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The Central Role of the Police in Networked Security in Indonesia:
A Case Study of Yogyakarta

David Jansen

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Abstract

This dissertation is premised upon a simple assumption: it is not possible to fully grasp how the security sector works until we understand interagency relations. The 'interagency' is the area where different security organisations interact in the pursuit of maintaining security. This topic throws up a number of questions, such as how do security groups interrelate and why do they behave the way they do? In the literature on Indonesia many sources take the view that relations between security actors, especially the police and the Indonesian military, are unclear and contested. This thesis finds the opposite. By pursuing a local level case study of the relationships between security organisations in Yogyakarta, this thesis argues that most security relationships in this case study are premised on generally well defined boundaries of jurisdiction. Most importantly, the dominant form of behaviour is not hostility or competition but rather collaboration.

This dissertation employs policing theory on networked security as the most appropriate paradigm to model security relations within the case study site. Policing is a dynamic task, involving not only the uniformed state police but a diverse range of government and non-government actors. This framework aptly fits the situation in Indonesia where we find various central and regional government agencies and commercial and civil society organisations deploying within the sector. Examples include the national police, territorial units of the Indonesian army, the civil service police of regional government, non-police civil service investigators, private security companies, neighbourhood watch groups, Islamic vigilantes, and political party militias among others.

The Indonesian police, however, are at the centre of this security network, they lead, support and lend their authority to other actors. The superiority of the Indonesian police becomes the core reason why collaboration takes place within the network. Other security organisations feel they need to access the formal authority and special powers of the police. This system has created something of a security leviathan. My research from Yogyakarta suggests the Indonesian police have emerged as the primary agent within the local security sphere.
Acknowledgements

This thesis would not have been possible without the generous support of many people and organisations. First and foremost I wish to express my heartfelt gratitude to my supervisor, Edward Aspinall. From the day Ed first answered the call of an inexperienced honours student in 2005, he has worked diligently to help me overcome a staggering array of weaknesses. Ed, I owe you an extensive debt for the views, criticisms and advice you’ve shared over the years.

Over the course of four years many other people have benevolently stepped in to render their assistance. The Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at UGM, in particular Muhadi Sugiono (as my in-country supervisor) and Arifa Rahmawati who agreed to sponsor my foreign research permit. My thanks to both of you and especially you, Pak Muhadi, for making a trip to Jakarta on my behalf to front-up to the man. To Ben Kerkvliet, Sinclair Dinnen and Harold Crouch for, at different times, lending me guidance and convincing me of the viability of my topic. Needless to say you bear no responsibility should I fail to fulfil the advice.

My thanks also to what was once the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies and what is still the Department of Political and Social Change for giving me a home for four years - and a very munificent scholarship too. The first day that I reported to our administrative assistant, Lyn Ning, I was shown a personal office and a photocopier, and told I had unrestricted access to both. At the time I felt a little light-headed with the privilege and I don’t think I’ve overcome that feeling yet. One thing I have learned these last four years is that the ANU is a pretty special place and I feel very humbled to have studied here. Thanks also to the Endeavour programme and the generous six month scholarship they gave to me in 2007. I wouldn’t be here without the support of either of these institutions.

It is also necessary for me to single out a few of the many people who lent assistance during my fieldwork in Indonesia. In general, when dealing with the Indonesian bureaucracy I had
a 40:40:20 ratio of success: 40% of bureaucrats were hostile to my research, 40% were apathetic and 20% were genuinely kind and went out of their way to help me. Some of those who deserve mention here, from the police are: AKBP Zainal Arifin, Kombes Agung, the Kamsa detachment at Polda DIY, Kompol Sutarmini, AKBP Dede Alamsyah, Kompol Endriardi, the Kapolseks and their staff of Kecamatan Pandak, Piyungan, Gondomanan, Gedongtengan, Tempel and Danurejan, Kombes Sunaryono, AKBP Sarjono, Kombol Wahyu and the Intelkam units at Polres Bantul, Poltabes and Polres Sleman.

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over the years are too numerous to count, words wouldn’t do your contributions justice. Without you, my PhD wouldn’t have been possible and whatsmore, wouldn’t have been worth it.

Having listed some of the thanks due to the many people who have supported me during my research, in the end, the final credit for this project goes to Jesus. For the record, about 10% of my work came about through my own creativity, initiative and hard work. The other 90% was divine intervention, pure and simple. It has been said: “with man it would be impossible, but with God, all things are possible.” Looking back on my experiences I’d say that’s pretty much right. With a glad heart I give all the credit for this project to the best Messiah humanity has ever had, thanks Chief.

Most importantly though this dissertation I dedicate to my mother. Mum you didn’t make it to the end, but I know if you could, you’d tell me you can’t be any prouder of me than you are now. For twenty six years I had the best mum in the world. I know you would have done anything to be here now, but it wasn’t meant to be. One day, at the conclusion of all things, we’ll meet again and you can hear me say this yourself: whatever it is I do, now and forever, it’s because you made it possible. Until then, this dedication stores up the words on my heart. Amen.
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABRI</td>
<td>Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Indonesian Armed Forces)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>Adjutan Komisaris Polisi (Assistant Police Commissioner = Army Captain)</td>
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<tr>
<td>APBD</td>
<td>Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah (Budget of Income and Regional Expenditure)</td>
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<td>APBN</td>
<td>Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara (Budget of Income and National Expenditure)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Babinkamtibmas</td>
<td>Bintara Pembina Keamanan dan Ketertiban Masyarakat (Social Order and Guidance Police)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BIN</td>
<td>Badan Intelijen Negara (State Intelligence Agency)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BNK</td>
<td>Badan Narkotika Kabupaten/Kota (Municipal/District Narcotics Agency)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>Badan Narkotika Propinsi (Provincial Narcotics Agency)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BPK</td>
<td>Badan Pemeriksaan Keuangan (National Auditing Board)</td>
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<td>BPS</td>
<td>Badan Pusat Statistik (Central Statistics Agency)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brimob</td>
<td>Brigad Mobil ([Police] Mobile Brigade, paramilitary rapid response force)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BSM</td>
<td>Barisan Shirotol Mustaqim (local PDIP gang in Yogyakarta)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BUJP</td>
<td>Badan Jasa Usaha Pengamanan (Security Services Company)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Densus 88</td>
<td>Detasemen Khusus 88 (Special Detachment 88, the police anti-terrorist taskforce)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIY</td>
<td>Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta (Special Region of Yogyakarta)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FJI</td>
<td>Front Jihad Indonesia (Indonesian Jihad Front, a local Yogyakartan vigilante movement)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FKPM</td>
<td>Forum Kemitraan Polisi Masyarakat (Community-Police Partnership Forum)</td>
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<td>GAM</td>
<td>Gerakan Anti-Maksiat (Anti-Vice Movement, a Yogyakarta vigilante group)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPK</td>
<td>Gerakan Pemuda Kabah (youth movement of PPP)</td>
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<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kamtibmas</td>
<td>Keamanan dan Ketertiban Masyarakat (Social Order and Security)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kasbagop</td>
<td>Kepala Bagian Operasi (Head of Police Operations section)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kominda</td>
<td>Komunitas Intelijen Dearah (Regional Intelligence Community [Meeting])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kompol</td>
<td>Komisaris Polisi (Police Commissioner = Army Major)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kombes</td>
<td>Komisaris Besar Polisi (Grand Commissioner = Army Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koter</td>
<td>Komando Teritorial (Territorial Command)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Linmas</td>
<td>Perlindungan Masyarakat (Community Protection [taskforce])</td>
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<td>Miras</td>
<td>Minuman Keras (liquor)</td>
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<td>MMI</td>
<td>Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Indonesian Mujahidin Council)</td>
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<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MPR</td>
<td>Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People’s Consultative Assembly)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Muspida</td>
<td>Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah (Regional Leader’s Conference)</td>
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<td>Muspika</td>
<td>Musyawarah Pimpinan Kecamatan (Kecamatan Leader’s Conference)</td>
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<td>Opsnal</td>
<td>Operasi dan Pelaksanaan di Lapangan (Operations and Execution in the field, term used to describe the operational elements of Polri)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pekat</td>
<td>Penyakit Sosial (Social Disease or vice)</td>
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<td>PDIP</td>
<td>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKL</td>
<td>Pedagang Kaki Lima (street traders)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLN</td>
<td>Perusahaan Listrik Negara (State Electricity Company)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPNS</td>
<td>Penyidik Pegawai Negeri Sipil (Civil Service Investigators)</td>
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<td>Pol.PP</td>
<td>Polisi Pamong Praja (Civil Service Police)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Polri</td>
<td>Kepolisian Republik Indonesia (Indonesian National Police)</td>
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<td>Polmas</td>
<td>Polisi Masyarakat (Community Police)</td>
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<td>Polres</td>
<td>Polisi Resort (District Police Command)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Polsek</td>
<td>Polisi Sektor (Sub-district Police command)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poltabes</td>
<td>Polisi Kota Besar (Major City Police [command])</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUU Kamnas</td>
<td>Rancangan Undang-Undang Keamanan Nasional (National Security Bill)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Satgas</td>
<td>Satuan Tugas (Taskforce: ubiquitous term for security groups of political parties)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Satpam</td>
<td>Satuan Pengamanan (Security Guard)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUTET</td>
<td>Saluran Udara Tegangan Ekstra Tinggi (Ultra High Tight Overhead Wires)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAP</td>
<td>Ketetapan (Decree)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TNI</td>
<td>Tentara Nasional Republik Indonesia (Indonesian Defence Force)</td>
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Thesis Introduction

Security problems cannot be tackled by single agencies. Joint efforts, inter-agency cooperation, and coordination are paramount importance.\(^1\)

It is imperative that we quench the thirst for understanding how the many actors involved in national security deal with matters that cross functional and departmental boundaries.\(^2\)

Security is not the product of a single agency working alone. In Indonesia, as in other countries, a multiplicity of local, national, regional, state, non-state, commercial, and volunteer organisations are involved in the production of internal security. The above quotations draw our attention to the fact that research on the security sector is not complete until we have developed an understanding of how different security organisations interact. In Indonesia, this debate has begun in earnest. Relations between the police and the military have become an especially prevalent topic in security sector reform debate during the years after the fall of the New Order.\(^3\) Yet what is missing from this debate is an analysis of what relationships look like at the local level, in particular what conditions dictate whether security organisations compete, collaborate or simply refuse to deal with one another? This is the gap this thesis aims to fill.

The central objective of this thesis is to define and explain which organisations are involved in regional security management within a local level case study. My task is to probe to what extent there are poor relations and ill-defined boundaries of jurisdiction, as implied by

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\(^1\) Kusnanto Anggoro, *Bridge Over Troubled Water: Convergence and Divergence in the Formulation of National Security Bill in Indonesia* (Jakarta: Propatria, 2008), 27


much of the literature on Indonesian security. My central findings indicate that, contrary to dominant perceptions, there are well defined divisions of labour between security actors. There is also ample evidence to show that cooperation is the main pattern of relations. Within this system the Indonesian police occupy a dominant position. For a mix of historical, legal and normative reasons, the Indonesian police have become the central security actor within my case study site and other security organisations depend upon the police.

Like much of Indonesia’s contemporary political landscape, current debates about security relations lie in a chain of events which originated with the fall of the New Order. The Asian financial crisis which struck Indonesia in 1997 gave birth to a broad range of eventually fatal challenges to the Suharto administration. Pressure from the international financial community and from domestic political forces coupled with a division in elite support for the president and mobilisation of anti-regime masses, eventually forced the resignation of Suharto in May 1998.4 The downfall of the president was only one manifestation of broad demands for democratic reform (or reformasi) voiced at the time. Another popular cause was the termination of a praetorian, interventionist role for the military within society.5 In response, the Indonesian military in 1998 drafted a program of reforms designed to placate civilian demands.6 As part of this policy, the armed forces willingly dismantled some of the most important sources of its power.7 One of these reforms was the separation of the Indonesian police from the military. Since 1960 the Indonesian police (Kepolisian Republik Indonesia or Polri) had been part of the Indonesian Armed Forces (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia or ABRI).8 The military’s decision in April 1999 to divide the two apparatuses, opened important questions as to where future jurisdictional boundaries would

7 ‘Komitmen ABRI Menyelamatkan Bangsa dan Negara’, Editorial of Armed Forces Commander Wiranto, Kompas 10 March 1999
8 Awaloedin Djamin, Menuju Polri Mandiri yang Profesional (Jakarta: Yayasan Tenaga Kerja, 1999), 44-45.
lie between an independent Polri and the Indonesian Defence Force (renamed the Tentara Nasional Indonesia or TNI).\(^9\)

While the military initiated the institutional separation of the armed forces and the police, the Indonesian parliament completed the process but, at the same time, left unanswered specific questions over when and how the TNI and Polri can cooperate. In 2000 Indonesia’s then supreme law making council, the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or MPR) formally made the Indonesian police an independent body under the command of the president. The MPR charged the police with “upholding law, security and public order” while making the Indonesian military responsible for “external defence” and upholding the “sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state.”\(^10\) Critically absent from these decrees was a definition over when the police responsibility for security may give way to the military’s responsibility for maintaining state integrity, and the circumstances under which the two forces may render assistance to one another. Subsequent parliamentary legislation on the armed forces and the police in 2002 and 2004 failed to rectify these problems.\(^11\)

The absence of legal direction over how the police and military can cooperate has stimulated debate in Indonesia over whether the state should reform security policy and legislation to redress this perceived problem. In a typical statement of the issue, Dewi Fortuna Anwar makes clear she believes lack of clarity in the regulatory framework has inflamed hostile relations between Indonesia’s security forces:

The sudden separation of the TNI and Polri ... created various problems in the field. The existence of ‘grey areas’, where there can be found overlapping responsibilities or an absence of clarity about authority between TNI and Polri, was at the beginning not sufficiently anticipated by policymakers. ... This thing does not only trigger conflict

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\(^9\) 'Polisi Mulai resmi berpisah dari ABRI', *Kompas* 3 April 1999.

\(^10\) *Republik Indonesia: Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*, Ketetapan MPR VI/2000 tentang Pemisahan Tentara Nasional Indonesia dari Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia and Ketetapan MPR VII/2000 tentang Peran Tentara Nasional Indonesia dan Peran Kepolisian Republik Indonesia Pasal 2 (2) and Bab II, Pasal 6 (1).

between TNI and Polri in the field, but also complicates the handling of various security problems in Indonesia.12

Although Fortuna Anwar wrote in 2004 at a time much closer to the turbulence of reformasi, the same concerns have not dissipated today. For example, Theo L. Sambuaga the former head of Commission I (the parliamentary committee responsible for overseeing state defence issues), in an academic publication of the think-tank Propatria wrote in 2008:

Regulation and a clear legal umbrella concerning the TNI’s Assistance role [to Polri] would be really helpful for TNI and Polri, up to now it turns out that many things between them have been shrouded in doubt, mutual waiting, anxiety about overstepping authority and breaking human rights principles, even up to mutual suspicion and clashes in the field, when facing the challenges of their roles, disturbances and threats in the field, oftentimes these things constitute a grey area.13

According to these two sources, one an academic the other a policymaker, the absence of legal provisions to guide interagency cooperation as well as perceived lack of clarity in jurisdictional boundaries contributes to antagonistic relations between Polri and TNI.

Other Indonesian commentators and policymakers have made similar observations. Yuddy Chrisnandi, another former member of Commission I argued the military’s role in securing the integrity and unity of the state is inseparably intertwined with the police responsibility for upholding security and order within society. Bearing this in mind, Chrisnandi declares:

Looking at the functions and tasks of TNI and Polri which almost “clash”, its already appropriate for us to re-examine the benefits and the risks of the separation of these two institutions. If this separation is indeed positive on the one side, a negative aspect on another side - in the form of the occurrence of overlapping authority in the execution of security and order within the state - should be minimalised.14

Such views - overlapping authority, poor cooperation, hostile relations - are widely expressed within the academic literature. Sukardi Rinakit for example has claimed: “the military also involves itself in a non-defence role by continuing to intervene in the affairs of

the police despite the stipulation in TAP MPR No.VI/MPR/2000 that their duties are separate.”¹⁵ Leonard C. Sebastian repeats similar observations when claiming: “though not having control over anti-terrorism operations, the TNI still has major responsibilities for domestic security” and “until the police develop the capacity to fulfil its internal security responsibilities, the logic of employing the TNI for contingencies related to a new security environment where counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency are pre-eminent is difficult to fault.”¹⁶ Defence commentator Edy Prasetyono similarly suggests: “the arrangement of authority in administering national security is still very unclear and even mutually overlapping. This confusion is born because of several factors... [such as among other factors] the function and role of TNI and POLRI which can still be interpreted openly, mainly concerning the meaning of ‘internal security.’”¹⁷ Likewise Damien Kingsbury has stated: “Polri’s separation from the military was intended to ‘civilianise’ security operations and reduce the TNI’s overt role in ensuring internal order. Yet, paradoxically what actually occurred was that the TNI’s function changed hardly at all, while the numbers and role of Polri... escalated quite significantly.”¹⁸ Arguably the view expressed by these commentators has today evolved to become the conventional wisdom. Almost without exception, the discourse on interagency security relations in Indonesia is dominated by assumptions that relations are bad, cooperation is problematic and boundaries of jurisdiction are grey and overlapping.

This discourse is not without policy consequences. Since 2005 the Indonesian Department of Defence has attempted to propose an overarching bill for the coordination of national security (the RUU Kamnas). This effort to craft a new institutional framework for security management has both stimulated and fed off academic debates over security reform.¹⁹ Civilian, academic contributors to this debate have long proposed redefining boundaries between the national security elements, creating new modalities for cooperation, building unified governance arrangements at the national level and many other initiatives. The

overwhelming impression that has emerged from this debate is that Indonesia’s security management system is broken and needs to be fixed.\textsuperscript{20}

Yet for all the discussion of problematic relations, this perception does not fit the dominant picture of security in Indonesia that has emerged over the last half decade. Despite the dark concerns which hung over the nation in the late nineteen nineties, by 2009 it was apparent that Indonesia is remarkably stable and secure. This idea is one that has been growing among Indonesian commentators for some time. As put by Douglas Ramage and Andrew MacIntyre in a 2008 policy paper:

> We need to start thinking of [Indonesia] as a normal country, grappling with many of the same challenges as other large, stable, middle-income developing democracies... Indonesia today is a stable, competitive democracy... It is no longer in a state of profound flux and turmoil.\textsuperscript{21}

Such revisionist analysis proposes that the fears about instability which flowered during the turbulence of Indonesia’s early transition period are, with the benefit of hindsight, exaggerated. This analysis emerged particularly prominently in media coverage of Indonesia’s 2009 national elections. The occurrence of these elections more or less ten years after reformasi, was an auspicious invitation to reflect on the state of modern Indonesia.\textsuperscript{22} At the time many non-specialist commentators, like the journalist Peter Hartcher who wrote for the \textit{Sydney Morning Herald}, insightfully juxtaposed the woes of Thailand in 2009 with the stable progress occurring in Indonesia.

\textsuperscript{20} For some of the most important contributions to this debate please see the published works referenced in footnote three.


\textsuperscript{22} I make the argument that Indonesia’s election in 2009 proceeded peacefully and that this has helped to form confidence in Indonesia’s overall stability. I do however concede one large caveat to this analysis. In July 2009 days before the presidential poll, terrorist bombings shockingly erupted in Jakarta. Nevertheless, after this incident the Indonesian police demonstrated their capacity to disrupt Islamic extremists by mounting a successful crackdown. I argue these events ironically demonstrate the maturity and capacity of modern Indonesia to handle its security problems. On the general absence of violence during the election see: Michael Buehler, ‘Suicide and progress in modern Nusantara.’ \textit{Inside Indonesia} No.97, (July-September 2009). For July 2009 terrorist attacks see: ‘Bom Marriot-Ritz Carlton: Polisi Telah Identifikasi Pelaku’, \textit{Media Indonesia}, 17 July 2009. For the arrests of terrorists some weeks after the bombing see: ‘Rumah di Bekasi Diintai Sejak 10 Hari Lalu’, \textit{Media Indonesia}, 8 Augustus 2009 and ‘Polisi Baku Tembak dengan Teroris’, \textit{Media Indonesia} 7 Augustus 2009.
[After 1998] Indonesia's prospects seemed to go from bad to worse.... If Thailand seemed to represent sunrise in South-East Asia, Indonesia appeared to be the region's nightfall. Today [2009] we see an extraordinary role reversal. Thailand is now [the] wreck.  

While good relations between security institutions are not necessarily a predicate of stability, neither are they irrelevant to the equation. The capable performance of the security sector is one component of stability. Today Indonesia is demonstrably effective in maintaining its own security. With the passage of time, it has become apparent that the perceptions of a poorly functioning security sector, undermined by bad security force relations, overlapping boundaries of jurisdiction and hostility between the police and military was a picture that fitted more appropriately with the chaos of the early transition period. As with the general revisions taking place concerning Indonesia’s overall health and stability, it is perhaps time to revisit the conventional wisdom concerning interagency security relations. The Indonesian security sector reform literature, which argues for nothing less than a wholesale reappraisal of the entire institutional framework of security management, is perhaps therefore leaping to conclusions. The gap between the claims of the literature and the stable security situation in Indonesia in the last half of the two thousands, at least is an invitation for further research.  

Preparing the Groundwork for this Study  

As alluded to, the literature on security sector reform in Indonesia is growing. One of the most articulate discussions of this topic however, remains an early report from the International Crisis Group: 'Indonesia: Rethinking Internal Security Strategy.' This policy discussion paper lays out with analytical sharpness the alleged problems in Indonesia’s security management and founds its claims on rich empirical data. In December 2004 the

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ICG very succinctly listed what it saw as the main obstacles to a functioning security sector:

A major challenge facing Indonesia's new president, Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono, is reform of the internal security sector... Major problems include:

- unclear institutional division of labour, particularly between the police and the military...;
- contradictory or ambiguously worded legislation on some aspects of internal security and no legislation at all on others;
- lack of accountability of the security services;
- inadequate oversight of operations; and
- no strategic direction.

One of the thorniest issues is the precise division of labour between the police and military. Formal responsibility for internal security has rightly been allocated to the police but there are "grey areas"... Intelligence is another difficult area... The intelligence functions of the police, military, and National Intelligence Agency (BIN) overlap, and coordination is not smooth.24

In short, the ICG argued the problems were far reaching. The ICG proposed there was contestation between the police and the military over their roles. Unclear legislation exacerbated the problem by failing to clarify how Polri and TNI can cooperate and, so the ICG says by confusingly extending each institution a role in internal security.25 The agencies also lack accountability to government and coordination (especially in intelligence sharing) is poor. These claims, as explained above, are representative of a broad cross-section of writing.

What stands out most prominently from the ICG’s argument, and almost all other works on Indonesian security reform, is that the analysis is founded upon a review of strategic policymaking at the level of the central government. Thus the paper refers to topics like the formulation of legislation, the macro-handling of terrorism policy, the strategic disposition of military forces and the like.26 As such, Rethinking Internal Security Strategy illustrates one of the core weaknesses in the contemporary debate. To date, there has been an almost complete absence of qualitative local case studies which test the claims of the literature.

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24 International Crisis Group, Rethinking Internal Security, 1.
against the situation on the ground. This constitutes a major gap in existing research and is something I wish to fill with my thesis.

The narrowing of existing debate to the realm of macro-policy, carries with it analytical dangers. With much of the literature making negative assessments about interagency relations, the absence of detailed local case studies means some of these claims rest on shaky grounds. To take the ICG report as the example again, the ICG stated:

The military is fulfilling a variety of police functions... [TNI] is also often used to assist with law and order tasks, especially for major events like nationwide elections. For example, 35,000 troops were deployed to help the police secure the second round of the presidential elections in September 2004. As capacity is strengthened, responsibility for this kind of task should be transferred to the police. But the bulk of the military's internal security commitment, some 180,000 troops, is the army territorial command, the structure that parallels civilian administration down to the village level. Every day, in most parts of the country, the territorial units are doing work that should gradually be transferred to the police.27

Two things are problematic with this statement. In the example of election security, the ICG arguably misinterpreted the chain of command in that combined operation. In reality, police headquarters took full command of Operasi Mantap Brata XII (the code-name for the election security operation of 2004). The tens of thousands of TNI forces who supported the operation were placed under police command.28 Responsibility was therefore fully assumed by the police. Secondly, the ICG's claim concerning the territorial command is very contentious. In my research, I find that the territorial command in Yogyakarta has probably been inactive in almost all significant local security tasks since 2000 and there is good reason to suppose the situation in other parts of Indonesia is the same as well.

While the above is merely one quotation, it does however illustrate the danger of taking a wide-angle view of this topic and making broad judgments that are not supported with in-depth empirically based case studies. Given the negative assumptions that most observers

27 International Crisis Group, Rethinking Internal Security, 8.
have about relations in the Indonesian security sector, by only executing strategic overviews of the topic we risk creating stilted analyses.

A small number of scholars have however attempted to explore police-military relations in Indonesia in a local, operational context. The best of this research comes from an edited compilation: *Relasi TNI dan Polri dalam Penanganan Keamanan Dalam Negeri (2000-2004)*. In this manuscript Ikrar Nusa Bhakti brought together a number of different case studies of conflict management in the post-reformasi era. In this compilation there are studies of Polri-TNI operations in Ambon, Poso, North Maluku and of maritime security in Batam.

If we take case studies of the ‘hottest’ conflict zones, Ambon, North Maluku and Poso, the researchers argued the initial police and military response was riven with problems – unclear chains of command, conflicting doctrine, indiscipline and occasional fights between the security forces. Yet this is not the entire story either. The authors point out that the worst of these problems took place in the tumultuous period from 1999 to 2001. After 2001 relations and command and control between the forces in these areas improved substantially.

In Sri Yunuarti’s case study of the Ambon, the police and military handling of the conflict started poorly but improved with time. Polri and TNI originally responded to outbreaks of violence in 1999 by individually deploying their own forces. These forces operated separately, took sides in the conflict and occasionally clashed with one another. Worsening violence caused the President in June 2000 to declare a state of civil emergency in Maluku and the neighbouring province of North Maluku. As part of this decision the central government gave the ranking military territorial commanders in Maluku and North Maluku the operational command of all Polri and TNI forces in their provinces. As Yunuarti suggests in her study, this arrangement operated well until 2003, when the central government lifted the civil emergency.²⁹

According to Moch. Nurhasim's research on North Maluku the management of the conflict there was even less violent than in Ambon. Part of this difference was due to the composition of local religious groups but another difference was in the handling of the emergency. In North Maluku the interim governor during and after 1999 was a military general. This officer was able to use his powers as governor, ranking army officer and later as controller of the civil emergency, to place full command over security operations (including police forces) into the hands of the province’s TNI commander.30

In Poso however, where there never was a declared state of emergency, military and police forces encountered similar confusion over which force should assume command. Disagreement over command and control arrangements resulted in localized TNI and Polri forces deploying their personnel separately and ineffectually from 1999 until 2001. The situation changed at the beginning of 2002 when the central government approved an operation engineered by the provincial police command, ‘Operasi Sintuwu Maroso’ which placed the central Sulawesi police headquarters in full command of all police and military forces in Poso. After this decision relations and coordination markedly improved.31 Thus the pattern of events in each of these case studies was poor inter-agency handling during the immediate years after reformasi, followed by intervention from Jakarta and a gradual improvement in joint command and control.

While these case studies are useful analyses of police-military relations in conflict zones, there are two significant issues which cast doubt on their reliability for generalising about interagency security relations today: the first problem is the change induced by the passage of time, the second problem relates to the mismatch between comparing ‘normal Indonesia’ with relations in extraordinary conflict zones. In the conflict case studies much of the evidence for the worst relations emerged from the turbulent 1999-2001 period. This was a time when security forces themselves were undergoing dramatic internal reforms, when the police were being separated in stages from the armed forces and the Indonesian military was relinquishing numerous capabilities of its own for control over society. The immediate

post-reformasi period was a time of disorder for much of Indonesia and TNI and Polri were not immune. By contrast, the years after 2001 demonstrated improving relations, as chains of command were established and the scale of the violence diminished. Arguably the most powerful impressions of TNI and Polri’s interagency failures emerge from these conflict zones and the crisis of the early post-reformasi years. These failings should be seen in the context of the institutional difficulties facing Polri and TNI at that time. When using conflict zones to formulate our impression of security force relations in Indonesia today, we must also recall that these case studies are all former conflict zones now, and no longer provide a reliable insight into contemporary security handling. Moreover, conflict zones are by definition extraordinary case studies. They tell us little about security management in the vast parts of Indonesia which have remained crisis free. To obtain a view of inter-agency relations as they are under ordinary conditions, then obviously we need case studies of “ordinary”, stable parts of Indonesia.

The limited number and comparability of case studies of local security management are not the only gaps within the literature. Thus far discussion of security sector reform in Indonesia has only considered the problem of interagency relations as it concerns the police and the military. Yet when we descend to the sub-national level a myriad of potential actors emerges - both within the state and outside the state - which can contribute to security. The failure of most existing writings to factor non-police and non-military organisations into their analysis also constitutes a gap within our knowledge.

Some commentators have identified certain groupings, like the civil service police of regional government (polisi pamong praja or Pol.PP) and newly empowered gangster organisations, as a growing influence on the regional security landscape. Stein Kristiansen and Lambang Trijono argue that the 1999 decentralisation reforms, and the enhanced regulatory powers these laws gave to local governments, have propelled the growth of regional law enforcement agencies. Kristiansen and Trijono give a bleak assessment of these organisations and imply that they undermine a coordinated application of the law:

Increasing crime and social disorder and the claimed weak role of the national police are used as arguments for building up local police units. Likewise, arguments are put forth that the numerous new local laws and regulations and escalating need to develop local revenue increase the need for local law enforcement mechanisms. Consequently, the Satpol PP units [civil service police] have been rapidly expanding under the authority of the bupati. These are paramilitary groups of several hundred men in each district... Their mandate is ambiguous and their funding and rules of operation lack transparency. They certainly contribute to strengthening the power of the district administration, especially the bupati, and may be used for security improvement and law enforcement. Alarmingly, they seem to be growing stronger, and they seem to be out of reach of democratic control. They could well be used for private business interests, repression, and devious political ends. 

In his research on gangs in post-reformasi Indonesia, Ian Wilson has argued that the fragmentation of Indonesia’s centralised state after 1998 created space for violent, civilian security groups to expand. In the process, some gangs have entrenched themselves and developed powerful networks of patronage. According to Wilson the durability of these groupings and their legitimacy within society, places the state (and its security apparatus) as merely one among a number of entities that may lay claim to the ‘legitimate’ use of violence:

Although incidents of state-sponsored violence have declined since the collapse of the New Order in 1998 ... the decline has been accompanied by an upsurge in violence, coercion, and extortion carried out by paramilitary, criminal, and vigilante groups that are not dependent upon state patronage. The fragmentation of the centralized state and the resulting rivalry between groups seeking economic and political power at the national level and control over resources at the local level have both been central factors in this proliferation of violent thuggery... This case study of Indonesia has broader implications as it takes problematic one of the most basic assumptions regarding the state, namely, that it has an internal monopoly over the “legitimate” production of violence and security. As I will show, the increasing privatization of violence that has occurred in post–New Order Indonesia demonstrates that the state does not possess a monopoly over violence, either its production or its “legitimate” use... The state now finds itself as one of a multiplicity of social and political forces employing and laying claim to legitimacy in the use of violence and coercion. 

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Such research has encouraged me to broaden the terms of my analysis beyond the primary instruments of state security - Polri and the TNI - which have been the almost exclusive concern of scholars to date, to consider the many other state and non-state organisations which can be involved in security at the sub-national level. An in-depth regional case study is aptly suited to drawing out the richness and complexity of the relationships between the (potentially) many actors involved in local security.

Theoretical Framework: the Usefulness of Studies of 'Networked Security'

If we accept that the appropriate starting point for my local case study analysis is to cast the empirical net broadly and include a multiplicity of actors which may play a role within the security sector, then an appropriate theoretical framework needs to be found. Scholarly literature to date has done little to explore how transitional, developing democracies manage security under conditions where there are multiple security organisations involved in the sector with overlapping mandates.

I propose that the debate on 'security networks' or 'networked policing' from the study of policing in the developed world, offers a suitable framework for modelling security relationships in my case study site. The empirical research of this dissertation indicates that the Indonesian police have become supremely powerful within regional security. As literature on networked security investigates interagency relations from the perspective of the police, the choice of this school is appropriate. Secondly, some sources within the networked security literature lay out plausible explanations for why state police forces can assume central roles within security networks. This branch of the security networks literature therefore has high value for explaining the relationships within my case study site.

One of the core propositions of networked policing theorists is the argument that security management cannot be interpreted as the act of a single institution - such as the state police - working in isolation. Rather security is produced by networks of multiple organisations, mutually engaged in the production of security. A typical example of these claims is contained in the following quotation:

It is well known that policing is conducted by public, private, and other 'nonstate' agencies ... The acceleration of this trend in recent decades has led to a tendency for liberal states to abandon some of their monopoly claims over security governance. With state police experiencing a crisis of public legitimacy... and a growing number of groups mobilising nonstate security providers, the question of how best to direct the process of policing in the 'common interest' has come to occupy both governmental and scholarly thought.  

Alternately as put by two other networked policing theorists:

What do we mean by nodes and networks? It is not always the case that distinct providers of policing and security, or 'nodes' come together in the form of networks. The degree to which nodes co-operate, share resources, develop trusting relationships or more generally align interests is an empirical matter to be verified... in general terms networks are characterised by interdependence between organisations, continuing interactions between network members... it is not just the public police or other state organisations that play an active role in establishing the[se] kinds of networks... Rather a plethora of other state institutions, private actors and community groups are active [in participating in security networks].

Therefore the dominant concept among these writers is that security is channelled through loosely organised networks; networks are decentred and deterritorialised agglomerations, which consist of a plurality of autonomous state, private and civilian security entities, each of which contributes to the production of security.

37 Writers of networked security often employ the terminology of ‘deterritorialisation.’ This encapsulates the notion that policing has taken on an international dynamic, with growing cooperation and involvement by foreign police institutions in domestic security affairs. I footnote this concept only briefly to provide background information. The intrusion of international forces is not really present in my local level case study. Benoit Dupont, ‘Security in the Age of Networks.’ Policing & Society, Vol. 14, No. 1, (March 2004), 80-81.
Many of the writers who debate networked security situate their theories in a trend of declining state-based policing. Such writers suggest that the public, uniformed police (and the state which employs them) no longer can be considered to hold a monopoly over the security. Supposedly, state police have been eclipsed by the rise of private security agencies, civil society groups, and other security actors. Thus within the literature we find numerous claims like the following quotation:

We are living in the midst of a potentially far-reaching transformation in the means by which order and security are maintained in liberal democratic societies, one that is giving rise to the fragmentation and diversification of policing provision, and ushering in a plethora of agencies and agents... What we might call a shift from police to policing has seen the sovereign state - hitherto considered focal to both provision and accountability in this field - reconfigured as but one node of a broader, more diverse 'network of power.'

Garland was influential in setting the scene for the networked security literature. In the nineteen nineties he argued that the modern state (referring to his study in the United Kingdom) can no longer be considered 'sovereign' over the provision of security.

The perceived normality of high crime rates, together with the widely acknowledged limitations of criminal justice agencies, have begun to erode one of the foundational myths of modern societies: namely, the myth that the sovereign state is capable of providing security, law and order, and crime control within its territorial boundaries.

The supposed erosion of the monopoly of state public police over policing which Garland identifies, has been interpreted by scholars of networked policing as synonymous with the rise of other centres of security. As mentioned by Loader and Walker:

The state has... come to cede authority over what has for the better part of two centuries been viewed as one of its constitutive functions – the enforcement of law and the maintenance of order. State power is being relinquished... ‘outwards’ to burgeoning commercial markets in policing and security; ‘downwards’ to private

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organizations and municipal authorities, and to 'responsibilized' consumers and citizens; and 'upwards' to new sites of international police cooperation and transnational policing forms... while the state remains a significant player in the delivery and regulation of policing, it is no longer the only or even, arguably, the principal institutional actor involved in offering guarantees of security to its citizens, but increasingly finds itself (and its agents) as one among a multiplicity of policing forms.  

Scholars of networked policing situate the cause of this trend in a combination of phenomena, from the neo-liberal 'hollowing out of the state', to the globalisation of human interactions. As described by Benoit Dupont:

In phase with modern theories that chart the decline of vertical hierarchical social structures and the concomitant rise of horizontal networks ... a number of commentators are reconceptualizing our ways of thinking about policing and security... the factors at the origins of such profound changes are many and closely interlaced, making it hard, if not impossible, to isolate or to place them in a neat chain of causality. Yet a consensus seems to exist concerning the importance of these factors in explaining the trend toward a more decentralized, horizontal, networked society. The exponential development of information and communication technologies around the globe has... been instrumental in the collapse of all sorts of barriers that previously corseted institutions... Another essential factor has been the effort by the state to rationalize its activities in the wake of the financial crisis experienced in the 1970s... Except in a number of countries where the state jealously retained its strength, no determinism appeared to limit the types of agents involved in the devolution of responsibilities, and private actors became free to cooperate and compete with public entities. 

Thus Dupont postulates that a networked style of security is at least partly produced by deregulation strategies of state governments and trends toward a more interconnected global society. 

While not wishing to second-guess the objectivity of scholars of networked security, it is relevant to acknowledge that the most important contributors to this theory originate from countries of the former British Commonwealth: like Canada, the United Kingdom, 

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40 Ian Loader and Neil Walker, 'Policing as a Public Good: Reconstituting the Connections between Policing and the State.' Theoretical Criminology, Vol.5, No.9 (2001), 10. See also: Mark Beeson, Private Policing (Devon, UK: Willan Publishing, 2002). Although Beeson does not use a networked concept in his analysis his work is inspirational for the study of networked policing. His book is a comprehensive review of the many state and non-state actors involved in policing in the United Kingdom.  
41 Dupont, 'Security in the Age of Networks', 77-78.
Australia and South Africa. These scholars, like Clifford Shearing and Jennifer Wood, pose their research as contributions to broad, universal policing and governance theory. Yet the majority of their work actually derives from research in their own countries. The fact that established theorists of networked policing do not bracket their arguments as confined primarily to the Anglo-Saxon world is a flaw noted by other contributors to the area. This potential flaw opens an opportunity for this thesis. Using the example of a post-authoritarian, developing country in Southeast Asia, this dissertation is able to describe how security management has evolved in a different, context dependent way in this section of the world.

Quite aside from contextual differences, it is also debatable as to whether scholars of networked security have correctly judged the decline of state police, or whether merely the perspective of scholars themselves has broadened in new directions of analysis. Put simply, scholars may have merely discovered that security entities other than state police exist. The novelty of this finding may have led contemporary theorists of policing to exaggerate the decline of the police, in much the same way that the globalisation thesis of the nineteen nineties exaggerated the declining importance of the nation-state. Revisionist scholars of policing like Adam Crawford, have critiqued networked policing on this basis:

There is much value in defining governance as ‘the property of networks rather than as the product of any single centre of action’... Moreover, there is considerable merit in not according conceptual priority to the state in order to highlight the range of governmental nodes that exist and the relationships between them... It is this challenge that I wish to explore in the context of security and policing. In so doing, I believe it would be foolish to ‘throw out the state’ with the governance or governmentality...

42 Those that can be described as the most important contributors to this school of thought are Benoit Dupont, Clifford Shearing, Jennifer Wood and to a lesser extent Ian Loader. Dupont is based in Canada, Clifford Shearing has executed research in both Australia and South Africa, Jennifer Wood is an Australian criminologist, while Ian Loader is based in the United Kingdom. For classic examples of their writing please see: Dupont, ‘Security in the Age of Networks’ (2004), Johnston and Shearing, Governing Security, (2003), Shearing and Wood, ‘Democracy, and the New ‘Denizens’ (2003), Loader, ‘Plural Policing and Democratic Governance’ (2000).

43 In fact, one scholar of policing from continental Europe, Jerome Ferret argues that scholars of networked security follow in traditions of Anglo-Saxon thinking. So Ferret argues, Anglo-Saxon theories of governance euphemise the role of the state in security. This writer argues that in his own native France, municipal and central state authorities have important arbitrating functions in security provision. Jerome Ferret, ‘The State, Policing and “Old Continental Europe”: Managing the Local/National Tension.’ Policing and Society, Vol.14, No.1 (March 2004), 50.
bath water. As Bayley has rightly warned, we should not get carried away with ‘a giddy sense at the moment among many intellectuals that the state is passé’.44

As such Crawford proposes that the role of the police within security networks is something which should be born out by empirical analysis. According to Crawford, the implicit assumption of mainstream networked security theory that the state police are in decline, in some instances could be premature.

While one could easily criticise the usefulness of networked security theory for Indonesia, given that this branch of scholarship derives from studies of policing in developed post-industrialised countries, I argue the value of this literature is not in its explanatory power, but its conceptual relevance.45 The model depicts a style of security management that arguably occurs at the regional level in Indonesia. As will be discussed over chapters two to six, in my regional case study we see there is a cluster of decentralised, autonomous security entities which originate both within the state and civil society as well as the for-profit sector, which all collectively contribute to security. It is appropriate to conceive of this complex landscape functioning like a network. Therefore the primary value of the networked model is that it creates a viable theoretical prism from which to interpret security management at the regional level in Indonesia; rather than being the product of a single agency or centre of power, there is cooperation and interactions between multiple, autonomous nodes of security. This thesis therefore aims to take up Fleming, Wood, Johnston and Shearing’s challenge of conducting an empirical inquiry into the exact nature of networked relations within a case study in Indonesia.46

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44 Crawford’s most influential work for my topic is not exclusively an article on policing and security. Instead, Crawford packages the article in question as a work of ‘post-regulatory theory’. Crawford makes his arguments on regulatory theory, however, by examining law enforcement practices. His article is therefore inspiring for its contribution to our understanding of the police, in particular his argument that unique powers elevate the police to a special role in security networks. Adam Crawford, ‘Networked Governance and the Post-Regulatory State: Steering, rowing and anchoring the provision of policing and security.’ Theoretical Criminology, Vol.10 (2006), 458.

45 Though one can argue that the ‘hollowing out of the state’ thesis and neo-liberalisation is equally relevant for Indonesia. In 1998 Indonesia experienced its own crisis of governance with the end of a centralised, repressive state that was replaced by a competitive, elite brokered system. The political liberalisation coupled with decentralisation have, as Ian Wilson and Kristiansen and Trijono pointed out, created many rival centres of power at the regional level. Although the causes for the ‘hollowing out of the state’ in Indonesia may not be the same as in developed countries arguably the effects may be.

One of the major criticisms of the way in which the literature has articulated the networked security model is that authors side step the issue of power relationships within networks by declaring that such an issue is one for “empirical inquiry.” Yet much of the literature explicitly proposes state police forces are in decline. Crawford contends that by doing so, contemporary scholars have underestimated the role of the public police within security networks:

Without wishing to discount the importance of regulation beyond government, I have sought to highlight the danger of running away with the sense that the state as a conceptual entity and empirical reality is becoming redundant...In many tangible ways, the state retains an anchoring role in the provision of security even with regard to much private governance. In the field of policing, it remains not only a resource of last resort, when all else fails, but also one that is symbolically and culturally distinct.47

Crawford’s research suggests the state police in the United Kingdom remain a centralising, dominant actor within security, as a consequence of unique powers which make the police a distinct actor. Crawford proposes we think of networked security in a different way. Unlike the networked policing theorists who argue state police should not be considered as greater or less than any other security organisation, Crawford argues the state police maintain a special role in security networks. For ease of understanding, he provides the reader with the metaphor of an anchor. The powers of the state police act as an anchoring influence, a point of reference for the activities of other independent security entities (or the metaphorical boats):

Reflecting upon this question of the position occupied by the state in determining and providing security, Loader and Walker... have usefully deployed the concept of 'anchored pluralism'. While they use the term in a normative sense to explore the role that the state should play as the anchor of collective security provision, I think it quite usefully describes distinct attributes of the state in regulation and governance... we can identify a number of ways in which state ordering and regulation as anchoring is exceptional:

* in its symbolic power and cultural authority;
* in its legitimacy claims and public perceptions of its legitimacy;
* as a distinctive (tactical) resource and source of information through which interests are pursued;
* in its residual position as a back-up of last resort with regard to other forms of control.48

Inspired by Crawford’s argument, I seek to explore the power relationships within the security network in my Indonesian case study site. What I seek to do is to apply Crawford’s basic argument on the special characteristics of state power in governance and ask whether the Indonesian police within the network of security in my case study site also exercise forms of authority which make them a distinct actor.

Thus, the value of the networked security literature to my research ultimately lies in the explanatory power of Crawford’s dissenting view to it. Crawford proposes a rational argument for why the state police can emerge as a centralising actor within coordinated security networks. This is because the police have unique powers which no other security actor possesses. Other junior parties desire or need to engage the police in order to perform their functions. As will become clear in the chapters that follow, this neatly describes the relationships which emerge in my Indonesian case study.

Research Aims, Questions and Methodology

The aim of this study is to explain how security organisations interact at the regional level in Indonesia. In achieving this objective I set out to define the principal state and non-state security actors within my case study site, identify what their functions are and determine whether interactions between the various security groupings are negative or counter-productive towards maintaining security and disorganised, or contested, as so much of the literature on Indonesian security implies. Having identified the nature of relations within the case study, this thesis will explore causes for why the network is constituted as it is.

Specifically I propose to answer the following questions: what organisations are involved in security management and what are their core tasks? Is there a precise division of labour or are there overlapping functions as the Indonesian studies literature suggests? What evidence is there for cooperation, conflict or hostility? Which of these behaviours predominates and why? Are there centres of power or groupings that are essential to the
functioning of the network and if so why? Finally, does the composition of the security network within the case study reveal anything distinct about the practice of security management in Indonesia?

The methodology employed to answer these questions is an in-depth analysis of a regional case study site, the Special Province of Yogyakarta and specifically three of its five districts: Sleman, the city of Yogyakarta and Bantul. Fieldwork for this study took place between April 2007 and December 2008. Due to limitations of time and resources the purpose of this research is not to provide the basis for comparative generalisations about security relations in other parts of Indonesia. Instead, its purpose is to expose the distinctive relationships which occur within the case study location. This is not to preclude the possibility that findings from this research can be applied to other parts of Indonesia. Nevertheless, this dissertation offers conclusions which are primarily intended to explain the dynamics found within the case study site.

This research considers only the relationship between security groups. I define a security group as any state agency which has a responsibility for physically enforcing law and order and those non-state groupings which help to enforce law and order. Although it is tempting to describe these organisations as purely ‘police’ or ‘law enforcement’ agents, I find this terminology reductionary. As the previous discussion suggests, in democratising states like Indonesia, many military forces remain focused on domestic security. It is confusing to describe militaries as agents of ‘law enforcement’ since their strategy, doctrine and internal philosophy are much different to those of the police. I prefer therefore to describe all the groupings I include in this study by referring to them with the more flexible appellation of ‘security’ groups.

The reason for including state law enforcement/security agencies in this study is obvious, but the reason for including non-state groupings which help state agencies is more obtuse, but no less important. In Indonesia there are a multiplicity of groups which are involved in providing security services and have normative (even legal) legitimacy to do so. These
include: the neighbourhood watch\(^{49}\) (or *ronda siskamling* as it is known), commercial security providers, party security task forces, arguably even Muslim vigilante groups. Although some of these elements have a dark reputation, they are nevertheless part of the enforcement regime. My intention therefore is to cast the net widely and include within this study any grouping which makes some kind of claim to uphold security. For a “grouping” to be considered a group however, it must be a collective, it must possess some kind of leadership and it must be sustainable (i.e. exist over time). Therefore I do not include within this research violent mobs, individuals, criminal gangs or other entities which would fail the above definition.

There are two predominant data sources for this research: interviews and documents. When performing fieldwork I relied heavily on the “snowball method” of data collection. The fact that prior studies of local security relationships in Indonesia are very rare meant that I had few comparisons to guide my research methodology. Therefore I improvised a great deal. I used the existing literature to identify likely targets of my research, such as the civil service police, the commercial security industry and so on. I then sought out interviews with personnel within these groups who would be able to provide me with information on their operations, structure and external relationships. The more I came into contact with police, regional government bureaucrats and others in the field, the more I learned. The more I learned, the more I sharpened my research and exploited new directions. Large, complex organisations like the police and regional government posed particular problems. In these cases I benefited greatly from organising initial interviews and repeat interviews with individual operational (and sometimes non-operational) commanders and asking for basic information on what they did. Much fieldwork time was spent in merely learning “who does what.” This signals another valuable contribution that my thesis is able to make to the Indonesian security literature. To date there has been a dearth of rich empirical data on what security actors (like the police, Pol.PP, etc.) actually do in their ordinary, regional

\(^{49}\) Neighbourhood watch is a shorthand term familiar to Anglo-Saxon countries. While the concept is similar in Indonesia, neighbourhood watch groups operate as nightly patrols. The terms will be henceforth used interchangeably.
commands.\(^{50}\) A valuable part of my research therefore has been to acquire some of this information.

As alluded to above there was not a clear roadmap for the accumulation of data, but I did have three broad objectives. Firstly, to identify a representative sample of the security organisations within my case study site. Secondly, to determine what they do to support security and thirdly, to determine what their external relations were. Following this approach I carried out 217 interviews. Another valuable data source which helped me to obtain a picture of the ordinary functioning of these organisations were documents, such as: yearly accountability reports, budget papers, personnel lists, operations orders and other miscellaneous written reports. Most of these documents originated from Polri and the regional government civil service police, the most important security organisations within the security network. A final and highly useful source was the minutes (notulen) of regional government security committees, in particular the Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah.

A final statement needs to be made on the difficulty of conducting this research. As a foreign researcher undertaking analysis into the Indonesian security sector, I am surprised at the generous access Indonesian government officials extended to me. I do not deny however that this research was hard. Much of my success in obtaining data has been due to persistence, luck and the helpfulness of some (a minority) of my interviewees. Nevertheless, the institutions and people I approached denied far more of my requests than they granted. Much of the analysis I present is pieced together from multiple sources that provide glimpses into the world of security in Indonesia. Therefore I present my data as the best approximate snapshot that I could make of the network of security within my case study site, under the circumstances.

\(^{50}\) Taking as an example the literature on Polri, there are numerous sources which discuss aspects of policing in Indonesia (such as the perceived obstacles to police reform or community oriented policing). But there are pitifully few sources which give us basic information about the police institution itself - its size, budget, programs, personnel, sub-commands, doctrine, activities, etc. One of the very rare exceptions is the ICG report, Indonesia: National Police Reform (20 February 2001). However, this source is not only dated and brief, but also presents its research as a strategic overview of the police without describing the details of how regional commands operate.
As will be discussed further in chapter three, the selection of Yogyakarta as my case study site was heavily influenced by practical factors. I had lived in Yogyakarta for some time in 2006 and developed relationships with people there at that time. Some of these people, like NGO workers and academics, became the initial contacts who helped me when I began research proper in 2007. Another powerful inducement to selecting Yogyakarta is the intellectual character of the province. As a centre of tertiary education, Yogyakarta is much more open to foreign researchers than the rest of Indonesia. Given the controversial nature of my research this proved to be a huge strategic benefit.

**Summarising the Argument**

The core argument of this thesis is that in Yogyakarta, there is a security network consisting of many different state and non-state security organisations. To take one side of this network, the state-based part, the state security apparatus is a non-unitary entity, which possesses many autonomous organisations from both central and regional government. Central government security organisations which operate at the regional level include the Indonesian police and the territorial forces of the Indonesian army. Regional government also has its own law enforcement task forces (the Pol.PP). My research also brings to light the roles played by small, sectorally specific law enforcement actors like immigration officers, tax inspectors, forestry police and transport officers to name a few. Outside the state there is also a booming commercial security industry, multiple volunteer security organisations (like the ronda siskamling) and even quasi-criminal groupings like Islamic vigilantes. The Indonesian national police however are the central element of this network. The reason for this ascendancy is simple. Almost all other security actors, whether they are a state security organisation (like the TNI or Pol.PP) or whether they operate outside the state (such as a commercial security company) need or feel they need police support, in order to function.

The ascendancy of the police in networked security has come about through an interplay of at least three factors. The first is the demilitarisation of security and the decentralisation of
government after the fall of Suharto. As will be discussed in chapter two, in the authoritarian New Order period the state handled security problems through centralising security functions in the armed forces (especially the army) and by giving the armed forces (especially the army) a strong role in the centralised, hierarchical government. Reformasi however dismantled this system. Military reforms have deprived the TNI of a practical role in day-to-day security. Regional government has been decentralised and its law enforcement powers enhanced, yet the central government still maintains control over the security and defence functions of the state. The disempowerment of the military and the under-empowerment of regional government has left the police as the supreme provider of state security services in the regions.

The second reason for the ascendancy of the police in the regional security network is that Polri has continued some aspects of its former strategies of social control begun in the Suharto era. During the Suharto era the police were responsible for regulating, observing and supervising certain groupings within society which could potentially constitute rival centres of authority to the state. Examples of these groups include the commercial security industry and volunteer security groups in Indonesian civil society, such as the ronda siskamling. As will be discussed in chapters five and six, Polri continued and intensified these strategies of control in the post-reformasi era. This strategy positions the police above these parts of the network. In chapter four we will also see how Polri’s historical supervisory functions over non-police parts of the state law enforcement apparatus (the non-police criminal investigators, penyidik pegawai negeri sipil or PPNS) has also continued after the Suharto period.

The third reason for the superior position of the police draws upon the modelling of the networked policing literature. As I alluded above, dissenting contributors to networked policing theory have argued that the importance of the uniformed police in networks derives from certain attributes that are unique to the police: their ‘symbolic power’, ‘perceptions of [police] authority [within society]’, the police’s own tactical resources (such as powers of arrest), the usefulness of the police as a source of back-up to other actors and so on. In my case study, the Indonesian police also possess such unique powers and other actors seek to access these powers to augment their own capabilities. Therefore while there
may be a multi-actor security network within my case study site, my analysis indicates the non-Polri actors believe their ability to conduct their activities depends upon them maintaining a relationship with the police.

This dissertation also argues that far from there being blurred lines of jurisdiction as the Indonesian security literature would lead us to believe, there is an absence of contestation over divisions of labour. We see this division most clearly in the state security sector. Security sector reform has deprived the TNI of the ability to operate in day-to-day security management. Decentralisation has allowed regional governments to draft their own misdemeanour offences for responsibilities which fall under their authority (such as business licensing). There are also numerous non-police investigators responsible for upholding statutes in their own areas of sectoral responsibility (such as tax inspectors or immigration agents). Yet none of these agencies duplicate the criminal law enforcement and repressive security powers of the police. In the non-state sector, Polri’s regulatory powers over civilian security elements (such as the commercial security industry) combined with the desire of many groupings to obtain police support, ensure that there is little contestation between formal police roles and the activities of most non-state security groups.

The final argument of this dissertation is that contrary to the existing literature on security relations in Indonesia, in my study there is much greater evidence for collaboration than hostility, competition or any other forms of negative behaviour identified by the Indonesian studies literature. Cooperation is in fact the default setting for security relations. Chapters three, four, five and six make this case by examining the ways in which state security organisations interact, and by then reviewing the relationships of non-government security actors with the police.

Thus to return to Crawford’s metaphor of the ‘police as an anchor’, while the metaphor is not strictly inaccurate, this visualisation does not entirely describe the nuances at play in my case study site. Crawford’s argument implies that the powers of the state police can function as a ‘back-up’ of last resort or are symbolically powerful or are perceived as legitimate in the eyes of other actors. These attributes are certainly present in the case of the
Indonesian police. But in Indonesia the position of the police as the centre of the network is even stronger – making other organisations more acutely dependent on Polri than merely being “anchored” by it. Polri has the power to directly regulate and supervise some parts of the sector – one example being the commercial security industry. In other cases the normative and legal supremacy that the police have in enforcing security and criminal law forces other actors to work with or underneath the influence of Polri. An example of this can be seen in the relationships between the regional commands of the police and their counterparts among the territorial units of the Indonesian army. At other times, the Indonesian police provide crucial support to the work of other security actors. An example of this is the police relationship with the law enforcement units of regional government. In this relationship the Indonesian police offer their superior repressive powers and certain special services – like powers of criminal investigation – to the operations conducted by regional government.

However, although the Indonesian police in the case study may occupy a dominant position at the centre of the security network, this is not synonymous with complete police control over the network. There is little evidence to suggest Polri attempts to use its superior position to monopolise the sector. Other actors instead seek out police support either as a condition of operation within the sector or because they feel they need police support to operate. Consequently, the police participate in security networks, lending police authority and resources without necessarily attempting to overtly control other security organisations.

If Crawford’s metaphor to describe state police powers is an anchor, the analogy that may be appropriate to describe the role of the police in the security network in Yogyakarta is that of the relations between a Board of Directors and corporate management. Although the Board is not involved in the day-to-day details of running a company, management nevertheless need the acquiescence and involvement of the board to perform their activities. So it is in Yogyakarta. A diverse set of security actors need the statutory power and involvement of the national police to perform their activities.
Organisation of the Thesis

Turning to review the design of this dissertation, chapter one constitutes a historical review of the two most important security organisations in the case study site: the Indonesian police and the Pol.PP of regional government. The first part of this chapter provides an explanation for how the Indonesian military's position of dominance in local security affairs has been transferred to Polri. During the Suharto era the Indonesian army dominated the police within the armed forces structure as well as local governance more broadly. Using elite interviews and documentary evidence I explain how the environment of crisis brought on by the reformasi period pushed the military to separate from Polri in a rushed and unplanned fashion. This process led to parliamentary debates in 2000 on security sector reform. The resulting parliamentary statutes define the current responsibilities of Polri and the TNI. I argue this process has had profound implications for security management in Indonesia today. Although the Indonesian parliament has not elucidated the boundary between the authority of Polri and TNI, analysts have underestimated the powerful normative intentions within Indonesian security legislation that defines what security forces should and should not do. Effectively, the military have been stripped of the ability to operate independently in the area of domestic security. This leaves the police as the supreme authority in internal security management. I go to some lengths in this chapter to demonstrate that the TNI seems to comply with this division of responsibility. I do this in order to challenge the arguably still strong impression that the TNI remains active in internal security. Finally, chapter one also provides a history of regional government powers over law enforcement. This section serves the twin purpose of filling a substantial gap in the area studies literature as well as demonstrating that although regional government law enforcement capacities have grown with decentralisation, regional government is still not able to duplicate the power of the police.

Chapter two introduces my case study site. In this chapter I provide a discussion of case study research and an overview of Yogyakarta. I also provide my reasons for choosing this region. I review the security situation there and I provide an overview of the major government security actors within Yogyakarta. In brief, I argue that the rich, qualitative
ample data that emerges from a single case study makes this form of research valuable, even for its purely empirical benefits. I also argue that, should we wish to, Yogyakarta also has a fair degree of generalisability when it comes to predicting trends in other parts of Indonesia. This argument is based in part on the jurisdictions of the state security actors in Yogyakarta, which are likely to be similar in other parts of the country. After laying out this case we then move on to an examination of the region of Yogyakarta, and its main social, economic, political and security features. The largest section of this chapter however, provides a description of state security organisations and their activities, size and authority. This section shows just how well defined the boundaries of jurisdiction are between state security actors.

In chapter three and four I continue the analysis begun in chapter two, but specifically move on to examine the relationships between state security bureaucracies. Chapter three begins this discussion and introduces the data which shows that collaboration is the dominant form of interaction. Chapter three demonstrates the importance of joint security committees for bringing together the principal state agencies involved in local security. The evidence within this chapter begins my reassessment of the negative perceptions towards inter-agency security relationships in Indonesia by showing how agencies like the police, regional government and the military can voluntarily meet in specific forums (such as the regional leaders conference, the regional intelligence community meeting and others) to discuss security, share intelligence and coordinate security operations. Within these meetings regional government plays a surprisingly important role. It is the initiator of security forums, but the effectiveness of these meetings depends upon the powers of the police. Chapter four continues the argument by demonstrating how government security actors inter-relate beyond security forums through cross-institutional financing and joint operations.

Chapter five moves beyond the state sector and introduce the relationships of non-state security actors with the police. In this chapter we see how consumers of commercial security (such as hotels, shopping malls, etc.) and providers of commercial security (such as private security companies) each rely on police support. Consumers of security utilise the police because police powers add strength to the consumer’s own in-house arrangements.
Providers of security, companies are obliged by regulation to operate beneath police supervision. The relationships between consumers and providers of security and the police show an interesting interplay between conditions which are specific to Indonesia and other behaviours which derive from policing in general. Indonesia’s historical style of security management has empowered Polri to supervise and regulate private providers of security; this situation constitutes something special to Indonesia. On the other hand, the effort by consumers of security to obtain access to police authority is something often noted in the general policing literature. These interactions are also apparent in my Indonesian case study. Both of these factors impart a superior position to the police in their relations with the commercial security sector.

Chapter six continues the argument of chapter five by examining the many volunteer security groups which exist within Yogyakarta. In this chapter we find there is an inner ring of organisations which maintain a very close relationship with Polri, such as Indonesia’s neighbourhood watch and the new community-oriented policing forums. The police directly regulate and supervise these organisations in the field. Next we examine some groupings which exist outside direct police sponsorship – the security units of the village and the security taskforces of political parties. Although not owing direct allegiance to the police, these groups nevertheless acknowledge the normative superiority of Polri within the sector, and seek out relations with the police. We end the chapter by examining one set of actors which has an adversarial relationship with Polri – Islamic vigilantes. As we shall see however, though vigilantes challenge the police, they also seek to engage it, and they moderate their behaviour to avoid direct conflict with the police. I argue that these behaviours demonstrate that volunteer security groupings actively seek out police power to add weight and legitimacy to their own activities, making Polri a necessary hierarchical superior.

The relationships that are discussed in chapter six, like those of chapter five, show the similarities and the differences between policing in Indonesia and other countries. The Indonesian police are the centre of the security network not only because they possess special powers common to all police forces, such as the legitimate use of repressive force, symbolic authority, superior knowledge on crime and security. Polri is also central to the
security network in Yogyakarta because of the unique approach to internal security in Indonesia. This approach entails the police continuing the strategies of surveillance and supervision over rival policing actors which began during the Suharto era. These factors, combined with the withdrawal of the military from security management after 1998 and the only marginal increase in regional government law enforcement powers, have left Polri the dominant actor in regional security management.

This chapter provides a historical discussion of the legal and political events at the national level which have shaped the current division of roles between security organisations in my case study site. This chapter charts the institutional histories of the two most important security organisations which have emerged in Yogyakarta: the Indonesian police and the law enforcement apparatus of regional government, the Polisi Pamong Praja (Pol.PP). Three reasons justify this historical analysis. By examining the evolution of these institutions we gain an understanding of the legal-regulatory parameters which now define the present day roles of Polri and the Pol.PP in Yogyakarta. Secondly, by studying the separation of the police from the military and how roles became divided between them, we gain an understanding of how the TNI have been deprived of a role in day-to-day internal security in post-reformasi Indonesia. A final reason for including a history of Polri and the civil service police is the simple paucity of research on either of these institutions in the English language literature.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section explains why the Indonesian army was so powerful in regional affairs during the Suharto era. In this section we examine the control exercised by the army territorial command over regional governments during the New Order. The demilitarisation of regional government in the early reformasi period constitutes a powerful explanation for why military influence appears to have declined so sharply today; a reality which is apparent in Yogyakarta. Yet the demilitarisation of regional government constitutes only a partial explanation of this phenomenon. The other part of the equation has been the separation of Polri from the armed forces. Prior to their separation, the army dominated the police within the ABRI structure. The institutional separation of the two forces put an end to this relationship. While previous commentators have already shown the dilutory effect decentralisation had on the power of the army, the
literature has not yet explored how significant the separation of Polri was for the decline in
the military's influence. This is the task of section two.

Section two gives a detailed discussion of the importance of Polri's separation from ABRI
and the redistribution of power between them. As discussed in the introduction there is a
dominant, if not hegemonic, set of assumptions that the separation process did not define
clear boundaries between the police and the military, and sufficient foundations for
interagency cooperation are lacking. A parallel concern is the strongly held belief that
security reforms have not withdrawn the military from domestic security. I argue these
views should be revisited.

Through a historical analysis I argue that the separation of Polri from TNI has resulted in an
almost complete removal of the military from the world of active, day-to-day security. The
separation process was put on the ABRI agenda during the crisis of reformasi. Although the
process was rushed, the defence and police leadership produced some very important policy
on structural separation and protocols for police-military cooperation. Although some
scholars argue the Indonesian government should codify regulations for interagency
cooperation, I argue that the police and military today still retain from the pre-separation
period very important agreements over Polri-TNI joint operations.

As section two describes, the most meaningful part of the separation process was the
parliamentary debate over Polri-TNI reform in 2000. This debate created the contemporary
role descriptions of the police and the military. Although scholars are correct to argue that
parliamentary statutes should define more clearly how and when the military can be
involved in domestic security, I argue that we have underestimated the powerful normative
intent within Indonesia's security laws. These laws dictate that the police is the primary
instrument of domestic security and the military is not permitted to involve itself in this
area without political approval. In order to fully comprehend the significance of the implied
intent within Indonesia's security laws, I go on to discuss in lengthy detail how the defence
leadership respects the normative legal constraints placed upon it. I do this in order to
respond to the still arguably strong assumption that the military remains involved in
Section three provides an overview of the Polisi Pamong Praja. Although the lineage of the Pol.PP extends at least until the early years of the Indonesian Republic, for many decades the civil service police have been an under-resourced, feeble part of state law enforcement. Until the transition period, the Pol.PP were retained at the lower levels of the civilian administration. With decentralisation, the provincial and in particular district governments were given grander regulatory powers. With the granting of these powers, the districts and provinces also obtained control over the Pol.PP and began using these officers more efficiently. The distribution of space in this chapter largely reflects the distribution of power between Polri and regional government. The law enforcement capability of regional governments place them in a poor second place to the police. Nevertheless, in my case study site today, decentralisation has made regional government the second most important source of law enforcement behind the police.

New Order Security Institutions: the Dominance of the Army over Regional Governance and the Police

The militarisation and demilitarisation of regional government

The purpose of this section is to provide background information on the enormous influence of the Indonesian army at the regional level during the Suharto era. This section serves to juxtapose the restricted capabilities of regional government and the police prior to 1999, versus the flowering of their enforcement powers after democratisation. Previously, local security was dominated by the army. This was not only because the army was able to strategically control Polri, but also because the army dominated regional governance. The Indonesian military has been identified as one of the three pillars of the Suharto
administration. The military sat alongside the Golkar party and the state bureaucracy. Yet the powers of the territorial army structure suggest that, in the New Order apparatus, the army played a type of Soviet commissar role at the regional level: it watched over the other instruments of the regime.

The Indonesian army’s territorial command has been a feature of some interest in studies of Indonesia. Despite considerable discussion of the influence that the territorial command (Komando Teritorial or Koter) bequeaths to the military, there are surprisingly few studies of what the Koter actually does, either during or after the New Order. Robert Lowry has provided a detailed structural overview of the allocation of units in the Komando Teritorial during the late New Order period. Nevertheless, his study was not able to provide qualitative analysis of how the command intervened in regional affairs at the meso or micro level. In 2006 Leonard Sebastian expanded upon Lowry’s early research of the military. Yet the strength of Sebastian’s work lies in its description of the strategic defence potential of the territorial structure, and how territorial units functioned in high-conflict areas like East Timor. Marcus Mietzner added to the literature a book chapter on army territorial relations with local governments. Despite its promising title, Mietzner’s analysis is largely one of TNI policy and national political debate about the territorial command rather than a substantial work about regional territorial activities.

Large questions therefore remain, how did the army territorial command operate during the New Order in the “ordinary”, stable parts of Indonesia and how did reformasi change the system? A recent PhD dissertation by Jonni Mahroza does much to fill this gap. Mahroza is an Indonesian army officer who executed a local level case study on the withdrawal of the army from regional politics in East Java, between 1998 and 2003. Although local

2 Lowry, Armed Forces of Indonesia, 66-76.
3 Sebastian, Realpolitik Ideology, 69-77, 123-152, 177-216.
security management was not a primary focus of Mahroza’s research, Mahroza’s study is instructive. Mahroza’s thesis details how the military’s control functions over society and local politics decisively evaporated in the early reform period.

In order to understand how the military could exercise control over regional governance it is necessary first to understand how the military is structured at the regional level. The army territorial structure is based upon the doctrine of Total People’s Defence. This doctrine dates back to Indonesia’s war of independence. The army disperses a large part of its manpower in regional units that broadly parallel the civilian government. The purpose of these units is ostensibly to prepare Indonesia to mount guerrilla resistance against external invasion but also disposes the military in such a way that it can intervene in local affairs ubiquitously across the archipelago. Referring to Annex A, we can see that the military has a supra-provincial command, the KODAM, a regional command, the KOREM, a district command, the KODIM and a sub-district command, the KORAMIL (and within the Koramil there are non-commissioned officers or Babinsa allocated to villages). The majority of a Kodam’s personnel are troops organised in regular units. These regular units do not specifically perform territorial functions. According to Mahroza territorial personnel only operate in the headquarters detachment at each level of the command. Numbers of territorial soldiers may range from around 300 personnel in the headquarters of Kodam V Brawijaya (East Java Kodam) to four or so in an average Koramil in East Java. The daily work of these territorial forces was to research, analyse and “develop” local conditions for national defence. Despite this erstwhile intention, in the New Order the Koter evolved into the regime’s primary instrument of social control.6

The most prominent tool in the armoury of territorial commands during the New Order was Kopkamtib (Komando Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban or Restoration Command for Security and Order). Although this was a national body, it was organised at the regional level under the command of the territorial military leadership. In 1988 Kopkamtib was reformed under the title Bakorstanas (Badan Koordinasi Pemantapan Stabilitas dan Ketahanan Nasional or National Coordinating Body for National Stability and Resilience), though its functions remained unchanged. At the Kodam level and the Kodim level the

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body was named Bakorstanasda. The Kodam’s Bakorstanasda had an intelligence gathering capability and the “right to arrest anyone suspected of being a disturbance to social and political stability.” These intelligence gathering and interrogation powers were immensely useful in elevating the regional army commands to a position of superiority in regional security. In practice, Bakorstanasda was organised as a committee attached to the regional government. Although the Bakorstanasda had a broad membership (including regional government heads, the chairman of the regional parliaments, regional district commanders, police chiefs and chairs of district courts), army territorial officers led the committee. The Bakorstansda broadly interpreted its mandate for combating threats to ‘national stability.’ According to Mahroza, the Bakorstanasda regularly intervened in mediating labour disputes, land conflict, and other social disputes, as well as supervising regime enemies, like suspected communists.7

Within the regional governments there was also another military dominated committee, the Wansospolda (Dewan Sosial Politik Daerah or Regional Political and Social Council or sospol). These offices coordinated military personnel assigned to be civil servants in regional government bureaucracy and military members of regional executive governments and legislative assemblies.8 The sospol office had highly important functions in investigating and black-listing perceived opponents of the regime. After 1990 for example, the president introduced a special screening test (called the Litsus) to vet the backgrounds of all bureaucrats and elected officials. The district or sub-provincial Koter administered the Litsus. Failure to pass the Litsus was a career death sentence for state officials.9 Aside from acting as a communication hub for territorial commanders (both in collecting data from regional governments and for disseminating information on military policies) the sospol offices were also active externally. They supervised and shaped the programs of political parties and social organisations.10

A final aspect of the territorial command’s influence was the direct secondment of active army officers to key posts in regional government, a practice known as kekaryaan. At the

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executive level of regional government, the army simply inserted a large number of its personnel into the positions of provincial governor and head of district (Bupati/Walikota). As late as 1999, army officers occupied fifteen of Indonesia’s twenty seven governorships and took control of 119 of 329 districts. Kekaryaan practices also extended to the lower regional bureaucracy. According to Mahroza, each bureau (or Dinas) head at the district level was open to military occupation. The military most commonly took over the Chairmanship of the Sospol office (Kansospol), the Regional Civil Defence office (Mawil Hansip), Market Chief (Kepala Pasar), Bus Station Chief (Kepala Terminal), Director of Regional Telecommunications (Dinashub) and often all the other most influential bureaus. The Kansospol and Mawil Hansip aligned with the military’s security functions, other positions however provided military officers with access to extra-budgetary finances. In the regional parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah or DPRD) ABRI took an automatic 20% of all seats. The armed forces also heavily dominated the structure of the regime party, Golkar. Associations of ex-military officers, associations of military families as well as military members themselves often controlled regional Golkar caucuses. Thus for example until 1998, retired military officers led thirty two of thirty seven Golkar fractions in East Java’s district parliaments.

The maintenance of all of these instruments and practices enabled local military forces an extraordinary degree of control over regional affairs during the New Order. Mahroza’s case study from East Java, gives us new insight into the depth and breadth of military control functions during the Suharto era. It would even suggest we should recategorise the old ‘three pillars’ claim, that the New Order state was dependent on a triumvirate of forces consisting of Golkar, the bureaucracy and the military. Within this triad the military had important control functions even over the other two elements. Yet if the military footprint over regional affairs during the New Order was very large, equally large has been the decline in its power since 1998.

11 This situation was much worse prior to civilianising reforms in the 1980s. In 1980, 70% of Governors, 56% of Bupatis and 33% of Mayors were all active army officers. Rinakit, Indonesian Military after the New Order, 151. Nugroho Notosusanto (ed.), Pejuang dan Prajurit, Konsepsi dan Implementasi Dwifungsi ABRI (Jakarta: Penerbit Sinar Harapan, 1984), 378-379.
Internal military reforms ushered in after reformasi have dismantled the Koter’s interventionist capabilities; the only remnant which exists today is the army territorial command itself. In 1999 the sospol offices were retracted back into the body of the territorial command, renamed Komsos and integrated into territorial intelligence offices.\(^\text{14}\) The supervisory role of the sospol office over society was removed and the new komsos office was remade as the secretariat for the TNI fraction in local parliaments. In 2004 the komsos office was completely eliminated when the military’s guaranteed seats in parliament were removed.\(^\text{15}\) The removal of the sospol offices also automatically stopped the army from screening members of the bureaucracy, regional government leaders and parliamentarians.\(^\text{16}\) Bakorstanasda was formally terminated in 2000 by Presidential Decree No.38/2000.\(^\text{17}\) The formal, legal liquidation of Bakorstanasa was a huge blow to military power. In the Suharto era not only were these forums active in managing local problems, the Bakorstanasda also stored information on dissidents, suspected troublemakers and other intelligence vital to the Suharto regime. All this disappeared in 1998-2000. On 15 February 1999, the commander in chief of the armed forces, General Wiranto promulgated Kep/03/P/II/1999 on the withdrawal of all active military officers from the civilian bureaucracy. By mid-August 2000 there were no active military officers in regional government in East Java. Yet as Mahroza points out in 1997, thirty three of thirty seven district governments had been led by military officers not including the hundreds of lucrative bureau headships below them.\(^\text{18}\) In 2000, the military surrendered numerous social programs to civilian ministries which previously were administered by territorial commands, the national foster parent movement, the agricultural promotion project, and twelve other such programs were transferred to regional governments.\(^\text{19}\) Finally, in 1999 the

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\(^\text{14}\) Overnight many sospol personnel became redundant. According to Mahroza’s source in Kodam V in East Java, around 300 former sospol personnel had to be reintegrated in their territorial HQs without jobs. Mahroza, ‘Military Withdrawal from Local Politics’, 122.

\(^\text{15}\) Mahroza, ‘Military Withdrawal from Local Politics’, 122-123

\(^\text{16}\) Mahroza, ‘Military Withdrawal from Local Politics’, 124-125

\(^\text{17}\) Though apparently Bakorstanasda committees in East Java had been ineffective at least since May 1998 when they failed to curb mob attacks on Chinese and widespread Ninja assassinations of witches. Litsus tests were not applied in the 1999 general election, marking the end of their utilisation. Mahroza, ‘Military Withdrawal from Local Politics’, 125-126.

\(^\text{18}\) Military officers were given three choices: retire early, rejoin their units, or transfer to become civilians. Many of the regional Bupatis chose to retire while almost all of the military officers serving in regional government bureaucracies chose to rejoin the army. Mahroza, ‘Military Withdrawal from Local Politics’, 128.

\(^\text{19}\) Mietzner, ‘Business as Usual,’ 251.
military’s guaranteed seats in local government assemblies were reduced from twenty to ten, before being completely removed by 2004.\textsuperscript{20}

What Mahroza’s dissertation shows therefore is how the army’s instruments of power at the regional level unravelled during the post-reformasi era. In effect, the armed forces’ internal reforms led to the demilitarisation of regional governance. The termination of these mechanisms can serve to explain why, although the military remains physically present in its territorial structure today, this structure is incapable of coordinating regional security affairs as it did in the past. My case study in Yogyakarta shows this phenomenon. This analysis is important when we consider the calls of reformist intellectuals, who have recommended the wholesale dismissal of the territorial command.\textsuperscript{21} Mahroza’s research reminds us that the influence of the territorial command is not founded, \textit{a priori}, in the existence of the territorial army structure, but rather through a combination of governmental structures and practices territorial officers once administered for the benefit of the army and the Suharto regime. As Mahroza elucidates, when these instruments and practices were pared back and then removed after 1998, the military’s capacity to influence regional affairs has likewise shrivelled.

Nevertheless the withdrawal of the military from regional government does not necessarily prove that present day territorial forces have no internal security role. The following section will explore this issue. I argue that one outcome of the separation of Polri from TNI has been the reallocation of all day-to-day security powers to the police. It is therefore the combined effect of the demilitarisation of regional government and the separation of the police that has rendered the modern territorial army as something of a dormant, winter grapevine; physically surviving but bearing no security fruit.

\textsuperscript{20} Prior to 1999, the chairmanships of East Java DPRDs almost always were occupied by a military officer. After 1999 there was not a single DPRD in East Java that chose a military officer as chairman. Apparently the ABRI fractions themselves also declined in quality. Before 1999, military headquarters had mostly sent out Lt. Colonels to sit in DPRDs. After 1999 military headquarters mostly assigned Captains and Majors, and after 2001 even sent 1\textsuperscript{st} Lieutenants. This decline in quality and experience matched the declining fortunes of the military itself in regional affairs. Mahroza, ‘Military Withdrawal from Local Politics’, 131-132.

\textsuperscript{21} Mietzner, ‘The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia’, 61.
While the Indonesian police were subordinated to the military in the early years of the Suharto regime, Polri initially began on a very different path. In the years after 1950 during the early Republican period, the Indonesian National Police were a civilian force organised under the office of the Prime Minister. During its early history the police fiercely defended its civilian credentials and institutional independence. In fact, in 1959 the country’s first Police Chief (Kepala Polri or Kapolri), Soekanto, chose to resign rather than support the inclusion of the police in ABRI. Although in 1960 Polri did formally become one of ABRI’s four services, the national police managed to maintain its independence as a separate Ministry within the Defence and Security portfolio. Thus for the duration of the so-called “Old Order” (1949-1965) Polri remained a civilian force run separately to the military.

With the end of the Sukarno era, the Suharto administration consolidated its grip over ABRI and began a process that would see the police gradually subordinated to the military. In 1967, the Chief of Police and the other heads of the armed forces lost their ministerial status and became responsible to the Minister of Defence and Security, who at that time was Suharto. Suharto’s reorganisation of ABRI in turn initiated a gradual depletion of police capabilities: police recruits were subject to a compulsory military curriculum while the armed forces headquarters discriminated against the police in the ABRI budget. As evidence of this by the early nineteen eighties the police to population ratio dropped from 1:500 in 1967 to 1:1200, three times the international standard minimum. While various efforts were made to rehabilitate police performance during the eighties and nineties Suharto era politics did not allow the armed forces to treat the cause of Polri’s problems – its subordination to the military.

22 Djamin, Menuju Polri Mandiri, 40.
23 Djamin, Menuju Polri Mandiri, 41-42.
24 Djamin, Menuju Polri Mandiri, 44-45.
While it is common knowledge that the police were an inferior service arm of ABRI, there is little empirical data which illustrates precisely what this system entailed for the Indonesian police. Partly this is a function of the difficulties of conducting research during the New Order. The post-1998 period has not dramatically changed the shortage of material on the police. Since 1998 most histories of Polri have been written by the police itself. These official narratives are often reluctant to speak frankly about the police experience under ABRI. In fact, this is politically understandable. The military is still a working partner of Polri today. Any official police claims which reflect poorly on the military leadership during the Suharto period would probably have a negative effect on current working relations. For this reason, as well as the dry general style of official sources, police historical narratives tend to be rather stale and matter-of-fact. The lack of critical histories on the Indonesian police is indeed a weakness in the literature and points to opportunities for future research.

Nevertheless police sources interviewed for this dissertation have been willing to discuss anonymously - their experiences of Polri’s subordination to the senior ABRI service, the army. It must be recalled that these sources are police officers, and their testimony is therefore biased. While bearing these weaknesses in mind, their information is related to provide some background on how inter-service relations operated within ABRI. The testimony of my interviewees underlines the irony of the post-1998 period: Polri’s importance in domestic security has leaped ahead of the army.

