THE CONTROL OF THE SZECHUAN-KWEICHOW FRONTIER REGIONS DURING THE LATE MING:
A CASE STUDY OF THE FRONTIER POLICY AND TRIBAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE MING GOVERNMENT

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ABSTRACT

Building upon the frontier policies and the handling of tribal affairs of previous dynasties, the Ming Court systematised the t' u-ssu chieftain institution as an instrument for controlling tribal administration in southwestern China. At the same time, t' u-kuan prefectural governments in which the official status and administration were the same as those of the regular prefectural government were established. The headship of both was conferred upon chieftains, but the registrars and secretaries of the t' u-ssu government and the deputies and subordinates of the t' u-kuan government were mostly Han civil servants. After the abolition of a t' u-ssu, the Court had to consider whether the use of a fragmentation strategy or the application of kai-t' u kuei-liu was more advantageous. The former being a policy of establishing many small, weak territories ruled by new chieftains and Han officials was usually adopted for reasons of economy. The kai-t' u kuei-liu policy which led to the change from tribal to regular government and the replacement of tribal chiefs with regular officials required considerable financial investment to be successful. In carrying out this transformation, the Court achieved its two greatest successes in the establishment of Kweichow province after the suppression of the t' u-ssu governments of Ssu-chou and Ssu-nan in 1413 in the early Ming and in the creation of the two prefectures of Tsun-i and P' ing-yüeh by the abolition of the Po-chou t' u-ssu government in 1601 in the late Ming.

The Yang family had ruled over Po-chou for seven and a quarter centuries since 876 A.D. By following an opportunistic
policy, the Yang family had maintained good feudal relations with a succession of dynastic houses. Having suffered official oppression and judicial trials from provincial authorities, the twenty-ninth ruler Yang Ying-lung revolted against the government. Displaying his antagonism towards five subordinate tribal chiefs and seven prominent local families, Yang Ying-lung confiscated their lands and property to provision his Miao troops in fighting against government forces and making raids over a wide area in northern Kweichow and southern Szechuan for several years. Thus the feudal relationship was broken and the social order severely disrupted. The local government forces failed to subjugate the uprising and the central government could not organise a new campaign because of the massive military commitment to keep Korea resist Japanese aggression. After the end of the Sino-Japanese War (1592-1598) in Korea, a government-tribal united force of 240,000 was recruited to conduct a suppression campaign against Yang Ying-lung. Finally, in 1600, Ying-lung was defeated and committed suicide. Owing to the expense of the military campaigns and the request for political reforms, the Ming authorities implemented a kai-t' u kuei-liu policy. The rule by the Yang family was abolished and Po-chou was divided into two new prefectures under the jurisdiction of Szechuan and Kweichow respectively.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>List of Maps and Tables</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgments</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explanatory Notes</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chronology Used in the Text</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ming Reign Periods</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviations Used in Citation</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter One: The T'u-ssu System: Frontier Policy and Tribal Administration of the Ming Government</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Establishment of the Ming t'u-ssu System</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Military Control and Utility</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Political Supervision and Conversion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Economic Exploitation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Cultural Assimilation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Judicial Administration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Two: The Yang Family: The Ruling Agent in Po-chou</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. A Geographical Survey of Ming Po-chou</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. The Occupation of Po-chou by the Yang Family</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Disruption and Reunion in Sung Times</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Submission to the Mongol Yuan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Three: Po-chou in Ming Times</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Feudal Relationship Between the Yang Family and the Ming Court</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Economic Burdens</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Military Service</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Domestic Struggles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Immigration of the Han People</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Four: The Po-chou Uprising and the Response of the Government</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Underlying Causes of the Po-chou Uprising</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Development of the Po-chou Uprising</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i) The first phase: 1594-1595</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii) The second phase: 1596-1599</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. The Response of the Government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Five: The Decisive Suppression in 1600</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Strategy for Suppression</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. War Preparation and Military Mobilisation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Three Stages of the Decisive Battle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Chapter Six: Policy Formulation and Implementation

**After the Suppression Campaign**

- A. Comments on the Ming Frontier Policy
- B. Application of *kai-t'ü kuei-liu*
- C. Establishment of Military Settlements
- D. Land Survey and Re-distribution
- E. Sinicisation by Education

### Conclusion

162

### Appendices

- **Appendix One:** The Military Hierarchy in Ming China  
  173
- **Appendix Two:** The Genealogy of the Yang Family in Po-chou  
  175
- **Appendix Three:** Chronicle of the Po-chou Tribal Troops' Participation in the Suppression Campaigns  
  180
- **Appendix Four:** A Brief Account on the 1476-1477 Suppression Campaign  
  181
- **Appendix Five:** A Brief Account of the 1486-1487 Investigation  
  184
- **Appendix Six:** The Case of An Kuo-heng: 1570-1577  
  190
- **Appendix Seven:** Official Career of Li Hua-lung (11 April 1554-17 January 1612)  
  192

### Glossary

195

### Bibliography

200
# LIST OF MAPS AND TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Map</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Map I.</td>
<td>Ming Po-chou in Modern Kweichow</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Map II.</td>
<td>The Ming-Ch'ing Boundaries Between Kweichow and Szechuan</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Map III.</td>
<td>Important T'u-ssu in Szechuan-Hukuang-Kweichow-Yunnan Area</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Map IV.</td>
<td>Government Military Control on Po-chou Since 1555</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Map V.</td>
<td>The 1594 Expedition upon Po-chou</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Map VI.</td>
<td>Routes of the 1600 Decisive General Assault upon Po-chou</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Map VII.</td>
<td>Change from Tribal to Regular Government</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Table One: | The Organisation of the T'u-ssu Government in Ming China              | 8    |
| Table Two: | Quantity and Percentage of Tribal-Government United Troops          | 17   |
| Table Three: | Annual Aids to Kweichow by Szechuan Tribal Units | 81   |
| Table Four: | Local Military Aids in the 1600 Suppression Campaign                | 129  |
| Table Five: | Government-Tribal United Force in the 1600 Suppression Campaign    | 134  |
| Table Six:  | Integration of Po-chou into Regular Government                      | 153  |
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Needless to say, the many inadequacies of this thesis are exclusively my own responsibility.
EXPLANATORY NOTES

Proper Names

The romanisation system employed in this thesis is the Wade-Giles for Chinese, including personal names, official titles, geographical names and special terms. Provinces and widely known places of the Ming and Mongol names are given according to their conventional English spellings. Chinese characters presented in the maps, the Chronology Used in the Text, the Ming Reign Periods and in Appendix Two (The Genealogy of the Yang Family in Po-chou) are not furnished in the Glossary. Special abbreviations are included at the beginning of Appendices One and Two as specific guides to the reader.

The Calendar and the Hour Period

Dates are calculated according to the western calendar. Time indicated in the original sources by Chinese hour (shih-ch'en) has been converted to Western time. (There are twelve Chinese hours in a day. The first Chinese hour period is from 11 p.m. to 1 a.m.)

Weights and Measures

Standard units include the following, with approximate English equivalents:

- mou = 1/6.6 acre
- tan (measure of grain) = picul = 133.3 pounds
- ch'ien = 1/10 tael of silver
- ting (paper cash) = 5 kuan = 5,000 copper cash
- li = 1/3 English mile
Civil Service Degrees

舉人 chu-jen = provincial graduate (second degree)
進士 chin-shih = metropolitan graduate (third and highest degree)

CHRONOLOGY USED IN THE TEXT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dynasty</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shang</td>
<td>c. 1766-1123 B.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chou</td>
<td>1122-249 B.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warring States</td>
<td>403-221 B.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'in</td>
<td>221-207 B.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Han</td>
<td>206 B.C.-A.D. 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Later Han</td>
<td>25-220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shu Han</td>
<td>221-264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Chin</td>
<td>265-317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T'ang</td>
<td>618-906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five Dynasties</td>
<td>907-960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liao</td>
<td>907-1125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Sung</td>
<td>960-1126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Sung</td>
<td>1127-1279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chin</td>
<td>1115-1234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yüan</td>
<td>1279-1368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ming</td>
<td>1368-1644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'ing</td>
<td>1644-1911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reign Period</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hung-wu</td>
<td>洪武</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chien-wen</td>
<td>建文</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yung-lo</td>
<td>永樂</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hung-hsi</td>
<td>洪熙</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsüan-te</td>
<td>宣德</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheng-t'ung</td>
<td>正統</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ching-t'ai</td>
<td>景泰</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T'ien-shun</td>
<td>天順</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'eng-hua</td>
<td>成化</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hung-chih</td>
<td>弘治</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheng-te</td>
<td>正德</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chia-ching</td>
<td>麟靖</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lung-ch'ing</td>
<td>隆慶</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wan-li</td>
<td>嘉靖</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T'ai-ch'ang</td>
<td>泰昌</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T'ien-ch'i</td>
<td>天啟</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'ung-chen</td>
<td>崇禎</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTWKP</td>
<td>Chao-tai wu-kung-pien</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMB</td>
<td>Dictionary of Ming Biography, 1368-1644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMCSWP</td>
<td>Huang-Ming ching-shih wen-pien</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KC</td>
<td>Kuo ch'üeh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KCTH</td>
<td>Kuo-ch'ao tien-hui</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCHC</td>
<td>Man-ssu ho-chih</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS</td>
<td>Ming shih</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSCSPM</td>
<td>Ming-shih chi-shih pen-mo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSK</td>
<td>Ming shih kao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPCS</td>
<td>P'ing Po ch'üan-shu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SL</td>
<td>Ming shih-lu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIFC</td>
<td>Tsun-i fu-chih</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMHT</td>
<td>Ta-Ming hui-tien</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WLSTCK</td>
<td>Wan-li san-ta-cheng k'ao</td>
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<tr>
<td>YSCC</td>
<td>Yang-shih chia-chuan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

China is a multi-ethnic country. Over fifty ethnic minority nationalities make up about six per cent of the total population, the rest being Han Chinese. While comprising a small percentage of the population, the ethnic minorities are spread over 50-60 per cent of the territory of present-day China. More than half of these have for many thousand years made their homes in the mountainous areas of the southwestern provinces of Yunnan, Szechuan and Kweichow, in western Hunan in central south China, as well as in Kwangsi, Kwangtung and Fukien in the south.¹ During the Ming era (1368-1644) the registered population of China was around 60,000,000 to over 65,000,000.² The population of ethnic minorities is unknown. Therefore the proportion of minorities to Han Chinese in Ming times cannot be accurately estimated.

Undoubtedly there were large groups of minority tribesmen in southwestern China, such as the Chuang in Kwangsi, the Miao in Kweichow and the Yi in Yunnan. Some ethnic groups established independent or semi-independent domains which survived for several centuries; some persisted for over one thousand years. The T'ien clan of Ssu-chou in Kweichow, for example, was said to have lasted since the Former Han dynasty

The ancestor of the An clan of Shui-hsi in Kweichow had led his tribesmen to assist Prime Minister Chu-ko Liang (181-234 A.D.) of Shu Han (221-264 A.D.) in his southern expedition. The Tuan clan of Ta-li in Yunnan and the Yang clan of Po-chou in Kweichow (Szechuan in Ming times) had founded their domains in the T'ang period (618-906 A.D.).

As Han-Chinese political influence gradually penetrated south and southwestern China, the imperial Courts tried to institute direct rule by regular officials in the border regions or the sinicised tribal areas wherever possible. Han-Chinese administrators were appointed to tribal areas with responsibility for tribal affairs during the pre-T'ang period; later, the imperial Courts of the T'ang and Sung (960-1279) dynasties established chi-mi fu chou (military and civil prefecture under loose rein) in the frontier regions because they found it expedient to accept nominal overlordship over a tribe by reinstating its old chieftain or by appointing a Han leader with a military following in place of a defeated chieftain. With the establishment of this special institution, the chieftain of such a prefecture was conferred the title of Tu-tu (military governor) or Tz'u-shih (governor) with rights


4 Chang T'ing-yü et al., Ming shih (Peking, 1974. Hereafter abbreviated as MS), 27:8169.

of hereditary succession for his family. During the Yuan (1260-1368) and Ming dynasties, the imperial Courts reformed the institution by setting up pacification offices known as the t'u-ssu system. The Yuan Court appointed an equal-ranked Mongol darughachi (normally a tax collector) to form a dual rulership with the native chieftain to govern a tribal district; the Ming Court appointed lower-ranked Han-Chinese officials as registrars and clerks to participate in tribal administration. Such pacification offices or native prefectures under loose rein in Ming times constituted a frontier prefectural system in name but a frontier feudal system in reality. Therefore, the Ming Court started to adopt a policy known as kai-t'u kuei-liu to convert them into regular prefectures and districts directly under the control of the provincial governments. This approach to tribal affairs was later widely used by the imperial Court of the Ch'ing dynasty (1644-1911).

This dissertation intends to assess the evolution of Court policy towards the minority groups from chi-mi to the t'u-ssu institution to kai-t'u kuei-liu through a study of Po-chou in the Szechuan-Kweichow frontier region where the Yang family held hereditary rule for seven and a quarter centuries from 876 A.D. to 1600 A.D.

Owing to the extreme difficulty and high cost of imposing direct administration upon the minority groups in the mountain

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areas of south and southwestern China, the Ming Court adopted the earlier policy of the Mongol Yuan, codifying and systematising the t'u-ssu institution. The Court granted each tribal chief a title and the hereditary right to rule, and in return, the tribal chief submitted tribute and undertook other obligations. In the first chapter, this t'u-ssu system—the frontier policy and tribal administration of the Ming government—will be discussed in detail. In order to understand the character of the t'u-ssu institution as well as its long existence in history, the Yang family rule over Po-chou from the T'ang to the Ming and its relationship to those imperial Courts will be introduced in the second and third chapters.

The last three chapters will focus on the conflicts, negotiations and challenges between the Po-chou ruler Yang Ying-lung and the provincial governments as well as the central government. Through the underlying causes and the development of the Po-chou uprising, the contradictions between the Yang family and its subordinate chiefs as well as the inconsistent policies of the provincial and metropolitan authorities will be clearly exposed. Consequently, the policy of kai-t'u kuei-liu of absorbing Po-chou into the regular government and replacing its tribal chiefs with regular officials was adopted after the elimination of the autonomy of the Yang family through a 112 days decisive suppression campaign in 1600.
CHAPTER ONE
The T'u-ssu System: Frontier Policy and Tribal Administration of the Ming Government

A. Establishment of the Ming T'u-ssu System

The practice of nominating local chieftains as imperial officials can be traced back as early as the times of Emperors Ch'in Shih-huang (r. 221-210 B.C.) and Han Wu-ti (r. 140-87 B.C.). Such appointments had been practised occasionally in the eras of Shu Han (221-264 A.D.) and Western Chin (265-317 A.D.) and during the reign of Sung T'ai-tsu (907-926 A.D.). Although the seeds of the t'u-ssu system had been planted in the early dynasties, it became a firmly established institution with a definite hierarchy of titles and ranks only during the Ming dynasty (1368-1644). The term "t'u-ssu" also originated in Ming times. Moreover, of the Twenty-five Standard Histories, Ming Shih is the first one which contains several chapters of "Biographies of T'u-ssu".

According to the t'u-ssu system of the Ming dynasty, there were two types of tribal officials: t'u-kuan and t'u-ssu. T'u-kuan were the civilian tribal administrative officials, such as the magistrates of t'u-fu (native prefecture), t'u-chou (native sub-prefecture) and t'u-hsien (native county). Their titles were t'u chih-fu (ranked 4a), t'u chih-chou (5b) and t'u chih-hsien (7a). These were tribal officials appointed to

1 Lien-sheng Yang, op.cit.; MS, 26:7981.
administer regular administrative units with largely tribal populations.

_T'usu_ were the rulers of the tribes which had submitted to the Ming Court. These tribal chieftains were invested with their pre-existing rule and were conferred the titles of _hsüan-wei-shih_, _hsüan-fu-shih_, _an-fu-shih_, _chao-t'ao-shih_ or _chang-kuan_ depending upon their size and merit. Their offices or headquarters were called _ssu_, such as _hsüan-wei-ssu_ or _hsüan-wei-shih-ssu_, _hsüan-fu-ssu_, _an-fu-ssu_, _chao-t'ao-ssu_ and _chang-kuan-ssu_. These _t'u-ssu_ in general maintained their established territorial boundaries and retained considerable local autonomy.

_T'usu-li_ were assistants in a tribal office, such as clerks, jail wardens and post-masters.\(^3\) They existed in the jurisdictions of both the _t'u-kuan_ and _t'u-ssu_ as the low-ranking underlings.

The character "_t'u_" has the cognate meanings of earth, local or indigenous — in other words, pertaining to the non-Han tribespeople.\(^4\) The character "_ssu_" originally means an administrative department or an independent bureau. The term "_yu ssu_" in ancient Chinese or literary language means official(s).\(^5\) Therefore, some scholars have translated "_t'u-

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3 She I-tse, Chung-kuo _t'u-ssu chih-tu_ (Shanghai, 1947), 1.
4 Herold J. Wiens, _op.cit._, 214.
5 [This footnote has now been deleted.]
ssu" as a tribal chief; some have defined it as a border or tribal government, or as an aboriginal self-government unit or a pacification office.

These tribal governments were not treated as foreign countries but as a special kind of local government by the Ming Court. Their chiefs and deputies were, of course, granted titles and ranks according to the Court's hierarchical principle. The following table illustrates the organisation of the t'u-ssu government in Ming China.

The titles of the Pacification Offices and Pacification Commissioners listed in the table did not actually originate in Ming times. They had been used in preceding dynasties for different duties. The an-fu-ssu designation originated during the T'ang period (618-906) when its head, the an-fu-shih, was appointed to receive imperial mandates from the Court and to carry out missions to the local governments. In the Sung period (960-1279), however, it designated a military commander.

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7 Lin Yutang, op.cit., 173; Sun I-tu (Jen) ed., Ch'ing Administrative Terms (Harvard University Press, 1961), 131.

### TABLE ONE: The Organisation of the *T'u-ssu* Government in Ming China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><em>T'u-ssu</em> Govt. or Pacification Office</th>
<th>Native Chieftain or Pacification Commissioner</th>
<th>Subordinates (Tribesmen)</th>
<th>Registry (Mostly Han-Chinese)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Vice-commissioner</td>
<td>Assist. Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsüan-wei-ssu</td>
<td>Hsüan-wei-shih (3b)</td>
<td>T'ung-chih (4a)</td>
<td>Fu-shih (4b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>T'ung-chih (5a)</td>
<td>Fu-shih (5b)</td>
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<td>Fu-shih (6b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chao-t'ao-ssu</td>
<td>Chao-t'ao-shih (5b)</td>
<td>Fu Chao-t'ao (6a)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chang-kuan-ssu</td>
<td>Chang-kuan (6a)</td>
<td>Fu Chang-kuan (6b)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man-i chang-kuan-ssu</td>
<td>Chang-kuan (7a)</td>
<td>Fu Chang-kuan (7b)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the Yuan (1279-1368), it was applied to military commanders in frontier regions.

Being a temporary but very important position during the Sung dynasty, the hsüan-fu-ssu was usually occupied by a high official of the Privy Military Council who supervised military personnel from the Court. During the Yuan, the hsüan-fu-ssu was stationed in the southwestern frontier regions and his duties concerned mainly pacification activities.

The position of the chao-t'ao-ssu originated in T'ang times and was adopted by the Five Dynasties (907-960) with responsibility for carrying out military expeditions under the Marshal. The ruling houses of the Khitan Liao (907-1125) and the Jürchen Chin (1115-1234) also appointed chao-t'ao-shih to conduct subjugation and suppression campaigns. During the Sung, it was a temporary position with the same kind of duty as it had in the periods of Liao and Chin. The Yuan officials of this name, however, were stationed only in the garrisons near the border areas.\(^9\)

There were two kinds of chang-kuan-ssu in Mongol-ruled China. The one in northern China was applied to officials in charge of the households of artisans. The other in southwestern China entitled man-i chang-kuan-ssu whose head and deputy officials were mostly conferred on chieftains was concerned

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with rule over their tribesmen. In Ming times, both chang-kuan-ssu and man-i chang-kuan-ssu became the lowest-ranking pacification offices and referred to offices dealing with the management of tribal affairs. The difference between the two was that the former ruled over four hundred or more households and the latter ruled over less than four hundred households.

The word "hsüan-wei" means to proclaim and pacify. It first appeared in the Chin shu (History of the Chin Dynasty, 265-317), a Standard History edited in the early T'ang. The official title "hsüan-wei-shih" was first used in the mid-T'ang when it referred to Confucius's seventy-third generation descendant K'ung Ch'ao-fu as the "Hsüan-wei-shih of Wei-po". It became an office within the provincial government during the Yuan dynasty and was entitled "hsüan-wei-shih-ssu". His duty was to assume full charge of all military and civil affairs within a circuit of a province. Since the provinces were so vast that the Yuan governors found it difficult to dominate the border areas far from the provincial capitals, the hsüan-wei-shih were appointed to share these duties with the provincial governments. Most of the staff in the hsüan-wei-shih-ssu were high-ranking officials, and usually three heads (ranked 2b)

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10 Hsü wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao, 1:3353; Hsü t'ung-chih, 1:4067; 4070.
12 Fang Hsüan-ling, et al., Chin-shu (Peking, 1974), 1:34.
were simultaneously appointed at the headquarters to form a collective leadership. From the Mongol point of view, all nationalities including the majority Han were conquered subjects and should be impartially "pacified". Therefore, although the hsüan-wei-shih were not tribal heads but administrative officials of local government units in the Yuan period, they were appointed to carry out the pacification activities in the Han provinces of China in the early stage. Only those who were appointed in the border provinces were concurrently in charge of a hsüan-wei-shih-ssu as well as a tu-yüan-shuai-fu or yüan-shuai-fu (Field-Marshal Headquarters) which concerned more military affairs. In order to rule over the tribesmen in the mountainous areas, "uncivilised" districts, remote places or frontier regions, the Yuan Court bestowed the titles of hsüan-fu-shih, an-fu-shih, chao-t'ao-shih (all ranked 3a), or the man-i-chang-kuan (5b) in cooperation with a darughachi (3a) (usually a Mongol) to form a dual rulership.\(^\text{14}\)

The Ming Court, as a Han-Chinese dynasty, of course, adopted a different point of view on pacification from the Mongols. After the overthrow of the Yuan, the Ming founder withdrew all hsüan-wei-shih-ssu and chang-kuan-ssu from the provincial governments in China and combined them together with hsüan-fu-ssu, an-fu-ssu, chao-t'ao-ssu and man-i-chang-kuan-ssu

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in forming different ranks of tribal government ruled by chieftains. From the viewpoint of the ethnically Han Chinese imperial Court, these *t' u-ssu* could be regarded as Pacification Offices dispatched from the Ming central government.

The Yuan *t' u-ssu* system was not tightly organised but was strongly supervised by the Mongol Court. The appointments of *hsüan-fu-shih, an-fu-shih* and *chao-t' ao-shih* were not conferred solely on tribal chiefs but were all supervised by the equal-ranked imperial ruling agents *darughachi*. In Ming times, the institution of *t' u-ssu* was simplified but systematised. The appointments of *hsüan-wei-shih, hsüan-fu-shih, an-fu-shih, chao-t' ao-shih* and *chang-kuan* were conferred solely upon the tribal chief who became the head of a tribal government; no *darughachi* or equal-ranked high officials were appointed. Instead, to maintain control, lower-ranked registrars who were in charge of official communications and documents in the tribal governments were mostly Han-Chinese civilian officials. 

Furthermore, some of the tribal units were converted into native *fu, chou* or *hsien* according to their size in Ming times. They had the same organisation as regular *fu, chou* and *hsien* local governments in China but their heads were mostly tribal chiefs governing with the assistance of Han-Chinese deputies or subordinates. This conversion which had been in practice since early Ming can be regarded as a kind of semi-*kai-t'u kuei-liu* policy.

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15 Huang K'ai-hua, *op.cit.*, 5:36-40; *MS*, 6:1876.
16 *MS*, 6:1876.
B. Military Control and Utility

The frontier policy in the early Ming period generally reflected a hierarchical approach. The Ming Court was not interested in those states far from China. It paid much more attention to the tribes in the frontier area or border regions. It is clear that the effort involved in bringing peoples of the overseas and neighbouring countries under China's domination would be too great. In 1371, the Ming founder (r. 1368-1398) had clearly stated that China should never send punitive expeditions to East and Southeast Asia.\(^\text{17}\) He pointed out that those nomadic cavalry people to the north who had for generations posed a threat to China should be watched with close attention.\(^\text{18}\) The Khitan Liao and the Jürchert Chin had taken over parts of China in the past, and the Mongols more recently had succeeded in capturing all of China, control of which the Ming Court had just regained. For the purpose of defense, the Ming government successively founded 3 Regional Military Commissions, 385 Guards, 41 Battalions and other minor military stations in north China.\(^\text{19}\) Later, nine or more so-called Defense Areas (\textit{chen}) or Frontiers (\textit{pien}) which stretched across the northern land frontier were also created for resistance against any possible invasion.\(^\text{20}\)

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19 \textit{MS}, 6:1876; 8:2222-2228.

While defending the border areas in the North in early Ming, the government troops marched to the South and the Southwest to confront the surviving Han rivals in Szechuan and the remnants of the Mongol feudal forces as well as unsubdued tribal clans in Yunnan. Southwestern China had been an ideal environment for the development and expansion by Han migrants since the Chin and Han periods. The Ming Court viewed the region with a similar interest. Since the Ming founder had successfully conducted subjugation campaigns in Szechuan in 1371 and Yunnan in 1382, the succeeding emperors adopted this suppression policy throughout the country.21 His usurping son Emperor Yung-lo (r. 1402-1424) even broke his specific imperial instructions by expanding further into An-nan (present-day Vietnam) with the dispatch of eight hundred thousand troops.22

During the suppression campaigns of the early Ming, the Ming founder in his instructions insisted on killing all disloyal and unyielding tribal chiefs or tribal heads but forgiving their subordinates and followers.23 In 1434, Emperor Hsüan-te (r. 1426-1435) specified in the reward regulations dealing with the suppression of southern tribesmen that anyone who could kill either three tribesmen or a tribal head would be

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21 MS, 1:26, 39; Chao I, Nien-erh-shih cha-chi (Peking, 1963), 2:710.
22 Chao I, ibid.
promoted by one rank. During the Ch'eng-hua reign (1465-1487), the number to be killed to gain the same promotion was doubled. From the Cheng-te reign (1506-1521) onward, because of the long distance from the capital which had been transferred from Nanking in the south to Peking in the north, the rewards for killing tribesmen in Szechuan and Kweichow were to be defined according to the number of ears cut from the dead, rather than heads. Despite these strong suppression campaigns, however, tribal revolts did not cease throughout the Ming dynasty.

On the other hand, the Ming Court preserved its military control over the t'u-ssu through a tight organisational military hierarchy. The basic military administrative hierarchy culminated in a cluster of five Chief Military Commissions in the central government, paralleling the Censorate and the cluster of six Ministries. These Chief Military Commissions were concerned with specialised professional aspects of military administration, whereas the Ministry of War dealt with problems of personnel, supply etc. At the provincial level, there were twenty-one Regional Military Commissions or Branch Regional Military Commissions. At lower levels, the military bureaucracy basically consisted of Guards, Battalions and Companies, each designated by its geographical locality and

24 Hsü wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao, 2:3894.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid., 2:3899.
supervised by one of the Regional Military Commissions or Branch Regional Military Commissions. In this rigorously organised military structure, most of the t'u-ssu were supervised by the Guards or directly controlled by a Regional Military Commission. (See Appendix One: The Military Hierarchy in Ming China.)

One of the successes of the Ming Court's policy towards the tribal peoples was that the Han-Chinese rulers could effectively utilise tribal forces to fight against foreign enemies, to suppress the disloyal tribes, to exterminate bandits, to guard the frontier regions, and to invade neighbouring countries. According to the historical sources, the first time tribesmen were used as a military force was in the late Shang dynasty (c. 1766-1123 B.C.). While marching to defeat the last Shang ruler, King Wu of the Chou dynasty (1122-249 B.C.) organised a united front in which at least eight kinds of famous tribespeoples were enlisted.

During the last period of the Yüan dynasty, thousands of tribesmen were organised into a strong military force by the Mongol ruler to fight against rebels. For the same purpose, the Han-Chinese rivals Chang Shih-ch'eng, Ch'en Yu-liang and Chu Yüan-chang who were contending for supremacy also utilised the tribesmen in their struggles.

27 Charles O. Hucker, op.cit.
During the Ming dynasty, the tribal forces obviously took part in the invasion of Vietnam. When military movements occurred, the Han-t'ü or government-tribal joint forces were mostly recruited from the southern and southwestern provinces. The highest estimate for such an army was the joint force of 1406 numbering eight hundred thousand, of which the number of tribesmen is unclear. The percentage of tribal troops was quite high in some suppression campaigns, as illustrated in the following table:

TABLE TWO: Quantity and Percentage of Government-Tribal United Troops

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Joint Force</th>
<th>Han-Chinese</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Tribesmen</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1395</td>
<td>Kwangsi</td>
<td>58,900</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>38,900</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1465</td>
<td>Kwangsi</td>
<td>190,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>84.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1476</td>
<td>Kweichow</td>
<td>22,821</td>
<td>5,710</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>17,111</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1600</td>
<td>Szechuan</td>
<td>240,000</td>
<td>72,000</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>168,000</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1606</td>
<td>Kweichow</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: MSCSPM, 1:400-401; MS, 26:8048, 27:8196, 8269.

So vast an empire as Ming China undoubtedly needed a substantial military force to guard its extensive borders. The wei-so garrison system took main responsibility for such heavy defense requirements. Those located along the north and

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31 MS, 14:4220; Chao I, op.cit., 2:710.
northeastern border regions were called *chi-mi wei-so*; those in the west and northwestern border regions, *fan-i wei-so*. The commanders of both kinds were largely recruited from the tribal chiefs who had the same feudal character as those *t'u-ssu* in southwestern China. Those garrison troops of northern borders were mostly organised by tribesmen. In 1388, the Ming founder ordered the selection of tribesmen from the *t'u-ssu* in Szechuan for guarding the border securely and controlling Tibet. This was an instance of the Emperor using a tribal force for the national defense of southwestern China.

Throughout the Ming dynasty, the government-tribal joint force made great contributions to safeguarding against the encroachment of China's border by alien forces.

Bandits in Ming times were classified into two categories: Han and tribal. They usually went into hiding in mountain areas after raiding cities or villages. In order to exterminate these entrenched bandits, the Ming Court found it most convenient and successful to conscript those loyal tribesmen experienced in fighting in bush and mountain areas. The suppression of Han bandits in Hukuang and tribal bandits in Kwangsi during the Ch'eng-hua reign are the most prominent examples of this kind of successful employment of non-Han

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32 *MS*, 8:2222; *Hsü wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao*, 1:3353.

33 *Hsü wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao*, 2:3942; *SL*, 7:2824-2828.

34 *SL*, 8:3620-3627; *MS*, 17:5241, 27:3185; Ch'iu Chun, *op.cit.*, 1189, 1192-1193.
forces. In the last two decades of the Ming dynasty, banditry was prevalent throughout China. The famous female t'u-ssu Ch'in Liang-yu of Shih-chu hsüan-fu-ssu in southeastern Szechuan bravely assisted the government troops in suppressing bandits in the southwest. Even though the strong bandit leader Chang Hsien-chung was vastly superior to government forces at the time, he still feared Ch'in's fighting capacity and warned his followers not to enter into the Shih-chu area.

