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Pursuing Livelihoods, Imagining Development
Smallholders in Highland Lampung, Indonesia

Ahmad Kusworono

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Except where otherwise indicated,
this thesis is the result of original work
carried out by the author

Ahmad Kuswoyo
Department of Anthropology
Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies
The Australian National University
For Nana, Alia, and Nabila
ABSTRACT

This study explores how people experience ‘development’ and the ways they shape and maintain their modes of life. The discussion begins with Lampung province, moves to one of the province’s highland regions, and to a village in this highland region. Colonial and post-colonial initiatives drove the transformation of Lampung in the 20th century, bringing mixed results and effects: rapid growth in agricultural production, the formation of ‘wealthy zones’ in some areas, and the creation of pockets of poor in other areas. In Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong highlands, migrants have transformed one of Lampung’s last frontier regions into one of its ‘wealthy zones’. Although the bulk of these migrants migrated spontaneously, they were integrated within the framework of planned development. The level of progress that the region has achieved is largely the result of villagers’ efforts to bring the state resources to the village. For decades in conflict with forestry authorities, recently farmers in some villages have agreed to establish a new relationship with forestry authorities, but the struggle for control over land resources continues. In Gunung Terang village, village social organization mediates official relations between people and the state as well as in community affairs. Household smallholder farming dominates the village economy. The persistence of this smallholder tradition is closely related to the social flexibility of smallholder agriculture.
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ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia)  
Indonesian Armed Forces

alang-alang  
Imperata grassland

AMPI (Angkatan Muda Pembaharuan Indonesia)  
Youth for the Renewal of Indonesia

arisan  
rotational credit and saving group

babinsa (bintara pembina desa)  
military personnel posted in village

borongan  
piecemeal works, contract wages

BRN (Biro Rekonstruksi Nasional)  
National Reconstruction Bureau

bujang  
annual, contract labour; single man

bupati  
district head

camat  
subdistrict head

desa, pekon  
administrative village

DI/TII (Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia)  
the House of Islam/Indonesian Islamic Army

DPRD (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah)  
Regional House of Representatives

dukungan masyarakat  
community, popular support

dusun, pemangku  
hamlet

gerombolan  
a band or group of men

Golkar (Golongan Karya)  
Functional Party

gotong royong  
mutual help, mutual aid, communal work

HKm (Hutan Kemasyarakatan)  
a version of community/social forestry

ICRAF  
International Centre for Research in Agroforestry, World Agroforestry Centre

IDT (Instruksi Presiden Desa Tertinggal)  
President Instruction on Neglected, Left-Behind Village

kabupaten  
district

kebun  
smallholder garden

kecamatan  
subdistrict

Koramil (Komando Rayon Militer)  
subdistrict military post

KNPI (Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia)  
National Youth Committee of Indonesia

krismon (krisis moneter)  
monetary crisis

lurah, kepala desa, peratin  
village head

ladang  
upland field
LHP (Lembaga Himpun Pekon)  village legislative council
LPMP (Lembaga Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Pekon)  village council for community empowerment
marga  clan, shire
maro, garap  sharecropping
musiman  credit with a high interest; usury
numpang  using somebody else’s property for free; temporary village resident
ojek  motorbike taxi
PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional)  National Mandate Party
pasar  market
perambah hutan  forest squatters
PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa)  Nation Awakening Party
PJS (Pejabat Sementara)  caretaker, acting officer
PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia)  Indonesian Communist Party
PKK (Program Pendidikan Kesejahteraan Keluarga)  Family Welfare Education Program
Posyandu (Pos Pelayanan Terpadu)  Integrated Health Service Post
PDIP (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan)  Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle
PPP (Partai Persatuan dan Pembangunan)  Unity and Development Party
reformasi  reformation
RT (Rukun Tetangga)  neighbourhood
sawah  irrigated rice field
sedekah  ritual feast (Semendo)
tegalan  dry field
TGHK (Tata Guna Hutan Kesepakatan)  Agreed Forest Land Use Plan
toko  shop, store
 tunggu tubang  female primogeniture inheritance (Semendo)
upahan, harian  daily wage
puyang  great-grandparent, ancestor (Semendo)
warung  stall, kiosk, shop
WATALA (Keluarga Pencinta Alam dan Lingkungan Hidup)  Friends of the Nature and Environment
CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

This study considers how people experience ‘development’ and the ways they shape and maintain their modes of life. It explores the forces that drive changes, their consequences, and the ways people cope with them. The focus area of this study is Lampung, the southernmost province of Sumatra, Indonesia. The approach explores local understandings within a local and regional perspective.

My discussion begins at the provincial level, moves to one of the province’s highland regions, and finally, to a village in this highland area. This changing scale provides an opportunity to look at a range of developments at various levels and people’s experiences and strategies in dealing with them. This approach is taken as an attempt to overcome what Eric Wolf (1982: 13) has called ‘the false confidence’ of micro-level ethnography. Similarly, the approach is employed to avoid treating ‘societies... [or] villages... as if they were the islands into themselves, with little sense of the larger systems of relations in which these units are embedded’ (Ortner 1984:142).

Imagining Development and Change

A commonly accepted view of the effects of post-colonial ‘development’ throughout the so-called Third World is that development has either failed to deliver its stated objectives and/or faced resistance from its intended

Escobar (1995) has identified development as a regime of knowledge embedded in world asymmetrical power relations. Development was a set of ideas and practices about ways to bring or deliver progress. These ideas and practices are produced and reproduced by and serving the interests of the first world (the north) applied efficiently in the third world (the south). The consequences have been continued domination by the first world of the third world, accompanied by processes of underdevelopment and resistance to development in the south. Continued poverty and environmental degradation have been the legacy of this structure of relations.

In a similar vein, Ferguson (1994), based on his ethnographic study in Lesotho, identified what he considered to be 'real' effect of development. Apart from failing to improve people’s livelihoods, mainly because it offered technical solutions to non-technical problems, the real effect of development was the expansion of state power whose role in improving the welfare of the people was taken over by development projects. Another real effect of development projects—that are planned, funded, and implemented by numerous international development agencies—has been the emergence of a global development industry.

Viewing development as the key element in global post-colonial relations, Hobart (1993) attributed the failure of development to the growth of ignorance. The production and reproduction of development packages were guided by the principles of western scientific knowledge. For Hobart, this western scientific logic and rationality was incompatible with and in
opposition to local/indigenous knowledge. It is little wonder, he argues, that the development packages ended in failure. Development practitioners were ignorant of local knowledge and continued to apply inappropriate models based on western scientific knowledge. The growth of such ignorance has also kept development and global development business, running. Hence processes of underdevelopment have continued to be reproduced.

In critiquing these views, Grillo has attributed the various perspectives promoted by Ferguson (1994), Escobar (1995), and Hobart (1993) as development myths that ‘see development as monolithic enterprise, heavily controlled from the top, convinced of the superiority of its own wisdom and impervious to local knowledge’ (1997: 20). Grillo (1997) further outlines the problems with this development myth. According to this perspective there are only developers and victims or resistors involved in development. The analysis ignores other responses, agendas, and actors. Moreover, the myth oversimplifies the situation and places the dominant power as an easy target. The myth fails to capture the multiple, diverse voices and realities embedded in the processes of directed/planned change and transformation. Rather than complete, static, and impermeable structures, both western scientific and local/indigenous knowledge continue to change and to be exchanged. Actors in development, as circumstances change, modify and adjust their perspectives, voices, and positions.

There are, at least, two directions that can be taken to study development. The first is by observing and interpreting the ways people are affected by and/or react to development practices. The second is by studying development in the context of the expansion of power. James Scott’s work in this field is of particular importance in this regard because he approaches development from both directions. His argument is grounded in the
powerful analytic tools articulated in the concepts of ‘weapons of the weak’ (1985) and ‘simplification and legibility’ (1998).

Scott (1985) used his ethnographic materials to demonstrate the ways in which peasants in a village in Malaysia experienced and reacted to the green revolution. The green revolution initiatives on rice cultivation (improved varieties, double cropping, engine-powered harvesters), he argued, made the rich richer while the poor remained poor. The poor used ‘everyday forms of resistance’ (from a war of words, boycott, disguised strikes, petty theft, to imposed mutuality among themselves) as ‘weapons’ in their class struggle against the rich and, indirectly, against the state. The poor peasants’ important accomplishment, Scott claimed, was to delay the complete transformation to capitalist relations of production, which was the aim of the implementation of agricultural development policy of green revolution by the Malaysian state.

In his later work, Scott (1998) provided explanations as to why development schemes to improve human conditions have failed. Examples of development initiatives around the globe—from scientific forestry, agricultural development, and city planning, to Soviet and African socialism—were painstakingly analysed. The failure of these schemes was attributed to expanding state power to control resources and people by simplifying complex, illegible, local social practices to make them legible from above and from the centre, hence, enabling those in power to record, monitor, and manipulate their subjects. In the process, local knowledge and know-how were ignored within the simplified administrative grid of formal state observations.
In criticising this analysis Ortner (1995) has focused on the problem of locating resistance in its every day forms. She raises the question of what is or is not resistance. ‘When a poor man steals from a rich man, is this resistance or simply a survival strategy?’ (Ortner 1995: 175). Ortner (1995: 175) argues that resistance ... highlights the presence and play of power in most forms of relationship and activity... [But] we are not required to decide once and for all whether any given act fits into a fixed box called resistance... [T]he intentionalities of actors evolve through praxis, and the meanings of acts change, both for the actors and for the analysts.”

For Ortner (1995: 175), the elements that need to be emphasized include; ...the ambiguity of resistance and the subjective ambivalence of the acts for those who engage in them... [because] in a relationship of power, the dominant often has something to offer, and sometimes a great deal (though always of course at the price of continuing power). The subordinate thus has many grounds for ambivalence about resisting the relationship. Moreover, there is never a single, unitary, subordinate...in the simple sense that subaltern groups are internally divided... [into various] forms of difference and that occupants of differing subject positions will have different, even, opposed, but still legitimate, perspectives on the situations.

Moreover, with the complexity of resistance and non-resistance (cooperation, reciprocity, harmony) there is the tendency to overlook the latter. In this regard Pelzer White went on to say that ‘we must add an inventory of “everyday forms of peasant collaboration” to balance our list of “everyday forms of peasant resistance”: both exist, both are important’ (1986: 56 quoted in Ortner 1995: 176, emphasis in original). In a similar vein, Brown (1996: 734) exaggeratedly pointed out:

[H]uman institutions... [such as] family, organizations, and systems of production doubtless impose forms of subjugation, [but] they are also institutions that enable. Without them society would cease to exist, and with it, the capacity of human beings to survive.
Like the concept of 'legibility', Scott's 'everyday forms of resistance' placed the 'state' and the 'people' in an oppositional framework in the context of 'development'. In situations where development brings mixed results, effects, and responses—rather than only failure and resistance, alternative conceptual tools are needed. The present study illustrates the experience in which development brings mixed results and effects. In dealing with the initiatives of development and its concomitant changes, people's responses or strategies involve competition, accommodation, and compliance, as well as resistance.

In the modern Indonesian uplands, as Li (1999a: xvii) explains, the state's primary concern 'has been to bring order, control and "development" to upland regions, while deploying upland resources to serve national goals'. Key state initiatives in Indonesian uplands are territorialisation and development (Li 1999b). Through territorialization 'modern states divide their territories into complex and overlapping political and economic zones, rearrange people and resources within this units, and create regulations delineating how and by whom these area can be used' (Vanderveest and Peluso (1995: 387).

State power in the Indonesian uplands has been directed to a greater control over resources and people. A large portion of the land is classified as state forest land to be granted to logging and forest plantation companies—prohibiting access to local people and transforming them into labourers; logged-over lands are 'developed' into large scale plantations by state and private companies; or, alternatively, designated as transmigration sites, that 'thereby promote economic growth while also bringing political and administrative order to peripheral areas' (Li 1999b: 15-16 ). A more peaceful
initiative to intensify state control over people and resources, Li (1999b: 17) continues, is accomplished by regularising the spontaneous incursion of migrants into frontier zones... Once new comers have been organised into administrative units (*desa*), their daily activities can be monitored and regulated through the various village committees and institutions specified in law.

This initiative is accomplished because:

As new comers trying to make their way outside the formal structure of a project, they may be especially eager to transform themselves into model communities and thereby legitimate their presence and consolidate their hold over resources. They want and need to be enmeshed in state systems in order to claim their place as citizens and as clients of state officials and institutions.

At the heart of development relations lies a tension between ‘centres’ and ‘peripheries’. In this context Tania Li has introduced the concept of ‘relational formations’ of social marginality (1999b, 2001). Marginality emerges from on-going centre and periphery relations, rather than from the resistance of the periphery toward the centre or the absence of centre and periphery relations. Indonesian upland communities that are often depicted as geographically isolated and socially marginal such as the Meratus Dayak in Borneo (Tsing 1993) and the hill Lauje in Sulawesi (Li 2001), were arguably reproduced through the engagement of local tribes with pre-colonial courts, colonial administrations, and postcolonial regimes. In the pre-colonial and colonial period, relations took the form of rule and trade; in postcolonial times ‘development’ is the leitmotif. Li explains (2001:44) ‘[l]ike the Lauje, the Meratus practice shifting cultivation and continue to live and move about in ways that are illegible to the government administrators nominally responsible for them. Yet they are not an autonomous group resisting outside authority.’ Their marginality was developed in dialogue with state...
formations. And ‘their lifeways are formed not outside state agendas but relationally, in and through them’ (Li 2001:44).

Li (2001) also contends that, in cases like the hill Lauje of Sulawesi, rule and trade relations enabled the centre to control the people and exploit local resources (forest products, agricultural commodities, labour) in the absence of legibility (maps, statistics, monitoring). In the context of the failure of Indonesia’s New Order rural development programs, Dove and Kammen (2001: 633) suggest, that the state produced illegibility as much as legibility. Illegibility is not an accidental product of weak governance, but may form a strategy by political central elites for political and economic purposes. State-based appropriation and exploitation of economic resources are facilitated in the absence of clearly defined local right and practices.

Dove and Kammen (2001), also in the framework of relations between centre and periphery, examined development in terms of resource flows in everyday practices of development in Indonesia’s New Order era (1966-1998). They suggest that

...[t]here were two co-occurring models of development: an official one and a ‘vernacular’ one. The former represents a formal, uniform, and idealized vision of what the state professed, whereas the latter represents a more nuanced, normative, and conflicting vision of what state agents actually strove for. ... The vernacular model is an intentional one: it was the product not of accident but institutionalized values and desires. (2001: 633)

As opposed to official models where development was supposed to promote the flow of resources from centre to periphery, vernacular models of development enabled the centre to block the flow of resources from centre to periphery, and in fact reverse the flow by extracting resources from the periphery. Contract farming on rubber cultivation, for example, was said to
provide assistance to the smallholders. In reality the estate companies prevented the flow of resources to the smallholders, while contract farming on sugar cane provided a venue for sugar companies to extract resources from local smallholders. The types of resources that ‘were allowed to proceed unhindered down and out from the centre were those that central elites did not want’ (Dove and Kammen 2001: 626-627). Examples of resources that were successfully transferred to marginal people were programs of the Social Department and family planning services whose resources were small in size, but they facilitated a view of the receiving areas as deficient and undeveloped thereby justifying increased state intervention. Another resource that central elites did not seek was allotments in the transmigration program. ‘According to the official model of development, the state gave valuable resources to marginal groups; according to [the] vernacular model, it gave value-less resources to them’ (Dove and Kammen 2001:627).

Locating the state/centre and people/periphery perspective relationally, the concepts of relational formation and the vernacular model of development can be applied strategically to analyse the formation of social marginality (Li 1999 and 2001) and the failure of development schemes (Dove and Kammen 2001). In the present study, the concepts of relational formation and the vernacular model of development are combined and modified to analyse situations where state/centre and people/periphery relations do not necessarily lead to marginality and development failures. That is, this study explores how people in geographically marginal areas position themselves within the orbit of state power in order to promote resource flows from the centre to the periphery, while restricting resource extraction from the periphery to the centre.
To look only at the ill effects of development raises the risk of overlooking its manifold benefits. In relation to the impacts and effects of development in Southeast Asia, Rigg (2003:328-329) contends that;

[It] is hard to think of one indicator of human well-being that has not improved during the course of modernization over the last half century. It is notable that those countries which have experienced sustained stagnation or decline in such indicators are those that have experienced an absence of development as modernization...

[Development has led to real, substantial and, in some cases, sustained improvements in human well being... Nor can this be rejected as a case of the benefits accruing to just a small segment of the population, leaving the majority mired in poverty... [Improvements in livelihood have been broadly based, even if they have not been equally distributed.

Development is ‘as much a fact of everyday life for most people of the world as other kinds of overarching frameworks of assumption and action’ (Croll and Parkin 1992: 8, cited in Grillo 1997: 1). Legg (1992), discussing examples from Nepal, goes on to assert that development connects villagers, the urban elite, national political institutions, international development [institutions], and representation of the third world in the West. ‘Everyone wants a piece of the development pie’ (Legg 1992:511).

**Smallholders, Production, and Differentiation**

Fundamental to an understanding of development and change are the ways rural populations reproduce their modes of livelihood. The people discussed in this study are predominantly smallholder farmers. The argument advanced in this study is that flexibility in the social organisation of production and in the use of available resources to respond to constraints and opportunities is the key to the persistence of smallholder farming (as a
system of agricultural production) and the smallholding tradition (as a social
[agrarian] structure).

People discussed in the present study accord with Netting (1993:2)
characterization of smallholders, who are defined as;

... rural cultivators practicing intensive, permanent, diversified
agriculture on relatively small farms in areas of dense population. The
family household is the major corporate social unit for mobilizing
agricultural labor, managing productive resources, and organizing
consumption. ... Smallholders have ownership or other well-defined
tenure rights in land that are long term and often heritable.

Netting’s (1993: 2-3) characterization of smallholders thus excludes:

... shifting cultivators practicing long fallow or slash and burn
farming where land is still plentiful and population density low, as in
some parts of the humid tropic today; ... herders whether they are
nomadic pastoralists of east Africa or the ranchers of Texas;...and the
farming systems of dry monocropping of wheat, sugar estates, cotton
plantation with slaves, or California agribusiness.

The argument that Netting (1993: 27) advances on the persistence of
smallholder household farming is that ‘intensive agriculture by landowning
smallholder households is economically efficient, environmentally
sustainable, and socially integrative’.

One of the key characteristics of smallholder production is the superiority of
household labour compared to communal labour in collective farming, and
to hired labour in capitalist farming (Netting 1993). It is the smallholder
household members who complete the diversity of tasks and the
requirements for skilled, responsible, unsupervised task performance in
intensive cultivation.
Population pressures and the market are often attributed as the driving forces of agricultural transformations toward intensive farming. Population growth increases land scarcity and promotes agricultural intensification (Boserup 1965), while markets create demand for cultivated commodities (cf. Netting 1993, Brookfield 2000). With land abundance, the market attraction of rubber, and labour shortage, indigenous people in Kalimantan cultivate extensive rice swiddens and rubber gardens (along with other tree crops); with labour abundance and shrinking landholdings rural populations in Java practise intensive irrigated rice cultivation (Dove 1986).

On the topic of the economic efficiency of small-scale agricultural production, Dove (cf. 1986) has noted that the production orientation of intensive irrigated rice cultivators is significantly different from swidden cultivators. Where land availability is a constraint, intensive irrigated rice cultivation is aimed at a high return to land, namely, production per unit of land. In swidden cultivation, characteristically constrained by labour shortage, farming is oriented toward a high return to labour, that is, production per unit of labour.

With regard to the elements and processes of agricultural transformation, Brookfield (2000) emphasises capital and skills as the key elements besides labour, in substitution for the land factor, that are involved in the process of increasing agricultural production. Increasing productivity may not necessarily derive from an increase in labour input. Conversely, there are cases where increases in production actually reduce the demand for labour. Here investment in working capital, such as tools and animals, may be more responsible for the increase in production. Farmers' skills usually refer to agro-technical skills, but their organisational skill may be more important.
Although an agricultural transformation can be triggered by various factors, such as new technology, expanding commercialisation, and/or state interventions, the real foundation of such transformations is the skill of small farmers to organise their land, workforce, and resources.

Brookfield (2000) goes on to argue that the key factor in maintaining small farms’ ecological and production sustainability is agrodiversity, namely, a diversity of plant and animal species cultivated, the methods and practices of farming, and labour organization, all of which require the farmers’ deep knowledge of ecology and technology and sensitivity to respond to market opportunities.

Flexibility in ‘[t]he ability to use different resources, and employ different strategies for making a living’ (Brookfield 2001: 187) is another key perspective to understand agricultural transformations. Agricultural transformations can occur either through intensification or ‘disintensification’. In many cases, Brookfield argues, increasing production ‘involved new skills in [the] use of “dynamic” land, and both agricultural and non-agricultural opportunities, and not increased inputs into any constant land or, indeed, increased current inputs of any kind except of management skills’ (2001:189).

Smallholder farmers’ commodity production for markets, more often than not, is possible due to their incorporation of non-market relations. In the Sulawesi highlands, for example, one strategy is to use non-market inputs such as mutual labour assistance to pursue market relations, otherwise production of rice for the market is difficult or may not even be possible (Schrauwers 1999). Similarly, for Minangkabau smallholder farmers (Khan 1999), the main inputs for production such as labour, land, and capital are
obtained largely through non-market relations. Access to land, for example, was obtained through inheritance, sharecropping, and squatting on forest reserves and plantations. In the production of rubber in Riau, smallholders retain their traditional elements of the farming system such as cultivation of jungle rubber, adat and communal land ownership, and, wherever possible, subsistence rice farming (Potter and Badcock 2004).

State policies regulating access to upland lands in Indonesia often influence smallholder intensive agricultural practices. A large portion of the Indonesian uplands has been either classified as forest reserves or granted to plantation companies. Responding to the loss of land to forest reserves and estate plantations many indigenous peoples in Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi changed their agricultural practices from dry land swidden of rice to tree crop cultivation and managed agroforests, sometimes with accompanying wet rice (Potter 2001). In the Lauje hills and Lindu areas of Sulawesi highlands, the government’s inability to control these ‘state lands’ has enabled the indigenous population and Bugis migrants to transform forests and former swiddens into intensive cocoa groves (Li 2002).

In the present study, one line of inquiry into the persistence of the smallholder tradition is directed at agricultural transformations, through changes in farming practices. A second line of the inquiry is oriented toward understanding agrarian transformations, through changes in the social organisation of farming. A key element in the social structure of rural society is rural differentiation.

Netting (1993) depicts smallholder agriculture as akin to gambling where some players, due to their personal ability, moral virtue, and environmental conditions, play the game better than the others. Differentiation and
inequality are inevitable in these circumstances. The state often plays an important role in promoting or constraining differentiation. In the Tengger highlands, East Java, for example, land distribution by the colonial government led to the emergence of a ‘smallholding tradition’ (Hefner 1990). In lowland Java, New Order initiatives such as the green revolution and the absence of land reform favoured village elites and promoted differentiation (Hart et al. eds. 1989). Studying agrarian structure, as Li (2002) and Potter and Badcock (2004) suggest, is an exploration into human agency. The agrarian structure is the result and medium through which rural people work out constraints and opportunities in their attempts and desires for the ‘good life’.

Ben White defines agrarian or rural differentiation as one that involves a cumulative and permanent (i.e., non-cyclical, which is not to say that it is never reversible) process of change in the ways in which different groups in rural society—and some outside it—gain access to the products of their own or others’ labor, based on their differential control over production resources and often, but not always, on increasing inequalities in access to land (1989:20).

White goes on to argue that,

It is useful to make a distinction between the process of differentiation itself and various aspects of that process which we might call the causes, the mechanisms, and the symptoms or indicators of differentiation. Similarly, any analysis of rural differentiation processes in a specific place and time will have to encompass their contexts (regional, national, political, cultural, etc.) and also the constraints to differentiation (which may originate externally or internally and may affect the pace and form of differentiation). (1989: 25-26, emphases in original)
In lowland rice areas in Java, White and Wiradi (1989) reported that the ownership of rice fields was highly unequal and differentiation ensued as well as constrained.

On the one hand, wealthy households have many other avenues for profitable investment, and many demands for non-productive expenditure, which compete with the alternative of land acquisition. On the other hand, the many smaller owners whose agricultural incomes do not provide reproduction at minimal levels ... are able by participating in a variety of low-return nonfarm activities both inside and outside the village to achieve subsistence incomes without the distress sale of their ‘sublivelihood’ plot. (White and Wiradi 1989: 299).

In the Tengger mountains (Hefner 1990), Malang (Suryanata 1999), and the Sulawesi uplands (Li 2002) wealthy migrants, through buying, renting, and mortgage, took over the control of a large portion of upland food or cash crop fields, converting a significant number of the local inhabitants into landless labourers. This differs from the situation in Langkat, North Sumatra (Ruiter 1999), where Batak villagers retained their control over smallholder rubber gardens, leaving the Javanese migrant labourers to occupy the bottom of village socio-economic stratum.

Hefner (1990) has pointed to a distinct rural social group he interchangeably called the ‘middle peasantry’ or ‘smallholder peasantry’ whose ethos and aspirations are to maintain the ‘smallholding tradition’. This persistence is related to the desire for social autonomy, to stand on one’s own, and the ability to own land. ‘Situated between the more visible agrarian elite and the mass of the poor’, Hefner asserts, ‘the middle peasantry... received scant comments in many agrarian accounts of agrarian change. Influenced by ... [the] vision of social polarisation ... scholars assume that middle peasants are doomed to historical oblivion’ (1990: 154). Villagers in the Tengger
mountains, like rural people elsewhere in Java, were pressed by shrinking landholdings and were incorporated fully into national markets and politics. The villagers, Hefner claimed, acknowledged that there are ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ but ‘[they] deny [a] suggestion that there might be an unbridgeable gap between rich and poor’ (1990: 154). Hefner went on explaining that middle peasantry in the Tengger mountain regions

...is characterised by neither the servile dependence of a dominated underclass nor the collective solidarity romantically attributed to proletarians.... Its social orientation emphasized neither selfless collectivism nor self-possessed individualism. Its animating ethos is an almost-paradoxical mix of self-reliance and communalist commitment. Ideally, in this view, each household guarantees its own welfare. (1990: 154)

Hefner continues:

The aspiration of these uplanders ... is ... [that] one seeks to stand on one’s own and not to be ordered about. Only in doing so can one be fully acknowledged as a member of the community. The simple achievement of respectful standing in a community of brethren is a valued end in its own right. (1990: 157)

Smallholders in the Lampung highlands too are characterised by the ethos and aspiration stressing social autonomy; that ‘one seeks to stand on one’s own’ and ‘each household guarantees it own welfare’. Their desires include having enough money for family needs, more education for children, possessing modern household items, better housing, and access to credit. These are goals to be achieved through personal development, that is, ‘the development of a person by themselves’ (Green 2000: 68), which is pursued within the context of state-led development. For migrant smallholders in the Lampung highlands, state-led development offers resources that have enabled them to attain the goals of their personal development. They have transformed a forest frontier into a flourishing highland. In the process, this thesis argues, they have produced and reproduced the smallholder tradition.
It is further argued that their village's social life is organised principally to attract state resources and to reap the benefits of development.

The Fieldwork

Fieldwork for this study was conducted between March 2002 and February 2003. During this period I lived in Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong, two adjoining subdistricts (kecamatan) in West Lampung district (kabupaten). For most of the time I lived in the village of Gunung Terang. There I lived in two homes; first in a Semendo neighbourhood in the main village hamlet of Gunung Terang, and secondly in the hamlet of Rigis Atas on the slopes of the Bukit Rigis mountain.

I visited and sometimes stayed for days in other villages of the region. Friends from WATALA1 and ICRAF (International Centre for Research in Agroforestry, now called the World Agroforestry Centre) often visited me in the village or invited me to visit their other work sites. I also regularly participated in their community meetings and workshops. ICRAF and WATALA have been working in West Lampung district for several years to support the negotiation processes between local communities and government agencies on the issues of natural resource management. ICRAF scientists collaborate with various national research institutions and also conduct their own socio-economic, biophysical, and policy research in the region. During my stay in Gunung Terang, friends from WATALA and ICRAF conducted community mapping of the village and assisted the

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1 Keluarga Pencinta Alam dan Lingkungan Hidup (the Friends of Nature and the Environment), an environmental NGO founded in 1978 by students from Lampung University based in Bandar Lampung.
community group in Rigis Atas to obtain a community forestry permission contract. Assistance in obtaining such contracts was also given to community groups in other villages across the region.

The 2002—2003 fieldwork was not my first visit to the Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong region. Between 1994-1995 with other friends and NGO activists from WATALA, WALHI, and YLBHI I visited the region at the invitation of the World Bank and PT. PLN (Perusahaan Listrik Negara, state-owned electricity company) to assess the social impact of the construction of the Way Besai dam and to discuss plans to mitigate these impacts. We were expecting villagers’ resistance to this mega project. To our surprise however, villagers were receptive and local leaders denied a suggestion that villagers rejected (menolak) the project. When we pointed out possible hardship for landless and near landless villagers in finding alternative sources of livelihood, as suggested in the environmental impact assessment report, a common response from village leaders was that the project would give more benefits than harm. A Semendo village leader even stated that to refuse the project was a sin, and against their ancestors’ wishes. It was said that their ancestors knew and had told them that a big dam would be built in the area.

1994-1995 was the time of the commencement of military operations to destroy smallholder gardens and houses inside the boundary of the state forest zones, for replacement by plantation forests. This was also the time when the region had begun to flourish as a new population centre in the

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2 Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia (Indonesian Forum for Environment) is a national NGO forum with a secretariat in Jakarta and regional secretariats in many Indonesian provinces.
3 Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia (Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation) has their headquarters in Jakarta and regional offices and posts throughout Indonesia.
4 The project paid relatively high compensation to hundreds of families in Way Petai, Sukapura, and Dwikora whose rice fields and coffee gardens were used for the project. PT PLN also provided credit for the village community groups.
highlands. The market villages of Sumber Jaya and Fajar Bulan were transformed into small market towns. The villages were electrified. Along the road sturdy wooden and brick houses were constructed or refurbished, thanks to the rise in prices and production of coffee. Between 1996 and 1998, on my trips to and from Krui on occasions related to my work on the damar agroforest in Krui, I frequently stopped in Fajar Bulan and Sumber Jaya either for a short rest or to meet acquaintances.

Between 1998 and 2000 I conducted a series of fieldwork visits to Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong. I was working for ICRAF and with friends from WATALA I visited different parts of the region. We did a general survey of community and forest interaction, farming households, and background history. This was the period of reformasi (the overthrow of Suharto in 1998 and the demise of the New Order regime), the El-Nino drought, and krismon (monetary crisis), all of which were embraced as ‘good things’ by the people in the region. Reformasi was interpreted as granting ‘freedom’ to reclaim land in forest zones, El-Nino effectively brought higher coffee production and made the dried bush easy to burn, while krismon hiked the export price of coffee and brought in a flush of money. The region was flooded with luxurious items from wool blankets, electronics, to motorbikes and cars.

When I returned to the region in the early 2002, the ‘good times’ of reformasi and krismon were over. Cars and motorbikes had been sold and many houses under construction were left unfinished. More recent migrants had left the region, returning home or moving on to new frontier zones in the neighbouring province of Bengkulu and elsewhere. The talk among ordinary smallholders in the region changed from aspiring to higher education for the children and sturdy modern houses for themselves, to how
to ensure enough food for their families and sufficient inputs to their diversified agricultural production.

**Thesis Organization**

Chapter 2 traces Lampung history during the 20th century. The focus of discussion is on the rural areas of the province. Depicted as an ‘empty land’ in the early 1900s, by the end of the century Lampung was perceived as a province peopled by land hungry migrants. Colonial and post-colonial initiatives are identified as the driving forces of the transformation of Lampung in the 20th century. Colonial and post-colonial government initiatives to bring progress to Lampung brought mixed results and effects: rapid growth in agricultural production, the formation of ‘wealthy zones’ in some areas, and the creation of pockets of poverty in other areas. The chapter explores the ways people in different rural regions of the province have experienced this transformation.

Chapters 3, 4, and 5 explore how migrants transformed one of Lampung’s ‘last frontiers’ into one of its highland ‘wealthy zones’. The chapters also explore how, in the process, these migrants shaped their modes of life. Chapter 3 gives an account of the history of the influx of different groups of migrants to settle in the Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong region. Although the bulk of these migrants migrated ‘spontaneously’, they were strongly integrated within the framework of planned development. It is due to the strong integration of its population with state, within this framework of state development and administration that the region was transformed into a ‘wealthy zone’. This situation is described in the second part of chapter 3.
Chapter 4 further explores the nature of villagers’ integration into the state. The level of ‘progress’ that the Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong region has achieved, it is argued, is largely the result villagers’ efforts to bring the state to the village as a strategy to tap state resources. The chapter outlines villagers’ engagements with the state within the context of national politics, rural development, and village administration.

Chapter 5 illustrates the ways in which local people in the region defend their smallholder farming by resisting forestry authorities’ attempts to exact a greater control over land and people. Having been in conflict with forestry authorities for decades, after reformasi some of the villagers in the region have agreed to engage in a new kind of relationship with forestry authorities. Collaboration between government and ‘community’ in ‘sustainable natural resources management’ is perceived to be the official goal of the new relationship. In practice, however, the desires of both parties are not easily reconciled and the struggle over control of land and resources continues.

Chapter 6 outlines the history of the formation of Gunung Terang as an administrative village, focussing on the village’s organization; its administration, leadership, and subdivisions. The chapter considers this village in the context of internal community affairs as well as within the framework of wider village relations. The village’s collective strategy, it is argued, is to mediate official relations between people and the state as well as in community affairs (social relations that are outside the state sphere).

Chapter 7, focusing on the village economy, is devoted to examining the persistence of smallholders. The chapter explores the flexibility of smallholding agriculture, beginning with a discussion of socio-economic
differentiation among villagers. This discussion is then followed by a closer look at the persistence, modification, and alteration in farming systems. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the dynamics in other aspects in the social organization of smallholder agricultural production (land, labour, capital).

Chapter 9 summarized the discussions with a view to possible future directions and developments. The chapter also highlights recommendations for future research and renewed development agendas.
Lampung up to the mid-1900s, like many areas in Indonesia’s outer islands, was a thinly populated, empty land. Lampung was known as a world leading pepper producer. By the end of the 20th century, besides pepper, Lampung produced surpluses of rice and other agricultural commodities. The province had a high incidence of poverty and, like Java, was perceived to have a problem with overpopulation. This chapter examines the driving forces behind these changes. Colonial and post-colonial governments development initiatives (land alienation and subsequent plantation and forestry development, decentralisation of administration and regional development, and transmigration and spontaneous migration) are identified as the key forces transforming Lampung in the 20th century.

Colonizing ‘The Empty Land’

In the past Lampung was known as the world’s pepper basket. When Banten developed into a flourishing international trading port in the 17th and 18th centuries, its main export commodity was pepper, which came largely from Lampung. From Lampung’s coasts and inland navigable rivers, boats (perahu) loaded with sacks of pepper regularly sailed across the Sunda strait to Banten. Maintaining steady supplies of pepper from Lampung to Banten, and later from the 18th to the 20th centuries to Batavia,
and monopolising its trade was one of the top agendas of the Dutch trading company (VOC) and the subsequent colonial administration (Kingston 1987 and Sevin 1989). Pepper production in Lampung steadily increased from 400 to 600 tonnes a year in the early 1800s to 2,000 tonnes in the 1880s; 4,000 tonnes in 1890; 10,000 tonnes at the turn of the 20th century; and 45,000 tonnes in the 1930s, making Lampung the source of 60% of the world’s pepper production (Bulbeck et al. 1998: 68).

The monopoly over pepper exports from Lampung has long been a source of rivalry between regional and international power centres. The Banten Sultanate controlled pepper supplies in most of the southern part of Lampung, in fierce competition with the Palembang Sultanate at Lampung’s northern tip, before both fell under Dutch control in the first half of the 19th century (Kingston 1987 and Sevin 1989). Bugis and Malay seamen were constantly involved in this trade, either by offering a higher price or by simply pirating the shipments. Denied access to pepper from Batavia and Banten, from the 1680s the British controlled the western part of Lampung (then part of Bengkuly residency) until the British transferred Bengkulu to the Dutch in exchange for Singapore in 1825 (Bastin 1965). In the second half of the 19th century the Dutch were able to unify and put under their control the southern part of Sumatra (Lampung, Palembang, and Bengkulu). To ensure the flow of profit, in addition to forced delivery of pepper and coffee to their warehouses for a low set price, the Dutch reoriented trading routes. Batavia was designated as an obligatory transit point for all export commodities, cutting the trading networks between southern Sumatra and Singapore (Sevin 1989).

In addition to pepper, coffee gained in importance as an export crop from Lampung during the 19th century. Coffee cultivation began at the
beginning of the 19th century (Sevin 1989: 45) and became a lucrative cash crop in Lampung by the end of the 19th century. Unlike in Java, where cash crop booms were largely the result of the imposition of the Dutch’s infamous forced cultivation (cultuurstelsel), in Lampung both pepper and coffee were cultivated by traditional smallholders (Bulbeck et al.1998). These smallholder farmers practised an ancient farming method, which is said to be typical of upland southern Sumatra, namely ‘supplementing shifting cultivation with cash crops’ (Pelzer 1945: 24-26). Coffee or pepper supplemented the traditional crop (i.e. upland rice), and the gardens were not permanent:

The lifetime of coffee bushes on ladangs is only from 3 to 5 years once they have started to yield berries... The lifetime of a pepper garden is considerably longer, perhaps 15 years... S[hifting cultivators plant coffee bushes 1.5 to 2 metres apart in the midst of upland rice fields during the first year that they occupy a ladang. In the following year the bushes are still small enough to permit the growing of a rice crop among them. In the third year a new ladang is made and planted with rice and coffee, while a coffee harvest is gathered from the first ladang. In the fourth year the first ladang produces an excellent crop of coffee. In the fifth year the first ladang yields its third coffee harvest and the second its first coffee harvest, while rice and coffee are planted in a third ladang. In the seventh year the cultivator may have as many as four ladangs, the first producing its last coffee crop before it is abandoned because of the declining yields, the second yielding its third coffee harvest, the third just entering the bearing stage, while the fourth ladang supplies the shifting cultivator with rice grown among young coffee bushes. (Pelzer 1945: 25-26).

Such a traditional method of cultivation was strikingly different from methods of cash crop cultivation practiced until the 20th century by farmers elsewhere in the nearby regions. Hevea rubber in Sumatra and Borneo and benzoin in North Sumatra were produced in permanent gardens (Pelzer 1945). In Java, under forced cultivation, cash crops such as coffee and sugar were produced using (modern) intensive farming.
methods. In the case of pepper, Chinese migrants in a few areas of the Riau archipelago, Malay peninsula, Siam, Cambodia, and Brunei introduced intensive pepper cultivation where hardwood—instead of traditional chinkareen (dadap) trees—was used to support the pepper vines, the ground was turned for clean-weeding twice a year, and fertilizer was applied (Bulbeck et al. 1998: 144-149). Production in these fields was much higher (over 2,000 pounds an acre) compared with the traditional system in Sumatra. By contrast, in Bengkulu annual production per acre was just 310 pounds. The weakness of this ‘Chinese method’ compared with the traditional system was its inability to withstand price variations, due to high demand on labour and cash outlay, which eventually led to its abandonment (Bulbeck et al. 1998: 155-156). Due to its low inputs, production of traditional swidden agriculture was relatively high in terms of return to labour (Dove 1986), and could withstand significant export price variations.

Apart from pepper and coffee, forest products were also important export commodities from Lampung. Rattan, elephant tusks, rhinoceros horns, swallows’ nests, kollelet rubber, and damar resin were exported to Batavia and Singapore in the mid 1800s (Sevin 1989: 45). Rice, on the other hand, was regularly imported from Java. Unlike neighbouring Java, Bali, and highland Palembang, natives of Lampung were not very fond of constructing large irrigation networks. Wet rice fields were limited to the banks of streams and rivers. Swidden ladang were by far the primary source of rice (Kingston 1987 and Sevin 1989).

The continuation up to the 20th century of smallholder production of rice, pepper, and coffee using traditional farming systems was possible largely because of the low population density (i.e. land abundance/labour
shortage) in Lampung. The Lampung population was merely 104,200 people in 1845, a number which, although it nearly doubled 60 years later, still gave an average density of less than 5 persons per square km (Sevin 1989: 47). In contrast, over the same period, Java’s population trebled from 9.3 million to 30.1 million, resulting in an average density exceeding 200 persons per square km. Compared to Java, Lampung at the beginning of the 20th century was indeed an ‘empty land’.

Besides its low density, Lampung’s population at the turn of the 20th century was also unequally distributed (Sevin 1989: 47-48). The mountain range of Bukit Barisan, apart from Balik Bukit and Belalau in the northwest, and swampy plains and estuaries of large rivers such as Tulang Bawang and Seputih in the northeast, were largely devoid of human settlements. Villages and small towns were scattered along the south and west coasts and on the banks of navigable inland rivers. In the mid-1800s, 21,270 people inhabited the Krui coast in the west; 12,000 people lived in Semangka Bay in the southwest; and 16,690 people occupied Lampung Bay in the southeast. By the turn of the 20th century, ports on these coasts were developed into small towns and commercial centres: Krui on the west coast, Kota Agung on Semangka Bay, and Teluk Betung on Lampung Bay. Teluk Betung, with 4,500 inhabitants, was the largest town.

Farther inland, the banks of the Way Sekampung river and Labuan Maringgai further downstream were home to some 10,600 people; Way Seputih river and its tributaries (Way Pegadungan, Way Sukadana, Way

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1 The population of Teluk Betung and the surrounding Lampung Bay and Semangka Bay was severely affected by the powerful Krakatau eruption in 1883. The resultant huge tidal waves wiped out villages and killed thousands of people.
Pengubuan, and Gunung Batin) in the centre had 14,118 inhabitants; and Way Tulang Bawang and its tributaries on the north (Way Abung, Way Sungkai, Way Kanan, and Way Besai) were occupied by 29,450 people. Small towns located on the banks of large rivers included Menggala—then the largest inland town—on the Way Tulang Bawang river, Gunung Sugih and Terbanggi on the Way Seputih river, and Sukadana and Labuan Maringgai down stream of the Way Sekampung river.

Around those small towns, native Lampung houses were grouped into traditional villages. The villages, located along the river banks and separated a few kilometres, had a few hundred, sometimes more than a 1000, inhabitants (Sevin 1989: 47). Between the villages was uninhabited land where temporary hamlets could be encountered. These hamlets (umbul) were created near the newly opened swidden fields (ladang) far from the villages (Utomo 1975 and Kingston 1987).

The natives of Lampung divided themselves into three large sub-groups: Pesisir, Abung, and Pubian. The Pesisir occupied Lampung’s west and south coasts, Abung dominated inland rivers in the centre and north, while Pubian settled in the smallest area in the centre and south. Other smaller sub-groups, such as Menggala on the Way Tulang Bawang river, and Meninting and Melinting in Maringgai downstream of the Way Sekampung river, are the result of the mixing of the main Lampung groups with outsiders. Menggala is the fusion of Pubian, Malay, and Bugis, while Meninting and Melinting are Pesisir and Pubian mixed with outside people from Banten, Sunda, Java, and Bugis (Sevin 1989: 49-69).
Map 1. Lampung province
Based on Dutch scholars and officials' reports Utomo (1975), Kingston (1987), and Sevin (1989) provide a brief account of elements of social organisation among the native Lampung population. The marga was the highest socio-political unit while the buay was another term to refer to their social organization. Marga, consisted of a number of genealogically related villages (pekon, tiuh, anek, dusun, or kampung) and emphasized territoriality, while buay put more emphasis on genealogical ties. Buay were subdivided into smaller patrilineal groupings of suku, which were further subdivided into cangkai and then nuwo (houses). The relationship between marga and buay varies. In some areas a buay was a marga. In other areas, several buay comprised a marga or a buay consisted of more than one marga. Several marga and/or buay often formed federations. At the village level, suku leaders (penyimbang) met in assembly (proatin) to govern village affairs. Similarly at the marga level, the proatin consisted of penyimbang of the marga. The natives of Lampung observed male primogeniture in the inheritance of title and property, and authority was based on seniority. The oldest village from which other villages had split was the seat of the marga. A penyimbang was the eldest male descendant of the founder of a suku, and this status was granted by the proatin followed by a title granting feast ceremony (pepadun).2

Native Lampung social organization was influenced considerably by Banten. Like Banten, the natives of Lampung were predominantly Muslim. The Banten Sultanates’ influences were strongly felt on the

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2 Today the native Lampung population identify themselves either as belonging to Lampung pepadun or Lampung pesisir (cf. Hadikusuma 1989). The pepadun inhabited inland Lampung. For the pepadun, the status of penyimbang is granted by the proatin only if the incumbent is able to perform the expensive ritual and feast of cakak padun. For the pesisir or peninggir, inhabiting Bukit Barisan mountain range and Lampung’s southern and wester coasts, the penyimbang status is hereditary.
marga’s external affairs (Sevin 1989: 51-59). The four marga (marga pak) around Mount Rajabasa in Lampung Bay, for example, were ruled by a lord (ratu), who was under the command of the Banten Sultanate. Similarly Ratu Melinting ruled the Sekampung valley in Banten’s name. Elsewhere, among several adjacent buay or marga, the Banten Sultanate granted noble titles. A jenjem was appointed to supervise a number of paksi and bandar who were selected among the buay or marga chiefs. The power of Banten over Lampung, however, was limited to ensuring the monopoly over pepper. The granting of titles that signalled a person’s nobility, denoting high social standing but without political authority, was another element of native Lampung social organization perceived to have been introduced from Banten.

In the mid-1800s, after decades of military campaigns, the Dutch were able to overcome the native Lampung rebellions. By this time, the Dutch had shifted their orientation from a monopoly over pepper toward control over the land and its people (Kingston 1987). Following their conquest, the Dutch imposed a formal administration. Lampung was divided into five (later seven) onderafdeeling, each of which had a Dutch officer (controleur) supervising appointed non-native demang (all of whom were from Java and/or Palembang) who dealt directly with individual villages, neglecting the higher traditional political unit of marga. Further, the Dutch declared that the vast uncultivated lands between villages, which had traditionally been marga lands, became part of the state domain. Some of these formerly marga lands were then granted as long lease (erpacht) to

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3 Previously all Lampung land was divided among its marga. On average, a Lampung marga had 5000 inhabitants, less than 10 villages, and occupied 500 km. sq. (van de Zwaal 1936 cited in Utomo 1975:52). Up to the 1950s there were 87 marga in Lampung (Hadikusuma 1989: 189-194), 81 of which were the native Lampung. Six marga comprised migrants from South Sumatra: four marga from Semendo and one each from Ogan and Mesuji/Pegagan.
private estate plantations; many more were designated as forestry zones (boschwezen). Later, in 1928, the Dutch recognised the marga as a political unit but modified many of its principles to meet government ends such as collecting taxes and recruiting corvee labour for the construction of roads. Marga control over land outside individual villages was never fully returned.