According to one, middle-ranking Assistant Police Commissioner interviewed in Yogyakarta, the first and most psychologically impressive aspect of police subordination during the Suharto era came from the armed forces training curriculum. Officer candidates


27 My sources certainly make clear their resentment of the police’s junior status in the armed forces. Ideally, it would be desirable to obtain accounts from long-serving army territorial troops on their attitudes to the police. Despite efforts in this direction, in conducting this research I was unable to find any serving or former military personnel who were willing to share their views on the record.

28 Equivalent to an Army Lieutenant Colonel.
for the police trained together with officer candidates for the army, the air force and the
navy at the national Armed Forces Academy. During their time at the academy, officer
cadets (as well as the non-commissioned police recruits who trained at the various Police
Schools around Indonesia) were drilled in the belief that the armed services were not equal
members of the same family. Rather, there was a hierarchy. The army was the senior, most
prestigious service, followed by the air force and the navy. At the bottom was the police,
the ‘anak bungsu’ or most junior child. After graduation, police personnel carried this
mindset with them into their careers.

According to a different informant the army’s discrimination against the police was an
institutional problem that took on the status of unofficial ABRI standing policy. The army
deliberately gave the police only a small percentage of the budget it actually needed, the
army weakened police influence on ABRI policymaking and occasionally army officers
exerted pressure on the police to bend criminal law to serve the interests of army officers.
In the early nineteen nineties this now senior police general served as the aide-de camp of
the then Kapolri, Kunarto. Through his access to the highest levels of the police
headquarters this source was, so he says, able to see much of the macro-relationship
between Polri and the ABRI leadership, even though he was at the time only a Major.

My informant illustrated his claims about the domination of the army with a number of
colourful anecdotes, the most interesting of which concerns the strangulation of funding to
the police. The example par excellence was the 1992 Indonesian general election. In
planning the security for this election the then ABRI leadership allocated a budget of
Rp.150 billion for the whole operation. The ABRI leadership divided the election security
into two parts, pengamanan tertutup (or closed security) and pengamanan terbuka (or open

29 This hierarchy was described to me less as a part of the formal curriculum and more as a part of the culture of
30 It is difficult to cross-reference this data with budget figures from ABRI since little detail of the police
budget line is publicly available. However based on the available open source data, the police budget in 1994
was around US$ 56 million, which accounted for about 30% of the ABRI budget. This figure represented
substantial underinvestment in the police portfolio. After successive increases since 1999, the police budget
has increased, reaching Rp.24.9 trillion in 2009. By comparison the Department of Defence acquired Rp.33.7
trillion in the same year. On the basis of a rough comparison, Polri’s budget now represents 70% of national
defence spending, a very substantial increase. For 1994 data see: Adrianus Meliala, ‘Sensitive Policing:
Indonesia’s Case.’ PhD dissertation, University of Queensland (June 2004), 18. For 2009 budget data see:
security). The army performed the closed security part of the operation, which involved espionage, monitoring the activities of party masses and the like. The open security side of the operation was performed by the police, this consisted of: guarding party rallies, deploying personnel to secure voting places and other activities done in view of the public. Clearly then the police would have had the biggest share of the security burden. However, in the division of funding, the army allocated only Rp.8 billion to Polri. This amount was sufficient only for the meal and personnel costs of the police and their civilian auxiliaries (Kamra) for one day before and up to one day after the election - despite the fact that the campaign proper took place over two months.

My informant also claims that the army deliberately hindered the police from contributing to ABRI policy. This can be seen from the number of Polri’s senior officers who entered the ABRI leadership. Up to 1995, the army possessed over 300 generals. Polri on the other hand had only sixty six. Of these sixty six, apparently only four were capable of contributing to ABRI policy. Of the four police generals the Kapolri was the most influential. He was followed by the Assistant for Security and Social Order (Askamtibmas) to the Chief of the Armed Forces, followed by a Polri representative in the Armed Forces Academy and one other officer (whose position was not explained). Polri’s other sixty two generals stationed in the regions and were thus outside the inner-ABRI circle. If we cross-reference my informant’s testimony with other data it appears this account is reliable. 'Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite’ from the journal Indonesia (1992), indicates that the only leadership positions held by the police in the ABRI high command in Jakarta was the Kapolri as a service chief, and the Assistant for Security and Social Order.31 Aside from these posts, the police were virtually unrepresented in the ABRI leadership. Based upon this maldistribution among the general staff my source thus claims “our [Polri’s] voice could never get inside [ABRI policymaking].”

The ABRI leadership also exerted acute psychological influence over middle ranking officers by using military intelligence for intimidation. In ABRI, military intelligence held the power to destroy officer’s careers. While my interviewee did not claim police were the only victims of ABRI’s pressures for conformity he did suggest police officers were very

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vulnerable. In the Suharto era, every candidate for the rank of Colonel (or the service equivalent in the navy and air force) had to pass a background check before promotion was granted. The armed forces strategic intelligence body, BAIS, performed this task. BAIS had only one police representative – attached to the Secretariat. Most BAIS personnel were instead drawn from the army. In the course of administering background checks if BAIS could not verify the “patriotism” of a candidate, the officer was placed on a black list and was never able to be promoted. The source implied that BAIS was allowed to continuously revisit these patriotism assessments over the course of a senior officer’s career. Officers who underwent the experience were forever, so my informant says, “afraid of BAIS.”

Police fear of senior elements in the army also manifested itself in the reluctance of police officers to investigate acts of military-backed criminality. Providing an example, my informant explained that one of his appointments after leaving police headquarters was to head up the detective unit in one of the district police commands in Jakarta. One time his detectives captured a suspect attempting to smuggle electronic products through Tanjung Priok port. The suspect was detained and his goods confiscated. During the investigation BAIS contacted my informant by telephone and explained that the criminal in fact belonged to BAIS as did his contraband goods. BAIS instructed my informant to release the smuggler and the goods immediately, which he did. My source explained that there were no sanctions or punishments or official response implied if police failed to comply. Obedience was expected. In a hierarchical system such as ABRI, the army maintained dominance over the police through this “mindset” and “culture of fear.” The army intimidated the police and individual officers were afraid to challenge the army – individually or institutionally.32

If we accept these testimonies at face value, the army victimised and dominated Polri. Although the police had potentially important roles to play in upholding criminal law and public order, Polri was a subordinated part of the armed forces and was deliberately kept below capacity. It is a great historical irony then that the police have become the main provider of internal security in the post-Suharto era. Few parts of the academic literature have dwelt on the origins of this historical irony. The story of how the police changed from the weakest part of the armed forces to become the most powerful security actor in

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32 Interview, anonymous source from police headquarters, 5 September 2008.
Indonesia is intimately linked with the legal process surrounding the separation of Polri from the TNI.

The Separation of the National Police from the Armed Forces

*The internal process within ABRI*

Analysing the separation of the police from the armed forces is difficult. There are few sources (either primary or secondary) that discuss the event. This is due to the fact that police-military separation was but one part of a much larger package of military reforms ushered in during the early reform period. Most observers have focused on the overall package. In retrospect however, the separation of the police from the military is arguably one of the most important aspects of Indonesia’s military reform agenda; the division of roles which came about as a result of this separation, defines how Indonesia manages internal security today. The separation process arguably, therefore, deserves much greater attention.

The separation occurred in two distinct phases, with the first initiated by ABRI. This phase consisted of dividing Polri from the armed forces and repositioning the police under the Ministry of Defence. This stage occurred during 1998 to 2000. The next phase occurred in 2000 when Indonesia’s supreme law-making body, the MPR, stepped in to provide the legal basis for the complete independence of the police, as well as drafting the current functions of the police and the military.

The historical forces unleashed by the toppling of Suharto was the main impetus behind the separation of Polri from ABRI. Attendant with demands for reformasi, mainstream Indonesia also rejected the smothering, repressive influence of the armed forces on society. The military, as Mietzner and others have explained, responded by introducing a program
of reforms dubbed the ‘New Paradigm.’ The military intended that the New Paradigm would placate civilian reformers while preserving the autonomy of the military from absolute democratic control. One item which the military came to offer was the separation of the police. Ironically, in a decision which has led to a dramatic expansion of police powers and capabilities at the expense of the defence forces, no one – not the executive government, the military leadership or senior police commanders themselves – ever really thought about how this process would unfold. As the idea of separation was supported by Indonesian society and the police and was considered an easy way for the military high command to demonstrate their reformist credentials, this particular reform was considered uncontroversial. Its significance can now only be realised with hindsight.

From the early nineteen nineties we can see there was a growing constituency of elites within civil society that supported the division of Polri and ABRI. Although this constituency was ineffective in initiating the desired change, their voices illustrate that within Indonesian society there was a general mood in favour of separation. In 1995, the year of Polri’s fiftieth birthday, several prominent intellectuals and editorialists aired their support for separation in the Indonesian press. Among them were criminologists, lecturers at the Indonesian police’s Institution of Higher Learning in Criminology (PTIK), politicians on the parliament’s defence and security committee and lawyers. From their statements we can see the issue of removing the police from military control was an incipient part of the debate about police reform, even before the end of the Suharto government. Although there may have been voices of dissent, the staunch opposition of the president and the military establishment stifled any hope of a policy shift.

34 Rinakit, Indonesian Military after the New Order, 100.
In 1997 though, the Indonesian government made a concession to reform demands. In its last year the Suharto administration passed Indonesia’s first ever law on the police. The Indonesian government declared its reason for creating the bill was the ‘complexity of the police role’, which required a special law. The 1997 Police Law did not however effect great change. The law’s greatest contribution was to define the roles, structure and responsibilities of the police in a more detailed way than previous legislation had. The police however remained a part of the ABRI command structure. One could however view this primitive attempt at police reform as a response to the general dissatisfaction with Polri’s performance, but one that fit within the constraints of the Suharto dictatorship. Therefore the last years of the Suharto era quietly presaged the beginnings of the later separation process. The subdued airings of discontent and the 1997 law on the police counted for little in comparison to the changes that occurred in 1998.

With the end of the New Order in May 1998, a new discussion arose among elite commentators and the press arguing again in favour of a separation. Many crises and political changes were occurring in Indonesia at the time, thus the discussion did not dominate the news cycle. But the issue nevertheless did arise in public debates. Around the anniversary of Polri (the Hari Bhayangkara on 1 July) a number of editorials came out in the press putting the case for separation. Using just one regional newspaper as an example, Kedaulatan Rakyat of Yogyakarta on 2 July 1998 ran commentary by academic observers criticising the military’s interventionist role in society and calling for an independent police. At the same time in Jakarta, the University of Indonesia ran a seminar series “Police and Community in the Democratic Era.” One of the central calls of this seminar was for the police to be separated from the armed forces. As former Deputy Chief of Police Adang Daradjatun has claimed, another source of support for Polri at that time were a series of seminars and workshops held independently in universities around Indonesia during 1998. During the course of my interview with Adang, the former general produced a

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document from his personal files listing the names of a series of sociologists and criminologists who in 1998, were active in pushing the argument for the separation of the police. Thus very early in the crisis atmosphere of 1998, debate arose over the future of Polri.41 This public constituency in favour of separation was an important factor in the thinking of policymakers. As I shall discuss, key informants within the police and the military believe that public pressure was a big factor in ABRI’s eventual decision to separate Polri.

Not long after the Suharto regime collapsed, the police and the ABRI high command began to revisit questions about the status of the police and various teams and officers set to work on the issue. In the course of this research I have sought out the testimony of three important interviewees, who were each directly involved in the decision making of the armed forces at the time of the separation. These interviewees were then Major General Agus Widjojo (who in 1998 was head of ABRI Strategic Policy and Planning), then Brigadier General Farouk Muhammed (a police general on secondment in 1998 to the Department of Defence as the head of Organisasi Tata Laksana Kerja, or the Organisation for Arranging Implementation of Work) and finally then Police Major General, Adang Daradjatun (who in 1998 was the head of the Planning and Development division of the Indonesian police).42 Their knowledge provides a valuable, first-hand account of how the separation came about.

Prior to the formal separation of the police in April 1999, the police informants claim there was little preparation. Agus Widjojo disagrees. According to Widjojo:

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42 The reason why each of these interviewees are valuable sources of information is because in early 1999 each former officer headed up a working group (kelompok kerja or Pokja) in their respective environments with the mission of preparing the police for eventual autonomy from ABRI. In weighing up their relative influence, the officer who is most responsible for managing the separation reform, and its internal logistical and other implications, was Adang Daradjatun. The pokja under Farouk Muhammad was responsible for preparing the legal/doctrinal aspects of the separation for the Defence Department. It is unknown what role, if any, Agus Widjojo’s team played but both of the police interviewees cite him as, at the least, an important source of moral support within ABRI for their work. Interview with former head of territorial forces Lt.Gen (ret.) Agus Widjojo, 29 April 2008. Interview with former Police Maj.Gen (ret.) Farouk Muhammad. 10 September 2008. Interview, Daradjatun, Sept.2008.
Actually there already was staged preparation beforehand, finally this moved toward separation. This was known as the doctrine of 'putting the police first' (mengedepankan Polri). Therefore this doctrine meant that while Polri was still under ABRI, but in policy [implementation on the ground] the police would be put first... this had existed for a long time... probably since the time of Panglima Faisal Tanjung [in the early nineties].

When cross-checked with the police informants, Adang and Farouk do not disagree with Widjojo’s proposition, but only say that any policy to put forward Polri as the main instrument of security as some kind of prelude to a separation, only existed at the level of policy and was never translated into reality. Adang for example says there was no planning at all within ABRI before 1997 for a separation:

not at that time [before 1998]. Indeed at that time the momentum which gave us [the police] the bravery to state ‘we want to depart from ABRI’, in my opinion, that was the momentum of history. When I was asked by the Kapolri about my attitude in facing this reform, I didn’t know but I directly grabbed it [the opportunity] and said, ‘we must break from the ranks of ABRI.’ Therefore it was the momentum of history.

In responding to Widjojo statements concerning a policy to mengedepankan Polri, Adang claimed:

If speaking about written doctrine then indeed there was... thus before 1997 there were writings to that effect... But because the political situation did not make it possible, consequently nothing became of it. [We the police] weren’t brave then as we are now... but the thinking was there.

In explaining the difference between Widjojo’s account and that of my police informants I assume that the police informants, being more intimately linked with developments in Polri are more reliable. Nevertheless it is apparent that in the years prior to the fall of Suharto there was discourse within the services about what Polri’s role should be. This situation reflects the voices of a number within civil society who desired the police not to be part of the armed forces. But in terms of substantive planning or concrete policy for an eventual separation of the forces, prior to 1998 there was probably none.

43 Interview, Widjojo, April 2008.
The absence of planning prior to 1998, stresses the significance of reformasi and precisely how much this event motivated the armed forces leadership to embrace reform, including to the status of the police. Both Agus Widjojo and Adang Daradjatun attribute the events of 1998 to providing the momentum for the separation of the police. As Widjojo says:

I think that force [reformasi] was enough to convince anyone that indeed we [the military] had reached the [appropriate] time to separate Polri from the TNI... Because at the time of reformasi, attacks and calumny were directed at the military in an insistent fashion. Consequently the military at that time was disempowered. And this encouraged the ABRI leadership to think that the time had come to accept the reality of separating the police from ABRI...45

Thus for the military, relinquishing the police was one of the concrete, uncontroversial policies they could make to demonstrate to the Indonesian people that they were sincere about changing their repressive, praetorian role. For this reason, the separation of the police from the ABRI command structure became one of the fourteen policy objectives of the military’s overall reform program.46 At the time, so it seems there was little future planning within ABRI as to what impact a separation of structures would have on the division of roles between an independent Polri and the post-ABRI military. The principle of an independent police force was, it seems, adopted without controversy. When I asked Widjojo about opposition within ABRI to separation with the police, he responded:

If we talk about the separation of Polri from ABRI itself, indeed it wasn’t too strong the opposition [within the armed forces]. Because from within Polri itself there already was a strong push for separating themselves from ABRI... whilst from within ABRI, because it was only structural separation and did not influence the authority of ABRI, actually the opposition was not too strong. It was different if compared to the opposition towards internal reforms within ABRI itself which then changed to become TNI...

In hindsight it seems incredulous that the military would agree to relinquish control over the police when, by doing so, the military may lose strategic control over internal security to an independent Polri. I asked Widjojo whether the ABRI high command consciously considered this risk. He responded:

Widjojo’s key comment is “learning by doing”, or we can suppose improvising and adapting to a fluid situation. Rather than analysing with the benefit of hindsight, this issue needs to be seen through the lens of the times. Under enormous pressure during a period of crisis, ABRI struggled to pioneer internal reforms. The separation of the police was one attractive reform article that was simple to execute and carried high visibility. There was public appeal for the idea, and the policy was welcomed by the police. As we shall see from the following discussion on the MPR debates, the TNI itself still believed at this time that during the transitional phase the military would continue to be involved in internal security missions for some time. Indeed given the general weakness of the police, the eruption of various conflicts around Indonesia and ABRI’s own immense influence up to 1998, probably few army officers in 1998 could have conceived of a future where the military was not involved in domestic security affairs. In retrospect we may therefore speculate that the military’s initially sanguine attitude to the separation of the police may have unintentionally created a monster. This monster now dominates internal security at the military’s expense.

It is difficult to isolate precisely when the decision was taken to separate the police. Both Adang Daradjatun and Farouk Muhammed state that the key decision was made in early 1999. Based on an internal police policy document given to me by Daradjatun it seems Polri and the Defence Department had a timeline for the separation. The document claims that the period from October 1998 to 31 March 1999 had been used to prepare the National Police to exit ABRI. Regardless as to when the decision was made, it transpired that on 1

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47 As we will go on to discuss, the “grey area” Agus Widjojo refers to is the absence of legal principles that clearly delineate responsibilities between Polri and TNI in internal security. This is made worse, Widjojo suggests, by a culture within TNI which still claims ownership over internal security. But as I argue we observers of Indonesia must not confuse a lack of definitional clarity in law with contestation over roles on the ground. As Widjojo himself pointed out in our interview, the military in the regions are today not involved in security management in any practical sense. Interview, Widjojo, April 2008.
April 1999, the Indonesian police were removed from the armed forces and placed (temporarily) under the command of the Department of Defence.50

The partial separation from the armed forces in April 1999 propelled momentous internal changes in the police, but of most concern to this research is an important debate within the Defence Department over the future position of Polri and how police and TNI elements could support each other in a post-ABRI future. What this debate shows is that in 1999 there was some - arguably not enough - thinking in defence circles as to what the police should ultimately become and what implications this had for the Indonesian military.51

The first debate within the Department of Defence concerned where the police should exist institutionally post-separation. In December 1999 the head of the police working group (pokja), Adang Daradjatun gave an address to the minister of defence and security (who in December 1999 was Juwono Sudarsono) on the progress of reforms in the Indonesian police and future directions for Polri. At this event Daradjatun produced three models for the future. One model was for the police to continue under the command of the Department of Defence. Another was for the police to be fully separated from the defence portfolio and placed under the minister of the interior. The final option, and the one Polri unsurprisingly supported, was for the police to be placed under the direct control of the President as an autonomous state agency.52 While the argument was not resolved here, Adang’s pokja stipulated that it continued to plan for an eventual complete separation with the defence and security ministry for “at the latest”, January 2001.53 From other sources it seems that this policy was the plan of the defence ministry all along. According to the long-time Minister of Defence Juwono Sudarsono, his department had decided in 1999 to remove the police from their control. However Sudarsono testifies that his preferred plan was for the police to become a part of the Ministry of the Interior.54 Thus even before parliament began to reflect on this issue, police headquarters and the Defence Department had agreed to make Polri

50 ‘Polisi resmi mulai pisah dari ABRI’, Kompas 3 April 2000.
51 Proses Reformasi, pg.13.
52 Proses Reformasi, pg.9-10.
54 Interview with Minister of Defence, April 27, 2008.
totally separate from the defence portfolio, even though they had different views as to where Polri should ultimately end up.

During this period of flux when the police were not a part of the armed forces but had not yet left the Defence Department, doctrine did come to exist which regulated TNI assistance to the police; while this doctrine has almost certainly been superseded today it is a very important aspect of this analysis. Such old protocols demonstrate that the Indonesian government has thought about how to manage cooperation between the two most important parts of the national security apparatus. The essence of this old doctrine has also been carried on into the management of security in contemporary Indonesia - and the case study site of my research.

The document is an executive order of the Minister of Defence and Security titled ‘The Proper Method of Assistance of TNI Force Elements to Polri’ dated August 1999.55 This doctrine was part of a packet of regulations that originated from Farouk Muhammed’s working group in the Defence Department that was preparing Polri for complete separation.56 The document is no longer legally binding for the police, though it may still have some legal impact on the TNI. The document does not create a division of roles between Polri and the TNI but it does show that the police and the military did have a very clear set of ideas - to the point of being articulated in regulation - governing how the military could support the police. Looking at Annex B we can see that the defence minister gave very clear guidelines to uniform personnel. In the document we can see:

1. the criteria of threat that could prompt a police request for military assistance;
2. procedure for the police in making the request of assistance to TNI territorial forces;
3. who in the police can make such requests;
4. principles for how such military forces are to be utilised - under direct police command (Bawah Kendali Operasi or BKO as it is termed);

56 Interview Farouk Muhammed, September 2008.
5. command and control arrangements for the joint force effort;
6. procedures for communication between the forces;
7. logistical arrangements and so on.

What is apparent then is that the defence leadership believed that if the military was to assist Polri in its duties under non-emergency conditions, such arrangements would have to be official, they would be decided on the basis of the police’s evaluation of the situation, the police would be in control of the military assistance force and the assistance would be terminated when the police had reasserted their control over the given security threat. Recalling that some commentators, like the ICG, have criticised Indonesia for failing to create modalities governing TNI-Polri joint operations, documents such as this in fact show there was bureaucratic consensus about joint operations.\textsuperscript{57} While the document no longer binds Polri today, as we shall see in following chapters, the essence of this doctrine lives on in the way joint operations are practiced in my case study site. The principles of BKO, official letters of request, logistical support and so on still exists.

While from the beginning, the ABRI leadership desired to fully separate Polri from the defence community, the Defence Department did not have the legal authority to overturn parliamentary statutes such as the 1997 Police Law, which clearly placed the police within the Defence and Security Ministry.\textsuperscript{58} Therefore although the TNI’s own new paradigm pushed the police onto the national reform agenda, ultimately it was the Indonesian parliament which was responsible for the final position that Polri has today.

\textsuperscript{57} ICG, \emph{Indonesia: Rethinking Internal Security}, I.

\textsuperscript{58} In public addresses on the day of the police anniversary in April 1999 the then Defence and Security Minister Wiranto, made these sentiments well known. In interviews with one of Wiranto’s successors, Juwono Sudarsono, the minister indicated that during his first term as defence minister in 2000, it still continued to be the intention of the department to eventually release the police from the portfolio at some future date. The department’s preferred model however was and is for Polri to be placed under the control of another ministry. Departemen Pertahanan, Proses Reformasi Menuju Polri yang Profesional, p.12. ‘Polisi Resmi Mulai Pisah dari ABRI: Stop Gaya Militer’, \emph{Kompas} 3 April 1999. Interview, Minister of Defence, 27 April 2008. Presentation, Minister of Defence, Australian National University, 27 March 2008.
The final part of the separation was the removal of Polri from the Department of Defence and the repositioning of the police as an autonomous agency under the president. However, the question of where the Indonesian police should ultimately end up begged another important question: what roles should an autonomous police force perform in post-New Order Indonesia and how should the police divide their duties with the military? In the year 2000, Indonesia’s then supreme law making council, the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat attempted to address these questions. What the MPR achieved was to establish a powerful normative directive for the substance of later parliamentary laws on defence and the police in 2002. This contribution was historically significant.

The MPR legislated on Polri and the TNI in its August 2000 session and produced two separate decrees, Decree VI on the ‘Separation of the Indonesian Defence Force from the National Police’ and Decree VII on ‘The Role of the Indonesian Defence Force and the National Police.’ These two decrees [reproduced at Annex C] were born out of the work of one of three Ad-Hoc committees set up under the Badan Pekerja (or Working Group) of the MPR. Of most interest to this research is the work of Ad Hoc Committee II. Among a

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59 In 2000 the MPR had the status of a supra-parliamentary body which could change the Indonesian constitution and interpret the constitution through the MPR’s own judgements (Ketetapan MPR or Tap MPR). In 2003 the MPR unilaterally chose to relinquish these powers. At the time the MPR revisited the legality of all its previous recommendations. On the subject of TAP MPR VI and VII/2000, on Polri and the TNI, the MPR ruled these decrees will remain valid until the passage of parliamentary laws regarding the voting rights of soldiers and police. This has not yet occurred. This leaves one to assume, constitutionally, that TAP VI and VII remain in force. Nevertheless the substance of much of the MPR’s intent in TAP VI and VII 2000 has already been embodied in two laws from 2002 on national defence and the national police. Republik Indonesia: Ketetapan Majelis Permusyawaratan Indonesia 1/2003, Pasal 4.

60 The Badan Pekerja was established after the MPR’s 1999 session to continue unfinished business from that meeting. During the 1999 session of the MPR there were approximately eleven issues which were not able to be “accommodated” during the scheduled sitting period. These eleven issues were handed to Badan Pekerja to debate. The job of the Badan Pekerja steering committee was to take these eleven issues and propose draft decrees and constitutional amendments on them, to be forwarded for general debate in the August 2000 MPR session. To do this, the steering committee was divided into three ad hoc committees. Ad Hoc Committee I was tasked with discussing proposed amendments to the Indonesian constitution. Ad Hoc committee II was made responsible for discussing proposed decrees while Ad Hoc Committee III was tasked with discussing the MPR’s sitting agenda and budget. MPR. Risalah Rapat Ke-4 Badan Pekerja (25 November 1999), p.11. At this time these committees were composed almost exclusively of politicians – Ad Hoc Committee II was made up of 45 members who were also representatives of the DPR plus 8 non-elected representatives; three
number of other draft decrees, Ad-Hoc Committee II was tasked with drafting a decree for “the role of the TNI in the Life of the State (Peran TNI dalam Kehidupan Kenegaraan).”

Over the course of the committee’s discussions this request would transform into Decrees VI and VII passed in 2000.

What makes Ad Hoc Committee II’s work on the TNI and Polri most interesting is that originally, the Indonesian police was not thought relevant to the draft decree under consideration. The Badan Pekerja originally handed Committee II the task of discussing “the role of the TNI in the life of the state.” Until late February 2000 the committee was busy discussing other parts of their agenda and did not directly debate the future of the military. On February 21 2000, Committee II began discussions on the TNI. Spontaneously within that meeting, the committee began to consider the need for reforms to both the TNI and the police. At that session the speaker desired to hear from an academic, Dr. Sacipto Rahardjo, a person noted for his expertise on the police. Complaints arose from the floor, notably the Deputy Speaker and members of Golkar, doubting the wisdom of including the police in the committee’s work. Ironically, the loudest voice urging Ad Hoc Committee II to make a ruling on Polri and the TNI came from the military’s own fractional representatives. One of them stated:

There is a problem for the TNI which is linked with Polri, sir. We can take the example concerning what is the role of the TNI and what is the role of Polri? Until now, there hasn’t been any agreement. Whether the TNI is for defence only and the police [are reserved only] for security. Also still there are many differences of opinion.... [this topic] cannot be divided one by one.

The committee leadership henceforth decided to proceed with discussions on both Polri and the TNI. The point however is there was no deliberate intention at the beginning for the MPR to legislate on the police. Rather, the MPR’s decrees on the police came about a by-product of reflections on how to reform the state’s defence functions.

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61 MPR, Risalah Rapat Ke-4 Badan Pekerja, p.2.
63 Risalah Rapat Ke-24 Pah II, Point.74 Interruption TNI/Polri Fraction: Budi Harsono, p.22.
64 Risalah Rapat Ke-24 Pah II, Point.75 Meeting Leader: Rambe Kamarutzaman, p.23.
As with most MPR decrees, the *Ketetapan* that emerged from the 2000 session are not detailed or very specific. This has been the cause of some discussion. The ICG for one has questioned the vagueness of Decrees VI and VII, saying:

MPR Decree VI/2000 on the Separation of the TNI and the Police of the Republic of Indonesia mandates separation of the two bodies. Without attempting to define "defence" or "security", it clearly specifies that the role of the military is defence, and the role of the police is maintenance of security, but it requires them to cooperate with and assist each other... MPR Decree VII/2000 ... repeats that the military is an instrument of the state whose primary role is defence but adds that its principal task is to uphold national sovereignty, defend the boundaries of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia, and "protect all Indonesians from threats and disturbances to the unity of the people and the country". This clearly implies an internal security function.\(^{65}\)

The ICG draws attention to the absence of precise definitions in some of the MPR’s key terms that describe the intended roles of the TNI and Polri. While it is true that these decrees are vague, the ICG infers that lack of clarity is identical with an intention by the MPR to retain domestic security responsibilities for the military. I argue however that the MPR’s intention was the precise opposite. Although this argument may seem convoluted, it is actually quite important. In the absence of judicial rulings, the intention of the drafters becomes the only guideline for how law should be interpreted. The notes of Ad-Hoc Committee II suggest that the drafters of TAP VI and VII believed it is inappropriate for the TNI to manage domestic security.

The consistent, consensus view within Ad Hoc Committee II was that the Indonesian military should be responsible for “defence” (a concept that includes upholding the ‘sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Indonesian Republic’) while Polri should be responsible for “security”. But, as the ICG calls to our attention what these terms mean is not a mere exercise in semantics, but is critical to understanding what the Indonesian government expects its security services to do. Indeed there was strenuous debate on these very points within Committee II. What eventually emerged was a broad consensus that, for the Indonesian police, “security” was assumed to mean threats from within the state (in the Indonesian language this terminology is often referred to as “keamanan dan ketertiban masyarakat,” security and public order or its Indonesian acronym “Kamtibmas”). For the

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TNI “defence” – and ‘upholding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state’ – was assumed to mean threats from outside the state. This becomes clear when we trace the debate.

Originally the TNI fraction on Ad Hoc Committee II was the most assertive in arguing for a wide interpretation of the proposed roles for the military. When the committee leadership opened the floor for opening addresses of the fractional representatives at the committee’s first hearing in February 2000, the political party representatives did not even mention the proposed decree on the TNI. The military’s fraction did, however. The TNI speaker argued:

TNI constitutes one of the nation’s components which owns a defence and security function for overcoming threats which emerge from developments in the strategic environment… with the jurisdiction of Polri in the area of security, this does not mean that TNI is freed from affairs related to KAMDAGRI [internal security] in certain conditions where the sovereignty of the state is threatened then TNI, in line with valid regulations… will appear for upholding sovereignty once again.66

Thus the military, from the very beginning opened the debate with a call for the TNI to maintain a strong presence in internal security. As the debate unfolded, the committee ultimately came to reject the TNI fraction’s views. At the stage of the first hearing however, the committee members were uncommitted on the future of TNI and Polri. Instead most of the debate was handed over to invited experts.

Interestingly at the first hearing stage, the calls of the military fraction to give the TNI a wide role in internal security were dealt a blow by someone within their own ranks – the Chief of Staff for Territorial Affairs, Lt.Gen. Agus Widjojo; who appeared on behalf of the Panglima. Being by far the most erudite contributor to any of these debates Widjojo had a simple formula for how the MPR should separate functions between the police and defence forces. Widjojo argued, all disturbances of security within the state are violations of law, and should be dealt with by the police, while all threats that emerge from outside the country are matters of defence and should be dealt with by the military. On this basis internal security should be purely a police function. The only grey area would arise when

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the police are incapable of handling a particular security problem. Then the question should become which authority should be allowed to declare a state of martial law – a regional police commander, the regional head of government or someone else.67 While Widjojo did not propose any answers to these questions (and nor did the committee eventually consider them) Widjojo began the debate by clearly supporting the transfer of routine internal security functions to Polri.

Although the first hearing was just an airing of opinions and no consensus was reached, some of the ideas did penetrate the thinking of the committee. In its next update to the Badan Pekerja on March 6 2000, Ad Hoc Committee II decided that the repositioning of the National Police should be considered by the MPR in the August session. Secondly, Committee II decided: “the role of TNI/Polri needs to be divided, TNI has the task of protecting the sovereignty of the State, whilst Polri is in the kamtibmas sector.”68 Thus from the early stages of its deliberations there was a hardening of some assumptions within Ad Hoc Committee II about Polri and the TNI’s future functions. It seems that the committee came around to the idea relatively early that internal security matters or “kamtibmas” should be a matter reserved for the police.

During June 2000, Committee II finalised its draft decree on Polri and the TNI. On 5 June the Decree Formulation Team for TNI/Polri69 had already written up a draft decree on the TNI much of which was identical to what would later be passed by the MPR proper in August. Under the first draft, the team declared that the TNI, as the state’s primary tool of defence, would be tasked with upholding national sovereignty and territorial integrity. In explanation, the chief of the drafting team stated “Now, TNI as a state defence tool has the main task of protecting all of the nation... from threats by other nations or states... therefore, in this passage the clarification of the Defence Force’s role is that it is mainly for facing external nations and states and other countries.”70 This proposition set off a round of

68 Risalah Rapat Ke-5 Badan Pekerja MPR (6 March 2000), Kesimpulan Sementara PAH II, point 3. pg 19.
69 Ad Hoc Committee II created Draft Decree Teams (sub-committees) to work on the language of its eleven draft decrees. These draft teams met outside the formal session times and forwarded their work for general debate within committee. Their individual work is not recorded in the committee’s meeting notes.
70 Risalah Rapat Ke-54 Badan Pekerja MPR (5 June), pg 3.
debate. Some speakers favoured extracting the military from domestic security. Other speakers requested that the TNI be allowed to deploy in internal security operations under certain, emergency circumstances. A related, but different issue was whether the MPR should draft detailed decrees on military and police tasks and how the two forces could cooperate, or whether the MPR should make general statements of intent and pass the task of filling in the detail to parliament. There were speakers for and against the argument. One of the Golkar members however, neatly summed up the problem at hand: the committee did not wish to create wording which defined the military out of all internal security problems (he gave an example of circumstances in which foreign powers may sponsor secessionist movements within Indonesia). On the other hand the committee did not wish to grant a domestic security responsibility which the TNI could manipulate.

Over the next several days of drafting, the committee came to accept this argument as the consensus view.

Over the next several meetings in early June, the argument as to whether the military should continue to maintain a role in internal security was abandoned, even by the military fractional representatives. Instead the military representatives turned the debate into one of how the military should support the police during times of security crisis. The committee even dismissed a compromise proposal by the military fraction to create specific clauses that would allow the military to assist Polri in emergency situations. A member of the decree drafting team - somewhat exasperatedly - responded to the TNI fraction by reminding them that in the Suharto era the defence-security functions (HANKAMNAS) of the military and the public-order and security functions (KAMTIBMAS) of the police had

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71 I. Gde Subidya from PDIP, Risalah Rapat Ke-55 Badan Pekerja MPR (6 June 2000), Para.8, p.4
73 Speaker for PDIP Potsdam Hutasoit stated for example his belief that the Decrees should not be written too strictly since it would be hard to amend in future. The TNI fraction strongly agreed with the argument. Golkar speaker Hajriyanto Thohari on the other hand, argued that given the importance of the issues at hand, it was best for the MPR to be very specific in its wording and intent. Risalah Rapat Ke-54 Badan Pekerja MPR (5 June 2000), Para.16 and 38, p.8, 16.
74 Speaker for the Functional Groups, Hamim Thohari, Risalah Rapat Ke-54 Badan Pekerja MPR (5 June 2000), Para.18, p.11.
75 One of the TNI speakers said thus: “about the problem of how to involve the TNI for assisting Polri, this becomes a problem which is really crucial now, the police want to be independent, indeed, but what about five years into the future... it’s possible they aren’t capable of doing that now, consequently the involvement of the TNI in overcoming problems within the state will become very necessary, [consider the] problems of Poso, Ambon, and the like...” Risalah Rapat Ke-57 Badan Pekerja MPR (8 June) Budi Harsono, point 55, pg.18.
been mixed in one institution, in a way that confused both. For that reason the committee decided to divide Polri and the TNI, giving the police responsibility for security and the TNI responsibility for defence. But:

in matters of defence and security and where they have a link in the prevention [of threats to them], the Indonesian Defence Forces is able to cooperate and mutually assist the police... then concerning the specifics of the TNI/Polri role what is intended with this decree will be regulated further in parliamentary law [Undang-Undang].

Thus what appears evident from these discussions is that Committee II did have a clear set of ideas on what the intended roles of the military and police should be: domestic security and external defence respectively. Although the committee realised that there may be a medium-term role for the TNI in assisting the police, they considered the job of the MPR terminated at permitting the two to cooperate – further refinement of security assistance was a matter they intended to pass to the parliament. Nevertheless, we can interpret from the discussions that the committee did wish to limit the military’s internal security role to only one of support to the police. The committee did not intend, as the ICG stated, to allow the “territorial integrity and national sovereignty” clause to become a mandate for the military to operate within the realm of internal security. Arguably then, there is a strong normative, implied meaning within the MPR’s decrees. The intention of the drafters was to remove from the military the capacity to administer domestic security as part of their normal activities. This responsibility was intended to be the domain of the police.

Repositioning Polri: national or regional police force?

Discussion of military and police roles was only one of the topics that occupied the drafting committee. Their conversations strayed over a wide variety of subjects, from cultural change within the forces to voting rights for TNI/Polri personnel. One of the other substantive issues which entered debate was where to place the military and the police after their final separation. For the TNI this issue was resolved without significant dissent, the

commander of the military was placed under the control of the president. In regards to the police, the issue became one of intractable disagreement.

The heart of the debate was whether the police should be placed under the command of the president as an autonomous national agency or whether the police should be put under the control of the minister of the interior. The argument was intense. Those who supported the latter option stressed that if the police became subordinate to the interior minister, Polri would fall under the command of regional heads of government. This would force Polri to more closely integrate with the community and enhance democratic governance over the police. One member of the committee for example, stated such a proposal would assist the regional autonomy reforms passed in 1999:

If we see our interests to the future, with the existence of regional autonomy and later [in a future scenario] where the police are placed underneath the Ministry of the Interior... the police in the regions will serve the regional governments, this will assist the governors.

Other committee members viewed the same scenario differently. They claimed that such a policy would endanger sound governance over the security sector because, so it was believed, regional politicians would manipulate and politicise the police. This argument must be placed against the backdrop of the times. In 2000 Indonesia was beginning its experiment with democracy. The capacity of newly empowered, regional politicians to exercise competent control over a security apparatus like Polri was a legitimate question.

Debate dragged on through two meetings without resolution. These events were extraordinary given the consensus style of the meeting discussions. Eventually on 8 June 2000 the committee leadership decided to pass the issue to the committee’s fractions to

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77 To be correct, there was not as much debate over the future position of the TNI as there was over the police, but there was debate on governance arrangements for the TNI too. This did not occur over substantive issues however. There was general agreement that the president should exercise control over the military through the Panglima. However, committee members resisted the idea that the president could appoint and sack the head of the military independently. This debate was resolved by requiring the president to obtain the approval of parliament on the tenure of the Panglima. Risalah Rapat Ke-54 Badan Pekerja MPR, 5 June 2000.
78 Risalah Rapat Ke-56 Badan Pekerja MPR (7 June 2000), Dr. Mochtar Naim (F-PBB), part 16 p. 6.
resolve outside of formal meeting times. Over the next several weeks Ad Hoc committee II moved on to other issues. The committee’s fractions reported back on 27 June 2000 that they were not able to achieve consensus. At a special drafting session held by Ad Hoc Committee II in the city of Bandung in mid-June the leadership of the parliamentary fractions (the direct superiors of the parliamentarians in the Ad Hoc Committee) had to be invited to achieve a final resolution. The contents of this Bandung meeting do not appear in Committee II’s notes. Instead it is only reported back that a decision was made at the Bandung meetings that the best place for Polri was underneath the president. It can only be said therefore that back room debates among parliamentary leaders determined the eventual outcome of Indonesia’s current system of policing.

Although the MPR’s debate over the position of the police has largely been forgotten by history, this argument over where to place Polri was highly consequential. The decision to reposition Polri as an autonomous agency underneath the head of state was, in effect, a conservative transition. The police institution was retained in more or less the same form and merely transferred from the minister of defence to the president. This decision has, however, sealed Polri’s rise as the most powerful security institution in Indonesia. The above debate was the closest that Indonesia came during reformasi to passing substantial law enforcement powers to the regional governments. Though one could seriously argue whether transferring the police to the Ministry of the Interior would have constitutionally

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80 Ad Hoc II’s leadership passed the debate over the future status of the police to the Formulating Team for Polri and the TNI. Meeting 57, Article 60. p.20
81 The Formulating Team stated that the parliamentary fractional leaders had decided that Polri should be under the office of the president. This ended the debate over whether Polri should be a national or a regional force. The Decree Formulation Team then proposed four models for how the Kapolri should be appointed. Through the progress of the meeting it was decided that the head of the force would be appointed by the president, with the agreement of the parliament, and a special police board would be set up to advise the president on police policy and the appointment/dismissal of the senior police commander. Meeting 63, 27 June 2000, article 2. p.2.
82 Unfortunately I have not succeeded in tracking down the parliamentary leaders of the day for confirming the events of these meetings. I flag this issue as one that would benefit from future research.
83 My thanks to Dr. Michael Malley (a specialist on decentralisation reforms in Indonesia) for confirming this point. There was however, a somewhat well known cabinet debate in 1999 in which B.J. Habibie considered remaking Polri as a provincially based force. In this meeting, the president was eventually convinced not to proceed with the idea. However it must be recalled that in 1997 the Indonesian parliament drafted a law explicitly declaring the police were a national force and part of ABRI. As Habibie never pushed his idea into a formal bill-drafting stage, the president did not alone have sufficient executive power to rescind a parliamentary law. The MPR did. I argue then that the event which requires most attention is the debate within the MPR. Interview, Farouk Muhammad, September 2008.
had the intended consequence of ‘regionalising’ the police, the MPR’s edicts did however settle the landscape in favour of the centre.

In effect there are three ubiquitous, hegemonic institutions that can claim to perform a security mission at the regional level: Polri, regional governments and the TNI. As has been argued and as I will continue below, military reform has rendered the TNI largely unable to operate in day-to-day security matters. As I will argue below, regional autonomy reforms in 1999 bolstered the law enforcement capabilities of district governments, but their powers are still much weaker than those of the police. By virtue of the fact that its closest competitor organisations are incapable of duplicating its functions, Polri has been handed the status of lead agency in internal security management. In this regard the MPR’s decision takes on a new light. The MPR inadvertently allowed the creation of a centralised, security leviathan, with integrated units that stretch from the national level right down to the village. This leviathan is now answerable only to the president and its own hierarchy and has the lead role in security management across the length and breadth of the archipelago.84

Conclusions about the separation process

Looking back at all the data presented above we can come to a final set of conclusions about the meaning of the separation of the police and the Indonesian military. Separating

84 As a footnote to this issue, in a journal article published in Contemporary Southeast Asia, I attributed the credit for the final separation of Polri to President Abdurrahman Wahid. In July 2000 Wahid promulgated an executive order putting the police underneath his own command. According to Farouk Muhammad, this order was legally invalid (because the president does not have executive authority to defeat a higher law) and in any case was superseded by the decision of the MPR in August 2000. In the same article I made the argument that Indonesia’s security laws are not clear on the issue of Polri/TNI roles and cooperation. On reflection this argument is only true in part. Indonesia’s security laws are indeed not very detailed. Yet at the time (not having access to the MPR’s meeting notes) I overlooked the powerful normative, implicit message in the MPR’s decrees to restrict TNI involvement in internal security. I also overlooked the fact Indonesia’s security laws also have strong political checks which solidify the role of the president in approving TNI deployments. As I will argue this executive authority, acts as a type of barrier that prevents TNI from independently managing domestic security. I take the opportunity in this thesis to correct my previous arguments. Interview, Farouk, September 2008. Republik Indonesia: Keputusan Presiden 89/2000 tentang Kedudukan Kepolisian Republik Indonesia, July 2000. The article referred to: David Jansen ‘Relations among Security and Law Enforcement Institutions.’ Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 30, No. 3 (2008), pp. 429-54.
Polri from the armed forces unleashed powerful questions: which actor should perform what mission? Where should the police end up? How should Indonesia's two principal security forces cooperate? Although the MPR's drafting committee may not have provided detailed answers to all of these questions, it did answer the most critical aspects and provided powerful, normative guidance for the remainder. The MPR divided the two institutions and clearly determined that the police would remain a national body, directly responsible to the head of state. The MPR also indicated a clear intent to make the Indonesian police the primary force in security management within the state, while on the other hand the MPR redefined the job description of the TNI as external defence. Though the MPR did not define its intent in as many words, there is nevertheless a very strong, normative implied message to that effect. This message was one which directed and limited the Indonesian parliament when passing more detailed statutes on defence, the police and TNI in 2002 and 2004. On the question of cooperation the Defence Department did have an idea, which was transformed into doctrine, as to how the Indonesian police could call upon military assistance for managing internal security. Such assistance could be provided to the police, under police control and at police request.

The post-2000 period: laws on National Defence, Defence Forces and the Police

There are at least two possible rebuttals to the above arguments. The MPR may have implied its intent in 2000 but the Indonesian parliament has subsequently passed its own security statutes. Is it not possible that these security laws could have carved out a bigger role for the TNI in domestic security? Secondly, even if law defines jurisdiction between Polri and the TNI, it is commonly assumed that regional military forces are highly autonomous from central control. Is it not possible that defence forces in the regions merely ignore Jakarta's intentions and act as a law unto themselves? These two propositions are worth consideration but I maintain it is difficult to sustain them.

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85 The ICG imply that this was an intent of the military when drafting the controversial TNI Law in 2004. ICG, Rethinking Internal Security Strategy, 11-12.
86 Leonard Sebastian, among others, has implied as much when for example he says: "TNI headquarters' control over troops in the field remains extraordinarily weak." Sebastian, Realpolitik Ideology, 336.
Taking Indonesia’s post-2000 laws on the military - Law 3/2002 on National Defence and Law 34/2004 on the TNI - while these laws expand upon the MPR’s decrees, they do not contradict the MPR either. The Defence Law of 2002 for example, aside from repeating the MPR’s declaration that the Indonesian military has a role in defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Indonesian Republic, also states:

The Indonesian Defence Force has the task of executing state defence policy for:

a. Defending sovereignty and territorial integrity;
b. Protecting the dignity and safety of the nation;
c. Executing Military Operations other than War.87

By itself the above quotation may imply a role in internal security, especially the vague concept of ‘military operations other than war.’ But in the same law however, the parliament also declared:

The state defence system when facing non-military threats places government institutions outside the defence sector as the main element, sufficient with the shape and character of the threat which is faced.88

What the parliament intended therefore was for security problems with a non-military character to be handled by other state agencies. On its surface this provision would limit the TNI’s ability to handle non-military threats within the state.

Arguably though, the following piece of legislation, the TNI Law of 2004 clearly strayed from the intentions of the MPR’s decrees. Under its provisions:

[the] TNI, as a tool of state defence, functions as:

a. an instrument of prevention [penangkal] towards every type of military threat and armed threat from outside and within the state towards the sovereignty, territorial integrity and safety of the nation;

b. an instrument of response [penindak] towards every type of threat as intended in section 1(a) above; and

87 Republik Indonesia: Undang-Undang 3/2002 tentang Pertahanan Negara, Pasal 10 (3).
88 UU 3/2002, Pasal 7 (3).
c. an instrument of recovery [pemulihan] towards the state’s security condition which is disrupted as a consequence of a security instability.  

Under this law, the Indonesian parliament arguably embellished upon the intentions of the MPR and the 2002 defence law, by defining all armed threats (both state and non-state) that originate from within the borders of Indonesia or outside of it, as threats which fall under the jurisdiction of the TNI. By the literal letter of the law, this statute does expand the role of the TNI to explicitly include security responsibilities within the state. Under this law it is indeed legitimate for the Indonesian military to handle internal security threats of an armed or military type. This edict is not inconsistent with the letter of the MPR’s decrees but it does embellish, if not challenge, the normative spirit.

We cannot terminate the analysis here though and assume that the TNI have resurrected a role in internal security, as parliamentary statutes do place severe restrictions on how military force can be employed. In the same 2004 law, the Indonesian parliament declared that only the president has the authority to operationally deploy TNI forces. To do this the president requires the approval of parliament. The consequence of this principle is that no uniformed officer in the defence forces has the actual authority to use force without government approval. Decisions to deploy military personnel in security operations are exceedingly rare in contemporary Indonesia. Indeed we find only a handful of examples where this has occurred after 2000: one example being the state of civil emergency declared over North Maluku and Maluku in 2001-2003 and the state of military and civil emergency declared in Aceh in 2000 and 2003. By contrast the Indonesian police have been granted permanent discretionary power to handle security everywhere, at all times.

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89 Republik Indonesia: Undang-Undang 34/2004 tentang Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Pasal 6.
91 See: Keputusan Presiden Nomor 88/2000 tentang Keadaan Darurat Sipil di Propinsi Maluku dan Propinsi Maluku Utara. For Aceh see: Keputusan Presiden Nomor 28/2003 tentang Pernyataan Keadaan Bahaya dengan Tingkatan Keadaan Darurat Militer di Aceh. According to Indonesian internal security laws, Indonesia has a four staged security posture (which the president may declare either in one locality or nationally): normal conditions, civil emergency, military emergency and all out war. Each stage triggers a different command hierarchy for threat management. Under normal conditions the police form the first line of response to any instability with the military lending assistance as needed; under a civil emergency the regional head of government takes charge supported by the security forces; under a military emergency the military takes control of all of the government apparatus in the area/s of the emergency; while in a war situation the president assumes command of the war effort, exercising his or her orders through the head of the military (Panglima). States of emergency however are very rare. Undang-undang Nomor 23/1959 tentang Keadaan Bahaya dan Lembaran Undang-undang Nomor 52/1960.
Therefore no parliamentary statute since 2000 has attempted to contradict the intentions of the MPR; the Indonesian military is still not capable on its own volition of executing internal security functions, this decision is a prerogative of the president. Whenever the president does not authorise such force, the police remain the primary manager of domestic security.

Discussion of law and political intent runs into complications when we consider the problems of governance in Indonesia; it is possible that the military - or parts thereof - may choose to ignore the intent of the central government. Scholars have long described the Indonesian military as being highly autonomous from civilian politicians. It is reasonable to speculate that if the military does not accept civilian supremacy then they may not accept boundaries on their operational freedom. The evidence suggests however that the TNI’s own interpretation of its role is in line with security legislation.

The highest authority on defence force policy whom I have interviewed is the former minister of defence, Juwono Sudarsono and the minister clearly believes that his former department’s interpretation of the military’s lawful role is one that virtually rules out a practical, day-to-day role in internal security. When discussing the meaning of the MPR’s decrees for his department the minister has claimed:

> the wording of TAP MPR 6 and 7 was unfortunate because it gave the impression that these two things, defence and security, were totally separate... “pertahanan” as only defence [that is] external threat and “keamanan” was mainly - not only - domestic security. So we talked about “keamanan kecil” [small security], with a small k, that is the police function including dalam negeri [security within the state] within the rubric of security, what we call now homeland security, which is kamtibmas, which is public order and security, penegakkan hukum, the rule of law, and perlindungan masyarakat, protecting society. This is the accepted version of what constitutes domestic security. Within this the TNI was out of bounds, in formal terms. I would have preferred Tap 6 and 7 to say the main task of domestic security was done by the police, and the main task of external defence was done by the military but that these two would overlap in certain grey areas... to say pertahanan hanya ini [defence is only this], is completely unrealistic. But, that was part of the political correctness of the time... keamanan kecil itu contrast dengan keamanan besar, keamanan besar is kedaulatan, keutuhan wilayah [small security if contrasted with big security, big security is sovereignty and territorial integrity] - this is the big definition... So the TNI has this largely external survival guarantor of security [role] ...

pengadilan [but] ada masalah survival of the state [this is for the TNI]. [if there is terrorism, that is a police problem and it goes to the courts, but if the problem is one of survival of the state (that is one for TNI)].

What we see in this quotation is the Defence Department’s assumption that the Indonesian parliament has - incorrectly so the minister thinks - limited the military to a role of guarding the survival of the state. Everything short of this constitutes “keamanan kecil” or a problem which should be handled by the police. The Minister reinforces these ideas once again when discussing how the police and the military cooperate today:

there is, there is an understanding, what we call BKO, bawah kendali operasi, particularly in what we call keadaan teriti sipil [orderly civil conditions], that includes Papua, Aceh. What we have now in formal legal terms is the rules of engagement of BKO, bawah kendali operasi, the Governor, the Bupati and the police would mainly be in charge, in command of security. Sewaktu-waktu di bawah kendali tentara bisa masuk. [from time to time, underneath [the civil power] the defence forces can participate]. [in response to the question of the interviewer: Tetapi di bawah pengendalian polisi? [but under the command of the police?]]. Ya. Di bawah pengendalian polisi [yes, underneath police command]. But it really depends on which province, which township, whether things can work that way.

Again the minister’s statement supports the assumption that the military’s New Order mandate for internal security has now been removed and passed to the police. The military can support the police, but they do so under police command, in line with the original doctrine passed in 1999.

The minister is a political appointee who under Indonesia’s criticised defence laws does not actually command the military; one could argue that the minister cannot speak for uniformed defence personnel. It is possible that their view of TNI involvement in internal security is different. If we cross reference the minister’s opinion with former army generals such as Agus Widjojo who as the Chief of Staff for the Territorial Command in 2000 negotiated reforms to territorial activities. Widjojo’s view of the TNI’s current role in internal security accords with that of the minister.

At the time I became the KASTER [Chief of Staff for Territorial Affairs], at the time there emerged the New Paradigm part 2. I desired to place TNI underneath democratic

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93 Interview, Minister of Defence Prof. Juwono Sudarsono, 27 May 2008.
principles. TNI can be placed wherever, in whatever capacity in whatever form, that is all valid. So long as it is consistent with law. Because law gives the function of defence to the TNI... But [in what we do] we must continuously defend [mempertanggungjawabkan] that this is a defence function. But if not, then it is not valid. Except if a region is declared to be in a state of military or civil emergency... Now we see, actually in times of peace, the territorial command, babinsa, koramil and kodim, do not have any authority whatsoever in the regions. They do not capture thieves, they don’t reconnoitre subversives, they cannot mobilise the local population for implementing government programs. There isn’t any authority for that. They do not function in intelligence, and what they do also doesn’t connect with the statements of state officials, “TNI in the regions acts as intelligence agents” - how? Statements like that are born from the pride of the old era, today they [territorial TNI forces] can’t do anything, it’s a waste of resources.95

Thus the judgement of the military’s former highest ranking territorial officer is that the Indonesian armed forces in the regions may not perform security operations, unless under conditions of national emergency. While observers have claimed the military still has an unreformed mindset in which many officers conceive of themselves as guardians of internal security,96 this should not be taken to imply the military actually believes they may act as they wish in support of internal security objectives. The testimony of Juwono Sudarsono and Agus Widjojo suggest the TNI does not consider it lawful for their personnel to conduct repressive activities without political approval.

It must be conceded however that Widjojo was an architect of the military’s reform process, it is entirely possible therefore that his testimony is biased. Yet when we examine how the military responds to security crises in Indonesia today, Widjojo’s opinion is not at all different to that of the current Indonesian military leadership. Take for example some of the most recent incidences of political violence in Indonesia: attacks by the Papuan Liberation Organisation in the aftermath of Indonesia’s 2009 legislative elections.97 In this episode an armed, self-avowed separatist movement launched violent attacks to disrupt a

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95 Interview, Widjojo, April 2008.
97 According to media reports, the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM) launched coordinated attacks in Jayapura, Abepura and other places in Papua around 8 April 2009. These actions were timed to coincide with the 2009 legislative elections. The attacks were small in scale and, if anything, illustrate the weakness of the OPM rather than its strength. Nevertheless a sub-district police station was attacked, the Rectory of Cenderawasih University in Jayapura was burned down, five non-Papuan transmigrants were stabbed, a tanker carrying fuel was set alight and bombs set off in the border area with Papua New Guinea. ‘Aksi Serangan dan Peledakan di Papua Menjelang Pemilu’, ‘Polsek Abepura Diserang’, ‘Rektorat Uncen Terbakar’, ‘Bandara Udara Sentani Tetap Siaga I’, ‘Widodo: Tindak Tegas Pelakunya’, Sinar Indonesia Baru, 10 April 2009.
peaceful, democratic election. Surely such an incident, which gives the military ample propaganda ammunition on an issue deeply sensitive for the TNI, would be enough to push the military into a repressive crackdown? Yet despite the military being offered such an open invitation to discharge an internal security operation, the military leadership did not exploit the opportunity. When asked by the press, according to the Chief of the Defence Force Djoko Santoso, the TNI handed the entire episode over to the police:

We [TNI] prioritise [mengedepankan] the use of soft power. Yes, certainly the response will be in line with the appropriate legal corridor, that is police action... No there will not be [military operations – in response to the question of a journalist, "won't there be a military operation for capturing the suspects?"]

The most logical conclusion to make of the Panglima’s response is to view it in light of the evidence already presented. The Indonesian military leadership did not order their forces in Papua to respond with force because TNI was not permitted to do so. TNI operations are constrained under a definition of security which delegates internal security responsibilities to the police unless the president and parliament instruct otherwise.

Yet my line of argumentation has thus far leant heavily upon official attitudes from policymakers in Jakarta. It is plausible to suppose that far away from the central military leadership, disobedient parts of the territorial command may act like a law unto themselves in the regions. This illustrates the value of performing local level case studies.

In my research on how the police and the TNI behave in Yogyakarta, I found that the defence leadership’s interpretation of the role of the military in day-to-day internal security is understood and applied by TNI in the regions. In an interview with officers of the Yogyakarta Military Resort Command (Korem) 072 Pamungkas it was apparent that the army territorial personnel in my case study site did not believe they possess a mandate to enforce security. At one very strained meeting, three low middle-ranking officers, the head of intelligence for the Korem, the head of operations and the head of territorial forces, gave formal, on-the-record responses in an interview. At this meeting, I put a simple, direct

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question to the officers: could the Korem deploy its personnel to manage day-to-day security problems? The officers replied they could not. Authority to deploy their personnel comes from their senior regional commander (the Pangdam), who could only release personnel for routine security operations based upon a written request received from the regional police command. Such personnel are placed under police command for the duration of an agreed operation. These are the exact BKO principles described previously. I have located no evidence in any of the other interviews or documentary research I have done in Yogyakarta which would suggest this Korem is at all active in internal security; the exceptions to this conclusion are intelligence gathering and providing support to the police. We therefore see a continuity in the testimony of elite policymakers at the national level and subordinate officers at the operational level. These sources agree with one another that it is illegitimate for TNI forces to conduct repressive security operations without permission from civilian powers.

I am however aware of the difficulty of extrapolating broad conclusions from a single case study, the statements of officers in one Korem in Yogyakarta are unlikely to convince sceptical observers about trends in the rest of Indonesia. The last best method of confirmation is to use Indonesia’s online regional media to substantiate my premise that the Indonesian military is not actively involved in day-to-day security. It is conceded this is an imperfect form of research. It is difficult to find Indonesian regional media which have websites which support this kind data gathering. But with the tools I have available I have searched the online archives of three regional newspapers: the Tribun Timur (a Kompas Group affiliated newspaper from South Sulawesi), the Tribun Kaltim (another Kompas Group newspaper for Eastern Kalimantan) and the Lampung Post (affiliated with Media Indonesia Group). Searching through their online databases for as long as there are records, I collected articles which contained the keywords “TNI” and “Operasi”. I read through the results to identify local news stories which would indicate TNI territorial commands were independently deploying their troops in internal security operations in the areas covered by

99 Interview: Kasi Intelijen Mayor Suwarno, Kasi Teritorial Mayor Jawa Heru dan Kasi Operasi Nurodin, Korem 072, 30 June 2008.

100 As I explain in chapter two, I originally planned to execute comparative studies in other parts of Indonesia. A comparative studies would have helped to strengthen my core findings. Unfortunately time and money was scarce. Performing a comprehensive, single case study was the best I could reasonably achieve.
the newspapers. From the information available not a single story emerged which shows a military led, internal security operation.\textsuperscript{101} It stands to reason that if the Indonesian defence force was active in enforcing domestic security, there would be at least a handful of examples in these regional media. Yet not a single story existed to support that assumption. Therefore if we can extrapolate a conclusion from this evidence, regional TNI forces in these random areas of Indonesia have it seems followed the wishes of the civilian government and returned to their barracks.

I have made this analysis in painstaking detail for a very important reason: I argue that studies of security in Indonesia remain dominated by studies of the military, and this scholarly tendency needs to be reassessed. There are good reasons why Indonesian area studies have historically allocated so much attention to the military.\textsuperscript{102} For thirty two years the military was the repressive arm of the Suharto dictatorship and enjoyed a privileged role in society because of it. The turbulence of the early post-reformasi period invited a number of provocative questions as to what extent the TNI could continue to be a state within a state. Yet such questions are arguably out of place in the Indonesia of today. The greatest asset the TNI possessed which rendered a privileged status to the military was its role in intervening in Indonesian society for security purposes. This section has laid out the argument for why this power no longer exists. Any suggestion that the Indonesian military

\textsuperscript{101} In the case of the Lampung Post, fifteen articles came up over the period August 2004 – July 2009. Three were stories of local TNI activities, and one of these concerned a combined operation held by military police with Polri to search for illegal weapons (N.B the Post website only provides key word searches of the entire content of its archives). In the case of Tribun Kaltim, ten articles came up, regrettably only over the very short time period of October 2008 – March 2009 (presumably the Tribun does not electronically archive its news). There were three stories of local TNI activities, the only one of note concerned the deployment of four army battalions to the border areas of Kalimantan. Finally the Tribun Timur provided 114 hits over a time frame of at least February 2009 to August 2006. Summaries of about eighty stories were available from the Tribun website. Of these eighty stories, at least twelve were local news. Of these twelve, four could not be verified (as the web links were inactive), and eight others did not provide any information on TNI internal security operations. Many of these articles had to be searched from old cache pages filed on the internet. For verification purposes, I have retained records of these searches.

\textsuperscript{102} In purely quantitative terms there is a significantly greater degree of interest in studies of the Indonesian military as opposed to the police. In Annex D, I have reproduced some of the results of my database searches of existing material on studies of security in Indonesia. Depending by which measure we use, Annex D shows there are between three and two times more manuscripts on the Indonesian military than on the Indonesian police. These, however, are merely quantitative results. In qualitative terms the difference is incomparable. Most books on the Indonesian police (both in Indonesian and English) come from either Indonesian police headquarters or from the Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia. They are written by a small group of elites (many being former Indonesian police officers) mostly for policy purposes and appeal to a narrow audience. By comparison, there is a rich literature of scholarly, policy and other analyses on the Indonesian military, not directly dependent on the funding of NGOs or the Indonesian state.
is systematically, continuously intervening in internal security across the length and breadth of contemporary Indonesia in operations of its own making, is without basis in evidence.

This is not to overlook the possibility that evidence may arise in future which casts doubt upon my argument. Perhaps in isolated parts of Indonesia or particular regions there are local TNI forces performing active security operations. Future case studies of local security would do much to develop this picture. I would caution us though to place any future research in context. Today there are mountains of evidence to show the National Police are in both policy and practice, the primary internal security organisation in Indonesia. It therefore begs a question: why do scholars still talk so much about the military, which does so little, while the Indonesian police, which does so much, is comparatively overlooked?

My argument thus far reveals an important reality about security in Indonesia today: the star of the Indonesian military has fallen and the star of the police has risen. The MPR achieved an important historical feat in 2000. By separating the police from the Department of Defence and making Polri an autonomous national agency, the MPR made the police the most powerful and important security actor in Indonesia. The weight of all the evidence of the next five chapters supports this argument.

Decentralisation and the Empowerment of the Polisi Pamong Praja

After such a lengthy discussion of the police-military separation process we finally come to the other important part of the picture, the implications of the 1999 decentralisation reforms for regional security. Although regional government (pemerintah daerah or pemda) have been involved in law enforcement for a long time, for the most part it was weak and ineffective. Decentralisation did not significantly expand the enforcement powers of regional governments, but it did strengthen their enforcement capacity. This has lead to a dramatic increase in the effectiveness and efficiency of sub-national policing.
When we discuss law enforcement in a regional government context we refer to units known as the Polisi Pamong Praja (Pol.PP or civil service police). The Pol.PP are uniformed enforcement personnel who are responsible for executing sub-national government ordinances. The actual investigation of regulatory violation is performed by personnel known as Penyidik Pegawai Negri Sipil (or civil service investigators, PPNS). PPNS are bureaucrats who are licensed to investigate and charge people with violations of specific sectoral laws. They exist in the regional government environment but are also found in many different sectors in the Indonesian state – like the Immigration Service, the Tax Office and forestry agencies to name a few. The story of regional government policing is a story of how decentralisation reforms have taken this weak and overlooked part of the regional government apparatus and turned them into one of the most important elements of regional security.

What follows is a historical account of the civil service police, from their pre-independence origins through to their final evolution in the Suharto era. We then look at how the decentralisation reforms of 1999 strengthened the enforcement capabilities of regional government, particularly by transferring Pol.PP personnel from the sub-district to the district level of government. Finally we examine how these legal changes led to increased activities on the part of regional government policing agencies in Yogyakarta after 1999.

The Civil Service Police in the pre-independence, post-independence and Suharto eras

The Polisi Pamong Praja have a long history, albeit as an only minor part of the government apparatus. Their origins predate the Indonesian Republic and go back to the bailluws of the Dutch East India Company and much later, to the various police units of the Dutch colonial government. The Special Province of Yogyakarta was the first province to revive these security units in 1948, during the disorganisation of the revolutionary

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period. After the establishment of the Indonesian Republic, the interior minister in 1950 mandated the creation of “Kesatuan Polisi Pamong Praja” for every sub-district (Kecamatan or Kapanewon at that time) in the territory of Madura and Java. At this time such units were limited to a maximum of eleven personnel consisting of one chief, five police agents and five support personnel. In the year 1960 the then minister of the interior and regional autonomy expanded the Polisi Pamong Praja, permitting provincial governments outside Java and Madura to form their own Kesatuan. From its inception to the present, the purpose of the civil service police has remained essentially the same: to enforce regional government ordinances relating to “public order” (ketertiban umum). Regional governments have historically exercised these powers through regulating things such as the use of public and private spaces (like the construction of buildings) and eliminating vice (like prostitution and the trade in illegal alcohol).

When Indonesia first experimented with decentralisation in 1974, the civil service police obtained formal legitimacy but certain features of the law hindered the Pol.PP from implementing their mandate – of particular note was the relegation of the civil service police to the sub-district. The 1974 law on decentralisation formally granted regional heads of government (in the provinces and districts) the responsibility for managing the public order and tranquillity of their territories. The central government did not follow this statute with promised peraturan pemerintah (or central government regulations) which would have provided guidance on jurisdiction and clarified the division of responsibilities between the civil service police and Polri.

Perhaps the greatest weakness with the 1974 legislation for the civil service police was that it continued the relegation of the Pol.PP to the sub-district level of government. As some of my interviewees revealed, this decision to retain the Pol.PP at the sub-district level was a major strategic limitation on their effectiveness. In the Indonesian governmental system the sub-district is a purely functional part of the bureaucratic administration. The sub-district is

104 Dajoh and Ismail, Polisi Pamong Praja, 7.
105 Dajoh and Ismail, Hari Ini dan Esok, 5–7
107 UU 5/1974, Pasal 81, 86. Also Dajoh and Ismail, Polisi Pamong Praja, pp. 7–10, 25–26
108 UU No.5/1974, Pasal 86.
a bureaucracy which acts as the district government's service point for a number of villages. The kecamatan answers directly to the head of the district. The fact that the civil service police were split up among the kecamatan meant that their productivity was entirely dependent on the direction of the head of the sub-district (the Camat). There was minimal oversight from the district governments and the system was prone to corruption and administrative failures. To use a simple illustration, former chiefs of the kecamatan Pol.PP in the city of Yogyakarta have told me that they did not even bother to attempt to process violations of local government ordinances (*peraturan daerah* or perda) legally — since they did not have administrative relations with the court system. Instead they mostly handled violations of perda through discussion, and at times intimidation. One of my interviewees claimed that, prior to 1999 the Pol.PP had been considered one of the “dumping grounds” of the public service, where uneducated, rough bureaucrats could be deposited. He implied that, because the Pol.PP had few legal resources at the time, force had been one of their primary instruments.

Finally, the civil service police had always been a small, under resourced part of regional government. Even in the self-proclaimed largest Pol.PP force in Indonesia - the Capital City Province of Jakarta - the numbers of personnel were tiny. In 1995 there were only 753 civil service police for the entire city, giving Jakarta a Pol.PP to population ratio of 1:13,750. For much of Indonesia's history therefore the Pol.PP has been a small and impotent part of the local government apparatus.

Indonesia’s ‘big bang’ decentralisation reforms of 1999 did two things which strengthened the capacity of regional government to enforce ordinances: the reforms changed the position of the civil service police in the government apparatus while granting much broader powers to provincial and especially district administrations. The first of these changes came about through Article 120 of Law No. 22/1999 which gave districts and

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110 Interview with Kepala Kantor Pol.PP and former Kepala (Mantri) Kesatuan Polisi Pamong Praja Kecamatan, Kabupaten Bantul, R.M. Kandiawan, 29 October 2007

111 Dajoh and Ismail, *Polisi Pamong Praja*, p. 38
provinces the authority to operate their own Pol.PP detachments. This gave regional heads of government greater opportunities to fully utilize the Pol.PP as regional law enforcers.\textsuperscript{112} The second factor was the way in which the decentralisation program enhanced regional government itself. This influence was subtle but powerful. One of the heads of the Pol.PP offices in Yogyakarta, whose period as a Pol.PP agent spans both the pre and post 1999 era, argues that the net effect of all the powers that decentralisation handed to district governments was to "strengthen the voice of the Bupati."\textsuperscript{113} He argues because decentralisation gave district governments great powers over a wide variety of policy areas - from service delivery to public works - the districts became a lot bolder in making regulations and setting policy. As regional government became more active in setting policy it needed also to become more active in enforcing its ordinances.\textsuperscript{114} In turn, this entailed a stronger Pol.PP and PPNS.

Thus, while provincial and district leaders have great autonomy for setting policy and are now able to field large, specialised regulatory agencies, the decentralisation laws did not actually change regional government's \textit{powers} of law enforcement. Governors and district heads still continue to be responsible for 'upholding public order', just as they were under the 1974 law.\textsuperscript{115} Today, as in the past, regional governments have applied the normative definition of public order to mean tackling vice and enforcing licensing regulations. So although the 1999 decentralisation laws did not add powers to local governments, what the laws served to do was to open the opportunity for regional government to become much more active in making and upholding local laws.

It is clear that local government enforcement in my case study site dramatically increased in the years after 1999. Using the city district of Yogyakarta as the first example, prior to 1999, there were fourteen local ordinances in the city of Yogyakarta which carried some form of penalty. These fourteen regulations had been accumulated over almost half a century of the city's existence. After 1999 the number of laws which carried some form of

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{112}] Republik Indonesia: Undang-Undang 22/1999 tentang Pemerintahan Daerah, pasal 120. This law has been renewed with Undang-Undang 32/2004 tentang Pemerintahan Daerah, Pasal 148.
\item[\textsuperscript{113}] Interview, Kandiawan, October 2007.
\item[\textsuperscript{114}] Kristiansen and Trijono, 'Local Government Reforms in Indonesia', 251.
\item[\textsuperscript{115}] UU/22 1999, Pasal 43, (f).
\end{itemize}
sanction skyrocketed, with the government passing thirty six new ordinances between 1999 and 2008.  

Similarly, the productivity of the civil service in upholding these laws also increased dramatically. In the period from March 1998 to April 1999 for example - two years before the formation of this district’s special enforcement agency, the Dinas Ketertiban (or Public Order Bureau) - there were 116 activities involving investigations by PPNS of the city district. Over the same period in 1999/2000 that number was 197. In 2002, the year after the formation of the Dinas Ketertiban, there were 1523 investigations by PPNS, increasing to 1585 in 2003, 2096 in 2004, 2842 in 2005 and 1592 in 2006. Taking the district of Bantul as the second example, after 1998 the district government in Bantul dramatically stepped up law enforcement. Only three perda existed before 2000 which were enforced by the PPNS of that kabupaten. After 2000 a total of thirty one Perda were created which carry some form of penalty. At the provincial level meanwhile, since 1999 the government has added fourteen new misdemeanour offences to its list of ordinances, compared to the eight existing offences prior to 1999.

We can see therefore that a revolution in regulation has been taking place at the sub-national level. Large areas of social life previously untouched by government control, or otherwise imperfectly supervised are now being increasingly regulated by the provincial and especially the district governments. To give an idea of the scope of these regulations, the city of Yogyakarta has fifty two criminal ordinances, twenty relate to the collection of revenue, twenty four others concern the licensing of particular types of enterprise or activity (such as licensing construction, regulating street trading and public parking, etc.), while other miscellaneous statutes control the sale of alcohol, govern water quality and regulate registration on the civil list (catatan sipil), among other things. Clearly this explosion in regulatory activity indicates just how aggressively regional governments have

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120 Dinas Ketertiban Kota Yogyakakarta: Daftar Peraturan yang Mengandung Sanksi (2008?)
begun to impose their mandate for public order. In the post-reformasi period this trend has elevated regional government to be perhaps the second greatest source of law enforcement after the Indonesian police.

Yet despite the flowering of regional regulation, local government ordinances carry much less weight than offences under the national criminal code. Under Indonesia’s regional autonomy law, local government regulations which carry a sanction and which invoke the regional government mandate for “public order”, have the status of a misdemeanour (or *tindak pidana ringan*). A misdemeanour carries a maximum punishment of six months imprisonment or Rp.50 million fine (approximately US$5,500).121 Thus the law enforcement powers of the regional governments are not approximate to the criminal statutes of the central government. The districts and provinces are therefore incapable of duplicating the powers of the police.

The weak position of regional government law enforcement is further complicated by the fact that a number of offences (especially related to vice) also fall within the responsibility of the Indonesian police. Polri’s area of criminal investigative authority is determined by the Indonesian criminal code, the KUHP (*Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana*).122 Within the KUHP there are a number of sections which deal with particular classes of vice, like prostitution and “indecent behaviour” (*perbuatan cabul*). Local government ordinances are not permitted to contradict the national laws.123 Perda also cannot supererogate vice crimes within the KUHP. An example of this is gambling, which is classed as a pure crime to be investigated by the police.124 Prostitution and ‘indecent behaviour’ on the other hand are complex issues. The KUHP does not forbid prostitution but it does forbid ‘pimping’ or deriving “profit from the immoral acts of women.” The KUHP also forbids the running of brothels.125 As I will discuss in chapter four, prostitution in public places is dealt with in

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121 UU 32/2004 tentang Pemerintahan Daerah, Pasal 143(2).
122 The KUHP constitutes Indonesia’s first and most comprehensive crimes statute. Under the principles of Indonesian jurisprudence the powers, investigation procedure and trial procedure for the police, prosecutors and law courts is based on a separate law, Undang-Undang 8/1981 tentang Hukum Acara Pidana (or the KUHAP). Other miscellaneous laws (such as Law No.22/1997 on Narcotics) also separately delegate responsibilities to the police for distinct classes of crime.
124 Republik Indonesia: *Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana* (KUHP), Pasal 303.
125 KUHP, Pasal 296, 506.
Yogyakarta under *perda*. In offences such as prostitution, where the police are responsible for part of an offence and local government is responsible for another aspect of the same offence, generally my research finds the avoidance of duplicated authorities.\(^{126}\) A large number of miscellaneous vice crimes also enter the KUHP like holding rowdy public events without police permission or impersonating a medical professional, among other unusual crimes.\(^ {127}\) Yet a number of other vice crimes are not dealt with by the national criminal code, one prominent example being the illegal alcohol trade, which in Yogyakarta is controlled by local laws. Thus *peraturan daerah* on public order generally operate in the area where the national criminal code does not.

In summary, although the powers of local government over ‘public order’ have long been recognised in Indonesian law, it is only with the passage of the 1999 decentralisation statutes that the central government has encouraged the regions to exploit their limited policing powers. Although regional governments remain confined to policing relatively minor areas like licensing and vice, we can nevertheless detect a major increase in enforcement activity in Yogyakarta after the passage of the regional autonomy laws. It is safe to assume that other regions probably experienced much similar changes. This indicates that regional government does occupy a small but important position within sub-national policing networks.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has provided an historical discussion of the national legal and political events which contributed to the current division of roles between the police, military and regional government. The post-1999 period has witnessed the rise of the Indonesian police and to a lesser extent the rise of regional government as important security players. The

\(^{126}\) In the case of the city of Yogyakarta for example, I find that the district police and the district Pol.PP hold combined operations in which police pool their authority to enter private places (suspected brothels), while the Pol.PP apply their *perda* granted powers to arrest suspects in public places. Field Observation, Combined Operation between Dinas Ketertiban, City of Yogyakarta and police of Poltabes Kota Yogyakarta, 25 July 2007.

\(^{127}\) KUHP, Pasal 510 and 512a. See also the broader section on Pelanggaran Ketertiban Umum, Bab.II.
demilitarisation of regional government in the early reformasi period constitutes a powerful explanation for why the role of the once significant Indonesian military appears to have declined sharply in domestic security. Yet the demilitarisation of regional government constitutes only a partial explanation of the shifting distribution of power. The other part of the equation has been the separation of Polri from the armed forces. Prior to the separation, the army exercised suzerainty over the police. The institutional separation put an end to this relationship of domination.

Despite strong perceptions to the contrary I argue that the separation of Polri from TNI has resulted in an almost complete removal of the military from the world of active, day-to-day security. The separation process was put on the ABRI agenda during the crisis of reformasi. Although the process was rushed, the defence and police leadership produced some very important policy on structural separation and protocols for police-military cooperation. Although some scholars argue the Indonesian government should codify regulations for interagency cooperation, I argue that the police and military today still retain very important agreements over Polri-TNI joint operations from the pre-separation period.

The most meaningful part of the separation process was the debate in the MPR over Polri/TNI reform in 2000. This debate, and the security statutes which emanated from it, created the contemporary roles of the police and the military. These laws dictate that the police is the primary instrument of domestic security and the military is not permitted to involve itself in this area without political approval. The defence leadership respects these normative legal constraints. The net consequence of these policies has been the empowerment of the police within domestic security at the expense of the military.

Section three provided an overview of the Pol.PP. Although the lineage of the Pol.PP extends at least until the early years of the Indonesian Republic, for many decades the civil service police were an under-resourced, feeble part of the law enforcement apparatus. Until the transition period, the Pol.PP were retained at the lower levels of the civilian administration. With decentralisation, the provincial and in particular district governments, were given grander regulatory powers. With the granting of these powers, the districts and provinces also obtained control over the Pol.PP and began using these instruments more
efficiently. Nevertheless the law enforcement capability of regional governments place them in a poor second place to the police. In the case study site today however, decentralisation has made regional government the second most important source of law enforcement behind Polri.
Chapter 2: Introducing the Yogyakarta Case Study Site

This chapter introduces the case study site. Part of its purpose is to argue that a single, regional case study can make important contributions to studies of networked security in Indonesia. In making this case, I will explain how Yogyakarta was selected for this research. I will then describe the value of case study methodology for answering my original questions and consider potential objections to the relevance of Yogyakarta, as a case study site, for interpreting security trends in broader Indonesia. In brief, I argue that the rich, qualitative data that emerges from a single case study project makes this form of research both justifiable and valuable, even for its purely empirical benefits. I argue that the case study site does have a good degree of generalisability for trends in other parts of Indonesia. This is based in part on the jurisdictions of the state security actors found within the study site. After laying out this case we then move on to an examination of the region of Yogyakarta, looking at its main social, economic, political and security features.

The largest part of this chapter however, consists of an analysis of the major public security organisations in the Yogyakarta region: their size, jurisdiction and a broad overview of their activities. The intention here is to peel back the onion once again, moving down from the level of Yogyakarta as a single unit to reveal the main elements of the regional security network as individual actors. In this chapter, I only consider state security organisations. My justification for doing so is that these governmental actors are large and complex in their own right. As such, the government security organisations deserve the longest introduction. Non-state security groupings (such as commercial security companies or neighbourhood watch groups) tend to be smaller, single issue organisations, and easier to describe. Therefore I postpone a discussion of these groupings until their respective chapters, five and six.

The amount of space devoted to each of the state security organisations below is proportional to their importance in regional security. I examine first the provincial police command (Polda DIY) and its sub-units. I then evaluate regional government law
enforcement agencies. Regional government possesses both generalist enforcement agencies for upholding ordinances (civil service police) as well as certain specialist agencies (such as the regional Forestry and Transportation Bureaus). I then look at the miscellaneous cluster of national government organisations which play small, sectorally specific roles in law enforcement. The agencies I include in this research are the Yogyakarta army territorial command and national Tax and Immigration Offices. It is important to point out that this list is not intended to be exhaustive. There are several state agencies involved in regional policing which have not been included in this study due to obstacles encountered in research. ¹ What this research aims to do is to provide the most comprehensive analysis of the many groupings involved in the regional security network, under the conditions encountered.

