will examine Indonesia Raya's coverage of five issues. Three events have been selected because they were of major importance, involving tensions within the military and between military and civil

During the Guided Democracy period Keng Po and Sin Po changed their names to Pos Indonesia [Indonesian Post] and Warta Bhakti [Loyal Journal] respectively.

33. Atmakusumah 1980:188.
34. Information on Indonesia Raya circulation provided in a chart in Chambert-Loir 1974:73.
authority; the two other issues are less important in themselves, but reveal telling characteristics of Indonesia Raya's journalism.

17 October Affair of 1952

One example of the coalescence of views between the Siliwangi intelligence officers who helped established Indonesia Raya and the paper's editorial staff is the 17 October 1952 incident. This was "the first major political crisis involving the army",[36] and it pointed to complex internal factionalism within the army and illustrated a range of growing social and political schisms.[37]

The planned reorganisation of the army, known to have Vice-President Hatta's support, to reduce numbers and emphasise training and skills above revolutionary ardour, was seen by disadvantaged officers to be privileging 'administrators' such as the central command 'military technocrats', rather than the less educated, former PETA[38] officers, now under threat of decommission. Those officers opposed to Nasution, Simatupang and others behind the rationalisation plan, applied pressure on sympathetic politicians particularly within the PNI, whose Prime Minister Wilopo, was heading the coalition cabinet of the PNI, Masyumi and several minor parties. There was dissatisfaction within the PNI over the alleged advantage Wilopo's policies were giving the Nasution faction, above PNI supporters in the military. With its stress on education and


37. This account is based on Feith 1962:246-73 and Crouch 1978:29-32.

38. PETA was the Volunteer Force for the Defence of the Homeland, established by the Japanese in September 1943. It trained officers up to the level of First Lieutenant.
professionalism, the plan was interpreted by critics as intended to strengthen the PSI within the armed forces. The Defence Minister, Sultan Hamengku Buwono, non-party and highly sympathetic to the military reorganisation, faced criticism from a range of political 'solidarity makers', in the PKI, the leftist Murba party, various minor nationalist parties, together with a faction of the PNI.

From September 1952 pressure was brought on the Defence Minister with a series of motions of 'no confidence' over the handling of the army reorganisation. There was dissension within the cabinet, with members of the PSI and Christian parties backing the Sultan against PNI attacks. The resignation of such members would have probably brought down the cabinet. Lobbying was intense on several motions criticising the state of the armed forces and the Defence Ministry. Manai Sophiaan, a PNI leader, sponsored a strongly worded motion for the establishment of a State Commission, among other things, to examine the leadership of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defence. The night before the vote, the President intervened to lobby PNI factions in support of the motion, which was passed on 16 October, opposed by the Masyumi, PSI and three other parties, but carried by the PNI and most other parties (with a few abstentions). The challenge to the Sultan undermined the cabinet and the position of the army leadership. The central command interpreted the politicians' actions as unwarranted interference in the army's internal affairs.

On the morning of 17 October 1952 a demonstration took place ransacking the parliament building, some of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs then moving on to the Dutch High Commission, and finally gathering outside the presidential palace. Tanks, cannon and armoured weapons were stationed in front of the palace with some weapons trained...
upon the building in a show of strength.[39] While the demonstration was taking place a large group of senior military officers including Army Chief of Staff Colonel Nasution approached President Sukarno arguing that the country was unstable because of the "unrepresentative" nature of the parliament. At this stage the country had not yet held a general election and the parliament was a composite body, many of whose members had been elected to assemblies of the Dutch-sponsored federal states in the 1946-1949 period. Deputy Chief of Staff Lieutenant Colonel Sutoko presented a written statement to the President urging him to dissolve the current parliament and form a new one as soon as possible, taking the people's wishes into consideration. The President stood firm, refusing to submit to the officers' requests claiming, as he had when speaking before the demonstrators in front of the palace, that to dissolve parliament would be tantamount to becoming a dictator. By standing firm he defused the officers' move against parliament and forced them to back down in an "extraordinary demonstration of the President's authority".[40]

Indonesia Raya had supported the Nasution faction during the weeks preceding 17 October. The paper, fearing social chaos may result from the political disorder, had expressed concern about the indisciplined nature of the parliament, its factionalism and the inability of the cabinet to take decisive action on the army reorganisation. As tensions mounted, on 16 October, Indonesia Raya's editorial had bemoaned the inability of successive cabinets to work efficiently and solve the nation's problems rationally, because the opposition adopted destructive

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39. Additional details of the events surrounding the 17 October Affair provided in interviews with Major-General (ret.) Dr Azis Saleh (13/9/82), H.J.C. Princen (1/9/82) and Informant B, an intelligence officer. Sukarno gives his version in An Autobiography as told to Cindy Adams, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1965, pp.266-7.

rather than constructive tactics. Pre-empting the Nasution group’s demands on Sukarno, *Indonesia Raya* wrote:

"As long as we have a parliament like this, with people acting in their own interest, and for their own self-ambition, this country will not be governable by any cabinet...The methods of this parliament will bring us all into a chasm of collapse and chaos...We regard the disbanding of this current parliament and the immediate holding of general elections, as the only way of helping this country of ours."[41]

*Indonesia Raya* featured the demonstration on the front page of its 17 October 1952 edition. The article, "People’s Demonstration Demands the Dissolution of Parliament", described the movement of the crowd through the city but made very little mention of the involvement of the military officers in the move against parliament.[42] The paper’s coverage presented the event as a large public demonstration instead of a transparently orchestrated action executed by military officers to bring increased pressure upon Sukarno.[43] *Indonesia Raya* noted that the placards which the demonstrators held aloft were strangely neat and ordered, though it did not imply that the demonstrators were organised by the military. By depicting the event as a broadly-based public response to critical political tensions and downplaying the crucial role of the

[41] "Sebaiknya Parlemen Dhibubarkan" [It would be best if the parliament was disbanded], Editorial, *Indonesia Raya*, 16/10/52, p.2.

[42] *Indonesia Raya* was not alone in presenting such an interpretation. e.g. *Siasat*’s "Riwayat Pendahuluan Demonstrasi Rakyat", 26/10/52, pp.5-6, also downplayed the military participation. Mochtar Lubis had worked in 1949 with *Gelanggang*, the cultural section of *Siasat* and was close to the editorial staff, which had strong PSI and Siliwangi leanings.

[43] Feith 1962:261 describes it as "substantially an army-organized affair". Military officers who took part said to me that it was clear that the demonstration was stage-managed by the military and not spontaneous. The demonstrators were mobilised by Lieutenant Colonel Imam Sjafe’i, "known as the 'Boss of Senen' because of his underworld contacts in the seamy Senen district of Jakarta" (Crouch 1978:174) and were referred to as "Sjafe’i's bandits" by one officer involved. Interviews with Azis Saleh (13/9/82), H.J.C. Princen (1/9/82) and Informant B, an intelligence officer (1982).
senior military officers involved, *Indonesia Raya*’s coverage propagated a view of the events which the military officers wanted disseminated. *Indonesia Raya* legitimised the military initiatives by depicting them as being in the public interest and a result of widespread public pressure.

Mochtar Lubis later recalled:

"*Indonesia Raya* supported the colonels because the liberal party system was making it impossible for Indonesia to move ahead...[The parties] would throw a cabinet out [of] power every month, sometimes every two months, or three months. It was getting too chaotic. We criticised the whole thing...So when the 17 October affair took place we gave it our support. We said that we must have more order in our political life than we have seen in the past...The military...coming fresh from the Revolution had as much say about the future of the people, of this nation, as these damn bloody politicians. Why should we allow the politicians, who had already shown their high irresponsibility, to decide on the future of the country by themselves?"[44]

Mochtar seems to have been worried about the likelihood of public disorder, and saw the military as providing a bulwark against that. He was keen to have parliament dissolved and more stringent conditions placed on the establishment of political parties to stop small groups forming independent political parties.

Mochtar Lubis, who had good personal relations with Colonel Nasution and the commanders of the troops surrounding the palace, had known of the officers’ intentions in advance. The exercise was discussed with Mochtar who had agreed to lend the support of *Indonesia Raya*. The fact that Mochtar discussed *Indonesia Raya*’s support with military officers involved is confirmed by one intelligence source, who puts a slightly different slant on the events, claiming that he was the source of the information incorporated into *Indonesia Raya*’s coverage and thus influenced the interpretations of it. This, the source claims, is one

[44. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 27/1/81. Unless noted as translations, interview material from Mochtar Lubis is quoted in the English original.]
reason why the *Indonesia Raya* coverage downplayed the military show of force and the senior officers' confrontation with Sukarno, putting more emphasis on the wishes of the people, and "demokrasi rakyat" (people's democracy).[45]

In his well-known *pojok* column "Di Pinggir Jalan" [By the Roadside][46] Mochtar Lubis, writing under his pseudonym 'Mas Kluuyr',[47] jovially notes the suspicions PNI Minister of Information Arnold Mononutu had of *Indonesia Raya*. Mononutu had commented that, because the day before the 17 October *Indonesia Raya* had run its trenchant editorial, "It would be best if the parliament was disbanded", in bold face type, the paper must have "atur permainan tonil" [organised the show]. While the appearance of the editorial can be explained by Mochtar's later admission that he was conversant with the military officers' intentions, Mas Kluuyr did not admit this at the time but simply criticised "ini warung kopi jang dikasi nama parlemen sementara" [this coffee shop called a provisional parliament].

Mochtar Lubis was disappointed with Nasution and his officers for not pressing their demands harder. His disapproval over the back-down by Nasution led to a parting of their political ways. Nasution and key supporters, Deputy Chief of Staff Lieutenant Colonel Sutoko and head of the military police Lieutenant Colonel S. Parman (also an earlier *Indonesia Raya* supporter), were suspended. Nasution was to spend three


46. *Indonesia Raya*, 18 October 1952, p.3. *'Pojok'* (literally 'corner') refers to a short, satirical, political column, in colloquial Indonesian, by a pseudonymous *persona* identified as the character or spirit of the newspaper.

47. 'Mas' is a term of affection and respect for an elder brother or male, while 'kluuyr' means wandering about. Hence 'Mas Kluuyr' might be translated as 'the wanderer'.

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years in limbo before being re-appointed Army Chief of Staff in 1955 as a Sukarno ally.

Sukarno's marriage to Hartini

In September 1954 Indonesia Raya produced an extraordinary scoop exposing President Sukarno's previously secret marriage to Mrs Hartini Suwondo, from the small Central Javanese town of Salatiga.[48] Mochtar Lubis was approached by representatives of women's groups who asked Indonesia Raya to take up their criticisms of the President for having secretly entered into a polygamous marriage.[49] The protesting women's organisation Perwari [Indonesian Women's Association] claimed that Hartini's divorce had not been legally finalised at the time of her secret wedding to the President in June 1954. Sukarno claimed that "the situation embarrassed and angered me painfully", that he was "distressed... especially when the newspapers went to town on me".[50] And go to town on him they did, led by Indonesia Raya.

The majority of Indonesia Raya's articles on the marriage were written by Kustiniyati Mochtar, a female journalist who had joined Indonesia Raya in November 1952,[51] but their content reflects the kind


of high moral stance for which Mochtar Lubis is renowned. Mochtar Lubis felt that it was hypocritical of the President, who had written Sarinah,[52] a book about the freeing of Indonesian womanhood from traditional constraints, to enter a polygamous marriage. By taking the stance that the marriage was demeaning to Indonesian women, Indonesia Raya represented the attitudes of urban, 'modern' readers, who could not accept that tradition allowed for polygamy, or that Sukarno had the right to behave as a traditional Javanese ruler.

The perseverance with which the issue was pursued suggests that Mochtar Lubis himself saw good reason to sustain it, especially since, as Chambert-Loir explains:

"The letter from the president of the women's association used by Indonesia Raya to launch the affair was a private letter and the signatory reproached the paper for using it in this manner."[53]

This was the most conspicuous of a number of criticisms of the personal life and behaviour of the President, pursued with journalistic tenacity for more than a year.[54]

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Berkisah, PT Badan Penerbit Indonesia Raya, [Jakarta], particularly pp.74-5.


54. Fourteen months after the initial scoop, Indonesia Raya published a front page report that the President had used the name 'Sukarna', rather than 'Sukarno' on the wedding documents, which, it asserted, rendered the marriage invalid! ('Sukarno Kawin Dengan Hartini Dgn[sic] Pakai Nama Sukarna' ['Sukarno married Hartini using the name Sukarna], Indonesia Raya, 26 November 1955, p.1.) Chambert-Loir (1974:75) counted over thirty articles relating to the Hartini marriage in Indonesia Raya between September 1954 and the end of the year, with subsequent articles running over until the end of the following year.
Mochtar's moralistic streak was one of a number of reasons for the launching of the attack. But it also proved commercially lucrative. The 'beat-up' of the Hartini wedding increased *Indonesia Raya*’s circulation, which certainly pleased the staff. But by selecting a 'moral' issue Mochtar Lubis was able to attack Sukarno without appearing to be forfeiting his paper's claim to be independent. Since the days of the Revolution Mochtar had nurtured a distaste for the President, a dislike which was deepening into animosity. Mochtar Lubis had been critical of Sukarno's endorsement of the Japanese *romusha* program to conscript Indonesian labourers for overseas service. In a satirical short story, "Kentung and the Medicine Pedlar", published in December 1949, Mochtar lampooned Sukarno's oratory as providing the inspiration for a pedlar of bogus medicines, who admitted

"[people] are transfixed by the name of Sukarno, and [so] I gave a sales pitch imitating Sukarno, making my voice strong, widening my eyes, really putting on a performance... I really believe now [I can] sell words, say anying, praise to the heavens, make promises the size of mountains... I've decided I'll just imitate Bung Karno; that'll make this coloured water medicine sell!"[55]

Sukarno was coming to represent almost all of the political values and personal qualities Mochtar despised. Mochtar regarded him as sexually promiscuous, egotistical, irrational, anti-intellectual, and politically opportunistic. The President's oratorical power over the public, his populist style and appeal to traditional Javanese made Mochtar Lubis apprehensive.

But Feith has observed that, although the

"initial reaction of the political public to the multiple marriage was negative ... the President's prestige rose soon afterward when it became clear that feelings of shame and

resentment were not at all widespread outside this public."[56]

If Feith is correct, then *Indonesia Raya* was out of step with popular feeling outside the urban political world. Interestingly, Major Brentel Susilo disagreed with Mochtar Lubis over the paper's criticism of the Hartini marriage. He felt that it was unwise to launch such personal attacks on the Head of State. Although Brentel Susilo had no formal link with *Indonesia Raya*, he was still playing an important role in mobilising bridging finance when required. From about 1956 Brentel Susilo would have preferred to edge Mochtar out of *Indonesia Raya* but, for the moment, he bided his time.

The Asian-African Conference and the Hospitality Committee

On 18 April 1955 India's Jawaharlal Nehru, China's Chou En-lai, Egypt's Nasser and many other prominent leaders of the Third World gathered in Bandung, in West Java, for the commencement of the first conference of Asian and African heads of government. The conference was a catalyst for the development of the Third World as a political force. It was an occasion for both Sukarno and the Prime Minister of the day, the PNI's Ali Sastroamijoyo, to present themselves and their country as pioneers of this movement, and to establish themselves as international statespersons. The Bandung Conference put Indonesia on the world map in a big way and was the crowning achievement of the first Ali Sastroamijoyo cabinet in the foreign affairs field.[57]


57. For a discussion of the build-up and the conference itself see Feith 1962:384-394. In his memoir, Ali Sastroamijoyo (1979) devotes 30 pages to the conference. He concludes: "It was because of the Bandung
During the planning stage for the conference Indonesia Raya, in chorus with the Masyumi's Abadi, the PSI's Pedoman and other papers associated with opposition to the PNI-led government of Ali Sastroamijoyo, was critical of the scheme, which it regarded as detracting from domestic problems.[58] Yet once it became clear that a very large number of the top figures of the two continents had arrived in Bandung, it was difficult for the opposition press to belittle its significance. But Indonesia Raya chose to make an issue of one embarrassing aspect of the way it was hosted.

While covering the conference Mochtar Lubis was told that he could obtain a 'hospitality committee' card, along with a list of 'safe houses' where women were located, to cater to the pleasures of the delegates. He went to the houses, interviewed the women and broke the scoop, which he regards as one of the most important issues taken up by Indonesia Raya during the 1950s.[59] Later Mochtar Lubis claimed privately that he was not objecting to men in positions of authority visiting prostitutes, but to the government procuring women for the delegates of the conference.[60] Indonesia Raya's exposure of the 'hospitality committee' did "strip the government of a little of its newly won prestige", but the scandal was regarded by observers as detracting little from the national pride generated by the international gathering.[61]

"Conference that our country very soon acquired a respected place on the map of world politics." (p. 304)

58. Note comments in Feith 1962:393 and footnote 128.
59. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 24/4/81.
60. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 24/4/81.
Indonesia Raya revived the issue of the 'hospitality committee' in 1956 when it accused an Indonesian Chinese public servant, Lie Hok Thay, implicated in a financial scandal exposed by Indonesia Raya, of facilitating the establishment of the 'committee' and, in more general terms, of finding women to "satisfy the desires" of several Indonesian officials.[62] A month previously Indonesia Raya had featured front page articles purporting to detail a "Female Public Servant's Bitter Experience" of being sexually harassed by her boss, the head of the cultural office of the Ministry of Education, Instruction and Culture. The prurient report devoted little space to rational explanations or facts.[63]

These stories illustrate a recurring tension with the style of journalism pursued by Indonesia Raya. It sought to expose and condemn sexual abuse and exploitation, but it faced the temptation of presenting such material in a way that would boost sales. Indonesia Raya's lurid descriptions of such matters were uncommon in the Indonesian press of the period. Some observers regarded the paper's moral outrage with scepticism. There were complaints from women's groups that papers like Indonesia Raya were breaching public morality. One women's caucus, in a statement directed specifically at Indonesia Raya, urged the press to "refrain from publishing statements which are of a sensationalist nature and breach the limits of decency."[64]

62. "Lie Hok Thay Carikan Wanita-wanita Untuk Pembesar-pembesar Indonesia", Indonesia Raya, 18/8/56, p.1, & Indonesia Raya 27/8/56 p.1 has a leading article on the 'hospitality committee'.

63. Indonesia Raya, 31/7/56, p.1 and subsequent issues.

64. Quoted in Atmakusumah 1980:194-5, which describes the protests of the General Assembly of the Indonesian Women's Congress [Kongres Wanita Indonesia, KOWANI] on 5 August 1956, verified later, by Nani Suwondo at a meeting with the press on 8 June 1958, as being directed at Indonesia Raya. A letter from the female public servant sexually harassed by her boss, published in Indonesia Raya (see above) was,
Indonesia Raya’s coverage of the Asian-African Conference’s ‘hospitality committee’ and the Hartini marriage were cited by the PKI leader Njoto as examples of how the "right-wing press" trivialised the achievements of the government and belittled the President.[65] ANTARA’s leftist editor-in-chief, Djawoto, warned of the dangers of what he dubbed ‘cowboy journalism’, [66] presumably a veiled reference to Mochtar Lubis who, because of his build and his close relations with Americans, was caricatured as a tall, lanky cowboy.[67] This style of journalism, leftists argued, ignored important issues such as colonialism and, instead, highlighted the supposed dangers of communism. They accused it of being anarchistic, simplistic and sensationalist.[68]

The Arrest of Roeslan Abdulgani

After the failure of the 17 October movement of 1952 Indonesia Raya maintained its push for a resolute, unified style of government. It often spoke out against the divisiveness and unpredictability of party --------


67. Mochtar described such a cartoon of himself which appeared in a rival paper (Interview, 27/1/81).

68. e.g. Njoto 1958:77, 80 & 107.
politics.[69] The frequency and vigour of *Indonesia Raya's* campaigns against corruption and inefficiency, established the paper as a political gadfly. And this was heightened in the years after 1953 by its vigorous anti-communism, for these were years in which the Communist Party was growing in power and influence.

Mochtar Lubis was becoming increasingly independent of the military men who had put his paper on its feet. He capitalised on the media base he had established with military assistance and gradually grew beyond the influence of early supporters. But *Indonesia Raya* still staunchly supported military factions critical of the central government. In one editorial, for example, the paper praised the Armed Forces as the "pioneers in the revolution, pioneers in [economic] development", while slamming "our old, corrupt and immoral politicians [who] have proved such a failure in the past".[70] Mochtar's relationship to the military can be gauged by his changing relationships with two major military figures, both Mandailingers like Mochtar himself: Abdul Haris Nasution and Zulkifli Lubis.[71] Close to Nasution till October 1952, his loyalties had shifted to Zulkifli Lubis by 1955, by which time he was strongly opposed to Nasution's political tactics.

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69. Chambert-Loir 1974:72 notes *Indonesia Raya's* disillusionment with Nasution after the 17 October debacle citing the editorial on 12 November 1956. He also registers *Indonesia Raya's* continued pressure for a more authoritarian form of government with a diminished role for the political parties.


By 1956 promising attempts at reconciling post-October 1952 factions in the army leadership, were foundering. Nasution and several other October officers had been re-activated. He was promoted to Major-General and re-appointed Army Chief of Staff in October 1955. But another schism was developing along rather different fault lines to that of October 1952. On the one hand, Nasution had become aligned with the president and the Ali Sastroamijoyo (PNI) cabinet, and associated, in the minds of critics, with the growing influence of the ethnic Javanese in government and the Armed Forces. Critical of this centralised power alliance was a group of officers around Deputy Chief of Staff Colonel Zulkifli Lubis and Colonel Simbolon, a former rival for Nasution's position of Chief of Staff. Sentiments in the Outer Islands and West Java against Jakarta were rising and backing the dissenting officers, who were supported by Masyumi and PSI leaders and by newspapers sympathetic to them, including Indonesia Raya. The division corresponded to tensions between Jakarta on the one hand and regional resentment of central control on the other. Mochtar was highly critical of Nasution and the political line and moral credentials of the PNI cabinet. By contrast, in January 1956 Zulkifli Lubis was declared Indonesia Raya readers' choice for Indonesian Personality of 1955.


75. See Indonesia Raya, 7/1/56.
On 13 August 1956 *Indonesia Raya*, normally a morning paper, put out an extraordinary afternoon bulletin to report that Foreign Minister Roeslan Abdulgani had been implicated in investigations into corruption, accepting financial favours from Lie Hok Thay, deputy-director of the State Printery.[76] At 6.00 am that morning, two hours before the Minister was due to leave for a London conference, Roeslan had been arrested by order of the Siliwangi Division's commander, Colonel Alex Kawilarang, backed by Zulkifli Lubis. That very day, Kawilarang, designated the next military attaché to the USA, was due to be relieved of his command by a Nasution appointee. Hasty intervention by the Prime Minister had the order revoked by Nasution, and Roeslan departed on time, leaving the city abuzz with anticipation. *Indonesia Raya* went into the attack, claiming that Kawilarang had moral authority on his side, and damning the intervention of the authorities to release a corruptor.[77] Mochtar, critical of Nasution's alliance with the PNI, made it clear by the slant of the reports that *Indonesia Raya* supported those officers opposing the central command.

A government *ad hoc* investigation cleared Roeslan of any criminal breach of law in August 1956, but *Indonesia Raya* kept up the pressure. In December 1956 Mochtar Lubis was taken to court accused of libel for comments on the Roeslan case and his editorial claims that the Cabinet had conspired to cover up the facts. Mochtar produced documents supporting his claims that the Foreign Minister had accepted a house and car from Lie, and, in return, taken foreign currency overseas illegally.

76. For details, see Feith 1962:503-507.

77. See *Indonesia Raya*, 14/8/56 and subsequent editions. Feith 19622:503-4 describes key aspects of *Indonesia Raya*'s coverage.
for him.[78] Mochtar was acquitted and in April 1957 a month after the fall of the Ali cabinet, the Supreme Court fined Roeslan for unintentionally breaching foreign exchange regulations.[79]

**Officers in Revolt**

While attacking Roeslan Abdulgani, *Indonesia Raya* was also defending Zulkifli Lubis against criticisms from both the political left and the Nasution faction. Zulkifli Lubis had relinquished his post as Deputy Chief of Staff a week after the Roeslan exposure, as did a number of key supporters. In November, after three months of tense internal army plottings and manoeuvring, Zulkifli Lubis attempted to shore up the troop strength of his supporters in the capital in a move against the Nasution command. He was backed by those officers who felt that they would soon be the subject of dismissal or arrest for their pro-Zulkifli Lubis sympathies. On 28 November 1956 Cabinet suspended Colonel Zulkifli Lubis, accusing him of attempting an unsuccessful coup.[80] He remained underground until emerging in Sumatra in 1957 in the company of officers involved in regional revolts. While cautiously refraining from supporting Zulkifli Lubis' actions outright, *Indonesia Raya* was at great pains to defend the colonel from accusations in other media.[81]

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78. *Indonesia Raya* attempted to bring the moral character of the Foreign Minister into question by publishing a note, purportedly from him to Lie Hok Thay, requesting a copy of a supposed sex book: Simone de Beauvoir's *The Second Sex*! (*Minggu Indonesia Raya*, 2/12/56 and editions for following week).


80. This account is based on Feith 1962:500-507. See also Atmakusumah 1980:196-9.

81. *Indonesia Raya* entered into argument with *Harian Rakyat* over the latter's charge that Zulkifli Lubis had improperly interfered in an
When Mochtar Lubis was arrested some months later he was questioned extensively about his relationship with Zulkifli Lubis and *Indonesia Raya*'s publication of various letters from him.[82] Zulkifli Lubis was a distant cousin of Mochtar[83] and had been Bachtar Lubis's superior officer during the Revolution when he headed a major military intelligence organisation. Although the editor denied that "*Indonesia Raya* had become Colonel Lubis's trumpet",[84] the paper gave prominence nonetheless, both in articles and in editorial comment, to the arguments of an officer openly challenging an army superior and civilian authority. Similarly, wide and favourable coverage was given to Siliwangi officers, such as Colonel Alex Kawilarang, when they challenged the central government.[85] *Indonesia Raya* sympathised with the Siliwangi officers and was prepared in 1956, as in 1952, to support them against their political adversaries.

On 20 December 1956, the regimental commander in West Sumatra, Lieutenant Colonel Ahmad Husein took charge of government in Central

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application for a domestic telephone connection for a person then overseas with an Indonesian delegation. (*Indonesia Raya* "Lagi-lagi Harian Rakyat Bohong! Mau Bikin Cemar Nama Z. Lubis", 20/8/56, p.1. See also *Indonesia Raya*, 20/12/56, p.1.)

82. See Mochtar Lubis's prison diary, *Catatan Subversif* [Subversive Notes], Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 1980, p.14 & 17.

83. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 27 January 1981. Mochtar stressed to me that he had relatives in many political parties and that he was no closer to Zulkifli Lubis than to these other relatives.

84. *Catatan Subversif* 1980:17. [For clarity, in repeat citations of books by Mochtar Lubis, this thesis will refer to title (abbreviated if appropriate) and date, rather than author and date.] From 1946 in Yogyakarta Zulkifli Lubis had headed the Fifth Office of the Ministry of Defence (which dealt with intelligence matters), and Special Military Investigations. See *Tempo* 1981:334.

85. See "Menteri Luar Negeri Tersangkut Perkara 1.500.000 Rupiah", *Indonesia Raya* 14/8/56, along with other front page statements by Zulkifli Lubis and other officers supporting Kawilarang.
Sumatra in a bloodless coup. He stated that the action followed a decision taken the previous month at a reunion meeting of the Banteng Division (which had fought in Central Sumatra during the Revolution and later been dissolved by Nasution). The meeting had elected Ahmad Husein chairperson of a new 'Banteng Council', and expressed concern about the treatment of the outer regions. It urged the central government to fill local government positions with capable people from that region, rather than outsiders, and it voiced its disapproval of the leadership of the State and the Army.[86]

The next day, hearing of Ahmad Husein's declaration, Mochtar Lubis wrote an editorial which:

"drew the conclusion that this incident will surely not be limited to Central Sumatra alone, but will have consequences for the other regions as well... The [coalition] Cabinet will not be able to overcome this, nor will President Soekarno himself, without Bung Hatta, nor will Chief of Staff Nasution."

He urged the Cabinet to step down and:

"if necessary for the greater good, then President Soekarno and Chief of Staff Nasution must also be prepared to relinquish their positions."[87]

Before this verbal challenge could go to press, Mochtar Lubis was arrested on 21 December 1956, and the editorial was never published. The following day, Indonesia Raya front page headlines made the paper's reservations about the government's ability to cope with the political situation clear: "The Cabinet Cannot Overcome The Explosion In Central

86. This account is based on Feith 1962:520-6.

87. Quoted from Mochtar Lubis's recollections of the censored editorial, in Catatan Subversif 1980:2. Chambert-Loir 1974:87-8 provides a French translation of a copy of the draft which he obtained from Hasjim Mahdan.
Sumatra". Gaps were left to indicate censored material and large letters announced: "Mochtar Lubis Taken By The Military Police Corps.[88]

Mochtar's doomed editorial was right in predicting that the Central Sumatran rebellion would spread to other parts of the Outer Islands. And it was representative of the political outlook which characterised the group of rebel movements which were to exercise control of many provinces outside Java throughout 1957. Inflation and the manipulation of the foreign exchange rate had hurt the export-producing areas of the Outer Islands, favouring Java, an importing area.[89] In the 1955 elections, the PNI, NU and PKI, three of the four main parties, gained more than 85% of their votes from Java (and mainly Central and East Java), reinforcing a cleavage between these three and the Masyumi, which gained much of its support in the Outer Islands.[90] The election results aggravated the sense of grievance felt by some in the Outer Islands, as did the resignation of Vice-President Hatta on 1 December 1956, a man "many non-Javanese, and especially Sumatrans, had tended to regard...as their representative" in the partnership with Sukarno, whom they saw as representing Javanese interests.[91] A large increase in PKI votes in the mid-1957 provincial elections in Java, exacerbated the feeling of non-


communist Outer Islanders that the country was gradually succumbing to Javanese communists. [92]

While this situation posed dilemmas for many Javanese non-communists, for Sumatrans like Mochtar Lubis, regional loyalty only enhanced their opposition to communism. After meetings in September and October 1957, rebel officers expressed the demands of the regionalists as: the election of a new president (because of Sukarno’s alleged pro-PKI bias), the replacement of Nasution and his supporters within the central army staff, and finally the banning of the PKI. The distinctly regionalist themes of the movement dovetailed with anti-Sukarno and anti-communist ones.

Mochtar, though not an official spokesperson, had expressed grievances felt by the regionalist rebels in *Indonesia Raya* editorials. He had the support of *Indonesia Raya* staff in the stand he took on the West Sumatran revolt. This is partly because 60-70 per cent of the editorial staff were Sumatran, [93] including Hasjim Mahdan, Enggak Bahau'ddin, D.H. Assegaff, Ali Hoeta Soehoet, Mohamadnoer, as well as Mochtar Lubis himself. But indeed the non-Sumatran staff were also sympathetic to the view that successive governments had neglected the Outer Islands.

On 15 February 1958 the regional rebellion entered its climactic phase when the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia [*Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia*, PRRI] was declared in

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93. The estimate of percentages was made by Mochtar Lubis in an interview, 13/1/81. Mochtar observed that most of the journalists in Jakarta during the early post-Independence years were non-Javanese, mostly from North Sumatra and Minangkabau.
Sumatra.[94] Mochtar Lubis was given special mention in their manifesto, which severed links with the central government of Sukarno. In explaining why they had declared their independence they included in their specifications:

"Mochtar Lubis, a journalist who has been particularly courageous in upholding truth and justice and has attacked tyranny and oppression at its very source, has already been under arrest for well over a year ... without having been brought up for trial in court."[95]

The declaration went on to mention particular corruption cases exposed by Mochtar Lubis in *Indonesia Raya*, such as the accusations against Roeslan Abdulgani (and earlier, Djody Gondokusumo), in which the government pardoned, reinstated or even promoted leading figures against whom corruption charges had been proved.

Why was it, then, that Mochtar Lubis was arrested, and detained for such a long time? Mochtar Lubis himself asserts that the censoring of his 21 December 1956 editorial prior to the release of the paper, indicates that

"it is very clear that my detention is entirely directed towards my activities as a journalist".[96]

*Indonesia Raya* had provided the first press story on the Sumatran coup.[97] Behind the instruction to detain him, Mochtar Lubis saw Nasution, Sukarno, and the PKI. While Nasution, criticised openly in an article in *Indonesia Raya* on 12 November 1956, was regarded by Mochtar as weak-willed and unprincipled, it was the influence of the Communists upon

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94. It was headed by Sjafruddin Prawiranegara (Masyumi) as Prime Minister, and included in the Cabinet the Masyumi leaders (and former prime ministers) Natsir and Burhanuddin Harahap along with the PSI figure Sumitro Djojohadikusumo and PSI-leaning officers such as Simbolon.


the President which Mochtar felt provided the major impetus for his removal. He saw "the hand of the communists behind my detention".[98] He felt very strongly that he was not arrested because of his relationship with military officers engaged in activities threatening the unity of the state.

However, Mochtar's reports of his interrogations suggest that the authorities assumed that he was conniving with Zulkifli Lubis, and other sympathisers in the outer islands, to undermine the authority of the central government.[99] Years later, in an interview, Nasution described how he took the initiative to issue orders for Mochtar's arrest because of links with Zulkifli Lubis.

"Mochtar Lubis's newspaper supported Zulkifli Lubis. We could not act against him until we found a press card of Mochtar in the possession of one of [Zulkifli] Lubis's officers, who had been arrested. I told the garrison commander to arrest Mochtar."[100]

Willard Hanna, a good friend of Mochtar Lubis, observed that, despite "vague and conflicting" military statements concerning his arrest, Mochtar Lubis was assumed by the authorities to be "very deeply involved in the stirring up of public dissatisfaction with the Jakarta regime which was the basic reason for the [regional] insurrection".[101] The American suggested four reasons for Mochtar's detention without trial: 1) "he gave offense to a great many very prominent people, including Bung Karno and members of the military command"; 2) he was


suspected of having been "not merely sympathetic but perhaps even helpful to the regional insurrectionists"; 3) a public trial would "result in sensational revelations"; 4) if released, Mochtar would "resume his role of gadfly".[102]

While some journalists had been temporarily detained for several days or charged under press laws for libel or similar offences prior to 1957, Mochtar Lubis was the first editor in the post-1949 history of Indonesia to be held without charge for anything more than a couple of weeks.[103] As Oey Hong Lee observed,

"For the Indonesian press world as a whole the ' [Mochtar] Lubis affair ' was a foretaste of things to come under Martial Law, which began in March 1957 and which limited the freedom of journalists to express their opinions."[104]

Mochtar Lubis had become the most prominent and the boldest of the anti-Sukarno and anti-Communist editors. On 16 October 1957, military authorities responded to ongoing press protests over Mochtar's detention, primarily in Indonesia Raya, by forbidding published comment on the case, unless it came from authorised sources, like the Army Information Office.[105] During Mochtar's detention, numerous protests were made on his behalf by a range of international organisations, including repeated


103. Smith (1969) provides tabulated data on actions against the press. In 1952, there were two arrests with two journalists jailed (p.152) and in 1953, two were also jailed (p.178). In 1954, the editor of Harian Rakyat, was the only journalist jailed, receiving a sentence of seven days for criticisms of the US President (p.182 & 186). In 1955 two journalists were jailed (p.194), with two arrested and one jailed the following year (p.199). All detentions appear to be of short duration.


appeals by the Zurich-based International Press Institute. In August 1958 he was awarded the Ramon Magsaysay Award for Journalism and Literature.

The Lingering Death of Indonesia Raya

Mochtar was released from the Jalan Budi Utomo Military Detention Centre into house arrest on 5 January 1957, until freed on 29 April 1961. Strictly, he was forbidden to receive guests, be interviewed, use the phone or write. But he was not prevented from writing and exceptions were gradually made for guests, after he established cordial relations with his guards. Mochtar was loaned films to screen at home by Maria Ullfah, then chairperson of the Film Censorship Board. Despite the relaxed conditions, he missed his flying lessons at the Jakarta Air Club, and his sailing jaunts with the Pulau Seribu sailing club.

From his house, Mochtar Lubis continued sending material to Indonesia Raya and guiding the paper's criticism of the government. Publication of anything regarded as propaganda for the rebels was banned by Nasution. In October 1957 the Jakarta Military Command ordered that

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further unofficial reports about Mochtar's detention were not to be
published in the papers.[111] During 1957-58, four other Indonesia Raya
editorial staff were temporarily detained,[112] and six military banning
orders kept the paper off the streets from time to time.[113] In July
1958, while Indonesia Raya was banned temporarily, the government was
angered when, in an embarrassing confluence of events, an American
embassy official declared his desire for the paper to re-open, just at
the time American material support for the PRRI government was made
public![114]

Policy differences between Mochtar and other company directors
widened as bans increased in frequency and length. Mochtar Lubis had
given little attention to the practicalities of day-to-day
administration, and financial management was a crucial weakness in the
enterprise. Hasjim Mahdan, the General Director of Indonesia Raya (placed
in that position by Brentel Susilo), and Mochtar Lubis disagreed about
the priorities of the paper, and this grew sharper as pressure on the
company mounted. Hasjim Mahdan felt that the interests of the staff, who
would lose their jobs if the paper become insolvent or was banned

(Yogyakarta) Kronik Pers 1957, p.84.

112. The periods of detention varied, with the maximum being about a
three months. One editor, Enggak Bahau'ddin was detained on four
separate occasions. See Atmakusumah 1980:208. In January 1958,
Kustiniyati Mochtar, Indonesia Raya's managing editor, was the first
woman journalist in post-independence Indonesia to be brought to
court, but the libel charge was subsequently dismissed. See
Kustiniyati Mochtar [1974]:84-93.

Diceriterakan", Indonesia Raya, 31/10/69, p.2) claims that the paper
was banned 17 times to September 1958, but Atmakusumah feels the
figure of six given by Hasjim Mahdan (in "Pembaca Indonesia Raya
Berhak Mengetahui Inti Persoalannya", Indonesia Raya, 7/10/58) is
more accurate. See his Note 46, p.182.

permanently, should be paramount. A newspaper's primary objective should be to survive, to present information to the public. In an announcement to the paper's readers, Hasjim Mahdan likened his policy to that of a captain in command of a ship. When facing storms and hazards, a cautious captain adjusts his course to ensure his ship, crew and passengers reach their destination.[115] For Moctar Lubis, if a paper was no longer able to print the news as it saw it, it had a moral responsibility to shut down. The interests of the staff were secondary to its 'mission'. In Hasjim Mahdan's imagery, Moctar charts his ship's course straight to his destination, irrespective of attendant hazards or whether the ship can make the distance. For Hasjim Mahdan, this tactic was "suicide".

In August 1958 the conflict was brought to a head when Hasjim Mahdan was offered government financial assistance by Information Minister Sudibjo, provided that Moctar Lubis resign and criticism was moderated.[116] Hasjim Mahdan and Sarhindi, whom some staff members assumed to be still acting in concert with Brentel Susilo, withdrew their support for Moctar, who was sacked by the company board on 20 August 1958.[117] Senior editors, Enggak Bahau'ddin and K. Sidharta, were reassigned to less responsible positions, replaced by Soejono Harjadi, a newcomer to the paper. In a sweeping demonstration of solidarity, all the editorial staff sided with Moctar Lubis.[118] The internal fracas was reported in vivid detail on the front pages of Indonesia Raya. Initially, they refused to accept the board's directives and managed to continue


117. Atmakusumah 1980:216 notes that Hasjim Mahdan and Sarhindi together controlled 75% of the company shares.

118. Interview with Atmakusumah, 26/3/81.
publishing *Indonesia Raya* under the old staffing arrangements until the authorities banned the paper on September 10. Continuing their struggle, staff members who had sided with Mochtar moved from the *Indonesia Raya* offices but brought out a parallel paper competing with Hasjim Mahdan's *Indonesia Raya*, also using that name.[119]

This move was shortlived, as was the Mochtar Lubis faction's plan to publish a rival paper, *Suara Indonesia Raya* (The Voice of Indonesia Raya), to continue their struggle. The local military authorities, Peperda (Penguasa Perang Daerah), empowered by a state of emergency declared after the outer island revolts, had ruled that all newspapers had to register by 1 October 1958 to be eligible for a henceforth obligatory publication permit [surat izin terbit, SIT]. The Mochtar Lubis faction's application was not approved. The Hasjim Mahdan group's request was allowed but its *Indonesia Raya*, colourless and disembodied and with little resemblance to the old paper, attracted few readers and survived only from 7 October 1956 till 2 January 1959, when it voluntarily ceased publication.[120]

119. Atmakusumah 1980:178-79 reproduces the front page of these competing "*Indonesia Raya*" papers, both dated Tuesday 4 November 1958. One, published by Hasjim Mahdan with new editorial staff, gives the full publication details of number and year, while the other, by the Mochtar Lubis group (led by Ali Moechtar Hoeta Soehoet and Enggak Bahau'ddin) lacks a publication number. Atmakusumah 1980:220 notes that the Mochtar group printed their paper as an afternoon edition, on the Abadi presses after the Hasjim Mahdan group had published theirs in the morning. Atmakusumah, a party to the clash, gives a detailed account of it (1980:209-22).

120. Hasjim Mahdan's *Indonesia Raya* began with a print run of between 20,000 and 22,000 (Atmakusumah 1980:221), far below the 1957-58 peak of 47,500 achieved by the paper before the split (Chambert-Loir 1974:73).
The Staff Ethos at Indonesia Raya

One reason for the failure of Hasjim Mahdan's *Indonesia Raya* to maintain its place in the market was that it lacked the vivid personality and style distinctive of Mochtar Lubis, which had come to be associated with the name *Indonesia Raya*. Mochtar had exerted a persuasive authority over the paper's editorial policies and, for the staff, on *Indonesia Raya*'s ethos. For the public, 'Mas Kluyr', the persona of the *pojok* and hence the newspaper, had become Mochtar Lubis's alter ego![121]

Mochtar Lubis had a strong influence upon his staff, but this was tempered by a high level of individual independence in the work environment. As Kustiniyati Mochtar recalled:

"working under the leadership of Mochtar Lubis meant having to make your own way, solving problems yourself and taking full initiative. He is not the kind of person to lead us tediously step by step, and because above all he values independence, that free atmosphere was the editorial hallmark of the paper which he led... [An] independent but close and friendly atmosphere became a unique feature of the editorial office of our paper. The superior here seemed more like an elder sibling, to whom we could come to ask advice or with all kinds of problems, both those relating to work as well as, sometimes, those of a very private nature."[122]

The working environment fostered a warm 'esprit de corps' amongst the staff who felt a strong loyalty to the paper and its head. The spirit and commitment extended beyond those with whom one worked, for Mochtar encouraged a sense of pride in his staff at being members of the journalistic profession. Solidarity was shown, for example, in August 1953 when journalists organised demonstrations in support of Asa Bafagih, editor-in-chief of *Pemandangan* [View]. A former colleague of Mochtar

121. For some readers Mas Kluyr epitomised the spirit of *Indonesia Raya*. Journalist Hanna Rambe who joined *Indonesia Raya* after its reappearance in 1968 described how Mas Kluyr was regarded in her family in the 1950s in "Mas Kluyr membenut hidupku" (pp.103-155) in Trimurti et al. [1974], especially pp.103-113.

Lubis in ANTARA, Asa Bafagih had been charged with leaking state secrets in an editorial. Resisting pressure from the court, he refused to breach professional confidentiality and reveal his informants, accepting full responsibility.[123] In what developed into a trial of journalistic ethics, Mochtar Lubis, then chairperson of the Indonesian committee of the International Press Institute, played a major part in organising a demonstration of a thousand journalists and supporters.[124]

The staff of Indonesia Raya regarded theirs as a 'crusading' newspaper, although they acknowledge that it had a reputation as 'sensationalist'. Most thought it a privilege to work under Mochtar Lubis, and were strongly behind him on the majority of issues. Discussions were held periodically to examine policies and particular campaigns and a degree of consensus was generally reached. As one journalist chose to express it, the staff "felt as one with Mochtar Lubis".[125] His staff found him a sociable, likeable man who got on well with them, taking a personal interest, without overtones of paternalism or interference.

Some staff were attracted to him because of his reputation as an author and artistic figure.[126] D.H. Assegaff, a short story writer and translator, joined in 1955. Mara Karma had been active in cultural


124. Including procuring a fire brigade band made available by Brigadier-General Sutojo Siswomihardjo, a former supporter of Indonesia Raya's establishment, and one of the six generals killed on the morning of 1 October 1965 (interview with Mochtar Lubis, 16/2/81). See also Smith 1969:175.

125. Interview with Informant C, who worked with Indonesia Raya from the mid-1950s, 1981.

126. One staff member compared the way the news weekly magazine Tempo attracted artists of various kinds into its staff in the 1970s, with Indonesia Raya in the 1950s.
magazines with Mochtar Lubis during the 1940s and continued on in *Indonesia Raya*. Sam Soeharto, the paper's cartoonist, was also a serious painter. Sympathetic writers and artists were also encouraged to submit articles either on a freelance or on a regular basis, or to take charge of specific columns in the paper.

Staff were encouraged to be self-reliant and autonomous, but the harmonious working environment, based on mutual respect and consensus, was partly a reflection of broadly similar attitudes to such issues as the PKI, weaknesses within the party system, support for the regional challenge to the central government, the role of the military, an appreciation of Western education, an embracing of concepts of modernity and rationalism rather than traditionalism, and a pragmatic, modernist attitude to religion.

Many journalists who served on *Indonesia Raya* regard their years with the paper as some of the best in their working life. Some later joined other papers, but found them less concerned with idealism and the crusading spirit than with commercial success. Mochtar Lubis urged his staff to adhere to professional ethics. In his handbook on the subject, he had stressed truth, accuracy and balance.

"In compiling the news [he wrote] objective journalists have to keep their own feelings in their hearts... for "it is the obligation of a journalist to provide a report which is correct, complete, unbiased and current"."[127]

Yet, in practice, there was a tension for Mochtar Lubis and for *Indonesia Raya* between values such as 'objectivity' and 'balance' on the one hand, and partisanship on the other.[128] *Indonesia Raya* frequently adopted a

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128. Some of the contemporary debates within the Jakarta press community on such tensions are surveyed in Kerry W. Groves (1983) *Harian Rakyat, Daily Newspaper of the Communist Party of Indonesia — Its*
consciously partisan position, such as over the 17 October Affair or the regional rebellions. Nonetheless, the staff involved perceived their paper as guided by the unofficial motto, "berani karena benar" [courage from truth].[129]

Unlike the editors of various other dailies with which Indonesia Raya had often been compared -- especially the Masyumi's Abadi, the PSI's Pedoman and the Chinese and business-oriented Keng Po -- Mochtar Lubis maintained a position of outright opposition to Guided Democracy and the Sukarno-Army dominated political order which emerged after the defeat of the regionalist rebellion. Mochtar's maverick stance was demonstrated in 1961 when he recommended the expulsion of Rosihan Anwar, editor of Pedoman, from the Zurich-based International Press Institute (IPI), after Rosihan signed a 19-point agreement accepting press constraints under martial law.[130] Mochtar, former chairperson of the disbanded Indonesian national committee of the IPI,[131] had been a founding member of the Indonesian committee in 1951, along with B.M. Diah, S. Tasrif and Rosihan Anwar.[132] Prior to his arrest, Mochtar had attended meetings regularly (on trips sometimes funded by the Asia Foundation or the Ministry of

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History and Role, Masters thesis in Asian Studies, A.N.U., Canberra, pp.29-55.

129. Kustiniyati Mochtar [1974]:82.


131. The 1960 General Assembly of the IPI in Tokyo dissolved the committee because in Indonesia 'in its opinion there is no freedom of the press any more' (quoting from S. Tasrif, "The Background to the Case of Rosihan Anwar", IPI Report, June 1961, p.7).

He and Rosihan Anwar had been described by their colleague, Suandi Tasrif, as 'celebrities' in IPI circles. The IPI, which had publicised Mochtar's detention and formally protested to the President, treated his letter regarding Rosihan Anwar gravely. Mochtar believed that the 1960 press document, binding the signatory to support the government's policies (Manipol-USDEK) was such that "by signing the 19-point declaration the journalist is associating himself with the authorities" and thus breaching the conditions of IPI membership by surrendering his journalistic freedom of expression. For Mochtar, the correct choice, taken by Suandi Tasrif and Abadi, was to close down. Tasrif admitted in the debate that, despite the rectitude of Mochtar's argument, his sympathy lay with Rosihan Anwar, for the decision to sign was a matter for "the editor and his own political conscience". Ironically, before Rosihan presented his defence to the IPI, Pedoman was shut down nevertheless by the authorities. His temporary suspension from the IPI was ended by the Annual Assembly in June.

133. *Indonesia Raya*, 15/3/56 and 20/10/56, both p.1.
136. The *Manipol* (Political Manifesto) referred to the President's Independence Day speech of 17 August 1959, while USDEK was an acronym for the ideological basis of the State (ie. the 1945 Constitution, Indonesian-style Socialism, Guided Democracy, Guided Economy and Indonesian Identity). See Legge 1973:1-4;330-332.
139. *IPI Report*, June 1961, p.1. See Rosihan Anwar 1983:244-248 for his reflections on this affair, summed up by his comment "how foolish [blo'on] I was at that time".
Release and Re-arrest

On 29 April 1961 Mochtar Lubis was released. Immediately he sent a telegram to the IPI informing them and expressing his gratitude for its support.[140] On invitation, he attended the 10th annual IPI congress in Tel Aviv from 30 May to 1 June, and addressed the general assembly. He described how Asia and Africa

"were in the grip of a deadly race, a race between the construction of democracy and a totalitarian construction which would ultimately lead to the destruction of all human values as they believe in them."[141]

Mochtar Lubis blamed the threat to democracy on the spread of "communist propaganda", and the susceptibility of national leaders to sacrifice free speech and democratic principles as they looked towards "totalitarian systems" for models for their countries. The press "must champion the cause of the people against the abuse of power... [For] the fire for freedom can never be suppressed." The only way for victims to escape this suppression of democracy "was by not yielding the smallest amount of one's principles, by not compromising."[142]

On his return to Indonesia he was detained again on 14 July 1961, because, as he records it, his IPI speech was interpreted as an attack on the "Manipol and Usdek of Sukarno".[143] After a period detained in Jakarta, on 25 January 1963 Mochtar Lubis was transferred to the Jalan


141. This account is given in the "Discussion of Institute's Policy", IPI Report, August 1961 p.7. Mochtar's account is given in Catatan Subversif 1980:156-158 (which appears to be based on the IPI Report).


Wilis Military Prison, Madiun, East Java. He was held there with a handful of leaders, including Yunan Nasution, Kyai Isa Anshary, E.Z. Muttaquien, Mohammad Roem, Soebadio Sastrosatomo, and other political prisoners, like H. J. Princen, Sultan Hamid and Anak Agung Gde Agung. Mochtar Lubis was better known both to Western journalists and to observers from the West generally than other of the detainees held during this period with the exception of Sjahrir.[144] Yet politically he was far less important than political leaders like Mohammad Roem, Mohammad Natsir and Soebadio Sastrosatomo. Mochtar Lubis represented no party, nor did he command the kind of sectional loyalty that other detainees did. He was a symbol of a broader non-party opposition to Sukarno, and of fearless journalism.

Conditions in the jail were relaxed and, though spartan, did not pose any threat to life. Mochtar spent the detention years writing novels, translating, developing skills and hobbies, following current affairs and keeping his diary, later published as Catatan Subversif [Subversive Notes].[145] The political prisoners were treated with respect and consideration. They were permitted to leave the prison to swim, play tennis and shop, and they were even provided with criminal prisoners to act as personal servants for them. Rations were poor, particularly after inflation reduced the food value of the ration allowance, but this was supplemented by outside supplies purchased at the

144. e.g. Mochtar was the only former detainee actually named in the report of the release of these prisoners, in Time magazine ("Indonesia: Tightening the Noose", [Australian Edition] 27 May 1966, p.23) and The Times [London] ("Indonesian army to carry on border fighting", 14/5/66, p.8; "Indonesia frees 15 politicians", 18/5/66, p.10). See also reports in The New York Times ("Foes of Sukarno to gain freedom", 17/4/66, p.3; "Indonesia frees 15 prominent political prisoners", 18/5/66, p.18; and "Indonesian press fears new curbs", 6/9/66, p.2).

145. Published in instalments in Indonesia Raya between October 1968 and October 1969 and as a book by Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 1980.
market or obtained from visitors. Periodic home visits to family in
Jakarta were allowed. On 25 October 1965, as leftist political detainees
began to flood the jail after the coup and counter-coup of 1 October
1965, the long-serving prisoners were returned to Jakarta detention.
Mochtar Lubis waited initially in a military prison for four months and
then, from 15 February 1966, in a laxly guarded detention house in Jalan
Keagungan in the Kota area of Jakarta till his release on 17 May.