The chief threats to the Ming borders were the Mongol cavalry and the Wo-k'ou pirates. The former came from the northern steppe and the latter came from the sea. To resist the Mongols, the defense burden fell largely on Han troops as well as on northern tribesmen of the chi-mi wei-so. To suppress the Wo-k'ou, the Han troops were unsuccessful in the first stage during the mid-sixteenth century when the plundering suffered by the southeastern coastal provinces reached its height. An army of eight thousand tribesmen enlisted from Yung-shun hsüan-wei-ssu and Pao-ching hsüan-wei-ssu of Hukuang, however, won a famous victory in 1555. In addition to these small wars along the coast, the Chinese troops had fought with the Japanese

35 MS, 16:4730; MSCSPM, 1:393-408.
37 MS, 23:6944-6948.
38 Li Wen-chih, op.cit., 91-92.
regular army in Korea between 1592 and 1598. In order to aid Korea in resisting Japanese aggression, the Ming Court ordered that recruits from all military forces including the tribesmen be thrown into the battle. The tribal troops from Szechuan, Kweichow and Kwangtung took part in this Sino-Japanese War in Korea. Despite the long distance, the tribesmen of southwestern China again contributed their fighting power in the Sino-Manchu War in northeastern China in the last two decades of the Ming dynasty. The two most successful were the hsüan-fu-ssu of Yu-yang and Shih-chu, both from Szechuan.

*I-i fa-i, i-i kung-i or i-man kung-man,* literally "using barbarians to attack barbarians" was a traditional imperial policy which had been frequently employed by Chinese strategists. In order to strengthen its domination over southwestern China, the Ming Court adopted this policy of utilising the military forces of the strong ethnic minority groups to suppress disloyal tribesmen. Such utilisation could save many Han soldiers' lives and a lot of military provisions. From the geographical point of view, the tribesmen were more experienced in operating in the mountains which the disloyal tribesmen tended to occupy as their natural defensible

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42 *MS*, 23:6944; 26:8058.

strongholds. Once the rebellious Yao tribesmen of Kwangsi proudly said, "The government has ten thousand troops but we have ten thousand mountains. We leave if they come; we return if they go". \(^{44}\) A tribal chief of Yunnan said in a similar vein, "As the Court has its strong military force of ten thousand troops, we also have our natural defensible strongholds of ten thousand mountains. How can they annihilate us at all?" \(^{45}\) In addition, the climate of the mountain regions did not agree with the Han soldiers, who suffered considerably in these harsh conditions. The tribal troops were more accustomed to the climate than were the Han troops.

For other reasons, the tribal troops were willing to fight for the Ming Court. First of all, they could obtain at least a part of their military supplies and provisions from the government if they were engaged in the suppression campaign. Secondly, they might seize the opportunity to loot after suppressing the disloyal groups. Thirdly, they had the chance to pillage the local inhabitants while on route home. \(^{46}\) At times, in a special case, the Court might promise to cede a piece of land to a strong tribe in exchange for their military assistance. \(^{47}\) Therefore, a large number of tribal troops usually joined with the government troops in the subjugation campaigns.


\(^{45}\) \textit{MS}, 27:8084.


\(^{47}\) \textit{MS}, 27:8172-8173.
Besides the above reasons for the use of tribal military forces by the Ming Court, the main situational factor was that the Court lacked effective combat troops. The government troops were no longer strong enough to fight against the strong and cunning enemies after the decline of the wei-so garrison system in the mid-sixteenth century. Thereafter, government regular troops were supplemented by militiamen organised for home-guard duty by local authorities. During the late Ming period, the frontier forces were augmented and finally almost superseded by mercenaries lured or coerced into service for pay.\(^{48}\) In the eyes of Han authorities, the "never-say-die" tribesmen were ideal brave and cheap soldiers for supplementing the regular troops. Therefore, the military utility of tribal forces was essential and was an important aspect of the t'\(u-ssu\) obligations in Ming times.

C. Political Supervision and Conversion

After the Ming Court had codified and systematised the t'\(u-ssu\) system, the regulations governing the t'\(u-ssu\) became very strict. Since the system appeared to yield effective results, it became a firmly fixed institution. First of all, a hierarchy of rank was established both in military and civilian titles and ranks.

A series of special titles, such as hsüan-wei-shih, hsüan-fu-shih, an-fu-shih, chao-t'ao-shih and chang-kuan, were only

\(^{48}\) Wu Han, "Ming-tai ti chün-ping", *Tu-shih cha-chi* (Peking, 1957), 92-141; Charles O. Hucker, *op.cit.*, 57.
to be conferred upon the t'u-ssu (tribal chieftains) with the ranks from 3b to 7a. (See Table One: The Organisation of the T'u-ssu Government in Ming China.) They were originally all under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Personnel but in 1397 came under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of War. In addition, a Registry was set up in each of the first two classes of the t'u-ssu government, i.e. hsüan-wei-ssu and hsüan-fu-ssu. All registrars and most of the secretaries and clerks were Han-Chinese regular civilian officials. Thus, each t'u-ssu government was supervised by Han-Chinese authorities from above by the Ministry of War and from below by the Registry.

Some of the tribes had been changed into the t'u-kuan governments since the early Ming, such as the native prefectures (t'u-fu), native sub-prefectures (t'u-chou) or native counties (t'u-hsien), their native magistrates (t'u-kuan) were codified under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Personnel. The authority over these native fu, chou and hsien with the ranks from 4b to 7a were mostly conferred upon tribal chiefs, but most of their deputies and subordinates were Han-Chinese regular civilian officials. Their official status and administration were to be the same as that of the regular prefectural system in the Han provinces of China.

Furthermore, in 1530, the t'u-kuan was re-codified under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Honour (in the Ministry of Personnel) in the central government and directly governed by the Provincial Administration Office in the provincial government, and the t'u-ssu was re-codified under the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Personnel (in the Ministry of War) in the central government and directly governed by the Regional Military Commission in the provincial government.\(^49\) Thus, the tribal chiefs of the t'\(u\)-kuan were fully absorbed into the administrative structure of the Empire with the sole exception of retaining their hereditary right. The tribal chiefs of the t'\(u\)-ssu, however, remained strong within their semi-independent domains because they still had full power over tribal administration, tax collection and judicial proceedings.

Although tribal chiefs of both the t'\(u\)-kuan and t'\(u\)-ssu were confirmed in their hereditary right of succession, many regulations were issued by the Ming Court limiting this formerly absolute right. In 1393, the succession of the tribal chiefs of both systems was required to be fully investigated regarding the details of the heir and the genealogy of his clan, and written bonds from the local authorities and the officials concerned were required by the Ministry of Personnel of the central government.\(^50\) After 1397, the t'\(u\)-kuan remained under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Personnel, but the t'\(u\)-ssu was transferred to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of War.\(^51\) Most of the regulations on succession for both, however, continued to be the same. New successors had to go to the capital to be formally installed at Court.\(^52\) This was to

\(^{49}\) MS, 6:1875-1876; 26:7982; She I-tse, \textit{op.cit.}, 21-22.

\(^{50}\) TMHT, 1:123.

\(^{51}\) TMHT, 1:123; 3:1706.

\(^{52}\) MS, 26:7982; TMHT, 1:123.
demonstrate the willingness of the chieftain to accept Han suzerainty and to impress upon him the majesty and splendor of the Emperor as well as the wealth and civilisation of China. More important, this was to confirm his position through a formal political recognition and make him more ready to continue his submission.

Usually the son inherited his father's title and rank. If there were no son, the dead chieftain's brother, wife, nephew, or even son-in-law who was regarded with esteem by the tribesmen might inherit the office and title. In order to get rid of the struggles among potential claimants to succession, the chieftain was required to present the details and names of heirs at an early stage. An heir up to the age of five was to be registered. Copies of the registration were to be sent to the Regional Military Commission, Provincial Administration Office, Provincial Surveillance Office, and the Ministry of Personnel or the Ministry of War. The heir took office on reaching fifteen years of age after the former chieftain had vacated his rule through death, retirement or other causes. Prior to this date, a regent was to be appointed to carry on temporarily. The prospective heir or successor had to study Han rules of conduct for three months. Although these regulations might not be carried out completely by all chieftains especially after the mid-Ming period, they could be used as a means of political supervision. In addition, according to the T'u-kuan ti-pu, the pre-Cheng-te reign (1506-1521) documents of 363

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chieftains of Yunnan (151), Kwangsi (167), Szechuan (24), Kweichow (15), Kukuang (5) and Kwangtung (1), the Court-issued certificates frequently used expressions such as "the request [for succession] is hereby temporarily approved", "to replace him when he is not law-biding", or "this succession is approved but not hereditary". Although dismissal rarely occurred, it was regarded as an art of political manoeuvring played by the Ming Court.

On the other hand, besides requiring that the installation take place in the capital, Court tribute presented by the chieftain or his representative was also a compulsory obligation. There were definite regulations pertaining to the frequency of tribute, the number of persons in the delegations, and the type of tribute presented. In return for tribute, the Court bestowed valuable awards which usually exceeded the tribute in order to show the graciousness of the Ming Emperor. The tribute senders always took the opportunity to conduct private business in the capital by transporting other goods or special products from their own place. In such Court tribute, the political design outweighed the financial aim and was used primarily to maintain communication between the Court and the tribal governments.

It was mentioned above that a considerable number of Han regular civilian officials were employed in the Registry of the

54 "T'yi yo" (Summary), T'u-kuan ti-pu (Reprint of the Ssu-k'u ch'uan-shu edition. Taipei, n.d.), 1-2; passim.
55 TMHT, 3:1615-1619; 1661-1663.
t'u-ssu government. Some of them were even appointed as deputys or subordinates of the magistrate in the native t'u-kuan prefectural governments. On occasion, two magistrates, one the native chief and one a Han civilian official, were appointed simultaneously to the same office with different duties. This policy called "I-Han ts'an-yung" (employment of both tribesmen and Han-Chinese) or "liu-t'u kung-chih" (joint rule by Han-Chinese regular civilian officials and tribal chieftains) could be regarded as a kind of transition from dual political administration to full Han-Chinese civil administration. Furthermore, the extermination of the rule by tribal chieftains over their semi-autonomous kingdoms and the abolition of the t'u-ssu tribal governments was the final step in the political integration of former tribal territory into the structure of the Chinese empire. This policy was known as "kai-t'u kuei-liu", i.e., to replace tribal chiefs with Han-Chinese regular officials or to change from tribal to regular government. Such a policy had been adopted since the early Ming. The most successful and largest scale example was the conversion of Ssu-nan hsüan-wei-ssu and Ssu-chou hsüan-wei-ssu into six prefectures, together with other prefectures, sub-prefectures, counties, guards and some tribal governments to

56 In 1522, a Han-Chinese magistrate and a native magistrate were appointed in Ning-chou, a sub-prefecture of Lin-an Prefecture in Yunnan Province. The Han-Chinese magistrate was in charge of the administration; the native magistrate was limited to the duties of patrol and inspection. See MS, 27:8070. Other examples, see Huang K'ai-hua, op.cit., 211-212.

form the new province of Kweichow in 1413. \(^{58}\) Thereafter, the Ming Court adopted the *kai-t' u kuei-liu* policy on various pretexts, such as the annihilation or dismissal of a tribal chief, the lack of a legitimate heir, incessant struggle among potential claimants to succession, the incapacity or disobedience of a tribal chief, or at the request of the local tribesmen. \(^{59}\) In order to achieve the goal of *kai-t' u kuei-liu*, both political means and military moves were used. Of course, the latter could be extremely expensive. The suppression of the Po-chou *hsüan-wei-shih-ssu* which cost over two million taels of silver was the most expensive example where military force was used.

Owing to the practical limitations of its military and economic resources and recognising the diminishing returns, the Ming Court did not insist on *kai-t' u kuei-liu*. On occasion, the same rebel leader was restored in office when a revolt was suppressed. Even a chieftainship system was rehabilitated after *kai-t' u kuei-liu* when the Court found it ineffective to rule the tribe by regular officials. Aside from pacification and suppression, the Ming policy also included measures designed to fragment the tribes politically. Over seventy separate *chang-kuan-ssu* were established when Kweichow was first conquered in the early Ming. This disintegration policy

\(^{58}\) MSCSPM, 1:219-222; MS, 4:1197-1217; 27:8176-8178.

was also adopted in Szechuan and Kweichow after the suppression of the joint rebellion of She Ch'ung-ming and An Pang-yen in the late Ming. Summing up, the Ming Court did not maintain the consistency on its frontier policy towards the tribal organisations.60

D. Economic Exploitation

Before the absorption into the t'u-ssu system, the tribesmen suffered heavy economic exactions only from their tribal chiefs. After the establishment of the t'u-ssu system, the tribesmen suffered from the additional economic exploitation of the imperial government as well. The economic exploitation included tribute, tax levy and corvée. The Court tribute presented to the capital was undoubtedly in the name of the tribal chief who would be usually presented costly rewards in return. These valuable awards would never be shared with the tribesmen who might be the real contributors of the tribute.

Undoubtedly the tribal chief had levied tax and labour corvée upon his tribesmen for his own benefit. Individual chieftains levied poll tax, housing tax or silver surtax upon their subjects.61 They had the right to do so because they were feudal lords and had never received a salary from the Court.62

60 She I-tse, op.cit., 35-37; 158-160; MSCSPM, 2:772-784.
61 MS, 26:8016; PPCS, 4:328; Chiang Ying-liang, op.cit., 19.
62 MS, 6:1752; 26:8052.
At the beginning of the Ming dynasty, in order to pacify the tribal chiefs and show its goodwill, the Court refused to levy taxes or to fix the quota of tax upon the newly submitted tribes. Subsequently, taxes-in-kind were levied upon them. In 1384, seventeen years after the foundation of the Ming, the native prefectures of Wu-meng, Tung-ch'uan and Mang-pu were ordered to supply 8,000 tan of grain and 800 felt clothes annually, and Wu-ch'e taxed at a rate of 20,000 tan of grain and 1,500 felt clothes per year.\(^{63}\) Shui-hsi hsüan-wei-ssu, the strongest tribe in Kweichow, was assessed annual taxes of 30,000 tan of grain from 1387 onwards.\(^{64}\) Most of the tribes in Yunnan were required to remit tax-in-silver cash or tax-in-gold cash. The total quota was 8,890.5 taels of which 110 taels were gold and the rest, silver. The tribesmen actually paid more than that quota because the tribal chiefs shifted the burden to their subjects and took the opportunity to collect more gold or silver from them for their personal benefit.\(^{65}\)

When the Ming Court asked the local governments including two metropolitan areas and thirteen provinces to compile the Register Book on taxation and corvee, the tribal governments which had submitted and were under control were also asked to compile a Register Book in the Han fashion or according to their own customs. The Kuei-chou hsüan-wei-ssu was allowed not

\(^{63}\) MSK, 7:86; MS, 26:8004.

\(^{64}\) MSK, 7:161; MS, 27:8169.

\(^{65}\) TMHT, 2:694; Chiang Ying-liang, op. cit., 18-19.
to compile it in the Hung-wu reign (1368-1398) but was asked to do it in the Hung-chih reign (1488-1505). In 1391, a Register Book was required to be compiled by the tribesmen neighbouring on Po-chou who could speak Chinese; the tribespeople unfamiliar with Chinese were not required to file data for this Register Book. This indicates that in the early Ming the Court levied taxes only upon the Han people and on those tribesmen who had been sinicised.

After the change from tribal to regular government, the rule by chieftains was ended and his share of the economic exploitation was automatically cancelled. In this manner, the tribesmen would be emancipated from double exploitation. The new tax rate was usually much higher than before because in rearranging the tax system the new bureaucrats sought to recoup the high costs of expenditure on military suppression required to stop the exploitation by the defeated chieftain. The Po-chou case which will be discussed in the following chapters illustrates this point.

Corvée, including military corvée and labour corvée, may be regarded as a kind of indirect economic exploitation. The military corvée levied upon tribesmen was extremely heavy especially after the decline of the wei-so garrison system. Due to their low cost and their fighting ability, the tribesmen

66 Wei Ch'ing-yüan, Ming-tai huang-ts'e chih-tu (Peking, 1961), 28-30.

67 Ch'en Jen-hsi, Huang-Ming shih-fa-lu (Taipei, 1964), 2:1114. Po-chou also had a Register Book which was cancelled by its last ruler, Yang Ying-lung (c. 1552-1600), when the revolt came to a height. But the initial compilation of the Register Book is unknown. See Ch'en Tzu-lung et al., Huang-Ming ching-shih wen-pien (Hong Kong, 1964? Reprint of the late Ming edition. Hereafter abbreviated as HMCSWP), 6:4550.
were frequently recruited. The percentage of tribal troops within the government-tribal united forces was higher than that of Han troops. (See Table Two: Quantity and Percentage of Tribal-Government United Troops.) The basic equipment and provisions of the tribal forces were largely self-supplied, being transported by themselves from their original tribe to the battlefield. The labour corvée, including the construction of tribal offices, bridges, fortifications and walls, service in post stations and offices, transport of taxes-in-kind and tribute, lumbering activities and the transportation of beam timbers and various other kinds of hard work, were mostly performed without compensation. After the change from tribal to regular government, the tribesmen only had to serve one ruling class. At the first stage the labour corvée might be still heavy because of the need to reconstruct the new prefecture. Thereafter, the labour corvée would be lighter than before.

E. Cultural Assimilation

The Court had paid attention to sinicising non-Han peoples since the early Ming. Confucian Schools were built in most of the t'u-ssu regions. Heirs or sons of tribal chieftains were

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69 MS, 6:1851-1852.
encouraged to enrol in the National University. They were all treated with special kindness and unusual politeness. The emperor always bestowed awards including paper cash, summer and winter clothes, shoes and socks, etc. Some of them were even allowed to be accompanied by a native servant who would be provisioned by the government during the stay in the capital. Because of this excellent treatment, a large number of tribal students went to the capital to study at the National University. In 1384, an additional five hundred new dormitories were built for several thousand new students from all provinces and tribal areas.

The Ming founder clearly expressed his idea that all sons of chieftains should come to study at the National University, so that they could return home to sinicise their tribesmen with Han culture. He also regarded that the best way to pacify the frontier regions was to establish Confucian Schools to teach the youth in tribal areas. These two ways of sinicisation seemed to be successful in the early Ming, particularly the first one requiring that the tribal heirs be

70 SL, 7:3025; MS, 26:8005-8017; 8032;8040.
71 SL, 7:2963, 3006, 3018, 3031, 3040, 3051, 3058, 3087, 3088, 3107, 3143; 8:3314, 3365, 3421, 3567, 3591, 3712.
73 SL, 6:2506-2507.
74 SL, 6:2365-2366.
75 SL, 8:3475-3476.
educated in the capital. The purpose was the same as the Court visits and Court tribute, impressing Han political and cultural influence upon the potential successors and future chieftains. This was especially important in view of the great distance from the capital after it was moved from Nanking to Peking in the early fifteenth century. On the other hand, the local sinicisation was much less successful, and some of the Confucian Schools were closed down. Several supplementary edicts were issued to restore Confucian Schools, but these were mainly concerned with tribal heirs. In 1444, an imperial edict announced that all heirs of tribal governments should be sent to school. In 1481, an edict indicated that the eldest legitimate sons of chieftains were allowed to study at the Confucian Schools in the neighbouring local regular governments because education was not well developed in some tribal areas or high level education was only available in regular governments. In 1492, an edict even ordered new tribal chieftains to study Han rules of conduct before taking charge of tribal affairs. In order to encourage the tribal heirs to accept sinicisation, in 1499, the Court agreed that an heir who had studied at a local Confucian School since the time he was ten years old could succeed to office without the approval of

76 SL, 8:3277; 21:2577.
77 SL, 27:2410-2411.
78 TMHT, 3:1240.
79 TMHT, 3:1743.
provincial authorities, requiring only a testimonial from the Director of Education of the school he attended.\textsuperscript{80} In 1503, the Court agreed with the decision reached at the joint meeting of the Ministry of War and the Censorate that an heir would not be permitted to succeed to a hereditary post if he had not attended a Confucian School.\textsuperscript{81} These supplementary regulations illustrated that the Court was serious about enforcing sinicisation upon the tribal ruling class. As a matter of fact, the general Chinese education at the local level in tribal regions was still much less developed than that in the Han provinces of China. The spread of the Han Chinese education, however, would be more popular in the tribal area where the policy of \textit{kai-t'u kuei-liu} was implemented.

F. Judicial Administration

Theoretically the chieftain was recognised as having jurisdiction in minor civil matters in the tribal government, such as in cases of household, marriage, land, etc. The arguments among tribal chiefs would be judged by their superior, such as the provincial government or the garrison town. Cases about military affairs or insurrection had to be reported to the Court.\textsuperscript{82} According to the traditional tribal custom, crime could usually be redeemed by payment in the form

\textsuperscript{80} SL, 57:2675-2676.

\textsuperscript{81} MS, 26:7997.

\textsuperscript{82} SL, 20:1936.
of cattle or rice. Sometimes this provision did not operate, and the Han-Chinese authorities judged the case according to Han-Chinese laws. In 1451, a deputy hsüan-fu-shih who had murdered his brother was sentenced to death. His wife sent his son to contribute horses in order to redeem his crime. The Court refused to pardon him but paid paper cash of equal value for the horses. In 1461, a tribal secretary was sentenced to imprisonment. His mother presented horses as redemption, and the emperor bestowed one hundred ting of paper cash upon this old woman but kept her son in prison.  

In the early Ming, a hereditary chieftain could not be arrested or judged without express imperial authority even if he had committed a serious crime. The case had to be reported to the Court first. The appointed chieftain would be treated as if he were a regular civil official. He would be punished in the manner of regular civil officials of the same level. Owing to this special right, the Han authorities sometimes instigated insurrection by a chieftain in order to create a pretext for investigating him or even suppressing him. Internal enemies who hoped to use the government military forces to suppress him also sometimes falsely accused him of the crime of insurrection, since the Court always pardoned minor crimes committed by hereditary chieftains. The case of the suppression of Miao tribesmen in Po-chou in 1476-1477, the

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83 MS, 26:7987.
84 SL, 6:2559-2560.
accusation of Yang Ai (1464-1517; r. 1474-1501) by his brother, the case of An Kuo-heng (r. 1562-1577; d. 1595) and the case of Yang Ying-lung (c. 1552-1600; r. 1571-1595) illustrate the use of Han-Chinese laws to control or threaten the authority of the tribal chieftains. (See Chapter Four and Appendices Four, Five and Six.)
CHAPTER TWO
The Yang Family: The Ruling Agent in Po-chou

A. A Geographical Survey of Ming Po-chou

Po-chou had been a semi-autonomous kingdom ruled by the Yang lineage since 876 A.D. It was situated in the northeastern part of Kweichow province. According to a scholar's description, it was an area about the size of Switzerland. More accurately speaking, its size and shape were more like Taiwan according to my estimate. Both look like long ovals; but the direction in which they run is different: Taiwan from northeast to southwest; Po-chou from northwest to southeast (See Map I. Ming Po-chou in Modern Kweichow.) Before its abolition in 1600 in the Ming dynasty, Po-chou generally belonged to neighbouring Szechuan province north of Kweichow. After the abolition, its territory was divided up to form two new administrative units: Tsun-i prefecture in Szechuan and P'ing-yüeh prefecture in Kweichow. After 1727, Tsun-i prefecture also became part of Kweichow. (See Map II. The Ming-Ch'ing Boundaries between Kweichow and Szechuan.)

In view of its position on the Kweichow Plateau, the climate in Po-chou is extremely humid, with abundant rainfall.

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1 YScc, 10:31.
2 Chaoying Fang, "Li Hua-lung", DMB, 1:823. According to Atlas de la Suisse (Wabern-Berne, 1966), 1A, the area of Switzerland is 41,287.9 square kilometres.
3 According to Hsieh Chiao-min's description in Atlas of China (USA, 1973), 148, Taiwan covers an area of 34,263 square kilometres, about the size of Massachusetts or Switzerland.
MAP I. MING PO-CHOU IN MODERN KWEICHOW
MAP II. THE MING-CH'ING BOUNDARIES BETWEEN KWEICHOW & SZECHUAN
As a result of water erosion, the geographical surface of Po-chou is rugged, with many mountains of greatly varying heights. A mountain range about fifteen hundred kilometres high lying from northeast to southwest at the frontier region of present-day Szechuan and Kweichow called Ta-lou-shan constituted a natural barrier at the northern end of Po-chou. A medium-sized river, Wu-chiang, which flowed northeastward through the middle part of Po-chou into the Yangtze River drained numerous small basins scattered among the undulating mountains. Thus, even a small plain could rarely be found in this area. Furthermore, Po-chou was also bounded by the mountains of western Hukuang (including modern Hunan and Hupeh) to the east and the Yunnan-Kweichow Plateau to the west. In the vicinity of Po-chou, there were many other tribal units. Shui-hsi and Yung-ning were of about the size of Po-chou. (See Map III. Important T'u-ssu in Szechuan-Hukuang-Kweichow-Yunnan Area.)

The rule of the Yang House in Po-chou lasting for seven and a quarter centuries (876-1600) from the late T'ang, through the Five Dynasties, the two Sung periods, the Yuan, to the Ming, can be regarded as the result of an opportunistic policy of serving the big power. Therefore, it was never destroyed following the defeat of an imperial house. That its territories were not frequently ravaged by war until 1600 might be attributed to its special geographical situation. The best

5 See Ku Tsu-yü, Tu-shih fang-yü chi-yao (Peking, 1957), 1:3008; China - A Geographical Sketch, 29; Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho-kuo ti-t'u (Peking, 1972); Chung-kuo ti-t'u-ts'e (Shensi, 1973), Map 32.
1. Chen-hsiung fu
   (錦雄府)
2. Pao-ching HWS
   (保靖宣慰司)
3. Po-chou HWS
   (播州宣慰司)
4. San-mao HWS
   (散毛宣撫司)
5. Shih-ch'ien fu
   (石阡府)
6. Shih-chu HWS
   (石砫宣撫司)
7. Shui-hsi HWS
   (水西宣慰司)
8. Ssu-ch'eng chou
   (泗城州)
9. Ssu-nan fu
   (思南府)
10. T'ien-ch'uan liu-fan CTS
    (天生六番招討司)
11. Yu-yang HWS
    (酉陽宣撫司)
12. Yung-shun HWS
    (永順宣撫司)
13. Yung-ning HWS
    (永寧宣撫司)

MAP III. IMPORTANT T'U-SSU IN SZECHUAN-HUKUANG-KWEICHOW-YUNNAN AREA
proof of this is the difficulty faced by the 240,000 tribal-government united force in marching into this area to attack Po-chou's strongholds during the extermination campaign.

B. The Occupation of Po-chou by the Yang Family

The name of Po-chou does not appear in official records until 639 A.D. in the early T'ang dynasty. In the mid-eighth century, Po-chou was said to cover three districts, with a population of 2,168 composed of 490 households. But in 815, Po-chou was still described as a far-reaching remote place suitable only for animals, not human beings. It had been invaded and occupied by the Nanchao tribal state in 859 but was soon restored by T'ang troops the following year. Unfortunately, it was again re-occupied by Nanchao in 873.

Responding to an imperial appeal for recruits to suppress the Nanchao rebellion, Yang Tuan, a Han-Chinese from Shansi province, led nine clans from his native region to the Po-chou area in 876. With the aid of three local bullies, Yang Tuan

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6 Chang Kuang-ssu et al., Kuei-chou t'ung-chih (1741 edition), 5:33-34; TIFC, 2:877.
7 Liu Hsu et al., Chiu T'ang-shu (Peking, 1975), 5:1625-1626; Hsin T'ang-shu, 4:1075.
8 Po-chou was a place for degraded officials in T'ang times. By learning that poet Liu Yü-hsi was degraded to Po-chou in 815, his good friend Liu Tsung-yüan, a famous writer of prose, suggested to replace him because Po-chou was not suitable for human beings and Yü-hsi had to look after his old mother. Censor P'ei Tu also asked for the transfer of Yü-hsi because he could not go with his mother who was at the age of eighty to Po-chou where animals could be seen everywhere. See Chiu T'ang-shu, 2:452; Hsin T'ang-shu, 16:5129, 5141-5142.
9 See note 6.
and his men recovered Po-chou the same year.\textsuperscript{10} Three decades later, with the fall of the T'ang Empire, China entered into the "Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms" era, a half century long period of great disunity and frequent dynastic change.\textsuperscript{11} Yang Tuan and his descendants therefore independently settled in Po-chou. Thereafter, the Yang family established itself as the dominant force in the region and inaugurated the practice of transmitting power from generation within its own clan.

Po-chou was inhabited mainly by aborigines mostly of Miao descent. Their contact with Han-Chinese can be traced back to the Warring States period (403-221 B.C.) when a general of the Ch'u State led his troops westward. Contact increased after the reign of Han Wu-ti (140-87 B.C.), who actively opened trade with the southwestern frontier-dwellers.\textsuperscript{12} The three Po-chou local bullies, surnamed Yü, Chiang and Huang, who had helped Yang Tuan to establish his authority in T'ang times might have been Chinese migrants long resident there. In addition to the troops of the nine clans (including his own clan) led by Yang Tuan from Shansi, a large number of other Han-Chinese undoubtedly became new residents in the Po-chou area.

\textsuperscript{10} Nine clans were, Yang, Ling-hu, Ch'eng, Chao, Yu, Lou, Liang, Wei and Hsieh. Three local bullies in Po-chou were Yü, Chiang and Huang. See YSCC, 10:31; TIFC, 1:67, 71.

\textsuperscript{11} Wang Gungwu, The Structure of Power in North China during the Five Dynasties (Kuala Lumpur, 1963), 1-2.

\textsuperscript{12} Ssu-ma Ch'ien, Shih-chi (Peking, 1972), 9:2993-2998, 3044-3049; TIFC, 1:46-50; Yü Ying-shih, Trade and Expansion in Han China (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967), 111-117; Yu Chung, "Han-Chin shih-ch'i ti hsi-nan i", Li-shih yen-chiu, 12:13, 26 (December 1957).
Therefore, in the early stages of occupation, the Yang family had to preserve its dominant position against threats from neighbouring tribesmen. Tuan's grandson Pu-she initially led his troops in attacks on the Min tribe attached to the Nan-chao. Unfortunately, Pu-she died in the fighting and his son San Kung was captured. Half a year later, San Kung successfully escaped from the Min tribe.  

We may conclude that the military power of the first four generations of the Yang family was not very strong and therefore its dominant position in this area had not yet been firmly established. The description by the Ming scholar Sung Lien in the *Yang-shih chia-chuan* (The History of the Yang Family) that once in the mid-tenth century the aborigines prostrated themselves on the ground in front of San Kung and swore not to revolt but to send tribute to the Yang clan is a total exaggeration!  

C. Disruption and Reunion in Sung Times

When emperor Sung T'ai-tsu unified China and ascended the throne in 960 A.D., San Kung's son Shih made preparations to head a mission to the capital. At the time, however, two barbarian tribes rose in revolt and Shih was forced to remain in Po-chou to suppress the rebellion. Unfortunately, he was mortally wounded by a stray arrow and died shortly thereafter.