The data presented in this chapter leads to two main conclusions. Firstly, a single qualitative, in-depth, case study of Yogyakarta is valuable. This is not only because such research provides new empirical data for studies of security in Indonesia but also because the results are potentially generalisable. Secondly, when compared to the functions and powers of other state security agencies, the Indonesian police clearly emerges as a metaphorical giant among the pygmies.

¹ There are at least another three public agencies which perform some kind of policing function that I was not able to include in this study – the State Prosecutors (or Kejaksan), the Customs Service (or Bea Cukai), and the Indonesian Railways Corporation (who administer special rail police). When I requested data from these bureaucracies I encountered some of the common obstacles of field research. To illustrate I explain using the example of the Kejaksan. The Indonesian state prosecutors are actually able to investigate corruption through a complex loophole in Indonesian anti-corruption laws [UU No.31/1999 tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi and its antecedent UU No.20 2001, see 'Untuk Korupsi: KUHAP Perlu Diterobos', Kompas 15 December 2003]. I approached the provincial state prosecutors (or Kejaksan Tinggi) with an interview request on this topic. Although having both national and regional government research permission the Kejaksan Tinggi decided that it was necessary for me to obtain the direct permission of the Attorney General (Kejaksan Agung). The red tape and waiting time involved in this process rendered the requirement simply impossible. This type of response was common, but thankfully not universal, during my research. In any case, simple practical problems such as this have meant that it has not been possible to provide a holistic overview of all policing/security actors in the case study. Instead what I have attempted is to analyse a representative sample of security organisations.
Yogyakarta as a Case Study and Its Contribution to the Study of Security Networks in Indonesia

I originally did not conceive of Yogyakarta as an ideal setting for the study of security cooperation. In fact I originally chose it for precisely the opposite reason. Nevertheless I believe I can make a defensible argument that Yogyakarta does have value for understanding security management in Indonesia. I believe we can extrapolate broad conclusions about how security networks may operate elsewhere in Indonesia on the basis of my findings from Yogyakarta. I must stress, however, that the primary intention of this dissertation is to execute a detailed, qualitative analysis of a single case study. Ultimately I justify this dissertation for its qualitative richness rather than the capacity to generalise my findings.

I picked Yogyakarta initially on the basis of a hypothesis that proved to be incorrect. As explained in the introduction, existing literature on security management in Indonesia emphasises the dysfunctionality of the sector. This same literature shaped the direction of my pre-fieldwork research. Before initiating field research, I developed the hypothesis that relations among public security institutions in Indonesia must be poor. I therefore saw Yogyakarta as an ideal environment for testing this hypothesis through the ‘falsification principle.’ Originally I chose Yogyakarta because it was an area with a small economy and a stable security environment. Both these factors at first glance suggest that there are not much external stimuli in the security environment which would cause security actors to compete (either for direct material benefit or for expanding their area of professional responsibility through ‘turf wars’). The almost universally negative conclusions of the

2 We will find that, with some exception in chapters four and five, I do not make references to the influence of corruption or the black economy on relations between security actors. Although I originally intended to include this topic in my research, what seemed easy in the safe confines of my office proved hard in practice. In reality I found little evidence that the black economy is a source of competition between security actors in Yogyakarta. I have found evidence to suggest corruption can prevent cooperation, yet illegal rackets do not appear to be causes of actual conflict. One hypothetical reason for this finding, at least according to one of my journalist contacts, is that the police and TNI in Yogyakarta have mutually divided certain territories, thus avoiding competition over ownership of protection rackets. Yet this same journalist also described how difficult it is to research corruption. This source even conceded he had no reliable proof for his claim
existing literature led to my original thinking. On this basis I assumed that if relations between security forces were bad in Yogyakarta then this was likely to be the case in other parts of Indonesia. As it turned out, this hypothesis proved wrong. On the contrary, institutional cooperation and divisions of labour between security actors were relatively positive. Part of the aim of this thesis therefore is to explain why my original hypothesis was wrong while reflecting on the other significant finding of my research, namely that the Indonesian police is dominant in the sector.

An initial criticism of a dissertation of this kind may be to question the value of a single, regional case study. I argue that the empirical benefit of accumulating original, pioneering knowledge from research of this kind, is justification enough of its value. According to such an argument the value of single case study research lies in its ability to produce qualitatively rich data that exposes the complexity of the issues that lie within the case. What is important according to this proposition is the case study itself, rather than its potential for generalisability: "In [the] qualitative case study, we seek greater understanding of X, ["X" represents the topic of the case study research] its embeddedness and interaction within its contexts."\(^3\)

There is, however, vigorous debate within academia as to what the true value of case study research is. Others make the argument that the primary intent of case study research should be to produce conclusions which hold comparative relevance across a given field of research.\(^4\) This assumption is however, contestable. Bent Flyvbjerg has made a very

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\(^{4}\) John Gerring ‘What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good for?’ *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 98, No. 2, (May, 2004), p. 341-354. Gerring’s argument is much more complex than I explain, but his working definition of case study research does assume that there is an intention to infer information “across
passionate defence of case studies in general and single case studies in particular. Although his argument is too detailed to reproduce here, in opening his defence he argues that context-independent facts (or the realm of analytical theory so he deems it) can only bring the student to a beginner’s level of knowledge on any given subject. But context-dependent knowledge and experience (such as that found from the analysis of case-studies) produces a much higher level of understanding. Flyvbjerg reproduces an eloquent statement from Hans Eysenck to illustrate his meaning: “sometimes we simply have to keep our eyes open and look carefully at individual cases—not in the hope of proving anything, but rather in the hope of learning something!” Therefore, my first justification for executing this single case study is because it is a powerful way for us to form original knowledge about the practice of security management at the sub-national level. Such information is difficult to duplicate in shorter periods of fieldwork in multiple places.

Quite apart, however, from the solely academic justifications for the selection of the case study site, there were also simple, practical reasons that determined Yogyakarta would be the site of my research. A dominant consideration was simply time. This research began in May 2007 and terminated in December 2008. In total, 15 months was spent in the field. I made a conservative but realistic assessment half-way into the research task that it would be impractical to consider incorporating additional, comparative case studies into the dissertation. This had been my original goal, but given the time necessary to process official permission, build contacts, relocate my office and do other things, comparative units” or infer generalisable conclusions across the topic. As such he does lay out the premise of some within academia that case study research must have comparative usefulness.

As he puts it: “For researchers, the closeness of the case study to real-life situations and its multiple wealth of details are important in two respects. First, it is important for the development of a nuanced view of reality, including the view that human behavior cannot be meaningfully understood as simply the rule governed acts found at the lowest levels of the learning process and in much theory... If researchers wish to develop their own skills to a high level, then concrete, context-dependent experience is just as central for them as to professionals learning any other specific skills. Concrete experiences can be achieved via continued proximity to the studied reality and via feedback from those under study... The second main point in connection with the learning process is that there does not and probably cannot exist predictive theory in social science. Social science has not succeeded in producing general, context-independent theory and, thus, has in the final instance nothing else to offer than concrete, context-dependent knowledge. And the case study is especially well suited to produce this knowledge.” While I am not certain I share Flyberg’s pessimism about predictive theory within the social sciences, I do support his argument for the qualitative value of case study research. See: Bent Flyvbjerg, ‘Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research.’ Qualitative Inquiry, Vol. 12, No.2 (April 2006), 223.

cases became impractical. My original selection of Yogyakarta was also based upon personal reasons. I completed six months of language training in Yogyakarta during the last half of 2006. This period enabled me to build contacts with people in the non-government sector and the academic world. These people became my initial contacts when I began my research proper in 2007.

There are also unique comparative advantages to doing research in Yogyakarta. As will be discussed below Yogyakarta is a university city. As such it is relatively open to researchers in general and foreign researchers in particular. Every year, literally thousands of Indonesian social science students in Yogyakarta undertake their final year undergraduate research project, or *skripsi* as it is termed. Many choose topics on governance related areas. Because of this, the Yogyakarta regional bureaucracy is accustomed to receiving students armed with letters of recommendation, much like I. In a country such as Indonesia with a highly bureaucratic culture of administration and recalling that this topic is one that is sensitive for the Indonesian state, Yogyakarta’s added advantage in being an environment where officials were accustomed to academic research became another argument in its favour. Thus for practical reasons, Yogyakarta became the location of choice for this research. When judging the academic value of my thesis therefore we must weigh up any doubts we may have over the comparative usefulness of the case study against the value of the original data. In the final calculation I argue it is better for the research to be completed in qualitative depth rather than not to have been done at all.

*Is Yogyakarta an Abnormal Region?*

While the strength of this research lies foremost in its analysis of the relations within the case study, I also argue that findings from Yogyakarta can be useful for deriving conclusions about networked security in other parts of Indonesia. If we could construct an artificial “average” province in a country as diverse as Indonesia, then Yogyakarta would not be that far outside the average, at least in statistical terms. In making this argument I am
cognisant of common perceptions that Yogyakarta is an exceptional province due to unique aspects of its culture and politics. The thesis does have merit when we consider the role of the sultan in local politics and other topics. I propose, however, when it comes to security management, there is much more that is “average” about Yogyakarta than exceptional.

There is a common perception in Indonesia that Yogyakarta is an exceptionally peaceful region. Comparative crime data from police headquarters (Markas Besar or Mabes Polri) though calls the view into question. The data in Annex E shows that during 2003-2006, Yogyakarta had the twentieth highest rate of reported crime (per head of population) among Indonesia’s thirty one provinces. This puts Yogyakarta in the middle third of Indonesia’s provinces, at the bottom of the middle but in the middle nevertheless. Yogyakarta also has, unexpectedly, the second highest rate of crime among the provinces of Java. While there are weaknesses with these statistics, these reported rates of crime are the most reliable comparative measure of the condition of insecurity across Indonesia. This data set does demonstrate that Yogyakarta is not an insecurity-free utopia.

Another argument for the exceptionality of Yogyakarta concern special features of the province’s governance and culture. As Sutoro Eko argues, there are three features of Yogyakarta which make it different to all other parts of Indonesia: its unusual system of land title, its high Javanese culture and its hereditary governorship. All three issues are linked with the special role of the sultan/governor of Yogyakarta. The present province of Yogyakarta consists of two kingdoms of the Dutch colonial era – the small princedom the Kadipaten of Pakualaman and its suzerain, the Kasultanan of Yogyakarta. During the revolutionary period, these royal households agreed to enter into the contemporary state of Indonesia. As recognition of their patriotism (and uniqueness) the Indonesian government

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7 Despite the iconoclastic title, the following text does an excellent job of discussing the special features of Yogyakarta and presenting them as issues for political reform: Abdur Rozaki and Titok Hariyanto (ed), Membongkar Mitos Keistimewaan Yogyakarta (Yogyakarta: IRE Press, 2003), see especially Pendahuluan pp.1-12.

8 Firstly, this data set does not distinguish between types of crime. Kalimantan Timur for example may have a lot of violent crime hidden in its figures, while Yogyakarta may have more light offences like theft. Secondly, these figures depend upon the willingness of citizens to report crime. So, it may be that citizens in Jakarta for example are more willing to report crime than citizens in Aceh. Although these factors temper accuracy of this data, this source is still one of the only pieces of comparative data on crime trends across Indonesia.

9 By mention of land title, Sutoro refers to the fact that much of Yogyakarta’s land is actually owned by the sultan. Sutoro Eko ‘Membuat Keistimewaan Lebih Istimewa.’ In: Rozaki and Hariyanto, Membongkar Mitos Keistimewaan Yogyakarta, XXV.
has passed a series of laws granting hereditary executive leadership to the families of the sultan of Yogyakarta and Paku Alam. Since the early period of the Indonesian republic therefore, the sultans of Yogyakarta (Sri Sultan IX and X) have assumed the office of governor. Underpinning the political reality that the sultan occupies both a royal post as well as that of the head of regional government, is a very strong cultural reverence that the original residents of Yogyakarta have for the sultan. It is usual for the sultan’s decisions to be received without question. In effect, it is the sultan who sets Yogyakarta apart from the rest of Indonesia.

Although the sultan/governor has powerful normative authority, we must question to what extent such authority makes security management in Yogyakarta different to the rest of Indonesia. I argue the sultan has limited influence on the security landscape. In formal political terms, the sultan’s powers as governor are no different to the rest of Indonesia’s other thirty two provincial heads. In terms of his normative powers, the sultan usually exercises his special moral authority only in the resolution of conflict. The most famous example of this comes from the rioting which shook Indonesia during the fall of President Suharto. While the nearby city of Solo suffered severe rampages, in May 1998 the sultan appealed to massive numbers of protestors taking to the streets of Yogyakarta and asked them to avoid violence. For the most part, Yogyakartans obeyed. Despite this extraordinary influence any conflict must be very serious, protracted and intractable for the sultan to be moved to intervene. Such examples of direct appeals by the sultan are very rare. No such action took place during my time in Yogyakarta. For every incident in which the sultan chooses to take part there are uninterrupted years where demonstrations, strikes, murders, robberies and other routine problems occur without his intervention. It is the management of security that takes place around the ordinary, day-to-day, week-to-week

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10 Rozaki and Haryanto, *Membongkar Mitos*, 26-28. Further clarified in UU 5/1974 and UU 22/1999 penjelasan pasal 122. Though somewhat controversially UU.No.32/2004, pasal 226 provides that Yogyakarta will be treated like any other province, meaning its hereditary governorship would end with the sultan’s last term as governor. In 2009, largely for political reasons, the president decided to extend the sultan’s term as governor. In any case this incompatibility between Yogyakarta’s hereditary royalty and Indonesia’s modern democracy will probably be resolved sooner or later. ‘Sultan Tak Permasalahkan Perpanjangan Perpanjangan Jabatan Gubernur’, Detiknews.com, 6 October 2008.

calendar that is of most interest to this research. During such times the sultan does not take direct interest.

There are also some features of security management in Yogyakarta which are very likely to be similar to security management in the rest of Indonesia. One of the core findings of this research is that there is a relatively clear division of labour between government security actors. This division of labour is dependent upon boundaries imposed by law and regulation which it can be argued is applicable across Indonesia, not just in Yogyakarta. The most generalisable set of security actors are the national government institutions which operate in the regions. The police, the TNI, the immigration service, the customs office, the state prosecutors, tax inspectors etc. are all highly centralised institutions operating on national laws and doctrine which are determined by their respective headquarters in Jakarta and by the Indonesian government. As such, many aspects of the work practices of these institutions in Yogyakarta are likely to be present beyond the case study as well. But such standardisation is not uniformly true of all actors. Regional autonomy empowers provincial and district governments to draft their own policies in key domains. Even so, national laws and regulations establish the limits of regional government’s law enforcement powers. Thus the national legal parameters on the behaviour of law enforcement organisations within regional government, is the same across Indonesia. Even if we selectively refer to some of the non-government security elements - like the commercial security sector, community oriented policing forums, and the rondasiskamling - chapters five and six demonstrate that the police regulate and supervise each of these groupings. This police management strategy is likely to be applied outside the territory of Polda DIY, as it is determined by policy established in national police headquarters.

While it is acknowledged that further comparative research is required to determine the relevance of my findings for other regions in Indonesia, I can make a defensible argument that patterns of security management in Yogyakarta are probably not exceptional when

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compared to a hypothetical mean average. Crime trends and the activities of state security institutions are likely to be similar in Yogyakarta to other regions of Indonesia. While Yogyakarta does have an exceptional form of government and culture, it is far from certain that these factors wield significant influence on the regional security landscape.

A Description of Yogyakarta and its Security Environment

Having examined the rationale behind the selection of the case study site and possible questions over the usefulness of data from Yogyakarta, we now turn to an overview of the case study site itself. Geographically, Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta (DIY) is located on the southern coast of Java island. Its land borders are met on all sides by its larger neighbour, Central Java Province [see map at Annex F]. In terms of both population size and land area, Yogyakarta is the smallest province in Indonesia. The province’s 3,185 square kilometres of territory is roughly equivalent to one and a quarter times the size of Luxembourg. The province is split up into five districts, the capital city district (Kotamadya or Kota) of Yogyakarta which is exclusively urban and developed. Part of the urban sprawl of Yogyakarta city spills over into its two neighbouring districts Bantul in the south and Sleman in the north. Because these districts are closest to the capital city, Sleman and Bantul are partly urbanised but also have large belts of rural farmlands in their northern and southern extremities. Of the two Sleman is the most developed. Bantul and Sleman are bordered by two very rural Kabupaten (districts) Gunung Kidul and Kulon Progo. Gunung Kidul is the largest of Yogyakarta’s districts, with 46% of DIY’s land area, followed by Kulon Progo with 18.4%, Sleman 18%, Bantul 15% and the city of Yogyakarta with 1%.13 It should be noted that the districts of Kulon Progo and Gunung Kidul do not feature prominently in this research, precisely because they are very isolated.14

14 The seats of government in Kulon Progo and Gunung Kidul are remote and ill-serviced by roads infrastructure. It was unproductive therefore for me to do detailed research in the regions of these two districts. Left alone this judgement may open my research to the criticism that it is heavily weighted towards an analysis of security in the urban centres of Yogyakarta. To address this potential weakness I dropped my analysis down one level and also examined policing in four rural sub-districts in Sleman and Bantul which
The population of Yogyakarta is also small and is concentrated in urban centres rather than villages. According to data from 2005, the population of DIY was 3.281 million, of this figure around 59.1% were classified as living in urban areas while 40.89% lived in rural areas. This trend is generally born out in the three districts that are the focus of this study, each of which has a high population density per square kilometre of land area.\textsuperscript{15}

Socially, Yogyakarta is in some ways the Boston of Indonesia – it is a region that on the one hand has a bad reputation for poverty but on the other has a good reputation for tertiary education services and tourism. There are some forty universities that operate in Yogyakarta (most of them in Sleman), including prestigious institutions like Gadjah Mada University, which is ranked among the top four universities in Indonesia.\textsuperscript{16} Despite perceptions that Yogyakarta is underdeveloped in comparison with other provinces, DIY has a deceptively high rate of workforce participation; 66% of the population over fifteen years was in employment in 2006.\textsuperscript{17} In line with its profile as a university town an unsurprisingly large number of people over the age of 15, 12.4%, were still obtaining an education in 2006.\textsuperscript{18} Despite the balance of Yogyakarta’s population living in urban centres, an indicator of the under-performance of the region’s economy is the fact that 37% of the workforce, the largest share, was still occupied in the agricultural sector. The other big employers, the retail and restaurant sector as well as the non-financial services industry absorbed a further 22% and 14.9% respectively of the Yogyakartan workforce.\textsuperscript{19} Taking this information we can basically depict the province as looking in economic-demographic terms like a fried egg – there is a large, non-industrial, services based city in the middle of

\textsuperscript{15} BPS, \textit{Yogyka dalam Angka}, ‘Kepadatan Penduduk’, pg.73. The city of Yogyakarta has the highest people to land ratio, with 12,939 people per kilometre. Sleman comes in second with 1756 people per km. For Bantul statistics were not available (owing to the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake) but it is unlikely to be very different to Sleman.


\textsuperscript{19} This compares to around 40% of the Indonesian national workforce employed in agriculture and fisheries industries and about 21% of the national workforce employed in the non-financial services industry. Badan Pusat Statistik: Population 15 Years of Age and Over Who Worked by Main Industry (see August 2008 column) < http://www.bps.go.id/sector/employ/table2.shtml>. Last accessed: March 2009.
the province (the yoke). This urban zone is ringed to its north, south, east and west by agrarian country-side that is still based on a farming economy (the egg white). Given the concentration of the workforce in the agriculture and services sector we can see the reality that the population of Yogyakarta is in general, poor.

The relatively underdeveloped state of the region’s economy can also be seen when looking at gross regional domestic product (GRDP). In the year 2006, Yogyakarta’s GRDP sat at Rp 29.4 trillion. In per capita terms this translated to Rp 8.6 million per head of population, about half the national average in real terms.\(^\text{20}\) By sector, the non-financial services industry (of which the majority comes from public sector services) and the hotel and restaurant industry were the largest contributors to economic activity (making up 20% and 19% of GRDP respectively) while agriculture provided 15.5% of GRDP in 2006. The manufacturing sector, the transport/communication sector and the construction sector were smaller contributors, making up 13.8%, 10% and 9% respectively. By district Sleman, followed by the city of Yogyakarta and then Bantul were the largest contributors to regional growth.\(^\text{21}\) What we can conclude from these figures again is the under-development of the region; the Yogyakarta economy is based mostly on primary and tertiary industry.

Turning to consider the security profile of Yogyakarta, when assessing the scale of threats to regional security we can divide this topic into actual security threats versus potential security threats. If we consider actual security threats then Yogyakarta, like most of the rest of Indonesia is reasonably stable. The province’s primary actual threat is standard crime (robbery, theft, etc.). But the region’s underdevelopment, combined with the political agitation that comes with being a university city, make for a complex set of potential security threats.

\(^{20}\) This data is tabulated in 2006 prices. Considered from the perspective of constant prices (base year 2000), GRDP in the year 2000 was Rp4,318,350 per capita while in 2006, GRDP per capita was 5,174,000. This makes for a growth rate of 14% over the period. In other words, there was not a significant improvement in provincial economic performance versus population size over the period. Yogyakarta’s GRDP per capita in 2006 was about half the 2006 Indonesian average of Rp.8.3 million (in constant 2000 prices). BPS, Yogya Dalam Angka, 502-503. Indonesia: BPS website, <http://www.bps.go.id/sector/population/tables.shtml>. Last accessed: 3 March 2009.

\(^{21}\) Sleman, Yogyakarta city and Bantul produced 30%, 27% and 20% of GRDP (in 2000 constant prices) respectively: BPS, Yogya Dalam Angka, 508-527.
Considering Yogyakarta’s actual security problems, crime trends in the region tend to be weighted towards crimes against property. Based on the statistics of the regional police command, Polda DIY, during 2002 to June 2007 there were 1809 reported incidences of serious theft (pencurian dengan pemberatan) and 2713 reported motor vehicle thefts. This trend is probably linked to the transient population of students, who are anecdotally both the source and the victims of such crimes.\textsuperscript{22} Despite the frequency of lighter offences Yogyakarta also experiences its own share of violent crime; in the same period there were 528 reported cases of violent robbery (pencurian dengan kekerasan), 215 cases of serious assault (penganiyaan berat) and sixty reported murders. There is also a very prevalent trend towards vice crimes, in particular those involving narcotics.\textsuperscript{23} While Yogyakarta is not considered a central point for the production of drugs (or illegal alcohol for that matter) the large university population makes Yogyakarta a big retail market for such contraband.\textsuperscript{24}

What these trends tell us is that the university population probably makes certain types of crime swell, such as property theft and the narcotics trade. With these exceptions, Yogyakarta suffers much the same crime problems as the rest of Indonesia.

Turning to Yogyakarta’s potential security threats, many of these are linked to Yogyakarta’s profile as a place of intellectual ferment. The most direct example of Yogyakarta’s potential for security problems are the frequency of demonstrations. In interviews with heads of sub-district police commands in the centre of the city, they claim that virtually once every week, they will be forced to deploy some of their troops to patrol a demonstration.\textsuperscript{25} I can support these statements with my own anecdotal experience during my time in Yogyakarta. Although most demonstrations are small and peaceful, Yogyakarta’s students are very active in taking their protests to the streets. These behaviours become a potential security concern for the police.

\textsuperscript{22} Interview, Kepala Unit Reserse Kriminal A.T.S Gultom, Polsek Depok Barat, 19 May 2008. This detective heads up the criminal investigative division of the police sub-district covering the largest number of campuses in Yogyakarta. Depok has the highest rates of crime in Yogyakarta.

\textsuperscript{23} Polda DIY: Data Kasus Tindak Pidana yang Menonjol per kasus (2002 to June 2007).

\textsuperscript{24} Interview: Aryoko Priyatno, Kepala Badan Narkotika Propinsi DIY, 24 October 2008.

\textsuperscript{25} Interview, Kapolsek Danurejan, AKP Sigit Haryadi 3 July 2008. Interview, Kapolsek Gedong Tengan, AKP Purnomo 3 June 2008. As an aside, AKP Purnomo once revealed to me that his former job had been as the head of a Polsek in South Kalimantan province. I asked him what the biggest difference was between policing there and in Yogyakarta. The Kapolsek smiled and told me, "the demonstrations - if over there we may have one a year. If over here [Yogyakarta city] we get one every week."
The same intellectual ferment which produces student activism also fuels groups on the extremes of politics. There is a very active socialist left movement in Yogyakarta. In fact, Yogyakarta was formerly the ideological birthplace of Indonesia’s first Marxist party of the reformasi era, the *Partai Rakyat Demokratik*. Quite aside from the issue of whether socialist ideas are a justifiable “threat” or not, Indonesia does have a deep-seated suspicion of communism. The activities of the far left therefore remain a concern for the security apparatus. From the polar opposite end of the spectrum, Yogyakarta has a strong, conservative Islamist community. Abu Bakar Basyir’s former organisation, the *Majelis Mujahadin Indonesia* (MMI), has located its national headquarters in Yogyakarta since 2000 (though in reality MMI numbers are small and only sufficient to run the secretariat). Similarly the former leader of *Laskar Jihad*, Jafar Umar Thalib, also lives and operates a pesantren in Yogyakarta. Besides these external newcomers, Yogyakarta’s own fundamentalist Islamic community has created regional vigilante groups – the *Gerakan Anti-Maksiat* (or GAM) and the *Front Jihad Indonesia* (FJI). Ironically then, powerful symbolic representatives of both the far left and the far right mingle in the one place. I do not judge whether such groups pose a real threat to stability in Indonesia (though the fundamentalist groups do have a reputation for local vigilantism). The important thing is that the Indonesian state apparatus considers these extreme movements to be a concern. Their activities therefore draw the constant attention of the public intelligence agencies, as we will see in chapter three. Thus Yogyakarta’s university sector and the intellectual ferment which goes with it, has spillover effects onto the security environment.

Finally there are certain historical groupings which continue to pose concerns for security in the region, albeit on a minor scale. In the days of the New Order, poverty and the province’s educational character, made Yogyakarta a natural source of gang-related crime.


\[27\] In the year 2007, the police were still counting communists and family members of communists involved in the 1965 coup attempt. In the city of Yogyakarta for example, police intelligence indicates there are 0 ‘Group A’ communists, 490 ‘Group B’ communists and 3412 ‘Group C.’ *Poltabes Yogyakarta: ‘Laporan Kesatuan Dalam Rangka Wasrik Itwasda Polda DIY’* August 2007, 12.

\[28\] That information was given to me as common knowledge by a number of individuals in Yogyakarta. But for external confirmation see: Michael S. Moore, ‘Talking to Jihadis’, *Spiegel Online International* 01 May 2006.<http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,391716-2,00.html> Accessed: 3 February 2009.
and resistance to the Suharto regime. Under the pressure of the regime Indonesia’s New Order parties, PPP and PDI, sought the protection of youth gangs and gangsters. Chapter six shows how the turmoil of the reformasi period opened opportunities for these gangs (or preman politik) to become influential. Since the early two thousands, these gangs have largely disappeared. But the poverty and the ideology (as either secular-nationalist gangs or Islamist gangs) which brought their members together have not dissipated. The floating mass of poor, idle youth in Yogyakarta still poses an ever present risk of being mobilised for violence. Therefore, although Yogyakarta’s actual security problems are not very great, we should realise there is a complex array of potential threats, from violent student activists, to Marxist movements, fundamentalist Muslims and political violence.

Profiling State Security Organisations

Having provided this overview of the security landscape, we now turn to look at the main public security organisations in Yogyakarta. I intend to postpone discussion of the various civil-society and commercial security groups until chapters five and six. Over the next section I will provide an overview of the provincial police command (Polisi Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta or Polda DIY), the policing elements of the provincial and the district governments (the Pol.PP and the PPNS), the Indonesian army’s territorial command in Yogyakarta and some of the miscellaneous law enforcement actors that fall under the regional government umbrella (such as the Forestry Police and the PPNS of the Transport Office) as well as national government law enforcement that operate in the region (such as

31 A valid question to ask here is what about gangsterism of the ordinary, nihilistic kind? The ingredients certainly exist in Yogyakarta; there is poverty among idle youth and ethnic enclaves of newcomers (pendatang). Yet in my research I find little evidence for the type of organised gangsterism of the Betawi Brotherhood or Pemuda Pancasila type. According to my interviews with ex-gangsters, the police have eradicated the old preman groups (and according to some ex-gangsters, the police have subsumed their extortive practices – Interview, Gunn Jack, 19 July 2007). Why criminal gangs have not resurrected in a different form is a subject for speculation. Perhaps the demise of the old political preman groups so disorganised the preman system that it has been unable to form under a new centre of gravity? In any case gangsters (rather than gangs) still exist in Yogyakarta, but they are pure criminals. People such as this are marginal to my research, dangerous and generally do not wish to be found.
the PPNS of the immigration service and the Taxation office). As far as possible we will attempt to construct a picture of these agencies, looking at their size, daily activities and jurisdiction.

Polda Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta (Polda DIY)

The history of the Indonesian police in chapter one shows how the autonomy and powers of the police have grown. By providing here a more detailed profile of the structure of the police in the case study site, we not only obtain a picture of what the police actually do, but also of how superior their authority is in comparison to other security organisations.

In terms of size, Polda DIY is comparatively small but the structure, roles and operations of the command follow a centralised standard established by Indonesian police headquarters. All Indonesian provincial police commands are classified into several types: A1, B1 and B2. These classifications are dependent upon the population size, geography and the ratio of crime of the given command area. The classification type will affect the seniority of the commander and the number of personnel, sub-departments and resources of the Polda. Polda DIY is a Type B2 Polda (the smallest) and is led by a police Brigadier General (or one star general). The breakdown of the Indonesian police at the regional level follows exactly the structure of regional government. So for each of Indonesia’s thirty three provinces there is a Polda, for each of the districts there is a Polisi Resort (or POLRES) and for each sub-district there is a Polisi Sektor (or POLSEK). The strategy for determining the size of the Polda (population, geography and crime index) is also applied to determining the size of the Polres. On this basis Polda DIY has one largish A2 Poltabes (Polisi Kota Besar) for the city of Yogyakarta, two medium sized B1 Polres for the relatively urbanised

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32 This hierarchical breakdown is, to some extent, also mirrored by other national government bodies, like Indonesian army territorial units and the state prosecutors and law courts.

districts of Bantul and Sleman and two smallish B2 Polres for the rural districts of Kulon Progo and Gunung Kidul.  

Looking at the size of Polda DIY, in the year 2006 the command possessed 9534 (actual) police personnel (including 474 public servants). This gives the command a police to population ratio of 1:344, high by Indonesian standards. This figure is only slightly down below the headquarters recommended minimum of 10,274 personnel. Following on from the guidelines established by national headquarters Polda DIY is organised into a provincial police command consisting of sixteen logistics, planning and support detachments, seven operational units and five sub-commands. In December 2006, 6922 police - almost all of Polda DIY - served in the five Polres of Yogyakarta.

Within the regional police structure the most important part of Polri is the district command, the Polres. The Polres acts as the bridge between the purely functional part of the regional police - the Polsek - and the higher planning/strategic part: the Polda. In Indonesian police terms a Polres is termed as the *Komando Satuan Dasar* (or Basic Unit of Command); this means that the Polres has substantial autonomy to plan its own programs and mount its own operations. Every year, the Polda allocates a yearly budget to the Polres to dispose of in accordance with the plans of the Polres leadership. This may seem like a

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36 As will be described in the next section the Polres are the most active operational part of the police command. The major purpose of the regional headquarters is to support, fund and coordinate the various Polres. Having said this there is a surprisingly large number of operational (or non-support) police that actually work in the Polda, 2612 in all. But many of these police are specialists, who handle more complex and unusual tasks not performed by the Polres. For example, of this 2612 operational troops in Polda DIY, 1714 of them are Brimob (*Brigad Mobil*) – the paramilitary wing of the police. Brimob are purely a reserve strike force and are not often directly deployed in day-to-day policing. Another example of the exceptionalism of the provincial commands is the fact that the Polda maintains a special anti-terrorist investigative detachment (Densus 88) as part of its detective directorate. So while the Polda does indeed do a small amount of operational police work, this represents a minor part of its entire workload. And even most of this small percentage of operational work is specialist in nature. Polda DIY: Data Kuat Pers Menerut DSP dan RIIL Polda D.I. Yogyakarta S/D Akhir Desember 2006. ‘Bagian Hubungan Tata Cara Kerja Polda DIY’ from SKEP Kapolri 54/X/2002, 17 October 2002.
37 In the financial year 2007 around 64% of the yearly Polda DIY budget was allocated to the Polres’. In all, the 2007 budget of Polda DIY was Rp. 366 billion ($US 33,272,727) and of this, Rp. 196.5 billion were allocated to the Polres. These figures however include Rp. 60.4 billion spent on the acquisition and maintenance of capital works and equipment in the Polres (and these decisions are actually made at the level of the Polda). So in reality the Polres get about 46% of the Polda’s budget to spend on their own though this
fairly unimaginative policy, but for the Indonesian police this has marked a huge change
(and indeed this is one of the more visible policies to come from Polri’s reform agenda).
During the ABRI days, the Polres depended on direct, periodic allocations of money from
the Polda. Often the allocations were unreliable and sometimes did not arrive at all.\textsuperscript{38} But
today the Polres can plan their activities on the basis of one large annual budget paid at the
beginning of the financial year. The Polres is also autonomous in an operational sense. For
example each Polres has the authority to mount its own special operations. To take the
Poltabes\textsuperscript{39} command in Yogyakarta city as our example. In 2007, Poltabes scheduled
around 30 operations for the entire calendar year. Nine of these operations were actioned by
the provincial police headquarters, four were actioned by police headquarters in Jakarta.
The majority however, seventeen in all, were planned and executed by Poltabes alone.\textsuperscript{40}
What this information shows is the autonomy of the Polres: it is equipped with the
resources and authority to manage its own tasks. Because it acts as the bridge between the
Polsek and the Polda, the Polres is actually the most important part of the police chain of
command.

Given that the Polres are more active in conducting the practical duties of policing, we now
turn to look at the structure of the Polres. In structural terms the Polres is like a miniature
Polda, but with slightly fewer support detachments. Taking the Poltabes of Yogyakarta as

accounts for the lion’s share of the operational budget. Polda DIY, RKA-KL Polda DIY Satker/Per Program
2007.
\textsuperscript{38} Interview, Kepala Bagian Operasi Poltabes, 14 April 2008.
\textsuperscript{39} For a discussion of the Poltabes see footnote 33.
\textsuperscript{40} To discuss briefly police operations: Polri divides the work of its operational units into day-to-day tasks and
special operations. A police operation entails moving police from day-to-day activities in their individual
units (intelligence collection or investigation for example) to an operation designed to achieve a specific
objective over a set time. Every year the Yogyakarta police have a predictable set of operations: motor vehicle
theft operations, violent robbery operations, traffic operations among many others. The purpose of the
operation is to bring down the overall incidence of a given crime through intensified law enforcement. Polri
divides its operations into three types Operasi Terkendali Pusat (actioned by Mabes Polri), Operasi
Kewilayahan (actioned by the Polda) and Operasi Mandiri (drafted on the initiative of the Polres). Given the
fact that the Polres plan and execute most of their operations independently, this again demonstrates the
critical role of the Polres in policing. (Interview: Kepala Bagian Operasi Poltabes Yogy, 12 September
2008). In 2007 in Polres Sleman for example, there were twenty four such independent operations in one year,
as compared to six other Operasi Kewilayahan and Operasi Pusat. Interview with Kepala Bagian Operasi,
Komisaris Polisi Kristiono, Polres Sleman, November 1 2007.For Police doctrine on operations see: Naskah
Pelaksanaan Operasi Kepolisian Tahun 2007’.
the example again, in this police command there are fourteen separate detachments [see Annex G]. Seven of these detachments can be described as support elements. These support elements back up the work of the Poltabes’ seven operational units (or Opsnal in Polri terminology) and fourteen sub-district police commands. To dwell momentarily on the Opsnal, these individual units perform the core functions of the police. In the Poltabes of Yogyakarta there is one Satuan Lalu Lintas (Traffic Police Unit), one Satuan Pengamanan Obyek Khusus (Vital Object Protection Unit), one Satuan Samapta (Police Patrol Unit – the ordinary ‘grunt’ police), one Satuan Narkoba (Narcotic Investigation Unit), one Satuan Reserse Kriminal (Detective Unit), one Satuan Intelijen Kemanan (Police Intelligence Unit), and one Satuan Pengamanan Pariwisata (Tourist Police Unit). These units perform independent operations on a daily basis, in accordance with their individual job descriptions and the yearly plan of the Poltabes (or rencana kerja – work plan).

The Opsnal are also required to participate in special periodic operations. Typically there are 20 or more police operations per year lasting from several days up to several months and including anything from dozens to thousands of personnel. Within Poltabes there are 1737 police (including 40 public servants), with the district police leadership attaching 807 personnel to the Poltabes headquarters and 930 personnel to the police substations, the Polsek. This gives the Poltabes a police to population ratio of 1:293 (or 1737 to 508,992), very high by Indonesian standards and largely due to the fact that this command is based on

41 This dissertation will often reference Poltabes as a source of information. The police personnel at this particular command were the most helpful of all those in the case study. Thus the data from this command is specially plentiful. Nevertheless, because the Indonesian police force is very hierarchical and doctrinaire, almost all the data on roles, operations, structure and so forth from the Poltabes of Yogyakarta can be applied to the other Polres of the case study.

42 Following Annex G left to right, these are: BagOps/Bagian Operasi (the Operations section, responsible for planning and executing police operations), the Bagian Binamitra (or the ‘Development of Partners [of the police]’ section, this group manages police relations with civil society), BagMin/Bagian Administrasi (or Administration Section, covering human resources, management of training, etc), UR Telematika (the telecommunications support group), Unit P3D (the police Provosts), Dokter dan Kesehatan (the medical support group) and TAUD (the Poltabes Secretariat).

43 Operasi dan Pelaksanaan di Lapangan (Operations and Execution in the Field) – is a police term for the ‘doers’ or operational elements.

44 The Polsek, as said above is a purely operation unit (or in Polri terms Kesatuan Pelayanan Terdepan – the Primary Forward Service Unit). Depending on the classification of its area, a Polsek usually has between 30-70 personnel, consisting of an intelligence unit, a detective unit, a patrol police unit, two Polmas/Babinkamtibmas (civil society management police) for every village in the sub-district, and, if the Polsek is large enough, a traffic police unit.

the boundaries of a small city, Yogyakarta.\textsuperscript{46} The core idea that we can take away from all this data is that the Polres is an important, self-contained unit within the Indonesian police hierarchy. It is highly autonomous and has the authority and the resources to manage security within its own area of operations.\textsuperscript{47}

By referencing the available police documents we can also create a basic picture of what the Indonesian police actually do in the case study region. It must be said, however, that our picture here is an incomplete one. As has already been discussed, researching the Indonesian police (or any security agency in Indonesia for that matter) is a difficult task. The fact that there are no Freedom of Information laws in Indonesia means that individual government departments decide themselves what they will and will not, make available to the public. Often there is little coordination, even between different parts of the same organisation, as to what should and should not be declassified.\textsuperscript{48} Thus it must be said that although this dissertation makes certain conclusions about what the police do, the data is pieced together from incomplete sources.

In describing what the police do from day-to-day, we need to take one step back and look at how they plan their tasks. Polri formulates its organisational goals on the basis of five year medium term strategic plans, which are translated into detail in one-yearly work plans.

\textsuperscript{46} The Poltabes has a smaller police/populations ratio in part because it manages a heavily urbanised capital city. In the Indonesian police matrix this factor is significant in determining the overall resources of the police command. Polres Sleman though was not too far behind. In 2007, it had 2094 personnel (over the recommended minimum) giving it a police to population ratio of 1:447. For Polres Bantul, the number was somewhat lower (fitting its condition as a semi-rural district with a lower rate of crime). In January 2007 Polres Bantul had 1333 police. I am unaware of the police to population ratio (there are no BPS or Polri statistics for that year). Polres Sleman: Laporan Kesatuan (2007) p.7. For Polres Bantul data is taken from Biro Personnel Polda DIY: Data Kuat Pers (Jan.2007).


\textsuperscript{48} To digress with just one example of this problem, at Polres Sleman I asked and received copies of the Polres' Yearly Work Report (\textit{renja}) but was told that another type of report (the \textit{Laporan Kesatuan}) was classified and not open to the public. At the Poltabes of Yogyakarta I asked for the Yearly Work Report but was told that most of the contents were classified, but instead was given the \textit{Laporan Kesatuan} the document which in Polres Sleman, was withheld. There are many other examples of these kind of obstacles. At Polda DIY I was denied access to all the previous documents on the basis that they may contain strategic information from Indonesian Police Headquarters. At the end of the day information of any kind is heavily controlled by the police. However the most cooperative level of the police chain of command was the Polres (for reasons that can only be guessed at; interestingly, this was true across the government spectrum in the case study site, district level units seemed to be the most helpful).
Because the police are a hierarchical, centralised organisation, there is a large amount of consistency in the objectives and goals of different command units and different sections - sometimes to the point of plagiarism. Generally however, it seems that individual commands take the grand, motherhood statements from the strategic plans of the level above them and, with varying degrees of originality, mould it to their area of responsibility. Given that these mission statements are more rhetorical than actual, they are not directly useful for demonstrating what the police do. But what these reports do underline is the important point that the core operations and tasks of the police are probably consistent across the organisation. Given that it is difficult to access large numbers of documents, this fact helps us to generalise on the basis of the available data.

What is clear is that all police commands that I have examined in the case study site (the Polda and the three Polres of Bantul, Sleman and Yogyakarta city) divide their activities into eight annual programs; five of these programs are aimed at the operational management of security while three involve police support functions. The police group their operational tasks into: programs for the development of security strategy and public order (program pengembangan strategi keamanan dan ketertiban), programs for the empowerment of security potential (program pemberdayaan potensi keamanan), programs for the management of social order and general security (program pembinaan kamtibmas) and programs for the investigation of crime (program penyelidikan dan penyidikan tindak pidana). The five operational policing programs follow a tactical philosophy which is often

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49 We can assume this is consistent across the police environment. In interviews with ranking officers in the provincial police, they acknowledge the existence of five yearly planning documents and yearly planning documents (called rencana strategis and rencana kerja respectively) which are produced by Mabes Polri and Polda DIY. The Polda denied access to these documents. Interview with Karorenbang Nurdjana, 28 August 2007.

50 To take for example the Mabes Polri Mission statement of 2006, Polri describes having nine core goals: [in brief] giving giving protection, guidance and service easily to the community, giving security and order to the community, securing transportation, developing community policing, upholding law professionally, administering police resources professionally, translating the desires of the community for obtaining good security in workplaces and living areas, increasing international law enforcement cooperation, and formulating a culture of obedience to law in Indonesia [Polres Sleman, Rencana Kerja Polres Sleman dan Jajarannya Tahun 2007 (Januari 2007), Bab II, 1, huruf b p.7]. The stated mission of the Polres of Sleman in 2006 is similar. The mission statement copies word for word four of the mission statements from the National Police Headquarters and adds five others of its own. Interestingly when looking at the Laporan Kesatuan of Poltabes Yogyakarta, which also holds the Poltabes' mission statement, their mission statement is word-for-word exactly the same as that of the neighbouring Polres Sleman. Presumably, the staff in each of these areas have probably copied this information directly from the work plans of the provincial headquarters [but since the Polda did not grant me their own rencana kerja, I am unable to verify my suspicion]. Poltabes, Laporan Kesatuan (2007), 2-3.
heard within the police environment – detection, prevention and repression of security threats (repression here meaning through either physical or legal means). If we were to metaphorically put the entire Polri workload into a centrifuge those three things are basically what the police do: detect security threats, prevent security threats and repress security threats. To continue with the description of the other program items, the Indonesian police also budget for three support functions: the development of human resources (program pengembangan sumber daya manusia Polri), the development of material and capital goods (program pengembangan sarana dan prasarana kepolisian) and finally a wages and pay scheme (program penyelenggaraan kenegaraan dan kepemerintahan).51

To give a more detailed description of police activities, we now look at each of the operational programs in detail, starting with the ‘program for the development of security strategy and public order.’ This agenda is conducted by police intelligence for the purpose of pre-empting security threats.52 In effect the program almost entirely describes the duties carried out by the Police Intelligence Unit.53 Police intelligence is responsible for collecting data on a variety of problems. The Police Intelligence Unit in any Polres is split up into (around) six operational sub-units: political affairs, social affairs, economic affairs, security (or crime) affairs, a sub-unit for supervising foreigners and a sub-unit for the licensing of weapons and the supervision of controlled substances. Intelligence collection in Indonesia is people-based, or otherwise known by the term ‘Human Intelligence,’ or HUMINT. Each intelligence officer maintains a personal network of informants. Informants feed data to their police contacts on anything of interest to the intelligence officer, like crime, political activities, public meetings, demonstrations, religious activities, the prices of basic goods, industrial disputes and anything which is considered a potential cause of instability.54 Of course, the type of data a police intelligence officer is interested in depends on their sub-unit; an officer from the Political Affairs sub-unit obviously tries to track intelligence on

53 Interview with Kepala Satuan Intelijen-Keamanan Poltabes, Kompol Wahayu, 1 October 2007.
54 Although monitoring prices may seem strange for the police, the intention is to detect usury or speculative behaviour over critical items such as rice, cooking oil and other products. The economic intelligence sub-unit also tracks the health of companies that occupy strategic sectors of the economy, union activities and the like. Interview, Kepala Unit Ekonomi Poltabes Y.Tarwoco Nugroho, 27 November 2008.
political activity, for example.\textsuperscript{55} Police recruit their informants from a wide variety of social strata, like criminals, unskilled labourers, business people, in fact anyone who may be a point of information in the community can be recruited by police intelligence.\textsuperscript{56}

The Intelligence Unit also supervises certain commodities and even, people. Police intelligence license and register controlled substances like weapons and explosives. In one reflection of the obsession of the Indonesian police with social control, in Indonesia the police must be informed of the presence and activities of all foreign citizens. In a university and tourist city like Yogyakarta this burdensome task is also carried out by the Intelligence Unit. Police Intelligence also provides certain forms of approval to citizens and information. For all public activities, like demonstrations and religious events, Indonesians must inform the police beforehand (and obtain a \textit{Surat Pemberitahuan}).\textsuperscript{57} For public commercial events, such as concerts or sports tournaments, the police must provide formal permission beforehand. The Intelligence Unit also provides criminal record checks (which are often an employment pre-requisite). Typically all of these services take up a disproportionate quantity of intelligence manpower. In Polres Sleman for example fifty of the seventy five Intelligence personnel there are involved in processing documents.\textsuperscript{58}

Finally, Police Intelligence also perform the other side of the intelligence coin, protecting

\textsuperscript{55} With Indonesia's background as a former authoritarian state, intelligence gathering of this kind legitimately raises questions. In the specific case of the Political Intelligence Unit, the kind of information they seek concerns the strength of political movements, the identities of party officials, monitoring public political meetings, and so forth. In my analysis the state intelligence apparatus seeks such information for two reasons: 1. force of habit (it was done for decades under the New Order) 2. the data is still useful today for assessing risks to stability by political movements (even though the data is not used for regime maintenance as it was under the New Order). There is an argument as to whether such activities are appropriate for contemporary Indonesia. I consider that debate best left to the Indonesian community. I do not see evidence though which leads me to believe the intelligence apparatus gathers such information for benefiting themselves or special interests.

\textsuperscript{56} Police intelligence officers universally tell me that they have no money to pay their informants. When asked why someone would wish to become an informant, intelligence officers tell me informants usually do so to \textit{menjalin hubungan baik} (maintain good relations) with the police. We can interpret this to mean in one sense that some people may be motivated by the idea that regularly giving information to the police, may function as a down payment on future police services. One can imagine that, especially for ex-criminals, becoming a trusted confidant of police intelligence can function as an insurance policy. I did once ask the head of intelligence in Polres Sleman whether he is able to intercede on behalf of his informants in criminal cases. He evaded giving a clear answer but said “it depends on the informant [and their value].” Interview with Kepala Satuan Intelijen-Kemanan Polres Sleman, Kompol Yuswo Hadi, 2 October 2007. Interview, Anggota Unit Intelijen Agus Supriyanto and Yunus Supriyono Polsek Tempel, Polres Sleman, 13 November 2008.

\textsuperscript{57} This is provided for in UU No.2/2002, Pasal 15, Ayat 2, huruf: a, d, e, i.

\textsuperscript{58} Interview, Kassat Intel Polres Sleman, October 2007.
classified information. Within the police environment, the intelligence unit manage the handling of police secret materials. These various tasks – the monitoring of threats, the supervision of materials and foreigners, providing security information services and security approvals to social activities and protecting police information – all fall under the aegis of Intelkam Polri.

The police program for ‘Empowering the Security Potential of the Community’ describes Polri’s efforts to engage civil society. The Bagian/Biro Binamitra or the ‘Development of [Police] Partners’ office performs the majority of this program. Binamitra functions as the police’s central agency for managing relations with all its partners in civil society. Thus Binamitra supervises and trains private security guards and the companies that employ them.59 Binamitra also oversee Indonesia’s ubiquitous neighbourhood watch system – the ronda siskamling. Binamitra is responsible for implementing Polri’s most high-profile reform plan – the Community Policing initiative or Perpolisian Basis Masyarakat. Under this initiative the police have developed dialogue forums between police and representatives of the community at the level of the village. Binamitra coordinates and encourages this initiative. Binamitra also perform the duties of maintaining communication with core elements of civil society, such as schools, trade guilds (paguyuban), attending public events, and cooperation with the local government apparatus for the purpose of disseminating police programs.60 Although Binamitra do not carry a prestigious reputation within the police environment, their importance in networked security clearly emerges in chapters five and six.61

The ‘Program for the Management of Social Order and Security’ funds the routine day-to-day policing of each unit as well as special police operations. Each Opsnal plans a specific number of operational tasks that they must perform under this program. They then break

59 Referred to as Pengamanan Swakarsa (SATPAM) and Badan Jasa Usaha Pengamanan (BUJP) respectively.
60 Poltabes, Laporan Kesatuan, 22.
61 The majority of Binamitra’s work is conducted in the Polsek by senior non-commissioned police once referred to as Babinkamtibmas, now known as Polmas (or polisi masyarakat). In the sub-districts there are two Polmas per village (of the nine Polsek I visited in Polda DIY, the average Polsek has three villages and six Polmas). The Binamitra personnel in the Polres/Polda train and encourage the Polmas in the sub-districts, while performing more strategic functions (like training Satpam, marketing police programs in schools, collecting weekly reports from the respective Polmas personnel in the Polsek, etc.). In Polres Sleman for example, there are ten Binamitra staff, and thirteen in the Polda.
this down into yearly, monthly, weekly and daily objectives. Each objective is lined up with the individual job description of the given Opsnal. To give specific examples from each Unit; in its yearly plan, the Traffic Police Unit of Poltabes planned 6480 four wheel vehicle patrols in 2007.\(^{62}\) The Samapta (Patrol) Unit planned for 9360 individual patrols (either on foot or motorised) and guard activities (say of a bank or community event) in the same year.\(^{63}\) The Tourist Police Unit programmed for sixty escort missions (of tourist bus convoys for example).\(^{64}\) The Strategic Vital Objects Unit programmed for 2920 activities in which stationary guards would be placed in strategic objects (like the provincial Pertamina building, electricity sub-stations, etc).\(^{65}\)

For reasons of space I have been selective in the examples that I have given, but needless to say the previous paragraph only captures a small glimpse of what the police actually do on a daily basis. Every day, reports enter police offices and must be responded to. Every day the police show their face in hundreds of different patrols and stationary guarding activities. Every day there are crimes which must be investigated and every day, hundreds of civilians apply for driver’s licences and other documents in police offices. It is impossible to depict in numbers the hive of activity that an average Polres in Yogyakarta becomes on any given day. This says nothing of what happens during peaks in the cycle when there is a security disturbance or operation.

In addition to the day-to-day policing, the other part of Polri’s ‘program for the management of social order and security’ is special operations. Police operations cover a broad range of objectives: countering terrorism, providing security for major yearly events (like Ramadhan and Christmas), managing traffic flows, combating robbery, and many operations besides. Depending on the purpose of the operation, the duration and scale of the activity may differ wildly. In public security operations where the objective is to decrease threats to the public on a wide scale, the size of the operation can be enormous. In the

\(^{62}\) In police thinking, one vehicle performing one patrol in one shift equals one activity. There are two shifts every day, which works out to an average of four four-wheeled patrols per shift. Poltabes Yogyakarta: Program Kegiatan Satker/Sub-Satker dan Polsek Jajaran Poltabes Tahun 2007 (10 July 2007), p.1 Sub Satker Sat Lantas.

\(^{63}\) Poltabes: Program Kegiatan Satker/Sub-Satker 2007, p.3 Sub Satker Sat Samapta.

\(^{64}\) Poltabes: Program Kegiatan Satker/Sub-Satker 2007, p.2 Satker Sat Pam Wisata.

\(^{65}\) The police breakdown works as follows: one guard in one installation for one shift equals one activity. Poltabes: Program Kegiatan Satker/Sub-Satker 2007, p.1 Sub Satker Sat Pam Obsus.
security operation that took place during the Islamic holiday of Idul Fitri in 2007 (codenamed “Ketupat Progo 07”) Poltabes Yogyakarta alone deployed 1,136 of its staff over fourteen days. Meanwhile for operations which are designed to put pressure on a particular type of crime for a short period, the scale of the operation can be much smaller. One small, anti-immorality operation (targeting prostitution and other “vices”) in Polres Sleman during September 2007 involved only sixty personnel and occurred over a time span of thirty days. As previously mentioned, in the year 2007 Poltabes Yogyakarta planned thirty different types of operations for that calendar year. Of these thirty planned operations, the Poltabes executed twenty one. The individual Polres conduct the clear majority of operations. In doing so they can draw upon the resources of the entire Polres and, if necessary, support personnel from the provincial police headquarters.

The high tempo of activities mean that special police operations can be expensive. The single biggest cost items in any operation are personnel expenses (consisting of meal allowances and out of pocket costs) and transport (petrol and maintenance of vehicles). The police prefer not to discuss these financial matters in detail. In general terms however, one Chief of Operations (Kasbagop) mentioned that based upon meal allowances of Rp.12,000 per person, plus other allowances that may be paid to personnel (such as petrol expenses) a 150 person operation lasting for thirty days can expend Rp.54 million in personnel costs alone. Unsurprisingly then the whole Program for the Management of Security and Public Order is Polri’s largest and most expensive security program.

Finally the Program for the Investigation of Crime is self-explanatory. The investigation of crimes, and all the attendant functions involved, falls entirely within the tasks of the Detectives Unit and the Narcotics Unit. These units investigate crime scenes, collect evidence and determine if a criminal case can be investigated (this investigation is known as penyelidikan in police terminology). The detectives then investigate the case (or conduct

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68 Though in part this low productivity reflects the gap between what the police plan and what happens in reality. At the beginning of the financial year the police must anticipate the security threats they may face in the year ahead. Some problems may or may not materialise while unanticipated problems may occur.
69 Interview, Kasbagops Polres Sleman, 1 November 2007.
70 Interview, Kasbagops Polres Sleman, November 2007.
a penyidikan) where they interrogate witnesses, seize evidence, detain suspects, and so on.\(^{71}\) In the year 2007 the Reskrim unit of Poltabes programmed for 468 penyelidikan and 420 finalised cases (or penyerahan berita acara ke penuntut umum – transfer of case file to state prosecutors).\(^ {72}\) As it turns out the Poltabes actually investigated 567 cases during 2007.\(^ {73}\) The Detectives Unit in an average district police command is usually split up into ten separate operational sections, focusing on different varieties of crime.\(^ {74}\)

Experienced Indonesia commentators may very well question the reliability of all of the above data. Police documents provide the basis for almost the entire above picture. Recalling the reputation of the Indonesian police for corruption and incompetence it is reasonable to question whether police documents actually reflect what occurs on the ground. The point is valid, but we should be cautious about being so dismissive. Regional police commands are subject to internal and external scrutiny. There is a central auditing agency in Mabes Polri, the Inspektorat Pengawasan Umum (Irwasum). Complimenting the work of Irwasum are regional police auditors under the authority of the Polda, the Inspektorat Pengawasan Daerah (Itwasda). Aside from being financial auditors these agencies also audit the conduct of regional police work programs. Every year teams of Irwasum investigators descend on the regional police commands, penetrating selectively down to the Polres level and checking what the Polres and Polda say they plan to do (in their renja) versus what they actually do (recorded in daily work orders or hasil kegiatan).\(^ {75}\)

Beside Polri’s internal auditors the police, like every other Indonesian government agency,

\(^{71}\) Narcotics detectives however differ somewhat from this template. Their modus operandi (at least at the level of the Polres) is much less focused on reactive investigation. Instead they perform a lot of entrapment type operations, where they attempt to catch drug users and drug dealers with police infiltrators. Interview, Kepala Satuan Narkoba Poltabes, Andy Traspoetra, 25 September 2007.

\(^{72}\) Poltabes Yogyakarta: Program Kegiatan Satker/Sub-Satker dan Polsek Jajaran Poltabes Tahun 2007 (10 July 2007), p.4-5 Sub Satker Reskrimg

\(^{73}\) In the year 2006 the detectives received 675 cases, investigated 567 and passed 438 to the state prosecutors, providing a resolution rate of 64%. Poltabes Yogyakarta: Laporan Akuntabilitas Kinerja Instansi Pemerintah (Januari sampai dengan Desember 2007), (January 6, 2008), p.8-9. Poltabes, Laporan Kesatuan, 15.

\(^{74}\) There are one or more units that operate in the field (who arrest suspects, gather evidence from crime scenes and so on). There is one unit for providing ‘Special Service’ on sensitive crimes – such as sexual assault and family violence. Another unit is devoted to economic crimes like fraud and money laundering, while another unit examines ‘Certain [read serious] Crimes’ like illegal logging (or crimes on a large scale), another unit provides investigation support to Penyidik Pegawai Negri Sipil, another unit is involved in identifying victims and perpetrators. The remaining units are involved in the investigation of corruption and ordinary crimes (like automobile theft). Satuan Reskrimg, Polres Sleman: Struktur Organisasi 2007.

\(^{75}\) For a description of the functions and authority of police internal investigators see: Republik Indonesia: Peraturan Kepala Kepolisian 1/2008 Penyelenggaraan Pengawasan Dan Pemeriksaan Umum Serta Perbendaharaan Di Lingkungan Kepolisian Negara RI.
are subject to the forensic audits of the Indonesian national auditing agency – the *Badan Pengawasan Keuangan* (BPK). While none of these processes can guarantee the accuracy of Polri documentation, they do create pressure on individual police leaders to refrain from falsifying documents. It is reasonable to say then that, on the balance of probabilities, most of what we find in papers such as those referenced above, is likely to be accurate.

A final issue to raise in this section is the police budget. It difficult to solicit data from the police about their finances. From the data I managed to collect, it appears police budgets are sufficient to cover operating expenses but part of the reason for this is that the leadership cannibalises other programs to fund essential expenditure. Most of my information for this conclusion comes from Polsek commanders who are relatively more willing to discuss these issues than their more senior colleagues, probably because the Polsek is such a junior part of the police hierarchy. In one meeting I had with Polsek commander Juwono [not his real name] from the Poltabes area, the commander painted a very bleak picture of their resourcing situation. Every year Juwono’s Polsek receives a fixed budget, which is the same for all Polsek, whether the area is crime intensive or quiet. Judging by the budget of a neighbouring Polsek, Gondomanan, the yearly operational budget for a Polsek in the Poltabes area is about Rp.36 million (US$4000). According to Juwono this budget is never sufficient. For example, Juwono’s Polsek receives a fixed allocation of 200 litres of petrol every month. Yet his minimum requirements for monthly vehicle patrols require 300 litres. By the same token Juwono’s Polsek is funded for investigating three criminal cases every year. In practice, the Polsek can however investigate ten to twenty criminal cases every month. When asked as to how the Polsek

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76 I have taken budget data from a neighbouring Polsek in order to conceal the identity of my informant. Comparative research indicates other Polseks in this district receive the same allocations. Polsek Gondomanan, Poltabes Yogyakarta: Rencana Kegiatan Polsek Tahun 2008 dan Rincian Anggaran Belanja 13 March 2008.

77 Mabes Polri sets a pre-determined budget for every criminal case. Investigations are categorised as ‘light’ or ringan (e.g. slander), ‘medium’ or sedang and ‘heavy’ or berat (e.g. murder). In 2008 the cost of a heavy criminal case was Rp.14 million, a medium case Rp.8 million and a light case Rp.5 million. Detectives units receive quotas of cases which affect their budgets. Narcotics investigations are always budgeted as heavy cases. *Satuan Reskrim* at the Polres receive a pre-fixed quota of light, medium and heavy cases. Polseks on the other hand are given funding for only three light cases every year. This funding is meant to cover a range of items: confiscating evidence, crime scene investigation, transporting witnesses and so on. From my observations most of the investigator’s money is spent on administration (fuel costs, printing, stationery, and the like). Presumably such low overheads mean that Rp.15 million is more than sufficient for three light cases. The problem is that it has to be. A Polsek can investigate dozens of cases every year. Also the rare
covers the financial shortfall, Juwono stated he “maximises the loyalty” of his personnel [i.e. his personnel can, for example, pay their own petrol expenses]. After pushing the question from different angles, Juwono denied that his Polsek would either receive “donations” from the community or special grants from the Poltabes command. His argument that the loyalty of his personnel is a remedy to his Polsek’s financial shortfalls is, however, very unconvincing.\(^78\)

Speaking with other Polsek commanders, I gained the impression that one of the legitimate tactics available to the police to cover budget shortfalls is to triage expenditure. In a neighbouring Polsek to Juwono’s, a second Polsek commander, Slamet [not his real name] related that he encounters the same problems as my previous interviewee. Slamet’s method of dealing with shortfalls was to cut money from non-essential programs, like the community policing program or the renovation of his Polsek building, to cover the essential activities, like criminal investigation. This tactic in principle constitutes financial malpractice. I asked the respondent whether his activities raised problems with his superiors in Poltabes headquarters. He responded “yes – but don’t forget Poltabes has the same problems we do, just on a bigger scale.”\(^79\) Based on his responses I would suggest that police budgeting is highly elastic. Police will reduce non-critical outputs in order to cover their most important activities due to structural deficiencies in their funding.

A final point to note on Polri expenditure is that police resources over the last decade have expanded exponentially. This situation is a reflection of not only Polri’s growing importance, but the severe neglect of the police during the ABRI period. I mentioned previously that a significant police reform has been the granting of budgetary autonomy to the lowest commands of the police. Yet this policy has been made possible only by the

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\(^78\) As an aside, I left the interview with Juwono feeling at least somewhat sympathetic for his situation. As I departed the building however, I happened to notice an immaculately washed car parked on his Polsek’s parade ground. Given its prominent position I assume the car belonged to Juwono, though I may be wrong. The car was a late 90’s model Honda civic with expensively customised features. By Indonesian standards the car was far more luxurious than what can be afforded on a civil servant’s wage. Such sights are not uncommon outside police stations, giving rise to legitimate suspicions that police are benefiting from corruption. The juxtaposition between what I heard in the interview versus what I saw, implies we should be circumspect about police protestations of destitution. Interview, anonymous police interviewee, 2 July 2008.

\(^79\) Interview, Kapolsek “Juwono”, 2 July 2008.
dramatic enhancement of Polri's own percentage of the state budget. In the year 2000 Polri was granted a budget of Rp.1 trillion. In the year 2008 this had expanded to Rp.21 trillion, an increase of 2000%. In 1998, national police manpower was only 180,000 personnel. By 2008 the number of police had grown to 380,000. Such increases have substantially enhanced the capabilities of police in the regions, albeit from a low base and with still significant capability lags. While my research is not able to comment on the role of corruption in supplementing official police budgets, the substantial growth of police resources indicates that Polri is becoming increasingly self-reliant.

Regional government: Pol.PP and the PPNS

We now turn to examine the second most active policing agency in the case study region: regional government. Regional government has a large, emerging role in law enforcement in Yogyakarta. Regional government connects to the security network in two ways. It can be viewed as a unitary actor through its executive leadership. It also operates through autonomous sub-units which individually connect to the network. As a unitary actor, regional government executive heads directly engage with other elements of the security apparatus (like Polri and TNI) through regional leaders' conferences. This type of engagement will be discussed further in chapter three. Underneath the top-level of the provincial and district governments, there are a number of specialised agencies that perform specific law enforcement activities and generalist meta-departments that uphold a wide variety of local government ordinances. The specialist agencies examined in this research are the Dinas Perhubungan (Transport Bureau) of the districts and the Dinas Kehutanan (Forestry Management Bureau) of the provincial government. The most active

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80 Interview, anonymous source in Police Headquarters, 5 September 2008.
81 Under the terms of Indonesia's decentralisation program certain non-core functions were handed over to the regions to administer. Among these are the delivery of government services (such as education and health) and certain regulatory functions (like the examples here, transportation and forest exploitation). Although there are national departments of transportation and forests, regional government directs the regional offices of these departments and the delivery of their core-functions. This relationship is not uncontested – as Luke Arnold points out, since the early two thousands the national government has re-centralised many of the permission processes in the forestry sector. I, however, do not explore this centre/regions power struggle in my dissertation. Rather I only look at the networked character of law enforcement by regional government agencies. Luke Arnold, 'Deforestation in Decentralisation Indonesia: What's Law got to do with it?' Law, Environment and Development Journal, 4/2 (2000), 82, 87.
enforcement agency, however, are the various *Dinas Ketertiban* (Public Order Bureaus) of the province and the districts. We will therefore examine the Public Order agencies first and then review the Forestry and Transport Bureaus.

Public Order Bureaus generally consist of two different types of enforcement personnel, each having different powers. These are the civil service police or Pol.PP (the repressive arm) and the PPNS civil service investigators (the investigative/enforcement arm). The central government mandates the authority of both of these types of personnel. The central government empowers the Pol.PP to take “repressive” non-legal action against citizens or organisations believed to be violating local government law. In elucidating this power, we can use the example of illegal constructions. In such cases the Pol.PP typically take on the duty of physically evicting the inhabitants of illegal structures and then executing dismantlement. The PPNS on the other hand are civil servants who have been licensed to investigate violations of sectoral laws. They are a kind of non-police detective. Indonesian law recognises two types of investigators: police investigators and PPNS. PPNS have responsibilities for conducting criminal investigations in their own sector of expertise. Thus in the forestry environment there are PPNS for enforcing forestry law, while in the tax office there are PPNS for investigating taxation violations. Individual statutes define the responsibilities of PPNS, but in general PPNS have the same powers as police detectives: to call witnesses, seize evidence, interrogate a suspect, and so forth. Historically Polri have supervised all PPNS in the Indonesian bureaucracy. This supervisory function has been enforced even to the point where police detectives are obliged to manually check PPNS investigations before the case files are sent to the public prosecutor. This situation is beginning to change today. During the time of my research, all PPNS I encountered in

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86 Republik Indonesia: Fatwa Mahkamah Agung No. KMA/114/IV/1990
87 A number of laws, like the Capital Market Supervisory Act, have liberated some PPNS from police supervision. PPNS in the Capital Market Supervisory Agency for example now deal with courts and public prosecutors directly [Republik Indonesia: Undang-Undang 8/1995 tentang Pasar Modal, pasal 101, Ayat 6] This is the cause of some concern in Mabes Polri. One of my senior informants in the Mabes Polri Legal Division looks askance at this trend, believing that it erodes Polri’s superiority in law enforcement. Some efforts have been made in the Mabes Polri Legal Division to draft a new law to solidify Polri’s power to supervise all PPNS (as well as civil society groups, private security guards and special police). Today the
Yogyakarta in the Tax Office, the immigration service, the Forestry Office and regional
government still operated under old laws in which they depended upon police approval to
conclude criminal investigations.\textsuperscript{88}

The district public order agencies\textsuperscript{89} have minor organisational differences and significant
differences of resources, but structurally they are very similar. The Dinas Ketertiban of
Yogyakarta city is divided into three components: a Pol.PP element that consists of sixteen
headquarters staff, twenty six permanent polisi pamong praja and 192 contract workers
(serving in the capacity of Pol.PP). There is one other division for PPNS, with twenty eight
personnel and one other support unit of eighteen administrative personnel.\textsuperscript{90} The Kabupaten
of Bantul organises its Office of Public Order in much the same way; it has fifty seven
personnel in the Pol.PP section, twelve personnel in the PPNS section and eighteen
personnel split up into an administrative working group.\textsuperscript{91} Compared to the district police,
these law enforcement agencies are tiny. The entire Pol.PP force in Bantul for example,
exceeds no more than 20\% of the district police command. The \textit{Dinas Polisi Pamong Praja
dan Ketertiban Masyarakat} of Sleman is slightly different. Although this bureau carries out
law enforcement functions it also has other, non-related units.\textsuperscript{92} Unlike Bantul and the city
of Yogyakarta, Sleman does not put all its civil service investigators in one office. Rather,
this district has around fifty PPNS of which only half have current licenses,\textsuperscript{93} and all are
split up in their areas of speciality; so for example, the Transport Office has five PPNS, the

\textsuperscript{88} Keputusan Mendagri 6/2003. Under Pasal 6, the PPNS in the pemda are still required to pass their
investigations to the prosecutors through the police.
\textsuperscript{89} The Indonesian bureaucracy establishes a hierarchy between, in descending order: \textit{Badan} (Agency), \textit{Divisi}
(division), \textit{Direktorat} (directorate), \textit{Biro} (branch), \textit{Dinas} (bureau), \textit{Kantor} (office). A dinas has more
personnel and higher ranking leaders than a kantor, and so on. In Yogyakarta, the provincial government, the
Yogyakarta city district and Sleman have Dinas Ketertiban, while Bantul has a smaller Kantor Ketertiban.
\textsuperscript{90} Dinas Ketertiban Kota Yogyakarta: Laporan Akuntabilitas Kinerja Instansi Pemerintah Tahun 2006,
Lampiran 10.
\textsuperscript{91} Interview, Jadi Bayu Broto (Kep. Seksi Pengamanan) and Wahyu Priyanto (Kep. Seksi Penegakkan Perda),
\textsuperscript{92} Such as a firefighters unit and the Office of National Unity, Sport and Youth (\textit{Kesatuan Bangsa, Pemuda
dan Olahraga}).
\textsuperscript{93} The inactive PPNS are bureaucrats whose investigative licenses have expired.
The task of the PPNS section in Sleman’s Public Order Bureau is to bring these external personnel together for enforcement operations. There were also seventy two Pol.PP in Sleman in the year 2007. The budgets of the different bureaus show that while they may look similar, they do not necessarily enjoy similar capabilities. In the year 2006 the city of Yogyakarta’s Dinas Keteritiban had a yearly budget of Rp.8.3 billion. The 2007 budget of Sleman’s Dinas Keteritiban was over Rp.2.3 billion. In 2007, the substantially smaller Office of Public Order in Bantul received only Rp.877 million. While the resource base of the district law enforcement agencies may be vastly different, their activities though are very similar.

The three district agencies in this study break their yearly activities down into four core items: training and development, operations for enforcing public order (or operasi pro-represif), investigations, passive guarding/patrolling, and pressing charges for violations of local ordinances (or operasi pro-yustisi). The first program constitutes an administrative support function, the following two programs are executed by the Pol.PP and the final program is the responsibility of PPNS.

The Pol.PP are responsible for physically executing the pro-represif activities. Common targets of the Pol.PP are pedagang kaki lima (PKL or street sellers), dismantling unregulated advertising, demolishing illegal buildings, conducting raids against vice like the illegal alcohol trade (minuman keras or miras) and trade in pornography or contraband
media, inspecting premises which are strictly regulated such as night clubs and boarding houses, operators of such businesses are often obliged to observe strict conditions. Owners of boarding houses for example must ensure they only offer single sex accommodation, that their customers do not use drugs or engage in immoral behaviour, among other standards. Kota Yogyakarta: Peraturan Daerah No.4/2003 Penyelenggaran Pondokan, Pasal 6, 8.

This may sound unimportant but in the local context upholding food quality is quite significant. In a Muslim country like Indonesia the sale of products marketed as halal must be enforced with strict standards. The natural concerns of Muslims towards the purity of their foods is made worse by the unscrupulousness of some market traders, who have been known to adulterate their products (I have been told one anecdote by a Pol.PP leader who claimed some butchers inject water into their products during Ramadhan, since the water increases the weight and hence the price.). Interview, Kandiawan, 10 April 2008.


114 Interview, Norwidi, 23 October 2007.
rounded up. In the city of Yogyakarta and Bantul, PPNS also coordinate their own snap inspections and raids on licensed premises. I participated in several of these patrols and witnessed them inspecting a number of building sites and businesses, and catching several people who had failed to obtain official permission.105 Aside from their own patrols and supporting Pol.PP operations, the PPNS also have the responsibility of acting as the regional government’s prosecutor in court. In the city of Yogyakarta this means at least twice every week the PPNS must attend court to prosecute public order offences.106 In Bantul this happens only once or twice a month, as their workload is much smaller.107 In Sleman, the circumstances are different. In this district, the PPNS tend to hold periodic operations referred to as operasi yustisi. The Dinas Ketertiban of Sleman will coordinate sting type operations – targeting for example, vehicle worthiness – in which, the PPNS, the district prosecutors and the district judges will hold ad hoc court sessions at a site where suspects are arrested.108 As an indication of their workload, the PPNS of Bantul pressed charges against 125 people from January to September 2008 (though it is not certain how many were actually sentenced in court).109 In 2006 the city of Yogyakarta submitted 1017 cases to court.110 In both examples, most of those charged violated building laws.

What emerges from the above discussion is a picture of a relatively significant source of regulation that is growing in influence and capacity. Clearly the small size and statutory powers of district Pol.PP and PPNS place them in a much junior role to that of the National Police. Nevertheless, to the extent it is able, district government in Yogyakarta is clearly flexing its ability to enforce order within its territory. The growth of Pol.PP and PPNS at

\[105\] Field Observation with the Seksi Penegakkan Perda, Dinas Ketertiban Kota Yogyakarta, 4 July 2007.
\[106\] Interview: Senior member of Seksi Penegakkan Perda (Dinas Ketertiban Kota Yogyakakarta) 16 April 2008.
\[108\] In this example, vehicle inspection raids, PPNS from the district transport bureau, with the district prosecutors, police and judges would set up a mobile court and roadside sweep operation at certain intersections; investigating, arresting, charging and trying the accused at the roadside. I did not succeed in obtaining data on the frequency of these type operations. This was due to a lack of cooperation on the part of the head of the Sleman Bureau of Public Order. My sense however is that the enforcement of regional ordinances in this particular Kabupaten is weak (due in part to poor leadership from the agency) and I would wager that these operasi pro-yustisi are probably infrequent. Interview, Kepala Seksi Lalu Lintas Sultan Fatoni, 2008.
the district level indicates a new locus of law enforcement power evolving in line with
decentralisation. While as will be discussed in chapters three and four, the Pol.PP and
PPNS still require police support to discharge their missions, as a distinct, autonomous
security organisation, district law enforcement agencies occupy an important role within
networked security arrangements.

The provincial government also has its own civil service police. The terms of Indonesia’s
decentralisation program, however, do not permit provincial Pol.PP and PPNS a
considerable role in law enforcement. This observation was put to me by several senior
Pol.PP in the districts. One of these informants, the head of the Public Order Office of
Bantul argued that under regional autonomy reforms, the central government gave the
power to deliver government services to districts, not provinces. The provinces were given
largely coordinating powers. In Indonesian thinking, this translates to something that has an
anthropological and not only legal significance. According to the informant, bupatis are
seen as owning territory (“mereka punyai wilayah”) while governors are seen as taking care
of issues which cross district boundaries (“mereka koordinisasi”). As a result, so describes
the informant, the bupati in contemporary Indonesia is like a little king (“raja kecil”).
Although the provincial government has its own provincial public order ordinances, the
provincial Pol.PP/PPNS must “knock the door first [to the districts i.e. ask permission]”
before they can enter the kabupaten jurisdiction.111 This source is of course biased, but his
observation does appear valid when we examine the activities of the provincial enforcement
apparatus.

Although the provincial Dinas Ketentraman dan Ketertiban has quite a number of
personnel and many perda to uphold, its activities are quite limited. At the provincial level
there are 177 Pol.PP and twenty five PPNS.112 The provincial Dinas is responsible for
enforcing more than twenty three regional regulations and oversees two national laws (on
the protection of consumers and standardised weights and measures). Most of the perda

111 My interviewee stressed this point, claiming in his experience, the Yogyakarta provincial government is
“really, really, really timid (sangat, sangat, sangat, tidak berani)” about operating on district territory without
the permission of the district government. When one considers that the sultan/governor of Yogyakarta is
perhaps the most normatively powerful of all Indonesia’s provincial heads, this is a significant finding.
Interview, Kandiawan, 8 October 2008.
relate to the payment of regional fees, such as those for trucking or other transportation companies licensed by the provincial government. To enforce these provincial regulations, the provincial public order office must first coordinate and obtain the permission of the district public order hierarchy. The provincial Dinas Ketertiban remains in continuous dialogue with their district counterparts through tri-monthly meetings at which they establish consensus to proceed with their operations in the districts.

Provincial PPNS are most often involved in investigation offences related to weights and measures. Provincial PPNS are also involved in supporting - or as they describe it “facilitating” - the enforcement activities of their counterparts in the districts. In effect, for the provincial Public Order Bureau to make itself relevant to the regional law enforcement sector, it must hold joint operations with the district PPNS officials. The province provides funds for the joint operations, the districts and the province pool their personnel and the district Ketertiban offices allow the joint activities to go ahead on their territory. As an example, in 2008 the Public Order Office of Bantul participated in five such activities, the last being an anti-prostitution sting.

For the provincial Pol.PP detachment, their range of activities is even more limited. Their main task is to guard the governor, the provincial parliament, the provincial bureaucratic offices and other provincial government assets. Occasionally, the Pol.PP office attempts to monitor, patrol and arrest purveyors of the vice trade that takes place between the borders of Central Java province and DIY. Again however, the provincial Pol.PP is forced to work with their counterparts in the districts to do this. In interviews with the provincial Pol.PP, I received the distinct impression that they conceived of their primary function as security guards.

113 Dinas Ketentraman dan Ketertiban Propinsi DIY, Daftar Perda Propinsi.
114 Interview, Kepala Bagian Penegakan Perda Gunder Soesino (Dinas Ketentraman dan Ketertiban Propinsi), 26 May 2008.
115 This amounts to subsidising the district activities. Apparently the province does not offer assistance to either the city municipality of Yogyakarta or the Kabupaten of Sleman. The provincial Dinas Ketertiban judges these districts to be financially capable of managing their own enforcement functions. Support is instead channelled to Bantul, Gunung Kidul and Kulon Progo. Interview, Gunder, 26 May 2008.
116 Interview, Kandiawan, 8 October 2008.
Given these facts I suggest the role of the provincial law enforcement apparatus is marginal. It has a limited range of enforcement functions, even by the low standards of the districts. The provincial PPNS/Pol.PP must even cooperate with the districts in order to be active at all. As such, when talking about regional law enforcement in the case study site, the provincial level of government is largely disengaged from this sector.

Specialist agencies for regional government policing: Forestry and Transport Bureaus

Within the regional government administration there are other sectoral agencies involved in law enforcement within their respective sectors. This chapter only provides a short introduction to two examples of these sectoral agencies, the Forestry and Transportation Bureaus, while postponing more comprehensive analysis of their work until chapter four. Sectoral actors like these have only limited mandates, applicable to their specific sector. They also have an interesting bifurcated identity. National laws define their tasks and authority. Because of Indonesia’s decentralisation program, however, these agencies fall under the umbrella of regional government. As such, it is the regional government which actually directs their work.

The Dinas Kehutanan (Forestry Bureau) exists at both a district and provincial level, but the provincial office in Yogyakarta carries out most of the guarding activities and has the largest security unit. Within the provincial Forestry Office there is a Seksi Pengamanan (or security section). In 2008 this section consisted of twenty six kepolisian khusus or special police and two PPNS. At the time of my research, the forestry PPNS no longer held valid licenses to investigate forestry crimes.118 The legal powers of the forestry police are laid out in two laws: Law No.41/1999 on Forestry and Government Regulation No.45/2004 on the

118 In Indonesia there are technically three kinds of police: Polri (the national police), Kepolisian Khusus (special police) and Satpam (commercial security guards). The special police come in two varieties, Forestry Police (attached to the Forestry Office) and Railway Police (operating in the state railway company). For personnel data see: Interview, Kepala Seksi Pengamanan, Dinas Kehutanan dan Perkebunan Propinsi DIY, Tri Basuki, 28 June 2008.
Protection of Forests. The more detailed government regulation empowers the forestry police to guard and patrol state protected forests, collect evidence of illegal logging and arrest suspects. The 1999 law grants PPNS in the forestry environment the right to interrogate witnesses, confiscate evidence, request explanations and form a case against a suspect for violating forestry law. The Forestry Police are in essence the patrol police and the detectives of the forestry sector.

