THE POLITICS OF CONTENDING PIETY
Naqshbandi-Haqqani Sufi Movement and the Struggle for Islamic
Activism in Contemporary Indonesia

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STATEMENT OF ORIGINALITY

This is to certify that this thesis is the result of my own work. Where I have the works of some scholars, due the acknowledgment has been made in the text.

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Signed: ________________________ Luthfi Makhasin
Date: __________________________
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ABSTRACT

This thesis is about Islamic piety movement in contemporary Indonesia focusing on Naqshbandi-Haqqani (NH), a transnational Sufi movement with origins in the Middle East and a large following in the USA and Western Europe. It spread to Indonesia in the late 1990s and, since then, has attracted thousands of followers throughout the country. Although certainly not the largest, it is one of the most active Islamic groups propagating the Sufi message to the public. Its steady growth in the last 15 years reveals some important features of contemporary religious life in Indonesia. By employing social movement theories, this study attempts to illuminate the intricate relationship between piety and Islamic activism in contemporary Indonesia.

This thesis reveals that Sufism still has a strong power to shape the nature of Muslim piety and influence public morality in Indonesia. The struggle for Islam is not targeting wide-ranging social reforms or the secular state, but it is primarily about the transformation of everyday life and small-scale changes affecting religious beliefs and rituals of individual Muslims. In a democratic context, this transformation contributes to the creation of a cosmopolitan pietyism that potentially promotes a ‘civil Islam’ that is neither secular nor Islamist in nature.

This study also demonstrates that cosmopolitan pietyism is not a given condition because it is dependent on various external factors. Indonesian Muslims have been and will likely remain fragmented along different pious orientations. Sufism contributes to the growth of authoritarian pietyism characterised by religious and political conservatism. This conservatism has uncompromising attitude toward secular virtues and unambiguous political stance over the political establishment.
GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AICP</td>
<td>Association of Islamic Charitable Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aqidah</td>
<td>Theological doctrine</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASFA</td>
<td>As Sunnah Foundation of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>Auliya (sing. Wali)</td>
<td>Muslim saint</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bai'at</td>
<td>Initiation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDII</td>
<td>Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia/Indonesia Council for Islamic Propagation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dzikir</td>
<td>Recollection/Invocation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fitnah</td>
<td>Dissension</td>
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<tr>
<td>FUI</td>
<td>Forum Umat Islam</td>
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<td>GPII</td>
<td>Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadra'ah</td>
<td>Sufi music performance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hajj</td>
<td>Pilgrimage journey</td>
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<td>HMI</td>
<td>Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam</td>
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<td>HTI</td>
<td>Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia</td>
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<td>ISCA</td>
<td>Islamic Supreme Council of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>Istighotzah</td>
<td>Communal God remembrance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jahiliya</td>
<td>Ignorance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jahr</td>
<td>Loud invocation</td>
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<tr>
<td>JAKIM</td>
<td>Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia (Malaysian Council of Rulers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JATMAN</td>
<td>Jamiiyyah Ahli Thariqah al Mutabarrah an Nahdliyyah (Indonesia Sufi Association)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>Physical struggle</td>
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<tr>
<td>Karamah</td>
<td>Miraculous behaviour</td>
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<tr>
<td>KAMMI</td>
<td>Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia/Indonesia Muslim Student Action Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>Khalwat</td>
<td>Seclusion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Khutbah</td>
<td>Sermon</td>
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<tr>
<td>KOPKAMTIB</td>
<td>Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPBA/LPIA</td>
<td>Lembaga Pendidikan Bahasa Arab/Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab</td>
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<tr>
<td>LPPI</td>
<td>Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manaqib</td>
<td>Recitation of the Prophet’s biography</td>
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<td>MATAN</td>
<td>Mahasiswa Ahli Thariqah an Nahdliyyah</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maulid</td>
<td>Prophet’s Birthday celebration</td>
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<td>Mubahadah</td>
<td>Communal invocation</td>
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<td>MUI</td>
<td>Majelis Ulama Indonesia</td>
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<td>Muraqabah</td>
<td>Sufi meditation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NKK/BKK</td>
<td>Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus/Badan Koordinasi Kegiatan Kampus</td>
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<td>PBUAN</td>
<td>Pengurus Besar Nahdatul Ulama</td>
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<td>PERSIS</td>
<td>Persatuan Islam</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pesantren</td>
<td>Islamic Boarding School</td>
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<td>PII</td>
<td>Pelajar Islam Indonesia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>PMII</td>
<td>Pergerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia Indonesia/Indonesia Muslim Student Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rais Aam</td>
<td>Supreme leader</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shariah</td>
<td>Islamic law</td>
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<tr>
<td>Silsilah</td>
<td>Chain of genealogy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sirr</td>
<td>Silent invocation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sohbet/suhba</td>
<td>Association with the Sufi sheikh</td>
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<tr>
<td>Suluk</td>
<td>Seclusion</td>
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<tr>
<td>SYAHAMAH</td>
<td>Syabab Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama’ah</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tabayyun</td>
<td>Seeking for clarification</td>
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<td>Tassawuf</td>
<td>Science of Sufism</td>
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<td>Taweez</td>
<td>Talisman</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tarekat</td>
<td>Sufi path</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thariqah</td>
<td>See tarekat</td>
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<tr>
<td>TMII</td>
<td>Taman Mini Indonesia Indah</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ulama</td>
<td>Muslim scholars</td>
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<tr>
<td>Umrah</td>
<td>Pilgrimage</td>
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<tr>
<td>YBS</td>
<td>Yayasan Baitus Syifa</td>
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<tr>
<td>YHB</td>
<td>Yayasan Haqqani Batam</td>
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<tr>
<td>YHI</td>
<td>Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zawiya</td>
<td>Sufi lodge</td>
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<td>Ziarah</td>
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INTRODUCTION

“In the worlds of mass media and scholarship, much attention has been given to the global ‘resurgence of religion’, with special attention given to developments within the Muslim world. However, most of this attention and research has been given to militant and politically activist movements…There is little recognition that while membership in the militant groups may be in the thousands, there are many millions of Muslims who are not fundamentalists, who are active participants in Sufi tariqas around the world” (Voll 2007, 283)

The conventional wisdom of modernist theories has assumed that religion would eventually fade and religious beliefs and rituals would likewise become irrelevant as people gradually embraced rational and secular worldviews. According to this line of argument, modern individuals would incline toward text-dictated creeds and concomitantly avoid devotional and ritual practices in their daily religious life. They would also be increasingly self-reflective and rely on themselves and secular authority rather than other worldly entities and religious authority. Science and its underpinning institutions would eventually prevail over religion, while mystical beliefs and rituals would eventually have no place in the development of a state of self-consciousness in the modern world. This view is supposed to constitute a great divide and irreconcilable divergence between the religious and the secular world, and between the rational and the mystical worldview.

However, such a secular view has been increasingly challenged because of its theoretical fallacies and empirical inaccuracies. Religion has not yet become obsolete in the modern world. Rather, it still provides solid and clear worldviews
that respond to feelings of anxiety and confusion. It remains important and is becoming more so as a source of moral value and identity. Under this trend, it is not surprising that the themes of religious revival and resurgence have gained currency among contemporary social theorists. Berger, for instance, suggested that religion has not disappeared yet because of the homeless-mind suffered by modern individuals. In Berger’s scheme, this ‘homeless-mind’ refers to a particular condition characterised by a strong distrust of rationalised and bureaucratised modern institutions (Berger 1967, 1969, Berger, Berger, and Kellner 1974).

Indonesia is a good case study of religious revival and its far-reaching impacts on society.

Indonesia has been experiencing an Islamic ‘spiritual revolution’.¹ This Islamic spiritual revolution has to do particularly with the resurgence of religious beliefs, doctrines and rituals inspired by and associated with Sufism, religious teachings that embrace Islamic mysticism.² It is illustrated by the growing popularity of typical Sufi collective rituals such as istighotzah (communal God remembrance) and maulid (Prophet Muhammad’s birthday) celebrations.³ It is also exemplified by continuing veneration toward deceased Sufi masters, pious ancestors, and the shrines of Muslim saints as shown in the continuing tradition and growing popularity of pilgrimage journeys (ziarah) among Muslims throughout Indonesia.

¹ This has been defined as a condition emphasizing “the subjective-life forms of the sacred, significance, and authority and the cultivation or sacralisation of unique subjective-lives” (Heelas and Woodhead 2005, 6).
² Schimmel defines Sufism simply as Islamic mysticism, referring to the consciousness of the One Reality and love of the Absolute that cannot be reached by ordinary means and be understood or explained by any normal mode of perception (1975, 3-4).
³ The Sufi collective rituals have been highly visible, increasingly attracting a large number of people and deliberately being promoted through various media outlets since late 1990s.
Sufism has recently become popular not only among rural population but also among the urban middle-class in Jakarta and in other cities. It is not uncommon now to see people gathering every Thursday night at mosques as well as at luxurious residential houses in Jakarta to chant formulae for invoke Beijing (dzikir). Self-development training with spirituality content, intensive religious training and tassawuf courses offered by individuals or urban Sufi groups in hotels or convention halls are also attractive and their programs are kept running by and for the Jakarta’s elites. Moreover, Sufi pesantren remain intact and Sufi brotherhoods (tarekat) still have a strong popular appeal in urban and rural areas (Zulkifli 2002, Howell, Subandi, and Nelson 2001b, 33-60).

Sufism has obviously had a strong appeal to people from all walks of life. People are increasingly eager to become pious, virtuous and righteous in all aspects of their life by emulating the Prophet’s moral excellence, rituals and exemplary habits. Sufism has long been deeply embedded in the Indonesian social fabric. It has been, and still is, an integral part of popular Islamic beliefs and religious practices. Sufism has also contributed significantly in shaping diverse local Islamic traditions throughout Indonesia. Sufism was a primary vehicle through which Islamic missionary activities were brought to the archipelago a few centuries ago (Johns 1961, 14, Shihab 2001).

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4 Howell used the term of ‘urban Sufi’ to describe Sufi-inspired spiritual expression that is becoming popular among urban upper middle class (2000, 17). These urban Sufi groups include Klub Kajian Agama Paramadina, Yayasan Tazkiyah Sejati and IIMaN.

5 According to some sources, there are more than 190 Sufi pesantren, more than 20 different Sufi brotherhoods, and around 40-70 million Muslims with a Sufi inclination, mostly associated with the largest Muslim group in the country, Nahdlatul Ulama.

6 They include various religious practices such as the remembrance of God (dzikr), dietary habits (fasting), temporary seclusion (khalwat), night praying (tahajud), and regular recitation of the Quran (tadarus).
In fact, there is still a large number of those embracing the so-called ‘mystic-synthesis’ and Sufism as part of their Muslim identity (Ricklefs 2006, 2007, 2008, 115). Sufi transnational networks played a significant role in promoting the growth and expansion of this intellectual trend in the 17th and 18th century (Azra 1992, 2004). Although it has been under constant pressure from Islamic reformism since the early 20th century, Sufism manages to survive in modern times in Indonesia (Howell 2007a, 217-240). It is not completely surprising that Howell made a compelling argument that Sufism has become an integral part of a thriving Islamic revival in Indonesia (Howell 2001a, 701-729).

This study is about Islamic piety movement in contemporary Indonesia. It focuses on Naqshbandi-Haqqani, a transnational Sufi movement based in the United States with social origins in Damascus, Syria. This study is, however, located in the broader context of the contemporary dynamics of emerging Islamic activism in Indonesia. The emergence of this Sufi group is a result of mixed factors: transnational influence, economic development and educational improvements, increasing religious literacy, new opportunities, media encroachment, and technological advancement.

The study attempts to address the following questions, why have Naqshbandi-Haqqani and other neo-Sufi movements grown rapidly in size and influence in contemporary Indonesia? This specific question becomes a guide to raise further broad questions about the relationship between the global and the local in the Islamic transmission of ideas, how and in what way Sufism manages to survive in the modern secular context, and the socio-political significance of this
Islamic piety movement in boosting Islamic activism amid the growing influence of Salafism and Islamism in contemporary Indonesia.

By focusing on Naqshbandi-Haqqani as the case study, I argue that Sufi resurgence in contemporary Indonesia represents a broader phenomenon in the Muslim world in which the search for Muslim piety goes hand in hand with the struggle for Islamic activism. Sufi resurgence is highly contested because it is taking place in the context of ongoing religious struggles and the socio-political dynamics of contemporary Indonesian society. This resurgence draws upon Sufi mystical teachings and the personalised religious authority of Sufi masters. It is partly a response to a perceived moral decline and the growing influence of Salafism and Islamism in Indonesia.

The case of Naqshbandi-Haqqani marks a broader shift in the contemporary religious landscape in Indonesia. This changing religious landscape is preoccupied with the cultivation of strict moral-ethical virtues at the level of the individual and society rather than broader socio-political reform at the state level. Sufism plays a significant role in delegitimising, and to some extent even weakening, the self-righteous claims of Salafism and Islamism as the sole legitimate determinants of Muslim piety and Islamic activism in Indonesia.

Before elaborating further and reviewing scholarly studies of Sufism in Indonesia, I wish to clarify two key concepts, ‘piety’ and ‘Islamic activism’, and various derivative terms that will be used in this study: Sufism, Salafism, Islamism, and post-Islamism. The conceptual framework defined by these key terms is pivotal to understanding the diverse religious expressions of Sufism in contemporary Indonesia. The two key concepts are related to one another, and
altogether they help to understand Sufism and its role in shaping Muslim piety and Islamic activism in Indonesia.

The term piety is a theoretical concept derived from the Western scholarly tradition. The term piety denotes personalised religious excellence and willingness or whole-hearted commitment to pursue and implement that excellence in a broader social context. In Weber’s scheme, piety is exclusively related to Protestantism and this is broadly applied to rational thinking, economic motives, and the drive for worldly salvation in the context of market capitalism. This kind of piety has two related aspects, asceticism and activism (Weber 1992). Asceticism refers to personal qualities and moral virtue resulting from an avoidance of worldly pleasures, whereas activism involves active engagement to promote these personal qualities to address broader social concerns. This conception of piety is based on a strong criticism toward otherworldly mysticism and ritual-oriented piety, which are supposed to characterise non-Christian religions.

Unlike Weber’s conception, Foucault (1997) argues that piety is par excellence a technology of the self which is designed to produce religious excellence or virtues. Being virtuous or pious can be effectively measured by contrast to those who are impious or lacking in virtue. To show piety publicly is to destroy it, and hence piety must be subtly insinuated and suggested by indirect comparisons with those lacking in religious virtue. Mahmood (2004) adopts this conception of piety to suggest that piety has nothing to do with economic-material motives and rational calculation but it is more about cultivation of ethical and moral virtues. For her, piety is also neither subordinate nor resistant to religious
authority as commonly understood among liberal-secular thinkers because it involves the embodiment of religious discourse and ritual.

Meanwhile, Turner regards piety as an active act and the state of becoming rather than of being. In his conception, piety is never taken for granted because it necessarily involves continuous efforts to be simultaneously pious on the one hand and socially engaged in dealing with broader problems of society on the other hand. He describes piety and the piety movement as follow:

‘Piety tends to have a radical impact on the everyday world of believers by encouraging devotees to change their habits or in the language of modern sociology to transform their habitus or their dispositions and tastes towards the material world. Piety is about the construction of definite and distinctive life styles of new religious tastes and preferences. In short, piety or the pietisation of the everyday world combines new elements to create a religious habitus that stands in competition with other possible combinations in a competitive religious context’ (2008, 2).

In Islamic terms, Muslim piety resembles the notion of being *shahleh* (pious Muslim) that incorporates a combination of belief, observance to shariah and ritual devotion. In this study, I frame Muslim piety in two main categories: Sufism and Salafism. Sufism is a Latinized derivation from the original Arabic term, *safa* (meaning purity), *suf*/wool (referring to those wearing woollen garments), *ahl al-suffa* (the people of the bench/the pious and indigent companions of the Prophet who lived in his mosque), and *ahl-al saffa* (referring to those who occupy the first Rank/row in the mosque or in the eyes of God). From this term, there is another Arabic derivative *tassawuf*, meaning the science of Islamic spirituality. Another
important term is *tariqah* (Arabic word meaning the path), which refers to the Sufi brotherhoods as developed by the great Sufi masters (Knysh 2000, 5).\(^7\)

Salafism is derived from the Arabic phrase *salaf as-shalih* (the pious ancestors) referring to the first three generations of Muslim community whose religious excellence is the role model for contemporary Muslims.\(^8\) The contemporary term of Salafism has multiple meanings. It denotes religious thinking and reform ideas that strive to purify Muslim beliefs and worship in accordance with the Quran, the teachings of the Prophet, and the first three generations of Muslims. It is associated with religious conservatism and the political establishment that rules in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

In this study, I define both Sufism and Salafism as Islamic terms that basically refer to an idealised type of Muslim piety. There may be overlapping and some shared meanings between these two types of Muslim piety. But in order to make matters clear, Sufism and Salafism are two completely different Islamic modes of Muslim piety. Sufism denotes particular beliefs, doctrines and rituals, which are maintained by and embodied in the personified religious authority of a Sufi master based on the cumulative interpretation of Islamic tradition for generations. Sufi piety entails idealised moral-ethical virtues and personal characteristics such as the absence of an excessive worldly orientation (*zuhud*),

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\(^7\) Sufism and its derivative terms began to gain currency among the Muslim community in the 9th century/2nd century of Islamic calendar. These terms were commonly attributed to the Prophet and his companions who were dissatisfied with the outward observance of the *shariah* and engaged in self-imposed strictures

\(^8\) The classical Salafism owes its origins Muhammad ibn Hanbal, Taqi ad-Din Ahmad Ibn Taimiyah (1263-1328), and Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahab (1703-1792). In modern times, Salafism has adopted the religious ideas of Jamaludin al Afghani, Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Ridha (1865-1935) who developed their renewal ideas in Cairo. Contemporary Salafism has been greatly influenced by Nashirudin al Albani, Muhammad Abdullah ibn Baz, and Muhammad Shaleh al Utsaimin.
wara’, patience (sabar), tawakkal, humbleness, forgiving (taubat), and contentment (ridha’). The cultivation of ethical-moral virtues is strongly based on mystical beliefs that the human being can achieve both the state of annihilation (fana) and subsistence (baqa’) through self-purification (tadzkiyah an-nafs).

On the other hand, Salafism is a modern scholarly concept emphasizing literal scriptural interpretations and the purification of doctrine. It particularly refers to a distinct set of religious features such as the doctrine of takfir (excommunication), wala’ wal bara’ (loyalty and disavowal), hisba/amar ma’ruf nahi mungkar (commanding good and forbidding vices). It is also pejoratively associated with particular Muslim groups that do not hesitate to pursue their religious and political goals through acts of violence and physical threat against non-Muslims as well as other fellow Muslims. Most importantly, Salafism seeks total rejection of Sufism as part of a legitimate orthodox Muslim praxis.

With regard to Islamic activism, I follow Wiktorowicz’s definition of this term. According to him, Islamic activism is ‘the mobilisation of contention to support Muslim causes’ (2004, 2). For Wiktorowicz, Islamic activism includes the types of contention that frequently emerge under the banner of Islam such as propagation movements, collective action rooted in Islamic symbols and identities, explicitly political movements that seek to establish an Islamic state, inward-looking groups that promote Islamic spirituality through collective efforts, and even terrorist groups that seeks violence action (2004, 2).

While piety touches upon private and individual aspects of religious practice, Islamic activism is about collective action to implement Islamic ideals, to address broader social and religious concerns, and to be pious in every-day life.
The wide-ranging definition of Islamic activism can be categorised into five types of Islamic activism: purification (tadzkiyah), proselytization (dakwah), education (tarbiyah), political action (siyasah), and physical action (jihad). There are two major analytical frameworks for understanding Islamic activism: Islamism and post-Islamism, each of which refers to a difference of goals, orientation, strategy and locus of Islamic activism.

Islamism is preoccupied with reviving and revitalising Islam in modern times through theological purification and political struggle. This theoretical framework departs from the assumption that Islam is inherently absolute due to the absence of the distinctive feature between religion and politics. It has two related principal features, religious revivalism and political ideology. As religious revivalism, Islamism generally adopts a Salafi theology characterised by its preoccupation with a return to the Quran, the Prophetic tradition (sunnah), rejection of Islamic jurisprudence (madzhab), and the right to independent interpretation or ijtihad (Roy 1994, 35-36). As a political ideology, Islamism is considered a complete and universal system that needs to be implemented through social and political actions. For an Islamist, Islam is a classical ideology that is similar to modern ideologies such as communism, capitalism, Marxism, and so forth. Islamists comprise revolutionaries and neo-fundamentalists; their political divergence derives from the difference on the issues of shariah and women (Roy 1994, 36-39).⁹

On the other hand, the term Post-Islamism has various different meanings but basically refers to the changing condition and project under which Islam plays a

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⁹ Ideologically speaking, Islamism owes much to Hasan al Banna (1906-1949), the founder of Ikhwanul Muslimeen (Muslim Brotherhood) in Egypt, and Abul A’la Maududi (1903-1979), the ideological father of Jemmaat Islami, an Islamist party in Pakistan.
defining role. According to Bayat, post-Islamism refers to a condition where ‘the appeal, energy, symbols and sources of legitimacy of Islamism become exhausted, even among its once-ardent supporters’ (1996, 45). He also defines post-Islamism as a project, referring to ‘a conscious attempt to conceptualise and strategize the rationale and modalities of transcending Islamism in social, political, and intellectual domains’ (2005a, 76). Unlike Bayat, Kepel (2004) defined post-Islamism as the departure of Islamism from the Jihadi and Salafi doctrines, whereas Roy proposes that post-Islamism is the privatization of Islam and ‘individual re-appropriation of Islamic symbols, arguments, rhetoric, and norms’ (2004, 97-99).

1.1 Sufism and Islamic Activism in Indonesia: A Literature Review

Indonesia provides a good example of thriving religious life and Islamic activism under strong Sufi influence. There are five major analytical frameworks in scholarly studies of Sufism in Indonesia as: 1) syncretic-heterodox, 2) reformist-orthodox, 3) an institution of traditional charisma, 4) as experiential religiosity or 5) commodified religiosity. These five analytical frameworks derive from diverse theoretical perspectives with different units of analysis and have consequently resulted in different conclusions about Sufism and its role in driving Islamic activism in Indonesia.

First, Sufism can be considered as a form of *syncretic-heterodox* belief violating the basic tenets of Islamic doctrine. Sufism is seen as contrary to Islamic canonical teachings or *shariah*. As a syncretic belief and practice, Sufism is considered a corrupted belief of an old-fashioned folk-religion and the cultural remnants of a rural peasant society without historical precedent within the Islamic
legal tradition.\textsuperscript{10} This popular syncretic analysis has been adopted especially by those who support modernist ideas of rationalisation and Islamic purification. Sufism or Islamic mysticism is regarded as culturally responsible for hindering material progress and economic development. As such, Sufism poses a serious constraint to modernisation (Geertz 1960).\textsuperscript{11} Hence, it was believed that once modernization was embraced, this syncretic belief would no longer have a place in the Muslim world.\textsuperscript{12}

Second, Sufism can be seen as a reformist-orthodox belief. In contrast to the syncretic-heterodox view, this analytical framework attempts to locate Sufism within Islamic orthodoxy through its compliance with mainstream Islamic tradition. This kind of analysis appreciates Sufism as a religious belief and ritual with far-reaching impact on the religious and social life of Muslim society. This framework is put forward particularly by generations of religious and social scholars who have conducted their studies on historical texts and ethnographic research in various localities across Indonesia. This line of analysis comprises two main variants with the emphasis on Sufism either as a foundation for philosophical moral-ethics or as the basis for socio-religious reform. These studies indicate that Sufism in Indonesia has developed to conform with the shariah rules on the one hand and to relegate the wahdatul wujud belief (al-Attas 1970, Mulyati 1992, 2004, 2006, Lubis 1996, Shihab 2001, Fathurahman 2008, Widiyanto 2012), to cultivate moral excellence

\textsuperscript{10} Interestingly, this view is also shared by the contemporary purist Islam which considers it as a popular mystical belief that represents religious heterodoxy and even heresy (Djamaludin 2001, Jaiz 2001, 2006)

\textsuperscript{11} This view is also shared by the Salafi Muslims who considers it as a popular mystical belief that violates the purity of Oneness doctrine (tauhid) and leads people astray because of idolatry (Djamaludin 2001, Jaiz 2001, 2006).

\textsuperscript{12} It came as no surprise that some prominent scholars such as Arthur Arberry (1956), Ernest Gellner (1985) confidently proclaimed that Islamic Sufism was a folk-religious tradition and would be obsolete as Muslim society embraced the modern path of economic development.

Third, Sufism, for those who put emphasis on its internal organising structure, is a type of personal cult and an institution of traditional charisma. This framework of analysis is particularly preoccupied with the strong relationship between the master and his disciples. In this regard, Sufi is a model of a charismatic institution in which the Sufi sheikh has a high degree of control and authority over his disciples. The vitality of the Sufi movement is therefore attributed either to the great personal charisma of the Sufi sheikh or murshid or the underpinning social institution established by this charismatic figure (Lombard 1990, 707-715, Bruinessen 1992a, 2007a, 225-251, Zulkifli 2002).

As an institution of traditional charisma, Sufism generates certain political attitudes toward existing power relations and the political establishment. This framework of analysis looks particularly at Sufism as either millenarian or as a pragmatist-conservative movement or as both. Sufism serves as an ideological apparatus which resonates with rural peasants’ worldview and social structure. In this sense, Sufism can provide a religious justification for political discontent and social protest. Sufism may offer millenarian expectations for resisting any encroaching foreign power and for establishing a divine order and preparing for the coming of the just ruler (Ratu Adil). Drewes (1925), Kartodirdjo (1966, 1984) and Darban (2004) are some classical studies on peasant rebellious movements that
were based on Sufism as an ideological source of millenarian expectations and revolutionary resistance against Western colonialism.

As a pragmatist-conservative movement, Sufism can represent an Islamic political force favoring the maintenance of the social order, stability, and a pro-status-quo position. Sufi activism is also portrayed as representing a sort of pragmatism that is able to utilize political patronage to gain economic benefits (Turmudi 1996, Sujuthi 2001, Sukamto 2006). Bruinessen, who has observed the upsurge of interest in Sufism in Indonesian politics, located this trend in the specific historical context of New Order politics. Sufism emerged because the New Order did not tolerate the public expression of political Islamism but certainly tolerated the private mystical expression of religiosity (Bruinessen 2007b). He was particularly interested in explaining the appearance of numerous ‘living saints’ within an orthodox Islamic group (NU) and their role in contesting the symbolic foundations of the powerful New Order state (Bruinessen 2007b, 92-112).

Fourth, Sufism can be considered a form of experiential religiosity. Sufism encourages people to seek direct experience with God beyond a legal-minded emphasis of primary religious institutions. In her study on Sufi revival in Indonesia, Howell explores the notion of ‘experiential religiosity’, referring to the subjective spiritual experiences beyond discursive consciousness (Howell 2001a, 701-729). She is very much influenced by the notion of subjectified religion, referring to a state in which religion is constructed as a self-experience in dealing directly with
the Divine (Woodhead 2002, Heelas and Woodhead 2005).\textsuperscript{13} She applies this notion in her suggestion that Sufism is a form of religious expression that cannot be catered for by a minimal ritual regimen or by dry scripturalism (Howell 2007a, 239). As Howell implicitly suggests, these rituals and traditional religious beliefs are a significant factor in attracting modern people to religion, which in turn contributes to the religious resurgence in the Muslim world. Yet, Howell points out various interrelated factors for this spiritual resurgence such as the legacy of New Order state’s religious regulation, socio-economic changes and shifts in Indonesia’s religious marketplace.\textsuperscript{14}

Fifth, there are also those who attribute the growing popularity of Islamic spirituality, especially among urbanites, as a sign of the ‘commodification’ in which Islam and its symbols are consumed as symbolic goods for newly self-conscious Muslims in market capitalist settings. In this framework, Sufism is a form of the so-called “Islamic chic” and urban spirituality. Its real meaning is reduced to a profane dimension like other consumer goods because it is mediated and, to some extent, even advertised through the media (Burhani 2001, Abaza 2004, 173-202, Laffan 2006, 91-115, Howell 2008a, 40-62). Abaza, for instance, suggests that the Sufi resurgence is a result of a so-called ‘spiritual void’ among the urban population who have emerged prosperous in the midst of a succession of severe economic and political crises in Indonesia (Abaza 2004, 180). She sees this

\textsuperscript{13} Sufism is considered a secondary mediating institution for those who are disillusioned with modern institutions rather than as ‘primary’ religious institution (Heelas and Woodhead 2001, 63-72, Woodhead 2002).

\textsuperscript{14} The emphasis on Sufism as a personal religious inclination is also shared by Bruinessen who states that ‘informal organisation as such [a Sufi order] offers spiritual and emotional outlets which is increasingly absent in the daily life. Besides that, Islamic de-politicization process drives the ummah to focus more on spiritual experience and cultivation of personal character rather than an aspiration for political Islam’ (1992b, 13).
‘spiritual void’ as representing the “struggle for accommodative solutions”, an “emotional outlet of social gathering”, and “a way of fulfilling leisure time” (Abaza 2004, 182-187). This framework of analysis resonates with the notion of a ‘spiritual economy’ as postulated by Rudnyckyj in which Islam as a religion is not seen as ‘a retreat into mystification or means of resistance’ against market capitalism but on the contrary, is regarded as active involvement in market capitalism. This involvement is ‘conceived of and enacted as matters of religious piety and spiritual virtue’ (2009a, 105).

Those scholarly studies have greatly contributed to understanding Sufism and its role in the making of religious life in Indonesia. The current scholarly works have provided an important contribution to the debates on the intricate relationship between religion (Islam) and modernity and have contributed to understanding the spiritual resurgence in contemporary Indonesia. Various scholarly works clearly show that Indonesia has been a Muslim country where Sufism has been playing a significant role in the creation of Muslim identity and religiosity (Johns 1961, Ricklefs 2006). Sufism represents changing religious inclinations at an individual level as well as broad cultural changes within the Islamic community in Indonesia. Such scholarly studies also affirms a fascination with Sufism in Indonesia because of its endurance over generations, its claims of religious authenticity, its rich intellectual legacies, its transnational nature, its flexibility and adaptability to changing cultural, social, political, and historical contexts.

15 According to Abaza, accommodative solutions relate to attempts at the ‘re-ordering of the public space’ and favouring post-Islamist public order pursued by the urban middle-class, whereas emotional outlets have to do with the needs for intimate and comfortable social interactions that the spiritual performance conveys to the participating audience (2004, 182). Meanwhile, filling leisure time relates to the needs for spiritual exercise, retreat and recreational activities as a way of spending leisure time among urban professional class (Abaza 2004, 184).
However, current research seems to be ambiguous about the place of Sufism in the modern world. Sufism is rendered in the ‘middle’ which is neither modern nor traditional and neither a religious nor a secular phenomenon. For instance, the preoccupation with internal organisational structures results in a stereotyping that overestimates the role of Sufi sheikh as a powerful figure within the movement on the one hand and underestimates the role of ordinary Sufi disciples on the other hand. Considering Sufi organizations simply as charismatic figure-led institutions also implies that Sufism is institutionally hierarchical and authoritarian in nature, which undermines the importance of individual religious agency, autonomy, and rationality. By consequence, Sufism is allegedly rejected as obsolete or inappropriate in the modern era. Labelling Sufism as betwixt-and-between therefore creates a situation in which scholarly studies about Sufism are always associated with something that is inherently mysterious, secret, hidden, and irrational.

Furthermore, discussion of a ‘spiritual void,’ as suggested by Abaza, also indirectly implies that the growing popularity of spirituality is merely a symptom of commodification at best or psychological escapism at worst. Preoccupation with the economic dimension that such a framework implies does not take into account other aspects: the rich and plural nature of the Islamic body of knowledge, differences in personal preferences, and the broader underlying social dynamics in which consuming patterns takes place. A commodification framework does not sufficiently differentiate between means, methods and goals. As suggested by Hasan, commodification does not necessarily mean commercialisation and profit
accumulation; rather it should be considered as a newly found method of Islamic proselytization (Hasan 2009, 242).

Moreover, current scholarly works seem to downplay the contentious situation of Muslim politics in Indonesia.¹⁶ Many works tend to ignore religious dynamics and the intricate relationship between Islam, politics and the fragmented situation of diverse Islamic movements. The notion of Muslim piety in Sufi terms is always questioned, contested, negotiated, resisted, condemned, or even completely rejected in a plural Muslim society like Indonesia. While giving great appreciation to the spiritual resurgence within the context of Indonesia’s religious pluralism, Howell’s suggestion of ‘experiential religiosity’ for instance, seems to locate the resurgence simply in a vacuum of Muslim politics. In other words, she tends to overlook the social and cultural dynamics behind this phenomenon that are at the heart of everyday-life politics in Indonesian Muslim society. Some scholarly works on Sufism thus replicate the modernist biases of previous scholarly studies. Under the circumstances, the contemporary Sufi resurgence is considered a peculiar phenomenon with no resemblance to any other manifestations of Islamic activism.

Most importantly, current scholarly work has yet to sufficiently address the intricate relationship between Muslim piety and Islamic activism. Current research needs to address such questions as why this religious phenomenon has emerged at this particular historical time, what religious, socio-political factors -- both global and local -- are involved in this resurgence in Indonesia. The question of Muslim

¹⁶ Eickelman and Piscatori defines Muslim politics as contesting interpretations and the competition over religious symbols and institutions (1996, 24).
piety and Islamic activism in particular has been gaining currency and, to a large extent, is at the core of many scholarly studies dealing with Islamic resurgence in Indonesia. The question touches upon why Muslims adhere to their primordial identity and religious traditions and how they are actively engaged in addressing broader social-problems at the same time. In the wake of the threat of terrorism, such questions have prompted many scholarly studies that deal with Islam in Indonesia to look particularly at Muslim groups that adopt both Salafism as the benchmark of their Muslim piety and Islamism as a strategy to achieve their political goals. While there is growing literature on Sufism and the Sufi resurgence in Indonesia, as far as I am concerned, there has been little attention given to relating Sufism to the broader emergence of new Muslim piety and Islamic activism. Consequently, there is an imbalance in understanding the real religious and political dynamics of Islamic resurgence in Indonesia.

1.2 Sufi Piety and Islamic Activism: A Theoretical Framework

Ernst has suggested that the study of contemporary Sufism should take into account globalising trends (the commodification of religion in global capitalism), the secular state, modern thought (positivistic ideas and rationalization) and underlying institutions as well the Islamic fundamentalist challenge (Ernest 2003, 302-303). Voll has also suggested that there is a need to ‘re-evaluate some basic analytical assumptions underlying the study of Sufism’. He has questioned in particular the relevance of the modernity/secularisation theory based upon the supposed dichotomies such traditional vs. modern, urban vs. rural, rational vs. irrational, literate vs. illiterate, and private vs. public (Voll 2007, 282). He
specifically suggests adopting social movement theory as an analytical framework to understand the contemporary Sufi resurgence (2007:285).

A perspective of social movement theory helps to fill a gap left by current scholarly studies on Sufism in Indonesia. This perspective can provide a relatively comprehensive analysis of Sufism both as an expression of piety and Islamic activism. According to Yavuz, social movement approach overcomes the dichotomies between individual versus collective, private versus public, and internal (piety) versus external resources (socioeconomic opportunity spaces). He has further argued that this theoretical approach helps to understand the transformation of everyday life and how religious identities and lifestyles are performed and contested in public (2003, 24).

Furthermore, there are four pre-conditions for collective action to be considered a social movement: solidarity (‘the ability of actors to recognize others, and be recognized, as belonging to the same social unit), conflict (opposition towards an opponent who makes claims to the same area or set of properties and utilities), collective identity (a process in which the actors or participants produce common or shared frames of knowledge that enable them to judge their environment according to these frames), and charismatic leadership (affective

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17 Social movement theory consists of two major theoretical strands: Resource Mobilisation (RM) and New Social Movement (NSM). Both approaches are applied to various collective actions taking place in the post-industrial society in Western countries. While the RM emphasizes the formal organisational structure of these collective actions, NSM approaches them as a relatively loose network tied to shared solidarity and symbols with common political, ideological and cultural causes. The NSM emphasizes the importance of solidarity and common identity in the formation of collective action, while the RM approach is more preoccupied with the economic-political concessions of rational actors. By and large, the NSM is seen as a response to the free market, bureaucratized-society, scientific and technological-imposed social interactions, and instrumental rationality (Touraine 1981, Habermas 1981, Offe 1985, Melucci 1989, Pakulski 1991)
identification with the extraordinary qualities of the leader and the enhancement of followers’ individual and collective identity) (Melucci 1989, 1996).

Social movement theory also helps to comprehend the *modus operandi* of Sufism at three levels. At the micro-level, the social movement perspective is useful to comprehend the importance of personal piety as an embodied driving factor for action. This is about what Sufi followers believe in and strive for. At meso-level, social movement theory helps to understand how charismatic leadership, material, and network resources play a significant role in transforming personal piety and interpersonal relations into collective action and meaningful Islamic activism. The popular appeal of Sufism relies not just on a charismatic leader but also on organised collective action. As such, it is not a spontaneous act but is deliberate action that is organised to achieve certain goals at certain times. While at the macro-level, social movement theory helps to understand the existence of the strains and opportunities that are important factors in the formation of Sufi activism. Strains refer to structural conditions that generate grievances and push people to become involved in collective action, whereas opportunities refer to pull factors that facilitate the formation of social movement. Emerging Sufi activism has particularly to do with a growing disillusionment with perceived moral decay and the inadequateness of *shariah*-oriented prescriptions to address this situation.

In the light of social movement theoretical framework, Sufism therefore could be understood as having two principal dimensions, inner experience and outer appearance. Five elements of inner experience are belief, doctrine, value, ritual and charisma, whereas outer appearance consists of symbol, organisation, networks, resources, and group solidarity.
Inner experience also has to do with personal devotion and belief to certain doctrine, observance of certain rules and rituals, and subjective-emotive relationship between the master and disciples. Whereas, outer appearance is an objective condition and social contexts that situate the way Sufi disciples collectively organise and support themselves to deal with the state and society. The five elements of inner experience and outer appearance provide a comprehensive understanding of Sufism as a personal expression of piety and Islamic activism. From the perspective of this study, the social movement approach incorporates ten important elements of Sufism into a single explanatory framework to understand Sufi as a piety movement.

This kind of theoretical framework is inclusive because inner experience and outer appearance with their respective composing elements are closely connected each other. By using this theoretical framework, Sufism is just a different side of the same coin of Islamic resurgence in Indonesia. Though Sufism is experiential religiosity in nature, it is not inherently mystical or mysterious.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inner Experience</th>
<th>Outer Appearance</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belief</td>
<td>Symbol</td>
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<tr>
<td>Doctrine</td>
<td>Organisation</td>
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<td>Value</td>
<td>Networks</td>
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<td>Ritual</td>
<td>Resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>Charisma</td>
<td>Group solidarity</td>
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**FIGURE 1. TWO DIMENSION OF SUFI MOVEMENT**
Rather, it is always expressed by means of human feelings/emotion, ideas, cultural symbols, practices, and institutions. Sufism is not simply a charismatic religious institution that is attached to a self-appointed authority. It is a form of active piety that involves a lot of people with different interests and orientations. Furthermore, Sufi resurgence in contemporary Indonesia is not an isolated phenomenon but is closely related to broader Islamic resurgence in Indonesia. This study attempts at examining the nexus of Muslim identity, Islamic tradition, market commodification, involvement in the Islamic public sphere, and power relations all of which have not yet been satisfactorily addressed in current research.

1.3 Aim of the Study

This study aims to:

1. Examine the transnational influence of global Sufi transmission, and local adaption in Indonesia.
2. Examine socio-cultural and economic factors that drive Sufi resurgence in contemporary Indonesia.
3. Explore the role charismatic leadership and ritual in maintaining collective solidarity within a Sufi group.
4. Find out about the mobilising structure, internal conflict, schisms, and divergences among different followers in Indonesia.
5. Explore the religious beliefs, doctrine and socio-political view of the Naqshbandi-Haqqani and its appeal among Muslims who are intent on embracing Sufi teachings in Indonesia.
6. Discern the distinct political activism and religious struggle of Naqshbandi-Haqqani and its political significance in shaping contemporary Islamic activism in Indonesia.

7. Examine controversies and polemics involving the Sufi community in particular and the Muslim community in general in relation to particular religious ideas, beliefs, and ritual.

1.4 Significance of the Study

Framing Sufi as piety movement, this study helps to better understand Indonesian Islam and the Muslim community in their own terms. I do hope that this study will add to the growing body of scholarly studies dealing with Sufism in particular and Islamic activism in general in Indonesia. Except few short commentaries and one study with limited scope on the early development of Naqshbandi-Haqqani by Laily Hafidzah (2010), there are no other scholarly studies that have sufficiently paid attention to the Naqshbandi-Haqqani movement in Indonesia.

There are many aspects that have not been dealt with and they are worthy of further investigation. This study focuses on the development of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia between 1997 and 2012. This study is only one of growing number of scholarly studies dealing with Naqshbandi-Haqqani in different contexts (Habibis 1985, Atay 1994, Bottcher 2000, Draper 2002, Stjernholm 2005, 2011, Schmidt 2004, 109-126, Damrel 2006, 115-126, Nielsen, Draper, and Yemelianova 2006, 103-114).
The case of Naqshbandi-Haqqani offers a clear vantage point to understand the intricate relationship between piety and activism behind the Islamic resurgence in Indonesia. As a relatively new Sufi movement in Indonesia, Naqshbandi-Haqqani sheds light on how a transnational Sufi movement can gain acceptance and a relatively large following, and in the process adapt itself to the context of contemporary Indonesia. It is a transnational Sufi movement that, on the one hand, rigorously promotes traditional Islamic knowledge and, on the other hand, strongly opposes religious extremism. This study underscores the plural nature of Indonesian Muslim politics and how this may potentially shape a future religio-political synthesis under a new democratic system in Indonesia. This study also may help to understand the emerging counter-movement to Salafism and Islamism which is vernacular in nature and is involved in the everyday politics of Indonesian Muslims.

1.5 Research Method and Data Collection

Data for this study were collected through bibliography research (books, journals, internet materials, magazines, newspapers, tabloids, and other forms of publication), interviews with Naqshbandi-Haqqanis leaders and disciples, email correspondence, and direct observation during fieldwork. This study is based on six months of fieldwork conducted between July 2010 and January 2011. During these six months of fieldwork, I visited 21 dzikr centers in 11 cities (Jakarta, Bandung, Jogjakarta, Solo, Pekanbaru, Batam, Pekalongan, Sukabumi, Tangerang, Depok, and Madiun). I attended and directly participated in various religious activities such as hadrah, maulid celebrations, dzikr, communal praying (sholat jamaah), and
ziarah. I also conducted interviews with 52 key-informants among the top leaders and the ordinary followers of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia.

Unlike other Sufi movements that tend to be secretive, I greatly benefitted from the fact that Naqshbandi-Haqqani is one of the most accessible Sufi group with around 3000 sohbet (sermons) that are available on its various websites (sufilive.com and islamicsupremecouncil.org) and are regularly updated, 15 major books, hundreds of short treaties/articles, 7 principal websites and numerous secondary websites/blogs, an email-list, twitter, and facebook groups. Moreover, despite its emphasis on traditional Sufi practices, the Naqshbandi has also been well-known for its credentials as the most orthodox Sufi movement. As part of a continuing process of fieldwork, since mid-2010, I have joined the e-mailing list, twitter, and facebook groups managed by the Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples. I have also signed up to the e-social networks (Haqqani Soul), Internet TV/Radio (sufilive.com) and have closely monitored the four main websites as well as the various secondary websites related to Naqshbandi-Haqqani. I am fully aware, however, that Internet materials are not always reliable as a source of data. For that reason, I have always double-checked information on the internet with key-informants whom I met during my fieldwork.

1.6 Structure of Presentation

This thesis is divided into 10 chapters. Chapter 1 deals with the research background to this study, research questions, a set of key conceptual frameworks, the review of current scholarly studies on Sufism in Indonesia, and methods of data
collection. This chapter also briefly explains the use of social movement theories and their application to understanding the Naqshbandi-Haqqani movement in Indonesia and concludes with a brief statement on the focus, aims and significance of this study.

The next eight chapters of this thesis elaborate in detail on some important features of Naqshbandi-Haqqani. It begins with chapter 2 on the origins and historical trajectories that trace this Sufi movement to religious teachings laid down by spiritual masters in Central Asia back in the 14th century. This chapter is important to understand gradual process of institutional evolution, early changes and internal reform, external challenge, struggle, and survival related to different socio-historical contexts for more than 600 years and how this is used to establish claim of continuity to the Prophetic tradition.

Chapter 3 deals with some socio-cultural and economic factors related to emerging Sufi religiosity in Indonesia. Socio-cultural factors have to do with impact of urbanisation and higher educational reform in Indonesia in the last 40 years, whereas economic factors is related to market system and its impact in leading to commodification and changing pattern of consumption among Indonesian Muslims. Altogether, these factors contribute to and lay a foundation for emerging Sufi religiosity that in turn paves the way for transnational transmission of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in the late 1990s.

Chapter 4 focuses on important feature of Naqshbandi-Haqqani, especially on the use of the Internet for preaching and guiding purposes. This chapter compares the use of the Internet in two different contexts, the USA and Indonesia.
This chapter shows how information technology has influence in determining the way Sufi teaching is transmitted in contemporary era. However, this chapter also demonstrates that while technology is helpful, it cannot generate intimate and emotive relationship that many disciples aspire to receive from their association.

The next two chapters of this thesis examine the role of charisma, ritual and organising structure of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia. Chapter 5 reveals that Naqshbandi-Haqqani is attractive because it provides an intimate environment and emotive relationship that fulfill religious needs of the disciples/followers. This intimate environment is based on close relationship between the master and disciples and regular ritual of communal gathering. Whereas chapter 6 explores organising structure and organisational dynamics of Naqshbandi-Haqqani movement in Indonesia. This chapter focuses particularly on leadership structure and organisational capacity to recruit new members and maintain the old ones.

Chapter 7 deals with teaching, belief, and socio-political views of Naqshbandi-Haqqani community. This chapter particularly deals with the influence of Akbari ideas in shaping millenarian-apocalyptic beliefs, strong adherence to Sunni orthodoxy, and its opposing view against overt political Islamism and Salafism. This chapter argues that Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teachings attempt to reconcile three different strands of Islamic teaching: mysticism, Islamic legalism and political Islamism.

Chapter 8 deals with the public activities and Islamic propagation that involve Naqshbandi Haqqani in Indonesia. This chapter begins with political
factors driving this public activity and examine various methods adopted to propagate Sufism to the broader audience.

Related to that, chapter 9 examines opposition and controversies generated by Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia and how this Sufi group responds and addresses the problem. This chapter demonstrates that despite its growing popularity, Sufism as a teaching and mode of Islamic piety when it becomes public is always highly contested. This contestation plays a part in shaping the dynamics of contemporary religious life and diverse Islamic expression in Indonesia.

Chapter 10 provides a brief conclusion that summarizes the most important points of discussion in this study, elaborating on the theoretical implications of these discussions and the empirical contribution to the growing scholarly literature on Naqshbandi-Haqqani, Sufism and general Islamic activism in Indonesia.
Chapter 2
NAQSHBANDI-HAQQANI AND TRANSNATIONAL
SUFI MOVEMENT
The Origins and Historical Trajectories

‘Whether in Jakarta, Cairo or Chicago, a new umma is taking shape that is envisioned against the perceived challenge of (western) modernity, and which offers an "Islamic" solution by invoking the images of the past to bolster the arguments of the present. Just whether Sufism is an intrinsic element of the package, and if indeed their electronic silsilas and ijazas will be accepted by the broader public remains, for the moment, an open question’ (Laffan 2006, 112-113)

Naqshbandi-Haqqani is a global Sufi movement with followers in 25 different countries and four continents. This is one of a handful of Naqshbandi movements that have survived into the modern era. Naqshbandi-Haqqani represents continuity and change of long Sufi tradition and activism. Drawing from the rich resources of previous scholarly studies, written materials, and online sources, this chapter examines the historical origins and trajectories of the Naqshbandi-Haqqani movement. This chapter consists of seven sections. The first three sections deals with the historical origins of Naqshbandi Sufi group – the progenitor of Naqshbandi Haqqani offshoot – in Uzbekistan and its early development to the Muslim world in Indian subcontinent during Mughal Empire and Middle East during the Ottoman rule up to the post colonial era. The next two sections examine the flourishing of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Western Europe and North America between 1970s and 1990s. The sixth section deals with transnational transmission of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia in the late 1990s.
Finally, this chapter concludes by re-elaborating the main argument proposed in this chapter.

2.1 Origins and Early Transnational Expansion: Naqshbandi under Timurid and Mughal Empire

Naqshbandi is geographically the most widespread Sufi movement in the Muslim world. Historically speaking, this Sufi movement has played an important role in shaping personal development and driving religious reform with a broad platform for social and political change in the Muslim world. Weismann (2007, 41) suggested that the Naqshbandi has endured throughout the modern era because it maintains and continues the spirit of both activism and orthodoxy embraced by its masters and followers over generations. The inclination for activism has to do with its concern toward broader socio-political affairs, whereas orthodoxy is related to its emphasis to uphold the implementation of shariah at the individual and collective levels.

Naqshbandi’s followers can be found almost everywhere in the Muslim world with strongholds in Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Dagestan, Turkey, and Syria. Naqshbandi and its many offshoots have attracted considerable scholarly attention. Through continuous internal religious reform and active socio-political engagement, it developed from a small religious group in the 14th century into a large Sufi group with a mass following across the Muslim world in the 20th century. For more than 600 years of its existence, Naqshbandi has survived and managed to

18 Since the pioneer work written by Hamid Algar (1976, 123-152), Naqshbandi has drawn scholarly interest in its many historical and geographical contexts. Three of the most prominent studies on Naqshbandi are edited books by Gaborieau et.al (1990) and Ozdalga (1999) and the special edition on Naqshbandi-Khalidi edited by Zarcone, et.al (2008)
adapt to changing socio-political circumstances in different socio-historical contexts.

The development of Naqshbandi-Haqqani indeed began in the 1970s but its historical origins actually dated back in the 14th century. The Naqshbandi-Haqqani is a contemporary offshoot of the Naqshbandi, a religious group founded by a Sufi master living in Bukhara, in present-day Uzbekistan. The name of Naqshbandi refers to the eponymous founder, Bahauddin Naqshbandi (1318-1389), a Sufi master who lived in the village of Sharf as-Shirwan, Bukhara, in present-day Uzbekistan. As a spiritual teaching, Naqshbandi traces its origins back to the *khwajaganiya* (literally means ‘the path of the master’), a spiritual teaching laid down by Abdul Khaliq al-Ghujdawani (d. 1220) who lived few generations before Bahauddin Naqshbandi (Weismann 2007, 14).

Abdul Khaliq was a Sufi master living in the small town of Ghijduwan, the oasis of Bukhara in current day Uzbekistan. Abdul Khaliq al-Ghujdawani was the first spiritual master to introduce the eight principles of spiritual training (*kalimat-i qudsiiyya* or ‘the sacred words’ in Persian), meditational techniques, and the silent form of *dzikr* that have been maintained by later generations of masters up until now (Algar 1976, 133). Bahauddin Naqshbandi is considered the founder of the movement because he was the first master who managed to organise a distinct spiritual training characterised mainly by the practice of silent (*sirr dzikr*) rather than loud remembrance (*jahr dzikr*), which was common to the other native Sufi traditions in Central Asia at the time, such as Yasaviya and Kubrawiya.\(^\text{19}\)

\(^{19}\) For details about Yasaviya and Kubrawiya, see De Weese (Weese 1988, 45-83, 1996, 180-207).
introduced three distinct techniques and principles of dzikir: *wukuf qolbi*, *wukuf 'adadi*, and *wukuf zamani*.

At the beginning, Naqshbandi was strongly influenced by Malamati Sufi ideas that formed part of early Sufi tradition. According to Schimmel, the Malamati “deliberately tried to draw the contempt of the world upon themselves by committing unseemly, even unlawful actions, but they preserved perfect purity of thought and loved God without second thought” (Schimmel 1975, 86). The term, Malamati, refers particularly to the so-called “intoxicated” Sufi who allegedly favored personal mystic experience over formal religious observance and devotion. Despite the early influence of Malamati teaching, Naqshbandi maintained its conformity to *shariah* provisions through continuous internal religious reform. For Naqshbandi, the Prophet Muhammad who channeled divine knowledge from the Angel Gabriel became the end of their chain of knowledge transmission (*silsilah*).

Through generations, the legacy of Abdul Khaliq al Ghujdawani and Bahauddin Naqshbandi were restored through literary works written by Muhammad Parsa (d. 1420), who compiled the teachings of the previous masters.

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20 Malamati refers to one stream of the early Sufi movement that flourished in Nishapur, Khurasan in the northeast of present-day Iran, in the 9th century. For details about the Malamati, see Christopher Melchert (Melchert 2001, 237-247).

21 In the Naqshbandi’s chain of transmission, the figure of Abu Yazid Bistami or Tayfur Abu Yazid al Bistami (804-878) in particular is regarded as a typical of Malamati and is thought to resemble Abu Manshur al Hallaj (858-922), a Persian mystic who was sentenced to death after being accused of committing heresy. A prominent Western Orientalist, Louis Massignon (1883-1962) wrote a doctoral dissertation on al Hallaj which then became a seminal work on Islamic mysticism.

22 De Weese notes that *silsilah* was previously not so important among Naqshbandi in Central Asia. It became significant as a group identity marker only later in the context of the struggle for religious dominance (1993; 1996a:180-207; 1996b:173-88). It is therefore misleading to treat *silsilah* as historical evidence because it was not always the case that the successive persons in the *silsilah* had personally ever met. Weismann, for example, has pointed out that it was almost impossible that Abu Yaqub Yusuf al Hamadani ever made direct contact with Abdul Khaliq al Ghujdawani (Weismann 2007, 25).
into various volumes: *Risala-i Qudsiyya* (The Treatise of Saintliness), *Anis al-Talibin wa-‘uddat al-salikin* (The Companion of the Seekers and Provider of the Followers), and *Fasl al-khitab li-wasl al-albab* (The Conclusive Judgment in Uniting the Hearts) (Weismann 2007, 18). For generations, the teachings of the Naqshbandi Sufi movement have been carefully maintained and bequeathed through a chain of knowledge transmission (*silsilah*) centering on prominent masters with lasting personal influence. In particular, there were three prominent masters with lasting influence to whom most of the later generations of Naqshbandi’s offshoots trace their *silsilah*: Ubaidillah Ahrar (1404-1490), Ahmad Faruqi as-Sirhindi (1564-1624), and Khalid al Baghdadi (1779-1827).

Until the 15th century, the Naqshbandi was just a small group confined mainly to the people in Bukhara and Samarqand of the Timurid Empire. It was under the guidance of Ubaidillah Ahrar (1404-1490) that this Sufi teaching was transformed into a transnational religious movement with broad propagating and educational missions. Ubaidillah Ahrar rose to prominence as a figure of lasting influence because he was not only a spiritual guide but also a typical religious activist with strong economic means and vast social capital. Ahrar was the first who introduced and institutionalised *sohbet* (association with the sheikh) into the standard ritual practice of Naqshbandi. In fact, *suhba* or *sohbet* has become the second most important religious gathering after communal *dzikir*. During this ritual, master and disciples meet directly and regularly for transmitting Naqshbandi’s teachings. The ritual also functions to maintain emotional ties among disciples. In

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23 Timurid is a Central Asian Sunni Muslim dynasty of Turkish-Mongol extraction founded by Tamerlane in the 14th century that ruled over Iran, modern Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and large parts of modern Pakistan, North India, Mesopotamia, Anatolia, and the Caucasus.
short, *sohbet* is a distinct institutional innovation that enables a Naqshbandi’s masters to establish an intimate and close relationship with his disciples.

As a religious activist, Ahrar was personally powerful because he controlled a vast territory of religious endowments throughout the Timurid regions—Bukhara, Samarqand, Herat, Taskhent, and even Kabul. This religious endowment enabled him to act as a landlord through which he managed to provide a system of social patronage and economic protection for his followers (Gross 1982, 533-548, Paul 1991, Dale and Payind 1999, 218-233). His religious authority and social prestige placed him as *de facto* political leader in Herat, the capital of Timurid sultanate (Gross 1988). Moreover, his considerable political influence in the Timurid court was established through his close personal relationship with the then ruler, Sultan Abu Said (r. 1451-1468) and his successor Sultan Ahmad (r. 1468-1494). In his position as a political advisor to the Timurid rulers, Ubaidillah Ahrar created the precedent for Naqshbandi’s conservative political stance favoring cooperation with the political establishment. He taught that approaching the state was a key method for successful Islamic propagation (Weismann, 2007:34).

Combining religious authority, political patronage, and economic support, Ahrar was able to consolidate further the legacy of Bahauddin Naqshbandi beyond his homeland. His missionary zeal expanded his Sufi networks to the Ottoman lands, Western China, Afghanistan, Iran, the Indian subcontinent, and even the Hijaz (Weese 1988, 45, Copty 2003, 322). His principal strategy for expansion was to send his foreign disciples back to their countries as his representatives (Weismann 2007, 44). Although he sent many disciples to other regions, it was in the Indian subcontinent that the legacy of Ubaidillah Ahrar continued to expand.
Naqshbandi arrived in India with the help of Babur, the founder of the Mughal dynasty, in around 1520s. Babur was the grandson of Sultan Abu Said of Timurid, a loyal disciple of Ubaidillah Ahrar (Weismann 2007, 51). Babur himself was an ardent admirer of Ubaidillah Ahrar. In the historical context of India in the 17\textsuperscript{th} century onwards, Naqshbandi experienced a doctrinal change that emphasizes the importance of 
\textit{shariah} observance as an integral part of Sufi rituals. This in turn contributed to socio-religious reforms not only in India but also in the broader Muslim world.

Under the guidance of Ahmad Faruqi Sirhindi (1564-1624), Naqshbandi in India developed to be a major religious movement with strong orthodox inclination. Ahmad Faruqi Sirhindi had lasting influence because of his reputation as a prolific Muslim scholar who used his writings to deliver his own mystical visions into conformity with \textit{shariah} provisions (Buehler 2003, 309-320, Abu-Manneh 2003a, 303-308). Ahmad Faruqi Sirhindi introduced the concept of \textit{wahdatus shuhud} (unity of perception) which addressed a long-standing religious debate on the legitimate position of mystical experience \textit{vis-a-vis} \textit{shariah} observance (Schimmel 1973, 199-203, Buehler 2003, 309-320). He taught his disciples that it was through \textit{shariah} observance and not affiliation to a Sufi Order that someone is regarded a true Muslim. Buehler (2003, 311) has pointed out that Sirhindi tried to emphasize the primacy of \textit{nubuwat} (Prophet-hood) rather than \textit{walayat} (closeness to God) in the spiritual journey. Buehler (2003, 313) further stated that Ahmad Faruqi Sirhindi turned the traditional teaching of Sufism upside-down because a state of closeness to God, which is the ultimate and sublime goal for other Sufis, is counted as the stage for beginners on the Mujaddadi-path.
Ahmad Faruqi Sirhindi’s teachings were compiled in a book entitled *Maktubat*, containing the correspondence between Sheikh Ahmad Faruqi and his disciples. His *shariah*-minded approach in spreading Naqshbandi’s teachings was prompted by his strong criticism of the Mughal Emperor, Sultan Akbar (r. 1556-1605), who adopted a syncretic form of Islam and Hinduism as official state policy. For this reason, he was hailed as the *mujaddid at tsani* (the reviver of the second Islamic millennium) and *Imam-i Rabbani* (the Divine master), titles that were then embedded into Naqshbandi’s *silsilah* (Naqshbandi-Mujaddadi).

Through his teachings, Ahmad Faruqi Sirhindi initiated a religious reform that paved the way for the *tajdid* (renewal) movement between the 17th and 19th centuries. In the Indian subcontinent, the *tajdid* movement focused on revitalizing Islamic tradition through the study of *hadith* as a basis for social reform. Shah Waliullah (1703-1762), a Naqshbandi-Mujaddadi disciple, for instance, played a pivotal role in revitalizing the Islamic intellectual tradition under the declining political power of the Mughal Empire in India (Hermansen 1986, 143-157, 1988, 1-25, Voll 1980, 264-273). Shah Waliullah initiated reforms centered on the study of the Prophetic tradition (*hadith*).

In India, Shah Waliullah was instrumental in transmitting Naqshbandi-Mujaddadi’s orthodox ideas to his followers such as Sayyid Ahmad Khan (d. 1898), an Indian modernist thinker and the founder of Aligarh Muslim University, and Siddiq Hasan Khan (d. 1889), the founder of Ahl i-Hadith movement. The influence of Shah Waliullah also spread to the Haramain, where most Muslim scholars from across the Muslim world studied in the 17th century. This confirms Voll’s suggestion that the study of *hadith* and *shariah*-minded Sufism that
flourished in India contributed to the moral reconstruction of Muslim society in later generations (1980, 268).

Naqshbandi-Mujaddadi, as this Sufi movement became known after Ahmad Faruqi Sirhind, was transmitted to the Muslim world mainly through social networks established by Indian Naqshbandi masters studying and living in the Haramain (Mecca and Medina). Under Ottoman rule, the Haramain was then a center of Islamic learning, especially in the study of the Prophetic tradition (*hadith*) and Sufism (Copty 2003, 322). Naqshbandi-Mujaddadi was embraced by prominent Muslim scholars of the Haramain like Murad al Bukhari (1640-1720) and Taj al-Din bin Zakariya (d. 1640). At the beginning, it was Adam ibn Ismail al Banuri (d. 1664)—the deputy of Ahmad Sirhindi—who became instrumental in disseminating Naqshbandi-Mujaddadi in Haramain (Copty 2003, 331).

2.2 Opposing Western Colonialism and the Kemalist Secular State

It was through the further effort of Khalid al-Baghdadi (1776-1827) that Ahmad Faruqi Sirhvni’s reformist branch of Sufism became influential across the Middle East and particularly in the Ottoman lands in the 19th century. Khalid al-Baghdadi was a Kurd born in Sulaimaniya, the capital city of the Baban sultanate in Northern Iraq. He received initiation into Naqshbandi-Mujaddadi from an Indian Naqshbandi’s master, Ghulam Ali of Delhi/Abdullah Dahlawi (1745-1825). After returning from Delhi in 1811, he began his career as a Sufi sheikh in his hometown, Sulaimaniya of the Baban Sultanate. In 1815, he moved to the capital city of Baghdad and established himself as a prominent Sufi master there. However, due to strong opposition from other Sufi movements and the local ruler, in 1822 he eventually fled to and then permanently settled in Damascus where he managed to
attract loyal disciples from among prominent religious families there. Khalid al Baghdadi revitalized Naqshbandi’s orthodox view in aligning Sufism and shariah.

Some scholars associate the emergence of Sheikh Khalid and his Sufi movement with the rising resistance against European imperialism, especially in the Ottoman regions (Hourani 1981, 75-89, Algar 1976, 123-152, Weismann 2001, 2007). Under the tutelage of Khalid al Baghdadi, the Naqshbandi movement expanded across the Muslim world: the Middle-East, Central Asia, Caucasia, North Africa, South and Southeast Asia. This rapid expansion had to do with the flexible and relatively autonomous organisational structure of the movement in which an appointed deputy (khalifa) can be a leader of his own. Khalid al Baghdadi reportedly sent his khalifa all over the Muslim world to disseminate Naqshbandi’s teachings. Through his efforts, Naqshbandi-Khalidi continued this distinct Sufi teaching and gave influence for later generations of Naqshbandi’s master/followers.24

Khalid al Baghdadi not only maintained standard Naqshbandi rituals such as silent dzikr, sohbet, and tawajuh, but he also introduced the practice of rabithah (directing concentration on the master’s face) and khalwat/suluk (seclusion). Sheikh Khalid reportedly warned his khalifa to do rabithah solely to himself to maintain religious guidance and blessing. Similarly, Khalid al-Baghdadi also encouraged his disciples to perform seclusion (khalwat/suluk) as part of their spiritual exercise, a temporary retreat from daily-life. Both rabithah and

24 According to Algar, during his life-time, Sheikh Khalid appointed more than 166 deputies (khalifa).
khalwat/suluk functioned as institutional innovations and as a method of communication to strengthen central religious authority.

The Haramain was then the main channel from which most of Naqshbandi-Khalidi’s offshoots trace back their lineages. Naqshbandi-Khalidi’s lodge in Jabal Abu Qubyas, Mecca, for instance, was the largest Sufi learning center in Mecca until its destruction in 1924 by the Saudi-Wahabi regime. Along with the Haramain, Damascus was also an important place for the dissemination of Naqshbandi-Khalidi. One of the initiated deputies in Damascus who then spread this teaching to Dagestan was Sheikh Ismail Muhammad ash-Shirwani (1787-1839). Among Naqshbandi-Haqqani, Sheikh Ismail Muhammad ash-Shirwani (also known as Ismail Kurdameir) was a trusted deputy who received full authority from Sheikh Khalid al Baghdadi. The Dagestani branch of Naqshbandi-Khalidi survived political oppression under the Tsar, under communism and under the Kemalist regime.

Through Sheikh Ismail Kurdameir, Naqshbandi-Khalidi’s reformist teachings provided a religio-political leadership in waging jihad resistance against the Russian encroachment in Dagestan for thirty years (Gammer 1994, 204-217, Kemper 2002, 41-71). Imam Shamil (1797-1871), the most prominent Muslim resistance leader against the Tsar regime in Dagestan, sought guidance from Naqshbandi-Khalidi masters. When the armed resistance was neutralised in 1877, Abu Ahmad ash-Sughuri (1792-1882)–the 36th in the Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s silsilah–endorsed the concept of hijrah (migration) as a strategy to continue jihad.

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25 In late 1810s, Sheikh Ismail Muhammad ash-Shirwani (Ismail al Kurdameri) was active as khalifa of Naqshbandi-Khalidi in his homeland of Shirvan (Gammer 1994, 207).
26 Muhammad Effendi al-Yaraghi and Jamaluddin al-Ghumuqi (the 34th and 35th in the Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s silsilah respectively) were the Sufi masters of Imam Shamil.
Adopting this concept of *hijrah*, the Naqshbandi-Khalidi Dagestani lineage managed to continue Naqshbandi-Khalidi’s teachings beyond its homeland.

According to Naqshbandi-Haqqani sources, Muhammad al-Madani (1835-1913) migrated to Ottoman territory in 1890. In this new home, Muhammad al Madani, as a Sufi master of Naqshbandi-Khalidi, enjoyed political patronage given by the Ottoman rule. According to Gall (2005, 35), Naqshbandi had the first solid presence in Istanbul in the 15th century during the reign of Sultan Bayazid II (r. 1481-1512). Yet it was during the reign of Sultan Abdul Majid (r. 1839-1861) that Naqshbandi-Khalidi’s orthodox outlook began to attract the highest echelon of the Ottoman establishment. Abu-Manneh has suggested that from the time of Sultan Abdul Majid on, Naqshbandi-Khalidi was politically influential in the Ottoman court.

For instance, during the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid II’s effort (r. 1876-1909), Naqshandi-Khalidi’s affiliated masters were then actively involved in orchestrating religious and political reform in the Ottoman lands (Weismann 2007, 91). Under the state-sponsored modernisation program of *Tanzimat*, Naqshbandi-Khalidi gave tacit support for the dismissal of Jannisaries and the ban of the Bekhtasi Sufi order on the accusation of embracing unorthodox Sufi teaching/practice (Abu-Manneh 1982, 26-27). Though coopting policy of the Ottoman rulers, Khalidi branch of Naqshbandi gain social legitimacy and political support that greatly help its survival through the modern era.

