and South American governments, argued other papers.[1]

Striving for understanding, the Launceston Examiner could only perceive the Doctrine as a 'dogma...an excellent shibboleth for screening patriots'. Given American annexationist impulses in Hawaii and possible interference in Turkey, 'It may be necessary for the United States to demonstrate more clearly what the Doctrine does mean'.[2] Bonython's Advertiser defended the Doctrine along traditional lines. He maintained that the powers of Europe knew perfectly well what the Doctrine meant - that it was a modest declaration that America was terra cognita in the fullest sense and no longer ground for Europeans to discover and colonise. Also, despite Canning's oratory, the New World had no intention of having itself redress the balance of the Old, but desired both to let the Old World balance itself without interference and for America to be allowed to do the same.[3]

Fairfax's Sydney Mail was one that disagreed with the notion of the Doctrine as a general claim, believing it applied to only one particular nation, regarding specific territory.[4] Other conservatives agreed and marshalled the arguments of Mark M. Dunnell in the American Law Review as well as the cabled views of prominent American jurists to back their position. The 'blanket' application of the Doctrine by the American historian John B. McMaster was refuted by the Courier who preferred Dunnell's more discriminating 'threat to peace and safety' principle.[5] As well, the new capacity to insult the Great Powers with impunity, given to 'half savage' South American republics hiding behind the skirts of the 'new' Monroe Doctrine, was widely derided. A more reasonable interpretation of the Doctrine could provide the

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[1] E.g. Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 6 Dec. 1895.

[2] Launceston Examiner, 9 Dec. 1895.

[3] Advertiser, 12 Dec. 1895.

[4] Sydney Mail, 28 Dec. 1895.

[5] Courier, 29 Jan., 14 Feb. 1896.

foundation for a new Anglo-Saxon alliance many believed, taking up a point in London's Spectator.[1]

Following Cleveland's second Message, objections to the 'new version' of the Doctrine became even more vocal. What appeared to be the case to many was that the United States had expanded its boundaries to include all of South America. Even so, it was difficult for most to conceive how Guiana could menace American security and to claim that Canada did so appeared to be complaining a generation too late. Many newspapers proclaimed the new Doctrine 'egomaniac' and refused to take it any more seriously than a 4 July oration. Papers had carried brief descriptions of the Doctrine for weeks so that criticisms of the 'new' Doctrine by most of the Continental European press as well as by Americans such as Pulitzer, began to take effect.[2]

A.T. Mahan's interpretation of the Doctrine, as it appeared in Harper's Magazine articles, appeared to signal to Australians, the intentions of America toward more active intervention in the Pacific and South America. By a clear exercise of strength, America seemed determined to 'fight for the enforcement of any portion of the Monroe Doctrine which it deemed might be expedient to apply', as one paper put it. Clearly, according to Australian press opinion, America seemed to be orienting herself toward a repressive and unpopular interfering role in South America - one that was to prove inoperable due to the sheer burden of attempting to police it (against France regarding the

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[1]See comment in, Australasian, 14 Dec. 1895; Geelong Advertiser, 28 Dec. 1895; Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 29 Jan. 1896. Somerset's article, op.cit., also decried U.S. support of South American 'tyrannies'.

[2]See editorial comment in, Herald, 19 Dec. 1895; Australian Star, 12 Dec. 1895; Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 19 Dec. 1895; Age, 20, 24 Dec. 1895; Argus, 20, 23 Dec. 1895; Launceston Examiner, 6 Feb. 1896; Leader, 28 Dec. 1895; Murchison Times, 25 Dec. 1895; Darling Downs Gazette, 28 Dec. 1895; The Week, 27 Dec. 1895. Material obviously from old files, though some used Encyclopedia Brittanica.

Brazilian border for example). With news of possible American acquisition of the Danish West Indies - St. Croix, St. Thomas and St. John - this new career seemed about to be launched. That it would encompass Nicaragua, Honduras and other proximate territories appeared inevitable.[1]

With just as much justification it was claimed, could Britain declare a counter 'Doctrine' objecting to American interference in the affairs of her American colonies; or might Australia declare her own 'Doctrine' objecting to encroachments by European imperialists in her own immediate vicinity. What was most reprehensible was that America's pretensions would involve an ultimate clash with British colonial interests, when previously the Americans had employed their Doctrine for 'defence, not defiance'. To admit an American right of interference with British colonies on the basis of a version of the Monroe Doctrine was 'intolerable tyranny' in the opinion of the Brisbane Evening Observer.[2] Consensus on a new version of the Monroe Doctrine relying no more on vague tradition and sense of principle, was now agreed to be an urgent need.[3]

Arriving by sea-mail a month after the height of the crisis, were relevant British newspaper materials which helped deepen discussion of the issues. Sir Donald McKenzie Wallace, the Times' foreign editor and a wide range of knowledgeable correspondents contributed learned basic

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[1]Editorial comment in, Argus, 20 Dec. 1895; Courier, 21 Dec. 1895; Age, 24 Dec. 1895; Australasian, 4 Jan. 1896; Advertiser, 16 Jan. 1896; North Queensland Herald, 22 Jan. 1896; Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 23 Jan. 1896; Launceston Examiner, 21 Dec. 1895, 28 Jan. 1896, quoted a Valparaiso paper, the Chileno and the Caracas correspondent of the Times to prove 'Yankee' unpopularity in South America.

[2]Brisbane Evening Observer, 8 Jan. 1896.

[3]Editorials in, Armidale Chronicle, 21 Dec. 1895; Sydney Mail, 4 Jan. 1896; Courier, 23 Dec. 1895; North Queensland Herald, 25 Dec. 1895; Argus, 18, 28 Jan., 19, 24 Feb. 1896 - quoted New York Sun which held the same opinion; Launceston Examiner, 28 Jan. 1896; Age, 4 Feb. 1896; Brisbane Evening Observer, 8 Jan. 1896; Advocate, 4 Jan. 1896.

materials, but most important, appearing in the 18 December (1895) edition of the London Times were the diplomatic despatches which had passed between Olney and Salisbury.[1] On these materials the Brisbane Courier remarked:

> the new Monroe Doctrine would only have to be stretched a little further to break up England's Colonial Empire. Mr. Olney's idea lays a covenant basis for the seizure of Canada by the United States.[2]

Most papers now agreed that the rebuff of Cleveland's policies administered by Salisbury had been necessary, if the dignity, high-spirits and interests of the Empire were to be maintained.[3]

By the middle of March, many were coming to welcome Cleveland's 'upstart' Commission as providing both an immediate safety valve to relieve the situation's mounting pressures and as the basis for a renewed and lasting understanding based on agreed concepts of a new 'Doctrine'. After the event, the storm's wreckage was picked over by Australian commentators for its 'rash and partisan speech, acute technicality and clumsy diplomacy'. Others however, hoped that 'good may ultimately come out of what appeared at the time an unmitigated calamity to both nations'.[4]

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[1]The Stirling Brothers' Inquirer and Commercial News (Perth) agreed with McClure's estimate of the London Times as the 'World's Leading Newspaper', 27 Dec. 1895. It was this common attitude which gave the paper its prestige as an opinion-leader. In the three months 20 Dec. 1895-20 Mar. 1896, it published 112 letters from correspondents on the dispute.

[2]Courier, 29 Jan., 14 Feb. 1896.

[3]E.g. Ballarat Courier, 4 Feb. 1896.

[4]Sydney Morning Herald, 16 Mar. 1896; Argus, 16 Mar. 1896.

CHAPTER FOUR

ANGLO-AMERICAN CRISIS (1895-1896): AUSTRALIAN REACTIONS

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At the most general level, Australian editorial reactions centred on answering three questions: first, would there be war? Second, if so, would Australia stand by the Empire? Third, what did Australia consider was its own interest in and possible performance during the crisis?

Throughout the first half of December 1895, the general European war scare generated by the critical nature of the Turkish situation regarding treatment of the Armenians[1] and the movement of Russians on the Indian frontier and in China, following the Sino-Japanese war, dominated the thinking of Australian editors on foreign affairs. James

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[1]Armenia and the Turks: in October 1895, Sultan Abdul-Hamid ordered massacred in excess of 80,000 of his Christian Armenian subjects on the grounds of subversion. This followed a belated attempt by Britain, acting with the lukewarm support of Russia and France, to press on the Sultan the need for administrative reforms in his Armenian provinces. The 'Armenian Question' had troubled Anglo-Turkish-Russian relations since the close of the Russo-Turkish War in 1878. Australian opinion was easily aroused, having been prepared by Gladstone's outcry against the 'Bulgarian Massacres' (twenty years before) and by the tacit understanding that Britain had undertaken to protect the Christian Armenians as part of its bargain in the Convention of Cyprus. For comment on Turkey during this period see: Sydney Morning Herald, 5 Nov. 1895, 5 Feb. 1896; North Queensland Herald, 11 Dec. 1895, 1, 22 Jan. 1896; Evening News (Melbourne), 10 Dec. 1895; Newcastle Morning Herald, 12, 15 Nov., 2, 25 Dec. 1895, 7 Feb. 1896; Ballarat Courier, 11 Dec. 1895, 8 Feb. 1896; Geelong Advertiser, 28 Dec. 1895; Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 28 Dec. 1895; Coolgardie Pioneer, 1 Jan. 1896; Southern Cross, 3 Jan. 1896; Launceston Examiner, 11 Jan. 1896; Argus, 31 Jan. 1896; Barrier Miner, 4 Feb. 1896, quotes Dr. Albert Shaw in the Review of Reviews and Richard Davey in the Fortnightly; Maitland Mercury, 8 Feb. 1896; Bega Gazette, 12 Feb. 1896; Wangaratta Chronicle, 11 Mar. 1896; Methodist (Melbourne), 7 Feb. 1896; Churchman (Sydney), 7 Feb. 1896; Freeman's Journal, 28 Dec. 1895; Advocate, 28 Dec. 1895; Singleton Argus, 15 Jan. 1896.

Thomson's Murchison Times in remote Cue, Western Australia, was one believing that

> the early spring will witness a big war and Great Britain is certain to be in it...there is a feeling of insecurity everywhere [but] ... the tocsin of war will not be sounded before March next[1]

But before March (and Spring) two unexpected world crises - over Venezuela and the Transvaal - were to intervene. As the Levis held in their intelligent, short-lived Melbourne Evening News, 'wars and rumours of wars are all over the world just now' and it was expected that '...the impending Armageddon [was] to come before the end of the century'.[2] However, Australia's anxious editorial attention in this regard had, until 19 December, been focused elsewhere.[3]

Only after receipt of the cables on Cleveland's second Message to Congress did the Australian press become alive to what the first of those commentators, Sydney's Daily Telegraph dubbed the 'New Western Question', balancing the omnipresent 'Eastern Question'[4]. Victoria's Governor, Lord Brassey, departed from the festive atmosphere surrounding the opening of Ballarat's Industrial Exhibition to observe, with the Clarks in their Ballarat Courier, the 'angry look' of the rift, with its 'grave possibilities...of great

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[1] Murchison Times, 7 Dec. 1895.

[2] Evening News (Melbourne), 19 Dec. 1895.

The Melbourne Punch published a cartoon reminiscent of Bouguereau called 'Britannia in the Thick of It', showing the fair lady beset by her many enemies, p.25, Jan. 9 1896; the Mercury criticised the 'half-sensible, half namby-pamby article' in the Spectator on the possibility of war, 7 Dec. 1895.

[3] In Victoria's parliament in December, 1895, Madden, representing Melbourne's Eastern suburbs agreed with the Queensland Governor and some of the South Australian parliament's members that Russia was the Menace in the East. His colleagues Rogers and McLellan believed the threat was from Germany and France in Europe: V.P.D.L.A., 1895-1896, Vol.LXXIX, pp.2866, 2876; Vol.LXXX, p.4789; S.A.P.D.L.A., 1895-1896, p.2767.

[4] Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 19 Dec. 1895.

results'[1]. Now the situation had taken a 'serious turn' thought the Barrier Miner and war was 'more than a remote possibility'[2]. The Douglasses lamented in the Geelong Advertiser that:

> ...suddenly...in the course of hours it brings England and the United States to the verge of war....If Lord Salisbury insists on the terms he has laid down for settlement there will be war...the situation is critical indeed.[3]

Heated excitement from America on the one hand and a cool steadiness on Britain's side at first, on the other, led to some interesting cross-currents in Australian opinion. What could avert an open clash? Editors from all sections of the press attempted answers. Those with faith in the caution and good sense of the American people relied on them to force their country's jingo elite into an accommodating position. But others hoped for the same to happen to Britain's arrogant establishment. Salisbury and Cleveland were both expected to defer to the national principles of the other and avert a terrible civil war between kindred peoples, unprepared either militarily or emotionally for such a struggle.[4]

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[1] Ballarat Courier, 20 Dec. 1895; agreed with London Times' attitude: 'no nation with any sense of self respect can concede such a demand as that made by President Cleveland'.

[2] Barrier Miner, 20 Dec. 1895.

