POST-MORTEM RITUALS AND PARTY REFORM


DECLAN O'CONNELL

(A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the Australian National University)

April 1990
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>xi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## 1 INTRODUCTION

1A Post-Mortem Politics 1
1B Post-Mortems, Internal Processes and the 'Public Face' of Parties 10
1C 'Social Change' and Change within Parties: Three Models 20
1D Change in the ALP, 1963-1981: 'Adaptation'? 'Revolution'? 34

## PART I (1963-67)

2 A PARTY IN CONFUSION: LABOR ENTERS THE '60s 52

2A Calwell and Whitlam Differ on 'Wooing the White Collars', March-June 1960 52
2B Establishing the Federal Secretariat: Trials and Tribulations, 1958-64 58
2C Research and Reorganisation: National Organising Committee, 1960-61 64
2D Winding Up the NOC: Lessons for Party Reformers 68

3 PICKING UP THE PIECES: LABOR AFTER 30 NOVEMBER 1963 72

3A Seventh Successive Defeat 72
3B Debates in the States 78

4 FULL-SCALE INQUIRY: NEW SOUTH WALES 85

4A Establishing the Inquiry: The Officers' Rationale 85
4B FECs and Labor Reconstruction 93
4C 'Anti-Communist Blitz': FECs in Conflict 99
4D 'Modernisation' and the 'Middle Class': The Whitlam Line 105
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Section</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>112</td>
<td>5 NEW SOUTH WALES INQUIRY: REPORT AND REPERCUSSIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112</td>
<td>5A Drawing the Threads Together: Official Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117</td>
<td>5B State Conference: Another Arena</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122</td>
<td>5C 'Morbid Self-Analysis' Rejected: Western Australia and Victoria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127</td>
<td>5D 'Modernisation' and the 'Middle Class': The Victorian Debate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>136</td>
<td>6 THE WYNDHAM REPORT: CONTEXT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>136</td>
<td>6A After the State Debates: Federal Executive Commissions Inquiry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>138</td>
<td>6B Cyril Wyndham: Party Professional, Symbolic Appointment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>143</td>
<td>6C Factions, Patrons and the Federal Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151</td>
<td>6D Blaming the Electorate: Labor Temptation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>156</td>
<td>7 THE WYNDHAM REPORT: CONTENT AND RESPONSES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>156</td>
<td>7A Labor Amateurism: The Wyndham Diagnosis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>162</td>
<td>7B Party Democracy Sub-Text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>167</td>
<td>7C Commentary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>171</td>
<td>7D After the Report: Manoeuvres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>187</td>
<td>8 POST-MORTEM POLITICS AGAIN: 'ADAPTATION' AND 'DISLOYALTY'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>187</td>
<td>8A Crises in 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>193</td>
<td>8B 'Disloyalty' and 'Adaptation' Rhetorics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>198</td>
<td>8C Calwell's Confidential Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>203</td>
<td>8D 'Modernisation' and the 'Middle Class': Once Again</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>211</td>
<td>9 COMPROMISE ON PARTY REFORM: ADELAIDE, AUGUST 1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>211</td>
<td>9A Whitlam's Reorganisation Crusade, Phase I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>218</td>
<td>9B Whitlam's Reorganisation Crusade, Phase II: Around the State Conference Circuit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230</td>
<td>9C Oiling the 'Old Machine'?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>234</td>
<td>9D Adelaide Compromise: Institutions and Interpretations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# PART II (1977-81)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY: ESTABLISHMENT</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10A</td>
<td>Looking Back</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10B</td>
<td>Responses to 1977 Defeat</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10C</td>
<td>Dramatis Personae</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY: PROCESS</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11A</td>
<td>Submissions: 'Garbage Can' Smorgasbord</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11B</td>
<td>Agenda: NCI Autonomy from 'Chiefs' and 'Masses'</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>PARTY RENEWAL: NCI RHETORIC</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12A</td>
<td>'Rank-and-File Alienation': Problems and Solutions</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12B</td>
<td>CPS 4: Ironic 'Lesson of 1975'</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12C</td>
<td>'Grass'Roots' Revitalisation: 'Legitimation' versus Manageability,</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NCI Dilemma</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12D</td>
<td>Conference Reform; 'Pseudo-Legitimation'</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>PARTY RENEWAL: NATIONAL CONFERENCE REALPOLITIK</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13A</td>
<td>National Conference Reform: The Calculus of Factional Advantage</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13B</td>
<td>Beyond a 'Who Gets What' Analysis</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13C</td>
<td>But Who Did Get What? (Case Study)</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13D</td>
<td>Still No Place for the 'Rank-and-File'?</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13E</td>
<td>The Haphazard Politics of Party Reform</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>THE POLITICS OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: A CASE STUDY IN LABOR/'NEW SOCIAL</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MOVEMENT' RELATIONS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14A</td>
<td>Transforming the Party?</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14B</td>
<td>No Place for Women in a 'Working Man's Party'?</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14C</td>
<td>Putting Affirmative Action into the Rule-Book</td>
<td>378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>'MAKING SOCIALISM IN YOUR OWN COUNTRY'?</td>
<td>389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15A Socialism, Economic Policy and the NCI</td>
<td>389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15B Reformulating the 'Socialisation Objective'</td>
<td>398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15C 'Capitalist Crisis' or 'Winning the Next Election': The Great Non-Debate</td>
<td>405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Post-Mortem Rituals and Change in the ALP</td>
<td>417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NOTES</td>
<td>449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>APPENDICES</td>
<td>543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I The Wyndham Report: Full Text</td>
<td>543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II What's New?</td>
<td>568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>III 'Socialisation Objective': Formulations</td>
<td>577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Models of the Relationship between 'Social Change' and Party Activity</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Conceptualisations of Changes in Australian Politics and Society</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 ALP Strategies: 'Ideal Types'</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER 4</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Labor Votes and Seats, by State, House of Representatives 1958-63</td>
<td>85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER 9</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Special Conference 1967: Acceptance of Wyndham Recommendations</td>
<td>233</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER 11</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 NCI Submissions</td>
<td>274</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Party Unit NCI Submissions</td>
<td>276</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Major Themes Submitted by Party Units</td>
<td>277</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Major Themes Submitted from within Party</td>
<td>278</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 'Defend Labor Socialisation Ideology' Submissions: Further Analysis</td>
<td>281</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 'Organisational Housekeeping' and 'Campaign Comments': Individual Member Submissions</td>
<td>283</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Reasons to DPs 1-4 and 6 - Origins</td>
<td>294</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER 12</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Labor 'Community Presence Strategies'</td>
<td>303</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 NCI Conference Reform Formula</td>
<td>325</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 13

1 Conference Reform Proposals: Percentage Comparison with 1981 status quo 332
2 How the Branches Would Fare under the Different Proposals 336
3 Cost-Benefit Analysis for Branches of Basing Increase on Membership rather than Federal Electorates 347
4 Distribution of Delegates, 1965 and 1979-82 352
5 Parliamentary and 'Lay' Delegates, 1955-1984 353
6 Occupational Background, 'Rank-and-File' Delegates, 1981-82 355
7 'Rank-and-File' Delegates to National Conference, 1979-82 356
8 Union Officials at National Conference, 1979-82 357
9 National Conference Delegates, 1979-82 358

CHAPTER 14

1 Pro-Feminist and Pro-Environmentalist Submissions from Party Units 370
2 1982 National Conference Uranium Debate: Voting and Speakers 386

CHAPTER 15

1 Speakers and Federal Politicians in General 'Socialisation Objective' Debate 408
ABSTRACT

After election defeats, parties usually engage in post-mortem rituals. These can take a wide variety of forms. Committees of inquiry may be established. 'Rank-and-file' members may be given opportunities to have their say about 'what went wrong'. Parliamentary leaders may attempt to convince voters that the party has mended its ways. Within the party, matters of organisational structure, programme and ideology may be debated, although post-mortems are often effectively confined to a narrow range of topics. Post-mortem ritual talk generally includes reference to more effective campaigning, intra-party democracy and 'adaptation' to 'social change'. 'Managerial' discourses, emphasising electoral success, efficiency and party professionalism jostle with the 'participatory' discourses embodying activists' aspirations (emphasising the party's mission, 'rank-and-file' rights and 'educating' the electorate). Commentators often dismiss these rituals as meaningless exercises, interesting only insofar as they provide a backdrop for realpolitik power plays about who is to be 'blamed' for the defeat. However, if we analyse post-mortem rituals seriously, we have a useful vantage point for examining what goes on within political parties. Both 'managerial' and 'participatory' forms of 'rationalistic idealism' may be little more than camouflage for realpolitik manoeuvre and machination. However, party reform involves the crystallisation of new meanings as well as factional struggles. 'Rationalistic idealism' may help new meanings
to crystallise and a new self-understanding to emerge within a party. Of course, the connections between post-mortem rituals and party reform are contingent. Post-mortems may, or may not, lead to party reform. They take place at a time when party leaders have suffered a loss of confidence. The study of post-mortem rituals allows us to examine intra-party processes when, at least potentially, they are in a state of flux.

By comparing different post-mortems in the same party over time, we can also address the vexed question of 'social change' and party 'response'. The literature on parties abounds with generalisations about the 'effects' of 'social change'. Such generalisations often rely on little more than hunches about what goes on within parties. This thesis explores post-mortem rituals in the Australian Labor Party in two periods, 1963-67 and 1977-81. In each of these periods, there were some connections between the post-mortems and attempts at party reform. Comparison of the two cases can help us appreciate some of the complexities involved in the relationship between changes in Australian society and changes in the ALP. In contrast with previous arguments about the 'middle-classing' of the ALP in a 'middle-class' society, distinctions are drawn between the emergence of Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1 as a model for 'new' Labor practice in the 1960s and the conflicts between Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2 and Labor Managerialism in 1977-81. Changes in ALP practice cannot simply be derived from changes in Australian society. They require analysis in their own right.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are a number of people I would like to thank in connection with this thesis. My supervisor, Don Rawson, was always patient and reassuring, despite changes of topic and delays with draft chapters. I appreciate his thoughtful and prompt comments on various mutations of the thesis. For comments on draft chapters I am also grateful to Don Aitkin, John O'Brien and James Jupp. The Department of Political Science, RSSS was a fine workplace with helpful workmates (students and staff). In my research, I relied extensively on the microfiched newspaper cuttings and assorted Australian political documents held in the Department and carefully looked after by Gillian Evans. I also relied extensively on material to which I was graciously given access by the Australian Labor Party. In this respect the ALP belied Kenneth Janda's suggestion that studying political parties is like studying leprechauns, in that they do not allow their special powers to be photographed. The National Secretariat of the ALP allowed me complete access to National Committee of Inquiry material (submissions, responses, draft discussion papers and associated documents). They also allowed me to use their boardroom table to take notes on the material. If only walls had ears ...

...The NSW Branch of the ALP gave me permission to study their Records, held at the Mitchell Library. This thesis began life as a study of 'grass-roots' politics in the NSW ALP. In various branches and FECs in Sydney I found people willing to allow me to sit in on their meetings and to
discuss ALP affairs with me. Indeed, I was invited to a number of branch and FEC Christmas parties. The material I gathered then has not been directly incorporated into this thesis. However, I hope my analysis is informed by a feel for the flavour of 'grass-roots' Labor politics and Labor factionalism, which I picked up at those meetings and Christmas parties and in those discussions (especially in the areas covered by Barton and Reid FECs).

I would like to thank my parents for their general encouragement of my undergraduate and postgraduate education. Kirsty Waring, Susan MacDonald, Bob Hefner, Mairead Burns, Neil O'Flanagan, Stephanie Chapman and Jack Waring-Dallwitz helped with proof-reading. Irene Scholtens worked wonders with my writing and her word-processor. Finally, I would like to give special thanks to Kirsty Waring, who has put up with the traumas associated with this thesis so cheerfully.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1A Post-Mortem Politics

Parties which lose elections often become introspective. There may be challenges to prevailing ways of doing things as well as recriminations and factional manoeuvres, as parties examine 'what went wrong'.

Introspection may be facilitated by such devices as official committees of inquiry, commissioned reports and special meetings (at 'rank-and-file' as well as executive level). How much introspection occurs, whether it leads to change and what questions remain taboo are all matters of dispute. Post-mortem rituals do not have pre-ordained outcomes. They offer an interesting route to the study of change within parties. Generalisations about the 'effects' of 'social change' on parties often pay little heed to how parties themselves attempt to 'set about adapting to changing circumstances' (Mair, 1983:429).\(^1\) Party reform blueprints may be trumpeted as appropriate responses to 'social change'. Whether they are adopted or not will depend on more than their accuracy in diagnosing relevant dimensions of 'social change'. Ambiguity and competing interpretations make for a complex relationship between 'social change' and party 'response'.

Post-mortem rituals and party reform are only contingently related. Recommendations from duly constituted post-mortem bodies (committees, reports, meetings) sometimes lead to changes in party practices but they are often disregarded, if not forgotten. Reforms that do eventuate
are often a far cry from what was envisaged. Reform blueprints become embroiled in ongoing intra-party conflicts. Organisational issues become inextricably intertwined with other issues and other dramas.

The Australian Labor Party suffered a significant federal defeat in December 1977. It failed to recover the ground it had lost in the very polarised election of 1975 following Australia's greatest political controversy, the sacking of the Whitlam Government by the Governor-General. Whitlam had led Labor to government in 1972 for the first time since 1949, on the slogan 'It's Time'. The long period in opposition was one of considerable turmoil, particularly around the time of the split, which led to the formation of the right-wing Democratic Labor Party in 1955. This distracted Labor from party reform projects. Increased confidence following a near-win in 1961, and the role played by denunciations of Labor's '36 faceless men' (its Federal Conference delegates) in the 1963 defeat, helped open up the issue of party reform. Part I examines party reform politics in the period 1963-67, a time when Gough Whitlam often argued for ALP 'modernisation' to remain 'relevant' in a changing Australia. On organisational matters, Whitlam championed the recommendations of federal secretary Cyril Wyndham. In a delayed response to the 1963 defeat, the Federal Executive commissioned Wyndham to report on party structure (Wyndham, 1965; reprinted as Appendix I) and then largely disregarded his recommendations. Whitlam succeeded Arthur Calwell as Federal Parliamentary Labor Party leader in 1967. He tried to resurrect the Wyndham Report. He demanded a
committee of inquiry on party structure. This was killed off at the 1967 Federal Conference in Adelaide, which did accept parliamentary representation at Federal Conference and on the Federal Executive. Part I shows a range of party reform debates, with different approaches and different conflicts in the various state Branches.

Chapter 2 lays out the prehistory of the 1963-67 period, including the complicated background to the establishment of the Federal Secretariat. It also documents the unfortunate fate of the short-lived National Organising Committee, disbanded in 1961 for apparently flirting with ALP/DLP rapprochement, a classic case of a vague party reform blueprint being derailed for offending powerful party forces. Reorganisation committees often use a 'rationalistic idealist' language which assumes a party has common goals and then asks how it can be made more effective or more democratic. Proposals for change, however, will impinge on the distribution of power, the fortunes of factions and such matters (the realpolitik of who gets what within the party), concerns which are difficult to express in 'rationalistic idealist' discourse. This clash between 'rationalistic idealist' proposals and intra-party realpolitik considerations recurs in post-mortems.

The 1963 defeat and post-mortems in some states are examined in Chapter 3; the official inquiry in NSW in Chapters 4 and 5. The right-wing NSW Branch leaders went along with criticisms of the 'faceless men'. In Victoria and Western Australia, which supported the dominant group on the Federal Executive, 'irrational hysteria', the 'post-mortem stampede' and 'morbid self-analysis' were
vociferously rejected (see Chapter 5). The background to the Wyndham Report, its text and its intersection with factional conflicts in NSW are examined in Chapters 6 and 7. Chapter 8 looks at the post-mortem following the debacle on 30 November 1966. Chapter 9 examines Whitlam's party reform crusade and analyses his compromise with the party 'machine' at the Adelaide Conference.

The changes agreed on at the Adelaide Conference fell short of Whitlam's pre-Conference rhetoric, but the addition of the parliamentary leaders to the party's federal bodies marked the end of his concern with comprehensive reorganisation. The restructuring of the Victorian and NSW Branches, through federal intervention in 1970-71, replaced old winnter-take-all practices with proportional representation. In other ways too, Labor 'modernised' itself under Whitlam, albeit in ways that had not been canvassed in 1967. For many, success in 1972 vindicated Whitlam's 'modernisation' project.

Party reform then went into hibernation. After the 1975 defeat Labor fulminated about the dismissal and the Governor-General's 'betrayal of Australian democracy'. The 1977 defeat led to a more comprehensive post-mortem exercise than anything that had occurred in the 1960s. Whitlam stood down as leader. The party had changed considerably since 1967, but now seemed seriously out of touch with the electorate. In January 1978, the National Executive approved new leader Bill Hayden's motion for a far-reaching National Committee of Inquiry. Part II looks at the intersection between the NCI and related debates on party
renewal, liaison with 'new social movements' up to the 1981 Special Conference in Melbourne.

There are interesting symmetries in the two periods of Labor self-analysis (see Table 1). Each began with a significant defeat and lasted about four years. In both cases, the changes approved by Special Conferences fell short of the preceding official 'party reform' recommendations.

Table 1

Patterns of Post-Mortem Debate:
The ALP, 1963-67 and 1977-81

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1963-67</th>
<th>1977-81</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Significant election defeat</strong></td>
<td>November 1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Further electoral defeat</strong></td>
<td>November 1966 (by huge margin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>'Party reform' (well short of 'post-mortem' report recommendations)</strong></td>
<td>Special Conference (August 1965) adds FPLP leaders to Federal Conference and Federal Executive but countenances no further inquiry</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In 1967, however, Whitlam could not get any committee of inquiry. His plans to open the party's doors to 'intellectuals' did not always win ready acceptance either. In 1978, the National Executive gave the NCI a broad brief and threw the party structure as well as 'responses' to 'social change' open to the gaze of social scientists, albeit carefully selected and sympathetic ones. Under Whitlam, policy committees drew on social-scientific knowledge, but, in organisational matters, the party remained wedded to tried and true ways of doing things.3

The NCI was charged with facilitating more membership involvement and better communication with voters. Post-mortem exercises often try to boost membership enthusiasm and regain lost votes at the same time. Demands for 'intra-party democracy' may conflict with calls for more 'professional' electioneering. A party can revive itself electorally without 'renewing' itself as a campaigning organisation responsive to its members. Reorganisation is often presented as some sort of recipe for electoral recovery, but there are many reasons why change is sought within parties. The relationship between the NCI and changing priorities and practices in the ALP exemplifies March and Olsen's (1976) argument that official attempts by institutions to reorganise themselves involve characteristically 'garbage can' decision-making processes.4 Such processes allow a range of concerns within an organisation to surface, with old 'solutions', grafted on to new 'problems', scores settled, careers advanced etc. Rational party reform blueprints are easy to
draw on paper, but post-mortems become an arena for registering a host of ongoing intra-party matters. David Stephens (1979) has used the March and Olsen approach to good effect in an earlier analysis of the ALP. He sees the garbage can metaphor as being unfortunate in some ways:

It is not meant to convey that problems and solutions are thrown away or that garbage cans are somehow collected by some organisational garbologist. The metaphor is meant to give the idea of jumbling together, tangling, complexity and confusion - the things that happen, say, in a refuse container used by many people in a large apartment block (D. Stephens, 1987:163).

This approach yields interesting insights into the ways in which parties 'make' 'decisions'. Certain features of post-mortem rituals and party reform projects make 'garbage can' analysis particularly apposite (Olsen, 1976:314). Their focus is particularly ambiguous. They are often disproportionately attractive to otherwise unoccupied participants, who are not tightly integrated into party routines.

Chapter 10 looks at the establishment of the NCI and surveys the ideas of some key committee members. Chapter 11 draws on 'garbage can' analysis (especially March and Olsen, 1983) to make sense of the concerns thrown up in the submissions to the NCI and the committee's processes more generally. The NCI attracted symbolic issues, was strongly influenced by 'short-run happenstance' and was characterised by an 'attention vacuum', whereby powerful party figures took their committee duties lightly while out-groups registered their grievances.
The picture of a 'what went wrong' committee embroiled in a 'garbage can' of issues undermines 'rationalistic idealist' expectations. Such committees cannot provide a disembodied vantage point for an 'objective' analysis of what 'actually' went wrong and what can be done about it. Reports do not summarise and eliminate data on logical and empirical grounds alone (Lehman, 1977:76):

... but on the basis of the interests, theories, assumptions and prejudices of those through whose hands a report passes.

We may be tempted to go in the opposite direction. With our eyes firmly fixed on power asymmetries, we may see 'what went wrong' committees as tools for the maintenance of party rulers' positions, perhaps a harmless outlet for 'rank-and-file' grumbling, but providing little possibility of transforming party practices. Chapter 11 notes problems with this notion, documenting the NCI's autonomy from party 'chiefs' (partly because of 'attention vacuum') as well as the party 'masses'.

Chapter 12 looks at the NCI's favoured 'solution' to the 'problem' of 'rank-and-file alienation': National Conference reform and a local branch 'community presence strategy'. Chapter 13 examines the rather different concerns of Special Conference delegates. The NCI had noted the dilemma between party 'manageability' and membership 'legitimation' (in the sense of improved intra-party democracy mechanisms and thoroughgoing party renewal). Pressure for 'professionalisation' often clashes with pressure for 'democratisation' in post-mortem
debates. The NCI explored party renewal more extensively than Wyndham had in the 1960s (although Wyndham did not ignore such questions). 'Democratisation' pressures in the ALP had increased in the meantime. At the Special Conference, however, Conference reform was seen as a matter of adjusting factional representation and 'who gets what'; easy to analyse in realpolitik terms.

One is tempted to contrast post-mortem 'rationalistic idealist' talk of party reform with Conference delegates' realpolitik priorities. For Michels, the latter in some sense contained the real key to how parties operated and the former was irrelevant, misleading and superficial. One could expect little from 'summary reports' and 'occasional special committees of inquiry' (Michels, 1962:71-2). Yet developments in relatively transient arenas within a party, like a reorganisation committee, create precedents and develop a logic of argument that can reorient some party practices (see March and Olsen, 1983). Party practices are circumscribed by available forms of political calculation and evaluation (Hindess, 1984:272). These can be altered in the course of reorganisation efforts.

The NCI promoted affirmative action for ALP women and served as an arena for debate on Labor 'socialism'. Chapter 14 looks at affirmative action, a form of which was endorsed by the 1981 Special Conference, as a case study of the sort of liaison with 'new social movements' sought in some sections of the party. Chapter 15 looks at Labor 'socialism'. The Conclusion (Chapter
16) asks what the two post-mortem periods show us about the process of change within the ALP and within political parties more generally.

1B Post-Mortems, Internal Processes and the 'Public Face' of Parties

There are many sociological generalisations about how parties 'respond' to 'social change'. Detailed analyses of how parties themselves perceive their place in 'society' are less common. Such questions emerge at times of organisational self-doubt, for instance, after serious electoral losses. Post-mortems often involve predictable and 'ritualistic' genuflections towards membership consultation, better communication and finding out what voters 'really' want, but they can help reorient party practices. They offer an arena for challenges by party insurgents. Interestingly, this was stressed by Otto Kircheimer, whom we shall come across in the next section as the author of one of the most widely-quoted sociological generalisations about party change. This 'catch-all' thesis has often been taken up by those who suggest that change within parties can be read off from changes in society. In 1957, Kircheimer (1969a:297) took a different tack, ruminating on the temptation for opposition leaders to minimise differences with government:

If this should happen, the opposition that exists within every opposition is what becomes the moving force of the country's political machinery. The irregulars rather than the official leadership will strive to inquire into the deeper reasons for the party's last defeat, clamour for the overdue great inquest, shout for reformulation of principles and
goals and to redraw the battle lines between government and opposition. The local party worker may be uninformed, the voter inarticulate, yet such gadflies may force on the recalitrant party leadership a sharper differentiation between official opposition and government policies.

Once the deeper reasons for defeat had been examined in the overdue great inquest, a recalcitrant party leadership could be moved away from 'convergence' politics.

This perspective allows us to see post-mortem rituals as political processes in their own right rather than defining them in terms of the 'functions' they serve. Those who focus on 'who gets what' and those who insist on explaining politics by its social context leave little room for myth, symbol and ritual (March and Olsen, 1984:735). Even those who do bring in myth, symbol and ritual often do so dismissively.

Lukes (1975:304) sees elections as 'the most important form of political ritual' in liberal democracies. They legitimise, stabilise and mystify the prevailing 'mobilisation of bias' (Lukes, 1975:305). Australian social commentator Donald Horne (1981:26-7) argues that if anthropologists from outer space arrived during the 1980 federal election campaign, they would have seen what seemed to be 'a great drama' in progress:

Being anthropologists, the outer space visitors would decide that the true function of all this was bound to be different from what those who were doing it thought they were doing. Putting slips of paper into ballot boxes didn't really mean that Australians were choosing a government that would 'represent' them; what they were really doing was engaging in a ritual legitimising the power of the state. 11

The ritual does not end on polling day. Losing
parties and their supporters try to make sense of what has just happened. Sympathisers of the defeated party may even write books in the process (e.g. Horne, 1981). Suggestions by functionalist anthropologists (from outer space or wherever) that the 'real' purpose of such public breast-beating and expiation to various gods was to maintain solidarity and cohesion among the defeated, in a manner acceptable to their leadership, would not help us understand post-mortem politics.

Not every election defeat leads to an elaborate post-mortem process, with official inquiries and party reforms that are vaguely related to at least the rhetoric of such inquiries. The great inquest, however established, is an unusual occurrence, even in parties well used to defeat. In the case of the ALP, which lost eleven of the thirteen federal elections between 1949 and 1980, only two defeats (1963 and 1977) led to party reform attempts.

Perhaps electoral post-mortems are rather special political rituals. We should be wary of the tendency to conceive ritual as 'a sort of all-purpose glue' (Turner, 1982:82; quoted Herzog, 1987:567) automatically reinforcing group solidarity, social integration, the prevailing 'mobilisation of bias' and the power of the state. Rituals involve struggles about and negotiation over 'meanings' as well as their reproduction (Kertzler, 1988). Elections can be 'models of' society, reproducing the status quo:

But at the same time, they may act as a 'model for' society, thereby introducing new meanings and
symbols ... they are an active arena for the creation of a political symbolic world through negotiation over its meaning (Herzog, 1987:569).

Election campaigns involve a certain suspension of disbelief. Small and large parties present their programmes as if they were equally powerful. 'Models for' new symbols and practices may emerge, alongside 'models of' old ones:

The empirical question, then, is which 'forest of symbols' ... germinated, flourished, withered or expired in the 'cultural' meaning of a given election campaign, by whom and how (Herzog, 1987:571).

Post-mortems offer a similar active arena. Here, too, there is a suspension of disbelief. For a short while, intra-party hierarchies seem to dissolve. Leaders suffer a temporary loss of confidence. The views of a local branch member at a special meeting, or sending a submission to a committee of inquiry, may be formally accorded the same respect as the pronouncements of a parliamentary leader. Post-mortems can involve the formal reconstitution of 'arenas of equality', which cut across ingrained intra-organisational inequalities (Pizzorno, 1970:42-3). Against the Michelsian picture of a unilinear fall from grace and descent into oligarchy, Pizzorno (1970:43) notes the possibility of at least occasional participation revivals, facilitated by 'major reorganisations'.

Political parties are coherent institutions, which can present a united public face. They have identifiable means of making decisions and acting on some of them, thus meeting Hindess' (1986) definition of a
'social actor'. Like other 'social actors', they make decisions in complicated ways:

... at various points within the organisation ... through a variety of ... processes (Hindess, 1988:67).

'Garbage can' analysis helps us understand this sort of dispersed and dis-aggregated decision-making. When 'decisions' are being 'made' in organisations, other things are also happening (March and Olsen, 1976). Technologies are often unclear. Preferences change. Temporal coincidence brings 'problems', 'solutions', 'decisions' and 'choice opportunities' together. In this way 'choice opportunities' become 'garbage cans'. The use of particular specialised techniques and institutionalised routines can make some 'choice opportunities' relatively immune from 'garbage can' contingencies. Overall, it is difficult to envisage how a party would 'decide' on its 'response' to 'social change'.

The coherent public face of parties coexists with endemically chaotic internal processes:

All the political parties have two faces - a public face turned towards the media, the voters and the rest of the world and an inward-looking face reserved for the initiated, activists, electoral representatives and leaders, who have access to their secret gardens - two faces and two publics in which the dividing lines pass between the sympathisers and activists of each party (Charlot, 1989:361).

For Charlot, all parties are thus 'dual parties'. However, students of parties often present them as unitary actors. Charlot (1989:359) quotes his fellow French political scientist Michel Offerle:
A party does not act, properly speaking. Behind the reassuring appearance of this collective actor which is supposed to act according to rational ends (party strategy) or to fulfil certain functions vital to itself or its environment (party functions) hides a multitude of interactions between individuals who ... use this immaterial body called a party in very different ways.

Offerle points to serious shortcomings in models of parties as bodies which can be subsumed under the 'functions' they are supposed to fulfil or the 'strategies' their leaders adopt. However, a party is not a completely 'immaterial' entity. In certain circumstances, it does 'act, properly speaking'. Conference delegates deciding on a policy are not simply another group of individuals making use of the 'immaterial body'. Nor are shadow ministers making election speeches. Their positions are governed by the party's identifiable means of making decisions. 'Garbage can' processes are not completely random. Indeed, Offerle concedes that certain 'ways of doing things' give a party 'a sort of objective existence' (Charlot, 1989:359). These include 'methods of organization, codewords, traditions, emblems, logos and symbols'. Ultimately, however, the focus on transactions between individual members also fails to capture the complexity of 'dual' parties (Charlot, 1989:360-1). The reference to certain 'ways of doing things' (see also Lagroye, 1989:368-9) raises interesting questions, but seems too vague to account for the ways in which dispersed and dis-aggregated processes can yield publicly identifiable party decisions.
The promise of focussing on post-mortem rituals is that we can look at the 'secret garden' (really, more of a semi-secret garden)\(^{16}\) and the public face, at a time when both are potentially in flux. Attempting to understand what makes parties tick has exasperated many political scientists:

Party organizations are the leprechauns of the political forest, legendary creatures who avoid being seen. Because no one has ever photographed a party organization, descriptions vary widely, and many scholars do not take them seriously enough to investigate their being (Janda, 1983:319).\(^{17}\)

This is an overstatement. Scholars who have looked at party organisation have come up with certain cumulative pictures. Pictures of the ALP have been provided by Overacker (1949 and 1968), Rawson (1954 and 1966a), Crisp (1978), Jupp (1963 and 1964), Houseman (1971), D. Stephens (1979) and Parkin and Warhurst (1983). We have good information on conferences, executives and union affiliations and on the relationship between the party's organisational and parliamentary wings. The local branches are less studied (although see Ward, 1983 and 1987). Post-mortems offer opportunities to study some intra-party processes that may otherwise remain obscure.\(^{18}\) Submissions to a committee of inquiry connect 'grass-roots' debate to more public conflicts amongst the party elite. Ascertaining which 'forest of symbols' emerges from a post-mortem, we can study a party examining its previously accepted 'ways of doing things'. Methods of organisation are under review, although some may remain
taboo. We may find new symbols and codewords emerging and party 'traditions' being reconstructed.

Political scientists have categorised parties in various ways. The duality that Chariot emphasised, as parties always turn inward (to members) and outward (to voters) simultaneously, is partly reflected in the categories put forward. In an interesting survey of such generalisations, W.E. Wright (1971) contrasted the 'rational-efficient' model of party favoured in much US political science with a 'party democracy' model that harked back to sophisticated European party structures. 'Rational-efficient' parties are vote-gathering machines, teams of candidates striving to win public office. The second model places greater emphasis on the 'goals' parties project for 'society', policy, ideology and internal arrangements. Some 'rational-efficient' theorists suggest changes in 'society' and electoral technology are making all parties more like American-style candidate-centred ones. Leon Epstein (1967a) argues that widespread 'middle-class' lifestyles, increased formal education and the changing role of the media in election campaigns constitute an organisational 'contagion from the right'. Leaders who can communicate directly with voters would only need loose, skeletal parties.

Epstein's thesis contrasts with Duverger's (1954) earlier view that the mass 'working-class' party, with its elaborate structures, represented the wave of the future. Whereas Epstein focussed on the public face of parties, Duverger's array of typologies tried to make sense of their internal processes. 'Party democracy' theorists do not
take parties' democratic pretensions at face value. From Michels on, oligarchical patterns have been noted in 'party democracy' analyses. However, such analyses take internal struggles, including struggles over intra-party democracy, seriously. The party is seen as a political system in its own right as well as a machine for contesting elections. The 'rational-efficient' approach assumes that electoral competition inevitably overshadows all other dimensions of party activity (see Schlesinger, 1984).

'Rational-efficient' and 'party democracy' models share a focus on the 'functions' fulfilled by parties. Some 'rational-efficient' analysts do eschew the language of functions, preferring 'rational choice' economics to sociological forms of analysis (e.g. Schlesinger, 1984:374). However, as we shall see, economic and sociological versions of the 'rational-efficient' model share common problematic features. Sociological versions of the 'rational-efficient' model stress party fulfilment of the functions of elite recruitment and interest aggregation whereas 'party democracy' writers emphasise goal formulation and mobilisation/socialisation. Both models tend to treat parties as unitary actors, thereby falling into:

... the error of considering a party as a being thinking and acting, according to a more or less preconceived project or according to some functional necessity of social organization and political regime (Charlot, 1989:359; see also Lagroye, 1989:364).

Party decision-making processes are dispersed and dis-aggregated. To an extent, this is recognised by some
who speak in the language of functions and roles; by Richard Rose (1964:33) for example:

The most salient characteristics of the entities called 'parties' shift as their functions change and attempts are made to reconcile the conflicting pressures arising from the bundle of roles, individuals and institutions generally lumped together under one omnibus heading.

More recently, Raschke (1983:110) has argued parties must be perceived as complexes of competing functions. This recognition of internal complexity is marred by Raschke's fondness for functionalist modes of explanation, despite his self-professed 'critical-dialectical' stance. Raschke sees party programmes and policies primarily determined by 'systematic functional imperatives'; social control and the maintenance of mass loyalty to the socio-economic system and the prevailing political institutions. Orthodox political scientists examine a check-list of party functions in relation to electoral and internal concerns. Neo-marxist writers often leave the analysis of political parties to their mainstream colleagues and seek out more distinctively neo-marxist topics, like the 'capitalist state'. However, such writers sometimes stress the role played by parties in class disorganisation. Macpherson (1978:24) calls this their 'obfuscation function'. Parties reconcile 'universal equal franchise with the maintenance of an unequal society' (Macpherson, 1977:69). For Offe (1972:83) the competitive political party functions as a filter, ensuring social needs incompatible with prevailing socio-economic arrangements remain unexpressed in the formal political
arena. These intriguing parallels between the sociological version of the 'rational-efficient' model and such neo-marxist analysis. Both define parties by their 'functions'. These functions in turn are derived from extra-political social logics (aggregating interests or disorganising the masses).

There are overlaps between the sociological and economic versions of the 'rational-efficient' model. Both focus on 'adaptation' to extra-party realities; the 'social structure' in general in the sociological account, voter preference in the economic 'rational choice' approach. Thus they share an 'adaptation' model of the relationship between 'social change' and party activity. The 'party democracy' approach could yield a model of party change being due to 'strategic' behaviour. The next section looks at these models of change within political parties and their difficulties in coping with dispersed and 'garbage can' decision-making.

1C 'Social Change' and Change within Parties: Three Models

'Adaptation' models see changes in their environment as the key to how parties change. But if parties are 'strategic actors', there is scope for autonomous 'elite manipulation' rather than exogenous 'social cleavages' to affect political divisions (see Sartori, 1976; Zuckerman, 1975). If politics is a contest between rival elites, outcomes can be seen as the result of the clash between competing 'strategies', rather than as a
registration of social forces or political preferences. Images of parties as 'strategic actors' usually assume elite control is unproblematic. Formulations such as the iron law of oligarchy dispense with detailed analysis of dispersed decision-making. We may need a third model, of parties as 'complex arenas'. Table 2 summarises the three models.

Table 2
Models of the Relationship between 'Social Change' and Party Activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>'Adaptation' model</th>
<th>'Social change' ----→ party response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'Strategy' model</td>
<td>'Social change' ----→ leadership choice ----→ party strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Complex arena'</td>
<td>'Social change' ----→ leadership choice constrained by available forms of calculation and evaluation ----→ party strategy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Economic and sociological approaches can be reconciled in the argument that the competitive candidate-centred 'rational-efficient' party is a consequence of social evolution. Parties may have been something else in the past (elaborately organised, ideological, etc.), but changing social trends have made them adopt the 'rational-efficient' form. This is the gist of Epstein's 'contagion from the right' hypothesis. 'Contagion' is spread by 'social change' and electoral technology. An even more frequently cited formulation is Kircheimer's (1966:198) analysis, whereby 'social change' and electoral competition force parties to adopt similar 'catch-all' styles and play
down distinctive clienteles and ideologies in the search for votes. Kircheimer focussed on diminished social and economic polarisation, the increased weight of the 'middle class' and secularisation. Parties would no longer be able to rely on traditional social constituencies. 'Adaptation' to the 'law of the electoral market' would become their raison d'être.

Kircheimer's 'catch-all' analysis flows from his analysis of changing social trends, although, as early as 1954, he also emphasised changing electoral technology. The need to reach as many voters as possible with increasingly sophisticated campaign technologies made parties more alike:

The resulting forms of competition dominate the structure and organisational principles of parties (Kircheimer, 1969b:246. See also Herz and Hula, 1969:xxviii).

This 1954 essay foreshadowed Kircheimer's later 'catch-all' argument. His 1957 comments on post-mortems (Kircheimer, 1969a:297) suggested a different approach. Sociologism is an approach which derives political phenomena from more basic 'social forces' and changes in social structure. Such an approach is built into the language of 'adaptation', derived as it is from evolutionary biology. 'Social change' (sometimes mediated by technological change) becomes a given pre-political datum. Parties must 'adapt' or 'perish'.

Panebianco (1988:235,264) sees the increasing 'professionalisation' of parties as a crucial but under-emphasised implication of the 'catch-all' thesis. As
parties become more voter-centred, they move from a 'mass-bureaucratic' to an 'electoral-professional' style. 'Experts' with extra-party and extra-political skills become more prized. These 'experts' are 'professionals' in the sense used in the sociology of the professions (Panebianco, 1988:221). Their prominence is seen as a consequence of the increasingly technical nature of political decisions (Panebianco, 1988:222). Parties need 'professional' advice in various policy fields, as well as in advertising, opinion polling and such matters. With more of this 'professional' input, parties lose some of their distinctiveness vis-a-vis other organisations (Panebianco, 1988:229). 29

Here we could note arguments about 'social change' and a general trend from 'parochial' to 'cosmopolitan' organisational styles (Gabriel, 1981). For Gabriel, the 'parochial' organisation's modus operandi is based on internal criteria, drawn from its own experience, whereas 'cosmopolitan' organisations value external, 'professional' criteria. 30 'Parochial' organisations socialise their members into tried and trusted ways of doing things. 'Expert' and 'professional' advice is not sought. In 'cosmopolitan' organisations, 'professionals' are encouraged to draw on 'rational' criteria of social-science-derived 'knowledge'.

More and more organisations in a complex, modern society are 'cosmopolitan' (Gabriel, 1981); relying on 'professional' input to pursue their goals 'rationally'. Success in 'adaptation' seems to depend on the quality of 'professional' advice. If 'crisis' leads to 'rational'
diagnosis of 'problems' and remedial action, all will be well (Gabriel, 1981:281). This view, like the sociological argument for a 'rational-efficient' party, assumes it is easy for organisations to 'read' changes in their environment (at least with appropriate 'professional' advice) and then change their practices accordingly. The ambiguity of 'social change', dispersed decision-making and conflicts over organisational 'goals' are all glossed over.

Downs' (1957) theory of party competition is based on economic axioms rather than analysis of 'social structure'. Like the sociological writers, he sees parties as unitary actors, whose behaviour is only explicable as a 'response' to more fundamental forces. For Downs, the laws of the electoral market shape party behaviour directly. In the sociological story, 'interests derived from the 'social structure' come first. Parties try to 'aggregate' them. As the 'social structure' changes, so do the 'interests' to be 'aggregated'. In the economic story, you have a market and a distribution of voter preferences, which parties try to reflect. They battle for the 'middle ground'. Post-mortems seem hardly worth studying.

Electoral market logic invariably overrides internal party preoccupations:

Political parties tend to maintain ideological positions that are consistent over time, unless they suffer drastic defeats, in which case they change their ideologies to resemble that of the party which defeated them (Downs, 1957:300).

Downs assumes party policies cluster around the preferences of the marginal voter, in a manner analogous to firms seeking profits by satisfying consumer preferences.
There are problems with such assumptions in their original economic context and in their application to political parties. The idea that enterprises can be driven by an overriding goal is problematic (see Thompson, 1982). The notion of 'profit-maximisation' depends on organisational patterns and accounting practices within firms (Tomlinson, 1984:598). Sub-units within firms have their own goals. There is no one, royal road to profit-maximisation. The a priori attribution of the 'goal' of vote-maximisation to parties amounts to a 'teleological prejudice' (Panebianco, 1988:4), which leaves the complicated relationship between organisational 'goals' and practices unexamined. Party sub-units have more autonomy than sub-units in firms. Routines are less developed (see Sharansky, 1970). There is much spare-time participation (see Eldersveld, 1964). Even with increased 'professionalism', the application of specialised techniques is more controversial. Disagreement on 'goals' is institutionalised.

Galbraith (1972:xviii) suggests major firms focus on their 'whole complex of organisational interests' and harmonising their goals with those of 'the larger community and the state' rather than just profit-maximisation. If we applied such an analysis to party competition, we would stress the peculiarly oligopolistic nature of the electoral market (Ware, 1979: Ch 3; Clegg et al., 1986:273-4). The suppliers do not just have to 'adapt' to voter preferences.33

Parties may try to protect their whole complex of organisational interests. Observers, however, cannot
define such 'interests' by *fist*. They emerge in the course of intra-organisational conflict. Downs (1957:111) allows some space for such conflicts, but what he gives with one hand, he takes away with the other, leaving us with the dictates of extra-party electoral-market rationality:

Different groups within the party use varying shades of the dominant party ideology as weapons against each other. In their struggle for power, each tries to convince influential members that it is the bearer of ideas most likely to win votes ... Party members choose an ideology which will win votes, not one they believe in, since their objective is the acquisition of office, not the creation of a better society.

Putative electoral benefits are often invoked in party debates, but such debates involve more than competing recipes for electoral success, proffered by power-seeking groups. For Downs, post-mortems might offer an ideal setting for different groups to present recipes for ideologies resembling those of the victorious party.

The 'strategic actor' model of party change (see Table 2) allows for a broader conception of intra-party concerns. However, this model tends to assume that if parties operate as 'strategic actors', they can be seen as unitary actors, bound together by the 'strategy' propounded by the leadership. As Lagroye (1989:369) reminds us:

... the identifiable changes in the way the political party game is played are too often perceived as simple changes of strategy due to the astuteness of leaders.

Rationalistic reconstruction can exaggerate leaders' control of the strategic agenda.
Przeworski's (1985) discussion of social democratic dilemmas is an interesting 'strategy' model, although it is also bound up with certain marxist assumptions about class. Party strategies are constrained by the strategies of other social forces:

The strategies which party leaders choose today produce the conditions under which they are forced to decide at the next election. The irrelevance of Downs' theory ... is due to the assumption that parties encounter an exogenous public at each election (Przeworski, 1985:119). 34

If the constraints of other social forces and past strategic choices are noted, Przeworski has little to say about how strategies emerge within parties, although he recognises the importance of electoral post-mortems. Parties decide what to say and whom to organise, settling on programmes, symbols and organisational efforts (Przeworski and Sprague, 1986:81). Party leaders reflect on electoral ups and downs:

... in the postmortems they often asked what went wrong with their strategies (Przeworski and Sprague, 1986:101-2).

The story of social democratic strategies is no steady retreat from 'class' and 'ideological' concerns. Given trade union connections and intra-party relations, it is 'empty formalism' to suggest 'party leaders can simply pick whatever strategy they like' (Przeworski and Sprague, 1986:120).

However, Przeworski's 'strategy' analysis has its empty, formalist aspects. While he notes that parties may speak with more than one voice, offering 'a weighted and
ambiguous mix of appeals' (Przeworski, 1985:112), this is seen as a matter of deliberate and discernible leadership choice rather than as a consequence of complicated intra-party processes. Social democratic strategic choices are unhelpfully pressed into a schematic 'class'/ 'non-class' dichotomy. He does not examine the specific forms of calculation and evaluation available to social democratic parties (Hindess, 1984:272).

Insofar as we can speak of a party as a whole having a 'strategy', this is the resultant of internal competition in a context of ambiguity. Przeworski allows space for post-mortems in his analysis, but sees them simply as opportunities for party leaders to weigh competing claims of pre-defined 'class' and 'non-class' strategies. As we shall see in our analysis of the ALP, the claims of 'class' can conflict with arguments about winning votes in some post-mortems, but many other issues emerge as well.

Przeworski's specific 'class'/ 'supra-class' focus is not inherent in the 'strategy' model as such. However, the presentation of 'strategy' as a matter of leadership choice in a unitary party facing an unambiguous environment is common. Yet, if we look at competition within parties and note the ambiguity of a party's 'environment' for all its groupings, we may find the notion of parties as 'strategic actors' in any simple sense problematic. The ambiguities inherent in reading 'social change' and the difficulties attendant on images of parties as unitary actors are addressed in our third model, of parties as 'complex arenas' (see Table 2). This may help us to come
to grips with the sort of dispersed 'garbage can' decision-making that seems common in parties.

'Social change' may indeed provide raw material for party debate, as different groupings read it in different ways. 'Social changes' in themselves have no 'essential' political meaning:

They are only endowed with particular meanings as far as they are effectively articulated through specific forms of political discourse and practice.... Relatively minor phenomena may be endowed with enormous significance, while major secular changes may be invested with no particular significance at all (Stedman Jones, 1983:23. See also Wolinetz, 1979:22; G. Smith, 1982:60). 36

The organisational and discursive complexities involved in specific party practices are often overlooked. 37 We should heed Gallagher's (1981:233) warning:

Not all parties change during a period of social change, and not all of the changes in parties are a reaction to social change, they are adapting to their own interpretation of it; the impact of social change is refracted by each party's perception of the nature of the social change.

We could go further. In the 'complex arena' model, perceptions of 'social change' within a party are related to available modes of political calculation and evaluation. 'Social conditions' external to the party affect the forms of calculation and evaluation adopted. They do so in a variety of ways, as the activities of other social actors, including their direct competitors, impinge on parties (see Hindess, 1986). 38 In 'adaptation' analysis, parties are undifferentiated, passive entities, subject to exogenous 'social structures'. In contrast, the
'complex arena' model sees change within the party as a result of diverse 'social conditions' intersecting with internal organisational and discursive processes.

As major secular changes may be invested with no particular significance, while apparently minor changes fuel political controversies, the most successful parties often seem to 'adapt' the least (see Gallagher, 1981:282; Garvin, 1982:22; Huntington, 1968:420-33). Australian Liberal ideology under Menzies seemed to undergo little formal 'adaptation' between 1944 and 1966. What has been described as Australian 'Cold War liberalism' outlasted the 'Ming dynasty' by a few years, before being seriously challenged in the late 1960s (Simms, 1982:119ff). Defeated parties are prone to anxious debates about 'social change' passing them by. They are likely to set up committees on such topics, but parties which talk a lot about 'modernisation' and 'reorganisation' may still change little. In many organisations, members discover that as 'reorganisation' smoke and dust settle:

... nothing seriously interferes with their desire to go on doing just what they were doing (Kaufman, 1971:58-9).

However, reorganisation rituals can redistribute influence and emphasise new values (Kaufman, 1971:58-9; March and Olsen, 1983).

Whether reorganisation attempts lead to change depends on the intersection between the temporary arena that emerges around a reorganisation attempt (a committee, a report, a set of special meetings or whatever) and more institutionalised party arenas. The 'complex arena' model
sees parties as loosely linked arenas of struggle. L. Johnston (1986:129) characterises the British Labour Party as 'a number of sites of conflict and pressure' (Conference, NEC, PLP etc.):

... it makes no sense to talk about political organizations as if they were subjects with essential interests and means of adequately representing them.

How these arenas, or points of conflict and pressure, are 'articulated' depends on a number of factors, including diverse 'social conditions' and internal struggles inside each arena (Hindess, 1982a:567-8). Permanent arenas include conferences, executives and parliamentary parties. Within such arenas, factions, groups and ideologies clash. Certain 'ways of doing things' crystallise. In temporary, less institutionalised arenas, basic party conflicts may simply be reproduced. On the other hand, 'models for' new practice may emerge in the temporary arena, which is very often 'loosely coupled' with the rest of the party. Post-mortem arenas have their own dynamic and their own discourses (about 'renewal', 'modernisation', 'intra-party democracy' etc.).

Given the various sites of conflict and pressure and the ongoing conflicts in these sites, there will always be a disjunction between 'rationalistic idealist' party reform blueprints from temporary arenas and subsequent party reform. Temporary reorganisation arenas encourage a 'rationalistic idealist' discourse, envisaging the party as a unitary actor and discounting factional rivalry. There are different kinds of 'rationalistic idealist' recipes.
Some talk of 'professionalisation' and ways to win votes (in a way that would not surprise Downs). At other times, the talk is of 'democratisation' and party 'renewal'. We can get participatory recipes for 'party democracy' as well as managerial recipes for 'rational-efficiency'. The presentation of such recipes will be affected by developments in the more permanent arenas (including conflicts between different groupings). Further complications will come from 'garbage can' coincidences, whereby very specific matters currently agitating individuals and groups in other arenas get registered in, say, reorganisation committees, simply because such committees happen to be around at the time. Rationalistic recipes bracket out such complexities. Parties examining themselves are prone to the curse of over-simplification (Blondel, 1978:186):

A reorientation or reorganisation that looks rational from the leaders' point of view may be very difficult to implement, because it will affect the internal power structure, the relationship between different coalitions and change the reward and motivation system of the party (Selle and Svasand, 1983:217).

The 'adaptation' model assumes that parties can meet the 'demands' allegedly placed on them by their 'environment' (whether general 'social structure', specific electoral 'market' or both) and ignores internal processes. The 'strategy' model acknowledges conflicts between intra-party coalitions, but tends to assume that, given the iron law of oligarchy and all that (imposed on parties by the requirements of electoral competition according to Przeworski and Sprague, 1986:184), leadership 'strategy' generally carries the day. The 'complex arena' model
operates with a more dis-aggregated conception of the party's 'environment' and pays detailed attention to intra-party processes.

The models yield different approaches to post-mortem rituals. Sociological 'adaptation' analysis could see such rituals in the context of organisational 'crises', enabling 'rational diagnosis' of 'problems' by 'experts'. The 'catch-all' party can be seen as a 'professional' party in two senses. Firstly, the role of 'experts' with extra-party and extra-political skills becomes more important. Secondly, party energy is focussed on the 'professional' search for votes. Here the sociological view overlaps with economic models of party competition. Such models could see post-mortems as an arena for competition between groups, each offering recipes for electoral recovery. In sociological and economic 'adaptation' analysis, the subject matter of post-mortems is given in advance. The question is whether parties find the right formula for electoral recovery or not.

'Strategy' models pay some attention to the party's 'introverted' face, as well as its 'extroverted' face (see Rose and Mackie, 1988) or its semi-secret garden as well as its 'public face' (see Charlot, 1989), but unambiguous leadership control of the 'introverted' domain is assumed. Post-mortems allow 'strategies' to be adjusted with a relatively free hand. They are important if the leadership takes them seriously. Leaders' private post-mortems may be more important than those conducted by special committees of inquiry and the like. As we have
seen, Michels (1962:71-2) saw little scope for occasional special committees to deflect leaders from what they were going to do anyway. In the 'complex arena' model, post-mortems are temporary arenas, which foster certain kinds of discourse (including 'professional' and 'democratic' party reform blueprints). Depending on the states of play within the more permanent arenas and an array of 'social conditions', post-mortems may lead to significant change in party practices. Party 'strategy' is a resultant of such factors, not something 'decided' by the party elite.

ID Change in the ALP, 1963-1981: 'Adaptation'? 'Revolution'? Students of the ALP often point to complicated internal processes, but generalisations about change in the party often reach back to 'adaptation' and 'strategy' arguments. Andrew Parkin (1983:15) notes 'a jumble of levels, lines and linkages' associated with the ALP's 'organisational complexity'. He also sees the party's recent history exemplifying Kircheimer's 'catch-all' thesis (Parkin, 1983:27). Dean Jaensch (1983:201) specifically endorses the claim that organisational 'contagion from the right' has infected the ALP, especially from the mid-1960s on. More recently (Jaensch, 1989), he has argued for a 'revolution' in the ALP, as a former 'class' party becomes 'catch-all'.

Epstein (1977:14) has endorsed the application of his own 'contagion from the right' thesis to Australian parties, declining 'both in size and participatory
decision-making'. ALP membership does seem to have declined considerably since the 1950s (Warhurst, 1983:259). The question of participatory decision-making requires further analysis. The Australian electoral behaviour literature also routinely endorses 'catch-all' arguments. Kemp (1978) sees a 'post-industrial' society generating changes in people's political 'interests'. Parties must respond, although 'the response of the elite to social change' is as important as change itself (Kemp, 1975:160). However, 'there is no convenient measure of elite response'. Aitkin (1977 and 1982) places less weight on social trends, but intra-party processes remain a 'black box'. Party systems 'have their own mechanisms for accommodating social change' (Aitkin, 1982:349), but these remain unanalysed.

Many commentators attribute changes in the ALP to a 'middle-classing' of Australian society since the Second World War. Such claims are sometimes made alongside detailed analyses of party structures. Overacker (1968) squeezes an interesting account of conflicts in the ALP in the 1960s into a clash between 'modern' forces trying to 'adapt' the party to 'social change' and 'traditional' defenders of older practices. The assumption is that, unless obstructed by 'traditionalist' obduracy, changes in 'society' must inevitably be reflected within parties. Kemp (1975:148-9) sees Labor in 1972 still divided between 'modernists' and 'traditionalists':

... over the necessity for new appeals to meet the results of social change, though the precise nature of this change remains ill-defined and controversial (Kemp, 1975:180).
With 'social change' ill-defined, controversial and ambiguous, it becomes difficult to see intra-party conflict in terms of 'modernists' who want to 'adapt' and 'traditionalists' who don't.

Jaensch (1989:3,22,37,155-7,176) traces the genesis of Labor's 'revolution' to Whitlam's ascent to the leadership in 1967. Before that, Labor's cumbersome machinery reflected a 'working-class' ethos (Jaensch, 1989:61). Since the late 1960s, the old 'mass party' model 'has increasingly been questioned and tested' (Jaensch, 1989:20). 'Social change' is seen as forcing Labor to 'adapt' its ideological stances as well as its organisational arrangements. There is also a touch of 'strategy' analysis in Jaensch's (1989:154) discussion of the role of 'Whitlam and his lieutenants' and the later 'Hawke-Keating putsch'. If the story is one of continuous 'adaptation' to an increasingly 'middle-class' electorate, it is also one of 'adaptation' prodded along by 'a determined party elite' and 'party leaders who, simply, were tired of losing' (Jaensch, 1989:156,159).

There are problems with the notion that the ALP, in its 'mass party' heyday, was both a 'syndical' party (for trade union 'interests') and 'socialist'. In one widespread view, ties between 'syndicates' and Australian parties gave the adjudication of 'interests' priority over the articulation of 'ideologies' (Miller, 1954; Davies, 1958; Crisp, 1970; Emy, 1974 and 1978; for criticisms see Simms, 1982; O'Meagher, 1983a). With ties between parties and 'syndicates' loosening somewhat in the 1960s,
parties might have had a chance to take up broader 'ideological' concerns. At the time, however, the more common prognosis was that parties would 'converge' as politics became more 'professional', more 'rational' and less tied to sectional interests. 48

Table 3 lists different conceptualisations of the loosening of ties between 'syndicates' and parties. Alan Davies (1958) insisted that a more 'professional' and sophisticated approach made for duller politics (see also Davies, 1972). 49 Head and Patience (1979:7) take up Davies' analysis in their discussion of pressures towards 'convergence', linking 'growing professionalization' to further ideological decline. Emy (1974) saw 'producer group' politics being replaced by more modern, aggregative styles. In 'producer group' politics, labour, business and the rural sector each had their own party and access to special sub-legislative arenas to advance their claims. More 'aggregative' parties would have to demonstrate a 'rational' focus on national policy formulation (and their possession of the relevant 'expertise'). Voters were more educated. Australia was becoming less isolated from the wider world.

As we shall see in greater detail in Chapter 10 (because he was the NCI's sociologist), Sol Encel was interested in the ways in which changes in Australian state and society made for more 'professional' and 'rational' politics. As a political scientist by training, he investigated the peculiarities of the Australian state. As a sociologist, he noted changes in 'social structure'.

37
## Table 3

### Conceptualisations of changes in Australian politics and society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Old</th>
<th>New</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'Intimate'/'oral' politics of the '1930s' (with 'primitive strength' and community identification with the protagonists).</td>
<td>'Mass'/'literate' politics of the '1950s' ('professional' and 'dull', with the life drained out of the old symbols). Davies, 1958: 150-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Operative concept of the state' (sectoralised, segmented, federalised, fragmented).</td>
<td>'Bureaucratic ascendancy' (incorporating intellectuals). Encel* Intellectuals prominent in protest movements, however.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Producer group' politics ('diffusion' to legislative sub-systems dominated by 'producer group' representatives.</td>
<td>Modern, aggregative politics (new emphasis on national policy-making skills). Emy, 1974</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* as discussed Chapter 10C

His picture of the 'operative concept' of the Australian state, revolving around fragmented interest-group sectionalism, is similar to Emy on 'producer group' politics. Encel saw the older 'operative concept' challenged by an emphasis on national policy-making, during the stalled 'bureaucratic revolution' promoted by the wartime federal Labor governments. This 'bureaucratic ascendancy' might be largely
unaccountable, but the older 'operative concept' had confined Labor to the pursuit of 'Ten Bob a Day'. In a polity which had congealed in an array of administrative and quasi-judicial agencies to accommodate sectionalist pressures, Labor saw little point in 'socialist' and 'social democratic' projects and felt little need for advice from critical intellectuals. Changing state structures might make a new kind of Labor politics possible. Such possibilities may well not be taken up.

Encel repeatedly stressed the capacity of the new 'bureaucratic ascendancy' to absorb intellectuals and smother public debate. On the other hand, the emergence of protest movements, and the role of intellectuals within them, were signs of hope.

'End of ideology' arguments were popular in the early 1960s (see Bell, 1960; Lipset, 1960). They influenced Kircheimer's 'catch-all' thesis. They reflected a widespread mood at the time. Similar assumptions can be seen in Davies' discussion of 'dull', 'professional' politics; Emy's expectations about the 'aggregative' future of Australian parties and some of Encel's formulations (see Table 3). Encel was torn in different directions. 'Catch-all' and 'end of ideology' theorists saw an abandonment of socialist ideologies and 'working-class' commitments by labour and social democratic parties as classic examples of convergence politics (Lipset, 1960:406). If the ALP was going beyond 'producer group' politics, did that amount to a retreat from 'ideology'?

Epstein (1967b:144) is equivocal about whether the ALP ever was a 'working-class', socialist, mass party.
It qualified in terms of 'class consciousness', if not 'socialist ideology'. Affiliated unions make it one of the world's small family of 'labour parties', defined by such affiliations (Rawson, 1969). Labor was thoroughly enmeshed in the utilitarian liberal assumptions that constituted Australia as a 'Benthamite society' (Collins, 1985). The ALP has always been:

... a creative arena with numerous ideological currents crossing through its membership: Populism, Keynesianism, nationalism, racism, republicanism, reformism and Douglas Credit have all made their mark ... (Watts, 1989:185).

The prominence of populist (Love, 1984) and racist (McQueen, 1976) discourses raise questions about whether one can talk of the ALP as a social democratic party. We have seen how 'Ten Bob a Day' politics left little scope for a comprehensive 'social democratic' agenda. However, given its labour movement base and the prominence of some 'social democratic' themes in its history, there is a sense in which one can place the ALP within the social democratic fold (albeit uncomfortably, for a long time, perhaps). Przeworski (1985:3-4) defines 'multi-class oriented, economically reformist parties' which organise workers as social democratic 'whether or not they wear the label' (see also Esping-Andersen, 1985:6ff; Paterson and Thomas, 1977:11).

If the ALP has always been social democratic in this broad sense, it took a long time to become interested in modern social democratic concepts like universalist welfare measures. The pursuit of 'Ten Bob a Day' in
arbitrated labour markets led to different priorities (Castles, 1985:76 and 82):

If there ever was a distinctively Australian conception of social justice, it was the gender-based labourist ideal that flourished from the beginning of the [twentieth] century to somewhere past its midpoint (Macintyre, 1985:58).

This involved a 'family wage', tariffs and immigration controls ('White Australia'). The Curtin and Chifley governments added Keynesian macro-economic techniques, without toppling the Laborist paradigm (Love, 1984:151). Welfare was still conceived in residual, safety net terms (Macintyre, 1985:83). The ALP only began to adopt the modern social democratic 'welfare state' agenda in the 1960s (Macintyre, 1984).

On a fairly minimal definition, the ALP has always been a social democratic party, if a rather peculiar one. Part of its peculiarity stems from its early success; minority federal government in 1901, majority government in 1910, well before other social democratic parties had made such breakthroughs. Early success, a stubborn sense of self-sufficiency and an attachment to institutions the party had a hand in establishing combined to make the ALP indifferent to many recognisably 'social democratic' concerns. In the 1960s, proponents of contemporary 'social democratic' themes clashed with those adhering to older Labor approaches. It would be misleading to see this as the 'middle-classing' of a once 'working-class' party. The early ALP breakthrough involved broad support (Childe, 1923; McQueen, 1976; Rawson, 1961a). The electoral dilemmas of labour movement parties facing electorates that do not
furnish ready-made 'working-class' majorities emerged as soon as such parties contested elections (Przeworski, 1980:40-1; Therborn, 1984:12). They did not suddenly emerge in the 1960s.  

Some writers (e.g. Miliband, 1977:155-7; Giddens, 1973:216) insist social democracy is irredeemably incorporated into the logic of capitalism. Others, drawing on an optimistic reading of Swedish experience suggest it could embody a politics of transition (see Korpi, 1978; J. Stephens, 1979). Social democracy is often characterised by an internal tug-of-war between incorporated and transitional approaches. In this contest, incorporation has some permanent advantages, but its invulnerability cannot be guaranteed by theoretical fiat, as in functionalist arguments about politics in the 'capitalist state'.

Social democracy, then, can include attempts to transcend capitalism (see Esping-Andersen, 1985). The social democratic parties that Przeworski (1985) looks at are not necessarily locked within his logic of choices, which makes such attempts structurally doomed. In the 'catch-all' thesis and related arguments, social democracy becomes purely accommodative and fully incorporated in an era of the 'end of ideology' and the 'mixed economy'. Continuous economic growth and ongoing political tranquillity proved to be considerably more contingent than was assumed in the early 1960s. The heyday of social democratic accommodation occurred within 'a limited and unusual period' (Wolinetz, 1988:306). It was followed by a
'crisis of manageability' (Hine, 1986) in many social democratic parties. New radicalisms emerged even before economic circumstances changed.

Within the ALP, attempts to distinguish 'democratic socialism' from 'social democracy' are unhelpful (Beilharz, 1986a:218). Instead, we could ask what kind of social democratic party the ALP has been. We have noted the emergence of a modern social democratic agenda in the ALP in the 1960s is difficult to interpret in 'end of ideology' terms, given the rough-hewn, pragmatic character of the older Australian Laborism (see Metin, 1977). Exploration of 'social democracy' in the 1960s was not tantamount to abandonment of 'socialism', even if it occurred at a time when many argued social democracy had become accommodative and incorporated and lost its transformative dimension.

The ALP in the 1960s was, as the party had always been, a creative arena criss-crossed by a wide range of ideological currents (see Watts, 1989:185). The nature of the mix was changing. Some older themes (e.g. 'White Australia') were under challenge. New projects were being articulated. In a 'complex arena', competing projects can be discerned, presented by different groupings. New policies may be advocated in some arenas. Party reform plans may or may not be related to advocacy of new policies. Such projects can appear quite consistent on paper, enabling us to see them as the 'strategies' of particular groupings. However, such 'strategies' cannot escape being embroiled in 'garbage can' coincidences. Battles over them become enmeshed in other conflicts.
Their fortune is also hostage to various 'social conditions'; the activities of other social actors, especially rival parties:

Changes of leadership teams, the strengthening or weakening of a faction, the adaptation of new themes and the creation of links which promote an image of underlying continuity all result as much from processes over which actors have little or no control as from strategies employed for reasons of rivalry within the party (Lagroye, 1989:170).

'Strategies' promoted by intra-party groupings, projects which emerge within a party, are not necessarily particularly coherent or easy to discern. In looking at change within the ALP between 1963 and 1981, we can discern three different 'ideal type' modern social democratic projects: Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1; Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2 and Labor Managerialism (see Table 4). For each project, as an ideal-type, I have traced consistent perspectives on (a) economic policy; (b) relations with 'new social movements'; and (c) intra-party democracy and party reform. Analysis of post-mortem rituals and party reform debates in the 1963-67 period shows a number of related proposals being put forward by self-styled Labor 'modernisers'. The 'modernisation' project, suggested in such proposals, involved new policies and new internal arrangements. In the period 1977-81, different projects were put forward. The area of economic policy and management of the 'mixed economy' is obviously central to modern, social democratic debates. 'New social movements' and Labor attitudes towards them are listed because of their challenge to the assumption that
radicalism would fade with affluence. Internal arrangements were a focal point of reorganisation attempts.

Table 4
ALP Strategies: 'Ideal Types'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Programme</th>
<th>Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1</th>
<th>Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2</th>
<th>Labor Managerialism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expand community services. Increase public expenditure within accepted 'mixed economy' framework.</td>
<td>'Re-mix' the economy through new 'socialist' projects (such as strategic nationalisations or 'economic democracy').</td>
<td>Sound economic management. Reforms repudiated insofar as they endanger fiscal responsibility as defined in 'stagflation' context.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'New Social Movements'</td>
<td>Cautious support through legislation plus some general sympathy.</td>
<td>Support through direct 'grass roots' liaison as well as legislation. Call for Labor practices to be re-modelled on 'new social movement' lines.</td>
<td>Support through legislation, where they demonstrate electoral clout.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Democracy/Party Reform</td>
<td>Combination of managerial and participatory approaches. 'Party reform' involving a better deal for 'rank-and-file' branch members alongside more effective domination by parliamentary leadership. Gains in intra-party pluralism over Laborist practice (State Branch monoliths).</td>
<td>Participatory emphasis. Support for National Conference reform to enable greater 'rank-and-file' input.</td>
<td>Managerial emphasis. Party reform left to negotiation between factional managers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The concerns I have labelled Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1 were articulated by Gough Whitlam and other Labor 'modernisers' in the 1960s. The Whitlam policy programme can be seen as an Antipodean version of Crosland's (1956) welfare-oriented revisionism, focussed on improvements in the 'social wage'. It proposed increasing social expenditure to reduce the imbalance between 'private affluence' and 'public squalor'.

Galbraith (1958) provided the text for many a Labor sermon at this time. Labor promised to clean up 'the seamier results of the long boom' (Catley and McFarlane, 1981:174) and catch up with levels of social provision in comparable countries (McLaren, 1972). There was sympathy for 'new social movements' then emerging in Australia as elsewhere, although Whitlam insisted on working within established, parliamentary, political channels. He kept his distance from broader 'liberationist' aspirations (Little, 1986). 'Modernising' the party was an important first step in this project to 'modernise' Australian society.

As we shall see in Part 1, party 'modernisation' in this context had ambiguous implications for intra-party democracy. 'Modernising' the party involved challenging authoritarian winner-take-all state Branch practices and rallying 'rank-and-file talent'. It also involved strengthening the FPLP vis a vis the party organisation. For the 'modernisers', new policies and a new party structure amounted to a coherent project, although there were different battles in different arenas. As we shall see, policies were easier to change than organisational arrangements.
When we come to the 1977-1981 period, different 'projects' can be reconstructed, drawing different 'lessons' from the 1975 trauma. In some parts of the ALP, the events of 11 November 1975 led to a questioning of conventional parliamentary approaches, increased sympathy for 'new social movements' and a new concern with 'grassroots' politics. Economic policy was also being rethought. 'Stagflation' in 1973-74 had played havoc with Australian Social Democracy Mark 1's assumption of continued trouble-free economic growth. New Labor 'socialisms' began to be articulated. The issue of party democratisation was revived. If 'modernisation' was the key word for Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1, 'participation' was the key word for Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2.

'Modernisation' in the 1960s was supported by FPLP leader Whitlam and he could gather support for much, but by no means all, of the project, in key party arenas. Enthusiasm for 'participation' after 1975, while widespread within the party's ranks, did not secure the same sort of official blessing. Concerns which emerge in a temporary arena are not always taken up in mainstream arenas. Support for various components of Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2 can be found in many NCI submissions and in the resolutions of Labor women's groups.

At leadership level, there was a reassessment of Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1. This looked to changing terms of economic debate and re-establishing Labor's credentials for 'sound economic management' rather than 'participation' and new 'socialist' projects.
the post-mortem arena itself, this analysis was not articulated very clearly. There, the talk tended to be more about 'participation' and such matters. Slowly, but surely, however, the mainstream arenas of the party took up themes from this 'project' which I have called Labor Managerialism, often without much explicit justification.61 The Whitlam Government's image of economic incompetence put Labor on the defensive. Emerging canons of 'sound economic management' in an era of recession and an ascendant 'new right' came to influence Labor debates.62 Eventually, through its Accord with the ACTU, which related carefully tailored 'social wage' improvements to 'money wage' restraint, Labor managed to demonstrate its 'economic responsibility', while providing a degree of 'social protection' acceptable to the ACTU. This combination underpinned Labor's electoral successes in the 1980s. Whereas Whitlam had plans to re-design a range of institutions, Labor Managerialism worked within existing institutional arrangements, eschewing grand designs for 'reform'. This approach was extended to intra-party matters. Reliable ground rules for factional negotiation were valued above plans for new structures. With an eye to electoral efficiency, 'discipline' and 'professionalism' were valued above 'participation'. Such an approach also informed Labor Managerialist attitudes to 'new social movements'.

The term managerialism has been used in a variety of ways.63 Some writers have seen post-war social democracy in general characterised by a 'managerialist' approach to politics (see, for example, Pierson, 1986:185).
In this view, social democrats are charged with reducing politics to technical decisions about the 'means' of 'managing' the 'mixed economy' and handing such decisions over to technical 'experts'. In the process, broad political debate is smothered and ideological traditions are discarded. Thus Catley and McFarlane (1974) denounced the ALP's exploration of contemporary social democratic themes under Whitlam as a form of 'Technocratic Laborism'. These 'managerialist' arguments fit closely with arguments about 'catch-all' parties and the 'end of ideology', seeing social democracy totally incorporated within the parameters of 'advanced capitalism'. Applying the argument to social democracy as a whole in the 1960s and 1970s involves considerable over-simplification. However, in many social democratic parties in the 1970s and 1980s, 'managerialist' approaches seemed attractive as economic difficulties led to dissatisfaction with what had been seen as a distinctively social democratic approach (Paterson and Thomas, 1986:14).

The contemporary social democratic ALP is often distinguished from the earlier Laborist party, with Whitlam a key figure and 1967 a key date in this transition. However, there are different forms of modern social democracy. Just as the 'Laborist' ALP was criss-crossed by a range of ideologies, so is the modern 'social democratic' ALP. The party has always been rent by competing groups with a wide range of ideas (see Theophanus, 1980:253). Identifying 'strategies' and 'projects' helps us to make sense of the vortex of ideas put forward in party arenas as
'solutions' to particular 'problems' by individuals and groups. In a 'complex arena', such 'strategies' and 'projects' can re-jig the balance between criss-crossing ideological currents. The forms of political calculation and evaluation within a party are manifold, but they do crystallise into recognisable discourses. Mapping change within a party is partly a matter of mapping changes in its discourses. The 'ideal-types' are not meant to characterise the ALP as a whole, but particular 'projects' put forward by particular groupings within the party. Such 'projects' are often articulated during post-mortem rituals. The interaction between the 'projects' emerging in such arenas (or in more mainstream arenas) and changes in party practices and priorities is, as we shall see, a complicated business.
PART I (1963-67)
CHAPTER 2
A PARTY IN CONFUSION: LABOR ENTERS THE '60s

2A Calwell and Whitlam Differ on 'Wooing the White Collars', March-June 1960

The 1950s had not been a happy decade for Labor, with a traumatic split (see Murray, 1970) and a run of electoral defeats. The Democratic Labor Party, which regrouped fiercely anti-Communist, mainly Catholic Labor supporters, was a thorn in Labor's side, particularly in Victoria. It directed its preferences to the Liberal-Country coalition and kept the 'anti-Communist bogey' on the electoral agenda. As well as having to cope with the Cold War and the effects of the 1954-55 Split, Labor was facing a changing Australian society. There was economic prosperity and Menzies had maintained the welfare provisions put in place by the Curtin and Chifley Labor Governments. There were tensions in the party over how to respond to changing circumstances. Overseas social democratic parties were also reassessing their traditions in the light of electoral reversals.

FPLP leader Arthur Calwell (elected March 1960) came to symbolise Labor 'traditionalism'. His deputy Gough Whitlam was identified with the view that Labor had to 'adapt' to a changing Australian society. 'Adaptation' was only one matter in dispute in a very divided and dispirited party. Both Whitlam's support for party 'modernisation' and Calwell's defence of Labor 'tradition' were predictable, given other ongoing disputes on matters such as:
... foreign policy; State Aid to non-governmental schools; unity tickets in trade union elections; the role of trade unions in the party; the relation between Federal Conference, the Federal Executive, and parliamentary members; and party reconstruction ... (Overacker, 1968:260).

Policy conflicts were linked to clashes between champions of the FPLP and champions of the party organisation:

On the one hand there seemed to be a growing demand for increased representation of parliamentarians on Executive and Conference. On the other a fear that the party's reverses were leading to a dangerous attack on the links between the industrial and political wings of the Labor movement (Hughes, 1964a:89).

Calwell tended to align himself with the latter position. The conflicts were complex, although there were identifiable 'left' and 'right' clusters of positions. K. C. Beazley (1983:37) suggests that the 1960s Labor 'right':

... combined a commitment to enhancing the influence of the Parliamentary party, sensitivity to perceived electoral opinion, support for E.G. Whitlam's leadership, and a concern to minimise the impact of opposition to the Vietnam commitment on support for the American alliance; those on the ALP 'left' tended to assert an educative role for the party where preferred policies clashed with public opinion, they opposed Whitlam's leadership and structural change in the party, and they were not convinced that the American alliance represented a solution to Australia's foreign policy problems.

Commitment to enhancing the influence of parliamentarians and sensitivity to electoral opinion led some to support party modernisation projects. Others saw such projects as a capitulation to Labor's enemies. Jim Cairns (1963:30) thought Labor should develop its socialist vision rather than 'adapt' to prevailing winds. Like other advocates of such a course, Cairns did not examine the existing federalised ALP's capacity to 'educate the electorate'. The left was suspicious of threats to its strong position on the
Federal Executive. Calwell became a champion of party 'tradition', partly because he feared reorganisation might undermine his leadership.

Whitlam's clash with Calwell can be seen as a clash between 'Paleo-Laborism' and 'Technocratic Laborism'. The 'Technocratic Laborists' argued:

Labor could no longer survive as the party of the underprivileged ... a dwindling minority surrounded by an affluent majority. While the continued neglect and suffering of the outcast groups is deplored, the emphasis shifted to professionalism and efficiency (Rowley, 1972:310).

While this shift in emphasis can be seen in Calwell (1963), Whitlam appeared to be the 'Technocratic Laborist' par excellence. Professionalism was a key word in his lexicon. Rowley (1972:310) noted that the 'Technocratic Laborists' were:

... recruited primarily from the intelligentsia and professionals and direct their appeal primarily to the new sectors of the intermediate strata rather than to Labor's traditional base ...

Shortly after winning the deputy leadership, Whitlam set out his path for Labor ('The Party's Policy : A New Enunciation', Sydney Morning Herald, 19 March 1960). Demands for education, employment and community services would increase. Young families and migrants would swing to Labor. So would professionals, increasingly salaried rather than self-employed:

They were in a better position than most to realise the lop-sided and anti-social features which our economy and society have developed under the Menzies Government ... Australians with a conscience will look to the Labor Party in the 1960s on New Guinea and aborigines.

The possession of washing machines, televisions and motor cars would not transform traditional Labor supporters' attitudes. Whitlam signalled an electoral strategy aimed at white collar
workers, combined with an ethical appeal to those in the professional sector who could diagnose the 'anti-social features' of the Menzies regime and 'Australians with a conscience' (possibly the same people, in Whitlam's eyes), who would respond to a new kind of 'issues politics' (on questions such as New Guinea and Aboriginal rights). An emphasis on professional altruism was integral to Whitlam's 'Technocratic Laborism'. In his 1957 Chifley Memorial Lecture ('The Constitution versus Labor'), he told Melbourne University staff and students:

You are better equipped than most of your fellow-citizens to understand the problem and to enlighten the public concerning it ... Your professional lives will be less circumscribed and stultified if the framework of our society is brought up to date (Whitlam, 1957:19. See also ACSPA/FCUSAA, 1959:99 and 101). 4

The call for Labor to open itself out to the emerging Australian professional and intellectual stratum was not always well received within the party. 5

Whitlam's article was one of four contributions to a Sydney Morning Herald symposium, 'Labor at the Crossroads'. The other three were from Lloyd Ross ('Where Lies the Highway to the Summit?', 16 March 1960); H.W. Arndt ('Social Patterns Demand a New Radicalism', 17 March) and E.L. Wheelwright ('The State Must Restore Social Priorities', 18 March). They echoed Whitlam's call for Labor 'adaptation' to a changing Australia. Both Arndt and Ross had been calling on the ALP to 'modernise' itself for some time. 6

Ross, secretary of the Australian Railways Union, was an Australian Labor intellectual. 7 He had been associated with the Communist Party in the 30s but became a strong supporter of
He thought Labor's divisions and difficulties were due to the vacuum the party found itself in following the failure of bank nationalisation and the defeat of Chifley:

There must be a great, simple, central theme branching into all the fields and subjects of debate, but in itself easily grasped, which runs through the words and actions of a successful opposition (Sydney Morning Herald, 16 March 1960).

Debate on Labor's purposes and priorities would not hinder party unity. The vacuum in ideas led to organisational differences. Attachment to outdated formulae hindered the ALP:

... while the public can be dismayed by the public controversies of a political party, the greater danger at the moment arises from a popular belief that Labor has stopped thinking on its aims and methods. A big debate would show the Labor Party to be not only alive, but also tolerant.

This call went largely unheeded, as did Whitlam's call for a concerted ALP appeal to professionals and intellectuals.

Heinz Arndt also took up the 'revisionist' banner. Labor had once been the driving force for change (Sydney Morning Herald, 18 March 1960). Since 1950 it lacked 'clear purpose'. This 'emptiness' allowed 'personal and sectarian issues' to become disproportionately important.

Arndt believed 'affluence' meant the 'end of ideology'. However there were still things to fight for. Domestically, there was the Galbraithian paradox of public squalor (in education, research, public health and arts support) alongside private affluence (cars, washing machines, televisions). Wheelwright took this up more stridently:

It is obvious to those not blinded ... by mass advertising that our social priorities are upside down. We view television in our homes and then go outside to a privy in our unsewered areas; we take our children to over-crowded, antiquated,
ill-equipped schools, yet purchase their clothes in smart up-to-date giant department stores (Sydney Morning Herald, 19 March 1960).

Arndt also asked Labor to take up the issue of Third World poverty and underdevelopment, whatever a 'hip-pocket nerve' electorate might think (18 March 1960).

From the left of the party, John Burton (1958:13), after denouncing Arndt's 'revisionism' in 1956, went on to argue that Labor never was and never could be socialist.

Nor could it be a 'crisis' party any more. Its significance was no longer as a workers' party, but as 'a party which represents economic and social justice'; giving leadership on issues such as 'the problem of New Guinea'.

Whitlam's 'wooing the white collars' strategy was based on the expectation of increased demands to redress 'public squalor', a common Labor theme at this time (see McFarlane, 1968:18), stressed by economists Arndt and Wheelwright. His ethical appeal to 'Australians with a conscience' was similar to that called for by Arndt and Burton.

A few months later, addressing the NSW conference, Calwell reaffirmed the 'socialisation objective'. The party would never be taken over by 'intellectuals and pseudo-intellectuals' who advocated its abandonment ('Socialisation: ALP Aim Reaffirmed by Calwell', Sydney Morning Herald, 13 June 1960). This call for loyalty to the 'socialisation objective' helped to forestall the sort of wide-ranging debate advocated by Ross. Calwell appealed to delegates, mostly affiliated unionists, to see the 'revisionist' calls as 'anti-Labor' suggestions, akin to what could be expected from Communist Party and DLP fifth-columnists. Labor would remain close to
the unions. 'White Australia' would stay. Clearly Calwell had little sympathy for the type of party 'modernisation' advocated by Whitlam, particularly insofar as it included extending a welcoming hand to 'intellectuals'. Calwell's (1963:8) own political career path had been pursued entirely within the ALP. He became secretary of his local branch at 18. He did not go to a university.

2B Establishing the Federal Secretariat: Trials and Tribulations, 1958-64

Following Calwell's outburst, the Sydney Morning Herald editorialised:

The party's need for a strong Federal Secretariat, staffed by precisely the type of Labor supporter Mr Calwell seems determined to drive away, has never been so apparent (‘Mr Calwell Turns the Clock Back’, 13 June 1960).

Labor was not to have a Federal Secretariat until January 1964. A proper Federal Secretariat, with a role in general publicity and membership education as well as campaigning was a long-standing, if rather half-heartedly pursued, Labor dream. It was also a handy panacea recommended by press commentators at electoral post-mortem time.

Enlisting 'modern thinkers' was often associated with advocacy of a Secretariat. If some saw a Secretariat as a think-tank, others saw it as a requirement of professional campaigning (see Crisp, 1978:96). Secretariat advocates stressed changes in the party's environment, especially the growth of 'the white collar professional, clerical and technical classes'. Such 'dreamers' often found it difficult to get the party to take their ideas seriously:
Many Labor men viewed the emergence of a permanent Federal Secretariat with about as much enthusiasm on the one hand and suspicion on the other as they did the expansion of the permanent component of the Australian Army (Crisp, 1978:70).

In his 1954 NSW conference address, state president Bill Colbourne called for a Federal Secretariat. It might help integrate local branch members into the party:

If we give our Councils and Branches some practical work to do in propagating the great cause of Labor, we will put new life into the Party and eliminate the differences that exist today on petty and unimportant issues (NSW ALP Branch Records, ML Mss 2083/449/1166).

A few months later, in October 1954, the Labor Split erupted. Not for the first or last time, 'rationalistic idealist' party reorganisation aspirations ran aground on realpolitik rocks.

Serious moves to establish a Secretariat were put in train following Labor's 1958 defeat. Recommending a Federal Secretariat, NSW campaign director Colbourne drew the lesson:

... that Labor propaganda, to be effective, must be issued in regulated doses over a long period and not forced on the elector in one or two big doses just prior to an election ... (NSW ALP Branch Records, ML Mss 283/453/1178).

The NSW executive endorsed a motion for the 1959 Federal Conference supporting the establishment of a Secretariat (NSW ALP Branch Records ML Mss 2083/455/1179).

NSW Senator James Ormonde publicised the NSW executive plan for a Federal Secretariat early in January 1959. A Sydney Morning Herald editorial described the plan as:

... a natural and familiar result of ALP reflection following a heavy setback ... So far it has been frustrated by a deeply founded scepticism regarding the extent to which the Australian electorate would respond to such 'education', by a lack of sustained interest in political crusading and by the curious and often troublesome relations
between the Federal ALP and the six State organisations ... ('A Brain for the Labor Party', 13 January 1960).

The secretariat idea was unpopular in important sections of the party. Ormonde's high profile on the issue was resented. During the 1958 election, he had been associated with the move to appeal directly to Catholic voters on the basis of differences between Sydney Archbishop Cardinal Norman Gilroy and Melbourne Archbishop Daniel Mannix. Gilroy was quoted to reassure Catholics that the Church was not anti-Labor. Gilroy regretted the use of his name, but repeated his view that only the Communist Party was beyond the pale (see Murray, 1970:348). Mannix replied:

Every communist and every communist sympathiser in Australia wants a victory for the Evatt Party ... (i.e. the ALP, quoted, Murray, 1970:348).

Eddie Ward and other prominent figures wanted party leader Evatt (who supported the move) and Ormonde to take responsibility for the failure of this tactic. Talk of a Federal Secretariat was seen as an evasion of such responsibility.

The WA Branch supported a Secretariat in principle (C.E. Menagh, 'ALP May Establish Secretariat in Eastern States', West Australian, 5 May 1959). Victoria opposed. The 1959 Federal Conference in Canberra:

... approved in principle the establishment of a federal secretariat ... The main object of the secretariat would be to provide a public relations department for the party. The secretariat would also conduct an educational campaign on such objects as democratic socialism ('Plan for Federal Secretariat', Sydney Morning Herald, 16 May 1959).
Finance and other operational matters were left to be sorted out later (ALP, 1959:42-3).

The Secretariat had been under active consideration since August 1958 (ALP, 1959:59). The extant federal machinery was 'hopelessly inadequate'. A central office could redress this without disturbing Executive authority:

Furthermore the Secretariat would be able to undertake research in all aspects of political theory and history and any required information should be readily available, to the Federal authorities and the State parties, such information being in strict accordance with Labor Policy and with official attitudes on any question (ALP, 1959:16).

The general income of the Federal Executive was little more than three thousand pounds. A Secretariat would require an income of twelve thousand pounds. Thus the Federal Executive insisted on increased state affiliation fees.

The Secretariat was not considered again by the Federal Executive until September 1960. Chamberlain was then asked to prepare 'a detailed proposal' (ALP, 1961:77). At this stage, Chamberlain was also acting Federal Secretary. Although some Branches were wary, 'influential ALP men' were convinced that the party needed a central Secretariat to match that of the Liberals ('ALP Plans for a Federal Secretariat', Age, 7 September 1960).

The December 1960 Federal Executive meeting considered Chamberlain's proposal (ALP, 1961:79). Chamberlain noted 'an acute awareness' in all Branches of the need to improve Labor's federal organisation (ALP, 1961:77). 'Grave organisational weaknesses' flowed from the lack of a 'real central administration'. Federal Conference met only biennially, Federal Executive only met twice a year and the
federal secretaryship was a part-time position. Chamberlain looked at the crucial question of finance. If the party had forty thousand or fifty thousand pounds a year, it could easily:

... establish a national administrative centre consisting of a number of experts in administration, public relations, research, a librarian and all that goes with the modern requirements of a political organisation.

The Branches would not hand over that sort of money. However, a fourfold increase in fees could finance an adequate Secretariat.

E.L. Wheelwright (1962:12) emphasised Chamberlain's argument on the under-funding of the federal ALP. The ALP as a whole appeared to have an income of over ninety thousand pounds but only about three percent of this accrued to the Federal Executive. Wheelwright commended the Chamberlain report, but maintained it did not go far enough. Its skeleton Secretariat, 'a bold proposal' in the ALP context, was not adequate. An official inquiry into organisation and finance, along the lines of the Wilson Inquiry in the UK, was warranted.  

The problems faced by British Labour were not dissimilar to those faced by the ALP. British Labour had been out of office since 1951. In both countries, it was argued that 'social change' and welfare capitalism had undermined traditional support (see Jupp, 1958). The Wilson Inquiry was set up after British Labour's 1955 defeat. It was conducted by a National Executive committee (chaired by Harold Wilson MP). It was 'deeply shocked' at Labour disorganisation:

... compared with our opponents we are still at the penny-farthing stage in a jet-propelled era and our machine, at that, is rusty and deteriorating with age (quoted McKenzie, 1956:94).
In the British Labour Party, as in the ALP, there were those who rejected such 'modernisation' rhetoric. Aneurin Bevan MP dismissed the Wilson report:

They were going to increase the number of organisers, streamline the machinery and make the car go faster. He was not sure that he wanted to go faster, if he were going over a precipice. He wanted to have a more precise idea of where they were going (quoted, Hanham, 1956:378, note 8).

The insistence that 'modernisation' was a political question is important.\(^{19}\)

The notion that changing social circumstances required a more professional approach was central to Wheelwright's (1962:12) diagnosis. He linked professionalisation to centralisation. Over-centralisation led to 'apoplexy at the centre and anaemia at the extremities' but Labor's problem was:

... acute under-centralisation, a body without a head, the whole suffering from pernicious financial anaemia which results in lethargy and inability to fulfil essential functions.

Getting the States to pay up delayed the establishment of the Secretariat. To get over the poverty of some states a revised plan was presented at the January 1962 Federal Executive meeting ('Finance Trouble Hits ALP's Secretariat Plan', Advertiser, 12 January 1962).\(^{20}\) This plan was for a Secretariat costing eleven thousand five hundred pounds, located in Canberra.\(^{21}\) At the time, commentators paid more attention to the Executive's decision not to intervene in Victorian Branch, than to its new Secretariat plan.\(^{22}\)

By the next Executive meeting\(^{23}\) all Branches were ready to pay up. The Secretariat could be set in motion.\(^{24}\) This was seen as a triumph for Chamberlain (M.C. Uren, 'Successes for Chamberlain at ALP Meeting', West Australian,
7 July 1962). The press welcomed the decision, suggesting the Secretariat would enhance the quality of Australian political debate as well as assist the ALP. In May 1963, the Federal Executive recommended then Victorian secretary (and Federal Executive delegate), Cyril Wyndham, as full-time Federal Secretary.

2C Research and Reorganisation: National Organising Committee, 1960-61

Alongside the complicated saga of the establishment of the Secretariat, there were other reorganisation attempts. The same Executive meeting that commissioned Chamberlain's feasibility study also:

... set up a 'political intelligence' committee to find the reasons for Labor defeats in recent years and to seek a formula for victory ('ALP Committee Seeks Reasons for Poll Defeats', Sydney Morning Herald, 12 September 1960).

It consisted of three Senators: Felix Dittmer (Qld), Pat Kennelly (Vic) and 1959 Secretariat advocate James Ormonde (NSW).

The 'political intelligence' committee, formally known as the National Organising Committee (NOC) had a broad brief. It anticipated, in a part-time way, the sort of services a professional Secretariat could provide. Ormonde said the committee hoped:

... to set up and maintain the same kind of intimate contact with the general public that the ALP has with its branches and the trade unions. Developments in public relations technique make it essential for the Labor Party to extend its organizational activities beyond the unions and the party branches (quoted, Sydney Morning Herald, 12 September 1960).
The *Sydney Morning Herald* saw the establishment of the NOC as 'a tempting subject for disrespectful comment', but conceded that the 'three wise men' might come up with something for the Secretariat to consider when it was eventually established ('Labor in Search of Intelligence', 12 September 1960).

But they would find it difficult to agree on the cause of Labor's setbacks, let alone base a policy on their findings:

The present leadership despises 'intellectualism' in the party ... If the 'political intelligence' committee does its job thoroughly it may gather some startling views from electors from whom, a generation ago, Labor would have expected unfailing support.

The NOC would find itself confronted with:

... all the contradictions and improvisations that political flesh is heir to. A few men without party blinkers would probably tell the ALP as correctly as a million why it has been defeated in election after election.

The final suggestion ignores the inescapably political nature of discussions on party strategy, involving as they do all the contradictions and improvisations of political flesh. Necessarily.

The NOC soon fell foul of Chamberlain. Ormonde's recommendations of more openness to professional advice, the use of surveys and reaching out to business organisations paralleled British 'revisionist' organisational arguments (see Minkin, 1978:274-6; Hindess, 1971:112; Howell, 1976:281; Warde, 1982:55 and 72-3). This was not what disturbed the supposed arch-'traditionalist'. Rather, it was Ormonde's emphasis on researching DLP voting patterns that alarmed Chamberlain. He stressed Ormonde had no right to speak on behalf of the Federal Executive. The NOC had not been formally established and had nothing to do with policy ('Labor Senator
Chamberlain appears to have agreed with the 'revisionist' emphasis on utilising professional and academic advice. But there was no room for even thinking about a deal with the DLP on his NOC agenda:

The Committee is to apply itself solely to organisational matters and shall provide a liaison between the Federal Executive and State Branches in relation to the next general Federal Election (Chamberlain statement, 30 September 1960, quoted, Brian Fitzpatrick's Labor Newsletter, 2 March 1961).

The committee was asked to co-opt the intellectual services of Brian Fitzpatrick and others.  

Fitzpatrick dispensed friendly advice to the ALP from his idiosyncratic Newsletter. This won him some useful contacts in the FPLP and on the Federal Executive. He argued strongly for Labor adjustment to social change without compromising what radicalism it possessed (see Watson, 1979:257). In 1960, Fitzpatrick's view was that the ALP had never been a socialist party, although 'its nominal commitment to socialism of a sort' had been 'an intangible support to the best people in the party' (quoted, Watson, 1979:264). But Labor had to win elections and swinging voters did not 'care tuppence' about the 'socialisation objective' (Brian Fitzpatrick's Labor Newsletter, October 1958).

Fitzpatrick insisted that Labor had to overhaul its organisation to communicate with a changing electorate that took Keynesian prosperity for granted (see, for example, Brian Fitzpatrick's Labor Newsletter, June 1958). He advocated a national Labor weekly, full-time organisers in marginal
electorates and provincial towns as well as local research and the involvement of community leaders at the branch level (see also Jupp, 1959:13-4; Rawson, 1959:13). Labor could no longer present itself as 'the party of the underprivileged' but could forge a new, modernised, 'grass-roots', populist radicalism cultivating 'a sense of participation and identity with the Party and political affairs' (Brian Fitzpatrick's Labor Newsletter, December 1958. See also Turner, 1959:7).

Fitzpatrick's basic thesis was that Labor had to respond intelligently to the growth of the 'professional, technical and managerial class' (mostly without links to the ALP or the unions):

The young technologists can be taught, by an articulate, educating, crusading Labor Party, why they can find in the ALP their most congenial political party home. The professional and technical workers can be accommodated in unions.

But the problems posed are great and complex ...
Now, surely, is the time to take stock ...

There was a reluctance to initiate grand debates in the FPLP and the party 'machine', as Calwell demonstrated at the 1960 NSW conference. Chamberlain's dressing-down of the NOC provided a further example. Chamberlain agreed with Fitzpatrick on the usefulness of local branches organising their own research projects (see 'Report on Yarra: Lessons for Labor', Brian Fitzpatrick's Labor Newsletter, March 1959).

Indeed Fitzpatrick's advocacy influenced the Federal Executive in its establishment of the NOC in September 1960 (see letter from Chamberlain, Brian Fitzpatrick's Labor Newsletter, April 1961).
Conflict with Chamberlain meant the NOC was almost still-born. It was formally buried by the 1961 Federal Conference. Its rise and fall illustrates important aspects of the process whereby internal ALP conflicts and complexities cut across any simple 'adaptation' to social change.

In a political party like the ALP, vague proposals for 'reorganisation', 'modernisation' or 'professionalisation' are particularly prone to derailment by apparently 'extraneous' factionalism, manoeuvring and intrigue (see D. Stephens, 1979:402, note 82 and 1980:44). In any organisation, formal reorganisation projects call forth a host of loose 'solutions', 'problems' and symbolic issues (Olsen, 1976:314-5). The NOC's interest in the taboo issue of ALP/DLP relations lost it the confidence of Chamberlain and the Federal Executive. Ormonde wanted this question to be taken up in NOC research. Then Senator Kennelly raised the issue of ALP/DLP rapprochement more concretely. The NOC's fate was sealed. The whole incident illustrates Encel's (1964:19) argument that obsession with the DLP, both on the part of those who wanted some sort of rapprochement and those who upheld the implacable 'spirit of Hobart' (from the crucial 1955 Federal Conference), cut across and confused Labor strategic thinking at this time.

The NOC's misfortune was that its appointment coincided with talk of a 'deal' with the DLP. Kennelly's response put him offside with the Federal Executive and with Calwell. Chamberlain was particularly upset at the prospect of prominent ALP members entering exploratory negotiations behind the backs of the party's official authorities.
In December 1960 the Federal Executive repudiated Kennelly, criticised his apparent willingness to talk with the DLP and attacked the NOC. Kennelly was deemed to have exceeded his authority as NOC chairman. Ormonde and Dittmer were criticised for their complicity. Charges were made that the NOC had failed to co-opt sympathetic academics. Some delegates wanted the committee dissolved if it did not stick to its brief ('Rebuff for Senator Kennelly over DLP Peace Effort', Sydney Morning Herald, 9 December 1960).

The NOC had produced an interim report on 2 December 1960, indicating 14 seats lost in 1958 by DLP intervention and 14 more that could be won on a moderate swing to Labor (Brian Fitzpatrick's Labor Newsletter, 2 March 1961). It did not begin contacting the experts recommended by the Executive until 23 December. A meeting ensued in Melbourne on 22 February 1961 between the NOC, Creighton Burns, Clyde Holding and Fitzpatrick. This endorsed some of Fitzpatrick's suggestions. Fitzpatrick argued that Chamberlain had six months 'to revolutionise ALP organisation for research, policy-making and public relations' in time for the 1961 federal elections. This did not happen. The NOC was disbanded shortly afterwards but the ALP still came within one seat of victory on 3 December 1961.

Before its burial, the NOC produced a report for the 1961 Federal Conference. This was not considered, but got significant publicity. It called for modernised rules and procedures to attract a more representative cross-section of the community into the party ('Labor Senators Want New Look', Age, 13 April 1961). Fitzpatrick noted the parallels between
the NOC's move away from 'workerism' and Labor's new economic policy. Both assumed traditional 'working class' families represented a minority of Australian voters. He approved of the direction the party was taking, although not all ALP advocates of party 'modernisation' articulated such a project with the cultivation of a new radical Labor populism in the way that he did. The NOC recommended the establishment of a Labor research team made up of advertising and market research experts, to analyse voter attitudes and devise a new 'image' for the party (Age, 13 April 1961).

On 13 April, Victorian delegate Cyril Wyndham noted statements about a Labor NOC in that morning's papers (ALP, 1961:29 ). He asked whether any such report had been received by the Federal Executive. Chamberlain replied 'No'. Conference asked the federal officers to contact NOC members about the press statements. The following day Wyndham moved a motion disbanding the NOC (ALP, 1961:38 ). Conference preferred an amendment leaving the Federal Executive to review the NOC. The NOC was never heard of again.

There were lessons for future committees. Such committees were sponsored by the Federal Executive. If their deliberations led them down stray paths, that the Executive disapproved of, their proposals could be marginalised. There were many obstacles to having grand organisational debates. However, inertia did not mean incremental change was impossible. The Federal Secretariat was eventually established, but it had been insulated from any broader debate on party 'reorganisation'. The doomed NOC had failed to link its proposals with the debate on the establishment of the
It was ironic that Cyril Wyndham, who seemed so anxious to wind up the NOC in 1961, would later find his own report, commissioned by the Executive in 1964, getting some of the same treatment. This was in spite of his care in steering clear of controversy and his attempt to give his report (which was much more comprehensive than the NOC report) a strongly technical-organisational focus. But no report can be purely technical-organisational. Inevitably reorganisation proposals have internal political implications and ramifications. As Wyndham put it in 1968 (to the NSW Fabian Society):

> When you start talking reorganisation, you don't get a rational debate - you get a power struggle, and when that happens the chances of reorganisation are practically doomed (quoted, 'Wyndham Urges Shake-Up in Labor Branches', *Australian*, 8 April 1968).

Reorganisation committees have a fondness for 'rationalistic idealist' rhetoric and recommendations. Whether reorganisation recommendations are implemented, however, depends a lot on intra-party *realpolitik* factors which such rhetoric systematically ignores. Wyndham did not have to wait until he was Federal Secretary to find this out. Committees set up and reports commissioned by state executives follow the same organisational logic as those emanating from the Federal Executive. As Victorian secretary, Wyndham prepared a reorganisation report for that Branch in 1962. This post-mortem on the 1961 state election loss was badly received by the Victorian executive. Few of its recommendations were taken up.
CHAPTER 3

PICKING UP THE PIECES: LABOR AFTER 30 NOVEMBER 1963

3A Seventh Successive Defeat: Press tells Labor 'Adapt or Perish'

Labor's confidence made defeat in 1963 the more galling and it encouraged the search for reasons (D. Stephens, 1979:383).

From an academic point of view there is probably nothing more stimulating than a political postmortem because there are few subjects outside politics which lend themselves so readily to conjecture and debate. The very controversy inherent in politics defies conclusive reasoning and begets dogmatism and fallacy as sin begets sin (Allan Fraser MHR, 1964:16).

... The various groups will now blame each other, and the inevitable inquest into the Party's big election defeat could spark off renewed internal troubles. (S.W. Stephens, 'Party Due for Drastic Overhaul', Advertiser, 7 December 1963).

Labor's defeat on 30 November 1963 was particularly traumatic. Wide-ranging 'what went wrong' debates ensued. They demonstrated deep divisions within the party. Certain questions were becoming increasingly difficult to avoid. This was the seventh successive such defeat. The long and bitter shadow thrown over the party by the 1954-55 Split enabled it to brush aside unwelcome evidence about its level of support. This shadow was still clouding the situation in 1963, but Labor's expectations had been increased by its close run in 1961. In a sense, 'what went wrong' debates are no more than ritual organisational gestures, routine responses to the internal problems associated with electoral defeat. Although post-mortems allowed various wounds and 'running sores' to be re-opened, their ritual quality also facilitated solemn incantations to the elusive spirit of party unity.¹

72
Denouncing the electorate was a constant temptation for disappointed Laborites. Certain hardy post-mortem perennials consolidated feuding groups around recurrent themes of press bias and the malevolent machinations of Labor's opponents. Press commentary and positions taken by Labor's opponents played a considerable part in shaping post-mortem debate. Internally, manoeuvring for factional advantage was a major factor.

The ritual nature of much Labor post-mortem debate was sometimes used as a stick to beat the party with, particularly in equally ritual forms of editorial sermonising (see, for example, 'The New Labor Leader', Advertiser, 8 March 1960), which were usually resented by their supposed recipients. Calwell (1963:58) preferred 'manly foes' to posturing 'candid friends', who wanted Labor to improve its 'image' by changing its policies, loosening its union links and dropping the socialist plank in its platform.²

The ritual quality of Labor post-mortems can be overstated. Each defeat had its own peculiarities. The degree of disappointment or desperation involved could alter the stakes in any particular debate. The 1963-64 debate illustrates the ideological and organisational condition of the ALP at a critical time. Internal debates influence how parties read change in the electorate:

While it is notoriously difficult to discover voters' motives, a politician's perception of reasons provides just as good a determinant of his future role as do objective data (D. Stephens, 1979:201).

Competing politicians' and party officials' perceptions of why elections were lost get thrashed out in post-mortems.
Sometimes contributions are solicited from lower down the organisational hierarchy.

Liberal exploitation of Labor disarray in 1963 was complemented by the allegation that Labor was dominated by 36 'faceless men'. Calwell's generous domestic policy promises were 'shrewdly picked over' by Menzies (Hughes, 1964b:93):

... who offered reduced if slightly different versions of many of them, without being committed to any of them.

