inferiority complex'.

There existed a definite desire on the part of Australians not to be overawed by the American experience. The U.S.A.'s very bigness was mocked. 'The citizens of the great republic are never satisfied except when they are doing things on a bigger scale than everybody else,' chided the Argus in 1889.

Their fortunes are more colossal and are more quickly amassed and dissipated; their railway accidents, explosions and disasters are more appalling, their blizzards are more destructive than in any other nation. This kind of deflation was common.

If America tried to develop the reputation that it could 'lick all creation' (to use American slang current at the time) Australian editors often tried equally hard to appear unimpressed. An Australian widow had publicised that in her experience, hours of work were longer and work was easier to lose; standards of comfort were lower and costs of rent higher in the United States than in Australia. Another published statistic put the average Australian wage ahead of that in the States. Another of the University of Melbourne's luminaries Professor Jenks, speaking to the Bankers' Institute of Australia had it that by placing utility before beauty; mercenary ahead of cultural considerations, the much-vaulted American 'progress' was a sham. Affirmative arguments for the oft-conducted debate: 'That the discovery of America did not benefit mankind' had it that the United States had siphoned off the best of the European migrants and investment capital of the Old World and by following selfish economic policies, had given little in return.

Even in its oft-praised organizational and mechanical talents, America by the 1890's was being considered by the Australian press as a faulty precedent. The importation of expensive American 'experts' to help with colonial problems concerning railways, postal and telephone services and wheat storage was no longer considered necessary. By 1890,

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2 Argus, 29 May 1889, 31 Mar., 12 Apr. 1890. See also, Herald, 1 June 1889, 29 July 1890, 23 Sept. 1893; Standard, 1 June 1893, 2 Aug. 1894.

3 Herald, 16 Aug. 1890; Age, 29 Aug., 12 Oct. 1892.
according to the press, the Australian should have considered himself, in
terms of general adaptability and inventiveness to be the American's equal.
In some items such as writers, statesmen, girls and products and in more
general matters such as the degree of lawfulness, tranquility, freedom,
intelligence and tact, some Australian editors were beginning to consider
Australia as superior to America. Given the sense of Australian national
identity emerging in the 1890's, the promise of Australian life and the
means of realizing it did not suffer in Australia by comparison with
estimates of America's prospects.

In one aspect at least, most Australian editors agreed they were
clearly ahead of American society. That was in the absence of what they
referred to as the 'coloured question'. The disruptive influence of
America's eight million negroes with the prospect of ten times that number
existing in America within a century was considered 'appalling' by a large
number of organs of the Australian press. As the Argus put it in 1889,

Racial incompatibility is the worst evil which can affect a
nation and in the United States we have the spectacle of an
ignorant, indolent, semi-savage people growing in strength
day by day in the midst of civilization to which they are
in most respects abhorrent.

The press noted the negroes' travails. From 1890 onward, the Negro
was rigorously disenfranchised. 'Jim Crow' laws ensured segregation in
Southern States and this received the blessing of the Supreme Court in the
case Plessey versus Ferguson in 1896. In 1892, 155 Negroes were murdered
extrajudicially in a slightly higher than average year for lynching.
These were conducted by mobs seeking revenge for crimes real or supposed.

With race hatred so evident, a race war seemed imminent. Australian
editors, while condemning the excesses of fellow whites, nonetheless
considered the problem insoluble. Migration was impracticable and
miscegenation ruinous, given the belief current at the time that an
'inferior' race absorbed a 'superior' one. Due to the Americans' seeming

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2 Geoffrey Serle, referring to the years 1885-1891 has written, '...In these
boom years, the utopian assumption of Australia's destiny as another United
States, peopled by a chosen white race, superior to the Old World and free
from its vices, held sway as never since'. From Deserts The Prophets Come
(Melbourne, 1973) p.60.

3 Argus, 27 Dec. 1889.
reluctance to educate their former slaves away from the sort of irresponsibility that had produced the horrors of Haiti and the failures of Reconstruction, America's racial future seemed clouded, with prospects of continued repression, confrontation and even bloody revolt.¹

Racial tension was also deplored following the lynching in New Orleans of eleven Italians acquitted of murder (April 1891). This outrage, which revealed considerable racial prejudice, had brought America to the brink of a diplomatic breakdown with Italy.²

The ultimate press indictment of American humanitarianism concerned the brusque brutality with which 'Manifest Destiny' had shunted aside the American Indian. The natives' long agony at the hands of greedy and dishonest Commissioners and trigger-happy troops reached its denouement at Wounded Knee in the massacre of 280 Sioux in 1890. The Indian had aroused admiration in the Australian press due to his dignity and fighting qualities. His slow passing aroused a species of sympathy that ironically, the less well-publicized passage of the unwarlike Aboriginal, dying of whisky and white-man's diseases, did not.³ Such press observations revealed the race prejudice of many editors in Australia.

An extension of these prejudices against those 'strangers in the land' of America was some of the Australian editorial reaction toward American immigration. It generally held that 70 years of unrestricted immigration had strained America's political institutions and social policies. Other editors noted with dismay that of the 1½ million people entering the United States in that time, only one and a half million were English-speaking. The rest were considered the 'refuse of the nations' and deserved the harsh reception awaiting them at Castle Garden, New York. Restriction of pauper, degraded and illiterate immigrants was approved of in the main, by a highly ethnocentric Australian press.⁴

¹See editorials in Age, 13 Aug. 1889, 23 June 1890, 9 Apr. 1892, 13 June 1893; Standard, 10 Feb. 1890; Herald, 3 Nov. 1894, 5 Oct. 1895.
²Argus, 13 Apr. 1891; Age, 17 Mar. 1892.
⁴Age, 25 Nov. 1890; 23 Feb. 1892; Argus, 29 Dec. 1890.
The Age for example, described the 579,000\(^1\) immigrants for 1892 - unlike the earlier cream of the North European stock - as 'brutal, ignorant outcasts...a huge mass of indigestible and undesirable rubbish, threatening to interfere with [America's] future prosperity'. The 'vices and vermin' which they imported were considered to be political as well as biological. Most of the industrial unrest, particularly the Chicago Haymarket riot and bombing (1886), and other anarchism was laid at their door, as was much of the organized murder in the cities: the work of the Camorra and the Mafia.\(^2\)

Germans\(^3\) appeared to threaten the English language itself within cities like New York, due to their flourishing independent press, while Scandinavians clearly dominated the culture of whole areas of the Mid-West and Italians whole sections of the cities. The courting of the votes of the illiterate immigrants was a long-recognized scandal as was the famed 'twisting of the lion's tail' diplomatically, in order to court the large Irish-American vote. Slavs, arriving in vast numbers, were particularly resented for their lack of sympathy with Anglo-Saxon traditions.\(^4\) As the Age put it, 'the scum of the earth...pollute [America's] fair fields with their undesirable presence'.\(^5\) The clear implication was that as long as this was the case, the quality of American life and the promotion of American ideals would be retarded.\(^6\)

The fact that by mid-1894 a reverse migration back to Europe had begun, proved to some Colonial observers how mistaken America had been to allow in such low-grade intruders in the first place and how badly

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\(^1\)The 1892 figure was the highest until 1902 i.e., following economic recovery of the U.S. In 1898 it reached the low figure of 229,000. Even by 1895 the numbers entering had halved.

\(^2\)Age, 5 Jan. 1893.

\(^3\)Well over 100,000 Germans arrived annually until 1892 and 30,000 to 40,000 thereafter.

\(^4\)The Immigration Restriction League protesting against these supposed 'evils' was formed in 1894, though legislation did not come until the 1920's.

\(^5\)The Age, ibid.

\(^6\)A.T. Yarwood, 'The "White Australia" Policy: A Re-interpretation of its Development in the late Colonial Period', Historical Studies (Melbourne, Nov. 1962), pp.257-70 shows how 1896 was a turning-point in Australian perceptions of their own immigration problem.
they had fouled the American nest with their encouragement of political
corruption, industrial unrest, anarchism, low wages and crowded,
unsanitary conditions. The real physical suffering of the tens of
thousands of unemployed left behind, following the effects of the
depression of 1893, was seen as a logical extension of this reprehensible
unrestricted immigration policy.\textsuperscript{1} By voicing such criticisms, Australian
editors did much to reveal their own nativism and their developing
attitudes on immigration.\textsuperscript{2}

So lawless had the United States become that more than one Australian
paper described them as a 'Murderers' Paradise'. This was based on the
published statistics revealing that from 1888 to 1892 the number of
murders doubled to reach 4,290 in the latter year. The carriage of guns
was deemed partly responsible for the 14,770 murders in the five years
1884-1889. In 1889 it was deplored that the number of lynchings (176)
outnumbered those formally executed for crimes (98). Not only was
intimidation common, as in the murder of the New Orleans' police chief
that precipitated the popular retaliatory Italian lynchings mentioned,
but American criminal law procedure was considered by Australians as
'monstrously slow and curiously uncertain'. It appeared to frustrate
justice rather than promote it (as in the Durrant murders of 1898) and in
United States Justice Martine's words made murder 'the safest crime one
can commit'.\textsuperscript{3}

Resentment was felt at the harbouring of dangerous alien dynamitards
by the United States - especially the Irish, who openly plotted to
disrupt the Empire with some outrageous act. Police corruption in New
York was regarded by the Ballarat and Bendigo papers as the result of the
'criminal apathy of an otherwise uncriminal public'.\textsuperscript{4} The growing American
tendency toward political assassination such as that of Chicago's mayor

\textsuperscript{1} Argus, 23 June 1894.

\textsuperscript{2} See C.S. Blackton, 'Australian Nationality and Nativism: The Australian

\textsuperscript{3} See editorial comment in Argus, 20 Aug. 1892; Standard, 1 July 1890, 9

\textsuperscript{4} Ballarat Courier, 4 Jan. 1895; 17 Sept. 1896, 30 Dec. 1896; Bendigo
Independent, 8 Jan. 1895; Herald, 15 Sept., 3 Nov. 1893.
in 1893 and which in one generation had claimed two presidents (and was soon to claim a third) gave rise to several odious comparisons of America with conditions of political crime existing in Czarist Russia. Aliens were often blamed by editors for much of this violence.¹

To some Melbourne editors, proper legal methods in America had been replaced by a form of primitive savagery. Continued lynchings illustrated in what light regard life was held. Leaders condemned the gala atmosphere in which human victims were, in American phraseology 'jerked to Jesus'. If some white Americans revealed themselves impatient with formal legal procedures, then equally, some Negroes appeared openly frustrated to the point of incorrigible barbarity with United States' society. United States' procedures were bringing European legal standards into universal disrepute. Britain's murder rate for the 1890's, often quoted as one-hundredth the United State's figure, was taken as an indication of the greater general respect for the civilized values of law and order. These were values in which most Australian editors were eager to claim a share.²

The scramble for the 'almighty dollar' by which phrase American acquisitiveness was described by the press in Australia and elsewhere, had given publicity to a number of plutocrats. They were the super-rich American industrialists and businessmen considered to possess inordinate political influence. Those like railroad builders Daniel Drew, Jim Pisk and Jay Gould³ of the 'Erie Ring' were condemned as cynical and greedy unregenerates. But reactions to semi-philanthropists such as Leland Stanford, Collis P. Huntington and Andrew Carnegie were at first cautiously ambivalent, then often praised, especially as Stanford's brother was a well-regarded citizen of Melbourne.

Publications such as Carnegie's well-read Triumphant Democracy (1886) and magazine articles such as 'The Gospel of Wealth' (1889) had done much to provide capitalists with a respectable Social-Darwinist rationale for

¹Age, 7 Oct. 1891.
³For Jay Gould's career and an assessment, see Review of Reviews, Jan. 1893, pp.18-35.
their position in society. Carnegie however, usually managed to irritate the Australian conservative press with provocative predictions such as the coming Republic in Britain to follow the death of Queen Victoria.