[3] Geelong Advertiser, 20 Dec. 1895. But the crisis quickly became newsworthy. See editorials in the Maitland Mercury, 28 Dec. 1895; Morning Bulletin, 1 Jan. 1896; Daily Telegraph (Launceston), 21 Dec. 1895; Mackay Chronicle, 1 Jan. 1896; Castlemaine Leader, 31 Dec. 1895; Goulburn Herald, 30 Dec. 1895; Newcastle Morning Herald, 30 Dec. 1895; Truth, 29 Dec. 1895; Australasian, 28 Dec. 1895; Queenslander, 28 Dec. 1895; Weekly Times (Melbourne), 28 Dec. 1895; West Australia Record, 28 Dec. 1895; Queensland Times, 28 Dec. 1895; Grenfell Record, 28 Dec. 1895; Geelong Times, 31 Dec. 1895; Sydney Mail, 28 Dec. 1895, 4 Jan. 1896.

[4] For comment, see Armidale Chronicle, 21 Dec. 1895; Bendigo Evening Mail, 21 Dec. 1895; Ballarat Star, 23 Dec. 1895; Bega Standard, 24 Dec. 1895; Murchison Times, 25 Dec. 1895; Southern Cross, Dec. 1895; Sydney Morning Herald, 27 Dec. 1895; Geelong Advertiser, 25 Dec. 1895; Advocate, 28 Dec. 1895.

Most feared with the Bulletin that Russia and France would seize on Britain's American distraction 'to leap at the lion's throat and the European scrimmage on the carpet for the last twenty years will be fairly afoot'. Later, Germany appeared as the startling new leader of this anticipated hostile European coalition. Worse, religious papers of different denominations feared that Britain was taking on the wrong enemy. Britain's aggressive energies should be reserved for 'tyrannous, retrogressive power[s]' like the Turks, not 'one which is in every respect travelling along the same road' toward freedom and equality for its people.[1]

Hatred of the contrasting Turk was so all-pervasive that any Australian passion toward America was small by comparison. Much resentment was abruptly channeled toward the Germans - a long established alternative menace. These reactions indicated in editors an amazement amounting to disbelief in the sudden nature of the Anglo-American hostility. This sudden turning away from a growing confrontation mentality reveals the absence of any deep-seated enmity in Australia toward America.[2]

Though a general war was predicted in the New Year by the Telegraph, it was noted how other powers were 'standing easy' until the United States had 'played its final card'.[3] In this period of suspense a series of red-inked hand-bill posters in the newspapers or rural areas of Victoria announced war between England and America in order to sell, among other things, 'scarce' American goods.[4] The Bowral

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[1] Bulletin, 28 Dec. 1895; Singleton Argus, 1 Jan. 1896. These reactions were similar to those of the British press. See R.C.K. Ensor, England 1870-1914 (Oxford, 1936), p.230.

[2] Many British observers thought there would be war. Winston Churchill, returning from Cuba, expected to be instantly shipped to Canada to aid in its defence. See A History of The English Speaking Peoples (London, 1958), Vol.IV, p.259, footnote.

[3] Daily Telegraph (Melbourne), 2 Jan. 1896.

[4] e.g. Numurkah Leader, Nathalia Herald, Maryborough Advertiser, 1-15 Jan. 1896.

WAR! WAR!

SERIOUS OUTLOOK!

IMPORTANT PROCLAMATION

ENGLAND & AMERICA

WAR between these Two Great Kindred Nations would be an everlasting disgrace, but

EAKIN & CO'S

NINTH ANNUAL SUMMER

SALE

Will be hailed with delight by the Nathalia people and district generally who have always appreciated these events.

The Sale of Sales. COMPULSORY Sale in consequence of having Overbought. 20 cases just arrived and will be opened Saturday. Merciless Reductions. We want the GOLD and must Sacrifice the Goods.

Saturday First, Great Opening Day

This Sale will last only about 13 days.

About £2500 worth of Superior and High-class Goods, including Dresses and Hosiery, Millinery, Mantles and Blouses, Ribbons, Laces and Gloves, Men's Mercery, Clothing, Etc. Calicoes, Flannells, etc., etc. Also in conjunction

BOOTS! BOOTS! BOOTS!!

Stylish, Strong and Reliable at a little more than half-prices. Inspect goods and note prices. For Prompt Cash only. We would like to point out that our sales are always what they are represented to be, and hundreds of our Customers will bear out these remarks.

EAKIN & CO., the Ready-money Drapers, Nat[illegible]

Nathalia Herald, 7 January 1896.

Free Press typified New South Wales country opinion: 'War is about the last thing which the world would tolerate at the present juncture and...the worst thing that could happen...its consequences would be tremendous' and unequalled. To prevent the calamity, it was argued that Americans should impeach Cleveland, for neither side could win without immense losses. These would be worse for Britain who would 'have to lessen her sway over most of her outer territory and...forego her dominant position in the council of nations'. No one doubted that an American or European war would threaten Australian security.[1]

Confirmation of the failure of the Jameson raid cabled on the 4 January 1896 was the turning point regarding anxiety over the American situation as most papers, like Thomas Hunt's Victorian Kilmore Free Press, were talking as if the worst had passed.[2] William Fisher's North West Post in Devonport, Tasmania, explained how 'the war scare...flared up and flickered out like an old-fashioned sulphur match, leaving behind it only a little smoke and disagreeable odour'. But, he asked, 'how long is this periodic stench-creating business...to be allowed to proceed?' Only the preceding 'period of profound peace and general amity' existing between the two peoples had prevented a difficult situation from getting out of control, he believed.[3]

Lord Brassey in an interview at Launceston, now found it 'impossible to conceive such a frightful catastrophe as war between England and America, originating in so infinitesimal a matter as the imaginary boundary line through an untrodden jungle' (11 January). On 23 January the Hobart Mercury, among the earlier alarmists, thought 'War is now as far off as ever'. On the 27th: 'There is no danger of war with the United States'. The Melbourne Methodist considered it had the last word at the beginning of February:

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[1] Bowral Free Press, 4 Jan. 1896. See also, Morning Bulletin, 1 Jan. 1896.

[2] Australasian cable, 4 Jan. 1896; Kilmore Free Press, 4 Jan. 1896.

[3] North West Post, 4 Jan. 1896.

> The Venezuelan difficulty is healed over for the moment, but it has served to show how easily a rupture might be made between the two great nations which are bound together by ties of language and natural kinship.[1]

Following a month of strain, many expressed a visible relief. Christopher Crisp had attempted to ease the tension on 4 January by publishing two funny stories from the New York Herald and the Philadelphia Call on the front page of his Bacchus Marsh Express. The Melbourne Punch blamed those 'energetic fictionists who run the cables...' for the greater share of the excitement that Australians had felt, compared with Englishmen. The 'Special Correspondent' came in for his share of the chiding, for by creating rumour and later denying it, he turned his reader into 'an imbecile... or a bitter cynic'.[2] 'Outis' joked that the war scares were altogether too short. On 2 March, he noted that the 'real' war scare was yet to come with a Russo-French combination against England in the Levant. This appeared to return attitudes toward foreign developments back to their pre-crisis situation.[3]

For twelve days (19 December-4 January 1896) papers had coped with the almost unthinkable. Once aroused however, Australian press opinion flowed naturally into alternate hostility toward the German and Turk against whom it had long been more deeply prejudiced. But faced with the prospect of war with America, what stance would Australia have taken? Many editors had addressed themselves to this question.

The mid-1890s was a time when some Australians appeared to be contemplating the nature of their relationship to the Empire with a certain degree of satisfaction, especially in

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[1] Launceston Examiner, 6 Jan. 1896; Mercury, 23, 27 Jan. 1896; Ballarat Courier, 11 Jan. 1896; Methodist (Melbourne), 1 Feb. 1896.

[2] Melbourne Punch, 16, 23 Jan. 1896.

[3] Brisbane Worker, 21 Dec. 1895, identified 'Outis' as John Farrell, 'the most prolific writer of the Australian press' (for the) Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 13 Feb., 2 Mar. 1896.

view of the prospect of their own coming Federation. Those still inclined toward Imperial Federation were deriving inspiration from either Kipling's latest offering in the London Times, in which he spoke of -

> Men of the four New Peoples
> And the Islands of the Sea

in which one paper saw 'the strong pulse of Empire and faith in the ultimate world dominion of the British race',[1] or from the speed of modern communications making the Empire one; or from Christopher Crisp's new pamphlet on the creation of an Imperial Consultative Council, which might 'embody for all time, in the face of all nations, the concrete fact that the Empire is one in all its aims....'[2]

Others derived loyal and Imperial inspiration from the current judgements of prestigious foreigners like Justice Stephen Johnson Field of the United States' Supreme Court whose views on the Empire were quoted from the Canadian press:

> You are bound to prosper. Wherever England plants her foot she at once establishes order; she makes laws; she protects life and property. And those who place themselves under that flag stay under it, assured they can sit under their own vine and fig tree. That is the secret of the British Empire. When I think of Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India and Canada, I am filled with wonder. England's rule in the main is for justice and righteousness and therefore, I would safely predict permanence for her great Empire.

Statements of this kind were to prove for much of the press-opinion, a basis of confidence against the erosion of challenge to Britain's imperium. Though few were open Empire federationists, most were undoubtedly loyal to the

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[1] George Maxwell and John Bowser's Wangaratta Chronicle, 4 Dec. 1896, among others reviewed the poem. Published in The Seven Seas, Nov. 1896, it was one of Britain's most successful volumes of poems. Kipling was so sickened by the crisis it decided him on leaving his American home in Vermont forever. He believed war with America inevitable. See C.E. Norton correspondence in Charles Carrington, Rudyard Kipling (Penguin ed., 1970), pp.280-3.

[2] Crisp in Bacchus Marsh Express, Dec. 1895.

British connection for a variety of reasons.[1]

When the American challenge came in December, the predominant response was clear and unmistakable: sympathy for America; support for Britain. Perhaps the Argus expressed it best: Australia had to accept insults and threats being itself 'part and parcel of a European power'. Further, 'the lowest of all instincts, that of self-preservation, as well as the highest, that of fidelity to our race, makes us cling to our flag'. That loyalty had been questioned in the British weekly Saturday Review. The Melbourne Stock Exchange telegram was used by a British commentator to conclude that 'Englishmen and things English [were] barely tolerated in the colonies and the people of Upper Canada and Australia...would almost as soon live under the stars and stripes as under the Union Jack'. The specific example as well as the general sentiment were put down as heavily as possible by the Australasian which regarded it as nonsense.[2]

A random survey of Australian newspapers reveals the tone of the reactions: Whilst conceding that 'the last desire of any right-minded Briton would be war with America', nonetheless, 'America will need to reckon on an aroused and enthusiastic Britain, utterly different from the ashamed and fool-led country which resented their reasonable and honourable desires a hundred odd years ago'.[3] Though it

> comes as a shock to...once again be paying the usual penalty of Empire, the Imperial Government will certainly receive the sympathy of its colonial empire in thus taking up the gauntlet in the interests of one of its smallest colonies.

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[1] Field from Montreal Daily Witness in Donald Times, 17 Dec. 1895, and others.

[2] Argus, 23 Jan. 1896; Australasian, 8 Feb. 1896. These two newspapers were notably pro-Empire.

[3] Australian Star, 19 Dec. 1895.

Beside, it would need to guarantee the 'independence and protection' from all aggression of its enormous American holdings.[1]

> In the event of the worst, we have only the grim satisfaction of knowing that the Empire was never in any period of her history so thoroughly equipped for a desperate struggle. A war now would probably alter the whole face of Europe if not the world, but Great Britain would emerge from the struggle not unscathed, but certainly not deeply injured in power and prestige.[2]

Though the Government of the United States had in late years 'made considerable strides to the position of a first class power', her navy 'compared only with that of Russia or Germany', was outnumbered in ironclads five to one and in cruisers six to one by the navy of Great Britain.[3] Worse for them, the United States navy had admitted it was 'totally unprepared for war'.[4] Thus,

> one British Squadron is more than a match for the whole United States navy....Many of the United States vessels in commission are mere flag rafts of the 'Mohican' type, which less than two years ago were summarily disposed of by one ball from the brass popugun of a poaching sealer....[5]

'The sympathies of every true lover of liberty would be with the Union Jack, the freest flag on the face of the universe.'[6]

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[1] Daily Telegraph (Launceston), 21 Dec. 1895. This paper quoted the extent of Britain's American interests: Canada, 3,456,383 sq. miles; Jamaica, Falkland, Bahamas, Barbados, Leeward, Trinidad, Windward Islands, 50,000 sq. miles; British Guiana, 110,000 sq. miles; British Honduras, 7,500 sq. miles.

[2] Ballarat Star, 23 Dec. 1895.

[3] Bendigo Evening Mail, 23 Dec. 1895.

[4] Observer, 28 Dec. 1895.

[5] North West Post, 4 Jan. 1896.

[6] Launceston Examiner, 6 Jan. 1896.