Menzies took advantage of Labor division on 'state aid' to private schools (including those in the Catholic parochial system). He offered five million pounds in federal grants for science blocks in all schools. NSW Labor was embroiled in a 'state aid' row with the Federal Executive, which ruled a proposed NSW government scheme transgressed ALP policy. A month later, the 'snap' election was called. Menzies also emphasised foreign affairs and defence issues, implying that Labor's 'faceless men' could wreak havoc in these areas.

The term 'faceless men' was introduced in March 1963, after the publication of a photograph of Calwell and Whitlam waiting outside the Hotel Kingston in Canberra, under a street lamp. Inside the 36 Special Federal Conference delegates were defining Labor's line on US military installations in Australia, particularly the naval communications facility then being established at North West Cape. The 'faceless men' incident has been described as a media stunt (Freudenberg, 1977:89) and a consequence of poor leadership by Calwell (Dunstan, 1981:100-101). Calwell and Whitlam were not barred from attendance. Calwell had referred the issue to the Federal Executive to secure party legitimation for his endorsement of
North West Cape. The Special Conference accepted North West Cape albeit with some qualifications to protect Australian sovereignty, by 19 votes to 17, on the votes of SA, Tasmania and NSW, augmented by the crucial defection of J.E. Duggan, Queensland SPLP leader.

The apparent ordering about of Calwell and Whitlam and the closeness of the vote, not the substantive decision, were capitalised on by Labor's opponents, none more so than Menzies:

In the very hey-day of our progress, the Australian Labor Party asks you to dismiss us, to commit the national fortunes to the hands of its Members of Parliament and the famous outside body, 36 'faceless men' whose qualifications are unknown, who have no elected responsibility to you ... (quoted, Hughes, 1964a:99).

Would Parliament or Labor's 'faceless men' rule Australia?

Liberals linked this choice between 'Parliament' and 'Puppets' with an ideological repertoire articulating 'affluence' with 'the Communist bogey':

In a country now growing and developing at express speed our external and internal security must be in the hands of known men, proved men - men whom Australia trusts. (Liberal advertisement, Bulletin, 23 November 1963. See also Simms, 1982:121).

Those denouncing the 'faceless men' made great play of the fact that a number of Federal Conference delegates sat on the same union executives as members of the Communist Party of Australia. Calwell gave a spirited defence of the delegates. They represented 'some hundreds of thousands' of ordinary Australians ('Calwell Demands Election : Menzies Challenged', Socialist and Industrial Labor, April 1963). Calwell was not successful in having his picture of Labor Party democracy publicly accepted. He found it difficult to see
beyond his own perceptions of Labor's role in Australian society (Tom Wheelwright, 1977:87).

The 'faceless men' furore did not undermine Labor's confidence. No previous Labor leader went into a campaign 'with a greater feeling of confidence' than Calwell (S.W. Stephens, Advertiser, 7 December 1963). None emerged 'in such a state of angry impotence'. The latter feeling is clearly shown in Calwell's eclectic catalogue of the causes of Labor's defeat which seemed to include everything but his own leadership and the party structure ('Bitterness by Calwell in review of labor's Defeat', Sydney Morning Herald, 3 December 1963). He still hoped:

... to lead Labor to the promised land ... I should not have to accept responsibility for the election going wrong, Labor did not get the votes because of malicious influences working behind the scenes and outside Parliament ...

His willingness to believe his opponents' behaviour required explanation in terms of conspiracy theories mirrored Menzies' fascination with the 'faceless men'. While constantly favouring 'explanations' of Labor's plight in terms of malicious external influences, Calwell admitted Labor did not know why it was losing and had to find out ('Calwell Seeks Defeat Facts', Sydney Morning Herald, 2 March 1964). Unlike his penchant for conspiracy theories, this admission of confusion opened the way to detailed internal inquiries.

By March 1964, many incantations within the ALP had denounced various demons, there were also some attempts at analysing what had gone wrong. All this was accompanied by didactic press commentary. The press call was for a far-reaching inquest, prepared to tackle difficult subjects,
including Calwell's leadership ('Labor Faces the Future', Advertiser, 3 December 1963). The standard rhetoric about social change by-passing the ALP was deployed. New ideas on education, housing and the economy were not enough. Labor needed a classless image:

Its trade union ties, which it must doubtless maintain, have yet to be woven effectively with the threads of other community groups. Union officials predominate among ALP candidates; the classless image of the Whitlam type is much rarer.

Across Australia, editorial advice to the ALP recapitulated these themes. Not for nothing do Connell and Irving (1980:297) see a certain 'modernisation' rhetoric constituting a hegemonic discourse in Australia in the 1960s (see also Baldock, 1978):

The Mercury saw Labor's defeat as a consequence of the influence of old guard union leaders on ALP policy, part of what the West Australian called Labor's 'drab and unfriendly' visage (Hughes, 1964b:103).

In 1961, uncharacteristically, the Sydney Morning Herald had supported Labor. By 1963, it had swung back to the Government. The ALP was 'unreliable', it bluntly declared (‘The Choice Before the Labor Party’, 3 December 1963). A 'reliable' Labor Party would change its image, repudiate its left wing, move towards rapprochement with the DLP and develop its Secretariat! The 'unreliable' ALP would avoid coming to grips with the electorate's distrust of the 'faceless men'. It would grasp at other explanations. Many excuses could be 'manufactured'. Some 'were already being advanced'.

The themes of an 'out of date' Labor Party and unhealthy domination by 'faceless men' were also staples of Liberal argument. A pamphlet whose title (Back to Methuselah:
The Faceless Men and the Power of the Labor Party) intertwined both themes, confidently predicted:

... a further decline of the political influence of the ALP in an Australia which, unlike the Labor machine, belongs to the twentieth century (Liberal Party, 1964:10).

The programme being imposed by the 'faceless men' was still essentially 'the socialist programme adopted by the ALP Federal Conference of 1921' (Liberal Party, 1964:4):

The new Australia that has emerged since the end of World War II, its place and problems in the Pacific, the tempo and challenges of its internal development, occupy only a subsidiary place in the thinking of Labor's Faceless Men.

Perhaps conservative detection of a 'socialist tiger' lurking behind innocent ALP appearances (which goes back to 1905) was even more anachronistic. The Liberal Party (1964:6) complained that ALP evolution differed from British 'Labor' (sic) with its strong local branches and its increasingly middle-class leadership. Similar idealised images of the British Labour Party were commonly employed by the newspaper chorus, based more on the beholder's criticism of the ALP than on an informed account of the British Labour Party.

3B Debates in the States

In a party as federalised as the ALP in 1963-64, post-mortems largely took place, firstly, at a state level. The Queensland Central Executive thought Labor had not put enough emphasis on youth ('The ALP Emphasis to be on Youth - Lesson from Poll', Courier-Mail, 25 February 1964). A circular from Queensland TLC president John Egerton to 300 ALP branches and 100 unions said Labor had to find out what went wrong from the small voter rather than 'tall poppies' ('"Why Did We Fail?"

... adopt the policy of the British Labour Party and set up a committee to examine why elections were lost ('Duggan: Examine Election Losses', Courier-Mail, 12 May 1965. See also ALP, Queensland Branch, 1965:28).

Not only did he invoke a misleading idealisation of British Labour practice, he also reminded delegates, as insistently as any editorialist, that Australia was an 'affluent' society and that Labor had to dispose of allegations about 'faceless men'!

On 13 December 1963, the Victorian executive set up a seven-man review committee to find out what had gone wrong ('Moderates Can Gain Labor Control', Australian Financial Review, 18 December 1963). Of the seven, only three were on the executive themselves. The committee could have 'far-reaching repercussions' including, ultimately, a big change in the type of executive elected by the state conference. It had a majority of branch representatives. The committee was seen as a potential rallying-point for opponents of the executive. Had the 'Junta' as its opponents called it (see Mathews, 1986) unwittingly established a Trojan Horse?

We will never know. The review committee had an even more ethereal existence than the Federal Executive's NOC of a few years before. No report was tabled at the 1964 conference. Three years later, critics of the executive were still wondering:
What happened to the 1963 Committee? It has never yet reported to Conference, or to anybody else as far as we know (Labor Comment, January/February 1967).

Realpolitik considerations may explain why the committee was aborted. Its story has surface similarities to that of the NOC. The review committee began amidst a panoply of 'rationalistic idealist' promises:

Its investigations should result in recommendations which will assist the ALP to streamline its electoral organisation and methods, and to increase its appeal to sectors of the community where we appear to have problems such as among young people, new citizens and, to some extent, women voters (Bill Hartley, 'DLP Attitude Precludes Any Future Reconciliation', Western Sun, February 1964). 12

The title of Hartley's piece points to some of the realpolitik post-mortem agenda; no deal with the DLP and protection of Calwell's leadership.

Hartley's patron, Chamberlain (see Jupp, 1983:90) was defining similar post-mortem parameters in WA. The WA executive expressed confidence in Calwell on 4 May 1964, deplored attempts to depose him and to change policies 'to satisfy the daily press' ('ALP Exec in WA Rejects Liberal Press Attacks on Calwell', Tribune, 3 June 1964). 13 Battle lines were being drawn. Entrenchments were being fortified.

At the same time, platitudes were as pervasive as ever in this type of situation. In Tasmania, too, the call went up to attract youth back into the Labor movement (ALP, Tasmanian Branch, 1964:2). 14 Tasmania also called on the Federal Conference to consider revising the 'socialisation objective', given the obstacles presented by Section 92 of the Constitution and judicial interpretations thereof (ALP, Tasmanian Branch, 1964:6). 15 The local left opposed, but need
not have worried. Federal Conference did not get around to considering the question in this round of 'party reform' debate, which focussed more on organisation, leadership and policy than on philosophy.

The 1964 SA convention decisively rejected a move to add the FPLP leader and deputy leader to Federal Conference and Executive ('No Vote for ALP Leaders', *Age*, 15 June 1964). Don Dunstan reminded delegates that both leaders had every facility to attend such meetings and had done so. Senator Cavanagh suggested politicians should be servants of the organisation, not masters.

Cavanagh had earlier defended the 'faceless men' who were:

... the appointed representatives of approximately 2,500,000 politically enlightened supporters of the Australian Labor Party ... (CPD, Vol S25:156).

An investigation of what happened on 30 November 1963 would be beneficial, although the term post-mortem was unsuitable:

... because the most certain finding of any ordinary post-mortem is that the body is dead ...
The Australian Labor Party will never be dead while there remains in Australia an under-privileged class which needs the party for protection and to obtain jobs (CPD, Vol S25:151).

The SA Branch was aligned with the left on many issues and was fond of 'democratic socialist' rhetoric, but its delegates had accepted North West Cape at the Special Federal Conference. SA president, Clyde Cameron, was unsympathetic to calls for party reorganisation. New SA secretary Geoff Virgo agreed. Labor:

... should not be stampeded into altering our policy or machinery merely to satisfy the dictates

Press advice was tainted, Cameron insisted. Like industry and the instruments of distribution and exchange, the 'organs of public expression' were controlled by the ruling class, which feared that a socialist government would strip monopoly capitalism of its:

... right to ruthlessly exploit the public in the way it now does ... the controllers of Big Business want to change the policy of the Australian Labor Party so that it will become nothing but a half-baked Liberal Party. They want Australian politics to follow the American pattern, where, no matter which party wins, General Motors, Duponts, Bethlehem Steel and the House of Morgan never loses (ALP, SA Branch, 1964:2).

Perhaps this was merely a tonic for the troops. At the same convention Calwell was eclectic enough to cite General Eisenhower and Harold Wilson as witnesses for the relevance of 'socialism' in an affluent society (ALP, SA Branch:1964:10)! A later SA Labor figure, Neal Blewett (1973b:392-3), suggested Calwell postured about socialism for internal/factional purposes, but studiously avoided working out a relevant socialist strategy. The 'shibboleth of socialism' became a 'war cry' which invested personal vendettas with a spurious ideological disguise (Blewett, 1973b:392-3, see also Jaensch, 1983:186-7; Murray, 1970:298). Cameron insisted Laborites agreed on the objective of a society which placed community needs above individual greed, but differed on methods (ALP, SA Branch, 1964:3):

Too often we allow the capitalist press to divide our ranks by categorising good, loyal Labor supporters as either 'right-wingers', 'left-wingers' or 'Moderates' ... (ALP SA Branch, 1964:2).

This was disingenuous. It understated intra-ALP division.
Cameron added a strategic dimension that was not always present in voluntaristic arguments in favour of a Labor attempt to educate the electorate in the principles of 'democratic socialism'. The party had to judge the extent to which it would 'allow immediate aims to override ultimate aims', a problem with 'no simple answer':

Under existing circumstances, it would be politically unwise to force a Labor Leader to fight an election on a policy to socialise monopolies when a Labor Government would have no constitutional power to implement such a policy (ALP, SA Branch, 1964:3-4).

Cameron called for a constitutional reform campaign, while fighting elections on the platform planks that could be implemented, constitutionally and financially, within one federal term (ALP, SA Branch, 1964:4). He gave priority to reforms that put little strain on Treasury resources.

Like others who defended the party's existing structure, Cameron preferred external 'explanations' for Labor's reverse. Menzies had been able to exploit an atmosphere of international uncertainty following the Kennedy assassination:

This, coupled with the vicious and the lying DLP propaganda ... sowed the seeds of suspicion that were to cause a sufficient drift to rob us of a well deserved victory (ALP, SA Branch, 1964:4-5).

Cameron did not consider the possibility that the existing ALP structure was inadequate for a long-term 'democratic socialist' mobilisation. ALP mythology about the impact of the Kennedy assassination was easily drawn on by defenders of the organisational status quo. While this mythology tells us a lot about internal Labor debate, it was misleading. Such instant 'explanations', however popular among political actors and
commentators, under-estimate voter stability:

Over-emphasising the importance of the events in an election campaign is one of the occupational hazards of politicians and journalists ... The death of President Kennedy towards the end of the 1963 election was widely thought to have steered waverers across to the government parties, a provocative thesis for which there is no evidence whatsoever (Aitkin, 1967:104).

Calwell's address to the convention echoed Cameron's comments, particularly on organisational matters. He praised the SA ALP for securing over 53 percent of the vote (ALP, SA Branch, 1964:10), thus 'giving the lie direct to the "faceless men" propaganda'. The SA 'machine' included many prominent state and federal parliamentarians, e.g. Cameron, Dunstan and Senator Toohey. Like Cameron, Calwell suggested Labor factionalism was exogenously generated by the press and other enemies:

... we need not worry too much about the spurious distinctions that our cliche-ridden press and the slogan-mongers in the ranks of our political enemies say about us. Above all, let us, who belong to the Party, never make the grievous mistake of couching our own thoughts and opinions in the language and slogans of our enemies (ALP, SA Branch, 1964:11).

This was a carefully coded attack on Whitlam.
CHAPTER 4
FULL-SCALE INQUIRY: NEW SOUTH WALES

4A Establishing the Inquiry: The Officers' Rationale

The most extensive post-mortem was in NSW. Seven of the ten seats lost were in NSW, which was bound to encourage reflection in a state where Labor had a solid electoral record (see Table 1).^1

Table 1
Labor Votes and Seats by State, House of Representatives, 1958-63

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Labor Share, 1st Preference Votes (per cent)</th>
<th>Average Vote Share (per cent)</th>
<th>Labor Seats</th>
<th>Total Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>1958-63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vic</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>49.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qld</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>44.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>50.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WA</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tas</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>45.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L-CP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>44.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Labor shares, 1st preference votes; Mackerras, 1975:224. Seats; Mackerras, 1975:233-6. ACT and NT not included because their representatives had only limited voting rights.
There were ongoing disputes between NSW and the Federal Executive, particularly on 'state aid' and 'unity tickets'. NSW delegates would want to defend their Branch in federal arenas. There was considerable suspicion that NSW was still influenced by the 'Grouper' mentality, despite the upheaval of 1955/56. Finding Federal Conference decisions unpalatable, NSW 'heavies' were predisposed to take attacks on the 'faceless men' seriously.

Electoral losses put NSW party managers on the defensive, especially since they had been champions of electoral pragmatism. Their critics on the left of the labour movement had a field day. In the Communist Review, Eric Aarons (1964:42) gloated that Labor's losses had been greatest in NSW where Labor had antagonised many workers and was surrounded by the smell of corruption. Waterside Workers' Federation national secretary, Charlie Fitzgibbon, who was not himself aligned with the NSW ALP 'machine', felt it necessary to rebut the suggestion that right-wing half-heartedness had contributed to Labor's defeat ('Shock Election Result', Maritime Worker, 18 December 1963).

An extensive post-mortem could help the NSW executive in manoeuvres to alter Labor's federal complexion, as well as in the separate exercise of maintaining the internal Branch status quo. D. Stephens (1979:197ff) lists four consequences of the 1963 defeat:

1. Pressure for organisational reform and reduction in federal machine power;
2. A changed relationship between Calwell and Whitlam;
3. The NSW Government joined the NSW executive in
pushing for 'state aid'; and

(4) Many NSW parliamentarians felt a special bid should be made for the Catholic vote.

The issues of 'state aid' and doing something about the 'faceless men' were difficult to disentangle. For internal purposes, the NSW executive preferred to concentrate on organisational matters.

The NSW post-mortem gave Whitlam an opportunity to register his new relationship with Calwell. His controversial contribution appeared in the press, causing apoplexy in some quarters of the ALP, after the formal inquiry had been completed. Whitlam kept his distance from the NSW right, although there was some overlap in their positions (see Daly, 1978:162).

There was a substantial left-wing minority in the NSW Branch. Les Haylen lost his seat in 1963. His post-election mood was nostalgic and fatalistic. It was futile to explore what had gone wrong (Haylen, 1969:174-5). Labor's rank-and-file had gone rotten. 'The slobbering cry for change at the top' did not address that. The party structure was all right. You could not have all indians and no chiefs (Haylen, 1969:207). The 'stupid controversy' about 'faceless men' was 'the most amusing piece of political gimmickry' he had ever observed.

Delegates to the 6 December 1963 NSW executive meeting received an officers' report, which noted:

... the necessity for an examination of all factors which contributed to the unfortunate results (ALP, NSW Branch, 1964:14)

The officers did not fault the campaign, policy or organisation; this was partly a justification of their own
stewardship. The 'rank-and-file' were thanked; it is difficult to criticise volunteers. Investigation was still required. They did not want to make:

... any precipitate judgement based on first reactions, emotionalism, press statements or personal recrimination ... The real cause must be found. Where errors of policy, organisation or judgement are found they must be admitted and rectified.

'Rationalistic idealist' assumptions that 'the cause' of an organisation's problems can be dispassionately discerned in this way are inherent in this sort of exercise. They involve the pretence that official inquiries can proceed oblivious of ongoing personal, ideological and factional disputes (inherent in a party like the ALP).

The form of post-mortem suggested by the officers was accepted by the executive, with only one speaker against. Federal Electorate Councils would hold special meetings. Each FEC and each candidate would submit a written report to a special executive meeting on 21 February 1964.

The dissentient, Federated Ironworkers' Association secretary, Laurie Short, suggested awaiting FEC opinion was 'cowardly' (Alan Reid, 'Labor Men Blamed for Poll Defeat', Daily Telegraph, 7 December 1963). Labor's enemies would have the initiative. The executive's enemies were already organising a campaign to blame it for Labor's losses. The conflation of Labor's enemies with the executive's enemies is interesting. The officers had their own rationale for an FEC-based post-mortem. It was expressed by secretary Colbourne. He, too, feared that forces within the ALP wanted to destroy the state government and the NSW executive. 7 Drawing in the FECs could help rebuff them.
The left minority on the executive was happy with the post-mortem. The round of FEC meetings would provide opportunities for them too. However, before the FEC meetings, they wanted to secure official NSW endorsement of Calwell's leadership and the prohibition of any deal with the DLP. A motion to this end from John Garland (an Amalgamated Engineering Union official) and John Heffernan (from the Sheet Metal Workers) was acceptable to the rightist majority, at the price of expressing confidence in Whitlam as well.

The executive's decision received considerable press coverage. The inquiry would be the biggest in NSW Labor history ('Searching Labor Inquiry on Poll Ordered', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 7 December 1963). Such accolades were double-edged. Labour movement suspicion of the capitalist press could interpret favourable publicity in many ways.

Outside the ALP, but expressing views held in some parts of it, Communist journalist J.R. Hughes saw the inquiry as part of an almost conspiratorial offensive against the unity of the labour movement organised by:

... the big monopoly groups linked with the Democratic Labor Party and the National Civic Council ... aided by the pseudo-Labor men of the extreme right wing within the ALP, particularly in NSW ... The link between monopoly groups and right wing ALP leaders is not just ideological. There is a strong personal physical relationship ('Monopoly Makes a Grab for the Labor Party', *Tribune*, 5 February 1964).

He did not tell his readers exactly who was in bed with whom. His thesis was that certain NSW-based monopolies had become dissatisfied with Menzies and were casting around for an 'acceptable' alternative government. In this interpretation, the FEC-based inquiry discriminated against affiliated unions:
Hundreds of thousands of affiliated unionists who bear the main brunt of financing the Party are deliberately ignored when it comes to seeking opinions for Labor's defeat ('Monopoly Makes a Grab for the Labor Party', Tribune, 5 February 1964).

Its union positions and its propaganda sheets gave the CPA potential leverage. It took care in analysing trends within the ALP (Playford, 1962:192), constantly changing tactical emphases and theoretical labels. The NSW executive paid much attention to cutting off points of contact between ALP members and the CPA.

The Lang Labor Century was even more remote from the ALP debate. It regularly fulminated against the NSW Labor leadership and dismissed the post-mortem as an attempt by head office to divert criticisms of its own shortcomings. Room 32\(^{10}\) was instituting an inquisition among the rank-and-file ('Labor's Inquisition', 13 December 1963). As FECs were not confined to self-criticism, this was misleading, although there was considerable stage-management by the officers. The nature of that stage-management needs to be analysed, rather than simply deduced from the officers' oligarchical position or the hidden hand of monopoly capital.

In post-mortem rituals, realpolitik manoeuvres can often be discerned, alongside the routine deployment of 'rationalistic idealist' rhetoric as a kind of liturgical language. Century, presumably drawing on Lang's extensive Labor 'machine' experience,\(^{11}\) assumed that the ALP could be analysed in terms of nothing but oligarchical realpolitik. Maintenance of 'inner group' power was the name of the game. The post-mortem ritual was futile and ridiculous:
Now the ALP witch doctors and medicine men of magic are about to spend months of voodoo incantation of a landslide against Labor. State Branches will be inundated with voluminous reports containing out-worn cliches and repetitive excuses which will resolve nothing except the production of a bunch of crocodile tears. The time might as well be spent in sticking pins into a rotund devil-doll image of Sir Robert Menzies (K.M. Peir, 'A Right Wing Coup Will Smash the ALP', 20 December 1963). 12

The NSW Labor left was happy with the post-mortem format, but wary of the officers. It was disturbed to hear some executive members pushing 'pre-conceived ideas' about the defeat, particularly the notion that some sort of anti-communist campaign was needed in the unions, to placate the electorate ('Election Postmortems', Socialist and Industrial Labor, February 1964). The left felt this violated the officers' expressed desire to avoid hasty conclusions. However, 'rationalistic idealist' talk about discovering the facts 'without fear or favour' and without any 'heresy hunt' (ALP, NSW Branch, 1964:15) did not mean the officers were about to abstain from any attempt at agenda-setting. After all, the post-mortem was their idea.

The officers thought making the FPLP leader and deputy leader ex officio Federal Conference and Executive delegates would ease the 'faceless men' problem. An officers' memo on 2 December, before the inquiry had been established, shows how the exercise was conceived as a party management mechanism:

In the light of the current setback, it is essential that the Executive retains the initiative in all subsequent examination of various phases of the campaign (NSW ALP Branch Records, ML Mss 2083/397/1016).

Executive representatives would attend the FEC meetings. They
would be briefed on the overall campaign and 'classic local factors'.

As well as trying to put out some local government bush fires, the executive could use the FEC meetings to legitimate criticism of the federal party regime. The memo made this clear:

If, as preliminary inquiries reveal, some facets of foreign policy, e.g. US/Australian relations, were the subject of press distortion, our Federal Executive representatives would have had their hands strengthened by majority FEC complaints in this field.

Perspectives on why the party lost were clearly enmeshed in ongoing struggles. The NSW officers now had an opportunity to vent their frustration with federal decisions. Attack was a good form of defence. Another officers' report referred back to the Kingston Hotel Special Conference, suggesting, in a retrospective 'if only' mood, that Calwell should have staked his leadership on unanimity. Many voters' doubts could be blamed on 'the stubborn 17, who resolutely opposed the base on any grounds'. The NSW Branch had wanted the party to embrace the ANZUS alliance more wholeheartedly for quite some time. It was also ambivalent about Calwell's leadership. This report mentioned that Whitlam was better on television and that Calwell's comments, during the campaign, on the electoral system had been ill-judged. Yet another NSW officers' report criticised the federal officers for setting themselves up as 'clay pigeons to be shot down by Alan Reid'. The 2 December memo insisted the executive should have its own federal reorganisation proposals ready for the 1964 state conference. Again, attack could be used as a form of defence:
The action would avoid dissentient elements calling the tune at Conference ... Debate on such issues will throw the Left on the defensive and prevent them seeking to attack the Executive on an organisational basis ...

4B FECs and Federal Party Reconstruction

The FECs were an interesting battleground for the officers and their critics. In many ways they were rather unimportant bodies. At state conference union delegates predominated and branch representation was through the state, rather than the federal electorate councils. The SECs were thus a more direct target for factional politicking (see Jupp, 1964:55 and 219; Cavalier, 1976:55). However, NSW 'rank-and-file' preselection methods meant factions had:

... to concentrate their activities at a local level far more than they would otherwise (T. Wheelwright, 1983:31).

Local alignments and arguments surfaced at FEC meetings. The state-wide FEC-based post-mortem offers a snapshot of the branches. Class, religious and regional factors were linked to different factional allegiances in different areas. The out-group was strong in the provincial cities, Newcastle and Wollongong. Labor activism:

... brought with it the possibility of moving in and being socialised by a number of party milieux ... (Walker, 1976:81; see also Cavalier: 1976:87, note 11).

Some FECs could be classed as 'loyalist' executive supporters. Others were 'left-wing'. There were also FECs locked in factional conflict and others where factional alignments were difficult to discern. A 1959 state conference decision to
replace state-wide 'rank-and-file' Senate preselection ballots with an electoral college consisting of 45 executive members (including the officers) and 2 delegates from each of the 46 FECs increased the FECs' importance in the party structure. The officers could not take the FECs for granted. In the first ballot under the new preselection system they had been rebuffed. From their perspective, executive/FEC relations could do with improvement.

The officers hoped to deflect dissatisfaction onto the party's federal regime. They called for ex officio representation of the FPLP leader and deputy leader on the Federal Executive and at Federal Conference, as well as further FPLP representation at the latter. 'Loyalist' FECs would endorse such proposals. One of the first to do so was Cowper FEC. Cowper was one of the two rural seats Labor had lost to the Country Party. Country organiser Don Sullivan represented the executive at the Cowper FEC meeting. Cowper FEC's endorsement of the NSW officers' analysis was given considerable publicity.

After the Cowper meeting, NSW officials called for support from SA and possibly even Victoria for federal reorganisation:

They said the party as a whole was in a receptive mood ... 'Let's face it, there is a vacuum to be filled and NSW has got to fill it before we get some wild schemes from somebody else', one official said. 'This will be a challenge to Mr Calwell to take the bit between his teeth ... to see that the other states play ball' ('Move to Put ALP Leaders on Executive', Sydney Morning Herald, 16 December 1963).

Reports from assistant secretary Tony Mulvihill noted FEC support for the officers. At Richmond FEC, also rural, there was:
... very constructive discussion ... for several hours ... Various theories were expounded and unquestionably the federal structure imperfections loomed large in delegates' thoughts (NSW ALP Branch Records, ML Mss 2083/397/1016).

Macquarie FEC agreed that the federal structure 'must be drastically overhauled'. So did Mitchell FEC, after 'remarkably temperate' discussion.20

What particularly pleased Mulvihill was support for the officers from beyond the factional faithful. He emphasised that, at the Richmond meeting, 'even Senator McClelland' was sympathetic. Indeed he wanted to go further on the question of FPLP representation. Mulvihill had to remind delegates that:

... since Federal Conference itself had to ratify the changes, it would be unwise to become too revolutionary in our suggested reforms.

Doug McClelland, at this stage, was an opponent of the dominant group. He had built up independent personal support, particularly in country FECs (see T. Wheelwright, 1983:38). A safe Country Party seat bordering on Queensland, Richmond was a long way from Room 32. Visits by key party figures were appreciated. Mulvihill thought Whitlam's Christmas visit was useful:

... since his views coincided with those of the Party Officers for an overhaul of the party structure (NSW ALP Branch Records, ML Mss 2083/397/1016).

Mulvihill attended the Shortland FEC meeting in Newcastle the next day.21 In this 'left-wing' stronghold delegates still went along with much of the officers' analysis.22

The officers' strategy put the left on the defensive. In Parkes, where Les Haylen had just lost his seat, the FEC began its report by emphasising 'exploitation of the "36
faceless men" propaganda'. While insisting that Federal Executive elections were 'democratic and fair', Parkes FEC accepted the addition of the FPLP leader and deputy leader.23 'Party modernisation' discourse put the left on the defensive. Miriam Dixson (1964:6) noted a widespread belief among Labor activists in Parkes:

... that the workers above all 'let them down', while the middle class vote stayed more or less constant. Typical explanations were: 'All this overtime', 'Two jobs a man, they've dumped Labor principle', 'Mum's working, so the worker thinks he'll give the Libs a try'. 24

Cunningham FEC in Wollongong rejected a resolution criticising the Federal Executive, but was prepared to countenance a review of the federal structure ('Election Postmortems', Socialist and Industrial Labor, February 1964).

Neighbouring Hughes FEC, also aligned with the left, went a step further. Hughes delegates criticised the party managers' failure to defend the 'faceless men', but wanted to broaden the Federal Conference by including FEC and federal union representatives. This was a more extensive reorganisation than the officers had canvassed. Radical reconstruction was also endorsed by the right-wing Eden-Monaro FEC. In the long-term, it favoured a Federal Conference based on FEC delegates (NSW ALP Branch Records, ML Mss 2083/397/1016).25 In the interim, it supported the officers' plan to add the FPLP leader and deputy leader and four other FPLP representatives to the Conference. Eden-Monaro's aspiration for an FEC-based Conference embodied a concern for 'rank-and-file' rights but did so ambiguously. This FEC also insisted that while Federal Conference should formulate policy, timing should be left with the FPLP. 'Party modernisation' discourse
wrong-footed the left, but was not always embraced enthusiastically on the right. Eden-Monaro MHR Allan Fraser (1964:16) was equivocal. He thought the extent of Labor's debacle had been exaggerated but went:

... along with the critics to the extent that Labor urgently faces the need to present a more attractive program and image - curse the word - to a large section of ordinary people who no longer see themselves as oppressed or downtrodden.

There could be important differences between an FEC-based Conference and one based on FECs and federal unions, but both Eden-Monaro and Hughes FECs wanted radical Federal Conference reform. On the policy issues and factional controversies of the day, they were poles apart. Eden-Monaro called the FPLP leadership into question, insisted that the ALP should not accept affiliations or donations from unions which contributed to Communist Party funds and demanded a 'state aid' commitment for the 1964 Senate election (NSW ALP Branch Records, ML Mss 2083/397/1016). Hughes, on the other hand, proclaimed that Labor's campaign had paid insufficient attention to the party's 'socialisation objective', which could have informed its economic policy (Socialist and Industrial Labor, February 1964). Hughes delegates explicitly condemned the suggestion that the ALP should intervene in union ballots to counteract 'unity tickets'.

Factional stances on policy controversies were fairly clear-cut. They influenced FEC perceptions of the reasons for Labor's defeat. Factional allegiances were not rigidly defined at the FEC level on every issue. There were some cross-factional alignments on federal reorganisation. The officers could win at least qualified support beyond their own group.
Assistant secretary Mulvihill was a key figure in this endeavor. Indeed, he was the central figure in the whole post-mortem. In the NSW Branch, a traditional task for the assistant general secretary has been to watch over the numbers for the ruling faction 'to ensure voting strength at the Annual Conference' (Tom Wheelwright, 1983:31). This partly explains Mulvihill's role. Given the federal election debacle, the ruling faction wanted to pre-empt criticism at the 1964 conference. Since 1955/56, the reconstituted right in NSW devoted much of its energy to fending off challenges from the left, but its 'rather uninspired approach ... helped gather support for the left' (Murray, 1970:352). The two major factions played out:

... institutionalised war-games, openly engaging each other in set-piece battles to organise votes for a ballot box or on the floor of a meeting (Cavalier, 1976:7; see also Tom Wheelwright, 1983:56).

These 'war-games' have a realpolitik logic of their own. Murray (1970:287) saw the traumatic struggle in NSW in 1955/56 as:

... essentially a fairly blatant one for power, between 'ins' and 'outs', arising out of obscure feuds of minor intrinsic importance.

We could use such a perspective to explain the post-mortem and the respective 'in-group' and 'out-group' analyses of Labor's woes, the myths they sustained and the grey areas in between. Competing myths could be dismissed as simple rationalisations. However, some consistency and a degree of continuity in the competing factional discourses suggest they were based on more than 'obscure feuds of minor intrinsic importance'. The debates have to be understood in their own
terms, before their realpolitik implications are analysed.

In the cycle of factional conflict, the post-mortem was, by definition, a one-off, irregular event. It lacked the focus of a ballot or a Conference agenda. This allowed for the articulation of a wide range of 'solutions' and 'problems', that expressed party mythologies. Analysis of the debate can allow us to excavate such mythologies, which informed competing factional recommendations. This is not to say that we should ignore the realpolitik dimension. The FECs were rather low down the party hierarchy, but provided a forum for local branch influentials. Winning such people over might be of some benefit to the officers, come the next conference. Moreover the electoral college arrangements for Senate preselections had caught the officers napping in 1960. The FECs had to be charmed. Mulvihill himself was a prospective 1964 Senate candidate, although Century speculated that 'party reconstruction preoccupations might force him to stay at Room 32 ('Haylen for Senate?', 13 December 1964).

4C 'Anti-Communist Blitz': FECs in Conflict

The officers pursued a quasi-consensus strategy and focused on organisational questions, but also flew a kite on the controversial issue of certified ALP candidates in union ballots. On 19 January 1964, a day when 11 FEC meetings were due to be held (NSW ALP Branch Records, ML Mss 2083/397/1016) it was reported that 'NSW ALP chiefs' were planning an 'all-out blitz' against Communists in the unions ('Labor Party Versus Red Unions', Sunday Mail). This was misleading. At the state executive meeting on 31 January, in a special
presidential minute, Charlie Oliver rebutted 'misleading statements' in the press and denied discussing official ALP involvement in union ballots with union leaders (ALP, NSW Branch, 1964:14).

Many FECs held their special meetings in the second half of January, between the press flurry about the 'anti-Communist blitz' and Oliver's clarification. Some of these meetings were acrimonious. At Farrer FEC according to the Sydney Morning Herald:

... a rowdy meeting ... endorsed the NSW ALP executive decision to campaign against Communist officials in unions affiliated with the party ('Campaign Against Communists Gets Support', 20 January 1964).

This was a reference to reported comments from Oliver rather than any official resolution. Farrer FEC called on the Party to endorse ALP candidates to contest all union positions held by Communist Party members.

The Farrer meeting, which was attended by ALP country organiser Don Sullivan, got considerable publicity but the press seemed confused about what exactly was decided. This compounded the confusion on whether the executive had officially sponsored an 'anti-Communist blitz'. The ensuing picture of the Farrer FEC endorsement of the anti-Communist crusade as typical of the post-mortem as a whole (Sydney Morning Herald, 20 January 1964) was unfortunate. Farrer FEC also passed resolutions supporting the left's concerns such as a nuclear-free zone, 'anti-monopoly' economic policies and countering the 'faceless men' slander ('Attempt to Hoodwink ALP Members', Tribune, 22 January 1964). On the anti-Communist crusade, what Farrer FEC endorsed were proposals put forward by
Sullivan as official recommendations, which also included the officers' federal reorganisation plan. Federal reorganisation and ALP candidates in union ballots were de-coupled later in the inquiry. The anti-Communist crusade was 'hotly contested' by some delegates. No wonder the Sydney Morning Herald called it 'a rowdy meeting'.

Another rural FEC meeting (Paterson) queried the exact status of the union ballot proposals. Executive representative Schofield (from the Federated Ironworkers' Association):

... tried to move, as an executive proposal, a resolution to run ALP candidates in union elections. Questioned by the chairman, he admitted that it was the view of some members of the executive only and his proposal lapsed ('Labor Bodies Rebuff Plan of Rightists', Tribune, 12 February 1964). 32

Paterson FEC came to no firm conclusions. Disagreement led to stalemate. In East Sydney, although the left was strong, debate was inconclusive, although there was concern that:

... the capitalist press was trying desperately to push Labor to the right (Socialist and Industrial Labor, February 1964).

Press interest in the FEC meetings was patchy. Acrimonious meetings were reported, as were Cowper's early 'loyalist' recommendations. The most spectacularly acrimonious meeting was in St George, a southern Sydney seat lost by Labor. Colbourne (the state secretary) and Mulvihill attended as executive trouble-shooters. There had been considerable factional tensions in the area. The meeting could not come to an agreed conclusion (Tribune, 12 February 1964). In the Daily Telegraph, Alan Reid, with his keen eye for a good ALP story, presented the bitter St George meeting as a microcosm of Labor's national plight ('Labor Attitudes Attacked', 31 January
1964). Defeated MHR Lionel Clay's criticisms of the Labor left and the Federal Executive were reported, to the effect that Labor had to clean up its political stables:

Labor had to rid itself of its Communist associations and follow a responsible foreign policy ... It also had to remove the impression that its Federal Parliamentary leaders were puppets of the 'faceless men' ...

Reid was no friend of the ALP left, nor the Federal Executive. This influenced his perception of ALP affairs.

Despite Clay's strong sentiments and an even more vitriolic attack on the Federal Executive by Rockdale delegate E. Cunningham, St George FEC was too divided to endorse an anti-Communist crusade or even agree on federal reorganisation. Colbourne and Mulvihill went some of the way with Clay's complaints without completely abandoning their quasi-consensus strategy. Colbourne suggested that both groups on St George FEC should send their diagnoses to the executive, without the meeting endorsing either of them.

The officers hoped to deflect recriminations away from themselves and the NSW Labor government. Thus their emphasis on limited federal reconstruction. Local government problems were another acceptable explanation taken up by some FECs. However it was always on the cards that opponents of the NSW 'machine' would use the post-mortem to attack the ruling group. Criticisms of the dominant group mainly came from FECs where the 'out' faction was strong. There was cross-factional discontent about Labor's electoral advertising (coordinated by the Hansen-Rubensohn agency). 'Loyalist' Mitchell FEC complained about inept Hansen-Rubensohn material (NSW ALP Branch Records, ML Mss 2083/397/1016). So did Richmond.
Mulvihill replied that the officers had no control over Hansen-Rubensohn. Eden Monaro called for an inquiry into the agency's role. The 'left-wing' Reid FEC, which thought the solid Labor voter had been overlooked in an endeavour to win the swing vote, argued Labor should rely on its own resources, rather than employ publicity firms that did not understand the party or its policy ('Election Postmortems', Socialist and Industrial Labor, February 1964). Parkes FEC linked criticism of Hansen-Rubensohn to a generalised attack on the NSW executive for allowing a poor public image to be created (NSW ALP Branch Records, ML Mss 2083/397/1016).

Perhaps the cross-factional dissatisfaction with the advertising agency reflected widespread branch unease that changed campaign techniques diminished the role of local activists (see Parker, 1978:101-2; Rawson, 1961:76). Grumbles about advertising were easy enough for the officers to contain. The Parkes FEC type of argument was not endorsed by a majority of FECs. The 'left-wing' Paramatta FEC took another unsuccessful tack, suggesting a general reorientation of party activity ('Election Postmortems', Socialist and Industrial Labor, February 1964). Parliamentarians and the Federal Secretariat should be deployed in a more propagandist capacity. Local branches would have to be reorganised also, becoming more familiar with national policy. This 'missionary' perspective also failed to win majority FEC support.

Criticism of the state government did not amount to much more than grumbling. In general, the left-wing FECs were quicker to criticise the state government, but there was no generalised critique. Protecting Calwell's leadership,
opposing any talk of rapprochement with the DLP, emphasising that the ALP should stay out of internal union matters and defending the general role of unions in the party were the main themes canvassed by the left.

The officers' quasi-consensus strategy led them to drop the 'anti-Communist blitz'. However, the arguments of those who wanted to go beyond quasi-consensus parameters helped the officers fend off criticism from the left. In reply to Parkes FEC's charge against St George delegate E. Cunningham for allegedly attributing Labor's defeat to Les Haylen's support for Red China, the executive ruled that when it had:

... decided to ask members to express their views as to the reasons for Labor's defeat, it was expected that many frank expressions of view would be forthcoming ... (NSW ALP Branch Records, ML Mss 2083/458/1191, Circular 64/15).

Cunningham's attacks on the Federal Executive and the left went well beyond diplomatic niceties. He berated 'an extreme ratbag fringe' in the party that would leave Australia defenceless (NSW ALP Branch Records, ML Mss 2083/397/1016). He dismissed Chamberlain as 'the person largely responsible' for the NSW disaster. 'State aid' was an issue taken up by many 'loyalist' FECs.

Cunningham's attack on Labor's federal regime was echoed by ALP Greek Auxiliary President E. Andronicus, who urged complete dissociation from unions with Communist officials. He thought the party should change its name to the Australian Democratic Party. The word Labor was 'linked with certain Communistic elements' which frightened migrant voters, while its connotations of manual work alienated the middle class and the young.
Throughout the inquiry the officers retained the initiative. Their stewardship was not effectively challenged. Quasi-consensus was effective. Where the left proved recalcitrant, the 'anti-Communist blitz' supporters could be mobilised.

4D 'Modernisation' and the 'Middle Class': The Whitlam Line

While the officers deployed 'modernisation' rhetoric in support of their federal reconstruction proposals, they did not envisage dramatic changes to NSW Labor ways of doing things. Contributions from deputy FPLP leader Gough Whitlam and defeated North Sydney candidate Maurice Isaacs articulated more direct arguments for ALP 'modernisation' and were less constrained by diplomatic requirements.

Both Whitlam and Isaacs were highly critical of Calwell. Whitlam (1965a:8) thought Calwell did not speak or act as effectively as Menzies. The Labor 'machine' was less 'self-effacing' and 'discreet' than its Liberal counterpart. Isaacs (1964:8) noted that Calwell did not go over well on TV. Many supporters would not vote Labor as long as Calwell remained leader (Isaacs, 1964:9). Calwell's comments on the electoral system 'revealed a streak of irresponsibility'. Whitlam criticised the general calibre of Labor's candidates. This was not a theme that was taken up by the NSW officers or the FECs. Whitlam (1965b:8) wanted more policy experts in the FPLP:

There was not one trained economist or farmer in the New South Wales contingent of 33 in the last Federal Parliament.
He was impatient with 'rank-and-file' parochialism and hoped factional criteria for preselection could be replaced with technocratic ones. Isaacs also expressed concern about the quality of candidates emerging from NSW's 'rank-and-file' preselection system. There were 'a lot of uncomplimentary remarks' about candidates (Isaacs, 1964:12). Preselection methods should be reviewed, if only to confirm their fairness. Many candidates did not properly understand Labor's economic policy (Isaacs, 1964:9). Foreign affairs and defence matters were poorly understood.

Whitlam and Isaacs thought party reform was necessary to attract 'white collar' voters, but prescribed different remedies. Whitlam emphasised Federal Conference reform and giving a higher profile to the FPLP. He had advocated 'de-federalisation' of the party for a long time.37 There was a tension between his argument that Federal Conference problems stemmed from party federalism and the influence of state Branch officials (a point which was only implicit in his report; he did observe some diplomatic niceties) and seeing the real problem as the low profile of the FPLP (which was not inherent in intra-party federalism). His general Conference reform proposals were fairly wide-ranging. Federal Conference should meet annually and be open to the press. As a general principle, delegates should comprise FEC and federal union representatives and endorsed federal candidates (Whitlam, 1965b:9). He did not go into the specifics of a new Conference format. It is not clear how seriously Whitlam was pursuing such radical Conference reform. Perhaps the rhetoric had more to do with setting the stage for more limited changes,
particularly pertaining to increasing the federal parliamentarians' profile in the party. The latter theme runs through the whole document. Upgrading the FPLP would avoid the 'faceless men' problem. The FPLP leader and deputy leader should be ex officio Federal Conference and Executive delegates (Whitlam, 1965b:10). Here Whitlam's analysis intersected with the NSW officers' campaign.

Isaacs (1964:13) also worried about the gaps between a Laborist party and an increasingly 'middle class' electorate. He wanted:

... a shift of emphasis within the ALP from complete Trade Union domination so as to allow a white collar identification.

He wanted to upgrade the branches within the ALP (Isaacs, 1964:14). Labor should present a more intellectually coherent image. In a spirit of continuous campaigning branches could organise 'non-political' public lectures. A quarterly review could be established to examine world events and local issues in the light of Labor philosophy. Despite his call for a concerted effort to build up Labor branches, Isaacs did not argue for FEC delegates at Federal Conference. The 'faceless men' tag did not worry him, although he did casually suggest that Labor's shadow cabinet should be ex officio Federal Executive members (Isaacs, 1964:10).

To encourage increased Labor ideological self-awareness and to meet increasing electoral demand for more intellectually coherent parties, Isaacs (1964:14) proposed:

... that in addition to the usual form of Annual Conference, the ALP should hold every 3 years an ideological conference so that as a great mass movement it should continue its programme, policy and platform in the light of existing conditions ...
Such a conference could examine the 'socialisation objective'. Calwell would hardly have been surprised. Isaacs was reaching out to the 'middle-class intellectuals'. Adaptation to the 'middle-classing' of the electorate in terms of policy and organisation (including candidates and union links) were often mentioned in the same breath as the suggestion that Labor should revise or abandon the objective. 'Modernisation' arguments were often rhetorically dismissed as 'right-wing' plans to turn the ALP into an 'alternative Liberal Party' but 'modernisation' proposals can be dis-aggregated in different ways.

Whitlam and Isaacs raised some important strategic questions. The apparent incompatibilities in their analyses can be reconciled. Federal Conference reform could cater for Isaacs' concerns - attracting the 'white-collars' and intellectuals to revitalise the branches, making policy formulation and presentation more sophisticated. Whitlam's proposal for annual conferences could have allowed for occasional special ideological conferences. Isaacs' suggestion, triennial ideological conferences alongside biennial ordinary ones, was unwieldy. His general emphasis on intellectual and 'grass-roots' ALP renewal was important, not only in terms of electoral arithmetic in a 'middle-classing' Australia, but also in terms of enhancing the party's capacity as a vehicle for progressive social change. Ironically, it applied the concern, often expressed by Whitlam, for Labor intellectual renovation to party organisation issues more thoroughly than Whitlam's own proposals. Whitlam seems to have thought that more intellectuals, particularly 'trained
economists', in Caucus, or at least as parliamentary candidates, was enough, although his Conference reform ideas were potentially quite far-reaching.

Whitlam's project of 'wooing the white collars' included a reappraisal of Labor's union links. He thought the ALP should distance itself from the 'labour movement' and appeal directly to the growing ranks of non-unionist citizens on the issues of the day (Whitlam, 1965b:10). He did not foresee the growth of white-collar unionism. Nor did Isaacs (1964:13) who suggested that:

... except on the broad basis of humanity there is very little in common between the white collar worker and the trade unionist within the framework of the Labor Party. The distrust of the trade unionist levelled towards the intellectual is symptomatic of the gulf that exists between these two groups.

The party officers in NSW went along with some of the 'modernisation' talk, but given their faction's reliance on affiliated union support they did not question the appropriateness of the party's union links in a 'middle-classing' society. The general issues raised by Whitlam and Isaacs posed some dilemmas for the party managers, even though neither was arguing for wholesale dis-affiliation or anything like that. On the other hand, Whitlam's (1965b:10) antagonism to 'unity tickets' and his worries about 'political subversion' in some unions were shared by the officers. Whitlam did not mention 'unity tickets' specifically but suggested unions could show more 'loyalty' to the Party:

... by refraining from producing pamphlets and conducting campaigns on their own account. Many parliamentarians could show more loyalty to trade unions by consulting with union officials rather than area and job committees. 41
On some immediate internal *realpolitik* issues, the new professional middle-class constituency offered support to the NSW officers. The alliance was tenuous. Much of the critique of traditional Laborism could be extended to the internal arrangements of the NSW Branch. The critique found no substantial bloc of support within the Branch. This accentuated its advocates' tendencies to 'rationalistic idealism'. Isaacs (1964:14) wanted re-examination of Labor strategy to be carried out in 'a spirit of critical detachment' rather than 'with the preconceived purpose of justifying the present set-up'. Such hopes are frequently generated by post-mortem debates and just as often inadequately fulfilled. 'A spirit of critical detachment' was difficult to find. Organisational debates become enmeshed in ongoing intra-party conflicts. Whitlam's and Isaacs' constituency was not as disinterested as they made out. Party managers were willing to sponsor wide-ranging post-mortems to improve morale and for other reasons. Institutionalising organisational self-examination, however, might open a Pandora's Box and cause electoral damage. Party officials establishing post-mortems are partly motivated by the fact that continued tenure of their positions requires them to give the conference delegates who elect them (and more broadly the party membership as a whole) an adequate account of their stewardship. Thus such inquiries will be influenced by 'the preconceived purpose of justifying the present set-up'. Certainly this seems to have been the case with the NSW ALP in 1963-64. Of course, intention and outcome do not always correlate.
Whitlam's document received considerable publicity. His criticisms of Calwell were particularly newsworthy (see Rawson, 1964a:228). It was leaked in April, after the post-mortem was officially completed. The *Sydney Morning Herald* hailed it as a courageous attempt to free the ALP from its shibboleths ('Bold Call for a Modern Labor Party', 15 April 1964). FEC representations at Federal Conference was 'elementary common sense'. Press enthusiasm for the Whitlam report stemmed from a belief that it accepted the 'adapt' or 'perish' post-election editorial chorus.

Within the party, some argued that Whitlam's report had been leaked to embarass him ('Whitlam's Report Months Old', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 15 April 1964). Commenting on the discrepancies between the Whitlam line and the official post-mortem summary, one member of the left-wing minority on the NSW executive commented:

The officers' summary embodied the points of criticism which appeared most frequently in the reports. If some of Mr Whitlam's points did not appear in the summary I assume it was because very few of the other reports contained these points. Obviously there was no general rubbishing of Mr Calwell in the reports (quoted, 'Victimisation of Whitlam Opposed', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 18 April 1964).

Whitlam had his agenda. The NSW officers had theirs. Short-term considerations produced an uneasy alliance.
CHAPTER 5

NEW SOUTH WALES INQUIRY : REPORT AND REPERCUSSIONS

5A Drawing the Threads Together : Official Report

The NSW executive had promised to consider all contributions carefully, but some dovetailed more closely with the officers' agenda than others. The special executive meeting, on 21 February 1964, proved contentious. After three hours of debate, there was no statement for the press ('State ALP Report Puts Blame on Federal Officers', Sydney Morning Herald, 22 February 1964). Nevertheless, journalists quickly pieced together what had transpired. The officers' arguments were accepted. The officers agreed that many factors contributed to Labor's defeat. 'No good purpose' was served by blaming 'any one particular cause, person or persons' (ALP, NSW Branch, 1964:14).

The meeting officially endorsed thirteen recommendations, which largely followed the officers' quasi-consensus strategy. The officers backed down on their initial diagnosis, eschewed policy controversies and attempted to answer some FEC complaints. Alan Reid saw the recommendations as an attempt to avoid repetition of Hotel Kingston incidents ('ALP Evading Issues that Lost Election', Daily Telegraph, 22 February 1964). This was clear in the first of four sections into which the recommendations can be classified. Recommendations 1-3 dealt with federal reorganisation. The suggestion that the FPLP leader and deputy leader should be ex officio additions to Federal Conference and Executive (Recommendation 2), had been widely canvassed by the officers at
the FEC meetings. They had also pushed for four further FPLP Federal Conference delegates, and had this endorsed by some FECs. Recommendation 3 simply settled for further consideration of Conference reform. The left was generally happy with the extant Conference format, although some left-wing FECs were willing to consider new formulae. On the other hand, some FECs, such as Farrer and Parkes, accepted an ex officio role for the leader and deputy leader, without considering further Conference reform. The issue would be fought out at the state conference in June.

Recommendations 4-5 and 7-8 shared a concern with centralising ALP communication with the electorate and raising the profile of the FPLP leader. The suggestion that Calwell screen parliamentary questions was seen as 'a move against left-wingers' to prevent them raising issues such as North-West Cape and Cuba (Sydney Morning Herald, 22 February 1964). Binding all to party policy had similar disciplinary intent. The move to make the new federal secretary, Cyril Wyndham, sole authorised spokesman on Federal Conference and Executive decisions was seen as a pre-emptive strike, should Chamberlain take up the federal presidency. In line with the general NSW executive push for a higher FPLP profile, Calwell was suggested as the only person entitled to present policy decisions, subsequent to those made by Federal Conference and Executive. This set of proposals had not surfaced in the FEC debates. The officers expected more sympathy from the FPLP than from the Federal Executive. There was also Whitlam's argument that the FPLP was best placed to put Labor's views to the public. It was ironic that the NSW 'machine controllers' argued for a
higher FPLP profile, while telling the FPLP how to approach question time.

Recommendations 9-11 answered questions which embarrassed the executive at FEC meetings. Recommendation 9 suggested advertising should be a responsibility of the federal secretary. This would insulate state officials from branch resentment. Recommendation 10 conceded the ineptness of Labor's television advertising. Recommendation 11 exonerated the state government.

Recommendations 6, 12 and 13 addressed more general points about the need for party 'modernisation'. Recommendation 6 asked for a Federal Executive review, to bring the party platform 'more into line with changing methods of the Scientific Age'. At least rhetorically, this embraced Whitlam's 'technocratic Laborist' concerns. The final two recommendations targeted young people and white collar organisations for particular attention.

The omissions were as interesting as the content. If young people and white collar organisations were targeted, women and migrants were not. Local government problems were not addressed. Nor (predictably) was the calibre of candidates. For the particular purposes of the post-mortem, the officers sought lowest common denominator positions on the major issues in that they attempted political management by platitude. The recommendations on centralising communication with the public were more pointed, although they were presented circumspectly. Calwell's leadership was another issue that failed to surface. Partly it had been pre-empted by the earlier executive resolution, but in any case it was too
sensitive a topic for a report such as this.

In view of the way the 'anti-Communist blitz' kite was flown during the inquiry, the most interesting example of the officers' quasi-consensus strategy was their unwillingness to focus on the 'unity ticket' issue in the final report. They were pursuing it in other arenas.

Political management by platitude it may have been, but this was still a three-hour meeting, described by Colbourne as 'lively' ('Power Demand for Calwell : Reform Sought in ALP Control', Canberra Times, 22 February 1964). The left delegates were equivocal on Federal Conference reform. Garland warned that Labor should not be stampeded into change by criticisms of the 'faceless men' (Daily Telegraph, 22 February 1964). Heffernan floated the idea of adding union delegates to Federal Conference. 4

The left was happy to have discussion opened up at FEC level, but had feared an executive attempt to ram through an 'anti-Communist crusade'. Socialist and Industrial Labor complained that the establishment of the inquiry gave the press a signal:

... to publish articles and 'news items' which tendered certain advice to ALP Branch members and delegates to the Federal Electorate Councils ('Post Mortem - Right Wing Rebuffed - Federal Election Analysis', March 1964). 5

Such advice included changing the leader, changing foreign policy and attacking Federal Conference delegates. In turn, Labor's 'extreme right' took up these signals and amplified them. Then Alan Reid further amplified the attack on the left. All this was too much of a coincidence for Socialist and Industrial Labor. It saw the 'anti-Communist blitz' as part of
a 'newspaper monopolies campaign', which failed because the FECs were not taken in. A survey of mainly left-wing FEC reports showed the rank-and-file were:

... not prepared to jettison Labor's policy to suit the Fairfax family of the Sydney Morning Herald or Packer for the Telegraph ('Election Post-Mortems', Socialist and Industrial Labor, February 1964).

A general FEC theme was that there was 'not enough difference between the ALP and the Liberal Party'.

The officers had to take account of a significant bloc of left-wing opinion at FEC level. The Tribune analysis of the post-mortem also pictured a 'newspaper monopolies campaign' being rebuffed by the FECs, despite support at high levels of the NSW ALP:

Proposals to interfere in trade unions, raise the anti-Communist chorus and adopt reactionary policies as a prelude to opening relations with the National Civic Council and the Democratic Labor Party, have been resoundingly rejected. (J.R. Hughes, 'ALP Electorate Councils ... Reject Moves to the Right', 4 March 1964).

After initially criticising the exclusion of affiliated unions from the post-mortem, the CPA now saw the FEC reports as the embodiment of progressive Labor aspirations. Tribune went on to complain that:

... the positive proposals which flooded the executive were largely covered up and were not included in the final thirteen points. 6

W.J. Brown (1964:101-2) in Communist Review noted that the ALP right had suffered a series of setbacks in the wake of the election defeat. The 'Oliver-Colbourne clique' failed.

... to get away with the crude lie that 'Communists were to blame' for the Federal election defeat.

The 'rank-and-file' rebuffed them:
The State Executive has finally had to table 13 points on Labor's election defeat which, to the concern of the capitalist press, do not give anti-Communism a mention (Brown, 1964:102).

The 'rank-and-file' blamed Labor's losses on the party's 'failure to fight on a progressive policy'. Commentators tended to simplify and inappropriately homogenise the FEC reports. Alan Reid (Daily Telegraph, 22 February 1964) was as guilty on this score, albeit from a different perspective, as W.J. Brown. Reid thought the FECs had a more realistic appraisal of Labor's problems than the NSW executive:

By failing to mention Communism, Foreign Affairs and Defence, the Executive has by implication rejected the proposition stated almost without exception by the FECs that these were the major issues that decided the last Federal elections.

Some 'loyalist' FECs accepted this line of argument. It did not receive endorsement 'almost without exception'. Garbled reports, however, had considerable influence on perceptions of the post-mortem, not least in other ALP Branches.

5B State Conference : Another Arena

The recommendations were referred to state conference. They were unlikely to be defeated there. The various issues considered in the inquiry were likely to reappear in the state conference arena. From there, they could go to the federal bodies. State conference supported the FPLP leader and deputy leader being added to Federal Conference and Executive, alongside three further FPLP representatives to Federal Conference ('Gains in Labor Ballots by Right Wing', Sydney Morning Herald, 15 June 1964). The long-standing ban on parliamentarians as NSW Federal Conference delegates was
repealed, as Whitlam had advocated. Conference also decided that NSW should seek a rule change preventing federal involvement in purely state affairs.

After being dropped in the post-mortem, the proposal to certify ALP candidates in union ballots was resuscitated in the more manageable conference arena. It was passed by 391 votes to 218 in a very bitter debate (Alan Reid, 'Bitter Debate at ALP Conference', Daily Telegraph, 16 June 1964). Punches were thrown on the Conference floor. Charlie Oliver warned interjectors:

You are in the Labor Party now but the moment you give evidence that you are in the Communist Party you will be put out of this show (quoted, 'Stop Comms Plan Starts Row in Labor: NSW Party Move', Courier-Mail, 16 June 1964).

From the left, Heffernan claimed the officers' recommendation breached federal policy, but his point of order was dismissed (Daily Telegraph, 16 June 1964).

The officers were more aggressive in the conference than they had been during the post-mortem. The rationale underlying their re-combined plan for federal reorganisation and an 'anti-Communist blitz', or at least what rhetoric could make of that rationale, was presented in Oliver's presidential address. He began by praising the state government's record of pro-worker legislation (NSW ALP Branch Records, ML Mss 2083/459/1191). Then he referred back to the post-mortem. The 'unexpected' defeat in November 1963 was:

... the severest blow the party has suffered for many years. Many and varied are the reasons advanced for this defeat. The State Executive, when seeking the cause, invited all sections of the Party to give their reasons.

The 'great debate' was over. It had revitalised the party 'as
a thinking force in Australian politics'. There was much repetition in the reports the executive received which, after careful analysis, provided valuable criticisms of party organisation. Oliver was using the post-mortem exercise to legitimate the party reform programme he favoured, which included some sort of 'anti-Communist blitz'. He dismissed attempts, especially by the *Daily Telegraph* to split the party by selective quotation from individual FEC reports.

Oliver linked the 'faceless men' problem to the dispute between NSW and the Federal Executive on 'state aid'. Labor parliamentarians should have more autonomy. Conference resolutions, in this view, were no more than expressions of opinion. It was ironic to hear Oliver complaining about 'rigid control' and people in the Labor Party seeking to control and dominate through the machine. He was no slouch himself when it came to machine manoeuvring. However his minority position on the Federal Executive made it easier for him to complain about 'dictatorship' (see D. Stephens, 1979:17). He was a skilful negotiator with:

... a bluff, direct manner and a disinclination to decentralise power. Moreover, he saw the main purpose of politics as winning benefits for one's members and supporters through Labor governments (D. Stephens, 1979:16).

Perhaps it was this emphasis on winning government that led Oliver to endorse Whitlam's analysis. The enthusiasm of the AWU boss and 'White Australia' champion for the Whitlam line poses some problems for the 'technocratic Labor' thesis. Oliver was at least as 'paleo-Laborist' as Calwell.

Oliver shared Whitlam's worries about the 'political subversion' of some unions (NSW ALP Branch Records, ML Mss 119).
Opponents profited from allegations about ALP/Communist links. Oliver stressed the general benefits of union affiliation to the ALP and parliamentary representation to the unions. Oliver deployed Whitlam's 'modernisation' rhetoric. 'A steady process of upgrading of the labour force' had made Australian society 'less and less working class in outlook'.

Industrial mechanisation and scientific advance meant more and more workers were acquiring a 'middle-class outlook':

It is natural for people to want a higher standing in the social scale, and as a consequence the traditional basis of the Labor Party is being steadily eroded.

Politics in a 'full employment' society was more marginal to people's lives than in societies where workers had yet to win effective social citizenship. Social, economic and psychological changes had created the marginal or swinging voter:

This vote is always in the centre, it is for this vote that all political parties are competing.

Labor would have to jettison some traditional assumptions to compete effectively in this environment:

We have always worked on the theory perhaps subconsciously that the working class would be subject to more and more exploitation and degradation. This theory is being proved increasingly false.

Oliver concluded by emphasising the nexus between winning government, in his eyes the party's *raison d'être*, and modernisation. Labor's biggest enemy was inflexibility and obstinacy against change.

Emphasising the importance of Labor being in government and attacking 'unity tickets' were old Oliver
themes. He had also called on the ALP to adapt to changes in the electorate before the November 1963 debacle. His 1964 presidential address, although foreshadowed by earlier speeches, was, with its specific endorsement of Whitlam's analysis, more focussed in its deployment of 'modernisation' rhetoric. Sociologism is not only an academic foible. It can underpin political discourses. It was probably because of its 'modernisation' talk that Oliver's address was so well received in the press, where much critical commentary on the ALP was imbued with similar presuppositions. Thus Alan Reid welcomed Oliver's speech ('ALP told to Accept Prosperity : Blunt Talk by Chief', Sunday Telegraph, 14 June 1964). Although 'in some ways a statement of the obvious', it was 'almost revolutionary in the ALP context'. The West Australian was quick to draw an anti-left moral from Oliver's 'social change' story ('Reforming Voice in NSW', 16 June 1964). The Sydney Morning Herald welcomed NSW Labor's 'new realism', although NSW had its own 'faceless men' ('The "Image" of the Labor Party', 16 June 1964).

The state conference decisions were clearly related to the earlier post-mortem, although they were differently constituted arenas with different parameters of debate and decision. Some press commentary relating the conference to the inquiry was quite misleading. Press discussion of 'ALP modernisation' often involved a fair degree of barrow-pushng. Thus the Sydney Morning Herald suggested that despite the results of investigations into Labor's defeat:

... party controllers were determined not to interfere with trade union control of the machine (15 June 1964).
Readers were solemnly told that the investigations found the controlling influence of unions, some Communist-controlled, as the source of Labor's woes! Whatever these 'investigations' referred to, it was not the NSW post-mortem. Some of the Labor 'modernisation' favoured by Sydney Morning Herald editorialists was taken up in that post-mortem, but the principle of union affiliation remained unchallenged.

5C 'Morbid Self-Analysis' Rejected: Western Australia and Victoria

The WA Branch's own post-mortem seems to have been primarily designed as a riposte to the NSW inquiry (particularly press versions of the latter). Little was heard about the WA post-mortem until just before the August 1964 Federal Executive meeting, due to consider NSW proposals about federal reorganisation and certified ALP union candidates. Chamberlain strongly opposed both proposals, which he saw as a smokescreen for ALP/DLP rapprochement. This line of argument was also favoured in Victoria where party reform was branded as 'crypto-DLP' in its logic.

The WA executive had appointed a committee of five to consider comment from branches and affiliates (Alan Reid, 'Secret Report Blasts NSW Labor', Sunday Telegraph, 2 August 1964). The committee fretted about the dangers of election post-mortems. It feared recommendations which could further damage the party. The WA committee conflated the NSW post-mortem and the NSW conference decisions. The latter were 'blasted mercilessly' in the WA report. Reid concluded that WA's 'thumbs down' meant the NSW proposals could not succeed.
Victoria and Queensland usually followed Chamberlain's lead. SA had already expressed its opposition.

The tone of the WA report was vintage authoritative Chamberlain. There was 'an abundance of factual material' to refute NSW suggestions that Communist union activity contributed to Labor's defeat and that the Party's federal structure had to be reorganised. Communist union influence must have been a NSW matter. NSW had 'no authority' to speak for other states. As to 'faceless men', the WA line was that parliamentarians had plenty of opportunities to contribute to policy formulation (e.g. through policy committees). NSW arguments implied that 'the nonsense published in the Press as a political gimmick' was in fact correct.

'Irrational attitudes', sometimes 'bordering on hysteria', developed after electoral setbacks. The atmosphere was 'anything but conducive to reaching sound conclusions'. Thus post-mortems were 'highly suspect'. The loss of seven seats in NSW 'was undoubtedly responsible for the post-mortem stampede'.

An internal WA dispute earlier that year revealed Chamberlain's suspicion of Whitlam and the NSW Branch. A WA executive member laid a charge against his secretaryship (Hughes, 1964a:90). His unsuccessful critic, Mrs Betty Smith, resigned from the party, complaining that Chamberlain had accused her of being:

... motivated by malice and ... acting under the instruction of the NSW Branch in conjunction with Mr Whitlam ...

An editorial in Chamberlain's WA ALP **Western Sun** concluded:

The Party would appear to be more than unfortunate in its membership ... People should only be
encouraged to join the ALP when they understand the privileges and responsibilities of membership ('The "Smiths" of the ALP, May 1964).

This stress on the privileges and responsibilities of ALP membership illustrated Chamberlain's equivocal attitude towards the 'rank-and-file'.

He veered between idealisations of the 'rank-and-file' as the fount of all Labor wisdom and stern edicts that they should fall in line behind their duly constituted organisational leaders. One scholar argues that Chamberlain:

... expressed the inchoate feelings of a section of the party which sought a principled, even moralistic approach to politics which saw the Labor platform as a citadel to be defended and from which to launch attacks against exploitative capitalism (D. Stephens, 1979:14).

He contrasts such 'exclusivism' which 'tends towards the protection of a citadel of immutable precepts', with an 'inclusivist' tendency to walk in 'the market place of ideas', absorbing 'myriad influences' (D. Stephens, 1979:34).

Looking at the 1960s debates, Stephens' dichotomy seems to overlap with Overacker's (1968:40-3) distinction between traditionalists and modernists. The traditionalists were 'exclusive'. The modernists, by definition, shopped in the supermarket and were not afraid to take ideas from the shelf called 'the capitalist press'. However, this would be to oversimplify. The 'exclusive'/ 'inclusive' dichotomy is endemic in the ALP (D. Stephens, 1979:35). Exclusivist ideology could go hand in hand with inclusivist practice and vice versa (D. Stephens, 1979:34). Instead of talking about 'exclusivism' and 'inclusivism' or 'traditionalism' and 'modernism', Houseman (1971:2-3) notes a contrast between 'movement' and 'electoral...
Perhaps the best way to describe these conflicting, but often strangely complimentary, outlooks is to say that one of them rests upon the conception of the party as an electoral machine, aimed principally at winning government and carrying out modest reforms, while the other regards the party as the basis of a broad social movement aimed at more far reaching changes in the social and political system.

He added that many in the ALP might see it as a movement at one time, and an election machine at another time. As well as being a movement and an electoral machine, the ALP should also be seen as constituting a self-sufficient political system in constant conflict.

Chamberlain often seemed to be the major advocate of the conception of the ALP as a 'movement'. Such advocacy, of course, also played its part in internal battles for party control. The rhetorical currency of this advocacy embodied a 'rank-and-filist' mythology, which saw the platform welling up from the party's grass-roots. In this vein, Chamberlain (1964:16-7) told delegates to the 1957 Federal Conference that, although many agenda items represented considered state executive views, the propositions had their origin in numerous small branches of the party. As in the early days of the Labor Movement:

... the humblest member of the humblest branch can, within the constitutional procedures laid down by gatherings such as this ... provide the original thought that may find its way on to the Statutes of our national Parliament.

At other times, Chamberlain insisted that if party leaders did not agree, the 'rank-and-file' would be confused. Therefore the organisational and parliamentary leadership (particularly the former) had to protect procedures and
principles. Back in 1950, during the intra-ALP debate on the appropriate response to Menzies' legislation outlawing the Communist Party, Chamberlain (1964:3) argued:

If leaders of the Party cannot agree as to what should be Labor's policy in respect to such a vital issue, then hopeless confusion will develop in the minds of the rank-and-file. 17

This top-down rea politik view of party organisation was a more accurate guide to Chamberlain's practice than the 'rank-and-file' sentimentalism that could be trotted out on suitable occasions. In intra-party matters, Chamberlain was renowned for what critics called 'rule-book authoritarianism'. He stressed connections between party discipline and party democracy (Chamberlain, 1964:51-2); connections that were distorted and misrepresented by the press to put the party in a bad light:

The Parliamentary democracy of Australia does not permit anarchy. Neither do the rules of the Australian Labor Party. No citizen of the community can flout the law and flout immunity. Neither can a member of the Australian Labor Party, pledged to support the cardinal principle of majority rule, flout the decisions of the Australian Labor Party and not expect to be dealt with accordingly. 18

Thus Chamberlain (1964:53-4) dismissed Federal Conference reform. Conference enlargement was too expensive. The propaganda about so-called 'faceless men' was an 'outstanding political gimmick'. The press were really concerned with fitting ALP policy into 'the conservative thinking and interests of the people it represents' (Chamberlain, 1964:54). 19

For Chamberlain, party introspection and tinkering with the federal structure were an unwarranted over-reaction to electoral defeat and, worse, a surrender to the party's
enemies. The WA committee devoted most of its energy to rebutting Whitlam and NSW arguments for 'modernisation'. These arguments were also poorly received at the Victorian Conference. Party president R.W. Holt attacked the whole NSW exercise ("Victorian Labor Leader Attacks NSW Reports", Sydney Morning Herald, 25 July 1964). Labor's reputation had been impugned:

... by 'public and morbid self-analysis and introspection whereby we weep through the press to analyse our faults'. Publicly airing intra-party grievances was 'disloyal and unworthy'. Holt conceded some case for Federal Conference enlargement, as long as there was no privilege for parliamentarians.  

5D 'Modernisation' and the 'Middle Class': The Victorian Debate

The 1964 Victorian conference was notable for the 'Jordan ticket' challenge to the ruling executive. Earlier in the year Jordan had defeated the candidate favoured by the Victorian ALP executive for the Melbourne Trades Hall Council secretaryship. Afterwards he found himself suspended from the ALP. The 'Jordan ticket' linked his craft union supporters with an emerging grouping of predominantly 'middle-class' branch members, unhappy with the authoritarianism of the dominant mainly union-based left faction ('Moderates Set Out New Labor Plan', Age, 23 July 1964). The Victorian version of the sort of 'middle-class modernisation' project articulated by Whitlam and Isaacs in NSW had a more pointed political purpose and more direct factional implications.
The press welcomed the 'Jordan ticket'. An Age editorial praised its programme of keeping the ALP free of Communist associations, giving more say to the branches and general organisational modernisation ('Time for a Change in the ALP, 10 July 1964'). The rebel group's 'new Labor' plan was imbued with 'modernisation' rhetoric:

The ALP should use all available modern skills and knowledge in its traditional pursuit of social justice and freedom. We believe that there is a tremendous reservoir of untapped skill and ability within the membership of the party. (Age, 23 July 1964)

This would have to be drawn on if Labor was to take up challenges such as 'technological change' and 'living with Asia'. Anticipating the sort of opposition they would meet, the rebels took the precaution of categorically repudiating any deal with the DLP.

The challenge was crushed fairly easily. In a surprise move, Calwell took a place on the 'official' ticket. So did Cairns:

... but the election of Calwell and Cairns did nothing to make the VCE more representative, in that neither represented a significant body of Party opinion likely to support changes in the way the Victorian Party operated (Allan, 1980:133).

The executive did concede a change in its own structure to allow for three electorate council representatives. Holt had been involved in attempts at a compromise between the ruling group and the insurgents ('Labor Heads for Major Showdown', Australian, 16 July 1964). His address conceded the case for some 'modernisation'. In an era of technological change (automation, improved communication and transport), the executive could be 'better informed' and more broadly representative ('Let's Keep it to Ourselves', Fact, 6 August 1964):
The economist, the social worker, and the educationist could help the Party. He warned that some of the challengers would be prepared to come to terms with DLP policies and ideas, while denouncing the DLP.24

Calwell also suggested the moderate ticket wanted reconciliation with the DLP (Robert Murray, 'Calwell Has His Party Warned', Australian, 23 July 1964). The official Victorian ALP paper described his speech as 'eagerly anticipated and brilliant', sparking 'the most enthusiastic reaction in the history of Victorian Labor Conferences' ('Calwell's Address', Fact, 6 August 1964). Calwell told delegates that the fault for the 1963 defeat did not lie within the ALP. Nor did the party need outside advice. The capitalist press intended only to hurt the party. Labor would run its business in its own way. Calwell said he was neither left nor right; 'just plain Labor'. Commentators saw his new alignment with the Victorian left as aimed at heading off any Whitlam challenge. They also suggested he was motivated by hostility to federal party reform. But Calwell was not unequivocally anti-reform.25

In Victoria, the 'Jordan ticket' supporters took up the running on party reform, especially in the branches, where they attempted to articulate disenchantment with the executive's disregard. The 'Jordan ticket' candidate, Barry Jones, issued his personal moderate modernisation manifesto to each delegate. Jones was a school teacher and television quiz champion, as well as an unsuccessful parliamentary candidate.26 His manifesto was reprinted in Dissent, a Melbourne University based journal which pursued a social democratic 'revisionist'
critique of the Victorian ALP. The Jones document was a usefully provocative summary of the dissident perspective. It pursued many of the same lines of thought as Whitlam and Isaacs did in NSW but in a more combative manner:

There are two ALPs in Australian politics today. They share the same name but their philosophies, methods of organisation, public appeal and electoral successes vary greatly. Party No. 1 comprises the ALP in New South Wales, South Australia and Tasmania ... (Jones, 1964:24).

It was generally successful, could win Senate majorities and state elections (except in SA, given 'Liberal gerrymandering'). The same could not be said of Party No. 2 - in Victoria, Queensland and WA.

Jones insisted that, in Victoria, Labor support was shrinking to a narrow base. It seemed to lack the competence to govern. Like Whitlam, Jones wanted the ALP to adapt to the 'middle classing' of the electorate and give its parliamentarians more autonomy:

The Victorian ALP attempts to create a moderate image in middle class electorates ... but we deny the middle class any effective say in policy.

Like Isaacs, he thought this could be remedied by facilitating white-collar infiltration of the branches, as well as an upgrading of the branches in the party structure. This was a key concern of the Victorian dissidents. Jones (1964:26) stressed the difficulties of local branches, often dead or dying. Accurate membership figures were:

... one of the best-kept political secrets in Victoria. The flow of information from Executive to branch level is very poor. Unlike LCP branches, which are bigger and more active, ALP branches are only useful for distributing literature and have little say on policy. Again, unlike their LCP counterparts, ALP branch members often tend to take little
part in community affairs and wield little influence in civic, professional and business life.

Perhaps this lack of influence in civic, professional and business life made the ALP's union links and its peculiar form of organisation all the more necessary. Anyway, branch members could be given more to do, without abandoning union affiliation.

There was some restiveness in the Victorian branches. At the time of the 1964 conference, branch member and Dissent editor Peter Samuel complained that branch members resented authoritarian mistreatment by the executive and:

... felt that they had little function beyond letterboxing propaganda and manning polling booths at elections. And damned lucky if they were allowed to do that too ('Stage Set for Vic Labor Tussle', Canberra Times, 25 July 1964).

After the conference, branch activist Race Mathews argued the branch structure had been sick for years. Before 1955, the symptoms had been masked by Tammany-style preselection politicking. ('Our ALP Branch Structure: The Need for a Remedy', Fact, 20 August 1964). This meant 'bloated' branches, with minimal membership involvement. At the time of the Split, most of the branch members went with the DLP. The new VCE was suspicious of the branch sector of the party. Citing fears of 'infiltration by outsiders' and 'Menzies' fifth column membership', it took over preselections (Allan, 1980:186). This initially temporary expedient became an entrenched practice. Later, two token representatives from the local campaign committee in each electorate were added.

For Mathews, the 1955 crisis was a lost opportunity to reorganise the branches (Fact, 20 August 1964). A committee
of inquiry could have been established. However, the union leaders 'who had been forced to accept responsibility' for party management were hard-pressed. Time did not permit them 'any great deal of speculative thinking' on organisational matters, had they wanted to pursue it.

In 1964, Mathews advocated an executive-initiated branch revitalisation programme to educate the membership, perform electoral tasks and ensure the ALP was 'active, favourably regarded and trusted in every community'. A comprehensive professionally-planned operation was required. Many new members did not last long. Any influx brought in by a skilful recruitment campaign were unlikely to be captivated by:

... dreary, ill-conducted meetings, hopelessly enmeshed in routine business, to rambling, ill-informed discussion and to immediate nomination to several limping inter-branch structures carefully avoided by more experienced members.

The executive should train branch officials. Many members were keen to build an effective organisation, but lacked know-how. Meetings could be less boring. Party education could:

... become a means of both attracting new members and of welding the membership as a whole into a thoroughly briefed and articulate body of Party spokesmen.

Local community activity was another ingredient in branch revitalisation. Labor's local image would be enhanced if some party members were active in each community organisation in their area. The aim was not proselytisation, but the 'implicit demonstration' that ALP members were:

... ordinary, decent Australians with much the same interests and hopes as their neighbours ...

The key to future Labor victories is inextricably bound up in the creation of an acceptable public image at the grass-roots level.
In suggesting that Labor had to develop its branches, to win back public trust, Mathews was implicitly critical of the executive's priorities. Others made more head-on attacks on what they saw as executive neglect of the branches. On 2 August 1961, Melbourne University ALP Club activist Bill Thomas wrote to the NSW ALP assistant secretary Tony Mulvihill:

The set up is such that many of us in the branches are prepared to stage a 'Warsaw Uprising' come what may because some rallying point has to be established ... We realise of course that as far as a successful war of liberation is concerned that union support is needed (NSW ALP Branch Records, ML Mss 2083/107/240).

Barry Jones (1964:27) took up the branch-based critique of maladministration in the Victorian Branch. 'Drastic surgery' was needed in 'Party No. 2'. A new spirit was necessary in all states. State executives (whatever factional complexion) had to concede a new intra-party pluralism. A new professionalism was also needed. The Victorian executive should utilise:

... the expert knowledge of party members, employ a full time country organiser, a full time journalist and put a competent television producer on retainer.

If the members were more involved, the party could ask more of them. As well as a greater role for branches, Jones wanted more professional administration and publicity. Labor's PR problems could not be put down to capitalist press malevolence. Before complaining of press mistreatment, the party should improve its own media presentation (Jones, 1964:26).²⁹

While there were many calls for Labor to adapt to the 'middle classing' of Australian society at this time, as well as suggestions for targeting young voters, there were not so many calls for Labor to adapt to changing aspirations of
Australian women, although there was widespread recognition that the 'gender gap' cost Labor votes (even if the term itself was not used). Jones (1964:24) noted inconsistencies in Labor's attitudes to women:

We urge equal pay and status for women but never give women the opportunity to win seats or have an effective say in shaping policy. Unlike the LCP, our proportion of women members is very small.

At the NSW Labor Women's Diamond Jubilee Conference, Calwell said the most important question facing the ALP was why it was not attracting a greater share of women's votes ('ALP "Out of Date to the Young"', Age, 24 February 1964):

Australia was still a long way from securing genuine equality for women and was falling behind most Western countries and Communist countries too. The ALP, which had done so much for women, had not set a good example in encouraging them to enter public life.

This was not a question that Labor gave much attention to at this time.30

Jones (1964:25) stressed the inconsistency between Labor's philosophical centralism and its federal structure. In direct contrast to those who complained that party self-analysis was 'morbid' or 'weeping crocodile tears to the press', he bemoaned the lack of frank debate in the ALP. Members adhered 'to particular lines on the basis of expediency', calculating factional advantage. The party had to make up its mind on 'socialism' (Jones 1964:27). Continued evasiveness was the worst option. The party should campaign openly for socialist policies or frankly modify or abandon the objective. On 'machine' matters, Jones thought Caucus should be represented on both Federal Executive and Conference to lift the 'faceless men' stigma.

134
Jones' (1964:26-7) diagnosis also noted that Labor could no longer be 'a party of the trade union movement'. Union membership had been declining since 1954. Automation, tertiary industry and increased self-employment meant the trend would continue. Like Whitlam and Isaacs, Jones assumed that 'white collar worker' and 'unionist' were almost incompatible categories. His assumption that the ALP in NSW and Tasmania held government because unionists had relaxed their grip on the machine was strange. Executives in these states and SA were hardly less 'union-dominated' than in what Jones called 'Party No. 2' (the other states). Jones' manifesto did not endear him to the Victorian executive, where self-analysis was not looked on kindly and calls for 'major surgery' seen as treacherous. The Victorian executive had earlier declared itself:

... shocked and deeply concerned at the publication of a controversial and highly critical statement ... allegedly made by the Deputy Leader, Mr. E.G. Whitlam MHR ... (ALP, Victorian Branch, 1964:31).

On federal reorganisation, it favoured attendance by the FPLP leader at Executive and Conference meetings, but not much more. Criticism of the Federal Executive or the state Branch were dismissed as 'capitalist press' or NCC inspired. During the 1964 Victorian executive member A. McNolty deplored anti-executive propaganda in the press and NCC-influenced news sheets. Only 'objective' criticism would be permitted:

We believe that Labor can govern in periods of relative prosperity but to achieve this we need the complete loyalty of all members in a solid front against the anti-Labor forces ... (letter, Age, 25 July 1964).
Calwell made his own reorganisation proposals in the run-up to the August Federal Executive meeting. Shortly after he got himself elected to the Victorian executive ('Reply to "Faceless Men" Charge: Calwell's Plan to Reshape Labor Party', Canberra Times 5 August 1964). His plan envisaged Federal Conference enlargement with union, branch and parliamentary representation. Conference should be 'truly representative of the party as a national party'. The ideas were embryonic. There were problems of cost and protecting the smaller states, which re-surfaced every time Conference reform was discussed. Calwell's Conference proposals resembled Whitlam's. However Calwell envisaged leaving the Federal Executive alone. Some saw Calwell's speech as being aimed at improving Labor's image for the pending Senate election. There were doubts about how seriously he was prepared to pursue party reform.

The Federal Executive meeting was its first opportunity to respond to the post-mortem debates in the Branches. In particular, the NSW proposals on federal reorganisation and ALP union candidates (decoupled in the NSW inquiry, recoupled at state conference) would surface. So would the WA rejection of these proposals. The Executive rejected the NSW scheme for certifying ALP union candidates.

Rebuffed, NSW delegate Oliver described his colleagues as 'a clique of dictators' (Alan Reid, 'Labor "Dictators" Blasted', Sunday Telegraph, 16 August 1964).
The dominant NSW faction's alienation from the federal regime was re-confirmed. The NSW reorganisation proposals were also rejected, although the new full-time federal secretary Cyril Wyndham was commissioned:

... to undertake a thorough and comprehensive review of all aspects of the Party's present Federal Structure, including the future position of the Northern Territory (NSW delegates' report, NSW ALP Branch Records, ML Mss 2083/459/1192).

Wyndham could re-examine the post-mortem controversies.

Producing the report was a major task for Wyndham and the fledgling Secretariat. Consultation with state Branches and other party units was expected. The National Organising and Planning Committee, an ad hoc body consisting of the six state secretaries, would receive the report and send it on to the Executive. Executive recommendations would then be referred back to the Branches. The projected trajectory, with its complex filtering process, exemplified Labor organisational federalism. Final Branch opinions were expected by early 1965. Informed discussion at the 1965 Federal Conference was the official intention.

The timetable came unstuck. Wyndham's report was available by May 1965, but there was a distinct lack of enthusiasm for reorganisation at key levels of the party. This hindered Wyndham and decisively shaped the delayed response his inquiry received. State offices refused to provide adequate membership data. This led Wyndham to see his report as provisional. Labor needed a more comprehensive self-analysis. Federal Conference should invoke its full authority and require Branches to hand over necessary information. Without such information, the feasibility of radical Federal Conference
reform could not be assessed.

6B Cyril Wyndham: Party Professional, Symbolic Appointment

Wyndham and the new Secretariat soon discovered the tension between 'rationalistic idealism' and realpolitik that recurs so regularly in ALP organisational debates. The 'rationalistic idealist' expectations of what a Secretariat could achieve were mirrored by the hopes some Labor intellectuals invested in Wyndham's appointment. They saw him as a modernising, professional federal secretary, who could play a central role in party reform.

Cyril Stanley Wyndham was a career party bureaucrat par excellence. He began in 1947 as a clerk in Transport House, British Labour Party headquarters, at the age of 17. Later he was private secretary to British Labour general secretary Morgan Phillips and administrative officer in Transport House International Department. In Australia, he worked as press secretary for Evatt (1957-60) and then Calwell, before being appointed Victorian secretary in 1961. He saw the federal secretaryship in terms of being the ALP's equivalent of a discreet 'traditional Westminster civil servant'.

Although Wyndham saw himself as an administrator rather than an intellectual, many intellectuals welcomed his appointment as a symbol of a new approach in the ALP. James Jupp soon noted improvements in Labor organisation under Wyndham's guidance:

The long-term aim of making the party literate, of giving it technical assistance from university and other trained well-wishers, of producing a few pamphlets and policy statements which do not arouse wild derision or despair in the educated is
still in the early stages. It is still bedevilled by the historical accident that the ALP is virtually the only radical party in the world which has been consistently anti-intellectual ('15 Years in the Wilderness - What's Wrong with Labour', Canberra Times, 10 December 1964).

Jupp thought Labor's 'refusal to tolerate critical support' was particularly self-defeating. Wyndham's appointment and the rise of Gough Whitlam were hopeful straws in the wind.

Jupp's (1963:31) reservations were about Labor's policy-making process rather than its actual platform. Only minimal consistency could be expected from such 'a complex multi-centric process'. 'Specialist advice' would gradually improve the situation. This 'rationalistic idealist' analysis bemoaned factionalism as an obstacle to rational policy discussion (Jupp, 1963:47). We have already seen how such factional struggles cut across discussions on general organisational and strategic issues in the NOC fiasco. We should note the limitations of 'rationalistic idealistic' analysis and probe its disinterestedness. Political parties are 'coalitions of interests, ideologies, individuals and idiosyncrasies ...' (D. Stephens, 1980:43). Policy formulation is influenced by 'a whole range of considerations unconnected with the strict merits of the policies'. Lloyd (1983:242) goes so far as to suggest:

The preparation and final format of the ALP's Federal platform makes the construction of the legendary pakapu ticket look like a flawless exercise in rational thought and a masterpiece of rational draftsmanship.

In his textbook, Australian Party Politics, Jupp (1964:53-4) again put ALP organisation under his critical microscope, seeing the party:
... not so much as a machine for evolving policy, nor as an electoral fighting force, but primarily as a power structure, assured of electoral support and determined that this support shall be channelled into seeking benefits for those the movement represents.

This hindered 'rational' electoral strategies. Some party activists were so engrossed:

... capturing and retaining positions in the complex structure that they overlook the relationship of their work to the more important capture of electoral positions.

The one, true 'rational' course was 'modernisation'. Labor's problems were accentuated by social trends - changes in the occupational structure favoured the Liberals (Jupp, 1964:73). The ALP's impressive capacity in routine electioneering was becoming less relevant (Jupp, 1964:72-3). The Liberals led it in work among youth, women and migrants as Labor's 'largely middle-aged, working-class and male' composition and its 'strong traditions' gave the party solidity, but also made it 'conservative in tackling new aspects of Australian society':

'Rationalistic idealist' supporters of a 'middle-class' orientated Labor modernisation strategy saw Wyndham as an ally. His Transport House professionalism might rub off on the ALP. He was quick to get to work. A few months after the Secretariat was opened, he was surveying all marginal seats and establishing a 3-year organisation and advertising plan ('Cyril Stanley Wyndham - The New Broom for an Untidy Labor Party', Sydney Morning Herald, 29 May 1964). Many Labor intellectuals contrasted the ALP unfavourably with the British Labour Party. Jupp (1965b:21) was unequivocal:

The main difference between the British Labour Party and the ALP is that the British party is much better ... Today there is not a socialist intellectual in Australia who does not get his
Whatever its intellectual and organisational deficiencies, the ALP was in some respects more successful than its British counterpart. Its share of the vote was higher. Only the vagaries of the Australian electoral system and the distribution of preferences stood between it and victory in 1954 and 1961. The discrepancy between Labor's vote-share and its poor electoral record is striking. Korpi and Shalev's (1979:179) tabulation of the 'power resources' of 'left parties' in 18 OECD countries in the post-war period has the ALP joint third in the 'percentage of the vote' column, well ahead of British Labour. On 'cabinet participation', the ALP drops back to eleventh place. In the early 1960s, the British Labour Party was riding the crest of a wave that was to see it win office in 1964 (and gain a big win in 1966 before beginning an electoral slide), while Australian Labor was still searching its soul after a long series of defeats. As well as providing inspiration for Australian Fabians, the British Labour Party became a handy general stick with which advocates of various professionalisation projects could beat the ALP. Australian cultural affinities with Britain and media exposure to British news facilitated such comparisons. Of course British Labour hardly offered the last word on 'modernisation'. Successful Scandinavian social democratic parties might have offered more appropriate models, but little was known about them in Australia at the time. British example was much more important then than it is now.

Some ALP peculiarities vis-a-vis the British Labour Party could be explained in terms of prior peculiarities in
Australian political experience. Jupp (1965a) recognised this, but still advocated an ALP 'modernisation' project that combined social democratic principles and Fabian fact-gathering. Of the two parties, the ALP was more union-based (Jupp, 1965a:4). This inhibited it in an 'affluent society'. The ALP's long history also hindered 'rethinking'. Partly because of federalism, the ALP was also more endemically factionalised (Jupp, 1965a:2). 'Certain peculiar features' meant ALP parliamentarians were given less autonomy (Jupp, 1965a:7) and ALP rebels and dissidents less toleration (Jupp, 1965a:5). The ALP had:

... never developed a middle class wing nor encouraged intellectuals other than lawyers ... despite widespread sympathy for it among academics, teachers and journalists (Jupp, 1965a:8).

ALP debates 'were conducted on a "head counting and head breaking" level' (Jupp, 1965a:7). There were strong undercurrents of religious sectarianism in Australian politics (Jupp, 1965a:8). Catholics and Communists were both more influential than in Britain. Australia was not a deferential society. In politics those with 'the numbers' came up on top.

Wyndham had been in Australia for seven years by the time he was asked to investigate Labor's federal structure. His experience as Victorian secretary may have been more significant than his Transport House past. When the Wyndham Report was commissioned, one journalist referred back to what Wyndham had attempted in Victoria (Brian Johns, 'Wyndham Gets the Green Light to Smarten Up ALP', Australian, 6 August 1964). His reports on local branches, the executive, finance and publicity were applicable across Australia. Victoria was not the only anachronistic Branch.
Wyndham's knowledge of ALP realpolitik tempered his commitment to party professionalisation, although it failed to prevent his ultimate downfall. Wyndham favoured a process of incremental professionalisation. 'Time honoured and well proven' practices would not be thrown overboard ('ALP "New Look" Talks Called', Age, 7 August 1965). Nor did he envisage 'a beautiful structure that exists merely for the purpose of being admired'. He hoped his recommendations embodied long-term aspirations, without transgressing the bounds of ALP realpolitik.

6C Factions, Patrons and the Federal Secretary

Wyndham's image of himself as the party's 'good civil servant' tended to keep him aloof from controversy. Proponents of party professionalisation welcomed his appointment as a triumph for technical efficiency over factional alignment. But technicalities and ideologies cannot be so neatly separated. Wyndham's reorganisation agenda could not avoid reflecting his personal interpretation of Labor's purposes and priorities. This is not to suggest that his recommendations were crudely tailored to give a favoured group of people and/or line of thought 'the numbers' for Federal Conference and Executive. They were not, but nor were they innocent of such considerations. Wyndham steered clear of immediate, day-to-day factional disputes, but his preference for professionalisation led to clashes with the left.

Different 'patrons' supported Wyndham at different points in his career, which factional intrigue eventually
brought crashing to a halt. As Evatt's secretary, Wyndham admired Chamberlain. Chamberlain's patronage was important in securing him the Victorian secretaryship in 1961 (Reid, 1971:256-7). Wyndham was tipped as a man with a bright future in the ALP, who had friends in high places in the party, nominating Chamberlain as the best of them (M.C. Uren, 'Young Man with a Future', West Australian, 14 November 1960).

Wyndham was still acceptable to Chamberlain in 1963. Such sponsorship did not prevent him drifting. This was not unusual. ALP factional allegiances have often been fluid (yesterday's friend always being potentially tomorrow's enemy). Wyndham did seem to have a genuinely non-factional approach, at least at the beginning of his federal secretaryship. Then proposals for party reorganisation brought him into conflict with his former patron. He was 'temperamentally unsuited to be anyone's creature' (Reid, 1971:257). Reid (1971:261) traces Wyndham's demise to this falling out with Chamberlain:

Despite his twelve years in Australia, his eight years in the ALP machine, and his realism in other directions, Wyndham was in some ways still naive. He thought there were friendships in politics, not just alliances, and that associates give loyalty and backing, even when such loyalty and backing could affect adversely their political futures. He was to learn otherwise, unmistakably, and the hard way. 18

The question of Wyndham's factional orientation was raised on his appointment to the Victorian secretaryship (West Australian, 14 November 1960). He was happy to keep the pundits guessing, declaring that his ardent belief in nationalisation no more made him left-wing than his support for 'White Australia' made him right-wing. He believed Labor needed a
strong organisational core, a bureaucracy that was 'above factions and of the party'.

As a federal secretary seeking to remain 'above factions and of the party', Wyndham gave little homilies to Labor gatherings on the importance of tolerance and compromise for an 'image' of party unity.\(^\text{19}\) In 1965 he preached against increasing factional virulence at the Victorian country conference in Wangaratta (ALP Federal Secretariat, Information Release No. 7/65). Labor policies had always been based on 'legitimate compromise' between a variety of views, but 'intolerance towards the other man's point of view' was growing. Debate should not be smothered but 'confined to the party structure'.

Wyndham (1966a:34) linked Labor's factional problems to its 'seventeen years of frustration' in the federal wilderness. The press could not be blamed for reporting real disagreements and real difficulties. Healthy differences were essential, but principles were soon forgotten, when personalities entered the conflict (Wyndham, 1966a:34-5). Wyndham thought telling the party how to prevent its electoral stocks falling was one of his main tasks. He willingly embraced it, often with refreshing bluntness:

> If we continue to prevaricate our policy, indulge in the futile exercise of factional strife and behave like a collection of political delinquents, we will continue to drive people from us (Wyndham, 1966b:20).

Wyndham wanted to develop an appropriate Labor strategy for advanced capitalism and the 'welfare state'. The 'real issue' was 'something much deeper' than 'just party reform' (quoted, Peter Smark, 'Wyndham the Frustrated
Reformer', Australian, 24 May 1967). Labor had achieved many of its welfare goals:

We must now chart our course in a society in which the objectives are not so obvious, and it is the differences over which tactical course to follow which is at the root of arguments in the Australian Labor Party.

Once Wyndham entered this tactical debate, he found it difficult to remain aloof from factional antagonisms.

Wyndham, who thought 'the primary goal of a party machine' was to ensure electoral success, (but not at any price), rejected the automatic equation of strategic change with the abandonment of party principle as a product of 'illogical reasoning' ('Unity the First Essential, Says Wyndham', Canberra Times, 15 June 1965). In his pamphlet, Democratic Socialism Today, he set about refuting the claims of this 'principles first' school of thought (Wyndham, 1966b:3). Both capitalism and Australian society had changed dramatically since the 1890s. To claim otherwise was to infer that Labor had made no impact. Wyndham went on to list other groups that hindered the party's strategic reorientation. The groups were identified only by their adherence to certain general lines of thought. Wyndham attacked the 'crisis mentality', which awaited serious social dislocation to bring Labor back to office. This was the most insidious group, because it helped opponents portray the ALP as a 'gloom and doom' party (Wyndham, 1966b:4). The 'crisis mentality' made strategic thinking redundant. In non-crisis conditions the ALP could simply sulk in fatalistic opposition. The 'crisis mentality' adherents overlapped with a third group, the 'permanent oppositionists'. Noting the government's tendency to steal Labor's clothes, this
group counselled that resolute opposition could achieve Labor goals, a course that embodied dubious logic (Wyndham, 1966b:5). The government adopted Labor policies in limited circumstances because Labor was an effective political force and credible alternative government. Wyndham (1965a:6-7) linked the 'permanent oppositionists' to a newer fourth group, which believed that Labor's domestic tasks were completed. Wyndham quoted the belief of an unnamed senior Labor parliamentarian that the only scope for a reform party in an affluent society lay in foreign policy.

While Wyndham observed supra-factional protocols, this was clearly a reference to Jim Cairns, leader of the FPLP left. In general, Wyndham had labelled the shoes but stopped short of saying which particular individuals they fitted (Jonathan Gaul, 'Englishman Had Courage to Answer', Canberra Times, 8 December 1965). Wyndham (1966b:7) thought the groups he delineated were small but troublesome. In other circumstances, they would comprise no more than 'a collection of frustrated failures'. However their energy in promoting themselves won considerable publicity. Their opinions were headlined. Their speeches were culled over and choicer bits were quoted. Ironically, Wyndham's own speech was fine-combed for choice quotations (see, for example, Alan Reid, 'Official Blasts Views of ALP Spokesman', Daily Telegraph, 7 December 1965). For all Wyndham's discretion and even-handed tone, his complaints were squarely directed against the left. This was probably why the NSW Branch reprinted the speech. Mainstream editorials patted Wyndham on the back. The Canberra Times eulogised his speech as:
... a thoughtful but restrained attack on the myths on which the left wing of the party lives ('Challenge for ALP', Canberra Times, 7 December 1965).

Wyndham ridiculed Labor activists who clung to the belief that Marxism contained some magic, 'despite its antiquity' (Wyndham, 1966b:12). He also scotched 'quaint' notions that Communists and democratic socialists shared common purposes. Wyndham's 'modernisation' discourse had an anti-left inflection. He dismissed 'fashionable' Labor anti-Americanism.24

Wyndham left room for a socialist objective in his 'modernised' party, albeit one based on humanitarian ideals rather than economic doctrines. He defined socialism as a form of society designed to allow innate human goodness break through the mental bonds of bigotry, prejudice and selfishness which restrained it in contemporary society (Wyndham, 1966b:14).25 Ever since Chifley's failure to nationalise the banks, Labor had been attempting to neutralise its 'socialism', redefining it to render it electorally innocuous (O'Meagher, 1983:24). What we have called Australian Social Democracy, Mark I combined arguments for party modernisation in the organisational sphere with these attempts to refashion Labor 'democratic socialism'.26 Whitlam (1965a) led the way. In a more circumspect manner, and with more emphasis on organisation, Wyndham followed.27

Wyndham spent more time denouncing the dangers of dogmatism than those of opportunism but stressed the distinction between (acceptable) 'realism' and (unacceptable, opportunistic) 'expediency'. 'Power with principles' lay within the party's grasp (Wyndham, 1966b:10). The ALP was,
however, in danger of slipping into 'the fallacious belief' that electoral expediency alone was what was required:

Fortunately, this thinking has been warded off and I say fortunately deliberately (Wyndham, 1966a:33).

Expediency might have short-term attractions, but in the long-term it could cause 'a deep and costly loss of faith in a party'. The suggestion that Labor had warded off the expediency danger implies Wyndham observed pressure for such a course. In *Democratic Socialism Today*, however, he did not see fit to include 'expedient wheeler-dealers' in his catalogue of disruptive groups. They were his allies on some aspects of party professionalisation. In 1965, Wyndham discovered left hostility to federal reorganisation. Relations with Chamberlain deteriorated further, following more Federal Executive/NSW 'state aid' conflict (Reid, 1971:257-8). Labor lost government in NSW. Wyndham began taking a harder line against 'unity tickets' (Robert Daniel, 'Big Calwell Gamble? He'll Vote the Left Line on Unity Tickets', *Australian*, 14 June 1965). Wyndham's criticisms of ALP amateurism were consistent and recurrent. Thus the 'Democratic Socialism Today' speech was seen as:

... not just a flash in the pan, but a culmination of a series of speeches ... tied in with his plea for a massive reorganisation of the party's structure (Jonathan Gaul, *Canberra Times*, 8 December 1967). 28

Wyndham's 'democratic socialist' commitment was heavily qualified. He told delegates to the 1965 Victorian country conference their first task was ensuring they did not provide their opponents with ammunition which could be fired back at the ALP (ALP Federal Secretariat, Information Release No. 7/65). The Cold War was still casting its shadow.

149
Opponents emphasised Labor's 'unsoundness' on issues such as anti-Communism and the American alliance. Much of Wyndham's time was taken up defending Labor's rear. Positions he took up in internal debates, eg on the enforcement of 'unity ticket' bans, were partly determined by his fear of giving ammunition to Labor's opponents:

The "soft-on-communism", "outside domination", "anti-American" charges have all taken their toll on the party's standing with the electorate ...

(Wyndham, 1966a:33).

Labor could expect 'a barrage of misrepresentation' in the press. This could only succeed:

... because we, ourselves, give substance to the misrepresentations and distortions by our own actions and behaviours (ALP Federal Secretariat, Information Release No. 7/65).