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27 *Tanzimat* is the state-sponsored modernisation program introduced during the reign of Sultan Mahmud II (1839-1876).
It was under this political circumstance that Naqshbandi-Khalidi with its Daghestan’s origins survived and continued to flourish in the Ottoman lands. According to Naqshbandi-Haqqani sources, through the help of Sultan Abdul Hamid of the Ottoman, Muhammad al-Madani managed to establish a Dagestani migrant community in Rashadiya in current day Gunekoy, near Bursa, Turkey.²⁸ This Dagestani migrant community in Gunekoy became a refugee camp for Daghestani Muslims, who suffered from Russian military suppression in their homeland. Young Sharafudin (1875-1936) who would continue Muhammad al-Madani’s silsilah as Naqshbandi-Khalidi’s master migrated to Turkey around 1900. Sharafudin was al-Madanis’ nephew and son-in-law. After Muhammad al Madani died in 1913, Sharafudin continued to live and guide the disciples of Naqshbandi-Khalidi in Rashadiya, Gunekoy. His disciples reportedly included not only Dagestani migrants but also Turkish and Egyptian followers.

When Sharafudin moved to Turkey, he took along with him his nephew, the young Abdullah Faiz (1891-1973) who was then only 9 years old. Abdullah Faiz served in the Ottoman army (c. 1913-1923), during which time he was involved in the Balkan wars (1912-13) and the First World War (Atay 1994, 51). He was reportedly seriously wounded during the Dardanelle military campaign against the Allied Forces. This seems to have been the turning point for his future career as a Sufi master. After this incident, Abdullah Faiz focused himself on mystical exercises. He reportedly conducted his seclusion under the guidance of his uncle and spiritual master, Sheikh Sharafudin. He continued to stay in the Dagestani migrant community in Rashadiya at least until the late 1930s.

Abdullah Faiz became a Sufi master under increasing hostility to Sufism in particular and Islam in general, following the emergence of the Young Turk Revolution that deposed Sultan Abdul Hamid II in 1908. A strong supporter of the old regime, Naqshbandi-Khalidi was in a vulnerable position as the Kemalist government carried out its anti-Islamic campaign. The Kemalist regime completely banned all Sufi activities in 1925 following the rebellion by Sheikh Said, a Kurdish Naqshbandi-Khalidi’s Sufi master in 1925 (Olson and Tucker 1978, 195-211).\textsuperscript{29} Under this political circumstance, Abdullah Faiz suffered badly under the new regime.

In the 1930s, Abdullah Faiz and Sharafudin were imprisoned for refusing to support the Kemalist regime (Atay 1994, 51). Sharafudin himself was reportedly in jail for three months at the Eskisehir Prison in late 1935 along with Said Nursi’s followers. This mounting oppression forced both to flee to Egypt/Syria and Jordania. Interestingly, in Naqshbandi-Haqqani sources, this move was a result of the deteriorating personal relationship between Sheikh Sharafudin and Kemal Attaturk, especially after Sharafudin’s refusal to endorse the Kemal Attaturk’s military campaign against the Greeks during the Turkish independence war (1919-1922) (Habibis 1985, 73, Atay 1994, 51).

Unlike his uncle, Sharafudin, who went back to Turkey shortly before he died in 1936, Abdullah Faiz left Turkey permanently. At first, Abdullah Faiz Dagestani left for Egypt in the late 1930s to follow his daughter who had married one of Sheikh Sharafudin’s disciples. Around 1940, he eventually moved to

\textsuperscript{29}The official ban on Sufi activity was based on Law No. 677 issued by the National General Assembly on 20 November 1925.
Damascus where he lived for the rest of his life (Habibis 1985, 75). He lived in Mount Qasyun of Salihya district overlooking Damascus where he lived among Muslim migrants coming from Kazan who moved there to escape communist oppression in their home country (Habibis 1985, 73).

Abdullah Faiz’s *hijrah* brought Naqshbandi-Khalidi back to its traditional homeland. Habibis (1985, 75) has suggested Abdullah Faiz Dagestani took a different path by not indulging himself in complicated intellectual discourse. Rather, he became preoccupied with simple things related mainly to the cultivation of moral and ethical virtues. It was perhaps because he was notable as an illiterate and not fluent in Arabic. Yet Abdullah Faiz still managed to attract some notable Muslim scholars and wealthy people from Damascus, Beirut and Amman. These included Sheikh Mukhtar Alaily (the then Secretary General of Religious Affairs of Lebanon), his brother, Abdullah Alaily, and their nephews, Muhammad Hisham Kabbani and Adnan Kabbani (Habibis 1985, 79). Draper has suggested that at one time Abdullah Faiz Dagestani, as he later known, had 40 deputies with Sheikh Nazim al-Haqqani as the most senior one (Draper 2002, 131).30

30 Other senior deputies are Sheikh Hussein Ali of Aleppo and Sheikh Abbas of Mecca.
MAP: A Global Expansion of Naqshbandi Sufi Order from the 15th to Early 20th Century
2.3 Facing Anti Sufi Salafism: Naqshbandi-Haqqani in the Making

As Abdullah Faiz died on 30 September 1973, Sheikh Nazim continued to propagate the Sufi teaching of Naqshbandi and perform his role as a Sufi master under a completely different situation than his predecessors. Unlike the previous era when many Sufi groups in general and Naqshbandi-Khalidi in particular enjoyed political patronage of the Ottoman rule, the rise of the Saudi regime and expansion of Salafi influence throughout the Middle East had considerable impact because this new regime was hostile to any expression of the Sufi tradition. In the struggles for dominance in the 1920s Middle East, the Sufi community faced and eventually lost two battlegrounds altogether, suffering political and symbolic defeats.

Politically, the collapse of the Ottoman rule meant the Sufi community had no longer a protecting patron as it enjoyed before, while symbolically, the rise of Saudi regime resulted in the loss of religious dominance that the Sufi community had maintained for hundreds of years. Physical destruction of many Sufi lodges in the Haramain in the 1920s resulted in disruption to informal social networks that the Sufi community had established through incoming pilgrims from across the Muslim world. Meanwhile, the growing influence of Salafism and political Islamism in the 1970s created hostile and violent environments that forced Sufi community to avoid overt propagation. The religious and political repercussions of these events across the region and the Muslim world established the socio-political milieu under which the Sufi community maintained its existence. The development of Naqshbandi-Haqqani therefore reflects continuity and change of the Sufi tradition to adapt to these dramatic socio-political changes in the Middle East.
The Sufi community survived through a combination of internal reform, institutional adaptation, cooperation with or underground resistance to various ruling regimes, and even accommodation to Salafi and Islamist propagation. These survival strategies managed to maintain their existence but sometimes at a price of losing their identity as a Sufi group. In Syria, Naqshbandi-Kuftariya for instance flourished through cooperation and political patronage given by the Assad regime since the 1960s (Stenberg 1997, 101-116). Naqshbandi-Kuftariya is named after Sheikh Ahmad Kuftaro (1912-2004), the grand Mufti of Syria between 1964 and 2004, who used his position to establish educational institutions and expand his propagating mission (Pinto 2003, 4-6). Different from Ahmad Kuftaro, Said Hawwa, a Naqshbandi-Khalidi disciple, joined with an Islamist group. He was an ideologue and leader of Syrian Muslim Brotherhood who believed that Sufi ideals could be achieved by political struggle (Weismann 1993, 601-623, 1997, 131-154, 2001, 206-237, 2004, 303-318).

In Lebanon, Jamiyyat al-Mashari al-Khayriyya al-Islamiyya (Association of Islamic Philanthropic Projects or the Ahbash group) attracted followers especially among those who were against the Lebanese secular government and anti-Sufi groups (Hamzeh and Dekmejian 1996, 217-229, Kabha and Erlich 2006, 519-538). The Jamiyyat al-Mashari al-Khayriyya al-Islamiyya or the Ahbash group was founded by Abdullah al Harari (1920-2008). Harari was a Rifaiyya-Qadiri Sufi master living in Beirut. The name of Ahbash – Ahbash or Habashi is an

31 Like Naqshbandi-Kuftariya, Jamiyyat al-Mashari al-Khayriyya al-Islamiyya expanded its propagating missions to the USA and established permanent home-base in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Arabic word referring to Ethiopia and was attributed to his origins coming from Ethiopia.

Like other Sufi groups, Naqshbandi-Haqqani is a Sufi group which managed to survive under the dramatic socio-political changes in Syria and Lebanon. Compared to other Sufi groups, Naqshbandi-Haqqani remained relatively intact to maintain its identity as a Sufi group. However, Naqshbandi-Haqqani survives mainly through the personal creativity of its master, his marriage relationship, and family support. This combination of seemingly conventional strategies has worked relatively well to survive in the changing socio-political conditions in four different countries: Cyprus, Turkey, Syria and Lebanon.

In Syria, the socialist preoccupation of the Assad’s Ba’athist regime posed a political challenge and was anathema to Islamic activism in general and Sufism in particular. The Wahabi-Salafi-inspired Islamic opposition of the Muslim Brotherhood against the secular government in Syria had become radicalized since the 1960s. This radicalization prompted a complete rejection of Sufism on the grounds that it was heretical and a deviation from Islamic orthodoxy. Sheikh Nazim found himself trapped in the middle of a battle between the Muslim brotherhood and Hafez al Assad’s socialist regime. In the wave of armed suppression against Islamic activism between 1960 and 1980, it was difficult for Naqshbandi-Haqqani to sustain.

Furthermore, under a social environment where violence was increasingly widespread and radical Islamic political-mindedness were gaining currency, the Sufi message on spirituality did not resonate widely. It was made worse by the fact
that Sheikh Nazim was not a native Syrian. In this increasingly hostile environment, Naqshbandi-Haqqani did not flourish well. According to Naqshbandi-Haqqani sources, he had been prevented from entering Syria since the late 1960s. This physical restriction led to his return to Cyprus from where he then focused his mission in Lebanon since the late 1960s.

In Lebanon, Naqshbandi-Haqqani attracted followers in Beirut. At least until the mid-1970s, Beirut was a temporary safe haven for Sheikh Nazim’s preaching activity though he only managed to gain a small number of loyal disciples there. The city was unfortunately on the brink of a civil war between competing political factions. As the civil war and sectarian conflict began to unfold in Beirut in 1975, Sheikh Nazim Haqqani was again forced to move his activity to Tripoli, in North Lebanon in the late 1970s. Unlike Beirut, Tripoli was then still a relatively safe place because it was located far from the heart of sectarian conflicts. More importantly, Tripoli had for a long time been a place where Sufis of various affiliations thrived and gained social support from the local community. His preaching activity went on quite smoothly as he managed to establish family connection with the Kabbani family, a prominent Sunni family of Lebanon on whom he heavily relied to sustain his mission.

According to Habibis, the Naqshbandi-Haqqani community in Tripoli had been established in the late 1960s through some disciples whom Sheikh Nazim Haqqani initiated in Beirut and Damascus (1985:186). As a matter of fact, it was in Tripoli that the Kabbani brothers, Muhammad Hisham Kabbani (b. 1945) and Muhammad Adnan Kabbani (b. 1947), helped their master to sustain his mission by providing material resources. The high social prestige that the Kabbani family
enjoyed in Lebanon also secured social networks needed by Sheikh Nazim Haqqani to continue his *dakwah* activity. In the late 1970s, Adnan Kabbani took over the local leadership of the Naqshbandi-Haqqani community there.

As the political environment in Cyprus and Turkey became friendlier, Sheikh Nazim Haqqani returned to his homeland in Cyprus, though he made frequent visits to Lebanon where his daughter and his sons lived among Kabbani’s family. It should be noted that during that time, Sheikh Nazim Haqqani’s son-in-law, Muhammad Hisham Kabbani, was living overseas, running his business as the manager of a medical clinic in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. It is through Hisham Kabbani’s networks that Naqshbandi-Haqqani then flourishes in the West.

Though Turkey, Cyprus, Lebanon and Syria were important places in the formation of Naqshbandi-Haqqani as a Sufi group, Naqshbandi-Haqqani had there only a small group with a limited network. For Sheikh Nazim Haqqani, Sufism in general and Naqshbandi-Haqqani in particular provide the most complete religious teachings not only for personal spiritual development, but also for the moral purification of Muslim society. His experience in Syria and Lebanon convinced him that the Middle East was no longer a viable place for spreading Sufi teachings. It was through his contacts among Turkish and Lebanese immigrants that Sheikh Nazim Haqqani began to turn his attention to spreading Sufism to the West. Through resource mobilisation and social networks in the USA and Western Europe, Naqshbandi-Haqqani managed to spread its teachings around the world, including Indonesia.

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32 Kabbani are one of the prominent families with strong political connection in Lebanon. This family is active in politics, religious matters and business. Muhammad Rashid Kabbani, the grand mufti of Lebanon, was the paternal uncle of both Sheikh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani and Adnan Kabbani.
2.4 New Age and Western Sufism: Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Western Europe

The transmission of Naqshbandi-Haqqani among the people in Western Europe and North America began in the early 1970s. This transnational expansion was a product of various factors: religious, demographic, socio-economic and cultural changes. The religious factor had to do with a growing interest in subjective experiential religiosity and perennial philosophy among some segments of Western society. Experiential religiosity was particularly represented by the growing popularity of New Age teachings through which Sufism found a primary vehicle of transmission and gained its first adherents in the Western world. Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s sources suggest that Sheikh Nazim al-Haqqani’s visit to London and other Western European countries simply fulfilled the prophecy espoused by his master, Abdullah Faiz Dagestani. Sheikh Nazim had also a strong personal conviction that it was his responsibility to bring Islam to the West and to revitalise spiritual life there. The 1970s was the time when Sufism in general and the Akbari ideas in particular had already become relatively known in the West through the works of Western Sufi converts.

In London for instance, the first Western disciples of Naqshbandi-Haqqani came from those who were previously affiliated John G. Bennet (1897-1974). Bennet himself was a former British intelligence officer who, during the First World War (1914-1918), was stationed in Istanbul, Turkey. He was a student of G.I. Gurdjieff (1866-1949), a Greek-Armenian who was one of the pioneers of the New Age movement in the West. During his stay in Istanbul, Gurdjieff had established contact with the Naqshbandi’s masters there. According Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s
sources, Gurdjieff met Sheikh Sharafudin and Abdullah Faiz Dagestani, Sheikh Nazim Haqqani’s direct master, in Turkey in 1920s during which Gurdjieff received his knowledge on spirituality (Kabbani 1995, 412). Like his spiritual teacher, Bennet also met Abdullah Faiz Dagestani for the first time during his spiritual quest in Damascus in 1955.

Interestingly, Bennet confirmed this story in recounting his first meeting with Abdullah Faiz Dagestani on the 11th of May 1955 as follows,

Sheikh Abdullah is a true saint in whom one feels an immediate complete trust. With him there were no lengthy arguments or quotations from the scriptures. He simply said to me, "I was expecting you. Last night an angel appeared to me and told me to give three messages to a stranger who would come to my house." The first two messages were clear and unmistakable answers to very important questions that were troubling me about my work in England, and about which the Sheikh could not possibly have known by any ordinary means. They convinced me that he must have powers of a kind that I had already seen in Gurdjieff and one or two others, and prepared me to take very seriously anything that he might say...We were sitting in the evening on the open roof of a house on the hills overlooking the ancient city. The Sheikh was a man of over seventy, dressed entirely in white, with a turban and white beard but with a youthful complexion and a steady humorous eye. One could scarcely imagine a setting more appropriate to the transmission of a solemn message, and just as the sun was setting he began to speak to me of the manifestation of the power of God in the world. The Old Age was dominated by satanic influences, but the time had come when all was to be changed. He spoke of the man who was soon to appear and through whom the power was to be manifested. It would not be right for me to set down here all that he actually told me, for the event is not yet complete. My only reason for telling the story is that it was an important factor in my subsequent decisions...After saying that someone would come from the East, Abdullah startled me by telling me that not only was I chosen by God to be an immediate helper of this 'someone,' but that he would come to England and even live in my house. He added that when I returned to England I should prepare a place for him, and assured me that henceforward I would be guided and protected in all my doings. It is hard to explain why I found myself taking seriously such a fantastic story and why, on my return to England, I began without explaining my reasons, to prepare Coombe Springs to receive an extraordinary visitor (Bennet 1958, 30-31).

In his autobiography, Bennet (1975, 309-310) also described his meeting with Sheikh Abdullah Faiz Dagestani as follows,

After the usual salutations, and compliments of [on] the excellence of my Turkish, he astonished me by saying: “Why did you not bring the lady sister who is with you? I have a message for her as well as you.” It seemed unlikely that anyone could have told him about Elizabeth. We walked straight to his house, and the Dadji, my guide, had left me at the door without speaking to anyone. I replied that as he was a Muslim, I did not think he would wish to speak with a woman. He said very simply: “Why not? Rules and customs are for the protection of the foolish; they do not concern me...He was saying, “I was expecting someone today, but I did not know it would be you. A few nights ago an angel came to my room and told me that you would come to visit me and that I was to give you three messages...I was astonished at the two messages, for it was perfectly true that I had prayed for guidance on just those two questions...”The most important message is the last. You must know that there is a great wickedness in the world. People have given themselves over to the worship of material things, and they have lost the will and the power to worship God. God has always sent Messengers to show the way out of such situations, and he has again done so in our present age. A messenger is already on earth, and his identity known to many. Before long, he will come to the West. Men have been chosen to prepare the way for him.”...He said that he had finished telling me the messages, but wished to add as a personal advice that he recommended to me to practice incessantly the act of submission to the Will of God. He said that no harm can come to anyone when he is actively and consciously surrendering himself to the Will of God. He said: “I advise you frequently to repeat in your heart the words la ilaha il Allah – which means surrender to God alone.” When I said that this was the Muslim profession of faith, he replied that it is as much Christian as Muslim, for the foundation of all religion is that man should not follow his own will, but the Will of God...

These long passages depict Abdullah Faiz Dagestani as a man with strong convictions. This incident also gives the impression that there was somehow already a strong spiritual connection between Naqshbandi-Haqqani and the New Age followers of Gurdjieff in Western Europe (Draper, 2002:125). It is interesting to note that Gurdjieff was a spiritual guru who traced his spiritual teachings back to the Naqshbandi’s masters (Bennet, 1975:27). In Meetings with Remarkable Men, Gurdjieff, for instance, shares his personal journey to see his spiritual masters in Central Asia and Turkey, which, according to Naqshbandi-Haqqani sources,
included some Naqshbandi masters. Meanwhile, in *The Master of Wisdoms: An Esoteric History of the Spiritual Unfolding of Life on this Planet*, Bennet elaborated on how his spiritual convictions were strongly attached to the Naqshbandi tradition.

Moreover, perennial philosophical ideas were also instrumental in popularising Sufism in the West. Some of them have been increasingly linked to Islamic orthodoxy while others maintain universal values shared in all religions with an emphasis on cultivating self-consciousness, energy, love and peace. Among Western Sufi converts, this perennial philosophy is particularly related to the mystical-philosophical ideas of Ibn Arabi as represented by some initiated Western Sufi converts such as Ivan Agueli/Abdul Hadi (1869-1917) and his subsequent disciples like Rene Guenon/Abdul Wahid Yahya (1886-1951), Frithjof Schuon/Isa Nuruddin (1907-1998), Titus Burckhardt/Ibrahim Izz-al Din (1908-1984), and Martin Lings/Abu Bakr Sirajuddin (1909-2005). Though small in number, these Western followers came from educated backgrounds and did not hesitate to express their Sufi conviction through numerous written works. These Western Sufi converts, through their numerous works, played a pivotal role not only in introducing Sufism but also in paving the way for further Sufi transmission in the West. In a later generation, there were even some Western

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34 This book has been translated into a movie with the same title and was directed by Peter Brook in 1979.
35 Ivan Agueli was a Swedish convert who continued the Akbari Sufi tradition. He was initiated into Sufism by Sheikh Abdurrahman Ilyas, one of the disciples of Sheikh Abdul Qadir al Jazairi (1808-1883), an Algerian Sufi master with affiliation to Naqshbandi-Khalidi who was exiled by the French colonial government in Paris. He initiated Rene Guenon who, after Ivan Agueli’s death in 1917, became affiliated with a Moroccan Shadzili master, Sheikh Ahmad al-Alawi (1869-1934). Sheikh Ahmad al-Alawi visited Paris in 1926 and inaugurated the establishment of Shadzili Sufi lodge there. For details about Sheikh Ahmad al-Alawi, see Martin Ling (1993).
converts who became Sufi masters, such as Alexander Hixon (1941-1995), Ian Dallas/ Abdul Qadir Isa (b. 1930), and Nuh Hamim Keller (b. 1954). Gibril Fouad Haddad, one of the main disciples of Sheikh Hisham Kabbani, reportedly converted to Islam in 1996 after reading Martin Ling’s *The Prophet Muhammad Biography*. Given this, it is not surprising that Ernst (2003:6) has noted that Sufi material published in America and Europe has ‘joined the shelf of New Age teachings, in a veritable marketplace of spirituality’.

In demographic terms, Sufi transmission to the West is related to the influx of Muslim migrant workers and Muslims with refugee status from conflict-torn countries in the Middle East between 1960s and 1990s. This growing number of Muslim populations provides a social basis through which Sufism in general and Naqshbandi-Haqqani in particular gain followers. Sufi transmission had to do with growing number of Muslim migrant workers and. Increasing transnational migration between Turkey and Western European countries facilitates Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s move.36 In fact, Sheikh Nazim began his first journey by visiting London where he attracted an audience among the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot migrant communities there in 1974. After that, Sheikh Nazim Haqqani carried out his mission preaching the Naqshbandi path not only among his fellow Turks and a small Sunni community in the Middle East, but also to a broader audience of Muslims and non-Muslims.

In terms of socio-economic and cultural factors, Sufi transnational expansion has to do with material resources and growing awareness to maintain Muslim identity and tradition. Charity and voluntary donation play a significant

36 As early as 1977, he also sent his representative to the USA, Sheikh Abdul Karim (d. 2012).
role for Sufi transnational transmission. During the 1970s, Sheikh Nazim al-Haqqani used funds that were raised by his followers in London and the Middle East to buy a property in London. This property then functioned as a Sufi lodge (zawiya). In 1976, with the help of the Turkish Cypriot community, he bought a property in Shacklewell Lane/London which became the first zawiya in London until 1980 (Draper 2002, 137). In 1992, he bought another large unused church in St Ann’s Road, London, through a generous donation from Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah of Brunei. Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah reportedly donated £2 million to buy and restore the property. It is still used as the main headquarters of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in England (Atay 1994, 56, Draper 2002, 137). Naqshbandi-Haqqani sources reveal that Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah of Brunei and Raja Dato Seri Ashman Shah (1958-2012)–the crown prince of the Perak Royal family–became his loyal disciples.

With a permanent base in London, Sheikh Nazim Haqqani continued his habit of travelling regularly to visit his disciples in London every fasting month. He would then stay for a whole month before returning to Turkey by car (Stjerholm, 2005:14). In this way, he reportedly managed to attract more followers in countries through which he travelled on his return route. From London, Sheikh Nazim al-Haqqani managed to open access to South and Southeast Asian countries. In 1986, for instance, he carried out a long tour to initiate more disciples in Brunei, Malaysia, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka (Draper 2002, 131).
MAP B. Global Expansion of Naqshbandi-Haqqani From the 1960s to the Late 1990s
2.5 Expansion and Global Networks: Naqshbandi-Haqqani in North America

The new trajectory of Naqshbandi Haqqani’s transnational mission occurred in the 1990s as Naqshbandi-Haqqani managed to establish a permanent home base in the USA. The new trajectory for further development of Naqshbandi-Haqqani began when Sheikh Hisham Kabbani, Sheikh Nazim’s son-in-law, obtained a green card and moved to the USA. With refugee status, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani moved to the USA soon after the civil war in Lebanon ended in 1990 along with all of his family.\(^{37}\) Although it did not fully lose its character as a new age group, Naqshbandi-Haqqani in the USA increasingly became overtly assertive in identifying itself with the Sufi tradition and Islamic symbols. Naqshbandi-Haqqani, for instance, explicitly designated itself as Naqshbandi-Haqqani, strengthening its symbolic claim as a new Sufi group, which continued a long Islamic spiritual tradition.

Sheikh Hisham Kabbani expanded Naqshbandi Haqqani from a relatively un-organised Sufi community to a global Sufi movement. He began his religious mission in New York before then moved to San Diego in California about 1994 where he began his career as a preacher going from mosque to mosque. Sheikh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani is reported to have established 23 Sufi retreat centers across the USA and Canada. The largest center is located in Fenton, Michigan, where he and his family are currently living. Currently, both Fenton/Michigan and

\(^{37}\) Some sources state that Sheikh Hisham Kabbani’s move to the USA was simply to follow his master’s instruction. However, there seem to be other reasons for this move. Tripoli was obviously no longer viable as a permanent basis for Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s activities due to the devastation that resulted from the civil war (1975-1990). Moreover, Tripoli was too small to cater to the two emerging Naqshbandi-Haqqani propagators (Sheikh Hisham Kabbani and his brother, Adnan Kabbani) who were competing with each other.
Lefke/Cyprus are considered the main centers of Naqshbandi-Haqqani. He organised Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s mission into separate but related institutions and has established himself as an authoritative figure within the movement.

Since the arrival of Hisham Kabbani, Naqshbandi-Haqqani has made deliberate efforts to fully integrate in and reach out to the wider Western society. While Muslim migrants still become the main source from which it attracts disciples, strengthening group identity became apparent as it began to promote the personal charisma of the Sheikh Nazim and position itself as a legitimate successor of Sufi tradition. Unlike Sheikh Nazim, who insists on not organising his disciples into a formal organisation, Sheikh Hisham Kabani has established numerous umbrella organisations to support his mission. He combines traditional authority as a spiritual guide and modern organisational skills to gain an audience not only among immigrant communities across America but also among white Americans.

Nowadays, Naqshbandi-Haqqani is one of about a dozen Sufi movements, which are currently active in North America. Through Sheikh Hisham Kabbani’s efforts, Naqshbandi-Haqqani has expanded its efforts throughout the world. Currently, there are reportedly more than 200 *diqir* centers in 41 different countries. Moreover, since his arrival in the USA in 1991, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani has established at least five umbrella organisations. They include American Muslim Assistance (AMA), Kamilat Sufi Women Organisation (KAMILAT), Unity One, Islamic Supreme Council of America (ISCA) and As Sunnah Foundation of America (ASFA). AMA was an organisation founded to provide relief for Bosnian refugees but along with KAMILAT and Unity One, it is currently no longer active.
Meanwhile, ASFA and ISCA were the key umbrella organisations through which Sheikh Hisham Kabbani run most of his social activities in the USA between the late 1990s and mid 2000s. He is a chairman of both the Islamic Supreme Council of America (ISCA) and As Sunnah Foundation of America (ASFA).
Damrel describes ISCA as “the most visible, politically active and controversial of all the affiliated Haqqani organisations”. It plays a role in political lobbying (Damrel 2006, 119). The organisation defines its goal as follows: namely to “support peace, the precepts of justice for all, and condemn all violations of human rights”, “advocate social integration and cohesion”, “promote the pursuit of spiritual growth and harmony”, and “commit to strengthening the values of charity, family love, education and public responsibility in American life”. To meet these goals, the organisation emphasizes practical and authoritative solutions for American Muslims seeking to maintain Islamic beliefs in a modern secular society (Damrel, 2006:119). On the other hand, ASFA serves religious education and publishes general works based on the four major Sunni law schools. ASFA presents itself as an authoritative, legally sound guide to proper Islamic practice and is affiliated with a number of internationally known Islamic institutions such as Al Azhar University and others.

These umbrella organisations and their fund-raising capability have enabled Naqshbandi-Haqqani to maintain a high-profile public appearance through its various websites, print publications, internet radio and television broadcasts, and video streaming. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani has also managed to gather talented disciples who help him carry out his preaching mission around the world, maintaining various websites, producing publications, and running his umbrella organisations. These disciples are mostly new converts such as G.F. Haddad (b. 1965), Nurjan Mirahmadi, Hedieh Mirahmadi, and Matteen Shiddique. Gibril Fouad Haddad (a Lebanese convert with a PhD on English Literature) in particular is a prolific writer who has learnt traditional Islamic subjects with Sayyid
Muhammad Alawi al Maliki of Mecca (1944-2004). Sheikh Hisham Kabbani assigns each of his associates a different role to perform.

Sheikh Kabbani has organised two international conferences of traditional Sunni scholars in Los Angeles (1996) and in Washington DC (1998).\(^{38}\) Those conferences were officially named the International Islamic Unity Conference. The first conference was held in early August 1996 at the Westin Bonaventure Hotel in Los Angeles and was organised jointly by the As Sunnah Foundation (ASFA) and American Muslim Assistance (AMA). There were around 7000 participants and 69 speakers attending the conference from several countries.\(^{39}\) The first conference dealt with the issue of standardizing Islamic curriculum in the mosques and for inter-faith dialogue.

The second conference was organised by the Islamic Supreme Council of America (ISCA) and was held at Omni Shoreham Hotel, in Washington DC, from 7\(^{th}\) to 9\(^{th}\) August 1998.\(^{40}\) The conference was concerned primarily with the humanitarian aid for Muslim victims of atrocities in Kosovo during the Balkan war. Like the previous conference, this conference was also attended by delegates from several countries including Indonesia.\(^{41}\) Sheikh Hisham Kabbani is reported to have invited and provided transport and accommodation expenses for 30 people from Indonesia. Tutti Alawiyah (Minister of Women Empowerment) gave a speech


\(^{39}\) The speakers included Dana Rohrabacher (US Republican Congress member of California), Sheikh Ahmad Kuftaro (Grand Mufti of Syria), Dr. Seyyed Hossein Nasr (Islamic scholar), Dr. William Chittick (scholar) and many other people. The complete list of speakers can be seen on [http://www.sunnah.org/nl/v0101/main_ballroom.html](http://www.sunnah.org/nl/v0101/main_ballroom.html), accessed 10 September 2011.

\(^{40}\) The speakers included the President of the Chechnya Republic and US Congressman, Jim McDermott, WA. An example of media reporting about the conference can be accessed on [http://www.washington-report.org/backissues/1098/9810107.html](http://www.washington-report.org/backissues/1098/9810107.html), accessed 23 July 2011.

\(^{41}\) For details, see [http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/109792-1](http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/109792-1), accessed 16 October 2011.
sharing Muslim experiences in Indonesia. The second conference was however a turning point for Sheikh Hisham Kabbani and Naqshbandi-Haqqani in the USA. Due to mounting pressure and continuing polemics among within Muslim community in America, he withdrew himself from this kind of high-profile activity and dedicated himself to his writings and to guiding his disciples.

2.6 Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia

Prior to the collapse of the Ottoman rule and the emergence of the Saudi regime in the 1920s, Naqshbandi had been one of the most active Sufi groups in establishing transnational connections between Indonesia and the Haramain (Mecca and Madina). It spread to the archipelago through commercial relations, intellectual networks and personal contacts by those doing pilgrimage journey to the Haramain cities. Naqshbandi with many of its offshoots has grown further and even became a dominant Sufi movement at least from the late 19th century (Bruinessen 1990, 161, 1992a, 17). Due to dramatic socio-political changes in the Muslim world in the 1920s, international Sufi connections were completely disrupted, leading to the Naqshbandi movement in Indonesia becoming indigenised. The dramatic socio-political changes that took place in the early 20th century affected the dynamics of transnational Sufi transmission in Indonesia. The

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42 Bruinessen showed that until 1920s, Mecca was still a center point from where Indonesian Muslims gained knowledge particularly about Sufi knowledge in general and particularly Naqshbandi’s teachings (1992:150-79).

43 In the wake of the waning influence of transnational Sufism in Indonesia, transnational networks between Indonesia and other countries are established by new Islamic movements such as the Ikhwanul Muslimin, Hizbut Tahrir, Jemaat Islamiyah (JI), and Salafi groups between 1970s and 1990s.
dramatic socio-political changes had to do with the decline of Ottoman rule and the rise of Wahabism in the aftermath of the First World War.

After 1924, the transnational religious transmission between the Haramain and the Indonesian archipelago was radically altered. The decline of Ottoman rule had an immediate practical impact because for a long time, the Ottoman rule provided both material and political patronage to many Naqshbandi’s lodges in the Haramain where Indonesian students came to study and acquire Islamic knowledge. Wahabism, on the other hand, posed doctrinal challenges and, to large extent, even an existential threat to Sufism because of its rigorous efforts in promoting anti-Sufi Salafism. The fall of Ottoman rule and the rise of Saudi regime therefore completely disrupted transnational Sufi networks that had been maintained for generations.

Naqshbandi-Haqqani began to attract audiences among Indonesian Muslims in the 1990s. According to some sources, a few Indonesian Muslims living in Europe and North America had known about Naqshbandi-Haqqani since the late 1980s. Asniar Sahab is reported to be one of the first Indonesians to join the Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Western Europe. She was an Indonesian journalist who met and was then initiated directly by Sheikh Nazim Haqqani in London in 1991. In her book entitled *The Spiritual Journey of Celebrities*, she explains that she came to know Sheikh Nazim Haqqani through the help of his friend, Sabar Prayoga, who was then living in Rotterdam, Netherland (Sahab 2001, 21). Asniar’s
testimony confirms that an Indonesian living in Netherland was the first Indonesian to join Naqshbandi Haqqani.44

Initial contact was also made in 1993 by Hadid Subki, a nuclear engineer who was then an employee at the General Electric Company in San Jose, California, USA. Hadid Subki got to know the Naqshbandi-Haqqani community in California for the first time through his Pakistani colleague (Asman Khan). Asman Khan introduced Hadid Subki to Sheikh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani.45 Hadid Subki then regularly attended communal *dzikr* and eventually gave *bai’at* to Sheikh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani at the At Tauhid Mosque in Mountain View in San Jose. It was through Hadid Subki that his younger brother, Bernie Subki, joined Naqshbandi-Haqqani in 1995 while he was pursuing his PhD at the University of Oregon.46 Based on this early historical narrative, it could be said that in the mid-1990s, Naqshbandi-Haqqani was known and embraced exclusively by a handful of Indonesians living overseas, namely Europe and North America, who met directly either with Sheikh Nazim al Haqqani in London or Sheikh Hisham Kabbani in California. There was no deliberate attempt by those early disciples to disseminate Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia.

The turning point for enduring direct contact, however, happened in the mid-1990s. In mid-1996, several young students took the initiative to contact the

44 It was very difficult to verify this testimony because Asniar Sahab passed away in 2005 and there are no other living witnesses to this early encounter between Indonesians and Naqshbandi Haqqani’s community in Europe back in the early 1990s. Interview Hagi Ghani Azis and Muchtony Ghani Azis, 12 August 2010

45 There were two deputies of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in the USA, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani then living in California and Sheikh Abdul Karim living in Catskill, New York.

46 Interview with Dr. Bernie Subki, 25 December 2010
Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s website administrator (Matteen Shiddique) through email. Through Matteen Shiddique, some of these students then managed to establish direct contact with the early disciples of Naqshbandi-Haqqani, Hadid Subki and Bernie Subki, who were living in the USA at that time. One of the people who regularly contacted Hadid Subki and Bernie Subki was Faried Bubhi Djamirin. After this, Hadid Subki and Bernie Subki took further steps by sending some written Sufi materials to their father’s home, Prof Iyos Subki, in Menteng in Jakarta. Following on from this, Sheikh Hisham asked Hadid Subki and Bernie Subki to arrange a visit to Indonesia. They then decided to follow up on their online contact with Faried Bubhi Djamirin in Jakarta. Hadid and Bernie Subki also shared their collection of Sufi materials with him. Among the many Sufi materials they sent to their father (Prof Iyos Subki) in Jakarta was the *Dalail Khoirot*, a classical Sufi text written by a Moroccan Syadzili’s master, Muhammad ibn Sulaiman Al Jazuli (d. 1465).

Faried Bubhi Djamirin, who was rather uncertain of what to do next, contacted his aunt, Hagi Ghani Azis, asking for help. Together they contacted Mustafa Mas’ud and brought along with them the *Dalail Khoirot*. Mustafa Mas’ud, who was an authorised teacher of the *Dalail Khoirot*, was impressed of what he heard from both Hagi Ghani Azis and Farid Bubhi Djamirin. It was also through Hagi Ghani Azis and Faried Bubhi Djamirin that Mustafa Mas’ud received more detailed information about Naqshbandi-Haqqani, and about Sheikh Nazim Haqqani

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47 Matteen Shiddique is one of senior disciples of Sheikh Hisham Kabbani in the USA. Interview with Farid Bubhi Djamirin, 16 December 2010
48 Interview with Dr. Bernie Subki, 25 December 2010
49 Professor Iyos Subki was then the head of Indonesian Nuclear Agency (BATAN)
50 According to Mustafa Mas’ud, he received an authorization to teach *Dalail Khoirot* from his master, Kyai Thahir in Pekalongan in late 1980s.
and Hisham Kabbani. On his students’ insistence, however, he changed his mind and agreed to arrange a personal meeting with Sheikh Hisham Kabbani and if possible, even invite him to come to Indonesia. The plan to invite Sheikh Hisham Kabbani was not, however, proposed until early 1997 and this plan was brought about by some of the closest students of Mustafa Mas’ud who decided to invite him when Sheikh Hisham Kabbani was visiting his disciples in Singapore. It happened that Hagi Ghani Azis and Iyos Subki’s wife were then regular attendees of the NAMIRA group.

In the meeting, Faried also told Mustafa Mas’ud that his contacts in the USA planned to arrange Sheikh Hisham’s travel to Indonesia him. To invite Sheikh Hisham Kabbani to come to Indonesia, Mustafa Mas’ud and some of his students (Hagi Ghani Azis, Tini Firdaus and his daughter, and Effendi Siregar and his wife, Ella Effendi Siregar) went to Singapore. What exactly happened during this first meeting in Singapore was not clear. Mustafa Mas’ud said that he and his students met Sheikh Hisham Kabbani for the first time at the Changi International Airport and invited him to come to Jakarta. Another source reports that Mustafa Mas’ud and his entourage met Sheikh Hisham Kabbani at the house of Sheikh Zakaria’s, a Naqshbandi-Haqqani representative in Singapore. Others attributed the arrival of Sheikh Hisyam Kabbani to the personal efforts of Hadid Subki, Bernie Subki, and Farid Bubhi Djamirin, a version of events that forms part of an

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51 Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s community in Singapore began in 1991 when Sheikh Syed Hasan Bahara went to Cyprus and asked for initiation from Sheikh Nazim Haqqani. It grew significantly after Sheikh Zakaria was initiated during Sheikh Hisham Kabbani’s first visit to Singapore in 1996 (Sani, 2010:43-44).
52 Interview with Hagi Ghani Azis, 12 August 2010
53 Mustafa Mas’ud did not recall that Effendi Siregar (known as Sheikh Aweng) and his wife came along to Singapore, whereas Rizal Tarigan mentioned both names.
54 Interview with Mustafa Mas’ud, 18 September 2010.
55 Interview with Rizal Tarigan, 22 September 2010.
official narrative kept among Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples in Indonesia.\textsuperscript{56} Whatever the case, all agree that soon after the direct meeting in Singapore, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani agreed to come to Indonesia and finally arrived in Jakarta for the first time on 7 April 1997.\textsuperscript{57}

On his first visit, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani initiated Mustafa Mas’ud and some of his students into Naqshbandi-Haqqani. The initiation ritual took place in Mustafa Mas’ud’s residence at Haji Hasbi Street Number 40, Cawang, East Jakarta, with an audience of around 30 people. Among the first disciples who were initiated into Naqshbandi-Haqqani by Sheikh Hisham are Muchtony Ghani Azis and his wife, Effendi Siregar and his wife, Soetono Joyosuparto and his wife, Prof Iyos Subki and his wife, and Firdaus Wajdi and his wife, Tini Firdaus. At a meeting with MUI’s top officials the following day on 8 April 1997, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani also initiated Ahmad Mubarok (then a MUI’s committee member). Together with Mustafa Mas’ud, Firdaus Wajdi and Ahmad Mubarok were particularly helpful in the further expansion of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia because it was through their social networks that Naqshbandi-Haqqani gained a solid basis among Jakarta’s urban middle class.

Firdaus Wajdi was described by many sources as a businessman, a political lobbyist with vast social networks among Jakarta’s business elites, and a former intelligence officer of the State Intelligence Agency who had a good personal relationship with prominent Indonesian politicians and top military figures. He was

\textsuperscript{56} It was previously displayed on http://haqqaniindonesia.blogspot.com/, but it is now no longer accessible.  
\textsuperscript{57} Sheikh Hisham Kabbani was accompanied by some of his students from Singapore and USA such as Mateen Siddiqui, Mohammed Khan, Leonardo Stoute, and Ibrahim Abdur Rahman. For details, see http://kunjungan7007.blogspot.com.au/2008/06/kunjungan-mawlana-syekh-hisyam-kabbani_6657.html
also a former HMI activist in late 1960s and a close friend of Akbar Tandjung, the then chairman of Golkar Party.

Ahmad Mubarok, on the other hand, was then a lecturer in Islamic psychology at the University of Indonesia, UIN Jakarta, and As Syafi’iyah Islamic University.\(^{58}\) His contacts among Jakarta’s political elites began in the late 1960s when he was a former PMII (Indonesia Islamic Student Movement, a Muslim student organisation affiliated to Nahdlatul Ulama) student activist at Jakarta Islamic State University. His future political career was heavily influenced by his uncle who was also a political mentor, KH Muslich (1910-1998), and a former senior NU politician in the 1950s and 1960s. Like Firdaus Wajdi, he also established his personal contacts among the intelligence community.\(^{59}\) He was, for instance, financially sponsored by his personal contact at BIN for attending International Sufi Conference in Tripoli, Libya, in 1997.

During his first visit, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani appointed Mustafa Mas’ud an official representative of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia. Sheikh Mustafa Mas’ud was charged with the authority to give religious instructions on behalf of Sheikh Nazim and Sheikh Hisham Kabbani. He was mainly responsible for leading dzikr, the recitation of dalail khoirot, and giving regular religious instruction. In the early days, he even required all students to come visiting him and conducting all rituals. On some occasions, he even asked his students to perform these rituals all night long.\(^{60}\) Between 1997 and 2000, Mustafa Mas’ud also had a few opportunities to visit Sheikh Hisham Kabbani in the USA and accompany him in

\(^{58}\) Ahmad Mubarok was born in Purwokerto in 1950
\(^{59}\) Interview with Ahmad Mubarok, 21 September 2010
\(^{60}\) Interview with Sutono Joyosuparto, 14 August 2010
his overseas tours. On a few occasions, he also came to see Sheikh Nazim in London. Through Mustafa Mas’ud, the personal charisma of both Sheikh Nazim and Sheikh Hisham Kabbani and the teaching of Naqshbandi-Haqqani were gradually accepted less as distant reality and more as personal testimony.

Naqshbandi-Haqqani first became known among only a few university students in Jakarta around 1994. In Indonesia, the 1994 internet debate was particularly influential in driving increasing interests to Sheikh Hisham Kabbani personally and Naqshbandi-Haqqani and Sufi teachings in general. Many early disciples who followed the 1994 internet debate testified that they were impressed by the way Sheikh Hisham Kabbani answered questions, addressing each issue with a detailed argument based on the Quran, Hadits and previous Muslim scholars on the legitimate position of Sufism in a language that was easily understood, and by the use of media that can be accessed by lay people. It is not a coincidence that Naqshbandi-Haqqani began to be known among Indonesian Muslims only after the 1994 Internet debate. Sheikh Musthafa Mas’ud himself confirmed that a group of university students in Jakarta stumbled upon Naqshbandi-Haqqani while surfing the net.

2.7 Conclusion

The case of Naqshbandi-Haqqani shows that Sufism survives through the modern era by way of creativity, individual efforts, and family connection. It also continues to expand through various institutional changes adapted to different

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61 Interview with Faried Bubhi Djamirin, 18 September 2010.
62 Interview with Farid Bubhi Djamirin, 28 December 2010
socio-historical contexts in the Middle East, Western Europe and North America. It began as a modest spiritual teaching in Central Asia in the 14th century. It then developed to be a transnational Sufi movement through creative and pious individuals who performed as a religious activist with a strong missionary zeal to spread their teachings across the then Muslim world.

The widespread of Naqshbandi throughout the Muslim world owed much to dramatic socio-political changes affecting the Muslim world between 17th and 19th century. In the 19th century, Naqshbandi-Khalidi, the progenitor of Naqshbandi-Haqqani, has survived through declining power of Mughal Empire and modernising challenge of Western colonialism by engaging in internal religious reforms. This Sufi movement also managed to avoid physical repression of the Russian Tsarist Regime and hostile attitude of rising secular government of the Kemalist regime in Turkey.

Naqshbandi-Haqqani emerged under hostile religio-political environments in Syria and civil war in Lebanon in the 1970s. At the beginning, it was just a small Sufi movement that flourished exclusively among Arabic and Turkish speaking people in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Cyprus. It is an offshoot of an old Sufi tradition with a claim of continuity to the authenticity of the Prophetic tradition. Naqshbandi-Haqqani becomes a fully global Sufi movement in the 1990s when it has a permanent base in the USA. The case of Naqshbandi-Haqqani provides a good example of how transnational Sufi transmission plays a part in shaping religious piety and promoting Islamic morality in Indonesia.
Though it is not the only transnational Sufi group that currently exists, Naqshbandi-Haqqani has become the most active transnational Sufi movement in contemporary Indonesia. There are several driving factors contributing to transmission and expansion of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in particular and Sufi piety in general among Indonesian Muslims: socio-cultural, political and economic factors. The expansion of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in the late 1990s re-established these international networks in Indonesia.
Chapter 3
SUFI TRANSMISSION AND RELIGIOUS LIFE IN INDONESIA
Social and Cultural Factors

The spread of Naqshbandi-Haqqani marks the contemporary development of Sufi movement and changing religious landscape in Indonesia. From the 1970s onward, the New Order policies brought about dramatic changes in the socio-cultural life in Indonesia. The New Order regime was increasingly able to provide social and public services in large scale to the populace. Moderate secular policies of the New Order also helped piety to flourish among Muslims and diminished, though not completely, the appeal of Islamist political ideology. This chapter deals with domestic factors in the rise of contemporary Sufism in Indonesia. It shows that Sufism’s global expansion is not only determined by creative individuals with strong personalities and personal appeal but also driven by underlying socio-cultural factors. There are at least three important socio-cultural factors that determine the general acceptance of Sufism among the urban population in Indonesia: urbanisation, improvement of higher education and religious commodification.

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section examines how urbanisation and commercial life in urban setting have laid a strong socio-cultural foundation for the growth and expansion of Sufism in some segments of Indonesian society. Second section deals with changing curriculum in Islamic higher education from fiqh to philosophical-scientific oriented courses in which
Sufism and *tasawuf* are important subject matter to include. This section also examines changing student activism at secular university campuses that has been increasingly Islamic and their impact in generating educated Muslims with friendly attitude toward Sufi religious expression. The third section considers how religious commodification paves the way for introducing Sufism among Muslim urbanites. This section particularly concerns to examine five different sites of consumption through which Muslim urbanites get to know Sufi materials: 1) Islamic books, 2) Mosque/Praying House, 3) Art and Music, 4) Fashion, and 5) Travelling and Tourism. Finally, this chapter concludes by elaborating on overall argument of the chapter.

### 3.1 Urbanisation and Islamic Religiosity

Commercial relations and individualistic life-style in urban settings provide a fertile ground for the personal seeking of Islamic religiosity. This personal element of religiosity finds its social basis among the burgeoning Muslim middle-class, which is not only aware of their social prestige, but also conscious about expressing their Islamic identity. This consciousness does not manifest naturally but it is shaped through a systemic and gradual process of informal learning in urban setting.

Geertz’s classical study on Javanese society suggested that puritan Islam would eventually diminish the influence of and even replace traditional beliefs as Indonesia came to modern era and urban commercial life takes into effect (1960). Such a suggestion was not empirically correct because, instead of vanishing
completely, traditional Islamic belief like Sufism has gained popularity among contemporary urban people. On the contrary to Geertz’s suggestion, Howell (2000, 17, 2001a, 701-729, 2007a, 217-240) points out that urban Sufism is a result of the New Order’s policy to promote economic modernisation through agricultural revolution in rural areas and industrialisation in urban areas. Thus, both Geertz and Howell have converging views that urban life in Indonesia can lead to rising Islamic piety. The principal difference is that while Howell believes in the survival of Sufism as a form of emotive piety, Geertz projected its replacement by a more legalistic or *shariah* oriented Islam.

Sufi piety is not a given condition but has emerged through a series of socio-cultural changes that took place in urban areas in the last 40 years. It is partly a response to growing spiritual needs of the Muslim middle and upper classes in Indonesia (Burhani 2001, 2002). Jakarta for instance became a fertile ground for propagating activities by all Islamic groups including those with Sufi inclination because it is a metropolitan city where the development of Islamic learning in urban settings has been well established. The proliferation of *majlis taklim* (religious study club) in the early 1980s provided the social foundation for this development. Since then, there has been a gradual revival of Sufism that offers many alternatives to urban Muslim middle and upper class in Indonesia. The *majlis taklim* has become the main intermediary institutions through which urban middle-upper class Muslims gain access to Sufi materials and instructions (Abaza 2004, 173-202). The emergence of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in particular is closely associated with the burgeoning of ‘Islamic salon’ and ‘Islamic chic’ among urban Muslims in the 1980s (Abaza 2004, 173-174).
As suggested by Abaza, the term ‘Islamic salon’ refers to a popular trend among the middle and upper class in which their houses are used for religious propagation, whereas ‘Islamic chic’ refers to the circumstance in which Islamic propagation was seen to become increasingly successful, both politically and economically. This had to do with the emerging spiritual marketplace in general and particularly with ‘Urban Sufism’ in the Jakarta metropolitan area (Howell 2000, 17). Higher educational background and a wealthier status among urban Muslims has led them to be more appreciative of philosophical or theoritical Sufism (Sufi falsafi). The flourishing of adult educational institutions with Sufi inclination such as Yayasan Tadzkiyah Sejati, IiMAN, and ICNIS manages to spread Sufi teachings and devotion to the urban population in metropolitan area of Jakarta. They offer tasawuf class with a curriculum that introduces prominent Sufi philosophers such as Ibn Arabi, Jalaludin Rumi, and Al Ghazali. This growing interest in philosophical Sufism opened up for practical Sufism (Sufi amali), which was preoccupied with ritual, charismatic veneration and emotive experience.

During the 1990s, the Islamisation process became increasingly visible in all aspects of Indonesian society, leading to further changes in the landscape of Indonesia’s religious life. Sufi ritual gatherings helped to obscure the rigid demarcating line between traditionalist and modernist Muslims as a socio-cultural category (Howell 2000, 17). Promoting Sufi rituals therefore is considered necessary, if not pivotal, for teaching lay Muslims the virtue of loving the Prophet Muhammad and his family. Moreover, Sufi rituals should be promoted, especially when the Muslim community is plagued by internal discord and conflict.

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63 Interview with Mustafa Masud, 18 September 2010
The Naqshbandi-Haqqani represents further institutional development and transformation of urban Sufism in Indonesia as people become increasingly eager to attach their religious conviction and practices to a particular Sufi master/order.

In this context, the biography of Mustafa Mas’ud provides a good example of how an urban lifestyle can be compatible with Muslim religiosity. Mustafa Mas’ud was born 25 January 1947 in Jombang from the family of Pesantren Darul Ulum. His mother is a younger sister of KH Romli Tamim, a well-known Sufi master of Naqshbandi-Qadiri. In his youth, he learned from his grandfather, K.H. Romli Tamim (1888-1958) at Pesantren Darul Ulum. He finished his elementary and secondary schools at Darul Ulum before pursuing his undergraduate degree at Sunan Kalijaga Islamic State University in Yogyakarta (1970-1974). During his undergraduate studies in Yogyakarta, Mustafa Mas’ud was a student activist through his involvement with PMII, a NU-affiliate university student association.

After finishing his undergraduate degree in 1974, he moved to Jakarta where he started his career as a NGO activist at LP3ES (1975-1978). Then, he became a lecturer at Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia between 1978 and 1981. He obtained an MA degree from SOAS University of London in 1982, and pursued his PhD at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe Universitat, Frankfurt in 1983. Unfortunately, he did not complete his PhD study because of, as he described it, personal conflict with the then Indonesian ambassador to West Germany following his refusal to stop his political activism. 64

Upon returning to Indonesia in 1983, he married Syarifah Fatmah Alatas, a descendant of Sayyid Hadrami from Pekalongan, Central Java. He made a living as

64 Interview with Mustafa Mas’ud, 18 September 2010
a lecturer in Islamic studies at several private and state universities in Jakarta and Bogor (Ibn Khaldun University in Bogor, State School of Accountancy/STAN, Pancasila University, As Syafi’iyah Islamic University, and Jakarta Muhammadiyah University). It was during this period that he established a small religious study club consisting largely of university students. Mustafa Mas’ud combines his modern educational background and traditional Islamic knowledge in his religious teachings. He sought Islamic knowledge from many Muslim scholars throughout Indonesia such as Kyai Hamid Pasuruan (1914-1982), Kyai Marzuki Magelang, Kyai Dimyati (1925-2003) Pandeglang, and Kiai Thohir Pekalongan. Many of his disciples claimed that he held authority in seven different tariqah before dedicating himself solely to teaching Naqshbandi-Haqqani. He is fluent in both Arabic and English, which helps him not only to communicate effectively with Sheikh Nazim and Hisham Kabbani but also to give his own interpretation of their teachings.

Through his wife’s social connections - Fatmah Alatas was then a wedding planner/organiser for Jakarta’s middle and upper classes as well as top celebrities - Mustafa Mas’ud managed to get access to some Islamic study groups (majlis taklim) in Jakarta. With the help of his wife, Mustafa Mas’ud became a religious instructor in NAMIRA, a women Islamic study group established in 1986 and led by Tini Firdaus, wife of Firdaus Wajdi. The majority of its members came from Jakarta’s middle and upper classes and though relatively small in number, members of NAMIRA came from socio-economic backgrounds with strong connections to Jakarta’s political and business elites. Since its inception, the group has been running weekly gatherings in residential houses in Kebayoran Baru, Menteng, and
Pondok Indah. On many occasions, this Islamic study group also holds religious gatherings in luxurious five-star hotels across Jakarta. One of its principal financial patrons is Hartini Usman Affan, who was also the financial supporter of PTIQ and IIQ, the two Islamic institutions focusing on Quranic studies led by KH Ibrahim Hosen (1917-2001).

Initially, Mustafa Mas’ud acted only as a religious instructor who specialised in *fiqh*-oriented Islamic learning, such as the proper way to do ablution and obligatory prayer (*shalat*), how to measure alms (*zakat*) and voluntary donations (*infaq* and *shodaqoh*), to conduct pilgrimage journey (*haji*) and so forth. As people’s Islamic knowledge increased, however, *fiqh*-oriented religious instruction gradually became obsolete. He therefore began to focus on ritual-oriented Islamic learning by providing personal services such as leading obligatory and supererogatory prayers and giving practical guidance on reciting prayer in Arabic. He also acted as pilgrimage guide (*pemandu ziarah*) for those conducting the ritual of *hajj* and *umrah*. Though he did not make a living from this service, it enabled him to conduct the *hajj* and *umrah* many times for free.65

He continued and even expanded this service after being appointed national representative of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in 1997. As a national representative, he began to initiate people on behalf of Sheikh Hisham as well as accompanying his teacher on several journeys overseas. Mustafa Mas’ud has also accompanied Sheikh Nazim and Hisham Kabbani on pilgrimage journeys in different countries where Naqshbandi-Haqqani has historical connections. Between 1997 and 2008, he visited the shrines of Bayazid al Bistami (Iran), Sheikh Bahauddin Naqshband,

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65 Interview with Samson Nasarudin, 1 October 2010
Amir Kulal, Imam al Bukhari, and Ubaiddillah Ahrar (Uzbekistan), Sheikh Khalid al Baghdadi and Abdullah Faiz Dagestani (Syria), and Sheikh Sharafudin (Turkey).

The case of Mustafa Mas’ud provides a broader picture of socio-cultural changes affecting the Muslim middle-class in urban areas. His personal experiences reflect the dynamics of religiosity among his followers. At the beginning, informal Islamic learning took the form of *majlis taklim*, an informal forum where Muslims receive instruction in basic Islamic *shariah* provisions. Then, it transforms into *majlis dzikir* where the environment is more intimate through the introduction of collective and communal rituals. Collective ritual leads to initiation into Sufi *tarekat* when Islamic learning and collective ritual becomes more and more intense.

### 3.2 Higher Education Reform and Emerging Muslim Urbanites

Sufi resurgence is a result of a long process of higher educational reform in Islamic universities and changing nature of student activism in secular tertiary educational institutions across Indonesia. In Islamic universities, higher educational reform affects curriculum that is more appreciative to various branches of Islamic knowledge including Sufism, whereas in secular universities, declining leftist ideology and emerging authoritarian military regime lead to emerging student activism with strong Islamic orientation. Tertiary educational institutions then become a breeding ground for a new Muslim generation with positive attitude toward Sufi religious expression. Altogether, growing number of university
students and Muslim elites with university background also provide a strong social foundation for the flourishing Sufism to broader society.

Higher educational reform in Islamic universities was closely related to broader social changes following the rise of the New Order in the late 1960s. The Islamic educational reform was part of the New Order’s modernising projects affecting all sections of society. It was made possible after the demise of traditionalist domination within the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The origins of Islamic educational reform began with the appointment of Mukti Ali (1923-2004) as the Minister of Religious Affairs in 1973.\(^6^6\) Enjoying political support from Soeharto’s inner circle helped him not only to consolidate the New Order’s power within the Muslim community but also to launch policy changes in Islamic higher education that would have considerable impacts on contemporary religious life in Indonesia.\(^6^7\)

Mukti Ali’s educational background is instructive to understand how higher educational reform in Islamic state universities (IAIN) combined both traditional Sufi Pesantren and modern educational institution that made him an important Muslim scholar with a progressive religious outlook.\(^6^8\) He was a disciple of Kyai Hamid Dimyati of Pesantren Termas, a prominent Naqshbandi-Khalidi master and local Masyumi political activist who was killed during the Madiun Affair in 1948. After finishing his undergraduate study at STI (later known as Indonesia Islamic University, Yogyakarta) in the 1950s, he went on to pursue a postgraduate degree

\(^{66}\) He replaced Mohammad Dahlan (1909-1977), a Muslim politician from NU political party.

\(^{67}\) Some other religious reforms launched during his tenure as a Minister included the establishment of MUI, draft of marriage law, and interfaith dialogue.

\(^{68}\) For a complete account of the educational background of Mukti Ali, see (Munhanif 1998, 269-320)
in Islamic studies in Pakistan and at McGill University, Canada. This unique religious upbringing provided him with the skills and knowledge to become one of the first intellectual guides to a small group of young intellectuals who later pioneered Islamic neo-modernism in Indonesia. With Mukti Ali’s support, emerging pioneers of Islamic educational reform paved the way for the introduction of Sufism as a compulsory subject in tertiary curriculum.

Harun Nasution was the most important reformist. During his tenure as Rector and Director of Post Graduate Studies at the Syarif Hidayatullah Islamic State University (now UIN Jakarta), Harun introduced changes to the curriculum that would considerably transform state Islamic universities across Indonesia. He replaced fiqh-oriented curriculum with Islamic philosophy, especially kalam and tasawwuf, as compulsory subjects in the faculty of theology. He was also the first to recognise the need to adopt critical-analytical thinking, a humanistic approach and scientific methodology in dealing with complicated religious issues such as theology (kalam), revelation, predestination, and mysticism. He introduced his progressive ideas to address what he considered to be backwardness within the Muslim community in Indonesia (Cone 2002, 60-62).

Harun Nasution played an important role in spreading a Mu’tazilite-style of rational thinking among Islamic university students (Woodward, Atmaja, and Martin 1997, 159). He also helped in transforming Islamic higher education in

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69 Harun Nasution was a prominent Muslim thinker who was born on 23 September 1919 in Pematang Siantar, North Sumatra. He came from a traditional religious background. He attended Dutch elementary school before pursuing further study in Mecca, Cairo, and Canada. He finished his undergraduate degree at Al Azhar and at the American University of Cairo. He got his graduate degrees from McGill University in 1968 by writing his PhD thesis on the genesis of the rational theological thinking of the Egyptian Muslim thinker, Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905). Nasution proclaimed himself as a modern Mu’tazilite thinker.
Indonesia (Afendi 2010). Through Harun’s Islamic educational reform initiatives, Sufism is no longer seen as an area of study accessible only to the chosen few but a subject of scientific inquiry open to everyone and not immune from critical evaluation. His initiative led to a growing interest in Sufism as a philosophical or theosophical discourse among the general academic community. This reform has also had long-term consequences in a sense that Sufism is currently no longer a foreign subject on Islamic university campuses across Indonesia. Moreover, Harun’s personal devotion to Sufism also demonstrates that Islamic rationalism and mysticism are not mutually exclusive.70

All these gradual processes of educational reform in Islamic universities pave the way for incorporating Sufism into university curriculum. Unlike in the past when canonical works of Sufi masters such as Ibn Athaillah’s *Al Hikam* and Al Ghazali’s *Ihya Ulumuddin* were restricted only to those who had achieved certain level of Islamic knowledge, contemporary Sufism has become part of university curriculum and is systematically studied as part of the Islamic intellectual tradition. Sufism as a philosophical discourse is now widely accessible to many students in a completely different academic environment, which is urban, critical, and modern.

Islamic consciousness with Sufi inclination among academic community is also a result of the changing nature of student activism on secular university campuses across Indonesia. This changing nature of student activism had closely to do with two important developments within secular university campuses across

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70 He became a devout Sufi practitioner in late 1980s after being initiated by Abah Anom (1915-2011), a prominent Sufi master living in Tasikmalaya, West Java.
Indonesia. First, the New Order’s de-politicisation policy to silence dissenting opinion and to weaken campus-based popular resistance directly contributed to the decline of leftist and secular-nationalist ideologies in the secular university campuses across Indonesia. The 1974 Malari incident and NKK/BKK policy that followed dramatically changed resistance strategies from street demonstrations to Islamic preaching and learning activities. Under an oppressive environment, these changing strategies were characterised by a shift in orientation from overtly political to covertly pious activism among university student activists with university mosques as their center stage. This paved the way for deepening Islamisation at secular university campuses across Indonesia.

Islamisation and pious activism at secular university campuses involved many players and organisations. Among others, DDII (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia/Indonesian Council for Islamic Propagation), an Islamic organisation established by some former prominent Muslim politicians, played a significant role in facilitating Islamisation in secular universities through the 1970s. By sponsoring religious training and providing scholarships for student activists, DDII helped to establish a nationwide network of student activists with a strong Islamic orientation. At first glance, this student activism appears to be replicating Islamist ideals as previously represented by Masyumi, the predecessor of DDII. Through personal connection between Muhammad Nastsir and Saudi-funded World Islamic League, DDII also created the precondition for the acceptance of Salafi ideas among

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71 Malari is an Indonesian acronym for ‘Malapetaka Lima Belas Januari’ (15 January Tragedy). It refers to a mass riot that took place in Jakarta on 15 January 1974 to protest the state official visit of Japanese Prime Minister, Kakue Tanaka. Whereas NKK/BKK (Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus/Badan Kordinasi Kampus) is a policy issued by Minister of Education, Daud Jusuf, to suppress student political activities at university campuses throughout Indonesia.
Muslim student activists at secular universities across Indonesia (Hasan 2002, 36). However, this new generation of pious Muslims with higher educational background actually embraced more diverse religious outlooks. Islamisation on university campuses therefore led to a new Islamic consciousness that was neither Islamist in political outlook nor Salafist in religious conviction. Among student activists affiliated to the tarbiyah movement, a campus-based student activism inspired by Egyptian Ikhwanul Muslim (Muslim Brotherhood), for instance, there are some who also adopted the Sufi teachings of Hasan al Banna (Machmudi 2008).

Second, the changing nature of student activism also had to do with the changing social background of those attending secular university campuses. The New Order’s economic development enabled people from diverse socio-religious backgrounds to attend universities. Unlike the previous era when the number of universities were limited, the oil boom in the 1970s widened this access as the government established and opened more public universities in provincial capitals and district towns. The number of universities grew further as the private sector founded their own universities in the 1980s. The growing number of possibilities for university education resulted not only in a large number of university students but also social mobility as university graduates coming from diverse social backgrounds sought professional expertise in the modern economic sector.

The New Order’s policies greatly affected rural and NU communities. Unlike the previous era when secular higher education was only accessible to a privileged few especially those coming from aristocratic and urban background, the opening of public and private universities generated a growing number of
university students coming from Muslim communities. Following the Muhammadiyah community which had stepped forward in higher education, there was a growing number of those coming from rural NU communities enrolling and graduating from universities. This number grew significantly after mid 1980s when NU officially declared its political support to the ruling regime.\(^{72}\)

Many of university students coming from an NU and Muhammadiyah background then played a significant role in the dynamics of student activism at secular universities through their involvement in extra campus organisations such as HMI (Islamic Student Association), PMII (Indonesia Muslim Student Movement), and KAMMI (Indonesia Muslim Student Action Front).\(^{73}\) While there was a growing number of Muslim student activists increasingly exposed to transnational Salafi and Islamist ideas, those who committed to Indonesian Islamic tradition remained large in number. Former Muslim student activists who took up academic and political positions in the 1980s and 1990s were relatively open-minded toward Sufi religious expressions. It is not a coincidence that Mustafa Mas’ud and Firdaus Wajdi, two of the first propagators of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia, had a strong background in student activism in the late 1960s and early 1970s through their affiliation to PMII and HMI respectively. The combination of diverse social backgrounds and diminishing ideological divergence thus leads to a student activism that was no longer sharply demarcated along social class and ideological lines.

\(^{72}\) The 1926 khittah as proclaimed during the NU national conference in Situbondo in 1984

\(^{73}\) Though NU and Muhammadiyah remain the two largest Muslim groups in Indonesia, a growing number of new Muslims groups have emerged and flourished, some of which are splinter groups of NU or Muhammadiyah. Other groups such as HTI and Tarbiyah movement attract young Muslim followers who are disillusioned with mainstream religious organisations.
3.3 Religious Commodification and Site of Consumption

Sufi resurgence in contemporary Indonesia cannot be understood simply as a religious phenomenon. It is closely related to the considerable improvement of living standards of the Muslim population in Indonesia. Economic development has given rise to a new Muslim middle-class with a cosmopolitan lifestyle characterised by unabashed consumerism (Fealy and White 2008a, Hasan 2009, 229-250). Economic development also facilitates the marketisation and commodification of various Islamic products, while education improves literacy and comprehension of Islamic symbols. Religiosity is increasingly dictated by considerations such as pleasure and fun to meet post-material needs. A combining factor of high educational background and wealthy status thus lead people to approach religion in the same way as they do with consumer goods. As people nowadays understand and practice it, religion is definitely not a consumer product, but a consumer culture with contemporary capitalist influences (Hiariej 2009, Rudnyckyj 2009). Under this general improvement of economic condition and market liberalisation that followed, popularity of both Sufi falsafi and Sufi amali among urban Muslims marks adaptability of Sufism to meet changing the religious needs of modern people.

Moreover, nowadays, Islamic propagation no longer relies on direct contact; instead, modern media outlets and elaborate marketing strategy will determine the success or failure of religious propagation. Good packaging and intrinsic high quality of the product are a must for a successful propagating mission to reach the hearts and minds of Indonesian Muslims. In an economic sense, Sufi religiosity is thus a matter of consumeristic desire expressed in different sites of consumption:
Islamic books, Islamic healing, mosque and praying house, art and music, fashion, and travelling and tourism. It is through them that Indonesian Muslims satisfy and express their newly found religiosity. Altogether they have facilitated the dissemination of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia from the late 1990s.

3.3.1 Islamic Books

Sufism has been known through Islamic books that are currently available and easily accessible in bookstores throughout Indonesia. Islamic books are currently very popular as they satisfy consumers’ desire for religious products as well as offering practical solutions to, advice and guidance on problems in daily life. Practical solutions range from reciting certain surah of the Quran, performing *dzikir*, formulae of daily prayers, to other supererogatory rituals (*amalan sunnah*). Sufi self-help books often contain popular psychological topics, Islamic healing methods (*thibbun nabawi*) and healthy foods.