Some newspaper critics began cautiously: 'There can be no doubt as to what the United States would be able to do if the nation were bent on a fight with Britain.' She had shown she could hold her own 'with any race either in peace or war'.[1] On the other hand, England had slipped in power. She had sold her soul to the Manchester hucksters; her best blood had emigrated; her army was miserably small; Free Trade had cut the throats of her yeomanry and her navy was capable of defending only her home waters. 'The result of the next big war to Britain [would] be a loss of power and prestige which no man could calculate.' Against the United States alone, such a war would be 'probably short, not particularly decisive and would produce only a limited amount of damage to either combatant'. As a duel, it would be 'desultory and unsatisfying...ending nowhere in particular'. Beside, Britain was an unknown quantity militarily,

> the time being so long since it fought a great enemy by itself, or even with a single ally, that no one knows how far the process of deterioration has really gone.

[It had been 80 years since Waterloo; 40 years since Crimea.][2] 'The nemesis which must sooner or later overtake England in her career of ruthless land-grabbing gains fast upon her....'[3]

Following the new dimension which the crisis assumed after the Jameson raid, the optimists of Empire, no matter how badly their bland hopes were to later prove misplaced, dominated the opinions expressed. Presented with a double

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[1] Newcastle Morning Herald, 25 Dec. 1895.

[2] Bulletin, 28 Dec. 1895, 4 Jan. 1896. Events in the next four years were to prove this assessment all too sadly true.

[3] Record, 4 Jan. 1896. Despite this criticism, C.S. Blackton's articles on Australian nationalism have perhaps underemphasized the degree of Australian feeling for Britain in the 1890s. Especially, C.S. Blackton, 'Australian Nationality and Nationalism: The Imperial Federationist Interlude, 1885-1901', Historical Studies, Nov. 1955, pp.12-16.

crisis in early January, critics' voices grew smaller with the awareness of a cordon strangulaire of enemies emerging: America to the West, Europe to the East, led by Germany.

Some now believed that all attempts to isolate Britain in the past having failed, they would do so again. In her role as the world's banker, Britain was in a fine position to discourage her enemies by inflicting financial embarrassment on them. Others gathered that Britain would always be threatened, but her troubles would vary in intensity and importance and not all be critical at once. If the century was to close as the one preceding, in a war of nations with America as before taking a peripheral role, what were Britain's resources to meet the new situation: A doubling of population, commerce and wealth; a substantial increase in political freedom through liberal legislation, hence loyal classes; the asset of a set of colonies fairly equivalent to a continental alliance made loyal by their trust in British justice, restraint and fairness and relying on her protection in times of adversity.[1]

A week after the news of the Jameson raid, the Wangaratta Chronicle, at the height of the outburst of patriotism for Empire, demonstrated how lyrical this could be:

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[1]For comment see editorials in the Evening News (Melbourne), 8 Jan. 1896; Melbourne Punch, 9 Jan. 1896; Ballarat Courier, 11 Jan., 5 Mar. 1896; Wangaratta Chronicle, 11 Jan. 1896; Goulburn Herald, 19 Feb. 1896; Australasian, 29 Feb. 1896; Bendigo Evening Mail, 3 Mar. 1896, quoted the words of Professor Vanberg, oriental traveller and historiographer: 'However strong the elephant may be, it can never conquer the whale.' Some Australians took refuge in the whale's dimensions: British naval expenditure was to be increased by £55 million in the next decade: 77 new vessels in the next 12 months. Beside, Britain could already claim 50 battleships, 25 armoured cruisers, 52 protected cruisers and 34 torpedo boats against 3 battleships, one armoured cruiser, 13 protected cruisers and one torpedo boat for America (Nov. 1895). Leopold, op.cit., p.165. Albert M. Imlah, Economic Elements in the Pax Britannica (Massachusetts, 1958), quantifies the nature of Britain's strength.

> We are Australians [it wrote], because England is England. We owe everything - our lives, liberty, laws, religion, social and family gifts - all to the vitality, the prowess, the civilization and the wealth of the Anglo-Saxon and Cymric people grouped indissolubly under the name of England [sic]. We cannot imagine therefore, any other feeling in the moment of her danger than hatred of her enemies and a strong will to give a helping hand against them. If we have any hope of the world dominion of the white races; if we have any faith in the laws, the religion, the civilization of the Anglo-Saxon people and their beneficent influence for the future peace and safety of the world - and that is the morning hope of all our missionary effort - we shall feel the spur of patriotism when England [sic] is assailed, because there is the corner-store of the British Empire, the repository of all we hold dearest, the only efficient safeguard of our liberty.[1]

As Melbourne's Weekly Times put it:

> ...away in Canada and here in Australia, the cry of Britain's children will be - 'Well done Old England! The lion's whelps are with you. And come the whole world of foes in arms, unitedly we'll face them.[2]

Other patriotic outbursts were more extreme.[3]

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[1] Wangaratta Chronicle, 11 Jan. 1896.

[2] Weekly Times, 11 Jan. 1896.

[3] See, Melbourne Punch, 16 Jan. 1896; Maffra Spectator, 23 Jan. 1896; Methodist (Melbourne), 24 Jan. 1896; Ballarat Courier, 5 Mar. 1896, speculated that the new naval expenditures could only mean 'that the Imperial Government regard war as inevitably at an early date'. More than one paper hoped that the enemy was not to be America, for Mulhall, 'perhaps the greatest living expert in statistics' according to the Australasian, 14 Mar. 1896, had revealed that by 1910 with 90 million energetic people, the United States would be the 'most powerful state in the world'. Further, as the Adelaide Advertiser, 11, 13 Feb. 1896, agreeing with the Contemporary article 'World Powers of the Future' saw by 1920, the coming confrontation of the English-speaking peoples would be with Russia and the Slavs. Other such predictions were made early in 1896 in the Nineteenth Century and the North American Review. The Bacchus Marsh Express, 25 Jan. 1896, quoted the Scottish historian Prothero to the same effect from the Edinburgh Scotsman.

During the crises, how did editors view Australia's power position? At the time of Cleveland's first Message, Lord Brassey at the Melbourne Town Hall, was once again warning an audience of the defectiveness of Victoria's defences (in fact, one of the better defended of all the colonies) due largely, he believed, to retrenchment economies.[1] The message that a federated Australia could deal much more effectively with the defence problem was once again delivered. After the second Message became public, the Sydney Mail felt obliged to rebuff 'Liberal and Radical' accusations that British Tories were using the foreign troubles to divert attention away from pressing domestic problems and insisted that they were real and uninvited.[2] On Christmas Eve, the pro-Empire Argus felt it

> useful to review the Australian position.... These war alarms are the occasion on which we can consider with advantage whether the insurance we pay in defence votes is sufficient and effects its purpose.[3]

This consideration was forthcoming in the defence debates of the Victorian Legislative Assembly at the end of January, held in the context of the double-crisis.[4]

Concern that the Americans were not signatories to the Declaration of Paris of 1856 (providing for the abolition of privateering and respect for neutral flags in war time) was taken up when the press reassured its readers that Americans were unlikely to interfere with Australian cargoes

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[1] Brassey's speech, 3 Dec. 1895, was widely reported e.g. Maryborough Advertiser, 4 Dec. 1895.

[2] Sydney Mail, 21 Dec. 1895.

[3] Argus, 24 Dec. 1895; see also, the Goulburn Herald, 15 Jan. 1896.

[4] Victorian M.L.A. Kirton also called for Federation in the interests of improved defence at this time, V.P.D.L.A., LXXIX, p.2870.

carried in neutral vessels as 'she would seek not to strain her relations with foreign powers, but rather induce them to maintain a benevolent neutrality'. Regarding the possibility of American privateering, many were satisfied with the presence of the Auxiliary Squadron, whose vessels the Boomerang, Karrakatta, Katoomba and Mildura were considered among the fastest in the Royal Navy. With neither arsenals nor coaling stations in the Southern and Indian Oceans, American cruisers could little hope to affect the Suez route for Australians. Nor did the American fleet have the resources to control the Mediterannean or the immediate area around England. 'Thus', claimed the Argus,

> there would seem to be a clear and safe run for our goods in and out from port to port, even without the assistance of a neutral flag....It looks as though...no big war in which Great Britain was involved would less directly affect the commerce of Australia.[1]

The Bulletin was traditionally gloomy at first, regarding the disadvantageous position Australia was placed in due to the Imperial connection. During the American phase of the double crisis, it lambasted the 'dull, stupid, casual' Australian, who due to blind loyalty to an Empire with a huge number of enemies and quarrels, was bound to have his 'time for war, invasion and death'. With the German phase of the crisis however, the paper performed a volte-face. It now believed it was

> high time that Britain seriously considered her position and began to set her house in order for war....For quite apart from Australia's direct interest in the encounter, we have some indirect anxiety for Britain's future....For, though we hate British cant and greed and hypocrisy, we admire British blood and grit and force....Beside, we have nothing to gain and a good deal to lose by the relegation of Britain to the ranks of second-rate powers - a contingency that looms nearer. With all Britain's faults, we cannot wish her failure in the struggle before her.

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[1] Argus, ibid.

Therefore, the Bulletin asked:

> How would Australia stand if it came to a fight? How many trained men, capable of bearing arms? How many rifles and how much ammunition? What artillery, uniforms, accoutrements have we?[1]

As Kipling had predicted three days before, the German situation coming as it did on top of the American, did indeed 'wake up the colonies', and provided one of the earliest evidences of the Bulletin's underlying chauvinistic tendencies.[2]

Australia's initial sluggish reactions were nowhere better illustrated than in 'Woomera's' parody of William McCulloch, Victoria's Minister for Defence:[3]

> How is it that amidst the row
> When din of battle peals,
> When Uruguay is on the ramp
> And Venezuela squeals,
> Victorians with unruffled nerve
> Go peacefully to bed?
> No wonder that they feel secure,
> McCulloch keeps his head....

and so on for four other verses, concluding:

> A fig for all the nasty things
> That Grover Cleveland said,
> There's peace on earth for Melbourne while
> McCulloch keeps his head.[4]

This frivolous tone disappeared after the news of the Jameson raid and was followed by serious discussion on the colonies' war preparedness. A year before, readers were reminded, Admiral Colomb in a National Review article had

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[1] Bulletin, 28 Dec. 1895, 4 Jan. 1896, cf. 11 Jan. 1896. The paper shamefacedly admitted 8 Feb. 1896 that alarmist cables had 'bulldozed' it into this reaction. Nonetheless, it is an interesting foretaste of the World War One attitudes of the Bulletin.

[2] Carrington, Rudyard Kipling, op.cit., p.283, Letter to C.E. Norton, 8 Jan. 1896.

[3] William McCulloch served from 27 Sept. 1894 to 5 Dec. 1899 in the Liberal Turner ministry. He was Minister of Defence from 13 Feb. 1895 and Vice President of the Board of Land and Works. He served again in the Turner Ministry from 19 Nov. 1900 until 12 Feb. 1901 and until 10 June 1902 in the Peacock Ministry. In all, he retained his Defence portfolio.

[4] Australasian, 4 Jan. 1896.

argued that the £126,000 paid by Australia to maintain a fleet in her own waters and the 32,000 troops maintained would be of little use as such forces would be withdrawn to 'key' strategic areas if the Empire were at war. A light cruiser at each colonial port and a light sea-faced battery would suffice against any Alabama-style surprise attack. Other defence monies would be better handed to a central Imperial defence authority, Colomb argued. The Wagga Wagga Express was only one among the many now urging increased volunteering, more training, resuscitation of branch reserves and greater prominence and permanence for the military.[1]

The new sense of alarm animating all sections of Australian press opinion combined with the new sense of solidarity among the colonies following the recent passage of the New South Wales' Enabling Bill. It produced the most remarkable telegram sent to the Home Government since that of the New South Wales' acting Premier William Bede Dalley on 11 February 1885, which followed news of the death of General Gordon in the Sudan. At 11 p.m. on Sunday night, 12 January, George Reid, Premier of New South Wales, sent the following official cable to Lord Salisbury:

> The Governments of Australia and Tasmania [sic] view with satisfaction the prompt and fearless measures adopted by Her Majesty's Government in defence of the integrity of the Empire. We desire to convey our united assurances of loyal support. The people of Australia are in full sympathy with the determination of the Mother Country to resent foreign interference in matters of British and Colonial concern. Signed on behalf of and at the request of N.S.W., South Australia, Victoria, Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia - G.H. Reid.

A reply from Lord Salisbury was delayed by a breach in the line at Darwin. It arrived on Wednesday morning, 15 January and ran:

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[1] Colomb's ideas were widely re-discussed e.g. Geelong Advertiser, 5 Jan. 1896; Wagga Wagga Express, 9 Jan. 1896; Leon Desmond Atkinson, 'Australian Defence Policy: A Study of Empire and Nation, 1897-1910' (unpublished Ph.D., A.N.U., 1964), takes up these developments.

Hatfield, 4:30 p.m., Jan. 13th.

