offered Catholics. However, to reject such an offer would not strengthen the British position in the eyes of unprejudiced observers' it believed with its London contemporary, the Tablet. Whether the Pope was to be employed in the present dispute or not, the Tasmanian Irish-Catholic Monitor considered the long-term goal of a means of international arbitration, the need for which had been currently highlighted, one to be applauded.1

Cleveland's proposed Commission, backed by Congress, was received in Australia with initial suspicion and hostility. The main objection was that the Commission was to be forced on Britain by America despite weak Venezuelan claims and that the decision was to be dictated by the United States. It became then, a matter of principle for the colonies of Britain to reject such meddlesomeness from an external power. As a body, the Commission was criticized for irrelevance, ineffectiveness and bias. Not only was its constitution 'impossible' in the eyes of the Brisbane Evening Observer, it was as well 'a folly and an insult' as a concept.2

Defenders of the Commission there were. To accept the Commission would be a vote of confidence in the justice of Britain's claims, they held. A decision in Britain's favour would vindicate its honour and was to be expected given the strength of Britain's case and the desire of America to drop as quickly as possible the crushing new responsibilities

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1Advocate, 1 Feb. 1896; Monitor, 3 Jan. 1896; Pope Leo XIII (1878-1903) raised the prestige of the Church to a height 'unknown since the Middle Ages' in the opinion of one observer. He successfully arbitrated between Spain and Germany over the Carolines. Both Archbishop Tonti of Caracas and the Earl of Kimberley had been involved in abortive Papal negotiations over the Venezuelan boundary.

she had so rashly assumed. It was expected that the Commission would fill in its time with historical discussion. With America obviously not intending force, the *Bendigo Independent* predicted the Commissioners would 'bring nothing more formidable into play than a theodolite and a surveyor's chain or a pair of spectacles for use among dusty papers....'¹ Most of the Australian press displayed an amused contempt toward America and an almost pathetic faith in the firmness of British claims. The London correspondent of the *Argus* conjured up the delectable prospect of a decision both against Venezuela and discrediting Cleveland - an ironic fate for his upstart Commission.²

Readers no doubt followed in a desultory way the cable items to the end of April 1896. These concerned the publication of a British Blue Book on the disputed area and the modifications to the structure of the Commission suggested by a variety of people such as Carl Schurz and H.M. Stanley - especially those to include Englishmen. They also probably noted the failure of the British government to appear too enthusiastic about arbitration, despite energetic efforts by Smalley, the *Times'* American correspondent, to involve his government. However, editorial interest, instead of concentrating on matters as narrow as British ambassador Sir Julian Pauncefote's agreement with the Venezuelan minister in the United States to consider the Yuruan incident claims separate from the frontier question (news of which arrived 21 March), began to channel itself instead toward the infinitely more fascinating prospect of a general arbitration.

¹*Bendigo Independent*, 28 Dec. 1895.

²*Argus*, 29 Jan. 1896. See also, *Daily Telegraph (Sydney)*, 28 Dec. 1895; *Newcastle Morning Herald*, 15 Jan. 1896. Nonetheless the *Bulletin* endorsed the Commission because it believed Britain's claims were weak and wished it to give that arrogant country a lesson.
Such a prospect had not just suddenly appeared. Hopeful efforts beginning in 1873, renewed in 1887 by Randal Cremer, the British M.P. and taken up again by him in 1895 with Secretary of State Gresham, had been made. Only the death of Gresham and the December crisis itself had intervened to curtail their further development. With the negotiations in January regarding the acceptance of Cleveland's Commission, the issue revived.  

Some Australian newspapers were at first doubtful of the efficacy of such arbitration. In the case of the unpaid Bering Sea Fisheries awards and the excessive American claims concerning the Alabama, Britain had several times been the victim of Yankee duplicity, it was felt. Claiming that the latter award had been a 'notorious and confessed swindle' and the Webster-Ashburton Treaty 'a palpable fraud ...open to grave suspicion', the Mercury for one concluded that 'this way of settling international difficulties is

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3 The Bering Sea Dispute (29 Feb. 1892) referred the question of pelagic sealing off the Pribilof Islands near Alaska to an international tribunal. Its decision 15 Aug. 1893 awarded damages of $443,151 to Britain which remained unpaid until 16 June 1898.

4 Alabama Claims (1869-72) were decided by an international tribunal, 25 Aug. 1872, against Britain for failing to exercise 'due diligence' in preventing the Confederate raider Alabama from preying upon Union shipping. The $15,500,000 award was paid by Britain, but the unclaimed excess was never returned - a point which long rankled.

5 The Webster-Ashburton Treaty (9 Aug. 1842) settling the controversial portions of the U.S.-Canadian borders was felt to be unfair by the British due to the use of 'rigged maps' by the U.S.
not likely to grow in favour unless national honour increases considerably.'

Despite a general recognition that such agreements were not panaceas and that they were only as good as the mutual confidence placed in them, many commentators, reacting against the high cost of war in blood and treasure (an estimated 4,913,000 men in the preceding century; £172 million in Europe on armaments per year), were prepared to endorse any system which offered a prospect of peaceful settlement of disputes 'in the interests of humanity, commerce and common sense' as one paper put it.2

Some commentators grew eloquent on the issue. The words of Tennyson from the volume, Locksley Hall were quoted:

Till the war drum throbbed no longer and battle flags were furled,
In the parliament of man — the federation of the world;
There the common sense of most shall hold a fitful realm in awe,
And the kindly earth shall slumber, lapt in universal law.3

Sydney's rabbi J.H. Landau based his sermon following Kislev, on arbitration:

As Jews [he said], we protest against war. Intelligence, justice, righteousness demand the settlement of all international disputes by arbitration, such as the prophets of our race sang in the days when brute force prevailed and none but inspired men dreamed of any other forms of settlement.

The concept of the brotherhood of man would relieve the crushing burdens of an armed peace and strengthen and purify the basis of all government. Every Jew should 'do

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1Mercury, 12 Dec. 1895.
his little part in creating a strong sentiment on the subject', he urged.  

Risking some unpopularity in the voicing of its views, the Australian News at an early stage urged Salisbury to back down and concede arbitration to Cleveland's appointed body, in response to 'universal endorsement from numbers [sic] of men representing all grades of society and all shades of public opinion'. Affirming the more pervading sentiment for arbitration, the paper claimed (20 January):

The probability is that if the whole of the British race were to be polled tomorrow, it would be difficult to find a thoughtful man who would vote in opposition to the line of argument we have ventured upon."

Others agreed, but more cautiously. The Leader was eager to discover some way to preserve peace with honour in the present situation given the costliness of modern war, while its parent daily the Age agreed with Sir Richard Webster, that disputes like the present could be easily handled by a regular tribunal. The paper also expressed irritation at Salisbury's tardiness in arbitrating and outlined and approved of the existence of a more durable, impartial court. With others, it was impressed by America's long-established reputation for employing arbitral means to settle disputes.

1Australian Hebrew, 3 Jan. 1896.
3Leader, 11 Jan. 1896.
4Sir Richard Webster was Attorney-General of England and president of the Congress of the Association for Reform and Codification of Laws of Nations. The meeting of the latter had just been held in Brussels.
5Age, 3, 16, 21 Jan. 1896; Age quoted New York Tribune, also referred to an article in the New York University Law Review, listing the 80 U.S. disputes settled since 1816 by arbitration making it 'literally the peace nation of the world'. By contrast, see Brisbane Worker, 11 Jan. 1896.
John Farrell was similarly delighted by the cabled suggestion of an established permanent court of appeal. He viewed it as refreshing...cold reason...in the midst of all the blisterous war talk. It provided...the germ of a movement which promises more for mankind than anything that human reason has yet evolved.

In this, he countered the view of Brient, his editor, who the day before considered arbitration had little chance of success as 'the original instinct that might is right and trial of arms a natural court of appeal survives among European nations'. As ever, it appears to have taken considerable courage for opinion-leaders to condemn the international lawlessness of the day and the arms race, despite their palpable absurdities.¹

It was easier to be critical of the new arbitration phenomenon than of the existing anarchic system. Many wondered aloud how arbitration could have prevented any of the 'great' wars - the Russo-Turkish (1854), the Prussian-Austrian (1866) and the Franco-Prussian (1870). Sceptics pointed to the already-established Peace Society's failure to inaugurate an international court of settlement; to the possibility that Britain might be involved with the settlement of speculative claims all the year round - a prey to any small government seeking popularity, and to the impossibility of arbitrating affairs involving national honour and policing decisions thus made. Critics also questioned the feasibility of arbitrating Ireland's status and pointed out the unpromising belligerence of the American Republican party's projected foreign policy attitudes. Far from dampening conflicts as many Australian editors suggested had occurred in the present situation, commerce would ultimately

¹Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 14, 15 Jan. 1896.
provoke struggles as bitter and prolonged as any more readily arbitrable territorial dispute. Finally, with Salisbury himself, some editors agreed that the time was premature for such a broader form of tribunal. ¹

Yet editorial support for the idea grew. This was assisted by the backing away of the Times from its formerly intransigent position and on recognition of Britain's vulnerability in Turkey, Egypt and South Africa and the need for the country to settle quickly some of its outstanding problems. A large number of editors agreed that conditions generally favoured addressing the American case first and that Salisbury's decision to arbitrate the Guiana-Venezuela issue after all, opened fruitful prospects for further cooperation. The growing Australian sentiment for arbitration was assisted by what was believed to be the favourable reactions toward arbitration animating France and Belgium. ²

There was further thrust provided by W.T. Stead's call 'To All English Speaking Folk' in the Review of Reviews. This remarkable item of peace propaganda urged the full arbitration of all future disputes, was signed by prominent clergymen and also included Darby, Secretary of the Peace Society; W. Cremer, Secretary of the Arbitration Alliance and J.F. Green, Secretary of the International Arbitration and Peace Association. ³

¹For this debate, see, Age, 16 Jan. 1896; Newcastle Morning Herald, 15 Jan. 1896; Mercury, 16 Jan. 1896; Sydney Morning Herald, 15 Feb. 1896. The opinions of H.M. Stanley and Amos Shields were widely quoted.


³Review of Reviews, 20 Mar. 1896, p.230. Stead's enthusiasm for the project is described in Frederick Whyte, The Life of W.T. Stead (London, 1925), II, p.87, passim. In her competent summation of Stead, Barbara Tuchman notes: 'The connecting principle running through his causes was belief in man's duty to amend society and extend the British sway.' These progressive and ethnocentric principles help explain his Australian appeal. See The Proud Tower, pp.245-8, esp. p.246.
Despite the impressiveness of this direct appeal and those supportive materials appearing in the article literature, the tone of the Australian reaction was still much more cautious than its overseas counterparts. It most closely matched that of John Morley in the Nineteenth Century, who both praised the general arbitration impulse and urged proper circumspection concerning it. Conciliation which did not enfeeble diplomacy but left open the right of protest was preferable, it was maintained. Attitudes expressed during the 1890 Pan-American Conference and the 1893 Chicago Peace Conference were cited as examples of this approach. In mid-March the Argus typified prevailing views when it concluded that only a 'limited arrangement may be feasible [or] worth striving for'.