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13 *YS CC*, 10:32a.
14 *YS CC*, 10:32b.
Shih left three sons: Chao, Hsien and I. The latter two commanded powerful armed support and initiated a struggle for succession. Hsien held the eastern part of Po-chou and I occupied the southern part. I even united with their enemy Min tribe to attack Hsien. Proclaiming his righteous indignation, Chao mobilised all military forces at his command to subjugate I and succeeded in re-occupying the southern part of Po-chou. He was unable to conquer his other rival at the time because Hsien was too strong. Subsequently, Chao's adopted son Kuei-ch'ien, the seventh ruler of Po-chou, was murdered by a bully bribed by Hsien. Thereafter, from about the last quarter of the tenth century to the first quarter of the thirteenth century, Po-chou was divided into two parts for over two hundred years. Chao held the greater part of Po-chou, called the "Upper Yang" or the "Great Po-chou". Hsien still kept the eastern part of Po-chou, called the "Lower Yang" or the "Small Po-chou". (See Appendix Two: The Genealogy of the Yang Family in Po-chou.) Seven generations later, at the beginning of the thirteenth century, descendants of the two sides agreed to seek a reunification. Two decades later, Huan, the head of the "Lower Yang" broke the agreement and plundered the border region. Finally, he was murdered by Ts'an, the leader of the "Upper Yang" and thirteenth ruler of Po-chou. Thenceforth, under the rule of the brilliant Yang Ts'an, Po-chou achieved real unity and its size was enlarged by the defeat of the Min tribe.15

During the period of disunion, another division had occurred within the "Great Po-chou" ("Upper Yang"). In order to deprive his nephew of leadership, Yang Kuang-yung of the eighth generation submitted to the Sung Court in 1108 with the contribution of his lands. Yang Wen-kuei of the ninth generation likewise donated the district he controlled to the Court the same year. Moreover, Yang Kuang-yung had repeatedly tried to poison his grand-nephew Wei-ts'ung, the tenth legitimate successor of Po-chou, but ultimately killed himself by mistakenly drinking the poisoned tea meant for his rival. 16

According to the research of Herold J. Wiens, if a Han-Chinese were appointed to rule a tribe in the isolation of the tribal habitat, he would eventually succumb to the tribal ways, lose his own culture and become a non-Han tribesman like his subjects. 17 However, it is difficult to measure accurately to what extent the Yang family had succumbed to tribal ways and to what degree it preserved Chinese practices. Members of the Yang family retained use of their Chinese names through the centuries. (See Appendix Two: The Genealogy of the Yang Family in Po-chou.) The Mongolian names Sayin-Buqa of Han-ying (the seventeenth ruler of Po-chou) and El-Buqa of Chia-chen (the eighteenth ruler of Po-chou) were names conferred by the Mongol rulers. 18 This formal acceptance of Mongol names, however, did

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17 Herold J. Wiens, op.cit., 208-209.
18 Yuan-Shih, 13:3884; YSCC, 10:41-42.
not signify rejection of their original Chinese names which were continued in the genealogy of the Yang family.

In 1081, in the aid of the Sung Court's efforts to suppress disloyal tribes, Kuang-chen, the eighth ruler of Po-chou, was described as "shu i" (civilised barbarian). In 1108, when they donated their lands to the Sung Court, both Kuang-yung and Wen-kuei were described as "i tsu", "i jen" (barbarian or tribesman) or "tsu shuai", "fan shuai" (commander of a clan or of a tribe) who came to submit to the Han-Chinese emperor. Part of Po-chou's history was first recorded in the Standard History Sung-shih, mostly in Man-i-chuan (the "Biography of Barbarians"). This seems to indicate that the Yang family as well as other Han-Chinese inhabitants of Po-chou were regarded as having succumbed to tribal ways after two hundred years since 876 A.D.

The Sung dynasty is regarded as a period of literary and artistic maturity, and the Yang family was also influenced by this literary atmosphere. After the fall of the Northern Sung, the imperial House withdrew southward accompanied by a large number of high officials and highly civilised Chinese scholars. At the beginning of the Southern Sung (the second quarter of the twelfth century), the eleventh ruler Hsüan employed famous teachers to coach his thirteen sons and supported a Szechuan

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20 Sung-shih, 36:5918-5921.
scholar in obtaining a chin-shih degree. Shih, the brother and
the regent of the twelfth ruler, paid much more attention to
arts and literature. He also provided accommodation and
subscribed lands for the support of those Szechuan scholars who
came to Po-chou. Thereafter the majority of barbarian children
and youths became literate and accomplished, and local customs
underwent a great change.

The thirteenth ruler Ts'an, who had ended the division of
Po-chou during the first quarter of the thirteenth century,
rebuilt a temple for the ancestors of the Yang family, founded
schools and supported scholars. He also wrote ten directives
based on Confucian ideals as the governing principles of the
Yang family. The civil examination system originated in T'ang
times and developed during the two Sung periods but had not been
introduced into the Po-chou area. At the earnest request by
the fourteenth ruler Chieh (d. 1243), Po-chou was allocated a
quota of three chin-shih degrees by the Court every year after
1238 A.D. Though famous as a strategist and militarist, the
fifteenth ruler Wen (d. 1265) also paid attention to civil

Ten directives were:
1. Fulfil one's official responsibilities to the utmost.
2. Emphasise one's filial duty to parents.
3. Carry on one's parents' enterprise.
4. Guard the borders.
5. Practise thrift and frugality.
6. Distinguish the good man and the bad.
7. Exercise fairness and reciprocity.
8. Act in accordance with the popular opinion.
9. Do away with extravagance.
10. Be scrupulous in administering punishment.
See Ch'eng Chü-fu, Chung-chieh miao-pei (Ch'eng-hsüeh-lou wen-
edition), 628-631; YSCC, 10:35b-37b.
administration and promoting literary studies. He built a Temple for Confucius to encourage the tribesmen to become sinicised.23

Following the efforts of the above five rulers to foster education and sinicisation, the cultural relationship with the Han-Chinese imperial government was greatly improved. This was largely because the political and cultural centre had shifted from northern China to the South during the Southern Sung period. On the other hand, relation between the Yang family and the Sung Court was mutually beneficial. The Court could obtain military assistance and tax collection from the Yang family. The chieftains of Po-chou were awarded imperial rank and honorific titles from the Court in return. Under such circumstances, the ruling class of Po-chou willingly accepted cultural assimilation. As far as we know, during the period from 1238 to 1274, eight Po-chou scholars obtained the chin-shih degree and two others were appointed magistrate and deputy magistrate in 1244 A.D.24

After the reunification of Po-chou, its size increased and its military power was stronger than ever. Due to its loyalty and strength, it became more and more highly regarded by the Sung Court. In 1239 A.D., when the Po-chou tribal troops went to the aid of the Szechuan governor against the Mongols at River Min, the fifteenth ruler Wen was appointed an-fu-shih, an

23 YSCC, 10:38-39b.
24 TIFC, 2:710-711, 885.
important military commander in the Sung official hierarchy. It was the first time a Po-chou ruler obtained a high position from the central government.\(^{25}\) Thereafter Wen commanded his troops in assisting the Sung Court against the aggression of the Mongol cavalry another six times. He won many victories in the battlefield and many honourable titles were conferred upon him.\(^{26}\) Unfortunately, the Mongols were too strong and all he could do was to delay their success.

D. Submission to the Mongol Yüan Dynasty

Since most tribal leaders were aware that they were not strong enough to resist a unified Chinese Empire, the best policy to adopt was to submit to the superior power in order to preserve their own position of local power. After the fall of the T'ang empire, Po-chou could still keep its independence because China was suffering internal troubles during the period of the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms. When the Sung came to power and established a unified empire, Po-chou submitted to the Court immediately. During the later years of the Southern Sung, when the Mongols had occupied Yunnan and were ready to march eastward via the tribal areas to invade China, Po-chou, owing to its military obligation to the Sung Court and in order to defend itself, mobilised all its power to fight against the Mongol cavalry. However, when the Sung army was defeated, Po-chou did not persevere in its loyalty to the Sung Court.

\(^{25}\) TIFC, 1:77; 2:885.

Following the fall of the Sung empire in 1277 and despite the continuing resistance of some Han-Chinese loyalist remnants, Pang-hsien (c. 1239-1282), the sixteenth successor of Po-chou, immediately yielded to the Mongol conqueror. In exchange, he was promised that the titles he had held before would be maintained. Seven months later, he asked for an imperial letter from the Mongol Yuan Court for confirmation of his position. In order to comply with the terms of tribute laid down by Emperor Khubilai Khan (r. 1260-1249), he went to the Court to seek an audience personally in 1278. Next year, he was urged to send his son to the Court as hostage. From 1281 onwards, he was asked to pay tribute every year. While the Court was sending troops to suppress a local uprising via Po-chou, he supplied them with provisions and provided fighters to assist the government forces. He thereby fulfilled most of the obligations laid down by the Mongol ruler. Therefore, after his death in 1282, he was conferred a posthumous title "Hui Min" (Kind and ready) and honoured with the highest degree of nobility as "Po-Kuo Kung" (Duke of the Po-chou State).

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28 In 1267, Khubilai Khan laid down what he really meant by the terms of tribute:
1. The ruler to seek audience personally.
2. Sons to be sent as hostages.
3. A census of population to be made.
4. The people to provide military corvée.
5. Taxes to be paid.
6. A Mongol governor to be in charge.

29 Yuan-shih, 1:210; YSCC, 10:40b; TIFC, 2:686.

30 YSCC, 10:41.
Pang-hsien left a few young sons. Of them Han-ying (c. 1277-1317), his successor, was only five years of age. Four years later, Han-ying was accompanied by his mother née T'ien (d. 1287) on a Court visit in 1286. The main reason might have been because they wanted to show their loyalty and ask for official recognition of their ruling position in Po-chou. Khubilai Khan received them personally. He touched Han-ying's head and, after studying him for a long time, spoke to the ministers, saying, "This boy will be an outstanding hero of the nation". He was also greatly impressed with the visit by a widow and an orphan who had come to the Court despite the long distance they had to travel from their home. During this successful Court visit, Han-ying was conferred a Mongolian name "Sayin-Buqa", an honourable title "General of Lung-fu-wei with Golden Tiger Tally", the hsüan-wei-shih of Shao-ch'ing, Chen-chou and Nan-p'ing, and the an-fu-shih of Po-chou. In addition to the former honourable title "Lady

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31 In *Yang-shih chia chuan* (The History of the Yang Family), only Pang-hsien's son and successor Han-ying had been mentioned. (See *YSCC*, 10:41). The recently unearthed discovery in China in 1972 shows that the other three sons of Pang-hsien, Ju-tsu, Hsiao-tsu and Szu-tsu, were also written into an epitaph of née T'ien (1230-1290). (See *Wen-wu*, 1974, 1:72.) Of the three, Ju-tsu's son Chia-chen (El-Buqa) was later adopted by Han-ying and became the eighteenth ruler of Po-chou.


33 *YSCC*, 10:41.

34 *Yüan-shih*, 13:3885.
Chaste and Obedient" (*Chen-shun fu-jen*), née T'ien was also conferred the title "Lady of Lasting Peace County" (*Yung-an-chun fu-jen*) and appointed regent to administer the affairs in Po-chou.  

Unfortunately, a year after the Court visit, née T'ien was killed in the power struggles within the Yang clan in 1287. This case was reported to the Court by Han-ying and the Court commanded the local government to help in the arrest of the murderers who tried to escape to Szechuan. Next year, Han-ying, at the age of twelve, was accompanied on a second Court visit, probably in order that he might thank the emperor personally for his help in avenging the death of his mother as well as to request the re-confirmation of his own ruling position. Again Khubilai Khan was pleased by his loyalty. In addition, following one of the ministers' reports that the Yang family had gained military merit in the suppression of the rebellion in the frontier regions, Po-chou was raised from *an-fu-ssu* to *hsüan-fu-ssu* and Han-ying was simultaneously appointed *hsüan-fu-shih*. Han-ying was too young to actually command the army and too inexperienced to handle civil affairs. There must have been a class of talented men from the Yang clan to assist him in fulfilling his ruling position.

As his economic obligation to the Court, Han-ying presented one thousand raincoats in 1290. When an imperial

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35 *TIFC*, 2:686.
36 *YSCC*, 10:41.
37 *Yüan-shih*, 13:3885.
38 *Yüan-shih*, 2:334.
appeal was issued asking for taxes from all local governments and tribal units, unlike Po-chou's neighbouring tribes which refused to respond, Han-ying immediately collected taxes and made a census of households to the Court. For this show of loyalty to the Court, he was given the additional title of "Commander of Ten Thousand Troops". 39

As military corvée, one thousand tribal troops of Po-chou were recruited to attack Burma. 40 At the end of 1293, eight thousand former Sung soldiers, possibly including a large number of tribesmen, were enlisted from Po-chou and three other tribal units in Szechuan to attack An-nan. 41 Although Han-ying was said to have made three Court visits during Emperor Ch'eng-tsung's reign (1295-1307), he did not gain any change in his position. 42 On the contrary, his burden of military corvée and supplies was increased because of the internal suppression campaigns waged by the Court. 43 After his death, he was conferred the same honourable degree of nobility as his father: Po-Kuo Kung (Duke of the Po-chou State). 44

Chia-chen (r. 1318-1352), a nephew of Han-ying, became the eighteenth ruler of Po-chou. He was conferred a Mongolian name

39 TIPC, 2:686-687.
40 Ibid., 2:889.
41 Yuan-shih, 2:375.
42 YSCC, 10:41b. According to the "Biography of Yang Sayin-Buqa" in Yuan-shih (13:3884-3885), Han-ying had only two Court visits in the reign of Emperor Ch'eng-tsung.
43 TIPC, 2:687.
44 YSCC, 10:42b.
"El-Buqa" when he paid a Court visit in 1322. During the late Yuan, Mongol rule was not very strong. A Mongol governor of Szechuan revolted in 1329. In order to march eastward to Hukuang, a key province of China, this rebellious Mongol governor succeeded in taking over a pass in Po-chou. Being confronted with the disloyal high official of the Yuan government at this crucial moment, rather than trying to resist a sudden attack, Chia-chen opened the gate to let the treasonous troops in.

Chia-chen probably was unable to wait for government relief troops because the rebel soldiers had already occupied Po-chou's strategic base. Po-chou would be less ruined if he let the rebel troops quietly enter into Po-chou. Furthermore, the Yang clan was not as strong as previously because it had not been fully successful in pacifying the rebels led by Hsieh Wu-ch'iung before this occurred. From the tribal point of view, no matter who controlled the empire or what struggles took place, the tribal heads should sit on the fence and at length submit to the final conqueror. Therefore, undertaking an opportunistic policy, Chia-chen and his brothers came to surrender to the Court when a large number of government troops were marching toward Po-chou from various directions. Not long afterwards, the governor who had revolted also yielded to the Court.

45 Ibid.

46 Yuan-shih, 3:728-730.

47 TIFC, 2:688, 891.

48 A few months later, the rebellious governor was sentenced to death because he reproached the royal carriage. See Yuan-shih, 3:730-731; TIFC, 2:891.
CHAPTER THREE
Po-chou in Ming Times

Yang Chien, a nephew of Chia-chen, succeeded Chia-chen's grandson Yüan-ting, becoming the twenty-first ruler of Po-chou. (See Appendix Two: The Genealogy of the Yang Family.) Adopting the traditional opportunistic policy, Chien remained neutral with regard to the military struggles among the Han-Chinese rivals for the throne during the last years of the Yüan. Of those rivals, Ming Yü-chen had swept the Mongols from Szechuan in 1358. He then established a state called "Ta Hsia" and crowned himself emperor in 1362.¹ There is no record of whether Chien was forced to adhere to the Ta Hsia State as a petty dependency because of geographical proximity or whether he simply submitted to the power which had founded this new state. The historical sources show that a governor was sent to Po-chou by Ming Yü-chen in 1365.² When the Ming founder Emperor Hung-wu (r. 1368-1398) had unified most of China in 1368, Po-chou was still under the control of the Szechuan ruler. After the elimination of the Ta Hsia State in mid-1371 and other successful subjugation campaigns in the rest of Szechuan several months later, an imperial emissary was sent to gain the adherence of Po-chou by an attractive promise by which the status of Po-chou would be raised from that of hsüan-fu-ssu to hsüan-wei-ssu. In the first lunar month of the following year,

¹ SL, 1:266-267.
² SL, 1:269.
Chien went with other tribal chiefs to acknowledge his submission to the Court and delivered all golden tallies, silver seals and bronze medals bestowed by the former Mongol rulers to the new Ming emperor. The positions of Chien and other tribal chiefs in Po-chou area were confirmed and their titles were formally recognised. Subsequently, two an-fu-ssu (Ts'ao-t'ang and Huang-p'ing) and six chang-kuan-ssu (Po-chou, Yü-ch'ing, Pai-li, Yung-shan, Chen-chou and Chung-an) were established under the jurisdiction of the Po-chou hsüan-wei-shih-ssu.

A. Feudal Relationship between the Yang Family and the Ming Court

The "feudal system" (feng-chien) and the "prefectural system" (chün-hsien) are two contrasting types of political systems in Chinese history. In Chinese usage, the "feudal system" normally refers to the monarch's establishment or recognition of feudal states in which the position of the state ruler is hereditary. In contrast, the "prefectural system" refers to the division of the empire into prefectures and districts, to which the central government appoints prefects and district magistrates as administrators for a limited period.


4 The years of the establishment of these an-fu-ssu and chang-kuan-ssu were: Po-chou, 1372; Huang-p'ing, 1374; Chung-an, 1375; Ts'ao-t'ang, Chen-chou, Yü-ch'ing and Pai-ki, 1384; Yung-shan, 1384-98(?). See TMHT, 1:290; MSK, 7:102; MS, 4:1034, 1205-1207; 26:8039; TIFC, 1:79-80; 2:893; Li Hsien et al., Ta-Ming i-t'ung-chih (n.p. 1559. Reprint of 1461 edition), 72:35; Map I, Ming Po-chou in Modern Kweichow.
of time. The two systems, however, were combined in a mixed system which was tried as early as the second century B.C. when the Han dynasty (206 B.C.-220 A.D.) established both "commandaries" and "principalities" simultaneously. The Ming founder Hung-wu adopted this mixed system by maintaining prefectures on the one hand and, on the other, setting up several of his sons and generals with hereditary titles and privileges to govern their enfeoffed lands.

Similarly the institution of t'u-ssu in line with the feudal system and that of t'u-fu as part of the prefectural system were simultaneously established as early as the beginning of the Ming dynasty. In the t'u-fu (native prefecture), the magistrates were mostly appointed from among the tribal chiefs, but most of their deputies and subordinates were Han civil officials. The administration of these t'u-fu and its official status were considered the same as those within the regular prefectural system in China. The chieftains of t'u-ssu, however, retained considerable power and authority within their semi-independent domains. Their hereditary right of succession as well as their full power over tribal administration, tax collection and judicial proceedings reflected their feudal character. Moreover, the feudal

5 Lien-sheng Yang, "Ming Local Administration", op.aet., 1.
6 Li Chieh, Ming Shih (Hong Kong, 1972), 40-41.
7 See Chapter One, Section C. Political Supervision and Conversion.
relationship between the chieftains and the emperor, or the
tribal units and the Court, remained strong, and audiences at
Court and tribute to the emperor were important aspects of this
feudal connection. The economic and military contributions
were the burdens imposed by these feudal obligations.

Before the abolition of Po-chou, the feudal relationship
between the Yang family and the Ming Court was firm. Yang
Chien, the first Po-chou ruler in Ming times, had been asked
in 1389 to send seasonal reports to the Court. Owing to the
long distance between Po-chou and Nanking, regular reporting to
the Court was difficult. After the capital was removed from
Nanking to Peking in 1421, the seasonal reports would have
been even more difficult to submit due to the longer distance.
It is not known whether or not this duty was carried out, but
the Court visits made by Chien and his sub-tribal chiefs
outnumbered those of any other tribes. During his reign,
nineteen court visits were made in the three decades after the
submission of 1372, nine by Chien personally. During the
Ming dynasty, the Po-chou rulers made a total of one hundred
and fourteen court visits in two hundred and twenty-eight
years — the highest number of Court visits of all the t'u-ssu —
with an average of one visit every two years. Obviously the
Yang family was peaceful and obedient to the Ming Court.

8 SL, 7:2930.
9 MS, 6:1739.
10 SL, 3:1318-1319; 4:1624, 1693, 1798; 5:1956, 2007; 6:2508,
2571; 7:2787, 2872, 3027, 3159, 3169, 3205; 8:3273, 3355-3356,
3369, 3472, 3568-3569.
11 The second highest number of Court visits conducted by Shui-
hsi hsiun-wei-ssu of Kweichow is 113. See Huang K'ai-hua,
op.cit., 120, 163.
B. Economic Burdens

Tax payment was one of the important feudal obligations. In 1374, there was a government proposal for the levy of taxes-in-kind on Po-chou at the rate of 2,500 tan of grain per annum from 1371 onwards. Emperor Hung-wu immediately rejected this suggestion deciding against a fixed levy in favour of voluntary tribute from the tribal chiefs. The reason given was that the Po-chou chieftains submitted to the Ming Court upon his assumption of imperial rule. This is an unconvincing superficial explanation since Po-chou was not among the first to come to submit to the Court. Some tribes had offered their submission even before the foundation of the Ming. The real reason was probably that Emperor Hung-wu wanted to avoid confrontation in southwestern China, so that he could concentrate on the north where Mongol remnants still posed a considerable military threat. Moreover, the Court was preparing for a series of subjugation campaigns in Yunnan, which was still occupied by a Mongol prince and a famous tribal clan and had not yet come under the control of the Chinese. Therefore, Emperor Hung-wu had to keep the Szechuan-Kweichow region peaceful and continue to pacify the powerful chieftains as well, so that not only would the expedition troops avoid opposition from the tribesmen but the Court could also utilise.

12 SL, 4:1558.

13 For example, An-ting hsüan-fu-ssu, Jung-mei hsüan-fu-ssu and Pao-ching an-fu-ssu in Hukuang, Ssu-nan and Ssu-chou hsüan-fu-ssu in Kweichow were those who had submitted to Chu Yüan-chang (the Ming founder emperor Hung-wu) during the late Yüan dynasty. See MS, 26:7984, 7995; 27:8167.
the tribesmen to build roads, to dredge the rivers, to
construct bridges and to supply provisions. Finally and more
importantly, the Ming forces needed tribal troops in
collaboration with the government troops for a successful
subjugation campaign. Therefore, Emperor Hung-wu did not
permit the fixed quota of 2,500 tan of grain per annum to be
levied upon Po-chou at this early stage. But this decision did
not mean that thereafter taxes would never be levied on Po-chou.
In many of the tribal units in Yunnan taxes-in-kind were levied
two years after the Court's successful subjugation campaigns
in 1384. Moreover, in 1406, the Court announced that some
267,000 mou (40,454.5 acres) of the Deserted Land Tax of Po-chou,
together with that of Chengtu Prefecture and the other tribal
units of Kweichow, Yu-yang and Yung-ning, could be exempted.
This means that before 1406 even "deserted lands" allowed to
become uncultivated could be taxed. We may, therefore, estimate
that the levy of a regular quota of taxes-in-kind (2,500 tan of
grain per annum) upon Po-chou must have been undertaken after
the mid-Hung-wu period.

According to an investigation by the Vice Minister of
Justice Ho Ch'iao-hsin (1427-1503) in 1486, the levy of taxes-
in-kind upon Po-chou was about 3,398 tan of grain per annum in
1478 and 1479. According to these two fixed levies, we can

14 MS, 26:8002-8003.
15 SL, 4:1558; 10:763; MSK, 7:102; MS, 26:8039-8040; TIFC,
2:893-894.
16 Ho Ch'iao-hsin, K'an-ch'u Po-chou shih-ch'ing shu (Chang-
surmise that there must have been some alteration in the quota between the last decade of the fourteenth century and the last quarter of the fifteenth century from 2,500 tan to 3,398 tan, about a one-third increase over the original. During the last period, the half century or more from 1544 to 1600, the tax burden amounted to 5,800 tan of grain per annum.\textsuperscript{17} In addition, Po-chou had to pay 3,164.7 silver taels to assist the Kweichow provincial government annually.\textsuperscript{18} Therefore, the burden of taxes-in-kind and taxes-in-silver were higher than before. The taxpayers in Po-chou inevitably suffered from the dual impositions from the Ming government as well as from their Po-chou ruling class.

Po-chou had once developed into an important trade centre. A government-monopolised tea warehouse was built in Po-chou in 1397. Officials were appointed to supervise the grain-tea trade as well as the horse-tea exchange.\textsuperscript{19} Unfortunately, this tea warehouse was cancelled in 1439.\textsuperscript{20} The reason is not known, but the trade between tribesmen and Han-Chinese remained prosperous.\textsuperscript{21}

Above all, lumbering was one of the major economic burdens since Po-chou became an important lumbering centre in

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{PPCS}, 4:328.
\textsuperscript{18} Kuo Tzu-chang, "Po p'ing shan-hou shih-i shu", \textit{HMCSWP}, 6:4551.
\textsuperscript{19} \textit{SL}, 8:3662.
\textsuperscript{20} \textit{TIFC}, 2:892.
\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Ta-Ming i-t'ung-chih}, 72:36.
Szechuan after the mid-sixteenth century. The cost of lumbering and the transporting of timber from the Po-chou jungle to the capital was extremely high. It ranged from about four to five thousand silver taels for large timbers and from one to two thousand silver taels for small ones. Sometimes a beam timber valued at one thousand silver taels would cost ten times that when it arrived in the capital. The tribesmen were the ones who were forced to provide this hard labour corvée.

C. Military Service

As mentioned in Chapter One, the Ming Court could effectively utilise the tribal forces for fighting. The Po-chou tribal troops had done their best to serve the Ming Court in many military campaigns.

In 1373, a year after Chien's first court visit, several government courier stations were built in Po-chou to improve communications. In 1381, before the Court sent expeditionary troops to Yunnan, Chien was ordered to accept responsibility for the construction of courier stations, post-houses, bridges and roads in support of the Chungking Battalion. These major projects took eight months to complete. In the later part of

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22 TIPC, 1:401.
25 TIPC, 2:893.
the same year, Chien was ordered to lead an advance guard of twenty thousand tribesmen and to supply three thousand horses for the expedition. In the first lunar month of the following year, Yunnan was brought fully under Ming control. Po-chou tribal forces undoubtedly made significant contributions to the success of the subjugation campaign.

After the military success, the Court decided to send retired military officers to guard Yunnan. Chien was asked to provide fifty-five tribesmen as a guard to accompany each of these experienced veterans to their assigned destinations. Because of its performance in these tasks, Po-chou came to be relied upon as one of the important military bases for the security of southwestern China. In order to control and communicate with this strategic area more effectively and directly, the Court decided to build three additional courier stations in Po-chou. Since Sha-hsi in Po-chou was walled, it was designated a garrison city and came to be guarded by a tribal-government united military force, composed of one thousand government regular troops and two thousand tribal troops. Historically speaking, the military significance of the Po-chou tribal force was less in Ming times than it had been in


27 *MSK*, 1:16; *MS*, 1:39.

28 *SL*, 5:2232.

29 *SL*, 5:2238.

30 *SL*, 5:2223.
Yüan times. The Po-chou troops had been enlisted in the attack on Burma and Vietnam during the reign of Khubilai Khan (r. 1260-1294). During the Ming dynasty, however, the Po-chou tribal troops fighting in collaboration with regular troops did not go beyond Yunnan, Kweichow and Szechuan. Most of the suppression campaigns in which the Po-chou tribal force participated took place in the Po-chou area or the Kweichow-Hukuang border region. Of the fourteen suppression campaigns in which Po-chou tribal troops were called upon, only six were obviously for the benefit of the Ming Court. One, in 1381, was the subjugation campaign in Yunnan with which the Court planned to sweep out the Mongol remnants and establish a Provincial Administration Office. Of the other five, one involved the Kweichow-Hukuang border region, two were in Szechuan, and two in Kweichow; these were all punitive moves against disloyal tribal chiefs or rebellious tribesmen. The other campaigns were largely for strengthening the dominance of the Yang clan in Po-chou. (See Appendix Three: Chronicle of the Po-chou Tribal Troops' Participation in Suppression Campaigns.) Overall, the Po-chou tribal troops were more important than the regular troops in the suppression campaigns, especially the two which occurred in Szechuan in 1586-1588. Even the Han-Chinese commanders borrowed severed heads from the Po-chou tribal troops, so that they could apply for rewards from the Court.

32 *TIFC*, 2:900-901.
D. Domestic Struggles

Power struggles within a tribe always arose out of contested succession to the chieftainship. The 1476-77 suppression campaign against the Miao people in Yao-pa-kan and Wan-hsi, in particular, was designed to solve internal conflicts of the Yang clan. The twenty-fourth Po-chou ruler Yang Hui (1433-1483; r. 1449-1474) wanted to make Yu, the son of his beloved concubine his successor in Po-chou in place of Ai, the legitimate heir as eldest son of his legal wife, but failed. He was advised by deceitful followers to wage a suppression campaign on the so-called uncivilised Miao people and then to request to establish a new Pacification Office with Yu as its head. The Court believed him and sent government troops to help him to undertake the suppression. Po-chou had to supply military provisions and more than ten thousand of its own troops, far more than the government's, and after the campaign, the burden of the construction of Pacification Offices and garrison fortifications were largely borne by Po-chou itself. (See Appendix Four: A Brief Account on the 1476-1477 Suppression Campaign.)

The conflict between the two brothers, Yu and Ai, did not cease after the re-distribution of power and property arranged by their father Hui. On the contrary, the conflict reached a serious level after Hui's death in 1483. Yu and his henchman Chang Yuan tried to murder Ai three times between 1485 and 1486. Subsequently, the two brothers reported each other to the emperor. Ai exposed Yu's conspiracy and the murders committed in his name. Yu, in collaboration with Yuan, fabricated more
than two dozen charges against Ai in order that he might replace Ai as ruler of Po-chou. After receiving the accusations made by the two camps, the Court, on 20 October 1486, decided to send the Vice Minister of Justice Ho Ch'iao-hsin to Po-chou to conduct an investigation of the case. After careful inquiry, he found Ai innocent except for a few minor mistakes. Subsequently, on 6 April 1487, the Court made its final judgement: Chang Yuan and his brother Shen were sentenced to death; Ai could stay in office by paying redemption; Yu was dismissed from office and transferred to Pao-ning to be kept in custody. (See Appendix Five: A Brief Account of the 1486-1487 Investigation.)