The irony of his boasted employment of a contented, self-restrained work force was rudely revealed in the violence that attended the strikes at his Homestead steel works in Pittsburgh in 1892 - put down by the mercenary strike-breakers of the Pinkerton Agency. The Argus commented:

Nowhere else in the civilized world is industrial strife so bitter as in the United States; nowhere else are strikes so vast and destructive and nowhere do they so swiftly lapse into crime and bloodshed. 2

Thereafter, for his part in the affair, Carnegie's judgements were increasingly suspect and the various evils of monopolistic capitalism given more publicity even by the more conservative newspapers of the Australian colonies.

Most damaging in this period was the exposé by the brilliant American 'muckraking' journalist and author, Henry Demarest Lloyd 3 whose 'A Strike of Millionaires Against Miners' (1890) made the point that great wealth was acting collusively to suppress the legitimate demands of needy coal miners. The useless accumulations of an Astor and the ostentatious, but uncomfortable girt surrounding a Rockefeller brought the narrow class of plutocrats into further disrepute. Their insensitivity to the plight of starving workers in 1894 caused many of them to be condemned root and branch by more radical elements of the Australian press as cold-blooded inhuman tyrants, exacerbating the coming class war many journalistic observers predicted, in which they richly deserved deposition. 4

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1 'Wealth' was run in the North American Review, June 1889. In December of that year the same magazine ran Carnegie's 'The Best Fields for Philanthropy'. At Gladstone's request 'Wealth' was reprinted by W.T. Stead in Pall Mall Gazette under the title 'The Gospel of Wealth' (1889) - not in 1900 as is often held.

2 Argus, 30 July, 27 Aug. 1892, 10 June 1893.

3 Henry Demarest Lloyd (1847-1903) was a U.S. author and fearless social reformer who had a marked influence on the 'Progressive' movement of the turn of the century in America. Following his exposé of the ruthlessness of the Standard Oil Company, he travelled to Europe and Australasia studying experiments in the fields of voluntary co-operation, public ownership and social legislation. He urged similar solutions to the problems faced by the U.S. See Caro Lloyd, Henry Demarest Lloyd (2 Vol., N.Y., 1912).

4 Ballarat Courier, 10 Sept. 1890; Herald, 8 Feb. 1893; Age, 28 May 1892.
For some Australian editors, a survey of private fortunes told the story: in 1892, 120 Americans possessed assets equivalent to the British National Debt. The number of millionaires - 4,047, most of them 'new' - greatly exceeded the British. One-thousandth of the population virtually owned the country, though 75 per cent of them were revealed as curmudgeons. By 1895, all elements of the Australian press viewed them in the same light as Lloyd in his scathing Wealth Against Commonwealth (1894) and that image was not flattering. At best, they represented the new crude rich of a raw democracy. They had shown pecuniary skill without commensurate taste with which to enjoy it, or wisdom to preserve it. In these comments Australian editors were generally revealing some of their socialist, anti-monopolistic attitudes.

An intense focus for many complaints against America was brought to bear on Chicago - the city chosen for the Columbian World Exposition of 1893, which celebrated, a year later, the four hundredth anniversary of the discovery of America by Columbus. A number of criticisms found voice: the site chosen was considered a corrupt political decision, given the current Democratic ascendancy in Congress. Chicago was considered a dull venue: too hot, too remote and too poorly serviced to be a success. The American Exposition was regarded as pretentious - certainly it was considered as unlikely to approach the showing of that in Paris in 1889.

A general editorial disenchantment with fairs as artistic failures and financial fiascos stemmed from Australia's embittering experience with their own 1888 Centennial Exhibition. This had cost the Victorian government which held it in Melbourne, ten times the originally projected amount. The government, affected by the 1891 depression and in a retrenching mood, viewed with disfavour the £30,000 now estimated as needed to advertise the colony in Chicago. It was held by the Age in particular that acting in isolation, the various colonies could do little to impress America or Europe or even the denizens of Chicago, for Australian wool, wheat and wine were products already well known overseas.  

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1E.g. Argus, 8 Apr. 1893, 1 Feb. 1894.

Nonetheless, Chicago and the Fair was to impress Australia and not at all favourably. Sir George Dibbs the New South Wales' Premier, while in New York in August 1892, had publicly 'damned Chicago' and the rest of the colonies were later inclined to damn it with him. The cause of condemnation in this case was the seizure by a Chicago sheriff of £10,000 worth of New South Wales' mineral exhibits - mostly gold - in trust for the impounding for glanders of the horses of Sell's Chicago Circus upon their arrival in Sydney. The matter threatened to assume the proportions of an international incident when the Agent-General, Sir Saul Samuel, alerted the Colonial Office who, through the Foreign Office, had the British ambassador in Washington settle the matter. The Age condemned the seizure as 'the height of ingratitude and unfriendliness'.

The work of the brilliant British journalist W.T. Stead, who had begun his influential Australian edition of the Review of Reviews in 1892, thus fell on ready ears. His book, If Christ Came to Chicago, based on investigations of the city during the Fair, was described by the Argus upon its release in Australia as 'the most daring and plainspoken indictment not merely of a whole city, but in a sense of a whole type of civilization, published in modern times'. Stead relentlessly catalogued the corruption and greed of millionaires and aldermen at the expense of an impoverished working class. The great Chicago Pullman Strike of mid-1894, which pitted troops against workers and paralyzed the nation's transportation coincided with the arrival of the book in Australian editorial circles and seemed to confirm the author's predictions of anarchism and violence on a huge scale.

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1 When Sir George Dibbs met Colonel Campbell, who was handling Australia's entry to the World Fair, in New York on 11 August 1892, Dibbs said rudely: 'I don't care a damn for your country, and I am sorry I came....Damn Chicago! It has caused New South Wales to squander £20,000 by the failure of the World's Fair Executive Committee to keep the promises made with regard to space for the colony's exhibits.' See Australian Star, 12 Aug. 1892. Dibbs was returning home from a visit to England, where he had been knighted. For Dibbs, see National Dictionary of Biography (Melbourne, 1972), Vol.4, pp.65-9.

2 Argus, 4 May, 5 June 1893. See also, Herald, 24 Mar., 6 Nov. 1893.

3 Age, 17 May, 1, 4, 14 Nov. 1893.

4 Argus, 2 June, 10 July 1894, 17 June 1895.

5 Herald, 10, 14 July 1894; Standard, 9, 13 July 1894.
Pullman Strike presented the conservative members of the Australian press with two names for their pantheon of society's enemies: John Altgeld and Eugene V. Debs.¹ For most Australian editors, Chicago seemed to represent all that was most contemptible in American urban developments.

There were other, more general complaints against America, of a social nature. Women, it was held, were nowhere more powerful and assertive than they were in the Republic. Whether involved in liquor reform, entering the professions, forming their own communities or governing others, they appeared as an incorrigible lot to Australian conservatives. Others noted the anomaly that though nowhere were women given more open deference, nowhere were they in such financial subjection to their husbands. Also, the political rights of women in America did not appear to be as advanced as those in Australia or Britain. As Max O'Rell pointed out, female suffrage was not prominent in the election platforms of 1892 or 1896. On the other hand, American women were considered by Australian editors as being too receptive to the vicissitudes of clothing fashions and easy divorce.²

American journals also came in for their share of criticism. Most editors considered them too gossipy, too personally vilifying and too prone to unreliable sensation-mongering. Cables from American sources were suspect, for more than once tales of vast American tragedies had been rescinded later, as a joke on overseas readers. The Melbourne Herald considered the literary and moral drift of the American journals as reflecting either depraved taste or some ugly social malaise.³ Australian editors refused in the main to identify a separate American literature or to endorse the many new American sayings and spellings entering the language and being constantly anthologized.⁴

¹For a portrait of Eugene Debs, see Review of Reviews, 20 Sept. 1894, pp.114-32. For the Review of Reviews see Appendix.


³Herald, 12 Jan., 17 July 1893, 8 Feb. 1896.

⁴E.g. Argus, 6 July 1889, 23 Sept. 1893, 7 Dec. 1895; Age, 18 June 1892.
A number of other items were objected to: polygamous Mormonism, faith healing; religious sects; bogus University degrees and electrocution as a form of death penalty - tried with little success on Kemmler in 1890. The list included inadequate fire precautions (a fire in a New York hotel in 1892 killed seventy guests); the allowance of corrupt lotteries; the Jack Cade quality of Coxeys's rabble labour army marching on the White House in 1894; the tremendous financial burden of bogus and genuine Civil War Army pensions - an open political bribe costing taxpayers $23 million a year from 1890 and finally, the public apathy that tolerated such abuses. 1 As the Herald put it: 'to be humourously patient of a great public scandal is a marked American characteristic'. 2

'All things' were supposed to happen in America. They very often did. The touring Australian cricket eleven of 1893 were beaten in their first game in Philadelphia by a scratch American team played during their return home from England. An exasperation with American sporting luck, conditions, style of play and fairness of refereeing was thereby enhanced as a tradition. Yet, despite this, Australian relations with the United States were more than usually amiable by the end of 1895 largely due to Australian sporting victories. The 'fastest cyclist in the world', America's Zimmerman, who was outraced by his Australian opposition, was drawing crowds of over 30,000 from early November in Australia's major cities. 3 The week before his appearance in Sydney another American entertainment, the comedy One Of Our Girls was being hailed as 'a mark in our theatrical history...' revealing 'that between this country and that of the Stars and Stripes there is a link which nothing in the world can sever'. 4 While Zimmerman was in Ballarat and Melbourne, the veteran

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1 See editorials in Age, 22 Jan. 1890, 10 Feb. 1892, 12 May 1893, 2 May 1894; Argus, 23 Apr. 1894, 11 June 1896; Ballarat Courier, 28 Feb. 1890; Standard, 7 Aug. 1890, 1 June 1894.

2 Herald, 15 Sept., 4 Oct. 1893.

3 Melbourne Punch, 2 Jan. 1896, p.2 (see Appendix). This rider - claimed to be a great grandson of Franz Zimmerman, one of the earliest voyagers to and commentators on Australia - was nonetheless a disappointment. On his first visit to Sydney's Cricket Ground (23 November 1895) he completed only two laps in a five mile race before retiring. He was beaten twice in Melbourne (21 Dec. 1895). Occurring at the peak of the western world's 'bicycle craze', the results were greeted in Australia with intense jubilation.

4 Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 18 Nov. 1895.
American actress 'Maggie Moore' — really Margaret Virginia Sullivan, wife of the great American entrepreneur of the Australian stage, J.C. Williamson — was also appearing in those centres for the twentieth successful year in the American play Struck Oil, as ever to packed houses. With equal success a recently arrived team of 'Chicago Minstrels' was touring Queensland's coastal towns.

Trade between the U.S. and Australasia, which usually represented between 30% to 40% of the share of all foreign trade had by 1894 (probably due to the effects of the depressions in the U.S. and Australia and the McKinley Tariff of 1890), fallen to as low as 22% of the total share of foreign trade. The value of that trade, as the table on the following page indicates, was £1,043,634, or less than a sixth of what it had been in 1891, and less than a quarter of what it had been in 1889. By 1896, that trade was back toward its highest figures — £6,033,116. The explanation would appear to be the extra intake of goods from Australia by the U.S., especially gold and wool.

Gold in the form of bullion and specie was exported in large amounts to overcome the currency crisis reaching its climax in 1896 with the effects of the depression in the U.S. since 1893, and the fiscal panic accompanying the possible election of William Jennings Bryan.

Wool, which had been placed on the 'free list' by the Wilson–Gorman tariff (of 1894–97) reached, in 1896, the figure of £441,049 or double the value of the 1894 sales. Relaxation of other U.S. duties on imported Australian coal and kauri gum, especially the former, and New Zealand flax, brought sales for the year to 38% of the total foreign trade. This had only been surpassed in 1891, when wool sales were up to £514,551 and when the total value of imports plus exports amounted to £6,189,376, or 40% of the total foreign trade. One factor of importance in these figures would have been the speculative and panic buying of Australian wool before the McKinley tariff of 1890 imposed a duty of between 1¢ and 2¢ per pound on raw wool.