April was a particularly active month on the American scene for the cause of arbitration. By cable, Australians learnt of the successful meetings of the American Peace Society of Boston and the Universal Peace Association of Philadelphia and the special efforts of Church groups — particularly the Quakers — in promoting the project. On America's west coast, college peace resolutions and on America's east coast, mass peace demonstrations, were also reported in Australia's metropolitan press. By 25 April the great Arbitration Conference held in Washington four days earlier which had boasted 400 distinguished

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2 Argus, 16 Mar. 1896.
representatives of most American States was reported. By the end of the month news arrived of the proposal for general arbitration drawn up by a special committee of the New York Bar association, who had presented it to Cleveland. These American developments and the known enthusiasm for arbitration of British conservatives and liberals (such as John Morley, James Bryce, Lord Rosebery, Herbert Asquith, William Watson, Herbert Spencer, Sir Richard Webster and Arthur James Balfour) together with the various religious and worker petitions (the latter containing names of 5,000 labour leaders) and the work of the Conference of the International Arbitration League and London Peace Society, made their impression on Australian editorial opinion.

From the moment when Salisbury entered the official negotiations on the prospect of general arbitration, involving an exchange of secret correspondence between Olney and Paunccefote (March–July 1896), Australian opinion had to fall back upon article literature, its own ruminations and cable news to assess what, if anything, was happening. For all the uncertainty of the progress of negotiations, comment moved slowly toward a hopeful position, much of the tenuous optimism of this intermediate period being vindicated by the publication of the diplomatic correspondence reaching Australia in September.¹

Debate concerning the possible relations of the two peoples continued into mid 1896. This was stimulated by the article literature whose points were taken up by various newspapers. Broken Hill's Barrier Miner for example, granted that British diplomacy regarding America had been

¹Foreign Relations of the United States, 1896 (Washington, 1897), pp.222-4; Olney to Paunccefote, 11 Apr. 1896, pp.224-8; Salisbury to Paunccefote, 18 May, 1896, pp.228-31; Olney to Paunccefote, 22 June 1896, p.234. Published in the Times.
maladroit at an earlier time but believed it unfair for Americans to now judge Britons by the standards of George III's day, especially when evidence suggested that Britons erred on the side of generosity toward Americans in particular, in awards for all branches of endeavour.¹ Economist, and arbitrator of railroad disputes, David A. Wells, had opened a branch of debate in the North American Review in defence of Britain and this had been challenged in the April copy of the same magazine by W. Hazeltine. The latter's reply suggested that Canada should be surrendered to America in line with the Shelbourne programme of 1783, a proposition denounced as unfair and unnecessary by the Miner's editor and W.H. Fitchett. In the Australasian edition of the Review of Reviews, the latter juxtaposed the tolerance of Professor John Bassett Moore of Columbia University in the May National Review with the intolerance toward Britain of Evelen Laura Mason in the May Arena, though 'she represents a trend in American opinion with which we have, as men bound to face the facts, in all seriousness to reckon'.² Others gathered more from events such as the friendly reception of the Honourable Company of the Artillery of Boston marching through the streets of London, than from wordy arguments.³

Some papers remained unimpressed by the cable rumours that agreement on more limited arbitration was imminent. One pointed to Venezuela's palpable unhappiness with such an agreement while another regretted that referring Venezuela's whole claim to a board of arbitration would 'forfeit sovereign rights, barter away prestige for a shadow and invite future aggression from every pettifoggling

¹ Barrier Miner, 4 July 1896, ref. to Stanhope Sprigg's article in May's Ludgate on 'British Schools of Music'.

² Review of Reviews, 20 July 1896.

³ E.g. Methodist (Melbourne), 26 June 1896; Sydney Morning Herald, 8 July 1896; Sydney Mail, 3 Oct. 1896; Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 20 July 1896; Ballarat Star, 23 July 1896.
State whose impudence is greater than its love of honour'. J.B. Moore (himself later an active member of peace and arbitration tribunals) had alerted Britons to the potential danger of collision with America on the issue of American trade carried in British bottoms. Steeling its readers against a possible renewal of Anglophobia, the gossipy social weekly *Table Talk* urged Melbourne theatregoers to extract an open apology from the well-known American actor and anglophobe, Nat Goodwin, before permitting him to appear on 25 July 1896 at the *Princess Theatre*.  

Few however expressed this open hostility, preferring to wait upon events. Editors kept the debate on the efficacy of arbitration alive in an intellectual way. The *Maitland Mercury* agreed with W.N. King in the *Century* that Venezuelans had little to fear from British commercial control of the Orinoco, while the *Hobart Mercury* agreed with the recently arrived former Governor and present Agent-General of Queensland, Henry Norman, who was playing a large informal role in arbitration negotiations. In his article in the *Cosmopolis* Norman believed the dispute over Venezuela was still full of danger. The conservative *South Australian Register* agreed with Lord Bryce's vague belief that 90 per cent of peoples were in favour of an International Court for the settlement of disputes, despite Salisbury's caution.

Others were encouraged with opinions expressed by anti-expansionists Edward J. Phelps, Frederick Greenwood and

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1 J.B. Moore had been Professor of International Law and Diplomacy at Columbia University since 1891.  
2 *Table Talk*, 24 July 1896.  
5 *South Australian Register*, 31 Aug. 1896.
William Graham Sumner.\textsuperscript{1} Some hoped that prospects for mediation would be speeded along by the encouraging precedent of Queen Victoria's Argentinian-Chilean adjudication, or by an unforeseen calamitous event in Turkey.\textsuperscript{2} Many more were inspired by the poem of American anglophile and former editor of the Atlantic Monthly, Thomas Bailey Aldrich in the July Century. Its last lines, referring to England's influence on America, ended hopefully:

\begin{quote}
Thy blood makes quick her pulses, and some day,
Not now, yet some day at thy soft behest,
She at thy side shall hold the world at bay.\textsuperscript{3}
\end{quote}

In the opinion of Stead, 'a pleasant message to reach the old country on the 120th anniversary of the Declaration of American Independence'.\textsuperscript{4}

Though a decision had been made in July 1896 by both governments in Britain and America to publish their correspondence on the progress of arbitration in the hope of soliciting public opinion on the issues, real comment on various proposals by the Australian press did not begin until W.T. Stead launched it in the Review of Reviews (20 September).

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{2}Geelong Advertiser, 4 Sept. 1896; Leader, 12 Sept. 1896.
\item \textsuperscript{3}Aldrich's poem 'On Reading William Watson's Sonnets: The Purple East'.
\item \textsuperscript{4}Review of Reviews, 20 Sept. 1896.
\end{itemize}
Stead summarised the Salisbury propositions to Olney regarding specific arbitration as being first, the appointment of a joint commission composed of two Americans and two Englishmen, to report on the facts of the disputed territory. Second, when their report was obtained, the nomination of a tribunal of three arbitrators— one British, one Venezuelan and a third to be decided by the first two. At that point, Salisbury had agreed only to accept recommendations and not awards concerning the settled districts. The Advertiser for one, commended this caution. ¹

Sir Edward Clarke, a prominent British conservative and a former colonial Solicitor General, deeply disturbed Australian editorial opinion in October with his suggestion that not only might the British claim be weak, but that the Commissioners' report could be adverse to Britain. The light that this threw on Britain's reluctance to arbitrate was now a sinister one some thought, and would not only confirm American anglophobes in their worst opinions, but might even lead to a war in which Britain would appear in the wrong.²

Anxieties of this nature were assuaged to a degree by British ambassador Lord Pauncefote's return to Washington (22 October) after a three month absence in England.³ It was now felt that a solution was imminent. Times cables, acting on the intelligence supplied by George W. Smalley to G.E. Buckle, the Times' editor, who passed it on to Salisbury, anticipated that the stumbling block to agreement was the length of time determining recognition of prescriptive title by British residents in Guiana. Not until Olney suggested

¹Advertiser, 26 Sept. 1896.
50 years of occupancy as a negotiating formula was the deadlock resolved.¹ During this latter phase of the proceedings and just prior to the signing of a draft Anglo-Venezuelan treaty (12 November 1896), the Australian press weighed in with its judgements.

Smalley² had clearly indicated that an agreement was at hand and this provoked a relieved response, in the weeks following the suspense caused by Clark's remarks. Those who believed Britain had done well, based their claims on the evident retention of British honour and the preservation of American goodwill. Those who held that America had triumphed, based their views on the assumption that America had 'forced' Britain to negotiate and had thereby enormously extended the powers of the Monroe Doctrine. What then appeared as a temporary solution was storing up potential future trouble claimed the pessimists, as Britain was bound to clash with these new pretensions. Salisbury's annual London Guildhall speech (9 November) differed dramatically in tone from the one the year preceding. Its placatory nature set the seal on what had been anticipated for days.³

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¹Olney's role is discussed in the following - Charles C. Tansill, The Foreign Policy of Thomas F. Bayard (Baltimore, 1937), pp.757-66, 774; George B. Young, 'Intervention Under the Monroe Doctrine: The Olney Corollary', Political Science Quarterly, LVII, pp.274-8; T.C. Smith, 'Secretary Olney's Real Credit in the Venezuelan Affair', Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, LXV, 1933, pp.137-46. Much of the Australian press came later to agree with the views of David P. Chalmers, K.B., former Chief Justice of British Guiana, that the 50 year rule was fair. His ideas appeared in the Judicial Review, Jan. 1896.

²George W. Smalley was an American who had returned to his native country (aged 62) to report on events. Many Americans such as Roosevelt came to dislike his pro-British snobbery.

³For editorial comment, see Maitland Mercury, 2, 9 Jan. 1897; 9 Nov. 1896; Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 11 Nov. 1896; Courier 11 Nov. 1896; West Australian, 11 Nov. 1896; Sydney Morning Herald, 11 Nov. 1896; South Australian Register, 11 Nov. 1896; Australian Star, 12 Nov. 1896; Launceston Examiner, 25 Nov. 1896; Advertiser, 26 Nov. 1896; Capricornian, 28 Nov. 1896; Mercury, 1 Jan. 1897; Age, 1 Jan. 1897.
Details of the Draft Treaty arrived 12 November. The court of arbitration was to have two members from both America and England with a fifth to be decided by both sides. Venezuela was not to be represented. With this news was cabled the judgement of the Times, which because of its Washington link had far outstripped all rivals as an opinion leader in Australia on this issue. It claimed the Treaty a 'signal diplomatic victory for President Cleveland' and felt that 'Great Britain had virtually conceded to the United States a general protectorate over the South American Republics'. Most conservative editorial opinion in Australia now followed this pessimistic line. It was described by some as a backdown by Salisbury in the face of American recklessness and by others as a menace to the rights of new settlers in Guiana's gold areas; a serious derogation of the rights of Europe and a blow to British hopes of joining a friendly European Concert.  

Optimism however, had been reserved for the cabled news also arriving 12 November that a decision had been made simultaneous with that on the Venezuelan arbitration, to proceed with the establishment of a permanent court of arbitration. Ironically therefore, the very machinery which had seemingly produced so unsatisfactory an arrangement in the case of Venezuela, was being applauded for the potential manufacture of unknown future decisions.