> Her Majesty's Government heartily thanks you and through you, the governments of Australia and Tasmania for your patriotic assurances of sympathy and support. Nothing can give us greater confidence in maintaining the rights of our country than the knowledge that we have the approval and good-will of our fellow-subjects in the colonies.1

Australia's press and public were generally gratified with this official response. Not only did Australians in London note a generally approving British reception to the cable, but the Times on Monday, 13 January, had mentioned the gesture favourably as did the Canadian Parliament some time later. In Australia, Reid's message was described as 'wise, thoughtful and statesmanlike...representing nine-tenths of the people of Australia'.[2] That ten per cent disaffected - if the estimate was correct - were probably the 'disgruntled hobbledehoys' resenting British bullying, or cynics who believed that despite such assurances, Australia's capitalists would sever the British connection the moment property was endangered by 'Yankees...Germans or some other nation's warships bombard[ing] any or all of the principal cities of this continent'.[3]

Most however, were pleased with this possible strengthening of Britain's hand in diplomatic negotiation. Further, whatever friction or irritation which might arise from unpaid colonial debts during a time of war, might thus be compensated for by an early display of loyalty such as had been made.[4] In any event it disproved the gloomy predictions of critics like war-correspondent Archibald Forbes and Manchester economist John Morley who had predicted

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[1]The telegram's contents were widely publicized e.g. Tamworth News, 17 Jan. 1896.

[2]Newcastle Morning Herald, 18 Jan. 1896.

[3]Brisbane Worker, New Year ed. 1896.

[4]See editorials in Courier, 14 Jan. 1896; Launceston Examiner, 21 Jan. 1896; West Australian, 15 Jan. 1896; Barrier Miner, 11 Jan. 1896.

a decade before, the falling away of Australia during such a British crisis.[1]

Could colonies remain neutral even if they wished to? The Launceston Examiner thought not. An Imperial Royal Commission, it reminded its readers, had been formed in 1870 to consider this question. Though that Commission had recommended that the requisite power be granted to the Australian colonies, nothing had come of it. Nonetheless, it was recognized that a declaration of neutrality would not help Canada's situation if the United States decided to take it. The question of neutrality was recognized as an academic one for 'having so long enjoyed the protection of the flag, it would be little short of cowardice to desert it when attacked, so the neutrality issue [had] been allowed to lapse'.[2]

Most metropolitan newspapers agreed that the ties of Empire had been strengthened by the crises and it was generally recognized that the best way to make Australia secure was to give strong support to the Mother Country. Though Chamberlain's suggestions at the Lamington Farewell Dinner for a form of Empire-federation were politely put aside, less formal links were encouragingly received.[3] The enthusiastic reception of the Imperial cable conference held in Australia at the end of January was thus recognized as

> due to some extent to the emphasis which recent events have laid upon the necessity for a united Empire and the need for maintaining a rapid and permanent communication with every part of it.[4]

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[1] It also disproved the prediction of Sir Charles Dilke who, while visiting the colony, believed that N.S.W. would not take the lead again in expressions of such loyalty. Problems of Greater Britain (London, 1890), p.177.

[2] Launceston Examiner, 1 Feb. 1896.

[3] Courier, 20, 28 Jan. 1896; West Australian, 25 Jan. 1896; Newcastle Morning Herald, 21 Feb. 1896; Sydney Morning Herald, 29, 31 Jan. 1896.

[4] Tamworth Observer, 29 Feb. 1896. The issue of a Pacific cable linking Australia and Canada had been discussed at length at the Ottawa Conference of 1894.

Most colonial parliaments had broken up far too early (before 20 December) to incoporate any discussion on the crisis, except for Victoria's Parliament which closed its session on 23 January with a debate on the Defence Budget in the Legislative Assembly. Should spending be increased above its figure of £165,000? No, argued Hancock, the Socialist member for Footscray who claimed that the war scares were artificially created 'in the newspaper offices of Collins Street and by Selbourne Chambers swashbucklers... inflaming uneducated, ignorant and brutal crowds'. He believed that 'any man who knew anything at all must have seen that war between England and America...bound by blood and commerce...was absolutely impossible' and was relieved that 'Parliament had not been sitting during the latest war scare'.[1]

The conservative, R. McLellan, replied intemperately (and inaccurately) that America had been preparing for war since the time of independence and now possessed a threatening 'army and navy second to none in the world' - exaggerating the nature of the American menace. P. Bromley agreed with the Age that logistic problems and preoccupation in Europe rendered Australia relatively safe from the Empire's invaders and enemies. Another Socialist, J. Prendergast, whose ideas found a regular outlet in the Labour weekly, Tocsin, claimed 'the people of Victoria had no trouble with the Americans or the Boers'; that a citizen army such as the Americans used to defeat the British was best and that cut-backs should continue. With a sure eye for economy which was to earn him a place in the Australian Commonwealth's first Cabinet as Treasurer, Victoria's Liberal Premier George Turner, closed the debate on this note and the retrenchments amounting to £44,127 remained.[2]

But the decision was widely criticized. The Wangaratta Chronicle agreed with the keen militarist Chirnside that this left Victoria's defences in a sad 'state of chaos'.[3]

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[1] V.P.D.L.A., 1895-96, Vol. LXXX, pp.4783-7 (Hancock).

[2] Ibid., p.4789 (McLellan); p.4798 (Bromley); p.4803 (Prendergast); p.4807, p.4840 (Turner).

[3] Wangaratta Chronicle, 22 Jan. 1896.

The Melbourne Punch in a stinging cartoon claimed that Turner's amputations had rendered Victoria's defence decorative but useless. In this way the press reminded parliament that it considered the German and American menaces placed Australian colonies in real military danger.[1]

On a more selfish economic level, some organs of the press suggested that Australian fishing in Britain's troubled commercial waters could be good. Having now suffered successive set-backs in Russia, South America and the United States, it was hoped that Australia might be kindly reassessed as an investment outlet for British capital. It was recognized that despite Britain's carriage of 57 1/2 per cent of the world's ocean trade, the country could be starved into submission within ninety days of being cut off from a supply of American goods. This possibility should convince Britain to look more kindly upon Australia as a food source, some editors held. Especially would Chamberlain's recent trade circular reveal Australian potential in this regard.[2]

David Syme's Age as ever, led practical suggestions on how Australia's share of 4.07 per cent of Britain's trade in meat could be increased at the expense of the United States' and Argentina's combined 20.5 per cent share. Advances in refrigeration, greater concern for consumer tastes, better preparation, faster transportation, more effective quality controls and an immediate loan of £12,000 to an E. Hotson to expand Melbourne's existing frozen meat trade were all

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[1] Melbourne Punch, 'Our Defenceless Defences', 23 Jan. 1896, p.49.

[2] See editorials in, Sydney Morning Herald, 27 Dec. 1895; Mercury, 28 Dec. 1895; Goulburn Herald, 30 Dec. 1895; Armidale Chronicle, 1 Jan. 1896; Evening News, 24 Dec. 1895; Australian Star, 27 Dec. 1895.

suggested to Victoria's government, though with little success.[1] With similar ends in view, Newcastle's protectionist daily suggested a further break into the British wheat market with the product of New South Wales' Hunter Valley.[2] In a similar vein, the papers of the Wimmera suggested that Californian canned and fresh fruits consumed on Western Australian goldfields be replaced by the local product.[3]

One extreme view came from the most intensely protectionist paper of those mentioned; the short-lived erratic Sydney weekly, the Australian News. A British military involvement should be welcomed by Australians it believed. Why? It would prove that contrary to popular overseas legend Australia could feed both itself and Britain as well as provide the necessary gold to provide the sinews of war. Full employment, federation, manufacturing industries and national unity would be the Australian harvest, '...so just trot that war out...for we're all right and would be all right', it assured its readers, calling on the dubious authority of a P. Belfield, local stove factory manager, to back up its opinions.[4] At a more sober level, most agreed with the normally sanguine Melbourne Punch that even though Australia might escape direct conflict with an American or German enemy, Britain's losses in terms of total international trading wealth would beset Australia's economy with 'tremendous ills... protract[ing] for many a day the already long drawn out contest we are fighting with depression'.[5]

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[1] Age, 19 Mar. 1896. As C.E. Sayers points out in David Syme (Melbourne, 1965), Ch.8, this sort of initiative on his part was common. See also, J.A. La Nauze on 'David Syme', Political Economy in Australia (Melbourne, 1949), pp.118-22. The Beacon, 1 Dec. 1896, was quick to point out that British naval authorities still purchased the bulk of their canned beef from Chicago.

[2] Newcastle Morning Herald, 30 Dec. 1895.

[3] Horsham Times, 31 Dec. 1895.

[4] Australian News, 20, 27 Jan. 1896.

[5] Melbourne Punch, 23 Jan. 1896.

While it considered itself reasonably secure, for a variety of economic, military and emotional reasons, Australia did not welcome war between Britain and America or any other foe. Furthermore, the Australian colonies were determined to demonstrate to the world that come what may they believed their own interests to be indissolubly associated for some time to come with those of their Mother Country - that as has often been stated, their loyalties were 'dual, but not divided'.[1]

More particular Australian reactions concerned several matters: those of her religious leaders; the response to Redmond's appeal to the Irish; the question of the loyalty of her sister country Canada; an assessment of the chief protagonists of each country and an early forecast of new American foreign policy directions.

Even editors of small and remote papers such as Queensland's Western Champion at Barcaldine were aware of the painful irony that the belligerence of the Guiana-Venezuela boundary dispute was occurring at Christmas during the festival of peace.[2] Overseas religious reactions to this irony were taken up by the cables. Australians learnt by cable of the influential Reverend Lyman Abbott's large congregation loudly cheering his anti-war sermon at Brooklyn; of the famous episcopal Bishop, Henry Codman Potter raising his voice against Cleveland in a sermon in New York; of the prayers for peace in thousands of chapels in America and Britain, and of the English Nonconformists

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[1] W.K. Hancock has most forcefully articulated this kind of loyalty, speaking of 'Independent Australian Britons', Australia (Sydney, 1945), Ch.3. Recently, Russel Ward has posited this type of conceptual framework as a new way of writing Australian history, apart from the 'Whig' approach pursued by R.M. Crawford, F.L.W. Wood, G.V. Portus, Geoffrey Serle, J.M. Ward and others, or the C.M.H. Clark framework of Catholic-Protestant-Enlightenment tensions. See 'Two Kinds of Australian Patriotism', Augustus Wolkesel Memorial Lecture (Sept., 1969), University of New England Circular No. 15.

[2] Western Champion, 24 Dec. 1895.

sending messages of conciliation directly to fellow American churches. Joseph Pulitzer had cabled English bishops and statesmen for publishable messages of peace and goodwill and had received replies from the Bishops of Chester and Liverpool among others. On Christmas Day, the Bishops of Canterbury, Winchester, Bangor and London delivered 'peace' sermons.[1]

Sermons were similarly preached on the Australian scene. Many papers reported the most impresive - that of Sydney's Catholic Cardinal Moran, given at the end of his High Mass on Christmas morning at St Mary's Cathedral. He condemned the warlike spirit of 'two great Christian nations' as pagan and barbaric. He thought it proper that the world should denounce 'those who set people against people and innundate the Christian world with blood'. He urged all

> to pray to God on that day of peace that the politicians should not be allowed to spill the blood of Christians, but that the divine light of grace and peace should show them the error of their course.[2]

The Jewish Rabbi in Sydney, J.H. Landau, also preached a sermon on the text: 'And thou shalt speak peace unto the nations' (Zach. IX, 10). He saw the present situation as a

> mockery...when [at a time] the Christian nations [were] preaching 'peace on earth, goodwill to all men', the two great Anglo-Saxon brother nations - brothers in common sentiment and a common past, [were] on the brink of a cataclysm of war. Which may God avert![3]

This moral timeliness was not confined to the cities. For example, the Reverend A. Ross at St John's Church of England Tamworth, engaged 'the close attention of a large

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[1] *Argus* cables 20-31 Dec. 1895.

[2] Moran quoted *Daily Telegraph* (Sydney), 26 December 1895; *Freeman's Journal*, 4 January 1896; small differences in textual details exist.