The conflict between Ai and Yu seemed to have been settled but this proved to be temporary. Both for profit and revenge, Ai levied heavy taxes upon those tribesmen previously ruled by Yu. Under these circumstances, these tribesmen favoured Yu over Ai as their ruler. With their support, Yu escaped from Pao-ning and returned to Po-chou and burned down Ai's lodgings and offices. At this moment, Ai asked for help. The Court promised to suppress Yu but suspended its preparations upon learning of Yu's death. When the Court realised that Yu still commanded considerable support, it decided to support Yu's son Hung as his father's successor. This device would keep the Po-chou people divided with each side keeping close watch on the other. Therefore, the Court appointed Hung as t'u-she, a tribal secretary, with responsibility to assist the registrar of Po-chou in pacifying tribesmen. As mentioned in the first chapter, members of the Registry in every Pacification Office
were mostly Han-Chinese regular civilian officials. (See Table One: The Organisation of Tribal Government in Ming China.) Thus, the Court placed Hung under the protection of a group of Han-Chinese officials and utilised Hung in helping to solve tribal problems. With the support of Hung, the Court could limit the expanding power of Ai, and especially of his son Pin.

Ai retired in 1501, sixteen years before his death. It was possibly pressure from the Court on Ai that forced him to seek early retirement or Ai himself might have relinquished his post to Pin for the sake of safety. Both explanations are plausible. After taking up the post, Pin demonstrated his brilliance by leading five thousand troops to aid the government in suppressing a rebellion in Kweichow. In 1507, Pin successfully bribed the famous and powerful eunuch Liu Chin to have himself promoted to the positions of Surveillance Commissioner of Szechuan and concurrently Pacification Commissioner of Po-chou. This was a unique and unprecedented situation. Under strong criticism by a censor, this promotion was cancelled the next year. Citing the provocative behaviour of the Miao tribesmen as a pretext, a tribal chief asked the Court to give Pin an imperial mandate permitting him to inspect the Kweichow-Hukuang border from time to time. This petition was also turned down by the Ministry of War. These actions indicate that Hung's new appointment as tribal secretary in the Registry was part of a Court policy to balance the powers or at least limit the power of the Po-chou ruler.

After Hung's death, the Grand Coordinator Tsou Wen-sheng suggested the restoration of the An-ning Pacification Office
and recommended that either Hung's brother or son be its head. Although there were internal disagreements within the Ministry of War, Hung's brother Chang was eventually appointed Pacification Commissioner of An-ning hsüan-fu-ssu in 1528. The name of An-ning was simultaneously altered to K'ai-li, however, and it was separated from Po-chou and re-organised under the jurisdiction of Kweichow Province, so that the Po-chou ruler would be restrained in acting against Chang.\footnote{33} In order to increase supervision Po-chou had been separated from Szechuan and placed under the jurisdiction of the Military Defense Circuit of Ssu-shih of Kweichow. It was not until 1562 that Po-chou was again returned to the authority of the Szechuan provincial government.\footnote{34} In order to strengthen its military control, the Court ordered the setting up of Military Defense Circuits at important bases along the coast and in the border regions from the sixteenth century onwards.\footnote{35} Therefore, even though Po-chou had been returned to the jurisdiction of Szechuan, the Ssu-shih Military Defense Circuit retained the right to supervise Po-chou and three other tribal units.\footnote{36}

Conflicts between brothers having different mothers reappeared in the reign of the twenty-seventh ruler Yang Hsiang


\footnote{35}{Li Kuo-ch'i, "Ming Ch'ing liang-tai ti-fang hsing-cheng chih-tu chung 'tao' ti kung-neng chi ch'i yen-pien", \textit{Chung-yang yen-chiu-yüan chin-tai-shih-yen-chiu-so chi-k'an}, 3.1:148-150 (July 1972).}

\footnote{36}{\textit{SL}, 90:8429; \textit{KCTH}, 4:2110.}
(r. 1518-1544). Envious of his father's favouritism toward his half-brother, the legitimate heir Lieh, with the encouragement of his strong-minded mother and the assistance of a group of tribal troops, deposed his father in 1544. Shortly afterwards, Hsiang died in the neighbouring Shui-hsi t'u-ssu government. The tribal regent of Shui-hsi, An Wan-ch'üan (See Appendix Six: The Case of An Kuo-heng: 1570-1577), forced Lieh to cede two pieces of land when Lieh asked for the body of his father. Lieh later broke his word, and the subsequent conflict between these two strong tribal units lasted ten years. Finally, Supreme Commander Feng Yueh ended the dispute by sending a strong government force in 1555. It is not known why the government waited ten years before intervening; possibly the confrontation suddenly became more serious or the tax collection and labour corvée were affected by the extended military conflict.

In the same year, Feng Yueh sent his Regional Commander with seven thousand troops to suppress a Miao rebellion in northern Po-chou. After these two suppression campaigns, Feng Yueh was keen to strengthen military control over Po-chou. He planned to establish a military control zone on the eastern border of Po-chou, where the military force could be easily recruited from the provinces of Kweichow, Hukuang and Szechuan. Alongside the inner zone, fortifications were to be built at three important military bases: Tsou-ma-p'ing in Szechuan, Lung-ch'üan in Kweichow and San-tu Pass within Po-chou. The

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37 KCTH, 4:2109; MSK, 7:104; MS, 26:8044.
outer zone was composed of the Garrison Guards of Chungking in Szechuan, and of T'ung-jen and Pien-ch'iao in Hukuang. Three commanders were assigned to these rear military bases to command and supply troops. In order to control Po-chou more directly, the local commander of T'ung-jen advanced to Shih-ch'ien, and the Local Commander of Ssu-shih Military Defense Circuit moved to Lung-ch'üan. (See Map IV. Government Military Control on Po-chou Since 1555.) Moreover, in order to solve the logistic problem, the Assistant Prefect of Chungking was transferred to Lung-ch'üan to take charge of the collection of taxes-in-kind. Feng Yüeh's proposal was approved by the Court.  

This military arrangement maintained the peace of Po-chou for about four decades until the full-scale uprising of Yang Ying-lung.

E. Education

Like the other tribes, the chieftains of Po-chou sent their children to the capital to enrol in the National University. This practice was encouraged by the Ming government to sinicise the tribal people, and differed from that of the Mongol Yüan government when the chieftains were forced to send their sons as hostages. In Ming times, non-Han students were treated well and eventually sent back to their original tribes after graduation. If a student died during

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38 *KCTH*, 4:2109; *MSHC*, 5:2.
39 *SL*, 7:3025; *TIFC*, 2:894.
IV. GOVERNMENT MILITARY CONTROL ON PO-CHOU SINCE 1555

MAP IV. GOVERNMENT MILITARY CONTROL ON PO-CHOU SINCE 1555

1. Chungking 重慶
2. T'ung-jen 銅仁
3. Ssu-nan 思南
4. Shih-ch'ien 石阡
5. Fien-ch'iao 偏橋
6. Lung-ch'üan 龍泉
7. San-tu Pass 三渡関
8. Tsou-ma-p'ing 軟馬坪
this period, his corpse would be sent back to his own tribes for burial, as in the case of Yang Chien's son Chen.\footnote{MSK, 7:102; MS, 26:8040.}

In 1400, a Confucian School was founded in Po-chou chang-kuan-ssu, and six years later it was promoted to the level of the hsüan-wei-ssu, so that children and youths could study locally.\footnote{Ta-Ming i-t'ung-chih, 72:37b; TIFC, 2:894. According to Charles O. Hucker's comment on Confucius School, there was one such School at each Prefectural seat, at each Sub-prefectural seat, and at each County seat. See Charles O. Hucker, op.cit., 47.} To send children to study at the National University could be seen as evidence that the Po-chou ruling class sought assimilation with the Han-Chinese ruling class. For the Ming Court to build Confucian Schools in a tribal area, however, indicated the desire to impose Chinese culture upon the aboriginal tribespeople. This policy of sinicisation by education, however, was not as successful as the Ming Court had hoped. Throughout the Ming dynasty, only one Po-chou student obtained the chin-shih degree — by special examination in the reign of the first Ming emperor. Only six passed the provincial examinations and obtained the chü-jen degree. Of these six, one was successful in 1414 in the early Ming, four in 1630, three decades after the abolition of the Po-chou tribal units, and the date of the other is uncertain.\footnote{TIFC, 2:711.} Moreover, the Confucian School in Po-chou was later converted into a Taoist monastery.\footnote{Ibid., 1:441.} This might have happened in the mid-sixteenth
century, for it might have been the result of Emperor Chia-
ching's (1522-1566) favouritism for Taoism.\textsuperscript{44} The conversion
could not have been earlier than 1522 because the bestowal of
the \textit{Collected Commentaries on the Four Books} on the Po-chou
Confucian School was recorded for this year.\textsuperscript{45} Confucian
teachings were even forbidden during the reigns of Yang Ying-
lung (r. 1571-1595) and Yang Ch'ao-tung (r. 1595-1600).\textsuperscript{46} It
was not until the Yang family was destroyed in 1600 that
Confucian teaching at a Prefectural level was restored, and a
Confucian School was rebuilt in 1608-1609.\textsuperscript{47}

Summing up, the Po-chou people seem not to have been
interested in Confucian education. They appear to have firmly
rejected sinicisation. Their enthusiasm for Chinese cultural
assimilation was far less than that of their ancestors in Sung
times.\textsuperscript{48} Under these circumstances, some Chinese candidates in
Szechuan, Yunnan and Kwangsi, taking advantage of the lack of
competition for limited quotas falsely entered local
examinations as members of tribal minorities. This was
prohibited by the central government in 1576, and the local
examiners were warned to check the identity of candidates
carefully.\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{44} \textit{MSCSFM}, 2:547-558.
\textsuperscript{45} \textit{MSK}, 7:104; \textit{MS}, 26:8044.
\textsuperscript{46} \textit{TIFC}, 1:516, 526.
\textsuperscript{47} \textit{Ibid.}, 1:441.
\textsuperscript{48} See Section C of Chapter Two; \textit{TIFC}, 1:441; 2:710.
\textsuperscript{49} \textit{TMHT}, 3:1240.
F. Immigration of the Han People

The historical development of Po-chou lasted seven and a quarter centuries. Its existence was undoubtedly a result of Han-Chinese expansion although the motive for its establishment was to fight against the aggressive tribal state of Nanchao and later a group of Han-Chinese had settled there because of the fall of the T'ang dynasty. In addition to the three local dominant families, Yü, Chiang and Huang, possibly three clans of early Han-Chinese migrants, another nine Han-Chinese clans, Yang, Ling-hu, Ch'eng, Chao, Yu, Lou, Liang, Wei and Hsieh, were led by Yang Tuan into the Po-chou area in the last quarter of the ninth century. Subsequently, other Han immigrants joined this group, especially during the Southern Sung period (1127-1279). As a result of social mobility within Po-chou, another seven important Han-Chinese families, T'ien, Chang, Yüan, Lu, T'an, Lo and Wu, arose in Ming times. Other less important families were Wang, Ho, Sung, Cheng, Lo, Mao, Han and Tan. The more than two dozen Han-Chinese clans comprised a sizeable population, including their Han-Miao mixed descendants. During the mid-fifteenth century, the customs and observances of the Po-chou inhabitants were described in the Ta-Ming i-tung-chih (Geographical Histories of Ming China). Members of the households of the officials and scholars were said to have

50 YSCC, 10:31b; TIFC, 1:71.
52 TIFC, 2:702-705.
the same customs and practices as Han-Chinese. Tribesmen retained their own styles of hair and dress, their own customs of marriage and diet, as well as their indigenous practices of hunting and cultivation. Chieftains, however, usually wore Han-Chinese dress; on formal occasions, the tribesmen would also wear Han-Chinese garments. At the end of the sixteenth century, a large group of Han-Chinese migrants and temporary residents, including merchants, scholars, workmen, labourers, escaped criminals as well as the slaves captured by the local tribesmen, was advised by Supreme Commander Li Hua-lung (1554-1612) to reject the rebellious chieftain Yang Ying-lung and turn to support the government in the suppression campaign. Although there is no source to indicate the population of Po-chou during the Ming period, we can estimate that the ratio of the Han-Chinese and the non-Han tribesmen had changed as a result of long term trends in immigration.

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53 Ta-Ming i-t'ung-chih, 72:36.
54 PPCS, 5:482.
CHAPTER FOUR
The Po-chou Uprising and the Response of the Government

A. Underlying Causes of the Po-chou Uprising

In discussing the relations between Imperial Courts and the ethnic minorities, some scholars have tended to emphasise economic exploitation and demands for military service. Although the existence of heavy taxation and labour corvée cannot be ignored, they do not seem to amount to sufficient cause in the case of the Po-chou uprising.

Undoubtedly, the taxes-in-kind levied upon Po-chou were gradually increased. During the Hung-wu reign, the rate was about 2,500 tan of grain per annum. In 1478 and 1479, the tax burden was increased to about 3,398 tan of grain per annum. During the last period, the half century or more from 1544 to 1600, it amounted to 5,800 tan of grain per annum. In addition, Po-chou had to pay 3,164.7 silver taels to assist Kweichow annually. These heavy taxes-in-kind and taxes-in-cash, however, were not the direct causes behind the Po-chou ruler Yang Ying-lung's decision to revolt, since Ying-lung could use his authority to shift the tax burden on his people;

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2 See Chapter Three, note 15.
4 PPCS, 4:328.
5 Kuo Tzu-chang, op.cit., 6:4551.
he was not obliged to pay the taxes himself. Not only was he unlikely to suffer however high the tax rate was, but he could exploit the tax collection for his own advantage at the taxpayers' expense. He reportedly adopted a new taxation method called "equal tribute" (teng-tsung) by which every mou (1/6.6 acre) of cultivated land was assessed at an average levy of several ch'ien of silver. (Ten ch'ien of silver equalled one tael of silver.) The obvious result was that he could obtain more money from this new taxation method and his people would suffer from a higher rate of levy than before. In addition, the ruler of Po-chou did not pay in full the taxes levied by the local government. For example, the Po-chou hsüan-wei-ssu was supposed to pay 3,164.7 silver taels to the Kweichow Provincial Government annually. From 1590 to 1599, the total tax remittance should have been 31,647 silver taels. In fact, it only paid 1,817 silver taels, about 5.75% of the total. This unsatisfactory revenue situation, however, was not an important factor in the Court's decision to conduct a suppression campaign. The tax-in-cash levied upon Po-chou was a relatively small sum. Because of Kweichow's poverty and low revenue-raising capacity, Szechuan and Hukuang were obligated to support this neighbouring province. As one of the tribal units under the jurisdiction of Szechuan, Po-chou was involved in this transfer practice. A delay in tax payment was the

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6 PPCS, 4:328.
7 Kuo Tzu-chang, op.cit.
general situation in Ming China even in the wealthy places in Central and Southern China. Consequently Po-chou was not alone in delaying payment of tax-in-cash; the other tribal units of Szechuan also owed over 50 per cent of their annual tax quota. The following table presents quantitative data on the annual aid to Kweichow by several tribal units of Szechuan.

On the other hand, the annual aid from Hukuang to Kweichow was 30,720 silver taels. The delayed payment of Hukuang was much higher than that of Szechuan. Before 1483, its debts of annual aid to Kweichow accumulated to 81,000(+) silver taels which was later cancelled by the Court. From 1484 to 1486, it had owed 65,000(+) silver taels, about 70 per cent of the total. ¹ Therefore, I can here conclude that the heavy levy upon Po-chou and its delay of payment were neither the main reason to stir up the Po-chou uprising nor the pretext for the Ming Court to wage the suppression campaign.

Corvée, including labour corvée and military corvée, was another form of economic exploitation. Besides the ordinary labour corvée for the construction of bridges and roads, the building of fortifications and tribal offices, the services at postal houses and offices, the protection of officials and the guard of garrison towns, the most difficult and hard labour corvée was the lumbering and the transportation of timber.

After Emperor Yung-lo moved the capital from Nanking to Peking in the early fifteenth century, many palaces were built

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¹ *SL*, 104:3533.
### TABLE THREE: Annual Aid to Kweichow by Several Szechuan Tribal Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribal Units</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Annual Aid: (silver tael)</th>
<th>Total (tael)</th>
<th>Unpaid (tael)</th>
<th>Paid (%)</th>
<th>Unpaid (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Four native prefectures:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wu-ch’e, Chen-hsiung</td>
<td>Late 16th century</td>
<td>3,100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Less 30%</td>
<td>Over 70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tung-ch’uan, Wu-meng</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Po-chou hsüan-wei-ssu</td>
<td>1590-99</td>
<td>3,164.7</td>
<td>31,647</td>
<td>29,830(+)</td>
<td>5.75%</td>
<td>94.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yu-yang hsüan-fu-ssu</td>
<td>1591-99</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>6,300</td>
<td>2,960(+)</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

periodically. Many high-ranking officials were sent to Hukuang, Szechuan and Kweichow where there were reserved natural jungles to supervise the lumbering activities and the transportation of big timbers. These timbers could not be cut into pieces because they were to be used as beams to support the roofs of the buildings. Long, thick and strong timbers were required for construction of the high great palaces during the pre-modern era. Owing to the poor and backward transportation facilities, the percentage of corvée labourers employed in this work who died or were injured was very high. A popular saying was: "As one thousand workers entered into the jungle, only five hundred returned alive". Disregarding the cost of the dead and the wounded, the expense of transporting the timbers from the jungle to the capital was extremely high. The cost ranged from about four to five thousand silver taels for the biggest ones and from one to two thousand silver taels for smaller ones. Sometimes a timber valued at one thousand silver taels would cost ten times when it arrived in the capital. Since palaces were to be rebuilt because of destruction by fire in 1583 and 1584 respectively, the Court ordered that big timbers from Hukuang, Szechuan and

10 Lü K'un, op.cit., 5:4495.
11 Ch'en Chi-ju, op.cit., 8:3b-4.
12 Lü K'un, op.cit. The tribal chief of Yu-yang hsüan-fu-ssu was ready to contribute twenty pieces of timber to the capital in 1589. The Regional Inspector of Szechuan reported to the Court that they totally cost more than three thousand silver taels (see SL, 105:4092). That means each timber cost about 150 or more silver taels. This might be the official price which greatly differed from the real cost. Or, perhaps those timbers were extremely small.
Kweichow be gathered for this purpose. From the mid-sixteenth century onwards, Po-chou, Yung-ning, Chien-ch'ang, Ma-hu and several other places became important lumbering centres in Szechuan. In response to obligations, the Po-chou ruler Yang Ying-lung contributed seventy pieces of timber to the capital in 1586, for which the Court bestowed on him an official garment embroidered with a flying fish and some colourful silk clothes. Rather than the heavy timber corvée making Ying-lung angry, he could utilise the manpower of his people to transport timbers to the capital in exchange for commendations and bestowal from the Court. The Court would not wage a suppression campaign upon Po-chou by a pretext that its tribal chief had not fulfilled his obligations satisfactorily. Even if the Po-chou tribal ruler had not met his timber transport obligation fully, it is unlikely that such an excuse would be used for a suppression campaign. For example, the tribal chief of Shui-hsi cheated the Court into bestowing a garment embroidered with a flying fish by lying that he had contributed timbers, but the Court only took back the garment and let him complete the transporting of timbers as redemption.

On the other hand, Ying-lung was dissatisfied with the garment. He asked to have a garment embroidered with a dragon

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14 TIFC, 1:401.
15 MSK, 7:105; MS, 26:8045.
rather than a flying fish, which was what his grandfather Pin had obtained. The Court refused because Pin had performed meritorious military service by suppressing the disloyal Miao tribesmen. It was a special bestowal which was not to be quoted as a precedent. But, in order to pacify Ying-lung, however, the Court did not dismiss his request for recognition fully, but promoted him to Regional Military Commissioner in the summer of 1587. The Court conferred such a military title upon him because he had fulfilled the military obligation in aiding government troops in suppressing the rioting tribesmen in Szechuan the previous summer and because the Court was preparing to wage another suppression campaign upon other groups of disloyal tribesmen in Szechuan at the end of 1587. Several months later, Ying-lung commanded his tribal troops in a half year suppression campaign upon disloyal tribesmen of Yüeh-chin and Ch'iuung-pu in Szechuan from 22 December 1587 to 13 June 1588 in conjunction with government forces. He and his troops were described as having been brave in fighting. It is possible that Ying-lung desired to show off his brilliant fighting capacity in order to earn a higher title of honour as well as a precious high-ranking garment since his grandfather had received both bestowals from the Court for his meritorious military service.

From this account, Ying-lung would not have been unhappy with such military corvée. On the contrary, he would have tried

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16a Under Ming conventions of official symbolism, a robe with a dragon was more prestigious than a robe with a flying fish. Even the Minister of War was not considered eligible for a dragon robe. See Hung Wen-pin, Shi li, 1:384.

17 SL, 104:3459-3460.

to do his best in the suppression campaign in order to achieve his personal aim of honorific recognition by the Court.

Finally, this was his last participation in government's suppression campaigns.\(^{19}\) He had not fought for the government for six years prior to revolting against the Court in 1594. Therefore, neither the heavy tax levy nor the difficult labour and military corvée directly stimulated the Po-chou uprising.

Before describing the main causes of the Po-chou uprising, certain aspects of the uprising should be explained. First of all, the Po-chou uprising and the government suppression was not a confrontation between the Ming Court and all the tribal units of Po-chou. The conflict was between the twenty-ninth ruler Yang Ying-lung of the Po-chou hsüan-wei-ssu and the Court, which had five of the subordinate tribal units of Po-chou on its side. Originally the Po-chou hsüan-wei-ssu had ruled over two an-fu-ssu (Huang-p'ing and Ts'ao-t'ang) and six chang-kuan-ssu (Chen-chou, Po-chou, Yung-shan, Chung-an, Pai-li and Yu-ch'ing) since the early Ming. According to Ming law, all civil problems concerning households, marriages, lands and cultivated lands of subordinate tribal offices were to be reported to its immediately superior tribal office, whose

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\(^{19}\) Although Yang Ying-lung had promised to join the government force at the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War (1592-1598), he was eventually not allowed to go to the battlefield in Korea. See SL, 107:4744; KC, 5:4690; WLISTCK, 69; MSCSPM, 2:692; MSK, 7:105; MS, 26:8046; Fan Ching-wen, Chao-tai wu kung-pien (1638, n.p. Microfilm made by the Library of Congress. Hereafter abbreviated as CTWKP), 10:22b.
authority was to be obeyed. According to regulations, the
memorandum concerning the hereditary succession and Court
tribute by the subordinate tribal offices should be stamped with
the seal of their superior Po-chou hsüan-wei-ssu. Therefore,
Yang Ying-lung could take advantage of these supervising rights
to exploit his subordinate tribal chief. Of these latter, the
chiefs of the Huang-p'ing an-fu-ssu, the Ts'ao-t'ang an-fu-ssu,
the Pai-li chang-kuan-ssu, the Yü-ch'ing chang-kuan-ssu and the
Chung-an chang-kuan-ssu were the principal victims. Ying-
lung was also at odds with seven prominent local families —
T'ien, Chang, Yüan, Lu, T'an, Lo and Wu — because he felt that
they did not sufficiently support him. These seven families
asked protection from the above five tribal offices after Ying-
lung had tortured and killed some of their clansmen. The
most important victims of these attacks were Ying-lung's legal
wife née Chang and her mother. They were both killed by Ying-
lung himself in 1587 after he had come to favour a concubine
and suspected his wife of infidelity. Chang Shih-chao, the
uncle of née Chang, joined two local tribal officials — Ho En
of Po-chou chang-kuan-ssu and Sung Shih-ch'en of Ts'ao-t'ang
an-fu-ssu — in presenting to the provincial authorities a

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20 MSHC, 7:3; Okano Masako, "Minmatsu Banshū ni okeru Yōinryū
no ran ni tsuite", in Tōhōgaku, 41:65 (March 1971).
22 MSCSPM, 2:691; TIFC, 1:71.
23 WLISTCK, 68; MSHC, 7:1b; Shen Shih-hsing, "Po ch'iü", HMCSWP,
5:4173.
24 WLISTCK, 68.
report which charged Ying-lung with rebellion in 1589. There are two possible reasons why they did not press their claims in the year that née Chang and her mother were slain. Firstly, Ying-lung left Po-chou shortly afterwards. From 22 December 1587 to 13 June 1588, he was fighting against the rebellious tribesmen in northern Szechuan with his tribal troops in collaboration with the government troops. Secondly, they could not accuse Ying-lung of rebellion because he had only killed some persons in his local area. This was not even a serious crime in the tribal world. For example, the half brother of the twenty-fifth Po-chou ruler, who had murdered several people in league with his henchmen, was not sentenced to death. (See Appendix Five: A Brief Account of the 1486-1487 Investigation.) In addition, after killing his granduncle's son and later defeating government troops, An Kuo-heng, the tribal chief of Shui-hsi hsüan-wei-ssu, was only sentenced to paying redemption and withdrawal from office. (See Appendix Six: The Case of An Kuo-heng: 1570-1577.) Therefore, neither the murder of his wife and mother-in-law nor the accusation of such a crime would be likely to drive Ying-lung to insurrection.

After splitting with the seven prominent local families and his five subordinate tribal chiefs, Ying-lung found himself increasingly isolated. He joined forces with the "uncivilised" Miao aborigines and allocated to them lands confiscated from wealthy local families, including the seven prominent ones

25 Ibid., 69; TIPC, 2:702, 705.
26 SL, 105:3763-3766.
mentioned above. Under these circumstances, Chang Shih-chao, a member of one of the seven prominent local families, united with two tribal officials, Ho En and Sung Shih-ch'en, antagonistic to Ying-lung and accused him of rebellion. Ying-lung did not actually rise in revolt against the imperial Ming Court at this moment, but he did desire to annihilate the influence of the seven families and to establish his own.

Because of the situation, these charges evoked two responses from the provincial governments of Kweichow and Szechuan for the solution of such problems. One was to suppress Ying-lung through the use of the government military force and the other was to negotiate with him by political means. The argument over the use of military force or political means lasted for three years from 1589 to 1592. This would indicate that Ying-lung had not yet risen up in revolt. Finally, as an official in the central government concluded, it was decided that the crime committed by Ying-lung was not revolt against the Court but the murder of some tribesmen. Above all, Ying-lung's case was at the time less important than the rebellion in northern Szechuan. Therefore, ignoring the proposal for suppression, the Court ordered the governors of Szechuan and Kweichow to investigate Ying-lung's case jointly and refused to send a high-ranking official from the central government to take charge of the case.

28 WLSTCK, 69; MSCSPM, 2:692; MSHC, 7:1b; MSK, 7:105; MS, 26:8045.
The officials dispatched by the provincial governments, however, took advantage of the investigation to make difficulties for Ying-lung. For example, the officials arranged a date and place with Ying-lung for a face-to-face investigation. When Ying-lung arrived, the officials purposely delayed without any reason. When Ying-lung left, they suddenly arrived. They later charged him with being recalcitrant and disobedient. They continued to oppress Ying-lung in this fashion until he bribed them. Learning that the Szechuan authorities advocate to negotiate with him by political means, Ying-lung consented to go to Chungking personally to submit himself to judicial proceedings in 1592. After his arrival, he was kept in prison, and the gaolers insulted and extorted him, causing him to become very angry. At the conclusion of the Chungking trial, he was sentenced to death. Undoubtedly, this was very unexpected because there seemed to have been a compromise that he would not be sentenced to death. He appealed and the sentence was referred to Peking, and he promised to pay twenty thousand taels of silver to redeem his life. While his petition was being considered, the Japanese

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31 Shen Shih-hsing, *op.cit.*
32 *WLSTCK*, 69; *MSCSPM*, 2:692.
33 Shen Shih-hsing, *op.cit.*
34 There was no direct source to illustrate this compromise. But the Court obviously agreed with Wang Te-wan, a supervising secretary, that Ying-lung should not be sentenced to death because he did not revolt against the Court (see *SL*, 107:4604). Ying-lung must have been informed of the result of the tribunal, otherwise he would not take the risk to submit himself to judicial proceedings.
invasion of Korea occurred and an imperial edict was circulated throughout the country calling for recruits. Seizing upon this opportunity, Ying-lung also promised to supply five thousand tribal troops in exchange for his release. Eventually his offer was accepted and he was allowed to resume his position in Po-chou. 33

At first, Ying-lung still kept his word on sending troops to Korea. But Yu Shen-hsing, the Minister of Rites, suggested not to use the Po-chou tribal troops because they might be out of control while marching through central China. 36 On the other hand, the Ministry of War also proposed that there would be no need to use the Po-chou troops since all provincial troops had already been mobilised. For these reasons, even though Ying-lung's troops had already departed from Po-chou, the Court decided to stop them from marching to Korea immediately on 17 January 1593.37

About half a year later, on 14 August 1593, the Ministry of War received a report of an impeachment upon Ying-lung from Wang Hsiang-meng, the Regional Inspector of Szechuan. 38 The content of the accusation was unknown. According to James B. Parson's studies, Ying-lung killed several officials dispatched

38 SL, 107:4860.
to remind him of his obligation and sought to evade responsibility for the slayings by blaming them on the "uncivilised" Miao, but I am unable to check his source for this. Subsequently, on 6 September, the provincial governors and regional inspectors of Szechuan and Kweichow were ordered to jointly undertake a retrial of Ying-lung. Ying-lung, however, refused to present himself before the tribunal again. He defended himself by stating that he had previously presented meritorious military and labour services to the Court, and he had the power of life and death over the seven families because they were his subjects. At this moment, née Chang's uncle again went to the capital to indict him before the Court.

Wang Chi-kuang, due to the refusal of Ying-lung, insisted on waging a suppression campaign upon him. The Court agreed to such a proposal and, on 8 December 1593, assented to suppress Ying-lung through military force. In the spring of 1594, the expedition forces were dispatched to Po-chou from the south, the north, and the northeast. Under these circumstances, Ying-lung decided to resist the government's authority. It was the first time for the Yang family — the ruling class of the Po-chou tribal units — to fight against the Ming government troops since its submission in 1372.

39 James B. Parsons, op.cit.

40 KC, 5:4707.

It was clear that the causes of Ying-lung's uprising were neither the heavy tax levy nor the military burden but the unreasonable serious political oppression by Han-Chinese officials under the guise of judicial proceedings. The extortion of bribery by the officials and gaolers might not have cost Ying-lung too much but it inevitably roused Ying-lung's hatred. The most important thing which made Ying-lung refuse to submit to another trial was the fact that the previous judgement had been death. Since he had earlier been sentenced to death, he did not know whether or not he would still be able to redeem his life by paying twenty thousand taels of silver. He had been fortuitously released because of the occurrence of the Sino-Japanese War in Korea. If he submitted himself again and the result was again being sentenced to death and if there was no redemption for his life as seemed to be a plausible scenario, it is understandable that he would not allow himself to be executed without any resistance. It was a matter of life or death with no choice but to revolt or face arrest and almost certain death. If the revolt were successful, he could save his life and found a state of his own like the Nanchao state in T'ang times. If he could defeat the government troops, he might still be able to negotiate with the Court. He might avoid being beheaded and suffer removal from office at the worst as in the case of An Kuo-heng, the tribal ruler of Shui-hsi hsüan-wei-ssu, two decades earlier. (See Appendix Six: The Case of An Kuo-heng: 1570-1577.) Furthermore, he knew that it would not be too difficult for him to defeat the Szechuan regular troops. He had had the opportunity to fight against the
disloyal tribesmen in collaboration with them a few years previously and learned that the government troops were very weak. The commanders on the other hand were so keen to apply for the rewards calculated in proportion to the number of beheaded that they had borrowed the beheaded from him. Understanding this situation, Ying-lung decided to fight against the government troops. The results proved that he was right.