In the first half of the 20th century, a major aim of the Dutch administration was to develop colonies of Javanese in Lampung. A railway line was constructed from Teluk Betung to Palembang, along which enclaves of 'little Java' would be created. This was supposed to be followed by the development of a plantation belt (cultuurgebied) (Kingston 1989). The Dutch started the creation of agricultural colonies of Javanese in Lampung in 1905. The plains on the south side of Lampung were selected as the primary sites; the first being Gedong Tataan, the second Wonosobo, and the third Sukadana. By 1941, 174,000 people mostly from overcrowded areas in central Java (Kedu, Banyumas, Pekalongan, Yogyakarta, Surakarta, and Jepara/Rembang) and a smaller number from east Java (Kediri, Surabaya, Madiun, and Malang) had been settled in the new colonies (Sevin 1989). Sukadana was the largest settlement with 90,000 inhabitants, and its main village of Metro turned into a town in the 1930s (Hardjono 1977). Each colonist received 0.3 ha dry field (tegalan) and 0.7 ha irrigated rice field (sawah). Under the colonisation scheme, the colonists brought with them to Lampung the Javanese style of lower-level structure of administration village (desa) and subdistrict (kecamatan).

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4 Kingston (1987) suggests that the abuse of power by the new government-selected marga chiefs gave rise to popular protests organised by the Commite Tani Lampung (Lampung’s peasant committee) in 1930s.
Opposition to this colonisation scheme initially came from plantation companies in Java and North Sumatra, claiming that they experienced difficulties in recruiting labourers who would prefer to join government-sponsored migration rather than becoming their cheap coolies. The great depression of the 1930s forced the plantation companies to stop recruiting and to reduce the number of their coolies. This revived the colonisation projects, and led to the creation of the last and largest colonial agricultural resettlement zone of Sukadana. Argoguruh weir was constructed to channel water from the Way Sekampung river to this zone’s irrigation schemes. The colonization project was stopped with Japan’s invasion in 1942, the subsequent World War II, and Indonesia’s revolution for independence.

Government-sponsored migration from Java to Lampung was re-started in the early 1950s, the program being called transmigration. Under CTN (Corp Tjadangan Nasional) and later BRN (Biro Rekonstruksi National) former soldiers and militias from various part of Java were moved to Lampung. In the beginning of the 1950s, small groups of these veterans were given cleared land and were expected to clear further areas to attract more Javanese. About 25,000 people migrated to Lampung, 60% of whom still remained in their new homes in 1960s (Benoit 1989: 107). Unlike the Dutch colonisation and later post-colonial Indonesia transmigration projects that concentrated on areas in the eastern lowlands of Lampung, the BRN also placed Sundanese and Javanese migrants in the western highlands. Lowland Palas in the south and Jabung in the centre were allocated to the BRN transmigrants. In the eastern foothills of the Bukit Barisan mountain range, four sites were selected; Pulau Panggung in the
south, Kalirejo in the centre, and Tanjung Raya and Sumber Jaya in the north.\textsuperscript{5}

Subsequent transmigration programmes largely followed the Dutch patterns. The central and northern plains were designated as the transmigration receiving areas. From the mid-1950s until the end of the 1970s, the plains around Sukadana, Gunung Sugih, and Kota Bumi were transformed into transmigration receiving areas. The World Bank was the main sponsor of the post-colonial transmigration program. Between 1950 and 1969, 100,000 ha of lands were allocated to 200,000 transmigrants. The number of transmigrants fell to 50,000, who settled on 53,000 ha of land, between 1969 and 1974, and finally, dropped to 11,000 people between 1974 and 1979 (Pain 1989: 293-294). Unlike colonisation schemes, post-colonial transmigration programmes did not always allot wet field sawah to each transmigrant; many transmigrants received only dry field tegalan. The size of land given to transmigrants was also larger, 2 ha or more.

By the end of the 1970s Lampung ceased to be the destination of transmigrants from Java. The local transmigration program (transmigrasi lokal or translok) was designed to remove forest squatters (perambah hutan) from government-designated forestry zones and to develop the isolated, thinly populated northeast regions of Lampung. From 1979 to 1986, over a quarter of a million people were forced to move from the southern and central forestry zones to the plains and swamps between Menggala, Mesuji and Blambangan Umpu. Several sites of 100,000 ha were cleared for this purpose.

\textsuperscript{5} Earlier and subsequent development of one of these sites, that is Sumber Jaya, is the subject of the proceeding chapters.
As a consequence of the influx of migrants, the proportion of the native Lampung population fell dramatically (Benoit 1989: 143-145). From 70% of the population in 1920, the proportion of native Lampung fell to less than 15% in the mid-1980s. In the mid-1980s, nearly 70% of the population of Lampung were Javanese, the Sundanese proportion was a little more than 10%, while migrants from South Sumatra comprised a little less than 10%.6

Table 2.1 Natives and migrants in Lampung, 1930—1986

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<td>Natives of Lampung</td>
<td>218,000</td>
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<td>458,000</td>
<td>556,000</td>
<td>661,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spontaneous migrants</td>
<td>498,000</td>
<td>577,000</td>
<td>1,057,000</td>
<td>530,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descendants of spontaneous migrants</td>
<td>123,000</td>
<td>184,000</td>
<td>804,000</td>
<td>1,652,000</td>
<td>2,340,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transmigrants</td>
<td>375,000</td>
<td>107,000</td>
<td>135,000</td>
<td>199,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descendants of transmigrants</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>513,000</td>
<td>755,000</td>
<td>1,002,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total*</td>
<td>376,000</td>
<td>1,472,000</td>
<td>2,459,000</td>
<td>4,155,000</td>
<td>4,732,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lampung population</td>
<td>406,000</td>
<td>1,667,000</td>
<td>2,775,000</td>
<td>4,627,000</td>
<td>5,250,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Bandar Lampung and translok are excluded
Source: Benoit (1989: 130,168)

Table 2.1 shows that of the total non-native Lampung population in the second half of the 20th century, the number of spontaneous migrants or independent settlers and their descendants, who migrated to Lampung without government assistance, is much greater than the number of government sponsored migrants and their descendants. Following their friends and relatives who had been sponsored to migrate to Lampung, other Javanese and Sundanese sold their possessions in Java to buy land in Lampung. Those who did not have enough money, settled to work as labourers and/or sharecroppers for the earlier migrants and native Lampung smallholders (Utomo 1975 and Levang 1989).

6 Other migrant ethnic groups in Lampung are Chinese, Minangkabau, Bugis, Balinese, and Batak, and Madurese.
Labour migration to Lampung is not a recent phenomenon. For centuries groups of labourers from Banten had come to Lampung to handpick the pepper corns and coffee cherries. These seasonal migrations amounted to 30,000—40,000 people per year at the turn of the 20th century. Although they usually returned to Banten, some settled in Lampung (Kingston 1987). Three large groups, the Mesuji, Ogan, and Semendo (Benoit 1989) migrated to Lampung at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century from the neighbouring province of South Sumatra (Palembang). Of these three, the Mesuji moved from the lowland Palembang border with Lampung to northeast Lampung, the Ogan moved to the northern Lampung plains between Kota Bumi and Bukit Kemuning, while the Semendo moved from their homeland in highland Palembang to the hilly and mountainous highlands of Lampung i.e. Kasui and Way Tenong in the northwest and Pulau Panggung in the southwest. The Semendo, the largest of the three groups, cleared the jungle, transformed it into coffee gardens, and settled in villages or hamlets near streams where, like in their home land, they could establish wet rice fields. The Semendo and Ogan migrants often employed and sold their coffee gardens to incoming Javanese migrants.

The transformation of Lampung in the 20th century is thus a result of complex factors. Some of these relate to the influx of migrants and the subsequent opening up of Lampung land. While some forces have attempted to control or limit the movement of these migrants, others have managed to benefit from their arrival.

Besides colonial and post-colonial government-sponsored transmigration, infrastructure development and the decentralization of administration have also stimulated spontaneous settlers to Lampung and the opening
up of its land. The Dutch constructed a railway from Teluk Betung at 
Lampung Bay to Palembang in the 1920s. It is along this railway line that 
most populated areas and economic centres are presently located. Road 
networks were continuously built to connect remote areas to these 
population and economic centres. Initially constructed by corvee labour 
during the Dutch occupation, the construction of these roads, especially 
after 1970 when transmigration programmes were integrated into regional 
development, became the main post-colonial development agenda. As a 
result, commerce was boosted, more lands were cleared and cultivated, 
and more spontaneous settlers moved in.

Colonial and post-colonial decentralisation of administration and land 
alienation played an important role in the transformation of Lampung. In 
the mid-1800s, the Dutch dismantled Lampung’s traditional government 
of marga, first by imposing a modern administration with district 
(onderafdeeling) headed by controleur assisted by several non-native demang 
to work directly with officially selected village heads, 400 to 500 in 
number (Kingston 1987). When the Dutch declared the vast areas of 
uncultivated land between villages as state property, native Lampung lost 
their important reserve lands vital for the continuation of their traditional 
agricultural production system. The native Lampung people soon could 
not resist migrants from the north (orang Semendo, orang Ogan, and orang 
Mesuji) who, with the Dutch controleur’s consent, occupied former marga 
lands. A large portion of the former marga lands were either granted on 
long-tem leases to plantation companies or designated as forestry zones 
(boschwezen).

The Dutch created different low-level administration systems, one for 
Javanese settlers and one for the native Lampung population. From 1928,
the villages (pekon, kampung, dusun, or tiuh) of natives of Lampung were organised under marga headed by chiefs (pesirah), who were selected by the government among the penyimbang nominees (Kingston 1987). Javanese transmigrants villages (desa) were organised into kecamatan, headed by a government officer camat (Hardjono 1977). Several kecamatan formed one kewedanan headed by a wedana. In the post-colonial era until the end of the 1970s, Lampung still largely retained this dual system. A modification was introduced for the native Lampung population in the 1950s (Utomo 1975) by merging several marga into a negeri, headed by a chief (kepala negeri) who was selected among the penyimbang. A dewan negeri was also formed as the council of natives’ elders. As more Javanese migrants settled in Lampung, further former marga lands were converted into Javanese settlers’ desa. The take over of forests and bush land was usually marked by a token payment (ulasan) by settlers to the head of the marga or negeri (Utomo 1975). Since the Dutch forbade the native Lampung population to sell their land to the Javanese migrants, ulasan was only paid as compensation for cultivated plants. In the late 1970s the negeri was abolished, and all Lampung then adopted the Javanese style of administrative village (desa), subdistrict (kecamatan), and district (kabupaten).

The last three decades of decentralisation of administration (pemekaran wilayah), resulted in the continuous creation of new districts (kabupaten, kota), subdistricts (kecamatan), and villages (desa). Lampung had 4 districts, 60 kecamatan, and 1164 desa in 1972; 4 districts, 77 kecamatan, and 1941 desa in 1991; and 10 districts, 162 kecamatan, and 2099 desa in 2001 (BPS Lampung 1972 and 2001). The direct impact of this pemekaran wilayah has been more rural development programmes (e.g., roads, schools, clinics, agricultural extension). The influx of settlers was the prerequisite
to *pemekaran wilayah* on the one hand, while *pemekaran wilayah* stimulated the further influx of settlers on the other.

Since the early days of government-sponsored migration of people from Java to Lampung, the estate plantation sector has benefited from the abundant and cheap labour. The opening of colonisation sites by the Dutch and the coming of Javanese agricultural colonists until the 1940s were soon followed by the granting of long leases on nearby land to plantation companies. Although less extensive than in North Sumatra, estate plantations of coffee, rubber, and oil palm were installed close to the transmigration settlements. In the 1930s there were 34 plantations with sizes between 2000 to 5000 hectares. While recruiting cheap labour from Java, these plantations also employed seasonal labourers from the transmigration settlements (Kingston 1987). After Indonesian independence, many of these plantations were nationalised and were placed under the control of PT. Perkebunan Nusantara, a state-owned plantation company.

In the post-colonial era, following the opening up of new transmigration settlements in central and north Lampung, state-owned and private companies were granted land leases for new estate plantations. The size of many of these new estate plantations was much larger than those of the colonial period. Some private companies had 20,000 hectares of land, while others controlled as ‘little’ as 40 hectares. Coffee diminished in importance and was no longer an estate plantation commodity. In addition to rubber, oil palm, and sugar, other crops such as cassava, coconut, pineapple, and banana are became estate plantation crops. In 1969, estate plantations controlled 21,000 hectares of Lampung land; in 1985 it had risen to 133,000 ha (Pain 1989:347). In the 1990s, Lampung’s
eastern swamps and coasts were gradually transformed into brackish shrimp ponds. In the late 1990s, Lampung was the home of two of the nation's largest shrimp industries.

As elsewhere in Indonesia, forestry policies in Lampung have for decades been designed and implemented to exclude undesirable people and land interactions. The Dutch started the process first by confiscating native Lampung marga lands and declaring them to be part of the state domain in the mid-1800s. Subsequent land alienation was carried out through the designation of forestry zones (boschwezen); between 1922 and 1943 nearly a million hectares of Lampung lands were gazetted as forestry zones. The native Lampung population was prohibited from both harvesting forest products and clearing the land for farming. The Dutch controlled harvesting of forest products, giving the marga only a small share of the tax (Kingston 1987 and Utomo 1975). A plan was drawn up for forestry plantations of teak such as those in parts of Java, a lucrative source of income for the Dutch. Labourers from Java were brought to Lampung and some hundreds of hectares of boschwezen land between Gedong Tataan and Tegineneng were planted with teak. However, the Japanese invasion in 1942-43 prevented further materialisation of the plan (Utomo 1975). While strictly prohibiting the native Lampung people from gathering forest products from, and clearing the land within, the gazetted forestry zones, the Dutch were permissive toward the Javanese transmigrants whose allotted settlements and fields were already fully utilized. These transmigrants were allowed to clear forest in an attempt to extend their agricultural settlements (Kingston 1987). Sections of the colonisation zones between Gunung Sugih and Sukadana were boschwezen lands that were converted into settlements.
Immediately after independence, logging became the main forestry work in Lampung. Prior to their designation as national parks in the 1980s, sections of Way Kambas and Bukit Barisan Selatan were also granted for logging concessions. In addition to former *boschwezen* lands, thousands of hectares of the remaining *marga* lands were granted to logging companies. Once this was done these former *adat* lands were officially classified as state forestry zones, which then legally became the property of the state. Meanwhile, some of the *boschwezen* were converted into transmigration and spontaneous settlements, as seen in the development of post-colonial pioneer transmigration settlements on the edges and within the boundaries of *boschwezen* land such as in lowland Palas and Gunung Balak and in highland Pulau Panggung and Sumber Jaya. Other former *boschwezen* and logging concessions were converted into estate plantations. By the early 1990s Lampung had no more production forest. About 175,000 hectares of former logging concession areas are now officially under the control of state forestry company (PT Perhutani) for industrial forestry plantations (*HTI: hutan tanaman industri*).

In the last three decades, the designation of state forestry zones, reforestation, and the eviction of ‘forest squatters’ have become key forestry policies. About 1.2 million hectares of land, over 30% of Lampung land, mainly the former Dutch’s *boschwezen* plus post-colonial logging concession areas have been reclassified as state forestry zones (*kawasan hutan negara*). From the end of the 1970s to the turn of 1990s at least a quarter of a million people were forced to vacate the protection forest zones (*kawasan hutan lindung*) located in the upper part of watersheds, to join local transmigration programmes. This was then followed by the planting of exotic trees such as sonokeling (*Dalbergia sisoo*) and caliandra (*Calliandra calothyrsus*) on the abandoned
smallholders' fields and settlements. But the plan to transform these forestry zones into forestry plantations was not fully implemented; the reforestation trees either died, were overgrown by bush, or removed and the areas were transformed back into smallholder farmers' fields. The appropriation and reappropriation of land in forestry zones has been a constant feature of the interaction between local people and the forestry authorities in Lampung.

The forestry authorities used conservation of watersheds to justify the imposition of repressive forestry policies and the selection of forestry zones in 'water catchment areas' (daerah tangkapan air) of Lampung’s main rivers. Large dams were constructed on the upper reaches of these rivers to feed water for the irrigation canals downstream and/or for hydroelectric power (cf. Departemen Pekerjaan Umum 1995). The Way Jepara dam, located near Gunung Balak in East Lampung, designed to irrigate 6651 hectares rice fields in the Way Jepara region, was constructed between 1975 and 1978. Located at the upper Way Rarern river near Kotabumi, the Way Rarern dam was constructed from 1980 to 1984 to feed 22,000 hectares of rice fields. At the upper part of the Way Sekampung river, near Pulau Panggung and Talang Padang in Tanggamus highland, the Batu Tegi dam was constructed from 1995 to 2003. The Batu Tegi dam was designed to produce electricity (24 MW) and to supply water for 90,000 hectares of irrigated rice fields downstream in the province’s rice bowls on the eastern and central Lampung plains. Located in Sumber Jaya on the West Lampung highland, the construction of the Way Besai dam, which was designed to produce electricity (90 MW), was started in 1994 and completed in 2001. Financial support for the construction of these dams came primarily from World Bank and the government of Japan. The eviction of thousands migrant smallholder families in Gunung
Balak since the early 1980s was described as an effort to ensure a steady supply of water for the Way Jepara dam. The construction of the Batu Tegi dam was preceded by a massive demolition of migrant smallholders’ houses and coffee gardens to be planted with sonokeling in Pulau Panggung, Wonosobo, and Sumber Jaya in the early 1990s. More recently similar attempts have been conducted on the upper parts of the Way Tulang Bawang river (e.g., Tanjung Raja, Bukit Kemuning, and Sumber Jaya).

Land of Hope, Land of Despair

While criticizing some aspects of the Dutch transmigration projects in Lampung up to the 1940s, Karl Pelzer (1945) praised the projects for their possible good outcomes: the hope of a redistribution of population and intensive agricultural production. A decade later, instead of intensive agriculture, J.F. Wertheim (1959) encountered vast areas of alang-alang grass replacing the forest cover he saw in the 1930s; instead of well-planned agriculture settlements, he found the spread of spontaneous settlements—as a result of the saturated early transmigration sites—whose populations were in desperate need of government assistance, if their livelihood was to improve. Comparing the conditions of agriculture pioneer settlements of Javanese migrants in Lampung in the 1930s and the late 1950s, Wertheim indicated a possible course for Lampung that in the future this ‘land of hope’ could turn into a ‘land of despair’.

Kampto Utomo⁷ (1975) gave a detailed account of village social organization and the modes of ecological adaptation of the spontaneous

⁷ He later changed his name to Sayogyo. Prof. Sayogyo is a well known Indonesian rural sociologist with focus on rural development and poverty alleviation.
settlers in Lampung in the mid 1950s. Between 1950 and 1957, spontaneous migrants from nearby old transmigration sites (e.g. Gedong Tataan and Pringsewu) and directly from Java opened new agricultural settlements in the Way Sekampung area. Between 35,000 and 40,000 inhabitants created 18 new Javanese villages (desa). The settlers were recruited by a number of kepala tebang (chief of clearing) who sought permission and paid ulasan to the native Lampung negeri head to clear the forest. The forest was cleared collectively, each man received a farming field and housing lot (kapling). More migrants came and more forests were cleared. Under the leadership of the kepala tebang several hamlets formed an administrative village (desa), usually with one of the kepala tebang as the village head. Government assistance was absent. Simple roads, markets, schools, and clinics were constructed through community work (gotong royong). The village administration received janggolan tax, either in cash or in kind (i.e. rice), from the villagers. Later the new villages were organised into a kecamatan headed by a government officer camat. However, the much needed government assistance (e.g. for construction of roads, irrigation networks, and agricultural extension) was still absent.

Rather than practising the intensive agriculture that they knew well in Java, these spontaneous migrants adopted the native Lampung people’s method of shifting cultivation, and practised its worst form, in the ecological sense (Utomo 1979). As described by Pelzer (1945), the shifting cultivation practised by the native Lampung population was supplemented by cash crops. This usually involved one or two crops of upland rice on an area of newly cleared forest, after which the field was planted with coffee and/or pepper, before it was left fallow. The Javanese

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8 This area form the present day Kalirejo and Sukoharjo regions.
migrants prolonged the planting of annuals (rice and soybean) and left the field fallow for a short period so that the soil was rapidly exhausted and infested by *alang-alang* grass (Utomo 1979). The migrants managed to convert stream banks into flooded rice fields, but the irregular water supply and lack of labour limited production. A few of them tried to plant coffee, but low production and poor upkeep soon transformed their coffee gardens into *alang-alang* fields. These migrants then abandoned their *alang-alang* fields and searched for new forests to clear, and started a new cycle of conversion of forest cover into *alang-alang*.

Concerns about the livelihood of the population in Lampung, with an emphasis on the distribution of population and agricultural production systems, continued to be raised by the ORSTOM research team in the mid-1980s (Benoit *et al.* 1989). Many areas were already heavily populated and saturated, while a few zones, called ‘last frontiers’, were still scarcely populated (Pain 1989). Agricultural practices underwent profound changes. Patrice Levang’s survey (1989) demonstrated that irrigated rice fields (*sawah*), gardens (*kebun*) perennial cash crops, and dry fields (*tegalan*) with annual food crops were the main farming systems of Lampung by 1980s. Often these systems were practised as a mixed farming system.

Pain (1989) divided Lampung into three forms of spatial organization: ‘the centres’, transition areas, and marginal zones. The ‘centres’ had populations over 500 inhabitants per sq. km. of cultivated land, and in some areas over 1000 inhabitants per sq. km. These ‘centres’ were rice-growing plains created by colonial and post-colonial transmigration programmes. These centres include Pringsewu, Metro, and Bandar Jaya and their surroundings, the piedmont parallel with Bukit Barisan
mountain range from southwest to northwest (from Talang Padang in the south, to Kalirejo and Sukoharjo in the centre, to Kota Bumi and Bukit Kemuning in the north), and large-scale estate plantations occupying the same areas. Talang Padang area was dominated by sawah and kebun; in Kalirejo and Sukohardjo, sawah, kebun, and tegalan were mixed; and in Kota Bumi and Bukit Kemuning kebun of pepper and coffee were predominant.

The transition areas were those on the peripheries of the rice-growing plains, the non-irrigated plains from Palas and Sidomulyo in the south to Sukadana, Gunung Sugih, and Padang Ratu in the centre, and the west and south coasts (Krui and Kalianda). The population density of these areas was 500 persons per sq. km, or less. Rain-fed rice fields (sawah tadah hujan) were farmed on low-lying marshy land in these transition areas, but dry land fields (tegalan) were planted with mixed or rotational annual food crops (tumpang sari) of maize, soybean, peanut, mung bean, and cassava—were becoming more dominant. When the soil deteriorated, cassava was the only crop to grow, otherwise the land was infested by alang-alang. The exception to this pattern were the farming systems on the south coast of Kalianda and Rajabasa mountain. Here the coasts were dominated by village-scale irrigation of sawah and coconut groves, while the adjacent hill slopes were transformed into perennial cash crop kebun. Prior to the mid-1980s clove was the main crop, often inter-planted with coffee, which brought prosperity to these regions.

The marginal zones were sparsely populated areas consisting of ‘isolated areas’ and ‘enclaves’ with a population density below 200 persons per sq. km. The isolated areas were the last transmigration settlements in central Lampung (Rumbia, Seputih Surabaya, and Seputih Mataram) and north
Lampung (Panaragan, Way Abung, and army veteran transmigration sites near Kotabumi), together with the newly cleared mountain areas of Sumber Jaya, Kenali, and Liwa and their surroundings. In the last transmigration settlements, stagnant poverty was the main feature. Due to poor soil and isolation only cassava could grow there. Working as seasonal labourers on the nearby large estate plantations provided another source of income, but wages paid to men, women, and children who had dropped out of school were low. The situation contrasted with the picture of mountain areas, which were still being progressively cleared. Although also isolated due to the absence of road networks, such areas were endowed with fertile soil and higher/longer rainfall. Returns from forest clearing, a crop or two of upland rice, coffee gardens and, in Liwa, vegetable fields (cabbage, potato, shallot, chilli) were high. As Pain noted (1989; 341) ‘here and there wealthy zones have taken shape’ in these pioneer zones. 9

Included in the enclaves of the marginal zones were the Krui region on the west coast, local transmigration clearings in the northern part of Lampung, swamps under reclamation on the east coast (Rawasragi in Palas in the south and between Way Tulang Bawang and Way Mesuji in the north), and various forest reserves. As on the Kalianda coast, village-scale irrigation of *sawah* and coconut groves could be encountered surrounding the village settlements of the native Lampung on the Krui coast. But unlike situation in Kalianda, where the hills returned to coffee after the clove gardens were ruined, in Krui the hills were returned to *damar* (*Shorea javanica*) resin gardens. Local transmigration sites in Mesuji and Tulang Bawang were in their early stages, irrigation canals were

9 The proceeding chapters will discuss in detail one of these pioneer zones, namely Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong.
under construction, and the transmigrants were struggling to survive by planting food crops. Another irrigation canal built in the early 1980s was the Rawasragi in Palas in the south, to be allocated to transmigrants and spontaneous migrants who had been in the area since the 1950s and for decades had subsisted by farming tegalan and flooded rice fields.

One of the features of Lampung depicted by Levang (1989) and Pain (1989) is the striking heterogeneity of the livelihoods of the rural Lampung population. They described zones of wealthy villages adjacent to zones of poor villages, and within the villages, wealthy families neighbouring poor families. Increasing population pressure, shrinking land holdings, decreasing production per capita, and, subsequently, decreasing household incomes were the characteristics of villages in both wealthy and poor zones. In the poor villages the problems were worsening rapidly.

Villages with families with incomes above subsistence level were found in the zones endowed with fertile soil with kebun, irrigated sawah, and mixed kebun and tegalan. Kebun dominate, from south to north, in the foothills of Bukit Barisan mountain range and its adjacent plains (Talang Padang, Kota Bumi, Bukit Kemuning, Sumber Jaya, and Balik Bukit) and the coasts (Kalianda, Kota Agung, and Krui). The fertile plain around Sukadana (Sukadana, Pugung Raharjo, Labuan Maringgai, and Jabung) is also dominated by kebun, often mixed with productive tegalan. The transformation of ladang into kebun was brought about by the increasing amount of labour available for weeding, regeneration, and harvesting.

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10 A wealthy village has a relatively large proportion of wealthy families with income enabling them to afford other than the basic subsistence needs (i.e., food). Villages whose inhabitants are mostly families with income below subsistence level, were defined as poor villages.
thanks to the influx of spontaneous migrants. Labour arrangements (daily wages, contracts, and sharecropping) enabled the migrants to accumulate savings and to buy their own kebun. One hectare or two of kebun, the size that can be managed by an average family, provided surplus family income. However, kebun were constantly being divided through the bequeathing of land to children. This led to a decrease in average landholding. As the number of migrant labourers grew, due to natural growth and the new arrivals, the area of land available for sale declined. Since there was no more empty land nearby to clear for expansion, the result has been the emergence of a stratum of landless labourers.

Villages in zones with irrigated sawah were also home to families with income above subsistence level in the mid-1980s. Irrigation canals, villages, and road networks in these zones were built during the colonial and post-colonial transmigration programmes. From south to central Lampung, these zones include Wonosobo, Gedong Tataan, Pringsewu, Metro, and Bandar Jaya. During the colonial period, the allotment that a transmigrant family received was 0.7 ha of sawah. Later under post-colonial transmigration the allotment was increased to 1 or 2 hectares. Regular water supply, fertilisation, agricultural extension, and the higher amount of labour application brought to these zones increasing production of rice. The first and second generations of transmigrants lived a better life than the one they had in Java. But this period of prosperity was short-lived. The subdivision of land through inheritance, sharp increase in land price, and growing population soon reduced per capita production and income. For the first and second generations of transmigrants, the variation of income among families was small. But after three or four generations the gap widened. A few rich families benefited from rice re-selling, shops, and huller machines, while the proportion of
landless and near landless families has grown. Responding to this pressure, the population in these zones employed various strategies, such as off farm and non-farm employment, cottage industries, and migration within and outside the province.

Poor villages with tegalan as the main farming system were scattered on the plains with poor soil. These were the last transmigration settlements that had no irrigation canals, from Sepuh Banyak to Sepuh Surabaya in the centre, which Joan Hardjono (1977) called 'cassava villages', and the local transmigration sites near Menggala in the north and the nearby villages created by subsequent spontaneous migrants. Annual food crops such as upland rice, maize, and cassava were cultivated, often mixed as tumpangsari. Without the application of fertiliser the production was low, and with no, or only a short fallow period the soil gradually became exhausted and infested by alang-alang grass. Only cassava could grow in this exhausted land, but the planting of this crop only further reduced soil fertility. The poor families constantly struggled to earn a subsistence level income. Unable to buy rice, these families turned to cassava as their staple food. Tapioca factories bought cassava at very low prices, frequently so low that it only covered the harvesting cost. Working as wage labourers for estate plantations only provided a modest supplement of income. Estate plantations employed labourers only seasonally, such as during planting, weeding, and harvesting. As the wage paid was low, poverty has been the main characteristic of the livelihood among such plantation workers.

Contract farming, a scheme involving smallholders ('the plasma') and estate companies ('the nucleus') was introduced in Lampung in the second half of the 1970s. Like the transmigration program, the main
sponsor for this scheme was the World Bank. The aim of contract farming program was to boost production and to improve the livelihood of the smallholder farmers. While production grew, the improved livelihood often did not eventuate. In Lampung, priority for contract farming program was given to transmigrants. In Way Abung, for example, under a PIR program (perkebunan inti rakyat, people’s nucleus estate) the transmigrants were given credit and assistance by PTP to plant high-yielding hevea rubber trees on their allotments. The plan was that transmigrants would secure their food supplies from tegalan or sawah, while the hevea field would provide additional cash. But eventually, instead of having two fields with one field for food supply and the other field to provide cash, the transmigrants either abandoned the hevea for food crops or abandoned the food crops for hevea (Levang 1989). Another example of contract farming was that of the transmigrant sites near the PTP Bunga Mayang sugar cane plantation and factory. The transmigrants were farmers who had been evicted from mountain forestry zones and forced to join the local transmigration program. Under the TRI program (tebu rakyat intensifikasi, people’s sugar cane intensification) the PTP gave credit and bought the sugar canes that the transmigrants planted on their land. The transmigrants’ land titles were kept by the PTP as collateral. High debt, low production, and the low price of cane ensured a consistently low income among the transmigrants (Elmhirst 1997). The transmigrant families also supplied cheap seasonal labour for the cane plantation and sugar factory. Because the government granted official land title only to the transmigrants, the neighbouring native Lampung population, with no official land titles, were excluded from the project.

As far as contract farming is concerned, the latest schemes of contract farming in Lampung involved the production of cattle and shrimp.
Central Lampung was the first to experience the contract farming in cattle husbandry. With regard to the lucrative shrimp industries, two companies (PT Dipasena and PT Bratasena) were granted thousands of hectares of swamp and mangrove land between the mouths of the Way Mesuji, the Way Tulang Bawang, and the Way Seputih rivers. Under the TIR program (tambak inti rakyat, people’s nucleus shrimp pond), the companies recruited smallholders as the plasma. The company provided credit, and bought, processed, and marketed the shrimp. The farmers provided the labour for the ponds’ (tambak) production. It was promised that over a number of years the farmers would be able repay their debt, deducted from their production, and become the owners of the tambak. An example of this is the contract between 8600 families and PT Dipasena. They were promised that after 8 years the farmers would be the owners of the tambak. But in 2000, after 10 years, not only had the promise that the farmers would own the tambak not materialised, the debt that the farmers still needed to pay was extremely high, and it was estimated that it would take much longer to repay (Kelana, Purba, and Pandia, Gatra 26/2/2000).

Conversion of swamps and mangroves into shrimp tambak is a more recent phenomenon. The surveys of Levang (1989) and Pain (1989) in the mid 1980s do not mention tambak as an important formal land use in Lampung. In the 1990s most of swamps and mangroves on eastern and southern coasts of Lampung were gradually transformed into tambak. In addition to the two large-scale estate shrimp ponds, both under a contract farming scheme, medium scale ponds can be found side by side with numerous small scale ones. Like kebun, tambak provide wages for labourers. Tambak yield a lucrative profit, but unlike kebun and tegalan, the installation cost and input for the operation of an intensive tambak is high.
Thus unlike tegalan and kebun, the landless poor are unlikely to be the ones who can afford to convert swamp and mangrove into tambak.

Thus, during the 20th century, the opening of the ‘empty land’ of Lampung was completed. It was began in the early 1900s by the Dutch through colonisation, followed by the post-colonial transmigration programmes, and was completed through the local transmigration programmes. The planned settlements started in the centre-south, continued to the centre, and finished in the northeast Lampung lowlands. Spontaneous settlements, following the same direction as the planned ones, moved further toward the northwest Lampung highlands. The conversion of swamps and mangroves on the east coast into irrigated rice fields and shrimp ponds (tambak) in the 1990s marked the last stage of the opening up of the Lampung lowland. Forests in the northern part of the province were logged and converted into local transmigration settlements and large estate plantations. During the same period, the isolated mountain regions in the northwest (Sumber Jaya, Kenali, and Balik Bukit), named by Pain (1989) as Lampung’s ‘last frontier’ where the clearing of forest was still in progress in the mid-1980s, were transformed into new population centres.

By the very end of the 20th century Lampung had been transformed into an important producer of agricultural products. Pepper and coffee, of which Lampung remains Indonesia’s centre of production, are still important commodities produced by smallholder farmers. Coconuts and

---

11 Between 1986-1988 Lampung sent 162 families to join transmigration programmes in South Sumatra and Riau (Pain 1898:317). The province has never become a major transmigration sending area. In the 1990s transmigration was no longer an important part of Indonesia’s national development program.

12 It is one of these new population centres, namely Sumber Jaya, that the proceeding chapters will be discussing.
bananas are largely produced from smallholder fields, though estate plantations also produce a few. Noted for centuries for its insufficient rice production and regular importation of rice from Java, Lampung today is a self-sufficient rice producer and, like its neighbour Java, is regarded as one of Indonesia’s rice baskets. Among the annual food crops (e.g., maize, soybean, peanut, mung bean), the production of cassava is worth noting: cassava has become an export cash crop of which Lampung is the main national producing area. Like sugarcane, cassava is produced by both smallholder farmers and estate plantations. Lampung is surplus in livestock production; the surplus is exported mainly to Java. Cattle are produced by small farmers, feeding companies (perusahaan penggemukan sapi), or by both under contract farming. Chickens are produced by small farmers as well as medium and large enterprises. Goats are raised primarily by small farmers.

In the wake of cash crops production by smallholder farmers and estate plantations (see Table 2.2), agricultural processing industries developed in Lampung. Beside dried and processed coffee and pepper, Lampung today is home to factories processing cane into molasses and sugar, and cassava into pellet and tapioca flour. Crude palm oil and crumb rubber have been exported from Lampung since the colonial period. More recently, processing factories in Lampung have begun to produce soap/detergent, monosodium glutamate (msg), citric acid, and sodium cyclamate.

Coffee and pepper processing factories are located close to the seaport at Panjang. Among these coffee-processing industries, the Nescafe factory in Srengsem is the largest one. Feed processing factories are also located close to Panjang seaport. On the western and northern outskirts of Bandar Lampung, close to the old transmigration sites, are factories operated
since the colonial era: the oil palm factory in Rejosari near Natar and rubber factories in Way Lima, Way Galih, Bergen, and Bekri. Eight sugar factories are located between Gunung Sugih, Kota Bumi and Menggala. The cassava processing industry is the most numerous in the province: over 30 factories in 2000. Initially, when their number was much smaller, these factories were located near Panjang. Today they are scattered close to the cassava producing areas in East Lampung, Central Lampung, North Lampung, Tulang Bawang, and Way Kanan districts.

By the end of the 1980s, the population of Lampung had reached the density of Java at the beginning of the 20th century. With over 200 inhabitants per sq. km. at the beginning of the 20th century, overpopulation was seen as the cause of economic stagnation and rural impoverishment in Java, and the distribution of its population to Indonesia’s outer islands through the transmigration program was believed to be the remedy. Although this belief has proved to be a fallacy ( Wertheim 1959), the transmigration program has played an important role in population distribution in Lampung (cf. Benoit et al. 1989) and in boosting agricultural production. But population is not the only impact that the transmigration program (and regional development) has brought to Lampung. Agrarian problems of rural impoverishment (i.e., low production per capita, landlessness, and poverty), widely perceived to be linked to the overpopulation that characterised Java for centuries have also been successfully transmigrated to Lampung.

In the 1990s, Lampung consistently ranked among the poorest provinces in Indonesia. In 1999 one out of two families in Lampung was classified as poor (see Table 2.3). These poor families are the ones who could not afford to live in proper housing and did not eat and dress properly. For
these poor, especially for those with a slim opportunity for upward mobility, Lampung has indeed turned from the land of hope into the land of despair.

Environmental degradation has also emerged as a problem facing Lampung. Waste from agricultural processing factories pollutes the tributaries of the Way Sekampung, the Way Seputih and Way Tulang Bawang. Keeping the quality of the river water at a level that can still be used for agricultural purposes (irrigation and fishery) is one of the local government's main priorities. The conversion of swamps and mangroves into brackish shrimp ponds along the east coast is reported to have caused the erosion of the beach and intrusion of saline water inland. The clearing of the mountain forests by spontaneous migrant smallholders has for decades been blamed for the perceived problem of watershed degradation. Forest squatters farming the upper watersheds feeding water for big dams were the main target of eviction and local transmigration programmes. More recently, the remaining migrant smallholders farming the mountain zones have also been blamed for the reduction of the habitat of endangered Sumatran animals such as tiger, rhino, and elephant.\(^\text{13}\)

Conflict over land is another pressing issue in Lampung. The incidence of land conflicts was among the highest in Indonesia (Kompas 25/6/2001). There are conflicts among the local population, between the local population and private and state-owned plantations companies, and between the local population and the forestry authorities. A village in

\(^{13}\)Scientists from World Conservation Society, a New York based conservation organization, suggest that the main threat that could lead to the extinction of these animals is the expansion of smallholder coffee gardens inside Bukit Barisan Selatan National Park boundaries (BBC News 18/5/2004).
north Lampung, where local transmigration settlements were created near old native Lampung hamlets, is a good example. Among the native Lampung families there were disputes over which families had the right to receive the compensation given by a private company opening a plantation on their former *adat* land (Elmhirst 1997). Some fields allocated to the local transmigrants were resumed by the native Lampung, because they claimed that they had received no compensation from the government. The local transmigrants themselves were among forest squatters who for years have been in conflict with forestry authorities. More recently, the native Lampung communities have claimed back and asked for compensation for thousands of hectares of their former *adat* land now used by PTP Bunga Mayang for sugarcane plantations. Conflicts over forestry zones can be encountered throughout Lampung, as well as between local peoples and large estate companies. Suppressed during the New Order, the landless and near landless peasants have taken matters in their own hands after the *reformasi* and claimed the lands designated as forestry zones or granted to plantation companies.

The title of a national newspaper article (*Kompas* 25/6/2001), *Sengketa tanah, wabah lapar tanah* (land conflict, epidemic of land hunger), suggests that land hunger is one of the root causes of conflicts over land in Lampung. With a high agrarian density, reaching 400 persons per km sq., and 20-22% of the population being landless, shortage of land has become a problem in Lampung. As in Java, agrarian problems in this ‘little Java’ or ‘North Java’ are perceived as the result of overpopulation.

As Table 2.3 shows, population distribution and regional development remain uneven. The city of Bandar Lampung, the capital of the province, and Metro, a rural commercial centre newly classified as a municipality
(kota administratif), are the most densely populated districts. This is followed by the early transmigration receiving districts (Tanggamus, South Lampung, Central Lampung, and East Lampung), and by the last local transmigration sites (Tulang Bawang and Way Kanan). With most of its mountain areas, covering nearly 60% of its territory classified as state forest, significant areas are not available for settlement therefore not designated as major transmigration receiving areas, West Lampung is the least populated district and has remained isolated until recently. Compared to other districts in Lampung except for Metro municipality, the least developed and least populated West Lampung has the lowest incidence of poverty (see Table 2.3). The chapters to follow will discuss West Lampung, particularly one of its highland regions whose inhabitants settled there quite recently. The highland region is regarded as 'the most developed area' in this underdeveloped district.
Table 2.2 Major land use and production in Lampung, 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land use and commodities</th>
<th>Area Ha</th>
<th>(%)</th>
<th>Production tonnes</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rice fields</td>
<td>284,664</td>
<td>(8.6)</td>
<td>1,992,689</td>
<td>Produced by smallholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- rice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dry fields</td>
<td>675,860</td>
<td>(20.5)</td>
<td>3,613,919</td>
<td>Produced by smallholders and plantation companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- cassava</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- maize</td>
<td>1,109,326</td>
<td></td>
<td>41,360</td>
<td>Produced by smallholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- sweet potato</td>
<td>12,024</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- soybean</td>
<td>13,081</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- peanut</td>
<td>41,360</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- green bean</td>
<td>6,352</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash crops fields</td>
<td>1,031,811</td>
<td>(31.2)</td>
<td>95,165</td>
<td>Robusta coffee produced by smallholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- coffee</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- pepper</td>
<td>23,885</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- coconut</td>
<td>139,617</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- cocoa</td>
<td>7,714</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- sugarcane</td>
<td>462,946</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- rubber</td>
<td>29,234</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- oil palm</td>
<td>99,910</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest</td>
<td>871,979</td>
<td>(26.4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brackish pond (tambak)</td>
<td>33,844</td>
<td>(1.0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alang-alang grass</td>
<td>90,164</td>
<td>(2.7)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlements</td>
<td>248,109</td>
<td>(7.5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BPS Lampung (2001)
### Table 2.3 Population density and poverty in Lampung

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subdistricts</th>
<th>Area (ha)</th>
<th>Population and Incidence of poverty in 2001</th>
<th>Villages and IDT*14 villages in 1996</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Persons</td>
<td>Persons per km sq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bandar Lampung</td>
<td>19,200</td>
<td>754,847</td>
<td>3911.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Lampung</td>
<td>340,583</td>
<td>1,146,740</td>
<td>360.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanggamus</td>
<td>340,158</td>
<td>800,400</td>
<td>238.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Lampung</td>
<td>379,927</td>
<td>1,055,226</td>
<td>220.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metro</td>
<td>7864</td>
<td>118,048</td>
<td>1910.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Lampung</td>
<td>443,789</td>
<td>874,169</td>
<td>201.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Lampung</td>
<td>176,628</td>
<td>529,923</td>
<td>104.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulang Bawang</td>
<td>777,084</td>
<td>711,886</td>
<td>91.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Way Kanan</td>
<td>352,021</td>
<td>357,225</td>
<td>91.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Lampung</td>
<td>474,989</td>
<td>371,787</td>
<td>75.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,301,545</td>
<td>6,720,260</td>
<td>190.44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: BPS Lampung (1996 and 2001); BKKBN Lampung (2000)

*The number of villages and IDT villages in Tanggamus is included in South Lampung, Metro and East Lampung in Central Lampung, and Tulang Bawang and Way Kanan in North Lampung.

14 The recipients of IDT (Inpres Desa Tertinggal), Presidential Instruction for Left-behind Villages) programmes (i.e., small credit for village community groups) were the least developed villages that lacked the services and facilities such as roads, clinics, schools, markets, etc. that the average village in the province had.
CHAPTER THREE

Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong Highland: Creating A ‘Wealthy Zone’

Colonial and post-colonial government initiatives in the 20th century brought mixed results in Lampung province: the formation of poor zones in some areas and ‘wealthy zones’ in other areas. West Lampung was one of the province’s least developed districts (kabupaten). However, a few regions in this undeveloped district can be classified as ‘wealthy zones’. These are Krui on the coast and Liwa with adjoining Way Tenong and Sumber Jaya in the eastern highlands. This chapter focuses on the creation of Way Tenong and Sumber Jaya, one of Lampung’s last frontiers that were transformed into one of the province’s ‘wealthy zones’.

Today, native Lampung populations are still relatively dominant in some regions of West Lampung coasts and highlands. Non-Lampung migrant populations are numerous on the southern part of the coast and the eastern highlands. In the ancient times, the West Lampung highlands was home to native Lampung settlements. Since the 14th century native Lampung people have left these highlands to settle the plains and coasts. This out-migration, it is argued, is a result of the integration of native Lampung people’s economy into world mercantilism.

Today the majority of the population in Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong are non-native Lampung migrants from neighbouring provinces: Semendonese from South Sumatra, Sundanese from West Java, and
Javanese from central and eastern Java. The in-migration of non-native Lampung to this highland region can be linked to ‘development’ and the reproduction of a mode of livelihood of smallholder farming.

This chapter gives a brief history of the out-migration of native Lampung people from the West Lampung highlands in pre-colonial and colonial times. This is followed by an account of colonial and post-colonial in-migration of non-native Lampung people to Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong. The chapter concludes with a general description of present socioeconomic conditions in Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong.

**Mountain West Lampung: An Ancient Abandoned Highland**

Lying between the borders of Lampung, Bengkulu, and South Sumatra in the north to the Sunda strait in the south, West Lampung district can be divided into three geographic zones. They comprise Pesisir Krui, forming a coastal strip, the southern hinterland and slopes facing the Indian Ocean to the west, and the mountainous highlands in the east. The gently rolling mountains and hills form part the southern tip of Sumatra’s Bukit Barisan mountain range, which stretches the length of the island, from Aceh to Lampung.

The west Lampung coastal strip, Pesisir Krui, is endowed with coconut groves and wet rice fields that dominate the narrow plains in the central portion of the coasts. The southern coast also has upland fields of annual crops (e.g., rice, maize) and, more recently, palm oil plantations. In Pesisir Krui generally, cattle rearing is a widespread economic activity. From north to south of Pesisir Krui, damar agroforests dominate the slopes to an
altitude of 800 metres. Here, along with other fruit and timber tree crops, native Lampung smallholders cultivate *Shorea javanica*, following successions of rice swidden with coffee and/or pepper gardens (Michon *et al.* 2000).

In the highlands, Mount Pesagi (2239 metres) and most of the surrounding mountains and hills are classified as forest reserves. Patches of forests can still be found on the upper slopes or the tops of the mountains and hills. Some villages have protected patches of forest adjacent to wet rice fields and their settlements. Most settlements are located on the elevation between 700 to 1000 metres. Smallholders cultivate coffee, pepper, and other tree crops in the highlands. Terraced wet rice fields are constructed on the alluvial flats adjacent to creeks and rivers.