International Experience and Cold War Politics

Since Independence, Mochtar Lubis had associated freely with
Western, particularly American, diplomatic staff, journalists and
residents of Jakarta. He was one of the closest Indonesian journalists to
the Americans.[146] The impact he had upon them is reflected in their
writings through the 1950s and 1960s. For example, Willard A. Hanna, US
Information Service head and cultural attache in the late 1940s and later
prolific writer for the American Universities Field Staff, wrote on
several occasions in glowing terms about Mochtar Lubis, whom he regarded,
in 1956, as

"one of the leading young journalists and literary figures in
Indonesia. He commands a widespread readership and as
widespread an admiration for his literary and his
journalistic style, his forthright expression of reasoned

146. In the opinion of a former Indonesia Raya journalist from the 1950s,
Informant C (1981). Other companions mentioned his close personal
friendships with US Embassy staff (e.g. Interview with Hazil Tanzil,
22/1/81). One of Mochtar's early short stories describes the
narrator's friendships with Western journalists in Jakarta, as they
sit around in hotel lobbies, swapping stories and drinking together.
See "Sarah Yvonne Dew &[sic] macam-macam yang lain" [S Y D & all
kinds of others], Mutiara, 7, II, 1/5/50, pp.8-9 & 24-25. See also
his story "Perempuan" [Woman], [reprinted in H.B. Jassin (ed.)
in a journalists' club in Tokyo.
political opinion, and his long-time record of patriotic activities in the Indonesian revolution."[147]

Even though local journalists regarded Indonesia Raya as pro-Siliwangi, Hanna preferred to describe it as Indonesia's "leading independent daily" paper.[148] In 1959, he reported expansively, that "to a very great extent...the zest and the flamboyance have gone out of the Indonesian newspaper world since the inadvertent withdrawal of Mochtar Lubis."[149] Hanna had earlier assisted Mochtar in compiling Pers dan Wartawan, one of several handbooks he produced with material largely culled from English-language publications.[150] Edward C. Smith, a former US Air Force officer who served with the diplomatic corps in Indonesia in 1957-58, wrote a dissertation on the suppression of the Indonesian press (1949-1965) in which, of all journalists and newspapers of the period, he gave greatest attention to Mochtar Lubis, Indonesia Raya and the English daily Mochtar founded, The Times of Indonesia.[151] Similarly, Robert H. Crawford, in his study of the Jakarta press, highlighted Mochtar Lubis and Indonesia Raya as "outstanding" among those "journalists and

147. Hanna (1956a) [WAH-9-'56], p.8.


150. In Pers dan Wartawan 1952:6 Mochtar Lubis thanks 'Dr W.O. Hanna'. Hanna was later associated with Mochtar, as an individual donor to the Obor Foundation (to be discussed in Chapter 5). Other handbooks were Teknik Mengarang [Writing Techniques] (edited by Mochtar Lubis), Balai Pustaka, Jakarta [1949 1st ed.] (5th ed. Kurnia Esa, Jakarta 1981) and Teknik Mengarang Scenario Pilem [Writing Techniques for Film Scenarios], Balai Pustaka, Jakarta, 1953.

151. The thesis, Smith 1969, was translated into Indonesian in 1983. In reviewing the translation, the senior journalist Mohammad Said, wrote "Smith admires Mochtar Lubis and it could be said Mochtar Lubis has become his 'hero'... [Like] Smith, many politicians from America and other Western capitalist countries spurred on their 'hero' Mochtar for particular purposes."("Sejarah Pembreidelan Pers di Indonesia", Harian Waspada (Medan), 20 May 1983).
newspapers with great courage and sense of responsibility" during the constitutional democracy period.[152]

During the early post-war period Mochtar travelled extensively overseas, to the degree that surprised many observers, including Willard Hanna, who described him as "an early Indonesian John Gunther".[153] In 1950 he made two trips abroad. In April, he visited various Southeast Asian capitals with Adam Malik, to cement closer relations between ANTARA and other national news agencies,[154] and in September he went to Korea, via Japan, as a war correspondent.[155] Three months of 1951 were spent in America.[156] In May 1952 he attended an IPI conference in Paris, with colleagues Suardi Tasrif and Rosihan Anwar, returning home via Rome and Cairo.[157] In 1953 he joined an Indonesian 'Goodwill Mission' to Burma led by Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX. He participated in an Asian Socialists Conference in Rangoon. In May the following year, he went to another IPI conference, with Tasrif and B.M. Diah, exploring Western Europe. That year also he was invited by the US Government to return to New York in

152. Robert H. Crawford (1967) The Daily Indonesian Language Press of Jakarta: Analysis of Two Recent Critical Periods, PhD, Syracuse University, University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, p.139.


154. The trip, for a little over a month, is described in Perkenalan ke Asia Tenggara [Introduction to Southeast Asia], Gapura, Jakarta, 1951. Chambert-Loir (1974:31 & 34-6) provides details of this, and Mochtar Lubis's subsequent trips abroad, summarised here.

155. Described in Catatan Korea [Korean Notes], Balai Pustaka, Jakarta, 1951. Of this and the next trip, I shall say more later.

156. See Perlawatan ke Amerika Serikat [Journey to the United States of America], Gapura, Jakarta, 1952.

October, from where he continued to Mexico and back to Western Europe. [158]

In February 1955 he returned to Rangoon for a conference organised jointly by the Congress for Cultural Freedom and the [Burmese] Society for the Extension of Democratic Ideals [159] and, later in the year, he visited Australia with a Goodwill Mission led by Mohamad Roem. In April 1956 he was in Tokyo for an IPI conference which he followed, in September, with another IPI meeting in Zurich for Dutch and Indonesian journalists.

He always saw his role as editor as requiring him to devote attention to international affairs and he was actively interested in the major issues of global ideological conflict. His *Indonesia Raya* articles and various books illuminate his views on the people and politics of the countries he traversed. Two trips abroad, early in his career, exemplify this.

In September 1950 Mochtar Lubis began a tour, as a United Nations War Correspondent, covering the Korean War. [160] His published reports, for which he won a PWI [Indonesian Journalists' Association] award,


159. The conference report was published as *Cultural Freedom in Asia*, CCF & Charles E. Tuttle Co, Rutland, Vermont & Tokyo, Japan [1955].

160. Officially a UN correspondent, he was given accreditation by General MacArthur, and provided with a US military officer's uniform to wear (Catatan Korea 1951:13 & 15). He spent about two weeks in Korea, and described his reactions to the combat in "Wartawan Perang" [War Correspondent] (pp.34-36) *Buku Kenang-Kenangan Dua Tahun Usia Reporters Club* [Reporters' Club Second Anniversary Commemorative Volume] [1952], [no pub.] Jakarta.
accorded with the Hatta enunciation of "non-alignment through an active and independent foreign policy".[161] In February 1948, Sjahrrir had sown "the seeds of post-independence foreign policy, namely a commitment to non-alignment", in a speech before the KNIP (Central Indonesian National Committee), the provisional parliament.[162] On 2 September 1948, Hatta in a declaration before the KNIP, advocated that Indonesia "row between the two rocks" of Russia on the one hand, and America on the other.[163] Hatta was, in practice, far more amenable to cooperation with the Americans, but kept significant aspects of his diplomatic dealings with the US secret, to avoid a domestic backlash from the left. His attitude to the Soviet Union was much more circumspect.[164] As Prime Minister till August 1950, Hatta also held the foreign affairs portfolio, and had adopted a neutral position over "the so-called civil war in Korea", which he declared to be really a matter for the two Cold War powers.[165] This 'independent and active' foreign policy was enthusiastically endorsed by the PNI and Sukarno at that time.

Mochtar Lubis reported that the Korean conflict was not really between Koreans, who were the victims of foreign powers skirmishing. Whoever 'wins', the Koreans are the losers. He pointed to the lesson for Indonesia:

"if we once allow our national unity to be torn apart by ideologies and influences from overseas, then the door is


163. Leifer 1983:20. Hatta's speech was later published as *Mendayung Antara Dua Karang* [Rowing between two rocks], Department of Information, Jakarta, 1951.


cast open which leads to great disaster for our nation and our country."[166]

He noted that America continued to make the fatal error of supporting "reactionary powers in Asia" against the best interests of the Asian people.[167] Mochtar depicted the South Korean regime of Syngman Rhee as unpopular, surviving only because of "support from the United States of America and because of the prestige obtained by UN recognition" (pp.53 & 79-87). North Korean leader Kim Il Sung, whom Mochtar regarded as a patriot for his fight against the Japanese, "can point out how Rhee is merely an American puppet, a national traitor" (p.82). For Mochtar, Kim's invasion of the South on 25 June 1950 was a legitimate attempt to unify the country. In his despatches Mochtar implied that Korea had the right to determine its own political future. The North Korean regime, though not depicted uncritically, is shown in less harsh light that the South Korean one.

Soon after his observations of US military involvement in Korea, Mochtar had an opportunity to spend more than three months in America. On 31 May 1951 he arrived in New York for the first of many visits to America. He said he wanted to evaluate the "American way of life" rather than to analyse a political system. For him, individuals, rather than a political system, provided the key to understanding America. His impression is generally favourable, although he is struck by the racism and pollution, alongside opulence, extravagance and waste.

The American people impressed him greatly. He found them friendly, helpful, fair-minded, hard-working, efficient achievers. He praised the


167. He mentions specifically US decisions in Indo-China and Formosa. (Catatan Korea 1951:75).
achievements of the Tennessee Valley Authority in improving the living standards of participating farmers; the Ford Motor Company for providing facilities and a high living standard for workers; and the trade unions for their organisational achievements and discipline. Throughout his journey he was met and assisted by representatives of the Indonesian and American administrations and leading professional figures, who opened their homes and their offices to him, providing him with help in negotiating his way through the maze of American cities and towns.

He wanted to understand America through its citizens, not statistics and he avidly sought their opinions.[168] His Americans did not want to interfere in other countries, nor did they want war, for it meant higher taxes. They were tired of paying to help developing nations, but desperately wanted to rid the world of communism. He noted, without any hint of criticism, that much of America's prosperity was due to the gearing of its economy to the production of war materials. As he interpreted it

"[the] principle adhered to now by the United States government is to continue with the mobilisation of war industries, without disturbing the people's economy. Up to now, this policy is still succeeding." (p.110)

Mochtar explained the US government's view of the world political situation on its own terms. Russia was a threat, and the US was arming to defend itself. The goal was to be suitably armed by 1953, for then Russia would not dare to initiate hostilities (p.101). He disliked the way foreigners branded the Americans as a "capitalist, materialistic, and lately imperialistic nation [and] I myself do not believe in attaching these labels" because they limit deeper understanding (p.99).

The Indonesian criticised America's anti-communist mentality and the way that was fostered by the government (p.106). Commenting on Senator McCarthy's attempts to hunt out communists, he saw no communist threat in America. The standard of living was too high for people to want to change the social or economic situation (p.107). Observing American politics, he noted that the politicians were usually linked with big business, and were in politics for personal gain (p.105). He was slightly bemused by the fact that parties were based less on ideological platforms than personalities, partly due to a constitution which vested great personal power in the president, who, in turn, appealed directly to the voters.

Mochtar Lubis asked many people about "The American Way Of Life" (p.73). For the dinner guests of a former Congressman, it meant "the freedom which we now enjoy. We are free to come and go as we please, without having to carry any kind of identification paper, and the police or the military have no right to interrogate us. We have the liberty to live wherever we like, to select the work which we enjoy. Freedom to state our opinions. Our letters are not censored. People are free to choose their religion. Free to criticise our government. People are not punished before their crime has been proved." (p.74)

Negroes, Mochtar noted, do not share in all these freedoms, but they are much better off materially than millions destitute in Asia (p.80).

A student added that America also meant "cars, refrigerators, all kinds of electrical goods, beautiful legs, cinema, television, radio, Hollywood, Broadway, burlesque (young women dancing half naked [Mochtar explained!]), bandits and all kinds of other things." (p.75)

Although Mochtar was sceptical about many of the claims made for the American way of life, it is clear that he enjoyed America greatly. His admiration for American efficiency, openness, individual freedom, discipline and hard work shine through his book.
In February 1952, back in Jakarta, Mochtar followed the lead of an Abadi scoop, exposing a re-negotiation of the terms of US-Indonesian relations, in accordance with America's Mutual Security Act (MSA) of 1951.[169] This new act required an adjustment in the terms and conditions of American economic and military aid to foreign countries, binding an aid-recipient country such as Indonesia to, among other conditions,

"[make] a full contribution, consistent with its political and economic capacity, its population, natural resources, facilities and general economic situation, to the development and maintenance of its own defenses and to the defensive strength of the free world".[170]

Indonesian Foreign Minister Subardjo wrote to US Ambassador Merle Cochran on 5 January 1952 accepting the terms of the act. This was before any cabinet debate, unbeknown to the chiefs of the armed forces, and month before the existence of the agreement became public knowledge.

This connivance with the Americans, and the fact that the cabinet was not privy to such important negotiations, was chastised by many sections of the Indonesian press, including Indonesia Raya. The exposure of the agreement, with the subsequent public outcry and political jockeying, resulted in the fall of the Sukiman (Masyumi) Cabinet.[171] Public opinion disapproved of the covert manner in which the agreement was negotiated and there was suspicion America was attempting to draw Indonesia too tightly into its strategic embrace. America had made efforts in Indonesia's brief independent history to pressure the young nation into bowing to its policies. In May 1951 the US State Department

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171. This account of events is based on Feith 1962:198-205.
had balked at a statement by Foreign Minister Subardjo that Indonesia 
"would sell [rubber] to the devil if this would serve the people's 
interests", because the Americans interpreted this as tantamount to 
admitting that Indonesia would sell rubber, a strategic material, to the 
People's Republic of China, contravening a US-sponsored trade embargo on 
such items.[172] The State Department notified the Indonesian Embassy in 
Washington that the sale of such material to China would mean that 
"Indonesia has moved away from its independent policy and will be 
considered by the United States to have chosen the Soviet bloc".[173] 
Indonesia Raya's opposition to the MSA agreement indicated Mochtar 
Lubis's desire that Indonesia should be true to its professions of an 
independent, non-aligned foreign policy, and should maintain a healthy 
distance from American geo-political intentions in Southeast Asia.

In subsequent years, domestic political changes within Indonesia led 
Mochtar Lubis to take more unambiguously pro-American positions. In the 
years after 1953 the Indonesian communist movement grew and President 
Sukarno and the powerful PNI moved to positions of cooperation with it. 
Also PNI-led cabinets drew closer to China and the USSR which indicated 
williness to support Indonesia's 'national claim', and Sukarno's 
personal crusade, for West Irian. The Ali Sastroamijoyo cabinet had 
appointed Indonesia's first ambassador to China in October 1953, and in 
March 1954 the Russians opened an embassy in Jakarta.[174] The anti-
Sukarno groups around the Masyumi and Socialist parties correspondingly 
moved to a position of active cooperation with the USA.

174. For a discussion of Indonesia's relations with China during this 
period, see David Mosingo (1976) Chinese Policy toward Indonesia, 
One important aspect of Mochtar Lubis's role in the 1950s was his participation in organisations such as the IPI. These international, but Western-oriented, organisations, steeped in the attitudes of the Cold War, helped to shape his view of the outside world and gave him a heightened sense of confidence about the roles he was playing in Indonesia. Mochtar's participation since 1951 in the IPI made him well known in that international community. Young and confident, Mochtar dealt comfortably with Westerners on their own terms in such situations. In 1954, for example, during a press seminar in Zurich, he responded angrily to Dutch participants' claims that the press in Indonesia was still undeveloped. His nationalist pride offended, he thumped the table, and demanded that the Dutch withdraw their comments! [175] But Mochtar also made numerous friends at these overseas gatherings, to the degree that even close comrades in Indonesia thought he was closer in outlook to IPI colleagues than to his Indonesian friends. [176] When he was detained, the IPI actively lobbied for his release, as did the Congress for Cultural Freedom, the writers' organisation PEN International, and Amnesty International (which began publicising his detention in October 1961 and formally adopted him as a 'prisoner of conscience' in 1964). [177]

In its international reports *Indonesia Raya* gave wide, and generally positive, coverage to events in Western countries. Criticisms were specific, presented amidst a wide variety of information, showing the paper's broad interest in developments in the West. Foreign material used

175. The incident was recalled by Suardi Tasrif who was present (interview 23/1/81).

176. Confidential interview with Informant D, who has known Mochtar well since the late 1940s, 1981.

177. *Amnesty newsletter*, [London], No. 8, 4 October 1961. Mochtar was the first Indonesian whose case was raised by Amnesty, which had only been established in May 1961. (My thanks to Clare Wositzky for information on Amnesty's involvement.)
in *Indonesia Raya* was generally from Western sources, in accordance with the orientation of the paper. The entertainment sections, for example, featured Hollywood reports, American-sourced popular science articles or human interest stories. Reports about activities in Communist countries were frequently presented in negative terms. International communist events were often linked to the domestic communist party in such a way as to present the Indonesian party as an agent of an international movement. During the de-Stalinisation period in Russia in the 1950s, PKI leader Aidit was ridiculed for his former support for Stalin and his subsequent condemnation of the dead leader. He was particularly lampooned in Sam Soeharto's cartoons. In one, Khrushchev is smashing a large statue of Stalin, and Aidit is shown being hit by Stalin's boot as it crashes down from the shattering statue.[178] 'Mas Kluur' commonly referred to Indonesian communists with the mockingly Russian-sounding term "kamaradski".

Domestically, *Indonesia Raya* gave space to anti-communist pronouncements by public figures, but reported PKI statements with editorial interpretation and unfavourable comment. Within months of the PKI success in the 1955 elections, *Indonesia Raya* ran a front page headline "If The PKI Comes To Power Individual Basic Rights And Democracy Will Vanish; The PKI Is Not Nationalist But Dictatorial". The article detailed a speech in Palembang by M. Natsir, the General Chairperson of the Masyumi, warning the people against communism.[179] In a follow-up editorial that moved from a discussion of the world communist movement to

178. See *Indonesia Raya*, 30/6/56, p.1. Months later, when Sam Soeharto was questioned by authorities over another cartoon, deemed offensive, he declared that Mochtuar Lubis had put the idea to him, which Mochtuar acknowledged. This suggests Mochtuar's influence, even over cartoons, was strong.

179. *Indonesia Raya*, 13/12/55, p.1.
the domestic party, the paper warned against the PKI claim that it was taking the parliamentary road to communism. Irrespective of the road taken, the PKI would bring in a communist dictatorship, and wipe out "kemerdekaan" [freedom] and "kerakyatan" [the people's spirit] in Indonesia, the editorialist argued.[180]

As the paper became more overtly anti-communist it attracted to its band of regular feature writers anti-communist activists like the essayist Wiratmo Soekito, who wrote the cultural column, and H. Firdaus A.N., who compiled the Religious Column.[181] From September 1956, Firdaus wrote over the by-line 'Secretary-General of the Anti-Communist Front'.[182] The following year he represented Indonesia at the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League conference in Saigon[183] and on 26 June 1961 he was arrested for "insulting President Sukarno" in a publication about the Hartini marriage.[184]

On few matters did Indonesia Raya mingle news and editorial opinion as freely as on ones to do with communism and it is in this that the claim to be 'professional' and unbiased was especially hollow. An example of this is the coverage given to a difference of opinion between PKI


181. Firdaus, whose first article was an Islamic legal view of Sukarno's marriage to Hartini, sometimes published under the pseudonym Muchlis. See Firdaus A.N. (1967) Dari Penjara ke Meja Hijau, Pustaka Nida, Jakarta, p.59.

182. Indonesia Raya, 18/9/56.

183. The domestic Front Anti-Komunis [Anti-Communist Front] later changed its name to the Liga Anti Komunis Rakyat Indonesia [Indonesian People's Anti-Communist League], an obvious reference to the wider Asian Body. Firdaus 1967:94.

184. Riwayat dan Analisa Perkawinan Soekarno-Hartini was published under his pseudonym in 1955. Firdaus 1967 is his account of his detention and trial (see pp.79-80). In 1964 he was sentenced to a token six months jail, minus previous detention (Firdaus 1967:153).
leaders Aidit and Alimin, in July 1956 regarding the first tenet of the Pancasila. Under a headline, "Aidit dishonest", the article highlights Alimin's criticism of Aidit's statements on the PKI's attitude to Belief in God. The journalist does not report simply what Alimin said against the background of Aidit's comments, but includes unsubstantiated accusations against the PKI in a distinctly partisan style.[185]

Conclusion

In the early 1950s Mochtar Lubis was widely seen as a promising maverick within the newspaper industry, bringing artistic and intellectual credentials to his position as a daily newspaper editor. His award-winning Korean despatches in 1950 launched his reputation as a journalist of national, and soon international, standing. As early as 1951 he was described in the local press as "of international stature".[186] His frequent trips abroad added sophistication to a man who only ten years previously had been a provincial school teacher.

In general, editors who shared Mochtar Lubis's ideological values admired him, although this did not prevent them from being critical from time to time, particularly of his tactics of challenging the government head-on, which they felt were counter-productive, only causing an indiscriminate crack-down on the press, much to their disadvantage.[187] Yet for many, Mochtar came to personify an admirably direct, outspoken style of journalism. He was a sharp-tongued skilful polemicist with whom

187. Interview with a former editor and friend of Mochtar Lubis, Informant E, 1981.
few chose to tangle.[188] His style was bold, sometimes barbed, and he was not likely to back down once he had taken a stand.

Even ideological opponents had respect for his preparedness to take responsibility for his statements. But many of his friendly critics from newspapers of broadly similar ideological persuasion, as well as his opponents, described him as nekad (reckless, rash), seeing his criticisms of the authorities as 'shallow' or poorly thought out. His moralism and penchant for heroic action, was seen, too often, to outrun his political judgment. Rosihan Anwar, in the IPI debate (see page 100), alluded to Mochtar's tactics as those of one out of touch, "a Don Quixote at best".[189] Some of these colleagues felt that he acted with this flair because he was an individualist, with a demanding ego, who enjoyed the limelight.[190] Surprised that Mochtar did not show more restraint after his release from house arrest in April 1961, Rosihan Anwar commented "Mochtar does not have such 'wisdom'. He wants to be a perpetual hero."[191]

Mochtar Lubis saw himself as a crusading journalist, a champion of the non-party, independent press; Indonesia Raya had declared that it was "not tied to party standpoints or those of a particular group [and] stands apart from all political parties or political streams" (see page 58). But as Marbangun, the head of the Public Opinion and Press

188. According to a political opponent of Mochtar Lubis, even skilled journalistic polemicists such as B.M. Diah were loath to lock horns with Mochtar. (Interview with Informant A, 1982.)


190. These comments were made in a discussion with former editors of rival papers (Informants N and O) in 1981.

Institute, noted, in Indonesia in the 1950s there was really no such thing as an independent, non-party press since all newspapers had links, sometimes material (through secret subsidies for example), sometimes moral (through personal, family relations or ideological sympathies), with either political parties or specific interest groups.[192] Because of these influences, no paper was truly non-partisan. Indonesia Raya was certainly not.

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CHAPTER FOUR

THE 'GOLDEN BOY OF THE NEW ORDER':

THE SECOND INDONESIA RAYA AND THE YEARS BEYOND (1966-82)

The political turbulence which seeped into all aspects of life in Jakarta during the heady months after 1 October 1965 brought a new excitement into the lives of Mochtar Lubis and his fellow political prisoners. On 15 February 1966 Mochtar and about 20 others were moved from the Jakarta Military Detention Centre (RTM) to a safe house in Jalan Keagungnan, in the Kota area of Jakarta. Once there visitors kept them informed on the rapid flow of events in the capital. Held in relaxed conditions, detainees could use an occasionally unguarded rear exit to slip away briefly into the surrounding kampungs or to observe demonstrations in the city.[1]

The internees greeted the news of Sukarno's transfer of authority to General Suharto on 11 March, and the subsequent banning of the PKI, with gusto.[2] A month later, Sjahrr's death, while in Zurich for medical treatment, was a sad blow. When permitted to pay last respects with a visit to Sjahrr's family on the day of his funeral on 19 April, Mochtar was interviewed by foreign and local press. The prisoners were greeted with fanfare by activists from KAMI and KAPPI (the university and high school students' Action Fronts) as they drove through the streets.[3]

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3. On the founding of KAMI and the events of the months after October 1965, see Crouch 1978:135-220, especially, pp.165-6 & 184-5, and Donald Hindley (1970) "Alirans and the Fall of the Old Order", Indonesia (Cornell), No. 9, April, pp.23-66, especially, p.45. KAMI had been officially banned in February, but it continued to operate, subsumed within a new body, the Laskar Arief Rahman Hakim [A.R.H.
From about April, young student leaders began to call on Mochtar and his associates to discuss what was widely perceived as a confused and confusing political situation. Those sections of the Armed Forces (particularly the Air Force) sympathetic to the PKI had been largely out-maneouvred by the end of 1965. Sukarno's economic and foreign policies were being changed by the new army-dominated government after 11 March. Militantly anti-Sukarnoist generals began to push for the President's removal. The Suharto group wanted to neutralise pro-Sukarnoists in the military and the political parties without triggering violent countermoves.[4]

The students who visited Jalan Keagungan sought inspirational heroes in their crusade to oust the President. In the officer corps, they found them in militant anti-Sukarnoists, like Brigadier General Kemal Idris, a former Siliwangi officer then chief of staff of Kostrad [Army Strategic Reserve Command], Colonel Sarwo Edhie, commanding the RPKAD [Army Para-commando Regiment], and former Siliwangi commander Major General Hartono Rekso Dharsono.[5] Among civilians, student leaders, such as the brothers Soe Hok Gie and Arief Budiman,[6] were attracted to Mochtar Lubis for his outspokenness, his principle and his unshakable opposition to Sukarno. But Mochtar's diary recorded his reluctance to accept the heroic mantle, conscious that the students would inevitably be disillusioned by their heroes.[7]

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Militia], and in concert with KAPPI. In his diary, Mochtar continued to use the term 'KAMI'. His second son was in KAPPI.

6. The latter was then still known by the name Soe Hok Djin.
The detainees believed their release was imminent, but nonetheless dependent upon Suharto, and the shifting fortunes of their anti-Sukarnoist compatriots. Foreign policy considerations were important for a government looking for Western economic help. During April and May, overtures to end confrontation with Malaysia, with Adam Malik leaving for negotiations in late May, were a tangible sign of foreign policy re-orientation. The release of the long-serving anti-Communist detainees was a further demonstration of change in the same direction.[8] Mochtar Lubis was released (into 'town arrest') on 17 May 1966. His obligation to report every Monday to the Attorney-General's Department,[9] was interpreted laxly.

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Return to Public Life

Mochtar Lubis began enthusiastically catching up on news and international developments, meeting with friends, such as Kemal Idris and Adam Malik, and receiving scores of well-wishers. A sought-after public speaker, he was invited to the University of Indonesia and to Bandung to address students. Mochtar was embraced by the anti-Sukarno radicals of Jakarta and Bandung, the two cities at the cutting edge of the movement. His association with PSI-oriented officers in the Siliwangi Division traced back to the mid-1940s, and PSI-leaning student groups in Bandung and Jakarta provided an obvious constituency.

Among the activists drawn to Mochtar were a group who had been involved in an underground anti-Sukarno movement, Gerakan Pembaharuan

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Indonesia [The Movement for the Renewal of Indonesia, GPI], established in 1961 by one-time PSI leader and later PRRI leader, Prof. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, then in exile.[10] As the PSI community polarised over tactics of opposition to Sukarno, the GPI followed Sumitro's outright resistance rather than the softer Soedjatmoko line of partial acceptance while gradually countering from within. When underground, the organisation had an elaborate cell structure, linked to the Mobile Headquarters which re-located variously in Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Hong Kong, Zurich and London (depending primarily on where Sumitro was).[11] GPI members tended to be pro-PRRI/Permesta, under 30 years old, with disproportionate numbers of Menadonese and other non-Javanese. More than half of the membership, were estimated by one participant, to have had PSI sympathies, although they were disillusioned with the PSI leaders that had accepted the party ban in August 1960.[12]

The cell structure and use of personal code names kept members' identities secret, even from others in the network. Very few members have been publicly identified. One was Soe Hok Gie, who was among the first student leaders to contact Mochtar Lubis in jail. He was in one of five GPI cells in Jakarta, and had been charged with 'penetration and infiltration' of intellectual circles.[13] Later, after Sumitro's return in mid-1967, Mochtar took a leading part in the group's activities.[14]

10. I thank John Maxwell for bringing the GPI to my attention.


12. Interview with Jopie Lasut, 23/8/82


14. Organisationally, the GPI disbanded some time after Sumitro entered cabinet in June 1968. Till at least December 1969, Mochtar continued to mediate informally between Sumitro and young members of the group like Soe Hok Gie, who were disappointed with Sumitro's leadership.
But Mochtar's connections with the anti-Sukarno movement extended far beyond this small network.

In addition to occasional contributions to cautious prestige papers, such as the Catholic Kompas [Compass] and the Protestant Sinar Harapan [Ray of Hope], Mochtar was closely associated with two student-oriented publications which began to appear in June 1966: the Bandung edition of Mahasiswa Indonesia [Indonesian Student] and Jakarta's Harian KAMI [KAMI Daily].[15] The Bandung students, and their weekly, Mahasiswa Indonesia, had a more radical reputation than their capital city KAMI compatriots who published Harian KAMI daily.[16]

When Mahasiswa Indonesia published its first edition in Bandung on 19 June, Mochtar Lubis's name stood out in the list of KAMI student radicals, such as Rahman Tolleng (the main organiser behind the paper), Soe Hok Gie and Yozar Anwar (Rosihan Anwar's brother), who made up the editorial staff. He was not particularly active but provided moral support and contributed occasional articles until at least November 1970. Most influential in the paper were former members or sympathisers of

(Soe Hok Gie 1983:444, entry dated 2 December 1969. In the published version, capital letters replace the manuscript's personal names. 'D' is Mochtar Lubis; 'S' is Sumitro.)


Gemsos [Gerakan Mahasiswa Sosialis, Socialist Students' Movement], a small group officially non-aligned, but in practice regarded as a PSI satellite.[17] Rahman Tolleng had been a Gemsos member and a GPI sympathiser, and Mahasiswa Indonesia was the mouthpiece of the "Bandung radicals" around him, linked with Dharsono and Kemal Idris. These civilian and Siliwangi radicals acted as pacemakers pressuring Suharto for 'de-Sukarnoisation'. For example, during the June 1966 session of the MPRS, the paramount Provisional People's Consultative Assembly, Mahasiswa Indonesia disapproved of Suharto's moderate line, and wanted Sukarno tried.[18]

Mochtar Lubis was a member of this group of 'civilian radicals' keen to force the pace of political change. As he later explained, when, within two months of his release, student activists inquired about his interest in the position of Minister of Information (an overture he believed to emanate from someone close to the President), he recommended instead that the entire Information Department be dismantled as part of government re-structuring.[19] He warmly greeted the recommendations of an Army Staff and Command College (SESKOAD) seminar in Bandung in August 1966, to "build a new order and wipe out the old order entirely".[20] Neither Mochtar nor the army showed enthusiasm for general elections, then scheduled for July 1968, or for the old political parties. Mochtar applauded the seminar's proposals for extensive reform of the party and electoral systems. He supported the proposed 'district system', or system

19. Interview with Mochtar Lubis 12/1/82. The position was subsequently filled by B.M. Diah on 25 July 1966.
20. Mochtar Lubis, "PKI Musuh Utama Orde Baru", Harian KAMI, 3/9/66, from where material in this paragraph is primarily drawn.
of single-member constituencies, whereby electors could vote, not for a party which had determined its list of candidates for each province, but for their preferred individual candidate, who would be directly responsible to the local community.[21] He endorsed the seminar's call for a "new national leadership" to end "dualism in leadership" (an allusion to the uncertain balance between Sukarno and Suharto). He was impatient that change was only coming with "the pace of a horse-cart"! For him, "the faster, the better."

He expressed such sentiments throughout 1966-68, when he contributed to Harian KAMI. His occasional column, "Now and Tomorrow", ranged from his reflections about current and past politics, to reports of his domestic and overseas trips. The staffers of the paper, including Nono Anwar Makarim, Fikri Jufri and Goenawan Mohamad, who were to become leading journalists, had greatly respected Mochtar. When, in September 1966 while he still technically under 'town arrest', he was refused permission to travel to Manila to receive the 1958 Magsaysay Award, Harian KAMI journalists joined other members of KAMI, artists and human rights activists to protest publicly.[22] However, some of Mochtar Lubis's young admirers were disappointed with the lack of fire in his articles.[23]

The trials in September and October sentencing to death Sukarno's former senior ministers, Jusuf Muda Dalam and Subandrio, for subversion and complicity in the coup attempt, raised the political temperature. Suharto had been moving to replace key Sukarno supporters within the army since March, but he was keen to avoid exacerbating the alarm felt by

21. See also Crouch 1978:249.
opponents, in the Armed Forces or the political parties like the PNI, by being seen to favour anti-Sukarno militants. In that climate, Mochtar had to wait till November for travel restrictions to be dropped. After receiving the Magsaysay Award in Manila, he went, via Tokyo, to the IPI General Assembly in New Delhi, before visiting Europe.[24]

In March 1967, a special session of the MPRS appointed Suharto Acting President and temporarily banned Sukarno from political activity.[25] Suharto and his group increased manoeuvres to excise pro-Sukarno elements from the army, using 'New Order radicals', like Dharsono and Kemal Idris.[26]

By November 1967, in a move designed to weaken the hold of established parties, an 'Independent Group' of non-party civilian intellectuals keen to work with the military, had coalesced around Dr Umar Kayam, author, academic and Director-General of Radio and Television.[27] Mochtar Lubis was associated with Umar Kayam in various projects, such as the literary magazine, Horison. He felt the idea of the non-aligned intellectual group had merit, and was eager that a military-civilian partnership purge the government of what he had earlier called old 'mental attitudes'.[28] The Independent Group, which included other colleagues of Mochtar, like the PSI intellectual Soedjatmoko, human


26. The Suharto group's moves to consolidate power are analysed in Herbert Feith (1968) "Suharto's Search for a Political Format", Indonesia (Cornell), No. 6, October, pp.88-105, particularly pp.94-5.


rights lawyer, Adnan Buyung Nasution, and psychologist Fuad Hassan, was strongly promoted by army militants like Dharsono.

After removing Sukarnoist opponents in the military and the political parties, the Suharto group extended its crack-downs, prior to the March 1968 MPRS session, to student radicals pressing Suharto for greater reforms, such as the purging of corrupt officers from the government. The army firmly suppressed civilian protests, and the MPRS confirmed Suharto as full President. The June 1968 cabinet confirmed the important role of Professor Widjojo Nitisastro and other American-trained economists, later dubbed the 'Berkeley Mafia', who had been Suharto's key advisers on economic policy since 1966. Included as Minister of Trade was Mochtar Lubis's business associate, the former PRRI leader Professor Sumitro Djojohadikusumo.[29]

Prior to Mochtar's release, he had accepted as inevitable at least ten years of military rule, since "there is, indeed, no other leadership".[30] During the first two years of the New Order, which he described later as the only period of "real democracy",

"I gave full support to Suharto's government... I accepted the statements of intent of these people for our nation so I supported them because they [said] they want to correct all the mistakes, the fatal mistakes under Sukarno. They want to develop democracy in Indonesia... build welfare for the people, ... social justice and political justice."[31]

Mochtar was an enthusiastic believer in the espoused goals of the Suharto group to institute a manageable political system freed from leftist agitation, to remove Sukarno and run a less heavily regulated economy.

31. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 13/1/81.
under the guidance of Western-trained economists, respected by the International Monetary Fund.[32]

Mochtar Lubis staunchly supported the Dharsono plan for a two party system based on mandates from local electorates.[33] When Dharsono and his military colleagues tried to implement a variant of their preferred two-party electoral system within West Java's local assemblies early in 1969, Suharto moved to crush the militants' challenge to his authority by shifting Kemal Idris to Makassar in February, then appointing Dharsono ambassador to Thailand. Having purged the New Order militants, as Crouch states, the remaining officers upon whom Suharto depended shared his interest in "stabilizing the existing system", and had "little vision of a really 'new order' for Indonesia".[34]

As Suharto moved to neutralise those military officers whom Mochtar trusted, Mochtar revised his attitude to a military government. In March 1969, while at a Press Foundation of Asia seminar in Hong Kong, Mochtar reportedly expressed the hope that, within three years, Indonesia would "organise its government according to the United States of America model, based on parliamentary democracy". Although the Armed Forces still held power, he believed optimistically "they realise that Indonesia has to return to a genuine civilian democratic form of government".[35]

In talking much later about those early years after his release, Mochtar referred to himself jokingly as "the Golden Boy of the New

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34. Crouch 1978:236.

Long out of circulation and lacking a power base, Mochtar was not an important political actor in this period, but his good name overseas was an asset to the emerging 'New Order'. He was a bridging personality, politically untarnished, with impeccable democratic credentials acceptable to the West and admired in intellectual and professional circles in other parts of Asia. To such observers, he appeared a democrat who might temper military influence in government. Suharto was seeking international legitimacy, partly to encourage foreign aid and investment, but also to re-inforce domestic legitimacy. That an internationally well-known anti-Sukarnoist like Mochtar Lubis endorsed the New Order enhanced its image in the eyes of Japan and the Western nations which, in February 1967, had established the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia, to re-schedule Indonesia's overseas debt and provide aid. Civilians like Mochtar Lubis were a reassurance to Western observers of Indonesia who had come to see the Indonesian army, with its reputation for bureaucratic inertia, inefficiency and corruption, as an obstacle to democracy. In this, he was similar to Professor Widjojo Nitisastro and his fellow economists from the University of Indonesia, who became principal architects of the government's economic policies. He symbolised principle, pragmatism and professionalism.

Mochtar Lubis was also the 'golden boy' of the foreign press. In their reporting of the release of the political prisoners, the Western press gave Mochtar coverage equal to, if not greater than, that given to party leaders with large national followings.[37] The IPI trumpeted his release with front page reports and articles about IPI efforts to assist in the re-establishment of Indonesia Raya. He was introduced to the 1966

36. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 24/9/81
37. See Chapter 3.
IPI General Assembly as "IPI's most illustrious member". His home became a frequent port of call for Western journalists.

At a time when Indonesian foreign policy was shifting its "first priority" to "the creation of regional stability and cooperation", symbolised by the establishment of ASEAN in August 1967, Mochtar functioned well as a Southeast Asian intellectual. The month ASEAN was founded, the Press Foundation of Asia, in which Mochtar was very involved, was established in Manila with a pledge to "uphold the legacies of the Asian Programme of IPI". He had good regional connections, through the CCF, with writers, journalists and intellectuals, particularly in the Philippines and Thailand, the two ASEAN states most subject to US influence.

Locating Mochtar Lubis within the shifting politics of 1967-69, highlights his contrasting links with power and influence on government. Many of his closest connections were with New Order militants, such as Dharsono and Kemal Idris, whose early ascendancy was eclipsed by 1969. Yet, he had important friends in the concentric circles radiating out from Suharto's Jalan Cendana residence. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, with whom Mochtar started a business in 1967, was in Cabinet. Adam Malik, Mochtar's former boss in ANTARA, remained one of the most influential civilians of the New Order, chiefly as foreign minister till 1977, and


41. On ASEAN and Indonesian foreign policy, see Leifer 1983:120-29.
subsequently as Vice-President. Mochtar retained a warm relationship with Adam Malik, who assisted when Mochtar re-established Indonesia Raya in October 1968.

The nature of that support remains a mystery. Indonesia Raya balance sheets for 3 January 1969 showed a debt of Rp 500,000 owed to a person identified only by the initials 'A.M.' [42] When questioned in 1981, Mochtar declined to specify who provided the capital, saying only that some were either in, or very close to, government. He told his editorial colleagues simply that the funds were from unnamed "friends". Mochtar's brothers, then established businessmen in the motor car industry, were assumed by some staff to be potential contributors. Some assistance was given by other business colleagues. [43] Evidence of any financial investment is slender. It is, however, known that Adam Malik gave Indonesia Raya ministerial permission to import printing equipment donated by IPI members in the Philippines and Australia, the receipt of which may have contravened regulations prohibiting Indonesian papers from accepting foreign assistance. [44]

42. Various accounts (buku kas) for January 1958 to June 1969 are in the Indonesia Raya offices at Jl. Suprapto. During October to November 1968 and January 1969 monthly debts amounted to approximately Rp. 3 million, entered almost entirely as 'Received from' either 'Pak Mochtar Lubis', 'Pak Mochtar L.', 'Pak. M.L.', or left blank.

43. Soe Hok Gie 1983:350 notes Louis Lasut provided funds to Indonesia Raya. Lasut, who had worked for Sumitro Djojohadikusumo since the early 1950s, was a senior employee of Indoconsult Associates, a business consultancy firm established jointly by Sumitro and Mochtar Lubis. He was also involved in setting up PT Air Murni, with Mochtar and Sumitro's father, Margono Djojohadikusumo, on the board of directors. After Indonesia Raya was banned, Lasut took Mochtar to court to recoup earlier loans [confidential interview with Informant F, 1982].

Before launching a second series of *Indonesia Raya*, Mochtar embarked upon a new career in business to regain financial security after his detention. The economy was regenerating, opening up to foreign capital, encouraged by the generous terms of the 1967 Basic Law on Foreign Investments. Business people with government connections sensed the beginning of a growth period after the stagnation and economic decline of the early 1960s. Foreign entrepreneurs were looking for reliable Indonesian partners with a reputation for honesty and efficiency.[45]

Mochtar Lubis's businesses tended to be associated with foreign companies. In July 1967, he joined with Sumitro Djojohadikusumo to establish a leading business consultancy firm, Indoconsult Associates. In January 1968, he started a Philippine-Indonesian joint venture, PT Sumatra International Timber Company, with American Dr Albert V. Ravenholt.[46] In 1969 with friends, including American David F. Fowler, Mochtar established the air charter company, PT Safari Air, in the hope of gaining American partners.[47] When US cooperation fell through, they joined with a Canberra-based company, Airfast Services Pty. Ltd, to form PT Airfast Services Indonesia.[48] In May 1970, PT Fortune Indonesia Advertising (which had a management agreement with Fortune (Australia)


46. Mochtar and his brother Bachtar represented PT Padma Megah National Trading Company, while Ravenholt and compatriot E.C. Geeslin owned the Philippine-American Timber Company. *Berita Negara R.I. Tambahar Perseroan-Perseroan Terbatas* [hereafter TBN(PT)] 100-1968, dated 16/8/68.)

47. TBN(PT), 229-1971.

48. Mochtar Lubis was on the board of directors of both Safari Air and Airfast. TBN(PT) 229-1971 and 153-1973.
Pty Ltd and thereby tapped into the giant transnational DSF-Dorland-Fortune Advertising consortium) was established with Mochtar as President-Director.[49] While Mochtar hoped such business activities would generate income without placing heavy demands on his time, he was often drawn into time-consuming negotiations when a business got into difficulties.

His timber company got embroiled in a dispute with locals who encroached on the concession. After about four years Mochtar withdrew from the business. Airfast struck problems when a levelling off of the oil boom caused liquidity problems, and consequent tensions between the Australian and Indonesian partners. Mochtar was hard pressed liaising between them. He and Indoconsult were drawn into the periphery of a number of complicated disputes.[50] Fortune Advertising, Mochtar's most successful commercial venture, must have required a considerable time


50. Two notable examples were: (1) the Condong plantation case (see Sinar Harapan, 8/9/69). PT Air Murni of which Mochtar Lubis was a Board member, was in a dispute over the ownership of the Condong plantation. Though legally independent, PT Air Murni shared similar personnel to Indoconsult. Mochtar's position appears to have been made more difficult because PT Condong was financing Indonesia Raya, through input from Louis Lasut, who was involved in both Indoconsult and Air Murni (Soo Hok Gie 1983:350);(2) the Pinder case (see Kompas 29-30/5/75). When brought to court in Singapore in 1975 accused of misappropriating company funds, D.W. Pinder, former Senior Director of the Sime Darby group of companies, claimed that he had used some of that money to pay bribes to obtain the Caterpillar concessions in Indonesia. After Indoconsult's name was mentioned, Mochtar publicly denied any knowledge of the case, stressing that he "did not receive bribes and has never given advice to any party (including Sime Darby) to engage in bribery of Indonesians" (Kompas, 29/5/75).
initially, but demands appear to have eased after Mochtar's second son, trained in TV and film in London, took up an executive position.

Apart from business obligations, Mochtar divided his time between other activities in Indonesia and abroad where he frequently participated in conferences on culture, literature, politics and the press. In 1968, for example, he spent four months on a Jefferson Fellowship at the East-West Center, Honolulu.[51] His trips abroad were often described in articles in Indonesia Raya.[52] Pursuing his long-standing interest in film, he went to Lake Toba, Sumatra, in December 1971, for the filming of his novel, Tanah Gersang [Barren Land].[53] All these commitments proved a considerable distraction from his role as editor of Indonesia Raya.

The New Order and the Press

Within months of 1 October 1965, 46 of Indonesia's 163 papers were banned indefinitely because of their presumed association with, or sympathy for, the PKI and its allies.[54] Many staff were arrested. Leftists in the PWI and ANTARA were expelled. The arrests and purges of


53. Mochtar Lubis co-wrote the scenario, his brother Amzar was managing producer, and the film was produced by Des Alwi's PT Avisarti Corporation. [See SFF (Sport, Fashion, Film), January 1972, No. 4, p. 40.] In 1953, Mochtar had written the story for a film Nelayan [Fisherman], directed by Indonesia's first female director, Ratna Asmara, and produced by a company Mochtar set up with her and Wildan Dja'far. In 1967, his novel Senja di Jakarta [Twilight in Jakarta] was filmed by PT Tuti Mutia Film.

communist and sympathising journalists in 1965-66, carried on against a background of large-scale massacres in the countryside, cast a very long shadow over the press in the following decade.

In 1966, the government granted a large number of the obligatory dual printing and publishing permits[55] to papers such as Harian KAMI and Mahasiswa Indonesia, whose anti-PKI and anti-Sukarno posture supported the army leaders gaining power. Some pro-Sukarno papers survived either because of military allies or by accommodating to the changing circumstances. For example, El Bahar,[56] established by influential protectors in and close to the navy in September 1966, was critical of the Suharto group.[57] But generally, in the words of an Indonesia Raya editor, Enggak Bahau'ddin, the press wanted to be regarded by the government as a "good partner in accelerating development".[58]

The closing months of 1968 saw the re-emergence of several papers associated with the urban intellectual opposition to Sukarno which had

55. Two related permits were required by newspaper publishers: the Permit To Publish [Surat Izin Terbit, SIT] authorised by the ostensibly civil Department of Information, and the Permit To Print [Surat Izin Cetak, SIC] issued by the military security authority, Kopkamtib. In a record for the years 1965-72 at least, in 1966, 502 SIT were issued nationally by the Information Department, compared to 31 in 1965, and 91 in 1967 (Tribuana Said & Moeljanto 1983:110-111).

56. 'El Bahar' could be from the Arabic 'bahr' meaning the sea, a noble or great man (whose knowledge is comparable to the vastness of the sea); or from 'bahhar' meaning sailor, or crew. (My thanks to Rabin Hardjadibrata for advice with this translation.)

57. Edited by Commodore R.S. Pugh (secretary to the Navy and a nephew of Sukarno) and his assistant, Sjamsu Sutjipto (Head of Information of the Navy), it was supported by the Navy, particularly the KKO [marines], who successfully resisted moves by the Suharto group to curb their independence till the end of 1969. Its tone then moderated after Pugh took up an ambassadorship and the editorial board was reorganised. See Crouch 1978:239 and Oey Hong Lee (1974) "Indonesian Freedom of the Press and the 1971 Elections" (pp.23-36) in Oey Hong Lee (ed.) (1974) Indonesia after the 1971 Elections, University of Hull & Oxford University Press, London, particularly, p.26.

been closed in the period 1958-61. It had been an articulate slice of the opposition which found sympathy and support from American and West European liberals, and which had sympathisers amongst New Order "militants" in the officer corps such as Dharsono, Kemal Idris and Sarwo Edhie. Approaches by Mochtar Lubis and others to the Finance Minister, Dr Frans Seda, resulted in Bank Indonesia agreeing to provide loans for the re-opening of certain papers.[59] After delays in getting approval when B.M. Diah was Minister of Information (July 1966 - June 1968), Mochtar Lubis was granted the obligatory publishing permit (SIT) on 24 July 1968 by the incoming Minister, Air Vice-Marshal Boediardjo, and the essential printing permit (SIC) from the Jakarta Kopkamtib commander on 10 August.[60] *Indonesia Raya*, back in the hands of Mochtar Lubis, appeared on 30 October, soon followed by *Pedoman* (29 November) and *Abadi* (7 December) dailies, formerly associated with the (still officially illegal) PSI and Masyumi parties respectively. The government's decision to allow the revival of such papers reflected the influence of groups which argued for the continued need to do battle with Sukarnoism as well as the continuing importance of a liberal image in Western countries.

At the end of 1968, prominent on the Jakarta daily press landscape were six (partially overlapping) newspaper types.[61] *Indonesia Raya*, *Pedoman* (and to some extent, *Abadi*) joined the New Order radical press, whose pace-setters included *Nusantara* [Archipelago], *Harian KAMI* and

59. Mochtar Lubis said *Indonesia Raya* got a substantial loan from Bank Indonesia because the government was keen to assist papers like *Indonesia Raya* (Interview 24/9/81).


other small student papers.[62] Secondly, there were the prestige journals, notably the moderate Protestant Sinar Harapan (1961)[63] and Catholic Kompas (1965), comparable to Kung Po and its successor Pos Indonesia, both banned during Guided Democracy. These Christian papers were politically cautious, with high circulation. Thirdly, the army had two organs: Berita Yudha [Military News] (1965) and Angkatan Bersenjata [Armed Forces] (1965).[64] Fourthly, the radical nationalists had El Bahar[65] and Merdeka (1945); and the PNI flagship, Suluah Indonesia (established 1953, then banned in October 1965), was eventually replaced by a new daily, Suluah Marhaen [Marhaen Torch].[66] Muslim interests were represented by newspapers like Abadi, Jihad [Holy War] and NU's Duta Masyarakat [Society's Ambassador] (which closed in 1969 after virtually continuous publication since 1954).[67] Finally, there were popular-style, 'a-political', 'entertainment' papers.

As an indication of the relative market position of these publications, in June 1970 the big four Jakarta dailies were Merdeka (82,000), Kompas and Berita Yudha (each 75,000), and Sinar Harapan (65,000), ahead of Indonesia Raya (40,000), Angkatan Bersenjata (35,000).

62. Mahasiswa Indonesia, the influential Bandung student weekly, could be group with this cluster. On the student press, see Amir Effendi Siregar 1983.

63. The commencement date of the paper is given in parentheses.

64. Oey 1971:158-9. Suara Karja [Labour Voice], (March 1971) established as the organ of the government political organisation, Golkar, fitted into this category later.


Pedoman (25,000), Suluh Marhaen and Abadi (each 20,000), with others selling less than 20,000.[68]

The Second Series of Indonesia Raya

On its publishing permit, Indonesia Raya was officially "independent" of any political party or group. The first editorial of the revived Indonesia Raya on 30 October 1968 declared that the paper fully supported the Suharto government with its policies of anti-Communism and economic development. Mochtar's editorial stressed the need for national social discipline, responsibility and hard work, a "rational approach to problem solving", a "balanced view of the world", the broadening of sectional loyalties to embrace national goals and a continued campaign against corruption.[69] But qualifying such loyalty to the Suharto government were assertions that the paper would criticise, constructively, when necessary.

To establish the Indonesia Raya of 1968, Mochtar reassembled the leading staff members from 1957: Kustiniyati Mochtar, D.H. Assegaff, Enggak Bahau'ddin, Mohamadnoer, K. Sidharta and Sam Suharto.[70] Atmakusumah, who was working for ANTARA after a stint with Radio Australia in Melbourne in 1961-64, joined some months later. The

68. Atmakusumah 1980:232 cites Kritis Mengupas Suratkabar, Cipta Loka Caraka, Badan Lektur Pembinaan Mental, Jakarta, 1970, pp.69-70. These figures appear to be based on print runs rather than sales, and may be considerably inflated. For example, in-house data on Indonesia Raya's total monthly sales, reduced to a daily average, give the much lower figure of 31,261 for 1970 (Atmakusumah, interview 26/3/81).

69. Indonesia Raya, 30/10/68, p.3.

70. On the re-establishment of Indonesia Raya, its personalities and format, see Chambert-Loir 1974:96-7.
lingering conflict between Mochtar Lubis and Hasjim Mahdan over the ownership of the paper was amicably resolved in September 1968 when it was agreed that Mochtar Lubis become sole publisher.[71]

Now, as before 1956, Mochtar Lubis encouraged a sense of initiative, joint responsibility and commitment amongst his staff, who were drawn by his firm principles, strong personality and popular personal leadership style. He did not play the 'father-figure' (bapak) in his relations with staff. In the office, he addressed everyone equally as either 'Bung' (brother) or simply by name, and asked to be called 'Bung' rather than the more honorific 'Pak' (father).