[3] *Australasian Hebrew*, 3 January 1896.

congregation' with a sermon based on a text from an Argus editorial: 'After the passage of two thousand Christmases, the two greatest powers in Christendom were trembling on the verge of war about a strip of South American forest.' Ross believed that nothing less than a revolution in human nature, taking 'twice twenty' centuries to accomplish was needed to effect a change.[1] But to the Brisbane Courier such expressions illustrated the great 'progress of Christian sentiment...over the last hundred years'.[2]

Not all would agree. Whereas Melbourne's Methodist had enthused over the style with which the official chaplain, Dr. P. Milburn, opened the current session of United States' Congress believing 'he became to the Senate, the interpreter of the Churches and of religious people generally', Adelaide's Observer attacked his informal prayer as hypocrisy: ('Heavenly Father, let peace reign throughout our borders. Yet may we be quick to resent anything like an insult to this our nation.') saying, 'it is nothing short of irrational for them to adopt, without valid excuse, measures directly inciting to war and at the same time to supplicate Heaven that the calimity may be averted'.[3] Sydney's Methodist hoped that Dr Talmage, the new Presbyterian minister at Washington, would be a benign influence on the 'belligerent President of the United States'. Australian religious reactions were even more placatory than many overseas varieties.[4]

On 27 December, the Age among other leading papers, carried the news that the Irish Parnellite leader in the House of Commons, John Redmond, had cabled Pulitzer's New York World to the effect that in the event of war, the Irish would back America. The action provoked a great outpouring of comment on the perennial Irish problem. To the Age it was traitorous:

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[1] Tamworth News, 31 Dec. 1895, 7 Jan. 1896.

[2] Courier, 25 Dec. 1895.

[3] Methodist (Melbourne), 8 Feb. 1896; Congressional Record, 54th Congress, 1st Session, Dec. 23 1895, p.26.

[4] Methodist (Sydney), 11 Jan. 1896.

> We shall not be surprised to find that it has angered the British temper more than all the bounce from over the water....It has certainly put Home Rule out of the region of practical politics.[1]

To the Courier it was a 'feeble malice' designed to appeal to 'that small section of the Irish in America which finds a savage delight in talking war'. Such were to be found at the recent Chicago convention (chaired by Finerty) who had declared as policy: 'We are here to tell beloved Uncle Sam that if he draws the sword in defence of the Monroe Doctrine, the Irish in America will be behind the Stars and Stripes.' However, for the rest of America's Irish, who were loyal and working constitutionally for a measure of legislative independence for their own country such 'as Queensland enjoys' it was 'a monstrous libel'.[2]

Of the papers denouncing the action the Sydney Orange Lodge's Protestant Banner was the most shrill. It was part of an ongoing international Catholic plot, it believed, for 'Rome never rests. She is ever on the wing....Like the hawk, only waiting an opportunity to drive down and seize her prey.' It assured Britain that her 'Yellow Boys of the Old Sod' would happily drive every Fenian into the sea.[3] Others were of the opinion that Redmond should resign his seat and dissociate himself from those loyal Irish now 'more English than the English'. But for some, it was a perfect example of British tolerance that a member of the House of

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[1] Age, 27 Dec. 1895; Discussion on Michael Davitt's Australian visit and on the Tory-Unionist Government's placatory attitudes to the Irish vote appeared in Hunt, Murray and Kelly's partisan Kilmore Free Press, 26 Dec. 1895, and Launceston's Catholic Monitor, 27 Dec. 1895. The Bulletin, 28 Dec. 1895, placed the Irish faction at the head of America's jingoes.

[2] Courier, 27 Dec. 1895.

[3] Protestant Banner, 28 Dec. 1895.

Commons could thus speak with impunity. Protestants generally condemned the cable as a wild declaration and a blunder amounting to crime, sent only to refurbish a waning personal influence.[1] Adelaide's Observer labeled it 'the most discreditable incident in connection with the imbroglio'.[2]

Those more sympathetic to Irish-Catholic aspirations saw it as an error of judgement typical of the many commited in the name of Home Rule. As a 'mere burlesque of a crime' it aroused only contempt for the man and pity for the injured cause. Beside, it was repeatedly recognized that Redmond spoke for only a small fraction of the Irish.[3] Catholic organs like Bishop M. Gibney's Perth weekly Record were more definite. It thought an Irish revulsion against recently entrenched Primrose Leaguers and Tory prejudice inevitable. It was legitimate tactics, given Britain's historic intransigence concerning Ireland, to call on the aid of the powerful Irish-American vote to pressure Britain into granting long-sought concessions. For Ireland stood 'before the world, baffled, beaten, driven into sore desperation'.[4] The Freeman's Journal also hoped that the threat of an Irish rebellion and another American war (employing as many as 300,000 revengeful Irishmen on the side of America) might do 'more to further the future of Home Rule than all the strategy of Parnell and all the eloquence of Gladstone'.[5]

If such a war occurred, Melbourne's Catholic Advocate for one, openly forgave those Irish who did not pray for peace on the grounds of 'human nature...deep wounds, bitter memories and unsatisfied claims to justice'. At the same time, the Catholic press reminded Britain that a contented

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[1] Tamworth Observer, 1 Jan. 1896; Launceston Examiner, 3 Jan. 1896.

[2] Observer, 4 Jan. 1896.

[3] Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 27 Dec. 1895.

[4] Record, 28 Dec. 1895.

[5] Freeman's Journal, 28 December 1895.

Ireland would release at least 20,000 British troops for service abroad. Nonetheless, the same press continued to deplore the rifts in the unity of the Irish cause effected by the quarrels of factions led by Healy, Dillon, O'Brien and Redmond.[1] At one point the Freeman's Journal considered the latter's telegram such a tactical political error it called its authenticity into open question. Most Australian Irish Catholics obviously preferred the peaceful, gradualist tactics of Irish Nationalist M.P. Michael Davitt (father of the Irish Land League), whose visit to Australia had helped him to achieve status among Catholic opinion leaders in the colonies.[2]

The formation of the 'Irish Rifle Corps for the Defence of Australia' by a widely representative gathering in January 1896, presided over by Cardinal Moran, was denounced by the Protestant Banner and the Bulletin as the 'Cardinal's Corps', 'Rome's Army' and 'Sectarian Soldiering'. In fact, it did much to reaffirm the general Irish loyalty to Britain existing in Australia and cast into such doubt by the Redmond telegram.[3]

At the height of the crisis, long-established literary connections on both sides of the Atlantic forcefully asserted themselves in the interests of peace. Australians learnt by cable of the friendly address sent by eminent 'men of letters' of England (Meredith, Lecky, Ruskin, Hardy, Blackmore, Arnold and others) to their American counterparts on Christmas Day. On the American side, Henry George, the pioneer socialist, well known for his Progress and Poverty

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[1] Advocate, 28 Dec. 1895, 4, 18 Jan., 1 Feb., 8 March 1896.

[2] Freeman's Journal, 4 Jan. 1896; Davitt's book, Life and Progress in Australasia (London, 1897), which described his several months in Australia, was favourably reviewed. See South Australian Register, 30 Apr. 1898.

[3] Freeman's Journal, 25 Jan. 1896; Australasian, 25 Jan. 1896; Protestant Banner, 1 Feb. 1896; see Patrick Ford, Cardinal Moran and the A.L.P. (Melbourne, 1966), pp.184-5.

(1879) and his visit to Australia in 1890, expressed a reciprocal feeling which probably influenced some worker and radical opinion in Australia.[1]

Some Australian literati and others took their conciliatory lead from the well known Mark Twain - whose droll humour made him in 1895, probably America's most widely-read author of fiction and travel-writing in Australia. During his successful lecture tour (mid-September 1895 to early January 1896) he spoke on the crisis. One occasion for this was his reception during the New Year's Eve luncheon at Glenelg celebrating the 59th anniversary of South Australia's foundation. Warmly received, Twain spoke following the Commissioner of Public Works who had blamed the war fever on the few 'demagogic scum' rather than the American people as a whole. Twain replied briefly but pointedly that

> such a war would certainly stop the wheels of progress and intelligence of the whole world for generations. Therefore, he would listen to no talk of war between the two countries. Blood was thicker than water and there must be no blood shed between English and Americans.[2]

Twain's own observations and experiences describe the tone in which the crisis was received. '...Speaking of the war flurry', he wrote in Following The Equator (1897),

> it seemed to me to bring to light the unexpected...the attitude of the newspapers was new...they treated the subject argumentatively and with dignity, not with spite and anger.... I heard many public speeches and they reflected the moderation of the journals....The war cloud hanging black over England and America made no trouble for me. I was a prospective prisoner of war, but at dinners, suppers, on the platform and elsewhere, there was never anything to remind me of it. This was hospitality of the right metal and would have been prominently lacking in some countries, in the circumstances.

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[1] Argus cable, 29 Dec. 1895; Australian Workman, 2 Nov. 1895; Maryborough Chronicle, 30 Dec. 1895.

[2] Advertiser, 31 Dec. 1895; see Mark Twain's Following The Equator (Connecticut, 1897), pp.99-241, esp. p.333.

Twain's Glenelg speech both fitted and helped sustain the prevailing Australian mood.[1]

No doubt achieving as wide an effect as Twain's placatory words were the witty cartoons of another American - Livingstone Hopkins, 'Hop' of the Bulletin - an institution on the magazine's front page since 1882. His accent on the lighter side of the crisis, satirizing Cleveland, Edison, the Monroe Doctrine and other 'sacred cows' of his own country, undoubtedly did much to relieve tension in many sections of Australian society.[2]

No portion of overseas Empire aroused more consistent interest in Australia, due perhaps to improving communications and trade and the country's federal experience than did Canada at this time. Many well-read Australians were made painfully aware by newspaper reviews of the article and book literature - especially Goldwin Smith's - of the arguments for Canadian annexation by America.[3] The most recent rebuff of this sentiment had been J.G. Bourinot's 'Why Canadians Do Not Favour Annexation' in the Forum for March 1895. He expressed the view that Canadian annexation had been manufactured as an issue by newspapermen, that Canadians were content with their status and growth and looked forward eagerly to the fulfilment of their own destiny within the Empire. With modifications like the Australian ballot, Canadian politicians considered themselves more advanced and less corrupt than those of the United States. These opinions,

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[1] Mark Twain, op.cit., pp.167-8.

[2] Bulletin, 28 Dec. 1895; 4, 11, 18 Jan., 8, 15 Feb. 1896.

[3] Goldwin Smith's Canada and the Canadian Question (1891) argued for union on sectional geographic lines. This British historian and publicist who had resided in Canada since 1871 also presented his ideas in the Canadian Monthly which he edited. See, Reminiscences of Goldwin Smith, New York, 1910, pp.439-446.

taken with those of the United States' Chief Justice that force would never be used by America on Canada did much to calm apprehensions of editors concerned with Canada's future within the Empire.[1]

As the crisis heightened, editors' thoughts returned to Canada's situation. Many newspapers reported with evident relief that the Canadian press supported Salisbury and were pressing Sir McKenzie Bowell to prepare for an invasion. With this development, many Australian papers were openly jubilant at the rebuffs to Cleveland in particular and the failing prospect of Canadian-American union in general. Others recognized that it was just such a tense confrontation which made war the disastrous possibility it had been 35 years earlier during the Trent affair.[2]

The Age proposed that Britain think seriously of severing the Canadian connection in the interest of removing a hostage, the defence of which endangered the security of the rest of the Empire.[3] The Age had long held an ambivalent attitude toward Canada. It usually tended to discount Bourinot and promote Goldwin Smith's publicity for a 'Continental union' in the belief that in any future overall union of English-speaking peoples, Canada's identity would

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[1] Forum, Vol.19, pp.278-88; Donald Times, 17 Dec. 1895. Donald F. Warner's The Idea of A Continental Union: Agitation for the Annexation of Canada to the United States, 1849-1893 (Toronto, 1960), provides the general background, including Bourinot's contribution to the debate.

[2] Maryborough Chronicle, 20 Dec. 1895; Australian Star, 24 Dec. 1895; Daily Telegraph (Launceston), 24 Dec. 1895. The 'Trent' Affair (8 Nov.-25 Dec. 1861), was an Anglo-American crisis which arose during the Civil War when the U.S.S. San Jacinto stopped the British steamer Trent and removed two Confederate commissioners en route to England. British war fever over the incident abated only after Secretary Seward released the two men.

[3] Age, 2 Jan. 1896.

not be a pressing issue.[1]

When news arrived of the loyalty to Britain and intransigence toward America of the newly re-opened Canadian Federal Parliament in the face of the threat, many papers hitherto sympathetic to the Age turned on the influential Victorian opinion leader for its defeatism and lack of faith in the Empire. When letters from special correspondents, and Toronto and Montreal newspapers themselves arrived in Australia to confirm the impression of Canadian steadiness, the Age not only withdrew its earlier comments, but argued lamely in its own defence that the greater threat to the security of the Transvaal had made it react in this manner - an argument which fooled no-one, as the Age editorial comments had been made preceding the unexpected Jameson raid. In short, every section of the Australian press, including finally the recalcitrant Age, was pleased to see how well Canada had emerged from this supreme test of Empire-allegiance.[2]

The double crisis in British international diplomacy brought about in the New Year by the Jameson raid (1 January) and the Kaiser's telegram (3 January) did much to distract attention in Australia away from Cleveland, America and Venezuela and toward the Kaiser, Germany and the Transvaal. Fifteen years of press comment since the British disaster at Majuba Hill (27 February 1881) together with the communications to their countrymen at home of the many thousands of Australian miners who had joined the Uitlanders, created a 'living and concentrated' association with the Transvaal in the opinion of John Farrell. It was one that

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[1] Age, 11 Feb., 5, 27 July 1893.