Wyndham was uncomfortable with the habitual excuses Labor accepted. He looked at internal causes for the party's ills. In this he had press support. The Australian triumphantly counterposed his diagnosis to the ALP's traditional fulminations against the capitalist press ('Overdue Insight on ALP', 7 December 1965). Wyndham also attacked his party's 'near neurotic tendency to blame the public' for its difficulties (ALP Federal Secretariat, Information Release No. 7/65). Labor should distinguish 'the partisan critic from the genuine friend and adviser'. This classification of commentators could do with more categories! Wyndham believed internal changes could solve Labor's problems, as long as the debate did not get out of hand.
Denouncing the conservatism of the 'little capitalist' electorate was one way Labor could avoid Wyndham's organisational critique. Arthur Calwell exercised this option from time to time. He told radio listeners that:

... Australia was 'a selfish, cowardly and lazy' community. Instead of thinking, people were running away from issues or allowing themselves to be brainwashed ('Calwell Says He Will Not Resign', Sydney Morning herald, 29 February 1968).

In his fighting memoirs, Be Just and Fear Not, Calwell (1978:247) concluded a diatribe against the 'permissive society' with the complaint that 'the great majority of Australians' were 'too smug, too greedy, too slothful' to appreciate the benefits of 'socialism'. Calwell's particular brand of authoritarianism was not shared by the left as a whole, but this perspective on the irredeemable Australian populace, sunk in its own apathy, was common in left circles.

Left intellectuals despaired of the Australian working-class. Ian Turner (1959:9) assumed that:

... capitalist Australia will continue to drug and degrade its workers, if not with bread and circuses, then with T-bones and TV. 33

Outlook editorialised that 'the people at large' were 'happy to be drugged by Ad-mass culture' ('The Politics of the Long Haul', January 1959). Even Brian Fitzpatrick, champion of a radical, populist Labor 'modernisation' project, fell into this way of thinking, arguing that Anti-Labor had been kept in power by 'the apathy of "swinging voters" content with washing machines, refrigerators and TV sets' (Brian Fitzpatrick's Labor Newsletter, September 1958). Labor's 1958 defeat represented a 'doubtful endorsement' of the Menzies Government by a
disgruntled electorate that disliked Labor even more (Brian Fitzpatrick's Labor Newsletter, December 1958). Labor had to overcome:

... that dislike, or suspicion, or sluggishness of uninformed, unthinking voters ... especially in those constituencies where new homemakers and New Australians are large elements.

Later, Fitzpatrick called on Labor to reach out to 'the uninformed women who attributed their washing machines to Mr Menzies' (Brian Fitzpatrick's Labor Newsletter, February 1959).

The left tended to find the electorate engrossed in consumerist conformism. After Labor's 1963 debacle, Outlook concluded:

A complacent electorate votes at the lowest level. For the status quo rather than for change; for short-term handouts rather than long-term developments. It is gullible and easily panicked into conformity by hysterical images of what threaten house-and-garden and never-never payments ('Room at the Top', February 1964).

Amongst those most easily panicked were:

... the 'directed' Catholic and New Australian vote; the non-political 'first voters', the TV-bound wives who no longer take their line from their husbands, the uncommitted newly-weds who see a Liberal vote as a vote in defence of HP instalments.

As Outlook's reference to TV-bound wives illustrates, blaming the electorate often ended up blaming half of it - women. The sons and daughters of the old working-class had moved to newer, outer suburbs (Crisp, 1970:187). There, they lost:

... something of the old identity and neighbourly solidarity ... which so often expressed itself in a solid Labor vote. A desire of the wives, if not at first of the husbands, to conform to establish their respectability in the new ethos may well lose some permanently from Labor's ranks. At least they are inclined to become politically footloose. 34
There was a 'gender gap' but facile generalisations by male Labor intellectuals failed to explore it.

Prophetic denunciation of the electorate did not make much sense in electoral terms. It bore witness for 'socialism', but reduced 'socialism' to other-worldly, religious status. Failure to question sexist modes of thought reduced the attractiveness of the 'socialism' that was on offer. Political frustration was at the root of the left's embrace of this discourse. Whitlam, on the other hand, shortly after he became FPLP leader, insisted that 'the worst possible course' Labor could take would be to blame the Australian people for the party's own failures (Alan Ramsay, 'Whitlam Tells Why Labor Lost Election', Australian, 17 March 1967). At the Victorian conference later that year, Calwell told delegates that during the 1966 election the people had been 'scared, selfish and brainwashed by the press on Vietnam' ('State Parties Differ on Troop Policy', Australian, 13 June 1967).

A constant theme for Wyndham preaching was the danger of Labor under-estimating the intelligence of the electorate. The elector today is a thinking one. He sifts and weighs the evidence available ... If we accept the argument ... that the great majority of voters are incapable of thinking for themselves, then we condemn the party to eternal political opposition (ALP Federal Secretariat Release No. 7/65).

Wyndham thought a more educated electorate necessitated the professional presentation of intelligently articulated policies. Old slogans may have been good enough in the past, but their concerns had been partly institutionalised in the 'welfare state'. A new sophistication was required.
Such a project of patiently educating the electorate on the benefits of carefully worked reform programmes was taken seriously in 'Australian Social Democracy, Mark I'. Swinging voters were seen as open to rational persuasion (Mills, 1986:23). See also D. Stephens, 1979:468-9; Brugger, 1986:12). Labor advocates of party 'modernisation' were also fascinated with the manipulative possibilities of advertising strategies tailored to swinging voters' prejudices and whims. The rationality of the swinging voter came to be re-evaluated accordingly.36

Wyndham was no exception. He stressed the centrality of 'image' improvements for ALP professionalisation. He invoked 'the Kennedy legend', founded on the image of a man aware of contemporary problems and seeking to address them (Peter Smark, 'Wyndham : The Frustrated Reformer', Australian, 24 May 1967). British Labour Party 'modernisers' at this time also found a star to follow in the 'Kennedy legend' (see Foot, 1968:15-6). Harold Wilson took up a rhetoric of 'dynamism and change'. Wilson's 1955 report on British Labour Party organisation,37 which Wyndham would have been familiar with, stressed the inappropriateness of 'a penny farthing bicycle in a jet age'.

In the ALP, Whitlam's accession to the leadership coincided with a new emphasis on 'image politics', as well as on patient education of the electorate. Thus, Wyndham's concerns were taken up, even though most of his specific party reform proposals were not and he fell by the wayside. With Whitlam's strategy clearly discernible, Bruce Grant noted that Labor would present itself:
... as the party best equipped to enhance the quality of life in Australia ... Labor is following at a respectful distance the principles which brought success to Kennedy in 1960, Wilson in 1964 and Trudeau in 1968 ... ('The Signs are Promising', Age, 19 February 1969). 38

Other commentators were more jaundiced. Kelvin Rowley (1972:310) saw technocratic Labor's emphasis on professionalism and efficiency in a less favourable light. The ideology of 'technocratism' assumed all political and social problems could be reduced to technical and administrative ones (Rowley, 1971:10). This was:

... blind adulation of capitalist rationalisation ...

Mr Cyril Wyndham, for example, seems a well-intentioned person, but this only makes his politics look all the more ominous. Writing as Secretary of the ALP, he objects to the 'lethargy', 'listlessness' and 'somnambulism' of the present regime, its 'lack of direction and purpose'. Without throwing capitalism into question, he sees the 'socialism' of the ALP as remedying this failing ... 39

Programmes for party professionalisation and 'modernisation', when their presuppositions and underlying assumptions are scrutinised, involve matters of political and ideological debate and not simply neutral 'organisational' matters. Of course, such programmes often use a 'rationalistic idealist' language that aspires to appear politically and ideologically 'innocent'.

155
Although Wyndham felt he was not given adequate information, his report was quite comprehensive. It began by looking at Federal Conference structure, suggesting limited reforms. It was hardly surprising that this was the first topic examined, given the 'faceless men' furore, which led to the commissioning of the report. The Wyndham Report went on to look at the Federal Executive, party discipline, organisation in the territories, Labor women and Labor youth, finance, membership, local branches, campaigning, ALP/union relations, the Federal Secretariat, standardising party rules and a superannuation scheme for party officials.

Underlying this array of issues was a concern with party professionalisation and an improved 'image'. It makes sense to see the report as one focused on improving the party's performance as a 'rational-efficient' vote-gathering machine (see Wright, 1971). Yet it would be a mistake to see it solely in such terms. 'Party democracy' themes were also explored. Wyndham looked at membership development schemes and local branch revitalisation. The emphasis was primarily party-managerial, but there was a participatory sub-text. The model 'rational-efficient' electoral party was not expected to bother much with 'grass-roots' concerns that might obstruct professionalised campaigning through the media. Wyndham, for all his professionalisation rhetoric, did not accept that the ALP's days as a 'mass party' were over or that local branches were irrelevant. If we analyse the report's recommendations
and the arguments Wyndham deployed, we find some tensions between its party-managerial professionalisation major text and its participatory 'party democracy' sub-text. The tension was latent only. The sub-text is particularly muted at key points. Even arguments for 'party democracy' deployed 'rational-efficient' managerial imagery. Nevertheless, Wyndham's diagnosis did not entail the ALP fully embracing what might (clumsily) be called 'post-mass-party' politics. Alongside a 'better image', improved finances and general 'adaptation' to social change, Wyndham invoked 'grass-roots' ALP renewal.

Federal Conference was the most pressing 'image' problem. The 'faceless men' jibe was an all too recent memory. Wyndham wanted a larger and more representative Conference. There was room for 'party democracy' arguments here, but Wyndham's emphasis was on 'image' and the efficient discharge of Conference business. The case for increasing state delegations from 6 to 10 was couched in terms of allowing 'key people' to be included. The 'key people' Wyndham particularly emphasised were the parliamentarians. On a delegation of 6, it was difficult to accommodate key parliamentary figures. Wyndham hoped that the increased delegations would include at least one federal parliamentarian, one state parliamentarian and (a concession to the 'grass-roots' sub-text) one FEC representative. Furthermore the FPLP leader and deputy leader, as well as Labor's Senate leader and deputy leader, would be automatically accredited. So would each SPLP leader. Wyndham also envisaged 2 delegates from the Labor Women's Organisation Committee and a delegate each from the ACT and the Northern Territory. In all, Conference would have 74 rather than 36
delegates, with key politicians automatically included. Wyndham saw merit in the suggestion that all FPLP members should have speaking rights, but preferred a more manageable proposal, giving such access to 'shadow Ministers'. Wyndham's rationale embodied a technocratic conceptualisation of Conference. He was seeking to tap 'the expert knowledge of the key people in the Caucus'. Ordinary Conference delegates lacked 'detailed knowledge' on many issues.

Federal Executive reconstruction was also recommended. The FPLP leader and deputy leader should be added. The Executive should meet more often. That might get it a better press. Disciplinary disputes should be resolved more speedily. Federal officers and FPLP officers should constitute a supervisory high policy committee, to ensure platform coherence and consistency.

Wyndham urged the establishment of a federal finance committee made up of a federal party treasurer (elected by the Federal Executive), two other federal officers and the FPLP leader and deputy leader. Wyndham criticised Labor's 'slapdash' financing at the 1965 NSW conference ('Unity the First Essential Says Wyndham', Canberra Times, 15 June 1965):

> What business would expend its energies in raising half a million and then fritter it away in the manner we do (quoted, "One Voice" Urged for ALP, Sydney Morning Herald, 15 June 1965). 7

This was for party professionalisation.

Wyndham's proposals suggested an alliance between the FPLP leadership and a reconstructed federal 'machine'. He had his own barrow to push. His proposals upgraded the role of the federal secretary (included in both high policy and federal finance committees). He did not forego the opportunity to
suggest increased Secretariat staffing, finance permitting and a superannuation scheme for party officials. Labor's 'humble civil servant' had a personal and institutional agenda to pursue, but his report was not simply an exercise in bureaucratic politics.

To improve Labor's electoral campaigning, Wyndham targeted specific groups of voters (women, youth and unionists). Other suggestions included earlier preselections, more professional use of the media, more concentration on marginal seats and (surprise, surprise) greater involvement by the federal secretary.

Wyndham recommended giving the Labor Women's Organisation greater status. The LWCOC was 'a rather insipid body' with limited powers. Its decisions were ignored. He would reconstitute it as a standing policy committee on women's affairs. It should nominate a woman for every other policy committee. As well as the two LWCOC Federal Conference delegates the LWCOC secretary should be given an advisory seat on the Federal Executive. Wyndham's proposals were mainly involved with cosmetic improvements to Labor's 'image' with women voters. They also involved hesitant steps towards internal reform in a very male-dominated party. Wyndham was sympathetic towards the cause of increasing the clout of the Labor Women's Organisation. Although sometimes expressed rather patronisingly, this was well received by LWCOC leaders. Wyndham did not address the question of the obstacles to women's participation inherent in many ALP traditions and practices.
Youth was another target category. Young people, like women, were not a homogeneous group, but Labor would suffer if it was seen as 'an old man's party'. Wyndham recommended a federal youth advisory committee (of six members, under 25).

Perhaps it was strange for a party with the history, structure and traditions of the ALP to see unionists as an electoral target group requiring special attention. Wyndham felt it necessary to press home that important changes were afoot in the union movement. Labor should not be complacent about unionists as voters. Nor could institutional party/union relations be taken for granted.

Labor had problems with its affiliated blue-collar unions. In particular, Wyndham warned, the involvement of union officials in ALP faction fights often led to negative perceptions of the ALP at union-membership level. Labor's approach to unionists as voters was predicated on outdated assumptions:

The Party itself alienates many unionists by assuming that they think in the same way as they did twenty years ago. References to the 'workers', the 'working class' and the 'underprivileged' are just so much meaningless and sometimes offensive jargon in modern society. A glance at the Taxation Commission Reports shows that not all the cars, all the boats and all the holiday homes are owned by 'the bosses'. In any case, many of the underprivileged are not organised or eligible to be organised in unions.

This was the clearest instance in the report of Wyndham's fondness for 'modernisation' rhetoric. 'Affluence' and the 'end of class' were often seen as sociological explanations for British Labour's travails. British 'revisionists' took up the argument of Abrams and Rose (1960) for polemical purposes.
Wyndham, in Australia a few years later, followed in their footsteps. His 'modernisation' rhetoric relegated 'class' to the realm of 'traditionalism'. His argument for annual Federal Conferences was not couched in terms of 'party democracy', but on the grounds that parties had to keep up with changing times. Policy made today could 'well become outmoded tomorrow'. Wyndham thought Labor could improve its relations with white-collar unions. ACPSA should be invited onto the Commonwealth Labor Advisory Council. State Branches should develop links with professional associations. As in other areas, he thought a new committee was the appropriate federal response. The Executive should establish a consultative committee made up of members of professional and salaried associations. Wyndham also advocated a general campaign to convince unionists of the benefits of ALP affiliation.

Wyndham's personal and institutional agenda shaped his concern with more uniform national rules. He drew attention to anomalies of procedure and practice in the organisation of preselection ballots for federal candidates. A more national approach was easily justifiable on 'rationalistic idealist' grounds, given Labor ideology on centralism. It would also increase the power of a reconstructed federal 'machine' within the party. Wyndham suggested an incremental approach. The Federal Executive should review state conference and executive decisions, which affected 'the conditions of candidature for the Federal Parliament'. Preselection methods varied considerably. Only two states retained 'rank-and-file' ballots; NSW (where branch members took part) and Queensland (where affiliated unionists
could also vote). Wyndham was wary of disturbing the Branches. Preselections for the next election were about to begin.

7B Party Democracy: Sub-Text

Wyndham's concern for party professionalisation led to consistent, interrelated recommendations on improving Labor's image, involving the federal parliamentarians more in the federal 'machine'; new approaches to policy-making and electoral campaigning; and more nationally standardised rules. In a more professionalised party, the Federal Secretary would be an important figure. There was another side to the Wyndham Report, its sub-text on membership participation, intra-party democracy and such topics. Thus Wyndham hoped, rather piously, that the increased state delegations to Federal Conference might each include at least one FEC representative. More substantially, perhaps, he recommended improved access for FECs and federal unions to Federal Conference and Executive. Material for the federal bodies normally had to go through state Branch channels.

Wyndham wanted to rehabilitate the 'grass roots' ALP (FECs and local branches). His argument was not so much 'party democracy' as the dividends that better local organisation could pay in increased electoral competitiveness. FECs were poorly funded 'Cinderellas'. The local branch, the party's 'first line of defence and attack' merited more support. The party did little to encourage potential members:

Too many branches meet in ill-lit, shabby and depressing surroundings. Too much time is wasted on routine matters. Standing orders are so restrictive and so slavishly followed that a
strong heart is needed to remain. Too many chairmen and too many secretaries are ill-equipped to run meetings. This is not their fault but the fault of the Party in that it has never provided training for them.

Wyndham believed electoral success depended on branch revitalisation. Federal Secretariat servicing, especially in party education, could improve branch input. His remedy for boring meetings and low branch morale was rather simple - education for key local personnel, plus better communication with the federal bodies. The obvious organisational level where federal/local communications could be improved was the FEC, often neglected in state Branches.

Wyndham's concern with membership development and his belief in the organisational importance of local branches were long-standing. Attempts to rejuvenate local branches were central to his 1962 study for the Victorian ALP ('Labor Party Talks on Rule Changes to Strengthen Movement', Age, 7 April 1962). Just before his report was ready, Wyndham told the 1965 Victorian country conference that branch members had wide networks of contacts in factories, offices, neighbourhoods and social clubs (ALP Federal Secretariat, Information Release No. 7/65). Given adequate information, they could push Labor arguments in these networks. Lines of communication between 'the highest councils of the party' and ordinary members had to be 'streamlined', a favourite word of Wyndham, the administrator (ALP Federal Secretariat, Information Release No. 7/65).

The Wyndham Report argued direct access for FECs to the federal bodies would raise their status in the party. They would feel their views were being considered. The same applied
to federal unions. Wyndham's concern for party professionalisation qualified his support for these 'party democracy' measures. FECs and federal unions might clutter up the agenda 'with items that should not be there'. Wyndham had strong doubts about how the FECs use 'this privilege'. While he complained that FECs were treated like 'Cinderellas', his own assessment of what the 'rank-and-file' could contribute to Labor decision-making was rather harsh (electioneering was another matter altogether, as was spreading the word at work and across the back fence). Wyndham consoled himself with the hope that the task of formulating a strictly limited number of Federal Conference items would educate local branches beyond parochial concerns. FEC and federal union Federal Conference items could be on federal matters only. They could have no more than three items each. The agenda could not be:

... cluttered up with the petty grievances of members affecting the location of a public convenience on the corner of a street. 18

Wyndham suggested various party education programmes, with strong Federal Secretariat involvement. They included summer schools and correspondence colleges for local officials, partly modelled on British Labour practice. The Secretariat's role in co-ordinating party education would further boost its status. Circulated discussion notes might help drag branches away from parochial concerns.

Generous provision of educational resources was something party reformers had hoped for from the Secretariat, serving the general membership as well as the Executive and the FPLP. They deplored the way internal education had always been relegated to the bottom end of Labor's priorities. John Burton
(1957:26), for example, in his attempt to rekindle idealistic Labor radicalism by means other than the reassertion of the 'socialisation objective', stressed the importance of local-level revitalisation. A Federal Secretariat could facilitate such a process, by developing internal education programmes:

Even in a fully developed democratic movement, in which authority and control are spread, and great responsibilities are placed on the local branches, strong higher levels are still needed.

Labor needed a Secretariat, which would supply research and initiative:

Local branches require something to chew on ... The Federal Organisation more than any other level of the structure can take advantage of the studies of specialists subjecting these studies to the examination of the rank-and-file ...

Wyndham appears to have agreed with this conception of Secretariat activity. He tried to develop communications with FECs and branches. Encouraging discussion on party aims, objectives and policy would not always run in harness with increasing the party's efficiency as a vote-gathering machine. Here, as in other areas, there was potential for conflict between party democratisation and party professionalisation. The effects of internal education would depend on whether the programmes would encourage discussion on policy and philosophy or have a narrower campaign focus (on matters such as scrutineering and electoral law). Whether branch members and FEC delegates wanted to be 'educated' and if so, by whom and on what topics, would also be crucial. There were many imponderables. Wyndham believed teaching local officials how to run meetings and conduct branch business was the key to local revitalisation. Wyndham-style party education would be about equipping ordinary members to be better 'ambassadors' for
the party. He saw the local branch as the party's first line of defence and attack, but failed to consider whether there was much enthusiasm in the branches for his kind of party education.

If the party wanted its members to be 'ambassadors', the overall low level of direct membership was an obvious problem. In her sympathetic discussion Overacker (1968:108) notes that the Wyndham Report saw lack of branch and affiliate vitality as 'the party's basic weakness'. Wyndham bluntly commented that individual membership was 'appalling': less than one percent of the Labor vote. He made some suggestions for a recruitment drive. 1966 was to be declared 'membership year', with a target of 100,000 individual members (five percent of the Labor vote). Professional and 'other' (presumably related) social strata were singled out for special recruitment efforts. This was in tune with Whitlam's 'wooing the white collars' strategy.20

The Wyndham Report was a wide-ranging document. Its primary concern was improving the party's electoral 'image' by a series of internal reforms that would have the incidental effect of making the Secretariat a considerably more significant body. Short-term Conference and Executive reform would strengthen the hands of the FPLP leaders and banish the 'faceless men' taunt for once and for all. Some of his recommendations were pertinent to the ALP as a 'reform movement', as well as an 'electoral machine'. His membership development suggestions could be looked at in this light, although they were mainly justified on the grounds that branch revitalisation would enhance the party's vote-gathering capacities.21
James Jupp strongly endorsed the report ('The Wyndham Report - Changing the Old Guard', Canberra Times, 1 June 1965). He had advocated similar measures himself. Jupp saw the higher profile for the FPLP as the most important part of the Wyndham package. Parliamentarians would be able to have more influence at Federal Conference. Parliamentarians and expert advisers could work together to give the ALP better researched and more professionally presented policies. Steps in this direction had already been taken. Wyndham's proposals would consolidate the process. They were likely to be resisted by the left, which preferred 'its banners, demonstrations and slogans', to 'this kind of quiet fact accumulation'. Party professionalisation challenged the unions' veto 'on all matters from arbitration to atomic energy'. The left wanted to leave the federal politicians 'in their current condition of formal servitude'. The unions, however, were by no means unambiguously left-wing, although Australian union officials maintained 'an unusual, if not unique' combination of 'ideological self-reliance, radicalism and political (in the sense of partisan) action' (Rawson, 1964b:18).

Jupp noted that while Wyndham suggested increased FPLP influence on the Federal Executive, his proposals maintained the 'essential balance' of the federal structure (Canberra Times, 1 June 1965). State variations and idiosyncrasies would survive. At least in the short term. Wyndham hoped to iron out many variations eventually. Wyndham's very acceptance of Labor federalism, while it was essential to his incrementalism, may have meant many of his
recommendations were unlikely to be implemented; Jupp concluded:

Building up the individual membership, diversifying the sources of income and of recruits, polishing up the public image must all be done in the Trades Halls of the capital cities rather than in Canberra. And very little stirs in some of them.

Wyndham was likely to be frustrated by state Branch realpolitik.

Rawson (1965:34) noted that federal reorganisation raised 'some fundamental questions' about Labor's priorities. He queried Wyndham's assumption that reorganisation was essential for electoral success (Rawson, 1965:25).

Organisational efficiency was prized by people like Wyndham:

... whose life and profession are the production of an efficient machine rather than its direction towards particular ends.

Yet Tasmanian Labor, electorally strong, had one of the weakest organisations. Here, we could note comments made by the NSW Press, Radio and TV Committee on 30 October 1959:

The whole question of publicity is complicated by the fact that, in NSW, the Party continues to achieve substantial electoral success without a publicity policy and, in fact, with almost total lack of planning in this important field (NSW ALP Branch Records, ML Mss 2083/454/1181). 23

Anyway, even if Wyndham could have unambiguously shown that his proposals would lift Labor's electoral prospects, some groups in the party would have remained hostile. The degree to which electoral success was the main priority was always a matter of internal dispute. Organisational proposals could not be seen in isolation:

They are always associated, even if unintentionally, with particular tendencies in policy and in factional control and this, of course, is largely what explains resistance to them (Rawson, 1965:25).
'Rationalistic idealist' proposals always have internal realpolitik implications. Even when the priority of electoral success is accepted:

It is always difficult to discover motives and to distinguish between the organisation-maintenance necessary to win elections and that which preserves oligarchy ... (D. Stephens, 1979:486).

While sceptical about their electoral importance, Rawson (1965:33) thought Wyndham's recommendations were worthwhile for other reasons. They were not simply about improving the position of the FPLP. Labor's federal machine was:

... satisfactory neither for the determination of policy nor for the conduct of election campaigns and still less for maintaining long-term campaigns between elections.

It would be ironic if the federal structure was left unchanged, because Labor 'radicals' wanted to keep politicians in their place:

... since its inadequacies make inevitable the predominance of the politicians in the formulation of election policy and the heavy dependence upon a single advertising agency for the conduct of election campaigns (Rawson, 1965:33-4).

If Wyndham's plan failed, it would probably only be because of sheer organisational conservatism, combined with 'an unwillingness of one faction to appear to give another a victory', even if both stood to gain (Rawson, 1965:34). Such considerations were quite important in organisations like the ALP.

Rawson thought Wyndham's recommendations would benefit the ALP as a whole. Humphrey McQueen disagreed (letter, Australian, 20 December 1965). He saw a right-wing factional agenda at work in the proposals. They arose out of
'counter-criticisms made by the Press and other opponents' rather than 'any investigation of the ALP's structure'. Wyndham did not prove Federal Conference was inefficient. His worry was it was 'unrepresentative ... of his right-wing opinion'. Wyndham, for all his professional organiser's pride in his practicality, had misunderstood factional *realpolitik* and demonstrated ignorance about the 'grass roots' party:

Mr Wyndham is particularly fond of efficiency and organisational rationality as concepts. This is not surprising as it is symptomatic of the right to look for causes of its failure in the only area of politics in which it has an interest - namely the purely administrative. 25

This made Wyndham 'the greatest utopian of them all'. The left would not vote itself out of power to satisfy his 'orderly mind'. The proposals were naive if Wyndham expected them to work. They were devious if he did not, and was trying 'to cause trouble and/or frustrate more realistic reforms'. Unfortunately, McQueen did not specify any 'realistic reforms' himself.

Press praise for the Wyndham Report concentrated on FPLP representation at Federal Conference.26 The *Mercury* suggested politicians were more attuned to public opinion than delegates who lived in 'an atmosphere of fervid party support and economic theories' ('ALP Seeks New Face', 27 May 1965). The good press Wyndham's proposals received was not surprising. Leader writers were always advising Labor to 'reform' and 'modernise' itself. There was, however, some concern that Wyndham did not go far enough.27
The May 1965 Federal Executive meeting postponed consideration of Wyndham's proposals but opened the 1965 Federal Conference to the press. The NOPC was due to consider the report in July. The holiday weekend, 12-14 June, saw state conferences in NSW, Victoria and SA. Responses to the report could be aired. Brian Johns thought the Federal Executive's referral of the Wyndham Report to the states was not a defeat for the federal secretary ('Changing from White to Grey', Bulletin, 5 June 1965). It kept debate on the document alive.

The NSW conference was expected to be testing for the ruling faction. Labor had just lost state government, which it had held since 1941. A manifesto from 14 'out' unions called on NSW Labor to reassert its socialist objective and its 'traditional radical approach' ('Labor Postmortem', Canberra Times, 8 June 1965). Labor's thinking was being paralysed by 'a pathological fear of the word socialism'. The manifesto went on to attack the NSW executive for failing to keep pace with 'world-shaking social and political change' ('Strong Attack on State ALP in Unions' Manifesto', Sydney Morning Herald, 8 June 1965). The left could turn its hand to 'modernisation' rhetoric on appropriate occasions, but it was decidedly cool on the Wyndham Report. Socialist and Industrial Labor thought Wyndham's 'highly controversial' proposals could only be considered if direct representation was given to federal unions ('Unions Must Be Represented', June 1965). The 'faceless men' charge was a malevolent and misleading capitalist press concoction. The Canberra Times predicted...
the NSW conference would be 'an organisational field par excellence' ('Pressure from the Left', 11 June 1965). There would be complex plots, counter-plots, tickets, counter-tickets and set-piece left/right clashes.  

By-passing Wyndham's carefully modest proposals, the conference confronted the federal structure head-on. NSW had often found federalism a major irritant. The state executive recommended increasing the number of Conference delegates from 36 to 100, elected on a pro rata basis of party membership. Conference preferred an amendment from a young Electrical Trades' Union organiser Barry Unsworth. This was based on the US Democratic Party Convention, which drew delegates on a population basis from the states ('Drastic State ALP Plan to Reorganise Federal Body', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 14 June 1965). Unsworth envisaged a Federal Conference with 132 delegates; made up of the FPLP leader and deputy leader, the SPLP leaders and 124 delegates from the states. The number of delegates each state or territory would be entitled to would be determined by the number of House of Representatives seats within its borders. The method of electing delegates would be left to the Branches. Thus the ruling NSW faction could redress some of its long-standing grievances. Unsworth's proposal contradicted the spirit of Wyndham's drive towards more national rules.

There was much confusion about Unsworth's recommendation. There was a fairly widespread mistaken assumption that because he favoured 124 delegates from the Branches, he favoured one delegate from each FEC. While leaving the method of delegate selection unresolved, the NSW conference
endorsed the abstract notion of Federal Conference representation for federal unions, FECs, state executives and federal MPs ('Right Wing Wins Vote to Wipe Out Faceless Men', Australian, 14 June 1965).

NSW would also expand the Federal Executive from 12 to 20, adding the FPLP leader and deputy leader and the SPLP leaders. Here, there was no attempt to redress the iniquities of federalism (the assumption that, on balance at least, the parliamentary leaders could be trusted to reject the NSW Branch controllers' left-wing opponents on the Federal Executive).33

The press saw the NSW reorganisation decisions as one more victory for the ruling faction in a conference it dominated (Australian, 14 June 1965). However, some of its opponents supported federal reorganisation. Charlie Fitzgibbon, for example, told delegates Labor had to counter the damage done by the 'faceless men' myth, although 'our need is more than just to fix this' ('Key Posts to All the Right Men', Daily Telegraph, 14 June 1965). Fitzgibbon strongly supported federal union representation at Federal Conference and proposed a federal affiliation mechanism for such unions.34

The NSW format for Conference enlargement may have been more a part of state conference plotting and counter-plotting than a serious proposition. It was a ploy to wrong-foot anticipated attacks on the NSW executive for being behind the times and out of touch with the membership. One commentator noted that the decisions were seen within the party as 'largely academic' as the other states were certain to reject them ('Right Wing Wins Vote to Wipe Out Faceless Men Stigma', Australian, 14 June 1965). NSW delegates did not
pursue them with much vigour at the federal level. The press praised the NSW proposals as 'far bolder and more imaginative' than Wyndham's ("Two Faces of the Labor Party", Canberra Times, 15 June 1965). This was partly because of a misperception that NSW had committed itself to a Federal Conference based mainly on FEC delegates.

Tribune suggested the Unsworth proposal was aimed at:

... strengthening NSW right-wing influence at Federal Conference and weakening trade union influence ("Strong ALP Stand on Troops to Vietnam", 16 June 1965).

Tribune claimed NSW wanted 124 FEC delegates, but no role for affiliated unions:

This action, supported by the anti-Labor press, constituted a right wing slap in the face to the trade unions ("Right Wing Attack on Trade Unions", 23 June 1965).

A Sydney University Fabian Society journal made a similar misinterpretation, but saw virtue where the CPA saw vice. Whereas Wyndham still worked within the federal framework, 'the NSW scheme apparently called for the abolition of state delegations' ("New Basis Editorial", August 1965). The editorial combined an awareness of the NSW scheme's ambiguities with an interpretation, based mainly on its own wishful thinking:

While the NSW proposals do not make it clear how these delegations are to be elected it is necessary for success that this be done by the Federal Electorate Councils themselves.

The Sydney University Fabians and the NSW machine had different criteria of what was 'necessary for success'. The Unsworth motion left the method of electing the increased state delegations entirely in the hands of each state executive. New Basis surprise that the NSW executive seemed 'willing to
sacrifice its own status' was premature. Clinging to its interpretation of the NSW proposal as one for an FEC-based Conference, New Basis stressed the 'equity' and 'rationality' of such a structure. An FEC-based Conference would produce 'a more rational policy' and 'reduce internal splitting'. Here, New Basis slipped into the 'rationalistic idealist' rhetoric, so beloved of party reform protagonists, clung to all the more desperately when realpolitik considerations suggested that reform was unlikely. At this stage, frustrated denunciation of the irrationality of realpolitik criteria usually followed. So it was with New Basis. Small state defensiveness would prevail, and the issue would not be debated on its merits, but in relation to which faction would have 'the numbers'.

The Victorian executive was hostile to the Wyndham Report but there was more ferment on party reform in Victoria than in NSW. 'Dissidents' rallied around the Wyndham Report. They became a formal faction after the 1965 state conference, where the report had hardly been discussed and no reorganisation initiatives were forthcoming. When the report was mentioned, near the end of the conference, party treasurer Albert McNolty indicated his unhappiness with its recommendations (Robert Daniel, 'Labor Split Widens - Worst for 10 Years', Australian, 15 June 1965). The conference formalised Victorian tolerance of 'unity tickets'. Party president Bob Holt resigned. He disagreed with the dominant group on 'unity tickets' and declared his support for the Wyndham Report ('ALP Leader Not Seeking Re-Election', Age, 9 June 1965; 'Holt Resigns', Australian, 9 June 1965).
As in the previous year, the official executive ticket was easily returned. Autonomous SEC representation on the executive was abolished, after only one year. In the wake of this decision, and the general failure of the opposition ticket, a more organised anti-executive faction was formed, calling itself 'The Participants'. One of its major complaints was that branch activists were squeezed out by the dominant set of union officials on the executive, (co-ordinated by the nebulous but effective Trade Union Defence Committee). The Wyndham Report gave the Participants fairly obvious ammunition. They became its most wholehearted champions in the whole ALP.

The foundation meeting of the Participants, on 18 August 1965, brought together signatories of a letter condemning the new 'unity ticket' line. They felt organisation was required if 'the ordinary members' were to regain control of the Victorian ALP ('The Participants, Labor Comment, May 1969'). Those who agreed to pursue 'participatory democracy within the ALP' at this meeting later became known as 'the Participants'. They would work within official ALP processes.

Thus, the Participants were not mentioned in the press until 1969. The inaugural meeting elected white-collar union official Barney Williams as president and James Jupp as secretary. It decided to establish a panel of speakers, publish a broadsheet and distribute copies of the Wyndham Report, which the state executive 'was treating as proscribed literature for ALP members'. The Participants were as worried about 'unity tickets' as the lack of branch representation. The focus on branch members' rights was important for a group trying to build an alternative coalition to run the Branch.
The first Labor Comment appeared in November 1965, edited by Robert Murray. The Participants became a pressure group for federal intervention in Victoria, which would put new people in key positions and change the Branch's political complexion. The Participants constantly drew attention to executive authoritarianism and the shoddy deal received by branches and non-TUDC unions. 'Modernisation' rhetoric came in handy in denunciations of the executive. The Participants argued the Victorian set-up was anachronistic. If it was not changed, there would be serious problems recruiting and retaining members.

A short-term objective of the Participants was to change the method of election to the state executive. They took heart from the suggestion in Holt's resignation speech that more 'interests' should be included ('Victorian ALP President Talks of Split in the Ranks', Canberra Times, 12 June 1965). There were a number of non-TUDC unions affiliated to the ALP, but the Participants focused mainly on the branches; initially concentrating on the restoration of the three 'autonomous' SEC representatives ('Mr R.D. Williams' Speech to First "Participants" Meeting', Labor Comment, May 1969). Branch members should not feel they were confined to handing out 'how to vote' cards. Barney Williams hoped that, before the 1966 conference, the Participants could call a meeting of branch representatives:

... to endorse three members to stand as the endorsed candidates of the branches for the three SEC representatives on the Central Executive.

This strategy failed. The majority of branch delegates supported the executive on the controversies of the day. They
accepted their lowly role in party affairs. In 1965, the only year with autonomous SEC representation, the 'non-industrial' wing supported ruling group candidates by a more than 3-to-1 margin.

Executive control of communication lines made it difficult to express branch discontent. The Participants were not the only group attempting to organise horizontal communication between branches. The Victorian Fabian Society tried to promote discussion on the Wyndham Report ('Wyndham Plan Talk Tonight', Age, 16 July 1965). Its secretary Race Mathews circulated a newsletter praising the Wyndham Report and urging ALP members to consider it carefully. The executive did not appreciate this challenge to its control of the Victorian ALP's vertical communication lines.

Mathews also organised a 'Committee to Inquire into Representation and Decision-Making in the ALP', set up by Scoresby SEC in September 1965. This committee circulated the 'Scoresby letter' calling for increased branch representation at conference and on the executive. It attempted to tap into branch revulsion at the abolition of the autonomous SEC representation on the executive (see Mathews, 1986:120). The Participants' panel of speakers, with their talks on the Wyndham Report, were involved in a similar, if more indirect, exercise. The executive's heavy-handed response to the Scoresby challenge vindicated its critics. The tale was later retold in Labor Comment. The Scoresby document was regarded as so dangerous that state secretary Hartley wrote to branches and SECs demanding they return the letter to him immediately:

Such was morale in the pliant branches that head office soon had a table littered with a pile of
Scoresby letters ('The Participants', May 1969. See also Mathews, 1986:120-1).

When Labor Comment first appeared, the Australian reported that it was under the sponsorship of the Scoresby committee ('The Political Circus', 19 November 1965). This confusion between the Participants and the Scoresby exercise was cleared up by Mathews. The committee was composed of 'socialists in the ALP mainstream' (letter, Australian, 1 December 1965). Its terms of reference were organisational:

... and their purpose to determine one aspect of the changes which must be made in order to give the ALP a membership in number and quality adequate for effective political operations.

Participants were wary of declaring themselves at this stage. The Scoresby letter took up some important Participant themes, but Mathews had been advocating them for quite some time. The official response queried the Scoresby figures and classified party membership data as confidential ('Lush Rumours as Basis of Hint and Guess', Fact, 22 April 1965). Mathews replied that, whatever the figures, there was room for improvement (letter, Fact, 20 May 1966). The branch structure had been 'outstripped by social change'. It had served Labor when the majority of the electorate belonged to the industrial working-class and daily experience strengthened their solidarity and consciousness of capitalist exploitation and injustice, but:

... failed to cope with the challenge of a community in which a majority of the workforce are white-collar workers.

For Mathews, the appropriate 'modern' form of 'grass roots' organisation involved the consolidation of branches into larger units. Routine functions and political education should be
clearly separated. Political education was a state executive responsibility. Scoresby committee members and others could be drafted to plan 'a new system of electoral organisation' with 'direct access to accurately identified community groups'. The executive would have to concede members 'a significant say' in party management.42

Many local branches were unwilling to revolt. Mathews' own branch (Croydon) rejected the motion setting up the inquiry, before it was passed by Scoresby SEC (Lew Gibson, letter, Fact, 20 May 1966). State Branch president Bill Brown argued Mathews had no bona fide organisational concern but wanted to 'exploit branch members for other ends' ('Debate on Role of Mathews', Fact, 22 April 1966).43 Hartley saw the Scoresby exercise as an ideological attack on the executive.

In defending the executive's recommendation to abandon separate SEC representation after only one year, Bill Brown sent a special letter to conference delegates. Electing SEC representatives by the whole conference would:

... ensure that the will of Conference and its adherence to the present socialist criteria be maintained (quoted, Mathews, 1986:120).

7E Non-Response : 1965 Federal Conference

The SA convention ignored the Wyndham Report. SA delegates would oppose reorganisation at federal meetings. In July 1965, the NOPC rejected most of Wyndham's recommendations (including the admission of the parliamentary leaders to the federal bodies) or referred them back to the Branches. Thus the bulk of Wyndham's proposals were unlikely to be considered
by Federal Conference (Robert Daniel, 'Wyndham Plan Gets Stinging Rebuff', _Australian_, 14 July 1965). The report's supporters believed that they had lost only the first round in a fight with the left for federal reconstruction ('ALP Reconstruction Report May Not Be Discussed', _Sydney Morning Herald_, 31 July 1965).

Federal Conference began on 2 August at Hellenic House in Elizabeth Street, Sydney. As it was about to open _Sydney Morning Herald_ journalist Ian Fitchett speculated that most Labor supporters would regret the shelving of the Wyndham Report ('Labor's Future Depends on this Conference', 2 August 1965). Wyndham's main achievement might have been to show 'the diminishing "rank-and-file" how weak its voice was:

The message must be: "Build up your branches and bring your louder voice to bear on your State branches".

The only groups that attempted this were the Participants and the Scoresby committee. They had little impact. Fitchett thought Labor also needed change at the top. Without 'dynamic new leadership', it would 'wither and decline'. Whitlam carried the hopes of many 'party reform' supporters. The line he carved out linked reorganisation to opposition to 'unity tickets' and support for 'state aid'. This put him at odds with Calwell.

Whitlam made his position clear. In March 1965, he denounced the Victorian executive's 'unrepresentativeness' and 'anti-Americanism' ('Whitlam Will Face Vic ALP', _Courier-Mail_, 16 March 1965). He threw down the gauntlet on 'unity tickets' in a controversial speech at Newcastle Workers' Club. He warned about the opportunities union affiliation
gave minority parties to subvert the ALP (Whitlam, 1966:252). He declared war on 'unity tickets' to assert Labor's 'anti-Communist' credentials. He made much of changes in the workforce. Collaboration with white-collar unions was important. Labor needed a more national structure. In a carefully coded attack on the Victorian executive, Whitlam declared Labor was weakest where it was not fully representative of the whole union movement. Being fully representative of its affiliate base was not enough. Labor had to 'woo the white collars'. Many industrial workers had sons and daughters who were:

... entering the professions and taking clerical positions ... The great change in the composition of the work force is largely explained by the vision and encouragement of the miner or other industrial worker for his family (Whitlam, 1966:253).

Unionism was changing. ACSPA unions were growing dramatically. The new collective professional worker was a favourite Whitlam theme. The current generation contained more 'professional people' than all previous generations combined (Whitlam, 1966:254). The ACTU sought industrial support from ACSPA and the High Council of Commonwealth Public Service Associations. The ALP should seek political support:

Investors and directors can make and carry out their own decisions on the use they make of Australia's resources and the opportunities they offer to other Australians. All employees and, not least, white-collar employees should look to the Labor Party as their instrument for making fair decisions on resources and opportunities.

Unions should support 'party reform' against the obstruction of state ALP officials.

Some of Whitlam's (1966:257) remarks aroused considerable antagonism, especially his attack on 'unity
ticketers' who 'betrayed' the ALP to hang on to union jobs:

These men are without honour or courage; they put their own interests before those of the party to which they and their unions owe allegiance. 46

Tribune quoted outraged union officials ('Trade Union Anger at Whitlam Attack', 30 June 1965)47 and linked Whitlam's attack on 'unity tickets' to his support for 'party reform':

The speech was part of a two-pronged attack now being developed by right-wing circles generally against the role and influence of the trade unions in the broad affairs of the labour movement.

Whitlam would increase ALP 'party-political interference' in unions:

The second line of attack on the trade unions is a scheme to weaken union influence from the top controlling authority of the ALP.

Party reform proposals could not avoid being embroiled willy-nilly in ongoing Labor disputes.


Adoption of the Wyndham proposals would give ALP parliamentarians the sort of profile their counterparts had in other socialist parties. Whitlam claimed widespread party support for broadening the Conference. Labor should abandon its federalist practices and leave states' rights to the Liberals. He welcomed the admission of the press to Conference. Rank-and-file members were only able to find out about the Wyndham recommendations through the media (ALP, 1965:257). Union and party journals had not been informative.
Labor had to cultivate intellectual support and 'expert' advice.49

The 1965 Federal Conference abolished the 'White Australia' plank, further clarified the ban on 'unity tickets' and reaffirmed opposition to 'state aid' for non-government schools. There was no reorganisation debate. The NSW proposal for a 132-delegate Conference was formally moved, but rendered irrelevant by a motion from Wyndham himself, on behalf of the Federal Executive, asking the NOPC to continue its deliberations and consultations on the report (ALP, 1965:99). This was passed unanimously. A further resolution from Bert Milliner (Qld) stipulated that a special Federal Conference on reorganisation would be held following the NOPC review. This was also passed unanimously.

Wyndham took the opportunity, when moving his motion, to rebut distortions of his report. There were so many and varied criticisms, he sometimes wondered what document his detractors were talking about ('ALP "New Look" Talks Called', Age, 7 August 1965). The report was mentioned a lot more often than read. The proposals would not hand the party over to the parliamentarians ('Wyndham Says Plan Would Lift Unions', Canberra Times, 7 August 1965). Long-term Conference reform would strengthen the position of unions, giving them direct federal representation.

Wyndham could only argue for further consideration of his report. The NOPC had foreclosed general debate on his proposals. No delegate was willing to re-open it on the Conference floor. In the circumstances, party reformers welcomed Milliner's motion (see Overacker, 1968:110).
special 'reorganisation' Conference could prevent the NOPC from burying the whole issue.

Observers interpreted the Conference as a setback for both Whitlam and 'party reform'. The Canberra Times suggested Whitlam's pre-Conference barnstorming had been counter-productive ('Victory for the Left Wing', 4 August 1965). Greater focus on the Wyndham Report might have yielded him more. This was probably wishful thinking. Another view was that the opening of the Conference to the press and decisions on topics such as 'White Australia' indicated new forces were making their presence felt in the party. Openness to the media had largely erased the 'faceless men' image (Overacker, 1968:109). Much of the platform was rewritten. 'Younger, more radical elements' had emerged at Labor's top policy-making levels (James Jupp, 'Radicals Find Room at the Top', Canberra Times, 9 August 1965). Jupp preferred the terms 'radical' and 'conservative' to 'left' and 'right'. He thought Labor 'radicals' had a leader in Whitlam, who

... mapped out precisely the attitude to the future which had come to be accepted as standard in Western Social Democracy. 51

The 'rational radicals' made policy gains, but the 'instinctive conservatives' still held sway in their organisational arena. Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1 made greater progress within the ALP as a policy package than as a new organisational model.

Those favouring the organisational status quo found the 1965 Conference decisions congenial. Whitlam's rhetoric was not enough to deflect delegates from attachment to a structure they were thoroughly familiar with and happy to leave
alone. Calwell defended his leadership by attacking the press (ALP, 1965:249). Defending his decisions to accept a place on the Victorian executive in 1964 and become a Victorian Federal Executive delegate in 1965, Calwell criticised the Wyndham Report implicitly:

If Leaders are elected by their State Branches to Party Executives or Party Conferences, they can take part directly in policy-making decisions. Whether they win or lose, they are bound by those decisions.

I don't want the right to have two bites of the cherry (ALP, 1965:252).
8A Crises in 1966

Had the Wyndham Report been implemented, 1966 would have been 'Membership Year' with special meetings, conferences and rallies to bolster recruitment. Such was not to be. In 1966, Labor found itself regularly in the headlines over internal disputes as 1965 Conference compromises came unstuck. The particularly contentious 'state aid' issue served as a battleground for more general conflicts. Injudicious intervention by Whitlam almost had him expelled in March. The following month he was manoeuvring to challenge Calwell. A Special Federal Conference in July reversed Labor's opposition to 'state aid'. When the federal election came in November, Labor was defeated easily after campaigning against conscription and the Vietnam War. After abating in the run-up to the election, intra-party hostilities reopened as different groups drew different 'lessons' from the defeat. Whitlam and his supporters argued Labor had to 'adapt' to changes in Australian society. Calwell and the Federal Executive argued that Whitlam had been 'disloyal'. Competing 'disloyalty' and 'adaptation' rhetorics were deployed in complicated ways.

A Federal Executive 'interpretation' of the ambiguous 1965 Conference resolution on 'state aid' was the catalyst for much of the pre-election conflict (Overacker, 1968:112). Federal parliamentarians were instructed to oppose any extension of grants to private schools for science
laboratories.¹ The Executive also established a legal committee to investigate challenging the constitutionality of 'state aid'. The 1965 Conference, while opposing the general principle of 'state aid' appeared to accept existing programmes as *faits accomplis*. Whitlam strongly disputed the Executive 'interpretation'. He took the opportunity to raise the general issue of party reorganisation, which was beginning to slip from Labor's agenda ('Whitlam Declares Open War on ALP's Federal Executive', *Canberra Times*, 2 February 1966). After attacking 'petty men' who wanted to reduce the ALP to their 'personal plaything',² Whitlam again called for Federal Conference reform.³ On television, his attack was more pointed:

> We've only just got rid of the 36 faceless men stigma to be faced with twelve witless men ... Do you realise four of these people live on the Labor movement, batten on the Labor movement as paid secretaries? (quoted, Calwell, 1978:229).

In the same interview he ruffled Labor feathers further by declaring his 'destiny' to lead the FPLP.

> Whitlam's opponents thought these remarks gave them enough cause to expel him from the party.⁴ Just before the Federal Executive meeting which would decide Whitlam's fate, Calwell exultantly telephoned supporters that he 'had the numbers' against his deputy ('Labor Indecision: Mr Whitlam's "Loyalty" Trial Collapses', *Age*, 4 March 1966). Calwell assumed Victoria, SA, WA and Queensland would all support expulsion. However, in a day of drama, the Queensland Central Executive, in the form of secretary Tom Burns, asked Queensland delegates (Jim Keeffe and Fred Whitby) to leave Whitlam alone. He had campaigned strongly in a federal by-election Labor had just won in Queensland, where a state election was due. Keeffe
and Whitby reluctantly complied. With the forces for and against expulsion equally divided, the issue was referred to a Special Federal Conference later that month. There Whitlam apologised and was mildly reprimanded. Ironically Tom Burns and the Queensland executive had saved Whitlam on 2 March through a classic 'machine' manoeuvre.

The disputes over 'state aid' and Whitlam's comments did not get federal reorganisation back on the agenda but the subject got some airing, albeit in partly coded terms. Victorian secretary Hartley complained that:

... some were using the issue of constitutional reform of Labor to hide very deep ideological differences within the party ('One Man to Blame: Labor Split Claim - Hartley', Age, 4 April 1966). 5

Just before the crucial Federal Executive meeting, Chamberlain stressed the responsibility of those holding important party positions:

... to observe and protect constitutional procedures and policies. That was because any breach of that responsibility had widespread repercussions among the rank-and-file who had personal loyalty to such people (John Slee, 'Chamberlain Hits Out at Whitlam', West Australian, 1 March 1966).

Chamberlain saw himself and the eleven other 'witless men' as the final and proper arbiters and protectors of Labor procedures and policies. Early in the crisis, Calwell declared on ATV-6 (Ballarat):

Those who want to change the party structure want to turn the ALP into an alternative Liberal Party (quoted, Fact, 25 February 1966). 7

Whitlam and his supporters scored a further win at the Special 'state aid' Federal Conference in Surfers Paradise in July. Deadlock between delegations was resolved when
Calwell broke ranks with his Victorian comrades. Academic 'adaptation' advocate Louise Overacker (1968:117) argued much delay and friction might have been avoided if the federal bodies had been in closer touch with rank-and-file opinion and on better terms with the FPLP. The tortuous process of changing the 'state aid' platform 'emphasized the need for better policy-making machinery'. Even those who supported such an analysis did not act on it at the time. An election was due in a few months. This made it difficult to reopen the reorganisation debate (Overacker, 1968:110). The Whitlam forces contented themselves with their 'state aid' win. The question of reorganisation had become entwined with the leadership issue. Calwell, whatever his own position on the abstract desirability of Federal Conference reform, championed the status quo. The party was heading into an election under him. The challenge in the FPLP had been held off. Reorganisation would become a big issue if Labor went down to its expected defeat. Wyndham's proposals would then resurface (Rawson, 1966b:156-7). Calwell had indicated he would stand down in such circumstances.

While Labor crises and the imminent election pushed reorganisation from the agenda in 1966, the Wyndham Report was still given occasional consideration. The main debate was in Victoria, spurred on by the Participants. Barry Jones warned that if Labor did not reform itself, Australia could end up with a one-and-a-half party system ('Labor's Election Hopes Almost Nil: Labor Man' Age, 11 May 1966). Several branches called on the executive to clarify its position on the Wyndham Report. It did so, favouring retention of strict federal
principles in party organisation. It opposed adding 'superannuary' personnel, who were not elected by the state Branches, to the federal bodies (ALP, Victorian Branch, 1966:33). The Victorian executive's federalism was not based on any permanent organisational principle, but was caused by 'the present leaders' considering themselves to be threatened by 'the present NSW leaders' and saw 'the present leaders in some of the smaller states' as useful allies (Rawson, 1965:29).

The Victorian executive's substantial rejection of the Wyndham Report was upheld by state conference. The anti-executive forces, now organised by the Participants, consoled themselves that the 184-95 margin was 'a vast improvement on their usual position' (Geoffrey Barker, 'Left Wingers Retain Firm Hold', Age, 14 June 1966). The Participants continued to press strongly for full implementation of the Wyndham Report.

Jim Cairns argued the organisational debate boiled down to which leading party personalities delegates identified with:

If you want a radical policy who would you choose? Hartley or Wyndham? And, let's be frank, Whitlam or me? (quoted, Age, 14 June 1966).

Factional realpolitik and party traditions offered better organisational guidelines than 'rationalistic idealist' reform plans, Cairns implied. He admitted defects in the ALP structure, but repairing them did not involve any specifically organisational principles. The flow of influence from the rank-and-file had always been obstructed ('Labor Must Not Surrender its Traditions', Socialist and Industrial Labor, February 1966). 'Checks and balances' gave those higher up in the party disproportionate influence. Executives and
conferences had always been small. This could be blamed on the tyranny of distance. It was 'the result of the sort of country that Australia is'. Perhaps ALP realpolitik was geographically determined! The influence of executives and conferences, in ALP history, had been in the interests of the rank-and-file, Cairns argued. He did not consider Wyndham's suggestion that links between the party membership and the FPLP could be improved by by-passing the state Branch organisational leaderships.

Labor was in disarray during the 1966 election, although it was ready to take a strong stand against conscription and the Vietnam War. Internal conflicts delayed campaign planning (Overacker, 1968:117). Finance was scarce. Right-wing MHR Allan Fraser asked 'Can Labor Win the Election?' (Sunday Telegraph, 14 August 1966). Radio and TV time would require money. On the Vietnam War, Labor had to maintain its principles, while saying 'to hell with Communism'. Fraser also thought Labor had to show it was free from 'outside control'. Fraser's outspoken support for 'state aid' earlier in the year had him in trouble with the Federal Executive. He had attempted to raise the reorganisation issue then:

The issue is that the executive shall be the servant and not master of the membership ... the policy must be made by the party as a whole in a directly representative conference ... this must not be supplanted by the edicts of a handful of officials (quoted, Aitkin, 1966:117). 14

Some Gallup polls suggested Labor's chances were slim. Queensland by-election victor Rex Patterson, on the basis of private polling, thought Labor should drop its opposition to the war and concentrate on domestic issues.
On the other hand, Bill Hartley thought a February 1966 poll portended a 'sensational political swing':

For the first time in many years, the collective support for the Labor Party by women was greater than by men. The obvious reason: Conscription for Vietnam ... ('Vietnam Swing is Gaining Force', Herald, 10 November 1966).

8B 'Disloyalty' and 'Adaptation' Rhetorics

The sensational swing did not materialise. Labor did even worse than in 1963. Its share of first preference votes (40%) was the lowest since 1931. Factional conflict continued in the run-up to the election. During the campaign Whitlam appeared to distance himself from Calwell's opposition to Australian involvement in Vietnam. He suggested an ALP government might retain some regular troops in a 'holding operation'. The post-mortem was bound to be bitter. Calwell and Chamberlain fulminated about Whitlam's 'disloyalty', while Whitlam's supporters thought the time was ripe to reopen the reorganisation battle. Ironworkers' national leader Laurie Short suggested that if Labor could not learn the 'obvious lessons' from 'this disaster', it faced 'a very bleak future indeed' ('Labor Vietnam View Rejected, Says Calwell', Sydney Morning Herald, 28 November 1966). What the obvious lessons were was a matter of bitter disputation. What you thought they were depended to a large extent on where you stood in the Labor spectrum.

Press commentators generally sympathised with the 'adaptation' analysis. In the Australian, Alan Ramsey and Patrick Nilon predicted 'more muck-raking' and settling of personal scores rather than 'an objective appraisal of what
went wrong' or any realisation that Labor had 'lost its way in modern society' ('The Party's Over', 1 December 1966).

Defenders of Calwell and the Federal Executive got short shrift. The ALP 'modernisers' and their sympathisers used the Wyndham Report as a reference point. The Canberra Times again urged the ALP to adopt Wyndham's proposals:

The challenge now is to merge the old traditions into a programme fitting a society in which the blue collars dissolve into a sea of white. There is radicalism under the white shirt but it has nothing to do with the dole. It is more directly connected with the principles inherent in the Wyndham plan, seeking to build Labor as a mass party with a unitary structure which reduces the power of the old State machines and the trade union vote ('A Hard Job to Salvage', 3 December 1966).

Chamberlain articulated the Federal Executive's 'disloyalty' analysis. Loss of support was due to 'lack of loyalty to principles, policy and leadership' within the party ('Chamberlain Blames Lack of Loyalty', West Australian, 29 November 1966). Even the 'finest organisational machinery' would not be much use if Labor presented an image of dissension and disunity. He clearly saw Whitlam as the chief culprit.

Calwell agreed. His confidential report devoted 13 of 32 foolscap typed pages to problems of disunity and personality conflicts (Calwell, 1978:232-3). He went into much detail, because he felt strongly about the matter. Whitlam's name was mentioned often in what Calwell saw as a catalogue of disloyalties.16

Defenders of the internal ALP status quo saw 'party reform' as an attempt to change Labor ideology. Public complaints about the party structure were 'disloyal'.

Calwell's report remained more or less confidential. His
public comments aligned him with those who seemed more worried about 'disloyalty' than about organisational anachronisms. Those emphasising 'disloyalty' were prepared to concede some organisational deficiencies but implied they could be remedied without drastic restructuring. Cairns warned that the party could only be led effectively by 'consultation with the whole movement' and especially 'with those near to the top who represent somewhat different views' ('Labor's Guiding Role in Politics', Advertiser, 7 December 1966). Labor should not become too despondent. An election should not be judged by the same criteria as a football match. The result was a judgement on 'the current state of acceptability' of Labor principles, not of 'their essential rightness'.

There were some interesting parallels between Cairns' 'left-wing' analysis and comments by leading 'right-wing' parliamentarian Allan Fraser ('Stocktaking by Labor Party'). Fraser dismissed the suggestion that Labor should reverse crucial policies on issues like Vietnam. That would be 'the most facile course' and 'the most obviously futile'.

Identifying with US policy in Asia, jumping on the anti-Communist bandwagon and 'piping down on social welfare' would not dispel Labor's woes. Here the parallel with Cairns ends. Fraser had been advocating reorganisation since the 1963 defeat. He now returned to one of his favourite themes, enunciating the 'party disorganisation' explanation of the election loss. This tended to be crudely correlated with 'right-wing' factional alignment, compared to the left's emphasis on 'disloyalty'. The significance of such correlations should not be exaggerated.
Fraser hoped the post-mortem focus would be on what Labor could do to get back into government. How could it harmonise its policies more with Australian public opinion without losing its soul? Press bias was real but the party could present itself more carefully. Reorganisation was the route to rejuvenation.\(^\text{19}\)

Pointing to organisational 'problems' was not simply a response to election defeat. Wyndham's 'solutions' had been around for a while (and they echoed earlier complaints). They were easily available for deployment in post-mortem debates. The losses in 1966 gave opportunities for supporters of Wyndham's 'solutions' to champion them again and to catalogue the 'problems' they might 'solve'. Fraser dramatically exaggerated the Liberals' superior electoral organisation to support his case for Labor professionalism.\(^\text{20}\) His reorganisation strategy centred on Conference reform and local branch renewal. A Conference mainly made up of directly elected FEC delegates would lead to 'a great increase in branch membership and interest'. Fraser did not mention direct federal union representation. He wanted a 'middle of the road' Labor Party, neither anti-American nor pro-Communist. He attacked authoritarianism within the party. Recognition of members' right to differ within the bounds of the party's broad-based principles was central to recovery. Fraser opposed Calwell's view that Labor needed stronger discipline and more integration with the union movement. Calwell wanted to run a tighter and less leak-prone ship in parliament.\(^\text{21}\)

WWF secretary Charlie Fitzgibbon's soothing statements bridged competing rhetorics. On the one hand, it
was time for Labor to take 'a good long objective look' at itself ('Shock Election Defeat and its Lessons for Labor', Maritime Worker, 7 December 1966). 'State jealousy and bigoted thinking' were a hindrance. Could the ALP remain 'the mass political voice of the workers' without federal reorganisation, including federal union affiliation and 'a properly based Federal Conference'? On the other hand, Fitzgibbon specifically emphasised 'party unity' and nodded towards party tradition:

The workers of this country will hope that the ALP remains the socialist-based party it has always been.

An interesting contribution from Doug White in the CPA-sponsored Australian Left Review complicated the factional classification of the competing rhetorics. It articulated a distinctive left-wing 'adaptation' analysis. The 1966 election marked the death throes of Australian Laborism (White, 1967:47). Restating the best labour movement traditions 'without taking into account present day reality' was no longer an option. Labor lost support in factories and on building sites, but schools, universities (and the intelligentsia generally) swung against the government (White, 1967:48). This decline in class consciousness was presented in holistic 'marxist' terms: working class 'social being' included more than work relationships. With 'a shift in emphasis from production to salesmanship' and media growth, leisure-time relationships contradicted 'the ideology which could be expected to arise from work relationships'. Such a decline in old working class ideology did not herald the decline of radical and socialist politics. The 'end of ideology' was not
at hand, but parties of the left had to find new ways to pursue radical and socialist projects. White (1967:50) was enthusiastic about the political potential of the new Australian intelligentsia. Although he used different terminology, his argument echoed Whitlam's. The intelligentsia's ideology arose from its lifestyle:

The theme of individual responsibility, a respect for the humanity of others, a refusal to hand over one's moral obligations or power to make decisions to another, is characteristic.

'Knowledge' challenged 'authority' in this rather romantic model of professional integrity: 'The machine, public service regulations, history or the organisation' could not determine what was correct. 'New forces for social reform' were emerging. Socialist ideology had to be reformulated and progressive unity reconceptualised. Communist WWF official Norm Docker (1967:23) replied that the 'sectoral trends' White referred to were hardly sufficient evidence for his conclusions. Docker dis-aggregated the category 'intelligentsia'. Different types of intellectuals had different class positions; although more were linked to the working class than before. White's analysis, however, was more important for the possibility it offered of changing the terms of the debate than for its actual conclusions. A left-wing 'adaptation' project was possible, although this position did not receive much consideration inside the ALP.

8C Calwell's Confidential Report

Calwell's report (NSW ALP Branch Records ML Mss 2083/14/283) maintained its confidentiality more successfully
than Whitlam's 1964 document. Calwell strongly condemned 'disloyalty', but was not totally opposed to reorganisation. He had his own version of 'party reform'. Those who characterised Calwell's conception of the party as anachronistic might have had their views confirmed by his suggestion that Labor was still wracked by the effects of the World War I conscription split. Australian society had changed considerably between 1917 and 1967. Calwell argued that ethno-sectarian tensions dating back to 1916-17 lingered in the ALP. Rebuilding the pre-1917 ALP was hardly an option in 1967. Although Calwell gestured in that direction, it would be a caricature to say that he advocated such a course.

Calwell claimed that his report set out the reasons for Labor's setback 'without rancour or resentment', but the 'disloyalties' of Whitlam in particular were carefully recounted. The section on 'Disunity' was the longest one. The report, however, also illustrated Calwell's dissatisfaction with the party structure, painted as 'the basic reason' for Labor's poor electoral record. The ALP was still a federation of six colonial parties. Despite its members' 'healthy Australianism' and their 'noble ideal' of constitutional reform, the party functioned as 'six watertight compartments', each more interested in state than federal office. This echoed long-standing Whitlam themes. Calwell drew on the anti-federalist rhetoric which had always gone hand-in-hand with Labor's internal federalisation (see Crisp, 1978; Galligan, 1981a).

Calwell saw Conference reform as the appropriate 'solution' to Labor's organisational 'problems'. It was 'the
only way ... to develop on a truly national basis' (NSW ALP Branch Records ML Mss 2083/14/283). He favoured direct representation for FECs and federal unions. The latter would have 60 percent of the delegates. This provision differentiated Calwell's plan from what Whitlam had advocated in 1964. Calwell paid greater attention to the affiliated (mainly blue-collar) unions. Calwell wanted a card vote for union delegates (as in Britain).

Calwell's line is interesting, although it was not seriously pursued and is something of an historical curiosity. Generally those who opposed the Whitlam/Wyndham conception of 'party reform' made little attempt to defend the details of the traditional party structure. They preferred to find suspect motives for the reform plans. Calwell's response was different. He accepted the critique of internal federalism and the need for 'party reform', but delineated a 'party reform' plan, imbued with his own concerns.

Calwell argued Labor's 'crisis mentality' was inappropriate. Labor could only become 'the major political force' by convincing voters that 'democratic socialism' was 'better than monopoly capitalism'. Labor's federal finances were 'pathetically weak'. He shared Wyndham's preference for nationally uniform preselection methods. He suggested an electoral college weighted in favour of local branches. This could assist local branch renewal.

Calwell stressed that co-operation between the party and the union movement had been in decline since 1949, a year of confrontation between the Chifley Government and the Miners' Federation. The Split and the dis-affiliation of some
'Grouper'-led unions accentuated this decline. ALP/ACTU coordination was non-existent. Without close links between the ACTU, the FPLP and the Federal Executive:

... the forces of monopoly capitalism will continue to triumph, and the wealth producers of Australia, whether white collar workers, non-white collar workers, or primary producers, will continue to suffer and questions like education and social services will continue to be neglected.

Few unions gave generously to the ALP at election time.

Many workers were not unionised and many unionists did not vote ALP. Calwell wanted a combined ACTU/ALP response to such problems. Traditional Laborist practices and forms of militancy remained relevant in the 'so-called affluent society', characterised by:

... profitless prosperity, in which the great majority of people are in debt, and where wives have to work, and where workers have to take two jobs, or seek overtime, to meet hire purchase payments at usurers' rates of interest.

Calwell seems to have had militant pursuit of the old gender-based 'family wage' ideal (see Macintyre, 1985:58) in mind. He did, however, chide:

... certain elements in our party membership who pussy-foot on such issues as the cruel, dirty war in Vietnam ... (NSW ALP Branch Records, ML Mss 2083/14/283).

Although he had described the organisational structure as the basic reason for Labor's electoral difficulties, Calwell explained the 1966 loss in terms of Liberal-Country vilification and internal personal and policy conflicts. He castigated Whitlam for insufficient loyalty. Whitlam's 1964 document was 'arrant nonsense ... self-glorification and opportunism'. Whitleam's description of him as 'old-fashioned' particularly incensed Calwell. It was
'gross disloyalty'. Some of Whitlam's calls for reorganisation were seen in the same light. Calwell raked over the 'state aid'/'witless men' crisis, arguing that ambition had led Whitlam, the self-proclaimed man of destiny, to throw the party into grievously damaging, needless turmoil. 'Intrigues and denigrations of my leadership' continued, even after the 'witless men' incident had been patched up. The last straw for Calwell was a Whitlam speech in Adelaide, fudging Labor's opposition to the Vietnam War. More generally, Calwell called for a more disciplined Caucus. The FPLP could not be run:

... like a Victorian boarding school, but it should be run along business-like lines. The board members of a major company, particularly when it is in trouble, do not shout their criticism of each other from the floor of the stock exchange.

A revealing analogy! Calwell wanted MPs to stop leaks which enabled the media to present the party as 'a disunited rabble, unfit to govern and incapable of working together'.

After insisting that there could be no reconciliation with the DLP, Calwell concluded with more on restoring ALP/union co-operation. The gulf between different unions was widening. The old 'clear identity of interests' between the union movement and the ALP no longer existed, but there was light on the hill. Labor was no more down and out than it had been in 1931 or 1917. It could win in 1972, perhaps even 1969:

It is not a matter of discarding our ideology, it is a question of modernising the internal activities of the party and instilling into its members a feeling of confidence and unity around ... democratic socialism and a healthy Australianism. Unity is strength and only real unity can give us victory.

The populist and racist connotations of Calwell's 'healthy Australianism' raise queries about the 'democratic socialist'
nature of such a project. However, Calwell's Labor 'traditionalism' was qualified. He seemed prepared to countenance some reorganisation, while distrusting the motives of the party reformers and would-be reorganisers.

8D 'Modernisation' and the 'Middle Class': Once Again

The Participants were quick to step up their calls for party reorganisation and professionalisation after the 1966 defeat. The 6 percent drop in the ALP vote was:

... one of the strongest rebukes the Australian public has ever given a political party ...
Public rejection of this order was the inevitable and deserved fate of a Party that has refused to learn any lessons from 17 years in opposition ('A Disgraceful Result - But It's Time to Think of 1969', Labor Comment, December 1966).

Strong words. The Participants felt the result vindicated their previous criticisms of Labor's lack of political professionalism and membership participation (not always compatible qualities). They deplored Labor's tendency to see politics 'as a matter of striking attitudes' rather than 'a complex business of winning people over' to a practicable social reform programme. Labor Comment almost exulted in the party's humiliation. The result had a 'comforting feature'. It demonstrated the sensitivity of public opinion. Public rejection of a 'sick' party augured well for a 'healthy', reorganised ALP. But the patient had to be disabused of the merits of a rival diagnosis, centred on 'disloyalty'. In the Participant analysis, Labor had not been serious about winning. Political idealism and romanticism had led it astray. Labor needed more money and more paid officials ('Party Reform is Urgent Task ...', Labor Comment, December 1966).
Wyndham's suggestions on regular bank orders and subscription cards for party supporters could be taken up. Once finance improved, Labor could embark on research, publicity and advertising projects.

The Participants complained more about the exclusion of parliamentary than branch member influence from what was presented as a 'union-dominated' party machine. The ALP, the Participants complained, was 'just about unique in the world' in allowing union-dominated conferences to dictate to parliamentary leaders. This tendentious analysis ascribed 'completely unnecessary faction fights' to a debilitating tendency for Trades Hall politics to spill over into the ALP. The Participants paid little attention to the possibility that increased 'participation' by branch members might increase factional differentiation.

The Participants sought better representation for Victorian branches and SECs. Membership rights was a crucial part of their initial charter, as their name suggests. Changing the complexion of the state executive was even more central to their project. They wanted automatic representation for the Trades Hall Council, the ACTU and white collar unions on the executive. Participant 'party reform' had its own contradictions:

They warn against control of the ALP by outside organizations, yet are prepared to give ACPSA (many of whose member organizations are politically non-partisan) the THC and the ACTU the right to appoint members of the VCE (Hudson, 1968:20).

The point of the 'reform' campaign was to replace the VCE with one that would support Whitlam. Arguments for 'modernisation' and 'efficiency' were incidental. Perhaps they were a
'rationalistic idealist' gloss on a minority faction's *realpolitik*. However the 'rationalistic idealist' logic deployed by the Participants raised important strategic issues that could not be dismissed with calls for party 'loyalty'.

'Unity tickets' had both electoral and intra-party *realpolitik* implications for the Participants. They wanted to curb 'Communist-dominated' union influence:

One simple, if drastic, solution would be to disaffiliate unions with paid officers who are members of a Party other than the ALP. Another would be to limit their voting rights at Conference. 36

The Participants attacked suggestions that Labor should 'turn to the left', 'stick to its principles' and 'not become an alternative Liberal party' ('Goldwaters in the ALP', Labor Comment, February 1967). 37 Such slogans were invoked to give refusal to change 'a spurious moral superiority'. Labor should abandon romantic, idealist sloganeering:

It should be clear to anybody seriously interested in politics that political parties can't wave magic wands. Changing society for the better is hard, slogging work that requires clear thinking, realism and courage.

The case for reorganisation was also presented by two leading Victorian ALP reform protagonists (John Paterson and Race Mathews) in the December 1966 issue of *Overland*. 38 Paterson was a Labor Comment editorial board member. 39 His article, presciently entitled 'Out of the Abyss', was written before the election. Mathews used the forum of a review of Don Rawson's *Labor in Vain* to canvass his own ideas on reorganisation. There were parallels between the two articles. Both were aimed at intellectual Labor supporters, but Paterson's 'managerialist' rhetoric and Mathews' more
'participatory' arguments contained different rationales for party reform.

Paterson (1966:21) thought Labor's organisational structure was unstable and out of kilter with the party's political goals. Factionalism made for many interpretations of Labor's goals. Party goals could not be traded for electoral success 'without legitimately attracting the charge of opportunism' (Paterson, 1966:25), but there was room for considerable tactical discussion. Factional posturing hindered this, preventing Labor from bearing electoral factors in mind when settling on tactics. Paterson (1966:26) assumed there were over-riding goals within the ALP:

It is a basic rule of organisational theory that once you know the goals you wish to reach, and measure your resources, then the correct structure of your organisation is specified. The overwhelming goal of the ALP at present must be to win power ...

Paterson's evaluation of Labor factionalism was informed by his managerialist 'rationalistic idealism'. The party should adopt rational criteria for its internal operations. Appointments and preselections should be geared towards electoral outcomes, instead of being 'counters in private tactical games or rewards for services rendered'. Labor needed 'the right people' in 'the right positions'. The 'wrong' people were in control. This could only be righted by a structure which provided a rational framework, as in any 'properly run' business or government department. Paterson did not see increasing membership participation as a goal in its own right. He deplored the irrationality of factionalism. The dominant Victorian TUDC group was:

... a good example of a faction which stifles discussion, makes inappropriate appointments,
and has a record of electoral failure. It should be regarded, on a managerial basis alone, as subversive of the goals of the party.

Union blocs at state conferences hindered a rational allocation of delegateships based on 'who has something to offer'. Federal Conferences were made up from the dominant faction in each state, 'not the people who can contribute to electoral success'.

For Paterson continued electoral failure fed into destructive inward-looking factionalism. The vicious circle served only the oligarchy of the 'wrong' people. An alternative virtuous circle would link electoral success to organisational 'sanity'. Paterson adopted the 'adaptation' analogy directly:

Organisations, like living organisms, must continually test themselves out on their environment ... If organisations do not work in a real environment they have to manufacture a fantasy-environment to give meaning to their existence. An organisation which does this is effectively insane.

The ALP is in this state. It regards seventeen years in the wilderness as a tribute to its moral virtue ... (See also Allan, 1980:3-4, 23, 29-30, 132-4, 157-62).

Thus Paterson's managerial 'rationalistic idealism' led him to see his factional opponents as effectively insane. Paterson's subsidiary argument was that 'social change' had undermined old-style Labor factionalism. Relationships between politicians, supporters and voters were changing. ALP members had different 'authority beliefs', beliefs about who to believe on matters beyond personal experience (Paterson, 1966:25). What made political leaders 'authoritative', in the community if not the party, was changing. Educational achievement and technical competence
were becoming more important, as they increasingly resonated with 'the individual aspirations of a large part of the electorate'. Paterson articulated claims of (professional) 'knowledge' against (party/'machine') 'authority'. But this form of 'authority' had some democratic legitimacy. 'Knowledge' could be infused into the ALP in many ways, not only the elitist one advocated by Paterson.

Paterson saw a professional, technically-proficient 'rational' style of politics as essential in a society undergoing considerable modernisation and 'rationalisation'. However, those who had steered the ALP into the abyss would refuse to relinquish control. The 'dead-heads' would be difficult to move. Rational decision-making on how to exit from the abyss was unlikely. Paterson put his faith in 'the strongman solution'. Changes could come from the top:

... at the hands of a ruthless federal leader, hell-bent for electoral success and recognising no loyalties other than the capacity to win ...

A leader who would 'crash through or crash' (see Oakes, 1976)? A self-proclaimed 'man of destiny' who would overcome the 'witless' objections of the 'dead-heads'?

Whitlam, the sort of technocratic leader Paterson had in mind, invoked a participatory rhetoric of renewal as well as a managerial rhetoric of efficiency, in his arguments for party reform. Race Mathews had been advocating ALP renewal for quite some time. His conception of party reform was broader than Paterson's. Mathews (1966:28) warned Overland readers that the left did not have a monopoly on radical and progressive positions in the ALP. Whatever their factional origins, organisational proposals should be evaluated objectively as to
whether they advanced radical goals or not. ALP radicals and socialists found an administratively incompetent 'left' whose radicalism was fraudulent in conflict with a 'right' that was 'ideologically repugnant' and not necessarily any more competent. The way issues were 'inevitably personalised' was symptomatic of Labor's 'low level of political debate'. Factional labels were misleading. The ALP had to be re-politicised. A new leader or a different executive would solve little. 'A class and an institution' had to be dragged 'into the real world of contemporary Australian politics'. Once again changes in Australian society were assumed to necessitate changes in the ALP. Instead of Paterson's 'strong man solution', Mathews favoured a co-ordinated 'party renewal' project, by-passing obstructionist ruling factions and challenging oligarchical inertia at all levels. The Paterson/Mathews contrast illustrated tensions between 'managerial' and 'participatory' arguments for party reform. Both were presented in mainly 'rationalistic idealist' terms. Professional 'cosmopolitan' standards were invoked against internal 'parochial' ones (see Gabriel, 1981).

'Cosmopolitan'/'adaptation' and 'parochial'/ 'disloyalty' arguments fed off each other's weaknesses. Thus, after Whitlam won the leadership and his troubles with the Federal Executive continued, Cairns stood against him, championing traditional intra-party democracy. He argued that Whitlam's ideas were characteristically 'theoretical and not drawn from a sense of history or particular circumstances' (Brian Johns, 'Dr Cairns States His Case', Sydney Morning Herald, 29 April 1968). Labor's consultative processes were
'perhaps rough and ready, but basically sound' ('Dr Cairns's Letter', Advertiser, 27 April 1968). 'Modernisers' would place an elite or even an individual on top 'on the assumption that it, or he, knows best', which was 'intellectual arrogance and dangerous folly'. 49 This perspective punctures some 'rationalistic-elitist' strains in many of the 'adaptation' analyses, but relies on 'rank-and-file' mythology which has never been much of a guide to internal ALP operations.
The drama of the Calwell succession overshadowed debate on reorganisation. Would the front runner Whitlam be expelled because of his equivocation on Vietnam? Would Calwell defy expectations and soldier on? Would there be an agreed alternative to Whitlam? There was plenty to speculate on. Caucus met on 6 February. Calwell stepped down. Whitlam succeeded him, defeating four rivals, the main ones being the Victorians, Frank Crean and Jim Cairns. With his new authority, Whitlam rejoined the reorganisation battle. He wanted to modernise Australia ('Whitlam Meets the Press - He Accuses the Liberals of Passive Policies and Smugness', Australian, 10 February 1967). Labor would question everything that was being done by Australian governments 'in the light of experience in similar democracies' and the suggestions of Australian experts. To do this, it would need to modernise itself.

In the next six months Whitlam missed no opportunity to canvass 'party reform' with Labor audiences. The Special Conference on the Wyndham proposals (agreed on in 1965) had not taken place in 1966. It would be held in conjunction with the 1967 Federal Conference. Whitlam had to move quickly. His crusade had two phases. Phase one lasted until the Federal Executive meeting in May, which rejected any drastic reorganisation. In phase two, Whitlam appealed to conference delegates in NSW, Victoria, SA and WA over the heads of Branch
'machines'. He also used his newfound status to pressure the 'machines'. His main demand in both phases was a committee of inquiry on party organisation. His opponents felt that stopping such an inquiry would derail Whitlam's 'party reform' project. They were quick to warn Whitlam that his outspokenness could damage the party (see 'Chamberlain v Whitlam: The Move that Rebounded', Bulletin, 1 April 1967).²

From the beginning Whitlam's speeches revolved around familiar themes and familiar ambiguities. Long-held concerns to 'woo the white-collars' and 'de-federalise' the party were regularly re-aired. The old ambiguity between 'image'-oriented, 'efficient' reforms and participatory ones remained. In phase one, Whitlam emphasised the need for Labor to respond to:

... the great industrial and political opportunities presented by the white collar workers ... the most significant and important change ... in the occupational make up of Australia since the last war ('Whitlam Woos White Collar Workers, Australian, 13 March 1967).³

'A trade union party' was 'no longer sufficient' ('Whitlam Wants Sweeping Party Reforms', Australian, 13 March 1967).⁴ Labor should become 'the proper political spokesman for all employees'. Commentators suggested that even when addressing ALP and union audiences, Whitlam was mainly trying to boost his 'image' with the voters (see Jonathan Gaul, 'Whitlam Stakes His Future: Labor Reform', Canberra Times, 14 March 1967). The 'noisy' Labor 'machine' attracted press attention:

The public agony as the State branches slug it out at a Federal Conference. Will 'X' be expelled by the Federal Executive? Will this or that stage change its vital vote at the last moment? Will such-and-such a policy be changed? Read tomorrow's blow-by-blow account.
Whitlam emphasised the need to exorcise electorally burdensome bogeys. He also conjured up a picture of party renewal through membership participation. Alongside the negative arguments about the electorally damaging consequences of not holding an exorcism ceremony, there were positive arguments for Labor revitalisation. Some of the latter were more important to Whitlam personally than to his 'right-wing' backers (especially in NSW). The Participants consistently supported him but had little influence. Whitlam's alliance with the NSW 'machine' was circumstantial:

Those key organisational supporters of his on the 'Right' whom other men would never have humiliated in the way that he did, do not really have a vision of a new Labor Party. And Whitlam knows it ...

Circumstances have cast Mr Whitlam's fortune with the wheeling-and-dealing 'Right', but this has not made him accept it (Brian Johns, 'Leap in the Dark by Labor', Sydney Morning Herald, 9 February 1967).

Whitlam wanted membership 'talent' and policy-making competence to be utilised more effectively. His 'party renewal' message was targeted at specific groups of members. The white collars and the intellectuals were again being wooed. Rhetorically Whitlam went further. He spoke of the 'rank-and-file'. This was the managerial/participatory dichotomy again. Participation for whom? The experts? The membership as a whole? Integrating the experts did not necessitate wholesale party renewal, whatever Whitlam claimed.5 Perhaps such rhetoric was required, however, if it was to be considered seriously within the party.

The Tasmanian conference was in March, before the general (winter) ALP conference season. Whitlam insisted Labor could not simply blame the electorate for its troubles (Alan Ramsey, 'Whitlam Tells Why Labor Lost the Election',

213
That was futile. So were complaints about capitalist press conspiracies. Labor had to demonstrate its competence and cohesion. That required reorganisation. Whitlam did not spell out whether he was advocating Wyndham's interim proposals or a more thorough reorganisation. Such differences were blurred in the call for a committee of inquiry. Whitlam's key demand was designed to maintain the momentum for reorganisation. It was endorsed by the Tasmanian Branch. That would give Whitlam six votes at Federal Conference. 6

Whitlam was trying to create an atmosphere that would facilitate party reform. He wanted the Branches to endorse FEC and federal union Conference representation:

> It would then be for a committee to work out the details of alterations to the party's constitution and such thorny questions as representation of parliamentarians, large State unions etc. (Harold Cox, 'Whitlam's Plan Could Strengthen the Political Wing ...' (Sunday Mail, 14 March 1967).

Cox believed that Whitlam's real agenda was to enable the FPLP leadership to dominate the party more effectively. In realpolitik terms, 'a big communion of miscellaneous delegates' could hardly attain the 'unity of purpose' achieved by 'the present tightly-integrated management'. The power 'now exercised by Labor's managers outside Parliament' would inevitably drift to the FPLP, 'particularly its senior officers and leaders'. FEC delegates may well have preferred Whitlam to Chamberlain, but they did not constitute automatic reserves of support for the 'right wing'. The simplistic assumption that branches were 'middle-class' and 'right-wing', while unions were 'working class' and 'left-wing' lurked around in
many minds at this time. A related assumption contrasted a 'modern' Labor 'rank-and-file' with a more traditional 'machine'. Such was the mythology of the debates.

Shortly after his Tasmanian success, Whitlam made a foray into Victoria. He told a Young Labor Association dinner he intended:

... to convert the ALP in the eyes of the public into a mass movement once again ('Labor Must Show It Is Mending Its Ways', Age, 20 March 1967). This hope encapsulated Whitlam's ambiguity. Was he advocating a cosmetic job to exorcise a few bogeys or a substantial 'party renewal' project? The term 'once again' was interesting. Had the ALP ever been a 'mass movement'? Whitlam was genuflecting to Labor myths about the 'collective sovereignty' of the membership.

There was much press support for 'party reform', but there were suggestions that Whitlam exaggerated its benefits. The Sydney Morning Herald supported reorganisation more as a blow to the left than anything else ('Organising Labor', 17 March 1967). It wanted FEC delegates at Federal Conference, but found it 'difficult to muster enthusiasm' for federal union representation. Large conferences were often manipulated, but could debate issues in a way that was 'impossible with Australian coteries of power'. The Advertiser thought Whitlam was 'so far giving good value' to those who hoped he might redecorate Labor's 'dusty, musty shop window' with something more appealing to the vote-spender ('Mr Whitlam Speaks Out', 21 March 1967). Interesting imagery. Workers in the shop might still have little say, after the window had been redecorated. The Northern Daily Leader suggested the alleged
nexus between reorganisation and electoral recovery was historically spurious ('Rebuilding Federal Labor', 23 March 1967). 'The Whitlam-Barnard theory' ignored nearly seventy years of achievement in all states and periodic national success.11

Wyndham's reorganisation proposals aroused considerable 'machine' disquiet, but this was not often publicly articulated. Perhaps Wyndham's opponents thought the topic would disappear, if ignored. Whitlam's crusade made further procrastination impossible. The May 1967 Federal Executive meeting rejected any move towards a Mass Conference.12 Whitlam did not call off his crusade or explore available compromises. The showdown would be at Federal Conference. The Executive decision was 'only tactical skirmishing, a drawing of the battle lines' (Alan Ramsey, 'Mr Whitlam Still Has a Chance on Reform', Australian, 11 May 1967).

By 'discharging' the Wyndham proposals, 'this strange body of men' made it clear to ordinary members that it would go to any length to retain its power ('For Mr Whitlam ... A Case of Numbers', Sydney Morning Herald, 11 May 1967).13 The Executive seemed deaf to changes in Australian society that Whitlam could hear loud and clear:

The opponents of reorganisation must recognise that in Australian society as it is now developing, politics will increasingly be an exercise of efficiency more than anything else, the party which attains power will have to prove itself an effective managerial body. Ideology will have a diminishing role in government in the future. Mr Whitlam has understood this: hence the emphasis in his recent speeches on roads, transportation and the quality of life: ideas which people can readily appreciate ('Labor's Latest Inner Struggle', Australian, 9 May 1967).
This view (akin to that held in the 'technocratic' face of Participant ideology) suggested reorganisation would help Labor project itself in an 'end of ideology' era. To an extent, so did Whitlam. Yet his declared aim of rebuilding the party as a 'mass movement' and clarification of Australian Social Democracy, mark 1 helped to re-ideologise the ALP.

While the Federal Executive decision registered the difficulties faced by 'party reformers', the fate of the Mass Conference idea may have been sealed at a Commonwealth Labor Advisory Council (CLAC) meeting back in March. Here ACTU officials told Whitlam they had grave doubts about the proposal for direct union representation (Geoffrey Barker 'Setback for Whitlam', *Age*, 30 March 1967). The Mass Conference had been argued for in a rhetorical way without much attention to detail. The ACTU foresaw problems.

In speeches to the Federal Ironworkers' Association and the Union of Postal Clerks and Telephonists, after the Federal Executive discharged Wyndham's proposals, Whitlam continued his crusade. He told the UPCT, one of the few 'white collar' unions affiliated to the ALP, that unions should pursue 'quality of life' issues, as well as wages and working conditions, in a difficult era of 'technological revolution' (Whitlam, 1967a). Federal Government initiatives would complement traditional union techniques. He told the FIA delegates that never before had the whole labour movement:

... needed to look so critically at its own capacity to handle and channel change into beneficial channels ('Automation Will Win', *Age*, 23 May 1967).

May 1967 saw yet another Victorian election defeat. This led Whitlam to link criticisms of the Victorian executive
to calls for 'party reform' ('Whitlam Hits Vic Labor', *Age*, 27 May 1967). The big test for Whitlam was about to come; the NSW, Victorian, SA and WA conferences (the first three all on the same June holiday weekend). Whitlam believed there was a large constituency in ALP branches (not usually strongly represented at state conferences) which would prefer the parliamentary leadership to the Federal Executive in any showdown.

9B Whitlam's Reorganisation Crusade, Phase II: Around the State Conference Circuit

Whitlam prepared thoroughly for the June weekend round of conferences. He was going to pursue his 'own particular method of kamikaze-style politics' (Jonathan Gaul, 'Three State Conferences for Labor Party: Whitlam to Face His Biggest Challenge', *Canberra Times*, 9 June 1967). Whitlam's (1967b) pamphlet, *Towards a National Party with a National Purpose: Let Us Now Begin*, documents his thinking on reorganisation. His speechwriter Graham Freudenberg (1977:91-2) recalled the reorganisation campaign as:

... a deliberate mixture of persuasion and confrontation ... The task was to stir up the membership to generate pressure for reform. Whitlam used all his prestige as a new leader in that task.

The campaign had been carefully planned to build up to the Queen's birthday conference weekend (Freudenberg, 1977:93). NSW and SA would get persuasion, Victoria confrontation. SA's recently installed Labor premier Don Dunstan was worried that Whitlam might upset the SA 'machine' (Freudenberg, 1977:97). Dunstan had dismissed the Mass Conference idea in
1964. Federal Conference reform would not guarantee intra-party democracy. The much derided 'faceless men' could bargain and compromise easily. He was doubtful that a large unitary conference would be an improvement. (Dunstan, 1964:15-6).

Some overseas Labour conferences were:

... ruthlessly managed from the platform and the opportunities for advancing of rank and file members effectively and for arriving at reasoned compromise available in the ALP are missing (Dunstan, 1964:16).

The suggestion that Labor's oligarchic structure allowed for effective representation of 'rank-and-file' views was disingenuous. However, a Mass Conference was no panacea.

Dunstan was an ally of Whitlam. He shared many of Whitlam's policy preferences and his desire to 'woo the white collars' and cultivate intellectual support. Dunstan disagreed with Whitlam's belief that ALP reorientation required formal reorganisation as well. The existing structure was flexible.

Whitlam (1967b:2) argued that reorganisation was necessary for Labor resurgence. He knew many in the party were implacably opposed. He pitched his appeal to those with an open mind. For this critical segment, Whitlam stressed the participatory aspects of the link between reorganisation and ALP resurgence as a mass, national party. His arguments had a 'managerial' face as well. He attacked structural incentives to 'divisiveness and discord' (Whitlam, 1967b:3). Conference reform was presented as the key to party renewal and electoral revival:

The National Conference should be a dynamic source of energy and enthusiasm. A voice and a vote in a viable organisation are the best means to ensure that rank and file members will enthusiastically wage a campaign over three years and not just three weeks before an election (Whitlam, 1967b:3-4).
Whitlam (1967b:4) complained that the FPLP was suffering most from the prevailing arrangements. His plan would not swamp smaller states. The FPLP never divided along state lines. It was a misconception to think that it would be the state Branches that would elect a number of delegates to National Conference, corresponding to the number of federal electorates in each state (Whitlam, 1967b:5). Such a misconception had been encouraged by the endorsement of exactly such a 'party reform' proposal by the NSW Branch in 1965.21 Anyway, Whitlam's call was for an inquiry with one representative from each state executive, the federal leader and deputy leader and the federal secretary. On such a committee of nine, Whitlam, Barnard and Wyndham would only need the support of two states (NSW and Tasmania?) to constitute a pro-'reform' majority.22

Whitlam intimately linked reorganisation to improving Labor's 'image'. He alluded to a September 1966 survey, where 27 percent of respondents named organisation as Labor's greatest weakness.23 Swinging voters were particularly prone to take this view. Reorganisation had intrinsic merits as well.

In Melbourne, Whitlam denounced the Victorian executive rather than canvass the abstract desirability of reorganisation. He was particularly disturbed by their apparent indifference to electoral defeat:

There is nothing more disloyal to the tradition of Labor than the new heresy that power is not important, or that the attainment of political power is not fundamental to our purpose ...
(Whitlam, 1967b:6).

'Quality of life' issues and social policy concerns could not be won industrially. He dismissed the 'delusion' that
political pressure could be successfully exerted:

... irrespective of parliamentary success or failure. This theory reached its zenith in protests on Vietnam ... (Whitlam, 1967b:8).

Many ALP members had participated in such protests. The Victorian executive encouraged such activity. Whitlam was not comfortable with this form of 'membership participation'.

His main supporters in Victoria, the Participants, shared his discomfort. Labor Comment dismissed 'pointless exercises' like the Victorian ALP's 'Vietnam Mobilisation' as a waste of money, while unpaid bills were piling up and 'the efficiency of the whole organisation' was 'rapidly declining' ('Labor News', December 1967). However, there was no logical contradiction between increased 'rank-and-file' input into Labor decisions and activities such as the 'Vietnam mobilisation'. Parliamentary reformism and political protest could complement each other.

Whitlam rejected the view that preserving the Victorian executive was necessary to maintain ALP opposition to the Vietnam War. A group of academics had taken this line of critical defence:

The style of work of the Victorian ALP Central Executive undoubtedly contains many unsatisfactory features and some of these can be traced to structural as well as administrative shortcomings. But in a political party, politics and policy are paramount, style secondary (letter, Age, 5 June, 1967).

Although mainly concerned with improving Labor's capacity to compete effectively in federal elections, Whitlam pushed the 'rank-and-file' versus 'bureaucracy' line with considerable flourish. Reorganisation was more than simply better public relations (Whitlam, 1967b:11). A new leadership or a new 'image' would not suffice. He refused to
accept such a compliment:

I wish to lead a mass party, as the Labor Party used to be proud to proclaim itself, not a one-man band.

Whitlam criticised TUDC domination of the Victorian Branch. The TUDC operated secretly and included all the unions that were 'accident-prone on unity tickets' (Whitlam, 1967b:12). He really raised the heckles (and hacklesi) of delegates by comparing TUDC methods to those of Santamaria's 'Movement'. He really raised the heckles (and hacklesi) of delegates by comparing TUDC methods to those of Santamaria's 'Movement'. State conferences could choose their own executives but he would repudiate people he believed were 'disloyal to the ALP, disruptive of its electoral prospects' and destructive of all it stood for.

Whitlam's speech 'created bitterness and resentment' (John Hurst and Brian Kitching, 'Split in Labor party: Vic Left and NSW Right Stand Firm', Australian, 13 June 1967). Calwell laughed, because he thought it meant Whitlam's days were numbered (Freudenberg, 1977:96). Provocation of the Victorian Branch had been a deliberate tactic. The boos in the hall mattered a lot less to Whitlam than the electoral gains he might make in taking on the Victorian executive.

Fact thought some of Whitlam's remarks were 'intemperate and ill-advised' ('Pledge to Fight On: Support for Leaders', 16 June 1967). In an earlier issue, Bill Hartley rehearsed the main anti-reorganisation arguments ('Labor Executive's "Meet the Press" on Party', 31 May 1967). Reorganisation meant parliamentary domination of policy-making, not increased 'rank-and-file' input. The Victorian Branch took upon itself the task of defending the existing ALP set-up ('Reorganisation', Fact, 31 May 1967). 'Too public' discussion had done 'a lot of damage'. FEC representation would give the
Labor 'right' and the FPLP greater clout in party affairs.

Travel costs might mean many areas went unrepresented or represented by MPs with free travel and accommodation allowances:

Conference would be heavily loaded with these delegates and they would be responsible to nobody except to their own Federal campaign committee.

They might pursue policies in conflict with those of their Branch. State executive guardianship of the 'true' interests of the rank-and-file' was the core of the Victorian position. ALP conflict was seen as a zero-sum game between politicians (always ready to compromise to win office) and party officials (vigilant guardians of Labor's principles and the 'interests' of the 'rank-and-file'). Proposals were evaluated according to whether they favoured the FPLP or the Federal Executive. Other criteria were irrelevant. Thus FEC Federal Conference delegates had to be a plus to the politicians and a minus for the 'machine'. Indeed, FEC representation was against the interests of the 'rank-and-file' which only the state executives could defend! Needless to say, given the balance of forces within Victoria, Whitlam's call for an inquiry was rejected.

In Adelaide, following an airport parley with Dunstan, Whitlam dropped many references to party reform from his original script. With an electorally successful Branch, Whitlam could leave his sledgehammer at home. He did allude to reorganisation at the end of his speech. His views on Wyndham's proposals were 'well known' (Whitlam, 1967b:19). Party reform would not be easy. No 'brand new organisation' would emerge 'fully-fledged, fully-armed from Zeus' forehead'.

Whitlam was well received but Dunstan's calculations were correct. The SA convention did not even consider
reorganisation. SA had settled on opposition to reorganisation before the convention.

The final leg of Whitlam's holiday weekend trip around the ALP conference circuit, pushing his reorganisation barrow, brought him to Sydney. His relationship with the dominant NSW faction was ambiguous. It would support some form of reorganisation, partly because Victoria, Chamberlain and the left opposed it. Whitlam presented his 'party reform' party piece. He solemnly warned delegates the historical vista was littered with the remains of parties which had not adapted to change (Whitlam, 1967b:23). Labor was in danger of fossilisation. Party reform would require a move away from a winner-take-all approach to 'getting the numbers' internally.

Whitlam (1967b:24) told NSW delegates reform should not be a factional question at all. He tried to disentangle reorganisation from policy disputes. This pious hope was not fulfilled. The left continued to oppose any tampering with prevailing federal practices. Rhetorically, Whitlam invoked a cross-factional 'party reform' coalition. The committee of inquiry could facilitate such a coalition:

Details cannot be determined without information on branch membership, union affiliations and finances. Let us get the facts and then determine the details.

A classic Whitlam prescription! Party operations confounded such rationalistic expectations.

Whitlam was well received. NSW endorsed the committee of inquiry. It also wanted all federal and state leaders admitted to Federal Conference and Executive, with full voting rights. The call for SPLP leaders to be included in the Federal Executive was not derived from Wyndham. Nor had Whitlam
canvassed it. The NSW Branch pursued its own concerns under the 'party reform' rubric. Admission of the SPLP leaders would shift the balance on the small Federal Executive and blur distinctions between parliamentary Labor and the party organisation. Charlie Oliver spelled out the NSW 'machine' position in his presidential address ("We Are Not Acceptable" - Oliver's "Reform Labor" Crusade', Daily Telegraph, 14 June 1967). He reinforced Whitlam's message on the importance of securing Labor governments. Oliver was more concerned with increasing parliamentary representation on the federal bodies than anything like membership participation. It should not even be necessary to canvass:

... the value of having our Federal and State Parliamentary Leaders taking their place on the administrative Federal Executive and the policy-making Federal Conference with full voting rights.

The NSW left wanted some reorganisation at the state level. There was no power-sharing within the Branch. A minority report deplored the way the official report ignored dissenting viewpoints. The officers had not addressed the realities of 1967:

Everyone is aware that party morale is down and some branches fail to meet because less than 7 members can be persuaded to attend a branch meeting once a month (quoted, Fred Wells, 'Report Hits Executive's Right Wing', Sun-Herald, 11 June 1967).

The left emphasised the contradiction between Whitlam's 'modernisation' project and the NSW 'witch hunt' against party members involved in the Association for International Co-operation and Disarmament:

How this authoritarian edict, commanding written confession, could help the Whitlam-style Labor Party is not clear ('Opposition to AICD Ban', Socialist and Industrial Labor, April 1967).
Willingness to deploy 'modernisation' rhetoric did not mean the NSW left was aligning itself with Whitlam or his proposals. Socialist and Industrial Labor suggested there was no evidence that reorganisation would lead to better policy or win Labor more votes ('When Will It End?', July 1967).\(^{34}\) It feared dangerous 'right-wing' plots lurked behind reorganisation proposals:

Why ... disrupt and divide ourselves on an issue which is superficial and doubtful in its electoral appeal?

The NSW left went along with its interstate comrades, although FEC representation could secure it Federal Conference delegateships.

Whitlam had Tasmania and NSW onside. Victoria and SA opposed reorganisation. Attention switched to WA. Queensland would not have a (triennial) conference until 1968. Queensland federal delegates would be unencumbered by state conference guidelines. Whitlam went overseas after the hectic June weekend. He returned to take on Chamberlain on his home ground.\(^{35}\)

Whitlam told WA delegates Labor had to professionalise itself ('Whitlam Calls for New Federal ALP Rule', West Australian, 8 July 1967). Existing arrangements 'disenfranchised' Labor parliamentarians. He again called for a committee of inquiry and asked delegates to read the Wyndham Report:

Do not ask a man to do something when you have been defeated and then do nothing further about it. \(^{36}\)

An amendment from Joe Berinson endorsed Whitlam's inquiry. Two MHRs, Kim Beazley and Harry Webb, spoke in support ('Vital Whitlam Win at WA State Conference', Sydney Morning Herald, 10 July 1967).\(^{37}\) Chamberlain spoke for about an hour against. His influence in the Branch was beginning to wane.
He wanted to clarify his position. He had been 'portrayed as the big bad wolf' in the controversy ('ALP in WA Agree to Inquiry on Reform', *West Australian*, 10 July 1967). Chamberlain felt his personal mistreatment was symptomatic of general press hostility to the ALP. The party should be suspicious of reorganisation. The press supported it. Press classification of Labor 'goodies' and 'baddies' was mischievous. A committee of inquiry, with its inevitable attendant disputation, would only provide more opportunities for press misrepresentation:

> After three years of public wrangling it would be ludicrous to go back to another inquiry. It would damage the party more than anything he could imagine.

Whitlam's crusade had already done damage and compromised the Federal Conference. Chamberlain could only hope that the forthcoming Conference would 'find a formula to protect the party' and allow Whitlam to sell 'this great policy we have'. The press trumped up reorganisation to discredit the ALP. Chamberlain harped on about the cost of a Mass Conference and the way it would swallow the smaller states.

> Despite Chamberlain's best oratorical efforts, conference accepted the Berinson amendment. The unexpected WA decision was 'something of a coup' for Whitlam (Freudenberg, 1977:99). Internal WA developments, however, had been undermining Chamberlain. With the WA votes, Whitlam had support from 18 Conference delegates out of 36 for an inquiry. Queensland could again swing the day, as it had in the 'witless men' episode. The Special Conference would be held in conjunction with the regular biennial Federal Conference, due to open in the Hotel Australia in Adelaide on 31 July.
In May, the Federal Executive had rejected Wyndham's recommendation for further investigation of party structure, on which Whitlam was basing his call for an inquiry. It also rejected Wyndham's interim recommendation of increasing state delegations. Some Wyndham recommendations were acceptable to the Executive (eg his financial proposals). The Federal Executive had no problems with large segments of the Wyndham report. However, the headlines about Federal Executive rejection of 'party reform' were accurate. On crucial matters (further investigation and Federal Conference reform) the Executive was unambiguously negative.

The lengthy Federal Executive recommendation contained 22 of the 28 Special Conference agenda items. Other items included LWCOC support for LWCOC representation at Federal Conference and on the Federal Executive and an LWCOC role in the policy committees (ALP, 1967:12). This built on Wyndham's proposals and took them a bit further. There was a resolution from NSW calling for the committee of inquiry and for increased parliamentary representation in the federal bodies. This offered a potential rallying point for supporters of an inquiry, if amended perhaps. Some inquiry supporters might not want SPLP leaders on the Federal Executive. There were three Queensland motions, two of which seemed close in spirit to Wyndham's call for Federal Secretariat/FEC co-operation and co-ordination (which the Federal Executive partly accepted). These motions took an added interest when we remember the Queenslanders were being lobbied so assiduously on the inquiry. The remaining items (from SA) suggested that federal platform, policy or rules could not be validly altered without being approved and endorsed by four
Branches out of six (ALP, 1967:11). This would maintain a strong federalist component in the party structure and prevent controversial deadlocks being resolved by delegates breaking Branch ranks.