Nonetheless, Australian traders and wool producers had cause to feel

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2. Mackay Mercury, 7 Dec. 1895. These performances are notable given the depressed condition of the entertainment business. See Age, 14 Dec. 1895. Brief notes on the above papers appear in the Appendix.
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<th>% Share of</th>
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Figures calculated from Yearbook, Vol. 1, Melbourne, 1989, but based on Australian figures only.

Figures completed from J.A. Coogan's A Statistical Account of the Seven Colonies of Australia.

Note: Figures not available.
some satisfaction in 1895 at the jump in trade with the United States following disappointment at the steady decline after 1891. Free traders in Sydney who had sent a message of congratulation to Cleveland upon his election as President in November 1892, felt vindicated in their theories concerning the efficacious effects of a lower tariff.

Protectionists pointed out in their defence, that the new Cleveland tariff, while having some good effects in Australia and elsewhere, was doing so at the expense of America. In reality, as a revision of the old tariff, that of 1894 was a mere 4 percent below the overall relatively high tariff levels of 1889. With the intake of Australian goods by the U.S. in 1896 approaching three times the levels of 1894, the long-awaited revival in Australia's economic fortunes seemed imminent.

Wool growers had for long been the most anxious among Australians concerned with American economic developments. Even their best year - 1891 - had seen the United States purchase directly a mere 2.1% of the crop. The year before it had been 1%. By 1901 it was only 1.6%. But the figures are misleading. Due to cheaper shipping rates from London to the United States, much wool was purchased by Britain for shipment to America. In 1891 for example, though 8,106 bales were purchased directly in Sydney by U.S. buyers, a further 98,000 bales were bought on the London market by Boston importers.

Most annoying for Australian wool producers and marketers was America's clear need for fine Australian wool to replace the 'shoddy' being used in the clothing of those in extremely cold sections of the U.S.. A particularly powerful wool lobby in Congress, which posited itself as the keystone to the whole United States' protectionist edifice, continued to annoy the Australian producer. One particularly obnoxious

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1. This meeting offers congratulations to the American people on the triumphant re-election of Mr Grover Cleveland as President of the United States and regards that event as the opening up of a new epoch of freedom and human progress'. See Lloyd G. Churchward, 'Australian-American Trade Relations, 1791-1939', Economic Record (June, 1950) p.76.


4. L. Churchward, ibid.
item appeared in the Republican party's campaign literature during the election of 1892. It falsely charged that 'convict shepherds' were making cheaper the cost of production of the wool of the Australian colonies, and that Australian woolgrowers had sent money to the U.S. in order to bribe Congressmen to vote for lower wool tariffs. Worse, it was suggested that after having captured a large share of the American wool market with a cheap, high-quality product, Australians would then hold the American public to ransom by raising prices.\(^1\) Though it was not as short-lived as U.S. wool-producers would have hoped, Australia's wool prosperity in the American market received a new set back with the 1897 Dingley tariff. By 1901, the value of wool marketed directly to the U.S. was back around the figure of 1894.

The value of Australasia's imports of United States' goods had more than doubled between 1894 and 1896, to reach £3,346,460 in the latter year. Only in 1891 had exports been greater than imports. In 1896, imports exceeded exports by around £660,000. That year, breadstuffs had swollen the import bill, following crop failures in South Australia. Sydney received most imports, due to the generally lower N.S.W. tariffs and the development of shipping services to California. Only Tasmania shared little in the trade.

One of the most successful U.S. imports was footwear. The value of imported boots and shoes rose from £1,227 in 1890 to £218,343 by 1900. American timber and timber products, tobacco, kerosene, fruit, flour and other provisions had a trading advantage. Some lines such as axes, were better adapted to Australian conditions and like denim material, were preferred to less suitable British products. Galvanized iron, fencing wire, windmills and pumps, lamps, padlocks, mowing machines, reapers and binders, disc ploughs, harrows and garden rakes were also popular U.S. items.\(^2\) Between 1886 and 1906, these manufactures of metals showed the greatest advance of any U.S. import item, until by the latter date, around 40% of Australia's needs came from America. Animal foods,

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2L. Churchward, op.cit., pp.74-5.
paper and stationery, apparel and textiles, jewellery, timepieces, fancy goods and leather manufactures were also important import items. ¹

From 1892 to 1895 the balance of payments continued to favour America. This did not please Australian merchants and politicians, especially when the chief Australian export was gold bullion. Most Australian newspapers in the metropolitan areas agitated for a better trade balance. Though the total value of Australia's overseas trade was a fifth that of America's, the value of that trade per head of population was four times the American figure.² These facts were often quoted in a misleading way to help give point to Australia's criticisms of American plutocracy and to promote a feeling of Australian economic superiority.³ By 1901, the total value of Australian trade was triple the 1889 figure. This new upward trend began in 1895.

An active agent of this new prosperity was a bright and versatile Virginian - Colonel George W. Bell, the American Consul in Sydney who had since 1893 reinstated himself in the eyes of the press. Cosmos called him '...the best known and most popular foreigner in Australia'. ⁴ It was agreed by both the Free Trade and Protectionist presses that he had changed opinion in Sydney from one of ignorance about America to one of warmth. Chambers of Commerce and businessmen in other colonies, where he travelled widely, echoed this praise. Thus the Storekeeper: he has 'thrown himself heart and soul into the noble work of promoting closer and larger commercial relations between Australia and the United States'.⁵ Defending his many activities as publicist to Edwin F. Uhrl, the Assistant American Secretary of State, Bell wrote: 'though neither people knew or cared much of, or for, the other....I assumed the duties at the Consulaté with a determination to change the impression regarding

¹Official Yearbook of Australia, No.1, (Melbourne, 1908) Import table p.517.

²Yearbook, op.cit., pp.501-6. Australia's trade in 1901 was £92,149,305 cf. America's - £527,979,000. Value of Australian trade: £24.4.6 per head cf. £6.16.0 per inhabitant for the U.S.

³E.g. Queenslander, 7 Dec. 1895; Evening News (Melbourne), 18 Dec. 1895; Geelong Advertiser, 10 Dec. 1895; Monitor, 20 Dec. 1895; Darling Downs Gazette, June 1895.

⁴Cosmos, Dec. 1895. See also comment in Australian Star, 4 July 1895; Sydney Trade Review and Prices Current, 5 July 1895.

⁵The Storekeeper, 15 Feb. 1896. The Illustrated American cited him as an example of the beneficial improvements wrought by Cleveland in the Civil Service '...one happy instance of the right man in the right place'; Cosmos admired him as able, temperate, courteous and patriotic.
our people....' Though exaggerating his own role, Bell's business diplomacy nonetheless did much to promote the good feeling that existed between America and Australia in 1895.

Metropolitan newspapers at the end of 1895 made much of the socially exciting news of mid-December concerning the lavish Churchill-Vanderbilt wedding in New York - the third of a noble Churchill to an American bride and the 138th of an American woman to a titled foreigner. Its cost (£80,000) was variously condemned or gushed over by editors. The Sydney Morning Herald detected in the American opposition generated, 'another expression of the anti-trust, anti-monopoly feeling growing in the States and the desire for reform against business selfishness'. Such American events highlighted growing Anglo-American amity, while American abuses did much to help formulate a 'progressive' attitude among Australian editors.

Over-powerful multitudinous American cartels, combines, rings and trusts were held up to constant editorial abuse. Though the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 was meant to control them, it was quickly viewed as no more than a paper tiger. Following the test case of United States-vs-Knight in 1895, it was recognized that the United States government would offer no obstacle to having laissez-faire operate regarding business combinations. This strangulation of competition, the monopolistic fixing of prices and the political corruption that sustained the system, was ceaselessly attacked by all progressive organs of the Australian press.

Fluctuation following a steady decline in the price of silver on

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3 Sydney Morning Herald, 21 Dec. 1895.


the international market after the passage of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act of 1890 and its repeal in 1893, unsettled Australian silver miners and businessmen in general. A bi-metallic currency standard to be imposed on the world by a United States government acting alone, was a continuing spectre. Such a decision, it was frequently held, would bring in its train massive debt repudiation, deal a mortal blow to the gold standard and British economic supremacy and, by the introduction of cheap money bring about a fearful world-wide depression.¹ Nonetheless the chaotic and crisis-ridden currency of the United States, with its lack of centralised controls, unbacked paper and depleted gold reserve was presented by editors in the Australian press as a fiscal example of what Australian nation-builders should strive to avoid.²

If the census of 1890 had officially declared the United States' frontier to be closed, few in Australia appeared more aware of it than the number who listened to the lecture of an obscure young historian, Frederick Jackson Turner, at the Chicago World Exposition in 1893.³ The tumultuous movement of a hundred thousand settlers into Oklahoma Territory in 1889 and 1893 was deplored by more orderly developing colonies such as South Australia and Victoria, especially the latter, whose own land 'booming' was having such an unfortunate aftermath.

Any United States' land shortage was belied by the entry to statehood of North and South Dakota, Montana and Washington in 1889, Idaho and Wyoming in 1890 and Utah in January 1896. A feeling that


³ Among the works comparing the Australian and American frontier experiences, perhaps H.C. Allen's Bush and Backwoods (Michigan, 1959) is best known.
these States had been too hastily admitted into the Union; that their overall political power in the Senate and Electoral College was inordinate; that they were the private domains of silver and cattle interests and prone to currency faddism and social anarchism, was sometimes voiced by Australian editors.¹

At a lighter level, J.L. Dow - one of the freelance journalists who were self-styled specialists on American agriculture - admitted at the end of 1895 to an amused audience of protectionists at Wangaratta in December that he had faked his 'American' articles to the Age on Californian irrigation, written a decade before, having composed them in Honolulu en route to the United States.² 'I wrote them before I got to America,' he said, 'When I got there, I was surprised to find how good they were.'³ Not only were rural Australians highly receptive to American materials, but they were gullible as well - a fault not uncommon in isolated communities.

Farmer distress in America, culminating in the political challenge to Eastern financial interests in the United States' elections of 1892 and 1896 had aroused considerable sympathy for over a decade, especially among papers and spokesmen in rural areas of the Australian colonies. The planks of the Populist platform, the writings of James Baird Weaver, Ignatius Donnelly and William H. Harvey were as readily received in some quarters - especially socialists both rural and urban - as had been the writings of Henry George, Edward Bellamy and Laurence Gronlund.⁴

Many radical and socialist editors in Australia identified, as before, the same numerous abuses existing in Australia's cities,

¹E.g. Argus, 29 May 1889.


³Nonetheless the articles on Californian irrigation written at the same time by E.S. Cunningham and Alfred Deakin were genuine contributions in every sense. See J.A. La Nauze, Alfred Deakin, Vol.1 (Melbourne, 1965), Ch.4.

industry, agriculture and countryside.1 Now however, it was more often conceded that America was worse off. Because of this, United States' trade unions, in particular the Knights of Labor, which had done so much to inspire Australian unionism, were roundly criticized.2 This was not only for indulging in an excessive number of unsuccessful strikes, but for giving up the struggle to reform the political and economic system from within. Its membership in the nineties had declined precipitously especially after unsuccessful recourse to violent, illegal methods. This development was especially distressing at a time when 'Yankee' ingenuity and industry had achieved an extraordinary degree of successful inventiveness and adaptation in other areas and had, since 1894, established the United States as the world's leading manufacturing nation.

On the level of domestic politics, there was other evidence of annoyance with American developments. The huge cost of an American presidential election ($20 million in 1888), spent largely on bribes to secure the votes for a succession of mediocre candidates, and followed by the greedy crush of well over 100,000 office-seekers — many of them like the Irish-American diplomat to Chile, Patrick Egan, considered less than equal to their tasks — was a quadrennial spectacle that never ceased to provoke harsh comparisons with the less expensive, more orderly continuity of the British system.