Highland West Lampung today is home to native Lampung people and migrant populations of Semendo, Javanese, and Sundanese. The native Lampung population, *Pesisir*, are dominant in the western part of the highlands including the regions of Sukau, Balik Bukit, Belalau, and Kenali. In the eastern part of the highlands, numerous old Semendo villages can be encountered in Way Tenong, less so in Sumber Jaya. Sundanese and Javanese hamlets and villages can be found almost everywhere in the West Lampung mountains. The concentration of hamlets and villages of migrants from Java is increasing on newly cleared mountain areas such as Sekincang and Suoh in the east. Migrant populations (Semendo, Javanese, and Sundanese) represent the majority in ‘the newly developed’ region of Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong in the easternmost regions.

The early history of highland West Lampung identifies a flourishing ancient civilization. Scattered megalithic remains can be found in the
highlands. Batu Brak, the largest site of these megalithic remains, is located in Kebon Tebu, Sumber Jaya. In an area of about two hectares a menhir in the centre is circled by neatly laid dolmens. Other pre-historic sites in West Lampung are smaller in size. In addition to megalithic stones, a series of archaeological excavations have also found bronze bracelets, blades, beads and sherds of locally made and imported pots. Sukendar (1979) interprets the artefacts as ritual objects used in burials and forms of religious worship as well as for more mundane uses, such as food processing, tool making, and building materials. The sherds of ceramics, thought to have been imported from China during the 9th and 10th centuries AD, according to McKinnon (1993) indicate the ancient occurrence of foreign trade relations in this highland.

The relation between the ancient communities of Batu Brak and its neighbouring megalithic sites and the present people of Lampung cannot be convincingly established. But one thing we can be sure of is that it is the disappearance of this ancient civilization that permitted the present population to migrate and settle in the West Lampung highland.

A more recent history of Lampung noted that highland West Lampung may have been abandoned by its population (cf. Hadikusuma 1989, Sevin 1989). The majority of the native Lampung groups now inhabiting the Lampung plains and coasts trace their origins from the West Lampung highlands. Sekala Brak, a location in the foothills of Pesagi mountain near lake Ranau, is said to be their land of origin. Different periods and directions of migration resulted in different dispersals of native Lampung populations (cf. Sevin 1989). Based on oral and written histories of native Lampung communities collected by the Dutch scholars and officials, it is thought that the first waves of out-migration took place during the 14th
and 15th centuries. These groups moved to the central and eastern plains. Here they developed as a sub-group of native Lampung people known as the Abung. A second and subsequent wave of migration dispersed to the southern and western lowlands and coast. In the 18th century they were identified as Pesisir (Peminggir). The out-migration of the Pesisir from Belalau continued up to the 20th century. Both Abung and Pesisir later either absorbed or drove out the Pubian, a third and smallest group of native Lampung people living in the central and southern Lampung plains. Unlike Abung and Pesisir, Pubian oral history does not relate their origins strongly to the Belalau highlands.

The subsequent waves of migration from highland to lowland Lampung during the 14th and 20th century\(^1\), it is argued, could be linked to pre-colonial and colonial mercantilism and elements of native Lampung social organization.

Between the 16th and 18th centuries, the sultanate of Banten, the primary world pepper supplier, obtained a steady pepper production from Lampung. Previously indirectly via Banten, from the 18th century the Dutch obtained pepper supplies directly from the eastern portion of Lampung. The British controlled the pepper supply from Lampung's west coast—the present day West Lampung district that was then included as part of the residency of Bengkulu—from the late 17th to the early 19th century.

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\(^1\) A history of Lampung before the migration from highland to lowland is difficult to ascertain. Historical materials provide convincing evidence of the existence of an earlier civilisation in lowland Lampung (Hadikusuma 1989). A Chinese source indicates trading relations between China and Tulang Bawang on the north coast as early as the 7th century. Stone plaques describing the Sriwijaya's power and influence in Lampung at the end of the 1st millennium were found in several places. Signs of the presence of Majapahit in Lampung in the 13th century can also be traced.
century. Native Lampung people during the second half of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} millennium were the most important global pepper producers.

A British report in 1813 (Bastin 1965: 147-148) notes that on the west coast of Krui, 881 married men and 640 single men engaged in a 'contract' with the British to farm various stages of pepper gardens. These men maintained almost a half million pepper-bearing vines and an equal number of non-bearing vines (newly planted and old). The production for that year was 147.6 tonnes. In addition, there were another 119,550 bearing vines producing 24 tonnes of pepper in 'free' gardens. An earlier historical record, from a 17\textsuperscript{th} century plaque (piagam), indicates a similar contract between the native Lampung population on the southern coast and the sultan of Banten (Kingston 1987:10-11). A married man was expected to plant 1000 pepper vines while bachelors had to plant 500. Monopolising the buying of the pepper at a set price, the Sultan also claimed a minimum of 11\% as tribute.

Up to the mid-19\textsuperscript{th} century, the sultanate of Banten, the sultanate of Palembang, and Bugis and Malay traders and pirates were involved in a series of conflicts downstream of Way Tulang Bawang river in northeast Lampung. Monopoly over pepper produced in the surrounding areas was at the heart of the conflict. From the evidence of pepper trading in the lowlands of Lampung, it can be assumed that pepper cultivation may well have been an attraction for the migration of native Lampung from highland to lowland.

If engaging in petty commodity production for global trade served as an attraction for native Lampung people to migrate to the lowlands, the process was mediated and even facilitated by their customary practices.
(adat). Marriage, property and inheritance, and socio-political structures were key institutions in this respect. Payment of an expensive bride price (ujujr) characterized marriages among Lampung people (Wilken 1921, cited in LeBar 1976). Native Lampung people observed virilocal post marital residence and male primogeniture in inheritance. The bride was ‘taken’ from her group, and the children ‘belong’ to the groom’s group. House and land passed to the elder son, who was then responsible for the care of the parents and unmarried siblings. The size of ujujr and the marriage party was negotiated in accordance with the status of the family in the community, the higher the status the more ujujr payment was required. Larger wedding parties required more buffalos to slaughter and more meals to serve. Having inherited none of their parents’ property, after their marriages younger brothers worked on their own farms to provide their family with food, a sturdy house, and enough resources to pay for the ujujr and the wedding party of their sons’ marriage. Pepper cultivation, and later in the 19th century, coffee enabled this system to persist. New land was constantly sought for pepper gardens. Forests were cleared for upland rice swiddens in the first year or two and transformed into pepper gardens (and/or coffee gardens, later in the 19th century) and managed for another 10 years or more. Old gardens were then left fallow and later rejuvenated, transformed into tree gardens, or simply abandoned for natural regeneration. A new forest plot was cleared and the cycle of such rotational cultivation then continued.

A dominant tradition among Lampung communities occupying new territory involved a process of political fission. As discussed in chapter 2, buay and marga were said to be the highest socio-political unit of the
native Lampung people. Each *marga* was independent of the other *marga*.² It is evident that rather than uniting into a single kingdom, the natives of Lampung were continuously creating independent *marga*. The creation of a new *marga* typically took place when groups of people migrated to open new gardens and created new villages on land beyond the boundary of their mother *marga* territory. With established trading networks for pepper on the coasts (Krui and Semangka Bay) and the navigable rivers such as the Way Tulang Bawang in the north, the Way Seputih in the centre, and the Way Sekampung in the south, lowland Lampung attracted more and more migrants from the highlands.

The waves of migration of native Lampung people from highland to lowland eventually left extensive tracts of the West Lampung highlands ‘unpopulated’. In the early 19th century, a few small villages surrounded by mountain forests were scattered in the regions of Balik Bukit, Belalau, and Kenali. In the mid-1800s, as mentioned in chapter 2, the Dutch gazetted the non-cultivated lands between settlements and fields as state property. On the one hand this action limited the native Lampung people’s access to forest land between their settlements and fields, but on the other hand it enabled the Dutch officers to permit migrants to move in and to occupy former native Lampung *marga* lands.

The present day mountain region of Way Tenong and Sumber Jaya, then the territory of *marga* Kenali, became an ‘empty’ frontier. It is this empty land that attracted an influx of migrants, this time from outside Lampung.

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² Some of the independent adjacent *marga* formed loose confederations such as *Megou Pak* (the four *marga*) on the southern coast (that later supported Raden Intan, his son Raden Imba Kusuma, and his grandson Raden Intan II’s rebellion against the Dutch in the 1800s) and Abung Siwo Mego (the nine *marga* of Abung) who all claim to be descendents of the same mythical ancestor Minak Paduka Begaduh, a migrant from Belalau.
Map 2. Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong
Semendo is the name of a sub-group of Pasemah people inhabiting highland Palembang in the province of South Sumatra. Compared to other sub-groups of Pasemah, the Semendo were said to have their own distinct characteristics in social organization (LeBar 1976). While other Pasemah sub-groups are organised genealogically into patrilineal sumbai or marga (clan) and jurai (lineage), the Semendo have matrilineal sumbai and jurai. Other Pasemah sub-groups practised the prevalent system of marriage with an expensive jujur bride price, virilocal post marital residence, and male primogeniture inheritance. In contrast, semendo marriage involved no jujur payment, uxorilocal post marital residence, and female primogeniture inheritance (tunggu tubang). The tunggu tubang stipulates that the eldest daughter inherits the parents’ property, usually the house and land. The Semendo, among the Pasemah, were also the earliest to convert to Islam, and their wet rice fields were more advanced than anywhere else in southern Sumatra in the 19th century.

An impetus for the migration of the Semendo might be attributed to the practice of tunggu tubang, which forced other children to look for new land to clear elsewhere (Sevin 1989: 93). Within the Pasemah land, the Semendo first migrated to Semendo Ulu Luas and Mekakau, and then later they moved further down to Bengkulu and Lampung. In the 1870s the

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3 According to Jaspan (1976) in ‘a broad sense’ the Pasemah includes ‘linguistically kindred’ groups of Empat Lawang (Lintang), Gumai, Kikim, Kisam, Lembak (?), Lematang, Mekakau, Pasemah Lebar, Semendo, and Serawai. In ‘a strict sense’, the term Pasemah refers only to the people of Pasemah Lebar.
Semendo started their subsequent southward migration to Lampung. Along the eastern slope of Bukit Barisan mountain range, the Semendo first moved to present day Kasui, Way Tenong and Sumber Jaya, and Pulau Panggung. They cleared the forest, created villages and wet rice fields, and opened upland rice fields (*uma, ladang*) that were then transformed into gardens (*kebun*) of coffee, often inter-planted with pepper. The Semendo established four ‘independent’ *marga* in the 1930s along this route of migration in Lampung following the eastern slope of the Bukit Barisan mountain range. These *marga*, from north to south, are Kasui, Rebang Seputih, Way Tenong, and Rebang Pugung.

Colonial interventions, it is important to note, facilitated the further southward migration of the Semendo people into Lampung. By the 1850s, the Dutch had been able to put the territory and the people of Palembang, Bengkulu, and Lampung under their political control. All the villages and *marga* in these three residencies were integrated into the colonial government administration. In order to cut the British-controlled Singapore trading networks with these three residencies, the Dutch also reoriented the trading of commodities (especially pepper and coffee⁴) via Batavia (Jakarta) as an obligatory transit. Migrating to Lampung to get closer to the trading posts in Semangka Bay offered an economic advantage to the Semendo. In the 1850s, capitalizing on their territorial control, the Dutch imposed a new system of land ownership (Kingston 1987) that enabled Semendo people to occupy land in Lampung. The

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⁴ In the middle of the 19th century, pepper was no longer the only commodity sought from Lampung. The production decreased to only 10 percent compared with a century before. The Dutch liquidated the VOC at the end of the 18th century. Coffee, among other cash crops (e.g., sugar, pepper), was planted by peasants under the system of ‘forced cultivation’ and by private companies in parts of Java, Sulawesi, and Sumatra. Eventually, by the 20th century, in the southern half of Sumatra, coffee in the highland and rubber in lowland became an important source of income for smallholder farmers.
government only recognised land claims by individual villages up to six km from the village and 3 km from an *umbul* or temporary hamlet on newly cleared land. The land located between the villages, formerly common *marga* territory, now became a state domain. The Dutch administration allowed non-Lampung migrants to occupy and settle on some of this newly gazetted ‘public land’. From this time, the Lampung *marga* were no longer in a position to protect its members’ traditional claims to a frontier land (Kingston 1987; 242) or to resist migrants seeking to settle and farm their former common land.

During the Dutch administration West Lampung district was known as the *onderafdeling* of Krui, and formed part of Bengkulu residency (cf. Sevin 1989). Of the four Semendo *marga* in present day Lampung, Way Tenong formed part of the *onderafdeeling* of Krui under the Bengkulu residency administration. Some elders in Way Tenong are said to know the story of the history of the first migration of Semendo to Way Tenong. Below is one version of this story as told by Pak Jahri the former village head of Mutar Alam. Pak Jahri’s story also appeared in BumiPos (11/9/2000).

In 1884, a group of men, Imam Paliare (Abidun), Raje Kuase (Serimat), and Puting Merge (Sendersang), and their followers Jenderang (Buntak), Jemakim, Senikar, and Jakalam received an order from Puyang Awak to search for land around the headwaters of Way Besai river. These men lived in *marga* Ulu Nasal in Bengkulu. They were told that Way Besai was located in Rantau Temiang. So they went to the village (kampung) of Rantau Temiang in Rebang Kasui. When they arrived there, two persons, Panjilam and Sersin, welcomed them. They continued travelling along the Way Besai river and stopped at Gedung Aji, now the site of the Way Besai hydroelectric power plant. In 1885, at Gedung Aji they cleared the forest and opened upland rice fields (*ladang*) for a year while continuing the search for the head (*ulu*) of the Way Besai river. After a year, in 1886, the location they were looking for
was finally found and they moved to this new location. They gave
the name of this newly cleared land Mutar Alam.

After building a settlement (*pemukiman*) in Mutar Alam, they
travelled back to Rantau Temiang in Rebang Kasui and continued
to Menggala to seek permission from the Dutch *controleur*. In
Menggala they reported to the *controleur* their new location at the
head of the Way Besai and asked for permission. They were told
that the land at the head of Way Besai was not under Menggala
administration, the land was under the jurisdiction of the *afdeling*
of Krui. The delegates were given an official letter to report to
*marga* Kenali. In Kenali, the delegates met the chief of the *marga*
Pangeran Polon. He accepted the new settlers as residents
(*penduduk*) of *marga* Kenali. He appointed Puting Merge as the
*kamid*, the head of the new settlement, who every 3 months had to
report to him about the development of the population and to
receive further guidance.

As the population grew, new hamlets (*susukan*) were created. In
1887, there were some new *dusun* (hamlets): ‘old’ Fajar Bulan (now
Sukajaya), Karang Tanjul (now Karang Agung), Gedung Surian,
and ‘old’ Sukaraja. In 1891, the Resident of Bengkulu officially
recognized all these hamlets as parts of the administrative village
(*dusun*) of Mutar Alam, and appointed Serimat as *perwatin* (village
head).

In 1900, after a long approach to *buay* Belunguh and *marga* Kenali,
the status of *marga* was finally granted. To mark the separation of
Way Tenong, the name of the new *marga*, from the *marga* of Kenali
a set of gifts was given by the new community to the *marga* Kenali.
The gifts included a sum of cash, a buffalo, a hundred dishes of
*kolak beras* (rice cooked in sweet coconut milk), a hundred
dried/fermented *semah* fishes, and an elephant tusk. The two *marga*
were declared as siblings (*kakak adik*), with Kenali as the elder and
Way Tenong the younger. The boundary of the territory of the new
*marga* was then set. Air Sanyir/Sekincau on the west, Dwikora on
the east, mount Remas on the north, and Begelung ridge on the east.
Also in 1900, the *controleur* of Krui officially appointed Raden
Cili as the first *marga* chief, the *pesirah*.
The common pattern of creating new settlements was, according to many elders, for small groups of families to depart from their village and settle new forestland to be cleared for cultivation. They sought fertile and relatively flat land where water could be channelled for wet rice fields. When this kind of land was found, the forest was then transformed into sedentary agricultural fields. This endeavour by a group of families to find new land to farm was called nyusuk. The cleared land evolved into a dusun or kampung from the stage where a few houses and huts were still scattered (susukan or talang) to nucleated settlements, usually along the main road/path. The first cleared land in Way Tenong was the old dusun and wet rice fields in the village of Sukaraja. Here, the wet rice fields, approximately 40 ha, were cleared and distributed among the first group of families arriving from Ulu Nasal, Bengkulu. This explains the location and style of all the Semendo dusun or kampung in the region, namely, rows of old stilted wooden houses along the main road near the wet rice fields along the banks of Way Besai river and its tributaries. The cultivation of coffee, it is said, was initiated later after the Dutch agricultural officers informed the people that the soil was suitable for coffee and advised them to plant this lucrative export crop. Coffee was then planted in the upland after forest clearing, with or without the initial one or two crops of upland rice (padi darat), and after 15 to 20 years the field was left fallow.

In the first half of the 20th century there were five Semendo villages in Way Tenong: Sukaraja, Mutar Alam, Gunung Terang, Karang Agung, and Way Petai (Pain 1989: 304). In the 1950s, when the BRN (Biro Rekonstruksi Nasional, National Reconstruction Bureau) transmigrants created new villages and a separate administrative subdistrict (kecamatan), all the villages of marga Way Tenong were integrated to the new subdistrict of Sumber Jaya. Simpang Sari, the capital of the new subdistrict of Sumber
Jaya, is much closer than Liwa, the capital of the subdistrict (negeri) Balik Bukit to which Way Tenong formerly belonged. It took a day’s motorbike travel to go to Liwa but only an hour or two to Simpang Sari.

Today, the Semendo in Way Tenong and Sumber Jaya, when discussing their adat, will mostly refer to tunggu tubang. The parental house and land is inherited by the eldest daughter, who, in return, is responsible for the care of her old parents. Those who had no daughter bequeathed their property to their elder son. This less preferred practice is called nangkit. Selling the tunggu tubang house and land is unacceptable and very rare. Thus, one can easily find in the region many tunggu tubang houses, wet rice fields, and coffee gardens. Some of the old ones have remained intact for four generations while new ones are continuously created. Old men usually relate the concept of tunggu tubang to politeness with regard to man and woman (singkuh sinduh). To live with your own daughter in the same house is more acceptable than with your daughter-in-law. It is extremely impolite for example for a man to be at home only with his daughter-in-law, to eat alone in the kitchen with his daughter-in-law, or even to be fed by his daughter-in-law when he is sick.

Semendo in the region also pay special tribute to their ancestors (puyang). Many people believe that the Semendo in the region are descendents of the mythical ancestor Puyang Awak, who is said to be ‘immortal’, because he has no grave and no one knows his whereabouts. Great-grandparent (puyang) graves are cared for and frequently visited for prayers (ziarah). At least in two villages, Mutar Alam and Gunung Terang, a ritual feast of sedekah pusaka is held each year in the Islamic calendar month of Muharam. In the sedekah gatherings the descendents of the ‘founders’ of the villages, a male in Mutar Alam and a female in Gunung Terang, recite
verses from the Qur'an and pray for their puyang. In both villages the sedekah is also marked by the cleaning of a dagger heirloom (pusaka) and concluded by commensality.

**Muara Jaya village: an enclave of native Lampung**

There is only one native Lampung Pesisir village in Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong region, namely Muara Jaya. Surrounded by Semendo, Sundanese and Javanese villages, Muara Jaya is now an enclave. Today, in this village there are no more than about 200 native Lampung Pesisir families. Among themselves, the native Lampung population in Muara Jaya still use the Pesisir dialect of Lampung language. Some Javanese men and women have intermarried with them. Like in the Semendo villages, many native Lampung Pesisir families in Muara Jaya live in stilted wooden houses.

The Lampung Pesisir population in Muara Jaya first arrived in 1930. Seven families first moved from Sebarus in Liwa. The land was inside the territory of Way Tenong marga so they needed permission from the Semendo people. The Semendo of Gunung Terang village were advised and gave them permission to clear the land and settle in their present location. A year later, immediately after a big earthquake, these families returned to Liwa. In the years which followed, some of these families, and more new families, arrived at Muara Jaya. In 1949 the new hamlet (susukan) of Muara Jaya was officially acknowledged as an administrative village. In mid 1990s the section of village with relatively fewer native Lampung was officially recognised as a separate village—now there are Muara Jaya I and Muara Jaya II.
According to elders in this village, looking for new land for wet rice fields was the primary reason for their migration from Liwa. Indeed, the alluvial flats on the banks of the river in the area, which is suitable for wet rice fields, was a source of conflict in the 1950s and 1960s between the Lampung and the neighbouring transmigrants. Both groups claimed ownership over the same precious land. The dispute was resolved after high profile mediation by the provincial and national authorities.

Apart from wet rice fields, the Lampung planted upland rice (padi ladang, padi darat). Some elders also said that they had heard that the Dutch administration planned to open a tea plantation in the region, but the plan never materialised. Coffee, it is said, began to be a significant source of income during the 1950s, after the arrival of transmigrants from Java. In relation to this, it is important to note that the world-wide economic depression in the 1930s, followed by Japan’s occupation in the first half of the 1940s and Indonesia’s war of independence to resist the return of the Dutch in the second half of the 1940s, caused the decline of markets and smallholders’ production of cash crops, including coffee. Consequently during the 1930s to the 1940s, rice production from wet and dry/upland fields was the villagers’ primary subsistence production in the region and elsewhere in the archipelago. Indonesian independence, declared in 1945 but acknowledged by the Dutch in 1949, marked the revival of coffee production in the region. The coming of transmigrants from Java and subsequent developments, have further facilitated such a revival.
The arrival of transmigrants from Java: the creation of Sumber Jaya

Unlike transmigration projects elsewhere in Indonesia, which are organised by the office of transmigration, the transmigration project in Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong was organised by a special unit under the office of the then Prime Minister of Indonesia. This special unit, called BRN (Biro Rekonstruksi Nasional, National Reconstruction Bureau), was designed to assist soldiers and civilian militia who had previously been involved in the independence war. The assistance was considered a kind of reward for these freedom fighters (pejuang kemerdekaan), and was primarily aimed at ensuring their return to 'a normal life'. One obvious choice was to turn these fighters into smallholding farmers by allotting each of them a piece of land. Since there was no more land to be distributed on Java, they had to be transmigrated outside Java. Lampung was chosen as the destination. Located close to Java, and with experience of receiving transmigrants from Java during the Dutch administration, several locations in Lampung were selected to receive the BRN transmigrants. The 'empty' Way Tenong highland was one of them.

Mimicking the structure of the army, the BRN transmigrants were organised into groups each under the leadership of a commander (Hereen 1976). Under this leadership each separate group cleared the forest, built a housing compound and road, and cultivated the land. Through their group leader the transmigrants received government assistance in the form of cash, food, tools, and building materials during the initial years. From 1949 to 1959 seven new transmigrant villages were created. The first location to be cleared was the present villages of Sukapura and Simpang Sari to the east of the Bukit Rigis mountain. From here clearing continued
to the area called Kebon Tebu to the south of Bukit Rigis mountain, where three villages were created (Tribudi Sukur, Pura Jaya, and Pura Wiwitan), and to the northwest of Bukit Rigis where two villages (Fajar Bulan and Pura Laksana) were created close to the Semendonese villages in Way Tenong.

Most BRN transmigrants were Sundanese from different parts of West Java such as Tasik Malaya, Karawang, and Bogor. There were few Javanese, however. It is interesting to note that the number of real veterans was very small, meaning that most BRN transmigrants to Sumber Jaya had never really been involved in the war, and more than half of those who migrated here were actually farmers and labourers (Heeren 1979:72). There is no data on how many ‘official’ BRN transmigrants actually arrived in Sumber Jaya. The BRN office recorded 22,198 members transmigrating to Lampung during 1951-53; among them 9,205 persons (2441 families) transmigrated to north Lampung, the rest to other sites in south and central Lampung (Hereen 1979:76). In north Lampung there were two BRN sites, Sumber Jaya and Tanjung Raya. The latter consisted only of one village in 1952, but a decade later had developed two other villages (Sevin 1989:107). Heeren (1979:81-83) noted that Sumber Jaya was the largest BRN transmigration site in Lampung. Transmigrants in Sumber Jaya were organised into two main organizations: Loba and PS (Pencak Silat). The PS was further subdivided into PS ’51 and PS ’52 and ’53. The Loba members settled in Sukapura. Of these, PS ’51 occupied Simpangsari; 450 families arrived in 1951 but by 1954 only 115 of them were left. There were 715 families in PS ’52 and ’53. Of these,

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5 An elder in Sukapura said that there were about 400 to 600 families in Loba, many of them from Tasik Malaya. Some of the Loba members later created the separate village of Tribudi Sukur.
by 1957, 2592 persons divided into 12 groups lived in Kebon Tebu and 2029 in Way Tenong.

Heeren (1979: 81-93) further notes the development of cooperatives among BRN transmigrants in Sumber Jaya and some problems with the neighbouring Semendo and Lampung people during the period 1951 to 1957. Under the organization of Loba and PS the transmigrants developed cooperatives for production and consumption. The land was cleared, cultivated, and harvested collectively. All the harvests ‘belonged’ to the organization; each member received food, goods and a small amount of cash for their daily needs. The harvests were sold by the organization and the surplus was kept by the organization. The organization was able to ensure that all members had enough food to eat. Houses were built collectively. For the first five years the land and houses could be individually owned, yet to sell them was prohibited. Hereen (1979) further suggests that with Loba, the development of the cooperative was positive, the organization owned six shops, a sawmill, and a tile factory. In contrast, the PS cooperatives in Kebon Tebu were soon in a state of crisis. Here harvests often failed and the road was not properly kept up. Collective farming soon gave way to individual production. The success of Loba and the failure of PS, with regard to the development of cooperatives, was largely related to the quality of local leaders. Loba had strong, charismatic and reliable leaders while the PS did not.

In Sukapura and Simpang Sari the average size of land holdings was 1.10 ha per family while in Kebon Tebu it was 0.80 ha; this figure was far below the ideal and planned average of 3 ha (Hereen 1979). Besides rice, the transmigrants cultivated maize, potato, cabbage, European vegetables, coffee and a little pepper. Since the road network was not yet constructed
in those initial years, transporting these commodities was the main constraint.

Claim and counter claim over land between the transmigrants and the neighbouring Semendo and Lampung people was another problem. There were cases where the native Lampung and Semendo settlers claimed the land transformed into irrigated rice fields by the transmigrants. These conflicts were largely due to the fact that, unlike other transmigration sites elsewhere, in Sumber Jaya the transmigration project was not preceded by process of field delineation to define the boundaries of the land allocated for the transmigrant villages.

Also in the 1950s, the BRN transmigration villages created a separate administrative subdistrict (*kecamatan*) and refused to be integrated into the existing administrative subdistrict (*negeri*) of Balik Bukit. The transmigrants’ concern was that under the Balik Bukit *negeri* they would be an inferior minority ‘ruled’ by Lampung and/or Semendo administrators. By creating a separate *kecamatan* the BRN transmigrants were able to interact directly with higher level authorities and successfully persuaded them to bring village development projects to the newly created villages of ‘freedom fighters’.

The then Indonesian president and vice president Sukarno and Hatta respectively officially inaugurated the formation of Sumber Jaya as an administrative *kecamatan* in 1952. Elders in Sumber Jaya keep the memories of Sukarno and Hatta’s visit to Sumber Jaya. It is said that the president himself chose *sumber jaya* (source of glory) as the name for the new *kecamatan*. Sukarno’s speech transcript, hand writing in a plaque, and photo are preserved. A monument (*tugu*) in Simpang Sari whose first
stone foundation was laid out by the president is named tugu Sukarno. A hamlet in Sukapura is named Sukarata, after Sukarno and Hatta. The wooden house in Simpang Sari where both men stayed during the visit is well maintained.

*The flood of spontaneous migrants*

The Semendo from the neighbouring Way Tenong and Kasui, seeing the BRN transmigration villages developing and constantly receiving government assistance of the sort that they had never received, were quick to decide ‘to get closer’ to these transmigration villages. They subsequently cleared the land adjacent to these transmigration villages.

While aligning themselves to the transmigration settlements as an initial strategy of the Semendo to benefit from government development projects, their next strategy was more dramatic. It involved bringing Javanese and Sundanese migrants to their villages. In this way the Semendo villages expected to receive government programs and projects similar to those of the transmigration villages. It is this pattern that later in the 1960s to 1980s brought a flood of many more spontaneous migrants to the region. By this strategy, in three decades the number of villages in the region doubled. Thirteen villages (five of Semendo, one of Lampung origin, and seven of Sundanese and Javanese BRN transmigrants) in the early 1960s became 26 villages in the mid-1980s (Sevin 1989:304). The Semendo and spontaneous migrants, mainly Javanese, later created ten new villages. Of these ten villages, four (Padang Tambak, Suka Menanti, Tanjung Raya, and Sindang Pagar) were created by both Semendo and Javanese migrants while the other five (Sidodadi, Sri Menanti, Sumber
Alam, Tri Mulyo, and Gedung Surian) were created mostly by Javanese migrants. In addition, the BRN transmigration villages created three more administrative villages (Pura Mekar, Cipta Waras, and Sukajaya).

It is interesting to note the new approach by the Semendo villagers. Not only were more and more Javanese and Sundanese migrants welcomed to settle in their villages, but part of their village land was allocated for the new migrants to create new villages. Not all of these Javanese and Sundanese migrants came directly from the island of Java; many were born or had lived in old transmigration sites in south, central, and north Lampung. In many cases, these Javanese migrants were given the land for free. For example, the village of Gunung Terang gave part of its village territory, then still forested, to groups of Sundanese and Javanese migrants who later created the villages of Gedung Surian, Cipta Waras, Trimulyo, and Semarang Jaya. In the same way, Sukamenanti gave and sold Javanese migrants land to create Sidodadi and Sri Menanti. The migrants transformed the forests and bush into the existing village land. In the established Semendo villages the Javanese migrants were also welcomed. They could work as numpang (farming the unused plots), sharecroppers (garap, maro, bagi hasil), and wage labourers (bujang, upahan) until they were eventually able to buy a piece of land. Usually the land was bought through a series of small payments (cicilan). Payments are made at each coffee harvest season for a couple of years.

The reason that the Semendo were so generous in giving land to the Javanese migrants, apart from obtaining abundant labour for their coffee gardens and wet rice fields, was to attract government programs and projects, such as roads, school, clinics, and markets. According to the former heads of these Semendo villages, the arrival of the Sundanese and
Javanese brought progress to their people. As these former village heads put it “without the migrants from Java there would be no development projects and no progress in our villages.” The result of this approach was that more and more migrants arrived, more administrative villages were created, and there was more ‘development’ and ‘progress’ in the villages and in the region. The region was soon transformed into a ‘wealthy’, flourishing highland. For the migrants the region was imagined as a place with opportunities for a better life. Many did actually attain a better life, but some did not.

A Flourishing Highland

Today, when someone visits West Lampung district (kabupaten) and asks about ‘the fastest developing region’ (daerah yang paling cepat maju), the answer most probably would be Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong. In the easternmost part of the district, two small rural towns of Sumber Jaya (the capital of the subdistrict of Sumber Jaya) and Fajar Bulan (the capital of Way Tenong subdistrict) are indeed flourishing. The region has become a new commercial and population centre in Lampung highlands, and one of Lampung important coffee pots. The region is dominated by small-land-holding agriculture production. The second part of this chapter gives a general description of the socio-economic condition this flourishing region.

A developing region in an underdeveloped country

The level of ‘advancement’ of Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong is meaningful in the context of modern Indonesia where, especially during the Suharto’ New Order period (1966-98), pembangunan (development)
and *kemajuan* (progress) are key words in the grand project of Indonesia nation building. Asking how much progress a particular region has made and which particular region within a certain administrative boundary is the ‘fastest developing’ was a way to measure the success (and failure) of the region.

One of the indications of the progress of the Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong region was the absence of *IDT* villages (*Instruksi Presiden Desa Tertinggal*, presidential instruction on neglected, left-behind villages) within its boundaries. A village was classified as an *IDT* village if it lacked the facilities and services (e.g., roads, schools, health clinics, markets) of the average village in the province. In the mid-1990s, of over two dozen villages in Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong, only two were classified as *IDT* villages. This was much less than the average figure for the West Lampung district: which is one out of every two villages.

The number of *IDT* villages in West Lampung district has gradually been reduced by nearly a half, from 80 (49.4%) of 162 villages in 1996 to 42 (25%) of 169 villages in 2000—thanks to the subsequent poverty alleviation and rural development projects. In 2000-2001, other than Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong, only in Balik Bukit, where Liwa, the capital of West Lampung district, is located, is there a complete absence of *IDT* villages (see Table 3.1). The absence of *IDT* villages in these three subdistricts reflects, in a narrow sense, the progress they have achieved.\(^6\) It also reflects a lack of such progress in other subdistricts.

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\(^6\) Notwithstanding that the *IDT* program failed to target the rural poor, because many actually lived in non-*IDT* villages (as Table 2.3 and Table 4.1 also show), and in transforming the livelihood of poor families in the *IDT* villages, benefits were derived from the subsequent poverty alleviation and rural development programmes (Perdana and Maxwell 2004).
A relatively high population density is another characteristic of the Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong highland region. In 1961 the region had only 16,000 inhabitants, but the population rose to 25,000 in 1971 and tripled to 75,000 in 1986 (Sevin 1989: 307). By 2000 the region was home to nearly 80,000 inhabitants living in 28 administrative villages. The dramatic increase in population, village development, agricultural production, and commercial activities during the last three decades transformed the region into a lively area (daerah hidup). What makes it exceptional is that the transformation of the region took place in the absence of large-scale government projects and private investment such as mining, plantations, or transmigration settlements.

Table 3.1 Population, poor households, and IDT villages by subdistrict in West Lampung 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Subdistrict</th>
<th>Households</th>
<th>Villages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>total</td>
<td>poor (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Bengkunat</td>
<td>7562</td>
<td>4006 (53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Pesisir Selatan</td>
<td>3875</td>
<td>1348 (35)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Pesisir Tengah</td>
<td>5946</td>
<td>1183 (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Karya Penggawa</td>
<td>2611</td>
<td>384 (15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Pesisir Utara</td>
<td>2015</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Lemong</td>
<td>2896</td>
<td>612 (21)</td>
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<td>Sukau</td>
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<td>Balik Bukit</td>
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<td>1497 (29)</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Belalau</td>
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<td>Batu Brak</td>
<td>3134</td>
<td>942 (30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Suoh</td>
<td>12,326</td>
<td>3914 (32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Sekincau</td>
<td>9423</td>
<td>2317 (25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Way Tenong</td>
<td>8351</td>
<td>2586 (31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Sumber Jaya</td>
<td>8908</td>
<td>2973 (33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total/(average)</td>
<td>82,057</td>
<td>24,848 (30)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the 1970s and 1980s the New Order village development program facilitated the creation of more administrative villages. Each of these attracted more development funds—made possible by the national oil boom and international lending institutions. This also led to increased infrastructure development in the region. Creating more administrative villages was a justification to tap national development funds. It became a central theme of all levels of government in Lampung and across Indonesia. In this way more and more people migrated to the region.

While the population in the region grew rapidly until the 1980s, the growth subsequently slowed. This was, partly, related to ‘the closing down’ of the state forest zones in the region. The late 1980s is remembered by the people in the region as the beginning of a number of efforts to clear smallholder farmers from state forest zones through a series of military operations and to develop reforestation projects. The coffee boom during the 1997-98 krismon (monetary crisis) was short lived and not long enough to attract new migration.

The small rural towns of Sumber Jaya and Fajar Bulan and their immediate surroundings can perhaps be characterised as a developing enclave in an underdeveloped district. West Lampung district has two other rural towns, the district capital Liwa and the small beach town of Krui. The development of Liwa is largely due to its selection as the capital of the district in the early 1990s, which brought people and physical infrastructure to this otherwise quiet (sepi) area. The rationale for the selection of Liwa was to separate the administrative centre (pusat pemerintahan) and commercial/economic centres. More development projects were carried out in Liwa after the 1994 earthquake, which ruined Liwa and many other villages in Balik Bukit. The other town, Krui, used
to be an important coastal-trading centre for the west coast of Lampung in the colonial era. The people in Krui still believe, however, that the reason their town was not selected as the capital of the district was due chiefly to the high profile lobbying effort of a few powerful provincial bureaucrats and politicians who originated from Balik Bukit and Kenali.

Sumber Jaya and Fajar Bulan are exceptional for West Lampung because they have had a different pathway of progress. Unlike Liwa, Sumber Jaya and Fajar Bulan were not selected as key centres in the district. Unlike Krui, Sumber Jaya and Fajar Bulan are not old population areas; both are newly created. Yet the level of progress and modernisation in Sumber Jaya and Fajar Bulan is comparable to Krui and Liwa. Compared to other regions in West Lampung, Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong are self evidently more ‘developed’.

In the wider context of the regional development of Lampung, it is important to note that the development of Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong are rather more typical. Flourishing towns, many of which are bigger than Sumber Jaya and Fajar Bulan, can easily be encountered throughout other districts in the province. These towns include as Pringsewu, Gading Rejo and Gedong Tataan in the south, Metro, Bandar Jaya, Kota Gajah, and Jepara in the centre, and Tulang Bawang in the north. All have been created mainly by Javanese transmigrants.

While almost all the area of other districts in Lampung province has been allocated for transmigrant settlements, in West Lampung only Sumber Jaya is the designated receiving area for transmigrants from Java—on a much smaller scale compared to other transmigration sites elsewhere in
Lampung. Many people argue that it is partly because the district does not have many sites of transmigration that West Lampung is still underdeveloped (kurang berkembang). Unlike other transmigration settlements located on the eastern Lampung plain and lowlands, where large-scale irrigation channels for rice fields (sawah) can be built, Sumber Jaya is in a hilly mountain region where no large area can be transformed into a vast area of sawah rice cultivation.

Today Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong can provide anything one expects from modern rural Indonesia. In each of the small rural towns of Sumber Jaya and Fajar Bulan, in what the people simply refer to as the pasar (market), hundreds of shops (toko) and stalls (warung) are open seven days a week. On a different day each week the two pasar also host the weekly rotational market; Monday in Fajar Bulan and Saturday in Sumber Jaya. Due to a previous prohibition on Chinese opening businesses in rural areas in Indonesia, today only a few toko are owned and operated by Chinese petty traders. In these toko people can get many kind of goods, including food/meals; a variety of household goods such cloth, electronic equipment (television, radio, hi-fi), and furniture; building materials; automotive spare parts; and brand new motorbikes. There used to be a movie theatre (bioskop) in Sumber Jaya, but it no longer functions because of the influx of VCD players and pirated VCD rentals. One can easily rent the latest films, either from Hollywood (which are at the same time being screened at Planet Hollywood Jakarta), India’s Bollywood, and/or Hongkong. Watching national sinetron, dubbed imported serials, and news on television is the most common evening home entertainment.

7 Besides Sumber Jaya, Biha in Pesisir Selatan subdistrict is another small scale transmigration site in West Lampung. In the early 1990s hundreds families of forest squatters from various parts of Lampung were resettled there under the local transmigration program.
In addition, recently many telecommunication shops (wartel: warung telekomunikasi), using wireless cellular connection, have been installed. (Land line telephones, available in the nearby small town of Bukit Kemuning, have not yet reached the region.) People use the service to communicate with relatives or colleagues nation wide, also occasionally to hear news from families working overseas (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Malaysia).

Simply put, people in the region do not need to go to bigger towns or cities to get the goods and services they want. Unlike their parents, to obtain education up to high school the youths do not need to go to other towns. Rising expectations, however, have accelerated the trend for people to travel out of the region. The desire for a better (and/or the latest) model of goods, to take care of children’s higher education, and to maintain family ties (sillaturrahmi), while satisfying the desire to see the world outside the region are the most commonly stated reasons for people to travel to bigger towns and cities within the province (Kota Bumi, Bandar Jaya, Bandar Lampung) and in Java. Since the construction of the western Sumatra highway (lintas barat) in the early 1990s, bus connections between Padang, Bengkulu, and Jakarta make travelling to Java easy. Almost each week there are also special buses that travel from Sumber Jaya to Bandung. There are two types of buses, the cheap and popular ekonomi and the comfortable air-conditioned (AC). The latter promises on time arrival. There are also minibus-taxis that pick passengers up at home in Sumber Jaya and drive them to any address in Bandung and surrounding towns in West Java. Those who want to travel within the province usually take buses regularly travelling from Krui and Liwa to the capital of the province, Bandar Lampung. When travelling in a group, with families and relatives, a chartered car is the favourite choice. One can
easily find a roadworthy vehicle to rent from a fellow villager. Celebrating lebaran and attending the weddings of relatives are occasions where a chartered car is used. Such a flow of people from the region to cities in Lampung and Java and vice versa not only blurs the rural-urban distinction, it also makes the Java and outer Java classification seem less relevant.

Some negative consequences of being close to urban centres have also been felt in the region. Trucks and cars passing along the west Sumatran highway often take rest stops at Fajar Bulan and Sumber Jaya. Here there are plenty of choices of restaurants and food stalls with the favourite Sunda and Padang menus. For overnight stops there are some small hotels that are almost fully booked during weekdays. This has led to emergent practices of prostitution. The story goes that there was once a warung remang-remang (romance stall), which beside food also provided young girls for men’s sexual pleasure. The food stall soon became popular, especially among truck drivers. The local community, led by the religious leaders, soon took firm action. The warung owner was asked to stop the practice of prostitution, and the girls were asked to leave, among them one from a neighbouring village. Today when one asks people whether there is prostitution in the region, the most likely answer is that “there are none that provide the service openly”. Another concern is the use of drugs among the youth. On one occasion, local policemen were suspicious that a small group of teenagers was using drugs at late night gatherings in parking lots and bungalows constructed by the tourism office for sight seeing and rest stops between Fajar Bulan and Sumber Jaya. On another occasion a police officer caught and jailed a young man planting hundreds of cannabis plants in a capsicum chilli garden in one of the villages in Way Tenong. Security is another concern that necessitates
night watches (*ronda*). Stories about brand new motorbikes being stolen are frequent. Burglaries are also frequently reported, especially during the coffee harvest season.

Within the region, from village to village people use *ojek* (motorbike taxi), minibuses, pickups, and four-wheel drive jeeps. Jeeps are now used only on limited occasions: to carry bulky stuff from one rotational market village to the others, to deliver heavy loads from *toko* (store) or *pasar* (market) to smaller *warung* (stall) in hamlets on the hills, and to bring down from the hills and mountains piles of dried coffee cherries and dried beans during coffee harvest season. A few of the jeeps today can still be seen loading housing construction materials and taking out lumber from the remaining forest in the mountains. With more and more paved road and bridges being constructed the use of these off-road vehicles, very popular during the last three decades, has gradually reduced.

The proximity of Sumber Jaya and Fajar Bulan, capitals of two adjacent subdistricts separated only by 15 minutes drive, will give the impression of a rural Java setting. In upland rural settings elsewhere, the distance between two neighbouring subdistricts’ capitals normally takes an hour or more to travel. The two small rural towns, apart from being the places that sell goods are also the places to that sell agricultural produce from the surrounding villages. When passing along the western Sumatra highway and viewing Sumber Jaya and Fajar Bulan, the impression one might get is that the region is the home of well-off rural Indonesians. Along this main road are modern brick houses and large traditional wooden stilted houses (*rumah panggung*) with either a motorbike or car in the front yard and a
A number of the houses are two-storey and extremely luxurious. Indeed most of the richest people in the region live in and near Fajar Bulan and Sumber Jaya and derive their wealth from coffee reselling and retail shops. But the picture changes as one travels to the surrounding villages. Along the main road are compact settlements with rows of sturdy brick and wooden stilted houses, but as one goes farther from the main road and the main village settlement compounds, one encounters dispersed humble houses or huts (rumah gubuk) made of wood and bamboo that fill the scene. While in both towns many people are involved in rural trading and other non-farm business and work, the majority of people in the surrounding villages and in the region derive their livelihood primarily from small-scale agricultural production.

**The making (and unmaking) of a coffee pot**

Located on the eastern slope of the Bukit Barisan mountain range, the villages in Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong region are surrounded by mountains and hills. In the centre is Bukit Rigis, to the north are Bukit Remas and Subhannallah, to the east Gunung Abung and Bagelung, and to the west is Gunung Sekincau. The mountains are connected by gently rolling ridges encircling Bukit Rigis. The Way Besai river runs from Gunung Abung to the west, encircling Bukit Rigis, and then down the valley to the west. The easternmost end of the valley, at the end of Way Besai river flow in the region, is the site of a dam for the Way Besai hydroelectric power plant at 720 metres above sea level. Village settlements are located in the valley encircling Bukit Rigis on the banks of the Way Besai river.

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8 Without the dish only one among nearly ten national television channels can be received in the western half of the region, and none in the eastern half.
Patches of forest can still be seen on the steep slopes and on top of the mountains. Smallholder robusta coffee gardens are the predominant land use system. Wet rice fields (sawah) are limited to the narrow banks of creeks and the Way Besai river. All the villages in the region have patches of sawah, but villages with more than 100 ha sawah are very rare. Rice is imported from other regions within the province and from Java. Within the settlements, many houses have a fish pond (balong, tebat), but favourite fishes such as ikan mas and gurame are regularly imported directly from towns in West Java such as Cirata, Cianjur, and Parung.

The dominant land use of coffee smallholder gardens in this particular region is a recent trend. Three decades previously, the region was heavily forested. While the expansion of sawah and settlements has been limited, the transformation of primary and secondary forests into coffee gardens has been massive. One of the impacts is wild animal attacks and infestations. In 1997 a few men and women, labourers on a reforestation project and small farmers, were attacked and killed in Lebuay. Later the old tiger responsible was hunted down by a special team from the forestry office and brought to Taman Safari zoo near Jakarta. This is not the only case of tiger attack; there were unreported cases before. Today, near the few remaining forests, villagers sometimes see tigers, bears, and deer. The latter are still an object of non-commercial hunting. Monkeys, pigs, and elephants are now becoming pests. Incursions by pigs and elephants are especially serious. The local health clinics frequently receive patients seriously wounded as a result of pig attack when they are being hunted down for their destruction of sawah. Elephant groups sometimes coming down to the villages for crops during drought periods have been another problem, forcing villagers to conduct extended patrols to keep the
elephants away. Forest rangers most often come late but they are limited in number and equipment. For the local people, killing the elephants would be the easiest way to gain protection, but the fear of jail for killing endangered animals generally prevents them from doing so.

The transformation of forests into smallholder coffee gardens has been accompanied by a decline of livestock husbandry in the area. Elders confirm that a couple of decades ago the old Semendo villages were full of cows and buffalos. Today in each village only a few households rear such animals. Thanks to the expansion of coffee gardens, neither grazing land nor labour to feed the livestock are available. There is a possibility that this trend began after the confiscation of cows and buffalos during the Japan occupation in 1942-45. Tiger attacks were the chief reason for the previous reduction in sheep and goat numbers. In some of the villages, until recently, village night patrols had to be conducted to prevent tigers taking the sheep or goats from the stalls. With the further shrinking of their habitat, the tiger population seems to be gradually reducing, and with the drop in coffee price and the need for manure for cultivation of commercial vegetables, more sheep and goats are now seen in the region.