For instance, the popular psychological topics commonly identify the source of all human problems as the tendency to follow ego (*nafs*). Preoccupation with ego (*nafs*) gives rise to arrogance, greed, hypocrisy, stinginess, and excessive love of the world (*hubuddunya*) that eventually leads to psychological and physical problems. To achieve real inner peace, Sufi self-help books prescribe initiating every action with a good intention by reciting *bismillah* (in the name of God), maintaining silent *dzikir* in every breath one take and reciting *istighfar* (to ask for forgiveness) for any mistakes or sins. The purpose of this method is to change an individual’s mindset and behavior so that every action becomes a meaningful
expression of total devotion. Fighting the demands of the ego, therefore, is in fact an umbrella topic in most of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s self-help books.

Self-help advice also touches upon other practical matters such as healing and halal food recipes. In Terapi Alamiah—a book translated and published by Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia in 2008—Sheikh Nazim identified more than 100 different health problems/diseases that could be cured through natural or herbal treatments. Self-help book puts great emphasis on how to provide food properly in accordance to shariah prescriptions. These books, as suggested by Reynolds, do not only deal with the legal aspect of food but also integrate dietary habits “into the whole daily-life of the disciples which must be a nourishing routine of spiritual training” (2000, 198). For instance, in Secrets of Heavenly Food and Heavenly Foods, two self-help books written by Sheikh Nazim’s wife and are popular among the disciples of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Jakarta, deals with cooking guide, dietary habits, and Islamic foods. These kinds of book not only prescribe food menus but also good etiquette or adab by advising reader to recite basmallah while preparing to serve foods.

Smoking is another important health issue that Sufi books of the self-help genre deal with. In No Smoking: Merokok Akar Semua Masalah for example, Sheikh Nazim said that smoking leads people astray. He relates smoking habit to people’s inability to control their own ego; therefore he strongly discourages smoking, quoting his master’s narrative that identifies tobacco as the devil’s tree which is not worth touching, let alone consuming. In the book, Sheikh Nazim rhetorically said that,
“Smoking for a believer is something like letting a small hole to be used by a thief. While you have already closed all doors for committing big sin, it would be meaningless so long as you let the small door remain open…”

Furthermore, Sufi books attract a large number of readers because they are entertaining, using as illustrations stories of extraordinary piety, wisdom, asceticism, miracles, humor, and even satire which are absent in the standard fiqh-oriented Islamic books. Sufi books telling stories of angels, demons, the miracles of the Prophet and great saints, paradise, hell, the after-life, and death mystery have become a source of leisure and entertainment.

Islamic books on spiritual healing are also instrumental in introducing Sufism to Indonesian Muslims. It refers to a method of healing that puts emphasis on the strength of prayer and ritual for curing physical health problems. Muhammad Salahuddin’s book, entitled ‘Mystic Healing: Panduan Praktis Menjadi Penyembuh dengan Pendekatan Spiritual dan Bekam’, is perhaps the best example of how Naqshbandi-Haqqani is introduced to the general public through healing. Published in 2006 by Hikmah publisher (an affiliate of Mizan publisher), as the title suggests, this book offers a practical guide to apply bekam and rukyah as an alternative healing method for any health problems. According to Salahuddin, medicine or syifa for any health problems could be obtained by combining rukyah and shodaqoh (charity act) through the intermediary of Sufi saints.

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74 Sufism became known among urban Muslims through the work of Abah Anom, an alternative healer and Naqshbandi Qadiri’s Sufi master of Pesantren Suralaya who was known for his Inabah – a healing method applied for curing drug addicts. During his lifetime, Abah Anom established more than 20 Pondok Inabah throughout Indonesia for helping those diagnosed of drug-related problems.
Sufi books on health and healing based on a person’s account and testimony about their spiritual experiences during the healing process are another way of introducing Sufism to the populace. One of these books is Amin Syukur’s *Zikir Menyembuhkan Kanker* (Reciting God invocation cures my cancer), which was published in 2007 by Hikmah publisher. Amin Syukur is a Professor of Islamic Studies at Walisongo Islamic State University in Semarang who suffered cancer but survived. As the title suggested, Amin shared his personal account and testimony regarding his struggle against and triumph over cancer. In short, Islamic books and their popularity play a part in promoting and introducing Sufism to the general public.

### 3.3.2 Mosque and Praying House

The Muslim worshipping places consist of mosques and other smaller praying houses such as mushola and *langgar* which are not used for Friday prayer. Mosque, as commonly understood, is a worshipping place where obligatory prayers is conducted regularly. It is also a place where communal prayer involving a large number of Muslims is carried out weekly/annually. Ridwan al-Makassary and Ahmad Gaus (2010), through their studies of mosques in Jakarta and Solo, show that mosques have become very important in recent years because they are a site of contestation among different religious groups with contrasting religious outlook. The mosque is also a site of consumption because the Friday sermon is often used for the quest for material incentives (Muzakki 2010, 67-82).
Complementing the previous study, the case of Naqshbandi-Haqqani reveals that mosque is a site of contestation as well as of consumption because access to and controlling over mosque has to do with social economic status. Mosque is now more than just a worshipping place. It serves as a public place where certain Islamic beliefs and doctrines are transmitted, obligatory and superregulatory rituals are performed, and religious symbols are displayed. A mosque running successfully relies on the financial support of its regular attendees. By building and providing a mosque with financial support have become a consuming habit among wealthy Muslims in Indonesia. Changes in religious preferences of the financial supporter would eventually influence not only mosque’s organising committee but also other regular attendees.

Of the 731,776 worshipping places registered with the Ministry of Religious Affairs in 2004, there are 643,832 Muslim worshipping places throughout Indonesia. Though an exact figure is not available, there is growing number of mosques and praying houses which are built or financially supported by wealthy Muslims. Financial patronage enables to change ritual habit and religious preferences practiced in mosque and praying house. The story of Sunarto and Sutono Joyosuparto, two senior Naqshbandi-Haqqani disciples, is indicative of the relationship of mosque, economic patronage, and Sufi religiosity.

Since the early 2000s, Soenarto has donated a large amount of money to buy land for the construction of a mosque. For instance, he donated a large amount of money to build a mosque in Sukabumi, West Java. The mosque itself is part of a large boarding school complex of Pesantren Darus Syifa al Fitrat that he also financially supported. He also built and donated a large building complex as a
retreat centre for conducting seclusion (*suluk*) in Cikereteg, Bogor. It is part of his villa used for family vacation. The construction of this retreat center was completed in December 2003, costing a total of Rp 2.3 billion.\(^75\) Relating to what he had done, he said as follows:

“As a businessman, I have been through a hardship and success many times. While I used to ask for more from God, it is time to give back in His path. I am happy with what I have right now. I felt grateful that I spend a lot to build the mosque and school.”

Another devout disciple, Sutono Joyosuparto, also shared a similar experience. Donating a piece of land in his hometown, Kuningan, West Java, he built a mosque that could cater up to 250 people. He was once a successful architect who, after retirement, had more than enough to live on. He donated the land and built a mosque on it soon after visiting Sheikh Hisham in the USA in early 2000s.\(^76\)

On the surface, it is an act of piety in the hope for spiritual reward, but fulfilling material needs and desire is also a driving force behind his pious act. Financial support enables both Sunarto and Sutono Joyosuparto to dictate what kind of rituals would be conducted in the mosque. According to Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s sources, KH Ece Supriyatna, Imam of the mosque who is also leader of Pesantren Darus Syifa al Fitrat was at first not a Sufi follower. Some of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples in Jakarta described him as an educated person with Salafi inclination. Generous donations from the Sunarto family certainly play a part in his decision to join Naqshbandi-Haqqani. Nowadays, *dzikir* is part of the daily religious praxis in the mosque. Similarly, *dzikir* has been conducted on a

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\(^{75}\) Interview with Abdurrauf Kurniadi, 30 September 2010  
\(^{76}\) Interview with Sutono Joyosuparto, 14 August 2010
regular basis in mosque donated and built by the Sutono family in Kuningan, West Java.

3.3.3 Popular Music

Music has been playing an important role in the transmission of Islamic traditions. The use of dance and music represents a deliberate effort to propagate Sufism not only as a complex theological, doctrinal and philosophical teaching but also an enjoyable communal festivity (Peterson 2008, 271-295). It is not uncommon that Sufi communal ritual includes art and music performances (Geertz 1960). The new styles and consumption patterns in music have to do with the current making of public sphere and youth culture (Sutton 2011, 212).

Art and music performance is part of the entertainment industry through which Indonesian Muslims get to know about Sufism and Sufi materials. Sufi themes spread to general audience and can be found in song lyrics produced by well-known music bands or famous individual performer. Popular cultural expression of contemporary Islam appears in various cultural products such as audiocassettes, CDs and DVDs and is manifested in form of religious musical albums (*album religi*) and movies. There are three that are worth to mention: Haddad Alwi’s and Sulis’ *Cinta Rasul*, *Laskar Cinta* of Dewa 19, and Opick’s religious songs.

*Cinta Rasul* (Love the Prophet) is a musical album recorded and distributed by Sony BMG in 1999. It is the most successful religious album ever made in Indonesia, with a record of 1.3 million copies sold. It contained eight *sholawat*
songs by Haddad Alwi and Sulistyowati. Haddad Alwi is of Sayyid Hadhrami background, while Sulistyowati (aka Sulis as she is known to her fans), was only nine years old then. This musical album is a good example of how the Islamic message is marketed as a popular cultural product. The album contains religious songs that emphasize the importance of loving the Prophet and one’s parents, two traditional religious themes popular among Sufi adherents.

The *Laskar Cinta* (Warriors of Love) is a musical album launched in 2004. This musical album consisted of 12 songs written by Ahmad Dhani, the founder and lead vocalist of Dewa 19, a popular rock band in Indonesia. The musical album has a strong Sufi flavour with lyrics inspired by various prominent Sufi figures (Wahyudi 2007). The title ‘Laskar Cinta’ itself was intended as a counter message to ‘Laskar Jihad’ which was notorious for its violent activism in Moluccas (Hasan 2002, 145-169). The Laskar Cinta sold almost a half million copies and attracted strong criticism from some Muslim activists and groups such as Ridwan Saidi, FPI, and FUI on the grounds that it delivered deviant teachings.

Meanwhile, Opick’s religious songs are attributed to a contemporary famous Indonesian performer, Opick, a nickname for Ainur Rofiq lil Fairdaus. He was born in Jember on 16 March 1974, and started his career as an entertainer and performer by launching a musical album entitled *Istighfar* in 2005. This musical album sold more than 800,000 copies and became one of the best selling Islamic albums in Indonesia. Unlike Ahmad Dhani who focuses on a rock musical genre, Opick has gained fame through his brand image as a singer of *lagu ruhani* (spiritual songs). His ‘Best of Opick’ album launched in 2011 included Islamic

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77 His first album, *Istighfar*, became a *hit* in 2005 and received double platinum with a total of 300,000 copies sold.
songs with a strong Sufi message such as *Tombo Ati, Rumput Bertasbih*, and *Shollu Ala Muhammad*.78

While Hadad Alwi’s and Opick’s songs share traditional Sufi messages on the importance of loving the Prophet and the need for remembrance of God, Ahmad Dhani’s songs cite universal love and humanity. Through his songs, Ahmad Dhani also expresses admiration for some controversial Sufi figures such as Al Hallaj, Bayazid al Bistami, Jalaludin Rumi, and Ibn Arabi.79 Song lyrics, accompanying music and the controversies they aroused introduced popular Sufism to lay Muslims in a way that was unimaginable before. Islam gained currency in determining Indonesian popular music (Sutton 2011). In the larger context, art and music represent contemporary popular culture that facilitates the shaping of Muslim piety among the middle-class in urban areas (Heryanto 2011, 60-82).

### 3.3.4 Fashion

Fashion is another site of consumption through which Indonesian Muslims find their way to Sufism. Fashion refers to any popular styles worn or attached as bodily accessories. It includes but not exclusively relates to popular styles in clothes, shoes, hairstyle, and so forth. In the contemporary world, fashion is not only consumer goods, but also an industry and lucrative business that generates profit by selling distinct brand image and maintaining exclusive claim of authenticity. Sufi groups in general and Naqshbandi-Haqqani in particular are fashionably attractive because they wear distinctive symbolic goods and accessories such as the long gown, turban, walking staff, praying beads, pin logo, 

78 Opick was reported to have been initiated into Naqshbandi-Haqqani in 2011.
79 Interview with Jerry Marmen, brother-in law of Ahmad Dhani, 18 May 2012
ring, *tawiz*, tooth-stick (*siwak*), fragrance *dupa*, and eye-liner (*celak*). They are also known for their distinctive long beards, and the custom of calling their fellow devotees *sheikh*.

The long gown, turban, *tawiz* and pin are the most important items of clothing. The long gowns are in the style of clothing common in the Middle East. Male disciples wear the long gown during communal rituals and public events involving the Naqshbandi-Haqqani community. Similarly, the turban is a head covering made from a long piece of cambric that is neatly wrapped up over the head. It comes in different colors such as white, green, black, purple or red. Each color is worn for a different purpose. Pin is a miniature replica of the Prophet’s sandals, whereas *tawiz* is a logo written in Arabic with the word Allahu Haqq embossed on leather and often used as an amulet. The miniature replica of the Prophet’s sandal is made of platinum, gold or simply metal attached to the turban or the long gown, while the *tawiz* is worn as a necklace, put in a wallet or hang on a wall.

Before long, all the accessories are available online to buy using credit card or international money order. The accessories and their distinct appearance show the disciples’ devotion to their master. In fact, Naqshbandi-Haqqani community in America develops special websites that function as an online shopping site. There are two websites used for this purpose.\(^8^0\) Both websites display various Islamic products ranging from books, calligraphy, rings, clothes, fragrance, beads, to other accessories. Although deliberately designed as promotional, the products themselves are not regarded by the disciples merely as commercial products.

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\(^8^0\) These two websites are [http://www.isn1.net](http://www.isn1.net) and [http://www.paradisenecklaces.com/](http://www.paradisenecklaces.com/)
Instead, the disciples consider buying such products as a pious act. The books written by Sheikh Nazim Adel, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani and other products, for instance, are highly sought after as expression of piety and devotion.

3.3.5 Travelling and Tourism

Ziarah is a popular religious practice among Indonesian Muslims. It is a ritualised practice of visiting graves to show respect and to pray over the dead. This practice is believed by Muslims to have the power of conferring divine blessing (barakah) on the living, a symbolic pious act to remind the living of the virtues of pious Muslims who have passed away (Jamhari 1995, Muhaimin 2006, Christomy 2008). The practice of ziarah also provides reference to the past and signifies ritualised aspects of popular Islam in Indonesia (Fox 1991, 19, 2002, 160).

Contrary to common understanding that it is just a remnant of an old-fashioned rural tradition, pilgrimage journey is now a lucrative business. Ziarah is also attractive especially for those seeking spiritual retreat and alternative tourism. The practice of ziarah allows the urban upper-middle class to express their religiosity. The practice of ziarah now resembles travelling and visiting tourist destinations. Travelling overseas and visiting domestic tourist destination is a leisure activity common among urban people in Indonesia. As recorded by Asniar Sahab in a book entitled Anugerah Ilahi: Perjalanan Spiritual Selebriti ke Baitullah (Divine Blessing: The Spiritual Journey of Celebrities to Baitullah),
performing *hajj* and *umrah* in a group by bringing their own guide has become a popular trend among celebrities and upper-middle classes in Jakarta.\(^{81}\)

Muhammad Salahudin (Kang Din) is perhaps the only person in the Naqshbandi-Haqqani community who transforms pilgrimage journey into a modern consumption habit to express the new religiosity among urban Muslims. At the beginning, he only organised a modest *ziarah* visit to local pilgrimage sites in Jakarta and surrounding areas.\(^{82}\) This pilgrimage journey only took a few hours and was normally held between midnight and sunrise prayer times. Next, he successfully organised *ziarah* to some well-known pilgrimage sites across Java.

At least once a year, he organised and led pilgrimage journey to several pilgrimage sites such as Sunan Gunungjati/Cirebon, Sheikh Abdul Muhyi/Pamijahan, Sheikh Panjalu/Ciamis, Batu tulis/Bogor), Sunan Kalijaga, Raden Patah, Sunan Kudus and Sunan Muria, Sunan Ampel/Surabaya, Sunan Giri, Sunan Drajet, KH Kholil Bangkalan, Maulana Malik Ibrahim, etc. The journey took between 3 and 5 days by using executive bus of 2-2 seats. The costs ranged from Rp 1,5 million to 2,5 million or Rp 500,000/day/person and included accommodation in 2 or 3 stars hotel. He managed to attract around 25 and 50 people for each trip.

Since 2011, he has begun to organise pilgrimage journeys overseas, visiting pilgrimage sites in several countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, Turkey and

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\(^{81}\) Asniar Shahab’s book was published by Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia in 2001.

\(^{82}\) In Jakarta and surrounding areas, Kang Din has organised pilgrimage journeys to local pilgrimage sites such as the shrine of Habib Husein bin Abubakar Alaydrus/Luar Batang in North Jakarta, Habib Kuncung/Kalibata, Habib Ali Abdurrahman al-Habsyi/Kwitang, and Pangeran Jayakarta/Jatinegara.
From 28 September to 5 October 2011, for instance, Kang Din led a pilgrimage journey to Turkey and Cyprus. During his stay in Cyprus, he and his entourage made *ziarah* visit to the tombs of the 7 companions of the Prophet buried there and also the shrine of Santo Barnabas in Cyprus. Kang Din also paid visit to the then living Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s masters, Sheikh Nazim Haqqani in Lefke, Cyprus and Muhammad Adil, Sheikh Nazim’s son and deputy, in Istanbul.

In Turkey, Kang Din led *ziarah* to Bursa where several Muslim tombs with historical and spiritual connection to Naqshbandi-Haqqani are located, such the tomb of Sheikh Sharafudin and Jamaludin al Ghumuqi, the 38th and 35th in the Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s *silsilah*. This *ziarah* visit ended with a visit to popular tourist destinations such as the Blue Mosque, Hagia Shopia Museum, and Topkapi Palace. As shown in the itinerary, this was not purely a *ziarah* because there was also an element of tourism in it.

The way Muhammad Salahudin promotes the practice of *ziarah* is instructive in understanding how this popular practice has been transformed into a new form of brand marketing. He identifies his *ziarah* visit as *Wisata Sufi* (Sufi Tourism) rather than simply a *ziarah*. This reflects his inclination to frame *ziarah* as a modern form of spiritual tourism. He offers his *ziarah* visit either as economical or exclusive tour packages with different prices and facilities. Kang Din also performs a dual role: a spiritual guide in traditional *ziarah* as well as a

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83 For the complete list of pilgrimage journeys conducted by Muhammad Salahudin, see [http://www.heavenlyhealingteam.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=featured&Itemid=180](http://www.heavenlyhealingteam.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=featured&Itemid=180)
tourist guide and travel agent. He would normally book in advance a comfortable accommodation and coach for travelling.\textsuperscript{84}

This tourism element becomes more apparent after Kang Din begins to conduct \textit{ziarah} on a regular basis. This element of tourism indicates that the current practice of \textit{ziarah} indeed has commercial aspects (Quinn 2008, 63-79). Though Kang Din flatly denies any economic motive in the \textit{ziarah} visits he organises, it is not difficult to see that he is in the position to make some profit as he is the only person who has the experience to arrange overseas and domestic pilgrimage journeys regularly. He even acknowledges that he has and will continue to maintain a good personal relationship with some travel agents and autobus companies in Jakarta for this purpose.\textsuperscript{85} This sometimes invites criticism from some disciples on the basis that \textit{ziarah} should not be carried out for commercial purposes but because of their growing popularity, Kang Din continues to organise these visits.

In the Naqshbandi-Haqqani community, the practice of \textit{ziarah} has become a signifier of collective identity and cultural fashion because it marks the boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’. As a collective identity marker, the practice of \textit{ziarah} is an outward ritual that distinguishes between the so-called ‘true Salaf’ and ‘fake Salaf’. Amid growing hostility toward this popular practice in the name of Islamic purification, \textit{ziarah} is used by Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples to identify ‘others’ based on the simple criterion of whether they accept and reject this ritual.

\textsuperscript{84} Interview with Muhammad Salahudin, 14 August 2010
\textsuperscript{85} Interview with Muhammad Salahudin, 19 November 2010
3.4 Conclusion

This chapter has examined and offered comment on the changing religious life in Indonesia in the last 40 years and its impact in generating favourable environment for Sufism to flourish among Indonesian Muslims. Urbanisation and higher education laid a strong foundation as they opened up opportunities for Indonesian Muslims to express their Islamic identity. Economic improvement and an increase in wealthy also paved the way for changing religious preferences as urban Muslims came to know about Sufism through indirect and unconventional ways. These socio-cultural and economic factors helped to establish a broader context through which Sufism was able to gain followers in Indonesia. Transnational Sufi transmission in Indonesia is not a sudden or a recent religious phenomenon. This process is closely related to state policy and market liberalisation that had been implemented since 1980s. The flourishing development of Naqshbandi-Haqqani represents a gradual process in a changing religious landscape and broader sociocultural transformation that had been taking hold in Indonesia during the New Order.
Chapter 4

E-SUFISM AND ONLINE ACTIVISM
The Media and Technology

The information revolution of the late twentieth century, generally subsumed under the title of globalization, has both posed dangers and offered new opportunities for the Sufi movement in general, and the Naqshbandiyya in particular…The most visible among the contemporary Naqshbandi branches, and arguably Sufi brotherhoods at large, on the global scene is the Haqqaniya branch (Weismann 2007, 166).

Globalisation has had overarching transformational effect within Muslim society in which Islamic messages are increasingly disseminated through mediation of information and communication technology. The new development of information technology has to some extent diminished direct and face-to-face transmissions of religious knowledge. Ernst (2003, 4) has suggested that the use of mediated communication affects all Islamic groups and that Sufi movements in particular has been forced to adapt to this new situation and, in accord with this process, have reinterpreted their teachings to conform to this situation. He has further argued that globalisation led to the so-called ‘publication of the secret’, referring to media representation of Sufism on the Internet.

Mediated communication and information technology has generated unprecedented situations for the dissemination of Islamic knowledge through cyberspace. Islamic preaching is also increasingly transmitted indirectly by way of online activism. Bunt (2003, 7) has identified two main Islamic notions currently disseminated on the Internet: jihad and fatwa. Furthermore, the Internet has “reshaped the boundaries of Muslim networks, created new dialogues, and
presented new transaction routes within the Islamic knowledge economy” (Bunt 2009, 276).

This chapter will elaborate further Ernst’s and Bunt’s suggestions on the influence of globalisation and information technology to the pattern of dissemination and transmission of Sufism and their impact in Indonesia. This chapter argues that mediated-communication and modern technology (the internet) has practically generated e-Sufism and online activism, which are unprecedented in the history of Sufi transnational transmission. To support the argument, this chapter consists of 4 parts. First, it examines the adoption modern technology and its effect in changing strategy of 

dakwah

following growing marginalisation in the USA in the late 1990s. Second, it deals with the adoption of information technology and its impact in generating E-Sufism. The third part will look at how the Internet influences in the making of online activism among Indonesian disciples.

4.1 Information Technology and Change of Transmission Method

Prior to the 1980s, Naqshbandi-Haqqani was disseminated through conventional methods of direct personal contact and the personal preaching effort of Sheikh Nazim al-Haqqani. This personal contact was made possible through patronage relationships, commercial relations, and personal encounters. Among Sufi followers, there is a common term that refers to ‘heart-to-heart’ as the principal mode of transmission by which Sufi knowledge is passed among close-knit relations. Afterwards, the dissemination of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teachings took another form of transmission by using modern media and written publications.
Indirect transmission brought along and opened new opportunities to reach out to a broader audience. It also addressed the limits of space and time that direct personal contact inherently had.

The use of modern media and written publications began with Sheikh Nazim Haqqani’s disciples in Western Europe who recorded, published and disseminated his sermons in print form. The publication of *Mercy Oceans* – a collection of Abdullah Faiz’s speeches – in 1980 set the path. Since then, disciples of Naqshbandi-Haqqani have compiled about 21 books containing numerous *sohbet* given by Sheikh Nazim Haqqani. Until the early 1990s, these publications were disseminated on a limited scale. Publications in English increased significantly following the migration of Sheikh Hisham to the USA in 1991.

The *Muslim Magazine* became the first print media through which Sheikh Hisham Kabbani endeavoured to reach a broader audience in the USA. During the 1990s, this periodical had around 20,000 active subscribers.\(^86\) When the magazine ceased publication in 1999, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani followed his master’s steps by writing books and treatises. In total, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani has written about 30 books and Sufi treatises. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani’s close aides such as G.F. Haddad, Hedieh Mirahmadi, and Noorjan Mirahmadi also wrote books elaborating on Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teachings as they received them from their master, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani. Haddad, in particular, was the most prolific writer. He wrote more than 10 books detailing the teachings of Sheikh Hisham Kabbani.

The revolution in information technology in the 1990s changed everything. While Sufi materials could only be accessed by very few people and by very

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\(^{86}\) Interview with G.F. Haddad, 19 November 2010
limited means in the past, they could now easily be reproduced electronically in
cyber media. Cyberspace thus became one of the primary sites through which Sufi
 teachings are disseminated and where disciples go to seek guidance. The revolution
in information technology and growing interest in Sufism have driven some Sufi
movements to use the Internet as their main preaching media. There are currently
more than a hundred active websites affiliated with Sufi groups around the world,
as well as hundreds of websites/blogs affiliated to prominent Sufi masters.87

Although Naqshbandi-Haqqani is definitely not the only Sufi movement
using the Internet, it provides a valuable case study on how the use of the Internet
transforms not only the way Sufi teachings are disseminated but how new meaning
is given to that ‘googling’ experience. In previous eras, Sufism was a matter of
active personal quest often achieved through a physical journey, now ‘googling’
activities on the Internet fulfill this same function. Initially, googling was a journey
for those seeking spiritual awareness and searching for a Sufi master. Eventually,
googling, however, became an act of piety and an expression of respect and
veneration toward a particular Sufi master. In this regard, the internet has become a
sacred site to carry-out personal and communal acts of piety.

Among Naqshbandi-Haqqani, the use of the Internet for the purposes of
dakwah was not known until 1991 when Sheikh Hisham Kabbani moved to the
USA. This new creative way of preaching was initiated for the first time by Sheikh
Hisham Kabbani and his disciples in the USA. Yet, at the beginning, the internet

87 Their activities are also routinely monitored through Alan Godlas’ website
(http://www.sufinews.org/) which is currently the most representative website reporting Sufi
activities all over the world. Since its first appearance in 2005, the blog has covered more than
3000 reports worldwide.
had a relatively minor role for teaching and preaching purposes. Until 1994, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani was still preoccupied with the conventional method of Sufi transmission (direct, face to face contact). At the time, he was using At Tauhid Mosque in San Diego, South California, as his main base for that purpose. To reach out to a broader audience, he relied only on the *Muslim Magazine*, a periodical with a few thousand subscribers for which he was chief editor. With limited resources and media at his disposal, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani could reach out to only a handful of loyal disciples.

The adoption of the Internet began to be seriously managed only after 1994. There were four main reasons for this adoption. First, the use of the Internet reflected a strong millenarian belief. Because the end of days was imminent, propagation of Sufi teachings should be as massive as possible and by any means. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani repeatedly emphasized that Naqshbandi-Haqqani did not only rely on direct personal contact but also on non-physical/indirect contact for transmission of its teachings. This was closely related to the so-called “Uwaysi” spiritual transmission, a distinct Sufi transmission in which direct personal meeting between the master and disciple is considered unnecessary. On many occasions during fieldwork, many disciples acknowledged that the Internet was their first encounter with Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teachings and with either Sheikh Nazim or Sheikh Hisham Kabbani. They came to believe that finding the Haqqani websites did not happen by accident but it was predestined by God.

88 Interview with Gibril F. Haddad, 19 November 2010
89 Uwaysi is attributed to Uways al Qarni, a pious Muslim who lived during the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad but never directly met him. It was reported that he died during the Battle of Shiffin in 657 between Umayyad and Ali ibn Thalib, the Prophet’s son-in-law Syria during which he supported Ali’s troops. For details about Uwaysi transmission, see http://naqshbandi.org/topics/uwaysi.htm
Second, the Internet provided a better platform for marketing because it helped Sheikh Hisham Kabbani to propagate his mission more broadly. This began in 1994 when Sheikh Hisham Kabbani accidentally became involved in an electronic debate on a mailinglist affiliated to the Muslim Students Association (MSA), an organisation for Muslim students in the US and Canada. The circumstances surrounding the debate are not completely clear because the MSA’s mailing list where the debate was posted cannot be accessed anymore.\(^{90}\) From the materials I have managed to trace, however, the debate occurred on 6 September 1994 on the MSA’s mailing list between those who were pro and contra Sufi teachings. At the beginning, the online encounter only involved members of the MSA’s mailinglist. The debate was about Sufism and its position within Islamic tradition.

The debate then led some members on the mailinglist to invite other authoritative figures to join the debate. This began when Jawad Ahmed,\(^{91}\) a student at the Department of Chemistry and Physical Sciences at the University of Maryland, posted a list of questions on the mailinglist. The list of questions was an open intellectual challenge raised by Sheikh Muhammad S. Adly, identified as a Salafi scholar who happened to be a religious teacher for all of those opposing Sufism on the MSA’s mailing list.\(^{92}\) The questions dealt with the definition of *tasawwuf* and legitimate religious basis for such teachings/practices in Islam.

\(^{90}\) The debate was reposted on Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s old websites (http://naqshbandi.net) which is also currently no longer accessible.
\(^{91}\) ahmed@wam.umd.edu
\(^{92}\) Sheikh Muhammad S. Adly was described as an Islamic scholar who was an Imam and Director of the Islamic Center and Al-Mumenin Mosque in Columbia, South Carolina. He was also described by his supporters as a former religious teacher at the Masjid Al-Haraam in Mecca and a former Chairman of Muslim World League.
The six questions were: 1). “What is Tasawwuf? Please give a detailed definition and explanation of the meaning of this terminology and the word itself?, 2). Are there any dhaleels (proofs & evidences) from the Quran in regards to Tasawwuf? If there are, then please state them explicitly? 3). Are there any dhaleels (proofs & evidences) from the Ahadeeths of our Prophet (saw) on Tasawwuf and its practices? If there are, then please verify their authenticity and state them explicitly? 4). Was our Prophet (saw) a Sufi? If yes, then please give vivid evidences from the Quran and the Sunnah only? 5). Did the Prophet (saw) practice Sufism or Tasawwuf? If yes, then please give evidence from the Quran and Sunnah only? 6). Did the Prophet (saw) tell/order or even recommend this, meaning Sufism and Tasawwuf? If yes, then please give us evidences from the Quran and Sunnah of the Prophet (saw) only?”

These questions were referred to Sheikh Hisham Kabbani by one of his students (Matteen Shiddique) who was a member of the mailing list. With the help of Matteen Shiddique, Sheikh Hisham then posted his written answer on the MSA.Net mailing list on 9 September 1994.93 In the course of the debate, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani elaborated his answer in detail on the undisputable place of Sufism within Islam. He also explained the textual basis in the Quran and Hadith of this religious practice. Interestingly, he quoted his primary sources mostly from Ibn Taymiyya’s Majmu'a Fatawa and al-Mukhtasar al-Fatawa al-Masriyya which was the main reference of his opponent. Sheikh Hisham even demonstrated that Ibn Taimiyah never completely rejected Sufism, but only certain aspects of Sufism.

93 Matteen Shiddique is a Pakistani-American US citizen and an engineer who at the time worked at Sybase, a well-known software company in the Silicon Valley. He served as the Secretary General of As-Sunnah Foundation of America (ASFA).
Sheikh Hisham Kabbani gave a detailed answer in which he made a strong defense of the legitimate status and textual basis of Sufi practices within the Islamic tradition based on Quranic exegesis, the Prophetic tradition and the views of previous Muslim scholars.

The online debate went on for several weeks involving those who were for and against Sheikh Hisham. Sheikh Muhammad S. Adly posted no response to Sheikh Hisham Kabbani’s lengthy explanation. Those opposed to his position, however, continued their personal attack against Sheikh Hisham Kabbani. They kept accusing him of being deviant without providing any refutation based on authoritative sources. Ignoring the personal attacks, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani’s followers who were members of the mailinglist managed to give the impression that Sheikh Muhammad S. Adly was not sincere in posing his questions because he failed to offer any response. In the end, perhaps because of Sheikh Hisham’s detailed explanation and quotations from many authoritative sources, the subject was simply dropped.

This Internet debate highlighted the internal dynamics and religious tensions within the Muslim community in the USA. Among Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s followers, it was celebrated as a symbolic victory. The debate resonated far beyond the internet because it was the first time that complex questions regarding Sufism were answered in great details. The difference was that while previously tensions were kept quietly behind mosque walls, after the MSA debate they became public for the first time. The 1994 Internet debate, however, brought about technical problems that had a short-term impact. There was a story that after the debate, Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s internet-connected computers were disrupted by cyber-
attack and Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s followers had no doubt that the cyber-attack came from those affiliated to Sheikh Muhammad S. Adly’s and his supporters.

Third, the Internet helped Sheikh Hisham and the Naqshbandi-Haqqani group to compensate for their growing marginalisation among the Muslim community in the USA. This growing marginalisation was the result of the massive boycott by Muslim organisations in the USA following a public speech given by Sheikh Hisham Kabbani during an Open Forum at the State Department on 7 January 1999. In that forum, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani gave a speech entitled “Islamic Extremism: A Viable Threat to US National Security”.

In his speech, he mentioned four points that potentially threatened US national security. First, there was a widespread extreme religious ideology in the USA.\(^{94}\) Second, there were many Muslim organisations in the USA that adopted this extreme ideology and claimed to speak on behalf of the Muslim community. Third, the extremists had taken over 80% of the total of more than 3000 mosques in the USA. Fourth, because of the extremists’ domination of many Muslim organisations and mosques, their extreme religious ideology had spread quickly into many segments of Muslim life in the USA.\(^{95}\)

His outspoken speech revealed the great divide within the Muslim community in the USA. According to Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s sources, this statement derived from the deep disappointment Sheikh Hisham felt toward mainstream Muslim organisations in the USA because of their elitist-bureaucratic nature and their refusal to absorb different religious opinions from different origins.

\(^{94}\) Sheikh Hisham defined Islamic extremism as ‘using religion to label intolerance and use it to make a militant movement and disturb the peace around the world’.

Muslim groups, especially the Sufi and traditional Muslim communities that Sheikh Hisham claimed to represent. There was also a report that Sheikh Hisham was prevented from voicing his opinion during an annual conference organised by some Muslim organisations.

The speech sparked strong condemnation from several Muslim organisations. These Muslim organisations referred to Sheikh Hisham’s statement that 80% of mosques in the USA were run by extremists. This condemnation eventually led to a joint statement issued on 22 February 1999 by eight Muslim organisations – AMPCC (American Muslim Political Coordination Council), AMA (American Muslim Alliance), AMC (American Muslim Council), CAIR (Council for America-Islam Relations), MPAC (Muslim Public Action Committee), ICNA (Islamic Council of North America), ISNA (Islamic Society of North America), and MSA (Muslim Student Association) – boycotting Sheikh Hisham Kabbani and Naqshandi-Haqqani’s activities in the USA and Canada. This boycott prevented him from attending and giving speeches in many mosques across the USA. These organisations accused Sheikh Hisham Kabbani of putting the Muslim community at large in danger of being falsely suspected by the US government security

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96 Dilshad Fakroddin, a Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s followers wrote a detailed story and chronology (1991-2000) revealing the relationship between Naqshbandi-Haqqani and other Muslim organisations and the dynamics within Muslim community in the USA on [http://www.islamicsupremecouncil.org/bin/site/wrappers/extremism](http://www.islamicsupremecouncil.org/bin/site/wrappers/extremism). I managed to print out all materials before they were removed from the website.

97 American Muslim Political Coordination Council (AMPCC), American Muslim Alliance (AMA), American Muslim Council (AMC), Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR), Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA) and the Muslim Students Association of USA and Canada, and Islamic Society of North America. For details, see: [http://www.wrmea.com/backissues/0499/9904071.html](http://www.wrmea.com/backissues/0499/9904071.html)

98 A short review of the a whole incident was written by Richard H. Curtiss, the editor of the Washington report on Middle East Affairs in April/May 1999. For details, see: [http://www.wrmea.com/backissues/0499/9904071.html](http://www.wrmea.com/backissues/0499/9904071.html)
agencies. Some went even further in accusing him of being a Zionist agent who was attempting to create internal discord.

Sheikh Hisham Kabbani strongly defended his statement as an early warning. He fought back by asserting that his true motive was in the broad interest of the Muslim community in the USA. He claimed that his statement was intended to avoid possible future damage to the Muslim community itself. Following the 9/11 tragedy in 2001, Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s followers hailed the statement as a fulfilled prophecy. They referred to the fact that Sheikh Hisham had already warned of the danger posed by Osama bin Laden, more than two years before the tragedy happened. They blamed mainstream Muslim organisations for politicising divergence of opinion and for their unwillingness to listen to Sheikh Hisham’s warning.

Unrelenting attacks directed against Sheikh Hisham and Naqshbandi-Haqqani led to the launching of the http://www.islamicsupremecouncil.org website in 1999. Unlike other websites, which mostly deal with religious issues, this new website contains materials with strong political messages. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani and his disciples published a lot of materials detailing the inaccuracies and false accusations against the statement issued in the State Department Forum. They shifted their emphasis from a purely religious debate to the importance of freedom of speech and constitutional rights in the US. By posting materials related to the

99 For details, see http://www.islamicsupremecouncil.org/media-center/domestic-extremism/64-shaykh-k Abbani-s-response-to-false-allegations-about-state-department-speech.html
100 In the aftermath of 9/11 tragedy and following intense scrutiny imposed toward Muslim community in the USA, the speech was pointed out by Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s followers as a timely and correct warning.
1999 Open Forum, Sheikh Hisham and his followers wanted to show the public that Sheikh Hisham had a constitutional right to voice his opinion.

Unlike the 1994 Internet debate, the 1999 State Department Forum, however, resulted in more serious repercussions with longer-term implications. In the aftermath of the incident, the relationship between Sheikh Hisham Kabbani and other mainstream American Muslim organisations was severely damaged leading to social exclusion, marginalisation, and even a massive boycott of Sheikh Hisham Kabbani personally and of the da’wah activities of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in the USA in general. As a consequence, more dramatic changes in da’wah strategy were adopted, making the use of the Internet inevitable and even strategic.

The electronic encounter on MSA.Net mailing list in 1994 and State Department Forum in 1999 therefore became the two turning points in the transmission of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teachings in the USA and worldwide. After the events, the internet was intentionally adopted for preaching and teaching purposes. Through the internet, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani involved himself in religious polemics and debates to assert the validity of Sufi traditional teachings in particular and Ahl Sunnah wal Jamaah doctrine in general. It was also through the internet that Sheikh Hisham Kabbani managed to regain his religious authority as a Muslim scholar and Sufi master.

Fourth, the internet helped Naqshbandi-Haqqani to solve physical and spatial problems. These physical and spatial problems had to do with the fact that Sheikh Nazim Haqqani was getting older and no longer able to guide his disciples directly, especially after he stopped traveling overseas. In 2001, Sheikh Nazim Haqqani decided to stay permanently at his home in Lefke, Cyprus. Because of this,
the conventional method of *dakwah* by directly visiting disciples was no longer viable.

The Internet therefore provided practical and strategic solutions to maintaining the *da’wah* activities of Naqshbandi-Haqqani, not only in the USA but throughout the world. Until 1999, the use of the Internet mainly served a limited audience, especially those who were already Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples in the USA. Afterwards, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani launched a massive cyber *da’wah* under the banner of Naqshbandi-Haqqani. With the assistance of young internet-literate Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani created six websites (five of them no longer exist) between 1995 and 2001.

Since the mid-1990s, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani has maintained Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s message on various different websites. Currently, there are six websites officially affiliated to Sheikh Hisham Kabbani. This number excludes numerous other unofficial websites created by his disciples. These websites recorded site-visits ranging from a few hundreds to a few hundred thousand daily. The Sufilive.com is the highest in terms of site-visits: it is currently accessed by more than 900,000 times each day from around the world.

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<td><a href="http://www.eshaykh.com">http://www.eshaykh.com</a></td>
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**Table 1.1 Naqshbandi-Haqqani's Websites Affiliated to Sheikh Hisyam Kabbani In USA**
Along with these websites, other deputies and representatives in some countries also have their own websites. Among these deputies and representatives, the most prominent are S. Muhammad Adil, S. Adnan Kabbani, S. Abdul Karim (d. 2012), and S. Amerudin. They each manage websites that are dedicated to spreading Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teachings.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Affiliation/Location</th>
<th>Websites</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| S. Muhammad Adil     | http://www.beforearmageddon.com  
|                      | http://www.saltanat.org/         |         |
| S. Adnan Kabbani     | http://www.theholyseal.com/      |         |
| Salim E. Spohr       | http://www.beforearmageddon.com  | Audio-podcast, video and news websites |
| S. Abdul Karim       | http://naksibendi.us/            |         |
|                      | http://www.nakshibendi.com       |         |
| S. Amerudin          | http://www.alsunnahfoundation.org |         |
| South Africa         | http://www.naqshbandi.org.za     |         |
| Argentine            | http://www.naqshbandi.com.ar     |         |
| Australia            | http://www.naqshbandi.asn.au     |         |
| Canada               | http://www.naqshbandi.ca/        |         |
| Singapore            | http://sufihub.com/              |         |
| Spain                | http://www.naqshbandi.org.es/    |         |
| UK                   | http://www.haqqaninaqshbandiuk.com/ht  
|                      | tp://naqshbandi-sheffield.com/   |         |
| Germany              | http://www.sufismus-online.de    |         |

The websites created by followers of Sheikh Hisham Kabbani and those affiliated to him are quite successful in attracting visitors. They have become the major instrument for the dissemination of Haqqani’s teachings in the West and worldwide. There are several reasons for the success of these websites. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani is supported by a creative team who has the technical skills needed to create and maintain interesting websites. All the websites affiliated to him are regularly updated with new content both in written and audio-visual form.
Sheikh Hisham Kabbani is also able to organise students to write about Sufism and spirituality. Among other students, Gibril Fouad Haddad is perhaps the most prolific one who learnt traditional Islamic subjects in Damascus and Mecca with Sayyid Muhammad Alawi al Maliki (d. 2004) and Sayyid Ramadhan al Bouti (d. 2013).

Moreover, the umbrella organisations established by Sheikh Hisham Kabbani to support his activities are quite successful in fundraising. Because of this successful fundraising, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani can maintain a relatively high-cost online media presence. The thousands of audio-visual presentations on the Sufilive and ISCA websites, with many more updated regularly, show the extent of storage capacity and sophistication of the server owned by Sheikh Hisham and his team. It also gives an indication of the extent of the financial resources at his disposal to keep these websites running.

However, the existence of these numerous websites affiliated to different deputies or representatives often results in a degree of contestation over which website is to be considered the most authoritative source for representing Sheikh Nazim Haqqani and the Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teachings. This contestation is often displayed openly on various websites. Each claims that its website is the only authoritative source of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teachings. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani claims that his websites are the most authoritative sources of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teachings, but Sheikh Abdul Karim and other deputies also make similar claims. In this situation of claims and counterclaims, only those with the most attractive web-designs tend to attract most people.

102 These talented followers include Gibril Fouad Haddad, Ali Elsayed, Noorjan Mirahmadi, and Hedieh Mirahmadi among others.
4.2 The Internet and E-Sufism

The use of the Internet serves to project further the personal charisma of the Sufi master. Schmidt (2004, 113) argues that Naqshbandi-Haqqani uses the internet to help a Sufi master strengthen his ‘natural gift’ and personal charismatic appeal among his followers. Elaborating on Schmidt’s argument, the case of Naqshbandi-Haqqani shows that the internet has even generated an e-Sufism, which is unprecedented in the transmission of traditional Sufi teachings.

The term e-Sufism refers to any kind of Sufi figures, products, teachings, knowledge, materials, emotional expressions, ways of devotion, rituals, and activities mediated by or found on the internet and deliberately used for disseminating, venerating, and preaching purposes. The websites that have brought about the creation of this e-Sufism are diverse. They include: e-Bai’at (initiation), e-Dzikr (recollection), e-Fatwa, e-Jihad, e-Sohbet (association with the sheikh), e-Rabitah (focusing on the master’s face), e-Muroqoba (Sufi meditation), and e-Ziarah (pilgrimage). Each website serves a different purpose.

The initiation or bai’at is perhaps the most important ritual that every Sufi disciple has to go through. It is a formal declaration of allegiance and commitment to and before his or her spiritual teacher. Since 2006, Sheikh Nazim has given permission for e-bai’at for those aspiring to be his disciple.103 The Naqshbandi website gives detailed information on how to do bai’at properly, followed by a detailed contact form.104 Next, the website provides a note encouraging anyone...

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103 Interview with G.F. Haddad, 19 November 2010
104 For e-bai’at, see http://naqshbandi.org/about/baya.htm
who takes *e-bai’at* to renew it once he or she meets Sheikh Nazim Adel or his deputy in person. The same website also provides complete ritual guidance (daily prayers and protocols) that have to be performed as routine religious obligations.

Sufilive and ISCA websites that contain audio/video recordings and live TV broadcasts of Sheikh Nazim Adel and Sheikh Hisham Kabbani are sites where Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples have the opportunity to carry out e-Sohbet as part of their daily devotion. Both websites are highly venerated as proven by more than 900,000 site visits per day. E-Sohbet is increasingly popular and perhaps has become a reasonable solution to address the problem of time and space without losing the essence of Sohbet itself, whose object is to be as close as possible to the guiding Sheikh. Until now, both websites have more than 5000 audio/video recordings of Sheikh Nazim and Hisham Kabbani.

Followers are encouraged to regularly visit the websites as a way of carrying out e-Rabithah by looking at the picture of the Sheikh, keeping in touch with and receiving the ever-flowing blessing (*barakah*) from both Sheikh Nazim and Sheikh Hisham Kabbani. Video recordings are sometimes used to strengthen the charisma of the master. Thus, watching e-Suhba on the Sufilive for many disciples is no longer an entertaining activity to be taken lightly. Instead, it becomes a ritual with certain *adab* (etiquette) to follow just as though the Sheikh himself were actually there in person.

On 19 December 2010 for instance, news spread among Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples following a video recording on Sufilive that showed visitors from Chile who had come to show their gratitude to Sheikh Nazim for helping...
them. The video was related to the use of tawiz and its miraculous effects for its users. Sheikh Nazim al Haqqani, through one of his disciples in Chile, reportedly gave the tawiz for protection to the miners who were trapped underground at the mining site in Chile.\textsuperscript{105}

The Internet has also become a site through which disciples establish intimate relationships, seek guidance and ask for counsel and through which the master performs his role as a spiritual guide. The Sunnah and Eshaykh websites address the daily concerns of disciples on family issues, health, and gender relations. They are also sites where the master explains matters of doctrine and shariah provisions to disciples. More importantly, the websites provide interactive communication between the master and his disciples in the form of Questions and Answers. This Q&A interaction is definitive and final; therefore, the websites include e-Fatwa telling the disciples what to do and what not to do based on shariah prescriptions. The websites also offer e-Jihad, not to promote violence or wage a campaign of cyber-terror (hacking or cracking), but instead to emphasize the importance of carrying out the greater Jihad (tadzkiyah an-nafs) rather than the lesser Jihad (holy war). The websites affirm the legitimacy of Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah in general and Sufism in particular within Islamic tradition and also condemn religious views, particularly Wahabism, which is regarded as a false doctrine that violates Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah’s orthodox stance.

Some video recordings show Sheikh Nazim or Sheikh Hisham opening and kissing a box containing the hair of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) followed by their disciples. To distant disciples, these recordings and devotion resemble a

\textsuperscript{105} \url{http://sufilive.com/interview_with_chilean_miners_part_1-3014.html}, accessed 15 March 2011
pilgrimage that is mediated electronically. This kind of mediated pilgrimage can also be seen when a distant disciple attentively reads on the websites about the pious acts and miraculous power (karamah) of every single Naqshbandi’s golden chain masters. This e-pilgrimage is repeatedly shown during special months of the Islamic calendar such as Rajab, Muharram, Rabi’ul Awal, and Sya’ban.

Noorjan Mirahmadi (a Western convert living in Vancouver, Canada) created two websites containing materials related to e-Muroqoba, a complete guidance on Sufi meditational techniques. These websites are dedicated to Sheikh Nazim Adel and Sheikh Hisham Kabbani. The websites provide practical guidance in the form of pictures and video recordings for conducting Sufi meditation but also give the philosophical and theological basis of these practices. The websites are quite popular in Indonesia especially among young Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples. However, the websites have also sparked controversy, allegedly because they openly display and elaborate ‘the so-called secret of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teachings and beliefs’ which seems contrary to its orthodox standing on shariah. This is one reason that Sheikh Hisham Kabbani instructed the creator of these sites to move from the USA to Canada in 2006.

However, the adoption of the Internet was not as smooth as might seem. It was not always considered acceptable to present Sufi materials so openly to the public, especially to those who were not initiated. Using the internet for preaching purposes has led to Naqshbandi-Haqqani adapting to a more open environment and revealing all its teachings, which have previously been kept secret or shared only among the most advanced students. The ‘publication of the secret’ as suggested by

106 These two websites are http://nurmuhammad.com and http://sufimeditationcenter.com
Ernst, about *Nur Muhammad* (Muhammad’s light), unseen worlds, and miraculous powers led to accusation that Haqqani held heretic beliefs. It was only after Sheikh Nazim Adel gave his permission that Sheikh Hisham Kabbani went ahead with his efforts to reveal all the secrets of Naqshbandi’s teachings. Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples described Sheikh Nazim Adel and Sheikh Hisham Kabbani as masters who are not stingy in sharing their knowledge because they were willing to impart everything they knew to their disciples.

### 4.3 Online Activism and Youth Culture in Indonesia

Information technology (IT) plays a significant role for Sufi resurgence in Indonesia. It directly related to dramatic improvement in and increasing access to the Internet in the 1990s. This particularly coincided with the ‘internet fever’ that was widespread Indonesia for the first time around 1995. The booming demand for the internet services, especially among young urbanites, emerged when a private Internet Service Provider (RADNET) began to offer subscriptions for private customers in Jakarta (Hill and Sen 1997, 69-72). This contributed to dramatic increase of the number of Internet subscribers from less than 25,000 to 400,000 between 1995 and 2000. While Sen and Hill (2005) demonstrate the effect of this new technology in driving democratisation in Indonesia, other scholars focus on the role of the internet in shaping Islamic identity, radical activism, and online proselytization (Brauchler 2003, 123-151, Lim 2005, Hosen 2008, 159-173). This has opened new opportunity spaces for growing interest in global spiritual marketplace.
Naqshbandi-Haqqani is one of the first beneficiaries of this new technological trend because it facilitates Sufi propagation at an unprecedented scale. Technological advancement enables direct personal contacts with Sufi masters overseas. Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s massive presence on the web attracted Indonesians literate enough in information technology and the use of the Internet to actively seek direct contact. It gained an initial Internet audience as early as 1994 among Indonesian urban youth, especially university students in Jakarta. They were particularly interested in accessing Sufi materials on two Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s websites. It can even be said that Naqshbandi-Haqqani was known for the first time through googling activities. The role of the Internet and its concomitantly emerging youth culture are thus pivotal factor in the early transmission of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia.

Robinson (1993, 231) argued that mass literacy and education, as well as technological advancement result in forms of religious transmission that are more abstract and intellectual. Despite the early influence of the Internet in the dissemination of Naqshbandi-Haqqani materials in Indonesia in the late 1990s, the use of the internet for preaching purposes came relatively late. In fact, the widespread use of the internet for Sufi propagation in Indonesia did not develop until at least 2005. The use of the Internet for Sufi propagation in Indonesia departs from three related factors, technological advancement, IT-literacy and growing number of young disciples who join the movement.

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107 Interview with Faried Bubhi Djamirin, 28 December 2010
109 Interview with Mustafa Mas’ud, 18 September 2010
In the beginning of his mission in Indonesia, Sheikh Hisham encouraged his disciples to regularly access websites run by his student in the USA.\textsuperscript{110} While he did not visit his followers regularly yet, online materials became a source of reference and even the only authoritative source of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teachings. Sheikh Hisham justifies the internet-mediated communication through his emphasis on the so-called Uwaysi chain of transmission adhered by Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani, who wrote short biographies of all Naqshbandi’s masters, pointed out that Uwaysi referred to the way in which Sufi teachings were taught not only by physical contact but also, more importantly, through the spiritual presence of long-gone masters.\textsuperscript{111} This non-physical contact is attributed to the figure of Uways al Qarni, a companion who allegedly never met the Prophet Muhammad directly during his lifetime.

Young disciples regard the Internet with its interactive nature as an attractive media for disseminating Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s written materials. In fact, it is these young disciples who maintain all websites and blogs related to Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia. The massive use of the Internet thus represents emerging youth culture in a sense that the internet becomes creative sites where young disciples can express their Sufi affiliation and religiosity. Moreover, the use of the internet for Islamic propagation represents a form of online activism and gives expression to religious identity among young Indonesian Muslims (Brauchler 2003, 123-151, Lim 2005). The difference is that such online activism does not

\textsuperscript{110} Interview with Mustafa Mas’ud, 18 September 2010

\textsuperscript{111} Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s sources further make clear that most of the Naqshbandi’s masters are Sheikh of the two wings (dhul janahain) of spiritual descent because beside direct/physical descent, they also recognize non-physical contact for spiritual transmission or Uwaysi (Kabbani 2004c, 66-68).
uphold radical ideas, as previously represented by some Muslim groups in Indonesia.

There are currently around 27 websites and blogs managed by Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples in Indonesia. They display the most update *sohbet* of Sheik Nazim and Hisham Kabbani, as well as disseminating Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s materials and other information regarding Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s activities. They include pictures, videos, online advice/consultation, and schedules of local activities conducted by each *zawiyah*, providing update information regarding the travel plans of Sheikh Hisham Kabbani and his entourage in Indonesia. These numerous websites/blogs are also used for communication among fellow disciples. They also facilitate and help to guide an expanding cohort of disciples across Indonesia. These websites and blog are important because they provide translated materials that Indonesian followers can access in the vernacular language.

**Table 1.3 Websites/Blogs Affiliated to Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Address of Websites</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fornaqsda</td>
<td><a href="http://www.madadulhaqq.net/">http://www.madadulhaqq.net/</a></td>
<td>Website</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><a href="http://www.kampungsholawat.net">http://www.kampungsholawat.net</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumi Café</td>
<td><a href="http://www.caferumijakarta.com/">http://www.caferumijakarta.com/</a></td>
<td>Idem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia</td>
<td><a href="http://naqsybandi.org/">http://naqsybandi.org/</a></td>
<td>Idem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabbani Cinere</td>
<td><a href="http://www.haqqanirabbani.asia/">http://www.haqqanirabbani.asia/</a></td>
<td>idem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yayasan Haqqani Batam</td>
<td><a href="http://naqshbandibatam.org/">http://naqshbandibatam.org/</a></td>
<td>Idem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHT</td>
<td><a href="http://www.heavenlyhealingteam.org">http://www.heavenlyhealingteam.org</a></td>
<td>Idem</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.4 shows that many affiliates of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia maintain their presence on the Internet either in the form of subscribed domain websites or free-of-charge blogs. Yet, of 27 websites/blogs managed by Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s
disciples in Indonesia, there are only a few which can sustain their presence on the Internet.

The relationship between technological advancement and youth culture can be seen in the massive use of social media. In fact, social media are becoming increasingly popular for exchanging information on Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teachings and activities in Indonesia. The Naqshbandi-Haqqani community in Indonesia uses a free email service provider of yahoo and maintains its presence on social media such as Twitter, BBM Group, and Facebook.\footnote{The mailing list of Naqshbandi-Haqqani can be found on the following address: muhibbun_naqsybandi@yahoogroups.com} The community also provides a Short Message Service (SMS) in Jakarta.\footnote{Until 2010, the Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s mailing-list had 1555 active members, the twitter account (https://twitter.com/Haqqanindonesia) has 1365 followers, and FB group has more than 5000 active members in Indonesia.} The mailinglist and social media function mainly in updating recent sohbet given by Sheikh Nazim and Hisham Kabbani, disseminating announcements of recent dzikir activities, and delivering short messages from the two masters. Though the number registered in the mailing list and social media account is far less than the actual number of disciples in Indonesia, social media plays a significant role in transmitting the master’s teachings.

However, there are also several technical problems regarding the use of the Internet among Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples in Indonesia, such as technical problems of accessibility and network coverage, and financing. Most Internet users in Indonesia access this service on a time basis and this result in a costly service that not all people can afford. High-speed Internet access is rare due to a lack of IT
infrastructure. This poses a problem because high-speed Internet access is crucial for videos and audio materials. In terms of network coverage, the Internet service is not yet equally available in every region in Indonesia. Even when this service is available, there is still the problem of high cost. As it becomes available in every region and is cheaper to access, the demand for Internet services increases.

Due to these problems, the importance of the Internet for disseminating Sufi teachings has to be evaluated through observation of those who have access to it and how they respond to online messages in offline situations. People certainly respond differently to the various messages. These different responses have to do with language, cultural understanding, and accessibility problems. In terms of language, the use of Arabic and English is obviously a big problem because not all disciples are fluent in these languages. Even if they regularly access the websites, they still need a translation service, which is not always available. There is also a question of cultural understanding. Most Sufi messages from Sheikh Nazim Haqqani and Hisham Kabbani are addressed particularly to Western audiences. All embracing messages and a preoccupation with the New Age spirits of cultivating love and energy sometimes fail to resonate with an Indonesian audience who are orthodox Muslims.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter shows that globalisation and advancement of information technology play an important part in Sufi transmission. Naqshbandi-Haqqani has adapted itself to this change by adopting the Internet for preaching purposes.
Adopting modern media opens up new opportunities for expanding and maintaining international connection across time and space. However, mediated transmission has intrinsic weakness such as lack of intimacy and emotional ties between the master and disciples. In turn, this contributes to distortion and misunderstanding of the messages and the masters. While it attracted a large number of new followers, modern media put Naqshbandi-Haqqani into constant public scrutiny, which attracted both support and strong opposition within and without the group.
Because Sufi orders and saints had been a regular aspect of everyday life in Muslim communities for centuries, they were a natural framework for Muslims who wished to remain true to their faith in the new sociocultural contexts (Voll, 2003: 8-9).

In her empirical studies on emerging urban Sufi groups in Indonesia, Howell makes a compelling argument that Sufi resurgence is connected with the seeking of experiential religiosity among urban middle class Muslims (Howell 2001a, 701-729, 2004, 2007a, 217-240). She suggests that improvement of the educational system and modernist reformism do not necessarily correlate with scriptural religiosity (Howell 2001a, 713). Elaborating on Howell’s analysis of experiential religiosity, I argue that Sufism is still pursued by Indonesian Muslims as a form of Islamic piety because it offers intimacy based on the close relationship between master and disciples. Sufism also provides a ritualised environment for maintaining a communal spirit of friendship and brotherhood/sisterhood among disciples of diverse social backgrounds.

This chapter focuses on examining experiential religiosity as expressed in the venerating attitude toward Sufi charismatic masters, as well as the role of Sufi communal ritual. The first section of this chapter examines the personal biography of Sheikh Nazim Haqqani, the founder and once the supreme leader of this Sufi movement, and Sheikh Hisham, the principal deputy of Sheikh Nazim from whom Indonesian disciples seek guidance. The next section deals with the idea of
sainthood and its importance as supreme religious authority within the movement. The remaining part of the chapter examines the role of collective rituals in maintaining solidarity and finally, this chapter concludes by summarizing various important points emerging from this discussion.

5.1 The Biography of Sheikh Nazim Haqqani (1922-2014)

The Naqshbandi-Haqqani movement is named after its founder, Sheikh Nazim Effendi Adel al Qubrusi al-Haqqani, a Turkish Cypriot who once lived in Lefke, in the northern part of Cyprus. Sheikh Nazim al-Haqqani, as he is known among his disciples, was born on 23 April 1922 in Larnaca, a region located in the southeastern part of Cyprus inhabited mostly by Greek Cypriots. He married Hajjah Amina Adel (1929-2004), a woman of Tartar origin, in 1952. The couple were married for more than 50 years and had two daughters (Nazihe and Ruqaya) and two sons (Bahauddin and Muhammad Adel). When he died on 7th May 2014, Sheikh Nazim left behind a vast network of Naqshbandi-Haqqani around the world to his successors and deputies.

Sheikh Nazim Haqqani traces his family’s lineage back to Sheikh Abdul Qadir Jilani (1077-1166) on his father’s side and Sheikh Jalaluddin Rumi (1207-1273) on his mother’s side. His grandfather (Hasan Yasir Baz) was a Qodiri

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114 Nazim Effendi Adil is the family name whereas al Qubrusi and al Haqqani are titles attributed by his master and disciples. Al Qubrusi is an Arabic term referring to his Cyprus origin, and Haqqani means the true one.
115 Abdul Qadir Jilani was the founder of the Qadiri Sufi Order whose shrine is located in Baghdad, Iraq, whereas Jalaluddin Rumi is the founder of Mevlevi Order. He was also well-known as a poet. He died on 17 December 1273 and was buried in Konya, Turkey.
master at the Umm Hiram Mosque in Larnaca,\(^{116}\) while his father (Ahmad Adel) was a junior Egyptian colonial administrator in the British crown colony of Cyprus (Damrel 2006, 116). He is described as *Hassani wal Hussaini*, related to the Prophet through the lineages of his paternal and maternal grandparents. The young Nazim spent his childhood and teenage years in his hometown until 1940 when he decided to follow his two older brothers and a sister who were living in Istanbul. He pursued his undergraduate studies in chemical engineering at Istanbul University between 1940 and 1944.

The teaching of Naqshbandi-Haqqani represented an uneasy and even traumatic experience that Sheikh Nazim personally dealt with. Sheikh Nazim was born and grew up during the final phase of the territorial disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of the Saudi regime in the 1920s. He came to maturity at a time when various secular socialist governments emerged in the 1960s and took power. During this time he also saw successive humiliating defeats of Arab socialist regimes in the Arab-Israeli war and the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict.

According to his biographers, Nazim Haqqani’s inclination to Sufism had begun at an early age and stemmed from his family tradition. Nazim Effendi reportedly received both Qadiri and Mevlevi instruction from his grandfathers at a relatively young age. However, his interest in Sufism is also related to the personal crisis while he was studying in Istanbul in the early 1940s. Sheikh Nazim Haqqani began to seek a spiritual path when he learned that his most-beloved brother, who

\(^{116}\) Umm Hiram binti Milhan was the Prophet’s companion who died in 649 during the Umayyad military campaign to conquer the island. Umm Hiram or *Hala Sultan tekke* in the Turkish language was erected in the 18th century during the Ottoman rule.
was a doctor and had joined the Turkish Army, was killed during World War II (Atay 1994, 50).

Afterwards, he left his study at the university and devoted himself to the pursuit of religious knowledge from various scholars in Istanbul. He received religious trainings on shariah and Arabic from Sheikh Jamaludin al Alasuni (d. 1955). Under Jamaludin al Alasuni’s tutelage, Sheikh Nazim Haqqani learnt to be a scholar of the Hanafi School of Islamic law. He also received guidance from Sheikh Sulayman Arzarumi (d. 1948) at Sultan Ahmad mosque, who introduced him to the Naqshbandi for the first time. There is no further information about Sheikh Sulayman Arzarumi whose name cannot be found in the later Naqshbandi-Haqqani silsilah. However, it is interesting to note that in those days, when Naqshbandi was officially banned and most of its tekke were taken over by the Turkish secular government, there was still a Naqshbandi circle remaining intact in Istanbul.

Sheikh Nazim continued his spiritual quest in Damascus where he met his spiritual mentor, Sheikh Abdullah Faiz Dagestani (1891-1973), who initiated him into Naqshbandi-Khalidi. He remained under the guidance of Sheikh Abdullah Faiz Dagestani for more than 25 years (1945-1973). Between the 1940s and the late 1960s, Sheikh Nazim al-Haqqani underwent a period of intensive spiritual training and extensive journeys. During that time, Sheikh Nazim reportedly spent a lot of time either with his master or by himself in seclusion (suluk) in Jordan, Baghdad, and Madina. Sheikh Nazim Haqqani, for instance, performed his seclusion ritual close to the Prophet’s shrine in Madina and in the shrine of Sheikh Abdul Qadir Jailani in Baghdad.
In the formative period of his mission between the 1940s and 1960s, Sheikh Nazim Haqqani travelled extensively to conduct religious preaching, and if possible, initiate new disciples across Cyprus, Turkey, Syria and Lebanon, and occasionally visiting Jordan, Iraq, Egypt and Saudi Arabia as well. Since his initiation in 1944, Sheikh Nazim Haqqani had dedicated himself to propagating the spread Sufism across Syria, Cyprus, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey as part of his training (Draper, 2002:129). It was his habit at the time that Sheikh Nazim Haqqani spent between six and nine months each year travelling across the region for *dakwah* (Habibis, 1985:83).

In his extensive walking tours between the 1940s and 1960s, Sheikh Nazim Haqqani encouraged people to ‘leave atheism, secularism and materialism and to come back to God’ (Kabbani, 1995:385). His uncompromising stance often led to clashes with the political establishment in countries where he conducted his preaching missions. These clashes did not, however, result in broader social prosecution because in most cases, it was only Sheikh Nazim Haqqani who was subjected to the hostility of secular governments in Cyprus, Turkey, Syria and Lebanon.

His courage to preach Islam in his homeland, for instance, provoked strong opposition from the Turkish political establishment in Cyprus. His biographer has quoted hundreds of charges against him for insisting on the call to prayer in Arabic in mosques throughout Cyprus during the 1940s and the 1950s. He emerged as a vocal opponent of the secular coalition government of the then President

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117 The prayer call had been forbidden since Musthafa Kamal came to power in 1924. The ban was only revoked in 1950 after Adnan Menderes (1899-1961) of the Democratic Party rose to power as Prime Minister of Turkey (1950-1960).
Archbishop Makarios (d. 1977) and Vice President Dr. Vazil Kucuk. This led to his complete ban from visiting his homeland in 1965 (Damrel, 2006:116-117). Banned from entering his own homeland, Sheikh Nazim Haqqani then moved to Damascus, Syria.

During his stay in Damascus, Sheikh Nazim also reportedly recorded thousands of different sohbet given by his master. These were then published in two volumes entitled *Mercy Ocean*, which then became the principal guiding book for new disciples. Sheikh Nazim Haqqani was a man with a sense of mission. He believed that he had been charged to spread his master’s teachings not only to his fellow Muslims but also to non-Muslims, especially in the West.

Between the 1970s and 1980s, Sheikh Nazim often visited Europe by plane, spending the whole fasting month (*Ramadhan*) among his disciples there, before returning overland to Cyprus (Damrel 2006, 117). During his travels he paid visits to his disciples and initiated new ones. He spent most of his time in the UK where he had loyal followers in cities like London, Birmingham, Sheffield, and Glastonbury (Stjernholm 2005, 14). After 20 years of following this routine, his disciples steadily expanded to include Western converts and Muslim immigrants from Turkey, Africa, South and Southeast Asia living in Western Europe such as UK, Germany, France, Italia, Spain, Portugal. Through Sheikh Nazim’s personal charisma and religious authority, Naqshbandi-Haqqani developed from a small religious congregation into one of the largest Sufi groups worldwide.

5.2 Sheikh Hisham Kabbani the Deputy

As far as deputies (*khalifah*) are concerned, there are many disagreements, claims, and counterclaims. Some claim that Sheikh Nazim assigned only three deputies to be his future heirs in the movement: Sheikh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani and his brother, Sheikh Adnan Kabbani living in Tripoli, and his son, Sheikh Muhammad Adel Nazim who now lives in Lefke, Cyprus. Others reject this view and are convinced that Sheikh Nazim appointed five deputies to help him spread Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teachings. In addition to the Kabbani brothers and his son, there are another two deputies: Sheikh Abdul Karim (New York) and Sheikh Ahmad Ameerudin.¹¹⁹

According to Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s sources, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani is the sole assigned deputy overseeing all Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples in North America and Southeast Asia, including Indonesia. Hisham Kabbani plays an important role in codifying the Sufi teachings of Naqshbandi-Haqqani, disseminating its teachings, and reaching out to a wider audience by organising and consolidating Naqshbandi Haqqani’s disciples into a relatively cohesive group. Though there were many deputies and loyal disciples who also contributed to these efforts, as son-in-law of Sheikh Nazim, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani was in a relatively better position than other deputies. This shows that personal and emotional ties, as well as family connections still matter for fostering Naqshbandi-Haqqani.