As James Bryce3 had revealed to Australians when his much-quoted classic critique of United States' institutions, The American Commonwealth, reached the colonies in 1889, successive Congresses,

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3 James Bryce (1838-1922) paid his first visit to the United States in 1870. His book, begun in 1883 and finished in 1888 has been called, 'the most authoritative work on the structure and working of the American constitution'. He wrote with the sympathetic eye of a historian and lawyer, and friend of the American people. He was ambassador to Washington for Britain 1907-13. See N.A.L. Fisher, Lord Bryce, (London, 1927). 2 Vols.
elected with such fanfare, were not addressing themselves adequately to the country's most pressing problems. Legislation which was subject to the uncertainties of lobby, committee and veto as well as the pressures of Upper and Lower House, was considered by editors as too devious and complicated by Australian colonial political standards. ¹

Bryce's observation on the two political parties in America - one which was to become famous - was that they were like two identically labelled bottles - both empty. An electoral system that was to choose only one Democratic candidate for the Presidency between 1865 and 1912 was considered to be malfunctioning even by 1890, especially when the ascendant Republicans had resorted to what were termed 'low partisan tricks' as in the Hayes-Tilden disputed election of 1876, and the dismissal of the British diplomat Sackville-West, during the election of 1888.

James Bryce had noted in his book that 'the government of cities is the one conspicuous failure of the United States'. The Australian press agreed. The open corruption of political organizations such as New York's Democratic Tammany Hall aroused an extreme repugnance. Most concurred with the Forum's description of it as 'a conspiracy for the acquisition of public plunder'. Wire-pulling political bosses such as John Y. McKane were loathed for the form of oriental despotism which they exerted over civic and municipal affairs and jubilation at their demise or groans over their ascendancy periodically echoed throughout editorials of the liberal-conservative press. ²

As a result of such evil publicity at the local, state and federal level, a determination not to accept at face value the precedents of American constitution-makers grew up in Australian editorials circles and among politicians. The need for a system less open to abuse and more adapted to Australia's special circumstances and requirements was constantly aired in leaders and letters to the editors. The disintegrative nature of State and local interests in the United States, ³


²E.g. Editorials in Age, 4 July, 11 Nov. 1892; Herald, 10 July 1894; Argus, 4 July, 3 Aug., 3, 7 Nov. 1892, 9 Mar., 2, 23 June, 28 Dec. 1894, 17 June 1895.
commented upon by the Age's travelling correspondent in 1892, challenged the lasting qualities of that federation. The special class, industrial, racial, rural and currency strains and the divisiveness of Congress, President and Supreme Court also cast doubtful light on the viability of United States federalism. If the President was considered too powerful, the influential Senate was singled out for its unrepresentativeness and for being a mere 'club of millionaires': more conservative and obstructive than the British House of Lords and less amenable to pressure.¹

More apocalyptically, some believed with Professor J. Tyndall, a critic of Herbert Spencer, that both the action of free American institutions and the violent appeal of socialism had palpably failed to solve America's myriad problems and that the country was headed for a future bureaucratic or militaristic despotism - a victory of conservative forces. Stead's 'The Labour War In America' refuted this view and posited the ultimate confrontation of despairing labour against entrenched capital, as taking place in America before the end of the century.²

Though fewest anti-American attitudes and reactions were expressed by Australian newspapers concerning foreign affairs, Australian editors were exasperated by several international irritations. Longest lasting had been the failure to recognize the copyright on materials written in Britain and her Empire, despite forty years of negotiations to prevent such piracy by American publishers. Australian pressmen were equally annoyed by America's failure to consider adequate reciprocal extradition arrangements. This had led to a number of opportunists and criminals from America seeking fresh fields in Australia, while making awkward and expensive the extradition of Australian criminal escapees to America.³


² E.g. Editorials in Age, 23 Aug., 1 Sept. 1892, 6 July, 6 Sept. 1894; Herald, 9 Sept. 1890, 13 Apr. 1895; Argus, 17 Apr., 25 Aug. 1894, 13 July 1895.

³ Age, 29 Jan., 6 May 1890, 7 Jan. 1891; Argus, 6 July 1889.
American coercion of Canada to persuade that country to join the United States in either an economic or political union was considered by most of the Australian press, with perhaps the single exception of the Age, as one of the most damaging aspects of American foreign relations with the Empire. The McKinley Tariff of 1890 and the so-called 'plot' of certain Canadian liberals in 1891 to negotiate to bring the depressed country within America's economic orbit, were considered the two pincers of this movement. Open discussion of Canadian annexation in Congress in 1890 fired further Australian resentment, especially when suggestions for purchase were put forward—seeming to place Canada on the level of Alaska, as a mere piece of real estate and source of raw material, regardless of sentimental and real Imperial ties.

Secretary of State James G. Blaine's First International American Conference in Washington (1889-1890) was sometimes referred to cynically as a piece of self-advertisement, designed to establish a United States' economic hegemony over the Latin-American countries of the south. 

Exciting more resentment from 1890 to 1893 was the renewed Bering Sea fishery controversy, concerning sealing in the vicinity of the Pribilof Islands off Alaska. American claims for a 'closed sea' and their belligerence toward Canadian sealing vessels were considered preposterous and unwarranted. Australian editorial satisfaction at the arbitration award granted Britain probably reflected earlier press resentments against American sealers as much as it affirmed the justice of British-Canadian claims. The non-payment by America of that award became itself a source of outrage during the following five years (1893-98) especially in the light of the honourable payment by Britain of the scandalously inflated Alabama claims following the Civil War, the excess of which, though unclaimed, had not been returned.

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1 *Age*, 11, 20 Feb. 1891, 30 Apr. 1892.
2 For editorials, see *Argus*, 7, 18 Oct., 7 Nov. 1890, 14 Feb., 9 Mar. 1891, 22 Feb. 1892.
Blaine's jingoism, as well as that of President Harrison was further derided during the Chilean imbroglio - an international crisis lasting from May 1891 to early 1892. America's warlike stance following the discourtesies to American officials on the Itata, and the sailors of the Baltimore was considered a shameful blow aimed at a small nation just emerging from the throes of a civil war for the principle of parliamentary responsibility. Such a struggle would have been a grossly uneven war of 'sulks and temper' as one Australian paper described it - fought only to preserve a nebulous United States' prestige.¹

Little animosity however, motivated Australian attitudes toward American interests in Samoa. These came to a climax with the greatly destructive Apian cyclone (16 March, 1889) which did much to clear the air of the intrigue and rivalry of Germany, England and the United States. The assertion of an Australian or New Zealand or British interest was naturally desired, but in matters of control America was preferred to Germany, and the United States was only criticized on the same level as Britain for not rebuffing those German pretensions more vigorously. With Britain, America was made by the Australian press to bear her share of the responsibility for the periodic outbreaks of tribal warfare and the many administrative failures of the tripartite condominium which followed the Agreement of Berlin in 1889.²

The American-inspired attempted revolution at Hawaii in 1893 created some criticism in Australia for its transparent promotion by the island's sugar interests and the crude rejection of the rightful claims of Queen Liliuokalani to the throne. For, despite the long-standing high degree of American commercial interest in Hawaii, it was recognized that with a mere two per cent of the total population, those American claims were somewhat tenuous when considered beside those of Britain or Japan, while New Zealand's objections were not to be ignored.

¹E.g. Editorials in Age, 3 Nov. 1891, 28 Jan., 17 Mar. 1892; Argus, 4 Nov. 1891, 9, 28 Jan., 5 Feb. 1892.

As a reversal of traditional isolationism, some considered it an expensive mistake, given America's lack of naval preparedness to defend such an acquisition. Cleveland's rejection of the annexation proposals cast a further shade on their legality. Future American selfishness regarding use of Samoa and Hawaii as strategic coaling stations for war or commerce was feared, as was the economic exclusiveness of the American tariff system, once extended to the islands.¹

As a result of his indiscretions whilst visiting Hawaii in mid-1894 on a return trip from Britain and the United States, Victoria's Minister for Defence, Robert Reid, was blamed for the failure of the Pacific Cable venture to gain Necker Island as a station. The total withdrawal of United States' co-operation in the scheme for a time following this, was an example of American cantankerousness that agitated Australian editors on the east coast, anxious for the cable's completion.²

The year 1895 was to be one of special significance for the Australian colonies in foreign developments. In mid-year, the Tory-Unionists came to power by defeating the Liberals in Britain. The new government contained Lord Salisbury as returned Prime Minister and in charge of the Foreign Office, with the capable and progressive Joseph Chamberlain as Colonial Secretary. An early impression was made on the colonies through the latter's Trade Circular of November, 1895. In it, he sought information from the Australian and other colonies as to how their trade with Britain might be better expanded and facilitated. Such a commercial impulse was well received by the Australian metropolitan press, which anticipated in it a variety of guaranteed future trade prospects with the mother country - a form of imperial protection.³

¹See editorials in Argus, 31 Jan., 20 Feb. 1893, 10 June 1894; Brisbane Evening Observer, 31 Jan. 1893; Standard, 21 Feb. 1893, 12 Jan. 1894; Merze Tate, 'Australasian Interest in the Commerce and the Sovereignty of Hawaii', Historical Studies (Melbourne, 1965), pp.499-513, due to too small a newspaper sample, mistakenly believed there was no Australian press opposition to the United States annexation of Hawaii.


Such concern and initiative it was hoped by the metropolitan presses, might now apply at the foreign policy level through joint Salisbury-Chamberlain action, to secure more vigorous protection and promotion of Australian colonial interests in the Pacific. Reinvigorated European imperialism in the Pacific had witnessed French annexation of Tahiti in 1880 and the French move more firmly into the New Hebrides by 1886. Germany had obtained some exclusive rights in Tonga in 1876 and in Samoa in 1879 and proclaimed a protectorate over New Guinea in 1884. By 1886 Germany and Great Britain had divided the Pacific into spheres of influence between them.

These events were to have a momentous impact on the Australian colonial impulse toward federation after 1889. Since 1870, various organs of the Australian colonial presses had regarded control of most of the south-western Pacific possessions as part of their own future destiny as a federated power. Editors and politicians were therefore deeply disturbed by the European invasion of the Pacific. From 1884 to 1886 this feeling bordered on hysteria. Australian colonists felt neglected. The British government was sluggish. The French recidivist menace in the New Hebrides and the German militaristic foothold in neighbouring New Guinea was offensive.¹

It was in this atmosphere that after 1889, many Australian editors came to relax their hostility toward nascent American imperialism in Samoa² (concerning which, annexation impulses had been strong since


²See editorials in Australasian, 26 Jan., 22 June 1889; Brisbane Evening Observer, 1, 5 Feb., 9 Mar., 1, 18, 23 Apr., 17, 22 June 1889, 12 Jan. 1895; Herald, 14 Jan., 1 Feb., 1 June 1889, 29 Apr. 1895; Age, 12, 19 Jan., 28 Feb., 1 Apr., 3 June 1889, 1 May 1894; Argus, 16, 25 Jan., 2 Feb., 6 Mar., 2 Apr., 16 May, 24 July, 24 Aug. 1889, 3 May 1894. A very well written and researched set of articles on Samoa were despatched from 'Vagabond' (J. Thomas) of the Age in the Saturday editions of the last three months of 1889. Most provocative was the despatch of 9 November, 1889: 'Some in Samoa', which attacked the politically mischievous role of the French priests in the island. This view received a prolonged defence in letters to the editor sent by D.F. Barry, O.S.B., of Manly, N.S.W. See Age, 15, 22, 24 Feb., 29 March, 19 April 1890. Robert Louis Stevenson's strongly anti-German attitude influenced editorialists. See interview Argus, 1 Mar. 1893 on arrival in Sydney and article 13 March 1893; balanced by interview with Baron Von Pilsach, Argus, 20 June 1893. All reprints from Sydney Morning Herald. See Argus editorials 26 Apr. 1892, 20, 21 June 1893. Also, R.L. Stevenson's A Footnote To History: Eight Years of Trouble In Samoa (New York, 1960). F.R. Dulles, America In The Pacific:A Century of Expansion (Boston, 1938) 2nd Edn. gives a good general account.
1883) and in Hawaii in the remote northern Pacific, where since 1868, the Australian press had recognized a growing sphere of U.S. influence. By 1895, in both cases it was quite clear that Australian editors preferred an American presence to that of any other foreign power as the best chance of preserving Australian colonial interests in trust. The example given by the Calliope, the British warship and only vessel to escape destruction during the cyclone at Apia in 1889, which at the time had been cheered on by American sailors whose own ships were sinking, created a legend for those editors desirous of promoting Anglo-American harmony. These attitudes mitigated much of the criticism of the United States and suffused much of the debate over American actions in the Pacific.