With no forest left near the villages, another difficulty posed now is to obtain timber for housing. Favourite first class timber from the forests, such as tenam, cempaka, and medang, have become very expensive. In the previous decade, the price of such first-class timber was merely equal to local costs of gesek (cutting) and angkut (transport), but today the price is more than double the gesek and angkut costs. Cheaper timber from planted trees is now preferred, among others, shorea and exotic afrika are used now for housing construction and furniture. Shorea and teak imported from the nearby regions are now sold in local lumber shops (panglong). Inferior
quality timber of kapuk and dadap are also used for light construction, such as huts and kitchens—attached to the main house. While the conversion of forest to smallholder coffee gardens is obviously the cause of a scarcity of local timber, illegal logging has been another important factor. In most villages some of the village elites, with the backing of either police, military, or forestry personnel have been, and in some cases continue to be, involved in this lucrative yet illegal business.

A large part of the region is gazetted as state forest reserve (kawasan hutan negara), mostly classified as protection forest (kawasan hutan lindung) and, to the west, there is the national park of Bukit Barisan Selatan. People here called these zones tanah kawasan (state forest land) when referring to the land and hutan kawasan (state forest) when referring to the forest. During the last two decades, the region has been the target of forest protection and rehabilitation projects. Yet there is no evidence to show that efforts to prevent further expansion of smallholding coffee farming and to convert present coffee stands to plantation forests have been successful. On the contrary, not only have those plantation forests been transformed back into coffee gardens but the remaining natural cover has continued to be removed and transformed into smallholder coffee gardens.

The region of Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong is recognised as an important coffee pot within the province. The region perhaps can also be regarded as the most intensive smallholding coffee growing area in the province. The indications for this are in the recent cultivation practices, i.e. levels of intensification, and in production. All recommended techniques and inputs are applied to achieve the maximum output for coffee farming. Grafting (sambung) has been done since the early 1990s. Initially, tunas (twigs) of more productive varieties of robusta were bought from the
nearby region of Tanjung Raya, where a handful of farmers had successfully obtained higher production after grafting their old coffee trees with stock imported from Jember, East Java. Chemical fertilizers have been used since the late 1970s, when they were heavily subsidized and made available under the New Order’s famous Bimas and Inmas scheme intended for rice cultivation. Local traders, usually wealthy villagers, create fictive cooperatives to obtain a delivery order (DO) from a designated fertilizer wholesaler from whom small farmers could buy the fertilizer individually or in a group (kelompok). Warung and ioko would often also sell chemical fertilizers. Weeding (koret) and pruning (buang ranting, buang tunas), tasks that absorb the largest proportion of labour in coffee farming, have been undertaken since the 1950s. Various techniques of soil conservation, such as the use of terraces (teras), ridges (gulud), and pits (siring, lobang) are applied as well. High production is thus the obvious result. During normal years the average production in the region is 1,000 kg to 2,000 kg tonnes per hectare, much higher than the national average of coffee production, which is around 500 kg per hectare. Only during poor years does the production in the region approach the national average.

The cycle of good, normal, or bad years is perceived to be the result of the interplay between coffee price, climate, and the age of the coffee gardens. The late 1950s, late 1980s and early 1990s, and the end of the 1990s (krismon of 1997-1998) are considered to have been good years (agung, musim). The 1980s and from 1999 onward are considered to be bad years (paceklik, non musim). The remaining years are considered normal (biasa). Interestingly, a natural factor, the climate, seems to be favourable when the price of coffee is good and vice versa, the climate is bad when the price drops.
The price of coffee is considered good or not in comparison to the price of basic necessities, most importantly milled rice (beras). For example, during the krismon in 1997-98 a kg of coffee was Rp 8,000—12,000 and a kg of rice was Rp 500—1,000. Thus during these good years (musim) a kg of coffee was equal to more than 10 kg of rice. From 1999 to 2002, the price of coffee dropped to Rp 3,000—4,000 per kg while the price of rice rose steeply up to Rp 2,000 per kg. During these bad years a kg of coffee was almost equal to the price of a kg of rice. To make matters worse, the price of other goods also rose.

The 1950s was said to have been the beginning of good years as far as coffee farming is concerned. A kg of coffee was Rp 3.5 while four kg of rice was said to be only Rp 1 in the region. The late 1950s was also said to be a time when the practice of transforming upland rice swidden ladang into coffee garden, on fallow land, ended. More labour was applied. Hired labour began to be enlisted; a day’s work earned Rp 3.5, equal to more than 1 kg of coffee. Rather than being left fallow, old coffee gardens were maintained. More Javanese and Sundanese began to come, either as labourers or sharecroppers or, for those who had some capital, buying young and old gardens and abandoned or fallow fields (belukar). Old gardens were pruned and rejuvenated. New forests were cleared, planted with upland rice for one or two crops while also being planted with coffee. Transforming the cleared forest directly into coffee gardens, without the early stage of swidden, was also commonly practised. Opening several plots of different ages was necessary to ensure continuous production at the agung stage, namely, full bearing coffee trees aged three to seven years. Pruned and rejuvenated gardens produced a relatively constant annual production, although lower than the agung
gardens. As a diversification strategy, the traditional system of inter­planting coffee with pepper continued to be practised by some farmers in the region. Besides providing shade for the coffee, dadap and gamal trees functioned as the poles for the pepper vines. More recently, commercial tree crops (e.g., timber and fruit) have also been planted in coffee gardens.

Despite the introduction of chemical fertilizer, the late-1980s were considered to be bad years. Cocoa and clove subsequently gained in popularity. Many coffee gardens were transformed into either cocoa or clove gardens. Cocoa grew and produced well, but there was no one to buy the harvest. Then the cloves were almost completely destroyed by leaf blight disease. A few clove trees still survive today, but their economic importance for this region was insignificant. Coffee, however, has never disappeared. The failure of both cocoa and clove brought smallholders back to coffee.

The 1980s and 1990s are remembered as the decades when government ‘s agricultural extension programs came to the villages. New techniques and new inputs were introduced. Smallholders were encouraged to form farmers’ groups, with whom field extension officers (penyuluh) worked closely to develop demonstration plots (demplot) for better farming techniques. PRPTE (proyek rehabilitasi tanaman ekspor), a World Bank-sponsored program to boost Indonesia’s smallholder export crop production, provided cheap credit for replanting and chemical fertilizers for hundreds of hectares of coffee gardens in the region. The forestry office ran projects to introduce soil conservation techniques (terracing and tree planting), also on the demplot basis. The coffee exporters’ association (AEKI: Asosiasi Eksportir Kapi Indonesia) regularly provided grants, directly to farmer groups and through agriculture extension agencies, to deliver
various kinds of technical assistance to promote better quality coffee. Sponsoring farmers’ delegates to visit and learn from other coffee pots in Java was one form of technical assistance.

The 1990s was the period when the harvest of coffee enabled the local people in the region to secure a higher economic position. Many brick houses were built during the first half of the decade. Old traditional stilted houses (*rumah panggung*) were renovated, and new ones constructed. Cars and motorbikes became much more numerous. Local coffee traders got richer and petty trading flourished. The prohibition preventing Chinese from opening businesses in rural Indonesia enabled a few merchants in the region to accumulate considerable wealth from local commercial activities. The climax came during the nation’s monetary crises, the *krismon*, in 1997-98 when the coffee price skyrocketed. Farmers received export dollars for their crops as the value of the rupiah deflated. The El-Nino drought brought good production from mostly grafted coffee trees. The price of coffee rose three to four times while the price of other goods remained stable. This was the time when luxurious goods flooded the region such as new cars, motorbikes, televisions, VCD, hi-fis, and furniture. With the sudden increase of purchasing power, local people likened the massive buying of such goods to buying cheap snacks “just like buying fried bananas!”

It was also during the 1990s that the dwarf coffee (*kopi kate*) *arabica* variety was introduced, again on a *demplot* basis. Seedlings were distributed free of charge. But when the harvest came, the promise of a higher price than *robusta* did not materialise. Local traders and exporters bought both *robusta* and *arabica* at the same price. According to those who happened to plant this new variety, more labour was required to maintain the *arabica*
gardens, especially to remove the twigs (buang tunas). Unlike robusta, without chemical fertilizer, the arabica would bear no cherries. These factors prevented further conversion of robusta to arabica in the region.

The post-krismon economic recovery of Indonesia beginning in 1999 brought a real economic crisis for the villagers in the region. The price of coffee dropped dramatically while the price of rice and other basic goods rose steeply. Things turned difficult. Even to buy cheap fried bananas was no longer that easy. Besides the reduction and alteration in chemical fertilizer applications, too much rain was blamed for the drop in average production in the region’s coffee gardens. Some simply said that the coffee trees were exhausted (capek, letih) after the lengthy years of agung in the 1990s.

While the bad years of the 1980s drove some smallholders to cocoa and clove, today some of the smallholders in the region are turning to commercial vegetables. The vegetable production in Liwa (which declined due to a combination of conversion of the vegetable fields into coffee gardens during the krismon, a recent severe disease infestation, and a decline in soil fertility) and steadily expanded vegetable production in the neighbouring region of Sekincau, to the western part of the region, inspired the conversion of some of coffee gardens into vegetable fields and the interplanting of coffee and small hot chilli throughout Way Tenong and Sumber Jaya. In 2002 in Fajar Bulan and Sumber Jaya one can hardly miss seeing sacks and baskets of vegetables filling the storehouses and loaded to pickups or light trucks to be exported to larger provincial towns and sometimes to Java.
A multiethnic middle peasantry

The slowing down of migration to the region since the late 1980s has contributed to the current pattern of landholding in the region. It has helped to prevent the further shrinking of the land to wo/man ratio and an increase in landlessness. As far as land holding is concerned, the region has not evolved into polarised and opposed classes of a few landlords at one end and a mass of landless on the other. This is not to say that large land ownership or landlessness is absolutely absent, but rather it accentuates the domination of middle peasantry in the region. It must be stressed, however, that such persistence is not simply a function of the land to wo/man ratio, or population pressure alone. It is obviously linked to wider and more complex contexts.

Extensive ‘wealthy’ landholding in the region refers to land area of over ten hectares. It is everyone’s dream to have such a large amount of land, but only very few are able to do so. In almost all the villages, a small number of families with more or less ten hectares of coffee gardens can be found. But the case of someone owning more than twenty hectares has ‘never been heard of’ (belum kedengaran). There are two strategies for gaining a large garden. One is by organising a group of men for forest clearing. The leader (kepala rombongan) is responsible for recruiting and providing the food for his followers (anak buah, pengikut) during the forest clearing and coffee planting. No cash payments are involved. Each group member then receives a certain size of plot, a hectare or two, of the young garden that he can either sell or keep as he wished. Some of the plots were sold to recover costs, such as providing food for the groups. The members could plant upland rice on the newly cleared land for one or two crops and were entitled to all the harvest. The kepala rombongan retains a larger
portion of the newly established gardens. A second strategy is to acquire the gardens during poor years, when their owners were in financial difficulty (kepepet, sulit) and the price of the garden could be bought below the former market price. After a decade or two of following either pattern repeatedly, one could eventually own a large number of scattered coffee gardens.

It also must be noted that these large gardens will soon be fragmented and passed on to children. With the fluctuation in coffee price and production during poor years, the revenue from coffee alone is insufficient to cover the cost of its up-keep, including fertiliser and hired labour. Having the plots scattered and in different stages/ages makes supervision difficult and production uncertain. Hence, it is necessary for large landowner families to have sources of income other than their coffee gardens, such as owning sawah. Engaging in trading, transportation, and, sometimes, money lending is a characteristic of large landowners.

Apart from such technical difficulties, having a large amount of land has also been discouraged by the national legal system. The Indonesian agrarian law and regulations set limits on the size of land that can be individually owned (hak milik)\(^9\). Beyond the set limit, the owner can only obtain hak guna usaha (long term lease). Obtaining the legal right for this type of tenure is time consuming and incurs considerable cash payments. More importantly, this type of ownership is incompatible with the adat system of inheritance that emphasises land ownership (hak milik), whether with or without an official certificate. Certificates of land ownership, on

\(^9\) Government Regulation No. 56 1960 stipulates that the ceiling is 5 ha for irrigated land or 6 ha for non-irrigated land per family in areas where population density exceeds 400 persons per sq. km. For areas with less than 51 persons per sq. km the limits are 15 ha and 20 ha.
the other hand, are easier to obtain and much cheaper under the
government land administration projects (Prona) regularly conducted in
the region.

There are numerous patterns for reducing landholding. Apart from the
cultural obligation to pass the land on to children, the general motives for
selling land are to invest in more profitable or less risky businesses, to
obtain cash for various uses such as one’s children’s higher education and
marriage, to cover the cost of curing severe illness, to complete house
construction, or, though less common, to cover the cost of pilgrimage to
Mecca.

Landless and near landless farmers are not uncommon. They are late
comers and spontaneous migrants who have settled in the region as
labourers or sharecroppers. Young couples waiting to inherit land from
their parents also fall in this category. Finding a garden and/or a rice field
to sharecrop is not difficult in the region. Numpang, borrowing an
‘unused’ plot without paying, is another arrangement through which
landless households can gain access to land to farm. Villagers in this
stratum often earn income from wage labour (upahan) in their friends’ and
neighbours’ gardens. From landless labourer to smallholder is a common
form of upward mobility. The main strategy is to save money during the
good years, which is then used to buy land. The bulk of the population in
the region owns a plot or more, totalling a hectare or more of coffee
garden (see Table 3.2). To maintain more than a hectare of coffee garden
requires extra labour in addition to household members. This necessitates
the arrangement of numpang, sharecropping, and hired labour.
Engaging on various forms of off-farm work is a general strategy among all strata, though the reasons, processes, and consequences may differ. Among the lower economic stratum, since income is insufficient, survival is a primary goal. In the region about one in three households/families was poor in 2000 (see Table 3.1). Family member(s) are sent outside the region to work in cities in Java or preferably in foreign countries. For the upper stratum families, investing in a more profitable and less risky business is a primary goal. For all strata, having educated children who will no longer engage in farming seems to be of a prime consideration.

In the Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong region, illiteracy, especially among the younger generation, is relatively low. Most elders and adults have received education in primary schools in the region. The younger generation continue to junior high school and to high school. Among the lower stratum, low income is the main constraint preventing children from getting a higher education. Money is also a concern among the middle stratum, but not for the upper stratum, it is the children’s desire that really matters. Among the middle and upper stratum there are many cases where the problem is the children’s reluctance or incapability to study further. The children’s reasons, nonetheless, are very much accepted and justified: a growing number of those graduating from universities fail to find a job (sarjana nganggur) or take low paid jobs. In this case, to study at university is a waste of time and money.

Higher education and socio-economic mobility are possible partly because of the acceptance of the government family planning program (KB: Keluarga Berencana). The majority of fertile couples (pasangan usia subur) in the region are KB acceptors. Previously subsidised, today fertile couples pay for the KB injection and pills. The lesser number of children, on the
one hand, increases the ability of parents to support financially their children’s education. On the other hand, it reduces the availability of free labour for farming. This, again, necessitates the arrangement of sharecropping and wage labour.

Children’s education and house construction/improvement are two household priorities. Income generated in excess of household consumption needs goes for these two items. Buying a vehicle and household items is the next desirable good. The last project is a religious one, that is ‘taking a last step on the stairway to heaven,’ a pilgrimage to Mecca. There are two types of haji, the first is kiyai haji or ‘real’ haj (betul). This refers to those with a deep knowledge of Islam, who practice it in their daily life, and actively teach it to pesantren pupils and a general audience in the mosque and occasional learning (pengajian) groups. There are few haji of this kind, and they earn high respect. The second type is referred to as ‘coffee haj’ (haji kopi). These are those who went to Mecca thanks to their large coffee gardens. Their knowledge of Islam and the alignment of their daily life with the teaching (ajaran) of Islam is limited. Compared to the haji betul, the haji kopi are more numerous. In the region there are more Semendonese and Sundanese haji than Javanese haji.

Measuring the proportion of the three major ethnic groups in the region is difficult. None can be said to be dominant. In the village markets, apart from bahasa Indonesia, all three languages—Sundanese, Javanese, and Semendonese—are spoken interchangeably. The younger generation usually understand all three languages. Many are able to speak all three languages. Since there is neither ethnic preference nor avoidance in marriage, intermarriage is prevalent. With marriage, it is religion that
matters. As long as the *iman* (faith, religious devotion) is the same, namely Islam, interethnic marriage is acceptable.

Within a village it is usual to find a hamlet or neighbourhood with a dominant ethnic group, either Sunda, Java, or Semendo. Those from other ethnic groups living in a hamlet are merged and speak the dominant language. There are also hamlets and neighbourhoods with a complete mix of ethnic groups along the main road. Indonesian language is used here. Along the main road in the main village settlements, Padang traders and tailors and Batak *tambal ban* (tyre services) can also be seen.

It is important to note that with regard to identity, all the migrants from the highlands of Palembang see themselves as Semendo, although originally they may have come from other Pasemah sub-groups. Thus all Pasemah-speaking persons in the region identify themselves and are identified as Semendo. The same is true of those from Sunda; those few from Banten identify themselves and are identified as Sundanese.

Ethnicity is often used as a subject of political jokes. In the case of forest destruction, the migrants from Java wash their hands and blame the Semendo for their aggressive and skilful techniques in clearing the forest. The Semendo reply smartly by pointing out that it is the migrants from Java who farm the cleared forestland. The Semendo claim that the migrants from Java have only become ‘healthy’ (*sehat*) as they are now thanks to Semendonese generosity in ‘giving’ them land. The migrants from Java claim that the region’s progress is the result of their work; without them there would be no ‘development’ and ‘progress’. These friendly rivalries over the subject of development and progress provide the central and dynamic theme of local village politics. The next chapter
will discuss the dynamic of local politics as it relates to ‘development’ and ‘progress’ in the region.
Table 3.2 Area, population, population density, and poor families in Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Area (ha)</th>
<th>Population in 1998</th>
<th>Density (per sq km)</th>
<th>Families/households in 2000</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>total</td>
<td>poor (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sumber Jaya</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Simpang Sari</td>
<td>4386</td>
<td>8564</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>1424</td>
<td>433 (30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sukapura</td>
<td>877</td>
<td>2505</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>138 (32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Way Petai</td>
<td>2631</td>
<td>4043</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>257 (38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Suka Jaya</td>
<td>1754</td>
<td>1755</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>138 (28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Sindang Pagar</td>
<td>14,330</td>
<td>1859</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>164 (43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Tri Budi Sukur</td>
<td>1040</td>
<td>2215</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>155 (24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Pura Jaya</td>
<td>1536</td>
<td>3581</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>194 (26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Purawiwinatan</td>
<td>1040</td>
<td>2553</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>182 (28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Muara Jaya I</td>
<td>991</td>
<td>1302</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>167 (43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Muara Jaya II</td>
<td>928</td>
<td>1764</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>162 (36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Pura Mekar</td>
<td>1685</td>
<td>4532</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>1034</td>
<td>316 (31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Gedung Surian</td>
<td>1427</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>232 (44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Cipta Waras</td>
<td>1536</td>
<td>1707</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>195 (43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Tri Mulyo</td>
<td>1486</td>
<td>2567</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>240 (39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>35,647</td>
<td>40,948</td>
<td></td>
<td>8908</td>
<td>2973 (33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>54,967</td>
<td>79,661 (31)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Government of West Lampung District (2002)
Table 3.3 Land ownership in selected hamlets in Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of village</th>
<th>Semendo</th>
<th>Transmigration</th>
<th>Spontaneous migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hamlet*</td>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of respondents</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee garden</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraction of households owning (%)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range (ha)</td>
<td>0.5—4.0</td>
<td>0.25—6.0</td>
<td>1.0—3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average (ha)</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice field</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraction of households owning (%)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range (ha)</td>
<td>0.5—1.75</td>
<td>0.25—1.0</td>
<td>0.04—0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average (ha)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field survey 2000

*Hamlet and village name

(a) = Gunung Terang, in the village of Gunung Terang
(b) = Sindang Pagar, in the village of Sindang Pagar
(c) = Air Ringkiah, in the village of Simpang Sari
(d) = Fajar Bulan, in the village of Fajar Bulan
(e) = Waras Sakti, in the village of Cipta Waras
(f) = Talang Bodong, in the village of Suka Jaya
(g) = Air Dingin, in the village of Trimulyo

Note:
The villages selected for the survey were to represent old Semendo villages created prior to the 1950s, transmigration villages created in the 1950s, and newer villages created by the subsequent spontaneous transmigrants since 1960s. In close consultations with the village leaders, a hamlet that has rice fields from each village was chosen for survey. About 20% of the hamlet residents were chosen for the household survey. Note that the survey excluded hamlets with no rice fields and non-landowning households viz. sharecropper s and/or contract labourers—many of whom lived in houses or huts in the gardens outside the hamlet settlement compounds.
CHAPTER FOUR

Local Politics:
Bringing State to the Village

The region of Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong has been the target of constant national, regional, and local political manoeuvres to control its population. There are clear indications of the deep penetration of the state into the villages. Village integration into the state in the region, however, can also be seen as local people's efforts—through their village leaders—to bring the state into the village as a strategy to tap state resources by putting their village in the mainstream of national and regional politics. These processes, interestingly, lead to the emergence of politically powerful village elites whose power and domination is nevertheless circumvented and limited. Thus far, villagers in the region have been able to develop ways to constrain the emergence of individuals with dominant political power in the village.

Military Campaigns Against State Enemies

From the mid 1960s to late 1980s people in Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong experienced a series of military operations to crush rural dissent. A military operation to wipe out the communist movement was undertaken in the mid 1960s, and against religious rebels in the late 1970s. These actions have created a dynamic relationship between the villagers in the region and the modern state.
Chasing the communists

During the military campaign against Indonesia's communist party (PKI: Partai Komunis Indonesia) and its elements in the mid 1960s, hundreds of men and women were taken from their homes, loaded into trucks, and jailed at the military post (Koramil) in Sumber Jaya for interrogation. Some of them were brought to other military camps in Kotabumi. A few of them never came back. Some spent years in jail and the rest—the majority—returned to the Koramil at Sumber Jaya. During the following years these women and men were obliged to report regularly (mel, wajib lapor) to the Koramil and were treated as corvee labour (kerja bhakti) repairing roads and cleaning military, police, and public facilities. The sight of hundreds of men and women carrying their children in fear sitting in the sun in front of the Koramil office and enduring various forms of torture and intimidation has filled the memories of many people in the region.

The alleged communists came from almost all corners of the region, but the largest proportion of leaders and followers were said to be from Simpang Sari and Way Petai. However, as it was later revealed, the majority of these communists had not actually taken any political action. In the region, the PKI never gained a significant number of votes during the early national elections. In 1965, prior to the commencement of the national military campaign against the PKI, women were recruited to join various groups of Islamic teaching (pengajian) and cottage industries (e.g., sewing, stitching), and youth were encouraged to join the rebana religious music groups. The only indication of concrete action, it was said, was with regard to land reform—the main the PKI political agenda to gain rural
support. There was a story that landless villagers were organised into
groups in anticipation of obtaining ownership of farming land. Village
elites and large landowners, threatened with becoming the target of the
dispossession of land, were more than willing to give full cooperation to
the military personnel.

During the campaign there were stories about villagers mistakenly
detained (salah tangkap). Those who had no links whatsoever with the PKI
were detained, interrogated, and subject to intimidation by the Koramil
personnel. This was largely the result of fierce opposition between
factions in the village. Both sides gave information about their opponent’s
involvement with the PKI. Having a distant relative or friends involved in
the PKI movement was enough to bring someone to the notice of the
Koramil.

Suspicion of involvement in the PKI had long-term deleterious
consequences for some. Near the market town of Sumber Jaya, there is a
small hamlet, a large proportion of the inhabitants of which were the
victims of oppression during the anti-communist campaign. Until recently
the hamlet has been isolated, receiving no government projects that the
neighbouring hamlets received, such as roads and schools. Most of its
poor inhabitants live mainly as labourers and sharecroppers. Another job
for the young men is tree felling and cutting from the remaining forests
nearby.

Chasing the Islamic rebels

While no ‘concrete action’ by the communist movement ever took place,
an Islamic rebellion a decade later was an actual one. Warman and his
*gerombolan* (group, band of men) were remembered as having a strong anti-state agenda and multiple criminal records. In the second half of the 1970s, Warman and his followers were involved in some armed actions in various parts of north Lampung. The *gerombolan* were responsible for burglaries, raids on buses, the killing of village officials, and attacks on military posts from which the group obtained firearms. The latter two endeavours were said to have been more frequent during the New Order’s 1977 national election and were widely perceived as an attempt to sabotage the election.

Warman was believed to be one of the closest loyalists of Kartosuwiryo, the leader of the *Darul Islam (DI)* and *Tentara Islam Indonesia (TII)* founded in 1949 in West Java. The ultimate political agenda of DI/TII was an Islamic state. After more than a decade of warfare with the Indonesian army, the DII/TII rebellion was crushed and Kartosuwiryo was executed in West Java in 1962. Warman fled to Way Tuba, a region near the town of Baturaja in the neighbouring province of South Sumatra (Palembang). In 1975-76 he and his family moved to Sukapura, Sumber Jaya. About 50 of Kartosuwiryo followers joined the BRN transmigration in the 1950s and lived in Sukapura. Of these, about 15 to 20 later joined Warman. During these years none of the neighbours knew that they had the notorious Warman living next door or that their village was the headquarters of his *gerombolan* movement. Warman lead a *pengajian* group in his small *mushala* (praying house). Members arrived and joined the group. A type of ‘true Islam’ (*Islam sejati*) was Warman’s main political teaching. When the group held separate Friday prayers, instead of joining in the village mosque, and the group became more and more exclusive, the village officials and military began to investigate. Soon the hilly region of
Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong became a battleground between the gerombolan and the military troops.

Instead of surrendering to the military troops, the gerombolan, consisting of no more than sixty men, fought back relentlessly. Hiding in the forest during the day they raided military posts and villages in the night. Like the DI/TII movement in West Java, food supplies were taken from the villagers, in this case from shops and stalls (warung). Unlike the DI/TII rebellion in Java, apart from taking food from the warung, the local gerombolan did not terrorize the whole village. They targeted only the village officials, not ordinary villagers. On the contrary it was the military personnel who forced the ordinary villagers to take part in the campaign against the gerombolan. Not being allowed to carry firearms was a good excuse for these ordinary villagers to avoid becoming involved in direct bloody contact with the gerombolan. Hence, the casualties, including some shot dead, were limited to the gerombolan members, military personnel, and village security officers (hansip). Although most of his followers were shot dead or captured, Warman himself escaped, first to elsewhere in Lampung and then to Java. Some of his followers had deep ideological views about the need for an Islamic state, and were never involved in any criminal acts, but others were simply criminals. The military hunt for Warman continued. Ketapang, near Kotabumi, was the site of a fierce clash between the gerombolan and military troops, resulting in dead on both sides. This was commemorated with the building of a Koramil post. Warman then fled to Java. He was first caught in Magelang, but managed to escape and remain at large until 1978 when a team of Kopassus shot him dead in Soreang near Bandung, West Java. Like the victims of the military action against the PKI, a few surviving members of Warman’s rebellion
and the wives and children of the dead or jailed now live in isolation and poverty. Many moved elsewhere in Sumatra and to Java.

The relatively long period of the military hunt, the fact that the group of rebels was small, and the absence of casualties among ordinary villagers indicate that villagers in the region carefully positioned themselves in the battle. Ordinary villagers neither harboured the rebels nor fully assisted the military campaign. Nonetheless, the alleged PKI movement and Warman’s gerombolan rebellion in the region brought special attention from the higher state apparatus that further deepened state entry into villages in the region.

**National Politics in the Villages**

Following the successful crack down on communist and religious dissent, a strong military presence continued in the region. Their role expanded from hunting down state enemies to ensuring monoloyalitas (single, undivided loyalty) of the population of the region toward the state. ‘The state’, until the 1998 reformasi, meant Suharto’s New Order and Golkar (Golongan Karya, functional groups). At the heart of the New Order were the twin objectives of ‘political stability’ and ‘development’. Both Koramil officers and the babinsa (the village military officer) played a key role in the process. To become the head of village (kepala desa) or to hold other official positions in the village, besides the ‘blessing’ from sub-district head (camat) and Golkar functionaries, a clearance from Koramil was needed. Through the program known as ‘the military enters the village’ (AMD: ABRI masuk desa) the villagers were forced to participate in gotong royong or kerja bhakti (community works) on village projects such as
building and maintaining roads, bridges and schools. In the absence of AMD, the constant supervision of village military personnel (babinsa) ensured villagers participation in routine kerja bhakti and gotong royong in similar village projects, especially on the construction and up keeping of the road network.

The triumph of Golkar until the 1999 national election and the instalment of Golkar cadres in village administration ensured a state of ‘political stability’ in the region. Undivided loyalty (monoloyalitas) toward the state was achieved through the incorporation of village leaders into official positions in village administration such as village councils LMD (lembaga sosial desa, village social board) and LKMD (lembaga ketahanan masyarakat desa, village board for community resilience), the youth association (Karang Taruna), a board of mosque for the religious leaders, and family welfare education for women (PKK: pendidikan kesejahteraan keluarga).

The creation and incorporation of village leaders into the village administration was directly related to the success in the mobilisation of rural populations in centrally planned rural development projects. In the region, as elsewhere in the nation, rural development projects included the construction of physical infrastructure (e.g., roads, bridges, schools, village halls, markets), village administration (pemerintahan desa), economic development (e.g., agricultural extensions, land administration), and social welfare (e.g., family planning, PKK). The New Order agenda of political stability and development was, apparently, successfully achieved in Way Tenong and Sumber Jaya. With the absence of villagers political alignment other than with Golkar, the villagers in the region devoted themselves to the rural development agenda. It was during this period of political stability and rural development from the late 1970s to the mid-
1980s that more administrative villages were created and more people migrated and settled in the region. The, nationwide mysterious killings of criminals in the early 1980s (known as mysterious killers, *penembak misterius* [petrus]) further ‘stabilised’ the region, enabling the movement of more people into the region.

The political texture of Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong is a reflection of a political dynamic at national level. With the majority of the population Golkar loyalists during the three decades of Suharto’s New Order regime, the region received its share of the development cake envied by the neighbouring regions. All villages have paved or gravel roads and two or more elementary schools. In every three or four villages there are a health clinic, rotational market, and junior high school (*SMP*). After the *reformasi* of 1998, local people in the region, like people nationwide, switched their political favour toward the oppressed PDIP (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan*). As elsewhere, people voted PDIP not because of the attraction of its political agenda but simply because they had had enough of Suharto’s New Order.

But for the local PDIP functionaries, winning of the 1999 election had a very different meaning. It was just like night turning into day. Economically and politically marginalised, often previously being fooled by their rich Golkar counterparts, thanks to their deep devotion to Megawati, the 1999 election provide them their time to reap the harvest. PDIP functionaries from Sumber Jaya dominated the PDIP branch, the House of Representatives (*DPRD*: *dewan perwakilan rakyat*), and government of the West Lampung district. The position of chairperson of PDIP, chairperson of DPRD, and vice head of the district (*wakil bupati*) all fell to the PDIP politicians from Sumber Jaya. Beside PDIP, Sumber Jaya
and Way Tenong was also home of members of DPRD and key figures from ‘Islamic’ parties such as PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan), PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional), PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa), PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang) and, of course, the former ruling party Golkar. People in the region noted that the new members of DPRD busied themselves in renovating and rebuilding their houses or building new ones and getting a car. This drastic change was most noticeable among many of those who were not among the well-to-do in their villages in the past.

What brought politicians from the region to the top seats of the district level political arena was the proportion of their voters. The two subdistricts of Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong are now home to a quarter of the total population of West Lampung district. West Lampung district now has nearly 400,000 people, spread over fourteen subdistricts. Thanks to the high proportion of a ‘dynamic’ population, Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong have always been seen as two important subdistricts in West Lampung district. An important pocket for Golkar during the New Order, the region had turned into the centre of PDIP and middle axis parties during the reformasi era. In 2002 and 2003, the uncertainty of the credibility of the present ruling party PDIP at the national level was also reflected in the region. The local dynamics again indicated a continuation of the strategy of the population in the region to ensure their position in mainstream national and regional politics. As some villagers in the region put it “We have to join the crowd, otherwise we will be left behind”.

During 2002 and 2003, there were early signs of an alignment of the population of the region to the established political parties, namely, the ruling party PDIP led by president Megawati and the camp of the ‘middle axis’ (the PPP led by the vice president Hamzah Haz, the PKB led by
former president Gus Dur, PAN led by the chairman of national people assembly (MPR) Amin Rais, and the PBB led by minister of legal and justice Yusril Ihza Mahendra). The national configuration of politics towards the national election in 2004 was also reflected in the region. The split of PPP into a camp led by the vice president Hamzah Haz and another camp, the PPP Reformasi, led by the popular Islamic preacher Zainuddin MZ is an example. On one occasion, over a thousand people gathered in Fajar Bulan soccer field to hear a speech by Zainuddin MZ inaugurating the branch of his PPP Reformasi in West Lampung district: as if the support from the region’s population was assured. A couple of months later, brand new billboards supporting Hamzah Haz’s PPP were erected in some villages, indicating that the village functionaries were active in getting local people’s support. Similarly with the split of PKB, boards and banners of both factions (i.e., pro-and-contra Gus Dur) could be encountered in the region. In the market towns of Fajar Bulan and Sumber Jaya one would see boards and banners of different political parties erected side by side. With regard to the erection of the billboards and banners, Golkar was an exception; its loyal cadres seemed to wait until the national election was closer. The political configuration in the region continued to reflect national political dynamics. Whether the population would be able ‘to join the crowd’ in time to come is still to be seen.

Cross-cutting the alignment to political parties, Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong has been the site for the emergence of mass organizations with ethnicity and regionalism as markers. In 2002, a branch of Paku Banten was inaugurated in Sumber Jaya. In the following months a Batanghari Sembilan branch opening was celebrated in Way Tenong. The Paku Banten was formally declared to be an umbrella of all camps of pencak silat
(martial art) in Lampung. The Paku Banten is known for its recent involvement in gathering mass support (dukungan massa) for particular candidates in the election of some district heads (bupati) in the province; the most favoured candidates were already incumbents in the position who hoped to be re-elected by the DPRD for the next term. The gatherings were organised with a martial art (pencak silat) performance, dangdut music entertainment, and concluded with a speech in favour of the candidates. Paku Banten is open to people of any ethnic background and one’s actual involvement with the pencak silat practice is not of prime consideration. In Sumber Jaya Paku Banten members and functionaries are Sundanese and Javanese and many of them hardly practice pencak silat. Batanghari Sembilan was also officially formed as a venue for promoting the arts (singing and pantun poet composition) of people originating from the southern part of Sumatra including Jambi, Palembang, Bengkulu but excluding Lampung. Two national figures, Taufik Kemas (president Megawati’s husband and a key figure in PDIP) and Ali Marwan Hanan (one of the chairpersons in PPP and Minister of cooperative and small business) are said to be involved in Batanghari Sembilan. In Way Tenong, Batanghari Sembilan functionaries are Semendonese politicians, government officers, and businessmen.

Typically, at the gatherings of these mass organizations, the candidates for political positions will promise to bring ‘progress’ and ‘development’ to the region in exchange for the support of region’s population. These statements are what the people in the region are eager to hear to ensure that they will not be ‘left behind.’ Many see both Paku Banten and Batanghari Sembilan as a response to the emergence of similar mass organizations of the native Lampung population which, besides promoting Lampung arts and culture, also campaign for the filling of
political positions by 'native children' (putra daerah). While 'native children' of Lampung and Javanese have joined Paku Banten, none seem to have joined Batanghari Sembilan. The functionaries and prominent members of this new breed of mass organization were key members and functionaries of other mass organizations during the New Order, such as Pemuda Pancasila, AMPI (Angkatan Muda Pembaharuan Indonesia, youth for the renewal of Indonesia), KNPI (Komite National Pemuda Indonesia, national youth committee of Indonesia), and the like. Formerly loyal to the unitary state as the central theme, regionalism is now put forward. But, underneath, is ultimately the struggle for local, regional, and national power.

Village Head Elections

By integrating their villages into the state, the villagers are involved in an effort to tap state resources to bring 'progress' to their villages and enable them to maintain their livelihoods and pursue prosperity. The indication of such a dynamic can be seen in the village leadership. At this local political level, state attempts to control the rural population and villagers' efforts to tap state resources are clearly visible. In the region such dynamics occurred during the New Order, and were further accentuated in the period immediately after Suharto's fall in 1998.

In village head elections during the New Order, one way to ensure the positioning of one of the Golkar functionaries as the village head was by blocking the non-Golkar candidate's eligibility to obtain approval and letters of 'clearance' from the sub-district office. To ensure the victory, village head elections were often organised with a single favoured
candidate against an empty box (kotak kosong). Another strategy, when the term ended and no one wanted to run for election, was the installation of an 'ad interim' or care taker (PJS: pejabat sementara) as a temporary replacement, nominated by the village council with the approval of the district head (camat). In cases where the village had not decided to organize a village head election and no PJS was suggested, the subdistrict office would appoint someone as the PJS. The latter could be a military or police officer or a government employee from the subdistrict office. Since they usually continued their current duties and did not live in the village where they were appointed as the ad interim village head, these PJS were rarely present in the village. This made it difficult for the villagers to obtain their services. There were only one or two cases in the last decade of a type of PJS who was sent from sub-district office; more than one-third of the villages had a PJS who was nominated by the village council.

During the New Order, one of the functions of the village head was to ensure that Golkar won the village vote. One popular and successful way to do this was by promising the villagers streams of development projects in their village or to threaten that the failure of Golkar to win would mean the end of 'progress'. Roads, schools, and health clinics were among the attractive items in this regard. The delivery of these projects was achieved by rotating the distribution of development funds and projects to each village in the subdistrict. The village head would then further 'rotate' the funds and projects to each hamlet in a village. It was the promise of bringing 'progress' that the villagers used to evaluate the achievement of a village head. Failure to deliver this promise would lead to a refusal to vote for the same person in the next village head election. Since funds and projects needed to be rotated among all the villages in the subdistrict, a village that received one had to wait for the next cycle. The longer the
'waiting period' the smaller the chance of the village head winning in the next village head election. Success in bringing 'progress' to the village would prolong the village head’s term of office, and a village head election would not be needed. The main and steady source of village development projects was the small annual village development fund (bangdes: dana pembangunan desa). The most common way to use the fund was to build gorong-gorong (small bridges) and to gravel the village’s unpaved roads. Thus each year there would be either a new gorong-gorong or more gravel roads. The fund was used only to buy the materials; the labour obtained through gotong royong or kerja bhakti (community works) was free. This meant community work involving all the men in the village or particular hamlet(s).

Until recently, the village head received neither salary nor office land. The only legal sources of income for a village head were a small portion of land tax (PBB: pajak bumi dan bangunan) and fees for services from various letters needed by the villagers. The amount from both sources was extremely small. In general, villagers accept the fact that village officials take a portion of development funds and projects, but the absence of village development projects seems to be unacceptable. This sets a limit for the village heads to accumulate wealth from state resources, forcing them to continue to bring development to the village.

It is possible to say that what the village communities in the region would like to have is a village head who can fulfil the villagers’ aspirations by bringing progress to the village. This is a formidable task. To ensure the flow of state resources into the village, the village head needs to get closer to higher levels of the state apparatus; during the New Order this would be managed through the Golkar network. This would imply involvement
in petty corruption at various levels of administration and more cash in the pocket of the village heads. If the village head went ‘too far’ with this petty corruption, however, the village community would react by setting up opposition in the village, developing factions, and spreading gossip to prevent the corrupt village head from winning in the next village head election. On the other hand, village heads who moved too close to community norms would bear expensive costs. Without involvement in petty corruption it would be hard to bring development funds and projects to the village. No one would be able and willing to personally bear such transaction costs. A few village heads in the region were and are somehow able to maintain a balanced position. They manage to be quite close to the state in order to bring regular development funds and projects to the village, but not overly involved in petty corruption, thus maintaining village community support (dukungan masyarakat). These village leaders manage to prolong their terms of office.

Efforts to keep the office within the family line by passing the office to children and/or to close kin have resulted in more failures than successes. In a few villages, the communities have nominated one of the children of a former village head to run in the next village head election. However, the nomination is usually based more on the nominated person’s active involvement in village and community affairs, such as in sports, religious feasts, and village projects and/or administration. In other word, it is quality that matters here rather than the kinship tie per se. The village communities would be supportive of the nomination of anyone with such qualities. It is the village community support that needs to be stressed as far as village head elections are concerned. During the New Order, a connection to Golkar was much more important than community support. Today community support is the determining factor. Even during the
New Order, community support could not be totally ignored. To avoid a win by an empty box in the village head election, the community support was obtained by selecting a favoured candidate who had potential ability to use his closeness to higher government officials, via Golkar, to bring development to the village.

In 1999-2000, in line with the new national trend toward regional autonomy which gives more authority to the district level, in West Lampung the uniform name desa for administrative village, which had previously been the official designation throughout the nation was changed to pekon, the head of the sub-village or dusun known as kepala dusun or kepala suku become pemangku, and the village head kepala desa—informally called lurah—was renamed as peratin. All the new terms were said to be the original adat (customary) terms used by the native Lampung communities in West Lampung district prior to Indonesian independence in 1945. The former village councils, LMD and LKMD, changed to LHP (Lembaga Himpun Pekon, village representatives council) and LPMP (Lembaga Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Pekon, village council for community resilience) respectively. Another important thing was that village officials such as the village head, village secretary, leader of village councils, and heads of hamlets were given a monthly allowance from the government of the West Lampung district. The annual village development fund, increased to Rp 5 million from previous Rp 3 million, did not need to be used only for physical construction such as gorong-gorong (small bridges) and roads but could be used for the village administration’s operational costs. Another change was that the village head’s term has been reduced from eight to four years.
Previously identified as part of the New Order, these village leaders now tend to act more as part of the West Lampung district administration. One of the results is that in most villages there is a kind of reluctance among them to show clear loyalties to a particular political party. With the disconnection of village administration from the political parties and the provision of monthly allowances the official village leaders attachment to the district administration has been strengthened. The official village leaders act as if they were the government apparatus, at the lowest level. They now pay more attention to district policies and affairs.

In 2000, the head of the sub-district of Sumber Jaya launched a new policy that stated that the year 2002 would be the end of PJS terms in all the villages in Sumber Jaya subdistrict. Otherwise the subdistrict office would send one of its office staff to be the PJS in the village, and no more village-nominated PJS would be approved. Villages that still had village-appointed PJS had to hold village head elections.

The dynamics of village politics can be better illustrated in actual cases of village leadership and village head elections in the region. Aliases are used for both the place and the person’s name.

Sukakarya is one of villages created by the early BRN transmigrants. The last elected village head, Sarman, ended his term in the mid-1990s. Since then, the village has an ad interim head PJS, a position occupied in the first year by the former village secretary (carik) Amin. Otong was appointed for the next couple of years before the PJS office returned to Amin until a village election was held in late 2002. Both Amin and Otong’s appointment as PJS were based on nominations by the musyawarah desa (village assembly), with the approval of the head of
Sumber Jaya subdistrict. Amin’s nomination was based chiefly on his experience and knowledge of village administration as village secretary. For Otong it was his activity in New Order and Golkar youth organizations such as AMPI and KNPI at the subdistrict level. Otong’s appointment was made possible through his father’s intensive lobbying within the village and at the subdistrict office.

Otong’s father Darsi was an elected village head from 1964 to 1983. (His successor, Sarman, won the village head election against an empty box.) Among the early BRN transmigrants, not many had a high school education, and Darsi was among these few. His active involvement in village administration and community projects amazed the elders, who then gave support for him to become the village head. It was during his term that most ‘progress’ (school, road, etc.) was brought to the village, enabling Darsi a very long term in office. He resigned as the village head and successfully managed to become a member of district house of representatives, DPRD, in North Lampung initially and then West Lampung when West Lampung separated from North Lampung in the early 1990s. He represented Golkar until the national election in 1999 that brought down Golkar and lifted the PDIP and the middle axis parties.

Darsi’s prominent involvement in the military hunt against Warman (Darsi himself was explicitly targeted by Warman’s gerombolan) helped him to establish contact with higher levels of government, the military, and Golkar. It is through this well-established contact that he was able to take a Golkar seat at the DPRD.

Later, however, Darsi’s son Otong was sacked from his PJS office by the village assembly—comprising heads of more than ten hamlets and village councils, which mainly consisted of village elders. Apart from the
villagers' disappointment at Otong's performance (he spent most of his time taking care of his *agen bis* business finding bus passengers to Java), villagers opposed his father's influence on village affairs. Darsi used his son's position to gather popular support for himself and Golkar in the 1999 national election. With the *reformasi* following the fall of Suharto's New Order and Golkar, Darsi suddenly lost his influential power in the village.

Following the sub-district policy to end *PJS* terms and to require an election of a village head, an organising committee was set up in Sukakarya. Yet, surprisingly, no one officially registered with the committee as a candidate. The few, who were interested or nominated by factions in the village, were either unwilling or unable to pay the costs of an election. The village committee had calculated the total cost for the election and the candidate was responsible for this cost, which was comparable to the cost of a wedding reception. The sub-district office demanded nothing except the actual cost of the photocopying and/or printing of the required materials. No bribe (*pelicin*) whatsoever was needed to obtain official approval of a nomination.

Still until late 2002 no one was willing to register as a candidate. The village assembly then decided that the village would be responsible for the cost of the village head election. An equal sum of cash was collected from each of the households in the village. Each head of hamlet was made responsible for collecting the money. In return, instead of candidates proposing themselves, the hamlets would select their own to be nominated for village head. From more than ten nominees, the village committee approved seven candidates. The subdistrict office approved three of these nominated candidates. The rest failed since they had only an
elementary school education, while according to the district regulation a minimum of junior high school is a requirement. Amin, the former village secretary and the present PJS, was among those who were rejected. This led to a great disappointment in the village, since Amin was the favourite candidate. The day of election was postponed to allow the village committee to lobby the subdistrict office to enable Amin to be a candidate. The head of subdistrict advised the committee to persuade Amin to sit for an equalised examination (ujian persamaan) of junior high school; if he passed the exam he would get a junior high school diploma (ijazah) and be officially approved as one of the candidates. The village committee, village council, and head of subdistrict were supportive of this idea and willing to postpone the village head election day. But, to everyone's surprise, Amin refused to take the advice. His close friends said that he was frustrated (patah hati) and embarrassed to be openly seen as too ambitious. Most villagers agree that had Amin's candidature been successful, he would definitely have won the election. Being an active village secretary for decades he was neither involved in serious corruption nor in other wrong doings. He, therefore, had village community support (dukungan masyarakat).