The forestry police in the provincial office are relatively inactive, due to a lack of criminal activity, poor resourcing and the nature of the local environment. The area of protected forest in DIY is only 2,312 hectares. Thus Yogyakarta’s forests are relatively small compared to those in most of the rest of Indonesia. Secondly, forestry crime is minimal. The culprits of illegal logging are usually rural dwellers living close to the forests who cut down individual trees for personal use. Finally, the operational budget of the Forestry Police in the area is small, only Rp.650 million in 2008. Rp.400 million came from the regional government budget (APBD) to finance wages and personnel costs, while Rp.250 million came from the national government (APBN) forestry department budget, specifically for security operations. However this source of funds is not always reliable. In 2007 the allocation was slashed by 70% due to fiscal tightening. As a result the Dinas could not afford to run anti-logging operations in 2007. Despite the limitations on its effectiveness the provincial forestry police still manage to mount patrols of the Yogyakarta protected forest area (including permanently manning three picket boxes in three different forest locations) and usually coordinate several anti-logging operations every year. I will postpone discussion of the details of Forestry Police operations and relations with Polri until chapter four.

120 Republik Indonesia: Undang-Undang No.41/1999 tentang Kehutanan, pasal 77.
122 The first time the Forestry Police noticed small-scale illegal industrial logging was in 2007. In this year a team of people was seen chainsaw felling hundreds of logs. Interview, Tri, 2008. Dinas Kehutanan dan Perkebunan Propinsi DIY, Rekapitulasi Kerusakan Hutan 2007.
123 Interview, Tri, 2008.
Within the regional government transportation bureaucracy, district transportation bureaus perform more important law enforcement functions compared to their provincial counterparts. District Transport Bureaus are responsible for enforcing automobile standards for private (non-commercial) vehicles, which are the vast majority of vehicles on Indonesia’s roads. This is the most important enforcement function carried out by the transport offices. Law enforcement is not however an especially important responsibility for the transport bureaucracies. Thus in the district of Sleman for example, the transport office had only five PPNS in 2008, while the city of Yogyakarta had around six PPNS. Both of these offices execute their enforcement tasks in the form of combined operations with the police and their district’s civil service police. More of the work of the Transport Bureau will be discussed in chapter four.

In summary if we disaggregate Indonesian regional government and analyse its autonomous sub-units, there are multiple agencies which are involved in law enforcement: these consist of both specialist local policing agencies and sectoral policing actors like the Forestry Police and the Transport Bureau. Between these two type of agencies the specialist, meta-policing bureaus at the district level emerge as the most important. While provinces and districts are both involved in law enforcement, Indonesia’s approach to decentralisation preferences the districts. The security network becomes even more intricate, however, when we factor in the non-Polri security agencies of the national government.

Central government security and law enforcement actors

Within Yogyakarta there are a number of security actors, beside Polri, which fall under the umbrella of the national government. Although these actors perform relatively minor security functions, they are worth analysing. By factoring in these remaining groups the true extent of the plurality and complexity of regional security becomes apparent. Within

this latter group we find the territorial units of the Indonesian army, the immigration service and the regional tax office.

Yogyakarta, like other regions in Indonesia, has its own territorial army unit: Korem 072. This army resort command is a sub-part of Kodam (or Komando Daerah Militer) IV, which covers the region of Central Java. Korem 072 has ten sub-units (Kodim), one for each of the districts of Yogyakarta province, plus five others for neighbouring districts in Central Java. The Korem has one infantry battalion of around 500 personnel with an indeterminate number of troops attached to each Kodim (and the sub-units of the Kodim, the Koramil, which cover the sub-district level of government).

Determining what Yogyakarta army territorial units actually do is not an easy task, but from the little evidence available I propose they have at least four active functions: training for war, supporting the police, performing community service and collecting intelligence. This modest set of duties generally supports the argument of chapter one, that since the separation of the police from the Indonesian military, the TNI no longer performs the internal security functions that it did during the Suharto era.

What is clearly apparent during my one interview with the Korem leadership was the dissonance between the common perception of the military as a powerful, authoritative security entity compared to the limited range of functions that territorial forces actually perform. My respondents, the Korem head of intelligence, head of operations and head of

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125 Interview: Kasi Intelijen Mayor Suwarno, Kasi Teritorial Mayor Jawa Heru dan Kasi Operasi Mayor Nurodin, Korem 072, 30 June 2008.
126 To give some background on the difficulty of dealing with the Indonesian military, I was granted one interview with the Yogyakarta Korem in June 2008. It took approximately five months to arrange this interview, and multiple layers of the military headquarters in Jakarta had to grant their permission. At the end of this long and bureaucratic process, I was granted an audience with the Korem’s head of intelligence, head of operations and head of territorial forces. Much of the evidence I refer to in this chapter originates from the little information that they gave me during this one rather hostile meeting. At the interview I asked the Korem only the questions TNI headquarters had already approved. After the officers terminated this meeting at their behest, the Korem refused to have further contact with me. Two months later, the Indonesian agency responsible for my research (RISTEK), formally demanded a meeting with my Indonesian supervisor (the head of the Peace and Conflict Studies Centre at Gadjah Mada University). At this meeting, the RISTEK executive questioned why UGM sponsored a foreign researcher to delve into Indonesia’s internal security matters. Subsequently during the year, RISTEK refused to extend my research permission. I suspect that the local Korem officers complained to RISTEK about my interest in them (recalling I had already done a year of research in Yogyakarta at that time with no problems from any other informants).
127 The intelligence collection functions of the territorial units will be discussed in the next chapter.
territorial forces, stated that the Korem’s primary duty is implementing a training schedule for personnel underneath its command. The training schedule is sent down on an annual basis from Kodam headquarters in Semarang. Particularly noteworthy, however, was the attitude of my interviewees to the army’s role in local security. My respondents conceded that the Korem does have a support function for the police. This responsibility is governed under specific military protocols.\textsuperscript{128} My interviewees were cautious to underline that, as far as they were aware, there had never been a security disturbance in Yogyakarta where their forces had been formally required to use repressive force in support of the police. In response to my prompting, they did recall that there were a number of incidents in which territorial forces had been mobilised under police command (for example the 2006 regional elections for the mayor of Yogyakarta). At such times, army personnel were only ever put on active alert (tetap disiagakan), but were not actually deployed outside their barracks. This information is supported by other sources.\textsuperscript{129}

In order to obtain direct confirmation I put the question to the Korem leadership, as to whether territorial forces ever (in their command), had independently responded to civil disturbances or been involved in any manner of internal security operation. My question was refuted and I was told that this was a task for the Indonesian police. The lead respondent, the head of intelligence drew a comparison with Australia explaining “our duties are much like those of the defence force of your own country [Australia]. We are here for defensive purposes. We are not that much different to the Australian military.” In this way the respondents deliberately denied that the Korem was permitted to deploy its organic forces independently in support of internal security operations.\textsuperscript{130} I can conclude from my only interview with the military that, at least according to their interpretation of

\textsuperscript{128} Which for TNI forces is written in the Mabes TNI doctrine: Petunjuk Pelaksanaan tentang Bantuan kepada Polri dalam rangka Bantuan Kamtibmas (2006). I was not however permitted to read the doctrine.
\textsuperscript{129} I found some supporting information from the head of the intelligence section in the Pol.PP unit of Yogyakarta city. In his experience of election security operations in 2006, TNI forces were put on stand-by, but never actually used. Interview, Former Kepala Seksi Intel. Dinas Ketertiban Kota Yogyakarta, 19 April 2008.
\textsuperscript{130} This view was qualified by the respondents at an earlier part of the interview. The head of operations, in his explanation of the principles of assistance to the police did point out that the military police (Denpom) are charged with enforcing military law over TNI personnel. As such Denpom always conducts either independent or joint patrols with the police (he gave the example of Lebaran, when Denpom join the police in anti-vice activities; largely for the purpose of arresting TNI personnel swept up in the raids). Their duties however only extend to searching and arresting TNI personnel. Interview: Kasi Intelijen, Kasi Teritorial dan Kasi Operasi, Korem 072, 2008.
their tasks, the army believe they have no mandate to conduct independent security operations. Most importantly, I have found no other interviewee in Yogyakarta - police officer, journalist, former gangster, regional government bureaucrat, or other source - who has contradicted these officer’s testimony.

Based upon information gleaned from other sources and field observations, I am aware that the TNI is also actively assisting in community development projects run by regional government. This activity seems to be a modern adaption of the old Suharto era program ‘ABRI masuk Desa’ (ABRI enters the village. I cannot speculate as to the number and scale of such projects in Yogyakarta today. I have though, at one time, observed one of these projects in the sub-district of Kotagede, Yogyakarta city, in May 2008. At that time one platoon of TNI forces had been organised to reconstruct a dike wall damaged in flooding. After discussions with the village (or Kelurahan) head of governmental affairs and with personnel on the work detail it became apparent that the territorial troops were providing unpaid labour to the project. The arrangement was that the kelurahan provided the materials, while the TNI provided the workforce. Although this is only one example, I find supporting references to such programs in the documents of the regional leaders conference in the Kabupaten of Sleman. At one meeting the Kodim commander of Sleman requested that the kabupaten provide funds for the Kodim to continue its program of bhakti sosial (or social assistance) as the Kodim had no funds of its own. I speculate that the condition of the territorial forces in Sleman and the sub-district of Kotagede is probably similar: local TNI commands probably have no funds to administer what they see as an important civil engagement program. In the interim, the army continues to provide ad-hoc assistance but under the aegis of the local government.

With the exception of intelligence gathering, which will be discussed in chapter three, the above information summarises the data that I have been able to uncover about the activities of the Yogyakarta territorial command. The clear message which emerges from this evidence is how functionally limited the Indonesian military actually is in security management. The Indonesian military have little opportunity to transform their state

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131 Field Observation, 19 May 2008.
132 Kabupaten Sleman: Resume Rapat Koordinasi Pimpinan Daerah, 18 November 2006, para.4.
defence responsibilities into practical involvement in the local security environment. In Yogyakarta, the security activities of territorial army units only seem to consist of supporting the police.

There are finally two other law enforcement actors in the case study area which provide examples of how the national government can enforce laws through non-police agencies, these are the provincial immigration office, and the regional tax office. Both of these organisations, like the regional government forestry and the transport bureaucracies, implement sectoral laws. Both of these actors have limited mandates, but they are nevertheless part of the network of security in Yogyakarta.

The Yogyakarta Immigration Office is the provincial service point for the national immigration service, which is part of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights. The duties of the immigration service are defined under Law No.9/1992 on Immigration. The immigration office is tasked with the duty of investigating violations of immigration law concerning foreigners who overstay or abuse their visas. The law empowers PPNS within the immigration service to investigate suspected crimes under immigration law. Within the two and a half years from 2006 to July 2008, the Yogyakarta Immigration Office investigated only four cases of immigration violations. The office has two PPNS.

The Tax Office of Yogyakarta is the provincial service point for the national Directorate General of Taxation, an arm of the Indonesian Ministry of Finance. The Yogyakarta Tax Office has authority under two regulations of the Indonesian Finance Ministry to conduct investigations into criminal conspiracies to avoid tax. The Office has eight PPNS and has uncovered three cases of criminal conspiracy, all of which were passed on to their head office in Jakarta for investigation. The reason for this low rate of prosecution is that the Yogyakarta Office of the Directorate General of Taxation was only opened in October

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133 Undang-Undang Nomor 9/1992 tentang Keimigrasian, Bab VIII, Ketentuan Pidana.
134 Interview, Eko Prinono, Kepala Seksi Pengawasan dan Penindakan, Kantor Imigrasi Yogyakarta, 1 July 2008.
2007. Previously taxation matters were dealt with by a sub-branch of the directorate in Yogyakarta. In the structure of the Directorate General of Taxation, the sub-branch did not have the full authority of a regional office. As such the three cases of violation of tax law which were found in Yogyakarta up to 2007, were not actually handled in Yogyakarta.\footnote{Interview, Kepala Kantor Pajak Daerah Yogyakarta Sigit, 27 June 2008.} In summary the remaining national law enforcement actors have authority for investigating crime, but are largely inactive. We will nevertheless look at their law enforcement relations with the police, in chapter four.

Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed the case study site and the security agencies within it. Part of the objective has been to justify the relevance of this dissertation to the study of relations in security networks. I selected Yogyakarta as a case study initially to test the hypothesis that relations among security actors were bad. Unexpectedly, these hypotheses proved to be wrong. Instead what this thesis has set out to do is explain the alternative findings of why there are collaboration and clear divisions of labour among security agencies. As argued in this chapter, case study research provides valuable insights for answering the questions of my research. Case study research is a powerful way for us to form empirical knowledge about the practice of security management at the sub-national level through in-depth, qualitative research. So far, this data has been missing from the contemporary literature.

Given the reputation of Yogyakarta as an unusual province within Indonesia, my thesis needs to confront potential criticisms regarding the relevance of my findings. In brief, I argue that the rich, qualitative data that emerges from a single case study project makes this form of research both justifiable and valuable, even for its purely empirical benefits. If we wish to pursue the comparative value of Yogyakarta, I argue that this province can be used to generalise about relations within other security environments in Indonesia. In part this is because the state security organisations found within Yogyakarta are likely to operate within jurisdictions and work patterns that are universal in Indonesia. Likewise many
assumptions about Yogyakarta's exceptionalism are questionable when we apply them to the security sector. Nevertheless it is conceded this thesis is presented as a single qualitative case study and justified on this basis alone.

The discussion of the Yogyakarta environment revealed that the case study is underdeveloped, has a large population density and has an interesting mix of actual and potential security threats. In terms of active threats, everyday crime afflicts Yogyakarta in much the same way as it probably does the rest of Indonesia. The large university sector leads to a complex mix of potential threats. The large number of young people combined with a permissive intellectual environment feeds a number of extremist movements and political agitation. This is manifested most visibly in the significant number of demonstrations around the provincial capital.

Finally, the largest part of this chapter consists of an analysis of the major public security actors in the Yogyakarta region, examining their size, jurisdiction and a broad overview of their activities. This chapter has only reviewed public security organisations, given that these groupings are intricate and possess complex boundaries of jurisdiction. Even by merely examining the public sector, we obtain a picture of a highly plural, multifaceted security network. Within the national government apparatus we find police, army, tax and immigration officers all involved in security and law enforcement in the province. Added to this is a large array of regional government agencies, like civil service police, forestry police and transport officers. Yet the Indonesian police, by virtue of its size, authority and broad range of activities emerges clearly as the most significant among these groupings.
Chapter 3: Collaboration Among State Security Institutions and the Role of Joint Agency Committees

This chapter begins my analysis of collaboration among state security organisations. Within the Indonesian system of security management joint-institutional taskforces play a particularly important role in facilitating security cooperation. This chapter explores how interagency security committees operate in Yogyakarta. Ranked in order of importance, this chapter will examine the Regional Leader’s Conference (Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah (Muspida)), the Regional Intelligence Community meeting (Komunitas Intelijen Daerah (Kominda)), the meeting of the Regional Head of Government, Regional Courts, Regional State Prosecutors and Police (Kepala Daerah, Pengadilan, Kejaksaan, Kepolisan – Kediljapol), and the sub-district leader’s forum (Musywarah Pimpinan Kecamatan or Muspika). Beside these examples there are also several taskforces which facilitate interagency law enforcement in specific sectors (such as the enforcement working group of the regional Narcotics Agency or the forestry security taskforce of the provincial forestry office).¹

One of the prominent characteristics of this system is the absence of ‘unity of command’ or a single institutional leader within the committee.² A second characteristic is that agencies participate in these forums voluntarily. No superior entity or officer obliges them to cooperate. American strategists have claimed that such models of inter-agency cooperation which do not possess a dominant leader, are ineffective for creating collaboration.³ In part,

¹ There is one other security forum I am aware of but have been unable to research as its initiator, the State Prosecutor’s office, refused to grant my request for an interview. This is the Community Belief Supervisory Team (or Tim Pengawasan Aliran Kepercayaan Masyarakat – Tim Pakem). This team is composed of police, regional court, and regional government/interior ministry representatives (usually from the Kesatuan Bangsa dan Politik area). The team meets to discuss the ‘lawfulness’ of deviant movements. The only information I have on this grouping comes from press reports. Tim Pakem in other parts of Indonesia have been especially active in monitoring heretical Islamic groups. I assume, given the organisational hierarchy of the state prosecutors that the team also exists in Yogyakarta. For press releases of the Kejaksaan Agung discussing Tim Pakem activities see: Republic Indonesia, Kejaksaan Agung, Jaksa Agung Muda Intelijen: <http://www.kejaksaan.go.id/unit_kejaksaan.php?idu=22> last accessed 30 July 2009.
³ Fishel, ‘The Interagency Arena at the Operational Level.’ In: Marcella, Affairs of State, 438.
my data suggests this analysis is correct. The various joint-security forums in my case study site are not orientated to producing outcomes. While there is evidence to suggest these forums have engineered combined operations, the examples are few. Security committees in Yogyakarta are more suited to producing discussion.

Several factors explain why these forums produce dialogue rather than action. The prevailing security environment in Yogyakarta is a major factor. Only rarely do threats emerge in Yogyakarta which are of such significance that they demand a joint agency response. A second factor is the lack of a unifying strategic goal. American strategists argue that successful interagency security committees require a single, unifying objective. Except for narcotics and anti-logging taskforces, Yogyakarta’s security forums have only general terms of reference.\(^4\) The final explanation for the dialogue-over-results outcome is weaknesses in decision-making. Without a dominant leader in inter-agency committees, decisions are made on the basis of consensus. Consensus decision-making is slow and ineffective in driving action.

Having made the case that interagency security meetings in Yogyakarta are not orientated to producing outcomes, to judge them on this criteria alone would be unfair. I argue the primary benefit of joint-agency forums, ironically, lies in their ability to facilitate dialogue and consensus. The establishment of consensus is not an insignificant achievement. Common perceptions of inter-institutional relations in Indonesia assume that security actors are in conflict. The literature would have us believe Indonesia’s problem is not how to create the best interagency security outcomes but rather how to discourage interagency disputes. Judged on this basis, the evidence from Yogyakarta shows that interagency meetings are helpful in creating agreement. Arguably therefore we should see the security cooperation glass as being half full, rather than half empty.

To return to the issue of security outcomes, in this chapter it is clear that in the few times where joint-operations are required, generally the security forums serve to build the consensus which permits officers in the field, much lower down the chain, to put agreed decisions into action. Most often, when operations do take place, they take place between

\(^4\) Fishel, ‘The Interagency Arena at the Operational Level.’ In: Marcella, Affairs of State, 438.
Polri elements and Pol.PP, and often the police become the ‘leading sector’ (i.e. the agency which takes command). Occasionally when an issue falls within the regional government jurisdiction (for example, conducting evictions), the Pol.PP take the lead. The TNI, when they are very rarely involved in such activities, do so purely as a support element. Therefore the superior responsibilities and repressive powers of the police make Polri the metaphorical ‘muscle’ behind the joint agency process.

The final and unexpected finding of this chapter is that regional government actually plays a key role in joint agency forums. This situation is counterintuitive as regional government has only weak law enforcement capabilities of its own. All inter-institutional taskforces fall under the administration of regional government. Because of this, regional governments – particularly through the Muspida – are able to impose some of its concerns on the national security apparatus and draw the national apparatus into resolving local problems. While regional government may have a loud voice in the meeting rooms, the forums require the powers of the police to enforce resolutions. Given that the primary interlocutors in interagency meetings - the police, military, regional government, the law courts and state prosecutors - are all virtually independent at the regional level, the issue of why they choose to cooperate becomes a critical question. I will provide a detailed analysis of the motives for security cooperation in chapter four. I begin this chapter however with a brief discussion of American studies of interagency security forums. This enables to contrast the strengths and weaknesses of the meeting process in Yogyakarta with the established theory. I then move into a review of each of the joint security conferences in turn.

The American Interagency Security Debate

The idea that interagency taskforces can play a meaningful role in security management comes from a branch of American security studies. At the beginning of the nineteen nineties, military policymakers and theorists of strategic studies began to examine has interagency cooperation within American national security policy. The failure of US intelligence agencies to stop the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks revitalised interest in
this school of thinking. For my thesis this area of research is inspirational but of limited theoretical value. As the United States is a stable, united superpower this discourse is exclusively directed at debating how the interagency functions in managing America’s external security. In this school scholars discuss such things as the appropriate design of the American National Security Council, the role of interagency cooperation for military nation-building operations (like Kosovo in 1998), the weaknesses in the security structures of federal government, and so on. As such, a large part of these discussions are context specific to the United States.

While much of the work in this field is virtually irrelevant outside the American federal government, at least one writer has provided theory which is of interest to the non-American context. John Fishel analysed six case studies of interagency military operations. This includes the Malayan Emergency, the operation of the American combined services command during the Vietnam war, US narcotics interdiction operations in Florida and the Colombian government’s handling of the Colombian civil war. Fishel’s analysis of the interagency management of these security problems led him to infer: “[there is] one obvious conclusion [about interagency cooperation]. Where there was unity of command, there was unity of effort and effective interagency coordination, not otherwise.” Fishel argues therefore that interagency taskforces require one leading institution as a necessity to achieve coordination. Secondly, “without a strategic objective, the best operational plan had little likelihood of mission success.” Therefore, every successful interagency activity must crystallise around a clear objective.

Although one could argue that there are vast differences of kind between Fishel’s research on high conflict scenarios and my own research in Yogyakarta, to some extent this situation highlights the paucity of theory construction on this topic. Fishel’s research is one of the

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few sources which attempts to make conclusions about interagency security relations at the meso or operational level. His observations on interagency taskforces in various war-like scenarios at least provides us with a yardstick to measure the functioning of security committees in Yogyakarta. As argued above some of his claims are accurate. Operational outcomes are closely linked to strong leadership and clear purpose. Security taskforces in Yogyakarta lack these elements, the effectiveness of them is accordingly small Yet Fishel’s analysis is heavily weighted to assuming the primary goal of interagency operations should be achieving outcomes. This assumption may be appropriate for countries like the United States where it is assumed agencies can be trusted to work cooperatively. For countries like Indonesia, the literature leads us to believe interagency cooperation is inherently problematic because of inter-institutional hostility and uncertain boundaries of jurisdiction. While supporting Fishel’s conclusion, I propose that in Indonesia our expectations of success should be more conservative. I argue that where interagency security taskforces play a role in facilitating dialogue and consensus - which is prima facie evidence of collaboration - this should be noted as an achievement in and of itself.

Regional Leader’s Conference (Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah)

In Indonesia, the Muspida is the most senior and important interagency security forum below the national government. The Muspida brings together the most important government figures at the provincial and district level. Historically, the Muspida had its origins in the nineteen sixties. In 1986, the president issued the most current executive order on the Muspida security meetings. According to this presidential decree, the primary intention of the Muspida is to “smoothen the implementation of national development” and “to assure the stability and unity of the state.” Following this, a secondary purpose is to strengthen the powers of local heads of government in developing

10 Keputusan President Republik Indonesia Nomor 10 Tahun 1986 tentang Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah. Although according to the notes of the executive order, the forum has existed since at least 1967. Keppres 10/1986 only served to revive the Muspida. Other boards with a similar composition can be found in the nineteen fifties. Lowry, Armed Forces of Indonesia, 75.
their respective territories. If we overlook the Suharto-era rhetoric, the actual intention of the Muspida is to allow regional actors to discuss and plan security.

National regulations on the Muspida are clear in certain respects, like the definition of the membership of the committee, but less plain about the Muspida’s exact functions. The Muspida consists of the governor at the provincial level and the bupati or walikota at the district level, as well as the regional military commander, the regional head of police, and the regional state prosecutor. The head of local government is tasked as the chair of the meeting. According to the presidential executive order, the Muspida is only authorised to achieve coordination. The chair is not empowered to make rulings that are binding upon the members. In a separate instruction, the minister of the interior has created a further requirement that Muspida meetings must take place at all regional levels of government once every three months (or sooner as required). Aside from these general points of guidance, state regulations do not rule on what issues the Muspida should or should not discuss. The absence of a central, organising purpose emerges as a major theme in the operation of the Muspida in Yogyakarta.

The notes from district Muspida meetings provide us with the richest and largest array of data for this chapter. Most of this information originates from declassified meeting notes compiled by the district governments of Sleman (2006-2008), Bantul (2003-2006) and Yogyakarta city (which provided miscellaneous papers from 2002 and 2003 and chronologically complete records from 2004-2007). This data is admittedly imperfect. The time series only spans several years, due to poor document storage. Sometimes the notes are incomplete or lapse into brief summaries. The provincial administration denied access to all its documents, preventing a comparison between layers of regional government.

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13 Surat Perintah Menteri Dalam Negeri, Hal: Pelaksanaan Keputusan Presiden No.10/1986, No.124/1926/PUID, Pasal 3. Within DIY, the governor has decided that all sitting fees and operational costs imposed by such forums are burdened upon the local government budget [Keputusan Gubernur Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta No.262/KPTS/1999, Pasal 3 and 4].
14 Information was deliberately withheld from me only once to my knowledge. This event concerned a July 2007 meeting of the Muspida in the city of Yogyakarta. The city’s Bagian Tata Pemerintahan withheld the meeting notes because the Muspida apparently discussed incidents of inter-ethnic conflict among university students. Aside from this meeting, the district governments assessed their Muspida notes as either unclassified or classified at the lowest level of secrecy, thus allowing the notes to be released to me in complete form.
Despite these weaknesses in the data collection, nevertheless we should not underestimate the significance of these sources. These documents are the only publicly available, primary source government documents which I have found that reveal how security actors interact at the sub-national level. Given the originality of the source material, and the general importance of the Muspida for security collaboration, it is justifiable to analyse each district Muspida individually.

The declassified Muspida notes depict a functional system of security cooperation, though one which emphasises talk rather than action. As the organiser of the Muspida, regional government has an unexpectedly strong voice in the meetings. Despite the fact that national regulations link the Muspida to countering threats to national unity, in the post-decentralisation period the district governments largely use the Muspida as a means of involving national agencies in the resolution of local problems. Because regional government establishes the agenda, regional government decides much of what gets discussed. We therefore see a lot of matters which fall within regional government responsibility (i.e. vice, local election security) appearing in the Muspida. The other participants in the Muspida generally concede the initiative to regional government. However, serious matters which require repressive force generally get passed on to the police.

*Muspida of Sleman*

The Muspida of Sleman district13 shows many of the basic traits which are apparent in the Muspida of Bantul and Yogyakarta city – that is, the Muspida discusses a broad variety of security problems and many of them relate to the portfolio of regional government. Muspida documents from Sleman show the importance of the police in enforcing security. The documents also depict a good degree of consensus in meetings. What is interesting about the Muspida of Sleman though is that it is newer. After the introduction of local

13 The Kabupaten of Sleman refers to its Muspida as the Rapat Koordinasasi Pimpinan Daerah (Regional Leader's Coordination Meeting or Rakorpim).
autonomy the district government allowed the Muspida process to fall into inactivity, it was revived only in July 2006. According to the chief of the district bureaucracy, this was a matter of legal interpretation. The kabupaten government considered the 1999 autonomy laws did not specifically allow regional (otherwise termed horizontal) institutions to cooperate with national (vertical) institutions. This situation changed with the updated 2004 laws on regional autonomy. This fact underlines one of the interesting things about this topic. Regional security cooperation is entirely dependent on the willingness of the institutions to work together.

Unfortunately, as the Muspida was only revived after 2006 there is not a long time span of data. On the other hand, the participants did engage in very mature and introspective discussions after the resurrection of the meeting, in which they surveyed the security environment of the district. This set of talks differs from the notes of the other older Muspidas, where the roles of each agency and their attitudes to the meeting process have crystallised, and discussions are much more matter-of-fact. Therefore by comparison the documents from Sleman are fewer, but more interesting.

The Muspida of Sleman tackled a broad range of issues during 2006 to 2008 – from natural disaster management to terrorism – but it appears evident that while local government took the initiative in setting the agenda, it was the police that provided most of the wherewithal to handle problems. Being true to its foundations as a forum organised under local government, the bupati of Sleman took the lead in re-assembling the Muspida and setting its first discussion. On 29 June 2006, the bupati submitted papers to the regional leadership of Sleman asking them to attend a coordinating meeting to restart the Muspida. The bupati defined the Muspida’s task as to discuss five core problems:

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16 The district secretary argues that Indonesia’s first autonomy law, UU 5/1974, refers to the Muspida while Indonesia’s next decentralisation laws UU 22 and 25/1999 do not. Therefore, until the 1999 local autonomy laws were superseded through UU 32/2004 (and the ruling of Pasal 27, huruf J which explicitly permits centre-region cooperation), the Muspida was not held officially in Sleman. The regional leaders did meet between 1999 and 2004, but on a personal, non-formal basis. Interview with Ir. Sutrisno, District Secretary of the Kabupaten of Sleman, 30 July 2007. ‘Materi Rapat Persiapan Rakorpimda / Muspida, 29 Juni 2006.’
17 Invited to attend were the deputy chief of the district, the district state prosecutor and their deputy, the head of the district police, the deputy head of police, the district military commander and his chief of staff and the Sleman district secretary. Notably absent however was the head of the district court. Kabupaten of Sleman: Materi Rapat Persiapan Rakorpimda / Muspida, 29 Juni 2006 (provided by the Bagian Tata Pemerintahan), p.1.
1. Policy on the execution of public law and order, for example:
   - The handling of street sellers
   - Land conflict
   - Mass Demonstrations
   - Neighbourhood Watch [ronda siskamling] management
   - etc

2. Prevention of Natural Disasters, for example:
   - Action Plan for Gunung Merapi [an active volcano in the district]
   - Handling of aftershocks [following a massive earthquake in Yogyakarta in June 2006]
   - etc

3. Population Problems, for example:
   - Citizenship cards
   - Supervision of foreigners
   - etc

4. Social Problems, for example:
   - Abuse of Narcotics
   - Handling of Street Children
   - etc

5. Upholding statutory law and regulations, for example:
   - Judicial Operations
   - Joint Patrols
   - etc

Sleman’s first Muspida forum in July 2006 met and seems to have considered point one as the most important issue. In the July meeting the Muspida resolved to create a unified government approach to the threat of terrorism. In particular, the Muspida called for a comprehensive response strategy taking in all government agencies down to the kecamatan level, the need for anticipatory measures (mapping the district’s population and developing mechanisms for reporting threats) and warning the community to be cautious about “visitors”. These measures were passed on to the Polres, the Kodim, the Public Order Bureau and the Bureau of Population [Dinas Kependudukan] for technical implementation. The Muspida declared that action should be taken on certain crime trends, in particular motor vehicle theft, narcotics and gambling. The Muspida also debated the need for a response to the danger of inter-ethnic conflict, but decided this was an issue of pure

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criminality and handed the issue over to the police. The Muspida did agree to approve a survey of the various ethnic groups in Sleman and to offer these groups ‘patriotic education’ and opportunities for inter-ethnic dialogue. These programs were again passed on to the Pol.PP, the police and the Kodim for execution.

The Muspida’s early resolutions all seem rather grand and short on substance, but there is evidence to suggest that Muspida participants moved on at least some of the resolutions. The 2007 budget papers of the Dinas Ketertiban, indicate there were appropriations for the bureau to conduct ‘ethnic data mapping’ together with Sleman’s Kodim. One can only imagine this means that the two institutions did joint population surveys. There was also another program in the Dinas’ budget for giving ‘democratic education’ to young adults. The Sleman Muspida did therefore attempt to transform some of its consensus motions into action.

In subsequent meetings, it is apparent the district government felt a subtle and unconscious sense of ownership over the Muspida process. The meetings following July 2006 took on an expanded membership mostly drawn from the district government. For the next forum held on 18 November 2006 the district invited a host of representatives from its own technical agencies such as: the assistant district secretary (for political affairs), the head of the Dinas Pol.PP, the heads of the Family Planning Bureau, the District Auditing Office, the Bureau of Population, the Bureau of Water, Mining and Natural Disaster Management and the head of the Legal and Government Affairs Bureau. It seems curious that in a forum essentially intended for coordinating security affairs, the district involved such a large number of unrelated agencies. The notes also show most of these agencies had very little to contribute to the meetings. While this trend

19 Perceptions of the threat of inter-ethnic conflict (or Konflik SARA as it is termed) is particularly sharp in Yogyakarta due to the large, transient population of students from across the archipelago.
20 ‘Resume Rapat Koordinasi Pimpinan Daerah (Rakorda)’. Kabupaten of Sleman, 4 July 2006.
21 Kabupaten Sleman Dinas Pol.PP: Rencana Kerja Tahunan 2007, Program 5. ‘Pengembangan Etika Demokrasi.’ This program includes Rp.30 million for “State Ideology” seminars and Rp.23 million for intelligence gathering towards likely sources of instability (included in this line item was the data mapping of foreigners and foreign NGOs, former members of “forbidden organisations” [organisasi terlarang which is code for the former Indonesian Communist Party], the children of foreigners and Indonesians and areas vulnerable to inter-group conflict and demonstrations). The latter of these programs was performed by Pol.PP personnel together with the district Kodim.
may be understandable given that Sleman was experimenting with the forum at that time, this information also suggests the district was subtly imprinting its own agenda on the Muspida.

It would not be correct either to maintain that the Muspida of Sleman was only a tool for local government interests, the national security agencies put forward their own issues as well. In preparation for the November 2006 meeting, the Kapolres of Sleman circulated his own discussion paper to the Muspida asking that the government of Sleman, among other things, to donate land and building materials for sub-district police stations. He added to this an additional request for patrol motorcycles, escort cars and financial assistance for the Polres’ anti-narcotics operations. The Polres also complained that the kabupaten should take a stake in paying for certain activities that had been burdened upon the national agencies. The Kapolres mentioned in particular autopsosy costs, vehicle accidents and the ‘services’ the police give to regional PPNS investigators in enforcing district ordinances. The Kapolres also asked the district executive for greater assistance in policing. The police pointed out they needed more information from local government to do “people mapping.” In fact, over the next several meetings the Kapolres would often express his disappointment that the pemerintah daerah was not doing enough to help the police to collect data on all the residents, foreigners, hotels and boarding houses of the district. Finally, the Kapolres also asked for more assistance from the local government’s social welfare apparatus (the Dinas Sosial) in giving care to beggars, prostitutes and poor people who fell into police custody.23

The local military commander (Dandim), like the Kapolres, was also not reticent about making his own requests for district government support. Financially, the Dandim pointed out that his communications equipment were disrepair and this required assistance. The Dandim also declared some of his offices had been damaged (presumably by the 2006 earthquake) and the Kodim required replacement buildings. The Dandim added finally that his Kodim’s welfare program (the karya bhakti activities referred to in chapter two) lacked funding from the TNI’s own sources. As such, the Dandim looked to the

government of Sleman for financial aid. Operationally, the Dandim made clear he believed the Muspida elements should revive the past practices of mutually gathering and sharing intelligence (here he referred to as the Suharto era Bakorstanasda). The Kodim commander also foreshadowed the approach of the sensitive holiday period – Christmas and Idul Adha – and stated that the integrated security patrols which had occurred in previous times, should be continued.24

In a reflection perhaps of the closeness of the working relationships between the local and national government agencies, the bupati of Sleman committed to some of the police and military requests. The bupati agreed to fund joint activities with the vertical institutions (particularly the state prosecutors and the police) for the ‘war on drugs’ through the Badan Narkotika Kabupaten (district drug agency). The kabupaten also deferred to the police’s requests and put on their agenda a proposal for a new kabupaten regulation governing the distribution of district fines.25 While not agreeing to the requisition of vehicles and equipment, the bupati pointed out that with preparations for an expansion of disaster relief equipment, the Kodim and Polres would be able to take advantage of the available materials. Furthermore, acting on mutual concerns regarding the end of year festivals Idul Adha and Christmas, joint patrols between the Polres, Kodim and Pol.PP would continue.26

While in these instances the national government actors were hardly assuming control of the agenda, clearly they were asserting their interests and issues of concern. While this does not overturn the point that the Muspida generally attends to the concerns of local government, it does indicate there is a sense of shared purpose in this forum. Of particular note was the ability of the various actors to arrive at in-principle commitments for specific activities, such as joint patrols, data sharing and anti-terrorism responses. These examples illustrate the capacity of local institutions to take the initiative in handling shared

24 The Dandim’s requests were compiled by Assisten Sekretaris Daerah Setya Budhi in: Resume Rapat Koordinasi Pimpinan Daerah (Rakorda) Kabupaten Sleman 18 November 2006.
25 The redistribution of district fines saw district fine monies divided as follows: 55% to the Sleman government, with the police and state prosecutors obtaining 12.5% respectively and the district court 20%. Interview, Edi Hermanan and Heru Djoko, Kepala Sub-Bagian Bantuan Hukum and Kepala Sub-bagian Dokumentasi in the Bagian Hukum, Kabupaten Sleman, 2 August 2007.
26 Kabupaten Sleman: Resume Rapat Koordinasi Pimpinan Daerah 22 December 2006.
concerns. The examples also illustrate how cooperation, rather than conflict, defines these inter-institutional relationships.

The early meetings of the Muspida of Sleman raise another critical issue for interagency cooperation: the funding of joint activities. While I will address this issue more comprehensively in chapter four, it is appropriate to provide an introduction to the issue here. As Jun Honna and Marcus Mietzner have pointed out, during both the Suharto era and the early democratisation period, regional TNI and Polri elements have used regional government to supplement their own budgets. The evidence from Yogyakarta indicates this practice went on in my case study site as it did elsewhere in Indonesia. As will be discussed in chapter four, this practice is an important part of inter-institutional cooperation. As decentralisation has progressed, however, it has become gradually more difficult for regional governments to grant cash payments to national security forces. While chapter four discusses inter-institutional funding in greater detail, this chapter will only highlight the issue as it arises in interagency committees.

At the Muspida of February 2007, the bupati of Sleman dropped something of a bombshell; the interior minister had decided to impose strict regulations on region-centre financial assistance. In a circular memo from the minister concerning regional budgets, the minister ruled that henceforth it was illegal for local government to grant money to national government institutions in the regions. While local governments had been discouraged from doing this in the past, in 2006 it was expressly forbidden. In effect, this caused the government of Sleman to rethink some of its budgetary commitments and warn its national government interlocutors that future joint-spending would be subject to strenuous auditing. Although the meeting notes are couched in official language the

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29 Kabupaten Sleman: Hasil Rakorpim 19 Februari 2007. Within the case study the way that the local government actors have tended to interpret this ruling is that they no longer fund block grants to their national government partners. Instead, they appropriate money for specific joint-operational activities. Interview with Head of Operations Hartana, Dinas Keteribatan Kota Yogya, 23 October 2007. Also: Interview with Sekretaris Daerah Bantul Gendut Sudarto 9 October 2007.
district government seemed shaken by the new policy. The secretariat documented the bupati proposing the following about future inter-institutional support:

- In execution, the budget user and the assisting apparatus [the national institutions like Polri, TNI, etc.] so that they avoid the risk of problems in the future will choose methods which are legally correct, and in this it must be added there is a need to pay attention to justice, sociology [sic] and psychology of the community.
- To solidify the actions to be taken, if there are things which are doubtful from the regulations then it is best to consult with various competent parties like: higher government (Prop, Depdagri, Depkeu, other departments), oversight bodies (Bawasda, Irjen, BPKP, BPK, etc) and report to the leadership.
- there needs to be further regulation as a guideline for the execution of activities.30

It would have been fascinating to know how the central government actors responded in the meeting. Unfortunately, due to poor document keeping the subsequent pages of the notes were lost. I did however question the Bupati of Sleman, Ibnu Subiyanto as to whether this change in central government policy created problems between his administration and the central government representatives in the Muspida. He said at the time it did, but since 2007 the Minister had withdrawn his policy and cross-institutional funding still continues in a different form.31 The bupati did not really answer the question satisfactorily but I speculate that, given the Dandim and the Kapores’s hopes for financial aid, this policy probably caused consternation at the time. The bupati is correct on his second point. Judging by evidence from the other districts, regional governments still continue to pay Polri, TNI and the other central government actors. What has changed is that regional governments now pay on a fee-for-service basis whenever cooperation is necessary. More, however, will be discussed of this in chapter four.

The final recorded meetings of the Muspida of Sleman from 2007 show some key weaknesses in the Muspida process. In particular the Muspida of Sleman encountered substantial difficulty in mounting a credible joint-response to major security threats. The

31 In fact, I find no evidence that the interior minister rescinded his order. What the minister did subsequently was to clarify his intent in public statements. The Interior Ministry declared regional governments are forbidden from making direct cash grants to national institutions that operate in their regions (or instansi vertikal). Regional governments may however fund joint activities with the national institutions. This clarification is probably what the bupati referred to. See: Press Statement, Ministry of the Interior, ‘Penjelasan DIRJEN BAKD Mengenai Belanja Bantuan Kepada Instansi Vertikal tang Bersumber dari APBD (23 February 2006).’ <http:/Ayww.depdagri.go.id/konten.php?nama=Pers&op=detail&id=15> Accessed May 2008. Interview, Bupati of Sleman Ibnu Subiyanto, 10 June 2008.
example par-excellence of this problem is terrorism. In late March 2007, a major network of terrorists was discovered in the northern parts of Sleman (in the Kaliurang region). Seven terrorists under the nominal leadership of the mastermind Abu Dujana were captured in a police assault. Two others were killed. The police specialist anti-terror detachment *Densus-88* confiscated several assault rifles, hundreds of rounds of ammunition and hundreds of kilograms of explosives.\(^2\) This operation was probably handled completely outside the knowledge of the Sleman police, or anyone in Yogyakarta. The intelligence that triggered the operation came from arrests made earlier in January 2007 in Central Sulawesi. Therefore it is likely National Police Headquarters, rather than Polda DIY, commanded this operation.\(^3\) All of the discussions I have had with Polres Sleman on the topic show they did not know details of the arrests even as reported in the media.\(^4\) This indicates they were probably not part of the operation at all. The local authorities therefore probably deserve no credit for the successful arrests but they do deserve to be judged for their response to the terrorist threat, once they were aware one existed.

In responding to the March 2007 arrests - and to other serious security problems for that matter - the joint-agency response from Sleman was not proportionate. In the next meeting of the Muspida on 4 July 2007 the participants discussed the handling of the then undeniable terrorist threat. The first problem with this meeting was its timing. The Muspida was held three months after a major domestic terrorist network was discovered in their area. Given the seriousness of the security breach, the Muspida arguably underestimated the situation.\(^5\) The only ideas that the Muspida participants could come up with in July 2007 were exactly the same as those put forward by the Muspida in July 2006: strengthening supervision activities by police and military at the street level, data mapping the population, encouraging civil society to report suspect activities by


\(^3\) The fact that so swiftly after the operation (less than one week later) the suspects were all flown to Jakarta supports the conclusion. ‘Tersangka Terorisme Sleman Mengaku Anggota JI, Punya 20 Nama Alias’, *Detik.com* 3 April 2007.

\(^4\) Interview, Wakil Kepala Polres Sleman Dede Alamsyah, 5 September 2007.

\(^5\) In fairness, other secret meetings may very well have been held before this date. I am unaware of any and I doubt that any were held but I bracket that fact as a possibility and if so, I concede the criticism. See: Resume Rakorda Kabupaten Sleman 4 July 2007.
newcomers, etc. These preventive measures were ineffective in nabbing the terrorists twelve months beforehand, but that irony appears lost in the meeting notes. In fairness, detecting secretive criminal organisations is very difficult. The authorities in Sleman may very well have felt overwhelmed. Nevertheless, given the seriousness of the event, the slow response afterwards and the rehashing of inadequate strategies from the past, the July 2007 Muspida shows the difficulty these forums encounter in producing effective action.

To compile what we can learn from the Muspida of Sleman, the information provides a particularly interesting snapshot of how the conference process develops from the beginning. Clearly the local government sets the meeting agenda. Therefore many of the group resolutions attend to the interests of local government. Over the important security matters the central government actors – in particular the police – also have input into the agenda. Indeed, the police provide the statutory power to put into effect the operational security resolutions made by the Muspida, like commanding joint patrols. We also gain the sense that, where it feels able, the district government seeks to fulfil the requests made by the national government apparatuses. Since many of their counterparts requests are financial in nature, the district government is placed in the uncomfortable position of having to reject most of their overtures.

36 The bupati has an interesting interpretation of this whole saga. When I questioned him on the effectiveness of his administration and the efforts of the local security apparatus, he said this: in 2006 he had implemented a program in which the village leadership, was encouraged to report (and he said infiltrate) suspicious activities by their citizens. The information was funnelled to his government and then distributed to polres Sleman and the Kodim. Out of this program, so he says, the kabupaten actually learned of the terrorists before the March operation. I challenged this explanation by pointing out that the March 2007 arrests actually resulted from information supplied by suspects arrested in Central Sulawesi in January 2007. He agreed but said his government did know about the terrorist cells in their own territory before any arrests were made. I then asked, why did he not do something about it, such as asking the police to arrest them? He replied, that in order to protect the informants at the village level, they decided not to do this. I find this whole explanation highly implausible. Most likely this whole episode took everyone in the district by surprise. Interview, Ibnu Subiyanto, 2008.

37 The July 2007 Muspida meeting also went on to discuss two other serious problems: inter-ethnic gang tensions (unexplained in the notes) and motor vehicle theft. The Muspida resolved that the police should refocus on handling such problems through criminal prosecutions and dialogue. The bupati also recommended that all Muspida components should be involved in holding inter-cultural dialogue forums, as a means of dissuading the different ethnic groupings in Sleman from conflict. In addition the bupati also requested that his Bureau of Public Order, the police and the military, data map the various ethnic quarters of the district. Those measures were exactly the same as those proposed in the first Muspida meeting of the year before. Why the Muspida considered these measures would be any more effective one year later remains unknown and highlights weaknesses of leadership and vision. Sleman, Resume Rakorda, July 2007.
Finally, there is one last point about the usefulness of the Muspida, as a discussion and planning forum the Muspida is a high value asset. The Muspida process raises the most vital problems faced by the district of Sleman and seeks a consensus based approach to managing the problems identified. The greatest benefit of the Muspida then is probably also its greatest weakness, it is more focused on talk than action. It mostly identifies problems rather than plans solutions, it approves coordinated activities but leaves to other elements – mostly the police and the Dinas Ketertiban – the details as to how coordination occurs in the field. From the data available it seems that several high-security challenges – terrorism, ethnic violence and robbery – are beyond the imagination and capabilities of this Muspida to resolve. This supports the value of Fishel’s claim that the best interagency outcomes derive from taskforces with firm objectives unified under solid leadership. Despite the Muspida’s weaknesses though, we can clearly see cooperation taking place.

*Muspida of Yogyakarta City*

In contrast to the neighbouring district of Sleman, the Muspida of Kota Yogyakarta focuses more on areas of concern to local government, like vice for example, rather than broad security issues such as inter-ethnic conflict. This focus results from a combination of executive policy and the influence of local government bureaucrats. The current mayor of the city, Herry Zudianto (2001 - present), is a civilian politician. Zudianto therefore tends to be less interested in security matters than the man he replaced in 2001, an army colonel. Up to 2007, the Muspida of Yogyakarta was also served by a Secretariat made up of Pol.PP officers. Because the personnel of this Secretariat were responsible for shaping the meeting's agenda items, much of what was discussed in the Muspida were

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38 According to the former head of the Muspida Secretariat, Ari Nugroho, the former mayor of Yogyakarta, Colonel Winarto (7-2001), was deeply interested in security developments in the city and often demanded extensive reports and notes from the Muspida Secretariat. This probably reflected his biases as a military officer. When Herry Zudianto, the current mayor replaced Winarto in 2001, Zudianto ordered the Secretariat to limit its preparatory research for the meetings to things only of concern to the city government. Zudianto also demanded that the Secretariat prepare only brief notes and reports for the Muspida. This preference probably reflects Zudianto’s background and predilections as a career politician who, so it seems, had little time for grand planning about regional security. Interview with Ari N. Yohannes, Kepala Seksi Pengamanan, Bagian Ketertiban dan Ketentraman, Dinas Ketertiban, 31 August 2007.
things that interested the Pol.PP: such as cleaning up vice, beggars, and so on. Thus the
district government in Yogyakarta city was like the government of Sleman in that is also
steered the meeting agenda of the Muspida to areas of its own interest. Although this is
ture, many of the Muspida’s decisions still required the active cooperation of national
government agencies, in particular the police.

One of the major, persistent concerns of the Yogyakarta city Muspida is ‘social disease’
(‘penyakit sosial’) or as it is commonly abbreviated ‘pekat’. Since pekat falls under the
rubric of ‘public order’, reducing it is one of the core responsibilities of the local
administration. The district government classifies a number of social problems within the
over-arching label of penyakit sosial: prostitution, gambling, illegal alcohol distribution,
narcotics use, begging, adultery (particularly during Islamic festivals), juvenile
delinquency and the like. It is evident from the early meeting notes that the regional
administration pressed the national security actors very hard to help the city combat vice;
in particular it sought the help of the district police. At this time much of the concern
about vice was directed at gambling. Most of the meetings from 2003 for example were
spent on debating how to stamp out social disease in general and gambling in particular.

The war on gambling in the early two thousands was a particularly vexing issue for joint-
institutional collaboration. This is because the Indonesian criminal code (KUHP)
describes gambling as a purely criminal offence. As such, only the Indonesian police may
combat it.\footnote{Interview, Norwidi, 23 October 2007. Norwidi, who is a senior Pol.PP officer in the Bureau and head of the
Pol.PP section explains that the district government’s interpretation of the criminal code [Pasal 303 to be
exact], nullifies any role for non-polri institutions in combating gambling.} Yet according to senior crime journalists, former gangsters, Islamic vigilantes
and senior Pol.PP in the city of Yogyakarta, it is an open secret that for many decades
Polda DIY actively backed the gambling trade.\footnote{Interviews, Norwidi, October 2007; senior criminal affairs journalist for Yogyakarta daily newspaper
Kedaulatan Rakyat, Hariardi, 25 June 2008; head of Gerakan Pemuda Kabah in Yogyakarta city (GPK is the
youth wing of the Islamist party PPP, GPK has a reputation as one of Yogya’s old gangster groups) Harist, 26
September 2007 (Harist was part of GPK’s Islamist vigilante faction); Pak Gemblek (Gemblek was
introduced to me as a former boss gangster. Gemblek was the mentor of another notorious Yogyakarta
gangster, Gun Jack), 19 July 2007.} In this permissive environment gambling
in the city flourished. Yet the city also found itself in a conundrum. According to some sources in the Dinas Ketertiban, Mayor Zudianto’s administration felt under pressure from the local community, which in the main opposed the gambling industry. The city administration believed that concerned citizens held the executive morally and electorally responsible for public order, including the war on gambling. Yet the city administration had no power over the police to make them tackle the issue. As a result the mayor was in a relatively powerless position and we see this in the Muspida notes. Prior to 2005 the mayor made numerous appeals to the police command. In an October 2002 Muspida, in a mildly provocative way, the mayor stated he would ask the provincial police commander to attend the city Muspida to explain the Kapolda’s policy on preventing pekat. In April 2003 the Muspida asked the Poltabes to hold a special meeting to explain how the command would increase its efforts to destroy gambling. The mayor even asked the Poltabes to investigate specific businesses (which he named). Appeals such as this go on during meetings of following years, but all of them it seems were ineffective in stopping gambling.

Below the leadership discussions, however, the Dinas Ketertiban of the city continued to mount ineffective anti-gambling operations with the police. In these operations the city “facilitated” [read encouraged] the Poltabes to tackle gambling. The head of the city’s Pol.PP detachment described the activities as follows:

We motivated those activities [joint anti-gambling operations between the Pol.PP and the police]. At that time, our role was facilitating and motivating the police so that they did enforce the law... we desired to create an image that we and the police cooperated. Although for significant change, we weren’t very hopeful... Because those who

41 Various types of gambling were practiced, Togel (a type of lottery), card games, slot machines/arcade games, bonggol (?), etc. This type of gambling was practiced in both ad hoc, street café type arrangements and secret casinos/nightclubs.

42 This was not described to me as a pressing political issue that threatened the mayor’s re-election or something so serious. Rather my source in the Pol.PP presented it as a matter of fact observation. Most ordinary Yogyakartans were angry with the growth of the industry and wanted the mayor to do something about it. Yet those on the inside of the bureaucracy knew the mayor had very little capacity to do so.


43 It is unknown if anything came of the Mayor’s intention.

conducted investigations were the police. And even for us [Pol.PP] to participate we had to do it with our friends in the police... we were often asked [by the police] our Operational Targets. And we often replied ‘later, when we are on the way’ [meaning the Pol.PP would not inform the police of the places to be targeted before departing on the operation, in order to avoid leaks]. Like at one time in Terban market. Terban market, in the afternoon was used as a regular market, but at night it became a gambling den. And the culprits who protected it were from the security apparatus. The turnover there could be hundreds of millions. And if we held an operation, we reconnoitred the area first. But that was already known. Thus in five minutes, as we gave the signs we were heading to Terban, the gambling immediately stopped. As we entered the gambling outlets all of them suddenly turned into cafes [using hand gestures he suggested a leak of information]. And after we left, the gambling would begin again. The reason being in that environment there were many culprits from the apparatus [police] which played around there.45

Such was the condition of the anti-gambling raids. Although operations were held, corrupt police would notify the gambling organisers of pre-operation reconnaissance missions. Because of this the campaigns were ineffective.46

The Muspida notes of Yogyakarta show that the war on gambling abruptly changed in 2005. The change apparently had nothing to do with the local environment, and everything to do with policy changes within the police. In this year the newly appointed Kapolri, Sutanto, declared one of his top priorities would be to crush the gambling industry. After threatening to sack any Kapolda who failed to tackle gambling, Sutanto’s regional commanders fell in line with his policy and began to attack gambling outlets.47 So much so that by the end of 2005, the Muspida stopped pleading for action on what until that time had been an incessant topic. According to Norwidi again:

The moment after [Sutanto] was appointed, he gave a statement that, first of all, he would eradicate gambling... And this came like a breath of fresh air for us. Because for several years when we conducted activities the obstacles were fairly great. Because a part of the security apparatus [coded wording to imply Polri] really stuck out in the protection of gambling outlets. And after there was that statement, we found it much easier to conduct our activities.48

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46 The Bureau of Public Order does not list how many operations took place but its internal reports indicate in 2003 over 750 suspects were arrested in combined operations with the police for various gambling offences and 200 were arrested in 2004. Laporan Akuntabilitas: Rekapitulasi Hasil Operasi Penyakit Masyarakat 2003-2006.
48 Interview, Norwidi, 2008.
In 2006 the year following Sutanto’s appointment, it seems that the Poltabes made such a turn around that the city’s Dinas Ketertiban did not even bother to run joint anti gambling operations with the police.\textsuperscript{49}

While the gambling situation is on the surface an extraordinary case, it illustrates clearly the dependence of this Muspida on police assistance. When the police are disposed to assist, joint responses to regional problems can succeed. But if the police refuse to act or drag their feet, joint activities flounder as there is no other element of the security network that can step forward to fill the void. Such is the centrality of the police role. The issue also shows a demonstrable failure of cross-institutional collaboration. Although with the passage of time Polri’s internal policy changes resolved the issue, the example shows the obstacle institutional self-interest can pose for security management. While there are few other examples as blatant, the gambling example shows that police can easily avoid participation when it does not suit their interests.

The dependence of the Muspida on police assistance is also supported in other examples, in a number of anti-vice operations which the regional government should have been able to discharge alone, the district still sought to involve the police. In 2004 the Pol.PP who staffed the Muspida Secretariat resolved in a number of their own meetings to ask the Poltabes for assistance with Pol.PP responsibilities. They sought to involve the Poltabes’s Binamitra detachment in ‘Student Operations [to combat youth delinquency].’ They sought meetings with all city’s sub-district police commanders to unify perceptions on how to tackle pekat. The Secretariat directly requested the police continue combined anti-vice patrols with the Pol.PP while also requesting police assistance to close night clubs and pornography outlets.\textsuperscript{50} These requests were echoed in Muspida meetings.\textsuperscript{51} It is not that the city administration felt incapable of acting alone. The Bureau of Public Order does perform many of its own anti-vice operations, like arresting beggars and confiscating illegal alcohol

\textsuperscript{49} Laporan Akuntabilitas: Rekapitulasi Hasil Operasi Penyakit Masyarakat 2003-2006.
for example. Rather, what the evidence shows is a distinctive attitude from law enforcement officials in this district who believe that good relations with the police enhance their own effectiveness. This attitude is not something they intimate in as many words, but it is perceptible from these internal documents. With the exception of the gambling precedent, the Poltabes largely reciprocated these desires from the city government for a close relationship.

Another repeated cause of concern for the Muspida of Yogyakarta city was security for public events, especially elections. In an emerging democracy like Indonesia, elections have often been seen as a locus of instability. However like the Muspida’s problems with gambling, the issue of election security throws up a complication for inter-agency cooperation. Indonesian law makes the General Elections Commission (at the national and the regional level) responsible for conducting elections. But the agency with the power to enforce election security is Polri. This situation once again forces regional government into cooperative relations with the police.

The city of Yogyakarta faced elections in 2004 (for the national parliament and presidency) and in 2006 (for mayor). In both of these elections all security responsibilities

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32 While Pol.PP and PPNS officers have sufficient authority to conduct their own operations, even to arrest people, informants in the Dinas Ketertiban of Yogyakarta city still believe the police have superiority over them. The head of the Dinas has said for example: “We are not free from the police apparatus, what’s more when we consider affairs of the PPNS, because the police are the supervisory coordinator of PPNS.” This hints to some extent at the normative (not merely legal) supremacy of the police in law enforcement. Interview Kepala Dinas Ketertiban Kota Yogyakarta Supriyono, 5 June 2007.

33 Interview, Norwidi, 14 June 2007.

34 As an indication of the subconscious fears of security disturbances erupting during election campaigns, in 2009 the Indonesian election commission (KPU) and all of Indonesia’s registered parties launched an official “Kampanye Damai Pemilu” in 2009. In this campaign all parties pledged to accept the results of the election peacefully. Behind this public campaign lies real fears that in a country like Indonesia, with powerful, wealthy, ambitious elites, party masses can always push the objectives of their party with violence. For the official campaign website see: Republik Indonesia, website, Kampanye Damai Pemilu Indonesia 2009 <http://kampanyedamaipemilu2009.web.id/>. Accessed 30 July 2009.

35 As an example of the powers and constitution of the KPU see: Undang-Undang 12/2003 tentang Pemilihan Umum untuk Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, Dewan Perwakilan Daerah dan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (that law has since been superseded but it provides an idea of the role of the KPU in the period of my research).

36 The Ministry of the Interior has drafted regulations to guide regional governments in managing regional election security. The guidelines are very clear. They stipulate that in ‘secure’ conditions, command of election security falls under the head of the province/district. If intelligence determines the election is likely to be slightly or moderately disrupted, command is transferred to the police. Menteri Dalam Negeri, Pedoman: Penyelenggaraan Ketertiban, Ketentraman dan Kemanan Dalam Rangka Pemilihan Kepala Daerah dan Wakil Kepala Daerah (2006), Bab V, p.24.
were passed to the Poltabes.\textsuperscript{57} It is difficult to tell whether the Muspida was especially concerned about the 2006 contest as the notes are incomplete. In 2004 however, the Muspida and the Muspida Secretariat discuss election preparations at seven different meetings, but no specific plans were made in the meetings.\textsuperscript{58} Mostly the Muspida participants, only convey or note information, suggesting that much of the operational details were worked out by the police alone. If so, this would resemble the situation in 2006, when the city government handed the entire local election security responsibilities to the Poltabes command.\textsuperscript{59}

There are other examples of the Muspida discussing security for big, public events. One of the other prominent examples were preparations to protect foreigners in anticipation of the American invasion of Iraq in March 2003.\textsuperscript{60} In this incident the Muspida noted the problem and turned it over to the police for execution. The Muspida of Yogyakarta then follows the same trend seen in Sleman. When major events occur which carry a risk of disturbing public safety, the Muspida looks to Polri to lead the handling of the event.

The evidence from the Muspida of Yogyakarta city implies that although the local government may administer the meetings and may even seek to exploit the forum to raise its own interests, the Muspida process is still dependent on the police for taking action to implement the repressive, law enforcement side of the Muspida’s resolutions. Using the gambling example we can see that if the police do not wish to comply with the group, it becomes very difficult for the inter-agency security effort to work. This situation results from the weakness of other state agencies relative to Polri and the fact that participation in this interagency forum is purely voluntary.


\textsuperscript{59} Poltabes Yogyakarta dan Pemerintah Kota, Perjanjian Kerjasama, 2006.

The focus of concern for the Muspida of Bantul is slightly different from the other two Muspida. Rather than being obviously biased towards the concerns of the district government, the Muspida of Bantul mostly discusses matters not directly related to the regional government portfolio. Characteristically these are things like election security, demonstrations, natural disasters and securing public events. This situation is probably reflective of the fact that there are problems in the relationship between the police and local government in this particular kabupaten. As a result joint planning suffers. While the issues will be explored in more detail in chapter four, it will suffice to mention here that the police in this district are, according to a number of reliable sources, more corrupt than in other parts of the province. Because the Bantul police protect illegal liquor vendors and other black market trades, Polres Bantul is almost completely unwilling to help local government in their efforts to stamp out 'pekat'. Nevertheless, dialogue and cooperation does take place in the Bantul Muspida. The pre-condition for cooperation appears to be that the issue under discussion is one of general interest and does not contradict the institutional self-interest of one of the Muspida parties. Having made this substantial caveat, however, the notes of the Muspida clearly show the default setting of regional authorities there is to work collaboratively.

While a number of different events have been discussed in this forum, there is one event in particular that draws our attention. This was a security disturbance created by community opposition to the construction of electricity wires. This problem, referred to as the “SUTET” issue, became a drawn out, two year wrangle. The SUTET issue is raised here because it becomes another illustration of the capacity of all the security arms of the

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61 “Saluran Udara Tegangan Ekstra Tinggi” or Ultra High Tight Overhead Wires. This construction project in Bantul was part of a much bigger effort to expand the Java-Bali electricity grid.
Indonesian state to unite and solve common problems. The incident also plainly illustrates the various jurisdictionary boundaries of the three most important parts of the Muspida: the regional executive head, the territorial military unit and the regional police. In responding to the SUTET issue, we can see that the police in Bantul was the only power that has the authority to employ repressive force. It was backed up by the territorial army command, which lent personnel and localised intelligence gathering to support the combined effort. Finally, the local district head was able to use his own normative legitimacy as the representative of the district to push forward a peaceful resolution. While the issue was eventually resolved with dialogue for two years the SUTET problem regularly entered Bantul’s Muspida discussions.62

To give a brief background to the SUTET issue, according to aggrieved local citizens, the problem began in November 2003 when Indonesia’s national electricity company, PLN, began excavating sites in the hilly region of Dlingo in eastern Bantul for the purpose of installing electricity towers.63 Over the years the number of sub-districts involved widened. According to the citizens, at that time PLN did not offer them compensation for the losses of their land and, in later negotiations, PLN would only concede to providing them compensation much below their asking price.64

From late 2003 - the earliest stage of the problem - the security elements of the kabupaten demonstrated they grasped the issue. On 17 November 2003, the Muspida met specifically to discuss the SUTET problem. The Muspida showed it was aware that in Sewon, a sub-district in central Bantul and a target of the development, citizens were already demonstrating. The Kapolres of Bantul declared that the police had identified eight ringleaders and were calling them in to the Polres for questioning. The Muspida decided to wait for the results of the police investigation.65 At the following Muspida, 30 December, the Kapolres reported that his investigation had concluded but he had also received an order

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from the head of the national police, the Kapolri, not to allow the SUTET issue to disturb security preparations for the 2004 election. The Kapores asked for a further several weeks grace for the police to handle the problem alone. Also showing his own capacity for situational awareness, the military district commander, the Dandim, reported that the army understood the ringleader of the demonstrations in Sewon had decided to cooperate with the authorities and urge his allies to refrain from halting the development.66 At the following meeting, however, probably in a reflection of the superior priority of the election, the Muspida decided to resolve the SUTET issue at the “lower level” or to encourage the sub-districts to negotiate the issue with protesters.67 The initial recommendation to take these steps originated from the police representative. Over the next year the SUTET issue would fade into the background as preparations for the national election assumed priority.

The SUTET issue flared again in January 2005. At this time it became apparent that citizens of another kecamatan, Pajangan, rejected the constructions. Over the year 2004, a number of kecamatans had been convinced to accept the tower emplacements. Because of this the Muspida was not required to take further action. In January 2005 however, a third party group of NGOs from outside the kabupaten volunteered to support aggrieved local citizens.68 Within the Muspida there appeared to be a degree of suspicion toward this intrusion, as if the outsiders were stirring trouble.69 At this juncture, the Indonesian military again demonstrated one of the sole rights it still appears to possess in the realm of internal security: intelligence collection. At the January 25 meeting the Dandim declared that his forces had already collected data on all the citizens potentially affected by the SUTET construction. The Kodim had identified the sub-districts most likely to pose resistance and requested that the district government involve itself as an impartial mediator between PLN and the communities identified. It seems that going forward, this became the consensus

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66 This situational awareness reflects one of the strongest benefits the military draws from its territorial units – the capacity for the army to use its territorial forces to monitor the micro-social level. The Dandim received this intelligence through his Koramil. Kabupaten Bantul: Notulen Hasil Rapat Muspida Bantul, 30 Desember 2003.
68 According to the head of the Kabupaten’s Pol.PP unit, Kandiawan, the term NGO can only be applied loosely to these groups. He says, people residing outside Bantul moved in, formed “NGOs” to protest the constructions but, “with only four or five people inside them.” These NGOs only had the objective of extorting money from PLN to stop protesting. I have not found an independent source outside the district government which confirms his view. Interview, Kandiawan, 10 April 2008.
view on how to resolve the issue. At the following meeting in February 2005 the kabupaten singled out a number of villages in Pajangan where more intense negotiations were required. Showing up one of the essential differences between military and police authority, the Kapolres at this meeting pointed out his sub-district commands had already been alerted to provide physical security to the selected areas.\(^7^0\) The Kapolres’ contribution sharply contrasts with the role that the military assumed up to that point; the army had only seen itself as able to accumulate information rather than providing direct security intervention as the police did. This is similar to the way the Kodim in Sleman behaved, in limiting itself to data-mapping vulnerable areas.

By July 2005, however, the situation had noticeably worsened, with some citizens of a new area, Kersen, resorting to violence and attacking and vandalising some of the homes of local Polri personnel. Residents of other villages also began engaging in fresh demonstrations. In response, the bupati called all the leaders of the kecamatans and the PLN electricity company for a special Muspida to discuss the state of affairs. According to the Muspida notes, a delegation from the national parliament some time before had visited Bantul and impressed upon the bupati the need for the SUTET project to succeed. Their lobbying appears to have influenced his decision to fully support the implementation of the project. The other Muspida elements hardly needed convincing – the forum thus resolved to ensure the final success of the project. For achieving this end, the Kapolres declared that his force would arrest the suspected ringleaders around the Kersen area, complete a full survey of the remaining opposition and report back on the results. The Muspida expressed its support for the Polres’ actions.\(^7^1\)

The situation came to a climax in an extraordinary meeting in the site of the village Kersen itself in August 2005 – attending were the full compliment of the Muspida and the sub-district and village leadership (the Kapolsek, Danramil, camat and the village head, the lurah). At this conference, the lurah expressed his fears that the people of his area were readying weapons for a final standoff against the project. In response, the Muspida declared its lasting support for PLN to finish its final tower constructions. The Kapolres declared

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\(^7^0\) Kabupaten Bantul: Notulen Hasil Rapat Muspida Bantul, 26 February 2005.

\(^7^1\) Kabupaten Bantul: Notulen Hasil Rapat Muspida Bantul, 28 July 2005.
that he would deploy one company of troops to secure the embattled lurah and for anticipating the potential anarchy that would follow. The meeting ended with PLN declaring a final set of dates for the installation of the last towers. Unexpectedly, the whole episode was resolved in a matter of days after that meeting when the revered Sultan of Yogyakarta stepped in to mediate personal negotiations between the sides.

Although the standoff ended peacefully, the SUTET issue is an interesting study of local security coordination. Throughout the situation, the local government took on the role of introducing and establishing consensus. The episode also shows that the police are the only agency imbued with authority to provide physical security and repress any threats of disturbance. It is the police that led the physical response and other elements played a supporting role. The SUTET issue also shows the shadowy role of the TNI’s territorial command, which refrained from a direct role in responding to the crisis but continued to exercise its ability to gather intelligence and plan the coordinated response to the threat. The SUTET incident shows then, a clear breakdown of the relative roles of the primary state agencies which oversee local security.

This information from Bantul also shows that unity of effort is possible in the taskforce model of cooperation found in the Muspida. In this situation, Muspida participants clearly were able to discuss and plot a loosely coordinated response to an evolving problem. Regional government, police and military each contributed their different capabilities. While much of the data previously referred to shows dialogue rather than action, in this example we see the capacity of the Muspida to handle a threat, demonstrating that it is possible for forums that lack a unifying leadership to cooperatively respond to security problems. This observation is further confirmed by my analysis of the intelligence sharing forum, the Kominda.

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73 See footnote 62.
Beneath the regional leaders meeting there is another ubiquitous regional security forum, the Regional Intelligence Community meeting (or Kominda). The Kominda is a modern day revival of the Suharto era Bakorstanasda. The current Kominda meetings, like the Bakorstanasda system, bring together all the intelligence elements in government agencies that operate in the regions, and encourage them to share data to anticipate common threats.

Unlike the Muspida, executive orders of the minister of the interior establish the shape of the Kominda system. The Interior Ministry puts the Kominda forum under the leadership of provincial and district government and directs all regional administrations to establish a Kominda meeting in their respective territories. Under the ministerial regulation, the Kominda brings together all of the principle intelligence agents found at the sub-national level: police intelligence, the State Intelligence Body (or Badan Intelijen Negara - BIN), military intelligence, the intelligence units of the State Prosecutors Office, local government enforcement agencies and any other agency with an intelligence capability. The role of the Kominda is to pool the data these various agencies collect, analyse potential threats to national stability and make recommendations to local government. As such, the Kominda falls under the administration of regional government and feeds into the Muspida.

It is difficult to infer why the minister of the interior chose to pass his 2006 regulation. Perhaps the minister was using his authority over regional governments to encourage them to resuscitate dialogue between the various parties involved in internal security and encourage them to renew intelligence sharing. From the little information available it seems that if this was the intention, then it has been realised. Almost all my information about the Kominda comes from the city of Yogyakarta. Beside Yogyakarta city the Kominda also

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74 Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri 11/2006 tentang Komunitas Intelijen Daerah, 'Menimbang'.
75 Permen No.11 2006, Pasal 2-4.
76 Permen No.11 2006, Pasal 7.
77 In the course of research, I struck up a relationship with the then head of the Pol.PP intelligence section in the Dinas Ketertiban. My informant was intelligent, proud of his work and liked to talk about it. His evidence forms virtually all the information that I have been able to collect on the activities of the Kominda. Given that all other agencies are highly secretive about the Kominda, finding this informant was very serendipitous.
exists at the provincial level and in the Kabupaten of Sleman. The other kabupaten featured in this research, Bantul, did not at the time of my research have a Kominda.

The structure of the Kominda in Yogyakarta city is determined by a mayoral order from 2007. This order declares that the Kominda is made up of the deputy mayor (as chair), the head of the Poltabes intelligence unit (as deputy chair), the head of the district’s office of National Unity, Youth and Sports (Kantor Kesatuan Bangsa, Pemuda dan Olahraga - Kesbangpol) whose office functions as the Kominda secretariat and, as ordinary members, the head of the Dinas Ketertiban, the head of the military intelligence from the district Kodim, the head of the district State Prosecutor’s intelligence office and a representative from the city’s BIN (State Intelligence Agency) detachment. The current Kominda system continues the former Bakorstanasda meetings which took place in the city since the nineteen eighties. The only difference between the Bakorstanasda meeting and the post-2007 Kominda is that the Kominda has a basis in law and the old Bakorstanasda did not.

In terms of roles, the primary task of the Kominda is to pool the intelligence data of its members, analyse perceived ‘threats to stability’ and recommend policy to the Muspida, which it does approximately once every month. Although the Kominda has unlimited scope to discuss whatever it deems necessary, there are several common topics which enter its discussions. One of these topics is the activities of suspect political, religious and social movements. The concept of what is suspect is left to the discretion of the intelligence professionals, but common groups of concern are fundamentalist Islamic movements and socialist groups. Another Kominda task is ‘mapping vulnerable areas’ i.e. areas which have certain characteristics (social, economic, political or criminal) which make them likely to produce instability. One of the final common topics of discussion during my informant’s

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79 The reason why Bantul does not have a Kominda is because the bupati, for personal political reasons, believed the creation of a Kominda would make him appear too close to the security apparatus. Interview, Kandiawan, 29 October 2007.
80 However, the head of the dinas preferred not to attend the meetings. Instead he appointed the head of his Pol.PP intelligence section to stand in his place. Interview, former head of the Pol.PP intelligence detachment of the Dinas Ketertiban, Kota Yogyakarta, 19 April 2008 and 29 October 2007.
82 Interview, former head of Pol.PP intelligence section, 29 October 2007.
time on the Kominda was preparation for the mayoral election of 2006. Although the electoral term in Indonesia is five years, we must recall that there are three major layers of democratically elected government (district, province and centre), which can operate on different cycles. Usually the intelligence agencies will begin preparing election security one year before the poll.\footnote{Interview, former head of Pol.PP intelligence section, April 2008.} One can imagine that in districts where national, provincial and district elections fall on different years, the Kominda would probably be reasonably busy with monitoring this situation.

In addition to this grand picture, I have obtained one set of declassified meeting notes from the Kominda of Yogyakarta city that illustrate what was discussed in one meeting on 8 August, 2007. In this meeting we see some of the typical problems that raise the interest of this district’s intelligence agencies: religious extremism and suspect political activities. In particular the Kominda discussed two separate findings concerning ‘radical’ Islamic groups. According to the meeting notes on 27 July 2007, a group of more than eighty university students under the banner of the *Negara Islam Indonesia* – a fundamentalist movement described as being committed to the creation of an Islamic state\footnote{Otherwise known as the *Darul Islam* movement.} – were found boarding coaches near a Yogyakarta public monument. Allegedly their objective was to attend a large extremist rally in Jakarta. This information came from five members of the group who “freed themselves” from the event (presumably at the point of embarkation). These people were interrogated by unknown sources, presumably one of the Kominda’s participating agencies. The five students gave their names and details, described how they were recruited into the Negara Islam movement and where its headquarters was located (in West Java). The Kominda also revealed that it had come to their attention that an Islamic religious cult, Al Qiyadah Islamiyah, had been found in Yogyakarta.\footnote{In appreciating the significance of this finding we must recall the specific social conditions of Indonesia, where religion is a deeply meaningful issue, individually, socially and politically. Religious movements – particularly Islamic ones – which stray from mainstream doctrine are often seen as dangerous since they run the risk of sparking social conflict.} The meeting notes go into a discussion of the practices of this group but no information comes to light concerning its location or size. Finally the Kominda members also stated that they became aware in the nearby city of Solo, outside Yogyakarta, there were found some English study books which carried the picture of the communist hammer and sickle. Although none had
been found in Yogyakarta the issue was flagged as something to watch out for, “to guard against a return of communist ideology.”86 The Kominda resolved to do the following: continue intelligence gathering on the Negara Islam Indonesia, request that other parts of the government apparatus (principally, they imply, the Education Department) renew pedagogy on the secular state philosophy - Pancasila. Finally they chose to alert campus authorities where the NIL was active and request that they observe the movement and report on its activities.87

The first thing which stands out about the discussions of this August 2007 meeting is the peculiar fear of the security apparatus regarding national unity. The Suharto era obsession with social conformity, national unity and anti-communism certainly still persists in the way that security agencies perceive threats.88 Right wing Islamists, trivial evidence of communist symbology and religious heretics all enter the threat matrix and are seen as things worthy of further observation. It is not my place to judge whether these practices are legitimate forms of expression or actual threats to the unity of society. I consider this debate best left to the Indonesian political process. Analytically, however, we can conclude that social control still remains a dominant concern for the Indonesian model of security management. Intelligence collection is one of the key means which the Indonesian state has for anticipating threats to stability. Viewed from the perspective of the Indonesian state, Polri is justified in maintaining a vast network of economic intelligence units, political intelligence units, and so on. It seems sensible for so many parts of the government – BIN, TNI, Pol.PP, Polri, state prosecutors, and so on – to be active in regional intelligence gathering. The present day Indonesian state therefore very much continues the practices of

86 Kantor Kesatuan Bangsa, Pemuda dan Olahraga, Kota Yogyakarta: Laporan Hasil Rapat Kominda, 8 August 2007.
87 I can independently confirm this did happen. In an interview with the head of security at Gadjah Mada University, Deda Suwandi, I discovered that the head of the provincial military intelligence unit telephoned Deda at around this time to question him on the NIL. He was asked whether he knew of its existence on his campus. He claimed it did not. Military intelligence then informed Deda that a number of UGM students were involved, though it is apparent there were no UGM students in the group that was questioned in July. Presumably this telephone conversation took place after the 27 July event. The military was presumably contacting all the Yogyakarta universities for collecting information and disseminating warnings. Interview, R.Deda Suwandi, Kepala Satuan Keamanan dan Keselamatan Kampus UGM, 27 October 2008. Kota Yogyakarta: Laporan Hasil Rapat Kominda, 8 August 2007.
the New Order: monitoring the activities of its citizens in the name of order and stability. The state also maintains a very broad interpretation of what constitutes a likely threat.

The other notable thing about this 2007 Kominda meeting is its lack of practical recommendations. For example, the Kominda recommends that in response to the circulation of communist oriented books there needs to be further observation of bookshops. If we suspend the debate over freedom of expression and look at the issue from the eyes of an Indonesian intelligence professional, perhaps it would have been wiser to recommend that someone call the local distributors and request they do not stock such books.\(^89\) Perhaps the Kominda had a more in-depth discussion than the notes suggest, and all such options were canvassed. The more likely explanation is that whatever the skills this grouping has in regards to gathering intelligence, they are not very imaginative in actually responding to security problems.

Beyond the previous example of what goes on in one of the Kominda meetings, my source has provided some fascinating information on how the different agencies of this district Kominda operate. Each agency has its own interests and capabilities. For example, the Kodim (and he implied BIN as well) is most interested in issues pertaining to ‘the unity of the state’, or “soal NKRI” as he put it. Specifically, BIN and TNI intelligence are interested in things like terrorism.\(^90\) The regional government and the police are more interested in general public order and security. The intelligence agents of the Jaksa often bring information related to land ownership and religious issues, for reasons that were not explained. Therefore: “every institution carries its own problems, and in the Kominda they are discussed, which will become the priority and which will be reported to the mayor.”\(^91\)

My source mentioned at one time that the chair of the city Kominda, the deputy mayor, does not often attend meetings. As a result, the deputy chair of the forum, the head of the

\(^89\) This was not the only unimaginative idea. In reaction to the Negara Islam movement the Kominda recommends a “refreshing, increasing and improvement of Pancasila Ideology in the community.” A more realistic idea may have been to actually call all the University rectors and ask them to watch out for the NIL organisation and discourage their students from joining it. As discussed in a prior footnote this is actually what happened, but I assume the military was acting on its own initiative in that matter, as the Kominda did not recommend this action itself.

\(^90\) Interview, former head of Pol.PP intelligence section, 2007.

\(^91\) Interview, former head of Pol.PP intelligence section, 2008.
Polabes police intelligence unit, leads the meetings. I asked whether this led to the Kominda being biased towards the interests of the police. My source responded that intelligence sharing was not weighted towards the interests of one party over another, rather any intelligence shared in the Kominda is that which is considered in the common interest.

What is discussed in the Kominda are problems which have a global characteristic. Because each of the institutions respectively has their own interests which cannot be revealed in the Kominda. With the existence of Kominda sourced intelligence, the institutions have a multi-fold function. That is searching for information for the interests of the institutions themselves, also collecting material for the Kominda [and the interests of all participants for situational awareness].

In terms of intelligence collection each Kominda participant has its own agents in the field. The Kodim has its own intelligence staff as well as its sub-district Koramil and individual military personnel allocated to the village, the Babinsa. These elements act as the intelligence antennae of the military. The police have similar capabilities, but on a much larger scale. The district and provincial Jaksa offices have their own small intelligence team, which my source describes as relatively weak since it often asks the other Kominda members for additional information. The city’s Pol.PP unit also has its own small nine man intelligence unit. My source does not know anything about the size of BIN in Yoyakarta, since he only knows the one agent who turns up to the meetings. In weighing up the proficiency of these agencies my source believes the police and the military are less effective than the other agencies:

Intel [agents] from the Kodim or from the Poltabes are easily detected by the community. If we talk about intel [agents] from the Prosecutors, Satpol.PP, or even BIN, they are difficult to be detected, because they don’t have a military scent. Consequently, their scope is wider. Besides that, intel agents from all institutions don’t wear uniforms, so that they don’t seem to stick out.

While his observation seems logical my source is from the Pol.PP and his testimony may be biased. But his observation is true qualitatively, then quantitatively most of the information that enters the Kominda probably comes from Polri and the TNI, since they

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92 The lack of interest shown by the deputy mayor also shows how much value the intelligence professionals attach to this forum, since in the absence of regional government initiative they continue to collaborate on their own.