Such was the official agenda. The terms of debate were open to last-minute amendments from the floor. There was much Conference-eve speculation about a 'deal' whereby Whitlam would settle for less than he had been advocating and his opponents would accept some change to Federal Conference. Talk of 'deals' increased as the showdown approached. 'Whitlam Seems Assured of Conference Win' said the Sydney Morning Herald on 31 July. The following day it was less sure ('Whitlam in Battle to Alter Party', 1 August 1967). A suggested compromise involved the left accepting the four FPLP leaders and the six SPLP leaders as full Conference delegates, if the inquiry was dropped. A further compromise was for the four FPLP leaders to be added to the Executive as well. Whitlam's speech was deferred, feeding the rumour mills. Around the conference lobbies, it was interpreted as:

... a clear-cut indication of the strong doubts existing among many pro-reorganisation plan delegates about their prospects ... The anti-reconstruction delegates are prepared to agree to a limited reconstruction ... but it goes nowhere near what the Whitlam supporters want (S.W. Stephen, 'Whitlam's Reform Plan in Jeopardy', Advertiser, 1 August 1967).

There were cracks in the pro-reorganisation facade (Alan Ramsey, 'Whitlam Faces Power Challenge', Australian, 1 August 1967). Barnard, Oliver and Dunstan were pressuring Whitlam to accept compromise.
As the Special Conference opened, commentators were still speculating about the back-room negotiating, horse-trading and manoeuvring. Tension was increased by a two-hour delay in getting proceedings under way. Conference was not declared open until after 11 am. What followed was stranger still. Delegates took only 3 minutes 25 seconds to resolve the issues at hand. They endorsed an amended version of the Executive recommendations and discharged all other agenda items by 35 votes to nil. The amendment (moved Chamberlain, seconded Barnard) showed the Executive had softened its opposition to 'party reform'. Whitlam did not get his inquiry, but the four FPLP leaders would be added to Federal Conference and the Federal Executive (ALP, 1969:111). The six SPLP leaders would be added to Federal Conference. Opponents of reorganisation found it was easier to accept the four FPLP leaders than just Whitlam and Barnard.

The accomplishment of all this in so little time was anti-climactic. Some had expected a high noon:

The tension was broken by a burst of laughter from people in the visitors gallery in which a number of delegates joined. Mr Cameron MHR (SA) called out as he walked from the conference room to take a telephone call: 'The old machine works well, doesn't it?' ('ALP Adopts Compromise Proposals', Advertiser, 2 August 1967).

To which Chamberlain is said to have replied: 'When it is properly oiled' (S.W. Stephens, 'Negative Meeting for Mr Whitlam', Advertiser, 12 August 1967). The old machine had prevented any attempt to have it sent off for a thorough check-up, to see whether it needed a new engine.
The enigmatic nature of the brief Special Conference led to much curiosity about the implications of what had happened and many attempts at reconstructing the negotiations of the night before. Allan Barnes was blunt:

It took Joe Chamberlain and the old guard of the ALP machine just 3 minutes 25 seconds to cut Gough Whitlam down to size ... ('Cut Down to Size', Age, 2 August 1967). 43

The press focus was on whether Whitlam or the 'machine' had 'won'. There was disagreement. Maybe the inquiry was only an ambit claim. Labor Party reformers always had to go for a target much higher than they hoped to achieve (Ian Fitchett, 'Whitlam Wins Vital Change in ALP Control', Sydney Morning Herald, 2 August 1967). The parliamentary leaders might form a cohesive bloc of 10 at future Conferences. Whitlam had defied the odds:

If the opposition leader ... ever imagined that he would force the intractably conservative Federal Labor Conference to digest in one sitting the most comprehensive and, to some of its members, most distasteful menu of changes in policy and organisation ever presented to it, he would have been a visionary without peer (Harold Cox, 'It Really Was a Win for Whitlam', Sunday Mail, 6 August 1967).

Brian Johns, in a thorough review, saw the Adelaide compromise as a warning to Whitlam ('Whitlam's Two Problems - To Keep the People and the Party with Him', Clarion, 9 August 1967). There would be no more electoral mileage 'in running public battles with witless, faceless or any other kind of ALP men'. The beauty of the Adelaide compromise for the 'old machine' was that it made it difficult for Whitlam to play such games. He could have continued his vendetta with the inquiry:

Even if the left controlled the committee, they reckoned that Mr Whitlam would be able to go ahead with his old manoeuvre of 'trial by the Press' ...
Whitlam himself put a brave face on the compromise. He acclaimed it as a historical reform with full rhetorical flourish (ALP, 1969:51-3). He might press for further reform on other occasions. The agreed measure was the work of the whole Conference. He dismissed speculation about 'left' and 'right' positions. The Adelaide compromise implemented Wyndham's plan. This was a disingenuous interpretation. The Adelaide compromise fell considerably short of what Wyndham advocated.

On television, Whitlam passed responsibility for further reform over to local branches and affiliated unions ('Labor and that Troop Problem', Australian, 7 August 1967). They had to demonstrate that a Mass Conference was practicable. He would help in any such efforts. However, as Whitlam was well aware, without the inquiry as a focus, FECs and federal unions would be isolated. At the time, there was speculation that Whitlam would use his new Federal Executive membership to resurrect the inquiry proposal in that arena.44 'One great step forward' rapidly became the official ALP interpretation. Victorian SPLP leader Clyde Holding, who had not championed Conference reform in the first place, now insisted that further broadening of Conference was just not practical ('Broader Labor Conference "Not Practical"', Age, 3 August 1967).

Shortly after the Conference, Wyndham argued that, in effect, it had passed 69 of his 87 recommendations (ALP Federal Secretariat Release, 'Liberals on the Defensive'; quoted Overacker, 1968:130, note 84). At first sight this almost 80 percent success rate constitutes an impressive degree of reorganisation. As we unravel the story, a rather different
picture emerges. The Wyndham Report contained 28 substantial recommendations. Many of these included various sub-recommendations. Wyndham got his 80 percent success rate by counting each sub-recommendation (see Table 1). On my calculations, only 15 of the 28 full recommendations were generally accepted. Making allowance for half-accepted recommendations this would give a success rate more like 60 percent than 80 percent.

Even the 60 percent figure is misleading. Each recommendation was not exactly equal in importance. A superannuation scheme for party employees (accepted in principle) was less significant than a Conference reform inquiry. If the original recommendations were weighted for 'degree of importance' the 'success rate' figure would drop well below 60 percent. Furthermore Conference acceptance did not equal implementation. Resolutions changing rules were one thing, resolutions expressing aspirations were another.
Whitlam eulogised the Adelaide compromise, but he had remained aloof from it, until it was accomplished. He took little part in the negotiations. Queensland delegates were effectively lobbied to oppose the Whitlam-Wyndham proposal (Freudenberg, 1977:99-100). Barnard and Wyndham more or less did Whitlam's negotiating for him (Brian Johns, Australian, 9 August 1967). Whitlam worried supporters by frequently changing settlement terms 'and by reverting to his old tactic of asking for the lot' (see also Houseman, 1971:159).

Chamberlain and Barnard were the architects of the eventual compromise (Jonathan Gaul, 'Parliamentary Leaders Get Vote in ALP Machine', Canberra Times, 2 August 1967). The SA delegation also played a significant role ('ALP Adopts Compromise Proposals', Advertiser, 2 August 1967).

The 'old machine' was able to see off the inquiry threat, partly because at heart many of Whitlam's supporters were more at home with 'old machine' ways than any unknown 'party reform' alternative. Opening the Conference, party president Jim Keeffe suggested that before changes were made to the party structure 'resolutions must be carefully debated' (ALP, 1969:33). Careful debate was conspicuously absent from the Special Conference floor. A fait accompli was hurriedly ratified. Doubtless, the lobbying and negotiating had involved much private 'debate'. Such was the way the 'old machine' could work, when it was 'well oiled'.

9D Adelaide Compromise: Implications and Interpretations

Freudenberg (1977:91) stressed the irony of the Adelaide decision. The Whitlam-Wyndham party reform plan had
six objectives:

(1) Direct representation of the parliamentary leadership on the federal bodies;
(2) Better policy-making processes;
(3) A strengthened national organisation;
(4) Less power for paid officials;
(5) An alteration of Labor's 'union-dominated' 'image'; and
(6) Direct representation for the rank-and-file membership.

The first four were attained, wholly or in part:

The last has still not been achieved. Yet it was through the appeal of the idea of rank-and-file representation that Whitlam was able to achieve so much on the other four.

Some have seen this disjuncture as evidence that Whitlam's rhetoric was merely a smokescreen for his real aim, increasing FPLP domination of the party (see e.g. Theophanus, 1980:291-2). Theophanus (1980:290) argues Whitlam's aim was to reduce 'socialist' influence in the ALP to make the party more electorally attractive. This is misleading. Opposition to reorganisation was at least as much about protecting positions within the party structure as it was about defending ideologies. Confusion was built into Whitlam's project from the start. 'Managerial' and 'participatory' concerns went hand in hand. Party reform always combined rhetorical grandstanding with factional manoeuvring (see Houseman, 1971:156-7). The degree to which this was blatantly displayed in Adelaide was surprising (Houseman, 1971:157-8). The debate was accompanied 'by activities and motives unrelated to altruism or objectivity' in a particularly 'transparent fashion'.
Discussion behind closed doors could be 'transparent', as it was easy to reconstruct the rationale of those who negotiated the 'deal'. If Whitlam's earlier crusade had provided the 'rationalistic idealism', the Adelaide compromise was easily explicable in realpolitik terms. But 'rationalistic idealism' was more than a smokescreen for realpolitik manoeuvres.

Realpolitik power plays were common currency at ALP Federal Conferences. One reason the Mass Conference won such little support was because it would cut across familiar ways of doing things - the bluffing, lobbying and bargaining between state delegation leaders, well-known to each other, that produced decisions such as the Adelaide compromise, the incrementalist 'oiling' of the 'old machine' (see D. Stephens, 1979:497).

The Labor left saw the Adelaide compromise as a 'victory for common sense' and hoped it meant 'the end of the so-called party reform proposals' ('Structural Reform Determined', Socialist and Industrial Labor, August 1967). For the CPA, Tribune welcomed the Adelaide compromise:

The party's 'reorganisation plan' born in panic following 1963 election accusations against the 36 'faceless men' was superseded by a proposal inspired by Mr Joe Chamberlain ... In private tick-tacking in hotel rooms, all made clear to Federal Leader Whitlam that he had to support Mr Chamberlain's plan ('Who Won at Adelaide - The Victory Went to Labor as a Whole', 9 August 1967).

The ALP left dismissed reorganisation as a 'right-wing' plot to change the federal 'numbers'. It did not respond to Whitlam's arguments about a national structure and membership participation. Whitlam's arguments challenged the left on its weakest ground. Control of state 'machines' rested on branch and affiliate apathy. Oligarchic practices belied theories of
intra-party democracy, dear to Labor rhetoric (Freudenberg, 1977:89-90). From the beginning, membership sovereignty or 'proletarian democracy' had been diluted by Labor federalism (Houseman, 1971:22; K. Turner, 1967:22). The left responded to Whitlam's argument by shoring up its position, playing the 'numbers' game within an unreformed ALP. Chamberlain's Adelaide success may have been somewhat pyrrhic (Houseman, 1971:235). Using a 'top down' structure, the left failed to build 'a mass support base within the party'. This may 'have inadvertently aided the pragmatic wing of the party'. The left's semi-conspiratorial internal practice belied its hopes for a Labor 'mass movement' rather than just an 'electoral machine'.

Playing old ALP 'numbers games' hindered the Labor left's involvement in the political ferment brewing in Australia, with the development of the movement against the Vietnam War. Whitlam had not anticipated this ferment but it fed into Labor's acceptance of Australian Social Democracy, Mark I. Cairns was involved in the protests against the Vietnam War, but remained aloof from 'party reform'. Whitlam fought for 'party renewal', but kept his distance from protest politics. Australian Social Democracy, Mark I was a conventional Fabian exercise, but it coincided with cultural conflict and a process of contestation in many Australian institutions (see Little, 1986).

No leading Labor left figure publicly supported the Whitlam/Wyndham proposals. Some left-wing intellectual Labor supporters favoured party reconstruction. Before the 1966 election, the Sydney independent left 'little magazine' Outlook
saw the conflicts in the ALP as a consequence of tactical differences over Labor's response to the 'Comfortable Society' ('Labor In Search of a New Identity', April 1966). A new radicalism was emerging in that society, where traditional class lines were shifting. ALP 'modernisation' was important in that context:

To be 'modern', the ALP must become flexible, well-informed, non-bureaucratic capable of attracting young people and the new professionals.

This was a general endorsement of the Wyndham Plan, although Wyndham's worry was under-bureaucratisation not over-bureaucratisation. Outlook saw responsiveness to newly emergent issues as the relevant index of party modernisation. A 'modernised' ALP should be a lively, campaigning, year-round organisation. Outlook unequivocally dismissed left Labor opposition to 'modernisation':

The Old Left in the ALP has failed dismally to respond to this need. It has merely dug its toes in and shown itself resistant to all political change.

'Modernisation' did not have to mean unconditional acceptance of Whitlam's project, which embodied contradictions between 'managerialism' and 'participation', as well as between its elitist and egalitarian components. One did not have to take Whitlam's 'rationalistic idealism' and its piety towards professional 'knowledge' at face value to accept that there was something in his critique of Labor organisation. Outlook upbraided the left for not developing its own politics of modernisation, its own politics of party reform (see also Hudson, 1968:21-2). Left abstentionism from party reconstruction conceded the whole arena to right-wing 'modernisers' who were:
... prepared to jettison whatever features of Labor policy they feel may embarrass them in their search for a public 'image' acceptable to the Comfortable Society ... (Outlook, April 1966).

'Modernisation' did not have to mean 'adaptation' to an electoral marketplace beyond the reach of political persuasion. That was a possibility. It all depended on internal debate and how the ALP linked up with various conflicts in Australian society. Australian Social Democracy, Mark I involved 'adaptation' in some arenas and 're-ideologisation' in others. In 're-ideologisation', it benefited from 'the crisis of Cold War liberalism' in Australia (Simms, 1982:119-22). This was not clearly evident in 1967. The 1966 election seemed to endorse going 'All the Way with LBJ'. By 1969, the tide was turning. In 1965, Outlook had hoped a Labor campaign against the Vietnam War would revive an organisation 'stultified by too much backbiting and too little activity' ('Can Labor Lead?', August 1965). Backbiting and 'jockeying for power' were unlikely to be eradicated by any form of Labor 'modernisation'. Outlook fell victim to its own 'rationalistic idealism' in this regard. Outlook believed the Wyndham proposals did not go far enough, although they would 'let some air' into the party and would encourage better contact with white collar groups.

Two Outlook articles by Sydney University Department of Government research student Bob Connell (1968a, 1968b) presented a particularly strong statement of 'new left' support for the Whitlam/Wyndham proposals. Although partly resting on a sociological and technological determinism that was similar to, if more elaborate and theorised than that of Wyndham himself, the articles made a number of important points about 'party renewal' and its relationship to political ferment in
late 1960s Australia. Connell (1968a:12) saw improved communications, with the electorate and within the party, as the key to 'party reform'. A revitalised mass membership could complement Labor leaders on TV. State executives clogged internal Labor communications. Instructions (in the 'how-to-vote' mode) were relayed down the party hierarchy, but policy discussion was more rarefied (Connell, 1968a:11-2). Labor parliamentary leaders could communicate an 'alternative vision' and an 'alternative style' (Connell, 1968a:13). Labor 'modernisation' would have to by-pass the Branch managers. Their 'numbers' games hindered the party from reaching out to the electorate and developing a new radicalism. The emerging constituency for 'new left' politics would respond to a reformed ALP (Connell, 1968a:6). This constituency was a consequence of educational expansion and generational rebellion (see Alomes, 1983; Rowse, 1982).

Denis Altman (1968:13) criticised Connell for not embracing 'modernisation' and a new Labor radicalism wholeheartedly enough. Labor had to show it was 'dynamic' and 'relevant' in a new era of 'presidential' TV-based politics. Having the Parliamentary leader chosen by the whole party would recognise the leader's centrality, while gesturing towards Labor notions of collective membership sovereignty. The notion of 'party democracy' had to be re-interpreted as Labor took up 'quality of life' issues in 'an increasingly complex and socially heterogeneous society' (Altman, 1968:12). Altman called for 'freedom of expression and diversity within the party' rather than submission to federal authorities. (however they were constituted). He suggested a radicalism that was 'no
longer predicated on the material interests of lower income groups'. In Altman's 'adaptation' analysis a more pluralist ALP could appeal to different segments of the electorate in different ways:

The one unifying theme that the Labor Party should offer ... is that it is better able to cope with the problems of modern society than its opponents, and here the character of the leader is important.

Altman's emphasis on coping with modern problems and on the parliamentary leader brought him close to Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1. He thought the Labor modernisers were too timid and the reorganisers had not paid enough attention to 'participation'. Yet he reproduced their ambiguities. His project suggested a 'managerial' as well as a 'participatory' reading. The Participants also urged Labor to 'adapt' to a 'post-capitalist', 'managerial' society, presenting itself as the party with the best understanding and the best prospects of 'humanising' the 'New Corporate State' ('Our "Managerial" Society', Labor Comment, December 1968).

This would incorporate Labor into the 'technocratic' logic of the 'new corporate state'. Managerial ideologies were being popularised in Australia in the 1960s (Rowse, 1978:191, 218). Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1 had some elective affinities with such ideologies (see Rowse, 1978:210, 262-3). This became clear when the Cold War fog lifted. Labor Comment called for 'more democratic control and more consideration for people's ... needs' within the corporation 'without sacrificing too much in efficiency and existing advantages' (December 1968). This concern was part of Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1. But pace the 'Technocratic Laborist' theory (see e.g. Catley and McFarlane,
1974), this was not the totality of what Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1 was about.

The 'new left' ferment spilled over into the Communist Party of Australia (see Docker, 1984). It had its own 'modernisation' debates, couched in the language of Marxist 'revisionism'. The divided CPA found Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1 a confusing phenomenon. Richard Dixon (1967:35) attacked:

... the proposition that the industrial working class is disappearing, being absorbed by, or subordinated to, the middle-class ...

On the other hand, leading CPA moderniser, Rex Mortimer (1967:47) saw increased differentiation within the workforce, the development of 'high culture' in Australia and the increasing importance of the 'intellectual strata' providing opportunities for left renewal. He wanted his CPA comrades to de-emphasise economistic industrial struggle. Mortimer subscribed to the 'Arena thesis' developed by Melbourne marxist Geoff Sharp (1964a; 1964b. See also Sharp and White, 1968). This welcomed the growth of 'intellectual culture' in Australia as the 'embryonic embodiment' of 'implicitly socialist' ethics and social relations (Osmond, 1970:196). At times Mortimer seemed to see the 'intellectually trained' as a new universal class that would overthrow capitalism.

There are interesting parallels in ALP and CPA 'modernisation' debates. Both explored the relationship with an emergent intellectual stratum (see Irving, 1982). However, while the CPA 'traditionalists' still thought in terms of a 'united front' with the ALP where possible, the 'revisionists'
called for:

... a more searching and trenchant critique of Whitlam's 'modernisation' policies as expressions of corporate-bureaucratic ideology within the ALP (Mortimer, 1969:393).

This was peculiar. It glossed over the extent to which 'modernised' Australian Communism overlapped with Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1. Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1 was a contradictory phenomenon. In part, it did express 'corporate-bureaucratic ideology'. This was its 'managerial' face. But it also had a 'participatory' face, which expressed a new Labor radicalism. Mortimer over-simplified the picture.

No wonder intra-ALP alignments puzzled him:

Why do so many ALP members from the ranks of the intelligentsia gravitate to the right wing as the representatives of 'modern' and 'progressive' trends, dismissing the left as 'traditionalist' and out-of-date?

Why indeed? But more to the point, why did Mortimer expect the intelligentsia to be a political 'bloc' with widely shared views?

The Adelaide compromise marked the end of the debate on 'party reform' that had begun with the turmoil about the 'faceless men' in 1963. Whitlam and his supporters found changing ALP policy easier than changing ALP organisation. The social democratic 'rational radicals' had made policy gains over Laborist 'instinctive conservatives' at the 1965 Federal Conference (James Jupp, 'Radicals Find Room at the Top', Canberra Times, 9 August 1965). These policy gains continued at 1967, 1969 and 1971. In 1972, Whitlam won office with a 'programme' that was furnished by Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1. Whitlam's critics within the party saw the programme as a shift to the 'right', and an 'adaptation' to...
changes in Australian capitalism. However, these critics often lapsed back into Laborist assumptions that were far from 'left'.

In organisational matters, the 'instinctive conservatives' were more stubborn. At Adelaide, they accepted some of Whitlam's 'managerial' arguments, but the party structure was not changed much. Leading politicians were added to the federal bodies. This did not make the ALP more pluralist or participatory. Intervention in Victoria and NSW in 1970-71, a realpolitik exercise which consolidated Whitlam's domination of the party and was deemed to boost his electoral prospects, did have the effect of increasing intra-party pluralism in these states.60

By 1972, the party had been won round to Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1 policies, although its organisational structure retained many recognisably Laborist features. Electoral success and reform euphoria further wedded the 'rank-and-file' to Whitlam's project, although the way things had worked out, there had been few participatory gains from all the earlier party reform talk. When the 1973-74 recession, the 1975 Dismissal and, finally, the 1977 election defeat made Whitlam Labor reform euphoria a dim memory, the talk turned to party reform again ...
PART II (1977-81)
10A Looking Back

After the party lost in 1977 a certain critique started to be argued by some Labor supporters. They said the party had much to learn from the West German Social Democrats: mainly in acquiring a reputation for good economic management. The party should pay attention to the outlying States of Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia where its representation had near vanished. The party should draw a clear line between itself and the totalitarian left: anything less would be unacceptable in a middle-class western nation such as Australia. The party needed to make itself popular in rural Australia and, if it wanted to become the majority party, it had to start looking like it - not like a band of disaffected cranks alienated from their society.

Some wiseacres giggled uncomfortably in their seats over this kind of talk. The emphasis should be democratic socialist, not social democratic, they said, otherwise the party would become a pale copy of the Liberals. Some argued Labor could win power with another strategy: putting together a coalition of single-issue enthusiasts, despite the lesson of George McGovern's defeat in 1972. Senator Arthur Gietzelt invoked the thought of Spanish communist Carillo.

But instinctively, without acknowledging it, the ALP moved in the direction laid out in the social democratic critique. It gave priority to economic management, developed a marginal seat strategy, cultivated rural voters and steadfastly rejected Left policy prescriptions at the 1979 and 1982 national conferences. The Socialist Left was locked away like a mad Victorian relative hidden in the east wing. Senator Gareth Evans redesigned a democratic socialist objective for the party platform but the ALP won power with less commitment to public ownership than any other party in the Socialist International (Bob Carr, 'Words of Some Wisdom on the Hawke Win', The Bulletin, 12 April 1983).

... It rather reminds me of the hypochondriac who died and had written on his tombstone, see, I was sick, and the Labor Party in a sense, when a national committee of inquiry considered the matter [in 1978], seemed to us to be in that state
... (Senator John Button, introducing the National Committee of Inquiry proposals at the Special ALP Conference in Melbourne, July 1981, ALP Transcript, 1981:135).

Hindsight can be deceptive. It seemed easy for someone contributing 'Words of Some Wisdom' in April 1983, the month after the Hawke-led Labor Party of national reconciliation had won a famous victory, to discern a clear and unilinear pattern of ALP 'adaptation' dating back to 1977. The relationship between defeat in 1977 and victory in 1983 was, however, considerably more complex and contradictory. As in the 1960s case, ALP reorganisation in the period 1977-1981 makes more sense within the 'complex arena' model rather than 'adaptation' or leadership 'strategy'. Labor's realpolitik electoral reorientation was only tangentially related to the great debates arising from inquests on the 1977 defeat.

Bob Carr himself had been a significant participant in those debates. The 'social democratic critique' he refers to was his own. It emphasised 'economic rationalism' (or 'sound economic management'), attention to provincial electorates, strong affirmation of the Australian/US alliance and avoidance of radical stances that might alienate middle Australia. It was by no means the only 'social democratic critique' on offer at the time. More popular within the party was Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2, which articulated a post-1975 Labor radicalism. In its hypochondriac mood, the ALP was prepared to listen to all sorts of diagnoses. The post-mortems were as much about party renewal as about what the electoral traffic would bear. Labor sought to link up with 'new social movements' as well as reassure dominant elites. Under the rubric of Australian Social Democracy, social
transformation projects were considered. Instead of 'instinctive' adaptation to 'middle-class' voters there were ongoing intra-party conflicts, factional divisions and shifting coalitions.

Labor's 1972-75 experience had raised many questions about 'the nature and prospects of reformist parties in advanced capitalist states' (Duncan, 1983:9). There were 'serious attempts' to define the party's identity and its prospects. These examined the perils and peculiarities of the Australian Constitution in the wake of the 'High Noon at Yarralumla' (Turner, 1976). They also re-examined the welfarist assumptions underlying Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1 in the wake of international recession and 'the fiscal crisis of the state' (O'Connor, 1973). Given the dissolution of the Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1 paradigm, various 'lessons of 1975' were drawn. There was considerable intellectual interest in an adventurous Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2. The parliamentary leadership were happier reaching back to a cautious Labor Managerialist strategy (rationalised in Carr's 'social democratic critique').

Ian Turner (1976:18) had hoped for a broad debate. He saw Hugh Stretton's *Capitalism, Socialism and the Environment* (1976a) as a hopeful portent. Stretton examined the topical issues of inflation, the environment and resource depletion (all of which had contributed to the collapse of Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1) within a carefully restated social democratic egalitarianism. Stretton defended the 'public sector' from 'free market' attacks, increasing with recession and stagflation. The impact of Stretton's tract on
the ALP was rather indirect. It influenced some Labor intellectuals.

Inflation and unemployment had persisted under the Fraser regime. Labor waited for the 'pendulum' to swing. The 1977 failure was thus particularly demoralising. People wondered what Labor could do to win office again (Weller, 1979:85; see also Butler, 1979:9-10). There was much debate on regaining electoral support, new policies, party structure and ideology. The official National Committee of Inquiry was established by the National Executive in January 1978 as a direct response to the December 1977 defeat. Outside the party, the Australian offered its pages to various individuals including NSW ALP right-wingers Bob Carr and Joe Thompson. Both drew 'moderate' lessons for the federal party from Labor's NSW success under Neville Wran. The lively Nation Review had its own symposium. Nation Review was interested in the 'counter-culture' and 'new social movements'. Contributors debated whether Labor's defeat signified entrenched Australian cultural conservatism. Strategies were considered for challenging the cultural-political status quo.

Carr and Thompson had called for Labor 'adaptation' to voter conservatism. Senator Susan Ryan thought the election exploded certain Australian egalitarian myths. She called on left-wing and new social movement activists to come under the ALP umbrella ("What Chance for the Left", Nation Review, 22 December 1977). In turn Labor should cease dismissing feminists and environmentalists as 'trendies'.

Bob Carr had gestured to some Nation Review concerns, only to dismiss them. It would be 'churlish to deride Jim
Cairns as an infatuated loony' ('What Chance for the Left', 19 January 1978).

The most interesting branch Carr had attended was in Lismore. Traditional country unionists and alternative lifestyles worked together. But the 'greening' of Australia was a long way off. It would only grow out of Labor rule, 'the politics of the possible' (i.e. 'dull social democracy'). Carr held up the West German Social Democratic model - 'moderate', managerial, efficient and electorally successful.

The debates culminated in the Special National Conference (July 1981). It considered both the NCI proposals and the 'socialisation objective'. The debates were fairly intense for a party where manoeuvring for the 'numbers' did not always require much philosophising. There was even a revival of pamphleteering. In NSW, Bob Carr (nd) committed his 'social democratic critique' to print, while Bob Connell (1978) married traditional socialist concerns to arguments for an ALP alignment with 'new social movements', especially feminism.

1977-81 saw many initiatives. A theoretical journal, Labor Forum, was launched in 1978 in Adelaide (with a national focus). The Victorian Branch launched the first of an annual series of Labor Essays in 1980. The first annual National Conference of Labor Economists was held in Brisbane in 1977. The second NCLE focussed on one of the key areas of strategic debate: 'Sound Economic Managers or Agents of Social Change?'. While Labor economists examined the recession, Labor lawyers drew up plans for constitutional reform. The first National Conference of Labor Lawyers was held in Adelaide in 1979. The NCLE and the NCLL vindicated Whitlam's 1960s concern with 'professional' support for the ALP, although they went beyond
his deference to ideologies of professional elitism. This was particularly true of the NCLE. In January 1981, the first in a series of National Labor Women's Conferences was held in Sydney. This fed into the party debate more directly than the professional conferences. In the late 1970s the party began, ponderously, to respond to the women's movement.

Concern with party renewal took Labor beyond 'sound economic management' and 'adaptation' to a conservative electorate. Mick Young commented:

> Idealism brings people into the Labor movement and belief in the need for a successful social democratic party in Australian politics should not be distorted by election results. If it is true that Australians are apathetic about politics it is Labor's task ... to change the attitudes ('Labor Has to Face the Facts', *Australian*, 24 December 1977). 13

Hayden's speeches and National Conference policy decisions emphasised 'sound economic management', but in matters such as uranium mining and women's rights a new Labor radicalism was emerging. Party president Neil Batt told the 1979 National Conference that 'the Hayden experts' had to replace 'the Fraser amateurs' as 'the natural party of government' but also emphasised the importance of party renewal and the NCi's call for National Conference to be broadened beyond the party elite, so that 'ethnics', women and country people could be better represented (ALP Transcript, 1979:9-10).

Instant histories recounted the 1975 trauma. More analytical contributions canvassed major strategic issues. Michael Sexton (1979) documented the intractability of the forces opposed to Labor and reform. Andrew Theophanus (1980) outlined a 'participatory' socialist project to resolve what he discerned as an Australian 'legitimation crisis'. 14 Altman
(1977) attempted to account for the 'hegemony' of the
Australian ruling class and suggested 'counter-hegemonic'
projects.15

10B Responses to 1977 Defeat

Bill Hayden was elected FPLP leader on 22 December
1977. Labor was distancing itself from 'Whitlamism'. Whitlam
(1978) warned that it should not throw the baby out with the
bathwater.16 He revived some of the 1960s reorganisation
agenda, including FEC delegates at National Conference.17
Hayden had his own ideas. He balanced Carr-style
'adaptation',18 with party renewal concerns. He wanted a
larger ALP membership (Michelle Grattan, 'Restoring Faith in
Labor', Age, 10 January 1978).19 Responding to the 'community'
could conflict with responsiveness to the party membership.
Hayden (1980:241) believed party reform could exemplify 'the
sort of evolutionary changes' Labor was advocating in economic
management and public administration.

There were expectations of increased consultation
and delegation under Hayden.20 Whitlam would always be a Labor
folk hero, but his style had grated on many colleagues.
Hayden's low-key approach might be more productive.21 It
helped rally a dispirited party (Kelly, 1984:70; Murphy,
1980:170ff). In December 1977, as Hayden himself recalled:

Morale was on the floor, people were milling about
in a confused, numbed state. That three years
had to be a period of regrouping, consolidating
and trying to lift the confidence of the troops
(Paul Kelly, 'How Hayden Plans to Overtake Fraser
and Hawke - in the Left Lane', Sydney Morning

252
One reason for poor morale was the feeling that Labor had lost its way and was out of touch with the electorate.

Nation Review editor Peter Manning mourned a lost Laborism:

Before the Whitlam bandwagon leaders like Eddie Ward and Ben Chifley, Calwell and Curtin knew their following. Class identifications were strong and the ties were tribal, not primarily rational. Class then relied on need (largely defence against the bosses and the elite) and on tradition and habit. Whitlam, over a decade of intellectuality, 'updated' the party, watered down the anti-capitalist heritage ('Labor's New Directions', 15 December 1977). 22

Labor veteran Fred Daly thought people in December 1977 'seemed to be different'. Manning's 'golden age' imagery is misleadingly romantic. His sentimentality documents a confusion in Labor circles about who supported the party and why. The widespread publicity given to David Kemp's research showing the declining usefulness of class as a predictor of vote helped reinforce this feeling, which sought refuge from confusion and despair in nostalgia. 23

Kemp's (1978) book, Society and Electoral Behaviour in Australia, came out with the Labor reappraisal in full flow. 24 Kemp discerned 'egalitarian' and 'individualist' crystallisations of values which correlated with voting choices. He located this value-conflict within a matrix of core consensus values, more likely to favour Liberal-Country rule. Kemp saw this as a consequence of the continued 'middle-classing' of the electorate. Other writers drew comforting signs for Labor in the way 'new social movement' concerns fragmented 'middle-class' political allegiances (McGregor, 1983:96-105).

Before the NCI was set up, there were various calls
for an official post-mortem. Bill Hayden moved the motion commissioning the NCI, although Combe (1978:14) notes that it was Mick Young's idea. The committee was asked:

... to inquire into and report upon - (a) the changing social economic and demographic structure, particularly in respect of the aspirations for a better society; (b) the most effective functioning of the party in terms of maximising the involvement and satisfaction of Party members and of communicating the policies and ideals of the Party to the Australian community (ALP, 1979:1).

The National Executive also asked state Branches to conduct recruitment drives and increase opportunities for membership involvement, especially in 'community activities' (Michelle Grattan, 'Change ALP Role: Hayden', Age, 21 January 1978), a form of membership 'participation' party managers did not find threatening. National secretary David Combe said Labor had to reach out to the 'community' and improve the quality of branch membership (to redress 'rank-and-file' alienation). ALP membership was 'not always a terribly satisfying experience' (quoted, 'ALP Moves to Broaden Base', Canberra Times, 21 January 1978). The possible tension between a party-managerial focus on membership 'quality' and more assertive 'participatory' concerns in the branches was ignored.

Placating members, supporters and voters is par for the course in such post-mortems, a ritual reaffirmation after an embarrassing experience. Those familiar with ALP history can be excused a feeling of *deja vu*. Victorian socialist left figure Tom Ryan dismissed Nation Review contributions (presumably including his own) as 'a mirror image' of 'other analyses of former electoral disasters' ('What Chance for the Left', 19 January 1978). Doomsayers' diagnoses that Labor was a terminal case were not new. Such pronouncements were
common in the 1920s and 30s, only to be refuted in the 40s (Rawson, 1966a:18). The NCI was 'the usual motherhood gesture of defeated parties', which 'frequently fall back on faith in better communications and new committees' (Michelle Grattan, 'Labor Gets Down to the Business of Adjusting to the Times', Age, 21 January 1978). 29

The cynics and sceptics had plenty to be cynical and sceptical about. Many Whitlam-Wyndham ideas, forgotten since 1967, were resurrected and recirculated by the NCI, which merely:

... introduced some new sub-plots for further development, into what is surely one of the longest-playing dramas of Australian politics: the struggle within the ALP for reform of itself ("Reform of the ALP", Canberra Times, 12 April 1979).

However, post-mortem rituals have a wide range of purposes and meanings.

The Labor debate of the late 70s also saw a re-run of Wyndham's rhetoric about Labor 'adaptation' to 'affluence' and 'the end of class', despite the changed economic outlook. Wyndham had dismissed Labor references to the 'working class' and the 'underprivileged' as 'meaningless and sometimes offensive jargon' in a society where the bosses did not own all the cars, boats and holiday homes. 30 In 1978, Bob Carr used almost identical imagery:

One union secretary points out that every second car in factory parking lots has a tow bar for a boat or a caravan, that the union office is inundated with inquiries about the best deal for holidays in Fiji, New Zealand, Singapore ('What Chance for the Left', Nation Review, 12 January 1978). 31

These 'end of class' stories looked at surface changes in leisure and lifestyle patterns, while ignoring the workplace.
In line with the Kemp thesis, they emphasise the instrumentalism and individualism of Australian workers.

The Kemp thesis set much of the NCI's intellectual context. The committee was asked to look at the impact of 'social change' on 'aspirations' for a better Australia. This gave it scope to look at 'changing community values', which allegedly made life difficult for the ALP. Kemp's 'end of class' story gained enough credence (partly through media acclaim) 'to influence thinking in the labour movement itself' (Connell and Goot, 1979:3). Two NCI academics, Encel and Logan (1980:3) argued that while commitment to 'the working classes' and 'the poorer and weaker groups in society' was Labor's raison d'etre, the party could appeal to all sections of society. Egalitarianism was 'not the only important social value in Australia'. It was matched by 'an equally strong belief in individualism'.

The impact of the Kemp thesis was largely a matter of temporal coincidence, itself amplified by media dramatisation. Some commentators thought grappling with the Kemp thesis was the best thing the NCI could do. Labor would have to avoid its tendency to let:

... its own preoccupations influence its reading of research material. The committee's work will be, as much as anything else, a test of Mr Hayden's intellectual rigour (Michelle Grattan, 'Labor Gets Down to the Business of Adjusting to the Times', Age, 21 January 1978).

However, post-mortem debates cannot be quarantined from ongoing intra-party conflicts. Competing groups 'explain' defeats in different ways. The NCI was always going to be more than a stage for selected Labor intellectuals to grapple with the Kemp thesis, while Hayden demonstrated his intellectual rigour.
Left-wingers feared the emphasis on accommodating to changing electoral 'aspirations' implied an abandonment of the party's own socialist aspirations. Victorian MHR Peter Milton thought the NCI's terms of reference put the cart before the horse:

Surely we should start with an ALP definition of what society should be like and then devise a means of creating that society ('The Future Direction of the Labor Party', Labor Star, 19 May 1978). 33

In its submission to the NCI, Bundeena branch (NSW) shared this emphasis on a socialist horse in front of the reappraisal cart:

... a restatement of the fundamental raison d'etre of the Australian Labor Party should precede any attempt to understand the changing nature of Australian society (Submission 225).

The left cast itself in an embattled position, defending its concept of 'Labor tradition'. The popularity of the Kemp thesis and 'adaptation' talk increased its fears for the party's soul.

South Australian MHA Peter Duncan (1978:26) argued that 'far too often' calls for 'a reassessment of the Party's role and that sort of thing' had been aimed at changing the ALP 'from being a democratic socialist party into something else'. 35

The leading FPLP left figure Tom Uren agreed a post-mortem was necessary, but feared Labor self-examination was being distorted by panic calls for a shift to the right:

... dictated more by conservative political motives than by a sound analysis of the past successes and failures of the Labor Party, of the limitations of the present party structure and of the changing political and economic context in which the party is operating (Submission 171). 37

The NSW Labor Women's Committee could not accept the terms of
Implicit in the enquiry's aims is an assumption that the Australian electorate has changed and that such change is towards conservative politics, and ... that the Party must placate such conservatism ...

While worrying many on the left, the NCI's brief provided opportunities for Labor radicals. The emphasis on changing aspirations for a better Australia allowed for a dialogue with the 'new social movements'. These emerged in Australia (see Horne, 1980; Altman, 1980), as in other advanced capitalist countries, out of the radicalisation of the '1968' generation around the Vietnam war and student rights. This radicalisation had belied earlier pronouncements about the 'end of ideology' in 'affluent' societies.

Labor left-winger Jim Cairns had led the movement for a moratorium on Australian involvement in Vietnam. Underlying 'new social movement' diversity was a common thread of anti-authoritarian, participatory themes and an expressive emphasis on personal experience and direct action (see Habermas, 1981; Laclau and Mouffe, 1981; Offe, 1982). The women's movement, itself very diverse, became the most enduring and well-entrenched 'new social movement'. In Australia, the concerns of both the ecologists and the revived peace movement fused in the Movement Against Uranium Mining. The 1977 ALP National Conference cautiously endorsed an anti-uranium line (see Weller, 1979:77). Other issues were raised by gay liberationists and by new forms of aboriginal and ethnic politics. We should also note agitation around issues like housing and transport by 'urban social movement' (Castells, 1977; see also Stretton, 1976:73).
Labor and social democratic parties had complicated relationships with 'new social movements'. They shared some common enemies. The parties' pursuit of an electoral majority and their attachments to dominant social forces distanced them from the movements. Proponents of liaison with the movements cited the dramatic rebirth of the French Socialist Party in the 1970s. Conservative Labor strategists preferred to note George McGovern's huge 1972 US presidential defeat. They dismissed 'single-issue enthusiasts' and 'disaffected cranks'.

The NCI offered an arena for Labor to respond to the new politics. The left was suspicious, although alignment with the movements offered possibilities for a new Labor radicalism. The left could have used the NCI to draw lessons from various developments in social democratic politics overseas. The long Swedish Social Democratic reign had come to an end in 1976, but there were exciting possibilities attached to its Meidner Plan which innovatively sought to use collective 'wage-earner' funds to fuel simultaneous growth, redistribution and social control of the economy (see Korpi, 1978; J. Stephens, 1979). In Britain, the 'alternative economic strategy' (selective nationalisation plus import controls) plus constitutional and democratic reform (open government, abolition of the House of Lords) package articulated by Stuart Holland and Tony Benn won considerable support among Labour activists, although it hardly influenced Labour in government. The 'Euro-Communist' phenomenon in the 1970s also offered new possibilities for left re-alignment. Old social democratic formulae were being questioned and new paradigms were being explored. No wonder social democratic leaderships, torn between demonstrating...
economic respectability and responding to new membership demands, found a 'crisis of manageability' (Hine, 1986) on their hands (see also Therborn, 1984). They faced difficult choices (Paterson and Thomas, 1986:14). They could pretend nothing was happening, present themselves as austere crisis-managers or move leftwards. The first was problematic, the second would involve conflict with party members and the third was electorally doubtful:

The choice between these strategies was often a very painful one which encouraged factionalism and dissent within the parties and made them much harder to manage than in the past ...

These were the ALP's dilemmas; cling to the 'Whitlamist' wreckage, swallow the bitter medicine of Labor Managerialism or explore the possibilities of Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2.

The Labor left could draw some comfort from evidence of renewed radicalism in some social democratic parties long thought to have made their peace with capitalism. The 'Swedish line' (see McFarlane, 1981), 'Bennism' and 'Euro-Communist' alignments (see Arthur Gietzelt, 'What Chance for the Left', Nation Review, 2 March 1978) all had their ALP admirers. The NCI provided scope for Labor to explore a new radicalism and a socialism suitable for Australian conditions. It also promised possibilities of medium- and long-term strategic thinking and serious analytical discussion at local branch and FEC level. Left rhetoric often denounces short-term electoral opportunism. 'Rank-and-file' and 'grass-roots' were amongst its favourite buzz-words. Yet there was considerable suspicion of the NCI on the left, particularly in Victoria, where it was strongly represented.
Hayden said he wanted to tap the 'collective wisdom spread throughout the party' (Malcolm Colless, 'I am "Tough Enough" for Victory - Hayden', Australian, 15 March 1979). The NCI gestured to this notion. The party's 'collective wisdom' could assert itself in submissions. Labor intellectuals could also contribute. Hayden was conscious that the ALP had never been 'rich in political theory' (quoted, Patience, 1981:286). The NCI's genesis reflected some general changes in Australian political practice. The speechwriter/adviser/consultant type had become:

... an integral part of ... the modern process of policy-making, presentation of leaders, and exposition of ideas ... (Tiver, 1983:20).

In the 1970s, the parties:

... began to take more notice of the ideas raised by community groups and also to hire academics to serve on advisory committees and to advise ministers (see also Walter, 1986).

The initial announcement promised the NCI would include a sociologist, an economist and a demographer (Michelle Grattan, 'Labor to Examine Electorate', Age, 20 January 1978). The sociologist appointed was Sol Encel (Professor of Sociology, University of NSW); the economist Geoff Harcourt (Professor of Economics, University of Adelaide) and the demographer Mal Logan (Professor of Geography, Monash University). The three professors were joined by eight party and union figures including Neal Blewett MHR (formerly Professor of Political Theory and Institutions, Flinders University). The others were joint chairpersons Hayden and Hawke and their proxies John Button (deputy leader in the Senate) and John Ducker (president NSW ALP and NSW Labour...
Council); front bencher Mick Young and two less prominent figures, Ken Turbet (general secretary, Australian Telecommunications Employees' Association and president, Council of Australian Government Employees' Organisations) and David Hamill (Queensland Young Labor).

Encel (1979:1) found the process whereby the National Executive chose the committee members, including himself, quite baffling, although some state balance had been sought. CAGEO president Turbet represented the growing public sector unionist constituency. Hamill was a voice from Queensland, that was not tied to the dominant 'old guard' line. This was under challenge from a reform group within the Branch, occasionally supported and encouraged by Hayden (himself a Queenslander). Apart from the symbolic appointments Hayden and Hawke, who took little part in the NCI (see Encel, 1979:1), the committee initially included three professors, one professor-turned-MHR, two senior federal parliamentarians, a trade union/party heavy from NSW and a Queensland Young Labor activist.

The all-male nature of the initial NCI line-up aroused considerable controversy. It stood rather uneasily alongside the committee's brief to examine changing aspirations in the electorate, demonstrating 'an extraordinary lack of sensitivity' (Duncan, 1978:26). Even the Queensland Branch, not noted for sympathy to feminism, complained. Of course, the Queensland 'old guard' had its own fears about the NCI becoming a focal point for supporters of federal intervention. The 'middle-class' and academic composition of the committee also attracted criticism. A Sydney Morning Herald letter-writer lamented:
No wharfies, garbos or tram conductors ... The ALP is no longer a labouring man's party (6 March 1978).

Two women were co-opted by the first NCI meeting: Ann Forward (federal vice-president, Administrative and Clerical Officers Association) and Fran Bladel (an activist from Tasmania, which had no initial representation). Two men were added also: John Garland (joint secretary, Amalgamated Metal Workers and Shipwrights Union) and Ken Bennett (ALP assistant national secretary). Garland brought a blue collar unionist perspective. He was from the left, which was not represented as such in the original selection. His union was a major force in the Australian left. Bennett linked the NCI to the National Secretariat.

The NCI's federal parliamentarians were all part of Hayden's loose centrist coalition in the FPLP: Hayden himself, Button (from the Victorian Independents) and Blewett and Young (both from the SA Branch, itself run by a centrist 'consensus' coalition). Dunstan's SA Labor Government found many admirers for its mixture of reformist activism and cautious electoral calculation, in the wake of Whitlamism's demise (see Parkin and Patience, 1981). SA was also characterised by an unusual degree of integration between the parliamentarians and the party organisation.

Of the academics, both Blewett (who became the committee's secretary) and Encel had written on the ALP. Their writings anticipated many NCI themes. Encel keenly observed trends towards 'professionalisation' and 'academicisation' in Australian politics, which he saw as a consequence of 'social change' (in particular, the rise of a 'new middle class'). We
should also note the views of Hayden's proxy, John Button, who became the committee's key federal parliamentarian. As Hayden and Hawke took little part in the proceedings, Button became de facto NCI chair and the salesperson for NCI ideas in the party's key echelons.

Blewett's research interests gave him the background to look at long-term strategies for Labor 'hegemony'. His PhD thesis analysed the 1910 British General Election as a key moment in the rise and decline of British Liberalism, noting Lloyd George's constitutional battles and social reform strategies. In Australia, he studied patterns of long-term electoral alignment (see, e.g. Blewett, 1971). He explored constitutional and political strategies for achieving a series of Labor governments in Canberra to secure social democratic reforms (Blewett, 1978).

Blewett believed that even a low-key ALP could attempt a serious reform project, rather than simply managing the system (ABC Four Corners, 1980:441). Whitlam Labor pursued 'relatively moderate policies, sometimes perhaps too moderate' with a flourish of 'radical panache'. Blewett hoped for a Labor pursuit of 'radical policies with a moderate style'. Only one year after the Whitlam Government was elected, Blewett (1973a:358) berated its paradoxical combination of policy timidity and stylistic excess. It was likely to be one more 'short-lived Labor interruption' to conservative hegemony, 'a brief interglacial break in the Ice Age'. Blewett shared the Labor Managerialist disdain for the Whitlam Government's lack of political professionalism; the lack of discipline, order and solidarity in the Cabinet and
the Prime Minister's prima donna tendencies. But he also lamented its lack of vision. He favoured:

... a renewed attack on the commanding heights of the private economy. One tactic would be deliberately to extend the socialization of the functions of private property; generally to replace private decisions on investment, property distribution and retention, and the utilization of capital resources with communal decisions ...

(Blewett, 1973a:365-6). 49

Blewett (1973a:361) wondered whether the ALP could transform itself into the sort of party he wanted. It would be hindered by its anti-intellectualism. Blewett conceded his project may have been beyond Australian Labor. His critique of the Whitlam Government embodied a radical 'technocratic Laborism' (see Blewett, nd). He was scathing about Calwellian 'paleo-Laborism' (Blewett, 1973b:392). Calwell would have had little time for 'new social movements' (despite his participation in anti-conscription protests). Blewett noted Calwell's morbid fear of 'permissiveness'. Despite eventually aligning with the Victorian left, Calwell rejected their notions of 'participatory democracy' as 'a close relative of anarchy' with 'no place under the Australian constitution' (quoted, Blewett, 1973b:393). In SA, Blewett was a critic of the 'card vote', which enabled affiliated unions to dominate preselections and state conventions.

The NCI was to look at issues which Encel had examined many times before January 1978. He was one of Australia's leading sociologists and a long-suffering Labor intellectual. He had a long-standing interest in the peculiarities of the Australian state and polity (Austin, 1984:152. See Encel, 1960 and 1962a). Australian state,
society and politics were segmented, sectoralised, federalised and fragmented (Encel, 1962a). The polity was over-determined by the demands of competing interest groups. Competing administrative satrapies pursued immediate advantage for their clientele. The parties were creatures of this context. Labor wanted 'Ten Bob a Day' for its clientele, not social transformation. Encel rejected the 'initiative'/ 'resistance' model, which attributed Australian statism and welfare to Labor design.

Encel's (1970) major work further explored the distinctiveness of the Australian polity. It also emphasised 'social change' after World War II. Osmond (1972:4) aligned Encel with modernisation theorists, who explored inevitable effects of 'inexorable' processes (industrialisation, bureaucratisation, urbanisation). They left little autonomous scope for politics, and sometimes fell back on technological determinism. Parties could only 'adapt' to changing circumstances. Encel sailed close to such a view at times.

His concern with Australian political peculiarities and his stance as a Labor intellectual modified this tendency. He looked at Australian society from within the Post-War Reconstruction ideology of 'Canberra Fabians ... for whom history stopped in 1949' (Osmond, 1972:5 and 50). He stressed the relationship between war-time Labor governments and their bureaucratic advisers (Chifley's 'official family') in accounting for 'social change', as did other 'Canberra Fabians' (e.g. Crisp, 1961:254-63; Coombs, 1981:1-104). Encel (1971:63) almost reverted to the 'initiative'/ 'resistance'
model in castigating Menzies for failing to maintain this momentum. He lamented the virtual freezing of political change in 1949.\textsuperscript{61} That would have been remarkable:

... even in a period of social and political calm. In a period full of political drama and social change, it is both remarkable and deeply puzzling.

Certainly deeply puzzling, if we expect political alignments to dance to 'social change' tunes!

In the 1960s, Encel urged Labor to come to grips with 'social change'. 'Affluence', welfare capitalism and changes in the class structure posed new problems (Encel, 1962b:5). Bureaucratisation was double-edged. There were new types of administered inequalities (Encel, 1965:17; Connell and Irving, 1980:303; Macintyre, 1985:96), alongside the strengthened welfare 'safety net'.

Intellectuals were incorporated into 'professionalised' forms of public policy formulation. This made it easier for electorally pragmatic socialist governments to resist intra-party pressure. Critics could be dismissed as 'insufficiently informed' (Encel, 1962b:6). Intellectuals were seen here as prisoners of industrial mass society (Osmond, 1972:51). Encel also saw intellectuals as social critics, an anti-bureaucratic opposition and policy advisers to Labor governments (Osmond, 1972:48-50). There were problems with intellectual incorporation into the emerging Australian 'bureaucratic ascendancy', but Encel welcomed the stalled 'bureaucratic revolution' as an advance on the parochial sectionalisms of the old 'operative concept of the state'.

The ALP owed its fragmented structure to that older 'operative concept' of the Australian state (Encel, 1962c:6-7).
In this spirit, Encel (1964a; 1964b) endorsed the 1960s party reform proposals. Labor had to mobilise support, develop policy and harness 'rank and file' enthusiasm (Encel, 1964b:21). Encel was sceptical of Labor responding to his diagnosis. Analysing the ALP's organisational defects required a monograph (Encel, 1964b: 14). He provided only a few paragraphs.62

Almost as an aside, Encel (1964b:32-3) asked Labor to recognise women's changing economic status. By 1978, this was very topical. Feminism had made an impact. Encel (1971:66-7) linked the resurgence of Australian feminism to other attacks on inequalities (see also Encel et al., 1974). Encel was open to learning from 'new social movements'. His 'new left' critic conceded his closeness to student radicalism on civil liberties, Vietnam and censorship (Osmond, 1972:49).63

While supporting Whitlam's party reform agenda, Encel (1972:10) had his doubts about the 'new revisionism'. It lacked vision and failed to foresee implementation problems (Encel, 1972:12). Ten years earlier, he had warned that Labor needed more than short-term expediency to extricate itself from the political wilderness (Encel, 1962b:8). A new 'image' should be a substantial one, 'not an electronic illusion'.

Encel was not impressed with the Kemp thesis, although he was prepared to draw on it ('The Seven Questions Labor Has to Face', National Times, 9 January 1978). It was an ahistorical re-run of 1960s 'end of class' arguments, which failed to give due weight to white collar radicalism. Interpreting Labor's 1975 and 1977 defeats brought Encel back to politics and 'social change'. As well as a constitutional
crisis, 1975 represented an Australian inflection of social
democratic difficulties in the face of intractable economic
problems and social tensions (Encel, 1978b:149). The
difficulties included 'stagflation', ecological crises and the
domination of national economies by giant corporations. The
'end of ideology' prognoses had been falsified by the swing to
the left in the late 1960s:

... and by the accumulating evidence that the
economic boom was slowing down and that its
social costs were becoming unacceptably high

The process took longer to unravel in Australia than in other
OECD countries. The coalition in support of the Whitlam
programme was fragile. Like other such social democratic
coalitions, it was vulnerable to recession and tax revolt
(Encel, 1978b:196. See also Esping-Andersen, 1985). Its
political objectives were confined to 'the distributive aspects
of the neo-capitalist economy' (Encel, 1978b:196). Encel
felt that conservative and social democratic problems with
crisis-management of neo-capitalist contradictions would lead
to electoral volatility. Perhaps excessive timidity had
brought social democracy to this impasse (Encel, 1978b:167.
See also Stretton, 1976a; 1976b). Encel's retrospective
evaluation of 1960s-style social democracy (including
Whitlamism) was similar to that of Stretton (1976a:114):

Through the mid-century summertime which had once
promised to last forever, many social democratic
leaders had lost hope of ever again winning
majorities for the old programme of workers' rights and socialist reconstruction. So in the
1960s they tried to attract more middle class
support by running as classless, consensual
parties of progress soft-pedalling socialism and
offering progressive theories of education,
technological change and personal liberation
instead. These might have been a good addition to
the old blue collar programme, but they did not prove to be a sufficient replacement for it.

Blewett and Encel were likely to endorse a new Labor radicalism, as long as it was presented professionally. John Button was more cautious, but his allegiance to a minority faction and his intellectual curiosity meant he would go some way with adventurous strategies, at least rhetorically. Button's high-profile NCI role won kudos and criticisms. Bob Carr argued Button turned what might have been 'a forgettable whitewash' into Labor's 'boldest revisionist foray' ('A Reformer Right on the Button', Bulletin, 27 June 1978). Against that, Button's detractors claimed he used the committee for personal aggrandisement (Russell Schneider, 'A Radical the Traffic Will Bear', Australian, 9 October 1978). They questioned the worth of public soul-searching by a relatively academic group. Such critics had an air of injured innocence. The NCI's front man could hardly avoid media attention and some self-aggrandisement.

What was Button's NCI agenda? He had been a founder member of the Victorian 'Participants'. Later, as the 'Independents', they carved out a distinctive position between the two major Victorian blocs ('Centre-Unity' and 'Socialist Left'), evolving a curious alliance with the latter (R. Smith, 1974:58-9). In Caucus, Button, 'a clever politician' (Kelly, 1984:335) pursued:

... the creation of a centre group to give more intellectual weight and political clout to the ALP.

He was a Hayden lieutenant with many ideas of his own. Button supported the old Whitlam/Wyndham goal of direct FEC and federal union National Conference representation. In the
1960s, he criticised Labor amateurism. Labor was hindered from communicating an image of unity and competence by Victorian Branch authoritarianism ('Way to a New "Image"', Labor Comment, June 1967). Button found the NCI a congenial arena for canvassing some old 'Participant' ideas. He had less success with ALP power-brokers.

Button was not simply recycling 1960s ideas. He wanted Labor to develop in a 'post-Whitlamist' direction. The party was trying too hard to recreate the past (John Hurst, 'The Shiny Button', Nation Review, 28 December 1977). Social reform had to be subordinated to 'sound economic management'. Admitting his views were unpopular within the party, Button argued Labor was too keen 'to listen to the strident voices of articulate minorities'. Many members thought it was all about 'women's issues or conservation or civil liberties or all of these things'. Button would only endorse Labor support of 'new social movements', insofar as the logic of 'sound economic management' would permit:

While adopting a genuinely compassionate interest in these things, they should be subordinated to the gut issues of what industries this country can viably support and will employ people.

The electorate was looking for 'low key, competent, compassionate management'.

Perhaps Button was recycling the old 'Participant' projection of Labor as the best managers of the 'new corporate' state. After the 1975 defeat, former Labor Comment editor Bob Murray (1976:35) wanted to bury 'Whitlamism'. Despite its 'better polish', it was very similar to Calwellism. Both emphasised increasing Commonwealth expenditure. Murray articulated an emerging Labor Managerialism. This responded to
recession and the 1975 trauma by reassuring dominant elites that, above all, Labor would not transgress prevailing canons of 'sound economic management'. The cultural radicalism that had attached itself to 'Whitlamism' (see Little, 1986) would be disowned. Labor had to 'pull its horns in' (Murray, 1976:38). The Australian social and economic climate did not allow 'all that much difference between the parties'.

This 'new realism' guided much Labor practice. It was not often proclaimed as such in the debates. Whitlam's programme assumed continued economic growth would underpin painless social reform. When this was dashed, many moved in the Labor Managerialist direction, buoyed by Wran's 1976 NSW success. They did not use the term Labor Managerialism. Bob Carr spoke of a 'social democratic critique'. But there are many varieties of social democracy. The retreat from public expenditure involved the rejection of some key social democratic ideas. The demise of 'Whitlamism' also led to the development of Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2 as a potential ALP project. It was distinguished from Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1 by its readiness to go beyond the parliamentary-bureaucratic emphasis of the Whitlam programme.

John Button was a Labor Managerialist politician, but he was prepared to explore Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2. The NCI facilitated debates on Labor identity and ideology, as well as organisational matters. Considerable confusion ensued. In March 1982, Button lamented Labor's lack of a vision for the 1980s:

Since the Chifley Government went out of office, perhaps the nearest the ALP has got to establishing a perception of an alternative vision was in the early 1970s. In 1972 we won. The vision was
perhaps too splendid - impossible to implement in haste by a Government of mortals ... In the ALP all sorts of tensions and confusions arise as to how the alternative programme or vision is to be developed and articulated ... (quoted, Kelly, 1984:218-9).

Party managers feared fanning factional flames. Furthermore, talk of 'vision' ruffled the Labor Managerialists. For Button, Labor in 1982, after all the debates, still only had:

... a series of disaggregated policies in various stages of development; plenty of trees, but no Burnham Wood to take us to Dunsinane (quoted, Kelly, 1984:219).

The development of such 'vision' in a 'complex arena' like the ALP is a tricky process!
CHAPTER 11

NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY : PROCESS

11A Submissions: 'Garbage Can' Smorgasbord

Having introduced some key *dramatis personae* and their favourite party reform scripts, we can watch the NCI plot unfold. Hayden and Hawke, the committee's figureheads, suggest the NCI set about its 'somewhat daunting task' by seeking written submissions and attending special party meetings (APSA, 1979:4. See also ALP, 1979:3). Submissions came from within the party and from the general public. According to the NCI Report, there were 320. I located 314 (see analysis in Table 1).¹

Table 1

NCI Submissions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extra-Party</th>
<th>Intra-Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'General public' and party supporters *</td>
<td>Individual members 74 (23%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parliamentarians, their staff and parliamentary candidates 11 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Affiliated unions ** 8 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local Branches 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Federal Electorate Councils *** 20 111 (35%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other Party Units 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intra-Party Total = 204 (64%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total = 314</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentages rounded to nearest whole number.

274
Differentiation between party supporters and individual members on basis of evidence internal to texts of submissions as well as other available information. Partly based on informed guesswork. These figures must be taken as approximations only.

As well as formal submissions from unions (3), this also includes those sent by people qua officials (4) or activists (1) within the relevant unions.

These bodies are sometimes known by other names (e.g. Federal Electorate Assemblies in Victoria, Federal Division Executives in Queensland. For convenience, I shall apply the term FEC Australia-wide).

Table 1 demonstrates the paucity of submissions from affiliated unions. The ratio between intra-party and extra-party submissions (approximately 65/35) should be noted. Extra-party submissions were very heterogeneous and, of course, did not indicate anything about ALP thinking. The NCI claimed it wanted to tap (and distil) 'grass-roots' ALP wisdom. It could find this in submissions from branches, FECs and 'other party units' (about 35 percent of the total, analysed in Table 2).

These 'grass-roots' submissions were also quite heterogeneous, but had some coherence. Certain themes recurred (see Table 3). 'Rank-and-file rights' was mentioned in almost half these submissions. This included assertions of branch-level alienation, expression of 'participatory' aspirations and specific 'party democracy' suggestions. The next most common themes, 'Educate the electorate' and 'Defend Labor socialisation ideology', indicated some 'grass-roots' resistance to the notion of 'adaptation' to electorate conservatism. 'Organisational housekeeping' suggestions included membership induction programmes, less boring branch
Table 2

Party Unit NCI Submissions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Branches</th>
<th>FECs</th>
<th>Other *</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>44 (37)**</td>
<td>10 (8)</td>
<td>4 (3)</td>
<td>58 (48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vic</td>
<td>23 (23)</td>
<td>9 (9)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>36 (36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qld</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tas</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NT</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 80 (73) + 20 (18) + 11 (10) = 111 (101)

* These other party units included some NSW State Electorate Councils, NSW Labor Women's Committee, the Labor Resources Centre in Victoria, the Education Policy and Socialist Education Committees of the Victorian Branch, University of Melbourne ALP Club, Australian Young Labor in WA, Head Office of the Tasmanian Branch and Italo-Australians for Labor.

** Some branches and FECs sent more than one submission. Others sent joint submissions. The bracketed figures represent adjustments to these 'double entries' where necessary (in Victoria, they cancelled out) and refer to the number of branches and FECs making submissions rather than the number of submissions sent from branches and FECs.

meetings, regional organisers and more professional administration. 'Labor/'new social movement" liaison' mainly focused on feminism. Affirmative action could redress the party's historic neglect of its women members. Confusion on the 1977 election trail provided plenty of material for 'Campaign comments',\(^3\) which also picked up more general matters (advertising, politeness outside the polling booth etc). The 'Local "community presence strategy"' suggested some inter-election projects for local branches.
Table 3
Major Themes Submitted by Party Units (101) *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank-and-File Rights</th>
<th>49</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'Participation ideology'</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEC delegates to National Conference</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open up policy committee process</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preselection Rights</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educate the Electorate</th>
<th>39</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party Newspaper</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General electorate education</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Labor media outlets</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defend Labor Socialisation Ideology</th>
<th>34</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socialisation Objective</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Social justice'/party ideals</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist economic policy</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisational Housekeeping</th>
<th>26</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intra-Party communication</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Branch maintenance</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Labor/ 'New Social Movement' Liaison</th>
<th>26</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women/feminism</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Affirmative Action) (11)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmentalism</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign Comments</th>
<th>25</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Campaign mechanics (miscellaneous)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'77 campaign confusion (payroll tax etc)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preselection timing</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Local 'Community Presence Strategy' | 20 |

* Number of party units making submissions, not a number of submissions from party units (see Table 2 for this distinction). Former chosen rather than latter as better indicator of 'grass-roots' sentiment and used throughout Table 3).
Look at the 'grass-roots' priorities. Intra-party democracy and ideological enthusiasm rated above routine organisational and electoral concerns. The submissions from individual party members were not as coherent overall and had different priorities (see Table 4).

Table 4

Major Themes Submitted From Within Party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party units</th>
<th>Individual members</th>
<th>Parliamentarians their staff and parliamentary candidates</th>
<th>Affiliated unions</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(101)</td>
<td>(71)*</td>
<td>(10)**</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(190)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rank-and-File Rights
49 19 1 2 71

Educate the Electorate
39 13 3 3 58

Defend Labor Socialisation Ideology
34 8 4 4 48

Organisational Housekeeping
26 18 2 2 48

Campaign Comments
25 20 5 2 45

Labor/New Social Movement' Liaison
26 13 2 0 42

Local 'Community Presence Strategy'
20 12 4 0 36

* In the case of the 3 members who each sent 2 submissions, both submissions have been amalgamated.

** One parliamentarian sent two submissions. These have been counted as one.
Support for 'party renewal' can be gleaned from the intra-party submissions as a whole (especially those from 'grass-roots' units). There were hopes a revitalised ALP could help change 'community values'. Then Labor would not have to 'adapt' to a conservative electorate. Drummoyne branch (NSW) wanted the 'socialisation objective' reaffirmed, alongside real policy and organisational changes (Submission 232). Adopting a 'safe' image for electoral purposes would be 'disastrous'.

While an implicit 'party renewal' project can be pieced together, the general coherence of the intra-party submissions should not be over-estimated. They often contained items apparently extraneous to the committee's terms of reference. It is the fate of committees investigating institutional reorganisation options to become 'garbage cans' for all sorts of concerns (Olsen, 1976:314). The 'choice opportunities' they provide link 'an assortment of loosely connected problems, solutions and participants'. Participants can graft 'solutions to almost any current problem' onto a reorganisation. It is precisely this 'garbage can' characteristic that makes reorganisation attempts privileged points of access to the study of what happens within 'complex arenas' like the ALP. Rules about access are not precise and an assortment of concerns are thrown up, so reorganisations become embroiled in symbolic issues and short-term happenstance (March and Olsen, 1983:286). Reorganisation projects:

... attract numerous otherwise unoccupied participants and otherwise unresolved issues. Any particular reorganization proposal or topic for discussion is an arena for debating a wide range of current concerns and ancient philosophies.
Within an arena like the NCI, a host of mini-arenas are generated, linked to ongoing intra-organisational conflicts. The defence of Labor socialisation ideology became central to many NCI submissions, because the NCI was a typical 'garbage can' reorganisation collecting loosely-linked:

... solutions looking for problems, ideologies looking for soapboxes, pet projects looking for supporters and people looking for jobs, reputations or entertainment ...

NCI solutions looking for problems and ideologies looking for soap-boxes tend to overlap. They included 'participation', 'party democracy' and 'community involvement' alongside 'Labor socialism'. Committee members could develop their reputations and push pet projects. Symbolic issues came to the fore and took on a life of their own. Reorganisation attempts facilitate organisational self-interpretation and the discovery of new organisational values (Olsen, 1976:315). The new values may affect organisational mythology more than organisational practice, often being quickly forgotten, once the reorganisation report is completed (see Kaufman, 1971:76). The emergence of a 'participation ideology' in NCI submissions was not surprising. The NCI's pet project, National Conference reform, was specifically presented as a 'symbolic' response to the 'problem' of intra-party alienation (ALP, 1979:22).

'Participatory ideology' and the resurrection of 'Labor socialism' were themselves 'garbage cans', embodying further concerns that were very much influenced by short-run happenstance. This can be seen in the 'Defend Labor socialisation ideology' submissions. Some were blunt resolutions. Mt Druitt branch (NSW) declared its total support for 'the socialist concepts, aims and ideals of the ALP'
Submission 286). Table 5 shows interesting differences between NSW and Victorian 'Defend Labor socialisation ideology' submissions.

Table 5

'Defend Labor Socialisation Ideology' Submissions:
Further Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Units Sending Submissions</th>
<th>NSW</th>
<th>Vic</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'Defend Labor Socialisation Ideology'</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialisation Objective</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Social justice'/party ideals</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist economic policy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NSW submissions couched 'socialist' sentiments in more declaratory terms. Victorian submissions touched on debates about economic policy. The NSW left felt itself in a besieged position. NSW ALP president, John Ducker, argued 'socialism' was a bugbear (Peter Terry, "Bogy" of Socialism Haunts Big Debate', Australian, 6 June 1978). Labor had to make up its mind whether 'socialism' was what it really was about. Otherwise, it was 'needlessly losing votes' in opposition when it could be in government, implementing the reform programmes 'we'd be pursuing anyway'. The NCI was an arena, where the NSW left could challenge the Ducker line. Proportionately more submissions from the 'right-wing' NSW
Branch defended Labor socialisation ideology than from 'left-wing' Victoria. Out-groups welcomed the NCI's open access. Party officials were more wary. A Victorian official warned Encel (1979:2), the NCI was dominated by the right. NSW, however, saw the committee as 'a left-wing attempt to upset the local apple cart'.

More than two-thirds of the NSW party units supporting 'Labor socialism' also supported 'Rank-and-file rights'. The NSW left was more sympathetic to the notion of 'branch rights' than the Victorian left. The way the differences between NSW and Victorian 'socialist' submissions reflected short-term happenstance is typical of what happens in reorganisation attempts. The 'political bargaining' processes they generate are:

... sensitive to contextual fluctuation and to short-term changes in political attention ... the course of events surrounding a reorganization seems to depend less on properties of the reorganization proposals or efforts than on the happenstance of short-run political attention, over which reorganization groups typically have little control (March and Olsen, 1983:286).

What are mini-arenas within a reorganization attempt may be more central to organisational processes than the reorganisation attempt itself. This can be seen when we look at another illustration of the impact of short-term happenstance on the NCI. Submissions from individual Queensland members had a high emphasis on 'Organisational housekeeping' and 'Campaign comments' (see Table 6). They reflected turmoil in that Branch. Assorted opponents were challenging the 'old guard' administration. Allegations of mismanagement and incompetence became 'Organisational housekeeping' submissions and 'Campaign comments' to the NCI.
Pressures were building up for federal intervention. Control of the Branch would then change hands, directly affecting the composition of Queensland delegations to the national bodies. Apparently further-reaching NCI pet projects seemed like shadow-boxing in comparison.

Some NCI members were heavily involved with the Queensland controversy on the National Executive. Ducker, Hawke and Young defended the 'old guard', fearing left gains from any upheaval (Bob Carr, 'Why Ducker is Quitting', Bulletin, 11 September 1979). They felt the 'old guard' provided 'moderate ballast', keeping the ALP 'closer to the Centre ground of national politics'. Preserving 'moderate ballast' was not necessarily compatible with 'party renewal'. Hayden was sympathetic to the reformers, but proceeded cautiously (Murphy, 1980:172-3; Stuart Simson, 'Why Bill Hayden Backed Quietly Off', National Times, 17 March 1979). Provoked by 'old guard' obduracy, the National Executive intervened in 1980 (see Swan, 1983:123-4).
While Hayden, Hawke, Young and Ducker took a high profile on the Queensland dispute they ignored the NCI. As key party figures and National Executive members, they were able to take their NCI membership lightly. Hayden 'took very little part in the committee's proceedings' (Encel, 1979:1). Hawke 'rarely appeared'. Ducker 'even more rarely'. Young's involvement was only cursory (Anne Summers, 'ALP's Hand Up for Reform - Or Was It?', Australian Financial Review, 12 April 1979). In this, too, the NCI was typical of reorganisation attempts, where it is often difficult to sustain 'the attention of major political actors' (March and Olsen, 1983:286). Such an 'attention vacuum' allows 'less central actors move to the forefront'. The final NCI Report was the product of four authors (Blewett, Encel, Garland and Forward) rather than the committee as a whole (Anne Summers, Australian Financial Review, 12 April 1979). The balance of forces and opinions represented in the NCI Report (ALP, 1979) did not reflect that of the National Executive. The NCI was prepared to explore Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2. The National Executive was more inclined to Labor Managerialism.

While the NCI was distributing its occasionally controversial Discussion Papers (henceforth referred to as DPs), a state election was being held in NSW. It resulted in a 'Wranslide' Labor victory. One NSW Labor official suggested Wran's practice provided a better model than NCI theory and hoped for 'a lot less tomfoolery of position papers' and grand new organisational projects (quoted, Malcolm Colless, 'What the Labor Party Must Learn from Wran's Landslide', Australian, 14 October 1978). Electoral calculation and 'party renewal'
could point in different directions.

With many of the party 'patrons' more interested in maintaining 'moderate ballast', winning state elections and such matters, various ALP out-groups gravitated towards the NCI. In particular, feminists and sections of the branch membership (especially in NSW). The 'garbage can' nature of reorganisation projects is accentuated by the ambiguity of the problems and solutions thrown up (March and Olsen, 1983:287). What the reorganisation is about is defined differently by different participants. They:

... may try to attach their pet projects to a reorganization ... to make it something they can support ...

The NCI offered out-groups some legitimation in various intra-party struggles. Labor women's groups helped tie affirmative action to the NCI agenda. The NCI became an arena for the registration of positions on issues such as the 'conscience vote' (on abortion) and the 'socialisation objective'. The NCI itself was partly a consequence of a temporary loss of confidence by the party 'patrons'. Such committees can be seen (in Michelsian terms) as concessions to 'rank-and-file' concerns so oligarchical rule can be legitimated. Michels (1962:71-2) was adamant that members were unable to conduct or even supervise party administration. The 'rank-and-file' had to content themselves with 'summary reports' and 'occasional special committees of inquiry'. Michels' 'oligarchical' model over-simplifies what goes on within 'complex arenas', but rightly emphasises important power asymmetries within such organisations. Special committees of inquiry, given their 'attention vacuum', may temporarily reduce some of these
asymmetries.

NCI submissions contained a 'garbage can' smorgasbord of issues, ideologies, problems and solutions, often little related to each other or the committee's terms of reference. This was particularly true of submissions from the 'general public' and party supporters. The NCI served almost literally as a garbage can for the receipt of letters to Bill Hayden from 'concerned citizens', Labor supporters and party members (labelled Submissions 97-113).^17

The extra-party submissions are difficult to generalise about. Some observations can be made. 'Concerned citizens' and party supporters did not worry about 'rank-and-file rights'. Nor were they enthused about 'educating' the electorate. They were more sympathetic to two diagnoses of Labor's woes, favoured in the mainstream press, but unpopular within the Party: (1) Labor should modify or abandon its socialisation ideology in a determined move towards the electoral 'middle ground';^18 and (2) Labor should distance itself from affiliated unions to improve its 'image'.^19

Many 'concerned citizens' used their NCI access to pursue particular Labor policies and stances. Some, however, tied particular interests to the NCI's concern with changing aspirations for a better Australian society. This was particularly so in areas related to 'Labor/new social movement liaison' such as environmentalism, feminism, sexual liberation, multi-culturalism^20 and 'alternative lifestyles'. Contributions from Fraser Island Defence Association,^21 Women's Electoral Lobby (ACT),^22 Campaign Against Moral Persecution (NSW),^23 the Australian Greek Welfare Society,^24 the Cannabis Research
Foundation of Australia and 'The Falls' community (alternative lifestyle, NSW) complemented calls for 'new social movement' liaison from within the party.

Hayden and Hawke claimed the NCI DPs were guided by submissions from party members (APSA, 1979:2). The NCI itself said its submissions did much to structure its subject matter (ALP, 1979:3). Some commentators criticised the NCI for dependence on its submissions. Gay Davidson alleged DP 1 (on National Conference) got bogged down in internal mechanics because of a reliance on intra-party submissions that somehow had to be used, ignored or incorporated ('The ALP Seeks Ways to Improve its Electoral Appeal', Canberra Times, 12 July 1978).

While the press criticised the NCI in this manner, some sections of the party worried about the impact extra-party submissions could have. Don Bowman (secretary, Shortland FEC, NSW) feared such submissions might override 'democratically made' state conference decisions. Agents provocateurs might deliberately submit 'spurious feedback'. It would be safer to rely on FECs 'as cross-sectionally representative of Australians'. The establishment of the NCI suggested the National Executive believed the party's ordinary mechanisms were not working effectively (Submission 55, G. Clark, SA). The NCI seemed unsure whether it should listen to 'the community' or ALP members. Formal submissions worked better with regard to membership views, although even here there are severe 'representativeness' problems. Local branch and FEC submissions were the most coherent, but one wonders how representative they were.

As well as waiting for submissions, the NCI could
have organised its own research. Some submissions criticised the NCI's failure to undertake systematic research. Victorian ALP member Chris Bain criticised NCI ad hocery (Submission 237). Waiting for written submissions was 'not an effective way of gaining representative views'. The NCI could have visited a variety of branches and examined practices in other organisations. NSW member B. Keon-Cohen wanted the NCI institutionalised as a non-factional focus for research and discussion, which otherwise might be dismissed:

... in some circles, as subversive. Such debate can only be fruitful and lead to questioning and perhaps change on a local basis (Submission 138).

This was traditional reorganisation 'rationalistic idealism'. Queensland academic R.H. Leach doubted the worth of submissions (Submission 7). 'A series of pub opinions' at one branch meeting would not solve Labor's problems. It was 'amazing' to expect serious theoretical analysis from such a process. Leach suggested a National Theoretical Analysis Committee. This could draw on intellectually high calibre ALP members: 'rank and file could be used for research'. The NCI was not simply a seminar for Labor intellectuals. Its own 'participatory' aspirations could hardly countenance such openly elitist suggestions.

The NCI faced constraints of time, money and major actor 'attention vacuum'. It touched on 'a very wide range of subjects' with a 'somewhat scatter-gunned' approach (Les Carr, 'Committee of Inquiry - A Background', Challenge, October 1978). 'Self-scrutiny' was alien to most branches. The party elite had little interest in remedying this. Debates were mainly confined to the committee itself and leadership groups.
The Socialist Workers' Party alleged that right wing Labor leaders did not want any wider discussion (Richard Ungram, 'Right Threatens Purge of NSW Labor Party', Direct Action, 11 May 1978). Given the electoral defeat, there had to be some debate, but the Labor leadership:

... tried to confine the study of the 1975 and 1977 debacles to a handful of highly paid 'experts' - who know very well who hired them.

Some of the NCI 'experts' were well-paid, but not by the ALP for being on the committee.

Perhaps in lieu of its own research, the NCI got some assistance from outside experts (APSA, 1979:5). NCI members met the 'rank-and-file' at some specially arranged meetings, generally at 'intermediate' party levels rather than lower down. State head office non-cooperation was often an obstacle (Encel, 1979:2). There was no systematic NCI discussion with or research on the 'grass-roots' ALP. There was no Australian Labor equivalent of the 1977-78 West German Social Democratic 'communication study' of membership composition, attitudes, involvement etc. (see Braunthal, 1983:37-60; Kolinsky, 1984:74ff).33

11B Agenda: NCI Autonomy from 'Chiefs' and 'Masses'

The NCI was no grandiose agent for wholesale 'party renewal'. Nor was it simply the passive instrument of its submissions, as it modestly claimed. Newspaper editorialists need not have worried about it being swept along by party activists. Their support for 'party renewal' was too diffuse to sweep anything along. Nor need the activists have worried about extra-party agents provocateurs. The disparate intra-
party submissions were a model of clarity and cohesion, compared to the bewildering array of concerns canvassed from outside the party. The NCI members' own party reform prescriptions were as significant as anything that could be distilled from the 'grass-roots' submissions in determining the committee's conclusions. It set its own agenda. Intra-party pressure had some impact, as in the resolution of the row over the original all-male committee. Formal submissions were, however, a clumsy way to apply pressure. Eleven 'grass-roots' ALP submissions favoured affirmative action, endorsed by the NCI. Nineteen favoured a party newspaper, dismissed as 'unrealistic'.

NCI support for National Conference reform probably had more to do with its own preferences than any pressure from below. 'Rank and file' submissions legitimated these preferences. The NCI and the National Executive had many opportunities to shape the debate. The Executive defined the terms of reference, appointed the NCI and could effectively veto proposals, before National Conference considered them. The NCI had a free hand in conducting the inquiry. Attention vacuum gave the report authors further autonomy. Special committees can offer some scope to 'rank-and-file' members. This was severely limited, in the NCI case.

An extensive organisation is clumsy to operate (Michels, 1962:78-9). With a mass distributed over a wide area, consulting the 'rank-and-file' on every issue 'would involve an enormous loss of time'. Furthermore, Michels implied, 'rank-and-file' contributions to special committees of inquiry would be 'summary and vague'. Party oligarchs and
committee members would have plenty of latitude. Michels (1962:310) viewed intra-party referenda in a similar light. The chiefs could 'lead the masses astray' by phrasing questions cleverly and reserving to themselves the right to interpret replies. In the case of special committees of inquiry and the 'garbage can' collection of issues they gather up, the power of interpretation seems more pertinent than the wording of the terms of reference.

'Grass-roots' ALP submissions showed enthusiasm for a 'party renewal' project, but vaguely enough for the NCI to pursue its own project, unhindered. This project, including National Conference reform, was not fully acceptable to the National Executive. The NCI had autonomy from the 'chiefs' as well as the 'rank-and-file'.

The NCI project can be deduced from its ten DPs (reprinted, APSA, 1979). An early NCI document set out the rationale for the DPs ('Notes on the ALP Committee of Inquiry'). As midwife for a Labor strategy to regain office with workable policies, the NCI was aiming for the kind of press coverage that would give:

... the impressions of a reformed party, putting behind the worst images of the past ... If the party's image is lousy, we may as well face up to it.

The DPs would suggest a 'new broom' was sweeping the ALP. Bill Hayden told the 1981 Special Conference the NCI process had been 'a valuable exercise' in projecting the ALP to the general public (ALP Transcript, 1981:332). Some thought washing dirty linen in public was a strange way of projecting a better 'image'. Victorian secretary Bob Hogg thought the DPs got the wrong sort of publicity (Letter to NCI).
distrusted the ALP in 1975 and 1977:

We are now confirming their prejudices by telling them we never had a competent, representative, democratic organisation ... To be agonising over internal reform does nothing but diminish our standing.

The press should not be given chances to put egg on Labor's face, with headlines like 'Labor Bureaucrats Reject Committee's Work'. Overdue change should proceed 'organically'. Hogg believed raising expectations beyond the practicable was counter-productive. Similar objections had been raised to Whitlam's crusade in 1967. 35

Some feared the public relations fanfare accompanying the DPs pre-empted proper debate. The Victorian administrative committee was so disgruntled that it asked the National Executive to ensure the party review process was 'representative of the movement and its aspirations' (Malcolm Colless, 'Hayden Takes Queensland Problem to Executive', Australian, 29 July 1978).

The NCI saw itself as more than a PR exercise. It used 'participatory' rhetoric, but did not relinquish control of its agenda and expected little from 'grass-roots' submissions. The DPs, as hoped ('Notes on the ALP Committee of Inquiry') helped set the agenda. 'Much debate and familiarisation' was needed to really change 'an organisationally conservative party'. The 'rank-and-file' had to get 'a sense of participation'. The DPs were envisaged as 'White Papers', that could deflect criticisms about an appointed committee. Proposals should not seem to be 'handed down' from above. Material circulated to branches 'could provide a focus for analytical debate', apparently often
lacking at that level. Encel told his fellow NCI members that asking the 'rank-and-file' what they thought would be a valuable exercise, irrespective of its results ('ALP Review Committee: Some Preliminary Observations'). In its attempts to promote analytical debate, the NCI hoped to defuse 'the silly dichotomy growing up' between 'the true road of socialism and we will be right at all costs' and 'selling out, just trying to manage the system' ('Notes on the ALP Committee of Inquiry').

The DPs were released at press conferences and circulated within the party. Responses were requested. 301 were received (ALP, 1979:4). Given the time factor, the responses were skewed towards the papers that were released earlier (see Table 7). The DPs were all released in the second half of 1978 (ALP, 1979:3-4). They were on 'Composition of National Conference' (DP 1, July); 'The ALP and the Media' (DP 2, August); 'The Role of the Local Branch' (DP 3, August); 'Women in the ALP' (DP 4, September); 'Social Change and the Future of Australia' (DP 5, September); 'Economic Issues and the Future of Australia' (DP 6, September); 'Regional Australia: Issues in Non-Metropolitan Australia' (DP 7, November); 'Electoral Strategies for the ALP' (DP 8, November); 'Unions and the ALP' (DP 9, November); 'Ethnic Communities and the ALP' (DP 10, December).

The DPs incorporated the committee's own agenda, but covered major 'grass-roots' themes. 'Rank-and-file rights' and the 'Local "community presence strategy"' were considered in DPs 1 and 3. 'Grass-roots' wishes to 'educate the electorate' and 'defend Labor socialisation ideology' were given
idiosyncratic treatment in DP 6, where the NCI economist linked Labor policy dilemmas and ideological disputes to a 'Post-Keynesian' economic paradigm, suggesting a way out of the 'silly dichotomy' between 'socialism' and 'selling out'/ 'managing the system'. NCI endorsement of affirmative action in DP 4 echoed some of the concerns embodied in the 'Labor/ "new social movement" liaison' submissions.\(^{37}\)

Table 7
Responses to DPs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 - Origins

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DP 1</th>
<th>DP 2</th>
<th>DP 3</th>
<th>DP 4</th>
<th>DP 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Branches</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FECs</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Party Units</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unions</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentarians</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (257)</strong></td>
<td><strong>93</strong></td>
<td><strong>61</strong></td>
<td><strong>40</strong></td>
<td><strong>33</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The April 1979 National Executive meeting gave the NCI Report a somewhat frosty reception. Controversial proposals were shuffled onto the Branches:

Every traditional tactic was employed to delay, defuse and refer on virtually every proposal which challenged party orthodoxy. Motions were rushed through, whole motions were not discussed and votes were taken without ensuring executive members knew the substance of the motion (Anne Summers, 'ALP's Hand up for Reform - Or Was It?', Australian Financial Review, 12 April 1979).

Publication had only a bare majority.\(^{38}\) Anne Summers believed Labor would remain unreformed, until someone did a Gough Whitlam and tried to 'crash through' with the NCI proposals. Affirmative action proposals were the subject of 'much ribald
comment' before being referred to the states. They could 'disappear into the nether regions of the Party bureaucracy'.

Encel (1979:2-3) was outraged:

> It was remarkable to see a collection of middle-aged gentlemen so alarmed that they might be superseded by energetic and effective women party workers.

As it turned out, the National Executive's initial lack of enthusiasm did not mean the end of affirmative action.

At the 1979 National Conference, in Adelaide, David Combe recommended holding over the NCI proposals until 1981. Tasmanian delegate John Coates thought the inquiry's momentum would be lost if that happened (ALP Transcript, 1979:631), but Conference did not accept his argument. Jim Roulston (Vic) put preparation for the 1980 election as a higher priority. As in the 1960s, the left could embrace electoral pragmatism when opposing party reform. The left was not ruling out party reform altogether. Bob Hogg wanted a Special Conference 'when appropriate' (ALP Transcript, 1979:635). Encel (1979:3) took the rejection of the Coates amendment as a bad omen.

The Adelaide Conference also considered a Victorian motion on the 'socialisation objective'. The reorganisation debate had spilled over into the area of party ideology. The National Executive would convene a Platform Review Committee to identify 'the main strands of current thought with regard to democratic socialism' (David Combe, ALP Transcript, 1979:677). This would be another arena where ideological conflicts could be played out (and other concerns 'dumped'), although it took a considerably lower profile than the NCI.

Labor did make preparing for the election its main priority. After the election, in which Labor had reduced
Fraser's majority (see Horne, 1981), the National Executive decided to divide the biennial Conference due in 1981. A Special Conference in 1981 would deal with NCI proposals and the objective. The ordinary policy-making Conference would be held in 1982. The 1981 Conference explicitly focussed on organisation and ideology. The 1977-81 reorganisation debate was broader than the debate in the 1960s. The earlier debate did not re-examine the objective. Nor was there an arena like the NCI. Whitlam wanted an inquiry, but was unsuccessful. Even if he had been successful, his inquiry would probably have been more narrowly organisational than the NCI. Between 1977 and 1981, organisational and ideological concerns could have informed each other productively. Yet the two were 'rarely discussed at the same forum' (Johns, 1983:119). Few bothered to link the party's objectives 'with its methods for achieving them'. The NCI lamented that Labor debates on 'socialism' neglected structural/organisational matters (APSA, 1979:83). Implicit support for participatory 'socialism', influenced by 'new social movements' as well as traditional economic considerations, was part of the 'party renewal' project, that can be distilled from 'grass-roots' NCI submissions.

Party reform and the 'socialisation objective' remained separate at the 1981 Conference. There was much 'grandstanding' on the objective. As John Coates, whose earlier attempt to maintain NCI momentum had failed, feared, delegates got 'bogged down' in 'past methods of wording' and 'semantic arguments' (ALP Transcript, 1981:28).

The NCI partly endorsed 'party renewal' and Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2. It stressed membership
participation (through National Conference reform), 'grassroots' revitalisation (through a 'community presence strategy'), affirmative action for women and more professional campaigning. It assumed such 'party renewal' was necessary for electoral revival. Labor had governed federally for less than twenty years since 1901. The NCI described this as one of the worst electoral records of any social democratic party (ALP, 1979:2). It saw this poor record as a consequence of relatively small membership, inadequate finance and Labor's relative failure 'to permeate the institutional framework' of Australian society, as well as 'the parochial horizons of too many Labor chieftains'. Concentration of media ownership and the resultant hostility to the ALP meant only 'a mass party' could secure 'a lasting tenure of power' for the national ALP. Some of the NCI's assumptions were doubtful. The ALP's record in gathering votes compared favourably with comparable parties overseas. Its governmental occupancy record was another story. Electoral revival was possible without 'party renewal'. As we shall see, the NCI itself stressed the irrelevance of much branch activity to electoral outcomes. 'The parochial horizons' of Labor chieftains may have resulted from Labor success in permeating 'the institutional framework' at state government and local authority level. There were, however, arguments for 'party renewal' if Labor was to become an agenda-setting 'hegemonic' party.
CHAPTER 12

PARTY RENEWAL : NCI RHETORIC

12A 'Rank-and-File Alienation' : Problems and Solutions

The NCI was asked to look at ways of maximising membership 'involvement and satisfaction' (ALP, 1979:1). In early 1978, there were many calls for Labor 'renewal' and branch revitalisation.¹ Bill Hayden endorsed National Conference reform, including direct FEC representation (Michelle Grattan, 'Change ALP Role: Hayden', Age, 21 January 1978). 'Rank-and-file rights' was the most prominent theme in 'grass-roots' party NCI submissions.² These submissions embodied a 'participation ideology'. This was partly called forth by the nature of the NCI itself, a fairly obvious 'solution' to the sort of 'problems' it was exploring. 'Participation ideology' also pointed to significant developments within the ALP. There was a new assertiveness on the part of branch members. Many commentators saw this as a direct consequence of a 'middle-classing' of the ALP (Parkin, 1983:27-8; Crisp, 1982. See also Howe and Howe, 1984). This was somewhat simplistic, but widely accepted within the party.³ ALP researcher Gary Johns (1983:124-7) hoped the party could combine a new 'participatory' ethos with an older emphasis on 'solidarity'.⁴ 'Participatory-critical' orientations had become more important in the ALP in the 1970s. 'Participatory-critical' conceptions of party membership went beyond the electoral support role, that had seemed to satisfy many imbued with the older 'solidarity' ethos, whose attitude to party membership was often one of 'passive loyalism'.⁵
'Participatory-critical' submissions suggested institutional mechanisms for intra-party democracy. They also called for a more meaningful role for branch members, including a 'community presence' between elections. The following examples illustrate this 'participation ideology':

In December 1977, the Party membership was keen, motivated and dedicated. The party has always been able to rely on its members, but it has not done much for them in return. Nor is the energy of the members channelled as efficiently as it might be (Submission 299, East Sydney branch, NSW).

... even where Party officials are conscientiously endeavouring to involve as wide a range of members as possible, the manner in which the Party is structured prevents meaningful rank-and-file involvement in decision-making ... (Submission 266, Blackburn North branch, Vic.).

Rather than attempt to increase the number of branch members ... the first thrust should be towards increasing the level of active involvement among existing branch members (Submission 69, Eltham branch, Vic.).

... discussion of ideology [should] be encouraged [in the branches] so as to break the idea that ALP members' only function is to hand out how-to-vote cards etc. (Submission 270, Bronte branch, NSW).

The role of 'ordinary members' is too often confined to listening passively to the routine trivia of branch meetings and performing the menial tasks of election campaigns (Submission 282, Drummoyne branch, NSW).

The party must develop its presence at the local level ... this implies a far greater recognition and promotion of the role of sub-branches and FECs (Submission 235, Mitcham North branch, SA).

... the Party must do more to allow its members to feel truly part of the organisation (Submission 166, Randwick North branch, NSW).

... the role of a well-informed membership involved in a wide range of community organisations is under-estimated (Submission 290, Macarthur FEC, NSW).

Such submissions indicated widespread 'participatory-critical' sentiment, but not necessarily a groundswell of
membership opinion. By its nature, the NCI was likely to tap 'participatory-critical' rather than 'passive loyalist' attitudes. Furthermore 'participation ideology' is one thing, party transformation another.

'Passive loyalists' had their own complaints. MPs did not attend branch meetings often enough. Some lamented the loss of branch conviviality. Former party and union organiser J. Mutton commented that:

... fifty years ago people looked forward to going out to attend a union or ALP meeting as something to look forward to in a drab existence. Today we expect to entice their counterparts to leave nice comfortable homes in the suburbs to attend sometimes drab, uninteresting meetings and uncomfortable surroundings (Submission 208).

The old Labor 'solidarity' involved strong social bonds. Perhaps these compensated for the restricted role prescribed in 'passive loyalism'. WA MLA Arthur Tonkin thought the old formula could be re-worked:

You and I may enjoy continuous rounds of policy-making ... but you and I are atypical. Mankind in general is far more a social than a political animal. We have ignored this ... The commitment of the older generation, tenuous though it may be, was developed from a social matrix in which the 'working man' identified with the party. This was partly because of the acceptance of 'working class' solidarity. But it was also through social interaction: picnics, social cricket matches, debates, dances and the like (Submission 236).

Invoking old solidarities was not enough. Those who enjoyed 'continuous rounds of policy-making' were a growing force. A few games of social cricket would not deflect them.

The admission of FEC delegates to National Conference was the specific institutional measure mentioned most often (eighteen times) in 'participatory-critical' submissions. The appropriate formula was disputed. Further mechanisms opening
up National Conference and the national policy committees were also suggested. The old Wyndham proposal for FEC access to the party's national bodies (through agenda items) was revived.\(^9\) NSW Labor Women's Committee wanted national policy committee drafts circulated to all branches and affiliated units, six months before National Conference (Submission 194).\(^{10}\) Annual National Conferences was another recycled Wyndham 'solution' to the 'problem' of membership alienation.\(^{11}\) As well as FEC representation at National Conference, Manly branch (NSW) wanted the national officers and the national policies to be elected by National Conference, rather than appointed by the National Executive, which should, in turn, be elected by the reconstructed National Conference (Submission 157).\(^{12}\) The hope was that such measures would enable Conference reform to play a significant part in reorienting the party's internal dynamics. NSW left-winger John Birch stressed that Conference reform, by itself, would not make the party more 'participatory' ('National Conference - A Background, *Challenge*, October 1978). It all depended whether FEC representation at National Conference would be articulated to more thoroughgoing party democratisation.

Some sought to by-pass National Conference. Cobar branch (NSW) thought Labor could learn from an Australia Party and Australian Democrat practice; membership policy ballots (Submission 232).\(^{13}\) Two other rural NSW branches, Lithgow and Byron Bay, contrasted cumbersome Conference procedures with the direct ballot. Lithgow branch complained that 'in the present hierarchical structure', most branch members did not know who their state conference representatives were (Submission 154).
Byron Bay extended the critique to National Conference (Submission 276).  

'Participatory-critical' submissions were unhappy with traditional branch 'routine trivia' and 'menial tasks'. Their abstract desire for 'more participation' was often combined with severe confusion about what branches might do between elections if they abandoned 'passive loyalism'. This makes one wonder what 'participation ideology' actually meant. Some submissions noted the dilemma. The party's hierarchical structure left little for the branches other than the boring, if necessary, electioneering grind and endless fund-raising (Submission 266, Blackburn North branch, Vic.). Party member Chris Bain noted the same 'problem' of branch aimlessness (Submission 237). He thought branch functions should be defined more specifically. However, authoritative clarification could hardly programme branch activity from on high. Bain's 'solution' invoked a Labor 'community presence strategy' (CPS). Branches could be 'ginger groups' in their communities instead of presenting:  

... a closed system ignoring community concerns. Associated with this a study needs to be done of the current operation of local branches.  

There were various versions of the CPS. It was an inherently ambiguous concept. 'Community' had become 'a vogue word' in Australia in the 1970s (Macintyre, 1985:109). Its meaning was difficult to pin down. It could be invoked in conservative ideologies of social harmony, as well as in radical critiques of capitalism. Support for a Labor CPS often rested on the dubious assumption that Labor electoral support was dependent on the amount of local community work done by
branch members and MPs. While some stressed the putative electoral benefits of a CPS, others thought a CPS could enable branches to transcend their traditional electoralist confines.

The CPS concept ran along a 'passive loyalist'/'participatory-critical' continuum, depending on whether it developed or challenged traditional branch practices (see Table 1). CPSs can be noted, beginning with the more conservative. CPS 1 simply involved informal supplementation of the electioneering grind, with branch members spreading the word to neighbours and workmates. CPS 2 extended this to activity in local community groups and branch community service projects. CPS 3 suggested research work on local policies. CPS 4 called for 'grass-roots' Labor/'new social movement' cooperation and Labor involvement in extra-parliamentary politics.

Table 1.
Labor 'Community Presence Strategies'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>'Passive Loyalist' Membership</th>
<th>'Participatory-Critical' Membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CPS 1 ('informal electoral supplementation')</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPS 2 ('community group involvement')</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPS 3 ('local research')</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPS 4 ('extra-parliamentary/ &quot;new social movement&quot;')</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CPS 1 was seen as a remedy for Labor's loss of support between 1972 and 1975. Dr Denis Murphy emphasised:

... the inability of Labor Party members and supporters ... to explain at smokos, in the pub and over the fence just what was being done (Submission 175).

This sort of argument seemed nostalgic for Labor 'solidarity' (see Crisp, 1982). CPS 1 had a strongly electoral focus. Unsuccessful candidate for Dundas (NSW) Russell Rollason told the NCI:

When ALP members can and do argue policy points with workmates, friends and neighbours, our chances of winning will be far higher (Submission 197).

This may have occurred spontaneously in the past. Now it would have to be organised. The electoral argument for 'community presence' runs into the reality of 'safe seats'. Ocean Grove branch (Vic.) conceded that local campaigning seemed to have little impact (Submission 49). Nevertheless:

... members should have had a role in publicising the platform more with their acquaintances.

CPS 1 might need official support. Canterbury North branch (NSW) suggested a national policy bulletin would assist branch members discussing such matters in the workplace, in clubs and elsewhere (Submission 310).

CPS 2 was also primarily presented in electoral terms. A presence in local community organisations could provide a sounding board for the presentation of ALP policies and the assessment of 'community attitudes'. CPS 2 was an apologetic CPS aimed at re-establishing ALP credibility with a conservative electorate. Branch community service projects could legitimate ALP respectability. CPS 2 could involve some reorientation of branch activity. Randwick North branch
(NSW) suggested the party should consider mechanisms whereby community organisations could affiliate in a manner akin to unions (Submission 166). Branches should be represented in each local group. Labor had 'to promote the idea' that it was 'representative of the whole community'. Eltham branch (Vic.) suggested ALP members active in community groups should report back at branch meetings (Submission 69).

CPS 3 offered some 'participatory' roles, although if this was confined to research assistance for local MPs, it would revert to narrow electoralism. Randwick North branch wanted local branches to undertake specialised research tasks (Submission 166). Seaford Pines branch (Vic.) suggested FEAs should:

... identify the local issues of concern, also the need to stimulate the public interest in those issues (e.g. lack of sewerage, school, transport etc.) (Submission 132).

More recently, Howe and Howe (1984:174) have suggested that branches should make:

... a much more sustained effort to investigate and consider the changing nature of the Australian economy, and the impact of this on particular electorates and regions.

CPS 2 and CPS 3 recalled the sort of redefinition of ALP membership activity promoted by Whitlam and Wyndham. It suggested a limited break with 'passive loyalism', but offered little challenge to hierarchical patterns within the party. Indeed, it was coupled with a new emphasis on the autonomy of the parliamentary leadership. CPS 4 involved a more drastic break with previous Labor assumptions. Thus, it marked an important line of demarcation between Australian Social Democracy, Marks 1 and 2.
Some branches mentioned the 'problem' of high membership turnover in their submissions. Membership attrition was topical in 1978. In the wake of the 1975 events, many Labor supporters took out membership tickets. Donald Horne (1976:81) wondered whether Labor could capitalise on the 'new consciousness' arising from indignation at the Dismissal:

Would it be ridiculous to imagine that party branches and sympathetic independent organisations could play a greater community role? And that the party could find new sources of energy and new approaches to deal with an increasingly strange world? 23

However many from the 1975 influx made an almost-as-rapid exit. Perhaps they found branch membership did not help them 'maintain their rage'. Reflecting on this 'lost opportunity', Race Mathews emphasised the deficiencies of traditional branch life:

One of the most disheartening experiences of recent months has been the way in which the great tide of eager, enthusiastic supporters who flocked into ALP branches in November and December were allowed to flow away again by the early months of the new year ('Campaigning to Win', Labor Star, 16 April 1977).

This was partly because of the off-putting ways in which branches conducted their business. But Mathews insisted that although the 1975ers wanted to work for the ALP, no work was given to them on any 'continuing, purposeful basis'. 24

CPS 2 and CPS 3 would have solved the 'problem' of the 1975ers having nothing to do. Mathews recognised this, but his reassessment of Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1, which he had helped put together, went further. Labor would have to look at what we have termed CPS 4, if it was to draw the correct 'lessons of 1975':

306
The Party's whole reason for existence as a mechanism for social reform has been brought into question ... There is no point at present in using Parliament to promote a social democratic programme as was done so brilliantly by Whitlam between 1967 and 1972, when everyone knows that Labor Governments are allowed to hold office only so long as they forget about giving effect to their programs ... ('Getting Labor Back on the Rails', Labor Star, 23 May 1977). 25

Labor had to assemble a new coalition of the groups that were 'left outside Mr. Fraser's Australia'. This was where CPS 4 came in. The new coalition would require a new approach. Labor had to go beyond its 'familiar routine' (adopting policies, endorsing candidates, electioneering). Assembling the new coalition required:

... not simply a majority of voters but the sort of informed commitment ... which will survive setbacks such as '75 ... It entails creating a warm bond of identification between great numbers of Australians who have come to feel that all their political parties are remote from their interests and a Labor Party which demonstrates its capacity for caring to them in strictly practical terms.