Since the money collected from all the village households was insufficient to cover the costs, the village council decided to pawn the village fishpond to the village saving and credit association. Sukakarya is among a few villages in the region with such communal land. For several years to come, the village saving and credit association was expected to manage and be entitled to the harvest of the fishpond, which was more than a hectare in size.
So the village head election went on with three candidates: Haryana, Odo, and Tatang. All candidates were young, in their 30s and 40s. Haryana was the head of a hamlet and the only one with a couple of years of university education. Otong was active in the village saving and credit association. Tatang was another son of Darsi, but had no leadership experience, and his candidature was largely 'steered' by his father. While Haryana and Odo worked their own coffee garden, Tatang sharecropped his coffee garden. Tatang’s house, the same house used by his father during his term as the village head, was the busiest a day before the election day. Friends and relatives gathered to work on the preparation or simply to talk. Cars and motorbikes came and went. The host generously served meals, snacks, and drinks for the guests. It was as if the house was holding a party. Large photos of Tatang were stuck on the front of houses, cars’ windscreens, and shops in the village. By contrast, at both Haryana and Odo’s houses, it was as if nothing special was happening; things just like any day, one or two kin and neighbours chatting.

With so many people crowded in his house, Tatang’s camp’s confidence’s was high. The morning of the election day half a dozen cars with Tatang’s poster on the windscreen were busy picking up voters from all the hamlets in the village, including the two hamlets of his rivals, and taking them to the village hall. His confidence was further boosted by the odds in the gambling market, two or three to one in favour of Tatang. Those who bet on Tatang were entitled to the same amount of money if he won and those who bet on Tatang to lose would get double or triple if the other candidates won. It is important to note, however, that those who were involved in the betting largely came from neighbouring villages.
The voting was held from 10 a.m. to 4 p.m. It began with a speech and official opening by the head of the subdistrict, followed by a detailed explanation of procedures by the committee. There were no campaign speeches from the candidates. The candidates with their wives sat side by side in the centre of the hall during the opening; afterward they were free either to stay or go back home. All candidates went back home immediately after the voting commenced. The voting began with women and elders, each entering the hall and exchanging the vote letter (surat suara), distributed before the day of election, for the voting form with photos of the three candidates on it. The voters entered one of more than a half dozen voting booths (bilik suara) to punch a hole in one of the candidates’ photos on the paper and put the paper in a large locked box at the centre of the hall.

By 2 p.m., with no more voters entering the voting rooms the committee decided to start the counting. A very small number of registered voters were considered to have abstained and a few voting forms which were not properly punched, were considered invalid. The ballot box was opened and the counting began. Each candidate appointed an official witness to ensure a fair count. The fairness of the counting was further enforced by the presence of subdistrict officials, police and military officers, members of village council, and anyone who wished to attend. The result was contrary to the expectation of many, especially outsiders. Harnaya convincingly won the election. In the next couple of days there were stories about those who had bet on Tatang losing their bank savings, coffee gardens, or motorbikes. The few who had bet on Tatang losing gained a considerable amount of cash. Yanto, a local Chinese businessman, was said to have instantly won Rp. 10 million.
Gossip about the way villagers had deceived Tatang and his father Darsi soon spread. A few days before the election key figures in the villagers had openly expressed their support of Tatang. None, except their close kin, seemed to be openly in favour of the other two candidates. Some of the villagers said that this was done to avoid humiliating Tatang’s camp because that might have led to chaos or disturbance (rusuh, ribut-ribut) in the village. Intimidation and violence were things that Tatang’s camp was said to be capable of if they were humiliated. However, by ensuring a fair and clean (jujur, bersih) ballot, there would be no reason for Tatang’s camp not to accept the final result.

Odo’s loss, on the other hand, was a surprise to no one, being largely due to the work of his own camp persuading the villagers not to vote for him. The night before the election and on the morning election day, Odo’s close kin informed the key figures in the village that Odo’s candidature was a mistake. He was too young, economically unstable, and immature as far as leadership was concerned. Simply put, for the sake of the village it would be better not to vote for Odo; even Odo’s close kin would not vote for him. The persuasive message continued with an argument that it would be better to give Odo a chance to improve his family’s economy and his leadership skill to be better prepared for the next village head election.

A couple of months prior to the village head election in Sukakarya, Ciptapura, a village about 30 km from the capital of Sumber Jaya town had held its village head election. Ciptapura was created in the 1960s by two groups of Sundanese who now lived in the two main, neighbouring hamlets in the village. Each group had a charismatic leader, Sujana in Sukawaras, and Takim in Ciptajaya. Both leaders were legendary for their
leadership role organizing the early migrants to transform the forested land into the present day Ciptapura. Both Sujana and Takim were separately able to persuade the neighbouring Semendo village head to give part of their village territory to the new migrants. Sujana and Takim were active in providing assistance to the subsequent migrants who settled in the village. This was done, in the first years, by simply collectively clearing the forest and distributing the cleared land to each individual involved. Later, it was facilitated by ensuring that new comers had a host in the village, allowing them to start work on a piece of land as numpang (using a plot of land for free), sharecropper, or as hired labourer to enable them to accumulate enough money to buy land of their own.

The communities in the two new hamlets sought advice from either Sujana or Takim. Both are now among the richest in the village with more than ten hectares of coffee gardens and rice fields. Later Sujana focused more on formal leadership in the village while Takim became an informal leader, regularly receiving fellow villagers who consulted him about supernatural things, such as asking for a good day to do things to healing severe sicknesses.

The settlement turned into an official village (desa) in the early 1980s. A village head election was held, and Sujana had a big win against the empty box. Sujana was also Golkar komisaris in the village, ensuring a majority vote for Golkar in the village until the 1999 national election when, as in the region and nation, PDIP won. Sujana’s term as village head continued until the early 1990s when he decided to retire, largely due to his wife’s health’s problems. No village head election was held at the end of Sujana’s first eight-year term, the village council and the sub-district office just agreed to continue his term of office. The villagers regarded Sujana as an ideal village head. He acted as a father in the
village by ensuring fair decisions on internal affairs. He was said to never
touch the village funds, kept with complete records by the village
treasurer. And he let the village councils and village assembly take
decisions on village funds and projects. More than that, Sujana was
recognised for his achievement in bringing government projects to the
village. It was during his term that the village built a health clinic, a
market, two elementary schools, and bridges so the village’s unpaved
road network could be reached by jeep. The village was also continuously
selected as the site of demonstration plots (demplot) for various
agricultural extension programs, and since the mid 1990s, the village was
one of the most productive and intensive coffee-growing villages in the
region.

When Sujana retired in the early 1990s, the village council appointed
Sudarto as the PSJ, and planned to hold a village head election in a year or
two later. Sudarto had migrated to Ciptajaya from Central Lampung in
the 1980s. He had bought a plot of coffee garden, which was sharecropped
while he himself was involved in the lucrative business of cutting and
selling timber from the remaining state forest nearby. Upon his arrival in
the village he was appointed by the village council as the assistant babinsa
(village military officer) in the village, his main responsibility being the
security of the village market. He received a regular income from the
village funds collected from the traders in the weekly village market.
Sudarto was successful in doing his job, preventing stealing and pick-
pocketing that had frequently occurred in the village market prior to his
appointment. His appointment as the market security guard and later as
the PJS was largely due to Takim’s endorsement. Sudarto had long been
in a close contact with Takim.
Sudarto somehow managed to prolong his term as *PJS* for almost a decade. A couple of years after his appointment, when the sub-district office questioned his status as *PJS* and suggested a village head election, he was able to persuade the village council and the head of hamlets to sign a letter stating that the village agreed to extend his term as *PJS*. With this letter, plus, according to rumours, trucks of lumber, the sub-district accepted the extension of his term as *PJS*. Like Sujana, Sudarto was very active in bringing government projects to the village, roads were gravelled and bridges, schools and market were rebuilt. A land certification project was also brought to the village. As far as tapping state resources was concerned, Sudarto’s achievements and leadership were well recognised. But, when it came to the issue of morality, the villagers expressed nothing but disappointment. He kept all the village funds in his pocket and left almost no room for the village council to have a say in village projects. It was also noted that he did shameful things such as selling the gardens in the state forest zones whose owners were evicted during military operations to evict the forest settlers at the turn of 1990s, ‘eating’ the villagers’ money to pay the cost of land certification, and continuing his illegal timber business. The list continued to include other forms of wrongdoing, from drinking, gambling, and ‘playing with women’ (*main perempuan*) to asking for cigarettes or drink from shops without paying. Only in the latter case, however, was Sudarto reported to have done such things in the village. For the other wrongdoing, it was said that Sudarto committed them outside the village, thus making them difficult to verify. The only proof was his frequent absences. A story about Sudarto’s brother being caught in the act of burglary and burnt to death near the town of Metro in Central Lampung was further used by the villagers to suggest the possibility of Sudarto’s involvement in the criminal networks elsewhere outside the region.
In addition to the sub-district policy to have a definitively elected village head in all the villages, the village head election in 2002 was also the result of conflict between Sudarto and Takim. This was the end of Sudarto’s long term support from the most influential informal leader in the village. One of Takim’s sons was involved in a fight with a young man from a neighbouring village. Normally, in cases of youth fighting with no weapons involved, both parties would enter discussions to reach ‘peace’ (damai); the injured party would receive an apology and compensation in cash equal to actual hospital costs. The peace agreement would indicate that the case was considered as juvenile delinquency and taken care of by the community rather than as a criminal act to be taken to court by the police. In Takim’s son’s case, his enemy’s family demanded compensation amounting to more than Rp 1 million, well beyond the actual medical costs to treat the injury. Sudarto, in his capacity as head of village, did nothing to persuade both parties to discuss a peace settlement; rather he reinforced the demand for compensation and obliged Takim’s family to pay the compensation. Many believe that had the compensation been paid, Sudarto would have taken a portion of the payment for himself. Sudarto had done this before to others in the village. Takim himself, not surprisingly, due to his strong informal leadership, was finally able to settle the dispute in a peaceful manner. But by then he had become so angry with Sudarto that he promised to topple him from the village head office. Takim’s statement was embraced with much delight by most Ciptapura villagers.

A village committee for the village head election was soon set up. Juhana, in his capacity as the head of the village council, directly supervised the committee. Yet there was another problem. Apart from Sudarto, no one
was willing to become a candidate. Takim soon asked Ujang, one of his sons, to run in the village head election. Less than 30 years in age, Ujang was studying at a private university in Bandar Lampung; hence he was frequently absent from the village. A couple of months prior to the election, Ujang married a Semendonese girl from a neighbouring village. Since there was no news prior to the marriage, and no wedding party, a common occurrence among ordinary villagers but extremely exceptional for a rich family like Takim’s, it was said the marriage was for the purpose of the candidature. According to the regulations, a village head must be married. Takim and Ujang’s next step was then to approach key figures in the village to gain community support. There was no problem with this. Key figures in the village were more than willing to advise the villagers to vote for Ujang.

It is interesting to note that both Sudarto and Takim actually nominated Hardi to become the next village head. Had Hardi agreed to run, both Sudarto and Ujang would have withdrawn their candidature to ensure Hardi’s election. Hardi, in his 40s, had a good leadership record. He was the head of the hamlet of Sukawaras and an active and influential young leader of the village council during Sujana’s term as village head. He was economically established, with more than 3 hectares of productive coffee gardens and a couple of plots of rice fields, and had managed to send his two sons to Yogyakarta and Bandung—two prominent cities in Java for good higher education. In the early 1990s, Hardi and his wife Minah went to the state palace in Jakarta to receive a national award from President Suharto as pioneers in the national family planning program for having only two children. During Juhana’s term as village head, his wife’s problems with literacy and health prevented her from performing the tasks as the head of PKK (Pendidikan Kesejahteraan Keluarga, the family
welfare education program). Hardi’s wife, Minah, had acted as the leader of PKK in the village and actively represented the village at the higher government levels. Thus Hardi and Minah were seen by the villagers as the ideal couple for the office of village head. To persuade Hardi to accept the nomination, the village council were willing to issue a decree that the village would be responsible for all the costs of the village head election. Yet both Hardi and Minah refused the nomination.

According to his friends, Hardi himself was quite willing and ready to accept the nomination, but not his wife Minah and his two sons. Minah, with her experience as PKK leader, concluded that the tasks would be unbearably exhausting for her. Another problem was that the task would not result in a comparable material reward. Although at this time all village heads in West Lampung district received a monthly allowance, the amount was relatively small: Rp 250,000, equal to merely 100 kg of milled rice, while the actual living costs for an established family, according to some of the village heads in the region, was about two to three times higher. Using the annual village funds for village head’s personal needs, although acceptable would trigger shameful gossip. It is for this reason that Hardi’s youngest son strongly opposed the idea of his father becoming a village head. According to him, if his father became a village head, any goods (household goods, vehicles, and clothes) the family bought in the future would be gossiped about as if the family had used the village’s money. In particular, he could not stand to hear in the future any gossip that the cost of his study was paid for using the village’s money.

Thus, finally, Sudarto and Ujang competed in the village head election. To cover the cost, Sudarto sold one of his cars and some of his coffee gardens,
while Ujang sold his motorbike and pawned some of his father’s coffee gardens and sawah. The village council decided that no village money would be used. On the morning of the village election day, a dozen jeeps, minibuses, and lightweight trucks with either Sudarto’s or Ujang’s posters stuck on them were busy picking up voters from all the hamlets to take them to the village hall in Sukawaras. Sudarto was reported to be very nervous and got drunk on the night before election day. He rode his noisy fake Harley Davidson motorbike from hamlet to hamlet, and said to anyone he met on the street that he would take note of those who did not vote for him and threatened that something bad could happen to them. To cool Sudarto’s temper, hundreds of villagers gathered in his house the night before the election day, cheering him up and indicating they would vote for him. The host provided snacks and meals. Takim’s house, where Ujang also lived, was much less crowded. It was said later that the villagers purposefully prevented themselves from openly showing their favour to him.

The procedure of the voting was similar to that in Sukakarya. The candidates and their wives arrived at 9 a.m. and sat in the middle of the hall watching the final preparation. Sudarto looked calm sitting on a couch, while Ujang was clearly nervous and frequently went out of the hall. The voting began around 10 a.m. after the head of the subdistrict’s official opening speech. Again there were no speeches from the candidates. In both Sukakarya and Sukawaras, in his speech the head of the subdistrict stressed that unlike the time before reformasi, the government now had no favoured candidate (tidak ada lagi calon yang dijagokan pemerintah). This time villagers should follow their hearts (mengikuti hati nurani) to vote for the best candidate for their village. Ujang and his wife left for home right after the opening speech prior to the
commencement of the voting. Sudarto’s wife left early, but Sudarto sat relaxed on the couch smoking, exchanging jokes with members of the committee, and teasing some of the voters. He left home a couple of minutes prior the lunch break.

Unlike the vote in Sukakarya, the gambling market did not bet on which one of the candidates would win or lose. No one seemed to dare bet for either Sudarto to win or Ujang to lose. The betting was on whether Sudarto could obtain 200 votes from the nearly 2,000 registered voters. The odds were one to one. Those who bet that Sudarto would get 200 or more would win the same amount of cash and vice versa. As in Sukakarya but with far fewer participants, apart from cash, the betting involved motorbikes and coffee gardens.

At 3 p.m. the voting was completed and the counting began. Sudarto got less than 200 votes. A party was held at Takim’s house that night to celebrate the victory. A couple of weeks later Sudarto was no longer seen staying with his family in the village. Some said that he was living with his other wife elsewhere. For Takim, not only did he manage to depose Sudarto from the village head office but he got rid of his rival from the village.

In the end of 2002, both the head and the secretary of the subdistrict of Sumber Jaya were promoted. It was these two men who imposed the policy that by 2003 no more villages in Sumber Jaya would have PJS and all would have definitive village heads elected through democratic elections. The secretary of the subdistrict was appointed head of the less developed neighbouring subdistrict, whose head was promoted to leadership of the developing Sumber Jaya subdistrict. The head of the
subdistrict of Sumber Jaya was himself promoted to be the head of an office at the West Lampung district level in the capital of Liwa. He was not really keen to take his promotion, as he much preferred to continue his position as the head of the Sumber Jaya subdistrict. The village heads in Sumber Jaya also preferred to his replacement. According to these village heads, unlike other *camat*, he treated the village heads more as colleagues (*kawan*) than inferiors (*bawahan*) and, more importantly, never unilaterally asked the village head to deposit (*setor*) money at the subdistrict office or slice (*potong*) a considerable portion of the village projects and funds.\(^1\) In the official ceremony for the handing over of the *camat* office, all the village heads of Sumber Jaya made a declaration to the district head (*bupati*) that they wanted the present *camat* to stay and refused the replacement. Acknowledging the sentiment, the *bupati* persuaded the village heads to give the new *camat* a chance. If in the following couple of months they still could not accept the new *camat*, then a replacement would be arranged. This was a warning to the new *camat* to treat the village heads as colleagues rather than inferiors.

With the replacement of the two key figures in the subdistrict office, the imposition of the policy of having elected village heads in all the villages in Sumber Jaya weakened. Among the fourteen villages, two villages still had *PJS* in early 2003. In both villages the *PJS* were former village secretaries. In the first village, Trijaya, the village committee scheduled a village head election for the end of 2002. The cost of the election was still an issue. The candidates were expecting the village to bear the cost as in Sukakarya, while the village council wanted the candidates to be responsible for the cost as in Ciptapura. At the beginning of 2003 the

\(^1\) Nonetheless, this by no means indicates that there was no petty corruption at all.
issue had not been resolved. An extension of the term of the PJS would be the likely result. In the second village, Sindang Cahaya, the situation was rather different. No one is willing to nominate as a candidate. A village council initiative like Sukakarya’s where each hamlet nominated a candidate and the village bore the cost, was also absent. The villagers seemed to quite happy to an extension of the current PJS.

Unlike Sumber Jaya, in the subdistrict of Way Tenong, the extension of the term of the PJS faced no obstacle. As long as there was no one willing to nominate as a candidate for the village head election, the PJS term would be prolonged. Yet, people are always attracted to the position of village head. Two village head elections were held in Way Tenong in 2002. In both villages the candidates were responsible for the cost of the election. In one of the villages, candidate Hendra was the richest man in his village, an important coffee re-seller in the region and owner of a large shop. Many people were surprised by his decision to run since the material gain from the office of village head would be nothing compared to his current business. Hendra finally failed to win the election, to the surprise of no one. The elected village head was an ordinary villager (orang biasa). It is said that the village head is a position that someone cannot get without money (tidak bisa didapat tanpa uang) but it is also something that money cannot buy (tidak bisa dibeli dengan uang). What Hendra lacked and could not buy was the villagers’ popular support (dukungan masyarakat).

The granting and withdrawal of villagers’ popular support (dukungan masyarakat) for village leaders has played a key role in village politics in the region. Dukungan masyarakat was given to individuals who were able to meet villagers’ expectation to integrate the village into the state and to bring ‘development’ to the village. Village leaders were expected to keep
promoting resource flows to the village; otherwise the *dukungan masyarakat* would be withdrawn and be given to somebody else.

**Conclusion**

The progress that Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong achieved has largely been the results of villagers' efforts to bring state resources into the village. This was achieved by positioning the village within the orbit of state power. During the New Order period, villagers turned the region into an important pocket of Golkar loyalists in the Lampung highlands and enjoyed resource inflows in the form of rural development projects. Following the *reformasi* movement, in the hope of aligning themselves to central elites as in the past, the villagers turned the region into a stronghold for the new ruling party the PDIP (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle).

The integration of the village into the state has led to the emergence of politically powerful village leaders, whose power has been promoted as well as constrained. Villagers expect their village leaders to promote the flow of state resources into the village. Village leaders who can bring 'progress' to the villages will gain popular community support (*dukungan masyarakat*). Otherwise the *dukungan masyarakat* will be given to someone who can deliver the promise of development.
CHAPTER FIVE

Resources Control, Conflict, and Collaboration

After discussing the ways villagers bring the state into the village in the last chapter, this chapter explores the ways villagers in Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong resist and, alternately, accommodate state attempts to exact a greater control over people and resources. As Peluso, Vandergeest, and Potter (1995) have noted, one of the trends in the social aspects of the political economy and political ecology of forestry in colonial and post-colonial Southeast Asia has been the consolidation of state power over forest resources, labour, and territory. States’ attempts at forest control, furthermore, have created struggles between state agencies and villagers involving claims and counter-claims over forest land.

Smallholders who farm the land inside state forest boundaries in the region can be seen to fit the Indonesian forestry authorities’ definition of perambah hutan (forest squatters/encroachers/destroyers). Notwithstanding that villagers knew that farming the land inside the state forest boundaries was illegal, they continued transforming forests into agricultural fields. For the late coming landless migrants and the children of the early migrants who aspired to become smallholder farmers, squatting on forest land was the way to gain access to land through non-market relations. Villagers’ resistance to the forestry authorities’ attempts to transform smallholder fields into plantation forests and, recently, villagers’ involvement in ‘forest
management’ can be seen in the context of restricting resource extraction from this peripheral area by the central elites.

**Conflict Over Land and Forest Resources**

**(Mis)classification and (mis)management of Lampung’s forest zones?**

Between 1922 and 1942 the Dutch administration gazetted forested land in lowland and highland Lampung as forest reserves. On paper, the Dutch administration classified nearly 1 million hectares of Lampung land as state forestry zones (*boschwezen*). Local people were prohibited from farming and gathering forest products from the gazetted forestry zones. Until the Japanese invasion in 1942, the Dutch were able to conduct field delineation and boundary pole demarcation of more than half of the gazetted forestry zones. Today, these delineated forest zones are still referred to by local people as *BW* land (*tanah BW*), after the signs of *BW* (*boschwezen*) marked on the boundary poles.

In the post-colonial time, the national forestry authority reclassified these Dutch-gazetted *boschwezen* as state forest zones (*kawasan hutan negara*). Although the designation of the new forestry zones was simply a reclassification of the former *BW* land, the process took decades to complete. The process began in the 1970s and was perceived to be completed in 1990, by the signing of a Minister of Forestry decree on Lampung’s agreed forest land use plan (*TGHK, Tata Guna Hutan Kesepakatan*). According to the Basic Forestry Law of 1967, the Minister of Forestry had the authority to designate the state forestry zones based on provincial government planning. For

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1 This material dealing with the history of forestry policy in Lampung is based mainly on my previous research (2000).
Lampung, the first governor’s proposition regarding the province’s forestry zones took place in 1977. The second proposition, with similar content (reclassification of former BW land) was in 1980. Through this process, it appears that the governor was the one who proposed the new forest land use. In reality it was the Provincial Representative Office of the Ministry of Forestry who did most of the work. Following this, field delineation was conducted, new boundary poles were installed and the old ones reconstructed.

Meanwhile, massive logging activities were conducted throughout Lampung. Beginning in the 1960s, it became the main forestry works in the province until the end of the 1980s—when there no more forests left for commercial logging. Included in logging concession areas were portions of lands that were later designated as Way Kambas and Bukit Barisan Selatan national parks in the mid-1980s. In addition to former BW lands, the forestry authorities also granted forests on adat lands to logging companies. After the logging many of these lands were either designated as state forest zones or granted to estate plantation companies.

When the Lampung forest land use was proposed in the 1980s, a considerable portion of the proposed state forestry zones were no longer forested due to (legal and illegal) logging and, with the flow of migrants to the province, the conversion into village settlements and the expansion of smallholding fields. These facts were ignored. The justification to include

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2 During the Gus Dur presidency in 2000, as part of the process of decentralization and regional autonomy, all the central ministries’ representative offices (kantor wilayah) in the provinces were dismantled.

3 An example of this inclusion was over 40,000 hectares of damar (Shorea javanica) gardens in Krui. Granted to a logging company in 1980s, it was later gazetted as production forest zones. In 1997 the Minister of Forestry signed a decree declaring the zone as ‘zone with distinct purpose’ (KDTI kawasan dengan tujuan istimewa) and granted the usufruct right of this zone to Krui adat communities.
these non-forested lands as state forest zones was said to be in accord with the Basic Forestry Law of 1967, which stipulated that 30% of land must be gazetted as state forest zones. Hence, 1.2 million ha of the province's territory was officially designated as state forest zones. These zones were further sub-classified into conservation forest (*kawasan konservasi*), designed for conservation of the flora and fauna in its natural habitat; protection forest (*hutan lindung*), with watershed conservation as its primary function; and production forest (*hutan produksi*) for timber production.

In the conservation forest zones (Bukit Barisan Selatan and Way Kambas national parks), more regular patrols have been the primary mechanism to limit further encroachments. But this has not prevented illegal hunting, poaching, and expansion of smallholder fields.

In the 1980s, following the process of the designation of state forestry zones, and with little forest left to log, the eviction of forest squatters and reforestation became the main forestry policies on protection forest zones. From the early 1980s to the mid 1990s, through a series of military operations, thousands of families were evicted from protection forest zones in various upper watershed regions in the province such as Gunung Balak in the east; Gunung Betung, Pulau Panggung, and Wonosobo in the south; and Sumber Jaya and neighbouring subdistricts in the north. Between 1979 and 1996, through local transmigration programmes (*translok, transmigrasi lokal*), 65,000 families (over a quarter of million people) were resettled to several sites in the northern lowland of the province (e.g. Pakuan Ratu, Tulang Bawang, Mesuji).

It is public knowledge that those who joined the transmigration programmes constituted only a fraction of those who actually settled and farmed the state
forest zones. Those who farmed in the state forest zones but did not live there were excluded from the local transmigration program. From the 1970s to the mid-1990s, it was stated in official reports that 180,272 hectares of protection forest zones had been reforested. But evidence in the field indicates otherwise; most reforestation projects failed to transform ‘degraded’ forest into plantation forests.

Plantation forestry was conducted both in protection forest zones and production forest zones. Various government forestry units were made responsible for reforestation on protection forest zones, while in the production forest zones the state-owned (PT Inhutani) and private companies were involved through the industrial forest plantation scheme (HTI, hutan tanaman industri). From the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s it was reported that PT Inhutani and other companies controlling 239,000 hectares of the production forest zones had planted 54,907 hectares of fast-growing trees and rubber, but actual successful planting was limited.

Not only did the government fail to clear the state forest zones of settlers and reforest the ‘degraded’ land, the eviction of the forest settlers and attempts at reforestation resulted in prolonged conflicts between smallholders, the forestry authority and HTI companies. Meanwhile, conversion into smallholder fields and illegal logging of the remaining forests continued. In the mid-1990s, at least 41.4% of some 316,570 ha of conservation forest was no longer forested, with 5,676 households living within its various boundaries; 83.5% of some 318,513 ha of protection forest, contained 36,349 households; and 81.5% of 401,910 ha of production forest, contained 54,000 households.
Map 3. Forest Land Use Plan (TGHK) of Lampung Province 1990
Land appropriation and reappropriation in Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong

In the region of Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong, the state forest zones included all the former BW land that comprised a large portion of the region, excluding the relatively flat land along the banks of Way Besai river encircling Bukit Rigis mountain. Located on the banks of Way Besai, most villages in the region have state forest zone boundaries as their village borders. The former BW land to the east and north of the region was classified as protection forest. The hilly and mountain land to the west and north of the region was gazetted as part of Bukit Barisan Selatan national park.

The opening of the BW forests began a few years after independence and continued before, during, and after the process of proposition and designation of the province’s forest land use. On the border of the then subdistricts of Way Tenong and Bukit Kemuning, as early as 1946, the forests were cleared for upland rice swidden, housing and, later, coffee gardens by a small group of Ogan and Semendo people from the neighbouring regions. Bedeng Kerbau, as this hamlet was named, supplied rice for Indonesian soldiers who used Bukit Kemuning town as their post during the revolutionary war in 1946-47 against the return of the Dutch. In 1965-66 the forestry service gave official permission for 489 farmers to use 1,294 ha of the BW land for housing compounds and farming, each person receiving 0.3 ha to 17 ha. Finally in 1969 the governor officially recognised this territory as the administrative village of Dwikora.

From the early 1950s, more BW forests were transformed as settlements and farms for the incoming transmigrants from Java. The region was selected as
the receiving area for the transmigration of veterans from Java. The transmigration program was organised by a central government unit called BRN (Biro Rekonstruksi Nasional). The first BRN transmigration village of Sukapura included 224 ha of BW land, while Tribudi Sukur took 127 ha. Elders in Simpang Sari remember that in the late 1960s there were already warnings from village officials directed at the incoming transmigrants to stop further opening of the BW land.

In the following decades, more and more people migrated to the region. Hence more BW land was cleared and transformed into hamlets and smallholder fields. As more people led to more ‘development’ in the region, with the creation of more administrative villages and the construction of roads, schools, and health clinics, even more people were attracted into the region. Other factors were the improved coffee prices and trade. The enforcement of the forest zone boundaries was not an issue until the 1980s. Elders in Gunung Terang and Muara Jaya still remember that during the Dutch period, forestry officers regularly patrolled the BW boundary and advised village heads to deter their fellow villagers from clearing and farming land within the BW boundary. However, after independence the village head had no authority to prohibit the outsiders from clearing BW land; the BW land was not part of the village territory and the incoming migrants were not ‘citizens’ of any village. Instead, many village heads profited from these situations. They charged the incoming migrants fees such as land tax and permission to farm (izin garap). The new migrants then became the ‘citizens’ of that village.

Illegal logging was another important factor leading to the deforestation of the region. In most villages the elites were, and a few still are, involved in this lucrative yet illegal business. In the village, their responsibility was to
organize felling, cutting, and local transport. To avoid being targeted by forest ranger patrols and raids during the process of felling and cutting, and to protect the trucks from the police and forestry checkpoints along the highway when transporting the timber out of the region, protection was provided by local policemen, military personnel, and/or forest rangers. Most often the three elements worked together. It is a widely held view that timber is the main additional source of cash for local state agencies and their apparatus. Such a situation is seen as normal for regions in Indonesia where alternative sources of additional cash such as large industry or plantations are absent, like in Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong. Without the backing of either police, military, or forest rangers, any local villager cutting and taking lumber, even from a naturally-felled tree in the forest, will become the target of a local forest rangers raid. The timber will be seized and the possessor will be sent to jail, to be released after a sum of ‘peace money’ (uang damai) is paid.

Since the late 1970s the region has been constantly targeted as a site for the sporadic implementation of forestry policies. Until recently, eviction of smallholder farmers from state forest zones and reforestation of their farms has been the main policy. Like the neighbouring regions of Tanjung Raja and Pulau Panggung, the selection of this hilly region of Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong has been justified because of its strategic location as the source of water for big river systems feeding large dams and irrigation schemes in the lowland. Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong region is the catchment area of Way Besai watershed, which forms part of the larger Tulang Bawang watershed. The neighbouring regions of Tanjung Raja and Pulau Panggung are the upper parts of Way Rarem, Way Seputih, and Way Sekampung watersheds. While Way Besai hydropower is an important source of electricity for the province, the Way Rarem dam supplies water for irrigation networks in the
district of North Lampung, the Way Seputih irrigates rice bowls in central Lampung lowland, and the Way Sekampung feeds Batu Tegi hydropower in Pulau Panggung and irrigation networks in the southern lowlands of the province. For the forestry officers, the removal of natural cover and the planting of smallholder coffee on sloping land causes erosion, damaging the quality (siltation) and quantity (debit) of water flowing downstream. Thus, smallholders were accused of environmental destruction (*merusak lingkungan*) and were said to deserve harsh measures.

In the region, reforestation projects began in the late 1970s. They began with the planting of a few hundreds of hectares of pine and sungkai trees (*Peronema canescens*). A few stands of these trees can still be seen today between Dwikora and Sukapura. During the 1980s and the early 1990s sonokeling (*Dalbergia latifolia*), caliandra (*Calliandra calothyrsus*), and mahogany (*Swietenia mahogany*) were used in reforestation projects. There was a contrast in the way these projects were implemented. Prior to the 1980s, a project was carried out by the office forestry service. After that, the project involved other parties; private companies, PT Inhutani (state-owned forestry company), and the army (through the AMR program [ABRI *Manunggal Reboisasi*]). Previously concentrated only on the sites between the villages of Sukapura and Dwikora, in the 1980s to the early 1990s the reforestation projects spread throughout the region. Thus, most villages in the region experienced a reforestation project.

In 1995-1997, the reforestation project concentrated on Dwikora and a few villages on the eastern part of Sumber Jaya such as Sukapura, Simpang Sari, and Tribudi Sukur, close to the site of the Besai dam. *Gmelina arborea* was the

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4 While pine, sungkai, sonokeling, and mahogany produce premium-class timbers, caliandra, a fast-growing bush, could quickly outgrow other plants (e.g. coffee, *imperata* imperata.)
main type of tree planted, along with a few other tree crops. Private companies and the army were no longer involved in these projects, leaving the implementation of the projects to PT Inhutani and the forestry service. In addition to labourers recruited from outside the region, the projects often involved local men and women as paid workers.

Bush (belukar) and coffee gardens were the main targets of the reforestation project. It is reported that between 1978 to 1985 the reforestation projects have planted 20,000 hectares of forestry zones in the region, and between 1995 to 1998, over 8,000 hectares. After planting the reforestation trees on a particular site for a year or two, the project moved to other sites. The newly planted trees were left without care. In belukar, the trees soon died. In coffee gardens, most trees were uprooted and a few were kept alive alongside the coffee stands.

The eviction of farmers living inside the state forest zones started in the early 1980s. Of the families whose coffee farms were demolished and planted with pine trees in Dwikora, a few hundred were involuntarily resettled in a new transmigration site in Mesuji, near Menggala in northern Lampung. Hundreds of another families from the BRN transmigration villages of Purajaya, Purawiwitan, Pura Mekar were among the over 8,000 people targeted by a military operation to evict small farmers from state forest in Sumber Jaya and Pulau Panggung in 1990-91. They were also forced to resettle in Mesuji. In July 1994, in a joint operation of the forestry service and the police force, houses and coffee gardens in 86 hamlets of over 1,200 families in Purajaya, Purawiwitan, and Muara Jaya were destroyed. Some of the families were resettled in Mesuji, the rest moved elsewhere.

grain). Gmelina, a fast-growing timber tree, produces soft wood for lumber and pulp industry.
To avoid the demolition of their houses and gardens through these military operations, elsewhere the farmers dismantled their hamlets on their own. Those who moved outside the region simply abandoned their gardens, those who lived nearby continued to care and harvest their coffee gardens. Living in a nearby village territory but outside the state forest boundaries, while continuing to care for and harvest the coffee gardens inside the state forest zones became a common response to such military operations. Since this involved the pruning, pollarding, or felling of the reforestation trees, this had to be done carefully to avoid being caught in the act by patrolling officers. Such a practice was called *kucing-kucingan* (hide and seek). During the harvest seasons, hide and seek was obviously more difficult. The patrolling forestry, military, and/or police personnel used the opportunity to confiscate the harvests. Later, this became a regular practice. Every harvest season the farmers would be asked to set aside a portion of their harvest to be collected by the patrolling personnel who threatened to destroy their gardens.

On the southern slopes of Bukit Rigis there were six hamlets, all located within the state forest. The population of three of these hamlets were registered in the transmigration village of Fajar Bulan. The other three hamlets belonged to another transmigration village of Puralaksana. In the 1970s, migrants, mainly from Java, had moved in and by the end of the 1980s there were over 500 families. Soon they were preparing to create a separate village administration. Sinar Harapan, literally meaning ‘the light of hope’, was chosen as the name of the village. The village community managed to have a small market, an elementary school, and mosques, just as in neighbouring administrative villages. But the plan to have a separate administrative village never materialised. In the early 1990s the forestry and
military personnel informed the villagers about an incoming military operation to evict those living and farming in state forest. Not wanting their houses and gardens destroyed, they vacated the village; some moved elsewhere, but most moved to neighbouring villages. Their coffee gardens were soon planted with sonokeling and mahogany. Only on coffee gardens that continued to be managed have these reforestation trees survived; on the abandoned gardens and bushes they died.

The most recent government attempt to evict small farmers and turn coffee gardens and bush in state forests zones into plantation forests took place in 1995-97. It began with what villagers in the region remember as ‘the elephant operation’ (operasi gajah) at the beginning of 1995. Unlike earlier, in this military operation a troop of elephants was involved. The villages of Dwikora, in Bukit Kemuning subdistrict, and Sukapura, Simpang Sari, and Tribudi Sukur, in Sumber Jaya subdistrict were selected for the showdown. The opening of the operation was aired nationally on the government television station (TVRI), and covered by local and national press.

In a couple of months, the operation managed to demolish hundreds of huts and houses and thousands of hectares of coffee gardens. Unlike in previous operations, this time the villagers were more open in expressing their disagreement. Hundreds of Dwikora villagers organised a demonstration in the capital of the province. Delegates from this village also managed to engage in a series of dialogues with high-level provincial government officers and members of the House of Representatives. Petitions were signed and sent to key institutions in Jakarta, such as the ministry of forestry, the human rights commission, and the House of Representatives. One of the results was that in Dwikora it was decided that the houses located 300 m from a stretch of the main road, over a kilometre long, would not be
destroyed in the operation. But the villagers were expected to dismantle their houses on their own. The demand for the cancellation or delay of the demolition of coffee gardens was not accepted. In 1996, through a decree by the governor, the administrative village of Dwikora was declared to no longer exist. At the end of 1996 a smaller troop of military, police, and forestry personnel was again set up to conduct a follow-up operation in Dwikora. But this time, when the troop wanted to start destroying the coffee gardens, hundreds of men, each with machetes in their hands rushed out and were ready to attack them. To avoid bloodshed, the troop cancelled the demolition of houses and coffee gardens. The villagers only allowed the troop to demolish government facilities such as the village hall, water tank, and elementary school.

As earlier, resettlement and further chopping down of smallholders' coffee gardens and the planting of reforestation trees followed the demolition. In 1996, through a local transmigration program, nearly 300 families from Dwikora and other villages in Sumber Jaya moved to Mesuji. PT Inhutani and various forestry units organised the reforestation projects. Dwikora was chosen as the site of base camp and nurseries. By the beginning of 1998, it was reported that the reforestation project had planted at least 6,000 hectares.

Although the re-opening of coffee gardens, previously destroyed and planted with reforestation trees or just simply abandoned, has been occurring for some time, a massive re-opening began in mid 1998. This was linked with the *krismon*, El Nino drought, and *reformasi*. In the early years of the monetary crisis, the price of export crops such as coffee and pepper increased sharply following the decline of the *rupiah vis a vis* the US dollar. Coffee prices rose fivefold, from Rp 3,000 to nearly Rp 15,000. Hence,
abandoned and demolished coffee gardens were reopened. Dried bush and
dying reforestation trees were burned, making felling and clearing of bush
and trees less arduous. The overthrow of Suharto and his New Order regime
in May 1998, marking the beginning of reformasi, was interpreted as the
abrogation of the New Order’s repressive forestry policies. The reformasi thus
justified land reclaiming and reappropriation. There was no more fear of
forestry and military personnel. Along with reclaiming fields, throughout
the province a series of protests and demonstrations were staged, resulting
in some forestry policy changes. The news spread among villagers that there
would be no more evictions and crops destructions, and that farming in state
forest zones was no longer prohibited. This was also the main theme of the
PDIP campaign for the 1999 general election in the region. The PDIP’s win in
the region then further justified the reclaiming and reopening of state forest
zones.

When talking about their interactions with the forestry authority, villagers in
the region often speak of a series of periods: buka kawasan (opening of [state
forest] zones), tutup kawasan (the closing of [state forest] zones), and bebas
kawasan (free [to occupy state forest] zones). The first refers to the period
prior to the enforcement of forestry policies, the second to the closing down
do state forest zones in the late 1980s to the mid 1990s, and the latter to post
reformasi. Some villagers said that had the coffee price not declined from
1999, the few patches of natural forest that now still remain would be gone
and completely transformed into coffee gardens. This is the case for the
reforested lands: most were cleared and returned to coffee gardens.
From Conflict to Collaboration?

The traditional social/community forestry

The early model for reforestation projects in the 1980s can be seen as a form of social forestry. 'Forest farmers' were treated as free (unpaid) labourers in the establishment of plantation forests. Although the sonokeling trees were planted in coffee gardens, the coffee trees were not cut down. Often the farmers worked as labourers on these reforestation projects to plant sonokeling on their own gardens. The farmers were allowed to continue caring for and harvesting their coffee but advised strongly to care for and not to fell the reforestation trees, and to abandon the gardens when the sonokeling trees outgrew the coffee trees. Although some farmers followed this advice, most did otherwise. They uprooted or felled the sonokeling or kept only a few of them. Today coffee gardens with a few sonokeling trees can still be encountered in the region. Most coffee gardens that were outgrown by sonokeling and abandoned, however, were soon taken over and transformed back into coffee gardens by other farmers.

The late 1980s and 1990s reforestation projects used harsher measures. Coffee trees were chopped down and planted with caliandra, gmelina and other trees. Up until 1997-98, thousands of hectares of caliandra bush covered state forest throughout the region and gmelina trees was common on the eastern part of Sumber Jaya. By 2000, except for a few caliandra groves planted on bushland not suitable for coffee cultivation, most of this reforestation cover had been cleared.

Outside the state forest zones, the forestry offices implemented people's forestry (hutan rakyat) programs, which provided training, materials, and
financial incentives for farmers’ groups. The program included re-greening (penghijauan) through which fruit tree and fast-growing timber tree seedlings were distributed free. Financial incentives for the introduction of farming techniques for soil conservation (terraces, ridges, pits) and the construction of small dams on creeks to reduce eroded soils flowing into the river were also included in the program.

In the mid 1990s, a different kind of ‘social forestry’ approach, still very limited in scope, was put in place. It was concentrated in a few villages on the eastern part of Sumber Jaya, the village of Simpang Sari being the main site. Villagers farming blocks of state forest zones were grouped and employed, as paid labourers, to plant the reforestation trees on their coffee gardens. Apart from exotic timber trees, a small number of non-timber trees were also planted. These non-timber trees, including petai (Parkia speciosa), aren (Arenga pinnata), jengkol (Archidendron pauciflorum), damar (Shorea javanica), durian (Durio zibethinus), are officially called MPTS (multi-purposes tree species). The project was then officially labelled as hutan kemasyarakatan (community forestry). The farmers, it was envisaged by forestry officials, in the long run would care for the reforestation trees, would be able to benefit from these ‘minor’ forest products, and would give up cultivating coffee. In 2002, the farmers still cared for the young MPTS trees, but the timber trees were uprooted, felled or pruned regularly to prevent them shading the coffee trees.

A few villages in the region are able to protect patches of natural cover adjacent to the village settlements. In the transmigration villages of Simpang Sari, Tribudi Sukur, and Cipta Waras in Sumber Jaya, and in the Semendo village of Sukaraja in Way Tenong, a few hundred hectares of forest groves were prevented from being cleared and converted into farms. The forest
grove in Sukaraja is an exception because, unlike others that are located within the state forest zone, it is located outside the state forest zone boundary. This village forest is known as Kalpataru forest, after the national environmental award given to Sukaraja community in 1987. Securing the water supply for rice fields and domestic use is said to be the primary reason for the villagers’ commitment to protect the forest. In all villages, the role of elders in reminding villagers to continue protecting groves is of importance. Farmers, either from within or outside the village, need land for farms, and this together with illegal logging by village elites backed by military, police, and/or forestry officers are the greatest challenge for the villagers to keep protecting their forest. Hence, these village forests were not primary forest, and gradually reduced in size. It is the illegal logging and expansion of smallholder farms that has caused the failure of village forest protection in some other transmigrant and Semendo villages in the region, who claim to have had such village forests in the old days.

*After the reformasi*

As far as relations between smallholders and forestry authorities are concerned, after the *reformasi*, ‘agroforestation’ and the protection of the remaining forest by local communities has become a major theme in the region. Community forestry (*HKm, hutan kemasyarakatan*) was adopted as a program policy that, it is hoped, will resolve the prolonged conflict over forest and land resources. The new policy marks the beginning of collaboration between forestry officers and village communities. The development of such collaboration is, however, problematic. The general perception of the new policy among the villagers is that there will be no more evictions and destruction of their farms. For the forestry officers, the new policy offers a different strategy to gain greater control not only over the
resource, but also over people. Such divergent views are manifested in the politics of resource control in the implementation of the community forestry program.

At the provincial level, besides community forestry, the reformasi in the forestry sector was also marked by a minor change in forest land use (TGHK), and the introduction of a regulation to take a levy on all non-timber products (IIHBK: iuran hasil hutan bukan kayu) from all state forest zones in the province. The new TGHK 2000 excludes 145,000 hectares of production forest, mostly in the plains and lowlands of the province, that have long been converted into established village settlements, smallholder upland fields, wet rice fields, and, on the coast, brackish shrimp ponds. The levy on non-timber forest products was designed to extract revenues from timber plantation companies that planted crops other than timber, and smallholders farming state forest zones. For the smallholders, the exaction of the levy is linked with the granting of the community forestry permission contracts (izin HKm).

Under the community forestry scheme, smallholder farmers are required to form a farmers’ group or, preferably, cooperative. The farmers’ community group (kelompok) or cooperative is obliged to submit a ‘management plan’ for a particular block of state forest areas managed by its members. The planting of trees, with a caution that coffee is not considered a tree, and protection of the remaining natural cover, if there is any, are the main ingredients of the plan. The official contract of usufruct right will be given to the group by the head of the district (bupati). The temporary permission lasts for the first five years. After that, it is promised that an evaluation will be conducted. The result of the evaluation, it was said, will be used as the basis for the granting of permanent permission that is valid for 25 years.
By the end of 2002 five community groups had been granted temporary permission. In the process of obtaining temporary permission, granted in 2001, the farmers’ group in Tribudi Sukur, consisting of 15 smaller groups with 248 members managing 360 ha of land, received substantial assistance from forestry office staff. For the other three groups assistance was also provided by field staff of WATALA (Friends of Nature and Environment) and ICRAF (the International Centre for Research in Agroforestry). They assisted the groups in processes from group formation, mapping and inventory, formulation of a management plan, to the granting of the temporary permission. Two of the farmers’ groups were from two hamlets in Simpang Sari: one from Abung Marga Laksana, consisting of four smaller groups with 73 members managing over 260 ha of land, half of which is over-logged forest; and the other one from Gunung Sari, with 145 members managing 259 ha land, including 90 ha of over-logged forest. The third group was from Rigis Atas, a hamlet in Gunung Terang village, with three smaller groups managing 203 ha of land, more than half of which is natural forest cover. The size of land per member for these three groups, and perhaps for other groups as well, is similar to the pattern of land control on margaland (non-state forest land), that is from 0.25 to 4 hectares with 1 hectare being the average. The last farmers’ group to receive temporary permission in 2002 was from the village of Tambak Jaya. Unlike the other groups, this particular farmers’ group did not received much assistance from external institutions.