93 Interview, former head of Pol.PP intelligence section, 2008 and 2007.

have the most ears on the ground. The method of intelligence collection is exclusively human source. That is, each of these various agents moves about in the community in civilian dress, absorbing data from their informants and from the word on the street.

They in searching for information are not like detectives. [An intel. agent] will study the problem first. For example, by pretending to be a merchant. Some time later he will touch on the problem. And, unconsciously the community gives information. Because intel. only needs information. If talking about enforcement, that is done by another team. Like in the Public Order Bureau. We search for information concerning the distribution of illegal alcohol by pretending to be the buyers. And to become an acquaintance of the seller can take a long time.95

Although the intelligence sharing that goes on in the Kominda is itself an illustration of security cooperation, Kominda meetings have also led to other inter-agency operations in the field. Though not all are successful they do demonstrate how professional security cooperation at one level can lead to cooperation at another. My source has provided three different examples of this.

One example of the Kominda’s influence on cooperation in the field comes from May 2007. The head of a neighbourhood association (Kepala RW) telephoned the Yogyakarta city hotline with information that a hardline Islamist from Afghanistan had taken residence in the city and was delivering sermons in some of the city’s mosques. Most worryingly he was apparently attempting to collect donations. As such there was a reasonable fear that this person was attempting to raise support for the terrorist cause in Afghanistan. The Dinas Ketertiban brought this piece of intelligence to the Kominda for debate.96 In the Kominda forum it was decided that as the issue had the overtone of foreign activity, BIN was best placed to handle the problem. The BIN detachment in the city took the information and passed the issue upward through its chain of command to BIN headquarters in Jakarta. Jakarta headquarters recommended that BIN in the district file the case with the Yogyakarta immigration authorities. The Yogyakarta immigration office investigated the matter and

95 Interview, former head of Pol.PP intelligence section, 2008.
96 According to my informant, the information came from a “pengurus mesjid” or an administrative officer in a mosque. This pengurus heard the sermons and reported the person to the head of his neighbourhood (the RT), who reported it to Kepala RW who reported the issue to the local government hotline, which was then filtered to the Dinas Ketertiban. Among other things that chain of events illustrates how Indonesia’s multilayered bureaucratic system enhances human intelligence collection by effectively expanding the number of ‘eyes and ears’ on the ground.

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discovered that the Afghani had abused the conditions of a limited tourist visa. Although my source is unaware of how this incident ended, it is probable that the immigration service forced the man to leave Indonesia.

My source also provided a second example of the Kominda’s intelligence collection capabilities which produced a failed security operation in the field. At one time in 2006 the city Kodim asked Pol.PP intelligence to investigate street traders (pedagang) in front of the provincial police’s Mobile Brigade (Brimob) building. After investigation, the Pol.PP intelligence unit discovered the street traders were selling illegal liquor and engaging in other illicit activities. Apparently this trading was supported by corrupt elements of the police and the military there. During its investigations the Dinas also discovered that many of the criminal merchants did not have appropriate permission from the district to trade. As such, the traders were vulnerable to eviction. After Pol.PP intelligence reported back to the Kominda, the Kominda recommended to the Muspida that a combined Pol.PP, police and military operation be launched to clear out the area. The Muspida agreed. Two days before the operation however, the head of the Pol.PP intelligence section checked with the head of the sub-district who was responsible for overseeing business licensing in the area. As it turned out all of the merchants due to be evicted had days beforehand acquired the appropriate permission. Clearly a leak of information had occurred. While that planned operation ended in failure it does illustrate the existence of a logical chain of security cooperation. Joint-intelligence gathering can lead to combined operations in the field.

The final example of the city of Yogyakarta’s Kominda in action, concerns a fight between university students from different ethnic groups. In this incident, which happened sometime during late 2007, a drunken youth from South Sulawesi was involved in a fight with another university student from Ambon. In response, Ambonese youths set upon and torched the residential college (asrama) of the Yogyakarta Sulawesi student community. To that point, this conflict had occurred in the territory of Sleman. But in response the

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97 In Indonesia it is customary for most provincial governments to operate a residential college (asrama mahasiswa) for their tertiary students in external provinces. Although the fight began in Sleman, because the Sulawesian asrama was located in Yogyakarta city, the city became embroiled in this conflict. See also: ‘Asrama Mahasiswa Sulawesi Selatan di Yogyakarta Diserang Enam Saksi Dimintai’, Kompas 15 January 2008.
Sulawesian student community attempted to burn down the residential college of the Ambonese, which happened to be located in the city of Yogyakarta. After the loss of the Sulawesian college, the city’s Poltabes command set up guards on the Ambonese asrama, and were thus able to thwart a mob of Sulawesian students attempting to attack it. After the incident, the Muspida requested the Kominda to reconnoitre the situation. The Kominda met on the night of the aborted attack, to identify the students and representatives among them. Apparently the police took the lead in this process as they had the authority to investigate crime beyond the boundaries of the city. The Yogyakarta city Muspida then called leadership figures from the respective student communities to meet before them. These representatives were told in stern terms there was to be no further violence – the message apparently was that if the students wished to fight they should do it outside Yogyakarta. As a result, the tit-for-tat attacks between the Ambonese and Sulawesians ceased after the Muspida’s intervention.

What these three examples show is the ability of the joint intelligence process to support local security management. By sharing intelligence and analysis, district intelligence elements are able to enhance their individual capabilities to detect sources of disturbance. The evidence from these examples also suggests the Kominda has a mixed record of success in the field. Despite success in two cases, one operation was spoiled by corrupt leaks. Nevertheless, whatever the Kominda’s effectiveness, the data does show these parties share a commitment as intelligence professionals to collaboration in support of security outcomes. This evidence again casts doubt upon the negative assessments of the literature, which define interagency relations as perpetually hostile and contested. At the local level, intelligence agencies are capable of mature collaboration.

The final point to add about the Kominda is that this forum is above all a servant of regional government. The Kominda reports to the Muspida and the Muspida decides what will be done with Kominda reports. The regional government effectively owns the intelligence analysis that comes out of the Kominda. When I approached the office of the Bagian Tata Pemerintahan (the District Secretariat) in the city of Yogyakarta I was

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98 Interview, former head of Pol.PP intelligence section, 2008.
informed that the city government does not forward Kominda or Muspida information upward to the provincial government. Intelligence products therefore do not leave the district. The bureaucrats in the Secretariat made a valid point that the hierarchical structure of Polri and TNI “probably” means that the police and military participants report discussions of the Kominda through their chains of command. Nevertheless the civilian state structure is probably not exploiting this forum to the limits of its effectiveness.

In summary, the Kominda is a critical example of cooperation through intelligence sharing. The Kominda is premised upon equal participation in sharing, analysing and recommending responses to jointly identified threats. In the city of Yogyakarta the process seems to take place well and has an effect on actual operations in the field. How much effect though is an open question. The Kominda is certainly, however, one further example of inter-agency collaboration.

The Meeting of the Regional Head of Government, Regional Courts, Regional State Prosecutor and Police (Kepala Daerah, Pengadilan, Kejaksaan, Kepolisian – Kediljapol)

There is one other meta-security forum which meets in Yogyakarta. It is much less active and much less influential than the two previous examples, but nevertheless it provides another demonstration of cooperation among law enforcement organisations. This forum is the Kediljapol. The Kediljapol brings together all the law enforcement agencies at the sub-national level to discuss technical legal issues. The Kediljapol is different from the Muspida and Kominda in that these forums discuss security in a global fashion, while the Kediljapol examines only matters pertaining to the interpretation and application of criminal law. While the state prosecutors and the regional justices were only minor contributors to the Muspida process, these organisations are important in the Kediljapol. The forum is active mostly at the provincial level. Some of the district governments have experimented with the

99 The only time when the district will forward information to the province is when the city comes across an issue that it believes will affect other districts or an issue it believes will concern the province. From 2007 to 2008 the Bagian Tata Pemerintahan had not been in contact with the Provincial Muspida at all, nor with the Muspikas of the sub-districts. Interview, Kepala Bagian Tata Pemerintahan Kota Yogyakarta, 12 May 2008.
Kediljapol in the past and one Kabupaten, Sleman, even maintains it at the present, but beneath the province the forum is largely moribund.

The Kediljapol has been held at the provincial level “probably” for the last ten to fifteen years, but has had a legal mandate through provincial regulations only since 2004. The terms of reference for the Kediljapol are, like the Muspida, vague. The governor has made the forum responsible for discussing all manner of problems which arise between the forum’s participants over the execution of their functions. In reality what the Kediljapol does is to extend an opportunity to all the state’s legal elements to meet and discuss their problems: from the interpretation of law to their complaints about one another. In the meeting notes which have been made available to me, many of the Kediljapol’s discussions relate to case handling. For example, the provincial government has previously brought to the meetings questions over whether the Legal Section (Bagian Hukum) in the districts are allowed to represent district governments in court. Polda DIY and the provincial state prosecutors have complained that the provincial court has threatened the prosecution of cases by demanding unreasonable standards of evidence. Although it remains uncertain from the meeting notes as to how those issues were resolved, it seems that the Kediljapol, like the Muspida seeks to resolve mutual problems through dialogue. Unlike the Muspida, the Kediljapol meets rarely, perhaps twice or three times a year and lacks a permanent chair. Based upon this information, the Kediljapol is probably best described as a technical coordination discussion group. I found no evidence that the forum activates

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100 I say this with some caution. The interviewee who provided me with this information is a senior bureaucrat, R. Nugroho, who works in the Biro Hukum (Legal Branch) of the provincial government and is responsible for managing the Kediljapol (Interview, 29 October 2007). As has been found many times in different situations, this bureaucrat has only occupied the position for a period of several years and the knowledge of the interviewee (and colleagues) about the period before his tenure is limited. The interviewee did, however, refer to a previous joint declaration of the Chiefs of the Supreme Court, State Prosecutors and Police of 1992 (Keputusan Bersama Ketua Mahkamah Agung RI, Menteri Kehakiman RI, Kejakaan Agung RI, Kepala Kepolisian Negara RI Nomor KMK/007/SKB/III/1992, M.01.PW.03/1992, Kep017/JA/3/1992, Kep01/III/1992 tentang Pemantapan Keterpaduan sesama Aparatur Penegak Hukum Dalam Menangani dan menyelesaikan Perkara-Perkara Pidana). After some discussion with colleagues, the interviewee indicated that this decision “probably” was the catalyst for the creation of the Kediljapol in Yogyakarta and it has been held continuously “ever since”. The most current regulation for the forum is: Keputusan Gubernur DIY Nomor 28/TIM/2004 tentang Pembentukan Tim Koordinasi Dilkehjapol Propinsi DIY.


102 This information originates from two documents given to me by Nugroho titled “Permasalahan Hukum Propinsi DIY 2006” and “Permasalahan/Pemecahan di Lapangan”. These were described as submission documents to the Kediljapol from 2006.

103 The Chief Justice, or any other representative may choose to lead the meeting. Interview, R. Nugroho, 29 October 2007.
investigations or seeks to prosecute the enforcement of law, rather that it seeks to coordinate the administration of law.

The Kediljapol has formerly been held in all of the three districts under examination and is active currently in one of them – Sleman. In Sleman, the district government has reconvened the forum after 2005 for the same reasons that it reconvened the Muspida; its interpretation of changes in the 2004 autonomy law supposedly now allows the district to cooperate with central government agencies. Since 2005, the Kediljapol of Sleman has convened at least twice, once in 2005 and once in 2006, to discuss two issues – the resurrection of the forum and how to divide the money collected from local government fines.\footnote{104 Interview, Hermanan and Djoko, Bagian Hukum Sleman, 2007.} The Kediljapol of Bantul, to the best of the knowledge available, convened in 1998 but was deactivated in 2000. According to an interviewee from the Kabupaten’s legal office, it was decided in 2000 that all matters in the Kediljapol could be referred to the discussions of the Muspida.\footnote{105 Interview with R.Sutinah, Seksi Bantuan Hukum, Bagian Hukum, Kabupaten Bantul, 29 October 2007.} The city of Yogyakarta also created its own Kediljapol in 2004. But, after a period of only six months of formal existence, political factions in the regional parliament levied suspicions that the forum created a ‘legal conspiracy’, and the forum was deactivated there also.\footnote{106 Interview with Basuki Harris, Kepala Bagian Hukum, Kotamadya Yogyakarta, 21 September 2007.}

While the Kediljapol exists at the margins in the case study, we can reasonably use the Kediljapol as a further example of how separate law enforcement institutions come together to jointly discuss matters of mutual interest. Since interviewees in the Legal Bureaus of regional government are only administrators of the meetings and not participants, it is unclear how well this forum works. The Kediljapol provides further evidence though that the umbrella of local government again provides key opportunities for cooperative problem-solving.
Sub-District Leadership Conference (Musyawarah Pimpinan Kecamatan - Muspika)

I wish to mention only in passing the existence of another forum which is also important for inter-institutional relations, but takes place at a much lower level, the sub-district. This forum, the Muspika, brings together the head of the sub-district police (the Kapolsek), the head of the sub-district military detachment (the Danramil) and the head of the sub-district bureaucracy (the Camat). The Muspika is another continuation from the Suharto era and operates exactly like the Muspida, though on a reduced scale. From the sub-districts I have visited, the Muspika tends to discuss micro-security problems, like traffic conditions, the trade in illegal alcohol and the like.\(^\text{107}\)

Sectoral Forums: The Regional Narcotics Agency and the Enforcement Taskforce of the Forestry Police

Beyond the meta-forums for general security problems, there are several small inter-agency meetings designed to tackle sectorally specific law enforcement issues. Although these forums are small, mostly passive and often ineffective, they are the final examples which show concerted efforts on the part of state actors to coordinate security. Like the previous forums, they operate under regional government offices and are dependent on the police.

One of these entities is the Narcotics Agency of the provincial government (Badan Narkotika Propinsi or BNP) and the districts (Badan Narkotika Kabupaten/Kota or BNK). These agencies are the regional offices of the Badan Narkotika Nasional (National Narcotics Agency), though because of decentralisation the BNP and BNK function autonomously. Like the national Narcotics Agency, the BNP and the BNK carry out the ‘war on drugs’ through coordinating drug prevention programs, drug treatment programs

\(^{107}\) The Muspika is a nation wide institution, but in Yogyakarta it is governed in detail by gubernatorial order. Surat Perintah Gubernor, Perihal: Muspika, No.138/197 24 January 1986.
and drug law enforcement. As will become apparent, the ability of the BNP/BNK to actually push the agenda law enforcement is very weak. As such the BNP/BNK tend to focus their work on prevention and treatment. Putatively, however, these agencies do claim a coordinating role for the ‘war on drugs.’ Paradoxically, their lack of action is more telling than what they do, as it illustrates again the critical importance of Polri in regional security.

The BNP and the BNK have ‘repressive taskforces’ (or Satgas), but these groupings do very little law enforcement.\(^{108}\) Using the BNK of the city of Yogyakarta as an example, their repressive taskforce is chaired by the head of the Poltabes Narcotics Unit. This taskforce also consists of the head of the city’s Pol.PP units and PPNS units, the head of the investigative unit of the provincial Food and Drug Bureau, the city Kodim’s head of intelligence, representatives of the district prosecutors and district court and a number of other members.\(^{109}\) The founding regulation of the Yogyakarta city BNK is similar to the provincial regulation for the BNP. The repressive Satgas of the Yogyakarta city BNK is permitted to “conduct coordination and observation on activities of enforcement on raids, arrests, confiscations, and investigations” and “conduct stake-outs and enforcement towards places/businesses.”\(^{110}\) The satgas functions largely as a dialogue forum, while Polri narcotics detectives are responsible for anti-narcotics activities on the ground. As described by the head of the police Narcotics Unit for Poltabes Yogyakarta:

> In the public sector, police cooperate with BNK... Indeed we cooperate. But for enforcing the law only we [the police narcotics detectives] can. When it concerns them [BNK] they can only give lectures, provide supporting funds... therefore possibly [it can be said] that forum discusses problems. Within BNK there are NGOs, furthermore there are narcotics bodies which have already been created by the community... They give information to the police. Aside from that there is an exchange of thoughts and also an exchange of information... According to my opinion this BNK is only an umbrella forum [wadah]. But for the frontline law enforcement this continues to be the police.\(^{111}\)

Once a year the National Narcotics Agency, the BNN, hands down orders to Indonesia’s various BNP and BNK at the regional level, to execute special anti-narcotics operations to

\(^{109}\) Kota Yogyakarta, 224/2006, Lampiran Susunan Personalia, V, B.
\(^{111}\) Interview with Kassat Narkoba Poltabes Andy Traspoetra, 25 September 2007.
coincide with the international anti-drug day. Although the operations come from the BNN, it is regional police that execute the operations. The same narcotics chief detective from Poltabes described this operation as follows:

On HARI BERSINAR [the codename of the operation]... BNN loads [beban] that on Mabes Polri, BNP loads the operation on the Polda, and BNK loads the operation on the Poltabes. Therefore the Poltabes also has responsibility to the Polda, the Polda is responsible to Mabes. Besides Poltabes there is also Bantul, Sleman and so on. Thus we move all in one line.\footnote{112 Interview, Kassat Narkoba Poltabes, 2007.}

Discussions with the head of the BNP and the secretariat of the BNK of Yogyakarta city indicate that this officer’s views on the distribution of power in the BNP/BNK is correct.\footnote{113 Interview, Sekretaris Badan Narkotika Kota, 26 July 2007.}

According to the provincial head of the BNP:

\begin{quote}
We [from BNP] are not always invited [in police activities/anti-narcotics operations]. Thus we are friends only. Therefore if they [the Polda narcotic detectives] operate, we don’t know. We are considered to make them uncomfortable. We are only given a sample [of drugs], from the originals up to the synthetic. But when they do the enforcement, we don’t know. Even for the data [on arrests etc.], we must go begging to them. There is one operation from BNP [the Hari Bersinar operation referred to above], for commemorating International Anti-Narcotics day. But we give that operation to them [the police]. But when Polri conducts an operation, [the BNP] staff who are involved only consists of two people. They are only from the [BNP] secretariat. And the large part of the operation is from Polri. The operation’s budget is also used by Polri alone.\footnote{114 Interview, Kepala Badan Narkotika Propinsi A.Priyatno, 24 October 2008.}
\end{quote}

The satgas represif of the BNP and BNK is therefore not very active and seems at best to observe and report on the anti-drug activities of police detectives. In all likelihood the BNP/BNK’s “coordinative” functions over drug law enforcement is a political device, which gives the illusion of a government wide response to Indonesia’s narcotics problems, while in reality Polri’s detectives run the entire show. Yet this example is still an instructive one. The BNP/BNK forum is yet another illustration of security cooperation in practice, largely in this case between the police and regional government. The fact that all law enforcement functions fall to Polri in this forum is an extreme illustration of the importance of the police in the regional security network.
The final noteworthy example of a sectoral interagency forum is the enforcement taskforce of the provincial forestry office. Unlike the BNP/BNK this forum oversees more activities but also depends upon the police. Within the provincial Forestry Bureau there is a ‘Forest Security Coordination Team.’ This body handles all anti-illegal logging operations in the province of Yogyakarta. This team consists of the head of the Forestry Bureau (functionally represented by the bureau’s Forestry Police Section or Seksi Pengamanan), the provincial prosecutors office, Polda DIY (represented by the Directorate of Detectives), the provincial Korem, the provincial court and a number of other miscellaneous participants. Looking at the operations orders from 2006 which was the last year the team conducted enforcement activities, the Forestry Bureau planned operations for twenty four days in that year. These combined operations included patrols, the arrest of suspects (if any were to be swept up — according to their recapitulated data there apparently were none in that year) and engaging the local community in dialogue. Out of those activities the Dinas Kehutanan budgeted for between ten to fifteen court cases every year, but these figures are rarely realised given the low amount of illegal logging in Yogyakarta. The Forest Security Team heavily depends on the Polda’s detectives since the investigative licenses of the two PPNS in the provincial Forestry Police section have expired. Therefore only police detectives can now investigate cases of illegal logging in Yogyakarta. This situation to some extent results from the low level of illegal logging in the province and the consequent lack of capacity in the Forestry Bureau. Yet even if this reality was different, the police would still be an integral part of this team because of the sectoral superiority of police detectives over PPNS. More of this issue will be raised in chapter four.

Conclusion

This chapter has introduced the evidence for collaboration among state security actors in regional security forums. Ranked in order of importance and seniority there is the Regional Leader’s Conference (Muspida), the Regional Intelligence Community meeting (Kominda),

116 Dinas Kehutanan dan Perkebunan Propinsi DIY, Rencana Operasi Perlindungan dan Pengamanan Hutan, p.6-10.
the meeting of the Regional Head of Government, Regional Courts, Regional State Prosecutors and Police (*Kediljapol*), the sub-district leader’s forum (*Mussywarah Pimpinan Kecamatan or Muspika*), and two sectoral taskforces designed to facilitate joint-agency law enforcement over narcotics and illegal logging.

The distinctive feature of these meetings is an absence of what American strategists have dubbed ‘unity of command’ or the centralisation of leadership in a single institution. In these various forums individual parties participate voluntarily. No central government agency or officer obliges the security organisations at the regional level to collaborate. American strategists have claimed this model of inter-agency cooperation is not effective in achieving outcomes. In part, the evidence from my case study site of Yogyakarta reifies this analysis. The central product of joint security taskforces in Yogyakarta is consensus and dialogue, rather than results. This situation devolves from the voluntary nature of participation. A second explanation for the difficulty these forums have in driving outcomes is that they are not designed to serve a specific agenda. Instead the committees are, with the exception of the BNP/BNK and the Forestry Security Team, to monitor the general security landscape. To some extent, however, the weak record of these joint forums in managing threats is not the central issue.

To stress the importance of security outcomes overlooks the substantial benefit these forums have in facilitating dialogue and consensus. The literature on security in Indonesia would have us believe inter-institutional relations in the security sector are poor and defined by conflict. The evidence presented in this chapter shows this is not the case. The fact that state security agencies actually communicate at all is noteworthy and constitutes *prima facie* evidence of collaboration. One could argue that some of the evidence in this chapter supports the conventional view of competition and corruption leading to poor security outcomes. The best example of this would be the police protection of illegal gambling dens in Yogyakarta city. While noting these exceptions, I would nevertheless argue that the vast weight of evidence in this chapter suggests that dialogue and collaboration is the default setting of these security institutions.
The joint agency security forums in Yogyakarta are also not incapable of producing action. In the few instances where joint operations were required, generally the security forums served to build the consensus which permitted officers in the field, to put agreed decisions into action. When operations did take place, they generally occurred between Polri elements and Pol.PP, and often the police become the 'leading sector.' The superior responsibilities and repressive powers of the police make Polri the power behind the joint agency process.

An unexpected finding is that regional government actually plays a key role in the joint agency meetings. All of the inter-institutional taskforces fall under the administration of regional government. Because of this factor we see that regional government – particularly in the Muspida – is able to impose some of its concerns on the meetings and is able to draw the national security apparatus into the resolution of local problems. Although regional government may have a loud voice in the meeting rooms, nevertheless the forums required the powers of the police to enforce the joint resolutions.
Chapter 4: Funding, Joint Operations and the Other Aspects to the Working Relationships of State Security Agencies

This chapter continues the analysis of inter-agency relations within the state sector. In this chapter we examine how state security actors interact beyond regional government forums. Inter-institutional contact outside regional security forums takes at least four different forms: the funding of inter-agency activities, the execution of occasional joint operations (which many times takes place purely between the operational elements of the participating institutions without Muspida approval), "pembinaan" or what may be termed in English as supervising/caring (for)\(^1\) in which the police provide services and support to the other law enforcement arms of the state (the PPNS) and, finally, interaction in the form of memorandums of understanding which codify attitudes and obligations between organisations. I arrange these practices in roughly their order of value, with funding being very important and the only standing MOU that I have discovered contributing in only a weak manner to interagency relations.

If considered as a whole, these interactions mostly take place between regional government and the police. Since regional government initiates most of these forms of engagement, the evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates the extent to which regional government depends upon Polri. The participation of other state organisations in these practices is often minimal. This situation underlines a circumstance which is made apparent throughout this dissertation: the most important actors in security management in my case study site are the national police, followed far behind by district government.

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\(^1\) The Indonesian language has a rich variety of terms to describe (shades of) the concept of a senior caring for or managing a junior (membina, membimbing, mengasuh, mendampingi and so on). Contemporary English has a restricted vocabulary for rendering these terms, largely because the concept in English is faintly patronising. Yet in an Asian society like Indonesia, the practice of pembinaan is considered benign (even positive). As we shall see in chapters five and six a large part of the police role is to guide the weaker parts of the non-state security sector. Although by no means uniform, I was struck by how much the non-police security providers (especially the commercial security industry, the ronda and FKPM, among others) embraced this terminology, without any sense of irony or resentment. In western countries this type of hierarchical relationship would probably not enjoy the same cultural acceptance.
This chapter enhances our understanding of networked security for three reasons. Firstly, this chapter reveals comprehensive new, empirical data on how security organisations interact in Indonesia. Secondly, this chapter again shows the surprisingly important role played by regional government in facilitating security cooperation, while also revealing the central role occupied by the police within the network. Regional government may often cultivate methods of cooperation but the police are the source of strength for joint operations and a source of knowledge and training services. Thirdly this chapter also shows that cooperation is the dominant form of behaviour between state security actors, in spite of the assumptions in the scholarly literature of widespread hostility and conflict.

In presenting this chapter I have deliberately eschewed reliance on official statements from leaders of government agencies. In my interviews I found that there was a tendency for public servants to provide bland official statements about their working relations with partner agencies. Therefore, I decided to look only at the evidence of action and activities. In doing so, I specifically hunted for information which would suggest agencies ignore or are apathetic to solicitations for cooperation. Where I have encountered such instances, as in Pol.PP relations with the police in the district of Bantul, I discuss the evidence. In general, however, there are few examples of non-collaborative behaviour. I find this further solidifies my argument that the dominant impulse of state security groups is to cooperate.

Why agencies choose to cooperate raises factors of agency and structure, and these issues need to be discussed separately as they apply to Polri and the non-police organisations. Non-police bureaucracies must cooperate with the police in order to adequately perform their mandates. Thus the Pol.PP and regional government seek police support in order to enhance their own enforcement powers. PPNS must deal with Polri investigators in order to prosecute criminal cases. As a result of national security reforms, territorial army forces are only able to deploy in regional security as part of combined operations with Polri personnel. Thus structural, systemic factors make non-Polri bureaucracies dependent on the police. Yet within this system we also see the influence of agency. Not all bureaucracies behave the same. In the city of Yogyakarta, public order officials deliberately cultivate close relations with their district police. In Bantul, the regional government seeks to buy
police support. Such choices imply that within structural parameters, non-Polri agencies adopt different patterns of engagement towards the police.

Why the Indonesian police choose to lend their assistance to other agencies, raises more difficult questions. I postulate that the willingness of the police to do so is founded on four reasons. Firstly, clear divisions of labour have an anodyne effect on interagency relations. Because there is little duplication of functions between these agencies, there is little contestation over security responsibilities. The police can freely lend assistance from a position of confidence, knowing that no other agency contests Polri's responsibility for internal security. Secondly, there are patterns of learned behaviour. Some aspects of police support derive from behaviours which have taken place over decades, two examples being Polri supervision of PPNS and police attendance at Muspida meetings. Arguably such patterns of support inculcate receptiveness to cross-institutional collaboration. Thirdly, certain accepted rules of behaviour mitigate the costs of inter-institutional collaboration. There is an in-principle commitment within the Indonesian public sector to compensate external agencies when their assistance is requested. This agreement removes from the police the financial penalty costs of cooperation. Finally there is the nature of the police role itself. The police are responsible for day-to-day security. Security is enhanced through the mutual collaboration of state actors. Therefore with little to lose, it becomes a responsible rational choice for the police to support non-Polri agencies.

Funding

Cross-institutional funding is an important component of security cooperation. Given the relative dependence of regional governments on the assistance of national security agencies, transfers of cash, more often than not, come from local government and are directed at the police, military and other national institutions. Most of the discussion in the following section shows how these transfers occur. Recently, Jakarta has moved to curtail the most egregious aspects of these relationships by imposing strict limits on the ability of regional governments to fund national institutions. My research shows that although joint
funding has been reduced significantly, it still occurs. It should be mentioned though that inter-institutional funding is not a topic that is easy to research. The easiest and most reliable information on joint funding comes from publicly available financial audits of the Indonesian Audit Board (Badan Pemeriksaan Keuangan, BPK). While I have not found reliable information that leads me to conclude illegal, unrecorded payments are being made, it is highly likely that this practice still occurs. However, my research has only been able to uncover funding that supports professional activities.

While the scholarly literature shows that regional armed forces and regional governments have historically had an intertwined relationship, today the situation is very different. As discussed in chapter one, during the New Order the Indonesian army territorial command fused onto and dominated regional government. This enabled army commanders to tap into the resources of the civil administration. Reformasi and decentralisation from 1998 to 2004 initiated the first phase of dislodging the military from local government, but over this period parts of military influence remained in place. While active military officers were withdrawn from regional government (or resigned their active commissions), TNI/Polri factions continued to exist in local parliaments. Though their influence was reduced, TNI representatives occasionally emerged as key voting blocs in local governments. Provincial and district executives therefore found themselves having to negotiate with military representatives for the passage of their legislative agendas. As a result, regional executive heads would grant budget concessions to territorial forces, often in the form of “local security funds.” Mahroza found one especially generous district in East Java where 10% of the entire district budget was transferred to the district Kodim. Yet the presence of military representatives in parliament ended in 2004. With the removal of military representatives a vital inducement for regional governments to grant funds to local TNI forces has now disappeared. As is apparent below, funding still occurs. Today however, the rationale for regional governments to financially support the national security apparatus is less strong and based upon the idea of payment for services rendered.

2 Honna, ‘Local Civil-Military Relations: A Comparison of West, Central and East Java’, 81-83. See also: Mahroza, Military Withdrawal, 56-63.
3 Mahroza, Local Perspective on Military Withdrawal, 234-235.
New rules imposed by Jakarta have dramatically changed the dynamics of cross-institutional funding in the regions. In 2005 the interior minister issued a ruling that discouraged, but did not apparently forbid, regional government from providing grants to central government bodies. In 2006 the minister tightened this provision by issuing Surat Edaran 903 concerning how regional governments may formulate their budgets. The minister declared that the annual budgets of national government institutions operating in the regions are sufficient for their activities. Provinces and districts (instansi horizontal or horizontal institutions) may not supplement the budgets of national government agencies (instansi vertikal or horizontal institutions) through grants from the regional budget (APBD). Direct financial grants from the APBD to national bodies are now, therefore, forbidden. This ruling led to both angst and elation among regional government.

Due to a negative initial reaction from the regions to his 2006 edict, the interior minister subsequently issued a qualification of his ruling. This qualification has allowed local government to fund the activities of national government agencies but in a much reduced form. The minister now allows districts and provinces to budget for “joint activities” between local government and national government bodies where the national agencies ‘assist’ in the activities of their regional government counterparts. Following the minister’s recommendation, local governments have today adopted the practice of funding joint activities on a case by case basis rather than as they did before – making direct grants of cash or assets to central government security actors. The head of the Pol.PP section in the city of Yogyakarta, illustrated this difference. At one interview, he and I discussed his Bureau’s 2006 yearly report. The respondent explained in that year the Bureau made a

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4 See: Menteri Dalam Negeri, Surat Edaran: 903/3172/SJ.
6 Angst from some, such as the district secretary of Bantul, who has argued that the new system places regional government in an uncomfortable position of having to reject requests from important institutions which it continuously works with. According to the Secretary’s statement in a BPK audit from 2005: “The District Secretary of the Kabupaten of Bantul understands the problem and stated that in executing the functions of government in the field, it is difficult not to give financial assistance to vertical institutions.” On the other hand, other district government officials such as the district secretary of Sleman view the interior minister’s directive positively since, he implies, it gives Sleman the grounds to legitimately refuse financial requests which strain the district budget. See: Republik Indonesia, Badan Pemeriksan Keuangan: Hasil Pemeriksaan atas Laporan Keuangan Kabupaten Bantul Tahun Anggaran 2005 (25 July 2006), 133. Also: Interview with District Secretary of Sleman, Sutrisno, July 2007.
block annual payment to the city Kodim and Poltabes, which was no longer deemed acceptable.

If we talk about the Rp.140 million for the Poltabes, and the Rp.40 million for the Kodim. This is in the framework of providing assistance to institutions in the year 2006. What I mean is if we request assistance from the Poltabes or the Kodim there wouldn’t be a problem. But making them accountable [for how they use those funds], that’s difficult. Thus this year [2007] the practice has changed to focus on supporting government activities. For example, the activity to support security for relocation at Klithihan [referring to a specific combined operation to relocate street traders]. However many people [police/TNI] participate, we paid. Therefore its quite real [i.e. accountable]... Before, that Rp.190 million, we didn’t know how they spent it. Now, we actually know.⁸

In the past years this district government (and presumably all others did the same) made a yearly block grant to the national security actors with the expectation that the district would be able to call upon their support whenever needed. But they had no way of knowing if the funding provided ever matched the material support. From 2006 these practices are no longer permitted. Instead the regional governments give funds to instansi vertikal on an as needs basis, and only when local district personnel are involved in the mission.

Prior to the passage of the interior minister’s 2006 order, it seems that almost all of the local governments of Yogyakarta were in the habit of paying moderate sums of money to the national security institutions. We can see this situation best through publicly available reports of the Indonesian Auditing Board, BPK.⁹ To take the provincial government as the first example. In the budget year 2004, the provincial government made the following payments to vertical institutions:¹⁰

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⁸ Interview, Norwidi, October 2007.
⁹ BPK is the Indonesian Audit Board (or Auditor General). This agency has the authority to audit every Indonesian national and regional government organisation. It conducts these audits in random surveys every half-year. While BPK’s audits are the most accurate information there are limits to the usefulness of the data. Audits of the districts and the province of Yogyakarta only began in 2004 and 2005. After initially revealing the financial malpractices and recommending that the Yogyakarta governments cease making large grants to national agencies, the regional administrations heeded BPK’s requests. The most recent BPK reports of the last two years show almost no references to instansi vertikal at all. Thus we can say that BPK’s reports in 2004-2005 into the finances of Sleman, Bantul, Yogyakarta city, and the provincial government offer an interesting snapshot into how security funding worked before 2006. These practices have since changed.
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<th>Amount</th>
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<tr>
<td>Kodim Kulonprogo</td>
<td>Rp 43.800.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kodim Bantul</td>
<td>Rp 38.800.000</td>
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<td>Kodim Yogyakarta</td>
<td>Rp 38.800.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kodim Sleman</td>
<td>Rp 38.800.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kodim Gunung Kidul</td>
<td>Rp 43.800.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Korem 072</td>
<td>Rp 4.500.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kodam IV Diponegoro</td>
<td>Rp 4.000.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distrantib*</td>
<td>Rp 82.600.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Honorarium</td>
<td>Rp 45.900.000</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>Rp 341.000.000</strong></td>
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* money was given to the provincial Dinas Trantibum (a different term for the Bureau of Public Order) with the intention of channelling the funds to national security agencies in Yogyakarta

Based on an audit of a separate account the BPK also noted that other payments had been made to vertical institutions in 2004:¹¹

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<th>Amount</th>
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<tr>
<td>Korem 072</td>
<td>Rp 277.000.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polda DIY</td>
<td>Rp 75.000.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>Rp 352.000.000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Therefore the BPK audit on the 2004 Yogyakarta provincial budget shows the province gave at least Rp.693 million (around US$77,000) to the national security agencies and almost 90% of the money went to the military. But it is possible that these figures understate the situation. At this time the central government had not yet formally forbidden regional administrations granting money to central government agencies. The only reason why BPK had listed these payments was because the auditor considered the money ‘wrongly allocated’, essentially the cash came from accounts designed to serve other purposes. Therefore these payments may in fact be the tip of a bigger iceberg.

¹¹ The money for vertical security institutions, however, made up around only 1% of the Rp.639 billion in realised expenditure for the province in 2004. BPK, Hasil Pemeriksaan Propinsi DIY 2004, p.199 and Bagian Pertama, Bab.II, B, p.7.
The other interesting thing to note about the provincial government payments is that most were directed towards the military. The reason for this is unclear. It is unlikely that the payments were quid pro quo for security services, precisely because the evidence in the rest of this dissertation indicates that the military was not active in internal security activities. There is little reason to suppose the situation in 2004 was different to the period of my field research in 2007-2008. Speculatively, one possible explanation is the composition of parliament at that time. During the 1999-2004 period, military representatives continued to sit in national and regional parliaments. As Honna and Mahroza have pointed out, it was customary in post-1999 Indonesia for regional heads of government to pay military parliamentary fractions with appropriations from local budgets.12 Probably the same dynamics Honna and Mahroza describes were at work in Yogyakarta.

The funding patterns in the districts were much the same as in the province, but after the minister of the interior began discouraging regional governments from direct cash grants in the 2005 financial year, a wider array of malpractices came to light in BPK audits.13 The 2005 audits of BPK therefore provide an interesting snapshot of how the districts subsidised national government agencies (and occasionally did so generously) prior to 2006. However it must be added this is only a snapshot. BPK audits of Bantul, Sleman and Yogyakarta district governments after 2006 show that the direct grants to national security/law enforcement institutions revealed in BPK’s 2004 and 2005 audits have now ceased.14

The auditors report on the 2005 budget of Kabupaten Bantul shows Bantul provided the most generous support to central agencies. The findings of this report are, in parts, quite striking and illustrate how this district attempted to buy close relations with the national

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12 Mahroza, Military Withdrawal, 56-63. See also: Honna, ‘Local Civil-Military Relations, 81-83
14 The only exception to this was a 2007 BPK audit which found that the city of Yogyakarta was loaning out a large number of vehicles (five four-wheel vehicles and nine motorbikes) and miscellaneous other electronic equipment to the district police, prosecutors, courts, and army unit. BPK deemed these loans not sufficient with procedure as the loan periods were unspecified. Republik Indonesia: Badan Pemerikssan Keuangan: Laporan Hasil Pemeriksaan atas Sistem Pengendalian Intern Dalam Kerangka Pemeriksaan Laporan Keuangan Pemerintah Kota Yogyakarta Tahun Anggaran 2007 (30 June 2008), p.30. Republic Indonesia, Badan Pemerikssan Keuangan: Hasil Pemeriksaan atas Laporan Keuangan Kabupaten Bantul Tahun Anggaran 2007 (24 June 2008). Badan Pemerikssan Keuangan: Hasil Pemeriksaan atas Laporan Keuangan Kabupaten Sleman Tahun Anggaran 2007 (15 July 2008).
law and security agencies. In the financial year 2005, the district disbursed funds of around Rp.608 million to central government security institutions. BPK tables the cash payments as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assistance to the Muspida</th>
<th>Rp 92.453.000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security assistance:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLRES Kab. Bantul</td>
<td>Rp 156.200.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KODIM 0729 Kab. Bantul</td>
<td>Rp 88.250.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Prosecutors Kab. Bantul</td>
<td>Rp 133.000.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Law Court Kab. Bantul</td>
<td>Rp 20.000.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satbrimob [police mobile brigade]</td>
<td>Rp 6.500.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOREM 702/Kodam IV Diponegoro</td>
<td>Rp 38.625.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korps Paskhas TNI AU Lanud Adisucipto [air force ground security]</td>
<td>Rp 2.000.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paspamres [Presidential security unit]</td>
<td>Rp 600.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Rp 537.628.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To this, the auditors added other financial assistance in the form of one payment of Rp.65 million to the Polres of Bantul and one payment of Rp.5 million to the Kodim. In one year this was a large sum of money for a small, mostly under-developed kabupaten.15

Bantul’s donations did not cease with financial assistance. In the same year, the BPK noted there were other donations of expensive capital goods. In total, the district granted some seventeen new and used vehicles to national government security agencies in 2005, in addition to other electronic equipment. BPK has broken down these findings as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Toyota Kijang Innova</th>
<th>Rp 139.300.000.00 2005 (1 unit)</th>
<th>State Prosecutors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

15 One reason for this extraordinary amount of money was that in 2005 the president made a special visit to Bantul. The Kabupaten partially subsidised the costs of security for his visit. This helps explains why so much money was transferred to the military (including Paspamres, the presidential security detachment). Even accepting this fact, the payment is very large and one security operation does not account for it all.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Toyota Kijang Innova Type E</th>
<th>Rp.139,300,000,00 2005 (1 unit)</th>
<th>State Courts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Honda Supra Fit</td>
<td>Rp.20,400,000,00 2005 (2 unit)</td>
<td>State Prosecutors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck Toyota Dyna 2003</td>
<td>(1 unit)</td>
<td>Kodim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suzuki Trail TS 125 2003</td>
<td>(7 unit)</td>
<td>Polres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suzuki TS 125 2002</td>
<td>(3 unit)</td>
<td>Polres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toyota Kijang pick up 2001</td>
<td>(1 unit)</td>
<td>Kodim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toyota Kijang Innova type E 2005</td>
<td>(1 unit)</td>
<td>State courts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On top of these donations was added one computer that the district gave to the Kodim of Bantul, one computer that was donated to the regional BIN office and one Motorola mobile phone donated to the Bantul police. Excluding the Motorola this last batch of equipment is estimated at Rp.14.1 million. In all therefore, we could conservatively estimate that the Kabupaten of Bantul, in one financial year, gave away over Rp.1 billion (approximately US$ 111,000) of cash and capital goods to national government law and security institutions. We must recall that this is merely a snapshot of the funding relations in one random year before the introduction of a ‘stop order’ on financial grants. It is difficult to accurately generalise on the basis of this information. While acknowledging the quantity of the transfers in Bantul seem unusually large, these grants were not unprecedented though among the other districts.

In the other districts the same funding relationship can be seen, albeit on a smaller scale. In the Kabupaten of Gunung Kidul, which is a northern district that is not a focus of this research but is included here to illustrate the ubiquity of the funding practices, BPK

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16 But to put the situation in perspective, this is only a small part of the Kabupaten’s (realised) 2005 expenditure of Rp.417 billion. Laporan Keuangan Kabupaten Bantul Tahun Anggaran 2005, p.5, 132-133, 141-142.
discovered in the year 2004, the Kabupaten disbursed around Rp.593.2 million to its national security partners – the police, the military, the state prosecutors and the national courts.\textsuperscript{17} In the budget year 2005, the city of Yogyakarta also gave Rp.477 million to vertical law enforcement and security agencies.\textsuperscript{18} In 2005 another remote kabupaten in Yogyakarta, Kulon Progo provided around Rp.157 million to vertical security bodies.\textsuperscript{19} The Kabupaten of Sleman also was found to have made contributions of Rp.807 million to unspecified ‘vertical institutions.’ The BPK is not clear on whether Sleman gave some of this money to law enforcement and security actors but, given trends in the other districts, this is highly likely.\textsuperscript{20} It is clear therefore that making direct cash grants to national agencies was a common practice for regional government in Yogyakarta.

Turning to the post-2006 period, we can see that local government still continues to pay their national government security partners but the practice has changed to concentrate on funding specific, joint activities. This situation is evident in the recent budgets of Sleman and Yogyakarta city. Nevertheless, there is still a sharp difference between the generosity of these two districts and the Kabupaten of Bantul. Sleman and the city of Yogyakarta stress ‘professional’ cooperation with the police and other agencies. Bantul on the other hand still attempts to buy positive relations by transferring (comparatively) large amounts of money. This situation is informed by fundamentally different relations between the security elements in the different areas.

Looking at recent funding practices of Sleman and Kota Yogyakarta, substantial funding still occurs but this funding has been tied to joint activities and specific programs. In the 2007 budget of the Bureau of Public Order Bureau in Sleman, the Bureau allocated Rp.36 million for cooperative activities between the police and the Sleman Pol.PP unit. In the

\textsuperscript{17} These figures may actually understatement the degree of assistance. The money was hidden in two separate appropriations accounts totalling Rp.2.7 billion. BPK did not list all the recipients of the activities budgeted for under these programs. As in the case with the provincial government in 2004, the only reason why BPK investigated these accounts at all is because they were not managed and accounted for appropriately. Republik Indonesia: Badan Pemeriksaan Keuangan, Hasil Pemeriksaan atas Laporan Keuangan Kabupaten Gunung Kidul Tahun Anggaran 2004 (28 March 2005), Lampiran II.A & II.B also p.145-146.
\textsuperscript{19} Republik Indonesia: Badan Pemeriksaan Keuangan, Hasil Pemeriksaan atas Laporan Keuangan Kabupaten Kulon Progo (11 May 2006), p.68.
\textsuperscript{20} Republik Indonesia: Badan Pemeriksaan Keuangan, Hasil Pemeriksaan atas Laporan Keuangan Kabupaten Sleman (26 Juli 2006), 118.
same year the Bureau also allocated Rp.63 million for cooperation with the district Kodim in providing guidance (pembinaan) to village security units (Linmas). Added to that amount was another Rp.8 million for joint intelligence gathering between the Kodim, Pol.PP and the Linmas. The bureau allocated Rp.65 million for supporting the Kominda intelligence meetings and Rp.73 million for PPNS operations (which are done in the form of sting-type operations involving the police, the prosecutors, and the district court). The Bureau of Public Order in Yogyakarta city meanwhile had drawn up budgets in 2007 which allocated Rp.40 million to the state prosecutors, the district court and district police detectives to train the Dinas’ PPNS personnel. This funding is much reduced in comparison to the largesse of previous years. The data suggests that the districts have adopted a system in which cross institutional funding is tied to specific activities rather than in the form of general cash payments.

Bantul on the other hand still shows hints of the former-but-now-frowned-on strategy of trying to buy the allegiance of national security elements through large cash transfers. Albeit this happens in much reduced form. Although the district’s public order officials keep relatively opaque budgets, one clear example of the fact that Bantul continues past behaviour is the extraordinarily high honoraria the district pays to members of the Muspida. In 2007, the budget for the Muspida of Bantul was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Budget</th>
<th>Honoraria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bupati</td>
<td>Rp.48 million</td>
<td>1x12x4 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dandim 0729</td>
<td>Rp.42 million</td>
<td>1x12x3.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapolres</td>
<td>Rp.42 million</td>
<td>1x12x3.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kajari [head prosecutor]</td>
<td>Rp.42 million</td>
<td>1x12x3.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sekda [district secretary]</td>
<td>Rp.30 million</td>
<td>1x12x2.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Bupati</td>
<td>Rp.30 million</td>
<td>1x12x2.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chair of the State Court</td>
<td>Rp.30 million</td>
<td>1x12x2.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretariat</td>
<td>Rp.56.7 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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21 Kabupaten Sleman: Dinas Pol.PP, Rencana Kerja 2007, program 2 (2)b., program 4 (5)a., (6)b. and c.
This money is a very generous attendance allowance. For the heads of the police, military and other national officers, this official honorarium is probably as much or greater than their entire yearly wage.23

Having laid out the case that even after 2006 money was still being transferred from regional governments to the national law and security apparatuses, a pertinent question to ask is how is this money spent? At least part of the funds seems to be used for operational compensation. Joint operations will be explained in more detail in the next section, here I provide some examples which illustrate the payment of money in practice. Several times in 2007 I had the opportunity to observe joint activities of Pol.PP and Poltabes personnel in Yogyakarta city. One of these joint operations was an anti-prostitution raid conducted on 29 July. This operation involved forty five personnel; thirty Pol.PP and fifteen from the police. At another time I witnessed a ‘pembinaan’ operation (or a social supervision activity) in which about five Binamitra police from the Poltabes with twenty three Pol.PP paid a series of visits to pos kamling (neighbourhood watch posts); this activity was held on 15 August 2007. Both activities began at around nine thirty at night. Before the troops were put in formation for the activity briefing they were allowed to file past a paymaster in the Pol.PP office and each officer, police and Pol.PP, was paid about Rp.25,000.24 This payment constituted their meal allowance and a small honorarium for transport costs. After the activity, the Pol.PP also paid for the police to fill up their vehicles with petrol, in the first operation that consisted of one truck and ten dirt bikes. These kinds of combined operations took place four to five times every month according to the head of the city’s Pol.PP unit. For such activities the city budgets Rp.600,000-700,000 for every group of ten personnel (or one regu) involved in the activity. In general, operational costs therefore mostly seem to

23 In 2003 for example the base monthly wage (not including allowances) of a major in the Indonesian army was between Rp.1.06 million and Rp.1.09 million. A Major is the usual rank of a Kodim commander. Republik Indonesia: Peraturan Pemerintah No.12/2003 tentang Perubahan atas Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 28/2001 tentang Gaji Anggota Tentara Nasional Indonesia; Lampiran.

24 One of my Pol.PP sources claims that individual allowances are formally Rp.8000 for meals and Rp.6000 for transportation. A separate source in the police confirms this is the scale of payments they use as well. Formal or not, I however saw more than Rp14,000 being paid during my field observations. Interview, Norwidi, 23 October 2007. Interview, AKBP Kristiono Head of Operations, Polres Sleman, 1 November 2007.
consist of allowances for individual personnel and petrol. This situation is probably roughly similar in the other regions of the case study.

The discussion thus far provokes the question: why do regional governments in the case study believe they must pay their national security partners at all? Regional government effectively is funding a responsibility - security management - which falls within the job descriptions of the "vertical institutions" anyway. Surely, given the competing pressures on any organisation's resources, this money could be better spent in other areas. This idea was put to a number of local government interviewees in the case study site, both policymakers like regional secretaries and executive heads and the 'implementers' in the Bureaus of Public Order. Their responses provide an interesting insight into the dependence of regional governments on national security agencies. Their responses also illustrate the challenge of attempting to coordinate the various elements of the state security apparatus, elements which are in reality independent from one another but which are jointly responsible for the production of security.

The most prominent point that emerges in the thinking of regional government on security management is that regional government believes it is normatively responsible for creating a secure and orderly environment. This feeling of responsibility not only exists because of obligations created by national legislation, but most importantly because local government is convinced that the voting population of their territories hold them responsible for security. As put by the Secretary of Bantul:

For us [the district government] it’s difficult. We don’t have the authority. For example – the President came [to Bantul] some time ago and visited the coastline. But those who have authority for securing the president are only TNI... Now it’s not possible for us [in matters of security] not to help. If something were to happen we [the district government] are the ones who will be blamed...by everyone, by government and the community... we feel responsible for security.

Or according to the Bupati of Sleman:

Actually we don’t handle security problems, security both of a national dimension and

23 Interview, Norwidi, 23 October 2007.
26 Interview, District Secretary of Bantul, October 2007.
a regional dimension is handled by the police, whereas under regional autonomy security problems should become the responsibility of the regional head and the police are controlled by the regional head... but between the statutes that issue is still unresolved, it hasn’t yet been synchronised... consequently we [district government] only handle it [security] from a social aspect, like illegal alcohol, youth accommodation, etc.

What this district head meant is that although he believes regional autonomy legislation delegates him normative responsibility for security management, actual control still lies in the hands of the police. Consequently, when faced with a security problem (following on from his implied meaning we can take the example of youth violence) the district is limited to tackling the social causes of the issue - like poverty and alcohol trading, which are two issues which clearly fall under district responsibility. Encouraging the police to tackle security problems which have become a concern for the district government therefore becomes a difficult challenge:

[district government] is still searching for a forum for conducting cooperation [with Polri], but because it [security] is in their hands, in the past we just didn’t bother... [in taking this approach though] there emerged a lot of dissatisfaction in the community, because if crime occurred the community often complained to the Bupati.27

Thus regional government feels that it is not politically free to surrender responsibility for security and order to the national security apparatus. This mindset explains why at times local governments in Yogyakarta have financed special security events (for example visits by dignitaries like the president) which are clearly the responsibility of the national security apparatus, or have subsidised the handling of problems for which the districts feel normatively responsible but are unable to manage in practice (such as gambling). In such situations regional government feels justified in paying the national government agencies to service the security need on behalf of, or together with, the regional government. This is a “user pays” service by any other name. In explaining this system the district secretary of Bantul said the following:

That which may not be permitted is if we [local government] pay for their [national security forces] activities. But if it concerns our activities and we request their assistance, they may [receive our funding]. That can be budgeted for because we request their assistance. Because they are the supreme powers [in matters of security]... of course there are things which fall

27 Interview, Bupati Sleman, June 2008.
outside our authority. Like securing the president, that is a TNI/Police affair. That which is not permitted under the Surat Edaran [of 2006] is for example if the police hold a training activity, for us to pay for that would not be permitted. But if we have an activity and request their assistance then they [the security forces] may [assist the district government]. It's like with Lebaran. This is a regional government event for the community. We request their [security force] assistance... and we give them money for meals and other operational costs... because they don't have the money.

This obviously opens the question: why do the police and the military not pay for these activities themselves? Are their own budgets insufficient? The same district secretary responded thus:

That we [regional government] don't know. Indeed because the police and the military budget we cannot know. Even there are other things which we cannot know [about security force activity]. But they always say that their budget is not large enough - “We only have enough money for wages” etc. For these things [operational expenses] they don't have money. Maybe that money exists in Jakarta but [laughing] it doesn't filter down to the troops in the regions.28

Budget insufficiency as a reason for subsidising the costs of the national security apparatus reveals much about the dynamics of relations in the Kabupaten of Bantul. I will discuss the distinctive character of relations in each of the districts below. However the broad point to conclude about these funding patterns is that regional government faces a conundrum. It feels politically responsible for ensuring security but lacks the means to achieve it. Therefore, regional government provides incentives to the national law enforcement apparatus to pay attention to its concerns. Specifically, local administrations try to remove penalty fees for joint cooperation by subsidising the operational costs of the national government agencies, in particular the police.

In the Indonesian context an obvious question to ask is whether these cash transfers are corrupt or improper. Arguably, the answer is no. The payments I have evidence for can be calculated in the hundreds of millions of rupiah, rather than the hundreds of billions. Formal payments are relatively modest. I use the terminology 'formal payments' deliberately. It is not my intention to deny that senior bureaucrats and elected officials make illegal or personal payments to one another. Unconfirmed rumours suggest these

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28 Interview, District Secretary Bantul, October 2007.
practices occur in Yogyakarta. Rather I wish to discuss the evidence that I have for formal, inter-institutional payments derived from state budgets. Given that the formal payments are reasonably modest and regional government does have a plausible explanation for why these payments are appropriate, on the balance of probabilities it is likely that these payments are at least mostly for the purpose that is described – to subsidise costs.

Although all three district governments transfer money to the national security apparatus, interestingly their degree of willingness to do so differs. Probing reasons why this is the case leads to the broader differences in the style of inter-institutional collaboration in Sleman, Yogyakarta city and Bantul. Each of the districts choose to collaborate with the national security apparatus. How they do so can be different. Although the following paragraphs digress from the issue of funding, the following discussion on the different approaches to inter-institutional collaboration helps to elucidate why Bantul for example donates large sums of money and Yogyakarta city does not. In brief, I argue that the local environment and the different styles of governance in each of the districts influences the way in which the districts engage their security partners.

The city of Yogyakarta for example is reluctant to grant the national law and security institutions much money. Instead, the city prefers to emphasise synergy and professional cooperation. This philosophy is implemented both by officials in the field and in the policies of the district administration. The leadership of the city’s Bureau of Public Order is diligent in maintaining professional links with the district’s whole legal apparatus, not only the police. The Dinas holds monthly dialogues between the district PPNS, district judges, the district’s state prosecutors and Poltabes police detectives for the purpose of giving training to PPNS. The Dinas has also been quite creative in its other methods of

29 For example I came across unconfirmed rumours that the Bupati of Bantul gave a personal gift of several hectares of land to then Kapolda DIY, Untung S.Radjab on his appointment in 2008. Whether this was a goodwill gesture or a quid pro quo payment (and if so for what) is unknown. Interview with Crime Reporter for the daily newspaper Radar Yogya, Ibnu Taufik, 2 May 2009.
30 This training support is important in preserving the skills of regional government PPNS investigators, who only receive three months of initial training in investigative techniques. It was also explained to me that these meetings offer the regional government law enforcers the opportunity to lobby for their agenda with the courts, police and prosecutors. Norwidi gave me an illustration: illegal tree felling. In the past, Yogyakarta city justices have punished these offences with fines which did not even cover the city’s recovery costs for the
engagement. Since at least 1998, the city has asked for and received a police liaison officer who is permanently seconded to the Pol.PP unit. The officer who served in this capacity during the period of my research, Ibna Tiono, is a senior non-commissioned police officer from the Bagian Binamitra of Poltabes. This officer acts as a point of coordination between the police command and the Pol.PP. The officer also lends weight to the Pol.PP’s activities in the field. He is able to use his powers of arrest if the Pol.PP were ever to encounter violence or resistance to their activities. The commander of the Pol.PP detachment claims this liaison officer is not under his command but is permanently available to lend support. To the best of my knowledge his presence is a free service from the Poltabes. The head of the city’s Pol.PP detachment also claims that his office goes to some effort to try to develop cordial personal relations with the key leadership personnel in Poltabes. From my interviews with the police, there is some truth to the claim. Similarly, the city also attempts to show that it does not feel financially beholden to the national law enforcement apparatus. The city insists that all fines which arise from breaches of district law are returned to the city. In the other parts of the province it was usual for this money to be divided among the police, the prosecutors, the courts and the regional government. What all this information points to is that the city of Yogyakarta has a distinct style of maintaining relations with its central government partners. The city attempts to build professional links with the police as the basis for involving them in city affairs, rather than attempting to buy their loyalty or appease them. Part of the credit for this strategy also goes to the district police themselves, who choose to reciprocate the overtures of the city administration.

31 I saw this for example during one of my field observations in the Dinas in 2007. During a combined operation supervising pos kamling, I witnessed Adjutan Inspektur Polisi Satu Tiono managing the briefing hand off between the Pol.PP leader and the visiting police in the pre-operation parade. AIPTU Tiono did not lead the operation, which fell to a Pol.PP regu commander. But I assume the police exchange officer did organise for the police detachment to come. Field Observation, 5 August 2007. Interview, Senior PPNS Arfo, 19 April 2008.

32 Interview, Norwidi, 9 April 2008.

33 Interview, Kasbagops Poltabes, 12 August 2007.

34 The city does not do this merely because it needs the money. In the year 2005 the city’s total original income was Rp.84 billion (Pendapatan Asli Daerah). Yet “non-tax income” (including fines) only accounted for Rp.11 billion. BPK: Hasil Pemeriksaan Kota Yogyakarta, 2005, p.6. Interview, Arfo, 19 April 2008.

35 In my opinion the police command in the city of Yogyakarta had by far the highest standards of professionalism of any in the province. The Poltabes at least tried to be professional, open and service oriented. This is not only my opinion but one that is shared by a number of the criminal affairs journalists and
The Kabupaten of Bantul however, was the polar opposite of Yogyakarta city. In this district there was a pronounced tendency for the local government to attempt to buy the allegiance of the central government’s security and law enforcement institutions. Bantul has a reputation for being a hard region with a high tolerance of corruption.36 The police here are especially corrupt and this causes problems in the police-district government relationship. The difficulties in sustaining cooperation between the police and local government have, it seems, led to a model of local government-security force engagement which is unique in the region. It is a model in which the Bantul government seeks first to ‘purchase’ or ‘entice’ the cooperation of the national enforcement agencies. This has become such a common expectation that the police expect to be paid for routine procedural matters. I once asked Kandiawan, the head of the Public Order Office in Bantul whether there were any problems in getting the police to approve their case files for submission to the state prosecutor. The head of the office claimed:

[for every file] there must be an attachment, so we stick on the picture of Bung Kamo... the reason being it’s in the common interest, but we [the Office of Public Order] don’t have an interest in this. Upholding law should be the interests of us all.37

The reference to Bung Karno is President Sukarno, whose portrait is on the Rp.100,000 bill. Kandiawan’s statement implied his office has to pay the police for every investigation approval. This type of behaviour shapes Kandiawan’s deep distrust, even contempt, towards the police. Relations between the Pol.PP and Polres Bantul are quite bad; the kind of joint anti-vice raids which go on in Yogyakarta are simply out of the question in Bantul. This is for the simple reason that, according to Kandiawan, other parties pay the Polres to turn a blind eye to the problems his office is interested in combating.38 The best example is the trade in illegal alcohol. Kandiawan related to me a story which illustrates the problem.

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36 See previous footnote.
37 Interview, Kandiawan, 10 April 2008.
38 Interview, Kandiawan, 29 October 2007.
As background information, it is procedure in Indonesia that all contraband items (pornography, drugs, illegal alcohol etc.) may only be disposed of – i.e. incinerated – by the police. Some time ago, Kandiawan began to suspect that the bottles of alcohol his office were confiscating in raids, were ending up back on the streets. To confirm his suspicions in one raid Kandiawan scratched a mark on the glass exterior of several confiscated bottles of alcohol before handing them to the Bantul police for destruction. Within ten days, Kandiawan re-confiscated some of these same bottles in subsequent raids. Thus the institutional self-interest of Polres Bantul prevents there being meaningful collaboration between the police and the Pol.PP in anti-vice activities. Nevertheless we should not forget that in issues which concern the general security of the district cooperation does occur; we see this in disruptive events like the SUTET incident.

Another, less prosaic reason why the Bantul district government seeks to subsidise national security agencies, according to the district secretary, is that his administration fears without such financial support, the police and the military may turn to banditry or extortion. In making this claim the district secretary explained:

> It’s like this, there’s another thing we are afraid of. If they [the security forces] are not ‘facilitated’ by us they may become gangsters. They may blackmail business people or ordinary citizens in the street. Now, that is something that we don’t want. Therefore we say to them, we will accommodate you so you don’t become gangsters. Indeed other districts that don’t give [such funding] may say ‘there’s no problem’, but try checking with their communities... therefore we [in the Bantul government] protect our people from the actions of the ‘uniformed mafia.’ If they don’t have any ‘activities’ and there isn’t anything to pay [them with], they will look [for money] in other places... then finally we [local government] will be blamed.40

I am unconvinced that his explanation is valid. Although I have found no evidence (or hearsay) which suggests that the security forces are engaging in extortion in Bantul, I do not attribute this situation to the fact that the Kabupaten makes occasional grants to the district’s security elements. I doubt that the Kabupaten could afford to pay enough money to dissuade the security forces from extortion if the forces really did desire to do so. Rather, I think that what the secretary’s statement shows is the willingness of this Kabupaten to use money grants as a tactic for influencing the behaviour of TNI, Polri and the other national

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39 Interview, Kandiawan, April 2008.
40 Interview, District Secretary Bantul, October 2007.
agencies. From the perspective of the district government the stability of Bantul is dependent upon the goodwill of self-interested security agencies. Thus it makes sense to support these actors with payments for the occasions in which their influence is necessary. Local government must, if it wishes to obtain the benefits of security force activity, pay the provider.

In Sleman there is evidence for both types of engagement: the district government attempts to both professionally engage the law enforcement apparatus and transfer money. I make this claim cautiously as the evidence from Sleman is not as clear as in the other districts.41 While there is cooperation between police and regional government in Sleman, I do not detect a clear approach towards engagement as is present in the cases of Bantul and Yogyakarta city. There is evidence to demonstrate professional engagement through joint operations.42 There is also evidence which indicates the Sleman government pays the district legal apparatus extra money which they probably are not entitled to; one prominent example is a share of the district’s fine revenue.43 In the case of Sleman, it is possible that the district government blends both styles of engagement seen in Bantul and Yogyakarta city; on the one hand paying funds to the security apparatus while on the other also attempting to engage them in professional activities.

Arguably the differences between these cases show the influence of agency. In response to the structural dilemma of how to collaborate with more powerful, independent, national government bureaucracies the districts have crafted certain styles of engagement. In the

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41 Part of the reason for my hesitancy in making conclusions about Sleman’s strategy of engagement is the problems I encountered in data collection. The Dinas Ketertiban of Sleman should have been able to give some guidance on the nature of its relations with the district’s other law enforcement actors, but it was difficult to interview the head of the Dinas. After two initial interviews, the head of the Dinas made it clear that he objected to my research and further cooperation was suspended. The impression these interviews gave to me was that this bureau is weakly led and poorly managed. The head of the Dinas was probably not competent to give detailed commentary on his portfolio. Unfortunately few of his staff were willing to be interviewed without his consent.

42 Aside from the activities mentioned in the Dinas Pol.PP budget there is also evidence for other occasional joint activities run by the Public Order Bureau as well as other regional government departments. As an example, the Tourism Bureau (Dinas Pariwisata) runs a series of combined patrols with Polres Sleman during Ramadhan. Under Sleman laws the Tourism Bureau is responsible for registering night clubs and entertainment outlets (tempat hiburan). During Ramadhan 2007, every day the Dinas Pariwisata ran combined patrols with the Tourist Police of Polres Sleman, the Sleman Pol.PP and the Dinas Pariwisata’s own inspectors. Interview, Seksi Perijinan Dinas Pariwisata, Heri S. Trisno, 28 September 2007.

43 This was planned at 55% for the district, 20% for the district court and 12.5% for the police and the prosecutors. Interview, Hermanan and Djoko, Bagian Hukum, Kabupaten Sleman, August 2007.
case of Yogyakarta city, the district authorities emphasise professional links. In Bantul, the district seeks to encourage cooperation through cash payments. In Sleman, there is limited evidence for both types of behaviour. Most likely these differences of style reflect subconscious responses shaped by the institutional governmental culture within these districts. I do not find evidence to indicate public order officials in the regional governments have consciously reflected upon their methods of engagement. Nevertheless, these outcomes do reflect choice and are not pre-determined by structure.

Despite the regional differences in the approach of the district governments towards joint cooperation, the similarities are greater. Firstly, in all the cases, underpinning joint cooperation was a principle that the user must pay: whenever one security actor requests the assistance of another, the user must subsidise the partner's costs. This system facilitates cooperation by removing some of the penalty fees for joint operations. Secondly, joint cooperation does occur in each of the regions. Having made this argument, the evidence from Bantul indicates that corruption and institutional self-interest has undermined collaboration. Although this is true, I point out that this is not as widespread as one would believe. Rather cooperation, even in Bantul, is the norm.

Finally, it must be noted that thus far I have only analysed the evidence for funding which arises from regional government requests towards the national security actors. Yet there are cases in which police and TNI seek the assistance of other government agencies for performing their own missions. In reality such requests for assistance are rare, and I have very little data on the dynamics of funding in such cases. What information I do have will be shared in the following section on joint operations.

Joint Operations

The funding relationships that are described above support a number of joint operations. Underpinning the over-arching concept of joint operations is the fact that the three principal state executors of security - police, Pol.PP and TNI - all have a commitment to maintaining
security and order. For the police their primary motive is clear, creating security and order is their *raison d'être*. As discussed above, local government also believes that it is democratically accountable for order and security. The Indonesian military has as one of its core tasks the protection of the integrity and sovereignty of the Indonesian state. While the broad powers that the military once had over domestic security have now waned, the continuation of the territorial command system offers the TNI an opportunity to offer limited support to some joint security operations - more often than not in the role of exclusively supporting the police. In the following section we will examine some of the different types of joint operations, what happens during these operations and the protocols which guide the behaviour of the participating institutions.

One point to make about these joint operations is that although they can occur frequently they are not normal activities for the institutions involved. The more dominant reality for the police, TNI and Pol.PP is the daily grind of their work: tackling crime, training for war or patrolling markets, as respective examples. Each of the institutions do these tasks independently. Although inter-institutional relations is the main topic of my dissertation, it must be pointed out that, for these organisations, cooperation with other institutions takes place as an addition to their normal work.

The frequency of joint operations varies. There are operations which have an element of routineness and predictability, while there are many which are non-cyclical and unusual. The most frequent operations are those which are called for by the Public Order Bureaus of the district governments and are held by the Pol.PP together with the district police to combat vice. These operations do not happen in Bantul but they do take place in the city of Yogyakarta and Sleman. In a one year period the Pol.PP in the city of Yogyakarta program for up to seventy two of these joint anti-vice operations, but anecdotally they happen only four to five times per month.\(^44\) The district of Sleman sets aside a budget for anti-vice patrols and operations with Polres Sleman (Rp.36 million in 2007 to cover fifteen combined activities), though I cannot confirm how many are actually carried out.\(^45\) Beside

\(^{44}\) In addition there is an intensified operational period during Ramadhan, when the Pol.PP do daily combined patrols with Poltabes and the military police, sweeping the city for vice. Kotamadya Yogyakarta, Dinas Ketertiban: Rencana Kegiatan Pengendalian Operasi (2007), p.10-11. Interview, Norwidi, 10 April 2008.

the Pol.PP there are other parts of regional government agencies which implement joint operations on a frequent basis. The Transportation Bureaus of the districts hold periodic roadside stings with the Satlantas (Traffic Police unit) of the district police commands.\textsuperscript{46} The Bureau of Transportation in Yogyakarta city plans for up to twelve of these stings per month.\textsuperscript{47} In Sleman, the combined roadside operations with the police are much less frequent and are wrapped into bigger PPNS-Police operations (called operasi pro-yustisi) which are held only several times per year.\textsuperscript{48} Some of the other regular, cyclical joint operations occur around Ramadhan/Lebaran and Christmas/New Year in which the institutions do joint patrols and joint anti-vice raids. We will see how these activities operate below.

Beside the predictable operations there are also non-cyclical joint operations which occur infrequently. Some of the operations which can be grouped under this classifier have already been introduced in the previous chapter: security for public events like elections, concerts, visits by VIP guests, mass demonstrations (particularly those that rally against government assets, like the presidential palace in Yogyakarta city), and so on. To these occasions I add the example of forced evictions, which usually fall under the responsibility of the regional government Pol.PP as it is often the case that some element of local government licensing is at dispute.\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{46} Under the transport law in effect during my research, only the police may stop traffic. Within the Indonesian traffic system, police are responsible for issuing vehicle registration and licenses while the Department of Transportation (and its regional staff) is responsible for certifying the roadworthiness of vehicles. To stop traffic for the purpose of conducting an inspection, district transport bureaucrats require traffic police to stop vehicles on their behalf. Interview, Sultan Fatoni, 10 November 2008. Interview, Kepala Seksi Pengendalian Operasi Udin and M. Moeljanto, Dinas Perhubungan Kota, 1 November 2008. The same principle has been upheld in the latest Indonesian traffic law. See: Republik Indonesian: Undang Undang 22/2009 tentang Lalu Lintas dan Angkutan Jalan, Pasal 262, Ayat 3.

\textsuperscript{47} My interviewees quote this number as an ideal quantity but most probably fewer than twelve operations occur in an average month. In these ‘operasi pro-yustisi’ (aimed at fining violators) the average operation consists of forty personnel from the Transportation Bureau, forty Traffic Police from the Poltabes and six PPNS from the city’s Dinas Ketertiban. How many suspects are arrested in a usual activity was not known. My interviewees in the Transport Bureau literally asked me to go and see the police as ‘all the information is with them.’ As it turned out the traffic police also did not retain this data. Interview, Udi and Moeljanto, November 2008.

\textsuperscript{49} One such incident which occurred during my period of research was the forced eviction of several hundred vendors from an area of land on the Bantul coastline near Parangtritis. This took place during December 2007. Another one of these operations which was planned but abandoned (as the community in dispute eventually ceased their opposition) was the relocation of street traders from markets in Pasar Klitihan in the city of Yogyakarta. This occurred in November 2007. In both incidents this operation was planned under the
In order to give some idea of the execution of joint operations, it is helpful to describe a couple of examples. The first example is of a routine activity between the Pol.PP and police of Yogyakarta city, namely anti-pekat raids during the Ramadhan/Lebaran period. The second example is that of a tri-institutional security operation (Police, Pol.PP, TNI) to secure the electoral campaign for mayoral elections in Yogyakarta city. In these operations it is apparent that Polri is much less competent at instigating combined operations than regional government. Arguably, because Polri occupies a hegemonic position within the security network, the police invest much less effort in integrating external assistance in police activities than providing their assistance to other agencies.

The Ramadhan/Lebaran period in Indonesia demands a high level of inter-service collaboration, at this time the Muslim community imposes pressure on government to uphold moral order. In particular, the fasting month arouses the intolerance of hardline Islamists for all manner of things they deem as vices and temptations; like illegal alcohol, public intimacy, etc. As discussed in chapter one, there are hardline Islamist groups in Yogyakarta, like the MMI, FJI and GAM. The combined demands of all of these groups and the general environment of piety, encourages the police and the Pol.PP to be especially active during Ramadhan/Lebaran. Their thinking is that if they are visibly active in stamping out maksiat, or vice, this will discourage hardliners from vigilante behaviour.

The combined police-Pol.PP Ramadhan operations in Yogyakarta city in 2007 were split into two different phases. In the first phase - from around 15 September to 8 October or almost the entire period of Ramadhan - the Pol.PP 'took the lead.' In the second phase - from 9 to 23 October, or the Lebaran holiday - the police took control of operations. During the Ramadhan phase there was intense coordination between the police and district government. Starting from September 10 to September 15, the head of the Dinas

leadership of the Pol.PP, with police brought in as back-up (and in the case of Bantul, a platoon of TNI as well). Interview, Kandiawan, 2008. Interview, Norwidi, 2007.

50 Interview with Norwidi, 22 September 2007.

51 This festival marks the end of the fasting month. Traditionally, Muslims return to their hometowns for family gatherings. In a nation of over 235 million people however, Lebaran tends to create a major strain on transportation, logistics, the economy and of course security. In a tourist centre like Yogyakarta the population swells dramatically over the period of Lebaran. The consequence is that the security forces - under police coordination - hold a large operation during this time aimed at protecting traffic and visitors.
Ketertiban’s Pol.PP detachment was involved in planning with the operations planning section in Poltabes. These discussions led to four weeks of sustained operations. During the first week the Pol.PP mounted daily and nightly patrols of the city’s territory. This was in line with a unified intelligence assessment that the first week of the fasting month was the most vulnerable to ‘disturbances of the peace’ such as entertainment venues doing business, couples engaging in public displays of affection, public drunkenness and other things which fall under the aegis of prohibited behaviour. From weeks two to four however, combined operations put police in the lead as the intelligence assessment predicted that a higher rate of crimes (such as theft) would be seen in anticipation of Lebaran. For the duration of Ramadhan up until October 9, there were two shifts in operation – one from 09:00 to 17:00 and another from 19:00 to 03:00. Each of these shifts consisted of two Pol.PP “regu” (or sections), between twenty two to twenty five troops strong with a similar number of beat police (or Samapta). Attached to most shifts were one or more military police officers. Each shift went on at least one patrol during its period of duty.

The interesting thing about the Pol.PP-police arrangement was that during this Ramadhan period, the Dinas Ketertiban took care of the administration of the operations but did not often take the command in the field. The bureau’s offices for example served as the operational headquarters for the patrols and the Dinas Ketertiban, as “facilitator”, paid the police’s costs. Of the several operations that I observed, however, all were commanded in the field by a police officer. This was the view according to the Dinas Ketertiban’s Satpol PP chief Norwidi. The Police were supposed to accompany Pol.PP patrols during this first week but, according to my observations at this time, the expected police detachments never appeared. This may be due to the fact that the Pol.PP called off their patrols due to a lack of ‘culprits’ being seen in the field. I know this because several times in that first week I turned up to the Dinas Ketertiban office and waited, only to be told later that the patrol had been called off. All of these Ramadhan patrols however were, so to speak, ‘intelligence led’. That is to say, non-uniformed intelligence personnel from the Pol.PP and the police would patrol the streets and radio (or sms) the locations of law breakers (engaging in prostitution for example). The combined patrols would then swoop in and round up the targets. Interview, Norwidi, 22 September 2007.

The role of the military police was primarily to anticipate the possibility of TNI personnel being arrested during the sweeps. According to Indonesian jurisprudence the civilian police may not arrest military personnel, which is a principle that creates an important caveat on police power over the military. Secondly the military police also turn up to show the community that there is a ‘united front’ among the government elements. Interview, Military Police Sergeant (name withheld), 21 September 2007.

During the Ramadhan operations the Dinas’ ordinary police liaison officer was joined by another similar ranking officer from the Poltabes’ Samapta unit. These two police officers rotated between themselves the command over all of the joint operations that I witnessed.
deploy in a mobile convoy around the city either searching for pre-determined targets or merely patrolling ‘vulnerable’ areas. The records indicate that the authorities seized illegal liquor, prostitutes, transsexuals, homeless people and persons without proper citizenship papers in these operations.\textsuperscript{56} At the conclusion of a successful mission the police would accompany the Pol.PP back to the Dinas offices and guard the suspects until they could be sent to court, usually the next working day. Almost all of the accused however, were actually charged under infractions of local government law. The purpose of having the police for these operations was essentially to lend hired manpower and resources as well as the police’s powers of arrest over brothel based prostitution, to the local government counterpart.

Thus we can conclude from the example of the Ramadhan operation that the sub-national partner agency is again dependent on the authority of the police. The local government body defers to police prerogatives at both the planning stage and in mission execution. The civil service police are forced to rent Polri services while not being able to control how these services are provided. What is being transferred from the police to the Pol.PP is not as simple though as the power of arrest. The Yogyakarta Bureau of Public Order believes it is able to detain suspects who have infringed local laws.\textsuperscript{57} Rather, what the Pol.PP seek from the police in this case are Polri’s tactical assets, not only of manpower, resources and intelligence but also the transmission of Polri’s absolute authority over criminal affairs; such as assault, theft, and so on. These superior police assets add substantial strength to the Pol.PP activity, ensuring the success of what would be difficult for the Pol.PP to handle alone. In the words of the Dinas’ Pol.PP chief: “we’re not free [lepas] of our friends in the police.”\textsuperscript{58} While this example demonstrates that the inter-service coordination certainly takes place, the relationship is not a balanced one.

During the Lebaran phase of operations however, the police took the lead in implementing a transport security operation (code-named “Ketupat Progo”). For the police, this operation

\textsuperscript{56} These Ramadhan patrols confiscated around 351 bottles of illegal liquor, eighty prostitutes or transsexuals, one customer of a transsexual, fifty five street people and twenty five people without proper citizenship papers.

\textsuperscript{57} Interview, Norwidi, 25 November 2008.

\textsuperscript{58} Interview, Norwidi, 29 July 2007.
was a success in achieving its stated aims - Polda DIY provided a secure environment for the Lebaran holiday. Yet the police were unable to manage a truly joint-agency response, though this was one of their aims.

In Yogyakarta *Operasi Ketupat Progo* was part of a nationwide operation planned by Mabes Polri and implemented throughout Indonesia. The primary aim of this operation was to secure the movement of traffic around the country.39 Thus aside from performing enhanced patrol activities, each of the Polres in Polda DIY identified critical choke points in arterial transport routes and set up temporary police security posts/service points (*pos pengamanan* or *pospam*) to direct people and traffic in these areas. In the territory of Yogyakarta city, Poltabes created ten pospam around areas like the central railway station (Stasiun Tugu), the main inter-provincial bus terminal (Terminal Bus Giwingan) and one of Yogyakarta’s major malls (Galleria Mall).60 In Sleman, the Polres created six major pospam and nineteen sub-pospam for directing traffic.61 In an average pospam in the area of Poltabes the police stationed fifty one Polri personnel, in three shifts of seventeen each. In Polres Sleman, there were around forty six personnel per pospam.62 Each was in theory responsible for patrolling and securing the territory 500 metres around each post. I made visits on different occasions to six of these pospam during 2007. At each of these times much of what the police performed was patrolling and directing traffic.

The interesting feature of these pospam was that, although the police operations orders for Ketupat Progo claimed to allocate specific non-police personnel to each pospam, in reality none of these personnel materialised. In Poltabes, the police operations orders called for 142 non-police personnel, including military police, Pol.PP, transport bureau officers, and civil society groups (like the Indonesian Red Cross, ambulance, boy scouts, and the like). These personnel were supposed to be allocated to each pospam. Thus the pospam of Terminal Giwingan for example should have commanded six military police, two Pol.PP

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41 Polres Sleman, Rencana Kegiatan Ketupat Progo, Peta Pos Pam Ops Ketupat Progo.
42 Field notes of visits to Station Tugu, 10 October 2007 and Plaza Ambarukmo 16 October 2007.
and six transport bureau personnel. Though the distribution of personnel was different the situation was the same in Polres Sleman. Yet in each of my visits to every pospam the only non-police institutions which bothered to turn up were the Red Cross and the boy scouts.