Colonial editorial attitudes toward China had been somewhat modified by 1895. The long-standing 'Yellow Peril' paranoia of all sections of the Australian press regarding dangers presented to the Australian 'way of life' by the cheap labour and inferior genes of a possible massive influx of Chinese immigrants had undergone a climatic upheaval in 1888. This took the form of anti-Chinese legislation in most of the colonies, a result of re-awakened fears following the visit of several Chinese Commissioners to the major centres of Chinese population in the colonies (25 April to 3 August, 1887). Anti-Chinese Leagues, Trades Hall Councils and sinophobes such as the Bulletin, Daily Telegraph, Age, Newcastle Morning Herald and Ballarat Courier, to name a few newspapers, aroused hostility to fever pitch.

Most opposition centred on the possible removal of the Poll-Tax on Chinese immigrants. Responsible conservative-liberal opinion such as the Argus and liberal-conservatives such as the Advertiser, were

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1 See editorials in Argus, 21 Aug. 1889; Herald, 10 Dec. 1890, 17 May 1895; Age, 21 Nov. 1892, 31 Jan. 1893; Standard, 13 Feb. 1893. The complicated story of moves by Americans to annex these islands in the period 1889 to 1895 is well presented in the following: Sylvester K. Stevens, American Expansion In Hawaii 1842-1898 (Harrisburg, P.A., 1945); William A. Russ Jr., The Hawaiian Republic 1894-98: Its Struggle To Win Annexation (Pa., 1961) and Merze Tate, The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom (Conn., 1965).

alike concerned that the British Foreign Office might feel compelled to choose between the friendship of China and the good-will of the colonies. The Sydney Morning Herald led a few newspapers in insisting that a modicum of Chinese friendship be preserved in order to secure future sales of wool, wines, oil, manufactured goods and business skills for Australia. But the Queensland press led by the Courier, was overwhelmingly hostile. With the Queensland Times, it viewed the Commissioners as the advance agents of forcible Chinese immigration despite their disclaimers. Xenophobia and racial nationalism won the day. The colonies and their presses entered the 1890's firm in their opposition to the Chinese.

The 'awakening giant' of China with its vast population, had long been viewed by Australian editors as a potential invasion threat. By 1889, it was realized that the government of China had a growing concern for its overseas population and a desire to begin a modern navy. These factors put China in the class of a potential world power.

But all the underlying Australian newspaper prejudice regarding Chinese social and political decadence and military ineffectualness was revived following that country's abrupt and humiliating defeat at the hands of Japan in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. China even lost her small trade in tea with the Australian colonies, during the struggle. As Jack Shepherd put it, ...'fear of China as a great power vanished with her defeat in 1895'. The Inter-Colonial Conference of

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1 Argus, 28, 30 May, 11 June, 3 Aug. 1887; Advertiser, 20 June 1887.
2 Sydney Morning Herald, 5 May, 14, 20 July, 4 Aug. 1887.
3 Courier, 6 June, 25, 26, 27 July 1887; Queensland Times, 19 July 1887.
4 The above two paragraphs are indebted to the researches of T.P. Buggy, whose M.A. Thesis, 'Australian Attitudes To China, 1887-1909' is at present being completed at Macquarie University, Sydney. When completed, the thesis will valuably supplement this dissertation.
6 Sydney Morning Herald, 6 Apr. 1888; Robert Thomson, Australian Nationalism (Burwood, N.S.W., 1888) pp.106-7.
7 Jack Shepherd, Australia's Interests and Policies In The Far East (New York, 1940) pp.4, 16.
the following year pressed for a uniform policy of excluding Chinese: a policy which reached fruition in the Immigration Act of 1901.\textsuperscript{1} The legislation revealed the contempt for China's power status that set in after 1895. Only concern that some avaricious Power might close China's 'Open Door' to trade with the Australian colonies remained.\textsuperscript{2}

When it was realised that the United States was proceeding along roughly similar policy lines of restricting Asiatic immigration and preserving equal opportunities in Chinese trade, Australian editors warmed toward United States movements in the Far East, especially when they worked in tandem with those of Great Britain.\textsuperscript{3}

After 1895, the Chinese question moved into the background. In its place there appeared a much more serious preoccupation with Japan.\textsuperscript{4} This concern was political and military. The political concern stemmed from the proposed Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty of 1894. One clause which caused much editorial heartburn in the colonies permitted the signatories unrestricted immigration into each other's country. Following much newspaper and political debate, all the Australian colonies with the exception of Queensland decided not to participate in the treaty. The colonies had been desirous of Japanese trade and especially the sale of more wool, hides and leather. But they were not interested in encouraging a flood of Japanese immigration and accompanying miscegenation; the influx of numbers of cheap Japanese goods, nor the further encouragement of Japanese imperialism.\textsuperscript{5}

Ambivalence also concerned military affairs. Many Australian editors had at first supported the plucky Japanese in their military

\textsuperscript{1} Myra Willard, History Of The White Australia Policy (Melbourne, 1923) Chapter I; Clunies Ross (ed.), Australia and the Far East (Sydney, 1936) Chapter I.


\textsuperscript{3} W. Levi, American-Australian Relations, p.86.

\textsuperscript{4} W. Levi, op.cit., p.83.

efforts as a check to the larger and more traditional Chinese and Russian invasion menaces. But the unguarded statements of some Japanese spokesmen and the energy and aggressiveness of the Japanese displayed after the war, were seized upon by colonial militarists to gradually fan into life again the nationalistic fears that had been earlier aroused by the movements of European powers in the Pacific.  

By the end of 1895, though some praise and encouragement for the Japanese as a people and as traders remained, newspaper opinion was coming to view the emerging world power of Japan as a replacement for Russia in potential aggression.  

Both rational and irrational elements now served to make Japan one of Australia's most central concerns. A rapport with U.S. actions, based on the ethnocentric and progressive elements of America's attitudes on defence and immigration regarding the Far East, was building up in the Australian press. From 1895, as Levi put it, 'Australians began to pay attention to American policy in the Pacific'. For, as Jack Shepherd has written; 'Since 1895 most Australians have regarded the Far East with mingled feelings of hope and fear'.

This did not mean that Australians turned the focus of their attention entirely away from political developments in Western Europe. Rather, after 1895 they had a dual perspective. As one cautious commentator has it,

Quite logically, in respect of political and military matters, Australians looked to Europe in the settlement of their international political and security problems, even when circumstances forced them to deal directly with any given area in the neighbourhood, for in the nineteenth century, such circumstances were usually created by Western powers.

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1 In general, see the thesis of D. Sissons: 'Attitudes to Japan and Defence, 1890-1923'. Unpublished M.A., University of Melbourne, 1956.


4 J. Shepherd, op.cit., p.16.

Security and defence were largely in the hands of the British navy and despite periodic colonial objections demanding a greater say, foreign affairs were essentially in the hands of the British Foreign Office. To prevent accusations of either ingratitude by Britain or internal Empire weakness by foreign rivals, Australian colonies, backed by their presses, were periodically prepared to unequivocally back British interests in times of extraordinary pressure. Such a circumstance prevailed at the end of 1895. Within a few months of their taking office, the government of Salisbury and Chamberlain were 'called upon to face the most serious, because the most complicated, crisis within the memory of living Englishmen'.

During one of the hottest summers in the history of the Australian colonies - 500 people died in N.S.W. alone, where temperatures reached 122°F. at Euston⁴ and amid the distractions of Gippsland bushfires and cricket mania, the crisis broke. With the Enabling Act being passed in New South Wales in December 1895 after two years of deliberation, federation of the Australian colonies proceeded toward its final phases after December 1895.⁴ Ironically, at the precise time when Australian editors were assessing their own country's image and future role, they were forced by events to reassess America's.

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¹ S.H. Jeyes, op.cit., p.385.


⁴ Shortly after N.S.W., the States of South Australia, Tasmania and Victoria also passed similar measures providing for ten Convention delegates from each colony to meet in 1897 in Adelaide to finalise the details of federation.
CHAPTER THREE

THE GUIANA–VENEZUELA BOUNDARY DISPUTE (1895–1896):
AUSTRALIAN ATTITUDES
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The overseas excitement regarding American actions involving Samoa, Hawaii and Chile having died down in the Australian press, the Guiana–Venezuela boundary dispute crisis caught editors in the antipodes off-guard. In August there had been some intimation that America might invoke the Monroe Doctrine to protest against British gunboat diplomacy in the 'Corinto Affair' involving Nicaragua. These fears had proved groundless and when Joseph Chamberlain, the forceful new Secretary of State for the Colonies sent Maxim guns to British Guiana to strengthen border defences against Venezuelan enroachments such as had taken place in November 1894 and January and November 1895, it was believed that America would not take offence at what was a domestic policing action.¹

Editorial attention was focused on other trouble spots: the 'Moroccan', 'Egyptian' and 'Eastern' questions as well as trouble in West Africa, the Congo, the Transvaal, the Mekong and Shan States. In the two weeks before Christmas, these alternate problems were to assume the status of minor irritations when compared with the new trouble with America.²


²Age, 13, 27 Dec. 1895; Ballarat Star, 6 Dec. 1895 (see Appendix).
The controversy between Venezuela and Great Britain dated from 1814 when the British took over that possession from the Dutch. In 1840, a survey made by Sir Robert Schomburgk, a British engineer, was rejected by Venezuela and the dispute remained unsettled. The disputed region did not become a troublesome issue until gold was discovered there. Venezuela pressed its case based on prior Spanish claims before America's State Department in the hope of winning sympathy from the Americans. Then, in 1887, it severed diplomatic relations with Great Britain. The United States offered to help the two countries arbitrate the boundary, but the British refused this tender of good offices. There the matter rested until Cleveland returned to the White House and announced that he would resume urging arbitration of the matter. Great Britain remained cool toward the proposal (20 February 1895). Meanwhile, public opinion in the United States began urging a firm stand by America against Britain and became partial toward Venezuela. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge warned:

If Great Britain is to be permitted to...take the territory of Venezuela, there is nothing to prevent her taking the whole of Venezuela or any other South American state. If Great Britain can do this with impunity, France and Germany will do it also...the supremacy of the Monroe Doctrine should be established and at once - peacably if we can, forcibly if we must.  

Probably to frustrate the momentum of the Republican opposition, the Anglophobes of his own party and

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expansionists of both sides, Cleveland had his new Secretary of State, Richard Olney, draw up a note offering American mediation — a position based on a broad construction of the Monroe Doctrine. This 'twenty-inch' gun as Cleveland called it, was fired off to Salisbury's new government on 20 July 1895. It stated that British pressure on Venezuela would be regarded by the United States as a violation of the Monroe Doctrine and that peaceful arbitration (with United States' intercession toward that end) was the only way of settling the controversy. The despatch was not only intemperate, it was inaccurate, and by maintaining that the three thousand miles of the Atlantic Ocean 'made any permanent political union between a European and an American state unnatural and inexpedient', it ignored British rights to Canada and her islands in the West Indies. Further, it was openly belligerent:

Today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition. Why?...It is because, in addition to all other grounds, its infinite resources combined with its isolated position render it master of the situation and practically invulnerable as against any or all other powers.¹

Lord Salisbury, who was Foreign Secretary as well as Prime Minister since his re-election as Leader of a Tory-Unionist Government in June 1895, rejected the American offer of arbitration, asserting that the Monroe Doctrine was not applicable to the boundary dispute, in a belated reply which was too late to be incorporated into Cleveland's State of the Union Message (2 December 1895). This fact, plus the note's supercilious tone, enraged Cleveland. In a special message delivered to Congress on 17 December 1895, the President placed the diplomatic correspondence before Congress together with a sharp message written by Olney and himself requesting $100,000 to establish an independent investigating commission to determine the boundary line.