B. The Development of the Po-chou Uprising

Historians writing about the Po-chou uprising have selected differing dates for the start of the insurrection. The Ming scholar Mao Jui-cheng and the Ch'ing scholar Ku Ying-t'ai use 1589, the year of the charges being made against Yang Ying-lung by his enemies; the Japanese historian Okano Masako starts his history of the rebellion with 1591 with the proposal by the Kweichow governor Yeh Meng-hsiung, an adamant advocate of a war policy. A Ti-ch'ao (official newsletter) in Ming times uses the mid-1599 appointment of Li Hua-lung as Supreme Commander for mobilising a military force to suppress the uprising as the beginning of the revolt. I have shown that Yang Ying-lung actually took up arms against government troops in the spring of 1594, but even at this point there was still not the full-scale resistance to government authority. There

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42 MSCSPM, 2:692; MSHC, 7:1b; Ch'a Chi-tso, op.cit., 34:32b.
43 WLSTCK, 69; MSCSPM, 2:691; Okano Masako, op.cit., 66.
was a second round of negotiations between Ying-lung and the provincial government in mid-1595. When Ying-lung was refused permission to recover the corpse of his second son who had been held hostage in Chungking, however, full-scale warfare broke out in the autumn of 1596. It was not until the end of the Sino-Japanese War in Korea that the Chinese government appointed a Supreme Commander to organise a massive government-tribal joint force in 1599 and conduct the decisive suppression in 1600. Therefore, development of the Po-chou uprising can best be understood by distinguishing two periods: (i) 1594-1595 and (ii) 1596-1599.

(i) The first phase: 1594-1595

Governor Yeh Meng-hsiung of Kweichow, one of the strong advocates of the war group was transferred to Shensi in 1590-1591, but Governor VJang Chi-kuang of Szechuan replaced him as the chief spokesman of a policy of military pacification. After Ying-lung's refusal to submit to a retrial, a Court decision to wage a suppression campaign against Ying-lung was passed on 8 December 1593, with Wang Chi-kuang in charge of the campaign.46

In February-March of 1594, Wang Chi-kuang arrived in Chungking and immediately organised an expeditionary force with

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45 The order of the transfer of Yeh Meng-hsiung was issued on 31 October 1590 (see SL, 106:4224; KC, 5:4636). But, on 13 March 1591, the Court still got the memorial from Yeh who asked for a supervising secretary to be sent from the central government to undertake an investigation (see SL, 106:4303-4304; KC, 5:4645).

Regional Commander Liu Ch'eng-ssu to crush Ying-lung. The troops were divided into three contingents and dispatched to Po-chou from the south, the north and the northeast. (See Map V. The 1594 Expedition upon Po-chou.) They were ordered to attack and occupy the strategic passes situated on the Ta-lou-shan mountain range. The first contingent led by Wang Chih-han from the south was to advance via Huang-p'ing and Mei-t'an to Ta-lou-shan; the second contingent led by Ts'ao Hsi-pin from the northwest was to proceed via Yung-ning and Chi-ma; the third contingent led by Kuo Ch'eng from the north was to advance via An-wen and Sung-k'an. When they reached Pai-shih-k'ou, Ying-lung pretended to negotiate with them and sent his representatives to the government camp. Suddenly, Ying-lung ordered his Miao troops to launch an attack by shooting arrows and then striking into the ranks; the entire contingent under Wang Chih-han was routed and the majority of troops in the other two contingents were killed or wounded. Total casualties reached between two and three thousand. The government troops withdrew and left a large quantity of baggage and military supplies. The relief troops from Kweichow were also defeated at Wu-chiang, and Wang Chi-kuang was dismissed from office immediately. The new Governor of Szechuan T'an Hsi-ssu was immediately appointed and ordered to discuss with

47 KC, 5:4726-4727; WLSTCK, 69-70; CTWKP, 10:23; MSCSPM, 2:692; MSHC, 7:2; MSK, 7:105; MS, 26:8046.

48 PPCS, 5:478.
(1) via Huang-p'ing
   & Mei-t' an
   (黃平  麥田)

(2) via Yung-ning
    & Chi-ma
    (永寧  齊麻)

(3) via An-wen
    & Sung-k'an
    (安文  晉坎)

MAP V. THE 1594 EXPEDITION UPON PO-CHOU
Liu Ch'eng-ssu and Governor Lin Ch'iao-hsiang of Kweichow a resumption of the suppression campaign.\(^{49}\)

When Ying-lung learned that the Court had decided to renew the suppression campaign, he petitioned the Court for pardon and in return promised to render further meritorious services in the future.\(^{50}\) The Court deferred immediate acceptance of his offer and on 14 October 1594 appointed Hsing Chieh, the Vice Minister of War, as head of an investigation to determine whether to accept a negotiated settlement or to continue the suppression.\(^{51}\)

In the spring of 1595, Hsing Chieh arrived in Szechuan and informed Ying-lung by letter that he would not be sentenced to death if he surrendered but warned that if he refused to submit himself to judicial proceedings the Court would offer a reward of ten thousand taels of silver in exchange for his head. Hsing Chieh also laid stress on the success of the suppression against Pübei (Po Pai) in Ningsia in 1592 to overawe him with this example.\(^{52}\) By this time, the seven prominent local families did not want the Court to accept Ying-lung's terms but preferred to see Ying-lung and his rule eliminated. They feared that Ying-lung would take the opportunity for revenge if

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\(^{49}\) See note 47 and SL, 108:5032.

\(^{50}\) SL, 108:5112; KC, 5:4734.

\(^{51}\) Ibid.; KC, 5:4735.

\(^{52}\) Pübei (Po Pai), a Mongol, was appointed Deputy Regional Commander after contributing a lot of meritorious military service. He revolted with his sons and was eventually suppressed in 1592. It was one of the three famous military campaigns between 1592 and 1600 during the Wan-li reign (1573-1620). The other two were the defeat of Japanese in Korea and of Yang Ying-lung in Po-chou. (See WLSTCK; MSCSPM, 2:670-698.)
the Court allowed him to continue in power after negotiation. On the other side, Ying-lung's associates realised that his surrender would bring about their own destruction since in the previous negotiations in 1592 a supervising secretary had suggested the pardon of Ying-lung but the execution of his advisors.\(^5\) They had no alternative to rebellion but certain death and therefore put pressure on Ying-lung to continue armed resistance. In addition, they waylaid the negotiation letters from the government.\(^5\)

As a demonstration of official goodwill and of the government's sincere desire to reach accommodation, Hsing Chieh ordered the Szechuan troops withdrawn from Ch'i-chiang and the Kweichow troops from Wu-chiang. By this time, the tribal chief of Shui-hsi hsüan-wei-ssu, An Chiang-ch'en, sought posthumous honours from the Court for his father An Kuo-heng, who had defeated the government troops during his chieftainship. The Minister of War made an offer to An Chiang-ch'en that his father would get the honours if he could persuade Ying-lung to submit himself for trial. While An Chiang-ch'en was proceeding in person toward Po-chou to persuade Ying-lung, Hsing Chieh also sent Wang Shih-ch'i, the Prefect of Chungking, to conduct the negotiations. Ying-lung was asked to go to An-wen in Ch'i-chiang county for trial. He sent his brother Chao-lung there to request a change of venue to Sung-k'an. Wang Shih-ch'i

\(^5\) _SL_, 107:4604.

\(^5\) _MSCSPM_, 2:693; _MSK_, 7:105; _MS_, 26:8046.
agreed to this change and went himself to Sung-k'an on 15 June 1595. Ying-lung walked on his knees and knocked his head onto the ground and requested that he be treated in the manner of An Kuo-heng, who also had defeated government troops but was not sentenced to death but only to being deprived of office. (See Appendix Six: The Case of An Kuo-heng: 1570-1577.) After Wang Shih-ch'i had obtained this promise from Hsing Chieh, a trial was arranged at An-wen on 29 August.

At the conclusion of this new trial, Ying-lung was again sentenced to death but his death penalty was not executed. Instead, twelve of his associates were sentenced to death and were later beheaded at Chungking. According to the tribal laws, by which crimes could be pardoned on payment of redemption, Ying-lung was required to pay forty thousand taels of silver to assist the local authorities in lumbering activities, was deprived of his office, which was handed over to his eldest son Ch'ao-tung, and had his second son K'o-tung detained at Chungking as a hostage until the forty thousand silver taels had been paid in full. This judgement was eventually approved by the Court on 19 November 1959.55

The tribal offices of Huang-p'ing, Ts'ao-t'ang, Pai-li, Yu-ch'ing and Chung-an, previously under the control of Po-chou hsüan-wei-ssu, were now transferred to the jurisdiction of an Assistant Prefect of Huang-p'ing and, early in 1596, Li P'ei-ken, the Assistant Prefect of Chungking, was appointed to carry

out the administration of this new post. Further changes included the promotion of Wang Shih-ch'i to Deputy Commissioner of the Military Circuit of Eastern Szechuan with supervision over the tribal officials and the establishment of a new pacification office at Sung-k'an with charge of tribal affairs. P'u Lin, Magistrate of Ch'i-chiang was appointed head of this new office, and thereafter a large portion of power formerly exercised hereditarily by the Yang family was shifted to the civil officials of the bureaucracy.

(ii) The second phase: 1596-1599

Though technically forced to abdicate his position in favour of his eldest son, with his power limited and kept in isolation from his subordinates, Ying-lung regained authority by uniting with other Miao tribesmen. At first, he still regarded the five subordinate tribal units and the seven prominent local families as his primary enemies. Because of them, he had lost his position, favour, reputation, and almost his life, so he vowed to kill all of them.

Still complying with the judgement, Ying-lung continued to meet his obligations by paying redemption in silver cash and obviously in regular instalments by contributing big timbers. Regarding the latter, it was recorded on 10 October 1596 that

57 WLSTCK, 73; CTWX, 10:266; MSCSPM, 2:693; MSK, 7:105; MS, 26:8047.
58 TIFC, 2:631-632.
59 WLSTCK, 73; CTWX, 10:26b.
twenty big timbers in his own name and twenty others in the name of his successor arrived in the capital. It was only with the death of his second son who had been detained at Chungking as hostage in early or mid-1596 that Ying-lung turned his rage against the Ming local authorities who refused to return his son's body until the redemption payments had been met. Burial was an important custom in the tribal world; even Ying-lung's father Lieh, though not on good terms with his father Hsiang, had paid heavily to secure the return of the body from Shui-hsi. Exasperated, Ying-lung exclaimed, "My ransom would [only] be sent if my son were alive". Afterwards, he assigned over one thousand monks to perform a funeral ceremony at the border accompanied by his own large military forces. At the same time, he occupied some strategic passes and bases and trained his Miao fighters as an advanced guard called "the strong hand" (ying-shou). For the provisioning of his Miao tribesmen, he confiscated the property of the wealthy local families after charging them with trivial crimes. With this financial support, the Miao people willingly agreed to give him their full support in battle. Perhaps they might have been promised to obtain much more reward after victory.

After consolidating his position and reorganising his military force, Ying-lung advanced toward outright rebellion in August of 1596. During the second half of the year, he

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60 SL, 109:5650; KC, 5:4780.
61 See Section D of Chapter Three.
plundered Ta-ch'ien and Tu-pa, razed the tribal offices of Ts'ao-t'ang and Yü-ch'ing, and attacked Hsing-lung, Tu-yün and other garrison towns. He dispatched his brother Chao-lung in command of a troop contingent to surround Huang-p'ing and slaughter the family of Chang Hsi, the tribal head of Chung-an.

By April of 1597, his pillaging had extended as far as Chiang-chin and Nan-ch'uan counties in southern Szechuan. In late 1597, having laid siege to the city of Ho-chiang, he demanded that his enemy Yüan Tzu-sheng be surrendered to him and cut Yüan into pieces while Yüan was hanging down from the city wall. At the end of this year, he gained the collaboration of his son-in-law Ma Ch'ien-ssu, brother of the tribal chief of Shih-chu hsüan-fu-ssu, who coveted his brother's position.

In 1598, Ying-lung's troops moved to plunder Kweichow and Hukuang and broke the communications between postal stations in the area. Learning that his enemies were hiding in the garrison town of Pien-ch'iao Guard of Hukuang, he attacked the town and wiped them out.62

During 1596, 1597 and 1598 Ying-lung and his troops made raids over a wide area mainly in northern Kweichow and southern Szechuan where he and his Miao troops were reportedly committing murder, rape, looting, and the desecration of tombs. No effective measures against him were taken, however, because the attention of the central government was still focused on Korea.63

62 WLSTCK, 73-74; CTWKP, 10:27-28; MSCSPM, 2:693-694; MSHC, 7:3b-4; MSK, 7:106; MS, 26:8047; TIPC, 2:902-903.
It was not until the end of the Sino-Japanese War in Korea in the winter of 1598 that a proposal for sending troops to the five tribal units and other bases in Po-chou was approved on 28 December of this year. Early in 1599, Governor Chiang Tung-chih of Kweichow dispatched an army of three thousand men to attack Ying-lung; after an initial success, however, the force was completely annihilated at Fei-lien-pao near P'ing-yüeh in Kweichow. Chiang Tung-chih was summarily dismissed from office and Kuo Tzu-chang was appointed new governor of Kweichow on 2 April 1599. The defeat undoubtedly drew the attention of the central government and forced the officials to realise that the case of Ying-lung was not as simple as that of Pübei (Po Pai) in Ningsia in 1592. On 14 April 1599, the Court accepted the proposal of Grand Secretary Shen I-kuan to appoint Li Hua-lung (1554-1612), the former Vice Minister of War and concurrent Assistant Censor-in-Chief, as Supreme Commander with personal charge of military affairs in Szechuan, Hukuang and Kweichow and concurrent Superintendent of Military Rations and Governor of Szechuan.

Li Hua-lung received his formal appointment from the Ministry of Personnel on 22 April 1599, but, owing to the long distance, he did not arrive in Szechuan until 19 July. After the transfer of duties from the former Governor T'an Hsi-ssu,

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64 SL, 110:6081-6082.
65 SL, 110:6144, 6164-6165; KC, 5:4831; WLSTCK, 75; CTWKP, 10:28b; MSCSPM, 2:694; MSHC, 7:4b; MSK, 7:106; MS, 26:8047; TIFC, 2:903.
he started to interview his subordinates at the provincial capital of Szechuan in order to understand the situation and mobilise the troops.\textsuperscript{67} Relying upon the knowledge that the government troops had not yet assembled, Ying-lung led eighty thousand Miao troops northward into southern Szechuan. From 16 July 1599 onward, while his son Ch'ao-tung was leading twenty thousand troops to Sha-hsi against the Yung-ning tribal troops, his associates were leading an additional twenty thousand troops against Nan-ch'uan and Chiang-chin. Ying-lung himself commanded over thirty thousand troops in an attack on Ch'i-chiang which was guarded by only three thousand new recruits. On 11 August, the city of Ch'i-chiang fell.\textsuperscript{68} At this moment, Ying-lung's military adviser Sun Shih-t'ai, a Han Chinese of Chekiang province, persuaded him to make a bold strike against Chungking and Chengtu in order to seize the Prince of Shu, Chu Ch'üan (enf. 1578, d. 1615), as a hostage.\textsuperscript{69} He rejected this plan, however, and continued to loot, demanding the return of his second son's body and handing over of his enemies. In view of the precarious situation when it seemed that Ying-lung could reach Chungking within half a day, the Prefect complied with his requests.\textsuperscript{70} By this time, even Supreme Commander Li Hua-lung recognised the possible fall of

\textsuperscript{67} PPCS, 1:1-3.

\textsuperscript{68} PPCS, 1:13, 27-28; 4:381, 444; SL, 111:6236; WLSTCK, 75-76; CTWKP, 10:29; MSCSPM, 2:694-695.

\textsuperscript{69} WLSTCK, 87; TIFC, 2:904; PPCS, 2:207; James B. Parsons, \textit{op. cit.}, 1555.

\textsuperscript{70} SL, 111:6236; PPCS, 1:28, 30; 4:386.
Chungking and even Chengtu. In his letter to the Grand Secretaries of the Court and the Minister of War, he frankly said that he had taken advantage of negotiations to delay Ying-lung's advance to Chungking. He informed Ying-lung in writing that negotiations were still possible and also concocted bogus letters (one to the Deputy Commissioner of the Military Circuit of Eastern Szechuan and one to the Prefect of Chungking) sure to fall into Ying-lung's hand indicating the same message in order to lure Ying-lung into a trap. Ying-lung, in contrast, adopted a strategy of maximum strength before the opening of negotiations and tried to expand the land under his occupation; he built stone tablets and renamed the new lands *Hsüan-wei-kuan-chuang* (Official Lands of Pacification Commissioner [of the Yang family]). In addition, he claimed that Lung-ch'üan, Ho-chiang and Chiang-chin were originally part of Po-chou. He thought he could take advantage of negotiations to enlarge the boundaries of Po-chou.

When Ying-lung found that the negotiations were a ruse, he plundered the area, killing thousands of inhabitants by throwing them into the river. By this time, Ying-lung could not attack Chungking directly because the defense of the city had been considerably strengthened and his sixteen spies had been discovered and killed. Shortly afterwards, the defense of other cities were also strengthened by the relief troops.

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72 *PPCS*, 4:387; *WLSTCK*, 76; *CTWKP*, 10:30; *TIFC*, 2:904.
73 *PPCS*, 6:667-668.
Therefore, Ying-lung turned southward and launched a major military campaign in Kweichow by burning the towns of Tung-p'o and Lan-ch'iao. With this victory, he gained control over more "uncivilised" Miao fighters from the mountainous area and could threaten the communications of the provincial governments of Kweichow and Hukuang. After strengthening his force, Ying-lung again turned northwards to attack Lung-ch'üan at the beginning of the following year.  

C. The Response of the Government

In response to the initial accusations lodged against Ying-lung in 1589, the provincial authorities of Szechuan adopted an attitude totally different from that of Kweichow. The Kweichow officials sided with Ying-lung's enemies — i.e., the five tribal chiefs and the seven prominent local families. Governor Yeh Meng-hsiung of Kweichow sent a report to the central government concerning the evil deeds committed by Ying-lung. Ch'en Hsiao, Regional Inspector of Kweichow, charged Ying-lung with twenty-four criminal violations. Due to the urgent need to pacify disloyal tribesmen in northern Szechuan, the provincial authorities of Szechuan in contrast sought postponement of Ying-lung's case. Governor Li Shang-ssu of Szechuan suggested that Ying-lung's tribal troops be recruited to take part in the suppression campaign rather than to force Ying-lung to submit to judicial proceedings. Regional Inspector Li Hua-lung, later the Supreme Commander in the 1600 suppression

74 PPCS, 6:680; WLSTCK, 77; CTWKp, 10:31; MSCSPM, 2:695; TIFC, 2:904.
campaign against Po-chou, also requested that Ying-lung not be arrested for trial at the present time. The case should be dealt with after the suppression of the rebellious tribesmen in northern Szechuan. Subsequently both provincial authorities again presented memorials to the Court concerning Ying-lung's case. While the war group of Kweichow remained committed to a suppression campaign against Ying-lung, the peace group of Szechuan pointed out that there was no crime upon which to justify a suppression campaign.75

In 1591, Yeh Meng-hsiung presented a proposal for political reform of the tribal chieftain system. He insisted on a change of the five tribal offices into regular government offices under the jurisdiction of Chungking Prefecture in Szechuan because the five tribal chiefs, having come out into open conflict with Ying-lung, preferred seeking the protection of the provincial government to remaining under the control of Ying-lung.76 The Szechuan provincial authorities, however, still placed emphasis on the urgency and importance of the suppression campaign in northern Szechuan. Owing to these divergent opinions of the two provinces, Li Shang-ssu and Li Hua-lung sought permission to resign, but their applications were rejected by the Court. Because of the northern Szechuan emergency, they were ordered to remain in their posts to conduct the suppression campaign.77

75 SL, 106:4267; KC, 5:4640; MSK, 5:105; MS, 26:8045.
76 SL, 106:4303-4304, 4358; KC, 5:4645, 4648.
77 SL, 106:4358; KC, 5:4648.
the Court decided to transfer Yeh Meng-hsiung to the northern province of Shensi. He then had a chance to present his prominent military capacity during the suppression of the Pübei (Po Pai) Rebellion in 1592.78

The discussion of Ying-lung's case within the central government continued unresolved. In the opinion of the supervising secretary Wang Te-wan, Ying-lung was guilty of slaughter but not of rebellion. He should not be sentenced to death but only to dismissal from office; only his associates who planned the murders should be executed. The trial of Ying-lung ought to be conducted jointly by the provincial authorities of Szechuan and Kweichow. These suggestions were supported by the Ministry of War and eventually approved by the Court on 26 May 1592.79 The Court understood that the provincial governments could not afford to wage two suppression campaigns simultaneously. Most of the troops had already been sent to northern Szechuan to suppress the rebellious tribesmen. If the Court approved the proposal of the Kweichow war group, it would rouse Ying-lung to revolt against the provincial governments, and the provincial troops would be confronted with uprisings on two fronts — one in northern Szechuan and one on the Szechuan-Kweichow border. Moreover, the Ningsia suppression campaign against Pübei (Po Pai) was being carried out in North China

78 SL, 106:4224; KC, 5:4636; MSCSPM, 2:683-691.
from March of 1592 onwards. Under these circumstances, the handling of Ying-lung's case was deferred and left to judicial investigation.

Since he was aware of the attitude of the Kweichow authorities, Ying-lung preferred to submit to a trial in Szechuan rather than in Kweichow. The arrest of Ying-lung and the subsequent trial at Chungking took place at the end of 1592 and the beginning of 1593, but the Japanese invasion of Korea intervened in mid-1592. In the discussion of recruits for this military mobilisation, a proposal to utilise Ying-lung's troops was discussed at Court. The original death sentence against Ying-lung was, therefore, not consistent with the Court's intent. Realising that crimes could be redeemed in the tribal world, the local authorities had sentenced Ying-lung to death, only so that they could extract more ransom by negotiation.

Once the suppression campaign in northern Szechuan was over, the new provincial authorities of Szechuan turned their attention to Ying-lung. Regional Inspector Wang Hsiang-meng of Szechuan impeached Ying-lung on 14 August 1593. Still of the opinion that Ying-lung was not in rebellion, however, the Court refused to appoint officials from the central government to administer Po-chou but ordered the provincial authorities to assume charge of an investigation of Ying-lung locally. Since Ying-lung refused to submit himself for another trial, Governor

80 MSCSPM; ibid.
81 MSCSPM, 2:671.
82 SL, 107:4860. Ying-lung would have been released sometime before 17 January 1593. (See p. 90)
Wang Chih-kuang of Szechuan had greater justification to insist on the suppression of Ying-lung. On 8 December, the Court agreed with Chih-kuang's proposal to crush Ying-lung, but at the same time, the Court warned him not to take the opportunity to slaughter tribesmen for military reward. 83 Two days later, Wu Ying-ming, a supervising secretary of the scrutiny office in the Department of War submitted the advice that it was necessary to distinguish between the cases of Ying-lung and Pübei. He insisted that Ying-lung's refusal to submit himself to a trial was not rebellion. He criticised the unjustifiable behaviour of the provincial authorities who released Ying-lung one day and arrested him the following day. This made the tribal chiefs feel that the provincial authorities were untrustworthy, so he argued against crushing Ying-lung immediately but rather moving the government troops to the borders in anticipation of Ying-lung's surrender for trial. The military force could take action only if negotiations were unsuccessful. 84 The central authorities, however, insisted that provocation of a new military campaign should be avoided.

Unfortunately, Ying-lung outmanoeuvred this tactic to his favour. He pretended to surrender and launched a surprise attack on them. After the defeat of government troops in early 1594, Governor Lin Ch'iao-hsiang of Kweichow asked the Court to condemn the provincial authorities of Szechuan, and he insisted

84 *SL*, 107:4947-4948.
on the suppression of Ying-lung. The Ministry of War, however, still suggested giving Ying-lung a chance to surrender himself voluntarily to the provincial authorities because the Sino-Japanese War which lasted nearly seven years from the summer of 1592 to the winter of 1598 was still being undertaken in Korea. The central government was unwilling to assume the burden of a simultaneous suppression campaign. The Court, therefore, decided to order the provincial authorities of Szechuan and Kweichow to be locally accountable for the suppression campaign.

Both provinces now regarded the suppression of Ying-lung as unavoidable, but the Kweichow authorities intended to shift the responsibility onto the Szechuan authorities. Lin Ch'iaohsiang stressed the poverty of Kweichow to show that Kweichow could not afford to finance the campaign itself. Regional Inspector Hsieh Chi-mou of Kweichow suggested that the Szechuan provincial government should take total responsibility for the campaign, but he offered to supply a tribal force to assist in the defense of certain strategic bases. T'an Hsi-ssu, the new Governor of Szechuan, however, pointed out that although Po-chou was under the jurisdiction of Szechuan, both tax-in-kind and tax-in-cash of five of the subordinate tribal offices of Po-chou had been transferred to Kweichow, so the Kweichow provincial government could not shirk in providing support for the suppression. At this moment, Yang Tung-ming, supervising secretary of the scrutiny office in the Ministry of Rites, after condemning the inconsistent policy followed by the provincial

authorities which was calculated to arouse Ying-lung's suspicions, suggested the dispatch of a high-ranking commissioner from the central government to investigate Ying-lung's case. If Ying-lung could be pardoned, the Court should not sentence him to death. If he maintained his resistance and refused to be investigated, the commissioner could then recruit troops from Szechuan, Kweichow, Yunnan and Hukuang to crush him. Yang Tung-ming's proposal was accepted, and on 20 November 1594 Hsing Chieh was appointed Supreme Commander with personal charge of military affairs in Szechuan and Kweichow to head an investigation for either a second trial or a suppression against Ying-lung.

In order to avoid having to finance the entire campaign by themselves, the provincial authorities of Szechuan backed away from an insistence on suppression. On 19 December 1594, both Governor T'an Hsi-ssu and Regional Inspector Wu Li-chia presented a proposal to deprive Ying-lung of his title and to appoint his eldest son Ch'ao-tung as tribal secretary to take charge of tax collection. Ch'ao-tung could later be recommended to regain Ying-lung's original post and title in five years if he had not violated any laws. The Szechuan-Kweichow joint force would be sent to suppress Ying-lung if he persisted in his opposition to appearing before any tribunal.

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87 KC, 5:4738.
Yang Ching-shun, a Kuo-tzu-chien po-shih (Erudite of the National University), regarded it unworthy to waste a lot of troops and money in waging a suppression campaign which might last a long time. The best way, he suggested, was to send an imperial edict listing Ying-lung's crimes but forgiving him and only forcing him to abdicate in favour of his son and narrowing the extent of his domain. T'an, Wu and two Yangs all disagreed with the death sentence for Ying-lung and urged that the case be settled peacefully.

Hsing Chieh arrived in Szechuan early in 1595. He behaved in accordance with the settled policy that peaceful negotiation be adopted first and suppression be used only as a last resort. Wang Shih-ch'i, in particular, patiently tried to accommodate Ying-lung in reaching a negotiated settlement. After several months of negotiations with Ying-lung, a second trial was eventually held on 29 August 1595 at An-wen in Ch'i-chiang, Szechuan. The death sentence for Ying-lung was replaced by the decision to behead his twelve associates. His post was to be handed over to his son Ch'ao-tung, and he was ordered to pay a fine of forty thousand taels of silver, double the fine at the first trial. In addition, his second son was to be detained at Chungking as hostage.

After the trial, Hsing Chieh also proposed the reorganisation of the administration of Po-chou. According to his proposed reform, a considerable portion of the power

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exercised hereditarily by the Yang family would be transferred to civil officials appointed by the provincial governments. These peaceful negotiations were considered successful because no military moves were undertaken. The results of the second trial were also satisfactory because the provincial treasury would be supplemented by such a heavy fine. Owing to these successful negotiations and the satisfactory conclusion of the trial as well as the reasonable reorganisation of the administration and military control of Po-chou, Hsing Chieh was promoted to Censor-in-chief of the Censorate and Wang Shih-ch'i, Deputy Commissioner of the Military Circuit of Eastern Szechuan. The Governors of Szechuan and Kweichow were also awarded silver and gifts.  

Owing to the high military expenditures on the Korean front as well as the destruction by fire of several palaces, the Court began to dispatch eunuchs as mining comptrollers and tax collectors to the province from 1596 onwards in order to increase Court revenue. In the winter of the same year, when negotiations with Japan broke down, the Sino-Japanese War again entered a serious stage. The full attention of the central government was again focused on Korea. Even Wang Shih-ch'i, the most important and able official during the successful 1595 negotiations, was transferred to the Korean battlefield. Ying-lung rapidly resumed his power and enlarged his force by recruiting more Miao tribesmen. During 1596, 1597

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91 MSK, 1:98-99; MS, 2:278; MSCSPM, 2:676-677; WLSTCK, 49-55.
and 1598, Ying-lung rose in full scale revolt. Because of the Sino-Japanese war, there were no effective military moves taken against him. It was not until the end of the Sino-Japanese War in late 1598 that the central government could turn its attention to Ying-lung's insurrection. After three thousand provincial troops of Kweichow were almost annihilated by Ying-lung in early 1599, the Court decided to appoint Li Hua-lung as Supreme Commander to organise a suppression campaign.

In sum, the responses to the Po-chou uprising differed with the central and local governments and especially with the provincial governments of Szechuan and Kweichow. At the beginning, the Kweichow provincial authorities insisted upon the suppression of Ying-lung through the use of military force, but their Szechuanese counterparts advocated negotiation through political means, mainly to be able to utilise Ying-lung's tribal troops in the emergency in northern Szechuan. The Kweichow provincial authorities proposed the reorganisation of frontier administration as a means of separating the five subordinate tribal units from the supervision of Po-chou and asked that a high-ranking official from the central government be appointed to investigate the possibility of such reorganisation. The Court ignored this proposal, and neither was an official sent to take charge of the reorganisation, nor were instructions issued from the central government. Instead, the matter of Ying-lung's uprising and that of the reorganisation of the five tribal units were left to be jointly discussed by the provincial authorities of Szechuan and Kweichow. Because of the emergency in northern Szechuan and the threat of
resignation by the Szechuan Governor and the Regional Inspector, Ying-lung's case was settled by trial rather than by suppression.

During the first trial of Ying-lung in 1592-1593, the case of the reorganisation of the tribal units was not mentioned. Again, owing to the emergency of the Japanese invasion of Korea, Ying-lung was released on his promise of commanding five thousand tribal troops in defence of Korea. Ying-lung did not take part in the campaigns in northern Szechuan or in Korea. The public statements of reliance upon Ying-lung's military assistance were, therefore, mainly to raise his pride and dignity but also to undermine the pressure against him.

Less than a year after the first trial, Ying-lung was ordered to surrender for a retrial. Although the Court realised that Ying-lung was not technically a rebel, it approved the request that Ying-lung be retried. When Ying-lung refused to submit to these new judicial proceedings, military moves against him were immediately undertaken. It seems there was a kind of chauvinist spirit in the minds of Han-Chinese government authorities.