Common sense and humanity now appeared in the ascendant, it was held by many: the practical difficulties of the Venezuelan arbitration should not be allowed to

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1For editorial comment, see, Argus, 12, 14 Nov. 1896, quoting Le Temps' reaction; Bendigo Evening Mail, 18 Nov. 1896; Sydney Morning Herald, 17 Nov. 1896, quoting Bryce's American Commonwealth to the effect that Mexico would be swallowed up like Texas; Maitland Mercury, 31 Dec. 1896; Advocate, 21 Nov. 1896, 9 Jan. 1897, criticizing the Argus; South Australian Register, 20 Nov. 1896.
obscure the idealism and vision of the broader scheme. Russell of Killowen, Lord Chief Justice of England,¹ who had delivered a speech before 4,500 members of the American Bar Association at Saratoga in August and had been enthusiastically received, now dominated Australian press opinion on these new developments. Highlights of the text of the speech were presented by Stead in the September Review of Reviews, based on the London Times' coverage.² Russell's general belief was that arbitration could work when the true facts of the case were ascertained; the right principles of international law were applied to them and a proper adjustment on a 'give and take' basis with equitable compensation provided for. This sober assessment was even further muted by the warning that a possible permanent tribunal might assume 'intolerable pretensions'.³ Such sensible caution still fitted much of the Australian mood.⁴

A few Australian observers were prepared to indulge in more open endorsement of the idea. One of the most notable of these was Dr. E. Bevan, who moved a resolution which was carried by a unanimous vote of the Congregational Union and Mission of Victoria. It desired to place on record its deep thankfulness that the danger of war between Britain and the United States had passed away and to prevent further such

¹Charles Russell (1832-1900) was recognized by Australian editors for his widely admired personality; his liberal advocacy of Irish Home Rule; his outstanding defence of Parnell (1889); his counsel as arbitrator in the favourable Bering Sea Award (1893) and his masterful conduct of the trial of the Jameson raiders (1896). After the death of Lord Herschell, Russell acted as British representative in the Venezuelan arbitration of 1899.


danger to civilization and Christianity, it recommended the foundation of a permanent tribunal to arbitrate any future disputes, taking the decision for war out of the hands of either an excited populace or the party designs of politicians. In conclusion, it applauded the present progress of the movement and trusted that 'the public opinion of Australasia may be led to express itself in sympathy with this endeavour to promote the peace and brotherhood of the nations of the world'.

The growing popularity of the idea expressed itself in considerable approval of Sir George Grey's suggestion for joint flags above clasped hands and the motto: 'Hands Across The Sea' - one to be adopted in many subsequent concerts, tableaux and pageants in Australia. Professor George Huntington of Carlton College, Northfield, in the United States, had suggested words for a combined anthem (sung to 'God Save The Queen' and/or 'My Country 'Tis of Thee') and they were also widely quoted in an approving way:

Two Empires by the sea,
Two nations great and free
One anthem raise.
One race of ancient fame,
One tongue, one faith we claim,
One God, whose glorious name
We love and praise....

What deeds our fathers wrought,
What battles we have fought
Let fame record.
Now vengeful passion cease,
Come victories of peace,
Nor hate, nor pride's caprice
Unsheath the sword.

1 The resolution appeared in Review of Reviews, 20 Oct. 1896.

2 Sir George Grey (1812-98) was well known in Australia for his explorations in N.W. Western Australia; his governorships of South Australia and New Zealand, (1877-9). He had left New Zealand for London in 1894.

3 e.g. Bendigo Evening Mail, 8 Oct. 1896.
In these ways, Australian public opinion as revealed by the press responded to the suggestions for limited arbitration on the one hand and general arbitration on the other. General proposals seemed almost invariably to evoke a positive response, while that for specific proposals was more negative. In either event, interest was widely aroused and emotions deeply stirred by the arbitration impulse. Developments during the next three years were to build on the foundations laid in 1896.¹

CHAPTER SIX

INFORMAL ALLIANCE? AUSTRALIA, AND LATER PHASES OF
ANGLO-AMERICAN ARBITRATION DEVELOPMENTS, 1896-99
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1896-99.

The fortunes of these two sets of arbitration proposals progressed through several further stages. Both forms however accomplished something. The first, more limited variety did so in a way that similar future forms of arbitration would not. For Britain it was more a short-term material victory while for America it resulted in a longer-term moral victory, marking as much as anything America’s emergence as a world power. The second, general form did not appear to yield much official fruit. But in a long-term informal way, by promoting a body of opinion in favour of Anglo-American agreement, it did have its effect — as the period of crisis in 1898, which gave underlying race patriotism its chance to emerge, was to illustrate. For reasons of its own, Australian editorial opinion encouraged both these varieties of arbitral developments between mid-1896 and the end of 1899.

Undoubtedly the single most powerful restraint on Australian editorial and other enthusiasm for arbitration treaties, whether specific or general, was the intensified American anglophobia released by the turbulent presidential election of 1896. It had been feared during the first half of the year that the aggressive foreign policy plank of the Republican party might renew discord with the British Empire. Following the nomination of William Jennings Bryan at the Democratic Convention in Chicago (8 July 1896) it became obvious that a far greater menace to Anglo-American harmony had emerged. For the latter half of 1896 the overriding suspense in Australia concerning the outcome of the election centred first on fears of whether the arbitration impulse
would lose its momentum and second, on whether the whole Anglo-Saxon ethnocentric ideal would suffer permanent damage by a Bryan victory.¹

McKinley’s nomination (17 June 1896) at the Republican Convention at St. Louis had not been welcomed by many conservative Australian papers, traditionally oriented as they were toward the low-tariff, anti-imperialist, gold-standard Democrats. Though he was often viewed as an extremist in policy and a mediocrity in ability, when it became evident that McKinley stood for the maintenance of the gold-standard as the basis for international finance, the Australian free trade press quickly joined its protectionist brethren in its support of the candidate of commercial prosperity and stability. It was generally conceded that a high tariff and ‘Large Policy’ in foreign affairs were more acceptable alternative prospects to English colonists sharing in the repercussions, than were either devaluation or chaos in international trade and finance.²

Bryan’s nomination three weeks later was received in Australia with howls of dismay from most sections of the press. The Sydney Morning Herald’s disgust was typical. The ‘Boy Orator of Nebraska’ was a ‘buffoon...tossed to the top by popular caprice’. His nomination was a ‘burlesque...a preposterous piece of spread-eaglism...a warning against

¹  Age, 6 Feb., 23, 27 May 1896; Argus, 1, 3 June 1896, focused attention on the contemporaneous Canadian elections vindicating Free Tradism, it thought; Age countered this by insisting Cleveland’s Free Tradism had ruined America and given McKinley his chance, 17 Oct., 2 Nov. 1896. See also Advertiser, 2 Nov. 1896; Maitland Mercury, 11 June 1896; West Australian, 17 June 1896.

a possible danger of democratic institutions¹. Most editorialists agreed that Bryan’s cardinal crime was that he had decided to cater to the rabble in their demand for a devalued currency based on silver and that the mob who sought this revaluation were the tools of the silver monopolists and currency faddists. Worse, it was feared that Bryan as demagogue was marshallng all the greed and spite in America under the banners of socialism, communism and anarchy. Bryan’s strong sectional appeal to the discontented agriculturalists and miners in the West and South of the United States was quickly detected. Most papers managed to curb their natural sympathies for the Populists who, four years after their first bid for the Presidency had, as the left wing of the Democratic Party, now captured it in their desire to redress pressing economic and social grievances. The rampant anglophobia of this western sectional group against the 'money power' of the North-Eastern financial establishment sinewed in Britain, was exaggerated in the Australian press through the cable reports, correspondents¹ letters and campaign literature emanating from Republican-dominated New York.¹

When large amounts of gold specie were shipped to America from New South Wales' banks and the value of Colonial Stocks rose with British investment monies deflected from the United States, the financial apocalypse many Australians had feared seemed at hand. As the election neared, a Bryan victory appeared an increasingly more plausible result. In that event, the worst predictions were for a short-lived period of artificial prosperity derived from the release of hoarded gold, to be followed by a stupendous crash. This would affect British finance in particular and through it Australia and the world in general, causing a realignment of currencies with the promised American silver ratio of 16 to 1 - or half the agreed international rate. More sanguine predictions were for the confinement of the ill-effects to the United States alone or for the operation of Gresham's Law to produce such a gold scarcity there, that it would be America herself who would be forced to retreat from the new ratio before other countries advanced toward it.

Many commentators revealed their conservative side in expressing regret at what they considered to be the cupidity of tens of thousands of 'little people' in America who wished to see their debts halved and seemingly have more money to spend. But Bi-Metallist Leagues in every Australian Colony expressed a guarded support for silver. The Barrier Miner, in Australia's largest silver centre, repeatedly explained the real advantages to Australian mining, trading and investment of a new internationally sanctioned bi-metallist agreement. Those like Bonython who agreed with this view, were at pain to distance themselves from Bryan's 'go it alone' attitude on the matter. The Meat Traders' Journal was the first to reprint a letter from Canada sent by a strong pro-Bryan Silverite, Moreton Frewn - to the owner of 'Canobar' station in New South Wales. That 'sublime failure' as he has been called by his biographer, assured Australian business journals that a Bryan victory, far from damaging Australia's commercial prosperity, would assist it by introducing lower American tariffs and bringing
more money into circulation.\(^1\)

But other sections of Australian editorial opinion beside the commercial, remained sceptical of such beneficent results. Labor journals believed both major Presidential contenders to be equally the servants of large money interests and endorsed only the little known Socialist candidate. Religious papers reacted as violently as any at the challenge to the status quo and appeared particularly offended by Bryan's religious references (the 'Cross of Gold' speech) and what they considered to be open attempts at exploiting man's weak nature.\(^2\)

Large penny dailies in the capital cities squeezed most newsworthiness from the election excitement. Heavily influenced by the outrage demonstrated by G.W. Smalley, the Times claimed Bryan's election represented 'a greater peril than either war or domestic disloyalty'. Newspapers in Australia, wary of Smalley's bumptiousness, quoted the view without ever entirely endorsing it and few descended to the partisan depths of labelling Bryanism 'Lungs, Lunacy and Larceny' though such vituperation was well known.

Overseas materials, most of them damming Bryan as well, provided much room for comment. Nonetheless, there was an impulse in Australia as elsewhere to reduce the complex issues to bare simplicities. New South Wales' Premier George H. Reid spoke for many when he likened the election during a speech in the Legislative Assembly to a referendum.