When he was not abroad, Mochtar Lubis led a weekly policy meeting of senior staff. In the early 1970s, a weekly 'plenary meeting' of all journalistic staff was held in the main editorial room. Such discussions ranged from political rumours and potential stories, to complaints over working conditions.[72] The new Indonesia Raya never challenged the circulation figures of the commercially successful publications such as Merdeka, Kompas, Berita Yudha or Sinar Harapan, and was unable to pay top wages.[73] However, shares in the company were offered to some senior

71. Atmakusumah 1980:228. Legal agreement on 15 October 1970 terminated reciprocal civil actions by Mochtar Lubis and Hasjim Mahdan, initiated after their split in 1958. None of the former directors, Hasjim Mahdan, Sarhindi nor Aminuddin Lubis, were involved in the new paper.

72. Interviews with Atmakusumah 26/3/81, Mochtar Lubis 16/2/81, and other staff.

73. Indonesia Raya's daily sales figures (averaged over a month) were: 22,214 (1969), 31,261 (1970), 26,035 (1971), 23,281 (1972), 19,830 (January - May 1973, prior to moving to off-set printing which raised circulation), 41,000 (January 1974, when the paper was banned). [Source: Atmakusumah interview 26/3/81.] Chambert-Loir 1974:102 notes in 1972, Indonesia Raya ranked eighth amongst Jakarta's twenty odd dailies, behind Kompas (110,000), the Chinese language Harian Indonesia (100,000), Pos Kota, Suara Karya, Sinar Harapan (60,000), Berita Buana (45,000) and Merdeka (30,000) but before Abadi, Harian KAMI, Pedoman and Nusantara. With a peak circulation of 41,000 in

- 140 -
administrative and editorial staff, primarily those from the 1950s. A profit-sharing scheme for other long-standing employees induced staff to accept low wages in return for a sense of involvement in the running of the paper.

The paper was financially weak. Income from advertising was small, reduced even further once government "appeals" for press restraint were backed by pressure on certain departments and agencies to direct advertising away from Indonesia Raya.[74] The company's accounting procedures were imprecise. As one staffer commented later, "honestly, from the business side of things sometimes we did not appear to be particularly serious".[75] In this, and more fundamental ways, Indonesia Raya was unable to adapt to the changing demands of the successful press in the 1970s.

Editorially, too, the post-1968 paper was less successful than its 1950s predecessor. Although a number of its headline-grabbing campaigns captured the public interest, it attracted few new, younger readers. Its style was less critical and zesty, with a penchant for backward-looking historical features. Prior to its re-opening, Goenawan Mohamad, then with Harian KAMI and later editor of the highly successful weekly, Tempo, said "the role of Indonesia Raya has already been taken by Harian KAMI. With several outstanding exposes, with a very courageous attitude to news-coverage, with a militancy and the dynamics of aggressive youth, Harian KAMI is already performing the role of Indonesia Raya ...[ during] Guided Democracy".[76]

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January 1974 prior to banning, it never equalled the 1950s high-water mark of 47,500.

74. For example, about 1973 a senior Garuda Airlines official privately told a friend on the staff that he had been directed to not advertise in Indonesia Raya (interview with Atmakusumah 26/3/81).

75. Interview with Atmakusumah, 26/3/81.

76. Quoted in Christiano Wibisono, "Come back or Advent?", Indonesia Raya, 30/12/69.
Other student activists and young journalists had hoped that Indonesia Raya would be able to marry the youthful verve and commitment of Harian KAMT with the intellectual force and maturity of Kompas. They wanted Mochtar to infuse young blood and were disappointed when he chose instead to regroup the old editorial board, which they felt was out of touch and far from the cutting edge of political change. [77]

As one student activist observed in 1969, the "myth of Mochtar Lubis in jail during the Sukarno regime was the most essential part of the myth of Indonesia Raya". [78] But, in the daily running of the paper, the role of upper echelon long-serving editors was greater than before 1956, because of Mochtar's more frequent absences from the office. His dominance was not undermined by this delegation of authority, but his appearances were brief, particularly during the final years. Then, he would breeze in, spend a few minutes chatting animatedly with various staff, praising them for achievements and monitoring their progress on important tasks. He would type the editorial and the 'pojok' speedily, often standing up with a typewriter on top of a cabinet in the main editorial room! He used his private office only rarely, for receiving guests or meetings. With the exception of general policy directions, editorials and the 'pojok', Mochtar "did not interfere at all" in daily Indonesia Raya business. His guidance was not particularly missed during his many absences abroad. [79] One senior staffer recalled that, about 1970, Mochtar Lubis even discussed the possibility of quitting Indonesia Raya.

77. Interview with Arief Budiman, 31/12/80.

78. Christianto Wibisono, "Come back or Advent?", Indonesia Raya, 30/12/69.

79. Various interviews, including Atmakusumah (26/3/81), D.H. Assegaff (2/10/81), Jus Soemadipradja (29/9/81) and Kustiniyati Mochtar (16/6/81).
Yet, his guiding influence on the paper's social and political policy is reflected in the major issues taken up by the paper, which illustrate also his transition from regime supporter to opposition critic.

The following survey of the contents of the second series of *Indonesia Raya* concentrates on six issues. Two are major national political events: the 1971 General Elections and the January 1974 civil disturbances. The others deal with the paper's stand on broader issues: the political ethics of intellectuals, the treatment of political prisoners, criticism of corruption, and Japanese and ethnic Chinese business activities. Emphasis is placed on the attitudes of *Indonesia Raya* and Mochtar Lubis, rather than a detailed recounting of events.

**'Intellectual prostitution'**

In April 1969, *Indonesia Raya* published a series entitled "Examples of Intellectual Prostitution during the period of the Sukarno Regime", under the pseudonymous byline of 'Wira'.[81] The articles, critical of intellectuals then well-positioned in the New Order, who had served in the pre-1966 government, triggered off vigorous debate within intellectual circles, being taken up in other papers, like *Mahasiswa Indonesia*. [82] One of those targetted by *Indonesia Raya* was the economist, Prof. Mohammad Sadli, who, though close to the PSI camp, had

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80. Interview with Informant C, 1981.


82. e.g. *Mahasiswa Indonesia*, 27/4/69 and 4/5/69. See also Raillon 1985:184-186.
helped draft an 'Economic Declaration' in 1963, which involved accepting many of Sukarno's ideological formulations. Sadli, who had opposed foreign investment prior to 1966, was encouraging it three years later as Chairperson of the Foreign Investment Committee. Others criticised included Prof. Ismail Suny, Prof. R. M. Sutjipto Wirjosuparto, Barli Halim and Emil Salim.

The series, written in a punchy, uncompromising style by a senior Indonesia Raya journalist, D.H. Assegaff, echoed Mochtar's attitudes that such intellectuals could not be separated from the power groups they served. On this occasion, as in 1954 when Kustiniyati Mochtar denounced Sukarno's marriage to Hartini, journalists, though not specifically directed to do so, pursued issues championed by Mochtar. The 'intellectual prostitution' debate displayed Mochtar's hard line against those who had attempted to work within the Guided Democracy system to change it rather than challenging it from without. It echoed Mochtar's criticisms of Rosihan Anwar in 1961, which led to Rosihan's expulsion from the IPI (see Chapter 3).

Many saw the Assegaff articles as pompously self-righteous and they were attacked in Harian KAMI and Sinar Harapan.[83] But there were also criticisms of Indonesia Raya for being too cautious. When, during the 'intellectual prostitution' debate, a supporter brought Mochtar incriminating information about Mrs Suharto's business activities, he decided against publication, leading the students to assume he was afraid.[84] Soe Hok Gie expressed his dismay on hearing from a friend


84. The published diary, Soe Hok Gie 1983:286, dated 24 April 1969, mentions only "the wife of a senior government official". However, the hand-written manuscript is specific.

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that Mochtar had refused to publish stories about corruption in the state corporation, PT Berdikari, reportedly because the director General Subardiman, was a client of Indoconsult.[85]

Mochtar's hardline anti-communism also left him open for criticism, as some of his early supporters queried his inflexibility. When he objected to a Russian film festival in Jakarta in April 1969, because "according to intelligence reports, Russia wants to stage a 'come back'".

Soe Hok Gie wrote

"I feel terrible when I see Mochtar, as an 'intellectual', thinking so narrowly and so confusedly. I remember Adji's comments when he said that Mochtar was an intellectual prostitute."[86]

Political Prisoners, Purwodadi and Buru

Mochtar Lubis's intransigent attitude to the PKI caused some consternation among his young admirers as they re-assessed the issue of human rights and democratic freedoms. When officials of the Human Rights Institute [Lembaga Hak-hak Asasi Manusia] visited him in jail on 11 May 1966 to press for his release,

"[we] raised for the attention of the Institute, the fate of the other detainees, also the 30th September Movement detainees, that they may get the appropriate treatment under the law".[87]


After his release, he remained concerned about prison reform and the treatment of left-wing prisoners but his call for a fair, swift trial for the leftist tapol [political prisoners] quietened.

Some intellectuals and student leaders wanted to use their anti-communist credentials to argue for 'rule of law' principles to be applied to the tens of thousands of untried prisoners arrested in the months after 1 October 1965. In August 1969, Arief Budiman and his brother Soe Hok Gie, who had had contact with Amnesty International, argued for an amnesty for the 'C Category' prisoners, that is, those the government itself had classified as least implicated and not to be tried. Mochtar was not sympathetic. On 3 August 1969, Soe Hok Gie wrote,

"Mochtar Lubis does not agree with my suggestion that Pak Haro put out a statement about receiving [the prisoners] back into society. I cannot understand Mochtar Lubis's 'non-intellectual' attitude."[88]

Mochtar's principles were put to the test in February 1969 when H.J.C. Princen, deputy chairperson of the Institute for the Defence of Human Rights, exposed a massacre of political detainees in the Purwodadi region of Central Java. Princen's sources told him that, in November and December 1968, between 2,000 and 3,000 people had been beaten to death by the military with iron bars, on suspicion of association with left-wing organisations.[89] Princen made his discovery while accompanying two Dutch journalists around Central Java. Assisted by local Catholic priests, they uncovered a grisly tale of massacres, conducted by

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88. Soe Hok Gie 1983:386

89. May 1978:205-209 and interview with Princen, 1/9/82, when he said the death toll was at least 767, though confirmation was impossible.
Diponegoro units under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Tedjo Suwarno.[90]

The exposure of the massacres was a personal crisis for Princen, a long-time anti-communist and human rights activist since 1966, who had shared Madiun prison with Mochtar. Still close, at that time, to government figures, Princen approached the authorities with the information in the hope that those responsible would be punished. On 26 February, Harian KAMI broke the news, which was quickly taken up by other papers.[91]

Two days later, Indonesia Raya's front page ran Princen's story, with virtually no insertions. The next day's editorial, later quoted by the foreign press, exhorted the press to verify details, since the killing of even one person without recourse to legal defence was intolerable. Princen was praised for his courage in revealing the incident. The editorial writer continued:

"If this mass killing had been carried out during the months following the Gestapu coup, we could still understand such 'mass hysteria', although we could not agree with it. However, under current circumstances, when, for more than two years, we have all been talking about maintaining the 'rule of law', killings such as these can no longer be permitted."[92]

However, during the following days, Indonesia Raya gave more coverage to the military denials of the massacres than to Princen's evidence. For example, on 4 March 1969, the lead story was the denial of the massacres by the Diponegoro Commander Major-General Surono, who doubted whether Princen had even been to the area. Princen's request to


91. Interview with Princen, 1/9/82.

the President to establish an independent committee to examine the charges was given only four column-inches on page four. But Indonesia Raya emphasised this call for an independent investigation strongly over the following weeks.[93]

The 5 March editorial noted that society was reluctant to face the problem of the political prisoners. Stressing the need to solve the issue legally, it argued that it was recourse to law that distinguished the 'New Order' government from its predecessor. The wording indicated no doubt that the massacre had taken place, but there was no call for punishment. The editorialist recognised implicitly that there was no hope of those responsible being tried. He argued that the struggle against communism should be waged by raising the nation's living standards, and countering the communists' "false teachings", not by slaughter.

The intensity of army hostility to Princen was reflected by slanders. The Dutch-born former soldier who had deserted to join the Indonesian army during the Revolution, was accused of being a closet member of the Dutch Communist Party and of using the title haji without having made the pilgrimage![94] Indonesia Raya strongly denounced these baseless aspersions, outlining Princen's services to the Republic.[95]

Indonesia Raya, like other leading papers, sent a journalist to Purwodadi, but he was under constant government escort and compiled only

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scant details of the atrocities. [96] In the face of a report by Information Minister Boediardjo denying the massacres, [97] Indonesia Raya was indecisive. Its editorial summation stated that, although journalist Maskun Iskandar found evidence of the murder of tens, perhaps hundreds, this was not mass slaughter on the scale claimed initially by Princen. Accepting Boediardjo's euphemistic explanation that the incident was simply the "excesses" of a military operation, Indonesia Raya simply reiterated the need for an investigative committee. [98]

Boediardjo gagged public discussion by declaring that

"the government cannot avoid drawing the conclusion that there is some connection, of course, between the launching of this news [about the massacre] and the activities of the remnants of the PKI to discredit the Indonesian government". [99]

Indonesia Raya replied with an editorial querying the assumption that raising the issue indicated PKI sympathies. Such intimidation, it said, was an 'Old Order' tactic, no longer appropriate in the "Order of Development". [100]

The paper's response to the massacre was muted and restrained, considering that it accepted that hundreds of people were killed. [101] Mochtar faced a dilemma regarding the political prisoners. Close friends

96. The seven-part series, "Laporan dari Daerah Maut Purwodadi", ran from 10 to 17 March 1969.


98. "Penyelesaian 'Peristiwa Purwodadi'", Indonesia Raya, 18/3/69, p.2.


101. On reflection, Princen was basically satisfied with Indonesia Raya coverage of the issue. Interview with Princen, 1/9/82.
were losing faith in the government's handling of the problem. For example, in October 1971 Arief Budiman was highly critical of General Ali Murtopo's callous dismissal of the tapol as "poison which did not deserve to be defended", a stance Arief likened to the gagging of the Cultural Manifesto group under Sukarno.[102]

In October 1973 Mochtar visited the penal colony of Buru island in the Moluccas to which over 10,000 political prisoners arrested in 1965-66 had been transported since 1969. He went as part of a tour of journalists[103] and staff of Kopkamtib commander, General Sumitro, and Attorney-General Ali Said. His Indonesia Raya reports made the tapols' harsh life sound almost idyllic.[104] He wrote in the introductory article on Buru, "people could only die of hunger if they were so lazy that they did not even want to swallow."[105] The article trivialised the tapol issue and painted Buru as a happy repatriation centre. The other articles in the series were more informative, but ignored the tapols' deprivations and the question of their release. There is virtually no mention of political or physical repression, the scarcity of the necessities of life, limited facilities, punishments meted out for trivial breaches of discipline, or the psychological intimidation of the prisoners. Despite his experience both as a journalist and as a political prisoner, Mochtar seems to have taken what the authorities presented on

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103. Including Rosihan Anwar, Jakob Oetama and others from the Sinar Harapan, Merdeka, Suara Karya, Angkatan Bersenjata and Berita Yudha.

104. The five part series, entitled "Ke Pulau Buru" [To Buru Island], ran 18-23 October 1973.

face value, unlike the highly critical reports that came out of similar visits by foreign journalists.[106]

Mochtar later defended his articles by saying he was concerned that the authorities would punish prisoners who had spoken to him if his reports were unfavourable. He also argued that he had spoken privately to General Sumitro about the tapols' grievances, believing that this would be a more effective in improving their conditions than publicising the issue in Indonesia Raya.[107] This was a stark reversal of his own position, when he was a prisoner in May 1966. Then he was annoyed with "friends" outside who kept quiet to avoid "aggravating the conditions of our detention". He wanted them to tell the world about his unjust detention, since keeping quiet only "gives comfort and aid to the tyrant".[108]

Although an irregular Indonesia Raya column, "Downtrodden and Ravaged", defending the legal rights of the poor, was praised as exemplary by the Legal Aid Institute,[109] Indonesia Raya's treatment of the application of 'rule of law' and human rights specifically to tapol was not significantly different from a much larger group of newspapers, including the moderate press and the New Order militant papers. Mochtar

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106. May 1978:27-40 described his visit in 1969 and that of Dom Moraes of Asia Magazine and Errol Hodge of the Australian Broadcasting Commission in 1971. All were deeply moved by the deprivation of the prisoners. Hamish McDonald [(1980), Suharto's Indonesia, Fontana, Blackburn, pp 216-31], who visited in 1977, includes an extensive account by Pramoedya Ananta Toer of the sickness, hunger and "beatings [which] kept coming beyond reason". Accounts by ex-tapol are gradually being published. e.g. Teguh [1981] Catatan di Sela-sela Intaiian, Yayasan Langer, Limburg, pp.16-29.

107. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 17/3/82.


Lubis's anti-communism and his acceptance of army rule, combined to make him a tepid defender of political prisoners under the New Order.[110]

Pertamina and and the Anti-Corruption Campaigns

More than anything else, the Indonesia Raya of 1968-74 made its mark by its exposés of corruption, in the frank, confrontative style of Indonesia Raya's earlier incarnation. Initially, this was tempered by explicit support for the regime. The paper never criticised the military as an institution, declaring that the Armed Forces "originates from the people and upholds the aspirations of the Indonesian people's struggle".[111] But, Indonesia Raya struck at Suharto's personal assistants, dubbed, by some, the "invisible cabinet".[112] The paper was highly critical of the financial dealings of important government functionaries like Major-General Soerjo Wirjohadipoetro, a former presidential personal assistant (Aspri); General Ibnu Sutowo, President-Director of the state oil company Pertamina; and Colonel Sudjono Humardhani, another former Suharto assistant, with strong links with Japanese business. Till the end of 1971, at least, the newspaper assumed the President was competent, well-intentioned and honest, but surrounded by rogue officers whom it appealed to Suharto to cull.

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110. For example, in 1978, following Amnesty International's 1977 Report on Indonesia, Mochtar wrote to Amnesty, "expressing concern that the organization ... was now being used by Communist groups and devoting all its attention to PKI prisoners in Indonesia" (according to a letter from Amnesty International, London, 26 June 1986).


Indonesia Raya’s major target during the first year of its new operations was the National Logistics Board, Bulog,[113] but the most dramatic story of its second run was the exposure of corruption and mismanagement in Pertamina, the state oil corporation.[114]

General Ibnu Sutowo, who had been made Minister for Oil and Gas in February 1966, was targetted by student demonstrations that year as corrupt.[115] He was moved from this position in 1967 but, with the strong support of Suharto, he retained control of Pertamina,[116] which he rapidly built into a major revenue generator for the army and the regime. From it, he diversified into non-oil industries, distributed largesse widely and extracted a personal fortune. He operated the company without government constraints or accountability, developing a "reputation as a very tough bargainer with foreign oil companies", yet one who could "assure foreign investors in the oil sector of expeditious and friendly treatment".[117] His 'production-sharing' contracts with

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113. Bulog had failed to account for the previous two years' stock losses. (May 1978:363). In April 1969, a Lichtenstein-based supplier to the national Bimas rice production program, Coopa Trading Establishment, was criticised for failing to meet contract requirements. In September, Indonesia Raya hammered Bulog for making suspicious up-front payments to the Japan-based Mantrust company for unfulfilled contracts (e.g. "Permainan Bulog-Mantrust Dalam Pembelian Beras Tekad" and "Skandal Mantrust", Indonesia Raya, 19/9/69). For an overview, see Crouch 1975:526-7 & 534-5.


116. Ibnu Sutowo actually headed Permina, but this was merged in 1968 with another state oil concern, Pertamin, to become Pertamina.

foreign companies gave Pertamina a share of actual production rather than eventual profit, and later became "a sought-after model for other OPEC countries". [118] To admirers, he personified the dynamic "Javanese captain of industry, operating with spectacular panache", refusing to allow legal obligations to constrain his expansive entrepreneurial imagination. [119]

Ibnu Sutowo became the central focus of Mochtar's moral passion, as Sukarno had been before 1966. Ibnu Sutowo's opulent lifestyle, paraded in March 1969 during his daughter's extravagant wedding, and his cavalier disregard for financial accountability to the government, angered the editor. His style of running Pertamina disregarded the principles of financial management and responsibility propounded by the Widjojo group of civilian economists within the government, with whom Mochtar sided.

The student press had been critical of Ibnu Sutowo since 1966. Mahasiswa Indonesia denounced his 'feudalistic' style and Sinar Harapan, too, disapproved. [120] Such papers were enthusiastic allies when, on 22 November 1969, Indonesia Raya began an exposé of Pertamina. Mochtar Lubis and his team were armed with information leaked by highly placed government officials within or close to Pertamina, the Department of Mines and Bank Indonesia, accumulated during nearly 12 months of extensive research. The evidence, outlined in rigorously documented articles detailing corruption and abuse of power within Pertamina and the company's refusal of government supervision, was so comprehensive that Pertamina did not contest the matter in court. The exposé exemplified how


editors like Mochtar Lubis used the relatively open press, under Information Minister Boediardjo (1968-73), to scrutinise government instrumentalities.[121]

The campaign began with an article, "Pertamina: does it want diversification, or to be a conglomerate, or to build a private 'economic empire'?". This argued that the spread of Pertamina into non-oil activities was "only to fulfil the desires of people within Pertamina to enrich themselves".[122] Mochtar Lubis was later approached by an assistant of Ibnu Sutowho who sought to test his interest in an oil concession, in what Mochtar interpreted as a financial inducement to drop the attacks on Pertamina.[123]

When Indonesia Raya's exposure of Pertamina was attacked by pro-Army papers, like Angkatan Bersenjata, which accused Mochtar of a conflict of interest between his roles in Indonesia Raya and Indoconsult,[124] moderate dailies, like Kompas, and the student press threw their weight behind Mochtar, although Pedoman agreed Mochtar faced a conflict of interest.[125] Mochtar challenged his "slanderers" to prove

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121. Indonesia Raya later praised Boediardjo for the restraint with which he exercised his prerogative to ban papers. "Penghargaan Pada Budiardjo", Indonesia Raya (editorial), 30/3/73, p.2. Oey 1974:28-31 notes examples of government actions against the press during this period.


123. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 27/4/81.


125. Christiananto Wibisono, "Come Back atau Advent", (Part 2) Indonesia Raya, 31/12/69 examines the press response to Indonesia Raya's
their aspersions in court.[126]

After *Indonesia Raya* published a prurient article claiming B.M. Diah had been involved in a sex scandal,[127] Diah's *Merdeka* responded by accusing Mochtar of trying to extort Rp.100 million from Pertamina in October 1969, in return for suppressing the exposé.[128] Diah implied that Mochtar attacked Pertamina because an Indoconsult offer of services to Pertamina was rejected.[129] *Merdeka* claimed that *Indonesia Raya* had received "foreign" funding to attack Pertamina and destroy Ibnu Sutowo, because his 'tough' oil policies were limiting foreign oil company profits. Diah was unable to prove his allegations during the ensuing court cases, in which Mochtar and Diah sued one another for defamation.[130]

The crusade against Pertamina was long and bitter. The pressure for an independent investigation into corruption increased when, in early January 1970, *Indonesia Raya* implicated President Suharto's personal adviser on financial affairs, Major-General Soerjo Wirjohadipoetra, in

Pertamina campaign. Supportive editorials include "I.R.[sic] dan Pertamina", *Kompas*, 27/12/69.


127. "Lagi Skandal Sex Pecah Di Yogya", *Indonesia Raya*, 18/1/71, p.1. *Indonesia Raya*’s tradition of 'yellow journalism' from the 1950s was continued in the 1970s with articles like this.


130. Mochtar won his case against Diah, and Diah's subsequent appeal against the Rp. 1 million fine.*Indonesia Raya* apologised publicly to Diah for the 'sex scandal' article.
the misappropriation of $711,000 of government money.[131] Large student
demonstrations broke out during January, triggered by a hike in the price
of oil which impacted on prices generally, and sustained by persistent
student opposition to corruption. The protests were supported by the
press, spearheaded by papers like *Indonesia Raya*, *Musanetara*, *Mahasiswa*
*Indonesia*, and *Harian KAMI*. [132] At the end of January, the government
appointed a 'Commission of Four' to placate the rising tide of protest
with an inquiry into corruption. Six months later the four-man group had
completed its report and Mochtar Lubis, like several other Jakarta
editors, was leaked a copy. By declining to print it, he disappointed
student supporters.[133] The initiative was taken by Aristides Katoppo of
*Sinar Harapan* who ran the report between 18–24 July 1970.[134]

Despite the Commission of Four's discovery of

"enough blatant instances of Pertamina's deviations from its
legal obligations to build up a compelling case of organisational changes...to circumscribe Ibnu Sutowo's
personal authority and impose a much greater degree of accountability",[135]

Pertamina mismanagement went largely uncorrected. In 1974 oil prices
quadrupled and Pertamina joined the list of the world's top 200
corporations. By February 1975 its massive short-term debts, which funded
its expansion, could not be met. In October 1975, with the company facing
financial chaos, the government took over all its financial obligations,
conceding that Pertamina's short-term debt of US$1.5 billion equalled

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133. Interview with Arief Budiman, 23/8/81.

134. Mackie 1970 summarises the report.

Indonesia's total foreign exchange reserves! Mochtar Lubis's unheeded warnings had proved correct. Long into the 1980s, he decried the government's handling of the Pertamina affair, in a vendetta against Ibhnu Sutowo, who was dismissed 'with honour' in March 1976 and presented by Suharto with a state award for his services to the oil industry in 1985.

While student demonstrations continued in Jakarta during July to August 1970, as Crouch notes, it "was widely believed that the confidence with which Indonesia Raya and Nusantara attacked the generals close to Suharto was derived from their belief that they had the support of reform-minded elements within the army [...]for these two papers showed a confidence and spirit unprecedented since the army had come to power". [137]

Indonesia Raya still believed the President would curb the excesses of his assistants, but, in August 1970, Suharto said that if papers like Indonesia Raya and Nusantara kept making nuisances of themselves, they would be dealt with firmly. [138] In April 1971, Nusantara's T.D. Hafas was charged with disseminating hatred against the President and his assistants, and, in September, sentenced to a year's jail. [139]

Golkar and the 1971 Elections

The 1971 elections proved a watershed in Mochtar's relations with the Suharto government. Like many intellectuals who had opposed Sukarno and the party system, Mochtar Lubis remembered Indonesia's only previous national election in 1955 with distaste and did not want current

139. Oey 1974:30-1.
disaffection with the Suharto government to jeopardise political stability. In April 1968 he had called for the dissolution of all the existing parties, arguing that all had lost credibility under corrupt leaders.[140] Since October 1969, Indonesia Raya had advocated the postponement of elections until the President reformed the party structure, believing that elections would only result in the return of "the same old people, who used to be Soekarno's 'yes-men' and used to accept the Nasakom cooperation which we have cursed".[141]

Like other New Order militants, and the government itself, Mochtar feared an election would reproduce the balance of parties already represented in the Parliament,[142] but he was also also uncertain about the government's own quasi-party, Golkar. Golkar, the Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups, had been established under Army sponsorship in 1964 to challenge PKI influence. It was largely inactive, until revamped by Ali Murtopo in 1969-70 as an organisational vehicle to secure an electoral victory for the New Order.[143] Golkar appealed to many 1966 student Action Front activists, such as Cosmas Batubara and the Bandung group around Rahman Tolleng, and to New Order intellectuals, hostile to the existing parties.[144]

But public protests through 1970 were draining support for the Suharto government. The murder of a Bandung student in October 1970 by a police cadet symbolised for observers such as Rosihan Anwar, the clear

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140. "Parpol-parpol sebaiknya dibubarkan saja", Sinar Harapan, 2/5/68.
141. "Terserah kepada Presiden Soeharto", Indonesia Raya, 20/10/69, p.3.
143. On the Golkar-Army alliance prior to the elections, see Crouch 1978:264-72.
rift which had developed between the military and students in particular, civilians in general. While some intellectuals and students were hoping to work through Golkar to acquire political power, others had lost faith and were seeking to exert "moral force" from outside the government. Some, such as Mochtar's confederates Arief Budiman and Adnan Buyung Nasution, were agitating for a protest vote. They advocated that voters repudiate not only the nine parties which were standing but also Golkar, by piercing the white part of their voting paper, demonstrating their preparedness to vote, but rejecting available choices. Supporters of this position became known as Golput [the White Group].[145]

For Mochtar Lubis, the choice was between Golkar and Golput; he favoured the former.[146] While adamant he was not a Golkar member,[147] he hoped that, with a firm mandate from the electorate, Golkar would fulfil its promises and ensure more even, widespread social and economic development, over-riding individual instances of corruption. Mochtar Lubis later claimed he was trying to keep Indonesia Raya neutral during the election campaign, but many of his friends felt the tone of the material he wrote favoured Golkar.[148] The paper was anti-party, criticised Golput, and opened its columns to material favourable to Golkar. Enggak Bahau'ddin reportedly spoke on a Golkar electioneering

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146. 'Mochtar Lubis: Golput Naif', Sinar Harapan, 3/6/71 and interview 13/1/81.


148. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 13/1/81.

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platform in Padang. For the editorial staff generally, Golkar represented the best of the uninspiring alternatives. [149]

In Mochtar's view, there was little alternative but to cooperate with and attempt to influence the army. He argued that "the Armed Forces-Technocrat partnership should be defended and continued, in order to guarantee the dynamic stability of economic development in our country". [150]

Such *Indonesia Raya* editorials were a declaration of support for Golkar, the embodiment of this 'partnership'.

Golkar's most spectacular convert from the New Order intellectuals, given his pivotal role in establishing Golput, was Adnan Buyung Nasution, who joined the Golkar bandwagon only days before the end of public electioneering prior to the 3 July election. On 24 June, at the Golkar finale in Senayan stadium, Buyung Nasution expressed his dissatisfaction about corruption and misuse of power, but pointed to the "objective achievements during the five years of New Order government". He declared that "it is Golkar which has clearly taken the people in the direction of improvements and progress" and called on youth not just to protest and complain, but to "build together with Golkar". [151] Buyung Nasution's qualified endorsement of Golkar paralleled Mochtar's position.

But Mochtar himself was moving in the opposing direction. He later said the election, in which Golkar gained 62.8% of the votes, signified

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"the end of my honeymoon with the government of the New Order".[152] His support was eroded by electoral malpractice, Golkar's intimidation of voters and the capricious arrest of opponents.[153] The paper's editorial line became harsher and its criticism directed closer to the President.

Indonesia-in-Miniature project

In December 1971, Indonesia Raya campaigned against a proposal, dear to Mrs Tien Suharto's heart, to build an 'Indonesia-in-Miniature' tourist park, Taman Mini Indonesia Indah, on the edge of Jakarta, to display the geographical and cultural diversity of Indonesia. The President's support for this venture, galvanised student opposition into a vocal 'Anti Taman Mini Movement' and antagonised the opposition press. Mochtar saw this as a wasteful prestige project reminiscent of Sukarno's grandiose extravagances. Through Indonesia Raya, he juxtaposed details of "this useless project" with the President's statements about correct development priorities.[154]

On 3 January 1972 a meeting on Taman Mini Mochtar was addressing, along with Princen, the lawyer Yap Thiam Hien, sociologist Harsja Bachtiar and economist Dorodjatun Kuntjoro Jakti, was disbanded by police intervention.[155] After the Anti-Taman Mini movement was banned and

152. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 13/1/81.


154. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 13/1/81.

155. Indonesia Raya. 4/1/72, p.1.
leaders, like Arief Budiman and Princen, arrested, Mochtar, Assegaff and Kustiniyati Mochtar joined with representatives of Sinar Harapan, Harian KAMI, Kompas and Mahasiswa Indonesia, on 23 February 1972 to protest to the DPR [People's Representative Council] about the park. [156] In March 1972 the DPR approved Mrs Suharto's scheme, provided that no government funds were involved, nor "compulsory donations" levied on private companies.

Indonesia Raya continued to use innuendoes to criticise nepotism, favouritism and the unethical business behaviour of the friends and wives of "senior officials", in what could be read as allusions to the President's wife and assistants. In one editorial, "Officials' Wives Who Are Active In The Field Of Business", the paper criticised

"the wives of central government officials in business, [who use] the legality and position of their husbands as their most important capital...[abusing] the position of the husband to attain wealth. [...] Today the wife, tomorrow the in-laws, after that the younger sibling, child or nephew. If the members of this official's family work together with cukong [Chinese financiers] then the destruction of this country is at hand." [157]

Economic and racial issues

Community anti-Sinicism, particularly evident since 1970 in papers like Nusantara, was reflected in Indonesia Raya. The paper frequently queried the mutually profitable relationship between powerful army officers and their Chinese business partners, or cukong. [158] As

156. Raillon 1985:96. Berita Yudha editor D.M. Sunardi supported Taman Mini at the DPR.


158. e.g., "Masalah Pribumi & Non Pribumi", Indonesia Raya, 25/5/73, p.2.
international capital flowed into the country, many foreign companies preferred to work with experienced Chinese entrepreneurs rather than with *pribumi* [ethnic Indonesians], a factor which some observers believed contributed to an upsurge in racist, and particularly anti-Chinese, sentiment during the early 1970s.[159] *Indonesia Raya* took up many of the complaints of the *pribumi* business community, of which Mochtar was a member, against the ethnic Chinese.[160] The paper's premise that the confluence of foreign, particularly Japanese, and established Indonesian Chinese interests disadvantaged the community can be seen as fuelling widespread anti-Chinese animosity. *Indonesia Raya* did not always distinguish between politically well-connected *cukong* and ordinary Chinese, but presented the economic and political conflicts in racial terms.

Mochtar Lubis had long been critical of Japanese business practices. In November 1966, addressing a foreign correspondents' gathering in his honour in Tokyo, he criticised the Japanese for offering bribes and women to Indonesian officials, a theme he reiterated in October 1967, in a *Mahasiswa Indonesia* article.[161] *Indonesia Raya*, together with other opposition papers like *Mahasiswa Indonesia* and news magazines like *Tempo*,[162] was particularly critical of the so-called "Japanese lobby".


160. e.g. *Indonesia Raya*, 4 November 1972 lists known *cukong*.

161. On the Tokyo speech, see "Reputasi Jepang tidak baik di Indonesia", *Berita Yudha*, 11/11/66. Mochtar was also featured in the Japanese press, criticising Japanese business. e.g. the interview in the economic weekly *Ekonomisuto* (a Mainichi News publication) on 31 March 1970, pp.72-75. (I am indebted to Yutaka Akiyama for discussing this source.) The *Mahasiswa Indonesia* article is "Jepang dan kita", 22 October 1967. See also Raillon 1985:314.

162. e.g. *Tempo*, 19 January 1974, p.6 and pp.42-43.
personified by General Sudjono Humardhani. In one of the boldest of its
attacks, Indonesia Raya asserted

"we feel that it is extremely damaging and dangerous for
Indonesia to allow Sudjono Humardhani to continue to play his
role as this 'unofficial channel'."

Mochtar's criticism of Japanese investment in Indonesia
contrasted with his more positive evaluation of investment from other
countries, such as America. As a founder and shareholder in Indoconsult
business consultancy, Mochtar had few qualms about foreign investment per
se, provided it was regulated and benefitted national entrepreneurs. When
multi-nationals dealt with cukong or military officers and colleagues of
the President, he was incensed.

The Chinese in Indonesia had historically been a scape-goat for
wider social and economic frustrations,[164] and Indonesia Raya had a
record of active channelling of anti-Sinicism.[165] In Bandung on 4
August 1973, a collision between a pribumi's cart and a car driven by an
ethnic Chinese, escalated into a major civil disturbance, with soldiers
from a nearby Siliwangi detachment reportedly joining the crowd
rampaging through the Chinese quarter destroying property and assaulting
ethnic Chinese.[166]

163. "Indonesia Amat Lemah Menghadapi Jepang?", Indonesia Raya, 8 January
1974, p.2 editorial.

164. For a brief history of anti-Chinese outbursts, see J.A.C. Mackie
(1976) "Anti-Chinese Outbreaks in Indonesia 1959-68" (pp.77-138) in
Nelson-AIIA, Melbourne.

165. During July 1956, Indonesia Raya highlighted an incident arising
from a traffic accident between an Indonesian Chinese and a pribumi
Army officer to criticise the PNI-led government (Feith 1962:483).

166. Senior Siliwangi officers were reluctant to swiftly quell the riots.
Arrested were 19 Siliwangi men and leaders of the civilian Siliwangi
Youth Wing (Crouch 1978:312).
Information Minister Mashuri immediately instructed all editors to refrain from "exaggerating the Bandung incident". In Mochtar's absence overseas, *Indonesia Raya*'s deputy editor-in-chief, Enggak Bahau'ddin, and managing editor, Atmakusumah, decided that an incident of such magnitude so close to the capital had to be reported in depth. *Indonesia Raya* published a comprehensive spread taking three-quarters of the front page, mainly based on their own sources, but with the government position and Mashuri's statement.[167] *Indonesia Raya*'s prominent coverage, with four graphic photos of the damage, greatly exceeded other papers. In some, such as Nusantara and Abadi, the Bandung incident ran as a normal lead story, but most gave only brief details on the inner pages. *Indonesia Raya* sold out swiftly with distributors unable to meet demand.

When Kopkamtib phoned for an explanation the following morning, the staff were alert to a possible closure. Enggak Bahau'ddin argued that unsubstantiated rumour is more dangerous than fact and that a balanced presentation would calm, not exacerbate, anxiety. Five months later, when *Indonesia Raya* was finally banned, the Bandung incident was cited as the beginning of a series of unheeded warnings and 'reminders' to the paper "not to sharpen or aggravate social contrasts which could destabilise or ruin national stability which has become a necessary pre-condition for development".[168]

In fact, the only written warning given the paper concerned a front page photo of an Australian strip-tease dancer which the Department of Information said "tended towards pornography".[169]

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168. The relevant document covering the withdrawal of *Indonesia Raya*'s publication permit (SIT) is reproduced in Atmakusumah 1980:334-6.

169. Photo published in *Minggu Indonesia Raya*, 30/9/73. The mildly-worded warning was included in a 2/10/73 letter from Drs T. Atmadi, Director of the Press Development Directorate, Department of Information. (Photocopy in my possession.)
Indonesia Raya’s coverage of the Bandung incident boosted sales significantly, as did the switch, in August, from 'hot metal' printing, which produced a cluttered, inelegant result, to modern off-set, which gave a cleaner, more readable appearance.[170] From a low of just under 20,000 during January to May 1973, sales quickly increased by about 5,000 with off-set, reaching a second series peak of 41,000 during coverage of the student demonstrations over the visit of Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka in January 1974.

The Demonstrations and Riots of January 1974

Summarising Indonesia in 1973, Allan A. Samson wrote:

"A poor rice harvest, an inflationary spiral, a coercive government rice procurement program, the perpetuation of clear military predominance, a questionable governmental regard for civil liberties, an anti-Chinese riot, increasing urban unemployment and rural underemployment, and student demonstrations against high-level official corruption and arbitrary governmental practices all produced a pervasive climate of apprehension and concern."[171]

In that year, moderate and opposition papers were becoming increasingly critical. Indonesia Raya, Abadi and Harian Kami, were all showing "fundamental opposition to the Development Strategy adopted by the New Order government".[172] In addition to its criticisms of cukong

170. Interview with Atmakusumah 26/3/81.


172. According to Kerry Groves [1978] The Press under Indonesia's 'New Order', Honours thesis, Asian Civilisations, A.N.U., Canberra, p.35, who examined the editorials on 'development' topics by leading Indonesian newspapers banned after Malari. He also notes (p.27) that, of the three papers mentioned, Indonesia Raya had the highest percentage of editorials on 'political' issues (37.9%) and least on 'development' issues (13.7%), but featured a comparatively high
and the Japanese, throughout 1973 Indonesia Raya emphasised the "rule of law", the "simplification" of the Opposition into two political parties, and exhorted the wealthy to avoid ostentation and "live simply".[173]

As Atmakusumah has noted, in its editorials, articles and pojok, Indonesia Raya supported students' and intellectuals' criticism of corruption and government economic policies, which they saw as exacerbating the gap between rich and poor, promoting "unselective" foreign capital investment, and favouring "Indonesian citizens of foreign descent".[174] In March, frustrated at parliamentary inaction on corruption, an Indonesia Raya editorial asked rhetorically "should the university students and young people be ordered back onto the streets like seven years ago?"[175] The newspaper regarded the student protests as "something positive".[176] Its own criticism of the 'Japanese lobby', Presidential Special Assistants (Aspri), particularly Sudjono Humardhani, economic mismanagement, foreign investment policies and nepotism within the government grew sharper in the last three months of the year.[177] Indonesia Raya provided extensive front-page reports when Thai students succeeded at bringing down the Thanom-Prapas military government in

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percentage (6.8%) on 'bureaucracy' (including corruption and inefficiency).

173. Editorials on these issues include "Ulangtahun Ke-7 Supersemar", 10/3/73, p.4, and "Hidup Sederhana", 21/3/73, p.4.


175. "Laporan Presiden Kepada MPR", Indonesia Raya, 13/3/73, p.4.


177. e.g. "Indonesia amat lemah menghadapi Jepang?", Indonesia Raya, 8 January 1974, p.2 editorial.
October 1973, in a victory which encouraged their Indonesian counterparts and was widely covered in opposition papers.[178]

The politics of late 1973 needs to be seen in the context of apprehension within the officer corps, particularly among field commanders, about the behaviour of what Crouch has called the "political" and "financial" generals surrounding Suharto. These generals, typified by the President's former personal assistants, Ali Murtopo and Sudjono Humardhani, were seen by more professional-minded officers as endangering what the army regarded as its legitimate mandate to rule Indonesia. These reform-minded professionals wanted to maintain military control, but to limit corruption and 'excesses'.[179]

In the last four months of 1973 Lieutenant General Sumitro, head of Kopkamtib and deputy commander of the armed forces, associated himself with the reform movement within the Department of Defence and Security. Along with other papers like Mahasiswa Indonesia, which were opposed to the "financial" aspri generals and the Japanese lobby, Indonesia Raya regarded General Sumitro's activities favourably, though Mochtar Lubis later said he did "not feel that we [Indonesia Raya] were collaborating with Sumitro".[180] Sumitro, a rival of Ali Murtopo, courted sympathy on campuses during a whistle-stop tour through Java in November 1973, engendering a relatively liberal atmosphere suggestive of a high-level responsiveness to reform. Photographed on Indonesia Raya's front page during an amicable discussion with the rebel playwright Rendra, Sumitro


180. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 12/1/82.
claimed encouragingly that April 1974 would ring in a "new pattern of leadership".[181] His call for "two-way communication" (between the people and government) was reported enthusiastically by a press interpreting it as a relaxation of press control.

During this 'Prague spring', Mochtar recommended that the Yayasan Indonesia [Indonesia Foundation] group (which published Morison magazine) organise a seminar on the benefits and disadvantages of foreign capital investment in Indonesia. The speakers at the 30 November seminar included Indonesia's first Vice President, Mohammad Hatta, Prof. Suhadi Mangkusuwondo, Dorodjatun Kuntjoro Jakti and Maruli Panggabean, with Mochtar Lubis as moderator. The packed, lively discussion united the civilian opposition across generational and party loyalties.[182] Participants demanded stricter controls on foreign investment and circulated a petition by student leader, Sylvia Goenawan, calling for a revival of national pride.[183]

Mochtar Lubis took an active personal interest in the protest movement and often met with student leaders, such as Hariman Siregar, Louis Wangge, Julius Usman and Butje Rumanuri. Enggak Bahau'ddin was also


183. See "Perbedaan Kelas Masyarakat Makin Bertambah Hebat" and "Diskusi Diakhiri Dengan Ikrar", Indonesia Raya, 1 December 1973, p.1 and VII for the text. After his arrest in February 1975 Mochtar was interrogated on his role as seminar moderator and signatory to this petition. See Mochtar Lubis (1979) Kampdagboek [Camp Diary], (translated by Cees van Dijk and Rob Nieuwenhuys) A.W. Sijthoff, Alphen aan den Rijn, p.121. This is the Dutch translation of a prison diary written in 1975 in a mixture of Indonesian and English. The original manuscript, Nirbaya: sebuah buku harian dalam tempat tahanan [Nirbaya: a diary in detention] (hereafter 'Nirbaya 1975') has not been published in Indonesia. I would like to thank Mochtar Lubis for giving me access to it.

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very sympathetic. One *Indonesia Raya* journalist, Jus Soemadipradja, was active in the movement while reporting for the paper.

Early January 1974, the students specified three primary demands, dubbed the "Tritura '74" (an echo of a 1966 acronym for three demands): the "dissolution of the Aspri, the reduction of prices, and the suppression of corruption".[184] *Indonesia Raya* supported all these, but with different emphases to the broad student movement. During the first fortnight of the New Year, the paper redoubled its campaign against Chinese business people and foreign, specifically Japanese, investment. It took up the cudgel for the pribumi business community, warning the government that the collapse of pribumi entrepreneurs would lead to serious unrest. One article by a retired colonel warned that socially or economically suppressed people will inevitably throw off their oppressors, for historically, economic difficulties have been a catalyst for rebellion.[185]

Enggak Bahau'ddin wrote that the President's New Year speech avoided central public grievances, such as the belief that the primary beneficiaries of "development" were "senior officials" and their families. Claiming generous financial credit was given to non-pribumi business people very close to the New Order elite, while pribumi entrepreneurs could not get the credit they required, he wrote tongue-in-cheek, "the person who drew up the President's speech forgot to touch on this problem". Suharto's assertions that Japanese and other foreign capital was not indebting the country were "untrue", he wrote. By citing

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the grievances of Hariman Siregar and other student leaders, Indonesia Raya indicated agreement that the government's ideology of development was being used to legitimise power and support the status quo.[186]

While the student movement was neither monolithic nor homogeneous, with various student councils and a range of non-campus groups such as the 'Anti-Luxury Committee', the 'Young Generation Opposition Movement' and the 'Indonesian Students for Indonesia Movement', the consensus target was the government's development policy. In retrospect, some leaders felt that Mochtar encouraged a sharper focus on Japanese investment, than general development issues. They claimed Indonesia Raya reported incidents or comments by public figures selectively, highlighting criticisms of Japanese, rather than other foreign, activities.[187] These students felt that, in discussions, Mochtar Lubis was less apprehensive about non-Japanese capital.[188]

From 10 January, demonstrations attacking the role of Ali Murtopo, Sudjono Humardhani, and Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka (arriving on 14 January), held the paper's front page. Massive student protests on the 14th and the morning of the 15th, were followed that afternoon by public rioting of slum dwellers and disaffected youths, and the burning of cars and businesses. Only the next day, when the Senen shopping centre was looted and set ablaze, did riot troops crack down. It was widely believed by student leaders (and foreign scholars) that petty criminal 'agent


187. Confidential discussions with a several students in the 1973-4 movement, primarily Informants G and H, 1981-2. Informants mentioned a public lecture on the economy at Salemba campus by Dorodjatun Kuntjoro Jakti as an instance when criticisms of the Japanese were given undue prominence in the Indonesia Raya report, "Tak Mungkin Dan Tak Guna Kejar Ketinggalan" (8/11/73).

188. Interviews with Informants G and H, July 1981.
provocateurs' mobilised by Ali Murtopo triggered the rioting and looting to discredit Sumitro's handling of the student demonstrations.[189] 

*Indonesia Raya* covered the '15 January Disaster* [Malari] with long descriptive articles, and eye-catching photos of the damage.

**The Post-Malari Crackdown**

The government moved swiftly against critics. Among the 470 arrested in the crackdown after Malari, were student leaders Hariman Siregar, Syahrir, Lukman Hakim and Ibrahim Zakir, former PSI leaders Sarbini Sumawinata and Soebadio Sastrosatomo, plus Princen, Adnan Buyung Nasution, Rahman Tolleng and Dorodjatun Kuntjoro Jakti.[190]

Press bans began on 16 January 1974 when *Nusantara* had its printing permit (SIC) withdrawn by the Jakarta Kopkamtib. After Surabaya's *Suluh Berita* three days later, *Mahasiswa Indonesia* was next, banned on 20 January. In a sweeping move against critical newspapers, on 21 January 1974 Jakarta Kopkamtib, withdrew the printing permits of *Indonesia Raya*, *Harian KAMI*, *Abadi*, *The Jakarta Times*, and the weeklies, *Wenang* and *Pemuda Indonesia*. *Pedoman* and the weekly *Ekspres* followed on 24


190. In this official total, cited in McDonald 1980:138, university students comprised only 14 of those arrested, while over half were labourers. Both Soebadio and Princen had been held in Madiun jail with Mochtar Lubis in the 1960s.
January.[191] In all, twelve publications were banned indefinitely causing 417 press workers in Jakarta and 85 elsewhere to loose employment.[192]

Like the others, *Indonesia Raya* was accused of having

"published articles which could damage the authority of, and faith in, the national leadership [...] and run stories which are regarded as inciting the people, resulting in the opening of opportunities which could ripen or aggravate the situation, leading to the chaotic events which took place on 15 and 16 January 1974, and which could incite one leader against the other" (presumably a veiled reference to the Sumitro-Ali Murtopo tensions).

On 22 January, an Information Department official rescinded the paper's publication permit (SIT), specifically citing, among other reasons, that it had published articles which

"had stirred up issues such as foreign capital, corruption, the Armed Forces' "Dual Function" [in military and civilian affairs], the degeneration of government apparatuses, high level struggles, the problem between the Presidential Special Assistants and Kopkamtib, [and] destroyed the faith of the community in the national leadership".[193]

*Indonesia Raya* had been caught in rivalry within the ruling military elite between reformist and 'financial' elements. Despite the official abolition of the Aspri, the Ali Murtopo faction jockeyed into primary positions, while General Sumitro and his colleagues were moved aside. Sumitro was dismissed from Kopkamtib and soon resigned as deputy commander of the armed forces.

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193. The rescission documents relating to *Indonesia Raya*’s SIC and SIT are reproduced in Abdurrahman Surjomihardjo 1980:332-336.
Indonesia Raya was one of the boldest papers prior to Malari, but compared with its style during the 1950s, the paper's criticisms of the government had been relatively restrained. Staff argue they were critical of individuals and particular government policies rather than Suharto or the principles of the New Order. They wanted to be a loyal opposition. The editors chose their words carefully. Indonesia Raya’s style encouraged readers to take their own inference from its presentation of statements by the President, together with actual contraventions of such principles, using Suharto's comments as a yardstick against which to assess his government. The pojok used this style incisively.[194] The paper constantly emphasised the need for government introspection, reflection, and responsive concern for public feelings.[195]

Characteristically, Mochtar Lubis was overseas when Malari reached its peak. Leaving for Paris the first morning of the big rioting, he passed a burning Pasar Senen on his way to Kemayoran airport.[196] The paper was then in the hands of Enggak Bahau'ddin and Atmakusumah. Mochtar, who had heard of the ban while waiting at an international airport, returned early February to find the entire Indonesia Raya staff waiting for him at Kemayoran airport. Anticipating his arrest on arrival, staff gathered, rather mournfully, to photograph any attempt. Mochtar emerged in good spirits, hoping to infect them with his customary enthusiasm and good humour. Reminding them that they had accepted the risks of being banned, he stressed, once more, his familiar theme that


195. In the final edition of Indonesia Raya (21/1/74), Enggak Bahau'ddin even titled his weekly commentary column "Pemerintah Harus Melakukan Introspeksi" [The Government has to be introspective].

196. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 24/4/81. Mochtar could not recall the exact date, but it would appear to be 16 January.
newspapers have a duty to tell the public what is happening or close down.[197]

Mochtar Lubis pressed Admiral Sudomo, who replaced Sumitro as head of Kopkamtib, and Information Minister Mashuri to justify the ban in court, or he would launch a legal challenge. They counselled patience, assuring that the President would resolve the problem. After about three months, Mochtar paid off the employees so they could try to find other work, particularly difficult for the journalists. The government required prospective employers to gain special clearance from the Department of Information to re-employ former staff from the banned papers.[198]

As part of the crackdown on the press, on 21 June 1974 Enggak Bahau'ddin was arrested, to be detained for nearly 11 months.[199] Immediately on return from Paris, Mochtar Lubis, along with former PSI intellectual Soedjatmoko, had been instructed not to leave the country. For about two months, he was called for questioning approximately once a week. No formal charges were laid, but the interrogators accused him of mobilising the students to overthrow the government. It was a tense year of freedom, sharpened sensitivities and conjured memories, as he anticipated re-arrest,[200] the butt of jibes from friends glad he was

197. The scene was described to me by Jus Soemadipradja, 29/9/81.

198. I have sighted copies of two such Information Department clearance letters, stamped "secret". One, dated 9 December 1975, concerned the employment of an ex-Indonesia Raya journalist by an entertainment magazine. 'Clearance' (the English term is used) was given "on provision that he is not permitted to hold a leadership position". Although none of my informants had actually sighted the infamous Information Department 'black list', they were generally convinced it existed.

199. Released on 7 May 1975, he died on 1 September 1976 of leukaemia, which colleagues believe was exacerbated by poor detention facilities.

200. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 12/1/82.
still free.[201] He busied himself writing for Solidarity magazine in Manila, and Newsweek.[202] It was not until 4 February 1975 that he was arrested, to spend nearly two and a half months in Mirbaya prison, on the southern outskirts of Jakarta, until 14 April.