After the defeat of the Szechuan troops by Ying-lung, the Court realised that the provincial military force could not solve the problem. Owing to the heavy military burden in Korea, a large scale centrally directed suppression campaign was not possible. After a series of negotiations with Ying-lung conducted by a Supreme Commander appointed by the central government, a second trial was held. The results seemed to be
satisfactory to the government, but the dismissal of Ying-lung from office failed to bring him under control. A civil official would never have risen up if dismissed from office, but a former tribal leader could resume his power easily once he was back in his semi-independent kingdom. The twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth rulers of Po-chou were good examples of this. They had power and were still regarded with esteem after their forced retirements. Unless the trial decided to detain Ying-lung himself instead of his second son, the Chinese government could not really control him. Another important mistake made by the provincial authorities was the refusal to return the corpse of Ying-lung's second son. This was a serious insult to Ying-lung and contrary to traditional tribal customs. In the early Ming even the corpse of the son of the twenty-first Po-chou ruler was allowed to be transported from Nanking despite the long distance. About half a century earlier, the twenty-seventh Po-chou ruler Lieh promised to concede two districts to the Shui-hsi tribal chief in return for his father's corpse. The provincial authorities had previously invoked tribal law to allow Ying-lung to pay ransom in redeeming his life, and they should also have respected the tribal customs by returning the corpse. It was not worth stirring up Ying-lung's uprising during the Sino-Japanese war. This demonstrates that the provincial authorities at the time were more foolish than those during the emergency in northern Szechuan. In order to concentrate all forces for the conduct of the suppression campaign, the former provincial authorities were careful to
avoid driving Ying-lung to insurrection. The situation was particularly inconvenient for the government side. Both provincial governments as well as the central government refrained from doing anything until the end of war in aid of Korea against Japanese invasion.
CHAPTER FIVE
The Decisive Suppression in 1600

Before their insurrection, Ying-lung's troops had been regarded as a strong military force, superior to the regular government troops of Szechuan in the suppression campaigns against disloyal tribesmen. Ying-lung himself was always the first to break through enemy ranks with his troops. The government troops followed them, and the Han-Chinese commanders always borrowed severed heads from him. In addition, he recruited a large number of "uncivilised" Miao to enlarge and strengthen his force. Since he had defeated the government troops in both the spring of 1594 and the spring of 1599 at Pai-shih-k'ou and Fei-lien-pao respectively, the Court found that the provincial force could not challenge him successfully without a mass military mobilisation. Understanding this situation, on 14 April 1599, the Court decided to appoint the former Vice Minister of War, Li Hua-lung, as Supreme Commander. In order to expand his authority, the Court ordered him to take personal charge of military affairs and logistic support in Szechuan, Hukuang and Kweichow. In addition, he was ordered to replace T'an Hsi-ssu as Governor of Szechuan. He was further bestowed an imperial sword (Shang-fang-chien) on 27 October of the same year, so that he had the

1 WLSTCK, 68; CTWKP, 10:21a; MSCSPM, 2:691-692; MSHC, 7:1; TIFC, 2:900-901.
2 The Court made up its decision on 14 April 1599, but Li Hua-lung received the formal appointment from the Ministry of Personnel on the 22nd of the same month. See SL, 110:6150; PPCS, 1:1.
right to put to death anyone up to the rank of Regional Vice-Commander who was not obedient to him or not brave enough in fighting without the approval of the Court.³

In this chapter, the discussion will focus on the strategy of the suppression campaign, the war preparation, the military mobilisation and the decisive battle of 1600.

A. Strategy for Suppression

In order to conduct the suppression campaign against Ying-lung effectively, the Court reviewed the appointments to some of the important regional posts. First of all, on 2 April 1599, Governor Chiang Tung-chih of Kweichow was replaced by Vice Censor-in-chief Kuo Tzu-chang (1543-1618), who had served in several of the southern and southwestern provinces, such as Kwangtung (1582-1585), Szechuan (1586-1589), Chekiang (1589-1592), Shansi (1592-1593), Hukuang (1593-1595) and Fukien (1595-1598).⁴ In the same month, Li Hua-lung was appointed Supreme Commander of Military Affairs in Szechuan, Hukuang and Kweichow and Concurrently Controlling Military Rations and Grand Coordinator of the Szechuan Area. Li had gained commanding experience on the suppression of the rebellious tribesmen in northern Szechuan while serving as a Regional Inspector of Szechuan between 1590 and 1591. (See pp.106-107) During the Sino-Japanese War (1592-1598) he was appointed Governor of Liaotung and then promoted to Vice Minister of War and Concurrent Governor of Liaotung. [For details see Appendix Seven: Official Career of Li Hua-lung (11 April 1554-17 January 1612)] In order to strengthen the commanding group, several of the leading military commanders were withdrawn from Korea, namely Liu T'ing (1552-1619), Ch'en Lin (d.1607) and Wu Kuang (d.1601).

Liu T'ing was born in a military family. His father Liu Hsien gained fame for leading an army of one hundred forty

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³ SL, 111:6292.

thousand men in a successful campaign against a rebellion of tribal people in I-pin in Szechuan in 1573. Liu T'ing, through his hereditary status, had taken part in that campaign but became well-known after the successful defeat of the Burmese invasion of Yunnan in 1582. Afterwards he was asked by the governor of Kwangsi to assist in putting down a rebellion. He had been serving in Korea at the beginning and end of the Sino-Japanese War (1592-1598). During this period, he was appointed Regional Commander of Szechuan for the purpose of the suppression of Ying-lung. When negotiations were made in 1594, he was transferred to Kansu province to defeat outlaws there. In 1587, when hostilities resumed in Korea, he was ordered to proceed there with Chinese and tribal forces under his command.5

Ch'en Lin (d. 1607), a Cantonese, was famous in the fight against banditry in the mountainous region of Kwangtung over a long period (c. 1562 to the 1580s). He had had experience in command of a squadron of warships and gained merit for taking part in suppressing coastal bandits and pirates. Before he was appointed to organise and command the naval forces in aid of Korea to resist the Japanese invasion, he was asked to help the provincial authorities in the suppression of a rebellion of the Yao tribesmen in Kwangsi in 1596.6

Wu Kuang, also a Cantonese, had been serving as Assistant Commander of southern Fukien before he was assigned to command

a naval detachment to cooperate with Liu T'ing's land force in the Korean War.\(^7\)

Besides those withdrawn from Korea, other military commanders experienced in fighting tribesmen were appointed to take part in the suppression campaign against Ying-lung. They were T'ung Yüan-chen, Li Ying-hsiang and Ma K'ung-ying.

T'ung Yüan-chen, a Han Chinese from Kweilin of Kwangsi province, had been serving for many years as a Regional Commander in Kwangsi and later Kwangtung. Because of his experience in suppressing tribesmen, in 1595 T'ung Yüan-chen was ordered by Supreme Commander Ch'en Ta-k'o to return to Kwangsi to assist in the suppression of Yao tribesmen. Both Ch'en Lin and Wu Kuang, who had both been removed from office and were residing at home, were also asked to take part in the campaign. Afterwards, T'ung Yüan-chen was transferred to Kweichow.\(^8\)

Li Ying-hsiang from Hukuang had been promoted to be Local Commander of Ssu-en in Kwangsi at a young age. In 1579, he was appointed Regional Vice-Commander of Sung-p'an in northern Szechuan; subsequently, in 1585, he returned to Szechuan as Regional Commander having demonstrated his military abilities in a variety of posts during the intervening years. Thereafter he was one of the chief commanders in the campaigns against the tribal rebellions in northern Szechuan and along the Szechuan-Tibet border, in which Po-chou troops had collaborated with the

\(^7\) *Ibid.*

\(^8\) *MS, 21:6401-6402.*
government forces. After these campaigns ended in 1588, he was deposed from office because of a bribery scandal. It was not until the beginning of 1600 that he was recommended by Supreme Commander Li Hua-lung to resume his post of Regional Commander in the suppression of Ying-lung. The Regional Vice-Commander Ts'ao Hsi-pin in the 1600 suppression campaign had also served as a Local Commander under Li Ying-hsiang during the 1585-1588 campaign against disloyal tribesmen in northern Szechuan.  

Ma K'ung-ying, Regional Commander of Shensi, had taken part in the suppression of a rebellion of Pubei in 1592 and two invasions of Tartar cavalry in 1596 and 1599. Learning that Ying-lung and his Miao troops were frightened of the Shensi troops, Supreme Commander Li Hua-lung strongly urged their participation in the suppression campaign in Po-chou. Ma K'ung-ying was appointed Regional Commander of the Shensi troops.  

Besides the appointments of military commanders, a dozen high-ranking civil officials were transferred or appointed to fill the vacancies in the posts of Provincial Intendent and in the Provincial Surveillance Circuit, the Provincial Administration Circuit and the Military Defense Circuit. In order to save time, Li Hua-lung suggested appointing them from Szechuan and the neighbouring provinces. The primary justification was that they could easily administer affairs

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9 *MS*, 21:6396-6401.  
because of their experience in southwestern China.  

To expedite the handling of problems, the provincial authorities were granted the right to appoint or transfer Prefects and Magistrates locally.

On the other hand, Li Hua-lung carried out a nationwide recruitment of troops since the local government troops could not challenge the Po-chou troops. Other tribal troops neighbouring Po-chou were not really reliable and might remain neutral in the military conflict between the provincial government and Po-chou. If a massive government-tribal force from other provinces could be formed, there would be no choice for the local tribal opportunists. The troops from Shantung, Chekiang, Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Yunnan in particular had no connections with Po-chou. They would fight against Ying-lung with total commitment under the command of the government. The Shensi troops, who were fierce fighters known for their cruelty and had defeated the Tartar cavalry, would be a strong army to threaten Ying-lung, and the Wolf troops of Kwangsi were similarly famous at fighting. Veterans of the Korean War were regarded as the most battle-hardened troops in China. Bearing in mind these facts, Li Hua-lung broadcast that the tribal-government troops were to be recruited from all over China, including the provinces of Shantung, Honan, Chekiang, Fukien, Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Hukuang, Shensi, Szechuan, Kweichow and Yunnan, in order to be formidable and make Ying-lung

11 PPCS, 1:57-62.
12 PPCS, 1:42, 63, 70.
confused. Even some Japanese who had surrendered or been captured and assigned to the garrison in Tientsin were recruited. Most of the troops were in small contingents as it was assumed that just the appearance of these troops from so many areas would dampen the spirit of Ying-lung's troops and cause some of them to surrender.

Before the government-tribal troops gathered together on 17 September 1599, the Court agreed with a proposal of the Ministry of War to offer a reward of land and honorific titles to anyone regardless of ethnic origin who could arrest or kill Ying-lung; this reward was to be advertised throughout China. In order to encourage the tribal chiefs and the Miao tribesmen to fight enthusiastically against Ying-lung, Censor T'u Tsung-chün suggested dropping mention of the policy of "kai-t'u kuei-liu"; he did not want to discourage those tribal chiefs who might refrain from fighting for the government if they learned that they would not get substantive political rewards after the extermination of the Yang family state in Po-chou. He suggested that the Court publish a proclamation which demonstrated that the government would not claim even a square foot of land and that the Po-chou territories would be rewarded to those who could arrest Ying-lung. On 21 October 1599, the Court announced that one could replace Ying-lung's hereditary position if he

13 PPCS, 1:42, 63, 70.
15 SL, 111:6254-6255.
kept Ying-lung in prison, or the Po-chou territories would be separated to reward those who got Ying-lung successfully by cooperation.\(^{16}\) The Investigating Censor Wang Fan-ch'en of Nanking also presented the same opinions on not publicising the intended confiscation of the land of Po-chou by the government.\(^{17}\)

Li Hua-lung also listed the twelve items in the regulations on rewards. Not only were the military commanders and tribal chiefs promised silver cash (ten thousand taels of silver for Ying-lung's head), a piece of land from Po-chou, honorific titles, beautiful imperial garments and precious gifts, Ying-lung's advisers, associates, followers, wife and sons were also promised rewards if they could imprison or kill him. Moreover, the military commanders and tribal chiefs would be punished if they did not march on time to the destination or fight bravely enough.\(^{18}\) In the same year, an imperial edict written in colloquial style was issued to attempt to persuade Ying-lung to either commit suicide or to come to surrender and to also attempt to arouse Ying-lung's wife and sons, brothers, brothers-in-law, advisers, Miao troops, native inhabitants, and the temporary Han-Chinese residents and merchants of Po-chou to murder Ying-lung with the promise not only not to punish them but also to give them all Ying-lung had.\(^{19}\)

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\(^{16}\) *SL*, 111:6277-6278.

\(^{17}\) *SL*, 111:6297-6298.

\(^{18}\) *PPCS*, 1:52-54.

\(^{19}\) *PPCS*, 5:478-482.
In conclusion, both the central and local authorities considered it necessary not to proclaim their intention of using "kai-t'u kuei-liu" to exterminate Ying-lung's tribal state in Po-chou because it might arouse other tribal chiefs not to fight actively against Ying-lung. It was even feared that such a public stance might cause them to join Ying-lung in revolt against the government out of fear lest they might also be replaced by Han-Chinese civil servants in the future. Therefore, the Court, rather than divulging its policy to replace chieftains with regular officials, announced that the government was not interested in the lands of Po-chou but was willing to offer part of the land as reward to those who could murder or arrest Ying-lung. Motivated by a desire for the rewards of silver cash, lands, titles and gifts, the tribal chiefs would be willing to fight against Ying-lung for their own benefits. Moreover, Li Hua-lung recruited troops from about ten provinces in order to threaten Ying-lung and his Miao troops and to impress the allied tribal troops that the Court was not solely dependent upon them for the suppression of Ying-lung. On the suggestion of the central and local authorities, the Court ordered the Ministry of War to broadcast the rewards for the murder or arrest of Ying-lung in order to encourage the military commanders and tribal chiefs in fighting against Ying-lung and to stir up internal discontent within Ying-lung's camp.

B. War Preparation and Military Mobilisation

The important thing for war preparation is military rations. Supreme Commander Li Hua-lung assumed this
responsibility as he was concurrently Superintendent of Military Rations. He had difficulty obtaining sufficient silver cash because of the financial weakness of the state. The central government had spent over 1,878,000 taels of silver during the Pübei suppression campaign in Ningsia in 1592 and over 7,822,000 taels of silver during the Sino-Japanese War in Korea from mid-1592 to the end of 1598. Therefore for military aids Li Hua-lung relied upon local authorities and donations from individuals. The results were only partially satisfactory. Details are illustrated in Table Four.

Because of the heavy burden of military expenditures in the Sino-Japanese War in Korea, the Court had previously levied a silver surtax in the Northern Metropolitan Area. On 27 November 1599, the Court approved such a taxation method in Szechuan and Hukuang for the purpose of financing the 1600 campaign. Every tan of grain would be levied an additional 0.12 taels of silver. By this means Szechuan could raise an extra revenue of 123,425 taels of silver and Hukuang, 260,223 taels of silver—a total of 383,648 taels of silver. Including military assistance and donations, the local authorities contributed a total of 1,616,722.3 taels of silver for the suppression campaign against Ying-lung.

21 SL, 111:6311.
22 PPCS, 4:421.
### TABLE FOUR: Local Military Aids in the 1600 Suppression Campaign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names of local authorities and persons</th>
<th>Silver Cash (tael)</th>
<th>Grain (tan)</th>
<th>Saltpetre (catty)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nanking</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Honan</td>
<td>90,000</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kiangsi</td>
<td>3,300 (+)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukien</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kwangtung</td>
<td>84,134</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kwangsi</td>
<td>300,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hukuang</td>
<td>96,147.1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Shensi</td>
<td>100,435.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Szechuan</td>
<td>171,482.1</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yunnan</td>
<td>70,775.9</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Prefecture                            |                    |             |                  |
| fheng-yang                            | 100,000            |             |                  |
| Ying-t'ien                            | 1,900 (+)          |             |                  |
| Yun-yang                              | 10,000             |             |                  |

| Prince of Shu in Szechuan             | 2,000              | 5,000       |                  |
| Duke of Ch'ien in Yunnan             | 2,000              |             | 10,000           |
| Tribal chief Li Ssu-ming             |                    |             |                  |
| Tribal chief An Ta-shun              |                    |             | 100              |
| Ch'en Shang-hsiang                   |                    |             | 100              |
| Née Chang                            |                    |             | 100              |
| 9 National University Students       | 900                |             |                  |

| Total                                 | 1,233,074.3(+)     | 5,300       | 10,000           |

On the other hand, the amount of the financial support from the central government had not yet been decided. The Ministry of War attempted to gain exemption from this financial burden. On 19 December 1599, its spokesman suggested cancelling the recruits from the Southern Metropolitan Area in order to decrease the military expenditure. He also pointed out that the Ministry of War had contributed substantially in the Sino-Japanese War and argued that rather than the proposed level of support of 70 per cent from the Ministry of Revenue and 30 per cent from the Ministry of War, the Ministry of Revenue should pay the entire cost. The Court ordered the Censorate to join with the two ministries in discussing the military budget. It was not until 8 January 1600 that the amount was settled. The total expenditure paid from the central government was to be 1,100,000 taels of silver; the Ministry of Revenue was responsible for 770,000 taels of silver and the Ministry of War for 330,000 taels of silver.

The problem of financial support was always troublesome. Owing to the long distance, silver cash from the central government in Peking was always accounted against the payment of other taxes from nearby provinces or prefectures. Some of the local authorities continued to argue over the amount of financial support demanded of them or simply delayed payment.

23 SL, 111:6323-6324.
The Court therefore dispatched an imperial edict that Supreme Commander Li Hua-lung had the right to set totals of silver cash and collect these amounts from the provincial authorities without the permission of the Court. 26

While the problem of finances was being handled, the military provisions, grain, firearms, weapons, armours, bows and arrows, explosives, gunpowder and cannons were being purchased or made in Szechuan, Hukuang and neighbouring provinces. Part of the military supplies, such as armours and firearms, however, were brought with the relief troops from other provinces. 27

Because the troops were gathering from different places, it was considered likely that conflicts between these troops and the local soldiers or the tribesmen would arise. Therefore, while preparing for war, Li Hua-lung did not neglect these internal problems. From time to time he issued regulations to restrain the troops with strict discipline. 28 Because the tribal troops outnumbered the government troops, Li Hua-lung regularly gave feasts in their honour or granted rewards to encourage them to fight against Ying-lung during the suppression campaign. 29

Owing to the heavy rain during the summers, Li Hua-lung urged all the troops to gather as soon as possible. He insisted

26 SL, 111:6383.
27 PPCS, 4:338-339.
that the mass mobilisation be completed no later than March of 1600. After that the heavy rain might cause flooding which would hamper the advance of the troops, especially when climbing over mountains. Therefore, Li Hua-lung harangued the troops in Szechuan on 28 February and Governor Kuo Tzu-chang of Kweichow repeated this with his troops on 17 March. The mass mobilisation of the three provinces, including Hukuang, was completed on 26 March. The total force was divided into eight columns and claimed to number two hundred forty thousand troops, of whom approximately 30 per cent were Han-Chinese and 70 per cent were tribesmen. They converged on Po-chou from nine directions, and Li Hua-lung directed the general operations from his headquarters at Chungking. Li retained direct command over troops proceeding separately along four routes from Szechuan; from Kweiyang, Kuo Tzu-chang issued instructions to the troops attacking Po-chou along three routes from the west and the south. To facilitate his command over his Hukuang troops, Governor Chih K'o-ta moved his office from the central part of the province to Yüan-chou on the Hukuang-Kweichow border. A temporary Grand Coordinator Chiang To was appointed to Pien-ch'iao to the east of Po-chou. Generals Liu T'ing, Ma K'ung Ying, Wu Kuang and Ts'ao Hsi-pin under Li Hua-lung, Generals T'ung Yüan-ch'en, Chu Ho-ling and Li Ying-hsiang under Kuo Tze-chang, and Generals Ch'en Lin and Ch'en

30 PPCS, 6:688, 690, 691, 694, 695.
31 SL, 111:6417-6418.
32 WLSTCK, 78-81; CTWKP, 10:33-35; MSCSPM, 2:696; TIPC, 2:904-905.
Liang-p'in under Chih K'o-ta, each commanded a column of approximately thirty thousand government-tribal troops. Assisted by subordinate commanders and tribal chiefs, they marched towards Ying-lung's headquarters in a coordinated operation. The following table shows the relationships between the administrative jurisdictions and the troops.

From Table Five (Government-Tribal United Force in the 1600 Suppression Campaign) and Map VI (Routes of the 1600 Decisive General Assault upon Po-chou), we can see that half of the government-tribal united troops gathered in Szechuan. Columns 1, 2, 3 and 4 would march toward Po-chou from the north and the northwest; columns 5 and 6 from the west. Most of them obviously focused on the northwestern border of Po-chou where Ying-lung's headquarters and strongholds were gradually built among the mountain range of Ta-lou-shan. This table illustrates that the tribal troops were directly commanded by their current tribal leader but under the supervision of Han-Chinese commanders. According to Charles O. Hucker, when military campaigns were undertaken, censors were commissioned to keep watch over all operations and to submit independent reports of successes or failures to the throne. 33 This table also shows that almost every column of the government-tribal united force was supervised by a Censorial Commissioner who was appointed by the Court for the same purpose during the 1600 suppression campaign upon Po-chou.

33 Charles O. Hucker, op. cit., 52.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provincial Commander &amp; Place Stationed</th>
<th>Troops Started</th>
<th>Chief Commander</th>
<th>Tribal Chieftain</th>
<th>Subordinate Commander</th>
<th>Rations Intendant &amp; Merit Marker</th>
<th>Censorial Commissioner</th>
<th>Joint Force</th>
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<tr>
<td>Supreme Commander Li Hua-lung</td>
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<td>Szechuan: Chungking</td>
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<td>Tribal Chieftain</td>
<td>Subordinate Commander</td>
<td>Rations Intendant &amp; Merit Marker</td>
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<td>Wei Yang-meng</td>
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Sources: PPCS, 2:106-107; CTWP, 10:33-34; MSCSPM, 2:696; MS, 21:6412; TIFC, 2:704, 904-910.
VI. ROUTES OF THE 1600 DECISIVE GENERAL ASSAULT UPON PO-CHOU

MAP VI. ROUTES OF THE 1600 DECISIVE GENERAL ASSAULT UPON PO-CHOU
C. Three Stages of the Decisive Battle

In addition to the three victories at Pai-chih-k'ou, Fei-lien-pao and Ch'i-chiang in the spring of 1594, in the spring and in the autumn of 1599 respectively, Ying-lung gained a fourth victory at Lung-ch'üan at the beginning of 1600 before the mass mobilisation of the government-tribal suppression force. At the end of 1599, Ying-lung razed the towns of Tung-p'o and Lan-ch'iao and blockaded the communications between Kweichow and Hukuang; with this region isolated and under his sway, Ying-lung was able to recruit the local "uncivilised" Miao tribesmen thus strengthening his military force. From 2 February 1600, he directed his Miao troops in a northward advance against the Lung-ch'üan tribal unit to the northeast of Po-chou. Supreme Commander Li Hua-lung learned of this manoeuvre but too late to offer assistance. On 18 February, Ying-lung captured the town of Lung-ch'üan which was guarded by the Han-Chinese Defender Yang Wei-chung and the tribal chief An Min-chih. Yang Wei-chung had already left before the fall of Lung-ch'üan; An Min-chih fought against Ying-lung with only five hundred tribal troops and was totally annihilated.

Owing to Ying-lung's strength and the delay in obtaining relief troops, Li Hua-lung ordered two tribal chiefs to launch separate but coordinated attacks against Po-chou to hamper Ying-lung's invasion. As a result, Ma Ch'ien-ch'eng of Shih-chu hsüan-fu-ssu captured seven stockades of Po-chou four days before the fall of Lung-ch'üan, and Tan Yu-lung of Yu-yang hsüan-fu-ssu killed three hundred Po-chou troops at their camp in Kuan-pa a few days later. On learning that Po-chou itself
was under attack by government-recruited tribal forces, Ying-lung withdrew from Lung-ch'üan and returned to Po-chou the following day. In a brilliant strategic move, Li Hua-lung had calmly and cleverly rescued Lung-ch'üan indirectly by an attack on Po-chou rather than directly by the dispatch of relief troops. Lung-ch'üan was later recovered and used as an important base for the Hukuang troops during the decisive battle.

After 26 March 1600, the eight columns of government-tribal united troops began converging on the troubled area and strategic passes from nine directions: four from Szechuan from the north and the northwest of Po-chou; three from Kweichow from the west and the south of Po-chou; the column separated into two from Hukuang from the east of Po-chou. (See Map VI: Routes of the 1600 Decisive General Assault upon Po-chou.) Li Hua-lung issued an instruction that outside the passes the rebels should be pacified and allowed to surrender because they were too numerous but inside the passes surrender was ruled out because Ying-lung might cunningly seize an opportunity to attack the government-tribal united troops. The battle of Pai-shih-k'ou in 1594 was an example of this.

During the first stage of the campaign from about 29 March to 13 May, the government-tribal united troops gained several victories but suffered one defeat. Liu T'ing starting from Ch'i-chiang with the first column of the united force marched

34 *PPCS, 2:99-104; MSCSPM, 2:695-696.*
towards Po-chou and occupied three strategic bases defended by Ying-lung's associate Mu Chao, who had been an important figure during the Po-chou victory in Pai-shih-k'ou in 1594. In April, Ying-lung sent his son Ch'ao-tung to organise a large number of Miao troops in an attack against Liu T'ing from three directions. Ch'ao-tung was instructed to defeat the Ch'i-chiang column and then turn to attack the second column of the government-tribal united force at Nan-ch'uan to destroy all the major stores of grain and military supplies. If Ch'ao-tung were successful, the government-tribal united force could not advance further without additional supplies. Ch'ao-tung's Miao troops were unexpectedly annihilated after a ten-hour desperate fight from 3 a.m. to 1 p.m. on 13 April. However, Ch'ao-tung was lucky to escape with his life.35

On the government side, the tribal troops of Yu-yang and Shih-chu (both from Szechuan) in the Nan-ch'uan column occupied Sang-mu Pass on 20 April after an important victory. The tribal troops of Ssu-ch'eng (from Kwangsi) and Yung-shun (from Hukuang) in the fifth and seventh columns of the government-tribal united force together with the regular troops of Pa-yang occupied Wu-chiang Pass on 23 April and Ho-tu Pass on 24 April. In a separate action, Regional Commander Ch'en Lin led his eighth column (Section A) from P'ien-ch'iao to defeat four groups of Po-chou rebels and occupied several strongholds within a few days' time.36

36 *PPCS*, 2:120-129; *MSCSPM*, 2:697.
After the Po-chou rebels had suffered several consecutive defeats, Ying-lung's adviser Sun Shih-t'ai suggested attacking a weak column of the government-tribal united force before all the columns converged. Learning that the fifth column led by T'ung Yüan-chen was proceeding from Wu-chiang alone, on 27 April, Ying-lung ordered a contingent of several tens of thousands of troops, including cavalry, to strike at the Shui-hsi tribal troops of the fifth column. The Shui-hsi troops used elephants in a counter-attack but the elephants turned back and stampeded through the camp after the elephant riders were shot. Their firearms misfired and exploded on the advanced detachments of the fifth column, and the tribal and regular troops fled in haste. Thousands of them were killed by the Po-chou troops when a bridge on the escape route was destroyed. Although the headquarters of the fifth column was about sixty li (about twenty English miles) distant from the battlefield, the commanders did not know what happened and sent three hundred tribal troops of Yung-shun on routine guard duty. The Yung-shun troops did not suspect the Po-chou troops they met because the Po-chou troops were dressed like the Shui-hsi troops and deceived them into forming a joint sentry patrol. Inevitably the Yung-shun troops were mostly killed. The Po-chou troops then put their clothes on and marched to the headquarters of the fifth column on 29 April. The government-tribal troops were similarly unaware of this stratagem because they dressed like the tribal troops of Shui-hsi and Yung-shun. The headquarters was attacked, and the troops escaped and attempted to cross the river. Most of them were slaughtered because the
Po-chou rebels had cut the bridge. Several Han-Chinese subordinate commanders died in this battle. This was the fifth major victory for the Po-chou forces since 1594. Because of this defeat, Regional Commander T'ung Yüan-chen was degraded from office, and his subordinate commander Hsieh Ch'ung-chüeh was beheaded with an imperial sword. Regional Commander of the seventh column of the government-tribal united force was ordered to replace T'ung Yüan-chen and assume charge of the remaining troops.

The first column led by Liu T'ing meanwhile continued to march forward, and on 11 May occupied Lou-shan Pass, the main entrance into Po-chou. Two days later, the Yai-men Pass also came under government control.

During the second stage of the campaign from about 13 May to 20 June, the government-tribal united force enjoyed victory on the battlefield except for the minor defeat suffered by Liu T'ing's subordinate commander Wang Fen at the beginning. Exploiting the advantage gained with the victory at Wu-chiang where the fifth column of the government-tribal united force had almost been annihilated, Ying-lung organised another attack against an independent contingent of the first column under Wang Fen. On 13 May, Ying-lung personally commanded Miao troops, stationing himself at Pai-shih-k'ou, the scene of his first victory over the government regular troops in 1594. Two days later, on 15 May, he launched an attack and annihilated

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38 *PPCS*, 2:156-159.
the whole contingent. Wang Fen, tribal chief Yang Yü of T'ien-ch'uan from northern Szechuan, as well as several military officers, and a total of two thousand soldiers died in this battle. This was the sixth and final victory enjoyed by Ying-lung.

Ying-lung desired to restore his control over the Lou-shan Pass which was occupied by Wang Fen's superior commander Liu T'ing after 11 May. When he heard of the loss of one of his contingents, Liu T'ing launched a counter-attack from three directions. Ying-lung was defeated and almost captured during the fighting. With the assistance of the second (from Nan-ch'uan), third (from Ho-chiang) and fourth (from Yung-ning) columns of the government-tribal united force led by Ma K'ung-ying, Wu Kuang and Ts'ao Hsi-pin, respectively, Liu T'ing occupied the strongholds of Lung-chao-t'un and Hai-yün-t'un on 30 May, reaching Hai-lung-t'un, the headquarters and the strongest base of Po-chou. Separately, Regional Commander Ch'en Lin of the eighth column of the government-tribal united force had occupied three strongholds — Ch'ang-k'an-t'un, Ma-nao-t'un and Ch'ing-she-t'un — on 25 May. The tribal chief An Chiang-ch'en of Shui-hsi, from the sixth column via Sha-hsi, had broken through the Lo-meng Pass and occupied Ta-shui-t'ien on 28 May. From the beginning of June, Ying-lung was severely limited in his ability to defend Hai-lung-t'un. He sent messages to

39 *PPCS*, 2:143-146, 176; *MSCSPM*, 2:697; *TIFC*, 2:906.
40 *MSCSPM*, 2:697.
every column of the government-tribal united force for
negotiations, but Supreme Commander Li Hua-lung warned all
Regional Commanders not to trust him; he ordered that the
representatives petitioning for surrender be beheaded and that
the surrender letters be burned. On 13 June, Regional
Commander Wu Kuang of the second column from Ho-chiang arrived
in Yai-men Pass and cleared Shui-niu-t'ang of the rebels in
three days. On 16 June, the Po-chou headquarters leaked a
false report of Ying-lung's death by suicide and had some women
perform a funeral in order to delay the attack of Wu Kuang.
When Wu Kuang discovered the ruse on 20 June, he burned two
passes and occupied three strategic mountain strongholds in
order to blockade the roads which the rebels used to transport
fuel (wood) and water. Thereafter the government-tribal
united troops adopted an encirclement and suppression policy.