The groups with temporary permission are responsible for the protection of the remaining forest from illegal logging. In addition, in each village with a HKm group, the district government also gives a small monthly allowance for the appointment of persons, nominated by the groups and village
leaders, as civilian forest rangers (petugas keamanan [pam] swakarsa). This gives the authority in these villages for both the HKm group and the appointed pam swakarsa to stop illegal logging and the clearing of the remaining forest in the villages. After some initial raids, tree felling in the forests nearby villages with a HKm group ceased. As some of villagers involved in the illegal business said “We can no longer cut trees from the forest in some villages. It is now forbidden, not by officials (petugas) but by the community (masyarakat).” But the protection of forest by the village community has created yet another problem. Timber now needs to be imported so the cost for house construction is becoming much more expensive.

There are similarities among the various groups that have led to the granting of temporary permission. All the groups are located on sites that were frequently targeted for evictions and crop destruction. In the last two decades, they have experienced such actions at least twice. With the official permission, the villagers now have a more secure tenure to farm in state forest zones. As they often put it “We are safe (aman) now. We will no longer be the target of eviction and crop demolition.” This gives a strong motivation to join the HKm scheme. Among villagers themselves, there were sometimes cases of conflict over ‘ownership’ of gardens on BW land where there were competing claims over a piece of land. Being registered officially with izin HKm ownership, the land is secured against any claim by fellow farmers. Another similarity the groups share is that a large number of members of each group live in the same hamlet. As neighbours and friends, sometimes relatives, it is easier for them to form a group and to reach agreement or reconcile disagreements on various issues. Strong leadership is another key issue. All the groups granted permission have energetic, smart, and articulate leaders. The groups are therefore not only excellent in reaching
group consensus to work together, but also successful in getting the much-needed assistance from external organizations.

Being granted only a temporary permission means that the groups still need to work to obtain a permanent one. This is a complicated issue, since it is not yet clear how permanent permission can be granted. One thing that the villagers have heard is that there is a reluctance by the forestry authority to continue the implementation of the HKm scheme. As is often stated by high ranking forestry officers at the provincial level, there were reports that in many parts of the province farmers have been clearing more forests in anticipation of HKm permission; in other words, the farmers have misinterpreted the policy as legal permission to convert more forest into farms. Unsuccessful attempts to collect revenue from non-timber forest products levy from smallholders farming state forest lands, not surprisingly, due to technical difficulties and villagers resistance, was another reason for a moratorium on the HKm policy.

Another problem, more technical but equally complicated, is the issue of the planting of trees. Questions relate to how many trees need to be planted, what species, and who should supply the seedlings. Smallholders who want to transform their coffee gardens into tree-based gardens would be happy to plant as many trees as possible, but many are keen to keep coffee or other export crops so they are inclined to minimise the number of tall trees. Others, instead, want to plant more annual crops, such as vegetables, in their gardens. Trees producing ‘minor’ forest products such as fruits, sugar palm, and resin are strongly recommended for planting on HKm plots. Good quality seedlings need to be imported from outside the region and are expensive, which is another constraint. Some farmers also reported that based on their previous experiments in planting commercial fruit trees (such
as durian and longan), the production was disappointing: too irregular and too few. Fruit trees that produce well such as guava, jackfruit, and avocado fetch a low price. It is the fast growing timber trees, the story goes, that grow well and there is a market demand, but the planting of the timber trees is discouraged since under the HKm scheme on protection forest farmers are obliged to plant but are prohibited from cutting trees, let alone selling timber.

Farmers from a few other villages also formed groups in order to obtain the temporary permission. A lack of skilful and trusted leaders and group cohesion was often cited as a problem. There were cases where the leaders’ indicated their intention to secure personal gains, which made members reluctant to continue to form HKm groups. In other cases, groups faced difficulties in reaching agreement, simply because each faction insisted on its own opinion. In the worst cases, a group meeting was already difficult to organise, let alone make a collective decision.

Given the large number of smallholders farming state forest zones in the region, the number of villagers engaged in the HKm scheme is relatively small. Many villagers said “The majority of people here in the region are forest settlers (perambah hutan). And most of the state forest zones in the region have been cleared and farmed.” This may be an exaggeration; however, a large proportion of smallholders farming state forest lands in the region currently do not bother to get official permission contracts. For forestry officers, villagers who refuse to join HKm and/or pay the levy “lack of awareness” (belum sadar) of environmental conservation, “need education” (perlu penyuluhan), and are “blind to the law” (buta hukum). The villagers, on the other hand, give equally interesting points. The destruction of coffee gardens and, in return, uprooting of reforestation trees has became a routine,
so frequent that, as they put it “We now are getting used to it (sudah biasa). It is a matter of who gets exhausted (capek) and gives up (menyerah) first. If we give up first, then they can plant timber trees. If they give up first, we continue cultivating the land”. Many villagers see the conflict as a conflict over access to wealth. Illegal logging, reforestation projects, and premium-class or fast-growing timber trees are lucrative sources of income for state apparatus (petugas). As some villagers put it “If all state forest lands are to be managed by the community, then how can those officers feed themselves (bagaimana petugas bisa makan)?”

The village of Simpang Sari is an interesting case that can perhaps represent the population in the entire region with regard to HKm. It has villagers who have successfully secured temporary permission contracts; villagers who have formed groups but are still struggling over whether to proceed or quit; and villagers who do not want to be bothered with official, administrative processes such as HKm. Those with permission were struggling to obtain tree seedlings, protect the remaining forest, and were confused over the additional burden of paying the levy. Other groups agreed to pay the levy but proposed that, in return they be granted permission but be freed from the obligation to plant trees and/or protect the remaining forests. Given such confusion, in addition to internal leadership and cohesion problems, other villagers dissolved the groups and abandoned the HKm scheme. Other villagers, because they have been paying land tax (PBB) to the village administration for years, felt that there was no need to join the HKm scheme and pay the levy.

The state of collaboration in forest land and resource management between villagers and forestry authorities is problematic, both in scale and substance. The protection forest zone of Bukit Rigis, for example, has a total size of 8,289
ha. Heavily forested until 1970s, in 2002 about 2,000 hectares (less than 20%) of Bukit Rigis' upper slope remained forested. The rest has mostly been transformed into smallholder coffee gardens. Four years after the community forestry policy\(^5\), only a few hundred hectares of Bukit Rigis protection forest were granted permits. In other words, for the other thousands of hectare, such collaboration is yet to develop. At a technical level of scaling-up community forestry permissions, the process of obtaining the permits required a strong community cohesion, exceptional village leaders, and/or external assistance, which more often than is not unavailable. With regard to farming decision the matters are more problematic. Individual households organize their agricultural production independently. Under the community forestry scheme, in contrast, smallholder households were required to form groups or cooperatives and make collective land use decisions instead. Household farming decisions are made in response to availability of farming inputs, market signals, and natural resources potentials and limitations, while the community forestry scheme demands a management plan similar to the scientific forestry for the development of the plantation forests.

Many villagers, and a few forestry and government officers, believe that the remaining forests will soon vanish unless the nearby village communities

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\(^5\) The Minister of Forestry decree on community forestry (HKm, hutan kemasyarakatan) was first promulgated in 1995, and revised in 1998 and 2000—after the reformasi. All the decrees stipulated that only in 'degraded' protection and production forests (i.e. not on national park) permission would be granted. Production forests granted to companies are not eligible for HKm. The earlier decrees allowed only harvesting of forest products, the later decree allows cultivation. In production forest timber planting and harvesting was permitted, but in protection forest zones the farmers were only permitted to harvest non-timber forest products. The 2000 decree delegates the authority to grant HKm permission form Ministry of Forestry to the head of the district (bupati). In Lampung, the problem was that in production forests in the lowlands, apart from that these zones have been granted to plantation companies, small farmers cultivated annual food and cash crops (e.g. soybean, maize, cassava) instead of trees, while in protection forests in the highlands farmers plant perennial export crops such as coffee, which is not considered as a forestry tree.
protect them, and efforts to convert existing smallholder fields into plantation forests are unlikely to be successful. But they also well know that, in the near future, the possibility for those in power to hand over their authority to control land and forest resources to local people is slim.
In Indonesia, legally, each person (and each parcel of land) has to be integrated within an administrative village. This requirement was imposed by colonial administrations in Java (Breman 1982; Tjondronegoro 1984) and further strengthened in the post-colonial era. This nationwide integration was achieved by the introduction of the National Village Law 1979, imposing the adoption of a Javanese style administrative village (desa) throughout the archipelago. Within this context, then, ordinary Indonesian villagers can be seen as members of an administrative community.

After discussing the region of Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong in the previous chapters, this chapter and the next chapter discuss a single village in the region. Gunung Terang is an administrative village created by Semendo migrants in colonial times and later, after independence, by migrants from Java. This chapter explores elements of village social organisation in relation to village formation, leadership, and community cohesion.

In Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong the administrative village functioned primarily as a vehicle to attract state resources into the villages. This fits the conceptual framework that situates local social organisations as intermediaries in rural development (Esman and Uphoff 1984; Tjondronegoro 1984; Quarles van Ufford ed. 1987; Warren 1993). Along this line, Antlov (1995) suggests that under the New Order rural leaders in Java
based their power on administrative authority as state clients and/or on their ability to meet villagers’ aspirations.

On the issue of villagers’ cohesion, Tjondronegoro (1984) notes that many communal tasks carried out by the rural communities in Java took place at sub-village/hamlet/neighbourhood level. Carol Warren (1993) has also noted the flexibility of Balinese villagers in organizing themselves, depending on the nature of the tasks to be completed. Tjondronegoro (1984) and Warren (1993) further note that villagers’ communal tasks range from planned development, religious matters, to the household economy. It is in these ways that the residents of Gunung Terang socially organise their village life.

The Creation of An Administrative Village

The village of Gunung Terang took its name from the oldest hamlet in the village. In this hamlet, the Semendo population is dominant; with roughly a quarter non-Semendonese, namely Javanese and Sundanese. Most houses and fields in Gunung Terang hamlet are tunggu tubang properties passed down from parents to the eldest daughter. All the Semendonese in the hamlet are the descendants of puyang Tendak, a founding ancestress, plus in-marrying women (jeme masuk, incoming persons). Four generations ago puyang Tendak’s parents brought her and two other brothers from Ulu Nasal in Bengkulu, first to Mutar Alam and then to the new hamlet (susukan) of Gedung Surian. The new hamlet soon developed into a populous settlement (dusun) under the administration of Mutar Alam village. In the early 1940s, puyang Tendak and her husband Kemuli took their children and grandchildren and left Gedung Surian to open a new settlement at the present location of Gunung Terang. Their kin soon followed. The decision to
migrate from Gedung Surian was largely driven by the need to find more land for rice fields, since there were not enough rice fields for all the families, and no more land could be transformed into rice fields in Gedung Surian. In Gunung Terang hamlet, the riverbanks of Way Besai were transformed into rice fields and settlement. Families from neighbouring Gedung Surian and Mutar Alam and from Ulu Nasal (Bengkulu) also came to settle in Gunung Terang.

According to a few elders, puyang Tendak was not supposed to leave Gedung Surian. As the only daughter she was the tunggu tubang and entitled to inherit her parents’ house and rice field. Her brothers’ reluctance to observe the tunggu tubang rule, however, forced puyang Tendak to find new land elsewhere. Some Semendonese in Gunung Terang hamlet believed that it was due to this mistake in not observing the tunggu tubang rule that the Gedung Surian population suffered from illnesses and harvest failures so frequently that eventually Gedung Surian was abandoned. In the 1960s there were only five Semendo families left in Gedung Surian, the rest of the population moved to Gunung Terang and elsewhere to survive. Some people in Gunung Terang use the case of Gedung Surian’s misfortune as an example of the punishment that comes for not observing the tunggu tubang rule.

Today, in the Islamic month Muharam each year, the Semendo community in Gunung Terang hold a sedekah pusaka ceremony. In the ritual, descendants (keturunan) of puyang Tendak gather in the house where the dagger heirloom (keris pusaka) is kept. The heirloom has continuously passed from puyang Tendak to her eldest daughter and then to her eldest daughter’s daughter and so on. Now the pusaka is kept by her great-great grand daughter (DDDD). The sedekah pusaka ritual involves the reciting Qur’an verses and
the cleaning of the *pusaka* dagger. Each family that joins the *sedekah* brings meals to be shared and served to conclude the *sedekah*. The main purpose of the *sedekah*, according to some of the elders, is to remember their origin (*asal usul*) and to ask God’s blessing (*berkah*) and well being (*selamat*) for the community.

Like the Gumai, another Pasemah speaking group in highland Palembang (Sakai 1996), the ritual and orientation toward *puyang* among Semendo in Gunung Terang hamlet stressed the important of origins that situates a person and a place as points of reference. Throughout the year the Gumai performed many types of *sedekah*. The ritual specialists possessed spiritual power and are highly respected in the ritual realm. This differs from the Semendo in Gunung Terang hamlet. The *sedekah pusaka* was held once a year over the last couple of years. Before it was only occasionally held in difficult years such as during the Warman insurgency, harvest failures due to severe drought, or epidemics of life-threatening diseases. The misfortunes of the post-*krismon* drop in coffee prices and production since 1999 as well as post-*reformasi* political turmoils have encouraged Gunung Terang residents to perform *sedekah pusaka* every year. The man who was in charge of the cleaning of the dagger (*keris*) was regarded as one who knew how to do the cleansing properly. But unlike the ritual specialist in Gumai, he neither possessed spiritual power nor was highly respected. The gathering on *sedekah pusaka*, arguably, is a way *puyang* Tendak’s descendants maintain their social ties. Since most of them live in Gunung Terang, the ritual served to strengthened community ties among the Semendo who live in Gunung Terang hamlet.
Map 4. Gunung Terang village
Other hamlets in Gunung Terang village (Table 6.1) were created between the 1960s and 1980s, mainly by migrants from Java. In Talang Jaya, the second oldest hamlet, there were initially less than half a dozen families from different parts of Java (Serang, Bantul, Nganjuk), who arrived in the late 1950s and early 1960s. They approached the Semendo in Gunung Terang and were allocated forest land which they transformed into housing lots and coffee gardens. Creeks were transformed into rice fields. More and more friends and relatives from Java then arrived and settled there. Today Talang Jaya has a fairly equal number of Javanese and Sundanese inhabitants. Both languages are spoken in Talang Jaya. A few Semendo have also moved in there.

Table 6.1 Population and hamlets in Gunung Terang village

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Hamlet</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Gunung Terang</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Bedeng Sari (and Talang Buluh Kapur)</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Sinar Jaya (Talang Jaya)</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Sukakarya (Petay Paya)</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Simpang Tiga</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Rigis Jaya I (Rigis Bawah)</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Rigis Jaya II (Rigis Atas)</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Temiangan and Talang Selingkut</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,880</td>
<td>706</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Village profile of Gunung Terang 2001

The hamlet of Bedeng Sari has a rather different story. In the mid-1960s a group of more than a dozen Javanese families arrived in Gunung Terang. Pak Kono was one of them, carried by his parents to Tegineneng/Hajimena (near Bandar Lampung) when he was 12 in 1962. A native Lampung family sponsored their migration. Pak Kono’s parents were assigned to take care of a citrus garden in Tegineneng. While taking care of this garden his parents also cultivated vegetables and raised goats. Despite good harvests, the situation in Tegineneng was difficult, cash and goods were frequently stolen from their house. Five Javanese families in Tegineneng, plus another ten
families from different parts of Central Lampung district, soon decided to migrate to Way Tenong. When they first arrived in Mutar Alam, they were advised to proceed to Gunung Terang. The village head of Gunung Terang organized housing lots for these new comers. He managed to persuade other Semendonese families to give the newly arrived Javanese land for housing lots (kapling). A bunkhouse (bedeng) made of bamboo walls and an imperata roof was built as a temporary communal house for them. From the bedeng each family subsequently built huts in the allocated housing lots. The current hamlet took its name from this communal bunkhouse.

Labouring in the Semendonese coffee gardens and being paid in cash or in food (cassava, maize, rice, bananas), was the main mode of survival for all of the newly arrived migrants. Access to land was also obtained through clearing the forest or the fallow plots of the Semendonese in exchange for a portion of the newly cleared fields. Sharecropping was another way to accumulate enough money to buy a coffee garden. Of the dozen Javanese families who arrived from Hajimena/Tegineneng in 1962 only five remain in Bedeng Sari now, the rest have moved elsewhere.

When the Javanese groups from Hajimena/Tegineneng arrived, there were already labourers and sharecroppers from Java living in scattered huts in the coffee gardens. The building of the bunkhouse (bedeng) and subsequent housing lots initiated further creation of hamlets. More Semendonese lands along the path were sold at low prices to be transformed into housing lots for these sharecroppers and labourers. Subsequent numbers of migrants further extended the Bedeng Sari housing lots. Initially part of Talang Jaya administrative hamlet, Bedeng Sari then separated and formed a single administrative hamlet. Later, Petai Paya and Simpang Tiga split from Bedeng Sari. In the late 1960s Petai Paya was settled by two or three families
who previously lived in BRN transmigration villages in Sumber Jaya before moving to Gunung Terang to work as labourers and sharecroppers in the Semendoneese gardens. As in Bedeng Sari, Javanese are dominant in Petay Paya, while Simpang Tiga is shared by both the Javanese and Semendoneese.

Until the 1980s, Rigis Bawah, Rigis Atas, and Talang Buluh Kapur were the location of scattered gardens and fallow plots, many of which belonged to those living in Bedengsari and Gunung Terang, and patches of remaining over-logged forest. Javanese migrants previously living elsewhere in Lampung came to buy the land or to work as labourers or sharecroppers. Until recently, illegal logging has been an important economic activity in Rigis Bawah and Rigis Atas.

The hamlets of Rigis Atas and Temiangan have only recently been integrated into Gunung Terang village administration. Rigis Atas residents previously lived in a hamlet within the state forest zone, now abandoned. Arriving in the late 1970s and early 1980s they were part of the BRN transmigrant village of Puralaksana. When in 1994-95 they were told to leave their homes and gardens, which were to be replaced by plantation forest, some of them moved down to the present Rigis Atas. After not receiving any ‘attention’ from Puralaksana administration for years, in 2000 the hamlet was integrated into Gunung Terang administration. Like Rigis Bawah, in Rigis Atas Javanese are the dominant group with Sundanese and Semendoneese being the minority. The hamlet of Temiangan used to be part of the neighbouring administrative village of Sumber Alam. Feeling abandoned by the Sumber Alam administration, the Javanese community in Temiangan has decided to become part of Gunung Terang village.
Recently there have been more attempts to mark the membership and territorial boundary of the administrative hamlets in the village. A few Javanese houses on the edge of Bedeng Sari, for example, are administratively within the boundary of the hamlet of Gunung Terang. However, they maintain day-to-day relations with their neighbours who are the residents of Bedeng Sari. A suggestion to include these Javanese in Bedeng Sari was rejected by the village council. Buluh Kapur, on the other hand, is administratively eligible to form an administrative hamlet separate from Bedeng Sari—just as Rigis Atas separated from Rigis Bawah. Yet the residents there were inclined to continue as part of Bedeng Sari.

A hamlet is socially and territorially divided into several neighbourhoods. Both hamlet and neighbourhood bear a communal responsibility/role. *Gotong royong* for paths, roads, small bridges, running water tanks and pipes sometimes are carried by all the residents of the hamlet but other times only by the neighbourhood men. Most hamlets have a mosque (*masjid, mushalla*) that is constructed and communally maintained. The residents gather in the mosque for regular Qur’an reciting (*pengajian, yasinan*), Friday prayers, and to celebrate Islam’s holy days. Some neighbourhoods have smaller praying houses (*surau*).

Adults in Gunung Terang village are keen to be seen as devoted (*taat*) Muslims. Before sunset men wear a sarong and cap (*peci*) and prepare for evening prayers. Most of them do the daily prayers in their house, leaving the *surau* and mosques empty. Friday is the weekend in village. On this day villagers stay at home. The villagers come to the mosque for Friday prayer and speech (*khutbah*) at midday. The Friday speech (*khutbah*) is delivered with the *imam* reading a section from a book containing a collection of Friday
speeches *(buku kumpulan khutbah Jum‘at)*. School age children in Bedeng Sari and Petai Paya go to a small *pesantren* to learn Al Qur‘an reading, writing Arab scripts, and learn Islam teachings *(ajaran)*. In other hamlets this is done in the *surau* and the mosque in the afternoon or evening. Women form *pengajian* groups and meet once or twice a week in the *surau* or the mosque to recite Al Qur‘an and hear preaching on Islamic teachings.

In cases of religious and emergency matters, community cohesion at neighbourhood level is stronger than at the hamlet level. The Javanese in the village admit that with regard to helping a member of the hamlet experiencing hard times (e.g., death, illness, accidents, and personal conflicts with outsiders), cohesion *(kekompakan)* among the Semendo community in Gunung Terang is exceptionally strong. For religious feasts *(sedekah* and *ruwahan* among the Semendo, and *selametan* or *syukuran* among the Javanese and Sundanese) it is the neighbours’ obligation to give *sumbangan* of raw food (e.g., rice, sugar, chicken, coconut) and snacks such as biscuits. Close neighbours also need to help in the preparation of the feast. Women who are close neighbours and kin usually help with the cooking of the meals. In the case of a death, the burial and the subsequent prayer rituals would be the neighbourhood’s responsibility. It is quite common for a villager to have close neighbours *(tetangga dekat)* who are also good friends *(kawan baik, akrab)*. They will frequently visit each other in their gardens and gather to chat at one another’s houses. Among the poor, the bond between close neighbours is particularly strong. Often their huts or simple wooden houses were constructed communally. They tend to organise reciprocal labour exchange, limiting the need to hire labour. Among themselves they often

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1 These books, written by various authors and published by various publishers, are available in bookstores or obtained through the *imam’s* network.

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arrange zero-interest credit relations or form rotational saving groups (arisan).

Like villages elsewhere in the region and rural Indonesia, Gunung Terang has two patterns of housing: nucleated/compacted and dispersed/scattered. In the hamlets of Gunung Terang, Talang Jaya, Bedeng Sari, Petai Paya, and Simpang Tiga the houses are nucleated, aligned in a row along the village’s main road. Except for Talang Jaya, all these hamlets obtained electricity in the late 1990s. In Buluh Kapur, Temiangan, Rigis Bawah, and Rigis Atas, houses are dispersed along the unpaved roads and paths. In Rigis Atas and Rigis Bawah there are a few small compact housing compounds with up to a dozen houses, but most houses are separated by coffee gardens.

Villagers refer to the construction of facilities and the provision of services by the government when discussing the progress (kemajuan) in their village. As far as ‘progress’ in the village is concerned, Suharto’s New Order era of the 1980s is said to have been the turning point. As some villagers put it “Before there was nothing (tidak ada apa-apa) in the village, everything was difficult (payah), and life was hard (susah).”

In Gunung Terang village, facilities and infrastructure are equally distributed among the main hamlets of Gunung Terang, Bedeng Sari, Petai Paya, and Simpang Tiga. The village now has two elementary schools, one in Talang Jaya and one between Bedeng Sari and Gunung Terang. The village’s Islamic school (pesantren, madrasah) is located in Petai Paya. A health clinic, run by a nurse, is also located in Petay Paya. The junior high school (SMP: sekolah menengah pertama) is located in Simpang Tiga. The village hall (balai desa) is located in the hamlet of Gunung Terang. The village weekly market is in Bedeng Sari.
In the 1980s the road network was built to connect the villages on the southern part of Bukit Rigis with the west Sumatra highway, which passes the northern slope of Bukit Rigis. The village paths, previously constructed by village communities through *gotong royong*, were enlarged, gravelled, and asphalted, and the wooden bridges replaced by sturdy concrete bridges. Before the construction of the road network, sacks of coffee beans had to be carried manually to coffee resellers in Fajar Bulan. Travelling the path on foot across the Bukit Rigis hill, the task could take a whole day. To obtain household needs one had to walk to the weekly market in Srimenanti and later to Fajar Bulan. This meant walking to the market the night before market day and sleeping over in the market. Since the construction of the road, Fajar Bulan can be reached in less than an hour by motorbike, pickup, or minibus. The road was further asphalted in the mid-1990s. A weekly market recently opened in the neighbouring village of Sumber Alam, where each Friday over a thousand villagers from neighbouring villages come to do their weekly shopping.

Before the construction of the current schools, children in Gunung Terang went to Mutar Alam. The construction of the elementary schools in the village started in the 1960s with the opening of a community school in Gunung Terang hamlet. A few literate adults in the village voluntarily taught the children. This was done first in the basement of a stilted house, later, through *gotong royong*, wooden classrooms were built. After years operating as a school, the government finally developed this informal school into a formal elementary school. The second elementary school in Talang Jaya was built in a similar way. When the subdistrict education office looked for a village willing to grant land for the construction of a secondary school in the early 1990s, the villages of Gunung Terang and Sumber Alam
were quick to agree to grant land on the border between the two villages. Thanks to this assistance today children need to go to Fajar Bulan only for high school education.

Clinic and health programs for women and children are other features which distinguish the difficult (susah) years before the 1980s. Sick pregnant women and infants often died before arriving at the clinic in Fajar Bulan. Today they will be soon taken care of by the nurse in the village, or health clinic (puskesmas) in the neighbouring village Sumber Alam, and, in serious and emergency cases, at the small hospital in Fajar Bulan. The well being of women and infants has been further improved thanks to periodical posyandu (pos pelayanan terpadu: integrated health service post), where subdistrict nurses and village PKK functionaries provided consultations to women on infant health issues, vitamins and immunisations. With regard to health issues, many families in the main hamlets in Gunung Terang once also received sacks of cement from the government to improve their housing.

The extent of progress in the village during the New Order continued into the economic sectors. In the mid 1980s, hundreds of families received generous agricultural extension assistance. Credit was provided in the form of chemical fertiliser and tools. Agriculture extension officers regularly visited the village to advise and supervise the farmers in regard to better farming techniques. Incentives in the form of cash, tree seedlings, and livestock were provided to encourage the application of soil conservation measures on the sloping land. The production of coffee gardens, rice fields, and other annual crops increased dramatically. The agricultural production improvement was followed by a cheap land certification project. Villagers used the certificate as collateral to obtain loans for various needs from the Bank Rakyat Indonesia branch at Fajar Bulan.
Aside from being referred to as the turning point in the history of the village, progress has also been a source of tension between the Semendonese and the Javanese in the village. On the surface such tensions might lead one to see them as an ethnic conflicts. But this is perhaps better seen simply as a manifestation of the desire for progress.

As a Javanese man put it “The Semendonese here are difficult (payah), they don’t want our village to flourish (ramai).” Two cases of the reluctance of the Semendonese to release/handover some of their land for the sake of village progress can be used as illustration. Unlike the condition in some of the neighbouring villages, the main hamlets of Gunung Terang, Bedeng Sari, Petai Paya, Simpang Tiga and Talang Jaya are separated by over a hundred metres of coffee gardens. They are not contiguous, thus preventing the hamlets from being further conjoined to form a larger village settlement. Some of the Javanese villagers suggest that this is largely due to the Semendonese reluctance to allow their gardens to be bought by fellow villagers and new migrants and transformed into house lots. Another Javanese man criticized the Semendonese for not allowing their land to be taken to enlarge the current path from the asphalt road to the hamlet of Rigis Atas. Had the Semendonese agreed, it would have reduced the transportation cost and attracted more new migrants to the remote hamlet of Rigis Atas. This allegation is, of course, denied by the Semendonese. According to them, the reluctance to sell the land in between the hamlets is largely due to the fact that the village is now full of migrants from Java, so if they sell the remaining land it would be difficult to find another plot that they could buy as a replacement. The prohibition on selling tunggu tubang property is another constraint. The Semendo also maintain that the cancellation of the construction of the road to Rigis Atas was due more to
financial problems and the technical difficulty of constructing the bridge crossing the Way Besai river than getting land to enlarge the existing path.

For their part, the Semendo complain that the Javanese are always trying to sideline the Semendonese with regard to progress. In the eyes of some Semendonese, Javanese domination in the village will put the Semendonese in danger. All the government projects go to the Javanese, and the Semendonese are left behind (ditinggalkan). Such tension occurs especially between the dominant Javanese hamlet of Bedeng Sari and the old Semendo hamlet of Gunung Terang. The tension has led to talk about either Bedeng Sari or Gunung Terang splitting to create a separate administrative village.

In the 1960s the administrative village of Gunung Terang included the present neighbouring villages of Tri Mulyo, Cipta Waras, Gedung Surian, and Semarang Jaya (Air Hitam). Tri Mulyo was created first by a group of Javanese whose leader Sumardi had lived in Talang Jaya for a couple of years before moving on and opening Air Dingin, the main hamlet in Trimulyo. Sumardi brought with him 17 families from Central Java in the 1960s. Pak Cik Nawi, the village head of Gunung Terang, gave them permission to clear the forest there. The creation of Air Dingin hamlet was soon followed by others. These hamlets officially became the separate administrative village of Tri Mulyo in the mid-1980s. Pak Cik Nawi also gave permission to two groups of the late BRN transmigrants from West Java. One group of a dozen families from Tasik Malaya, led by Pak Juhana, first came to Tribudisukur, only to find that in this BRN transmigration village there was no more available land. This group then created the hamlet of Waras Sakti. The other group of about 40 families, mainly from Bogor, first came to Puralaksana. This BRN transmigration village also had no more available land for them. With Pak Cik Nawi's consent, this group cleared the
forest and created the hamlet of Ciptalaga. Initially parts of BRN transmigration villages (Waras Sakti being part of Tribudi Sukur and Ciptalaga part of Puralaksana), in the mid 1980s both hamlets and the neighbouring hamlets formed a separate administrative village of Cipta Waras. Pak Juhana was elected as the first village head.

The abandoned hamlet of Gedung Surian soon filled up with Javanese and Sundanese migrants. It also separated from Gunung Terang administration in the 1980s, retaining its old Semendo hamlet name. A portion of Gunung Terang land was also given to hundreds of families from Semarang (Central Java), who arrived in Mutar Alam in the late 1970s and early 1980s. They settled in Air Hitam and later created the village of Semarang Jaya.

**Village Leadership**

When one asks villagers in Gunung Terang about persons that can tell the history of the village, they mostly point to three men: Pak Kasijo in Talang Jaya, Pak Timan in Petai Paya, and Pak Cik Nawi in Gunung Terang. Aged in their 60s and 70s these three men are former village leaders now considered to be village elders (*sesepuh, tokoh*).

Pak Kasijo is well known for his prominent role in promoting children’s education in the village. He arrived in Lampung in the mid-1950s from Bantul, near Jogjakarta. He has relatives who transmigrated during the Dutch administration in the 1920s to Wonosobo in southwestern Lampung. Initially he planned to join his relatives in Wonosobo, but upon arrival in Lampung he took up an offer to work as a foreman (*mandor*) in a rubber plantation and factory in Kotabumi, which formerly belonged the Dutch, but
had been nationalised. After a couple of years he decided to migrate to the newly opened transmigration area in Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong. With his friend Sumardi, who later led a group of Javanese to open the land in Trimulyo, he finally settled in Gunung Terang.

Unlike most early migrants with a low level of education, Pak Kasijo is a high school graduate. In Gunung Terang he opened the first community school in the 1960s. At that time the children had to go to Mutar Alam to get an elementary education. Pak Kasijo’s initiative was very much welcomed by the villagers. He and a few other villagers with junior high and high school education voluntarily acted as teachers. Initially the classes were held under the stilt house of Pak Cik Nawi, the village head. Later, through gotong royong, all the villagers worked together to build a simple wooden house as the classroom. The community school later became the first formal elementary school in the village, located between the hamlet of Gunung Terang and Bedeng Sari. Pak Kasijo then continued his efforts to open a second elementary school in the village, located near his house in the hamlet of Talang Jaya.

Pak Timan is another elder well known for his leadership in village affairs, especially agricultural extension. In 1962, as an orphan boy, he was taken from Pacitan, East Java by his uncle, who was a transmigrant in Kota Gajah in central Lampung. When his uncle’s family life broke up (berantakan) he was taken by a Lampungnese family to take care of the upkeep of their pepper garden. Given a hard time by the children of his Lampungnese foster father, young Timan joined a friend who left for Sumber Jaya in 1964. For a few years he lived in Simpang Sari, farmed a small plot of coffee garden, and married a Sundanese girl whose father was an early BRN transmigrant. Later Pak Timan decided to move to Gunung Terang to join, and later to replace,
his brother who was working to maintain one of Pak Cik Nawi's coffee gardens. Pak Timan eventually managed to establish his own coffee garden and build a decent house in Petai Paya hamlet.

Pak Timan and his wife were active in village affairs. His wife was active in assisting Pak Cik Nawi's wife in various PKK programs, such as the posyandu program. When a group of migrants from Hajimena/Tegineneng arrived in Gunung Terang, Pak Timan became involved in the construction of the communal bunkhouse (bedeng). He was active in the process of creating the hamlet of Bedeng Sari. But Pak Timan's outstanding leadership role was in organising villagers to receive government assistance in agriculture during the 1980s. He was chair of a village farmers' group (kelompok tani) with over two hundred members, for more than a decade. With an elementary school education, his literacy was an important reason the villagers chose him for this position. Pak Timan coordinated the provision of credit (to buy chemical fertilisers) from the subdistrict agricultural extension office for members the kelompok. The extension officers also routinely gave advice on better planting materials and cultivation techniques. Pak Timan was often selected as the farmers's delegate in meetings in the capital of the subdistrict, district, and province. In his capacity as chair of the kelompok, he initially organised the villagers in the land titling program. Today, according to Pak Timan, two-thirds of the village population have their land titled.

The most prominent leader in the village of Gunung Terang is Pak Cik Nawi. Unlike Pak Kasiyo and Pak Timan, who are now retired, Pak Cik Nawi is still active. Born in Gedung Surian, he was still a little boy when his grandparents and their offspring moved to create Gunung Terang hamlet. He went to Mutar Alam for elementary school. He learnt about village
administration mainly from two kin; one was the then village head of Gunung Terang and the other was the village head of Mutar Alam. Pak Cik Nawi was first elected as the PJS village head in 1962. He won the village head election in 1965, lost it in the 1972 election but was appointed as PJS village head two years later. In the 1979 he failed to win village head election but in 1983 was again appointed as the PJS. In the 1990 village head election his candidature was rejected by subdistrict office, mainly because of his education that lower than the minimum requirement of junior high school graduate. Since then he has been a key figure in the village council.

Many of the early migrants from Java in the village liken Pak Cik Nawi to a ‘parent.’ He is remembered for his efforts from 1960 to 1970 to ensure that each migrant family had a house to live in and land to work. Some early migrants from Java still remember how during difficult years Pak Cik Nawi allowed them to take rice from his rice field and other food (e.g. cassava, banana, jackfruit) from his garden. He persuaded other Semendonese to do similar things. He acted as an example, and actively persuaded other Semendonese to welcome the newly arrived migrants from Java.

Pak Cik Nawi earned respect for not treating the later migrants as inferiors, most of them being landless initially, including those who worked his gardens. The fact that Pak Cik Nawi did not take too much material advantage from his position as village leader and that he was seen as villagers’ ‘parent’, are qualities noted by the villagers. Pak Cik Nawi is very average with regard to wealth; he is not among a handful of wealthy families in the village. None of his children went to university, and he could not even afford to send his two younger sons to high school.
Pak Cik Nawí's role in the village today is more related to his advice to village officials on village affairs. He was formally the chair of the village council (LHP). Some villagers, exaggerating Pak Cik Nawí’s role, said “Without Pak Cik Nawí’s approval (restu) village projects could not be implemented smoothly.” This, of course, does not imply that with Pak Cik Nawí’s approval all the village projects would be successful nor suggests that he had the power to impose his opinion on village decisions. Rather, it is a kind of recognition of Pak Cik Nawí’s persuasive ability to encourage key actors in the village to come to a consensus. The issue of development projects such as the construction of schools, roads, bridges, and water networks requires the mobilisation of villagers’ participation for their successful implementation. Negotiations over such projects can easily be the source of tension between factions and/or sections in the village. Most often the tensions are manifested as conflicts between the Semendonese and the Javanese. Pak Cik Nawí’s advice was mainly directed at resolution of such tensions. This is what he is good at, and respected for.

With regard to village administration, the village head Bu Mas Muda, village secretary Mas Paryoto, and village council chair Pak Cik Nawí are three key village figures. Gunung Terang is the only village in the region headed by a woman, Bu Mas Muda. Her good leadership is recognised not only in the region of Way Tenong and Sumber Jaya but also in the district of West Lampung. The villagers are proud of having her as the village head. One of the hamlet heads in the village once proudly claimed that “No village head in the region or elsewhere that I happen to know is better than our village head, Bu Mas Muda.”

Bu Mas Muda won the village head election in 1998. She was quite underestimated by her only rival, a man from Simpang Tiga. Apart from her
ability to gain full support from the hamlet of Bedeng Sari where she lives,
her success in the election was also due to her ability to convince the
Semendonese in the village, mainly living in the hamlet of Gunung Terang,
to vote for her. She promised that the Semendonese would not be ‘left
behind’ in the village development projects—an issue that worried the
Semendonese most if the village head was Javanese. Endorsing Pak Cik
Nawi as the chair of the village council can be seen as a way to ensure her
promise. She learnt much about village administration and affairs and ways
to bring development projects to the village during her husband Pak Hasan’s
term as Golkar village komisaris and village head from 1990 to 1998. (In the
1990 village head election, Pak Hasan almost lost against an empty box. He
won the ballot by only 30 votes).

Recognition of Bu Mas Muda’s leadership is largely due to her success in
bringing development projects to the village. Between 1999 and 2001 there
were several such projects, part of the package of loans and grants that the
Indonesian government received from multinational development agencies
to cope with the 1997-98 monetary crisis. The path through Rigis Bawah
was enlarged and gravelled, enabling car transportation. The road from
Simpang Tiga to Talang Jaya was also gravelled—the project was part of a
road construction project in the region to shorten the distance between the
village of Trumulyo and Fajar Bulan. A network of plastic pipes to supply
running water was installed from the Bukit Rigis foothills to the hamlets of
Gunung Terang and Bedeng Sari. For the villagers, especially the poor, these
works provided substantial wage earnings. For her success in bringing
such development projects to the village, Bu Mas Muda’s reputation was
acknowledged by the villagers.
Preventing tension among village sections with regard to the benefits of the village development projects has been another item on Bu Mas Muda’s working agenda. By nominating both hamlets of Bedeng Sari and Gunung Terang as the intended beneficiaries of the running water project, tension between the two hamlets was prevented. Gravel, the main material for road construction in the hamlet of Rigis Bawah was supplied by those living in the hamlet of Rigis Atas. The latter received the cash while the former obtained the improved road so both hamlets enjoyed the benefit of the project.

Although active in seeking government projects to be implemented in the village, Bu Mas Muda is quite careful not to put the village (and her leadership) in a potentially difficult situation. A small group of men, including some hamlet heads in the village, once intended to engage in a soft credit scheme provided by a government agency of the district. The credit would have been distributed among households in the village to buy inputs (compost, fertiliser, and pesticides) for commercial vegetable farming. A well-written proposal was prepared and was ready to be submitted. Intense communications with officials in the district who would give the credit had been established so the chance of obtaining the credit was deemed high. Bu Mas Muda’s signature on the proposal and cover letter signifying the village’s official approval was the last stage of the proposal submission. Yet Bu Mas Muda gently refused to approve the initiative. She was quick to point out that the village had bad experiences in handling a government credit scheme in the past. Under an IDT program the village had received cheap credit that was used to buy sheep and goats distributed selectively to poor households. The credit was designed to rotate among the poor. Soon all the distributed sheep and goats were reported sick or dead. Some village officials were taken to the district attorney’s office and accused of corruption.
Although no one was proven guilty it was a great humiliation for the village and village officials. Despite her refusal, Bu Mas Muda did not, however, totally ignore the proposal. She supported the idea of forming a village vegetable farmers’ group in her village. She agreed to allocate village funds for village delegates to visit some ‘advanced’ (maju) vegetable farmers in neighbouring Sekincau. The next plan of the newly formed group was to collect cash from each member, the use of which would be decided and monitored by its some 40 members. Bu Mas Muda wanted to see if the farmers’ group, of which she herself was a member, could demonstrate the ability to handle its members’ money before trying to engage in risky credit schemes provided either by the government or by private agencies.

The village secretary, Mas Paryoto, according to many villagers, has leadership abilities in village affairs besides those of village administration’s paper work. Before being assigned by Bu Mas Muda as the village secretary, Mas Paryoto was appointed by the subdistrict office as the village enumerator (data collector) regarding family planning and social welfare (PPKBD: petugas pencatat keluarga berencana desa). Maintaining good communication among village officials and leaders is a task that Mas Paryoto has managed quite well. He regularly visits formal and informal leaders in the village to keep them informed about village affairs. He maintains close contact with all the hamlet heads in the village, either by visiting them, often with Bu Mas Muda, or inviting them to his or Bu Mas Muda’s house. In this way he and Bu Mas Muda keep updated on things happening in all the hamlets. On the other hand, the hamlet heads are informed about government policies and programs related to village affairs.

Recently Mas Paryoto was active in promoting commercial vegetable farming in the village. With his two neighbours he started the commercial
and highly intensive cultivation of vegetables. It started with *capsicum* chilli. Other vegetables such as tomato, eggplants, and beans were also introduced. In Mas Paryoto’s house some villagers frequently gather to hear his technical advice on how to start commercial vegetable farming. He is also frequently invited to see fellow villagers’ vegetable fields and give suggestions. He makes intense contacts with traders or salesmen of agricultural inputs for commercial vegetable farming (e.g., seeds, fertilisers, chemicals). Mas Paryoto has cleverly invited sellers with different products to the village. Frequently in his house a small group of villagers gather to hear a salesman promoting his products. On other days other salesmen do the same thing for different brands of the same product. Mas Paryoto keeps persuading the salesmen to give free samples for a demonstration. In this way a variety of brands can be tested and compared. Mas Paryoto was one of the initiators of the newly formed village farmer group whose purpose is to assist members to grow better commercial vegetables through the provision of inputs and better marketing of the harvests.

With his skill and ability in village administration, maintaining good communication among village leaders, and promoting commercial vegetable farming, some villagers already say that Mas Paryoto is the most suitable candidate for next village head. But Mas Paryoto is quite uneasy about this early nomination (Bu Mas Muda’s term will end in 2006). First, he is reluctant to be seen as too ambitious. Secondly, and this is his more serious concern, he feels that economically his family is not yet established (*cukup*, *mapan*). According to him, an economically established family is one of the prerequisites for an ideal village head. Today Mas Paryoto is still struggling with his family’s economy. He does not own a coffee garden. As a sharecropper he takes care of less than 1 hectare of coffee garden belonging to another villager. He has just started farming commercial vegetables in his
0.25 hectare house garden. He is still not sure whether he can afford to send his two little daughters for higher education. Although his father was a large landowner in Rigis Bawah, with over 10 hectares of coffee gardens and able to support Mas Paryoto's high school education in Java, when he died, the land was equally distributed among his children from two wives. Mas Paryoto's share was sold to buy a house lot and to build his present house.

Each 'administrative' hamlet in the village has a head, but unlike the village head all of them are appointed by the hamlet residents by consensus (musyawarah) instead of being elected. Since 2001, village officials have received a monthly allowance from the district government. The administrative tasks of the hamlet heads (pemangku, kepala dusun, kepala suku) include recording monthly as well as annual data on the demography of the hamlet and collecting annual land tax (PBB: pajak bumi dan bangunan). They represent the hamlet at village meetings and are responsible for delivering messages from the village administration about new government policy for the hamlet community. Within the hamlet they are expected to maintain the hamlet's harmony (rukun, tentam, guyub). This includes settling disputes amongst neighbours, giving advice on official matters, organising their hamlet's religious rituals (e.g., yasinan, celebration of Islam holy days, burial), and encouraging gotong royong activities for community facilities (roads, bridges, mosque).

There are variations among hamlet heads' leadership in the village. In the hamlets of Gunung Terang and Bedeng Sari, the role of the hamlet heads is rather minimal, focusing only on the collection of demographic data and land tax. It is in these two hamlets that the village head Bu Mas Muda, the village secretary Mas Paryoto, and the chair of the village council Pak Cik Nawi reside. The villagers in both hamlets consult and hear village affairs
from them directly rather than through the hamlet heads. In these hamlets, thus, the hamlet heads are shaded by the top-ranked village officials. In other hamlets such as Rigis Bawah, Rigis Atas, and Temiangan, where the residents only rarely meet higher ranking village officials, the hamlet heads’ role and leadership is more prominent. In contrast, during 2001-2002, the hamlet heads of Bedeng Sari, Gunung Terang, and Talang Jaya had little involvement in community work. In Buluh Kapur, which is part of the administrative hamlet of Bedeng Sari, the heads of the neighbourhoods (kepala RT) were active in the community activities through gotong royong and religious rituals.

Like other village officials, hamlet heads are recognised for their efforts in integrating the community into the village administration and tapping state resources for the hamlet. The name of Talang Jaya hamlet was taken from the name of its first head, Pak Jaya. He was the one who put a lot of work into creating the administrative hamlet and integrating it into the village of Gunung Terang in the early 1970s. Pak Maryono followed a similar strategy in the 1980s in what is now the hamlet of Rigis Bawah, whose former name was Talang Maryono (a name which is still used informally). Pak Maryono, in his other prominent role as the Golkar komisaris in the village, was a key figure in Golkar’s success in the village during the general elections from the 1980s until the 1990s. He actively persuaded the Javanese villagers—now the majority in the village—to vote for Golkar. Pak Simun, the present hamlet head of Temiangan, has more recently taken a similar role in separating the hamlet from the village of Sumber Alam and integrating it into Gunung Terang. Mas Kaulan, the present hamlet head of Rigis Bawah, gained his leadership reputation thanks to the recently government road building project in his hamlet and a community water supply project. Muayat Wagimin, the newly appointed hamlet head of Rigis Atas played a
rather different role. He organised his community to supply the gravel for a road building project in Rigis Bawah, providing much needed extra paid work. But his most prominent leadership role was in organising his hamlet’s residents who farm the state forest zone to engage in a community forestry agreement (HKm).

The official village administrative structure has other posts as well. P3NTR (petugas pembantu pencatat nikah talak dan rujuk), for example, is responsible for witnessing and recording marriages, divorces and reunions. The position of chair of PKK, usually occupied by the village head’s wife, in Gunung Terang has been given to another woman who was active in assisting Bu Mas Muda when she was the chair during her husband’s term as village head. Under the village head, there are several heads of special affairs (kaur: kepala urusan). Under the hamlet head there are also several heads of neighbourhoods (kepala rukun tetangga [RT]). The village council (LHP) has about a dozen members. The village also has several civil security officers (hansip: pertahanan sipil). Except for the P3NTR and RT in some hamlets, the holders of these positions are nominal.

The religious leaders in the village including the board of the mosque (pengurus masjid) and teachers and preachers in the village’s small pesantren, besides working their gardens, concentrate on religious teaching and rituals. Each mosque in the villages has one or more imam or kiyai. Villagers do not see that affiliation of these imam and kiyai to national Islam organisations as particularly important. Their role in everyday affairs is minimal.