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between gold and silver. The most reliable American commentator was the *Sydney Morning Herald*’s perceptive correspondent. He was widely quoted as predicting a close election and, if Bryan’s influence persisted, a growing rift by the end of the century between Anglo-Saxon peoples. Goldwin Smith was quoted along similar lines, but granted less credibility. Talk of mass hysteria and renewed civil war was confined to lighter journals such as *Table Talk*. Americans like Colonel Bell, recently returned from the United States, and visiting businessmen and sea captains, calmed such fears when interviewed, by assuring Australians of a speedy return to prosperity following the election, regardless of the victor.¹

Confusing the issue for all commentators was the break-up of old party loyalties with their resulting political realignments. This sort of disruptiveness, thought to be caused by the attraction or repulsion of Bryan’s appeal, was felt to endanger the very principle of democracy in its emphasis on baser popular emotions. There was renewed debate on the efficacy of the American system of choosing political leaders, with special reference to developing Australian federal theory. Phrases concerning ‘law and order’, ‘haves and have-nots’ and the ‘silent majority’ entered the discussion.²

¹ Stead, Shaw and Pitchett in the *Review of Reviews*, June-Nov. 1896, were not unsympathetic to Bryan. They reviewed articles by E.L. Godkin, E.E. Haynes, J.A. Collins, R.B. Mahany, Dr. Arendt, Senators Miller and Chandler, J.R. Bishop, C.S. Cleed, W.C. Alden, A.J. Wilson, T.G. Shearman, Goldwin Smith and J.L. Rice among others. The views of Chauncey Depew, Andrew Carnegie, Henry Henty, John Russel Young, Henri Conuschi, Ernest Seyd, Alexander Del Mar, Dr Ireland, E. Atigeld, E.V. Debs, Henry George and E. Bellamy were referred to. Among other Australian commentators, the most conspicuous were Lyne, O’Sullivan, Dr Jefferis and Grainger.

² Contained in the following editorials: *Mercury*, 2 Nov. 1896; *Maitland Mercury*, 2 Nov. 1896; *South Australian Register*, 3 Nov. 1896; *Ballarat Courier*, 3 Nov. 1896; *Ballarat Star*, 3 Nov. 1896; *Australian Star*, 3 Nov. 1896; *Sydney Morning Herald*, 3 Nov. 1896.
Most newspapers agreed that it was the first time since Lincoln's election 36 years before that Australians had been so excited by the results of a Presidential contest. Run on the same day as 80,000 spectators viewed the favourite Newhaven win the Melbourne Cup, it was deemed as being of proportionate interest - an observation that would have pleased Mark Twain. At the heart of the Australian anxiety was something deeper than the issues of silver, the tariff, or imperialism. What was feared most was the scuttling forever of those dreams of a peace-keeping Anglo-Saxon world federation, due to the constant and massive strains that would be imposed on the relationship by belligerent Bryanite economic attitudes.

News in Australia of Bryan's defeat (5 November 1896) produced much editorial comment. 'Demagoguery', 'Extreme Radicalism', 'Fiscal Faddism', 'Dishonour', 'Disorder' and most of all, 'Anglophobia' had been hearteningly deflated by the patriotism, honesty and sound commercial sense of all sections of the American people - so it seemed. Davies, Tasmania's arch-conservative, who had predicted in the Mercury a return to a new Dark Age, reached the apogee of delighted over-reaction. He believed that 'in the world's record of telegraphy, a more important message than this, telling of the result of the United States' Presidential election has never been flashed across the waters...'. For all their excess, such reactions indicate the degree of nervous relief with which even remote corners of Australia greeted the news. For a week, papers of all shades of opinion and backgrounds sank their differences in editorial

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1Twain, Following The Equator, op.cit., pp.162-4. He identified Cup Day and Election Day as Australia's and America's respective national festivals.

2Comment in the following editorials; Singleton Argus, 4 Nov. 1896; Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 4 Nov. 1896; Daily Telegraph (Launceston), 4 Nov. 1896; Launceston Examiner, 4 Nov. 1896; Argus, 4 Nov. 1896; West Australian, 4 Nov. 1896. A good index of the topic's seriousness was that cartoonists left it completely alone.

3Mercury, 5, 6 Nov. 1896.
rejoicing at the expected return of stability, prosperity and prospects for arbitration.  

This surge of optimism continued until the inauguration in March 1897, though it was tempered by those who maintained that the disruptive forces of Bryanism and discontent had only been rendered latent. Some also bewailed the potentialities for harm to the Australian economy in McKinley's flirtation with an international silver agreement and with a new high tariff against wool. The Dingley Tariff of July 1897 made palpable those fears when it raised tariffs to an average of 57 per cent, the highest in America's history, which effected Australian wool and hides as expected. Though panic buying of wool had made the American market briefly lucrative, the renewal of restrictions from mid-1897 onward, helped cool feeling in Australia toward America. In this fashion, the election of 1896 paved the way for both the euphoria of early 1897 and the equally brief bitterness toward America during the

1See the following editorials: Age, 5 Nov. 1896; Advertiser, 5, 6 Nov. 1896; Sydney Morning Herald, 5, 7, 9 Nov. 1896; Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 5, 6 Nov. 1896; South Australian Register, 5, 10 Nov. 1896; Courier, 5 Nov. 1896; Daily Telegraph (Launceston), 5 Nov. 1896; Mercury, 5, 6 Nov. 1896; Herald, 5 Nov. 1896; Ballarat Courier, 6 Nov. 1896; Ballarat Star, 6 Nov. 1896; Geelong Advertiser, 6 Nov. 1896; Geelong Times, 6 Nov. 1896; Bendigo Advertiser, 6 Nov. 1896; Mt. Alexander Mail, 6 Nov. 1896; Hallett Mercury, 6 Nov. 1896; Barrier Miner, 6, 11 Nov. 1896; The Week, 6 Nov. 1896; West Australian, 6, 9 Nov. 1896; Perth Morning Herald, 6 Nov. 1896; Australian Star, 6, 10 Nov. 1896; Weekly Times, 6 Nov. 1896; Launceston Examiner, 11 Nov. 1896; Australasian, 7 Nov. 1896; Arrow, 7 Nov. 1896.

2Nelson Dingley (1832-99) was an editor, publisher and politician. As a Republican congressman from Maine, 1881-99, he prepared the tariff that bore his name.
latter part of that year. 1

There followed upon the developments of November, a brief euphoric period in Australian editorial reactions, during which the general arbitration gains were hailed in Cleveland's terms as opening 'a new epoch in civilization'. Whilst the specific arbitration treaty on Guiana-Venezuela awaited Venezuelan approval (2 February 1897) and Congressional ratification (30 March 1897) as well as further ratification between Britain and Venezuela (14 June 1897) before sinking out of sight until its conclusion (3 October 1899), the spotlight fell dramatically on the general arbitration, or Olney-Pauncefoot Treaty signed 11 January 1897. Responding to Salisbury's remarkable and unprecedented invitation to comment on these foreign policy developments, influential sections of the press in all of the Australian colonies expressed

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encouragement for this supremely ethnocentric turn of events.  

A great event in the history of the world... perhaps the first step toward a mighty English-speaking confederation, which if achieved, would dominate the world... one of the most important events of the nineteenth century... one of the most hopeful signs that the human race has yet seen,

were some of the words used by Sydney's Daily Telegraph. 

Others used similar superlatives to describe the treaty.

'The history of the world supplies no exact parallel to this momentous event', claimed the South Australian Register.

It thought the 'impossible' had been attempted as an experiment

not by decaying states which have fallen under the sway of either timidity or sentiment, but by nations in the full heyday of their prosperity and vigour... To Britons wherever they may be, it cannot be other than a most gratifying reflection that it is Great Britain and America which are leading the way in the greatest and most beneficent movement of this or any other age. In this respect, the English-speaking race is acting in accordance with its noblest traditions and fulfilling the highest mission that it is possible for it to undertake.

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1 See, Age, 5 Jan. 1897; Leader, 9 Jan. 1897. The later history of the specific arbitration is covered in Proceedings of the Tribunal of Arbitration between Great Britain and the United States of Venezuela (Paris, 1899). The Colney-Paunceforte Treaty was designed to cover all types of controversies and to provide a final decision in most cases. Pecuniary claims not exceeding £100,000 were to be subjected to the final decision of a tribunal composed of one arbitrator from each country and an umpire chosen by the two; all larger pecuniary claims and other controverted matters except territorial claims were to be submitted to such a tribunal of three, but unless their decision was unanimous, an appeal might be made to a second tribunal of five: two from each country, plus an umpire chosen by the four. Territorial claims were reserved for a tribunal of six members: three from each party, with no umpire and were not to be final unless agreed to by at least five of the arbiters. Disagreements over the choice of umpires were to be resolved by the King of Sweden. See Arbitration with Great Britain, 58 Congress, 3rd session, Senate Document No. 161, pp. 2-7.

2 Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 13, 16 Jan. 1897.

3 South Australian Register, 14 Jan. 1897.
BETTER UNITE THAN FIGHT.

"If you and I agree to settle our little differences amicably now, we may presently employ the strength of the Lion and the cunning of the Eagle in settling our little differences with other people."

Melbourne Punch, 20 January 1897.
Even the highly conservative *West Australian* thought the treaty 'invested with a dignity, a significance and a potentiality far exceeding anything that has preceded it by reason of what is termed its permanent character'.

This euphoria did not last long. Earliest opposition in Australia to the concept of general arbitration centred on what Sidney Low had called in an article in the December Nineteenth Century, the 'Olney Doctrine'. This new version of the older Monroe Doctrine obviously implied that a conflict sometime in the future concerning tracts of land in the Caribbean, Central and South America or Canada was inevitable and this probability dampened the congratulatory impulse animating other organs of the press. Another line of argument had it that to appear too enthusiastic about the treaty was to ensure its defeat by arousing the suspicions of the American anglophobes. Vague notions of the damage to a potential Australian Monroe Doctrine claiming the hegemony of the South Pacific following Federation, through a permanent Anglo-American agreement embodying even bolder concepts of Monroeism than the Olney variety, similarly worked against universal acceptance of the treaty among some Australian editors. But even more telling than the arguments of those worried about the frustration of Australia's future power aspirations were the arguments against human nature allowing the completion of such a scheme. The *Perth Morning Herald* was the most discouraging:

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1 West Australian, 14 Jan, 1897. See also, Argus, 12, 13 Jan. 1897; Maryborough Standard, 14 Jan. 1897; Mt. Alexander Mail, 25 Jan. 1897, referred to the union of the 'two great, pure, white world forces, birds of the same stock...'; Advance Australia, official organ of the Australian Natives' Association in its inaugural edition, Australia Day, 26 Jan. 1897, denied that Britain had committed herself to backing the Monroe Doctrine.
New epochs in civilization are not brought about by paper treaties... international difficulties are not settled by an application of the precepts of the Sermon on the Mount (which) in the mouth of a statesman or politician is cant...of a very nauseous kind. 1

Senate opposition to the treaty which had manifested itself immediately following the treaty's announcement was the factor which did most to sour the early enthusiasm. A treaty promising universal peace and goodwill was too good a thing to be killed by 'baleful influences' and 'malevolent attacks' insisted the Mercury. For, in a blatant land where craving for excitement and sensation marks every phase of public life, where hallucinations or inventions defy all the resources of fact...honest, practical politics in America receive many rude shocks. 2

Jingo senators like Morgan from Alabama, the new Secretary of State, John Sherman, and the United States Board of Trade were all felt to be gathering their strength to defeat the treaty in the face of popular press, religious and business agitation in America supporting it. Amendments by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee were viewed as being similarly hampering. Some suspected lobbies from American armaments manufacturers and German, French and Irish minorities as working against it. The most obvious explanation to others was that America wished to retain a predominance over the Nicaraguan Canal and was not prepared to negotiate concerning it. Personal spite and factional malice aimed against the outgoing party of Cleveland and Olney were also keeping opposition to the treaty alive, as were the frustrated Western populists and silverites, it was held. All, aspects of American life had been affected by the overwhelming spirit of unrest caused by unsatisfactory

1Perth Morning Herald, 14, 18 Jan. 1897. See also; Sydney Morning Herald, 15 Jan. 1897; Courier, 16 Jan. 1897; Ballarat Courier, 16 Jan. 1897; Bendigo Advertiser, 15 Jan. 1897; Capricornian, 16 Jan. 1897; Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 16 Jan. 1897; Bendigo Evening Mail, 14 Jan. 1897; Barrier Miner, 14 Jan. 1897; Review of Reviews, 20 Jan. 1897; Young, op.cit., p.279.