The third stage from 28 June to 15 July was the final
stage in the annihilation of Ying-lung. All government-tribal
united troops started to encircle and assault the Po-chou
headquarters at Hai-lung-t'un on 28 June. Hai-lung-t'un was
situated in a mountainous area and could only be attacked from
the front and back. At first, most of the government-tribal
united troops assembled at the front, but subsequently the
tribal troops of Shui-hsi and Chen-hsiung, the main forces of
the fifth and sixth columns, camped separately to the rear of
Hai-lung-t'un. Learning that part of the Shui-hsi troops sold

41 PPCS, 6:601-602; MSCSPM, 2:697.
firearms and explosives to Ying-lung, Ch'en Lin ordered them to retreat from the rear of Hai-lung-t'\un and replaced them with his own troops. As a result, Supreme Commander Li Hualung ordered the reassignment of the troops in preparation for an attack on Hai-lung-t'\un. The first and seventh columns led by Liu T'\ing and Li Ying-hsiang united in an attack on one day, and the third and eighth columns led by Wu Kuang and Ch'en Lin combined to launch an assault on the following day. Both attacked Hai-lung-t'\un from the rear. Regional Commander Ma K'ung-ying commanded the rest in an attack from the front. Because of the heavy rain, they found it difficult to gain this stronghold before the rain stopped on 13 July. The following morning from about 3 a.m. to 9 a.m., Liu T'\ing and Li Ying-hsiang overcame several walled bases with cannon fire; and on 15 July, Wu Kuang and Ch'en Lin pressed the attack from 3 a.m. gaining the Po-chou headquarters at dawn. At the same time, Ma K'ung-ying's troops entered the headquarters from the front. Ying-lung hanged his two beloved concubines and himself and set fire to the room in which they locked themselves. The final and decisive battle lasted only for one hundred and twelve days from 26 March to 15 July. It reportedly had slain more than twenty thousand rebels and captured one hundred forty important figures alive, including Ying-lung's wife (nee T'\ien), brothers, sons and grandsons, who were sent to the Court the

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43 PPCS, 2:188-190; 6:600, 604; MSCSPM, 2:698; TIFC, 2:909-910.
following year, together with the corpses of Ying-lung and six other members.\textsuperscript{44} The rule of the Yang family was finally ended. The one hundred forty prisoners were judged to be executed or exiled on 29 January 1601.\textsuperscript{45}

In conclusion, during the first stage (29 March - 13 May), since Ch'ao-tung could not succeed in crushing Liu T'ing and destroying the biggest store of supplies at Nan-ch'uan, the Po-chou troops remained under repeated attack. The victory at Wu-chiang could only defeat one-eighth or less of the total government-tribal united troops. After attempting in vain to recover the Lou-shan Pass and sweep the government-tribal united troops out of the traditional Po-chou border areas in the second stage (13 May - 20 June), Ying-lung was confined to his headquarters and could not go outside to fight the regular army. Once eight columns of the united force had gradually converged for the third stage (28 May - 15 July), Ying-lung's hopes were lost and even his request for surrender was rejected. A semi-independent kingdom which had endured for seven and a quarter centuries came to an end.

\textsuperscript{44} PPCS, 2:194-210; MSCSPM, 2:698; MSK, 7:106; MS, 26:8049; Ming shu, 29:3247. All sources show the decisive battle lasted 114 days. Probably the authors of the later periods misfollowed the prefaces written by Chang T'i in 1600 and by Chang Wen-yao in 1601 in P'ing Po ch'uan-shu respectively. I accurately work it out according to Ch'en Yuan, Erh-shih-shih shuo-jun-piao (Peking, 1962), Hsieh Chung-san and Ou-yang I, co-ed., Liang-ch'ien-nien Chung-hsi-li tui-chao-piao (Taipei, 1970. Reprint of the 1936 edition), and Cheng Ho-sheng, Chinh-shih Chung-hsi shih-jih tui-chao-piao (Taipei, 1972, 3rd edition).

\textsuperscript{45} SL, 112:6630-6633.
CHAPTER SIX
Policy Formulation and Implementation after the Suppression Campaign

The t'u-ssu chieftainship system and the t'u-kuan prefectural institution were instruments for controlling tribal administration in Ming times. When these proved to be inadequate, the Ming authorities were forced to look for alternatives. After the abolition of a t'u-ssu, the Court had to consider whether the use of a fragmentation strategy or the application of kai-t'u kuei-liu was more advantageous. In the late Ming, after the reign of the Yang family ended in the decisive suppression campaign of 1600, the central and local authorities agreed to adopt a policy of kai-t'u kuei-liu; the Po-chou tribal unit was absorbed into the regular administration and the native chieftains were replaced by civil officials. In order to exert more direct military control over this newly-conquered area, a strong military settlement was established. To eliminate the domination of the prominent wealthy families and tribal heads and to regularise the tax revenue for the new prefectural governments, a large-scale land survey was carried out and their large landholdings were redistributed. Under these reforms, the landlords of Po-chou were replaced with small landowning cultivators, including a large number of Chinese migrants from Szechuan, Hukuang and Kweichow. Chinese culture was promoted as a means of exerting greater Chinese political influence. For this purpose and to train native collaborators to serve in the local government, Confucian Schools were rebuilt, and the civil examination system
re-introduced with the object of greater sinicisation. These are the important aspects which will be discussed in this chapter.

A. Comments on the Ming Frontier Policy

Although the t'u-ssu and t'u-kuan institutions seemed very stable under the strict supervision exercised by the Ming central and local governments — by the military establishments from above and by the registrars and subordinates from below, tribal uprisings especially of t'u-ssu occurred frequently after the mid-fifteenth century. The internal causes were the struggle for succession or for power within the ruling class, economic exploitation by cruel chieftains, blood feuds among tribesmen, and Han-tribal tensions. The external causes were the increased difficulties and consequent loosening of political supervision. The removal of the capital from Nanking to Peking made the Court feel remote from tribal affairs and weakened its ability to exercise control over them. Most of the chieftains were granted permission not to proceed to the capital personally because of the long distance but were allowed to be installed locally by presenting testimonials to their superior local government and to transmit their tribute to the throne through the local authorities; this became standard practice after the mid-fifteenth century. Moreover, the major threats to the Ming were posed by the Mongol cavalry and the Wo-k'ou pirates, and they diverted the attention of the Court to the steppe and to the coast. The tribal affairs in the southwest were not seen as of major significance.
In handling tribal problems, the Ming Court had no fixed policy between seeking pacification through political negotiations or carrying out suppression by military force. Attitudes differed among the central authorities and among the local authorities. Such inconsistency not only delayed the success of a campaign but also led to the spread of uprising because the rebellious chief might have sufficient time to restore his power and strengthen his military force. Even after the suppression of a t'u-ssu, the Court did not invariably adopt the practice of kai-t'u kuei-liu. The rebel leader might be allowed to stay in office after the suppression assisted by government-appointed native police officers. Alternatively, the t'u-ssu authority might be transformed into a t'u-kuan prefecture. On occasion, after the application of kai-t'u kuei-liu, a rebel leader might be rehabilitated or new native chieftains might be selected if the Court found itself unable to rule over the tribe through regular civil officials.

The Po-chou case was a successful example of kai-t'u kuei-liu. In the case of the suppression of the Yung-ning – Shui-hsi rebellion (1621-1629), however, a fragmentation strategy was employed in which the tribal feudal organisations were preserved but the vast tribal area was divided into many small domains respectively ruled by newly-elected native chiefs and Han.

1 Wang Shou-jen (1472-1529) was a strong advocate of such a policy. He did not agree to adopt kai-t'u kuei-liu because of the considerable military expense needed to guard the newly-conquered area. See Wang Shou-jen, Wang Yang-ming ch'üan-chi (Shanghai, 1935), 14:5b-11; 18:8.

2 MSK, 7:88, 179, 185; MS, 26:8007-8009; 27:8211-8212, 8226.
military officers. Therefore, the kai-t'u kuei-liu policy was not a course adopted out of necessity. The resolution of tribal problems ultimately depended upon what was most advantageous for the Ming Court. The Po-chou case was resolved only after the end of the Sino-Japanese War (1592-1598) in Korea when the Court could expend sufficient time, money and manpower to implement the kai-t'u kuei-liu policy since kai-t'u kuei-liu required considerable investment to be successful. The Yung-ning - Shui-hsi case, on the other hand, arose during the Sino-Manchu War (1618-1644) in the northeast and in the long period of nationwide popular uprisings. The Court could not afford the creation of new prefectural governments and therefore adopted the fragmentation policy of establishing many small, weak territories ruled by new tribal chieftains and Han rulers.

In comparison with the Ming policy for tribal administration, the Ch'ing Court (1644-1911) exercised much closer supervision and enforced harsher regulations over the t'u-ssu. In order to prevent possible collusion against Manchu rule in China, the policy of joint administration by tribal chiefs and Han civil servants was abandoned during the Yung-cheng reign (1723-1735). Thereafter the Manchu t'u-ssu policy was three-fold: (1) fragmentation of hereditary feudatories, (2) change of t'u-ssu ranks to "t'u-t'ung" ("military colonisers") and (3) kai-t'u-kuei-liu. The last one which became the ultimate goal was frequently adopted and repeatedly put into effect especially in

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China's southern and southwestern provinces. Only those t'u-ssu in the border regions of China were reserved throughout the Ch'ing and the Republic (1912-1949).^5

B. Application of kai-t'U kuei-liu

Before the decisive suppression campaign of 1600, the Court administrators and the local authorities all expressed publicly that the outcome of the suppression campaign would be the redistribution of Po-chou territory as military rewards rather than the transforming of this tribal unit into a regular administrative unit or the replacement of tribal chiefs by regular officials.

Immediately after most of the strongholds of Po-chou were occupied by the government-tribal united force and Ying-lung was forced to retreat into his headquarters at Hai-lung-t'un on 28 May, however, Supreme Commander Li Hua-lung started re-interpreting the exact meaning of the stated policy. In his letter to the Grand Secretaries (Chao Chih-kao and Shen I-kuan) and the Minister of War (T'ien Yüeh), Li Hua-lung pointed out that although an imperial edict had already been announced against absorbing the tribal units within the regular government, this had only been done to encourage the tribal chiefs to fight against Ying-lung. He argued that the sentence that a tribal chief could succeed to Ying-lung's honours and titles and become the ruler of Po-chou if he killed or imprisoned Ying-lung should be explained as meaning only before

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the general mobilisation or the national recruitment of the government-tribal united force. After the troops had already been mobilised and Ying-lung had been defeated and confined to his headquarters, even if a tribal chief took Ying-lung's head in the final fighting, he would only be awarded titles and gifts. Li said that it was not necessary to follow the former imperial edict in every detail.\(^6\)

On 6 August, twenty-two days after the end of the suppression campaign, the Ministry of War received news of the victory from Grand Coordinator Chiang To of P'ien-ch'iao - Yuan-chou in Hukuang.\(^7\) On 11 August, the Ministry of War listed ten measures for the disposition of Po-chou. The final items concerned the policy of *kai-t'u kuei-liu*. This explanation was more convincing than Li Hua-lung's. It pointed out that in the initial decision the policy of *kai-t'u kuei-liu* was to be used after the extermination of Yang Ying-lung, except if a tribal chief gained the right to succeed to Ying-lung's title and to annex his land by killing or arresting Ying-lung. The strongest tribal troops of Shui-hsi [of Kweichow] and Ssu-ch'eng [of Kwangsi] had withdrawn from the battlefield on 8 July, however, a week before the fall of Ying-lung; Ying-lung had not been killed by a tribal chief but had committed suicide, and his body was found in the fire by Regional Commander Wu Kuang. The chiefs of these two tribal groups were therefore to receive awards only according to their contribution to the fighting

\(^6\) *PPCS*, 2:186; 7:800-801.

\(^7\) *SL*, 111:6511.
during the campaign along with the other troops. Under such circumstances, the local authorities were free to reorganise the administrative districts in the Po-chou area and to integrate them into the structure of the regular local government.  

Subsequently, Li Hua-lung and Kuo Tzu-chang, in presenting memorials to the Court, both listed twelve proposals for the reconstruction of Po-chou and both insisted on a change of the Po-chou tribal unit into regular government and the replacement of the tribal chiefs with regular officials. The revenue would obviously increase after the application of kai-t' u kuei-liu because the taxpayers would pay both taxes-in-kind and taxes-in-cash directly to the local government and would be exempt from exploitation by the tribal heads and chieftains. After the landlord class had been broken, the small land owners would be less able to escape the tax levy. Because of the small size and poverty of Kweichow province, both Li and Kuo suggested dividing up the territories of Po-chou into two prefectures, each comprising several counties; one of them would be under the jurisdiction of Kweichow, and the other, Szechuan. Despite these initial proposals for the creation of prefectures and counties which differed only slightly from one another, the final decision in 1601 was that Tsun-i prefecture (fu) with one sub-prefecture (chou), four counties (hsien) and one garrison town (wei) be created and placed under the jurisdiction of

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8 SL, 111:6519-6521; PPCS, 4:344; MSCSPM, 2:698.

Szechuan and that P'ing-yüeh prefecture with one sub-prefecture, three counties, two small sized tribal units (chang-kuan-ssu) and two garrison towns be part of Kweichow. (See Map VII. Change from Tribal to Regular Government.) The following table illustrates this integration.

**TABLE SIX: The Integration of Po-chou into the Structure of Regular Government**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provincial Government</th>
<th>Prefecture</th>
<th>Sub-prefecture</th>
<th>County</th>
<th>Tribal Unit</th>
<th>Garrison Town</th>
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<tr>
<td>Kweichow</td>
<td>P'ing-yueh</td>
<td>Huang-p'ing</td>
<td>Yü-ch'ing</td>
<td>K'ai-li</td>
<td>Ch'ing-p'ing</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Wen-an</td>
<td>Yang-i</td>
<td>Hsing-lung</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mei-t'an</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Sources: MS, 4:1034, 1205-1207; TIFC, 1:80.

After the creation of the prefectural governments, the newly-created administrative posts were filled by Han-Chinese officials from neighbouring local governments or by those who had participated in the suppression campaign. About two dozen of them had been nominated by Li Hua-lung and were listed in the fifth item of his memorials. The five original tribal chiefs of Po-chou, all enemies of Ying-lung, had taken part in the suppression campaign as guides but were not reinstated. They were appointed as lower ranked tribal assistants in the regular government offices. They were blamed by both Li (in his eleventh

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10 PPCS, 4:326-328.
MAP VII. CHANGE FROM TRIBAL TO REGULAR GOVERNMENT
item) and Kuo (in his third item) for fomenting the Ying-lung uprising with their accusations.\textsuperscript{11} Because of the numerous tribal inhabitants and in view of their efforts in the suppression campaign, they were appointed to assist the Han-Chinese officials in governing the newly-conquered area. Several tribal heads who had participated in the campaign were also appointed to posts in the new governments.\textsuperscript{12}

Because of the length of time the uprising had lasted, thirteen postal stations in Po-chou had been closed or ruined. These were all rebuilt so that communications between these newly-created government offices and the neighbouring provinces would be restored and maintained.\textsuperscript{13} The semi-independent autonomous domain was thenceforth under Chinese cultural influence and politically became part of China.

C. Establishment of Military Settlements

In order to firmly control this newly-conquered area, a strong military settlement was set up. The garrison town of

\textsuperscript{11} PPCS, 4:331-332; Kuo Tzu-chang, \textit{op.cit.}, 4549-4550.

\textsuperscript{12} TIFC, 2:702-706. Such as Po-chou hsüan-wei t'ung-chih Lo Ch'i-pin was appointed chih-hui-shih t'ung-chih (Vice Commander) of Wei-yüan wei (Guard); Chen-chou chang-kuan Cheng K'uei, t'u t'ung-chih (Vice Magistrate) of Chen-an chou (Sub-prefecture); Chen-chou fu chang-kuan Lo Lin, t'u t'ung-p'an (Assistant Magistrate) of Chen-an chou; Yü-ch'ing chang-kuan Mr Mao, hsienc'h'eng (Vice Magistrate) of Yü-ch'ing hsien (county); Pai-ni chang-kuan Mr Yang, chu-pu (Assistant Magistrate) of Yü-ch'ing hsien; both Ts'ao-t'ang an-fu-shih Sung Yüeh and Weng-shui chang-kuan Yu Ho, Vice Magistrates of Weng-an hsien.

\textsuperscript{13} PPCS, 4:330.
Wei-yüan wei was built at Pai-t'ien-pa where the headquarters of the Tsun-i prefectural government was located. Li Hua-lung suggested assigning five battalions to this garrison town, each comprising one thousand households and each with one thousand soldiers. Each soldier would be allotted thirty mou (4.55 acres) of land, so that they could provision themselves. This was the system of military colonies which was adopted generally in Ming times. It was proposed that the total number of troops in Tsun-i prefecture be ten thousand. In P'ing-yüeh prefecture, the Huang-p'ing sub-prefecture was said to have three thousand garrison troops. In addition, the garrison towns of Ch'ing-p'ing and Hsing-lung of Kweichow province, now under the jurisdiction of P'ing-yüeh prefecture, undoubtedly comprised at least several thousand soldiers. A Regional Commander was also proposed for Tsun-i prefecture to be in charge of the garrison troops. Li Hua-lung suggested setting up a combined Circuit of General Surveillance and Military Defense to be in charge of all military affairs in the new prefectures and the neighbouring garrison towns and tribal units, as well as being responsible for the construction of city walls and fortifications, the defense of border regions, the storage of military rations, the communications of postal stations, and the suppression of local bullies.

14 PPCS, 4:324.
15 Wang Yu-ch'uan, Ming-tai ti chun-tun (Peking, 1965), 92-94.
16 PPCS, 4:325-326.
17 PPCS, 4:324-325.
Since the important cities and counties of the coastal provinces had high walls to protect against the Wo-k'ou pirates, Kuo Tzu-chang suggested building an outer city wall at Kweiyang.\(^18\) Li Hua-lung suggested the construction of city walls in all the newly-established prefectures and counties. He advised the use of rock or brick instead of wood for the construction of these walls.\(^19\) Although control over this area was sufficient, defense against neighbouring "uncivilised" tribesmen was still important. The strong tribal unit of Shui-hsi had not yet been changed into the regular government and might pose a particularly intimidating threat, as proved true two decades later.

D. Land Survey and Re-distribution

After Ying-lung confiscated the lands of the wealthy and locally prominent families to provision and train the Miao troops, the proof of land title was destroyed. The agrarian situation deteriorated as Po-chou was subjected to revolt and suppression. Much of the land remained uncultivated, and many landowners died or disappeared during the war. After the elimination of all tribal units in Po-chou and the creation of new prefectures and counties, the land was surveyed and divided into classifications according to productivity. The survey revealed that there was a total of 396,305.3 mou (60,046.3 acres) of paddy (\(t'ien\)) and 885,142.1 mou (134,112.4 acres) of land (\(ti\)) in Tsun-i prefecture. The total of the taxes-in-kind

\(^18\) *HMCSWP*, 6:4554.

\(^19\) *PPCS*, 4:331.
was 17,478.336 tan of grain, and the total of the taxes-in-cash was 30,190.992 taels of silver.\textsuperscript{20} There is no available data as to tax revenue from the part of Po-chou which became P'ing-yüeh prefecture. In Ying-lung's time (r. 1571-1595), however, the taxes-in-kind for the whole of Po-chou (an area smaller than the total area of Tsun-i and P'ing-yüeh prefectures) was 5,800 tan of grain and the taxes-in-cash, 3,164.7 taels of silver.\textsuperscript{21} It is difficult to estimate how this rate compares to that prior to the redistribution since the taxpayers previously had to pay taxes both to the local government and to their tribal chiefs. Moreover, previously Po-chou had been responsible for the cutting and transport of beam timbers.

In dealing with the redistribution problem, the government confronted false claims of up to one or two thousand mou from Po-chou residents as well as claims from non-residents claiming to be Po-chou inhabitants. Only applicants with genuine local accents were to be given land, and they were to each receive thirty mou (4.55 acres) regardless of their previous wealth or poverty. The remaining land was to be cultivated by recruited labourers on whom a tax-in-kind and labour corvée was levied. The land belonging to the Yang family or to Ying-lung's relatives who had died in the battlefield or been executed by the government was confiscated and sold to Han-Chinese from Szechuan, Kweichow and Hukuang according to the market price. The limit of land purchase was fixed at fifty mou (7.58 acres) for common

\textsuperscript{20} TIFC, 1:282.

\textsuperscript{21} PPCS, 4:328; Kuo Tzu-chang, \textit{op. cit.}, 4551.
people and one hundred mou (15.16 acres) for military officers. The revenue from the land sale was to be used for the construction of the projected government offices, postal stations and city walls, etc.\textsuperscript{22}

Under these circumstances, the old landlord class of Po-chou was destroyed and a new class of self-cultivating, taxpaying small landowners established under the new prefectural governments. Many of these were Han-Chinese migrants from the neighbouring provinces. Thus the old ruling agents were replaced by regular civil officials and the social leadership shifted from the few old established families to the new migrant middle class. Thereafter the Szechuan-Kweichow border region passed under the direct control of Chinese local government officially and under the influence of Han-Chinese migrants socially.

E. Sinicisation by Education

The imperial Court had tried to sinicise Po-chou for a long time, most successfully during the Southern Sung, partly because the Court moved southward and partly because a lot of highly-educated Han-Chinese visited or even migrated to Po-chou. In the early Ming, a Confucian School was set up in Po-chou. The twenty-first Po-chou ruler Yang Chien and other tribal chiefs also sent their sons to the National University in Nanking. The twenty-second ruler Yang Sheng (1378-1440) sought permission to set up schools and employed scholars to teach the Po-chou people. The twenty-sixth ruler Yang Pin (b. 1487; r. 1501-1508)

\textsuperscript{22} \textit{PPCS}, 4:328-329.
asked the Court to let his son Hsiang (r. 1518-1544; d. 1544) enrol in the National University in Peking. In 1522, the Court bestowed the *Collective Commentary on the Four Books* upon the Confucian School at the request of Hsiang. Apparently, the Court did not give up its education policy although it was not fully developed.

Ying-lung was said to have ignored Confucian teachings, and the Confucian School in Po-chou was rebuilt as a Taoist temple. Undoubtedly, the education in Po-chou must have been interrupted for a long time, at least for the duration of the uprising. Confucian teachings were restored only after the suppression campaign. An Instructor of Prefectural School was appointed in each of the prefectural seats, and two Assistant Instructors were also appointed to teach students. The old schools in Tsun-i prefecture and Chen-an sub-prefecture were rebuilt. Thirty students were enrolled in the Tsun-i prefectural school, and twenty students at the Chen-an sub-prefectural school. A Confucian School in the Huang-p'ing sub-prefecture of P'ing-yüeh prefecture was also rebuilt. A total of 99.616 mou (15.09 acres) of cultivated land was set aside for the support of these Confucian Schools. Depending on the prosperity of the new counties, schools were to be built in each of them. The outstanding students would be selected to serve in the new local governments. In 1608-1609, the Confucius Temple

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23 *TIFC*, 2:689-693.

24 *TIFC*, 1:441, 516; *PPCS*, 4:329.
was also rebuilt.\textsuperscript{25} The symbol of Chinese culture again appeared in the Szechuan-Kweichow border region. Thereafter Chinese cultural assimilation was fully developed especially during the Ch'ing period in this previously tribal area.

\textsuperscript{25} \textit{PPCS}, 4:329-330; \textit{TIFC}, 1:441, 490-491.
CONCLUSION

Recognising the diminishing returns involved in efforts to bring all of the ethnic minorities directly under imperial authority, the Ming rulers did not set out to conquer the tribes in the Southwest or to abolish the chieftainship system. Because of the practical limitations of its military and economic resources, such a course would have been infeasible. On the other hand, the Chinese authorities could not ignore these tribal societies nor could they permit them to develop independently or even exist under loose rein in the frontier regions. Mindful of the threats posed by strong tribal states and powerful tribal coalitions in the T'ang and Sung periods, the Ming Court realised the need to maintain supervision over the peoples in the border areas. Utilising aspects of the frontier policies and techniques for regulating tribal affairs which evolved during previous dynasties, the Ming Court codified and systematised the t'u-ssu chieftainship institution as an instrument for controlling tribal administration.

In the early Ming t'u-ssu system, chieftains who offered their submission to the throne were reinstated in their pre-existing rule and were conferred special t'u-ssu titles and ranks depending upon their size and merit. Once such a feudal relationship was established between the tribal unit and the imperial Court, the emperor could require the chieftain to fulfil various obligations, including Court tribute, tax collection, military and labour corvée. Collaterally, with formal confirmation of his position, a chieftain became a legitimatised
feudal lord with recognised authority over his tribal subjects. As a consequence, he could request assistance from the Court if his tribesmen rose in revolt against him.

To exercise supervision over chieftains, the Ming Court maintained military control over the t'u-ssu tribal governments through a tight military structure under the jurisdiction of both the Ministry of War in the central government and the Regional Military Commission or Guards at the provincial level. In addition, a Registry was set up in each of the first two classes of t'u-ssu government; i.e., hsüan-wei-ssu (ranked 3b) and hsüan-fu-ssu (ranked 4b). All registrars (ranked 7b in hsüan-wei-ssu and 8b in hsüan-fu-ssu) and most of the secretaries and clerks were Han-Chinese regular civilian officials. Thus, each t'u-ssu government was supervised by Han-Chinese authorities — from above by the Ministry of War and the Regional Military Commission or Guard and from below by the Registry.

A considerable number of sinicised tribes were transformed into t'u-kuan prefectural governments after the early Ming. Their official status and administration were the same as those of the regular prefectural governments. Generally, the headship of these t'u-kuan governments was conferred upon chieftains, but most of the deputies and subordinates were Han-Chinese civilian officials. On occasion, two magistrates, a tribal chief and a Han-Chinese were appointed simultaneously to the same office to form a dual leadership with different duties. For the same purpose, these t'u-kuan prefectural governments were also codified under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Personnel in
the central government and directly governed by the Provincial Administration Office in the provincial government.

This practice in the Ming tribal administration was called "liu-t'u kung-chih" (joint rule by Han-Chinese regular civil officials and tribal chieftains) or "I-Han ts'an-yung" (employment of both tribesmen and Han-Chinese). The intent of such practice was to have a dual political administration as a kind of transition to full Han-Chinese civil administration.

Although the t'u-ssu system as an instrument of regulating minority peoples was employed throughout the course of the Ming dynasty, the policies in the pursuit of which it was used changed over time. The succeeding stage in dealing with tribal affairs was "kai-t'u kuei-liu"; i.e., the replacement of tribal chiefs with Han-Chinese regular civil officials or to the change from tribal to regular government. Although this became the objective of the Ming Court in its frontier policy and tribal administration, the Ming rulers did not undertake to change all tribal governments into regular ones in a planned way. The practice of kai-t'u kuei-liu had been in use since the early Ming but it was not consistently and regularly carried out. It was employed only occasionally and only under specific circumstances, such as the annihilation or dismissal of a tribal chief, the lack of a legitimate heir, incessant struggle among claimants to succession, the incapacity or disobedience of a tribal chief, or at the request of local tribesmen who preferred a regular government to a tribal one. On occasion, a chieftainship might be re-established after the application of kai-t'u kuei-liu if the Court found itself unable to rule over the tribe through
regular civil officials. Aside from kai-t'u kuei-liu, the Ming policy also included measures designed to fragment the big tribes politically. The advocates of this divide-and-rule policy regarded that a lot of money and a considerable military force would be saved by separating a big tribal area into many independent small and weak tribal units ruled by many new and old chieftains. Until the late Ming this policy was still adopted as it was after the suppression campaign against the Yung-ning - Shui-hsi rebellion (1621-1629) because it arose during the Sino-Manchu War (1618-1644) in the northwest and in the long period of nationwide popular uprisings and the Court could not afford the creation of new regular prefectural governments.

The Ming Court achieved its two greatest successes in the establishment of Kweichow province after the suppression of the Ssu-chou and Ssu-nan hsüan-wei-ssu in 1413 in the early Ming and in the creation of the two prefectures of Tsun-i and P'ing-yueh by the abolition of Po-chou hsüan-wei-ssu in 1600 in the late Ming. In order to achieve the goal of kai-t'u kuei-liu, both political means and military force were used. The suppression campaign against Po-chou which cost over two million taels of silver was the most expensive instance in which military force was used.

Under the rule of the Yang family, Po-chou had existed as a semi-autonomous kingdom for seven and a quarter centuries since 876 A.D. from the late T'ang, through the Five Dynasties, the two Sung periods, the Yuan, to the Ming. That its territories remained undisturbed by war until 1600 A.D. might be attributed
to its geographical isolation. But that the rule of the Yang family was maintained for such a long period can be regarded as the result of its opportunistic policy of serving the imperial houses by means of a feudal relationship. Except for periods of imperial weakness during the late T'ang and the Five Dynasties, Po-chou rulers submitted to new imperial Courts of the Sung, the Yüan and the Ming without reluctance even though they had been faithful and obedient to the previous newly-defeated imperial house. They never refused taxation, labour corvée, military service and other feudal obligations levied upon Po-chou. Rather they met their obligations regularly and presented tribute to the Court frequently. The emperors of the Sung, the Yüan and the Ming dynasties appear satisfied with the services rendered. The rulers of Po-chou consistently endeavoured to gain merit in order to be awarded honours from the imperial houses. Even the 29th Po-chou ruler Yang Ying-lung eagerly sought an imperial noble garment and an honorific title through his military service and lumbering activities. The elimination of the Yang family's rule and the abolition of the Po-chou tribal government were made possible by internal strife and accomplished by government military moves.

Yang Ying-lung was described as vigorous but envious. He became antagonistic towards his five sub-tribal chiefs as well as towards the seven locally prominent families because they failed to remain subservient to him. When he found himself isolated, he united with Miao tribesmen; in defence, the five tribal chiefs and seven prominent families sought protection from the provincial and central authorities. In this situation, the
Ming Court remained flexible in its response, assessing its priorities and the possible benefits it could expect at what cost to itself. Initially, for example, the accusation by the five tribal chiefs and seven prominent families was ignored when the Court found Ying-lung's military contribution was vital in the emergency in northern Szechuan, even though he had killed his wife and mother-in-law and was reported to plot against the Court. The Court also decided that it would not be worthwhile to wage an additional military campaign while the massive military assistance to Korea against the Japanese invasion was being undertaken although the lands and properties of the five tribal chiefs and seven prominent families had been confiscated by Ying-lung.

In the handling of the case of Ying-lung, it seems that the central authorities were more correct or reasonable than the provincial authorities. In response to the accusations lodged against Ying-lung, the provincial authorities of Szechuan and Kweichow assumed divergent positions. When this occurred, the Court immediately transferred the strong advocate of war Yeh Meng-hsiung from Kweichow to Shensi where it could utilise his military capabilities in the suppression of the Pübei rebellion. Belatedly, the Court refused to permit the resignations of Li Shang-ssu and Li Hua-lung and agreed with them on the need to put Ying-lung's case aside because of the suppression campaign in northern Szechuan. Otherwise, the provincial troops would be faced with uprisings on two fronts.