The new coalition could include women, environmentalists, Aborigines, the unemployed, pensioners and Housing Commission tenants. There was a tension in Mathews' analysis between accepting the full CPS 4 logic (with Labor embracing the 'new politics') and simply adding some new categories to an older-style electoral shopping list. Even the latter approach would require considerable party reform.

Was such reform possible? Not without official encouragement and support:

Every branch member is familiar with the sort of meeting where general business is the signal for a strained silence, while people grope around desperately for something worthwhile to talk about ... Clearly, if members are going to gain opportunities of becoming better informed on policy ... and of developing their capacity
to contribute to the ALP and represent it in the wider community, there will have to be plans prepared, resources gathered and leads given ...

Marshalling members in this way might not be the best way of building the new coalition. Mathews thought 'acute political malnutrition' contributed to membership attrition.  

Mathews was not the only architect of Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1 to have second thoughts, given the 'lessons of 1975'. Another former Whitlam aide, Peter Wilenski (1980a:62) called for more careful Labor analysis of the forces it had to overcome. The party would have to ally more closely and, to a degree, share power with groups which pursued similar objectives:

This means, at the least, the development of a new party structure with a large and well-educated membership ...

Such a party could rally support for a reformist government. Wilenski also called for 'the development of a partnership with a reformed trade union movement' and careful attention to policy development and co-ordination. A new partnership with the unions and a carefully co-ordinated package of cautious reforms were possible without 'party renewal'. Wilenski (1980b:399) argued that the extent of change in the ALP's 'structure, approach and methods' was an important determinant of the extent to which reform of state and society in Australia could proceed.  

He called for a reorientation of ALP activity towards 'wider community education', countering 'the dominant ideological values' (Wilenski, 1980b:411-2). This was another 'lesson of 1975'. The problem had not been poor PR or
the Cabinet's failure to 'explain' the programme:

The problem lies in the very nature of the Labor Party ... whose raison d'être lies primarily with the selection of candidates for political office and in organising campaigns at election time, and secondly (and fairly far behind) in the formulation of policies ... Unlike the great European parties of the left, the ALP has never seen as one of its primary purposes the political education either of its own members or of the population as a whole (Wilenski, 1980b:412).

Submissions to the NCI drew similar 'lessons of 1975'. Mt. Druitt North branch (NSW) thought the 'Canberra party' lost touch with Labor's 'mass popular base' (Submission 311). Labor's structure was not geared towards 'influencing public debate outside Parliament' (Chris Bain, Submission 237). It was highly centralised and heavily bureaucratised:

... hierarchical, rule-bound, preoccupied with preserving internal positions of power, inflexible. The consequences of this are low membership involvement, low recruitment, poor public image, and often policies inappropriate to the current generation of members and voters.

Bundeena branch (NSW) wanted a thoroughgoing CPS to counter 'big business' power:

A well directed campaign conducted by local branches in their communities over a number of years will undoubtedly ensure the permanence of reforms (Submission 225).

There was some irony in these 'lessons of 1975'. Whitlam had crusaded for 'party reform' and 'membership participation' in the 1960s. Yet, notwithstanding later myths, Labor's 1972 policies were worked out under Whitlam's aegis, by a small coterie gathered around him, which included both Mathews and Wilenski (see Walter, 1986). The party was largely by-passed. The policies:

... were not fully absorbed by the party as a whole, often not fully understood and rarely deeply felt ... (Freudenberg, 1977:111).
Labor in government failed to make use of 'the policy contributions dormant among rank-and-filers' (D. Stephens, 1979:490-1). The Whitlam approach privileged 'expertise' over 'common sense' and user experience of community services.

ALP mythology presented the '1972 policies' differently. Perhaps the events of 1975 gave the '1972 policies' a spurious retrospective radicalism. Tom Uren invoked the '1972 policies' myth (Submission 171). He thought Labor lapsed into an elitist approach in 1974. This left it incapable of resisting the Dismissal and the subsequent Fraserist regime:

Labor has yet to fully commit itself to a political practice that involves the mobilisation of its own membership and the broader public. 31

The '1972 policies' myth was invoked in arguments which went beyond the logic of Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1 (which did not suddenly become elitist in 1974). CPS 4 had not been part of the '1972 policies'. The left emphasised CPS 4 as a 'lesson of 1975'. This can be seen in a submission signed by thirty Caucus members (Submission 70).32 This argued that major corporations and financial institutions determined Australian development.33 Parliamentary control could only be restored in tandem with a strong commitment to involvement in extra-parliamentary social and political movements:

Conscription struggles (1917 and 1960s), the struggle against War, particularly in Vietnam, and racism, the ecological movements, the movements against uranium mining and the women's movement are some of the more notable grass-root activities ...

Such activities were 'an essential ingredient' in the process of 'defining a new strategy for the Labor Movement'.34
Left support for CPS 4 was ambiguous. In the 1960s, the left had opposed party reform to protect its 'numbers' on the federal bodies. The Vietnam Moratorium campaign infused it with new elements. 'New social movements' began to transform its constituency. However, the left's own political practice, including its continued fondness for 'numbers' manoeuvres, was vulnerable to 'new social movement' critique. The left under-estimated the extent to which CPS 4 required it as a faction, as well as the ALP as a party, to find new ways of practising politics. 'New social movements' embodied a critique of 'mechanical thinking and manoeuvring practice' in established political institutions (Williams, 1983:250). Crouch (1976:2) had referred to a general 'movement away from established institutions of participation' (especially parties) to alternatives including 'ad hoc community level or unofficial groupings'. 'Participatory-critical' orientations might lead to an alienation from political parties as institutions. Participatory values encourage:

... self-directed political behaviour and independence from elite-controlled hierarchical institutions, such as political parties (Flanagan and Dalton, 1984:16).

The post-1968 'new urban sociology' (e.g. Castells, 1977) romanticised 'urban social movements'. It relied on a crude dichotomy between (incorporated) formal and (radical) extra-formal politics (see also Hindess, 1971:152-5). Other writers insisted that 'new' informal styles of politics could be articulated to party activity (see, e.g. Rustin, 1981).

For the Labor left the articulation of 'new social movement' activism to internal party factional conflicts was
immerse itself in 'real economic and political struggles' (Uren, 1978:34-5). Labor activists should draw on their experience in the workplace, community groups and 'action groups like the anti-uranium movement' to fashion 'a socialist role and a socialist set of policies' for itself. In this version of CPS 4 'our community groups' and 'our action groups' save Labor's 'socialist' soul. What would 'new social movements' think about being tacked on to an 'anti-transnational-corporation coalition', already defined by the Labor left, which assumed their specific concerns could be subsumed into the grand project? Were there contradictions between the left's apparent openness to 'new social movements' and its practice inside the ALP?

The Victorian Branch combined its endorsement of CPS 4 with a rejection:

... of the planned and orchestrated campaign to attack Labor's nexus with the unions and to identify the party with a style of European social democracy whose traditions and aspirations are not identifiable with the Australian movement, and who, in some instances, now stand for the worst features of transnational penetration and foreign intelligence manipulation (Resolution forwarded in Submissions 250 and 251, Auburn branch and Ballarat FEA). 39

Such an approach failed to distinguish between the Labor Managerialism of Carr and Button (wary of CPS 4) and Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2, as explored by Mathews and Wilenski. Both were rejected as alien 'social democratic' infections attacking a healthy, socialist ALP, a strange picture, to say the least, given the party's record (see Love, 1984).

Labor government pursuit of 'socialist initiatives' through the 'capitalist state', backed up by mass mobilisation outside. This had proved beyond Labor in the past. The ALP was:

... generally better adapted to fighting a defensive struggle within capitalist society than to transforming it (Connell, 1978:16). 41

Labor Party members dissipated energy and enthusiasm 'just keeping the machine ticking over', with 'boring branch meetings' and 'remarkably cumbersome' policy-making procedures. Parliamentary activity 'should be simply the tip of the iceberg'. Connell absorbed 'new social movement' priorities into a 'class conflict' model of society, urging the ALP to concentrate on 'the point of immediate class conflict' at work and in neighbourhoods. This glossed over the way 'new social movement' politics defied easy 'class' categorisation. Connell believed the ALP could learn a lot from the women's movement (see also Magarey, 1983).

Alongside Labor's post-mortem there was a big internal debate in the Communist Party of Australia. It culminated in the adoption of Towards Socialism in Australia (CPA, 1979) at the CPA's National Congress in June 1979. The CPA and ALP debates covered some common terrain. Towards Socialism in Australia placed great emphasis on 'new social movements', linking their emergence to developments in capitalism such as consumerism and the consolidation of the welfare state.

The CPA criticised the ALP's remoteness from 'new social movement' politics. Labor Party branches were 'almost wholly geared for electoral work' (CPA, 1979:34). However, the CPA grudgingly conceded that:
... a significant proportion of the activists of most mass movements as well as the trade unions is made up by members of the Labor Party.

ALP members who were also 'new social movement' activists sometimes found the two roles conflicted. This could be resolved by 'exit' from the ALP as well as by the 'voicing' of movement concerns within the party. It was quite likely that many left the ALP:

... to move into groups that provide a more immediate feedback and offer a more dignified and involving role. The environment movement, civil liberties groups, the women's movement, community action groups and so on contain some of the most active and skilled 'politicians' in the country (Johns, 1983:123-4).

This 'problem' was brought to the attention of the NCI.

Randwick North branch hoped special ALP projects might 'stop the drain of active, concerned citizens into one-issue groups' (Submission 166). Jena Hamilton (Carlton North branch, Vic.) went one step further (Submission 259). Local branches could be abolished altogether and replaced by various membership special interest groups. Drastic change was necessary:

There is a ... consensus ... that the ALP, to be effective in gaining electoral support should have more of a 'seen presence' in the community ... this cannot happen given the current structuring of the local branches.

The branches were not fulfilling 'the roles ascribed to them'. They did not engender 'any emotional commitment'. Revamped FEAs could carry out electoral tasks and co-ordinate the special interest groups.47
'Grass-Roots' Revitalisation: 'Legitimation' versus Manageability, NCI Dilemma

National Conference reform and 'community presence' were the party revitalisation measures favoured by the NCI. DP 1 presented an expanded National Conference (with direct FEC and federal union representation) as a 'solution' to the 'problem' of 'membership alienation' (APSA, 1979:8). The ALP claimed to be a mass party but its National Conference involved 'a relatively small group of Party leaders'. This was a re-run of Whitlam's 1960s rhetoric, as was the NCI's dismissal of Labor's 'horse and buggy' federalism. There were newer arguments. Conference reform could reflect the growth of multi-culturalism and changes in women's aspirations. The NCI also noted 'changed expectations' in the community with regard to 'participation in public life' (APSA, 1979:8). Australian apathy was declining (Aitkin, 1982:273).

Affirmative action for women (in particular), 'ethnics' and youth should be built into the new Conference structure. The diversity of affiliated unions should be recognised. DP 1 also advocated some state Branch and FPLP representation. Various Conference reform formulae were noted. DP 1 concluded that further developments would depend on the active participation of all interested ALP members (APSA, 1979:12). The electorate would judge the ALP on the quality of the subsequent debate. One wonders whether the committee was more naive on the party or on the electorate.

Groupings within the ALP took a while to respond to the NCI suggestions. The question about which faction would control a reformed Conference eventually became uppermost (John
Button, 'National Conference Structure', Challenge, November 1978). Button complained that such 'interested traditional thinking' distrusted the party membership. It was a powerful force within the party, powerful enough to cool left-wing enthusiasm for unpredictable new 'participatory-critical' ways, over tried and trusted practices.

Labor Managerialism had its own party reform dilemmas. An expanded Conference could be a PR spectacular, but it might be harder 'to manage than the present one' (Bob Carr, 'Labor Believes It's Time for Self-Change', Bulletin, 6 June 1978). Some ALP managers feared 'party renewal' as a threat to 'moderate ballast' on the National Executive and an obstruction in state election campaigns. The impression of 'party reform' might improve the party's PR, with assumed attendant electoral benefits. Its substance, on the other hand, could threaten party manageability, a supreme value to party managers. State head offices frowned on 'too much unsupervised or unusual' activity at the branch level (Walker, 1980:332). On the other hand, party managers had to offer:

... incentives to keep the members interested enough to perform the routine tasks at election time. 53

This dilemma is a general one for competitive western parties (Wolfe, 1977:308-9). The logic of maintaining party manageability leads to membership de-activation and depoliticisation. Maintaining party morale and internal 'legitimation', on the other hand, requires some mobilisation of members and supporters. Although parties generally sacrifice 'legitimation' for 'depoliticisation', Wolfe insists, this tension gives them 'a schizophrenic character'.
Party reformers try to iron out the inconsistencies, striving for managerial 'depoliticisation' or participatory 'legitimation':

Whether proposals to 'reform' the parties will succeed in restoring to them a working depoliticisation or whether their delegitimation will constitute a breakthrough for genuine politics are questions that are being fought out now. 55

Political struggles 'in late capitalism' were 'not between the parties, but over them'. Within the ALP, depoliticising 'managerial' change tended to proceed incrementally, without explicit debate. 'Participatory' reforms were talked about more (and they were talked about in 'rationalistic idealist' terms). Such was the way of party 'legitimation'.

The NCI's review of local branch performance was unsentimental and showed some 'depoliticising' managerialist assumptions. Indeed, one review of DP 3 was headlined 'ALP Inquiry Blasts Grass-Roots Lethargy' (Gary O'Neill, Australian, 26 August 1978). DP 3 noted that branches contributed little to policy-formulation or general campaigning. Their fundraising was tied to the electoral cycle. They bored the few members they managed to attract. Their activity had little effect on electoral outcomes, but objective assessment of their overall performance was difficult. The NCI was unsure whether branch members were actually interested in policy matters. Party 'legitimation' myths had to assume they were. Yet branch members were remonstrated with for their poor knowledge of ALP policy and Australian political events (APSA, 1979:24).

The NCI wavered between resignedly ascribing this 'problem' to inherent membership ignorance and seeing it as a consequence of weaknesses in the party structure. Branch
debate, the committee admitted, could sometimes be 'stimulating', but subsequent motions had 'nowhere to go'. State secretaries and policy committees rarely told branches how their resolutions fared. The NCI's recognition of such limitations suggests its Conference reform project involved symbolic rather than substantial party 'legitimation'. Local units were represented at state conferences. This facilitated some discussion, but branches could hardly:

... function for 11 months of the year gearing themselves for the annual conference elections (APSA, 1979:25).

Could FECs spend 23 months of every 24, holding their breath for the election of their National Conference delegate? The NCI failed to pursue this question. Complementary measures that could integrate Conference reform with a thorough 'legitimation'/'re-politicisation' exercise were ignored. DP 3 did, however, float the suggestion of abolishing traditional branches (APSA, 1979:26) so that the 'grass-roots' ALP could:

... liberate the same level of energy, enthusiasm and dedication found in women's rights, black power, anti-conscription, anti-uranium, civil liberties, anti-freeway groups etc.

Serious pursuit of such a project would require a more thorough reorientation of the party than the NCI envisaged.

However managerial its logic, a committee set up to investigate ways of facilitating 'grass-roots' party renewal could hardly conclude that campaigning should be left to the professionals, leaving the 'grass-roots' to wither away. The NCI's core concept for branch revitalisation was the gloriously ambiguous notion of 'community presence through community involvement' (APSA, 1979:27). Although targeted towards branch
fulfilment of electoral, financial and policy communication goals, the CPS favoured by the committee seemed reasonably radical. It entailed 'community group involvement', but also suggested an infusion of 'new social movement' activists could enliven the branches:

There is the basis within the existing local branch/federal electorate organisation unit to accommodate single-issue groups, whether concerned with policy issues or public consciousness type activities (APSA, 1979:27).

Such groups could be given formal ALP recognition. Activity within them could count towards ALP 'membership attendance requirements' (for eligibility to participate in party ballots). This was a rather pious hope. Whether the groups implied would want to link up so formally with even a vastly transformed ALP was extremely doubtful. Allowing activity in such groups to count towards ALP preselection requirements could have considerable nuisance potential for both the party and the movements.

As a symbol of Labor CPS aspirations, and an incidental indication of the committee's tendency to rather mechanistic thinking about organisational 'problems', the NCI called on ALP branches to work towards the purchase of 'a permanent headquarters and meeting place' (APSA, 1979:26). Old Wyndham stand-bys (better servicing from state head offices, courses for branch officials etc.) were invoked to help branches with the CPS. The NCI also endorsed the calls for more 'social' activities in the branches. The Victorian experiment with 'ethnic' branches (see Allan, 1978) was praised. The NCI also endorsed rotation of officers and affirmative action at branch level. Wyndham's 'modernisation'
rhetoric was revived in the NCI's attack on branch ritualism.

The NCI was confident that reformed local branches could revitalise the party (APSA, 1979:30). For branches to do this, they had to be better integrated within the party's 'management structure'. This was where contradictions emerged in the NCI's 'legitimation' project. The very 'culture of apolitisme' at the branch level made it easier to integrate the party management structure. Full-scale 'legitimation' was anathema to the party managers, who were quite happy when the logic of 'depoliticisation' dampened down membership expectations. Insofar as parties concentrated on providing personnel for the key elected positions within 'the state', such 'depoliticisation' seemed to make sense. But parties were also arenas for the articulation of concerns that arose within 'civil society'. Here 'legitimation' could not be ignored so easily.

12D Conference Reform: 'Pseudo-Legitimation'

Responses to DPs 1 and 3 were generally supportive, often effusively so. Various formulae for FEC representation at Conference were considered. Hughes FEC was prepared to go further than the NCI, suggesting two federal delegates for each federal union delegate (DP 1, Response 60). Muswellbrook branch (NSW) revived the idea of regular membershipballotting on policy matters, which DP 1 had ignored (DP 1, Response 9).

There were discordant voices. Some opposed affirmative action. Greystanes branch (WA) thought Conference enlargement would still leave only an elite represented. Colin Jamieson MLA (WA), a long-serving Labor
politician also prominent on the organisational side, challenged NCI rhetoric head-on, with a realpolitik note:

There is no way, repeat no way, where rank and file can possibly be included in a National Conference (DP 1, Response 6).

There were fewer responses to DP 3, but they were much more detailed. DP 1 was more amenable to treatment/mistreatment by 'resolutionary' methods. DP 3 responses seem more informed. But their tone, too, tended to vary only from the supportive to the enthusiastic.

Responses tended to prefer CPS 2 ('community group involvement') to CPS 4 ('extra-parliamentary/new social movement'). Mt. Colah/Berowra branch, from safe Liberal territory in Sydney proudly proclaimed its members' 'leading role' in the creation of a community centre, a local high school and old age pensioner assistance schemes (DP 3, Response 17). Diamond Creek branch (Vic.) thought Labor could rehabilitate itself with the electorate through non-partisan, non-controversial community service projects:

If the community recognises the ALP ... as a positive force, then the acceptance of our controversial policies may be enhanced ... (DP 3, Response).

Carrying this further, and echoing an older Laborism, D. King (Tas) attacked the whole idea of liaison with 'new social movements':

If branches were replaced by groups who are generally involved in some controversial matter such as uranium, women's lib etc., this would only cause dissension and failure (DP 3, Response 3).

Rejection of any suggestion that local branches should be abolished recurred in the responses. The idea seemed to touch some raw branch nerve.
Given its wide-ranging criticisms of local branches, the NCI received surprisingly few brickbats. Wentworthville branch (NSW) complained that the NCI exercise exemplified 'poor communication' within the ALP, between 'a far-removed bureaucratic structure and the grass roots' (DP 3, Response). 67 In a classic illustration of the clash between the imperatives of short-term routine and aspirations for a long-term reorganisation, Macquarie FEC pointed out that NSW branches had been 'heavily involved in a state election' during the period allotted for discussion (DP 3, Response). Randwick North branch (NSW) thought negative NCI attitudes indicated a low evaluation of so-called 'traditional' branch activities. It feared that the NCI, like NSW head office, favoured 'the complete de-politicisation of branches'. Randwick North weakened its critique, however, by conceding that its own members were 'ignorant of all but local political scenes'.

Chris Bain (Vic) was more critical (DP 3, Response 20), arguing DP 3 misunderstood the real dynamics of local branches. Its recommendations were 'vague and wishy washy'. The NCI's CPS was 'well-intentioned waffle'. Bain made some telling criticisms of poorly researched and poorly thought out NCI suggestions. 68 Most branches could not afford to rent, let alone buy, their own buildings. Bain wanted branches' policy input upgraded, although he believed many members had little interest in policy-formulation. 'A balance between elite and populist forms of decision-making' was needed. Interaction between parliamentarians and the party membership was important for those who had 'little reinforcement for their views elsewhere'. It was 'possibly the major role of branches at
The relevant sections of the NCI Report (ALP, 1979) re-traverse ground covered in DPs 1 and 3. The NCI was pursuing its own agenda. Its main arguments had been outlined in the DPs. Subsequent 'dialogue' had little effect. The final Report did contain some subtle differences of emphasis. National Conference reform was explicitly presented as a way to counteract members' feelings of being 'cut off', of having little impact (ALP, 1979:3). The extension of Conference reform to the national policy committees and circulation of the agenda had already been filtered out, by being omitted from DP 1. The Report did make one interesting new suggestion to overcome the potential unwieldiness of an enlarged Conference. Plenary sessions could be restricted to 'major controversial items' (ALP, 1979:22). Committee sessions could cover remaining topics. Even more strongly than DP 1, the Report presented Conference reform as a matter of symbolic rather than substantial party 'legitimation' (ALP, 1979:24). We could call this 'pseudo-legitimation'.

The Report preferred one delegate from each FEC to 'grass-roots' representation in enlarged state delegations. Affirmative action would be easier in the latter case, but the NCI invoked 'a rank and file fear' that indirect election 'would permit manipulation and encourage factionalism'. DP 1 had canvassed fairer representation of the major factions in each state as one advantage of an enlarged but still indirectly elected Conference, especially with proportional representation (APSA, 1979:11). The NCI's 'rationalistic idealism' generally led it away from acknowledging internal ALP realpolitik. It
either studiously ignored factionalism or condemned it. The NCI's allusion to anti-factionalist sentiment in the submissions was slightly misleading. The reference justified the NCI's own preconceptions. 'Anti-factionalism' was not a major 'grass-roots' theme, although it did surface in some submissions. East Sydney branch called on all ALP members to continually examine whether they were 'concentrating too much on internal matters and private empire-building' at the expense of expounding Labor's 'broad and worthwhile ideals' to 'the community at large' (Submission 299). The submissions, like the NCI, tended to forget the realpolitik conflicts that always co-existed with grand designs in a 'complex arena' like the ALP. Parties examining themselves are prone to the curse of over-simplification (Blondel, 1978:186).

The NCI's simplistic 'rationalistic idealism' accounted for its assumptions that factionalism varied in inverse proportion to party democratisation and that Conference reform could transcend factional divisions. Its contrast between 'factional polarisation' and 'judging issues on their merits' (ALP, 1979:24) begged many questions. As political scientist Andrew Parkin (1983:15) points out, one cannot fully understand the ALP without appreciating 'the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and impediments' caused by its 'organisational complexity'. This complexity 'produces a jumble of levels, lines and linkages', often sorted out only by factional alignments. The interstices of 'complex arenas' like the ALP often provide breeding-grounds for factionalism!

Alongside 124 FEC delegates, the NCI favoured equal representation for federal unions (see Table 2). This might
revitalise the party-union relationship at the national level (ALP, 1979:24) and thus 'relegitimate' the union affiliation mechanism. The NCI was also quick to point out the PR benefits of a public display that affiliated unions were not monolithic and represented a diversity of interests. Table 2 sketches out how the NCI built in a federal component, FPLP representation and Australian Young Labor into its plan for a 310-delegate Conference.

Table 2
NCI Conference Reform Formula

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FPLP delegates</th>
<th>124</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal union delegates</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Branches</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPLP</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Young Labor</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 6 from each state, 2 from each territory (with statutory places for each state and territory parliamentary leader).

** From the FPLP Executive.

Source: ALP, 1979

The NCI provided for a bloc of FPLP delegates but federal parliamentarians would be ineligible for FEC delegateships (ALP, 1979:26). This was a concession to 'Rank-and-file rights' sentiment. When Wyndham and Whitlam talked about FEC representation in the 1960s such an exclusion of federal parliamentarians was never mentioned. The NCI took
party 'legitimation' more seriously than Whitlam and Wyndham did. 'Participatory-critical' demands within the party had increased in the meantime. 'New social movements' had made their mark. The NCI Report insisted that 'at the very least', the ALP had to respond to demands from women 'for more effective representation' (ALP, 1979:25-6). It recommended that, at least once in every three Conferences, each FEC should be represented by a woman. The Report backed away from affirmative action to secure more 'ethnic' balance. Its affirmative action proposal was rather mild. Union, state and FPLP delegates would not be affected. One-third of the FEC delegates accounted for only about 13 percent of the envisaged Conference. The Report left responsibility for branch revitalisation and the CPS in the hands of the National Secretariat. The suggestion that 'community' and 'new social movement' activity could count for preselection requirements was dropped.

Political parties, as 'complex arenas', can seem rather Janus-faced institutions. Particularly in parties with pretensions to internal democracy, contradictions often occur between managerial preferences for a 'depoliticised' membership and projects aimed at internal 'legitimation', through organisational renewal. Social democratic parties found their normally complex internal situations made even more complex in the 1970s. Previously successful formulae were challenged with economic difficulties and 'participatory-critical' membership demands:

In the 1970s, policy-making and policy-implementation in all parties, but particularly those on the Left, became a far more complex, intricate process involving the reconciliation of a greater number of
contradictory objectives and a far wider range of actors throughout the party. (Hine, 1982:51. See also Hine, 1986).

Increased factionalism often ensued from this intensification of the contradiction between 'depoliticisation' tendencies and new 'legitimation' projects.

This was particularly true in the ALP. Different sections of the party drew different lessons from the trauma of 1975. Those who regretted the alleged 'too far, too fast' excesses of the Whitlam era embraced Labor Managerialism and the logic of 'depoliticisation'. In a party as racked with crises of morale as the ALP was in early 1978, such an approach was advocated in coded language. A body like the NCI, accessible for party out-groups, was bound to be presented with the makings of a new 'legitimation' project in the 'problems' and 'solutions' thrown before it. And it was. What we have called Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2 crystallised a widespread mood within the party at this time, albeit one which lacked secure realpolitik anchorage.

The NCI responded to this mood, while pursuing its own agenda. It explored 'legitimation', but tended to endorse the symbols rather than the substance. To that extent, it pursued 'pseudo-legitimation' rather than full-scale 'legitimation'. In many ways Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2 was a still-born project. In realpolitik terms, however, even NCI-style 'pseudo-legitimation' would disturb established ALP practices, which left the 'rank-and-file' membership fairly 'depoliticised'.

327
CHAPTER 13

PARTY RENEWAL : NATIONAL CONFERENCE

REALPOLITIK

13A National Conference Reform: The Calculus of Factional Advantage

National Conference was a crucial symbol of Labor's organisational values in the NCI's project to 'legitimate' the ALP as a dynamic, mass party. As such a symbol, it had several deficiencies. Fifty indirectly elected delegates seemed rather elitist. Strict federalism contradicted Labor's official anti-federalist aspirations and compromised Conference's democratic legitimacy. Male monopolisation of Conference obstructed attempts to redress the electoral 'gender gap'. The NCI wanted to resolve these inconsistencies. The Special Conference delegates in Melbourne in July 1981 were less worried about the symbolic significance of the institution they were attending. Their debates, at times almost brutally frank, acknowledged internal realpolitik considerations that the NCI had glossed over. Home truths emerged. State Branch and factional ' heavies' thoroughly scrutinised each proposal, often reading extensively between the lines to detect hidden dangers.

Except on affirmative action, debate on Conference reform had narrowed considerably since the completion of the NCI Report. The National Executive gave a lower priority to 'grass-roots' revitalisation than the NCI. The 'community presence strategy' only emerged at the Special Conference in a delegate's amendment to the draft new 'socialisation objective'. The key NCI idea, direct FEC and federal union representation, had been dismissed by 1981. Conference, on
the other hand, emphasised PR in the election of state delegations, which the NCI had given only cursory consideration and then rejected (APSA, 1979:11; ALP, 1979:24).

PR was important in the factional calculus. The NCI's 'rationalistic idealist' discourse discounted factional divisions and state rivalries. The Special Conference could not ignore 'numbers' realities. A lengthy debate on how the additional delegates should be allotted was a classic mini-case study of Sartori's (1976:72) dictum:

> Whatever the organisational - formal or informal - arrangement, a party is an aggregate of individuals forming constellations of rival groups.

Sartori echoed Weber's earlier observation about 'parties' living in a house of 'power' (Gerth and Mills, 1976:194). Within such houses of power, some lived "for" politics and others lived "off" politics (Gerth and Mills, 1976:84). The contrast was not exclusive. Those who lived "for" politics made politics their life 'in an internal sense', either because they enjoyed 'the naked possession of power' or derived meaning from service to a 'cause'. Both those who lived "off" politics and those who lived "for" politics-as-power would be at home with *realpolitik* conceptions of party life, although they could speak 'rationalistic idealism' if that seemed appropriate.

Factions involve interests and ideologies as well as individuals (see D. Stephens, 1980:43-4). Changes in formal organisational arrangements affect the fortunes of rival groups, however constituted. *Realpolitik* analysis emphasises this and offers a useful corrective to 'rationalistic idealist' blindesses. *'Realpolitik realism', however, whether in the high academic Weber-Michels tradition* or in the maxims of
party figures, has its own blindesses. Conflicts within party elites over 'spoils', pace Michels (1962), do not constitute the totality of intra-party conflicts. 'Rationalistic idealism' does not simply play 'false consciousness' to the 'truth' of 'realpolitik realism'.

John Button pleaded with Special Conference delegates to consider the NCI proposals, in principle at least (ALP Transcript, 1981:134). They were based on the submissions received (ALP Transcript, 1981:135). This was disingenuous. The committee pursued its own agenda, which involved more than 'participation ideology'. Its party-managerial concerns raised questions about whether it was pursuing cosmetic reform ('pseudo-legitimation') rather than comprehensive party renewal ('legitimation'). Was Button using 'legitimation' rhetoric in the service of a 'pseudo-legitimation' project?

Many ALP organisational practices offered sitting targets for 'legitimation' rhetoric. Button detected 'great signs of nerves on all sides' about who would control a Conference reformed along NCI lines (ALP Transcript, 1981:137). Factions and state Branches feared direct FEC and federal union representation. They could not predict directly elected delegates' alignments. There was also some fear that the NCI proposals would turn Conference into a mass rally, easily disregarded by the FPLP (see Lucy, 1979:79). If Conference reform really was a public relations 'pseudo-legitimation' exercise, this was a possible outcome.

The NCI plan had no chance. Three proposals to enlarge Conference were considered seriously. Bob McMullan (WA secretary) advocated 75 delegates; David Combe, 100 (the
National Executive option) and Bob Hogg (Victorian secretary), 150. Combe and McMullan retained the existing 'base' of six delegates for each state (one for each territory). Additional delegates\(^7\) would be allotted according to size of state. Hogg's formula was slightly different. In a Conference of 150 delegates, he would extend the 'base' to ten for each state (three for each territory).\(^8\) The ensuing debate was confusing. McMullan pushed a 'small costs less' line. Hogg used NCI rhetoric. Combe's plan was extolled as a suitable compromise. Despite Hogg's rhetoric, Combe's proposal was a slightly larger break with strict federalism (see Table 1). It left 50 percent of Conference places in the new 'residual' category. The comparable Hogg figure was 48.6 percent.

The three proposals each grafted some movement towards a new national concept onto the existing federal basis.\(^9\) Delegates represented state-based factions, some of which had national networks. Hogg spoke for the national left, as well as being Victorian secretary. His high 'base' figure contradicted his NCI rhetoric, but maintained generous representation for the smallest state, Tasmania, where the left was strong (see Max Walsh, 'How the Left is Winning the Numbers', Bulletin, 28 July 1981). Yet his rhetoric was not completely misplaced. He specifically provided for a wide range of affirmative action measures in the state delegations.\(^10\) Furthermore, the larger Conference was, the less the bloc of parliamentary leaders counted for proportionately (see Table 1). This bloc accounted for 22 percent of the 1981 Conference. McMullan would reduce it to 14.66 percent; Combe, 11 percent and Hogg, 8.32 percent.\(^11\)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1981 (50)</th>
<th>WA (75)</th>
<th>Nat Exec (100)</th>
<th>Vic (150)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>State/Territory</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Base'</td>
<td>76.00</td>
<td>50.67</td>
<td>38.00</td>
<td>44.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Residuals'</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>33.33</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>48.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Australian Young Labor</strong></td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SPLP Leaders</strong></td>
<td>14.00</td>
<td>9.33</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>4.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FPLP Leaders</strong></td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>5.33</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>3.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PARLIAMENTARY LEADERS</strong></td>
<td>22.00</td>
<td>14.67</td>
<td>11.00</td>
<td>7.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OTHERS</strong></td>
<td>78.00</td>
<td>85.33</td>
<td>89.00</td>
<td>92.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>'FEDERALISED'</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>('Base' + SPLP Leaders)</td>
<td>90.00</td>
<td>60.00</td>
<td>45.00</td>
<td>48.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>'DE-FEDERALISED'</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>('Residual' + AYL + FPLP Leaders)</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>40.00</td>
<td>55.00</td>
<td>51.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two federal union contributions were placed before Conference. They received even less consideration than the NCI proposals. The AMWSU wanted to increase Conference size, while retaining strict federalism. The BWIU praised the NCI proposals, especially direct federal union representation, but recommended proceeding cautiously. Button suggested that the way these contributions were ignored further demonstrated affiliated union alienation from National Conference, which the NCI had tried to rectify (ALP Transcript, 1981:138-9).

Hogg's proposal first appeared in a draft document for the NCI, when there was considerable publicity about what the committee's first DP, on Conference reform, would contain. The committee's preference for direct representation had been gleaned (Bob Carr, 'Labor Believes It's Time for Self-Change', Bulletin, 6 June 1978). News had also filtered through that affirmative action was on the agenda. Hogg wanted to retain state Branch channels of representation (Alan Reid, 'Hawke Again in the Gun', Bulletin, 6 August 1978). Enlarged state delegations could cater for branches, unions and Labor's 'alienated' constituencies (migrants, women, blacks etc.). Hogg noted that, in ethnic and sexual terms, Labor's power structure resembled the most conservative forces in Australian society. Even blue collar workers had become a 'minority group' in the ALP, whose representation had to be guaranteed (Laurie Oakes, 'Labor Call to Cut MPs' Pull', Sun News-Pictorial, 7 July 1978). Party policy was largely determined by the articulate, the educated and the middle-class. Direct FEC representation would reinforce that trend.
Hogg drew on a widespread 'alienation' of the 'rank-and-file' from the Labor hierarchy, a feeling that also nourished the NCI's participation ideology. Hogg infused this with his faction's conception of the ALP as a 'working-class' party. He was more suspicious of the FPLP leadership than the NCI had been. National Conference had to build up as 'a form of counter pressure' on the FPLP (Alan Reid, Bulletin, 8 August 1978).

At the Special Conference, Hogg claimed his plan worked towards desirable NCI objectives, while recognising ALP complexities and the political constraints of Australian federalism (ALP Transcript, 1981:197). It was:

... not simply a question of numbers game or ... a convenient solution to the fact that we set up a national committee of inquiry or set up a national conference, we have to do something because we cannot say 50 or we will have egg all over our face ...

The state Branch channel could secure adequate 'ideological representation' (ALP Transcript, 1981:198). Delegates elected, one by one, from FECs might not match the prevailing factional balance in a Branch. 'Ideological representation' was a code word for factional balance, an important consideration, although Hogg protested his proposal:

... had nothing to do with questions of factional advantage which may or may not last (ALP Transcript, 1981:199).

Veteran Victorian Socialist Left battler Bill Hartley suggested the Hogg plan could transform the party, breaking down the remaining rigidities which occasionally prevented National Conference from really representing:

... the rank-and-file thrust of the Labor movement in general, the trade union movement and Labor Party branches (ALP Transcript, 1981:203).
Hartley brought out the concern with 'working class' interests and the suspicion of the parliamentary leadership shown in Hogg's earlier document, but not emphasised in Hogg's own speech.

Bob McMullan was less concerned with elaborate ideologies of intra-party democracy. His case was a simple managerial one. Some increase had to be agreed on or Labor would indeed get egg on its face. But cost was important. McMullan made no apology for 75 being the smallest possible number that could achieve some 'equitable representation' for the larger states (ALP Transcript, 1981:204). Of course, the smaller the increase, the more diluted the 'equitable representation'. McMullan envisaged only a small reduction in the clout of smaller states such as WA (see Table 2).

In the general debate, John Cain from the minority Victorian 'Independents' declared he was 'a direct representation man all the way' (ALP Transcript, 1981:208). Federalism made Conference a 'rotten borough'. The NCI plan had no chance, but the Hogg scheme would make things 'less rotten'. In the complex internal politics of the Victorian ALP, the Independents often aligned themselves with the Socialist Left. With Hogg, Hartley and Cain all supporting the 150-delegate Conference, it was not surprising that Centre Unity 'numbers man' Bill Landeryou opposed it. What was somewhat surprising was his apparent enthusiasm for the NCI approach. Himself a formidable factional chieftain, Landeryou thought the Special Conference was a ridiculous meeting of 'tribal chieftains' (ALP Transcript, 1981:209).
Table 2
How the Branches Would Fare Under the Different Conference Proposal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1981 (50)</th>
<th>WA (75)</th>
<th>Nat Exec* (100)</th>
<th>Vic (150)</th>
<th>Electorates</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>23.20</td>
<td>23.33</td>
<td>34.40</td>
<td>40.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vic</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>17.33</td>
<td>19.20</td>
<td>19.33</td>
<td>26.40</td>
<td>24.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qld</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>13.33</td>
<td>13.60</td>
<td>14.00</td>
<td>15.20</td>
<td>14.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>10.67</td>
<td>10.40</td>
<td>10.67</td>
<td>8.80</td>
<td>9.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WA</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>10.67</td>
<td>10.40</td>
<td>10.67</td>
<td>8.80</td>
<td>8.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tas</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>9.33</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>8.67</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>1.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>3.33**</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NT</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 76.00 84.00 88.00 92.67

* These figures assume electorates rather than membership as basis for residual delegates. This issue will be examined separately, although the final two columns above show why only NSW and SA were keen on membership-based allocation. The National Executive figures show why the 100-delegate proposal ended up producing a 99-delegate Conference (by rounding up percentages to nearest whole number).

** See Note 8.

Sources: Conference proposals - as Table 1. Membership and electorates: Warhurst, 1983:258-9 and McKerras, 1980.

'The various power-brokers' worried about how proposals would affect their own position. Landeryou noted that unions were less federalised than the ALP. His own union, the Federated Storemen and Packers' Union, had operated very successfully in ACTU politics. Perhaps he saw possibilities in the NCI combination of federal union and FEC representation.19
John Garland, one of the NCI Report's authors, championed the Hogg plan. It won general support from the left, wary of the unpredictabilities of direct representation. Garland was not averse to drawing on NCI rhetoric. Conference delegates should:

... give meaning to all the things that confronted us in 1975 and 1977 about the people's role, about the desire of the membership to be involved at a more representative and more democratic conference (ALP Transcript, 1981:213).

For the NSW right, Branch secretary Graham Richardson supported the Combe amendment. Like other party professionals, he emphasised that Labor had to avoid getting egg on its face:

After three years of investigation by a committee of inquiry, after referring to the rank and file over the last couple of years ... if all we do at this conference is increase its size from 50 to 75, we will look ridiculous.

75 was not enough of a break with federalism for the largest state. NSW also worried about cost. It contributed about 43 percent of Labor's national finance (Graham Richardson, ALP Transcript, 1981:214). Whatever happened, it was not about to get 43 percent of the delegates. Richardson queried the NCI argument that increasing the number of delegates made for more democracy. To strengthen his case, he debunked myths about state conferences. In NSW, only 'the "heavies" of the place' got to the microphone for any length of time (ALP Transcript, 1981:214). Something similar would occur at a 150-delegate National Conference. Richardson overlooked the NCI's proposal for plenary and committee Conference sessions.

Richardson suggested 100 delegates would allow 'a wider cross-section' to be represented without reaching 'the stage of being unmanageable'. 'Manageability' was a key word
for the NSW right, in the way 'ideological representation' was for the Victorian left. The NSW right wanted a Conference where it could continue to buttress 'leadership coalitions', holding the electorally pragmatic line against 'innovation and adventurism' (Lloyd, 1983:245). As former NSW Branch research officer Tom Wheelwright (1985:1) has suggested:

In so far as the Right differs from the Left in Labor politics, policy is the driving force of the Left and leadership is the driving force of the Right.

The logic of manageability and leadership coalitions is the logic of membership 'depoliticisation'. Policy-driven 'ideological representation' could lead to membership mobilisation and internal party 'legitimation'. It could also be diverted into intra-elite 'numbers' games. 'Depoliticisation' could be seen as a game for those who, in Weber's terms, lived off politics or lived for politics-as-power. 'Legitimation' would satisfy those who lived for involvement in a 'cause'. In July 1981 the managerial 'leadership coalition' held the line on Conference enlargement. In a debate dominated by paid party officials, Richardson and Combe were victorious. For the major factions, even 'pseudo-legitimation' was incompatible with ALP realpolitik.

13B Beyond a 'Who Gets What' Analysis

Presenting the doomed NCI proposals, Button stressed their 'rational base' (ALP Transcript, 1981:196). He could not find 'any other rational bases' being proposed. Encel (1979:2) saw the NCI Report as 'a feasible and rational alternative' to Labor's 'living fossil' of an organisation. Labor's 'machine' crudities often offended intellectual observers. Emy
(1974:388) complained that endemic factionalism in the ALP:

... complicates the problem of devising rational electoral strategies for gaining power. 24

Encel (1979:2) suggested the rationality and feasibility of the NCI proposals did not commend them to the Executive: 'Indeed, they may have had the opposite effect'.

The arguments and, more particularly, the alignments in Melbourne recall the operating maxim of famous Labor 'fixer' Pat Kennelly:

You may have the 1-1-logic, brother, but give me the numbers any time (see Geoffrey Barker, 'Labor Kingmaker Looks Back', Age, 22 May 1971). 25

Button proclaimed the logic of the NCI proposals, but the 'numbers' for this were very slim. Analysing the prospects of the Wyndham Report, Don Rawson (1965:25) had pointed out that in intra-party affairs organisational and constitutional principles were 'usually, and perhaps reasonably, subordinated to factional advantage'.

Party debates on rules and organisational procedures are usually accompanied by manoeuvres by different groups to maintain or expand their 'numbers'. New arrangements might advantage some groups and disadvantage others. The manoeuvring is generally not advertised as such:

In the struggle which the various groups of leaders carry on for the hegemony of the party, the concept of democracy becomes a lure which all alike employ ... It is easy to see this when we read the discussions concerning the system to be employed for the appointment of the party executive. The various tendencies manifested in this connection all aim at the same end, namely, at safeguarding the dominance of some particular group (Michels, 1962:183).

Debates on the method of electing party conference delegates can easily be read in this way. However the disjuncture
between high-blown rhetoric and mundane manoeuvring is more complex than Michels allows. Talk about democracy and party reform often is 'a lure', but it is not only a 'lure'. In the ALP, incidentally, little shame attaches to acknowledging the importance of 'safeguarding the dominance of one particular group'. Party conflicts over federalism, centralisation and decentralisation were 'of great scientific importance' to Michels (1962:200). They generated 'a notable array of theoretical concerns' alongside occasional 'valid appeals to moral conceptions'. Students had to be disabused of any notion that such conflicts were ever really for or against 'oligarchy', 'popular sovereignty' or 'the sovereignty of the party masses'. American political scientist Austin Ranney (1972:61) has argued along similar lines:

... to understand fully any particular conflict over party reform we must consider not only what the contestants said but also who they were and what they stood to gain or lose in the dispute. 26

Such a 'who gets what' analysis taps important realpolitik dimensions, but has its limitations. To go beyond them, we can draw on March and Olsen's (1983) analysis of federal bureaucratic reorganisation projects in the USA. In the US federal bureaucracy, formal reorganisation attempts accounted for only a small proportion of change. Change was generally incremental. However, the idea of comprehensive reorganisation was constantly resurrected. There were thus many such attempts. They generated two recurring 'stories': orthodox administrative theory and realpolitik. A story of planning, efficiency, economy and control and a story of conflicts, coalitions, deals and pay-offs:
... the litany of interests, politics, bargaining and power is as stylized as the litany of coordination, chains of command, authority and responsibility ... Most knowledgeable administrators and other political actors as well as students of administration and organization know both rhetorics and recite one or other when appropriate (March and Olsen, 1983:284).

There are parallels and divergences in party reorganisation. In many parties, the equivalent of orthodox administration seems to be intra-party democracy. Its litany invokes 'rank-and-file' rights, membership sovereignty and 'grass-roots' participation. This yields a participatory 'rationalistic idealism', a rhetoric of 'legitimation' for a would-be mass party. If pursued inconsistently this may be only 'pseudo-legitimation'. Parties have a second equivalent to orthodox administration. This focusses on electoral success rather than membership aspirations. Thus party reorganisations also generate a managerial 'rationalistic idealism'. As its litany directly resembles orthodox administration proper, it has a 'depoliticising' logic. Planning, efficiency, co-ordination and chains of command are invoked in the name of professional electoral campaigning.

While having very different logics, both participatory and managerial 'rationalistic idealisms' assume internal party goodwill, a preparedness to work together (whether to formulate policy or to win elections). Both downplay intra-party struggles, particularly struggles for power and spoils. Inside parties realpolitik talk balances the picture, but it does not always dare to speak its name, even in the ALP. The realpolitik standards by which a proposal may be judged are often not articulated as such, although they may be
alluded to. They are not difficult to infer. Delegates at the ALP Special Conference displayed an awareness of factional and inter-Branch *realpolitik*, but did so apologetically or to accuse opponents. Such considerations seemed to have a slight air of illegitimacy about them.

Gerald Houseman (1971:54) found it interesting that few were prepared to publicly defend the ALP's 'seemingly irrational structure' with any pride. The structure had strong roots in Labor history:

The unrepresentative character and other problems of the structure were readily admitted even by those who would not want it changed. No one offered, even when questioned, any defence ... (Houseman, 1971:55).

Despite this, the structure offered 'some advantages' to 'special interests in the ALP'. The federal bodies provided 'an area of relative intimacy and discretion' for 'compromise and bargaining'.

Special interests in the ALP are very concerned with their own advantage, but this cannot always be stated openly. Sartori (1976:77) has noted the problem of 'camouflage' in intra-party debate:

A faction of interest does not declare to be such, to be nothing but a power or spoils group manoeuvring for place and emolument ... There are many recipes for obfuscating the real motivations (see also Michels, 1962:176; Zuckerman, 1979:108-9 and Hine, 1982:41-2).

Party reform rhetoric is not just camouflage for the manoeuvres of factions, special interests and ambitious individuals. As March and Olsen (1983:292) point out:

... the long-run development of political institutions is less a product of intentions, plans and consistent decisions than incremental adaptation to changing problems within gradually evolving structures of meaning. 28
This is how change occurs within 'complex arenas'. Social change may throw up new 'problems' for parties, but the diagnosis of those 'problems' and the 'solutions' offered are a matter of internal conflict. Much of that internal conflict can be explained in realpolitik terms, but 'rationalistic idealist' argument can affect structures of meaning within parties. Party debates are limited by available forms of political calculation and evaluation (Hindess, 1984:272). 'Rationalistic idealism' can introduce new forms of evaluation.

Those who calculate the 'numbers' cannot completely ignore reorganisation proposals:

Reorganization studies provide concepts and ideas; they keep theories and proposals alive. They create precedents. They develop a logic of argument that is carried over to subsequent reorganization efforts. They develop 'solutions' waiting for 'problems' and circumstances ... Each of these occurs over relatively long time periods, and the relevant ideas evolve in a subtle way over a series of experiences (March and Olsen, 1983:288-9).

The Wyndham Report and the NCI Report, which recycled many of its recommendations fourteen years later, had some impact on the terms of debate within the ALP. At the 1967 and 1981 Conferences, this took second place to shorter-term realpolitik considerations and contingent circumstances.

Incremental decisions can account for more organisational change than specially commissioned reorganisation projects. The case of PR in the election of state delegates to ALP National Conference exemplifies this. Wyndham had not considered it and it was very peripheral to the NCI, which rejected the idea. The adoption of PR as a new official party norm in 1981, a substantial organisational change, was the culmination of a series of incremental steps.
In the previous eleven years, incrementally 'solving' various 'problems', PR had been institutionalised in four states.

To understand the 1981 debate, we have to look at these episodes. PR was part of a package imposed by the Federal Executive on Victoria and NSW in 1970-71 (see Walker, 1971). Intervention was mainly aimed at Whitlam's old Victorian foes. The Victorian 'machine' was sacked. Key NSW personnel held their positions, but had some constraints imposed. Intervention was a classic realpolitik exercise, consolidating a new dominant coalition on the Federal Executive and removing what was seen as an electoral embarrassment. As is usual with such exercises, there was an accompanying 'rationalistic idealist' rhetoric. This justified new arrangements in the two biggest Branches in terms of:

... greater rank and file participation, lessening of executive authority and greater representation for differing points of view ... (Walker, 1971:33).

The 'legitimation' such rhetoric could offer was somewhat compromised. Those who deployed it outside Victoria and NSW tended to assume it had no relevance in their own states.

The realpolitik exercise of 1970-71 made the ALP safe for Whitlam's Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1. In that respect, it was more significant than the Adelaide compromise on 'party reform' in 1967. Some commentators thought Labor factionalism was declining in the early 1970s (see, e.g. Emy, 1974:405). Emy (1974:391, 443-4) suggested that the ALP, like other Australian parties, was 'modernising' in response to 'social change'. Labor factionalism was not dying, however, but finding new forms.
The deposed Victorians became an 'out-group' reconciled to PR (see R. Smith, 1974). Soon Hartley was welcoming an emerging disregard for state borders 'within the ALP theatre' (quoted, Laurie Oakes, 'Will the Cure be Worse than the Disease?', Sunday Mail, 20 June 1971). In 1976, the Tasmanian Branch accepted PR, when an extensive internal reorganisation followed considerable turmoil (Davis, 1983:191). PR was secured in Queensland, by federal intervention, in 1980. The NSW right were the main defenders of the Queensland 'old guard'. They had never fully reconciled themselves to PR. They tried to circumvent its implications whenever possible (see Lucy, 1985:343-4; Tom Wheelwright, 1985:4).

NSW officials argued PR would institutionalise factional divisions in Queensland (see Stuart Simson, 'The New Hayden: Party Strongman and Vote Getter', National Times, 1 October 1979). Whether PR 'causes' factionalism has been debated academically. Sartori (1976:93-7) suggests PR creates structural incentives for 'factions of convenience' fighting for places on tickets (see also Zuckerman, 1979:111-2). 'Factions of convenience' existed in the ALP before 1970-71. They revolved around the dominant 'machines' in each state, who drew up their own tickets. 'Out-groups' could expect little. Objections to PR usually rested on a yearning for the winner-take-all days of unfettered Branch 'machines'.

With equal-sized delegations and four states divided by PR, the two non-PR states could be decisive, acting in concert as blocs. The 'socialisation objective' debate was largely determined by such orchestrated SA and WA 'machine'
manoeuvres. The PR debate focussed on these states. The National Executive accepted PR in principle. Implementation could be negotiated. The left wanted a tighter timetable. This worried SA more than WA. Its much vaunted 'consensus' was fraying. Losing state government in 1979 began a traumatic period. The National Executive formulation allowed SA to buy time. Against that, Bob Hogg insisted that anything less than PR in time for the 1982 Conference would not satisfy 'a lot of delegates around here' (ALP Transcript, 1981:146). Assurances that SA and WA would fall into line were not enough. 'Good faith' could not be assumed. Talk of 'consensus' was suspect. It was a form of 'paternalistic' PR. Why not have PR proper? Delegates agreed to PR by 1982, following an indication that WA could live with the idea. This was an important decision, facilitating the emergence of national factions (see Lloyd and Swan, 1987), although such factions could still fragment along state lines (Lucy, 1985:347). PR was adopted incrementally. The fact that the final step was taken at a Conference ostensibly called to deal with NCI proposals was largely coincidental.

13C But Who Did Get What? (Case Study)

Two formulae were on offer for the allocation of the additional delegates to the states; one based on the number of federal electorates in a state, the other on fees paid to the National Executive. These fees were calculated according to membership (direct and indirect). Realpolitik factors dominated the alignments, which can largely be deduced from the cost-benefit analysis for each Branch outlined in Table 3. The
major exception, again easily explicable in realpolitik terms, was when an 'out' faction opposed additional representation for its Branch (as did the NSW left).

Table 3
Cost-Benefit Analysis for Branches of Basing Increases on Membership rather than Federal Electorates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percentage *</th>
<th>Conference Places **</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>+ 6.31</td>
<td>+ 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vic</td>
<td>- 1.42</td>
<td>- 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qld</td>
<td>- 1.11</td>
<td>- 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>+ 0.44</td>
<td>+ 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WA</td>
<td>- 0.44</td>
<td>same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tas</td>
<td>- 2.16</td>
<td>- 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>- 1.19</td>
<td>- 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NT</td>
<td>- 0.43</td>
<td>same</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Calculated from figures in Table 2

** Calculated from figures in note

The left supported the federal electorates formula. Victorian secretary Hogg claimed it was closer to the spirit of the NCI (ALP Transcript, 1981:249). For historical reasons going back to the 1954-55 Split, Victorian membership was proportionately lower than that in NSW. 'Marginally wealthier' states should not be able to buy extra representation (Bob Hogg, ALP Transcript, 1981:250). Fee-based allocation would not inspire membership recruitment or new union affiliations. Intra-state factional manoeuvres provided sufficient incentive:

The numbers game is played out at the state level, every day of the week, 365 days a year - not every two years at a national conference.
Organisational maintenance was assured. Of course, union affiliations that threatened the balance of power within a Branch were not encouraged by dominant factions (see Rawson, 1981:35).

Opponents of the fees proposal stressed that it was open to abuse. Branch records could be manipulated. Federal electorates, set outside the party, could not be 'rorted' (see Bob Hogg, ALP Transcript, 1981:252). John Green from Tasmania, another relatively low-membership state, took up this theme. There was no uniformity in the way states counted members (ALP Transcript, 1981:257-8).

Wyndham's plea for standardised national procedures had gone unheeded. It was not even revived by the NCI. State secretaries were still reluctant to hand over membership data to the National Secretariat (Solomon, 1980:322).

'Rationalistic idealist' expectations about the use of information in organisations can be misleading:

Most information that is generated and processed in an organization is subject to misrepresentation. Information is gathered in a context of conflict of interest and with consciousness of decision making (Feldman and March, 1981:176). Some kinds of information can be over-supplied, other kinds withheld. State executives controlled the flow of much information in the ALP. Standardised national procedures seemed beyond the pale of Labor realpolitik. In 1979, David Combe dismissed Tasmanian calls for such procedures as being in the 'if pigs could fly' category (ALP Transcript, 1979:648). Apart from the problems of 'rorted' membership data, ALP 'membership' was a rather elusive category:

A member of the Labor Party can be everything from that precious person who goes along to the
twelve branch meetings a year, is an electorate council delegate and gives up almost all of their free time - to the detriment of their health and happiness - to further the cause of Labor. You could also go to the person who is nothing more than a digit on a branch membership book, who makes no contribution at all (Rod Cavalier, ALP Transcript, 1981:260).

That was only the direct membership. The 'indirect' membership included many Liberal voters! Cavalier, from the NSW left, was alluding to another aspect of ALP realpolitik, the 'stacking' of branches with phantom members for preselection ballots. The fee-based proposal might encourage state head offices to 'stack' branches with passive members, by-passing the activists.48

Only NSW and SA stood to gain from fee-based allocation (see Table 3). All the speakers supporting SA secretary Chris Schacht's amendment came from these two states. SA had the highest direct membership/electors ratio of any Branch (Warhurst, 1983:258).49 This was ironic. SA was the most 'union-dominated' Branch. Schacht argued that the principle of membership sovereignty was at stake.50 Statistics could not be 'rorted':

If there are crook affiliation fees in any state, obviously some forces in those states could lay complaints or charges to the national executive (ALP Transcript, 1981:254).

Such good faith in ALP due process was not shared by all delegates.

In reply, Hogg returned to his 'lead us not into temptation' theme. Under Schacht's proposal, National Executive delegates from state A might be tempted to manoeuvre for federal intervention in state B, where factional rivals held sway. This could destabilise Branch B. Some unions might
dis-affiliate. State B's representation would then be reduced. Such a scenario seems far-fetched; in 'rationalistic idealist' terms literally inconceivable. Hogg insisted it reflected an accurate appraisal of ALP realities. Such things could occur on the 'narrowly-based' 18-member National Executive (ALP Transcript, 1981:264):

I can imagine people jockeying around for the numbers to say 'well, Jesus, if we can knock off a branch and cause a bit of disarray, we can halve their component at the national conference or at the national executive because we will certainly reduce their affiliation level' ... Do not believe that people do not think like that, because they do.

People who thought like that often found it difficult to talk like that. Factional realpolitik was often a logic that dared not speak its name. When a party finds itself faced with electoral laws which disadvantage it, it can publicly complain. Factions inside a party faced with new rules which weaken their position are often more circumspect in presenting their case. This is ironic. Rules can be more critical in the intra-party arena. Sartori (1976:95-7) contrasts 'visible' politics (electoral competition) to 'invisible' politics (factionalism). This distinction has some uses. Factional and party discourses do differ. The distinction is only relative, however. Factionalism is 'semi-visible' rather than 'invisible'. This very 'semi-visibility' contributes to the muffled and oblique way in which factional realpolitik considerations are publicly alluded to. Factional 'semi-visibility' was one reason why Conference would not be 'led into temptation' and accepted the Hogg amendment.
13D Still No Place for the 'Rank-and-File'?

An ill-prepared David Combe proposal genuflected to some NCI concerns. In the new Conference structure, a segment, say a quarter of each state delegation, could be directly elected through the branches (see ALP Transcript, 1981:195). When first put forward, this was ruled out of order as Conference size had to be settled first. Then, Combe discovered logistic flaws. Version 2 merely requested the National Executive to investigate his idea.

A very confusing debate followed. Even version 2 won little support, after being pursued half-heartedly. Schacht was not sure what it meant, but seconded it anyway (ALP Transcript, 1981:266). A reference to postal ballots in version 1 provided a red herring, to compound the confusion. Garland, who was fond of deploying NCI rhetoric, found postal ballots irksome. They were controversial in union circles.

In the ALP, the NSW Steering Committee feared measures which would swamp activists with passive members. Mick Young noted the mischief-making potentialities of postal ballots:

... God help us, as John Garland says, if we should ever fall for the trap of having postal ballots ... because that means that you will not be concentrating on building the party; you will be door-knocking ... to get votes to send your delegates along to the federal conference ... just imagine the turmoil and the chaos ... (ALP Transcript, 1981:267). 54

Young, the originator of the NCI idea, did not want any more organisational introspection. July 1981 was not December 1977. Young, unhappy with PR, opposed further new requirements for the Branches. Delegates agreed, clearly rejecting Combe's reformulated proposal.
Without any formal mechanism for 'rank-and-file' representation, the branch sector had been improving its position at Conference anyway. At the Special Conference itself, 11 delegates out of 50 (22%) came from this sector (see Table 4). In 1979, there had been eight such delegates out of 49. Back in 1965, only one out of an allegedly 'faceless' 36.

Table 4

Distribution of Delegates, 1965 and 1979-82

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Parliamentary FPLP</th>
<th>Party SPLPs</th>
<th>Party Officials</th>
<th>Union Officials</th>
<th>Other ('Rank and File')</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Combe warned delegates that without something like his proposal, Conference reform would be meaningless (ALP Transcript, 1981:195). All that would happen would be that the same people would choose more delegates:

The same people, putting on their tickets under proportional representation, more people than they have had to put on their tickets in the past.

This was partly borne out in 1982, as Table 4 shows, although there was some reduction in parliamentary representation. Rawson (1966a) noted a long-term inverse relationship between
'lay' domination of Conference and electoral success. This trend held up for the Whitlam Government (see Table 5).56 A notable increase in parliamentarians at the 1969 Conference coincided with an electoral upturn.57 In 1982 the pattern was broken. A year before the Hawke Government was elected, the first 99-delegate Conference saw a relative decline in parliamentary representation. Conference dynamics had altered considerably since the 1960s.

Table 5
Parliamentary and 'Lay' Delegates, 1955-1984

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Parliamentary Delegates</th>
<th>'Lay' Delegates</th>
<th>Total Delegates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956 (Special)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963 (Special)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966 (Special, March)</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966 (Special, June)</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973*</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981 (Special)</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Compiled from incomplete list of delegates plus press reports, possibly slightly inaccurate.

Improved branch representation was related to a reduction in women's under-representation. In 1981, there were six women delegates (12%), a higher proportion than ever before. Five of these came from the branch sector. In 1982, following affirmative action, there were 28 women (out of 99 delegates). Eighteen came from the 'rank-and-file'. This was not surprising. Males monopolised parliamentary positions and union officialdom. After affirmative action, the faction leaders were likely to find the women for their tickets from the branches.  

Table 6 documents the occupational profile of 'rank-and-file' delegates. It suggests increasing branch input was part of a wider shift from older 'labourist' patterns (see Jupp, 1982:97-100). These changes at Conference mirrored changes in the caucuses. There, members of non-manual, non-affiliated unions (teachers, public servants, other professionals and semi-professionals) had rapidly increased their representation (Rawson, 1981:42).

Conference reform allowed for a slightly broader range of 'rank-and-file' delegates (see Table 7). In 1979, only the Young Labor delegate had never been a parliamentary candidate, local government representative, union official or ALP bureaucrat. In 1981, there were four such delegates (out of 50). In 1982, 16 (out of 99). Most of these 'inexperienced' delegates in 1982 were women. Such 'political inexperience' was relative. Eight of the 16 (the three men and five of the women) were on their state executive.
### Table 6

**Occupational Background, 'Rank-and-File' Delegates, 1981-82**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Gender, Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>11 delegates</td>
<td>(data on 26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>30 delegates</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>1981</th>
<th>1982</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>LAW</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers</td>
<td>2 (m) *</td>
<td>Lawyers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4 (2f, 2m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Law student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EDUCATION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lecturer</td>
<td>1 (m)</td>
<td>Teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5 (4f, 1m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ph.D. student</td>
<td>1 (m)</td>
<td>Lecturers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 (1f, 1m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education researcher</td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td>Ph.D. student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>researcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CLERICAL/ADMINISTRATIVE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS Accountant</td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td>Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CES Officer</td>
<td>1 (m)</td>
<td>Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OTHER</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Worker</td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td>Social Worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>1 (m)</td>
<td>Journalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economist</td>
<td></td>
<td>Economist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMMERCIAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advertising</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Sales Rep</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company Rep</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FARM</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OTHER</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet Maker</td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td>Student Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>1 (f)</td>
<td>Organiser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* m: male; f: female

**Source:** ALP conference Documents, 1982 (supplemented by newspapers, electoral rolls and ALP Candidates, 1983).
Table 7

'Rank-and-File' Delegates to National Conference, 1979-82

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Parliamentary candidates</th>
<th>Local government*</th>
<th>Former Officials**</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes Mayor of Brisbane (1979); Act House of Assembly member (1981); former ACT MHA (1982, same person) and Townsville city councillor (1982).

** Includes former Victorian ALP secretary (each conference); two retired union officials (1982, both former delegates) and one former union official turned Industrial Relations lecturer (1982, female).


NCI rhetoric spoke of increased Conference representation for local branches, affiliated unions, women, rural and regional Australia and the ethnic communities (see, e.g. John Button, 'National Conference Reform', Challenge, November 1978; Neil Batt, ALP Transcript, 1979:9-10).

Conference reform accelerated the trend for more branch representation and allowed a slightly wider range of such delegates in terms of party experience, if not social class. Conference enlargement meant more union officials could become delegates, but the proportion remained almost identical. In
part, union losses were the corollary of branch gains. Changing career patterns in the ALP were also involved. Union officialdom was less of a prerequisite for a Labor political career than before (see Weller and Fraser, 1987:78). Unions themselves were employing research staff, often interested in this career structure.66

The NCI wanted the full diversity of affiliated unions reflected at Conference. Enlargement allowed a slightly wider range of affiliated unions to secure representation in 1982. No officials from non-affiliated unions became delegates.67 The NCI also noted that union officials who did make it to the indirectly elected Conference tended to be already part of the ALP elite (Branch presidents, National Executive delegates etc.). Table 8 shows Conference enlargement enabled some union officials who were not already ALP 'heavies' to become delegates. This was partly because of affirmative action. In 1979 and 1981, the union officials were all male. In 1982, there were four women, none of them party 'heavies'.68

Table 8
Union Officials at National Conference, 1979-82

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party 'Heavies'*</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\* National Executive delegate, MLC, state Branch president or vice president, secretary or other paid official.

Conference enlargement facilitated increased rural and regional representation, but the 1982 delegates were as ethnically mono-cultural as ever. Special speakers had to be injected on multi-cultural television. Bill Hayden told 1982 delegates they constituted the most representative Conference in ALP history (ALP Transcript, 1981:231). However, Conference reform meant that those drawing up tickets in the states listed more names. The insistence on PR in all states was an important change. Factional leaders drawing up tickets had to include more women and drew on a slightly wider pool of branch and union representatives. 61 percent of 1982 delegates were first-timers (as full delegates) compared to 48 percent in 1981 and 22 percent in 1979. Stability quickly re-asserted itself. The 1984 figure was 39 percent.

1982 delegates were proportionately less 'high party profile' than delegates at previous Conferences (see Table 9). This slight reduction in elitism was partly because of affirmative action. In 1982 women comprised 28 percent of total delegates; 38 percent of first-time delegates and 55 percent of the delegates without a 'high party profile'.

Table 9
National Conference Delegates, 1979-82

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>'High Party Profile'</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>42 (84%)</td>
<td>8 (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>44 (88%)</td>
<td>6 (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>70 (77%)</td>
<td>29 (29%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* MP or endorsed candidate, local government representative, National Executive delegate, state Branch president or vice president, state Branch secretary or other paid party official.

Sources: As Table 8.
The Haphazard Politics of Party Reform

Even if only as part of a 'pseudo-legitimation' exercise, the NCI integrated Conference reform into a reasonably coherent and consistent party reform project. The Special Conference took up party reform as a set of discrete issues, reduced its scope and tore it from its NCI context. NCI rhetoric was deployed to support rather un-NCI-like propositions:

While they fell so far short of the proposals of the committee of inquiry as to bear no worthwhile relationship to them, they are being heralded by the proponents of change as ushering in a new era of flux within the ALP (Mike Jacobs and Rod Wise, 'After the Talks: Hayden Invincible, Hawke Invisible', Australian Financial Review, 31 July 1981).

There had been a similar disjuncture between the Wyndham Report and the 1967 Adelaide compromise. In the array of discrete issues raised, however, some issues related to the NCI project did surface. National policy committee reform, suggested to the NCI but not taken up by it, was one such issue.

Reform of the national policy committees and related measures were raised in a set of recommendations from the AMWSU. In practice, the committees set the Conference agenda. Elected by the National Executive and dominated by parliamentarians, they were remote from the bulk of the party membership (Walker, 1975:178; D. Stephens, 1980:39-40; Lloyd, 1983:242). They dated back to 1960, ready for the 1961 Conference (Dunstan, 1962). They were the instrument through which Whitlam overhauled the Labor platform, in Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1 directions.
Before the 1977 Conference the committees were opened up a bit. This was to assist extra-party lobbies, not to facilitate referral back to the 'rank-and-file' (see Michelle Grattan, 'Labor Shuffles a Step Forward', Age, 1 February 1976; D. Stephens, 1980:41). The AMWSU wanted to amplify Labor's internal dialogue. Draft committee proposals should be circulated (John Garland, ALP Transcript, 1981:307). Responses could feed into further drafts. Such a 'sifting process' would respond to a new 'participatory' climate within the party and the Australian community which was evident to the NCI (ALP Transcript, 1981:305-6). Without policy committee reform, Conference enlargement could not lead to any nett gain in membership involvement (John Green, ALP Transcript, 1981:308). The committees were the least representative part of the ALP. Their recommendations were the party's 'best kept secret'. Conference went along with Combe's suggestion for better liaison with state policy committees (ALP Transcript, 1981:309) rather than any wider dialogue. The Metal Workers succeeded in widening FEC and union opportunities to contribute to the Conference agenda but the policy committees, by and large, would continue as before. They would remain a rather technocratic forum. Garland had neither convinced his NCI colleagues nor the Conference otherwise.

NCI proposals that were filtered out by the National Executive had minimal chances of being considered by Conference. Proposals for branch revitalisation were thus not debated as such. The 'community presence strategy' did manage to surface. A successful Tom Uren amendment to the new 'socialisation objective' provided a convenient 'garbage can'.
Uren added 'principles of action' to the objective. "Ongoing action by organised community groups" was listed as an important avenue for pursuing 'democratic socialism', which involved more than installing Labor governments (John Garland, ALP Transcript, 1981:25-6). This implied CPS 4 should be an important dimension of Labor activity.

Tribune presented the amendment as an insufficiently publicised left gain (Mark Taft, 'Labor Debates its Aims and Changes its Structure', 5 August 1981). It shifted the emphasis:

... from words on a piece of paper to popular campaigning for social change embracing a broad coalition of forces.

This was wishful thinking. The amendment could facilitate CPS 4, but its reference to community action was vague. It was another form of words on another piece of paper. Concerted local ALP involvement in anti-uranium, disarmament, feminist, gay rights, and other 'new social movement' causes would hardly follow. All the amendment meant was that those ALP branches already pursuing such involvement could now cite official ALP approval. As the NCI emphasised, Conference activity was often decidedly symbolic. If the amendment was a victory for the left it was definitely a symbolic victory. Perhaps the only kind possible without the 'numbers'.

The disjuncture between the NCI and the Conference illustrates the process of change within 'complex arenas' like the ALP. Parties are made up of different arenas, each with their own particular features. Some are relatively transient (like the NCI). Others are thoroughly institutionalised (e.g. National Conference). An 'attention vacuum' meant key party
figures treated the NCI as an irrelevant side-show. Open access threw an array of 'problems' and 'solutions' before it. The committee could deal with these as it saw fit. Concern with party morale and a good press helped the NCI ignore realpolitik factors. Conference was a more tightly structured body. Its credentialled delegates were integrated into established factional and Branch alignments. Debate focussed on the ALP platform and its internal rules. Key party figures paid the Conference assiduous attention. The organisational debates in 1981 were dominated by paid party officials (Combe, Hogg, Richardson, Schacht and McMullan). Their work immersed them in realpolitik considerations. The different discourses of the NCI and the Special Conference reflected their nature as different arenas within the party.

In the USA, Ranney (1972:139) argues that, in conflicts over party reform there, the 'expressive' values of 'purists' (participation, intra-party democracy) have generally overshadowed the 'competitive' values of 'professionals' (manageability and, above all, electoral success). But parties can change in ways not considered in formal party reform efforts. When parties formally examine internal reform (setting up special committees, commissioning reports etc.), a temporary arena may emerge for the registration of 'participation ideology'. This happened with the NCI, although it had plenty to say about 'competitive' matters as well. In such temporary arenas, 'participation ideology' protagonists may secure the odd symbolic victory. In day-to-day party practice, however, involving many undebated and unannounced incremental changes, participatory hopes for 'legitimation'
often run aground on the rocks of realpolitik, manageability and, ultimately, 'depoliticisation' (confinement of debate to a narrow range of formal and informal arenas with restricted access).
CHAPTER 14

THE POLITICS OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION:
A CASE STUDY IN LABOR/'NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENT' RELATIONS

14A Transforming the Party?

Labor responded to 'new social movements' ambiguously. The NCI hoped 'new social movement' activism could help re-invigorate the branches. The 'new social movement' organisational form, however, embodied its own critique of political parties. If Labor was to learn from these movements and build an alliance with them, considerable overhaul (of practices, priorities and policies) would be required.

In the early 1970s the distance between the ALP and the emergent 'new social movements' was surprisingly narrow:

The convergence of 'new wave' feminism and the election of a social democratic government after so long a period of conservative rule is perhaps unique in contemporary western democracies (Dowse, 1983:203-4. See also Altman, 1980:161-2; Simms, 1981a). 1

The collapse of 'Cold War liberalism' had facilitated Labor's revival (Simms, 1982:119-22). 2 The emergence of 'new social movements' at this time left its mark on Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1:

At its most ambitious, the Whitlam government sought to cater to their aspirations with programmes aimed at specific disadvantaged groups which would allow their full and equal participation in public life. In each case, accommodation was incomplete (Macintyre, 1984:12. See also Horne, 1980 and Little, 1986).

Despite talk about 'participatory democracy' and 'community development' (Game and Pringle, 1978:131; Brugger, 1986:12), Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1's attempt to extend the
scope of effective citizenship to groups neglected by traditional Laborism was developed from above. It had a legislative, parliamentary focus. Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2 wanted to go beyond that sort of elitism. The NCI was considering these questions when Labor appeared to be disavowing the Whitlam vision. It was trying to demonstrate its 'sound economic management' credentials and its political respectability. This made for a confusing picture, because 'new social movements' were making gains. Jupp (1982:111) argues Labor hardened its resistance to pressures from women, intellectuals, homosexuals, ethnics and Aboriginals in the post-Whitlam period. Yet affirmative action was not addressed until the NCI was set up and Labor's opposition to uranium mining began in 1977, at the end of the Whitlam era.

The diversity of the ALP was a major factor in its ambiguity towards 'new social movements' (Altman, 1980:160). There was some support for 'new social movements' amongst leftists and those Altman calls 'moderate reformers'. The latter tended:

... to have assimilated in varying degrees some of the main ideas of feminism, ecology, etc., although in practice they are too wary of electoral reality and too wedded to traditional power games to take these ideas to their logical conclusion. 4

Some submissions to the NCI did take such ideas to their logical conclusion. East Sydney branch thought Labor should try to promote 'realistic new values', overcoming consumerism and materialism (Submission 299):

There is now a greater awareness of urban and environmental issues. More importantly attitudes towards women and migrants are changing ...

Belmont branch (Vic) also stressed the importance of ecological
issues in building a new Labor coalition (Submission 177). In a general endorsement of what Inglehart (1977) calls 'post-materialist radicalism', Belmont branch also championed egalitarian socialism, minority rights and the promotion of women within the party.\(^5\)

It was through the notion of affirmative action, especially for women, that 'new social movements' had real impact on the NCI. It was only in the 1970s that the notion of 'demographic representation' made inroads in Australia (Sawer and Simms, 1984:17). Women, blacks and ethnic groups developed strong collective identities. The notion of 'representative bureaucracy' had been on Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1's public service reform agenda (see Hawker, 1981). Now the ALP was being asked to heal itself.

Even at branch level, the ALP was dominated by middle-aged Australian-born males (Submission 282, Drummoyne branch, NSW). This problem was compounded by the weight of affiliated unions within the party structure. Significant socially and economically disadvantaged groups were not represented by unions (Submission 148, Berwick branch, Vic):

> It is essential that representatives of disadvantaged groups be elected to the governing bodies of the party, not appointed by formal organisations ...\(^6\)

Berwick proposed an elaborate 'positive discrimination' plan to include 'working class' party members, women, Aboriginals and first-generation immigrants in conference delegations directly elected from the branches.

Not all affirmative action advocates wanted to undermine the special position of affiliated unions. The Victorian ALP wanted greater representation for \(\text{the more}\)
militant section of the community' (Alan Reid, 'Hawke Again in the Gun', Bulletin, 8 August 1978). This included 'women, union affiliates and ethnic and black minorities'. Reid saw affirmative action as a crude 'numbers' ploy by the left. He under-estimated the nature of cross-factional support for the principle. Nor was the left unanimously behind accommodating 'new social movement' concerns.

Victorian Centre Unity member Ann Forward took up the affirmative action torch within the NCI. Her own late inclusion, following the outcry over the original all-male committee, had an element of affirmative action about it. She wanted places for Aborigines, women's groups, migrants and environmentalists built into the party structure (Bob Carr, 'Labor Believes It's Time for Self-Change', Bulletin, 6 June 1978). This inclusive concept of affirmative action would institutionalise Labor/'new social movement' links. However, 'demographic representation' was not applicable to environmentalists in the same sense that it was to women, Aboriginals and migrants. 'Demographic representation' is appropriate for 'new social movements' affirming ascriptive 'naturalistic' collective identities (see Offe, 1982:60). 'Demographic representation' is not the only way in which parties can accommodate 'new social movement' concerns. Various 'networks' could be developed inside a pluralist party (see Rustin, 1985:70). They could be combined with 'demographic representation' in various ways. 'Demographic representation' by itself may be a minimal adjustment, an attempt to assimilate 'new social movement' aspirations to traditional party practices. 'New social movements' stress
autonomy and self-activity rather than delegation and representation (Offe, 1983:60). They cannot easily be absorbed into competitive party politics (Offe, 1982:59. See also Ross and Jenson, 1986:32; Berger, 1979:33). Parties, for their part, may not be all that welcoming anyway. Berger (1979:45) argues that parties of the left missed a great opportunity by failing to connect with 'the new interests and emergent values' articulated by the movements.⁹

14B No Place for Women in 'a Working Man's Party'?

Feminism was the most popular theme in NCI submissions from 'grass-roots' party units favouring Labor/'new social movement' co-operation (20 submissions). Environmentalism was referred to in seven submissions; youth and migrants in four each. There was support for 'demographic representation' of women (11 submissions). Pro-environmentalist submissions mainly referred to policy matters.¹⁰

Pro-feminist submissions took up a range of issues. Eltham branch (Vic) thought the 'conscience vote' for Labor parliamentarians (on abortion) disillusioned more party members than it placated members of the public (Submission 69).¹¹ There was considerable regret that Labor's apparent openness to feminism in 1972 had not been followed through.¹²

The lack of women candidates in winnable seats was symptomatic of the Labor sexism. It was remediable by affirmative action.¹³ More women MPs and more women branch presidents¹⁴ would not be enough, by themselves. Party discourses and mythologies had to be re-cast. Anne Field and
Ros Kelly (ACT) urged the party to reconsider its 'trade union dominated ... confrontationist and divisive' male image (Submission 241). The problem was more the way Labor's ethos occluded certain concerns rather than confrontation or divisiveness per se. It was not only women's concerns that were occluded in this way. The traditions of 'a working man's party' left little space for Aboriginals, the aged, the handicapped, immigrants, prisoners and the 'new poor' generally, as well as women to articulate their interests and assert their identities (Submission 182, Ms. M. Nicholson, NSW). The working man's party pursued reforms for women and children in a family context only. 'New social movement' concerns were difficult to present in familiar ALP discourses. Much Labor discussion was:

... couched in the jargon inherited from the party's past and/or is concerned with internal struggles for power.

This was an important point. Full-blown Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2 would require changes in the terms of internal ALP debate and party practices as well as 'demographic representation'.

A number of the submissions suggesting Labor feminist links advocated CPS-2-style community campaigning among women:

The key to success in increasing women's support for the ALP lies in long-term continuous campaigning throughout the community (Submission 241, Anne Field and Ros Kelly).

A network of Labor women could encourage and train:

... female party members to use the community groups to which they belong as sounding boards for ideas.

Kooyong FEA also seemed to give priority to CPS 2 methods of changing women's voting patterns over the articulation of
feminist concerns (Submission 268).\(^{16}\)

The idea of a Labor/'new social movement' coalition appealed to radical intellectuals (see, e.g. Altman, 1980). However, we have to dis-aggregate the category 'new social movements'.\(^{17}\) Of the twenty pro-feminist submissions, only one is also pro-environmentalist (see Table 1). Of the seven pro-environmentalist submissions, only one (Belmont) is also pro-feminist. Table 1 does show significant correlation between feminism and 'rank-and-file rights' and some feminist Labor support for defending socialisation ideology (especially in NSW).

Table 1

(a) Pro-feminist submissions from party units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Also pro-environment</th>
<th>Also 'Rank-and-File Rights'</th>
<th>Also 'Defend Labor Socialisation Ideology'</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vic</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>20</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Pro-environmentalist submissions from party units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Also pro-feminist</th>
<th>Also 'Rank-and-File Rights'</th>
<th>Also 'Defend Labor Socialisation Ideology'</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NSW</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vic</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2 is partly defined by its general receptiveness to 'new social movements'. Nevertheless Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1 put 'demographic representation' on the agenda. Whitlam wanted the ALP to cease being:


The Whitlam Government established the Human Relations Commission after the failure of David McKenzie's private member's bill on abortion law reform. The commission recommended, among other things, that parties should take steps to have more women activists and parliamentary candidates and to allow more scope for women's perspectives in policy formulation. 18

Women's Electoral Lobby (ACT) reminded the NCI of the commission's recommendation (Submission 176). WEL had emerged on the Australian political scene in time for the 1972 election (see Glezer and Mercer, 1973). It was encouraged by some early Whitlam Government decisions, before conflict on abortion law reform and child care (see Game and Pringle, 1978; Simms, 1981b and Dowse, 1983). Australian women's aspirations had been changing before the 'It's Time' election. Senator Susan Ryan (1980:4) noted that:

... towards the end of the 60's a new public consciousness developed about the condition of women in Australian society.

Attitudes were changing. Labor's response was ambiguous. Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1 made some attempts to redress gender inequalities with legislative programmes, but the ALP remained a profoundly sexist institution.
DP 4, 'The ALP and Women', endorsed 'demographic representation'. This chapter is focusing on Labor and feminism as a case study in Labor/'new social movement' relations. The NCI was wary of 'new social movement' radicalism and equivocal about Australian Social Democracy.

Mark 2. DP 9 (on Union links) made this clear:

In predominantly capitalist societies such as Australia, Canada and the USA, 'radicalism' is usually a middle class, and single issue related, phenomenon, or a manifestation of the views of a vociferous minority. It can be argued that, in the Australian context, the union connection has kept the Labor Party in touch with fundamental 'bread and butter' issues; and the concerns and aspirations of the vast majority of the Australian workforce (APSA, 1979:87).

DP 1, on National Conference, looked at 'demographic representation' fairly generally. Women, ethnics and rural-dwellers were seen as the most obvious groups vital to Labor's future, with little or no Conference representation (APSA, 1979:8). Later, it became clear that the NCI was cautious about 'demographic representation'.

John Button defended DP 4 ('National Conference Structure', Challenge, November 1978). Labor should be 'in the vanguard of change' with regard to women's involvement. There was 'a strong case' for positive discrimination for women, 'at least for a trial period'. Button signalled the NCI was wary of further 'demographic representation'.

DP 4 documented women's second-class status within the ALP. Only about 25 percent of the membership were women (APSA, 1979:31). When it came to parliamentary representatives and party functionaries, the situation was considerably worse. Labor seemed off-putting to many women (APSA, 1979:33). Those who did join were discouraged from
seeking advancement. This compromised Labor's aspirations as a representative mass party. To reverse this, the NCI asked women to increase their involvement in unions and the party. But that would not be enough:

Positive discrimination in favour of women for a fixed period of say 7 to 10 years would overcome the barriers imposed by existing attitudes and practices (APSA, 1979:35).

Various formulae could achieve this at National Conference. In the states, unions could be required to include women in their delegations in proportion to their membership, but the mechanisms whereby they would comply with such a rule would be left up to the unions themselves (APSA, 1979:35-6). Local branches would also have to promote women.

Preselection of candidates for safe Labor seats was a crucial arena for affirmative action:

Each State Branch ... might be required to endorse a woman candidate for one safe seat at each federal election until women are represented in Federal Parliament in proportion to their membership of the Party in that State (APSA, 1979:36). 24

The Human Relations Commission had recommended each party should pre-select more women in safe seats. Furthermore, the major parties should sign an agreement guaranteeing women fair representation. They could agree to have at least 10 percent of their candidates women and progressively increase that figure at successive elections.

Such bipartisan suggestions come more easily to royal commissions than party committees. The NCI endorsed the goal, but not the bipartisan approach. Labor should carve a position for itself as the party more prepared to advance women. The 'gender gap' had diminished significantly between 1967 and 1979 (Aitkin, 1982:326-33). This long-term swing to Labor amongst
women:

... was in part caused by the entry of young Labor women into the electorate and in part by a notable conversion to Labor of the young female voters of the 1960s, whose behaviour in this respect was quite unlike that of their male counterparts (Aitkin, 1982:330).

Work experience and feminism played their part in this conversion. For newly mobilised women, Labor seemed 'the lesser of two evils' (Aitkin, 1982:332).

The 'gender gap' increased in 1977 (Bacchi, 1984:11). The newly-formed Australian Democrats attracted more ALP women than ALP men (Sawer and Simms, 1984:158). In 1980, Labor attempted to capitalise on its record 23 women federal candidates (Sawer and Simms, 1984:108). Some of the DP 4 analysis had been digested by then, but affirmative action was not seriously considered until 1981.25

The workings of Labor 'mateship', through overlapping union and party networks, made it difficult for women to find sponsors and 'build up the necessary power connections' (APSA, 1979:34). Women were under-represented in union officialdom, particularly in affiliated unions. In 1978, one-third of Australian unionists were women, but in a sample of 489 union officials, there were only 12 women (Sawer and Simms, 1984:37. See also Clarke and White, 1983:88-103). Labor Party culture was weighted against women:

Traditionally party men considered that in-fighting was too dirty a game for women to play. The reverse side of that attitude was that one would not be able to trust women to stick with the tribe or faction (White, 1981:4. See also Clarke and White, 1983:70-1).

The 'numbers game' alienated many women, and indeed many ALP men (see Johns, 1983:123; 'Connell, 1982:58-60).26 Susan Ryan
(1979:24) saw 'machines, steering committees, complicated trade union connections' as major obstacles to Labor women:

These antiquated, unrepresentative, male-dominated hierarchies with their mysterious and indirect ways of gaining the numbers for preselection and the election of party officers deter many women who are otherwise attracted to Labor policies.

The absence of such hierarchies in the Australian Democrats appealed to women, she suggested.27

Traditional macho intra-ALP politicking favoured authoritarian and aggressive characters and gave little importance to issues 'which primarily concern the welfare of women and/or children' (APSA, 1979:34). The consequences of this could be seen in the priorities displayed in the Labor platform. The NCI asked Labor to integrate feminist insights into its 'democratic socialist' ideology (APSA, 1979:38). The conjunction of arguments from electoral utility with the notion that Labor ideological renewal had to include an opening to feminism recurred in the subsequent debate. The electoral utility argument was:

... particularly attractive to men at the top echelons of the party at the national level. Women have been more attracted by arguments of distributive justice and the need for more direct representation of a feminist viewpoint (Sawer and Simms, 1984:118).

The NCI also agreed that Labor had to modify inherited terminology, assumptions and images (APSA, 1979:38).

'New social movements' focused on power and decision-making rather than economic exploitation. They criticised the notion that growth would solve problems of inequality and poverty (see McQueen, 1984). Recognising distinctive group identities involved an extension of Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1's notion of legislation
equal citizenship rights (Macintyre, 1985:118-137. See also Ryan, 1983). Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2 accepted the implications of this critique. But as the NCI's response to feminism shows, Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2 was often embraced very cautiously, even by those who were critical of Labor's remoteness from 'new social movement' politics.

Responses to DP 4 were generally supportive, despite undercurrents of opposition to and/or scepticism about affirmative action, especially 'reserved safe seats'. Senator Jean Melzer disputed the view that increasing the status of women within the party would increase female electoral support:

I don't believe the ordinary suburban mum, whose vote could make us or break us, knows or cares about the make up of the local ALP branch or even the State Executive (NCI Documents). 29

'Reserved safe seats' ignored ALP realpolitik. Melzer asked rhetorically: 'Whose safe seat? Over whose dead body?'. The following year her own safe Senate seat, over her own 'dead body', was effectively handed over to a male by her faction (Victorian Centre Unity). 30 Her demotion 'mobilized women members of the ALP to an extent not previously witnessed' (Jupp, 1982:86). This did not reverse the decision, but it fed into the continuing campaign for affirmative action.

Some responses to DP 4 echoed Melzer's scepticism. Thirroul branch (NSW) supported a higher profile for Labor women, but thought reserving safe seats ignored 'the reality of the ALP structure' (Response 13). 31 The left-wing Manly branch (NSW) opposed affirmative action (Response 29). Low female participation reflected 'sociological factors evident in the community generally'. Bundeena branch (NSW) agreed (Response 22). Despite enthusiasm for CPS 4, it felt 'a structural
"solution" was 'not the correct answer'. The ALP was 'a party of social change' as well as 'a vehicle for democratic practices'. Expending energy in 'simply practising certain rituals' might reduce Labor's effectiveness:

... in promoting more fundamental social changes which will ultimately ensure equality for all regardless of sex, colour or country of origin.

Was there a contradiction between being 'a party of social change' and 'a vehicle for democratic practices'? The Bundeena dichotomy rested on the assumption that 'correct' economic policies (of a 'socialist' nature) were the key to reducing inequality all round. Pursuit of such policies was more important than redressing internal ALP inequalities through 'democratic practices' such as affirmative action. This can be turned on its head. Could Labor achieve 'fundamental social changes' if it was not 'a vehicle for democratic practices', particularly if 'fundamental social changes' involve more than 'socialist' economic policies?

Victorian ALP members Shirley Ambrose, Eric Young and Susan Edwards suggested Labor's democratic inadequacies weakened its capacities as a party of social change (Response 26). Women's views were not adequately reflected in ALP decisions. Affirmative action was not simply a ritual, distracting Labor from pursuing fundamental social changes that would ensure equality for all.

The NCI Report insisted affirmative action was necessary if the ALP was to be an effective party of social change (ALP, 1979:11). It was also necessary for electoral reasons. In general, the Report replicated the substance of DP 4, although it did not repeat the earlier list of women's grievances on the 'conscience vote' and other matters. On
'reserved safe seats', the National Executive was now asked to advise the state Branches to take 'positive steps' to move the party progressively towards the goal of women being represented in the FPLP in rough proportion to their membership of the party (ALP, 1979:11).

14C Putting Affirmative Action into the Rule-Book

NCI endorsement, by itself, did not mean affirmative action would be seriously considered. The National Executive seemed hostile. Some saw its referral of affirmative action on to the Branches as a way of burying the idea. In 1979, there were seventeen men and one woman (Joan Taggart, ACT) on the National Executive.

Affirmative action was kept alive by a combination of sustained pressure from Labor women's groups and the gradual recognition by Labor electoral strategists that the 'gender gap' could be closed if the party played the right cards. Labor women's groups were in ferment in the late 1970s. They pushed for renewed Labor radicalism on a range of issues. The old 'ladies' auxiliary' style of organisation was being discarded (Moore, 1985:36). In states where separate organisations were retained, such as NSW and WA, they were transformed. Labor women's committees were strongly influenced by the women's movement (see Sawer and Simms, 1984:147). They established an affirmative action lobby that crossed factional lines.

Senator Susan Ryan, shadow minister for Women's Affairs, Aboriginal Affairs and the Arts, championed Labor women's concerns in the FPLP. She convinced her colleagues
that Labor could close the 'gender gap' by appropriately responding to the women's changing aspirations. As an individual, she seemed interested in Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2. She stressed the importance of women in the anti-Vietnam-War movement and the anti-uranium movement (Ryan, 1979:23. See also Ryan, 1981a:5). She had been drawn into the ALP by enthusiasm for Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1. A newly active feminist and founder of Canberra WEL, she took the view in 1971-72 'that you could change things through the parliamentary system' (Ryan, 1981b:26). She was 'very influenced by Whitlam'.

After the 1977 election, she reminded party strategists that Labor would be in government if women voted for it in the same proportion as men. Ryan's (1979:25) strategy was aimed at particular groups of women, including those whose experience of marked changes in their personal lives led them to reject or at least question 'establishment values and stereotyped concepts of "women's role"' (Ryan, 1979:25). Labor did make gains amongst women in 1980. Ryan (1981a:4) told the National Labor Women's Conference that 'a modest but effective effort' aimed at women would pay significant electoral dividends. Official Labor adoption of Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2 was too much to hope for. The male leadership could not be converted to a feminist/socialist ideology. However, Labor could base its policies for women on fact rather than fiction. Women were not impressed by a health policy, which seemed to assume they spent most of their lives pregnant.

The NLWC was held in Sydney in January 1981.
women attended. Activists from Labor women's groups canvassed affirmative action and other topics. The National Executive contributed $5,000 for travel expenses. This indicated a more conciliatory attitude to women's claims than had been shown in April 1979 (see Summers, 1983:132). In a further gesture by party chiefs, Senate leaders John Button and Don Grimes spent the weekend making tea and coffee for delegates.

The NLWC strongly supported the NCI proposals on affirmative action. It established a working party, chaired by Ann Forward, to work out recommendations for the Melbourne Special Conference, six months later. NLWC organisers were pleased with delegates' agreement:

... that the only way forward in a male-dominated ALP is through a viable national rank and file women's movement (Sandra Nori, 'Show of Political Strength, Principle and Purpose', Challenge, 10 February 1981).

The working party lobbied the Executive.

In a series of workshops and plenary sessions, the NLWC supported other 'new social movements' (anti-uranium, land rights, environmentalism). Also in the spirit of Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2, the NLWC grafted its exploration of 'new social movement' concerns onto a reformulated Labor 'socialism'. It endorsed a strong 'socialisation objective', which included the 1921 wording, adding:

... a statement to the effect that any system based on the exploitation of individuals within households cannot be truly egalitarian (NLWC, 1981:30).

The NLWC also registered strong opposition to the 'conscience vote' and agreed on policies for women at work, in education and in the community.

The Special Conference examined the application of
affirmative action to the revised National Conference structure. There was also a general debate on further affirmative action and ancillary measures. The National Executive recommended requiring state Branches to include women to the extent of at least one quarter of their delegations. Labor women's groups had won official endorsement of affirmative action principles, but there was considerable debate about their application. National Executive responsiveness to the women's groups did not extend to challenging powerful intra-party interests. Its recommendation recognised 'the forces that exist in the party' (Mick Young, ALP Transcript, 1981:176), particularly affiliated unions.42

The preferred NLWC figure for affirmative action at National Conference was 30 percent. It was seen as reflecting the percentage of women in the party.43 Victorian proxy delegate Joan Coxsedge moved an amendment for 30 percent affirmative action. She accepted that women's under-representation reflected social attitudes (ALP Transcript, 1981:178), but a democratic socialist party could not just reflect such attitudes. Women would bring 'a new vitality and fresh ideas'. Susan Ryan also argued in terms of democratic socialism and party renewal (as well as electoral utility). There was:

...a new spirit to express what we are about as democratic socialists and sex equality, of course, is the most obvious area where our house should be in order and where our house is not in order (ALP Transcript, 1981:179).

Conference accepted the lower figure (25 percent).

The very fact that there was any further debate on affirmative action was largely thanks to NLWC pressure. The
Special Conference was originally going to be confined to those sections of the NCI Report 'relating precisely' to party structure (David Combe, ALP Transcript, 1981:282). A general debate was added in response to 'expectations which had been built up'. The general debate looked at (a) the broad application of affirmative action throughout the party, particularly to the preselection of parliamentary candidates; and (b) complementary measures to counter sexism within the party. The Executive commended the NLWC working party document. It would refer it to the Branches. It promised to monitor implementation. Joan Coxsedge (ALP Transcript, 1981:286) preferred direct Conference endorsement of the document, which recommended 'reserved safe seats' for Labor women, until they made up at least one third of each Labor parliamentary party.

Graham Richardson (NSW) strongly objected to 'reserved safe seats' (ALP Transcript, 1981:293). It would lead to difficulties in NSW, with its tightly-contested 'rank-and-file' preselection ballots. Which safe seats should be reserved? For this electoral strategist, the ensuing turmoil might outweigh the potential gains in closing the 'gender gap'. Of course, the NSW right had been slow to promote women within its own ranks. Susan Ryan insisted that the Coxsedge amendment would not cause turmoil (ALP Transcript, 1981:295). See also Ryan, 1981b:27). The impetus for party renewal had to be maintained.

David Combe asked delegates to trust the Executive (ALP Transcript, 1981:296). Conference did not accept such assurances. Coxsedge's specific guidelines were endorsed, albeit by a narrow margin. Opponents included Mick Young, Bob
Hawke and Bill Hayden (Jan Burnswoods and Sandra Nori, 'Women Get a Foot in the Door', Challenge, August 1981. See also Kelly, 1984:147). Anne Pengelly (SA) successfully proposed adoption of NCI ancillary measures to underpin affirmative action. Conference also endorsed the National Executive decision to have at least one woman on each policy committee.

The affirmative action debates touched on a wide range of issues. David Combe suggested that they involved considerable 'grandstanding' (ALP Transcript, 1981:297). 'Commitment to a faction' could outweigh 'commitment to affirmative action'. However, the rhetoric was important. The debates were an arena for the deployment of Labor feminist ideology, just as the NCI had been an arena for the registration of 'participation ideology'. A large number of proxy delegates were introduced for these debates. Five of the seven women speakers in the first debate (Coxsedge, Ryan, Barbara Wiese, Anne Warner and Janet Hunt) were proxy delegates. Wiese and Hunt defended the National Executive figure. Jan Burnswoods suggested Conference could easily be seen as 'a glossy sort of window dressing' (ALP Transcript, 1981:183). Delegations sent in proxies is an exercise in tokenism.

Delegates also emphasised the importance of affirmative action at the 'grass-roots' level. Women's concerns had to be at the heart of any restatement of democratic socialism (Janet Hunt, ALP Transcript, 1981:290-1). Women's experience of life was different to men's. Thus they looked at government policies differently. Labor could not tap into that perspective without going out of its way to facilitate women's participation:
How often women have said to me, 'I was going
to suggest so-and-so during the meeting but I
didn't know if I should' and another good idea
has passed the meeting by (ALP Transcript, 1981:291).

Another strong theme was that affirmative action
should forge a new progressive coalition of support for Labor.
Queensland left-winger Anne Warner underlined this rationale for
affirmative action as a process:

... where we can effectively make up for the oppression
which has been inflicted upon women by an uncaring,
exploitative, discriminatory capitalist society

Pat Giles (WA) suggested affirmative action would have policy
implications in issues such as abortion. As the French
Socialist Party began listening to its women it began developing
policies that were immediately seen as being 'a great deal more
relevant to women' (ALP Transcript, 1981:302).

Bill Hayden suggested Joan Coxsedge would enjoy some
sort of footnote in ALP history for her successful amendment
(ALP Transcript, 1981:332). He wondered whether state and
federal Labor MPs would be queueing up to surrender their seats.
His scepticism was justified. Conference's 'guidelines' could
not abolish the party's state-based structure nor eliminate male
domination of parliamentary positions. The amendment's
importance lay more in its official legitimation of Labor
women's aspirations than its concrete contents:

The whole thrust of what women within the party
have been doing is legitimising their participation.
Women have always been important in the Party but
haven't been acknowledged, and now there are a
number of signs that we are being acknowledged
(Ryan, 1981b:27).

In Melbourne, Ryan had reminded delegates the guidelines were
'flexible' and would not force Branches to do anything
'impracticable' (ALP Transcript, 1981:295). The degree of
accommodation to sexist traditions and practices such 'flexibility' would entail, and the definition of what was 'practicable' would depend on further debate and further struggle. Party chiefs had accepted affirmative action following intra-party pressure and their own electoral calculations. Whether affirmative action would lead to more than tokenism was indeterminate, but Labor women had won a significant victory.

Affirmative action advocates assumed an increased women's presence would help the causes favoured by Labor women's groups (see Ryan, 1981b:26). Australian Financial Review journalists Mike Jacobs and Rod Wise implied the reformed Conference would be more sympathetic to 'new social movements':

The difficult task now confronting the parliamentary leaders and their machine allies will be how to graft an integrated program for an alternative government from a conference whose centrifugal nature will tend to produce a loose collection of fragmented special interest proposals ('After the Talks - Hayden Invincible, Hawke Invisible', 31 July 1981).

Such expectations were not borne out in 1982. The 'conscience vote' survived (with some female support), despite predictions that affirmative action would lead to its demise. The party's anti-uranium stance was modified, although Labor women's groups strongly opposed the mining and export of uranium. Table 2 shows there was a slight majority among women delegates for the anti-uranium policy. To this extent, the 'progressive effect' of affirmative action did materialise. The significant female support for the Hogg amendment, however, did not reflect the strength of anti-uranium feeling in the Labor women's groups. Five women spoke in the debate. Only one (Barbara Wiese) supported the change.
Table 2

1982 National Conference Uranium Debate

(a) Voting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supporting Hogg Amendment</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defending 1977 Policy</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Speakers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supporting Hogg Amendment</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defending 1977 Policy</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ALP Transcript, 1982. Opponents of the Hogg amendment called for a division, which recorded each individual delegate's vote (see ALP Transcript, 1982:478-9). However, although the official tally was 53-46, the transcript only records 51 pro-Hogg-amendment votes. Overall the list is short one Qld and one WA delegate. As the non-listed Queensland and WA delegates and proxies were all male, I have included the two 'missing' delegates in the 'men' column.

Affirmative action was grafted on to an evolving balance of Branch and factional interests. The women were elected by state conferences, still predominantly male, not by women's groups. In many cases, their alignments reflected factional patronage rather than feminist allegiance. As David Combe predicted, Conference reform mainly meant state faction leaders added more names to their tickets. The debates were dominated by male speakers. Many of the women delegates were treated as voting fodder for the faction that sponsored them. Their inexperience lessened their impact (Hutchison, 1982:10).
Labor women's groups supported ALP alignment with 'new social movements' and hoped for an appropriately renewed Labor socialist vision. They expected a 'progressive effect' from affirmative action. ALP managers worked to dis-articulate affirmative action from generalised endorsement of 'new social movements'. They accepted the electoral logic of 'demographic representation', but wanted minimal adjustments in party practices.

Labor national women's co-ordinator Kate Moore attributes disappointments in the working out of affirmative action to the subversion of feminism by factionalism. Factionalism can be seen as a form of macho politics. Affirmative action was won by a united women's movement (Moore, 1985:33). Later, 'intense suspicion and dislike' divided these women (Moore, 1985:50). It was not factional division per se which frustrated Labor feminists. Rather it was the particular forms of increasingly disciplined and nationally co-ordinated factions in a party where Labor Managerialism was on the ascendant. Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2, closer to the women's groups' aspirations, was a still-born project. There remained space within Labor Managerialism for anti-discrimination policies developed by the women's groups. This combination of factors caused the strain. Some women wanted to get involved in anti-discrimination policies. Others were disillusioned by the way the 'new social movements' had been disregarded. The change of policy on uranium was particularly traumatic.

Labor has always been made up of conflicting sub-coalitions. The acceptance of affirmative action, like most ALP
decisions (see D. Stephens, 1979:389), expressed the goals of sub-coalitions, adjusted to the goals of other sub-coalitions, registering a temporary balance of forces. Interpretation and implementation would be fought over. After 1982, the hardening of other sub-coalitions into factional blocs and the changing balance of forces fragmented Labor women's groups and reduced their room for manoeuvre.