The long gap between the Indonesia Raya ban and Mochtar Lubis's arrest is an unanswered question. The last to be detained over Malari,[203] Mochtar claims the delay was used to fabricate evidence, namely a document alleging that Mochtar Lubis, Enggak Bahau'ddin and others held a secret meeting to overthrow the government.[204] A Malari detainee, Subroto Danusaputro, who claimed to be an Indonesia Raya correspondent in East Java, produced a "strictly confidential" report[205] of an alleged "briefing" given by Mochtar at Enggak Bahau'ddin's home on 5 February 1974 which discussed capitalising on Malari to change the national leadership by 1977. Subroto's cryptic and confused report could not be substantiated,[206] and, whereas a number of student leaders, such as Hariman Siregar, Syahrir and Ibrahim Zakir, were


202. He had been writing in Solidarity since 1966 and was listed as contributing editor for Newsweek's international edition from 7 May 1973 to 2 February 1976 (although inactive during his detention).

203. Kustiniyati Mochtar was questioned by military police and the South Jakarta State Prosecutor's Office, from February till May 1975 but not detained (Abdurrachman Surjomihardjo 1980:253).

204. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 12/1/82.

205. Photocopy in my possession.

206. My inquiries indicate the meeting as reported by Subroto never took place and the document was fabricated. Atmakusumah publicly denied that Subroto Danusaputro had ever worked as an Indonesia Raya correspondent, and asserted that his allegations about the secret meeting "make absolutely no sense" (Atmakusumah's letter to the editor, Kompas, 6 April 1976).
tried and given jail terms of up to six and a half years,[207] charges were not pressed against Mochtar Lubis or any others implicated by the Subroto document. Mochtar and Enggak Bahau’ddin were released unconditionally.[208]

Mochtar Lubis regarded his arrest as a victory for the Japanese lobby. Malari proved an opportunity, he thought, for people, such as Ibnu Sutowo and Sudjono Humeirhani, who had been the targets of Indonesia Raya’s attacks, to silence the paper.[209] Indonesia Raya’s history of opposition to the Aspri and Ali Murtopo made its re-appearance unlikely. Mochtar was approached indirectly by someone he believed to be acting unofficially for the Information Department. They suggested he would be permitted to either publish another paper without the name Indonesia Raya, or re-open Indonesia Raya without his name although he could still write, anonymously.[210] Mochtar Lubis rejected both compromises, arguing that neither he nor Indonesia Raya had acted illegally and to compromise would be an admission of guilt. He stood firm, but Indonesia Raya’s demise disturbed his personal and professional life and significantly changed his public profile.

The Years after Indonesia Raya

With the exception of Hariman Siregar, who was kept mostly in solitary confinement, Mochtar was the only Malari detainee in Nirbaya, a

209. Interviews with Mochtar Lubis, 24/4/81 and 12/1/82.
210. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 12/1/82.
model prison for elite political detainees. He shared a compound with senior prisoners arrested after 1 October 1965, such as former air force commander Omar Dhani, who had been Mochtar's instructor at the Jakarta Aeroclub in the early 1950s, and Soebandrio, formerly Sukarno's first deputy premier, to whom Mochtar was close during the Revolution when Soebandrio was Secretary-General of the Information Ministry in Yogyakarta. Despite political differences, the detainees got on amicably.

His diary, which includes a number of letters written to his family, reveals the author as a man still motivated by crusading moral rectitude and belief in the "rule of law". He is passionately concerned about people and his society, and writes with great conviction about injustice and abuse of power. But it seems clear, in retrospect, that his rebellious posture was curbed by this last imprisonment. Earlier detentions had meant long periods away from loved ones. He had not been present to deal with family problems, some of which were aggravated by his absences, nor to participate in the joys and responsibilities of his children's childhood. His wife, Hally, proved an unparalleled support and their relationship was loving and passionate, but family relations suffered under the strains of indefinite detention.

These are things about which he preferred not to talk, but after his release, friends noted a more restrained, reflective manner, interpreted by some as an indication of greater personal maturity and political sagacity, by others as a dissipatedness, a resolve not to subject himself or his family to another detention. While his jovial good nature and boisterous laugh sustained the image of a man of boundless optimism, the realisation that his international standing had not protected him from arrest seems to have tempered his willingness to risk his freedom.
As a business person, too, he had had to pay a price for criticising the government. While his political stance had enhanced his business potential during the early New Order, his notoriety after his Malari arrest was a commercial liability and a disincentive for business partners. After Indonesia Raya's collapse, it had to re-schedule the Bank Indonesia debt and cancel informal loans, causing substantial losses to Mochtar and his 'friends'. The Indonesia Raya offices were let, to recoup income, and debt re-scheduling favoured Indonesia Raya, but much remained unpaid in 1981.[211]

From his release until the close of this study in 1982, Mochtar's forays onto the political stage were few. Overseas commitments and his businesses, particularly Fortune Advertising, took an increasing share of his time.[212] In addition, his social, artistic and professional activities continued to attract public interest and his opinions were frequently sought by both foreign and local journalists and academics, on topics from advertising to art, from politics to painting.

From December 1977 till November 1979, he served on the 16 member International Commission for the Study of Communications Problems, established by UNESCO to examine the "problems of communication in modern society",[213] after Third World calls for a New International Information Order (NIIIO). Mochtar Lubis is one of only four Indonesians

211. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 24/4/81.

212. As a measure of his status in the advertising industry, in December 1979, he was elected chairperson of the Honorary Council of the PPPI (Advertising Companies' Association of Indonesia) (Pers Indonesia, October 1980, p.69).

to sit on such prestigious UN Commissions.[214] Headed by Sean MacBride, former Irish Foreign Minister, Chairperson of Amnesty International and holder of both the Nobel and Lenin peace prizes, the commission had four sessions at the Paris headquarters plus others in Sweden, Yugoslavia, India and Mexico, taking about two months of Mochtar's time.[215] Mochtar was critical of the final report and accused the secretariat of manipulating the commission's recommendations to reflect the biases of bureaucrats rather than commission members.[216] He believed it was hypocritical for Third World spokespeople to complain about an imbalance in the information flow internationally, when they are "completely silent about the nonexistence of a free and balanced flow of information and news within their own countries, between the power elite which rules and the masses of the population".[217]

Mochtar Lubis took on other new international responsibilities. In 1978, he became Associate Editor for Southeast Asia of the new Boston-based WorldPaper, which was inserted into host papers on five continents, quarterly at first then monthly from 1980.[218] His involvement with the

214. The others were Adam Malik (on the Independent Commission on International Development Issues, chaired by former West German Federal Chancellor, Willy Brandt), Soedjatmoko (on the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, chaired by former Swedish Prime Minister, Olof Palme) and Emil Salim (on the Independent Commission on the UN Commission on Environment and Development, chaired by former Norwegian Prime Minister, Ms Gro Harlem-Brundtland).


218. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 8/3/82.
international press community continued through the IPI, and the PFA, in which he was elected Director-General in 1981.[219]

By 1982, Mochtar Lubis was spending half his time abroad.[220] He consciously stepped back from Indonesian public life to move into international forums because, as he said in 1981,

"it is like rowing against a very strong tide politically in Indonesia today. Whatever you do you will fail, and if you do it in a very strong manner you will get a reaction from the government which will stop all your activities completely...[By] being active abroad, looking also into real problems, which have very direct implications for our future, I think I could be more constructive".[221]

However, he remained peripherally involved in the dissident politics of the secular modernising intellectuals. He had been a member of the Advisory Council [Dewan Penyantun] of the Jakarta Legal Aid Institute (LBH) since its founding in 1971. One of the most outspoken of a new group of non-governmental organisations, the LBH

"has proved more effective than any other public or private institution in calling attention to the decrepitude of the legal system, political injustice, and social and economic inequity."[222]

Mochtar sympathised with its push for structural social and legal reform, which owed much to the thinking of founder, Buyung Nasution, himself a Malari detainee, and particularly his protege and successor, T. Mulya Lubis. Mochtar was proud of the LBH's radical reputation and its goals of educating people about their legal rights, conscientising the legal profession and agitating for a just and equal legal system.[223] In

219. "Mochtar Lubis Terpilih Menjadi Dirjen PFA", Kompas, 7/11/81, p.VII.
221. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 12/1/82.
223. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 27/4/81.
January 1980, he joined a new LBH-based lobby group, 'Abolish the Death Penalty' [Hapuskan Hukuman Mati, HATI]. [224]

On 1 June 1978, the 33rd anniversary of the birth of the Pancasila, Mochtar Lubis joined a group of opposition figures, including former Vice President Mohammad Hatta, former Defence Minister A.H. Nasution, former Jakarta Governor Lieutenant General Ali Sadikin, and former chief of national police, General Hugeng Imam Santoso, to found the Institute for Constitutional Awareness [Yayasan Lembaga Pengembangan Pengertian dan Kesadaran Berkonstitusi Menurut Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, or LKB]. Bringing together leading retired military figures, with respected civilians, this proved to be a small, but influential, elite opposition network.

Cooperation within this group led in May 1980 to the presentation to Parliament of a Statement of Concern, signed by 50 citizens from different ideological and generational groups, including at least 14 members of the LKB. The Group of 50 were reacting to unscripted speeches by the President in which he implied that criticism of him was tantamount to subversion, alleged there were opposition groups threatening the Pancasila, and urged the army to take political sides. [225] Mochtar Lubis did not sign the 'Petition of Fifty'. He was abroad when signatories were approached, but he has become associated, in the minds of many, with the group.

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225. For a summary of the issues, see David Bourchier (1987) "The 'Petition of 50': who and what are they", Inside Indonesia, No. 10, April, pp.7-10.

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Despite being a founding member of the LKB, Mochtar Lubis has participated in few of their activities, with the exception of particular tasks, such as urging the Sultan of Yogyakarta to join the LKB, or lobbying factions of the DPR in July 1979 on the implementation of the Constitution.[226] He does not enjoy the regular demands of organisational work. His is a symbolic role, affirming the ideals of clean, open, responsible government. Mochtar has not cultivated an organisable constituency, nor after Malari, has he had a medium through which to influence or mobilise support. Moreover, his close relationship with the student community has tended to fade. Till 1974, he enjoyed prestige as a symbol of the struggle for press freedom under the Sukarno government. After his release in 1975, his political attitudes became less noticeable publicly, partly because Indonesia Raya was no longer championing them, partly because Mochtar himself was more cautious and less frequently drawn into public debate.

The nature of the student movement was changing too. By 1974, the leaders of the 1966 movement, with whom Mochtar had maintained good relations, had moved out of student politics. Some had graduated to national politics (like Cosmas Batubara) or become public servants. Some worked as restrained editors in successful commercial enterprises (like Goenawan Mohamad). Others like Nono Anwar Makarim and Arief Budiman were overseas studying. As a generation, they had either joined the ranks of the New Order government, which they basically supported and helped legitimate, or they had been politically neutralised, cut off from the bases of activism on the campuses and without mobilisable followings.

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amongst the general public. Also, Mochtar's hero image had been somewhat tarnished by accusations, such as those launched by Diah over the Pertamina exposure, and by legal disputes.[227] Some admirers were disappointed that he chose businesses, such as Indoconsult and Fortune, in the fields of consultancy and advertising, which directly promoted foreign companies in Indonesia.

His business roles notwithstanding, Mochtar Lubis was still admired by many of the young students who moved into the streets in January 1974. When large-scale student opposition re-emerged in 1977-78, he was far less well-known and played only a small part. Mochtar was on a fellowship in Holland during the build-up to the 1978 demonstrations.[228] After his return, he joined 13 other intellectuals and literary figures, in signing a statement issued on 24 January 1978, calling for the lifting of constraints on students' councils and campus freedoms, the release of arrested student leaders, and the revoking of the bans on seven newspapers.[229] However, his support was more symbolic than active.

By the middle 1970s, student leaders were looking to people younger than Mochtar for a analysis of socio-economic alternatives and practical guidance for the opposition movement. Intellectuals like Dorodjatun Kuntjoro Jakti, Mulya Lubis, and Juwono Sudarsono became more interesting and more authoritative to secular youth, while figures like Dawam Rahardjo, A.M. Fatwa, H. Sanusi and Abdurrachman Wahid found enthusiastic audiences among Islamic young people.

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227. See footnote page 134.


In the early 1980s Mochtar was still fairly frequently approached by students to address campus groups or write for their publications. But, within the broad opposition, his mentor role had passed to others. He was less a domestic opposition figure than a participant in a transnational community of intellectuals and artists.
CHAPTER FIVE

A CAREER IN CULTURE

This chapter traces Mochtar Lubis's career outside journalism, as a cultural figure. It looks at his changing cultural roles, from his emergence in the mid 1940s as a young satirist, his national recognition as a leading author, his international reputation as 'writer-prisoner of conscience', his role in key institutions of New Order artistic life, to his prominence as a national and international cultural statesman in the 1970s and 1980s. While a detailed examination of some of his fictional works and major public lectures will be conducted in later chapters, this chapter describes the artistic activities in which he has been involved. The groups and organisations, both domestic and international, which represent his constituencies, will be examined in locating Mochtar Lubis within the shifting cultural politics of post-Independence Indonesia.

The career begins

H.B. Jassin, to whom many young writers submitted manuscripts for advice, was unimpressed by the first short story he read by Mochtar Lubis, whom he met at Achdhat Karta Mihardja's home during the Japanese occupation. Jassin, then working at Balai Pustaka, declined to publish the romanticised story about a young girl and her boyfriend.[1] But Mochtar's literary skills were fostered during his involvement in the weekly magazine on politics and culture, Siasat [Strategy], established in Jakarta in 1947. Siasat attracted numerous PSI supporters to its

editorial board under Rosihan Anwar and Soedjatmoko. It was Mochtar Lubis's short stories in the cultural column 'Gelanggang' [Forum, Arena] that earned him his early reputation as a author. Throughout 1949, Mochtar contributed both short stories and essays[2] and was an editorial assistant with 'Gelanggang', which began in March 1948, under the editorship of Chairil Anwar, Asrul Sani and Rivai Apin.[3]

Initially, Mochtar Lubis made his mark as a satirist with his short stories in Siasat about 'Si Jamal', a character based on an acquaintance.[4] He published six such stories in 1948-49, and in 1950 they were collected in the book Si Jamal dan cerita-cerita lain [Jamal and other stories].[5]

Mochtar's first novel, Tidak Ada Esok [There is no tomorrow],[6] in 1950, failed to impress Jassin, who preferred the satire of Si Jamal.[7] Jassin appreciated its nationalist symbolism but criticised

2. The first short story I have located is "Si Jamal dan buku-buku" (Kisah benar kejadian oleh Mochtar H. Lubis) [Jamal and books (a true story by M.H.L)], in Gelanggang, Siasat, 5 December 1948, p.3. Mochtar rarely uses the middle initial. When I inquired in 1982, he did not remember what it stood for, suggesting that it was probably in place of his father's personal name, Husein (interview with Mochtar Lubis, 8 March 1982). The first essay, "Aliran Romantik" [Romanticism], was published a week later in Siasat, 12 December 1948, pp. 6 & 9.


4. For publication details of Mochtar Lubis's short stories, see Chambert-Loir 1974:243-5 & 247. I record my thanks to Dr Ulrich Kratz and the staff of the H.B. Jassin Literary Documentation Centre, Jakarta for help in locating many of these early stories.

5. Gapura, Jakarta, February 1950.


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what he saw a lack of technical skill in its author, who employed a complex series of flashbacks in the novel. He suggested that this style "gave rise to the impression that the author was not able to describe reality realistically from within [the characters]."[8]

Early Polemics

Mochtar's background and education had provided a familiarity with European traditions, literature, culture and social forms. He had been drawn into examining one of the major philosophical challenges of the pre-war era, the so-called "Cultural Polemics" [Polemik Kebudayaan], initiated in the pages of the intellectual journal Pujangga Baru during the 1930s.[9] The debate was over the most prudent Indonesian stance on Western values. In an ongoing exchange of articles, one school of thought suspected Western influence and called for a re-emphasis of traditional values, a re-assertion of spiritual strengths. The opposing argument, expressed most eloquently by Takdir Alisjahbana, advocated the selective acquisition of Western values and dynamism in order to deal with the West on its own terms.[10]

Mochtar Lubis said in 1981 that he regarded himself as treading the middle ground:


9. See Keith Foulcher (1980), Pujangga Baru: Literature and Nationalism in Indonesia 1933-1942, Flinders University Asian Studies Monograph, [Bedford Park], pp.23-25. Pujangga Baru magazine (July 1933 - February 1942), edited by Takdir Alisjahbana, Amir Hamzah, and Armijn Pane, was a major outlet for leading writers of the pre-war period. It was later revived from 1948 to 1953.

"At first, during the colonial time, I was quite impressed by this second view, that we just take over all these values from the West and use them against the West, but during the revolution I saw that it was really many of our traditional values [that] were a source of strength for our people at that time, rather than the Western values: the solidarity at the village base which kept the Revolution going."[11]

On 19 November 1946, an Independent Artists' Forum (Gelanggang Seniman Merdeka) was formed, at the instigation of Chairil Anwar, consciously breaking with the pre-war literary traditions of Pujangga Baru.[12] The initial editors of Siasat's Gelanggang column were core members of this group, which later recorded its beliefs on 18 February 1950 in the Surat Kepercayaan Gelanggang ['Gelanggang'/Forum Testimonial of Faith], declaring that:

"We are the legitimate heirs of the culture of the whole world, a culture which is ours to extend and develop in our own way... For this Indonesian culture will be determined by the manifold responses made on our part to stimuli from every corner of the globe, each of them true to its own nature... Our results may not always be original, but our fundamental quest is humanity."[13]

Prior to the Transfer of Sovereignty, Jassin was wary of the political ramifications of this philosophy, feeling that editors of sympathetic magazines, such as Gema Suasana, had "unwittingly become Dutch political tools, ... weakening the spirit of [anti-colonial] resistance which is rooted in nationalism" at a time when "the Dutch are consciously fueling this spirit of humanism precisely to aid their

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11. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 24/4/81.
tactics in subjugating Indonesia again".[14] Many nationalists were suspicious of the influence of Dutch cultural activists collaborating on Indonesia magazines, such as *Gema Suasana*. However, by December 1951, Jassin was using the term 'universal humanism' approvingly to describe the spirit of the Gelanggang declaration.[16]

During his period working with Gelanggang and Mutiara, Mochtar Lubis wrote essays identifying with the Surat Kepercayaan Gelanggang philosophy. In a Gelanggang essay entitled "Hidup, Mati?" [Alive, Dead?] he defended the writers of the 1945 Generation[17] and the Gelanggang group. He identified himself unequivocally with the values of that group writing

"Almost every member of the Generation of 1945 who has written in the Gelanggang column repeatedly affirmed the meanings of 'human dignity'.[18] For us, the term 'human dignity' implies everything we are striving for. It is an


15. Such figures included Dolf Verspoor, regarded even by some anti-communists as working for Dutch intelligence (NEFIS), and Drs Rob Nieuwenhuis, who, with friends, published the cultural magazines Orientatie and Kritiek en Opbouw. My understanding of this period was enriched by conversations with Achdhat K. Mihardja, Canberra, 15 December 1984.


17. In political parlance the '1945 Generation' referred to the people mobilised into the nationalist struggle in the years of guerrilla fighting from 1945 (rather than earlier). In literary discussion, it was used also for a category of writers, associated with Chairil Anwar and Gelanggang (and sometimes called the 'Chairil Anwar' or 'Gelanggang' Generation) who were distinguished from writers prominent before the war (see Jassin 1985, Vol. 2, p.2). Numerous debates have arisen regarding the appropriateness and definition of these terms. For example, it was debated whether members of the leftist cultural institute LEKRA, established in 1950, were included in this Generation of 45, since the term referred more to a community of common belief rather than a chronological period. See Bakri Siregar, "Prof. D. A. TEEUW Tentang Lekra", *Zaman Baru*, June 1956, pp.29-32, particularly p.29. Keith Foulcher discusses the political implications of this tussle over terminology (1986:21-23).

18. English used in the original.
idea which transcends national boundaries, an idea which embraces the whole of humanity."

The group did not seek only Independence, for that was merely

"a key to open the door onto an even broader field of endeavour, an endeavour which strides beyond the constraints of nationalism. The Generation of 1945 also wants to achieve universal values, eternal humanitarian values."[19]

Mochtar Lubis's idealism and lauding of human dignity was ridiculed by Asrul Sani, from the Gelanggang group, who responded mockingly:

"Could Mochtar Lubis who once said 'For us the term human dignity implies everything we are striving for' explain to me the meaning of the term human dignity? Or is this just an air, an empty heroic gesture...?"

After his energies were absorbed in Indonesia Raya from December 1949, Mochtar Lubis took little part in the polemics that surrounded the growing schism between artists associated with Gelanggang, and the principal vehicle of opposition to the Gelanggang group and its philosophy, LEKRA. LEKRA [Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat, Institute of People's Culture], was founded in 1950 by D.N. Aidit, Wjoto, (both leaders of the PKI) together with M.S. Ashar and A.S. Dharta.[21] During

19. My emphasis. Siasat, III, No. 144, 4 December 1949, p.6. In an interview (11/3/81), Mochtar Lubis said that he did not see himself as being a member of any particular generation, or identifiable support group of writer-friends amongst whom he circulated drafts or discussed plans, but I feel he was simply trying to distance himself from the practice of type-casting 'generations', rather than denying these comments written over 30 years earlier.


21. On LEKRA see Foulcher 1986 and Yahaya Ismail (1972) Pertumbuhan, Perkembangan dan Kejatuhan Lekra di Indonesia: Satu Tinjauan dari Aspek Sosio-Budaya, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Kuala Lumpur. The most comprehensive analysis of literature by a senior LEKRA member, including criticisms of the 'universal humanism' of the Gelanggang group, was given by Pramoedya Ananta Toer at a Seminar at the Faculty of Arts, University of Indonesia, on 26 January 1963. The text later circulated in stencilled form, under the title Realisme-Sosialis dan Sastra Indonesia (sebuah tinjauan sosial). In June 1980 a corrected re-typed copy was deposited in H.B. Jassin's Literary
its early years the Institute attracted a range of writers, who were not supporters of the PKI. Achdhat K. Mihardja, for example, attended LEKRA functions, like discussions and seminars. Mochtar Lubis did too, although he never took an active part in the organisation. Though identified by LEKRA members, as a Gelanggang sympathiser who was politically non-party but close to the PSI,[22] Mochtar was a strong individualist, cultivating a distance from the artistic groupings of the time. He was discriminating enough to distinguish between the PKI, as a political party, and LEKRA, as a cultural organisation. Key former LEKRA members expressed qualified respect for Mochtar Lubis because, although he opposed the Institute's ideology, he did not publicly damn LEKRA by linking it indiscriminately with the PKI in his frequent attacks on the party.[23]

Mochtar Lubis's even-handed attitude to LEKRA may have been based on a belief, fostered by the intimacy of the Jakarta artistic community, that LEKRA artists and writers would not accept being dictated to by the PKI leadership. One LEKRA officebearer assumed

"Some of the major LEKRA figures, like Pramoedya, Henk Ngantung, Hendra, Affandi, Utuy Tatang Sontani, Rivai Apin, Basuki Resobowo, may possibly have been regarded by [Mochtar Lubis] as unable to live under PKI political power."

Throughout the first half of the 1950s there was movement of artists between these two groups. The sharp conflict between LEKRA and its opponents which dominated artistic discourse in the 1960s was yet to

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Documentation Centre. I will refer to this version, signed and dated by Jassin on 2/7/80, as Pramoedya 1980a. The LEKRA Preamble (Mukaddimah) (1950 and 1955 versions) outlining the institute's principles appears with translation in Foulcher 1986:209-222.


23. Interview (1982) and correspondence (25 November 1982) with Informant A, a former member of the LEKRA Central Committee.

emerge. Group members participated in similar activities. Symposia and
conferences provided an opportunity to argue and debate. In 1951, LEKRA
office-bearers A.S. Dharta and M.S. Ashar joined with non-LEKRA authors,
such as Achdiat K. Mihardja, to establish an Indonesian branch of the
literary PEN Club of poets, playwrights, essayists and novelists, of
which Mochtar became a member. About a year later, Mochtar Lubis
cooperated with LEKRA members, such as Joebaar Ajoeb, in a Multatuli
Remembrance Committee [Panitia Peringatan Multatuli].[25] The committee,
headed by Joebaar Ajoeb, invited Mochtar Lubis and LEKRA member Boejoeng
Saleh to give lectures at a gathering to recognise Multatuli's
contribution to Indonesia. At a time when Indonesia Raya's editorial
policy was clearly anti-communist, in artistic and cultural affairs
Mochtar willingly cooperated with LEKRA members. As he viewed it, he
preferred to keep political tensions out of art as much as possible.

Literary recognition

Mochtar's first literary works to gain him recognition as an
important writer was Jalan Tak Ada Ujung [A Road with No End], published
in 1952.[26] Critics such as Jassin, Teeuw, A.H. Johns and M.S.

25. Multatuli, the author of Max Havelaar, was actually a Dutch national,
E. Douwes Dekker. His 1859 Dutch-language novel stirred liberal
Europeans against Dutch colonial practices. See introductions by Roy
Edwards (translator) and D.H. Lawrence to the English translation,
University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst, 1982 (pp.7-8 & 11).

26. Detailed studies of Jalan Tak Ada Ujung, include Hutagalung 1968 and
Tim Peneliti Jurusan Bahasa dan Sastra Indonesia 1979. I discuss this
novel in more detail in Chapter 6.
Hutagalung regard this work as Mochtar's most outstanding, and it enjoys a paramount place in the Indonesian literary ranking.[27]

In 1952, *Jalan Tak Ada Ujung* won an annual prize for best novel awarded by the National Cultural Council [Badan Musyawarat Kebudayaan Nasional, BMKN], a government-sponsored body founded that year, which brought together various partisan cultural groupings.[28] The four man jury was headed by two leading LEKRA members: Bakri Siregar, as chairperson, and Boejoeng Saleh, as secretary, suggesting that the assessment of LEKRA members was similar to those of Jassin.[29]

Notwithstanding the bi-partisan BMKN award, *Jalan Tak Ada Ujung* proved controversial, highlighting growing differences in assessment by the Gelanggang group and LEKRA. Mochtar Lubis regards this work as his greatest literary achievement.[30] For sympathisers of the Gelanggang declaration such as Jassin (along with his proteges and foreign colleagues), the novel stands, alongside Idrus's *Surabaya* and Pramoedya's *Keluarga Gerilya*, as a model achievement of the Generation of '45. Such

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27. Teeuw 1967:197 describes it as "one of the soundest novels to be found in the whole of modern Indonesian literature"; Johns (introduction to *A Road with No End* 1982:3) regards it as having established "the place of Lubis in modern Indonesian literature"; while, in 1952, Jassin described it, Idrus's *Surabaya* and Pramoedya Ananta Toer's *Keluarga Gerilya*, "the peaks of the literature of the Generation of 1945" (See H.B. Jassin, (1955) *Kesusasteraan Indonesia Modern dalam Kritik dan Essay*, Gunung Agung, Jakarta, (2nd ed.) p.222.


29. According to an informed source privy to negotiations (Informant I, interviewed in 1981), the LEKRA judges had protested about the BMKN stipulation that the winning novel should be set during the Revolution, which they regarded as overly restricting their choice. The appropriateness of the award has been questioned more recently by Panusuk Eneste ("Ketutakan Guru Isa: Penilaian Kembali", *Horison*, April 1978, XIII, No.4, pp.123-5, see p.125).

30. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 24/4/81.
novels played a role in establishing the patterns and precedence for future literary production, to be emulated by aspiring writers drawn to the same literary traditions.

Jassin's praise was not without reservation. In 1953 he gave some credence to an accusation by Pramoedya Ananta Toer that Jalan Tak Ada Ujung may have been plagiarised. Pramoedya claimed there was a similarity between the novel and the story-line of an American-made film by French director Jean Renoir, entitled This Land is Mine. Although Jassin had never seen the film, he agreed that, on the basis of Pramoedya's descriptions, it appeared to be an 'adaptation' of it. [31] Mochtar denied emphatically any connection, stressing that he had never seen the film, and so could not have even been "inspired" by it. [32] Yet the inference gained some currency.

Many of the precise qualities regarded by the universal humanists as the strengths of Jalan Tak Ada Ujung -- the Freudian revelations of the psyche of the protagonist in his dreams; the unstereotypical, critical characterisation of the pejuang [Independence fighters] complete with all their shortcomings in a process of de-mythologising the revolution; the probing focus on individuals standing apart from their community -- were those disliked by opponents. When political schisms developed within the artistic community at the end of the decade, LEKRA members interpreted Jalan Tak Ada Ujung as pessimistic literature, typical of the bourgeois

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32. Mochtar Lubis, "'Jalan tak ada ujung' tak ada hubungan dgn[sic] 'This Land is Mine'", Harian Mimbar Indonesia 16 February 1953. Having viewed the film, I believe the similarity is coincidental.
authors of Gelanggang. [33] By the early 1960s, LEKRA publications were attacking
"the cynicism, intellectualism, scepticism and individualism which characterises the works of some of the 'Generation of 1945', like Idrus, Rosihan Anwar and Mochtar Lubis". [34]

Various critics argued that Mochtar's novel reduced the issues of national independence and freedom to those of personal independence and psychological freedom.

**The Congress for Cultural Freedom**

Mochtar Lubis was strongly attracted to the intellectual and literary products of the USA and he recognised a similarity between the 1945 Generation artists, with their emphasis on "human dignity", and contemporary American writers, who were trying to awaken, what one American literary critic (quoted by Mochtar Lubis) described as, "the dignity of the human spirit". [35] While leftist-nationalists acknowledge Mochtar was fiercely pro-Republican in the 1940s, by the mid-50s his proximity to the Americans in Jakarta was viewed with suspicion. [36]

In 1951 Mochtar joined the International Press Institute, which, although founded in Paris and operated from a headquarters in Switzerland, was largely the product of American initiative. [37]

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35. Mochtar Lubis made the comparison in his essay "Buku yang akan datang", (Gelanggang, Siasat, 20 February 1949, II, No.103, pp.7-8), reviewing The Shape of Books to Come, a study of American literature by J. Donald Adams.

1954[38] he joined the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF), established in Berlin in 1950 after strong American lobbying and amidst a "strong undercurrent of ex-communism" and a "view of intellectuals as the vanguard of history".[39] The CCF provided a forum, according to Mochtar,

"where the intellectuals around the world can get together and exchange their views, know each other and discuss problems which concern all mankind... [and] look into the problems of intellectuals around the world".[40]

From its headquarters in Paris the CCF was active in sponsoring the publication of magazines in various languages, to promote 'cultural freedom' and debate. The most well known journal was the English Encounter magazine. However, as Christopher Lasch says of the editors of Encounter, the "defense of 'cultural freedom' was wholly entwined, in their minds, with the defense of the 'free world' against communism."[41] Critics regarded the CCF as an attempt to make "anti-communism respectable among the intellectuals around the world".[42] The West

37. In 1959 the Chairman described the IPI as having been "born in America" but said it was "in fact becoming genuinely international" ([IPI Report, August 1959]). On Mochtar Lubis's involvement, see Chapter 3.


39. A detailed discussion of the CCF in the American and international context is given in "The Cultural Cold War: A Short History of the Congress for Cultural Freedom", Chapter 3 of Christopher Lasch (1970) The Agony of the American Left, Andre Deutsch, London, pp.63-114. Quotation p.67. Referring to the organisations' connection with the American government, Lasch argues the CCF had a 'quasi-official character', because of the official positions formerly held by the main American promoters of the organisations, Melvin J. Lasky (formerly with the American Information Service and editor of Der Monat, a US government-sponsored magazine in Germany) and Michael Josselson (former officer in the Office of Strategic Services, the precursor to the CIA, who became CCF executive director) (Lasch 1970:63).

40. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 16/2/81.


European and American origins of the CCF exerted a major influence over its composition and ideology.

In Jakarta an 'interim committee' of the CCF was set up by 1956, composed, among others, of Mochtar Lubis and Takdir Alisjahbana, who had attended a CCF meeting in Rangoon the previous year.[43] Prabhakar Padhye, the Indian secretary for Asian Affairs of the CCF, was invited to address a small meeting in Jakarta on 12 April 1956, on "The Meaning of Freedom in Contemporary Cultural Life".[44] Although no formal CCF structure was established in Indonesia, linking the circle of sympathisers, which included Soedjatmoko, Wiratmo Soekito, journalists P.K. Oyong and Rosihan Anwar, these individuals contributed to the ideological mix of the times by promoting a world view broadly sympathetic to the West, circulating reading material from the CCF and attending conferences and seminars organised by the body. Such conferences, enlivened by vigorous intellectual debate, gave considerable attention in the late 1950s to the problems for democracy posed by 'authoritarianism' in Asia and Africa.

Serious interest in the CCF in Indonesia was limited to a small number of liberal intellectuals, but its publications may well have had considerable influence, not least in helping Indonesian intellectuals to compare their situation with other Third World countries. Ivan Kats, a Belgian-born American national who worked in the CCF's Asia Program, claims to have been sending reading material to about 150 people in the

43. [Congress for Cultural Freedom] [1955] for details of this meeting, with Mochtar's contribution on pp.134-5.

44. "Kemerdekaan dan Kebudayaan Modern", Indonesia Raya, 11 April 1956, p.3.
early 1960s, motivated by his passionate conviction that "democratic intellectuals" in Indonesia were "utterly isolated" under Sukarno.[45]

Defending the political emphasis of the CCF, Kats explained,

"it may be that some branches of the Congress for Cultural Freedom became very exclusively anti-communist but that was neither the definition or the purpose of that organisation".[46]

Yet Indonesian critics attacked what they saw as the CCF's anti-communist bias internationally.[47] Kats also arranged for Goenawan Mohamad and Soe Hok Djin (Arief Budiman), two young anti-Sukarnoist intellectuals, to study in Europe around 1965.

For Mochtar, organisations like the CCF and the IPI provided both intellectual stimulus, and, during his detention after 1956, persistent support. His orientation abroad was to such organisations, rather than the fount of Holland, which drew many Dutch-educated Indonesians.

Fictional works

Novel and short story reading in Indonesia was the preserve of a minute urban elite, with print runs of fictional works rarely exceeding

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45. Interview with Ivan Kats, 12 April 1982. Recipients included prominent political figures, such as Mohamad Roem, Mohammad Natsir and Anak Agung Gde Agung.

46. Interview with Ivan Kats, Jakarta, 12 April 1982. Mochtar Lubis emphasises that the CCF defended the rights of leftists who were suffering under pressure from right-wing national governments, specifically in South America. (Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 18 March 1982).


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5,000 copies, until the 1970s' boom in 'popular' novels. In February 1950, after only two months of production, *Indonesia Raya* claimed to have a daily print run of twice this figure. The newspaper, not the novel, was the medium through which Mochtar Lubis sought to fashion public opinion. Mochtar Lubis's

"decision to devote his principal energies to journalism rather than literature was the result of careful thought and quite deliberate. He felt that in this way he could communicate to a far wider public his ideals of democracy and individual responsibility."

Mochtar wrote short stories from time to time, while working as a journalist in the 1950s, but more commonly his notes and drafts of fictional works were only jotted down, to be expanded later, in a habit he continued into the 1980s. His interest in art showed through *Indonesia Raya*, which (together with *Harian Rakyat*) was one of few newspapers with a regular 'cultural' page, a commitment respected even by LEKRA opponents.

Mochtar Lubis's final literary volume before his arrest in December 1956 was a short story collection, *Perempuan* [Woman, 1956], which won the BMKN literary prize for 1955-56. Mochtar particularly liked the title

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49. Full page advertisement in *Mutiara*, 30 January 1950, II, No. 1. Such figures, especially when used in advertising, should be regarded with some scepticism. Chambert-Loir 1974:70 cites the December 1949 figure of 5,000, declining to 3,500 by October 1951.


52. Details of the 18 short stories (ten of which had been published previously either in *Indonesia Raya* or the fiction magazine, *Kisah*) are given in Chambert-Loir 1974:244, which lists details of their previous publication.
story and "Orang Gila" [The mad person].[53] "Orang Gila", based on an actual occurrence, displays the author's concern for the poor as he attempts to come to terms with his moral obligations and sense of guilt. On his way to work, over a number of days, the narrator observed a bedraggled woman, sitting half naked in the street. Eventually he approached her, with a garment. Her erratic reactions led him to question whether such people were truly deranged, or simply feigning madness to avoid the guilt and social stigma of abject poverty.[54]

The Perempuan collection included another well known short story which presents the author's concern for the socially disadvantaged. Like several other short stories, it was incorporated into Mochtar's next novel, Senja di Jakarta [Twilight in Jakarta], written under house arrest.[55] The previously published short story "Sepotong rokok kretek" [A clove cigarette][56] opens the novel with its description of two garbage collectors savouring a few warm draughts of a kretek cigarette butt in lieu of the food they could not afford. Mochtar's attention in his stories to the struggles of the urban poor and his incorporation of this story into his most overtly political novel indicates his attitudes to fiction. In the debate and exchange between LEKRA and non-LEKRA


54. Mochtar Lubis discusses his personal reaction to seeing the mad woman in "Pengakuan-pengakuan Seorang Pengarang" [An Author's Confessions], Buku Kita (monthly magazine), No.5, May 1955, pp.200-2.


56. Published in Kisah, February 1954, II, No.2, pp.57-59.
artists, authors were being challenged to make their art speak about the problems of the community around them. Mochtar recognised a potential in literature to address social and political issues and demonstrated this in Senja di Jakarta.

"Speaking to the world"

Senja di Jakarta [Twilight in Jakarta] contrasts sharply with Jalan Tak Ada Ujung in style and subject matter, and in the extent to which it treats directly political issues. At a time when LEKRA was coming under criticism for its call for a blending of aesthetic standards with political commitment, Mochtar was attempting to do precisely this: produce a literary work of high standard, with a clear political message. Unlike Jalan Tak Ada Ujung's focus on the psychological quandaries of its solitary central protagonist, Senja di Jakarta embraces a score of characters, whom readers know more from their actions than their psyche. This is no agonising, self-consciously intellectual volume, but a broad political tableau in which editorialist and short story writer collaborate to damn a political system. The issues are those of abuse of political power and the need for social control. The criticisms embodied in the novel are clear and the targets unquestionable. Mochtar adopts a realist, almost journalistic, style in the novel. The reader sees easy parallels between fictional characters pilloried and actual public figures they represent. The subtlety and revelation of psychological conflicts admired in Jalan Tak Ada Ujung by critics like Jassin have given way to a transparent forthright crusading style. Mochtar is criticising both the party political system, and particular styles of political activity associated with Sukarno-like figures.
Mochtar Lubis began writing the novel, originally entitled *Yang Terinjak dan Melawan* [Down-trodden and resisting], in December 1958 during his house arrest.[57] In November 1960 he was visited by a Danish member of the CCF, Frode Jacobson, who took the completed manuscript to England.[58] It was translated by Claire Holt and the drafts perused by Mochtar when he was in Europe during his brief respite from detention in 1961. *Twilight in Jakarta* became the first Indonesian novel to appear in English, when, in 1963, with the support of the CCF, it was published by Hutchinson in London, and by Vanguard in the United States the following year.[59] By arrangement with the publishers, the book was the first in a CCF series, 'New Voices in Translation', covering works by writers in the developing world. Its success gained an international reputation as a Third World writer for Mochtar Lubis.

The Indonesian original of *Senja di Jakarta* was not published until 1970, after editions in English, Dutch, Spanish, Korean, Italian and Malay.[60] During Mochtar Lubis's detention some English and Malay copies were brought into the country surreptitiously, read and discussed, but the novel had little impact there. When the Indonesian edition appeared, Jassin remarked rather dismissively:

"Its story is interesting enough, showing the social conditions and political situation when Sukarno was in power... [But] unfortunately [Mochtar] has not continued his former style, as in *Jalan Tak Ada Ujung*.[61]

57. See *Catatan Subversif* 1980:144.


60. See back cover of 1970 Indonesian edition, published by PT Badan Penerbit Indonesia Raya.

After an unattractively presented first edition, it was not reprinted until 1981.

Mochtar Lubis wanted to write Senja di Jakarta as a "report" depicting "the social and political conditions of our country".[62] With the CCF's help, he succeeded in portraying his view of Indonesian political life to a wider audience, for many of whom Twilight in Jakarta provided their first glimpse of Indonesian literature. Literary critics wrote of Mochtar's commonality with other Third World writers[63] and described the issues dealt with in the novel as common to many Third World countries.[64]

The publication of Twilight in Jakarta proved to Mochtar Lubis personally that he had succeeded in "breaching the blockade of Sukarno's prison walls and speaking to the world".[65] He had 'internationalised' Indonesian literature, in the spirit of Gelanggang. International support and attention provided a continual boost to his spirits and confirmed for him the correctness in his political and moral stance. Mochtar Lubis was the first Indonesian novelist to 'speak to the world', and this pre-eminence was only surpassed two decades later by Pramoedya Ananta Toer.[66]


64. The Times of Ceylon newspaper suggested the problems described in Twilight in Jakarta apply equally in Ceylon (Chambert-Loir 1974:155).


66. Pramoedya, who during his fourteen years of detention endured circumstances much worse than Mochtar Lubis, was only able to publish the fruits of that experience after his release, in the form of the Bumi Manusia [This Earth of Mankind] series of novels.
Twilight in Jakarta enhanced Mochtar's international prominence. Its publication dovetailed well with his adoption by Amnesty International as a 'prisoner of conscience' by 1964 and with the ongoing representations made on his behalf by IPI, which took up his case with Prime Minister Nehru of India and President Macapagal of the Philippines.[67] Other protests and declarations of support came from the International PEN Writers in Prison Committee, the International Association of Editors and Publishers, along with actions by particular newspapers like the Philippines Herald and national bodies like the Mexican Committee for Cultural Freedom.[68] The protests continued throughout the detention.

The promotion of Twilight in Jakarta gave Mochtar Lubis the mantle of an oppressed writer, struggling under detention to produce a novel of international acclaim. The image was enhanced by prominent interpretations given to the reasons for, and conditions of, his detention. Sympathetic foreigner observers, such as the literary critic A.H. Johns whose translation of Jalan Tak Ada Ujung made a second novel by Mochtar available to English-speakers in 1968, believed that

"Lubis was imprisoned ... for his commitment to Universal Humanism -- by then regarded as decadent, socially unproductive and bourgeois -- and his insistence that he was first a man, a free individual, and then an Indonesian."

The image of a man punished for his literary writings. Yet, by the time of his initial arrest in 1956 and his re-arrest in 1961, Mochtar Lubis's novels had caused no political reaction. It was not Mochtar Lubis the author, but Mochtar the editor, who had antagonised the authorities. Nor was the common claim accurate that the novel had been written "from


68. See references to such actions in Catatan Subversif 1980, pp.48, 64, 71, 90, 108, 134, 156, 212, 240, 270, 439.

69. Johns' Introduction to Road With No End, 1982, p.11.
the misery and stench of a Java prison cell", for Mochtar produced it at home during the house arrest phase of his detention.[70]

To his supporters, Mochtar Lubis became a symbol of democratic opposition to Sukarno's left-leaning leadership, a victim of arbitrary unjust detention.

Domestic tensions and bans

While in Madura military prison, the prisoners received news through visitors. Members of the PSI and Masyumi had party sources of information. Anak Agung Gde Agung, to whom Mochtar was particularly close, was friends with Mohammad Hatta and heard of events in the upper echelon of government.[71] Moral (and some material) support was channelled to the detainees with the utmost discretion by the American Embassy in Jakarta.[72] The detainees were among those supplied with reading material by the CCF, through the good offices of Ivan Kats.[73] An informal domestic organisation of sympathisers was set up to attend to the prisoners' needs, such as bribing guards so they could leave the prison briefly every few days for sport or shopping.[74]

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70. Rohan Rivett "Corruption Denounced -- from a prison cell", IPI Report Vol. 12, No.2, June 1963, p.16. Johns also states the novel was "written while [Mochtar] was in prison" (p.3 of his Introduction to A Road With No End, 1982).

71. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 27/1/81.

72. Interview with one of the detainees, Informant D, 1982.

73. Interview with Ivan Kats, Jakarta, 12 April 1982.

74. Interview with Informant D, 1981.
When the Cultural Manifesto [Manifes Kebudayaan], [75] which challenged LEKRA's interpretations of art, was circulated and published in Jakarta in August 1963, Mochtar concurred wholeheartedly with its sentiments, and he was disappointed when some of the leading signatories tendered their apologies and retracted the document. [76]

When anti-Manifesto cultural activists pressured signatories, [77] Mochtar Lubis's works were also attacked. From August 1965, when books by (or including contributions from) signatories such as Jassin, Wiratmo Soekito, Boen Sri Oemarjati, Bokor Hutashuhut, Goenawan Mohamad, Trisno Sumardjo and Bur Rasuant o were banned from schools by the Department of Education, Mochtar Lubis's books were included, together with those by other leading authors such as Takdir Alisjahbana, Idrus (then teaching abroad), and the Islamic scholar Hamka. [78] In Surabaya, police confiscated Mochtar's works along with those of the others named. [79] Fifteen months prior to the August 1965 Department of Education

75. The document was drawn up by opponents of LEKRA to assert their separate identity, rejecting what they saw as the tendency to subsume art in politics. Keith Foulcher (1969) "A Survey of Events Surrounding 'Manikebu'", *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde*, Deel 125, 4e Afl., pp. 429-465, reproduces the Manifesto and related documents in both Indonesian and English translation (pp. 453-465). *Horison* (May 1967, II, No. 5) published excerpts of the diaries of two signatories, notes on the manifesto and descriptions of the atmosphere at the time.


77. Jassin, a target of anti-manifesto protests, was moved from his lectureship at UI to a research position, and Sastra magazine, which had published the manifesto, ceased for 'technical reasons'. See Foulcher 1986:126-7. Wiratmo Soekito ("Mengapa Sebuah Pseudomanifes", *Horison*, November 1987, pp. 380-1) refutes the widely held belief that signatories were sacked from government positions; they were moved to less prominent posts on full salary.


directive, Mochtar Lubis had noted in his diary radio reports that his books were banned from circulation.[80] But such a ban cannot have been comprehensive since a later novel, *Tanah Gersang* [Barren Land] bearing the publication date of 1964, was not on the Department of Education's 1965 list of prohibited works.[81]

During the first six years of Mochtar's detention, he had managed to publish, under the pseudonym 'Lesmana', a string of translations of children's stories by American author Laura Ingalls Wilder.[82] Under his own name, he published short stories in magazines such as *Siasat Baru* [New Strategy].[83] Mochtar smuggled out his prison diary, including poems and ideas for future works.[84] Drafts were prepared for a number of novels, including *Harimau! Harimau!* [Tiger! Tiger!] and *Maut dan Cinta* [Death and Love].[85] The nine and a half years in detention were by far


82. These included *Rumah kecil di padang yang luas* [Little House on the Prairie], *Rumah kecil di hutan raya* [Little House in the Big Woods] in 1960, *Anak tani* [Farmer boy], *Di tepi pantai Silver Lake* [By the shores of Silver Lake] in 1961, and *Musim dingin yang lama* [The Long Winter] in 1962, all published by Penerbit Masa, Jakarta (Chambert-Loir 1974:244-5). Mochtar has also used the pseudonym 'Savitri'.


84. The diary was published first in *Indonesia Raya* and then, in a slightly abridged version, as *Catatan Subversif* 1980. He smuggled the hand-written notes out (*Catatan Subversif* 1980:396, dated 3 November 1965).

85. These works will be discussed in Chapter 6.
Mochtar Lubis's most prolific literary period. He completed or substantially drafted four novels. When he emerged from jail, one of Indonesia's pre-eminent artistic figures, rivals on the left had been swept from the public arena. LEKRA had been banned with the PKI in March 1966, its membership decimated.

Horison

Among the anti-Sukarno student leaders who approached Mochtar Lubis in detention in 1966 was a signatory of the Cultural Manifesto, Soe Hok Djin (later known as Arief Budiman). He impressed upon Mochtar the need for a new literary magazine and, on his release, Mochtar agreed to become Penanggungjawab [Chief Editor legally responsible for the publication] and assist in arranging finance for the magazine.[86] Horison began publication in July 1966 and immediately became the literary vanguard of the 1966 student movement, a nexus between opponents of LEKRA from the Manifes Kebudayaan group and young artists associated with the new student movement.[87]

86. Arief Budiman, who had returned recently from a year's college in Europe arranged by Ivan Kats, recalled the early meetings with Mochtar in Jalan Keagungan detention house (which he refers to as Jl. Kemuliaan) in "Catatan Kecil, delapan belas tahun yang lalu...", Horison, July 1984, pp.267-8.

87. For a description of Horison during the early years, see Henri Chambert-Loir (1972) "Horison: Six années d'une revue littéraire Indonésienne", Archipel, Vol. 4, pp.81-90, and E.M.J. Hume (1968) The Reaction in Indonesian Literature towards the Sukarno Regime with Particular Reference to the literary journal Horison. B.A. Honours thesis, Department of Indonesian Languages and Literature, Australian National University, Canberra.
In its first edition, *Horison* defined itself a "monthly magazine of literature in the broadest sense".[88] It was committed to "stimulating ideas and experiments in the field of literature specifically, culture generally". Its internationalist horizons were visible in that, apart from the works of Indonesians, it promised

"always [to] strive to present the works of artists and intellectuals from outside Indonesia, especially works which articulate new thoughts and experiments in the field of culture".[89]

In his introductory editorial, Mochtar defined the new course for the magazine towards "freedom and constructive values", constituting a clear break with the "monolithic power" of the past. He called upon readers to

"leave the narrow space which till now has imprisoned our spirit and thoughts [and] let us free ourselves from the shackles and traps of slogans of a chauvinistic and xenophobic nature".[90]

Mochtar Lubis headed an editorial board of Jassin, Zaini, Taufiq Ismail, Soe Hok Djin and D.S. Moeljanto, all of whom had been signatories of the Cultural Manifesto.[91] The names of other signatories, such as Goenawan Mohamad and Djufri Tanissan were soon added. Some observers saw *Horison* as a continuation of *Sastra*, the magazine which had published the Cultural Manifesto and then been forced to close in 1964. There was an overlapping of editorial personalities, content and style between the

[88. *Horison*, July 1966, No. 1, p.3.]

[89. *Horison*, July 1966, No. 1, p.3. Jassin commented privately, many people "are saying [Horison] is rather intellectualist (particularly the essays...)], feels foreign, and is not about Indonesia's own problems. I feel there is some truth in this". (Jassin 1984:275, letter to Nh. Dini, dated 28/11/66).]

[90. "Kata Perkenalan" [Introduction], *Horison*, July 1966, No. 1, p.3.]

[91. Zaini (1926-77), a painter, was born in Pariaman, West Sumatra. Taufiq Ismail (b. Bukittinggi, 1937), a poet whose collections *Tirani* and *Benteng* expressed the protests of the 1966 student movement, was to become a manager with Unilever Indonesia in 1978. D.S. Moeljanto (b. Solo, 1933) had edited various magazines, including *Kisah* (1955-7), *Cerita* (1957-8), *Roman* (1955-62) and *Sastra* (1962-4).]
two. Of the three primary former editors of Sastra, Jassin and D.S. Moeljanto joined Horison.[92] As the first New Order literary magazine and the one most closely identified with the '1966 Generation', Horison was almost as strong in its anti-communism as in its opposition to Sukarnoist populism. But its humanist commitment and a growing concern among staff about army-instigated human rights abuses meant that a number of stories sympathetic to the victims of the anti-communist purges were published.[93]

While there were other magazines regularly publishing fiction,[94] Horison was the major outlet for those writers constrained by the closure of Sastra in 1964. Established writers inhibited by earlier political circumstances embraced the magazine enthusiastically, and new ones sought

92. The third editor, M. Balfas, had taken up a teaching position at the University of Sydney. Sastra was revived in 1967, but lasted only two years. After Sastra published a short story, "Langit Makin Mendung" by Kipanjikusmin (August 1968) deemed by the court 'insulting to religion', the magazine came under considerable pressure from Muslim groups, and Jassin, as editor responsible, received a year's suspended sentence in October 1970. Mochtar actively supported Jassin and arranged for his own solicitor, Mr Abdullah Hafil, to defend him without fee. [Darsjaf Rahman (1986) Antara Imajinasi dan Hukum: Sebuah Roman Biografi H.B. Jassin, Gunung Agung, Jakarta, p.278]


94. In addition to Horison and Sastra, two other magazines gave a lot of space to fiction in the early New Order period: Budaya Jaya [Glorious Culture] and Basis. Budaya Jaya was a small-circulation intellectual journal produced between 1968-79 by the prestige publishers, Pustaka Jaya, with the financial backing of the Jakarta city council. It included poems, plays and artistic criticism but also essays on a range of general philosophical, intellectual and social issues. Basis, Indonesia's longest running cultural monthly magazine, has been published by Yogyakarta Catholics since 1950. Its role in fostering the arts in Yogyakarta is substantial but it is not primarily a magazine of fiction.
its imprimatur. Horison largely set the standards by which New Order fiction was evaluated. When Ajip Rosidi compiled his comprehensive, 690 page anthology, Laut Biru Langit Biru,[95] covering the first decade of 'New Order' literature, at most only ten of the 62 authors included had not published in Horison. For many it was their major outlet. The editorial board, under Mochtar, played an important role as 'gatekeeper' influencing literary production in New Order Indonesia. In September 1974, members were criticised during a mock "Poetry Trial", when a group of young writers called, tongue in cheek, for the "pensioning off" of the Horison editors and a ban on the magazine, partly because of, what they claimed was, its reluctance to open the magazine to styles of writing outside the personal tastes of editors.[96]

Although it was prestigious, Horison's circulation remained small and unable to fund the magazine. Mochtar Lubis played a pivotal role in arranging finance. The initial capital came from

"an entrepreneur friend of Mochtar Lubis. In order to keep the price down, the printing was also done at an Islamic printery of a friend [of Mochtar], called PT Angin in Blora Street."[97]

Around 1970, the Indonesia Foundation [Yayasan Indonesia], which published Horison, turned to the International Association for Cultural Freedom, successor to the CCF.