The absence of non-Polri support personnel is an interesting example of a failure of joint agency cooperation. I attribute this situation to the following factors. Firstly, joint-agency involvement was done on an entirely voluntary basis, the police did not offer incentive money to external institutions. As a result the only institutions to attend were the volunteer civil society representatives, who did not anticipate being paid at all. Secondly, the police themselves were not enthusiastic about facilitating a joint agency operation. The operations orders of Poltabes and Polres Sleman indicate that both of these commands convened public meetings to facilitate a discussion with non-police actors to support the operation. I was invited to attend one of these meetings in Polres Sleman on 2 October 2007. The meeting, done under the banner of the Muspida of Sleman (but held in the Polres Sleman operations room) was, in my estimation, more of an opportunity for the Polres to showcase their security operation to a public audience than a genuine attempt at raising assistance from other parties. The fact that this meeting was held three days before the launch of the operation demonstrates just how little concern the police had for the involvement of other institutions. In reality this is understandable. There was very little that other parties could have contributed to this policing operation, other than to wait idly at the Polri pospam. Yet the police were aggrandising when they allocated phantom personnel to their operation who never showed up. Since the police publicly erected large summaries of their operations orders at every pospam in Sleman and Yogyakarta city, I assume the reason why they claimed phantom non-Polri personnel was to make their operation look more inclusive than it was. What this example highlights is that Polri is much less interested in coordinating with other security elements than non-police organisations are in cooperating

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63 Poltabes, Anev Giat Ops Ketupat Progo 2007, 10-11. In Polres Sleman, it was not anticipated there would be any Pol.PP or military police. Polres Sleman, Rencana Kegiatan Ketupat Progo, Peta Pos Pam Ops Ketupat Progo.
64 In Polres Sleman there was a group called Senkom (Sentra Komunikasi Mitra Polri) which is a volunteer group of radio communications enthusiasts who befriend and support the police. This group put a number of volunteers at the two pospam I visited.
with it. This example arguably alludes to the oblivious self-confidence of the police in their own authority. Polri in this example was not serious about engaging other parties precisely because it did not need to. Its own authority was sufficient.

From the Ramadhan/Lebaran routine joint operation we now turn to examine a non-routine joint operation commanded by the police - the security mission for the 2006 mayoral elections of Yogyakarta city. Recalling what was mentioned in chapter three, elections in contemporary Indonesia are often viewed as carrying substantial risks of instability. This is true as well in the local environment. Nankyung Choi noted in her research of democratisation in Yogyakarta, there was a significant amount of violence in politics during the early reform period. Because of the risk of violence, elections are always accompanied by a security operation. The superior role of Polri in local elections is due to national laws that delegate the police specific powers over election security. Government Regulation 6/2005 declares that the police are responsible for the security and good order of regional elections. In accordance with this statute, the Poltabes of Yogyakarta city took control of the planning and execution of the mission, while drawing on the support of the city’s Pol.PP and Kodim units.

Although the police delivered the security, the city government approved and funded the operation. In this process we see again the dependence of local government on the police. The first step in 2006 was for the district government to create an overarching body to manage election security, dubbed the Election Security Coordination team. Reflecting its foundation as a joint operation under police leadership, the team consisted of the commander of the Poltabes as the chairman, with the heads of the Dinas Ketertiban and the Kodim commander as his deputies. Beneath them was a vast assemblage of security personnel. The second act was for the city to provide a hefty budget to fund the

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68 Republik Indonesia: Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 6 Tahun 2005 tentang Pemilihan, Pengesahan, Pengangkatan dan pemberhentian Kepala Daerah dan Wakil Kepala Daerah, Pasal 145. Under the same provision the Pol.PP are made responsible for assisting the police.
69 The heads of the regional electoral commission, electoral observers (Banwaslu), the head of police operations at Poltabes, the chief of staff for the city Kodim, the head of the state prosecutor’s intelligence office, the head of Kodim operations, the heads of the Poltabes’ detectives, patrol, traffic and intelligence unit,
operation. To make the process official the city signed a memorandum of understanding with the Poltabes. In the agreement the parties agreed to recognise police control over the delivery of election security and for the city to fully fund all of the police’s costs.70

Intelligence very heavily guided the election security operation. Although intelligence gathering was a joint task the police coordinated these activities. Up to one year before the election, the city’s intelligence elements began collecting information. The intelligence agencies gathered data on such things as the identities of the party leaderships, the geographic bases of the party masses, how likely the party supporters were to commit violence, and the like.71 Election security was determined on the basis of a sliding scale assessment, between “secure” conditions (without significant disturbances) to vulnerability level three, two and one (with one being the worst, where the election process cannot function due to political violence).72 The police were responsible for assessing the intelligence and determining which level of readiness was appropriate for the operation. Their assessment was the city of Yogyakarta would be level three, though the situation apparently never reached that level during the campaign proper. The police assessment was applied to the city as a whole, meaning that the election process would only be disturbed by periodic political violence. But within the city the police conducted assessments of individual areas, particularly those which contained the mass bases of parties like the PDIP and PPP, which bordered one another, and classified these as being level 1 and 2. An example was the suburb Kauman, which was a PPP stronghold but which PDIP supporters passed in campaign convoys.73

The police executed the operation in concert with the Pol.PP and TNI but clearly the operation was under police management. In all the election security operation took over

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70 The costs were originally estimated at Rp.1.04 billion, but the police themselves spent only Rp.789 million. In all the entire security costs of the election were finalised at Rp.866 million. Perjanjian Kerjasama Antara Pemerintah Kota Yogyakarta dan Kepolisian Kota Besar Yogyakarta tentang Pengamanan Pemilihan Kepala Daerah Langsung, 22 April 2006. Kepolisian Poltabes Kota Yogyakarta, Berita Acara Rekonsiliasi, 20 December 2007. Kota Yogyakarta, Dinas Ketertiban: Menyelenggarakan Pengamanan Pilkada 2006 (December 2006).
71 Interview, former head of Pol.PP intelligence detachment for the city of Yogyakarta, 19 April 2008.
275 days, an unusually long time.\textsuperscript{74} During the campaign the Poltabes together with its partners – the Kodim and city Pol.PP – provided a number of security services: guarding the local electoral commission offices, providing training for participating security personnel, protecting the electoral candidates, patrolling and securing the campaign, protecting the supply of electoral materials, guarding the vote counting process and providing personal security for the candidates.\textsuperscript{75} Violence during the campaign itself was minimal, so much so that although TNI forces from the Yogyakarta Korem’s infantry battalion were put on standby, they did not leave their barracks during the election campaign, but were instead on passive alert (‘siaga pasif’).\textsuperscript{76} Although this may have been a joint operation, the allocation of personnel alone demonstrates precisely which agency had the most input. Poltabes provided 852 police (not including 200 additional supporting personnel from the Polda) while the TNI provided 200. The city’s Satpol.PP detachment spared eighty eight personnel for the mission, which was over half of the whole agency’s workforce.\textsuperscript{77}

This example shows clearly the pre-eminence of the police in exceptional, localised, security operations. The police assumed the lead in commanding, delivering and coordinating the security mission. The other parties, the military and local government were relegated to a backseat role of assisting the police in force – for local government – funding the tasks carried out by the lead agency. While national law in this case formally delegated responsibility to Polri it must be recalled that the broader foundations of police power – that of security, the powers of criminal arrest and their superior resources – are more than adequate to make the police the dominant actor in such joint operations.

Moving on from these examples of interagency operations, the next issue is the protocols which underpin their execution. There is in fact a clear logic and a common understanding

\textsuperscript{74} The election had to be put off several times due to the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake. Interview, Norwidi, October 2007.

\textsuperscript{76} Campaign posts of the PDIP were set on fire and there was rock throwing at party campaigns but this was not sufficient to stall the election. Interview, Norwidi, April 2008. Interview, former head of Pol.PP intelligence, April 2008.

about how individual institutions can operate together, even if these protocols do not have, as far as I can ascertain, any formal legal status. As was discussed in chapter one, the police and the Indonesian military have a concept called ‘bawah kendali operasi (BKO).’ As far as I have discovered this is the understanding which informally guides joint security operations.78 As discussed in chapter one, there is old doctrine from the Department of Defence which explains how BKO joint operational procedures guide police and military cooperation. This doctrine is no longer valid for the police after its separation from the Defence Department.79 High ranking informants in the Mabes Polri Legal Division as well as police operations officers in my case study site both point out, Polri has not yet produced any general guiding doctrine on how the police should cooperate with TNI or any other state security apparatus.80 My interviews with staff from Korem 072 in Yogyakarta reveal there are internal TNI protocols for how TNI elements can lend assistance to the police, but I am aware only of the existence and not the content of the documents.81 What I have gleaned from my interviews with TNI and the police is that the old concept of BKO is recognised by both parties. A district or provincial police or military chief – who commands the ‘leading sector’ for an operation – is able to make a written request for a given number of personnel from their opposite number. When the military receive this request it is passed to the Kodam commander (the Pangdam) for approval. Once approved, the supporting entity releases its personnel to be placed under the command of the ‘leading sector’ for the duration of the operation. Operational costs, like meal allowances and

78 I make this argument with one caveat. Indonesia does have very old, Sukarno era legislation (which are still legally valid) that determine security emergencies. This legislation does spell out systems of coordination between police, military and regional government. But as states of emergency are very rare in Indonesia, this legislation is hardly ever used. Therefore under normal, non-emergency conditions, police and military elements refer to the principles of bawah kendali operasi. See: Republik Indonesia: Undang Undang 23/1959 tentang Keadaan Bahaya and Lembaran UU Nomor 52/1960. Also: Jansen, ‘Relations among Security and Law Enforcement Institutions in Indonesia’, 451-452.

79 Interview, former police general Farouk Mohamed, September 2008.

80 Interview, anonymous source from Divisi Hukum dan Pembinaan Mabes Polri, 18 November 2008.

81 Interview, Head of Intelligence, Operations and Territorial Forces Korem 072, June 2008.
transport costs, become the responsibility of the leading sector. This is the theory of BKO. In reality, however, the military is so constrained in its authority that the local TNI elements can, apparently, only do one task independently in the area of internal security: guarding the head of state and international VIPs at the level of head of state. Thus BKO under ordinary security conditions is mostly a one way street, from the TNI to the police.

There are some excellent questions to be asked about specific features of the BKO system, unfortunately few of which I can answer. We can ask for example, are troops in a BKO operation supposed to treat their BKO commander as if he were their normal commander? Are TNI forces in a BKO operation still governed under their internal rules or by police ones? Are there things which they can do and the police cannot and vice versa? These are good questions which my informants have not answered. There are good reasons for why the BKO system may not cover these details. Firstly, the BKO system in Yogyakarta is untested. In all operations to date, the police have only ever readied military personnel but never used them. Therefore my informants have probably never had the experience of having had to deploy BKO forces in the field. Secondly, the BKO system is not codified in police doctrine. It relies upon the corporate memory of ranking officers in the police and the military, who can recall the pre-2000 period when Polri and TNI were unified under the same command structure. Nevertheless, it is incorrect to claim that there is no system for joint-agency cooperation in the field. My research reveals there is. The BKO system may be imperfect and formal regulation is necessary, but the system exists nonetheless.

82 Interview, Head of Intelligence, Operations and Territorial Forces Korem 072, June 2008. Sources in the police confirm the general explanation provided by the sources from the Korem, Interview, Kasbagops Poltabes, October 2007.
83 My source of information for this claim were two of the deputy operations officers of Polda DIY. The sources were partisan but, from my own observations I doubt that they were misleading. They say guarding heads of state and international VIPs at the level of the head of state is the only task they know of that the TNI may take the lead in. In Yogyakarta this is not an inconsequential thing. During the period of my research the city was visited by Vice President Jusuf Kalla (2006), the former Prime Minister of New Zealand Helen Clarke (2007) and Prince Charles of the United Kingdom (2008). The police grumble that operations such as these should be their responsibility but that the TNI Law of 2004 is explicit in mentioning that security for heads of state is a responsibility of the TNI. In the latest of these occasions, a visit by Prince Charles in October 2008, the local Korem requested several hundred police personnel to direct traffic and secure the outside of the Prince’s meeting venues. The police granted the TNI’s request though apparently, the police complained that the Korem did not have enough money to fund its costs and Polda DIY had to meet some of the operational expenditure from its own pocket. According to these police sources, the whole operation was planned in Jakarta, handed to Kodam IV in Central Java and the Yogyakarta Korem were merely the pelaksana (or executor) of the task. Interview, Kapusdalops AKBP Z Arifin and assistant Kapusdalops AKBP Kristiono Polda DIY, 6 November 2008
Yet it must also be recalled that regional government, not the police, is the actor which initiates most of the combined operations; thus, we should ask what is its approach to combined operations? Interestingly regional government adopts the same principles of BKO as we see in the Polri-TNI environment. We see this in the examples of the combined Pol.PP-Poltabes anti vice raids in Yogyakarta city. Under that system the Pol.PP also made formal requests of assistance, received supporting forces underneath its putative command and paid for the operational costs of the supporting elements.

When I questioned Pol.PP officers as to what protocols determined how they conduct joint operations the uniform answer was that the Pol.PP do not have any formal, Interior Ministry regulations, instead the process they follow more or less comes about through common sense. As one of the Bantul Pol.PP leaders explained, combined operations with the police are based on ‘improvisation in the field.’ The Pol.PP for example obtain orders from their bupati, if the Pol.PP officials feel unable to handle the situation themselves they approach the police for assistance and ‘borrow’ the capabilities of the police and TNI. I put the proposition to my informants, that their method of doing joint activities imitated elements of Polri or TNI doctrine, but they replied that this was not the case. Rather regional law enforcement cooperated with the national security apparatus, according to them, merely on the basis of simple logic. Probably these informants were right. For regional governments, achieving joint operations by requesting, gaining control of and then paying for capabilities they do not indigenously possess is merely a rational way of doing business. In effect, they have a BKO system without the history that Polri and TNI share with doing such joint operations. What this evidence shows is the simplicity of the way in which joint operations proceed. There are principles which all of the actors recognise when they lend assistance to one another. This system – without any formal basis in law – seems to function effectively in my case study site.

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85 Interview, Bayu Broto and Priyatno, November 2008.
86 I am not entirely convinced this is true. When talking to Pol.PP informants I have heard them using word forms, like ‘lapis kemampuan’ and ‘leading sector’ and other terminology which comes straight from the police environment. I do not put forward my hunch as reliable evidence, but there may be at least a slight transfer of ideas from one sector to another.
Thus, from the discussion of security operations we can see the following things: joint operations do occur in the case study, there is a system which is recognised by all the major state parties for how operations may be executed in practice; within these operations the police are the fundamental element, either in directly planning, commanding and executing the combined operations or in lending support to the activities of the TNI and regional government. It appears that local government seizes most of the initiative in conducting joint security tasks. Due to its much weaker claim to direct involvement in security we only very rarely see the military move beyond anything but a supporting role.\textsuperscript{87}

\textbf{Police \textit{Pembinaan} (Guidance/Supervision) of Non-Polri Law Enforcement}

One of the final forms of interaction among state security actors occurs when the police provide services to the other law enforcement elements of the state: the PPNS. These practices provide another illustration of why the police assume the dominant role at the centre of the regional security network.

Recalling what was described in chapter two, there are various types of PPNS in the case study region, all of them appear dependent upon cooperation with the police. In chapter two we introduced the fact that in order for PPNS to achieve a criminal prosecution their cases must pass an inspection by Polri's \textit{reserse kriminal} or detectives\textsuperscript{88}. This system operates for PPNS in both levels of the bureaucracy, national and regional. Thus Forestry Police, PPNS in the Bureaus of Public Order in the district and provincial governments, the immigration

\textsuperscript{87} As an explanatory point, when the TNI are involved in either police or Pol.PP activities (such as the evictions in Parangtritis, Bantul), they did not really do anything. For example in the 2006 Mayoral elections the city, Kodim forces were only stationed in their barracks and placed on passive alert. In the Parangtritis situation, the Pol.PP anticipated they would be faced with violent demonstration. In this situation a primary line of Pol.PP was deployed to handle the demonstrators. Behind them was a line of police from Polres Bantul. Behind the police were a line of TNI from the Bantul Kodim. The thinking behind this process is that if the Pol.PP are not able to contain the protest, the police move up to reinforce them. If the police are not strong enough the TNI move in to reinforce the police. Although I was not present at the Parangtritis situation (and in any case the Bantul Pol.PP did not face any resistance) I have been present at demonstrations in Yogyakarta city which have had similar composition of forces. At such times the military and police do not carry lethal weaponry, only riot gear. Interview, Kandiawan, April 2008.

\textsuperscript{88} UU 2/2002, Pasal 16 (k).
service, the tax inspectors, all must submit any criminal investigations in their areas of responsibility to the Indonesian police before their cases can be heard in court.89 This makes the police an indispensable link in the chain of state law enforcement.

Besides having legal supremacy within state law enforcement Polri also possesses normative superiority as well.90 Many PPNS have a psychological view of the police as the natural agency of law enforcement, a view which is inculcated by the process through which PPNS obtain their training; from the police. The first step for any bureaucrat who becomes a PPNS investigator is for them to undertake three months of training in investigative techniques. The majority of bureaucrats undertake this training direct from Mabes Polri.91 Thus PPNS not only require the permission of police detectives to prosecute a criminal case, they also draw their instruction from the police as well. Each of the Bureaus of Public Order in the districts also offers continuous training to PPNS, by funding workshops with their local Polres. The police provide refresher training to PPNS in the district governments approximately once every month.92 Thus the PPNS, even when maintaining their limited capacity through training activities, are reminded of their junior investigative status as they train under the tutelage of police detectives.

The PPNS-police relationship again underlines the supremacy of Polri in the security network. Indonesian law gives the police a mandated, superior role in cross-checking the work of PPNS. This situation reinforces the normative superiority the police have as 'rightful' or 'natural' law enforcement investigators.

89 Immigration service and taxation PPNS I have interviewed in Yogyakarta acknowledge that this is indeed the system under which they operate, but they have never actually undertaken a criminal investigation. My interviewee from the immigration service prefers to recommend direct deportation rather than criminal investigation. The Yogyakarta region Tax Office was only established in 2007 and had yet to formally complete a criminal investigation. Interview, Head of Oversight and Execution Section (Pengawasan dan Penindakan) Eko Prinono, Immigration Office Yogyakarta, 1 July 2008. Interview, Head of the Regional Tax Office in Yogyakarta, Sigit, 27 June 2008.

90 For Polri this role is made clear in the Police Law, which allocates them the responsibility to "conduct coordination, supervision and the development (pembinaan) of special police, PPNS and forms of civil society security." UU 2/2002, Pasal 14 (1), f.

91 The Ministry of the Interior is authorised to conduct its own PPNS training. Several of the PPNS I interviewed for example did their training (diklat) with the Yogyakarta provincial government. Yet even in these circumstances, the police do the instruction while the Interior Ministry facilitates the training. The Interview, Head of PPNS section Dinas Ketertiban, Yogyakarta city Susilo Irfan, 13 May 2007. Interview, senior PPNS Dinas Ketertiban Yogyakarta city, Arfo, April 2008.

Memoranda of Understanding

The final form of engagement worthy of mention are legal agreements. By definition, agreements serve to create understanding and codify obligations between participants. In the Indonesian public sector, as in the private sector, state agencies enter into agreements with one another. Written agreements are probably most useful at the national level, where we can find a legion of covenants Polri has signed. The influence of the one and only standing agreement which I have found in Yogyakarta is minimal. But the fact that an agreement exists provides a further illustration of cooperation within the network and deserves passing mention.

The Memorandum of Understanding of 2007 between the provincial government of Yogyakarta and the provincial police, is a symbolic statement of the commitment of the police and regional government to cooperate over security, but outlines few concrete obligations. This MOU also suggests that one of the important priorities for the police in providing services to external agencies is obtaining financial subsidies for their contribution. The police initially offered a very similar agreement to the provincial government in the year 2002. It is difficult to precisely determine why the Polda did this as there are no serving officers who can comment on the details of an initiative so far in the past. According to informants from the provincial government, the agreement failed

95 In the same year the Minister of the Interior signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the head of the police on the same topic. It is possible that the momentum for the agreement in Yogyakarta came from this
because the police requested that all the costs for regional government-police cooperation, be borne by the regional government budget.\textsuperscript{96} This was unacceptable for the province. In 2006, the governor revisited the issue and offered a modified agreement. The current MOU stipulates that the two signatories agree to increase their level of cooperation while recognising that both sides retain responsibility over public order.\textsuperscript{97} The regional government agrees to help the provincial police in facilitating their operations while the Polda agreed to assist provincial government with requests for assistance in executing the province’s own public order tasks. In turn the police also commit to providing information on the regional security situation.\textsuperscript{98} Differing from the original text, the 2007 MOU declared that both sides commit to funding their activities jointly.\textsuperscript{99}

This agreement, however, is mostly redundant and redundant for two reasons. Firstly, as one informant has related, the core purpose of the document is to legitimize all the combined activities of the two parties.\textsuperscript{100} Following this rationale, all the agreement does is to give formal approval to what was already happening on the ground. Secondly, because in Indonesia decentralisation provides that the implementation of policy is done by the districts and not the provinces, the province’s role in public order management is actually very limited. Thus what this agreement shows, like the other examples used in this chapter, is that state security agencies fundamentally wish to cooperate with one another. The provincial MOU provides another illustration of how they do so.

\textsuperscript{96} My informant is a senior bureaucrat in the ‘Cooperation Branch’ at the Yogyakarta Provincial Government. I have not found any police who can comment on either the former or the current agreement, so my information is one-sided. Interview, Assistant to the Head of the Bureau of Cooperation, Sudardi, 21 September 2007.

\textsuperscript{97} Propinsi DIY dan Polda DIY, Kerjasama Penyelenggaraan Ketentraman dan Ketertiban Umum, 2007, Bab.II. and Bab.IV Pasal 4 and 5.

\textsuperscript{98} The parties also agree to coordinate matters of joint operations through program coordinators in the provincial Binamitra office of the police and the Dinas Kententraman dan Ketertiban Masyarakat in the provincial government. Propinsi DIY dan Polda DIY, Kerjasama Penyelenggaraan Ketentraman dan Ketertiban Umum, 2007, Pasal 4-6.

\textsuperscript{99} According to my informant, the way this principle operates is that when the police wish to hold a joint activity, the police pay operational costs. When the provincial government wishes to hold a joint activity the reverse applies. Propinsi DIY dan Polda DIY, Kerjasama Penyelenggaraan Ketentraman dan Ketertiban Umum, 2007, Pasal 8.

\textsuperscript{100} Interview, Sudaradi, September 2007.
Why cooperate?

Having by now repeatedly demonstrated the point that the primary impulse of state security actors is to collaborate rather than compete or conflict, the final question raised by chapters three and four is: why is cooperation the dominant form of interaction? A very important part of the answer is the anodyne effect of a clear division of labour between the state security institutions. The police do not duplicate regional government functions over public order, nor does regional government perform Polri functions in providing security services and enforcing the criminal code. The Indonesian military remains firmly lodged in its barracks and is unable to enforce internal security independently. The various other minor policing actors such as immigration PPNS, Forestry Police, and others each perform their small mandates without intruding on the activities of other agencies. Because there is not a substantial overlap in functions, there is little space for competition between agencies to increase their authority. But this factor only provides a partial answer.

The question of why state agencies cooperate needs to be applied separately across the sector, addressing the question to both Polri and the non-police agencies. Dealing firstly with the non-Polri security organisations, from the evidence presented above it is clear that non-Polri security agencies are dependent upon police powers in order to fulfil their mandates. An extreme example of this are the relations of the PPNS with the police. PPNS are required under statutory procedure to pass their files to Polri investigators for inspection. Likewise the Pol.PP have the power to use repressive force but their capacities are so small and their authority so limited that often these organisations need superior police resources in order to discharge their work. The territorial forces of the Indonesian army are almost entirely only able to deploy their forces domestically to support police operations. All of the non-police actors therefore are obligated to seek police services or coordination in order to fully function within the sector.

The more interesting question though is why the police choose to cooperate with other agencies. After all, one of the core findings of chapters three and four has been that public security bureaucracies in Yogyakarta are functionally independent. The example of the
Lebaran operation indicates the police do not require assistance from partner agencies to discharge Polri’s own mission. In the majority of cases, Polda DIY appears to collaborate with other bureaucracies for purposes not primarily determined by its own self-interest. The question is why?

I suggest there are four explanations for why the police are willing to cooperate with other public security organisations. Firstly, there is the benign effect derived from clear divisions of labour. Because there is little duplication of functions between police, military, regional government and the other groupings, there is little contestation over security responsibilities. The police can freely lend assistance from a position of confidence, knowing that no other agency contests Polri’s ownership of criminal investigation and internal security. Secondly, the accepted rules of behaviour mitigate the costs of inter-institutional collaboration. There is an in-principle commitment that requesting institutions should compensate supporting agencies when assistance is required. This agreement removes the financial penalty costs of cooperation for the police. With these two factors, Polri has little to lose by supporting external agencies. Thirdly, there is arguably some influence of learned behaviour. Some patterns of police support derive from behaviours which have taken place over decades. Polri supervision of PPNS and special police can be dated back at least until 1962. Similarly cooperative forums like the Muspida and Muspika have probably operated at the regional level since the nineteen sixties. Thus successive generations of police leaders have risen through the ranks participating and overseeing patterns of support to non-Polri agencies. Arguably such patterns of historical behaviour inculcate receptiveness to cross-institutional collaboration; simply because it evolves to become an accepted part of the job. It is conceded, however these explanations all appeal to inductive reasoning. Often my police informants have not provided reflective answers on their motives for collaborating with other agencies. Usually I received superficial responses which appeal to professional responsibility. Although there is merit to their answers, I contest there are deeper explanations.

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101 Mabes Polri: Pembinaan Kepolisian Khusus dan Penyidik Pegawai Negeri Sipil (Selayang Pandang Pasca Polri Mandiri), (Jakarta: Mabes Polri, 1 July 2003), 4-5.
The final factor in explaining why the police cooperate derives from the police responsibility for security. In making this case I defer to the most senior regional police officer whom gave on-the-record responses for my research, the deputy head of Polda DIY, Grand Commissioner Sunaryono. The Commissioner suggested very simply that Polda DIY chooses to cooperate with external institutions because it is professionally responsible for security. Partner agencies, like the TNI and regional government, have separate mandates but all have a collective, institutional interest in ensuring order and stability. Out of this spirit of professionalism, Sunaryono argues that Polri elects to collaborate with other state enforcement agencies. Despite the seeming naivety of his commentary, the argument is highly plausible, and derives from the above factors. Polri has relatively little to lose financially from inter-institutional collaboration. It faces little competition for its own functions. Security is enhanced through the mutual collaboration of the state actors. Therefore with little to lose and much to gain professionally in terms of enhanced security outcomes, it becomes a responsible rational choice for the police to support non-Polri security agencies.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the interactions of state security agencies outside regional government forums. It has found that security organisations engage one another in at least four ways: funding inter-agency activities, executing occasional joint operations, “pembinaan” in which the police supervise other law enforcement arms of the state and finally memoranda of understanding which attempt to codify obligations between security actors. These patterns of behaviour have been organised in roughly their order of importance, with funding being very significant and the only standing security related MOU in Yogyakarta contributing in a weak manner to interagency relations.

This chapter has again shown the surprisingly important role played by regional government in facilitating security cooperation, while also revealing the central role

\[102\] Interview, Wakil Kapolda DIY Komisaris Besar Sunaryono, 24 July 2007.
occupied by the police within the regional security network. Regional government may often cultivate methods of cooperation but the police are the source of strength for joint operations and a key source of knowledge and training services. This chapter also illustrates the fact that there is far greater evidence to show that cooperation is the dominant form of behaviour, as opposed to hostility and conflict, which is assumed by much of the scholarly and journalistic literature on Indonesian security.

This chapter finds that non-Polri agencies must cooperate with the police in order to adequately perform their mandates. Thus the Pol.PP seek police support in order to enhance their own enforcement powers. PPNS must deal with Polri investigators in order to prosecute criminal cases. As a consequence of national security reforms, territorial army forces are only able to deploy in regional security as part of combined operations with Polri personnel. Thus structural, systemic factors make non-Polri bureaucracies dependent on the police. Yet within this system we also see the influence of agency. Not all bureaucracies behave similarly. In the city of Yogyakarta, public order officials deliberately cultivate close relations with the city’s police commands. In Bantul, the regional government seeks to buy police support. Such choices imply that within structural parameters, non-Polri agencies adopt different patterns of engagement towards the police.

Why the Indonesian police choose to lend their assistance to other agencies, raises more difficult questions. I postulate that the willingness of the police to do so is founded on four reasons. Firstly, there is a benign effect derived of clear divisions of labour. With little role duplication of functions, there is little contestation over jurisdiction. The police can freely lend external assistance without surrendering aspects of their own mission. Historical patterns of police support instil receptiveness to inter-institutional collaboration. Thirdly, there is an in-principle commitment to compensate supporting agencies when assistance is requested. This agreement removes the financial penalty costs of cooperation for the police. Finally there is the nature of the police job description itself. The police are responsible for day-to-day security. Security is enhanced through the mutual collaboration of the state actors. Therefore with little to lose, it becomes a responsible choice for the police to support non-Polri security organisations.
Chapter 5: Commercial Security

While the previous two chapters examined relations within the public sector, chapters five and six examines non-state security organisations. Chapter five begins this analysis by reviewing the commercial security industry. Both chapters show that the national police dominate not only the formal, government side of the security network but also the non-government part as well. This finding carries important theoretical implications. For Indonesia these chapters show that the state security apparatus still continues to exert a supervisory role over the sector in ways that are remarkably similar to the Suharto era. Early writers like Joshua Barker have attributed these behaviours to attributes of the New Order state. Adopting a networked security analysis encourages us, however, to avoid generalisations about state power, and view the state as a non-unitary entity. The distribution of power within the security network in Yogyakarta indicates that one state actor, the national police, has risen to a dominant position. In Indonesia, the national police have authority to regulate and directly supervise many of the non-state security organisations, especially security guards and private security companies. This authority elevates the police to a superior position within security management.

In the policing literature the term 'commercial security sector' is the label for a concept which actually has two parts: providers of security services and consumers of security. Consumers come in a variety of types: schools, shopping malls, banks, or any private or public interest which pays for security. Providers of security are companies or individuals which sell security – from security products (like electronic CCTV cameras) to private guards. The mainstream networked security literature conceives of the commercial security industry as being an emergent challenger to the police. The premise is that the commercial security sector is an alternate source of authority and provision to the state police.

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1 Barker, 'State of Fear', 8-9.
2 Shearing and Loader use the terms “auspices” and “providers”. Shearing and Loader, Governing Security, 15-18.
3 Such an argument is made explicit in statements such as the following: “such bodies [private security companies] often work closely with states and their agents, their very existence can be viewed as representing something of a challenge to the first premise of the traditional paradigm [of the monopoly of the state over
The situation in Indonesia however is quite different: far from challenging the police, the commercial security sector in Indonesia has been co-opted by Polri. The dependence of commercial security actors on Polri occurs for different reasons depending on whether we view the issue from the perspective of a consumer or a provider. My research indicates many consumers maintain direct relationships with elements of the police. Through such relationships consumers obtain a type of informal ‘security insurance’. Where direct relationships do occur the consumers of security maintain contact with the police as an addition to, rather than a replacement of, their own private security apparatus. Even in instances where consumers do not actively seek out direct relations with the police, they acknowledge the normative and legal superiority of Polri within the sector. Thus consumers of security feel they need police support. If considered from the perspective of the providers of security, the police dominate these entities for two reasons: firstly, in Indonesia the national police regulate the commercial security industry. Secondly, different parts of the police hierarchy provide supervision (or pembinaan) to the providers of security. Although the police do not often involve themselves in controlling the provision of security by private providers, Polri’s regulatory and normative superiority make it the dominant party in the provider-police relationship.

Thus what we see in Yogyakarta is qualitatively different from what we would expect according to the arguments of writers in the mainstream networked policing school. The commercial security sector in Yogyakarta is not autonomous of the police. Nor are the police merely an anchor of support in a broader network as Adam Crawford depicts in his research. Rather in Yogyakarta we see that the commercial security sector is dependent on the police. It is dependent for a mixture of reasons: because the police regulate the sector, because the police possess special assets (such as intelligence data) which some groups seek to access and because the police are seen as the normatively superior entity that has unique security powers (such as that of arrest). These interactions show how the networked
model needs to be readapted in my case study site. The internal power relationships of this network position the state police at the centre of the commercial security industry.

This chapter is divided into four sections. In the first section I re-examine parts of the Indonesian studies literature which describe the appropriation of non-state policing during the New Order. My dissertation significantly updates this research showing the continuation and even intensification of police strategies of control in the current era. In the following section, I present a brief description of the primary instrument of the police for supervising society today: the Binamitra or Babinkamtibmas/Polmas police. In the third section, I analyse a sample of Yogyakarta’s consumers of commercial security. Following the economic profile of Yogyakarta laid out in chapter two, I have selected six enterprises in the most important sectors of the regional economy. These enterprises consist of three hotels, the two largest retail shopping malls in the province and a major university. I look at the security arrangements in each of these entities and how each of them relates with the police. In the final section, I examine the providers of security services. The security services industry in Indonesia is divided into two major streams: private security companies that operate under police license (Badan Usaha Jasa Pengamanan or BUJP) and a floating mass of security guards (Satuan Pengamanan or Satpam) who have obtained official training from Polri. In Yogyakarta the floating mass of Satpam constitute the larger source of supply. I will examine how managers of these companies and individual Satpam perform their work and interact with Polri.

The Literature on Commercial Security in Indonesia

There is little analysis of the commercial security industry in Indonesia. The best insight into this topic derives from Joshua Barker’s research into the strategies of the late New Order state for managing security at the local level. Barker argued the New Order state
applied a two fold strategy to assert dominance over society. One part of the strategy involved a mass extermination of suspected criminals (pembunuhan misterius) to “appropriat[e] the power that "criminals" and gangs represented.” The other part of the strategy involved state surveillance over key parts of the non-state security landscape, these other points being Indonesia’s neighbourhood watch patrols or ronda and private security guards (Satpam and “hansip”). This system was termed the siskamling (sistem keamanan lingkungan or local environment security system):

Siskamling was started in 1980 as an off-shoot of a larger government program called Kopkamtib... It represented an attempt by the New Order government to impose overt state control over local security practices by taking them out of the hands of organized private gangs... Siskamling’s system of control worked by dividing local security guards into three types: satpam (Satuan Pengamanan, or Security Unit), Kamra (or "hansip"), and ronda (night guard). In general, satpam guards were responsible for protecting commercial and public buildings and spaces, while hansip and ronda guards were responsible for patrolling residential neighborhoods. Satpam and hansip were salaried and uniformed guards while the ronda, a far older institution, was still based on community obligation and used no uniforms. All three elements of the security system were brought under the control of the "Guidance of Society" (Bimbingan Masyarakat, or Bimmas) division of the Police. Because the guards were not paid by the Police, however, Bimmas's sole functions were surveillance and training.  

The state’s institutionalisation of private security into the hands of only ‘approved’ non-state groups, functioned to co-opt society into a state administered security system. State superiority was, according to Barker, institutionalised through continuous surveillance and contact by a special arm of the police: Bimmas.  

My research shows that what Barker observed about the New Order’s strategies of control has been continued into the present era; the police continue to directly supervise key parts of the non-government security sector. At his time of writing, Barker explained this behaviour by pointing to the centralising tendencies of the Suharto regime. Yet ten years after the fall of Suharto a technocratic, non-political agency - Polri - still attempts to maintain parts of the same style of social control as it did during the Suharto era. Since the New Order can no longer be seen as the sole causation for this policy, this behaviour arguably sheds light on the distinctive approach to policing within Polri. As Leonard

Sebastian has noted, the Indonesian state historically has been deeply concerned about inter-group conflict, national disintegration and social instability. These anxieties are reflected in Polri’s strategy of policing. The police have developed a social control intensive model of security management. Non-state providers of security such as those revealed by Barker, which could become disruptive and uncontrolled are brought beneath police supervision. While this chapter substantially extends Barker’s early research on how the police attempt to control private security, it also adds considerable empirical depth by examining Polri’s primary instrument of social control: the Binamitra/Polmas personnel.

**Polri’s Regulation of Non-State Security Organisations and the Instruments of Police Supervision: Polmas/Babinkamtibmas/Binamitra officers**

The Indonesian police take a syncretic approach to the regulation of non-state security actors. Polri lumps all non-state security elements under the category of Pengamanan Swakarsa (Self-security). According to the Police Law No.2/2002 Pengamanan Swakarsa (or Pamswakarsa) are:

> forms of self-security [pengamanan swakarsa] is a type of security which is established over the desire, awareness and interests of the community itself which then obtains the affirmation of the National Police, like environment security units [Satpam] and companies in the security services sector.9

According to this meaning Pamswakarsa are all manner of non-state security groupings within society, from the commercial security industry to the ronda siskamling neighbourhood watch. Therefore Indonesian law and by association, police regulation does not differentiate between the for-profit security sector and volunteer civil society security groups. In theory Polri may regulate all non-state security organisations.10 In practice, this

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8 Sebastian, Realpolitik Ideolog, 55.
9 *Penjelasan UU No.2/2002, Pasal 3, Ayat 1, huruf c
power is unevenly applied. As will be discussed in chapter six, there are many security
groups like the militias of political parties, whom the police do not seek to directly regulate.
Yet Polri’s claim to a mandate for regulating private forms of security is a startlingly
ambitious attempt by the police to elevate itself above the sector.

Yet such observations on the regulatory superiority of the police seem grandiose when one
is confronted in the field with the very modest condition of many non-government security
groups. The apt imagery here is the (often) dilapidated pos kamling which houses the
residential night ronda. The pos kamling which one finds in the average village (kampung)
is an improvised hut, usually constructed from shoddy materials, with a small size and
 cramped interior. Several times I have visited these security posts in the company of police
officers and had to swallow feelings of sympathy for the people who faithfully serve in
organisations that are so ramshackle and humble. I can extend the same observation to
many Pam swakarsa groups I have encountered. By extension this makes the police
supervisory role seem somewhat exaggerated. But whatever the exterior presentation, these
forms of security are meaningful for ordinary Indonesians. Similarly the value of these
groups to my research does not devolve from how well resourced they are, but rather what
they say about the nature of relationships within the network. The status of Pam swakarsa
groups beneath the police, reflects the powerful position of Polri within local security.

The primary police instrument of supervision is the Binamitra/Polmas police. Although the
appellation is different depending on where the officers are in the police hierarchy, the
function of these police remains the same: to engage Polri’s external partners and monitor
Pam swakarsa. As Meliala notes in his research on community policing in Indonesia, the
Polmas role is not a popular one for police officers. This is partly because the role offers
little opportunity for corruption. In terms of the police’s relations with society however,
the Polmas/Binamitra are very strategic. Polmas officers are effectively the first point of
call for ordinary Indonesians in dealing with the police. Their purpose is to put forward the
friendly, direct face of Polri to society at large. As will be discussed in chapter six, many of
the volunteer security groupings value Polmas officers because their existence offers direct

12 Meliala, ‘Sensitive Policing: Indonesia’s Case,’ 204-205.
access to the police. Given the importance of the Polmas in the networked security relations discussed in chapters five and six, it is fitting to provide a background to their functions.

Although there are Binamitra offices in the Polda and the Polres, this arm of Polri does its most important work at the lowest level of the police hierarchy: the sub-district Polsek. Within the Polsek, such officers (termed Polisi Masyarakat or Polmas) directly engage with civil society. In the Polsek, there are two Polmas officers attached to every village. Based on my field observations of nine Polsek in different parts of Polda DIY it is usual for a Polsek to have around three villages and six Polmas officers. Polmas officers are often old in age and senior in rank (usually a Brigadir Polisi Satu or Brigadir Polisi Kepala, which is roughly equivalent to a senior sergeant in the army). Unlike the other units of a Polsek (Intelligence, Patrol, Traffic and Detective units) the Polmas officer is highly autonomous. The Polmas officer answers directly to the Polsek commander and the Polsek commander generally leaves every pair of Polmas officers to monitor the events of their allocated village. The Polres have a policy that the Polsek must program at least fourteen activities for each Polmas officer per week, though it is usual for the Polmas to do more than this. The shape of these activities is multifarious and can include: disseminating police information in schools, participating in mass religious seminars (pengajian), providing security at social events (like sub-village markets), visiting clusters of night ronda, and so on. The Polmas are also on call to their villages to provide assistance as called upon. It is customary for the Polmas to be known to the major community leaders in their villages. These leaders - be they a head of a sub-village neighbourhood association or the coordinator of the night ronda, or other figure - will know and be in direct telephone contact with their villages’ two Polmas officers. If these leaders require the police (for example in the case of domestic violence or the capture of a thief), community leaders feel capable of calling the Polmas for assistance. Surprisingly, according to my interviewees in

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13 When Mabes Polri adopted its strategy of community-oriented policing in 2006, the police changed the terminology for these officers from Babinkamtibmas police (Bintara Pembina Keamanan dan Ketertiban Masyarakat) to Polmas (Polisi Masyarakat – Community Police).

14 According to my sources before 2000 there were only 1-2 Babinkamtibmas per Polsek. After 2000, Polda DIY expanded the force to one per village. In the words of one of my Polmas informants, “DIY is full of Babin now.” Interview, Adjutan Inspektur Polisi Satu Sarjono and Adjutan Inspektur Polisi Satu Subiantoro, Polmas officers in Polsek Pandak, Polres Bantul, 9 October 2008.


the community, the Polmas service their rare requests quickly and without hesitation. In this role the Polmas not only serve and engage society but also monitor and supervise it as well.

The Binamitra police in the Polres and Polda are much fewer in number and in function. In Polres Sleman for example there are only ten Binamitra staff while in Polda DIY there are thirteen. These police play a support role to the Polmas in the Polseks through data collection and the provision of training. The Binamitra of the Polres and Polda also support Polri’s program of engaging police partners (mitra polisi) but do so at a higher level. Thus as discussed in chapter four for example, the Bagian Binamitra in Poltabes was the service point for police assistance to the city of Yogyakarta’s Bureau of Public Order. The Binamitra section in Polda DIY was likewise responsible for drafting the Polda’s MOU with the provincial government.

While I have discussed the important role played by the Polmas/Binamitra, we must recall that Polri not only operates as a unitary actor (coordinated through its hierarchy) but also as a disaggregated entity, through various units operating autonomously. It is not Polmas alone that represent the police in their relations with other groupings, it is merely that this activity is the distinct responsibility of Binamitra/Polmas officers. For the commercial security industry the Polmas in fact are rarely seen, which is ironic given that police doctrine makes Polmas officers nominally responsible for supervising Satpam. Instead, some of my Satpam informants mention that they have the most contact with Patrol Police (samapta) and Tourist Police (polisi pariwisata) who visit Satpam workplaces in the course of normal police patrolling. Thus, in understanding how the police inter-relate with the wider security network, it is important to point out that the police institution is itself complicated and has many points of contact with other security organisations.

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19 According to my Satpam interviewees, their local Polsek’s Polmas officers exercise their duties by visiting the Satpam’s workplaces on very rare occasions (generally once every half year) for the purpose of mapping Satpam numbers. This contact with the police pales in comparison to the sometimes daily contact the Satpam have with other opsnal like the patrol police. Interview, Satpam Suzaidan, Wasirudin and Marjono, Mall Malioboro 23 October 2008.
Consumers of Security

The range of private entities that require security services is very broad. At one end of the spectrum are large commercial organisations like banks, shopping malls, and the like, which demand many Satpam and have complex security arrangements. At the other end of the spectrum there are innumerable small and middle-sized entities, like schools, small shops, restaurants, housing complexes and so on which have much simpler security systems; often only one or two Satpam. It is impossible to obtain reliable information on the raw numbers of security consumers in Yogyakarta. The police do not collect this data. To provide a crude estimate I refer to data from the provincial Association of Indonesian Security Managers (AMSI) which is the peak representative body for the commercial security industry in Indonesia and has thirty four member organisations in Yogyakarta. AMSI Yogyakarta has fourteen hotels, five banks, two shopping malls, three hospitals, three factories, three government utilities companies, a TV station and three universities as its members. This list at least provides us with a sample of the type of large consumers of security which exist in Yogyakarta.

Following the structure of the Yogyakarta economy – which is dominated by the retail, hotel and tertiary education sector – I sought out six enterprises from these sectors which I believe reflect a representative sample of the major commercial security users in the province. In the retail sector my investigation focused on two of the province’s largest shopping malls: Plaza Ambarukmo and Mall Malioboro. Plaza Ambarukmo is

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20 This is somewhat unexpected as the police are usually fastidious about collecting data on all manner of what one would otherwise consider trivial issues. Anecdotally I once read the yearly work plan of one Polsek in Sleman which contained detailed information on the agricultural yields of the sub-district. It struck me as a surprise then that Polda DIY does not accumulate information on a reasonably important topic like commercial security users who fall within their area of responsibility.

21 AMSI Yogyakarta also has fourteen private security companies (or BUJP) as members. The BUJP should be excluded from this analysis as they have no choice over their membership. Police regulations compel the BUJP to be members of AMSI, as AMSI is the official (police approved) representative of the commercial security sector. More will be discussed at the end of the chapter. Assosiasi Manager Security Indonesia Yogyakarta: ‘Daftar Anggota AMSI Daerah Instimewa Yogyakarta’ [the document was given to me by the Treasurer of AMSI and was up to date as of June 2007].
Yogyakarta’s largest and newest shopping mall. Mall Malioboro is an older shopping mall, which is smaller than Plaza Ambarukmo and interestingly has a closer relationship to the police. Both facilities cater to the upper middle class. The three hotels included in this study are: Hotel Grande Mercure, a five star facility located in a tourist hotel precinct in the northern part of Yogyakarta city, Inna Garuda Hotel, a four star facility at the centre of Yogyakarta city (in the main tourist trading area Malioboro Street) and Apartemen Sejahtera, a three star complex in the southern, urban suburbs of Sleman (in the central residential, university and commerce precinct of Yogyakarta). I selected three different classes of hotel for a reason. I assumed (correctly as it turned out) that because each of these businesses targeted a different segment of the market, each business had different security needs. The five star hotel targets an upper class clientele and has fairly complex security arrangements. The four star hotel targets the upper middle class market while the three star apartment complex has a lower class of customer and a much simpler security system. Finally, I also review the security arrangements of Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM), Yogyakarta’s largest and most prestigious university.

The evidence which emerges from the five businesses (the hotels and shopping malls) creates an interesting picture; despite maintaining their own private security apparatus four of the five consumers seek additional relations with elements of the police. Relationships with the police significantly enhance the capabilities of the businesses’ own security. Direct relations give businesses access to ‘fixers’ in the police, who are seen as able to immediately respond to security crises on behalf of their clients. In the event of the arrest of a guest or a brawl or any other such emergency situation, a business is able to contact its police fixers and depend upon prompt police service. Businesses also obtain direct access to police intelligence about criminal trends, a practice which some of them seem to value. Finally, businesses can sometimes use their direct relations with the police to strengthen the quality of their own Satpam force, through additional training and capacity building. For five of these private enterprises, all of the previous services make direct relations with the police an insurance policy and a value-adder in security terms.

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22 From 2009 this hotel was renamed Hotel Phoenix.
The exceptional case among the previous examples is Grande Mercure, the five star hotel. This business does not have direct relations with Polri. Instead, Grande Mercure has a policy of investing in the professionalism of its own Satpam force. But when questioned on the issue of the hotel’s relations with the police it is clear that hotel management consider Polri to be a superior agency, while believing their own apparatus is dependent on police powers. This business is thus not as exceptional as it appears at first glance. Crucially, the other thing that emerges from my interviews is that there is scarce evidence to show these businesses relate with other security actors. Occasionally there are relations with territorial army elements but this is exclusively for the purpose of accessing intelligence. Thus when these consumers of security think of external support they invariably channel their efforts to the police.

The final example, UGM, is somewhat different. UGM is not run on a commercial basis. Its level of turnover is not linked to a steady flow of customers and hence its security arrangements do not need to be as great as those in the market economy. Nevertheless, UGM does have its own large Satpam force which operates with relatively high professional standards. UGM has only irregular contact with Polda DIY. Yet, like Grande Mercure, this private security entity acknowledges it cannot operate without Polri. In this sense the UGM private security force also recognises the normative superiority of the police.

Shopping Malls

Plaza Ambarukmo (Amplas) has the most complex security environment of all the facilities under examination. Yet, ironically, the Amplas management devotes only a moderate degree of attention to the mall’s security arrangements. Amplas is not only Yogyakarta’s largest but also its most luxurious shopping mall. The mall tailors to a high class of clientele, who presumably have expectations of a high level of visible security. Amplas is
located in an area (Kecamatan Depok) that has the highest rate of crime in Yogyakarta.\textsuperscript{23} There is a nightclub in the shopping centre which produces at least a small amount of drunkenness during evening trade. Yet according to Amplas management and their security staff, the centre experiences only rare disturbances of security; usually missing property, occasional public drunkenness (generally during weekends) and rarely drunken fights.\textsuperscript{24} At the time of my research Amplas management sub-contracted its security to a commercial security services company called ISS (International Security Services).\textsuperscript{25} ISS corporate headquarters is in Jakarta. The company manages the Amplas contract by attaching a two-person coordination team to the mall (who are appointed by ISS Jakarta) and by tapping into Yogyakarta’s pool of regional Satpam. The ISS contractors supply ninety three Satpam, recruited in Yogyakarta, to the Plaza. These personnel are split into three shifts. On any one shift Satpam are broken up into static monitoring posts around thirteen different points in the building, such as entrance gates, exit gates, loading docks, and so on. In addition the security force also conducts periodic patrols of the Plaza premises.

The ISS contractors, on behalf of their centre clients, maintain close contact with the police. ISS’s first point of contact is with the closest Polsek, Polsek Depok Barat which is conveniently located several hundred metres down the street.\textsuperscript{26} Once a week the ISS leadership at the Plaza meet with Polsek Depok Barat to discuss the security situation around Plaza Ambarukmo. This meeting, which the ISS Superintendent refers to as “Team Plaza Ambarukmo” also involves the army Koramil in Kecamatan Depok. This team meets every week, primarily to exchange intelligence information for the benefit of the Plaza. The

\textsuperscript{23} This fact was revealed in a workshop I attended in Polda DIY in 2007. Depok has more reported crime than the rest of Sleman district combined as Depok contains most of the province’s universities and houses most of the student population. As discussed in chapter two, the student population are both victims and perpetrators of much of the province’s crimes. Field Notes, ‘CSPS Conflict Resolution Seminar bersama Polda DIY’ (18-22 May 2007), Day 2.

\textsuperscript{24} Interview with ISS Security Supervisor and Deputy Security Chief, Prabowo and ISS Security Superintendent and Head of Security Sugiyanto, 17 May 2008.

\textsuperscript{25} In the three years since the shopping centre opened security arrangements changed three times. In 2006 Amplas’s security was handled by another firm called 911. In 2007 Amplas management attempted to handle their own security in-house while in late 2007 management again held tenders and granted the contract to ISS. Interview with Budiono, Deputy Head of Human Resources for PT. Yogya Indah Sejahtera (Amplas Management), 17 May 2008.

\textsuperscript{26} Although a Polsek in all other circumstances covers one kecamatan, due to the extent of crime in this sub-district in 2006 Polres Sleman made the unique decision to establish Polsek commands down to the village level. Thus Kecamatan Depok effectively has three Polsek – one for each of its villages. Interview, Camat Depok, Supardal 4 June 2008.
ISS Superintendent and his deputy both agreed that this meeting was a very useful tool for them to obtain a wide angle view of security trends in the area around the mall. As an example of the type of things discussed in meetings of ‘Team Plaza Ambarukmo’, the superintendent mentioned the projected likelihood of demonstrations. When I asked as to what type of emergency assistance ISS obtained from the police, the interviewees mentioned that the Polsek was always on standby to provide support if called on. ISS however “rarely” had to call the police. When a request is made it is usually to ask for police aid in detaining people caught in drunken fights.

The ISS leadership at the Plaza left an impression they maintained a consistent, direct line of communication with their local police command and that this command was active in assisting them. As a security contracting firm, however, these ISS staff were also obliged to remain under the supervision of the provincial police command, specifically the Biro Binamitra. Approximately once every month, the provincial police Binamitra office called the ISS leadership to the Polda to attend meetings. The two ISS leaders did not explain the content of these meetings but referred to them as evidence of their ongoing need to submit to police oversight (pembinaan). Because the interviewees that supplied this information were relatively low-ranking personnel they were not able to answer important questions like whether TNI and the police are paid for their services or who initiated the “Team Plaza Ambarukmo”.27 But what is evident from their accounts is the maintenance of a close relationship between the police and this private security company. Although the police do not intrude on the execution of security activities, the private security company does seek to maintain access to unique police powers (like those of arrest) as well as ancillary services, such as intelligence gathering.

My second shopping mall case study is Mall Malioboro which is located on the main shopping and tourist precinct of Yogyakarta, Malioboro Street, an area very vulnerable to crime. Because Malioboro street contains one of Indonesia’s presidential palaces, as well as

27 It became apparent after my meeting that Amplas management were not very open to my research. To their credit they did not object to me interviewing their security contractors, but I was only ever able to carry out one interview with these personnel. It became apparent in the interview that these contractors were ‘doers’ (pelaksana) and their capacity for giving detailed background information on the mall’s external relations was limited.
the provincial parliament and the governor’s complex, very often demonstrations pass by outside the Mall. In addition, there is also a risk to the mall from criminals, especially thieves, entering from the densely packed streets outside the centre. Although centre management insist they experience very little crime, the risk is nevertheless high.

The management of Mall Malioboro places higher significance on its security arrangements than Plaza Ambarukmo and therefore places a higher emphasis on a relationship with the Indonesian security apparatus. One explanation for this difference is the fact that Mall Malioboro began operations in 1994, under the New Order, at a time when many businesses sought direct relations with security forces. This is something which the management freely admits. Mall Malioboro was also its parent company’s first shopping centre, thus in 1994 the company was highly concerned about security risks to the investment. Owing to this fact, centre management in the early nineteen nineties sought direct relationships with different parts of ABRI in Yogyakarta, such as the district’s police detective unit, the Kodim’s military intelligence unit, a Kopassus unit from neighbouring Solo, and others. At the time, management sought these relationships to obtain special services like information on the criminal affairs of Yogyakarta, assistance in selecting security staff, building their Satpam’s capabilities through training and emergency security assistance. Because management incorporated these practices in its original business plan as well as the fact that the Mall lived through the turbulence of the reformasi period, the management of Mall Malioboro is perhaps unusually anxious about security. An interesting outcome of this situation is the fact that Mall management continues to involve the Indonesian army in its affairs.

Mall Malioboro has a security staff of fifty personnel divided into three shifts. Management employs all of their personnel in-house and plans to install an expensive CCTV network in the near future. This pre-occupation with security is intriguing given that the outside shopping district - Malioboro Street - is very well policed. The length of the street falls under the responsibility of three individual Polseks (Danurejan, Gedong Tengan and Gondoman). Towards the southern end of the street, barely 500 meters from the shopping

centre is the district police office, Poltabes. Poltabes houses hundreds of its own operational personnel at that location. Directly beside the Poltabes building is the regional Korem headquarters. In the middle of the street dozens of provincial Pol.PP permanently guard Yogyakarta’s DPRD and governor’s offices. Although passing demonstrations are frequent, there is no shortage of security personnel close at hand to the mall. Yet Mall Malioboro, ironically, shows greater interest in its security affairs than its larger, richer competitor Plaza Ambarukmo. This situation serves to illustrate the point that the private security industry does not follow an objective assessment of security needs but rather the subjective assumptions of corporate management.

In terms of its external relations, Mall Malioboro continues the same direct relations with the security apparatus today as it has in years past. During the Suharto period, Malioboro established a *Tim Pengamanan Khusus* (Special Security Team or *Pamsus*) consisting of officers from the city’s Kodim, the military police, Poltabes, neighbouring Polseks and Kopassus. Quite importantly, management points out this team was formed on its initiative – and paid from the Mall’s budget. Today, however, management maintains the same Pamsus arrangement but with a reduced membership. The current Pamsus of Mall Malioboro consists of the head of the city’s Kodim intelligence unit - which gives the Mall access to army intelligence - another officer from Poltabes’ Binamitra detachment whose purpose is to oversee the mall’s Satpam and another police officer from the Polda’s elite response unit Brimob, because of potential concerns about terrorism. This Pamsus provides several valuable services to Mall Malioboro. Like the Team Plaza Ambarukmo, this Pamsus channels intelligence to Mall management, on for example demonstrations and criminal gang activities. The Pamsus occasionally coordinates training services for the Mall’s Satpam (for example weekly self-defence lessons with the police) and also, crucially, the Pamsus functions as a point of contact for the Mall should emergency assistance be necessary.29

The Mall also has certain obligatory responsibilities to the police. Binamitra officers from Poltabes headquarters drop in occasionally to data map Mall Malioboro’s Satpam and observe their work. Samapta (patrol) police often drop in, usually daily, on their patrol

29 Interview, Hadiwijaya and Hendro, June 2008.
rounds to seek information from the Satpam. Usually this only consists of checking the Satpam’s log books and chatting over events. Like the ISS staff, a representative from Mall Malioboro is also obliged to attend monthly consultation meetings with the Polda’s Binamitra detachment.

As with Ambarukmo Plaza, Mall Malioboro’s direct relations with the security apparatus function as a type of insurance policy, providing direct, on-call access to security services. This direct relationship bolsters the Mall’s own security arrangements. The appropriate metaphor to be used in this context is that of an insurance policy, since emergency assistance from the Pamsus has rarely been necessary. Yet insurance is one of those critical products which many businesses choose to purchase, though often never use. For Yogyakarta’s largest businesses it seems security is often viewed the same way. It is important to point out that this security service, like real insurance, is not free. Centre management willingly admit that they pay the security apparatus for their assistance, though they do not specify how much. Whatever the cost, it seems that Mall management are willing to pay for, and highly value the assistance they obtain in return. Mall management view the security services not as a necessary evil but rather as a useful asset.

Hotels

There are two other consumers of security in my sample which seek a close relationship with the police. Two of the three hotels that provided information for my research maintain

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30 The short hand phrase for this among Satpam is ‘Polisi, dia mampir, tanya aman? Aman. Ya udah – pergi.’ (The police drop by and ask us ‘is the situation safe.’ We reply ‘yes, it’s safe.’ Then they go.). This often heard refrain underlines the regularity of police-Satpam contact. Although most meetings are uneventful, Satpam in the establishments I research are in habitual contact with elements of Polri, usually the patrol police. Interview, Komandan Sektor Timur SKKK UGM Marsito and Satpam Wahayudi, 28 October 2008.
31 The management could recall barely five episodes of crime that had ever occurred on their premises. One of the examples was fraud (a dukun santet or shaman allegedly tricked a McDonalds employee into delivering the contents of the restaurant’s safe) while the others were minor cases of theft. At one time the Mall did call upon the assistance of its Pamsus during 1998. At this time the Mall called on a platoon of Brimob troops to secure the building during the worst of the reformasi riots. Interview, Hadiwijaya and Hendro, June 2008.
32 Interview, Hadiwijaya and Hendro, June 2008.
some form of direct link with Polri, but the exact form of these links varies depending on which segment of the market the business appeals to.

Hotel Inna Garuda, like the shopping mall cases, seeks direct relations with the police besides maintaining its own permanent Satpam force. The hotel is located in Malioboro Street, Yogyakarta city and offers international standard four star accommodation. The hotel is in a reasonably secure environment, given the high density of police close to Malioboro Street. The hotel maintains a security staff of sixteen Satpam (one chief of security, five supervisors and ten ordinary members) who are divided into three shifts. Each shift contains a minimum of four Satpam. The hotel also has access to three assistant police (Ass.Pol.) who are permanently allocated to the hotel. While these police do not work regularly at the hotel, they are on permanent stand-by, ready to provide emergency aid, training services and other incidental assistance. As part of its package of assistance to this hotel, the Polda provides Inna Garuda’s Satpam staff with their initial private security training sufficient for the Satpam to obtain accreditation. In addition, the police also provide self-defence instruction (three times a week) and occasional specialist training. At least once a month the hotel’s Ass.Pol. hold seminars to educate the Satpam on changing crime trends (like fraud and theft). Beside direct assistance to the hotel’s private security guards, hotel management meets on an ongoing basis with representatives from Poltabes. These meetings take place on an undetermined schedule, once a month or once every several months. According to the Ass.Pol one of the purposes of these meetings is to exchange information, with the police contributing data on criminal trends.

Hotel Inna Garuda has strong similarities in its relations with the police to the shopping malls Amplas and Malioboro – the value of the relationship to the hotel is that it provides direct access to the police, in particular: to individual police officers permanently available

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33 When I organised my first interview at Hotel Inna Garuda the interviewee the hotel provided was one of its police assistants rather than the hotel’s own security staff. Interview with Assistant Police for Inna Garuda, Brigadier Polisi Rinto Pamuji, 18 June 2008.
34 Interview, Rinto Pamuji, June 2008.
35 Rinto gave an example of one seminar that was held recently at the time of my interview. The police staged a mock conference at the hotel and police in civilian clothing played the part of thieves. The hotel’s Satpam were tasked with identifying the pretend thieves. Beside this example Rinto also mentioned bomb identification, arrest procedure and evacuation procedure as other things that cropped up in these seminars. Interview, Rinto Pamuji, June 2008.
36 Interview, Rinto Pamuji, June 2008.
to provide emergency assistance, to police training services and police intelligence. Although my interviewee could not recall a single incident were the hotel ever had to call for emergency assistance, it could be reasonably hypothesised that Inna Garuda’s relationship with Polri is in fact another elaborate form of insurance. Like with Mall Malioboro, hotel management admits that they initiated this relationship (though they did not specify when) and the management pay for the services (though they do not disclose how much).37

The relationship between the police and another hotel, Apartemen Sejahtera, shows the same pattern of relationships as the other examples, though on a reduced scale. The reason why the police-business relationship is of a simpler nature in this example is that Apartemen Sejahtera is a more down-market establishment than Inna Garuda. Apartemen Sejahtera has a three star ranking (by Indonesian domestic standards) and caters to the lower middle class. The hotel is actually more accurately described as a serviced apartment complex. It thus has fewer resources to spend on security. Even if the management had a greater budget the tastes of its guests are hardly as demanding as the guests of an international hotel chain. However, the same basic impulse to seek a direct relationship with the police is present in the case of Apartemen Sejahtera.

The apartment’s management has contracted the services of a police ‘fixer’, an officer referred to as Wayan. This officer has not made himself available to be interviewed, so all the information on his role is obtained directly from the apartment’s staff. As such, it is not possible to determine his rank or position or duties in the police as my interviewees do not know, but Apartemen Sejahtera’s duty manager seems to believe he is a middle ranking officer of some kind.38 The owners of the complex apparently knew Wayan personally and offered him work as the apartment’s police contact. He is paid a stipend for his service, though management did not disclose how much. Wayan’s exact role is as a type of non-resident supervisor to the business’ Satpam. Apartemen Sejahtera has ten private security guards, and a head of security.39 This team is mostly employed in manning the front (and

37 Email contact with Edy Suaharyono, training manager for Hotel Inna Garuda (the member of staff made responsible for coordinating my interviews), 1 July 2008.
38 Interview with Duty Manager, Apartemen Sejahtera, Dinia Achmad 22 November 2008.
39 Interview with the Head of Security of Apartemen Sejahtera, Budiono 18 June 2008.
only) entrance to the facility, twenty four hours a day. Although the head of security acknowledges that the apartment has never had an episode that required the involvement of Wayan (with the exception of a fire), it seems that theoretically Wayan performs a similar role as the Ass.Pol for Inna Garuda: emergency back-up. As put by the head of security “usually if there is a problem which can’t be handled in the field we report to Pak Wayan.” It is then hoped that Pak Wayan, using his powers inside the police, can resolve problems for the apartment; “therefore we handle [a problem] first, then we will request orders from Pak Wayan, later Pak Wayan will determine [the course of action] and request assistance of the Polsek or Polres.”

Aside from the expectation Wayan will be able to use his influence inside the Polri bureaucracy, this police contact also occasionally performs self-defence and physical training for the private security team. Aside from this, however, Wayan is rarely needed. In this case, the dynamics are basically the same as in the case of Inna Garuda. The owners of this establishment have sought out direct contact with part of the police apparatus as form of emergency insurance for their asset.

Thus far, four of the five commercial businesses have chosen to maintain direct links with the police, the fifth case study however, Hotel Grande Mercure, is different. Hotel Grand Mercure has a staff of thirty one Satpam organised again in three shifts. Grand Mercure’s personnel man nine posts around their complex like the front entrance gates, lobby, basement and a twenty four hour CCTV system. Showing the high commitment to security in this business, the hotel set up its CCTV network from the opening of the hotel in 2004. The network covers thirty two separate points in the building. As in the other interviews Grand Mercure claimed to have never experienced a crime on its premises.

Regarding its external relations, Hotel Grand Mercure eschews a policy of dependence on external security institutions and instead focuses on creating a strong private security force of its own. This situation is somewhat counter-intuitive as this hotel is a five star facility. Given its class of patron, one could expect this business to have attached the highest importance to security and therefore have placed the highest value upon support from the

40 Interview, Budiono, June 2008.
41 Interview, Head of Security at Hotel Grande Mercure, Gatot Subroto, 22 August 2008.
police. Yet this was not the case. Grande Mercure has a professional relationship with the police, but not a close, ongoing partnership. According to the hotel’s chief of security:

> We continue to maintain relations with the police. We can’t leave that behind. But not too far, because I can still handle things here if anything comes up. But we continue to maintain relations with the police and the tourist police. If for example there was a problem, we would report it to them.

The hotel therefore chooses to deal with the police on a selective and professional basis only. Thus there was no Ass.Pol. or police fixers working for Grand Mercure. But Hotel security did admit to having both obligatory contact with the police and occasionally seeking certain services from them. For example the hotel passively accepted information from the police on crime trends – particularly in relation to warnings of terrorist activities and organised theft rings. The hotel also must, like all commercial security entities, accept periodic inspections of its Satpam by Binamitra police. Like all Indonesian accommodation outlets the hotel also must report the identities of foreigners staying on its premises to the police. It made these reports to its local Polsek. It was rare though for Grand Mercure to seek external assistance. When it did so its requests were mostly for trainers for its internal security seminars, such as personnel from the Brimob bomb squad for bomb recognition instruction. This training was irregular and very different from the services that the four other establishments seek from their police contacts. Although the hotel did not seek direct relations with Polri elements, neither did hotel security see themselves as independent from the police either. As the security manager made clear, he viewed the police as an indispensable form of support. Hotel Grand Mercure sees the police as the only agency which can legitimately deal with security problems should they ever arise.

*University Campus Security*

My final case study is Universitas Gadjah Mada, which has a large private security force. This university has a similar philosophy in its private security arrangements as Hotel Grand Mercure; it maintains a relatively robust Satpam force while cultivating minimum,

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42 Interview, Subroto, August 2008.
professional contact with the police. UGM is the largest university in Yogyakarta. It has a student population of 54,000 sprawling over a central campus that covers six or seven city blocks. Although in past years the university authorities took a relaxed attitude to security, since 2003 the Rector elevated the UGM security service to a Unit led by a Director. In the university structure this means the campus security service (or Kesatuan Keamanan dan Keselamatan Kampus, SKKK[sic]) is answerable only to the Rector, giving SKKK a high status within UGM. The UGM security service has 131 Satpam. In the other establishments I researched most of the activities Satpam performed were passive guarding. At UGM, however, the size of the campus grounds encourage the campus Satpam force to be more active in such things as directing internal traffic and conducting mobile patrols. UGM Satpam also engage in the more common passive tasks of guarding buildings and manning command posts.

Unlike the other establishments, UGM does have a fairly dynamic set of security concerns, coming from the young, boisterous and activist student population. According to campus security, the most serious problem they face is theft, which is usually of personal electronic equipment. Thefts on campus grounds are usually crimes of opportunity, probably committed by students themselves. However, the most frequent problem the campus security authorities say they encounter are violations of ‘susila’ or public morals, when students engage in intimate behaviour in public. When asked how highly demonstrations rate on their agenda, the campus security chief, who has served four years in his role, says there are numerous demonstrations but none have ended in “anarchic actions” (or tindakan anarkis). All protests must be under the standard of one of the UGM student guilds; if a protest does not have the stamp of a student guild oration is forbidden and the group is dispersed. According to the security chief this system of guild-organised protest has limited the possibility for rowdy protests. This system pacifies the students by giving them an

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44 This number does not include another seventy or so Satpam which are under the control of the individual faculties. Interview, Suwandi, October 2008.

45 According to SKKK data, since 2004 demonstrations have trended downwards from forty in that year to fifteen in 2007. Traffic accidents have also trended downwards from eighty nine in 2004 to thirty two in 2007. Thefts have increased every year from six in 2004 to twenty seven in 2007. Violent fights track only several cases each year while violations of public morals consistently reach at or over 100 cases every year. SKKK UGM, Grafik Kefadian di Kampus UGM (2008?).
opportunity to protest for their cause under the controlled leadership of their student representatives. The security chief insists that in his four years there has not yet been an incidence of a protest which has ended in violence. Nor has there ever been a student protest in which he has been forced to call in the assistance of the police.\textsuperscript{46}

When it comes to external security organisations the campus, like Hotel Grand Mercure, has a reliable but arms-length relationship with the police. The relationship is underwritten by the fact that campus security needs access to police law enforcement powers, but access to these powers only occurs as a public service on the part of the police and not through special relationships. In describing the general attitude of campus security to the police, it is apparent that campus security attaches high value to Polri and actively seeks to communicate with them. When asked whether Polri are of any use to SKKK the response is unequivocal: “[the police] are very useful. However the frequency [of communication] is too small. It needs to be increased... the coordination is good. But their visits need to be increased... But generally it’s good. Every time there is a request the [police] response is positive.”\textsuperscript{47}

The reason why UGM attaches value to assistance from the police is much the same as with the other organisations. The police have unique assets that the campus security needs. One of these assets is sectoral training. UGM sends all of its Satpam recruits to undergo one month of training with the Polda to obtain police-issued trade licenses. As will be discussed below the police are intimately involved in the licensing and training of Satpam. Through this training, UGM’s Satpam recruits obtain knowledge on sectoral laws, equipment handling (like how to use hand cuffs and the like) and other skills from the primary source of knowledge on policing: Polri. UGM also needs the police for emergency security assistance, which they have had occasion to request. During graduation period, the chief of security called on Polres Sleman to provide personnel to direct traffic on the major roads which intersect the campus. This is something that the SKKK, as a private organisation,

\textsuperscript{46} Other senior Satpam agree with this. Interview, SKKK Komandan Sektor Timur Marsito, 28 October 2008.
\textsuperscript{47} Interview, Suwandi October 2008.
may not do on public roads. Apparently the Polres grants these requests, sending around thirty traffic police at each time.

The SKKK have also infrequently requested police assistance when there have been large student demonstrations on the campus, though the police have only ever been required to assemble outside the campus grounds and remain on stand-by.\textsuperscript{48} Apparently Polres Sleman has always been willing to answer these requests for assistance: “without negotiation... Whenever I call them, they [police from Polres Sleman] come.”\textsuperscript{49} I asked the chief of UGM security why he thought that Polres Sleman bothered to assist UGM, was it because UGM was such a large university? The chief responded: “I think Polres Sleman doesn’t differentiate amongst UGM, UNY, Atma Jaya [other prominent universities located near UGM]. The important thing is the Polres desires the campus not to become a place for acts of anarchism.” Although the campus defray police costs for the few occasions when police are called on for assistance, this only concerns the provision of food to police on the ground and diesel for their vehicles. From the security chief’s perspective, money then is not a motive for the police when rendering assistance. Thus we can see that, if anything, campus security is dissatisfied with what it perceives as too little attention from Polri. The campus authorities consider the police to be valuable sources of support and sectoral knowledge.

UGM also has very little contact with the other primary sources of external security, the Pol.PP and the TNI. UGM’s main cause of concern with regard to the Pol.PP is unregulated street sellers (pedagang kaki lima) who use UGM’s open access points to enter the campus and trade. The campus authorities frequently invite the Sleman Pol.PP to tackle the street

\textsuperscript{48} It should be mentioned that Indonesia has special procedures for security in its education institutions. University students are permitted to demonstrate on their campuses with the permission of their rectors. The police or any security element may not enter without the permission of the rector. According to the head of security in UGM, he has never had cause to request the police enter UGM to deal with a protest. Interview, Suwandi October 2008.

\textsuperscript{49} In one incident that had occurred not long before the time of my interview with the head of security, protestors came to the campus from Kulon Progo. The background to the incident was that UGM had been involved in a sand mining venture in the district of Kulon Progo that was opposed by citizens there. Thirty one truckloads of Kulon Progo residents came to demonstrate at the campus. At that time, the head of security called Polres Sleman and the Kapolres came directly to deal with the situation with 100 of his personnel. The demonstration ended peacefully. The head of security used this example as one which demonstrated the efficient service he had come to receive from the police. Interview, Suwandi October 2008. ‘Warga Kulon Progo Demo UGM’ Kapanlagi.com, 21 July 2008 <http://www.kapanlagi.com/h/0000240321.html>
sellers, apparently with only limited response. The regional TNI forces, however, have almost never been involved in campus security, since at least after reformasi. On this issue the chief of security commented:

Today, we don’t coordinate with the Kodim or the Koramil. Because the system has already changed. Therefore they [TNI] can’t act as in the past and perform social and security control functions. Now their function is military [i.e. defence]. Therefore we don’t invite them to participate [in UGM security arrangements]. Except if there is an international guest. Like the New Zealand Prime Minister. Security [for her visit] was planned by the military. For security for heads of state, they are protected by the military. The police only assist. In past times they [police and TNI] were together. Now its only if there is a VVIP guest at the level of a head of state they [TNI] are involved.

Although in general the security chief maintains no contact with the territorial army, he does mention one incident in which he was contacted by the provincial head of military intelligence. This incident was mentioned in chapter three, when students from various Yogyakarta universities were observed participating in a radical Islamist event. Beside this one example the UGM head of security has had virtually no contact with the TNI.

Thus, we can conclude two things from the UGM example. Firstly, although campus security does not seek to create a special relationship with Polri elements, they do seek and value Polri support nevertheless. Secondly, when it comes to external security support, UGM channels its demands to the police. University security acknowledges that the police is the only actor with authority in security matters. This finding is consistent with the other examples. Consumers of commercial security may possess their own internal security systems, but they recognise that their own arrangements depend on continuous contact with Polri.

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50 In an amusing example of the lukewarm attentiveness of the Sleman Pol.PP, the chief of security claimed once to have called the head of Sleman’s Public Order Bureau and asked for assistance in cleaning up street sellers on UGM property. The chief of security was told by the head of the bureau ‘do it yourself and if there are any problems call me back.’ Interview, Suwandi, October 2008.

51 Interview, Suwandi, October 2008.
One of the surprising features of these relationships is that consumers of security services very rarely call on the police for assistance, yet four of the six case studies go to elaborate lengths to keep direct relations with the police. I have used the metaphor of an insurance policy to hypothesise why this might be the case. In deploying this metaphor we need to understand the specific circumstances of Indonesia. Indonesia has never had a reliable ‘911’ style telephone system that provides a central emergency services coordination point. Indonesia does not even have a history of prompt, free, universal public services in the case of emergencies, quite the opposite in fact. Public servants in Indonesia have a reputation for slowness, bureaucracy and unfriendly service; in the public consciousness the police, as an institution, stand out especially prominently on this point. Polri’s service standards rank consistently poorly in public opinion polls. Yet as this thesis points out, Polri is still the primary instrument of internal security. Viewed from this perspective, it is perhaps understandable that an entrepreneur who invests billions of rupiah into an asset like a hotel, is unwilling to risk the safety of their investment on the belief that the Indonesian police can be trusted to deliver prompt and free security services in the event of an emergency. Four of the five businesses in this research certainly think this way. Four of the five businesses prefer to develop direct links with specific parts of the Indonesian police in order to extract extra services above what they are otherwise entitled to.

Another relevant question to ask is whether such payments by private business to the police are corruption? I argue, it depends on how the money is used. The practices I reveal in my research can be viewed, from the security consumer perspective, as the commercialisation

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32 Indonesia for some time attempted to maintain a universal emergency system for emergency services. The police emergency number was 110. Other such numbers were, for example 113 for the fire department and 118 or 119 for the ambulance service. The system was poorly used, poorly operated and eventually scrapped. The problem with the police number was that few people knew of it. Anecdotally, some police commands did not service this number at all while others were in the habit of putting callers through to voicemail. In an admission of the failure of the project, Mabes Polri in 2008 announced the system would be rebuilt with the new number: 112. As of January 30 2009 however, only Polda Metro Jaya (in Jakarta) and Polda West Java had trial-tested the new number, apparently due to lack of resources for a nation-wide rollout. ‘Program Reaksi Cepat Polisi, Telepon 112, Dalam 15 Menit Polisi Datang’, Vivanews 30 January 2009. Available from: <http://metro.vivanews.com/news/read/25316-polisi-luncurkan-call-center-baru-112/>. last accessed 29 August 2009.

33 Kompas media group conducts yearly opinion polling of public satisfaction in the police. In Kompas’ November 2009 poll, public satisfaction with the police reached only 32.6%. Although the 2009 results marked an all-time low due to specific police corruption scandals of that year, over the two thousands public satisfaction in Polri generally fluctuated in the 40-50% range, which is a poor showing of confidence. ‘Jajak Pendapat Kompas: Saatnya Reformasi Penegak Hukum’, Kompas 16 November 2009.
of a public service. As Adam Crawford and other criminologists point out, it has long been common in the Western world for private entities to purchase extra services from the police. Crawford himself uses an example of the Gateshead shopping mall in the United Kingdom which ‘rents’ twelve police officers from the Northumbria police department, as an illustration of this phenomenon.\(^5^4\) In principle, there is little difference between the scenarios described in the policing literature of the developed world and Indonesia. In my case study, four of the five private businesses choose to pay for additional services they would not otherwise be entitled to. As Crawford has argued, in such cases private interests effectively cartelise a public service.\(^5^5\) While one can question whether such actions are fair uses of tax-payer resources, they are accepted practices in the developed world and are not necessarily corruption in Indonesia. The question really depends on how such money is employed by the police. If these payments are being used to enrich senior officers (which is probably the most likely scenario), then police resources are being employed corruptly. If the payments are channelled to compliment the police budget then such private payments are not, in principle, illegal. My research was not able to uncover how these funds were dispersed within Polri, the question therefore remains open.

I do not view these payments as protection money either. Protection money implies that a person or organisation is obliged to pay moneys to avoid violent consequences. The consumers of security I research in Yogyakarta pay for tangible returns, such as enhanced access to intelligence, police training support and direct access to ‘fixers’ in the police environment. They are not obliged to make these payments; one of the hotels does not even bother with such arrangements at all. This is not to say that the police do not extract bribes or protection money in other forms, but these cases should not be interpreted as evidence of extortion.

It becomes difficult therefore in this situation to apply the argument of the policing networks theorists that the commercial security industry has become a rival to the police. Although consumers deliver much of their own security using their own resources,

\(^{54}\) Crawford, ‘Networked Governance and the Post-Regulatory State’, 463.

consumers are not independent of the police when doing so; they still demand police assistance. This situation bears a strong resemblance to the type of argument proposed by Crawford. As explained in the introduction, Crawford depicts the police in the United Kingdom as acting like an anchor. The special powers of the police act as a centre of gravity which draws non-police security actors to the police in order that non-police actors can perform more effectively. Individual nodal actors are therefore autonomous but remained linked to the police. In the case of security consumers in Indonesia, that anchor chain is considerably shorter than in Crawford’s metaphor. This is at the behest of the consumers themselves, rather than Polri. Indeed this Indonesian case study suggests we need to amend the dominant model of the networked security theorists. The police are not equivalent to other security entities in the network; Polri’s authority and special powers make it unique. The commercial security actors in this research are not independent from the police or able to deal with the police on an equal basis. The relationship is one of dependency.

Providers of Security

Turning to review the supply side of the market, this half of the commercial security industry is more firmly under the shadow of the Indonesian police than consumers of security. Providers of security are divided into two streams: incorporated security companies which sell security services to the market, and a floating mass of Satpam who hold trade qualifications from the police and privately sell their labour directly to consumers. Although Polri is not interested in how Satpam or private companies deliver their services, Polri actively asserts its power to regulate and supervise the providers. This situation creates a clear dominant-subordinate relationship. While the relationship can be burdensome - sometimes severely - for the security companies, individual Satpam seem to regard their relations with the police positively. In the following three sub-sections we look at how police regulate the providers of security. We then look at several case studies of

56 Crawford, ‘Networked Governance and the Post-Regulatory State.’

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private security companies in Yogyakarta and their activities and relations with the police. In the final sub-section we look at the perspectives of individual Satpam, their activities and relations with Polri.

**Police Regulation**

Although Polri has the right to regulate the world of private policing, in reality Polri’s approach to regulation shows a lack of consistency; there are a large number of recent, detailed police regulations which govern private security companies but much less material on other Pam Swakarsa groups.\(^5^7\) When it comes to police regulation of the generic Pam Swakarsa, the most recent police ordinance consists of a series of guidelines and orders that Mabes Polri addresses to its own members on how to supervise (or membina) Satpam and other Pam Swakarsa groups.\(^5^8\) Buried within these documents are descriptions of the powers of Pam Swakarsa and their responsibilities. This new doctrine expands on older, more detailed doctrine from pre-reformasi times. Comparatively, there is a great amount of detailed, modern regulation on the BUJP.\(^5^9\) As to why the police devote most of their regulatory effort towards the security companies is difficult to explain. It is possible that Polri regulates BUJP especially closely as this offers the police opportunities for corruption. As will be discussed, police use their licensing powers to obtain illegal payments from BUJP. As such police regulation probably serves a duel purpose. Firstly and most importantly, it imposes police control over Pam Swakarsa. Secondly, regulation gives the police opportunities to extract money from the corporate providers of security.