Socialist Workers Party journalist Sue Reilly saw affirmative action in the ALP as a direct result of the general ferment on the question of women's rights ('What's at Stake in Affirmative Action', Direct Action, 12 August 1981). How the ALP responded to this ferment depended on complex intra-party conflicts. Reilly recognised the indeterminate policy implications of affirmative action. It enabled women to fight discrimination and inequality. Whether this eventuated depended on further struggle inside the party. The changes might only assist 'female careerists' to secure more rapid promotion within the party. However, given that 'careerism' had been such a male preserve, such a change would still be significant. Affirmative action, although indeterminate in its implications, did make some difference. Crisp (1982:79-80) was wrong to see affirmative action as simply a zero-sum gain for 'middle class' Labor women at the expense of 'working class' Labor men.
CHAPTER 15

'MAKING SOCIALISM IN YOUR OWN COUNTRY'?

15A Socialism, Economic Policy and the NCI

Among the 'ancient philosophies' and 'current concerns' surfacing in the NCI were the 'socialisation objective' and the parameters of economic policy. The NCI set out to defuse a 'silly dichotomy' between 'socialism at all costs' and 'selling out'/managing the status quo, that was 'growing in Labor argument' in 1978 ('Notes on the ALP Committee of Inquiry'). It hoped to mediate within a very divided party. Submissions indicated some 'grass-roots' support for radical initiatives, or at least radical rhetoric (see Catley and McFarlane, 1980:303). Labor responses to recession and electoral defeat in the 1970s ranged all the way from attempts to demonstrate economic respectability by laying the ghost of the Whitlam programme to talk of tackling the trans-nationals with a new wave of public ownership.¹

The relationship between Labor ideology and Labor policy had always been remote (Rawson, 1966a:72; Jaensch, 1983:171-2; Lucy, 1985:47-8). Labor's objective; 'the socialisation of industry, production, distribution and exchange'; dated from 1921.² The same Conference added the Blackburn Declaration, which limited collective ownership to the extent necessary to prevent exploitation. This was later incorporated into the objective proper (Reeves and Evans, 1980). Despite the objective's confusion and ambiguity it enshrined grandiose hopes which contrasted with Labor's cautious 'empirical' practice (Crisp, 1978:15-6). Bruce

389
O'Meagher reminded the NCI that Labor had never resolved the conflict between 'its weak philosophical commitment to a vague ideal of socialism' and its pragmatic policy parameters (Submission 223). The 'silly dichotomy' had a long history. To defuse it, short-term 'empirical' policy parameters would have to be linked to long-term 'rationalistic' aspirations.

Some dismissed the possibility of linking economic policy to Labor ideology in this way. Economics professor Fred Gruen (1980:225) stressed the imperatives of short-term economic management in a mixed economy:

Socialism - either in the sense of the public ownership of the means of production or in the newer sense of participation, decentralisation of control and decision-making - is largely irrelevant to coping adequately with such major economic problems as inflation and unemployment (see also Gruen, 1983).

By and large, this was the position taken by the FPLP leadership (Higley et al., 1979:61; Walsh, 1979:219). Some on the left counterposed 'mobilisation', 'struggle' and 'direct action' to the compromises of the policy game, which could lead to entrapment in the logic of capital and the capitalist state. Critics of 'Technocratic Laborism' (see especially Catley and McFarlane, 1974; Beresford, 1975) rejected 'reform' as 'revisionist' and abstained from 'current policy discussion' (Groenewegen, 1979:203). They too appeared to believe that 'empirical' policies could not be linked to 'rationalistic' aspirations.

The sort of 'socialism' advocated in NCI submissions was short on policy content. 'Resolutionary' recommendations advocated little more specific than abstract audacity. Thus Double Bay branch (NSW) declared:
The ALP must present itself to the Australian people as a Socialist Party intent on innovative social change in the community and at the same time educating the electorate as to what socialism is (Submission 41).

Voters were 'bloody little capitalists', who had to be educated out of their 'cargo cult mentality' (Submission 37, Hotham FEA and Cheltenham branch, Vic.). The emphasis was on the expressive pursuit of a 'correct line'. Gellibrand FEA hoped for policies that would eradicate 'the injustice, inequality and inefficiency of modern capitalism' rather than being bound by 'the parameters of office in 1980' (Submission 60).

'Resolutionary' politics may have little direct implications for policy-formulation but it has its own logic and its own rationale, particularly in relation to factional manoeuvring. 'Resolutionary' politics is constantly complicated by its 'garbage can' characteristics. Debates about 'socialism' may be no more about 'socialism' than debates about 'reorganisation' are about 'reorganisation'. Indeed, the 'silly dichotomy' between extravagant declarations of the party's aspirations and a practice of 'muddling through' also has its own rationale. Philosophical declarations have often served as tests of factional strength (see Alan Reid, 'How to Win Votes and Lose Influence', Bulletin, 31 July 1979). Political scientist Peter Loveday (1980:74) notes that debates about the objective have usually been about other things as well: the policies it might legitimise, the power and authority of different factions etc.

DP 6, written by the NCI's economist Geoff Harcourt, described major problems facing Australian economic policymakers and sketched out options for a democratic socialist
party tackling such problems, as it worked towards 'a more just and equitable society' (APSA, 1979:61). DP 6 transcended the timid approach of the front bench, which had been mesmerised by the changing terms of Australian economic debate since 1973-74 (Sheehan, 1980:59; B. Hughes, 1980:50-1). Labor only quibbled with the details of Fraser's 'fight inflation first' strategy:

Hayden defined his own position by reference to Fraser's economics. If Fraser stood for, say, deficit D, Hayden's policy would always be D+1 (Kelly, 1984:71. See also B. Hughes, 1980:38, 53 and 132; Abbey and Catley, 1980). 11

DP 6 complained that Australian economic policy had been dominated by short-term ad hocery (APSA, 1979:57). Governments (and, presumably, oppositions) overlooked the changing international context. Capitalism was now 'dominated by internationally operating corporations' (APSA, 1979:56).

Harcourt (1977), a leading international figure in the 'Post-Keynesian' school of political economy, felt policymakers were hampered by inappropriate 'bastard Keynesian' and 'monetarist' models. In response to 'stagflation' in the 1970s, the 'Post-Keynesians' reinterpreted the master and revived his maverick Marxist contemporary Michael Kalecki. They emphasised relationships between class struggle, inflation and shares in the national income. 12 The range of policies Harcourt (1977) grouped under the 'Post-Keynesian' label was catholic to the point of confusion. That might have been a help rather than a hindrance in stimulating economic debate in a factionalised party. 'Post-Keynesianism' subsumed:

... a wide range of political attitudes and ideologies from Keynes plus compassion through Crosland's socialism and Wedgewood Bennery to a Marxist restructuring of the whole society (Harcourt, 1977:46-7).
In more concrete discussions, Harcourt drew his boundaries more tightly, seeing 'Keynes plus compassion' and Croslandism as too compromised, while 'Bennism' (let alone Marxist restructuring) was too adventurous. 'Post-Keynesianism' was attractive to Labor economists who wanted to re-establish the ALP's 'economic management' credentials without selling the pass on serious social reform. They wanted to combine prices and incomes policies with new redistributive tactics. The Whitlam Government had increased social expenditure, but failed to develop planning institutions and made few inroads on private sector decision-making discretion. Social democratic thinkers overseas were radicalised in devising responses to the same problem - simultaneously securing wage restraint and advancing reform (Panitch, 1986:55).  

Labor's 1972-75 experience made Harcourt (1977:48) sceptical. The Whitlam Government had been constrained by the political and economic structures of Australian capitalism as well as its own incompetence. It had failed in terms of economic management and in terms of social transformation. In endorsing a more transformative approach, Harcourt (1977:49) was cautious. Grasping 'the socialist nettle' along lines laid down by Stuart Holland (1975) with suitable modifications for Australian conditions seemed:

... far from being an election winner, or at least being perceived as such by those who make policy and political decisions in the ALP.  

Harcourt (1977) advocated a 'real social contract', trading money wage restraint off against more control over work, security against redundancy and more comprehensive social service provision. DP 6 raised the further issue of re-mixing
the economy and gaining more social control over the private sector (APSA, 1979:59). Market mechanisms could not be trusted. New institutions and a new kind of state intervention in the economy were required, which went beyond 'just organising capital more efficiently' (APSA, 1979:58) through the indirect juggling of demand management targets and tariff levels. Major firms should be taken into public ownership. 'Socialisation' was put on the policy agenda, alongside plans for a revitalised export-oriented manufacturing industry (without dismantling tariffs hastily) and an indexation-based incomes policy (tailored to Australian Arbitration procedures).

The strategy implicit in DP 6, gradually socialising investment decisions through a series of social contracts with the union movement, was one which was gaining support in certain Labor circles. Some saw Swedish-style moves towards 'economic democracy' through the deployment of wage earners' funds as an alternative to taking major private firms into public ownership (see, e.g. Wilenski, 1980a:62). Stretton (1976a) saw capital redistribution to boost the 'domestic sector' of the economy and reorganisation in the public sector as the way to secure worker consent to anti-inflationary policies and avert ecological crises. Turner (1976:18) advocated social contracts directed towards an equitable distribution of wealth and power. There was some sympathy for such an approach on the Labor front bench (see Willis, 1979).

Generally, leading Labor politicians were wary of policy proposals that could be construed as advocating 'socialisation'. DP 6 led to a 'minor furore' (Graham Dunkley, 'National Inquiry: That Nationalisation Problem Again', Labor
Star, 11 December 1978). State and federal parliamentarians rushed 'to reassure the public' that this was a proposal 'they fully intended to ignore'. Defensive Labor politicians stressed the NCI was not an official party policy committee.21

DP 6 was released with the NSW election campaign in full swing. Labor premier Wran was not impressed (Laurie Oakes, 'Nationalisation: A Clash of Principles and a Poll - How the Party Upset Wran . . .', Age, 7 October 1978). There were complaints from NSW Labor. Harcourt replied robustly that Wran and NSW Labor should face up to what Labor was about. This little vignette symbolises the clash between Harcourt's Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2 approach and NSW Labor Managerialism. Indeed eclectic 'Post-Keynesianism', with all its vagueness, was the ideal economic theory for advocates of Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2. Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1 had presumed too much on capitalist cooperation and the continuation of economic growth. Labor Managerialism eschewed social transformation altogether. It cut the party's cloth to suit its measure in hard times.

Defending DP 6 from press criticism Neal Blewett argued the NCI would have been 'intellectually dishonest' to side-step questions like nationalisation (letter, Canberra Times, 21 October 1978).22 It was charged with advancing long-term considerations for a democratic socialist party and was confronted with 'the malaise of the capitalist order'.23 Blewett articulated the committee's 'rationalistic idealist' self-image. Quests for organisational improvement cannot avoid being tangled in factional struggles, policy debates and a range of other concerns. The NCI did more (and less) than
develop rationally appropriate policy-making procedures for subsequent adoption. However, its official self-interpretation precluded it from trespassing on the prerogative of formal, specialised policy committees. There were no official NCI recommendations on economic policy. No section of the Report corresponded to DP 6.

DP 6 stimulated debate, especially among Labor economists. The NCI received only thirty formal responses, mainly from individuals rather than party units. Perhaps this was because of DP 6's 'unnecessarily complex academic style' (Marc Robinson, 'Economic Issues and the Committee of Inquiry', Lobby, February 1979) and occasional obscurity. Its advocacy of both incomes policy and nationalisation cut across existing factional alignments! Abstract economic theory was becoming more embedded in mainstream Australian political debate (as elsewhere, see Przeworski, 1985:205ff; Clegg et al., 1986:274). Harcourt had a point spelling out the theoretical foundations for his proposals, 'Keynes-Minsky instability thesis' (APSA, 1979:62-3) and all.

The CPA journal, Australian Left Review, welcomed DP 6 as a surprisingly vigorous attempt to change the terms of Australian economic policy debate (O'Shaughnessy, 1978). O'Shaughnessy praised DP 6 for putting a transition to socialism on the agenda, but criticised its advocacy of incomes policy and its failure to couple public ownership with democratic self-management. DP 6's sketchiness led to further criticisms, even from those who were sympathetic to its general argument. Graham Dunkley criticised its failure to examine the operational dimension of its proposals (Labor Star,

The ALP had always found it difficult to operationalise its rationalistic aspirations. Debates on Labor's objectives were 'full of mythologies and misconceptions' and 'in desperate need of clarification' (Graham Dunkley, Labor Star, 11 December 1978). The 'garbage can' nature of such debates amplified the confusion and made clarification difficult. Indeed, Loveday (1980:86) predicted that Labor 'socialism' would inevitably remain 'undefined and unelaborated', because factions found it difficult to link 'socialism' to day-to-day politics.

In an earlier article, Dunkley noted that, within the ALP, ideological clarification, policy formulation and party solidification were compartmentalised ('Making Socialism - or Whatever - Work', Labor Star, May 1978). Labor had only scored well in all three areas, he suggested, in the 1940s (through the emergent Labor-Keynesian reconstruction programme). Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1 updated that programme within the confines of the public/private sector mix settled in 1949. Recession in the 1970s provoked new arguments:

The collapse, in the face of stagflation, of popular faith in Keynesianism as a governmental regulatory policy and a guarantor of full employment has sharpened the dilemma for democratic socialism. Without a distinctive economic alternative it runs the risk of degeneration in practice (whatever its rhetoric) into a party based on interest-group politics (Wilenski, 1983:58).

Such degeneration might mean 'legitimation' deficit within the party, but was quite compatible with electoral success. Labor Managerialists feared a distinctive economic
alternative might upset dominant elites and lose votes. DP 6 postulated party unity around a policy framework, that could be linked to long-held (if usually dormant) ideological aspirations and sold to the electorate. Such was the promise. The debate around DP 6 did not link up with debate on the 'socialisation objective', let alone seriously influence Labor economic policy.

15B Reformulating the 'Socialisation Objective'

The formal 'socialisation objective' debate focussed on matters of ideological clarification. The main bone of contention was whether four words, 'to the extent necessary', should be retained at the head of the objective. In 1955, clarifying an 'interpretation' adopted in 1951, the ALP said it sought socialisation of industry, production, distribution and exchange 'to the extent necessary' for the elimination of 'exploitation and other anti-social features in these fields' (Reeves and Evans, 1980:161). The National Executive (in 1981) wanted to retain the gist of the 1955 formulation, fleshing it out with 21 points of contemporary application. The SA amendment would delete the phrase 'to the extent necessary'. It was seen as the main alternative and became the focal point of the debate. Hopes that the debate would help integrate future policies or solidify the party around a consensual objective were misplaced.

The old Labor formula of believing in some 'socialisation' as a distant goal, but not talking, let alone doing, anything about it had been disturbed in 1975. There were some suggestions that Labor should not even believe in
'socialisation' any more. Some who felt the Whitlam Government had moved 'too far, too fast' explored making the Whitlam programme the party's ultimate objective. Elsewhere in the party a new post-1975 radicalism and the collapse of the long post-war boom led to a renewed interest in Labor 'socialism'. These divisions shaped the background to the 'socialisation objective' debate. Circumstances and complications narrowed the range of issues discussed and papered over real differences. The debate served as a 'garbage can' for other concerns (e.g. factional disputes in SA, the consolidation of Bill Hayden's leadership and the reorganisation itself.

The debate had its farcical elements. The phrase 'to the extent necessary' was in danger of being deleted. State conferences in Victoria, SA, WA and Tasmania all passed motions to that effect. Without PR, SA and WA delegations were bound by such votes. The SA and WA blocs, plus the left in the other states, added up to a majority. Dire electoral consequences were predicted if such a majority materialised. Considerable last-minute lobbying ensured that it did not (Peter Baldwin, 'More a Form of Words than an Ideology', Challenge, 28 August 1981). SA and WA voted for their own 'socialisation' formulae exclusively. When both formulae were defeated, they fell in behind the National Executive. Party professionals Mick Young (SA) and Bob McMullan (WA) worked hard for this result (Rod Wise, 'Left Backs Off at ALP Conference', Australian Financial Review, 28 July 1981). By such manoeuvres, a leadership coalition triumphed. The party hierarchy defeated restive elements in the ranks. In both SA and WA, the words 'to the extent necessary' had been deleted against the advice of senior
party professionals.  

Young chaired the National Executive sub-committee, which drafted the proposed new objective. All five sub-committee members were federal MPs, four of them on the front bench. It received submissions from within the party ('Hayden Outlines His "Socialisation" Ideal', Sydney Morning Herald, 1 June 1981) but generally proceeded in a rather top-down manner. Perhaps that made Young's manoeuvrings at the Conference ironically appropriate. In analysing the Conference vote, we should note the role played by the parliamentary leaders' bloc. In the 28-22 votes against both the SA and WA amendments, there was only one vote each time from this bloc against the National Executive line. That one vote was only because John Bannon (SA leader) and Dave Evans (proxy for WA leader Ron Davies) went along with the Young/McMullan manoeuvre. Excluding the parliamentary leaders, there was a slight majority (21-18) for deleting the contentious words.

There was widespread 'Defend Labor socialisation ideology' sentiment in the ALP. Many union officials suspected that reformulation was a way of watering down the objective. This had been important in SA and WA. Those holding such views were unconvinced by claims that the new language was not part of a 'sordid bourgeois defence of pragmatism' over principle (Evans, 1980:173).

In the 1960s, people like Calwell, Cameron and Chamberlain were more successful deploying 'socialist' rhetoric to defend their positions within the party than in developing 'socialist' strategies. What was the story in 1981? Why did the left put such hope in the SA amendment (see Michelle
Grattan, 'Debate on Socialist Objective a Test for ALP Left', Age, 27 July 1981)? The left was divided. NSW leaders felt hardening other sections of the platform was more important than deleting the qualification (Russell Schneider, 'Labor Left Defeated on Nationalisation Move', Australian, 28 July 1981). Elements of the left 'ran dead' because they did not want to embarrass Bill Hayden or leave him vulnerable to a challenge from Bob Hawke (Rod Wise, Australian Financial Review, 28 July 1981). This muted the left's clamour, but the factional fluidity associated with reorganisation made clearly differentiated and stridently articulated ideological stances attractive. Wise suggests the question of reformulating the objective was first addressed in a 'rather comradely' manner ('Labor Wrestles with Its Aims', Australian Financial Review, 27 July 1981). As the Conference approached:

... the issues and personalities became inextricably embroiled in the log-rolling and manoeuvring over the restructure ... The debate became more symbolic and thus nastier ...

All this said more about the ALP 'than any theoretical treatise could ever begin to say'. Looked at differently, 'garbage can' theory on organisational processes tells us more about 'running dead' and nasty manoeuvring on 'symbolic' issues (which mingle 'current concerns' and 'ancient philosophies') than such phenomena tell us about the ALP. The 'socialisation objective' debate, however, was another interesting case study of ALP processes.

Labor federalism complicated the left's dilemmas. In some states, the left became locked into the 1921 language as a badge of radicalism (see Peter Baldwin, Challenge, 28 August 1978). This enabled a centre-right bloc to coalesce around the
A superb opportunity to swing the ALP's ideological position in a leftward direction was lost as a result of the way the debate developed.

What the consequences of such a swing might have been is another matter. Baldwin's analysis of both the left and the debate contains elements of 'rationalistic idealist' optimism. The Conference alignments were contingent. Baldwin pointed to the sort of political calculations that would have been involved in producing a more favourable alignment for the left.

In analysing the 1981 alignments, we have to look at how the debate had unfolded since 1975. Senator Gareth Evans (Vic.) was the main champion of reformulation. He objected to the old objective's exclusively economic focus. 'Socialisation' had been identified with nationalisation, which was electorally unpopular and constitutionally difficult. Evans (1980b) presented 'socialism' as a set of inter-related values: liberty, equality and democracy. In June 1978, the Victorian Branch endorsed Evans' declaration of Labor's goals in terms of 'democratic socialist' values. Ten areas were listed where these values could be applied, beginning with democratic control, where necessary by 'social ownership', of production, distribution and exchange (Evans, 1980:179). Points mentioned included social justice and 'equality of respect', constitutional reform, cultural diversity (including Aboriginal land rights), conservation and world peace.

Evans had codified the goals of Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1. 'Democratic socialism' could be pursued without a substantial 're-mixing' of the economy. 'Equality of respect', cultural diversity, conservation and peace could
be integrated with Labor's economic concerns. Evans was keen to differentiate his 'democratic socialism' from 'social democracy'. The distinction is difficult to sustain. The terms are sometimes used to distinguish left and right wings in labour parties, but usage varies considerably. It is more pertinent to distinguish Australian Social Democracy, Marks 1 and 2. Evans (1980:178) painted his draft in 'democratic socialist' colours because he wanted to proceed consensually. Victoria was 'the most consistently socialist' Branch (Jupp, 1982:148).

Despite the nostalgia for the Whitlam years and the way the '1972 policies' were brandished against the drift into Labor Managerialism, Evans was optimistic in expecting the party could accept Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1 as its ultimate objective. How the reformulation would be challenged and the terrain on which battle would be joined were open questions. The answer came with the second thoughts of the Victorian Branch. In November 1978 it decided that in any reformulation:

... the wording of the Objective should be the original wording ... this ... separately stated, should precede any other contemporary analysis of Labor philosophy (quoted Evans, 1980b:180).

The Victorian Branch had earlier rejected any identification of the ALP with 'European social democracy'. Signals from the NSW machine that it was unhappy with the objective provoked 'Defend Labor socialisation ideology' submissions to the NCI. The fact that the NSW signals coincided with Evans' initial success encouraged a 'Defend Labor socialisation ideology' response to his proposals as well.
The National Executive sub-committee sought a balance between the Evans line and 'Defend Labor socialisation ideology' sentiment. The Conference debate focussed on the National Executive draft. There was some press speculation that an alternative formulation, written by Neal Blewett and supported by Bill Hayden, might be presented to Conference as a fait accompli. This did not materialise. The Blewett draft seems to have been a fall-back position for the party leadership, if the National Executive line was in trouble. The two versions largely overlapped, but Blewett added a paragraph replete with 'the buzz words of the left' (Geoffrey Barker, 'Hayden Bid for Deal on Socialist Objective', Age, 25 July 1981):

... without a significant degree of social ownership and control, equality is unattainable, freedom is the property of the privileged and not the possession of the people and the interests of the national and international community are sacrificed to an exploitative, materialistic and imperial capitalism.

The Conference got bogged down in the old Labor game of playing off rationalistic reform aspirations against empirical electoral realpolitik considerations (see Altman, 1980:59; Slee, 1980:22). Correct analysis of capitalist crisis was played off against 'the exigencies of the political process' (Johns, 1983:38-9). The debate had a confused format. There was a plethora of alternative short objectives to the National Executive draft. These generally sought a return to 1921-style language. Opponents of the Executive draft rallied around the SA amendment. The National Labor Women's Conference emphasis on having the objective reflected directly in electoral programmes hardly surfaced. There were many
amendments to the National Executive's 21-point contemporary list. The debate lacked focus. Delegates talked at cross purposes. Some fell asleep.

15C 'Capitalist Crisis' or 'Winning the Next Election': The Great Non-Debate

1921-style language was presented as a symbol of Labor identity. SA wanted to delete the qualification because the concept of democratic socialism had not changed 'since it was first established as a political theory' (Bob Gregory, ALP Transcript, 1981:19). The 1921 wording had been a response to perceived capitalist crisis after World War I. Now delegates returned to it, in response to another capitalist crisis. Bill Hartley was confident that economic crisis would eventually force Labor to take a more radical stance (ALP Transcript, 1981:63).

There are problems with the assumption that capitalist crisis produces an automatic majority for socialism:

Political support for socialism must be constructed on the basis of existing conditions, and what these are can be determined only by analysis and investigation ... Socialists must come to terms with existing political concerns, organizations and forms of struggle (Hindess, 1983:10-11. See also Cutler et al., 1978:269).

Those who invoked the 1921 language as the appropriate response to capitalist crisis did not specify any process of transition to socialism in Australia. Hartley admitted his goal was to 'get some rhetoric out of this conference' (ALP Transcript, 1981:22). Left wing delegates insisted there was no 'social democratic' solution to capitalist crisis. The policy implications of this were vague, particularly as it often implicitly relied on forms of Marxist economic theory that
offered little guide to administering a mixed economy or addressing workers' distributional claims in such a context (Przeworski, 1985:296).

John Garland was adamant that Labor had to derive its objective from a correct economic analysis. Devising and discussing blueprints for a better society was 'at best a sterile exercise' without first understanding 'the real power relationships and the new division of capital and labour' (ALP Transcript, 1981:56). Thus he stressed transnational corporation domination of the Australian economy, invoking a thesis with wide circulation on the left (see, e.g. Crough et al., 1980). Just as the banks symbolised the dreaded 'money power' in the 1930s, the transnationals did so for many on the left in the 1970s (Love, 1984:194. See also Groenewegen, 1979). The implied preference for autarchic policies was generally not spelled out (Dunkley, 1983:98). Tom Uren spoke of the need to develop a coalition of forces to take on 'the real enemy ... corporate capital' (ALP Transcript, 1981:59-60). There was a 'real struggle' against 'foreign capital'. Labor had to choose sides.

However, economic struggles do not transparently translate themselves into political divisions. There are problems with this economically reductionist analysis. The Australian left was impressed with Stuart Holland's (1975) analysis of the culpability of the transnationals in British 'de-industrialisation', but did not develop programmes with the degree of concreteness which Holland produced in Britain. There were, however, problems with Holland's detailed British programmes, partly because of their almost exclusive reliance...
on nationalisation (Cutler et al., 1978:269). There were problems with the notion that 'monopoly', a distillation of capitalist concentration and centralisation, produces an instantly compatible alliance of victims (Cutler et al., 1978:268). The search for correct economic analysis displaced the development of a socialist political project.

Three special Victorian speakers (Brian Howe MHR, a former sociology lecturer; Andrew Theophanus MHR, a former politics lecturer; and political scientist Joe Camilleri) also focussed on a correct analysis of capitalist crisis, but introduced some further themes. Howe (ALP Transcript, 1981:66) thought 'socialisation' measures could resolve the 'fiscal crisis of the state' (O'Connor, 1973), torn as it was between subsidising capital and providing adequate public services. Whether returning to the 1921 language was the best way of articulating Labor socialist commitments in a 'post-Keynesian' era was not addressed.

As well as a response to capitalist crisis, support for a strong objective was presented as a badge of identification for the left. Ian McLean (Qld) suggested the qualification should be deleted because the media had focussed on those words (ALP Transcript, 1981:96). This gave the party an opportunity to re-establish its identity. Using the word 'socialism' was an old Labor way to express 'intransigent emotions' (Rawson, 1966a:61. See also Evans, 1976:6).

Those motivated by political exigencies rather than analysing capitalist crisis were primarily concerned with avoiding an electorally embarrassing objective. That is why they stressed the words 'to the extent necessary'. The
National Executive draft was not written for Don Quixote, or starry-eyed idealists, but working politicians, ALP members and potential supporters (David Combe, ALP Transcript, 1981:15). Most contributions from senior politicians were reminiscent of the scramble for cover in the wake of DP 6. Working politicians preferred the National Executive formulation (see Table 1). Those defending the Executive draft included the FPLP leader and deputy leader, the leader in the Senate, three other federal front benchers and a prominent Victorian state politician. Only one of the four parliamentarians presenting alternatives was a federal front bencher.

Table 1

(a) Speakers in general 'socialisation objective' debate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nat Exec Draft</th>
<th>Other Drafts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal Politicians</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Politicians</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Officials</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Officials</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This does not include three speakers who moved draft objectives but did not take part in the general debate (one union official, one party official, one other). It does include David Combe who moved national Executive draft and contributed general summary at the end of the debate. It does not include two speakers (one federal politician, one other) who spoke on one of the 21 points (the Australian republic) rather than the short objective. Inclusion of the five extra speakers would have strengthened the contrast.

(b) Federal politicians in general 'socialisation objective' debate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nat Exec Drafts</th>
<th>Other Drafts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frontbenchers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Backbenchers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NSW Premier Neville Wran, whose electoral success had been seen as a rebuff to DP 6 radicalism, did not take part in the debate proper. His presidential address, however, left little doubt about his sympathies. The ALP had been formed for and existed for:

... quite specific, positive and concrete purposes. Politics is not theology and policies are not semantics. We are not here as a college of cardinals or a council of Trent (ALP Transcript, 1981:8).

There was 'one permanent principle of politics': Achieving government was the fundamental factor in implementing any part of the objective or platform. Defenders of the National Executive gave considerable priority to this 'one permanent principle'. They had little time for philosophical debate on the purposes Labor governments might pursue.

FPLP deputy leader Lionel Bowen was quick to get to what he saw as the political nitty gritty. The objective could be misrepresented by Labor's opponents (ALP Transcript, 1981:51). The 'socialist tiger' was an old scare tactic (see Crisp, 1978:270-98). Labor responded to the Cold War chill in the 1950s with 'ideological withdrawal' (O'Meagher, 1983:24). In 1981, speakers like Bowen and Keating were still wary voters might confuse 'democratic socialism' with Soviet or Chinese-style communism. If the SA amendment was passed, Labor could 'kiss the next federal election goodbye' (Paul Keating, ALP Transcript, 1981:70).

Bill Hayden presented similar arguments in a less abrasive manner. The debate was not one between 'democratic socialists' and opponents of 'democratic socialism' (ALP Transcript, 1981). It was a discussion amongst democratic
socialists about the word structure which would most effectively state the philosophy by which a Labor government would:

... wish to establish those values and that atmosphere appropriate for a democratic socialist party.

For all his conciliatory tone, Hayden was quick to suggest electoral disaster, if delegates preferred the 'warm inner glow' to the practicable 'light on the hill' and the party was lumbered with an objective that had it 'flailing about, disabled and on the defensive' (ALP Transcript, 1981:81-2). The National Executive draft offered an umbrella to shelter the broad Labor spectrum (Graham Richardson, ALP Transcript, 1981:95). John Button doubted where there was really much labour movement enthusiasm for 'socialisation' measures (ALP Transcript, 1981:71). Another argument was that 'socialisation' measures were constitutionally impossible anyway. Against delegates who invoked the name of Mitterand, Graham Richardson stressed constitutional differences between France and Australia (ALP Transcript, 1981:94). Compensation costs were another obstacle. Paul Keating suggested that, far from solving the 'fiscal crisis of the state', new public ownership would overburden a Labor Party that would be:

... flat out trying to manage a modest budget deficit to put some humane make-work programmes into the last election campaign (ALP Transcript, 1981:69).

The 'heavyweight' defence of the National Executive draft lends some support to models of party change which stress 'adaptation' to social change, voter preferences and the norms of the prevailing political system. In theory, parties have a number of responses when faced with electoral unpopularity and
constitutional difficulties. There are alternatives to abandoning one's objective. Electoral perceptions and constitutional provisions are not immutable. As Hindess (1983:141) argues (with regard to the British Labour party):

Considerations of how Labour might take account of popular concerns must bring questions of political priorities together with questions of the organizational capacities of the party, the constraints it operates under and the room for manoeuvre open to it.

Answering such questions is difficult, but involves intra-party debate. Considerations such as these influenced the 'socialisation objective' debate, but were obscured by the rhetorics of capitalist crisis and electoral 'adaptation'. In assessing whether the debate exemplified 'adaptation' to the political market (Downs, 1957; Kircheimer, 1966), we should remember that realpolitik advocates were constrained in the extent to which they could reformulate the objective. They did not have everything their own way. We should also remember the sort of coincidences and contingencies emphasised in 'garbage can' theory, when analysing the debate and the production of its incomes.

Many realpolitik advocates thought the whole debate was over-played. This view was echoed by Australian Financial Review journalist (and former NSW ALP official) Rod Wise. The objective's:

... essential irrelevance to the ALP is manifested by the party's winning and losing elections with it at both State and Federal levels throughout the 60 years since 1921 ('Labor Wrestles with its Aims', 27 July 1981).

Gareth Evans thought the debate had been dominated by:

... the politics of the armchair, the politics of the bar-room and the politics of self-indulgence (ALP Transcript, 1981:89).
The left insisted on an argument:

... because they could not go away from an ALP Conference on a matter such as this without having an argument.

Bob Hawke dismissed opponents of the National Executive draft as 'intellectual wankers' ('Hawke is Hissed by Party', *Australian*, 28 July 1981).

Kim Beazley jnr (WA) gave the concept of 'socialisation' more consideration than most of his right-wing colleagues. His contribution partly escaped the nationalisation/non-nationalisation impasse. He noted a vast array of possibilities under the rubric 'socialisation', from British union/government/management 'planning agreements' to Swedish plans for 'economic democracy' (ALP Transcript, 1981:79). Of course, Beazley's contribution was partly tongue-in-cheek. He went along with the WA/SA charade (voting against each other's motions to protect the National Executive draft). His invocation of Swedish social democracy hinted at alternatives to large-scale nationalisation and stumbling through in the 'mixed economy'. Proponents of the latter course, like previous generations of Labor politicians, wanted an ambiguous and innocuous objective, which was somehow supposed, mysteriously, to fulfill long-term aspirations (see Ross, 1934:54-5). Beazley's separation of ultimate objectives from day-to-day policy (ALP Transcript, 1981:76) brought him back in line with his right-wing colleagues.

The Swedes tried to link short-term policies to longer-term aspirations. This approach had a long pedigree in their party (Tilton, 1979; Esping-Andersen, 1985:20-4; Clegg et al., 1986:331). Plans for 'economic democracy' in the 1970s
(see Meidner, 1978) continued a tradition of 'provisional utopias' which bridged day-to-day politics to a project of social transformation (Korpi, 1983:232). In this regard the Swedish social democrats had been more successful than parties like the ALP and British Labour Party (see Korpi, 1983:50-1). Parties with a 'socialist objective' usually proclaim it as 'an empty slogan having no bearing at all on their strategy or tactics' (Heller, 1982:1).

John Stephens (1979:206) thought the Meidner Plan:

... which essentially calls for socialisation of economic growth is almost certain to replace nationalisation as the primary path to gradual socialisation of the economy in the programmes of most socialist parties attempting to move beyond the welfare state towards socialism.

It was 'a brilliant solution to the political and tactical problems of social democracy' (J. Stephens, 1979:190. See also Esping-Andersen, 1985:297). Interestingly, Australia and New Zealand were among the few countries where, Stephens (1979:199-200) felt, labour movement 'ideological renewal' and a Swedish-style approach, were on the agenda. The ALP, however, was not keen to move beyond Australia's limited and peculiar form of welfare capitalism (see Stretton, 1980, 1981; Castles, 1985). Those who favoured a more combative approach seemed more interested in British strategic nationalisation than Swedish 'economic democracy'. Stuart Holland was their most likely guru.

Beazley (ALP Transcript, 1981:80) insisted there were 'political democracy' battles still to be won in Australia. 'Economic democracy' was a more remote prospect. The events of 11 November 1975 had convinced many Labor supporters that 'political democracy' battles were still relevant in Australia.
The Australian Constitution was found lacking (see Patience, 1978). Labor explored constitutional reform strategies. Linking a constitutional reform campaign for 'political democracy' to a longer-term struggle for 'economic democracy' raised many strategic imponderables.

'Economic democracy' concepts of 'socialisation' could reconcile some competing Labor rhetorics. Brian Howe was keen to distinguish public ownership from 'state capitalism' (ALP Transcript, 1981:67). Industrial democracy, important in 1921, had been neglected by the Australian labour movement since then, yet no issue was more crucial 'if we are to talk about a socialist society'. Lionel Bowen suggested unions could marshal capital and re-orient ownership 'back to the people who produce the wealth' (ALP Transcript, 1981:54).

In the intellectual debate before the Conference, Wilenski (1983:58-9) championed 'economic democracy' as a way of transcending sterile disputes about nationalisation and non-nationalisation. The intellectual debate was far-ranging. Conference had a more restricted focus. Honour was satisfied with an inevitable compromise and Labor returned to more comfortable topics (Evans, 1983:83).

Many of the realpolitik advocates were happy to leave the wording of the objective to 'intellectual wankers' as long as electoral damage was avoided. Their criteria were negative. The left, on the other hand, by abstractly deriving the case for 'socialism' from 'capitalist crisis', and by not considering Labor's organisational capacity to pursue 'socialist' goals, also divorced the objective from policy matters. To this extent, the debate exemplified Winton
Higgins' (1983:136) analysis of 'organisational under-development' in labour parties. Policy-making was left to shadow ministers and their staff:

Most left oppositions don't tackle this problem, but rather engage the right in factional battles over positions in the hierarchy and over symbols like resolutions of principle about nationalisation.

He believed this 'permanent crisis of pointless factionalism' could be overcome by policies which promoted long-term goals while filling gaps in the party's electoral programme. The criticism of the combination of 'socialist' rhetoric and policy abstentionism is pertinent (see Hindess, 1983:107-8 and 119; Hirst, 1985). However, 'garbage can' theory gives us many reasons why 'pointless' factionalism, with its attendant symbolic debates on 'ancient philosophies', should be so persistent.
CONCLUSION
CHAPTER 16
POST-MORTEM RITUALS AND CHANGE IN THE ALP

According to the Canberra Times, the NCI merely introduced 'some new sub-plots' to 'one of the longest-playing dramas in Australian politics', Labor's struggle to reform itself ('Reform of the ALP', 12 April 1979). Many of Whitlam's and Wyndham's earlier arguments, and some even older ones, re-surfaced in 1978-79. In both 1963-67 and 1977-81, a changing Australian society was invoked as a reason for reforming the ALP. Party reformers in the 1960s thought Harold Wilson's description of the British Labour Party as 'a penny farthing bicycle in a jet age' was applicable to the ALP. The NCI saw both the Australian Constitution and the ALP structure as remnants of a 'horse-and-buggy' era.

Analysis of the ALP's attempts to reform itself in 1963-67 and 1977-81, including the various sub-plots in each episode, suggests that, despite the similar language and the recycling of some proposals, Labor did not stand still. Such analysis also raises more general questions about the relationship between 'social change' and change within parties. 'Adaptation', 'strategy' and 'complex arena' models of this relationship were noted in Chapter 1, alongside arguments that Australian politics became more 'professional' in the 1960s and Jaensch's (1989) suggestion of a continuous ALP 'revolution' from 1967 on, in a process of 'adaptation' spurred on by a determined Labor elite's 'strategy'.

417
Compared to earlier post-mortems, the scope of the NCI exercise and the prominence within it of social scientists stand out. As far back as the 1950s, party reformers had hoped a Federal Secretariat with a capable research wing could enlist the services of 'modern' thinkers. The ill-fated National Organising Committee (1960-61) and the independent, but sympathetic, commentator Brian Fitzpatrick urged Labor to keep abreast of developments in public relations techniques and survey research. Others wanted to improve Labor's 'image', particularly on television, which had been introduced to Australia in 1956. Calls for official inquiries and grand debates tended to fall on deaf ears. When Whitlam became leader, he came into conflict with the Federal Executive, 'the twelve witless men', as he once called them. He sought a thorough inquiry into party structure in 1967.2

Here Whitlam echoed the party's first full-time federal secretary, Cyril Wyndham. State Branches refused to provide membership statistics for Wyndham's (official) 1964-65 investigation into party structure. Seeing his report as provisional, his very first recommendation was for a detailed inquiry (see Appendix I). In 1960, to no avail, Ted Wheelwright had called for an inquiry along the lines of the 1955 Wilson Inquiry into the British Labour Party (which concluded the party was a penny-farthing bicycle in a jet age) and Lloyd Ross demanded a grand debate on Labor's future. In 1961, with an election due, Brian Fitzpatrick gave the ALP six months to revolutionise
its approach to policy, research and public relations.\textsuperscript{3} No such revolution transpired, but Labor only lost by the narrowest of margins.

Party reform advocates often stress electoral imperatives, but the relationship between party structure and electoral outcome is complicated. Organisational change is important to organisers (and writers on such topics) and raises 'some fundamental questions' about party purposes, but may not be required for electoral success (Rawson, 1965:25). The use made by Menzies of the notion that Labor parliamentarians were in thrall to 'the thirty-six faceless men' made reorganisation a prominent topic in the post-mortem on the 1963 defeat. The 'faceless men' tag was shaken off in 1967 with the allocation of special places at Federal Conference (and on the Federal Executive) to parliamentary leaders.

Party reform in the 1960s involved more than warding off 'faceless men' jibes. Critics within and on the fringes of the party argued for a more 'professional' approach, which could draw on new campaign techniques to present a better 'image' to a changing (more 'middle-class' and 'white-collar') electorate. Federal Conference reform, increased autonomy for parliamentary leaders, intra-party pluralism, improved mechanisms for 'rank-and-file' participation and a more co-ordinated national focus were also often mentioned. The 'gender gap' in voting and the changing ethnic composition of the electorate...
were noted less often. Critics of prevailing ALP practices concentrated on boosting the party's electoral stocks, but were also concerned with party 'renewal' and membership involvement, especially at the local level.

'Social change' as a reason for party reform had been cited earlier by those advocating a Federal Secretariat. They stressed the growth of 'the white collar, professional, and technical classes' (Crisp, 1978:96). Brian Fitzpatrick called for an intelligent Labor response to the growth of 'the professional, technical and managerial class' ('Capitalist Social Revolution Poses Problems for Labor', Brian Fitzpatrick's Labor Newsletter, February 1959). Fitzpatrick believed the 'young technologists' could be won to an 'articulate, educating, crusading Labor Party'.

Whitlam thought 'wooing the white-collars' necessitated party reform. He specifically appealed to Australia's emerging professional and intellectual stratum (who were assumed to have special insights into the Menzies regime's 'anti-social features'). Whitlam wanted Labor to distance itself from the 'labour movement' and appeal directly to what he saw as the growing ranks of non-unionist citizens on the issues of the day. NSW ALP president Charlie Oliver suggested more and more workers were acquiring a 'middle-class outlook'. In NSW, Maurice Isaacs complained that 'complete trade union domination' left little scope for 'white-collar' participation in the ALP. In Victoria,
Barry Jones argued that 'middle-class' members were denied any effective say. Party change was thus argued for both on the grounds of a more effective appeal to an increasingly 'middle-class' electorate and more effective scope for 'middle-class' participation within the party structure. Others emphasised certain skills. Victorian Branch president R.W. Holt thought the addition of an economist, a social worker and an educationist would help the state executive cope with 'technological change'.

Race Mathews thought local branches had been outstripped by 'social change'. Labor had to create 'an acceptable public image at the grass-roots level' ('Our ALP Branch Structure: The Need for a Remedy', Fact, 20 August 1964). His Scoresby committee project addressed this question, but state executive hostility aborted it. Cyril Wyndham insisted that local branch and FEC revitalisation was important for electoral success. He also argued for Federal Conference reform, more in terms of 'professionalism' than intra-party democracy. Whitlam thought a reformed Federal Conference with direct FEC involvement would improve electoral campaigning and renew Labor energy and enthusiasm. He insisted reorganisation was more than a matter of improved public relations. Even Calwell agreed that Labor's federal structure, divided into 'six watertight compartments' was unfortunate.

The circulation of party reform ideas in the 1960s was often obstructed. The Victorian executive
got many SECs to return their 'Scoresby letters' unread and hindered discussion of the Wyndham Report. In Victoria and WA, the 1964 NSW post-mortem was denounced as 'morbid self-analysis' and 'irrational hysteria'. After the 1966 defeat, many claimed the problem was 'disloyalty', not party structure. Throughout this period, Labor figures regularly 'explained' defeat in terms of 'press bias' and the malevolent machinations of the party's opponents. The electorate's 'little capitalist' proclivities were denounced. There was widespread Labor 'refusal to tolerate critical support' (James Jupp, '15 Years in the Wilderness - What's Wrong with Labour', Canberra Times, 10 December 1964).

Arthur Calwell had assured the 1960 NSW conference that 'intellectuals and pseudo-intellectuals' would be kept at bay. Chamberlain felt disagreement between leaders would lead the 'rank-and-file' astray. He dismissed 'party reform' as a gimmick, whipped up by the press and other opponents. Disruption and division would follow introspection. His watchwords were discipline, loyalty, tradition and Labor principle. We need to be careful when talking about Labor 'debate' in the 1960s. Party reform advocates often had to present their ideas carefully. In Victoria, the Participants, founded in 1965, felt they could not come out of the closet until 1969. In NSW, the dominant faction championed federal reorganisation, but was not prepared to countenance reform within its own domain.

By 1978, there was an openness and a willingness to explore controversies and to draw on
social-scientific advice that had been rare in the
1960s. The party was also less federalised. The NCI
was set up a month after the December 1977 defeat. The
Wyndham Report was not commissioned until eight months
after November 1963. The NCI provided a national focus,
invited submissions and included social scientists. In
contrast, Wyndham had an almost impossible task,
particularly with so little state Branch co-operation.
His report was commissioned after a hotch-potch of post-
mortems (especially in NSW) and what we might call anti-
post-mortems (especially in Victoria and WA) in the
states.

Some of the things that party reformers had been arguing for in the 1960s had come about by 1978. There was more intra-party pluralism. The old winner-take-all practices in Victoria and NSW had been eliminated with the imposition of proportional representation in 1970-71. This intervention heralded an increase in National Executive authority. The parliamentary leadership had increased its autonomy. The complaints in the 1960s had been about 'middle-class' members being made feel unwelcome. Now there was talk of 'working-class' members being alienated (see Crisp, 1982). The 'It's Time' campaign in 1972, which won an advertising industry award, demonstrated the sort of Labor mastery of public relations, advertising and polling techniques that earlier party reformers had hoped for. By 1978, Labor was less suspicious of
intellectuals. The party had become 'more receptive to critical advice' (Jupp, 1982:112).

Some things stayed the same. State Branches were unwilling to hand over membership details to the NCI. Federalism had only been slightly weakened. The party reform rhetoric of the 1960s included some concern with more intra-party democracy as well as more 'professionalism'. The intervening years saw little progress with the former objective. To a considerable extent, Whitlam by-passed the party structure, instead of transforming it. The NCI revisited submerged 1960s 'democratisation' arguments. The 1975 trauma and the rise of 'new social movements', especially feminism, meant more radical 'democratisation' suggestions also surfaced. Some of Whitlam's closest advisers, such as Race Mathews and Peter Wilenski, now seemed willing to explore a new radicalism.

The NCI itself argued that, given concentrated media ownership, Labor had to become a 'mass party' anew to secure 'a lasting tenure of power' (ALP, 1979:2). It diagnosed Labor's poor electoral record in terms of low membership, inadequate finance, a failure 'to permeate the institutional framework' of Australian society and the 'parochial horizons' of party chieftains. National Conference reform, a 'community presence' at the local level, and affirmative action would revitalise the party. Deficiencies in Labor 'professionalism' were also noted, but the NCI Report emphasised 'party renewal' (although, as we saw in Chapter 12D, this had its own ambiguities).
The argument that a renewed 'mass party' of the sort envisaged by the NCI was electorally necessary seems dubious. Of course, there are other reasons, besides electoral ones, why a party might want to reform itself. Here we could note Peter Wilenski's (1980b:399) contention that, to a significant degree, the extent of reform a federal Labor government could secure in Australian state and society depended on the degree of change in the party's 'structure, approach and methods'. Within the ALP, conceptions of the party as the basis of 'a broad social movement' struggling for far-reaching social and political changes have always jostled with conceptions of the party as an 'electoral machine' aiming at government and modest reforms (Houseman, 1971:2-3). In 1977-81, there was considerable exploration of the sort of reform Labor would require, as a 'social movement' in Houseman's sense. Thus the concern with 'democratisation', 'grass-roots' revitalisation, Labor 'socialism', affirmative action and more general Labor/'new social movement' liaison. The three most popular themes in 'grass-roots' ALP submissions to the NCI were 'Rank-and-file rights', 'Educate the electorate' and 'Defend Labor socialisation ideology'. The National Executive and Special Conference, however, were reluctant to disturb factional balance and showed considerable respect for what Neville Wran described as 'the one permanent principle of politics'; achieving government was the fundamental factor in implementing any part of Labor's objective or
platform (ALP Transcript, 1981:8).

Wran had been unimpressed with the release of the NCI's lively discussion paper on economic policy in the midst of the NSW election campaign. While the NCI explored party renewal, many pointed to the 'Wran model' of cautious, competent management as the route to electoral revival. One NSW Labor official saw Wran's practice as a better model than NCI theory and hoped for 'a lot less tomfoolery of position papers' and grand new projects (quoted, Malcolm Colless, 'What the Labor Party Must Learn from Wran's Landslide', Australian, 14 October 1978). The focus here was very much on the party as 'an electoral machine'. In September 1987, NSW Branch secretary Stephen Loosely claimed the 'NSW model' as the blueprint for subsequent Labor success elsewhere.

In other states, and nationally, the ALP, following NSW's example:

 developed a corporate system of recruitment and promotion of party officers and officials ... Moreover, to win, the party understood the need for absolute commitment to discipline. In most instances, this meant self-discipline. But where necessary, this discipline was imposed (quoted, Stephen Guest, 'Labor Party Branches All Out of the Same Mould Now', Canberra Times, 18 February 1988). 14

There is an element of self-promotion here, but also a striking contrast with late 1970s hopes for 'party renewal'. The talk then was of participation, learning from 'new social movements' and the like. Those with other priorities only occasionally demurred at what they saw as 'tomfoolery'.

Some of the leading party figures on the NCI
took little part in its proceedings. They were, however, quick to become involved in (ultimately unsuccessful) attempts to block federal intervention in Queensland, on the grounds that the 'old guard' there provided 'moderate ballast' (votes for the right on the party's federal bodies) which kept Labor closer to the middle ground in national politics (Bob Carr, 'Why Ducker is Quitting', Bulletin, 11 September 1979). This did not show much concern for 'party renewal'. Nor was there much talk about why 'moderate ballast' was more important either. With an 'attention vacuum' from senior figures, access for out-groups and its own 'party renewal' agenda, the NCI set the terms for debate on party reform in the late 1970s. The 1981 Special Conference showed that (except on affirmative action) this did not necessarily mean an influence on official party decisions.

In the 'adaptation' model, parties change in response to changes in 'social structure' or voter preferences. There was considerable social change in Australia between 1963 and 1981, for example in workforce composition, gender relations, distribution of educational qualifications, patterns of immigration and official acceptance of cultural diversity. The intersection between such changes and changes within parties depends on how they become matters of political debate. 'Social change' does not translate into political change automatically. The notion of some all-encompassing 'basic' change in 'social structure' is problematic.
The years between 1963 and 1981 also saw significant changes in electoral campaign technology, a factor which is stressed in Epstein's 'contagion from the right' theory, Kircheimer's 'catch-all' thesis and Panebianco's more recent argument on the rise of the 'electoral-professional party' (and the demise of the 'mass-bureaucratic party'). Television has become increasingly central in Australian elections. Party polling techniques have become increasingly sophisticated (Mills, 1986). The media and the political players themselves have become more familiar with political science perspectives. The sort of 'professionalisation' that Davies, Emy and Encel wrote about has come to characterise Australian party competition. However, we have to ask whether, as Davies and Emy implied, such 'professionalisation' amounted to a 'de-ideologisation' or whether, as Encel sometimes suggested, it has had more ambiguous consequences. Many 'adaptation' writers, and Jaensch in his 'ALP revolution' argument, suggest that parties which become more 'professional' in their approach (or more 'rational' in their absorption of social-scientific perspectives) also become less 'ideological' and more 'moderate'.

Such a perspective might suggest that Australian politics became more 'professional' as Australian society became more 'middle-class', with Labor being forced to 'adapt' or keep on losing elections. In post-mortems, groupings within the party could present recipes for
recovery, based on shifting towards the ideology of the rival, victorious party. Such recipes were put forward within the ALP. In 1964, Charlie Oliver suggested politics was more and more marginal to people's lives in a full employment society. Elections were a competition for the centre ground in an increasingly 'middle-class' society. In 1965, Cyril Wyndham dismissed references to the 'working class' and the 'underprivileged'. It was not only 'the bosses' who owned cars, boats and holiday homes. In 1978, Bob Carr and Joe Thompson, citing the 'Wran model', called for Labor 'adaptation' to voter conservatism. Both saw the prevalence of tow bars for a boat or a caravan on cars in factory parking lots and inquiries in union offices about overseas holiday deals as being particularly symbolic. In places, the NCI went along with this line of analysis (APSA, 1979:6, 43, 79 and 82). However, the assumption that changes in the class composition of the electorate translate directly into changed political attitudes is problematic. The 1960s 'end of ideology' expectation that 'middle-classing' made for conservatism was belied by the upsurge in student and 'new social movement' radicalism at the end of that decade. More 'professional' Australian politics in the 1970s did not mean duller politics. Polarisation in 1974 and 1975 was considerable.17

Post-mortems do involve the articulation of recipes for electoral recovery. Defeated parties sometimes do abandon controversial stances. Much of what happened in Labor post-mortems between 1963 and 1981 would not surprise Downs, but a lot else was going on. Electoral
recovery recipes were often overshadowed by 'party renewal' projects. There was no one, right recipe for electoral recovery anyway. In the 1960s, party reform advocates stressed improving Labor's 'image' and 'adapting' to 'social change', but also tried to boost 'rank-and-file' enthusiasm. In the late 1970s, there was considerable interest in what the party (in conjunction with other political forces, including unions and 'new social movements') could do to shift 'community attitudes', instead of just 'adapting' to them. 'Social change' was seen as something achieved through struggle, rather than something driven by impenetrable 'structural' forces.

As parties became more 'catch-all' in style and 'professional' in approach, perhaps they became more like other organisations, moving from what Gabriel called 'parochialism' to 'cosmopolitanism', in another 'adaptation' argument. Some features of Labor change between 1963 and 1981 fit such a picture. Labor did become more 'professional', more receptive to social-scientific analysis and less suspicious of 'intellectuals'. Labor in 1963 was 'parochial' in many ways. A long apprenticeship was needed to learn tried and trusted ways of doing things. 'Intellectuals and pseudo-intellectuals' were suspect. Social and political rituals in modern societies tend to be 'organized around the consultation of expertise and the making of decisions' (March and Olsen, 1984:742). The 'consultation of expertise', however, was often low down the list of Labor post-mortem priorities. Calwell
favored 'explanations' of the party's plight in terms of malicious 'external' influences, although he did admit that Labor did not know why it was losing and had to find out. He himself had served a long apprenticeship in the ALP. He valued party experience over external 'professional' criteria. Whitlam, on the other hand, surveyed the ALP with the eyes of a successful professional (he had been a lawyer) and found it wanting in many respects, not least in its unwillingness to accept critical advice from intellectuals and professionals.

Many commentators criticised this Labor parochialism in the 1960s. Rawson (1966a:124) suggested that the influence of 'the peculiar and deadly pseudo-radicalism of many union officials' meant the ALP was 'insufficiently mobile in a radically changing world'. Labor 'pseudo-radicalism' was largely gestural (see also Rawson, 1964b:17). It worked quite happily within the restricted confines of Encel's older 'operative concept of the state' or Emy's 'producer group politics'. Within the ALP in the 1960s, 'instinctive conservatives' who had climbed to the top of the greasy pole by 'head-counting and head-breaking' were being supplanted by 'rational radicals', who could claim national policy-making skills (James Jupp, 'Radicals Find Room at the Top', Canberra Times, 9 August 1965 and Jupp, 1965a:7). This sort of change fits in with Panebianco's emphasis on the importance of extra-party and extra-political skills in 'electoral-professional parties'. The rise of Labor's 'rational radicals' could be seen as appropriate 'adaptation' to 'social change' and changed electoral technology.
In this perspective, the NCI could be seen as the sort of crisis-induced opportunity for 'rational diagnosis' that can lead to successful remedial action in 'cosmopolitan' organisations. This assumes unambiguous performance criteria are available and that a party's purposes are easy to define. John Paterson, a 1960s party reform advocate with a strong managerial bent, argued that Labor success depended on recognising 'the basic rule of organisational theory'. The party would have to specify its goals and 'rationally' adjust to changing circumstances. These included changed 'authority beliefs' in the electorate, which placed increased emphasis on educational achievement and technical competence in candidates for public office. However, stating the party's goals and 'rational' adjustment to changing circumstances were matters of political disputation, not technical analysis. At the time, new forces drawing on 'knowledge' were challenging 'authority' in various Australian institutions (White, 1967). The harnessing of 'knowledge' involved political struggles. Parties could draw on 'knowledge' in different ways. A disinterested vantage point is hard to find on a reorganisation committee. As Cyril Wyndham, who had good reason to know, put it:

When you start talking reorganisation, you don't get a rational debate - you get a power struggle, and when that happens the chances of reorganisation are practically doomed (quoted, 'Wyndham Urges Shake-Up in Labor Branches', Australian, 8 April 1968).
As the ALP became more receptive to critical advice, this still held good. Party reform debates became embroiled in tactical arguments as well as power struggles. The 'real issue', Wyndham believed, was often 'much deeper' than 'just party reform' (quoted, Peter Smark, 'Wyndham, the Frustrated Reformer', Australian, 24 May 1967).

Different courses of action could be championed with different 'expert' arguments. The NCI was informed by various kinds of social-scientific 'knowledge' including psephology, neo-Weberian sociology and post-Keynesian political economy, although it did not organise its own research and matched preferred 'solutions' to the 'problems' it discerned rather haphazardly. Like other such committees in other organisations, it became a 'garbage can' for an array of concerns, that happened to be circulating at the time. Given the impossibility of a disembodied purely technical-organisational vantage point, reorganisation will always involve more than just 'rational diagnosis'. The NCI also shows that the incorporation of 'knowledge' does not necessarily imply 'convergence' and the 'end of ideology'. 'Experts' can re-articulate old ideologies as well as pinpoint suggestions for a better 'image'. Academic political economy fed into Labor 'socialist' projects in the 1970s.

So much for 'adaptation' models. 'Strategy' models see party change as largely a matter of what leaders decide. In post-mortems, party leaders can assess previous strategies and decide whether new ones are called for. Much attention is paid to how parties respond to the
strategies of their competitors. Change in the ALP could be seen as a response to successful strategies by the party's opponents. Here, the connection between Menzies' adroit use of the 'faceless men' image in 1963 and the addition of parliamentary leaders to Labor's federal bodies in 1967 could be noted, and the establishment of the Federal Secretariat in 1964 could be seen as a delayed response to the earlier establishment of a Liberal secretariat in Canberra. More broadly, Whitlam and his supporters could be seen as carving out a new path for the ALP from 1967 on. The disregarding of many party reform proposals in 1967 and 1981 could be seen as a matter of elite choice. The case studies suggest a more complicated picture. Rather than attempting to implement grand projects, Labor leaders addressed particular 'problems' at particular times. For example, intra-party pluralism was an important Whitlam party reform theme. Federal intervention in Victoria and NSW in 1970-71 enabled some progress to be made in this area in those states. It was not until 1981, however, that the principle of proportional representation was accepted for the whole party. The Special Conference agreed on proportional representation, although it had not been recommended by the NCI. 20

Change was more likely to come incrementally than through formal reorganisation projects or grand debates. 21 Whitlam had to abandon much of his party reform programme in 1967, although he did secure significant changes:
... a man who steers for Northern Territory and finds Tasmania instead may still have achieved something, though not a triumph of navigation ('After So Much Labour', Canberra Times, 2 August 1967).

The introduction of new themes in 1977-81 (e.g. affirmative action) suggests Labor was not simply being forced to respond to the successful strategies of its opponents. What both case studies show is a pattern of reorganisation debate characterised by dispersed decision-making, realpolitik power plays and the ubiquity of 'garbage can' coincidences.

Dean Jaensch's picture of a 'revolution' in the ALP emphasises 'adaptation' to changes in the electorate and the determination of the party elite. Some qualifications in his analysis throw doubt on the 'revolution' thesis. For all his claims about the party being hijacked, he suggests much of the party's 'basic ethos' has survived. Reforms since 1966:

... were intended to provide broader representation, greater internal cooperation and coordination and to overcome some of the intra-party tensions that had emerged, sometimes with disastrous electoral consequences (Jaensch, 1989:99).

More could have been made of these points. Calls for a Mass Conference pointed to flaws in the ALP as a 'mass party'. Reform was called for if the party was to be successful as some sort of 'social movement' as well as if it was to be a successful 'electoral machine' (see Houseman, 1971:40). Ambiguously, Whitlam stated his intention to convert the ALP, in the eyes of the public,
into a 'mass party' again. More consistently, the NCI implied the ALP never had been a 'mass party', but should become one to secure a lasting tenure of power.\textsuperscript{22} The story of change within the Labor Party was not just the story of a slow abandonment of distinct 'mass party' characteristics. Attempts were made, often, it is true, without much success, to provide mechanisms for increased 'rank-and-file' participation. Furthermore, the limited 'de-federalisation' which took place in 1981 could be seen as equipping Labor to be more of a 'mass party' than it had been. The 1981 changes:

... provided a greater opportunity for 'majority rule' within the national party, and hence a potential for a real and substantial increase in the powers of the national party (Jaensch, 1989:107). \textsuperscript{23}

This 'de-federalisation' was partly a response to wider changes in Australian federal processes (Jaensch, 1989:103). It was also justifiable, as the NCI was well aware, in terms of Labor's 'mass party' ethos (Jaensch, 1989:106). Jaensch notes all this, as he notes the complicated motives of 1960s party reformers. However, such considerations do not disturb the model of transition from 'mass' to 'catch-all' party that guides his analysis. Perhaps they should.

Jaensch (1989:41) sees the NCI, the 'most wide-ranging self-assessment of any party', as an important part of the Labor 'revolution'. Along with the 'Wran model', it helped set the stage for the Hawke-Keating hijack in the 1980s (Jaensch, 1989:159). The NCI noted the electoral significance of shifts in class identification
and Labor realists drew the appropriate inferences (Jaensch, 1989:159-60). 'A decision to proceed' with an 'electoralist' strategy, whereby policies, practices and the platform itself would be made acceptable to 'middle-class', swinging voters, 'had obviously been made' by 1980 (Jaensch, 1989:160). The turn to 'electoralism' began in 1967 and picked up steam in the 1980s. Jaensch (1989:166-7) sees the smoothly managed 1988 National Conference as:

... a major step along the road begun by Whitlam, following the 36 faceless men episode in 1966 (sic). Whitlam set out to broaden the Conference base, specifically to grant Labor parliamentary leaders more representation, and to weaken the perception (and the reality) that the party was under the control of the machine. 24

In Chapter 9 we saw the ambiguities built into Whitlam's reorganisation crusade. While emphasising 'professionalism', he also took up the theme of 'party renewal'. The NCI explored 'party renewal' more thoroughly. It hoped that, at least symbolically, a Mass Conference would redress 'rank-and-file alienation'. By 1988, redressing such alienation seemed a lot less important than avoiding 'media scenes of delegates abusing each other, tearing up membership tickets and the like' (Jaensch, 1989:167). We saw the NCI wrestling with the dilemma of combining party 'manageability' with mechanisms for 'grass-roots' revitalisation in Chapter 12. We noted Alan Wolfe's theorisation of this sort of conflict in terms of 'depoliticisation' versus 'legitimation' to party activists. There are problems with Wolfe's formulation and his hankering for 'genuine' politics, 25 but this
analysis of party schizophrenia does help clarify how conceptions of party reform can differ.

In parties with pretensions to internal democracy, leadership preferences for a 'depoliticised' membership can often conflict with internal 'legitimation' projects. The NCI explored such tensions. It stressed 'professional' presentation, but did not simply herald an 'electoralist' approach, in the way that Jaensch suggests. In its own way, the NCI wanted to build Labor up as a 'mass party'. Jaensch sees the 1988 Conference as the culmination of Labor's turn to 'electoralism'. Discussing what happened in 1988 is beyond our scope here, but Jaensch's highlighting of the NCI as a significant step in a unilinear 'electoralist' trend downplays significant aspects of its work. There are problems with Jaensch's picture of an ALP 'revolution' as an 'adaptation' to a changed Australian society, spurred on by a determined elite (including parliamentary leaders, party officials and NCI members). The NCI spiritedly disputed the proposition that Labor had to choose between its identity and ideology on the one hand and indiscriminately adapting to the electoral market on the other. It set out to defuse the 'silly dichotomy' between 'socialism at all costs' and 'selling out'/managing the status quo. Jaensch suggests that, encouraged by the NCI, Labor had firmly adopted the latter course by the 1980s.

Labor post-mortems and party change in the period 1977-81 raise questions for any 'strategy' model, not just one which assumes the NCI argued for unalloyed 'electoralism'. Przeworski, for example, suggests post-
mortems facilitate complicated trade-offs between identity maintenance and electoral imperatives. In his model, one could imagine a party leadership trying to overcome the sort of 'silly dichotomy' noted by the NCI. But what scope does a leadership have for settling on a 'strategy' in this way? We have to ask questions about the degree of leadership control of post-mortem processes and about the nature of these processes themselves. When post-mortems occur party leaders are likely to be on the defensive and the level of intra-party conflict is likely to be high. Secondly, post-mortem processes take place in a range of arenas, some temporary, some permanent. These processes are complicated by 'garbage can' coincidences in the various arenas. This makes the development of a coherent 'strategy' difficult. Attempts at such coherent 'strategy' can be discerned in the 'projects' different groupings put forward. 'Party reform' projects can be expected in temporary arenas exploring 'what went wrong'. Such projects may be linked with conflicts in other arenas (over new policies perhaps). 'Projects' are always compromised in their implementation, given the competition between them in a context of ambiguity. To say that a party is influenced by a new 'project' is not the same as saying that a party leadership has settled on a new 'strategy', which redefines party discourses and practices in a mutually consistent and coherent manner.

Post-mortem rituals provide opportunities for possibilities besides the development of coherent new 'strategies' by party leaders, who may be somewhat
vulnerable after a defeat. Electoral defeat can lead to an organisational 'crisis'. Rather than providing a stage for 'rational diagnosis', as some 'adaptation' models assume, such 'crises' may lead to struggles over why the party has come to such a sorry state. Defeat can discredit a party's 'dominant coalition' (Panebianco, 1988:246). Previously influential projects may be questioned as the dominant coalition's control over intra-party communication is weakened. Insurgent elites cannot be held responsible for the 'crisis' and proffer their own recipes for resolving it (Panebianco, 1988:46 and 206-11; see also Ware, 1987:147; Chariot, 1989:360). Such recipes, or new projects, can focus on party renewal as well as electoral revival. Kircheimer's suggestion (1969a), put forward before the formulation of his 'catch-all' thesis, that post-mortems offer interesting opportunities for party gadflies and irregulars, may offer more purchase on post-mortem ritual dynamics than Michels' brusque dismissal of the idea of expecting anything from special committees of inquiry.

Our case studies show examples of party leaders treading warily as they account for their stewardship in the wake of an unpleasant defeat. The NSW party officers, in their 1964 inquiry, wanted to retain the initiative, so dissentient elements would not call the tune at state conference (see Chapter 4A). The NCI worried about the 'rank-and-file' getting 'a sense of participation' and deflecting criticisms about an appointed committee (see Chapter 11B). This sense of struggle, controversy and leadership uncertainty does not come through in images of
post-mortems as occasions for calm deliberation on new strategies by party leaders.

Post-mortems are often justified instrumentally. The assumption is that, once 'what went wrong' is discovered, the party can set about rectifying its electoral problems. Subsequent electoral success might then be seen as a sign that the ritual had 'worked'. The case studies, however, suggest that in post-mortems different groupings proffer different 'solutions' to what they see as the party's 'problems'. Such 'problems' and 'solutions' are often matched fairly haphazardly. 'Party reform' becomes enmeshed in other concerns. Looking at the 'problem' of recovering from electoral defeat tends to bring an array of (perhaps previously latent) 'problems' to the surface.

For 'strategy' models, post-mortems raise the question of intentional change within political parties. Is change within parties explicable in terms of the intentions of party managers or do parties operate in a world of 'bounded rationality', where we have to expect 'counter-intuitive effects' to follow formal reorganisation efforts (Panebianco, 1988:239-41)? 28 The case studies show considerable disjunctures between party reforms in 1967 and 1981 and the preceding recommendations of the Wyndham and NCI reports. Proportional representation was gradually accepted in a series of discrete decisions that attempted to resolve particular sets of 'problems' rather than as part of a coherent 'strategy'.
The case studies show complex connections between temporary arenas, established in the course of post-mortem rituals, and more permanent, institutionalised arenas. The issues thrown up in the temporary arenas, and the reception of reorganisation recommendations in the permanent arenas, depend on various 'garbage can' coincidences and complications. Temporary arenas can be unpredictable. In 1964, the NSW officers approached the special post-mortem FEC meetings more circumspectly than the annual state conference. Within the Branch, a cycle of factional conflict yielded predictable manoeuvres and counter-manoeuvres. 'Institutionalised war-games' made the annual conference 'an organisational field par excellence'. The FEC meetings were more unusual events. Members were asked directly where they thought Labor had gone wrong. The officers left controversial proposals for the state conference. The dominant faction was sure of 'the numbers' there. This kind of disjuncture between temporary and permanent arenas is also illustrated by the differences between NCI discourse on National Conference reform and the ways National Conference delegates themselves framed this question. We have also noted 'attention vacuum' on the NCI, with key party figures apparently taking their committee duties rather lightly. Another example of 'attention vacuum' can be seen in the NCI submissions. Only 3 per cent of submissions came from affiliated unions, compared to 23 per cent from individual branch members and 35 per cent from 'grass-roots' party units (Table 1, Chapter 11). Yet it would be unwise to infer that affiliated unions were uninterested in the
shape of the party structure. They could register their views on such matters in other arenas.

The NCI worried about the decline in the proportion of unionists in ALP-affiliated (mainly blue-collar) unions. It recommended a task force to further inquire into Labor/union relationships. No such task force eventuated. In another arena, the Australian Labor Advisory Council, significant developments were afoot. The ALAC brought FPLP and ACTU leaders together for intermittent meetings.\(^{29}\) The ALP-ACTU Accord was negotiated in this arena, before the 1983 election. Arguments for trading-off money wage gains for 'social wage' improvements were floated in the late 1970s by people like Hugh Stretton and the NCI's Geoff Harcourt,\(^{30}\) but the particular organisational and consultative mechanisms associated with the Accord were not anticipated.

The durability and electoral benefits of the Accord in the 1980s provided an ironic counterpoint to the worries about Labor's union links, which beset earlier party reformers. In the 1960s, there was a feeling that unionism was in decline in an increasingly 'middle-class' society. This was confounded by a growth in white-collar unionism, especially in the public sector, from the late 1960s. Nagging doubts remained.\(^{31}\) The NCI worried that the growing sections of unionism were not affiliated to the party. By the 1980s, the ACTU encompassed many unions that were not affiliated with the ALP. The Accord consolidated a novel relationship between the ACTU and Labor in government. Whether unions were affiliated to
the ALP (and some of the largest were not) seemed to matter little in this relationship. Party-union relations may well produce 'problems' in the future, but they are unlikely to be the particular 'problems' which preoccupied party reformers in the 1960s and the 1970s.

Labor's Accord approach was a consequence of complicated processes inside and outside the party and in the ALAC. This illustrates the disjuncture between specific party reform arenas (in this case the NCI) and the multifarious ways in which important 'strategic' decisions are made by 'the party'. As the 'complex arena' mosel suggests, 'the party' is often best seen as a set of loosely connected arenas of struggle, held together by certain procedures, which specify means of making decisions. Recognition of this kind of complexity should be incorporated into generalisations about change within parties.32

The intersection of different processes in different arenas is not completely controlled by the party leadership. It is difficult to explain change within parties in terms of shifts in 'strategy'. Party leaderships and insurgent groupings do promote new 'strategies'. Such attempts or 'projects' can have significant effects, as they are taken up by competing forces in various arenas. The fate of different 'projects' can tell us much about the state of a party. Chapter 1 noted three 'projects'; Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1, put forward in the 1960s, and two rival versions of the 'lessons of 1975', Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2 and Labor Managerialism. Each project
linked party reform to stances on economic policy and Labor/'new social movement' liaison. The 1977-81 debates touched on all these topics. The 1963-67 debates had a more narrowly organisational focus, but conflicts on party reform reached out into matters of policy and style as well.

In the 1960s, various groups in the ALP hoped the party would adopt a more contemporary 'social democratic' approach. Gough Whitlam championed such a project. As we saw in Chapter 9, Whitlam and his supporters found policy easier to change than party structure. At successive Federal Conferences from 1965 on, Labor's platform was substantially rewritten. The 1972 election was won on a recognisably contemporary 'social democratic' programme. Labor also became more 'professional' in drawing on 'expert' policy advice. The parliamentary leaders won places on the party's federal bodies, but other party reform concerns were dropped from the agenda with the 1967 Adelaide compromise.

Whitlam's 'project' helped reorient some Labor discourses and practices. Such reorientation contributed to electoral success in 1972. Party reform debate did not begin in earnest again until 1977. By then, different groupings in the party had digested very different 'lessons of 1975'. Changed economic circumstances and Liberal success with 'small government' rhetoric damned further 'social democratic' public expenditure projects in the eyes of some, who began to see excess ideological baggage in the Whitlam 'programme' (Murray, 1976). In the
post-mortem arena, those who hoped Labor could gather a new coalition of support, by rebuilding itself as a 'movement' with new 'socialist' economic policies, took up the running. Support for such a project, which we have called Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2, can be seen in many submissions to the NCI. In the temporary post-mortem arena, Labor Managerialism was a more shadowy entity, although we could note the committee's cautious approach to winning back support lost between 1972 and 1975. The way in which the NCI proposals were filtered by the Special Conference, trends in Labor economic policy and the outcome of the 'socialisation objective' debate also suggest some support for the Labor Managerialist approach.

While proponents of Labor Managerialism were generally fairly quiet in the post-mortem arena, the party was being reshaped in other arenas (e.g. ALAC). The 1980s became an era of Labor Managerialist ascendancy in ways that had not been anticipated. The dilemma of party manageability versus 'legitimation' to party activists, which had so preoccupied the NCI seemed to lose importance. Unprecedented electoral success seemed to make 'legitimation' in this sense dispensable. The NCI dilemma may yet return to haunt the ALP. Alongside Labor's strong discipline in the 1980s, the party's 'grassroots machinery', its 'traditional pride and strength' was progressively enfeebled (Lloyd and Swan, 1987:108-9; Jaensch, 1989:168). The NCI wanted to strengthen this machinery, through National Conference reform and a 'community presence' in local areas. If the 'grass-roots' began to wither, as the party became more 'professional'
and electorally successful, we can expect NCI ideas to re-
surface:

Old solutions do not go away but wait for new
occasions on which they might be represented
as answers to problems unresolved by current

To understand change within parties, we have to understand
this complex and ambiguous matching of 'problems' and
'solutions'.
CHAPTER 1

1. Dittrich (1983:266) argues that too much has been extrapolated from hypotheses about what 'rational' parties would do. We need 'to get inside the parties'.

2. In the earlier period, the terms Federal Conference and Federal Executive were used. In the 1970s, National Conference and National Executive became preferred. There was an element of wishful thinking in the changed nomenclature: 'We changed our name to national some years back - we have yet to change it in an emotional, psychological and political sense' (Bob Hogg, ALP Transcript, 1981:197).

3. Although parliamentary representatives were added to the party's federal bodies in 1967, much party practice was left untouched (see Chapter 9C). The changes imposed on Victoria and NSW in 1970-71 were significant (see Chapter 13B). D. Stephens (1979) stresses the ways in which the policy committees bypassed older party structures (see Chapter 12B).

4. 'Garbage can' theory was first presented by Cohen et al. (1972). Scott (1987:72-118, 134-6, 262-81) places 'garbage can' analysis and related insights in their organisation theory context.

5. Stephens' application of 'garbage can' analysis to the ALP is particularly illuminating. He focussed mainly on the 'making' of Federal Executive 'decisions'. This thesis uses 'garbage can' analysis to examine Labor 'responses' to changing circumstances.

6. The exploration of this dilemma in Chapter 12C and 12D relies on a modified version of Wolfe's (1977) 'depoliticisation'/'legitimation' dichotomy.

7. The NCI's response to these pressures was ambivalent. See the discussion of 'pseudo-legitimation' in Chapter 12D.

8. Membership participation and voter concerns were treated 'ritualistically' when their acknowledgement was dissociated from changes in party practice.


449


13. Reorganisation committees often generate 'models for' new practices, although they may present them cautiously. Self (1978) suggests administrative reform committees 'tend to combine radical and critical diagnoses with relatively moderate prescriptions' (quoted Wilenski, 1986:173). See also March and Olsen, 1983). Radical diagnoses could generate one 'forest of symbols', moderate prescriptions another.

14. Hindess distinguishes 'social actors' which can do these things from collectivities like 'classes' and 'society' which are often invoked by sociologists, but which have no identifiable means of making decisions, let alone acting on them. On political parties as 'social actors', see Hindess, 1986:115 and 1988:5, 46, 67, 84.

15. For Rose and Mackie (1988), parties are always simultaneously 'extroverted' and 'introverted' organisations.

16. Semi-secret rather than secret in the sense that factional conflicts and other intra-party matters are not completely kept out of the media. For this reason, in Chapter 13C, Sartori's (1976:95-7) distinction between 'visible' (inter-party) and 'invisible' (intra-party) politics is replaced by a distinction between 'invisible' and 'semi-visible' politics.

17. Janda's own photography, which uses a cross-national, quantitative approach, yields the fairly banal conclusion that 'modern' forms of 'external' socio-economic organisation make for 'organisationally complex' parties. As with the early research on comparative welfare policies (such as Wilensky, 1975), attempts to be comprehensive in the number of countries studied make for uninteresting conclusions (see the critique of Wilensky in the more focussed research of Castles, 1978 and J. Stephens, 1979).
18. This thesis mainly relies on internal ALP documents and press reportage for its account of the post-mortem debates. For the 1963-67 period, much useful material was located in the records of the NSW Branch. Important sources for the 1977-81 debate included original submissions and other documents from the National Committee of Inquiry, as well as the transcript of the 1981 National Conference. Newspaper coverage of intra-ALP affairs has its limitations. Prevailing conceptions of a 'good story' lead to a focus on leaders and dramatic disputes. The press material does, however, help establish the context for the debates and 'decisions' recorded in the party documents. Press coverage often influenced these debates. The leading participants in the debates knew this. Senior Labor figures routinely deplored it, by complaining about 'press bias'. They just as routinely fed it by judicious 'leaks' and general availability. Comparison between the elite debate covered in the press with the 'grassroots' debate, recorded in the party documents, tends to confirm arguments about the oligarchic nature of the ALP.

19. Daalder (1983:2 and 22) suggests the absence of detailed empirical studies contributed to the emergence of sweeping generalisations like Epstein's 'contagion from the right' and Duverger's earlier 'contagion from the left' (with the 'mass party' of the socialist/'working-class' kind as the wave of the future.

20. These common features are worth noting at a time when public choice theorems prove attractive to political scientists as an alternative to what Barry (1978) calls the 'characteristically sloppy logic and flabby prose' of the sociologists (quoted, Dunleavy and Ward, 1981:351). Barry (1970) had earlier emphasised political science's theoretical dependence on economics and sociology (see also Huntington, 1971:284; Therborn, 1975:426). Now he was suggesting economics alone was persuasive. The economic models, however, often read off the formulation of preferences from membership of particular social categories (Hindess, 1988:43, 107). For a good discussion of the complementarity of Parsonian sociology and neo-classical economics, and their shared neglect of organisational analysis, see Tomlinson, 1984:591. Simon (1947) criticised neo-classical economics' organisational assumptions. Moe (1984) tries to reconcile public choice theory and sophisticated organisational analysis.

21. To take the four key party functions listed by von Beyme (1985:362ff) Check-lists of party 'functions' can often be found in political science textbooks. See, e.g. Dowse and Hughes, 1972:339. For

22. Von Beyme (1985:360-2) notes the rise of the 'critical-dialectical' school, concerned with issues like party 'legitimation' as an alternative to mainstream political science in West Germany. He accords their arguments respect, but concludes from his own empirical survey that talk of a 'party legitimation crisis' is overblown (von Beyme, 1975:372). Raschke (1983) criticises von Beyme's book from a 'critical-dialectical' perspective. This thesis makes use of some 'critical-dialectical' ideas (see the discussion of ALP 'legitimation' problems in Chapters 12C and 12D); but it rejects the assumption, which von Beyme (1985:362) attributes to 'critical-dialectical' analysis, that parties should be considered 'as the organisational expression of classes'. This assumption seems central to Raschke's (1983) analysis. The 'societal guidance' that parties engage in (that he presents as their over­riding 'function') serves the 'function' of maintaining social peace in a class-divided society. In other words, social democratic parties are criticised for failing to prerepresent 'working-class' interests adequately.

23. As with Epstein and Duverger (see note 19), Raschke's formulation seems to involve the triumph of hasty generalisation over detailed analysis. In this context, Raschke's (1983:114) dismissal of single­country case-studies, on the grounds that they substitute 'the persuasive power of the single example for the weight of complete evidence' seems premature. Indeed, given what little we know about intra­party processes, his assertion that 'internal' party factors can be explained in terms of 'external' 'systematic functional imperatives' (Raschke, 1983:110) seems shaky.

24. Interestingly, whereas the 'rational-efficient' model notes the limited nature of party activity and sees parties as rather weak social institutions (sharing the 'function' of interest aggregation with interest groups for example), the neo-Marxist account often seems to see parties as rather 'strong' institutions (doing all that 'hegemonic' work for the 'ruling class'). However, the Macpherson/Offe emphasis on the political party as social cement in a class society is displaced by other neo-Marxist writers onto a broader concern with the 'capitalist state', which subsumes the political parties into that structure. Althusser (1971) goes so far as to characterise conventional parties as 'Ideological State Apparatuses'. San Francisco Bay Area Kapitalistate Group (1977:29-35) follow political party theorists in emphasising the way in which 'a
smoothly functioning party system' plays its part in the reproduction of capitalism. They follow the 'capitalist state' theorists by suggesting that party 'functions' have been narrowing and lessening of late. Poulantzas (1978), the famous 'capitalist state' theorist, has some interesting things to say about the contribution of 'the dominant mass party'. Poulantzas (1978) is a more open text than Poulantzas (1973) and seeks to combine electoral politics with new forms of popular power, rather than pose a 'revolutionary' alternative completely outside the 'capitalist state'. Left-wing parties can play a part in the transition to socialism as long as they don't fall into the authoritarian 'dominant mass party' trap. By this roundabout route his analysis leads to similar dilemmas as Macpherson's analysis. For, after all he said about the supremely integrative and anti-participatory functions of the competitive political party, Macpherson (1977:112) tells us that in all probability the journey into the promised land of 'participatory democracy' will be made 'under the leadership of a popular front or a coalition of social democratic and socialist parties'. These parties will not wither away, at least for some years. Like Poulantzas, Macpherson simultaneously seems to acknowledge the 'complex arena' status of political parties, while denying the open-endedness that status implies, by formulating functionalist arguments about the essence of political parties residing in their contribution to the reproductive requirements of modern capitalism.

25. The paradoxical fondness of marxist writers for functionalist arguments is mulled over by Giddens, 1981:15-22 and Turner, 1986:60-1. Its implications for an analysis of social democracy are taken up by Crouch, 1979:26-31 and Maravall, 1979:277-87. Marxist writers have attempted to get around the related problem of 'class reductionism' by putting forward, with varying degrees of sophistication, concepts of the 'relative autonomy' of politics (see e.g. Poulantzas, 1973). These attempts to square the circle seem to be ultimately self-defeating (Cutler et al., 1977, 1978; see also Mouzelis, 1980, 1984).

26. Parsonian sociology sees convergence politics in the electoral marketplace as the culmination of 'political development' and a lengthy process of 'social change' (Almond, 1956). Panebianco (1988) explicitly rejects evolutionist arguments of this type, but there are interesting parallels between his discussion of the contemporary trend towards the 'electoral-professional' party and evolutionist analysis.

27. Kircheimer was ambiguous on the catch-all party. He had his misgivings about the phenomenon (La Palombara, 1966:6, note 5), but he thought it was an
inevitable consequence of the 'modern' division of labour, which made political representation a specialised activity (see also Jupp, 1968:38-9). Kircheimer's ambiguity has meant that some left-wing critics of social democracy have uncritically endorsed the catch-all thesis (e.g. Offe, 1982). There are parallels between the catch-all thesis and Keane's (1988:106-45) characterisation of the 'compromise party'.

28. Giddens (1981:21) wants 'to erase the notion of "adaptation" (or any synonym) from the vocabulary of the social sciences, just as thoroughly as that of function'. Here we could note Elster's (1979) distinction between organisms adapting functionally and people acting intentionally (Lash and Urry, 1984:37). Ascribing intentions to 'social actors' is problematic (Hindess, 1988), but Elster makes important criticisms of functionalist notions of 'adaptation'.

29. Panebianco's analysis of the 'electoral-professional party' seems to discount some of his own argument about different patterns of institutionalisation and internal conflict in different parties. He makes some qualifications, but tends to present the 'electoral-professional' trend as a general one, produced by increased rates of 'social change' and 'social turbulence'.

30. See also Gouldner's (1957, 1958) distinction between 'local' and 'cosmopolitan' career orientations in US higher education. This distinction was 'potentially fruitful for the study of intra-organisational tensions and conflicts' (Gouldner, 1958:467). Concern about 'loyalty', a key value for 'locals', might surface during 'outbursts of organisational conflicts and crises' (Gouldner, 1957:208).

31. Wright (1971) lists both Downs and Schumpeter as theorists of the 'rational-efficient' party responding to the market signals provided by voter preferences. Downs presented a perfect competition model, but Schumpeter (1987) emphasised the oligopolistic nature of the electoral marketplace. This meant parties did not simply reflect voter preferences (Macpherson, 1977:91; Ware, 1979:34; Dunleavy and Ward, 1981:356-7; Miller, 1983:141-6).

32. Weick (1985) suggests that, in many organisations, 'managerial rationality' emerges in practice as currently dominant coalitions surf on the waves of events and decisions rather than from any grand strategy. See also Greenwood, 1984. In this context, formal reorganisation efforts offer researchers interesting intra-organisational 'natural experiments' (see Starbuck and Nystrom, 1981:xviii).
33. Schumpeter provides a better guide than Downs, but pays little attention to how supplier 'strategies' are formed.

34. After quoting Gramsci's observation that "the counting of votes is the final ceremony of a long process", Przeworski and Sprague (1986:7) note the multiplicity of actors involved in forging collective identities and defining terms of political debate - political parties, churches, armies, newspapers, etc. The implications of this insight are ignored when Przeworski and Sprague privilege the role of political parties and the question of whether they represent 'class' interests. For comments on the range of social forces involved in the electoral arena, see Hindess, 1983:76 and 139-40.

35. In the end Przeworski is only interested in the formation of 'working-class' identity. 'Non-class' identities are seen as 'bourgeois' by definition. See L. Johnston, 1986:107.

36. For a general discussion of the problems involved in the theorisation of 'social change', see A. Smith, 1973.

37. Thus Gustafson (1976:46) acknowledges the 'complex' and 'dynamic' nature of the New Zealand Labour Party, but sees change within it 'organically' generated by 'social change'.

38. 'Social conditions' in this sense involve the 'complex intersection of a variety of specific practices' (Hindess, 1986:120). They have no overall unifying principle or centre.


40. These articulations are even more complex for a party in government, when Cabinet is at the centre of the 'capitalist state' and the centre of the party. Rose (1964) suggests we should distinguish between (a) party qua government or opposition; (b) party qua organisation; and (c) party qua set of 'policy parties' (i.e. factions, tendencies). Articulations between different party arenas go along a continuum from participatory/democratic to managerial/authoritarian. Cabinet's role may make for a more managerial/authoritarian pattern, as well as a more complex one, although it would be defeatist to argue intra-party democracy is only possible in opposition.
41. See also Higley et al., 1979:149). The proposition has literally acquired textbook status (e.g. Woodward, 1985:163).


43. Ware (1985:8) notes that in American political science, an inappropriate concern with quantification in the study of political parties has sometimes meant that 'trivial research' has been pursued 'at the expense of more interesting subjects'. More seriously, intra-party processes which are not easily amenable to quantitative analysis have simply been neglected. See Kertzler, 1988:7.


46. See also Kemp, 1978:xviii.

47. For Jaensch (1989:91), 1967 was 'a turning point' in Labor's shedding of 'not only socialism, but ideology itself' as well as an organisational watershed.

48. Professional research in sociology and political science was establishing itself in Australian academia at this time (Alomes, 1980). One reason for the assumption that the incorporation of social scientific knowledge would lead to 'convergence' politics was the pervasive 'orthodox consensus' (Giddens, 1987:54-9; 184-91) which spanned the prevailing forms of Keynesian economics, Parsonian sociology and the dominant paradigms in political science. On the 'convergence thesis', see Head and Patience, 1979; Head, 1985.

49. Pre-professional 'intimate'/oral' politics held sway in 'the 1930s' which could be 'seen elastically as running, say, from the mid-twenties to the coal strike in 1947' (Davies, 1958:150).

50. See the comments on the politics of sectional pressures in Jupp, 1961.

51. There were disputes as to whether this 'de-radicalisation' was a consequence of 'modernisation' or the logic of political competition (F. Parkin, 1972:98ff).
52. See also Brugger and Jaensch, 1985, Chs 1 and 2; Rowse, 1978; Melville, 1986.

53. McQueen (1972:357-8) notes the distance between Labor racism and 'social democracy'. Connell (1987:177) sees 'social democracy' as a category specific to the culture and politics of north-western Europe, with little application to Australia.

54. The peculiarities of Australian Laborism are further explored in Castles, 1988.

55. This dilemma provided a focal point for German social democratic debate at the turn of the century (Lichteim, 1970:283; see also Bernstein, 1961; Gay, 1952; Salvadori, 1979). 'Revisionists' and 'fundamentalists' have constantly argued in social democratic parties (J. Stephens, 1979: Ch 3; Warde, 1982:10-11 and 197; Hindess, 1983:Ch 3; Lichbach, 1984).

56. For good overviews of this debate, see Kesselman, 1982 and Shalev, 1983.

57. The same game goes on in the international literature. Maravall (1979) attempts to distinguish (potentially transitional) 'parliamentary socialism' from (incorporated) 'social democracy'.

58. Constitutional difficulties and federal complications meant Whitlam had to pay great attention to the means of implementing these policies (e.g. by extensive use of tied grants to the states, as allowed in Section 96 of the Australian Constitution).

59. See also Connell and Irving, 1980:305. The Whitlam approach had 'a cosmopolitan dimension by Australian standards', a 'European ambience' (Beilharz, 1986a:211. See also Beilharz, 1986b).

60. Maddox's (1989) thesis that the shattering of Labor's psyche by the 1975 crisis explains the party's subsequent rush into consensus politics ignores the diversity of 'lessons of 1975' that were drawn within the ALP. For an earlier argument similar to Maddox's, see Anne Summers, 'Behind the Bravado Lurks the Spectre of 1975', Australian Financial Review, 7 October 1983.

61. Change within complex organisations more often takes place in this way rather than as a result of explicit 'reorganisation' debates (see Lindblom, 1959). The new Labor Managerialism was not often spelled out in the debates, but it came to dominate the reorientation of Labor practices (see Kelly, 1984; Mills, 1986).

63. See L. Johnston, 1986:13-4. In Australia, there are many references to 'managerialism' in discussions of public service reform in the 1980s (e.g. Yeatman, 1986; Wilenski, 1988).

64. See Keane, 1984:2-3 and 14ff.

65. More recently, Head (1989:487 and 492) has referred to a 'new managerial' style of Laborpolitics involving the sophisticated marketing of policies and a rhetoric of fiscal responsibility and efficient management, the origins of which he locates in the late 1960s.

66. At this time, many social democratic parties were torn between pressures for economic responsibility in a changed climate and pressures for membership participation and liaison with 'new social movements'. See Wolinetz, 1988:306-10; 315-6. This dilemma will be explored in Chapter 10B and generally in the NCI case study.

67. Thus there are problems with Gerritsen's (1986) argument that the consolidation of a 'strategic elite' in the early 1980s enabled Labor to transcend the 'garbage can' decision-making processes of the Whitlam era, with its Caucus revolts and its undisciplined prima donnas. This suggests 'garbage can' theory only applies to mismanaged organisations. However, 'garbage can' decision-making is an analytical category, not a term of abuse. It is inherent in a 'complex arena' like the ALP. There are, of course, many kinds of dispersed, 'garbage can' decision-making processes.
1. Vietnam and Whitlam's leadership were not issues in the early 60s, but the general relationship between organisational disputes and left/right clashes is worth noting.

2. The ALP at this time was a strictly federal organisation. Each state had two Federal Executive delegates and six Federal Conference delegates. In practice, the state Branches had substantial autonomy. Much of their attention was focussed on state rather than federal politics. In his famous 1957 Chifley Memorial lecture at Melbourne University, Gough Whitlam suggested that this states' rights approach had conservative implications in the ALP, which mirrored its effects in Australian society generally. It protected vested interests associated with the disposal of state government patronage at the expense of broader Labor aims (Whitlam, 1957:14).

3. The 'Technocratic Laborist' thesis argued older Labor concerns with 'socialisation' and 'egalitarianism' were being replaced by a new emphasis on 'economic planning' and 'meritocracy' in the 1960s. Although this might be taken to imply nostalgia for 'paleo-Laborist' principles, the proponents of the 'Technocratic Laborism' thesis (e.g. Rowley, 1972; Catley and Mcfarlane, 1974) thought Labor had never been the hypothetical 'working-class', 'socialist' party of their dreams. Thus the 'Technocratic Laborism' thesis could be re-stated in Poulantzasian terms as an argument that Labor had shifted from being a party dominated by 'old petty bourgeois' concerns to one in thrall to 'new petty bourgeois' ideology (see Poulantzas, 1974).

4. Where Whitlam (1957) noted the constitutional obstacles to Labor's aspirations, Whitlam (1965a), a Curtin Memorial Lecture, put forward suggestions for 'Socialism within the Australian Constitution' (Evans, 1980:28), although this involved a redefinition of Labor 'socialism' along lines that the 'Technocratic Laborist' thesis would suggest.

5. See 'Labor Expected to Choose Mr Calwell', *Age*, 7 March 1960; Calwell, 1978:221.


7. As his father, R.S. Ross, had been.


10. In the sense argued by Bell, 1960 and Lipset, 1960. They theorised what was a common assumption in political debate at this time.


12. Earlier that year, Harry Jensen, Labor Lord Mayor of Sydney, sent a submission to the NSW executive ('Economic and Social Research within the Australian Labor Party') calling for better organisation and research (NSW ALP Records, ML Mss 2083/452/1170). Jensen noted that television, which had arrived in Australia in time for the 1956 (Melbourne) Olympics, posed new campaigning challenges for Labor. His memorandum was referred on to an apparently bemused Federal Executive, which in turn sent it, in August 1958, to the federal publicity committee (D. Stephens, 1979:31). The federal elections were held on 22 November.

13. See 'Plan for Federal ALP Secretariat', Sydney Morning Herald, 12 January 1959. Ormonde was a prominent 'anti-Grouper' Catholic who won a place on the partly reconstructed NSW executive after the Split (see Murray, 1970:122-3).

14. WA Branch secretary, 'Joe' Chamberlain's attitude was seen by observers as a key factor in whether the Secretariat would go ahead. As Federal President, he was a key player in Labor 'machine' politics.

15. In Canberra.

16. Jack Schmella, the Queensland secretary, who had been part-time Federal Secretary since June 1954, died on 18 July 1960.

17. In Melbourne.

18. Much of Wheelwright's argument was built around comparisons between the ALP and the British Labour Party, emphasising the relative wealth of the British Labour Party, and, particularly, the degree of central control over that wealth. Wheelwright argued that excessive internal federalism made the ALP organisationally inefficient. More generally, Wheelwright (1974:242) believed Labor made insufficient use of policy 'expertise'.

19. The response to the Wilson Inquiry in Britain was half-hearted. Many who supported 'revisionist' policy prescriptions 'were opposed in principle to the use of mass advertising techniques' and obsessive about keeping 'a careful watch on party funds' (Howell, 1976:218. On the latter, see also Drucker, 1979:15-6).
20. This meeting was held in Melbourne. The plan involved reduced contributions from Victoria and WA, and an increased contribution from Queensland (where there had been an increase in membership).

21. Research facilities and access to federal parliament were seen as outweighing Canberra's 'removal from ordinary political life' and its 'undesirable public service atmosphere'. Liaison with Labor's Sydney-based PR firm would be easy and the interstate tensions that a Melbourne or Sydney location could provoke would be avoided.


25. See, e.g. 'The ALP Secretariat', Sydney Morning Herald, 6 July 1962.

26. This was ratified by the 1963 Federal Conference (ALP, 1963:10).

27. Ormonde hoped the committee would reach out to sections of the community not normally seen as pro-Labor. He also said the committee would collate material from Labor canvassers and rally 'idle talent' in the Labor movement to organise surveys.

28. They were Don Rawson, Max Poulter, Clyde Holding, Ian Wilson and Creighton Burns. Some of these had studied party campaigns in particular electorates. See Rawson and Holtzinger, 1958; Wilson, nd and Burns, 1961. Poulter was a Brisbane academic and Holding a Melbourne solicitor (who went on to have a long career in state and federal parliaments).

29. Fitzpatrick was a maverick left-wing intellectual. He had been a member of the ALP between 1942 and 1944, when critical comments about 'Catholic-Tammany' leaders of the Victorian Branch led to his expulsion (Watson, 1979:257). He argued they had sabotaged Labor's campaign in the referendum on extending Commonwealth powers. With the Split in 1954-55, many of Fitzpatrick's former antagonists joined the DLP. Fitzpatrick's first Newsletter appeared in August 1958, devoted entirely to 'Lessons of the Victorian Legislative Assembly Elections'.

31. This makes one wonder whether the reorganisation Fitzpatrick called for was electorally necessary, whatever its desirability on other grounds.

32. To this end, the NOC recommended discarding various 'clogging' membership restrictions and initiating provision for associate membership ('Opposition to ALP Facelift', *Mercury*, 13 April 1961).

33. Even though NOC member Ormonde had been a prominent participant in that debate.

34. See the discussion of Wyndham's arguments in Chapter 7A-C.
CHAPTER 3

1. For an earlier example see 'Calwell Tells Labor Not to Bicker', *West Australian*, 12 February 1959. For a general survey of the post-mortem mood induced by the November 1963 loss, see C. Burns, 1964.

2. Calwell's book was written after the near-miss in 1961, at a time when he thought he would be Australia's next Prime Minister. It was 'ghosted' by Graham Freudenberg (see McQueen, 1974:110).

3. Senator James Ormonde argued the term 'faceless men' had been invented by a professional journalist whose job it was to wreck Labor (CPD, Vol S25:94).

4. The advertisement in the *Bulletin* asked voters to remember the night 'when Labor "leader" Calwell waited for hours in the street to receive his orders'. Menzies conjured up a picture of what the 'faceless men' might do to Australia; leaving its alliances broken and export industries ruined (Hughes, 1964b:100). 'National security through alliances' would be abandoned for 'a species of impotent isolation'; 'steady growth' for 'a spectacular decline'.

5. As well as 'filthy and scandalous' DLP advertisements, Calwell mentioned anti-Labor indoctrination in church schools and argued the assassination of US President Kennedy, while the Australian election campaign was in process, had damaged Labor 'especially among women voters' (Hughes, 1964b:104).


7. For a colourful version of the argument that 'affluence' had rendered ALP attitudes out-of-date see Alan Reid, 'Beaten ALP is Living in the Past', *Sunday Telegraph*, 8 December 1963. Reid argued the proletarian possessing nothing but his labour was becoming as rare as the Tasmanian marsupial tiger. Homes, cars, furniture, washing machines and televisions were as valuable to their owners 'as the steel furnaces are to BHP'.


9. In Townsville. These conventions were held triennially. Thus this was the first one since 30 November 1963.

10. State president R.W. Holt, new secretary Bill Hartley and T. Doyle. The other members were Xavier Connor (lawyer and Catholic Worker contributor), Val Doube (former state parliamentarian), R. White (candidate against Menzies in Kooyong) and E. Scott (full-time campaign organiser in marginal Maribyrnong).
11. The Australian Financial Review added that Holt, Doube and Scott had all worked in marginal seats where Labor had lost ground.

12. The article in the WA Labor paper was based on Hartley's first broadcast on 3KZ 'Labor Hour'.

13. See also 'The ALP Under Fire', Western Sun, May 1964.

14. State Branch president V.S.C. Williams wanted an 'all-out membership drive' aimed at 'the young people, the ladies and the New Australians'.

15. Section 92 had been crucial in the High Court rejection of Chifley's bank nationalisation legislation. On the Section 92 problem see Whitlam, 1957 and 1965a.

16. At the declaration of the poll in his Hindmarsh electorate, Cameron suggested the Kennedy assassination was as much a boon for the DLP as the Reichstag fire had been for the Nazis in Germany in 1933 ('DLP Alternative Not the Solution', Western Sun, February 1964). At his Yarra declaration, Jim Cairns said the election had been determined by fear, especially 'the vague fear of superstitious and impractical people ... easy victims to the "big lie"' (quoted, 'The Great Debate', Tribune, 18 December 1963). Calwell was another who invoked the Kennedy assassination/DLP propaganda/fear of Communism 'explanation' for Labor's woes (see note 5).

17. All among the supposedly 'facelessmen'. There were only six other parliamentarians at the Special Conference (three WA state parliamentarians and one federal and one state representative from Tasmania).
1. NSW Labor had held state government since 1941, making it the most successful Branch at this time. The poor federal result in NSW in 1963, however, signalled a change in its fortunes. It lost the NSW election in 1965.

2. Joint tickets between ALP members and members of another party, usually the Communist Party, in union ballots.

3. It had, however, welcomed his defeat of a Communist opponent to get his union position (to succeed Communist Jim Healy).

4. Fitzgibbon warned those 'from both extremes of thought' in the party who showed signs 'of wanting to use the election result to service their own desires'. He called for party unity, playing his part in the post-mortem ritual.


7. Colbourne was reported as referring to a meeting, attended by an interstate parliamentarian, calling for the destruction of the NSW Executive.


9. In this analysis, the Sydney Morning Herald was seen as a front for this group which was said to include the Bank of NSW, CSR, AMP, Breweries, Herald Sun and others dissatisfied with Menzies' preference for Collins House (Melbourne) and heavy industry (see also 'Attempt to Hoodwink ALP Members', Tribune, 22 January 1964).

10. This was a shorthand term for 'head office' or the dominant faction in the NSW ALP. The NSW ALP office was located in Room 32 of the Labor Council building.


12. See also J.T. Lang, 'Labor's Futile Post-Mortem', 20 February 1964.

13. He expressed his preference for a British-style first-past-the-post system.
14. The federal officers seemed to assume that they would be treated as 'clay pigeons' by the capitalist press whatever they did. Reid was often the journalist who broke ALP stories and he took considerable interest in the NSW post-mortem. Rawson (1961:106) noted the Daily Telegraph's unswervingly Liberal orientation. For that paper "Reid specialised in "insider" stories, usually of events within the ALP, which were always plausible and very frequently confirmed by events' (Rawson, 1961:110). Reid had been an ALP member, but, in 1957, the NSW executive directed Canberra South branch not to renew his ticket. Murray (1970:178) describes Reid as a 'well-informed, though at times melodramatic' writer. Within the ALP, the original 'faceless men' story was seen as a classic Reid exercise.

15. Rawson and Holtzinger (1958:54) referred to the ALP FEC in the electorate they studied as 'an organisational dead-end'.

16. Their favourite son Senator Armstrong was relegated to the unwinnable fourth position behind two relatively unknown candidates supported by the left, Lionel Murphy and Doug Mcclelland (Campbell, 1960:237).

17. The other one was Hume. The remaining five losses were to the Liberals in Sydney (Evans, Mitchell, Parkes, Phillip, St. George).


19. Cowper FEC warned ALP politicians against 'ill-considered and hasty statements' which caused them to be branded as 'extremists' ('Pressure for ALP Reform', Daily Telegraph, 16 December 1963).