After public revelations in 1967 that one of its primary sources of funding was the American CIA (which had provided more than US$ 1 million


96. The main papers in the "trial" are collected in Pamusuk Eneste (1986) Pengadilan Puisi, Gunung Agung, Jakarta. See p.27 for the young critics' demands.

for its establishment and maintenance,[98] laundered through little-known private foundations), the CCF had suffered an image crisis.[99] In September 1967, to extricate itself, the organisation declared that it no longer received CIA money, and that since October 1966, the Ford Foundation (which had long been one of its benefactors) had been the sole financier.[100] The CCF also then decided to change its name to the International Association for Cultural Freedom (IACF), but there were evidently few changes in its activities and aims.[101]

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99. The San Francisco magazine, Ramparts, exposed the CIA funding of the CCF as part of a series on covert CIA involvement in student and trade unions, international organisations and foundations. The New Republic revealed the CCF "was funded for years by the J.M. Kaplan Foundation, a CIA pass-through" (Vol.156, No.9, 4 March 1967, p.8). The New York Times followed the story during 1966-1967, reporting on 14 May 1967 (p.32) that "Michael Josselson, executive director of the Congress for Cultural Freedom resigned...after having assumed responsibility for his group's accepting funds from the Central Intelligence Agency from 1950 to the summer of 1966". Josselson said: "To supply the congress with funds the C.I.A. appealed to the patriotism of bona fide foundations to serve as a conduit for money.[...] The C.I.A., knowing of our approximate budgetary requirements, would indicate to me the name of a foundation which was likely to respond favorably to a request for a grant to the congress". See also "Stephen Spender Quits Encounter", The New York Times, 8 May 1967, pp. 1 & 37, and Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks (1980) The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, Dell Books, New York, p.43.


101. The IACF also selected a new executive director, Shepard Stone, to replace the discredited Josselson. Stone, a friend of Josselson, was director of internal affairs for the Ford Foundation, a former consultant to the State Department and to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Josselson remained with the IACF as a 'consultant'. See "Cultural Group Once Aided by C.I.A. Picks Ford Fund Aide to Be Its Director", The New York Times, 2 October 1967, p.17.
After his release from jail, Mochtar Lubis had joined the Executive Board of the new IACF. When Horison struck financial problems, the IACF agreed to provide Yayasan Indonesia with an annual subsidy of just under US$10,000.[102] This support continued until December 1977. After which time four major publishers, Sinar Harapan, Kompas, Tempo and Femina, became sponsors, providing approximately Rp.150,000 each per month to cover running costs.[103]

At the end of the 1960s, Horison, along with the Jakarta Cultural Centre, Taman Ismail Marzuki (TIM), established in 1968, was regarded as one of "the two leading institutions in Indonesian intellectual/artistic life" in Indonesia.[104] But by the mid 1970s, Horison had begun to wane. Sales were declining, as was public and artistic interest, resulting in a dearth of material from those contributors of national calibre who had initially written for the magazine. In the early years, in addition to his responsibilities as editor, Mochtar Lubis had published a steady trickle of short stories, essays and even a drama, Pangeran Wiraguna[105] in Horison, but by the mid 1970s he was generally only writing the quasi-editorial "Cultural Notes" [Catatan Kebudayaan] column. Busy with a myriad of other affairs, he spent only a couple of days a month on Horison business, dropping in occasionally to cast an eye over the office,[106] and generally oversee operations, leaving the daily work to


103. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 12 January 1982.


106. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 27/4/81.
others. Hamsad Rangkuti (b. Medan, 1941) (first with Bambang Bujono and, from 1979, the artist Hardi) did most of the routine work, receiving a small retainer. H.B. Jassin still assessed manuscripts submitted, but early supporters on the Advisory Board, such as Umar Kayam, Fuad Hassan and M.T. Zen, were largely inactive.[107]

The magazine was criticised by some literary critics as having failed to maintain its position as a trend-setter in the literary world.[108] Young poets claimed individual editors had too much control over the type of material published.[109] The frequency of essays on literary criticism or ranging over contemporary social or philosophical issues declined. The "Cultural Chronicle" [Kronik Kebudayaan] column, which detailed recent cultural events or developments, disappeared, as the magazine lost its immediacy and topicality, publishing mainly short stories.

In 1971 two publications opened, which, though very different to Horison, provided new outlets for many kinds of writing. The news weekly, Tempo, under Goenawan Mohamad, assisted by artist and journalist

107. Umar Kayam (b. Ngawi, 1932), a short-story writer with a PhD from Cornell, was Director-General of Radio, TV and Film (1966-1969), then Chairman of the Jakarta Arts Council (1969-72), taking up a position as Director of Indonesian Cultural Studies at Gajah Mada University in 1977. Fuad Hassan (b. Semarang, 1929), who has a PhD in psychology from the University of Indonesia (1967), become Ambassador to Egypt (1975-80), and Minister of Education in 1986. [Details from Tempo 1981 and Pamusuk Eneste (ed.) 1981.] Mudaham Taufick Zen (b. Bangka, 1931), who became Professor of Geology and Geophysics at Bandung Institute of Technology and Indonesia's Assistant Minister of Research, had a long interest in art and literature.


colleagues, featured short, topical essays, while the intellectual monthly journal, Prisma, provided a more prestigious outlet than Horison for longer analytical essays on the social sciences. Daily papers, like Kompas, also became vehicles for more serious essays, and together with an increasing number of attractively presented, popular magazines, enticed short story writers with higher honorariums, more efficient management and wider circulation. Horison suffered greatly from such competition.

Unhappy about the decline of Horison, Mochtar Lubis and the editorial team made various attempts to broaden the content of the journal and boost its appeal. In 1979, Mochtar stressed in the monthly Catatan Kebudayaan column that Horison was widening its own horizons to "wipe out the limits on thought or study and to abolish the boundaries on the possibilities of our creative energies in all fields of national life". It was a call to diversify the magazine's contents, to include ideas on "urban and rural problems, education, economic development, the future, the environment, ecological protection" and other problems. But the call went largely unheeded and the contents of the magazine changed little, despite editorials by Mochtar on such diverse topics as "Artists and social conscience", "Other views on Science and Technology", "Indonesian Film has great potential", "Rediscovering oneself in ecological balance", "Challenges of the 1980s",

110. By 1980, Kompas was paying about three times the Horison honorarium of Rp.15,000 for a story or article.

111. On Horison and the literary media, see A. Teeuw (1979) Modern Indonesian Literature, Volume 2, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, pp.48-53. In 1983, Prisma implied the decline of Horison was due partly to an absence of serious debate on such questions as Literature and Social Change in Indonesia "for over 15 years" (alluding to the banning of LEKRA). ["A Note from the Editor", Prisma: The Indonesian Indicator, No. 29, September 1983, p.2.]

112. Horison, January 1979, XIV, No.1, p.3.
and "Save the forests".[113] By the end of the 1970s, Horison was gradually petering out, not because of repression, but because, unable to compete with other publications, it was lapsing into a rut.[114]

Arief Budiman's return in early 1981 from eight years abroad catalysed a regeneration. A meeting at Mochtar Lubis's home in January 1982 appointed Arwah Setiawan, former editor of the humor magazine, Astaga, to redesign and revive the flagging journal.[115] The four major sponsors, Sinar Harapan, Kompas, Tempo and Femina, were approached for substantial donations (of about Rp 7.5 million) to enable Horison to compete financially, by increasing honorariums and improving its appearance. Top editorial figures from Sinar Harapan and Femina, Aristides Katoppo and Sofjan Alisjahbana, joined long time members Goenawan Mohamad (chief editor of Tempo) and Jakob Oetama (chief editor of Kompas) on the advisory board.

In August 1982, along with the unveiling of the 'new look' Horison, printed by 'off-set' on quality paper, with full colour cover, Yayasan Indonesia began promoting the magazine with a series of seminars, co-sponsored by various donors. The first, on The Role of Literature in Social Change, was held at Kompas on 10 August 1982.

113. These editorials appeared from March to June 1979 and February to March 1980 respectively.

114. At the beginning of 1982 Horison's monthly circulation averaged approximately 2,800. At least one popular women's magazine, about three times the price, was averaging about 200,000 even in 1977 (Wildan Yatim, "Pendidikan Sastra Sejak Remaja", Kompas, 11 January 1977, p.5), while even a general magazine like Intisari sold 143,000 per issue in 1980 (Theo, "Profil majalah-majalah hiburan kita sekarang", Kompas, 2 November 1980, p.5).

115. Arwah Setiawan resigned two years later in April 1984 after the crucial transition period in re-vamping the magazine (Horison, No. 4, April 1984, Table of Contents).
The revival came at a time when literature was becoming a topic of public interest, as writers long imprisoned after 1965, such as Pramoedya Ananta Toer, began publishing again. Horison's second seminar, on Socialist Realism and Universal Humanism, co-sponsored by Tempo on 26 October 1982, revealed how deep antagonism for LEKRA still was among the artists clustered around Horison.[116] The new-style magazine began generating more attention and interest within the Jakarta artistic community. The editorial rhetoric of Horison presented the magazine as a vibrant, open forum, but tensions were apparent within the editorial committee and its supporters between those who sought to revive the anti-LEKRA editorial line and those who wanted to be more open to ex-tapol artists who had once been LEKRA members. In the 1980s, the journal has provided an avenue for discussion of contrasting approaches to literature, as in the "Contextual Literature" debate when a Solo symposium in October 1984 triggered spirited national discussion of the relationship of literature to the political and social context of its production.[117] Mochtar has tended to remain aloof from public condemnation of former LEKRA members, but the influence of anti-communists, like Abdul Hadi WM, has led the journal to re-fight the polemics of the early 1960s, now against voiceless opponents. Despite the influence on Horison of people like Arief Budiman, who had moved to a position in which he has much in common with the ex-LEKRA writers, the magazine remained a bulwark against the left.

116. On the return to literary production of the former tapol, see Hill 1984.

117. The main documents in the debate are collected in Ariel Heryanto 1985.
Taman Ismail Marzuki and Artists' Organisations

In the first years of the New Order, Jakarta's energetic governor (then Major-General) Ali Sadikin responded enthusiastically to requests by the artistic community for the formation of a structure to facilitate (and regulate) certain aspects of artistic production. Artists who supported the change in political regime sought his backing for a cultural centre and a national artists' council overseeing it. The concept harmonised with his burgeoning vision of a modern, efficient metropolis, rivaling other international capitals, yet preserving its artistic identity. Ali Sadikin, with his practical drive, modernising zeal and interest in cultural life, impressed both young artists, like Goenawan Mohamad, who were at the forefront of the push for the cultural centre, as well as senior figures, like Mochtar Lubis. Ali Sadikin was, for many, an exemplar of the potential they envisaged, in the early New Order years, for rapid social transformation and development.[118]

The first step in fulfilling the artists' requests was the establishment, on 3 July 1968, of the Jakarta Arts Council [Dewan Kesenian Jakarta, DKJ], a triennial 25-member body[119] which had, among its responsibilities, the supervision of the Jakarta Arts Centre, Taman Ismail Marzuki (TIM), officially opened by Ali Sadikin on 10 November 1968.[120] Located in central Jakarta's Jalan Cikini Raya in the former


[119] Under statutory provisions, a representative of the Jakarta Municipal Council is an ex-officio member of the DKJ, bringing the membership to 26. See the bi-lingual (Indonesian-English) official guidebook, [Ajip Rosidi] (1974) TIM, Taman Ismail Marzuki, Dewan Kesenian Jakarta, Jakarta, (hereafter 'Ajip Rosidi 1974'), p.64. Hence, it is not strictly accurate that all members are artists (Ajip Rosidi 1974:63).

grounds of the zoo, TIM bore the personal imprint of the governor, who fostered the project with great interest. A focus of intellectual and artistic endeavour, the centre was unrivalled nationally in its facilities, organisational support structure and its generous regular funding from the Jakarta provincial government. The grounds and food stalls of TIM, adjoining the Jakarta Art Academy [Lembaga Pendidikan Kesenian Jakarta, LPKJ] another Sadikin-backed project, established in 1970,[121] became a convivial meeting place for the artistic community. On the boundary between the affluence of Menteng and the kampungs that run alongside the Ciliwung River, TIM quickly became a thriving hub of artistic production, the venue for nationally applauded performances and exhibitions, and the artistic centrepiece of the capital.

At the pinnacle of this artistic activity was the Jakarta Academy [Akademi Jakarta, AJ], constituted in 1970 as an elite honorary body consisting of ten prominent cultural figures who had shown a "constant dedication" to art and culture and who, at the time of their life-membership appointment, had reached the age of 40. The original members were Mochtar Lubis, Takdir Alisjahbana, H.B. Jassin, Soedjatmoko, educationalist Mohammad Said, film-makers Asrul Sani and D. Djajakusuma, artists Popo Iskandar, Rusli and Affandi.[122] Elevation to the new Jakarta Academy signified that Mochtar had reached the peak of the national artistic Establishment. Young artists, like Goenawan Mohamad and Arief Budiman, had lobbied for the establishment of the Academy so it could provide protection for the independence of the DKJ against possible


121. Soetjipto Wirosardjono et al. (eds) 1977:208, especially Note 30.
future interference from the Governor's office. [123] The Academy was given the power to draw up, for the Governor's ratification, the list of members for the triennial DKJ. In turn, the Academy was responsible both to the DKJ and to the Governor of Jakarta, and was to function as a liaison between artists and government. Mochtar Lubis, along with most on the Academy, enjoyed an excellent working relationship with Ali Sadikin, who related well to non-bureaucrats and lent his full support to TIM and associated bodies.

As an Academy member, Mochtar could stand above the day-to-day affairs of TIM, which were supervised by the DKJ (through its Executive Council [Dewan Pekerja Harian]), while still having a formative influence on the general direction of policy and implementation, through the regular selection of the DKJ members. For such members of the Jakarta artistic community, the politics of culture had freed up after pre-1965 tensions. Artists like Mochtar Lubis could work closely with the authorities and within a few short years, achieve the tangible achievements of an artists' organisation and a physical infrastructure. The favourable circumstances encouraged a lively, outpouring of material withheld during preceding years and the emergence of major new artistic talent, given access to high standard facilities.

The relationship between the DKJ and the Jakarta Municipal Council (DKI) ran far less smoothly after Ali Sadikin left the governorship in 1977. His successors Lieutenants-General Cokropranolo (1977-82) and Suprapto (1982-87) had far less attachment to TIM and its constituency, and more desire to rein in artists, who had enjoyed considerable political latitude under Ali Sadikin. In December 1979, Governor Cokropranolo refused to inaugurate members of an incoming DKJ designated

by the Academy because the AJ had declined to incorporate Municipal Council nominees. The Academy felt the Governor's office was interfering in artists' independence to select their own representatives. However, TIM and the DKJ depend upon government subsidies and technically, while the AJ had the right to formulate the list of names, the Governor could refuse to install the Arts Council.[124] The incumbent DKJ remained until February 1981 when the frustrated DKJ Executive Council resigned en masse and returned its brief to the Academy, which asked Mochtar Lubis, who was AJ deputy chairperson, and the painter Rusli, to take over ad interim from the Executive. For 12 months, Mochtar and others in the AJ were involved in protracted negotiations with the Municipal Council. Mochtar felt the Governor's office was stalling intentionally to factionalise the TIM community so that the authorities could claim the AJ had lost artists' confidence.

By the 1980s, Mochtar Lubis's role as an elder statesman and mediator in the cultural politics of Jakarta was by no means universally popular. During 1981 and 1982 younger artists[125] protested at TIM against the artistic 'Establishment' represented by the DKJ and the AJ, which the critics felt were neglecting their responsibilities to foster young artists and encourage a conducive climate for the creative arts.


125. Most vocal were a fluid group including Hardi, Ikranebara, Abdul Hadi WM, Dede Eri Supriya, Sutardji Calzoum Bachri, Leon Agusta and Danarto. Their sympathisers included more established figures from 1966 such as Goenawan Mohamad and Taufiq Ismail. In 1975, Rendra, when accepting an award from the Academy, had expressed his concern about the "semi-institutionalisation" of its members, which made them resistant to innovation and political action. [Rendra (1975) "Pidato Penerimaan Penghargaan Dari Akademi Jakarta", Budaya Jawa, VIII, No. 87, August, pp.468-76, translated in Rendra 1979:75-85.]
When the prominent young painter Hardi,[126] wrote that some members of the AJ who extolled democracy, criticised feudalism and opposed dictatorship actually behaved like undemocratic, "new privati" dictators, Mochtar Lubis was widely believed to be one of his main targets! The possibility of disbanding the AJ should be considered, Hardi urged.[127] Senior figures like Mochtar were accused of being out of touch with recent artistic developments because they rarely attended performances at TIM and were so frequently overseas. The young artists claimed that, in subtle ways by virtue of the authority of the AJ, Mochtar was a restraining influence on artistic experiment and change.[128] Mochtar acknowledged privately that his other obligations leave him little time to attend TIM, but stressed he did get reports from others.[129]

Eventually, the Governor agreed to withdraw his nominees for the DKJ but two former 'New Order' ministers, Boediardjo, a former naval officer, diplomat, Minister of Information (1968-73) and expert in traditional Javanese arts, and Mukti Ali, former Minister of Religious Affairs (1971-78), were offered vacant positions on the AJ.[130] On 25 February 1982 the new DKJ, whose composition was widely regarded as a compromise,

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126. Hardi (b. Blitar, 1951) had been detained for several days in December 1979 over a controversial exhibition of his paintings at TIM, which included a portrait of himself as President. ("Pelukis Hardi dipanggil Laksusda", Kompas, 8/12/79).


128. My thoughts on this were clarified in informal conversations with activists such as playwright Ikranegara, poet Sutardji Calzoum Bachri and essayist Dani N. Toda, August 1981.

129. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 12/1/82.

was inaugurated by the Governor after a political security check on all members. Mochtar, as principal negotiator for the artistic Establishment, had played a key role in settling the dispute between the AJ and Municipal Council but he was absent from the inauguration, attending a Seoul board meeting of the Press Foundation of Asia as Director-General.

Criticisms of Mochtar Lubis, his colleagues in the Academy, and the DKJ, arose largely from a generation which had emerged after the establishment of the artistic bureaucracy epitomized by the AJ. For these younger figures, the primary tension was between, what they regarded as, "cultural bureaucrats" in the DKJ together with ageing absentee eminents in the AJ, and an emerging younger band of practising artists. As Mochtar Lubis saw it, the dispute was not about the principles of art or ideological differences, which he would have found more interesting, but about styles of management. For Hardi, between the younger artists and the Academy lies "a kind of generation gap, a communication gap, a gap of vision, and gaps like these seriously endanger creative expansion." He blames the Academy members' inability to perceive and evaluate contemporary creativity, for "time has changed making [them] no longer attentive and sensitive to new symptoms."

In his role as an elder statesman of the arts, Mochtar Lubis faced other pressures from within the TIM community. Among the more religious


132. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 27/1/81.

Muslim artists, such as Abdul Hadi or Taufiq Ismail, animosity for the left was strong, as was the desire to caution younger activists against flirting with "Neo-LEKRAism".[134] While Mochtar believed that he had been a victim of LEKRA and was convinced that "if the opportunity should arise, [and the former Communists] get power in their hands, they would also kill us",[135] he presented himself as a moderating influence at TIM, arguing

"we tried to be open-minded about the return of the communist writers and artists into the society [...] And since I was asked to take care of Taman Ismail Marzuki temporarily, I felt if they wanted to come there, we must welcome them."[136]

There was little welcome given, however, since the government applied pressure on the TIM management to refrain from inviting former LEKRA members. While Mochtar still tried privately to maintain his long acquaintance with artists like Pramoedya, he was publicly unsympathetic to Pramoedya when the latter's books were banned. Asked abroad about his personal attitude to Pramoedya's lack of freedom of expression, Mochtar replied only indirectly that "even if I was in power, I would not permit communist propaganda in Indonesia".[137]

Mochtar Lubis and those artists who enjoyed the full support of Ali Sadikin during the early years of the New Order, had succeeded in establishing a physical and organisational infrastructure, in TIM, the DKJ and the AJ, to facilitate and foster the development of the arts in Jakarta. In his role in the Academy, Mochtar demonstrated his skills as a mediator and liaison at times of tension. By the early 1980s, he was

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134. Abdul Hadi coined this term. e.g. Abdul Hadi 1987.

135. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 24/4/81.

136. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 24/4/81.

striving to maintain the integrity of those structures assailed by internal criticism, and to retain their autonomy in the face of government pressures.

**Obor**

After his release in 1966, Mochtar Lubis became good friends with Ivan Kats, who had left his position in the CCF prior to the CIA revelations. During the late 1960s, Kats expressed his concern, in discussions with several Indonesian friends, including Mochtar Lubis, P.K. Ojong and Soedjatmoko, at the large range of important foreign books untranslated into Indonesian. In 1970, together they formed the Obor publishing enterprise to translate into Indonesian significant works in the social sciences.[138]

Obor (which means 'torch') was established as a network with a New York State headquarters, Obor Incorporated, registered as a public charity, governed by an international Board of Trustees, on which Mochtar Lubis sat.[139] Mochtar Lubis also headed the Indonesian wing, Yayasan Obor Indonesia [Indonesian Obor Foundation, YOI], which was incorporated in 1975 as a national organisation. At the planning stages Mochtar gained the support of Foreign Minister Adam Malik, who facilitated approaches to influential overseas contacts. Mochtar and Kats approached Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands who became Patron of Obor.[140] Domestically,

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140. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 27/4/81.
many friends from Horison's Yavasan Indonesia joined Mochtar in Obor, including Arief Budiman, Goenawan Mohamad, Fuad Hassan, Taufiq Ismail, Umar Kayam and M.T. Zen.[141]

Obor sought to provide translations of two categories of foreign (usually English-language) works: books and articles about Indonesia, and works seen to have made a significant contribution to world thinking on contemporary social problems. The foundation selected relevant material for both university students and the general public, and many of its volumes were readers of collected essays, including works on government and politics, transmigration, women's rights, economics, industrial development, science and technology.

Funding for this "modestly sized philanthropy", as Kats called it, has come from numerous supporting institutions, including various foundations (such as Ford, and smaller German and Dutch agencies), church and academic bodies, and the International Association for Cultural Freedom. The corporate donors include some of the major multinationals involved in extractive operations in Indonesia, such as Freeport Indonesia, International Nickel Corporation, Mobil Oil Corporation, Shell Nederland; and other multinationals such as Philip Morris. Individuals from International Nickel Corporation and Mobil Oil Corporation accepted seats on the International Board of Trustees, along with American, Canadian and Dutch academics. While there have been some Indonesian corporate donors, such as PT Astra, these remain rare.[142]

141. By 1981 the Obor Indonesia committee reflected a greater educational emphasis, incorporating more academics and government figures, such as Taufik Abdullah (from LEKNAS), D.A. Tisna Amidjaja (Director of Higher Education), Achmad Amiruddin (Chancellor of Hassanuddin University), Mubyarto (University of Gajah Mada), Sajogyo (Centre for Rural Sociology, IPB), Otto Soemarwoto (Director, Centre for Ecology, Pajajaran University) and retaining M.T. Zen.

Ivan Kats has played most of the crucial roles in Obor, negotiating most funding, and, during the initial stages, selecting titles for translation, many of which (as he put it) were "naturals", such as E.F. Schumacher's Small is Beautiful.[143] But suggestions for titles came increasingly from Obor's Indonesian committee which seeks sponsors for specific titles. Mochtar Lubis asserted that title selection is not prejudiced by concerns of donor reluctance.[144] Obor has financed some books from its own capital. It usually arranges copyright clearance, translation and editing of manuscripts, then offers them to commercial publishers.

While the Indonesian Obor Foundation is theoretically an independent arm of Obor Incorporated, the devolution of control has been problematical. Some Indonesians felt that, having established Obor, Kats was reluctant to relinquish his influence over it. Since about 1977 friction between Kats and Indonesian staff over policy and implementation led to tensions and disputes, and contributed to the resignations of an Executive Committee member and an editor.

Despite Mochtar's occasional lack of success in resolving such tensions, he regarded Obor as one of his most satisfying ventures of the 1970s. Its development reflected his own shifting horizons. His interest in the day to day issues of national politics was then gradually giving way, especially after the closure of Indonesia Raya, to longer term global concerns such as environmental protection, cultural transformation.

143. Interview with Ivan Kats, Jakarta, 12 April 1982. Small is Beautiful was published by Obor in 1979 as Kecil Itu Indah, with a preface by M.T. Zen. It sold very well, more than 10,000 copies by the end of 1981. Print runs varied. For specialist titles like T.O. Thromi's Adat Perkawinan Toraja (1981), it was only 1,000, while 5,000 was the norm. (A list of Obor titles, print runs and sales figures was kindly provided by editor, Marianne Katoppo, 15/4/82.)

144. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 18 March 1982.
and relations between the First and the Third Worlds. Nurtured by his personal contacts and experiences abroad, particularly during various stays in the 1970s at the Aspen Institute of Humanistic Studies, these concerns were both stimulated by, and expressed through, Obor. The publication list and Mochtar's introductions to Obor translations reflect the new style of global and cultural politics Mochtar was exploring. These commitments were not entirely new to the 1970s but were extensions of long-held beliefs, reinforced by his contacts with intellectual currents abroad.

Obor's list of 47 titles in print in 1982 was divided into eight areas: civility and ethics; religion, language and logic; the environment and the earth's resources; poverty; social dimensions of history; economics; anthropology and politics; and introductions to foreign cultures (five of the six titles in this last category were by Japanese authors).[145] Mochtar Lubis's long-standing concerns were evident in *Etika Pegawai Negeri* [Public Servants' Ethics],[146] a reader about corruption and ethics in the public service, which he co-edited with Yale political scientist James C. Scott, and for which he wrote the introduction.

Mochtar Lubis's own developing interest in ecology and a just utilisation of resources, which was particularly stimulated by international gatherings on these issues which he attended in the early 1970s,[147] is clear in Obor translations of milestones of the

145. 1982 Obor prospectus, pp.4-5.


147. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 13/1/81.
environmentalist movement. The 13 books in the "Environment and the Earth's Resources" category of the 1982 Obor list make it the largest of the eight categories. Titles include not only Schumacher's Small is Beautiful, but also Barbara Ward and Rene Dubos's Only One Earth [Hanya Satu Bumi, 1974], Lester Brown's By Bread Alone [Dengan sesuap Nasi, 1977], and Paul R. Ehrlich and Anne H. Ehrlich's The End of Affluence [Berakhirnya Masa Kelimpahmewahan, 1981].

The Ehrlichs' critique of the West's consumption practices urges the First World to adopt the ethic of 'simpler living'. Mochtar's introduction to their book is similarly critical of the developed nations and the "ruling elite [in the developing countries, which] unites its self-interests with the interests of the governments and the industries of the large world powers".[148] He concludes his introduction, entitled "The Rich Countries Have to Change Themselves First", with a long quotation translated from a 1973 speech he gave to the Aspen Institute in Colorado. In it he warned that the "advanced countries and the developing countries have entered a collision course".[149] He told his American audience, that if we are to avert disaster, it is important that

"we pool our thoughts, and we open the channels of communication between us as widely as possible, because in this way we can change our old attitudes which are no longer appropriate to the demands of the problems which we face".[150]

The key lies in the cultural values of the individual and

"how we can equip mankind with cultural values required, so it can continue to control science and technology and


continue to control political powers and the other large powers which it holds".[151]

Mochtar's advice reflected his love of nature, his desire for global harmony and an optimistic, almost spiritual, belief in individual change as the key to progress when he wrote:

"We have to learn to adopt a more humanitarian attitude to each other, in relations between nations, between governments, between organisations, between companies and individuals and we also have to learn to adopt a more humane attitude with birds, with fauna, with flowers and trees, with rivers, lakes, forests and oceans... Can we learn to love all these as we love ourselves?"[152]

Mochtar seeks to overcome the chaos, conflict and confrontation he identifies in the world political and economic order, by stressing cultural and moral learning rather than political action.

By making available key works in the "simple living" and environmental movements abroad, Obor has contributed to the expanding discussion within Indonesia on such issues. In 1980, Obor also published Mochtar's Berkelana Dalam Rimba [Wandering in the Jungle],[153] a jungle tale for children, designed to arouse an appreciation of nature. In 1980, Mochtar also wrote the lyrics of several songs, for the popular band Trio Bimbo, about the extinction of Indonesia's endangered species.[154]

Together with M.T. Zen, another driving force in Obor, Mochtar Lubis also supported the establishment of the environmental organisation Yayasan Indonesia Hijau [Green Indonesia Foundation], founded in 1978 in

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153. Published jointly with Pustaka Jaya, Jakarta, 1980. The writing of the manuscript with assisted by funding from the International Wildlife Fund, Geneva, and Prince Bernhard of Holland (acknowledged on pp.4 & 9).
154. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 13/1/81.
Bogor. When approached by organisers, he assisted in obtaining some funding from the International Wildlife Fund, and arranged for a notary to draw up the foundation's legal documents.[155] He declined an executive position, arguing that his involvement could hamper the development of a beneficial relationship between the foundation and the government, but accepted honorary membership. Mochtar was encouraged by the proliferation and growing strength of new non-governmental organisations like this. He had a good relationship with, and considerable faith in, Emil Salim, appointed in 1978 as Indonesia's first Environment Minister. While administering a department with little direct power, Emil Salim has succeeded in placing environmental issues on the national agenda, and has shafted home much of the blame for environmental degradation in Indonesia to the First World.[156] His efforts and tactics have Mochtar's support.

Despite the open hostility towards Japanese business displayed in the second series of *Indonesia Raya*, Japan has held an increasing fascination for Mochtar Lubis in the 1970s, reminiscent perhaps of the attraction of the USA in the 1950s. Mochtar has written the introductions to two of the five titles by or about Japanese published by Obor since 1976.[157] While sales of the books on Japan have generally been sluggish, *Kekuatan Yang Membisu: Kepribadian Dan Peranan Jepang* [The

155. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 27 April 1981.


157. In 1976, Obor published a collection of articles on the Indonesian economy by Japanese scholars; the remaining four books (three in 1979 and one in 1981) were by Japanese and about Japan. (Information from 1982 Obor Prospectus and Daftar Buku Yayasan Obor Indonesia, provided by Obor Editor Marianne Katoppo, 15/4/82.
Silent Power: Japan's Identity and Role (1981), [158] introduced by Mochtar Lubis, proved the most popular, by selling over 2,500 within a year. This collection of essays contains critical studies of Japan and of Japanese political relations with other countries, by Japanese scholars. Mochtar Lubis's introduction elaborates on the anthology's criticisms of Japanese economic domination of the Southeast Asian region, criticisms echoing Indonesia Raya's editorials till 1974. He retains his sharp distaste for Japanese economic practices.

Yet, while he criticises much about Japan, its existence, ideas, cultural complexity and sophistication have exerted an mounting influence over his intellectual agenda since the late 1960s. In a public lecture, at TIM on 7 January 1982, on his return from a visit to Japan, he displayed his fascination for the cultural values which he sees as having enabled the Japanese to rebuild so effectively since his first visit there on his way to Korea in 1950. [159] Frequent visits to Japan since 1966 are part of this regional figure's increasing role in international dialogue and organisations, building up close links with other like-minded Asian intellectuals.

Obor has also provided Mochtar Lubis with a framework for important links with somewhat comparable figures in other parts of Asia. A 1982 Obor publicity sheet states:


159. Copies of the unpublished paper, "Sebuah Perbandingan: Indonesia dan Jepang, Kontinuitas-Identitas Kebudayaan" [A Comparison: Indonesia and Japan, Cultural Identity-Continuity], were distributed at the lecture, attended by about 300.
"Two cultural groups long active in Southeast Asia -- Suksit Siam in Thailand, and Solidarity in the Philippines -- have joined Yayasan Obor Indonesia and Obor Dacca to form the Obor network. This informal fraternity of like-minded groups is able to view problems from a regional perspective and define regional projects."[160]

The key person of Suksit Siam, director Sulak Sivaraksa, and Solidarity's central figure, F.['Frankie'] Sionil Jose, are long-time friends of Mochtar Lubis and both have known Ivan Kats since his period with the CCF in Paris. Both head organisations structured around bookshops with publishing interests, which had produced intellectual cultural magazines, and provided a focus for seminars and discussions.

Sulak Sivaraksa (b. Bangkok, 1933), returned to Thailand with a British law degree in 1962. The following year, under the royal patronage of Prince Wan Waithayakorn (Kromamun Narathipphongphrahan), a former president of the United Nations General Assembly, he established Sangkhomsat Parithat [Social Science Review], one of Thailand's most respected intellectual journals.[161] Reminding some observers of Encounter, in the early years, Sangkhomsat Parithat "had a definite liberal, and sometimes almost royalist, orientation. It often featured articles in English by American writers, Asia Foundation officials and the like."[162] The journal was partially assisted by the Asia


Foundation,[163] and since the mid-1960s Sulak had been close to the Foundation's ex-patriate Bangkok representative, William Klausner, who was working to strengthen anti-communist sentiment among the Buddhist monkhood. In 1969 Sulak's efforts to liberalise Thai intellectual life by revitalising the Siam Society gained the support of some American embassy staff.

Benedict Anderson writes of "his excellent American connections" but notes Sulak "maintained a pointedly critical stance vis-a-vis the Americanophilia and 'developmentalism' of the Sarit era [1958-63]."[164] One younger radical, writing in Sangkhomsat Parithat, "noted that for all Sulak's criticism of 'Americanism' he had nonetheless unselfconsciously adopted the American demonological conception of World Communism."[165] By 1971, after Sulak had ceased editing the journal, Sangkhomsat Parithat became highly critical of Americanising institutions, particularly the Asia Foundation, and had developed into a leading intellectual mouthpiece of radical students involved in the October 1973 uprising.[166]

Sulak has long been an opponent of militaristic and authoritarian trends in Thai politics, while at the same time being a staunch supporter of the monarchy, a keen advocate of national cultural values and a firm


163. Indirect CIA funding of the Asia Foundation was revealed at the time of the CCF revelations in 1967. See footnote page 214).


believer in the Buddhist faith. In the years of the student-led democracy after 1973, he was a strong supporter of the democratic experiment and the Suksit Siam bookshop was raided during the 1976 military coup and its contents burnt.[167] After the coup, Sulak became far less hostile to the left, and began promoting what he termed 'Buddhist Socialism'. A devout Buddhist and peace activist, he appealed to many young former leftist radicals, who were disillusioned with China and Vietnam in the late 1970s, and sought a more autochthonous model for social change.[168] Sulak is a popular, eloquent and entertaining campus speaker and essayist, and frequent international traveller, having been invited to teach at the University of California, Berkeley, Cornell University and the University of Toronto. He is actively involved in various local and regional non-government organisations, maintains good links with international funding agencies, and was a Rockefeller Fellowship scholar-in-residence at Villa Serbelloni, Belagio, Italy in August-September 1982, following Mochtar Lubis who was there in May 1981 for a month-long fellowship writing short stories for his Bromocorah [The Outlaw] collection.[169]

F. Sionil Jose (b. 1924) and his wife run Manila's Solidaridad bookshop and publishing house, and he produces Solidarity magazine (1966-1977 and revived in 1983), which was "affiliated with the

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167. The bookshop held a wide range of publications. Among the more than 45,000 volumes burnt were works on non-violent struggle, the Thai labour movement, Allende, Quakerism, German literature, and texts by Marx, Lenin, Thomas Moore and Mao.


International Association for Cultural Freedom" in Paris[170] and, since its revival, the magazine has regularly acknowledged funding from Ford and other American foundations. More than any Indonesian or Thai publication, Solidarity circulated regionally and featured articles and literary works by leading Southeast Asians, with occasional pieces by other internationally renowned figures, such as Gunnar Myrdal, Ivan Illich, Yukio Mishima and Alexander Solzhenitsyn. Its editorial board included Jose, Sulak, Ivan Kats and Mochtar Lubis.[171]

Following the Obor model, Solidarity has also published a Tagalog translation of essays by Sulak on Buddhism and modernisation, Mochtar's Indonesia: Land Under the Rainbow in which he "attempted to present a popular narration of the highlights of Indonesian history" (from pre-history to 11 March 1966) viewed through the "Indonesian optic",[172] and a collection of essays Literature and Liberation (1988), with contributions by Jose, Sulak, Mochtar and two others.

Jose's profile is not as high in the Philippines as Sulak's is in Thailand, nor has he attained the international prestige of either Mochtar or Sulak, though he spends considerable time abroad, on fellowships and at conferences. After his emergence nationally as a


171. Mochtar and Sulak are first listed as Editorial Advisers in the March-April 1967 edition of Solidarity, while the revived 1983 magazine lists Mochtar Lubis as Chairman of the Board, Ivan Kats and Sulak Sivaraksas on a board of six, and F. Sionil Jose as Editor and Publisher (Vol. 4, 1983).

novelist in the 1960s, he has published widely in the Philippines[173] and been translated abroad, including in Russia which he has visited several times. He has been an energetic head of the Philippines PEN organisation, is close to the Magsaysay Foundation and various foreign foundations in Manila, and has been presented with a Magsaysay Award for literature.[174] However, while Jose's proximity to the American embassy was suspected by some leftists, he reacted fiercely to an innuendo in the press that he had CIA links, winning a libel action in court.[175]

Jose does not have Mochtar's reputation as a former political activist, whose name came to symbolise a particular style of political opposition. In 1969, he described himself as a socialist, who believed in "political and/or physical confrontation" with the rich national oligarchies, a Marxist, who believes "in the dignity of the individual, in the existence of God", and admitted his "very pronounced anti-communist sentiments".[176] He was consistently opposed to the Marcos martial law regime, and long advocated land reform, which has been a strong theme in Solidarity.[177] On a couple of occasions, Solidarity also reprinted leftwing policy documents such as the "Programme for a

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174. American support for President Ramon Magsaysay (notably via the CIA's General Lansdale) was "never much of a secret in Manila, [and] came to be regarded in Washington as a classic cold war success story" (Robert Pringle (1980) Indonesia and the Philippines: American Interests in Island Southeast Asia, Columbia University Press, New York, p.43).

175. The legal judgement was published verbatim as "Scurrilous Imputations", Solidarity, Vol. VI, No.1, January 1971, pp.69-75.


177. Solidarity has been sponsoring seminars and publishing articles on Land Reform since the July-August 1967 edition.

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People's Democratic Revolution in the Philippines", by the underground Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Philippines, which *Solidarity* obtained after it was captured by the military.[178] The magazine has played a significant and ongoing role in liberal Philippine intellectual and cultural life, and displays great variety in both the genre and political orientation of its contributions. Its contents include fiction and political and philosophical essays and a good deal of material from the legal left-wing opposition. *Solidaridad* bookshop, a convivial meeting place for artists, writers and foreign visitors, reflects a similar eclecticism in its stock. Jose's attitude of radical left politics was closer to Sulak's than Mochtar's.

Mochtar Lubis emphasised that personal relationships were important in binding the various national groups into the *Obor* network.[179] While Mochtar personally does not regard himself as having a particularly close relationship with any specific Third World group, he does feel a solidarity with Sulak and Jose. There is, he says, a kind of international intellectual community which is looking at world problems from similar standpoints, sharing common values across national boundaries, whether East or West.

Apart from their cooperation in *Obor* and *Solidarity*, Mochtar, Sulak and Jose, operating in different national political environments, present other, less tangible comparisons. They have located themselves in the intellectual, non-party moderate opposition to their national governments. Sulak and Mochtar have become associated with student protest movements. Yet Sulak's stand has been firmly anti-military, while Mochtar, in the 1950s, supported military challenges to civilian


179. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 18 March 1982.
government, and in the 1960s commended a military-technocrat alliance. All three men have had good working relations with American ex-patriates of various kinds (embassy staff, foundation representatives, journalists and academics) winning their respect and support. They have received American foundation funding and have spent much time in America and other Western countries, on fellowships, conferences and lecturing tours. They have published extensively in English, which they speak with ease and fluency.[180] Sulak, like Mochtar, attracted sustained international support when he was arrested.[181]

With all their differences and their various criticisms of the West, Sulak, Jose and Mochtar constitute another kind of Western cultural asset in Asia. While developing environmentalist and anti-consumerist ideas into a critique of many aspects of Western penetration of Third World societies, they also embrace a liberalism which seeks conciliation, collaboration and inter-action with America and the First World, not confrontation. [182]

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180. Sulak has published at least six books in English. Jose writes his literary works in English.

181. When Sulak was detained briefly in 1984 on a charge of lèse-majesté international protest included a letter from a score of Jakarta intellectuals (see Tempo, 25 August 1984, p.24). On the "dozens of organizations and hundreds of people [who] sent petitions to the king as well as to the people in the government" during the two months after Sulak's arrest, see Watanabe Ben (1984), "Possible Life-Imprisonment for a Man Devoted to Freedom, Democracy and People", AMPO Japan-Asia Quarterly Review, XVI, No. 3, p.50-2. Jose has never been detained.

182. To this extent, their moderating position serves the status quo.
Cultural Statesman: The Career in Review

From the early 1950s, Mochtar Lubis established an international role for himself through his participation in American-sponsored international professional and cultural organisations. Support from organisations like the IPI and the CCF enabled him to put his view of Indonesia and its political system to the international community in a manner afforded no other Indonesian journalist or novelist. Prior to his detention in December 1956, he did not participate greatly in domestic intellectual and cultural debates, committing his primary energies to political journalism. Mochtar was not in the mould of literary intellectuals like Takdir Alisjahbana, Jassin, or Pramoedya. He expressed himself through the brief editorial and barbed pojok column of *Indonesia Raya*, and rarely through literary essays. His years in detention were a political rite of passage, which conferred upon him the mantle of a democrat martyr, who had influential international connections and the eyes of the world upon him. After his release, although *Indonesia Raya* was unable to identify and optimise a market niche, personally Mochtar Lubis developed his role as a cultural spokesperson with considerable success, domestically and internationally.

In Indonesia, political reputation, literary achievements, and the respect in which he was held by members of the Cultural Manifesto group and other student supporters combined to elevate Mochtar to cultural peerage in the Jakarta Academy and give him an ongoing influence upon two of the leading institutions in Indonesian artistic life: Horison and TIM. He has fought battles with the Jakarta Municipal Council to defend the autonomy of TIM, but has been criticised by younger artists as out of touch, a restraining influence, and too frequently absent abroad to appreciate their creativity.
community. His writings on his society sought to highlight those aspects of Indonesian culture which he saw as impeding social progress.

Mochtar Lubis saw the decade of the 1970s as a time of renewal and reaffirmation for him, just as it was a period of dramatic change in the world at large. He needed to reflect and consider the consequences of changing global and domestic political circumstances upon him. His international activities, through his membership of various journalistic, literary, cultural and intellectual organisations, brought him constantly in touch with new currents of thought. He expanded his longstanding international connections very effectively, into an enhanced and satisfying global role. Months in America, at Aspen and the East-West Center, sojourns in Holland, his participation in the MacBride Commission, and frequent trips around Europe and Asia to confer with other intellectuals, stimulated new concerns for an equitable global order and revived his latent interest in ecological imperatives. He saw the need for a global re-alignment and awakening to foster a fairer, more equitable re-distribution of wealth, a careful husbanding of resources and a simpler lifestyle for the affluent. He took on this vision with a creative zeal and keenly propounded it back home.

Some Indonesians more radical than Mochtar are highly critical of his role as a "world citizen", who plugs into liberal political currents abroad and attempts to communicate them in Indonesia. To adopt the metaphor of one activist, if Mochtar can "metabolise" what he ingests abroad, breaking it down to suit Indonesia's needs, his international experience may benefit the community. But this requires of him a very

185. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 11/3/81
discriminating appetite lest he regurgitate in Indonesia inappropriate values and material consumed abroad. [186]

Such people regard Mochtar as, at best, a populariser, rather than an innovative thinker. His skills as a communicator are used to channel ideas abroad back to Indonesia, and to represent Indonesia internationally. In each of these realms he both absorbs something of the prevailing values and radiates ideas brought from the other sphere. This process, which has been going on since he was in his twenties, has fashioned his attitudes and the way others perceive him. In such forums as UNESCO, he is regarded as an articulate spokesperson not only for Indonesian journalists, artists and writers, but more broadly, for Third World ones. His cosmopolitanism and the sweep of activities in which he has been involved, have made him, at times, more valued abroad than at home.

Mochtar Lubis is regarded, with Pramoedya and Takdir, as a leading cultural figure of his generation in Indonesia. The degree of respect in which he is held can be gauged from the numerous prizes, fellowships and other honours he has been awarded. However, the measure of his achievements since 1966 has been enhanced by the fact that, with the crushing of the left, the values he represented have not had to jostle with a vocal opposition in the nation's cultural politics, criticisms from disgruntled young artists notwithstanding. Compared to his activism during the 1950s, the changing political circumstances after 1966, and especially after 1974, gave Mochtar Lubis a reduced role as political reporter and activist in day-to-day national political life. He shifted his focus from daily politics to cultural affairs, nationally through TIM, and internationally through his various fellowships, conferences,

seminars and networks like Obor, whose publications reflect his shifting interests and the international influences upon him. As his essays and introductions to the Obor translations reveal, it is such international currents of thought rather than autochthonous traditions or domestic debates which provide his intellectual succour and stimulus.
CHAPTER SIX

REVOLUTION AND LEADERSHIP IN NEW ORDER NOVELS

The previous four chapters have focussed chronologically upon Mochtar Lubis's political, journalistic and cultural activities, using mainly non-fictional, journalistic or oral sources. In this, they have tended to examine explicit statements or actions by Mochtar Lubis. The next two chapters deal with his non-journalistic writings, beginning, in this chapter, with an examination of his novels.[1]

As earlier chapters have suggested, Mochtar Lubis has tended to turn to writing fiction when other avenues of expression have been closed to him. This chapter examines his fictional writing for underlying attitudes to, and assumptions about, the society that are not evident in his more self-consciously public, political writing. While, in writing fiction, Mochtar was actively selecting that genre to express particular ideas, an author's conscious intentions in producing a work are not the only signs in the text available to the reader. A novel may be strewn with less conscious indications of the author's perceptions.

Any reading of a text holds the potential for a re-patterning of its constituent elements by a reader who invests it with meaning within the context of his/her own world view. Nonetheless, in the following analysis, insofar as I have access to Mochtar's explicit intentions in writing the novels discussed, I will state them, then proceed to explicate the narratives in their own terms, seeking their internal coherence, and counterpoising my comments with assessments by literary

1. I would like to thank Keith Foulcher, Virginia Matheson and Barbara Hatley for their suggestions and comments on previous versions of this chapter.
critics. Under scrutiny, in the first instance in this chapter then, are the texts, not the author per se.

I wish to concentrate on the portrayal of the 'Revolution'[2] and leadership, two overlapping and recurring themes that are crucial indicators of the texts' historical location and their author's perspective on society. They serve as loci for broader discussion. I have chosen to illustrate these themes from Mochtar's two most recent novels, Maut dan Cinta (1977) and Harimau! Harimau! (1975), which I will contrast with earlier, well-known works of the 1950s and 1960s.

Sheer preponderence of material determines the selection of the theme of Revolution. Half of Mochtar's six novels are set during the physical struggle for Independence (1945-49): his first two novels, Tidak Ada Esok (1950) and Jalan Tak Ada Ujung (1952), and, 25 years later, his most recent, Maut dan Cinta (1977).[3] The events of 1945-49 formed the material for much of the literature produced by the group of writers categorised as the 1945 Generation (see Chapter 5),[4] but the Revolution appears a particularly evocative setting for Mochtar Lubis. One literary critic even observed that "Mochtar appears to have a kind of obsession with this struggle for independence".[5] A comparison between Maut dan Cinta and these earlier novels indicates how Mochtar Lubis's attitude to

2. I use the term 'Revolution' for the armed Independence struggle between 1945-49 (as it is used generally in these novels), not in the sense of a convergence of class conflicts resulting in a cataclysmic leap by the society from one mode of production to another.

3. Reference is also made to the Revolution in Tanah Gersang (1964).


nationalist history has changed over the three decades of his public life.

The second theme, the nature of leadership in the society, follows on from the depiction of the revolutionary hero. A constant feature of Mochtar's public life has been his periodic criticisms of national political leadership. In his vision of the social order there is a special role for leaders. What characteristics and qualities of leadership are attributed to his fictional heroes? How is the social role of leadership constructed in the novels? In Harimau! Harimau!, Mochtar Lubis depicts two leadership styles in conflict. The novel's concentration on the transfer of leadership lends itself to juxtaposition with the leaderless society of Senja di Jakarta.

When examined in tandem, these themes of Revolution and leadership encompass related issues, such as nationalism, democracy, the role of the military, the exercise of power and authority, and the fissuring of social organisation under crisis.

To date, Mochtar Lubis's published fiction includes six novels, one play, at least six collections of children's stories (often re-telling well-known foreign folk-tales), four collections of short stories (totalling 60 stories) with at least 25 more short stories published separately.[6] In addition, he has published several translations. Novels form a primary part of his oeuvre, having contributed substantially to his national and international reputation.

Maut dan Cinta and Harimau! Harimau! are significant also as the only two novels by Mochtar Lubis first published during the New Order

6. These calculations are based on Chambert-Loir's bibliography (1974:243-55) plus my own bibliographical survey.
period.[7] Although Mochtar's novels have been the subject of several academic studies,[8] Chambert-Loir, in his 1974 study, presented the most detailed discussion of Mochtar's fictional works to that time, in the context of a biography.[9]

In order to highlight what is different about the publications of the New Order period, this chapter commences with Mochtar's latest novel.

**Maut Dan Cinta**

Mochtar Lubis's most recent novel, *Maut Dan Cinta* [Death and Love] was begun while he was imprisoned in the mid 1960s.[10] A 3 November 1965 entry in his diary, nine days after he had been moved from Madiun to the Jakarta Military Prison [RTM], recorded his desire to begin a new novel


9. Chambert-Loir devoted nearly 40% of the substantive body of his study (excluding the appendixes which contain 80 pages of French translations of works by Mochtar Lubis) to a detailed examination of Mochtar's fiction. Chambert-Loir surveys the range of material published during the 1950s and 1960s, examining the language and style (for example, vocabulary, images and structure) as well as the depiction of Indonesian society in Mochtar's works. He isolates the author's social critique, Mochtar's focus on corruption and the individual isolated within society (see Chambert-Loir 1974:128-228).

10. *Maut Dan Cinta* [Death and Love], Pustaka Jaya, Jakarta, 1977 (all page references are to this edition). The foreword states that the book was begun in Madiun jail, "not long before the Gestapu-PKI coup broke out", however Mochtar's *Catatan SubversIF* diary (1980) would imply composition began slightly later.
or some short stories.[11] Nine days after he was moved to a low security
house of detention in Jalan Keagungan on 15 February, he wrote in his
diary:

"I am not able to write in peace, to continue a new novel
which I began last November. News about events outside is
continually flowing in, taking my attention."[12]

The manuscript, provisionally entitled Matahari menyingsing [The Sun
Rises], [13] was three-quarters complete when he was released in May 1966.
During a three month stay at the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies
in 1973 he finished it rather hurriedly.[14]

The story traces the period from the beginning of 1947 to the first
Dutch military action in July 1947, with a concluding chapter covering
the second military action in December 1948. A three-paragraph epilogue
tells of the Dutch Transfer of Sovereignty on 27 December 1949. The novel
describes the activities of Major Sadeli of the Indonesian military
secret service assigned to intelligence and acquisition duties in
Singapore to equip the beleaguered Republican forces with information,
weapons, communications equipment and medicines. His brief extends to
disciplining his predecessor, Captain Umar Yunus, who had misappropriated
Republican funds for his personal use. In the course of Sadeli's
espionage activities he makes contact with British intelligence officer,
Inspector John Hawkins, and enlists the assistance of 'National'

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13. In providing this detail, Chambert-Loir 1974:246 notes the similarity
between this title and Ernest Hemingway's The Sun Also Rises (the
14. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 11/3/81. The following discussion of
Maut dan Cinta is based on David T. Hill (1987b) "Mochtar Lubis: The
Artist as Cultural Broker in New Order Indonesia", Review of
Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs (RIMA), Vol. 21, No.1, Winter,
pp.54-88.
Indonesian News Agency journalist, Ali Nurdin, and a range of shadowy foreign characters, including Western adventurer pilots who fly supplies into the embattled capital of Yogyakarta. The "foreign flyers who helped the struggle of the Indonesian Republic to break through the Dutch blockade" are among those to whom the novel is dedicated (p.6).[15] Though the novel's events are fictional, the author based the story on the experiences of people he knew and drew on recollections of his own first trip overseas in 1947 to attend a conference on Inter Asian Relations in New Delhi.[16]

The setting is exotic with jaunts from Sadeli's base in Singapore around Southeast Asia to Hong Kong, Macao, Bangkok, and of course, Indonesia. The characters are a stylishly international mix of Europeans, Americans, Asians and Eurasians inhabiting the shadowy fringes of journalism, crime, military intelligence and gun-running. One Indonesian reviewer likened the novel to a James Bond adventure[17] and the story resembles a Western popular spy or war-adventure tale with an Indonesian hero.