\(^{57}\) For the most current regulatory documents see (for BUJP): Peraturan Kepala Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia, No. 17/2006 tentang Pedoman Pembinaan Badan Usaha Jasa Pengamanan. The more general set of regulations which apply to the sector as a whole and govern the activities of individual Satpam can be found in: Mabes Polri: *Buku Pedoman Tugas Pengamanan Swakarsa*. Edition 2001 (Mabes Polri: Jl Trunojoyo No.3 Kebayoran Baru Jakarta Selatan, August 2001).


\(^{59}\) In the course of researching this topic I liaised with the Kamsa detachment (Keamanan Swakarsa – Civil Society Security) of Polda DIY’s Biro Binamitra. Over a series of months I accessed all of their available information on police doctrine, training, data collection and other material relating to police management of non-state security elements. I am confident I have the most current material which explains how the police regulate the commercial security sector and civil society security elements.
A BUJP requires the permission of the Indonesian police to operate. The Indonesian police license BUJPs to provide six different types of services: Security Consultancy, Security Devices, Security Training and Education, Security Transport, Escort Services and K-9 (sic) services. In lay terms these services are: commercial assessments of the security needs of a client, providing devices like alarms and cameras, supplying training to Satpam recruits, transporting valuable goods like cash, supplying bodyguard services and, obviously, dog patrols. Polri’s commitment to governance does not cease with defining what BUJPs may do. The police also go into some detail in defining how a company must deliver its services. To take one of these service areas as an example, security consultancy, Polri declares:

The shape of activities of Security Consultancy Service Companies... consists of:

a. Conducting security suitability evaluation services for objects, assets and environments;

b. Making basic security plans and designs which are structured and systematised sufficient with the vulnerability potential of the object to be secured;

c. Conducting research and development about the methods and security procedures to be used [for securing] an object;

Etc...

Although there is nothing especially controversial about the police defining - in very specific terms - what companies licensed under their authority may do, this typical quotation from Polri regulations hints at the degree of pedantry with which the police attempt to govern the sector as a whole and the BUJPs in particular.

Although police regulation is most strict towards the BUJP, Polri also regulate Satpam quite extensively too. To give an idea of the extent to which the police attempt to exercise control over their private 'counterparts', the official Book of Guidelines for Private Security (Buku Pedoman Tugas Pengamanan Swakarsa), which is published by police headquarters, consists of 292 pages of regulations, most of which are solely drafted by

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Mabes Polri. This set of regulations covers everything from the authority of Satpam to their curriculum, standards of dress, registration, permission to use weapons and their work hours and workplace conditions. In terms of job description, Polri declares that Satpam are in simple terms, responsible for the security and good order of their work place. Aside from directing Satpam to obey their individual workplace employers, Mabes Polri empowers security guards to perform the following functions: control the movement of employees, regulate traffic and visitors in their places of work, guard their workplaces, conduct patrols, take initial steps to secure the scene of a crime or accident and arrest suspected criminals. The above information is an edited summary of what is a very detailed set of instructions. What we see here then is the micro-managerial attitude of the police. Mabes Polri seeks to impose, in almost exhaustive detail, its interpretation of the legitimate activities of commercial security. This underlines the unique nature of policing in Indonesia where Polri is not merely a partner or even just normatively superior. The Indonesian police actively seek to coopt the suppliers of commercial security.

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62 Some of the information contained within the 292 pages is superfluous (for example there are a number of Chief of Police Orders (or Surat Keputusan Kapolri – SKEP) which countermand or repeal each other). Furthermore, approximately forty pages of the document discusses private security in the forestry industry which is something very important in the sector as a whole, but is not relevant for my dissertation. Nevertheless, the sheer density of this book in some ways illustrates how the police exercise detailed – at times micro - management of the commercial security sector. Mabes Polri, Buku Pengamanan Swakarsa, (2001).

63 Some of the regulations regarding hours of workplace conditions are joint declarations with the Ministry of Manpower. For powers of Satpam see: Sub-Direktorat Bimbingan Masyarakat Direktorat Bimbingan Masyarakat Polri, “Pedoman Pelaksanaan Tugas Satuan Pengamanan/Satpam”. In: Mabes Polri, Buku Pengamanan Swakarsa, p4-19. For uniform standards see: Surat Keputusan Kapolri, Pakaian Seragam Satuan-Satuan Pengamanan (Satpam): SKEP/74/IV/1981. For registration requirements for Satpam see: Surat Keputusan Kapolri: Registrasi Satuan-Satuan Pengamanan (Satpam): SKEP/75/IV/1981. For weapons permission see: Surat Keputusan Kapolri: Buku Petunjuk Pelaksanaan Pengawasan dan Pengendalian Senjata Non-Organik TNI/Polri : SKEP/1198/IX/2000. Some of these decrees have been superceded. One example being the training curriculum. But other decrees, such as those concerning dress standards and work functions are still apparently valid. For the current Satpam curriculum see: Peraturan Kapolri, Nomor 18/2006, Satuan Acara Pelajaranan Pelatihan Satuan Pengamanan (12 December 2006).

64 Direktorat Bimbingan Masyarakat, ‘Pedoman Tugas Satpam’, 4-18.

65 For example, in section 4. of its directions, Mabes Polri provides guidelines on the things “which must be paid attention to during the period of [a Satpam’s] duty.” The police provide directions on: the ‘appropriate attitudes and behaviour of Satpam’ (including keeping hair neat and trimmed), ‘personal equipment [to be carried]’, ‘methods of receiving guests’ and ‘methods of answering the telephone’ – all with very detailed sub-instructions. When defining how a Satpam can perform their tasks Mabes Polri makes clear that Satpam are only empowered to use repressive force in limited circumstances; such as detaining suspects and preventing acts of violence in their workplaces. See: Direktorat Bimbingan Masyarakat, ‘Pedoman Tugas Satpam’ – Part.d., subsection 1 and 9.
At the time of my research, there were a surprisingly large number of both BUJP and individual Satpam in Yogyakarta. As of June 2008 there were twenty one BUJP, seven of these companies were formed in Yogyakarta while the balance were headquartered outside the province but had business operations in DIY. One of these companies was a ‘cash and carry business’, while the other twenty were listed as recruiters and suppliers of Satpam. Six of these companies operated Satpam training courses (or diklat services) which, as will be discussed below, is often a richer business venture than security contracting. Yogyakarta’s BUJP could all be classed as small to medium sized with most being at the small end of the spectrum (less than fifty employees). The two largest BUJP in Yogyakarta, Garda Total Security and Garuda Merah employed 89 and 81 personnel respectively. In Yogyakarta in 2008 there were 4,533 individual Satpam. If ranked by district most could be found in Sleman (2,166) and the city of Yogyakarta (1,736) with the remainder in Bantul (375), Kulon Progo (130) and Gunung Kidul (126). These individual Satpam made up the majority of the supply side of the industry. Although Yogyakarta’s commercial security industry is tiny compared to Jakarta or Surabaya, Yogyakarta does indeed have all the component parts which offer us a picture of the sector in Indonesia.

Security Companies

The two BUJP included in this study are PT. Total Security and PT. Garuda Merah. There are similarities and differences between these companies. Both operate under strict police licensing and in that manner are directly dependent on the police for their existence. There are some major differences in their operations and attitudes to the police. The managers of

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66 An example discussed previously is ISS, the security contractor for Plaza Ambarukmo.
68 Polda DIY, Biro Binamitra: Data Satpam 2008 (Juni 2008).
69 I also included another small Satpam training company, PT. Manggala Pratama, in my research. It is not discussed, as it adds nothing which is not covered in the other examples.
Total Security have a resentful attitude to police dominance over their company and freely admit they must pay bribes to police officers. Garuda Merah on the other hand pays much smaller bribes to Polri officers and has a neutral attitude to their relations with Polda DIY. What is clear, however, is that police licensing tightly limits the autonomy of these companies. Because these companies operate with police permission they bear little resemblance to the security companies that operate in the developed world, which are purely commercial and market-based.

Looking firstly at Total Security, this BUJP is the largest and oldest in the province, in comparison to Garuda Merah, Total’s managers have poor opinion of the police. Total Security was established in 2004. The company’s two owners describe themselves as private businessmen though the main partner, Seti Widodo, also claims members of his family were senior officers in the police. According to one of the senior management team, obtaining the permission of the police to open this business took six months and cost the owners Rp.100 million in bribes – though this amount does perhaps seem exaggerated given what was later paid by Garuda Merah’s owners. Total Security has two business operations: the provision of training services and the out-sourcing of Satpam. Every year the company delivers around five basic training classes for Satpam recruits. The training lasts for one and a half months and includes fifty-seventy recruits in each class. Each recruit pays Rp.2.5 million and upon graduating, meets the Polri formal standard to perform work as a Satpam. Total Security takes the best of its graduates and channels them into its outsourcing contracts. In June 2007, the company employed seventy two Satpam in contracts with thirteen different companies. According to Total, its customers are mostly small to medium sized enterprises. In 2007 Total’s largest customer was an amusement park called ‘Taman Pintar’, which provided a Rp.90 million contract for twenty three Satpam. Total’s smallest contracts were for single Satpam in several small companies.

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70 Interview, Directors Seti Widodo and Atus Nurwijanarko, PT. Garuda Merah, 14 April 2008.
71 Interview, Widodo and Atus, 5 November 2007.
72 Interview with Operations Manager S.Pariyanto, PT. Garuda Merah, 5 October 2007.
73 Interview with Operations Manager Pariyanto and Executive Secretary Nuning, PT. Garuda Merah, 2 October 2007 and unnamed documents shown to me at Total Security.
74 Interview, Habib (an employee from the accounting desk), PT. Garuda Merah, 5 October 2007.
Although Total Security’s owners do not directly state they have a poor view of the police, by exploring the subtle, implied meanings within their statements, one begins to understand they believe the police are heavy-handed in dealing with the company. The managers assume Total has little choice but to accept this state of affairs if it wants to remain in business. In one conversation with the two owners, Seti Widodo and Agus Nurwijanarko, in 2007, I asked what their profitability was. After some brief exchanges they both agreed for financial year 2007 their company would make 0% profit. Without prompting, Widodo claimed the reason for this was excessive police bribes— or as he described it ‘upeti.’ I asked the directors whether the police demand bribes. He explained that this upeti is not demanded, it is expected. Unless it was paid he said the extension of the company’s license “akan dipersulit” (would be made difficult). In accordance with police regulations every year the Polda audits BUJP to determine whether the companies are fit to remain in business. Presumably at these times police expect payments to be made. In my interviews with the company’s management it was apparent that Total Security’s directors were frustrated and disappointed with their subordination to the police. As claimed by the company’s executive secretary, “indeed we are under the police.”

What we begin to see therefore in the Total example is just how closely the police control BUJP. The superiority of the police is not dependent upon direct management. Total Security remains autonomous. Rather what Polri has achieved is to invent systems of control which keep these companies dependent on police patronage. Without police approval these companies cannot operate. One likely explanation for this set of relationships is the fact that BUJP are a potential money earner for the police.

As all of Yogyakarta’s indigenous BUJP are involved in training Satpam it is appropriate to digress briefly to discuss Satpam training. All Satpam training in Indonesia is dictated by Polri and delivered to a police standard. The police demand that all security guards must obtain police certified training; this requirement is one of the main methods by which Polri

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75 Upeti is a Javanese term to describe ‘gift’ or tribute donated to a king. Upeti is formally donated as an act of filial loyalty but with a strong undertone of extortion. Interview, Widodo and Agus, 5 November 2007.
76 Interview, Chairman, Deputy Chairman and Treasurer of the Yogyakarta branch of the Asosiasi Manager Security Indonesia, 24 June 2008. AMSI Yogyakarta accompanies the Polda’s BUJP Audit Team in its yearly inspections of the BUJP in Yogyakarta.
77 Interview, Executive Secretary, October 2008.
establishes its dominance over Satpam. Satpam training can be delivered by both the police themselves or by appropriately licensed private security companies, like the two BUJP in this research.\textsuperscript{78} Police headquarters have set their own curriculum for Satpam.\textsuperscript{79} Private security guards can take three types of police mandated courses: basic (for recruits), intermediate and advanced (for those already qualified). The police enforce strict standards for entry into each of these courses of training.\textsuperscript{80} The police also standardise the curriculum for each set of courses. The Satpam basic training course for example consists of 232 hours of training, including units on self-defence and use of handcuffs, recognition of explosives and narcotics, English language training and other topics organised in twenty three separate classes. One of the BUJP directors has quite neatly described their role in this training as that of an ‘event organiser’ - but a more accurate description would probably be a franchisee.\textsuperscript{81} The BUJPs which offer training services take a Polri designed service and assume the risk of marketing it to potential Satpam. Polri even reserves a massive role in the delivery of training by BUJP. According to BUJP informants, they depend upon Polri personnel to deliver up to 80% of their curriculum.\textsuperscript{82} Although there is some doubt on the part of BUJP as to whether they are permitted to use non-Polri instructors, it seems to be that they follow the safest path and use the police. One BUJP informant claims this is because police personnel are most knowledgeable about the work of Satpam.\textsuperscript{83} Although no

\textsuperscript{78} Prior to the establishment of companies like Total Security, Satpam training in Yogyakarta was done in each of the Polres. The fees were lower, only Rp.250,000, and my sense is that this training was more like a police ‘service’ to the community – giving job skills to people who may have otherwise ended up as gangsters or become unemployed. The emergence of the BUJPs has made these services redundant. The police still offer their own Satpam training but this is now done by the Kamsa detachment of Biro Binamitra in Polda DIY. The Polda offers their training in competition with the BUJP, at the price of Rp.2.8 million. According to a police informant these funds are a cash earning enterprise which are distributed among members of the Kamsa detachment. When I asked the informant why the police competed with the private sector to deliver these courses the informant, with some humour replied, ‘if we didn’t we [the Kamsa detachment] wouldn’t have anything else to do.’ Interview, anonymous source in Kamsa Detachment, Polda DIY, November 2007.

\textsuperscript{79} Peraturan Kapolri, Nomor 18/2006, Satuan Acara Pelajaran Pelatihan Satuan Pengamanan (12 December 2006)

\textsuperscript{80} For example to undertake basic training (Garda Pratama) a Satpam recruit must pass a police background check (SKCK), be between the ages of 20 and 30, graduate from middle high school and pass other requirements. Tighter requirements apply for the intermediate and advanced courses. The advanced course can only be delivered by Police Headquarters. Perpol 18/2006, Pasal 2, 8.

\textsuperscript{81} Interview, Direktur Utama Garuda Merah Bayu Nugroho, 29 October 2008.

\textsuperscript{82} Interview, Direktur Garuda Merah, October 2008. One of the operations managers at Total Security claim about 70% of their curriculum is delivered by police instructors. Interview, Operations Manager, October 2007.

\textsuperscript{83} According to the executive secretary of Total Security: “if we consider capability in giving material it must be the police [who become instructors]. But that also does not close the possibility teaching is able to be handled by other people who have capabilities which are the same as the police... Occasionally we are confused at whether certain things should be taught by police. But, fundamentally since Satpam work is close
informant has said so, I speculate that the BUJP also use police instructors because this is another form of unofficial tax the police expect to be paid. For Total Security, to contract one police instructor for up to 85 minutes costs Rp.45,000 (for a middle ranking officer of Captain/Adjutant Komisaris Polisi rank). The higher the rank, the greater the cost. Based upon my observations, Polda DIY's Biro Binamitra provides most of the instructors for Total and Garuda Merah.

Clearly Polri retains tight control of the design of Satpam training and even its provision; this system has implications for the police's relations with individual Satpam and with the BUJP. By designing, standardising and delivering Satpam training Polri demonstrates from the very beginning its legal supremacy over the commercial security industry. Satpam are left in no doubt that they are dependent upon and indeed are an extension of, the police apparatus. The apt symbol of this is contained in the uniforms Satpam wear; every Satpam in Indonesia carries on the shoulder of their police standardised uniforms the emblem of the provincial police command where they serve. For the BUJP, the role of the police in training Satpam reinforces their dependence on Polri. In effect, the BUJP are mere conduits for the police, extracting rent from the service while the police in turn extract commissions from the BUJP. This issue also sheds light one of the other major truths about the supply end of the commercial security sector. The police financially profit from the regulation of the security industry.

Continuing the discussion of the BUJP, the next example is the second largest company in Yogyakarta, Garuda Merah. This company seemed to be in a much healthier financial position than Total but also to have a merely lukewarm relationship with the police. Like Total Security, Garuda Merah operated both diklat training and security outsourcing. The company began operations in October 2007. According to the corporate director, the owners of Garuda Merah were all civilians and set up the company as a family owned business. They ran Garuda Merah therefore without using backers within the police. Surprisingly the process of establishment took only several months, the shortest period of

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8 Interview, Direktur Garuda Merah, October 2008.
81 Interview, Operations Manager, October 2008.
84 Interview, Nuning, October 2007.
time was in fact receiving permission from the police. The company submitted a request for a license first with Polda DIY, which took one week to issue a reply. After obtaining the Polda’s recommendation, final permission came from Mabes Polri one week later. For this service Garuda Merah paid Rp.4 million to the Polda and Rp.7.5 million in “thank you” money to Mabes Polri. The company derives 80-90% of its turnover from training courses, where the profit margin was an incredible 50%. By October 2008, Garuda Merah already began its seventh basic Satpam course, which on average delivered training to forty Satpam recruits. Like Total, Garuda Merah channelled the best of its graduates into its outsourcing business. Although the company had thirteen outsourcing contracts these contracts composed a tiny share of its business. Garuda Merah’s largest contract was for sixty Satpam supplied to PT. Kereta Api, the national train operator. These Satpam guarded Yogyakarta’s two main train stations, Tugu and Lempuyangan. Judging by the information I obtained, Garuda Merah was much closer to the example of a successful BUJP than its competitor Total.

As described previously, Garuda Merah has a lukewarm relationship with the police, the business deals with the police as it must. According to its principal director: “Our relations [with the police] are limited to work. Not too far and not too close. If we have a need with the Polda we discuss it with the Polda. Our relations are not more than work relations.” Like Total, Polda DIY audits Garuda Merah. Because the company was so new however, its first audit was yet to be done at the time of my interview. Like Total, Garuda Merah also sub-contracted the majority of its training to police instructors. Unlike Total the company did not complain of having to pay regular police bribes (though it must be conceded the company was yet to be audited, therefore it was yet to face its first real test of police avarice). The company did admit, however, that it made set payments to the police. Garuda Merah paid the Polda Rp.150,000 for preparing each certificate of attainment for its Satpam graduates, a massive mark-up for a piece of paper. The company also admitted to setting

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86 Prior to their submission for a license from the police the owners of Garuda Merah were required to obtain all the various permissions for operating a business in Indonesia, including having legal status as a company (PT.), Ijin Gangguan (permission from the district government), NPWP and registration with the Department of Manpower. These steps all consumed a bit over one month. Interview, Direktor Utama, October 2008.

87 Apparently the company derives only 6-8% profit from its outsourcing contracts, the reason being the Satpam market in Yogyakarta is overcrowded and there is severe price competition. Interview, Direktur Utama, October 2008.
aside payments of Rp.1-1.5 million for distinguished police guests to attend its opening and graduating ceremonies. Beside these payments, the company says it had a strict policy of not paying any further grants to the police. This experience with bribery marks a major difference between Total and Garuda Merah. The former appeared to be in an extortionate relationship with the police while the latter claimed to make only limited, commission type payments. I find it difficult to explain the difference between these cases. One possibility is that one of the interviewees was not telling the whole truth. Another possibility may be that Garuda Merah entered the market after 2007 at a period when Polri was attempting to improve its standards of probity, whereas Total Security may be trapped in old, unchanged patterns of patronage and may be too timid to assert its objections.

In relation to its outsourcing contracts, Garuda Merah maintained communication with the Polsek where its Satpam worked. Thus for example Polsek Danurejan which covers the area of Stasiun Lempuyangan knew the identities of the company’s Satpam at the Station, while also having the contact details of the contractor (the PT. Kereta Api office) and Garuda Merah management. In addition to the exchange of information, the Polsek were also active in checking on the company’s Satpam as part of their duty to supervise the non-state security elements in their territories. The company was aware of these visits happening between once a week and once a month depending on the diligence of the Polsek. As a matter of course I asked the director whether Garuda Merah had a relationship with the Indonesian military. I was informed that the company extended the same information on its Satpam workforce to the local Koramil as it did to the Polsek. Beyond this cordiality, the company had no relationship with the TNI. Thus again we see the key difference between police and military behaviour in the field. The police are active in regulating, supervising and surveying key parts of the non-government security sector, while the military is barely noticeable.

While Garuda Merah is not as despondent about its relationship with the police as Total Security, it is hardly more autonomous than the other company. Both companies clearly need police cooperation to operate and both fall under the orbit of police regulation and supervision. The primary difference appears to be in their vulnerability to police bribery.

88 Interview, Direktor Utama, October 2008.
Security Guards

While the BUJP are a strategic part of the industry, the large number of Satpam who sell their own labour to the market by far outstrips the number of Satpam employed by the commercial security companies; because of this, the perceptions of these people are an equally useful component in understanding the security industry in Yogyakarta. What emerges from the several Satpam I interviewed is that their work is menial and mostly uneventful. Satpam are a poorly valued part of the workforce. Their tasks are mostly preventive, involving guarding and patrols. The interesting thing about their testimony for this topic is what they consider of their relationships with the police. All of the Satpam consider themselves underneath the command of Polri. This does not impinge upon the Satpam’s loyalties to their workplaces. Rather they see themselves as an abstract extension of the police, to use the phrase of one Satpam, the ‘kepanjangan tangan polisi (an extension of the hand of the police)’. The police are a force which is above and behind the Satpam. My metaphor, albeit a bad one, is that of a subsidiary company. The subsidiary is fully autonomous but nevertheless operates under the influence of the parent company. This is how Satpam consider their position relative to Polri. The Satpam do not resent their inferior status, they in fact consider the police a valuable source of support. My evidence for these conclusions derives from interviews I conducted with six Satpam in three different organisations; three from Mall Malioboro, two from UGM and one from the Hotel Grand Mercure. I relate some of their experiences below.

The most senior Satpam I interviewed were Pak Marsito and Wahayudi, two of the campus security force for UGM. Both started work in UGM around 1985 and obtained their training directly from the city’s police command at that time. Both men are Satpam leaders and are responsible for directing other personnel in conducting patrols, guarding Satpam posts and regulating traffic. Each of them has stories of occasionally exciting things during their service. Marsito can recall a murder on campus while Wahayudi was involved in foiling a burglary. But most of their work is unsurprisingly mundane. According to Marsito
and Wahayudi, demonstrations on campus dropped significantly since the formation of the SKKK in 2004. The worst problems they routinely face now are unruly street peddlers and motor vehicle accidents. According to these informants, the police are rarely needed for assistance. Each of the respondents could only nominate infrequent episodes when they have been forced to request the help of the police. Marsito recalls that every new year, senior high school students from the adjacent school enter the campus for fights and the police are called to break this up. Other contact with the police though is frequent. Police samapta patrols from the nearby Polsek Bulaksumur which border the UGM campus often drop in on the Satpam’s security posts. Beside the samapta patrols, the Polmas officers in the Polsek also drop by to check on them. For the last four years the UGM campus has also arranged for ‘representatives’ from the SKKK workforce to attend refresher training at Polres Sleman. Aside from these moments, there is no other contact with the police.

The Satpam have firm ideas though about what their relationship is with Polri. Marsito says “we always have relations with the police... indeed we are assistant police.” Wahayudin says “we (Satpam) are the extended hand of the police... we are only first police [as in first-aid], [we] can only detain a suspect.” When I asked the question are the police useful Maristo and Wahayudin’s answer were emphatic. Wahayudin claimed: “really useful... because they have the authority of law.” Interestingly, both sources claim they have no contact at all with local military forces. Thus for these Satpam police are valuable as they are a source of indispensable support. Polri has the authority to use their superior legal powers, such as those of arrest, to deal with security incidents which Satpam cannot. Satpam, in the eyes of the interviewees, only can perform a limited police response, like temporarily detaining a suspect. Satpam therefore have limited powers while Polri does not.

The three Satpam from Mall Malioboro more or less share similar opinions to those of the UGM Satpam. Suzaidan, Wasirudin and Marjono are three senior Satpam in Mall Malioboro. Suzaidan has worked for the company for fourteen years, Wasirudin for eleven and Marjono for at least eighteen. All of them have similar experiences and perceptions of their work. Wasirudin and Marjono obtained Satpam certification with the assistance of their employers, while Suzaidan paid Rp.250,000 of his own money for training conducted

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89 Interview Marsito and Wahayudi, SKKK UGM, October 2008.
at Polres Bantul. In regard to their work, the Satpam find themselves doing a routine set of tasks: guarding parking spaces, observing entrances and exits and patrolling within the mall. The kinds of problems they face are minimal, both in scale and in quantity. Most of the incidents they handle concern customers stealing products from the mall supermarket, or thefts of other small items like mobile phones. These incidents take place very rarely, “less than once a month” according to Suzaidan. Previously, in the early nineties, the mall had severe problems with drunken youths engaging in theft and other illegal practices outside the building. The Satpam freely admit to having had to fight and beat these thugs. Apparently these incidents ended in the late nineties.

The interesting thing about these Satpam, however, is their attitude to the police. Like the Satpam from UGM, those from Mall Malioboro look favourably on their relations with Polri. According to Suzaidan: “Here the ones which are always around are the police. From morning until mid-afternoon it’s the tourist police, in the evening its personnel from the Polsek. And that helps us in our duties psychologically. And we feel more brave in doing our jobs.” Or as put by Wasirudin “[the police] are really very useful. They are able to help us in our duties. Mainly in terms of making it smoother... from the perspective of the law.” The Satpam say that the members of the local army Koramil and an unnamed garrison occasionally drop by on vehicle patrols but the greatest share of their contact is with the police. Every day samapta patrol police, tourist police and traffic police pass by on routine patrols. Thus, like the UGM Satpam, those from Mall Malioboro consider the police the indispensable source of support. Like the UGM Satpam they cite the importance of the legal powers of the police. The ability to call upon Polri to handle a security problem – although they claim this rarely takes place – functions as a force multiplier for their own limited array of powers. The police, rather than being a hindrance are actually valuable to these Satpam.90

My final observation on the relations of Satpam with the police concerns the status that the relationship conveys on Satpam. Although the Satpam I interview make no mention of this issue, I hypothesise that another aspect to their respect for the police is that by identifying

90 Interview, Satpam Suzaidan, Wasirudin and Marjono, October 2008.
themselves with Polri, Satpam enhance their own self image. By projecting themselves as proxies of the police (which, under police regulation, they are), these Satpam also probably believe part of the prestige and authority of Polri is conveyed to them. This exchange probably goes some way to elevating what for Satpam is otherwise demeaning work.

Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed the commercial security sector in Yogyakarta. We have seen how the providers of security are dependent on the police. Four of the five private companies feel they need to maintain direct relations with elements of Polri. The remaining two users of security services still recognise and value Polri’s superiority in the sector. Consumers of security services depend on the police for a mixture of reasons including their respect for Polri’s normative supremacy and the enhanced services they can obtain from the police. The providers of security depend on the police for a mixture of reasons, including respect for normative authority, enhanced powers in the field but most importantly the obligations forced on them by police regulation. Polri regulates the commercial providers of security quite fastidiously. It does this in the strongest fashion with BUJP. BUJP must accommodate police licensing demands and corrupt police rent-seeking. The Satpam on the ground recognise their dependence on police assistance and see themselves as extensions of Polri.

Following on from Barker’s research on security management in the late Suharto era, the strong hand of the state still continues to exert itself over the security sector in ways that are remarkably similar. Nevertheless, while Barker argued that the monitoring and supervision of society through the Bimmas arm of the police was an extension of the centralising tendencies of the Suharto regime, we must now recognise this is not the case. Rather the efforts of Polri to regulate and supervise Pam Swakarsa speak of a particular style of social control intensive policing. In this chapter we see how the police have applied this strategy to the regulation and supervision of the suppliers of commercial security.
Beyond Indonesia studies, the analysis of this chapter shows the need for modifications to the model of networked security developed by researchers of policing. In countries like Indonesia, with strong traditions of state control over security, a networked model is a useful theoretical device only when seen in light of the hierarchical relationships which structure the network. We find this in the way Polri asserts dominance over the commercial security industry. Thus what we discover in Yogyakarta is qualitatively different from the theories put forward by writers in the mainstream networked security school. The police are more than a source of support or an anchor as Crawford depicts in his research. Rather, the internal power relationships of this network show clearly that the state police play a commanding role even in the commercial security industry.
Chapter 6: Volunteer Security Groupings

This chapter continues the analysis of non-state security actors by evaluating what can be described as volunteer security groups. Indonesia has a long heritage of an assertive civil society accustomed to organising security collectives beyond the boundaries of the state. It is not surprising that today we can find a large number of volunteer civilian security groups in Yogyakarta. Although these security groups are constituted for different reasons they all share two common features: all are volunteer organisations, and police authority limits the autonomy of all of them. Each of these groups, arguably even Islamic vigilantes, recognise the supremacy of the police and feel very to slightly subordinate towards Polri. This chapter makes two theoretical contributions to my dissertation. First, it advances my argument by demonstrating that the police assume a central role even in the volunteer, non-state parts of the security network. Secondly, this chapter also offers the opportunity to re-evaluate previous scholarly work on gangsterism and the state in Indonesia. In the early democratisation period state control over society weakened. One of the forces which was seen as embodying this phenomenon were quasi-criminal gangs, whose influence was seen to grow and expand vis-a-vis the state. Much of the literature on gangsters, however, only considered this issue from the perspective of the gangs. I argue this has left Indonesian studies to exaggerate the autonomy and power quasi-criminal groups wield. By integrating an analysis of how quasi-criminal groups relate with state law enforcement, this chapter indicates the influence of these gangs in Yogyakarta is a lot more circumscribed than previously thought. Thirdly this chapter also makes an important empirical contribution by revealing new information on the character of policing in Indonesia. As discussed in chapter five, the state police have crafted a policy of coopting parts of the non-state security landscape beneath their supervision. Chapter six continues this analysis.

This chapter organises volunteer security groups into three broad types. There is an inner cluster of groups which have been established with the sponsorship of the police and have little autonomy from Polri. These groups are the *ronda kamling* and the Community Oriented Policing Forums (*Forum Kemitraan Kepolisian dan Masyarakat* or FKPM). Like
the providers of commercial security, Polri regulates and supervises these groups as its own ‘partners.’ From this inner ring of dependent actors we move towards the outer parts of the network that do not have a direct connection with the police: the protection units of the village (Perlindungan Masyarakat or Linmas) and the militias of political parties (Satgas partai). These security groups have been established by parent organisations which are independent of the police, the village governments and political parties. Although the Linmas and the Satgas are loyal to different parent organisations, these groups concede they must defer to formal police authority in order to discharge their activities. Lastly, there is also a fringe layer of groups consisting of Yogyakarta’s Islamic vigilantes. These groups have a fractious relationship with the police. While challenging police superiority they nevertheless seek police support to legitimate their activities. For ease of understanding we can conceive of this volunteer section of the security network as appearing like a mandala; with police influence radiating outwards and strongly impinging the autonomy of some groups while lightly affecting the autonomy of others. The formula of analysis applied to each volunteer security group in this chapter is to describe the organisation, analyse its activities and review its external relations.

The common element in the relationship of volunteer security groups with the police is that all of these groups recognise the normative legal supremacy of Polri. This supremacy confers an obligation on them to engage the police. For ronda and FKPM, the obligation to engage the police is attractive, since it creates relationships in which they can access police powers. For the Satgas, the obligation to engage the police is onerous and confers little benefit, but it is an unavoidable responsibility. The fractious vigilantes perform activities which deliberately set them in conflict with the police. Even so, the vigilantes also recognise the danger of out-right conflict with Polri. As a matter of pragmatism they seek to engage parts of the police apparatus and moderate their behaviour in order to propitiate the police. Arguably, these behaviours indicate an indirect recognition of police superiority. Fundamentally, what this chapter shows is that Polri is still the centre of the security network, even in the part of the sector in which we would expect to see the highest degree of autonomy.
As a final note with regard to the discussion of the Satgas, while party militias in Yogyakarta seem largely benign today, they have a dark past. Historically Yogyakarta was plagued by violence between the various formal and informal security groups which clustered around political parties. The worst of these groups were the political youth movements (laskar pemuda) of the parties PDIP and PPP. Although the once violent behaviour of these youth movements has now moderated, given the power of Yogyakarta’s political gangs in the early reformasi period a special section is devoted to these groups and their demise. We begin however with a review of the previous works on volunteer security from the Indonesian studies literature, and then move on to look at the groups themselves.

Private Security, Private Violence and the Literature from Indonesia:

There has been a long tradition of debate about private sources of violence and security in Indonesia. In the words of Kristiansen and Trijono: “there are long and dark traditions of indistinct and rival policing and criminal justice systems in Indonesia.” While numerous authors elucidate how society and the state interacted in the security field during the New Order period, of most interest to this research is the period after reformasi. There is a strong perception emanating from the scholarly literature that private sources of authority under various guises - organised criminal gangs (preman) or self-organised societal security groups (such as the pam swakarsa groups in Bali and Lombok) or religious vigilantes (like the Front Pembela Islam, FPI or Islamic Defenders Front among others) - have flourished under the loosened state controls of the post-reformasi era. Arguably this branch of research has fostered a strong impression that state control over public law and order has diminished in favour of civilian expressions of security.

The best articulation of the argument for the influence of private security groups within post-Suharto society comes from Ian Wilson. As I noted in the introduction, Wilson has reviewed several sources of private security in the post-reformasi era, among them the security militias of political parties, ethnic gangs (notably the Front Betawi Brotherhood in Jakarta) and religious vigilantes (like the FPI). Wilson’s conclusion is that: 

The proliferation of paramilitary and vigilante groups post-1998 represents a manifestation of the decentralization of violence as a political, social, and economic strategy, with the state losing control as its sole formal source and patron. If we define the state in Weber’s terms, as the entity with a territorial monopoly over “legitimate violence,” then these other groups present a major challenge to restoring public confidence in state institutions and the judicial system.3

Key to Wilson’s argument therefore is that the existence (and claims to legitimacy) of other security entities not constituted from a basis within the state undermines the state monopoly of violence. Wilson is not the only scholar to have documented this phenomenon. In his work on Pemuda Pancasila, Loren Ryter was among the first Indonesia scholars to document the emergence of a new post-Suharto era gangster, capable of negotiating shifting alliances with different political forces in the turbulence of reformasi.4 His work has been followed by that of Stein Kristiansen who charted the expansion of paramilitary pam swakarsa groups in Lombok and political youth gangs in Yogyakarta.5 The ICG has provided other research on private security groupings in Bali and Lombok, while Ryter and Wilson have each published similarly themed but separate research at different times.6

A key component missing from this research on non-state security in Indonesia is an understanding of how the powers of the state influence civilian security groups. Arguably there has been a pronounced tendency on the part of scholars in Indonesian studies to accept the existence of preman and other groups constitutes an a priori challenge to state rule, but not to interrogate how state rule challenges or impacts the way preman groups conceive of themselves. In Yogyakarta, I find the leaderships of these groups view state authority (as exercised through the police) as being normatively and practically greater than

5 Kristiansen, ‘Violent Youth Groups in Indonesia’ (2003).
their own. Fear and respect of the police as well as the pragmatic calculation that police powers enhance the capabilities of volunteer security groups, pushes these groups (even the quasi-criminal ones) to seek relations with Polri. In this environment, we can hardly conceive of the state police as having an equal or horizontal relationship with private sources of security, or as Wilson puts it, violence having been ‘democratised.’ Instead there is a relationship of dominance and subordination between the police and volunteer security elements, where Polri clearly has a commanding influence over and limits the autonomy of, volunteer security elements.

Under the Wings of the Police: the Inner Ring of Groups With Close Relations to Polri (the Ronda and FKPM)

Ronda Siskamling (the [local] environment security system patrol)

The ronda siskamling is the traditional form of policing in Indonesia and still constitutes the most basic unit of community security. Before the formation of the first modern policing forces during Dutch colonial times, traditional Indonesian society practiced village or kampung security, in which groups of residents would patrol and protect their own kampungs.7 This practice of volunteer, community-based patrolling is still the basic philosophy behind the modern ronda. Today, however, the state police have subsumed this traditional form of security beneath their own supervision.8 This process began in the nineteen eighties and has been continued since that period.

To understand the ronda siskamling it is necessary first to understand the hierarchy of Indonesian government at the micro level and where the ronda fits within this system. I make the following analysis on the basis of my field observations.9 In my case study site

8 Barker, ‘Containing the Criminal Contagion’, 13.
the ronda operates at the lowest level of the civil administration, the Rukun Tetangga (neighbourhood association or RT). An RT is a residential neighbourhood that consists of perhaps 100-200 people, though there is great variation in the size of RT. The RT is the basic unit in Indonesian society for organising communal activities. The RT does such things as cleaning the neighbourhood and arranging the ronda. The RT also discharges some important official bureaucratic functions like validating official documents such as the ubiquitous Indonesian national identity card, the KTP. Above the RT is the RW (or Rukun Warga, the citizen’s association). The RW is ostensibly a forum for meetings of heads of the RT to organise social activities on a grander scale. Above the RW is the Dusun (or sometimes an intermediary level the Dukuh in very rural areas). The head of the Dusun is a volunteer who discharges similar bureaucratic and social organization tasks as the heads of the RW and RT, but on a grander scale again. Dusun are responsible to chiefs of the village (or Kepala Desa). Under Indonesian law, village governments are given the responsibility of determining the structure and functions of the various tiers of administration which exist below the village. Given that villages have status in national law and the RT, RW, Dukuh, and Dusun do not, if an arbitrary line had to be drawn between state and society, the line would be drawn at the village.

The village is the first tier of administration which can be labelled a type of government. The village in Indonesia has significant legal autonomy for administering communal assets (such as schools and health centres), and has its own revenue generating capacities. The citizens of the village elect their own chief and have a type of little parliament. This parliament is today referred to as the Badan Permusyawaratan Desa (or Village Consultative Body). Above the village is the kecamatan (sub-district) which represents

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10 To give a brief idea of the size of an RW, I visited one very urbanised RW in the city of Yogyakarta in the sub-district of Gedong Tengan which consisted 729 residents split up fairly evenly among five individual RT.


12 However, given the RT, RW, Dusun and other organisations discharge pseudo-official functions (such as document verification) it is difficult to determine precisely when the formal state ends and society begins, all arguably merge within Indonesia’s system of governance.

13 In my area of Java village revenue often comes from the administration of village land. For current legal status of the village and its powers see: PP No.72/2005.

14 There is great variation in the size of individual villages depending on whether the village is in an urban, rural or intermediate area. I lived for two years in a sub-district in Sleman (Depok) with a population of 118,000 people split up among three villages. I visited another Kecamatan (Pandak) in a rural part of Bantul which had one village, Catorharjo, with a population of 12,000. Website Kabupaten Sleman: Profil Kecamatan Depok. Accessable from: <http://www.slemankab.go.id/?hal=detail kecamatan.php>
the kabupaten, though under Indonesian law the village constitutes an independent
government unit and is not upwardly accountable to the district.\textsuperscript{15} Though the village is
very important in Indonesian society it is beyond the task of this dissertation to analyse the
village beyond its limited role in security.

To analyse the activities and organisation of the ronda, I selected five RT in different parts
of Yogyakarta and interviewed local citizens who participated in it.\textsuperscript{16} Two of my ronda
case-studies were located in a heavily urbanised village or \textit{kelurahan} of Yogyakarta city.
Two other ronda were located in a peri-urban or \textit{kampung} village in Sleman and another
interviewee lived in a rural, agricultural hamlet in Bantul.\textsuperscript{17}

There are strong commonalities between each of these case studies regarding the activities
of the ronda. In each ronda participation is voluntary. The head of the RT oversees a duty
list of ronda volunteers, posted on the \textit{pos kamling} (kamling post, which serves as the ronda
meeting point and usually comes in the form of a little hut).\textsuperscript{18} When I asked informants to
nominate problems with the system, respondents in two of the ronda from Yogyakarta city
suggested their biggest concern was encouraging participants as “sometimes only one or
two people come.”\textsuperscript{19} Other ronda members in Sleman and Bantul claim there are not any
difficulties in obtaining eleven or twelve participants per night in their RTs.\textsuperscript{20} In two of the

\textsuperscript{15} However the head of the village is required to submit accountability reports to the head of the district. PP
\textsuperscript{16} As background information, in 2007 the Poltabes listed there were 862 active ronda siskamling patrols and
313 “passive” or non-active patrols in Yogyakarta city. Polres Sleman in 2007 listed 2989 ronda siskamling.
In Bantul there were in 2007, 1768 active ronda and 621 non-active. For references see: Interview, Bagian
(September 2007). Interview Brigadir Polisi Kepala Munadi and Brigadir Polisi Dua Enik, Staff officers in

\textsuperscript{17} My chief informant in Bantul was also the head of his Dusun. I interviewed this person in his dual capacity
as a member of his village’s FKPM and as a participant in his community’s ronda patrol. The other ronda
informants were: Pak Suparno and Pak Sugianto, RT.14 and Pak Ismail RT.12, RW03, Kelurahan
Pringgokusuman, Kecamatan Gedongtengen, City of Yogyakarta. From the kabupaten of Sleman: Pak
Samarin, RT05-06 (and unnamed colleagues), RW03 and Pak Suhardi RT04, RW07, Desa Sidokarto,
Kecamatan Godean. From Bantul: Pak Suparno, Kepala Dusun Gesikan IV (RT 05,06,07), Desa Wijirejo,
Kecamatan Pandak. 10 and 11 October 2008.

\textsuperscript{18} As an incentive, each household in the RT makes a compulsory contribution of around Rp.100 every night
and ronda participants take somewhere around Rp7000-9000 (US$ 0.80) per turn. This was the case in all but
one of the RT, RT05-06 from Sleman, where no money was donated.

\textsuperscript{19} Interview, Suparno and Sugianto, RT.14, 2008. Also: Interview, Ismail, RT.12, 2008.

\textsuperscript{20} Interview, Suparno, Dusun Gesikan, 2008. Also: Interview, Samarim, RT05-06, 2008.
case studies, participants claimed their ronda had an additional emergency function, to carry sick residents to hospital. Interviewees in two other cases did not mention that issue at all and another claimed the purpose of their ronda was “purely security.” All interviewees agreed that the ronda’s primary purpose is preventative security. This takes the form of ronda volunteers meeting of an evening to patrol their RT. Each of the ronda case studies meet at different times. Although these kamling occasionally patrol the boundaries of their RT, based on my observation, much of their time is spent chatting in the ubiquitous pos kamling. The ronda are entitled to stop visitors or unknown persons who wish to enter the RT and verify their intentions. This practice in theory is to prevent thieves or undesirables from entering the RT during the middle of the night.

Each of the ronda informants claims their RT deals with very little if any crime. We need to treat this evidence somewhat cautiously, however, given we can expect few people to willingly cast aspersions on the reputation of their neighbourhood. With this caveat in mind, each informant reported their ronda faced very few problems. One of the RT in the city of Yogyakarta, for example, describes their main concern as drunken people walking the main street to the north of the RT during weekend evenings. Even this situation was encountered “not often.” The interviewee from Bantul reported that the only problem his ronda ever experienced was catching teenagers stealing flowers from the gardens of the RT’s residents, but the incident was resolved “informally” (secara kekeluargaan or within the family). None of the other informants claim to have dealt with any crime at all, often saying “during my time there has never been any [crime].” According to the interviewees then, the ronda is almost exclusively about anticipating hypothetical threats.

Concerning external relations, ronda participants have an on-going relationship with the police while other local security groups like the Linmas and the army do not feature in ronda activities at all. Among my informants there was almost unanimity of opinion on the police. When I asked the interviewees the question, ‘are the police useful for you?’, their

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21 In Desa Sidokarto Sleman, one of the RT meets at 12:00-3:00am, the other from 12:00-2:00am. In the city of Yogyakarta, the two RT meet from 11pm to 3am and 11pm to 1:30am while the Bantul RT meets at 10pm to 12 midnight.

22 Interview, Ismail, RT.12, 2008.

23 Interview, Suparno, Dusun Gesikan, 2008.
responses gave different reasons for police value, but all interviewees agreed that the police were important for their ronda. One interviewee implied that relations with the police positioned the ronda close to the only source of authority in local security affairs:

"yes they [police] are useful, obviously because they are the ones with authority [in security] – but they’re happy too [with the existence of the kamling] because there are people who pay attention [to local security]."

Another respondent emphasised the fact that the police were important for supervising the ronda: “yes indeed, it’s the police who supervise us [mengasuh] – indeed that’s their job.”

Another interviewee, Suparno, argued that the ronda system provided the community with direct access to the police. With direct access Suparno believes there is a mutually beneficial transfer of knowledge:

for polmas officers, they are really helpful for the community. Thus the community knows the role of the police and the police know the activities of the community. Therefore we support each other.

Common to all the informants then, was the belief that the police are normatively responsible for supervising the ronda and that this relationship was important to them.

As Barker pointed out in the early nineties, the police exercise their authority over the ronda in two ways, issuing regulations and Polmas officers providing supervision in the field. The police regulations on ronda siskamling that are effective today date from 1993, though Polri actually began to impose itself over the ronda in the nineteen eighties. Police regulations on the ronda show a similar streak of pedantry and officiousness as police regulations over the commercial security industry. If we care to consult the police

24 Interview, Samarin RT 05-06, 2008.
25 Interview, Suhadi RT04, 2008.
26 Interview, Suparno, Dusun Gesikan, 2008.
28 One section is devoted to how the ronda is to make different drumbeats when sounding the *kentongan*. The kentongan is a traditional type of warning device found in every pos kamling, made of hollowed wood and beaten with a stick. Apparently there are different types of drumbeats for different emergencies, like fires, robberies, traffic accidents and even murder. Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Markas Besar Kepolisian: Petunjuk Lapangan No.Pol Juklap/207/IV/1993 tentang Pembinaan Pos Kamling. Bab. III. Pembinaan Pos Kamling.
doctrines, there are specific requirements regarding the number of members a ronda should have, the size of the pos kamling, the equipment (including the exact size and colour of the sash ronda members are supposed to wear) and other trivialities. Based on participant observation, few of these regulations are actually followed in practice. Quite aside from the question of how explicitly Polri’s supervisory ambitions are realised the most important attribute of this system is that the police have a legal claim to supervise the ronda, and this claim is respected and acknowledged by those who participate in the ronda system.

The other method of police control over the ronda is direct visits by Polmas officers; these occur infrequently but embody police dominance. In the five ronda I examined there was extreme variation in the amount of contact each RT had with its Polmas officers. In one case there was variation even in the same neighbourhood. In RT.14, RW03 in Yogyakarta city, the interviewees received visits by police only once every three or so months. Usually these visits only fulfil the purpose of asking the ronda “aman atau tidak” (safe or not) or otherwise showing the police face.29 By contrast, the neighbouring RT.12 which is located on a main thoroughfare gets visits by a Polmas officer once every week.30 In RT.05-06 in Sleman, respondents there claimed the Polmas drops by “often” usually only for the purpose of asking: “is it safe or not? If it is safe he’s not long here, he goes and that’s it.” In the neighbouring RT.04, this ronda is apparently never visited by a Polmas - the reason being that the pos kamling hut is visible from a main thoroughfare. Whenever the police patrol passes through they merely slow down and beep their horn. Apparently the informant there does not mind, he is on first name terms with the Polmas officer allocated to his village and sees him in weekly village meetings.31 In Dusun Gesikan in Bantul, the informant claims that in his RT either the Polmas or the Kapolsek visits his neighbourhood at least twice a week.32 The purpose of these visits is not elaborate, but appears mostly to function for ‘showing the police face’ and remaining in direct contact with the community. Quite aside from the positive effects for police-community relations, these direct visits also act as a constant reminder of the normative authority of the police.

29 Interview, Suparno and Sugianto RT.14, 2008.
30 Interview, Ismail RT.12, 2008.
31 In fact the informant takes this as a badge of pride, believing it shows the police have confidence in the capability of his ronda. Interview, Suhardi RT.04, 2008.
32 Interview, Suparno, Dusun Gesikan, 2008.
The critical point about the power imbalance between the ronda and the police is that my interviewees did not object to their subordinate position. In fact, they value their relations with Polri. The reason is more or less the same as why Satpam value their relations with Polri. Ronda members see the police as having powers the ronda does not - to legally handle crime. In the words of Ismail from RW03, Yogyakarta city: “We prioritise the RW, but for problems outside their capabilities our hopes go to the Pak Babin... with alacrity the Polsek comes [if needed] because our relations are close.” By the same token however, when I asked each of the informants whether their ronda had any contact with their local Koramil or their village Linmas all of the respondents answered negatively. The only informant to expand slightly on this point was the Dusun head from Bantul, Suparno, who explained:

The Linmas’s task is securing activities which are held by the village. Like yesterday there was a ceremony for readying the Linmas in anticipation of the 2009 elections. But with activities regarding the ronda, we cooperate with the Babinkamibmas only [another term for Polmas officer] ...the Koramil is active [in response to the question of the interviewer: is the Koramil active in supporting the ronda?]...they are active in giving ‘socialisation’...mainly about government programs which are linked with security.

I include this quotation to give an idea just how powerful the police are in delivering direct security to Indonesian society. Despite the existence of other state security entities, even at this micro-level, their involvement in security provision pales in comparison to the police. The police appear as virtually the only active representative of the state that has the authority to enforce security. Other elements like the military and the Linmas are reduced to the role of ‘giving advice’ or providing only occasional physical security services. These roles are marginal in comparison to what can be performed by the police.

Thus we can infer that the ronda is subordinate to the police. This situation is not merely because Polri takes upon itself the task of regulating and supervising the kamling. This situation is also brought about because ronda participants conceive of the ronda as being dependent upon Polri. Such relations are beneficial. They enhance the capabilities of the ronda while enabling the police to further the social control objectives of their security.
strategy. The police-ronda relationship hardly illustrates the horizontal, mutually inter-
dependent security network favoured by most scholars of networked security.

*Forum Kemitraan Polisi dan Masyarakat (Community Oriented Policing Forums)*

While the ronda are Indonesia's traditional form of police, after 2006 Polri created a new
security group as part of its effort to engage civil society. These are the FKPM. The FKPM share a fundamental similarity with the ronda in that both fall beneath the umbrella of police supervision. However, the existence of the FKPM shows Polri's capacity to adapt and broaden its strategy of coopting non-state centres of security. The purpose of the FKPM is to resolve local conflicts. Participants in the FKPM project share similarities with the participants in the ronda. Like the ronda, FKPM groupings consist of volunteers. Also like the ronda, members of the FKPM value relationships with the police and normatively recognise the superiority of Polri over their organisations.

The FKPM project is one of the few externally visible changes that Polri has made as part of its internal reform process. Polri released the FKPM policy in 2005 for implementation over the period 2006-2009. This policy constitutes the product of several years of trial programs in various parts of Indonesia. The Community Oriented Policing Strategy (or COP) has been praised by international donors as presenting a new face of Polri to the Indonesian community. This is true but it also masks the fact the Polri’s COP delivers only modest change and involves little extra reform effort on the part of police. The greatest change attendant with this policy is that police headquarters has expanded the number of Babinkamtibmas/Polmas officers on the ground. The basic premise of the COP policy is to create a new point of contact for the police and the community, in which the two parties can

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**References**

34 In fact one of the first places in which Polri trialled this strategy was in Yogyakarta in 2002. ‘Community helps police improve image’, *Jakarta Post*, 5 July 2003.
discuss local security problems. The police COP policy document is full of lofty rhetoric and long winded abstractions, and it is difficult to extract from it a clear idea of how Polri intends to apply its policy in practice. It was only after I began interviewing participants on the ground that I learned basic facts about how Polri practices community oriented policing.

In essence the Community Oriented Policing strategy in Indonesia amounts to the establishment of new meeting forums at the micro-level of society, in the village in particular. Each forum is composed of representatives from the local community who meet to resolve security problems, like domestic violence or theft. According to my research, the police choose FKPM community representatives from leaders of neighbourhood associations (i.e Kepala Dusun or Kepala RW). Each FKPM is allocated a Polmas officer from its local Polsek. This Polmas officer provides a point of contact between the police and the FKPM and provides the community-police forum with access to Polri’s authority. The Polmas officer is also responsible for legitimising resolutions between disputing parties which are mediated within the FKPM. Thus the Polmas officer plays a strategic role by adding to the FKPM the normative, legal authority of the police. From 2007 Polri began rolling out this project with the intention of creating an FKPM in every village in Indonesia. Polda DIY has been dilatory in implementing the Mabes Polri template. The Biro Binamitra explained that, due to difficulties in administrative preparation the Polda started promoting (mensosialisasikan) the initiative one year later than called for in the Mabes Polri grand plan. By May 2007, Polda DIY had succeeded in creating 198 of the 438 community-police forums that had been planned for the year. As a result the FKPM I researched all had existed for less than one year.

To describe how community policing forums operate I sampled three FKPM from very different environments in Yogyakarta. The first of my case studies was located in a highly urbanised neighbourhood in Yogyakarta city. This FKPM was established in April 2007

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37 There are essentially two types of FKPM – wilayah (residential area) and kawasan (commercial zone). FKPM wilayah in Yogyakarta are established on the boundaries of a village. Polseks take the initiative in establishing FKPM kawasan. The Polsek will select a commercial area – such as a train station or shopping district – which would benefit from the creation of an FKPM.
and set up on the boundaries of an RW rather than a village. Organisational identity and titulary positions were taken very seriously by the leadership of this forum. The second case study – Stasiun Lempuyangan – is an community-police forum established for a commercial district, rather than a residential neighbourhood. In this instance the FKPM’s territory was an economy class train station in Yogyakarta city. Polsek Danurejan created FKPM Stasiun Lempuyangan in September 2007. The membership of this forum was drawn largely from the commercial guilds (or pagubuyan) which trade around the station, such as the taxi drivers, street stall holders, and motorcycle taxi drivers (tukang ojek). The pagubuyan supply their leaders as the day-to-day managers of the forum, but virtually everyone who trades around the station is considered a member of FKPM Lempuyangan. The final case study is from the village of Wijirejo in Kecamatan Pandak, in the agrarian countryside of Bantul. The FKPM had only been in operation for six months at the time of my interview. As a matter of practicality in these rural areas the police draw the membership of the FKPM by nominating the chief of each Dusun (and one or two others from every Dusun) to lead the community-police forums. While each of my FKPM case studies have different characteristics, there is a remarkable similarity in their approach to conflict resolution and in their attitudes to the police.

As mentioned previously, the most powerful attribute of the FKPM is its capacity to become a platform to negotiate the micro-social problems of interest to its participants. The ingeniousness of the system is its simplicity. Through such forums ordinary citizens gain

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40 Although Polri doctrine dictates that one FKPM should cover an entire village/kelurahan area, the RWs of this area (Kelurahan Pringgokusuman) initially decided they were not ready to contribute collectively to such a grouping. Instead the FKPM was built on the foundations of the best organised and most active RW (RW03 in Kelurahan Pringgokusuman, Kecamatan Gedong Tengan) to be a special sample for the others. The leadership of this FKPM was transferred from the security committee of the RW. Interview with Ketua FKPM Jlagrah, RW03 Sutiono and Sekretaris Setiyana 17 June 2008.

41 When I was met by the leadership of this organisation in their RW building, the seven or so people attending our interview greeted me in their RW03 uniforms. They showed me an immaculately kept series of records for their forum, from meeting minutes to membership cards to an incident log. All of this showed an impressive commitment to the activities of the group.


43 At the time of my interview around 600 or more people formally joined this FKPM. The people who live in the residential areas around the FKPM also participate in the forum and provide one of their own residents as the chairman. FKPM Lempuyangan (Document), Daftar Anggota (as at June 2008).

44 There was some disagreement among interviewees on when the FKPM was established. The interviewee from the FKPM, Pak Suparno, claimed that the Wijirejo village FKPM had existed for the last three years, but I find this claim improbable. Instead I refer to the opinion of the Polsek’s Polmas officers, who claimed the FKPM had existed for only six months. The nominal head of the FKPM is the head of the village. Interview, Suparno Kepala Dusun Gresikan, 2008. Interview, Polmas officers Sarjono and Subiantoro, October 2008.
continuous, direct access to a single Polmas officer. This officer can take up the concerns of local citizens and legally handle an alleged instance of crime. The Polmas officer can also act as an impartial witness to negotiations between disputing parties and thus, in the eyes of the FKPM, add normative legal weight to the FKPM’s dispute resolution. In a society like Indonesia which does not have a reliable 911 emergency call system, the direct access to members of the police provided through the FKPM is a valuable asset for local communities.

Of the three case studies, Bantul has the most systematised procedure for dealing with security problems through the FKPM; Polmas officers perform a critical role in this process. Although the Forum in the Bantul case study meets routinely every three months, when a problem occurs within a Dusun of Wijirejo village, the Dusun’s representative on the FKPM is involved and seeks to bring the victim and the perpetrator together. For purely criminal cases (tindak pidana umum) like violent crime with a weapon, the police stress they cannot allow the FKPM to resolve the case. The FKPM can deal with small cases (kasus ringan) like domestic violence, extra-marital affairs or theft. According to the police 90% of the problems referred to the FKPM are resolved by negotiation (secara musyawarah).45 For example, the one and only case that my informant, a representative of Dusun Gesikan, has dealt with, involved children stealing flowers from the gardens of his neighbours. In this instance the children and the victims were brought together for a discussion and the children signed an agreement (surat kesepakatan). The children admitted to the crime and agreed not to repeat the act. The victims signed that they would not take further action. The agreement was witnessed and under-signed by the Dusun’s FKPM representatives and by the Polmas officer.46 The police performed the role of an impartial witness to the resolution. In essence the police used their legal authority to legitimate the negotiation. The community apparently values these services. My informant said: “before that institution [the FKPM] existed, we didn’t have a process for resolving a problem. After the existence of the FKPM, we can bridge a problem through a consensual agreement

46 On another occasion the Polmas officers of Kecamatan Pandak (the Polsek which covers Wijirejo village) showed me numerous copies of official agreements from other villages that had been negotiated through their FKPMs. One example shown to me was a case of underage theft. Interview, Sarjono and Subiantoro Polmas officers, October 2008.
Although the formal agreement documents are a policy only of Polres Bantul, the negotiation functions of the FKPM are much the same in the other two cases.

FKPM RW03 in Yogyakarta city performs much the same dispute resolution functions as its counterpart in Bantul. Although in some instances this community-police forum uses a similar letter of agreement as used in Bantul, this is done on the initiative of the RW and not as policy of the police. In most instances it is sufficient to note an event in the FKPM’s log book. If two sides to a dispute reach an agreement verbally, it is noted in the FKPM log and the Polmas signs the log to demonstrate the issue is resolved. The secretary of RW03 describes the function of the Polmas in these cases as a “strong (credible) witness” (saksi berat). The FKPM meets once a month to discuss general matters of neighbourhood security, but responds to specific problems as they arise. Looking at their log of events, the FKPM was involved in twelve incidents between August 2007 and June 2008, ranging from traffic accidents, two cases of adultery, to a mentally ill man who attacked a housewife. The Polmas officer noted and signed off on the FKPM’s response to each of these events. The informants view the police as useful primarily because the police are capable of taking official responsibility for these disturbances:

for the polmas who is here, indeed [his presence] is very helpful for the community... if there are problems they are able to be lifted to the head of the RW all at once with the polmas. Thus the polmas later will give a report and he will be responsible.

The answer of this FKPM informant bears an interesting resemblance to the opinions of the Satpam and ronda interviewees. The above interviewee from FKPM RW03 believes the forum provides his community with access to police law enforcement powers. Access to such powers is seen as acting as a force multiplier for the FKPM.

The FKPM of Lempuyangan railway station, however, faces a different set of problems and has a different relationship with the police as well. The most important set of functions for this grouping is dealing with eruptions of conflict between the transport workers who

47 Interview, Suparno Dusun Gesikan, 2008.
48 Buku Laporan Kejadian Polmas RW03, Kelurahan Pringgokusuman.
49 Interview, Setiyana and Sutiono, October 2008 and 8 July 2008.
compete for business outside the station. In dealing with this kind of conflict, the FKPM relies solely upon informal negotiations between the sides to a dispute. In these instances the community-police forum acts as a facilitator and a guarantor of agreements. Respondents describe the police as only having a back-up role. During its year of existence (at the time of my interviews) the FKPM had dealt with only a handful of problems. According to their Log of Events, FKPM Lempuyangan had dealt with one case of fraud in December 2007, one case of a disagreement between two passengers in February 2008, and one case of a stolen scooter in May 2008. It seems that this FKPM takes an approach of separating cases that have an element of criminality from those which are matters of social conflict, referring the former to the police and taking responsibility for the latter itself. In this regard, the Polmas for Lempuyangan has the most tenuous relationship with the FKPM of any of the three cases. Informants consider his assistance to be beneficial but their relationship with the police is clearly more limited than in the other examples. As to why this is the case, I speculate that through their paguyuban, the respective transport workers and other traders around this train station already have a representative system that can guarantee and legitimate negotiations between disputing sides. The legitimating powers of the Polmas are therefore redundant, and the police's role within the FKPM is largely one of emergency support.

The FKPM case studies from Yogyakarta demonstrate two things. The police strategy of supervising and regulating non-state security groups, a phenomenon Barker revealed in the nineteen nineties, continues today. In fact Polri has expanded the policy by inventing FKPM groupings at the micro-social level, which directly draw upon police authority for their existence. Secondly, the FKPM provides another illustration of the centrality of Polri in the security network. Within the relationship between Polri and community-police forums, the police are in a clear position of superiority. Although police superiority is born of the fact that Polri regulates and initiates the FKPM, the superiority is sustained because

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50 Interview Harjanto and Heri, June 2008 and Wakil Ketua II Tri Noviriyanto, 20 October 2008
51 A shop owner in the area had loaned Rp.50,000 to a person of unknown identity who had then absconded, the incident was reported to the Polsek without resolution.
52 Two station passengers had disputed the ownership of an item of luggage. According to the log this incident was resolved by the FKPM leadership calling the sides together and mediating a resolution.
53 The scooter theft was reported to the local Polsek without resolution. Buku Kejadian FKPM, FKPM Stasiun Lempuyangan (as at 2 July 2008).
54 Interview Harjanto and Heri, June 2008 and Wakil Ketua Tri Noviriyanto, 2008.
local communities demand services from the police, like access to police law enforcement powers and the symbolic legal authority Polmas officers inject into dispute resolution agreements. The unbalanced power relationships occur, however, within an overall framework in which the FKPM are autonomous. The police do not actively attempt to run the FKPM, rather the police offer assistance on an as needs basis determined by the FKPM participants.

Neither Hot nor Cold: The Middle Ring of Organisations Without Direct Links to the Police (Satgas and Linmas)

We now turn to examine other civil society groupings which are involved in the provision of security but which are parts of larger organisations. Their structural relationships makes such groups less dependent on Polri and diminishes the value of the police. There are two of these type of security entities which my research has discovered: the Linmas units which are organised underneath the control of the villages and the security units of political parties. Coincidentally, both of these organisations are most active during election periods.

Returning to the mandala metaphor proposed in the introduction, this analysis is gradually moving out from the central groups solely dependent on the state police to those which have an increasingly distant relationship with it. Nevertheless, although the Linmas and Satgas are entirely independent of the police, they also must acknowledge the authority of Polri. In these examples a different aspect of Polri’s superiority comes to the fore. In the case of the ronda and the FKPM these groupings are coopted by a policy of police supervision and regulation. In the case of the Satgas and the Linmas, these groups must defer to Polri because of the police’s unique legal authority to enforce domestic security. Satgas and Linmas are forced to deal with the police when conducting security affairs during elections. The articulation of this demand is modest, Satgas for example only feel required to provide information to the police on their activities. Linmas units are placed under police command when guarding election events. Nevertheless Linmas and Satgas volunteers believe they are obliged to act in this way. The obligation is non-negotiable and

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signals a dominant-subordinate relationship. Thus although Satgas and Linmas are the security arms of independent parent organisations, neither are these groupings free from the obligation to deal with the police.

*Perlindungan Masyarakat - Linmas*

The antecedents of the present day Linmas are the Hansip (*pertahanan sipil* or civil defence units) of the army and the Kamra (*keamanan rakyat* or people’s security units) established by the police during the New Order period. ABRI developed Hansip and Kamra units as volunteer organisations to provide Polri and TNI with client civilian groupings which were capable of rapid mobilisation for security purposes. According to my informants, the Koramil was responsible for organising the Hansip units (who were dressed in olive drab khaki uniform) and the Polsek was responsible for the Kamra units (dressed in brown police issue uniforms). During the early post-1998 period, the Department of Defence dismantled both these organisations. Although my interviewees in the villages are unable to recall exact dates, some time between the 1999 national election and the Megawati administration in 2001, the old Hansip and Kamra units were renamed Linmas and placed

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55 The most detailed description I have discovered for the Hansip/Kamra forces is in Lowry’s *Armed Forces of Indonesia*. Lowry provides a strategic overview of the program but confuses Kamra, Hansip and emergency services volunteers. At least in Yogyakarta these were all separate units during the New Order period (and the emergency volunteers did not exist at all). Joshua Barker provides a different account, equating the Hansip in his Bandung case study with police controlled Satpam. It is likely that Hansip and Kamra elements were organised in a haphazard way during the New Order period. At this point I merely note these differences in the literature and flag this topic as one for future research. See: Lowry, *Armed Forces*, 111-112. Barker, ‘Territoriality in Bandung,’ 96.

56 This information was supplied to me by the police. In one of my early meetings with the Kamsa Detachment of Biro Binamitra in Polda DIY (who are responsible for overseeing the police engagement of civil society at the provincial level), I asked about the existence of Kamra units. I was told that all the Kamra/Hansip/Pam swakarsa groups were dismantled during Wiranto’s time as Minister of Defence and Security.
underneath the control of the village.\textsuperscript{57} Since that time the village governments have administered Linmas units within my case study region.\textsuperscript{58}

To understand the operation of Linmas units in Yogyakarta, I selected three different villages in different parts of the region. The first of these was Desa Triharjo, Kecamatan Pandak, which is a poor, agrarian village in southern Bantul. The second of these was Desa Srimulyo, Kecamatan Piyungan in eastern Bantul, which is a peri-rural village, on the outskirts of the suburban fringe of Yogyakarta. The final village was Condong Catur, in the most highly urbanised and wealthy sub-district of the province: Depok. The activities of the Linmas units in each of these villages was virtually identical, with the only notable difference being that Condong Catur’s Linmas unit met on a more regular basis than the others for the purpose of performing village patrols. Presumably this was due to the fact that Condong Catur is wealthy enough to allocate a regular budget for its Linmas unit.\textsuperscript{59}

The Linmas personnel are drawn from volunteers in each of the sub-administrative parts of the village. In Triharjo, the Dukuh organises volunteers and forwards them to the village.\textsuperscript{60}

The same system applies in Sri Mulyo and in Condong Catur. In Triharjo there are around 114 Linmas personnel, in Sri Mulyo there are a similar number while in Condong Catur, the Linmas unit has 275 personnel. While formally the Linmas unit is under the head of the village, the Linmas’ actual commander and the one who organises and directs the units is a


\textsuperscript{58} I asked my informants in the villages whether they were aware of any Interior Ministry regulations or national government laws for the Linmas. None of the informants knew of any. I have been able to find scattered regulations from the Ministry of the Interior concerning guides to the formation of Linmas units and their basic roles. My interviews lead me to doubt, however, whether the central government Linmas regulations have any effect at all at the micro level of the village. From what I have seen in my research, it seems that the Linmas have evolved from the Hansip/Kamra units of the nineteen nineties and have become a feature of the contemporary village structure. According to regulations of the Ministry of the Interior, every kabupaten and kota should develop Linmas units as part of the basic services they provide to the community. I assume, however, that drawing upon the rights granted to district governments under Peraturan Pemerintah No.72/2005, the districts in Yogyakarta have exercised their right to sub-contract this responsibility to the villages. See: Republik Indonesia: Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri No.62/2008 Standar Pelayanan Minimal di Bidang Pemerintahan Dalam Negri di Kabupaten/Kota, Lampiran: Target dan Panduan Operasional, II. B. Pemeliharaan Ketentraman dan Ketertiban Masyarakat The same law also mentions a very old Interior Minister decree as being the legal basis for all Linmas units: Surat Keputusan Wakil Menteri I Urusan Pertahanan Keamanan Nomor MI/72/1962, 29 April 1962.

\textsuperscript{59} These patrols happen around once every month. Interview, KassubBag Winoto, November 2008.

\textsuperscript{60} In rural Bantul, the Dukuh is above the Dusun which is above the RT.
senior village public servant, the head of the governmental sub-section (kepala sub-bagian pemerintahan).

All of the respondents describe the primary purpose of the Linmas is to secure local elections. The Linmas perform other security related tasks, like the guarding of community events, but this occurs on an infrequent basis. In the words of one Linmas commander:

Regarding its [the Linmas unit] role, if there is an event they are invited [to guard it] by the village. Mainly elections. The important thing is elections. When elections happen, the Linmas is always involved...[in response to the question of the interviewer: besides elections?]...if there are guests from above [i.e. visiting officials], [the village] always involves the Linmas. If there is a social event in the hamlets [dusun], [the village] involves the Linmas.61

The elections referred to here are national elections, when money from the central and the district governments is disbursed to fund the Linmas. At the time of my interviews in 2008, plans were already underway to ready the Linmas for the 2009 election campaign.62 This was the only time in five years that new uniforms were provided for the Linmas members in Bantul.63 During election periods command of election security operations is placed in the hands of the police.64 Outside of the election period the Linmas are occasionally involved in security for other local elections, like those for village head and district government and for safeguarding other events, like mass religious teachings (pengajian). Occasionally, I have witnessed Linmas members directing traffic, for example during public wakes. The involvement of the Linmas in such events is purely voluntary and unpaid. The fact that election times are the only periods when Linmas members are paid

61 Interview, Kassubbag Sugimartono, October 2008.
62 According to election security procedure every TPS (tempat pemungutan suara or voting booth) must have two Linmas guarding it, along with a number of other key places. To make up for the short fall between the numbers of core Linmas members from the non-election period and the demand during the election, the sub-district governments – which have a responsibility for channeling funds from the districts to the villages - must engage in a precipitous increase in members. In Kecamatan Depok, it was explained to me that the ordinary numbers of Linmas, 300 or so, would have to be ("mau tidak mau" - whether they wanted to or not) expanded to 1000 to meet election demand. Interview, Kepala Seksi Trantib Kecamatan Depok, Agus Santoso 4 June 2008.
63 Interview, Kassubbag Suratman, October 2008.
64 The Ministry of the Interior and Mabes Polri have agreed on joint doctrine for security operations during the electoral campaigns for heads of districts and provinces. This agreement places the police in command of operations when disturbances of the campaign are foreseen. Republik Indonesia, Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Pedoman Penyelenggaraan Keterlibatan, Ketentraman dan Keamanan dalam Rangka Pemilihan Kepala Daerah dan Wakil Kepala Daerah (2006), Bab V.
probably explains their relative dormancy. Given that my interviewees nominate national election times, once every five years, as the only major period of Linmas activity, I conclude that Linmas are a comparatively marginal part of the local security network.65

Concerning their external relations, the Linmas units have contact and receive support from both the army66 and the police, but my informants consider the police to be the primary agency. When asking the Linmas coordinator in Condong Catur village about the contact his unit had with other agencies he ventured:

[the kecamatan is] active [in supporting his unit]... if we talk about the head of the kecamatan, [he] uses Pol.PP, if it’s the Koramil they use the Babinsa, and the Polsek uses the Babinkamtibmas. The leading sector is the Babinkamtibmas.67

Suratman, one of my other interviewees, gave the following comment in response to my question about how his Linmas personnel communicate with the police: “[they report] direct to Polri. You see, the task of the Linmas is to assist the police... thus they support the police. Linmas is behind the police.”68 What the second informant intended to convey with his last comment is that the Linmas perceive the police as being at the forefront of local security. From a position behind the police, the Linmas render their support. This statement reflects the sentiment of the first informant who described Polri as the “leading sector” or the side with authority for handling security and public order. Thus, using the example of the Linmas we see again that societal security bodies look to Polri as the primary source of authority in local security management.

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66 All of my informants in each of the villages mention they are in contact with their local Koramil. But only one informant, the head of the Linmas unit in Condong Catur village, Sleman, claims that his Linmas has any direct assistance from the TNI. Such assistance comes in the form of training (like parade ground drill) and patriotic education. In these village case studies therefore the military’s role in security affairs has been almost completely marginalised.
68 Interview, Kassubbag Suratman, October 2008.
Political Party Militia (Satgas) in Yogyakarta

The primary function of Satgas is to provide physical security at party events. During the period of my research not all political parties in Yogyakarta deployed Satgas units. Some, however, did. As such, the Satgas are potentially a part of the regional security network. In many ways, the Satgas bear similarities with the Linmas units of the village. Like Linmas, Satgas units are most active during election times. Like Linmas, Satgas units are composed of volunteers and are subordinate to a parent organisation. The Satgas have a more distant relationship with the police than the Linmas. While Satgas recognise the authority of the police, their primary allegiance is to their party hierarchy. Their contact with the police is often limited to professional dialogue. While the Satgas are autonomous, neither can they be described as equal to or independent from Polri. The Satgas, like other actors, see the police as a superior security agency and concede they must ultimately defer to police authority when securing party events.

The current status of the party Satgas marks a dramatic about-face between the present era and the politically motivated violence of the post-reformasi period. In the early transition era in Yogyakarta, violent political youth movements (laskar pemuda) played a dominant role in the criminal underworld. But the youth laskar were different from the party Satgas. Party Satgas were generally organised and hierarchically responsible to the party leaderships, youth laskar on the other hand were disorganised agglomerations of violent party sympathisers. Youth laskar and party Satgas formerly played a similar function. The Satgas and the youth movements were both used as vehicles for attracting mass followings to political parties. Satgas and youth laskar both gave the party leaderships a security tool which they could use to inflate their image and intimidate potential rivals. Choi dubbed this system ‘security-cum-mobilization.’ As my research uncovers however this

69 For example, in response to telephone requests the provincial branch of the Islamist party, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera revealed they did not have a party security unit in 2008.
70 Choi, ‘Local Party Politics’, 156
72 Choi, Local Party Politics, 168.
system failed to live up to its potential and was jettisoned many years prior to my research. I explore this history below, in the section on the youth laskar. Although the Satgas and the youth laskar were two separate entities, their similar functions meant that Satgas have been tarred with the same brush as the more chaotic youth laskar. I therefore choose to separate these two groupings and review them in isolation. In this section I discuss the activities of Satgas during the period of my research. Further below I explore the rise and demise of the political youth movements. Fundamentally, Yogyakarta’s Satgas of today show the shift in the political and security climate in Indonesia; their peaceful activities are an illustration of the transition from the violent, chaotic years after reformasi to the orderly, stable security system of today.

To provide an overview of Satgas in Yogyakarta, I selected three different party security units. I decided to examine the Satgas of the two largest parliamentary parties based upon votes at the 2004 provincial parliamentary elections. This was Partai Demokrasi Indonesia - Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle or PDIP) and Golkar. The third case study was the Satgas of the small Islamic party Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party or PPP). Although PPP is barely represented in Yogyakarta’s provincial and district parliaments now, my knowledge of the former influence of PPP youth groups (discussed below) convinced me to review the current state of the PPP Satgas as well. Of these three Satgas groups, the PDIP is probably the most active, largely because the party mobilises its Satgas outside election times and uses these units for recruitment. The common characteristic to all these units is that they fall under the firm control of their respective party leaderships.

Interviews with the Satgas of the PPP revealed an organisation that appeared to be in the autumn of its days. In the early post-1998 period the official Satgas of PPP was Paskam (Pasukan Keamanan). In her research on party politics in Yogyakarta in 2003, Nankyung Choi speculated that the PPP at that time was considering the dissolution of Paskam. By 2008 it appears this decision had been executed. When I asked my sources in the PPP for an interview with the party’s Satgas I was referred to the head of AMK (Angkatan Muda

Kabah or Kabah Youth Force) in Yogyakarta city, A.S. Purbadi.\textsuperscript{74} Apparently between the time of Choi’s research and 2008 AMK became the formal satgas of PPP. As AMK’s name implies this was not its intended purpose, and perhaps subtly reflects the declining fortunes of the PPP. Hierarchically the AMK is situated in the Bagian Kepemudaan (youth wing) of the PPP. The leader of each regional youth wing is responsible to the regional chairman of the party above them; thus the AMK at the district level is responsible to the district chair, and the provincial AMK to the provincial chair. Purbadi was the commander of the Satgas in PPP’s biggest electoral base, Yogyakarta city.\textsuperscript{75} AMK in Yogyakarta city in 2008 had around sixty personnel, but the organisation was generally inactive. The last time that PPP of Yogyakarta city deployed AMK was for the 2006 mayoral elections, two years before my interview with Purbadi. One of the reasons for this, according to Purbadi was a lack of money:

Now financial problems are fairly strong, whilst PPP doesn’t have a large source of funds... thus my obsession is obstructed because of financial problems. Because every activity, minimal I have to spend Rp.5 million. I have to calculate for future activities [the 2009 elections] [for which] I need Rp.30 million... While political parties - their contributions aren’t too great... for becoming a large organisation, we’re not ready.

Yet lack of funds only constitutes part of the reason why AMK chooses to remain quiet. In interviewing Purbadi, I also found an organisation that was haunted by the ghosts of PPP’s violent past.

The old ones [members of AMK], actually there are a lot who ask me when can we hold activities again. But I am still traumatised with the movement which [in former times] was uncontrolled. I am afraid if [AMK] becomes large again, uncontrolled activities will happen again.

The political strategy of mobilizing mass, violent youth is discredited in the eyes of the party leadership in Yogyakarta. Party loyalists in the PPP must now attempt to overcome

\textsuperscript{74} The contact who supplied Purbadi’s details was a veteran youth activist of PPP and a PPP member of the Yogyakarta DPRD. This contact was emphatic that Purbadi was the leader of the PPP Satgas in Yogyakarta city. Purbadi however was unclear on his exact position within the organisation. He preferred to describe himself as the secretary general or facilitator of AMK but made it clear he was not the head of the youth section of PPP, the nominal chair of the Satgas. I assume that Purbadi was the operational commander. Interview, Sekretaris Jenderal AMK A.S. Purbadi, 3 October 2008.

\textsuperscript{75} Interestingly, the hierarchy of Purbadi’s organisation was such that he had very little knowledge of the activities of AMK in any of the other districts or the province. I found this to be much the same with the other Satgas as well.
the party’s reputation for violence inherited from the early transition period. Although the now defunct youth laskar were most responsible for the PPP’s poor image, AMK as the standard bearers of the PPP’s security today still suffer guilt by association. As such, the AMK leadership chooses to deactivate the Satgas outside election periods.

Regarding AMK’s attitude to the police, the Satgas leadership believes it is necessary for them to involve Polri. The depth of this cooperation though, is limited to transmitting information:

Every training event, we invite the police, state prosecutors, military for speaking... I want my colleagues to be able to understand the KUHP and its articles. We always coordinate with the police, because national security issues are dealt with by the police. Therefore, members of the police meet with us, and we discuss our programs.

Thus although AMK serves PPP, this Satgas does not see itself as free from the obligation to deal with the police. Polri’s responsibility for handling “national security problems”, including those associated with political security, situate the police in a position of superiority over AMK. Although AMK does not feel obligated to do more than transmit information about its activities, this demand is a meaningful reminder of Polri’s authority within the sector.

PPP’s sometime enemy in Yogyakarta, the PDIP, also has a highly structured Satgas. Like AMK, this Satgas has had to distance itself from the premanisme of the former youth laskar. My information derives from two informants of the PDIP Satgas in the district of Sleman: these are the deputy chair of internal affairs (Kukuh), who coordinates Satgas units for the whole district, and a Satgas commander in Kecamatan Depok (Kristi), the largest PDIP Satgas detachment in Sleman. According to these informants, after PDIP’s 2006 Bali Congress, the party moved to exercise greater control over its security units by integrating them structurally within the party. Simultaneously, the PDIP also deconcentrated the Satgas membership.76 Today in Yogyakarta the provincial and district branches of PDIP do not have their own security detachments. Instead Satgas members are organised and recruited

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in the kecamatan but are answerable to district PDIP boards. For every deployment or expenditure, the Satgas in the kecamatan must now seek the permission of the party kabupaten leadership (DPC). My interviewees drew great attention to this organisational reform and I assume that it marks a significant change within PDIP, putting local party leaders in a much stronger position to control the Satgas than in times past.

According to my interviewees the PDIP Satgas perform activities of two broad varieties. These are activities which support the party and activities to support the community for the purpose of enhancing the image of PDIP. During campaign periods the Satgas “secure” PDIP candidates as well as party masses. Outside of formal electoral campaign periods, PDIP Satgas are used to campaign (through holding rallies and the like) for even the lowest parts of the civilian administration, like elections for the heads of hamlets (Kepala Dusun). According to Kristi and Kukuh, the Satgas also guard churches and places of worship for religious minorities, usually during Christmas. The PDIP Satgas therefore take on an active role in furthering PDIP interests, either directly in PDIP campaigns or providing protection services to PDIP sympathisers in the community.