2Mercury, 16 Jan. 1897.
domestic economic conditions asserted the Launceston
Examiner, the arbitration treaty suffering among other
things.\footnote{Launceston Examiner, 2; 26 Feb. 1897. See also, Sydney
Morning Herald, 3 Feb. 1896; Sydney Mail, 23 Jan. 1897;
Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 13 Feb. 1897; Advertiser, 4
Feb. 1897. Pulitzer's N.Y. World received 2,000 replies
from church, labour, educational and commercial leaders-
mostly favourable to the treaty; of 400 U.S. newspapers
polled, only ten percent were critical or hostile. Literary
Digest, XIV (23-30 Jan. 1897), pp.357-8, Public Opinion, XXII,
(21 Jan., 11 Feb. 1897), pp.68-70, 166-7, Senate Documents
No. 63, 55 Congress, 1 Session, p.2. The Examiner was aware
of this material.}

Opposition of this kind helped drain away the
hostilities initially expressed by certain Australian
commentators and aroused sympathy for the scheme in others.
Even the Melbourne Punch joined the Age in criticizing the
half-hearted endorsement of arbitration shown by Salisbury in
his Address in Reply to the Queen's Speech opening the
Imperial Parliament. For, 'we do not expect war to be
abolished within the next ten years as a result of this
treaty... but we expect much more than the English Premier
is prepared to admit'.\footnote{Melbourne Punch, 28 Jan. 1896; Age, 22 Jan. 1897.}
Other former opponents, like the
Sydney Morning Herald, were impressed by the body of opinion
in America growing in its favour and 'though the treaty
may not lead to a perennial peace... the opposition to it
seems wholly out of place and against the popular weal'.\footnote{Sydney Morning Herald, 23 Jan. 1897.}

Though not an epoch-making event, claimed the Advertiser,
the treaty was valuable as a precedent, 'the embodiment of
sentiments that cannot be compressed into legal and
diplomatic phraseology... more effective and enduring than a
formal alliance'. Opposition to such a scheme, it held,
could only be a short-term hindrance, compared with the
slower 'ocean current' of 'irresistible' popular feeling for
arbitration that had been awakened.\footnote{Advertiser, 2 Feb. 1897.} The Daily Telegraph
was more trenchant. It attacked the many journals and
influential men in America against the Treaty as 'a
conspiracy against civilization and the worst of national
crimes... a declaration in favour of the old method of
settling international disputes by means of gunshot wounds and bayonet thrusts'.

Others accepted the treaty's inevitable defeat with better grace. Human nature could bring any treaty, 'though drawn up by a committee of angels, to hopeless breakdown', held the Australasian. Further,

if the United Senate can throw out a treaty of arbitration for the sake of affronting Mr. Cleveland, it might reject the award of the arbitration of that treaty for the sake of a party triumph, or to gratify any transitory craze of popular passion.

With its parent daily, the Argus, it viewed the imminent defeat of what the Daily Chronicle had called 'the event of the century' and 'one of the most celebrated events in diplomatic history' - as part of the 'inevitable satire of history'. For, 'the privilege of twisting the lion's tail when occasion suits, is too dear to be surrendered'. Behind the brave words and 'sour-grapes' attitude there was nonetheless among those who had dared hope for much, 'justification for real regret'.

Hope for the treaty's survival in however truncated a form, had been kept alive by the document's 'wise prudence and business-like' nature; the belief that Continental European opposition to the treaty would be combatted by patriotic American feeling, and the hope that the Senators could not really be as cynical as they appeared at a distance. New hope however, sprang from the impetus of approval given the treaty during the inauguration of McKinley (4 March 1897). Beside promising a 'firm and dignified' foreign

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1 Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 3 Feb. 1897.

2 Australasian, 27 Feb. 1897. The paper however was not so inclined to completely agree with E.L. Godkin's assault on war in the Century as an 'animal' method of settling differences (13 Feb. 1897; Argus, 5 Mar. 1897. Both papers welcomed the announcement (22 Feb. 1897) of Colonel John Hay's appointment as ambassador to London replacing Thomas Bayard. Hay was expected to revitalise Anglo-American diplomatic activity. See also, Maitland Mercury, 27 Feb. 1897.
policy, he had recommended the Senate 'as a duty to mankind' to ratify the Olney-Paunceforte general arbitration treaty as a 'glorious example of reason and peace'.

Boosting these new hopes was the influential opinion of the Sydney Morning Herald's New York correspondent who held that despite all objections, especially the well-known reluctance of the Senate to embark on novel departures in policy, 'nine Americans out of ten believe that the treaty will somehow make its way safely into port'.

The American Senate now became the focus of hopes and fears concerning the fate of the treaty. With journals in America and Britain, Australian papers vigorously attacked senatorial pretensions, which appeared to desire an even great influence in foreign affairs than the President. Stead, particularly, was furious at the mutilations wrought on the treaty by the Senate. He impugned American sincerity, pointing out the irony that America's desire to go to war in late 1895 over the principle of arbitration was being contradicted by their present intransigence regarding the passage of an arbitration proposal initiated by them and forced on Britain.

Smalley's view that the arbitration treaty was 'dead' was first taken up by the Melbourne Herald (27 March 1897) lamenting 'so perish therefore, all the great hopes formed on both sides of the Atlantic'. What had killed it? A failure of racial sympathy thought the Geelong Advertiser;

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1 Sydney Morning Herald, 9 Mar. 1897. Letter sent 9 Mar. 1897. See also, Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 8 Mar. 1896; Mt. Alexander Mail, 9 Mar. 1897; Mercury, 10 Mar. 1897; Leader, 13 Mar. 1897.


3 Herald, 27 Mar. 1897.

4 Geelong Advertiser, 29 Mar. 1897.
a lack of ready cash to pay the outstanding Bering Sea award believed the Mercury. For, 'the enemies of Great Britain in America are many and must influence legislators in a country where political action is as corrupt as in any part of the world, excepting Turkey'. Others suggested that Senators were withholding their support in the hope of extorting benefits for the pecuniary interests they represented; out of pure cussedness, or from revulsion against a detested administration. Whatever the reason, the result was undesirable and potentially disastrous for Britain, 'due to threatened crises in the Mediterranean, the Nile, India, China and Siam'. Not only was the Senate running counter to public opinion on the issue, but it was steadily losing the confidence and respect of the people and stood to 'damn itself to everlasting fame'.

Australian constitution-makers stood to learn from the American Senate's terrible example, others warned. An Upper House placed by constitutional enactment above the voice of the public and hence irresponsible as was the American Senate, became an obvious hindrance to a democracy as the present situation showed, for such a body could not even be controlled by the threat of the creation of new peers. Power should be written into the Australian Constitution to prevent such deadlocks some added. The present circumstance sadly illustrated how regardless of the praise of John Bright and Sir Charles Dilke, the American Senate had degenerated and was far from the ideal of consisting of the best men.

The Sydney Morning Herald believed that the narrow attitude of the American Senate was symptomatic of the

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1 Mercury, 29 Mar. 1897.

2 See, Sydney Morning Herald, 30 Mar. 1897; correspondent's letter sent 27 Feb. 1897. Smalley had again performed sterling service as an 'early warning system' though he was mocked by the Sydney Telegraph as 'a big journalist who knows all things', 13 Feb. 1897. See also, Chronicle, 3 Apr. 1897; Mercury, 3 Apr. 1897. But jingo papers like the N.Y. Sun and Journal, the Chicago Tribune and Irish World and parts of the more Western U.S. presses were opposed to the treaty.

3 Ballarat Courier, 7 Apr. 1897; Mercury, 8 Apr. 1897.
'degrading, demoralising' nature of American life. This was in line with the *Times*' indictment. The Senate had struck a blow at the principle of arbitration itself and at the confidence of the world in the American people....There is in its action a note of levity, of wantonness and of irresponsible caprice, such as happily, is very rarely struck by any legislative assembly.

New South Wales' senior metropolitan newspaper hastened to assure its readers that such behaviour would not have occurred in Australia to mar such 'a unique and great occasion' as the achievement of Anglo-Saxon solidarity.¹ The Federal Convention which had been sitting in Adelaide since 22 March 1897, was urged to consider these points in its protracted debate on the nature of the Senate in the coming Australian Federation. Whether strong as Conservatives wanted, or weak as Liberals and Labor members wished, the main concern was that the Australian Senate should be flexible, cooperative and responsive to the popular will.²

This sort of criticism injected an increasing amount of realism into the commentary. H. Wilson, author of *Ironclads In Action*, was often quoted for his view that the arbitration process could be the occasion for more friction than amity due either to non-payment of awards or biased and fraudulent decisions. Others considered the old 'give and take' concessions of diplomacy a preferable system. Even the *Argus* was dubious as to whether the European wars of the nineteenth century could have been avoided. For arbitration would have had in those instances as much effect as 'pulling at a locomotive with a snaffle bridle'.³ The *Sydney Morning Herald*'s American correspondent rationalized the failure by admitting the treaty was merely 'a general

¹ *Sydney Morning Herald*, 16 Apr. 1897; *London Times*, 10 Feb. 1897.

² *See* editorials in *Age*, 17 Apr. 1897; *Advertiser*, 6 May 1897; *Daily Telegraph* (Launceston), 7 May 1897.

³ *Age*, 22 Jan. 1897; *Argus*, 5 Mar. 1897.
expression of opinion that war should be reached by three stages instead of two.\textsuperscript{1}

Louis Tracy, that 'Anglicized American with some experience as a war correspondent' as one paper described him, was assessed by several editors in April and May 1897 for his book \textit{The Final War}. It timed 'Armageddon' as 2 May 1898 and visualized the struggle as that of twelve million English-speaking troops against Germany, France and Russia - a struggle from which the former emerged victorious. His conclusion that the destiny of Britain and America 'is to rule the world, to give it peace and freedom, to bestow upon it prosperity and happiness, to fulfil the responsibilities of an all-devouring people; wisely to discern and generously to bestow', was now condemned as ridiculous, misleading and mischievous - an editorial reaction reflecting better than anything the new sobriety of opinion.\textsuperscript{2}

The outbreak of the Greco-Turkish War (17 April 1897) served to remind Australians that it was still a hazardous world and despite the imminence of the treaty's defeat, many continued to voice support for the ideal of the peaceful settlement of disputes. The International Union of Peace meeting at Berne in March was taken as a hopeful sign that the peoples of the world, if not their governments, wanted such a peace. The \textit{South Australian Register} echoed the hopes of Professors Freeman and Dicey for a 'common citizenship of the English race',\textsuperscript{3} while the details of the panegyrics delivered by the British economist Morley and American diplomat Bayard in praise of the Anglo-Saxon initiative were applauded in other editorials. W.T. Stead let it be known that he would accept any treaty, no matter how mutilated,\textsuperscript{4} Sir Langdon Bonython's paper attempted a last word on the day of the Senate vote on the treaty: 'The

\textsuperscript{1}\textit{Sydney Morning Herald}, 30 Mar. 1897; letter of 27 Feb. 1897.