Sheikh Kabbani became one of the most prominent deputies in disseminating Naqshbandi-Haqqani throughout the world. This is partly because

¹¹⁹ Sheikh Abdul Karim is a Turkish Cypriot who led Osmanli Dergah, a Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s lodge located in Mount Catskill New York. He has been living in the USA since the late 1970s. On the other hand, Sheikh Ahmad Ameerudin lives in Ottawa, Canada.
he is a son-in-law of Sheikh Nazim Haqqani, but most importantly because he is the person who has written extensively on all aspects of the teachings of Sheikh Nazim Haqqani and has managed to re-organise Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples worldwide.

Born on 28 January 1945 in Beirut, Lebanon, Sheikh Kabbani finished his undergraduate degree in chemistry at the American University of Beirut and went on to pursue postgraduate study of medicine at the Louvain Catholic University in Belgium. Apart from this secular educational background, he also reportedly attended formal study in Islamic law at Al Azhar University’s Damascus campus. He married the oldest daughter of Sheikh Nazim Haqqani (Hajjah Naziha Adel) in the early 1970s and the couple had four children (three sons and one daughter). He came from a prominent Lebanese Sunni family with hereditary claim to descent from the Prophet. His uncle, Muhammad Rasyid Kabbani, was the grand mufti for the Lebanese Sunni Muslim community.120

Growing up in a prominent Lebanese Sunni family, Sheikh Hisham witnessed and directly experienced the increasingly hostile religious environment that resulted from the emergence of political Islamism and the growing influence of Wahabi-Salafism after the oil crisis in the 1970s. Sheikh Hisham was initiated directly by Sheikh Abdullah Faiz Dagestani in Damascus in the early 1960s. After Sheikh Abdullah Faiz Dagestani died in 1973, he continued his spiritual development under the guidance of Sheikh Nazim Haqqani. He became the main

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120 Annabelle Bottcher noted that the rest of the Kabbani family in Lebanon belong to the Naqshbandi movement. For details, see http://www.naqshbandi.org/naqshbandi.net/www/haqqani/features/naqshbandiyya_in_us.htm
communicator bridging the spiritual visions of both Sheikh Abdullah Faiz Dagestani and Nazim Haqqani.

Before dedicating himself to spread the teachings of his master, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani ran the family business during the 1960s and 1970s in Lebanon. After that, he spent his time doing business for a few years in Saudi Arabia between the 1970s and late 1980s. In Saudi Arabia, he made a living by running a medical clinic for the Saudi Arabian elite. His biography reveals that he was a co-founder and former General Manager of the Islamic Medical Center in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. While in Saudi Arabia, he reportedly had a spiritual crisis as a result of directly witnessing the widespread moral decadence among the Saudi elite. He suffered from the devastation that resulted from the unfolding sectarian conflict and civil war in Lebanon (1975-1990). In 1990, soon after the end of the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990), Sheikh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani was granted refugee status in the USA; he left for the United States with all his family in 1991.

Since the mid-1990s, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani has faced a hostile religious environment leading to a total boycott by other Islamic organisations. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani’s personal experiences in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and the United States have had a considerable influence in shaping his opposition to Islamic radicalism, violence, and extremism. Through his regular and extensive journeys to visit distant disciples, he has managed to claim both spiritual and organisational authority. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani received the title of Madadul Haqq Hujjatul-lahi Mukhlis (The support of al haqq, the proof of Allah, the sincere one) and

122 For 15 years, from 1977, he lived in Jeddah where he established and managed a medical clinic serving mostly wealthy and prominent Saudi princes before returning to Tripoli, Lebanon.
Quttubul Mutasyarrif (The guardian of the planet) from his master, Sheikh Nazim Haqqani.

It is Sheikh Kabbani who strengthens Sheikh Nazim’s authority as a Sufi master by a silsilah or chain of Sufi transmission. A silsilah is not only about legitimate symbolic authority but also historic authenticity within the Islamic tradition. Among Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples, this chain of transmission (silsilah) is popularly known as the ‘golden chain’ (silsilat ad-dhahab).\(^{123}\) The term silsilah ad-dhahab refers to the silsilah, which combines both personal and spiritual descent from the Prophet (Algar 1976, 130). Sheikh Nazim Haqqani was said to be the sole spiritual heir of Sheikh Abdullah Faiz Dagestani with a genealogy going back to the Prophet Muhammad.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1.</th>
<th>Prophet Muhammad SAW (d. 632)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Abu Bakr as-Siddiq (d. 634)</td>
<td>Siddiqiya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Salman al-Farsi (d. 655)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Qassim ibn Muhammad ibn Abu Bakr (d. 687)</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Jafar as-Sadiq (d. 765)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Tayfur Abu Yazid al-Bistami (d. 784)</td>
<td>Taifurriyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Abul Hassan Ali al-Kharqani (d. 1034)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Abu Ali al-Farmadi (d. 1084)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Abu Yaqub Yusuf al-Hamadani (1019-1140)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{123}\) The chain of this silsilah, however, creates controversy and generates strong criticism because of the appearance of Prophet Khidr (Abu Abbas al Khidr). This is deemed as an innovation but Naqshbandi-Haqqani denies all such accusations by emphasizing the spiritual nature of the silsilah and rejects the idea that this genealogy consists of purely historical characters.
10. Abul Abbas, al-Khidr

11. Abdul Khaliq al-Ghujdawani (d.1220) Khawajaganiya

12. Arif ar-Riwaqri (d. 1259)

13. Khwaja Mahmoud al-Anjir al-Faghnawi (d. 1245/1272)


15. Muhammad Baba as-Samasi (d. 1340/54)

16. as-Sayyid Amir Kulal (d. 1371)

17. Muhammad Baha'uddin Shah Naqshband (1318-1389) Naqshbandi

18. Ala'uddin al-Bukhari al-Attar (son in-law, d. 1400)

19. Yaqub al-Charkhi (d. 1447)

20. Ubaydullah al-Ahrar (1404-1490)

21. Muhammad az-Zahid (d. 1515)

22. Darwish Muhammad (d. 1549)

23. Muhammad Khwaja al-Amkanaki (d. 1599)

24. Muhammad al-Baqi bi-l-Lah (1563-1603)

25. Ahmad al-Faruqi as-Sirhindi (1564-1624) Naqshbandi-Mujaddadi

26. Muhammad al-Masum (1586-1668)

27. Muhammad Sayfuddin al-Faruqi al-Mujaddidi (1645-1685)

28. as-Sayyid Nur Muhammad al-Badawani (1664-1722)

29. Shamsuddin Habib Allah (1700-1781)

30. Abdullah ad-Dahlawi (1745-1824)

31. Khalid al-Baghdadi (1776-1827) Naqshbandi-Khalidi

32. Ismail Muhammad ash-Shirwani (1787-1839) Baku Azerbaijan
FIGURE 2. NAQSHBANDI-HAQQANI’S CHAIN OF TRANSMISSION

By including Abul Abas al Khidr, a mystical figure well-known among Sufi disciples whose name cannot be found in any other Naqshbandi silsilah, Naqshbandi-Haqqani strengthens its claim to being the descendants of Sufi masters with two wings (dhul janahain), referring to both physical and spiritual descent of the Uwaysi chain of transmission (Kabbani 2004c, 66-68).¹²⁴ This is partly the reason why Sheikh Nazim Haqqani was hailed as the direct spiritual heir of both Jalaluddin Rumi and Abdul Qadir al Gilani, to whom he also claims a genealogical connection. The emphasis on an Uwaysi chain of transmission and particularly the placement of Abul Abas al Khidr in the silsilah represent, as will be explained later, the strong influence of Akbari ideas among Naqshbandi-Haqqani. Interestingly, Sheikh Kabbani is the one who repeatedly says that Sheikh Nazim would be the last in the silsilah.

¹²⁴ The figure of Khidr as a spiritual transmitter is well-known among Sufi disciples. For details see (Halman 2008).
5.3 Charisma and Sainthood: Religious Authority and Veneration

The relationship between the Sufi master and disciple is close and intimate in nature. It is commonly characterised by excessive veneration and unreserved allegiance from disciples to the master, not to mention a strictly hierarchical structure that exerts a high degree of control over its adepts (Trimingham 1971, Buehler 1993, 1998, Werbner 2003). The Sufi masters, borrowing Phillipon’s terms, represent typical “charismatic leaders who embody the group’s ideals, inspire love and respect, are a catalyst for commitment, and facilitate the identification of disciples with their cause” (2011: 353). This charisma allegedly derives from successive lines of knowledge, genealogy and teaching lineages (silsilah) and proximity to God combining the inner-path of religious devotion and the requirements of sharia’s observance (Buehler 1993, 10).

For generations, the Sufi movement has survived through the embodiment of charisma (Werbner 1998). The charisma has been long associated with a personalised religious institution that is maintained through a ritualised relationship between master and disciple. Far from being obsolete, the concept of Islamic sainthood still attracts people to join the Sufi movement. The Sufi sheikh, along with the ulama (Muslim scholar), is still considered as a legitimate personified religious authority among Muslims (Botcher 2006, 241-268, Foley 2008, 521-545). Foley particularly pointed out that Muslim saints merit great respect and are thought to fill a role for their age analogous to that played by the prophet Muhammad in the earliest Muslim community (2008:528).

The framework of charisma closely resembles to that of the traditional Islamic concept of wali (singular for awliya). Those personified as holy persons
and resembling the status of *wali* could perform *karamah* (divine miracles) and confer *baraka* (divine blessings). The status of *wali* attributed to someone is not an abstract status but one built on a concrete personal encounter and strengthened through continuous reproduction by those having experience of it. Within this framework, one’s ability to build a clientele usually validates one’s religious mission and in effect, worldly success is proof that God is on one’s side. Thus, Sufi piety flourishes because it combines observance of *shariah* provisions and devotion toward an exemplary living figure of a spiritual guide.

For Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples, both Sheikh Nazim Haqqani and Hisham Kabbani are living saints (*awliya*) who perform divine miracles (*karamah*) and confer divine blessings (*barakah*). With this attributed status, they are highly venerated for having religious spiritual authority to issue religious decrees (*fatwa*) and embodying miraculous power to intercede between God and the human beings in the world and the hereafter (*wasilah*). In practical terms, this authority implies recognition being a spiritual guru to guide disciples, whereas miraculous power has to do with the power to heal the sick and make correct prediction of the future. Sheikh Kabbani is particularly highly venerated and even considered by many disciples as a living *wali* because he addresses daily concerns of his disciples in private matters of healing, dream interpretation, marriage and family issues, and even mundane matters such as business, career, and work. The disciples are able seek personal spiritual advice and general religious counsel related to their daily concerns.125

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125 Interview with Rizal Tarigan, 22 September 2010
First of all, Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples regard both Sheikh Haqqani and Kabbani as *par excellence* Muslim scholars with extensive and deep religious knowledge. Both are instrumental in introducing *tasawuf* as an integral part of Islamic knowledge. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani for instance teaches that inner-self transformation and purification, in the sense of total control over body, mind, desires and passion, is not only possible but is in fact a religious necessity. It can only be achieved by practicing the constant remembrance of God in *dzikir* recited in a definite number and in accordance with other required obligatory and optional rituals under the guidance of a spiritual master.

Sheikh Hisham Kabbani further states that there are three levels of understanding for a believer: the knowledge of certainty (*ilmu ‘l yaqeen*), the eye of certainty (*‘ainu ‘l yaqeen*), and the truth of certainty (*haqqu ‘l yaqeen*). The first refers to the discursive level, the second to the level of imaginary perception, and the third has to do with total bodily experience. To achieve this level of understanding, every believer must express love (*mahabbah*) and strive for the presence of (*hudur*) God, the Prophet and Sheikh, before directly experiencing complete self-annihilation (*fana*) (Kabbani 2004a).

Moreover, Sheikh Hisham becomes a religious authority whom they seek knowledge on the importance of self-purification. From him, the disciples learn that the widespread satanic traits such as backbiting, arrogance, jealousy, fear, selfishness, greedy, and so forth are the by-product of a total neglect of the Prophet’s moral examples. These traits cannot be eradicated without a commitment to certain rituals and devotion. Following the Quranic stipulation, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani insists that while *shariah* in principle regulates the bodily needs of human
beings and the *kalam* (Islamic theology) limits rational thinking on the existence of unseen realities, self-desire and passion can only be controlled through the constant remembrance of God. Cultivating this constant remembrance of God is a prerequisite for total self-consciousness. This can only be carried out through *tadzkiyah an nafs* (self-purification).

Most of the disciples commonly attribute their veneration for both Sheikh Nazim Haqqani and Hisham Kabbani to their personal appeal as pious persons. This personal appeal generates trust and love among their disciples. They described their affiliation to Naqshbandi-Haqqani as an experience of ‘falling in love’ with both Sheikh Nazim and Hisham Kabbani. They related this feeling to the smiling face and warm gesture that Sheikh Nazim and Hisham Kabbani usually demonstrate before their disciples. All these personal qualities enabled Sheikh Hisham Kabbani to establish the core of his loyal disciples. They further testified that both Sheikh Nazim and Hisham Kabbani are trust-worthy and sincere persons whom they seek out for guidance and wisdom. They trust them because both persons are quite consistent in their saying and behavior.

Bernie Subki for instance testified that he is ‘two hundred percent’ sure that both Sheikh Nazim and Hisham Kabbani are sincere in their role as spiritual guides. He described both as individuals who are in the state of *fana-i Rasulullah* (self-annihilation within the Prophet). They have no egos and no personal agenda, except to spread the love of the Prophet.\(^{126}\) He further testified that to be a Sufi adept is not easy at all, if not even *babak belur* (mentally exhausted) because the Sufi master always puts emotional tests designed to teach adepts to control their

\(^{126}\) Interview Bernie Subki, 26 December 2010
temper and emotions. The following testimony from Dani (not his real name) shows how Sheikh Kabbani’s personal appeal is the main reason for his conversion to Sufism. He said,

“Before I was initiated, I was a bad Muslim because I was too lazy to perform obligatory rituals such as five day prayers and fasting during Ramadhan. I knew the scripture and I was aware that I was committing a sin, but that was not persuasive enough to change my behavior. After I met Sheikh Hisham in 2003, I was completely in love with him. He never blamed me for what I had done and had not yet done. After that, I try my best to perform all my obligations as a Muslim wholeheartedly. I believe love makes everything light and easy, no matter how hard they are.”

Healing power is certainly one of the most appealing aspects that attract people to join and stay in the group. Sheikh Nazim and Hisham Kabbani for instance are known for their gifts as alternative healers. For devout disciples, there is a strong belief that Sheikh Hisham Kabbani is indeed an alternative healer, not because his MD degree but because of his authority as a Sufi sheikh. In the process of performing his role a healer, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani often prescribed special invocations (doa), gave holy water (air doa), led qiymul lail (night prayers) and khatm khawajagan and delivered sohbet. I observed that the most common media for healing among Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples is by using water. During the visit of Sheikh Hisham Kabani, the organisers will usually distribute one liter bottle of spring water that has been blessed (air doa) by Sheikh Hisham Kabbani himself. Many believe that using this water for drinking or washing could help ease the sickness they were suffering from.

127 Interview with Dani (not his real name), 15 September 2010
128 Interview with Soetono Joyosuparto, 14 August 2010
Interestingly, Sheikh Nazim Haqqani and Hisham Kabbani also promote natural and alternative methods of healing for those who are in need. Sheikh Nazim Haqqani even wrote a special book entitled *Natural Medicine* elaborating treatment for various diseases using natural products such as honey, dates, onions, tea, lemons, almonds, and so forth. Sheikh Nazim’s *Natural Medicine* remains a principal reference for those interested in alternative healing. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani also elaborates on the idea that healing is part of the prophetic tradition. He said that there are and always will be those who are gifted with the skills of a spiritual healer.

One of the disciples, Lia (not her real name), said that she previously suffered from cancer, asthma, and eye problems. She almost gave up before she finally joined Naqshbandi-Haqqani in 2007. Not long after that, she had a chance to visit Sheikh Nazim in Cyprus in 2008 during which she had only one intention: asking him to pray for her health. Before she even had the chance to convey her intention, Sheikh Nazim Haqqani suddenly tapped her head gently with his stick. She then realized that all her health problems were miraculously gone.¹²⁹ After that, she joined the *dzikr* congregation at Rumi Café and dedicated her skills in art design to support fellow members.

Alan (not his real name), a loyal male disciple in Batam also shared a similar story about his reason to join Naqshbandi-Haqqani. He said that he became a disciple not long after he found out that his wife was suffering from a very serious health problem and had been bedridden for months.¹³⁰ At first, he turned to

¹²⁹ Interview with Rina (pseudo name), 5 January 2011
¹³⁰ Interview with Alan (pseudo name), 13 October 2010
Sufism only in the hope that his wife would be cured. He had visited almost all the best doctors in his town, but to little avail. Not only did the doctors fail to cure his wife but they could not even provide a definite medical diagnosis. When his wife fully recovered in 2003, he became fully committed to Sufism and even provided financial support for the movement.

The charisma of both Sheikh Nazim and Hisham fulfill the drive to be rich and prosperous. Many strongly believed that associating with the two masters would bring about barakah (divine blessing) that would have a powerful effect as support to be successful in business or a career. Some others even believe that the barakah and karamah of the master are the reasons for the material success of top-ranking Naqshbandi-Haqqani disciples in Indonesia. Both are considered by many disciples as a kind of secret formula for generating material gains and fortunes.

One disciple, Samson Nasarudin, testified that he joined the Naqshbandi-Haqqani not long after finding out that one of his business’ partners cheated him and left him nearly bankrupt. After many unsuccessful attempts to recover his assets, he had no other recourse but to ask for spiritual advice. He was then given a certain dzikr formulae. Not long after that, his business partner came and apologized for cheating him. All his assets were returned. This incident transformed him completely, and he is now a fully committed Sufi disciple. From a very rational person with a Western educational background in engineering, he came to believe in the so-called ‘miracles’ and saints. Leaving behind all his bad habits and sinful acts, the man has been very diligent in attending ritual gatherings. Moreover, he actively helps Sheikh Hisham Kabbani and Mustafa Mas’ud in
spreading Naqshbandi-Haqqani to his hometown in Padang and in Batam since early 2001.131

For some disciples, joining the Naqshbandi-Haqqani is a remedy for the disillusionment and disappointment they suffered from prior involvement in other Islamic groups. This experience I found among a few of those coming from Islamic movement/organisation with long traditions of social activism such as Tablighi Jemaat and the Tarbiyah movement. For an ex-Tablighi Jemaat and Tarbiyah member, being initiated to Naqshbandi-Haqqani opens an opportunity for new religious learning that focuses on continuous self-reflection and personal improvement. Muchsin Mulaela (an ex-Tarbiyah activist) and Dicky Aryo Seno (an ex-TJ activist) said that while they were previously too busy to teach and preach to others, they sometimes ignored purifying themselves.

They further said that, through his teachings, advice, guidance and prescribed rituals, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani made them realize that teaching religion to other people is not so simple and easy because it requires continuous self-reflection. According to them, social activism does not necessarily fulfill their personal needs for living under Islamic ideals. It is a real figure/person not simply an organisation, they affirmed, providing genuine emotional expression of spirituality. It does not mean however that they reject all types of activism. Rather, they simply want to balance activism with their personal spiritual needs.

131 His close personal relationship with Habib Luthfi bin Yahya even made him a committee member of foreign relations in Indonesian Sufi Association (JATMAN). This practically positions him as a religious activist. He is now the main channel through which Sheikh Hisham Kabbani, Mustafa Mas’ud, Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia and Naqshbandi-Haqqani community in general establish contact and vice versa.
There are also those who join the Naqshbandi-Haqqani to reconnect with family tradition. According to Alvin Awwal, he fully committed himself as a disciple soon after finding out that his grandfather was actually a prominent Naqshbandi-Khalidi’s master in West Sumatra.\textsuperscript{132} His commitment was proven as he organised a \textit{khaul} in his grandfather graveyard in Parak Gadang, something that was very uncommon in Padang. It is also the case with some other disciples who testified that Sheikh Hisham Kabbani has a gift to tell the disciples about their family backgrounds and relationships to Naqshbandi without prior knowledge. In most cases, they come to believe that Sheikh Hisham Kabbani simply guides them to re-establish a connection to the religious tradition of their ancestors.

Mystical experience and vision are also another reason why people join Naqshbandi-Haqqani. This mystical experience is mostly in the form of visions of Sheikh Nazim that appear in a dream. As suggested by Ewing (2008), dreams have indeed a transformational effect on Sufi followers by changing their behavior and mental state and hence their religious preferences. In fact, every disciple seems to be obsessed with having a vision/dream that is always described as a sign of Prophet-hood. Dreams also have a very important role in determining the spiritual attainment of disciples, and each dream must therefore be shared with an authorised person who can interpret it. Related to that, true spiritual vision in form of dream could be a basis for correct prediction of the future. It is not surprising that dream interpretation is the most popular subject addressed on the Naqshbandi-Haqqani affiliated websites.

\textsuperscript{132} His grandfather was Chatib Muhammad Ali bin Abdul Muthalib, a prominent Naqshbandi-Khalidi’s Sufi master between the late 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} century in West Sumatra.
According to the late Pudjo Basuki, when he and his Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s colleagues from Jakarta were visiting Sheikh Nazim Haqqani in Lefke/Cyprus in late 2004, Sheikh Nazim Haqqani made a prediction. At their private meeting, Pudjo Basuki and his colleagues were told to be careful and, if possible, to stay away from North-West Sumatra and Central Java because there would be a very big disaster coming soon. As Sheikh Nazim Haqqani did not elaborate on his prediction, Pudjo Basuki and his colleagues were very confused as to what it meant exactly. The answer materialised a few weeks after their return to Indonesia when the media reported a tsunami hitting Aceh in late 2004.

After this, the earthquakes that hit Padang and Yogyakarta were already anticipated simply as a fulfillment of what had been predicted by Sheikh Nazim. This story is still continuously reproduced to prove the karamah of Sheikh Nazim Haqqani. In fact, natural disasters such as earthquakes, tsunami, and volcano eruptions, and the people’s fear of their destructive power may have contributed to the expansion of Sufi movement in Indonesia. This may explain the growing number of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples in Padang and Jogjakarta, the two regions, which were severely hit by the earthquake in 2004 and the volcano eruption in 2006.133

Nevertheless, the charisma has its limits. As the number of disciples grows, personal encounter is not always possible due to limited time and space. In fact, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani reportedly encourages his disciples to consult him directly on only three personal affairs: marriage, moving in/out of new houses, and

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133 Interview with Musthafa Mas’ud, 18 September 2010
conducted a pilgrimage journey. He delegates all other issues to his representatives. Practically speaking, the representatives enjoy a high degree of religious autonomy and authority and therefore the disciples venerate them as charismatic guides too. In reality, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani has been sharing religious authority with his three representatives in Indonesia, Sheikh Mustafa Mas’ud, KH Taufiqurrahman Subki and KH Ahmad Syahid as well as with numerous badal/imam/amir.

5.5 Ritual and Communal Spirit

Sufi ritual is basically a religious platform through which certain religious practices are performed on regular basis and doctrinal views are shared with an attending audience. The ritual plays a significant role in strengthening the personal charisma of a Sufi master and cultivating strong emotional ties among Sufi followers. Most importantly, ritual provides a religious repertoire to balance the personal seeking of piety and communal spirit of friendship and brotherhood/sisterhood among the disciples with diverse social background. Besides its important role in generating emotive feelings of joy and happiness for the individual attendee, the Sufi collective ritual has an important social aspect for maintaining internal cohesion as a social movement.

There are two basic forms of Sufi typical ritual: chanting dzikir and sholawat recitation. The dzikir is a devotional act that includes the repetition of divine names, supplications and aphorisms from sections of the Qur’an or from the

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134 Interview with Mustafa Mas’ud, 19 September 2010
literature of the Prophetic tradition (*hadits*), whereas *sholawat* recitation is singing praise songs and poems dedicated to commemorate the virtues of Prophet Muhammad. These praise songs are compiled in *maulid* books (Hasan 2012, 370, Zamhari and Howell 2012, 48–49).^{135}

While dzikir ritual has to do with the virtue of constant remembrance of God, *sholawat* emphasizes the importance of loving the Prophet Muhammad and his descendants. The ritual has recently become a feature of the contemporary Sufi resurgence in Indonesia. Like many other Sufi groups, Naqshbandi-Haqqani has a set of rituals performed regularly by all the disciples. These collective rituals include *khatm khwajagan*, *hadrāh*, *maulid*, and a whirling dance. Altogether, they have become a distinctive marker of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia.

*Khatm khawajagan* is collective *dzikir* held once a week, normally every Thursday night. It is a moment during which disciples chant *dzikir* that consists of asking for forgiveness (*istighfar*), praising the Prophet Muhammad (*sholawat*), chant *dzikir*, and recite some Quranic verses. Different from most Naqshbandi Sufi groups, which maintain silent *dzikir* (*sirr*), the Naqshbandi-Haqqani community adopts loud *dzikir* (*jahr*). On the other hand, *hadrāh* is an Arabic term referring to a form of collective ritual that combines elements of dance, music, and singing. During the performance of *hadrāh*, disciples collectively stand up in circle while they move their upper body rhythmically forward and backward, with two hands folded and released up and down while they chant loudly the praise songs to Allah, the Prophet and master accompanied by musical instruments such as duff and...

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^{135} These *maulid* books include popular ones such as *barzanji*, *burdah*, *diba*, *situmudduror*, and *dala'il khoirot*.  

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percussion. Both *khatm khwajagan* and *hadrah* are a distinct collective ritual performed by Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples. They follow currently compulsory ritual menus and are performed together in many Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s dzikir centers. Normally, the disciples of Naqshbandi-Haqqani would conduct khatm khawajagan and follow it up by performing *hadrah*. They are a communal gathering during which joyful feelings are cultivated through repetitive recitations and bodily movement.

*Maulid* celebration is another ritual dedicated mainly to commemorate the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday by reciting *sholawat*. Among Naqshbandi-Haqqani, there are two types of *maulid* books to read which are *simtud duror* and *dalail khoirot*. Different from common practice, the *maulid* ceremony within Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia is conducted almost throughout the year and followed by the so-called *ziarah* of the Prophet’s holy hair. Some sources said that Sheikh Hisham brought along the holy hair with him to Indonesia on Sheikh Nazim’s instruction. The *sholawat* recitation and the holy hair prompt strong emotive response among those attending the ritual. This emotive response particularly occurs during *mahalul qiyam* (standing ovation) in which the disciples stand up and kiss a small cylindrical glassed case keeping the hair inside. Many people testified that such experience brings about inner-peace and tears, something which they desperately sought. Many respondents among Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples further said this kind of thing is one of the reasons they would never give up their affiliation. Not only did they experience feelings of joy and happiness, the

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136 *Simtud Duror* is a *maulid* book written by a Yemeni Sufi, Habib Ali bin Muhammad bin Husain al Halbsyi (1843-1915), whereas *dalail khoirot* was written by Abu Abdullah Muhammad bin Sulaiman al Jazuli, a 15th century Moroccan Sufi leader.
sholawat ritual’s emotional impact on the participants is so strong that they even believe this kind of ritual will somehow create solidarity not only among their fellow Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s followers in Indonesia and around the world but also in the Muslim community as whole.

The whirling dance is also a ritual commonly practiced by young disciples of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia. The whirling dance is originally a Sufi ritual common among members of the Mevlevi Sufi Order in Turkey. The whirling dance involves several dancers who perform anti-clock wise bodily movement accompanied by musical instrument. As the name suggest, it is attributed to Jalaludin Rumi, the Sufi master who founded Mevlevi Sufi order in the 13th century. Among Naqshbandi-Haqqani disciples, this ritual practice is attributed to Abu Bakr as-Shiddiq who began to sway his body when he was told during their hijrah journey from Mecca to Medina that he would be among those going to paradise along with the Prophet. The use of music and dance has an important role in addressing growing internal disappointment between the youth disciples and the old ones. While the old disciples tend to be exclusive and limit their activities only in dzikir ritual, the young disciples are willing to make their affiliation public. They believe that Sheikh Hisham and Naqshbandi-Haqqani have a strong appeal over the youth seeking religious guidance. Music and whirling are just a good way to approach these prospective disciples.

For those who are already well-off, practicing the ritual of Naqshbandi-Haqqani fulfills post-material satisfaction. While I attended the khatm khawajagan, I was often asked about my feeling regarding the ritual. I took the opportunity to

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137 Interview with Muchsin Mulaela, 15 October 2010
ask participants the same question. The common response is that \textit{khatm khawajagan}, which is recited loudly and in rhythmical sound, brings about excitement, comfort, joy and a feeling of instant delight. This feeling is commonly identified as a truth confirmation of this ritual. For those coming from a secular background, the ritual offers a self-disciplining and simultaneously a non-rigid method of religious praxis. For disciples, regular recitation of \textit{dzikr} at a certain prescribed time is considered as a training session for more serious religious learning because it is more intensive than compulsory prayers. However, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani is always very soft in his approach, encouraging his disciples to practice only the most suitable and appropriate ritual in private. The ritual is not presented as a rigid formula. Rather it is considered as an enjoyable activity, which can result in benefits only if the disciples practice it voluntarily and sincerely.\footnote{An explanation for Sheikh Hisham Kabbani’s gentle approach is perhaps the fact that he is from the USA. He is fluent in both Arabic and English and attracts disciples from a middle-upper class background.} All this clearly plays a part in changing the perception about the ritual and the master among the young disciples.

For lay disciples, the ritual and surrounding environment where it is conducted has an emotionally powerful effect. It is a moment when the communal spirit of friendship is cultivated and flourished. Attending collective \textit{dzikr} in a large luxurious house, meeting face-to-face, and sharing a meal are something that was previously unthinkable for most of the disciples, especially those coming from modest backgrounds. According to them, the Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s communal ritual enabled people from very different economic backgrounds to meet, something which is just impossible in a normal situation, especially in metropolitan
city like Jakarta. Both *khatm khawajagan* and *hadrah* for instance are communal gatherings where those attending the event can share and enjoy leisure time together.

The repetitive nature of ritual cultivates what Durkheim identified as ‘collective effervescence’, referring to a situation in which an amplified and excited reaction is made possible when a group of people experience something emotional together. Jasper (1997, 184) suggested that,

> “Collective rites remind participants of their basic moral commitments, stir up strong emotions, and reinforce a sense of solidarity with the group, a “we-ness”. Rituals are symbolic embodiments, at salient times and places, of the beliefs and feelings of a group.”

Collins (2001, 27) further argues that ritual has to do with transmutation of feeling and emotion to the moral commitment of those joining the movement. As Collins has said, emotional ties thus play an important role in maintaining internal cohesion within the movement. This emotive expression is, to a large degree, more influential than material motivation in persuading disciples to stay and commit themselves to the movement.

**5.6 Conclusion**

The case of Naqshbandi-Haqqani confirms what Howell identifies as experiential religiosity among middle-upper class in Jakarta. This experiential religiosity relies on the charisma of the Sufi master and his ritual. Strong personal charisma and repetitive collective litanies offer a joyful environment to create affectionate ties between the master and disciples and among the disciples.
themselves. It is through mobilisation of emotion and passion that Naqshbandi-Haqqani manages to maintain collective ties among people with different socio-cultural and economic backgrounds. A charismatic figure provides a leadership resource to lead and direct the disciples, whereas collective rituals generate intimacy and emotional feeling within the group. Emotional feelings, instead of rational calculation, are a particularly important aspect for this social movement because it lays a strong foundation for passionate mobilisation that motivates people to join, maintain their commitment and sustain their active involvement in the movement (Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001, 2004, Jasper 1998). All this personalised religious experience therefore contributes to transform this Sufi group into an Islamic social movement.
Chapter 6
MOBILISING STRUCTURE AND SOCIAL NETWORKS
Affiliates and Institutional Arrangement

The charismatic leader focuses the forces for change and brings them to bear upon cracks in the edifice of the existing traditional establishment. In this way, over time, the new movement inspired by the charismatic leader may come to overthrow the existing power structure, whether this being political or religious in form. But in order to complete his task the leader must not only attract followers[,] he has also to develop an organization, and it is out of this requirement that many difficulties arise (Nelson 1987, 117).

Sufi resurgence did not happen overnight through magical means. It has been going through institutional innovations that are flexible enough to adapt to changing social, economic, cultural, and political conditions over a long period of time. In the institutional sense, Sufi resurgence is closely related to the organisational capacity to mobilise resources and expand social networks. Examining this organisational capacity is pivotal to have comprehensive understanding about Sufi resurgence in Indonesia. Howell points out that institutional innovation, in a sense of partial disengagement from traditional Sufi underpinning institutions, has led to a wider appeal of Sufi devotion beyond its traditional audience (Howell 2002, 4-5).

This chapter deals with institutional innovation, arrangement, and organisational capacity. In this chapter, I will examine internal organising structures, schism and internal dynamics of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia. This organising structure lays a strong foundation for resource mobilisation. While this organising structure helps the Sufi sheikh to expand his mission, the existing structure and diverse background of followers also generate schism and internal
conflict. This internal dynamics show the extent of institutionalisation and organisational capacity to recruit new members and maintain the old ones.

This chapter consists of five sections. The first section deals leadership structure and membership. Second, it examines institutional arrangement of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia by focusing on four different forms of religious institutions (Zawiya, Pesantren, Yayasan, and Shelter/Rumah Singgah). The third section examines internal conflict and organisational dynamics of these various institutions. Fourth section of this chapter is about internal mechanism to maintain cohesion and strengthen collective solidarity within the movement and finally this chapter concludes by re-elaborating the main arguments and its supporting examples.

6.1 Leadership Structure and Membership

The leadership structure of Naqshbandi-Haqqani closely resembles that of many other Sufi movements. Sheikh Nazim claims the highest religious authority, but this authority is then dispersed among different deputies and, particularly in the Indonesian context, religious authority is equally shared among the three national representatives (Mustafa Masud, K.H. Taufiqurrahman Subki, and K.H. Ahmad Syahid) and around 40 assistants (badal/imam/amir/ustadz) who help the representatives to guide and give religious instruction to disciples. The large number of local leaders forms a complex web of independent religious authority. Some local assistants pay allegiance to different representatives, while others claim direct allegiance to the deputy (Sheikh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani).
The three different layers of disciples (muridin, muhibbin, and salik) are distinguished by their relationship with the master, as well as the degree of commitment and interactional intensity. The murid (pl. muridin) refers to those who have taken bai’at and know either Sheikh Nazim Haqqani or Sheikh Hisham Kabbani in person. They consist mostly of senior and early initiated disciples. They are considered spiritually mature and trusted by Sheikh Hisham Kabbani to perform certain rituals and spiritual roles such as leading dzikir/muraqabah/i’tikaf/suluk, interpreting dreams, and representing the master in taking baiat. The national representatives are in this category and, in a few cases, the murid also refers to those senior initiates who have been given a new name by Sheikh Hisham Kabbani.
The *muhib* (pl. *muhibin*) refers to committed disciples with certain roles and institutional responsibility such as looking after day-to-day rituals, fundraising, and translating Naqshbandi Haqqani materials. They are committed and loyal disciples who are keen to provide material and non-material resources to support Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s activities in Indonesia. The first and second layers are thus the core of disciples who perform their role as Sufi activists to spread the message and attract new disciples. This distinction seems to continue the legacy of Abu Muhammad al Madani (the 37th master in the silsilah) who distinguished between *ittiba’iyya* (fully committed and sincere disciple) and *syar’iyya*. This distinction in turn also resembles the distinction between *tariqa murid* and *na’ib murid* during the Great Jihad era of Abu Ahmad as-Sughuri (Kemper 2002, 58-60).

Beyond these layers, there is *salik* (seeker) which refers to all those who have sympathy for and no objection toward Sufi beliefs and rituals. They normally
come, especially when Sheikh Hisham Kabbani pays a visit to Indonesia, and attend public ceremonies conducted by his murid/muhib. They will commonly attend or participate in public sermons given by Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s representatives/badal/imam/amir or occasionally access Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s websites. Through a gradual learning process, some of them become muhibbin but most of them remain distant sympathisers.

6.2 Naqshbandi Haqqani and Its Affiliates in Indonesia

Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia is not a typical Sufi order. Unlike most other Sufi movements which maintain close and strict charismatic institutions, it deliberately develops a complex and rather sophisticated organising and mobilising structure. It is also relatively open, welcoming everyone to join and participate in its ritual congregation, even before they are formally initiated. Though the personal charisma of the Sheikh is still essential, modern organising structure and institutional arrangement have become increasingly important in supporting transnational missionary mission and further expansion. Naqshbandi-Haqqani attempts to adapt to the organising needs of the modern world that requires impersonal institutions and capable personal leadership. Because of this, Naqshbandi-Haqqani is able to gain important strategic resources such as financial support and social networks which are vital for supporting its activities and propagating mission in Indonesia.

Naqshbandi-Haqqani was previously an elitist and exclusive religious group. This Sufi congregation was concentrated in luxurious residential houses in Jakarta.
consisted mostly of people from upper middle class background such as businessmen, politicians, and celebrities. Though Sheikh Hisham Kabbani allowed and, to some extent, even encouraged his disciples to set up various institutional arrangements to spread Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia as early as the late 1990s, the elitist and exclusive nature of Naqshbandi-Haqqani remains unchanged.

The development of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia cannot be separated from the establishment and flourishing of its underpinning institutions such as zawiya, shelter, yayasan, and pesantren. The zawiya and other similar institutions are not simply a building complexes where people gather to chant dzikir collectively, but more importantly, it is a religious institution where Islamic teachings are taught and practiced, that of social institution where solidarity and cohesion are built, of political institution where resources are mobilised, of economic institution where voluntary exchanges occur, and of cultural institution where Islamic living tradition is manifested and performed on daily basis.

Sheikh Hisham Kabbani asked his disciples to establish an official umbrella organisation representing Naqshbandi-Haqqani Sufi Order of America Foundation in Indonesia. According to Bernie Subki, this request was related to the Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s world tour planned to be held in the following year.139 In short, the request was then warmly welcomed by some senior disciples such as Firdaus Wajdi, Bernie Subki, Farid Bubhi Djamirin, Muchtony Ghani Azis, and

139 In this 25 days world tour, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani brought along his master, Sheikh Nazim al Haqqan, visiting Uzbekistan, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Srilanka, and Pakistan. During the visit, Sheikh Nazim al Haqqani and Hisham Kabbani were accompanied by some of their close disciples such as Sheikh Raja Asman (Malaysia), Sheikh Zakaria (Singapore) etc. Interview with Bernie Subki, 25 December 2010
Effendi Siregar who immediately followed it up by initiating the establishment of *Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia* (YHI) in December 2000.

It began to change around 2003 when new disciples from different social backgrounds were initiated to this Sufi movement. A further significant turning point in the development of Naqshbandi-Haqqani occurred especially when Sheikh Hisham Kabbani instructed his main deputy, Mustafa Mas’ud, to shift his focus of propagating activity from Jakarta to other regions across Indonesia. Since then, Mustafa Mas’ud has spread Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s religious teachings and initiating new disciples in other parts of the country. In 2004, Sheikh Hisham also authorised 38 disciples to spread Naqshbandi-Haqqani in other areas after they had completed their seclusion ritual. From this time on, Naqshbandi-Haqqani has been gradually transforming itself into an inclusive religious movement with active participants from all walks of life.

However, progress was slow at the beginning. Until 2004, there were only around five *dzikir* centers in Jakarta, one *dzikir* center in Bandung, and another in Batam. The five *dzikir* centers in Jakarta were located at Mustafa Mas’ud’s house in Hasbi, Cawang/East Jakarta, Firdaus Wajdi’s house in Brawijaya/South Jakarta, Hagi Ghani Azis’ and Prof Iyos Subki’s house in Teuku Umar Street and Indramayu Street, Menteng/Central Jakarta, and Muhammad Hasan’s house in Pangkalan Jati/South Jakarta, while the *dzikir* center in Bandung was located at Hadid Subki’s house and the one in Batam was at Yandri Irzaq’s house.

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140 Interview with Buddy Rachmadi, 11 November 2010
141 Interview with Wahyudin Yusuf, 5 November 2010
142 Interview with Bernie Subki, 26 December 2010
MAP D: Regional Distribution of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s Dzikir Centres Across Indonesia c. 2010
Since then Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples have continued to establish their own formal and informal institutions to organise their activities. Through Sheikh Hisham Kabbani’s continuous encouragement and personal support, disciples have been developing different institutionalising strategy to establish both formal and informal organisations. The number of dzikir centers has grown significantly from only 5 in 2000 to around 37 in 2004. This number went up again to 72 in 2009; there are currently 135 dzikir centers in Indonesia. The proliferation of dzikir centers throughout the country led to significant increases in the number of disciples, which rose from about 1800 in 2004 to around 3000 in 2006. These organisational resources play an important role in spreading Naqshbandi-Haqqani. More importantly, Naqshbandi-Haqqani also manages to establish and maintain social networking with other Sufi movements and Islamic organisations in Indonesia.

There are some factors contributing to the rapid expansion of Naqshbandi-Haqqani across Indonesia such as the unconventional method of dakwah and the use of modern media and information technology. For instance, in his early mission, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani had the habit of taking mass bai’at in every public forum he attended. The unconventional use of music and dance performances attracted many young people in Jakarta and other areas. The use of media and information technology, especially the internet, also helps to boost Sheikh Nazim and Hisham Kabbani’s prestige and charisma as Sufi masters, especially among those who are IT-literate.

Moreover, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani seemed to realise that confining Naqshbandi-Haqqani only to Jakarta’s elites increasingly compromised his
independence as a Sufi master. Though exclusive and elitist approaches manage to secure both financial and political support, those approaches are no longer sustainable for long-term *dakwah* mission in Indonesia. As the number of new disciples continues to grow, more inclusive and open approaches are needed. By expanding the mission beyond his original audiences among Jakarta’s elites, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani tries to strengthen his religious authority by giving spiritual instruction to his disciples independently rather than following the dictates of those who provide his movement with financial and political support. The movement’s rapid expansion changed the dynamics and nature of the relationship between master and disciple.

Organisationally speaking, Naqshbandi-Haqqani is relatively egalitarian and less hierarchical than commonly understood. As the number of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples continues to grow, some followers began to set up their own religious institutions. Disciples are organised by their social and geographical backgrounds, and receive religious instructions from their own local leaders. There are currently four types of institutions: Zawiya, *Pesantren*, Yayasan, and Shelter. These institutions are responsible for organising all ritual congregations (*Majelis Dzikir*) and manage those disciples who have been initiated into and practice Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s rituals as part of their daily religious devotion.
6.2.1 Zawiya

The term *zawiya* originally means a Sufi lodge where a master guides his disciples in spiritual training, a practice long established in Islamic history. In the Indonesian context, the term *zawiya* refers to a meeting place where disciples would come regularly to perform collective rituals. This meeting place can be a private house, a mosque, or *mushola*. Organisationally speaking, *zawiya* is a loose institution characterised by informal and voluntary nature.

Mustafa Mas’ud’s *zawiyah* Hasbi is the first Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s affiliate-institution in Indonesia. It was originally located at Jl. Hasbi 40 Otista, Cawang, East Jakarta, which is a private house of Sheikh Mustafa Mas’ud. This *zawiyah* was established in April 1997 soon after the first visit of Sheikh Hisham Kabbani in Indonesia. The *zawiyah* started with a modest number of people (less than 30), most of whom were women.
After this modest start, Mustafa Mas’ud proceeded to establish more than 40 dzikir centers across Indonesia between 2004 and 2009, attracting followers from diverse backgrounds. In Pekanbaru, his followers are mostly medical doctors. Prominent medical specialists such as Chairudin Lubis, Eko Suyono, and Pramudjo Abdulgani have joined Naqshbandi-Haqqani since 2005 and become its main financial supporters.

In Jakarta, Semarang, Yogyakarta, Malang, and Surabaya, most of the followers are students, young professionals and academics from prestigious universities such as University of Indonesia, IAIN Walisongo, Diponegoro University, Gadjah Mada University, Indonesia Islamic University, UIN Malang, and 10th November Institute of Technology (ITS). According to Muhammad Hikam, a lecturer in the Department of Physics at the University of Indonesia, many of his colleagues became followers of Naqshbandi-Haqqani through Mustafa Mas’ud, including Prof. Gumilar Rosliwa Somantri, the then vice counselor.

Since 2005, Mustafa Mas’ud has organised his disciples under one umbrella called FORNAQSDA (stands for Forum Naqshbandi Daerah – Regional Naqshbandi Forum). This informal organisation receives financial support in the form of voluntary donations by his loyal disciples. For instance, one of his disciples in Batam, Elvian Awwal, established a special trading company and dedicated most of its profit to support the organisation. Mustafa Mas’ud also founded several retreat centers where he would pay most visits. These retreat centers are designed to be the place where he would guide his disciples in

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143 This dzikir centres are located in Riau and Riau islands, West and North Sumatra, Jambi, Central and East Java, Jogjakarta, East Kalimantan, and South Sulawesi
144 Interview with Muhammad Hikam, 15 December 2010
conducting *suluk, tawajuh,* or *i’tikaf* rituals. The retreat centers are mostly busy during *Muharram* and *Rajab* when the disciples come to hold the rituals together.

Using a generous donation from one of the disciples (Chairudin Lubis), Mustafa Mas’ud also founded a permanent retreat center in Lembah Manah Khwajagan in Pekanbaru, Riau. It is located on the 20 hectares of land that used to be a palm plantation about 30 minutes drive from the capital city of Pekanbaru. The Lembah Manah Khwajagan is used for those living in Sumatra. Currently, the retreat center is looked after by Abdul Mughitz, one of Mustafa Masud’s disciples from Demak, Central Java. Similar retreat centers are also established in Bambu Apus-Tangerang and Takeran-Madiun, catering to disciples in Jabotabek and East Java regions with the further plan to build another two centers in Batam and Samarinda, East Kalimantan.

Since 2009, he has been planning to build a permanent base in Takeran, Madiun, on a plot of land donated by KH. Maskin Abdul Azis where he planned to build *Kampung Sholawat*. Sheikh Mustafa Masud admitted that, at his age, it has become increasingly difficult for him to travel long distances and make regular visits to Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples all over Indonesia. Therefore, he began to consider staying permanently in one place and guiding his disciples from there.

*Zawiya* Brawijaya is the second oldest *zawiya* in Indonesia and has been used exclusively for holding ladies’ *dzikir* gathering once a week. This *zawiya* is founded and led by Tini Firdaus. This *zawiya* is located in Firdaus Wajdi’s private residential house in Brawijaya Street, Kebayoran Baru-South Jakarta. Most of the attendees come from the NAMIRA group. *Zawiya* Brawijaya caters ladies mostly
coming from Jakarta’s middle upper class. By contrast, the Haqqul Mubin is the newest Naqshbandi-Haqqani zawiya. Located in South Tangerang, this zawiya was officially opened in 12 May 2012. Like zawiya Brawijaya, zawiya Haqqul Mubin also receives financial support from an oil-drilling contractor.

In addition to those zawiya, there are also independent zawiya. There are five independent zawiya, one in each of the following places: Jakarta, Bandung, Cirebon, Cianjur, and Cipanas. These independent zawiya are small congregations with around 25 disciples each. Compared to the three large zawiya (Hasbi, Brawijaya, and Haqul Mubin), these zawiya are less resourceful but they keep growing in number.

6.2.2 Shelter (Rumah Singgah)

Shelter is an urban institution, especially one kept by a religious order that gives shelter to pilgrims or strangers. In the Indonesian context, it refers specifically to a meeting place for young disciples to chant dzikir and conduct other activities, as well as a temporary shelter for street kids and homeless persons. This type of religious institution appeals particularly to young disciples. There are currently two shelters affiliated to Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia: Rabbani Cinere and Rumi Café.

Rabbani Cinere – also known as Rabbani Sufi Institute of Indonesia – began its activity in 2003, not long after Sheikh Kabbani initiated Dicky Aryo Seno (aka Sheikh Zulfikar) at Firdaus Wajdi’s house in Brawijaya, South Jakarta. Dicky began his involvement in the Islamic movement as a member of JT (Jamaat
Tabligh) in 1991 while he was studying at Parahyangan Catholic University, Bandung. He became disillusioned with that organisation because of a personal spiritual crisis. Perhaps due to the founder’s background as a JT’s activist, the Rabbani Cinere was very rigorous in spreading Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teachings through various proselytizing initiatives. Dicky became particularly active in preaching Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teachings among his JT’s fellows to the extent that it created tension among the top ranks of JT that led to his expulsion from his previous affiliation.145

At the beginning, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani authorised Dicky Aryo Seno as the sole leader (amir) for the Rabbani Cinere. By the help of his brother (Doni Indarto aka Sheikh Abu Tufail) and two close friends (Zalyati and Eri Barkah Saridria), Dicky initiated the establishment of a large dzikir center in Jl. Vila Terusan Mas 16 Cinere, Pondok Cabe. After that, Sheikh Kabbani assigned both Doni Indarto (aka Sheikh Abu Tufail) and Eri Barkah Saridria (aka Sheikh Barkah) as amir to lead the shelter collectively in 2005. Sheikh Kabbani attributed the name of Rabbani for this new congregation in 2006.

The Rabbani Cinere secured financial support from some businessmen in Jakarta who are sympathetic to its activities. Between 2006 and 2008, the shelter expanded to other areas such as Bandung, Solo, Jogja, and Bontang. Until 2009, this shelter was Sheikh Hisham Kabbani’s principal vehicle for reaching out to the growing numbers of young urban disciples through its unconventional approach of religious propagation by adopting music, dance performances (whirling dervishes), and martial arts.

145 Interview with Dicky Aryo Seno, 21 September 2010
For most of the disciples, Abu Tufail is the de facto leader of the Rabbani Cinere. He reportedly possesses a spiritual power that enables him to foresee the future and heal the sick, so much so that he is regarded as qutb ghwat (living saint). It is claimed that Abu Tufail is the only authorised representative who was directly appointed by Sheikh Nazim Haqqani while the former and some of his closest aides visited Lefke in 2008. It was symbolised by a staff that was reportedly given to him by Sheikh Nazim as a gift.\textsuperscript{146} Abu Tufail’s growing personal reputation might also be explained by the fact that the shelter is located at his own house where he provides shelter and free meals for most of the disciples.

This is the first dzikir center which introduced the whirling dervishes’ dance performance, Sufi meditation (muraqaba), and the use of music (hadrah) as part of ritual devotion. Sheikh Nurjan Mirahmadi, the trusted deputy of Sheikh Hisham Kabbani from the USA, was sent by Sheikh Kabbani in 2006 to teach Sufi meditation at the center. After the training, Sheikh Nurjan authorised Dicky Aryo Seno to teach this technique to others. Along with Sheikh Nurjan, there was also Sheikh Abdul Wahid (an Australian from Melbourne and disciple of Sheikh Nazim Haqqani) who spent some time at the center to share his skills in performing the whirling dervishes.\textsuperscript{147}

Another important shelter is Rumi Cafè. It was founded in 2008 and pioneered by two young Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples (Arif Hamdani and Mukhsin Mulaela). The Rumi Cafè is financially supported by the Asih Foundation, a charity organisation founded by prominent business figures such as Hendro

\textsuperscript{146} Interview with Muhammad Sholeh, 20 July 2010
\textsuperscript{147} Interview with Aat, 20 September 2010
Martowardoyo, Miranti Abidin, Amania Rai, and Tito Sulistio. It was officially inaugurated on 10 August 2008 at the Four Season Hotel by Sheikh Hisham Kabbani. It is located at a two-storey building of Wisma Iskandarsyah Blok B4, Jl. Iskandarsyah Raya Kav 12-14 Kebayoran Baru, a commercial district of South Jakarta, close to Pasaraya Sarinah Blok M, and owned by Tito Sulistio, one of the founders of the Asih Foundation.

The founders of Rumi Café come from very different background. Arif Hamdani is an ex-Jamaah Tabligh activist and was previously active at the Rabbani Cinere. He was very active there and became one of the key figures in the Rabbani Cinere until 2008. He actively translated and disseminated Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teachings. He also organised many public events which enabled Sheikh Hisham Kabbani to reach out to the urban youth. On the other hand, Mukhsin Mulaela is a former Tarbiyah activist. Financial supporters of Rumi Café come from those who have studied Sufism through Paramadina’s executive *tasawuf* courses. It was through Mukhsin Mulaela that the Rumi Café came to its existence because he is a personal aide for Hendro Martowardoyo and works at Yayasan Wakaf Paramadina in which Hendro Martowardoyo is a board member (treasurer).

With the support of Asih Foundation, both Muksin Mulaela and Arif Hamdani worked together to transform Rumi Café into a meeting place and shelter for young Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples in Jakarta. Rumi Café represents an urban institutional adaptation that attempts to combine *zawiya* and *yayasan*. Like

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148 Hendro Martowardoyo is older brother of Agus Martowardoyo, the Minister of Finance, a banker and close friend of Robby Djohan of Niaga Bank, and the President Commissioner of Resource Alam Indonesia Co. Ltd., a private coal mining company.
149 Miranti Abidin is owner and CEO of Fortune Indonesia, a private largest advertising company in Indonesia.
150 It should be noted however that Arif Hamdani split from Rumi Cafe in 2009, brought along with him some disciples and established his own zawiya in Pondok Jaya, South Jakarta.
Asih Foundation, the Rumi Café focuses its activities on providing social charity to the needy. It also runs weekly religious programs (dzikir khatm khwajagan, Sufi meditation, Islamic studies, etc.) and providing free meals for street kids. It has hadrah and whirling teams that are sometimes invited to perform publicly in several prestigious places across Jakarta. During the 2010 fasting month, for instance, the Rumi Café’s hadrah and whirling teams were invited to perform at the Pacific Place Plaza of SCBD and some other places.

Since 2008, Rumi Café has also proposed the establishment of new foundation (Raudlatul Madina) that would be functioned as educational and publishing centers of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia. There was a plan to abolish the YHI and replace it with the new one called Yayasan Raudlatul Madina in 2009.\textsuperscript{151} Hendro Martowardoyo was actually ready to donate 3000 square meters of land in Cilandak area for this purpose.\textsuperscript{152} However, Soenarto’s reluctance to support the proposal prevents this to materialise any time soon.\textsuperscript{153} It seems that Soenarto is reluctant to support the establishment of Raudlatul Madina because he does not want to lose his control over it.

\textbf{6.2.3 Yayasan}

\textit{Yayasan} (foundation) is an urban-type institution established to organise religious and social activities. It is formally structured and officially registered with the government. There are currently three social foundations affiliated to Naqshbandi-Haqqani: Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia (YHI), Yayasan Haqqani Batam (YHB), and Yayasan Baitus Syifa (YBS).

\textsuperscript{151} Interview with Rizal Tarigan, 22 September 2010
\textsuperscript{152} Interview with Muchsin Mulaela, 18 August 2010
\textsuperscript{153} Interview with Bernie Subki, 25 December 2010
The first official institutional representative of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia, the YHI was founded in December 2000, but it was not officially inaugurated until April 2001. It serves as the official branch of Naqshbandi-Haqqani Sufi Order of America Foundation and responsible for organising Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s activities in Indonesia. Until 2012, the YHI’s was located in 41 Teuku Umar Street, an elite suburb of Menteng, Central Jakarta before then moved to Permata Hijau.\textsuperscript{154} The YHI is funded by Jakarta’s businessmen, and is politically connected to prominent politicians and top bureaucrats in Jakarta.

From 2000 to 2004, Faried Bubhi Djamirin and Dr. Bernie Subki were in charge as chairman and secretary of the YHI respectively, whereas Firdaus Wajdi and Muhammad Hasan (1920-2005) were in charge as advisors.\textsuperscript{155} However, because of his vast social networks and organisational skills, Firdaus Wajdi became the key figure and even\textsuperscript{de-facto} chairman of the YHI. Through his vast social networks among Jakarta’s elites, Firdaus Wajdi managed to secure financial support which was important for further dissemination of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia.

Since its inception, the YHI has been responsible mainly for fundraising and arranging travel plans during the visit of Sheikh Nazim Haqqani or Sheikh Hisham Kabbani and their entourage in Indonesia. Its duties range from selecting places for the Sheikhs to visit or events for them to attend to booking

\textsuperscript{154} The headquarter used a pavilion building attached to Muchtony Ghani Azis’s house, one of the senior disciples of Naqshbandi-Haqqani before then moved to private residence of Soenarto in Permata Hijau.

\textsuperscript{155} Muhammad Hasan was former Chief of National Police between 1971 and 1974.
accommodation, transport, and even voorijder.\textsuperscript{156} The YHI is also involved in publishing, organising national gatherings, charity works, and social networking with other national Islamic organisations.

During the tenure of Firdaus Wajdi, the foundation seemed concerned with political lobbying to secure financial support and political patronage from Jakarta’s elites. However, Firdaus Wajdi’s influence in the foundation sharply declined after Soenarto formally took over as the chairman of YHI in 2004. Unlike his predecessor, Soenarto is a businessman and currently the biggest financial supporter of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s activities in Indonesia.\textsuperscript{157} He financially supports the foundation along with some other businessmen such as Ahmadin Ahmad and Malik Tarigan.\textsuperscript{158} The YHI is currently run by the younger generation with family connection to the financial patrons. In daily operation, the YHI is currently managed by Rizal Tarigan (Malik Tarigan’s son), Buddy Rakhmadi (Soenarto’s son), and Nasher Nasran (Ahmadin’s son).\textsuperscript{159}

The YHI routinely holds weekly \textit{dzikir} rotating from one to another residential house. There are currently eleven houses used for this weekly \textit{dzikir} ritual across Jakarta. The \textit{dzikir} ritual is led by one of the most senior disciples (Effendi Siregar) without sohbet. The regular \textit{dzikir}’s attendees are mostly from

\textsuperscript{156} During the visit of Sheikh Hisyam Kabbani in December 2010 for example, I observed how the foundation and its ranks prepared everything down to the last detail, from booking domestic flight tickets, buses, police voorijder, and establishing SMS center to documenting all the attended event into video live-streaming etc.

\textsuperscript{157} Soenarto is the owner of Gurita Lintas Samudra Company, an Indonesian cargo ship company specializing in coal and mining shipment.

\textsuperscript{158} Both Malik Tarigan and Ahmadin Ahmad are businessmen. Malik Tarigan is the owner of Kaliguma Transindo, an Indonesian freight forwarder company, whereas Ahmadin Ahmad is a businessman closely related to a former commander of Indonesian Special Forces, Sjahir MS

\textsuperscript{159} Nasher Nasran is a particularly interesting person because many testified that he is an initiated Shadzili’s disciple who learnt Sufism while he was studying in Damascus, Syria.
Jakarta’s middle-upper class background and numbered around 200 people. Though small in number, the YHI provide most of material resources for Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s activities in Indonesia thanks to its vast political networks and established financial support. The YHI also owns and operates a large retreat center in Cikereteg, Bogor.

Yayasan Haqqani Batam (YHB) was established in September 2003. This is the second oldest foundation affiliated to Naqshbandi-Haqqani. The YHB was founded by Yandri Irzaq, the then top official at Batam Industrial Development Authority (Otorita Batam), with the strong support from Firdaus Wajdi, the founder of YHI in Jakarta. The YHB’s headquarter is located in Orchid Park D11 Batam Centre, Batam, and is responsible for organising Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples in Batam, many of whom have been initiated since July 2001. According to Alvian Awal, Batam is the third place – after Jakarta and Bandung – where Naqshbandi-Haqqani gained audience. It was initiated by Mustafa Mas’ud and some of his disciples who moved from Jakarta to Batam.160

At least until 2006, the YHB was financially established thanks to the support from local politicians and businessmen in Batam. A few people recalled that some of the disciples there used their Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s affiliation to seek positions in the local bureaucracy and to gain financial support from the local government. Due to the position of its chairman, the foundation worked in close collaboration with the Batam Authority Agency. The YHB for instance tried to establish a permanent base by building a mosque on 5000 square meter plot of land donated by Ismet Abdullah, who was the head of Batam authorities at that time.

160 Interview with Alvian Awwal, 18 October 2010
Sheikh Hisham Kabbani attended its opening ceremony on 11 October 2003. Following the downfall of its political patron (Ismet Abdullah, the then Governor of Riau Islands Province) in 2010 because of corruption charges, the socio-political influence of the YHB significantly declined.

However, to date, the YHB still manages to maintain regular *dzikr* ritual every Tuesday and Thursday night. Muhammad Yusuf Ridwan Syafe’i was the principal Imam of *dzikr* ritual at the YHB until his death in 2011. While Yandri Irzaq provides material resources for running Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s activity, Muhammad Yusuf Ridwan as Syafe’i is mainly responsible for leading the *dzikr* ritual and gives religious instruction. As the principal Imam, Muhammad Yusuf Ridwan is assisted by two *badal* (Faridudin and Abdurrahman) who run their own religious congregation after finishing seclusion ritual in the Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s retreat center in Cikereteg, Bogor in 2007.

Meanwhile, Yayasan Baitus Syifa (YBS) was recently established by Muhammad Shalahuddin in 11 November 2011. Muhammad Shalahudin was born on 7 August 1974 in Bandung as the third of five children of Rasyid Abdul Kadir and Dedeh Suryawati. He studied at secular schools and attended an Aviation School in Sydney, Australia in 1994. He gave up his dream to be a pilot reportedly after experiencing a ‘spiritual illumination’ of seeing the Prophet in a dream. During his stay at Surry Hill Mosque, Muhammad Shalahudin received religious instruction from his first spiritual master, Sheikh Jaffar, a Pakistani Qadiri master. Upon returning to Indonesia in early 2000, he pursued his religious study at PTIQ (Perguruan Tinggi Ilmu Al Quran) where he had to memorize the entire Quran to gain the title of *al hafidz*. 
Muhammad Shalahudin was initiated into Naqshbandi-Haqqani by Sheikh Nazim Haqqani when he visited Indonesia in May 2001. Between 2001 and 2007, he spent most of his time travelling across Indonesia to teach alternative healing methods (*ruqyah* and *bekam*). He organised those with similar skills into HHT (Heavenly Healing Team). At least once a year, he goes on pilgrimage, which often includes a retreat, to local saints’ graveyard across Java. Among his disciples, Kangdin is believed to have special skills in healing methods such as *ruqyah* and *bekam*. Under Kangdin, *zawiya* HHT disseminates the Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teachings indirectly through alternative healing campaigns carried out throughout Indonesia. Those who have been successfully cured by Kangdin or his team usually seek initiation into the Naqshbandi-Haqqani.

The YBS was previously known as HHT – stands for Heavenly Healing Team – an independent *zawiya* founded by Muhammad Shalahudin. The name of HHT was reportedly given and authorized by Sheikh Hisham Kabbani in 2007. This group is called Heavenly Healing Team (HHT) because Muhammad Shalahudin organises those who have alternative healing skills. The YBS/HHT has currently its own permanent home base at Baytul Jalal mosque, Jl. Danau Raya No. 4 Islamic Village Kelapa Dua, Tangerang.\(^{161}\) The YBS/HHT’s affiliated-*zawiya* is located in many regions such as Lampung, Tangerang, Anyer, Jakarta, Semarang, Garut, Karawang, and Cikampek with around 700 disciples.

\(^{161}\) Muhammad Shalahudin currently organizes his disciples into Baytusy Syifa Foundation aimed to establish a permanent Islamic educational institution.
6.2.4 Pesantren

*Pesantren* is a typical Islamic educational institution in Indonesia where a Muslim scholar teaches various traditional Islamic subjects and rituals. Pesantren is also a traditional educational institution where Sufism and other Islamic subjects are taught as part of the curriculum and where Sufi devotion is practiced on a daily basis. The Pesantren is thus the most established institution for the preservation and transmission of Sufi teachings (Dhofier 1982, Zulkifli 2002).

There are currently 12 Islamic boarding schools (Pesantren) affiliated to Naqshbandi-Haqqani. Some of them are small and modest Pesantren, but some others are quite large with more than 300 students. They include Pesantren Madaniyah (Batam), Pesantren Sirajul Huda (Karo), Pesantren Miftahul Jannah (Pakanbaru), Pesantren Al Falah and Sirojul Muniro (Bandung/Lembang), Pesantren Al Maunah and Nurul Hidayah (Depok), and Pesantren Darus Syifa al Fitrat (Sukabumi), Pesantren At Taufiqy (Pekalongan), Pesantren Al Falah (Kajar, Bondowoso), Pesantren Darus Sholawat (Takeran-Madiun), and Pesantren Asri, Singaraja, Bali. Of the twelve Pesantren, Pesantren At-Taufiqy/Pekalongan, Pesantren Al Falah/Bandung, and Pesantren Darus Syifa al Fitrat/Sukabumi are particularly important as centers of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia.

Pesantren At-Taufiqy was founded and is led by KH. Taufiqurrahman Subki and located in Rowokembu Kaum, Wonopringgo, Southern Pekalongan. K.H. Taufiqurrahman Subki is a close friend of Mustafa Masud when both attended undergraduate study at IAIN Sunan Kalijaga, back in the late 1960s in Yogyakarta. K.H. Taufiqurrahman Subki began his religious mission as an instructor of Quran reciting course in his village’s mosque in the 1970s. As the number of his students
grew, he decided to establish a modest *pesantren* close to his home. At present, Pesantren At Taufiqy has about 600 hundreds pupils aged between 12 and 25. The focus is on traditional subjects such as Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*) and Arabic grammar (*nahwu* and *shorof*).

K.H. Taufiqurrahman Subki was appointed to be the Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s representative by Sheikh Hisyam Kabbani in December 1997, and was responsible for overlooking Central Java region. According to some reports, K.H Taufiqurrahman Subki already had close connections to Naqshbandi long before his formal initiation in December 1997. In the middle of his *pesantren*, there is a tomb of Sheikh Abdullah Khani, believed to be one of Maulana Khalid al Baghdadi’s Syrian deputies sent to Java in the 19th century.

Among Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples, K.H. Taufiqurahman Subki is a legendary figure and considered one of the 7007 Naqshbandi’s living saints. His pious reputation stems from the popular story that he had built his Pesantren by reciting *shalawat* for every piece of materials and stones he laid down on the foundation of the building. His pious reputation is well-known especially among those regularly attend his religious congregation in his Pesantren. This regular propagating event has attracted an average of 3000 people every Wednesday night since 2000. This large congregation increases dramatically during special commemorations such as Sheikh Abdullah Khani’s death commemoration (*khaul*), the Prophet’s birthday celebration (*maulid*), and so forth. KH Taufiqurahman Subki always provides free meal for all those who attend the event.
Pesantren Al Falah is located in Cicalengka, Bandung-West Java. The pesantren was founded by Ahmad Syahid in 1971. At the beginning, this Islamic boarding school caters those specialising in Quranic recitation. This is perhaps related to the founder’s background as a former qori’ (Quran reciter) who won the first national competition of Quran recitation in Makassar in 1968. The pesantren then developed into a large complex providing Islamic education from kindergarten to tertiary levels. Pesantren Al Falah has about 2000 students in two locations, Cicalengka (Al Falah I) and Nagrek KM 38 (Al Falah II). KH Ahmad Syahid himself was initiated as a representative of Naqshbandi-Haqqani for West Java region during the visit of Sheikh Muhammad Hisyam Kabbani in 18 October 2000. At the beginning, K.H. Ahmad Syahid knew Naqshbandi-Haqqani through his father-in law (K.H. Yayat Ruhiyat Siroj, the leader of Pesantren Bidayah) who was introduced to Sheikh Hisham Kabbani through Hadid Subki’s family.\footnote{Interview with Bernie Subki, 26 December 2010}

Ahmad Syahid spread Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teachings not only among his students but also to the surrounding community. Attended by his students and women from surrounding areas, the Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s dzikir is routinely held on the 17\textsuperscript{th} of each month of the Islamic calendar. Since then, Pesantren Al Falah has become the main dzikir center of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in West Java. Naturally, tasawwuf in general and Naqshbandi Haqqani’s teaching in particular are not taught to all students at Pesantren Al Falah because these teachings are only for the chosen students and those who are mature enough to receive instruction.