Mochtar's aim in writing the book is enunciated in the foreword:

"The deviations conducted by the Soekarno regime and the betrayal of the ideals of our nation's independence struggle by so many Indonesians at that time, drove me to write this book, not only to re-clarify for myself why our nation struggled to gain independence, but also to re-affirm dedication to the ideals of our nation's independence."
(Foreword, p.5)

15. One of these pilots, an American citizen David F. Fowler, mentioned by name in the dedication, was involved with Mochtar Lubis in establishing PT Safari Air, which was incorporated in PT Airfast Services Indonesia (see Chapter 4). The exploits of pilots such as Americans Fowler and Bob Freeberg and Australian Ralph Coblentz provided much of the background to the novel.


He set out to recapture the idealism and selflessness of the Independence struggle's pejuang [freedom fighters] in the novel to inspire the young generation, so that, in the words of the protagonist,

"our nation shall learn from history. So too, our leaders. All these sacrifices of the young fighters and the Indonesian people must not be in vain"(p.253).

As literary critic Umar Junus (not to be confused with the novel's fictional character Captain Umar Yunus) has pointed out, the version of the past presented in the novel is "implicitly contrasted with and formed by the present".[18] In a 1978 essay he writes:

"Mochtar Lubis intentionally used the Independence struggle, in Maut dan Cinta, so that we could look again at the situation in which we now live [and ask]: Is this [current] situation a concrete translation of the hopes fought for during the past Independence struggle?"[19]

In the narrative, the post-Independence period is described in terms of the characters' ideals and plans for the nation when the fighting is finished. It is Major Sadeli's view of the Revolution and his hopes for the future society against which readers are directed to compare the present. What constitutes this 'present' is problematic. While the author wants readers to compare the ideals he attributes to the 1945-49 Revolution with their experience in a subsequent period, there are various ways of interpreting when that intended future time might be. It could be argued that Mochtar Lubis was implying that, at any point in the future, Indonesians could refer back to, and compare developments against, the Revolution; in which case the 'present' is the reader's (continuing, changing) 'present'. Mochtar may have also intended the comparison to be made with a specific period, such as the time he was writing in 1966 and/or 1973. Given the author's statements regarding the

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deviations of the Sukarno period cited above, it may be argued that he himself was juxtaposing the last years of Guided Democracy with the Revolution.

Sadeli is cast in the mould of the traditional heroic figure of the satria [knight, noble warrior], the personification of 'Good' opposing 'Evil'. "A satria for Sadeli represents the perfection of all fine human qualities, and of all the satria, the Indonesian satria are best" (p.9). Ironically, the string of historical exemplars that comes to Sadeli's mind as personifying the "true Indonesian satria" are mainly foreigners:

"Admiral Piet Hein... Sir Francis Drake, Walter Raleigh, Sultan Saladdin, King Richard the Lion-heart, Charlemagne, El Cid from Spain, the Muslim knights in Spain, Alexander the Great, Hannibal, Caesar, Siegfried, Odysseus, Gatotkaca, Hanuman, Rama, Arjuna, Diponegoro, Tuanku Imam Bonjol, the Achenese heroes fighting the Dutch" (p.9).

Sadeli believes the future of Indonesia will be in the hands of the "satria who hold the weapons", for

"it is they who will later become the leaders, the cadres and the soldiers of our armed forces, the apparatus of our country, our journalists, our authors, our artists. They are the guarantee of the continuation of the principles of our revolution!" (p.47)

Stressing the glory of the military calling, Sadeli likens the role of the soldier to that of the artist; both are driven by their emotions and semangat (motivating spirit) (p.283). Sadeli himself is skilled as a spy, a successful negotiator with foreigners (among whom he is an equal), and an understanding superior and counsellor to his men. The military officer is a blend of military prowess, intellectual competence and gentlemanliness. Nick-named 'professor', fluent in six non-Indonesian languages (pp.16-17), he is a well-read, contemplative intellectual, who participates fully in philosophical discussions. He has an artistic, sensitive aspect to his nature and, had it not been for the Revolution,
he says he might have been a teacher (pp.8 & 254), a musician or a composer (p.283). The narrative establishes Sadeli as an exemplar of the intellectual and the military officer. Sadeli's view of society provides a dominant role for a benevolent army leadership, such as Mochtar Lubis envisaged in the early New Order period.

The description of the satria towards the beginning of the novel emphasises a code of behaviour, high principles and a responsibility as protector of particular social groups depicted in the novel as weak. For Sadeli

"a satria has to be courageous because he is right, afraid only when wrong. A satria does not lie. A satria must be loyal. A satria is a defender of truth and justice. A satria always opposes tyranny. A satria is a defender of the weak and downtrodden. A satria respects women and is their shelter. A satria shelters and bestows affection on children. A satria has a strong, healthy and agile body. A satria likes to forgive defeated foes. A satria does not bear grudges. A satria must struggle bravely with his face and chest exposed. A satria has a gentle and polite manner, yet he is determined and knows no retreat in his opposition to sin, falsity, dishonesty and iniquity.

As the story unfolds, the image of the satria changes into a professional, 'modern', Westernised espionage operative, whose morality is dictated by the international circles in which he moves rather than by the high satria principles outlined early in the novel. As a secret agent he is hardly in a position to "struggle bravely with his face and chest exposed." Nor do his sexual exploits show he particularly "respects women and is their shelter."[20]

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20. The author said later that, in handling sex in the novel, he wanted to show how values were distorted under the pressure of the Revolution. Mochtar declined a suggestion from the Pustaka Jaya publisher, Ajip Rosidi, that he revise the character of Sadeli to avoid instances of non-marital sex, since such behaviour was inappropriate in a man raised, as Sadeli was, as a good Muslim. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 11/3/81.
The *satria* principles are re-defined in the narrative as Sadeli's high principles are challenged. The image of the military officer is still above reproach but, as the narrative unfolds, Sadeli, the *satria*, comes to resemble a Western James Bond-style hero. His piety and sexual morality slacken. He is tempted into sex, initially over a wager with friends, but later in a series of willing encounters, including even one with an intelligence contact's "nymphomaniac" wife,[21] whose eyes cause Sadeli to "forget all considerations of honour [kesatriaan] and morals" (p.125). But this piquant sexuality throughout the narrative enhances Sadeli's aura as a hero with a zest for life. His sexual encounters do not indicate a moral backsliding or betrayal of principle, but foster the mystique of the sophisticated, masculine spy, whose racey lifestyle incorporates sex just as it does various aliases, clandestine arms deals and the recruiting of international allies. Towards the end of the story, after this image is established, Sadeli marries Maria, a comfortably well-off Eurasian artist with whom he fell in love in Macao, and the conventional principle of marriage is maintained without destroying Sadeli's sexual mystique.

Sadeli, who emerges from the story (in the words of one reviewer) as Mochtar's "prototype of the ideal Indonesian man",[22] is depicted as the ideal combination of the attributes the military officer. Having established Sadeli's exemplary character from the outset, the narrative presents Sadeli's relationship, in his role as military officer, with three sections of the society which come in contact with the Revolution. In relation to wayward officers like Umar Yunus (whom he rehabilitates),

21. This is the word which comes to Sadeli's mind to describe the woman (p.191).

Sadeli is the role model. For civilians like Ali Nurdin (whom he recruits for the military), he is a paragon. To the ordinary people, the rakyat (who obey and respect him), he is a saviour.

Sadeli is juxtaposed sharply with Captain Umar Yunus, the officer who preceded him to Singapore and whom Sadeli is sent to discipline. Umar Yunus is essentially a good, but weak-willed man, who had been tempted by the lifestyle abroad and abandoned his mission. He has misappropriated Republican funds, bought a large house and set up his girlfriend in business. Unlike the ostensibly austere Sadeli, Umar Yunus's self-discipline and military professionalism have been eroded by comfort and decadence. Unlike Sadeli, who, while sleeping with women, generally maintains an emotional distance[23] and never allows sex to undermine his commitment to the Republic, Umar Yunus not only sleeps with women but is seduced by a life of personal comfort, security and self-indulgent pleasure. Always the just leader, Sadeli eventually brings Umar Yunus back into the Republican fold, rekindling his patriotic spirit and forgiving his frailty.

Sadeli's importance as a Revolutionary hero is confirmed in his relationship with the journalist, Ali Nurdin. Ali Nurdin had initially gone to Singapore to serve the Revolution as journalist for the 'National' Indonesian News Agency (pp.35-6 & 83). He admires Sadeli as a "man of steel" (p.190) and is keen to assist him in intelligence gathering. Ali Nurdin's pragmatism and suspicion of political leaders tempers Sadeli's initial idealism. The journalist suspects the politicians' proclivity for self-aggrandisement once installed in power. He voices apprehensions and concerns about his society and its

23. An exception is his future wife, Maria. I shall return to a more detailed discussion of women in the novel later.
future, while Sadeli is exceedingly optimistic about creating a utopian egalitarian state (e.g. pp.250-3). The men's attitudes converge somewhat. Sadeli's idealism is tempered, but more pronounced is Ali Nurdin's shift. After his fiancee is killed in a Dutch air attack, he demands a position in the intelligence service and is given the rank of lieutenant, while maintaining the guise of journalist (p.288). That Ali Nurdin has to become a military officer in order to serve the Revolution fully, suggests that men under arms epitomise the only true revolutionaries.

The major characters of the novel are educated, privileged[24] Indonesian military officers enlisting the help of foreign sympathisers and adventurers. When ordinary Indonesian civilians interact with Sadeli, they are presented as depending upon him for guidance and explanations. Sadeli declares that he is working for the rakyat [people, masses] and the Revolution, but the rakyat are rarely shown as involved. They remain in the wings, making few contributions to the struggle, a backdrop for actors such as Sadeli. When Sadeli and his men are trying to smuggle arms to Sumatra and get caught in the coastal swamps by a Dutch attack, they are helped by villagers from a nearby kampung (pp.150-74). The villagers are paid off with "some money for their trouble" and a cheer of "Merdeka!" ("Freedom!", p.174). Despite speeches which describe the people as the guarantors of Independence, it is the officers, as a category set apart from the people, whose actions are depicted in the narrative as guaranteeing the success of the Independence struggle.

Nor is the rakyat involved in the post-independence development of the nation. Sadeli's view of Indonesia's future is of an elite-led modernisation, where everyone works hard under the direction of skilled

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24. For example, Sadeli's pedigree is established by having a father who was a wedana (district head), one brother a doctor and another a 'resident' in Sumatra (p.8).
specialists and intelligent civil servants. All manner of industrial goods, including "iron, aluminium, electric lights, radios, ships, cars, planes, guns, cannons, torpedoes, clothes, medicine" must be produced (p.22). A police force, army and navy are required. While "the fate of the farmers, workers, fisherpeople, government servants, and the general public has to be improved, [and] prosperity has to be equalised", he allocates no active role in this to the rakyat, except to work hard in the hope that those with more power or skill will lead wisely.

Some of Sadeli's soldiers are ordinary people who knew poverty and suffering during the Dutch and Japanese occupations. In explaining the goals of the Independence struggle to one of his men, Amir, the son of a village teacher, Sadeli stresses that

"[your] status as a human being in God's eyes is no lower than that of the king of England, for example. Or Gandhi. Or the President of the United States, Stalin. No lower than President Soekarno, Hatta, Syahrir, any general, or I myself" (p.166).

In an earlier speech on the meaning of Independence, he tells some sailors that the guarantee of success rests with them all, for

"[if] there is a leader or dignitary who wants to contravene the Independence or trample upon human rights, then we must all rise up to oppose him." (p.22)

It is not, however, a violent uprising Sadeli has in mind, for he continues by explaining that such checks and balances are guaranteed by the constitution and the legal system. He is the benevolent, paternal figure, whose mission includes dispensing lessons on equality to the less well educated; it is not they who demand equality in their dealings with him, or with other social superiors.

Class conflict in Indonesia is seen as of minor importance and America is held up as a positive example of the achievements of capitalism. According to Sadeli, Marxism is obsolete because
"the labouring class now holds a very strong position, in fact, in the United States of America for example, it can be said to have the same degree of strength as the capitalists. In Indonesia now, there are no landlords in the sense of the kind of landlords there are in Egypt, Iran, or other countries. Neither are there Indonesians who could be called capitalists. So we can establish social justice easier because there is almost no conflict of class interests." (p.26)

On numerous occasions Sadeli describes his vision of a free prosperous Indonesia, an equal member of the world community. His nationalism is tempered by an apprehension about the dangers of chauvinism and xenophobia. He asks rhetorically, "Nowadays, doesn't a good nationalist have to be a good internationalist too?" (p.132) Voicing sentiments that were enshrined in February 1950 in the Surat Kepercayaan Gelanggang [Gelanggang Group's Declaration of Beliefs], an important statement of principles by Indonesia's non-communist artists (see Chapter 5), Sadeli declares that, as Indonesians, "[we] are the heirs of World Culture" (p.137), a recognition of the universality of Indonesia's heritage.

Throughout the novel Sadeli amplifies this belief in the essential oneness and equality of humanity. As he swims at a beach in Malaya, he is enveloped by a consciousness of the "ties of humanity binding him to hundreds of millions of people scattered across the face of the earth... What differentiates them is only the path of history, society and their separate cultures" (p.66).

Later, after a cheery evening sharing fine cuisine at a Hong Kong floating restaurant,[25] Sadeli and his American companion, David Wayne, muse upon how similar they are, and how "all human beings are essentially the same" (p.210), only their physical features vary. The kind of "new internationalism" Sadeli seeks is, "of course, not communist

25. It is noteworthy, considering Sadeli's criticism of Umar Yunus for embezzling revenue to finance his comfortable lifestyle, that Sadeli insisted on paying for the meal from government funds.
internationalism which will mean nothing more than world subjugation under one totalitarian system" (p.132). But the flush of camaraderie and brotherhood sensed by Sadeli and Wayne, fuelled by alcohol and fine fare, may say more about the class affinity of the characters than about international humanism.

The foreign, and often comfortable, setting of the story enables the violence and gore of the Revolution to be sanitised. There is no hand to hand combat; no tortuous moral dilemma in killing; indeed, very little death. The Indonesians are attacked from air and sea by the Dutch as they smuggle goods into Sumatra. Some Republicans are killed. Yet the armed conflicts are described as if at arm's length, with death shrugged off lightly.[26] Umar Yunus, for example, reports one man's death to Sadeli with "Yahya was hit by a bullet when the Dutch boat opened fire. Right in the forehead. Fate! But we succeeded in driving them back" (p.172). The grief and emotional turmoil of battle is absent. Because the narrative locates them far from the physical combat in Indonesia, the noble military men, who behave like gentlemen adventurers, are not aggressive nor tainted by violence. In the novel, the Revolution brings glory, without being gory.

Sadeli has grand expectations of how his nation will emerge from this honourable war. The irony of Sadeli's optimistic rhetoric about the golden future of an independent Indonesia is accentuated by the political shifts during the gap between the historical setting of the story and the two periods when the novel was written (that is, the months preceding May 1966, and Mochtar Lubis's three month stay in Aspen in 1973).

26. The death of Ali Nurdin's fiancée, Nani, is an exception to this. When she and Ali Nurdin are returning to Yogyakarta from a picnic, planes straff their unprotected car. The attack is brief and her death is not laboured in the narrative, though Ali Nurdin grieves.
Sadeli's eulogising is almost sarcastic when considered against the background of the political turmoil of 1965-6 and the disillusionment with the Suharto government by 1973, when many like Mochtar Lubis acknowledged that social and political improvements which they had expected from the New Order had not materialised.

The novel seems to have been written not only as a reaction to Sukarno's Guided Democracy. Its anti-communism is more a product of the period when the novel was written than the period in which the narrative is set. One can imagine Mochtar writing in jail in 1965 of Sadeli's hopes in early 1947 that

"[on] the soil of an independent Indonesia, let there never be places of political exile like Boven Digul or jails for holding political prisoners... Let people who have different religions or political convictions never be hunted down."

It seems anachronistic when Sadeli adds immediately, more than a year prior to the Madiun Affair and nearly two decades before the events of October 1965, "Oh, except for the communists of course, whom we have to reject, because they are part of the international communist movement!" (p.50). Such a comment seems more to reflect the attitudes of an author, who attributed his imprisonment without trial to Communist machinations, writing with the New Order government's interpretation of the events of October 1965 firmly in mind.

Almost without exception those significant characters in Maut dan Cinta who comment on communism express hostility. Only the captain of the small boat taking Sadeli to Singapore questions Sadeli's rejection of communism, by recalling that

"I used to have an uncle who was exiled by the Dutch to Boven Digul and later died there. The Dutch said that he was a communist. But Uncle told us before he was captured that his aim was the independence of our nation."

But the possibility of the communists working for independence is immediately denied by the dominant voice in the narrative.
"Sadeli smiled. 'Your uncle was not necessarily a communist. The Dutch branded all our freedom fighters communists... But we must reject the communists for several primary reasons.'" (p.25)

In overt statements, characters with high rank and status in the story indicate that communists cannot be nationalists, since communism is an international conspiracy not an indigenous political movement. Colonel Suroso, Sadeli's superior in the Republican capital of Yogyakarta, emphatically opposes communism, denouncing it as "an international movement which wants to subjugate the entire world" (p.17). Similarly Inspector Hawkins, Sadeli's contact in British intelligence in Singapore, warns him against "a new great danger -- aggressive international communism" (p.34). Communism is not the only international threat. Sadeli thinks that "the nations which profess to be supporting the principles of democracy, independence, justice and humanity, now come to murder"(p.162). But this reflection is shrouded in Sadeli's long monologic musings about human failings in general. Communism remains the primary international threat.

While much of the narrative conflict is between the Indonesian revolutionaries and the Dutch forces, who are their immediate physical enemy in the armed struggle for Independence, nonetheless, the ideological struggle of the protagonist and his supporters against the international adversary Communism emerges as more fundamental. Even while pinned down by the Dutch enemy, Sadeli recognises that "these Dutch men were ordinary, civilised people and [they] could possibly become friends in another place and [a different] relationship"(p.161). There is a conviction of ultimate Republican victory in the armed struggle against this tangible enemy, whom the hero recognises as basically decent people. By comparison, Communism is depicted as some alien contagion, menacing the Republic insidiously. There is no implication that communists, like
the Dutch soldiers, are basically 'ordinary civilised people' with whom Sadeli could be friends.

The final chapter and the brief epilogue warrant comment in this regard. The first 15 chapters, covering the earliest seven months of 1947, run for 285 pages of generally linear narrative (though details of the lives of the characters are sketched in reminiscences). There is a gap of 17 months between these chapters and the final 13-page chapter, which is dated December 1948, the occasion of the second Dutch military action against the Republic. The effect of the periodic reference to dates and key historical events, throughout the narrative, is to create the impression of the text as an authoritative, accurate 'historical' record of events. Chapter 16 leaves the impression of being a somewhat jerky tidying up of the narrative, as if a longer story had been intended. Significantly, it encompasses the "rebellion of communists at Madiun", the surrender of the national leadership at Yogyakarta and the resolution of Sadeli's personal dilemma as he recognises that his love for his new wife can co-exist with and revitalise his love for his country.

Although it does not enter the preceding narrative at all, the Madiun affair is included in the final chapter. The incident is described briefly in two paragraphs, without reference to conflicting interpretations.

"In the middle of the month of September 1948, there broke out a rebellion of communists at Madiun. Extraordinary cruelty was shown by the communists against their political opponents. [...] Amir Syarifuddin and the other leading PKI figures were captured, and given death sentences" (p.293).

The events and perspective are presented as 'fact'. That depiction of the rebellion, in turn, justifies earlier warnings about the insidious international threat from communism. It presents the execution of the
communist leaders as a legal necessity and a demonstration of Republican victory.

The narrative ends with Chapter 16, but a half-page epilogue is added to give a summary of events from the Second Dutch Military Action to the Transfer of Sovereignty on 27 December 1949. By implication, the military heroes of the narrative have been victorious over the Dutch and the communists. The narrative needs to depict the Revolution as completed in order to conclude the story neatly, and to show its military hero as a victor. As the character the readers have been directed to trust, Sadeli must have doubts about the future state of the society, in order to point to the 'deviations' the novel was written to highlight. Yet the novel must show that his principled stand was correct and brought victory, so that he remains a positive juxtaposition to Umar Yunus, a model for Ali Nurdin, and an exemplar of the values the text is lauding.

Not just communists, but politicians generally do not fare well in the novel. All three politicians, representing the Masyumi, the PNI and the PSI in the KNIP (Central Indonesian National Committee), are preoccupied with personal power and success (pp.264-8). The PSI representative wants to mould a democratic society from contemporary feudal remnants but feels that, to achieve this, temporarily the party will have to hold power undemocratically. The Masyumi man has his eyes on a future cabinet post and a modern, socially sophisticated woman to replace the village mother of his eight children. Similarly, the PNI member who imagines his fortunes as the "king of Indonesian industrial development", has his day-dreams diverted by thoughts of a new woman he has been 'visiting' in Solo.

Women are present in the novel as motifs of male vice and virtue, and very rarely as characters in their own right. The majority are
depicted as sexually available or promiscuous. Politicians seek women as a measure of their own success. Female characters are used in the narrative to establish Sadeli's sophisticated image, his sexual prowess and powerful mystique. Umar Yunus's vulnerability to women is a measure of his weakness, though his aggression towards them is condoned.

On their first meeting Umar Yunus forces himself sexually upon Rita, the Singaporean woman provided for his pleasure by a Chinese business contact (and whom he later marries after divorcing his Indonesian wife). Having raped her in a drunken stupor, he feels no guilt. Neither should he, because, as she says, it is "not your fault! It is I who should apologise. It is the job of a woman like me to give pleasure to a man. I'm so embarrassed" (p.55). Some minutes later, as their sex becomes more gentle, she embraces him and whispers (in a manner the text presents as genuine, her "terror" evaporated by his "fond caresses"), "You are so kind. You are a wonderful man" (in English in the text, p. Umar Yunus "feels his masculinity can now be proved by providing shelter and happiness for this woman"(pp.56-57). Two women, exceptional for their sexual integrity, are the women fit to be wives of the uncorrupted revolutionaries, the women who do not stand in the way of their men's service of the Revolution: Ali Nurdin's fiancee, Nani (killed in a Dutch air raid of Yogyakarta) and Maria, whom Sadeli marries.

While the male characters hold broad-ranging intellectual discussions, the females are depicted as passionately responsive, but essentially unconcerned with the currents of ideas expressed in the novel, uninvolved in the future society the protagonists are aspiring to create. The women are exploited but unexplored characters.
Mochtar acknowledges that he writes to promote his particular view of the world to his readers.\[27\] Literary critics have noted the author's predilection for too many 'sermons' (khotbah) which, according to the critic Pamusuk Eneste, make the characters stiff, static and unconvincing.

"Consequently, the characters of Sadeli and the others appear like shadow play puppets, with Mochtar Lubis as their puppeteer. Sadeli comes across more as an 'incarnation' of the author rather than an 'ordinary Semarang man' born in 1914".\[28\]

Teeuw, on the other hand, says, *Maut dan Cinta* is

"a well-told adventure story ... possessing all the necessary ingredients - love, war, espionage, heroism and treason - to make it thrilling reading, but actually offering no more than pleasurable entertainment."\[29\]

Considering the monologic 'sermon-like' style criticised by Pamusuk Eneste, Teeuw's praise (and lack of mention of such short-comings) is surprising, since he regarded *Harimau! Harimau!* (which, in my opinion, contains less of these characteristics than the drawn out, and very 'speechy' *Maut dan Cinta*) as "too emphatic, explicit, and moralistic to be convincing". Long monologues and uninterrupted speeches in *Maut dan Cinta* describing visions of Indonesia's social and political future sometimes result in the submerging of the characters in the rhetoric.\[30\]

True to the author's intention, the novel emphasises values which Mochtar believes to have been forgotten since the Revolution, but does so by not critically examining Indonesia's nationalist myths.

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27. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 11/3/81.


30. For example, Sadeli's conversation with Indian physician, Dr Banerji, when he talks uninterrupted in one passage for over 450 words (pp.92-94) or David Wayne's longer speech of two pages (pp.129-131).
Whatever its literary shortcomings, Maut dan Cinta, like most of Mochtar Lubis's publications, sold well, reaching its second printing within eighteen months.[31] The novel was given public recognition and a promotional fillip when, on 15 December 1979, the semi-governmental Jaya Raya Foundation [Yayasan Jaya Raya] awarded it a literary prize of Rp 1 million for best recent novel.[32] According to jury member Lukman Ali, Maut dan Cinta was selected from the forty other entries because, apart from matters of style, it provided unique information about the Revolution and posed the question as to whether the goals and beliefs, once held so strongly, still survive.[33]

What was not stated by the jury but which the above discussion of the novel has tried to argue, is that the values in the work represent those which the New Order establishment also seeks to reinforce. It diverts the credit for Independence away from common people onto extraordinary individuals in the army executing feats of unique daring. Branches of the government charged with information and propaganda have come increasingly since the late 1970s to emphasise the contribution made to the Revolution by military heroes.[34] The glory of these individual

31. The first edition of 5,000 in April 1977 was followed in October 1978 by an equal second printing, with a third in 1982 (correspondence with Sugiarta Sriwibawa, PT Dunia Pustaka Jaya, 14/10/81).

32. "Hadiah Sastra untuk Mochtar Lubis", Kompas, 17/12/79, p.1. The Foundation was established by the Governor of Jakarta, Ali Sadikin, on 10 October 1971. The incumbent Governor heads the Advisory Council and the majority of the foundation's members are Jakarta municipal officials, such as the head of the BAPEDA (Regional Development Board). Despite initial plans to award biennial prizes, Mochtar Lubis remains the only recipient. Though not officially disbanded, the foundation is dormant (correspondence with the H.B. Jassin Literary Documentation Centre, 26/5/86).


34. For a discussion of the promotion of the military's role in the Revolution through the medium of feature films, see Krishna Sen (1987) Indonesian Films, 1965-1982: Perceptions of Society and
army officers is elevated beyond the collective role of the general public. Such figures save Indonesia, not merely from the Dutch, but also from the other major foreign threat, communism. The Indonesia the military heroes strive to create is one which denies class conflict, where the army, bureaucracy and intellectuals determine what is best for the community, and where democracy is circumscribed by the banning of leftist political parties.

The Revolution in Earlier Novels

Unlike Maut dan Cinta, which was not published until 28 years after the Transfer of Sovereignty, Mochtar Lubis’s two others novels set during the Revolution were published very close to the event. Together they illustrate changing notions of the Revolution in Mochtar Lubis’s novels since the appearance of Tidak Ada Esok in 1950.[35]

As in Maut dan Cinta, the central character of Tidak Ada Esok is a military officer. The story of the protagonist, Lieutenant Johan, is told through a complex sequence of flashbacks and time shifts, while he is fighting the Dutch forces in April 1949.[36] He had trained as an officer in the Peta[37] and the bulk of the novel deals with his experiences in,

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35. Tidak Ada Esok was first published in 1950 by Gapura, Jakarta, however subsequent page references are to the 1982 Pustaka Jaya, Jakarta, second edition.


37. Peta (Pembela Tanah Air, Defenders of the Homeland) was established by the Japanese Army in late 1943 as an embryonic volunteer defence force.
and attitudes to the Revolution. It is primarily through Johan, his thoughts and perceptions, that the reader has access to events in the narrative.

Notable are criticisms of politicians and the Islamic militia, whose credentials may be seen (in the context of the time the novel was written in 1949) to rival those of the Indonesian army. The military felt betrayed by the political leaders (especially Sukarno) who are depicted as squabbling for their own positions and whose diplomatic negotiations with the Dutch were eroding the gains made by the armed struggle (p.150 & 196). Internal division, even more than the Dutch, is presented as the main enemy of the national Independence movement. As one battalion commander, expresses it:

"[this] struggle against the Dutch is really not all that hard... [What] makes the Independence struggle difficult, to a large degree, is us ourselves... We are fighting more against ourselves than opposing the enemy" (p.150).

Although Johan admires the way the various militia and the regular army can work together (p.133), there is also criticism of certain kinds of people's militia (lasykar), specifically the Islamic Sabilillah which marches to battle chanting 'Allahu Akbar' [God is Great] and believes only those whose faith faltered would die (pp.122-7).[38] A disciplined, regularised army is presented as the solution, too, to the disreputable behaviour of the "cowboy" irregulars and the uncontrollable "animals using the guise of the independence struggle to satisfy their own base passions" (p.102 & 112).

Like Maut dan Cinta, Tidak Ada Esok depicts the military officers as moral exemplars. They have joined the struggle, as Johan says, primarily

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38. Kahin 1952:163 described this group as "a sort of territorially based home guard in which all Masyumi members were liable for service."
"karena panggilan" [because of a calling], although partly too because they simply got caught up in something beyond themselves (p.115). (In Johan's own case, this rationale is partly undermined because he sees Peta training as an escape from a troublesome romance! But he is depicted as quickly fired by genuine commitment to pursue officer training, to "live for something bigger [than himself]. For his nation" (p.90.) The military are the people's saviours, upon whom the weak, the women and the villagers are depicted as dependent. At the conclusion, Johan, along with several of his comrades, dies protecting helpless village women and children, in an act of selfless heroism.

In the novel, there are two contrasting images of the masses, projected by Hassan and Johan. During the Japanese Occupation, Johan's friend, Hassan, chides him for his patronising attitudes to ordinary farmers, who restored Hassan's faith in the nation's spirit. Though this attitude is presented sympathetically at that point, the more frequent negative references to the general populace suggest the narrative supports Johan's contrary views. The narrative depicts Johan's military training as providing the opportunity to escape from "a narrow, blind society" in which he would have become "just another amongst the multitudes whose daily work is simply waking, sleeping, making money, eating, and living with the crudest passions" (p.95). During the independence struggle, Johan still projects the dominant criticism of the general population as lacking direction, no different from "animals running amok", refusing to obey regulations (p.113). He believes the success of the independence struggle depends, not so much on popular resistance, but on good leadership. The people respond because they are "charmed [by leadership], not because of their own consciousness" (p.112). The narrative depicts the military officers as symbolising this leadership to a disorganised general public.
However, there is some questioning of the Revolution from within this military perspective, reflecting an ambivalence which is largely absent in *Maut dan Cinta*. Johan's friend and commanding officer, Hassan, observes that, after the revolutionary *elan* of the early months evaporated, the troops are united more by their sense of participating in a grand collective adventure than by commitment to the principles of the Revolution.[39] As they deviate from the sacred spirit of the struggle, their sense of common purpose is strengthened by bearing a collective sin; the sin of exploiting the situation for their own personal ends, such as refusing to pay for goods they took and instead, saying dishonestly, pistol in hand, that it was all "for the Revolution!" (pp.134-5). There is, thus, a dark side to the Revolution, which leads even the military to sin.

*Tidak Ada Esok* gives graphic descriptions of death in battle. Under enemy fire, the soldiers are

"[s]mashed to smithereens. Blood would spray the earth. Heads smashed. Breasts shattered. Legs crushed. Arms severed. Life completely destroyed.... And the skulls cracked by mortar shrapnel, the red blood soaking the shirts torn by bullets, the red flesh and white bones of the legs, the guts dangling from ripped bellies; they didn't look pretty to those who survived, who saw their friends die like that." (p.160)

Johan's friends die all around him. One comrade, taking cover beside Johan, has "half his head blow away by mortar shrapnel. His pulped bloodied brains oozed to the ground" (p.220). The Revolution is noble, but it is sorrow and suffering.

Johan tries to identify the ultimate purpose of the struggle, which holds both the Indonesians and the enemy in its grip (p.171). Unless he and his comrades reflect philosophically upon their situation they are in

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39. Hassan's rather depreciatory remarks about the Revolution as 'adventure' are particularly pointed in the light of *Maut dan Cinta*'s adventurist depiction.
danger of "becoming revolutionary animals, crazy for blood, destruction and fighting" (p.178). In this, the Revolution holds the potential of social destruction. The victory they should seek is not over the Dutch but a "victory of human values... A human victory against each individual's own base desires. A victory of good over evil" (p.180). The two alternatives presented for the army figures are either the collective sin of those who corrupt the Revolution selfishly, or the martyrdom of heroic sacrifice.

By sacrificing their lives to ensure others may live more humanely, Johan and his army comrades are shown not as failures, but as successes, because it is the maintenance of human values, not strategic military victories, which are elevated in the narrative. The final scene, however, must sanctify the deaths of these officers. Whereas, to this point, the novel was questioning the image of Revolution as a glorious crusade, ultimately, officers are heroes and the Revolution is heroic.

Mochtar Lubis's second novel, Jalan Tak Ada Ujung, [40] written over six months in 1952,[41] focusses, even more than Tidak Ada Esok, on the mental and emotional turmoil of the characters living through the Revolution, rather than the historical events that form the background to their stories. The scenes of the Revolution are not primarily those of armed combat (as is the case in Tidak Ada Esok). The fighting generally serves as a backdrop to the psychological revelation of the characters. Military conflict is usually mentioned at the close of chapters (e.g. p.53) to tie the text into a broader, "historically-known" situation.

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40. Balai Pustaka, Jakarta, 1952 (to which all subsequent page references refer).

This story highlights, not the military, but a scared, unwilling civilian caught up in an internal struggle peripheral to the national revolution surrounding him. In *Jalan Tak Ada Ujung*, the depiction of the Revolution shifts from that of a specific historical event to 'revolution' as some kind of a transcendental, 'universal' human journey, a "road with no end" leading to a psychological release, a metaphysical rather than a national freedom.

Isa, the anti-hero, is a mild-mannered school teacher who is unwillingly caught up in the Revolution because he is afraid of being branded a spy or a traitor. His life is ruled by fear. The Revolution has brought chaos into his world and his mind floods with nightmares and the constant menace of all-enveloping violence. His sexual impotence, too, has become a source of mental anguish, a cause, or perhaps a manifestation, of his marital breakdown. Hazil, a *pemuda*[42] activist and resistance organiser, draws Isa into underground activities, despite Isa's dread. He gets Isa to observe and report on a grenade attack on a crowd of Dutch soldiers, but Isa is petrified by the explosion and flees, senseless.

After Hazil's capture, Isa is terrified as he waits for his own inevitable arrest. Yet during torture, he is too scared to talk and thus unable to turn traitor. Under the rain of blows, Isa realises that everyone experiences fear and has to learn to live with it. In their shared cell he observes Hazil's psychological disintegration through torture. Isa thinks of recounting Hazil's spirited speeches to his demoralised companion, but "he did not utter them, because everything

42. The term 'pemuda' (literally 'youth, young person') took on the connotation of a young fighter for independence.
that Hazil had said before stood in judgment on Hazil now".[43] Isa learns to "be at peace with his fear" and, as his torturers approach again, he realises that "their terror could no longer touch him. He was free."[44]

Umar Junus has written that Jalan Tak Ada Ujung juxtaposes Isa, "a thinking character" who is "impotent", with Hazil the "man of actions"[sic].[45] A closer examination of the construction of these two characters and their relationship suggests competing perceptions of the Revolution.

Unlike the military figures in the previous novels, the frightened Isa is swept along without being able to take any decisive action. He attempts to think through problems rationally and is alarmed by the denigration of both human dignity and the principles of the Independence movement by the renegades who are expropriating de facto control of the Revolution in the kampungs. He is apprehensive at the destructive consequences of such violence and disorder. Isa is a pragmatic nationalist who loves his country but does not want to die for it (pp.60-1).

When Hazil is introduced he is the brave nationalist activist, brimming with revolutionary ardour. He also has a sober, creative energy, displayed in sensitive musical duets with Isa. Hazil is spontaneous, creatively artistic, and an energetic spokesperson for action. But, by the second half of the novel, Hazil, too, has become uneasy about the

44. Johns' translation, p.151; Indonesian, p.127.
45. Umar Junus 1981:178 footnote 4. The final quotation is in English in the original.
excessive and unwarranted violence of the pemuda with whom he has associated himself (pp.78-9). A strong individualist, he comes to oppose the runaway emotionalism of populist xenophobia and is uneasy once the Revolution becomes a flood beyond the control of people like himself who began it (p.79).

Until the denouement Isa is "impotent", literally and figuratively, while Hazil, the man of action, controls their joint destiny, and even seduces Isa's wife. In the final chapter, however, from the time Isa awaits arrest, there is a transformation in roles which exposes the ideological constraints of the narrative. The commanding strengths of Hazil -- his control over his life, his energy and self-confidence, his heroic place in the Revolution -- are transferred to Isa, who overcomes his fear and has his negative characteristics rendered positive by an authorial sleight of hand. Hazil is stripped of his strength by being unable to bear the final torture and betraying his comrades. Isa's inability to speak because of his fear [46] becomes glossed as a victory. The contemplative individual emerges from the novel as the victor but he only achieves this by default.

Viewed within the contemporary context of its production, Jalan Tak Ada Ujung can be read as a product of the contradictions between the romantic image of the Revolution and the spirit of post-war intellectual rationalism. The novel was produced at a time when the verve and idealism of those who had grown to adulthood fed on the works of the great romantic figures of the Independence movement -- leaders like Sukarno, Hatta, Sjarhir -- were being disillusioned by the results of the physical

46. When Isa was being beaten "he opened his mouth to speak, but could project no voice. He was already too frightened" (p.124). Later he told Hazil "all my being cried out to confess, but my tongue was tied because of pain and fear" (p.126).
struggle. In the novel the anti-hero rejects the jingoism and glorification of the Independence struggle and achieves his personal victory. The young revolutionary is condemned by his own rhetoric. From such a conclusion, the reflective thinker must be seen to acquire a nobility and character which identifies him as the appropriate model, while the disorder of the activist must degenerate into defeat. Cautious contemplation is elevated above impetuous nationalism and militarism.

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The Revolution of Maut dan Cinta is a very different concept from the Revolution of Jalan Tak Ada Ujung, although it shares similarities with that of Tidak Ada Esok. Tidak Ada Esok depicts a bloody struggle, with vivid descriptions of death and combat. Jalan Tak Ada Ujung personalises the social turmoil in one man's psychological trauma. Maut dan Cinta glorifies the Revolution as grand espionage adventure.

For Johan in Tidak Ada Esok, the fighting was brutish and violent at the front line of the Revolution, but the real struggle was against the de-humanising effects of war on the human spirit, which Johan transcends in his death. His death was not unexpected, since the combat had not been kept at arm's length, but was all around him, ultimately engulfing him, but guaranteeing martyrdom for the Revolution. He comes to terms with the trauma of the physical and psychological conflicts of the Revolution. Like Sadeli in Maut dan Cinta, he can empathise with the enemy, regarding them also as being caught, like a needle in a "gramophone record,... unable to escape" (p.171). But Tidak Ada Esok, published only two years after the Madiun incident, is far less concerned with depicting a Communist threat. Johan's troops were mobilised with the Siliwangi to put down the PKI revolt, but the narrative passes over the event with merely a comment that "those battles to rout the communists were not much different" to the guerrilla war against the Dutch after the Second
Military Action in December 1948 (p.164). There is no communist bogey linked to an international terror. Other politicians draw the greater criticism for causing debilitating dissension within Republic ranks.

Neither politicians nor the PKI come within the ambit of concerns in *Jalan Tak Ada Ujung*, which presents the Revolution as social disorder and chaos. This novel contrasts the contemplative, insecure Isa with the assertive nationalist Hazil, where Isa's primary enemy was his own fear. But in the end his weakness is transformed into virtue and victory. It is the contemplative civilian, not combatant *pemuda* activist who emerges as hero.

By contrast, Sadeli is the idealised martial hero: a courageous fighter, intellectual and gentleman. There is no hint of fear, little self-doubt, and an enduring sense of the correctness of his duty to his nation. The moral quandary, fear and individual philosophical reservations, of both Johan and particularly Isa, have vanished in the honour of Sadeli's job well done. Sadeli's 'independence struggle' is a glorious, if clandestine, struggle, the omnipresent adversary in which is not self-interest (though it is this which Ali Nurdin senses will ultimately corrupt the future society) or xenophobia. The enemies are external: the Dutch and international communism. In *Tidak Ada Esok* and more particularly *Jalan Tak Ada Ujung*, the Revolution is a metaphor of internal struggles, internalised in individual psychological conflicts. *Maut dan Cinta*’s polemical style can be more straightforward since the conflict in its 'Revolution' have been directed against identifiable external enemies, rather than internal divisions or contradictions. *Maut dan Cinta* reinforces an image, (evident, but less dominant, in *Tidak Ada Esok*) of a glorious Independence struggle in which the military officers are the heroes who save the nation.
Tidak Ada Esok and Jalan Tak Ada Ujung, written soon after the events they take as their setting, have little jingoistic rhetoric, unlike Maut dan Cinta which eulogises the nationalist spirit despite the novel's call for a tempering internationalism. The early novels re-examine the ambiguity and complexity of the Independence struggle in works written for those who had also experienced it. With Maut dan Cinta, it is as if the increasing temporal distance from the Revolution has accentuated a desire to demonstrate commitment to nationalism and whip up a spirit of patriotism and national pride in readers. When Maut dan Cinta was published in 1977, readers under 30 would not have lived through the Revolution. They are presented, not with an exploration of its complexities and contradictions, but a lesson, passing down a particular post-1965 version of history to those who had not experienced it. The type of hero presented in Maut dan Cinta reinforces the concept of an idealised, uncorruptible, benevolent, military leader acting for the good of the community, but, crucially, not subject to the public's wishes or control.

Harimau! Harimau!

Like Maut dan Cinta, Harimau! Harimau! [Tiger! Tiger!], Mochtar Lubis's other novel published since 1966, was also written during detention. The manuscript, initially entitled Hutan [The Jungle], appears to have been drafted in Madiun jail by 19 August 1963,[47] then revised


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till mid December[48] and it was finally published in 1975.[49] The novel can be read as an allegorical study of leadership in society, examining the decline of one leader and the rise of another from amongst a small number of characters, within a isolated jungle setting. Within the context of the time of its composition, when Mochtar Lubis and other like-minded intellectuals were deeply concerned about Sukarno's leadership, this novel may be interpreted as an attempt to explore the phenomenon of the replacement of a corrupt leader with a more upright one.[50]

The setting and narrative style of Harimau! Harimau! are very different from Mochtar's other novels. Tidak Ada Esok, Senja di Jakarta and Maut dan Cinta are semi-historical. Other works, such as Jalan Tak Ada Ujung and Tanah Gersang, are based solidly within the urban society of Jakarta he knows well. In Harimau! Harimau! he is describing the jungle hunting and gathering activities of a rural community he experiences only from the outside, despite his ramblings in the jungle during his schooling at Kayutanam, his love of nature and long-standing interest in environmental issues.[51]

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49. All following page references are from Harimau! Harimau!, Pustaka Jaya, Jakarta, 2nd ed., 1977.

50. Two members of the Foundation for Fine Books [Yayasan Buku Utama] jury, which awarded Harimau! Harimau! the 1975 prize for best novel for adolescents, mentioned the allusion to Sukarno and Indonesian political life [discussions with H.B. Jassin (9/1/81) and Hazil Tanzil (22/1/81)]. See also Soedjijono 1985:70-71.

51. Five years after Harimau! Harimau! was published (and 17 after it was commenced) Mochtar used the Sumatran jungle setting for the adolescents' tale, Berkelana dalam Rimba (1980), designed to awaken young people's environmental awareness.
Seven villagers go collecting *damar* [resin] deep in the jungle. They are led by Wak Katok,[52] a 50 year old village *dukun* [traditional healer] with an unequalled reputation in the arts of mysticism, healing, hunting and combat. The group's oldest is 60 year old Pak Haji Rakhirmad,[53] who has spent decades wandering the globe. Pak Balam has fought beside Wak Katok in the 1926 uprising against the Dutch for which he spent years in exile in Tanah Merah. These three older men are accompanied by four young students of Wak Katok: Talib, Sanip, Sutan, and Buyung. Buyung's hunting and fighting skills rival those of his teacher.

After a week's walk, the group stay at the home of Wak Katok's former teacher, Wak Hitam, a mysterious, mystically powerful old *dukun*, who had left his village for the isolated jungle of Bukit Harimau [Tiger Hill]. Siti Rubiyah, the youngest and most beautiful of his many wives, is nursing him, for he is chronically ill. The *damar* collectors, Buyung particularly, are drawn to the wistful Siti Rubiyah, who is sexually abused by her bestial, feverish husband. Seduced by her, Buyung promises to return and free her from Wak Hitam, after taking the resin to his village.

On the journey back to their village, one by one the men are attacked by a marauding tiger. First, Pak Balam is wounded, then Talib and Sutan are killed. Pak Balam, believing that the tiger has been sent by God to punish sinners, urges the men to confess all past sins, or face retribution. He confesses how he had condoned Wak Katok's murder of a wounded compatriot in the 1926 Rebellion, and then not stopped Wak Katok raping and murdering innocent people.

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52. 'Wak', an abbreviation of 'Pak tua', is a term of respect used for an elder.

53. The title *haji* is given to men who have fulfilled the fifth tenet of Islam, the pilgrimage to Mecca.
Remembering his adultery with Siti Rubiyah and the rumours that Wak Hitam could change into a supernatural tiger, Buyung worries that the beast is Wak Hitam's avenging spirit. But, although others confess, he refuses to do so, suggesting instead that they stalk the tiger. The young men's faith in Wak Katok's leadership is eroded by the revelations about his past and by his increasingly poor judgement, for although, acting boldly, his inner turmoil and weakness show. They track the tiger, unsuccessfully.

Pak Balam passes away in the night but anxieties about the wrath of God haunt the survivors. To keep his transgressions secret, Wak Katok plans to kill the others once they are nearer the village. When he tries to force them to expose their own sins, a brief appearance of the tiger renders him rigid with fear. As Sanip recounts how Wak Katok forced himself sexually upon Siti Rubiyah, the dukun snatches their only firearm, an ancient muzzle-loading rifle and sign of his authority and power, and drives the others into the night jungle.

As the group capture the firearm and the aberrant Wak Katok, Pak Haji is mortally wounded, but he urges the others to forgive, and, "before you kill the wild tiger, first kill the tiger in your own heart... Have faith in God" (p.202). Buyung then tethers Wak Katok as a lure to attract the tiger, which he despatches with one clean shot, overcoming his impulse to let the beast first kill Wak Katok. Finally, Buyung muses on the real achievement of his ordeal: he has opposed tyranny (by capturing Wak Katok and killing the tiger) and conquered his inner temptations (to allow the tiger to kill Wak Katok).

When asked in 1981, Mochtar Lubis said he intended Harimau! Harimau! "to be a subtle allegory of criticism against the abuse of power, abuse
of faith of the people in a man."[54] He acknowledged some obvious symbolism, saying Wak Katok represented Sukarno, while there is something of the 'tiger' -- ambition, lust and the like -- in everybody. The villagers wandering lost in the forest, he recounted, were like the people of Indonesia, whose leaders were not willing to admit that they had lost their way.

In developing his allegory on the abuse of power, Mochtar examines the conscience as a determinant of social behaviour and compares two types of leaders under stress: Wak Katok and the emergent Buyung. Wak Katok is widely recognised for his leadership qualities. The young generation seeks to learn from him; his own generation defers to his greater prowess. The plot reveals the gradual dissolution of this leader as his hypocrisy and dissemblance are exposed. The leader's immorality causes a breakdown in community harmony. Wak Katok clings to the gun as his claim to authority but his leadership is based on a myth of invulnerability created by manipulating people's superstitions. Initially, Pak Balam's exposure of the leader vexes the resin collectors. They do not want to expose their own weaknesses, nor to have their faith in Wak Katok shaken and the status quo disturbed (p.106). Ironically, it is Pak Balam, the confessor, not Wak Katok, the sinner, whose behaviour is resented when the dying man tells about Wak Katok's past murders and rapes. For all the villagers are hiding secrets and they are only made more insecure by Pak Balam's insistence on exposing people's pasts.

Gradually, Buyung emerges as a potential alternative leader to Wak Katok. More important than his hunting and shooting skills, which even Wak Katok admits to himself excel his teacher's, are his principled, rational, good intentions. Buyung sees through his idol's falsity and has

54. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 11/3/81.
the courage to challenge him. This critical turning point is reached when Buyung suggests they begin to hunt the tiger, to behave like hunters, not prey, to "seize the reins of their fate in their own hands again" (p.140). Unlike Wak Katok, Buyung seeks to challenge the threat head on, to take the initiative and be the decisive leader. Wak Katok's unforgivable sin, in the eyes of Buyung, is not his brutality, his treatment of Siti Rubiyah or his attempts to kill his companions, but his deceitful "false teachings, false mantera, false talismans, [and] false leadership" (p.209).

Buyung is established early as the champion opposing tyranny. When contemplating Siti Rubiyah's plight, he believes "everyone is obliged to oppose the tyranny of one person against another. Even though that tyranny does not strike oneself" (p.79). When the haji asks Buyung why they need to risk hunting the tiger instead of fleeing, the youth replies that "wherever we meet with evil, which seeks to destroy us, other people, or the public at large, we who are closest are obliged to oppose it" (pp.184-185). This major message of the novel is re-emphasised by Buyung on the penultimate page.

"Everyone is obliged to oppose tyranny wherever tyranny exists. It is wrong for people to seclude themselves, and pretend to shut their eyes to the tyranny which strikes others... [The] degree of tyranny, or the existence of tyranny cannot be measured by the distance it occurs from oneself" (p.214).

Once Wak Katok's past atrocities have been exposed and he has become identified with evil, his decline as leader begins. The power, heroism and reverence which has resided in the mystically potent Wak Katok is gradually transferred to the idealistic Buyung who begins to take the lead in challenging the threats to the group. The transference of hero status from one character to the other is engineered under strain
however. Wak Katok must have not simply a previously hidden sinful past, but a violent, tyrannical present. So he turns against his comrades.

The pivotal incident, during which the leadership is acquired by Buyung, is one of the most tense in the novel. The narrative tension fuses the instant Wak Katok is about to pull the trigger and kill Buyung for refusing to confess his sins. Suddenly, the tiger approaches to within the circle of their campfire light (pp.193-5). Wak Katok takes aim at the animal but misfires. His self-control snaps. At Buyung's initiative, the others drive the tiger away with firebrands, returning to find Wak Katok curled up in their shelter, terrified.

While the narrative directs the reader to accept Buyung as principled leader, there are inconsistencies in his depiction. Various incidents could be construed by the narrative as suggesting weaknesses or misdemeanours on Buyung's part, but they are not constructed to indicate these. The narrative protects Buyung from unfavourable depictions which could undermine the reader's sympathetic interpretation of him. His relationship with Siti Rubiyah is one example.

Buyung rejects superstition and articulates the principles of opposition to oppression and tyranny, whatever the cost, wherever these may occur. One of the earliest opportunities for him to venture such opinions is when he decides "he wants to save Siti Rubiyah who can no longer bear to live with Wak Hitam, who is clearly cruel and guilty [of physically abusing her]" (p.72). She begs Buyung for help and he agrees to return to free her, for he "felt the tyranny Wak Hitam exercised over Siti Rubiyah" (p.79). Buyung is willing to "defend and shelter this weak, innocent young woman, who was in such trouble" (p.69).

But this image of the worthy, helpless Siti Rubiyah is changed by the narrative in the last 20 pages, to extract Buyung from his promise to
return to save her. As Wak Katok is losing the leadership of the group, Sanip accuses the dukun of forcing himself sexually upon Siti Rubiyah. Wak Katok impunes her morals in his defence, saying, "you know I paid her. And she would sleep with anyone who wanted to give her money or buy her a blouse" (p.196). Buyung's response is "disappointment mixed with relief". The narrative relieves Buyung of the moral responsibility of returning for Siti Rubiyah as he had promised, because he had been 'lured' [dipikat] by her (p.213).

"He knew... he would not return to fulfil his promise to Siti Rubiyah. What happened between Siti Rubiyah and him was like the water of a river which had flowed far behind -- it was passed, finished -- and now he knew that life was not as easy as he supposed." (p.214)

Buyung seems to accept Wak Katok's defence and discount Sanip's version that Siti Rubiyah was raped. Buyung's reneging on the promise is not presented as a betrayal or a weakness implying that this leader, like the last, has feet of clay. It is glossed over as a lesson in the realities of life, to allow a neat ending with Buyung looking forward to a life with his village sweetheart, Zaitun. Although the credence of his glorious declarations of opposition to tyranny could have been undermined by Buyung's betrayal of the first promise he had given, the narrative diverts attention from such a potential conclusion, assuaging the reader's doubt, by having Buyung re-iterate his illustrious principles at the close of the novel.