2 Throughout Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong one can see signboards of national Muslim organisations of Muhammadiyah, Nahdatul Ulama, and, alternatively, Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia. Religious leaders in the region seem to be flexible in affiliating themselves with big Islam organisations.
Functionaries from national political parties in the village have no great role in everyday village affairs. There is no sign of political activity from the major national parties' komisaris and cadres other than putting up signboards and attending party meetings in the subdistrict and district.

The village has no official office. The village hall is only used during village meetings attended by higher level government officials. For internal village official meetings, Bu Mas Muda’s house is used. The village administrative paper work is held at the village secretary’s house. Mas Paryoto has a study in his wooden house where he does all the paper work. All the village officials in Gunung Terang are full time farmers, and consequently part time village officials. They work in their gardens in the morning and afternoon everyday. They came home for lunch and dzuhur praying at midday, and before sunset. Except during the busy seasons in the farming calendar, on Friday they are at home the whole day. Within this time frame, the villagers wanting to see the village head and village secretary must find them early in the morning, during the midday break, before sun set, or in the evening.

In June 2002, the village held a village development meeting (musyawarah pembangunan pekon). This was supposed to be the venue for the village community to outline the village development plans they wanted the government to fund. The meeting was organised at the request of the district office (kecamatan). About a week before the meeting, an official letter of invitation was send to village officials, members of the village council, hamlet heads, and heads of RT. The letter was signed by Bu Mas Muda and distributed by Mas Paryoto himself. Mas Paryoto also visited all the hamlet heads personally to promote the occasion and advise them to be prepared. In the following days, most hamlet heads, and few other village officials,
were seen visiting either Bu Mas Muda or Mas Paryoto to further discuss the preparation for the village meeting.

The meeting was held at the village hall. The delegates had already gathered at about 9 a.m. but they had to wait for a couple of hours to start the meeting. This was a rare occasion for villagers from different parts of the village to meet and have a lively chat. Nearly 80 delegates attended the meeting. Adult males were dominant. There were numerous young men, but there were less than a dozen women. When the district officer arrived at nearly 12 o’clock, the meeting began. Mas Paryoto opened the meeting by greeting all the delegates, explaining the purpose of the meeting, and outlining the agenda and timetable. The meeting had three main agenda items: explanation of the new government policy on village administration, selection of the chair and members of the village community development council (LPMP: lembaga pemberdayaan masyarakat pekon), and a workshop on village development plans, which concluded the meeting.

Bu Mas Muda delivered the opening remarks. She began her speech by stressing that each hamlet should propose development programs that were deemed to be urgent (penting, mendesak) and actually needed (dibutuhkan). Her remarks consisted of reminders to all the village hamlets to collect the targeted amount of land tax (PBB) on schedule; distribute the government-subsidized rice (beras miskin) properly (only for those who were eligible such as poor families); and not to wait for an order (perintah) to undertake gotong royong. The second speech was by Pak Cik Nawi in his capacity as the chair of the village representative council (LHP). First he advised that in selecting the LPMP members the delegates must choose those who lived permanently (menetap), in the village otherwise it would be difficult. He continued his remarks by stating that every year the village conducted village
development meetings like this but the results of those meetings were never followed up. The resulting village development plans only ended up piled high (menumpuk) at the district government office. Yet since there was a formal request from the subdistrict office, the village must again hold this village development meeting. Pak Cik Nawi concluded his remarks, by repeating Bu Mas Muda’s reminders, that the delegates should only propose programs that were urgently needed.

The meeting went on, chaired by the district officer. He began by explaining the new government policies in accordance with the newly enacted national, provincial, and district laws, regulations, and decrees on village administration and development. He continued by explaining that the village should now have two councils with complementary roles. The village representative council (LHP) was responsible for formulation and ratification and enactment of village decisions and regulations. The village community development council (LPMP) functioned as the working partner (mitra kerja) of the village official administration. As Gunung Terang had already selected the members of the LHP, about a dozen from all the hamlets, the meeting would not discuss this. Gunung Terang still needed to select persons for the LPMP, which has a chairperson, a vice-chairperson, a secretary, and a treasurer. There were to be 8 sections in the LPMP: (1) religion and community harmony (kerukunan warga), (2) organization, legal institutions (kelembagaan hukum), and laws and regulations (perundang-undangan), (3) youth, sport, art, and culture, (4) improvement of human resources, natural resources, and environment, (5) economic development, (6) family and women’s empowerment, (7) media, communication, and information, (8) customs and tradition (adat isitadat).
The meeting continued with the selection of persons for the LPMP. One of the criteria for the candidates for chairperson of the LPMP was that s/he must live along the main road to make it easy to find the chairperson anytime s/he was needed or his/her signature was needed. Since the hamlets of Rigis Atas, Rigis Bawah, and Temiangan were not along the main road, they were not allowed to nominate a candidate. All the delegates were given a small piece of paper to write down the name of the possible candidates. Nurdin, a Javanese, had the highest number of votes and became the chairperson; Ka’i, a Semendose, came second and so became the vice-chairperson. Persons to fill the positions of secretary and treasury were appointed by the village head, the chair of the LHP, and the elected LPMP chair. The positions for the 8 sections were basically selected from all the hamlets. Bu Mas Muda directed the selection by nominating the person followed by a loud chorus of “agree!” (setuju! sepakat!). There were some questions about each nominee, but Bu Mas Muda always managed to convince the crowd of her selection.

The next agenda item was the discussion of the village development plans. The district officer started by explaining that at the district level there were three financial sources for village development programs and projects: central, provincial, and district government. The funds would be divided and used for programs and projects by all lidang sektor (leading sectors; development implementing agencies, units, or offices) at the district level. Before proceeding to the discussion, the district officer expressed his dissatisfaction about the DPRD members from the region. He said that although the Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong region has many DPRD members none of them ‘fought’ for development in the region. Instead of backing up subdistrict officers at the district level, they just did the 4d (datang, duduk, diam, duit! came, sat, were quiet, and sought money!). As a
result, repeating Pak Cik Nawı’s remark, piles of proposals for the village development plans just sat on the desk at the district government. Yet, since the district government required the subdistrict office to submit village development plans that were actually proposed by the village community, this kind of village meeting had to be held.

The district officer continued the meeting by reading the list of 24 liding sektor to which the village proposed plans should be matched. And so the process of village development plans went on. The officer read each sector, the delegates then mentioned a plan that might suit that particular sector. Most often the district officer himself proposed the plans, which were then accepted by the crowd with a loud “agree!” He also frequently rejected plans proposed by the delegates that he thought were irrelevant. For example, when a few delegates proposed a project for running water it was simply rejected because Gunung Terang had already received such a project. When the discussion came to the sektor of irrigation, a delegate proposed an irrigation project. The officer then asked whether the village had an intact area of more than 50 ha suitable for rice fields, because the government would not fund any irrigation project if the area suitable for rice was less than 50 ha. Since none of the delegates could answer his question, the proposal for an irrigation project was simply erased from the list. The discussion became a bit lively when it came to the agriculture and the natural resource management sector. In response to the decline in the coffee prices and recent forest clearing, a program of agricultural diversification was proposed, which included vegetable farming and tree and cash crop planting. The discussion focused on what types of crops would grow well in the area and have good market demand. The listing of the village plans continued for each of the liding sektor in a similar way. In less than two hours the workshop was completed.
The meeting concluded with the subdistrict officer reminding the audience about the allocation of the annual village development fund (dana pembangunan desa). Due to so many allegations of corruption, in 2000-2001 the district government had decided to stop providing this fund. But the village heads had complained that without the money they could not run the day-to-day village administration. So the district government decided that the annual village fund would again be provided, but that it must be used only for operational costs of village administration. To use the annual village fund, as was done in the old days, as a source of credit for income generating activities and for physical construction was totally prohibited.

The village development meeting finished at about 2 o’clock. Lunch was provided for all the delegates. All went home without knowing what would happen with the village’s proposed development plans. But all knew for sure that some time the following year a very same ritual of village development planning would be organised, and they would again submit to what they had just done that day.

**Contingent Cohesion**

As a corporate group, an administrative village is characterised by clear membership and a territorial boundaries. The village consists of several hamlets, each hamlet being made up of several neighbourhoods. A neighbourhood might only consist of half a dozen families or households.

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3 The allocation of the annual village fund is (1) village operational costs (Rp 3.5 million), (2) adat institutions (Rp 250,000), and (3) PKK, children, youth, and woman (Rp 1 million). The district government takes Rp 250,000 from the total of Rp 5 million for the “socialization” (sosialisasi) of the new policy.
Official village affairs tend to be taken care of by the village and hamlet, while other community affairs (e.g., religious, emergency matters) are organised by the hamlet and neighbourhood.

At the village level, community cohesion is seen within the context of formal state 'rituals.' The village development plan meeting, for example, is a venue that serves to symbolise the existence of a village community. The process very much involved the pseudo-participation of a village community in national rural development planning. No one expected that the result of such village planning would seriously be considered and followed up by the higher level government decision makers. Nevertheless, the gathering itself strengthened the delegates' feeling that they were members of an entity, discussing matters that would benefit all of its members.

The celebration of 17th August, the nation's Independence Day, is another occasion where the villagers' sense of community is accentuated. For Independence Day in 2002 the subdistrict office requested all the villages to maintain tidiness (kerapihan) and raise the national flag. Following this request, the national flag and colourful banners (umbul-umbul) were erected in front of houses along the main road, with bamboo fences all painted in white. The main activities were sports matches of volleyball, checkers, and domino gaple, which were held for a week. The celebration concluded with panjat pinang, where boys competed to climb the greased trunk of a palm tree for small goods hung on top of it. The games were entirely a village initiative, the money for the celebration being collected from all the households in the village. Here again the flag raising, fence painting, games, and the gathering served as venues for the villagers to meet, collaborate, and do things together. Besides strengthening the sense of community at the
village level, such ‘ritual’ also deepened the villagers’ feeling of being part of the larger Indonesian national community.

Upkeep of the village graveyard is another venue where the villagers act as a community. About a week before the fasting month of Ramadhan, each hamlet sends about a dozen men to weed the village’s main graveyard located in the hamlet of Gunung Terang. Although not all deceased villagers are buried here, since the remote hamlets of Rigis Atas and Temiangan have smaller graveyards, men from every hamlet are involved in the village gotong royong. The village graveyard itself is not very large; to weed it could be done easily by less than a dozen men within less than a half day. Yet more than three dozens men gathered during half a day’s gotong royong work prior to the fasting month in 2002. Thus it was not the weeding itself that is important but the fact that villagers from all the hamlets in the village take part.

In the old days, the village gotong royong was the primary way to get a village project done. Through years of village gotong royong, paths were enlarged and wooden bridges were constructed so that motorbikes or four-wheel jeeps could pass by. The use of the village annual development fund to buy material for the small bridges (gorong-gorong) was almost a must. The construction of elementary schools and the village market were also done in similar ways, as villagers from all hamlets spent days or weeks working on the projects. Quite often, when additional money was needed to buy materials to get a project done, cash was collected from all the households in the village.

While successful in building mosques in all the big hamlets, the villagers plan to have a pesantren in the village is yet to be seen. Through donation
and *gotong royong* the biggest mosque in the village at the border of Bedeng Sari and Petai Paya was built. Attached to the mosque are a few classrooms. Following the drop in coffee prices, donations ceased to flow. The plan to have more classrooms for the school and boarding houses (*pondok*) to house pupils from outside the village did not eventuate. Today, after their formal school hour, children in the village go to this *pesantren* to study Islam.

The road networks of Bedeng Sari - Buluh Kapur – Rigis Atas and Simpang Tiga – Temiangan are examples of unsuccessful village projects. Only motorbikes can pass. The problem was not in mobilising *gotong royong* to enlarge the path but getting the cash to purchase materials for some small bridges that needed to be constructed for the road to be passable by car or jeep. Car transportation would ultimately reduce the transportation cost for goods such as coffee beans, fertiliser, and building materials. Coffee gardens in Buluh Kapur and Rigis Atas do not only belong to the residents of the two hamlets, many belong to villagers in the hamlets of Bedeng Sari and Gunung Terang. Despite the urgent need, there was no serious plan for road construction.

The construction of a weekly market was also an unsuccessful village project. Less than a dozen traders sell goods every Wednesday. The market failed to attract as many traders and buyers as the Thursday market at Ciptalaga and the Friday market at Sumber Alam. Even the Gunung Terang villagers themselves prefer to go to Sumber Alam for their weekly shopping.

The recent project for water supply is another example of failure. The project was a heavily government-assisted project. The government (i.e. department of public works) provided all the materials (e.g. cement, plastic pipes) and paid for the labour. The project constructed a pipe network from a spring in
Bukit Rigis to several concrete containers/tanks in the hamlets of Gunung Terang and Bedeng Sari. Connection from the tanks to the houses was not part of the government project; it was the villagers’ responsibility. The plan did not materialise, the tanks were soon empty and there was no supply of running water to houses in either hamlet. There were meetings to get the project done, but no concrete plan was decided on. One of the problems was the difficulty between and amongst those who lived in the hamlets of Bedeng Sari and Gunung Terang in agreeing on a concrete plan. One of the villagers vividly pointed out “There were too many smart men in those two hamlets. Each insisted that his opinion was right and the others were wrong. They could come up with nothing!”

In contrast to the failure of the running water project in the hamlets of Gunung Terang and Bedeng Sari, the community in the hamlet of Rigis Bawah successfully carried out exactly the same project. Almost all residents have running water in their houses. Through weekly gotong royong they built water tanks and installed a piping network throughout the hamlet. To ensure every household participated in the weekly gotong royong, certain measures were agreed upon. Those who were absent from the gotong royong would either be prohibited from using the running water (channelling water from the tank to their houses) or obliged to pay in cash (an unacceptable absences from gotong royong equalled a day’s wage). The hamlet community found a clever way of obtaining cash to purchase the materials (e.g., cement, PVC pipe). A few years before one of the hamlet residents had granted (hibah, wakaf) his coffee garden to the mosque in the hamlet. The accumulated profits from this garden, which belonged to the mosque, were used to purchase the materials. The loan from the mosque was then paid back by each of those who enjoyed the running water.
Surprisingly, many residents of Rigis Bawah are also residents of both hamlets of Gunung Terang and Bedeng Sari where the water project failed. The problem of “too many strong leaders, too much debates” in Bedeng Sari and Gunung Terang hamlets was often cited as the cause of failure of the water project. But the fact that most houses in both hamlets of Gunung Terang and Bedeng Sari has a well was an important factor. The pressure to having the project done was high in the end of 2002, when wells were empty due to long dry months in that year and overuse for watering the chilli gardens. Villagers with empty wells have started to go to the Way Besai river for bathing and washing cloths. There were meetings to discuss how to get the water project done. But as the discussions intensified, the rain came and the wells were filled. All talk on the water project subsided. In contrast, villagers in the higher altitude of Rigis Atas and Rigis Bawah hamlets still used springs and creeks as their primary water source. They had no wells. Failing to regulate the water use created a serious crisis in these hamlets.

The community in Rigis Atas has had a different experience. They are now engaged in a community forestry contract. The head of the district granted them the right to farm in the state forest zone. They now have a kind of formal permission to use the land without worrying about being evicted or having their crops destroyed by the forestry authority. It took two years for the community to arrive at a formal contract. The processes involved a detailed inventory, mapping, and formulation of rules and plans regarding the management of the cleared land and the remaining forest patch. They were involved in intense interactions with the field staff of WATALA and ICRAF, who assisted them in the process, and local forestry officers. They are among the first of a small number of community groups in the province to engage in such a community forestry contract.
Apparently, the cohesiveness of the village community is contingent on need, urgency, resource availability and limitation, and leadership. The communal tasks carried by the villagers include development, religion and ritual, and household economy. While extra-household relations play a role in villagers' livelihoods, most tasks in agricultural production are carried by individual households. The next chapter explores this topic.
Plate 6.1 Semendonese houses in Gunung Terang

Plate 6.2 A wealthy Javanese house in Bedeng Sari

Plate 6.3 Houses in Rigis Atas
Plate 6.4 Residents of Rigis Bawah doing gotong royong

Plate 6.5 Members of a community forestry (HKm) group in Rigis Atas
CHAPTER SEVEN

The Village Economy:
Smallholders, Householders

Differentiation

Farming is the main occupation and source of livelihood of most the villagers of Gunung Terang. There are limited occupations other than farming in the village, such as teacher, shopkeeper, re-seller of farm produce, mechanic, builder, and car or motorbike taxi (ojek) driver. The proportion of villagers engaged in such off-farm work is relatively small, perhaps no more than 5 percent. For most of those engaged in these off-farm activities, moreover, farming is still important, either as a primary or a secondary source of income.

When they were asked about the economic conditions of the families in the village, villagers often used the terms strong (kuat), established (mapan), and makmur (prosperous) to refer to wealthy families; poor (miskin), have not (tidak punya), and needy (kurang) for poor villagers; and enough (cukup), not bad (lumayan), ordinary (biaza), common (kebanyakan), average (rata-rata), and on the edge (pas-pasan) for those in between. Thus, according to their wealth, the population of Gunung Terang village can be divided into a lower, medium, and upper stratum. At the base of these strata are the poor, who comprise nearly a half of the village population. The main characteristics of this group/class are their struggle to secure food to feed their families throughout the year, and the inability to afford their children’s higher education. They usually live in huts (gubuk) or humble houses. The middle
stratum of the village population consists of those who worry less about feeding their family, but more about how to support their children’s higher education, having a sturdy decent house, and possessing modern goods. The middle stratum can be further divided into what the villagers often refer to as pas-pasan (on the edge) or cukup makan (enough food), and cukup or lumayan (just enough, enough). While the former struggle to avoid becoming kekurangan (needy), the latter hope and keep looking for opportunities for further upward mobility. This stratum comprises about half of the village population. In the upper stratum, there are about two dozen families, i.e. 3.3% of a total 708 village families/households, whom the villagers refer to as mapan, kuat ([economically] established, strong). These families have successfully managed to accumulate wealth so that they have no problem feeding their families, building sturdy houses, and sending children to university. They posses luxurious household goods, vehicles, and, if they wish, go for pilgrimages to Mecca.

The ‘outer’ hamlets of Rigis Atas, Rigis Bawah, Buluh Kapur, and Temiangan have a more or less equal number of low and medium stratum households. None of the wealthiest village families live there. In these hamlets, during good years the population tends to increase because of the arrival of new labourers, and shrink during poor years as the labourers move out. Medium stratum households dominate the ‘inner’ hamlets of Gunung Terang, Talang Jaya, Bedeng Sari, Petai Paya, and Simpang Tiga. All the village upper stratum households live there.

The following discussion illustrates the household circumstances of Gunung Terang villagers in the different economic classes. The stories are taken from fieldwork research in 2002. Emphasis is given to the household’s upward as
as downward mobility. Aliases are used for the individuals, but the places and times are real.

Lower stratum

Udin and his siblings were taken from Ciamis, West Java, to Rigis Atas by their parents in 1973. Udin was six years old then. His parents sold their small rice fields and upland field (ladang) in Ciamis, West Java. A few years earlier, Udin’s father had visited Lampung to sell clothes and mats. On their journey to move to Sumber Jaya, they were robbed in Kotabumi and lost all their cash. Unable to buy land, the family cleared the state forest land near Rigis Atas and transformed it into 2.5 hectares of coffee gardens. Over the ensuing years they bought a one hectare field, also within the state forest zone, which they then converted into a housing lot, 0.25 ha of rice field, and a coffee garden. In the 1980s the forestry office commenced the reforestation projects. Udin’s parents and hundreds of their neighbours’ gardens were planted with sonokeling trees. They continued to take care of, and to harvest, the cherries from coffee trees between the sonokeling trees. In 1993-94, when the state forest zone’s boundary was enforced, they were advised to dismantle their house and abandon their coffee gardens and rice field. After that Udin, like his parents and siblings, started to work as sharecroppers in Gunung Terang and in the neighbouring village of Cipta Waras. He is now sharecropping three hectares of coffee gardens and caring for a dozen goats. Udin, with the help of his brother, has also cleared a fallowed field belonging to the village school teacher and converted it into a rice field. He has been granted the right to use the rice field, of about 0.5 hectare, for two years. He, his wife, and his six children live in a hut in Bedengsari, belonging to the owner of the coffee gardens that he sharecrops. Although they do not need to go into debt to secure their food supply, the family has few possessions and cannot afford to send their children for education higher than
elementary school. In working the gardens and rice field, Udin and his wife regularly involve their younger siblings and, consequently, they have to share the proceeds with them. Udin and his wife regularly work as wage labourers (upahan). They have a long term plan to save their income to move back to West Java. A few years before, Udin pawned a 0.25 hectare of rice field in his wife’s village of origin in Bogor, West Java. The field is now managed by his wife’s parents. He wishes in the near future to be able to save enough money to take over this rice field and move back to Java.

Karya, in his mid 30s, migrated to Rigis Atas with his parents and siblings in 1982. Following a big eruption of Mount Galunggung that year, they vacated their house and left all their possessions in their home village in Ciamis, West Java. Bringing nothing other than their clothes and kitchen utensils, wage labour was their primary income source upon their arrival in Rigis Atas. There they cleared the forest, planted coffee, and built a decent house. The gardens and house were within the state forest zone, but in 1993-94, after the eviction of forest encroachers (perambah hutan) they abandoned their gardens and house. The family first moved to Banding, near lake Ranau, for a couple of years. Later, they moved again to Simpang Luas, near Liwa. Their efforts to establish a new life in these new places were not as successful as they had been in Rigis Atas. Despite its very low production, his parents decided to continue maintaining a coffee garden in Simpang Luas. Luckily, the family had managed to buy a housing lot near the hamlet of Gunung Terang. Karya, his wife, and two little daughters live in a humble stilted house in this lot. His main sources of income are from a motorbike taxi (ojek) and from buying produce from Rigis Atas, such as bananas and chilli, sometimes also fruit like as jackfruit and avocado, which he then takes by motorbike to sell to middlemen in Fajar Bulan. He also cultivates a few hundreds capsicum chilli in his small house garden.
Kamino, in his mid 30s, is considered by his neighbours to be one of the poorest in the hamlet of Rigis Atas. His grandparents took care of him and his siblings in Ponorogo, East Java when, in 1973, his parents joined a transmigration program to Rumbia, Central Lampung. Kamino arrived in Lampung in 1989 when his parents had already moved to Mesuji, another transmigration site in northern Lampung lowland. In 1990 he came to Rigis Atas, cleared the bush and planted coffee while working as a wage labourer. He sold his 3.5 hectares of coffee gardens and used the money to marry a woman from his parents' village in Mesuji, and bought a small plot of land. In 1993, failing to make a decent life in Mesuji, he took his wife back to Rigis Atas and worked a hectare of coffee garden as a contract labourer (bujang), paid annually with a fixed amount of the harvest. The family has three small children. His eldest son is just starting to go to elementary school. Kamino and his family live in a simple hut (gubuk) belonging to the owner of the coffee garden that he sharecrops. He also sharecrops another 1.5 hectares of young, non-bearing coffee garden belonging to other neighbour. Kamino has recently planted green beans on 1 rante (400 sq. metres) of unused land that he borrows (numpang) from another neighbour. In 1999 he used all his family savings to make a down payment for a plot of coffee garden, but due to the drop of the coffee price, he was unable to complete the payments during the following years. As a result, the owner of garden took the garden back without returning his down payment. Kamino and his wife obtain food for their family primarily from wage labour (upahan). Their income is so low that they cannot even afford to buy 'poor rice' (beras miskin), government-subsidized rice for the poor, the price of which is half the market price but has to be paid for in cash. Kamino is well known among the neighbourhood as a strong and diligent man. But, according to some of his neighbours, he does not manage his income well. To make matters worse,
unlike others, he does not let his wife manage their income. This is part of the reason for Kamino’s failure to attain a better life.

Hambali is a head of another poor family in Rigis Atas. In his 50s, with four teenage children, he and his wife are struggling to pay debts they incurred to buy rice. He migrated to Lampung from Salatiga, Central Java, in 1979. He first lived in Simpang Sender, near lake Ranau, working as a wage labourer in a coffee garden. In the mid-1980s he and his family moved to Rigis Atas. They bought a fallow field and planted it with coffee while continuing to work as wage labourers. In 1993 they sold this plot and bought another 3 hectares of coffee garden, but soon they had to sell the garden to pay their accumulated debts. Since then they have been living by sharecropping (maro) a coffee garden and working as wage labourers (upahan). Most often the share and wages that they receive is much less than the debts that they have to pay. In 2001, they again bought nearly a hectare of imperata field where they built a hut to live in, and planted the field with coffee. Hambali’s son has dropped out of junior high school, and none of his three daughters attended school higher than elementary school. His elder daughter, 16 years old, has just started to work as a domestic helper in Jakarta. Hambali and his wife expect their other children to follow suit.

Like Hambali, Ahmadi, a Semendones in his mid 40s, is struggling to feed his family. He is no longer able to support his two sons to continue studying at the junior high school, forcing them to drop out. Thus, only his youngest daughter now studies at elementary school. His wife is actually a tunggu tubang. She inherited her parents’ house, a 0.6 ha coffee garden, and a 0.5 ha rice field, all of which are located in his wife’s village of Srimenanti. His wife’s parents are both sick and in constant need of his wife’s care and cash for medication. The rice field is rented out for his wife’s parents’ food and
medical treatments. Ahmadi and his two sons live in a hut in Rigis Atas and take care of a sharecropped young coffee garden. They regularly return home to their house at Srimenanti. The land that they planted with coffee in Rigis Atas is his eldest sister’s tunggu tubang property, inherited from their parents. The land, of about a hectare, was originally a productive terraced rice field, which was abandoned when, in the 1980s, the reforestation project planted sonokeling trees on it. The land was soon transformed into bush. In 2001, Ahmadi’s family cleared the bush and planted it with coffee. With any further drop in the coffee price, according to Ahmadi, his family investment on the young coffee garden would be a waste. Ahmadi is thus uncertain about the future of his family.

Bi Ati, in her 50s, her husband, and her four children migrated to Lampung from one of West Java’s lowland rice bowls, Karawang, in 1982. They first lived in Dwikora, a village on the eastern tip of Sumber Jaya subdistrict, working as wage labourers clearing the forest, planting coffee, and weeding gardens. In 1994-95, after the military operations to evict farmers from the state forest in Dwikora, the family first moved to Krui and then elsewhere in Sumber Jaya before finally arriving in Rigis Atas. Here they sharecrop nearly 0.75 hectares of rice field and 2.5 hectares of an old, unproductive coffee garden belonging to a Semendonese who lives in Fajar Bulan. Bi Ati and her family live in a stilted house in the middle of the rice field. The share they receive from the rice field was never enough to feed the whole family. The low productivity of the rice field, according to Bi Ati, is largely due to a combination of low quality seeds, lack of chemical fertiliser, rat infestation, and poor upkeep. Rather than pouring all available labour into the rice field, the family frequently engages in wage labour to pay the debts they incur to buy rice. Warsi, Bi Ati’s elder daughter, has been working in Saudi Arabia since 2001, leaving her only daughter with Bi Ati. Warsi’s husband lives in
Karawang. Asih, Bi Ati's second daughter and Asih's small son live with Bi Ati; her husband has just left her, and no one knows his whereabouts. Discussing her situation, Bi Ati once said “I want my family to move back to Karawang. Being poor but close to relatives (saudara) would be better. Being poor without anyone to turn to for help, like we are now here, is very difficult.” As soon as they have enough money to buy the bus tickets, Bi Ati insists, they will definitely return to Karawang, West Java, leaving the region for good. But, even saving some money for the bus tickets is difficult for the family.

Bi Ati's only son, Satria, in his 30s, is just expecting his second child. He and his family have recently moved to a small hut belonging to the owner of 1.5 hectares of coffee garden that Satria sharecrops. To buy rice for his family, he continues working as a wage labourer. He also inter-plants small *capsicum* chilli in the coffee garden. He endorses his parents' decision to move back to Karawang as soon as possible. He himself would wait for another two or three years. If things get worse, he would take his family, following his parents' steps, to return to Java for good.

Ujang and his wife arrived in Gunung Terang in 1980. He was born in Gunung Terang hamlet, but since he was a boy had lived in Talang Padang, a Semendonese region in the neighbouring district of Tanggamus. He studied and married in Talang Padang. His wife was not a *tunggu tubang*, so she inherited none of her parents' property. In Gunung Terang, at night, Ujang taught Qur’an reading for young children. Initially, he received 15 kg of rice and 15 kg of dry coffee beans as an annual tuition fee from each of his pupils. But, after 2000, none of his pupils' parents could afford to pay the tuition fee. He lived in a simple stilted house belonging to his close kin. From 1995 to 1999 he was able to rent 1.5 hectares of coffee garden in Gunung
Terang. Now he sharecrops the garden. Ujang puts a high priority on his children’s education. His eldest daughter is a high school graduate, teaching in an elementary school on a casual basis. His son and other daughter go to junior high school. With a very small income, his family can support their children’s education by maintaining a very simple life.

In addition to young families/households struggling for upward mobility, the lower stratum of the village is also occupied by an older generation. These are old couples, widows and widowers, many of whom are sick. Their children live elsewhere, or live nearby, but do not economically ‘have enough’. While the possibility for upward social mobility in the future is believed to be likely for the young generation, for the old generation such upward mobility would be difficult—if not impossible.

**Middle stratum**

Triman, in his early 50s, departed from Salatiga, Central Java, in 1978. First he lived as a wage labourer in the neighbouring region of Bukit Kemuning. In the following year, he used the savings that he had accumulated to buy a 0.75 ha coffee garden in Gunung Terang. He married a Javanese woman from Bedeng Sari, bought a housing lot, and built a simple wooden house in Bedeng Sari. He has eight children, none of whom has received education higher than elementary school. Half of his children are already teenagers and help him in daily farming activities. Beside the coffee garden, he owns a 0.25 ha rice field and half a dozen goats. The family has recently cleared a fallow field belonging to a Semendonese and transformed it into a rice field. For this effort, the family have been granted the right to farm the 0.25 ha rice field for two years. As far as food security is concerned, Triman’s family is in a better
situation than those in the lower stratum, but for other needs, the family has to struggle hard.

In his late 30s, Ali, a Semendonese who lives in the hamlet of Gunung Terang, has a better life than Triman. He was born in the village and married his neighbour, a Semendo woman. The family has two daughters, one in elementary school and the other in junior high school. As a tunggu tubang, his wife inherited all of her parents’ property: a house, a 0.5 ha rice field, and 2.5 ha coffee and pepper garden. Her parents are still able to feed themselves by farming 0.8 ha coffee garden, and live in a separate house (turun) located in the garden. The tunggu tubang rice field has been borrowed by one of Ali’s wife’s younger brothers, the harvest of which is shared amongst Ali’s wife, Ali’s wife’s brother—who farms the field, and Ali’s wife’s parents. Ali regularly hires labourers to weed and harvest the coffee and pepper garden. He and his wife do the other farming work themselves.

Syafri, in his early 50s, was born in Gunung Terang. In 1979, he married a widow with one daughter. From the marriage, the family had two more daughters and a son. His wife is a tunggu tubang in Muara Enim, South Sumatra, and is entitled to the harvests of her parents’ rice field and coffee garden. In 1980, Syafri bought 2 hectares of coffee and pepper garden. In 1988 he bought a 1 hectare rice field and a 1.5 ha coffee garden. He also bought a housing lot in Gunung Terang hamlet and built a sturdy wooden house. The house has quite luxurious possessions such as a big television, satellite dish, stereo set, and nice furniture. The family manages their gardens and rice field on their own, labourers are hired for weeding the gardens and hoeing and transplanting in the rice field. The family will have two tunggu tubang daughters; Syafri’s wife’s daughter from her first marriage will be entitled to all Syafri wife’s parents’ tunggu tubang properties.
in Muara Enim, while Syafri’s own eldest daughter will inherit all the family properties in Gunung Terang. The former now lives, with her husband and a baby, in a hut in the rice field. The latter has just graduated from high school, and is preparing to study at a university in the capital of the province. Syafri’s younger children are studying at junior high school.

Like Ali and Syafri, Effendi, in his mid 30s, also married a Semendo woman. The couple has two sons who are studying at elementary school. The family lives in a small but sturdy stilted wooden house in Rigis Atas, close to their garden. Unlike Ali and Syafri’s wives, his wife is not a tunggu tubang. They acquired all the properties they now have with their own efforts. Effendi and his wife were born and raised in Fajar Bulan. In 1990, soon after their marriage, they cleared 3 hectares of state forest in the neighbouring region of Simpang Luas. A hectare of the cleared field was planted with coffee, and the rest was transformed into an upland rice field (ladang padi). The couple also engaged in wage labour. In 1993, while maintaining their coffee garden in Simpang Luas, they sharecropped one hectare of coffee garden in the neighbouring village of Srimenanti. They rented a house and lived in Srimenenati, where Effendi’s wife opened a small stall (warung). In 1996, using the money from selling their garden in Simpang Luas and the savings they had accumulated, they bought 2 hectares of coffee garden and a one hectare imperata field in Rigis Atas. Later the imperata field was planted with coffee. Effendi sharecrops half of his coffee garden and, with his wife, manages the other half. He hires labourers for weeding and harvesting the coffee garden. He has recently planted capsicum chilli in his coffee garden together with fruit and timber trees. Effendi owns and operates a movable engine-powered coffee mill, and is very busy milling his neighbours’ coffee beans during the coffee harvest seasons.
Sutisna, in his early 50s, came to Rigis Atas from Ciamis, West Java, in 1979. With three other men, he worked as a contract labourer (*bujang*) maintaining Sucipta’s coffee gardens in Rigis Atas. Sucipta was a trader selling clothes from Tasikmalaya, West Java to various places in Lampung and South Sumatra. He had bought 6 hectares of coffee gardens in Rigis Atas, all managed by contract labourers he brought from Java. After his gardens’ peak harvest (*agung*), he sold the gardens and opened a clothing shop in Tasikmalaya. In the following years, Sutisno took over 2 hectares of Sucipta’s coffee gardens, and paid for them in three payments, once each harvest season. In the early 1980s, following the drop in the coffee prices, Sutisna went to Palembang. For a year he worked as a labourer in a chilli garden and a brick factory. He returned to Rigis Atas and married a Javanese woman from the neighbouring village of Gedung Surian. He sold 1 hectare of his coffee garden, and built a simple house. While maintaining his one hectare of coffee garden with his wife, he worked as a wage labourer, and ran an engine-powered portable coffee mill. His wife opened a small stall (*warung*) selling small items such as rice, cooking oil, sugar, *salt, micin* (msg.), instant noodles, soaps, cigarettes, snacks and lollies. In the mid-1990s, he sold his garden and house, and sent his wife and four children to live with his mother in Ciamis, West Java. He bought a half hectare coffee garden nearby, and built a hut to live in. He later bought another two plots, totalling one hectare, of coffee gardens in the nearby state forest which had been abandoned by the owners, after they were evicted by the military and forestry officers. In 2001, Sutisna planted his gardens under the coffee and sonokeling trees, with capsicum chilli. He was the first person in Rigis Atas to plant chilli for commercial purposes. Sutisna’s neighbours frequently consult him on how to plant chilli in their coffee gardens. To manage his coffee and chilli gardens, apart from his younger brother, who lives with
him, Sutisna regularly hires his fellow neighbours as wage labourers. From his chilli plants he is able send cash to his family in Java on a regular basis.

**Upper stratum**

Fahrozi, a Semendonese in his mid-40s, was born in Gunung Terang. He married a *tunggu tubang* woman who inherited a big wooden stilted house, 4 hectares of coffee and pepper gardens, and 2.5 hectares of rice fields. The family manages 1 hectare of the garden, and sharecrops the rest of the garden and the rice field. His wife’s parents have moved out (*turun*) from the house to live on, and manage, coffee and pepper gardens elsewhere. Until 1999, Fahrozi was active in the coffee (and pepper) reselling business. He was one of half a dozen coffee middlemen in the village. In 1999, he bought 10 hectares of bush land in the neighbouring region of Sukau. Due to the drop in the coffee price, he has not enough capital to carry out his plan to plant his fields with coffee and pepper. But he could still afford to build a big sturdy wooden stilted house, which will be his and his wife’s home, when, in the future, they have to pass down all the *tunggu tubang* properties they now possess to his eldest daughter. Fahrozi has three children. Fahrozi’s eldest daughter has just graduated from high school and is preparing to study further in the province’s capital, Bandar Lampung. He expects that his sons, the first studying at elementary school and the second still under school age, will also go to university. Otherwise, they will inherit the bush that he has just bought and become farmers.

Sunaryo, a Javanese in his 60s, came to Gunung Terang in 1983. Prior to that, he and his family, from Purwodadi, Central Java had joined a transmigration program to Rumbia, in lowland central Lampung, in 1974. The failure of the construction of irrigation in Rumbia forced the family to leave the
transmigration site. In Gunung Terang, Sunaryo began his business of cutting and selling timber from the state forest in Rigis Atas, where the family first lived. Backed by the local police and military officers, without whose support he would have been jailed, he ran the business for over a decade. Sunaryo used the proceeds from the timber business to buy land. He bought 4 of hectares of old coffee garden in 1983, 2 hectares in 1987, 1 hectare in 1992, and 2.5 hectares in 1997. Also in 1997 he bought 1.5 hectares of rice field, which he soon converted to a coffee garden. Thus, in total, he had 11 hectares of coffee gardens. In the same year he bought a 0.25 ha housing lot (kapling) in Bedeng Sari, built a large brick house, and moved there. Sunaryo has seven children. Three of them, a daughter and two sons, are married. Sunaryo gave each of these three children 1.5 hectares of coffee garden and a house. His other four sons, all in their 20s and graduated either from junior or senor high school, collectively manage the remaining 6.5 hectares. Each of them will inherit the same area of land when they marry later. According to Sunaryo and his wife, they will bequeath the house and housing lot to their youngest son or the last one to marry, who will, in return take care of them. The family has recently begun to cultivate red chilli in their housing lot and small chilli in the coffee gardens.

Unlike Fahrozi and Sunaryo, Haji Sabar and Rahman have much less land, but much more wealth. Sabar has only 3 hectares of coffee garden but is an active coffee middleman and, more importantly, a moneylender. His family lives in the capital of the province, Bandar Lampung. Once or twice a week he drives his sedan to Bandar Lampung. His house in Gunung Terang functions more as a store for sacks of dried coffee beans, which he buys and re-sells, and an office for his money lending business. Rahman owns the largest shop (warung) selling household items in the village. He owns no coffee garden. Following Haji Sabar’s footsteps, Rahman also engages in
money lending in the village. Over a decade before, after some years of work as a *kenek* (car driver assistant), he and his wife rented a small house and opened a small shop (*warung*). He started his money lending business as a broker, later he set up his own service. He was the most active moneylender in the village in 2001-2002.

Two village officials, Bu Mas Muda, the village head, and Udin, the chair of LPMP are among the established (*mapan*) families in the village. According to some of the villagers, it is not because of their official position that they became wealthy. On the contrary, it is because both were established families that the villagers chose them as village officials. Both families own more than three hectares of highly productive coffee gardens, and have recently started commercial vegetable farming.

As far as wealth is concerned, the wealthy families in Gunung Terang are much less wealthy than a couple of dozen rich merchants (big coffee resellers and owners of big retail shops) in the two towns of Fajar Bulan and Sumber Jaya and in other villages. For these rich merchants, as in the cases of Sabar and Rahman in Gunung Terang, the amount of land owned is not the determining factor for wealth accumulation. Obviously, access to capital and trade networks matter more.

**Household Farming**

Like all villages in the region, coffee gardens dominate land usage in Gunung Terang village. Until the early 1980s, according to elders in the village, leaving old coffee gardens fallow, and clearing forest or old fallow for new gardens was a common practice. Thanks to the introduction of
subsidized chemical fertilisers and better farming techniques (pruning and grafting, weeding, soil conservation), introduced through various agricultural extension programs, the system of rotational cultivation of coffee has not been practiced since the 1980s. With the new techniques, production of coffee gardens has risen dramatically. Under the old rotational system, a hectare of coffee garden would produce 0.7 tonne once, that is during the peak (agung) stage, and an average of 0.3 tonne for the remaining years until it ceased to bear fruit, at the age of 10 years or over, when the field would be left fallow. Under the new system, a hectare of coffee garden would normally produce 1.5 to 2 tonnes of dry coffee beans. An attractive coffee price and the arrival of new migrants enabled the success of the new coffee farming system.

During the last five years there has been a decline in coffee garden production. As Table 7.1 shows, the average production in 2002 was three times lower than in 1998. The decline of production from 1998 to 2002 coincided with a drop in the coffee price from Rp 12,000 to Rp 15,000 per kg in 1998, to Rp 6,000 to Rp 7,000 in 1999, Rp 3,000 to Rp 4,000 in 2000, and Rp 3,000 in 2001 and 2002. In response to the drop in coffee price, non-labour input (fertiliser) and/or labour input (weeding and pruning) have been gradually reduced. This has led to a further drop in coffee garden production. Production tends to fall as the price drops. Smallholders argued that a higher price in the near future would revive the production.
Table 7.1 Coffee garden production in 1998—2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Garden size</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Production (tonnes per hectare)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Efendi</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Grafted, 0.25 tonne fertiliser application in all years.</td>
<td>1.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Barnawi</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>Grafted, 0.6 tonne fertiliser application in 1988.</td>
<td>1.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Dudung*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Grafted, 1.0 tonne fertiliser application in 1988.</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Parto*</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>Non-grafted, 0.6 tonne fertiliser application in 1988-2000.</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Ilham</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>Grafted, inter-planted with pepper(a), no fertiliser application all years</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Syafe’i (1)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Grafted, inter-planted with pepper(b), no fertiliser application all years</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Syafe’i (2)</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>Grafted, inter-planted with pepper(b), no fertiliser application all years</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Karman</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>Grafted, inter-planted with pepper(c), 0.5 tonne fertiliser application all years</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interviews with villagers in Gunung Terang, 2002.

Note:
* Sharecroppers
(a) 1,000 vines, producing 2,700 kg in 1998, none from 1999 to 2001, and 6 kg in 2002
(b) 100 to 200 young vines
(c) 1,500 vines producing 600 kg in 1998 and 1999, and none from 2000 to 2002

Table 7.2 Input and income from a hectare coffee garden in 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Labour inputs</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>(average)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-weeding</td>
<td>32 to 150 wo/man days</td>
<td>54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-pruning</td>
<td>7.5 to 60 wo/man days</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-harvesting</td>
<td>12.5 to 58 wo/man days</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-drying</td>
<td>7 to 14 wo/man days</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>102.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-labour inputs</td>
<td>Rp 150 x 700 kg</td>
<td>Rp 105,000 (b)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>Rp 3,000 x 700 kg</td>
<td>Rp 2,100,000 (c)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-net: (a) landowner, hiring labourers</td>
<td>(c) – [(a) x Rp 10,000] – (b)</td>
<td>Rp 970,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) sharecropper/landowner</td>
<td>0.5 x [(c) – (b)]</td>
<td>Rp 997,000 (d)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-return to labour</td>
<td>(d) : (a)</td>
<td>Rp 9,725</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-income in milled rice</td>
<td>(d) : Rp 2,000 per kg</td>
<td>498.5 kg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interviews with half a dozen villagers in Gunung Terang, 2002.
Despite the drop in the price and production of coffee, coffee gardens are still seen as an important household income source. Table 7.2 indicates that income from a hectare of coffee garden producing 0.7 tonne of coffee was provided modest but significant to the household economy. With regard to the return to labour, smallholders received a daily income at approximately the daily wage rate in the region—Rp 10,000 per day. In the form of rice, the production would equal 0.5 tonne of milled rice that, according to some villagers, would be just enough stock for a small family for a year. Milled rice, however, is only one item among many other basic household needs. Even to have an income double the amount of the minimum stock of milled rice is considered on the edge (pas-pasan). With the low price and production of coffee, low incomes became a problem that farming households were struggling to cope with.

Although dominant, coffee is rarely the only crop planted in the gardens. Many coffee gardens have shade trees (dadap and ki hujan) that also support pepper vines. However, as it is prone to various diseases, pepper has recently become a less important cash crop. Close to housing lots, the gardens have a greater variety of crops. Fruit trees such as coconut, jackfruit, avocado, rambutan, and jambu (guava) have been planted but only for domestic consumption. Recently, bananas have started to become a commercial commodity. Various timber and fruit trees have also been planted, though their economic importance remains to be seen. Vegetables, spices, and tubers (cassava and sweet potato)—all for household consumption—are annual crops that are easily encountered in the kitchen gardens in the backyards of villagers’ houses. Stall-fed sheep and goats have also recently begun to emerge as an item in the village economy. The recent demand for compost for commercial vegetable farming has also driven the emergence of this livestock husbandry in the village.
Unlike commercial vegetable farming (*kebun sayuran*), especially capsicum chilli, which is a recent trend, rice fields have always been important. From over nearly 1500 hectares of village land, only about 90 hectares are rice fields. A few of these fields were abandoned or converted into coffee gardens during the last peak in coffee prices in the mid-1990s. Recently many of the abandoned fields have been transformed back into rice fields. Interviews with a dozen of those farmers who farm the rice fields revealed that half of them are land owners while the other half are sharecroppers. Field size varied from 0.25 to 1.5 hectares, with an average of 0.725 hectare; and production per crop varied from 0.485 to 2.1 tonnes per hectare with an average of 1.3 tonnes. With normally two crops per year, households who farmed a rice field would have relatively greater food security.

### Table 7.3. Input and production of a hectare rice field in 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Labour input</th>
<th>(wo/man days)</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- hoeing and ploughing</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Rp 400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- seed bed</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- transplanting</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Rp 300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- fertilising</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- weeding</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>Rp 275,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- spraying</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- harvesting</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>139.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Non-labour input      |               |         |
| - fertiliser         | 300 kg x Rp 150 | Rp 450,000 |
| - pesticide          | 4.5 lt x Rp 5,000 | Rp 45,000  |
| **Total**             |               | Rp 1,700,000 |

| Production            |               |         |
| - total               | 1,750 kg      |         |
| - harvesters' share   | (1/7) x 1,750 kg | 250 kg  |
| - net                 | (6/7) x 1,750 kg | 1,500 kg |

Source: Interview with a villager in Gunung Terang, 2000. Note: labour for winnowing and drying, and costs for seeds, transportation, and milling are excluded.
Table 7.3 illustrates the input and production of a hectare of rice field. According to those who farm rice fields, production could be increased further to at least double the present level. There are constraints to such improvements in production, however. Depending solely on rainfall for water, lower or late rainfall would consequently reduce rice field production. Too much rain would flood rice fields on riverbanks and destroy the harvest. Fungus, insects, and pests (e.g., rats and, for fields close to forests, pigs) are constant threats. Seed is always a problem. Local rice varieties (belebur rimba) produced well but need 5 to 7 months to ripen, making two crops less possible. Seeds of high yielding varieties (e.g., Cisadane, IR 36) are not readily available in local shops, thus seeds from the harvest are used instead. Credit for fertiliser is unavailable. The availability of extra labour for proper weeding and repair of bunds, terraces, and ditches is another constraint. Particularly for households who also farm coffee and/or regularly engage in wage labour, the labour shortage in the rice fields is always a problem limiting higher production.