\textsuperscript{2}See editorials in \textit{Advertiser}, 9 Apr. 1897; \textit{Sydney Morning Herald}, 16 Apr. 1897; \textit{Barrier Mail}, 26 May 1897.

\textsuperscript{3}\textit{South Australian Register}, 21 May 1897.

\textsuperscript{4}\textit{Review of Reviews}, 20 May 1897.
ideal of humanity, so far as the Anglo-Saxon world is concerned is nearly if not quite attained¹, he believed.

Even if not adopted by legislatures, the treaty had been adopted with enthusiasm by the peoples on both sides of the Atlantic, and like Penn's treaty with the Indians in Pennsylvania which was 'never signed and never broken' the arbitration treaty is operative from henceforth.¹

News of the defeat of the much-amended treaty came as no great surprise to Australians. On 5 May 1897, even a weak gesture of good-will toward Britain which was all the treaty by then represented just failed to gain a two-thirds vote and was lost by 43 votes to 26 in the American Senate. Silverites, determined amenders, Irish, Anglophobes of different hues, anti-arbitrationists and arrogant Senatorial power had combined to destroy it. But, as the Advertiser and others intimated, the idea had taken root in Australia as elsewhere and the hopes expressed for future rapprochement would not easily die away.

However, during the latter half of 1897, Australian editors indulged themselves in expressions of irritability toward America. The most immediate items to attract criticism were domestic developments - a traditional source of anti-American reactions. McKinley's newly-appointed Secretary of State, John Sherman,² the younger brother of the famous general, then 74 years old, was an early target. He had been regarded with mixed feelings in Australia due to his leading role in enacting two important items of legislation in 1890: the Anti-Trust Law, at first applauded until judged ineffectual, and the Silver Purchase Act, which came to be considered an unmitigated evil. His appointment was cynically regarded as an open political reward for past services rendered to the Republican party. As the former

¹Advertiser, 6 May 1897. See also Sydney Morning Herald, ibid.; Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 8 May 1897; Age, 17 Apr. 1897; Courier, 20 Apr. 1897.

²John Sherman subsequently resigned his office due to the strain of the Spanish-American war in April 1898 and died 22 Oct. 1900.
chairman of the Senate committee on foreign affairs which had done so little to help the treaty, these services were not considered highly in Australia. Now his tactless jingoism and anglophobia became once again evident when he attacked Britain for 'quarrelling more often than she fought' and by sending despatches to Salisbury at least as provocative as some of Olney's had been. In particular, he attempted to reopen the Bering Sea controversy. This served only to remind Australians of America's bad faith in that affair and how palpable had been the failure of the arbitration system in that case. Harsh words concerning Yankee 'smartness' were applied. 'In the affairs of great nations they show a bewildering readiness to use the arts of a fifth-rate court practitioner', the Argus charged. ¹ Sherman was bracketed with the ' tiresome old ranters ' of the Senate and not taken seriously. But the Mercury, which had lost patience, insisted that Americans needed to be taught a lesson and treated in the same rough fashion they treated Britons.

We submit that the constant references to [the Americans] as a great, noble, conscientious people are just the kind of stuff to make them despise the English and be a great deal more insolent and aggressive than they are...At all events it seems to be [Britain's] duty to preserve her own dignity and not be constantly fawning as if she was dreadfully afraid. ²

Beside the enactment of the Dingley Tariff in July which because of its concentration on wool many in Australia took as a direct affront, there were other minor irritations. One concerned the much publicized murderer Butler, hung at

¹ Argus, 20 July, 8 Sept., 20 Dec. 1897.

² Mercury, 16, 17 Sept. 1897. See also Herald, 9 Aug., 30 Sept., 1897; Geelong Advertiser, 10 Aug. 1897; Bendigo Evening Mail, 10 Aug. 1897; Advertiser, 21 Aug. 1897; Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 21 Sept. 1897; Brisbane Evening Observer, 28 Sept. 1897; Sydney Morning Herald, 12 Aug. 1897, 13, 21 Jan. 1898. Materials from the British Blue Book and from a November Macmillan's article were quoted on the Dispute and from the New York Herald on Sherman.
Darlinghurst jail (16 July 1897) after having been apprehended in San Francisco and extradited at New South Wales' insistence. Beside an exorbitant claim for £7,000 to cover the four long months of court proceedings, the United States' Government suggested that a piece of silver plate to the value of £100 be presented to their Attorney General. John Henry Want, Q.C.,¹ indigantly suggested that America keep any future such criminals and during a heated debate in the New South Wales Legislative Council (4 August) loud cries were heard for the revision of extradition treaties along reciprocal lines.² The Ballarat Star suggested that the figure requested by America be withheld as part payment of Britain's outstanding Bering Fisheries award.³

Australian sensibilities, most acute concerning sport, had also been offended by the shabby treatment of the Australian baseball team visiting America in the summer of 1897. 'Cheating and intimidation were felt to be frankly justified and constantly utilized in defeating the visitors,' complained the Bendigo Evening Mail. But the trouble was broader: 'The same sordid, degrading spirit seems to permeate the sporting, the judicial and the political life of this people, so great in numbers and in wealth. The almighty dollar is supreme, Mammon is their God and the fruits of worship are lying, thieving, bragging and bullying.'⁴ The Melbourne Leader agreed:

Not only in baseball do American methods strike outsiders as not altogether consistent with fair and honourable dealing. Our cousins across the Atlantic [sic] play to win the game and in their desire to attain this object they appear to cast away all scruples as useless and hampering lumber. In matters or sport this theory is accountable for much irritation and many misunderstandings, but introduced into the more

¹John Henry Want (1846-1905) was an advocate and politician who served as Attorney General in the Reid Ministry (1894-99). Always strong-minded, he was a determined anti-federationist.

²The issue was covered in most newspapers (July-Aug. 1897).

³Ballarat Star, 6 Aug. 1897.

⁴Bendigo Evening Mail, 10 Aug. 1897.
serious realm of politics, it is liable to evolve graver danger.

At this point, America's standing in some Australian eyes reached its nadir.¹

Overseas analyses of America were pursued for similar condemnatory appraisals. One brought to Australian readers' attention was America and the Americans, From the French Point of View. Traditionally friendly, the French too, were undergoing an anti-American phase. The book attacked America's government as a 'plutocratic ochlocracy' and its Senatorial power as undemocratic and unrepresentative given that 'almost one fourth of the voting power...is in the hands of men who represent a population smaller than New York city'. The book predicted 'a mad war of races, interests and classes' resulting from the strains in American society. Altogether, this outsiders' view verified all the worst estimates long entertained by Australian editors.²

There followed a period wherein older charges of Yankees as loud-mouthed braggarts was revived. Some arguments were specifically designed to combat the false judgement of W.D. Howells, who in the July Harper's Magazine had claimed Americans were 'modest...thoughtful...quiet and mockly attentive' and to defend Britons accused in the Forum of being 'unsympathetic, unsociable and overbearing'.³ To make their own predilections perfectly clear, some papers reacted violently to the supposed suggestion of the American journalist Whitelaw Reid, that Australia's Colonial Premiers who had so impressed at the Diamond Jubilee Celebration in London were 'Much more like Americans than

¹Leader, 14 Aug. See cartoon 'Australian Baseball In America', Melbourne Punch, 27 May 1897, p.414.

²E.g., Argus, 21 Aug. 1897; Review of Reviews, 15 Aug. 1897, p.224, similarly regretted the Senate's unrepresentativeness in that a state like Nevada (population 60,000) could block so important an issue as Anglo-American arbitration. The editor of June's New England Magazine, was comforted that none of that area's 12 senators had 'blocked civilization and covered the Republic with shame before the world'.

³Argus, 28 Aug. 1897; Newcastle Morning Herald, 2 Oct. 1897.
they were like citizens of the old country'. This was 'untrue and absurd' growled the Herald, one newspaper to take W.T. Stead's mischief-making in this respect, badly.  

On the other hand there emerged a general recognition that talk of an alliance had been wildly premature, the sort of practical problems involved in a broad Anglo-Saxon federation, becoming daily more evident with the numerous problems bedevilling Australia's own limited attempts at federation-making. Some were prepared to admit that the failure of the Senate to pass the treaty by a mere three votes was encouraging for future attempts. The great festival of solidarity marking sixty years of Victoria's reign (June 1897) during which many American journalists heaped praise on the monarch, the colonies and the Empire's defences, helped calm anxieties regarding the Anglo-Saxon future. Those who took stock at this time could see that only one nation rivalled and surpassed the Empire in every aspect of growth and general progress and was therefore best kept on side, and that nation was America.

Among reasons advanced why Americans should continue to remain in Australia's good favour was the renewed virility of Sir Wilfred Laurier's leadership of Canada apparently now forever removed from the possibility of acceding to American annexation. Germany, France, Russia, China and Japan, in which the European power struggle was developing, were all considered to be more detestable as nations than was America. Some pointed out that Sir George Dibbs and Justice John Want had often illustrated that Australia could lay claim to a number of jingoes of its own. It was argued that America ought to be courted for its future payment of the Bering Sea Award; the markets on the

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1Herald, 30 Sept. 1897. They were 'all Yankees' Stead reported Reid as saying, guessing Australians' reactions to this.

2See editorials in, Mercury, 6 Sept. 1897; Geelong Times, 6 Nov. 1897; Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 8 Nov. 1897; South Australian Register, 13 Nov. 1897; Advertiser, 4 June 1897.

3Sir George Dibbs (1834–1904), Premier of N.S.W. 1891-94 was always considered an authoritarian man.
THE GRAND IMPERIAL TABLEAU.

Mr. Queen is a proper title to aaverse to the tableau, declaring that the representation of him has been and should be
the best known of all the empires of India.

Blackwood (the chief): "It's a great spectacle, Joe! I guess if I had had the privilege of seeing it I'd never have gone off on my own!"