[2] Age, 11 Feb. 1896; Table Talk, 3 Jan. 1896; Ballarat Courier, 3 Jan. 1896; Launceston Examiner, 11 Feb. 1896; Argus, 27 Dec. 1895. Letter from correspondent written 27 Dec. 1895, published 29 Jan. 1896; Evening News, 1 Jan. 1896; Canadian George Parkin significantly sub-titled his book, Imperial Federation, 'The Problem of National Unity'. See J.T. Saywell on the 1890s in Careless and Brown's ed. The Canadians (Toronto, 1968), pp.108-37.

gave a South African difficulty more impact in Australia than similar dangers affecting the scant number of dispersed Australians living in America.[1]

By 10 January the Geraldton-Murchison Telegraph represented the last of those editors in Australia who had forgotten the Monroe Doctrine in the new discussion of the prospect of Germany leading the long-anticipated European coalition against Britain. Prejudice against Germans in Melbourne expressed itself in the action of a crowd in Flinders Lane which refused to listen to the German band there play 'Die Wacht am Rhein', forcing them instead to play 'Rule Britannia' repeatedly, instead of their normal selections. Rhodes' telegram to Pulitzer's paper reminding Americans of the numbers of their countrymen in the Rand in need of protection by Britain was expected to have a salutory effect on American attitudes toward the Empire. The long-standing basis for anti-German sentiment had been laid by the New Guinea annexation, the widely recognized belligerence of an unstable Kaiser who tolerated Turkish atrocities, and the 'Made in Germany' resentment against that country's commerce by those advocating increased Empire trade and domestic protectionism.[2]

For these reasons, general Australian editorial feeling in this second crisis was more fervent, and critical analysis

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[1]Comment in, Zeehan and Dundas Herald, 9 Dec. 1895; Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 1 Jan. 1896; Donald Times, 11 Jan. 1896; Maryborough Standard, 4 Jan. 1896; Burrangong Argus, 8 Jan. 1896; Courier, 9 Jan. 1896; Brisbane Evening Observer, 8 Jan. 1896; Age, 7 Jan. 1896; Argus, 10 Jan. 1896; Bendigo Evening Mail, 10 Jan. 1896; Freeman's Journal, 11 Jan. 1896; Singleton Argus, 8, 11, 18 Jan. 1896; Murchison Times, 15 Jan. 1896.

[2]Geraldton-Murchison Telegraph, 10 Jan. 1896. Other comment in, Maffra Spectator, 23 Jan. 1896; Mercury, 13 Jan. 1896; Maitland Mercury, 13 Jan. 1896; Age, 14 Jan., 3 Feb. 1896; Courier, 15 Jan. 1896; Argus, 15 Jan. 1896; Maryborough Advertiser, 15 Jan. 1896; Ballarat Courier, 30 Jan. 1896; Bacchus Marsh Express, 18 Jan. 1896, was one of the few papers very hostile to Jameson and understanding of the Kaiser.

more muted than during the first. Though Australian (and Empire) friendliness toward both Americans and Germans appeared to be quickly restored, in fact more permanent damage had been wrought to the image of the Kaiser's Germany. It was believed by many editors in Australia as in Britain, that Americans had been shocked by German interference and that they secretly admired Jameson's bold action on behalf of democratic rights while they openly condemned its illegality. Germans, predicted the North Queensland Herald 'on top of other discourtesies [had] permanently estranged British sympathies and decided that when the big war comes, England will be the ally of France'.[1]

In broad terms, it can be said that Salisbury's and Chamberlain's reputations rose considerably in the eyes of Australian editors for what was believed had been a steady and dignified handling of the crisis on their part. Only a small section of the catholic and labor press held aloof from the general congratulatory feeling at having been saved both a war with America and the confusing dilatoriness in foreign affairs which had bedevilled the recently concluded Gladstone era. As the Goulburn Herald believed, with increasing concern at the consolidation of the Empire, an interest of the colonies in the character and policy of the British government was equally intensified.[2]

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[1] North Queensland Herald, 22 Jan. 1896. For background to the Jameson raid see Ronald Robinson, J. Gallagher and A. Denny, Africa and the Victorians (London, 1961), pp.410-23 and J.S. Marais, The Fall of Kruger's Republic (Oxford, 1961), pp.46-63. On the raid itself, J. van der Poel, The Jameson Raid (London, 1951) is best. The Kruger Telegram is discussed in W.L. Langer's The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1920 (New York, 1935), Vol.I, pp.234-54. He considers it one of the greatest blunders in the history of modern diplomacy.

[2] Goulburn Herald, 27 Nov. 1895.

The radical Australian News was one of the few newspapers which directly blamed the crisis on Salisbury's 'ferociously barbaric nature'. By some means of its own, the paper claimed to have 'tested public opinion' on whether Salisbury should have agreed to arbitrate and had found the opinion 'locally endorsed by men of repute in the country'.[1] Nonetheless, Salisbury was able to back down by slower degrees than did Cleveland, and the latter, by not following up his threat with immediate forceful action, was thought in the perception of a biased Australian press, to have lost face in a way which the British leader had not.[2]

By contrast, Cleveland had been under attack since 1884 at the beginning of his first term of office by labor and protectionist elements of the Australian press. All sections of the Australian press had disapproved of aspects of his strike and depression-ridden second term (1892-96). Though elements of the press which were pro-Conservative, or Free Trade; anti-imperialist or pro-gold-standard in orientation, regularly defended him during this time as a man of strong principle, his incredibly belligerent, anti-British stand shocked them and provided the ideal excuse to flail him on personal grounds. Even the normally staid West Australian attacked him in the course of one editorial as 'arrogant...meddlesome...gratuitous... domineering...pretentious...high-handed and brazenly impudent'.[3] He was regularly called 'mad' and 'criminal'.

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[1] Australian News, 30 Dec. 1895, 6, 20 Jan., 9 Mar. 1896.

[2] For comment, see Geelong Advertiser, 11 Dec. 1895; Bega Standard, 14 Jan. 1896; Sydney Morning Herald, 15 Jan. 1896; Melbourne Punch, 23 Jan. 1896; Singleton Argus, 25 Jan. 1896; West Australian, 3, 15 Jan. 1896; Argus, 28 Jan. 1896; Courier, 12 Feb. 1896; Bacchus Marsh Express, 15 Feb. 1896. Nonetheless Salisbury's reputation in Australia fluctuated and reached 'lows' as the New Hebrides (1887) and Chinese (1897) situations illustrated.

[3] West Australian, 21 Dec. 1895.

Some papers used the crisis as another occasion on which to remind the forthcoming Federal Convention of the deficiencies and rigidities of the American system of government and the arrogance of Presidential power in that system. Only after the cooling action of Cleveland's proposed Commission took effect and he was favourably compared with Bryan and McKinley in the approaching election, did his reputation begin to recover.[1]

By early February 1896, some mature consideration had been given to America's new foreign policy aspirations by perceptive organs of the Australian press. The Launceston Examiner was the first with this reassessment. It realised that what was termed the 'dead hand' of the past was swiftly losing its restraining grip on the people of the United States and that the century-old traditional policy of non-interference with the effete monarchies of Europe was being abandoned. American actions in Samoa and Hawaii as well as interest expressed in events in China, Transvaal, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba, the West Indies, Canada and Turkey revealed an American orientation toward increased involvement in European complications. This was not without considerable contradiction, as the intimation of courting Russia as ally against Britain and Britain as ally against the Turk illustrated. Thus,

> so far as having no foreign policy, the United States is developing one as fast as it conveniently can and in a few years there will be hardly a dispute anywhere but the Americans will want to have a finger in.

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[1]See other comment in, Courier, 28 Dec. 1895; Goulburn Herald, 30 Dec. 1895; Bulletin, 4 Jan. 1896; Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 9 Nov., 19, 30 Dec. 1895; Sydney Morning Herald, 6 Dec. 1895; Brisbane Worker, 7 Dec. 1895; Launceston Examiner, 16, 27 Dec. 1895; Geelong Advertiser, 18 Dec. 1895; Australian Star, 19, 28 Dec. 1895; Newcastle Morning Herald, 20, 25, 28, 30 Dec. 1895; Courier, 24, 28 Dec. 1895; Weekly Times (Victoria), 28 Dec. 1895; Bowral Free Press, 28 Dec. 1895; Observer, 4 Jan. 1896; Sydney Mail, 4 Jan. 1896; Australian News, 6 Jan. 1896; Methodist (Melbourne), 10 Jan. 1896; Coolgardie Mining Review, 11 Jan. 1896; Herald, 8 Jan. 1896; Argus, 20, 24 Feb. 1896; Table Talk, 31 Jan. 1896 - was one of the few papers to mention Olney.

The irony was recognized by the paper that distance, far from granting America immunity from interference in her hemisphere as she claimed, was being increasingly ignored by that country herself, in order to assert her own interests in far-away places. The present wide deployment of America's growing navy was actively forwarding the desire of Senator Lodge not to 'fall out of the line of march' of the great nations of the world. With the development of America's western territories, a swelling population of 70 million energetic people, animated by jingoism and the jettisoning of the old Monroe Doctrine,

> the United States can no more follow a policy of isolation and confine itself to the New World than Great Britain can to the United Kingdom. The world is gradually growing smaller with steam and electricity and whether desirable or not, her natural expansion as a nation will bring her into contrast with others.[1]

The Sydney Morning Herald's concern was that this new expansionist foreign policy would quickly bring America into conflict with surrounding British territories in the West Indies and Canada. To prevent this, Britain had first, to arbitrate the present outstanding dispute and later, to enter 'a close and cordial alliance with the United States', in order to preserve and promote Anglo-Saxon interests.[2]

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[1] Launceston Examiner, 6 Feb. 1896.

[2] Sydney Morning Herald, 7 Feb. 1896. See also, comment in, Courier, 12 Feb. 1896; Sydney Mail, 4 Jan. 1896; North Queensland Herald, 15 Jan. 1896; Goulburn Herald, 17 Jan. 1896; 'American Ideals', Forum, Feb. 1895, p.749. W.H. Fitchett was uneasy about Bryce's endorsement of Roosevelt's Republican platform on foreign policy, Review of Reviews, 20 Dec. 1895.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE ARBITRATION IMPULSE OF 1896: THE AUSTRALIAN RESPONSE

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The prospect of a closer military and naval alliance of English-speaking peoples had occupied a part of Australian editorial thinking before the Guiana-Venezuela dispute. Following the crisis of late 1895, these ideas were re-examined to see what, if anything, of the desire for Anglo-American understanding remained.

Reviewed following the shock of collison of national interests, the older sentiments came into sharp focus for Australian press commentators. The first step in coming to terms seemed an appreciation of the existence of mutual differences. Time and thoughtful attitudes combined to assist in an actual waning of antipathy.

Arbitration of the boundary at first forced upon the British, was resented. Later, Cleveland's Commission was welcomed as a means of easing the immediate tension and as suggesting the broader solution of any such future disputes by means of general arbitration.

The chief attitude underlying the impulse to arbitration between England and America was ethnocentrism - the common sharing of racial ideas for purposes of surviving or prevailing in a hostile world. Elitist attitudes concerning the nature and mission of the Anglo-Saxon peoples were widely subscribed to by Australians who viewed this sympathetic racial self-centredness as a bond shared by Americans as well as by all branches of Empire. It was with dismay that Australians perceived that the prospect of superiority for Anglo-Saxon peoples in the councils of the world was in jeopardy at the end of 1895. Australian editors - whether liberal, conservative or radical - had the ideals of race loyalty and race solidarity at the front

of their thinking and they let it be known that as an increasingly important part of the Anglo-Saxon community of interests in the coming twentieth century, they desired a rapprochement between the two largest branches of that family to prepare the whole for the ultimate challenge from the Slav and Oriental.[1]

There were several reasons explaining the interest in Anglo-American arbitration in this period.[2] Australia had a highly homogeneous English-speaking population of its own, in which ethnocentric ideas could take root. Over 95 per cent of the Australian population (excluding aboriginals) was of British origin. In 1901 in New South Wales, for example, of a population of 1,354,846, 1,316,097 were either born in Australia or somewhere in the British Empire. Of the latter number, 220,401 were from the United Kingdom and 1,079,154 were native born. The proportions were roughly similar in Victoria, which together with New South Wales contained three quarters of the population of Australia. Queensland was the colony with the highest proportion of foreigners - a mere 8.71 per cent. As B.R. Wise put it in

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[1] Ethnocentrism has been described as '...based on a pervasive and rigid ingroup-outgroup distinction; it involves stereotyped negative imagery and hostile attitudes regarding outgroups, stereotyped positive imagery and submissive attitudes regarding ingroups, and a hierarchical, authoritarian view of group interaction in which ingroups are rightly dominant, outgroups subordinate', Adorno-Frankel-Brunswick, Levinson and Sandford, The Authoritarian Personality (New York, 1950), p.150. Australian ethnocentrism today has been outlined in D.G. Beswick and M.D. Hills, 'An Australian Ethnocentrism Scale', Australian Journal of Psychology, Vol.21, No.3, 1969, and the same authors', 'A Survey of Ethnocentrism in Australia', Australian Journal of Psychology, Vol.24, No.2, 1972.