Melbourne Punch, 2 January 1896.
When such report is made and accepted [ he said ], it will... be the duty of the United States to resist by every means in its power, as a wilful aggression upon its rights and interests, the appropriation by Great Britain of any lands or the exercise of governmental jurisdiction over any territory which after investigation we have determined of right belongs to Venezuela.\(^1\)

In effect Cleveland was recommending that after fixing a boundary line the United States should, if necessary, uphold it by going to war. With the grave observation that he was 'fully alive to the responsibility incurred, and keenly realize[d ] all the consequences that may follow', the President concluded:

I am nevertheless, firm in my conviction that...there is no calamity which a great nation can invite which equals that which follows from a supine submission to wrong and injustice, and the consequent loss of national self-respect and honour, beneath which are shielded and defended a people's safety and greatness.\(^2\)

Cheering and applauding, Congress unanimously voted the appropriation for the investigating commission and with Salisbury seemingly intransigent toward such a proposition, the scene was set for another Anglo-American war.\(^3\)

Australian press attitudes toward the disputed area had to be formed quickly, but were based on a deep-seated prejudice and bias. At first there was a search for authorities. One of the first in this respect was the well-known travel writer W. Somers Somerset (Land Of the Muskeg).

\(^1\)Foreign Relations, op.cit., pp.564-5.


\(^3\)How important was the crisis? Recent texts are reassessing it and giving it far more space than formerly. E.g. Arthur S. Link and Stanley S. Coben, The Democratic Heritage (Massachusetts 1971), p.334, call it '...what might have been one of the most serious international crises in American history'.
whose article in November's Nineteenth Century gained added
circulation when it reappeared in the December Review of
Reviews. His estimate of Venezuela was unflattering.
Socially it consisted of a moral and refined aristocracy
supported by a penniless but contented half-breed
population. Politically, it was a mass of violence, fraud
and corruption and utterly untrustworthy. Another
influential travel writer, the American Richard Harding
Davis, whose article, 'The Paris of South America' appeared
in the November edition of the widely-read Harper's Magazine
(and also reissued by Fitchett), reinforced this bad image.
Davis viewed Venezuelans as

...no more fit for a republican form of government
than...for an Arctic expedition...a lot of semi-
barbarians...a nuisance and an affront to other
nations...better for some strong hand over them
to keep them in order.

Such observations met a ready response in Australia.\(^1\)

Other papers quoted more obscure sources. The Bega
Gazette for example, claimed a General Baret de Nazis as its
correspondent.\(^2\) His estimate of prodigious auriferous
deposits in the disputed Yuruari valley and in the Colleо
mine in particular was verified by the several interviews
with Tasmania's Governor, Lord Gormanston - a former
Governor of British Guiana.\(^3\) The latter's opinion of
Guiana's difficult climate countered that of de Nazis' who
claimed it ideal. Gormanston's belief that the Guianan
gold deposits could rival Australia's (then the world's
foremost producer) and that the 2,400 newly settled English
miners had to be protected, was widely believed due to
his credibility as an opinion leader.

Later articles by H. Whates in the Fortnightly Review
(February 1896) and David P. Chalmers, former Chief

\(^1\) Review of Reviews, 20 Dec. 1895.

\(^2\) Bega Gazette, 29 Jan. 1896.

\(^3\) Australasian, 28 Dec. 1895 (see Appendix)
Justice of British Guiana, in the Scottish Geographical Magazine, both re-quoted in the May 1896 edition of the Review of Reviews, reaffirmed these initial impressions. In their immediate need for information, most frankly used the current edition of the Stateman's Year Book, presenting relative statistics of the two areas in terms of their own colonies. Editors were familiar with the views of the London Times' correspondent at Demarra, though not all accepted his assessment of the situation.

Guiana was consistently viewed as holding reasonable prior claims demarcated by the Schomburgk decision. As a colony similar to those in Australia, it was bound to be defended by Britain against any outside interference - even American. Without a vigorous rebuttal all of Britain's colonies became vulnerable to such demands as the United States was making. British Guiana's bright economic future needed to be safeguarded against Venezuela's repressive backwardness, it was held. Queensland's own tropical weekly, the Capricornian, was sure that 'Venezuela is a torpid country...compared with it, British Guiana is a bustling, energetic place, busily developing its resources as becomes a British colony'. Nothing better illustrates Anglo-Saxon prejudice against Latins as colonisers as it existed at this time.

Venezuela by contrast was 'restless and despicable' in the eyes of the Kyneton Observer - a typical reaction. Barcaldine's Western Champion claimed that Venezuela had already cribbed 181,000 square miles from its neighbours and was 'crowing like a cock on a dunghill, preening its feathers for a brush with the English rooster' only because

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1Review of Reviews, 20 May. 1896.


3Though the Coolgardie Miner, 1 Jan. 1896, warned of a serious sugar slump adversely affecting Guiana's economy. For the above newspapers see Appendix.


5Kyneton Observer, 31 Dec. 1895.
of traditional American backing which, the paper claimed, had similarly emboldened the Republic in 1810, 1824 and 1888.¹ To the Launceston Examiner as to others, it was a 'pestilential little Republic [where]...fighting appears to be as essential to existence as "blowing" is to the typical Yankee' - one that should be brusquely shown its place in the international power pecking-order as Nicaragua recently had been.²

Even early criticisms of British greed and bullying of Venezuela standard to catholic and labor sections of the Australian press were later replaced by concern for adequate Empire defence arrangements as well as by intense annoyance at the arrogant and remote republic which had caused such an alarming international disruption over what was increasingly disparaged as a 'strip of jungle'. Peppery and partisan pre-judgements seemed confirmed by events.

Those in Australia who applauded British actions, did so because they believed that Britain's aim was not to acquire new territory, but rather to confirm ownership of that already settled. British national honour seemed to demand from Venezuela reasonable and appropriate apology and redress for the outrages committed.³ Those radical papers which were unsympathetic like the Brisbane Worker⁴ and the Champion⁵ thought they detected the hand of the

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¹Western Champion, 25 Feb. 1896.


⁴Brisbane Worker, 11 Jan. 1896.

⁵Champion, 11 Jan. 1896.
'Company Monger' in Tory actions - an attitude carried over from similar criticisms of developments in the Transvaal. When rumours arrived of a British Chartered Company's activities in the disputed area with news of the Jameson Raid, the Hobart Mercury predicted that such high-handed action in the face of hostile American opinion and Venezuelan claims would undoubtedly bring matters to a climax.¹ The Bulletin viewed such action as typical of the new Salisbury government 'which began its existence by serving ultimatums on all its weaker enemies in all parts of the earth'. It believed that previous negotiations had failed because 'Britain always insisted as a basis from which to start, that Venezuela should recognize something like three fourths of its claims and arbitrate about one fourth only...¹ But the journal admitted that:

> It was impossible to say that either party [was] wholly right or wrong, for the trouble had no definite starting point and the trouble [was] over the delimitation of a frontier that never really existed.²

The comment pointed out one of the difficulties which all papers encountered - the dearth of reliable and recent maps of the area, and this lack tended to make any discussion of claims confused and confusing.³

Several attempts at determining America's reasons for sudden hostility were made in the Australian press. They included a desire to protect the projected Canal; the operation of commerical or fiscal reasons and the assertion of the Monroe Doctrine. Other motives believed to be prompting America were those involving the relief of growing jingoism at home, which gave vent to incipient Anglophobia and achieved personal political ends. Beside incidentally contributing to an ongoing historiographical debate, this intense questioning of American motives amounted to nothing less than a reassessment of America as a whole by

¹Mercury, 3 Jan. 1896.
³Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 21 Dec. 1895, published the first clear map, but it was in Spanish. A better map in English was not available until 20 February 1896 when the Review of Reviews published one on p.160.
Review of Reviews, 10 February 1896.
the Australian press.¹

Did American sensitivity over Venezuela have anything to do with the proposed Nicaraguan canal? Given the vast expense involved (an estimated $134 million) and Britain's former lack of interest, the Launceston Examiner typified those deriding Senator Morgan and New York reporters who believed that Britain was about to tamper with the joint agreement reached in the 1850 Clayton-Bulwer Treaty regarding ownership of the projected Nicaraguan Canal.²

The Catholic Freeman's Journal of Sydney was not so sure that British designs, following so close on the Corinto affair, were really innocent in intention. It wondered with suspicious Americans like Senators Lodge and Chandler, whether 'England was feeling her way to find out how much British interference on American soil the United States would suffer'.³ The new pretensions of the Monroe Doctrine, the Foreign Affairs Committee and Senator Davis however, caused Langdon Bonython in the Adelaide Advertiser to complain:

> It amounts to saying that no European Power has any interests or duties on the American side of the Atlantic, and that the United States' Government are not bound to keep their word when such good faith would involve an acknowledgement that such duties and interests exist.⁴

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¹Beside the standard works of Bemis, Pratt, Bailey, De Conde, H.C. Allen, A.E. Campbell, E.R. May, W. La Feber, W.A. Williams, D. Perkins, C.S. Tansill, A. Vagts, A. Nevins, A.L. Dennis, H. James and A.B. Hart on the dispute mentioned in the bibliography, the article literature of La Feber, G.B. Young, N.M. Blake, J.A. Sloan, T.C. Smith, P.R. Fossum and W.S. Robertson has been equally important in raising questions and attempting answers regarding the nature of American motives. See bibliography for references.

²Launceston Examiner, 27 Nov. 1895, 28 Jan. 1896.

³Freeman's Journal, 28 Dec. 1895. (See Appendix).

⁴Advertiser, 27 Jan., 8 Feb. 1896.
The paper believed America's new claims might lead to a controversy more troublesome and dangerous than the Egyptian question over Suez. ¹

Free trade journals like Victoria's Australasian, whilst welcoming Chamberlain's recent 'forward' commercial colonial policies which promised to assist trade within the Empire, viewed America's actions in South America as a defensive means to achieve the same end: trade advantage. America had been inhibited in its degree of South American commerce due to its protectionism, its silverite policies, its lack of merchant marine and the abrogation of the 1889 reciprocal trade arrangements with certain South American republics.² New South Wales' leading free trade journal, the Sydney Morning Herald believed America acted from motives of commercial jealousy '...and not upon any aggressive act of which the British Government had been guilty'. It held that as with the Germans, Americans seemed wedded to a semi-military trading philosophy conducted by force for selfish advantage. Such a business attitude - that states could be prosperous of themselves - had to be abandoned by Australian colonies as well as America the paper warned, for as Venezuela's case illustrated, any disturbance would harm all traders equally.³ This American motive was also arraigned by protectionists for a lack of logic and consistency.⁴

Many papers, baffled by Cleveland's actions, devised a complex rationale involving America's long-entangled fiscal structure. Both the free trade and protectionist press agreed that Cleveland's second administration had,


²Australasian, 8 Feb. 1896.

³Sydney Morning Herald, 8 Jan. 1896.

since 1892, resulted in a worsening of United States' finances with depression, strikes, riots, a general currency shortage and demands for more silver coinage being widely felt. 1

Therefore Cleveland's action had been prompted by a desire to 'awaken the national mind once and for all to the dangers of a depleted gold reserve', by showing how dependent on Britain America's finances really were, claimed the Adelaide Advertiser and others. 2 When American railway, cotton and wheat stocks all dependent on British investment, fell by £200 million in the week after 17 December and gold reserves slumped to £8 million below the pegged limit, many papers claimed that such losses represented an actual war situation and were going altogether too far in making their point. 3 At the very least, the loss of confidence in America imperilled the fragile returning prosperity of Australia and through the proposed increase in American tariffs to offset debts incurred, affected Australian wool - deplorable developments in Australian eyes. 4

Protectionist newspapers such as the Age blamed the financial situation on Cleveland's addled economic policies and condemned the artificial international crisis as a gambit to divert attention away from self-created domestic problems. 5 Some were unkind enough to suggest that the

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1 See editorial comment in, Courier, 9 Dec. 1895; Capricornian, 14 Dec. 1895; Barrier Miner, 10 Dec. 1895; Launceston Examiner, 18 Dec. 1895; Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 6 Dec. 1895; Argus, 23-26 Dec. 1895; Advertiser, 28 Dec. 1895; Sydney Morning Herald, 30 Dec. 1895; Herald, 23 Dec. 1895.