While Buyung is depicted as a principled leader who rejects superstition, there is little to indicate that he will relate to those who follow him differently than Wak Katok did in other key respects. In taking command, Buyung acts unilaterally, giving orders to Sanip without consultation or discussion, just as Wak Katok had. He automatically assumes the leader's role, like Wak Katok who, the reader is told at the outset, is their 'unofficial' leader (p.10). There is no implied
criticism in the narrative of elements of Buyung's behaviour which resemble Wak Katok, such as his consistent refusal to confess or reveal his fear to his comrades. These are depicted as indicating his strength of character, not his weakness. By giving him grandiose speeches about opposing tyranny, the novel presents Buyung as being an upright leader whose authority is based on moral values and principles. Yet, although his practice does not differ, in many ways, from that of Wak Katok, Buyung's dealings with his comrades are not depicted as contradicting such declarations. The reader is directed to accept his statements, rather than his practice.

That there should be a 'leader' at all, is not at issue in the novel. It is taken as a natural social ordering. While the men work together under their leader, they resolve the threat from the tiger in an essentially individualist manner. It is a matter of each man's conscience, his sins and his God. Each is urged to 'kill the tiger in himself' -- to overcome his base, sinful desires -- as the way to survive. The men are together, as a group under a leader, but grappling with their fear each in their own way. As individuals, various members of the group put pressure (moral, physical, and eventually armed) upon others to expunge their sins publicly, but the solution is an individual and personal reconciliation with God.

Harimau! Harimau!'s characters are isolated individuals cut off from their companions. The soul implodes upon itself, contracting under the stress and threats posed by the physical and emotional surroundings. Like Jalan Tak Ada Ujung with its agony of fear and self-doubt, Harimau! Harimau! can be read as a novel of psychological drama, examining the individual conscience. But unlike Guru Isa who copes with his fear by default, Buyung recognises his fear (and the temptation to surrender to revenge) and overcomes it through his moral strength.
When invited to rank his novels in 1981, Mochtar Lubis listed Harimau! Harimau! second only to Jalan Tak Ada Ujung.[55] With some notable exceptions, critical response to the novel was generally favourable. In 1967 Tjeeuw had not been impressed by a preprint (then entitled Hutan) which he regarded as displaying "a tendency to moralism on the one hand, to sensationalism on the other", bringing out "the weakest sides both of the journalist and of the writer Mochtar Lubis".[56] On re-reading the published version he recognised its "definite literary merits", but maintained it was "not a really good novel, being too emphatic, explicit, and moralistic to be convincing."[57] Nonetheless, Satyagraha Hoerip, although recognising Mochtar's tendency to moralise (something Mochtar had attempted to revise out of the draft after his wife's initial criticisms[58]), felt this was integrated into the flow of the story, and was more subtle and controlled in Harimau! Harimau! than in Mochtar's previous works. He praised it as "one of Mochtar Lubis's crowning works, even one of the best novels in Indonesian literature."[59]

In May 1976, Harimau! Harimau! was awarded a prize for the best book of fiction for young people by the Foundation for Fine Books [Yayasan Buku Utama] (under the aegis of the Department of Education and Culture).[60] Mochtar Lubis received a Rp 1 million prize from foundation

55. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 24/4/81.
60. See "Hadiah Satu Juta Rupiah untuk Mochtar Lubis", *Kompas*, 4 May 1976, p.3. The jury members were Ali Audah, Goenawan Mohamad, H.B. Jassin, Hazil Tanzil and Mr. Rustandi Kartakusumah.
Chairman, the Minister of Education and Culture, General Syarif Thayeb, and the book was placed on the government purchase list for schools (under the 'Inpres' programme). This meant a special government printing of 15,000 copies, in addition to Pustaka Jaya's commercial print-runs. [61]

The selection was criticised in the press because the novel contained sexual innuendo and descriptions regarded as inappropriate reading for young people. [62] Mochtar Lubis was unconcerned by the criticism of the sexual descriptions but surprised by the Department of Education and Culture's prize. [63] He felt the Department would have been less keen to encourage students to read the book if it appreciated the political themes in the novel. [64]

Mochtar Lubis's novels usually attract public and critical interest and sell well. The timing of the publication of this particular work may have enhanced its reception and its potential for multiple

61. Both the Pustaka Jaya June 1975 first edition and the December 1977 second edition were of 5,000, indicating steady sales. (Commercial figures were supplied by the publisher in a letter from Sugiarto Srimbawa, dated 14 October 1981.)

62. As examples of the public response, see Indonesia O'Galelano, "Wah, Pak Menteri Syarif Thayeb, Lho??" [photocopy located in the H.B. Jassin Literary Documentation Centre, source unknown, dated circa 16 May 1976], which also mentions an article by Riris K. Sarumpaet, (Lecturer, Faculty of Arts, University of Indonesia), in Kompas, 11 May 1976, p. 4.; and Sinar Harapan, 15 May 1976, p. 10. The jury clarified that the award was for reading material for 16-21 year-old adolescents, not under-age children.

63. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 11/3/81.

64. While the Department was preparing to circulate Harimau! Harimau! to schools, the writer of a letter to Kompas claimed to have been told by departmental 'Inpres' officials that some of Mochtar's children's stories (for primary school students) had been rejected for 'security' reasons, because of Mochtar's possible implication in the January 1974 incident (see Soekico J.G., "Penilaian Kontradiktif", Kompas, 12 July 1976). Syarif Thayeb subsequently issued a pro forma denial of the claim ("Buku-buku Mochtar Lubis Tak Dilarang", Sinar Harapan, 12 July 1976).
interpretations. While Mochtar Lubis initially drafted *Harimau! Harimau!*
with Sukarno in mind, by the time it was published in 1975, readers could
relate it to other political events. Jury members who awarded it the Fine
Book prize saw symbolic representations of Sukarno in the political
allegory.[65] In a detailed study of the novel, Soedjijono interprets the
conflict between Wakan Katok and Buyung as a clash of generations and he
notes the symbolism of an old corrupt leader being overthrown by the
young generation in the context of the political events of 1965-66.[66]
Mochtar's diary entries (indicating the manuscript was basically
completed in 1963) would mean any correspondence with events after
October 1965 owes more to authorial presage rather than post-factum
symbolism. But the text is always open to other readings. That the youth
emerges in the novel to overthrow the leader, who had fostered him,
provides a passing similarity to student rebellions against the New Order
government in January 1974, another potential point of historical
reference for readers. The likelihood of this interpretation would have
been accentuated by press reports of Mochtar's arrest and detention after
Malari between February and April 1975, the year the novel was published.

Indonesian political history since 1963 had furnished various
contexts within which the novel could be interpreted. Mochtar wanted the
novel to be read as an allegory "against the abuse of power". Yet, since
a primary target of Mochtar's criticism (as interpreted by both members
of the jury and literary studies, such as Soedjijono's) was presumed to
be President Sukarno, it appears the Suharto government's Department of
Education and Culture saw no reason to reject the novel.

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65. At least one member of the jury, Hazil Tanzil, had read the prison
manuscript, and knew the circumstances under which Mochtar wrote it.

66. Soedjijono 1985:70-71 discusses the novel's symbolism and although he
does not specifically mention Sukarno, the allusion is clear.
Leadership in Senia di Jakarta

Tidak Ada Esok, Naut dan Cinta and Harimau! Harimau! all present very favourable depictions of upright leaders as society's heroes. However, one influential earlier novel by Mocthar Lubis, Senia di Jakarta, presents a very pessimistic view of society without adequate moral and political leadership.

Senia di Jakarta, in its various translations, particularly the English Twilight in Jakarta, has become Mocthar Lubis's best known novel internationally. It is unique in the history of Indonesian literature because the English translation (and those of various other foreign languages including Dutch, Spanish, Korean, and Italian) was published years before the Indonesian.[67]

Mocthar Lubis recorded his motivation for writing the story in his diary:

"I want to depict in a novel the social and political situation of our country. How the thirst for power, greed for possessions and the power to use the position of the [political] parties have caused so much damage to the core of our society. [...] I feel, in writing it, I am compiling a report which our society should know about in the future."[68]

67. For the purpose of this chapter, I shall be referring to the PT Badan Penerbit Indonesia Raya, [Jakarta], 1970 edition of this novel since this edition was published by Mocthar's own company presumably with his imprimatur. The publication history of the original manuscript (see Chapter 5) is a complex one, raising questions about which of a number of resultant editions -- specifically the English (Twilight in Jakarta, translated by Claire Holt, Hutchinson & Co., London 1963), the Malay (Senia di-Jakarta, Pustaka Antara, Kuala Lumpur, 1964), the first Indonesian edition (1970) or the second edition (Senia di Jakarta, Pustaka Jaya, Jakarta, 1982) -- should be regarded as the definitive text. Its history illustrates the mutability of 'a text'. However, such a detailed study lies outside the confines of this chapter. Page references to the English translation refer to the Oxford in Asia Paperback (Kuala Lumpur) 1983 re-print of the 1963 Hutchinson's translation by Claire Holt (hereafter 'Holt 1983').

68. Catatan Subversif 1980:144, dated December 1958. Although the 1970 Indonesian text concludes with a modern colophon "completed/jakarta,
Senia di Jakarta moves between stories of the very rich and politically powerful, the Western-oriented urban intelligentsia, middle-ranking public servants, political party organisers and activists, and, beneath them on the social pyramid, the urban poor. The story follows this cross-cut of the capital's social life through events between May to January in an unspecified year.[69]

At the bottom, Saimun and Itam, labourers on a garbage truck, are starving destitutes. Saimun has fled to the city after his village had been razed and his parents killed by bandits. Neneng, another village refugee, happily sleeps with them both, sharing their affection and the tiny room they rent in a dilapidated hovel. A world above them live the city's powerful political party leaders, rapacious and unprincipled. On their fringes is Suryono, recently returned from a diplomatic posting in America. He has a semi-incestuous relationship with his father's new young wife, Fatma. His wealthy father, Raden Kaslan, is a council member of the Indonesia Party in the government coalition. Raden Kaslan and the party finance committee raise party funds and enrich themselves by manipulating government licences and other dubious practices. Halim, an opportunist newspaper editor, places his newspaper at the party's disposal (for financial and other considerations), while pretending

7 march 1957" (p.280), diary evidence in Catatan Subversif (1980) suggests the manuscript was actually completed more than three and a half years later. In the 'December 1958' entry Mochtar wrote that he had "begun my novel given the name Yang Terinjak dan Melawan [Down-trodden and Resisting]" after which the published diary added the footnote, "[this] book was later published in English in London with the title Twilight in Jakarta" (p.144). In the entry for 22 November 1960 he wrote he had "completed writing the novel Yang Terinjak dan Melawan several days ago" (p.149).

69. Internal references in the text relate to various historical incidents (suggesting a setting between about May 1954 to January 1957), but there is no direct congruence between the fiction and 'history'.

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political neutrality. Between these two social extremes middle-ranking public servants and their wives are gradually lured into corruption and impropriety.

A regular discussion group meets at the home of a leading intellectual and essayist, Pranoto. Participants include the activist Muslim, Murhalim, and the leftist, Achmad,[70] together with waverers like the poet, Jasrin. Eventually frustrated with the group's intellectualising and anti-leftist bias, Achmad leaves to devote himself more to his trade union work. Jasrin later also exits to join the leftist Movement for People's Culture (GEKRA) and accepts a junket tour to Peking and Moscow.

When the Indonesia Party fraud is exposed in the press, Halim shifts his paper's alignment to the Opposition, Raden Kaslan absconds abroad and the cabinet returns its mandate. Suryono, fleeing with Fatma, dies in a car accident. In the turmoil, hungry mobs sack shops at the instigation of leftists like Achmad. When Murhalim tries to intervene, Itam kills him and is, in turn, shot by the police. The discussion group, told of Murhalim's death, disbands.

Saimun goes to the police station to recover Itam's body, and sees Neneng (who had left him some months previously to work as a prostitute) caught in a police raid. To gain her release from the police, he claims she is his wife, and the couple agree to return to the village together.

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70. Achmad's precise party affiliation is left vague. He states initially that he is not a communist, but could become one if the national situation did not improve (p. 51). He later describes himself as "a follower of Marx and Lenin" (p.101) and thereafter becomes a labour organiser for "the party" (unspecified). Others in the discussion group regard him as representing a 'communist' line.
The novel depicts a society without effective moral leadership. As Suryono tells the study club, "as far as I'm concerned, our most fundamental [national] problem is the matter of leadership"(p.145). The leaders of the Indonesia Party, the political activists like Achmad, the opportunistic editor Halim are all depicted as exploiting and misleading the people for personal gain. Personal and political loyalties conflict with the broader loyalty to the community, to the common good. The politicians are without redeeming qualities (depicted even more caustically than in Maut dan Cinta). They are causing, not solving, the nation's problems. If we locate the novel in the historical context of its production when Mochtar Lubis was under house arrest during the transition from a liberal parliamentary system to Guided Democracy, Sukarno, though never named, is constantly 'present'. Numerous criticisms of political leaders in the novel could (and, at the time, would) have been read as alluding to him.[71]

There is no admirable leadership from other quarters. The intellectuals appear impotent talkers, out of touch with their own society. The journalists (both Halim and his assistant) are congenital opportunists. Artists (and minor trade union officials, too) are easily won over by inducements from political parties. The leftists are manipulative, uncaring, more concerned about building the party's power than genuinely working in the interests of the people. The Muslims are

71. E.g. p.275. This is Mochtar Lubis's only novel with a prefatory disclaimer that all characters and events are fictional, which alerts the reader to historical allusions yet circumvents libel. Similarities include: Husin Limbara, head of the fictitious Partai Indonesia, with Djody Gondokusumo, of the PNI; Halim and his newspaper Suluh Merdeka with B.M. Diah and Merdeka; Pranoto with the PSI's Soedjatmoko (and with Takdir Alisjahbana); the poet Jasrin with Rivai Apin and Utry Tatang Sontani (not H.B. Jassin, as Roskies 1986:89 suggests); Raden Kasian with Iskaq Tjokroadisurjo, former Minister of the Economy; and GEKRA with LEKRA. [Mochtar Lubis discussed some of these similarities in an interview (11/3/81); others are mentioned in Chambert-Loir 1974:154.]
ineffectual, impetuous and unable to counter the Communists. In a novel composed as a 'report' of the times (see page 291), the total absence of the military suggests that the vision of society in the novel implicitly exonerates the military from any part in the decline of the Jakarta political system at the centre of the work.

While the rich have few admirable qualities, the dominant image of the poor as individuals is morally positive.[72] They help each other not for personal gain, but because of a sense of common fate. The poor struggle to gain some power over their own lives; the wealthy crave power over others. While the poor are depicted with great sympathy as individuals, particular tensions in the narrative are evident in the treatment of the poor as masses. The reader's sympathy is directed towards poor characters, who are living in intolerable conditions, constantly battling hunger and fearful of losing their meagre employment. Yet when they begin to protest collectively, the poor are seen to be easily misled and manipulated by malevolent self-interested (Communist) agitators. Itam may genuinely believe the slogans he chants about the people's right for food, but he is presented as being paid by the party which orchestrates when and where he chants.

From the commencement of the novel, with the tales of Saimun and Itam, the narrative depicts the lives of the poor with sympathy. In the minor vignettes, the frustrations of the poor become evident. A impoverished young prostitute, abused and discarded, laments: "Help me, God, why did I become like this, who made me like this?"(p.132). Saimun and Itam feel they are being "trampled on", and driven to thieving to survive since nobody cares about their fate (p.169). As the national

72. Even the unorthodox sexual triangle between Itam, Saimun and Neneng is handled in a sensitive and sympathetic manner, without being judgemental or critical (pp.36-38).
political crisis heightens, the undercurrent in the narrative depicting the frustration of the poor increasingly surfaces, as the main narrative describes their grievances. The December floods mean "the life of the masses in Jakarta becomes increasingly heavy with suffering. The general dissatisfaction with the government and the parties in power also mounted" (p.217). 40 pages from the conclusion of the novel, a vignette describes Zakaria, a lowly office messenger, who is unable to walk home in the rain after work lest he soil his only set of office clothes. He shelters in the street all afternoon, hungry, waiting for the rain to abate. After dark as he ventures home, a speeding car intentionally sprays a muddy puddle over him, drenching the clothes he had strived to kept clean. He bursts into tears of frustration, overcome by "a fierce and bitter hatred", and "glaring with red eyes full of enmity and hatred, [he] cursed all who own cars" (p.243). The seething frustrations of the poor, depicted as fully justified, are bubbling through these vignettes to flow into the main current of the story during the riot at the grocery shop.

Yet, having directed the reader to anticipate the poor's justifiable resistance, the narrative pulls back from this trajectory without endorsing such insurrection. The novel cannot approve mass agitational protest or class struggle, although it depicts a hopeless situation in which political and social leaders are corrupt and ineffectual and no other social group works effectively for a common good.

The principle of resistance was deemed important enough by the author for it to feature in the original typescript's title, Yang Teriniak dan Melawan [Down-trodden and Resisting].[73] This title is

73. Significantly, the eventual title Twilight in Jakarta (used in the first published [English] edition and retained in other editions, including the Indonesian) exchanges the original empowering image of
paraphrased in the scene of the hungry crowd storming the grocery shop (p.269). Murhalim desperately attempts to turn the mob back to "the path of Allah" but is killed by Itam, who is then shot while battling to defend the rights of the poor.

"Thus the two who had wanted to fight for the ordinary people now lay together. They had met and had been united in death. The one who'd been downtrodden had resisted, and the one who had resisted had been trodden down."[74]

But Itam had not merely fought back against the authorities for the rights of the masses for food; he had been crushed again in death, suggesting that both those who rebel against the social and political system of the authorities, and those, like Murhalim, who stand up against the masses unprepared, get trampled. It is a bleak picture in which the corrupt authorities and the masses are both something fierce and uncontrollable, to be feared by people like the novel's postulated reader.

Amidst the novel's enveloping pessimism, the narrative presents the promising image of the village. Displaying the germ of individual self-assertion at the novel's close, Saimun plucks up the courage to identify Neneng as his wife at the police station, and "his fear of the police vanished. He was now ready to fight for a life with Neneng."[75] Saimun decides to return with Neneng to the village, the embodiment of hope. At the beginning of the novel, Saimun had been driven from the village by bandits, and there is no indication the situation in the countryside has calmed. In the light of earlier tales of rural turmoil and banditry, the final symbol of peace offered by the narrative is an idyllic chimera.

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the conscious resistance of the oppressed, with the 'exotic' imagery of encroaching darkness in a mysterious 'Oriental' city. Resistance is 'written out'.

Unable to endorse agitational resistance, the narrative offers this hope in the idealised village as the dawn after the 'twilight in Jakarta'. This cannot be sustained within the narrative's own terms.

Ultimately, the author's main purpose in writing the novel was served, as the judgement of one sympathetic Western reviewer indicates, for although "[this] is a bad novel read as a novel [...] with] no subtleties of style, plot or development... [it] is a superb journalistic indictment [of Indonesia's leadership]."[76] Mochtar Lubis's 'report' shows a hopeless society, under a corrupt leadership. The novel depicts the decline, the twilight, of the political and social life of 'Jakarta', synonymous with the nation's government. In the text's final paragraph, "night held the capital in its tight embrace. The streets were deserted. [and] dark shapes stalked the streets".[77] Gloom and pessimism have overtaken the city. 'Jakarta' has been eclipsed and is morally bankrupt.

Both *Harimau* and *Senja di Jakarta* relate the moral decay of society to the nature and qualities of its leadership. While *Harimau* implies that the resolution to the problems caused by immoral leadership is the replacement of one leader with another, *Senja di Jakarta* provides no such solution. It is permeated by a despondency and disillusion with politics and society. Not only is the leadership untrustworthy, the masses are also violent and unpredictable. In *Harimau*, addressing a readership in the mid-1970s, the problems with wayward leaders, like Wak Katok, remain, but these are counterpoised against the heroic image of a just, principled leader like Buyung. This

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77. Indonesian p.280; translation adapted from Holt 1983:254.
novel is much more encouraging than *Senja di Jakarta* about the prospects of replacing leaders (although there are indications that Buyung, too, will be susceptible to the moral weaknesses of his predecessor, these are glossed over). Resistance to oppression is not endorsed in *Senja di Jakarta*, which depicts no escape from the social decline. In *Harimau! Harimau!*, the solution to tyranny is presented as the replacement of one leader with another. The nature of the relationship between leaders and society does not shift, fundamental social structures do not change, nor are such changes depicted as inevitable or necessary, in either of these novels.

Deep within both novels there runs a fundamental disbelief in democracy. The democratic party system depicted in *Senja di Jakarta* is represented in universally negative terms, as essentially unworkable, endemic corruption and corrupting. It serves the politically powerful, and is unfair, unjust, and unconcerned with the fate of the poor. As a system of government, it is doomed to failure. No redeeming virtue of democracy is evident in the narrative. *Harimau! Harimau!* takes as its assumption that the natural social order is maintained by a powerful individual leader. Questions of alternative forms of social organisation, of consultative leadership or shared power are not canvassed. An individual acquires power by overthrowing and succeeding the powerholder. The novels imply that it is firm, powerful, centralised leadership, not popular participatory democracy, which forms the basis for a stable society.
New Order Novels

Despite their curious production history and long gestation, both *Maut dan Cinta* and *Harimau! Harimau!* can be located within the context of views on society and politics prominent during the New Order. In their depiction of nationalist history and social relations, they differ from Mochtar Lubis's earlier works.

As the preceeding discussion of *Maut dan Cinta* has argued, its view of the Revolution is more congruent with the image promoted since the late 1970s by branches of the New Order government charged with information and propaganda. The emphasis on individual military heroes shifts the Revolution from the common historical property of the 'rakyat' and elevates it to the preserve of the military officers. There is a re-ordering in emphasis as to what constitutes the main enemy of the Republic. In *Tidak Ada Esok* internal division and dissolution are seen as undermining patriotic resolve, while *Maut dan Cinta* represents the threats as external, alien forces. Congruent with the re-interpretation of history, and particularly perceptions of the PKI, during the New Order, *Maut dan Cinta* presents Communism as the greatest threat. By contrast, communism is hardly an issue in *Tidak Ada Esok*, which was written very close to the events described.

By the time *Maut dan Cinta* was produced, the Revolution was no longer a matter of personal anguish (as it was in *Jalan Tak Ada Ujung*) but a foundation rite of historical nationalism, into which the young generation had to be initiated. It is stripped of its gore and violence, its contradictions and internal conflicts, and is presented as a glorified mythic adventure of heroic men. *Maut dan Cinta* is not an exploration of the shared roots and formative collective experiences of
national uprising, but a lesson for the next generation in how they should regard the 'Revolution'.

By contrast, the a-historical setting in Harimau! Harimau! militated against the characters making explicit reference to specific national political events or circumstances. But the strong allegorical overtones (e.g. in Buyung's speeches about opposition to 'tyranny') encouraged various interpretations of possible political allusions in the novel, which may well have stimulated the public reception of the work.

Harimau! Harimau! offers the reader a far more optimistic view of society and leadership than does Senja di Jakarta, yet neither of these nor the other novels mentioned in this chapter, offer any positive function for the 'rakyat' in the events they describe. It is a common trait in Mochtar Lubis's novels that, even when they may present the stories of the 'down-trodden' (like Senja di Jakarta), they offer no hope and no role for them in ameliorating their circumstances. It may be a story about them, but, as D.M.E. Roskies' study of Jalan Tak Ada Ujung and Senja di Jakarta has suggested, it is a 'description' of their story, not an engaged 'narration' through which they speak.[78] Such a 'narration' records the facades accessible to "an author who senses himself deep down to be powerless before events". Powerless, perhaps, before the inert society in the novels with their fundamental disbelief in the strengths of democracy.

Do the novels challenge the status quo of New Order Indonesia? Harimau! Harimau! may offer possible allusions to a youthful rebelliousness, but more evident is the novels' endorsement of the role of military officers, powerful leaders, not subject to popular control.

They furnish no active role to those ruled over by such leaders. In a broad sense, the novels' vision of society is hierarchical with social classes structured in a 'natural' order. When that order is threatened with destabilisation by unsuitable leaders or a rebellious populace, the solution is the rise of another powerful leader. These fictional works tell tales of heroes challenging ideological enemies and tyranny. But they do not question the fundamental relationship of power, between the heroes and the society, between the leader and the led.
CHAPTER SEVEN

INTERPRETING THE NATIONAL CHARACTER:

THE MANUSIA INDONESIA LECTURE

After the banning of Indonesia Raya in January 1974, Mochtar Lubis used other methods to present his opinions to the public. Fiction provided one outlet in Indonesia, and his Dutch-language books addressed a foreign readership. But his major domestic statements and social critiques after his post-Malari detention were in the form of public lectures. Three have been published as brief monographs: Manusia Indonesia [Indonesian Humanity] (1977), Bangsa Indonesia [The Indonesian Nation] (1978) and Transformasi Budaya untuk Masa Depan [Cultural Transformation for the Future] (1983).[1]

Of these, Manusia Indonesia is the most significant in terms of the public reaction and polemic it generated. The lecture is examined in detail in this chapter because it represents Mochtar Lubis's most explicit and lengthy statement about contemporary Indonesian society, towards the close of our period of study, exemplifying his views and analysis during the late 1970s. It is also the only one of these lectures

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to reach an international audience through an English translation.[2] Couched in the provocative style that has become Mochtar's trademark, it was not intended as an academic study, but as a public lecture to stir debate. In so doing, he was conscious, when interviewed some days after the lecture, that "if one is too subtle, no attention is paid to the criticism. If one is too outspoken, action is taken against you."[3]

This chapter will summarise the contents of the Manusia Indonesia lecture and discuss various Indonesian responses. It will then attempt a critique of the lecture as an ideological statement and illustration of Mochtar Lubis's political and social perceptions and attitudes.

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On 6 April 1977, less than one month before the May 2 General Election, Mochtar Lubis addressed a gathering in the Arena Theatre at the prestigious Jakarta cultural centre, Taman Ismail Marzuki. The audience spilled out of the seating onto the floor of the theatre.[4] Mochtar Lubis spoke for 2 hours 20 minutes and then fielded a battery of questions.

The talk, entitled "The State of Present-day Indonesians, viewed from the Perspective of Culture and Human Values", proved to be one of

2. It appeared initially as We Indonesians (translated by Florence Lamoureux, edited by Soenjono Dardjowidjojo, Asian Studies Program, University of Hawaii, 1979). Florence Lamoureux's revised translation was published in 1983 as The Indonesian Dilemma (Graham Brash, Singapore) and reprinted by 1986. These translations will be identified as Lamoureux 1979 and 1983.

3. "Dalam Setiap Masyarakat Kritik Mempunyai Tempat", Kompas, 19 April 1977, pp.IV & IX.

the most popular and controversial held at the centre. It provoked a polemic in the national press, taken up in *Kompas*, *Sinar Harapan*, *Suara Karya*, *Pelita*, and *Angkatan Bersenjata*. The 80-page monograph based on the lecture, in its sixth edition by 1985, was a best-seller for the publisher, *Yayasan Idayu* [Idayu Foundation], and a major commercial success for a non-fictional work.[5] The popular success of the publication motivated Idayu publishers to commence a series of 'character study' analyses of particular Indonesian ethnic groups.[6]

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7. The appropriate English translation of 'manusia Indonesia' depends on context. Literally, 'manusia' means 'human, human being, humankind ['Man']'. 'Manusia Indonesia' is used in the lecture to refer to the 'national character', or the typical 'Indonesian person'. In lowercase, it refers to these definitions; when capitalised, it refers to the lecture's title.

8. Mochtar Lubis uses the once derogatory term for the Chinese, *Cina*, a term which he himself opposed during a polemic in the early post-coup

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The Lecture's Content

Mochtar Lubis identifies six major, and numerous minor, traits of the Indonesian character ('manusia Indonesia').[7] The first is hypocrisy. He attributes this to Indonesians' need to hide their true feelings when confronted by outside forces, for fear of retaliation. Feudalism and forced proselytisation caused people to feign acceptance while masking their true beliefs. In addition,

"We have been ravished by the Portuguese, the Spanish, the Dutch, the Japanese, the Chinese,[8] and other peoples, and
for the last thirty years by international consumerism, and
greed-orientated giant multi-national enterprises, not to
mention our own selfish people."[9]

The ingrained hypocrisy manifests itself in attitudes towards sex,
Mochtar Lubis continues. Nowadays, while respectable and moral at home,
immediately this 'manusia Indonesia' goes overseas, he[10] heads straight
for the nightclubs in search of women. While damning corruption, he
himself is a corruptor (p.24).

National hypocrisy permits major criminals to go free or serve only
brief sentences, while petty criminals languish in prison. It allows
large-scale corruption within government institutions like Pertamina[11]
to go unchecked for decades. In this instance, although "the facts are
crystal clear, to this day no legal action has been taken against the
senior participants" (p.24).

Mochtar Lubis blame this corruption upon the 'ABS mentality', which
justifies all behaviour 'Asal Bapak Senang' [as long as the boss is
happy]. So an underling will avoid telling a superior something
unpleasant. Mochtar Lubis believes this tendency was implanted long
before the coming of the colonialists, when "Indonesian feudal lords
ruled over the land, oppressed the people, and violated the values held
by Indonesians" (p.24). Subservience continues in the use of terms such

years in favour of the older, more neutral term, Tionghoa. See Mochtar
Lubis, "Surat dari Bangkok", Kompas, 28 April 1967, cited in Charles
A. Coppel and Leo Suryadinata (1978) "The Use of the terms 'Tjina' and
'Tionghoa' in Indonesia: An Historical Survey", (p.123) in Leo
Suryadinata (1978) The Chinese Minority in Indonesia: Seven Papers
Chopmen Enterprises, Singapore, pp.113-128.

mine, unless otherwise acknowledged.

10. The Indonesian word for third person singular, 'dia', is not gender-
specific; however, Mochtar Lubis's use of the term assumes 'manusia
Indonesia' to be male.

11. On the Pertamina debacle, see Chapter 4.
as 'bapak' [father] for seniors or superiors, which negate the Indonesian democratic spirit of the struggle for independence.

A second feature of the Indonesian character is unwillingness to accept responsibility for one's actions. Again Mochtar points to the behaviour of senior executives of Pertamina, specifically former chief Ibnu Sutowo (p.27). Yet many other Indonesians also accept praise and state awards without having earned them. It is always the figureheads (and not the real workers) who get the praise, unwarranted though this may be.

A 'feudalistic mentality' is 'manusia Indonesia'’s third attribute. This is evident in such things as the nomination of the wives of very senior government officials for candidature in General Elections. In women's associations, it is the status of a woman's husband which determines her position within the association, not her own qualities of leadership or experience (p.28). While those in 'high' positions expect to be treated according to their station, those beneath them "have no less spirit or feudal mentality in their service to their 'bapak'" (p.29).

In traditional Indonesian societies, the king was believed to have a divine right, a wahyu cakraningrat, which fitted him to rule. Though the title 'king' may have changed, nowadays

"[those] in power do not like to be criticised, and their subordinates are very reluctant to criticise them...Communication between the powerholder and the people goes only from the top downwards. It is a one-way street."[12]

The fourth characteristic is superstition, the investing of natural objects with supernatural powers. Indonesians place faith in symbols,

talismans, and mantera (magic formulae) for protection. Mochtar sees this as the pollution of rationality by mysticism. Even the most rational and highly skilled Indonesians often surrender to the pull of kebatinan.[13] at times of crises (p.12). As far as Mochtar Lubis is concerned "this mystical ideology has control of the largest segment of Indonesia's population, especially those on the island of Java".[14] Mochtar is critical of mystical animistic beliefs and practices. He cannot accept that modern, educated people turn to mysticism.

"Try to imagine", he urges his audience sarcastically, "what would happen if all our government policies were based on wahyu [messages from God] and other entirely irrational guidance. How dangerous it would be for the life of our nation" (p.15).

Traditional mystical belief in divine messages, talismans and mantera have their modern equivalent in symbolic political slogans, which encourage people to place faith in oft-repeated words rather than tangible achievements (p.33-4). He is critical of "new magic formulae and slogans" promoted by the Suharto government. Though bandied about as a slogan, the idealised 'Pancasila society' is not reflected in the statutes governing taxes, social welfare, and equal access to education (p.34). While he hopes that Indonesia will one day create a "manusia Pancasila" [the Pancasila-guided person], who personifies the highest ideals of human society, Mochtar doubts this will be achieved before 2000 (p.15).

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'Modernisation' and 'economic development' are new superstitions, he observes. Instead of achieving a just and equal distribution of wealth, 'modernisation' encourages consumerism (p.35). Mochtar warns of the damage to human values, the environment and natural resources posed by technological and economic 'advances' in industrialised societies (p.34).

Language is manipulated to obscure contradictions between people's statements and their actions, making it difficult to evaluate politicians' statements about "the rule of law"[15] or the existence of a free and responsible press in Indonesia because "the meaning of words or other symbols is not in the words themselves, but in our semantic reaction to those words" (p.37).

The fifth characteristic of 'manusia Indonesia' (and the only one offering hope for the future) is artistic ability, developed by closeness to nature, an intimacy exemplified by ascribing spiritual powers to inanimate objects (p.38).

Being weak-willed or indecisive is the sixth characteristic (p.39). Mochtar criticises intellectuals who have adjusted their philosophies to suit prevailing politics; a practice Mochtar calls "intellectual prostitution" [pelacuran intelektual].[16] The Javanese attitude of tepa slira [knowing one's place[17]], he regards as a character weakness and a manifestation of 'ABS' behaviour (see page 306).

In his discussion of "Other Characteristics", Mochtar Lubis describes the Indonesian as wasteful, extravagant and not an "economic

15. In English in the original.
16. See Chapter 4 for Indonesia Raya's criticisms of 'intellectual prostitution'.
animal".[18] The average Indonesian seeks instant wealth, success, and status as a public servant only to exploit it for personal gain. Jealousy and covetousness are widespread. Mochtar's "typical Indonesian" is pretentious (manusia-sok, p.43), power-hungry and avaricious, and prefers foreign products to local ones. The favourable physical environment has made him lazy and impecunious. On the positive side, he is gentle, peace-loving, quick to learn, dexterous, endowed with a sense of humour, and patient to a fault (pp.46-7).

Mochtar is critical of the pengusahaan [powerholder] who wants to be seen as a servant of the people, a defender of justice and the rule of law, but who is, in practice, malicious, power-hungry, greedy and egotistical. He criticises the hierarchical and neo-feudalist language used by, and about, powerholders (p.49), and particularly the ambiguous, platitudinous headlines used by newspapers (p.50).

Mochtar mocks the flamboyant lifestyle of the Indonesian 'elite', a super-wealthy clique of powerholders, increasingly distanced from the population they claim to lead. "As the years go by we allow this elite of ours to enrich itself by corruption and theft of the rights and property of the people, in ever-increasing amounts" (p.53). He quotes Gandhi's famous dictum, "Earth provides enough for everyone's need, but not for everyman's greed".[19] To benefit from natural resources "we must control science and technology. But we must be careful. Science is power, and power is never neutral."[20]

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18. The English term is used in the original.
He criticises the predominance of foreign investment in capital- not labour-intensive areas (p.56). As a step to rectifying this, Mochtar recommends that a community voice must counter-balance government control.

"Social supervision of our natural resources, our capital, our use of labour, our science and technology, our country's ecological balance, and the prevention of environmental disaster needs to be institutionalised."[21]

He stresses that, since the Transfer of Sovereignty in 1949, the gap is increasing between national pretensions (such as Pancasila, justice, human rights, and the rule of law), and the actual behaviour of Indonesians, individually or collectively (p.57).

In the lecture's substantive penultimate section, "Today's World" (pp.58-75), discussing global economic developments, Mochtar Lubis speaks of an increasing gap between "developed" and "underdeveloped" or "developing" countries,[22] a distinction measured according to criteria determined by Western economists. Such economic indicators give the incorrect impression that the wealthy countries are more advanced in all areas of human civilisation and culture. Mochtar calls for a re-conceptualisation of such loaded terminology. He questions the direction of Western economic development with its stress on materialistic gains and de-emphasis of "human considerations".[23] "How primitive and backward" is a theory which stresses Gross National and Domestic Product, the pursuit of goods and profits, he insists (p.59).

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21. p.56. Translation adapted from Lamoureux 1979:30. Lamoureux 1983:49 toned this down to "We must learn to be far-sighted and carefully control the exploitation of our natural resources, our capital, our manpower, science and technology, so as not to upset our country's ecological balance and thereby cause an environmental disaster." This removes the element of social supervision or control of resources.

22. p.58. Both English and Indonesian terms are given.

23. p.59. In English in the original.
'Modernisation' should not mean computers or giant factories, but "a certain mental attitude and rationality of thought, which always strives to find solutions to the problems of human life in a rational and all-encompassing manner" (p.61).

While attacking piecemeal approaches to the problems created by 'economic development', he lambasts the West (particularly America) for seeking ever-increasing opulence without thought for the developing world. The goal should be the alleviation of hunger, the provision of adequate clothing, housing, equal educational opportunities, and guarantees that neither life nor death will be too expensive. This is achievable through a simpler lifestyle for the wealthy countries, with emphasis in Indonesia on small-scale agricultural industries, producing food, the most vital commodity for the future (pp.64-65). 'Appropriate' or 'intermediate' technology [teknologi madya] must take priority, especially in developing renewable energy resources (p.66). Mochtar sees little hope in North-South debates or dialogues on the proposed New International Economic Order (p.67). Unfair trade flows continue to mean low returns for primary producers, and high prices for industrial goods which developing countries buy because "we have been deceived and impressed by their advertising and consumerist propaganda" (p.68).

The industrialised countries will have to either:

"defend their extravagant, luxurious standard of living at all costs (including forcing their will upon those countries which possess the reserves of raw materials they need), or change their lifestyles, adjusting and learning to live simply once more" (p.70).

Mochtar Lubis recognises that:

"The more we are drawn along in the currents of consumerism of the rich countries, the more we make ourselves dependent upon their aid, whether in the form of their capital or technology, the more we make our safety dependent upon their weaponry, the more we weaken our ability to protect our individuality as a nation and as people, and the more we fall further and further into dependence upon them" (p.71).
Indonesia must become self-sufficient in food and reduce dependence upon the wealthy countries by efficiently utilising financial, human and natural resources, ending corruption and improving the life of the people. Otherwise

"I fear greatly that, in our own homeland, we will become just unskilled labourers for multinational companies from Japan, America, Germany, the Netherlands, France, England and the rest" (p.75).

In the conclusion to his lecture, Mochtar Lubis reiterates that Indonesians need to free themselves from the constraints of a semi- or neo-feudal society. They should return traditional art forms to their deserved place as an inspiration for developing the creativity and artistry inherent in Indonesians since "through artistic expression we will be able directly to attain truth" (p.77).

He proposes a closer relationship between powerholders, the private sector and the artistic community, in the hope of tempering power with humanistic principles and artistic sensitivity (pp.77-78).

"We have to make culture and art tools for liberating our people from the grip and fetters of a value system which has long inhibited us and dwarfed and constrained the Indonesian capacity for inspiration and creativity" (p.78).

He urges a regeneration of a national self-confidence, and a redevelopment of the strengths of character which enabled Indonesians in pre-Colonial times to explore and trade as far afield as Madagascar and Africa (p.78). Ethics must be strengthened to reach beyond personal relations into public life and the realm of ecological responsibility and environmental preservation (p.79). The education system must meet modern challenges and demands for rapid information flows to keep abreast of current scientific developments.
After nearly two and a half hours, Mochtar Lubis closed his talk with two proverbs. One Minangkabau:[24]

"I have told you all I know;
The rest, that I know not,
I must leave to others --
To those who know more than I."

The other, Javanese:
"What you are after is not available,
What you are not after is everywhere."

The lecture reveals much of Mochtar Lubis: the man, his attitudes and his style. He sees himself as a social critic, deliberately being provocative to stir a public response.[25] How successful Mochtar was in issuing his challenge, may be gauged by the public response to his lecture, which suggests his ideas have both a wider currency and articulate critics.

Responses To The Lecture

Public lectures at TIM rarely generate extensive press coverage. They are reported in the literary or cultural columns of the inner pages. Few make front page or feature columns. *Manusia Indonesia* did both, with front page reports, a detailed summary of the lecture's contents, a number of substantial articles devoted to the subsequent polemic being given prominence on the prestigious "features" page, along with various letters to the editor.[26]


26. Most of the written responses were based upon the *Kompas* summary (12 April 1977). There was widespread informal discussion of the lecture (according to "Gebrakan Mochtar Lubis - borok-borok Manusia
Most respondents praised Mochtar Lubis for his frankness. They regarded the lecture as evidence of Mochtar's concern for his community. In responding, they wanted to provide other perspectives or to correct some of Mochtar's assumptions.[27] Critical responses ranged from chidings from aristocrats offended by Mochtar's accusations, to more fundamental challenges to 'national character' approach.

Margono Djojohadikusumo (1894-1978), the father of Professor Sumitro Djojohadikusumo and head of an influential aristocratic Javanese family, was "a little hurt" (p.99) by Mochtar Lubis's criticisms of feudalism and his representation of Javanese culture.[28] He was concerned that Mochtar gave the impression of being anti-Javanese, an impression which Margono (who said he had known Mochtar well for 30 years) knew to be erroneous. Yet Margono felt that Mochtar misunderstood Javanese culture and the role of the Javanese aristocracy as noblesse oblige. Margono defended the aristocracy, arguing that what distinguished them from commoners was not wealth but their behaviour and view of life (p.103).

Margono's distinction between the benevolent aristocracy and the plutocracy, which weilds power because of its wealth, was echoed by Abu Manifah who claimed that the traditional aristocracy generally dispensed with the trappings of privilege during the upsurge of democratic ideals

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Indonesia", Horison, August 1977, No.8, pp.240-242) but my comments are based on the published material.

27. See, e.g., the responses by Sarlito Wirawan Sarwono, "Kondisi dan Situasi Manusia Indonesia Masa Kini, Dilihat Dari Sudut Psikologi", Kompas, 5 May 1977, pp. IV & IX, (included in Manusia Indonesia 1980:82-91) and also Margono Djojohadikusumo, "Feodalisme, New-Feodalisme[sic], Aristokrasi", Kompas, 13 May 1977, pp. IV & IX (included in Manusia Indonesia 1980:97-105). Where responses have been published in Manusia Indonesia 1980 I will refer to that version.

after 1928.[29] It was unfair for Mochtar Lubis to blame the nation for the shameful behaviour of the 'new Aristocrats', as Abu Hanifah termed those who had gained recent wealth through their powerful bureaucratic and military positions (p.127).

Mochtar's lecture had inspired Abu Hanifah to re-read, and reflect upon, previous studies of the Indonesians and their character. He recalled the practices of various foreign 'Orientalists' whose writings about Indonesians were often motivated by political reasons. Their depreciatory assessments were often used to justify the extension or maintenance of colonial power. As a nationalist, Abu Hanifah "suspected the authors of such books intended to find the weaknesses in the Indonesian nation" (p.119). Abu Hanifah claimed there was no justification in thinking that "the attributes of the Indonesian character are different from the attributes of people anywhere else in the world" (p.124). With its subtle linking of the Manusia Indonesia lecture with the traditions of Orientalist scholarship, Abu Hanifah's response foreshadowed more radical critiques.

A frequent criticism was that the lecture was based upon Mochtar's own necessarily limited experience, without supporting data. Social psychologist, Sarlito Wirawan Sarwono wrote that Mochtar tended inaccurately to present an attribute as if it was exclusively Indonesian, whereas, for example, superstition and corruption "are not an Indonesian monopoly" (p.84). While there may be examples of subservient behaviour in the community, he observed that this does not mean Indonesians are

29. Abu Hanifah, "Renungan Tentang 'Manusia Indonesia Masa Kini'", Sinar Harapan, 25 May 1977, p.5 & 26 May 1977, p.5 (included in Manusia Indonesia 1980:117-130). Abu Hanifah (1906-80), himself an aristocrat, was a member of the youth movement which drew up the 1928 Youth Pledge [Sumpah Pemuda]. He was a member of the Masyumi Party, the first Minister for Education and Culture, and an author, using the pseudonym 'El Hakim'. See Tempo 1981:196-7.
characteristically feudalistic, for such behaviour arises from the pattern of power relations into which people are pressured (p.86). Such behaviour was linked to structural causes.

Equally fundamental was Sarlito's criticism that Mochtar had limited his observations to:

"those who, in their daily lives, had the opportunity to come directly face to face with influences coming in from outside, in relation to development and modernisation. They live in the large cities and consist of government officials, wealthy businesspeople, intellectuals and others of the elite, as well as their families".[30]

Mochtar Lubis's description is not accurate of the Indonesian working people, for the

"vast majority of Indonesians are farmers, and workers who are industrious, persevering, resolute in the face of the challenges of nature, appreciating moral values, upholding religious values, and respecting honesty and courage" (p.89).

In answering his critics, Mochtar denied that the negative characteristics he identified were those of a minority, and maintained that he described general practices, which "have spread to a great number of Indonesians".[31] He attempted to counter Sarlito's claim that his observations were only applicable to the urban elite by arguing that the "idealistic and romantic image of the Indonesian peasant" as "industrious, persevering, determined, respecting honesty and courage" was mistaken for "even in villages nowadays many of the bad things we see in our large cities are reflected" (p.95).

Such assertions did not convince author Wildan Yatim who stressed that "the common people could not possibly be corrupt, laze about, not

take any responsibility, and the like". [32] Such behaviour breeds within the government apparatus. In his article, published 22 days after the 2 May 1977 General Election, Wildan Yatim argued that the attitudes Mochtar attacked are generated by an unrepresentative political structure, which does not serve the needs of the ordinary people. The current political system was the root cause of the characteristics Mochtar Lubis described (p.116). As one example, he argued that the electoral system encourages politicians to tolerate corruption because they are dependent, not on an electorate, but on those in the political hierarchy. This hierarchy determines the ranking of candidates on electoral lists and, thus, their political future (pp.109-10).

To varying degrees, the criticisms of Wildan Yatim, Sarlito Wirawan Sarwono and Abu Hanifah referred to biases inherent in Mochtar's perceptions of his society, which the following section attempts to lay bare by looking closely at the text of the lecture.

The Author's "Strategic Location"

The year Mochtar Lubis delivered this lecture on the Indonesian character, Indonesian-born Malaysian, Syed Hussein Alatas, published an analysis of the image of the Malays, Filipinos and Javanese from the 16th to the 20th century and its function in the ideology of colonial capitalism. [33] As Alatas embarked on his task of dismantling the premises and prejudices upon which the Europeans based their myth of the


indolence and inferiority of these Southeast Asians, he cited Karl Mannheim's dictum that only by being conscious of the social roots of one's ideas and attitudes could one escape the distorting influence of ideology's intrusion upon one's scholarship.[34] In opening his landmark work on the production of images of 'the Oriental', the Palestinian-American Edward Said declared similarly that "no production of knowledge in the human sciences can ever ignore or disclaim its author's involvement as a human subject in his own circumstances".[35] Both these texts, with their authors' critical awareness of their own location, provide appropriate contrasts with Mochtar Lubis's *Manusia Indonesia*.

Mochtar Lubis seems unaware of his position in relation to his subject matter. There is no acknowledgement of his class, religious, ethnic or gender perspectives. In examining the writings of non-'Orientals' about the 'Orient', Said tests their "strategic location", "the author's position in a text with regard to the Oriental material he writes about".[36] Mochtar opens his lecture with an anecdote in which he nearly comes to blows with a "loud-mouthed whitey" ["si mulut lancang bule itu"] who had insulted Indonesians (by claiming "you can buy everybody in Jakarta") (p.8). So, from the outset, Mochtar presents himself as a defender of Indonesians against outside critics, identifying himself, as author, firmly with the 'manusia Indonesia' who is his subject. This attempted insertion of himself into his subject is reinforced by his use of the inclusive first person plural, 'kita' as he talks about the characteristics of Indonesians.


His posture throughout the lecture, however, negates this insertion and identification. He establishes the national character, which is his subject, as a reality separate from himself, as something tangible and 'objective', to be analysed. This has two effects. Firstly, his highly personal views are thus presented as knowledge of an "objective reality". As his closing Minangkabau proverb illustrated, he has told the audience all he knows; opinions have become knowledge. Occasionally, he poses rhetorical questions to this audience, bidding them judge the accuracy of his picture of 'manusia Indonesia'; this device encourages and assumes their agreement. Secondly, his distancing from his subject and his attribution of primarily negative characteristics to his 'manusia Indonesia' establishes a pattern of images which reinforces the stereotype which had incensed Mochtar when articulated by the "whitey" in his opening anecdote. All his primary characterisations, with the single major exception of the fifth, that of artistic ability, are consonant with the stereotypical images of the Malays and Javanese which Alatas has dispatched as elements of the colonial ideology.

The lecture opened with questions: "Who is this Indonesian person ['manusia Indonesia']? Does he really exist?" (p.7.) It answered them with a detailed description of characteristics testifying that such a being does exist. That there is a predominance of negative characteristics reinforces the exclusion of the author from his subject. By implication, he does not share these traits he observes in the national character, but stands apart as a signpost pointing to danger. Responding to Sarlito's hopes that the next generation would come closer to the ideal Indonesian, Mochtar Lubis hinted at his perceived role when he asked rhetorically, "How can this happen if there is no example [tauladan] to motivate them?" (p.97). His own practices are implicitly
assumed to have deviated from the norm he establishes for this 'manusia Indonesia'.

Identifying a "National Character"

Sarlito Wirawan Sarwono criticised Mochtar for basing his lecture on observations of the Indonesian urban elite (see page 317) and extending these to conflate limited practices with national characteristics. Sarlito concluded that "excessive generalisations will be dangerous because they can give rise to misleading impressions about national character" (p.90). Unaware of his own strategic location, Mochtar Lubis presents an image of a 'national character' largely devoid of such variables as class, religion, ethnicity and gender. The third major characteristic, the feudal mentality, Mochtar observes equally in both status superiors and status inferiors. Although he is very critical of the fourth characteristic, superstition [takhyul, kebatinan], Mochtar excuses himself from a discussion of 'religion' saying,

"[w]e cannot talk too much about religion tonight, because it will lead to many sensitive matters, and will never bring us to an agreement. Each religion says that it is the absolute truth, because it is a belief" (p.57).

Implied criticisms of the Javanese stimulated Margono Djojohadikusumo's spirited defence. Yet generally Mochtar's approach was not consciously to differentiate amongst various ethnic groups in his remarks, but rather to extend traits he observed in one to a 'national' character. As for gender, there is no integrated consideration of women and throughout the lecture 'manusia Indonesia' appears to be male.

The result of this reductionist perspective is, in Said's words, "to eradicate the plurality of differences" in the interest of establishing
one primary difference, that between 'good' and 'bad' characteristics. [37]

If one crucial underlying premise to Mochtar Lubis's lecture is that the analysis of 'national character' is possible, another is that the perspective of an urban intellectual is an appropriate point of departure for it. Other social scientists working on Orientalism are less convinced. As Alatas has noted:

"There are serious problems connected with national character study which have baffled the best brains in social sciences, one of these is the definition of national character.

The difficulty of defining the national character is due to the fact that there are many classes in society with their sub-cultures, there are also the differentiations into age groups, into male and female, and into responses which arise from the national character in a given situation, or responses which arise from the situation only, without the dominant influence of the national character." [38]

Mochtar Lubis is caught between attempting to define the 'national character' and being forced to acknowledge specificities of classes or groups. At one point, he suggests that "Indonesian feudal lords... violated the values held by Indonesians" (p.24). Here, the behaviour of the rulers is contrasted with Indonesian values ["nilai-nilai manusia Indonesia"], although later the characteristics for which the Indonesian personality is criticised are precisely those of the elite.

As Alatas asserts, just as ideology influences an observer's perspectives, so it influences one's identification and selection of, and approach to, problems. [39] The premise of the 'national character'

37. Said 1978:309. This is notwithstanding the inherent contradictions (as Sarlito points out) in describing 'manusia Indonesia' as, for example, lazy, but also creative and manually skillful; greedy for instant success, yet patient to a fault (p.84).


approach assumes the existence of a (relatively) homogeneous, undifferentiated character within physical national boundaries. It excludes or subsumes other variables, which contradict the existence of intrinsic, 'national' characteristics, or it misrepresents dominant characteristics as 'national'.

**Contradictions**

Early in his lecture, Mochtar Lubis referred humorously to colonial scholars' views of various Indonesian ethnic groups (pp.8-10). Given Abu Hanifah's deft association of Mochtar's lecture with Orientalists' perceptions, can *Manusia Indonesia* be justifiably interpreted as an extension of the Orientalist tradition?