20. Macquarie MHR Tony Luchetti and defeated Mitchell MHR John Armitage were both aligned with the dominant faction.


22. Shortland MHR Charlie Griffiths expressed support for FPLP representation on federal bodies.

23. Clearly Parkes FEC was more worried by the 'faceless men' taunt than Haylen himself had been.

24. Ironically, Dixson's analysis of voting patterns in the stratified Parkes electorate found a uniform swing against Labor.

25. In line with the views of local MHR Allan Fraser (1964:16). He thought Federal Conference should meet annually in public and have at least 300 delegates (including direct FEC representatives).

26. Hughes FEC complained that Labor left its financial policy unexplained and did not put enough emphasis on countering 'the growth of big business, monopolies and combines'. Taxes on capital gains, undistributed profits, mergers
etc. could have been pushed. Hughes FEC presented 'socialism' in populist 'tax the wealthy' terms. Neighbouring Cunningham FEC agreed, complaining that Labor's criticisms of the monopolies such as BHP, which dominated the Cunningham electorate, were not aired adequately during the campaign ('Labor Bodies Rebuff Plan of Rightists', Tribune, 12 February 1964). Reid FEC endorsed local MHR Tom Uren's view 'that the ALP must remain a radical party not afraid to espouse its socialist objective'. On the other hand, Parkes FEC, generally aligned with the left, argued that Labor's November 1963 policy was 'financially impossible without sky high taxation' (NSW ALP Branch Records, ML Mss 2083/397/1016).

27. He was executive delegate to seven FEC meetings (NSW ALP Branch Records, ML Mss 2083/397/1016). The only other person scheduled to attend more than two meetings was country organiser Don Sullivan (down for four meetings).

28. In the event, Mulvihill was duly preselected and got elected to the Senate in 1964. The preselection ballot, however, again confounded the officers and upset their careful plans. Les Haylen squeezed out their preferred candidate (Senator Arnold) for the potentially winnable third place on the Labor ticket (Patrick Nilon, 'Haylen the "Has-Been" is Back in Triumph', Australian, 28 July 1964). As it turned out, only the first two on the Labor ticket (Ormonde and Mulvihill) were successful in the 1964 half-Senate election.

29. The officers did not seek endorsement for such a blitz from the FECs. They were wary of stirring factional discord in the post-mortem arena (see 'Blitz on Reds, Split Fear', Sun-Herald, 19 January 1964).


31. Wagga Wagga, the major provincial city in the Farrer electorate, had been one of the few places in NSW where the DLP Split had bitten into the ALP (see Murray, 1970:340). Wagga Wagga branch had to be re-formed in 1956. A circular from NSW Branch assistant secretary Mulvihill referred to 'the insistent political warfare' that had become 'a feature of Party activity in the Riverina' at that time (ALP NSW Branch Records, ML Mss 2083/450/1171. Circular 56/20).

32. See also 'Election Postmortems', Socialist and Industrial Labor, February 1964. In a letter to Mulvihill, Mackellar FEC delegate Jack Wishart asked whether it was an offence against ALP rules 'to give an interview to Tribune giving details of a ruling by Executive officers . .'(NSW ALP Branch Records, ML Mss 2083/397/1016).

33. Bennelong was another deadlocked FEC (Tribune, 12 February 1964).

34. e.g. Cowper and Mitchell.
35. The main focus of complaint was a decision increasing taxation on private motorists.

36. Who saw the Whitlam document as evidence of gross disloyalty on his deputy's part (Calwell, 1978).

37. See note 2, Chapter 2.

38. This was the major concern of Whitlam's colleague Eli Harrison MHR who complained that parliamentarians were being reduced to 'robots' in the party, a situation that would not be really changed by adding six of them to Federal Conference (quoted, Alan Reid, 'What Must Happen at the June Conference', Bulletin, 6 June 1964). He clearly felt frustrated, suggesting that policy should be formulated by the state executives rather than by Federal Conference. This would hardly have got around the difficulties in FPLP/'machine' relations.

39. This would have involved radical changes in internal ALP workings, yet Isaacs did not seriously canvass its merits.

40. Isaacs (1964:14) suggested Labor should accept that nationalisation was blocked by Section 92 of the Constitution and explore the possibilities contained in Section 96, authorising tied federal grants to the states, an argument pioneered by Whitlam (1965). The topic was not mentioned in Whitlam's report. The deputy leader's contribution was considerably more focussed than the North Sydney candidate's.

41. Left-wing unions were more likely to produce their own election leaflets. Some left-wing unions were involved in Communist Party 'Menzies Out' campaigns. The NSW officers shared Whitlam's concerns about unsupervised and unofficial union activity (Officers' Report, NSW ALP Branch Records, ML Mss 2083/397/1016).

42. However, we could note that Alan Reid presented Isaacs' report under the heading ' Revealed Streak of Irresponsibility - ALP Man Attacks Calwell' (Daily Telegraph, 28 April 1964). In general, there was not much criticism of Calwell in the post-mortem. Richmond and Parkes FECs mentioned his unfortunate remarks on the electoral system (NSW ALP Branch Records, ML Mss 2083/397/1016). Mitchell FEC noted his poor television image and Parkes FEC also suggested that he erred in making his policy speech before Menzies, which at the time was taken as an index of Labor confidence.

43. See also 'Facing the "Faceless Men"', Age, 15 April 1964; 'The Winds of Change in the Labor Party', West Australian, 21 April 1964.
CHAPTER 5

1. The motion instructing Colbourne not to make a press statement was moved by Australian Journalists' Association president, George Godfrey.

2. Oliver, Colbourne, Mulvihill and vice-presidents Jim Bale and Fred Bowen.

3. Recommendation 1 suggested an interim arrangement pending adoption of Recommendation 2.

4. Socialist and Industrial Labor later signalled NSW left willingness to accept FPLP Conference representation, provided federal unions and FECs were accepted as well ('The 36 Faceless Men', April 1964).

5. See also 'The Splitting Role of the Daily Press', same issue.

6. The proposals mentioned included calls for an 'anti-monopoly' programme linking ALP economic policy to its 'socialisation objective'. L. Aarons (1964:41-9) sketches out a CPA view of what such an 'anti-monopoly' programme should contain. This was in a pamphlet produced in February 1964 'as a contribution to the keen discussion which has arisen following the 1963 Federal Elections on the way forward for the labour movement' (L. Aarons, 1964:9).

7. Parliamentarians would also now be permitted to become Federal Executive delegates.

8. Harking back to Chamberlain's contentious 'state aid' visit to Sydney.

9. Reid described the fist fight as 'a wild outbreak ... between rival factions'. The brawl, involving about twelve people, involved delegates from the building trade group of unions (Courier-Mail, 16 June 1964).


11. Oliver's speech was characterised by judicious quotation from Whitlam's post-mortem report.

12. Oliver suggested the 'middle-classing' of Australian society was a consequence of reformist legislation by wartime federal Labor governments. On this Labor myth see Howe and Howe, 1984:159.
13. Oliver had canvassed these themes at the NSW ALP Women's Diamond Jubilee conference the weekend after the official post-mortem recommendations were released ('Attack on "Out of Date" ALP', Sunday Telegraph, 23 February 1964). His views were endorsed by NSW Labor Women President, Edna Roper.

14. Committee members were Chamberlain, Branch president Colin Jamieson MLA, Ron Davies MLA, J.M. Berinson and J.M. Wheeldon. Wheeldon had been an advocate of greater local branch input (Mitchell, 1983:178). The committee received forty suggestions from fifteen party units (including calls for more opinion polling and an age limit for candidates).

15. In WA itself the committee saw little prospect of Labor improving on its three (out of nine) House of Representatives seats. In WA Labor won 39.2 percent of House of Representatives first preference votes, compared to 47.6 percent in NSW. Labor lost seven seats in NSW, none in WA. See Table 1, Chapter 4. Different Branches had different electoral expectations.

16. Charging him with granting endorsement to a federal candidate with insufficient membership continuity and arranging electoral co-operation with the Country Party. Chamberlain's earlier nomination for Senate preselection had proved controversial. So he withdrew, on the grounds that opposing the sitting Senator was being represented as a breach of party tradition. The two charges brought against Chamberlain were completely dismissed by the WA executive.

17. The essay's characteristic Chamberlain title was 'Labor: Principles or Expediency?'.

18. Chamberlain was addressing the Political Science Club at the University of WA, giving his response to post-November 1963 party reform suggestions.

19. Without clear distinctions between Labor and Liberal, Australian parliamentary democracy was vulnerable to Communist threat, he thought. His hostility to the press was long-lasting. He told the 1959 Victorian conference that Labor's critics wanted the party to embrace the conservative attitudes of those who controlled the media. If they fell out with Menzies, they could then feel secure in supporting 'a conservative Labor Party, led by some person who is prepared to rat upon the party which gave him political recognition combined with personal profit' (Chamberlain, 1964:35). In 1962, he asked what attention was being given to the drugging of the mind by the Australian press ('The Press and the Double Standard', Western Sun, September 1962).

20. In a letter to the Western Sun branch member Ian Hills warned that it would be fatal for Labor to be stampeded into a flurry of witch-hunting (December 1963).
21. As a former state and federal parliamentarian, he saw no reason to expect superior wisdom from MPs.

22. Those on the ticket included John Button, Xavier Connor, Gil Hayes (Boot Trades), Barney Williams, Barry Jones, Dick McGarvie and R. White as well as Mick Jordan. Connor and White had been members of the official Victorian post-mortem committee (see note 10, Chapter 3).

23. The Australian described the Jordan group as a coalition of unionists close to the ACTU leadership and 'branch intellectuals' ('Fight Over ALP Lead', 15 July 1964. See also 'Labor Heads for a Major Showdown', 16 July 1964).

24. Holt argued Labor should accept 'the wholesome clash of "left" and "right"', as long as it remained within 'the bounds of legitimate compromise'.

25. See Chapters 6A and 8C.

26. Jones was a Fuel and Fodder Union conference delegate. Credentialled branch members filled out many union delegations. This was a common practice (see Rawson, 1966a:21, note 1).

27. Although when three places were made available for branch representatives on the executive, they were easily won by supporters of the ruling faction. The practice of autonomous SEC representation had hardly been established, when it was abolished. Thus there was only one such election (in 1965). See Chapter 7D.

28. Traditionally, enrolled affiliated unionists, as well as branch members, had been allowed to vote in Victorian preselection ballots. Executive preselection was, initially, an 'emergency' expedient. It was not formally regularised until an investigatory committee's report was received in 1960 (Allan, 1980:92). The token local representatives were added then.


30. Although see Carol Wilder, 'Parliament Needs the Influence and Ideas of Women', Fact, 20 February 1964 and Julie Dahlitz, 'Victorian MPs are All Men', Fact, 16 April 1964). Jones' concern that Labor should simultaneously appeal to 'middle class' voters and women was echoed in a letter to Fact (16 November 1964) from 'a professionally employed woman'. She argued that swinging voters should be reassured they were not losing status by supporting Labor. Perhaps the party should change its name and call itself the Democratic Party? It was losing touch with the generation that 'despite Beatlemania' was breaking away from old Australian habits and embracing new tastes in dress, music, drinking, eating and reading. Perhaps Labor
should have 'an elite corps' like the Young Liberals. More women were entering the paid workforce. This 'encouraged them to be individuals in their own thinking rather than echoes of their men' (see also the reply from another professional woman, 'Labor's Image is Defended', 14 December 1964).

31. Although Jones did call on the party to develop closer relations with organisations such as the Association of Professional and Salaried Workers, the Victorian Teachers' Union and the Victorian Secondary Teachers' Association.
1. Canberra, 4-7 August 1964.

2. The Executive had a wide and varied agenda to consider. Calwell was congratulated on his Order of St. Gregory the Great Award, the NSW Branch was thanked for its contribution to the Federal Secretariat fund, Branches were asked to be more diligent about press leakages and NSW 'state aid' proposals were considered (NSW ALP Branch Records, ML Mss 2083/459/1191). Wyndham was also asked to investigate the NCC, which according to Fact was closely allied with Fascist ideology ('Federal Executive Report: Full Scale Probe Ordered into NCC', 20 August 1964). Federal Executive agendas tended to include this sort of haphazard collection of overt issues, combined with diverse motivations and disputes. 'Garbage can' analysis is appropriate (see D. Stephens, 1979).

3. Oliver complained that 'half-a-dozen Communist-influenced unions were more effective at the Federal level than the NSW ALP which comprises half the labour movement'. Compare J.R. Hughes, 'ALP Decision Will Win Support in Trade Unions', Tribune, 17 August 1964.

4. The NSW Branch hit back at the federal regime with a defiant resolution. A spokesman commented that NSW had been getting 'anything but a fair go. There's been one thing after another - blame for the Federal loss, charges of post-mortem hysteria, disloyalty. The lot' (quoted, 'Bucking the Machine: State versus Federal Row Hits ALP', Australian, 17 August 1964).

5. This was the sort of service advocates of a Secretariat had hoped it would provide. See Chapter 2B.

6. See note 2, Chapter 2.

7. For full text of Wyndham Report, see Appendix I.


9. Indeed, Wyndham was unwittingly responsible for Calwell's attack on intellectuals at the 1960 NSW conference ('Cyril Stanley Wyndham - The New Broom for an Untidy Labor Party', Sydney Morning Herald, 29 May 1964). He included a hostile reference to 'pseudo-intellectuals' in the speech he drafted, which Calwell expanded.
10. Jupp noted that while Whitlam and Cairns differed on many issues they shared an openness to new ideas. He had earlier commented on a lack of idealism and reforming zeal in the ALP that cut it off from the growing stratum of Australian intellectuals (Jupp, 1959:13-4).

11. This was in a lecture to the Australian Institute of Political Science summer school. Press reports bore headlines like 'Expert Hits at ALP Policy', Sunday Telegraph, 27 January 1963). Jupp believed that Labor intellectuals who did not criticise the party were doing it a disservice (Canberra Times, 10 December 1964).

12. See also Arthur Burns' (1965:358) view that Australian intellectuals looked 'with envy to London and the opportunity for debate, influence and power in the British Labour party'. For criticisms of this sort of argument see Dixson, 1969 and McQueen, 1976:198.

13. With the Austrian Social Democrats, behind only the Swedish Social Democrats and Norwegian Labor.


15. Wyndham's own occasional comparisons of Australian and British Labour were very diplomatic and formal. They mainly registered the complications of Australian federalism and the geographical sources of those complications. See 'ALP Secretary Moves to ACT', Canberra Times, 7 January 1964; 'Wyndham Predicts a Space-Age Labor Party', Age, 17 September 1965.

16. Wyndham was pleading with the 1965 Federal Conference to reconsider its decision to put his recommendations on ice.

17. Melbourne poet Vincent Buckley described Labor factionalism as 'wilful and confused ... A man who was prominent in one "camp" in June might be found in another one in October' ('Labor and the Split', Sunday Review, 17 January 1971). See also Rawson, 1954:180 and Murray, 1970:284).

18. Labor factionalism 'was more often desperate than it was nice ... "matters of principle" could be settled over a beer, the personal differences last for a long time ...' (Cavalier, 1976:25 and 70). See also Vincent Buckley's interesting comments on the psychology of this phenomenon, in his review of Murray (1970) (Sunday Review, 17 January 1971).

19. For example, his reminder to the 1965 NSW conference that independent research showed voters saw apparent disunity as Labor's greatest vice ('"One Voice" Urged for ALP', Sydney Morning Herald, 15 June 1965).
20. The pamphlet reprinted Wyndham's speech to the Queensland Young Labor Association (at Noosa Heads), 5 December 1965.

21. Wyndham added that such a view denied state Labor achievements. Encel (1964), however, saw state experiences as irrelevant in the federal arena and he explicitly rejected the 'crisis' view. See also Sol Encel, 'Landscape for Labor', Nation, 25 January 1964.


23. See also 'Overdue Insight on ALP', Australian, 7 December 1965; 'Curing the Ills of the Labor Party', Age, 7 December 1965; 'Labor's Search for Unity', Advertiser, 8 December 1965.

24. The NSW Branch controllers probably took comfort from Wyndham's comment that anyone who criticised this attitude was 'immediately dubbed ... a "grouper"'.


26. See Table 2, Chapter 1 and the discussion at the end of Chapter 9D.

27. For an interesting comparison with Wyndham's views on 'socialism' see Bill Hayden's (1968:20) attempt to refashion Labor 'socialism' that went beyond the 'rigid dogmatist approach' associated with 'the great depression complex'. In his pamphlet, the Queensland MHR, who was associated with the parliamentary left, sought to chart a path through the pitfalls of dogmatism and opportunism. Hayden insisted democratic socialists had to work hard 'at developing the relevance of their policies in a changing modern environment'. He offered his pamphlet as a contribution to that project.

28. See also 'Overdue Insight on ALP', Australian, 7 December 1965 for an endorsement of the speech and the Wyndham Report as a blueprint for ALP modernisation.

29. One of his first tasks as federal secretary was to produce a pamphlet on the 'unbridgeable gulf' between Labor and Communism (Wyndham, 1964).

30. See also 'Cyril the Surgeon', 2 April 1968.

31. His 'modernisation' programme was clearly conceived in cautious terms. Wyndham did not challenge Laborist taboos, such as the 'White Australia' policy.

32. Calwell (1978:259) suggested blue-collar workers who did not vote ALP were 'more despicable' than industrial scabs.
33. An 'Australian Socialist Review' that emerged from CPA trauma and falling out over the Hungarian Uprising in 1956.

34. On the relationship between negative images of 'suburbia' and negative images of women in Australian social commentary, see Rowse, 1978:208, note 27.

35. Although he was diplomatic enough not to comment on Calwell's outbursts. For an earlier, more optimistic Calwell's guidelines for Labor post-mortems, which Wyndham probably would have appreciated, see 'Calwell Tells Labor Not to Bicker', West Australian, 12 February 1959). Then Calwell insisted that Labor's difficulties would not be remedied by irresponsible criticism of other ALP members, party policy or the intelligence of the electorate.

36. By 1980 the ALP's strategic pollster was presenting the party with a profile of ignorant, selfish swingers, unreceptive to reform politics (Mills, 1986:21-5). Brugger and Jaensch (1985:105-6) note the contradiction between Australian parties' invocation of the rational-judgemental electorate and their carefully researched attempts to manipulate the 'political consumer' in the manner of soap-powder sellers.

37. See the references to this report in Chapter 3B.

38. Grant went on to suggest that Labor had taken advantage of its long years in opposition to prepare comprehensive policies which reached 'the deepest currents of Australian life. Political parties do their best thinking in the wilderness'.

39. The references to the 'lethargy', 'listlessness' and 'somnambulism' of the Menzies Government come from Wyndham (1965a). Although Wyndham called on Labor to come to terms with 'the era of the technical and skilled administrator', he also counselled against the dangers of the age of the technocrat becoming the age of the autocrat ('Wyndham Predicts a Space-Age Labor Party', Australian, 17 November 1965). Wyndham thought popular access to art and culture was a new strategic issue for labour movements to consider. Much could be learned in this area, he suggested, from the cultural activities of Scandinavian trade unions.
1. For full text, see Appendix I.

2. Ironically, as a Victorian delegate, Wyndham had been one of the 'thirty-six faceless men' in March 1963.

3. Although, as von Beyme (1985:171) points out, parties 'have often shown more concern to acquire members than the de-ideologised catch-all parties are often said to have'.

4. The president and secretary of each Branch were usually automatically included in the delegation, leaving a scramble for the remaining four places.

5. This was his short-term Conference reform programme. In the long-term he wanted a Mass Conference with FEC, federal union and parliamentary delegates, but further investigation of this idea's feasibility was required.

6. One concern of Wyndham's was to increase the FPLP's autonomy. He wanted a ban on state Branch 'direction' of federal parliament written into the party's constitution.

7. Wyndham told WA conference delegates that no back-street delicatessen would organise its finances as carelessly as the ALP ('Unity of ... Wings Essential', Fact, 26 November 1965). Earlier, Wyndham argued that his financial proposals were even more important than reorganisation (Jonathan Gaul, 'Labor Likely to Defer Decisions on Reforms', Canberra Times, 27 May 1965).

8. Wyndham's marginal seat strategy included direct Federal Secretariat involvement, consideration of field organisers responsible to the Federal Executive and NOPC and more coordinated deployment of Senators and safe seat MHRs in marginal campaigns.

9. Without voting rights.

10. Wyndham's strategy for improving the situation of women in the party was to facilitate the emergence of LWCOC as an internal lobby group. The two LWCOC Conference delegateships were specifically reserved for the president and the secretary.

11. Wyndham told an Australian national University Labor Club meeting Labor had the image of 'an ageing party managed by old men' ('Here's How We Can Do It Better', Fact, 23 July 1964).

12. The Commonwealth Labor Advisory Council provided a forum for the federal ALP's parliamentary and organisational leadership to consult the ACTU leadership. It had a chequered history, meeting infrequently and changing its name from time to time (see Lloyd, 1983:239-40 and Crisp, 1978:194-204).
In his discussion of provision for federal recognition of the ALP in the ACT (then included in the NSW Branch) and the Northern Territory (then administered by the Federal Executive), Wyndham emphasised that he had never believed it was 'a sound approach for the party to advance a principle which it does not implement internally'. In principle, the ALP favoured greater autonomy for the ACT and the Northern Territory.

Wyndham thought this was a major reason why Labor branch membership was so low. For an interesting discussion of low ALP membership at this time, see 'Labor's Malaise at the Grass Roots', Australian Financial Review, 28 July 1965.

This was also the approach that Race Mathews had been arguing for in the Victorian Branch, as we noted in Chapter 5D (see his 'Our ALP Branch Structure: The Need for a Remedy', Fact, 20 August 1964). The assumption was that party education and community involvement would increase branches' electoral capacities in a changing society.

See also 'State Labor Plan to Reorganise - Build Up Branches in City, Country', Age, 20 March 1962.

The Federal Secretariat did send out regular information releases which attempted to serve local branches, FECs, unions and individuals.

Thus Wyndham had rather low expectations about what 'rank-and-file' involvement could contribute to Labor policy-formulation. He was much more hopeful about 'rank-and-file' involvement in electioneering. 'Enthusiasts' could campaign, but policies were left to the 'experts'; although the 'enthusiasts' could send some material to Federal Conference.

Participatory 'rationalistic idealism' valued intra-party discussion for its own sake and as a contributor to better policy-making. Electoral realpolitik feared increased discussion and debate might damage the party's 'image' of 'unity'. See the discussion on 'legitimation' and 'depoliticisation' (Wolfe, 1977) in political parties in Chapter 12C.

See especially Chapters 2A, 4D.

Aitkin (1977:261-2) argues that given compulsory voting, Australian parties have in fact little electoral incentive to improve their branch organisation.

The 1961 Federal Conference had been the first to base its deliberations on the work of special policy committees with some 'expert' input (Dunstan, 1962). Jupp noted that the committees were 'slowly becoming indispensable' (Canberra Times, 1 June 1965). The perils of 'amateur' policy-making were being overcome. On the later emergence of contradictions within the new Labor policy 'professionalism', see Chapter 12B.
23. We could also note that despite the NOC fiasco, Labor still did reasonably well in 1961. See note 31, Chapter 2.

24. If Wyndham's financial reforms worked, penny-pinching Branches would not feel they had to send politicians as Federal Conference delegates because of their free travel entitlements. Such considerations had sometimes been relevant in the past.

25. McQueen emphasised that Labor had nearly won in 1961 and made its best improvement in Queensland where 'a very real and widespread mass organisation was built up over a period of eighteen months by a group of about fifty enthusiasts'. This group's leadership and electorate-level support were electorally crucial. What made the difference in particular seats was things like the organisation of postal and absentee votes, not media campaigns. McQueen was president of Queensland YLA in 1960 (Pascoe, 1979:139). Much of his later writing was devoted to demonstrating the deficiencies of the ALP from a socialist perspective. One of his major themes was the way in which involvement in the ALP led to a dissipation of radicalism. McQueen (1972:371) suggested that young idealists who joined the ALP to 'create a better world' or 'achieve socialism' found their enthusiasm burnt up in debates over how many election signs to erect or how many how-to-vote cards to print. The machine had an insatiable appetite for volunteers, especially when it came to fund-raising.

26. See, e.g. 'Pushing the ALP Into the Open', Canberra Times, 26 May 1965. This suggested Wyndham's recommendations would affect the party more than a change of leadership.


28. The Tasmanian Branch had held its conference in March. Queensland conferences were triennial. There was one in May, just before the Wyndham Report was ready. WA conferences were also usually triennial (Mitchell, 1983:184). There was one in November 1965.

29. See also 'ALP Manifesto Challenges Right Wing Policy', Tribune, 9 June 1965.

30. Branch president Charlie Oliver was reported to have told a meeting of right-wing union officials that the left would bitterly attack the Wyndham Report at the conference. Adding to the conference plotting and counter-plotting was the fact that Labor had just lost government in NSW after 24 years. In his presidential address to the conference, Oliver emphasised 'adaptation' to the electorate ('Why We Lost', Sun-Herald, 13 June 1965), as he had the year before (see Chapter 5B).
31. It had tried, unsuccessfully, to secure improved representation in both 1912 and 1942, but at other times opposed Victorian 'de-federalisation' plans. The tenacity of Labor federalism, 1901-81, is discussed in Appendix II.

32. This equalled the number of seats in the House of Representatives.

33. If delegates were elected by FECs directly, the NSW ruling faction could not expect to win more than 60 percent of the places. The extant system gave it six 'faceless men' of its choice.

34. Fitzgibbon distanced himself from 'extreme right' and 'extreme left' ('I Hate Extremes, says WWF Head', Australian, 14 June 1965). An interjector suggested that put him in the middle. Fitzgibbon replied: 'No, I am to the left of the middle'.

35. See also 'A Tale of Two Conferences', Sydney Morning Herald, 15 June 1965.


37. Opposition to the ban on 'unity tickets' was now expressed openly rather than by selective enforcement. The ban was attacked as an infringement on unionists' civil liberties.

38. This presumed that 'ordinary members' had controlled the party in an earlier era - a dubious conjecture, to say the least.

39. Secretary of the Bank Officials' Association and federal secretary of the Australian Council of Salaried and Professional Associations.

40. The Victorian Fabian Society organised a public debate between Bob Holt and James Jupp on 16 July 1965, a week after the executive had decided Wyndham's reforms were too expensive and instructed its Federal Conference delegates to oppose many of them.

41. The letter also contained a questionnaire on branch-level electoral expenditure.

42. Local branch reform was not a new Mathews theme. See note 15.

43. Lew Gibson complained Mathews had alienated the Fabian Society from the Victorian ALP by printing the Wyndham Report, which the federal secretary had marked 'strictly confidential' (Fact, 20 May 1966).

44. He was speaking at a Victorian Young Labor meeting.

45. On 22 June (just after the Victorian conference).
46. Whitlam argued the main reason union officials 'betrayed' the party by collaborating in 'unity tickets' was to hang on to their jobs. He also suggested that some union officials were still living in the 1930s and did not realise that bankers and landlords had been tamed in Australia and that Australians were not oppressed by Tsars or warlords. Such a juxtaposition of 'modern' social democracy and 'anachronistic' communism was common among Whitlam and his supporters at that time. See the discussion of Wyndham (1966b) in Chapter 6C.

47. Such as Mick O'Brien (ARU) and Dick Scott (Boilermakers). Scott suggested Whitlam's background as a barrister might have explained 'his lack of understanding of the union movement'. O'Brien and Scott were both prominent in the NSW ALP left.

48. Wyndham himself also conflated his short-term and long-term proposals when addressing this Conference.

49. Whitlam told delegates that it was the first time for fifty years that a bearded man had taken part in ALP Federal Conference deliberations (ALP, 1965:256). Dr. Keith Crook typified 'the men at the Australian National University and the State and provincial universities who are able and anxious to help the Labor Party' (see also 'Labor Call to Brains of Community', Age, 5 August 1965).

50. The Canberra Times had been a consistent champion of the Wyndham Report (see, e.g. note 26). Thus it found the fate of the report as 'the greatest tragedy' of the Conference ('Labor Sticks to its Last', 7 August 1965).

51. The most consistent 'rational radical' group in the ALP in this sense emerged later that month when 'the Participants' were founded in Victoria, with Jupp as secretary. They were the most enthusiastic supporters of Whitlam's 'modernisation' programme in the party. This form of 'rational radicalism' tended to stress the desirability of Labor 'adaptation' to a 'middle-classing' Australia.
CHAPTER 8

1. This was the mechanism that Menzies had used to initiate federal involvement in funding (public and private) secondary schools. See Hawker, Smith and Weller, 1979:163-7.

2. He referred to the Federal Executive as 'this extremist group' which breached party policy, humiliated parliamentarians and ignored the rank-and-file. It was 'neither representative nor responsible. It must be repudiated'.

3. With a Federal Conference based on delegates from federal electorates and federal unions Whitlam was later to maintain a preference for a Federal Conference without any statutory union representation (see D. Stephens, 1979:388-9). Stephens notes Whitlam's fondness for the US Democratic Convention model (see Oakes and Solomon, 1973:57) and refers to Clyde Cameron's belief that Whitlam's later thinking was influenced by Austrian Social Democrat leader Bruno Kreisky. Recently, Whitlam (1986:85) declared that the 1981 reforms (to be discussed in Chapter 12) made national Conference 'reasonably representative'.

4. Federal president Jim Keeffe boasted that Whitlam was 'dead' as far as the party was concerned (Alan Reid, 'Three States Unite: "Demand" to Expel Whitlam', Daily Telegraph, 23 February 1966).

5. Hartley thought it 'deplorable that some people are attacking the party from within when issues of vital moment are facing the party and, of course, the nation'.

6. For Chamberlain's general views on such matters, see Chapter 5D.

7. Calwell had not always been so hostile to reorganisation. Just before the Wyndham Report was commissioned, he declared his support for overhauling the party (see Chapter 6A). Almost a year later (in June 1965), he was elected a Victorian delegate to Federal Conference. Some wondered whether this would lead him to oppose reorganisation (see, e.g. Ian Fitchett, 'Calwell's Stunning Action over Unity Tickets', Sydney Morning Herald, 29 June 1965), but this was not put to the test, as the issue did not surface at the Federal Conference.

8. See also 'In Bad Shape All Round', Canberra Times, 14 June 1966.

9. Although it did accept Wyndham's financial proposals and some of his minor organisational recommendations.
10. Apparently, many delegates did not vote. Participants' secretary James Jupp pointed out that this was the largest anti-executive vote on a critical issue affecting intra-party power relations since 1955 ('Marked Change in Atmosphere Noticeable', Canberra Times, 15 June 1966).

11. See Jupp's speech to the Melbourne University Democratic Socialist Club, reported in 'ALP "a Shambles" says Delegate', Age, 17 June 1966.

12. See also his 'Labor, Trade Unions and MP Links', Fact, 7 April 1966.

13. Fraser chaired the FPLP foreign affairs committee.

14. Around this time, Fraser also issued an apocalyptic warning against developments within the ALP that might help produce a revolutionary situation in Australia ('Where Stands Labor Now?', Canberra Times, 21 February 1966). However, when 'state aid' was endorsed, Fraser could stop worrying about saving Labor from 'subversion' and start thinking about how to win the election.

15. For 1958-63 Results (including state-by-state variation) see Table 1, Chapter 4. Labor's share of House of Representative (first preference) votes in 1966 was as follows: NSW - 40.7 percent; Vic - 35.0 percent; Qld - 42.1 percent; SA - 40.7 percent; WA - 42.8 percent; Tas - 51.6 percent; Total - 40.0 percent (Mackerras, 1975:225). Labor lost nine seats (three in NSW, two in Vic, three in Qld and three in SA) (Mackerras, 1975:253). Labor also lost the NT seat, not included in these calculations because the NT MHR did not have full voting rights.

16. Calwell told the December 1966 Federal Executive meeting that Whitlam and AWU leader Tom Dougherty had been damagingly 'disloyal' ('Calwell Lashes Out at Whitlam', Courier-Mail, 10 December). He was also reported to have criticised Charlie Oliver. He felt let down by the ACTU and the Australian Catholic community had also let him down (the latter for not responding to Labor's painful turnaround on 'state aid'. In this mood, Calwell concluded that the Australian electorate was 'selfish' and 'stupid' (Hughes, 1967:106. See the discussion in Chapter 6D).

17. Cairns recalled Chifley's unyielding words of 1951 about Labor having to stand up for what it believed in, a quotation that was often drawn on in the wake of electoral losses. Victorian Branch president Bill Brown also insisted that Labor should not change its policies ('ALP Policies Not Rejected Says Official', Canberra Times, 26 December 1966).

18. 'Stocktaking by Labor Party' is a newspaper clipping from the M5 Australian Public Affairs Collection, General: Commonwealth ALP 1938-1978, Fiche 67, held at the Department of Political Science, RSSS, ANU. In this article, Fraser deployed the same 1951 Chifley quote about things worth fighting for that Cairns had used in his comments.
19. Fraser noted that 'party specialists' thought that Labor's organisation and, particularly, its electioneering, were pitifully weak.

20. Fraser thought Labor should organise its own national fund-raising to steer clear of dependence on unions and business interests.

21. Fraser thought the analogy with trade union solidarity was inappropriate in the parliamentary context.

22. Here White was putting forward the original 'Arena thesis' on the socialist potential of the new stratum of 'the intellectually trained' emerging in Australian society (Osmond, 1970:192-8). For more on the 'Arena thesis', see Chapter 9D. White was on the editorial board of Arena, an independent Melbourne marxist journal.

23. The report was dated 3 February 1967. The FPLP met on 6 February to choose Calwell's successor (see Chapter 8A).

24. For example, Alan Ramsey and Patrick Nilon, 'The Party's Over', Australian, 1 December 1963. They saw the 70 year old Calwell 'as the complete embodiment of all that is wrong in the ALP in the year 1966'.

25. The sections were, in order: (a) 'The lack of close co-operation between the trade union movement and the ALP'; (b) 'The failure of the union movement to unionise all workers'; (c) 'The need to modernise the organisational structure of the Australian Labor Party'; (d) 'The method of selecting candidates'; (e) 'Disunity'; (f) 'Lack of effective unity between Federal and State PLPs'; (g) 'The effect of increased state taxes and charges'; (h) 'Education, Repatriation and Social Services, Development'; (i) 'Outside interference'; (j) 'Role of the AWU'; and (k) 'Related matters'.

26. See Chapter 4D. In this plan, union representatives would have been outnumbered by a combination of FEC delegates and a specific parliamentary contingent. Whitlam later expressed a preference for a Federal Conference without specific provision for specific union representation (see D. Stephens, 1979:388-9 who noted his admiration for US Democrat and Austrian Social Democrat conference structures.

27. Calwell thought that such a reconstructed Conference should elect the Federal Executive, which could have 24 members (including at least one from each state and four from the FPLP).

28. But he did not want any 'reversion to the system ... so grossly abused in Victoria before the Split', which allowed enrolled members of affiliated unions, as well as ALP branch members, to participate in 'rank-and-file' ballots.
29. In that confrontation, Calwell had been one of the government's principal Red-baiting anti-strike orators.

30. Chamberlain (1964:18-9) had earlier outlined a distinctively Australian Laborist conception of 'socialism' when he defined 'socialism' as 'security in all its forms at home. The breadwinner working usefully in the community and being remunerated at a level which will enable him to discharge the responsibilities of family life. His wife, divorced from the drudgery of housekeeping as she can be with the application of modern science. His children well equipped in our schools to play their part in the years to come in the maintenance and development of a human society based on the principles underlying the freedom of the Atlantic Charter'. That was what 'democratic socialism' was all about, Chamberlain told the 1957 Federal Conference (see O'Meagher, 1983:25).

31. Calwell also recalled a letter from Whitlam to Wyndham which alleged some ALP members had given ammunition to the DLP by associating with Communists and that Calwell had been distressed but too weak to do anything about this.

32. Some FPLP members and some affiliated unions, he argued, had not followed party policy, and the AWU's failure to support its members' Mt Isa strike had contributed to the loss of two seats in Queensland. Calwell was buying into factional conflicts here. There had been ALP/AWU conflict in Queensland. In NSW, on the other hand, AWU secretary Charlie Oliver was ALP president. There was considerable internal conflict in the AWU itself.

33. The 'most immediate danger' was the development of a 'stab in the back' legend of the kind promoted in Germany after World War I.

34. Labor Comment insisted that parties in government were imprisoned by 'tremendous economic and ideological forces' which greatly restricted their ability to act (i.e. some of the Participants accepted the logic of the 'convergence thesis' and urged the ALP to 'adapt' accordingly). On 'convergence' and 'divergence' in Australian party politics, see Head and Patience, 1979 and Head, 1985. .

35. They sought a ratio of about 40 percent branches/SECs/parliamentarians to 60 percent affiliated unionists.

36. The Participants' expectation was that such a measure would seriously change the nature of the ALP in Victoria and in Queensland.

37. See also 'Many Myths in the ALP' and Graham Freudenberg, 'Swing from Labor Bit Deep' (same issue).

38. A literary journal which proclaimed its democratic temper and offensively Australian bias on its masthead.
39. He had been a research officer for the Australian Council of Salaried and Professional Associations (whose secretary Barney Williams was the Participants' first president).

40. Which had been published in October 1966 (shortly before the election).

41. Rather than 'who has the legal right to attend'.


43. British Labour PM Harold Wilson was 'a grey individual' but had 'a heavy stamp of professional competence'. Australian equivalents included Whitlam, Rex Patterson, John Menadue and Bob Hawke. They could not make speeches with the skill of Calwell nor compete with Cairns 'for moral uplift; yet can command the support of an audience with an ingrained respect for technical excellence'.

44. His basic argument was that the ALP should be guided by technical 'knowledge' rather than 'the numbers'. This is re-examined in the Conclusion (Chapter 16).

45. Resting as it did on 'the numbers', although this was complicated by federalism and oligarchy (the latter amplified by some of the consequences of union affiliation). Thus many party reform plans revolved around ways of re-calculating 'the numbers' (e.g. by Federal Conference reform).

46. Whitlam's approach was similar. At the height of the 'witless men' crisis, he suggested the choice was between 'those who want a broadly-based socialist and radical party and petty men who want to reduce it to their personal plaything' ('Whitlam Declares Open War on ALP's Federal Executive', Canberra Times, 2 February 1966. James Jupp's preference for the terms 'rational radical' and 'instinctive conservative' to the usual talk of 'right' and 'left' is noted in Chapter 7D).

47. Thus he disputed the line of argument that saw abolition of specific SEC representation on the Victorian executive as a 'left' gain or the Wyndham Report as a 'right-wing' plot. His 'rationalistic-idealist' hope was to carve a separate arena for 'pure' organisational debate. For earlier attempts by Mathews to engage in such debate, see Chapters 5D and 7D.

48. Whitlam and his supporters evaluated ALP organisation in terms of 'external' standards of 'middle-class' professionalism, whereas Calwell's world was more bound by the ALP itself. For more on this 'cosmopolitan'/ 'parochial' distinction, see Conclusion (Chapter 16).
In a similar vein, Bruce McFarlane had earlier argued: 'People who are unfamiliar with the complex and contradictory trends within the Australian Labor Party may find it easy to condemn the "slowness" in achieving necessary internal change' ('Settlers for Less', Nation, 13 June 1964). McFarlane's sense of ALP complexity and contradictoriness (also evident, to a degree, in McFarlane, 1968) seemed to desert him when he came to propagate the 'Technocratic Laborist' thesis (Catley and McFarlane, 1974). For a return to more caution, see Catley and McFarlane, 1980; McFarlane, 1981 and Catley and McFarlane, 1981).
1. Whitlam was a clear winner on the third count, with 39 votes against a combined total of 29 for Cairns (15) and Crean (14).

2. Chamberlain's argument was that if the Labor structure was left more or less alone, Whitlam's criticisms of its unrepresentative out-of-date nature would be gleefully pounced upon by Labor's opponents in future elections. Chamberlain complained that Whitlam constantly derided the party structure as 'outmoded, archaic, unrepresentative, a horse-and-buggy survival in a sputnik era'. Chamberlain was made to apologise for his denigration of Whitlam (which could also be gleefully quoted by Labor's opponents).

3. He was addressing a Melbourne Labor Day dinner.

4. He told a Victorian ALP country conference.

5. Labor's moves towards Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1, under Whitlam, can be interpreted as a process of integrating the 'experts' without stimulating 'party renewal' at the 'grass roots' level. For further exploration of this question see Chapter 12B.

6. Whitlam's deputy Lance Barnard (a Tasmanian) strongly supported the 'party reform' cause at this conference (in Devonport). Barnard emphasised exorcising electoral bogeys rather than party renewal. He told delegates that unless the ALP was transformed 'we could get less than 30 percent of the votes at the next election' (quoted, 'Overhaul ALP, Barnard Urges', Examiner, 16 March 1967).

7. Thus the Participants rationalised their support for 'party reform' as a way of attracting 'middle class' branch members and wooing white collar voters, while Chamberlain rationalised his defence of the existing party structure in the name of the 'working class'.

8. Whitlam thought it was 'fantastic' that 'a businessman's, investor's or employer's party' was the biggest. He suggested improved 'rank and file' representation at the state Labor conference would lead to 'a colossal upsurge in the branches.


10. Hugh Gaitskell's defeat of unilateral nuclear disarmers in the British Labour Party was held up as an example for the ALP.

11. See also 'Mr. Whitlam's Unity Crusade', 1 June 1967.

12. NSW and Tasmania were the only states prepared to back 'party reform'.

488
13. See also 'Labor Struggles', 10 May 1967.

14. One ACTU official was said to have told Whitlam that the ACTU could not afford to seem so closely tied with the ALP.

15. Yet another Whitlam/Chamberlain clash preceded this round of conferences. Chamberlain criticised some remarks of Barnard on Vietnam. Whitlam counter-attacked, insisting that 'the ALP should be based on the rank-and-file and not on State bureaucracies' ('Alan Ramsey, Whitlam Demands Chamberlain Apology', Australian, 9 June 1967). He added: 'If other State secretaries were as autocratic and idiosyncratic as Mr Chamberlain, the party's membership would be as reduced and frustrated in the other States as it is in Western Australia'.


17. It contains the texts of his speeches to the three conferences, plus some additional introductory material.

18. SPLP/'machine' relations were good in SA. Dunstan 'cultivated union officials as carefully as he placed the indignant cadences in his speech making (McQueen, 1982:9). See also Stokes, 1983.

19. When he was a delegate to the Federal Executive.

20. Incidentally, the introductory material in Towards a National Party ... appears to contain the paragraphs deleted from Whitlam's speech in SA at Dunstan's bequest (Compare Whitlam, 1967b:5 and Freudenberg, 1977:97).

21. See Chapter 7D.

22. NSW and Tasmania tended to support 'reform' because the left opposed it, but did not seem committed to Whitlam's organisational principle. An advantage for Whitlam in the committee format was that it seemed a way of keeping the 'party reform' issue alive and developing 'rank-and-file' support for the project.

23. Another 15 percent said it was Labor's second major weakness. The survey was conducted by the Melbourne University Political Science department.

24. In an earlier speech (to the Victorian YLA), Whitlam insisted Labor should be a party of 'reform and progress' rather than one of 'repeal and protest' ('Labor Must Show it is Mending its Ways', Age, 20 March 1967. See note 8).

25. In the same issue, four leading Participants (Harold Crouch, Dick McGarvie, John McGinley and Barney Williams) painted the dispute between Whitlam and the VCE as one between those who believed in using parliamentary power to
carry out radical reforms and 'those who believe that the essential role of Labor is to head a protest movement' ('Reply to "Victorian Labor"').

26. In each case, a small group commandeered the resources of the whole Branch, Whitlam suggested.

27. Whitlam thought it was 'disgraceful' that men who flouted the ban on 'unity tickets', organised political strikes in defiance of the ACTU and demonstrated against the Melbourne THC should sit on an ALP executive.

28 D. Stephens (1979:396) noted Victorian president Bill Brown's warning against the danger of overshadowing the 'machine' which represented the 'rank-and-file' whereas politicians were 'too sensitive to things other than the principles which are supposed to guide us'. See also Whitlam, 1967b:10).


30. Although there had been attempts to put it on the agenda (see 'No Discussion of Wyndham Plan', Advertiser, 14 June 1967). A 'party reform' recommendation from Burnside/Ross Park sub-branch was one of forty agenda items not discussed by the convention.

31. Colbourne rejected an amendment based on an interim Wyndham proposal ('State Parties Differ Over Troop Policy', Australian, 13 June 1967). Labor Mayor of Kempsey R. Melville wanted four extra delegates from each state (which the Victorians accepted) and the federal leader and deputy leader. In support Sutherland shire president Arthur Gietzelt said ideas for wider 'rank-and-file' representation were unrealistic.

32. Signed by representatives of the Hairdressers, the Plasterers, the Printing and Kindred Industries Union, the Miscellaneous Workers, the WWF and the Meat Workers.

33. See also Fred Wells, 'NSW - Next Ten Years in the Balance', Sydney Morning Herald, 10 June 1967. Further, see 'How Representative is the Labor Party?', Socialist and Industrial Labor, April 1967.

34. It also looked back to the Split to discern the lesson that the smaller states had saved the Labor movement in 1955 ('Labor's Future', May 1967).

35. See 'Breakthrough for Whitlam', Canberra Times, 10 July 1967.

36. Wyndham also addressed the conference, reminding delegates his proposals were not dogmatic, but simply a basis for discussion ('Let Us Unite - Wyndham', Australian, 8 July 1967.

37. Webb was regarded as being on the left in the FPLP.
38. On a show of hands (72-58) and on a card vote (420-397).

39. On parliamentary representation, the Executive supported only allowing the leader and deputy leader to attend and speak at federal party meetings.

40. The third motion wanted (a) an age limit and (b) special education services for federal parliamentary candidates.

41. Kim Beazley (WA) was absent. He had sent an apology.

42. So would an NT delegate, making for a 47-delegate Conference. There would be a 17-member Executive (which would also have an NT delegate).

43. The Canberra Times thought Whitlam had been defeated, but not completely: '... a man who steers for Northern Territory and finds Tasmania instead may still have achieved something though not a triumph of navigation' ('After So Much Labour', 2 August 1967).

44. See Allan Barnes and Geoffrey Barker, 'Whitlam is Planning New Attack', Age, 2 August 1967; Jonathan Gaul, 'Labor Lifts "Faceless" Label', Canberra Times, 8 August 1967). Lance Barnard, who was a strong supporter of 'party reform' for electoral reasons (see note 6), also argued that Adelaide represented a giant step forward for the party. It did not foreclose further reform ('Labor Enters a New Era - Faceless Men Are Now Unmasked', Mercury, 2 August 1967).

45. See also 'Close the Ranks' (same issue).

46. New issues and new styles of activism were emerging in Australian society which were resistant to the 'top-down' approach of the 'numbers' game in the Labor 'machine' (Houseman, 1971:218. See also McGregor, 1966:271-2).

47. Although he was said to deplore the secrecy of the Victorian executive (Theophanus, 1980:292).

48. The transition from the 'Chifley doctrine of security' to the 'Whitlam doctrine of equality' (Whitlam, 1975) involved complex changes in Labor conceptions of 'equality'. In some ways the old Laborist concept of 'mateship' had elements of egalitarianism that were now being eroded by meritocratic concerns, but that 'mateship' had always been flawed by its racism and its sexism, which were now being addressed.

49. As Beilharz (1985:104-5) points out, the expanding Australian 'new middle class' was likely to see itself as a bearer of 'rationality' and 'the common good'. Class analysis of the 'middle class' has always proved elusive. We might want to distinguish between an executive 'service class' and a mass of de-skilled white-collar workers (Goldthorpe, 1982; Abercrombie and Urry, 1983). Callinicos (1983) wants to argue that the latter are
unambiguously 'proletarian', which Abercrombie and Urry would see as an over-simplification. Interestingly, Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1 was in some ways pitched more directly at the 'service class' than at the new 'white-collar' mass. We have noted Whitlam's fondness for the ideology of 'professionalism' on a number of occasions. On that ideology see Clegg et al., 1986:191-203. See also Ehenreich and Ehenreich, 1979; Johnson, 1977 and Larson, 1977.

50. Therborn (1980) thought a crisis of 'the system of 1947' had begun to mature in the developed capitalist world in the late 1960s. The 'system of 1947' had revolved around the Cold War, economic boom and mass welfarism. The movement against the Vietnam War undermined some of its crucial assumptions (see also Therborn, 1968).

51. Although the particular individuals such reforms would bring into Federal Conference in the short-term gave 'no cause for rejoicing'.

52. Connell thought communication within the ALP was hampered by anachronistic procedures (e.g. the practice of reading the correspondence at branch meetings).


54. This was so, Connell (1968a:12) argued, whatever their factional allegiance. Given the left's claims about developing the party as a 'mass movement' this was a serious criticism. Hudson (1968:22-3) argued that the left-wing Victorian executive was doomed unless it reconstructed itself. Otherwise, it ran the risk 'of eventual defeat by more efficient bureaucrats who can beat it at the same game'. Its only hope was to build a mass base, deliberately stimulating the branches and encouraging debate. In 1970, the Victorian executive was sacked by Federal Executive intervention (see Chapter 13A).

55. Altman argued that, with their emphasis on 'defederalisation', Whitlam, Wyndham and Connell were only bringing the ALP up to date with the 1940s and its expansion of Commonwealth power. For a very different critique of Connell see maverick left-wing NSW MLA George Petersen's (1968:8) dismissal of 'organisational tinkering from above'. Petersen argued that 'grass-roots' campaigning and TV politicking were incompatible. Instead of elitist 'party reform' projects, he suggested Labor should rededicate itself to 'socialism'.

56. This could make for dramatic changes in individual commentators. Compare Horne, 1964 and Horne, 1980. Interestingly, Horne (1980:157) noted that 'Whitlam seemed more in touch with 'new management procedures than did Liberal politicians'.
57. This thesis was radically revised when the Arena writers began to argue that the 'intellectually trained' were being incorporated into new projects of social domination under the aegis of the Whitlam administration (Rowse, 1982. See Sharp, 1973 and 1974). Perhaps both the optimistic and pessimistic Arena theses could be criticised for under-estimating the heterogenous social and political locations of 'intellectuals'. Brym (1980) strongly emphasises this heterogeneity. So, in his own way, does Gouldner (1979) in his presentation of 'the intellectuals' as a 'flawed' universal class with both elitist and emancipatory characteristics.

58. See Chapter 7D. In his analysis of the 1969 Federal Conference, Henry Mayer detected a similar clash between (still) rising 'young intellectuals' and 'old and brainless figures' who remained strong in the party ('Labor Pains that May at Last Lead to Real Political Rebirth', Australian, 7 August 1969). Mayer counselled the 'young intellectuals' to be patient. Their new policies were hardly understood and were no electoral panacea, however worthwhile. With persistence, after 'a long and tough road, we'd have a party modelled somewhat on the Scandinavian Social Democrats'.

59. See the outline of Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1 in Table 3, Chapter 1.

60. See the discussion of this episode in Chapter 13B.
CHAPTER 10

1. Since his departure from the Communist Party in 1956, Turner had been interested in the development of a distinctively Australian socialist strategy. See the essays collected in Turner, 1982.

2. Nevertheless, Humphrey McQueen predicted that by 1978 a lot of Labor people would be 'sprouting Strettonisms without realising their source' ('Where Stretton Fears to Tread', Nation Review, 29 October 1976). McQueen felt that Stretton's reform project, although more serious than anything envisaged by Whitlam, was flawed by an under-estimation of the strength of the forces committed to the defence of class rule in Australia.

3. Labor frontbencher Mick Young commented that during the first two Fraser years Labor people complacently assumed 'that somehow by divine right' voters would return them to office ('Labor Has to Face the Facts', Australian, 24 December 1977; quoted Catley and McFarlane, 1980:309, note 112).

4. See Bob Carr, 'The ALP Must Now Stress a Capacity for Real Economic Management', 10 February 1978 and Joe Thompson, 'It's Time for the ALP to Listen to the Moderates', 7 February 1978. Carr, who was then the NSW Labor Council education officer, also contributed to the Sydney Morning Herald's post-election analysis ('Where Does Labor Go', 19 December 1977). He went on to be a Bulletin journalist, before becoming a state MP (being elected leader of the opposition after Labor's defeat in 1988). Thompson was an official of the Vehicle Builders' Union. For an endorsement of Carr's self-styled 'social democratic critique' from a political scientist, who was not noted for being sympathetic to the ALP, see Patrick O'Brien, 'Labor Must Forget the Myths and Face Facts', Australian, 27 February 1978. The Australian was an interesting location for Labor debate. The paper had been so hostile to the Whitlam Government in 1975 that its journalists went on strike in protest against its bias (see Elliot, 1978:221-2).

5. Labor regained government in NSW in 1976, after having been in opposition since 1965. The 'Wran model', so influential in ALP electoral realpolitik in this period, is discussed in detail in Chaples et al., 1974.

6. Their assessment of cultural attitudes was shared by some Nation Review contributors, who disagreed with their conclusions. Political scientist Lex Watson described the Australian electorate 'even when poor' as 'irretrievably bourgeois and selfish' ('What Chance for the Left', 22 December 1977).
7. She thought they could be a leavening influence in the party and in the community who could make it possible for 'a sound Labor party' to form a government 'acceptable to the electorate on a long-term basis'. To attract this group, Labor needed 'a positive programme of education, participation and active involvement'. She wanted Labor to win 'the young, better educated, more hopedul, more aware' before 'the weight of the suburban mortgage deadens their mind and reduces their spirits'. For a similar argument about the importance of cultural change and Labor responsiveness to 'new social movement' concerns, see Denis Altman,'Signposts in the Gloom', Nation Review, 5 January 1978.

8. By this time Cairns, who had been deputy Prime Minister in 1975, until the 'loans affair' brought about his demise (see Sexton, 1979) had become disillusioned with parliamentary politics (although he remained an MHR until December 1977), and was heavily involved in 'counter-cultural' activities, such as 'Down to Earth' festivals (see Altman, 1980:115).

9. The ambiguous 'reform euphoria' of the earlier 1970s had clearly given way to an emphasis on 'sound economic management' in Helmut Schmidt's 'modell Deutschland' (see Braunthal, 1983:155-6, 263 and 298; Markovits, 1986:94-6).

10. The last was produced in 1984. As Labor became more successful electorally, its theoretical output declined drastically.

11. In June 1978 (again held in Brisbane).

12. Which explored a wide range of issues and was strongly influenced by the 'political economy' critique of conventional economics.

13. Young called on Labor to go beyond opinion poll populism. There was a political generation emerging that was afraid to make decisions 'before we unleash the wrath of the pollsters' (see also similar quotation from Young in Mills, 1986:43).

14. Later in 1980, Theophanus became MHR for Burke, after deposing the incumbent in a preselection contest.

15. Connell's preface, dated 11 November 1975, brought his sociological analysis and political agenda together. Partly as a consequence of Connell's work, a number of writers began to invoke casual references to Gramsci as well as the term 'hegemony' in their interpretations of what had gone for Labor since 1975. The 1960s 'New Critics', Horne (1981) and McGregor (1983) seem to have been radicalised by the events of 1975, particularly Horne, who was moving from a more conservative position. See also references to 'hegemony' in Wilenski (1983). Casual deployment of 'hegemony' analysis could lead to 'dominant values' being seen as the main obstacle to Labor progress in a rather simplistic manner.

17. But he was now cool on the idea of federal union representation at National Conference (see Bruce Wilson, 'Whitlam Speaks Out', Sydney Morning Herald, 10 January 1978. See also note 3, Chapter 8.

18. Arguing that a party seeking to 'serve' the community had to 'evolve' with the community (Peter Bowers and Ian Frykberg, 'Hayden Pledges to Review Labor's Aims', Sydney Morning Herald, 23 December 1977). Hayden was sympathetic to the West German Social Democratic model (Michelle Grattan, 'The Hayden Philosophy', Age, 9 January 1978).

19. Here he invoked the example of the Austrian Social Democratic Party (on which see Sully, 1982).


21. Deputy Senate leader John Button suggested that having a non-charismatic leader gave the party a great opportunity to think about philosophy and organisation (Michelle Grattan, 'John Button - The Life and Soul of the Party', Age, 16 April 1979), Button described Hayden as 'a desirable social democratic figure' who was 'not about monuments' (quoted, Bob Carr, 'A Reformer Right on the Button', Bulletin, 27 June 1978. See also Allan Ashbolt, 'Why Whitlam Should Go Too', New Statesman, 22 July 1977).

22. For some, the decline of Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1 led to a confused nostalgia for an older Laborism (see McQueen, 1982:210).

23. See David Kemp, 'The Secret Ingredient in Fraser's Success', National Times, 16 January 1978. The title was not Kemp's.

24. The main arguments are prefigured in Kemp, 1977. See also Kemp, 1975.

25. ALP president Bob Hawke called for a special National Executive meeting ('A Time for Critical Analysis', Labor Star, 16 December 1977). The Victorian Branch argued that, at all levels, Labor had to analyse what was happening in Australian society and find ways of getting its policies and arguments 'across, understood and supported by the electorate'.

26. Young had been part-time federal secretary, 1969-73, before becoming a federal parliamentarian. He replaced Wyndham in controversial circumstances (see Reid, 1971:261-3; Freudenberg, 1977:151-2 and Oakes, 1973:184-86) and worked out of Adelaide. Despite the closure of the Federal Secretariat, professionalised campaigning reached new heights under Young. 1972 was Labor's first nationally co-ordinated campaign (see Oakes and Solomon, 1973:100). Young could take much of the credit (Blewett,
1973c:9-11). The campaign used survey research carefully and the media calculatedly (see Blewett, 1973c; Braund, 1973. See also Mills, 1986:95). Indeed, Labor's 'It's Time' campaign, promoted by the Hansen-Rubensohn-Erikson agency was voted 'the outstanding marketing promotion of the year' by the Marketing Communications Executives Association ('Labor's Campaign an Award Winner', Australian, 22 March 1973). Young (1986) himself insists that there was a lot more to Labor's campaign than slick advertising. The full-time Federal Secretariat was re-opened in 1973, with David Combe (SA) as federal secretary. Young had seen his part-time position as an interim arrangement and thought Labor could learn from the organisational thoroughness of the West German Social Democratic Party (David Solomon, 'Slim Scheme for Labor HQ', Canberra Times, 13 March 1972). After the 1975 defeat, Young called for 'a "think-tank" of our most brilliant people, looking at least ten years ahead' (Jane Cunningham, 'More Prophesies from South Australia', Sydney Morning Herald, 14 January 1976).

27. The meeting also discussed Combe's report complaining that there had been no party discussion on the policy speech and that the parliamentary leadership had been cavalier towards the organisation. Hayden rejected the idea of a party organisation representative at Caucus meetings (Michelle Grattan, 'Combe Report Under Attack', Age, 18 January 1978).

28. Ryan suspected the National Executive meeting would 'produce much less' (see also Bruce O'Meagher, 'What's Wrong with the ALP?', Lobby, November-December 1978).

29. See also Ian Frykberg, 'ALP's Poll Dissection All Huff 'n Puff', Sydney Morning Herald, 23 January 1978. In reply, Combe (1978:15) was adamant that the NCI was more than a predictable 'easy-way-out of a difficult situation' for a party of inveterate 'resolutionaries' (see also Bob Carr, 'Labor Believes It's Time for Self-Change', Bulletin, 6 June 1978). For comments on the ritual nature of earlier Labor post-mortems, see Chapters 3A and 4A.

30. See Chapter 7A.

31. The union official was Joe Thompson (see note 4).

32. Along with probing policy dilemmas raised by 'the apparent fading of the grandiose programmes of Whitlamism' (Michelle Grattan, 'Labor Gets Down to the Business of Adjusting to the Times', Age, 21 January 1978). Grattan believed that although post-mortem committees were generally rather ritualistic entities, the NCI had possibilities.

33. Milton went on to suggest that the terms of reference were drawn up by people, who feared that 'the bold enunciation of socialist policy' would 'deny them the government corridors of power'. They wanted to tailor party policies.
to voter aspirations 'fed by false hopes and the promise of elusive rewards by the advertising mogul'.

34. In 1977 the suggestion of dropping the 'socialisation objective' had been floated on the National Executive, apparently with the support of Bob Hawke and David Combe (see Button, 1981:18 and Tim Herat, 'ALP Left Takes a Mauling', Australian, 6 June 1978).

35. The NSW Labor left paper Challenge noted that moves to water down or remove the party's 'socialisation objective' were usually promoted in terms of 'modernising' the party ('Challenge for Labor', February 1978). Challenge also worried that emergent myths about the 'natural conservatism' of the Australian electorate could paralyse Labor thought (see also 'What the Election Means', Tribune, 13 December 1977).

36. He had been FPLP deputy leader (December 1975-December 1977) and, before that, Minister for Urban and Regional Development.

37. See also 'Uren Slams Conservative Propaganda', Challenge, February 1978.

38. A striking Australian example was the 'green bans' imposed by the Builders Labourers' Federation in Sydney in alliance with resident action groups in the early 1970s. See, Jakubowicz, 1984.

39. S. Berger (1979:45-6) sees the French Socialist Party of the 1970s as 'a partial success story alongside a catalogue of missed opportunities' in the general failure of left parties to connect with 'new interests' and 'new emergent values' in West European electorates. (See also Bell and Criddle, 1984:252). However, even in the French case, relations with 'new social movements' were ambiguous. The French left's response to feminism was uneven (S. Berger, 1979:46) and the peace/anti-nuclear movement was weak in France and its cause was not embraced by the Socialist Party (Hirst, 1985:180, note 2. See also D. Johnstone, 1984).

40. Because it 'necessarily involved playing down completely the transformative dimension of social democracy'. In terms of Wolfe's (1977) concepts, as utilised in Chapter 12C, this involved a managerial preference for membership 'de-politicisation' over 'legitimation' to party activists. This was particularly so with the 'modell Deutschland' (see note 9) and led to the rise of the German Green party (see Papadakis, 1984). Sassoon (1986:24-5) documents considerable re-evaluation of the 'modell Deutschland' approach by the West German Social Democrats in the 1980s.

41. The quote is from Hayden's Chamberlain Memorial Lecture, University of WA, 2 March 1979. See also 'ALP Needs Theorists: Hayden', Canberra Times, 17 March 1979.
42. Combe added that these experts might not all be ALP members.

43. See also Whitlam's (1978:17-9) criticisms of the Queensland Branch.

44. Queensland suggested a committee made up of representatives of each Branch.

45. It had issued a hard-hitting statement after the election, saying voters were disillusioned with the '... mistaken tactics, bad strategies and elitism of the parliamentary ALP' (Malcolm Colless, 'Union Blasts Labor for Poll Defeat', Australian, 13 February 1978).

46. Button chaired the NCI sub-committee on party organisation. The other major sub-committee (which examined social trends) was chaired by Blewett.

47. Invoking his former Adelaide University colleague, Hugh Stretton (1976a) in the process. Blewett regarded this book as 'the most powerful, persuasive and passionate weapon offered to democratic socialism in a generation' (quoted, John Langmore, 'Domestic Aid: Stretton's Vision of Social Justice', Age Monthly Review, April 1988). On 'Strettonism' and the ALP in the late 1970s, see note 2. Langmore adds that Stretton's book 'influenced Labor's preparation for government in the late '70s'. The ALP-ACTU Accord 'was inspired by Stretton's recommendation for an incomes policy'. Stretton's radicalism, however, was not easily contained within the framework of Australian Labor Managerialism. See Stretton's (1987) critique of the Hawke Labor Government.

48. Bob Carr was interviewed on the same Four Corners programme, which looked at the Kemp thesis.

49. Later, Blewett (1982:49) argued that Australian neo-conservatism had some successes during the Fraser regime, partly because Labor 'offered no clear philosophical alternative'. This was fairly vaguely argued. Its policy implications were not explored, although some dissatisfaction with social democratic capitulation to the nostrums of 'sound economic management' was indicated (see also Blewett, 1983). Earlier, Blewett (1973a:360) suggested Labor should see its parliamentary opponents as 'the front men for powerful forces long nourished by the conservative hegemony and sustained by a capitalist and conformist culture'. It was the latter 'subtle, pervasive and dangerous' forces that posed 'the real threat to Labor'. This sort of argument won widespread support within the ALP, in the wake of the events of 11 November 1975 (see note 15).

50. Which included 'an Anglo-Saxon distrust of theory' and a 'stubborn pragmatism' which often degenerated into opportunism and crude anti-communism. By gutting
'democratic socialism' of 'vision and idealism', Whitlam's 'new revisionism' reinforced this older Laborist pragmatism.

51. One of the problems with Catley and McFarlane's (1974) category is its failure to dis-aggregate 'Technocratic Laborism', of which there were a number of versions. Blewett had been radicalised by his participation in protests against the Vietnam War (see Robert Milliken, 'The Man in the Medicare Hot Seat', National Times, 1 April 1983).

52. Blewett saw 'participatory democracy' as the Victorian Socialist Left's 'most interesting contribution to socialist thought'.

53. He was involved in an unsuccessful move to increase branch participation in preselection in 1974 (Eric Franklin, 'Conference of Challenge', Advertiser, 22 June 1974). Franklin commented that although academics had done much to lift Labor's horizon their judgement was not wholly trusted because they were 'regarded as theorists rather than down-to-earth practical men'. A premature *realpolitik* epitaph for the NCI?

54. The strength of egalitarian sentiment (i.e. white, male egalitarian sentiment), the weakness of 'civil society' and the state's regulatory role in Australian 'marsupial capitalism' (Brugger and Jaensch, 1985:76) are all important in this context.


56. Emy's (1974) 'diffusion' model of an Australian political culture dominated by 'producer groups' relies on a similar analysis (see also Miller, 1954:52-7 and 110-8; Collins, 1985).

57. In his Boyer Lectures, Encel (1971:7) explored 'the conversion of Australia from a society dominated by its rural hinterland to an affluent, urban, industrial country'.

58. Modernisation theory's functionalist sociologism made explicit what was implicit in much political science analysis of 'modern', an-ideological, catch-all electoral competition.

59. See his account of 'the managerial style of political discourse' as a consequence of the 'information society' (Encel, 1984b:6).

60. Furthermore, Encel's fascination with Daniel Bell's arguments about the 'end of ideology' and the 'post-industrial society' was always tinged with criticism (see Encel, 1981).
61. Contrasting 'The Decade of Decision' (1939-49) with 'The Politics of Irresponsibility' which followed. Here he switches from determinist, 'adaptation' analysis to a voluntarist emphasis on the strategy of political leaders and their bureaucratic advisers.

62. Encel (1964b:25) thought the federal policy committees functioned particularly poorly, being ill-equipped for technocratic politics. He had served on the education committee (ALP, 1963:8). Encel's support for Whitlam's drive to rationalise ALP policy formulation helped bring him into direct conflict with Calwellian Labor (see Encel, 1978a:53-5), with Calwell abusing him, under cover of parliamentary privilege in his farewell speech to the House of Representatives (on 11 October 1972).


64. Much earlier, Encel (1962b:8) argued for party reform so Labor could counter 'the growing concentration of economic power' in Australia (see also Encel, 1970:318-415).

65. Which could be described as 'the crisis of Cold War Liberalism' (Simms, 1982:119-21. See also my discussion, note 50, Chapter 9).

66. Therborn (1980:15-6) notes that while the socio-political crisis of the 1960s favoured the labour movement and the political left, the economic crisis which followed in the 1970s led to 'division, passivity and demoralisation'.

67. cf Theophanus, 1980:125-6 on the 'rationality-crisis of the state'.

68. Like Blewett, Encel could be described as a radical 'technocratic Laborist'. Both were sympathetic to 'Strettonism'. See note 47.


70. He was, after all, deputy leader in the Senate (and therefore an ex officio Federal Executive member) and a high profile shadow minister.

71. Before that, he had been on the 'Jordan ticket' in 1964 (see note 22, Chapter 5).

72. This was after control of the Victorian Branch had been radically altered by federal intervention in 1970-71 (discussed in Chapter 13A).

74. He decried what he called a 'Play it again, Sam' mood.

75. Similar lessons from the Whitlam years were drawn by Gareth Evans (1986:171-5) who argued they showed Labor could not govern successfully without being primarily preoccupied with economic management, closely co-operating with the ACTU and giving careful consideration to the machinery of government.

76. Which themselves were changing with the dissolution of previously accepted 'Keynesian' verities (see Hughes, 1980; Whitwell, 1986).


78. For earlier Participant endorsement of the 'convergence thesis', see note 35, Chapter 8.

1. Although submissions were not always easy to distinguish from other contributions (letters, papers etc.).

2. These included calls for a Labor newspaper. 'Media bias' was a sore point for Labor at this time. Richie Gun (defeated candidate for Kingston, SA) suggested Australian papers were 'as objective and reliable as Pravda and Isvestia' (Submission 230. See also Elliott, 1978). The NCI thought 'media bias' was real, but felt a Labor paper would be bound to fail (ALP, 1979:7). Labor could approach the mainstream media more professionally and could make better use of its own media outlets (mainly radio stations). A national Labor newspaper was an old Labor dream (see Crisp, 1978:81-97). In 1976 the National Executive considered a plan for a Labor Media Investments Fund and a national newspaper (see Garry O'Neill, 'ALP Plans Newspaper - Officials Study Media Investment Fund', Australian, 13 August 1976; Michelle Grattan, 'Labor Studies "Super" Plan to Enter Media', Age, 13 August 1976).

3. Frontbenchers contradicted each other. Whitlam canvassed a payroll tax that had not been discussed within the party (see Butler, 1979:12-3; Weller, 1979:61-3).

4. For outline of 'garbage can' model of organisations, see Cohen et al. (1972). My application of the model to the NCI draws on Olsen's (1976) analysis of reorganisation in universities and March and Olsen's (1983) study of formal attempts to reorganise the US federal bureaucracy. D. Stephens (1979) pioneered the application of 'garbage can' analysis to the ALP.

5. See Chapter 1.

6. Some also considered whether Australia had a comprador class.

7. An NCI member, albeit an inactive one (see Encel, 1979:1).

8. Programmes which had precious little to do with 'socialism', Ducker implied (see also Carr, nd).

9. Thus it was reluctant to co-operate. We could recall Wyndham's difficulties extracting information from the states in 1964-5.

10. This was largely because of the NSW right's union strength (see Rawson, 1981:13), which Ducker personified. A section of the NSW left wanted more branch representation at state conference (about 50 percent instead of about 40 percent). Some submissions reflected this (see also Rod Cavalier, letters to Sydney Morning Herald, 22 September and 1 October 1979; John Carson, 'A Case for Ending the Union Nexus', Challenge, January 1980).
dominant view on the Steering Committee, itself heavily influenced by the left unions in the ALP, accepted the status quo on this question (see Tom Uren, letter to Sydney Morning Herald, 29 September 1979. See also '60:40 and Class Ideology' (BWIU letter), Challenge, February 1981 and Renfrey Clark, 'Reply to Rod Cavalier: Why Unions Must Control the Labor Party', Direct Action, 25 October 1979.

11. Different conflicts, debates, power plays and factional situations in the two Branches provided different contexts. Submissions varied accordingly.

12. See especially the contributions from Peter Beattie and Denis Murphy (Submissions 11 and 275). Beattie appended proposals from the 'Queensland ALP Reform Committee', a body formed in late 1977. Murphy, an historian, noted that Queensland branch membership was at its lowest since 1932. When the 'new regime' emerged in Queensland, Beattie became secretary and Murphy president. In defence of the 'old guard', C. Nolan (Electrical Trades Union) alleged the reformers were subverting the 'worker need' base of the ALP (Submission 200).


14. Although John Button (an ex officio National Executive member) took a prominent part in the NCI. See Chapter 10C.


16. This mechanism enabled parliamentarians to escape the obligations of Caucus solidarity expected in the party. It was used during legislation on homosexuality as well as abortion.

17. Submissions 88-91 likewise found their way to the NCI from the in-tray of Senator Geoff McLaren (SA). Submission 117 began life as a letter to Senator Jean Melzer.


19. See Submissions 21, 46, 83, 110, 111, 112, 118, 185, 191, 256, 261 and 285. Intra-party submissions did not question the principle of union affiliation, although some quibbled with the ratio of union to branch delegates at state conferences.

20. Multi-culturalism was a distinct challenge to old Laborist 'mono-cultural' assumptions, but ethnic politics took many forms. Defence of ethnic identity could be linked to conservative as well as radical politics (see Turner, 1987:82-4).

22. Submission 176.

23. Submission 179. CAMP was a gay rights group.


26. Submissions 189 and 252.

27. The NCI was also contacted by opponents of 'permissiveness' (Submissions 109, 121, 136; the first from a WA 'Christian Action in Government' Senate candidate), complainants about 'vocal minority groups' (14, 302) and racists nostalgic for 'White Australia' (27, 86, 190). These submissions did not link into internal ALP debates in the way that the 'new social movement' ones did. Invitations to the 'general public' to send submissions were always likely to appeal to the odd crank or two.

28. See, e.g. 'Beliefs of the ALP', *Canberra Times*, 12 June 1978.

29. But the NCI wanted to be able to claim it was listening to 'the community' as well as to ALP members.

30. In general, relying on written submissions as a guide to decisions can lead to bias in favour of the educated, the articulate and the 'middle-class' (see Sjoberg et al., 1966).

31. Keon-Cohen was writing on behalf of the Annandale (Sydney) branch Labor and the Electorate Committee, set up in response to the NCI.

32. A Social Studies lecturer at Mount Gravatt College of Advanced Education.

33. A side-effect of this was that West German political scientists were provided with considerable information on topics such as the 'middle classing' of the SPD; information which could only be arrived at through considerably more laborious routes for parties such as the British Labour Party (see Hindess, 1971 and 1982b; Whiteley, 1983) and the ALP (see Ward, 1987, a study based on an analysis of occupational data recorded on Victorian ALP membership tickets). Von Beyme (1985:170) suggests that party analysis of its own membership has become increasingly important in western democracies generally in recent times. However, the trend seems to have taken on much more in some countries than in others.

34. See also Hayden, 1980:241.

35. See, e.g. note 2, Chapter 9.
36. So 'the impression of wisdom being delivered from on high' could be avoided.

37. Which were also touched on in DP 5 and DP 10.

38. Amongst those opposed to Hawke's pre-publication amendment were Harry Hauenschild (Queensland 'old guard') and Jim Roulston (Victorian Left), (Michael Gordon, 'Labor to Tell What's Wrong', Age, 10 April 1979). Peter Bowers thought the opposition to publication was based more on anti-media than anti-reform sentiment ('Change Comes Slowly to a Fractional and Volatile ALP', Sydney Morning Herald, 13 April 1979). Other commentators were more alarmist (e.g. Malcolm Colless, 'Labor Throws Proposals for Major Reform into Limbo', Australian, 10 April 1979).

39. One Executive member admitted he would not like to play a tape of the discussion to an ALP women's group (Michelle Grattan, 'A Shock to the Labor System', Age, 11 April 1979).

40. The 'new social movements' and the continuing transformation of the ALP and, above all, the changed economic circumstances all contributed to the broadening of Labor debate in the decade 1967-1977. The decline of Cold War 'anti-communism' also helped reduce Labor intellectual rigidity.

41. At least in relation to liaison with 'new social movements'. The NCI did not make any recommendations on 'socialism' or economic policy which were seen as being beyond its brief, although DP 6 had made some suggestions that were consistent with Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2 assumptions (see Chapter 15A).

42. See the discussion of Korpi and Shalev (1979) in Chapter 6B.


44. Labor was thoroughly embroiled in 'the Australian form of government' (Lucy, 1985. See also Encel, 1960 and Emy, 1974 on Labor and the Australian political ethos). Labor's stubborn federalism illustrated this (see, e.g. Whitlam, 1957; Wildavsky, 1961).

45. Anderson (1966) argued for a 'hegemonic' British Labour Party and advocated a concomitant socialist strategy for British civil society. Castles (1978) notes the extent to which the Swedish Social Democrats have implanted a 'social democratic image' of society and changed the nature of Swedish 'common sense' in the process. Anderson (1961a, 1961b) thought the Swedish Social Democrats fell short of the sort of 'hegemonic' party he was advocating.
1. See, e.g. May Pillinger (Roseville, NSW), contribution to 'Where Does the Left Go from Here?', Nation Review, 9 February 1978.

2. See Table 3, Chapter 11.

3. Differences between 'traditionalists' and 'trendies' in the ALP were often seen as reflections of differences between 'working class' and 'middle-class' identities. However, Ward's (1983) survey of Victorian branch secretaries found ideological differences could not be pinned down to 'class' background (see also Pervan and Mitchell, 1979:153). A 'middle-classing' of the ALP had taken place (compare Wilson, nd and Hughes, 1969:39 with Hay, 1979:116-7, Ward, 1983, Ward, 1987). Whether this accounted for a new branch militancy was more doubtful. 'Middle-class' party members may have easier access to certain politically relevant resources (such as education). We could remember Michels' (1962) argument that the masses' lack of education was a major reason why the party chiefs could lead them astray (see also Bottomore, 1984:131-2, 184). However, 'middle-class' party members do not have any automatic proclivity to 'participatory' politics. In a number of social democratic parties in the 1970s the branch membership did become more assertive as it became more 'middle-class' (see Hine, 1986:269). See also Rustin, 1981 and Whiteley, 1983:44-5 on the British Labour Party and Braunthal, 1983:47-52 and Kolinsky (1984:84) on the West German Social Democrats. In explaining this assertiveness, we have to note the political context in which it arose. Rather than being a simple consequence of 'middle-classness', it can be traced to the impact of the '1968 generation' of radicals on social democratic parties, at a time when their old policy formulae were being eroded by 'stagflation' and the challenge from a 'new right' championing of 'free market' alternatives to bureaucratic statism (see Therborn, 1981).

4. Johns, a National Secretariat employee, embraced a strong version of the class reductionist argument about cultural conflict in the ALP. He suggested many blue-collar workers were in need of 're-education' within the ALP, which could not afford to reinforce and reproduce the authoritarian attitudes they brought into the party from workplace and family experiences (Johns, 1983:124).

5. In my characterisation of 'participatory-critical' and 'passive loyalist' orientations to membership activity, I have drawn on Hine, 1986:269; Whiteley, 1983:44-5; Braunthal, 1983:47-52 and Kolinsky, 1984:84. They all note the increase in 'participatory-critical' membership pressure within social democratic parties such as the British Labour Party and the West German Social Democratic
Party. They contrast this assertiveness with an earlier more passive concept of party membership revolving around election campaigns. 'Passive loyalists' trusted their leaders. Between elections 'passive loyalist' branches tended to be dormant.

6. Blackburn North branch lamented that the party structure fell short of what one might hope for from Labor's 'great theme' of 'comradeship and fraternal involvement'.

7. Interestingly one union submission wanted branches and electorate councils to be given 'a more purposeful role' (Submission 3, AMWSU). The new assertiveness in the branch sector had some union support. Branch rights sentiment did not generally lead to an attack on union affiliation and its impact on ALP organisation (although see note 10, Chapter 11).

8. See Submissions 72 and 222, Springwood-Falconbridge and Nelson Bay branches, both NSW.

9. See, e.g. Submissions 258 and 299 from Greensborough branch, Vic and East Sydney branch, NSW. Drummoyne branch (NSW) wanted similar FEC access to the national policy committees (Submission 242). For full text of Wyndham Report, see Appendix I.

10. Tom Uren thought they should be circulated nine to twelve months prior to Conference.

11. See Submissions 129, 134, 145 and 299 from Werriwa FEC (NSW), Seaford Pines branch (Vic), Tuggeranong branch (ACT) and East Sydney branch (NSW).

12. As a further boost to the 'lay' party, Manly wanted paid party officials to be ineligible for election to the National Executive. Greensborough branch (Vic) suggested the national policy committees should have paid research staff (Submission 259).

13. On the Australia Party, see Kemp (1975:153-9) who saw its 'participatory' structure as an attraction to 'the disaffected technocracy'. Don Chipp's Australian Democrats, founded in 1977, had more electoral impact, securing a parliamentary foothold (in the Senate), which had eluded the Australia Party. Its 'small-l' liberal stance included an opening to some 'new social movement' concerns (especially environmentalism), but on the major economic issues, it sometimes seemed more worried by 'big' unions than by 'big' business (see Edwards, 1985).

14. Lithgow left the mechanics of membership consultation open (Submission 154). There could be postal ballots or ones organised through the branches. The Hills District Branch (also NSW) wanted regular membership opinion polls (Submission 163).
15. Olsen (1976) emphasises that institutional reorganisation programmes often generate a 'participation ideology' as they are being formulated, yet this is often followed by indifference to the new participation opportunities they institutionalise. He suggests the right to participate seems more valued than participation itself. Furthermore, the right to participate often serves as a 'garbage can' for a host of intra-organisational antagonisms and resentments.

16. Bain did not envisage the branches becoming 'umbrella social action groups'. They could however respond more to 'issues of concern to residents'.

17. See, e.g. Submission 166, Randwick North branch, NSW. However, most seats were 'safe' for one of the three major parties and the battle for 'marginal' seats rested mainly on national factors.

18. For example, Progress Associations, Parents and Citizens Associations. Many ALP members would have been already involved in such bodies as individuals. Research, however, suggests that Liberal Party members were more likely than ALP members to be involved in established 'community' organisations (Walker, 1976:51-2; Rawson, 1958:51-2. See also Robertson, 1965:16 and Aimer, 1973).

19. If approached sensitively and subtly. See Submissions 144 and 206, Belconnen Branch (ACT and Hotham FEA (Vic.).

20. See, e.g. Submission 135, Oatley branch, NSW.

21. Wentworth FEC (NSW) thought branches could produce local field research packages (Submission 257, prepared by a special sub-committee).

22. Because of the ways in which it implied that Labor should be transformed by 'new social movement' practices.

23. Horne (1981:128) later noted the lack of 'any active community base' for the ALP and Australian unions was a major point of contrast between the Australian and Swedish labour movements. He thought this was an area where the Australians could learn from the successful Swedes. Scase (1977:72) made a similar comparison between the British and Swedish labour movements. There were many voluntary associations directly related to the Swedish labour movement. Britain lacked 'a similar set of institutions', which developed out of the labour movement and were 'salient to the non-work lifestyles of manual workers. Most Swedish communities had their folkets hus (people's house) which offered a range of social, educational and recreational facilities.(Scase, 1977:53. See also Esping-Andersen, 1985:19-20; Linton, 1985). In the 1960s, Horne had invoked Australian 'suburbia' against what he saw as an authoritarian labour movement (Rowse, 1978:208-9, 214-7). By the late 1970s, he was celebrating the social
democratic potential of Australian 'suburbia' (as had Stretton, 1976a before him). Interestingly, Horne's fellow 'New Critic' from the 1960s, Craig McGregor (1966:196), had argued back then that the ALP, dominated by unions had 'failed to build up the widespread community support at local level which has helped give overseas Social Democratic parties a wide social base'. Rowse (1978) makes some pertinent points about the conservative-populist logic in the 1960s 'New Critic' literature, but his own class essentialism leads him to dismiss all talk of 'community' as a bourgeois trap, a diversion from the class struggle. This is particularly noticeable in his dismissal of Stretton's work (Rowse, 1978:263). Interestingly, reflection on 'new social movements' seems to have modified Rowse's (1985) stance, while radicalising, in different ways, Horne (1981) and McGregor (1983).

24. See also Aitkin, 1982:283.

25. Mathews thought the prospects for constitutional reform were remote. The concern with 'missed opportunities' for party reform was an old Mathews theme, which had recurred in his 1960s endeavours within the Victorian Branch, which had brought him into such conflict with the state executive (see Chapters 5D, 7D and 8D. However, by 1977 he believed that tidying up the branches was no longer enough, although he still put a high premium on it. Labor had to develop a new radicalism. This attitude seems to have been partly a product of despair. Mathews returned to a more conventional stance as Labor's electoral position improved. He later went on to effusively celebrate Labor Managerialism ('The Gradualists', Lobby, Spring 1984. See also Mathews, 1981).

26. Every year 'dissatisfaction with the tedium and lack of political content' of ALP branch life led to new members disappearing fairly quickly, as well as long-term members dropping out.

27. This was similar to the NCI analysis, although the NCI emphasised the electoral importance of a 'mass party' ALP (ALP, 1979:2). Wilenski (1980b:412) thought the NCI recommendations did little more than 'scratch the surface of the problem'.

28. We have already noted Labor intellectuals' fondness for 'the dominant ideology thesis' as an explanation for the party's woes in 1975 and afterwards (see note 15, Chapter 10). For a critique of the theoretical foundations of 'the dominant ideology thesis', see Abercrombie, Hill and Turner, 1980. Ironically partisan ALP versions of the 'dominant ideology' analysis reproduce much of Kemp's (1980) argument about a conservative Australian consensus. The idealist emphasis on 'values' as a source of social stability downplays the significance of organisation and political struggle (see Chamberlain, 1983 and Mann, 1970).
29. See also Wilenski, 1981:37; Macintyre, 1976. Australian parties had become little more than 'nurseries, electoral agents and policy advisers of politicians' (Parker, 1980:19; quoted, Wilenski, 1981:37). Earlier Emy (1974) had seen the eclipse of party and the centrality of sectoral interests as defining features of the Australian polity. Wilenski did not specify which 'great parties of the European left', Labor could learn from. He was an admirer of the Swedish Social Democrats (see Wilenski, 1983). In terms of a lively 'party culture', there were lessons to be learned from the Italian Communist Party, lessons which Rustin (1981) and Hobsbawm (1982) drew for the British Labour Party. Hine (1977) suggested the Italian Communist Party had some 'social democratic' characteristics, despite its problems in presenting itself as a potential party of government. Pierson (1986:87-128) draws interesting comparisons between Swedish Social Democracy and Italian Communism. On the ALP right, Carr (nd) invoked the West German Social Democratic Party. It had traditions of membership mobilisation, but had decisively broken with those traditions at Bad Godesberg in 1959. In the 1970s, an emphasis on 'economic management' left little room for membership mobilisation (Markovits, 1986:96. See also Braunthal, 1983).

30. It dated this divorce to the February 1975 Federal Conference. Henty FEA (Vic) complained that the Whitlam Government listened to academic and journalistic advisers rather than the Labor 'rank and file'.

31. Uren suggested 'politicisation' and 'activation' of the party membership required the integration of 'analytical discussion at FEC level, party education, stronger union links and internal bulletins (see also Arthur Gietzelt, 'What Chance for the Left', Nation Review, 2 March 1978).

32. The submission was entitled 'There is an Alternative'. The signatories were mainly from the left, but also included John Dawkins, Barry Jones and Susan Ryan. See also 'Labor MPs Come Out Fighting', Challenge, April 1978.

33. Uren (1978) emphasised that this was something that was impressed on him by his experience in the Whitlam Government.

34. See also Submissions 171, 250 and 251 from Tom Uren MHR, Auburn branch (Vic) and Ballarat FEA (Vic).

35. See the discussion on changes in the NSW left (the Steering Committee) in Cavalier (1976).

36. This contrast between passive and plodding political party routine and 'new social movement' vibrancy is echoed in Sassoon's critique of Constituency Labour Parties (CLPs) in Britain. Passing resolutions to keep themselves busy between elections they act only as an internal pressure group: 'A resolution is a proposition that someone else does something or other' (see also Hain, 1981:190-2).
Sassoon argues that CLPs did not present new or original demands, but served as a Discount House recycling demands from unions and 'new social movements' (see also Samuel and Stedman Jones, 1982:327 and Macpherson, 1987:97-9).

37. As well as 'special interest lobbies' and 'new radical movements of urban protest and direct action'. See also N. Young, 1977:Ch 4.

38. As an a priori 'class alliance'. This is further discussed in Chapter 15C.


40. Connell was aligned with the NSW Left. In the 1960s he had advocated a 'participatory' version of the Whitlam/Wyndham project, combined with better use of the media. See Chapter 9D.

41. Even a 'defensive struggle' seemed a bit adventurous for Labor Managerialism. For a more recent analysis, see Connell, 1986:33-5.

42. And a rather simplistic two-class model at that (see Beilharz, 1985).

43. Held in Sydney.


46. She suggested groups focussing on industry and employment art/propaganda, journalism, education, medicine and health, law and civil liberties, women, aboriginals, uranium. Her list had a 'new social movement' flavour, although not exclusively. One could imagine various ways of organising intra-party special interest groups. Compare Braunthal's (1983:137-8) analysis of the situation in the West German Social Democratic party (where associations were officially established for women, workers and the self-employed, alongside the branch structures) with Rustin's (1981:39-42) advocacy of 'pluralisation' within the British Labour Party as an imaginative alternative to that party's organisational status quo.


48. The NCI stressed that 'the interests of certain groups and communities' that were vital to Labor's future had secured 'little or no representation at the National Conference'.

512
The most obvious of these are women, the ethnic communities and rural electorates' (APSA, 1979:8).

49. See also Stretton, 1976a:73.

50. See also Lucy, 1979:78-9.

51. See Chapter 11A.

52. See also Close, 1972:12-3.

53. For an 'official' NSW Branch attempt to juggle these imperatives, see Rod Wise, 'Interesting Branch Meetings', Radical, October 1977. Interestingly, it endorsed CPSs 1-3. Wise was the NSW Branch education and research officer.

54. Wolfe thought parties sacrificed internal 'legitimation' for 'depoliticisation' because of the priority they gave to serving 'the state'. As the state served contradictory functions, so did the parties which served the state. Wolfe's (1978) own analysis of social democracy is rather one-dimensional, stressing its integration into the capitalist state. Theoretically, however, his notion of party schizophrenia is more open-ended and can be incorporated into our 'complex arena' model.

55. A distinction between 'genuine' and 'non-genuine' politics is central to Wolfe's analysis, but sometimes seems rather slippery. Wolfe (1974:148) argued that capitalist societies were characterised by 'alienated' politics in which the 'totally frivolous' displaced the 'ultimately political' (see also Offe, 1972:84-5 and 92; Therborn, 1978:113, 121). The 'genuine'/'non-genuine' dichotomy runs through Wolfe's (1982) analysis of a 'mobilization vacuum' in US politics and his (1986) critique of 'inauthentic democracy'. It is not always clear whether Wolfe believes that 'genuine' politics can be achieved through party transformation from-within or whether parties as we know them are irredeemably enmeshed in 'non-genuine' forms of politics. He does, however, seem to tend towards the latter view. He calls on citizens to 'hoard' their political capacities and 'refuse to participate in the organized rituals that go under the name of politics in late capitalist society' (Wolfe, 1977:344. See also his critique of voting in Wolfe, 1986:72). However, there is also his rather ambiguous suggestion that 'if a genuinely political party were to be created, its role would be unique and consequently its tasks could not be derived from existing institutions called parties' (Wolfe, 1977:345). Wolfe suggests existing parties are confined within the logic of 'the capitalist state'. This would lead to scepticism about party reform projects. Our 'complex arena' model of party activity would see the tension between 'legitimation' and 'depoliticisation' as a real one within parties (at least those with some pretensions towards internal democracy) rather than a predictable 'Punch and Judy' puppet-show.
ritual, in which 'legitimation' always seems to get clobbered by the forces of pragmatism, electoral realpolitik and the capitalist state (as, e.g. Macpherson, 1977:113-4, seems to suggest). Writers like Wolfe seem to write about parties with what Johnston (1986:128) describes as the 'evangelistic criteria' of a 'totalistic conception of politics' (see also Buci-Glucksmann, 1983:24). Behind these criteria lurk the Holy Grail of a notion of 'genuine' politics. The search for such a Holy Grail can be abandoned, while retaining the notion of tension between 'legitimation' and 'depoliticisation' as a concept guiding an analysis of parties as 'complex arenas'.

56. To use the phrase put forward in Jim Bulpitt's (1976) discussion of British local parties (as quoted, Ware, 1979:88). Such a culture was integral to the Labor 'deferential loyalism' described earlier in this chapter.

57. On the contradictory orientations towards 'civil society' and 'the state' embodied within competitive parties, see Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987:192 and Wolfe, 1986:64). This distinction helps us to understand the tensions which occur between parties in their 'rational-efficient' mode and the occasions when they find themselves concerned with 'party democracy' (as noted by Wright, see Chapter 1A). For an earlier analysis of the ALP that relies on a similar contrast, see Houseman, 1971. There the party as 'electoral machine' is regularly contrasted with the party as 'movement'. See Chapters 5C and 9D.

58. Ware (1979:81,123) suggests that identification with particular ideologies and restricting participation in the nomination of candidates to party members only tend to 'close' parties from issue-oriented activists. However, the relationship between social democratic parties and 'new social movements' suggests that such activists have ways of influencing parties, whatever their structure. An openness to new currents in 'civil society' can occur without the institutional mechanism of the US-style 'primary' (see Held, 1987:298).

59. See DP 1 Responses 11 and 69 from B. Keon-Cohen and Bronte branch, both NSW. See also John Birch, 'National Conference - A Background', Challenge, October 1978).

60. See DP 1 Responses 3, 23, 41 and 70 from Casuarina branch, NT; Dandenong branch; Alexandra-Eldon branch and Kew branch. The latter three were all from Victoria.

61. Not all the responses were numbered.


63. See Table 7, Chapter 11. When DP 1 came out, the NCI still had novelty value.
64. Branches felt more competent discussing their own operations than their hypothetical role in a reformed National Conference.

65. Randwick North branch (NSW) told the committee that, following its examination of DP 3, it had completely changed the format of its meetings (DP 3 Response. See also DP 3, Response, Sutherland branch, NSW). Randwick North also hoped to get involved in local community organisations.

66. See also DP 3, Response, Watsonia branch, Vic.).

67. Wentworthville objected to the DPs being released to the media months before they reached branches.

68. Without adequate research, generalisations about the branches were unreliable. The ALP's 'problem' here was similar to that of the British Labour Party where 'nothing at all' was known about 'how far the organisational charts mapped in various sets of model rules' corresponded to actual behaviour (Race, 1971:7). A lot of very basic research was needed. It could point to the ways things were going in the membership, who joined and why, etc. (Race, 1971:10). See also note 31, Chapter 11).

69. As had the notion of membership ballots on policy matters.

70. That is why it is not listed in Table 3, Chapter 11.

71. See also Submissions 177, 232, 233, 266, 278 and 290 from Belmont branch, Vic; Cobar branch, NSW; Bald Hills branch, Qld; Blackburn North branch, Vic; Henty FEA, Vic and Macarthur FEC, NSW.

72. Hine's (1982) analysis of parties in Western Europe sees a correlation between measures aimed at party democratisation and a subsequent increase in factionalism.

73. The new National Executive sub-committee was to monitor membership and affiliation trends, take charge of recruitment and party education programmes and foster debate. It was not asked to take up the research tasks foregone by the NCI, although monitoring membership and affiliation trends could lead it in that direction.

74. Although Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2's project of Labor/'new social movement' liaison did register some significant successes, this was within a context where Labor Managerialism was becoming the party's dominant orientation. See Chapter 14C. Australian Social Democracy Mark 2's other distinguishing feature, its new Labor-socialist critique of the 'mixed economy' failed to make much impact on Labor economic policy. See Chapter 15A.
CHAPTER 13

1. The National Executive referred the NCI's call for a handbook on political education for the branches onto the National Campaign Committee ('Decisions of National Executive relating to Committee of Inquiry Recommendations', Radical, May 1979); a body with a distinctly short-term electoral focus (Lloyd, 1983:241).

2. Only the idiosyncratic ACT Branch endorsed it. In the ACT, only 13 percent of unionists were members of unions affiliated to the ALP (Warhurst, 1983:259), by far the lowest percentage for any Branch.

3. For critical discussion of this notion see F. Parkin, 1982:105-8; Therborn, 1978:143.


5. Rather than being 'plucked from the air' in some 'exercise by committee'.

6. Whereas Button suggested 'it might be a very good thing' if it was not known who would control a reformed Conference. The party should assume 'some good will and good faith' in its membership. Button's membership of a minority faction enabled him to cast a sceptical eye on the power games of the major factions. See Chapter 10C.

7. 25 in the McMullan plan, 50 in the Combe plan.

8. The McMullan proposals gave NSW 15 delegates; Vic, 13; Qld, 10; SA, eight; WA, eight; Tas, seven; ACT, one and NT, one (ALP Conference Documents, 1981). The corresponding Hogg figures were: NSW, 35; Vic, 29; Qld, 21; SA, 16; WA, 16; Tas, 13; ACT, five and NT, four. Both assumed additional delegates would be allotted according to the number of federal electorates in each state/territory. By my calculations the figure for the ACT should have been four rather than five in the Hogg plan. Perhaps the ACT was being compensated for not having a parliamentary leader. Combe favoured an allocation according to fees paid to the National Executive. Using membership figures from Warhurst (1983:258-9) this would have given NSW, 26 delegates; Vic, 18; Qld, 13; SA, 13; WA, 10; Tas, seven; ACT, one and NT, one. When added to the eleven parliamentary leaders (retained in all proposals) and the AYL delegate (retained by McMullan and Combe), this would have made a 99-delegate Conference, as there are problems with the mathematics of the plan for a 100-delegate Conference on this basis. Delegates found such problems with the formula they eventually agreed on: a 100-delegate Conference based on the number of federal electorates in each state/territory. This yielded a 99-delegate Conference in which NSW had 23 delegates; Vic, 19; Qld, 14; SA, 10; WA, 10; Tas, eight; ACT, two and NT, one.
9. Which one delegate described as 'a marriage of the worst propositions' (Bill Landeryou, ALP Transcript, 1981:209).


11. The NCI plan reserved places for 27 parliamentarians (the FPLP executive and the SPLP leaders) in a Conference of 310 delegates (8.71 percent) and specifically barred federal parliamentarians from representing FECs (see Table 2, Chapter 12). If the latter was to be fair, the ACT Branch argued, there should be a further delegation of FPLP backbenchers, directly elected by Caucus (ALP Conference Documents, 1981).

12. It was the largest union in the country, affiliated to every ALP Branch except the ACT. It wanted a Conference with 89 delegates: 12 from each state, two from each territory, two from AYL and the 11 parliamentary leaders (ALP Conference Documents, 1981).

13. The union movement was 'about as remote' from national Conference 'as the royal wedding tomorrow night'.

14. Guaranteed representation for these groups would force Branches to amend their own operations (see also Bob Hogg, ALP Transcript, 1981:199).

15. Here he mentioned the Catholic Church, the Masonic Lodge and BHP.

16. Hogg noted that many semi-skilled, unskilled and process workers were alienated from their union leadership and from the ALP.

17. The NCI did, however, suggest that the national secretary be entitled to attend FPLP executive meetings (ALP, 1979:47). This was rejected by the National Executive (Radical, May 1979). Bill Hayden had earlier rejected the proposal, when David Combe advocated it, in the wake of the 1977 defeat (see note 27, Chapter 10). The National Executive was wary of infringing on FPLP autonomy (Michelle Grattan, 'A Shock to the Labor System', Age, 11 April 1979). Historically, the Federal Executive had often shielded the FPLP from the Branches (Wildavsky, 1961; Rawson, 1954:380). Bill Hayden and the National Executive rejected the Combe/NCI view that much of Labor's problems in government (1972-75) 'could have been avoided if there had been some sort of structural liaison between the PLP and the party itself' (David Combe, quoted, Michelle Grattan, 'Dash of Realism to Oil Labor's Works', Age, 26 April 1977).

18. He said he could not see how moving from one sixth of one percent of total membership to one third of one percent
made representation more democratic (ALP Transcript, 1981:204).

19. Just before the NCI proposals were considered by the National Executive, some ALP sources predicted they could lead 'to a concentration of the centre-right factions in NSW, Victoria and the ACTU into the dominant force within the party' (Malcolm Colless, 'Major Revamp Urged for Labor', Australian, 4 April 1979). Such a coalition underpinned the Labor Managerialist Hawke ascendancy. It was cobbled together in 1982-83 (see Kelly, 1984).

20. From the NCI; Garland, Button, Hayden, Hawke and Young were also Conference delegates. Conference did not experience the same 'attention vacuum' from the latter three that the committee did. Garland's NCI Report co-authors (Blewett, Forward and Encel) were not delegates.

21. Richardson's argument echoed the response of one National Executive member, who dismissed the NCI proposals on the grounds that it was better to look for 'expertise than just someone from every electorate (quoted, Stuart Simson, 'Labor's Long Term Gamble', National Times, 21 April 1979).

22. Hogg's proposal was defeated 33-16.

23. Encel suggested the fossil's grey matter was distributed in tiny pockets across its huge frame, an image derived from Eggleston (1953:75. See also Encel, 1962a:175, note 1 and 1964b:24). This imagery had obvious appeal for those who wanted to argue Labor had failed to 'adapt' adequately to changes in Australian society.

24. We have already noted similarities between Encel's 'operative concept' of the Australian state and Emy's 'diffusion' model of a 'producer group' dominated polity (note 56, Chapter 10). Both saw older sectoralisms being replaced by a more 'modern' and a more 'rational' politics. In his depiction of ALP 'irrationality', Emy (1974:407, note 5) too drew on Eggleston (1953). For more on Eggleston, a more-or-less unique Australian Liberal intellectual, see Osmond, 1985.

25. In a similar vein, Clyde Cameron dismissed NSW objections to having PR imposed on their Branch: 'You have a good case, Peter, but logic doesn't count here. I've done a deal so I have to vote against you, and so do others in the deal' (Allan Barnes, 'Cameron's Deal Fixed the Machine', Age, 17 April 1971).

26. Ranney had been a member of the Democratic Party's McGovern-Fraser Commission on Party Reform, which led to considerable change, with a higher rate of implementation than is usual in such exercises. Schafer (1983) chronicles the episode in impressive detail (see also Crotty, 1978; Polsby, 1983).
27. As noted by Dunstan (1964), Dunstan's defence of the ALP structure is discussed in Chapter 9B. Advantages of long-standing Labor arrangements are also noted by D. Stephens (1979).

28. One NCI member told Peter Bowers that state secretaries were like chameleons and suggested that if the committee created a climate for reform and 'rank-and-file' pressure supported reform, party officials would quickly blend in with a new environment ("Change Comes Slowly to a Factional and Volatile ALP", Sydney Morning Herald, 13 April 1979). This exaggerated the impact 'rank-and-file' feeling could have on state secretaries, but it did point to the way in which changing structures of meaning could affect 'numbers' calculations.


30. The key figure was Clyde Cameron, who had formed an alliance with Whitlam. This meant Chamberlain's old coalition could be broken up. The SA Branch (through Cameron and part-time federal secretary Mick Young) presented itself as a centrist alternative to the Victorian left and the NSW right. Intervention rhetoric suggested the SA 'consensus' model might be exported to the eastern states.

31. The SA view was that different views could be accommodated by 'consensus', without formal factional representation. Queensland ALP secretary Tom Burns, whose damning report on malpractices in the NSW Branch played an important part in justifying intervention there, told an advocate of PR in NSW: 'We wouldn't have a bar of that in Queensland' (quoted, 'A Not So Rosy Labor Garden', Sunday Review, 23 July 1971). His Queensland 'machine' colleague Jack Egerton said: 'I don't care what you do with PR voting, as long as you keep it south of the border'. At the time, however, some commentators discerned a reform mood within the ALP that might mean intervention would be quickly followed by more thoroughgoing Labor reorganisation (see Ken Randall, 'Labor's Newest Wing', Australian, 19 April 1971). This scenario did not come to pass.

32. Earlier, many commentators had heralded the 1969 Conference (with the bloc of parliamentary leaders making its first appearance) as the harbinger of a new post-factional ALP. See Alan Reid, "How to Win the Election After Next", Bulletin, 7 August 1969; Allan Barnes, 'Old Guard Put in the Shade', Age, 4 August 1969. See also Oakes and Solomon, 1973:20-1. Labor's gains in the federal election later in 1969 brought a new intake into the FLP, which, it was argued, was 'de-factionalised' as a result of this influx (see, e.g. Max Walsh, 'Men to Watch in "New" Labor Party', Sun-Herald, 31 May 1970). Shortly before intervention, David Solomon contrasted the 'de-factionalised' FLP with the authoritarian factional control manifest in the NSW and Victorian 'machines' ('Whitlam and Labor Unity', Australian, 15 July 1970).
33. Hartley began to appreciate the new legitimacy factions could claim (see 'Labor's Image More Youthful - Hartley', Age, 28 June 1971). Those sponsoring intervention had a rather different perspective, apparently wanting the appearance of balance without strongly organised factions (see 'Fed Sec Calls for an End to Factions', Labor Times, April 1971).