[2] Forming a domestic background to international arbitration was debate on Australian industrial arbitration. This bore fruit in the Commonwealth legislation of 1904. See H.B. Higgins, A New Province For Law and Order (Melbourne, 1922). The effect was to air principles common to all forms of arbitration.

1909: 'Australia is the most British country out of Great Britain.'[1]

Australia was only another portion of Anglo-Saxondom sharing in a general ethnocentric enthusiasm which began around 1885, reaching its height around 1899 before carrying through to the end of World War One and beyond. A Canadian scholar, D. Coles, recently observed that, 'Australian ethnocentric expressions were closely, often directly related to ethnic ideas held elsewhere in the English-speaking world'. He considered Henry Parkes' statement concerning 'the crimson thread of kinship which runs through us all' as 'perhaps the most famous in Australian history'.[2] One of Australia's most eminent historians, Sir Keith Hancock, expressed roughly similar views when, as a young man, he wrote of the generation at the turn of the century, 'among the Australians, pride of race counted for more than love of country'.[3]

The corollary of race pride, racism, has been considered by Humphrey McQueen (writing at the same age as Hancock, but forty years later) '...the most important single component of Australian nationalism'.[4] Frank S. Stevens' recently edited work builds on the belief that the Australian racial experience contains virulent and sustained elements of prejudice and xenophobia - the basis of ethnocentrism - stretching back in particular to the 1890s when as a number of writers have shown, the 'White Australia' policy worked

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[1] Sir Thomas Coghlan, Statistical Account, op.cit. (1902), p.545; B.R. Wise, The Commonwealth of Australia (London, 1909), Preface, p.viii.

[2] D. Coles, 'The Crimson Thread of Kinship, Ethnic Ideas in Australia, 1870-1914', Historical Studies, Australia and New Zealand, Vol.14, No.56, Apr. 1971, p.524; 'The Problem of "Nationalism" and "Imperialism" in British Settlement Colonies', Journal of British Studies, Vol.X, No.2, May 1971, p.169.

[3] Sir Keith Hancock, Australia, 2nd ed. (Brisbane, 1961), p.49.

[4] Humphrey McQueen, A New Britannia (Melbourne, 1970), p.42.

out its final form.[1] Historians such as Richard Hofstadter in America and A.E. Campbell in Britain agreed that British and American imperialisms from 1885 had 'Anglo-Saxonism, belligerent and pacific' as their 'dominant abstract rationale', while ethnocentrism, with its Darwinist element, 'more than anything else...set the tone of the argument' by providing an interpretation '...simple, comprehensive and impossible to prove'.[2] Australian racial sentiment was part of a general phenomenon. Its particular tradition was expressed in its strong anti-Chinese and anti-Japanese bias.

Australian ethnocentric thinking was influenced by books on the topic from overseas, as well as by local productions. John Fiske's The Destiny Of Man and Excursions of an Evolutionist (both 1884), his articles, lectures and American Political Ideas (1885) were among the earliest to have a broad impact on these lines though inspired by earlier British historians, Carlyle (1842) and Seeley (1883). They affected E.M. Curr's The Australian Race (1886); W.E. Hearn's The Aryan Household (1891) and the American Charles Francis Adams' well known works in 1886 and 1892. Especially important was Charles Pearson's National Life and Character: A Forecast (1893), written while Pearson, the colony's former Minister for Public Instruction, was still in Victoria.[3] R. Thomson's Australian Nationalism (1888) and A. Patchett Martin's Australia and the Empire (1889) as well as more formally Imperial Federationist works were affected by Fiske and the British historians.

Among other important American influences on Australian ethnocentric thinking, beside William Graham Sumner who

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[1] F.S. Stevens (ed.), Racism: The Australian Experience, Vol.I (Sydney, 1971). See especially, A.T. Yarwood (ed.), Attitudes to Non-European Immigration (Melbourne, 1968).

[2] R. Hofstadter, Social Darwinism In American Thought, rev. ed. (Boston, 1955), p.172; A.E. Campbell, Expansion and Imperialism (New York, 1970), p.6.

[3] For Pearson, see J. Tregenza, Professor of Democracy (Melbourne, 1968).

coined the word[1] were the writings of Josiah Strong (1885, 1893) and the works of Burgess, Hosmer and Carnegie (1890) and Mahan (1890, 1897) mentioned elsewhere. Though Brooks Adams' The Law of Civilization and Decay (1896) and later works (1900, 1902) was defensive, like Pearson's, various others were more promotive of Anglo-Saxondom: Charles A. Gardiner's The Proposed Anglo-Saxon Alliance (1898); Edmond Demoulins' Anglo-Saxon Superiority, To What It Is Due (1898) and Charles Waldstein's The Expansion of Western Ideals and the World's Peace (1899) to name but a few. Later works carried on the theme, for example: W.T. Stead's The Americanization of the World, or the Trend of the Twentieth Century (1901); John Dos Passos's The Anglo-Saxon Century and the Unification of the English Speaking People (1903) and A. Woodhouse The Foundations of National Greatness (1905). Most of these books appear to have had an intellectual influence on Australian editorialists and other opinion leaders.

A number of influential, articulate overseas visitors stressed Australia's Anglo-Saxon links, thereby supplementing existing formal connections through British governors and officials. Among them were authors such as the Scot, James Inglis, who wrote Our Australian Cousins (1880) for the Anglo-Indian market,[2] and his fellow countryman William Westgarth, who wrote Half A Century Of Australian Progress (1889).[3] The English historian, James Anthony Froude published Oceana; or England and Her Colonies (1886), the year following his trip to Australia.[4] Charles Wentworth

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[1] Folkways, 1907, pp.12-15; though F.H. Gidding's 'consciousness of kind' concept broached the issue in 1896 in The Principles of Sociology.

[2] For Inglis, see Australian Dictionary of Biography, Vol.4 (Melbourne, 1972), pp.457-8.

[3] For Westgarth, see P. Serle, Dictionary of Australian Biography, Vol.II (Sydney, 1949), pp.482-3.

[4] For Froude, see A.D.B., op.cit., pp.221-2.

Dilke continued his earlier interest in Australia with Problems of Greater Britain (1890) and Imperial Defence (1892).[1] James Bevan Edwards, an Imperial Federationist, was inspecting Australian defences in mid-1889.[2] Contemporaneously, the Canadian Imperial Federationist, George Parkin was visiting Australia. He published Round The Empire in 1892.[3] John Joseph Caldwell Abbott, Prime Minister of Canada 1891-92, visited the country in connection with the establishment of closer commercial contacts just before his death in 1893.[4] Other visitors included the author Rudyard Kipling and the Salvation Army's founder, General Booth, who visited the colonies briefly toward the end of 1891.[5] They increased Australia's awareness of belonging to a wider racial family. So too did general travel between England and Australia, often via America.[6]

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[1]For Dilke, see A.D.B., op.cit., pp.74-5.

[2]For Edwards, see A.D.B., op.cit., p.130.

[3]For Parkin, see Encyclopedia Canadiana, Vol.8 (Toronto, 1968), p.108.

[4]For Abbott, see Dictionary of National Biography Supplement (Oxford, 1965), Vol.XXII, pp.5-7.

[5]For Kipling and Booth, see Carrington, Rudyard Kipling, op.cit., pp.260-1.

[6]Regarding travel, for Victoria, 1890-9 inclusive, 70,386 departed for the United Kingdom, though from 1890 to March 1897, only six went directly to the United States. From 1890-9 inclusive, 67,281 arrived from the United Kingdom, while 171 arrived from the United States; see Passenger Ship Registers (Melbourne, Jan. 1888-Mar. 1901), 7 Vols. 'Englishmen travelling for pleasure or for business find it advantageous to traverse the U.S. and then to complete their circuit of the globe by travelling southwards to Australia before returning to Great Britain. Similarly, the opening up of communications between California and Australia leads numbers of Australians to visit the wondrous territories of North America.' Standard, 3 Sept. 1890.

Andrew Inglis Clark, 1848-1907 is one example in this period of an Australian who represented the ethnocentric type. Born in Hobart; a lawyer in 1877 and elected to the Tasmanian House of Assembly the next year, he was a prominent member of the American Club and spoke of the 'Anglo-American Republic' with admiration. He first visited the United States on his return from a trip to England in 1890. During that stay, he renewed friendship with Moncure Conway, whom he had entertained in Australia in 1883, and was introduced by him to Oliver Wendell Holmes and other famous Americans with whom he corresponded for the rest of his life. The democratic and republican virtues of the American Constitution continued to appeal to him. In 1891 he circulated an important draft constitution bill at the Australasian Federal Convention in Sydney. B.R. Wise believed its American bias strongly influenced the Australian Constitution. Clark was a delegate to and served on important committees of the Federal Councils and Conventions during the 1890s. In 1897, he resigned from the Braddon Government and went to the United States to place his sons in schools there as well as make contact with American feminists. In 1900 he published a paper on 'Natural Rights' in the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, of which he had been a member since 1891. His life and work was made up of a significant combination of English, American and Australian thought and activity.[1]

Australian politicians of various hues widely disseminated ethnocentric attitudes in this period. Included in their large numbers were H. Parkes, A. Peacock, J. Quick, I. Isaacs, G. Reid, W. Hughes, E. Barton, A. Deakin, J. Watson, E. O'Sullivan, W. Spence and B. Wise. Most newspaper editors similarly broadcasted ethnocentric attitudes.[2]

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[1] See Australian Dictionary of Biography, op.cit., Vol.3, pp.399-401; P. Serle, op.cit., Vol.1, pp.168-9. Also, J. Reynolds, 'A.I. Clark's American Sympathies and His Influence on Australian Federation', Australian Law Journal, 32, 1958-59.

[2] For biographies see P. Serle, Dictionary of Australian Biography (Sydney, 1949), Vol.1, pp.53-6, 227-34; Vol.2, 209-10, 216-24, 229-30, 256-7, 263-7, 346-7, 467-8, 502-3, respectively.

All shades of opinion were influenced. Organizations such as the Australian branches of the Imperial Federation League promoted racial ideals up to 1890. The Australian Natives' Association (1898) did much of a similar nature. Labor organizations often easily accepted ethnocentrism as the corollary of the racism which they more openly endorsed, and catholic as well as protestant organizations freely subscribed to the ethnocentric concept - especially when Celts were given due regard as superior civilizers.

Important for Australian liberal and conservative opinion alike was the overseas article literature which entered the country in a continuous stream. A random sample indicates its nature: A.V. Dicey, 'A Common Citizenship For the English Race', Contemporary Review, LXXI, Apr. 1897; James Bryce, 'The Essential Unity of Britain and America', Atlantic Monthly, LXXXII, July 1898; Lyman Abbott, 'The Basis of an Anglo-American Understanding', North American Review, CLXVI (1898); Carl Schurz, 'The Anglo-American Friendship', Atlantic Monthly, LXXXII (1898); Sidney Low, 'The Change in English Sentiment Toward the United States', Forum, XXVI (1898). Other articles appeared in the Nineteenth Century, Spectator, Edinburgh Review, Contemporary Review, Westminster Gazette, and the Fortnightly Review. A constant stimulation was thereby given to editorial attitudes on race-kinship by this material.[1]

From 1895 to 1899 Australian newspaper interest in this forging of closer links between Anglo-Saxon peoples focused at first on the fate of the specific arbitration agreement attempting to solve the Guiana-Venezuela boundary dispute through the action of Cleveland's Commission. Later, it concentrated on the general arbitration agreement growing from the first development and embodied in the abortive Olney-Pauncefote

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[1] See G. Seed, 'British Reactions to American Imperialism Reflected in Journals of Opinion, 1898-1900', Political Science Quarterly, LXXII, 1958, esp. p.257, and James P. Shenton whose 'Imperialism and Racism' chapter gives a 'New Left' approach to Imperialism and Racism in D. Sheehan, and H. Syrett (eds.), Essays in American Historiography, New York, 1960.



Melbourne Punch, 2 June 1898.

Treaty. By applauding, encouraging and occasionally agonizing over these arbitration developments, Australian editors revealed something of the nature of their own vague broader power aspirations beyond the framework of imminent federation as well as their underlying attitudes toward both England and America within the overall concept of Anglo-Saxonism.

Before reactions to these arbitration developments could be registered, underlying Australian press attitudes toward America had to reformulate following the disturbance caused by the crisis.