Edward Said's exploration of Orientalism identified key elements in the view of 'the Orient' and 'the Oriental' held by non-'Orientals' from early contact to the 1970s. While manifestations changed, what he called Modern Orientalism, after the Second World War, continued the fundamental dogmas: that there is an absolute and systematic difference between the (positive) West and the (negative) Orient; that abstractions about the Orient were preferable to direct evidence; that the Orient was eternal, uniform, incapable of defining itself, and was therefore defined by the 'scientifically objective' West; that the Orient was to be feared and controlled.[40] Said warns those who assume such attitudes to be the preserve of non-'Orientals', that, to some degree, the intelligentsia in "the modern Orient... participates in its own Orientalizing", by

accommodating itself to a "new imperialism". Though employing different terminology, Syed Hussein Alatas documents this process in Malaysia, detailing the continuation of Orientalist biases in two influential studies of the Malay national character written by Malays in the early 1970s. Manusia Indonesia's English title, The Indonesian Dilemma, is an obvious allusion to the better known of these studies, The Malay Dilemma, whose author, Mahathir bin Mohamad, by the time this translation appeared, was Prime Minister of Malaysia!

There are parallels between the Orientalist tradition (as summarised above), the two works Alatas examines and Manusia Indonesia. In Manusia Indonesia the systematic difference is not between West and 'Orient'/Asia, though such categories are assumed. But there is an implied discontinuity between contrasts such as tradition and modernity, between superstition and rationality. The approach is essentially a-historical and abstract, without systematic evidence. This entity dubbed 'manusia Indonesia', the subject of the lecture, does not speak through the text. The lecture is not his perspective; he is spoken for by an external articulator, who defines the characteristics of the subject entity in negative, ostensibly 'objective', terms. The tone of the account is apprehensive about the long-term social consequences of the subject's negative characteristics.

One recurring trace of this kind of thinking stands out. The Manusia Indonesia lecture reproduces arguments against mysticism and 'superstition' (the fourth characteristic of the Indonesian character),

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paralleling colonial scholars' low opinion of indigenous faiths. Margono Djojohadikusumo claimed that Mochtar Lubis did not adequately understand the attitude of the Javanese to such 'mystical' practices as the keeping of a keris, a particular example selected by Mochtar. All peoples have their myths, which are fundamental to their 'security need' (p.87), wrote the psychologist Sarlito. There is a distinction in the lecture between 'mystical spirituality' [kebatinan], regarded as negative, and approval for religions of the Great Traditions, such as Islam and Christianity.[43] While kebatinan is depicted as contrary to 'rational' thought, belief in an approved religion is not. Mochtar thus throws his weight onto one side of an argument between conventional institutionalised religion and other forms associated with mysticism and animism. Yet he does so without conveying any sense of meaningful Islamic conviction.

Contradictory as it may seem to the preceding comments, Mochtar Lubis also borrows concepts from dependency theory, where he elaborates on how aid and capital investment links with the First World reinforce Indonesia's dependency upon the wealthy countries (pp.58-75). He questions the goal of 'modernisation' (a new 'superstition', he calls it) set by Western economists. While Mochtar's perspective had necessitated defining and speaking for 'manusia Indonesia', he asserts the right of Indonesians to take out of foreign hands the definition of their own economic goals. At one point, he argues that "we still have to be able to define for ourselves what is meant by 'developed country', 'rich country', 'poor country' (p.58, my emphasis). Mochtar Lubis argues that what people regard as 'modern' varies historically. In ten or twenty

years it might be regarded as most modern to reject environmentally
damaging technologies (p.61). Modernisation should be "a certain mental
attitude and rationality" (p.61), implicitly contrasted with traditional
superstitions.

But the terminology of dependency is peripheral to the basic thrust
of Mochtar Lubis's argument, which draws on the modernisation theory of
the 1960s. This theory, which inherited aspects of the intellectual
tradition of Orientalism, posited that traditional societies required a
cultural transformation to develop into modern states (modelled on a
Western paradigm) in order to become capable of achieving First World
levels of economic success. Dependency theory challenged this by
identifying how Third World countries reinforce, rather than reduce,
their dependence upon Western economies by taking an imitative path to
'modernity'. While adopting aspects of radical dependency theory to
criticise the directions of Indonesia's growth, the Manusia Indonesia
lecture retains undercurrents of the modernisation theory argument. It
argues that a cultural transformation of negative (traditional) values
and characteristics (such as the feudalistic mentality, superstition,
avoidance of responsibility) will result in a more desirable rational
(modern) culture.[44]

This perspective locates culture (and largely 'national character')
as autonomous of the political system and power relations which govern
the community. It contributes to crucial silences in the text. The
military's role in social and political control is ignored (or seen to
have no bearing upon the formation of 'manusia Indonesia'). Although
delivered only weeks before the 1977 General Elections, there is no

[44. This line of argument is extended in Mochtar Lubis's Transformasi
Budaya untuk Masa Depan (1985) lecture.]
reference in the lecture to the national electoral system, its inadequacies in relation to political representation and its implications for democratic life.

Furthermore, while adopting dependency theory's criticisms of international consumerism and the advertising industry for promoting acquisitive and materialistic values detrimental to 'manusia Indonesia', and thereby increasing dependency (pp.35 & 68), Mochtar's condemnation is relative, not absolute. At the time of the Manusia Indonesia lecture, Mochtar Lubis was President-Director of one of Indonesia's major national advertising companies, PT Fortune Indonesia Advertising (see Chapter 4) whose clients included several major transnational companies such as Cathay Pacific Airways, Nestles, Bristol-Myers and Peugeot.[45] In Manusia Indonesia, Mochtar Lubis criticised the entry of foreign capital-intensive investment and stressed the need for 'labour-intensive' technology (p.56). The question of foreign investment and imported technologies was not just a theoretical one for Mochtar Lubis, for he had been a founder of Indoconsult Associates business consultancy firm, which, from its inception in mid-1967, had a clientele of transnational companies wanting to invest in Indonesia.[46] His involvement in business consultancy and advertising may have sharpened his awareness of the nature of dependency, while also bringing home personally the financial benefits and costs.


46. Mochtar Lubis stepped down as director in 1972, saying later that the multi-national clients were ignoring his warnings about the negative side-effects of their projects. He remained a major shareholder in the company. (Interview, 24/4/81.)
Conclusion

Consistent with Mochtar Lubis's practice since 1975, in defining the parameters of his lecture, practical politics found little place. The approach has elements of the Sjahririan heritage (as identified by Liddle,[47]) in that, while Mochtar praises some of the achievements of Indonesia's pre-colonial past and her traditional art (p.78-80), there is a general disparagement of traditional beliefs and practices (particularly those identified as Javanese). There is little explanation of how 'positive' values from this past have decayed, but there is an exasperation at the resilience of 'mysticism' and 'superstitions' despite the influence of (Western-style) education in inculcating rationality. There are the ideals of social justice, equal education opportunities, a just prosperity, personal human freedoms and humanistic ethics, to be achieved by a cultural transformation, an aggregate cultural shift generated by individuals changing. Mochtar's hope that a closer relationship between powerholders, the private sector and the artistic community, will temper power with humanistic and artistic sensitivity (p.77-78) implies a tremendous faith in gradual reform through collaboration.

The lecture has a moralistic tone and fervour appropriate to one who would consider himself a 'public conscience'. But Mochtar Lubis adopts the role of the conscience not for the regime, but for the society, levelling most of his criticisms there.[48] The lecture's subtitle, "A Statement of Responsibility" [Sebuah Pertanggungjawaban], may refer to the society's responsibility to take note and change, or the

47. Liddle 1973:179.

48. Chambert-Loir 1974:101 noted this trend in Indonesia Raya's position in the early 1970s.
intellectual's duty to reveal the society's failings to itself. It reinforces the assumption that the intellectual is spokesperson for the society. It is through education and reflection upon information presented by educated, rational individuals that people within the broader community will become civic-minded and reformist, and begin to act for legally-sanctioned change within the society. There is an implication that only a few are currently equipped, since

"[perhaps] only a few Indonesians have succeeded in freeing themselves from the various kinds of shackles and pressures to which they have been subjected for these past centuries" (p.22).

Although Mochtar Lubis shared few of the deprivations of his poorer countrypeople, in a subsequent public lecture he closed, saying

"I venture to speak for the orphans of our nation, the 50 percent who are still below the poverty line, who still suffer calorie and protein deficiencies,... and also for the future, and for the generations to come in this, our homeland."[49]

The lecture indicates Mochtar Lubis is a conciliator, seeking a middle-road to avoid conflict. Given the industrialised countries' immense demand for the world's scarce resources, he outlines two possible scenarios: either the industrialised countries defend their lifestyle at all costs, or they voluntarily embrace a simpler, less consumption-oriented lifestyle. His is a call for global conciliation, voluntary temperance and self-restraint, a request for concessions for the developing countries, lest their resentment lead to sharp confrontation. Cultural change unrelated to political action lies at the heart of the lecture. In effect, Mochtar keeps options for change in the hands of the powerful.

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Internationally, the powerful are the rich nations. Domestically, on the one hand, Mochtar sees a greedy self-serving Indonesian elite, "essentially becoming increasingly distanced from the community because of its behaviour, and communication between it and the people is becoming increasingly more awkward and difficult day by day" (p.54).

Yet, on the other, the lecture is an appeal to those who have attained a degree of economic and political influence over their own lives to work for a general change in the society.

These are the tactics of an Opposition made up of individuals with a belief in their equal claim to authority, and with a shared apprehension at mass political action and the chaos and disorder that might engender. In earlier years, many key members of groups like the Institute for Constitutional Awareness [LKB] and the Petition of Fifty[50] (particularly retired military officers) had been in power, or at least in positions of substantial influence. Their tactics in Opposition involve lobbying and appealing to particular factional groups with the government, groups believed to be concerned with ruling in a responsible, restrained manner. They are, in Southwood and Flanagan's terms, the "critical collaborators".[51]

Mochtar Lubis's criticisms are not threats to the essential ideological principles of the current government, but urgings to consider the changing nature of Indonesia within the context of world developments. His dilemma is common to those who occupy a privileged social position and need to maintain a working relationship with the government and its bureaucracy, for business or other reasons. There is no indication that Manusia Indonesia angered the government. Mochtar

50. See Chapter 4.

Lubis has chosen an approach to sociological study which sidelines domestic political factors, focussing, on the one hand, on domestic 'cultural' characteristics and, on the other, under the influence of dependency theory, on economic and political relationships between states.

Despite the appearance of some responses in the national press which took umbrage to various assumptions of the lecture, the sentiments expressed by Mochtar Lubis on this occasion reflected a common stream of thought within the middle-class urban secular modernising community. It is valuable for the detail it provides on how an articulate figure in the New Order Opposition views his society and, by implication, his own role within it. While Mochtar Lubis is critical of colonial scholars' views of Indonesians, like the elite observers in Malaysia whose works Alatas analysed, Mochtar Lubis reproduces elements of the anti-traditional bias common in Orientalist scholarship. This despite a conscious effort to make himself defender of and spokesperson for the community about which he writes.
CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSION

In studying the life of Mochtar Lubis, this thesis has attempted to show some aspects of the changing circumstances of secular modernising intellectuals in post-Independence Indonesian society. It has posited that, despite his maverick tendencies, Mochtar Lubis's world view is in harmony with, though not formally representative of, a small but articulate group of urban liberal intellectuals.

This concluding chapter addresses three overlapping issues, in an attempt to present a contextual assessment of Mochtar Lubis. Firstly, to sum up his society's evaluations of him, I shall examine how Mochtar is regarded by those who know him reasonably well, the members of three significant milieux: journalists, student activists and moderate opposition figures. While some comments by political opponents are also included here, the emphasis is on the critical opinions of those generally sympathetic to Mochtar's political and professional values, people who have admired him or associated with him in common tasks. Secondly, I shall look at a range of prominent editors, intellectuals and artists with whom Mochtar Lubis is most frequently compared. Finally, I will review some of the qualities displayed by Mochtar Lubis throughout his public career.

Mochtar Lubis in the eyes of other Indonesians

Mochtar Lubis operates in a variety of circles and groups. He is, or has been, a newspaper editor, fiction and non-fiction writer, political activist, polemicist, business person, cultural administrator, political
detainee, beneficiary of international fellowships and representative of Indonesia in international forums. Of primary interest in this section are the opinions of journalists and editors, student and youth leaders, and moderate opposition figures. These groups are not mutually exclusive, and the divisions are, to some degree, artificial, since, for example, some leading editors of the 1970s were youth leaders of the 1960s and could be seen also as part of the moderate opposition. However, the categories strike a balance between the variables of profession, generation and political sympathy.

This discussion is based substantially on material from interviewees, most of whom preferred that their criticisms of Mochtar Lubis not be attributed, for personal reasons. I must ask the reader to accept my assurance that I tried hard to find people who are representative of each of these categories. In the nature of oral history, interviewees' assessments need to be seen as efforts, at the time of interview during 1981-82, to reflect upon a past. Such attitudes are not necessarily how they would have evaluated Mochtar at some previous point in time. The attitude of student leaders of the 1966 generation would have been far more positive in 1971, for example, than when interviewed a decade later. Thus, despite an effort to provide an historical perspective, the following evaluations of Mochtar by other Indonesians, must be considered as coloured by attitudes at the end of my period of study.

a) Journalists and Editors

Mochtar Lubis epitomised a style of hard-hitting, journalism seen by professional colleagues as being more in the tradition of American than Indonesian (particularly Javanese) journalism. Even editors of newspapers
usually regarded as sympathetic to the Indonesia Raya editorial line during the 1950s felt (when interviewed in 1981 and 1982) that Mochtar relished the role of "professional hero", and was unconcerned that his political outspokenness was paid for by other journalists who had to live with tightening government restrictions. These they saw as a partial consequence of Mochtar Lubis's 'un-Indonesian' attacks on powerholders. His tactics were ultimately counterproductive, exacerbating rather than reversing the erosion of press freedoms.

One former editor of a sympathetic paper argued that Mochtar Lubis was "too libertarian" and lacked a sense of "social responsibility" because he was unable to see the negative social effects of his style of advocacy journalism. Foreigners admire Mochtar (this former editor continued) because they cannot see the inevitable consequences of his bravado for the press community at large. Outsiders are dazzled by the heroic image of Mochtar Lubis as an individual and do not consider the collective well-being of the press community. This one-time professional colleague acknowledged that Mochtar was a courageous editor, but qualified this by saying that it is easy to get a reputation for bravery, since "you can get arrested in just one day!" It is harder to devise astute strategy and maintain one's political room to move and professional credibility, so that one's paper could continue to inform, educate, reform and criticize. Are people like Mochtar useful as symbols of that particular style of journalism? I asked. "Yes, but only after they're dead!" he replied with a sarcastic chuckle.[1]

Mochtar Lubis has become a symbol of press courage within that social democratic 'crusading' tradition. Various of today's leading editors and journalists who were students during the 1950s and 60s,

1. Interview with Informant E, 1981.
admired Mochtar in their youth and early professional life. Some journalists continue to advocate Mochtar Lubis's approach, although many in this category (such as former *Indonesia Raya* staff-members) have found it difficult to remain in journalism after the 1974 post-Malari bans. Of those early admirers of Mochtar Lubis who remain journalists, leading editors have changed their views of Mochtar as they matured in the profession and as they observed *Indonesia Raya*’s behaviour and its consequences, in the 1970s. One editor in this group felt that Mochtar Lubis had been more a pamphleteer than a professional editor, since *Indonesia Raya* was often fighting campaigns because of Mochtar's personal attitudes, which were not relevant to the issues concerning ordinary newspaper readers. In these campaigns Mochtar Lubis came across as too self-righteous, more interested in attacking and 'exposé journalism', than in balancing the news with replies from criticised parties.[2]

One editor, a former admirer of Mochtar Lubis, illustrated Mochtar's approach to journalism in sporting terms. For Mochtar, journalism was like playing singles at tennis. Mochtar Lubis played alone, smashing the ball all around the court, with enormous energy and good intentions but little strategy and no subtlety. Sometimes he produced a grand slam, but more often the smash flew-uselessly out of court and he achieved nothing. It may be exciting to watch this kind of tennis player (especially if the observer does not appreciate the intricacies of the game), but the style is counter-productive. A newspaper, or news magazine, like *Tempo*, must play more like a soccer team, working together with a common goal against a complex network of opponents. The team does not promote the personality of the editor, but moves according to joint strategies, shifting focus as

2. Interview with Informant J, 1981.
tactics demand, while remaining in play and ready to strike on important issues.[3]

Mochtar Lubis's style was regarded by such editors as no longer appropriate in the 1980s. The nature of both the government and the industry have changed. The government is now much more determined in its control of the press. Its power could be focussed and it was prepared to use it determinedly against press actions it did not like. The press tactics of the 1950s, when power was less centralised, would not succeed in the 1980s, but simply result in a swift ban.[4] As one editor saw it, Mochtar assumed that the press had a significant influence upon powerholders as may be the case in the West. In Indonesia, however, this assumption is false, he said, because senior powerholders are generally impervious to public (and press) opinion. Financial factors, too, have become much more important for the owners of the press, since, to be successful now the newspapers must be run as efficient businesses. Daily losses are considerable if a paper is banned. Journalism is now an industry, not a grand personal mission.

These pragmatic editors recognise that Mochtar Lubis disapproves of their more restrained tactics and regards this as compromise with the authorities, but, as one editor expressed it, Mochtar

"doesn't appreciate the precarious position of Indonesian journalists and journalism now... and tends to see things in black and white as if we are all political whores. Now even in the whoring business there are nuances, and nuances are important!... This is not like the 50s... You cannot 'do a Mochtar Lubis' these days...banging your head against the wall!"[5]

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3. Interview with Informant K, 1981.
4. Interviews with Informants J, K and M.
5. Interview with Informant M, (conducted in English), 1981.
Yet this editor admired Mochtar Lubis's intellectual curiosity and recognised his importance as a "living symbol" for Indonesian journalists. As another editor expressed it, while Mochtar may not be a "pembawa kebenaran" [a bearer of truth], he is a "pembawa inspirasi" [a bearer of inspiration].[6]

Mochtar's political opponents in the field of journalism, former journalists with leftist papers banned after 1 October 1965, acknowledged, in discussions in 1981, that he has been consistent, unwavering and prepared to take the consequences of his political actions. But some argued that this courage sprang from a spirit of recklessness [nekad], based on a shallow understanding of the political forces operating in the society. His personal animosity for Sukarno, for example, evident in Indonesia Raya's efforts to make the Hartini marriage into a cause célèbre, outweighed his political acumen, they argued. Mochtar wanted to be regarded as an arbiter, independently standing between political parties, analysing his society, but opponents saw him as highly subjective and unaware of his own biases. Mochtar's 1970s declarations of the importance of "living simply" were regarded by these critics as the affectations of a self-righteous intellectual. They argued convincingly that what is 'simple' for some is 'luxury' for others.[7]

Just as these opponents were suspicious of Mochtar's proximity to Americans in the 1950s, they remain critical of Mochtar Lubis's business association with multi-national companies, which they see as a betrayal of his declarations of nationalism. Former left-wing editors said that, in Manusa Indonesia, Mochtar Lubis chose to look at ordinary Indonesians from a Western perspective in a manner which is "insulting to

the ordinary people", and failed to appreciate the inherent strengths in Indonesian culture. That Mochtar took this approach was not surprising to these critics; they saw it as characteristic of elite intellectuals in the PSI mould. They added that Mochtar was doomed to be in perpetual opposition; if his political allies gained power they would exclude him because he does not have a practical political instinct. He is a poor tactician, preferring the role of romantic polemicist.

b) Student Activists

Some sections of the student movement of 1966, such as those which coalesced in the newspapers Harian Kami and Mahasiswa Indonesia, had a deep respect for Mochtar. He was, in the words of one 1966 activist who had worked with Harian Kami, "jago kita" [our champion].[8] Mochtar Lubis's willingness to accept the consequences of his principles provided an example of great courage for some in this group, especially as they had an hostility to other older Indonesians whom they saw as having been too pliant in the years of Guided Democracy.

Within a few years of the re-establishment of Indonesia Raya, student admirers were becoming disappointed, both with Indonesia Raya and, to a lesser extent, with Mochtar Lubis himself. For some, Indonesia Raya seemed too sensationalist and superficial, with Mochtar coming across as a "naive" or even "simplistic" political analyst. Other student admirers felt the problem was that the revived newspaper did not exude a sense of Mochtar's guiding presence, and lacked direction. Some former members and sympathisers of the underground Gerakan Pembaharuan Indonesia felt disappointed that Mochtar's increasing wealth and the trappings of

8. Interview with Informant K, 1981.
his lifestyle were distancing him from them. The involvement of several of Mochtar Lubis's companies in protracted legal proceedings exacerbated scepticism in such circles about whether Mochtar could combine business with high moral principles.

Yet Mochtar Lubis's proximity to student leaders continued through to the movement of 1973-74. There was a continuity between 1966 and 1974, in the sense that some 1974 leaders had been on the streets in 1966. When interviewed in 1981 several of these leaders remembered discussions they had had with Mochtar in the years before 1974. They defended his role as an intellectual, in raising issues for public discussion. It is not reasonable, said one, to expect such thinkers to lay out practical designs for social and political change, for they are not politicians skilled in realpolitik. Their role is to throw up challenging ideas, to trigger a process of public debate, rather than provide a solution. This activist described Mochtar as Indonesia's "little Solzhenitsyn" who dreams of influencing those in power, but he stressed the limitations of this role by adding, "but don't think that Solzhenitsyn can replace Lenin!"[9]

From the late 1970s, Islam has become a more prominent element and unifying factor for young people critical of the New Order. This growth of explicitly Islamic values has tended to sideline Mochtar, who is seen as honest and principled, but not particularly Islamic. One prominent middle-aged Islamic leader involved in non-government community development organisations, who enjoys a good working relationship with Mochtar, commented that although young Muslims with whom he comes in contact generally admire Mochtar Lubis, some resent Mochtar's past sympathy for Israel in the Middle East conflict and disapprove of the

casual attitude to sex in his novels. Some are critical, too, of the cosmopolitan lifestyle of the secular intellectuals, who cannot move comfortably between their international activities and Indonesian kampungs or Islamic environments. This leader saw Mochtar Lubis as part of a group of secular intellectuals who are losing their political grip, still issuing bland statements and speaking in cliches, lacking the zest, drive, intellectual agility and ability to adapt to the mood of the broader, non-intellectual community.[10]

This prominent figure, often regarded as a spokesperson for 'progressive', less orthodox, Muslims noted a disillusionment in Mochtar. In the 1950s and late 1960s, Mochtar "was outspoken...in a very uncompromising, but dignified way" but his Malari imprisonment and frustrations with the New Order have caused him to lose his posture and balance, making him more derisive and undignified in his criticisms. Mochtar's commitment to democracy now has a tinge of desperation. The "derogatory style" of Manusia Indonesia was cited as another example of his loss of authority [wibawa] and his erratic criticism. This approach was regarded by the Muslim leader as typical of the secular intellectuals who do not try to understand how Indonesian government and society actually function, but want to impose their own views based on an unsuitable external model. This leader observed that Indonesia Raya did not know how to work with government institutions, by playing one section of the government off against another to achieve the paper's goals by shrewdness rather than with blanket condemnation and direct attacks. Neither did the newspaper raise its sights from attacking symptoms, such as corruption, to address the cause, a particular system of power relations.

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One post-1966 secular radical who knows Mochtar well felt he was not "reflective" or conscious of the biases of his own ideological perspective, which he regarded as neutral. He was unable to analyse himself or the political structures of the state. Fundamentally, the state and the military, for him, are essentially neutral. Individuals within this system become corrupt because of character flaws and personal weaknesses. Arief Budiman described Mochtar as

"not a social thinker in the sense of ranging over the complexities of society. He is more a moralist. A person who knows, by principle, what it is he wants to do and carries it out."

"if he is changing somewhat, that is, of course, because of his increasing age. His patience is growing and he is becoming more moderate [lunak], according to the natural process of change."[12]

This increased moderation was recognised, too, by other friends from the 1950s and 1960s. In trying to understand why Mochtar Lubis's public statements have become milder and less frequent since the mid 1970s, one friend highlighted the dilemma for someone who made his public declaration of principles early in life, and then faced the discipline of having to live up to them in the public eye. Any wavering, any deviations from those principles were taken up by critics as signs of hypocrisy or a weakened commitment. Now, with greater maturity, Mochtar was perhaps merely conserving his energies for more strategic political battles, this colleague suggested.

This man, who has known Mochtar Lubis since the early 1950s, argued that Mochtar did not appear to have recognised the apparent conflict between his 'big' business activities and his public statements of concern for society's 'little people', who are ultimately disadvantaged by big business. Because of Mochtar Lubis's willingness to work with multi-national corporations, "in the jargon of socialist-communists he could be regarded as a comprador", said another friend from the 1950s, who added:

"On the one hand he becomes the human rights hero but on the other hand, in fact, he has become the tool of those who oppress human rights in the economic field, the multi-national corporations".[13]

Mochtar Lubis was seen by some as too 'business-like' in his dealings with people, too inflexible and unaccommodating of different

attitudes and new ideas. He had a strong sense of confidence which one friend saw as "egotism", a trait of Western individualism.

R.S. Bratanata, a member of the Petition of 50 group, who admits his own Westernised background and has known Mochtar since the 1950s, admires Mochtar's style, referring to him as a "knight without fear", recalling the Dutch traditions of chivalry and honour. Mochtar would always take the side of the underdog and could not remain silent if he saw injustice. His willingness to expose it, even if this jeopardised friendships, made some friends ill at ease, and consequently impaired intimacy, Bratanata felt.[14] Some of Mochtar's longest associates described him as a loner who rarely made intimate friends. Mochtar Lubis himself says he is "much more at ease [with friends] in the artistic world" where he can be more open and vulnerable than in the more overtly political aspects of his life.[15]

Mochtar Lubis and his Peers

Mochtar Lubis's position in Indonesian society may be illustrated by comparing him with a range of other journalists, intellectuals and artists. I have selected for particular attention nine prominent figures, mentioned previously in the thesis, with whom he is frequently compared. Four are or were newspaper editors, two have built political lives on professional foundations and three are primarily authors.

Rosihan Anwar is in some ways, Mochtar Lubis's alter ego. Both were born in 1922 into aristocratic Sumatran families. Both fathers were

15. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 27/4/81.
assistant *demang* when these sons were born, and both later spent time as *demang* of Kerinci based in Sungai Penuh.[16] When Mochtar and Rosihan moved to Jakarta both gravitated towards the same circle of socialist-minded friends. Rosihan began work as a journalist with *Asia Raya* in 1943, was a co-founder of the weekly *Siasat* in 1947, and established the daily *Pedoman* in 1948. *Pedoman* was regarded as an organ of the PSI, although Rosihan did not formally join the party until 1955. Rosihan Anwar was much nearer the centre of the Sjahrrir circle than Mochtar.

*Pedoman*, *Indonesia Raya* and Suardi Tasrif’s Masyumi-oriented *Abadi* played very similar roles during the 1950s, expressing similar attitudes to the PKI, PNI and Sukarno, and siding with the regions in the centre-periphery tensions after 1955. All three editors were active members of the Indonesian committee of the IPI; all three were hostile to Sukarno’s initiatives to establish what became Guided Democracy; and all three saw their newspapers cease publication by 1960. But Rosihan, unlike Mochtar, remained free and wrote in other publications using various pseudonyms.[17]

*Pedoman* and *Indonesia Raya* were re-established within weeks of each other in 1968, and banned within days in January 1974. But when Mochtar Lubis and Rosihan Anwar are spoken of together, it is usually the contrasts between the two which are emphasised, and sometimes the conflict and rivalry. Their most memorable conflict was in 1960, when Rosihan Anwar signed a compulsory 19-point declaration committing *Pedoman* to conform to the state ideology. Mochtar requested his suspension from the

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17. His pen names included Abu Luthfi, Al Bahist, Mualiq and Muwahid. He tended to write for Islamic-oriented publications. Apart from irregular journalistic work, Rosihan was employed by PT Indomarine, a shipping dry dock company and contractor bureau owned by Daan Jahja (Rosihan Anwar 1981:440 & 442).

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International Press Institute, arguing that Rosihan should close Pedoman voluntarily, rather than accept governmental press constraints. Their subsequent polemic was made more bitter because Pedoman was banned despite Rosihan's compromise (see Chapter 3).

Years later, in an attempt to avoid a ban immediately after Malari, on 22 January 1974 Pedoman published a public retraction of an implied criticism of Mrs Tien Suharto run 10 days earlier, yet two days later its printing permit (SIC) was withdrawn regardless.[18] Incidents like these have gained Rosihan Anwar a reputation as much more accommodationist than Mochtar Lubis.

Rosihan Anwar has taken an active role in the PWI [Indonesian Journalists' Association] in the New Order period. He was General Chairperson of the Central PWI (1968-74), though Ali Murtopo's intelligence organisation, Opsus, attempted to replace him by B.M. Diah at the 1970 Congress.[19] While Mochtar Lubis regards the PWI as seriously compromised because of such government interventions, Rosihan believes it is best to try to work within the organisation, regardless of constraints, to train journalists to be more professional.[20] In 1972, he was offered an ambassadorship in Hanoi but declined the offer for 'family reasons'.[21] He was a Golkar member of the MPR in the 1973 and 1978 sessions. and his writings, as a columnist, in overseas and Indonesian publications, have only occasionally had a hard critical edge.

20. Interview with Rosihan Anwar, 22/6/81.
Rosihan Anwar has written widely on Islamic subjects since the early 1960s and Islam is a more important part of his world view than it is of Mochtar's. Yet many reformist-minded Muslim young people see Rosihan as vacillating and less principled than Mochtar, despite the latter's secular style. Compared with Mochtar, Rosihan "bent with the wind".[22] Rosihan Anwar himself is aware that many people have the impression that he is non-committal and fickle.[23] One current editor of a major press outlet, who knows both Rosihan Anwar and Mochtar, credited Rosihan with a greater sensitivity and awareness of the complexities of press and politics during the 1950s and early 1960s. Rosihan's attempt to tread a fine line, keeping Pedoman critical but alive, was respected by working journalists who appreciated the difficulty of such tactics.[24]

If Rosihan Anwar has occasionally been Mochtar Lubis's polemical sparring partner, then B.M. Diah, another member of the Indonesian IPI branch and five years their senior, was long Mochtar's arch-adversary. Merdeka, established by a group which included B.M. Diah in 1945, provided a training ground for many of the generation's leading journalists, who moved on to other papers. Despite the vagaries of press history in Indonesia, Merdeka has survived as a major daily into the 1980s, still under Diah. Although never a party organ, it sided with the PNI in the 1955 elections and with the central government during the regional tensions. Diah embraced the populist style of Sukarno, while working assiduously to counter increasing PKI influence in the press.[25]

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23. Interview with Rosihan Anwar, 22/6/81.


25. Two major incidents will serve as examples. In August 1963 Diah replaced Merdeka editor Joesoef with former Indonesia Raya journalist Hiswara Darmaputra, because, during Diah's absence abroad, Joesoef had aligned Merdeka with the pro-Manipol, pro-PKI press. The issue
The editor, Halim, in *Senja di Jakarta*, whom Mochtar acknowledges as being based on Diah, is an unashamed opportunist who uses his paper to support whatever elite faction offers him the greatest personal financial rewards.

Diah had three ambassadorial postings after 1959, and returned to Jakarta to become Minister of Information in July 1966, a post he held for two years. In 1969 he established the Hyatt Aryaduta Hotel and now heads an expanded press empire as well as his hotel interests. He and Mochtar have exchanged bitter accusations of personal and political impropriety through the pages of their newspapers, most spectacularly in 1971, leading to mutual libel charges and a series of unresolved legal appeals (see Chapter 4). Admirers of Mochtar Lubis are particularly critical of Diah's willingness to work with Ali Murtopo in his 1970 bid to become chairperson of the PWI. When Diah and other PWI officials explained on television after Malari that freedom of the press was guaranteed in Indonesia, Mochtar's Nibraya diary noted "This is a joke that is not funny".[26] Mochtar and Diah maintain a display of friendship when they meet socially, but acquaintances see this as camouflaging animosity.

Two men who epitomise the tradition of 'Javanese journalism' of which Mochtar Lubis has been sharply critical, are P.K. Ojong and Jakob Oetama, who co-founded *Kompas* in 1965, built it into Indonesia's most ---------


successful daily newspaper, and then diversified into a growing network of associated businesses. Both men had strong Catholic backgrounds, with Ojong serving on the Catholic Party leadership from 1964 to 1968. Ojong[27] had been part of a network of Jakarta intellectuals attracted to the Congress for Cultural Freedom before 1965. Mochtar had considerable respect for Ojong, who had provided reading materials for him while he was in Madiun prison. In December 1972, Mochtar defended him in an Indonesia Raya editorial against anti-Chinese slurs linking him with cukong.[28] He had joined with Mochtar on such projects as Yayasan Indonesia, Horison and Yayasan Obor in the early New Order period. After his death in 1980 Jakob Oetama acceded to many of his positions on such bodies. Jakob Oetama sits with Mochtar on the Supervisory Board of the Indonesian Legal Aid Institute Foundation (YLBHI).

Jakob Oetama and Ojong had worked harmoniously on Kompas for 15 years. According to Jakob Oetama, "our views on fundamental social issues were the same, while our differences were more to do with style and our subcultural backgrounds".[29] Under their guidance Kompas survived various waves of bannings, and expanded into the country's largest, most respected daily paper, while still maintaining a political autonomy from the government.

Their restrained style of journalism did not impress Mochtar Lubis, who wrote in his Nibiraya diary that numerous friends advocated he express his criticisms, especially of Javanese powerholders, in the indirect


style of Jakob Oetama, using subtle allusions [sindiran] so as not to offend. He rejected such appeals because

"in my experience this method is not productive either. Those to whom it is directed do not feel such subtle innuendoes in the slightest... If the Yacob Utama [sic] approach is ... continued, then this will only reinforce feudal cultural values in the face of power."[30]

While not doubting Jakob Oetama's integrity, Mochtar interprets his moderation and restraint as contributing to the maintenance of a style of opposition which is ultimately counterproductive, further empowering those in control.

Sumitro Djojohadikusumo is a very different figure from the journalists discussed so far. For many years, he was Indonesia's best known economist and held cabinet positions on many occasions between 1950 and 1978. A PSI leader who challenged Sjahri's leadership in 1956, he eventually became a principal leader of the PRRI rebellion, living in exile for over nine years. He and Mochtar had similar attitudes to the central government during the PRRI rebellion, and to Sukarno during the Guided Democracy period, during which time Sumitro tried, while abroad, to organise opposition to bring down Sukarno.[31] The two men became business partners in Indoconsult soon after Sumitro's return from abroad in 1967 and when Sumitro became Minister of Trade in June 1968, it was with Mochtar Lubis's full agreement.

As Mochtar recalled (in 1981), the invitation to Sumitro to join the government came during the "honeymoon period", when Mochtar and his friends were supporting Suharto because they wanted to sweep away the

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remnants of the 'Old Order'. Mochtar Lubis's disillusionment with the New Order after the 1971 Elections and his growing criticism of the figures around the President during 1973-74 suggest his attitudes to the government diverged from those of his former business partner. However Sumitro's departure from the Trade Ministry in 1972 (when he was given the less powerful post of Minister of National Research which he held for six years) was interpreted by some observers as hastened by differences of opinion with the President over the implementation of economic policy. Mochtar's relationship with Sumitro was one of the matters about which he was interrogated after Malari.[32] Mochtar retains his respect for Sumitro despite their different attitudes now to working closely with the Suharto government.[33] They still see each other regularly.[34] Mochtar's identification with opposition groups, like the signatories of the Petition of 50, is widely seen as compatible with his respect for the role which various technocrats and other 'honest professionals' play within the government.

Adnan Buyung Nasution, born in Jakarta in 1934, emerged to political prominence in 1966 as a leader of the Indonesian Graduates Action Front [Kesatuan Aksi Sarjana Indonesia, KASI], established in support of the newly formed student body, KAMI. He was a nominated member of the People's Representative Council [Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR] from 1966 until sacked two years later for his outspoken stands against the army. Buyung, with his fiery oratory and directness, was a popular figure for the 1966 students, frequently speaking on campuses and contributing to student and other newspapers. He and Mochtar share Mandailing ethnicity.


33. Sumitro's son, Prabowo, married Suharto's second daughter, Titi, in 1983.

34. Interview with Mochtar Lubis, 27/4/81.
though both were born outside the Mandailing heartland and have few roots there. In 1971, Buyung Nasution founded the Legal Aid Institute (LBH), which has since grown to become one of the largest and perhaps the boldest of a new cluster of non-government organisations. He has remained a prominent member of the secular intellectual opposition, advocating a devolution of political control and the effective implementation of the rhetoric of social justice. The LBH has a unique place in the informal Opposition, for its conduct of the legal defence of student radicals and others charged with subversion, its lobbying for structural legal changes to empower the poor, and its grass roots work with disadvantaged groups.[35] Buyung Nasution's contribution to the extent of legal aid in Indonesia has been recognised by various international awards. In 1972, the year after founding the LBH, he was *Indonesia Raya*’s "Man of the Year".

Buyung Nasution spent 22 months in detention after Malari. Although he was not in Nirbaya with Mochtar Lubis, they met on visits to the military hospital. Mochtar admired the defiant Buyung, who

"refused to be interrogated because he strongly feels he was arrested unlawfully. [...] Indonesia needs more lawyers like him[...He] is really fighting and suffering for his idea to establish the rule of law in this country."[36]

If Mochtar Lubis was seen by some as becoming calmer after the Malari detention, Buyung Nasution emerged as spirited as ever. Twelve years younger than Mochtar, he retains the passionate style of a man aware of the political potency of public confrontation with authority structures over matters of principle. He continued to act as defence counsel in controversial political trials and, in 1986, his impassioned courtroom

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35. On the LBH, see Chapter 4, Lev 1987, and LBH publications such as *Langkah Telah Diayunkan: Sepuluh Tahun Lembaga Bantuan Hukum* (1981) LBH, Jakarta.

36. *Nirbaya* 1975:27 (original in English), and *Kampdagboek* 1979:65.
defence of H.R. Dharsono, resulted in his being charged with contempt of court, in a case which received nation-wide publicity for months.

Mochtar Lubis and Buyung Nasution have a similar stubbornness of principle, common goals of social justice and a shared political agenda of strengthening the 'rule of law' as protection against the abuse of power. But Buyung has kept more of a reputation for radical commitments although he too, like Mochtar, has been criticised by younger activists for his comfortable lifestyle and fashion consciousness.

Of the writers and artists with whom Mochtar Lubis is often compared, three stand out: Takdir Alisjahbana, Pramoedya Ananta Toer and W.S. Rendra. Takdir Alisjahbana, chairperson of the Jakarta Academy, was born in Tapanuli in 1908, published his first novel in 1929 and was founding editor of the influential literary journal, Pujangga Baru, in 1933. Mochtar admired much about the pro-Western position which Takdir took in the 'Cultural Polemic' of the 1930s. Like Mochtar, Takdir has maintained a relatively constant literary output throughout his working life. Teeuw puts the two into his category of "Old Veterans",[37] and both are seen by younger artists at TIM as amongst the Old Guard of the literary establishment (see Chapter 5). Both approach their fictional writings with a strong didactic intent, and have drawn criticism from many, including Teeuw, who believe explicit 'sermons' weaken their novels.

Takdir was a member of the PSI and, like Mochtar, he identified with its more militantly anti-Sukarno wing during Guided Democracy, spending time in quasi-exile as a lecturer at the University of Malaya. Both men have been associated with the Congress for Cultural Freedom and both are

37. Teeuw 1979:165. The "veterans" named are Takdir, Mochtar, Achdiation K. Mihardja and Idrus (now deceased).
members of various liberal-oriented international organisations. Takdir is regarded by many as typifying intellectual pro-Westernism and hostility to Javanese mysticism, feudalism and leftist populism.

At the celebration of Takdir's 70th birthday at TIM in 1978 Mochtar Lubis delivered the eulogy on his contributions to Indonesian society. Takdir, Mochtar said, "could be categorised as an Indonesian 'giant' of a man, of whom there have been so few in the history of our nation".[38] Mochtar noted with awe the breadth of Takdir's achievements. Having described him as a "Renaissance" man, Mochtar suggested Takdir was even more than that, for he had not only conquered the past, but designed and striven towards his own vision of the future.

Takdir has never been as strongly political in his interests as Mochtar. His pursuits have been more philosophical and cultural. His present involvements include the Toyabungkah cultural centre he established in Bali, the World Future Studies Federation (based in Rome) and the International Association for Art and the Future he founded in the late 1970s. Takdir's interest in 'future studies' is analogous, in many ways, to Mochtar's excitement about environmentalism since the early 1970s. Currently Rector of the National University, Takdir has more impressive academic credentials than Mochtar, and is a more systematic thinker, with a greater intellectual range.

Pramoedya Ananta Toer contrasts strikingly with Mochtar Lubis. Their early novels, Jalan Tak Ada Ujung and Keluarga Gerilya, published within two years of each other, were highly praised by Teeuw and Jassin, and

regarded as major achievements of the 1945 Generation of writers. But while Mochtar became involved in Western-bloc organisations with American sympathies, Pramoedya developed radical nationalist and leftist commitments which led him to join LEKRA in 1958. In 1961, Pramoedya was detained for nearly a year over his sympathetic history of the Overseas Chinese in Indonesia. After his release, as editor of the cultural page, Lentera, in the radical leftist daily Bintang Timur, Pramoedya was extremely critical of Jassin and the Cultural Manifesto group. He was arrested again on 13 October 1965 and detained until 20 December 1979, spending ten years on Buru Island. Since his release, Pramoedya has had five major works banned.

If Mochtar may be viewed as a politically committed author in the Gelanggang tradition, so Pramoedya can be seen as a leading LEKRA author. Both have spent long periods in detention because their political activities were regarded by those in power as a threat. With H.J.C. Princen and Soebadio Sastrosatomo, they are among the select few to have been detained for lengthy periods during the presidencies of Sukarno and Suharto. During their detentions, they have been the focus of international attention and protest by organisations like Amnesty International. As the Indonesian fiction writer most translated into foreign languages, Mochtar Lubis was displaced only when translations of Pramoedya's Bumi Manusia quartet began appearing abroad in 1982.

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40. These are the four linked novels, Bumi Manusia (1980), Anak Semua Bangsa (1980), Jejak Langkah (1985) and Rumah Kaca (1988), and a volume Pramoedya edited of works by an early Indonesian writer R.M. Tirto Adhi Soerjo, entitled Sang Femula (1985), all published by Hasta Mitra, Jakarta.

41. Bumi Manusia and Anak Semua Bangsa were translated into English by Max Lane as This Earth of Mankind and Child of All Nations, and published by Penguin, Harmondsworth, in 1982 and 1984 respectively.

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are unquestionably Indonesia's best known novelists abroad. The two men have a mutual, if cautious, respect, though their political differences leave no ground for active friendship. Unlike Mochtar who came out of jail in 1966 to an heroic reception, trips abroad and an informal offer of a ministerial position, Pramoedya returned from Buru to face a regime which has banned his publications, continues to deny him the freedom to speak publicly or travel overseas, and requires him to report regularly.

W.S. Rendra, a poet and playwright born in 1935, inhabits the political middle ground between Mochtar Lubis and Pramoedya. Although active in the 1950s, Rendra came to be seen as comparable with Mochtar only after the poet's return from theatrical studies in America in 1967 and the establishment of his Bengkel Teater troup,[42] which rehearsed in a Yogyakarta kampung and performed in the open air in surrounding kampungs and villages. In the early 1970s, Rendra played a role in the Moral Force movement against corruption, reading his increasingly critical poetry at demonstrations and on campuses. In 1973 his play Mastodon dan Burung Kondor [The Mastadon and the Condors][43] was performed only after General Sumitro, the head of Kopkamtib, countermanded a police ban. Rendra gained the respect of leaders of the 1973-74 student movement and he captured the swelling mood of student defiance in his critical 'pamphlet poetry'.[44] After a reading of these at TIM in April 1978, he was detained for three and a half months.

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The novels have been, or are in the process of being, translated into Dutch, Chinese, French, German, Russian, Japanese and Swedish.

42. Literally 'Theatre Workshop', though usually referred to in English as Bengkel Theatre.


Subsequently, he was unable to get permission to perform publicly until December 1985. Nonetheless, he read poetry for student gatherings, and at selected events, like a poetry festival sponsored by the Dutch cultural centre in Jakarta in 1981.

Mochtar Lubis, Pramoedya Ananta Toer and Rendra represent something of the diversity of the informal opposition among writers and cultural figures. Mochtar is part of a group which helped legitimise the New Order, then became disillusioned with it. He joined lobby groups of prestigious figures like the Institute for Constitutional Awareness [LKB] and used his access to public forums like TIM and the media to express his criticisms of society, and to urge the government to cleanse and reform itself. Pramoedya, denied a voice in public forums, is a symbol of the leftists whose opposition to the New Order is more fundamental. By his capacity to survive the restrictions the New Order places on him he affirms the continuing existence of traditions of socialism and populist nationalism which have been suppressed since 1965-66. His writings have set an agenda for radicals well beyond the group of leftist former political prisoners. His banned (but widely circulated) publications have opened up debate on the interpretation of Indonesian history among young intellectuals and activists. The attention his historical writing has generated contrasts starkly with the lack of domestic interest in Mochtar's attempt to write a national history in his glossy Dutch publication, *Het land onder de regenboog: de geschiedenis van Indonesië*.

Rendra, a more accessible figure than Pramoedya, has made repeated efforts to take his poetry to audiences outside the major cultural venues. In 1978, he cooperated with the painter Hardi to produce a series of postcards, with a Hardi collage on the cover and a Rendra verse within, focussing on the contrast between government rhetoric, and poverty and injustice. He draws large crowds of mainly young people to
his readings, and skillfully exploits his theatrical flair to drive home his political messages.

From the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, it was Rendra rather than Mochtar Lubis who symbolised the socially committed artist for the young generation of activists. Unlike Rendra, Mochtar had never encouraged younger admirers to bond to him as anak buah,[45] and, during the 1970s, much of his orientation was abroad, his attention divided between business, journalism and international commitments. Rendra was 13 years younger, active domestically, mixing and discussing issues with the student leaders and cultivating a personal following, through the theatrical training program of the Bengkel Theatre. Although he lost much of his radical appeal when he moved to Jakarta in the late 1970s (and especially when he started producing large-budget dramatic performances in the mid 1980s), he did endeavour to maintain his roots in the Yogyakarta artistic traditions, which encouraged a close melding of art and community.

The way Rendra came to eclipse Mochtar in the artistic sphere is analogous to Mochtar's loss of appeal to the student movement with the rise of younger, more intellectually and analytically oriented leaders, like Dorodjatun Kuntjoro Jakti, Adi Sasono, Dawam Rahardjo, Mulya Lubis, and, after his return from America, Arief Budiman. This was partly a result of Mochtar growing older, but it also reflected the increasing appeal of structural ideas to students convinced of the imperviousness of the regime to proposals for far-reaching reform.

45. 'Anak buah' refers to the younger subordinate who gives respect and loyalty to his/her 'bapak' ('father', 'superior) in return for guidance, and protection.
Reviewing Strengths

Many of these comparisons with his peers are to Mochtar Lubis's detriment. He emerges as less subtle than Rosihan Anwar, less effective as an institution builder than Jakob Oetama or Buyung Nasution, a less systematic thinker than Takdir Alisjahbana, a political prisoner who gained his hero stature for less physical and psychological hardship than Pramoedya, an artist less deeply rooted in Indonesian society than either Pramoedya or Rendra. What then are Mochtar's central strengths, the contributions for which he is likely to be remembered?

As a crusading journalist, Mochtar Lubis demonstrated persistent courage, fiery moral passion and stubborn determination. For young journalists, Mochtar has been an influential symbol, a man committed to a particular view of what the profession should do, who stood up for his principles and took the consequences. If he could not publish what he believed needed to be said, he accepted the banning of his newspaper rather than compromise. His direct, unyielding journalism ended in defeat in both the 1950s and the 1970s. But the inspirational force of the attempt has been great because large numbers of Indonesians, both journalists and newspaper readers, dislike and resent the alternative, of cautious, devious and ambiguous journalism which is dominant today.

It is likely that Mochtar will be remembered more for what he opposed than for what he supported. In the 1950s he personified passionate opposition to communism, radical nationalism and the party system and, above all, to the growing power of President Sukarno. Indeed, Sukarno was the principal target of his criticisms, representing almost all that Mochtar despised. Mochtar regarded him as pompous, promiscuous, hedonistic, opportunistic, power hungry, ill-disciplined, and hypocritical, and saw a close connection between these personal
weaknesses and what he regarded as the shortcomings of Sukarno's political outlook, which he perceived as feudalistic, irrational, irresponsibly agitational and pro-communist.

He saw Sukarno as driven to these "heights of folly and distortion [by a belief in a] mytho-mystical force",[46] and felt a responsibility to challenge and expose the traditional feudal, mystical and obscurantist mentalities, which he believed Sukarno was exploiting, and which he saw as inhibiting the development of a modern democratic nation.

Fundamental to Mochtar's criticism of Sukarno was that he failed to exercise self-control, which Mochtar believed led ultimately to national indiscipline. In the eyes of many Indonesians associated with the 'New Order' movement of 1966-67, Mochtar was a prescient figure who saw very early what they came to believe only later, that Sukarno's verbal magic was dangerous for the country.

Mochtar's attacks on Ibnu Sutowo in the 1970s were conducted with a similar crusading zeal, and again for reasons which reflect his puritanical moralism. Ibnu Sutowo's flamboyant opulence and his cavalier disregard of his responsibilities to the government's budget managers evoked a vehemence in Mochtar far greater than the ruthless and widely feared intelligence chief, Ali Murtopo, and very much more than the enigmatic, undemonstrative Suharto did. The ignominious crash of Ibnu Sutowo's Pertamina in 1975-76 was a powerful vindication of the stand which Mochtar had taken against him in the previous five years.

Mochtar Lubis will also be remembered as a pioneer in the role of mediator or networker between Indonesia and the West, especially the US,

and between Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries. He has participated in international cultural and professional organisations throughout his adult career, rising to positions of high prestige and influence in them. From his early books on the United States, Southeast Asia and the Korean War, to his participation in the International Press Institute and the Congress for Cultural Freedom, his later involvement in the Press Foundation of Asia, and his central role in the publishing venture, Obor, he has functioned as an conduit or interactive junction in the flow of ideas and information between Indonesia and the outside world. In the 1970s he has been an enthusiastic promoter of global environmental issues in Indonesia.

Throughout his life, Mochtar Lubis has displayed a remarkable consistency of world view and an impressive tenacity in his commitments. His early family life and schooling left a legacy of stern respect for self-discipline, a strong sense of the importance of honour, a view that right and wrong can and must be sharply distinguished, and a belief that individuals must take personal responsibility for their actions. His education emphasised the importance of rational problem solving, and a sense that privileged members of a small educated elite had a special responsibility to shape the nation's future. The nationalism he embraced at high school in Kayutanam, was easily compatible with an outward-looking internationalism and with the humanism which characterises the religious side of his outlook.

The Revolution linked his sense of the importance of honour with admiration for the military. He came to have particular admiration for the Siliwangi officers, whom he saw as able professionals who had shown their skill and patriotism in holding the colonial power at bay and putting down a Communist uprising. His respect for the military contrasted with his scorn for civilian politicians, especially those he
regarded as irresponsible rabble rousers. Aggressively 'anti-party',
Mochtar has always regarded himself as a democrat, but his concept of
'democracy' consistently incorporated a belief in the need for strict
controls on parties and, after 1966, the prohibition of left wing
parties, lest communism or agitational politics re-emerge. While he has
condemned militarism as totalitarian, his faith in the military as an
institution, defending democracy, against political extremism, is only
slightly diminished in the 1980s. His condemnation is of individuals
within the institution, rather than the military as such.

As Mochtar Lubis has aged, a process of introspection and maturation
has tempered his outspokenness, lessening his zeal for combat with the
authorities. Since the mid 1970s, he has been more reflective, more
cautious, more the elder statesman, less the maverick. But few would
question that Mochtar Lubis's life has been one of exemplary
steadfastness.
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B) SELECTED PUBLICATIONS BY MOCHTAR LUBIS

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Berita Negara R.I. Tambahan Perseroan-Perseroan Terbatas
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SFF (Sport, Fashion, Film)
Sinar Harapan
Solidarity
Suluh Indonesia
Tempo
The Toyota Foundation Occasional Report
Time [Australian ed.]
The Times [London]
CONFIDENTIAL APPENDIX

ATTACHED TO:

RESTRICTED FOR TWENTY YEARS FROM 17.1.89

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AUTHOR, EDITOR, POLITICAL ACTOR

by

David T. Hill

Bachelor of Arts [Asian Studies] (Honours)
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A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of
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July 1988

David T. Hill.
CONFIDENTIAL APPENDIX:
LIST OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS AND INTERVIEW DATES

(FOR EXAMINERS' INFORMATION ONLY:
NOT TO BE COPIED OR CIRCULATED)


C) D.H. Assegaff, 2 October 1981.


G) Hariman Siregar, 10 July 1981 and 11 January 1982 (There were at times, up to six other former student colleagues of Hariman participating in these discussions).

H) Butje Rumanuri, 10 July 1981 (contributed significantly to my discussions with Hariman Siregar).

I) Bakri Siregar, 4 March 1981.


O) Joesoef Isak, 5 August 1981.