34. Right-wing 'heavy' Brian Harradine had been expelled by the National Executive in 1975. In the same year all five federal seats had been lost (Bass first in a devastating by-election). The Rules Committee report sought to ward off the possibility of Federal Executive intervention. Its adoption marked the beginning of a period of 'broad left' hegemony in the Branch 'machine'.

35. This was the argument NSW delegates John Docker and Peter Westerway had deployed unsuccessfully on the Federal Executive in 1970-71 (Kenneth Randall, 'New Rules Give More Power to Labor Left', Australian, 16 April 1971). State secretary Westerway emphasised the party-managerial difficulties of having assistant secretaries from rival factions (John Stubbs, 'NSW Executive to Retain its Control', Sydney Morning Herald, 15 April 1971). Cameron's reply (quoted, note 25) indicated his own ambivalence about PR, which he saw as a necessary part of the 'deal' he had put together rather than something intrinsically desirable.

36. NSW's objections to PR in Queensland rested on a fear that this would reduce 'moderate ballast' and strengthen the left on the National Executive and at National Conference (see Bob Carr, 'Why Ducker is Quitting', Bulletin, 11 September 1979 and his 'Hayden's Power Base Turns Left', Bulletin, 14 July 1981. See also Lucy, 1985:342).

37. Attempts to reduce the 'card vote', while maintaining consensus, were proving difficult (Stokes, 1983). The 'machine' was being challenged by a new organised left grouping, the Labor Socialist Committee. At the Special Conference, SA delegates argued the 'uniqueness' of its 'consensus' approach rendered PR unnecessary (see John Bannon, ALP Transcript, 1981:162).

38. At the pre-Conference National Executive, left delegates sought to defer changing the Conference structure until all delegates had been elected by PR ('ALP Seeks to Modernise, Strengthen', Australian Financial Review, 27 July 1981).

39. From Dave Evans, proxy delegate for Ron Davies, WA opposition leader.

40. He argued the alternative formula would entrench 'state rivalry'.
41. Of all unionists in NSW, 71 percent belonged to affiliated unions, compared to 59 percent in Victoria (Warhurst, 1983:259). NSW had 20,000 branch members, 0.6 percent of the electorate (Warhurst, 1983:258). Victoria had 13,000, 0.5 percent of the electorate.

42. See also John Green, ALP Transcript, 1981:258.

43. As Chris Schacht (ALP Transcript, 1981:256) had argued.

44. Four right-wing unions were re-admitted to the Victorian Branch in 1985 only following threatened National Executive intervention (see Anson, 1984).

45. Only 34 percent of Tasmanian unionists were in affiliated unions (Warhurst, 1983:259). Dis-affiliations had followed the expulsions of Harradine and some of his associates.

46. For further discussion on this point, see note 12, Chapter 16.

47. See also Mick Young, ALP Transcript, 1979:646.

48. On these grounds the Steering Committee opposed NSW head office's proposal to centralise membership on computerised rolls (see Jan Burnswoods, 'Members' and Branches' Rights to be Taken Away', Challenge, April 1983).

49. SA had 8,050 branch members, 0.9 percent of the electorate (Warhurst, 1983:258). About the same percentage of unionists belonged to affiliated unions as in Victoria (Warhurst, 1983:259).

50. See also Paul Keating, ALP Transcript, 1981:256; Graham Richardson, ALP Transcript, 1981:261. Keating suggested federation was a conspiracy against NSW. He also attacked Hogg's use of NCI rhetoric, in terms that resembled comments made by Bob McMullan in an earlier debate (see note 18). Keating noted that there were thousands of members in NSW and Victoria, who would never be represented at National Conference (ALP Transcript, 1981:257): 'Let's understand that and let's not find any pious logic in delegate Hogg's amendment.

51. A direct line to the FECs was in the National Secretariat's institutional interest. In 1965 when he advocated increasing state delegations from six to ten as part of his interim Conference reform plan, Wyndham wanted one place in each delegation reserved for a representative of the branches (see Chapter 7A and Appendix I). In 1976 assistant national secretary Ken Bennett (later an NCI member) revived and expanded some of Wyndham's ideas, including his long-term aspiration for a Mass Conference (Michelle Grattan, 'Labor Cannot Afford to Act Like a Loser', Age, 4 October 1976).
52. Combe argued that such direct representation could help branches and FECs focus more directly on policy matters (ALP Transcript, 1981:257).

53. He emphasised that the NCI had never considered postal balloting. Some submissions, however, did advocate direct membership ballots on policy matters (see Chapter 12A).

54. Young seems to have believed that postal balloting was an NCI idea. After Young's speech Button, in a point of order, got Combe to point out that his reformulated proposal included no reference to postal balloting. This bid to salvage some recognition for the principle of direct representation was unsuccessful.

55. I have not included the 1984 figures in Table 4 because the candidates' biographies in the 1984 Conference documents are incomplete. 21 percent were federal parliamentarians, 23 percent state parliamentarians and 5 percent party officials. Union officials and 'other' delegates were not always distinguishable but union representation seems to have increased (to about 26 percent) and branch representation decreased (to about 24 percent).


57. The increase in parliamentary representation in 1969 was largely a consequence of the 1967 decision to give automatic Conference representation to federal and state parliamentary leaders. If we discount this leaders' bloc, we find that 42 percent of the remaining delegates were parliamentarians. The comparable figures for subsequent Conferences (calculated from same sources as Table 5) were 1971:41 percent; 1973:41 percent; 1975:49 percent; 1977:36 percent; 1979:31 percent; 1981:38 percent; 1982:35 percent and 1984:37 percent.

58. In 1982, a majority of the branch sector delegates were women (17 out of 30). The 1981 figure was 5 out of 11.

59. Table 6 also seems to suggest that Bob Hogg's fear of FEC representation being dominated by 'middle-class' ALP members was well-grounded. See also Hutchison, 1982:8 (she includes proxy delegates). May-Louise O'Callaghan ('ALP Sheds its Blue Singlet', Sydney Morning Herald, 11 July 1986) reports similar findings from a study of recent trends in the social composition of ALP National Conference delegates by Barry Jones (whom she describes as the party's 'unofficial sociologist'. In 1986, Jones was Minister for Science and Technology in the Hawke Government).
60. 'Rank-and-file' delegates one year could resurface as parliamentarians another year. In both 1979 and 1981, endorsed parliamentary candidates combined with those who had some local government experience made up a majority of 'rank-and-file' delegates (see Table 7). Two 1979 delegates were elected to federal parliament within months (Ros Kelly, ACT and John Coates, Tasmania. Coates was a former MHR and Kelly had been an ACT MHA). Shortly after the 1982 Conference two 'rank-and-file' delegates became federal MPs (both male) and two more became state MPs (both female). Former Tasmanian MHA John Green was a 'rank-and-file' delegate in 1981 and 1982. Another Tasmanian, Dick Adams, was a state parliamentarian in 1981, a 'rank-and-file' delegate in 1982 and a union official in 1984.

61. The Young Labor delegate and three from Queensland, where the 'old guard' had been deposed a year earlier.

62. Five NSW; three Vic; four Qld; one each from SA, WA and Tas; and the Young Labor delegate.

63. All but three (one from Victoria and two from Queensland).

64. Including Queensland president Denis Murphy and vice-president Joy Ardill.

65. There were 11 in 1981, 21 in 1982.

66. Paul Keating had been a Municipal and Shire Council Employees industrial officer before becoming a federal MP and SA Premier John Bannon was once an AWU industrial advocate. Bannon also served as an adviser to federal minister Clyde Cameron (former SA 'machine' leader and AWU official) and assistant director of the SA Department of Labor and Industry (appointed by the state Labor government). He became a state MP in 1977, a minister in 1978, opposition leader in 1979 and Premier in 1982. On the peripatetic career patterns of Labor 'information specialists', see Encel, 1984b.

67. In 1984 Hamish Linacre (Queensland Teachers Union) and Alan Evans (secretary, Tasmanian Public Service Association) were delegates.

68. Pauline Papworth (Liquor Trades, Victoria); Jenny Acton (ACTU industrial officer (Victoria); Clare Hall (ATMOEA, Queensland) and Jeannette O'Keeffe (Cleaning, Security and Allied Employees, WA).

69. In 1979 there were only three delegates from outside the capital cities: Tim Thorne (Launceston, Tas) and the state leaders from Queensland and SA, Ed Casey and Des Corcoran, whose electorates were in provincial Mackay and rural Millicent respectively. In 1981 this had been reduced to two: Casey and Joy Ardill (Gold Coast, Qld). In 1982 there were ten such delegates: Casey and Ardill again, Michael Reynolds (city councillor, Townsville,
Qld), Margot Paterson (Tasmanian farmer), Bob Collins (NT parliamentary leader, who represented outback Arnhem Land) plus a NSW quintet (union official Steve Harker and teacher Margaret Bowman from Newcastle; sales representative Maria Bottomley from the north coast and two rural politicians, state minister Terry Sheahan and federal candidate David Simmonds).

70. Nearly half the parliamentary delegates and more than two-thirds of the 'lay' delegates in 1982 were first-time full delegates.

71. 60 percent of the new delegates were union officials and 'rank-and-file' representatives.

72. As Bill Hartley, a survivor from 1967, pointedly reminded delegates (ALP Transcript, 1981:202). The only other survivors from the Adelaide Conference were Hartley's Victorian factional comrade George Crawford and Col Jamieson (WA).

73. The AMWSU had put similar arguments to the NCI (Submission 3. See also Submissions 171 and 194 from Tom Uren and NSW Labor Women's Committee respectively, discussed in Chapter 12A).

74. See Chapter 12B.

75. Garland's suggestion that every single one of 'some 400 submissions' reflected this climate was rather hyperbolic. 'Rank-and-file rights' was the major intra-party theme, but the submissions were extremely diverse.

76. Tasmania's inability to contribute to the pooled travelling expenses meant that it had gone virtually unrepresented on the policy committees (see John Green, ALP Transcript, 1981:273).

77. Adding only an amendment that this should be reviewed in 1982. The issue was not discussed at the 1982 Conference (but see the reference to it in ALP Transcript, 1982:707-8).

78. Up to 1981, only state Branches, unions affiliated in all states and groups like Australian Young Labor were entitled to add to and/or amend national policy committee recommendations. Delegates could also move amendments and resolutions from the Conference floor. The Metal Workers succeeded in enabling unions affiliated in three states and FECs to submit Conference agenda items. They also got access to National Executive for unions affiliated in three states but such access for FECs was rejected.

79. For full text of 'socialisation objective', see Appendix III.

80. Uren saw protests against the Springbok rugby tour in New Zealand as the sort of community action he had in mind (ALP Transcript, 1981:105). However, the reference was
vague enough to encompass CPS 2 projects as well, despite Combe's complaint that it was framed too narrowly (ALP Transcript, 1981:105).

81. ALP branch activity was considerably decentralised. Administrative approaches varied from state to state. The lack of a reference to community action had not stopped ALP members from taking part in Vietnam Moratorium marches! State Branch attitudes on such participation varied considerably.

1. We have already noted Jim Cairns' role in the Vietnam Moratorium demonstrations (Chapter 10B).

2. See Chapter 9D.

3. Jupp suggests that the retirement of Whitlam (in 1978) and Dunstan (in 1979) marked the ALP's reversion 'to its previous attitudes' at a time 'when general support for the new radicals was also declining'. Specific radical movements were, however, consolidating their support. That consolidation had its impact on Labor debates. See Paul Malone, 'Recalling Gough through Rose-Coloured Glasses', Canberra Times, 6 December 1986).

4. Altman (1980:112) argued that Labor/'new social movement' rapprochement was dependent on 'a victory for what might loosely be termed the progressive forces in the ALP over the conservative wing, often led by Catholics and/or union bureaucrats'. See also C. Johnston, 1982.

5. Belmont branch argued Labor had to recognise that world economic growth could not be maintained.

6. The submission argued branch and FEC delegations to state and federal conferences should include 'at least, say, 50 percent members of affiliated unions, 25 percent women, 10 percent first generation immigrants (non-rural electorates), 10 percent farmers and farm employees (rural electorates), one Aboriginal'. This plan for the 'structured dissemination of power' assumed away the problem of how socially representative the extant ALP membership actually was, although the submission noted that many 'working class' people were put off ALP branches, seeing them as 'academic' or 'trendy' debating societies.

7. Reid was an old antagonist of the Labor left. See note 14, Chapter 4.

8. For example, within Altman's 'moderate reformer' category.


10. Two submissions defending Labor's anti-uranium policy are included in this category rather than under a separate 'peace' label.

11. See also Submission 215, University of Melbourne, ALP Club and Submission 47, F. Timmermans, Fitzroy branch, Vic.
12. See, e.g. Submissions 69, 132 and 155 from Eltham branch, Vic; Seaford Pines branch, Vic and Narrabeen-Pittwater branch, NSW. See also Submission 213, individual members, Hughes Labor Women, NSW. The importance of Labor defending women's right to work was stressed (Submissions 167 and 222, Lawson and Nelson Bay branches, both NSW). On the other hand, some party members accepted the view that support for 'permissiveness' under Whitlam lost Labor support (Submissions 267 and 283; Mrs. M. Mather, Newcastle, NSW and Mrs. P. Rutherford, WA), but this line was not endorsed by branches or FECs.

13. See, e.g. Submissions 69, 133, 155 from Eltham branch, Vic; Oatley branch, NSW; Narrabeen-Pittwater branch, NSW and George's River SEC, NSW.

14. We have already seen criticism of male domination at branch level from Drummoyne branch, NSW and Berwick branch, Vic. See also Submissions 166 and 305 from Randwick North and Springwood-Faulconbridge branches, NSW and Submission 241, Anne Field and Ros Kelly, ACT.

15. See Macintyre, 1985:58; Castles, 1985:76 and 82.

16. Emphasising addresses by ALP 'celebrities' at daytime functions and local charity projects by ALP branches. Kooyong FEA believed Australian women were characterised by 'conservatism, apathy and unquestioning acceptance of their social role'.

17. Even individual 'new social movements' are characterised by considerable internal diversity. See Doyle, 1987 on Australian environmentalism.

18. The Whitlam Government had also sponsored the controversial Women and Politics Conference in Canberra in 1975, as an International Women's Year Project. The conference explored women's political roles as voters and party members, in unions and in the bureaucracy, in lobby groups and as people affected by government policy and/or seeking government support (Office of Women's Affairs, 1977:vii).

19. The NCI looked at Labor and the ethnic communities in DP 10, which did not endorse 'demographic representation' but recommended continuing with 'ethnic branches', where suitable. The published set of DPs included an appendix on Aboriginal land rights. The NCI did not look into ALP responses to environmentalism, the peace movement or gay liberation.

20. Rural-dwellers are difficult to conceptualise in 'new social movement' terms. The NCI criterion in such matters was whether groups seemed reluctant to support the Labor Party rather than whether they had formed 'new social movements' or not.
21. Thus it had dismissed ethnic 'demographic representation' before DP 10 was released, although Italo-Australians for Labor had drawn the committee's attention to the specific under-representation of Italo-Australians (Submission 170).


23. In 1978 there were no Labor women in the House of Representatives. At the 1977 National Conference, only two delegates (out of 49) were women. In the states, on average only about 11 percent of conference delegates were women (APSA, 1979:31).

24. Similar action could be taken at state elections.

25. We should note that DP 4 listed ancillary measures as necessary complements to affirmative action. These included the printing of given names on intra-party ballot papers and a membership campaign aimed specifically at women. Furthermore, meetings should be scheduled carefully and have child care facilities (APSA, 1979:33).

26. This had been noted in an earlier draft of DP 4 (NCI Documents).

27. Ryan was no slouch herself when it came to 'getting the numbers' (see Juddery, 1983:217; Clarke and White, 1983:82-3). The ACT Branch had no full-time 'machine' and few affiliated unions (see note 2, Chapter 13 and Ryan, 1979:25).

28. Although, as Bacchi (1984:13) points out, while the NCI reached out to the women's movement, it was careful not to offend the family woman. The NCI reminded the ALP it had to acknowledge 'a responsibility to working people, their dependents and those unable to work or choosing a career as homemaker'.

29. She was commenting on a draft of DP 4.

30. The Victorian public office selection committee relegated her to the difficult No. 3 spot on the Senate ticket. She had lost the support of her Centre Unity faction. Her involvement in 'new social movement' politics, especially feminism and the anti-uranium movement, had put her offside with factional 'heavies' (see Sawer, 1981:245). Following her demotion, a unique plebiscite was convened, which duly endorsed her and was duly disregarded (see Sawer and Simms, 1984:140ff). Eventually a special conference was called to reaffirm the original ticket.

31. See also Responses 9, 14 and 18 from Barossa branch, SA; Dandenong branch, Vic; and Hughes FEC, NSW.

32. Federal candidate, Corangamite.

33. State candidate, Barwon.
34. As well as endorsing affirmative action and ancillary measures, the Report urged the National Secretariat to organise women's forums and to research women's voting patterns (ALP, 1979:12).

35. See Chapter 11B.

36. There was no 1978 National Labor Women's Organisation conference because not enough states were willing to send delegations (Moore, 1985:36). In some states, the old Labor Women's Organisations had been eschewed by feminists who preferred direct participation in the party's mainstream (Warhurst, 1983:262). Labor Women's Organisations in Victoria and Tasmania were disbanded and replaced by status of women policy committees.

37. Changes in NSW were evident as far back as 1970 (see Allan, 1977:14).

38. She was added to the National Campaign Committee in 1981.

39. Here Ryan was criticising Labor's 1980 election policy. In general she shared the Whitlamist assumption that proper understanding and presentation of 'the facts' was the key to social change. Certain myths were a major obstacle to women's advancement in the ALP (Ryan, 1979:23), but the data were limited and the 'machine' refused 'to examine rationally' the data that did exist.

40. It had one representative from each state and territory women's committee. Barbara Wiese (SA) represented the working party at the National Executive meetings in April and June. See also 'Male-Run Structure of ALP "Iniquitous"', Canberra Times, 2 June 1981 (on Wiese's views) and Anne Summers, 'Labor Women Face ACTU Opposition', National Times, 8 February 1981 (on the NLWC).

41. See the discussion in 'National Women's Conference', Lobby, February 1981.

42. Young argued the ALP was not responsible for the composition of union delegations at Labor conferences (ALP Transcript, 1981:192. See also Manfred Cross, ALP Transcript 1981:180). Jan Burnswoods emphasised that women were unionists too and rejected the 'most unfortunate' and 'quite untrue' dichotomy between unions and women (ALP Transcript, 1981:184. See also Anne Warner, ALP Transcript, 1981:186). Women activists pursued affirmative action agendas and other feminist concerns within the union movement (see Caswell, 1986).

43. See note 22.

44. Richardson suggested he would relish drawing up such a list, but that it might create 'an awful lot of trouble'.

45. See note 25.
46. See Mick Young, ALP Transcript, 1981:277. The NCI had recommended guaranteed representation for women on the policy committees. Another NCI suggestion accepted by Conference was the appointment of a national women's co-ordinator (a move proposed by Mick Young).

47. Combe saw contradictions between the way some delegates argued strongly in principle for 30 percent affirmative action on the National Executive, but, when the particular form of Executive expansion they favoured (a 30-delegate Executive) was unsuccessful, opposed any expansion, and thus any affirmative action there. Combe and Bill Hayden had pushed for a 25-delegate Executive, but this was unacceptable to the left. Thus prominent left-wing women like Jan Burnswoods, Joan Coxedge and Barbara Robson voted to retain the status quo at the National Executive level ('Conference Backstabber', Lobby, August 1981. 'Backstabber' was a regular Lobby column. See also Moore, 1985:42). For the NCI, National Executive reform was complementary to National Conference reform (ALP, 1979:27-33), although it canvassed the merits of the latter more thoroughly (e.g. in DP 1).

48. Although the debates also provided opportunities for male party 'heavies' like Mick Young, Manfred Cross (Qld), Graham Richardson and David Combe to argue in realpolitik terms against what they dismissed as impracticable forms and degrees of affirmative action.

49. Wiese was president of the SA Branch, which had rejected a mandatory affirmative action programme. Hunt argued affirmative action was only a transitional measure until it would no longer be necessary to distinguish delegates on the basis of gender (ALP Transcript, 1981:189). Such a process would require reforms in education, health and employment and the general breakdown of sexist attitudes.

50. This particular form of symbolic politics had also occurred in the 1979 abortion debate at the 1979 Conference (David Combe, ALP Transcript, 1981:20). In that debate delegates challenging the 'conscience vote' cited DP 4 (see Joan Coxedge and Margaret Duckett, ALP Transcript, 1979:659 and 668). After the Special Conference, Button (1981:20) suggested that if the use of proxies was extended, union delegates could debate industrial relations, ethnic delegates could discuss immigration etc. The party might end up 'much closer to a system of direct representation of interest groups which the Committee of Inquiry proposals catered for than anyone suspects'.

51. There was potential tension between arguing for affirmative action so gender-based insights on peace, social policy etc. could be articulated and arguing that affirmative action was necessary so gender differences would eventually become irrelevant.

53. See also Jan Burnswoods and Sandra Nori, 'Women Get a Foot in the Door', Challenge, August 1981. For a more sceptical view, see White, 1981.

54. Ranney (1972:208-9) points out that advocates of party reform are often confounded by the implementation of their proposals. He suggests party reform is an area where unintended consequences loom large.


56. John Button (1981:19) wondered whether women had changed numbers in the rule book at the expense of changing attitudes. This misses the point. The process of changing attitudes in a party is a political one registered constantly in rules, platforms and the composition of the party elite.

57. See Therborn, 1978:238 on co-optation as 'a contradictory phenomenon'.
CHAPTER 15

1. See Marc Robinson and John Quiggin, 'Where's Labor Going Now?', Nation Review, 1 September 1978.

2. The objective reflected a syndicalist vision which was only half-heartedly accepted in 1921 and officially abandoned in 1927. There are good accounts of the adoption of the objective in Turner, 1979 and Farrell, 1981.

3. Crisp argued that the 'rationalistic' aspirations embodied in the objective and the platform sketched out Labor's notions of 'steps towards social perfection'. The party's practical politics however owed more to the 'empirical temper' of its parliamentarians.


5. Such views were generally pursued outside the party (see, e.g. Kuhn, 1982), but they were occasionally echoed in some left Labor rhetoric.

6. Some Victorian submissions touched on economic policy debates, but in a rather indirect way (see Submissions 51, 76 and 187, 268: Victorian Branch Socialist Education Committee, Balwyn branch, Kooyong FEA. See also Submissions 153, 250 and 251: Port Melbourne branch, Auburn branch and Ballarat FEA.

7. Lane Cove branch warned against Labor tailoring its policies to the mood of 'a largely ignorant and non-informed electorate' (Submission 261).

8. Some submissions saw no contradiction between a renewed Labor 'socialism' and electoral realpolitik. Cobar branch (NSW) called for 'a calm and rational articulation of Labor radicalism' (Submission 232), which could simultaneously honour traditional ideology and educate the electorate. This rather ambiguous formulation emphasised style rather than substance. In a similar vein Oatley branch and George's River SEC (NSW) saw 'intelligent radicalism', as practised by Neville Wran and Don Dunstan as the way forward for Labor (Submissions 215 and 274). However, there are problems in assimilating the 'Dunstan model' and the 'Wran model' to each other in this way, let alone the suggestion that either was particularly radical. If Dunstan represented the swan song of Australian Social Democracy, Mark 1, Wran heralded the new Labor Managerialist era.

9. Brassall branch (Qld) suggested a Labor plan for 'limited socialism', whatever that might be, so that the party could 'challenge consumer capitalism' with a 'rekindled vision'
10. See also Jaensch, 1983:187.

11. See also Jones, 1985:122-53. Jones thought the ALP should pay more attention to the political issues involved in 'new technology' and 'post-industrial' development. He offered a version of Australian Social Democracy, Mark 2, which brought such issues to the fore. This had little impact on party strategists. As one manifestation of 'post-industrialism' in Australian society, Jones studied the changing social composition of the ALP National Conference (see note 59, Chapter 13). In the 1960s, he had been a prominent advocate of Labor 'modernisation' (see Chapters 5D, 8A).

12. This made for parallels between 'Post-Keynesian' political economy and certain sociological theories of inflation (e.g. Goldthorpe, 1978).


14. In 1974, Harcourt had been associated with the 'Adelaide plan'. This advocated incomes policy as a way of avoiding a descent into contractionary policies, which were being presented as the only available anti-inflationary strategy (B. Hughes, 1980:89-90). In its 1975 Hayden budget, the Labor Government clearly rejected 'Adelaide plan' ideas. See also Harcourt, 1974.

15. Holland (1975:40) envisaged a socialist 'social contract' in Britain involving new public ownership of strategic, major firms, industrial democracy and 'planning agreements'.


17. See also Harcourt, 1974:526. DP 6 aimed not only for full employment in itself but also for a 'socially desirable' pattern of (goods and services) production (APSA, 1979:53). Policy prescriptions derived from 'Post-Keynesian' theory are further outlined in Harcourt and Kerr, 1980 and Harcourt, 1982a - the latter provided me with a title for this chapter. 'Post-Keynesian' theory is discussed in Harcourt, 1982b.

18. By this he meant household-based economic activity. He saw a nexus between capital redistribution and a revived 'domestic' sector.

19. On Stretton and the ALP see also notes 2 and 47, Chapter 10.
20. Willis (1979:5) insisted that a viable prices and incomes policy would have to have a genuinely redistributive element. He told the 1978 Conference of Labor Economists that perhaps it was time to move from the 'secondary redistribution' of incomes through taxation and improved infrastructure as favoured by Whitlam to 'primary redistribution' which directly addressed inequalities in economic power and wealth (Russell Barton, 'Redistribute Wealth, Labor Told', Sydney Morning Herald, 1 July 1978; Warwick Bracken, 'Future Options for Labor Government', Canberra Times, 1 July 1978). P.P. McGuinness thought there was some support on the Labor front bench for a combination of 'right-wing' policies on inflation and 'left-wing' policies on other economic issues ('Hayden's Flair Begins to Show', Australian Financial Review, 4 July 1978).

21. See, e.g. speeches by Paul Keating and Mick Young, CPD, House of Representatives, 12 October 1978. The WA opposition leader, Ron Davies, said that DP 6 was a 'thought-starter' with no official standing and earlier DPs 'had not met with a great deal of enthusiasm within the ALP' (quoted, 'Davies Ridicules Nationalisation', West Australian, 6 October 1968. But see also E.A. Barker, 'Davies Modifies Tough Stance', West Australian, 7 October 1978).

22. In particular, Blewett was replying to 'An Unreal Proposal', Canberra Times, 16 October 1978.


24. See Table 7, Chapter 11.

25. The AMWSU rejected DP 6's endorsement of incomes policy (DP 6, Response). Its omission of industrial democracy was also noted (DP 6, Response 9; John Quiggin et al., ACT; DP 6, Response, Hugh Saddler et al., ACT). On the other hand, fully 20 percent of the responses wanted no new public ownership measures at all. V. Grant and M. O'Riordan (NSW) said they were against nationalisation and for 'Neville Wran appeal'.


that Labor would have to redesign public service economic advice structures, to overcome the 'Treasury line' (Graham Dunkley, Labor Star, 13 July 1977). In 1979, however, the ALP National Conference rejected the idea of a Department of Economic Planning (Oakes, 1979:19-20. See also ALP Transcript, 1979).

28. Following the defeat of the Chifley Government's bank nationalisation plans in the High Court. Love (1984) sees the ill-fated proposal as an illustration of the limitations of Labor 'socialism'. Connell (1977) sees its defeat as an example of successful 'ruling class mobilisation'.

29. The new objective, the National Executive draft and the formulation presented by Gareth Evans in 1978 are reproduced in Appendix III.

30. This followed seven years of Labor using the Blackburn Declaration to defuse Cold War attacks on Labor 'socialism'.


32. The front benchers were Young, Hawke, John Dawkins (WA) and Arthur Gietzelt (NSW). The other member was Manfred Cross (Qld). Gietzelt was the only leftist, although Dawkins had also been a signatory to 'There is an Alternative' (Submission 170 to the NCI, see note 32, Chapter 12). See also 'Hayden at Labor Seminar', Canberra Times, 1 June 1981.


34. Political scientist Brian Galligan (1981b) commented that Evans was so keen to distance himself from Marxism that he overlooked economic inequality. Evans (1981) later added 'social co-operation' to his set of core 'democratic socialist' values. For earlier statements, see Evans, 1976 and Turner, 1976:19-20. Evans' 1978 text (reproduced in Appendix III) was derived from a draft prepared for the National Executive by Ian Turner in 1977 (Evans, 1980:178). In the 1960s, Cyril Wyndham had presented Labor 'socialism' as a matter of humanitarian ideals, rather than economic doctrine (see Chapter 6C). See also Hayden, 1968; Dunstan, 1976; Mathews, 1981).
35. Evans (1976:8) acknowledged that the Whitlam programme served as his 'democratic socialist' model. It was 'coherent enough, meaty enough and consistent enough with the proud traditions of the past to justify the label "socialism". It's a pity Mr. Whitlam himself didn't much like the word'.

36. See, e.g. Peter Milton, 'The Socialist Objective', Labor Star, June 1981. Interestingly, however, the CPA paper, Tribune, was quite muted in its criticisms of Evans' draft. Roger Coates agreed that socialism was about 'values' as well as economic relations, but thought Evans failed to connect the two satisfactorily ('ALP to Review Socialist Objective', 25 February 1981).

37. Despite a similar resolution having been passed in Victoria in June 1979 (see Peter Baldwin, 'Victorian Conference - Left Gains', Challenge, August 1979). The NLWC was more successful in getting official Labor rejection of 'exploitation in the home' built into the new objective.

38. For an earlier example of Hartley's vagueness on the policy content of the 'socialism' he espoused, see Andrew Clark, 'Tame Labor Leaves the Left in Disarray: Cairns is the Fallen Idol', National Times, 24 February 1975.

39. See also AMWSU, 1977 and 1979; Crough and Wheelwright, 1982. See the critique by Bryan, 1983.

40. Uren conceded that wherever capital was involved there was exploitation, but saw the transnationals as the 'real enemy', against whom Labor could help assemble a populist coalition including small farmers, small business and 'national capitalists' (whoever they may be; see the critique of this notion in Bryan, 1983).


42. See also Cottrell, 1984:164-4; Rustin, 1985:189.

43. See also Andrew Theophanus, ALP Transcript, 1981:74.

44. Wran wanted to revive the old Labor distinction between the objective and the 'fighting platform'.

45. See also Paul Keating and Denis Murphy, ALP Transcript, 1981:70 and 87.

46. Button noted that it was the Waterside Workers' Federation that scuttled the Whitlam Government's plans for the stevedoring industry, Labor's only real attempt to nationalise anything since 1949 (see also Button, 1987).

47. Bob Hawke argued that a Labor government would be constitutionally unable 'to go any further down the road than the commitment ... contained in the executive resolution' (ALP Transcript, 1981:76).

536

49. Interestingly, this reference is deleted from the official transcript.

50. He suggested the term 'socialisation' contained its own qualifications.

51. The theoretical rationale for 'economic democracy' as a socialist strategy is explored in Himmelstand et al., 1981.

52. Heller was not endorsing the Swedish approach. She wanted a socialism centred on radical participatory democracy.

53. Pierson (1986:123), however, sees the proposal as 'a technical (and dirigiste) strategy for changes in formal ownership without any idea of how this is to articulate with a mass movement for socialism'. This is a valid and important criticism and Pierson (1986:124) concedes the 'ingenuity' of the Meidner Plan. Implementation 'of even an attenuated version' would place Sweden 'indisputably in the van of European social democracy'. For a recent critical survey of the very attenuated implementation record, see Pontusson, 1988.

54. A later interest in Swedish Social Democracy came to be associated with arguments justifying the ALP-ACTU Accord of 1983, but the focus here tended to be on trade-offs between wage restraint and expansionist policies, rather than moves towards 'economic democracy'. The mild expansionary approach of the first Hawke Government budgets was later abandoned in the context of a collapse in Australian terms of trade (see Stilwell, 1986). Government enthusiasm for 'deregulation' also tended to clash with Accord expectations (see Stretton, 1987). See also ACTU/TDC, 1987 and J. Mathews, 1988.


57. Bob Carr (nd:10) saw constitutional reform as a major priority for a 'social democratic' ALP. In passing, he described the Meidner Plan as 'the most interesting socialisation proposal' but he generally wanted to distance the ALP from 'socialism' (see also Carr, 1986).

58. This rested on a concept of property as 'a bundle of rights', which could be challenged in a variety of ways, rather than simply head-on through nationalisation (see J Stephens, 1979:25). The idea had a long pedigree in Swedish social democracy (Esping-Andersen, 1985:23. See also Adler-Karlsson, 1969).
59. Tribune correspondent Mark Taft commented that the debate was 'unsatisfactory' and misleading (Labor Debates Its Aims and Changes Its Structure', 5 August 1981). Those defending the National Executive draft 'didn't mean what they said'. Those who attacked it 'didn't say what they meant'. The strategic dimension was ignored (see also Marc Robinson, ALP Transcript, 1981:90-1).

60. The negative and derived (i.e. above all 'not-left') identity the ALP right adopted for itself has parallels with Negt's (1983:60) observation of the way German social democracy 'gains its identity through self-separation from more radical positions on its left'.
CONCLUSION

1. The venerable history of some Labor party reform ideas is noted in Appendix II.

2. Whitlam believed that only when the facts had been ascertained and details determined on branch membership, union affiliation and finance could specific new Federal Conference formats be considered.

3. Following the 1958 election defeat, Fitzpatrick thought it was time for Labor to 'take stock' of the 'great and complex' problems it faced ('Capitalist Social Revolution Poses Problems for Labor', Brian Fitzpatrick's Labor Newsletter, February 1959). See Chapter 2C.

4. An intelligent response to changing circumstances, Fitzpatrick believed, did not entail the abandonment of Labor radicalism. 'Modernisation' arguments were generally advanced by the Labor right, while the left dug its heels in defending party 'tradition'. Fitzpatrick was one of the few articulators of a left-wing politics of 'modernisation' within the ALP, although see also the arguments of E.L. Wheelwright (Chapter 2C) and Doug White (Chapter 8B). For critiques of Labor left abstention from the politics of party 'modernisation', see Hudson, 1968 (Chapter 8D) and Houseman, 1971 (Chapter 9D).

5. Somewhat ambivalently, Whitlam saw great industrial as well as political opportunities associated with white-collar growth ('Whitlam Woos White Collar Workers', Australian, 13 March 1967). Generally, he argued that ALP exploitation of the political opportunities required going beyond the traditional Labor approach of being a 'labour movement' party.

6. The latter was of more interest to Whitlam, Isaacs and Jones than it was to Oliver.

7. The Scoresby committee focussed on the development of an ALP membership adequate 'in number and quality for effective political operation' (letter, Australian, 1 December 1965). See Chapter 7D. Mathews' ideas on Labor branches are also examined in Chapter 5D and Chapter 12B.

8. However, it was under the aegis of Chamberlain that the national policy committees were established in the early 1960s (see Dunstan, 1962 and 1964).

9. See note 2, Chapter 1.
10. The WA exercise seemed mainly concerned with denouncing decisions taken in NSW, and while a committee was set up in Victoria, it never issued a report (see Chapters 3B and 5C).


12. D. Stephens (1979) notes the by-passing of the more established party channels. He contrasts the party machine channel (conferences and executives), which could easily become clogged by electorally damaging disputes, which reopened old ideological wounds, with the policy committee channel, where 'Whitlam and others worked relatively quietly to put together shopping lists for a Labor government' (D. Stephens, 1987:168). 'Minders' were important in this second channel (see Walter, 1986). The second thoughts of some 'minders' are looked at in Chapter 12B. The second channel had emerged before Whitlam became leader (see note 8). Jupp (1965a:15-6) noted that, although there were problems with policies in areas such as education and social services, Labor's general economic policies were 'much more coherent. For many years now they have been formulated at the Federal level by consultation between economists and politicians away from the ill-informed and faction-ridden atmosphere of the mass machine'.

13. For more recent treatment of this issue, see McMullan, 1988.

14. This self-congratulatory picture of NSW 'machine culture' was somewhat tarnished by that party's heavy state election defeat in March 1988. During the election campaign, Max Walsh suggested that NSW Labor machine culture 'had the effect of repelling the social activists and reformers who have embraced Labor traditionally', thereby contributing to increased support for Independents ('The March of Independents towards an Unstable Government', Sydney Morning Herald, 1 February 1988. See also Jack Waterford, 'Labor Loses Its Capacity to Inspire Even Its Own', Canberra Times, 20 March 1988). The theme of 'rank-and-file alienation' figured very prominently in the post-mortem on the NSW defeat. It was evident in many submissions to the party's official Commission of Review (John Della Bosca, 'March 19th and the ALP Commission of Review', Labor Times 2 (2), September 1988).

15. This was true of Hawke, Ducker and Young. Hayden wanted to reform the Queensland Branch. See Chapter 11A.

16. See note 48, Chapter 1.

18. See Chapter 3A. Calwell had his own criticisms of the party structure, but he did not shout them from the rooftops (Chapter 8C).

19. There are some similarities between White's argument and Gouldner's (1979) theses about the 'culture of critical discourse'. Gouldner, however, puts more stress on the elitist, self-interested and ideological aspects of 'professional' concepts of 'rational' argumentation (see also the references in note 43, Chapter 9).

20. The important federal intervention in 1970-71 had been a response to specific problems, particularly in Victoria, with NSW thrown in to maintain apparent factional even-handedness and minimise disruption.

21. See Lindblom, 1959; March and Olsen, 1983. Wyndham was aware of this. He saw little point in proposing 'a beautiful structure that exists merely for the purpose of being admired' ("ALP "New Look" Talks Called", Age, 7 August 1965).

22. See also O'Meagher, 1983a.

23. These possibilities worked themselves out through increasingly disciplined and nationally co-ordinated factions at a time when Labor Managerialism was on the ascendant (see Chapters 14C and 15C).

24. For further misdating of the 'faceless men' episode to 1966, see Jaensch, 1989:25 and 151. Jaensch (1989:93 and 107) also presents the 1981 Special Conference debate on the 'socialisation objective' as taking place in 1982 and mistakenly presents proportional representation of states based on total party membership in each state as the National Conference format preferred by the NCI.

25. See note 55, Chapter 12.

26. Panebianco (1988:31) suggests that the particular kind of 'participation' that party leaders prefer is one which leaves them the widest possible freedom of movement.

27. We may find a search for scapegoats, demands for increased intra-party democracy and promises to stick to party principles more determinedly next time in social democratic post-mortems after a spell in government (Coates, 1986:421; Keane, 1988:129).
28. Panebianco (1988:242) himself sees change as a matter of deliberate choice within the party's dominant coalition, but 'influenced by bounded rationality and anonymous pressures ... which interact with the choices to produce both desired innovations and counter-intuitive effects'. He prefers theories which stress changes in intra-organisational alliances over approaches derived from evolutionist sociology (i.e. 'adaptation' models) but sees change occurring when organisational crisis makes for the intersection of 'external' factors with 'internal' developments, which have undermined the position of the previous dominant coalition (Panebianco, 1988:239-61).

29. ALAC and its predecessors, which went back to 1938, generally 'performed a relatively perfunctory role, with neither side seeming anxious to exploit its potential for coordination of the industrial and political wings of the labour movement' (Lloyd, 1983:240). In 1979, ALAC was 'put on a much more organised basis' (Willis, 1979:6) and began to discuss 'the possibility of putting together an equitable co-operative prices and incomes policy'. See also Stilwell, 1986:10.


31. Howe and Howe (1984:163) comment that the expansion of white-collar unionism in the 1970s 'did not lead to any general re-evaluation of the party's strategy based on the "bourgeois" decline of class consciousness analysis'.

32. Panebianco (1988) moves in this direction, but not entirely successfully (see note 29, Chapter 1).
AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY

PARTY RE-ORGANISATION

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE GENERAL SECRETARY

A: FEDERAL CONFERENCE

I - DIRECT REPRESENTATION

1: Although personally favouring a Federal Conference comprising direct representation from Federal electorates and Federal Unions, with the sparsity of information available on such basic matters as (i) local finances and membership, and (ii) actual membership and degree of authority of Federal Trade Unions, I could not objectively assess the practicability of the scheme.

2: Without the complete co-operation of State Branches in making private information available on individual membership and finances, and the assistance of trade union organisations, no one can state with accuracy if the scheme could work.

3: After very careful consideration, I believe it is necessary to invoke the full authority of the Federal Conference to obtain the requisite information and to permit a detailed study of all the implications of such a change.

4: Accordingly, I recommend:

R:1 "That the Federal Conference instruct the National Organising and Planning Committee to report to the Federal Executive on the desirability and practicability or re- organising the future Federal Conferences on the basis of representation from (i) Federal Trade Unions; (ii) Federal Electorate Party organisations; (iii) State Executives; and (iv) Federal Parliamentarians."

II. PROPOSED CHANGES

A: STATE REPRESENTATION

5: As the Federal Conference is the supreme governing body of the Party, and its decisions are binding upon all sections, it should be as representative of the Party as possible. At present its composition is too small and restrictive to allow for all the Sections to be adequately represented.
6: Although based on the Senate system of representation, the Party did not follow the Chifley's government action in 1948 by increasing the size of the State delegations. I believe that to raise the size of delegations from six to ten would be to the advantage of both the States and the Party as a whole. The work of a Federal Conference will in the future become heavier. Policy committees functioning throughout the year will be submitting very detailed reports to Conference for consideration. The more representatives, therefore, the Conference of key people within the States, the sounder will be any ultimate finding.

7: The present number of six is too limited. All States would like to send more leading personnel to the Federal body but cannot do so because of the small number permitted. Most States now automatically include the State President and State Secretary on their delegations, which immediately reduces the number of other places to four. When one considers the wealth of talent that is available within the Party structure, four delegates from each State to the National Conference is far from adequate.

8: Although it is outside the jurisdiction of the Federal Executive to recommend who should be included on such delegations, I would hope that States in any increased delegation would make room for at least one Federal Parliamentarian, one State Parliamentarian and one representative of the Party Federal electorate councils.

I accordingly recommend: -

R:2 "That as from 1966 the size of State delegations be increased from six to ten."

B: PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION

9: The question of Parliamentary representation is one which has raised a great deal of controversy within the Party, not just recently, but throughout the years of the Party existence. In the years immediately following the formation of the Federal Party, Parliamentarians were well represented on the Conference and the Leader of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party was invariably a delegate from his home State.

J.C. Watson attended the 1900, 1902, 1905, 1908 and 1912 Conferences, the first three being held during his time of Federal Leadership.

A. Fisher attended the 1905, 1908, 1912 and 1915 Conferences, all except the first when he was Federal Leader.

The 1918 Conference resolved to admit Mr. Frank G. Tudor, then Parliamentary Leader, with the right to participate in all discussions but not to vote (Official report, page 2).
A similar decision was taken at the 1919 Conference (Official Report, page 21).

Matthew Charlton (1922-8) did not attend any Conference, whereas J.H. Scullin (1928-35) attended all Federal Conferences held during his period of Leadership as a delegate from the Victorian Branch.

John Curtin (1935-45) was a delegate from the West Australian Branch to all Federal Conferences held during the term of his Leadership.

Therefore, of the 24 Conferences held between 1900 and 1943, the Federal Leader was in attendance either as a full delegate or by invitation of the Conference at 19 of them.

10: I hold the opinion very strongly that the Parliamentary Leaders should attend the Conference in their own right and not have to depend on an election in the State Conferences.

Once a Leader has been duly elected by the Caucus, for all sense and purposes he becomes the Leader of the Australian Labor Party.

11: As the Parliamentary Leaders serve the Party as a whole, they should not have to run the risk of possible defeat in State Elections for Annual Conference delegates.

If the Leaders are expected to represent the Party as a whole, then they should be afforded direct access to the Federal Conference in their own right.

Therefore, I recommend:

R:3 "That the Leader of the Parliamentary Labor Party; the Deputy Leader of the Parliamentary Labor Party; the Leader of the Party in the Senate and the Deputy Leader of the Party in Senate shall be automatically delegates to the Federal Conference with full voting rights."

12: There is a great merit in the proposal that Members of the Parliamentary Labor Party should be given the right to attend Conference in an ex-officio capacity and be granted the right to speak but not to vote. However, this can only operate efficiently and without infringing upon the rights of other delegates if the Conference is a large one. When the Conference is comparatively small, the position could become completely unworkable. What is undoubtedly required and what would be of great value is the expert knowledge of the key people in the Caucus. The knowledge that these people possess would be of benefit to the ordinary delegates to Conference who have neither the time nor the facilities to equip themselves with a detailed knowledge of every subject with which they have to deal during a Federal Conference.
The Parliamentary Labor Party has now adopted the 'shadow cabinet' principle. A logical step is for the Federal Conference to have the benefit of the advice of 'shadow ministers' readily at hand.

I, therefore, recommend that:-

R:4 "Members of the 'shadow cabinet' of the Parliamentary Party be afforded ex-officio status at Federal Conference with the right to speak but not to vote."

C: STATE PARLIAMENTARY LEADERS

13: The relationship of the State Parliamentary Leaders to the Federal bodies has to be considered in a different light from that of the Federal Leader and his colleagues. Strictly speaking the State Executives have primary jurisdiction over the respective State Parliamentary Parties, although in fact the Federal Conference could exercise immediate jurisdiction over them if it so desired. However, from all available records, it would seem that only once has the Federal Executive gone over the head of a state Executive and dealt directly with a State Parliamentary Party and that was as recent as 1963 in connection with New South Wales.

Up to that point, the Federal Executive had scrupulously followed the practice, even in its dealings with members of the Federal parliamentary Labor Party, of usually working through the respective State Executives.

14: The position of the State Parliamentary Parties should not, however, be dismissed as having no relationship or bearing upon the functioning of the Federal bodies. On the contrary, they are a key unit within the party structure and should be considered as such.

15: With the Commonwealth exercising greater powers than hitherto thought possible or necessary, and with the strong probability that this tendency will be accentuated rather than lessened, the need for the very closest possible co-operation between State and Federal bodies is imperative. This applies with special significance to the Labor Party, more than other Parties, although all suffer from this dichotomy of power.

The Labor Party must function on the basis of the closest possible co-operation between all of its sections and units, not the domination of all by one.

16: State Leaders play a key role in the public arena of politics. Their presence at Federal Conferences, in their own right, would be of very great value in debates and in the harmonious functioning of the Party. The Federal Conference is the supreme policy making body of the Party, and its decisions are binding upon all units and sections. It is logical, therefore, that if the decisions of the Conference are to be carried out effectively, then the leading people in each State
responsible for ultimately implementing those decisions should participate in the making of those decisions.

I, therefore, recommend that:-

R:5 "The Leader of each State Parliamentary Labor Party be automatically a full delegate to the Federal Conference."

D. WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION

17: The importance of the women's vote in elections is now recognised as a decisive factor. In the section on Women's Organisation, I deal with the subject in more detail. Here to enhance the status of the Labor Women's Organising Committee I recommend:-

R:6 "That the President and Secretary of the Federal Labor Women's Organising Committee be automatically full delegates to the Federal Conference."

E. ANNUAL CONFERENCES

18: When the Party was founded, the Federal Conference met every three years. Later this was changed to every two years. Now the time has arrived to provide for annual Conferences.

19: Any political party must keep abreast with changing times. Policy which is made today may well become outdated tomorrow, either because of changing circumstances or through the legislative action of Government. This applies particularly in the field of international affairs and defence. Events move so rapidly that it is practically impossible to lay down anything other than a broad set of principles. Too much detail, as is now found in the foreign affairs platform, makes the risk of dating greater. As a result, confusion can arise to the detriment of the Party.

20: The Federal Executive has no power to change policy. This is a sound principle and one which should be adhered to. But it inhibits the approach of the Party and its operation when circumstances that motivated a particular item policy change dramatically or disappear from the political scene.

21: If the Party is to keep abreast of events, then its highest policy making body must meet at least once a year. This does not necessarily mean that every item of policy will be gone over year after year. With policy committees now functioning between Conferences, the party's policy is becoming much more orderly and sensible. What it would mean is that at every Conference more time could be spent on important matters which merit attention. At the moment, the Conference is faced with the task of catching up with two years work.
I, therefore, recommend:

R:7 "That commencing with 1966, the Federal Conference shall meet annually."

F: DIRECT ACCESS OF FEDERAL ASSEMBLIES AND FEDERAL UNIONS

22: Under present procedure, Federal trade unions and Federal Party organisations have no direct access to either the Federal Conference or the Federal Executive, except in special circumstances. All material for either body must come through the respective State Branches and be endorsed by the State Conferences or State Executives.

A complaint made by all Federal Party organisations is that insufficient attention is paid to them in the States, the emphasis being laid upon State Parliamentary elections. This is wrong. Probably, the election of a Federal Labor government is more important than anything else. State Governments complain that their powers are being undermined by the Federal authority and that the taxing power leaves them at the mercy or otherwise of the Commonwealth Government. Thus it must be of primary concern to every section of the Party to work for the election of a Labor Government in the Federal sphere.

23: Federal electorate authorities are treated as Cinderellas at the moment. Their fund raising activities are given very little priority and one finds all too often that much more time is devoted to financing a local government by-election than to a Federal campaign. Some Party campaign committees covering local government have bulging bank balances while Federal Campaign Committees have hardly anything at all.

24: The status of the Federal Party organisations must be raised and one way to do this is to give them direct access by means of communication with the Federal Conference and Federal Executive. At least they will know that their views are being laid before the highest policy making bodies of the Party.

25: This procedure will not cut across the rights of the State Executive or State Conferences nor will it cause them any embarrassment. It could save the State Executives embarrassment or difficulties and assist them rather than hinder them. In any case, the final decision remains with the Federal Executive or Conference upon which the States are directly represented.

26: A similar facility should also be accorded to Federal trade unions. At the present time, Federal Unions can only have direct access when a matter of discipline is involved. This builds up in the minds of delegates to Federal Unions that the Federal Party Executive and/or Conference is a 'grudge' body. Under present procedure, a Federal Union wishing to place an item on the Agenda of the Federal party Conference would have to arrange for one of its State Branches to submit
it through the appropriate State Executive. If one State Party Executive refuses to endorse the proposition for transmission to the Party Executive or Conference at Federal level, this causes discontent within that Union. In any case, the procedure is unwieldy and unnecessary.

27: A limit should be put on the resolutions to be submitted by a Union of Federal Party organisation. If they are given free access without restriction, the Agenda would soon become cluttered up with motions that should not be there. I have always felt that insufficient attention is given by local branches and Party units to the Agenda items they submit for State Conferences. Too often the merits of the case are not debated but the item is simply sent on to the next highest Party unit because there is no restriction on the number of items that may be submitted.

28: If Federal Unions and Federal Party organisations are to be given access then they must treat this privilege with great care and consideration.

29: Furthermore, the items to be submitted must be of a Federal character and strictly related to Federal policy. No one wants to see a Federal Conference Agenda cluttered up with the petty grievances of members affecting the location of a public convenience on the corner of a street!

I accordingly recommend:--

R:8 "That as from 1966 Federal Trade Union organisations and Federal Electorate Party organisations be permitted to submit no more than three items for inclusion on the Federal Conference Agenda, provided that these resolutions are confined to matters of Federal policy; and further that the organisations mentioned may have direct communication with the Federal Executive."

B: FEDERAL EXECUTIVE

(a) Composition

30: The Federal Executive was established by the 1918 Federal Conference and has remained at two delegates from each State for nearly fifty years. For reasons I have already advanced in recommending an increase in the size of Conference delegations, I believe an increase in the size of the Federal Executive is long overdue.

The work that the Federal Executive has to handle has grown. Delegates are being asked to spend more time on Federal matters than ever before. Since 1961, Standing Policy Committees have been established and are presided over by a Member of the Executive. The establishment of the Federal
Secretariat has also added to the work of the Federal Executive.

Thus a greater amount of work is being undertaken by a group of men already carrying a heavy load in their respective States.

31: Meetings of the Federal Executive should also be held more often than at present. One of the weaknesses in our Federal Structure has been that meetings of the Executive had been sufficiently infrequent to make them a subject of notoriety when they do meet. If they met regularly and often they would become an accepted feature in political life. More frequent meetings would also mean less time away from home States and duties for the delegates attending.

32: The position of the Leader and Deputy Leader of the Federal parliamentary Labor Party I have already covered, and there is no need for me to repeat the arguments for their inclusion on the Federal Executive here.

I accordingly recommend that:

R:9 (a) The Federal Executive shall consist of:

(i) Three delegates from each State Branch;

(ii) The Leader of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party;

(iii) The Deputy Leader of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party;

(iv) The President, ex-officio, unless he is otherwise appointed a delegate.

(v) The General Secretary with the full rights of a delegate except that of voting;

(b) The Federal Executive shall meet at least every two months."

(b) Party Officers

33: Insufficient attention has been given to the question of Party finances at the Federal level. I deal with this subject in much more detail under the appropriate heading.

At this point, I recommend that:

R:10 "The Federal Executive shall elect each year a person to fill the office of Treasurer of the Party."
The position will, of course, be honorary but it is a post of sufficient importance to be established forthwith."

(c) High Policy Committee

34: Under direction of the 1961 Federal Conference, the Federal Executive was empowered to establish Standing Policy Committees. This was a great advance in the Party's machinery for formulating policy.

35: There is, however, a serious weakness, namely, there is no Committee charged with the task of looking at the Platform and policy as a whole. In some instances, Sections of the Platform could not justify a separate committee to be set up just to consider it. Nor would it fit appropriately within the jurisdiction of any existing committee. Consequently some proposals remain on the Platform which should have been struck out long ago. Such a situation weakens the value of the Platform as a whole and tends to hold the Party up to ridicule and the allegation that it is rigid and inflexible.

36: There are also occasions when the Parliamentary Party or the Party organisation has to make some pronouncement on a subject which is not covered by the Party Platform. In the past, the issue has either been let slip until it is too late or someone makes a statement which does not meet with the approval of the rest of the Party and a public controversy breaks out.

37: The two situations I have outlined could be met by the establishment of a High Policy Committee comprising the Officers of the Federal Executive and the Officers of the Parliamentary Labor Party. Naturally, the committee could not make policy but it would be able to review the problem in the light of circumstances then prevailing. It would be of sufficiently authoritative a character to give sufficient weight to the guidance it offered.

I accordingly recommend:-

R:11 "That the Officers of the Party together with the Officers of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party shall constitute a High Policy Committee which shall keep under constant consideration the existing Platform and Policy of the Party and advise the Federal Executive, Federal Conference or appropriate Standing Committee on any matter which in its opinion needs review by the Executive, Conference or Standing Committee. The Committee shall meet as and when required to consider matters which may affect Party policy and are likely to become the subject of public debate and about which
there is some doubt as to the Party's attitude. No decision of the Committee can be considered binding until it has been endorsed by the Executive or the Conference."

C: PARTY DISCIPLINE

38: Where self-discipline is exercised and there is a high degree of loyalty to the Party, the exercise of machinery discipline arises on very rare occasions.

39: Because of the Federal nature of the Party, very often a dispute which could be settled quickly and with a minimum of public controversy drags out over many months. Thus when it comes before the Federal Executive for determination, it is revived in the public mind, and the whole process of public dispute is gone through again. This time lag also acts unfairly against an accused person, who is sometimes left in doubt as to his position for many months. This is contrary to all forms of democratic justice - or it should be.

40: The only rule at present covering the powers of the Federal Executive and/or Federal Conference is 7(c) (vi) and the present wording has itself caused confusion. By breaking the present rule into the three sections suggested below, there should be no doubt as to its meaning.

I recommend that Rule 7(c)(vi) be rephrased as follows:-

R:12 "(i) The federal Executive shall hear appeals from any affiliated organisation or individual member on the decision of any State Conference or State Executive where leave to appeal is granted to the appellant(s) by the State Executive or State Conference concerned.

(ii) The Federal Executive shall be competent to hear and decide appeals on the decision of any State Conference or State Executive on any matter affecting the Federal Labor Platform or Federal Policy or the attitude of any members of the ALP thereto.

(iii) The Federal Executive shall hear and decide any appeal from any candidate for Federal Elections whose approval or endorsement as a candidate has been withheld or unduly delayed for any cause which, in the opinion of the Federal Executive affects the Federal Labor Platform or Federal policy or the attitude of any member(s) of the Party thereto."
Many of the delays in disciplinary matters created in the past were due to the absence of a full-time Federal Secretary. Now that both are in existence, there is no reason why what should have been done in the past is not now operated.

Where a State Branch has to act to implement the decisions of the Federal Executive and/or Federal Conference when an organisation or individual has breached a Federal rule, the Federal Secretary of the Party should be brought into immediate consultation. As the Chief Executive and Administrative Officer of the Federal bodies, he should be intimately concerned with the hearings and evidence from the very beginning to ensure that the decisions of the Federal Executive and Federal Conference are carried out and not themselves breached or abrogated.

I accordingly make the following recommendation:-

R:13 "That where the powers of the Federal Executive and/or Federal Conference are likely to be invoked in matters concerning Party discipline, the General Secretary of the Party shall immediately consult with the State Branch concerned and recommend a course of action to the Officers or Executive of the State Branch affected. He shall forthwith notify all members of the Federal Executive of his action and recommendation and seek a postal ballot on his decision. If the vote upholds his recommendation, it shall become operative as if it were a decision of the Federal Executive taken at a duly constituted meeting but an adverse vote shall stay the implementation of the recommendation until such time as the Federal Executive meets to review the matter. In using any powers granted under this section, the Rules and Constitution of a State Branch, State Executive, Federal Executive and Federal Conference shall in no way be impinged.

In exercising his powers under this Rule, the General Secretary of the Party shall be empowered to take whatever action he deems necessary to protect the rights of the Federal Executive and Federal Conference.

D: THE FEDERAL PARLIAMENTARY LABOR PARTY

(a) Position in the Structure

The position of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party and its members is an invidious one. Although in theory the controlling body is the Federal Executive and Federal Conference, in practice the members of the FPLP serve two masters - the Federal bodies and the State bodies. Because the States control the selections final and effective influence
resides with them. There is the safeguard that a member whose pre-selection or endorsement has been withheld or unduly delayed can appeal to the Federal Executive. But this does not surmount the problem of divided responsibility.

44: There is a growing tendency within the Party to view the Parliamentarian as something apart. Once he is elected to Parliament he becomes, in the eyes of some, something different to the ordinary rank-and-file member or the Party official. He is distrusted and viewed with suspicion. On the other hand, some Parliamentarians consider themselves superior beings with special rights and claim that they owe allegiance to the people who selected them and not the Party. Both extreme views are to be deplored.

45: Without the Parliamentarian, the Party would be ineffective and futile. Without the Party, the Parliamentarian would never be elected to Parliament. Co-operation is the essence in any democratic party, not coercion. The Parliamentary and extra-Parliamentary wings of the Party need each other and there must be the highest degree of mutual respect and trust.

46: To clarify the position of the Federal Parliamentary Labor party, I recommend that the various decisions of the Federal Conference be included in the Constitution of the Party in the following form:

```
R:14 " (i) No state Executive may direct members of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party in regard to matters affecting the Federal Platform or policy or upon legislation before the Parliament or any matters the subject of consideration by the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party.

(ii) The power of direction, advice and/or guidance is reserved for the Federal Conference and, between Conferences, the Federal Executive.

(iii) No State Branch shall approach the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party except through the Federal Secretary who will report to the Federal Executive on any action taken."
```

(b) Powers of Discipline

47: It is only on rare occasions that a Member misbehaves and it is necessary to invoke the disciplinary powers of the Federal Executive and/or Conference. On such occasions, as these however, the Party should not be tardy to protect its integrity nor slow in exercising its powers. It should not be forgotten that when a single Member acts irrationally or
irresponsibly, the whole Party can be brought into disrepute. (The Party is currently paying for such an act which took place nearly seven years ago.)

48: Again self-discipline is the best form of discipline. But if the members will not or cannot behave in a responsible manner, then someone else must. As the body charged with administering the whole Party, the Federal Executive must be concerned with the feelings of the ordinary branch member without whom this Party could never survive. What the highest official or public representative of the Party does, affects the rank-and-file member. It can enthuse him; it can depress him; it can drive him out of the Party.

49: I think it is timely that the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party should again be reminded by the Federal Conference that they are expected to exercise a greater amount of self-discipline than they have done hitherto. They should also be reminded that if they will not control themselves, then the Federal Executive will invoke its authority to control them.

50: The 1955 Conference decision went a long way to clarifying the position, but it had the weakness that a Member of the Federal parliamentary Labor Party who breached discipline was to be reported to the State Executive concerned and not the Federal Executive. This decision should be amended as follows:-

R:15 "That where a Member of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party offends against the Party or acts in breach of a Caucus decision, he shall first be warned by the Caucus Executive and if the offense continues, he shall be reported forthwith to the Federal Secretary of the Party who shall (a) immediately advise the Members of the Federal Executive; (b) notify the State Executive concerned; (c) interview the Leader and member concerned."

(c) Condition of Candidature

51: I strongly believe that conditions for candidature in the Federal Parliament should be uniform, and no State should have the power to insert a rule or condition which does not operate elsewhere. The candidates are standing for the same position whether they live in Queensland or West Australia. The States have uniform conditions for the State candidatures and they do not differentiate between electorates within that State.

It seems to be quite illogical and to a degree unjust that certain conditions should be imposed in one State without due regard being given to the position in others.

51a: At the present time, some States are operating an age limit; others are not. Unless there is uniformity, a candidate
or member living in, say Albury, could find himself forced to retire at 65, provided the State decided to enact such a rule, while his colleague in Wodonga could go on to 95. If there is to be an age limit, it should be uniform and not discriminatory.

52: The same reasoning applies to a lesser extent to the levies paid by Federal Parliamentarians to their respective State Branches. Why should one member be compelled to pay a levy or x per cent, while another pays x- or x+ per cent and yet another pays none?

For these reasons, I recommend that a new Rule be added:-

R:16 "That the Federal Executive shall be entitled to review any decision of a State Conference and/or State Executive which affects the conditions of candidature for the Federal Parliament."

53: The Membership Qualifications for pre-selection, as laid down in State Rules, are:- South Australia, Victoria and Tasmania two years; West Australia, New South Wales and Queensland three years.

There seems no logical reason why a member in Albury has to wait three years before being eligible for pre-selection while his colleague in Wodonga waits two years.

I accordingly recommend that:-

R:17 "State Branches be advised that the Membership requirement for Federal pre-selection shall be two years."

54: Methods of pre-selection vary greatly in each State, although only two adhere to the pre-selection ballot.

No attempt has been made to lay down uniform regulations for pre-selections. To disturb the position now with pre-selections about to commence for the next Federal Elections, would cause confusion. It is, however, time that the whole position was reviewed and I recommend that:-

R:18 "The Federal Conference be requested to instruct the NOPC to investigate the present methods of pre-selection with a view to preparing a uniform method."
E: THE COMMONWEALTH TERRITORIES

55: Within the present structure, the Northern Territory is directly under the control of the Federal Executive while the ACT is an integral part of the New South Wales Branch.

56: The Party advocates full autonomy for both Territories and I have never believed that it is a sound approach for the Party to advance a principle which it does not implement internally. Obviously there are considerable differences between the ACT and the Northern Territory.

57: The ACT does have an advantage in that it is part of a larger unit and has representation to the New South Wales State Conference, but in fact, this means very little when it comes to the internal problems of the territory. The New South Wales Government has no jurisdiction within the ACT and any resolutions adopted by the New South Wales State Conference are pious expressions of sympathy or support. At the same time, the ACT Branches do enjoy privileges denied the Northern Territory.

I recommend:-

R:19 " (i) That the Branches in the Northern Territory be permitted to form a Territory Executive which shall enjoy the status of a State Executive with respect to the internal administration and organisation of the Party in the Territory. Further, the Federal Executive shall approve a set of rules for the Territory Executive which shall enjoy the status of a State Executive with respect to the internal administration and organisation of the Party in the Territory. Further, the Federal Executive shall approve a set of rules for the Territory Executive which shall have the right to submit items to the Federal Conference and Executive, and which shall be entitled to appoint one delegate to Federal Conference.

(ii) That the Branches in the ACT be removed from the jurisdiction of the New South Wales Branch and be formed into a Territory Executive with the status of a State Executive with respect to the internal administration and organisation of the Party in the Territory. Further that the Federal Executive shall approve a set of rules for the Territory Executive which
shall have the right to submit items to the Federal Conference and Executive, and which shall be entitled to appoint one delegate to Federal Conference.

F: LABOR WOMEN'S ORGANISATION

58: The Federal Labor Women's Organisation is at present a rather insipid body. Its powers are limited and when it takes decisions, no one takes any notice of them.

59: Either the Party should have an effective women's organisation which is allowed to play a useful and influential role, or it should have none.

The Party dare not ignore the women's vote in future elections. Therefore, steps must be taken to improve the standing of the Labor Women's Organisation.

I, therefore, recommend that:-

R: 20 " (i) The Labor Women's Organisation Executive be recognised as the Standing Policy Committee on Women's Affairs.

(ii) That the Secretary of the Labor Women's Organisation Executive be granted an Advisory Seat on the Federal Executive of the Party with the right to participate in discussions but not to vote.

(iii) That the Labor Women's Organisation Executive shall be asked to nominate a woman to serve on each Policy Standing Committee."

G: YOUTH ORGANISATION

60: The problems in forming a Young Peoples' Association at a Federal level are as difficult as they are at a State level. Young people cannot be considered a homogeneous group. Like any other section of the community, they act and think according to their circumstances or position.

61: The attitude that young people adopt towards the Party depends on the behaviour of the Party itself. If the Party is intolerable of their views and opinions, they will treat the Party with scorn and contempt.
But they cannot be ignored. By the time of the 1969 Election, 1,500,000 voters will be under 27. None of these people will be able to recall the Chifley Labor Government! The basic work in attracting young people must still be done in the States. Nevertheless, the Federal Bodies could be assisted by advice and I recommend:

R:21 "That a Youth Advisory Committee of six members under the age of 25 be established to advise the Conference and Executive on all matters affecting young people."

H: FINANCES

Finance is the most vital matter with which the Party must concern itself. Everyone recognises this fact. How to overcome is the problem. The following recommendations are designed to put the Party on a sound financial basis:

R:22 "(a) That the Federal Officers together with the Federal Leader and the Deputy Leader constitute a Finance Committee over which the Treasurer shall preside.

(b) The Committee shall be charged with the task of raising ordinary and special funds for the development and expansion of the Party and for the conduct of elections.

(c) An immediate appeal for 50,000 pounds be launched to provide a base for the Party's operation.

(d) A bank order system be instituted through which members, friends and supporters can donate regularly to Party funds.

(e) A scheme be launched to obtain 2,000 members who will collect from 20 other people a minimum of 1/- per week thus raising 100,000 pounds a year which will enable the Party at both State and Federal levels to function effectively."
I: MEMBERSHIP

64: The individual Party membership is appalling. Our membership in relation to our vote is less than one percent! Some electorates have a pitiful handful of devoted stalwarts to keep the Party alive. As electorate vote grows, so our membership lessens. An increase in membership means increased revenue.

The following recommendations are made in this connection:

R:23 "(a) That 1966 be declared Membership Year with a target 100,000 individual members (1/20th of the Party's popular support).

(b) The NOPC to prepare a detailed programme to attract members including:

(i) special television and radio programmes;

(ii) the production of special pamphlets and other publications;

(iii) the organising of special rallies; meetings and conferences throughout the Commonwealth;

(iv) special articles by leading Party members for reproduction in Union Journals;

(v) the organisation of special functions designed to appeal to professional and other social groups."

J: LOCAL BRANCH ORGANISATION

65: One reason for poor individual membership is that the Party does little to encourage people to join. New methods are being employed in some States but they are the exception to the general rule.

66: Too many branches meet in ill-lit, shabby and depressing surroundings. Too much time is wasted on routine matters. Standing Orders are so restrictive and so slavishly followed that a strong heart is needed to remain. Too many chairmen and too many secretaries are ill-equipped to run meetings. This is not their fault but the fault of the Party in that it has never provided training for them.
The local branch is the Party's first line of defence and attack. The organisational and electoral success of the Party depends in the final analysis on the members of those branches. Related to this is the question of Party education.

I make the following recommendations:

R:24

(a) To encourage effective branch meetings. State Branches be requested to review their rules and Standing Orders to provide for streamlining of business.

(b) That to train Party members in the duties and functions of branch presidents, secretaries, treasurers, etc., and in election organisations, special day, weekend and week schools be organised.

(c) Such schools to be arranged on local, regional, State and Federal basis.

(d) Similar schools be arranged on the history, aims, ideals and policy of the Party.

(e) That at Federal level, Summer Schools of a week's duration be arranged to embrace courses on organisation and policy.

(f) To assist Party members to attend such schools, State Branches and trade unions be urged to award scholarships.

(g) As a further aid to improving the efficiency and standard of the Party, a National Labor Correspondence College be established to conduct partial courses for Party members.

(h) A regular publication be issued on organisational matters.

(i) Regular decision notes to be circulated to all units to stimulate discussion on the aims, objectives and policy of the Party.

(j) Local branches to be encouraged to organise their own evening schools on the above topics.

(k) Federal Party organisation to be encouraged to arrange schools on an electoral basis.
67: The Party's electoral organisation needs complete renovation. To effect some improvement, the recommendations with respect to Party Branches will assist. The following recommendations take the process of improvement a stage further:

R:25 "(a) Candidates to be selected at least two years before an election.

(b) Candidates and key Party personnel to be trained at both State and Federal levels in the techniques of television, radio and public speaking.

(c) Publicity for an election to continue throughout the years between an election.

(d) Publicity be prepared to aim at special members of the Community.

(e) That a television and broadcasting station be established for training, filming and recording purposes.

(f) That regular radio programmes be prepared Federally for replay on Labor Stations in the respective States.

(g) That immediate concentration on marginal electorates be undertaken and for this purpose the Federal Secretariat to have direct contact with the Federal Party organisation in those electorates.

(h) To ensure that the maximum benefit is gained from the use of leading personnel, itineraries for the Parliamentary leaders shall be arranged by the Federal Secretary in consultation with the State Secretary concerned.

(i) That urgent consideration be given to the employment of field organisers in marginal electorates under the control of the Federal Executive and the NOPC.

(j) That a handbook on the organisation and conduct of elections be prepared for use by all sections of the Party.

(k) That in conjunction with the State Branches, Senators be allocated to cover marginal electorates.
(l) That members in the House of Representatives in safe seats be allocated to a specific marginal electorate to service the local branches in the House and to 'shadow' the sitting member.

(m) To ensure that all Members participate in the marginal electorates campaign and that no single member is penalised, a fund be established to meet the accommodation, travelling and other expenses of members and Senators affected by (k) and (l). The details of the fund to be mutually agreed between the NOPC and the Caucus Executive."

L: TRADE UNIONS

68: The position of the industrial trade unions has been changing dramatically in recent years. The advent of strong, militant 'white-collar' associations reflects the changing character of society. The ACTU and the AWU have recognised the simple fact in their collaboration with ACSP&A and the High Council of the Public Service Associations. Regrettably, the Party has been slow to recognise the existence of such a powerful and influential force.

69: Concurrent with the growth of the 'white-collar' associations, there has been a falling off in the support of the Party from the industrial unions.

For too long the Party has assumed that it is receiving the support of the unionists, and, therefore, insufficient attention has been paid to what was really happening. Trade union journals are read by their members and too many of them continually carry implicit or open attacks on the 'right-wing' or 'left-wing' of the Party, depending on the political complexion of key people on the Union Executives. We should not, therefore, be surprised if at election time, the union member re-acts against the Party he is supposed to support.

70: The Party itself alienates many unionists by assuming that they think in the same way as they did twenty years ago. References to the 'workers', the 'working class' and the 'underprivileged' are just so much meaningless and sometimes offensive jargon in modern society. A glance at the Taxation Commission Reports shows that not all the cars, all the boats and all the holiday homes are owned by "the bosses". In any case, many of the underprivileged are not organised or eligible to be organised in Unions.
Thus the task that faces the Party is twofold; (a) to gain the support of the professional associates; and (b) to consolidate its support in the individual unions.

Therefore, the following recommendations are made:-

R:26 "(a) An approach to be made by the CLAC to the ACSPA to join that body in a mutually agreed status.

(b) State Branches be encouraged to seek the closest possible contact with professional associations.

(c) That the Federal Executive establish a Consultative Committee consisting of members of professional and salaried associates.

(d) A special campaign be commenced to inform all trade unionists of the advantages of affiliation with the Party.

(e) Trade Unions be reminded that affiliation with the Party demands support for the policies of the Party and that advocacy of policies of other Parties will not be tolerated.

M: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The recent decisions of the Executive to seek affiliation with the Socialist International and to co-operate in the formation of an Asian Regional Organisation have done much to end the Party's isolation in international affairs. More needs to be done and I recommend:-

R:27 "(a) That with affiliation to the International, steps be taken to secure a seat on the Bureau.

(b) With the need for closer relationship with New Zealand closer contact be established with the New Zealand Labour Party by the exchange of delegations to Party Conferences and the establishment of a Liaison Committee.

(c) That to gain a first hand knowledge of Asian affairs, arrangements be made for the exchange of delegations.
(d) That when leading members of the Party are touring overseas, they advise the Federal Secretary who will arrange contact with Labour Parties in the countries they are visiting.

(e) Upon the return of members from overseas, whenever possible, arrangements shall be made for him to address meetings of Party members.

(f) The Federal Executive to explore the possibility of inviting Asian socialists to Australia to be trained in Party and electoral organisation.

(g) That a system be devised in co-operation with Asian parties whereby local branches could 'adopt' or link with a similar unit overseas and assist in the provision of necessary requisites, etc.

(h) That to set an example, the Federal Executive itself adopt an orphanage and that the International Refugee Organisation be requested to nominate such an orphanage.

(i) That every assistance be given to the development of a Party in New Guinea."

**N: FEDERAL SECRETARIAT**

73: The expansion of the Federal Secretariat to provide for an Administrative Assistant, a Press and Publicity Officer and a Research Officer with appropriate clerical staff must be considered as the finances become available.

**O: STANDARDISATION**

74: To achieve a great degree of uniformity and assist in the removal of confusion, I recommend:-

R:28 "That State Branches be requested to revise their Rules to include the following:-

(i) Standard Membership and Affiliation Fees;

(ii) Membership Ticket expiry as to 31st December;"
(iii) Minimum age for admission to membership - 16 with full rights;
(iv) Maximum age for youth organisations, 25."

P: SUPERANNUATION SCHEME

75: To provide Party officials and staff with the conditions enjoyed by many of the members they serve; I recommend:-

R: 29 "That a National Superannuation Scheme be established to embrace all officers and staff willing to join."

CYRIL S. WYNDHAM,
General Secretary
Conference reform, the NCI's favoured 'solution' to the 'problem' of 'intra-party alienation' was not a new idea. Encel (1979a:2) tells us that he and his fellow-NCI members:

... were, of course, aware that ours was only the latest in a long series of attempts to reform the party structure. One of the papers considered by the committee was the 'Wyndham report' ... whose proposals for party reorganisation bore a considerable resemblance to our own recommendations.

The 'factional and historical factors' the NCI found so 'hard to shift' (as Wyndham had in the previous decade) had 'moulded the party in the last 90 years' (Weller, 1983:60).

Presenting the NCI proposals to the Special Conference, John Button reminded delegates how venerable and tradition-bound the Conference procedures were by comparing them to the original Australian Constitutional Conventions:

... if Alfred Deakin and Mervyn (sic) Bourne Higgins and Sir George Reid walked in here today in this atmosphere, they would feel totally familiar except for the television lights. They would look at the delegations around the room like seven football teams and they would each move to their seats - Alfred Deakin to Gareth Evans' seat and Sir George Reid to Tom Uren's seat and so on - and they would be perfectly familiar in this atmosphere, the way we are today (ALP Transcript, 1981:141).

Whatever about its constitutional reform aspirations, federalism has been thoroughly ingrained into ALP organisation (Wildavsky, 1961; Galligan, 1981a. See also Overacker, 1949:691-2; Holmes and Sharman, 1977:102-116 and Lucy, 1985: 47-64 and 338-53).

Certainly, had any delegates from the 1912 Federal Conference resurrected themselves, they would have had little difficulty understanding the issues at stake in the reorganisation debate at the 1981 Special Conference:
In 1912, Conference had before it a serious proposal to jettison equal State representation at Federal Conference in favour of a sliding-scale based on population (Crisp, 1978:31).

NSW delegate J.C. Watson (who had been Labor's first Prime Minister) thought each federal electorate body should be entitled to send one delegate to 'Inter-State Conference' as it was then known. The Labor leagues in the electorates had a high profile in the party then. The affiliated unions did not come to the fore until the dramatic upheaval over conscription in 1916-17 (see Childe, 1923). Watson complained:

Under the present system, the smallest State, Tasmania, had as many representatives as the largest, New South Wales ... I don't approve of it. It's not democratic and it's no use saying that it is. I am not bound to the system outlined in my motion but I do hope that the larger States will be given a larger share of representation in a conference such as this (quoted, Crisp, 1978:33).

Watson would not have been bemused by the 1981 debate. He could have moved over to Paul Keating's or Graham Richardson's chair. Not being particularly tied to the terms of his proposal in 1912, he would have understood why they preferred a different Conference enlargement formula in 1981, based on membership rather than population. Victorian delegate John Barnes favoured Conference enlargement on a membership basis. A South Australian delegate, E.A. Roberts, opposed Watson's line of argument completely:

Were they to get in the thin edge of the wedge they might have the whole of Australia ruled from the south-east corner of it. They have not yet so permeated the mind of the people of Australia as to make it one country in the eyes of its inhabitants. There is still a State feeling (quoted, Crisp, 1978:33).

Had E.A. Roberts reappeared in 1981, he could have taken Mick Young's seat. He would also have appreciated Bob
Hogg's argument in favour of protecting:

... the smaller states to a degree that our political interests are covered in that, when we have a national conference - if we had it directly on FEA's for example - it would be a big cities Conference. It would be dominated by Melbourne and dominated by Sydney combined (ALP Transcript, 1981:198).

In 1912 cost was another objection to enlargement. This issue also re-surfaced in 1981. Several delegates spoke in favour of cost reduction measures:

Surely we can find a cheaper venue; surely we can forget about impressing some diplomats or ambassadors ... Let us remember in this party that there are many members ... who are quite willing to meet in less impressive temples ... and who are even prepared to be billeted ... (ALP Transcript, 1981:165. See also John Green and Peter Duncan, ALP Transcript:1981:166-7 and 168-9 respectively).

The surroundings of the Southern Cross Hotel might have surprised our resurrected 1912 delegates, as might the accommodation provided for delegates. Things were a bit different in the early days (Crisp, 1978:80).

In 1912, there was a compromise amendment from Queensland delegate Thomas Givens for Conference enlargement on basis of population (one delegate for every 150,000 of population) combined with a minimum of six delegates for each state. This would have given NSW eleven, Victoria nine and the rest six each. It was only defeated by one vote. A further amendment with a membership formula was defeated more heavily. Conference agreed to look into the matter again in three years time. 'De-federalisation' proposals were duly rejected in 1915, as they were in 1919, 1921, 1924 and 1936.

Only in 1919 was there a serious debate. The push this time was coming from Victoria (see Rawson, 1954:41). Victoria had a plan for completely re-structuring both
Conference and Executive in proportion to population. The new Conference would only have 29 delegates: NSW ten, Victoria eight, Queensland four, SA three and WA and Tasmania two each). This was not on the cards. One Queensland delegate said it was 'bushranging' (ALP, 1921:20). However another Queensland delegate, E.G. Theodore, indicated a willingness to consider some change, if not the Victorian plan:

Certainly we might have arrived at a stage in our development when it would be wise to give possibly greater representation to the more populous states, but it should not be done alone the lines which had been foreshadowed (ALP, 1919:21).

By this stage the Victorian plan had been withdrawn in favour of an amendment from J.C. Willcock (WA) favouring a 30-delegate Conference 'de-federalised' on a membership basis. On Theodore's suggestion a Conference committee was set up to come back with another proposal. This allowed for each state to be represented by one delegate for every 10,000 members (or part thereof), with a maximum of eight and a minimum of four for each state). This would have given NSW eight delegates, Victoria seven, Queensland six and the others four each). Although the committee seemed reasonably representative, this was unacceptable to the Conference as a whole. The brief debate involved a clash between labor's constitutional aspirations and internal federal realpolitik similar to that which recurred about sixty years later over the NCI proposals. In reply to an interjection about whether he believed in 'one-vote-one-value', J. Jelley (SA) said:

Generally speaking I do, but I hardly think it should be made applicable in connection with the supreme governing body of the Federal organisation, and the history of Labor's progress since the inception of the Commonwealth bears out that view (ALP, 1921:54).
A. Clementson (WA) commented:

One-vote-one-value was beautiful in theory, but it did not always work out in practice.

In the 1930s the Depression and the Lang secession took centre stage and there was little time or inclination to consider changing the Conference structure which had settled in a federal mould. Even in the early debates the argument that existing arrangements should not be disturbed was as common as cries against 'centralisation'.

However:

The New South Wales Branch was no sooner effectively united and happily back in the bosom of the Party (1941-42) than it produced the most revolutionary of all proposals before Conference to reorganise the Party's constitution. It called for an All-Australian Labor Party Conference to decide on the basis of reorganisation (Crisp, 1978:45).

This was pursued at the 1942 Federal Conference. NSW thought the special constitutional conference should be elected along the new lines it was proposing with:

... one delegate from each Federal Electorate, elected by the rank and file, together with one representative from each Federal Union affiliated to the Party (quoted, Crisp, 1978:45).

Such a suggestion resembles the NCI plan (although, nearly forty years later, the NCI allowed for weighted federal union representation, whereas the NSW proposal in 1954 favoured smaller federal unions in much the same way as the traditional federal format favoured a small state like Tasmania). The idea of a special constitutional conference, elected along reconstructed lines, was an interesting one, which was not revived by the NCI. In 1942, the idea of FEC representation was hardly new but the suggestion of federal union delegates:
... was ... quite novel. The impact even of the first part of the proposal in 1942, after forty years of equal State representation, was almost certainly more revolutionary than Watson's proposal in days when there was still a fluidity and incompleteness about the Party's constitutional arrangements (Crisp, 1978:45).

The NSW plan was quickly dismissed in 1942. 'De-federalisation' was not taken up again until the 1960s. In the wake of the 1954-55 Split, there was an alliance between Victoria and some of the smaller states. Victoria opposed talk of 'de-federalisation' in the 60s. The two largest states had rarely been interested in 'de-federalisation' at the same time. Victorian delegates opposed Watson's proposal in 1912, although some of them favoured an alternative membership-based formula. In 1919, there was some NSW opposition to the Victorian push for 'de-federalisation' (see ALP, 1919:21).

An enlarged Conference was not the only idea considered in the 1977-81 period that had a long history in the party. Some ideas dismissed by the NCI had been given considerable thought earlier on. Back in 1918, the ALP tried to hold a membership ballot across Australia to decide:

... whether the Party should cease its support for recruiting campaigns unless the allies proposed to Germany the ending of the war on 'the basis of no annexations and no indemnities'. This was the first and last time that an attempt was made to ascertain rank and file opinion on a particular issue (Rawson, 1954:39. See also Crisp, 1978:37).

Tasmania and SA did not co-operate, the war came to an end anyway and the attempt was unsuccessful. The idea of a Commonwealth Government newspaper was raised at the 1902 Federal Conference and the idea of a Labor newspaper was a Labor dream with a long history (Crisp, 1978:81). 'Educating the Electorate' was another old Labor theme and the 1921 wording was the focal point in the 1981 'socialisation
objective' debate. The NCI's recommendation that the National Secretary should sit in on FPLP Executive meetings was as unsuccessful as the attempt of Tasmanian delegate E. Dwyer Gray at the 1916 Federal Conference to empower the Federal Executive (then only one year old) to be represented at federal Caucus meetings and supply confidential reports to each state executive.

During the 1981 affirmative action debate Barbara Weise (SA) excavated some party history:

... this is not the first time that this issue has been debated by a national conference of the Labor Party. The debate first took place in 1936 when the National Labor Women's Organisation at the time put forward a proposition for proportional representation for women. In 1942, they put forward a proposition for six out of twelve delegates to the national executive to be women. That, too, was defeated.

The Party in the late 1920's started looking seriously at women in the community because, with the introduction of compulsory voting in 1925, suddenly women became terribly important to the Labor Party and this led to the formation of the first National Labor Women's Organisation. As we know, between that time and until very recently, women ceased to be very important within the forums of the Party ... (ALP Transcript, 1981:182. See Crisp, 1978:73-5).

Back in 1921 Mrs. Dwyer (NSW) was unsuccessful with her proposal that each state should include one woman in their delegation (Crisp, 1978:39). 'Affirmative action' (although not under that name) had been canvassed before 1978. What distinguished this subject in 1981 was not that it had been raised much earlier in the party's history but that, unlike other proposals of which the same could be said, it was now accepted. In diluted form so was 'de-federalisation'. Incremental adaptation is something that takes time to work itself out:
Any specific major reorganization project is likely to fail, but persistent repetition of similar ideas and similar arguments over a relatively long period of time appears to make some difference. Persistence both increases the likelihood that a proposal will be current at an opportune time and creates a diffuse climate of availability and legitimacy for it (March and Olsen, 1983:288).

It is likely that the idea of a directly elected 'Mass Conference' will re-surface the next time the ALP has to conduct a federal post-mortem ritual.
APPENDIX III

'Socialisation Objective' Formulations
Objective

The Australian Labor Party's objective is to achieve -

The democratic socialisation of industry, production, distribution and exchange - to the extent necessary to eliminate exploitation and other anti-social features in those fields - in accordance with the principles of action, methods and progressive reforms set out in this Platform.

Interpretation of Democratic Socialism

The Australian Labor Party believes that -

Democratic socialisation is the utilisation of the economic assets of the State in the interests of citizens, and that man is greater than the machines he uses or the environment in which he lives.

Scientific and technological advancement shall serve the interests of all and not be the exclusive right of the few.

The economic aims of social ownership or social control are full employment, higher production, a rising standard of living and social security; and seeks to secure through democratic socialism -

a. social justice and economic security;

b. freedom of speech, education, assembly, organisation and religion;

c. the right of the development of the human personality protected from arbitrary invasion by the State;

d. free election under universal, adult and secret franchise, with government by the majority, with recognition for the rights of minorities; and,

e. the rule of law to be the right of all.

Principles of Action

The Australian Labor Party believes that its Objective will be achieved by means of -

Constitutional action through the State and Australian Parliaments, municipal and other statutory authorities.
National planning of the economic, social and cultural development of Australia.

Cultivation of Labor ideals and principles, such as implementation of human rights, correction of injustice, help for the under-privileged, building Australian nationhood and abhorrence of war.

Promotion of the spirit of community service and of the acceptance of the duties and responsibilities of citizenship.

Co-operative activities involving training of workers and other producers in the duties and responsibilities of management and where necessary subsidising such activities.

Source: Challenge, June 1981.
Statement of Objectives

The fundamental objective of the Australian Labor Party is the realisation of a society founded upon the principles and values of democratic socialism - a society built upon liberty, equality and democracy, in which everyone may freely participate in the shaping and control of the institutions and relations which determine their lives.

To this end, the Australian Labor Party stands for:

1. Control by democratic process, including where necessary social ownership, of the means of production, distribution and exchange.

2. Ownership and control of Australian Resources by the Australian people.

3. Social responsibility for the abolition of poverty, the achievement of economic security and decent living standards for all, and the achievement of greater real equality in the distribution of income and wealth.

4. Social justice and equality of respect for every member of society, regardless of sex, creed, race, national origin, citizenship, age or economic status.

5. Equality of access to education, housing, health and welfare services, cultural and leisure activities, and the law.

6. Reform of the Australian Constitution so as to ensure that Australia's political institutions reflect the will of the majority of Australian citizens and the existence of Australia as an independent nation.

7. Recognition and protection of fundamental political and civil rights, including in particular freedom of expression, assembly, association, conscience and religion, the right to privacy, and the protection of the individual from oppression by the state.

8. Recognition and encouragement of diversity of cultural expression as the basis of Australian nationhood, including in particular recognition of the right of Aust-
ralian Aborigines to preserve and develop their culture on the basis of ownership of their traditional lands.

9. Safeguarding the rights of future generations through the conservation of resources and of the natural and historical environment.

10. Maintenance of world peace through an independent Australian position in world affairs, the right of all nations to self-determination and independence, regional and international agreements for arms control, economic and social aid to the developing nations, and resolution of international conflicts through the United Nations.

Objective

The Australian Labor Party is a democratic socialist party, and has the objective of the democratic socialisation of industry, distribution and exchange to the extent necessary to eliminate exploitation and other anti-social features in these fields.

To achieve the political and social values inherent in this Objective, the Australian Labor Party stands for:

1. Redistribution of political and economic power so that all members of society have the opportunity to participate in the shaping and control of the institutions and relationships which determine their lives.

2. Establishment and development of public enterprises based upon federal, state and other forms of social ownership, in appropriate sections of the economy.

3. Democratic control and strategic social ownership of national resources, for the benefit of all Australians.

4. Maintenance of support for a competitive and non-monopolistic private sector controlled and owned by Australians operating within clear social guidelines and objectives.

5. The right to own private property.

6. The development of a democratic communications system as an integral part of a free society, in which all citizens shall have opportunity for free access.

7. Monitoring introduction of new technology to ensure that the needs of labour and society as a whole are taken into consideration, as well as the requirements of competitive industry and consumer demand.

8. Application of democracy in industry to increase opportunities for people to work in satisfying, healthy and humane conditions, and to participate in the decision making processes affecting them.

9. Equal access and rights to employment, education, information, technology, housing, health and welfare services, cultural and leisure activities, and the law.

10. Security of the family.

11. Abolition of poverty.

12. The achievement of greater equality in distribution of income, wealth and opportunity.
13. Elimination of discrimination and exploitation on grounds of class, sex, race, religion, national origin, citizenship, age, disability, regional location or economic or household status.

14. The right of Australian Aboriginals and Islanders to preserve and develop their culture, through self determination and the granting of land rights.

15. Recognition and encouragement of a diversity of cultural expression and lifestyles within the Australian community.

16. Recognition and protection of fundamental political rights, including freedom of expression, assembly, association, conscience and religion; the right to privacy and protection of the individual from oppression by the state; and democratic reform of the Australian legal system.

17. The proper management of our resources and the environment to safeguard the rights of present and future generations.

18. Reform of the Australian Constitution and other political institutions so as to ensure that they reflect the will of the majority of Australian citizens and the existence of Australia as an independent nation.

19. Maintenance of world peace; and independent Australian position in world affairs, on recognition of the right of all nations to self-determination and independence; regional and international agreements for arms control and disarmament; the provision of economic and social aid to developing nations; a commitment to resolve international conflicts through the United Nations; and a recognition of the inalienable right of all people to liberty, equality, democracy and social justice.

20. Commitment to and participation in the international democratic socialist movement as represented by the Socialist International.

21. Recognition of the right of citizens to work for progressive changes, consistent with the broad principles of democratic socialism.

This is followed by the text of the existing sections, C and D, of the Preamble, which relate to membership and policy formulation.

Source: Challenge, June 1981.
BASIC PRINCIPLES

A ORIGINS
The Australian Labor Party had its origins in:

- the aspirations of the Australian people for a decent, secure, dignified and constructive way of life;
- the recognition by the trade union movement of the necessity for a political voice to take forward the struggle of the working class against the excesses, injustices and inequalities of capitalism; and
- the commitment by the Australian people to the creation of an independent, free and enlightened Australia.

B OBJECTIVES
The Australian Labor Party is a democratic socialist party and has the objective of the democratic socialisation of industry, production, distribution and exchange, to the extent necessary to eliminate exploitation and other anti-social features in these fields.

To achieve the political and social values of equality, democracy, liberty and social co-operation inherent in this objective, the Australian Labor Party stands for:

1. Redistribution of political and economic power so that all members of society have the opportunity to participate in the shaping and control of the institutions and relationships which determine their lives.

2. Establishment and development of public enterprises based upon federal, State and other forms of social ownership, in appropriate sectors of the economy.

3. Democratic control and strategic social ownership of Australian natural resources for the benefit of all Australians.

4. Maintenance of and support for a competitive non-monopolistic private sector, including small business and farming, controlled and owned by Australians, operating within clear social guidelines and objectives.

5. The right to own private property.
6. Recognition and encouragement of the right of labour to organise for the protection and advancement of its interests.

7. The application of democracy in industry to increase the opportunities for people to work in satisfying, healthy and humane conditions, and to participate in and increase their control over the decision-making processes affecting them.

8. The promotion of socially appropriate technology and the monitoring of its introduction to ensure that the needs and interests of labour, as well as the requirements of competitive industry and consumer demand, are taken into consideration.

9. The restoration and maintenance of full employment.

10. The abolition of poverty, and the achievement of greater equality in the distribution of income, wealth and opportunity.

11. Social justice and equality for individuals, the family and all social units, and the elimination of exploitation in the home.

12. Equal access and rights to employment, education, information, technology, housing, health and welfare services, cultural and leisure activities and the law.

13. Reform of the Australian Constitution and other political institutions to ensure that they reflect the will of the majority of Australian citizens and the existence of Australia as an independent republic.

14. Recognition and protection of fundamental political and civil rights, including freedom of expression, the press, assembly, association, conscience and religion; the right to privacy; the protection of the individual from oppression by the state; and democratic reform of the Australian legal system.

15. The development of a democratic communications system, as an integral part of a free society, to which all citizens have opportunities for free access.

16. Elimination of discrimination and exploitation on the grounds of class, race, sex, sexuality, religion, political affiliation, national origin, citizenship, age, disability, regional location, or economic or household status.

17. Recognition of the prior ownership of Australian land by Aborigines and Islanders, recognition of their special and essential relationship with the land as the basis of their culture, and a commitment to the return of established traditional lands to the ownership of Aboriginal and Islander communities.

585
18. Recognition and encouragement of diversity of cultural expression and lifestyle within the Australian community.

19. The proper management of Australian resources and protection of the environment, whether created by people or nature, to safeguard the rights of present and future generations.

20. Maintenance of world peace; an independent Australian position in world affairs; the recognition of the right of all nations to self-determination and independence; regional and international agreement for arms control and disarmament; the provision of economic and social aid to developing nations; a commitment to resolve international conflicts through the United Nations; and a recognition of the inalienable right of all people to liberty, equality, democracy and social justice.

21. Commitment to and participation in the international democratic socialist movement as represented by the Socialist International.

22. Recognition of the right of citizens to work for progressive changes consistent with the broad principles of democratic socialism.

C PRINCIPLES OF ACTION

The Australian Labor Party believes that the task of building democratic socialism is a co-operative process which requires:

1. constitutional action through the Australian and State Parliaments, municipal and other statutory authorities;

2. union action; and

3. ongoing action by organised community groups.

D MEMBERSHIP AND ORGANISATION

1. Membership of the Australian Labor Party is open to all residents of Australia who are prepared to accept its objectives and who have associations with no other political party.

2. Australian Labor Party Policy is made by National Conferences comprising the national and State parliamentary leadership of the Party, together with elected delegates from all States, the Australian Capital Territory, the Northern Territory and Australian Young Labor.
Party policy within the States and Territories is framed by conferences of delegates elected by constituent branches and affiliated unions.

Policy within the Australian Labor Party is not made by directives from the leadership, but by resolutions originating from branches, affiliated unions and individual party members.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


THE ADVERTISER (Adelaide)

AEU MONTHLY NEWS (Sydney)

THE AGE (Melbourne)

THE AGE MONTHLY REVIEW (Melbourne)


ALP (1921) Ninth Commonwealth Conference Report.

ALP (1959) Official Report of the 23rd Commonwealth Conference (Canberra, 19 May and following days), Brisbane, ALP.

ALP (1961) Official Report of the Proceedings of the 24th Commonwealth Conference (Canberra, 10 April and following days), Perth, ALP.


ALP (1965) Official Report of the Proceedings of the 26th Commonwealth Conference (Sydney, 2-6 August), Canberra, ALP.

ALP (1966a) Report of the Special Commonwealth Conference (Canberra, 29-30 March), Canberra, ALP.
ALP (1966b) Report of the Special Commonwealth Conference (Surfers Paradise, 29-30 July), Canberra, ALP.

ALP (1967) 'Agenda: Twenty-Seventh Commonwealth Conference and for the Special Commonwealth Conference' (Adelaide, 31 July and following days).

ALP (1969) Official Reports of the 27th Commonwealth Conference (Adelaide, 31 July 1967 and following days) and 28th Commonwealth Conference (Melbourne, 28 July 1969 and succeeding days), Adelaide, ALP.

ALP (1979) National Committee of Inquiry Report, Canberra, ALP.

ALP CANDIDATES (1983) Biographical Details of Federal Candidates, Canberra, ALP.

ALP CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS (1981) Documents for Special Conference (Melbourne, 27-29 July) including Biographies of Delegates and texts of motions, Canberra, ALP.

ALP CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS (1982) Biographies of Delegates (National Conference, Canberra, 5-9 July 1982), Canberra, ALP.

ALP CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS (1984) Biographies of Delegates (National Conference, Canberra, 9-13 July), Canberra, ALP.

ALP FEDERAL SECRETARIAT (1965) 'Information Releases', Canberra, ALP.


ALP, QLD BRANCH (1965) Official Record of the 25th Queensland Labor-in-Politics Convention (Townsville, 10-14 May), Brisbane, ALP (Qld Branch).


ALP, TAS BRANCH (1964) 1964 Annual Conference (Report of the Proceedings, Devonport, 10 March and following days), Hobart, ALP (Tas.Branch).


ALP, VIC BRANCH (1964) 1964 Central Executive Report, Melbourne, ALP (Vic Branch).


AMWSU (1977) Australia Uprooted, Sydney, AMWSU.

AMWSU (1979) Australia Ripped Off, Sydney, AMWSU.


APSA (1979) ALP National Committee of Inquiry Discussion Papers, Bedford Park, APSA.


THE AUSTRALIAN
THE AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL REVIEW


BEILHARZ, P. (1985) 'Theorizing the Middle Class', Arena (72), 97-105.


BLEWETT, N. (nd) 'Sense and Nonsense in South Australia - Some Thoughts on Some Reviews of Playford and Dunstan' (unpublished paper).


BRIAN FITZPATRICK'S LABOR NEWSLETTER.

BROWN, W.J. (1964) 'Strengthen the Struggle for Unity', Communist Review (April), 101-3.


THE BULLETIN (Sydney)


CALLINICOS, A. (1983) 'The "New Middle Class" and Socialist Politics', International Socialism (20, new series), 82-119.


THE CANBERRA TIMES

CARR, B. (nd) Social Democracy and Australian Labor, Sydney, NSW Labor Day Committee.


CENTURY (Sydney, Lang Labor).

CHALLENGE (Steering Committee Group, NSW ALP).


THE CLARION (Sydney, AJA strike newspaper)


596


THE COURIER-MAIL (Brisbane).


CPD (Hansard, House of Representatives and Senate).


THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (Sydney).


DIRECT ACTION (Sydney, Socialist Workers Party)


ELSTER, J. (1979)


ENCEL, S. (1962b) 'Socialist Ideas - The Sixties', *Dissent* 2 (2), 4-8.


THE EXAMINER (Launceston)


FACT (Melbourne, Victorian ALP)


FRASER, A. 'Postmortem Morbidity', Dissent (12), 16-7.


603


HEAD, B. and PATIENCE, A. (1979) 'Labor and Liberal: How Different are They' in Patience, A. and Head, B. (eds), From Whitlam to Fraser, Melbourne, Oxford UP, 1-8 and 290-1.


HELLER, A. (1982) Why We Should Maintain the Socialist Objective, Melbourne, Kooyong FEA.

HELLER, A. (1985) 'A Socialist in Exile' (interview by Patrick Wright), New Socialist (July), 11-14 and 35.


THE HERALD (Melbourne)


HUNTINGTON, S. (1968) Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven, Yale UP.


JONES, B. (1964) 'The Two ALPs', *Dissent* (13), 24-7.


JUPP, J. (1964) Australian Party Politics, Melbourne, Melbourne UP.


LABOR COMMENT (Melbourne, The Participants, Victorian ALP)

LABOR STAR (Melbourne, Victorian ALP)

LABOR TIMES (Melbourne, Victorian ALP)

LABOR TIMES (Sydney, NSW ALP).


LA PALOMBERA (1966) 'Decline of Ideology: A Dissent and an Interpretation', American Political Science Review 60 (1), 5-16.


LOBBY (Canberra, ACT ALP)


612


THE MARITIME WORKER (Sydney, WWF)


THE MERCURY (Hobart)


THE NATION (Sydney)

NATION REVIEW

THE NATIONAL TIMES

NCI Material (including Submissions, Responses, draft Discussion Papers, 'Notes on the ALP Committee of Inquiry, Bob Hogg letter', ALP Review Committee: Some Preliminary Objectives and sundry other documents made available to me by the ALP National Secretariat, Canberra)


NEW BASIS (Sydney, Sydney University Fabian Society)

NEW STATESMAN (London)


NORTHERN DAILY LEADER (Tamworth)

NSW ALP Records M1 Mss (for guide, see Turner, K., 1973).


OFFICE OF WOMEN'S AFFAIRS (Dept. of Prime Minister and Cabinet) (1977) *Women and Politics Conference 1975 Papers and Proceedings*, Vols. 1 and 2, Canberra, AGPS.


OUTLOOK (Sydney)


THE RADICAL (Sydney, NSW ALP)

RANNEY, A. (1972) *Curing the Mischief of Faction*, Berkely, University of California Press.


RAWSON, D. (1961b) *Australia Votes*, Melbourne UP.


ROSS, L. (1934) 'From Lane to Lang - The Evolution of Labor Theory', *Australian Quarterly* 6 (14), 49-62.


SOCIALIST AND INDUSTRIAL LABOR (Sydney, Steering Committee group, NSW ALP).


THE SUNDAY MAIL (Brisbane)

THE SUNDAY REVIEW (Melbourne)

THE SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (Sydney)

THE SUN-HERALD (Sydney)

THE SUN NEWS PICTORIAL (Melbourne)

THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD


TRIBUNE (Sydney, CPA)


TURNER, I. (1959) 'Counter to Stagnation', Outlook 3 (1),


627


THE WEST AUSTRALIAN (Perth)

THE WESTERN SUN (Perth, WA ALP)


WHEELWRIGHT, TOM (1985) 'The ALP Machine in NSW', paper presented to Federalism Conference, Dept. of Political Science, RSSS, ANU.


WHITLAM, E.G. (1966) 'Trade Unionists and Politics' in Mayer (1966b),
WHITLAM, E.G. (1967a) 'Address at the Conference of the Union of Postal Clerks and Gelegraphists', Sydney, May.

WHITLAM, E.G. (1967b) Towards a National Party with a National Purpose: Let Us Begin,


WILSON, I. (nd) 'The 1958 Federal Election in Yarra', Sydney, APSA.


WYNDHAM, C. (1964) The Unbridgeable Gulf - The ALP and Communism, Canberra, ALP.