3 Coolgardie Miner, 15 Jan. 1896; West Australia Record, 21 Dec. 1895, The Week, 3 Jan. 1896, noted that Australian gold production led the world in 1894 at £8,352,000 worth and that in the same year Australian silver production contracted by 2½ million ounces.


5 Age, 24 Dec. 1895.
disturbance had been deliberately engineered so that a few opportunist capitalists could create a 'corner in war' on the American stockmarket.\footnote{\textit{E.g. Geelong Evening News,} 30 Dec. 1895; \textit{Herald,} 8 Jan. 1896; \textit{Ararat Advertiser,} 31 Dec. 1895. For all further notes on newspapers consult Appendix.}

Most papers however, preferred to believe that America's massive economic losses had dampened their enthusiasm for war. A general satisfaction was expressed in the fact that the New York Chamber of Commerce had quickly withdrawn its support for Cleveland's belligerent stand. A cablegram was sent by the Melbourne Stock Exchange on Christmas eve to the London and New York Exchanges hopefully wishing them both peace and goodwill. This middling Australian stance was significant largely for the impartiality displayed at a time when loyalties were being tested.

The scare had been sobering to Anglo-Saxons everywhere and many were claiming that without the financial panic there would have been war. The very magnitude of the losses reassured many Australian editors that 'war between Great Britain and the United States is impossible'. Others gained renewed confidence in the strength of America's finances illustrated by the swift subscription of the £20 million emergency loan by the Rothschild-Morgan syndicate. With this restored stability, Australian government securities on the London market made unprecedented recovery coinciding fortuitously with the breaking of Australia's drought in the middle of February.\footnote{\textit{Courier,} 21 Dec. 1895, 8 Feb. 1896; \textit{Australian Star,} 23 Dec. 1895; \textit{Tamworth Observer,} 28 Dec. 1895, 1 Jan. 1896; \textit{Argus,} 29 Jan. 1895, 4 Feb. 1896; \textit{North Queensland Herald,} 1 Jan. 1896; \textit{Australasian,} 11 Jan. 1896; \textit{Daily Telegraph (Sydney),} 11 Jan. 1896; \textit{Herald,} 13 Feb. 1896; \textit{Cobargo Watch,} 15 Feb. 1896.}

But the Australian silver boom so widely predicted in New South Wales country papers as remote as the Grenfell Record and the new Merriwa and Cassilis Standard did not materialise.\footnote{\textit{Grenfell Record,} 28 Dec. 1895, 26 Sept., 3 Oct. 1896; \textit{Merriwa and Cassilis Standard,} 4 Jan. 1896. This paper began life during the crisis, on 21 Dec. 1895.} Indeed, far from encouraging bimetallism, Cleveland's fiscal efforts had been directed
toward establishing a sound gold standard. As the election of 1896 was to show, none of these actions discouraged Cleveland's fiscal critics, if that had ever been his intention.

It occurred at an early stage to the more contemplative weekly journals such as the Sydney Mail$^1$ and the Australasian$^2$ that Cleveland's motive for speaking in such 'dictatorial tones' in his first Message to Congress (2 December 1895) may have been for domestic political gain, pure and simple. Once articulated, this suspicion was amplified by the Australian press into what they considered to be the single most obvious motive for American intransigence. As the former paper suspected, Cleveland might covet a third term and was 'hunting around for catching phrases and sensational headlines' to promote it. It quoted a November Century article in which the Republican foreign policy spokesman, Theodore Roosevelt, indicted the feebleness of Cleveland's foreign policy - such as it was - in Hawaii, Nicaragua and Venezuela.$^3$ The Sydney Mail concluded that:

Mr. Cleveland is to be accused next year of failing to maintain 'national self respect'. It can be seen therefore, why [he] watches straws to see how the wind blows [and thus] should have jumped at the opportunity to wave the American flag at this moment.$^4$

As 'low partian tricks' and 'campaign ingenuity' had once before been identified with a Cleveland campaign in 1888, with the shady circumstances that preceded the dismissal of the British Minister to Washington, Lord Sackville West,$^5$ ostensibly to appease the Irish vote, the

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$^1$Sydney Mail, 14 Dec. 1895.

$^2$Australasian, 14 Dec. 1895.


$^4$Sydney Mail, ibid.

$^5$The Sackville-West Incident, said to have cost Cleveland the election of 1888 through its alienation of the anglophobe Irish vote, occurred when a 'planted' letter revealed that the British diplomat was pro-Democrat. Too late, and embarrassed Cleveland asked him to leave the country - a discoursity that long rankled the Australian press.
Sydney Morning Herald was at first inclined toward an indulgent outlook. It surmised that when the two countries better understood each other

...an outbreak of bitter denunciation of perfidious and grasping Albion will be looked for in the political sky of the United States at regular quadrennial periods, and we shall think that something has gone wrong with the stellar system if the expected manifestation fails to make its appearance.1

This bantering tone changed to something more serious after 17 December. Especially was this so in the protectionist press which accused Cleveland of appealing directly to the Irish 'Clan-na-gael' and other 'hoodlum' elements for election purposes.2 To the Age it was an attempt to anticipate the Republicans with a Blaine-like attempt at a strong foreign policy.3 Protectionists gave wide publicity4 to the views of the well-known English silverite - protectionist, Moreton Frewen whose views appeared in both the National Review and the Review of Reviews.5 Frewen, who had lectured in Australia in the early months of 18956, made the point that Cleveland, by a 'weak' and 'criminal' act, was attempting to heal the divisions in his own party, 'enfeebled, demoralised and split' as they were by the corrupt and forceful methods employed on its membership, to implement his 'sound money' and 'tariff reform' policies. But not even all protectionists accepted Frewen's views -

1 Sydney Morning Herald, 6 Dec. 1895.
2 Geelong Advertiser, 20 Dec. 1895.
3 Age, 20 Dec. 1895.
4 Leader, 28 Dec. 1895; Advertiser, 11 Feb. 1896.
6 For Frewen's lectures in Australia on the silver issue see Age, 1, 4, 7 Feb., 8 Apr. 1895; Argus, 4 Apr. 1895.
many of them considering his occasional brilliance to be tempered by otherwise eccentric judgements.¹

Even Cleveland's former free trade advocates on the Australian scene were critical. The Telegraph condemned his political machinations against the Republicans as 'callous cynicism...the ugliest feature of the sudden storm'. Worse, 'it is anything but safe to believe that the Republicans will stand quietly by and see the foundations cut from under their political prestige'. It seemed more likely '...they will go one better and try to hasten war while public fever remains at the heat to which it has been fanned'. Thus war would come, brought about 'by mere political exigencies, the temporary necessity to buttress a falling party with something attractively heroic'.²

The Argus claimed that only 'national madness' could have resulted in a combined vote of the two houses of Congress, 'unanimous for the first time in modern history' in authorizing Cleveland's Commission.³ Taking its usual centrist position, Melbourne's Herald bemoaned that now both protectionists in America with their excessive McKinley tariff (1890) and free traders 'whose statesmanship has been lauded by the British press' were shown to be capable of proving themselves equally bad friends.⁴ The Australasian blamed both American political parties for this:

¹This judgement of a famous relative of the Churchills is borne out by the author's knowledge of his talented, if obscure eldest son, Hugh Moreton Frewen, whilst he was living in Dorrigo, N.S.W., 1961-63. See Shane Leslie (Frewen's cousin): Studies In Sublime Failure (London, 1932), p.272. A more recent study is Anita Leslie, Mr. Frewen of England, London, 1966. Chapter 18. According to the author, Frewen wrote from Melbourne that Australians were 'very nice, more old-world than the Americans and yet with some dash'. Through his friend Lord Kintore, the Governor of South Australia, he founded Suplhides Corporation and purchased for a consortium of which he was a member, the Central Broken Hill Mine. He owned shares in the original Ashcroft patent for separating lead from zinc. Typically, he allowed the huge fortune earned from these ventures to slip away from him. A. Leslie, op.cit., pp.145-146.

²Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 19 Dec. 1895.

³Argus, 23, 27 Dec. 1895.

⁴Herald, 23 Dec. 1895.
The fault of the system is that false issues are invariably raised before every Presidential election. Democrats and Republicans are not separated from each other by any definite barrier; each party makes up its own policy as it goes along and it asks rather what will sweep the polls rather than what will tend to the national advantage. Thus the election is fought out in an atmosphere of falsehood and make-believe.\(^1\)

Taking a line from Dickens' *American Notes*, the *Windsor and Richmond Gazette* philosophized on the situation: 'Directly the acrimony of one election is over, the acrimony of the next one begins, which is unspeakable comfort for all politicians.'\(^2\)

Operating in a society containing considerable vocal Anglophobes of its own - especially catholics and radicals - the Australian press was well aware of a similar feeling existing in America, despite bland assurances of the quiescent nature of this feeling from the British press. The virulent Anglophobic ebullition from that country in late 1895 was variously explained in Australia. Some saw in it a desire to create jobs and places in a refurbished American military structure; others to capture business diverted from Britain. But more pervasive than economic reasons were those referring to kinship jealousy. The *Sydney Morning Herald* however, suspected a motive more sinister: alien races in America with their narrow prejudices and different backgrounds were unable to share in the traditional 'intellectual' union that brought the two Anglo-Saxon peoples together. Long-standing covetousness of Canada was again advanced as a reason.\(^3\)

The *Bulletin* attempted an out-of-date sectional explanation: New England (Eastern) States still begrudged

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\(^2\) *Windsor & Richmond Gazette*, 28 Dec. 1895.

the moral support that Britain had given Southerners during the Civil War. Further, it believed a general anti-monarchism animated the country—a view not unusual for a 'Republican' organ such as Archibald's was.¹ The Bulletin's assurance of friendly British sentiment existing in the Western section of the United States was simultaneously countered elsewhere; in one place, by the scathing tone of 'Argonaut's' correspondence—sent from San Francisco to the Geelong Advertiser. His rabid Anglophobia, which he claimed to be typical, was based on a deep aversion to British bullying and avarice concerning the developing gold areas of the world.²

Yet in British colonies where patriotism was a genuine emotion, most continued to find such American hatred of Britain difficult to explain. John Gunning, editor of Launcestons flourishing Daily Telegraph thought that '...to deny that such feeling does exist is wilfully closing our eyes to palpable facts'.³ The London correspondent of the Argus admitted himself mystified at its occurrence,⁴ though he was probably aware that the Spectator—to name only one journal—had openly admitted that England was 'the most unpopular nation in the civilized world'.⁵

The Adelaide Observer mitigated this harsh judgement. Britain's popularity it believed, 'varies with current moods and changing circumstances'. Behind Britain's 'bluff and haughty demeanour' she was sensitive to criticism. In fact, British pluck, integrity and generosity were widely admired,

¹Bulletin, 28 Dec. 1895.


³Daily Telegraph (Launceston), 24 Dec. 1895.

⁴Argus, 27 Dec. 1895.

⁵Yet the Spectator may not have enjoyed much prestige as an opinion leader within Britain. The Speaker for 4 March 1893 criticized it in a series on 'The Modern Press' as 'disappointing...slipping'.
it claimed.\textsuperscript{1} Fellow Anglophiles agreed with this defence. The Melbourne \textit{Punch} considered Britain's rule incomparably benignant - it was human nature to envy such a record.\textsuperscript{2} Even protectionists considered it unfair that countries should hate a commercial society so selfless and open in its trading policy.\textsuperscript{3} Loyalists considered that the love returned by Britain's colonies would compensate for this Anglophobia, so obviously not confined to American alone.