All villagers who farm rice fields in the village also farm coffee, ensuring their household income and food security. But the majority of households in the village, until recently, farmed only coffee gardens. Since 2001, chilli has started to become another important commodity. There are two types of chilli farmed in the village, that is hot small capsicum (cabe kecil, lombok) and big red capsicum (cabe merah, cabe besar). Several varieties of each type of chilli planted in the village. The main difference between small and red capsicum is that the former is planted under the coffee trees in the coffee garden, while the latter is planted in open fields. Another difference is that small capsicum farming, with a modest profit but little non-labour input, is the favourite choice by households in the lower strata; red capsicum farming,
which required considerable cash investment yet promises a more lucrative return, is limited to those in the medium and upper stratum. Tables 7.4 and 7.5 illustrate input, production, and income from both small and red capsicum farming. At the end of 2002 less than 50 villagers could afford to start farming red capsicum, while over a hundred households cultivated small capsicum in their coffee gardens. A few of them have also recently experimented with other commercial vegetables such as beans, tomato, shallots, and egg plant in their house gardens, but chilli was, at the time, still the favourite choice.

It is possible to harvest small capsicum for up to 1.5 years, twice a month. Maintaining small capsicum crops in coffee gardens saves labour, particularly on weeding, while the application of compost also benefits the coffee crops. Iman, sharecropping a coffee garden in Rigis Atas, claimed that his 1300 small capsicum plants ‘fed’ his small family in 2001-2002. The sacks of dry coffee beans he earned as his share, were un-touched and treated as the family’s saving. The number of plants is a critical factor in relation to family labour; 1500 or less of small capsicum could be easily managed by a couple. Beyond this amount, hired labour would be required.
Table 7.4 Input and income from 1500 plants* of small capsicum in 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Labour input</th>
<th>(wo/man days)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-land preparation</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-seedling</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-transplanting</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-weeding</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-compost application</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-spraying</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-harvesting</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Rp 400,000**(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>127.50</td>
<td>(b)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Non-labour input

| -compost                      | 10 sacks*** x Rp 10,000 | Rp 100,000 |
| -pesticide                    | 0.5 lt x Rp 20,000     | Rp 10,000  |
| total                         |                         | Rp 510,000 |

Income

| -total                        | 750 kg x Rp 2,000       | Rp 1,500,000 |
| -net                          | (d) - [(a) + (c)]       | Rp 990,000 |
| -income in rice               | (e) : Rp 2,000 per kg   | 495 kg |
| -return to labour             | [(d) - (c)] : (b)       | Rp 10,980 |

Source: Interview with 2 villagers in Rigis Atas, 2002.
Note: * In an open field 1500 chilli plants required a rante (400 m2) of land. When interplanted in a coffee garden, chilli can be planted in equal numbers with the coffee trees.
** Half of harvest labours were hired (40 wo/man days x Rp 10,000). *** One sack is 50 kg.

Table 7.5 Input and income from 2 rante* 'big' red chilli in 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Labour input</th>
<th>(wo/man days)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-land preparation</td>
<td>90**</td>
<td>Rp 900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-seedling</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-transplanting</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-making and putting sticks</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-compost and fertiliser appl.</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-spraying</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-harvesting</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Rp 600,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Non-labour input

| -fertiliser                   | 300 kg        | Rp 375,000       |
| -compost                      | 60 sacks x Rp 5,000 | Rp 300,000  |
| -fungicide                    | 1 kg          | Rp 46,000        |
| -pesticide                    | 0.5 lt x Rp 70,000 | Rp 70,000  |
| -plastic mulch                | 20 kg x Rp 13,000 | Rp 260,000  |
| -bamboo                       | 20 x Rp 3,000  | Rp 60,000        |
| total                         |               | Rp 2,611,000 (a) |

Income

| -total                        | 3,000 kg x Rp 5,000 | Rp 15,000,000 |
| -net                          | (b) - (a)          | Rp 12,398,000 |

Source: Interview with three villagers in Gunung Terang, 2002.
Note: * A rante (400 m2) of open field can be planted with 800 chilli plants. ** This included uprooting the coffee trees.
Unlike small chilli that can be planted under the coffee trees, red chilli cannot tolerate shade, thus requiring permanent conversion of a coffee garden. Most households that plant red chilli convert 2 rante (2 x 400 m sq) of their coffee gardens. Less than a dozen households could convert a larger area, with a maximum size of 0.25 ha. Like small chilli, more than 2 rante of red chilli field would require hired labour. Unlike small chilli, which can last up to 1.5 years, a cycle of red chilli takes only five months. Apart from capital, according to most villagers, disease and declining soil fertility would be critical factors that would hinder the sustainability of farming red chilli. The lucrative return promised from red chilli farming is believed to be short lived. Many villagers predict that planting red chilli three years in a row would exhaust the soil so that no valuable crops would grow. It would be “dead soil” (tanah mati), as they put it. To make matters worse, diseases caused by resistant viruses and/or fungus could no longer be cured. Should this happen, nothing could be done other than leaving the field fallow, or planting trees. It is to prevent such developments that some villagers see that it is urgent to experiment with other commercial vegetables, to be planted rotationally. Some villagers predict that should coffee prices remain low, smallholders in the village, and the region, will turn to commercial vegetable farming. How successfully smallholders in the village can cope with such market dynamics and ecological limitations remains to be seen in the future.

**Land, Labour, and Capital**

As far as the legal status of farming land is concerned, like smallholders in most hilly areas in Lampung, villagers recognise two types of land, namely tanah kawasan and tanah marga. The former refers to government designated state forest zones (kawasan hutan negara), which are also called BW (from the
Dutch’s *boschwezen*). The latter is non-state land that can be individually owned and is eligible for land title (*sertifikat tanah*). There are different terms used for buying and selling these two types of land. *Jual* (selling) or *beli* (buying) are terms used for *tanah marga*, while *ganti rugi* (compensation) is used for *tanah kawasan*. Unlike *tanah marga*, where individual ownership is secure, for *tanah kawasan* there is always a risk of crop destruction, confiscation, and eviction. (It is for this reason that smallholders in Rigis Atas were so keen to engage in the *HKm* community forestry contract). The price of a coffee garden in *tanah marga* is more than twice one in *tanah kawasan*. For example, in 1999-2000 a one hectare of a productive coffee garden in *tanah marga* in Bedeng Sari was priced between Rp 20 million to Rp 40 million, in *kawasan* in Rigis Atas it would cost less than Rp 10 million per hectare. In 2002-2003, with the drop in the coffee price, the price of land in both *marga* and *kawasan* declined to approximately half of the 1999-2000 prices. In practice, the number of coffee trees matters more than the size of land. Normally, 2500 coffee trees stand in a hectare of land. Thus, the size of the coffee stands determined the price.

While ownership of a plot of *belukar* (fallow, bush) in *tanah marga* is secure, in *kawasan* it is otherwise. There are cases of smallholders whose abandoned gardens in *kawasan*, simply left during the eviction operations and turned into *belukar* in the following years, are said to be taken or sold by someone else. Similarly there are also cases of smallholders granted (*dikasih*) a *belukar* plot for free by fellow villagers who were giving up farming *kawasan* land. Buying or compensating for coffee gardens can be done, in general, with a down payment followed by up to three payments (*cicilan*), once a year after the harvest season. There are cases of those who failed to complete the payments, due to poor coffee harvests and/or low prices. In such cases the garden was resumed and the family lost all the money paid.
Due to the recent drop in coffee prices, renting a coffee garden has, understandably, become more infrequent. In Gunung Terang hamlet, for example, until 1999 Ujang rented a 2.5 ha coffee and pepper garden for Rp 3 million for seven years. Since then, in anticipation of a further drop in coffee price, Ujang has changed the tenancy to sharecropping. Cases of renting rice fields are more frequent. In Rigis Atas, for example, Ahmadi’s wife has for years rented out her one hectare tunggu tubang rice field for 100 kaleng of gabah (unhusked rice) from the first crop and 60 kaleng from the second. (One tin container [kaleng] of 13 to 16 kg gabah, depending on the quality of the rice, contains from 5 to 7 or 8 kg of milled rice [beras]). A few villagers who farm red chilli gardens plan to rent land from fellow villagers in the future if the price of the red chilli remains stable.

Sharecropping (maro, garap for both a coffee garden and rice field, or njawat for a rice field) is a dominant form of land and labour relationship in the village, as well as in the region. The 2001 village statistics on source of income (mata pencaharian) recorded 808 adults working in agriculture. They are most of the male heads of households in the village (706 households) plus other adult males residing in the same houses. Women are excluded from these statistics. Among all the villagers who noted agriculture as their main source of income, about 60% of them were petani (owner cultivators) and 40% buruh tani (non land-owners, agricultural labourers). Most of the latter category (buruh tani) sharecrop land belonging to the petani while regularly engaging in wage labour. Among these buruh tani, about half of them farm only coffee gardens while the other half work both on rice fields and coffee gardens.
There are variations in the arrangement of sharecropping for both coffee gardens and rice fields. For a coffee garden, the sharecropper would usually be responsible for all the labour inputs i.e., the weeding and pruning. The harvest, after other costs such as fertiliser and the cost of harvest and milling which are deducted, would be shared equally with the landowner. There are variations in the arrangements for the cost of fertiliser and labour for harvesting. The cost of fertiliser may be deducted from the total harvest (as above), or it may be the responsibility of either the landowner or the sharecropper. There are cases where labour for harvesting is the sharecropper’s responsibility, but frequently such costs are deducted from the total harvest. There are also exceptional cases where the sharecropper receives only one third of the harvest. For a rice field the variation is in the sharing of the harvest. For the first cropping (tanam pertama, rendengan, musim tahun), viz. rice planted in the rainy season (in the first months of the year) and harvested in July and August, the harvest is equally divided (bagi dua, paro). With the production declining by up to a half in the second cropping period (tanam kedua, gaduh, parekat, musim selang), planted in September, the harvest is divided into three with the landowner receiving one third and the sharecropper two thirds. The arrangement for labour and other costs is fixed. All the labour, except for harvesting, is the sharecropper’s responsibility. The cost for fertiliser and labour for harvesting are deducted from the total harvest.

While a sharecropper can terminate a tenancy anytime s/he wishes, the landowner cannot. Minggat (leaving without saying) is a negative term used for a sharecropper terminating the arrangement without any, or with only short notice. Especially for a coffee garden, when the landowner wants to farm on his/her own garden or choose someone else to sharecrop the garden, the sharecropper can ask to remain sharecropping the garden for a couple of
years more. Although lending money or rice to the sharecropper is common, it is not an obligation of the landowner. The service is provided, rather, as a way to prevent the sharecropper from minggat. Numpang, using land in both rice fields and coffee gardens for free for housing is common in sharecropping arrangement. In the case of small chilli inter-planted in a coffee garden, if the landowner provided no inputs the sharecropper is entitled to all the chilli harvest. Another version of numpang involves the right to use rice fields. By converting land (abandoned rice fields, coffee gardens, or bushes) into a rice field, i.e., by levelling the field or build terraces and channelling the water, a family can ‘own’ the field for a year or two.

Wage labour (upahan) is an important source of income for households in the lower stratum in the village. Jobs in farming that are done by wage labourers include ploughing, hoeing (macul) and harvesting rice fields; weeding (ngoret), pruning (buang ranting, buang tunas/twiwil), and handpicking (mutil) coffee cherries in coffee gardens; and, recently, land preparation and harvesting in chilli gardens. Upahan can be done on the basis of daily wage (harian) or contract (borongan) for all jobs except rice harvest. The daily wage rate in 2002 was Rp 10,000 without meals or Rp 5,000 or Rp 6,000 with three meals (food and coffee) plus cigarettes. With borongan, work would be completed quicker and cheaper than harian. For example, weeding one hectare of coffee garden takes 15 wo/man days in the harian system, which would cost Rp 150,000. With borongan, by paying Rp 100,000, the work is done in no more than 10 days. Exploiting his wife and children to help complete the work is a common way for a husband to get the job done in the borongan system. Another way is by working harder and/or longer. A strong labourer could do the work quicker, and earn over Rp 10,000 per day. Borongan for the hoeing (macul) of rice fields, which
requires both skill as well as strength and longer working hours, is a kind of job in which a daily wage higher than Rp 10,000 could be earned.

Until recently, giving milled rice in addition to cash payments was quite common in both harian and borongan. For example, in 2000, Kamino, a labourer in Rigis Atas, working for 10 to 15 days weeding and pruning coffee gardens might earn either Rp 100,000 plus 25 kg of milled rice or Rp 130,000 minus the rice. Since 2001 he has found no one willing to include rice as payment for his wage.

For harvesting of rice fields there are two systems of wages. In derap, selected wo/men receive of one sixth or one seventh of the total harvest as their share (bawon). In ngepak or nyeblok/ceblokan the harvesters do the weeding but are not paid. The ngepak or ceblok system, which is still uncommon in Gunung Terang, has just started to become more frequent in the neighbouring villages with larger rice fields. The workers are sometimes provided with meals, and receive one fifth of the harvest as their bawon share. The ngepak or ceblok system frequently involves close kin, friends, and neighbours. Reducing cash outlay is said to be the primary reason for the adoption of a ngepak/ceblok arrangement. Elders in Gunung Terang hamlet insist that paying wages for rice field harvests is a recent trend; in the old days reciprocal help (bantu) was the rule.

With coffee harvesting, the wage can be paid either on a daily basis or in kind (harvesters received a share of one fourth to one fifth). In good years a wo/man can handpick (mutil) 10 to 15 kaleng coffee cherries in a day, but in poor years only 2 to 5 kaleng. (One kaleng of coffee cherries, weighing 15 kg,
is equal to 3 kg dried milled coffee beans). A *harian* wage is always used for handpicking both small and red chillies.

From the 1970s to the mid-1990s, a type of annual contract labour (*bujang*) was common in the village and the region. The term *bujang* is used to refer to young unmarried male contract labourers.\(^1\) In this arrangement the *bujang* labourer was paid annually, either in cash or in kind with sacks of coffee beans. In the case of a family, such an annual labour contract was usually referred to by a term used for sharecropping, namely *nggarap*. Generally the value of the annual wage would exceed the cash needed by a small family to buy milled rice for a year. In the 1980s, for example, a *bujang* working 2 hectares of coffee garden in Rigis Atas received a sum of cash equal to 2 tonnes milled rice. Moreover, the landowner was responsible for providing shelter and meals for the *bujang*. In the 1990s, some villagers had 3 *bujang* or more in their house. In 2002, none of the villagers had *bujang*.

Reciprocal labour exchange (*gantian, gentenan, liuran, royongan*) in coffee gardens was said to be common prior to the recent poor years. Half a dozen men or more formed a temporary group and worked in each other’s fields weeding and pruning their coffee gardens. Since 1999-2000 this is no longer practiced in coffee gardens, but in 2001-2002 the system was applied by some villagers in most hamlets to chilli cultivation. The number of the group has become smaller though, often involving two or three persons. One pattern that has not changed since the old days, as far as reciprocal labour exchange is concerned, is that it is always practiced by those in the lower-medium and lowest strata of the village.

\(^1\) *Bujang* is a Malay vernacular term for single, unmarried man.
Musiman, a local form of usury, is another common way in which villagers can lose their land (and crops or house standing on it). Failing to pay a debt, the land will simply be taken over (ditarik, dicabut) by the moneylender. The interest rate on this kind of debt is between 70 to 100 percent per year, so the debts will double each year. After some years the accumulated debt would be close to the market price of the land, so the moneylender can sell the land and take all the money. This is possible with a land title (sertifikat) or a blank duty stamp paper (kertas segel) signed by the debtor, on which a buying and selling transaction can be written, in the moneylenders’ hand.

Unlike musiman, a form of gadai arrangement carries no risk of losing the land. With this type of pawning arrangement, villagers receive an amount of cash. No interest is charged, but the lender is entitled to all the harvests until full payment is made. When in need of money, getting credit from the local branch of Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) is the first thing tried by villagers. Land title, as the collateral, is a prerequisite. In the hamlet of Bedeng Sari alone, according to some villagers, at least 50 households receive credit from BRI. All of these BRI clients are from the medium and upper strata. For those in the low stratum, the absence of land title and the high cost (of paper work and transportation) of getting the credit prevent them from obtaining the BRI credit. During the recent bad years, neither BRI credit nor gadai arrangements from fellow villagers were available. Hence musiman became the alternative. The high profit from red chilli cultivation (see the calculation in Table 7.5) was seen to be able to offset such a burden.

The lucrative profit of red chilli cultivation has recently slightly changed the arrangements for outstanding musiman debts. Rather than taking over the coffee garden, the moneylenders turn the debtor into a red chilli garden sharecropper. The moneylender finances all the start-up costs while the
debtor household is responsible for the day-to-day upkeep of the garden. The net income, total revenue minus start up costs, is divided equally. The outstanding debt plus the accumulated interest, however, remains intact. Apart from the profit promised by red chilli, the change in musiman debt arrangement was also due to a greater pressure from villagers on village officials to prevent the taking over of their land by the moneylenders. With the drop in production and price of coffee, more and more villagers would have had their land taken. One thing the village officials could do to prevent this was not to put the village official sign and stamp on the land transfer paper. To back the village officials, a few educated villagers also threatened to report the moneylenders to the police for usury, which, by law, is a crime.

The musiman debt system, according to villagers, emerged at the same time as the production boost of coffee in the region in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. It began with the infamous satu dua (one two) debt. One sack of coffee beans, for example, borrowed four to six months prior to the coffee harvest season, would be repaid double (i.e. two sacks of dried coffee beans). Similarly with milled rice, a sack of milled rice borrowed during the planting season would be repaid by double that amount four months later. Newly arrived migrants were the ones usually engaged in this satu dua debt. Coffee resellers, shopkeepers, and haji kopi were the likely sources of such loans. Later, to avoid losing their profit, the moneylenders demanded cash payment amounting to double the cash value of the coffee or rice when it was borrowed. Soon, the system of borrowing cash with a hundred percent interest per year and accumulated debt was introduced. The increasing price of coffee from the late 1980s to late 1990s made the satu dua and, later, musiman debt systems work in the region.
There are opposing views among villagers on the practice of musiman. Some perceive it as a sin (dosa) to accumulate wealth from usury, referring to Islam’s prohibition on taking usury (riba). Others see it as a normal cash transaction, no different from obtaining a loan from a bank. The latter opinion is based on the fact that the usurers never openly offer their service. On the contrary, they are the ones who are approached and need to be convinced. All, however, agree that it is immoral to derive large profit from musiman.

The hamlet of Bedeng Sari has two men running the musiman money lending business: Rahman, an Ogan origin, and Samsi, a Javanese. Both also run retail business in their large shops (warung). In Simpang Tiga, Haji Sabar, a Semendonese who runs a coffee re-selling business, is another source of musiman debt. Apart from Rahman, Samsi, and Haji Sabar, villagers in Gunung Terang are also the clients of two big moneylenders in neighbouring village Sumber Alam: Indra, an Ogan and Barno, a Javanese. Indra also runs a retail shop (warung) and Barno a coffee re-selling store. According to some villagers, it is through the networks of warung retail and coffee re-selling store that musiman debt has developed in the region. Until recently, Barno was the richest one. He has a luxurious two-storey house, with a big store attached to it, and some trucks and minibuses. An elder in Gunung Terang once exaggeratedly speculated that the number of villagers’ land certificates that Barno kept as collateral for musiman debts were as many as those retained by Bank Rakyat Indonesia branch in Fajar Bulan for villagers credit. Barno died a few years ago. Indra replaced Barno’s position as the big moneylender in Mutar Alam.

In general, villagers look down on those who run such businesses, and try as hard as possible not to be trapped in musiman debt. Close kin, friends, and
neighbours are the ones to turn to for help when, for example, there is no rice
to cook or a small amount of cash is needed to buy medicine or visit the
health clinic. It is equally immoral not to lend cash or rice, of course without
interest, to a close friend, neighbour, or kin when they are in such emergency
situations. It is such reciprocal help and assistance that, somehow,
strengthen the bonds and cohesion among villagers. For those in the medium
and upper strata, such mutual help among close kin, friends, and neighbours
often expands to non-emergency needs such as children’s schooling, house
building, and farming inputs.

Small warung, mostly run by women, are another source of limited, short
term, and interest-free loans. In the village there is always one or two small
warung for about a dozen houses. Giving a short-term loan is an important
service for each warung’s regular costumers (langganan). Small household
items such as rice, cooking oil, sugar, salt, and msg are goods that are often
taken from warung and paid for a couple of days or weeks later. If they do
not provide such credit, the warung would lose their langganan. For the
langganan, not repaying the loan would lead to the loss of an important
source of credit. Giving too much or too little of such credit, thus, would lead
to the closing of the warung. For most small warung owners, the business
offers almost no profit in a formal sense, namely, profit in the form of cash.
Rather, the warung provides free household items that otherwise need to be
bought. Thus, the question is more about how much the warung can reduce
household expenditures rather than how much profit can be earned.

Arisan, especially among women in poor households, is one way to
accumulate a sum of cash. Two active women’s arisan groups in the village,
one in the hamlet of Temiangan and another one in Rigis Atas, might serve
as examples. Both consist of twenty or more neighbouring women. In
Temiangan, each year after the coffee harvest season, each member deposited an agreed sum of cash. This collective saving is continually accumulated. By 2002 the group had collected more than Rp 10 million. Rather than agreeing to disburse the accumulated saving, the group decided to continue saving collectively. If life gets harder in the following years and there is no alternative source of cash then the savings would be disbursed, but for the time being the group agreed to continue saving collectively.

Unlike in Temiangan, in Rigis Atas a group has only just recently formed. The group meets twice a month to collect the money and randomly select the recipient of the pooled cash. When, later, a rotation is completed i.e., each member has had her turn, a new round then commence. Members use their saving for either consumption (e.g. buying rice, paying children’s school fees) or productive investments (e.g. to buy a goat, starting chilli farming, or adding more goods to a warung).

Conclusion

One of key factors observed in relation to economic differentiation in the village is ownership or control of land. Poor villagers are landless or near landless households. This category comprises late-coming migrants and younger generation villagers who have not inherited their parents’ land. They cultivate other people’s fields, or possess only a small size plot of land. A few of them own or control a relatively large area of land but don’t have the capital to develop productive cultivation. Impoverished households tend to obtain additional income from on-farm, off-farm and non-farm employment. Wealthier villagers tend to derive their wealth from both farm and non-farm investments. While some wealthy households control extensive areas of cultivated land, land ownership in itself is not a
determinant of household economic status. Two households owning or controlling the same size of land may occupy different economic strata.

Smallholder farmers are rational, flexible, and responsive to constraints and opportunities. In the years with attractive coffee prices they have poured labour and capital into coffee farming, and adopting modern techniques in the process. Following the recent drop in coffee prices, they have responded by reducing labour and non-labour inputs in coffee farming and investing elsewhere. The result is a sharp decrease in the return to land for coffee production, but returns on labour remain high, nearly as high as the return to labour from small chilli cultivation. In contrast, more labour and non-labour inputs were directed to vegetable farming, where productivity—in terms of the return both to land and to labour—is higher than the cultivation of both coffee and rice. Their reluctance to wholly abandon coffee production in favour of high return vegetables is based on the advantages of strategic diversification and the opportunity to intensify coffee production in the future when prices increase.

Smallholder households' production of agricultural commodities for domestic and global markets is also made possible because of significant production inputs obtained through non-market relations. This is reflected in patterns of mutual assistance and reciprocal labour exchange among kin and neighbours for food and commodity production. Access to productive land can also be acquired through inheritance, sharecropping and borrowing (numpang) arrangements, or simply squatting on forestry land. Forms of usury (musiman), revolving credit among neighbours (arisan), and free-interest loan from friend and relatives provide the alternatives to commercial lenders as sources of capital. The ability to discount a range of production
costs by engaging social capital enables smallholders to profit on the margins of commodity production.
Plate 7.1 A shop (toko) in Sumber Alam village market

Plate 7.2 Women in the weekly market in Sumber Alam

Plate 7.3 Villagers returning home after weekly shopping
Plate 7.4 Harvesting coffee

Plate 7.5 Hoeing a rice field

Plate 7.6 A motorbike taxi (*ojek*)
Plate 7.7 Harvesting chilli

Plate 7.8 Transplanting rice

Plate 7.9 Weeding a coffee garden
CHAPTER EIGHT
Conclusion

The persistence of smallholder tradition

The evidence presented in this thesis illustrates smallholder farmers’ flexible responses to constraints and opportunities. With attractive export coffee prices in the last couple of decades, smallholders in Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong allocated available labour and capital to intensive *robusta* coffee farming. Following the drop in coffee prices after the 1997-98 monetary crisis, labour and non-labour inputs for coffee farming were gradually reduced. Although the returns to land from coffee farming decreased, its return to labour remained attractive. To allocate a greater amount of labour and non-labour inputs to coffee farming, as villagers put it, would like doing unpaid work (*kerja bhakti, gotong royong*) or unrewarding work (*kerja tanpa hasil*). Thus available labour and capital shifted from export crops to intensive vegetable farming for the domestic market. Compared with coffee, vegetable farming provides higher production per unit of land and per unit of labour.

Diversification in smallholder agricultural production in Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong is made possible because of the significant amount of labour and non-labour inputs acquired through non-market and non-capitalist relations. Access to land can be obtained through borrowing, sharecropping, inheritance, or squatting on forestry land. Relatives, friends, and rotational loan and savings groups often provide credit free of interest. When commercial credit is not available through formal sources, usury is an
alternative. Family members, sharecropping arrangements, and reciprocal labour exchange provide alternatives to paid labour.

Another response to farming constraints was that more households sought off-farm, non-farm, and off-village sources of income. During my fieldwork in Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong, I was told many stories on this topic. A wealthy villager in Gunung Terang bought a shrimp pond in South Lampung. Another wealthy villager in Bedeng Sari bought a palm oil garden in Jambi. A family in Rigis Atas bought a rice field in Bandar Jaya, Central Lampung. When I was completing my fieldwork in early 2003, five men from Bedeng Sari and Buluh Kapur left the village to work overseas in Malaysia, leaving their wives and children. Among the poor, I often heard discussion of villagers' plans to send members of their family to work elsewhere (e.g., helpers or factory labourers in Java, farm workers in other parts of Lampung and in the neighbouring provinces of Bengkulu, Jambi, and Riau).

These diverse responses offer a challenge for future research on household economies. '[T]he household', as Rigg (2003: 199) vividly points out, 'has become more fractious, fractured and fragmented'. Co-residency as well as a family's communal production and consumption seem no longer the defining traits of the household. Members of a household no longer necessarily live continuously under the same roof. Consumption and income generating activities are conducted separately. Perhaps, the only thing that constitutes a household is the dynamic social process of decision-making and coordination of production (income generating activities), consumption, and, in a broader sense, the reproduction of the household.
Swift response to constraints and opportunities has been the key strategy for families to guarantee their own welfare. The ethos is that one is expected to stand on one’s own. It is everyone’s stated goal to have a better income, better education for children, better housing, and posses more modern household goods. Attaining personal prosperity is an individual household/family responsibility. Furthermore, families see attainment of this goal as one facilitated through engagement with state-led development initiatives. It is in this context that villagers organise their social life.

*Taming the forest frontier, tapping state resources*

Villagers in Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong have transformed the forest frontier into a flourishing region (chapter 3). They have managed to adapt well to centralised government. In the past, in an attempt to attract state resources to the village, the villagers invited more migrants and created more administrative villages (chapter 3), turned the region into a pocket of Golkar voters (chapter 4), and orientated village leadership within the framework of state resources to the village (chapters 4 and 7). Villagers, however, resisted state attempts to transform their smallholder fields into state plantation forests (chapter 5).

In Gunung Terang village, villagers’ collective actions include official, economic, and religious tasks. The completion of these communal tasks is highly contingent on urgency, resource availability, and leadership (chapter 6). For the tasks that are perceived to be urgent, communal involvement in completing the tasks is readily possible. Through regular communal work *(gotong royong, kerja bhakti)* essential facilities such as roads, mosques, and village schools are constructed and maintained. In hamlets where wells provide no water, instalment of pipe networks through unpaid mutual
assistance for water supply was successful. In hamlets with water available from wells and where a water pipe network is not urgently needed, the project failed. Following the recent drop in coffee prices, villagers could no longer continue donating money for the construction of an Islamic boarding school (pesantren) in the village. With strong leadership, the community of Rigis Atas hamlet has obtained a community forestry contract. Initiatives to set up a farmers’ group, to provide inputs and better market access in vegetable farming, are accepted with caution. Villagers do not want to suffer the bad experiences that occurred elsewhere where village cooperatives (KUD: koperasi unit desa) turned into leaders profit first organization (‘KUD’: ketua untung duluan). They wait for trusted leaders.

Indonesia’s post-New Order reformasi and the decentralisation of administration brought changes in the organisation of village life. Villagers no longer aligned themselves with Golkar, and village leaders paid more attention to policies at the district (kabupaten) level (chapter 4 and 6). In West Lampung the term for the administrative village desa was changed to pekon, sub-village or hamlet dusun to pemangku, village head lurah or kepala desa to peratin, and hamlet head kepala dusun to pemangku. The functions of these units, nonetheless, remained largely the same. Through the granting of community forestry contracts some villagers’ have started to collaborate with forestry authorities in ‘forest management’ (chapter 6).

Reformasi and decentralisation will continue to bring changes in the organisation of village life. More decision-making will perhaps be taken at provincial and district levels. With decentralisation, villagers in Way Tenong and Sumber Jaya now have a different game to play; they need to adopt new strategies. The question for future research in this regard is whether they will be as successful as before.
Reformasi and decentralisation have also fostered the presence of non-government institutions and people's organisations in villages. State institutions are no longer the only extra-village agencies that villagers engage. In Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong, apart from WATALA and ICRAF there are several other organisations working with villagers. In 2002 KoAK (Komite Anti Korupsi, anti-corruption committee), based in Bandar Lampung, for example, recruited and trained some village leaders for an anti-corruption campaign and in rights advocacy. KoAK also published the result of its investigation into illegal logging practices in the region. Some Semendonese in Sukaraja in Way Tenong have recently formed YACILI (Yayasan Cinta Lingkungan, Caring for the Environment Foundation), whose activities included gaining support for the protection of the Kalpataru forest, anti-illegal-logging campaigns, promoting the formation of community forestry groups in some villages, and obtaining assistance and credit for villages cooperatives. Villagers in Dwikora, Bukit Kemuning joined regional and national farmers' fora that fought for farmers' land rights. The emerging and diverse issues and opportunities that arise for village relations with non-government institutions form part of the reformasi landscape of highland West Lampung. Their impact represents a significant theme for future research.

1 Another organisation that was present in the villages in the region during my fieldwork was Yayasan Amalillah, which was banned by the government. The Yayasan, operating in parts of Java and Sumatra, recruited village leaders to register and collect membership fee from local villagers. The Yayasan promised to distribute a large sum of money (viz. millions of rupiah) to each registered villager. The money that the Yayasan promised to distribute, it was said, will come from President Sukarno's deposit account in a Swiss Bank to which the Yayasan claimed to have access. In Gunung Terang, like in other villages, hundreds of villagers registered and kept waiting for this "money to fall from the sky" (uang jatuh dari langit).
Future prospects

In the future, as in the past, smallholder farming and development of villages in Way Tenong and Sumber Jaya will be entangled in the transformations of the province of Lampung. In this regard, the possible future development of villages in Way Tenong and Sumber Jaya region should be discussed within the framework of the possible future of Lampung province. This approach enables a discussion with comparative perspectives of future developments of Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong with other ‘wealthy’ and poor regions in the province of Lampung.

In a speech to inaugurate various development projects in front of 20,000 people in Central Lampung on 31 August 2004, President Megawati claimed that she was surprised to learn that Lampung was among the three poorest provinces in Indonesia (Lampungonline 31/08/2004). She could understand that East Nusa Tenggara, due to its limited resource potential, might be one of Indonesia’s poorest provinces. Lampung, however, was well known as a producer of abundant agricultural commodities such as rice, coffee, pepper, and sugar. It was not supposed to be a poor province. She concluded her speech by asking industries (pengusaha) to do more to assist local farmers (petani).

President Megawati is correct in pointing out the absence of a mutually supportive relationship between industries and smallholder farmers as an important issue to be addressed for a better future for the Lampung people. But industry and farmer relations, albeit fundamental, are not the whole story. The historical transformation of the province of Lampung, which
brought mixed results, has been driven largely by colonial and post-colonial central-planning development initiatives (chapter 2). The results of these development initiatives, it is argued, are linked to centre and periphery relations and the emergence of uneven resource flows.

In an interview in 1997 (Angkatan Bersenjata 26/11/1997), Harris Hasyim, the head of the Lampung Development Planning Office (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah) acknowledged that poverty eradication in the province had been slow (lamban). This he attributed to continued high population growth. Later, Harris Hasyim elaborated the argument (Kompas 25/6/2001) noting that;

Despite the end of the transmigration program [in Lampung] in 1977-78, the migration of population from Java to Lampung has continued to flow and is very difficult to control. They [viz. the migrants] are poor people from Java ...

The high incidence of poverty in Lampung is perceived to be the result of the growing number of incoming poor migrants from Java. Thus in contrast to the past decades when the migration of people from Java to Lampung was perceived as the source and justification for Lampung’s regional development (chapter 2), the in-migration of people from Java is now seen as inimical to development and poverty eradication. Viewed as a blessing in the past, the inflow of migrants is now seen as a curse. Should this view become popular, controlling the inflow of migrants may become a key element in the policy agenda for Lampung in the future.

Although it is true that late coming migrants formed the poor stratum in Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong, children of earlier migrants and the older generations also occupied the village’s lowest socio-economic stratum (chapter 7). Moreover, not all late coming poor migrants came directly from
Java. Many of them had previously lived in other regions within the province of Lampung. This is an internal migration. Linking high incidence of poverty with the inflow of poor migrants from Java, nonetheless, could shift the focus of attention. The correct link, it is argued, is between poverty and uneven resource flows in the context of centre and periphery relations.

Geographically, ‘poor zones’ in Lampung are areas where the inflow of state resources is limited and where natural resources tend to be extracted by central elites (chapter 2). The poor zones on the plains of Way Kanan, Tulang Bawang, North Lampung, and South Lampung represent the last transmigrations areas. Instead of irrigated rice fields the transmigrants were allotted dry fields to cultivate. Although the size of allotted land was larger than irrigated rice fields granted to the transmigrants during colonial and the early post-colonial periods, the fields were not large enough for rotational cultivation. Cultivated without effective fallow periods, poor soils deteriorated further. Hence, income from cultivation of dry land crops was low. Even to stay at a subsistence level was hard for these migrants.

The opening of these transmigration sites, nonetheless, attracted a flow of spontaneous migrants and more administrative villages were created (chapter 2). These migrants too could only obtain small sized fields. In the colonial and the early post-colonial eras, transmigration programmes were preceded or immediately followed by the construction of irrigation canals and a range of regional and rural development projects (e.g., construction of roads and villages, education and health facilities, and agricultural extension). This was not the case with the late post-colonial transmigration programmes. In the 1980s, Lampung ceased to be a major transmigration receiving area. The funds from the central government for regional development also ceased to flow. Thus, unlike the earlier transmigrants, the
last transmigrants and those migrating ‘spontaneously’, the expected flow of resources from centre to periphery did not eventuate. Instead, the development of the estates sector stimulated the extraction of resources from these peripheral areas.

Because there are few other options, today many smallholder farmers in these poor regions practise intensive farming. Demand from feed industries for maize and from food industries for cassava and soybean has led to the application of chemical fertilisers (and, for maize, hybrid seeds). While production has increased, farmers’ incomes remain low. Despite a higher return to land, farmers fail to obtain a higher income because of high input costs and price fluctuations.

In contrast, the late colonial and early post-colonial transmigration areas in Lampung were transformed into so-called ‘wealthy zones’. Metro, East Lampung, and Central Lampung regions belong to this category, with their relatively high incidence of ‘wealthy’ families. Cultivation of irrigated rice fields drives the economy in these areas. Thanks to the flood of state resources for regional development, the economy of these areas is buoyant. A few decades ago, the early colonial transmigration settlements of Pringsewu, Gading Rejo, and Gedong Tataan in the district of Tanggamus also belonged to the category of ‘wealthy zones’. But after two or three generations of subdivision of land through inheritance, the number of landless and near-landless villagers has grown and poverty has become an issue. Input costs for rice cultivation are high and, despite the floor price set by the government, incomes are low.

In ‘wealthy zones’ with the cultivation of perennial cash crops such as pepper and coffee, a higher household income enabled smallholders to live
above a subsistence level. Besides native Lampung people, the population of these ‘wealthy zones’ areas also consist of spontaneous migrants. The bulk of these smallholders have a better life. However, here too shrinking landholdings and increasing landlessness is an emerging problem (cf. chapter 7) although at a slower pace compared to irrigated rice field areas. Coping with the fluctuation of prices for cash crops is another perennial issue.

Smallholders in upland Lampung are rational and quick to respond to constraints and opportunities. In the years following the drop in the prices of cassava, maize, and soybean, farmers ceased to plant these crops and instead planted other crops. Among these, bananas, lemons, and watermelons emerged as commodities that Lampung exported to Java. Surplus production was also achieved for eggs, chickens, goats, and cattle. When tapioca factories and feed industries stimulated a rise in the prices of cassava and maize, hundreds of thousands of hectares of land were replanted with cassava and maize. A similar pattern applies to smallholder coffee farmers following the recent drop in coffee prices. In Tanggamus some farmers planted vanilla and cocoa. In Liwa, West Lampung, smallholders started to plant lemon/citrus trees in addition to vegetables. In Sekincau, Way Tenong, and Sumber Jaya, (West Lampung) intensive vegetable farming became the alternative. Another response was to seek off-farm, non-farm, and off-village sources of income.

In an attempt to increase the price of cassava the provincial government has recently poured funds into the development of tapioca *ittara* (*industri tepung tapioka rakyat*, people’s tapioca industry). Credit was provided to hundreds of individuals and cooperatives to install small processing machines and to purchase cassava from farmers. Having difficulty competing with big companies who buy cassava from farmers at higher prices, only a handful of *ittara* have continued to stay in the business.
Farmers’ decisions to diversify their farming and non-farming income sources can be linked to the absence of mutual relations between farmers and industries. For decades Lampung has been the home to agribusiness like oil palm, sugar, tapioca, feed, and more recently canned food (e.g., pineapple, *rambutan*, coconut) and shrimp. Most of these industries obtain raw materials from their own plantations. They buy additional raw materials from smallholders, but, as farmers frequently complained, the prices they set are too low to give farmers an adequate income. Lampung is also the home to big exporters of coffee, pepper, and copra. Like the processing industries, these exporters do not offer much help for the smallholders in their attempts to obtain better incomes.

Conflicts between plantation companies and villagers have become a feature in Lampung everyday politics. As Lucas and Warren (2003) have noted, the Indonesian people’s struggle for land rights and demand for agrarian law reform remains unfinished business in post-Suharto Indonesia. There are examples of these conflicts in Lampung. In October 2000, about 1000 people from six villages burned the office, employers’ houses, hall, and clinic of the state-owned PT. Perkebunan Nusantara in Kalianda, South Lampung (*Kompas* 4/10/2000). The only building that the villagers did not burn was the company’s mosque. Fortunately all the company’s employers were evacuated prior to the arson, so no one was injured. The attack was triggered by villagers’ anger after a story about company’s guards torturing five villagers accused of stealing coconuts from the plantation. *Kompas* (25/06/2001) reported that prior to this arson, in mid-2000, farmers demolished 500 hectares of the company’s palm oil plantations in Bergen, also in South Lampung and converted the land into a settlement. In Bunga Mayang, North Lampung nearly 5000 hectares of the company’s sugarcane plantation were claimed as communal *adat* land by the surrounding native
Lampung people. In Tulang Bawang, the *adat* communities claimed 12,800 hectares of land that the government granted to PT SIL, owned by the Salim Group, for sugarcane plantations. In 2001, PT Tris Delta, a Taiwan company developing a pineapple plantation and canning factory in Central Lampung was closed after the company's land was taken over by thousands of transmigrants from adjacent villages.

Assistance provided to coffee smallholders is an example of the divergence between what exporters (and the government) have offered and what farmers expect. President Megawati's visit to Lampung on 31 August 2004 was to declare Lampung as a 'national coffee étalase'. Lampung, the producer of 60-65% of national coffee production, is expected to take a lead in coffee research and development. In 1999, AEKI (*Asosiasi Exportir Kopi Indonesia*, Indonesian Coffee Exporters Association) opened its Centre for Coffee Extension and Development (*Pusat Penyuluhan dan Pengembangan Kopi*) in Hanakau, West Lampung. The centre has 10 hectares of exemplary gardens (*kebun percontohan*) for smallholders to emulate, demonstrating the application of cloning, cultivation techniques, and post-harvest handling that would produce a higher yield and quality of coffee (*Lampung Post* 24/08/2004). It is clear that advice given to farmers is directed toward generating a higher return to land. The smallholders would adopt this advice if the price was attractive, as in Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong during the period of high coffee prices in the 1980s and 1990s. But with a decline in coffee prices in recent years, they chose the opposite strategy, namely, reducing labour and non-labour inputs in coffee farming and diversifying their crops and income sources.

Given the fact that collaborative relations between industries and farmers in Lampung do occur, to suggest an absolute absence of such relationships is
misleading. The problem involves more the nature and scale of these relationships. PT. Nestle Beverage, a multinational food company whose factory in Panjang, Bandar Lampung produces Nescafe instant coffee exported worldwide, for example, has recently provided assistance for the provision of inputs, cultivation techniques, post harvest handling, and marketing to a village cooperative in Pulau Panggung, Tanggamus (Lampung Post 16/08/2004). In a similar fashion, recently the government has begun promoting partnerships between feed industries, banks, and maize smallholder farmers. It will be interesting to study the development of these initiatives in the future.

Contract farming\(^3\) is the type of farmer-industry relationships in Lampung, whose scale and nature are beginning to be recognised (chapter 2). The agricultural industry will most likely continue as the backbone of the Lampung economy. But with conflicts over existing plantation lands and no more empty land available for expansion, processing and exporting are areas where industries should concentrate, leaving the supply of raw materials to smallholders. With such interdependencies, contract farming will perhaps become an important element in agrarian relations in the province in the future. To date experience with contract farming in the province, however, has been disappointing.

In the late-1970s, contract farming in Lampung began with rubber in the North Lampung plain. Recently contract farming, among others, has been

\(^3\) Eaton and Shepherd (2001: 2) define contract farming ‘as an agreement between farmers and processing and/or marketing firms for the production and supply of agricultural products under forward agreements, frequently at predetermined prices. The arrangement also invariably involves the purchaser in providing a degree of production support through, for example, the supply of inputs and the provision of technical advice. The basis of such arrangements is a commitment on the part of the farmer to provide a specific commodity in quantity and at quality standards determined by the purchaser and a commitment on the part of the company to support the farmer’s production and to purchase the commodity.’

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adopted in sugarcane, oil palm, and shrimp production. Apart from land conflicts, a common problem arising from the implementation of these schemes is that farmers feel they are exploited. In May 1999 4,000 shrimp pond smallholders from Dipasena, Tulang Bawang demonstrated and camped overnight at the governor’s office in Bandar Lampung. In mid-October the number of the smallholders who joined the demonstration and the encampment at governor’s office doubled. The demands were the same: revision of the contract, which would make it more beneficial to farmers, and the curtailment of intimidation and unilateral contract termination by the company (Kompas 15/10/1999). The company, PT Dipasena, was owned by a tycoon Syamsul Nursalim of the Gajah Tunggal group. The conflict continued and the industry collapsed. Later the company assets were handed over to IBRA (Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency), a new negotiation with smallholders commenced, and, in the early 2004, the shrimp production was resumed (Tempointeraktif 4/5/2004). In September 2004, 200 of 1600 smallholders engaged in contract farming with PT BNIL on a palm oil plantation accused the company of not paying their entitlements from the harvests (Lampung Post 2/09/2004). From these media reports, exploitation emerged as a point of contention in contract farming, but more information on other cases needs to be reviewed for a general conclusion. Further research on this topic can give a fuller account on what has actually been happening.

About 1 million hectares of Lampung’s territory is classified as state forest (kawasan hutan negara). Smallholder farmers control a significant portion of these lands. To date the forestry authorities and the industry have shown a great desire to own the trees and land and force the villagers into the roles of gatherers of minor forest products at best or as a cheap labour force at worst. Small wonder that villagers relentlessly resist the attempt to pursue such
objectives (cf. chapter 5). This is particularly true for the production forest zones (hutan produksi), all of which are legally controlled either by the state-owned forestry company (PT Perhutani) or by private companies. In protection forest zones (hutan lindung), now under the jurisdiction of provincial and district governments, the forestry authorities have hesitantly begun to invite villagers’ collaboration on ‘forest management’. In Sumber Jaya and Way Tenong (chapter 5), permission to continue coffee farming has been given to community groups who are expected to plant more trees in their gardens and protect the remaining forests. Another example comes from Tanggamus, where there is reforestation of protection forest in Air Naningan, Pulau Panggung. Instead of being implemented by a private company, the military, or a government agency as has been done in the past, reforestation funds have been given to 15 community groups who are responsible for planting trees in their coffee gardens (Lampung Post 13/08/2004). The eviction of forest squatters has continued but the ways it is being conducted are different. In August 2004 over 2000 farmers living inside Gunung Betung Provincial Forest Park (Taman Hutan Raya) in South Lampung were asked to dismantle their huts and move elsewhere (Lampungonline 24/08/2004). Unlike in the past, this time there was no violence, no arson, and no crop demolition. More importantly, the farmers were officially forbidden but discreetly allowed to continue farming coffee and cocoa inside the park.

The two national parks in the province (Way Kambas, in East Lampung, and Bukit Barisan Selatan, in West Lampung and Tanggamus), both directly under the authority of central government (i.e., the Directorate General of Nature Conservation), have similar problems: illegal hunting and poaching, elephant attacks on surrounding villages, and the expansion of smallholders’ fields. Coordination between the park authority and local government is
minimal, and coordination with villagers is even more limited. Given the problems with the park authorities' attitude in involving the surrounding villagers in protecting the remaining forests, the wildlife in these two parks may soon disappear and be replaced by smallholder fields.

The changes in the management of protection forests (and the absence of change in production and conservation forests) are one of the effects brought about by post-Suharto decentralization in resources management. While the management of protection forests has been devolved to regional governments, the management of production and conservation forests has not. State, people, and natural resource interactions will continue to be an issue in the future. The dynamic of this interaction is a vital topic for future research on the development agenda for Lampung.
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