Melbourne Punch, 1 July 1897.
West Coast it was opening up for Newcastle coal and for access to the Yukon goldfield, whose rush beginning in the summer of 1897, attracted hundreds of Australian miners to American ports in Alaska. 1

As Charles Bright 2 put it in an article in the Age ('Does America Love England?'), some Americans were Anglophobic because their newspapers (especially Charles A. Dana's New York Sun) artificially encouraged it as part of editorial policy. The author, one of several Australians who had worked briefly for the American press, travelled widely and talked to many in the United States in the late 1870s, thought the opposite feeling existed among the classes and professions of people in America he had met, most of whom treated visitors from Britain and her Empire with extreme courtesy. The trait Dickens had labelled 'Universal Distrust' kept anglophobia alive in the American character, he believed. Such an assessment did much to get the 'love-hate' relationship (viewed from America's side) into perspective. 3

There were more open expressions of affection. Melbourne's Catholic Advocate held that despite the irritations caused by the re-opening of the Bering Sea controversy, 'we love our cousins too much to quarrel with them under any provocation'. 4 The Leader frankly attacked Australians acting from spite when it wrote:

If I were not an Englishman I would be an American is the view held by most Britshiers, who cherish the Stars and Stripes only next to the Union Jack...Though there are influences

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1 See editorials in, Daily Telegraph (Launceston), 28 June, 2 Sept. 1897; Melbourne Punch, 1 July 1897; Barrier Miner, 7 July 1897; Herald, 9 Aug. 1897; Argus, 30 Sept. 1896; Newcastle Morning Herald, 14 Oct. 1897.

2 Charles Bright (1832-1903) was a journalist, lecturer, spiritualist and insurance secretary. He wrote for the Argus in his earlier free trade years and edited the Melbourne Punch 1863-67. A gossipy, courteous man, he wrote later for the protectionist Age though his views were dated. Internal evidence suggests that Bright wrote the article, but there is some doubt.

3 Age, 16 Apr. 1898.

4 Advocate, 8 Jan. 1898.
which tend to hostility, there are others and we hope stronger ones, which encourage a comity of purpose.\(^1\)

It became obvious by the end of 1897 that most of the animosity expressed by Australian editors and others toward America, had been defensive. The moment American attitudes appeared to assume a positive friendliness toward Britain, Australian reactions were quick to reciprocate in kind.

For this feeling, 1898 was to be a crucial year. The condition of Cuba wrought by the three years of destructive war between the Spaniards and the insurgent Cubans was well publicized. In mid-1896 some papers had suggested that Britain should join the United States 'for the common benefit of civilization' in preventing further barbarities. But the issue of international co-operation did not take hold until the end of 1897 and the beginning of 1898 when the alarming situation in China made the need more urgent in British eyes. Russian and German seizures of territory there made war appear imminent. In the search for allies preceding such a conflict, Britons everywhere looked toward the United States where Secretary of State John Hay's concern for an 'Open Door' suggested a natural ally. The Newcastle Morning Herald spoke of the probability of America wishing to retain its position as 'the natural dominant power in the Pacific' and regretted that country's naval preoccupation in the West Indies which now appeared to prevent her from asserting that primacy.\(^2\)

\(^1\)Leader, 14 Aug. 1897.

\(^2\)Newcastle Morning Herald, 21 Dec. 1897, 5, 22 Jan., 14 Feb. 1898. See Also West Australian, 11 July, 1896; Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 26 Jan. 1898. The China Difficulty referred to the anger aroused in England by Russia's illegal seizure of two ports from China - Port Arthur and Talienwan, supposed to secure domination over Peking. This followed Germany's seizure in November 1897 of Tsingtao in the Shantung peninsula. From mid-December 1897, until February 1898, the situation was confused, but Salisbury was heavily censured for passing by the aggression with no more than a diplomatic protest, when many expected war. J.A.S. Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy (London, 1964), Ch.VI, pp.130-47.
A new friendliness toward Britain seemed to animate the American press. 'North America has virtually sent up a shout for Anglo-Saxondom', rejoiced the Brisbane *Courier*. ¹ Most guessed that America's motive in this strong change of attitude was the hoped-for preservation of mutual trading interests in China. America's interest in China as a field for investment and economic exploitation was well recognized by Australia's press and heartily approved of for its unifying tendencies. ²

War fever had once again gripped Australia since the beginning of the China troubles in November 1897 and by March 1898 was still very much in evidence. Australian newspapers relying on the friendly attitudes of papers like the *New York Herald*, the *Baltimore Sun*, and the *Boston Transcript* hoped with the *Geelong Advertiser* that 'possibly if it became necessary, the Americans would be prepared to make a naval demonstration in Chinese waters', to help warn off any threatening European combination.³ Many Australian newspapers were confident concerning American antipathy toward Germany and Russia because of those countries' well known anti-democratic and anti-Monroe attitudes. Archibald's reference in the *Bulletin* to a San Francisco paper debunking those 'fothy enthusiasts' for an Anglo-Saxon alliance was an editorial voice in the wilderness.⁴

Sydney's *Daily Telegraph* best exemplified the nexus of emerging diplomatic interests in its editorial 'The Far East and the Far West'.⁵ Increased diplomatic activity on the part of Sir Julian Pauncefote seemed to British and Australian observers as being on the point of producing a rapprochement, if not an Anglo-American alliance by the end of March. Signs of American approval for such a scheme now attracted eager attention in Australia's press: the enthusiastic reception given the British cruiser *Cordelia*

¹ *Courier*, 5 Feb. 1898: 'Anglo-Saxondom cannot live unless the world is opened up to its activity.

² *Sydney Mail*, 19 Mar. 1898.

³ *Geelong Advertiser*, 23 Feb. 1898.

⁴ *Bulletin*, 19 Feb. 1898. See also, *Courier*, 19 Feb., 7 Mar. 1898

⁵ *Daily Telegraph* (Sydney), 10 Mar. 1898.
coaling off Key West; the pro-English speech of Richard
Olney at Harvard; the friendly observations in Mark Twain's
recently published book covering his antipodean travels; the
Empire's message of sympathy to McKinley following the Maine
disaster\(^1\) and the rousing singing of what was believed to be
Britain's national anthem in American music halls (especially
New York's Empire Theatre), were all taken as indicators of
growing Anglo-American collusion, though somewhat erroneously.\(^2\)

As the Cuban situation warmed up and the Chinese
situation cooled, the focus for such common interests shifted
from the Eastern Chinese theatre to the Western, Cuban area.
Again economic reasons were put forward as the ostensible
reason for co-operation - the exchange of raw cotton and
British manufacturers, mutual passenger services and use of
British bottoms carrying grain, cattle and dairy produce
from America to England, had to be preserved in the face of
possible Spanish piracy, it was held. The Daily Telegraph
was one of the few disgusted by the fact that Britain seemed
to be spending more energy reassuring America of its support
and good-will than in attempting the more humane task of
drawing the combatants apart.\(^3\)

Most newspapers were partisan concerning these
developments. The Argus claimed "no doubt our policy with
regard to America should be to persistently claim brother-
hood with her and persistently refuse to treat her as a
foreign power."\(^4\) Some comment was stimulated by cabled
suggestions of the re-opening of general arbitration
negotiations, while others were excited about the prospect

\(^1\)See comment in Age, 10 Mar. 1898; Mt. Alexander Mail, 3,
10, 12 Mar. 1898; Sydney Morning Herald, 9 Mar. 1898; Argus;
18 Mar. 1898; Geelong Advertiser, 15 Mar. 1898; the Melbourne
Punch viewed a union of the English-Speaking Peoples as 'no
longer a wild dream'; the Anglo-American poem of worker-
solidarity 'The Brotherhood of Man' by Arthur Desmond can
perhaps be viewed in the same context: Bulletin and Toscin,
3, 10 Mar. 1898.

\(^2\)It seems probable that observers were confusing the singing
of "My Country 'Tis of Thee" with "God Save the Queen".

\(^3\)Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 10, 14 Mar. 1898. For further
comment see, Newcastle Morning Herald, 22 Mar. 1898; Advocate,
26 Mar. 1898; Maitland Mercury, 16 Mar. 1898; Herald, 19 Mar.
1898.

\(^4\)Argus, 18 Mar., 16 Apr. 1898.
of a British-American-Japanese triple alliance regarding China, though others regretted that America's preparedness for such an alliance was hampered by a small navy.1 Best of all, the Brisbane Evening Observer believed, was that 'the element of kinship lies underneath everything...and Great Britain's needs are probably helping to the better understanding we all hope for'. 2 With both Cuban and Chinese troubles threatening European war 'one conclusion is clear to us Australians', held the Ballarat Courier: 'the wisdom of consummating our federal aspirations'. 3

That the budding Australian future would blossom in a secure Anglo-American environment seemed obvious to most. Several opinion leaders now voiced classic encouragements of the ethnocentric ideal. One which summarized others was from the Australian Star. Cuba the paper saw as:

the revolt of British-bred people against tyranny which insults humanity and flouts the age...And if, as may be, European Powers regard the maintenance of territorial rights and the upholding of imperial dynasties of higher importance than the most sacred rights of common humanity, they may make their own move and necessitate the American, which will then be but the wider, British appeal. And of its answer, no man who feels the tingle of British blood in his veins would have much doubt. Britain throughout the world indeed, is quickening for a reply to that appeal. It would come with one shout from the remotest Hebridean isles to the furthest Austral shores. It would provide instantly the flux to weld Saxon and Celt, with all their descendants and all the peoples they have absorbed and incorporated into one people, indivisible, indomitable and practically unassailable. We can hardly suppress a desire that the time of that appeal may be nigh. It would come to us, as most great

1For the exact details of the complicated and confusing diplomacy which preceded the Spanish-American War, see R.G. Neale, 'Anglo-American Relations During the Spanish-American War: Some Problems', Historical Studies Australia and New Zealand, VI, No. 21, 1953, pp.72-89; and the same author's Britain and American Imperialism, 1898-1900 (Brisbane, 1965), Ch. 1.


3Ballarat Courier, 25 Mar. 1898. See also, Sydney Morning Herald, 24 Mar., 6 Apr. 1898; South Australian Register, 29 Mar. 1898; Geelong Times, 18 Apr. 1898.
matters in the development of our race, through a rain of blood, but the strength and security and the abiding peace to be ultimately established will make full compensation. 1

Cables reinforced the prevailing impression that Anglo-Saxon peoples throughout the world were 'solid for America' in the coming struggle. In the words of the Brisbane Evening Observer with war imminent,

Anglo-Saxon is practically united...Later on there will be room for arbitration treaties and the hearty exchange of brotherly greetings. Today there is only room for active sympathy in a crisis and the readiness to join hands when the call comes...If nothing else comes of the war with Spain that would be a great gain. 2

As Frederick Greenwood, who was pro-alliance, put it in the Argus: 'At all events, we live in notable times. We see the oldest Empire in the world, China, disappearing and the youngest republic of the globe - that of America - coming to the front'. 3

Expressions of support were more common as war approached. The crises in China and Cuba had called forth all that underlying sense of Anglo-Saxon solidarity. Seen in perspective, anti-American expression of the Australian press in 1897, was an aberration caused in part by what was considered to have been a somewhat misguided view by America of her racial loyalty.

But the anticipated European involvements and consequent need for alliance did not materialise. During 1898 America fought a brisk, efficient war which Spain felt compelled to bring to a rapid conclusion. With Europeans, despite external appearances to the contrary, Australia believed that the future lay with America, not Spain. Therefore it endorsed America's war, rejoiced in its victories and approved of its expansion. The impulse for

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1 Australian Star, 18 Apr. 1898.
2 Brisbane Evening Observer, 21 Apr. 1898.
3 Argus, 9 Apr. 1898. As an index of the speed opinions travelled, the Maitland Mercury, 12 Apr. 1898, 500 miles away from Melbourne, agreed with Greenwood three days later.
alliance was kept hopefully alive during this period and encouraged at every turn. That it did not eventuate was not reacted to in the same bitter way as earlier disappointments had been. Rather, Australian editorial opinion contented itself with recognition of the genuine harmony now existing between the leaders of their race.¹

Tangible expression of that good-will was provided in the following year by the agreement on the Guiana-Venezuela boundary, reached after the report and recommendation of the Commissioners of the Arbitration Court sitting in Paris had been given.