Ahmad Syahid is both not an ordinary Muslim scholar because he has long been as a seasoned politician. He became politically active by joining Golkar
during the New Order and was once the chairman of the advisory council to the National Awakening Party (PKB) of Yenny Wahid faction. It is perhaps because of his political activity that for many Haqqani’s disciples, K.H. Ahmad Syahid is less popular than other representatives as a spiritual guide.

Meanwhile, Pesantren Darus Syifa Al Fitrat is located in the village of Cipetir, Sukabumi, West Java. Pesantren Darus Syifa al Fitrat is currently led by K.H. Ence Supriyatna. From modest beginnings, this pesantren developed into a 5 hectares modern complex through generous donations from Soenarto’s family, the chairman of Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia. The name of Al Fitrat was named after Soenarto’s wife. It has currently about 2500 students from junior to senior high school’s age. According to some sources, K.H. Ece Supriyatna was previously a salafi-type scholar. After being initiated into Naqshbandi-Haqqani in early 2000, the Pesantren routinely conducts mawlid performance and dzikir at the suggestion of Sheikh Hisyam Kabbani. This Islamic boarding school is a regular destination when Sheikh Hisham visits Indonesia.

Overall, the four principal institutions are independent of each other but together they are the backbone of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s community in Indonesia. Together, they play an important role as intermediary institutions to interact and cooperate with other Muslim organisations. Through these four principal organisations, Naqshbandi-Haqqani manages to maintain its presence and directly contributes to the expansion and consolidation of Naqshbandi-Haqqani movement in Indonesia. All those institutions also serve the practical purpose of maintaining day-to-day activities and, more importantly, enable Naqshbandi-Haqqani as a
missionary group to expand and establish a good relationship with other Muslim figures and mainstream Islamic organisations in Indonesia.

Though they all share function as *dzikir* centre, the four types of institution are different in some respects. The difference in institutional arrangement stems from differences in socio-religious backgrounds, geographical context, sources of funding, degree of institutionalization, and type of activity. This difference affects the organising capacity of these institutions, as well as their effectiveness in mobilising people and material resources. Naqshbandi-Haqqani practically adopts a combination of traditional and modern organising structure based on specific division of labor and distinct organisational roles. In this sense, the expansion of Naqshabandi-Haqqani is not as miraculous as commonly claimed by its disciples.

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<th>Table 1.4 Comparison of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s Institutional Arrangement</th>
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<td><strong>Geographical Context</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Social Background of Disciples</strong></td>
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Since 2009 Naqshbandi-Haqqani has focused on consolidating its existence in Indonesia. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani seems to realize that it is simply impossible
to maintain mass initiation without provoking and even inciting suspicion from other Sufi and established Islamic organisations in Indonesia. Consolidation means that the current priority is not initiating more people into Naqshbandi-Haqqani, but to establish contact with Naqshbandi’s networks across Indonesia. Naqshbandi-Haqqani is concerned to create a friendly religious environment in which traditional Sufi teachings in particular and Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah religious tenets in general are respected and, if possible, held by other Islamic organisations and lay Muslims.

While maintaining its basic characteristic as a spiritual movement, Naqshbandi-Haqqani has also been preparing itself as an established propagating (da’wah) movement and educational institution. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani has been trying to shift his focus to establishing a relatively small but solid institutional basis with strong financial support, loyal and well-connected disciples who would be able to secure political protection and a vast social network reaching out to a broader audience. Since 2009, he has given up mass initiation and has become more selective in his choice of disciples.

Given the internal dynamics among his disciples and the broader Islamic environment in Indonesia, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani’s decisions seem realistic enough. He is fully aware that expanding his mission throughout Indonesia will be very costly, and the current Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s social base cannot fully support this mission yet.\textsuperscript{163} Instead of pushing his disciples to support his propagating mission, he gives freedom to his disciples to run their own activities and also to establish and expand their own organisations for propagating purposes.

\textsuperscript{163} Interview with Nursyafaat, 19 November 2010
Nevertheless, Jakarta is still very important for Naqshbandi-Haqqani because it is where the wealthiest disciples live. In 2008, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani initiated another powerful financial supporter of Naqshbandi-Haqqani. Hendro Martowardoyo, a banker and businessman, joined Naqshbandi-Haqqani in August 2008 and since then he has been, along with Soenarto, an important financial supporter. Through Hendro Martowardoyo’s financial support, Gibril Fouad Haddad, one of Sheikh Hisham Kabbani’s deputies, is able to visit Indonesia on regular basis to guide Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples in Jakarta and other regions.

6.3 Schism and Internal Dynamics

As a social movement, Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia is by no means a single entity because the disciples are organised into various different institutions. They come from very diverse social backgrounds and give allegiance to numerous different local leaders. Each of them also has different aspiration and expectation. It is quite surprising that as a social movement based on strong religious conviction, Naqshbandi-Haqqani community also has internal divergence and friction that divide this Sufi movement into various factions with different orientation. The nature of this divergence is mostly personal but then disperses to the group as a whole. This situation also creates a ‘free-rider’ problem – a situation in which there are those who want to get benefits without making a contribution – that often leads to divergence and contestation over resources, leadership and religious authority.

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164 Hendro Martowardoyo is a prominent banker at Niaga Bank, chief commissioner of Resources Alam Indonesia, and treasurer at Yayasan Wakaf Paramadina. He was also a committee member at Yayasan Pendidikan Al Azhar.
The internal conflict has actually started since 1997, not long after the first visit of Sheikh Hisham Kabbani in Jakarta. This involved the top ranks of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples, especially between Firdaus Wajdi and Mustafa Mas’ud. Between 1997 and 2004, the disciples of Naqshbandi-Haqqani consisted mainly of the so-called Hasbi and Brawijaya group referring to both Mustafa Mas’ud’s and Firdaus Wajdi’s residential address, respectively. The reason for the conflict was not completely clear because different people had different versions of what happened.

For some, this simply showed a lack of respect on the part of Firdaus Wajdi toward Mustafa Mas’ud. As a person who has a long experience and strong political connections to Jakarta’s elite circle, Firdaus Wajdi tends to underestimate Mustafa Mas’ud who comes from a modest student activist background. Others blame this conflict on Mustafa Mas’ud’s immoderate style in his role as a representative. For instance, Mustafa Mas’ud reportedly put the title of al Haqqani behind his name and placed his own name on the chain of silsilah, contrary to Sheikh Hisham Kabbani’s own instruction for not doing so. He also encouraged his disciples to perform rabitah (imagining the face of the master) ritual directly to Sheikh Nazim Haqqani rather indirectly through Sheikh Hisham Kabbani. One informant also recalled that in the early days, Mustafa Mas’ud obliged all the initiated students to come visit him at his home where he would lead

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165 There was then a permanent zawiya in Bandung and Batam. In Bandung, Hadid Subki gathered around 15 disciples whereas in Batam, Mustafa Mas’ud established a zawiya with around 25 people in 2001. Interview with Samson Nasarudin, 1 October 2010 and Medi Kusmedi, 3 October 2010
166 This narrative is common among students close to Sheikh Mustafa Mas’ud at zawiya Hasbi.
167 Interview with Ahmad Mubarok, 21 September 2010
168 Mustafa Mas’ud refused this accusation because he said that he simply used the title given personally by Sheikh Hisham Kabbani during the first visit in April 1997, not from his own will.
all the rituals. On some special occasions, he even asked his students to stay the whole night, a practice which was considered as too demanding.169

On the other hand, there are also those who attribute this conflict to personal dislike between the two due to their different social backgrounds and political orientation. As a person with Muhammadiyah background, Firdaus Wajdi reportedly dislikes Mustafa Mas’ud who comes from NU’s background. There are even those who believe this conflict originated in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when both were student activists. Mustafa Mas’ud admitted that he was an ex-PMII (Indonesia Islamic Student Movement) student activist and was very much influenced by his political mentor, Subhan ZE (1931-1973).170 He indirectly denounced the pragmatist approach taken by some ex-HMI (Islamic Student Association) student activist like Firdaus Wajdi toward the New Order. As a strong supporter of Golkar, Firdaus Wajdi was reportedly worried that Sheikh Nazim and Hisham Kabbani’s charisma would be used by Sheikh Mustafa Mas’ud for his own political interests especially for boosting PPP’s influence.171 Mustafa Masud recalled an incident when Firdaus Wajdi, without giving any prior explanation, cancelled a planned trip of Sheikh Hisham Kabbani in East Java though there were already thousands of PPP’s supporters waiting for them in the city park of Tuban during the 2004 campaign time.

During the Abdurrahman Wahid’s presidency (1999-2001), Naqshbandi-Haqqani managed to establish contact with the inner circle of the President. It

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169 Interview with Sutono Joyosuparto, 14 August 2010
170 Subhan ZE refers to Subhan Zaenuri Ehsan (, a prominent NU politician and businessman who actively involved in mobilising political support in the early days of the New Order.
171 Interview with Rizal Tarigan, 22 September 2010
began in 1999 when Sheikh Hisham met the President at the palace. This meeting was made possible through the help of Mustafa Mas’ud who used his Jombang-NU’s connection to get in touch with the President. President Wahid met Sheikh Nazim during the latter visit in Indonesia. The President was initiated in Naqshbandi-Haqqani. It took place during their meeting at the Grand Melia Hotel, Jakarta, on 2 May 2001. President Wahid was reported seeking for spiritual counsel from Sheikh Nazim amid mounting pressure from his political opponents.

Perhaps because of this that Sheikh Hisham once gambled his religious authority to defend the President during the political turmoil in 2001. According to Mustafa Mas’ud, Sheikh Hisham summoned Firdaus Wajdi, the founder and financial supporter of Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia, to come to Michigan where he warned the latter not to continue his personal involvement in the efforts to topple the then President Abdurrahman Wahid from power. There was a widely circulated story within Naqshbandi-Haqqani community that Firdaus Wajdi, along with his HMI’s networks and political colleagues, opposed Abdurrahman Wahid’s presidency and even actively involved in the efforts for toppling the President.

In 2003, Firdaus Wajdi attempted to broker the meeting between Sheikh Hisham Kabbani and the then President Megawati to whom Firdaus Wajdi at the time support her bid for presidency in the coming 2004 Presidential election. He arranged the meeting between the two in Yogyakarta during Sheikh Hisham Kabbani’s visit there in early July 2003. The arranged meeting however failed to materialise because Megawati and her inner circle cancelled it at the last minutes right before it actually took place. Some attributed this failure to Megawati’s religious background which comes from abangan. Because of this background, her
refusal to see Sheikh Hisham was perceived as a deeply unsympathetic attitude toward Islam. Others, however, related this incident simply as representing personal disrespect and symbolic loss of face for Megawati that indirectly contributed to her failure to win a second term. Ironically, this failure directly led to the decline of Firdaus Wajdi’s influence within the YHI in particular and Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s community in general.

Although he denied all accusations, Mustafa Mas’ud indirectly confirmed that he was then indeed a politically-minded person. For instance, he admitted that he was personally close to PPP due to his good personal relationship with Djamaludin Tarigan (d. 1998), a senior central committee member of the United Development Party (PPP). On a few occasions during the interview, Mustafa Mas’ud did not even try to conceal his strong opposition against Golkar and Soeharto’s policy toward the Muslim community. He especially referred to his opposition to the decision of his distant cousin, the late KH Mustain Romli, to join Golkar in 1975. He even acknowledged that at certain point he indeed dreamt Sheikh Nazim Haqqani and Hisham Kabbani could somehow help in revitalising NU’ political influence in Indonesia.

It was not surprising that because of Firdaus Wajdi’s interference, Mustafa Mas’ud was no longer involved in the establishment of the Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia since December 2000. Muhammad Hasan and other senior disciples of Naqshbandi-Haqqani insisted that Mustafa Mas’ud should be included, but Farid Wajdi refused to comply.\(^{172}\) Under Firdaus Wajdi’s influence, the YHI’s inner

\(^{172}\) Muhammad Hasan (1920-2005) was an advisor of the Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia. He was former chief of Indonesia National Police (1971-1974) and one of the early patrons of Naqshbandi-
circles also excluded Mustafa Mas’ud from leading *dzikir* and any other collective rituals conducted by YHI. The YHI’s financial supporters also refused to fund Mustofa Mas’ud activities in spreading Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teachings in Indonesia, though Sheikh Hisham Kabbani encouraged them to do so.

![FIGURE 6. INTERNAL FRICTION WITHIN NAQSHBANDI-HAQQANI COMMUNITY IN INDONESIA](image)

This internal conflict greatly affected the development of Naqshbandi-Haqqani. Those who supported Mustafa Mas’ud’s position formed their own congregation which led to the creation of FORNAQSDA, while those sided with Firdaus Wajdi gathered into the Yayasan faction. Interestingly, most of the senior disciples who were previously close to Mustafa Mas’ud chose to leave him and organise their own *dzikir* gathering in Yayasan with Effendi Siregar (Sheikh Haqqani in Indonesia. He became the disciple of Naqshbandi-Haqqani through his daughter, Ella Effendi Siregar in late 1990s and he had a very good relationship with Mustafa Mas’ud.)
Aweng) as the Imam. Meanwhile, those who were neutral preferred to stay away from both groups and conducted the rituals on their own. Surprisingly, this internal schism did not prevent new disciples from joining.

As the number of disciples steadily grew, Firdaus Wajdi became involved in another internal battle, this time against the newly initiated young disciples of urban background. Like most senior disciples, he particularly resented the use of music, whirling, and distinct physical symbols which were popular especially among young disciples. The conflict began to escalate and became increasingly intolerable when Firdaus Wajdi openly challenged Sheikh Hisham Kabbani’s religious authority.

In 2001, he was reportedly summoned and given a warning by Sheikh Hisham Kabbani to stop his active involvement in the attempts to topple the then President Abdurrahman Wahid. He reportedly went to Fenton, Michigan on Sheikh Hisham Kabbani’s request and became furious when Sheikh Hisham Kabbani simply told him not to go further with his political activities. In 2004, he also refused Sheikh Hisham Kabbani’s request for fundraising to support the YHI’s involvement in the ICIS conference in Jakarta. In the very same year, he once again sparked controversy among Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples in Indonesia when he managed to persuade Yandri Irzaq of Yayasan Haqqani Batam (YHB) to invite Sheikh Adnan Kabbani in a deliberate attempt to counter balance his brother’s influence among Indonesian disciples.

173 Interview with Muhammad Shalahudin, 20 October 2010
174 Interview with Mustafa Mas’ud, 18 September 2010
175 Interview with Muhammad Solahudin, 14 August 2010
176 Interview with Alvian Awwal, October 2010
Firdaus Wajdi’s bid for power backfired when his close associates turned against him. His actions antagonised fellow disciples who still respected Sheikh Hisham Kabbani’s religious authority. Firdaus Wajdi also met with fierce resistance from younger disciples because they could not accept that Firdaus Wajdi and other senior disciples limiting access to and, to some extent, even monopolising the attention of Sheikh Hisham Kabbani. Firdaus Wajdi’s maneuvers went on unchecked because he controlled most of the resources. Events in 2004, however, changed everything.

With strong support from Sheikh Nazim Haqqani, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani took actions to end this internal schism. He realized that internal schism posed a threat to his movement. There are several actions taken by Sheikh Hisham to address this problem. First, he instructed Mustafa Mas’ud to completely shift his preaching activity from Jakarta to other regions. For instance, Mustafa went and established the first dzikir center in Batam in 2001. After the death of his wife in 2003, Sheikh Mustafa Mas’ud completely shifted his attention and focused his mission on spreading Naqshbandi-Haqqani outside Jakarta. For Mustafa Mas’ud himself, this was a win-win solution following his growing isolation in Jakarta. Yet, he still guides those who remain loyal to him in Jakarta.

Sheikh Hisham then appointed Soenarto as the new chairman of Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia (YHI) in December 2004. Following this decision, though not completely renouncing his affiliation to Naqshbandi-Haqqani, Firdaus Wajdi was no longer involved in the day-to-day activities of YHI. After this, Soenarto gradually replaced Firdaus Wajdi as the most important financial supporter of YHI,
providing material support that enables Sheikh Hisham Kabbani to visit Indonesia more regularly.

Under the new chairman Soenarto, the schism did not entirely disappear yet. The new schisms and internal conflicts afterwards involved contestation over religious authority, leadership, and resources. This internal conflict was a direct result of the growing number of disciples and institutions affiliated themselves to Naqshbandi-Haqqani. In Jakarta alone, there were five institutions: Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia, Zawiya Hasbi, Rabbani Cinere, Rumi Café, and, Zawiya HHT. They all have their own local leaders claiming religious authority and control over resources.

For instance, those in YHI claimed sole authority in organising Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples in Indonesia and denounced those who refused to accept it. The argument is that because the YHI was established by direct order from Sheikh Hisham Kabbani, all the disciples must follow the Yayasan’s direction in their religious activities. On the other hand, those who are not in the YHI (most prominently zawiya Hasbi) refuse to recognize the claim, and insist that, as a Sufi movement, Naqshbandi-Haqqani cannot be established through institutional framework an sich. Only those who have enough religious knowledge can be spiritual guide.

Though the Yayasan has abundant material resources, it does not have a capable spiritual guide who can meet the spiritual needs of disciples. The yayasan has only an Imam to lead dzikir, but not a spiritual guide, hence it has absolutely no religious authority to provide spiritual guidance. For non-YHI members, the
Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s religious authority should be put in the hand of those who have adequate religious knowledge (‘alim) and are bestowed with personal qualities of a spiritual guide.

As a matter of fact, both Rabbani Cinere and Rumi Café were established as a result of growing disappointment among young disciples of Naqshbandi-Haqqani to exclusive and elitist approaches taken by Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia (YHI) in spreading Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s religious messages. At the beginning, the Rabbani Cinere was among the favorites of Sheikh Hisham. With the help of Sheikh Hisham, the Rabbani Cinere group for instance managed to invite Abdul Wahid from Melbourne to teach some young disciples of Rumi’s whirling dervishes (sema’) at Zawiya Rabbani Cinere for two months in 2006.

Ironically, the Rabbani Cinere then also split into some smaller groups. While Eri Barkah Saridria and Zalyati maintained their allegiance to Abu Tufail, Sheikh Zulfikar and Arif Hamdani established their own group following their split from the Rabbani Cinere. Sheikh Zulfikar has been conducting dzikir ritual at his own house in Pamulang since 2007 and Arif Hamdani soon followed the path by co-founding Rumi Café along with Muchsin Mulaela in 2008. Later, Arif Hamdani also split from Rumi Café and established his own congregation named Pondok Rumi after his personal dispute with financial supporter of Rumi Café, Hendro Martowardoyo.

The internal divergence and friction indeed pose organisational challenge to Naqshbandi-Haqqani community in Indonesia. The nature of the conflict and its

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177 There is widespread view among those I encountered at Rumi Café that the ranks of Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia concern to keep Sheikh Nazim and Sheikh Hisyam only for themselves.
consequences raises question about its endurance as a social and religious movement. The internal dynamics within Naqshbandi-Haqqani movement in Indonesia demonstrates that internal divergence is not necessarily negative. Growing challenge to address the divergence and friction force the Naqshbandi-Haqqani community to rely back on their strength as a Sufi movement.

6.4 Cohesion and Collective Solidarity

As aforementioned in the previous section, the Naqshbandi-Haqqani community in Indonesia has been struggling in managing organisational dynamics and simultaneously maintaining internal cohesion among the disciples and collective solidarity within the group. Cohesiveness has to do with leadership skill to maintain degree of unity within the movement, whereas collective solidarity is partly related to a sense of belonging as a group arising from common purposes and shared emotional ties.

In this sense, cohesiveness and solidarity are less about instrumental rationality and logical calculation. Rather, they involve various emotive expressions such as trust, love, comfort and joy. Emotive religious experience resulted from close relationship with the Sufi master and nurtured by intense ritual practices is a powerful motivating factor for keeping the Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples in Indonesia intact and committed to the movement. Instead of developing a complex mechanism of organisational discipline, Naqshbandi-Haqqani relies back to charismatic authority and communal ritual to address this internal divergence.
Sheikh Hisham plays a central role in addressing the internal divergence and maintaining collective solidarity within the Naqshbandi-Haqqani community in Indonesia. He seems to be fully aware that his disciples are far from united entity. By exerting his spiritual authority as a spiritual guru, Sheikh Hisham always reminds his disciples to stay focused. He would not denounce internal divergence, schism and conflict at once but frame them as a natural part of continuous inner struggle to fight ego or *nafs*. It is framed as part of self-purification process that one has to deal with before being uplifted to a better spiritual station (*maqom*). This self-purification can be achieved through constantly performing private and communal ritual as prescribed by the master when a disciple joins the movement at the first place.

### 6.5 Conclusion

This chapter demonstrates that Sufi guides increasingly rely on a complex and relatively sophisticated organising structure to lead and mobilise its disciples. I relate the development of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesian to its organisational capacity. Growing number of disciples is followed by the establishment of hierarchical leadership structure. Resource mobilisation provides organisational capacity and material also plays a significant part in organising growing number of disciples. Resources mobilisation involves the use of materials, social networks, and organisation. The institutional innovation and decentralised organisational structure of Sufi movement go hand in hand with the flourishing of ‘regional cult’ of charismatic model as proposed by Werbner in a sense that a charismatic leader
increasingly shares, rather than monopolises, his religious authority with
designated representative or deputy.

Despite its institutional innovation and modern organising structure, 
Naqshbandi-Haqqani remains to maintain its typical nature as a Sufi movement. 
Personal charisma still plays an important role for the existence of any Sufi 
movement. Sufi sheikh is still preoccupied with initiating new disciples and 
guiding the old ones through the embodiment of charisma and emotive religious 
rituals. Emotive and passionate religious expressions are important in attracting 
people to join and maintaining commitment to stay in the group. This emotive-
passionate expression is mainly centered on personal appeal of the masters and the 
performance of collective ritual. Intimate and emotive environment generate 
passionate mobilisation Passionate mobilisation also has to do with the role of Sufi 
rituals in cultivating collective solidarity among the disciples. Yet, personal 
charisma still has a strong appeal and is even deliberately reproduced to maintain 
solidarity and internal social cohesion.
Chapter 7
THE AKBARI LEGACY AND MILLENNARIANISM
Mysticism, Islamic Legalism, and Political Islamism

For more than three decades, the Naqshbandiya has attracted considerable scholarly attention, unmatched by any of the other Sufi brotherhoods in Islam. This interest has largely been due to the realization that in the eight centuries or so of its existence masters affiliated with the Naqshbandi tradition, and with its major successive Mujaddidi and Khalidi offshoots, time and again acquired positions of influence with the rulers of the day and within their respective communities. Such outstanding political and social involvement has been employed by scholars not only to discredit the once prevalent view about the decline of latter-day Islam, but also to demonstrate that Sufism played an important role in framing the Muslim world’s response to modernity (Weismann 2007, xii).

This chapter endeavours to explicate the teachings of Naqshbandi-Haqqani that attempt to reconcile the maintenance of Sunni orthodoxy on the one hand and socio-political activism on the other hand. This explication addresses in particular the question of how Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teachings provide a basic framework for collective action. I argue that Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teachings attempt to reconcile mysticism, Islamic legalism, and political Islamism. Based on written materials, online publications, direct observations and in-depth interviews, I try to give a nuanced discussion of the relationship between religious teachings and the formation of Islamic activism.

This chapter is divided into five parts. First, it will examine the roots of the distinct Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s Sufi teachings by focusing on the influence of Ibn Arabi’s ideas. Second, it will examine the theological and doctrinal positions of Sunni orthodoxy and the difference between Naqshbandi-Haqqani and other Islamic movements, particularly Wahhabi-Salafism. Third, it will examine
Naqshabandi-Haqqani’s millenarian-apocalyptic beliefs by focusing on various notions such as the Signs of the Hour and Armageddon (Qiyamah), the coming of Mahdi (Sahibus Zaman), Isa ibn Maryam (Jesus Christ), Dajjal (Anti-Christ) and Juj wa ma’juj (Gog and Magog). Fourth, it will examine Naqshabandi-Haqqani’s socio-political views especially its rejection of political Islamism, radicalism and violence. Finally, this chapter will conclude by re-emphasizing the argument put forward at the beginning.

7.1 Naqshbandi-Haqqani and the Influence of Akbari ideas

The term Akbari refers to Sufi ideas and teachings introduced by the Shaikhul Akbar, Muhyiddin ibn ‘Arabi (1165-1240), an Arab Andalusian mystic who was hailed as one of the greatest and most prolific Muslim philosophers, poets and scholars in Islamic history (Knysh, 1999). He was born in Murcia Andalusia in present-day Spain and travelled extensively across the Middle East during his lifetime. He died and was buried in Damascus in 1240. He wrote more than 350 manuscripts that have survived to modern times. Some of his acclaimed works include Futuhat al Makiyya (The Revelation of Mecca)–a vast encyclopedia of spiritual knowledge which unites and distinguishes the three strands of tradition, reason and mystical insight--; Fusus al Hikam (The Bezels of Wisdom)--an exposition of the inner meaning of the wisdom of the prophets in the Judaic/Christian/Islamic tradition--; and Diwan--a fine collection of poetry expounding his spiritual experience.

The influence of Akbari ideas is not openly acknowledged because of the controversial nature of Muhyiddin Ibn Arabi and his teachings among mainstream
Sunni scholars. His supposedly \textit{wahdatul wujud} (the unity of being) idea, for example, is often cited as evidence of his antinomian view that is incongruent with \textit{tawhid} (the Oneness of God) as the basic pillar of Islamic belief. However, the influence of Akbari ideas among Naqshbandi’s masters has a long historical precedence and dates from as far back as Ubaidillah Ahrar in the 14\textsuperscript{th} century to Khalid al Baghdadi in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century (Algar: 1991:45-66). As a matter of fact, since the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century, Turkey, Lebanon and Syria have been in fact a fertile ground for the revitalization of Akbari ideas in a concerted opposition to the encroaching Western influences of late Ottoman Rule (Weismann, 2001:145).\footnote{In Damascus, the Akbari ideas were embraced by many Naqshbandi-Khalidi masters/scholars associated with Abdul Qadir al Jazairi (1808-1883), an Algerian Sufi resistance leader who was exiled in Damascus in 1855.} Akbari ideas provide a philosophical, ethical and practical basis for the superiority of Sufism in general and Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teachings in particular compared to other Islamic groups.

The influence of Akbari ideas perhaps derives from the long acquaintance between Sheikh Abdullah Faiz Dagestani and Nazim Haqqani during their stay in Damascus. The great admiration toward Ibn Arabi and the influence of his teaching on Naqshbandi-Haqqani can be found in \textit{Mercy Oceans}, \textit{Mystical Secrets of the Last Days}, \textit{Angels Unveiled}, \textit{The Muhammadan Light}, and numerous \textit{sohbet} delivered by Sheikh Nazim Haqqani and Hisham Kabbani. Interestingly, Abdullah Faiz Dagestani’s house in Maidan district was located in a place overlooking the burial site of Ibn Arabi. This location is important in that it symbolizes a continuous spiritual connection between Abdullah Faiz Dagestani and Ibn Arabi.
Some aspects of Akbari ideas that are popular among Naqshbandi-Haqqani are *al haqiqatul al Muhammadiya* (the reality of Muhammad), *al insan al kamil* (the perfect human being), *walaya* (sainthood), and *kashf* (spiritual unveiling). These four religious concepts epitomize the spiritual vision, religious discourse and Sufi teachings of Sheikh Abdullah Faiz Dagestani. Framing Abdullah Faiz Dagestani’s spiritual visions within the Akbari theosophical ideas, Sheikh Nazim Haqqani and Hisham Kabbani have endeavoured to demonstrate the authenticity of their master’s teachings and the legitimate status of his spiritual visions.

Preoccupation with millenarian ideas, eschatology and prophesy, which are the hallmark of contemporary Naqshbandi-Haqqani, are some of the signature themes that can also be found in Ibn ‘Arabi’s spiritual visions as revealed in his many works. Sheikh Nazim Haqqani and Hisham Kabbani always reiterate Abdullah Faiz Dagestani’s background as uneducated and illiterate to establish his superior spiritual claims. Emphasizing the master’s background, Naqshbandi-Haqqani seems to achieve two important things: first, to prove that Sheikh Abdullah Faiz Dagestani has indeed a miraculous legacy resembling the Prophet Muhammad as the *ummi* (illiterate) and second, to make a convincing case that Sheikh Abdullah Faiz’s religious knowledge comes directly from God and the Prophet through mystical-spiritual illumination and was not achieved through learning and systematic study.

*Al Haqiqatul al Muhammadiya* is derived from a metaphysical view that the Prophet Muhammad is a manifestation of the light of *Allah*. As such, Nur Muhammad (the light of the Prophet) is regarded as the primary substance of all other creations and that of any other preceding creations. It relies on Ibn ‘Arabi’s
interpretation in *Futuhat al Makiyya* of the verse “*There has come to you a Light from Allah, and a Manifest Book*” (Quran 5:15). Relying on Ibn ‘Arabi, Naqshbandi-Haqqani sources explain that God then divided this very first light into four parts to create *kalam* (the pen), *lauhul mahfudz* (the preserved tablet), *arsy’* (the Divine Throne); from the fourth, God created all other things. Given this, the Prophet Muhammad is conceived as embodying two separate but closely related existences as a human being (*maqam bashariya*) and as a divine spirit (*maqam uluhiya*). These two existences are exemplified in the testimony of *sahadat* requiring a professed Muslim to affirm Allah as One God and the Prophet Muhammad as His messenger. The unity of *tawhid* is complete only if a professed Muslim affirms both, not just one. Consequently, pure *tawhid* (Oneness of God) is to be upheld through total submission to God’s will and complete veneration of the Prophet.

Related to its view of *Al Haqiqatul al Muhammadiya*, Naqshbandi-Haqqani also follows Ibn ‘Arabi’s idea of *al Insan al Kamil* (the perfect human being). Ibn ‘Arabi, in *Fusus al Hikam*, suggests that humanity attains its ultimate perfection as exemplified by personal characters of the Prophet Muhammad. This is based on the Prophet Muhammad sayings that he was already in existence while Adam was in between ‘water and clay’. The Prophet Muhammad is thus an example of *al Insan al Kamil* (the perfect human being) whose existence and moral character became a model for human beings. The Prophet Muhammad is also an exemplary human being whose essence provided the existential paradigm for humanity in

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general. Rather than the one who overcomes fear in himself, the Perfect Man is instead one who overcomes, through God, the fear of what is other than Him.

The religious conception of walaya (sainthood) is closely related to Ibn ‘Arabi’s idea of nubuwwa (Prophethood). As suggested by Chodkiewicz (1993), Ibn ‘Arabi distinguished two related notions in nubuwwa: nubuwwa tashri’ and nubuwwa ‘amma. Nubuwwa tashri’ refers to the idea that God appointed certain messengers to teach humanity about certain legislation and this had stopped with the coming of Prophet Muhammad who was the last and ultimate messenger (khatm nabiyyin). However, nubuwwa ‘amma or non-legislative prophethood will always be present till the end of the world as a sign of mercy from God. The nubuwwa ‘amma refers to the elect or the chosen people who master not only exoteric but also esoteric dimensions of religion. After the Prophet Muhammad, the nubuwwa ‘amma or walaya will represent Prophet Muhammad to revitalise his true message and teachings. According to Ibn ‘Arabi, the Prophet Isa ibn Maryam (Jesus Christ) will be the seal of walaya, someone who has both spiritual and worldly authority to reveal the true meaning of the Prophethood.

Based on Ibn ‘Arabi’s conception of walaya, Naqshbandi-Haqqani believes that the Prophet and the living saints give constant spiritual guidance to human beings at any given time. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani has said that in total there are 124,000 living saints in every generation. These saints are ranked according to the hierarchy of sainthood. Of 124,000 saints, there are 7,007 saints with higher status, of these 7,007 there are another 313 with higher status, another 40 with higher status than 313 saints, 5 with higher than 40 saints, and above all, there is one saint with the supreme status (the king of saints). The 124,000 resemble the number of
Prophets, whereas 313 are the number of messengers sent by God to the world. The 7,007 and 313 saints are reserved exclusively for the Naqshbandi lineage, whereas the 40 represent the founders of another 40 different Sufi orders (Kabbani 2004c, 638).

Through his conception of *kashf* (spiritual unveiling), Ibn ‘Arabi also postulates that spiritual experience (direct experience to sense God’s existence) is real and a source of religious knowledge. This conception derives from Ibn ‘Arabi’s own spiritual visions of seeing Prophet Moses, Jesus and Muhammad. This knowledge is not achieved through ordinary sensory perception and mind-logic but through visions and dreams. It is based on the Prophetic tradition that says that when the Prophethood and revelation cease to exist, visions and dreams will guide the believers (Knysh, 2012:2). Based on this, Sheikh Nazim Haqqani and Hisham Kabbani put strong emphasis on the importance of dreams and spiritual visions as part of spiritual experience. Seeing the Prophet in a dream, for instance, has a very deep spiritual meaning. However, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani makes a clear demarcation between true and false *kashf*. If a dream or vision is true, it must be followed as long as it does not violate *shariah* provisions.

Sheikh Nazim Haqqani and Hisham Kabbani devote their mission to revitalising Islam in the modern world by promoting the love of the Prophet (*mahabbah fi rasul*) and the importance of dzikr and other supererogatory rituals. They also believe that personal and moral cultivation can only be achieved through constant seeking of subjective religious experience, strictly following *shariah*, and maintaining the unity of Muslim *ummah*. Framing Abdullah Faiz Dagestani’s religious discourse and teachings in the legacy of Ibn ‘Arabi, Sheikh Nazim
Haqqani and Hisham Kabbani therefore personify themselves as Muslim revivers and spiritual guides who are involved in the struggle for religious reform and moral cultivation to counterbalance the excessive Mu’tazilite-style of speculative rational thinking, the taqlid limitations and rigid legalism of Muslim jurists (fuqaha), modern secular-scientific modes of thinking, and technological and scientific advancement that has been inflicted upon the Muslim ummah. Their insistence on upholding madzhab and on a millenarian-apocalyptic belief with a strong opposition to radicalism and political Islamism distinguish them from other Islamic groups.

7.2 Millenarian-Apocalyptic Beliefs and Islamic Eschatology

Millenarian belief has long been identified as one of the main ideological forces in traditional peasant societies in Asia and Africa (Hobsbawm 1959, Worsley 1968, Burridge 1969, Kartodirdjo 1966, 1971, 1973, 1984). There are also those who suggest that millenarian-apocalyptic ideas, though not mainstream, are well-established within the Islamic tradition, stemming from social turmoil and political crisis (Cook 1997, 2002, 2005, Filiu 2011). All these scholarly studies imply that millenarian-apocalyptic belief plays a significant role in driving popular revolutionary and socio-political movements because it sets a high religious commitment and offers a coherent and total vision of socio-religious change. The idea of the Mahdi in Islam has been used to rally support for moral purification, armed struggle, economic demands, and political protest (Furnish 1999, 22).

Since its inception, millenarian-apocalyptic belief has been a signature theme for Naqshbandi-Haqqani (2006, 122, Habibis 1989, 225, 1990, 605, Atay
1994, 200). Among Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples, this millenarian-apocalyptic belief is primarily attributed to spiritual unveilings (kashf) that the Grand Sheikh Abdullah Faiz Dagestani had during his five years of seclusion (c.1908-1913) and his near-death experience after being shot during his service in the Ottoman army in the First World War (1914-1918). According to Naqshbandi-Haqqani sources, Sheikh Abdullah Faiz predicted in advance the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 and 1973 in which Arab forces would be defeated. He predicted that ‘Islamic spirituality would be popular in England’.

He made prophesies that “there would be a war in the Gulf area involving the whole world”, “Germany and England would lead the whole of Europe”, and “in Germany there would be a saint assigned by the Mahdi and Jesus who would raise and train people there in spirituality”. He also prophesied that “there would be a big change in the approach of Arabs to politics, one powerful regime was going to change to a better way of government”, “communism would collapse”, and “a peace deal would occur between Israel and Arab which the United States would broker”. In addition, he also predicted that “in the midst of peace, suddenly there would be an attack and invasion of Turkey by a close neighboring country that would lead to a big war causing a great disaster across the world during which the Mahdi would come forth and Jesus Christ would return on earth”.

This millenarian-apocalyptic belief was at the beginning only transmitted orally (sohbet). Afterwards it was disseminated globally through written materials and online publications by his deputy (Sheikh Hisham Kabbani) and other disciples. This openly proclaimed millenarian-apocalyptic belief is certainly one of

the main features distinguishing Naqshbandi-Haqqani from other Sufi movements in Indonesia. In a translated book entitled *Kiamat Mendekat: Kronika Terobosan Ilmiah dan Peristiwa Akhir Zaman yang Membuktikan Ramalan Nabi*, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani has stated that his master attempted to elaborate an established eschatological view among Sunni Muslims and addressed this distinctive teaching to both fellow Muslims and Western people.

Through this book, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani echoed his master in his attempts to provide a textual basis from the *Quran* and Prophetic tradition (*hadits*) as well as compelling scientific evidence that the Muslim community has passed a thousand years in triumph and currently lives within the five hundred years of decline that will soon be revived by the Mahdi and Jesus Christ. The emphasis on millenarian belief and the last days departs from the interpretation of the Prophetic tradition implying that God granted the Muslim community only fifteen hundred years in this world (Kabbani 2004a, 41), which means that less than 70 years are left. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani has written:

For the first millennium of Islamic civilization, the Muslims were favoured by Allah with advancement unparalleled before or after...After its first millennium a gradual yet definite decline began within the Ummah which has continued until our present time. As the Muslims have wandered away from the way of the Prophet and Allāh’s heavenly message of Islam, the divine blessings and support have similarly diminished. Miraculously, the Prophet predicted that this process would take one thousand years and it came to pass. The second prediction in this hadith is that the Ummah will continue further for five hundred more years in decline (2003a, 35).

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181 This book was originally entitled ‘The Approach of Armageddon: A chronicle of scientific breakthroughs and world events that occur during the last days, as Foretold by Prophet Muhammad’ and published by the Islamic Supreme Council of America in 2003. With 10,000 copies, it was sold out soon after it became available on the market. Interview with Arif Hamdani, 11 August 2010 and Abdurrauf Kurniadi, 30 September 2010.
The contemporary era is perceived therefore as a critical time of preparation for the coming of the last days in which Naqshbandi-Haqqani in particular and the Muslim community in general will again play a great historical role, once and for the last time.

This millenarian belief as held among Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples is closely related to the notion of the Signs of the Hour. These signs relate to all unfolding events in the past, present, and future that affect humanity and the Muslim ummah. Echoing his master, Abdullah Faiz Dagestani, Sheikh Nazim Haqqani believes that the minor Signs of the Hour have already passed and the major ones are soon to come.

The minor Signs have to do with the widespread moral decadence resulting from weakening religious norms in regulating people’s daily life.\textsuperscript{182} The Signs of the Hour are characterised by massive injustice, oppression, bloodshed, tyrannical rule, and especially sexual permissiveness affecting everyone in all walks of life, especially those who are not guilty, the poor, and the weak.\textsuperscript{183} The minor Signs of the Hour are also related to modern fashion that disregards modesty in clothing, especially among women, pornography, same-sex relationships and other forms of sexual permissiveness as being foretold by the Prophet Muhammad (Kabbani 2004a, 113-179). Such minor Signs thus apply practically to present self-examination of the contemporary moral decadence within the Muslim ummah.

The major Signs of the Hour include major occurrences: the time when the sun will rise from the West, smoke will cover the whole world, massive

\textsuperscript{182}http://www.sufilive.com/print.cfm?id=122&lc=EN, accessed August 2011
\textsuperscript{183}Interview with Mustafa Mas’ud, 18 September 2010.
earthquakes, and plagues that will affect everyone in the world. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani relates the major signs of the hour to the current state of countries in the Middle East about which the Prophet reportedly said that in the last days “the barefoot, naked, indigent shepherds compete in building tall structures” and “the barefoot and naked, the deaf and dumb are the kings of the earth” as narrated in Sahih Muslim, and that “…the destitute (al-buhm) camel-herders compete in building tall structures” as recorded in Sahih Bukhari. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani has also said that,

…the Prophet (s) said: "Sawfa tudi'u narun min ardi Najdin yashra'ibbu laha a'naqul ibili bi Busra," "Such a fire will come from the land of Najd that camels in Basra will run away from its heat" (Bukhari, Muslim). That happened last year [Iraq war]. Prepare yourselves, therefore, not for the best, but for the worst. Dark ages, not progress, [are] is coming ahead. Only after the dark ages will the golden age of Islam come about, which is the age of Mahdi (s). In the very near future many events are going to take place around us. Every one of us must be careful concerning his beliefs, the beliefs of his wife and family, and of his children. Satan is not leaving anyone alone. He is trying to change your beliefs and to remove you from the love of saints, of Sufi people, and of the Prophet.  

Sheikh Hisham Kabbani also related the prophecy of the ‘fire in Hejaz’ to what is happening in Arab countries. He attributed all these developments to the economic boom in the Gulf countries and particularly to the war for oil and the chaotic situation in Gulf areas (Kabbani 2004a, 340). Sheikh Nazim Haqqani and Hisham Kabbani have taught their disciples that the world is heading toward an imminent Armageddon. Sheikh Nazim described this as follows,

Armageddon is the war between East and West, and it is written that the West will win and the East will vanish. The biggest of all wars is between the believers, followers of Jesus Christ, people who have prepared themselves for the savior, and

185 As recorded in Sahih Bukhari and Muslim, hadith number 6935.
the followers of the Anti-Christ, unbelievers, who are running after this life’s pleasures, following materialistic thoughts, seeking pleasure that their egos are asking for, asking for every freedom. They are people who always come into contact with the devil, falling under his control, and supporting the kingdom of Shaytan. They will be with the Anti-Christ because they are evil in themselves. The devils will carry them to the source of evil and devils, the Anti-Christ (Haqqani 2004, 67).

The coming of Armageddon, depicted as the great battle between Good and Evil and between Truth and Falsehood, between believers and unbelievers, is a constant theme in Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s apocalyptic teachings. The great battle is personified by the well-known figures in Islamic apocalyptic literature: the Mahdi, Jesus Christ, the Dajjal/Anti-Christ, and Gog and Magog. The Mahdi and Jesus Christ are always depicted as representing the forces of Good, while the Dajjal (Anti-Christ) and Gog and Magog are bad. The Mahdi is described as a direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad who was born in the Wadi Fatimah, a green valley on the way from Jeddah to Medina between 1930 and 1940. He is the fortieth generation in the line of Hasan and Hussein’s descendants.

Sheikh Nazim has further stated that the world has been heading toward a catastrophic situation in which people will be killed en masse. Only one out of seven will survive and the number of women will be 40 times higher than men.\footnote{186 http://www.sheiknazim2.com/thirdwar.html, accessed 10 June 2011} Yet, in many of his sohbet, Sheikh Nazim Haqqani changes the details of when and what will actually happen, though he is consistent in saying that the new era will come during his life time. In the 1980s, Sheikh Nazim, for instance, associated this catastrophic event with a nuclear war. During the 1990s, he explored this topic in relation to the fear of the coming Y2K and its impact on computer networks across the globe. Currently, he elaborates the last-day scenario in relation to the socio-
political dynamics in the aftermath of 9/11, especially in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{187} He pays particular attention to the role that Turkey will play in the global conflict.

Sheikh Nazim has asserted that the Mahdi is alive now but remains hidden because ordinary people are not ready yet to see him physically. His first appearance was in 1960 when 12,000 saints gathered and gave \textit{bai’at} to him.\textsuperscript{188} He is now still hidden in a place behind the Mountain of Qaf, in the empty quarters, the Ruba Qali, a desert between Yemen and Saudi Arabia. No one can go there, because of the quicksand, moving sands. The place is protected by genies that send out electricity that can kill intruders or drive them away. He is living with his 99 caliphs and other highly spiritual and powerful people (Haqqani 2004, 67). The Mahdi will eventually appear during the \textit{Hajj-Akbar} in Mecca when people will gather and give \textit{bai’at} to him \textit{en masse} (Haqqani 2004, 64). Sheikh Nazim has given these details about the Mahdi:

He will appear for all people, according to the Lord’s Command, in the Great War, Armageddon. There are one hundred and one hindrances which he must overcome before he can appear; ninety-nine of those hindrances have passed. Now only two are remaining. Then there are 7 stations on his way from Damascus to Istanbul-Homs, Hama, Trabulus/Tripoli, Halep/Aleppo, Konya, Bursa/Turkiye, and in Istanbul he will take out the flag of the Prophet peace be upon him from the Topkapi Palace. But before that, the Padishah will appear and they will meet in Konya where Mehdi will put on the sword of the Prophet and his coat, the Holy Amanats/The Relic. After Mehdi has taken out the flag in Istanbul, the Anti-Christ will come quickly through Khorasan in Iran, and run to Jerusalem, to go around the whole world from there for 40 days. Muslims are expecting Sayyidena Mehdi and they are waiting also for Sayyidena Isa/Jesus Christ to come from the Heavens. Christians are expecting Jesus Christ to come back from the Heavens, too. But the Jews, because they do not believe in Sayyidena Isa and Sayyidena Muhammad peace be upon them, are still waiting for a prophet from among themselves to appear…There will be a Heavenly Announcement: "The enemy of Allah, dajjal, has appeared. Whoever wants to save himself from him must go to Damascus, Mecca or Medina… so believers will run because dajjal will be after them. They will run like streams to Damascus, and all believers must be there for 40 days…\textit{dajjal} will go around the whole world, but 700 Angels, 700 Jinn/beings

\textsuperscript{187} Interview with Mustafa Mas’ud, 18 September 2010
\textsuperscript{188} \url{http://www.sheiknazim2.com/sahibuzamaan.html}
made of smokeless fire who inhabit the earth with us, and 700 Awliya/Saints from Budala, Nujaba, Nuqaba, Autad and Ahyar will protect Damascus so he won’t be able to enter.189

Meanwhile, Ahmed Amiruddin, one of Sheikh Nazim’s disciples living in Canada, associates the coming of Mahdi with the finding of the Ark of the Covenant. Quoting al Suyuti, Ahmed Amiruddin has written that “the reason he will be known as the Mahdi is that he will show the way to a hidden thing. He will bring the Ark of the Covenant to light from a place called Antioch”. He has further stated that the Ark will emerge from the Tabariya Sea through the efforts of Imam al Mahdi and it will be placed before him at the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.190

The Mahdi will rely on Jesus Christ to defeat the Dajjal because he will not manage to face the Dajjal alone.191 Sheikh Nazim Haqqani stated this about Jesus Christ’s descent to earth during the Armageddon:

After 40 days, Isa alaihi salaam peace be upon him will come down from the Heavens. It will be the time of the fajr/dawn prayer when he comes down in the Omayyad Mosque in Damascus. He is coming down to a minaret of that Dome in the East, under which Sayyidena Yahya, John the Baptist, is buried. Two Angels will protect him with their wings, and bring him down to earth. He will be wearing a green turban, and he will be shining. He has the most beautiful face, rosy and white. His beard is red, and he is sweating. And he has a sword. When he was on earth, he never touched a sword, but now he is coming as a Savior to save people from the hands of the Anti-Christ. His sword is a miraculous sword, a Heavenly sword; it can reach any point to where he sends it. The Lord gave it to him. He is not coming as a Prophet anymore but as a member of the ummah/nation of Sayyidena Muhammad, following his shariat (2004, 65-66).192

191 Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s ideas regarding Prophet Isa (Jesus Christ) is allegedly based on the interpretation over the gospel of Barnabas which was reportedly found in Cyprus during the Byzantine rule (Stjernholm 2011).
The Dajjal or Anti-Christ is described as an arch enemy of both the Mahdi and Jesus Christ. The Dajjal is depicted as a one-eyed man coming from Khorasan who will lead the world to disobey God and His commandments. He will offer a worldly paradise to those who follow him and a worldly hell to those opposing him. Under these circumstances, the most illiterate believer can recognise him because kafir will be clearly encrypted on his forehead. Like the Mahdi, he is now ready to appear but still hidden. Sheikh Nazim has said:

He is now in chains imprisoned on an unknown island that no one can approach because he is saying: "I am your Lord", claiming to be the Lord of mankind, not just a prophet but the Lord... He can't move from there. He is shaitan, the father of all devils. He is giving orders, and he has 30 deputies who are preparing people for his coming.\footnote{http://naqshbandihaqqani.blogspot.com/2005/12/saviors-imam-mahdi-as-jesus-christ-as.html}

As revealed in this statement, Sheikh Nazim Haqqani asserts that the Dajjal will appear and proclaim himself as the Lord for human beings. On his appearance, the Dajjal will be the main source of confusion and create a rift and discord within and among Muslims. However, before the true Mahdi appears, Sheikh Hisham also asserts that there would be thirty false Mahdi and, by implication, thirty false Dajjal (Kabbani 2004a, 229).\footnote{http://eshaykh.com/doctrine/false-mahdis/} Sheikh Hisham Kabbani describes the Dajjal and what he will do to the Muslim believer as follows:

The Dajjal will have powers of the devil. He will terrorize the Muslims into following him, converting them into unbelief. He will conceal the truth and bring forth falsehood. The prophet said that the Dajjal will have the power to show the image of one’s dead ancestors on his hand, like a television screen. The relative will say, “Oh my son! This man is correct. I am in Paradise because I was good and I believed in him.” In reality that relative is in hell. If the relative says, “Believe in this man, I am in hell because I didn’t believe,” one must say to the Dajjal, “No, he is in Paradise. This is false.” The Prophet said: the Dajjal will say to a Bedouin Arab, “what will you think if I bring your father and mother back to life for you? Will you bear witness that I am your lord? The Bedouin will say,
“Yes.” So two devils will assume the appearance of his father and mother, and say, “O my son, follow him for he is your lord (Kabbani 2003a, 223-224).

According to Sheikh Nazim Effendi, the coming of Armageddon, in which a deadly clash will occur between the believers and non-believers, is a prerequisite for the coming of the new awaited golden era, under which Muslims would eventually be led by a true spiritual-political leader. Under his leadership, Muslims and all human beings around the world will eventually embrace and seek deeper spirituality, live in a natural way, be concerned only with God, and take no heed of worldly things. The new awaited era is also characterised by justice, peace and by implication the disappearance of oppression, ignorance, confusion, and disunity or division. This last-days theme therefore projects both a grim scenario of the coming of massive global conflict under which people will suffer terribly and a positive utopian vision of the heavenly kingdom on earth afterwards. Sheikh Nazim Haqqani has further stated that the Mahdi and Jesus Christ will support each other during the Armageddon. He has explained that,

Sayyidena Mehdi will offer the place to Jesus to be Imam, but Jesus will refuse. Sayyidena Mehdi will lead the prayer once, and after that Jesus will be Imam…And Sayyidena Mehdi will be with him for 7 years…Jesus will kill the Anti-Christ, break the crosses, and make clear the truth about himself and his mother Sayyidena Mariam/Meryem/Mary the Virgin. He will govern the Heavenly Kingdom on earth for 40 years. In his time, all technology will be destroyed, and everyone will be given miraculous powers so that when you look somewhere and you say: "BismillahirRahmanir Rahim, by Your Divine Permission, Oh My Lord, You honored me to be Your Deputy, I ask of You", and if He gives permission, you may put your step from here to there. After Jesus has killed the Anti-Christ, there will be no more devils…people will live a life like in Paradise, Paradise Appearances, Tajallis/Divinely Visions will come on them…At that time, the purpose of Allah’s creation will appear. Isa will marry and have children. When he is going to die, he will be buried in Medina, in the fourth tomb next to the Holy Prophet, Sayyidena Abu Bakr and Sayyidena Omar may Allah be well pleased with them, that is empty now. Then all believers will die by a sweet scent from
Paradise. Everything terrible after that will come to the unbelievers who will have started to reappear during Jesus’ time.195

Soon after the Dajjal is defeated, the new awaited era will prevail in which people can fulfil their potential as God’s servants. The new awaited era will be led by the Mahdi and Jesus Christ. Under the Mahdi and Jesus Christ, evil rule will eventually be demolished and an Islamic order will be established in which the Mahdi will give constant spiritual guidance. In addition to that, during the time of the Mahdi and Jesus Christ, spiritual people will do miraculous things without the help of modern technology. Sheikh Nazim has further stated that,

After this big war people will be like a candle ready for the match. Sayyidina Mahdi will open the seed of faith in their hearts, opening the hearts of the believer who lived through that war. Common people will be dressed in sainthood and will be granted miraculous powers and lights from Allah Almighty. Awliya will be love springs. People will be perfect servants of Allah, living on prayer and dhikr, and swimming in love oceans. Everywhere you will find the love of the Lord. Creatures will take from you that divine love. We are created for that. The perfection of creation should appear in those days (2004, 68).

Together, both will uphold justice and peace over the whole world. The Mahdi and Jesus Christ will lead people into spiritual life and political harmony. Sheikh Nazim even stated that during the Mahdi era, the 73 different sects in the Muslim community and religious divergence among Muslims and between Muslims and non-Muslims will eventually disappear. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani has also said that the caliph is a spiritual leader who will give guidance to political leaders. According to Sheikh Nazim Haqqani, the 21st century is the age of truth as people come to realise their basic existential mission as God’s servants. Sheikh

Nazim said that the coming of Armageddon is one of the two last unfulfilled prophesies before the last day. According to him, the coming of Armageddon is inevitable in order to cleanse the world and to draw a distinction between sincere believers and non-believers. During the Armageddon, no place in the world, except Mecca, Medina, and Damascus, will be safe.

Sheikh Hisham Kabbani said that the Mahdi, with the help of Jesus Christ, will act as a mujtahid mutlaq (a religious reformer of absolute authority) in the modern era. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani has also said that the title of caliph is reserved exclusively to the Mahdi as a spiritual leader, not as a political leader (2004a, 279).

Interestingly, Sheikh Nazim also relates a future scenario for the unity of the ummah in line with the Mahdi prophecy. For example, has said that under the Mahdi, all people will be united to the extent that all religious rifts and political divergence will end. He has further proclaimed a utopian vision under the Mahdi and Jesus Christ, in which all human beings will be united. On the 29th November 2010, Sheikh Nazim al-Haqqani stated that,

The Lord wants to change everything now...[a] new declaration [for the] first time in Islamic history, that 73 sects will now be made one...they are putting a line for ending Tasawwuf (Sufism), from now until end of world because [the] Holy Prophet and Quran never spoke on it...no more Naqshbandi, Qadiri, 40 tariqats, no Tasawwuf (Sufism) or Salafi, Wahabi...nowhere it is saying [does it say] Israel chosen ones, twelve sects (the twelve tribes of Israel mentioned in Surah al-Maidah v. 11-12) no more...from now until [the] end of world we must say we are Rabbaniyoon...no[t] any Tasawwuf, I am not Sufi, I am Rabbani, that is [the] highest honour, this is for Christians, Jews, [the] whole Islamic world, to end all nifaq (treason), that order coming tonight, don’t say “I am Naqshbandi, I am Haqqani”...just say I am Rabbani, finish.... O `ulamas! If anyone asks you what is your way, say, “I am trying to be Rabbani,” or “I am Rabbani.” Finished! La ilaaha illa-Llah. That is bombardment on the fortress of Shaytan. Finished! Don’t say, “I am Christian,” “I am Jewish,” “I am Maronite,” “I am Orthodox,” “I am Catholic,” “I am Protestant,” “I am Shi’a,” “I am this, or that”. No! No more using the term “tasawwuf” as it was never used by the Sahabah (r)!...Quran saying only

Rabbaniyeen, no more Naqshbandi, no more Tasawwuf (Sufism)….you must be for whole nations…no more fighting between Mutasawwif (Sufis) and Salafis….I am saying first for myself, that I am not Mutasawwif, but trying to be Rabbani (Divine). 197

By Rabbani, Sheikh Nazim refers to those who commit themselves only to serve God and humanity. He therefore proposed a total vision not only for Muslims but expanded this total vision to include the followers of other religions: Jews, Christians and others. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani describes this total vision by referring to a prophecy that in the last days, Islam will enter every house and people will voluntarily embrace Islam, including those in the West (2004a, 253-263).

When the Mahdi and Jesus Christ are gone, the world will again descend into moral decadence leading to total natural destruction which will also be the end of the time for all believers and the world. The final signs for the Judgement Day will then appear which includes the emergence of Dabbah (the beast) from underground, heavy smoke in the sky, the sun rising from the west, the destruction of Ka’bah in Mecca and the appearance of Gog and Magog (Yajuj and Majuj) who will destroy everything in sight (Habibis 1990, 608, Kabbani 2004a, 289-302). The final signs will also include the flooding of Egypt and Cyprus, and the eruption of a volcano near Bursa. Next, there will be a time when the Angel Israfil will blow the first trumpet resulting in the death of all remaining believers. This will be followed by resurrection day, the day when Angel Israfil blows the second trumpet. Between the first and second soundings of Israfil’s trumpet, there will be heavy rain lasting

197  http://sufilive.com/Koonoo_Rabbaniyeenah_Be_Those_Who_Establish_Lordly_Worship_-_2770.html
for 40 days during which all human beings will rise to life again, ready for the judgement day, the day when human beings will go to God’s court. Only those who did good deeds will go to Paradise, whereas those who carried out bad deeds will receive Hellfire.

Having elaborated in detail on the signs of the hour and the coming of Armageddon, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani ends his account by simply instructing his disciples to recite *Al Kahf* verse and a formula of *dzikr* recommended for avoiding the Dajjal’s *fitnah* (Kabbani 2004a, 343-347). In doing this, he is using millenarian-apocalyptic narratives to create a dramatic effect that can be applied as a teaching method (Habibis 1989, 221-240, 1990, 603-619, Atay 1994, Damrel 1999, 1/6). This ritual-devotional practice is employed as ‘what has to be done’–a practical recipe for anticipating the imminent coming of Armageddon and the Mahdi/Jesus Christ for individual Muslims. In this respect, Naqshbandi-Haqqani is not completely unique compared to other Islamic movements.

Though employing different religious terms, Naqshbandi-Haqqani resembles other Islamic movements in its insistence on upholding a utopian vision about Islam and Muslims and their role in addressing current socio-political problems. Through the prism of millenarian-apocalyptic scenarios, Naqshbandi-Haqqani provides both negative and positive scenarios about the future. Through ambiguous and symbolic narratives of this millenarian-apocalyptic view, Naqshbandi-Haqqani not only offers a distinct world-view but also attempts to change religious preference, ritual, and behaviour in line with a traditional Sufi religious repertoire. In the case of Naqshbandi-Haqqani, a millenarian belief
represents a worldview for dealing with the world and the self-perception of those who play a part in it.

The millenarian-apocalyptic belief as embraced by Naqshbandi-Haqqani is quietist rather than revolutionary in nature because this belief is primarily concerned with cultivating self-piety and is disseminated as an instrument for teaching. The motivational framing is not directed to drive broader socio-political change but to modify personal behavior and religious preference. Naqshbandi-Haqqani maintains that cultivating good character is a basic foundation for enduring social and political change. As a faith-based movement, Sufi collective action involves more emotional attachment than rational calculation.

Using this millenarian-apocalyptic scenario, Sheikh Nazim teaches that the secular worldview, science and technology and all the promises for continuous advancement and rationalistic solutions prevent people from accepting the miraculous, spirituality and the quest for religious-spiritual guidance.\(^{198}\) Sheikh Hisham Kabbani further states that because modern people are addicted to science and technology with its proven advancement, the belief in karamah and miraculous powers has disappeared to the extent that people tend to disregard them completely. He has also stated that nowadays, ‘people are preoccupied only with seeking for proof of everything and lack of belief in anything’. Asking for proof of karamah and miraculous powers, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani said, gave the belief no meaning.\(^{199}\) Sheikh Nazim Haqqani has further stated that modern people reject

\(^{198}\) [http://www.sufilive.com/Technology_Removes_the_Taste_of_Mankind_s_Real_Life-2547.html](http://www.sufilive.com/Technology_Removes_the_Taste_of_Mankind_s_Real_Life-2547.html)

\(^{199}\) Sheikh Nazim’s and Hisham Kabbani’s position on modern science and technology is based on his interpretation of the dominance of the pen (written tradition) as one of the signs of the Hour. Interview with Mustafa Mas’ud, 18 September 2010.
spirituality because of their addiction to technology and that modern science enslaves people who depend on it rather than on their own faculties. It is not surprising that Sheikh Nazim prophesied that when the Mahdi recites the takbir (recitation of Allah the great in Arabic) three times, all technology will be obsolete.

It is interesting to note, however, that Sheikh Nazim and Sheikh Hisham Kabbani accept and utilize the internet and information technology.

7.3 Returning to the Consensus of Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah: The State of Ignorance (Jahiliya) and Dissension (Fitnah)

Sheikh Hisham Kabbani identifies the current problem within the Muslim ummah as representing the prevailing state of jahiliya (ignorance) and fitnah (dissension). He has further identified some aspects of the current state of ignorance (jahiliya): Islam is becoming marginal within the ummah, secessionist groups have re-emerged within the ummah; there is a rejection of honesty and honest people, and a rejection of Prophetic tradition (Kabbani 2004a, 183-221). He has described the current situation as the second era of ignorance (jahiliya). He has said that,

…Islam came to take people from darkness into light. That time is called Jahiliyya in Arabic, the Era of Ignorance. Unfortunately, we are regressing, in our century, to jahiliyya ukhra, another Era of Ignorance. Everywhere now you find ignorance. The people on the right path are being opposed, disliked, defamed, and fought. The people of falsehood are being praised and honored. This was foretold by the Prophet (s) who said that in such a time, "Yukhawwanul amin wa yusaddiqul kha'in," "The most trustworthy one will be called 'dishonest and untrustworthy', and the dishonest one will be called 'trustworthy'…"200

200 [http://www.sunnah.org/audio/2nd.htm](http://www.sunnah.org/audio/2nd.htm)
On the other hand, the great dissension (fitnah) and division among the Muslim ummah is depicted as a situation in which the whole ummah no longer knows which religious authority to follow and where to seek spiritual guidance. Because of this, the Muslim ummah is trapped in constant religious strife. The prevailing problems among contemporary Muslims are therefore conceived as having their origins mainly from disunity in the matter of theology and doctrine, and being related to religious divergence incited by religious reform deviating from a Sunni major consensus.

Naqshbandi-Haqqani maintains that it is only the Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah group that will be saved. Among Naqshbandi-Haqqani, the term Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah specifically refers not only to those who are the followers of the two schools of Sunni Islamic theology (Ash’ari and Maturidi) and one of the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence (madzhab), but also those following one of the forty-schools of self-purification with a direct chain of spiritual transmission to the Prophet (tarekat al mu’tabarrah). The Ash’ari and Maturidi schools of theology, the

201 This is based on a hadith compiled by Abu Dawud (#4579) and narrated by Abu Hurayra saying that “The Jews were split up into seventy-one or seventy-two sects; and the Christians were split up into seventy-one or seventy-two sects; and my community will be split up into seventy-three sects. All [will] go to Hell, except one who follows the sunnah.”

202 The madzhab is a compilation of Islamic jurisprudence or fiqh that comprises the interpretation of Islamic jurists and mostly deals with the observance of rituals and method of worship (ibadat) and social legislation (mu’malat) in Islam. There are four schools of Islamic jurisprudence with the largest following in the Muslim world: Hanafi, Maliki, Syafi’i, and Hambali. The Hanafi School is named after the Persian scholar Abu Hanifa an-Nu’man ibn Thābit (699-767) who was born in Kufah, Iraq. He was one of tabi’in generations and his school is the oldest surviving Islamic jurisprudence. This School of Islamic jurisprudence is embraced by Muslims in Central Asia, Turkey, Balkan, and South Asia. The Maliki School was founded by Mālik ibn Anas ibn Mālik ibn Abī Ḥāmid ibn Asbāḥī (711-795), a Medina born Muslim jurist. His school of Islamic jurisprudence is adopted mostly by Muslims in North Africa, whereas Syafi’i School derives from Abu ʿAbdullah Muhammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfīʿī (767-820), a Palestinian jurist whose school of Islamic jurisprudence has great influence for Muslims in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia. The Hambali School derives from Ahmad bin Muhammad bin Hanbal Abu ʿAbd Allāh al-Shaybānī (780-855), an Iraqi jurist. They are considered the most authoritative figures applying the principles of using Qur’an, Prophetic tradition (sunnah), ijmāʿ (consensus) and qiyas (analogy) as sources for Islamic jurisprudence and, with the greatest following, they are unanimously considered as the great mujtahid (renewers). For details about the four schools and their pioneers, see (Haddad 2007).
four schools of Islamic jurisprudence, and the forty schools of self-purification are believed to represent the very foundation and the most authentic and authoritative form of Sunni orthodoxy. They, as a whole, are what the Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples are supposed to believe and practise as part of their faith and daily religious devotion.

In terms of theology, both Abu Hasan Ali ibn Ismail al Ash’ari (874-936) and Abu Mansur al Maturidi (853-944) are considered as providing the most solid and authoritative foundation for the unity of Sunni orthodox theology. The Ash’ari and Maturidi schools avoid the use of philosophical speculation, rational logic and literal interpretations as a basis of Islamic theology (kalam). Naqshbandi-Haqqani holds the belief that God ‘is above all conception of His creation and He is exalted above any description or likeness’ (Kabbani 1996b, 9). By this theological position, Naqshbandi-Haqqani rejects, for instance, the Mu’tazilite’s rationalist stance that the Qur’an is simply a creation and that the Night-Ascension of the Prophet (mi’raj) occurred in spirit only (Kabbani 1996b, 8-9). Naqshbandi-Haqqani also rejects the Mu’tazilite denial of the positive significance of the divine attributes and believes in the symbolic and figurative attributes of God and a balance between human free-will and predestination (Kabbani 1996b, 10).

Moreover, Naqshbandi-Haqqani upholds that the Qur’an comprises the eternal words of God consisting of verses with clear unambiguous meaning (muhkamat) as well as those with ambiguous or even secret meanings (mutashabihat). The muhkamat verses, because of their clear and non-ambiguous meaning, can be interpreted by those called fuqaha (Islamic scholars) whereas mutashabihat verses, because of their ambiguous meaning, can only be interpreted
by those bestowed with spiritual illumination (Kabbani 1996b, 104-109).

Sheikh Hisham Kabbani writes regarding the method of interpretation regarding mutashabihat verses,

The scholars of true Salaf – that is, the pious Muslims of the first three centuries after the Hijra of the Prophet – used to interpret the mutashabihat in the following way: they refuted the unacceptable interpretations but did not specify which one of the acceptable meanings was the intended meaning of the verse or the hadith. Thus we see that the way of the Salaf was mere acceptance of expressions on faith without saying how they are meant, and without additions, subtractions, or substituting meanings imagined to be synonyms, while stressing Allah’s absolute transcendence beyond the characteristics of created things in order to preclude likening Him to His creation (Kabbani 1996b, 108).

Closely related to this, Naqshbandi-Haqqani strongly rejects tajsim (anthropomorphism), takyif (asking about God’s attributes), tamthil (conceiving of God and His attributes by comparison to creation), and tashbih (likening God to creation). Sheikh Hisham Kabbani has pointed out further that tajsim, takyif, tamthil, and tashbih are altogether a clear-cut aberration not known during the first three generations of Islam/salaf as-shalih (Kabbani 1996b, 104-182). Avoiding literal interpretations about God and His attributes is therefore regarded as the essence of tawhid (monotheism) and establishes the basic pillar of Islamic belief. Adopting such views leads to corrupted belief and, by implication, committing heresy.

Sheikh Hisham Kabbani maintains the position that the unity of doctrine is crucial and vital for the unity of the ummah. The unity of doctrine as espoused by the Ash’ari and Maturidi becomes the foundation for the idea of tauhid, which is

203 Implicit in this view, Naqshbandi-Haqqani believes that the Prophet Muhammad actually left the legacy of the two kinds of religious knowledge to his heirs, dhohir (shariah) privileged for Islamic scholars and batin science (tasawuf) reserved specially to the Sufi saints.
the essence of every Muslims’ faith. Regarding theology, he thus takes a critical position toward Ibn Taimiyah and his modern students such as Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahab and the likes. He has said that it was Ibn Taimiyah who introduced innovative views regarding God’s attributes and theological doctrine with long-term consequences within the Muslim ummah. He has quoted classic Muslim scholars who opposed Ibn Taimiyah’s theological position to affirm that such views were not known during the Prophet’s lifetime and the three generations of pious ancestors. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani has said about Ibn Taimiyah’s theological position,

Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal, to whom Ibn Taimiyah stated his affiliation, never said that tawhid consisted of two parts, one being tawhid al-rububiyya and the other tawhid al-uluhiyya, nor did he ever say that “whoever does not know tawhid al-uluhiyya, his knowledge of tawhid al-rububiyya is not taken into account because the idolaters also had such knowledge”; nor did any of the followers of the Followers (taba’ al-tabi’in) ever say such a thing to his contemporaries, nor any of the Followers (tabi’in) to his, nor any of the Companions of the Prophet to his. Nor did the Prophet himself in his Sunna, which is the exposition of the Book of Allah… (Kabbani 1996b, 54-55).