In performing these tasks, the PDIP Satgas have a strictly professional relationship with the police. This relationship, as with the AMK, is limited to the transmission of information. The PDIP Satgas feel obliged to provide the police with data about their leadership changes and party events. Occasionally, they request training from local police or army personnel (most frequently Brimob) for things like self-defence. This exchange happens on a fee for service basis. Otherwise the PDIP sees the police, much like AMK does, as a necessary partner. The police have responsibility for law enforcement and the PDIP satgas recognise this. Thus contact between the PDIP Satgas and the police is limited to obligatory communication and occasional training requests.

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77 According to Kukuh: “considered from the perspective of structure, indeed [Satgas] are different from in the past. In the past, Satgas appeared separated and had their own authority for administering their role... without coordination with the party structure. Also in providing their own budgets.” Interview, Kukuh, November 2008.

78 Interview, Bendahara Satgas PDIP Kecamatan Depok, Kristi Haryono, 26 November 2008.

79 Interview, Kristi, November 2008.

80 Interview, Kristi, November 2008.
The Golkar party has an even simpler security system. Outside of election periods Golkar’s Satgas are deactivated. At the provincial level, the Golkar Satgas are organised under the party secretary. At the time of my interview with the DIY provincial party secretary, Golkar was preparing for the 2009 national elections and had prepared a security committee of seventy five personnel. These personnel were an ad-hoc assemblage of karate experts and former Satgas members patched together specifically for the campaign. When asked why Golkar chooses to create only temporary party security units, the provincial secretary has a very reasonable answer: “because it will add a burden [he meant to the party’s budget, to have permanent groups].” When the Golkar party decides to hold a political event or rally it is standard procedure to report the activities to the police. According to the party secretary:

Usually we have good relations [with the police]. Every time we hold an activity, they’ve already given their mobile phone numbers which can be contacted. Thus, if there is information or consultation needed, we just telephone. For example, tomorrow, we will hold a meeting. I will report it to the Polda, the Polres and the Polsek. From the three of them, [police personnel] will come for security. From our internal structure [the Golkar Satgas] will do the security physically [meaning the police will come, probably loitering around the vicinity of the event while the Golkar Satgas will do the visible security on the meeting premises].

Thus, as with the AMK and PDIP, the Golkar Satgas as well feels obliged to maintain relations with police. These relations only concern the provision of information on party activities. Yet this obligation is real and marks the elevated normative status of the police.

Thus in summary, the Satgas today are security groups with limited powers and with the exception of the PDIP, are exclusively focused on party events. The Satgas, like the Linmas, are most active during election times and do not seek close relations with Polri. Within the security network the Satgas, like the Linmas, are autonomous actors answerable to their hierarchy, but they are hardly equal to Polri. The Satgas, like other actors, see the police as the superior security agency and concede they must ultimately defer to police authority when securing party events. This deference only constitutes the transmission of information but this act is a necessary condition of Satgas operations. One of the reasons why this deference is so modest is because the conduct of recent elections in Yogyakarta

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82 Interview, Sekretaris Golkar Propinsi DIY W.FX Soedardi, 10 November 2008.

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has been free of substantial disturbances. Nevertheless, these organisations do not conceive of themselves as able to challenge or operate beyond the authority of the police.

Cold War Enemies: The Outer Ring of Groups with Hostile Relations to the Police

The Youth Groups (laskar pemuda) of Political Parties During the Early Transition Period

From a discussion of the centre ring of groups which are autonomous of the police but which respect police authority, we now turn to examine the outer ring of organisations which have hostile relations with Polri. In the following sections I will analyse two distinctive types of these groups, the former political youth gangs of the early reformasi period and contemporary Islamic vigilante movements. The violent youth laskar have disappeared. Yet to understand the present nature of police supremacy within the security network we must take a journey into Yogyakarta's recent past, to look at the rise and demise of Yogyakarta's violent political youth groups and their contribution to the professionalisation of the party Satgas.

Recalling my review of the literature above, there has been much discussion of the tendency for volunteer security groupings in Indonesia to be associated with violence, vigilantism and gangsterism. A prominent strand of thought in the literature views such groupings as an implicit challenge and a rival source of power to the state. My research serves to modify this proposition by demonstrating the ways in which volunteer security groups feel constrained or obliged to respect the powers of the state police. The example par-excellence of this is the story of politically-linked gangsterism in Yogyakarta.83

83 I employ the term "politically linked" to describe the behaviour of the youth movements of parties in Yogyakarta. These organisations engaged in violence and intimidation, sometimes in support of their parties but often in their own interests. The term 'politically linked' implies a connection with politics only insofar as these groups had a political identity which guided some of their behaviour.
In Yogyakarta the most powerful and dangerous volunteer security groups coalesced around political parties during the early period of reformasi. These organisations had a reputation for violence and quasi-gangsterism. As Nankyung Choi’s 2003 dissertation on post-New Order democratisation in Yogyakarta states, the Satgas and the youth movements were two different entities. The Satgas were functionaries of the party hierarchy and even during the early transition period were answerable to the party leadership. The youth movements on the other hand were loose affiliates of political parties, but not directly subordinated to them. Although Choi’s research treats the Satgas and the laskar pemuda as practically the same, Stein Kristiansen’s later work claims that the majority of the violence and premanisme in post-reformasi Yogyakarta was the work of the laskar pemuda. My research also supports this view. Following on from the work of Choi and Kristiansen, my work shows how such gangsterism has disappeared in the years after 2004.

Violent political youth groups have a long lineage in Yogyakarta. Before and after the fall of the Suharto regime, Yogyakarta’s various political parties nurtured mass, violent youth gangs. While such movements fell apart in the decade after 1998, they did play a significant role as a node of security – and more often as a node of insecurity – during their period of existence. The existing sources make clear that these youth movements were very significant actors, even to the point of being rivals to the formal authority of the state.

In the post-1998 period Yogyakarta had two main youth political movements - the Gerakan Pemuda Kabah (the Kabah Youth League or GPK) and the Barisan Shirotol Mustaqim (or BSM). GPK was affiliated with the Islamic party, PPP, while the BSM supported the secular-nationalist PDIP. Despite having a titular identity, it is more accurate to consider

84 Choi, Local Party Politics, 156.
85 Kristiansen, ‘Violent Youth Groups in Indonesia,’ 128.
86 Interview, Ketua GPK Lilik, 8 September 2007. Interview, Komandan Operasi BSM, Mas Bintu 6 November 2007.
87 In repeating the history of these organisasi pemuda, it should be acknowledged that there are weaknesses in the data. Most of my information is based on interviews with former members of these organisations. As with all oral histories, this data constitutes a recollection of interviewees’ memories, filtered through their biases and information that has been forgotten. Secondly, while every effort has been made to corroborate information, often individual episodes cannot be verified by other witnesses – thus leaving us to assume the validity of interviewee accounts. We can perhaps say that my analysis is the most accurate account of the rise and fall of these organisations according to their own former members.
88 Kristiansen, ‘Violent Youth Groups in Indonesia,’ 128.
these groups as a collection of autonomous gangs with only a semi-formal leadership. Although effectively autonomous, the greatest unifying force for these laskar was their identification with a political party. The historical roots of GPK and its PDI-P counterpart date back to the Suharto era, when the non-regime parties at that time – the PDI and the PPP – sought to create mass movements for both rallying votes at election time and to protect their party events from the New Order apparatus. It is difficult to date precisely when and how this happened, but in the years after the Suharto government’s national operation to exterminate gangsters (known as Petrus) in 1983, the remaining criminal elements of Yogyakarta sought protection by coalescing in two main criminal gangs: the Muslim Joxzin which sought refuge in PPP strongholds and the non-Muslim gang Quzruh, which took refuge in areas loyal to the PDI. It seems that these gangs became feeder groups for the later Satgas and youth gangs that would rise again during the nineteen nineties.

The political upheavals of the nineteen nineties created conditions for the expansion of Yogyakarta’s violent youth gangs and for the consolidation of GPK as the largest of these groups. In her analysis of the politics of Yogyakarta in the post-Suharto era, Choi makes the argument that political parties at that time effectively entered into a deal with the laskar; parties would extend protection and political favours to these groups in exchange for the mass mobilisation of votes and violence when necessary. This political trade-off led to something of a divided set of loyalties in the ranks of the youth gangs. Some members of the laskar joined primarily with the motivation to support their chosen parties. Others joined because they sought protection from the party system to further their illicit activities. In retrospect, political motives were more easily discernible on the GPK side where many...
strict Islamic laskar were motivated to perform acts of religious devotion, such as attacks on 'places of sin' like gambling parlours and brothels. As Stein Kristiansen points out, between these two types of laskar there was also a large floating mass of unemployed youths simply searching for belonging, economic opportunities and distractions from their circumstances. These youth gravitated to the laskar pemuda in large numbers.

In 1997, at its peak, the PPP laskar almost certainly had many thousands, if not tens of thousands, of followers in Yogyakarta. After 1998, however, the multiparty environment of the reformasi period saw a dramatic decline in the numbers of the PPP laskar. The creation of new Islamic parties like PAN and the PKB and the resurrection of the PDI as the PDI-P poached many of the PPP's former supporters. However, according to its members, the remaining PPP laskar continued to have a reputation as the toughest of these gangs. Kristiansen's research supports this view. After 1999 GPK was still able to attract the largest number and the hardest thugs in Yogyakarta. Although the rise of the BSM in 2000 gave GPK some competition, GPK still remained the greatest of the youth gangs.

Within the world of the gangs there were overlapping sets of interests within and between gangs which produced a complex array of disputes. GPK as the largest of the gangs enjoyed a privileged position in the illegal economy. For the preman and idle youth that affiliated with GPK, there was the prospect for some of them to gain employment through protecting tempat maksiat ('places of sin') and extortion. According to the former chairman of GPK, Muhammad Lutfi, in 2000-2001 around twenty five major brothels and gambling dens

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93 Kristiansen, 'Violent Groups in Indonesia', 111.
94 Numbers within the laskar are impossible to document reliably and so I rely on informants for this information. Apparently laskar were only sporadically active. Many followers would turn up to a laskar rally but far fewer members would attend regular activities like religious education seminars or raids on tempat maksiat. According to one senior GPK member there were approximately forty five laskar in the whole of DIY in 1997, with a minimum membership of about fifty people per laskar (Interview, Harist, September 2007). According to another informant there were about sixty laskar (Interview, Ghodi, September 2007). The largest of them in the Kabupaten of Sleman, Radatul Jihad, supposedly was able to raise 5,000 followers for an activity, though numbers were probably vastly exaggerated (Interview, Ketua GPK Sleman Wicak, 27 September 2007).
97 According to my sources, GPK was brought into existence formally in 2000-2001 out of the disorganised PPP affiliated laskar. Muhammad Lutfi inherited the position of Chairman when GPK’s first chair
actively sought security personnel from Lutfi’s GPK; each of them paying between Rp.1 million to 5 million every night.\textsuperscript{98} A smaller grouping of hard-line Islamist GPK continued to mount attacks on tempat maksiat, at times on the very places protected by GPK’s gangster elements, though my sources estimate less than twenty percent of the organisation participated in anti-maksiat violence.\textsuperscript{99} More common however was for different laskar affiliated with GPK to fight with one another over territory.\textsuperscript{100}

Beside the intra-GPK conflict, there was also rivalry engendered by GPK’s support of PPP. In Yogyakarta, the PPP and the PDIP became vitriolic enemies during the reformasi period; quite ironically in fact because after 2001, the PPP and PDIP leaders joined forces to become Vice President and President in a coalition government. Partly to balance the power of the many GPK youth laskar, in 2001 militant PDIP sympathisers formed the Barisan Shirotol Mustaqim.\textsuperscript{101} As a result, BSM and GPK laskar fell into cycles of politically driven conflict caused by their allegiances to their host parties. Because BSM and GPK would protect the political events of PDIP and PPP respectively, BSM and GPK would also become involved in firebombings, attacks and vandalism directed at each other.\textsuperscript{102}

Dr. Ahadam stepped down. Given the internal conflict between the Islamist and the preman parts of GPK, I take it that even though Lutfi was the putative chairman and had many followers in the organization, GPK did not function in a strict hierarchical fashion. Interview, Ketua GPK Wilayah Kota DIY, Harist 26 September 2007.

\textsuperscript{98} This was GPK’s share. Lutfi agreed to the proposition though that the nightly takings of the Yogyakarta gambling industry in the early two thousands was probably more than a billion rupiah, but out of this “many sides” were paid, including the military and the police. Interview, former Chairman of GPK, Muhammad Lutfi 25 May 2008.

\textsuperscript{99} This estimate comes from Ghodi Nurhamidi. His twenty percent estimate was not intended to be scientific but to illustrate the corruption of GPK at that time. Ghodi is the current Deputy Secretary of GPK (2006 -). In the late nineties Ghodi established his own vigilant fundamentalist group, GAM. GAM were PPP allies and joined actions with the Islamist laskar of GPK but chose not to join with GPK because it was morally compromised. Another senior Islamist GPK member, Harist, noted on many occasions his laskar prepared attacks on tempat maksiat only to have their raids spoiled by leaks beforehand. He says he only learned with time that the head of the organization, Lutfi, was the one who leaked the information. Interview, Harist, September 2007.

\textsuperscript{100} My information comes from two sources, Mas Bintu the self described field commander of the BSM and Mas Mugi, self-described Ketua II of BSM. Mugi disagrees with Bintu and says BSM started in 2002. Interestingly, both claim that BSM was established with the knowledge and approval of the police. Although Bintu is Catholic and many of BSM’s followers were non-Muslims, an Islamic sounding name was chosen in order to prevent GPK from legitimating its struggle against the BSM by appealing to Islam. Interview, Mas Bintu, 6 November 2007 and Mas Mugi, 24 June 2008.

\textsuperscript{101} Gauging the extent of the violence is difficult but in my interviews I did hear multiple references on both sides to individual episodes of violence where, for example, PPP convoys were raided by BSM thugs, and GPK members firebombed PDIP ‘command posts (offices)’ and miscellaneous stabbings and beatings.
Although politically-motivated violence was one variant of the inter-laskar conflict, according to GPK informants it was more common for BSM-GPK conflict to involve individual laskar competing for territory.\textsuperscript{103} Therefore, both between the laskar and within GPK itself, there was extensive conflict.

Having mapped out the relations between the youth laskar, the story of how these organisations fell apart involves a combination of internal reforms and external pressure. The Yogyakarta police eventually played a secondary role in dismantling GPK, yet at the beginning of reformasi the police were afraid to take action against the group. Numerous interviewees, from the youth movements, the party leadership and from the police agree on this point. All of my GPK interviewees agree that, from the beginning of reformasi until 2003 when the GPK laskar de-escalated their activities, the Yogyakarta police did not press a single case against one of their members – though many were arrested. When asked why this was the case, my GPK informants provide two reasons: the first factor was the skill and influence of the (then) provincial PPP leader Dr. Fauzi Azahari who almost always negotiated the release of arrested GPK suspects.\textsuperscript{104} Secondly, GPK at that time was a mass movement, and the police were afraid GPK rank and file would riot if one of their members was prosecuted. This factor immeasurably strengthened the negotiating powers of Dr. Fauzi and was the more important of the two factors.

Dr. Fauzi proposed that he had never failed to have any members of GPK released from police custody after he negotiated on their behalf and that he did indeed defend every person who professed allegiance to GPK.\textsuperscript{105} I cross-checked Fauzi’s claims with


\textsuperscript{104} It was said that Dr. Fauzi had a number of important strengths that intimidated the police. Firstly, Fauzi was a provincial leader and a powerful figure in the PPP. It cannot be forgotten that, after 2001, the vice president of Indonesia was himself general chairman of the PPP, so the party had enhanced leverage in national politics. Secondly, the police recognised that Fauzi spoke on behalf of the GPK. The strength of GPK therefore added to Fauzi’s bargaining power with the police. Finally, Fauzi was not only a respected member of the Muslim umat himself, but also the son of AR Fahrudin, an influential Islamic scholar and important figure in Muhammadiyah. According to Ghodi: “from all of these strengths, the police would think a thousand times before they reject him.” Ghodi, Interview, 29 September 2007.

\textsuperscript{105} Interview, Former Chair of the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan Yogyakarta (1997-2001), Dr. Fauzi Azahari, 11 October 2007
Yogyakarta police detectives. Although this was by no means an easy task,\textsuperscript{106} I did succeed in finding two senior (in experience but not rank) Indonesian detectives who could comment on this. One of these informants, Pak Chito, came from Polres Sleman and another, Pak Gusmiyadi, served in Poltabes, Yogyakarta city. These men claimed to have had fourteen and twenty seven years of continuous experience in their respective roles. I questioned both informants on their knowledge of case handling towards arrested GPK members during 2000 to 2004 and both men responded with the same answer: the police hierarchy in Yogyakarta had a policy that officers were to reprimand political youths but not to charge them. Pak Chito and Gusmayadi claimed that the reason why this policy was put in place was because the police leadership was afraid that arrests of GPK youths would lead to other GPK elements taking ‘anarchical actions’ in response.\textsuperscript{107} The police were apparently intimidated by the political youth gangs to such an extent that they were not able to take direct action against them.

Police impotence may have originally created space for the youth gangs to assert their power, but the police did not remain quiescent. With the passage of time, Polda DIY began to challenge the laskar and GPK in particular. According to the former head of GPK: “[concerning relations between police and GPK] previously we clashed. Previously if there were places which didn’t give us work, we took them from the police.” I put to him that other interviewees suggested GPK and the police at one time had a close relationship. Lutfi answered: “that was in the beginning. At the time of year 2000, police were still persuasive then. The police weren’t bold enough to arrest [GPK members]. Because at that point it was still early reformasi.” The key point to take away from Lutfi’s testimony is that in the early reformasi period the police did not challenge GPK. Although Lutfi did not elaborate, we could hypothesise that one simple reason was that the police were, after the separation from ABRI, much weaker in 1999-2000 than in subsequent years. As discussed in chapter one, the expansion of the Indonesian police force since 2000 has been quite startling. By 2002,

\textsuperscript{106} Polri moves commissioned officers around regularly, sometimes shifting personnel between roles within a year or less. This means that the most experienced police in any area are often the most junior ranking personnel (who, anecdotally, often are assigned the same role for many years). These informants are generally not well educated and have difficulty discussing issues outside their direct job experience. This became a major obstacle I struggled with in my research.

\textsuperscript{107} Interview, Chito, Anggota Satuan Reskrim Poltabes, 5 October 2007. Interview, Gusmiyadi, Anggota Satuan Reskrim Polres Sleman, 1 November 2007.
Lutfi claimed the police had began a violent crack down on GPK. In response to a question about when the system of dividing protection money to the police, military, GPK, and other groups changed, Lutfi responded:

At the period when the Kapolda was Saleh Saaf [around 2002]. He was harsh towards GPK. But he was harsh because he received money from them [illegal casinos] as well...

I followed by questioning what caused the police to change their attitude towards GPK. Lutfi replied: “Because they felt disrupted [terganggu]. It should’ve been them that got all the money, but it was taken by us.”

This view was also supported by some of my Islamist informants in GPK:

Before, the police didn’t take a hardline with us. We were free to destroy tempat maksiat, because at that time the supremacy of law didn’t exist. Then there was a change of government [meaning Megawati’s time]. Then there was a policy of upholding law. Then they [the police] took decisive action towards the laskar. Whoever took anarchical actions, did vigilantism would butt heads with the security apparatus. The places of sin weren’t bold enough to oppose us, the ones who opposed us were the police...

I asked the same informant how many times there were fights with the police:

Gee, hundreds of times. At the time Saleh Saaf came it was common. But he was pretty cruel [jahat] as well. He struck the laskar. In the end, he got money from the gambling industry.

According to the testimony of y informants in the BSM, they also connected the demise of GPK with improving effectiveness of the police:

Since the time of Kapolri Sutanto [who was appointed in 2005], gambling has been really forbidden. But what’s certain is what happens today, in the past didn’t happen. And with the firmness [ketegasan] of the Kapolri now, I and other parts of the community feel comfortable. Whenever in the past, there was a report from the community about gambling, the police only attempted to appease the community, that’s it. But now, although there’s still money paid, a case will be investigated. And the report must go to the [police] superiors... Like Gatot from GPK, he controlled the petrol station [with a wave of the hand indicating a local business]. Every month the petrol station, always had to give an allocation of money to Gatot. Then after an appeal

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108 Interview, Lutfi, June 2008.
109 Interview, Ghodi, September 2007.
On the other hand, former GPK Chairman Muhammed Lutfi stated that rather than attacking GPK directly, the police preferred instead to encourage GPK’s gangland enemies. When I asked Lutfi whether there was a precise moment when relations between GPK and Polda DIY turned sour, Lutfi ventured:

Around June 2002. At the moment there was an incident, the PPP party was attacked at Pakualaman. At that time the police were behind the BSM. They encouraged the BSM to attack us... After that the BSM controlled all the tempat maksiat.111

This account generally agrees with the information I received from my respondents in the BSM, who claim that the police did indeed give them moral support and turned a blind eye to the BSM’s war with GPK. Although the BSM interviewees deny their personnel were gangsters in the form of GPK they do agree they had special assistance from the police.112

In the words of the BSM field commander:

What I hoped is they [the police] know themselves that the BSM does not deviate [into immoral activities]. And indeed it is correct we stabbed people, but we stabbed people who were anarchists [his meaning is criminal deviants like GPK]. They [the police] saw this themselves in the field. Finally they felt untroubled in the field. And they felt assisted with the existence of the BSM...

I put it to Mas Bintu that because the BSM opposed GPK, the police therefore turned a blind eye to the violence of the BSM. He replied:

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110 Interview, Mas Mugi, June 2008.
111 Interview, Lutfi, June 2008.
112 While Mas Bintu emphatically denies his group promoted gangsterism, he does concede the following about the criminal backgrounds of some of his group’s members:

I think those [preman who infiltrated BSM] they are preman, automatically then, they are in economic need. I tried to push them into Papillon [a Yogyakarta nightclub] or disco outlets for security. But I put them there officially, through lobbying. And I also clarified about their background and the type of work requested. And one or two [of Bintu’s people] would be put there. But when GPK saw that, they desired to do the same thing, but they used violence. Not through lobbying methods.

Interview, Mas Bintu, November 2007.
Correct. There was much that was off the record, mainly towards my friends. In principle things occurred. But it was if they [the police] didn’t know.

One final claim is that the police attempted to divide GPK by instigating disputes between its rival factions. Some of the Islamists claim that Lutfi was bribed by the police to halt activities in support of PPP.\textsuperscript{113} Lutfi himself claims that the police supported another prominent Yogyakarta gangster, Gun Jack, to raise a rival faction of GPK laskar against the members loyal to him.\textsuperscript{114} These claims go back and forth and we cannot take them at face value. What is apparent is that the police were initially intimidated by GPK and the political leaders behind it. Rather than confronting GPK with the force of law they chose to play rival gangster groups against one another. While GPK posed a problem for the police insofar that the organisation was a lawless band of thugs which disrupted the peace, a stronger motivating factor for the police to turn against GPK was probably competition in the black economy. Although the police were an important nail in the coffin of the youth laskar, Polda DIY however only played a secondary role in the demise of GPK.

Internal party politics was the greater factor in the end of GPK, as the PPP leadership reappraised its views of the political value of the movement. Two factors stand out as internal causes for the decline of GPK: the loss of Dr. Fauzi, followed closely by the new chairman of the Yogyakarta PPP, Syukri Fadoli, promulgating a policy of ‘cooling down.’ In 2002, Fauzi ended a long running rift with the party’s chairman (Vice President Hamzah Haz) by resigning.\textsuperscript{115} According to the GPK interviewees, the effect of Fauzi’s resignation was tremendous. Without Fauzi the party lost its greatest asset in dealing with the police.\textsuperscript{116} At the same time it had become apparent that the violent activities of the youth wing had become an electoral liability for the party. Voters had become tired with the constant violence of GPK. At the same time senior, more political GPK elements had become dissatisfied with the preman who - especially after 1997 - infiltrated the movement. Such preman were happy to seek the protection of the PPP and Fauzi when they faced opposition from the police but also engaged in ‘backing’ and protection activities which tarnished the PPP’s image.

\textsuperscript{113} Interview, Harist, 2007.
\textsuperscript{114} Interview, Lutfi, 2008.
\textsuperscript{115} Interview, Fauzi, October 2007.
\textsuperscript{116} Interview, Harist, September 2007. Interview, Ghodi, September 2007.
Based upon both the advice of the GPK Islamist faction and the PPP’s own political interests the new provincial chair of the party, Syukri Fadoli, initiated a policy of ‘cooling down’ or essentially discouraging his followers from engaging in violence, attacks on tempat maksiat and inter-laskar conflict. To underline the new policy, Syukri stopped interceding with the police when GPK followers were arrested. With nothing left to gain from their links with GPK, the preman elements began to leave the organisation. By 2004-2006, the organisation had virtually abandoned violence. These leadership and policy changes constitute the two most important factors that led to the pacification of the GPK movement.

Although as previous literature shows the political youth gangs were once influential actors in the security landscape of Yogyakarta, they have since fallen by the wayside. Their fate reminds us of the limitations of police power, particularly at the inception of police autonomy in 1999-2000. At this time the police were clearly loath to tackle mass movements which could draw on the protection of elites. However one could argue that in the early two thousands Polri was at its weakest at a time, conversely, when the youth laskar were at their strongest. In the crisis of reformasi, society was emboldened and state power was put on the back foot. Youth laskar drew strength from this permissive environment. Yet by the last years of the decade both the institutional weaknesses of Polri and Indonesia’s instability had both disappeared. The police of today are therefore much less likely to be intimidated by mass social movements than in the past. There is

118 As the GPK general secretary in Yogyakarta during 2007-2009 described it, GPK attempts to channel “80%” (or as he meant a clear majority) of their activities into party rallies, micro-financing and the like, while raids and ‘opposing sin’ only constitute 20% of their other activities. The chairman does not claim that GPK has foresworn all violence toward unIslamic behaviour, instead he suggests such activities are rare nowadays (and usually take place at certain holy times such as Ramadhan ). This information is probably true. Police intelligence say that they are not especially concerned with the activities of GPK, they focus most of their attention on other hardline Islamist movements like MMI and FJI. Interview, General Secretary of GPK, Totot, 11 September, 2007. Interviews, head of Police Intelligence Unit Polres Sleman, 2007 and head of Police Intelligence Unit Poltabes, 2007. Interview, Harist, September 2007, Interview, Ghodi, September 2007.
119 With regard to the BSM, my interviewees did not elaborate in detail upon how the BSM ceased to operate. The interviewees claim that after GPK began to cease its violent activities, the BSM automatically lost its reason for existence: which previously had been balancing GPK. The BSM’s leadership chose then to deactivate the organisation. I find the argument improbable but can only speculate that the same political calculations which were made by PPP, were also probably made by the PDIP leadership and the BSM was discouraged from operating. Interview, Mas Bintu, November 2007. Interview, Mas Mugi, June 2008.

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nevertheless evidence to show the police still continue be reluctant to tackle certain types of
t vigilantism. In Yogyakarta, we see this in some of the police handling of Islamic
fundamentalists which will be discussed in the next section.

The experience of the youth groups also cautions us to the danger of making an enemy of
an organisation as powerful as the police. Although the police were a secondary factor in
the downfall of GPK, the asymmetric tactics of Polda DIY in mobilising GPK’s enemies
proved to be disastrous for the Islamic gangsters. This has been an important lesson for
those who came to inherit the GPK legacy of Islamic vigilantism: the MMI, FJI, and GAM.
These groups have learnt from the GPK experience. While not disavowing vigilantism they
deliberately do not seek to make the police their enemies – instead they seek to ally
themselves with parts of the police apparatus.

Islamic Vigilante Groups

The death of the youth laskar movement was a significant development in the history of
Yogyakarta’s contemporary security network. The youth laskar were the strongest grouping
which could be said to be rivals of the police. The only remaining set of actors in
Yogyakarta which attempt to openly oppose police authority are a small number of Islamic
vigilante groups. These groups are not large but the fact that they reserve the right to use
violence in their crusade against irreligiosity directly challenges the rule of law and ipso
facto, the police. We can legitimately argue whether these groups are vehicles of security or
insecurity. Their employment of extra-legal violence suggests Islamic vigilantes are no
better than criminals themselves. Yet, so they argue, much of their activities are focused on
discouraging prostitution, illegal alcohol trading and (at one time) the gambling industry.
These things are indeed illegal in Indonesia. Insofar that vigilantes oppose such activities,
one could argue that they are indeed forces which enforce law and are therefore legitimate
agents to be included in my research. I would suggest that it is best for this type of study to
cast the net as widely as possible and include vigilantes in my research.
The relationship of vigilantes with the police is tense and contradictory. Islamic vigilantes are the most independent of any of the security groupings I have researched. Their very existence and demonstrated will to use violence challenges Polri. However, these groups nevertheless show that they desire to engage the police. They consciously refrain from certain actions out of fear and respect for police authority. This situation reminds us of the need to take power relationships into consideration when making judgements about private violence in Indonesia. As I have argued above, studies of violence and society in Indonesia have tended to view preman and vigilante groups in isolation. I argue we need to see how these types of groupings adapt their behaviour towards other actors. My study suggests that, at least in Yogyakarta, these vigilantes are limited by the powers of the police. They do not feel autonomous enough to defy the police except in special circumstances. They too recognise police normative authority, seeking to access the powers of the police and are wary of making themselves open enemies of Polda DIY. These groups are not dependent on Polri, but neither do they see themselves as free to compete with the police.

In 2007-2009, Yogyakarta had three organisations which can be described as true Islamic vigilantes: the Gerakan Anti-Maksiat (GAM), the Front Jihad Indonesia (FJI) and the Majelis Mujahadin Indonesia (MMI). Each of these groups shares broadly the same philosophy and cooperates with one another but has its own history and leadership. One of the defining characteristics of these volunteer groups is that they are loose coalitions of individuals which are organisationally weak. They group around one or more charismatic leader (tokoh) but nevertheless have a very strong group identity. GAM is under the leadership of a young Islamist named Ghodi Nurhamidi. Ghodi, who is probably in his early thirties and prior to the 2008 economic downturn owned a silversmith firm, established GAM around 1998. GAM draws its membership from the networks which Ghodi has in his neighbourhood, Banguntapan, in northern Bantul/south-eastern Yogyakarta city that forms part of the Kotagede-Kauman stronghold of PPP. FJI is a splinter group of the Yogyakarta branch of the Front Pembela Islam (FPI). According to my sources, in 2006 the FPI in Jakarta invited the creation of an FPI branch in Yogyakarta to be led by a man called Bambang Tedi. Apparently Tedi was a former gangster and

120 Interview, Ghodi, September 2007.
exploited the FPI brand (‘angkat nama FPI’) to return to gangsterism. In agreement with FPI head office in Jakarta, Hasby Lukman, another prominent Yogyakarta Islamist and co-founder of GAM established FJI in April 2007. With the blessing of FPI Jakarta, Hasby took the FPI masses who had flocked to Tedi’s FPI in 2006.\(^{123}\) Hasby claimed to have an active membership of 1500 followers, though this is probably highly exaggerated. FJI draws its members from different parts of Yogyakarta but is most active in Bantul.\(^{124}\) MMI, the hardline organisation affiliated with Abu Bakar Basyir until late 2008, limits its presence in Yogyakarta to a secretariat office.\(^{125}\) MMI stands out from GAM and FJI in that MMI possesses a clear organisational structure, whereas GAM and FJI are better described as gangs. My efforts to interview MMI leaders were unsuccessful but Ghodi, who claims to be a close ally of MMI, does not estimate their numbers as being greater than 100 or so in Yogyakarta.\(^{126}\) Together the FJI, MMI and GAM make up Yogyakarta’s Islamic vigilante front.

Having interviewed the leadership of GAM and FJI, and having spoken with some of their membership, police intelligence and with local NGO workers, I estimate these organisations collectively to be small but highly motivated. Although they are only sporadically active, their use of intimidation and occasional violence gives them a greater reputation than their actual resources deserve. I hypothesise that individually GAM, FJI and MMI consist of a core membership of probably several dozen members and radiate outwards to perhaps several hundred sympathisers. For any individual activity I estimate they are capable of fielding perhaps thirty to forty members combined.\(^{127}\) To describe what

\(^{123}\) Although the FPI in Yogyakarta still exists, according to the Islamists I interview, it has been disavowed by FPI headquarters and consists only of the preman friends of Bambang Tedi. These people still continue to use the FPI trade name. FPI in Yogyakarta are apparently confined to Wates, a sub-district of Sleman. I tried to interview Tedi but did not succeed. Interview, Ghodi, September 2007; Interview with Hasby Lukman founder and former leader of FJI, 10 October 2007. Police intelligence confirms the gangster practices of the FPI in Yogyakarta and confirms that the leadership still exists and is a cause of concern for the police. Interview, Kassat Intelkam Poltabes, October 2007.


\(^{126}\) Through intermediaries I succeeded in making contact with MMI but was informed that for an interview with their office they would require a donation, which would cost $100 to be paid in American currency. I declined. For opinion on numbers of MMI: Interview, Ghodi, 16 July 2008.

\(^{127}\) I estimate this from a DVD that Ghodi played for me. This DVD was produced under the name of the fictitious "Aliansi Penyelamatan Indonesia" (the Alliance for the Salvation of Indonesia), which Ghodi and GAM made up to distance themselves from the DVD’s content. The DVD was compiled from footage taken
these groups do we must first recognise that they are not permanently active and their operations are fairly irregular. In terms of their most dominant activity, GAM and FJI probably meet most often to perform Koranic studies (*pengajian*).128 There tends to be a spike in their anti-maksiat raids during Ramadhan (ubiquitously termed “sweeping” in Indonesia). As described by Hasby:

As for [the number of their activities] per month, I haven’t ever calculated. But if during Ramadhan then it gets rather intensive. This Ramadhan we’ve done it four times [conducted ‘sweeping’ operations]... If outside Ramadhan, it’s not that we don’t operate, but more we volunteer for those who’ve been struck by crises.129

Outside Ramadhan these groups tend to lie low, spread their ideology, observe immoral practices they deem to offend Islam and take selective action against them.130 My research of newspaper archives tend to suggest this view is correct, since little mention is made of MMI or other hardline groups operating on a regular basis.131 These groups tend to be opportunistic. They have certain constant targets that they intimidate: illegal alcohol traders, prostitutes and at one time gambling premises. But these attacks are planned in advance and infrequent.132 Vigilantes also take irregular action against other targets, examples I have heard of include youth rave parties and Islamic cults.133

Because their most important concern is eliminating vice, vigilantes see the police as both an obstacle and a resource. Vigilante tactics attempt to provoke the police into acting

during October to December 2007 when hardliners around Indonesia staged combined attacks on the Islamic cult Al Qiyadah Islamiyah. As will be discussed later, MMI coordinated this activity in Yogyakarta with the cooperation of GAM and FJI. Ghodi’s DVD showed in full (and sometimes disturbing) detail the chronology of events in Yogyakarta, starting with a raid on the Yogyakarta Al Qiyadah compound and the beating of the male residents there on 29 October 2007. At the end of this raid – which concluded with the detention of the distraught Al Qiyadah followers at Polsek Gambing, Sleman – the MMI-GAM-FJI followers held a parade/debriefing (*gladi lapangan*) on a nearby tennis court. They were addressed by the Komandan Laskar MMI, the putative leader of the raid. I judge that there were about thirty to forty participants in this action. If this single example constitutes an ordinary show of force, we can expect that these organisations are able to call on at least thirty to forty members for a single activity. I know of no copies publicly available of the DVD and Ghodi only granted me a private viewing, thus I make all of my claims here from the notes I compiled after the event.

129 Interview, Hasby, October 2007.
130 Interview, Head of Police Intelligence Poltabes, October 2007.
131 I conducted a review of the archives of two local Yogyakarta newspapers, *Harian Bernas* and *Kedaulatan Rakyat*. I collected daily entries for select months over the years 1998-2006. I found little reference to vigilante activities.
132 Interview, Hasby, October 2007.
133 Interview, Ghodi, July 2008.
against vice. Occasionally the Islamists even confront the police for attempting to halt their activities, but the leaders of the vigilante groups are well aware of the danger of police retribution and they adapt their behaviour to anticipate Polri’s actions. Of the two organisations I have researched, the FJI takes the most cynical attitude to the police. The former leader of the FJI, Hasby Lukman, describes them thus:

They [police] have become an obstruction to the stoppage of tempat maksiat. They arrest, but if we want to enter then we are obstructed... the continuation of premanisme and tempat maksiat greatly involves the police. If we talk about [the problem posed by] preman, then it’s easy. Because if the heart of a person is touched then they will become good. In fact, preman are good comrades [of his]... But police are cowards who take advantage of their rank and position...

I asked Hasby bluntly if FJI came into direct conflict with the police. He answered:

Yes. Quite often. Even [it’s the case] I am most vicious towards the police. But with the ordinary community, I’m not like that. If it’s the police then I’m brave to, because they extort ordinary folk [rakyat kecil].

Clearly there is not any love lost between FJI and the police. Yet the former leader of FJI clearly distinguishes between those police with whom he cooperates and those whom he dismisses as corrupt. Recalling the discussion in chapter four, unsurprisingly it is Polres Bantul that has the worst reputation for vice and corruption. Hasby claims that his organisation has often been involved in raids on businesses peddling vice which operate under the protection of Polres Bantul. I asked Hasby how many times his organisation fought police. He responded:

Often. Too often. Now its fairly often with Polres Bantul. If it’s Polres Sleman and Poltabes we don’t have any problems. They can operate side-by-side with us. If there is info [from his group] on illegal alcohol joints, they respond well. If [Polres] Bantul, its funny, we inform them there is a seller of illegal alcohol, but they say there isn’t one. A head of police intelligence, a university graduate, I say [to him] in a certain place there is a seller of alcohol, my intelligence says there is and I carry the evidence, he says there isn’t. How is it possible? After we come then there really isn’t...[setelah kita datang, kita menjadi benar-benar tidak ada]

134 Interview, Lukman, October 2007.
I asked Hasby whether he considered that all of Polres Bantul accepted bribes, and if relations between FJI and the police were so poor, was there any cooperation with FJI and Polda DIY at all. Hasby answered:

If they’re [Polres Bantul] honest then surely yes. But there isn’t a thief who is honest... For the regions of the city, Sleman and Gunung Kidul there is [cooperation]. In Bantul there isn’t.

What we see therefore is that Hasby distinguishes between elements of the police, accepting some while rejecting others. The leader of FJI acknowledges the usefulness of police who are cooperative while positioning his organisation as an opponent of those he deems crooked. Within the security network, FJI and its vigilantes therefore clearly stand apart as denying the normative supremacy of the police. Although FJI pursued a confrontational path with Polda DIY, Hasby’s example also demonstrates the dangers for vigilantes who choose to make an enemy of Polri.

Probably as a direct result of a police investigation, Hasby was sacked as the leader of the FJI in 2008. This episode goes some way to explaining Hasby’s vitriolic comments about Polres Bantul. At the time of my October 2007 interview Polres Bantul had finalised Hasby as a witness to a criminal incident that occurred during one of FJI’s anti-alcohol ‘sweeping’ operations. On 15 September 2007, six members of FJI were involved in a violent altercation when they forcibly confiscated alcohol from a restaurant in central Bantul. According to the police report, a copy of which Hasby displayed to me, six FJI members were accused of entering a restaurant without permission, damaging furniture and stealing Rp.500,000 from the owner. Hasby admitted that the raid occurred and conceded his followers may have engaged in property damage, but he vehemently denied claims of theft. Hasby was not himself charged in the incident but was called as a witness.

Polres Bantul’s move to make the FJI leader a witness hung an ominous cloud over the FJI leader; Hasby interpreted the move as a police tactic to put pressure on him to testify against his followers. What particularly disturbed Hasby about this incident was the one-

135 Interview, Lukman October 2007. Lukman drove me to an interview with one of the accused, who confirmed the essentials of the case. Interview with FJI Komandan Cabang Pandak, Warsito, 10 October 2007.
sidedness of police justice. The police did not attempt to punish the seller of illegal alcohol, whose bottles the FJI delivered to the police. Hasby argues that Polres Bantul's actions devolved from the fact that they secretly protected the alcohol seller and received payments from him. It is entirely possible that the police case was an attempt to intimidate the FJI. Warsito, an FJI member charged in the incident, claimed that the Rp.500,000 theft was a police concoction.  

Whatever the truth of the matter, if the police case was an attempt to intimidate Hasby it failed. As I learned in 2008 the police dropped the case against FJI. Yet in a roundabout way, Polres Bantul did apparently score a victory from the case. They succeeded in pressuring the FJI to drop Hasby as its leader. In an April 2008 interview with me, Hasby claimed to have resigned from FJI in the February of that year. According to another source, Ghodi of GAM, Hasby was actually sacked by FJI’s ruling council. While Ghodi directly refused to answer why Hasby was removed, throughout the same interview Ghodi consistently unfavourably compared the violent (keras) style of Hasby’s leadership to Hasby’s replacement, Gus Nuri, a man who Ghodi considered much more “proportional”. I speculate that FJI’s ruling council probably decided that Hasby’s violent style of leadership caused too much controversy. As a result Hasby was dumped. In this example of a defeated vigilante leader we can see that vigilantes do indeed court danger when confronting the police. Hasby’s philosophy of confrontation with Polri stands out as an interesting juxtaposition with the attitude of the more cunning leader of GAM, Ghodi Nurhamidi. 

Ghodi and GAM are (legitimately) cynical about the integrity of the police and about their commitment to fighting vice, but Ghodi does nevertheless believe that the most viable way for his organisation to operate is in partnership with Polri. In relating this philosophy, Ghodi describes his attitude by reviewing GAM’s relations with other organisations: 

GAM, MMI, and FJI are the three musketeers. There are many which try to destroy us. We move separately, but our vision and mission is the same. Anti-corruption, anti-vice, and anti-liquor. Why don’t we operate together? It’s the same with GAM and the 

136 Interview, Warsito, October 2007. 
137 Interview, Lukman, 23 April 2008. 
138 FJI apparently had its own governing councils, a dewan syuro and a dewan tanfidziah. Hasby described the dewan syuro as like a little MPR. 

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police, we aren’t their minions, we’re not their spies. But we are able to operate together because we have the same vision. That is upholding the law.\textsuperscript{139}

Ghodi is a religious fanatic, but he is a pragmatic and clever one. He realises that GAM’s activities are more effective when he seeks cooperation with or the blessing of the police. He is unafraid of taking vigilante action. But when Ghodi’s group does choose to act violently, it does so in a way that challenges the police without overturning their authority.

The example par excellence of the way in which vigilantes can challenge the police without overturning their authority, was the handling of the Al-Qiyadah Islamiyah cult in 2007. Al-Qiyadah is a nation-wide cult which maintains certain beliefs which many Muslims believe contradict the central tenets of Islam. In Yogyakarta the group had set up offices in Sleman and apparently gathered a following of over 900 converts. After months of preparation the MMI network began a coordinated, nationwide attack on Al-Qiyadah offices all over Indonesia, in Bogor, Surabaya and Yogyakarta on 29 October 2007.\textsuperscript{140}

In Yogyakarta, MMI, FJI and GAM staged a combined raid, in the course of which four ordinary Al-Qiyadah followers were beaten in an attack that was given nationwide media coverage. On the back of their deft use of the media, the Islamic vigilantes who staged the raid publicly demanded that police act against Al-Qiyadah for ‘insulting Islam.’ The vigilantes threatened to continue ‘sweeping’ against Al-Qiyadah if the police failed to act.\textsuperscript{141} At this point, the police nationally and in Yogyakarta chose to extend protection to Al-Qiyadah’s followers while beginning an investigation into the cult’s leadership. This was extremely disappointing for the vigilantes, but during November they continued to press the police to charge Al-Qiyadah.\textsuperscript{142} Although the police investigation was ultimately dropped, Polda DIY did go to extraordinary lengths to appease the demands of the vigilantes. In an exceptional ceremony held in the mosque of the Polda’s headquarters in December 2007, 935 members of Al-Qiyadah in Yogyakarta participated in an event in

\textsuperscript{139} Interview, Ghodi, July 2007.
\textsuperscript{142} Interview, Ghodi, November 2007.

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which they recanted their beliefs (bertobat). I am unaware precisely who instigated the ceremony, but I speculate a mixture of police pressure and fear of the vigilantes motivated Al-Qiyadah to agree to this event. The leader of Al-Qiyadah in Yogyakarta, under the watchful eye of the provincial police leadership and the Chairman of MUI, publicly renounced his beliefs and instructed his followers to revert to Islam.

By careful use of aggression, the Yogyakarta vigilantes achieved an extraordinary accommodation by the police. The vigilantes obtained what they wanted by defying the law. Yet their defiance of the KUHP was targeted and limited. It was limited to pressing the police to take action by making a high profile attack on Al-Qiyadah members, followed up with aggressive threats. Their tactics ultimately worked. This deliberate tactic of pressing the police rather than defying them, ultimately yielded far better results than the recklessness of FJI’s Hasby Lukman.

To review then, Yogyakarta’s Islamist hardliners have an existential conflict with the police. On the one hand, unlike other security groupings, they certainly do not acknowledge dependence or an obligation to cooperate with the police. In fact, their claim to a right to use violence presents an explicit challenge to Polri. On the other hand, vigilante groups also seek to engage the police and seek their support. They respond to police pressure and take calculated actions which are designed to avert outright confrontation with the police. The vigilantes are the most autonomous security grouping in Yogyakarta but they do not see themselves in an independent position to compete with the police. As such, vigilantes arguably confirm the central place Polri has within the security network.

Conclusion

This chapter has continued the analysis begun in chapter five by reviewing the volunteer security groups in the security network in Yogyakarta. Today we can find a large number of

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143 My evidence for this ceremony is the DVD Ghodi played for me to which I referred in footnote 124. Also see: ‘925 Anggota Al Qiyadah DIY Tobat Massal’, Detiknews.com, 23 November 2007.
vibrant and active civilian security groups operating in the region. Although these security groupings service different parties or different security needs, or are constituted for different reasons, they all share two common features: all are volunteer, civilian organisations and police authority limits their autonomy. Each of these groups, arguably even Islamic vigilantes, recognise the supremacy of the police and feels very to slightly subordinate to Polri.

The analysis in this chapter has proceeded through Yogyakarta’s security network as through a mandala, with the police at the centre, and has traced the relationships of different volunteer security groupings have with the police. In Yogyakarta there are an inner cluster of actors which have the least autonomy from Polri: the ronda and the FKPM. Like the providers of commercial security, Polri regulates and supervises these groups as its own ‘partners.’ The ronda are organised at the lowest level of society (the neighbourhood association) to execute night patrols. The FKPM are formed by Polri at the level of the village or in small commercial areas to provide a platform for mediating small-scale social disputes.

From this inner ring of dependent actors, there follows another layer of groups which lack a direct connection with the police: the protection units of the village, the Linmas, and the militias of the political parties, the Satgas. The Linmas are constituted by village governments and are intended to provide the village with personnel for attending to localised security problems. Resource constraints mean that most Linmas units are generally inactive outside election times. The political parties also employ their own units whose primary function is to provide physical security at party events. Two of my three case studies deactivate their security units outside election times and all three are under the firm control of their party leadership. Both Linmas and Satgas constitute groupings that have been established under the control of alternative bases of power other than the state security apparatus. Although the Linmas and the Satgas are loyal to different parent organisations, nevertheless these actors concede they must defer to police when discharging their functions.
My analysis of the Linmas and Satgas groups was followed by a discussion of the outermost ring of actors which have fractious relations with the police. In beginning this section of my chapter I introduced an important aspect to Yogyakarta’s recent past - the demise of the youth laskar. Although moribund today, the youth laskar successfully challenged state authority and dominated the criminal underworld in the early years of reformasi. Yet the end of the youth laskar paved the way for the emergence of police dominance over the network by the mid-two thousands. The only remaining group which actively poses a challenge to police authority are a small cluster of Islamic vigilante groups. These organisations, the MMI, FJI and GAM, constitute a membership of several hundred between them and are devoted to opposing irreligious activities. The vigilante groups, as a matter of pragmatism seek police support and endeavour to avoid outright confrontation with Polda DIY. Arguably they cannot be described as competitors of the police and their behaviour indeed shows a degree of deference to Polri.

The analysis of this chapter makes three contributions to the argument of my dissertation. The relationships of the FKPM and ronda siskamling with the police demonstrate the continuation of a distinctive, Indonesian style of security in which the state police actively seek to regulate and supervise important units of private policing in civil society. The strategy today has been enhanced with the addition of the new FKPM groupings. Secondly, this chapter also illustrates the central position of the police within the security network. The special attributes of the police laid out by Crawford function to explain why Polri assumes a superior position within the network.\textsuperscript{144} Polri’s regulatory powers, perceptions of police authority and Polri’s unique powers of repressive force mean that other actors, be they ronda, FKPM, Linmas, Satgas, or even Islamic vigilantes, value, defer or seek to use the authority of the police.

The final contribution of this chapter is to question the way in which the Indonesian literature has analysed criminality. Arguably the contemporary literature has exaggerated the power of preman and private sources of violence. My research from Yogyakarta cautions us to view the power relationships between actors, rather than seeing the actions of preman and vigilantes in isolation. Islamic vigilantes emerge as the only security group

\textsuperscript{144} Crawford, ‘Networked Governance and the Post-regulatory State’, 458-459.
which in some way seeks to challenge police power in Yogyakarta. Yet even these groups clearly do not see themselves as capable of competing with Polri.
Thesis Conclusion

This dissertation is written on a premise that it is not possible to fully understand the security sector until we understand the interagency relations taking place within it. Where this issue is taken up in studies of security in Indonesia, the hegemonic view is that relations between security institutions are hostile and complicated by unclear boundaries of jurisdiction. To date, such an argument has been founded upon a narrow analysis that has only penetrated the macro-policy making level at the centre of government. One of the major motives of my research, therefore, has been to advance existing thinking on this topic by engaging with security practices at the regional level. The methodology chosen for this task has been to execute a local level case study of relations in the security sector in the province of Yogyakarta.

In undertaking this course of research, my thesis has been guided by the following questions: what organisations are involved in security management and what are their core tasks? Is there a precise division of labour or are there overlapping functions as the Indonesian literature suggests? What evidence is there for cooperation, conflict or hostility? Which behaviours predominate and why? Are there centres of power or groupings that are essential to the functioning of the network and if so why? Finally, does the composition of the security network within the case study reveal anything distinctive about the practice of security management in Indonesia?

To answer these questions in brief, many sources view interagency relationships in the Indonesian security sector as unclear and contested. My findings suggest this is not so. This thesis finds that relationships between security actors in the case study site of Yogyakarta are based on generally well defined boundaries of jurisdiction. The dominant form of interaction is not hostility or competition but rather collaboration.

My dissertation has employed network security theory as the most adequate device to model security relations within my case study site. The literature on policing argues that
law enforcement is a dynamic task, that involves not only uniformed state police but a plethora of state and civilian organisations. This framework aptly fits the situation in Indonesia where we find a range of central and regional government, commercial and civilian security organisations deploying within the internal security sector. However, in contrast to the findings of much of the literature on policing in the developed world, my research leads me to conclude the Indonesian police are at the centre of the security network in Yogyakarta; leading, backing and lending their authority to the activities of other actors. The normative, legal and logistical superiority of the Indonesian police becomes the core reason why collaboration takes place within the network. Other security actors need access to the special powers of the police.

This conclusion is divided into four sections. In the first section I provide a brief review of my core findings on the security network and the large number of organisations within it. Given the quantity of different actors which discharge security functions in Yogyakarta, it seems counter-intuitive to infer that one organisation emerges as the fulcrum upon which this network depends. Yet I conclude that Polri plays such a role. The second section lays out the reasons why Polri has a centralising function in the security network. The third section goes on to explain why cooperation has emerged as the dominant form of interaction within the network. The final section explores the theoretical significance of these findings.

The Plural Network of State and Civilian Organisations Involved in Providing Security

Chapters two, five and six serve to answer some of the exploratory questions in this dissertation about what organisations operate in Yogyakarta’s security network. We can divide this network into two conceptual halves: there is a cluster of organisations which are based within the state and a large non-state sector as well. Looking firstly at the state sector, we can disaggregate this part of the network again: there are numerous central government agencies which operate within the regions; these operate alongside many other law enforcement agencies which are responsible to regional government. An analysis of their
roles, however, indicates that there is little duplication of functions between state security agencies.

When considering the central government security organisations in Yogyakarta, the largest and most organisationally complex is Polri. Although the police are a national body under the direct command of the president, Polri has a regional command system that reaches into the provinces, districts, sub-districts and even to the village. Polri's seemingly innocuous job statement to 'serve, guide and protect' the Indonesian community and to uphold 'security and public order' is an abbreviated summary of what is in fact a very complex mission. In practice, Polri guides society through its community police officers, secures transportation, provides direct security services to society through patrolling, guards vital objects, and responds to demonstrations and other disturbances. Polri investigates crime, collects intelligence and through the more strategic units available at provincial police offices, Polri manages high security threats, like counter-terrorism, inter-social conflict and trans-national crime. Without including any of the other evidence, based on Polri's vast array of responsibilities alone, we can distinguish the Indonesian national police as a special institution. The depth and breadth of its powers make Polri the critical provider of security at the regional level.

Territorial units of the Indonesian army are, like the police, deployed in a system which mirrors the civilian administration. As a consequence of military reform, however, the TNI has today been forbidden from conducting internal security activities without the direction of the central executive government. This type of intervention has generally taken the form of declared states of emergency and is rare. The last example was the state of military emergency declared in the province of Aceh, which ended in a peace accord in 2005. Thus, while the Indonesian military is still ubiquitously present at the regional level through the territorial command system, my research indicates that territorial army units are severely constrained in what they can officially perform. In Yogyakarta, the most important thing these units do is train for combat. Beyond training, territorial units are available to support the police in periodic joint operations. In such operations military personnel are seconded beneath the command of the police. Military units also support society through the 'TNI masuk desa' program. From my observations of this program, territorial forces seem to
operate at the behest of regional government as unpaid labour. The military is also highly active in intelligence gathering. Intelligence gathering marks the last substantive task the TNI can perform independently to support regional security. In the Yogyakarta case study the military is a powerless and idle part of the security network.

Beyond the police there are a number of different state law enforcement agencies which are responsible for policing sectorally specific laws. Some of these agencies operate at the regional level but remain hierarchically part of central government departments. Two examples included in this research are taxation inspectors of the Department of Finance and immigration officers of the Department of Law and Human Rights. Under the terms of Indonesia’s decentralisation program, there are also agencies which fall under the hierarchical control of regional government but which enforce national laws. Two examples of this type of bureau are the Forestry Police and the Bureau of Transportation. These agencies have specially qualified bureaucrats, Penyidik Pegawai Negri Sipil (civil service investigators) who enforce the given laws of their sector. Decentralisation has also granted new law enforcement capabilities to provincial and district governments. These powers enable regional government to draft misdemeanour offences over infractions of local licensing and certain classes of vice. These ordinances are implemented by regional civil service police and PPNS.

Having analysed each of the state security actors in the Yogyakarta case study site, it is clear that we need to reassess the claims often expressed in the literature. Much of the scholarly literature on security in Indonesia assumes the security sector is shaped by overlapping jurisdictions between different agencies. To the contrary, I argue each of the government security organisations in Yogyakarta manages some aspect of security, but the jurisdictions are clear and uncontested. The core functions of these organisations are therefore very distinct.

Chapters five and six extended my analysis to non-government security groupings; the non-state groupings can be further sub-divided into a commercial security sector and a volunteer sector. Chapter five reviewed commercial security. There are a mixture of large and small business enterprises in Yogyakarta which have an interest in maintaining physical security
on their own premises. These enterprises tap into a growing security industry composed of private security companies (BUJP) which supply specialised labour for security contracts and a floating mass of accredited security guards (Satpam). Chapter seven analysed the volunteer, civil society security organisations. In this area there are two ubiquitous grass roots organisations, directly supervised by Polri: the Indonesian neighbourhood watch or ronda siskamling and the village based community oriented policing forums (FKPM). Other volunteer security groupings operate at the local level and function as the arm of larger organisations. One ubiquitous example is the security units of the village, the Linmas. Political party security taskforces (Satgas) are another feature of the local security landscape. Today the Satgas are mostly inactive outside election times. There is also a small community of Islamic vigilantes, which are periodically active in disrupting un-Islamic practices, like illegal alcohol trading. While the existence of such non-state security groupings would seemingly pose a risk of duplication with the functions of the police, as will be described in the next section, the non-government security groups acknowledge normative and legal superiority of the police within the network. They also acknowledge an obligation to cooperate with Polri.

Polri: the Centre of the Network

While security clearly involves a plurality of organisations, the paradoxical outcome is that far creating a security network that is diffuse, disorganised and decentralised, the network actually possesses a strong centre of gravity: the police. This outcome is entirely contrary to the accepted views in the literature on security in Indonesia. The literature observes that security sector reform after 1998 created two separate and arguably competing security bureaucracies, the military and the police. Decentralisation handed greater law enforcement capabilities to regional government. At the same time, authoritarian chains were lifted from Indonesian civil society and new groupings of preman and vigilantes rose to press their
The logical consequence of this deconcentration of power should be competition and disorganisation. Yet the opposite has occurred. How is this possible? The previous section shows how little jurisdictions actually overlap. This situation is quite benign insofar that it removes the potential for competition over functional roles. Yet an absence of confusion about jurisdictional boundaries does not explain how Polri has become the centre of the network. This outcome has arisen because all non-police organisations believe they must cooperate with the police in the course of performing their duties. Three separate factors have created this situation.

The first factor derives from historical and structural reforms which have prevented the development of competitor organisations which could rival the influence of the police. In chapter one I described how military reforms ushered in during the transition period disempowered the Indonesian military. In the New Order, the Indonesian army dominated the police within ABRI. The army also maintained certain institutions like kopkamtib and the dewan sospol which enabled the army to play a strategic role in local security. Under societal pressure, the military dismantled this system in 1999 and made the hugely significant decision to separate Polri from ABRI. The Indonesian parliament extended these changes by making the TNI and Polri independent institutions. Although the Indonesian parliament did not explicitly define boundaries of authority between the two forces, the parliament did provide very powerful, normative directions that anointed the police as the primary institution in domestic security. The other major source of governmental authority in local security, regional government, is also similarly incapable of duplicating police functions. The decentralisation process in Indonesia has left regional government without substantial law enforcement powers. The inability of rival sources of security provision to develop, has left the Indonesian police as almost the exclusive provider of security at the regional level.

The second reason for the centrality of the Indonesian police is the continuation of Suharto era practices by Polri which enables it to supervise other nodes of security. Chapter four discussed non-police criminal investigators, the PPNS. These bureaucrats are forced by

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procedure to submit their investigations to the inspection of Polri detectives. This procedural requirement installs Polri above these other arms of state law enforcement. Chapters six and seven discussed how during the nineteen eighties and nineties, the police developed a strategy of regulating and supervising volunteer security organisations (Pam swakarsa). The intention behind this strategy was to place potentially rival centres of policing beneath the supervision of the state. This practice continues today through the expanded Polmas arm of the police. Today, Polri also regulates and supervises the commercial security industry (Satpam and BUJP), ronda siskamling, and community oriented policing forums. Regulation and supervision is more intense over some of these elements than others. BUJP are tightly regulated while the ronda only obtain infrequent visits from sub-district Polmas officers. Nevertheless Polri has ambitious claims to supremacy over these groupings. The subjects of this system, the BUJP, Satpam, ronda and community policing forums reify the police position by accepting and valuing the terms of their relationship with the police apparatus. The reason why they do so, links with the third element of police superiority I discuss below.

The third factor in explaining the superiority of Polri is the appeal of unique police powers to non-police security organisations. In the introduction, I referred to the research of Adam Crawford. In his work on security and regulation in the United Kingdom, Crawford argues that the state has certain unique assets when compared to other regulatory actors. Crawford postulates state powers are exceptional because of:

- ... [the state’s] symbolic power and cultural authority;
- ... its legitimacy claims and public perceptions of its legitimacy;
- ... [the state’s position as a] distinctive (tactical) resource and source of information through which interests are pursued;
- ... its residual position as a back-up of last resort with regard to other forms of control.2

Similar unique properties of symbolic authority, repressive power, distinctive knowledge and emergency support make the Indonesian police especially attractive to other security entities. Most of the actors within the network actively seek out and value relations with the

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Indonesian police because Polri's capabilities bolster their own. Chapters three and four discussed how various arms of regional government - the regional executive leadership and operational agencies like the Public Order Bureaus, Forestry Police and Bureaus of Transportation - seek access to Polri's criminal investigative powers and repressive security powers. Chapter five discussed how most consumers of security seek to augment their own private security arrangements by paying for additional police services; in these arrangements the consumers seek access to police 'fixers', police intelligence, and police sourced training. Even for those consumers which do not pay for additional police services, these enterprises still value direct contact with police representatives and consider the police a critical source of emergency support.

The idea of emergency support also weighs heavily in the appeal of the police to many volunteer security groupings. From my interviews with participants in the ronda, community oriented policing forums, Linmas, and party Satgas, each of these entities values direct relations with police officers because each group sees the police as the only legitimate authority capable of managing security threats. Although threats are very rarely realised, these actors place a high value on the idea that the police can support them when a security problem arises. All of this must be placed within the Indonesian context, where there is not a history of a coordinated, '911' emergency response system. As such, direct access to police officers is considered valuable. Even when considering Islamic vigilantes, these groups also regard relations with the police highly. Though vigilantes pose an existential threat to police authority, these groups do not seek direct conflict with the police. Rather these organisations seek to cultivate links with Polri to assist and legitimate their struggle against anti-Islamic practices. The appeal of the special properties of the police thus becomes an important factor in the elevation of Polri over the non-state providers of security.

Collaboration: the Dominant Feature of Networked Relations

The dependence of non-police actors on Polri also determines the nature of relations within the network. Virtually all non-police groupings feel they need to acquire services from the
police or feel obligated to obtain police permission to function. *Ipso facto*, cooperation becomes the dominant behaviour in interagency relations. The instruments and procedures for cooperation differ in individual relationships between the police and the other security actors.

Regional government emerges prominently in seeking and facilitating cooperation. Chapter three and four demonstrated that regional governments attempt to facilitate interagency security cooperation in three ways: maintaining interagency security forums, providing cross-institutional funding, and executing joint operations. Most interagency forums are a throwback to the Suharto era, like the Muspida, the Kominda and the Kediljapol. These groupings enable the regional leadership to meet, engage in dialogue, share intelligence, discuss mutual problems and plan joint security activities. Although at one time regional governments subsidised Polri and TNI units, today these practices are forbidden. Regional government can still financially support central government agencies but today this takes the form of subsidising the operational costs incurred by Polri and the TNI when they engage in joint operations with regional government. Various regional government bureaus with law enforcement capabilities also hold joint operations with the police. Transportation bureaucrats hold roadside traffic inspections together with Polri. Forestry Police hold anti-logging operations with Polri. Pol.PP often stage anti-vice operations, squatter demolitions and other activities together with the police.

One of the least expected findings of this research is that local TNI and police forces do not compete but do on occasion collaborate. Aside from TNI and Polri participation in regional government security forums, chapter four discussed the ability of police commanders to request the secondment of territorial forces to police operations. This system is termed ‘bawah kendali operasi’ (underneath the operational control [of a leading sector]). These operations are rare and local military forces have, to the knowledge of my interviewees, never been employed in operations, but only deployed in readiness to support police operations. This system is not based upon modalities, or mutually agreed doctrine, but upon practices of Polri and TNI during the ABRI period. Arguably, it would be best were such a system articulated in formal procedure but it is clear that an agreed framework for achieving cooperation between police and military elements does exist in the field.
Collaboration also defines the relations of non-state security groupings with Polri. Consumers of security (like shopping malls and hotels), ronda siskamling participants, and volunteers in the FKPM, all seek relations with Polri elements as a means of accessing police services. Linmas, party Satgas and private security companies feel obliged to operate with the permission of the police. Sometimes this obligation is very modest. Satgas for example only feel compelled to transmit information to Polri and coordinate with the police over security arrangements for party events. Nevertheless this obligation is unavoidable and is a necessary pre-condition for Satgas to operate. At the opposite extreme of the spectrum, commercial security companies are tightly regulated by the police. They must obtain police permission even to exist. Islamic vigilantes are an interesting exception. While they do not defer to the police, these groups also attempt to engage the police and involve Polri in their activities.

These patterns of cooperation reveal an important point about the role of Polri within the network. Polri is in high demand by other security organisations yet it is rare for the police to seek collaboration with them. The one exception is Polri’s policy of supervising Pam swakarsa. The police initiate these relationships, but the policy is an inheritance of the Suharto period. With this exception, the general disposition of the police towards cooperation is one of passivity. Polri’s assistance is in high demand yet the police do not attempt to exploit their superior status by steering or controlling other organisations. Even Polri’s attitude towards the activities of the Pam swakarsa is one of regulation and supervision from a distance. The internal activities of these groupings is an issue for their individual leaderships.

The ambivalence of the police towards initiating cooperation is itself a product of the power of the police within the network. As mentioned in chapter four, interagency relations is the topic of my dissertation. Yet the dominant concern for police leaders is the management of Polri’s own vast responsibilities. Every day the Yogyakarta police mounts hundreds of patrols, submit daily reports at every level of the hierarchy, investigates dozens of crimes and generate huge amounts of administrative work to support operational personnel. These activities are the dominant interest of police commanders. Cooperation within the network
framework described in my dissertation is an additional task, and something of a sideshow for Polri commanders.

Given the fact that it is other security institutions which need Polri rather than Polri which needs them, the final question is why do the police support other security organisations at all? It is likely there are a combination of reasons. Part of the answer is that the security network operates to minimise disincentives to collaboration. Many forms of cooperation are not a substantial burden on police resources. In chapter four I discussed the principle of the ‘user pays.’ There is an assumption that institutions which wish to call upon police powers compensate the police. Thus regional government and consumers of commercial security pay the police for their services. This argument does not, however, explicate the police strategy of supervising Pam swakarsa. Supervision of Pam swakarsa is an impost on police resources. In this case, it is probable that historical legacy has some influence on police strategy. Police regulation and supervision of Pam swakarsa groupings dates back to the Suharto era. This strategy has become so ingrained in the practice of policing that Polri continues this program today almost reflexively. Finally, professional responsibility dictates that the police reciprocate the desires of other agencies for security assistance. As a public institution Polri’s effectiveness is defined by how well the institution produces security and order. As discussed in chapter four, police commanders feel there is a certain responsibility on their part to cooperate with other institutions which play a role in the sector in order that the general goal, of a well-ordered, secure environment may be achieved.

Future Research Agendas

While this dissertation is not the final analysis on relations in the Indonesian security sector it does provide the literature with a revised view of the topic. The findings summarised above suggest that we should reconsider the conventional wisdom that relations between security actors (especially the military and police) are poor and contested. Although in chapter two I laid out the argument why Yogyakarta actually can be used to generalise
conclusions about security trends in other parts of Indonesia, I accept critical readers may not be convinced by this proposition. Future research in other case study sites would therefore contribute much to testing my findings. There are two general points which emerge from this study which may serve to direct future research on security in Indonesia.

Firstly, when reviewing the security sector it is necessary to integrate an analysis of relations between multiple security organisations. Previously there has been a strong tendency in the Indonesian literature to analyse preman or the military in isolation. To gain a reliable measure of the influence and role of these actors it is necessary to consider the interagency dynamic and how these groupings compare to and inter-relate with others in the security field.

Secondly, considering the future study of security sector reform in Indonesia, this research suggests the need to dramatically enhance analysis of the police. Polri has been underrepresented in scholarly research of the security sector in Indonesia. With the military reforms of 1998-2000, however, responsibility for domestic security has passed from the defence portfolio to the police. Indonesia's contemporary system of security management now prioritises most internal security problems as issues of policing. Scholars of Indonesia therefore arguably need to reconceptualise how we view security in Indonesia, and utilise theory from studies of policing. This research fundamentally then justifies a dramatic enhancement of the academic attention devoted to the police.

The hegemonic position of Polri within the case study of Yogyakarta also calls into question some of the assumptions of the literature on gangsterism in Indonesia. In the early reform period the Indonesian state experienced a substantial crisis, one of the symptoms of this was the rise of non-state dependent criminal or quasi-criminal gangs. Arguably the mood of these times propelled the work of Ian Wilson, Loren Ryter, Stein Kristiansen and others who documented the influence of gangsters and other non-state forces within society.3 Yet as Ramage and MacIntyre have argued, it has become increasingly clear that Indonesia has weathered this period of crisis and re-emerged as a stable, orderly,

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democracy. The ability of the police in Yogyakarta to dominate non-state security groupings supports this conclusion. Arguably, therefore, scholars of Indonesia should begin to revisit concepts of the strong state and the extent to which the Indonesia of contemporary times fits this model.

Finally, for comparative studies of networked security the analysis of this dissertation leads us to reassess the role of police. As discussed in the introduction, the majority of policing scholars prefer to emphasise the diminution of police authority within security networks. Arguably there has been a tendency to prioritise the quantitative breadth and complexity of networks at the expense of qualitative analysis of the relationships within. As Crawford argued and I have extended, the police possess unique assets which no other actor duplicates. These assets define the police as a special, centralising force within security networks. Greater consideration should arguably be given to the relationships within networks and the potentially significant role played by police.

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Municipality of Yogyakarta City (Kota Yogyakarta)


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Kabupaten Sleman. Resume Rapat Koordinasi Pimpinan Daerah (22 December 2006). (District of Sleman. Regional Heads Coordination Meeting Minutes)


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**District of Bantul (Kabupaten Bantul)**


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Office of Public Order (Dinas Ketertiban)

Dinas Ketertiban. Daftar Perda Yang Menjadi Dasar Hukum Dalam Penegakan Peraturan Daerah Seksi Gakda Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja (2007). (Office of Public Order. List of Perda which are the reference in upholding regional regulations Gakda Section of Civil Service Police Unit)

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and Municipality of Yogyakarta City. Agreement between Yogyakarta City Police and Municipality of Yogyakarta City about securing District Head Election)


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(Group Interview)

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(Group Interview)


Bantul District Police (Polisi Resort Bantul, Polres Bantul)

Sumarianto. Kepala Unit Sosial dan Budaya, Satuan Intelijen (Head of Social and Culture Unit, Intelligence Unit). 28 August 2008.

(Group Interview)


Jamingan (BRIPKA) and Sujito (BRIPDA). Polmas officers, Polsek Piyungan (Community Police officers, Piyungan Polsek). 30 August 2008


Yogyakarta Regional Government

Provincial Government of Yogyakarta

Cooperation Branch (Biro Kerjasama)

Forestry Bureau (Dinas Kehutanan dan Perkebunan)


Legal Branch (Biro Hukum)

Nugroho, R. Senior Civil Servant. 29 October 2007

Narcotics Bureau (Badan Narkoba Propinsi)


Bureau of Public Order (Dinas Ketertiban)


Municipality of Yogyakarta City

Administration Section (Bagian Tata Usaha)

Kepala Bagian (Head of Administration Section). 12 May 2008.

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Harris, Basuki. Kepala Bagian Hukum (Head of Legal Section). 21 September 2007.

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Murtihardjo. Kepala Bagian Tata Usaha (Head of Administration Section), and former Kepala (Mantri) Kesatuan Polisi Pamong Praja Kecamatan (former Head of Civil Service Police Unit of the Sub-district). 16 April 2008.

Senior member of Seksi Penegakkan Perda (Perda Upholding Division). 16 April 2008.


Yohannes, Ari N. Kepala Seksi Pengamanan, Bagian Ketertiban dan Ketentraman (Head of Security Section, Division of Order and Safety). 31 August 2007.

Bureau of Transportation (Dinas Perhubungan)

Moeljanto, M. Kepala Bagian Teknik Sarana dan Prasarana (Head of Technical Division of Tools and Infrastructure). 30 October 2008.

(Group Interview)

Udin, Kepala Seksi Pengendalian Operasi (Head of Operation Control Section). M.Moeljanto, Kepala Bagian Teknik Sarana dan Prasarana (Head of Tools and Infrastructure Technical Division). 1 November 2008.

District of Sleman

Subiyanto, Ibnu. Bupati Sleman (Head of Sleman District). 10 June 2008

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Bureau of Housing, Infrastructure and Transport (Dinas Pemukiman, Prasarana dan Perhubungan)


Legal Section (Bagian Hukum)

(Group Interview)
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Dinas Tourism (Dinas Pariwisata)


Kecamatan Depok (Sub-district of Depok)


Desa Condong Catur (Condong Catur Village)

District of Bantul

Sudarto, Gendut. Sekretaris Daerah Bantul (Regional Secretary of Bantul District). 9 October 2007.

Office of Public Order (Kantor Ketertiban)


(Group Interview)

Jadi Bayu Broto, Kepala Seksi Pengamanan (Head of Security Section). Wahyu Priyanto, Kepala Seksi Penegakkan Perda (Head of Perda Upholding Section). 7 November 2008.

Legal Section (Bagian Hukum)

Sutinah R. Civil Servant, Seksi Bantuan Hukum (Legal Aid Section). 29 October 2007.

Desa Srimulyo (Srimulyo village)


Kelurahan Triharjo (Triharjo village)


Civil Society/Non-government Interviews

Media


NGO Activists


Criminal Underworld


Commercial Security Industry

Assosiasi Manager Security Indonesia (Cabang Yogyakarta)

(Group Interview)

Chairman, Deputy Chairman and Treasurer of the Yogyakarta branch of the Asosiasi Manager Security Indonesia. 24 June 2008.
Consumers


(Group Interview)


Suppliers

Security Companies (Badan Jasa Usaha Pengamanan)

Habib. Employee from the accounting desk, PT. Garuda Merah. 5 October 2007.


(Group Interview)


Parjiyanto, Operations Manager. Nuning, Executive Secretary. 2 October 2007.

Private Security Guards (Satpam)


Pamuji, Rinto (Brig.). Assistant Police for Inna Garuda. 18 June 2008.\(^6\)

(Group interviews)

Marsito, Komandan Sektor Timur SKKK UGM (East Sector Commander of SKKK UGM) and Wahayudi, Satpam (Security Guard). 28 October 2008.


Volunteer Security Groups

Ronda Siskamling

Suparno and Sugianto, RT.14 and Ismail RT.12, RW03, Kelurahan Pringgokusuman, Sub-district of Gedongtengen, City of Yogyakarta. 10 October 2008.

Samarin, RT05-06 (and unnamed colleagues), RW03 and Suhardi RT04, RW07, Sidokarto Village, Godean Sub-district, Sleman District. 11 October 2008.

Suparno, Kepala Dusun Gesikan IV (RT 05-07) (Head of Sub-village Gesikan IV). Bantul District. 10 October 2008.

(Group Interview)

Syahbudin, Atus, Ketua Senkom DIY/former Ketua RT (Head of Yogyakarta Province Senkom/former head of Neighbourhood Unit), and Sungkono, Ketua Senkom Bantul/Ketua RT (Head of Bantul Senkom/head of Neighbourhood Unit) 10 May 2008.

Forum Kemitraan Polisi Masyarakat


\(^6\) N.B. The role of this person makes it difficult to categorise him in the bibliography. He is a police officer but serves as a security consultant to Hotel Inna Garuda as part of a fee-for-service agreement between the hotel and his police superiors. I arbitrarily list him as a security guard but his background is more complex.
(Group Interview)

Haryanto, Ketua FKPM Stasiun Lempuyangan (Head of FKPM Lempuyangan Station), and Heri, Wakil Ketua (Deputy Head). 17 June 2008.

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Harist. GPK Leader, City Branch. 26 September 2007.


Totot. Sekretaris Jenderal GPK (General Secretary of GPK). 11 September, 2007

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Pikiran Rakyat, 29 August 2005.


Tribun Timur, February 2009 - August 2006.

Vivanews, 30 January 2009.

Worldfocus.com, 8 July 2009.
Annex A:

Territorial Structure of the Indonesian Military

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Cabinet</th>
<th>Panglima TNI - Commander of the Military</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Province</td>
<td>Panglima Komando Daerah Militer or Pangdam* <em>(Military Region Commander)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Komandan Komando Resort Militer or Danrem ** <em>(Military Resort Commander)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District</td>
<td>Komandan Komando Distrik Militer or Dandim <em>(Military District Commander)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-district</td>
<td>Komandan Komando Rayon Militer or Danramil <em>(Military Sub-District Commander)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village</td>
<td>Bintara Pembina Desa or Babinsa *** <em>(Non-commissioned Officer for Village Development)</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Adapted from Lowry, *Armed Forces of Indonesia*, p. 60.

* a Kodam may cover one large province (for example Kodam V for East Java) or several small provinces (Kodam IX which covers Bali, West and East Nusa Tenggara)

** a Korem may cover a cluster of districts (such as Korem 072 Yogyakarta which includes the five districts of Yogyakarta province and five neighbouring districts in Central Java province)

*** A Babinsa may be responsible for more than one village
Annex B:

*Historical Regulations on Support of Defence Forces to the Police*
Annex C:

Decrees VI and VII of the People’s Consultative Assembly on the Police and Indonesian Military
Annex D:

Search Results from Australian Libraries

Database: Survey of the literature on the Indonesian Military versus the Police

Australian Library Collections - Results 982
Searching: military, Indonesia, by subject (any year, any language)

Australian Library Collections - Results 345
Searching: police, Indonesia, by subject (any year, any language)

N.B. This search however draws up a large number of historical documents. A more precise search examines the important period after the fall of the New Order.

Australian Library Collections - Results 370
Searching: military, Indonesia, by subject (year greater than 1998), any language

Australian Library Collections - Results 235
Searching: police, Indonesia, by subject (year greater than 1998), any language

N.B. Even so, this search yields a large number of primary source, Indonesian government documents. The inclusion of these sources undermines the purpose of surveying the academic literature. Many of the more critical, scholarly sources are written by foreign observers in English. Arbitrarily therefore, if we limit the search to only English sources, we find the following results:

Australian Library Collections - Results 128
Searching: Indonesia, military, by subject (year greater than 1998), English sources only

Australian Library Collections - Results 39
Searching: Indonesia, police, by subject (year greater than 1998), English sources only
Annex E:

Comparative Crime Figures for Indonesia

“Risk of Citizen becoming a victim of crime (Per 100.000 citizens) According to Regional Police Commands (based on reported incidents of crime) 2003 – 2005 [I.E. the reported rate of crimes per 100,000 people]”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>Total 2003-2006</th>
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Ranking based on three year average

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6. Sulawesi Tengah 553
7. Kalimantan Timur 519
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| | 23 | Jambi | 227 |
| | 24 | Sulawesi Tenggara | 216 |
| | 25 | Bengkulu | 210 |
| | 26 | Lampung | 172 |
| | 27 | Jawa Barat | 165 |
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*Italicisation indicates where an entry was not recorded, instead a proxy average was calculated.
Annex F: Maps

Java Island
Yogyakarta Province
Annex G:

Diagram of Poltabes Yogyakarta
KEPOLISIAN NEGARA REPUBLIK INDONESIA
DAERAH ISTIMEWA YOGYAKARTA
KOTA BESAR YOGYAKARTA

KEPUTUSAN KAPOLRI
NO. POL. : KEP / 7 / I / 2005
TANGGAL : 31 JANUARI 2005

STRUKTUR ORGANISASI POLTABES YOGYAKARTA

KAPOLTABES
  WAKA
    BAG OPS
      SUBBAG BINOPS
      SUBBAG WATTAH
    BAG BINAMITRA
      SUBBAG BIMMAS
      SUBBAG KERMA
    UR TELEMATIKA
    UNIT P 3 D
    UR DOKKES
    TAUD
    BENSAT

SPK 1
  SAT INTELMAM
  SAT RESKRIIM
  SAT NARKOBA

SPK 2
  UR BINOPS
  UR YAN MIN
  UNIT OPSNAL

SPK 3

SEK GM SEK NG SEKWB SEK KR SEK MJ SEK MG SEK UH SEK KG SEK PA SEKKG SEK DN SEK GT SEK JT SEK TR
**DIAGRAM KEY:**

- **KAPOLTABES/WAKA**: Leadership
- **BAGOPS**: Operational Planning Section
- **BAG BINAMITRA**: Caring for [Police] Partners Section
- **BAG MIN**: Administration
- **UR TELEMATIKA**: Communications Support
- **UNIT P3D**: Provosts
- **UR DOKKES**: Medical Support Section
- **TAUD**: Secretariat
- **BENSAT**: ?
- **SATINTELKAM**: Intelligence Unit
- **SATKRIM**: Detective Unit
- **SATNARKOBA**: Narcotics Investigation Unit
- **SATSAMAPTA**: Patrol Police Unit
- **SATPAMOBSUS**: Strategic/Vital Objects Protection Unit
- **SATLANTAS**: Traffic Police Unit
- **SATPAMWST**: Tourist Police Unit

**BOTTOM OF DIAGRAM**: Sub-district police precincts subordinate to Poltabes