The first Hague Peace Conference convened by the Czar (18 May-29 July 1899) in which 26 nations including Britain and the United States participated, did establish the Permanent Court of International Arbitration. Through it, disputes could be settled by means similar to those being proposed throughout 1897 in the Olney-Pauncefote discussions. Though they considered them a definite step forward, the Australian press was never as enthused by these proposals as they had been by Anglo-American prospects. Given the failure of the latter, some considered the Hague Court as utopian and were openly cynical of it. But it was against this background of international agreement and on the eve of the Boer War (Kruger's ultimatum was sent 9 October 1899) that the Australian press greeted news of the success of the

long-awaited specific arbitration.1

The Venezuelan Arbitration Court had opened in Paris in June during the Hague Conference, under the Presidency of Professor Martens the eminent Russian jurist nominated by King Oscar of Sweden. Its sittings extended over 55 days and were closed on the 28 September. Sir Richard Webster, Attorney General, had argued the British case and Mallet Provost had performed a similar task on behalf of Venezuela. The British representatives were Justice Collins and, following the death of Lord Herschell, Lord Russell of Killowen. The Americans were represented by Chief Justice Fuller and Justice Brewer of the United States Supreme Court. In a fashion similar to Clark at an earlier date, Webster had alerted public opinion in Australia to the expectation of an adverse decision.2

Sydney’s Evening News was the first to comment at length on the favourable decision (5 October). Britain retained possession of the goldfields and valuable forests while Venezuela gained possession of Point Barima and thus the mouth of the Orinoco. American and Venezuelan honour thus appeared satisfied, while Britain had avoided humiliation and upheld former claims.3

The result evoked a mixed reaction. Some papers felt it conceded even more to British rights than was originally claimed, while others considered that it was no more than what had been expected as probable. The Bulletin noted cynically how consistent was the coincidence of British national honour and the existence of disputed gold areas,4 while the Advertiser believed that the result had illustrated that neither aggrandisement nor greed lay at the basis of Britain’s claim. The same paper contrasted

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1 Australian cynicism toward the Hague Conferences of 1897 and 1907 is understandable given the open doubts entertained by the powers participating of the conferences’ efficacy. See B. Tuchman, op. cit., pp. 229-88.

2 Age, 29 Sept. 1899. Cable.


America's present friendliness with her former hostility, while Archibald's weekly believed that 'the United States apparently abandoned Venezuela in payment for Britain's moral support against Spain'. ¹ The *Sydney Mail* was only one holding that the new American friendliness exemplified by the Treaty decision left Britain stronger than ever and with a free hand to deal with Kruger in the Transvaal.²

Undoubtedly British confidence in the moral righteousness and justice of her claims in the disputed African gold area had been boosted by the decision concerning the South American gold area, though circumstances differed. Venezuela had been justly rebuffed in the eyes of many by gaining only 30,000 square miles, or three-eighths of what she had claimed. The long-held unworthiness of that country seemed highlighted to some by the fact that while the arbitrators were sitting in Paris, the Republic was undergoing a revolution which replaced Ignacio Andrade with General Castro as president. Yet Venezuela's obvious unhappiness at this decision confirmed some in the belief that no arbitration treaty could please everyone.³

W.T. Stead received the decision with predictable enthusiasm and thought it not only 'speedy, definite and satisfactory', but (agreeing with the *Edinburgh Review*), 'the first great arbitration...in which neither side has shown signs of resentment at the award and neither side impugned the reasons of the decision'.⁴ 'Tom Touchstone' of the *Ballarat Courier* was not the only one believing that a similar system of successfully settling disputes should be applied to the present unhappy Boer situation, which they took to be a crisis situation precipitated by the type of belligerence Chamberlain had displayed when he sent Maxim guns to Venezuela in his first week of office as Colonial

¹ *Advertiser*, 16 Oct. 1899.


Secretary. Nonetheless, Chamberlain's speech at Leicester broaching the prospect of an Anglo-American-German treaty was received tepidly.

Thus was closed 'a chapter of history of which the direct results have been out of all proportion to its intrinsic interests and merits', claimed the Sydney Morning Herald:

The philosophic historian, accustomed to deal with the relations of the facts forming the bald record of history to their antecedent causes and ultimate effects, will find in this comparatively insignificant question about a disputed strip of gold-bearing Guiana territory the starting point of new international policies.

For 'whatever the future may hide, it is safe to say that it will be coloured and influenced by the events of the last three years'. The Cleveland-Olney diplomatic challenge had made Britain aware of her 'splendid isolation' and its dangers and had precipitated the further challenges to Britain's power by the Russians and Germans in China, the French at Fashoda and other irritations elsewhere the paper held. Britain's reaction to this, the re-establishing of friendly relations with America at the time of the Spanish-American War, had established 'a community of sentiment and feeling of racial kinship as well as a shrewd appreciation of the advantage of union'. Not only did it appear that Britain's isolation was at an end given the success of this policy, but the paper regarded 'race sentiment' ('part of Australia's tradition of growth from the first') as responsible for this. It was an optimistic assessment.

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2Sydney Morning Herald, 7 Oct., 18 Nov. 1899.
With both Empires too involved in the quelling of difficulties in the Transvaal and the Philippines to criticize each other, this solidarity continued beyond 1899. In the latter year the 'White Man's Burden' concept entered Anglo-American thinking to provide a further sense of common commitment concerning the responsibilities of empire. To all outward appearances, the years of arbitration excitement had resulted in an 'informal alliance' between America and the British Empire.

1 Compare this with the attitude a decade before: 'It is inconceivable that any nation will ever consent to modify the very smallest of its sovereign rights; and so well is the fact recognized that the humblest tyro in a debating society rarely ventures nowadays to prophesy the advent of international arbitration', Argus, 4 Feb. 1889.
CHAPTER SEVEN

THE CONDITION OF CUBA, 1895-1898:

AUSTRALIA'S CASE AGAINST SPAIN
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AUSTRALIA'S CASE AGAINST SPAIN

American interest in the condition of Cuba had declined in the 20 years following an earlier attempt in 1875 to terminate the ten year insurrection of 1868-1878. When on the 24 February 1895 a new revolt against Spanish rule broke out, American sympathy was once again with the rebels. Despite the fact that it was widely recognized that high American tariffs, and the depression of 1893 had done much to add to Cuban distress, overt assistance by means of filibustering was officially discouraged. Contributions to finance the filibusters were freely and openly solicited by the Cuban juntas - committees of revolutionaries - in American cities. As well, insurgents deliberately destroyed American investment property on the island in an attempt to coerce active American intervention. Cuban insurgent strategy remained the older one of attrition - to break the will of the Spanish rulers.

Recognition of the belligerent rights of the Cuban revolutionaries (discussed by Congress, February-April 1896) and an offer by America to Spain to recognize Cuban independence (refused by Spain 22 May 1896) stimulated early Australian comment. When it was learnt of the concentration camps established by General Valeriano ('Butcher') Weyler on Cuba (from February 1896), the situation invited comparison with the harsh treatment the Turks had meted out to the Christian Armenians (1894-96).

Most blame for the destruction of crops was placed on Spain's shoulders. By the July of 1896 sugar production

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had dropped to a fifth of its 1894 figure and tobacco to a tenth of its former production, while the total value of exports had fallen from £12 million to £3 million. So read the figures in the metropolitan Australian press taken from the London Times. One of the fairest spots on earth had received its death blow and lay in ruins. Queensland politicians and newspapers evinced special interest in the prospect of taking over Cuba's share of the world's sugar market.¹

Despite the bias of the London Times reports reaching Australia from correspondents in Havana, opinion leaders such as the Sydney Morning Herald had, by the end of 1896, through constant and uncritical repetition, granted them a degree of authenticity.² This was in strong contrast to the credibility of the severely censored Spanish news sources. Consequently, when the British correspondents wrote of the destruction of the 'best cigar industry in the world' and other depredations, they were generally taken as being authentic, a general shortage of Cuban and Manilian cigars in Australia proving their point.

Overseas comment was keenly sought. Articles by Clarence King in the Forum³ and Mayo W. Hazeltine in the December (1896) North American Review⁴ were given wide currency through editorials. King described the desolation being wrought by the insurgents on an island 'which they crush to liberate'. Hazeltine's observations evoked more sympathy for the Cubans. He maintained that only 53,000 were enfranchised in a population of 1,600,000 and that this had resulted in the crushing tax burden of $9.79 per inhabitant (the highest on earth) to remove a deficit in

¹West Australian, 11 July 1896; Queensland Times, 24 Oct. 1896. One of the earliest reports on Cuba was veteran journalist Murat Halstead's Review of Reviews, 20 May 1896, p.501. The Age's New York correspondent had put the number of Cuban refugees in America at 10,000-12,000, 9 Apr. 1892.

²Sydney Morning Herald, 11 Dec. 1896. Though the paper believed they were 'well-informed', A.E. Campbell in Great Britain and the United States (London, 1960) questions their reliability, p.147.

³Clarence King, 'Shall Cuba Be Free?', Forum, XX (Sept. 1895) pp.57-8.

excess of $295 million. Further, out of an annual budget of $26 million, only three-quarters of a million had ever been spent on actual improvements for Cuba, the bulk going on 'Spanish wars, Spanish efforts to suppress insurrection and Spanish extravagance'. As one paper put it - 'a heavy price to pay for mismanagement'.

In the middle of 1897 the *Age* weighed in with the observations of a captain of the Cuban insurgent engineers - Leon De Monte - who had written in *April's Pall Mall*. De Monte delivered a formidable indictment of Spain's rule. The hollowness of Spanish trade reciprocity arrangements, the rapacity of officials, the burden of maintaining a minimum of 20,000 Spanish troops even in peace-time were but some of the complaints. The poverty of education where 90 per cent of whites and all blacks (one-third of the population) were illiterate and the inadequacy of 1,000 miles of railway in an island of almost 50,000 square miles were others. Some organs of the Australian press added Cuba's poor roads, primitive sanitary arrangements, dishonest government lotteries and discriminatory tariff duties to this picture of Spanish-induced suffering. To the *Launceston Examiner*, as to others, De Monte's views revealed the story from the 'other side', by-passing the less credible official Spanish sources.

By August 1897 the large dailies were dubbing Cuba 'America's Armenia'. Progressive figures on the cost of the war were published. The 1895-96 campaign had cost Spain £31 million. Sixty thousand insurgents had died - 10,000 in battle, 20,000 from starvation and 30,000 from disease. The *Age* lamented the fact that Cuba's condition 'does not

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2 *Age*, 31 May 1897.

3 *Launceston Examiner*, 8 June 1897.

4 E.g. *Daily Telegraph* (Sydney), 18 Aug. 1897.