He made a very similar criticism against Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahab, the follower of Ibn Taimiyah’s theological position as follows,

It is strange that he [Muhammad Abdul Wahab] shuns the name of “Islam” given by Allah to His religion, and he shuns the name of “Ahl al-Sunna” used by Muslims to refer to those of sound belief, naming it instead “the Salafi doctrine”, an invented name in Islam suggesting that there is more than one doctrine among Ahl al-Sunna. What is worse, he makes the Prophet the adherent of a doctrine – his doctrine – when in fact it is the Salaf who are by the very definition of the term “Salaf” the adherents and followers of the Prophet (Kabbani 1996b, 184).

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204 This stand is also supported by another prolific writer and eloquent speaker of Naqshbandi-Haqqani, Gibril Fouad Haddad (b. 1960), who wrote an extensive refutation of Wahabi-Salafism and its modern manifestations as proposed by contemporary scholars like Abdul Azis ibn Abdullah ibn Baz (1910-1999), Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani (1914-1999), and Muhammad al Utsaimin (1917-2001) who were strongly influenced by the method developed by Ibn Taimiyah. For details, see http://www.livingislam.org/n/slfm_e.html
Moreover, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani wrote about the Wahabi-Salafi and other groups embracing Ibn Taimiyah’s theological position as,

...[the] Westernized modernists striving to distance themselves from their own authentic but "messy" Islamic past in favor of an inauthentic but "hygienic" past which they identify, in youthful, revisionist fashion, with the pious Salaf (Kabbani 1997, 8-9).

Based on this theological position, Naqshbandi-Haqqani rejects the use of takfir against other fellow Muslims on the ground that it is contrary to the Sunni mainstream principles of religious rules—Quranic exegesis, Prophetic tradition (hadist), the consensus of scholars (ijma), and analogy (qiyas). Sheikh Hisham particularly condemns the use of takfir doctrine because he, following the consensus of the traditional Sunni scholars, maintains that the Qur’anic verse regarding this should not be used to target fellow Muslims. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani maintains that after someone has professed the declaration of faith (shahadat), any mistake/sin a Muslim has committed, let alone difference in the belief system and Islamic jurisprudence, cannot be a basis for unjustified and excessive accusations against fellow Muslims of being a musyrik (idolater) or a kafir (disbeliever) or a murtad (apostate). If a Muslim commits a sin, he/she is only considered fasiq (disobedient to Allah/rebellious against God’s command). By implication, his/her rights as a Muslim are still protected under Islamic law and thus it is completely unlawful to harm or confiscate his/her property, let alone kill him/her.
After having written a long refutation, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani offers his reconciling view regarding Ibn Taimiyah’s position on the matter of theology. He offers the following statement about Ibn Taimiyah and his disciple (Ibn Qayyim al Jawzi) and his theological and doctrinal position:

There is no doubt that these two scholars had the ability to exercise ijtihad in the area of mu’amalat. In fact, they gave many good fatwas in this area. Moreover, they did not attempt to bring about major changes in ‘ibadat, although they diverged substantially from the Ahl al-Sunna in their ijtihad. However, they did pursue change in the area most crucial to Muslim unity and soundness of religion: they went astray in the area of ‘aqida and completely left the pure teachings of the original scholars of the Salaf (Kabbani 1996b, 44).

Following the madzhab is likewise considered vital among Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples because it regulates in detail the way Muslims worship and behave in fulfilling their religious obligations. Maintained strictly through the chain of religious transmission (silsilah), the madzhab is considered as providing the most reliable source regarding the Prophet’s teaching, devotional practices, and social behaviour. Following a particular madzhab is also regarded as necessary for practicing Muslims because it provides a complete guidance for proper worshipping conduct and ritual performance. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani stated the wisdom of following the precedence laid upon by previous Islamic scholars by saying that,

Jurisprudence requires not just knowledge and understanding of the sacred texts, but a deep comprehension of the circumstances around the issue being addressed and an intuitive spiritual wisdom that guides the jurist toward a decision that fulfils not just the letter of the law, but also the practical realities of a given time and place. The spiritual wisdom needed to derive well-rounded and valued rulings is not something that comes from excessive study or memorization. Rather, it is an inner light that comes from sincere devotion to Allah and a spiritual connection to the source of guidance. That light is developed and maintained by means of rigorous exercises under the guidance of masters of spiritual training and enlightenment. The history of Islam shows that ijtihād and juristic reasoning,
conducted by competent and spiritually enlightened scholars, have enabled the social, cultural and intellectual adaptation of Islam to innumerable contexts. This living, vibrant heritage, that is open to change and adaptation, will continue to sustain the faith through many centuries to come (Kabbani 2007a, 182-183).²⁰⁵

Accepting those sources of Islamic jurisprudence is thus regarded as inevitable to avoid the twin pitfalls of subjective rationalism and blind literalism (Haddad 2007). Sheikh Hisham Kabbani supports his position by reiterating that the rules of ibadat and mua’malat in Islam have been complete for hundreds of years and that later generations of Muslims should only follow the previous path, otherwise they are very likely to go astray. Interestingly, though strongly defending the validity of following the madhab, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani does not accept the idea of taqlid (blind imitation). According to Sheikh Hisham Kabbani, although taqlid is not completely bad especially for lay people, it cannot sustain them since people are becoming increasingly learned in their religious knowledge.²⁰⁶ Thus he still opens the possibility of ijtihad for contemporary Muslim scholars. He has said that,

Though some scholars have attempted to freeze the interpretation of Islam, most accept the view that Islamic Divine Law, or shari’a, is subject to ongoing re-evaluation according to the principles of juristic reasoning, known as ijtihad. The purpose of this ongoing process of ijtihad is to adapt shari’a to changing societal circumstances. Thus, most Islamic scholars say that "the door of ijtihad" remains open (Kabbani 2007a, 180).²⁰⁷

Nevertheless, he seems to be ambiguous in this regard because he strongly adheres to the Sunni orthodoxy that the ijtihad can only be delivered by those who meet the requirements to do so. He stated this about the requirement for ijtihad:

²⁰⁶ Interview with Sheikh Mustafa Mas’ud, 17 October 2010.
...scholars sought to penetrate the principles behind the thousands of rulings made in the time of the Prophet and his successors in order to build a system of precedent-based law that would provide a solid foundation for jurists in the future. These principles include the consensus of scholars, analogy to prior rulings, pursuit of the greater good, the idea that a lesser harm is preferable to a greater harm, and the importance of pre-existing customs and practices. Thus in practice Naqshbandi-Haqqani maintains the Sunni mainstream conservative position on the closure of the door of *ijtihad* due to the alleged absence of qualified scholars in the contemporary era.

Furthermore, Naqshbandi-Haqqani holds and maintains the belief in several aspects of religious creed that have been a consensus among *Ahlus Sunnah* scholars such as the belief in intercession (*syafa’at*) and in the role of the intercessor (mediator) and the permissibility of conducting visits (*ziarah kubur*) to shrines and graves. Naqshbandi-Haqqani maintains the belief in the power of intercession (*syafa’at*) embodied in the Prophet Muhammad as an integral part of the Muslim faith. This is related to the belief that the Prophet Muhammad left two related legacies to the later generations of the Muslim community: the Quran-Sunnah and the blood descendants of the Prophet. While the first represents the written form of Islamic teaching, the second is about oral transmission, which is in fact a contested issue within the *umma* and distinguishes the *Sunni* and *Shiah* communities.

Naqshbandi-Haqqani venerates the descendants of the Prophet. The descendants of the Prophet (*ahl bayt*) are considered as living *Sunnah* who must be

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209 Interview with Samson Nasarudin, 20 September 2010.
followed and respected. Because of this, the Prophet Muhammad is regarded as having supreme authority to be an intermediary between human beings and God in the hereafter. The emphasis on love of the Prophet, peace and tolerance is based on the belief that these qualities represent the basic teachings of the Prophet Muhammad.

Naqshbandi-Haqqani also holds belief in the permissibility of *tawasul* and *tabaruk*. *Tawasul* involves seeking a path to God through the Prophet or through the person of a saint. *Tabaruk* involves seeking goodness by virtue of touching or being close to the relics of the Prophets and of living or dead saints. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani has, however, suggested that *tawasul* and *tabaruk* can be possible only with the permission of God. Among the Naqshbandi Haqqani’s disciples, the belief in the permissibility of *tawasul* is expressed in the ritual of *dzikr* during which God is invoked on behalf of the Prophet, whereas the *tabarruk* is expressed through kissing the remaining hairs of the Prophet.

Naqshbandi Haqqani believes that visiting the graves of saints is permissible and has a foundation within the Islamic tradition. *Ziarah* is regarded not only as an act of piety but also as symbolically important to ensure the continued flowing of blessings (*barakah*) from the Prophet, the pious ancestors and dead saints. According to Sheikh Hisham Kabbani, the Prophet was a noble man, who has brought about a real freedom, from the state of disbelief to belief, from the state of idolatry to the state of Oneness. In this regard, the Prophet Muhammad is also considered as a man who laid down the foundation of Muslim identity (Kabbani 1998b, 30). Given his theological and doctrinal position, the state of

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210 For details about the permissibility of intercession, *tawasul* and *tabaruk*, see (Kabbani 1998c)
jahiliya, fitnah and their impact in creating growing disunity within the Muslim ummah is believed coming from the propaganda of Wahabi-Salafi groups.211 Sheikh Hisham Haqqani has said that,

With the neatness of mind which they had learnt from the West, and driven by a giddy enthusiasm which blinded them to the finer aspects of the classical heritage, many of the fundamentalists announced that they found the Islam of the people horribly untidy. Why not sweep away all the medieval cobwebs, and create a bright new Islam, streamlined and ready to take its place as an ideology alongside Marxism, capitalism, and secular nationalism? To achieve this aim, it was thought that the four madhabs of fiqh had to go. Ditto for the Ash’ari and Maturidi theological traditions. The Sufi orders were often spectacularly exotic and untidy: they of course had to be expunged as well. In fact, at least ninety percent of the traditional Islamic texts could happily be consigned to the shredding machine: while what was left, it was hoped, would be the Islam of the Prophet, stripped of unsightly barnacles and presiding over a reunified Muslim word, striding towards a new and shining destiny (1997:9).

The Wahabi-Salafi group is regarded responsible for waging doctrinal, political and even physical wars that in the end have created social disintegration and chaos within the Muslim community. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani has stated that,

We are coming to the end of the present world. There is not much time left for this world to continue. Today we heard something very surprising: a Sufi movement has been banned in one of the Far Eastern countries. This is the influence of the Wahhabi movement. Using their money, they are trying to control and to fight the love of the Prophet (s). They don't like anyone to love the Prophet (s), and for that reason Wahhabis are spreading false teachings that go against the person of the Prophet (s) and against the teachings of the four madhhabs (schools), in order to show Islam as a dry and cruel religion. They are the ones responsible for the present scandalous view of Islam, due to which Islam has a bad name in the West. They say, it is the Jews that are responsible for passing Islam off as cruel; but in reality more harm is coming against Islam from Wahhabis than from Jews. The Wahhabis' disrespect to the Prophet (s) is so great! They are buying religious departments and institutions in every country. They are giving as much money as people want in order to induce them to fight the love of the Prophet (s).212

211 The terms, Wahabism and Salafism, as used among Naqshbandi-Haqqani, are not necessarily terminologically correct because such labels represent a broad-brush designation referring to any Islamic group opposing Sufi religious belief and praxis.

212 http://www.sunnah.org/audio/2nd.htm
This anti-Wahabi-Salafism and anti-Saudi Arabia has strong religious tones. Echoing his master, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani always quotes authentic hadith in which the Prophet Muhammad reportedly cursed the Najd people for causing fitnah (confusion) among the Muslim community. It is based on Bukhari and Muslim who narrated a hadith in which some groups of companions came to the Prophet (s) in his time and asked him to pray for them. He said, "Allahumma barik lana fi shamina wa fi yamanina," "O God, bless us in our Sham (Syria) and bless us in our Yemen." They said, "What about Najd, O Rasulallah?" He said another time, "O God, bless Sham and Yemen." Again they asked, "What about Najd" and again he did not answer them except by blessing Syria and Yemen. The third time they asked him about Najd, he said: "Yakhruju minha qarnayyish shaitani wa yakthuru fiha az-zalazilu wal fitan," "The two horns of the devil will appear from there, and earthquakes, confusion and corruption will abound there."213 The repeated reference to Najd is interpreted as the whole area around present-day Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

Sheikh Hisham Kabbani further told the disciples how the new students from Saudi Arabia disrupt social cohesion and incite hatred within the Muslim community by accusing other fellow Muslims of being committed to bid’ah (innovation) and syirik (idolatry). The bombings and attacks on Sufi shrines that have occurred in Pakistan and Somalia is also not missed in the narrative.214 The attempts to desecrate the Holy Prophet Muhammad’s shrine and the destruction of other historical sites in Medina and Mecca carried out in the past by Wahabi followers spark a particularly emotional response among the disciples and are

213 For a complete collection of the hadith, see http://mac.abc.se/~onesr/ez/hdth/hpf_e.html
214 Interview with Aat, 20 September 2010.
used as proof of the deviant position of Wahabism.\textsuperscript{215} By saying that, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani seems to reopen an old rift that dates back to the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century during the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of Wahabism and the bloody repercussions within the Sunni community in Saudi Arabia region.\textsuperscript{216}

Moreover, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani has characterised the allegedly deviant position of the Wahabi-Salafi as opposed to the mainstream \textit{ahl Sunnah} in five aspects: anthropomorphism of God’s attributes, disrespect for the Prophet Muhammad, an egalitarian approach to the Quran and Hadith, disregard for the four schools of the Sunni Imam, and the practice of the doctrine of \textit{takfir}. The first has to do with rejection of the Sunni theology of Ash’ari and Maturidi, the second relates to the rejection of the practice of celebrating the Prophet’s birthday, the third is about not using the traditional methods of the Islamic sciences, whereas the fourth involves the differences of scholarly schools in religious rulings regarding worship and devotion and the fifth is about excommunicating other fellow-Muslims (Kabbani 1997, 8). In addition to those, Sheikh Nazim al-Haqqani has reportedly said that the Wahabi’s doctrinal position, which is strongly against ‘miracles and spirituality’, qualifies the group as materialist in principle.

In \textit{Salafi Movement Unveiled} and \textit{200 Years of New Kharijism: the Ongoing Revision of Islam}, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani presents the debate in a simple and straightforward manner in which Naqshbandi-Haqqani identifies every aspect of disputed theological and doctrinal matters. In the \textit{200 Years of New Kharijism:}

\textsuperscript{215} Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s affiliate website (\url{www.nashbandi.org}) displays pictures on the desecration carried out across the Arabia. See for example, \url{http://www.naqshbandi.org/ottomans/wahhabi/relics_under.htm}

\textsuperscript{216} For details of the history and rise of Wahabism in Saudi Arabia, see David Commins (2006).
The Ongoing Revision of Islam, for instance, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani begins with very strong and sharp words as follows:

[w]e live in a time when the enemies of Islam are attempting to destroy it from within. Resourceful and determined, they announce a new mode of leadership that pretends to restore the purity of the faith as a guise to gain the confidence of Muslims and non-Muslim alike. The unwary observer is readily misled by their portrayal, which is eagerly disseminated by the media. In fact, it is these proponents of extremism who are themselves outside the realm of true Islam.

These strong and straight words perhaps derived from the fact that both writings are intended as a counter-attack against the Wahabi-Salafi groups that provoked the attack in the first place. Salafi Movement Unveiled was written in 1997 by Sheikh Hisham Kabbani following the publication of The Naqshabandi Tariqah Unveiled, an anonymous nineteen-page booklet reportedly published by a Salafi group in Sri Lanka attacking Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teaching and Sheikh Nazim Haqqani.217

200 Years of New Kharijism is a short introduction for a book translated into English entitled “Advice to Our Brothers the Scholars of Najd (Nasiha li Ikhwanina ‘Ulama’ Najd)” written by Yusuf Al Rifai and “Refutation of the Innovator from Najd (Misbah al-Anam fi Radd Shubah al-Najdi al-Bid’i al-Lati Adalla biha al-‘Awamm)” written by Sayid Alawi bin Ahmad al Haddad.218

Sheikh Hisham Kabbani’s refutation is more extensively developed in a work entitled the Encyclopaedia of Islamic Doctrine, a seven-volume work of 1,500 pages, which reportedly took five years of research and writing by Sheikh Hisham Kabbani.219 In the Encyclopaedia of Islamic Doctrine, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani details his view on every disputed aspect of Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah’

217 http://islamicweb.com/beliefs/cults/sufi_naqshabandi_unveiled.htm
218 http://www.livingislam.org/n/nkhar_e.html
219 http://www.naqshbandi.org/about/Sh_Kabbani_bio.htm
belief and devotional practice and provides their basis according to Quran and sound Hadits. In this work, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani refutes the salaf-ness claims of Salafi-Wahabism in every disputed matter of doctrine, belief, and the way of worshipping and devotion. He points out that the so-called Wahabi-Salafi represents a khalaf and neo-kharijite group which deviates from Sunni orthodoxy. The term of khalaf and neo-kharijite has become a preferred label attributed to any Islamic group which is against the Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah. The most interesting thing about this work is that Sheikh Hisham Kabbani quotes many passages from Ibn Taimiyah’s own works to reveal that his views are in line with the majority of Muslim scholars. By doing this, he attempts to show the healthy intellectual debate during classical period of Islamic history.

Sheikh Hisham Kabbani has also spent a great deal of effort to counter the accusations of bid‘ah (innovation) and syirik (idolatry) by Wahabi-Salafi groups in which he draws a clear-cut boundary between ‘correct’ and ‘false’ belief and praxis. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani has been trying to engage in religious debate in a way that follows the example set by the classical Muslim scholars. He is ready to agree to disagree because he believes that difference is a good thing. He believes that putting aside theological and doctrinal disputes would be much better and help to address the prevailing ignorance and avoid dissension within the Muslim ummah.

Sheikh Nazim Haqqani and Hisham Kabbani have been trying to position themselves as authoritative figures in Islamic jurisprudence. Both figures are considered capable and have religious authority to give Islamic legal rulings.

Sheikh Nazim Haqqani is a Hanafi scholar whereas Sheikh Hisham Kabbani follows the Syafi’i school of Islamic jurisprudence.
(fatwa) regarding fiqh-related matters. Sheikh Nazim Haqqani and Hisham Kabbani hold the strong belief that differences in theological and doctrinal positions should not affect the unity of the ummah so long as people follow a guide. Yet not all Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples are keen to involve themselves in this complicated religious debate. They consider discursive debate on matters of theology and jurisprudence is well beyond their reach and comprehension and therefore leave this exclusively to the masters to deal with.221

7.4 Social and Political Views: Political Islamism and Radicalism

Naqshbandi-Haqqani is certain that the Muslim community currently has its own socio-political problems which, according to Sheikh Nazim Haqqani and Hisham Kabbani, have their origins in the adoption of the secular worldview, capitalistic economic system, and democratic political order in the Muslim ummah. Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s socio-political views derive from a long encounter with various Islamic political movements in the Middle East and USA, and stem from the belief that Islam provides the only comprehensive solution to the current problems facing the world.

Sheikh Nazim Haqqani’s and Kabbani’s personal experience in hostile political environments particularly in the Middle East and USA have played a part in the formation of their strong opposition to Wahabi-Salafi ideas as well as their opposition to the radical Islamist ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood. Furthermore, relying on many Prophetic traditions to make his point, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani

221 On one occasion, Gibril Fouad Haddad frankly admitted that Naqshbandi-Haqqani simply followed the madzhab of the Sheikh and nothing else. Public sermon at Rumi Café, Jakarta, 12 November 2010.
specifically examines the current situation in conflict areas such as Somalia, Chechen, Pakistan, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yemen where the Muslim community has been experiencing internal sectarian political conflicts.\footnote{Interview with Muchsin Mulaela, 27 September 2010.}

Sheikh Nazim Haqqani has said that Islam has been downgraded because it is used simply for justifying political struggle and worldly material interests. He rejects the idea of individual freedom embedded in modern democracy.\footnote{http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5drDJ3CenTU} He does not accept that under democracy, the rule is in the hands of lay people and the ruler is chosen through a general election. By saying that, Sheikh Nazim Haqqani does not accept democracy as a matter of principle but he does accept it as a matter of political reality. This view derives from Sheikh Nazim’s interpretation of the \textit{hadith} (Prophetic tradition) in which the Prophet reportedly said that,

\begin{quote}
After me come caliphs, and after the caliphs come princes, and after princes there will be kings and after the kings, there will be tyrants. And after the tyrants a man from My House will fill the earth with justice, and after him is al-Qahtani. By the One who sent me with the Truth! Not a word less.\footnote{Hadith narrated by Abdurrahman bin Qays bin Jabir al Sadafi, Naim bin Hammad in Fitan. Kanz al Ummal, hadith #38704}
\end{quote}

Sheikh Nazim interprets the caliphs to refer to the Rightly Guided Ones (Abu Bakr, Umar, Utsman, and Ali bin Abi Thalib), the princes were the \textit{Ummayad} of Damascus and Abbasid caliphs of Baghdad, and the kings were attributed to the Ottoman Sultans. The tyrants therefore refer to the current politico-economical system adopted by Muslim society (Kabbani 2003a, xxi). Sheikh Nazim Haqqani states that many Muslim countries are now trapped in debt because they have adopted an evil economic system based on interest (\textit{riba’}). According to him,
people should only use gold and silver as the Prophet did, instead of paper money as is common today. Though sharing a view that the current political and economic system is un-Islamic, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani seems to soften his language in dealing with these complicated issues.

While theological-doctrinal dispute is juxtaposed as a part of the jihad struggle to combat the state of jahiliya and fitnah within the Muslim ummah. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani asserts that the greatest jihad in the contemporary era is standing and speaking out through intellectual and civic engagement against those proposing anti-Ahlus Sunnah belief and doctrine. He also emphasizes that the best activism in the contemporary era is showing love of the Prophet and the peaceful and tolerant nature of Islam. In his response about the distinctive feature of Naqshbandi-Haqani preaching, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani, for instance, reiterates that,

…the most distinctive quality has to do with my emphasis on love, peace and tolerance. Others can emphasize politics and activism but we present a historically authentic version of Islam. The Prophet Muhammad always extended his hand to all people, regardless of their beliefs, and so do we.

Meanwhile, in Islamic Extremism: A Viable Threat to US National Security, the first political statement he delivered in an Open Forum at the State Department on 7th January 1999, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani pointed out his concern over what he called an Islamic extremist ideology and its potential threat to American security. He expressed his political views about the condition of Muslim society in America as follows:

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225 http://www.sufilive.com/print.cfm?id=1736&lc=EN
226 http://www.meforum.org/61/muhammad-hisham-kabbani-the-muslim-experience-in
The most dangerous thing that is going on now in these mosques, that has been sent upon these mosques around the United States...is the extremist ideology. Because they are very active they took over the mosques; and we can say that they took over more than 80% of the mosques that have been established in the US...So it means that the methodology or ideology of extremist has been spread to 80% of the Muslim population, but not all of them agree with it. But mostly the youth and the new generation do because they are students and they don’t think except with their emotions and they are rebellious against their own leaders and government. This is the nature and psychology of human beings. When we are students in university or college we always fight the government, whether they are right or wrong, we have to attack the government. This is how they have been raised.

In this way we see that the extremist ideology...is beginning to spread very quickly into the universities through the national organizations, associations and clubs that they are establishing around the universities...Through the universities there will be the most danger. If the nuclear atomic warheads reach these universities, you don’t know what these students are going to do, because their way of thinking is brainwashed, limited and narrow-minded.... I’d like to tell you that extremism, when a person has been brainwashed, demands that a person doesn’t think, even if his father or his mother or his brother tells him to stop, he has to go to do what he has been asked to do. That’s why there are 5,000 suicide bombers being trained by bin Laden in Afghanistan who are ready to move to any part of the world and explode themselves. They are very sophisticated, they can buy anything they need locally and then put it on and explode themselves.

This is what I want to say to you, to present to you from within the Muslim community. We want to tell you that the Muslim community as a whole is innocent from whatever extremism and extremist ideology is being spread around the world. The problem of extremism is a big danger, and it can be solved if the West better understands Islam and builds bridges with the moderate Muslims, the traditional Muslims. This way, the Muslim community will eliminate the extremist threat from within. Otherwise, media, television, newspapers, and the leadership will not understand that there is a difference between extremists and Muslims. They have to begin a dialogue with Muslims from around the United States, and they have to have good advisors. What I am seeing, unfortunately, are those that are advising the media, or advising the government are not the moderate Muslims. Those whose opinion the government asks are the extremists themselves. Those that have been quoted in the newspapers, in the magazines, in the television, in the media are the extremists themselves.

In *Islamic Radicalism: Its Wahhabi Roots and Current Representation*, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani clearly shows the relationship between an extremist ideology and

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Wahabism. He said that Wahabism and its distinct religious doctrine and theology are the origins of Islamic radicalism. According to him,

…the broader ideology name "Wahhabism" represents a serious challenge to the theology and practice of the mainstream Sunni Islam to which most of these nations’ populations adhere. Should this radicalized understanding of Islam continue to spread unchecked, radical interpretations could threaten social stability at the local, national, and regional levels and create serious geopolitical dangers to which neighboring powers, as well as the US and Europe, would have to react.228

He related encroaching global Wahabism as posing a threat not only to the Muslim community but also to the whole world. In *The Globalization of Jihad: From Islamist Resistance to War against the West*, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani expresses his opposition to Islamic radicalism and political Islamism. He particularly opposes Islamic groups such as Hizbut Tahrir, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Hamas. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani wrote about the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas as follows:

The Muslim Brotherhood was born as anti-imperialist movement and has always been focused as much on winning political power for its own sake as it has been on anything having to do with the religion of Islam. Today, that emphasis has only increased, and we now see the Brotherhood – along with the many other national movements it has spawned over the years – expressing more and more enmity for the West. It is in part by promoting such anti-Western sentiments that Hamas, effectively the Palestinian branch of the Brotherhood, was able to generate so much support in the recent Palestine elections, just as its own anti-Western rhetoric helped the Brotherhood itself at the polls in Egypt. The people who respond to such rhetoric are not religious people. Rather, they are motivated by socioeconomic concerns. It is true that poverty and socioeconomic inequity are very real problems in many parts of the Muslim world today. The extremists are cleverly exploiting these problems. Wherever people are living in poverty, extremism is bound to find fertile ground. Therefore, addressing these problems is one way of undermining the influence of the extremists.229

In *Principles of Leadership in War & Peace*, a paper delivered at the first International Conference of Islamic Scholars (ICIS) organised by PBNU (Nahdlatul Ulama Central Board) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in December 2004, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani again affirmed his view on the importance of self-restraint to impose *jihad* and fight against others. He has said that Muslims must avoid aggressive and violence acts in the pursuit of their political goals and do their best to seek truce and peace whenever possible. He follows Sheikh Nazim Haqqani’s political view of discouraging his disciples to take to the streets and be involved in demonstrations or political protest.

Sheikh Nazim reportedly said that to prepare for the terrible situation of the imminent coming of Armageddon, there is no better way than maintaining the practice of ritual. He also encourages his disciples to spend most of their time at mosques either gaining religious knowledge or reciting *dzikr*. He even reportedly said that there will be no safe guarantee for those preoccupied with protest and demonstrations during the Armageddon. He warns that only those keeping themselves busy worshipping and learning at the mosque will be safe. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani also continually reiterates Sunni political conservatism by stating that every Muslim must follow a legitimate ruler.230

7.5 Conclusion

In the current Islamic resurgence in Indonesia, Sufism is both a practical devotion and philosophical discourse whose religious teachings remain influential in shaping a collective framework of action. Despite the differences in practical

230 Interview with Mustafa Mas’ud, 18 September 2010.
devotion (e.g. litanies of recitation), contemporary Sufism shares the metaphysical and philosophical views elaborated by the prominent founders of the Sufi schools who have had a lasting influence in the Muslim world: Junaid al Baghdadi (830-910 C.E.), Al Qushayri (986-1073 C.E.), Al Ghazali (1058-1111 C.E.), and Ibn ‘Arabi (1165-1240 C.E.). Through their scholarly works, these Sufi Muslim scholars have provided not only the intellectual basis for the legitimate position of Sufism within the Islamic tradition but have also provided a personal model of piety to which all later generations of Sufi masters and Muslim scholars have looked for their inspiration.

As elaborated in detail in the previous sections, Naqshbandi-Haqqani conveys eclectic religious teachings characterized mainly by mystical visions, an interpretation of the Quranic and Prophetic tradition, millenarian-apocalyptic belief and eschatological views, along with a pious reading of Islamic tradition. It believes that revitalizing Islam can only be achieved through complete emulation of Prophetic piety. In this regard, following a madzhab and a school of theology (kalam) along with acceptance of the canonical works in Quran exegesis (tafsir) and the Prophetic traditions (hadist) in particular are emphasized as a prerequisite for ‘correct religious belief and ritual and action’.

As a total framework – meaning a set of beliefs, theology, ritual, physical symbols, and, to some extent, even political aspiration – Sufism thus provides utopian visions that include messianic expectation and salvation, justification of moral protest and social action, shared identity and solidarity. In its totality, Sufism therefore offers a comfortable mantle for rallying support for collective action seeking social, political, cultural and religious change within Muslim society. As a
Sufi group, Naqshbandi-Haqqani embraces a religiously and politically conservative stance because instead of providing a broad socio-political platform, this Sufi group targets changing personal attitudes and behavior as a foundation for broader socio-political changes.

However, the metaphorical and sometimes even ambiguous nature of the Naqshbandi-Haqqani teachings often generates differing interpretations, speculations, and even disillusionment among its disciples. In this regard, it is not the teachings themselves but the personal credibility of Sheikh Nazim Haqqani and Hisham Kabbani that is also important to defend the validity of their teachings and convince people of the relevance of this teaching in fulfilling unique personal religious needs. The coherent teachings and personal credibility of the Sufi master therefore will significantly determine whether Naqshbandi-Haqqani can continue to exist in the future or not.
Chapter 8
PUBLIC OUTREACH AND SOCIAL ENGAGEMENT
Politics and Islamic Propagation

“…a tariqa is an “institution” that translates the needs, aims, and ideals of Muslims in particular settings into “a social organization or movement.” (Halil Inalcik as quoted by Foley, 2008: 524)

In this chapter, I contend that the Sufi movement consists of more than a collection of inward looking group preoccupied solely with ritual and other-worldly salvation. This chapter examines the social engagement, public appearance, and preaching activities that involve the Naqshbandi-Haqqani community in Indonesia. This chapter deals with political determinants for Sufi propagation by focusing on Indonesia’s involvement in the global war against terrorism, the use of Sufi ritual as an electoral strategy for mobilising people and prevailing mysticism and supernatural culture in Indonesian politics. It also examines various different method of dakwah employed by the Naqshbandi-Haqqani community to reach out to the general public. This chapter is concerned to show that Sufi propagation represents collective efforts to maintain Sunni orthodoxy (Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah) as a dominant religious norm among Indonesian Muslims, and to reclaim Sufism as a legitimate voice of the Islamic tradition in Indonesia. In the end, Sufi propagation contributes significantly to maintaining the moderate and peaceful character of Islam in Indonesia.
8.1 Political Determinants for Sufi Activism: Moral Protest and Islamic Mobilisation

The history of Sufism in Indonesia has always been closely related to certain political factors. In the early inception of Islam in the 15th century, Sufi propagation laid a strong foundation for the political consolidation of newly emerging Muslim rulers in their competition over the diminishing influence of hitherto Hindu-Buddhist Empire in the archipelago. In the 19th and early 20th century, Sufi propagation was part of anti-colonial resistance against the Dutch colonial power. From independence until the 1990s, Sufi propagation was mainly concerned with strengthening Islamic orthodoxy against the legacy or remnant of ‘pre-Islamic heterodox belief and religious praxis’. In contemporary times, Sufi propagation represents a popular expression and political aspiration for affirming collective identity as a pious Muslim democratic country. Such popular expression and political aspiration have to do with three recent developments in Indonesian politics: the threat of terrorism, electoral politics and popular Islamic mobilisation, and the prevailing mysticism in Indonesian politics.

8.1.1 Threat of Terrorism and Moral Protest

Since the Bali bombing in 2002, Indonesia has joined in the global campaign against terrorism. The Bali bombing and several subsequent terrorist acts became a catalyst for creating a domestic political environment in which radical religious messages and violence become less favourable. The Salafi radical rhetoric against secular democracy and on behalf of strict observance of shariah provisions, on the one hand, and the Sufi preoccupation with the political establishment and a
peaceful religious message, on the other hand, make the Sufi community a natural, though not necessarily reliable, political ally to address growing security concerns about terrorist threats. Sufi and other Muslim groups with a similar religious outlook thus provide political support for government without raising suspicion from the Muslim community at large.

For Sufi community, violence acts and radical religious messages remain an alarming concern because they not only pose a threat to human security but also to the traditions that have been maintained for a long time. These traditions include popular religious traditions that are common among Indonesian Muslims but fiercely denounced by some Muslim groups with a Salafi religious outlook. In early 2000, a rumor was spread in Cirebon about a time bomb had being planted at Sunan Gunungjati and the Grand Mosque of Cirebon. This terror plot was successfully thwarted by the police with the help of a prominent kyai who had a vision about it in a dream the day before.  

There is no way to find out whether this incident really happened or was simply a false rumor. Yet, Indonesia is a country where religious dispute and sentiment over doctrinal and ideological matters can lead to serious political repercussions. In the 1920s, doctrinal disputes divided the nation into two large Islamic camps, traditionalist vs. reformist. In the 1960s, religious sentiments played a part in mobilising people to fight against communism with disastrous results. Recent news reports on the desecration and even complete destruction of popular pilgrimage sites in other countries perpetrated by terrorist groups create an atmosphere of fear that similar things can happen in Indonesia. Reports about what

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231 Interview with Yakub Romdhoni, 10 September 2010
has been happening in other Muslim countries are taken seriously by the Indonesian population.

Sufi communal rituals have become a rallying point in the fight against terror. Such rituals receive political support because of their preoccupation with peaceful Islamic messages, a counterbalance to radical religious views posed by some Muslim groups. These Sufi rituals therefore cannot be understood simply as religious events because they are also communal gatherings during which religious and political messages come together for expressing moral protest. Through communal rituals, the Sufi community expresses its political concerns regarding perceived moral decay and the growing influence of Salafism. Ritual gatherings also become a political stage where a pluralist vision about Islam is upheld and pious acts are demonstrated openly in public.

On 29 September 2012 for instance, Sheikh Hisham attended a *dzikir akbar* and *maulid* celebration in Purbalingga, Central Java. In this ritual gathering, Sheikh Hisham delivered a sermon that touched upon the virtue of obeying the legitimate ruler. Sheikh Hisham also shared his political convictions with those attending the ritual gathering, urging them to love their country, avoid political discord and violence acts. These political ideas resonate among the general Sufi community in Indonesia: that Indonesia as a national entity should not be challenged and must be defended at all cost. It is interesting to note that all these ritual gatherings were facilitated and financially supported by the local security apparatus such as the Head of the Local Police (Kapolres) or a local military commander.
The peaceful and nationalistic messages that the Sufi ritual gatherings promote certainly play a part in bringing about this cooperation.

Habib Luthfi, the president of Indonesia’s largest Sufi Association of JATMAN (Jamiyyah Ahli Thariqoh Mu’tabarah an Nadhiyyah), with whom Sheikh Hisham has established a good personal relationship since the late 1990s, has been active in religious campaigning to promote the so-called “Sufisme Kebangsaan” or Nationalistic Sufism (Arifin 2012, 91). This nationalistic Sufism provides symbolic legitimacy for combatting terrorism, violence and radicalism that widely resonates among Muslim community with political slogan of “NKRI Harga Mati” or Indonesia is final entity. In his hometown, Pekalongan, he organises annual communal festivals called “Pawai Panjang Jimat” during which participants salute the Indonesian national flag amid the chanting of dzikir and maulid celebration.

8.1.2 Electoral Politics and Mass Mobilisation

Reliance on Sufi rituals has become part of an electoral strategy to mobilise popular support and gain symbolic legitimacy. In the new democratic era in Indonesia, ritual is an effective mobilising tool that is far less expensive than other conventional forms of mass political mobilisation such as street rallies, parades, or demonstrations. This is because Sufi rituals such as dzikir akbar and maulid celebrations often involve a large number of people. Hasan (2012, 369) has

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232 Interview with Muchsin Mulaela, 10 October 2010
suggested that typical Sufi ritual like *dzikir akbar* provides a religious platform through which social networking can be established and maintained in Indonesia.

This use of Sufi ritual for Islamic mobilisation in Indonesia is a recent phenomenon. The historical precedent for this kind of Islamic mobilisation can be traced back to the time when the then chairman of NU central board, Abdurrahman Wahid (1940-2009), conducted mass *istighotzah* ritual in the traditionalist Muslim community in the 1990s. At the time, the *istighotzah* ritual became an effective mobilising instrument to counterbalance the mighty authoritarian state. During his short presidency (1999-2001), some of Abdurrahman Wahid’s supporters in fact manipulated *istighotsah* rituals to rally political support from the NU community to respond to growing pressures from his political opponents (Feillard 2002, 117-144).

Instead of co-optation, this kind of Islamic mobilisation is mutually beneficial because Sufi activism helps those aspiring to political power to mobilise and rally popular support from the Muslim community in Indonesia. The ritual is equally vital for both challenging and maintaining political power (Kertzer 1989, 38). The *dzikir* and *maulid* celebrations for example, offer a religious platform through which mass mobilisation takes place. The practice of *ziarah* also constitutes political strategy for those who are in power (Quinn 2009, 173-199). By conducting *dzikir*, *maulid* celebrations and *ziarah*, an aspiring politician is able to reach large numbers of people and fulfill his political ambitions at the same time. This is clearly a factor in the political dynamics behind the proliferation of such rituals and communal gatherings at the local and national level.
During the SBY era, Sufi communal rituals were organised and financially supported by political elites as part of their electoral strategy to rally political support from the Muslim community, as well as showing personal piety and the religious credentials of these political leaders. The Naqshbandi-Haqqani community shares its religious and socio-political concerns with the general public through the promotion of religious rituals in the form of dzikir and maulid celebrations. Sufi ritual is therefore not only a religious gathering but also a form of Islamic political mobilisation.

8.1.3 Mystic and Politics: Charisma and Symbolic Legitimacy

Sufism strongly accords with the prevailing tendencies toward mysticism and supernatural culture in Indonesian politics (Mulder 1978, 1999, Stange 1980). Javanese culture in particular is rich with symbolism and with people who still associate political leader as embodied in a divinely chosen charismatic person. From this perspective, political power, to some extent, has little to do with electoral legitimacy and instead, is sought and maintained mainly through a mystical quest (Anderson 1972, 1-69). Though there is an overall shift towards scripturalist Islam in contemporary Indonesia, the charismatic mystical teacher has not lost his personal reputation for miracle-working to bolster symbolic legitimacy, thus providing spiritual counsel, especially for those aspiring to political power (Bruinessen 2007b).

Sufi charisma represents an expansion of spiritual counsel for those who seek to gain or maintain political power, whereas its rituals represent the seeking of
divine blessing (*barakah*). As happened in the previous era, Sufi charisma was frequently co-opted by the authoritarian regime to rally Muslim political support (Sujuthi 2001, Turmudi 2004, 2006, Sukamto 2012). Following deepening Islamisation, Sufi charisma and ritual are replacing, though not completely, some of the older mystical and supernatural symbolism of power. Sufi charisma and ritual also can be used to gain symbolic legitimacy because it incorporates the Sufi ideals of the unity and solidarity of the Muslim *ummah*.

Sheikh Hisham often uses his authority as a Sufi master to approach the political establishment at the local and national level. The relationship between Sheikh Hisham and Naqshbandi-Haqqani community and the political establishment is marked by a pragmatic political attitude. This is typical of Sunni political conservatism that has been a hallmark of Naqshbandi for generations in Indonesia and in other part of the Muslim world. Sheikh Hisham, for instance, enjoyed a good personal relationship with President Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001). He also attempted to make contact with President Megawati, though unsuccessfully. At the local level, on 18 December 2010, Sheikh Hisham and Habib Syekh conducted a *maulid* celebration in Bantul to show their support for the Bill for Yogyakarta’s special autonomy status. This support perhaps had to do with Sheikh Hisham’s view that Yogyakarta’s sultanate is symbolically vital for protecting the majority Sunni community in Indonesia.

However, it is in Jakarta that this political connection is well maintained. Through the help of his disciples in Jakarta, Sheikh Hisham manages to reach out to Jakarta’s elite politicians and high-ranking officials. In fact, during Sheikh Hisham’s visits between 1999 and 2004, those in the Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia
(YHI) were responsible for arranging “VIP meetings” - a practice that has continued to this day. Through these VIP meetings, Sheikh Hisham got to know dignitaries such as Azwar Anas (Coordinating Minister of People Welfare during the Habibie administration), Akbar Tandjung (State Secretary), Tuti Alawiyah (Minister of Women Empowerment), Jusuf Kalla (Coordinating Minister of People Welfare), Jahja Muhaimin (Minister of National Education), Djohan Effendi (State Secretary during the Abdurrahman Wahid administration), and A.M. Hendropriyono (Head of Indonesia Intelligence Agency during the Megawati administration).  

Yet, it was during the SBY administration that these personal relationships were particularly fruitful. The relationship between the Naqshbandi-Haqqani community and Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) began when Sheikh Hisham, with the help of Ahmad Mubarok and Firdaus Wajdi, met SBY in person when he was Coordinating Minister for Political, Law and Security Affairs. The meeting took place at Firdaus Wajdi’s house in Brawijaya, Kebayoran Baru, on 10 July 2003. SBY was even reported as giving ba’iat to be come a Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciple. On that occasion, Sheikh Hisham was reported to have spontaneously touched SBY’s chest with his hand, assuring SBY that he would be President. To show his support, Sheikh Hisham gave SBY a set of prayer beads (tasbih) and the ijazah (authority) to practice a certain formulic dzikir. Sheikh Hisham was indeed identified as one of the three religious figures – together with KH Achmad Muzakky Syah/Pesantren Al Qodiri, Patrang, Jember and KH Achmad Khairun

233 Interview with Rizal Tarigan, 22 September 2010
234 Interview with Ahmad Mubarok, 21 September 2010
Nasihin/Pesantren AKN Marzuki, Pati – from whom SBY sought spiritual
guidance in his bid for political power.235

As a person growing up in Javanese culture, SBY appears to believe in
mysticism (Artha 2009, Mubarok 2011).236 Exploiting his inclination toward
mysticism to defend himself and undermine his opponents, SBY often became
overly sensitive to criticism against his personal integrity and moral character. He
would be very furious if someone accused him of lying (bohong), for instance.
Using Sufi pious language, he often labelled criticism against his personal integrity
and moral character simply as fitnah, which means unrest or rebellion, especially
against a rightful ruler. Nor did hesitate to frame his political endeavors in mystical
terms. For instance, he publicly announced that he managed to capture black magic
(sihir) from his political opponents237 and further stated that practicing dzikir was
the most effective way to deal with this black magic.238 The terms fitnah and sihir
that SBY packed into his messages might be politically irrelevant but they had
strong religious resonance.

Pujo Basuki (aka Syekh Muhammad Djamil) said that not long after being
inaugurated as President in 2004, SBY met with Sheikh Hisham Kabbani at the
Presidential Palace where Sheikh Hisham delivered Sheikh Nazim’s personal
message to the President.239 He described how Sheikh Hisham sat on the floor right
before the President and asked him to remain seated in his high chair. Sheikh

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235 For details, see Gatra Special Report, Para Kiai Sekitar SBY, No. 47 Tahun X, 9 October 2004
236 His personal inclination to mysticism is also partly shared by his wife who is reported to be a
follower of Paguyuban Ngesti Tunggal (Pangestu). Pangestu is a Javanese mystical group
established by Soenarto Mertowardjo (1899-1965) on 20 May 1949 in Solo.
237 http://us.politik.news.viva.co.id/news/read/72286-sby_banyak_yang_menggunakan ilmu sihir
238 http://www.tempo.co/read/fokus/2009/07/04/699/SBY-Mengaku-Banyak-Dikirimi-Sihir and
http://blog.tempointeraktif.com/portal/yudhoyono-sihir-dan-dzikir/
239 Pujo Basuki was a former Army colonel and a close friend of Firdaus Wajdi. He was died during
a dzikir gathering at Pesantren Ba’alawi Gunungpati, Semarang, 19 June 2011.
Hisham delivered to the President of Sheikh Nazim’s personal message that as long as the President maintained his commitment to propagate Islam and support the Muslim community, Indonesia would be just fine. In addition, there was also a story that Sheikh Hisham passed on a message about a large amount of hidden treasure belonging to the Indonesian people.  

Nevertheless, Naqshbandi-Haqqani community was disappointed by SBY and his failure to keep his commitments as a disciple. Among Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples, SBY’s political blunders, the country’s ongoing socio-economic problems, and the series of personal attacks following his inauguration for the second term (2009-2014) are perceived as a consequence of not fulfilling his commitments as a disciple. Unfortunately, Pujo Basuki declined to give details of the kind of commitments that SBY was supposed to fulfill. Other disciples have suggested that SBY was more interested in gaining power and was not sincere in his personal commitment to support Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s activities in Indonesia.

However, Sheikh Hisham does not always feel comfortable giving spiritual advice to political leaders because this often involves unnecessary political maneuvers that can create tension and discord among Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples. For many disciples, this political involvement undermines the principal mission of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia and potentially weakens its internal solidarity. The pluralistic ideological and political orientations of his numerous disciples have certainly played a part in shaping Sheikh Hisham Kabbani’s political attitudes.

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240 Interview with Pujo Basuki, 10 November 2010
It is perhaps because of this reason that during the 2009 Presidential election, Sheikh Hisham personally and secretly endorsed Jusuf Kalla rather than his rival, SBY, on the grounds that Jusuf Kalla was more sincere in his support for the Muslim community in Indonesia. Despite his endorsement, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani warned his disciples in advance that Jusuf Kalla would lose because he did not have enough political support.241

### 8.2 Sufism and Islamic Propagation

The influence of Sufism stemmed from the fact that most Indonesian Muslim scholars living and studying in the Haramain in the 19th century learnt Islamic knowledge and sought spiritual guidance from Naqshbandi’s masters residing in the holy cities. In contemporary times, popular acceptance of Sufism is a result of active propagation through various media, ranging from print publications, sermons, music, public performances of ritual and seminar/academic conferences.

#### 8.2.1 Print Publication and Propagation

Print publication has been pivotal for Islamic transmission in Indonesia. Sufi print publication in modern times had a historical precedent especially when Hamka collected and then published his short essays from *Pedoman Masyarakat* magazine into a book entitled *Tasawuf Modern* in 1939 (Howell 2008b, 2, 2010, 1031). The growing number of Islamic publications since the early 1990s has

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241 Interview with Muchsin Mulaela, 10 September 2010
developed further and played a significant role in informing the contemporary Sufi resurgence in Indonesia (Watson 2005a, 190). Indonesian Islamic publishers such as Mizan, LKiS, Serambi, Pustaka Hidayah have contributed significantly to popularising the great works of prominent Sufi masters, which were previously known only among the Pesantren community. It is within this general environment of the rising popularity of Islamic publications that books and other forms of reading materials with Sufi themes gain popularity and find readers among the general Muslim population.

Sufi books cover a wide range of topics: from Quranic exegesis and Prophetic tradition, to Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). In terms of Quranic exegesis, the Prophetic tradition and fiqh, the four books of Ensiklopedia Akidah Ahlusunah series published by Serambi are particularly important. It is because they are among the first translated publications detailing Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s orthodox religious views. They provide the Quranic and Prophetic basis for popular Sunni orthodox positions on matters relating to doctrine, belief and religious practices such as dzikir, sholawat, tawassul (intermediary), maulid (the Prophet’s birthday celebration), and ziarah (pilgrimage). They also provide detailed explanations of those popular doctrines, beliefs and religious practices and their historical precedents.

Sheikh Hisham’s Ensiklopedia Akidah Ahlusunah, for instance, became a model for the writing of books of a similar genre, most of which were published by followers. Noval bin Muhammad Alaydrus’ books entitled Mana Dalilnya (2 volumes) and Ahlul Bid’ah Hasanah (2 volumes) are good examples of this
Noval’s books were published by Taman Ilmu, a small Islamic publisher in Solo between 2008 and 2011. Unlike Sheikh Hisham’s *Ensikopedia Akidah Ahlus Sunnah*, Noval’s books were relatively cheap and targeted lay Muslims using simple and straightforward messages. His books were supposed to be a source of guidance protecting followers from the so-called “deviant teachings” of Salafi-Wahabism.

The Naqshbandi-Haqqani community in Indonesia has been actively involved in disseminating Sufi genre of Islamic publications since the late 1990s. Sheikh Nazim’s books such as *Mercy Oceans, Mystical Secrets of the Last Days*, *The Divine Kingdom*, and Sheikh Hisham’s books such as *The Naqshbandi Sufi Way: History and Guidebook of the Saints of the Golden Chain*, *The Approach of Armageddon: A Chronicle of Scientific Breakthroughs and World Events that Occur During the Last Days as Foretold by Prophet Muhammad*, and *Universe Rising* found many readers. Prior to 2003, these books arrived in Indonesia through direct order or online purchase to fill private libraries and collections. It is through Subki’s family that one of these private collections was used for instructing a small group of initiated disciples. When the number of disciples grew, a collective effort was made to translate and publish these books for the general audience.

At the beginning, Naqshbandi-Haqqani relied on large publishers in Jakarta such as Serambi and Hikmah. Serambi translated and published *The Approach of Armageddon: A Chronicle of Scientific Breakthroughs and World Events that*...
Occur During the Last Days as Foretold by Prophet Muhammad into Indonesian with the title of *Kiamat Mendekat*. This book has a distinct place in the popular Islamic literature on millenarian prophecy because, unlike other similar books written by Indonesians and foreigners who emphasize a Christian-Jews conspiracy,\textsuperscript{243} *Kiamat Mendekat* combines rational scientific explanations and its textual basis in the Quran and the Prophetic traditions with a view of the inevitability of peaceful coexistence among different religious affiliations. Hikmah publishing house, on the other hand, published *Dialog dengan Malaikat* which contains stories and materials that are mostly based on the personal spiritual experiences of both Sheikh Nazim and Hisham Kabbani.

With more than 5000 copies of each book sold, the success of these two books is comparable to that of other books of a similar genre. Sheikh Hisham’s *Dialog dengan Malaikat* in particular repeated the success of similar books such as *Dialog dengan Jin Muslim* and *Dajjal Akan Muncul Dari Segitiga Bermuda*, a best-selling book written by an Egyptian journalist, Muhammad Isa Dawud, and published by Pustaka Al Hidayah in 1995 and 1996 respectively. Like Muhammad Isa Dawud, who claimed that his two books were based on a real dialogue with a fellow genie, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani claims that *Kiamat Mendekat* and *Dialog dengan Malaikat* are based on the true spiritual vision of his masters, Sheikh Nazim and Abdullah Faiz, and his own experiences during the civil war in his home country, Lebanon.

The publication of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s materials dramatically increased after 2003. Since then, hundreds of written materials in the form of books, journals, and booklets have been translated and published by disciples and affiliate organisations in Indonesia. Unlike Serambi and Hikmah, these other translated works were initially produced for internal use but then have spread to the general public through massive copying. Arif Hamdani for instance translated more than 100 booklets containing the teachings of Naqshbandi-Haqqani. These translated works were published by Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s affiliate organisations such as Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia, Rumi Café, and Rabbani Cinere. These numerous booklets are mostly short versions of Sheikh Nazim’s and Hisham’s books and sohbet on the internet which were then translated into Indonesian.

Some of the bestselling booklets produced by Arif Hamdani are Nur Muhammad (The Light of Muhammad), Kedatangan Imam Mahdi (The Coming of Savior), Ruh dan Raga (Body and Soul), Rahasia Power Sembilan (The Secret of Power Nine), Operasi Spiritual (Spiritual Operation), and Cahaya Para Wali (The Light of Saints). Arif Hamdani also helped Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia to publish its own periodical named Ahl-Haq. This periodical was published regularly between early 2005 and mid-2009. The Ahl-Haq was of good quality with a full glossy cover page. Both booklets and the Ahl-Haq periodical contained Sheikh Nazim’s and Hisham Kabbani’s sohbet, which had been downloaded from Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s websites.

Despite its significant role in transmitting Sufi teachings to the general public in Indonesia, print publications have their weaknesses, however. High

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244 Interview with Arif Hamdani, 12 July 2010 and Abdurrauf Kurniadi, 8 November 2010
market demands result in numerous technical errors, bad translations and poor editing. Many publications mistranslate and simplify the metaphoric/symbolic languages used in the original texts. Arif Hamdani’s booklets/blogs, for instance, are criticized for their errors and misunderstanding of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teachings. The high demand for Arif Hamdani’s booklets, it is said, leaves no room or time for double-checking of grammatical errors. According to some reports, Arif Hamdani was in such a hurry to translate and publish materials from Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s English websites and books that he often lost the real meaning, message and the socio-cultural contexts of the original texts.

8.2.2 Sermon

Since his arrival in Indonesia in the late 1990s, Sheikh Hisham has been invited to lead prayers or deliver sermons at prestigious mosques. During his regular visits to Indonesia, Sheikh Hisham has lead prayer/dzikir and delivered Friday sermons at several mosques in Jakarta and other regions. This was made possible through the personal relationships and connections of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples with the organising committee (takmir) of the mosques. Prior to a visit, Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples would contact the organising committee of the mosque to make arrangements.

Yet arranging Friday sermons for Sheikh Hisham is not always easy. Sometimes, the organising committee of the mosque refuses to give permission for various reasons. In that case, the Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples have to rely on their social networks. Failing that, those in charge in Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia
will resort to providing the mosque with material incentives so long as Sheikh Hisham has permission to attend because leading prayers and delivering sermons at prestigious mosques not only helps Sheikh Hisham to reach a broader audience but also shows strong financial support for him.

Since early 2000, Sheikh Hisham has led prayers or delivered sermons at mosques located in some of the most prestigious areas in Jakarta such as Istiqlal, Sunda Kelapa/Menteng, Al Bina/Senayan, and Central Bank Mosque/Kebonsirih.\footnote{He has also delivered Friday sermons in less prestigious but important and large mosques such as Al Mughni Gatot Subroto, Al Hawi Condet, Hidayatullah, and Pekojan in Jakarta, Al Akbar Surabaya, and Kauman Solo.} For instance, in mid-2009, after many failed attempts to gain permission, Sheikh Hisham gave a *khutbah* at Sunda Kelapa mosque, a well-known house of prayer located in Menteng, Central Jakarta. The permission to deliver the sermon at this prestigious mosque in Menteng was given only after Soenarto, the chairman of *Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia* (YHI), contacted his business partner, Aksa Mahmud, the brother of Vice President Jusuf Kalla and a well-known businessman from Makassar who also happened to be a financial patron of the mosque. Afterwards, Aksa Mahmud guaranteed that Naqshbandi-Haqqani could use the mosque anytime they wanted to conduct *dzikr* or other rituals.

This is also the case with Central Bank Mosque in Kebon Sirih. At first, Sheikh Hisham was not allowed to lead prayer/dzikir and deliver Friday sermons at Masjid BI/Kebonsirih. After a few attempts, the organising committee of the mosque finally gave permission. Some Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples believed it to be a miracle. It was said that one of senior members of the mosque’s organising committee gave permission only after he had a dream in which the original
founders of the mosque urged him to allow Sheikh Hisham to lead prayer and deliver a sermon at the mosque. In reality, however, the permission to use the mosque had very likely to do with economic and social capital of those sponsoring the event. A disciple attributed this success to the fact that Hendro Martowardoyo was the financial supporter of the event. Hendro is a well-known investment banker of Niaga Bank and older brother of Agus Martowardoyo, the current governor of Indonesia Central Bank. Through this connection, the mosque has been used by Naqshbandi community and Sheikh Hisham repeatedly, not only for delivering Friday sermons but also for holding communal dzikir.

Sheikh Hisham often delivers his Friday sermons either in Arabic or English without any translation. A translator is needed only during tele-preaching. In his Friday sermons, Sheikh Hisham usually speaks of the importance of loving the Prophet and following the right path of pious ancestors. He also urges his audience to respect the legitimate government and follow the majority voice of the Muslim ummah, avoiding fitnah and discord.

8.2.3 Hadrah and Whirling Dance

Naqshbandi-Haqqani is one of the few Sufi groups in Indonesia that currently propagates Sufism by non-conventional dakwah methods, as well as adopting music and dance in their communal rituals. Naqshbandi-Haqqani promotes hadrah and whirling as part of the vibrant urban youth culture. Promoting hadrah and whirling has become an important strategy through which

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246 It was narrated that Masjid BI was originally a small prayer house built by seven pious Muslims on endowment land in that neighbourhood in the early 20th century.
247 Interview with Muchsin Mulaela, 10 September 2010
Sheikh Hisham Kabbani propagates the beauty of Sufi rituals and the value of loving and venerating the Prophet Muhammad. This is partly driven by the millenarian belief that music (*hadrah*) will be an instrument for uniting the Muslim *ummah* in the last days and during the Mahdi era. According to this view, both music and dance will be a universal language to address misunderstanding and mistrust, an effective means of communication for people coming from different social backgrounds.\(^{248}\) Overall, music and dance have a practical function through which young disciples can express publicly their involvement in *dakwah* activities.

In the Indonesian context, the use of music for the propagation of Islam is not something new because it has been around since the 16\(^{th}\) century. Back then, the early Muslim propagators in Java adopted folk art and local culture such as *wayang* (shadow puppet), *tembang* (traditional poetry/songs), and *gamelan* (Javanese musical instrument) to disseminate their Islamic message. For instance, Sunan Kalijaga is credited with propagating the Islamic message through the shadow puppet performances, whereas Sunan Giri adopted Javanese *tembang* in disseminating his *dakwah* messages. Their creations survive into the contemporary era and some of them are even reproduced in modern packaging.

Naqshbandi-Haqqani has introduced music and dance as a propagating instrument. Now there are around 45 *hadrah* teams and around 25 whirling dancers. While *hadrah* teams spread all over Indonesian, all the whirling dancers affiliated to Naqshbandi-Haqqani are only in Jakarta. The use of music and dance for propagating missions targets young audience in urban areas. It began in 2006 when Sheikh Nazim Haqqani instructed his disciple, Steve Abdul Wahid, to teach the

\(^{248}\) Interview with Arif Hamdani, 14 August 2010
whirling dance at the Rabbani Cinere center.\textsuperscript{249} Steve Abdul Wahid himself is an Australian living in Melbourne. He was reported to have been initiated into the Mevlevi Sufi Order in 1995. In 2005, not long after the death of his Sufi master, he met Sheikh Hisham Kabbani. Through Sheikh Hisham, he then met and came to know Sheikh Nazim Haqqani in Cyprus. After he renewed his initiation into Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Cyprus, he spent 45 days doing seclusion (\textit{suluk}) in Cikereteg, Sukabumi in 2006, after which he spent about two months at the Rabbani Cinere center giving instruction and teaching his skills in whirling dance to Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples there. The Rabbani Cinere center became the first Naqshbandi-Haqqani \textit{dzikir} center in Indonesia, with its own whirling dance and a \textit{hadrah} team.

The Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s whirling team was involved in the making of \textit{Laskar Cinta}’s video clip, a successful musical album launched in 2005.\textsuperscript{250} On 10 September 2006, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani also attended a music concert organised by the Rabbani Cinere group. In the concert, the Rabbani Cinere’s whirling team accompanied Ahmad Dhani/DEWA to perform. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani took this opportunity to give \textit{sohbet} and take mass \textit{bai’at} from all those who attended the event. This cooperation was made possible through close personal relationship between Ahmad Dhani and Arif Hamdani (a whirling dancer and a disciple of Naqshbandi-Haqqani who was once affiliated to the Rumi Café and Rabbani Cinere center).

Dhani himself has established good contact with the Naqshbandi-Haqqani community through his personal relationship with Sheikh Hisham. There is a story

\textsuperscript{249} Interview with Aat, 21 September 2010
\textsuperscript{250} Interview with Arif Hamdani, 11 August 2010
that Sheikh Hisham initiated Dhani around 2006. A master and disciple relationship between Ahmad Dhani and Sheikh Hisham is, however, unlikely because Ahmad Dhani has long been associated with another spiritual guide, Habib Faiz al Muhdor of Malang, East Java.\textsuperscript{251} Thus, instead of a formal initiation (bai’at), the close personal relationship between Sheikh Hisham and Ahmad Dhani is more likely associated with the Ahmad Dhani’s outspoken admiration for some controversial Sufi figures such as Al Hallaj, Bayazid al Bistami, Jalaludin Rumi, and Ibn Arabi, all of whom figure in his song lyrics. Sheikh Hisham also shares similar admiration for the ideas of these prominent Sufi figures.

Moreover, Sufi songs and music are performed at luxurious hotels and meeting halls on various occasions such as gala wedding ceremonies, company events, TV shows, circumcision ceremonies, interfaith art performances, and music festivals. In fact, the whirling teams affiliated to Rabbani Cinere center and Rumi Café are often invited to perform on television or at the private ceremonies of upper class families in Jakarta. For instance, between 2006 and 2012, the hadrah and whirling teams performed at several TV stations including RCTI, Indosiar, SCTV, TPI, TVRI, TVOne, Trans7, TransTV, and ANTV.

They also performed in well-known places such as Planet Hollywood, the Senayan City Mall, the Ritz Charlton, the Pacific Place, the Grand Melia, the Four Seasons, Shangrila, the Grand Indonesia Kempinsky, the Grand Hyatt Hotel, and the Savoy Homan in Bandung.\textsuperscript{252} Because of the high demand for such performances, they have become a lucrative source of income for those directly

\textsuperscript{251} Interview with Jerry Marmen, Ahmad Dhani’s brother in-law, 10 September 2012
\textsuperscript{252} Interview with Arif Hamdani, 14 August 2010, Aat, 21 September 2010, and Muchsin Mulaela, 15 October 2010
involved. One member of the whirling dance team said that he can perform from 3 to 5 times a month with a fee of Rp 1 million per performance. This number increases significantly during Ramadhan (fasting month). The best whirling dancer could perform up to 100 times during the fasting month, and earn up to Rp 25 million.\[253\]

8.2.4 Tele-preaching

The growth of the television industry since the late 1980s has played a significant role in the dynamics of Islamic propagation in Indonesia. A booming TV industry provides a religious platform through which Islamic and Sufi messages can be transmitted directly on a scale that is unprecedented in the long history of Islamisation in Indonesia. Howell (2008a, 40-62) notes that the use of television is an expression of active piety to influence others about Islamic ideals. Television is, however, also an arena of contestation and a site of power relations between different groups with different religious outlooks. Due to its public nature, tele-preaching is not only about commodifying Islam but also about shaping the public space and religious opinion. Under these circumstances, tele-preaching cannot be ignored in understanding the dynamics of Islam in Indonesia because it is one of the primary institutions to exert influence on the general public and also to help shape dominant religious views in society.

Tele-preaching is small in scale but it is no less important for Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s propagating mission in Indonesia because of its ability to reach millions

\[253\] Interview with Aat, 21 September 2010
of viewers at once. Tele-preaching was made possible through good personal contacts and master-disciple relationships established between Sheikh Hisham and several prominent contemporary tele-preachers in Indonesia. Sheikh Hisham attracted prominent tele-preachers such as Wahfiudin, Jeffrie al Buchorie, Muhammad Arifin Ilham, and Yusuf Manshur who coincidently became hosts in various popular Islamic broadcasting programs both in public and private television stations. These prominent tele-preachers were instrumental in helping Naqshbandi-Haqqani community to reach public audience in Indonesia.

Sheikh Nazim and Hisham Kabbani were once invited as guest speakers to deliver sermons on TVRI, Indosiar, RCTI, MNCTV and TransTV. For instance, as early as 13 October 2000, Sheikh Hisham attended and delivered a live sermon at Indosiar, one of the private TV stations in Indonesia, hosted by Ustadz Wahfiudin. On 17 October 2000, Ustadz Wahfiudin once again arranged for Sheikh Hisham to be a speaker on an Islamic program at TVRI. During the Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s World Tour in 2001, Ustadz Wahfiudin invited both Sheikh Nazim Haqqani and Hisham to speak about the topic of Sufism on one of TVRI’s religious program broadcasted on 28 April 2001.

Muhammad Arifin Ilham and Abdullah Gymanstiar also invited Sheikh Hisham to their television programs. The biggest broadcast took place at Istiqlal Mosque under the banner of Indonesia Berdzikir. This event was broadcasted live by TVRI in early February 2004 and was attended by the then Vice President Hamzah Haz and around 30,000 people. After a long delay, Sheikh Hisham resumed his public appearances on TV by attending Nikmatnya Sedekah on 15 June 2011. The Nikmatnya Sedekah is a television program at MNCTV hosted by Yusuf
Manshur, a prominent young Muslim preacher. In his TV appearances, Sheikh Hisham often speaks about the meaning of *tasawwuf*, its textual basis in the Quran and the Prophetic tradition, and its role in Islamic teaching.

Prior to 2008, Sheikh Hisham’s Friday sermons and tele-preaching were recorded and then distributed in the form of VCDs/DVDs with Indonesian subtitles. Since 2008, however, all sermons and tele-preaching delivered in Indonesia have been recorded and uploaded to the internet, and can be accessed online on Suflive.com and islamicsupremecouncil.org websites. Interestingly, Musthafa Mas’ud has said that sometimes he is compelled to change some of these messages without altering their basic meaning because he does not consider them appropriate for Indonesian culture, especially when Sheikh Nazim and Hisham Kabbani touch upon their millenarian views and the coming of Jesus Christ, or on gender issues and the position of women in Islam.

8.2.5 *Dzikir Akbar dan Maulid Celebration*

Since 2004, Sheikh Hisham has been conducting public *dzikir* and *maulid* celebrations with other ritual congregations in Jakarta and other regions.\(^{254}\) Prior to 2008, he mainly conducted these ritual gatherings in and around Jakarta. Because of the relatively small number of his disciples, he had to rely on his own connections and the social networking of his disciples within the Muslim community in Indonesia.

\(^{254}\) These ritual congregations include Majelis Azzikra Depok, Jamaah TQN Jakarta Rawamangun, Majelis Maulid Darul Islah Buncit, Majelis Dalail Khoirot Cidodol, Majelis Jamaah Dzikir-Maulid al Muawanah Cempaka Putih, and Majelis Ahbabul Musthofa Solo.
In Jakarta, the disciples of Naqshbandi-Haqqani are willing to provide financial support in sponsoring large public ritual along with other more established congregations.255 The appearance of Sheikh Hisham Kabbani at Istiqlal, the largest and most prestigious mosque in Indonesia, is indicative of this support. The first event was held in February 2004 together with Arifin Ilham’s Majlis Ad Dzikra when Sheikh Hisham attended and gave a sermon at a religious event entitled Indonesia Berdzikir on 22 February 2004. The second event took place at a maulid celebration entitled Indonesia Bersholawat which was organised by Habib Hasan bin Jaffar’s Majlis Nurul Musthofa on 30 May 2009.