During the period of the military campaigns against rebellious Mongol officials in Ningsia (1592) and the Japanese
invaders in Korea (1592-1598), the Court had had to focus on these military threats and attempt to handle Ying-lung's case through political means. The provincial officials must be held responsible for the considerable mishandling of the problem posed by Ying-lung. This poor administration resulted in Ying-lung's being forced to stand trial twice, Po-chou's being antagonised twice in seven years, and in the development of a large-scale uprising. In the first place, the provincial authorities did not take the opportunity to execute or imprison Ying-lung when he allowed himself to stand trial at Chungking. They should have removed him and then should have changed Po-chou from a tribal state into a regular administrative unit after the five subordinate chiefs and seven prominent families sought their protection against Ying-lung in 1592-1593. Secondly, the Szechuan provincial authorities erred in ordering Ying-lung to stand trial a second time in half a year without additional evidence. This roused Ying-lung to oppose the government forces and he won his first victory in early 1594. Finally, the Szechuan provincial authorities miscalculated in refusing to return the corpse of Ying-lung's son previously held as hostage in Chungking. Such a decision seriously contravened tribal custom and provoked Ying-lung to revolt against the provincial government a second time while the Sino-Japanese War in Korea was still being undertaken. In sum, the provincial advocates of war never took the whole situation into consideration. They should have attempted to avoid driving Ying-lung to insurrection. Instigating revolt amounted to disrupting the whole national strategic plan and forcing the
Court to confront two military campaigns on two distant fronts simultaneously—one on the northeastern border of China and the other in the southwest. As a matter of fact, the heavy military burden in Korea prevented the Court from supporting a new military campaign. It was not until the end of 1598 when the war with the Japanese was over that the Court could turn its attention to the southwest and reorganise the suppression campaign against Ying-lung.

The Court did not handle Ying-lung's case through political negotiations at this moment because Ying-lung's uprising had spread over a wide area in northern Kweichow and southern Szechuan where his Miao troops were accused of murder, rape, looting, the desecration of tombs, attacks on garrison towns and the destruction of government offices. The local military force was ineffective in suppressing this insurrection. The confiscation of the lands and property of the five tribal chiefs and seven wealthy local families by Ying-lung seriously disrupted the social order and upset its economic basis. Ying-lung refused to pay the tax-in-kind and tax-in-cash, utilising this extra financial revenue to strengthen his own military forces. If the Court could not immediately suppress Ying-lung, the rebellion might escalate to the point that a strong tribal state might reappear in the southwest of China as happened in the T'ang and Sung periods. Therefore a military campaign against Ying-lung conducted by high-ranking military officials was inevitable.

The institution of t'u-ssu was a policy of i-i chih-i (using barbarians to govern barbarians). When conducting a suppression campaign against a rebellious chieftain, the Court
would adopt a policy of *i-i kung-i* or *i-i fa-i* (using barbarians to attack barbarians). In the 1600 suppression campaign in Po-chou, about one hundred sixty-eight thousand tribal troops were recruited to crush the rebellious tribesmen in Po-chou, approximately 70 per cent of the total government-tribal united force. Most of the strong tribal chiefs from Szechuan, Hukuang, Kwangsi and Yunnan personally commanded their tribal troops on the battlefield, including several of the Po-chou subordinate tribal chiefs who had rejected Ying-lung. Due to Supreme Commander Li Hua-lung's brilliant military strategy, the decisive battle lasted only one hundred and twelve days. The rule by the Yang family over Po-chou eventually ended in this suppression campaign.

Ying-lung's failure to maintain his rule over Po-chou can be imputed to subjective and objective reasons. Consistent with his envious and cruel character, he murdered his wife and mother-in-law, and these acts aroused the enmity and hostility of the Chang family. His five subordinate chiefs were annoyed at what they considered his exploitation of them. After the confiscation of their land and property, he suffered a decline in strength when his five subordinate chiefs and seven prominent local families were forced to seek protection from the local government authorities. With this increased financial support, he could gain the support of a large quantity of Miao troops and successfully defeated the government troops. He did not consolidate his military force to found a new state nor did he heed Sun Shih-t'ai's advice to advance directly to Chungking,
occupy Chengtu and keep Prince of Shu as hostage. The more places he could occupy, the more he could obtain through negotiations or the longer he could support his fight against the government troops. Foolishly, all he did was enlarge the boundaries of his own domain, hoping to gain government acquiescence after negotiations. Li Hua-lung could safely remain in Chungking and have sufficient time to mobilise his massive government-tribal united force. Utilising internal conflicts among tribal leaders and promising awards including land, silver cash, titles and ranks, the government troops gained the support of other strong tribes to build a strong government-tribal joint force. Ying-lung could not gain the support of even one strong tribe but could only employ Miao tribesmen to fight for him. Therefore his troops were considerably outnumbered and defeated by the 240,000 government-tribal troops.

After the abolition of the rule of the Yang family in Po-chou, the central and local authorities broke their promise to bestow lands on the tribal chiefs who had rendered distinguished military service but agreed unanimously to change Po-chou from tribal to regular government and to replace all chieftains with civil officials. Consequently, the territory of Po-chou was divided into two new administrative units: Tsun-i prefecture in Szechuan (in Kweichow after 1727) and P'ing-yüeh prefecture in Kweichow. After the implementation of "kai-t'u kuei-liu" in Po-chou, about two dozen important civil officials were nominated to fill the posts in the new prefectural governments. A few tribal heads who had helped the Court and rendered meritorious military service were reappointed as low-
ranking subordinates. In addition, a strong military settlement was established to directly control this newly-conquered area and keep watch on the adjacent tribal units. A large-scale land survey and re-distribution was carried out by which the Po-chou landlords including locally prominent families and tribal heads were replaced with small land holders including a large number of Han-Chinese migrants from Szechuan, Hukuang and Kweichow. Confucian Schools were rebuilt and the civil examination re-introduced with the object of greater sinicisation and the training of native collaborators to serve in the new local government.
APPENDIX ONE

The Military Hierarchy in Ming China

Abbreviations

CMC : Chief Military Commission or Tu-tu fu
RMC : Regional Military Commission Tu-chih-hui-shih-ssu or Tu-ssu
BRMC : The Branch of RMC Hsing tu-ssu
G : Guard wei
B : Battalion so
HWSS : ( ) Hsian-wei-shih-ssu
HFS : ( ) Hsian-fu-ssu
APS : ( ) An-fu-ssu
CTS : ( ) Chao-t'ao-ssu
CKS : ( ) Chang-kuan-ssu
MICKS : ( ) Man-i Chang-kuan-ssu

I. Left CMC

The capital: Peking — G(6)
RMC Chekiang — G(16) & B(35)
RMC Liaotung — G(25) & B(18)
RMC Shantung — G(16) & B(17)

II. Right CMC

The capital: Peking — G(3)
Metropolitan areas — G(1)
RMC Shensi — G(30) & B(17)
BRMC Shensi — G(12) & B(3)
CTS T'ien-ch'üan Liu-fan (1)
G Mou-chou — CKS(3)
HFS(1)
G Chungking — HFS — CKS(2)
G Sung-p'an — CKS(17)
AFS(4)
B Tieh-hsi — CKS(2)
G(9) & B(10)
RMC Szechuan — ( )
G Chien-ch'ang — CKS(3)
G Yen-ching — CKS(1)
G Yüeh-chin — CKS(1)
G(2) & B(8)
RMC Kwangsi — ( )
G Yung-ch'ang — AFS(3)
G(10) & B(22)
RMC Yunnan — ( )
G(19) & B(20)
AFS(1)
CKS(2)
RMC Kweichow — ( )
G Hsin-tien — CKS(5)
G P'ing-yüeh — CKS(1)
G Lung-li — CKS(1)
G(15) & B(12)
III. Central CMC

The capital: Peking — G(4) & B(2)
Metropolitan areas — G(26) & B(16)
Defense command — G(8) & B(1)
RMC Honan — G(12) & B(7)

IV. Front CMC

The capital: Peking — G(3)
Metropolitan areas — G(1)
HWSS Yung-shun — CKS(6)
HWSS Pao-ching — CKS(2)
RMC Hukuang —
  HFS Shih-nan
  G Shih-mao
  HFS Chung-chien
  HFS Yung-mei
  CKS(2)
  G Chiu-hsi — AFS(1)
  G Chen-yuan — CKS(1)
  G(25) & B(31)
  BRMC Hukuang — G(8) & B(9)
  Defense Command — G(3) & B(1)
  RMC Fukien — G(11) & B(16)
  BRMC Fukien — G(5) & B(5)
  RMC Kiangsi — G(3) & B(11)
  RMC Kwangtung — G(15) & B(52)

V. Back CMC

The capital: Peking — G(21)
Metropolitan areas — G(40) & B(12)
RMC Ta-ning — G(11) & B(1)
RMC Wan-ch'uan — G(15) & B(7)
RMC Shansi — G(9) & B(9)
BRMC Shansi — G(14) & B(3)

Source: Ming shih (Peking, 1974), 8:2205-2220.
APPENDIX TWO

The Genealogy of the Yang Family in Po-chou

Abbreviations

\( a \) = adopted son  \( r \) = reign
\( b \) = year of birth  \( s \) = shih, the posthumous title
\( c \) = about  \( t \) = tsu, a courtesy name
\( d \) = year of death  \( s_l \) = son of the legal wife
\( h \) = hao, an extra name  \( s_c \) = son of a concubine
\( m \) = Mongol name  \( e_b \) = the elder brother
\( n \) = degree of nobility  \( y_b \) = the younger brother

Ancestors of the Yang family
registered as natives of Taiyuan in Shansi

\[ [杨] 嵠 TUAN^{(1)} (Entered Po-chou in 876 A.D.) \]
\[ \text{慕南 MU-NAN}^{(2)} \]
\[ \text{拏射 PU-SHE}^{(3)} \]
\[ \text{三公 SAN-KUNG}^{(4)} \]

The above were in the late T'ang (618-906) and the Five Dynasties (907-960).

\( y_b \) = the younger brother (t. Chen-ch'ing)

(6 other YEN-brothers)  LANG  (Yen-chao)  (958-1014)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHUNG-KUANG (Wen-kuang)</th>
<th>CHAO (eb)</th>
<th>CH'I</th>
<th>I (yb)</th>
<th>HSIEN (yb)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KUEI-CH'IEI (7) (a) (t. Sheng-shu)</td>
<td>KUANG-CHEI (8) (t. Ch'ang-ch'ing)</td>
<td>WEN-KUANG (9) (t. Ching-te)</td>
<td>WEI-TS'UNG (10) (t. Hui-chih)</td>
<td>HSUAN (11) (t. Chien-fu)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KUANG-YUNG</td>
<td>KUANG-MING</td>
<td>CHEN</td>
<td>HSUAN</td>
<td>PIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH'E</td>
<td>CHEN (12) (t. Te-yü)</td>
<td>SHIH (yb) (t. Te-tsai)</td>
<td>(11 other brothers)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUAN (t. Wen-ch'ing; Po-ch'iang)</td>
<td>(t. Chung-ling)</td>
<td>(n. Wei-i hou)</td>
<td>[Annexation of Lower Yang to Upper Yang]</td>
<td>(Small Po-chou) (Great Po-chou)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above were in the Northern Sung (960-1126).
The above were in the Southern Sung (1127-1279)

文 (15) (eb) 大陸 TA-SHENG (yb)
(t. Ch'uan-pin) 大陸
(s. Ch'ung-te) 大陸
(n. Po-ch'uan Po; Po-kuo kung) 柏川伯; 柏川公
(d. 1265)

邦暹 PANG-HSIEN (16) (t. Chung-wu) 仲武
(s. Hui-min) 志敏
(n. Po-kuo kung) 柏川公
(c. 1239-1282)

漢英 HAN-YING (17) (eb) 仲
(t. Hsi-tsai)
(s. Chung-hsüan)
(m. Sayin-Buqa) 蔡師安
(m. Po-kuo kung)
(c. 1277-1317)

貞貞 CHIA-CHEN (18) (eb) 貞貞
(m. El-Buqa)

忠孝 CHUNG-YEN (19) (eb) 忠孝

元臣 YUAN-TING (20) (eb)

The above were in the Yuan Dynasty (1279-1368)

The above were in the Southern Sung (1127-1279)

CHIEH (14) (eb) 佐
(t. Shan-fu) 佐
(s. Chung-hsien) 佐
(n. Wei-lin-ying-lieh hou) 佐
(d. 1243)

文 WEN (15) (eb) 大陸 TA-SHENG (yb)
(t. Ch'uan-pin) 大陸
(s. Ch'ung-te) 大陸
(n. Po-ch'uan Po; Po-kuo kung) 柏川伯; 柏川公
(d. 1265)
APPENDIX THREE
Chronicle of the Po-chou Tribal Troops' Participation in Suppression Campaigns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Objects to be Suppressed</th>
<th>Po-chou Troops Participated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1381</td>
<td>Yunnan</td>
<td>Mongol remnants and unpacified tribes</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1409</td>
<td>Po-chou area</td>
<td>Tribesmen of Ts'ao-t'ang, Huang-p'ing and Chung-an</td>
<td>uncertain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1416-1417</td>
<td>Southeastern Kweichow</td>
<td>Tribesmen of Ch'ing-shui-chiang</td>
<td>uncertain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1432</td>
<td>Po-chou area</td>
<td>Tribal heads and over 2,000 tribesmen of 41 stockades of Ts'ao-t'ang</td>
<td>uncertain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1452</td>
<td>Kweichow-Hukuang border regions</td>
<td>Tribesmen of Chin-pou, Wu-ch'a and Ts'ao-t'ang</td>
<td>uncertain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1456</td>
<td>Kweichow-Hukuang border regions</td>
<td>Tribesmen of T'ung-ku and Wu-kai</td>
<td>uncertain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1474</td>
<td>Po-chou area</td>
<td>Robber Chi-kuo of Po-chou and his followers</td>
<td>uncertain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1476-1477</td>
<td>Po-chou area</td>
<td>Miao tribesmen of Wan-hsi and Yao-pa-kan</td>
<td>10,000(+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>1478</td>
<td>Po-chou area</td>
<td>Tribesmen of Lan-t'u</td>
<td>uncertain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1494</td>
<td>(Uncertain)</td>
<td>Miao tribesmen</td>
<td>uncertain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>1501</td>
<td>Kweichow</td>
<td>Female chieftain Mi-lu of P'u-an</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>1518</td>
<td>Po-chou area</td>
<td>Tribal heads of K'ai-li and Chung-an</td>
<td>uncertain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>1586</td>
<td>Szechuan</td>
<td>Tribesmen of Sung-p'an</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>1587-1588</td>
<td>Szechuan</td>
<td>Tribesmen of Yüeh-chin and Chi'ung-pu</td>
<td>uncertain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX FOUR

A Brief Account on the 1476-1477 Suppression Campaign

Yang Hui (1433-1483; r. 1449-1474), the twenty-fourth ruler of the Po-chou tribal unit, took a concubine because his wife had not provided him with an heir. Subsequently, both became pregnant and the concubine was the first to give birth, delivering a son Yu on 19 August 1464. Two months and twenty days later, his wife also presented him with a son named Ai (8 November 1464-1517; r. 1474-1501). Hui favoured Yu over Ai, and in 1474 attempted to abdicate his title with Yu as successor. Such a decision was totally rejected by the other tribal chiefs who insisted that only the son of a legal wife could be a legitimate heir. This rule was not only the law of inheritance adopted by the Yang clan but also the traditional standard of inheritance practised both by the dynastic families and the Han-Chinese families in China. Under such circumstances, Hui had no alternative but to pass his position to Ai. Hui still sought an opportunity to advance Yu's interests. Under these circumstances, a group of deceitful supporters proposed that Hui wage a suppression campaign against the "uncivilised" Miao tribesmen in Yao-pa-kan, Wan-hsi and the border regions of Yung-shan and Chung-an, and then seek the establishment of a new pacification office there with Yu as its head under the pretence of his superior military merits. Hui consented to this plan and forced the tribal chiefs of Yung-shan and Chung-an to countersign an application to the Court proposing suppression of the Miao tribesmen, falsely claiming that they refused to pay taxes or
render corvée. Since tax collection and corvée obligation were shared by both the Court and the tribal leaders, the Court in 1476 appointed Chang Tsan, the Vice Censor-in-chief of the Chief Surveillance Office and concurrently Grand Coordinator of Szechuan, to be the commander-in-chief of this suppression campaign.

Tsan has written a book entitled Tung-cheng chi-hsing-lu (Diary on the Eastern Expedition) based on the diaries he kept during the 103-day suppression campaign (7 October 1476-17 January 1477). The actual pacification and suppression campaigns lasted only about two months from 13 November 1476 to 10 January 1477. Those who refused to be pacified were militarily suppressed by the joint forces of the government and tribal troops. The largest mobilisation occurred on 7 December 1477 comprising 22,821 soldiers from the tribal-government joint force. About one-fourth of this army were Han-Chinese (5,710) and the rest, tribesmen (17,111), including those from Po-chou and from Szechuan's southeastern t'u-ssu: Shih-chu, Yu-yang, P'ing-ch'a and I-mei. Hui himself led 9,000 tribal troops to participate in this suppression campaign on the following day.

A month later, the whole campaign ended with the result that sixteen stockades were captured, 496 killed and 9,800 tribesmen and tribeswomen pacified. Hui bribed Tsan to petition the Court to establish the An-ning an-fu-ssu and two new chang-kuan-ssu and to report falsely that Yu had been brave in the battlefield, had killed seven enemies at one time, and therefore should be appointed the head of An-ning Pacification Office. Due to Yu's youth, Hui also bribed Tsan to falsify Yu's age as
eighteen instead of thirteen so that Yu could be regarded as mature enough to be a tribal commissioner. Hui's followers, advisers and deceitful relatives were appointed to the new posts of these new pacification offices. These facts were only exposed ten years later when the Vice Minister of Justice Ho Ch'iao-hsin conducted an investigation of Po-chou in 1486.

When Tsan's suggestion was approved by the Court, Hui was obligated to undertake construction of the three new pacification offices and two new fortifications for the purpose of dominating the conquered or pacified tribesmen. The Provincial Administration Office of Szechuan only gave three hundred silver taels to help to solve the workers' food problem. Hui ordered five thousand people to commence this work, and, at the same time, he asked the Court to permit him to settle 1,500 tribal troops from Po-chou with their families in the newly captured districts to guard the offices and forts. Eight hundred of these troops were sent to An-ning where Yu had become the head of the Pacification Office.

APPENDIX FIVE
A Brief Account of the 1486-1487 Investigation

The investigation of Po-chou affairs in 1486-1487 by the Ming Court which lasted nearly half a year was a continuation of internal difficulties which had been evolving within the Yang Clan for more than a decade.

In order to allocate power and position to two of his sons, Yang Hui (1433-1483; r. 1449-1474) had passed his own title to his legitimate heir Ai in 1474 but also waged a suppression campaign against the Miao tribesmen and established a new pacification office for his favourite son Yu in 1477. Furthermore, the following autumn, Hui distributed the property of the Yang family among his four eldest sons (Yu, Ai, Tzu and Min), including 145 units of cultivated land, 26 units of tea gardens, 28 units of wax mines, 11 units of hunting districts, 13 units of fish ponds as well as a quantity of gold or silver utensils and decorative fittings. Moreover, not forgetting his other two sons, he urged Ai and Yu to distribute some of the cultivated land to these brothers not previously provided for. He had thought that there would be no conflicts among his sons, especially between Yu and Ai, since he had attempted to distribute his status, authority and wealth among his descendants.

Unfortunately, the conflicts between Yu and Ai were aggravated as they were growing up. Between the eighth lunar month of 1485 and the fourth lunar month of 1486, Yu, encouraged by his follower Chang Yuan, made three attempts on Ai's life. Only with the birth of Ai's son on 9 August 1486 did Yu and Yuan
decide to abandon efforts to murder Ai since even if Ai were eliminated, Yu would still not succeed to the rulership of Po-chou because of Ai's legitimate heir. Moreover, the tribesmen would be unwilling to forgive the murder of an infant expected to become their future chieftain.

Chang Yuan, the planner of the abortive assassination attempts ordered the summary execution of the three hired assassins to conceal his crime. One of them escaped, however, and informed Ai. Frightened of being exposed, Yuan sought refuge under Yu's protection. In order to evade blame, they decided to act first by falsely accusing Ai of many serious crimes. They were unaware that with the assistance of the informer Ai had discovered the two corpses concealed by Yuan and had informed the Ministry of War which referred the report to the Censorate.

The crimes for which Yu and Yuan indicated Ai are:

1. Trying to murder Yu.
2. Wounding, killing or imprisoning tribal officials.
3. Falsely reporting that the city walls of An-ning were completely built up.
5. Bribing the inspecting officials from the provincial government.
6. Placing the imperial letters in discourteous places.
8. Making firearms, flags and golden imperial staffs.
10. Castrating male tribesmen for use as eunuchs.
11. Building a golden dragon gate at the entrance to his house.
13. Raping his father's concubines and killing the infant offspring of one of them.
14. Opening 24 iron mines in order to smelt iron for making weapons.
15. Establishing silk factory to make imperial garments without imperial authority.
16. Setting up a Merchant Tax Office at Pai-t'ien-pa without Court approval.
17. Commanding three thousand troops to carry out military exercises on the pretext of attending a funeral at Shui-hsi hsüan-wei-ssu.
18. Setting up an Office of Music without imperial authority.
19. Wearing imperial dragon garment at festivals, calling himself 'Master of Heaven' and his wife 'Mistress of Earth'.
21. Levying tribesmen tax-in-cash for his personal use.
22. Doubling the fines on criminals.
23. Placing a golden dragon post in his bedroom.
24. Personally appropriating all the properties of the Yang Clan.
25. Communicating secretly with the Prince T'ang.

These were grave offences against the Ming Court. In addition to the violation of criminal and civil laws, items 14, 15, 16, 20, 21 and 22 deprived the Court of its rightful profits and revenues; items 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 19 and 23 overstepped the imperial rights and usurped the prerogatives in imperial honours; and items 4, 17, 25 and 26, the most important ones, amounted to treasonous conspiracy to revolt. If verified, the Court would be forced to despatch an army to deprive Ai of Po-chou.

These charges were all concrete and specific, so it would not be difficult for the Court to ascertain if they were true or
false. Yuan suggested that they fabricated rumours and poems showing that Ai really wanted to revolt. They believed that this kind of gossip could be easily impressed upon the public and form a popular image of Ai. In such a case, the Court would have to take the action of sentencing Ai to death. To further enhance their case, Yu instigated Yuan's brother Shen and a tribal chief Ho Ch'ing to accuse Ai as well. If the effort were successful, the crimes of Yu and Yuan would be effectively concealed. Moreover, Yu would have an opportunity to replace Ai as chieftain of Po-chou. Ai, however, did not remain silent while Yu was conspiring against him. He engaged Yu's enemies from various tribal pacification offices to press charges against Yu.

After receiving contradictory reports from the two opposing camps in Po-chou, the Court deemed it necessary to initiate an official investigation of the Po-chou situation and, on 20 October 1486, Ho Ch'iao-hsin (1427-1503), the Vice Minister of Justice, was ordered to proceed to Po-chou to carry out this inquiry. Other members of the commission were Liu Kang (Commander of Embroidered-uniform Guard), Liu Ya (Grand Defender of Szechuan), Liu Chang (Grand Coordinator of Szechuan) and Ho Chun (Regional Inspector of Szechuan). Ho Ch'iao-hsin and Liu Kang were from the Metropolitan Government, and the others were from the Provincial Government.

Ordinarily, under Ming judicial procedure, both Ai and Yu, as well as all of the accusers and the accused involved in the case would be arrested and sent to the court at Chungking, the closest city to Po-chou, where an official probe would take
place. With the tradition of strong local autonomy in Po-chou, however, the tribal chiefs might escape from prison or refuse to be arrested. Therefore, Ho Ch'iao-hsin received permission to make an on-the-spot inquiry without arrest or transfer.

After a thorough investigation in Po-chou, Ai confessed that he had only failed to return an imperial letter promptly in violation of official procedure and asserted that he had wounded, imprisoned or accidentally killed persons only in the course of his official duties. But he convincingly defended himself against the false accusations made against him, most of which proved to be completely groundless. The remaining charges were seen to be based upon distortions and misrepresentations. In the course of the detailed investigation, Ho Ch'iao-hsin and his colleagues examined the corpses of Yu's murdered henchmen and of those who died of illness but were falsely claimed to be killed by Ai, the houses and furniture allegedly having imperial decorations, the places where it was claimed iron mines were opened and a merchant tax office set up, affidavits of forty witnesses as well as the depositions of seventy-one accused persons. In the final judgement, the less important criminals sentenced to death, heavy beating, imprisonment, punishment in fines and rations, or dismissal from office had their sentences carried out immediately. The tribal chiefs Ai, Yu, Yüan and Shen as well as three high-ranking Han-Chinese officials awaited for the final judgements from the Court. In the following year, on 6 April, the Court made its verdict: Yüan and Shen were sentenced to death and had to be beheaded; Ai could remain in office after paying redemption; Yu was dismissed from office and
transferred to Pao-ning to be kept in custody, but he retained the right to his share of property; the three high-ranking Han-Chinese officials could return to office after paying redemption. The exact amounts to be paid as redemption are not specified, but the Court instructed Ho Ch'iao-hsin to execute his decision flexibly according to the circumstances.

APPENDIX SIX

The Case of An Kuo-heng: 1570-1577

An Kuo-heng (r. 1562-1577; d. 1595) was a native chieftain of Shui-hsi hsüan-wei-ssu of Kweichow. After the death of his grandfather, his granduncle An Wan-ch'üan temporarily administered the tribal affairs during the regency of his father An Jen. Wan-ch'üan left office when Jen reached his maturity and took the chieftainship. Not long after, Jen died. Wan-ch'üan was again requested to manage the tribal affairs because An Kuo-heng was not yet mature enough to be a tribal ruler. In 1562, when Kuo-heng succeeded as chieftain, Wan-ch'üan again withdrew from office.

Kuo-heng was proud and cruel. Once he killed Wan-ch'üan's younger son over a petty matter. Wan-ch'üan's elder son Chih appealed to the Kweichow provincial government. The Governor Wang Cheng immediately advanced with troops to suppress Kuo-heng, and Chih promised to supply provisions. When the troops had marched to the bend of a river, Chih's provisions had still not arrived. Therefore, Wang Cheng sent an order for the troops to cease their advance at once, but it was too late. The troops had already passed the river and been defeated by Kuo-heng. Afterwards, Kuo-heng, resisting total loss in the face of the mass mobilisation of government troops, sued for peace. The Censor-in-chief Juan Wen-chung made a deal with Kuo-heng that if he could present the persons who headed the conspiracy, concede a place to settle Chih and his mother, and compensate the Court for the military expenditures and the loss of this suppression...
campaign, the Court would not sentence him to death. Kuo-heng promised to do so. Eventually, Kuo-heng had to pay 35,000 taels of silver to redeem his life and 6,000 taels of silver for some of his followers. Kuo-heng and Chih both were deposed and abdicated to their sons.

Sources: Kuo-ch'ao tien-hui, 4:2111-2112; Man-ssu ho-chih, 2:16; 3:5-6; Ming-shih-kao, 7:161-162; Ming-shih, 27:8171.
## APPENDIX SEVEN

Official Career of Li Hua-lung (11 April 1554-17 January 1612)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Title of Officialdom</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1574</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Degree of <em>chin-shih</em></td>
<td><em>MS</em>, 20:5982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1574-1580</td>
<td>20-26</td>
<td>Magistrate of Sung hsien in Honan</td>
<td><em>PPCS</em>, 1:88; <em>MS</em>, 20:5982; <em>DMB</em>, 1:823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1580-1582</td>
<td>26-28</td>
<td>Secretary of the Nanking Ministry of Works</td>
<td><em>PPCS</em>, 1:88; <em>DMB</em>, 1:823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Aug. 1586-Jan. 1589</td>
<td>32-34</td>
<td>Assistant Director of Education in Honan</td>
<td><em>PPCS</em>, 1:88; <em>SL</em>, 103:3227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 1590-</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Deputy Director of Education in Shangtung</td>
<td><em>SL</em>, 105:4113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-27 Jul. 1590-</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Governor (?) [of Szechuan?]</td>
<td><em>KC</em>, 5:4630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-10 Jan. 1591-</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Regional Inspector of Szechuan</td>
<td><em>SL</em>, 106:4267; <em>KC</em>, 5:4640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-24 Feb. 1591-</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Regional Inspector of Szechuan</td>
<td><em>SL</em>, 106:4290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-16 Mar. 1591-</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Regional Inspector of Szechuan</td>
<td><em>SL</em>, 106:4303; <em>KC</em>, 5:4645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-25 May 1591-</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Regional Inspector of Szechuan</td>
<td><em>SL</em>, 106:4358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-28 Jul. 1591-</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Censor Serving as Regional Inspector in Szechuan</td>
<td><em>SL</em>, 106:4391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-4 Apr. 1592-</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Censor [Serving as Regional Inspector in Szechuan]</td>
<td><em>SL</em>, 107:4573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-16 Oct. 1592</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Deputy Director of Education in Shantung</td>
<td><em>PPCS</em>, 1:88; <em>SL</em>, 107:4693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Title of Officialdom</td>
<td>Sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Jan. 1593-</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Vice Minister of the Court of the Imperial Stud</td>
<td>PPCS, 1:88; SL, 107:4746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-6 Mar. 1593</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Censor of the Circuit of Shensi</td>
<td>SL, 107:4777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Mar. 1593-</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Assistant Administration Commissioner</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Sept. 1593-</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>(Degraded from office)</td>
<td>SL, 107:4882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-4 May 1594</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Vice Minister of the Court of the Imperial Stud</td>
<td>SL, 108:5033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Jul. 1594-</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Assistant Censor-in-chief and Concurrent Governor of Liaotung</td>
<td>SL, 108:5067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Mar. 1595-</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Vice Minister of War</td>
<td>PPCS, 1:89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Oct. 1596-</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>Governor of Liaotung (under recuperation at office)</td>
<td>SL, 109:5651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Jun. 1597-</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>Vice Minister of War and Concurrent Governor of Liaotung (under recuperation at native place: Ch'ang-yuan, Pei-Chihli)</td>
<td>SL, 109:5786; DMB, 1:822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Jul. 1597-</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>(Under recuperation at native place: Ch'ang-yuan, Pei-Chihli)</td>
<td>PPCS, 1:88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Apr. 1599-</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Vice Minister of War and Concurrent Assistant Censor-in-chief Serving as Supreme Commander of Military Affairs in Szechuan, Hukuang and Kweichow and Concurrently Controlling Military Rations and Grand Coordinator of the Szechuan Area</td>
<td>PPCS, 1:1, 88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Apr. 1600</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>(Title as above but promoted from Assistant Censor-in-chief to Censor-in-chief)</td>
<td>SL, 111:6429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Title of Officialdom</td>
<td>Sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 1603</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>Vice Minister of Works</td>
<td>MS, 20:5986; DMB, 1:825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 1604</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Minister of War and Concurrent Junior Guardian</td>
<td>MS, 20:5986; DMB, 1:824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1605-1608</td>
<td>51-54</td>
<td>(Retirement)</td>
<td>DMB, 1:825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1608-1612</td>
<td>54-58</td>
<td>Minister of War</td>
<td>MS, 11:3485-3486; DMB, 1:825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
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