The danger appeared to reside in the American politicians'\textsuperscript{4} regular kindling of this fire for their passing purposes so that 'when great and high-spirited peoples are brought into strained relations some unforeseen circumstance, perhaps trivial in itself, may precipitate anger into war', wrote Buzacott's \textit{Courier}. But all observers found something disquieting in the definiteness of Senator Lodge's six points published in his influential \textit{Concord Monitor}. They asserted that not only was a defensive Anglo-American war imminent, but it would be precipitated by British encroachments and would be fought by America with Russia as ally and Canada as prize. William Fisher, editor of Devonport's \textit{North West Post}, ignored this as 'mere electioneering bounce' - a further presumption on overtaxed British tolerance toward America.\textsuperscript{5} American papers such as the \textit{Pittsburgh Chronicle} were similarly criticized for their unprovoked biting tone. Free traders in Australia singled out for special criticism the openly belligerent comments of silverites such as Senator Stewart and protectionists such as Henry C. Carey. The \textit{Courier} was distressed by the Anglophobia of more intellectual critics such as G.F. Fearing and G.D. Buchanan and in particular, the supposed distortion and exaggeration of historic events involving Britain in American school texts.\textsuperscript{6}

\textsuperscript{1}Observer, 4 Jan., 12 Mar. 1896.
\textsuperscript{2}Melbourne \textit{Punch}, 9 Jan. 1896.
\textsuperscript{3}Advertiser, 20, 25 Jan. 1896.
\textsuperscript{5}North West Post, 4 Jan. 1896.
One extraordinary, if more frivolous reason for the Anglophobic resurgence was presented by the sports-loving Australian press. It concerned the ill-will that had been generated during the 1895 America Cup Yacht race during which Lord Dunraven in Valkyrie III had withdrawn following interference from spectator craft. Far from bringing the two peoples together, the event had all too obviously been divisive. Most Australian papers had taken sides on the issue and many accused America of foul play and ruthless tactics in response to American charges of Dunraven's 'madness'.

The Argus made most of the incident and noted that during the Guiana-Venezuelan crisis the London Exchange had cabled New York: 'Keep a clearer course for our admirals than you did for our yachtsmen', to which New York had replied: 'We hope your warships are better than your yachts'. The Sydney Morning Herald though it '...just possible that some of the ascerbity over the Venezuelan question was in a measure due to this dispute'. If so, the Argus held that 'history records no more dramatic example of a high sounding and tragical dispute [the Venezuelan] kindled by such childishly inadequate causes'.

There can be no doubt that the press of Australia experienced difficulty in explaining and accepting incipient American Anglophobia and was as prepared to seize on the trivial and immediate as to explore the significant and long-term in its effort to come to grips with the phenomenon. Obviously allied to Anglophobia in Australian eyes was the recrudescence of the jingo spirit in America. Many

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1 Sydney Morning Herald, 21 Sept. 1895.


3 Sydney Morning Herald, 11 Feb. 1896.

4 Argus, 28 Dec. 1895.
papers in Australia and the Goulburn Herald was one of them took pride in their anti-jingoism and their reliance on the quiet and unassuming strength of the Mother Country, recently reaffirmed by the new Salisbury-Chamberlain government. Arch-American jingoес such as Senators Chandler, Sherman and Lodge were caricatured as Dickensian 'Jefferson Bricks' considered 'insignificant representatives of American feeling' by the Melbourne Leader and others.

In this serene mood, the Australian press faced the cabled news of jingoism following Cleveland's 17 December message. Sydney's Evening News called it 'ludicrous and pitiable', against the 'good sense of the great body of the American people' - bound to be put down by the better sections of the press (such as the New York Herald and New York Times) and the 'firm and dignified attitude' of the Marquis of Salisbury. An outraged international opinion would similarly restrain irresponsible American jingooes from embarking on 'one of the most unwarrantable and disastrous wars that could happen'.

Who were America's jingoес? To the Melbourne Methodist they were both the unemployed, ready for any adventure and the Irish, at least the Anglophobic element of it. To the Newcastle Morning Herald they were opportunists of all kinds hoping for good fishing in troubled waters. To the Queensland Times they were profiteers and other followers of 'the great God Mammon' seeking gains from Britain's losses.

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1Goulburn Herald, 27 Nov. 1895.
2Sydney Morning Herald, 6 Dec. 1895.
3Leader, 28 Dec. 1895.
5Howard K. Beale ably discusses the jingoes in America in Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power (New York, 2nd printing, 1905), pp. 31-63 passim.
6Methodist (Melbourne), 27 Dec. 1895, 4 Jan. 1896.
7Newcastle Morning Herald, 30 Dec. 1895.
8Queensland Times, 2 Jan. 1896.
In all, the Sydney Evening News believed that America's jingo leaders needed to take a leaf from the 'circumspect and little provocative [sic] ... public men here'. George Reid, the New South Wales' Premier, spoke at the New Year's Eve Commercial Travellers' Banquet with such effect. He deprecated the thousands of Americans who were ready to plunge two nations into the most disastrous and wanton war of the present century all over a few leagues of fever-breeding jungle to which no sane man in the forty-four States would consign his pet dog.\(^1\)

Though the same occasion had been used by another speaker, Lord Hampden, to press the necessity for federation, the weekly Sydney Mail showed it derided the jingo rationale for unity when it attacked General Hutton on similar grounds. Admitting that even though the most modern of great nations, the United States, had twice passed through a baptism of fire - once with a foreign, once with a civil foe - gaining in national cohesion each time, the paper held that such experience was not necessary for an Australia which had a common continent, common interests and common institutions to give it unity. For, 'the elements of national greatness are with us already and we do not need to build upon the uncertain foundations of military glory'.\(^2\)

But the jingo spirit in Australia, so quiet at the beginning of December, was to leap suddenly to life in January, following news of the Jameson raid and the Kaiser's telegram to Kruger. Nonetheless, the reanimated domestic Australian variety came in for the same degree of criticism as had the more general international type. John Farrell branded the British Empire jingo-type as a 'public nuisance'.\(^3\) Others scoffed at the excesses and gaucheries surrounding military manoeuvres in Western Australia, Tasmania and New South Wales.\(^4\) This press reaction was at first in definite contrast to its English, Russian, French and American

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counterparts - roundly criticized for their sales-seeking sensationalism in their promotion of a warlike ethos.¹

A significant change of tone in reactions became evident following Chamberlain's rousing speech at the London farewell dinner for Lord Lamington, the new governor of Queensland, at which the 'National Anthem' and 'Rule Britannia' were twice sung spontaneously. J.L. Brient in the Daily Telegraph of 23 January now noted that

...it is in England indeed, that jingoism is at its hottest...and while national enthusiasm [in the United States] has been receding from President Cleveland ever since he spoke, in England, the fervour of it has grown daily and gathered strength.²

Enthusiasts such as the Melbourne Punch were quick to respond.

Were the Empire in danger tomorrow, [it wrote] not a colony of the many that owe their birth to England but would freely and gladly strip itself, if need be, of men and money to beat back the country's enemies.³

The Bulletin was swift to ask the Punch man whether he was going to sacrifice himself and his money for the glorious empire or [was] he only willing to float a loan and sacrifice someone else? This (being) the great jingo problem in a nutshell.⁴

The Bacchus Marsh Express thought 'a warning against excessive jingoism appears to be internationally needed just now, but the journalists who should give it are in need of discipline themselves'.⁵ Especially was this the case with the journalists of the Argus and the Age thought the anti-establishment Catholic Melbourne Advocate; for the partisanship of these papers blinded them to the fact that


⁵Bacchus Marsh Express, 25 Jan. 1896. Author's emphasis.
an action could be 'wicked and jingoistic' or 'praiseworthy and patriotic' depending on the point of view.  

Present dangers had now made it 'the fashion to be a jingo' asserted the Bowral Free Press. Thus the comment of the Socialist Trenwith in Victoria's colonial Legislative Assembly that 'the less belligerent we are in policy and action the less likely we are to be attacked', was itself assaulted by the normally peace-loving Ballarat Star and others as not squaring with Britain's previous experience.  

With many Australian newspapers' awareness that they had shared in a general jingo phenomenon, comment at the end of January focused on the overseas aspects of the outburst. Edison's imaginative and diabolical gadgetry to be employed against England was everywhere vetoed as a set of 'sensational tales' made up especially for the crisis.  

The Bendigo Independent observed:

One of the most remarkable developments of the close of the nineteenth century is the growth of the military or jingoistic spirit throughout the United States...an arrogance which bodes ill for the continued peace of the continent.  

So all-pervasive was the development that thousands of church military organizations using real weapons existed throughout the nation, it believed. American millionaires fanned this atmosphere of violent confrontation by retaining bodies of armed men themselves - to forestall a possible revolt against their money-power. Thus:

the Republic is believed by some to be growing drunk and giddy with the contemplation of its own paper and resources[ which ]...may expend

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1 Advocate, 25 Jan. 1896.


3 Ballarat Star, 24 Jan. 1896. See also Newcastle Morning Herald, 24 Jan. 1896; V.P.D.L.A., 1895-96, Vol.LXXX. The argument was often used by Socialists, pacifists and republicans in the various colonial parliaments.

4 Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 8 Feb. 1896; Advertiser, 30 Jan. 1896.

5 Bendigo Independent, 14 Mar. 1896.
itself in a conflict with some European power on some such trivial pretext as the boundary lines of Venezuela.¹

To the Argus it was obvious where the jingo spirit was being re-directed: toward Cuba and Spain—satisfactory alternatives to Britain

...in as much as the worst result of the present trouble could only be a little war, whereas the other would be the most terrible calamity that could befall civilization and the English-speaking races.²

In this way, jingoism as it revealed itself in America was judged by the Australian press to be no transitory phenomenon, but one likely to produce dire results sometime in the near future.³

At the base of the dispute lay conflicting concepts of the Monroe Doctrine.⁴ With an early perception, the Sydney Morning Herald thought that 'practical politics, patriotic speeches, party interests and the voices of the newspapers during the last seventy years have all combined to place an interpretation of their own upon the Doctrine'.⁵ The Sydney Morning Herald led the conservatives in considering that the current controversy involved an 'arbitrary stretching' of the traditional doctrine. It declared itself against those countering views of the American

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¹Bendigo Independent, ibid. The Edwards' paper often quoted Harvey's Coins' Financial School (1894) and Donnelly's Caesar's Column (1892) where it had obviously derived some of these ideas. See J. Pratt, Expansionists of 1898 (Baltimore, 1936), p. 32.

²Argus, 3 Mar. 1896. See also Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 10 Mar. 1896.


⁴The Monroe Doctrine (1823) was defined by the Argus, 23 Oct. 1895, as declaring 'that no European Power would be permitted to interfere in the affairs of any independent state in North or South America'. Of course, it implied much more than that. See Armin Rappaport (ed.), The Monroe Doctrine (New York, 1964) and especially Dexter Perkins, A History of the Monroe Doctrine (2nd ed., London, 1960).

⁵Sydney Morning Herald, 28 Oct. 1895.
editor Albert Shaw of the *Review of Reviews* and the English editor of the same magazine, W.T. Stead (in the *Contemporary*) who had both interpreted British actions as violating the Doctrine.¹

Following Cleveland's first message to Congress, Lt.-Col. Reay, editor of the Melbourne *Herald*, believed that Australians subscribed to the views of the anti-imperialist editors of the New York *Evening Post* - Edwin L. Godkin and Carl Schurz - that the Venezuelan question was not a matter concerning the United States and that the Monroe Doctrine '...would have nothing to do with it, even if the Doctrine was an accepted part of international law as it is not'. This, thought the *Herald*, was a commonsense attitude...[for] Brother Jonathan's solicitude for the Monroe Doctrine we respect [but] the point to be kept in mind is that the British Government is not asking Venezuela for anything inconsistent with the most devout regard for the Monroe Doctrine.²

Cleveland's 'loud-mouthed' proclamation of that Doctrine could only be explained by the fact that he 'deliberately seeks a quarrel'. Writing on the same day, Davies' Hobart *Mercury* thought the new use of the Doctrine 'would considerably astonish its reputed author' and had to be rejected because it had no warrant in the precedents established by diplomacy; cannot be sustained by any process of reason and yielding...would be an admission that the United States has the right to interfere in all questions that arise on the continent of America.³

This would leave unsettled the exact application of the Doctrine to territorial disputes between European powers.

¹ *Sydney Morning Herald*, Ibid. See also, *Daily Telegraph* (Sydney) 4 Oct. 1895.

² *Herald*, 5, 7 Dec. 1895.

³ *Mercury*, 6, 7 Dec. 1895.