Because of the small number of disciples in Jakarta, it seemed impossible to organise such a big event. But Naqshbandi-Haqqani community managed to do so because they have money. Offering material incentives in return for permission to lead prayers has even become a common practice among Naqshbandi-Haqqani. Rizal Tarigan did not openly admit to the idea that material incentives were the reason behind the success of such a big event in such a prestigious place. According to him, the event was simply an expression of devotion to his master. However, he acknowledged that sometimes he, on behalf of YHI, had to resort to using financial incentives to make such events possible.256 Another disciple, Aat, stated that YHI could spend up to Rp 150 million for each of Sheikh Hisham’s visits to Indonesia. Though this number covers travel and accommodation costs, it also indicates that Naqshbandi-Haqqani community is willing to pay because it has the resources to do so.

255 Interview with Rizal Tarigan, 22 September 2010 and Muchsin Mulaela, 10 October 2010
256 Interview with Rizal Tarigan, 22 September 2010
Hisyam Musawwa, the person who often organises these events for the Naqshbandi-Haqqani community, said that he was willing to help because he believed Sheikh Hisham simply wanted to spread his religious message beyond his own disciples. He also added that it was natural for the Naqshbandi-Haqqani community to offer material incentives. Yet, he declined to say if this was the main reason for helping Naqshbandi-Haqqani to organise these events.

In the local context, Majelis Ahbabul Musthofa has become the most important local network through which Sheikh Hisham reaches a broader audience by means of music and dance. It is the largest sholawat congregation in Central Java with a vast local network in other regions such as East Java and South Kalimantan. According to some sources, the relationship between Naqshbandi-Haqqani community and Majelis Ahbabul Musthofa began in mid-2008 when Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples managed to persuade Habib Syech, the leader of Majelis Ahbabul Musthofa, to hold a maulid celebration together in Yogyakarta.257

Habib Syech bin Abdul Qadir Assegaf was born in Solo, 20 September 1961. He is a student of Habib Anis bin Alwi al-Habsyi (1928-2006), a prominent Muslim scholar of Hadhrami background in Solo. The Majelis is derived from a small sholawat congregation established in Solo in 1998 that combined both Hadhrami and Javanese style of sholawat recitation (Woodward et al. 2012, 122). Habib Syech has organized his disciples into several branches across Central Java that routinely performs sholawat recitation with musical instruments. He has

257 Interview with Joko Sulistiyono, 19 October 2010
regular ritual gatherings with more than 10,000 devout followers in several cities such as Solo, Yogyakarta, Purwodadi, Jepara, Kudus, and Sragen.258

The relationship between Habib Syekh bin Abdul Qadir and Sheikh Hisham reflects shared mutual interests. Habib Syekh bin Abdul Qadir and his Ahbabul Musthofa group provide a religious platform through which Sheikh Hisham Kabbani can deliver his message to a larger audience. Through Ahbabul Musthofa, Sheikh Hisham has managed to introduce both hadrah and whirling dance to the general public in several places such as Solo, Yogyakarta, Kudus, Wonosobo, Surabaya, Bangkalan, Purwokerto, and Purbalingga.

Sheikh Hisham Kabbani, in turn, provides an opportunity for Habib Syekh to reach out to Jakarta’s elites and even to an audience overseas. Habib Syekh is often invited to perform sholawat recitations for prominent businessmen and politicians with connections to Naqshbandi-Haqqani community in Jakarta. For instance, through the financial support of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples in Jakarta, Habib Syech accompanied Sheikh Hisham to perform sholawat recitations in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore in 2013. Afterwards, it became a routine for Habib Syech’s Ahbabul Musthofa to perform whenever Sheikh Hisham came to visit his disciples in Indonesia.

On 15 May 2010, Sheikh Hisham attended a maulid celebration organised by Majelis Ahbabul Musthofa in Jepara City Park in support of a local candidate who was running for local election. On 20 July 2005, Sheikh Hisham also visited Padang, West Sumatra during which he led communal dzikir (istighotsah) in the Imam Bonjol Park in Padang. According to Alvian Awwal, a Naqshbandi-

Haqqani’s disciple in Batam who organised the event, this ritual gathering aimed at relieving the traumatic experiences caused by the earthquake and the pervading fear of a potential tsunami like the one that hit Banda Aceh a year before.

During this visit, Sheikh Hisham gave a speech on the spiritual lesson of the natural disaster that hit Padang. He was reported to have urged people to return to the spiritual legacy of many Naqshbandi’s masters in Padang. However, considering a large number of people who attended the event (approximately 10,000 people), it was likely that the religious event had to do with Fauzi Bahar’s (incumbent Mayor of Padang), bid to run for election later that year. Direct and indirect support from the incumbent Mayor of Padang for the event indicated that the event was not merely religious but also political in nature.

Dzikir akbar and maulid celebrations are rituals that can attract thousands of people to gather in one place at any one time. With the support of a good sound system, the maulid ritual is a joyful experience in which people from all walks of life come together and sing in praise of the Prophet. Participants often express their confusion at the rejection of the maulid celebration, which in their view is simply an expression of their love for the Prophet. They also said that loving the Prophet and seeking his blessing during the maulid should be the minimum requirement for Muslims nowadays. I observed one such ritual in the city park of Bantul in December 2010. Attended by around 5000 people, the ritual lasted for a full 2 hours at night and under heavy rains. Yet, not one person moved to seek cover from the rains. Everybody excitedly followed the recitation of shalawat led by

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259 Interview with Alvian Awwal, 19 October 2010
Habib Syech bin Abdul Qadir Assegaf and Sheikh Hisham Kabbani at the front of a large stage.

8.2.6 Seminar/Conference

Naqshbandi-Haqqani takes advantage of changing religious environment on university campuses throughout the country. Sheikh Hisham is perhaps the first and still the only Sufi master to deliver public lectures on Sufism on various campuses in Indonesia. The academic forums which Sheikh Hisham has attended have ranged mostly from seminars, talkshows, to public lectures at university halls or luxury hotels across Jakarta.\(^{260}\) He elaborated on various different topics ranging from philosophical discourse, socio-moral reform, interfaith dialogue, Islamic radicalism, to popular psychological prescription for personal development. Nevertheless, he tends to be less sermonising when delivering *khutbah* or *subbah* by using popular psychology and philosophical terms. More importantly, he tends to play down the miraculous narratives common among Sufi followers; instead, he provides rational explanations to meet the expectations of his educated audience.

Through his disciples in some universities in Jakarta, Sheikh Hisham has begun to arrange academic forums where he has been delivering speeches since 2005. On 14 June 2011, Sheikh Hisham delivered a public lecture to academics and students at the Islamic State University (UIN) in Jakarta. This public lecture was organised by Faculty of Ushuluddin, UIN Jakarta along with Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia. Sheikh Hisham combined his knowledge of Qur’anic exegesis and hadits to support his argument on the necessary and legitimate place of Sufism

within the Islamic tradition. He stressed the importance of critical thinking, which
he described as better than performing ritual continuously for 70 years.\textsuperscript{261} On these
occasions, he affirms his position as a reformist Sufi because he shares the rather
ambiguous idea that a Sufi master is not obligatory for those aspiring to follow the
Sufi path. He is reported as saying,

There is no such thing as an obligation to have a Sufi master. The existence of a
Sufi master is not essential. It is possible to follow the Sufi path by purifying the
self and cultivating good character and this can be carried out without guidance
from a Sufi master.\textsuperscript{262} The Mursyid [spiritual master] is not a compulsory
requirement for those learning Sufism. There is no such demand. It is possible to
achieve self-purification and cultivation of good character without the guidance of
a Sheikh. However, if you are afraid that you could be misled, then it is better to
have a Sheikh and to accept his guidance and follow his ritual instruction. But,
let’s see the good lesson behind the revelation. Why did the Prophet Muhammad
receive the revelation through Jibril as an intermediary? Why did God not convey
His message directly as He talked directly to the Prophet Moses? There is one
lesson that we have to learn. If we want to fully commit ourselves to performing
our religious obligation, we have to follow someone who can be a guide…when it
comes to spiritual matters; we certainly need a guiding Sheikh because it is a long,
difficult, and complicated path. It would be wiser that we learn from an
authoritative teacher and master. The only obligation of spiritual master is to guide
and direct His disciples, nothing more.\textsuperscript{263}

A few days afterwards, on 17 June 2011, Sheikh Hisham also delivered a
public lecture at the University of Indonesia. In this forum, Sheikh Hisham
Kabbani spoke about \textit{Spiritualism in the Modern World}.\textsuperscript{264} This forum was
organised by PKTTI (The Center for Middle East and Islamic Studies) along with
Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia (YHI), KMNU (The Nahdlatul Ulama Student Forum),
PMII (The Indonesian Islamic Student Movement), and IKABA (The West Asia
Student Association). The public lecture was made possible through a formal
invitation by Gumilar Rosliwa Somantri, the then rector of the University of

\textsuperscript{261} For more details, Al Kisah, No. 14/11, 24 July 2011
\textsuperscript{262} Republika, 13 June 2012
\textsuperscript{263} http://www.sufilive.com/University_of_Indonesia_Spiritualism_in_the_Modern_World_3683.html, accessed 12 March 2012
Indonesia and Muhammad Hikam, Senior lecturer at Department of Physics, University of Indonesia, who is a disciple of Naqshbandi-Haqqani. In his speech on *Spiritualism and the Modern World* Sheikh Hisham spoke about the signs of bad character and how to address them from a Sufi perspective.

These public lectures are important because they reach out to audiences who may have been skeptical about Sufism or have never been exposed to Sufism at all. His mastery of Arabic and English also gave him some academic credibility because these are the languages that the academic community in Indonesia is familiar with. His experience as a preacher in the USA is important cultural capital in attracting an audience. In different forums, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani uses a different language in delivering his message. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani usually speaks in his mother tongue of Arabic while giving sermons and speeches at the mosques, and always uses English in delivering public lectures on campuses. He gives the impression that he can deal with people from very different educational backgrounds, and it is not uncommon that after a sermon or public lecture, many in the audience come to him for *bai’at*.

According to some Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s sources, Sheikh Hisham deliberately targets academic community because he strongly believes that university educated people play a critical role in the survival and maintenance of Sufism in the future. He believes that Indonesia is one of the very few countries left in the Muslim world where the doctrine of *Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah* still has a dominant influence. Furthermore, academic engagement opens up opportunity for expanding social networks among educated and upper-middle class Muslims in urban areas. Through their intermediary, Sufism can reach the elites and this would
indirectly influence the loyalty of the mass. This conviction represents an elitist approach of Islamic propagation which has long been a hallmark of Naqshbandi. Furthermore, Sheikh Hisham considers Sufi ritual as a significant identity-marker for distinguishing between the so-called true and false *salaf*. He also believes that it is no longer appropriate to teach Sufism exclusively to the religious elites while lay Muslims are increasingly exposed to anti-Sufi Islamic ideas.²⁶⁴

At this stage, it is still difficult to assess how academic engagement can be a contributing factor in spreading Sufism among the academic community in Indonesia. However, considering that many other Sufi groups also begin to target university campuses for propagation, this could be potentially significant for Sufi propagation on university campuses. Naqshbandi-Haqqani along with its counterpart such as AL KHIDMAH KAMPUS and MATAN will potentially provide a counterbalance to the encroaching influence of Tarbiyah, HTI and other Islamic groups that are currently claiming to be the sole authoritative voices of Muslim piety and activism within the academic community in Indonesia. As the *Islamisation* of campus in the 1970s brought about the rise of Islamism, Sufi activism will potentially alter the religious landscape of Indonesia in the near future.

8.3 Conclusion

Indonesia has long been recognised as the largest Muslim country in the world, but it is only recently that Islamic piety has taken center stage in the religious life of the country. Since the late 1990s, the religious landscape in Indonesia has changed to such an extent that it is no longer possible to distinguish

²⁶⁴ Interview with Mustafa Mas’ud, 18 September 2010
between nominal and pious Muslims. The distinction nowadays is between pious Muslims of different religious outlooks. The religious expressions of various Muslim groups have tended to create a pluralistic Islam and, borrowing Casanova’s term, a ‘public religion’. It is pluralistic because Islam is interpreted and practiced in many different ways by different people, whereas the term of public refers to a ‘deprivatising’ process in which Islam has been increasingly important in determining public morality and discourse in Indonesia (Casanova 1994, 2003, 111, 2008, 101).

The case of Naqshbandi-Haqqani demonstrates that it has been actively propagating Islamic message to a larger audience. Though Naqshbandi-Haqqani community is not the largest Sufi group in Indonesia, it is among the most outspoken and active in upholding the validity of Sufism in the public sphere. Naqshbandi-Haqqani community does not hesitate to use all the resources at its disposal to conduct public campaigns and religious *dakwah*. Naqshbandi-Haqqani combines a traditional approach with modern packaging to reach a broader audience. In the name of its *dakwah* mission, the Naqshbandi-Haqqani community is actively involved in collective attempts to re-appropriate ASWAJA as a collective identity and a dominant religious norm in Indonesia. Its traditional Islamic belief is presented in modern packaging that attracts upper and middle-class Muslims in urban areas. This rigorous effort, in turn, contributes to shaping public discourse and morality with a broad impact on religious, cultural, and socio-political life in Indonesia.

Sufi propagation through various means plays a significant role not only in generating a new Islamic consciousness with greater appreciation toward Sufi
traditions, but also in shaping public morality and consumption patterns of Muslim upper and middle classes in urban areas. Written and oral forms of transmission become the two main media through which Sufism shapes popular Islamic discourse within the Muslim community. Written religious transmission takes the form of online publications on the internet and print publications in form of books, journals, and pamphlets, whereas oral transmission is expressed through Friday sermons (khutbah) and through preaching on television. They serve to promote and maintain Sufism as a popular Islamic discourse among Indonesian Muslims. All these forms of religious transmission share a view that following shariah is in itself inadequate for instilling piety so long as it contributes to cultivating virtue and good character.
Chapter 9

RIVALRIES AND OPPOSITION

Religious Polemics and Controversies

Criticism of and opposition to mystical conceptions of Islam and their adherents have been and are still crucial forces shaping and coinciding with socio-political configurations in the world of Islam while constituting an integral part of an ongoing debate inside the Islamic tradition (Jong and Radtke 1999, 1)

Indonesia is not only the biggest Muslim country but perhaps among the most diverse in terms of its religious orientations. Though claiming to be Sunni Muslims, Indonesian Muslims have been in reality very pluralistic in their religious outlooks due to the long history of Islamisation in the archipelago, Western colonialism and differences in socio-economic and cultural bases, as well as geographical and political factors. Since the pre-colonial period, NU and Muhammadiyah have represented two mainstream religious orientations.265 Muhammadiyah, for instance, considered the NU community as representing impurity because it allegedly promotes “TBC”, that is takhayul (irrational belief), bid’ah (innovation), and churafat (superstition).266

Among other important and highly contested issues, opposition against Sufi teachings has been particularly influential in shaping Islamic reform and the dynamics of socio-political and cultural religious life in Indonesia (Azra 1999, 665-686, Steenbrink 1999, 687-704, Bruinessen 1999, 705-728). Since the flourishing

265 NU was identical with the Pesantren community and rural peasant Muslims with traditional orientation, whereas Muhammadiyah attracted urban Muslims and embraced modern reformist ideas of religious thinking and practices.

266 In Indonesia, TBC has also a negative connotation for infectious disease of tuberculosis. This reformist critique is still shared by contemporary Salafi and Islamist groups.
tajdid movement in the 17th century onward, Sufism has been a subject of scrutiny by orthodox ulama for its alleged deviations from shariah. Reformist Muslims denounced it because of its supposed religious heresies deviating from shariah provisions. They considered Sufism to be contaminating and degrading the purity of belief and ritual. Moreover, the reformist Muslims also regard Sufism, which is preoccupied with supposedly mysticism and other worldly orientation, as being a major source of backwardness and ignorance embedded in traditional peasant society. Sufism was seen as leading to fatalistic attitude that hinders rational thinking, economic development and progressive social changes.

In the contemporary era, the controversies regarding Sufism have not ended yet. While old divergences as represented by the two mainstream Muslim organisations remain intact, Islamisation in the 1990s also brought about religious polemics and disputes between existing mainstream organisations and the newly established ones and among the new coming groups themselves. These religious polemics are principally related to theological and doctrinal positions, whereas other disputes are trivial in nature and may have something to do with political, material or cultural differences. Though these differences have steadily diminished, minor and major polemics on religious, political and social affairs involving Sufi community still play a role, and will likely remain, to be significant in shaping the socio-cultural and political dynamics of Islamisation in Indonesia.

This chapter discusses ongoing controversies and polemics following the coming of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in Indonesia. As a new Sufi movement in Indonesia, Naqshbandi-Haqqani was the subject of ongoing controversies and polemics. The way Naqshbandi-Haqqani community addresses these controversies
and deals with its opponents reveal an interesting aspect of contemporary Islamic resurgence in Indonesia. I argue that these controversies and disputes are not an isolated case but they actually reflect broader cultural and religious struggles within Indonesian Muslim society. Naqshbandi-Haqqani has to interact with diverse Muslim groups, some of which either completely oppose or are critical of its doctrines and rituals. Naqshbandi-Haqqani defends its practices through various strategies, including publication, social networking, and even seeking political support.

This chapter consists of four sub chapters. For a comprehensive discussion, the chapter will situate these controversies and polemics in different local contexts in Indonesia. The first part traces the origins and source of contestation between the Ahbash group and its affiliate organisation (SYAHAMAH) in Indonesia on the one hand and Naqshbandi-Haqqani on the other. Second part of this chapter deals with controversies that emerge within traditionalist Muslim communities especially among the Habaib group, among Sufi groups and, in general, within the NU and Pesantren community. Third, the chapter then examines the critique of Amin Jamaluddin from LPPI and his Salafi-Islamist colleagues in HTI and FUI. Finally, this chapter concludes by considering these controversies and polemics in a broader context of Islamic resurgence in Indonesia.
9.1 Naqshbandi-Haqqani vs. The Ahbash group: Competition over Disciples and Resources

Since its inception in Indonesia in the late 1990s, the Naqshbandi-Haqqani community has been in conflict with another transnational Islamic movement with a relatively similar background, Jami’yyat al-Mashari’ al-Khayriyya al-Islamiya (The Society of Islamic Philanthropic Projects), a transnational Islamic group of Lebanese origins. This group is also known as the Ahbash/Habashi group. The name of Ahbash/Habashi is attributed to Sheikh Abdullah ibn Muhammad ibn Yusuf al-Hirari al-Shibi al-Abdari (1920-2008), the principal master of the group who originally came from Ethiopia. In Indonesia, the Ahbash group is represented by its local branch, SYAHAMAH (Syabab Ahslus Sunnah wal Jamaat).

The SYAHAMAH was founded in the late 1990s by the followers of Salim Alwan, a loyal disciple of Sheikh Abdullah Hariri and Lebanese Muslim preacher who is currently the head of Darul Fatwa, an Islamic organisation based in Sydney, Australia. The Darul Fatwa itself is a branch of the Ahbash group in Australia. The roots of the conflict between Naqshbandi-Haqqani community and the Ahbash’s local branch in Indonesia have to do with competition over disciples and resources. Compared to Naqshbandi-Haqqani, the SYAHAMAH has been in fact far less successful in attracting people to join. It is just a small

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267 The Ahbash/Habashi is originally an Arabic term for an Ethiopian.
268 Salim Alwan was born in Tripoli, Lebanon in 1967.
269 Darul Fatwa was founded in the late 1990s by Salim Alwan and organised many local Muslim organisations in Sydney such as Al-Amanah Islamic College, Islamic Charity Projects, Muslim Community Radio, the Sufi Society of Australia, Al-Ashraf Muslim Society of Australia, the African Australian Islamic Association, the Muslim Society of Liverpool, the Muslim Women Welfare of Australia, the Lakemba Islamic Association, the Islamic Association of Auburn, the Muslim Youth of Truth, Sydney Eid Festival Inc., El-Eslah Islamic Association, the Australian Arabic Family Association, the Nile Cultural Association, Ahle Sunnat Islamic Centre of Australia, the Multicultural Australian Women's Association and Blacktown Islamic Association. For details, see [http://www.darulfatwa.org.au](http://www.darulfatwa.org.au)
congregation with only few hundred members and limited resources at its disposal. Reportedly until 2002, Salim Alwan regularly visited religious congregations and pesantren Java on behalf of SYAHAMAH to campaign against Naqhsbandi-Haqqani.

According to some sources, the competition between Naqshbandi-Haqqani and the Ahbash group began in Lebanon in the 1980s. Some attributed this competition to a long political dispute involving the Kabbani family and the Ahbash group. There is a story that the Ahbash group favored its own leader to be the Mufti of Lebanese Sunni Muslim community, while it was the Kabbani family which eventually won the position. If this was the case, this rivalry perhaps had to do with the appointment of Muhammad Rasyid Kabbani (b. 1942), uncle of Sheikh Hisham Kabbani, by the Lebanese government in 1989 shortly after the death of the previous Mufti, Sheikh Hasan Khalid (1921-1989). The appointment was opposed by the Ahbash group because it had nominated its own leader, Nizar Halabi (d. 1995) for the position. The conflict between the two groups was also related to a dispute in the 1980s over a mosque in Tripoli controlled by the Ahbash group where Sheikh Nazim Haqqani used to perform collective zikir ritual (Habibis 1985, 126).

270 Interview with Verdino, August 2010
271 Interview with Mustafa Mas’ud, September 2010 and KH Muhammad Lukman Hakim, October 2010
272 Interview with Ali Yahya, 25 September 2010
273 Muhammad Rasyid Kabbani became a Mufti following the death of Sheikh Hasan Khalid (1921-1989) in the car bombing on 16 May 1989. The bombing was allegedly orchestrated by Syrian occupying force.
This conflict continued when both groups moved their activities to the USA in the early 1990s. Bitter conflict between the two is expressed in printed and online publications that contain claims and slanderous accusations against one another. Several prominent leaders of the Ahbash group in the USA (e.g. Samir Qadi and Riad Nachef) have written and disseminated pamphlets attacking Naqshbandi-Haqqani.

The attack against Naqshbandi-Haqqani and its allegedly deviant teachings can be found in three principal texts: Samir Qadi’s *The Unveiling of Nazim al-Qubrusi’s Misguidance* and *The Irrefutable Proof that Nazim al-Qubrusi Negates Islam*, and Riad Nachef’s *Exposure of Nazim al-Qubrusi and Guidance for the Wanderers*. Samir Qadi’s booklet lists and refutes supposedly false statements of Sheikh Nazim, by quoting Quranic verses and the Prophetic tradition. Unlike Samir Qadi, Riad Nachef, however, wrote a long academic style paper of refutation complete with glossary and bibliography. The two texts are widely circulated on the Internet and have become the main references for the Ahbash’s followers in their opposition to Naqshbandi-Haqqani.

These booklets reiterate Samir Qadi’s and Riad Nachef’s claims that Sheikh Nazim Haqqani and Naqshbandi-Haqqani are deviant and false Sufi. Furthermore, the booklets cite an alleged religious ruling issued by Sheikh Thaha ash-Shabunji/Mufti of Tripoli, Lebanon, and Sayyid Ahmad ibn Sulaiman Darwisy

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274 Sheikh Hisham Kabbani established his home base in San Diego, California, whereas the Ahbash group chose Philadelphia as its centre of activity.

275 Although Samir Qadi’s *The Unveiling of Nazim al-Qubrusi’s Misguidance* appears not to be available on the Ahbash affiliated-websites, the other two texts can be downloaded in PDF format from two websites affiliated to the Ahbash group in the USA (http://www.aicp.org and http://riadnachef.org).
Hajiyu/Mufti of Dagestan against Naqshbandi-Haqqani. Along with Naqshbandi-Haqqani and its allegedly deviant teachers, the booklets also include many Muslim groups (e.g. Wahabi, HTI, IM) and scholars (e.g. Sayid Qutb, Hizbut Tahrir, Nasirudin al-Albani, Sayid Sabiq, Yusuf al Qardlawi, and Sayyid Ramadan al-Buti).

Samir Qadi, for instance, makes the claim that Sheikh Nazim spreads erroneous and deviant Sufi teachings. He accuses Sheikh Nazim of teaching his followers to blindly obey the master even when he instructs them on what is the contrary to shariah. Sheikh Nazim is accused of holding a view that all religions are basically the same, that creation is eternal in nature, that the followers of Naqshbandi-Haqqani are better than the Prophet’s, and that the blasphemers and believers are equal (Qadi 1998a, 4-22). To strengthen his claim, Samir Qadi says the following,

…These are the statements of Nazim Qubrusi, his sheikh, [Abdullah Faiz] ad-Daghistani, and his student, Hisham [K]abbani, which I chose to bring to your attention and to comment on briefly—in accordance with the Rules of the Religion. No Muslim would feel comfortable with the deviant teachings of these men. I see their teachings the result of a school dangerous to the Religion and dangerous to the nation of Muslims. It is too far-fetched to believe these statements are fabricated and planted in the books of Qubrusi. These books are distributed under his supervision and the supervision of his vice regent, Hisham Kabbani. Moreover, they have been taped, and trustworthy Muslims who have met Sheikh Nazim have quoted him as saying these statements. Whatever the case, these books contain many perversions dangerous to the Religion and its rules, and the one who accepts them and believes in them becomes among the atheist Batiniyy even if he identifies himself as a religious Sufi (1998b, 45).

Riad Nachef makes an even more severe condemnation of Naqshbandi-Haqqani, claiming that Naqshbandi-Haqqani is simply an erroneous and heretic teaching

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276 The booklet cites a source based on a journalistic report published in Al Afkar magazine, Beirut, number 898, November, 1999 and Sayyid Ahmad ibn Sulaiman Darwisy Hajiyu’s letter addressed to Al Idarah ad-Diniyyah Li Muslimi Daghestan.
with origins outside Islam. In his long refutations against Naqshbandi-Haqqani, Nachef calls Sheikh Nazim and Hisham Kabbani false Sufi and impostors. He states that his only aim in writing is to warn both Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s followers and people in general. In the introductory, he writes:

We aim at warning people against the reality of Nazim’s teaching and give some help to those who wish to refute him. It is inevitable that many of his disciples will feel hurt when they read this work. Our purpose is not to hurt them but to fight the deceitful evil of this man and his lieutenants, such as Hisham Kabbani. It is a religious duty which we carry out with determination. We cannot knowingly let them lead people astray and bring shame upon the name of Sufism.

Disciples of Nazim! We call upon you to listen and enquire, if you do so, you are bound to find confirmation for many of the points found in this work, in sha’ā-llāh. Like so many before you who had to open their eyes, bitterness and dejection will most likely fill your hearts and you will find it very hard to trust anyone for a long time; but you have little choice. Your end, like ours, is close and you need to integrate or reintegrate orthodoxy in order to save yourselves. Many are those who have left Nazim and in spite of what you may feel know, many of you will be forced by your own consciousness or simple disgust, to disown a people who have conned you into fake spirituality and false Sufism (Nachef 2004, 5).

Nachef further states that Sheikh Nazim Haqqani was forced to leave Lebanon by order of Sheikh Hassan Khaled (1921-1989), the Mufti of Lebanon. Sheikh Nazim Haqqani was also personally denounced for spreading erroneous and invalid Sufi teaching on the basis that its silsilah was maqthu’ (disconnected), whereas Sheikh Hisham Kabbani was denounced because he made a wrong interpretation about the Quran.

Nachef identifies several major points as a basis for his claims. He claims that both Sheikh Nazim and Hisham promote occultism and a personality cult, pantheism, the violation of tawhid; they use physical pressure and blatant lies, and deviate from fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence). He rejects their use of music, the mingling between men and women during ritual, their millenarian beliefs,
perennial philosophy, and Ibn Arabi’s ideas of sainthood (walayah). Quoting from Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s materials, Nachef ends his writing with the following harsh statement,

We have established that ^Abdullâh Faizi ad-Daghestani, Adil Nazim al-Qubrusi and Hisham Kabbani are impostors posing as Sufis, usurping titles which are not theirs, teaching a doctrine whose source is the same as that of Masons and Rosicrucians. We have demonstrated how dangerous their true religion is for the salvation of those who follow them. We do declare that whoever checks thoroughly our information will find many faces to them and will be amazed at their blatant hypocrisy, „in shâ”a-llâh. Now we call upon all, scholars and common Muslims, to spread among people the truth about those impostors, to warn their brothers and sisters against their danger and deceitfulness. They must not be helped, abetted or their actions condoned. No member of Muhammad‟s Ummah (salla-llâhu ^alayhi wasallam) should shelter them, offer them mimbars to speak from, mosques to propagate in, Islamic centres to corrupt, columns in newspapers or magazines. The Messenger of Allâh (^alayhi ssalâtu wassalâm) said what means: “Allâh has cursed whoever gives shelter to an author of bad innovations” (2004, 93).

Samir Qadi and Riad Nachef’s works were translated into Indonesian and briefly summarised before eventually being published in booklet form. The SYAHAMAH was responsible to translate and then distribute those materials to the general public. The SYAHAMAH distributes these two booklets entitled Mewaspadai Bahaya Golongan Sesat/Become Aware of the Danger of Deviant Group (2002) and Mewaspadai Ajaran-Ajaran Sesat di Luar Ahlussunnah wal Jama'ah/Become Aware of the Deviant Teachings Outside Ahlussunnah wal Jama’ah (2006).277 Mewaspadai Bahaya Golongan Sesat is particularly interesting because it was endorsed by some prominent Muslim figures in Jakarta and in other

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regions. In terms of substance, the two booklets are similar. Although only a few hundred copies were printed, they have spread through multiple copying and been disseminated throughout Jakarta and other regions. This makes the exact number of distributed booklets impossible to determine.

Gibril Fouad Haddad, a loyal Lebanese disciple of Sheikh Hisham Kabbani, was the first Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciple to address the Ahbash assault. He has written extensively online to defend Naqshbandi-Haqqani online. Responding to the Ahbash’s attacks, he states in his *Refuting the Habashi’s Claims* that the Ahbash group fabricates evidence because Samir Qadi quotes Sheikh Nazim’s statements out of context and perverts their original meaning. He begins his refutation with the following statement about Samir Qadi and the Ahbash group,

I originally intended to visit them and debate them concerning the slanders and fabrications that I found issuing from them. However, upon re-reading what they have said, and after receiving some information about them from concerned brothers, I decided that my complaint with the author of these slanders, Samir Qadi, and his friends was beyond the benefit of a public debate. Therefore I will content myself to post on the Internet some of what I wanted to state publicly, and I pray that Allah will accept this from me as my hujja that I did not stand idly by when I saw his awliya' attacked, slandered and lied upon.

Unfortunately, instead of refuting accusations made by the Ahbash group, G.F. Haddad makes equally slanderous statements, accusing the Ahbash group of being *kharijis* (an Islamic sect that rebelled against the Caliphate Ali bin Abi Thalib and the Umayyad dynasty in the early history of Islam). He states that,

[t]he unmistakable marks of [kharijism] are purism and their addiction to anathema. From the beginning until now they and their epigones have not been

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278 They include prominent figures such as KH Azis Masyhuri, Habib Luthfi bin Yahya, KH Syaifuddin Amsir, etc.
279 [http://www.sunnah.org/fiqh/refuting_the_habashis.htm](http://www.sunnah.org/fiqh/refuting_the_habashis.htm)
able to devise a better sell for bigoted types. All one happy gnarlin’ ’n hissin’ family inside a worn-out Trojan horse that goes: “Let us purge ye from your damning beliefs so that ye not roast in Hell where we had rather expedite ye.” They will cry 'Tawhid,' they will cry 'Fight Riba.' But all join hands when it comes to declaring mainstream Muslims deviant. Take, for example, the Habashi sect based in Beirut, Lebanon...They may protest day and night that they are “Ash’ariyy, Shafi’iyy, Rifa’iyy” but as surely as the sun rises in the sky, they are the same brand of insipid Kharijites as their arch-enemies the Wahhabis. Imam al-Shafi’i, Imam al-Ash’ari, and Imam al-Rifa’i, Allah be well-pleased with them, are innocent of anyone that wags their tongues against the Companions of the Messenger of Allah, upon him and them blessings and peace, while the Habashi leader known as Ḥādīth al-Harari is the proud author of a booklet declaring thousands of Companions corrupt. It is nearly mass-transmitted from the Prophet, upon him blessings and peace, that anyone that insults his Companions is cursed. As Imam Abu Zur’a said: “Whoever insults the Companions, know that he is a zindiq” i.e. a hidden disbeliever, as narrated by al-Khatib in his Kifaya. The Habashis also distinguish themselves for attacking the Awliya and `Ulama of Ahl al-Sunnah in our time and declaring them apostates right and left when the Prophet said, upon him peace, as narrated by al-Bukhari and Muslim: “Whoever calls his [Muslim] brother ‘kafir’, it becomes definitely true of one of the two.”

This is a defamatory statement that the Sufi and general Muslim community commonly try to avoid. Calling an opposing party kharijis often carries a negative connotation because it not only refers to a particular sect with a distinct religious view but also represents a dark age in Muslim history. It refers to the time when political dispute and religious contestation threatened to destroy the integrity and unity of the early Muslim ummah. Yet, this defamatory statement is offset by another statement:

In Islam, we are allowed and encouraged to have different opinions and to look at our great religion from different point of views, as long as we maintain Muslim Unity and respect other Muslim dignity and not create fitnah.

Haddad’s emphasis on not creating fitnah perhaps derives from the fact that while there is a huge difference between Naqshbandi-Haqqani and the Aḥbash group,

280 http://www.sunnah.org/publication/salafi/vadillo/murabitun.htm
281 http://naqshbandi.org/topics/refute/aicp/aicp10.htm
they also share the same views on many other things. For instance, they equally oppose Salafi-Wahabism and political Islamism. Both also uphold the legitimate status of Sufism within Islam, the Sunni orthodox theology of Ash’ari and Maturidi and the four Sunni schools of Islamic Jurisprudences (madzhab). The Ahbash group even claims a Sufi affiliation to the Rifa’i-Qadiriyyah Sufi Order, although this organisation never openly acknowledges it.

Meanwhile, some Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples in Indonesia focus their response particularly on the accusations that their silsilah is maqthu’ (disconnected) based on a fatwa issued by the religious authorities in Lebanon and Dagestan. They said that it was a fabrication that the Mufti of Dagestan (Sayyid Ahmad ibn Sulaiman Darwisy Hajiyu) issued a warning about the alleged deviation of Sheikh Abdullah Dagestani. Sheikh Abdullah Faiz, Sheikh Nazim Haqqani’s master, left his country of origins when he was still very young so it is impossible that such a religious ruling was issued while Sheikh Abdullah himself did not have any followers in Dagestan. In fact, Sheikh Nazim’s first and the only visit to Dagestan took place in August 1997, but he attracted very few disciples there (Nielsen, Draper, and Yemelianova 2006, 109).

Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s sources also dispute that there was any religious ruling given by Sheikh Thaha ash-Shabunji, the Mufti of Tripoli. They stated that this could not possibly be the case because, according to Sheikh Hisham, there is no such recognised position in Tripoli, nor is there anyone by the name mentioned.

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282 For details about the Ahbash group and its socio-political activity in Lebanon, see Hamzeh and Dekmejian (1996:217-229) and Kabha and Erlich (2006:519-538)
283 Rifa’iyah is a Sufi movement founded by Ahmad ar Rifa’i (1119-1182), an Iraqi mystic with chain of transmission that extends back to Sheikh Abdul Qadir Jailani (1077-1166), a Persian mystic in the 11th century
284 Interview with Mustafa Mas’ud, September 2010
in the Ahbash sources. It is impossible to verify the validity of the claims and counter claims on each side because the roots of the problem can be traced back to long religious and political disputes between the Naqshbandi-Haqqani and Ahbash while they were still in Lebanon.

Overall, Naqshbandi-Haqqani has provided a minimal, if not entirely adequate response. Sheikh Hisham and his disciples try to avoid such polemics by simply declining to discuss them further.\textsuperscript{285} Between 2002 and 2006, when these accusations were circulated, Naqshbandi-Haqqani was not yet well established. As the leader of a new religious group, Sheikh Hisham was still struggling to consolidate and organise his disciples. Instead of becoming involved in never-ending religious polemics, Sheikh Hisham is reported to concentrate his efforts on strengthening his own charismatic position and that of his masters by teaching the virtue of rituals. Interestingly, Sheikh Hisham is reported to have deliberately used the slanderous Ahbash accusations as a teaching material on the virtue of avoiding fitnah and backbiting among fellow Muslims. He is also reported to have repeatedly said to his disciples that being silent and praying for one’s attackers is far better than making similar slanderous claims against them.

Sheikh Hisham’s pious response has worked well in maintaining his existing followers and, to some extent, succeeded in attracting new ones. Some even claim that the Ahbash booklets are a free advertisement that generates public curiosity encouraging people to know more about Naqshbandi-Haqqani. Certainly, for a time, some disciples left the group but there were more people who joined.\textsuperscript{286}

\textsuperscript{285} Interview with Verdino, September 2010
\textsuperscript{286} Interview with Wahyudin Yusuf, 5 November 2010
Naqshbandi-Haqqani recorded its highest growth in the number of followers between 1997 and 2007 when the slanderous Ahbash claims spread widely. These slanderous claims had a relatively minor impact among Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s followers. However, Sheikh Hisham’s refusal to discuss these accusations is a potential time-bomb. His minimalist response generates what Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples describe as fitnah and misunderstanding (kesalahpahaman) that can occasionally erupt especially among traditionalist Muslim communities.

9.2 Naqshbandi-Haqqani vs. Traditionalist Muslim Community: Question over Sunni Orthodoxy

Since its inception in 1997, Naqshbandi-Haqqani has incited religious controversies and polemics among traditionalist Muslim communities. These controversies spread especially among Habaib/Sayyid-Hadrami, Sufi groups and the larger NU community. They mainly concern the question of whether Naqshbandi-Haqqani propagates orthodox or heterodox Sufi teachings. Responding to all these controversies and polemics, Sheikh Hisham and Naqshbandi-Haqqani community in Indonesia have been committed to carry out both silaturahmi and tabayyun.

There are some factors that led to these controversies and polemics among traditionalist Muslim communities. First, the strong influence of Akbari ideas in Naqshabandi-Haqqani’s teachings seems to arouse suspicion among traditionalist Muslim communities that Naqshbandi-Haqqani actually propagates heterodox teachings. The widespread dissemination of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teachings
through print and online publications plays a part in driving these polemics and controversies.

Second, it also has to do with the exclusive behaviour of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s followers in propagating their master’s teachings, and excessive superior claims over karamah of the Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s masters. This was particularly related to the incident involving a Naqshbandi-Haqqani affiliated group (Rabbani Cinere) in 19 September 2009. It happened that the Rabbani Cinere-affiliated disciples were organising the prayers two days before the official date was announced by the Indonesian government.

Some said that this happened because Abu Tufail, Amir of Rabbani Cinere, simply followed the step of Sheikh Hisham who followed the so-called hisab munjid to determine the beginning and end of the fasting month. But others also testified that Abu Tufail decided to break fasting earlier because he claimed to have had a spiritual vision in which he was told to do so. This incident came under public scrutiny because it provoked a mob of people from the surrounding neighborhoods not only to come and forcefully prevent the Idul Fitri’s prayer and celebration, but also to ban dzikr gathering there.

Third, the controversies are also incited by the eccentric styles of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples in performing certain rituals. Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples always wear distinct clothing and use physical symbols such as turban, taweez, staff etc. The polemics also relate to the use of non-conventional

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287 Hisab Munjid is one of few methods applied in determining Islamic lunar calendar combining mathematical calculation and actual moon sighting. Each month has only 29 or 30 days and as other Naqshbandi communities in Indonesia, the beginning and ending of fasting month always come earlier than the official government’s announcement.
Sufi rituals such as mass initiation, music (*hadrah*) and dance performances common among Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples in Indonesia. With the proliferation of new Islamic groups in Indonesia, a distinct physical appearance and exclusive behaviour sometimes incite suspicion from the surrounding community.²⁸⁸

Fourth, prior to 2006, the dissemination of the Ahbash’s anti-Naqshbandi-Haqqani materials and Salim Alwan’s visits and active propagation to various religious congregations and *Pesantren* played a significant role in inciting polemics and controversies. In the following period, the polemics were driven mainly by direct interpersonal contacts and indirect encounters with the Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s followers in religious ritual gatherings. These controversies became public following the *Indonesia Bersholawat*, a public ritual performance organised by Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia along with Majelis Nurul Musthofa. The performance itself took place at Istiqlal Mosque and was broadcasted lively on TV-One on 30 May 2009.

**9.2.1 Naqshbandi-Haqqani vs. Hadrami Community**

Strong criticism against Naqshbandi-Haqqani emerged especially in Jakarta, where the *Habaib/Sayyid Hadrami* community is still regarded as the religious elite by the local Muslim population. At the beginning, suspicions developed through rumours and gossips but eventually spread to a larger audience during religious congregations. They became public only when Habib Munzir Musawwa issued a statement about Naqshbandi-Haqqani and its allegedly deviant ritual practices.

²⁸⁸ Interview with Sugeng Ferywanto, 15 August 2010
According to some Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s sources, Habib Munzir’s public statement was made very soon following the publication of a book entitled *Mengenal Lebih Jauh Sheikh Hisham Kabbani* published by Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia that highly praised Sheikh Hisham as a spiritual guide. Though carefully stated and using quite polite language, Habib Munzir implicitly questioned Naqshbandi-Haqqani by raising his concern that it was actually a deviant *thariqah*. Habib Munzir Musawwa comment on Naqshbandi-Haqqani stated:

Regarding Naqshbandi-Haqqani, I do not know much about it because it is a new *thariqah*. But for sure, if its teaching deviated from *shariah*, this means it is deviant because it violates the Prophet’s original teachings. For instance, there is a report that this *thariqah* spread the teachings that Ali ibn Thalib [the Prophet’s son-in-law] was still alive. This kind of deviant teaching should be avoided because it would potentially damage the image of Islam and *shariah*… By disseminating this statement, I have no intention whatsoever to be proud of my own group and undermine others. I just want to warn Muslims in general to keep following the Prophet’s examples of *sunnah*. Prophet Muhammad is the supreme leader of all *auliya*. He introduced us *shariah* and *haqiqah* that we should follow and practice in our daily religious life. Let us back [to] the true teaching of the Prophet.

Habib Munzir also criticised Naqshbandi-Haqqani for allowing male and female disciples to dance together during communal ritual congregation. This controversy was intensified when the statement was displayed on the *Majelis Rasulullah’s* website (http://majelisrasulullah.org/) on 19 May 2009. This message was then spread by members of the religious congregations and through online contacts on numerous mailing-lists.

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289 The book was a compilation collected from Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s websites and edited by Abdurrauf Kurniadi.
291 Interview with Muchsin Mulaela, 15 October 2010
Habib Munzir’s public criticism resonated widely within the *Habaib* community in Jakarta. At the time he was a young charismatic leader of a large ritual congregation (*Majelis Rasulullah*). Between 1994 and 1998, Habib Munzir spent his time studying at Darul Musthofa, an educational institute founded by his teacher and spiritual master, Habib Umar bin Hafidz (b. 1963) in Tarim, Yemen. On returning to Indonesia in the late 1990s, Habib Munzir pursued his career as a religious preacher in Jakarta and the surrounding areas. He began his *Majelis Rasulullah* with only around 50 students in the late 1990s. It has since grown to thousands of followers and regular attendees throughout Jakarta and the surrounding areas. This significant growth was made possible by the help of a senior disciple of Habib Umar bin Hafidz in Jakarta, Habib Muchsin al Hamid, who provided financial support for *Majelis Rasulullah* in its early inception. Habib Munzir belongs to a different Sufi network because he is affiliated to *Alawiyah*, a Sufi Order that is exclusive to the *Habaib/Sayyid Hadrami* community.

While Habib Munzir’s criticism seemed to touch only upon religious concerns, it actually had a broader social dimension that reflected the contentious religious life in Jakarta and the surrounding areas as *Majelis Rasulullah* and *Nurul Musthofa*, the two largest ritual congregations in Jakarta, competed for followers. Instead of Majelis Rasulullah, Sheikh Hisham was personally closer to Habib Hasan bin Ja’far Assegaf, the leader of Nurul Musthofa, the main competitor of *Majelis Rasulullah* in attracting young followers in Jakarta and the surrounding areas.

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292 For details about Habib Umar bin Hafidz and his activities in Yemen, see Knysh (2001:399-414)
According to some sources, Habib Munzir Musawwa criticised Naqshbandi-Haqqani because he was worried that Sheikh Hisham’s charisma would only strengthen the position of Nurul Musthofa and undermine his own. While Habib Hasan welcomed Sheikh Hisham to attend his religious congregation, Habib Munzir repeatedly declined to do the same. Habib Munzir’s criticism had also to do with the question of who should be considered the most authoritative Sufi master and which thariqah was to be considered the most authentic Sufi order to follow. For Habib Munzir, it was obvious that his teacher and spiritual master, Habib Umar bin Hafidz and the Alawiyah Sufi Order are much superior to Sheikh Hisham and Naqshbandi-Haqqani. Like Sheikh Hisham, Habib Umar bin Hafidz is in fact a transnational Muslim preacher who has routinely visited his disciples in Indonesia since mid-1990s. On one occasion, during an interview, one of Habib Umar bin Hafidz’s disciples implicitly confirmed this by saying:

Look! For Alawiyah, the silsilah is very clear because it is connected through a genealogy because it is transmitted among the Prophet’s descendants while for others, they do not have such a thing. They only claim that their spiritual silsilah is connected to the Prophet without physical and genealogical evidence. Yet, the difference between Sufi orders is inevitable and it is just normal.293

Because of the strong religious influence of Habaib in Jakarta, Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples could not ignore Habib Munzir’s statement and the negative rumors within Habaib community in Jakarta about their thariqah and their masters. Thus, since 2009, Naqshbandi-Haqqani has mobilised its resources and networks to approach the Habaib community across Jakarta. They have taken active measures to carry out silaturahmi and tabayyun in a deliberate attempt to clear what they

293 Interview with Muchsin Mokhtar, 24 December 2010
perceive as misunderstandings about Naqshbandi-Haqqani, its masters, and their teachings.

The committee members of YHI have taken the initiative to approach many Habaib in Jakarta. Muchsin Mulaela is in charge of carrying out a mission to do silaturahmi and tabayyun by visiting prominent Habaib across Jakarta. He acknowledged that some Habaib refused to meet him while others were willing to see him personally to arrange a meeting with Sheikh Hisham when he visited Indonesia. During these meetings, he would share Sheikh Hisham’s writings in Indonesian. He also tried to convince prominent figures of the Habaib community that there was nothing wrong with Naqshbandi-Haqqani, its masters, and their religious teachings.

Muchsin also explained that both Sheikh Nazim Haqqani and Hisham Kabbani came from Habaib background in their own countries. For instance, Muchsin Mulaela managed to approach influential Habib such as Habib Abdurrahman al Habsyi of Kwitang and Habib Abdul Qodir bin Muhammad al Haddad of Condet (d. 2012). Habib Abdurrahman was considered particularly strategic because Habib Abdurrahman’s Majelis Taklim Kwitang is the oldest and most prestigious religious congregation in Jakarta. It is a religious congregation at which generations of prominent Habaib and Muslim scholars in Jakarta sought their religious knowledge. This religious congregation was founded by Habib Abdurrahman’s grandfather, Habib Ali bin Abdurrahman al Habsyi (1870-1968).

Naqshbandi-Haqqani disciples also approached those in the social networks affiliated to Habib Umar bin Hafidz’s Darul Musthofa, such as Habib Naguib al
Hamid of Bekasi and Habib Muchsin al Hamid of Cidodol. Habib Muchsin al Hamid was particularly important because he was the main financial supporter of Majelis Rasulullah. During my interview with Habib Muchsin al Hamid in November 2010, he confirmed that Naqshandi-Haqqani’s disciples met him to clarify the misunderstanding about Sheikh Hisham and his teachings. Habib Muchsin said he personally had no problem with Naqshbandi-Haqqani and Sheikh Hisham. He further pointed out that the problem between Naqshbandi-Haqqani and Habaib community was nothing significant because it simply reflected the ‘clash of love’ (perselisihan cinta) that had not affected followers at the grass-root level.²⁹⁴

Through intensive and repeated approaches, Habib Munzir Musawwa eventually allowed Sheikh Hisham Kabbani to attend his religious congregation. Sheikh Hisham attended Habib Munzir’s congregation at Al Munawar mosque, Pancoran, on 20 December 2010. Sheikh Hisham came along with G.F. Haddad during which Habib Munzir greeted and introduced them to thousands of his disciples who were attending the event. This was made possible through the help of Hisham Musawwa who managed to convince his cousin, Habib Munzir Musawwa, to allow Sheikh Hisham Kabbani to attend his congregation.²⁹⁵ According to Hisyam Musawwa, he managed to convince his cousin that Sheikh Hisham and his disciples only wanted to carry out silaturahmi.²⁹⁶ Hisyam Musawwa, as it happens, is a close friend of Muchsin Mulaela who asked for his personal help to arrange the meeting.

²⁹⁴ Interview with Muchsin Mochtar, 24 December 2010
²⁹⁵ Interview with Hisyam Musawwa, 17 December 2010
²⁹⁶ Interview with Hisyam Musawwa, 17 December 2010
9.2.2 Naqshbandi-Haqqani vs. Sufi Community

Within the Sufi community, controversies regarding Naqshbandi-Haqqani are best represented by Habib Luthfi bin Yahya (Rais Aam of JATMAN), Wahfiudin (coordinator of TQN Jakarta, a Sufi congregation affiliated to Abah Anom), and Lukman Hakim (a Syadzili’s deputy of PETA Tulungagung). They raised concerns about Naqshbandi-Haqqani because of the excessive claims regarding the karamah of both Sheikh Nazim Haqqani and Hisham Kabbani. They were particularly critical that Sheikh Nazim Haqqani is considered the only living saint (wali) with the highest status (sulthonul auliya) who has authority to guide people around the globe. They were also disturbed that Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s followers do not hesitate to claim publicly that Sheikh Nazim Haqqani is the last authorised person in the long silsilah of Naqshbandi and the only Naqshbandi’s master who is capable of guiding other Sufi masters. They were also critical of the exclusive behaviour of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s followers in propagation and public rituals. This exclusive behaviour has to do with their distinct public appearance such as turban, uniform, and other group-symbols. The practice of mass initiation that Sheikh Hisham Kabbani commonly carried out after collective rituals provoked a critical response from Sufi community in Indonesia. To address these criticisms, Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples conducted silaturahmi dan tabayyun to clarify the misunderstanding.

Habib Luthfi bin Yahya is a leading Sufi authority to voice criticism against Naqshbandi-Haqqani. His religious authority derives from the fact that he is Rais Aam of JATMAN, the largest Indonesia Sufi Association affiliated to Nahdlatul
Ulama. He addresses his concern about the dissemination of numerous materials that openly claim the superiority of Naqshbandi-Haqqani and its masters, Sheikh Nazim and Hisham Kabbani. He was worried that those materials would potentially be misunderstood by lay Muslims. Habib Luthfi also raised his concern about the group’s appearance in terms of physical symbols such as clothes, turban, etc. In addition, he criticised the exclusive style of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s followers in performing rituals of zikir. Instead of total rejection, he focused his criticism, however, only on Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s followers and particularly on their claims of superiority regarding their Sufi order and masters. Habib Luthfi shared his concern about Naqshbandi-Haqqani with his fellow members in the top ranks of JATMAN’s central leadership. It was not surprising that the polemics erupted during the 10th JATMAN national conference in 2005. In the conference, there was a proposal from some JATMAN’s top officials to investigate the allegedly deviant teachings of Naqshbandi-Haqqani. Others were reported even going further to demand that Naqshbandi-Haqqani should be banned or at least declared as a deviant Sufi Order.297

Due to his religious authority and formal position as Rais Aam of JATMAN, Habib Luthfi’s criticism was taken rather seriously. The fact that Habib Luthfi has a personal relationship with Sheikh Hisham did not make a personal approach much easier because Habib Luthfi had on more than one occasion declined to meet with Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s representatives.298 For instance, Soenarto, chairman of Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia, was reportedly coming to see Habib Luthfi to clarify

297 Interview with Muhammad Lukman Hakim/JATMAN DKI, 29 August 2010
298 Habib Luthfi was reported giving allegiance (bai’at) to Sheikh Hisham Kabbani in December 1997. Interview with Mustafa Mas’ud, September 2010
the misunderstanding. The meeting was supposed to take place in Pekalongan around June 2009. This attempt at reconciliation, however, failed because Soenarto headed back to Jakarta even before he met the host. He was reportedly tired of waiting while Habib Luthfi was said to be busy playing music at home.  

After this, Mustafa Mas’ud made another attempt to see Habib Luthfi in Pekalongan. After many unsuccessful attempts, Mustafa Mas’ud eventually managed to see Habib Luthfi during a maulid celebration in South Pekalongan, around July 2009. During the meeting, Habib Luthfi was reported to angrily express his concern about the excessive claims by Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples regarding the karamah of their master. He also warned that dissemination of Sufi materials would potentially raise misunderstanding not only about Naqshbandi-Haqqani in particular but also Sufi movements in Indonesia in general. Habib Luthfi’s concern reflected the long-standing reputation of JATMAN in upholding Islamic orthodoxy within Sufi community in Indonesia. In fact, since the 1950s, JATMAN has been fighting for orthodoxy by ensuring that all Sufi orders in Indonesia conform to shariah provisions.

The polemics and controversies, however, gradually came to an end through the efforts of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples who also happened to be committee members of JATMAN. Samson Nasarudin and Salman Danis, the disciples of Naqshbandi-Haqqani and committee members of JATMAN, played an important role in addressing the controversies. They had been personally close to Habib Luthfi since around 2004. Samsun Nasarudin is a committee member of the Foreign Affairs of JATMAN, while Salman Danis is chairman of West Sumatra

299 Interview with Nursyafa’at, 19 November 2010
300 They have become committee members of JATMAN since 2005 following the 10th JATMAN national conference in Pekalongan.
provincial branch of JATMAN and a professor in Islamic studies at Imam Bonjol Islamic State University, Padang. They consider Habib Luthfi their second spiritual master though he has no formal Sufi affiliation with them. One of Habib Luthfi’s disciples in Cempaka Putih, KH Lukman Hakim, who is the chairman of Jakarta provincial branch of JATMAN, confirmed this by saying,

I can assure you that my master has no personal problem with Sheikh Hisham Kabbani. His only concern is Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples who are too exclusive with their superior claims about their master. He just reminds them to be careful because it would lead misunderstanding about Sufi community in general.\footnote{Interview with KH Muhammad Lukman Hakiem/JATMAN, a muqoddam of Tijaniyah and disciple of Habib Luthfi bin Yahya, 29 August 2010}

Criticism has also come from Wahfiudin, a \textit{wakil talqin} (representative) of Tharikat Qadiri-Naqshbandi (TQN) affiliated to Sohibul Wafa Tajul Arifin/Abah Anom (1915-2011). Wahfiudin could not accept that Sheikh Nazim Haqqani has superior spiritual powers to other Sufi masters as claimed by Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples. Wahfiudin’s criticism was quite surprising because he is one of \textit{sabigu al-awwalun} (those who are among the first to be initiated into Naqshbandi-Haqqani). His initiation was described by one disciple as follows: “It miraculously took place at the departure lounge of Soekarno-Hatta International Airport when Sheikh Hisham was about to leave for the USA in December 1997”.\footnote{Muchtony Ghani Azis, 12 August 2010} Wahfiudin was described among Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples as one of the early representatives of the Jakarta region along with Mustafa Mas’ud. In 1998, he was invited to attend the second Islamic Unity Conference in Washington organised by Islamic Supreme Council of America. He stayed for a while conducting \textit{dakwah} among American Muslims in some cities there with the support of Sheikh Hisham. Since 2005, however, Wahfiudin has completely withdrawn his
affiliation from Naqshbandi-Haqqani and focused his attention on guiding Qadiri-Naqshbandi’s disciples in Jakarta and surrounding areas.

Wahfiudin’s criticism seemed to derive from Sheikh Nazim Haqqani’s statement which praised Abah Anom and his karamah during his visit to Suryalaya in 2001. For Wahfiudin, Sheikh Nazim’s statement confirmed that it is Abah Anom who deserves to be called a Muslim saint. During the visit, Sheikh Nazim was reported to make the following comments about Abah Anom,

“He has been praised for his karamah during his visit to Suryalaya in 2001. For Wahfiudin, Sheikh Nazim’s statement confirmed that it is Abah Anom who deserves to be called a Muslim saint. During the visit, Sheikh Nazim was reported to make the following comments about Abah Anom,

“Many Muslim scholars and intellectuals provide religious knowledge. That knowledge is like candle but not light! Both candle and light can only be handed on through a tarekat. There are 41 tarekat at the moment, 40 connected to Ali and one which draws light from Our Lord Abu Bakr Siddiq, being the Naqshbandiyya tarekat. The `ulama and the intellectuals can hand out candles as big as coconut trees, but what meaning have they without light? And one of the sources of that light comes from the heart of this gentleman (Abah Anom). I do not know whether this light will vanish or continue after him. While he is alive, go run after and take the light from him. From his heart, messages are transmitted to me. I am too shy for not taking those divine messages from him. I am ashamed for talking from my own. What is needed now is the light that shall set afame the candles of knowledge. Many ulama only look outside in quest of knowledge. They know much … but what is the benefit of knowledge without divine illumination? The saints abide in hidden places and people may only know their knowledge from the books they wrote. In the past many `ulama established madrasas, but at the moment when the students finish, all they are given is an ijaza. The teachers say: ‘We have given you knowledge from intellectual (`aqli) and transmitted (naqli) sources’. But these are only candles. And what is the meaning of a candle without light?”303

Another critic, Muhammad Lukman Hakim, has also raised his concern about Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples and their excessive claims regarding their master. Muhammad Lukman Hakim is a Syadzili’s khalifah living in Depok, West Java. He was born in Jombang in 1962. He studied at Pesantren Tebuireng, Jombang before continuing his study to be a disciple of KH Abdul Jalil Mustaqim

(1942-2005) at Pesulukan Tarekat Tulungagung (PETA), the largest Syadzili Pesantren in East Java (Waddin, 2011). Lukman Hakim is the chief editor of Cahaya Sufi, an Islamic magazine devoted exclusively to publishing materials related to Sufism in Indonesia. He received his graduate degree from Malaysia before pursuing a career in journalism. His writing career began in the late 1990s with a column called Konsultasi Sufi for Posmo, a local tabloid published in Surabaya (Laffan, 2006:100; 2007:163). Nowadays, he runs a popular Sufi website (http://www.sufinews.com). He also performs as a religious preacher and Syadzili’s Sufi guide for its followers in and around Jakarta. He is mainly concerned that Sheikh Hisham initiates many disciples without giving them further instruction. For Lukman Hakim, a Sufi master should guide his disciples constantly. He bases his criticism on the fact that many of those joining Naqshbandi-Haqqani have sought religious instruction by attending his religious congregations across Jakarta.

The controversies and polemics within the Sufi community have changed the way Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples propagate their teachings. They have been obliged to accept the fact that Naqshbandi-Haqqani is only one of many Sufi movements currently active in Indonesia. They have increasingly come to realize that Sheikh Nazim and Hisham Kabbani belong among other charismatic Sufi masters with loyal disciples across Indonesia. According to Mustafa Mas’ud,

Most of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples are those who were previously not familiar with Sufism. Many of them, especially those living in Jakarta, even came from non-traditionalist Muslim backgrounds. They appeared exclusive and sometimes even propagated superior claims over others simply because they were too enthusiastic about their new religious identity and their master. The fact is that
they still need to learn religious subjects because no true Sufi exists without willingness to continuously ngaji (seek for religious learning).\textsuperscript{304}

Sheikh Hisham is also reported to have encouraged his disciples to seek religious knowledge from many local representatives charged with guiding disciples on behalf of Sheikh Nazim. He allows his disciples both to seek Islamic knowledge and also to practice rituals with and from other Sufi orders on the grounds that Sheikh Nazim has authority in more than one thariqah. By doing this, he teaches his disciples that all Sufi orders are basically the same.

\textit{9.2.3 Naqshbandi-Haqqani vs. NU/Pesantren Community}

In the general NU and Pesantren community, criticism of Naqshbandi-Haqqani and Sheikh Hisham Kabbani has to do with certain religious doctrines, ritual practices, and the validity of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s silsilah. The criticism became public when \textit{Al Kisah}, an Islamic bi-monthly magazine owned by a businessman with a Sayyid Hadrami background, Harun Musawwa, published an article containing KH Syarifudin Amsir’s (one of Rais Syuriah of PBNU) interview in which he openly criticised the belief among Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples about the Mahdi and the last days.\textsuperscript{305} With more than 10,000 subscribers, this interview was an advertisement for Naqshbandi-Haqqani.

He further noted that religious discourse among Naqshbandi-Haqqani on the coming of Mahdi during the life-time of the 40\textsuperscript{th} master (Sheikh Nazim

\textsuperscript{304} Interview with Mustafa Mas’ud, 18 October 2010

\textsuperscript{305} Al Kisah No. 12, 15-28 June 2009
Haqqani) was new and was previously unknown in any Naqshbandi literature. The idea that the coming of the Mahdi is imminent is not common among other Naqshbandi’s offshoots. Putting forward an interpretation of this belief potentially destroys the unity of the Muslim ummah because it is a sensitive issue with various contending interpretations among different Muslim groups.

KH Syarifudin Amsir traced his concern to a historical precedent in the late 19th century when Habib Usman bin Yahya (1822-1913), the Mufti of Batavia, issued a letter warning Muslims to be careful about false beliefs about the coming of the Mahdi and any prophecy about the last days. He quoted Habib Usman bin Yahya’s well-known statement on thariqah as ‘tarik’-lu tarik duit orang terus lu ikat duit itu bawa pulang or “You first extract money, then you tie them (to you) and take your money home”-a local idiom referring to a situation where Sufi belief is only an instrument to collect money from their followers.

Criticism also emerged when KH Azis Masyhuri (Chairman of RMI/NU Affiliated Indonesia Pesantren Association) wrote a book entitled Ensiklopedia 22 Aliran Tarekat dalam Tasawuf. The book was quickly sold and widely read among members of the NU community after its official launch in July 2011. KH Azis Masyhuri made his criticism while still including Naqshbandi-Haqqani as one of 22 Sufi Orders that currently exists in Indonesia.

He began by praising Naqshbandi-Haqqani and its masters, Sheikh Nazim Haqqani and Hisham Kabbani and their efforts in propagating Sufism in Indonesia. In the same book, he elaborated on Aghash’s accusation that Naqshbandi-Haqqani is a heretical group, claiming that Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s silsilah is maqthu’ or ‘disconnected’ (2011, 173). He also argued that Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s claims of
wali, sultanul auliya, and the personal closeness between Sheikh Nazim and the Mahdi are religiously baseless and suspicious. This accusation was based on his reading of Naqhsbandi-Haqqani’s published material such as Washiyah murshid az-Zaman wa Ghouts al-Anam, Muhithat ar Rahmah and Mercy Oceans: Endless Horizons. Instead of total rejection, however, he emphasized that a legitimate Sufi order is one that only subscribes to shariah provisions (2011, 175).

In the face of these criticisms, Sheikh Hisham tried his best to prevent the controversy from developing further. Sheikh Hisham continued to assert the principle that difference is actually a blessing for the Muslim ummah. However, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani was obliged to state openly that Naqhsbandi-Haqqani’s teachings fully conform to shariah provisions. For instance, he said the following in his interview with Republika, a national newspaper on 13 June 2012,

Our principles fully conform to shariah. We reject everything that violates shariah. We never accept symbols and terms that do not fit with shariah. We only follow what is determined as valid in four schools of Islamic law (madzhab). Please do not mention to me about wihdat al-wujud, Ibnu Arabi and other theosophical ideas. We do not accept them. 306

Sheikh Hisham’s statement reflects his effort to compromise with the general inclination among NU communities in Indonesia. Although in appearance, this statement appears to undermine the basic teachings of his master who was greatly influenced by Ibn Arabi’s theosophical ideas, he is simply trying to avoid unnecessary polemics. However, Sheikh Hisham also carried out internal disciplining measures among his disciples. While Rabbani Cinere was a personal favorite of Sheikh Hisham Kabbani for approaching urban youth, after this incident,

306 Republika, 13 June 2012
Sheikh Hisham issued a ‘spiritual punishment’. He reportedly demanded that his disciples in Rabbani Cinere repent by performing a fast for two consecutive months and not break their fast before the official announcement by the local authority.\textsuperscript{307}

On the instruction of Sheikh Hisham, the disciples again returned to the traditional Islamic concept of \textit{tabayyun} (seeking clarification). They intensified their efforts to conduct \textit{silaturahmi} by approaching prominent traditionalist figures. To perform this task, Mustafa Masud became an active spokesman approaching the NU Pesantren community across Java to explain the teaching of Naqshbandi-Haqqani. He reportedly visited many prominent \textit{kyai} and pesantren across Java to provide information about Naqshbandi-Haqqani, its teachings and its masters. This approach seems to have worked well because those who had previously opposed Naqshbandi-Haqqani now changed their opinion.

Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples regularly visited leading officials in PBNU and sought clarification (\textit{tabayyun}). After many such attempts, they managed to persuade KH Saifudin Amsir to change his position. On 16 June 2011, during a religious congregation conducted by the Mayor of Central Jakarta to celebrate the 484\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of Jakarta, KH Saifuddin Amsir revoked his statement about Naqshbandi-Haqqani. On that occasion, KH Saifuddin Amsir became the translator for Sheikh Hisham and reiterated Sheikh Hisham’s sermon about the importance of \textit{tasawwuf} and love of the Prophet. This event served as a reconciliation between Sheikh Hisham and KH Saifuddin Amsir. After this, Al Kisah published the timetable for Sheikh Hisham’s visits in Indonesia.

\textsuperscript{307} Interview with Aat, October 2010
Nevertheless there are prominent kyai who still refuse to see Sheikh Hisham. KH Abdul Rasyid Abdullah Syafe’i, the leader of Pesantren As Syafi’iyah Jakarta, for instance, has repeatedly declined to see Sheikh Hisham. Despite his refusal, many Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples believe that it is only a matter of time before everything will eventually be settled because there was already a close personal relationship between Sheikh Hisham Kabbani and Tuti Alawiyah, the older sister of KH Abdul Rasyid Abdullah Syafe’i and the current chairwoman of the Asy Syafi’iyah Foundation.

9.3 Naqshbandi-Haqqani vs. Salafi and Islamist Groups: Questions of Doctrinal Purity and Political Stance

In terms of religious teaching, Sheikh Nazim, Hisham and Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples regard Salafi and Islamist groups as their real enemies. This teaching has its roots in theological divergences and reflects tensions in the Middle East and North America where Naqshbandi-Haqqani spread its teachings between the early 1970s and late 1990s. In Indonesia, however, the two groups were only an ‘imaginary enemies’ because there were no polemics directed against Naqshbandi-Haqqani by these two groups until 2009. A controversy emerged following the distribution of a 12 page full color folio-size pamphlet entitled Kesesatan Tarekat Naqsybandi Haqqani. This pamphlet was written by Amin Jamaludin, a Salafi figure and the chairman of LPPI (Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam) in June 2009. Amin Jamaludin’s pamphlet spread widely among Islamist
communities such as FUI, HTI and the Muslim media like Sabili, Media Ummat and Suara Islam.\textsuperscript{308}

Amin Jamaludin himself was born in 1950 in Bima, West Nusa Tenggara. He graduated from PGAN (State Islamic Teacher’s School) Bima in 1970. After that, he moved to Jakarta where he became general secretary of Jakarta’s regional branch of GPII (Indonesia Islamic Youth Movement) between 1973 and 1975. His Salafi credentials were established in the early 1970s through his involvement in PERSIS and DDII.\textsuperscript{309} As a Muslim activist, he was involved in mass demonstrations organised by GPII against the draft of marriage law (RUU Perkawinan) in 1978 and, as a result, he was detained by KOPKAMTIB (Order and Security Command, a military super agency established by General Soeharto to support his authoritarian rule) along with his fellow young Muslim activists. He was personally close to his life-long religious and political mentor, Muhammad Natsir (1908-1993), the founder and chairman of DDII. Under Muhammad Natsir, DDII (Indonesian Council for Islamic Propagation) was responsible for propagating Salafism among Indonesian Muslims. The DDII even became a national representative of Saudi-based organisation, World Muslim League/Rabitah Alam ‘Islami (Hasan 2005, 32).