That there existed real differences between England and America was the first problem to be faced realistically by many organs of the Australian press. Some editors did this far sooner than their British counterparts who clung to an old-fashioned indulgent sentimentalism toward America. That a nation might not love Britain or the British, was not as inconceivable to Australians (especially Irish-Australians) as it appeared to some commentators in the mother country. There had long existed among Australian editors a sympathy for American independence and republicanism and an aversion to British class snobbery and patronage. It was quickly recognized that even family squabbles could be bitter and long-lasting and that the Alabama and Trent episodes had shown how readily bad feeling could develop.[1]

Following Cleveland's second Message - a convincing blow to existing notions of Anglo-American solidarity - several more radical organs of the press insisted that they had never believed in the notion of a 'pan-Brittanic idyll', despite the constant stream of overseas magazine and newspaper materials attempting to promote it, written by leading men in other countries. As independent of prevailing

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[1] Mercury, 6 Dec. 1895; Herald, 7 Dec. 1895.

opinion as ever, the Douglass's Geelong Advertiser insisted that 'unlimited and indiscriminate immigration has given the United States of today a more mixed racial population than exists elsewhere in the world' and worse, that this consisted of the dross of many countries, easily alienated from Britain. To prove this point, the paper claimed that the 26 (out of a total of 37) states which had backed Cleveland's belligerence were dominated by foreign elements - the Chambers of Commerce backing Cleveland for example, being mostly Dutch. The paper concluded that the blood-tie counted for nothing and that Britain would have to respond to an American challenge in as sanguinary a manner as if that challenge had been issued by the French or Russians.[1]

This situation, crowed the ever-sceptical Bulletin

> should be noted by all those eloquent drivellers who drivel so diffusely at maudlin banquets about the 'two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race' and the 'brotherhood' thereof and the 're-union of the English-speaking peoples' and similar absurdities.[2]

Conservative papers were near the edge of despair concerning what they believed was deep-seated, ineradicable jingoism and anglophobia existing in America toward Britain. The present outburst had severely crippled, if not destroyed the growing amity of the two nations it was felt, for even the Prince of Wales' telegram of goodwill and conciliation sent to Pulitzer's New York World had little tangible effect. The new attitude of Britons toward Americans must be one of 'cool watchful distrust' thought the Sydney Mail, for:

> It is useless going on talking the old language of friendship, kinship and brotherly good-will when one party to the relationship is animated by bitter and unrelenting animosity to the other. Since this is so it is better that it be recognized and frankly admitted....Any attempt to draw into closer and more friendly relations

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[1] Geelong Advertiser, 23 Dec. 1895.

[2] Bulletin, 4 Jan. 1896. See also, Newcastle Morning Herald, 25, 31 Dec. 1895; Bendigo Independent, 28 Dec. 1895; Coolgardie Mining Review, 4 Jan. 1896; Kilmore Free Press, 9 Jan. 1896.

> with a country which imparts the trickery and faction and unscrupulousness of its party politics into the more serious matters of diplomacy and international polity must be relinquished as hopeless.1

What had happened wrote the Advertiser, some time later, 'surprised and gave publicity to a kind of secret...that Americans love the Englishmen and hate England'.[2]

Misunderstanding was not all on one side. Christopher Crisp delighted in quoting the views of the American Franklin Eastman whose eloquent plea for understanding appeared in the Atlantic Review. To Eastman, Americans were neither philosophical radicals, English provincials, half-civilized pioneers, utopians, nor silly boys and girls as England constantly insisted they were. They were instead, a 'conservative and cautious people', easily misunderstood through distortion and exaggeration.

> There is one liberty we claim as our English birthright - the liberty of being illogical when we please and succeeding or failing according to our own ideas of working out our own problems whether they are yours or not,

he concluded.[3]

The Age joined in this defence. Critics like Lord John Russell, Sydney Smith and Charles Dickens had falsely labelled Americans as corrupt swindlers and hypocritical sycophants with absurd institutions containing ridiculous public men.

> Yankee meat, Yankee cheese, Yankee oysters and all other Yankee notions with the exception of Yankee dollars and canvas - back ducks are names for inferior articles in the minds and mouths of most Englishmen,

the paper chided.[4] For their part, Americans were realizing,

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[1] Sydney Mail, 4 Jan. 1896.

[2] Advertiser, 3 Mar. 1896. See also Herald, 23 Dec. 1895; Argus, 20, 28 Dec. 1895; Sydney Morning Herald, 27 Dec. 1895; Advocate, 28 Dec. 1895.

[3] Bacchus Marsh Express, 18 Jan. 1896.

[4] Age, 18 Mar. 1896.

claimed the Argus, that despite the irritations of 30 or 40 years, Britons were not 'foreigners'; nor were they insolent, bullying thieves as many Americans claimed.[1] Given these mutual misconceptions, means had to be found, in the words of the Advertiser to 'extinguish distrust and promote genuine cordiality'.[2] Mark Twain observed regarding Australian press opinion during the crisis: 'the outlook is that the English-speaking race will dominate the earth a hundred years from now, if its sections do not get to fighting each other'.[3]

It was recognized that if restraint was exercised by both sides, a return might be made to something like the kind of amity that had existed between Britain and America at the end of November 1895. Certain things were possible 'only in America' some conservative papers agreed with England's Lord Bryce, and therefore had to be tolerated; the best means of handling America being '...kindness and firmness combined'. Other editors reminded readers that the German-American anti-imperialist Carl Schurz, had urged his fellow countrymen not to 'swagger among the nations of the world with a chip on the shoulder, shaking a fist in everybody's face'.[4] With the prospect of immediate hostilities past, the Age on 4 February 1896 was typical of those who in their desire to promote renewed solidarity, sought a scapegoat upon which to lay blame for the bad feeling engendered:

> The mere suggestion that two great nations like Great Britain and the United States, allied by ties of blood, a common language and to a great extent, a common past, should embroil themselves in a fratricidal war because a little swindling,

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[1] Argus, 28 Jan. 1896.

[2] Advertiser, ibid.

[3] Mark Twain, Following The Equator, op.cit., p.168.

[4] Argus, ibid.

> half-savage state like Venezuela sets up a preposterous claim to a few miles of primeval forest is really too absurd. Far better would it be for the world at large if the miserable little despotism masquerading under the name of a republic were blotted out altogether from the map of nations than one drop of Anglo-Saxon blood should be spilt in its defence.[1]

The Argus[2] summarized pre-crisis attitudes when on 9 November 1895, it confirmed Mahan's contention that the isolationist infancy of the States had passed. It also echoed the 'beautiful dream' of the former editor of the Atlantic Monthly and North American Review (1857-1872), James Russell Lowell - of an Anglo-American naval alliance to secure an absolute supremacy of the seas. Deploring the publicist-industrialist Andrew Carnegie's 'shrieking... rhetoric' in demanding that the great crime of George III be undone, the paper nonetheless approved of his sentiment that 'the English-speaking race all round the world should be politically united'.[3]

By mid-January some papers were returning to these attitudes expounded a year before by Colonel Bell in front of the New South Wales Premier during a lecture at the Melbourne Chamber of Commerce.[4] One New South Wales country newspaper hoped for a future 'trinity of English-speaking nations - the United Kingdom, the United States and a United Australia...leagued together to maintain the cause of

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[1] Age, ibid.; 4 Feb. 1896.

[2] Argus, 9 Nov. 1895, summarizing materials like A.T. Mahan, 'The United States Looks Outward', Atlantic Monthly, Dec. 1890, pp.816-24; A. Carnegie, 'A Look Ahead', North American Review, CLVI, June 1893, pp.658-716; J.E. Chamberlain, 'A Dream of Anglo-Saxondom', Galaxy, XXIV, Dec. 1877, pp.788-91; Meath, 'Anglo-Saxon Unity', Fortnightly Review, Old series, LV, Apr. 1891, pp.615-22 and others.

[3] Andrew Carnegie, who dominated the U.S. steel industry during the 1890's, became an increasingly vocal advocate of Anglo-Saxon union. See J.F. Wall, Andrew Carnegie, New York, 1970, pp.673-88.

[4] Bell reported in Bendigo Independent, 31 Jan. 1895.

freedom'.[1] The Age believed that 'although exceedingly sensitive to any supposed injury to their dignity as a nation (the Americans) are always ready to forget and forgive when John Bull offers the hand of friendship'.[2]

Patriotic public orators like the Reverend A.S.C. James at the Bendigo Town Hall ('The Queen of Empires' delivered in mid-March) repeated the older myths that 'America is as truly English as is Australia and Canada' and that she would join Britain in an alliance against any future hostile European coalition.[3] This sentiment was enthusiastically affirmed in the widely acclaimed Canadian poem of that time, 'The Sea Queen Wakes'. Though much of this material lay in the realms of wishful thinking, it revealed the nature of the attitudes which formed the background against which the prospects of arbitration were considered.[4]

With the arrival of the news on 28 December of the fortification of New York Harbour, John Edwards' Bendigo Independent was typical of those puzzled by the failure in diplomacy leading to such a drastic situation. 'Surely there must be some secret and confidential methods of

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[1] Bega Standard, 14 Jan. 1896.

[2] Age, ibid. See also, Sydney Morning Herald, 6, 27 Dec. 1895, quoting New York Herald, 28 Mar. 1896.

[3] James's oration reported in Bendigo Evening Mail, 12 Mar. 1896.

[4] See, for example, Courier, 25 Nov., 23, 27 Dec. 1895; Ballarat Star, 6 Dec. 1895; Donald Times, 17 Dec. 1895; Bendigonian, 9 Jan. 1896; Horsham Times, 24 Dec. 1895; Melbourne Punch, 26 Dec. 1895; Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 20 Jan., 13 Feb. 1896; Murchison Times, 22 Jan. 1896; North Queensland Herald, 22 Jan. 1896; Weekly Times (Victoria), 1 Feb. 1896; Goulburn Herald, 19 Feb. 1896; Bowral Free Press, 1 Feb. 1896; Northern Territory Times, 7 Feb. 1896; West Australian, 19 Feb. 1896; Australasian, 22 Feb. 1896; Perth Morning Herald, 12 Feb. 1896.

communications between British and American statesmen, the latter assuring them prudently that there is nothing in it after all?' he asked.[1] The Age attempted the most thoroughgoing explanation of this sort of diplomatic failure.[2] Despite the fact that many of the authorities on international law were American, it held, Americans were almost entirely ignorant of the amenities of diplomatic life.[3] Deliberately eccentric by European standards, over-sensitive to criticism and unrestrained by Congress, belligerent United States representatives abroad had developed insolent and arrogant habits - an over-confidence born of 50 years of wonderful prosperity. Though Guizot,[4] the French historian and statesman who had judged that America was the most disagreeable country in the world to negotiate with was considered overcritical, nonetheless, 'being the youngest of the great nations and only admitted to the charmed circle recently [they have] all the bumptiousness and self-assertiveness of the parvenu', commented the Age.[5] Such comment was ironic for a colony which could itself associate responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs with a Britain sober and seasoned in diplomatic niceties, while enjoying the luxury of criticizing that conduct when it suited.

More specifically, Syme's paper had long opposed the recently censured Thomas Bayard in his role as America's ambassador to England (since 1883) and used examples from

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[1] Bendigo Independent, 28 Dec. 1895.

[2] Age, 28 Dec. 1895.

[3] H. Wayne Morgan criticized those Americans who 'considered diplomacy the last refuge of timidity': in America's Road to Empire (New York, 1965), p.3.

[4] Guizot died 1874 - it was recognized that his views were somewhat dated.

[5] Age, ibid.

his period of office[1], as well as earlier episodes concerning Seward's opportunism while Secretary of State (1865-1869),[2] to make its point regarding American indecencies in the conduct of international affairs. The paper considered that setbacks in diplomacy concerning Hawaii and Samoa had resulted in the present American bluster. That it was no more than this seemed testified by precedents such as the humiliating end for America of the German pork dispute.[3] Many were edified by the way that some lawyers and judges, together with authors, churchmen and workers, British professional people and prominent men from universities and the aristocracy, were using every means to bridge the gap in understanding which diplomatic failure had exposed.

The most impressive intercessor suggested to help close this gap had been Pope Leo XIII, whose good offices had secured the solution of some minor European disputes. Australia's Catholic spokesmen were enthusiastic about the suggestion. John Farrell considered the offer 'made in the true spirit of Christianity...an example for all its teachers to follow' and castigated Churches for not taking a more active role from the pulpit in discouraging war than they had done hitherto. The Advocate assured its readers that the Pope was a 'peerless arbitrator', anxious to reconcile the leading English-speaking countries because of the liberties they both

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[1] Age, ibid: Thomas Francis Bayard (Sec. State 1885-1889; Ambassador to Britain to 1897) had been censured by the House of Representatives, 7 Nov. 1895, for excessive Anglophilism. The Age opposed use of his official position to propagandize for free trade. A critique of Bayard appears in Allen Nevins, Henry White, Thirty Years of American Diplomacy (New York, 1930), pp.111-12.

[2] As Secretary of State, William H. Seward was supposed to have commented to the Duke of Newcastle that he was obliged to insult England.

[3] The German Pork Dispute occurred between 1879 and 1891 when heavy embargoes were placed on American pork and other product by Germany in retaliation for high American tariffs on German manufactured goods. American agreement to provide adequate inspection for disease of such exports removed the German ban after a decade of negotiation.