Amin Jamaludin’s close personal relationship with Muhammad Natsir began when Amin Jamaluddin published his writing in the Pelita newspaper (18-21 October 1983) refuting the scholar and former rector of Syarif Hidayatullah State

\textsuperscript{308} Interview with Amin Djamaludin, 21 September 2010
\textsuperscript{309} PERSIS (Islamic Unity) is a Muslim organisation founded on 12 September 1923 in Bandung, West Java. For details about PERSIS, see Federspiel (2001)
Islamic University Harun Nasution’s ideas of Islamic renewal.\textsuperscript{310} Amin Jamaludin claimed that he was personally asked by Muhammad Natsir and other colleagues, to establish the so-called \textit{Ghazrul Fikri} (‘War of Thinking’) Team of DDII (Islamic Council for Islamic Propagation). This team was set up with a special mission to fight all forms of deviant thinking (\textit{aliran sesat}) and the groups associated with them. He founded the LPPI (Institute of Islamic Research and Studies) in 1983 for that purpose, an organisation of which he is still the leader. Between 2005 and 2010, he became a member of \textit{Komisi Pengkajian} of MUI.

Since mid-2009, Amin Jamaludin has led a campaign to ban Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s public activities and has written materials and distributed 10,000 pamphlets to mosques throughout Jakarta and other regions. He is not hesitant to voice his denouncement of Naqshbandi-Haqqani in the mosques he attends as a preacher. This has led to a rising suspicion among a large number of mosque committees toward Naqshbandi-Haqqani to such an extent that Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s affiliates are prevented, often completely banned, from conducting \textit{dzikr} in mosques throughout Jakarta. For instance, Al Azhar mosque forbade Naqshbandi-Haqqani to conduct activities in its mosque following a Friday sermon delivered by Amin Jamaludin in mid-2010. The attack intensified when Amin Jamaludin, in his capacity as a member of \textit{Komisi Pengkajian} of MUI, tried to persuade several government agencies to officially ban the distribution of Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s written materials.\textsuperscript{311} Amin Jamaludin even brought his case to the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Attorney General in late 2010.

\textsuperscript{310} Interview with Amin Djamaludin, 21 November 2010
\textsuperscript{311} Interview with Amin Djamaludin, 21 September 2010
Amin Jamaludin wrote his pamphlet to attack the alleged heretic teachings of Abdullah Faiz Dagestani, Nazim Haqqani, and Hisham Kabbani as a group. His accusations are based on his reading of 49 booklets produced by Naqshbandi-Haqqani. These booklets were acquired by one of his staff at LPPI (Institute of Islamic Research and Studies) during an open bazaar on 1 June 2009. The bazaar itself was organised by Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia at the Shangri-La Hotel. The booklets are compilations of Sheikh Hisham’s numerous sohbet on various websites translated by Abdurrauf Kurniadi and Arif Hamdani, two disciples of Naqshbandi-Haqqani. Amin also based his accusations on the Malaysian JAKIM’s fatwa issued on 3 April 2000. JAKIM is an official Malaysian religious institution representing Muslim’s interests. The fatwa stated that Naqshbandi-Haqqani was a heretic (sesat) group and not part of Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah.\footnote{Interview with Amin Djamaludin, 21 September 2010}

Amin Jamaludin’s writing style is direct, blunt and has an uncompromising tone. He selects statements that he considers erroneous and refutes them based on his own interpretation of certain Quranic verses. In the pamphlet, he categorized his accusations into four parts: blasphemy against God, the Prophet, and Islamic teaching, and erroneous deviant doctrines. For instance, commenting on Sheikh Hisham’s statement that God’s mercy extends to all human beings including unbelievers (kafir), Amin claims that God curses the unbelievers as mentioned in the Quran. He also harshly refutes Sheikh Abdullah Faiz’s metaphoric statement on the three distinct characters of an auliya (saint); that of the donkey, dog, and pig. Amin Jamaludin quotes many Qur’anic verses on low and illicit status of these animals without taking into account Sheikh Hisham’s statement saying that these
three animals are symbolically representative of different characteristics: 1) the readiness to bear a heavy burden and to be patient (donkey), 2) the capacity of loyalty (dog), and 3) the willingness to digest filth for human betterment (pig).

He further states that associating these three animals with the character of an *auliya* (saint) is clear blasphemy against the Prophet because the Prophet is *ma'shum* (free from sin) in character. Amin Jamaludin also states that Sheikh Hisham allegedly taught his newly converted disciples to perform obligatory prayers in a way that is contrary to *shariah* (Islamic law). He also denounces Sheikh Hisham for exaggerating the *karamah* of his masters in a way that leads to *syirik* (idolatry). He accuses Sheikh Hisham of teaching his disciples that all religions are basically the same - a teaching that undermines the purity of Islamic doctrine. In the end, Amin Jamaludin reiterates his statement by saying that Naqshbandi-Haqqani is a clear sign of the Dajjal’s *fitnah* in the end of days.

Since mid-2009, Amin Jamaludin’s pamphlet has reached a broader Muslim audience through his active efforts to distribute it among his Islamist colleagues. Based on Amin Jamaludin’s pamphlet, the Islamist media affiliated to HTI (*Media Umat*) and FUI (*Suara Islam*) have joined together to voice their attacks on Naqshbandi-Haqqani. Amin Jamaludin has also shared his finding with *Sabili*, a media with a clear Islamic message. While Amin Jamaludin puts a strong emphasis on the alleged deviation of Naqshbandi-Haqqani purely in terms of *aqidah*, other Islamist groups have expanded their opposition in political terms. For Islamist groups, Naqshbandi-Haqqani is considered a heretic group because it puts too much emphasis on ritual activities and tends to disregard political activism.
In July 2009, the 16th edition of *Media Umat*, for instance, published an article attacking Naqshbandi-Haqqani. In the article, Harits Abu Ulya, a HTI activist, strongly criticized Sheikh Hisham Kabbani and his pluralist view which regarded other religious adherent’s access to the same spiritual universal message. He further raised his suspicion that the coming of Sheikh Hisham Kabbani in particular and Sufism in general is aimed at maintaining the political status quo. In his view, Sufism, through its emphasis on ritual piety, undermines Muslim political consciousness. Harits Abu Ulya also invoked the ‘Western scenario’ and ‘Christian-Jews conspiracy theory’ that Naqshbandi-Haqqani represents a ‘grand design’ to create a split within the Muslim ummah. The fact that Sheikh Hisham Kabbani comes from the USA is exploited to spread this rumor further.

In the Indonesian context, the ‘Western scenario’ and ‘Christian-Jews conspiracy’ are related to the personal closeness between Sheikh Hisham Kabbani and Ahmad Dhani, a prominent yet controversial musician and entertainer in Indonesia. Ahmad Dani is indeed a controversial figure in the entertainment industry in Indonesia. He was born in Surabaya, 26 May 1972. His alleged Jewish background comes from his maternal great grandfather, Jan Pieter Frederick Kohler, a German Jew who worked as a banker in Indonesia during the Dutch colonial period in the late 19th century. Since 2005, Ahmad Dani has invited strong condemnation from some Islamist groups because his song lyrics and symbols (e.g. the Star of David, illuminati and freemasonry symbols) that appear on his musical albums. These are allegedly to contain heretic teachings and non-Islamic messages. For instance, during his live-performance on Trans TV on 10 April 2005, Ahmad Dhani was denounced by Ustadz Wahfiudin, a Muslim preacher and prominent
Muslim motivator in Jakarta, because Ahmad Dhani deliberately put the calligraphic *Lafdhul Jalalah (Allah)* on stage where he performed.

Dhani also got into trouble when Habib Rizieq Shihab of FPI demanded that he change the cover of his album, *Lasykar Cinta*, in April 2005. For Habib Rizieq, the use and modification of *Lafdhul Jalalah (Allah)* as the cover of the *Lasykar Cinta* album was clearly a blasphemy against God. On 15 March 2011, amid threats and denunciations, Ahmad Dhani received a parcel containing a bomb with a message attached accusing him of being a militant Jew and Zionist agent who spread heretic teachings through his song lyrics.\(^{313}\) Among Islamists, the resentment against Ahmad Dhani was perhaps best represented by Harry Mukti, a former musician, HTI activist and Muslim preacher, who denounced him as Satan.\(^ {314}\)

In *Refleksi Akhir Tahun* (end of the year self-reflection), published on 15 December 2009, Ismail Yusanto, a spokesman for HTI, issued a public statement in which he openly denounced Naqshandi-Haqqani and its allegedly heretic teachings. He warned Indonesian Muslims to be aware of the danger of such heterodox and heretic beliefs. He stated the following about Naqshbandi-Haqqani:

> At the beginning, there was no suspicion that this group [Naqshbandi-Haqqani] spread many heretic doctrines. This group used the name of *Naqsabandi* along with Haqqani. It was KH Amin Jamaludin (Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam) who found out and then reviewed many heretical teachings in booklets published by Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia...the spread of the heretic groups in Indonesia shows a lack of understanding among Muslims about their true religion. The state plays a role in that this heretic group still attracts followers because it refuses to educate people about their *aqidah* and allows heretic groups to spread

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\(^{313}\) This bomb came from the same source of the similar package sent to Ulil Abshar Abdalla and the office of Utan Kayu community in Jakarta.

\(^{314}\) [http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2012/05/19/20251-ustadz-harry-moekti-ahmad-dhani-itu-setan.html](http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2012/05/19/20251-ustadz-harry-moekti-ahmad-dhani-itu-setan.html)
their teachings. This attitude derives from the secularism adopted by the Indonesian state. Secularism considers religion as a private matter, so that the state cannot interfere. The state will interfere by detaining heretics only when it disrupts public order, not because of the heretical teaching itself. Otherwise, the heretical teachings will spread widely and affect the people. This condition will not happen when *shariah* is fully implemented. Under *shariah*-by law, the heretic and deviant groups will cease to exist because the state will prevent them from flourishing. The state can also interfere by using capital punishment for those committing heresy. The state will actively perform its role to guide people to following proper *aqidah*. By performing this role, the state can ensure that each one has self-protection to avoid deviant and heretic teachings.\textsuperscript{315}

By relying on Amin Jamaludin’s pamphlet, Ismail Yusanto has used Naqshbandi-Haqqani to reiterate HTI’s political project to implement *shariah* as a counter not only for heretical groups but also to oppose general secularism. He denounces the state’s negligence in giving free space for heretic groups to flourish. He even suggests that under *shariah* law, the state would impose capital punishment on the heretics who commit apostasy.

At the beginning, the Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples seem to have dismissed the seriousness of Amin Jamaludin’s pamphlet. For Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples, the controversies and polemics were simply the result of personal mistakes made by disciples, Abdurrauf Kurniadi and Arif Hamdani, who had no permission and authority to translate and distribute Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s teaching materials. Because of this, some top ranking members of Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia (YHI) only took internal disciplinary measures by sacking both Abdurrauf Kurniadi and Arif Hamdani from the daily organizing committee of the *Yayasan*. Rizal Tarigan, the acting chairman of YHI, remarked as follows,

\textsuperscript{315} This public statement was in form of Surat Edaran Number 173/PU/E/12/09 issued on 15 December 2009. See, \url{http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id}
For those in the Yayasan, the problem is actually simple. There are translated booklets and misunderstandings about them. The Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia was not involved institutionally in publishing and distributing the booklets. The translators have acknowledged their mistakes and taken responsibility for them. The Yayasan has sacked them. Therefore, the Yayasan and our master have nothing to do whatsoever with the booklets and this also means the problem is over.316

However, massive dissemination of Amin Jamaludin’s pamphlet throughout Jakarta has resulted in mounting pressure and increasing public scrutiny toward Naqshbandi-Haqqani. Amin Jamaludin’s position as member of Komisi Pengkajian of MUI has also generated additional pressure on Naqshbandi-Haqqani to respond officially. These factors have forced Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples to abandon their dismissive stance and instead, to actively defend their masters and the validity of their Sufi teachings. To address Amin Jamaludin’s and his Islamist colleagues, the Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples have also tried to activate their social networks among Jakarta’s political and business elites. This elitist connection has put indirect political pressure on Amin Jamaludin to cease his accusations and attacks against their master’s teachings.

On 28 October 2009, some of the YHI’s representatives (e.g. Rizal Tarigan, Budi Rachmadi and Muchsin Mulaela, etc) came to the MUI office and met with the Chairman of Komisi Pengkajian, Utang Ranuwijaya. They explained that the booklets that had come under Amin Jamaludin’s severe criticism were not officially published by the Yayasan (YHI) and had nothing to do with their master, Sheikh Hisham. Abdurraauf Kurniadi and Arif Hamdani also came to the meeting to express their regrets for translating Sheikh Hisham’s sohbet without prior permission and authorisation. Abdurraauf and Arif Hamdani further affirmed that

316 Interview with Rizal Tarigan, 22 September 2010
the booklets did not represent their master’s (Sheikh Hisham Kabbani) true teachings because they did not fully comprehend the complicated Sufi ideas conveyed by their master. Therefore, they were willing to take full responsibility for their mistakes. During the meeting, Utung Ranuwijaya as Chairman of Komisi Pengkajian, suggested that a meeting between Sheikh Hisham and Amin Jamaludin be arranged.

Following on Utang Ranuwijaya’s suggestion, the next day, 29th October 2009, the YHI’s representatives went to the LPPI office to meet Amin Jamaludin. They conveyed the same message, stating that the YHI and Sheikh Hisham had nothing to do with any of the translated booklets. Amin Jamaludin, however, refused to accept their apology and explanation. Instead he demanded that the Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia should take institutional responsibility because the publication used the official logo of the Yayasan, its address and bank account. Amin Jamaludin did, however, accept an invitation letter to attend tabayyun (clarification) meeting with Sheikh Hisham, during the latter’s visit to Indonesia the following month.

On 6 November 2009, the meeting took place at the Financial Club at the Graha Niaga Building, in the Soedirman Central Business District (SCBD). It was attended by official representatives of MUI (Utung Ranuwijaya, Anwar Ibrahim, and Aminudin Yakub), Sheikh Hisham and some of his disciples in Jakarta such as Rizal Tarigan, Budi Rachmadi, and Muchsin Mulaela. This meeting was made possible with the help of Hendro Martowardjo, one of Sheikh Hisham’s disciples, who provided the venue. During the meeting, Sheikh Hisham denied all the
accusations and clarified in detail the misquotations attributed to him and his masters in Amin Jamaludin’s pamphlet. Sheikh Hisham is reported to have said:

I am a scholar, author, and publisher of many books and I would be happy to explain any of the material presented in that wide body of literature. However, I will not respond or answer to material or information I have not produced, which is published in a language I do not even read or understand. It is also unreasonable to ask me to interpret the alleged words of my teacher when I cannot verify the author that has translated or interpreted it correctly in the first place.  

He also strongly defended Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s orthodox view regarding shariah and its legitimate position within Islamic tradition. He also explained that all written materials about Naqshbandi-Haqqani to which Amin Jamaludin made references were translated literally without proper religious understanding and adequate language skills. He urged that all emerging concern about Naqshbandi-Haqqani and its teachings should refer only to books he had permitted to be translated and nothing else. Sheikh Hisham referred particularly to his books published by Serambi publisher such as Tasawuf dan Ihsan: Antivirus Kebatilan dan Kezaliman, Energi Zikir dan Salawat, Maulid dan Ziarah ke Makam Nabi, and Syafaat, Tawasul, dan Tabaruk.

Some of the MUI members who attended the meeting accepted Sheikh Hisham Kabbani’s explanation but they also stated that further investigation was needed to clarify certain disputed issues. The only problem was that Amin Jamaludin, who had promised to attend the meeting, did not show up. For Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples, this simply showed that he had no intention of clarifying his accusations. Sheikh Hisham Kabbani was reported to be particularly

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317 Interview with Rizal Tarigan, 22 September 2010
318 Interview with Muchsin Mulaela, October 2010
disappointed by the fact that Amin Jamaludin missed the opportunity to obtain direct answers to all the issues he had raised concerning Naqshbandi-Haqqani. Amin Jamaludin defended himself by saying that, at the time, he was very busy preparing for his departure for the pilgrimage.\(^\text{319}\) Instead of seeking further clarification, Amin Jamaludin continued to distribute his pamphlet to mosques throughout Jakarta and throughout LPPI’s networks in other regions.

These continuing polemics led the Ministry of Religious Affairs to interfere. In November 2010, *Puslitbang Depag* (Center for Research and Development, Ministry of Religious Affairs) organised a meeting to scrutinize Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s written materials. This team organised an open gathering to investigate Amin Jamaludin’s report on the alleged heretical teachings of Naqshbandi-Haqqani. The gathering was held on 15 November 2010 at Istiqlal Museum-TMII and was attended by Muslim scholars, researchers of *Puslitbang Depag*, MUI’s representatives, Amin Jamaludin and his LPPI staff, and delegates from the Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia. The main agenda of the meeting was to review eight Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s written documents; 1) *Ruh dan Raga: Tidak Ada Reinkarnasi dalam Islam*, 2) *Awas Setan Musuh Terbesar Manusia*, 3) *Muhasabah*, 4) *Maulid dan Ziarah ke Makam Nabi SAW*, 5) *The Naqsahabandi Sufi Tradition: Guidebook of Daily Practices and Devotions*, 6) *Kisah Perjalanan Cahaya Muhammad SAW*, 7) *Berbagai Kesusahan sebagai Sebuah Kebaikan dari Allah SWT*, and 8) *Kematian: Persiapan Menjemput Maut*.\(^\text{320}\)

\(^\text{319}\) Interview with Amin Djamaludin, 21 September 2010
During the meeting, Amin Jamaludin insisted in his accusation that Naqshbandi-Haqqani violated some basic Islamic doctrines. He repeatedly referred to his pamphlet in an attempt to convince others on the validity of his accusation. Of eight reviewers invited, however, there was only one (Ali Fahrudin) who supported Amin Jamaludin’s position and demanded that the books should be banned. The majority of Muslim scholars invited to the event also did not endorse Amin Jamaludin’s position. They argued that basically, there was nothing wrong with the teachings because they reflected spiritual experience that could not be judged by outward appearances. The gathering therefore concluded that Naqshbandi-Haqqani was a legitimate thariqah. After that, the controversy about Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s written materials was put to rest except for the occasional outburst of criticism.

Interestingly, some sources I interviewed during fieldwork hinted that Amin Jamaludin was not powerful enough to deal with the strong political support behind Naqshbandi-Haqqani among Jakarta’s political-business elites. One source even used the term ‘to run out ammunition’ to describe Amin Jamaludin’s situation.\footnote{Interview with Khaerudin of Media Ummat, 28 October 2010} His reluctance to directly confront Sheikh Hisham did not help his credibility among his own supporters. Yet, Amin Jamaludin has not changed his opinion and continues to accuse Naqshbandi-Haqqani of being a heretical group that should not be allowed to flourish in Indonesia.\footnote{Interview with Amin Djamaludin, 21 September 2010} Though he never retracted his accusation regarding the heretical nature of Naqshbandi-Haqqani, he did not openly name Naqshbandi-Haqqani a heretical (sesat) group when he appeared as an expert to

\footnote{Interview with Khaerudin of Media Ummat, 28 October 2010}
\footnote{Interview with Amin Djamaludin, 21 September 2010}
provide testimony during the judicial review session on religious blasphemy at the constitutional court in 3 March 2010.

Despite their relative success in dealing with the controversies and polemics involving Amin Jamaludin, such controversies seem to have strengthened the perception among Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s disciples that Salafi and Islamist groups pose a genuine threat toward Sufi groups and the general Muslim community. This perception helps to shape a millenarian belief in the representation of the Dajjal (the deceiver) as “a man with one-eye only”. This is interpreted as symbolising the narrow-minded and literal religious thinking promoted by Salafi and the over-emphasis on socio-political activism by the Islamists. The term Salafi itself broadly refers to reformist ideas which claim that the first three generations (salaf-as shalih) of the Muslim ummah provided the best example for later generations of the Muslim ummah. This term, however, is narrowly applied to the followers of Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahab (1703-1792). Naqshbandi-Haqqani identifies five characteristics that distinguish Salafi from the mainstream Sunni orthodoxy: 1) attribution of anthropomorphism toward Allah, 2) disrespect for the Prophet, 3) an amateurish-egalitarian approach to the Qur'an and hadith, 4) rejection of the Four Sunni schools of Law (the Four madhahib) and the two Schools of doctrine (Ash’aris and Maturidis) as well as all the Schools of self-purification (Tasawwuf), and 5) the practice of takfir against fellow Muslims.

Yet, facing Salafi and Islamist’ criticism, Sheikh Hisham Kabbani and his disciples only attempted to seek a compromise. When this failed, they went ahead

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323 The origins of these reformist ideas derive from the 13th century Syrian Muslim jurist, Ibn Taimiyah.
and ignored the criticism altogether. This uncompromising stance is strongly related to the belief among Naqshbandi-Haqqani that the current turmoil affecting the Muslim community comes from Salafi religious doctrine and the Islamist’s over-emphasis on political activism. Sheikh Hisham has said the following about Salafi propaganda:

We who keep the traditional teachings of Ahl as-Sunnah wa ‘l-Jama`ah are on the path of haqq. We, the `ulama, must not keep silent when we see these kind of deviations of `aqida. The first duty of us, who are `ulama is to stand against falsehood. Unfortunately, we `ulama are not doing our duty and in this way the propaganda of Salafis is having more and more effect. If we, the `ulama don’t stand up, we cannot expect the common person to know the difference between true `aqidah and false. People believe easily in slogans like “follow only the Sunnah” and don’t know how to distinguish false claims to piety from reality. Only when those who have deep Islamic knowledge have the courage to face the Salafis, will this problem go away.\(^{324}\)

Within the group, he encourages his disciples to conduct zikir in public and ziarah. He strongly believes that these communal rituals can be used as an effective counter to the growing influence of Salafism, which fiercely denounces these popular ritual practices as idolatry and deviation from shariah provision. In fact, both communal rituals remain an effective propagating instrument. The popularity of these ritual practices enables Sheikh Hisham to share his religious conviction in the language that is neither doctrinal nor scriptural.

Sheikh Hisham was reported to have told his disciples that Islam has survived into modern times, and the Muslim community expands over generations partly because they left cultural heritages as physical evidence. Such physical evidence was represented by, among many other things, the existence of numerous

\(^{324}\) Tabloid Ibadah, No. 8 Tahun 3/Minggu I-II, February 2012
pilgrimage sites that are preserved across the Muslim world. He warned his disciples that contemporary religious violence does not only affect the lives of people but also the Islamic cultural and historical heritage. He always reminds his disciples of the old memories about the widespread desecration of many historical sites throughout Saudi Arabia following the rise of Wahabism in the early 20th century. He is also concerned that the desecration and destruction of many Muslim shrines now carried out by the Salafi group in the campaign against idolatry and *bid’ah* is just an excuse for crushing different religious opinions in the Muslim community.

Sheikh Hisham’s words reflect his concern and sadness over the desecration of many historical sites across the Muslim world. Maintaining the popular practice of *ziarah* is a practical and effective way to ensure that something like that would never happen again.\(^{325}\) Such wanton destruction must be prevented at any cost because the desecration of pilgrimage sites did not only disconnect members of the Muslim *ummah* from their glorious past but also led to erroneous interpretation of Islam. Once the pilgrimage sites are gone, Islam will potentially vanish because without physical evidence, future generations will regard Islam as only a legend rather than a historical reality.\(^{326}\) Given the massive desecration and destruction of many Sufi shrines and popular Muslim pilgrimage sites in other Muslim countries such as Pakistan, Libya, Syria, Mali, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, and so forth, this explanation has quite a strong appeal among his disciples in Indonesia.

\(^{325}\) Among Naqshbandi-Haqqani community in Indonesia, there is a distinct practice of *ziarah* by visiting the remnants of the holy hair of the Prophet Muhammad. During the occasion, the disciples paid their respect by kissing the glass box that contains a few pieces of the holy hair of the Prophet that was brought by Sheikh Hisham to Indonesia.

\(^{326}\) Interview with Mustafa Mas’ud, 18 September 2010
Regarding Islamist groups, Sheikh Hisham encourages them to improve themselves before attempting to change other Muslims. Preoccupation with the political efforts to change people from above would not lead to a better world. In an interview, he has also said:

…So these Islamists would do better to work on themselves and clean themselves up first before beginning to clean up everyone else. When I clean myself and you clean yourself and he cleans himself and she cleans herself, the society will automatically become clean, obedient to Allah’s Law and this will immediately result in improvement and blessings. But when we are only busy looking at what this one is doing, that one is doing, and not looking under our own “hat” we will end up doing more harm than good.327

In Indonesia, religious and political discourses on Salafi-Wahabism and Islamism are not new.328 This recent accusation posed the most serious challenge Naqshbandi-Haqqani has ever had since its first arrival in Indonesia and, therefore, it could not be easily neutralised and localised. Though it is not factually correct, a perception was formed among Naqshbandi-Haqqani’s followers regarding the serious threat from the Salafi-Wahabi group in Indonesia. Naqshbandi-Haqqani thus claims that its principal religious mission is countering Salafi-Wahabism across the globe.

327 Tabloid Ibadah, No. 8 Tahun 3/Minggu I-II, February 2012

328 It has been known at least since 18th century especially among traditionalist Muslim community following the rise of Saudi regime in the Haramain. Salafi-Wahabism even indirectly gave rise to the major traditionalist Muslim organisations that defended Sufi-influenced religious beliefs and practices in Indonesia such as NU, PERTI, Darul Dakwah wal Irsyad, etc. The establishment of LPBA (later known as LIPIA) in 1980 facilitated further the spread of Salafi-Wahabist teachings among Indonesian Muslims.
9.4 Conclusion

This chapter has considered the general landscape and contentious religious life in Indonesia. Some polemics are continuation of old theological and doctrinal disputes, some others are new and they are related to competition over disciples, material resources and political patronage. They derive from the competitive nature of religious life in Indonesia because each Muslim group with a different religious orientation struggles for dominance and to gain popular support. The controversies and polemics are also part of the socio-political dynamics that have been integral to the current Islamic resurgence in Indonesia. Understanding these controversies and polemics in their own historical and social context is pivotal to grasping the current Sufi resurgence and the dynamics of post-Islamist activism in Indonesia.

As in previous eras, the current Sufi resurgence in contemporary Indonesia is however not immune to controversy. The various controversies pertain to either to religious doctrines or ritual practices; they involve competition over resources, social prestige and the disposition of disciples among different Islamic groups. While in previous eras such polemics only resonated among the elite, current polemics are accessible to be followed by numerous individuals through various different media. The nature of these polemics therefore plays a part in shaping religious views among Muslims in Indonesia. This continuing religious debate is conducted for the most part in peaceful way involving intellectual debate, and reasonably civil dialogue and the continuing encounter of various different Muslim groups with different religious inclinations. This is a positive trend in the making of plural Muslim society in Indonesia. However, self-righteousness and uncompromising stances based on religious doctrinal convictions also have a
negative effect. Preoccupation with ritual piety undermines cultivation of secular virtues to address the broader socio-cultural problems embedded among Indonesian Muslim society.
Chapter 10
CONCLUDING REMARKS

This study has revealed some important and interesting features of Indonesian Muslims and contemporary religious life in Indonesia. Indonesian Muslims have been increasingly exposed to the global spiritual marketplace. Though this exposure is a recent phenomenon, it is rooted in the changing religious landscape that has been underway in Indonesia since the 1970s. This changing religious landscape has particularly to do with several factors such as educational and economic improvements, urbanisation as well as the revolution in information technology and transnational migration. All these factors have greatly affected Indonesian Muslims in Indonesia and paved the way for new incoming Islamic ideas from abroad. The new incoming Islamic ideas in general and Sufism in particular found a fertile ground among the Muslim population in urban areas, which is keen to seek religious knowledge from unconventional methods of Islamic learning. Sufi piety is a result of a deepening Islamisation characterised by direct personal experience of devotion and observance of normative ideals prescribed in the Quran and the Prophetic tradition.

The case of Naqshbandi-Haqqani demonstrates that charisma remains powerful and has even become an identity marker for contemporary Indonesian Muslims. Charisma personifies veneration to a role model of an exemplary living figure. It represents mutual trust and respect based on close personal relationship between the master and the disciples. The personalised religious authority provides not only interpretation of religious texts but also private guidance on religious
service. This charisma is strengthened through repetitive and performative pious acts in the form of individual and collective of *dzikir* (remembrance), music and dance. The repetitive and performative rituals and their effects in shaping strong emotive ties between the master and disciples maintain internal solidarity within Sufi group.

Growing literacy does not completely replace this supposedly ‘old-fashioned’ religiosity with a strong veneration to personal appeal of religious *guru*. Furthermore, flourishing rational thinking and strong influence of Islamic reformism with strong emphasis on formal organisation do not undermine the strong appeal of charisma because it is not only a source of religious authority but also organisational resource. While formal institution is particularly important to secure material and non-material support, it is not intrinsically sufficient to keep people maintaining their allegiance as devout followers. As a leadership resource, the charisma plays a significant role to direct and lead the followers. Once the congregation grows larger, charismatic leader needs to establish formal institutions to organise his disciples that helps to strengthen further the charisma not only among within the group but also to the broader Muslim community.

Yet, adopting formal institution potentially compromise the charisma due to excessive bureaucratization. It would likely lead to internal divergence and schism that could potentially weaken a charismatic leadership and internal solidarity and even impeding further expansion. The survival of Sufi groups in modern era thus shows not only individual but also organisational capacities to strike the balance between religious authority and leadership resource of charismatic figure. As a religious authority, the charisma tends to exploit the popular belief of sainthood
(walayah) that has been strongly embedded within the Muslim tradition in Indonesia. On the other hand, the charisma also increasingly relies on modern media outlets, rather than face to face relationship, to indirectly communicate and emanate the appeal to the disciples and broader audience.

To continue attracting people and to keep them in the group, new Islamic groups have to offer coherent and if necessary, utopian visions that resonate with the personal and collective religious grievances of their members. Popular millenarian belief in particular is powerful because it offers redemption and salvation to all, a remedy for all difficulties and problems. For generations, it has been effectively used to justify a religio-political cause in the struggle for Islam and the whole Muslim community (ummah). In modern times, the Islamic term Dajjal (Deciever/Anti Christ) is also used in reference to one’s religio-political opponents, while Fitnah (Dissension) and Jahiliya (Ignorance) describe internal problems, rifts and discords within the Muslim community. Far from becoming obsolete, this millenarian belief with its normative ideals which hark back to popular religious traditions in the past, continues to have relevance in modern times by helping Muslim Indonesians addressing and dealing with current socio-economic situations.

As a piety movement, there is nothing mysterious about Sufi groups because they are openly and actively engaged in the struggle for Islam and the Muslim community. It is unprecedented, however, that typical Sufi rituals such as dzikir and maulid celebrations are currently performed on an open stage, widely advertised on various media, and generously sponsored by rich individuals. This public performance of Sufi ritual does not happen in a political vacuum. It actually has to do with emerging political opportunities and public space thrown wide open.
during the SBY Presidency (2004-2014). *Dzikir akbar* and *maulid* celebrations for instance, have been deliberately used as a public campaign during which political messages for combatting terrorism and soliciting electoral support were carefully couched in pious Islamic language. In the name of *dakwah*, the Sufi community also uses these communal gatherings to voice their religious concerns and declare their support for the legitimate government.

The struggle for Islam in Indonesia is highly contested, involving many different religious groups with diverse religious orientations. Religious life in Indonesia is thus similarly contentious because every group is involved in either intra group rivalries or extra group opposition. Amidst growing *shariah*-mindedness among Indonesian Muslims, Sufism is not completely secure because it is always under public scrutiny to show conformity to religious orthodoxy. Sufism contributes to a counter balance to the self-righteous claims of Salafism as the sole model of Islamic piety. Sufi groups have managed to survive because they are not reluctant to defend their teachings and existence by engaging in civil encounters and dialogue with their rivals and opponents. This dialogue has been made possible not only by traditional methods of *silaturahmi* (face-to-face meetings) and *tabayyun* (seeking clarification) but also through the use of ‘soft intimidation’ by manipulating connections to political and business elites.

The findings of this study contribute to an empirical and theoretical understanding of contemporary dynamics of Indonesian Islam and the Muslim community in Indonesia. Empirically speaking, this study indicates that Indonesian Muslims have been and will likely remain fragmented along different pious orientations. Sufi ideas and rituals are still attractive to shape individual piety.
Preoccupation with individual piety does not turn their attention from collective activism because Sufi group strongly believe that individual piety requires and will eventually cultivate pious Islamic public sphere. The making of pious public sphere along different religious orientation is political in nature because it involves many groups that compete one to another for dominance.

Though the struggle for piety is primarily about the quest for individual-centered changes, transformation of everyday life and small-scale changes affecting what people believe and what they should stand for, it does not necessarily mean politically less significant. In the long run, this individual change could transform into ideological struggle targeting secular values with broader implication for promoting wide-ranging social and political reforms. Islamic activism with deeply rooted Sufi orientation potentially generates cosmopolitan pietism that is an important pillar for Indonesian Muslims, requiring them to remain open-minded and pluralistic in their religious orientation. This cosmopolitan pietism provides a strong cultural foundation to establish civil democratic culture in Indonesia.

Theoretically speaking, this study also addresses the question of piety and activism not as an exclusive framework as commonly seen in most scholarly studies dealing with Islam and Muslim community in Indonesia. For instance, religious scholars and anthropologists regard the expression of and quest for piety as the most important aspect of Muslim community. Above anything else, they are mainly concerned about sacred texts, belief, ritual and their significance for understanding Muslim community in Indonesia. On the other hand, social and political scientists put too much emphasis on historical, ideological and political
aspects of Islamic activism and tend to disregard belief and ritual in their analysis. Unlike previous scholarly studies, this study attempts to bridge the gap between the two and considers both as different sides of the same coin.

However, this study also shows that cosmopolitan pietism is not a given condition. Sufism in itself does not necessarily generate cosmopolitan pietism because it depends on the religious dynamics and the nature of power relations between various external factors such as politics, economy and culture. Without sufficient social and political support, Sufism has potentially minor influence in shaping the religious orientation of Muslim society. In non-democratic, impoverished and authoritarian environments, Sufism could be as deadly and violent as other militant groups. In Pakistan and Iraq for instance, Sufi groups are involved in daily armed struggle to defend their existence and survival against opposing forces.

The case of Indonesia shows that Islamic piety generates religious and political conservatism that is not necessarily good for the country. Religious conservatism is characterised by too much emphasis on ritual piety, shariah-minded religiosity, self-righteousness, claims of moral superiority, and to some extent, even blind obedience to personalised religious authority. This religious conservatism shows an inclination to frame everything from moral, ethical to social and political problems, in religious terms. This often leads to uncompromising attitude toward dissenting religious opinions and reforms (ijtihad), and the cultivation of non-secular virtues such as free and liberal thinking and equality. Shariah-minded Sufi groups in Indonesia, however, are more ambiguous in dealing with the so-called ‘Islamic deviant groups’ such as Ahmadiyah and Shiah. They
neither condemn nor support these minority groups from prosecution.

Sufi groups are prone to pious authoritarianism. With this ideological stance, instead of promoting post-Islamist discourse such as religious freedom and civil rights, Sufi-inspired activism could lead to an authoritarian pietism that seeks to shape public morality and the common good based solely on Islamic ideals. It tends to manipulate public morality by employing pious language and behavior as a political tool to prevent criticism from the public. Moreover, Sufi groups are also politically conservative because they tend to legitimize political establishment. Supporting the political status quo could mean legitimising corrupt and incompetent politicians so long as they can keep up a pious appearance in public. The so-called “suddenly pious syndrome” is a good example of this authoritarian pietism common in Indonesia. It refers to a condition in which people declare themselves to be pious Muslims in order to attract sympathy from the public and divert attention from their offences or wrongdoing.

Although this study is limited in its scope because it only focuses on one particular Sufi group in Indonesia, it helps to understand contemporary religious life in Indonesia. Yet this is insufficient to draw general conclusions about the whole spectrum of Islamic piety movements in Indonesia. Future studies should deal more deeply with other important issues such as the impact of changing charismatic leadership, youth and women’s involvement in the movement, ritual change and ideological transformation, and the relationship between Sufi groups and the state. Those studies will present a more complete picture of contemporary Islam and the Muslim community in Indonesia in their own terms.
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Appendix I

LOGO
Appendix III

SHEIKH NAZIM HAQQANI
(23 April 1922 – 7 May 2014)
Appendix IV

SHEIKH MUHAMMAD HISHAM KABBANI
During the initiation ritual, an aspiring initiate recites syahadat and then recites the following:

إنَّ الَّذين يَبَيِّنُونَ إِنَّمَا يَبَيِّنُونَ اللهَ يَدُ اللهَ فَوَّقَ أَيْدِيهِمْ فَمَنْ نَكَثَ فَإِنَّمَا يَنْكَثْ عَلَىٰ نَفْسِهِ وَمَنْ أُوْفِيَ بِمَا عَاهَدَهُ عَلَيْهِ اللهُ فَسَيْبُوتِهِ أَجْرًا عَظِيمًا

(I bear witness that there is no god except Allah and I bear witness that Muhammad is His servant and Prophet. In the name of Allah, the Compassionate and the Merciful. Lo! Those who swear allegiance unto thee (Muhammad), swear allegiance only unto Allah. The Hand of Allah is above their hands. So whosoever breaketh his oath, breaketh it only to his soul's hurt; while whosoever keepeth his covenant with Allah, on him will He bestow immense reward)

Then recites

رضينا بله بربنا و بالإسلام ديننا و بسيدينا و نبيًا محمد صلى الله عليه و سلم رسولًا و نبيًا بالقرآن كتابا

و تعالى ما نقل و كيل و قيلنا بسيدينا الشيخ محمد ناظم الحقاني شيخًا و مرشدًا.

(We accept and are pleased with Allah as our Lord, and Islam as our religion and with our Master Muhammad Messenger and Prophet and with the Quran as our book and Allah is the Trustee on what we say. And we are pleased and accepting our Master Mawlana Shaykh Muhammad Nazim as our Shaykh and Guide to Allah. Allah is, Allah is, Allah is Reality. Allah is, Allah is, Allah is Reality)
Present the reward of the preceding recitations to the Prophet (s) and to the shaykhs of the Naqshband Order: O God! Grant that the merit of what we have read, and the light of what we have recited, are (considered) an offering and gift from us to the soul of our Prophet Muhammad, and to the souls of the Imams of the ṣaḥabah and of the Imami shaykhs of the Naqshband Order, Khwajag Bahauddin an-Naṣḥī Muhammad al-Uwaisi al-Bukhari, and our venerable teacher and master, the Sultan of Saints, Shaykh 'Abd al-Ḥaqq al-Fā'iz al-Dāghestani, and our master, Shaykh Muhammad Nāzim al-Haqqānī, and to the masters of the Khāwjagan and to the righteous. The ritual initiation is finally concluded by reciting Surah Al-Fatihah.
## NAQSHBANDI-HAQQANI'S DZIKIR CENTRES IN INDONESIA

<table>
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<tr>
<th>No</th>
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<td>Ust. Nugrahanto</td>
<td>PP Madaniyah Anggrek Mas F-5 Baloi Batam</td>
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<td>Encep Fariduddin</td>
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<td>KH. Ence Supriyatna</td>
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<td>Ust. Sohib</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>KH. Ahmad Syahid</td>
<td>PP Al Falah Cicalengka</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>KH. Taufiqurrahman Subki</td>
<td>PP At Taufiqy Rowokembu Kaum No.154 Wonopringgo 51181 Pekalongan</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>H. Sauqi/Ridwan Pinem</td>
<td>PP Asri Singaraja Bali</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>KH. Maskin Abdul Azis</td>
<td>PP Darus Sholawat Dukuh Klubuk Rt 27 / 07, Kelurahan Kedungrejo, Kecamatan Pilangkenceng Caruban, Kabupaten Madiun, Jawa Timur</td>
<td>Dzikir &amp; I’tikaf Saturday Morning-Sunday Night</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Ibu Makiyyah</td>
<td>PP Al Falah Kajar Bondowoso</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Effendi Siregar/Syekh Surya</td>
<td>Effendi Siregar (Aweng) Pangkalan Jati I Pondok Labu (Effendi Siregar)</td>
<td>Thursday night (weekly)</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>Idem</td>
<td>Teuku Umar 41 Menteng (Muchtony Ghani Azis)</td>
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<td>HKP Malik Tarigan Jl. Cempaka Putih Raya 114</td>
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<td>Bp Samsudin Jl. Poncol Vila Ragunan Permai Kav 1 Ragunan</td>
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<td>Soenarto Jl. Mandalaxe Selatan 16 Tomang</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<td>(Budi Moefreni) Jl. H. Maung No. 33 Saksak Tinggi Ciputat</td>
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<td>20</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>Ust. Abdul Qodir</td>
<td>Vila Pancawati, Cikereteg Ciawi Bogor</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>Tini Firdaus</td>
<td>Firdaus Wajdi-Tini Firdaus Jl. Brawijaya 1A No. 16 Kebayoran Baru</td>
<td>Friday morning at 11am (weekly)</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>Ustadz M. Salahuddin</td>
<td>Zawiyah HHT DKI Jakarta</td>
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<td>Al-Bandungi As-Sufi</td>
<td>Apartemen Lavande, Jl. Prof. Dr. Soepomo (Belakang Univ. Sahid)</td>
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<td>Al-Hafizh (Kangdin)</td>
<td>Tebet, Pancoran Jakarta Selatan</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>Ustadz Munawar /Ust.</td>
<td>Masjid Baitul Jalal</td>
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<td>Jl. DANAU RAYA NO. 4 KELAPA DUA ISLAMIC VILLAGE KARAWACI TANGERANG</td>
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<td>RICKY RIZAL</td>
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<td>Karnawan</td>
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<td>Kang Deni H.</td>
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<td>Agasya/Iwan</td>
<td>ZAWIYAH HHT CIKAMPEK</td>
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<td>Warsono/Bustari</td>
<td>Zawiyah HHT Lampung Jl. Trans Sumatera Km 01 Way Apus Rt 002 Rw 13 Desa</td>
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<td>Bakuheuni Kec. Bakuheuni Kab. Lampung Selatan - 35592</td>
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<td>Aboen/Safrudin</td>
<td>Zawiyah HHT Anyer Banten Kampung Baru Rt 20 Rw 05 Desa Kosambi Ronyok</td>
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<td>Isa Swahusada</td>
<td>Zawiyah HHT Pondok Cabe</td>
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<td>Jl. Lombok No.200 Rt.002 Rw.004 Ciputat Tangerang Selatan</td>
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<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Mulyadi (Izenk)</td>
<td>Sanggar Bulungan/Blok M</td>
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<td>34</td>
<td>Muh Anwar</td>
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<td>35</td>
<td>M. Rofiq</td>
<td>Weru Plered Cirebon</td>
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<td>36</td>
<td>Arif Hamdani</td>
<td>Masjid Jami Darussalam, Jl. Kedasih IV Cikarang Baru, Kawasan Perum Jababeka</td>
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<td>37</td>
<td>Bambang Sulayman/Hidayat</td>
<td>Perum Bumi Rengganis Blok 5A No. 110 Balikpapan Kaltim</td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>Arif Hamdani</td>
<td>Jl. Pangkalani Jati I Gg. Bantu</td>
<td>Sunday</td>
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<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Zulfikar (Dicky Aryo Seno)</td>
<td>Jl. Cabe Raya 56 Pamulang</td>
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<td>40</td>
<td>Iwan</td>
<td>Masjid Al Hikmah Komplek Departemen Dalam Negeri II Pondok Labu Jaksel</td>
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<td>42</td>
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<td>Masjid Al Hikmah Desa Cikole Lembang Bandung</td>
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<td>43</td>
<td>Ust. Dedi</td>
<td>Komplek Budi Indah A33 RT 04/7 Kelurahan Pasir Kaliki Babakan Loa Cimahi Utara</td>
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<td>44</td>
<td>Ibu Dahlia</td>
<td>Gg. Banza Leuwinutug RT.001 RW.002 No.11 Citeureup - Bogor</td>
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<td>45</td>
<td>Medi Kusmedi</td>
<td>Jl. Kuningan Antapani Bandung</td>
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<td>46</td>
<td>Adjat Sudrajat</td>
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<td>Armand/Mohammad Sofyan</td>
<td>Jl. Waliwis No. 2 Tanah Sereal Bogor</td>
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<td>48</td>
<td>Ust Dudi</td>
<td>Pp. Toriqul Huda Pasekon Gg. Bunga (Simpan Raya) Cipanas</td>
<td>Thursday</td>
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<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Rohmat</td>
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<td>50</td>
<td>KH. Bunyamin</td>
<td>Tipar Caringin, Panembong Cianjur</td>
<td>Thursday</td>
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<td>51</td>
<td>M. Hadid Subki</td>
<td>Jl. Cimanuk 37 Bandung</td>
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<td>Abdul Mughits</td>
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<td>Ahmad Djuanta</td>
<td>Jl. Mesjid No. 32 Helvetia Timur Medan</td>
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<td>54</td>
<td>Riza Alamsyah</td>
<td>Al Barokah Dukuh Sandan Waru Mranggen Semarang</td>
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<td>55</td>
<td>Ust. Muhammad Yusuf Ridwan Asyaf’i</td>
<td>Bengkong Permai Komplek Nurul Jadid RT 01/1 Blok D No. 10 Kelurahan Bengkong Laut Batu Ampar Batam</td>
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<td>56</td>
<td>Asep Hidayat</td>
<td>Masjid Ar Rahman Kp. Ciaja Desa Sindanglaya Kec. Cimenyan Bandung</td>
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<td>57</td>
<td>Solih</td>
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<td>KH. Misbah</td>
<td>Cipanas</td>
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<td>Tegas Budiman</td>
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<td>Zamhuri Ramli</td>
<td>Jl. Teuku Muhammad Shaleh No. 2 Lambuk, Banda Aceh</td>
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<td>61</td>
<td>Syamsul Bahri</td>
<td>Jl. Listrik No.13 Hagu Barat Laut Kota Lhokseumawe</td>
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<td>62</td>
<td>Zainal Arifin</td>
<td>Dusun II Pasar Lapan – Indrapura, Kec. Air Putih - Batubara</td>
<td>Wednesday</td>
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<th>No.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>Hasan Sebayang/Abdul Qoyyum</td>
<td>Jl. Kediri No.74 Medan, Sumatra Utara</td>
<td>Sunday morning</td>
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<td>64</td>
<td>Irham Sanuri</td>
<td>Kompleks PT. Inalum, blok S27 No.12 Tanjung Gading, Kabupaten Batu Bara, Sumatra Utara</td>
<td>Thursday night</td>
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<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>Roni Hendra</td>
<td>Mushola Baitul Huda Parak Gadang, Padang</td>
<td>Thursday night</td>
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<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>Roni Hendra</td>
<td>Zawiyah almarhum H. YA'QOEB Pasia Ampek Angkek Agam</td>
<td>Saturday night</td>
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<td>67</td>
<td>Yandri Irzaq</td>
<td>Orchid Park D-11 Batam Center</td>
<td>Wednesday night</td>
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<td>68</td>
<td>Eko Suyono/Chairudin Lubis/Pramudjo Abdul Ghani</td>
<td>Zawiyah As Syifa Jl.Kartini 24, Kompleks Farmasi, Pekanbaru 28111</td>
<td>Tuesday and Thursday night</td>
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<td>69</td>
<td>Riady</td>
<td>Bengkong Abadi 2, Jl. Cenderawasih Blok A/127 Batam</td>
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<td>70</td>
<td>Achmad Marzuki</td>
<td>Zawiyah Asyiqernani Jln. Lintas Timur RT.09, di samping SMPN 5, Sakernan (36381) Kabupaten Muaro Jambi.</td>
<td>Sunday night</td>
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<td>72</td>
<td>M. Yusuf</td>
<td>Jln Kapten Patimura Lrg Bunga Seroja no 15/A. Kota Jambi</td>
<td>Thursday night</td>
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<td>74</td>
<td>Aryuda Rahmanda</td>
<td>Zawiyah Al Kautsar Perumahan Vila Kenali. Blok C No.18 Kenali Asam Bawah. Kota Jambi</td>
<td>Thursday night (khatm khwajagan) Saturday night (Hadrah &amp; Maulid)</td>
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<td>75</td>
<td>Candra Gupta/Joni Kurniawan</td>
<td>Kompleks Graha Asri C.27 Jl. Palembang Betung KM 15 Palembang</td>
<td>Wednesday night after 9pm (male) Sunday afternoon (female)</td>
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<td>76</td>
<td>Muchsin Mulaela</td>
<td>Wisma Iskandarsyah Blok B4 Jl. Iskandarsyah Raya Kav 12-14 Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta Selatan 12170</td>
<td>Thursday night</td>
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<td>77</td>
<td>Iskandar/Eri Barkah</td>
<td>Jl. Villa Terusan no. 16 Villa Cinere Mas Pondok Cabe, Jakarta Selatan Indonesia</td>
<td>Sunday night</td>
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<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>Rizal Tarigan</td>
<td>Jl.Puri Kencana No.39 Rt.0010 Rw.06 Cipete Selatan, Cilandak Jakarta Selatan 12410</td>
<td>Wednesday night after 9pm (male) Sunday afternoon (female)</td>
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<td>79</td>
<td>Handi Biantoro</td>
<td>Jl. Hasbi No. 40 Otista, Jakarta Timur 13330</td>
<td>Saturday night</td>
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<td>80</td>
<td>Wahyudi Yusuf</td>
<td>Jl. H. Salihun No.9, Rt.009/01 Kebayoran</td>
<td>Saturday night</td>
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<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>Dedi Alim</td>
<td>Zawiyah JIC Jl. Kramat Jaya Tugu, Jakarta Utara</td>
<td>Sunday Night</td>
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<td>82</td>
<td>Iwan</td>
<td>Pasaraya Sarinah Lt. 5 Blok M</td>
<td>Sunday morning</td>
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<td>83</td>
<td>Arif Hamdani</td>
<td>Pondok Rumi Jl. Pondok Jaya VIII No. 4, Mampang Perapatan VII Jakarta Selatan</td>
<td>Friday night</td>
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<td>84</td>
<td>Miftah</td>
<td>Jl. Cikunir No.72 Kampung Dua, Rt. 04/Rw.015, Jaka Sampurna, Bekasi Barat 17145</td>
<td>Friday night</td>
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<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>Arman</td>
<td>Jl. Abimanyu Raya 18 - Bantarjati, Bogor 16153</td>
<td>4th Saturday Night/monthly</td>
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<td>86</td>
<td>Ust. Sohib</td>
<td>Majelis Taklim Ar Rohaniyah Pertemuan Jl. Wahid Hasyim dan Jl. Pelita Ujung Rt. 03 Rw.03 Kelurahan Limo Depok</td>
<td>Friday night</td>
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<td>87</td>
<td>Ust. Sohib</td>
<td>Majelis Taklim Kurniati Jl. Limo Raya Gg. Yasfi Rt. 03 Rw.03 Kelurahan Limo Depok</td>
<td>Shalat Nariyah recitation Saturday night</td>
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<td>88</td>
<td>Suhono/Ujang Setiawan</td>
<td>Paguyuban Syekh Hisyam Jl. Pangkal Jati No.1A Rt.03 Rw.01 Cinere, Depok</td>
<td>Thursday day</td>
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<td>89</td>
<td>Amat Sodikun</td>
<td>Zawiyah Al Haqq Perum Villa Pertiwi Blok Q1 Ujung Depok (Iewat Jl.Raya Bogor Km 37)</td>
<td>Thursday night</td>
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<td>90</td>
<td>Eka A.K.</td>
<td>Grand Depok City, Cluster Alamanda Blok C4 No.11</td>
<td>Saturday night</td>
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<td>91</td>
<td>Nur Hidayat</td>
<td>Zawiyah Nurul Haqq Jl. Kirai No.1B Rt.05/02 Andara, Pangkal Jati baru, Cinere, Depok</td>
<td>Thursday day</td>
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<td>92</td>
<td>Ust. Rochmat Endang</td>
<td>Majelis Dzikir Al Istighfar Kampung Mekarbakti RT.04/02 Kelurahan Mekarbakti Kecamatan Panongan-Tangerang</td>
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<td>93</td>
<td>Junaidi/Yandi Hidayat</td>
<td>Zawiyah Daarud Dzikra Perum Citra Raya, Kompleks Graha Indira Jl. Kiara No.12 Blok K.18 No.1-2 Cikupa, Tangerang 5940-3454</td>
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<td>94</td>
<td>Syaiful Husni</td>
<td>Jl. Raya Jombang 93 B Bintaro-Parigi Bintaro Jaya Sektor 9</td>
<td>Friday Night</td>
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<td>95</td>
<td>Abdus Sattar Alwi</td>
<td>Zawiyah Pamulang Gapek Jl. Dream Residence Blok B 10</td>
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<td>96</td>
<td>Nanang Ahmad Nurkosim</td>
<td>Dusun Cigangsa, Desa Cijati, Kecamatan Situraja, Kabupaten Sumedang.</td>
<td>Sunday Morning 9.30am</td>
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<tr>
<td>97</td>
<td>Yakub Romdoni</td>
<td>Kompleks Griya Bukit Mas II Blok C3-22 Bandung</td>
<td>Sunday Morning 9.30am</td>
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<td>98</td>
<td>Mughni/Fadli Irawan</td>
<td>Zawiyah At Thohiriyah Randobawailir Kuningan Jawa Barat</td>
<td>Thursday night 7.30pm</td>
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<td>99</td>
<td>Arief Rochman</td>
<td>Zawiha Bukit Mas Taman Citeureup Cimahi Jl. Nusa Sari Utara III No.6 Bandung, Jawa Barat</td>
<td>Thursday night 7.30pm</td>
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<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>Rida Firdaus</td>
<td>Zawiyah Raudhatul Rabbani (Ahhbabur Rasul) Pasir Mulya Majalaya Karawang</td>
<td>Thursday night 7.30pm</td>
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<td>101</td>
<td>Abdul Mufid/Aryanto</td>
<td>Jl.Erlangga Tengah VI No.02 Semarang, Jawa Tengah 50117</td>
<td>Wednesday night 8.00pm</td>
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<td>102</td>
<td>Waluyo Pujianto</td>
<td>Cubluk Rt.03/Rw.03 Girtilrto Wonogiri, Indonesia 57611</td>
<td>Thursday night 7.30pm</td>
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<tr>
<td>103</td>
<td>Mukhlisin/Muhib</td>
<td>Zawiyah Kebon Tengah Pekalongan</td>
<td>Thursday night 7.30pm</td>
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<tr>
<td>104</td>
<td>H. Tahlis Abdillah</td>
<td>Jl. Raya Doro 274, Pekalongan, Jawa Tengah</td>
<td>Thursday night 7.30pm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105</td>
<td>Muhammad Hambali</td>
<td>Perumahan Permata Ngalian III No. 78 Semarang, Jawa Tengah 50181</td>
<td>Thursday night 7.30pm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106</td>
<td>Joko Try Abdul Haqq</td>
<td>Jl. Sawi No. 16A RT 04 RW 06 Kel. Sendangguwo, Kedungmundo, Semarang 50273</td>
<td>Thursday night 7.30pm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107</td>
<td>Suradi/Sutrisno</td>
<td>Rabbani Nogosari Bandung Playen Gunung Kidul Wonosari, Yogyakarta</td>
<td>Thursday night 7.30pm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108</td>
<td>Joko Sulistyono</td>
<td>Perum Tiara Citra 2 No B5, Maguwoharjo, Depok, Sleman 55282</td>
<td>Sunday Morning 8am</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109</td>
<td>Atika/Bu Prasty</td>
<td>Ibu Prasty Jl.Pakuncen 15, Wirobrajan, Yogyakarta 55253</td>
<td>Sunday Morning 8am</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>Achmad Mashuri</td>
<td>Sedah Romo Lor No.2 RT.02 RW.07 Kartosuro, Solo</td>
<td>Thursday night 7.30pm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111</td>
<td>Bapak H.M.Fadli</td>
<td>Jl. Gang Pasar, Toko Sakinah SidoarjoSaturday night</td>
<td>Thursday night 7.30pm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112</td>
<td>Tripurdi</td>
<td>Kebravan Sport Center (KSC) Jl. Kebravan Gg. II Surabaya</td>
<td>Thursday night 7.30pm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113</td>
<td>Anwar/H. Suyuti</td>
<td>Mushola Al-Muhiddin Pondok Wage Indah I/39 Sidoarjo, Jawa Timur</td>
<td>Thursday night 7.30pm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114</td>
<td>Madyo/Kusyaeri</td>
<td>Jl.Pakis Tirtosari VII/17 Surabaya, Jawa Timur</td>
<td>Thursday night 7.30pm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115</td>
<td>A. Hatta/A. Naris</td>
<td>Perumahan Sukolilo Regency Park Blok J No. 7 Keputih – Surabaya</td>
<td>Thursday night 7.30pm</td>
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<tr>
<td>116</td>
<td>Abdul Hamid</td>
<td>Masjid Adz Dzakirin 116Jl.K.H.Agus Salim, gq.Taman,</td>
<td>Thursday night 7.30pm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Address</td>
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<tr>
<td>117</td>
<td>Nurul/Bambang</td>
<td>Mushalla as-Salafiyah Pasuruan, Karangsentul, Gondangwetan, Pasuruan, Jawa Timur</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>118</td>
<td>Suyitno/S. Riyanto</td>
<td>Tamplek, Takeran, Magetan</td>
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<td>119</td>
<td>Sugianto/ Cak Mas'ud</td>
<td>Jl. Asparaga 12 Malang.</td>
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<td>120</td>
<td>Nur Fadhilah</td>
<td>Pakisan, Kajar, Bondowoso</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>121</td>
<td>Ustadz Munzakki</td>
<td>Masjid Hubul Iman, dusun Ngantingan, Banjarworo, Bangilan Tuban</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122</td>
<td>Ust. Rozy</td>
<td>Jl. Raden Patah No.16A Karya Bhakti, Pasuruan</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td>Muji Irmulandari</td>
<td>Jl. Sawo II, No.3, Patrang, Jember</td>
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<tr>
<td>124</td>
<td>Abdul Rosyid Murodi</td>
<td>Jl. K.H. Ghozali X/9 Citradewangsan, Lumajang</td>
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<tr>
<td>125</td>
<td>Sugeng/Hidayatur Rohman</td>
<td>Zawiyah Mantingan Tuban</td>
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<tr>
<td>126</td>
<td>Made</td>
<td>Zawiyah Tuban (Kota)</td>
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<td>127</td>
<td>Achmad Rachozim Ilyas</td>
<td>Zawiyah Sumenep</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Jl. Diponegoro No.110 Sumenep, Madura</td>
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<td>128</td>
<td>Asep Abdus Sattar Rinjani</td>
<td>Zawiyah Jembrana</td>
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<td>0812-396-xxxx</td>
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<td>129</td>
<td>Bambang Supriyanto</td>
<td>Zawiyah Luklu Bali</td>
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<td>Jl. Permata Utama DI/7 Mengwi, Badung Denpasar, Bali</td>
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<td>130</td>
<td>Untung S</td>
<td>Zawiyah Banjbarbaru</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Jl. Sanggiringan Raya No.76, Komp. Ratu Elok, Banjbarbaru, Kalsel</td>
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<td>131</td>
<td>Firli</td>
<td>Perum Kaltim Cipta Yasa (KCY)</td>
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<td>Jl. Sabang KK.2, Bontang Kaltim</td>
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<tr>
<td>132</td>
<td>Ust. Abdul Muiz</td>
<td>Zawiyah Bumi Sempaja Samarinda</td>
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<td>Kompleks Perum Bumi Sempaja (Jl. Poros Griya Mukti Sejahtera) Rt 39 Samarinda Utara, Kalimantan Timur</td>
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<td>133</td>
<td>Ust. Fauzi</td>
<td>Zawiyah Hidayatul Musthofa Bontang</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Jl. Kapal Layar 5 HM 5 RT 20 Lokhtuan</td>
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<tr>
<td>134</td>
<td>Ustadz Ruly Wahyudi</td>
<td>Zawiyah Pupuk, Balikpapan&lt;br&gt; Jl. Pupuk Utara V Rt.76&lt;br&gt; Blok F No. 2&lt;br&gt; Kel. Gunung Bahagia&lt;br&gt; Kec. Balikpapan Selatan&lt;br&gt; Kalimantan Timur 76114</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135</td>
<td>Bapak Muhammad Rusmin</td>
<td>Jl. Suka Maju XIV No.8&lt;br&gt; Makasar, Sulawesi Selatan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix VII

### DZIKIR OF KHATM KHWAJAGAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Khatm Khwajagan (Long version)</th>
<th>Khatm Khwajagan (Short version)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shahada 3x</td>
<td>Shahada 3x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Istighfar 70x</td>
<td>Istighfar 25x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doa Syekh</td>
<td>Doa Syekh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabitah Syarif</td>
<td>Rabitah Syarif</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatiha 7x</td>
<td>Fatiha 7x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shalawat 100x</td>
<td>Shalawat 10x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surah Al Inshirah 79x</td>
<td>Surah Al Inshirah 79x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surah Al Ikhlas 1001x</td>
<td>Surah Al Ikhlas 1001x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatiha 7x</td>
<td>Fatiha 7x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shalawat 100x</td>
<td>Shalawat 10x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recite Quran (by order of syekh)</td>
<td>Recite Quran (by order of syekh)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ihda</td>
<td>Ihda</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nafi itsbat 100x</td>
<td>Nafi itsbat 100x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ismu dzat 100x</td>
<td>Ismu dzat 100x</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recite Huu (huwa) 33x</td>
<td>Recite Huu (huwa) 33x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recite haqq 33x</td>
<td>Recite haqq 33x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recite hayy 33x</td>
<td>Recite hayy 33x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recite Allahu...Allah haqq 10x</td>
<td>Recite Allahu...Allah hay 10x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recite Allahu...Allah hay 10x</td>
<td>Recite Allahu...Allah hay 10x</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recite Allah hay ya qayyum 10x</td>
<td>Recite Allah hay ya qayyum 10x</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recite Ya Hu, Ya Hu, Ya Da’im 3x</td>
<td>Recite Ya Hu, Ya Hu, Ya Da’im 3x</td>
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<td>Recite Ya Da’im, Ya Da’im, Ya Da’im, Ya Allah 2x</td>
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<td>Recite Ya Ghaffar, Ya Ghaffar, Ya Ghaffar, Ya Allah 2x</td>
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<td>Recite Ya Fattah, Ya Fattah, Ya Fattah, Ya Allah 2x</td>
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<td>Recite Ya Mujeeb, Ya Mujeeb, Ya Mujeeb, Ya Allah 2x</td>
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<td>Recite Ya Mu’izz, Ya Mu’izz, Ya Mu’izz, Ya Allah 2x</td>
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<td>Recite Ya Dayyan, Ya Dayyan, Ya Dayyan, Ya Allah 2x</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recite Ya Sultan, Ya Sultan, Ya Sultan, Ya Allah 2x</td>
<td>Recite Ya Sultan, Ya Sultan, Ya Sultan, Ya Allah 2x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hasbunallah wa ni’mak wakeel, ni’mal mawla wa ni’man nasir, la hawla wa la quwwata illa billahi l ‘aliyyil ‘adhim

| Ihda                            | Ihda                             |
| Ihsan                            | Ihsan                            |
| Recite Huu (huwa) 33x            | Recite Huu (huwa) 33x             |
| Recite haqq 33x                  | Recite haqq 33x                   |
| Recite hayy 33x                  | Recite hayy 33x                   |
| Hasbunallah wa ni’mak wakeel, ni’mal mawla wa ni’man nasir, la hawla wa la quwwata illa billahi l ‘aliyyil ‘adhim | Hasbunallah wa ni’mak wakeel, ni’mal mawla wa ni’man nasir, la hawla wa la quwwata illa billahi l ‘aliyyil ‘adhim |

369
Recite Ya Aman, Ya Aman, Ya Aman, Ya Allah 2x
Recite Ya Allah, Ya Allah, Ya Allah 2x
Recite Hasbunallah wa ni’mak wakeel, ni’mal mawla wa ni’man nasiir, la hawla wa la quwwata illa billahi ɏ ‘aliyyil ‘adhim
Shalawat 10x
Ihda

Recite Allahu, Allah, Haqq 3x
Recite Allahu, Allah Hayy 3x
Recite Allah Hayy Ya Qayyum 10x
Hasbunallah wa ni’mak wakeel, ni’mal mawla wa ni’man nasiir, la hawla wa la quwwata illa billahi ɏ ‘aliyyil ‘adhim

Recite Ya Hu, Ya Hu, Ya Da’im’ 3x
Allah Ya Hu, Ya Da’im’ 1x
Ya Da’im, Ya Da’im, Ya Da’im Ya Allah 2x
Ya Haleem, Ya Haleem, Ya Haleem, Ya Allah 2x
Ya Hafeedh, Ya Hafeedh, Ya Hafeedh, Ya Allah 2x
Ya Lateef, Ya Lateef, Ya Lateef, Ya Allah 2x
Ya Ghaffar, Ya Ghaffar, Ya Ghaffar, Ya Allah 2x
Ya Sattar, Ya Sattar, Ya Sattar, Ya Allah’ 2x
Ya Fattah, Ya Fattah, Ya Fattah, Ya Allah 2x
Ya Mujeeb, Ya Mujeeb, Ya Mujeeb, Ya Allah 2x
Ya Mu’izz, Ya Mu’izz, Ya Mu’izz, Ya Allah 2x
Ya Mu'een, Ya Mu’een, Ya Mu’een, Ya Allah 2x
Ya Wadud, Ya Wadud, Ya Wadud, Ya Allah 2x
Ya Rahman, Ya Rahman, Ya Rahman, Ya Allah 2x
Ya Raheem, Ya Raheem, Ya Raheem, Ya Allah 2x
Ya Hannan, Ya Hannan, Ya Hannan, Ya Allah 2x
Ya Mannan, Ya Mannan, Ya Mannan, Ya Allah 2x
Ya Dayyan, Ya Dayyan, Ya Dayyan, Ya Allah 2x
Ya Subhan, Ya Subhan, Ya Subhan, Ya Allah 2x
Ya Sultan, Ya Sultan, Ya Sultan, Ya Allah 2x
Ya Aman, Ya Aman, Ya Aman, Ya Allah 2x
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ya Allah, Ya Allah, Ya Allah, Ya Allah 7x</th>
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<tr>
<td>hasbunallah wa ni'ma-l-Wakeel, ni'ma-l-Mawla</td>
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<tr>
<td>wa ni'ma-n-Naseer, la hawla wa la quwwata illa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>billahi-l-'Aliyyi-l-'Adheem'</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
أعرز بالله من النسيان الرغم
بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
مكتبيتنا ستكون...
وتمام...
ماشاء الله سبحان وايا لم يكن..
Appendix IX

SAMPLE OF FLYER

Munajat dan Doa untuk Bangsa
bersama Syekh Hisyam Kabbani
Desember 2010

Selasa, 14 Desember 2010, pkl. 19.00 WIB
Zikir di Masjid Sunda Kelapa

Jumat, 17 Desember 2010,
Salat Jumat di Masjid Al-Hawi, Condete

Sabtu, 18 Desember 2010, pkl. 19.00 WIB
Maulid Nabi bersama Habib Syech Assegaf
di Alun-Alun Kota Bantul, Jogjakarta

Rabu, 22 Desember 2010, pkl. 11.00 WIB
Silaturahim dengan Habib Nagib (Majelis INAT)
Megamendung, Bogor

Rabu, 22 Desember 2010, pkl. 19.00 WIB
Zikir dan Taushiyah di Pesantren Daaruss-Yifa
Kadudampit, Sukabumi

Kamis, 23 Desember 2010, pkl. 19.00 WIB
Maulid Nabi bersama K.H. Amir Hamzah
di Pesantren Darul Istah, Buncit Raya, Jaksel

*Acara sewaktu-waktu dapat berubah
**Saksikan Siaran Langsungnya melalui www.sufilive.com

Donasi:
Rek. BCA: 3360006335 an Meza
Rek. Mandiri: 0060099162663 an Meza

Yayasan Haqqani Indonesia
Jl. Teuku Umar 41, Menteng
Jakarta Pusat
email: alhaqqani@gmail.com
telepon: +62812 1105 212
www.naqpybandi.org